

IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS AND BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE
CASE OF TURKEY ORIGIN IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN GERMANY

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation aims to explore different comprehensions of immigrants' political participation and/or integration adopted by two distinct groups of organizations founded by Turkey origin immigrants in Germany, namely religious immigrant organizations and secular immigrant organizations. To that end, the unique political practices of migrant organizations are comparatively analyzed with reference to their activities, objectives, decision making processes, organizational structures, and conceptions on political participation, democracy and integration. The data were collected through thirty six in-depth interviews with the executive or active board members of nine different migrant associations. The interviews were conducted in Cologne and Bielefeld within the years 2012-2013. The findings of the interviews reveal that the two groups of immigrant associations could be associated with two different social capitals, namely bonding social capital and bridging social capital. The dissertation also shows that in the relevant literature, there is little focus on the organizations which disseminate and carry bridging social capital. Thus, existing theoretical approaches on the immigrants' political participation in Europe is critically evaluated. Based on the findings, this dissertation argues that the mentioned bilateral differentiation among immigrant groups has some negative effects on the well-being of the immigrant community and on the social harmony in Germany.

Key words: Immigrant political participation, Immigrant associations, Islamization, democracy, integration, bridging and bonding social capital.

Öz

GÖÇMEN ÖRGÜTLENMELERİ VE SİYASİ KATILIMIN SINIRLARI: ALMANYA'DA TÜRKİYE KÖKENLİ GÖÇMEN DERNEKLERİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu doktora tezi Almanya'da Türkiye kökenli göçmenler tarafından kurulmuş iki farklı grup göçmen örgütlenmesinin iki farklı göçmen siyasal katılım kavrayışını irdelemek amacını taşımaktadır. Bu iki farklı örgütlenme, dini göçmen dernekleri ve seküler göçmen dernekleridir. Bu tez iki farklı grup göçmen derneğini, etkinlikleri, amaçları; karar alma süreçleri ve örgütsel yapıları; siyasal katılım, demokrasi ve entegrasyon anlayışları olmak üzere üç ana başlık altında karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz etmektedir. Bu çalışma için veriler dokuz farklı göçmen derneğinin yöneticisi ya da aktif yönetim kurulu üyeleri ile toplamda kırk dört tane derinlemesine mülakat yoluyla toplanmıştır. Görüşmelerin bir kısmı Köln, bir kısmı ise Bielefeld şehirlerinde olmak üzere 2012- 2013 yıllarında tamamlanmıştır. Görüşmelerin bulguları, iki farklı toplumsal sermayeyle ilişkilendirilebilecek iki göçmen dernek grubunun var olduğunu ortaya koymuştur; bunlar köprü kuran sosyal sermaye ve birleştirici sosyal sermayedir. Tez aynı zamanda ilgili yazında köprü kuran sosyal sermayeyi taşıyan ve yaygınlaştıran organizasyonlara pek az odaklanıldığını göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, göçmenlerin Avrupa'daki siyasi katılımı ile ilgili mevcut teorik yaklaşımlar eleştirel olarak incelenmiştir. Bulgulara dayanarak, bu tez göçmen gruplar arasında belirtilen ikili farklılığın, göçmen topluluğun refahı ve Almanya'daki sosyal uyumun üzerinde bazı olumsuz etkileri olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar sözcükler: Göçmen siyasal katılımı, göçmen dernekleri, İslamileşme, demokrasi, uyum, köprü kuran ve birleştirici sosyal sermaye.

To my beloved family...

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Political participation and democracy are closely related concepts in that most theories of democracy associate the concept of political participation with democracy (Dahl 1959, Pateman 1970, Young 2000, Norris 2002). As inspired by the thoughts of Kant, Rousseau and Mills respectively, the common argument in these theories is that political participation is an asset for an effective and qualified democracy. However, according to recent studies (Zittel, T. Fuchs, D. ed.2007), it is not true to assume that high level of political participation literally leads to a qualified democracy since empirical studies indicate that the level of political participation is likely to be lower when the opportunities are greater.

Similar studies also analyze two different ways of political participation, namely electoral and non-electoral. It should be accepted that although seems unfashionable, electoral participation still has significant impacts on national political systems. However, with the social movements starting from the 60s on, alternative ways of political participation such as *ad hoc* demonstrations or street protests became more visible and came to the agenda. Later, the immigration wave from the East to the West from the Cold-War era on further contributed to the prevalence of non-electoral political participation. Particularly, movements raised by immigrants' presence in Western countries required a redefinition and reaffirmation of national democracies.

The flow of immigrants to Western countries continues today. In fact, the recent years have witnessed perhaps the biggest immigrant crisis in Europe due to the effects of the Syrian War. According to the statistics of European commission, the number of

immigrants Germany had received by 2014 was nearly 884,900¹ and this number was the highest among the other European countries. Similarly, only in the year 2015, there were 1,321,560 asylum claims in overall Europe. Germany again was the country receiving the highest number of asylum applications in the same year.²

Clearly, this prevalent presence of immigrants in the Western countries raises the issue of their political participation in the host countries. It is possible to argue that political participation of migrants could contribute to the democratization of Western nation-states. They can be seen as developmental agents as they have the potential to bring the rights of different ethnic, religious and excluded groups to the nation-states' agenda. They could also contribute to their homelands' democracy indirectly through arousing public consciousness about the rights of ethnic minorities and excluded groups. On the other hand, the presence of migrants challenges the boundaries of national democracies thereby causing the nation states to reassert their sovereignties through immigration and citizenship policies (Benhabib 2004).

In that respect, the most indispensable agent for immigrants is the immigrant associations. They are significant actors in both integration and identity formation of immigrants. They can create links between home and host countries of migrants. They also help understand the diversity within immigrant communities (Akçapar 2009).

Immigrant associations are different from the other types of voluntary associations in several manners. First, they can be alternative agents to the state in terms of migrant's adaptation to a new society. Second, they can be a unified voice of particular ethnic community thereby expressing a collective identity. Third, they can serve as contact points of ethnic communities with different countries of origin (Odmalm 2009).

¹http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Main_Page

²<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>

Some other roles and functions of these organizations could also include influencing immigrant public opinion, bargaining on political issues as political actors, and acting as buffer institutions –thereby holding an important status in the eyes of the host countries’ governments (Adigüzel, 2009: 471-474). When the political attachments of migrant associations are concerned, they build contacts and develop aims as well as strategies toward both host countries and the countries of origin. That is, they have a transnational character (Faist and Amelina 2008). They can also function as mobilizing and representative agents.³ In brief, migrant associations can be considered as political actors voicing the immigrants’ concerns in the political sphere of the host country.

1.1 Introducing the Subject and Research Questions

According to the literature, political participation of immigrants is a significant issue basically for two reasons. First, as migrants live in host countries for long years, there is a growing concern about their representation problem in liberal democratic states (Cyrus 2005, Miera 2009). Second, large scale immigration challenges the homogeneity claims of national democracies and boundaries of nation-states in social, cultural as well as political manners (Klusmeyer 2001, Benhabib 2004, Davy 2005,). Problems of representation and integration are connected to immigrants’ functions as agents of civil society. (Lacey 2009) At the same time, however, their basic claims of being a part of the political sphere in a universal manner arouse political debate about their legal status, basically around the conception of citizenship. Thus, not only the status of non-citizens become much weaker, but also the requirements of entering and staying in one country as well as the process of naturalization are strictly controlled through immigration /integration policies (Davy 2005).

³ See as examples

-G. Yurdakul State, Political Parties and Immigrant Elites: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Berlin
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Volume 32, Issue 3, 2006

- L.Michon and F.Vermeulen Organizing for Access? The political Mobilization of Turks in Amsterdam
Turkish Studies Volume, 10 No 2, 2009

The main focus of this study is to explore the relationship between the effects of the German integration/immigration policies and the political participation patterns of Turkey origin immigrant associations founded in Germany. To that end, the research questions are as follows: What are the effects of the German integration/immigration policies on the patterns of Turkey origin immigrant associations' political participation patterns in Germany? In a similar vein, how do the immigrant associations respond actively to the policies of immigration in Germany? In support of these two broad questions, a number of sub-questions have also been identified: 1. What are the different political participation patterns of Turkey origin immigrant associations in Germany? 2. How different are their ways to achieve their claims and objectives? 3. How do they interact with different associations and the state authorities? 4. Which concepts and ways of participation do they mostly use in expressing their ways of political participation? 5. What are the impacts of these different patterns upon the integration process of immigrants and social harmony in Germany?

1.2. Approaches to the Subject

Looking into the literature on political participation of immigrants, one can identify at least three groups of studies from three different approaches. I prefer to classify them as follows: *the institutional and political opportunity structures perspective; social capital perspective and transnational perspective.*

The first approach, *the institutional and political opportunity structures perspective*, handles the issue from the perspective of the structural conditions, or the institutional structure of the host country. This group includes the studies on integration policies, or incorporation models of different countries, and citizenship models. The studies based on the theory of political opportunity structures are also included in this group (Soysal 1994, Koopmans 2004, Earnst 2005, Boswell 2007, Odman 2009, Özcürümez 2009). In explaining the patterns of political participation of immigrants, these studies mainly make use of the citizenship models of different Western European countries. However,

with that, they overlook an important point: understanding the political actions of immigrants do not only depend on the state regimes and policies. It is a dynamic process. Immigrant groups receive certain policies, but shape a pattern of participation in accordance with their own objectives, which may be different from the objectives of other immigrant associations. There are also different actors who might be influential at different levels. Therefore, the interaction between exclusionary and inclusionary processes should also be understood.

The second approach, *the social capital perspective*, includes the comparative studies on different immigrant groups, their origins, their ethnic or religious characteristics, and their various kinds of participatory patterns pertaining to these characteristics (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001, Küçükcan 2002, Barreto and Munoz 2003, Tillie 2004, Jacobs et al. 2006, Akçapar 2009). However, more importantly, this group of analysis focuses on the types of social capital, which are usually associated with the pattern of political participation and organizational structure of a particular group. The two main types of social capitals are *bonding capital* and *bridging capital*. The former refers to the social relations or networks in a homogeneous culture or society. The latter, on the other hand, refers to the social relations or networks among culturally or socially heterogeneous social groups. *Bonding capital* is usually affiliated with ethnic groups, while *bridging capital* is affiliated with the networks across diverse cleavages. *Bonding capital* is defined as exclusive while *bridging capital* is inclusive (Putnam, 2000). To Morales and Giugni (2011), *bonding social capital* is usually conducive to social and political cohesion, while *bridging social capital* is significant for democratic engagement.

However, the problem with the studies adopting *the social capital perspective* is that they are primarily interested in ethnic and Islamic organizations, and their politicization processes. It is true that ethnic and Islamic communities are the most visible and worked upon. Nevertheless, with their overemphasis on ethnic and Islamic

communities, these studies undermine the importance of other immigrant groups. They overemphasize ethnic or bonding social capital and tend to build a positive correlation between the successes of immigrant organizations in political participation and the production of ethnic or bonding social capital (Fennema and Tillie 1999, Tillie 2004, Tillie and Slijper 2007, Akçapar 2009).

In fact, since there is ample research on Islamic migrant groups, Islamic political participation and associations could be considered as a sub focus of study within *the social capital perspective*. For the same reason, I will be analyzing these in a separate section further in my study. In the section titled “Question of Islam and Islamic political participation”, I will be focusing on the problem of handling political participation from only one perspective, or of seeing Islam as the most important in immigrant integration studies (Küçükcan, 2000; Pauly, 2004; Schifauer, 2006; Yükleven and Yurdakul, 2009).

The third and the last approach, *transnational perspective*, approaches the issue of political participation from a more sociological perspective and seek to explore sub politics and subcultural characteristics of participation. This perspective does not give any priority to political participation, but rather it covers all kinds of networks, relationships and participation in various transnational spaces (Faist, T. 2013, Fraser N. 2014). A paralel view that could be also be considered within *transnational perspective* focuses on the homeland politics of immigrant groups as a question of incorporation (Ögelman 2003, Ostegard-Nielsen 2003, Portes et al. 2007). In this dissertation, as I study an area which intersects Germany and Turkey, I acknowledge that transnational studies are also of value for my study. However, the scope of this study will still be limited to the first two approaches, *theinstitutional and political opportunity structures perspective* and *social capital perspective*, since the prior focus of these is the political participation of different immigrant groups. *Transnational studies*, on the other hand, neglect the dimension of political participation, which is one of the primary issues that this study deals with.

For this study, one valuable assumption is that immigrants are not only the receivers of policies, but they also give response to and have an influence on politics. In that respect, above mentioned theories are limited since they primarily focus on the groups that are more visible and “more successful” in the eyes of the public and the state. Yet, there are other groups, too, which adopt different patterns of political participation. These groups distrust and question the state policies and follow an alternative path of participation. Describing these groups as just excluded, the two theories above not only underestimate them but also neglect the consequences of this exclusion with respect to the well-being of whole immigrant community and democratic political civil sphere.

1.3 Major Finding and Data Collection Method

Having taken into account all the issues mentioned above, the major concern of this dissertation is **to scrutinize the impacts of the selectively inclusive/exclusive immigration/integration policies of German state upon the patterns of political participation adopted by the immigrant associations with Turkey origin.** The primary argument of the study is that there are two major patterns or understandings of political participation among the immigrant groups with Turkey origin: *participation as an Islamic community*, and *participation as individuals*. Different immigrant groups have different ways of political participation peculiar to themselves. Those peculiar ways are based on the type of social capital that they produce or represent. Accordingly, there are mainly two groups of immigrants that could be associated with *bonding social capital* and *bridging social capital*. This bilateral differentiation in the immigrant civil political sphere has certain negative affects not only upon the general well-being of the whole immigrant community, but also upon the social harmony of the entire society living in the host country.

Based on thirty-six in-depth interviews with active or board members of nine different Turkey origin immigrant organizations, the major finding of this dissertation is that

there are two distinct groups of associations founded by immigrants with Turkey origin: *religious organizations* and *secular organizations*. Those organizations differ in their organizational structures, integration paths, activities, decision making processes, and in their conceptions of democracy, political participation, and citizenship. There is also one group in-between including the Alevi and Kurdish associations.

Having considered the rising attention on Islam as well as the growing literature on Islamization of migration and Islamic organizations in Europe, so far neglected social democratic, women and left wing workers associations -*secular organizations*- will also be the focus of this study. Comparing claim-makings, activities, internal functioning, and political participation perceptions of the two different camps of associations will not only reveal their different places in the “multicultural” political space of the Western democracies, but it will also shed light on the diverse ways of social capital production. Uncovering the differences of immigrant associations in this manner will provide an opportunity to see the distinct capacities of immigrant associations in becoming political members in different ways as well as the boundaries of German state in being responsive to their claims.

In order to assess my argument, as a methodological tool, I have used a three parted in-depth interview frame and conducted it with the members and board members of nine different Turkey origin immigrant associations in Germany. The interview questions have been inferred from the following major questions: 1. What are the activities and fields of participation of the studied immigrant association? 2. How do immigrant associations get visible in the public sphere? 3. How do they negotiate their problems with the state authorities or other different civil organizations? 4. What are the local, regional or federal attachments? 5. What ways of participations are more important to be effective in the political sphere? 6. What paths do they follow to achieve their targets? 7. What are their opinions of the immigrant policies of the government? 8. How do they describe political participation? 9. What is their inner functioning like? 10.

How do they make the division of labor within the organizations? 11. How do they describe democracy and political participation?

In brief, this study will present a critical assessment of Turkey origin immigrants' political participation patterns in Germany and analyze the different roles of the immigrant associations as democratic actors.

1.4. Design of the Study

Following Chapter 1, the introduction, I will clarify my methodological standpoint and the methods of data analysis in Chapter 2. This chapter will also contain the structure of the questionnaires, fieldwork impressions, self-reflexivity and positionality of the researcher as an insider and outsider.

In Chapter 3, an historical overview of Germany's immigration policy, recent legal regulations and the structural constraints on immigrants will be depicted. In this chapter, there will also be a separate section on integration councils as local channels of political participation.

Chapter 4 manifests the theoretical framework where I will expose a critical literature review which has been formed to cover the different approaches toward immigrants' political participation. In the first section of this chapter, I will elaborate on the institutional approaches, which indicate the role of the state policies, the citizenship policies and the political opportunity structures in shaping the political participation patterns. By doing this, I intend to show the ways in which certain groups become more legitimate and visible thanks to some structural opportunities from national to local or regional levels as well as the channels in mass media. Considering the institutional preferences of Germany, this section will also be an analytical response to the public visibility of Islam in Germany. In the second section, approaches dealing with the characteristics of immigrant groups will be analyzed. The comparisons of different immigrant groups, their origins, characteristics, and participatory patterns across

different countries will be elaborated on. Most importantly, analysis associated with the types of social capital will be critically assessed. In the same section, Islamic political participation and the question of Islam will also be a focus of my analysis.

In Chapter 5, after a detailed description of each, immigrant organizations will be examined with respect to the major questions and expectations of the study comparatively in two different groups: *the religious* and *the secular* immigrant associations. The first group will cover Islamic organizations: Islamic Community National View (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs - IGMG), Turkish Islamic Union of Religion (Die Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V.- DİTİB, Islamic Culture Center (Verband der Islamische Kulturzentren e.V.– VIKZ), European Turkish-Islamic Union (Türkisch-Islamischen Kulturvereine e.V. – ATİB), Federation of European Alevis Union (Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland – AABF). In the second group, workers, human rights and women organizations will be analyzed: Federation of Democratic Workers (Föderation der Demokratischer Arbeitervereine - DİDF), Migrant Women Union (Bundesverband der Migrantinnen in Deutschland e.V.), Turkish Germany Human Rights Organization (Menschenrechtsverein Türkei/Deutschland - TÜDAY), Federation of Kurdish Associations Germany (*Föderation Kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland*-YEKKOM-NAVDEM). Comparing and contrasting the two groups, I will both discuss the potential results of the presense of these two separate political spheres on part of the immigrants and put forward another factor which has not been dealt so far: *the bridging social capital*, which symbolizes the network among heterogeneous social groups or different immigrant or non-immigrant groups.

In Chapter 6, revisiting the theoretical discussions, the major findings of the study will be enumerated and the final evaluation will be made with concluding remarks.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

2.1. Methodology and Methods of Data Analysis

This study is predominantly a qualitative research. Qualitative methodology requires “talking to people, observing phenomena and processes, learning from multiple sources of data and participating in social situations” (Iosifides, 2011: 231). During the research, observing general social environment, participating in the activities, meetings and demonstrations of the organizations, talking to people randomly, following newspapers and TV broadcasts, collecting related documents, publications, reports, and flyers from the organizations and city councils, making friends, and most importantly living in the field area for one year have fully contributed to my perception and enabled me to handle this study. I lived in Bielefeld, a medium size city located in North Rhine Westphalia in Germany for one and a half years. . Most of the interviews were conducted there. However, I also travelled to Cologne, which is the biggest city of NRW, several times to conduct some of my interviews. In total, thirty six in-depth interviews, ten of which in Cologne and the rest in Bielefeld, were conducted with the active and board members of the immigrant associations. The selection and use of a limited number of participants have enabled me to “focus on depth rather than on breadth...emphasis on detail, multidimensionality and context” (Iosifides, 2011: 175). Admittedly, trying to understand such a complicated issue, *political participation of immigrants*, was not possible only through an analysis of the interviews. Hence, along with the general readings on migration, a wide range of literature on immigrants’ political participation have been reviewed in the context of the study.

In the research, all the levels of the social reality have been considered: *micro*, *meso* and *macro*. As Coleman (1990) states, as a level of analysis, *micro* refers to small group, face to face interactions of individuals, *while macro* refers to large scale social processes. Focusing on the migrant organizations has helped me to connect these two levels as migrants' organizations could be considered as the mediators between the two. As I conducted my interviews with individual members of the organizations and inquired about their own visions and thoughts, subjective and intersubjective relations were at focus. However, I did not only try to see the general picture of the political participation of the group of immigrants but also the discourses and the social capital developed at organizational level. The immigrants' different visions, objectives, motivations, repertoires, discourses, and different power relations they are subjected to –both as an individual and as an organization- were all valuable subjects of inquiry for the aim of the study- *revealing and questioning the power differentials and the different roles of immigrant organizations from Turkey with respect to democratic civic immigrant political sphere.*

As a specific methodological standpoint, *critical realist perspective* has primarily been adopted among other methodologies for the study. In general, critical social research “goes beyond surface illusions to uncover the real structures in the material world in order to help people change conditions and build a better world for themselves” (Neuman, 2000: 67). There are three levels of social reality: “empirical (sensory experience), actual (action in events) and real (causal powers separate but not always evident in empirical and actual) manifestations”. According to critical realist methodology, “interviews may not reveal real causes of action and present a partial picture...” On the other hand, we need individual experience in order to comprehend actual and empirical representations of action. (Smith and Elger, 2012: 4). As Bhaskar (1989) suggests, “society does not exist independent of human activity, but it is not the product of it” (quoted in Smith and Elgar, 2012: 5). Critical research is also concerned

with social justice. Clearly, the endeavor of understanding and uncovering the social divisions and power differential is a prospect of social justice (Griffiths, 2009).

At this point, before going into further details of *critical realist methodology*, it would be of use to explain several inadequacies of *positivist* and *interpretivist approaches* first.

Positivist perception of social reality is calculative through empirical findings. Those empirical findings are reached via human reason which is categorically logical. Thus, one can trust what one observes because one's reason can successfully constitute the relationship between facts. Similarly, the understanding of causality is based on the relationship between facts. If one observation is successive for all instances, then a generalization can be made. Scientific laws are reached by this way; universal laws are generated from these scientific laws (Neuman, 2000: 57-60; Iosifides, 2011: 91-95). There are many migration-related studies written in this understanding. In fact, the governmental reports and statistical works making generalizations about the level of political participation of immigrants could be considered within this understanding. What is missing in this understanding, however, is that it ignores the social reality which is not observable by senses or measurable by statistics. That is, the elements of social reality such as construction of meaning, structural factors, intentions, perceptions and attitudes of people are overlooked in positivist approaches. However, such subjective knowledge is also significant particularly for social sciences because society and individuals are not constant and cannot always be explained by unchangeable laws derived from observable events. The interpretivist critique to the positivist research makes the point in this sense.

Interpretivism can be traced to Weber and his concept of *Verstehen* (emphatic understanding). It is a wide methodology that the majority of qualitative social sciences do make use of. It has been used interchangeably with hermeneutics, which is a theory of meaning asserting that "people carry their subjective experience to a text" (Neuman,

2000: 61). Furthermore, it considers the “subjective and intersubjective meanings through which social actors perceive it and act accordingly” (Iosifides, 2011: 97). It seeks socially meaningful action which is constructed through people’s own definitions. Contextual analysis, interpretative textual analysis, field researches, ethno methodological research are all derived from interpretative outlook. In those senses, critical understanding criticizes interpretative approach in several ways. First, interpretivism “exaggerates the role of subjective or social meanings...and confines social reality to the understanding of meanings” (ibid). Second, interpretivism has problems related to its understanding of causality. This is because interpretivism has the tendency to make no distinction between what people say and what they in reality are. That is, epistemology precedes ontology in interpretivist analysis. Furthermore, interpretivists ignore the fact that human reasons can be causes. The way people act could be different than what they say. Therefore, we cannot totally know about people through considering what they tell us. According to realist notion of causality, “powers, liabilities, potentialities and tendencies characterizing social agents, entities and emergent social/cultural properties” (ibid: 97- 98) are all considered in the analysis. That means, while analyzing social phenomena, critical realist approach reckons with the origins of beliefs and meanings as well as the broader societal and cultural conditions that conduces the subjects to certain conceptualizations. Third, interpretivists avoid the idea that objective research is possible. In line with this, they do not even aim at reaching an objective criterion for social research. Moreover, they have commons with positivist understanding in their understanding of causality (conjunction between distinct events and phenomena) and their methodological individualism as a way of interpreting human behavior. In brief, for interpretivism, individual intentions and motives are much more significant than structural and contextual conditions. Yet, according to realists, both should be considered, without any privilege to agent or structure (ibid: 99-100).

Notwithstanding above criticisms, with reference to Sayer (1992), Losifides also argues “with certain presuppositions, interpretative understanding is fully incorporated into realist social theorizing and research practice since systems of constitutive meanings, their origins and their impacts are real”. Similarly, he agrees “agents’ contextual motives, intentions, interpretations and practices are indispensable parts of any research endeavor” (ibid: 101). Thus, it should be noted that realist critical research does not totally exclude interpretative approach; instead, some of its premises are compatible with critical research. Furthermore, as Willis (2007: 104) points out, critical version of interpretivism, among philosophical and objective ones, promises to “promote human emancipation through investigating the conditions resulting in ideological distortions and false consciousness” (ibid: 96).

Qualitative research in general is concerned with what, how and why questions, which refer to describing, understanding and explaining respectively. It is true that causal and explanatory research purposes are given priority in critical realist research; at the same time however, what and how questions are also incorporated into research for wider explanatory and causal analysis (ibid: 168). Definitely, realist approach goes beyond people’s interview report, and seek for additional sources of information. Taking into full account of interpretations, meanings and perspectives of social agents; linking discursive practices with social and relational realities; focusing on social relations, social agents’ social location, social positions, and embeddedness within various networks of practices; being critical by considering relations of power asymmetries, exploitation and domination; not confining research to what and how questions, and engaging in micro-meso-macro analyses are all important principles of realist critical qualitative research (ibid: 145-146).

All in all, “critical realism is not a set of analytical methodological procedures or specific methods and techniques for the collection of analysis of empirical data, but rather a philosophy of social sciences concerned mainly with ontological and epistemological

questions” (ibid: 127). It can be described as “explanatory, critical, emancipatory and socio-politically relevant” (ibid: 237) social research.

When migration studies are concerned, there are three theories in the existing migration literature. Firstly, micro level studies which put individuals at focus; for instance, widely known push-pull theories see the issue in the framework of neo-classical economics. The major reason for migration, according to these theories, is “utility maximization” (i.e. Ernst Ravenstein, 1880, *Theory of Human Migration*; Bauer and Zimmerman, 1998, *Causes of International Migration*; Castles and Miller, 2003, *The Age of Migration*).

Secondly, there is structuralist or historical structuralist theories, mainly based on Marxist and neo-Marxist traditions. In these theories, labor exploitation, capital accumulation, and class struggle are at focus (i.e. Immanuel Wallerstein, 1974, *The Modern World System*; Saskia Sassen, 1988, *The Mobility and Labor and Capital*; Hein de Haas, *Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective*). The major reason for migration flows and any movements of migration are explained through structural, institutional or historical reasons. This perspective has the danger of conflation of the agency into structure.

Thirdly, there are transnational and social capital theories. The former deals with the global societal transformations and changing meaning of nation-state. Although it seems to overcome the shortcomings of individual and structuralist theories and the dichotomy of structure and agent, this perspective gives a considerable weight to the role of agency and transnational social interaction among social communities. The latter, social capital theory, is also much often used in migration studies. It can be defined “as the form and the content of social relationships and networks in which individuals participate” (Iosifides, 2011: 25). Bourdieu and Putnam are two of the social capital theorists. Bourdieu defines social capital as a social relation or a resource which may lead to a social antagonism as it is not equally distributed in society. His

conception is important because it is the only one emphasizing the social injustice and inequality through distribution of social capital. The significance of Putnam, however, is for a different reason. He defines three different social capitals: *bonding*, *bridging* and *linking*. Bonding social capital could be described as social relations or networks in a homogeneous culture or society (i.e. social networks along ethnic lines); bridging social capital, on the other hand, refers to social relations or networks among culturally or socially heterogeneous social groups (network between different immigrant groups or between immigrants and non-immigrants). Linking social capital could be characterized as hierarchical network such as that between immigrants and governmental offices. The realist critique to social capital approaches could be sought in the neglect of the issues of power and in its over-intersubjectivity. Therefore, this approach should be enhanced by methodological stances aiming at investigating deeper mechanisms and processes in specific socio-cultural contexts (Iosifides, 2011: 18-27).

As a hybrid methodological stand in migration studies, Collinson (2009) suggests that causal and in-depth explanations of migration phenomena and process should be contextually specific, explanatory as well as descriptive, dynamic, historically grounded, actor oriented, concerned with agency as well as the structure, and linking between micro, meso and macro levels. She “aims at linking social processes related to migration occurring at a local level with broader socio-political and economic contexts”. Portes (2008) also proposes that migration research needs to distinguish surface and deep invisible factors, either structural or cultural. Moreover, reality should neither be reduced to surface sense data nor be exhausted in interpretations and discourses (ibid: 29 -30).

2.2. Structure of the interviews

Two different interviews have been prepared for this research. One was for the migrant associations and the other for immigrant city council members. All the questions can be seen in the Appendix A. Here, I would like to explain the parts of the two different

interviews. For the first interview, in the first part, demographic information about the participant and the historical and objective information on the association are inquired about. In the second section, members' profile and individual networks, and the inner functioning of the association with respect to the active participation of members are investigated through several questions. In the third part, the range of activities and projects of the association are inquired about together with the networks of the organizations in order to explore the bonding and bridging social capitals. In the same part, critical stand of the organization is assessed through questions regarding the relations with the state and local authorities, and the attitudes toward integration and other state policies concerning immigrants. As for the fourth part of the first interview, members' conception of political participation and democracy are inquired about. Their perceptions of democracy, after and before, and their ideas on the best way of political participation for immigrants are investigated. In the same part, the most important problem they encounter in pursuing their aims and their thoughts about the impact of naturalization on political participation are questioned. In the fifth and the last part, their emotional bindings with the association are investigated in order to evaluate the influence of the organization on the members' life, perception of life and perceptions of political participation. This last set of questions also aim to reveal members' perception of the organization as a democratic political actor.

In the second interview, I have fewer questions. After demographic information of the participants, the structure of the immigrant city council is inquired about through questions such as how the decision-making process in the council is. Other than these information-based questions, questions on citizenship, effectiveness, networks and critical stand toward the state policies are similarly asked. Questions as to the perception of democracy and political participation are also incorporated into the interview in a similar way to the first interview.

All in all, forty-seven questions for the associations and twenty six questions for the immigrant city councils are asked. For most of the interviews, the sequence of the question sets is as follows:

- 1) Demographic information and the description of the organization
- 2) Members' profile, decision-making processes and participation of members
- 3) Fields of participation, influence and relationship at local, national and transnational levels
- 4) Members' perception of political participation and democracy
- 5) Roles and functions of the organization in members' life

2.3. Demographic qualifications of the respondents

My respondents were from various immigrant associations, ages, occupations and education levels. Twenty-two were male, and fourteen were female. Twenty-four were German citizens, and twelve were Turkish citizens. Nineteen were university graduate and seventeen had lower education levels such as high school or vocational schools. Only four respondents were born in Germany. The rest were Turkey-born. All the interviews were conducted in Turkish. Some respondents did not want recorder during interviews, either for security reasons or not feeling competent in Turkish. Below, a general profile of the interviewees could be seen in Table 1.

Table 1 Profile of the Interviewees

Name of Association/ Organization	Age	Gender	Education	Educati on in Turkey / Germa ny	Profession	Monthly Income	Place of Birth	Citizenship
IGMG Cologne Head Office	44	M	Bachelor's Degree	G	Mechanica l Engineer	4.000 €	Germ any	TR
IGMG	55	M	Primary Education	T	Constructi on Operator	2.000 €	Bayb urt	Germ an
ATF (Turkish Federation Of Germany)	40	M	Real Schule (High School Diploma)	A	Truck driver	2.000 €	Niğde	Germ an
DITIB	55	M	8 th Grade	T	Worker	1.800 €	Güm üşha ne	TR
DITIB Cologne	50	M	Doctoral Degree	A	Islamic Theologist	2.500 €	Kony a	TR/G erma ny
ATIB	44	M	Hauptschul e	A	Worker	2.000 €	Antal ya	Germ an
ATIB Cologne	44	M	Bachelor's Degree	T	Freelance	-	Turke y	TR
ATIB Cologne	56	M	Bachelor's Degree	A	Mining Engineer	-	Turke y	Germ an
Kurdistan Zentrum	50	M	Bachelor's Degree	A	Interprete r / Social Pedagogist	2.500 €	Diyar bakır	Germ an
Kurdistan Zentrum	25	F	Vocational High School Education	A	Student- Office Managem ent	400 €	Malat ya	Germ an
Kurdistan Zentrum	34	F	Bachelor's Degree	A	Student- Faculty of Law	900 €	Şanlı urfa	Germ an
Immigrant Women Union	38	F	Bachelor's Degree	A	Sociologist /Media Expert	900 €	Bielef eld	Germ an

Immigrant Women Union Cologne	43	F	Bachelor's Degree	T	Journalist	-	Ankara	TR
Immigrant Women Union	42	F	Higher Vocational Education	A	Social Pedagogist	600 €	Susurluk	German
Union of Muslim Women	35	F	Bachelor's Degree	T	Islamic Theologist	-	Stuttgart	TR
Youth Center/ Culture and Solidarity	47	M	Primary Education	T	Journalist	1.400 €	Erzurum	German
DIDF Cologne	58	F	Bachelor's Degree	T	Teacher	1.000 €	Denizli	TR
DIDF	39	M	High School Diploma	T	Journalist	1.500 €	Turkey	German
DIDF	56	M	High School Diploma	T	Hairdresser	2.500 €	Turkey	German
Integration Council	52	M	Bachelor's Degree	A	Municipal Social Services	3.500 €	Turkey	German
Ataturkist Thought Association	53	M	Bachelor's Degree	A	Civil Servant/ Social Pedagogist	870 €	Turkey	TR
IBZ	38	F	Bachelor's Degree	T	Journalist	1.000 €	Turkey	TR
IBZ	55	M	Higher Vocational Education	T	Education alist/ Freelance	1.200 €	Turkey	German
VIKZ Cologne	45	M	Master's Degree	A	Public Relations Expert	-	Sivas	German
VIKZ	42	M	Higher Vocational Education	A	Accountant	1.600 €	Afyon	German
Integration Council	38	F	Bachelor's Degree	A	Pedagogist / Social Practitioner	1.500 €	Bielefeld	TR
Integration Council	32	M	Higher Vocational Education	A	Education al Consultant	2.000 €	Sivas	German
Integration Council	37	M	Bachelor's Degree	A	Project Coordinator	-	Bayburt	German

AABF	42	M	Bachelor's Degree	A	Mosaics Company/ Project Manager	3.500 €	Tunceli	German
AABF	40	M	Vocational High School Education	A	Job Safety Technician	3.700 €	Ordu	German
ÖDP Europe	59	M	High School Diploma	T	Freelance	2.000 €	Şanlıurfa	TR
ÖDP Europe	47	F	High School Diploma	T	Nursery Teacher	1.400 €	Erzurum	TR
TÜDAY	32	M	High School Diploma	T	Unemployed	-	Tunceli	German
TÜDAY	32	F	Bachelor's Degree	A	Political Scientist	1.000 €	Berlin	German
TÜDAY	62	M	Bachelor's Degree	T	Teacher	-	Bolu	German
IGMG Cologne Head Office	44	M	Bachelor's Degree	G	Mechanical Engineer	4.000 €	Germany	TR

2.4. Access to the field, nature of the field and fieldwork experience

My access to the field was a part of my research stay in Bielefeld University Graduate School in History and Sociology between March 2012-2013. Apart from my field experience, I participated in the seminars and international colloquiums of the research group of migration headed by Prof. Thomas Faist.

During the first half of my stay, I tried to get used to the university and the studies of other students in the research group. I learnt a lot about various migration studies, especially transnational theories of migration during this process. Meanwhile, I was also thinking about my research and trying to differentiate it from other studies around me, and trying to decide what to do exactly in the field. After presenting my research proposal in the class, I received a lot of criticism, which made me reconsider my research path. I focused on reading and sought to gain in-depth knowledge into the migration literature, particularly political participation of immigrants. At the same time,

I reached people from associations through contact persons around me. I participated in the events of the associations and tried to get to know the people there. I made observations and talked with people from the associations both for socializing and collecting preliminary information about my research.

In the second half, as I felt ready to go into the field, I started to conduct my interviews in Bielefeld. First, I selected the associations to which I had easier access. International freedom house (IBZ) was one of those since it is a cultural institution, half school and open to everyone. Later, a contact of mine from the university helped me to access the Kurdish Association in Bielefeld. Then, like a snowball other interviews came one after another. Because of my left wing, socialist and democratic individual view, migrant workers' associations, Kurdish associations, Alevi and women associations were easier to access. In fact, many of the respondents became friends of mine at the same time.

However, when I decided to compare religious immigrant associations and the others, it grew slightly harder to reach people from the religious immigrant organizations. However, having grown up in a Sunni family, and being a cultural Sunni, it did not turn out to be so difficult to overcome that difficulty, and I managed to identify my relevant respondents and conduct my interviews.

At the beginning, I was planning to confine my research only to Bielefeld. However, in the course of time, I found out that head offices of religious organizations were particularly in Cologne. Therefore, I chose to expand my research to include the organizations in Cologne and stayed there for a while. My interviews with religious organizations were much more formal. Usually, a spokesman welcomed me and I could not make more than one interview. They stated that I would hear similar views from everyone there.

In general, it was a fruitful experience for me; I did not encounter any considerable difficulties in conducting my interviews. I think the role of being a "foreigner" just like my respondents had a positive role in this situation. When I said I was from Turkey, I

usually observed exited and willing people along with their genuine hospitality. During my one year stay, I sometimes missed my homeland very much and it was an advantage for me to better understand the feelings of my respondents. I experienced many difficulties just because of being a foreigner and this was also a useful experience to be able to empathize with the immigrants. Most of the people from religious organizations thought that I was sent from Turkey by AKP (Justice and Development Party) to collect information about them. They were so nervous about this, so I tried to tell them about myself and my research. One other point that caught my attention was their unrest about my research project since they were afraid of being inspected by the German state. However, when they learnt that I would present the dissertation in Turkey, they felt relaxed and agreed to participate in the research.

It was an invaluable experience for me to conduct interviews with Turkey origin immigrants from various political outlooks and from various social statuses in Germany. Indeed, I sometimes had the feeling that a compact version of all political fractions in Turkey could be found in a middle-size city like Bielefeld, and it was both surprising and convenient for me.

2.5. Researcher's positionality, insider/outsider

Researcher's position while conducting research is at focus in various social researches, especially in anthropology, ethnographic research and sociology. The relationship between the researcher and the participant is considered as an issue of power and authority in that since researcher has the authority to conduct research granted by larger society or professional communities, the research should be based on trust and should have an ethical guidance (Neuman, 2000: 430). Although this view is still partially true, the hierarchical relationship and the distance between the researcher and the participants have been undermined in the course of time by feminist and post-modern researchers as well as by the migration researchers through the introduction of the conceptions of insider and outsider positions in migration studies (Voloder and

Kirpitchenko, 2014). Recent studies indicate that neither full insidership, nor full outsidership is possible in social research. Both are realized in the research because of the situated character of the relationship between the researcher and the participant (Carling, et al, 2013; Voloder and Kirpitchenko, 2014; Shinozaki, 2012).

Although used in various ways, insider research can be described as “social interviews conducted between researchers and participants who share a similar culture, linguistic, ethnic, national and religious heritage” (Ganga and Scott, 2006). The concept is associated with closeness in contrast to distance in traditional research. The traditional desire for an access to the field to attain inside information spending a lot of time trying to reduce the distance in field-based and ethnographic research assumes a distance at the beginning, and thus the position of an outsider in traditional research makes a pre-distinction between the researcher and the participants. Insidership, on the other hand, does not fix the researcher’s positions and roles as the researcher can have various positions and experiences. In that sense, insidership can be “used to refer to shared experiences of institutionalized racism, of being other, and positioned as an outsider within white hegemonic spaces... as well as to sharing political allegiances” (Voloder and Kirpitchenko, 2014: 13). Merriam et.al. (2001) suggest that, “being an insider means easy access, the ability to ask more meaningful questions and read non-verbal cues, and most importantly be able to project a more truthful, authentic understanding of the culture under study” (quoted in Liamputtong, 2010: 112). However, it has been suggested that although insidership is seen as the more efficient method in conducting migration research, there are also some disadvantages of this perspective. These disadvantages result from the researcher’s being too close to the culture. In that respect, they can be biased, or they may not find the knowledge of the participants as interesting because of their closeness, and thus may not be able to ask critical questions (Bilecen, 2014: 53; Liamputtong, 2010: 114-115). Another problematic aspect of the insidership is that as most researchers in migration studies feel ethnic or national group belonging, they may be unable to see other lines of their own

positionalities such as, age, gender, class, and thus they may fall into methodological nationalism (Cukut Krilic, 2011; Shinozaki, 2012).

Outsiderness is associated with the researchers who conduct research in their own community about specific immigrant groups. Most of the statistical works and governmental reports, which use authoritative measures putting a distance between the subject of inquiry and the researcher, could be perceived as outsider research. Although not considered as efficient as insiderness, outsider research may also offer some advantages. Apart from seeing certain problems more closely, as Coloma (2008: 15) suggests, “becoming an outsider also has its own usefulness, such as, providing different perspectives on cultural and community norms, asking questions that require more detailed explanations, and developing other forms of interactions and spaces often relegated to non-members” (Liamputtong, 2010: 115). Either quantitative or qualitative, creating objective criteria is also another characteristics of outsider studies.

Construction of insiderness and outsiderness is an interactive process building up during the research according to multiple and shifting positionalities of the researcher. As suggested similarly above, “insiders can have linguistic or cultural skills that facilitate access and interaction with group members, while outsiders can encourage informants to be more explicit and explain the things that are taken for granted within the group” (Carling et al, 2013: 3).

Regarding my research, I had many different positions. I was a student coming from Turkey, a person from the Black Sea Region, a person living in Ankara, a female and a young person. I was also a Turk who speaks good Turkish, who has a post-graduate education and a political science and sociology degree, who has grown up in a Sunni traditional family, who comes from a lower-middle class family, who has a socialist world-view, who is a feminist, anti-racist and so forth. These diverse social positions influenced my research process, and they even became an integral part of my research. I sometimes situated myself in the questions I asked to my respondents. My social

location in interpreting the world “has helped me become more reflexive during all stages of my research, and has enabled me critically to reflect upon my relationship with the social milieu in which my research is situated” (Cukut Krilic, 2011: 164). Additionally, considering the domination of national belonging perspectives in migration research, having multiple positionalities helped me to re-evaluate the naturalized primacy given to my national belonging. That is, in this study, other social divisions such as ethnicity, gender and social and economic class have more dominant meanings than national belonging (Shinozaki, 2012: 1810-1811).

I also observed the advantages of above mentioned positions in the different interviews I conducted for my research. One advantage was being an insider for the Turkish community. A friend of mine from a Kurdish association helped to become an insider for the Kurdish community in Bielefeld, too. I had the advantage of speaking Turkish to contact with the associations. To be welcomed by all associations was the effect of coming from Turkey as most of the respondents of mine missed their homeland, and they were excited to see me just as a person from Turkey.

On the other hand, I was an outsider in certain aspects. Although my respondents were speaking Turkish, they were using some German words while speaking which was a strange way of talking for me. Apparently, they had the German culture and gestures. They had all spent long years in Germany; their children were going to school there; that is, they were permanent in Germany. Therefore, their familiarity with German culture, German language and institutional structure were always better than mine. It is true that I learnt a lot from each of them, but having a limited time there, and knowing that I would come back to Turkey sometimes hindered my empathy with them. My pre-intermediate level German, knowing not much about the psychology of being permanent in another land, and the effects of policies of integration upon permanent residents were the factors that made me feel as an outsider. However, referring to the theoretical discussions above, being an outsider was also advantageous

in my case. That is, I asked a lot, learnt a lot, and I asked over and over again to understand them better and to make everything clear in my mind. Therefore, being a Turkish researcher residing in Turkey was to my benefit in some respects since these kinds of researches are usually conducted by researchers with Turkey origin, but residing in German, namely the third generation Turkey origin immigrants in Germany. I strongly believe that in that respect, I was able to build up an alternative perspective different than the researches done in Germany and in German by the third generation researchers. Another point is that I did not only focus on the integration problems of immigrants from an *integrationalist* perspective, which means reducing all the phenomena into integration problems, but rather I perceived the immigrant associations as democratic political actors having power relations among and around them.

In brief, in this study, I was both an outsider and insider. I looked at the phenomena from an outsider's eyes; on the other hand, since I speak Turkish and know about the history of and the political fractions in Turkey, I was able to discuss the homeland activities of the associations or their relationships with Turkey better.

CHAPTER 3

GERMANY'S INTEGRATION POLICIES, REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANTS, LOCAL CHANNELS AND CIVIC POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, first, I intend to focus upon the preparation processes and potential results of the new *Citizenship Law 1999*, and *Immigration Act (Residence Act) 2004*, in order to see how the future picture of Germany's immigration policy has been envisaged. In the second section, referring to Schönwälder (2012) and Schönwälder and Kofri (2010) respectively, I will present the general profile of immigrant representation in Germany and briefly mention the population characteristics and electoral system in *North Rhein Westphalia* (NRW) presenting some data on immigrants' representation in NRW. In this second section, I will also present an overview of a governmental report (2012) on the political behavior of immigrants in Germany in order to see how the state officially approaches to immigrant representation and immigrant voting behavior. Additionally, based on Miera (2009), the perception of parliamentarians on the issue of citizenship and political integration of immigrants will be discussed in this section. In the third section, German National Integration Summit (*Integrationgipfel*) and German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz* or DIK) will be elaborated with respect to the importance of them for the immigrant organizations. The fourth section will be devoted to the experience of Foreign Citizen Advisory Councils (*Integrationrats*) as channels of local political participation. The historical development and recent functioning of *Integrationrats* will be examined critically referring to the related literature and the interviews conducted for this research. Lastly, immigrants' civic memberships in associations, political parties and trade unions will be evaluated in a general manner by referring to Cyrus (2005).

This chapter is expected to facilitate the understanding of the political setting upon which all the theoretical discussions and the case study will be built. This chapter will also place a special emphasis on Turkey origin immigrants' participation patterns and their representations at local level purposely.

3.2. Citizenship Law (2000) and Residence Act (2004)

With the promotion of European integration after *Maastricht Treaty* (1993) and the introduction of European citizenship, like other member states, Germany also started to follow a line which liberates the rules of citizenship for the third country nationals during the 90s.

To that end, in November 1993, Asylum Seekers Benefit Law was made effective. According to this law, asylum seekers would no more benefit from the general welfare system, rather they would benefit from an independent public assistance system with certain restrictions. With the amendment in 1998, benefits were further curtailed and bounded to certain requirements. The decrease in the asylum applications, as seen in Figure 1, can be interpreted as a result of these policies.

Other steps taken were regarding naturalization. *1990 Aliens Act* required naturalization after fifteen years of residence. In 1993, the individual right of naturalization upon satisfying the necessary requirements was first conferred in the federal government. Accordingly, naturalization applications doubled in one year. While there were 37,042 naturalized non-ethnic German foreigners in 1992, this number increased to 74,058 by the year 1993. In 1995, automatic citizenship for the third generation foreigners and the requirement of eight years of residence for naturalization were first proposed by SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) in the parliament. In September 1998 election, Social Democratic /Greens coalition entered office. The coalition was determined to modernize German citizenship law. Eventually,

acquisition of German citizenship at birth and naturalization came into force in January 2000 (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, 2009: 197-203).

Figure 1⁴ The decrease trend in asylum applications in Germany among other industrialized countries between the years 1992-2006

Table 16.1. New Asylum Applications Submitted in Industrialized Countries, 1992–2005 (absolute numbers)

Country of Asylum	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Germany	438,191	322,599	127,210	127,937	116,367	104,353	98,644	95,113
United Kingdom	32,300	28,000	42,200	55,000	37,000	41,500	58,487	91,200
France	28,872	27,564	25,964	20,415	17,405	21,416	22,375	30,907
Italy	6,042	1,647	1,786	1,732	675	1,858	11,122	33,364
Austria	16,238	4,745	5,082	5,919	6,991	6,719	13,805	20,096
United States	103,964	143,118	144,577	149,065	107,130	52,200	35,903	32,711
European Union*	675,455	516,398	309,722	274,951	233,460	251,762	311,408	396,737

Country of Asylum	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Germany	78,564	88,287	71,127	50,563	35,610	28,910	21,030	1,804,505
United Kingdom	98,900	92,000	103,080	60,050	40,620	30,840	27,850	839,027
France	38,747	47,291	58,971	59,768	58,550	49,730	30,690	538,665
Italy	15,564	9,620	16,015	13,455	9,720	9,500	10,110	142,210
Austria	18,284	30,135	39,354	32,359	24,630	22,460	13,350	260,167
United States	40,867	59,432	58,439	43,338	52,360	48,770	51,510	1,123,384
European Union*	391,275	388,372	393,441	309,329	241,000	239,770	198,900	5,131,980

*1995-2004 data does not include new members; 2005 and 2006 data include all 25 EU members.
 Note: All figures rounded to nearest 10.
 Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2001 and 2003, Asylum Trends 2005.

⁴ *ibid*: 177

Figure 2⁵ The increase in the number of asylum applications and the accepted cases by years in Germany between the years 1995-2015


APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUMS			
	Total applications	First applications	Accepted applications
1995	166.951	127.937	39.014
1996	149.193	116.367	32.826
1997	151.700	104.353	47.347
1998	143.429	98.644	44.785
1999	138.319	95.113	43.206
2000	117.648	78.564	39.084
2001	118.306	88.287	30.019
2002	91.471	71.127	20.344
2003	67.848	50.563	17.285
2004	50.152	35.607	14.545
2005	42.908	28.914	13.994
2006	30.100	21.029	9.071
2007	30.303	19.164	11.139
2008	28.018	22.085	5.933
2009	33.033	27.649	5.384
2010	48.589	41.332	7.257
2011	53.347	45.741	7.606
2012	77.651	64.539	13.112
2013	127.023	109.580	17.443
2014	202,834	173,072	29,762
2015	476,649	441,899	34,750

⁵http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Broschueren/broschuere-asyl-in-zahlen-2009.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

The numbers by the year 2013 have already climbed nearly to 600,000 (as registered refugees) by September 2015 and Chancellor Merkel has declared that Germany will accept one million refugees who mostly set off due to Syrian war.

see: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-shows-signs-of-strain-from-mass-of-refugees-a-1058237.html>

Figure 3⁶ The number of naturalized Turkish descent population 2003-2015 in Germany



According to the new citizenship law, first generation immigrants were able to acquire German citizenship if they had been working in Germany with legal residence. Yet, this entitlement required adequate knowledge of German A, a clean record and commitment to the Basic German Law (Constitution) and a sufficient income to support themselves and their families. (Yurdakul, 2009: 42; Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, 2009: 203-204). Moreover, born in Germany after the year 2000, children of foreign parents would get automatic temporary dual citizenship; the citizenship of the native country of their parents and German citizenship providing one of their parents had a legal employment of eight years in Germany and an unlimited residential permit for three years. However, children were required to decide which citizenship they preferred to hold at the ages between 18 and 23. The children who preferred German citizenship were required to give up their parents' native country citizenship (Mueller, 2006: 421).⁷

⁶<http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/152908/umfrage/einbuengerungen-von-tuerken-in-deutschland/>

⁷According to the very recent amendment in July 2014, necessity to give up one nationality for children of migrants born in Germany has been discarded. According to the new regulation, those children will be eligible to dual citizenship, if they attended school in Germany for six years, and lived in Germany for

As a result of the introduction of this law, the number of naturalizations rose about 30 percent in the year 2000. However, as seen in Figure 3, the rate of naturalization on part of Turkish population did not increase but decreased about 20 percent (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 158). The Turkish population responded to the limitation to dual citizenship by not preferring to leave their original citizenship (Kaya, 2009 cited in Abadan-Unat 2011). Accordingly, in 2000, “thousands of Turkish migrants applied for re-approval of their Turkish passports after being naturalized” and this attempt resulted in losing their German citizenships and permanent residence status (Miera, 2009: 8). Double citizenship for the European Union citizens was accepted in 2007.

When Christian Democrats–Social Democrat coalition came to power in 2005, those attempts to pave the way for multiculturalism were not favored by Christian Democrats and a year later, “citizenship tests” started to be applied in Baden-Württemberg, where Christian Democrats dominated. Those implementations of citizenship tests became disputable especially for Muslim population with Turkish descent as the questions were highly biased. That is, the questions assumed that Muslim applicants did not share German values and norms. Three examples of the questions are as follows: 1. “Must a woman obey her husband, and if she does not, is it acceptable that he beat her?” 2. “What would your reaction be if your son told you he was homosexual and he wanted to live with another man?” 3. “Do you think it is acceptable to keep one’s daughter at home in order to prevent her from breaking rules of honor?” (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 159; Miera, 2009:9). Upon reactions, broad criticism and disputes, Böhmer (CDU) (Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration) declared that the questions would only be about Germany’s history, politics and society. However, some other impediments in the process of citizenship applications were also present. Security reasons were one of them. Especially in the aftermath of September 11, inquiries were made about the applicants by Federal Intelligence Service of Germany. For example, if

eight years. (<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/german-parliament-approves-dual-citizenship-draft-law.aspx?pageID=238&nID=68666&NewsCatID=351>)

the applicant had any affiliation with an Islamic organization or political party (for instance, *die Linke*, the Left Party) which was followed by the Intelligence Service, his application could be denied (Miera, 2009: 7). As for the regulations of family union (an amendment made in 2007), exceptional restrictions were imposed on the couples of naturalized Turkey origin German citizens. While European citizens could live in Germany with their spouses without any restrictions, the spouses of Turkey origin German citizen coming from Turkey were required to speak basic German. In addition, the naturalized spouse was required to maintain a certain standard of living (Miera, 2009: 11).

Another act to regulate immigration came in 2005, *Immigration Law 2005*. It was based on the works which were started in 2000 by Schily (Federal Minister of Interior). The first draft was proposed in 2001 and the aim was “to have a modern immigration act that will safeguard Germany’s competitiveness, create jobs...at the same time limiting immigration, preventing illegal immigration” (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, 2009: 251). Nevertheless, only a revised version of the law draft was managed to be brought into force on January 1, 2003 due to the objections of conservatives. Still, when the emphasis was directed to economic and labor market needs of Germany as well as the limitation and control of immigration to the country, the law received acceptance in the *Bundesrat* (German Parliament).

The proposed law was bringing a point system in employment applications according to age, education, work, history, family status, language skills and links with Germany. It was also encouraging entrepreneurs, who wanted to invest in Germany, found a business and employ at least ten persons. In these ways, both highly skilled workers and business men would be attracted. Another provision of the law was regarding the types of residence and employment permits. In the new law, there would be only two types of residence permit: temporary and unlimited rather than five different permits. Unlimited residence permit would be linked to the work permit. According to the law,

neither the accepted highly skilled workers nor European citizens would have to apply for residence permit. They would only be expected to register themselves like native Germans.⁸ Language courses for the new immigrants (workers, entrepreneurs, asylum seekers and refugees) would also be compulsory. If the immigrants fail to attend the courses despite their insufficient language skills, this would be considered in their prolongation of work and residence permissions. These courses would not only teach German, but also history, culture and legal institutions of Germany.⁹

A newly named *Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge* (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, or BAMF) would have the responsibility for overseeing the integration courses for immigrants, along with administering asylum procedures it would inherit from the former *Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge* (Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, or BAFL) (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, 2009: 254).

Having inspired by Katzenstein' term of parapublic institutions, Munsch describes BAMF as a parapublic institution which is "under public law bridge the private and public realms... to facilitate the process of formulating and implementing public policy" (Musch, 2012: 76).

A change in the situation of asylum seekers in terms of residence permit had also been proposed with the law. According to this, asylum seekers whose applications were approved could only get temporary residence permit. It would be turned into an unlimited residence permit only if the conditions in their country were still dangerous after three years. *Härtefallkommission* (Hardship Commissions) could be founded only if *Länder* (province) regards it necessary to examine the rejected individual cases of asylum applicants (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, 2009: 259). That is, if *Länder* did not consider an examination necessary, reapplication or objection to the decision of

⁸For a little more detailed and critical evaluation in terms of the history of entry, residence and employment see also, Davy, Ulrike, 2005 "Integration of Immigrants in Germany: A Slowly Evolving Cocept", *European Journal of Migration and Law*, vol 7: 123-144 related part pp. 130-133.

⁹See an evaluation of full law at: www.fr-hessen.de/Erlasse/Erl-Zuwg-turk.rtf written by Thomas Wanie.

repatriation in federal level would be impossible. Additionally, a refugee status would be granted to those threatened by non-state or gender- based persecutions, as different from before.

Eventually, the law was enacted in 30 July 2004 and came into force on January 1, 2005 with the “omission of the point system” which was assessed as deplorable by some commentators. It was clear that on part of non-EU citizens and non-qualified workers, the law brought almost nothing. Rather, it controlled the status of asylum seekers and refugees much more strictly. It brought certain incentives to highly skilled workers, investors, and students who completed their studies in Germany (they were entitled to one-year residence permit to seek job). On the other hand, it brought basic German language requirement to the foreign spouses before entering into country. Due to its discriminative content, this highly disputable regulation was alleged to prevent forced marriages and facilitate integration of especially non-EU spouses, or third country nationals with certain exceptions. When one thinks that immigrant group from Turkey is the largest one among foreigners, it is clear that, the most affected group was Turkish nationals. The more detailed analysis of the regulation could be found in section 3.4 of this chapter.

When the implications of the law are considered in terms of security measures of Germany, three-year condition brought the risk of deportation for asylum seekers because investigation about the conditions in the country of refugees might not be made neutrally by BAMF for each different case, nor was there a certain standard to measure it. Furthermore, if a foreign citizen was/had been a member of a terrorist organization, or had a relation with such an organization, Federal Germany and any Länder was entitled to repatriate the person. Any suspect in endangering the interest of the Federal Germany, or Federal States would be evaluated and could result in deportation again. Lastly, centers of deportation (Ausreiseeinrichtung) would be

founded if necessary in order to encourage voluntary repatriations and to provide a stricter control over refugee and asylum applications.

This law has neither been able to break the exclusionary immigration law tradition of Germany nor has it shown much eagerness to integrate new comers or establish immigrant communities. Researches show that Islamphobia has been on the rise and native people support the decisions of repatriation for legal immigrants. Considering the rising unemployment rate in European countries and disbeliefs in multicultural policies, this fact is not only related to Germany particularly but to many European countries. Another tendency in Europe is to focus on the security issues much more than before after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and bombings in Madrid in 2003 (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, 2009: 255-257).

3.3. The Political Setting for Voter Participation and Representation of Immigrants in Germany

In Germany, there are 16.4 million residents with a migration background¹⁰, 20.3 % of the population. According to micro census figures of 2014, 8.2 million of the people with a migration background have German citizenship, and the rest (literally 8.2 million people) do not hold German passports. Of the 62 million electorate, 5.6 million have a migration background. That is nearly 9 % of the total number of electorate (Schönwälder, 2012: 69, Cyrus, 2005: 10). It is important to underline that “those with former Turkish nationality are the largest single group among naturalized foreigners, but they account for only about one-fifth of that group” (ibid). According to the data from BAMF, by the year 2013, there were nearly 3 million people with Turkey origin

¹⁰Person with a migration background means immigrant person with or without German citizenship.

and 1.5 million of them were Turkish citizens. That is, there were 1.5 million Turkey origin people without a German passport.¹¹

Previous studies on minority representation in the USA, and the UK, show that three factors influence minority representation: electoral system, settlement structures and consciousness or mobilization of immigrant population. As all these three factors are diverse in Germany, general patterns of immigrant representation cannot be found. However, these three factors could be effective in state or city levels. In general, the immigrant population is widely distributed over Germany instead of concentrating in one region. Duisburg and Berlin are the densest cities with regard to Turkish population. In Duisburg, 12 percent of the population have Turkish passports or background. In Berlin, this percentage is 7 percent. Except these examples, it is difficult to find any other city having Turkish population higher than 10 percent. Italians, Greeks and those from former Yugoslavia are even less concentrated than Turks. Furthermore, though constituencies are small, there is no constituency in which immigrant population accounts for a majority of the electorate (Schönwälder, 2012: 70-73).

In 2009, there were four candidates with a migration background among sixty nominated by five leading political parties. Only one had a chance of winning. Even in Kreuzberg (a district in Berlin where Turkish population densely live), *SPD* supported a non-immigrant candidate. Twenty members of *Bundestag* (Federal Government, Federal Parliament) had a migration background, but only two won direct seats, and there is no indication that they had been supported because of their migration background (ibid: 73).

¹¹For accurate numbers see the links below

http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2012.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

<https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendischeBevolkerung/Tabellen/StaatsangehoerigkeitJahre.html>

This low representation of immigrants cannot be related to the list system and proportional representation since neither is a disadvantage for the candidates with a migration background. Through these practices, most of them enter parliaments via party lists. In this sense, the decisions of parties carry considerable weight (ibid: 74).

In fact, with the recent reforms in the citizenship law, immigrant representation tends to grow. However, there are patterns which might hinder this trend. These patterns are mostly related to the uneven attitude of political parties towards candidates with a migration background (ibid: 76).

Very recently, Germans have begun to consider immigrants as part of population. Christian Democratic Union (CDU) expresses that it is important to win more members with a migration background. They say conservatives want to improve parliamentary representation of immigrants. They even have separate websites for citizens with Turkey origin and for ethnic Germans (ibid: 78).

Still, immigrant representation is quite low and inefficient if city states are put aside; Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg where 32 of the 53 representative have been elected (ibid: 79). However, interestingly enough, in immigrant city councils and regional immigrant parliaments, more than half of the parliamentarians have a Turkish background. That means they have been overrepresented in many cities, the reason for which will be discussed in the following section. It is plausible to expect higher representation proportions in small size cities, but in bigger cities as the competition is higher, this proportion decrease nearly five times. All in all, one can observe that in cities and in federal and regional levels immigrants are getting more and more visible although the level of representation is still low (ibid: 81).

As to the representation of immigrants in NRW, it would be useful to give some information on the population characteristics and the electoral system there. NRW is the most highly and densely populated regional state in Germany. In 2008, 22% of Germany's total population inhabited in the region. It has 29 cities with at least 100,

000 inhabitants (Schönwälder and Kofri, 2010: 9). The Ruhr Region in NRW was a major industrial and mining hub in Germany. In 1960s and 70s, hundreds of thousands of guest workers were recruited to work in mines and industrial firms of this state. 4.38 million (2.8 million are foreign born and 2.4 million German citizen) or 24.5 % of the 18 million inhabitants in NRW have a migration background. As Schönwälder and Kofri suggests “more than a quarter of Germany’s immigrant population is in NRW, and in absolute figures, it hosts the largest immigrant population of all German states” (ibid: 10). By 2009, the electorate with a migration background was 14 or 15% of the total number of electorate.

The voting age is 16 in NRW. The inhabitants with a migration background make up from 7% to 26% of the total number of potential voters. It is not possible to estimate the number of voters with a migration background since once they are naturalized, they are not considered as foreign nationals any more. The only way to learn that number is censuses.

The municipal election system in Nordrhein-Westfalen is a mixed system based on a combination of majority and proportional representation. Voters are accorded a single vote. With this vote, they simultaneously vote for a direct candidate in their constituency and for the list of that candidate’s party. Approximately one half of the councilors are elected directly in the electoral constituencies according to a majoritarian principle. The other half of the councilors is elected according to the proportion of a party’s or a list’s overall votes in the city from a city-wide list (the so-called Reserveliste)... The absence of thresholds systematically augments the electoral chances of smaller parties and independent local lists (ibid: 12).

One interesting fact on the interest shown to candidates with a migration background in the media, particularly, in newspapers in the region is regarding the municipal elections in 2009. According to the examination of Schönwälder and Kofri (2010), German newspapers did not make any mention of foreign candidates. On the other hand, Turkish-language newspapers seemed to undertake the role of publicizing

candidates and mobilizing voters. Yet, it is distinctive that they mostly emphasized the ethnic background of candidates, which is Turkish, instead of considering the commonalities of immigrants (ibid: 14).

Regarding the approaches of political parties to local elections; they usually allot limited financial resources as it is a local issue. However, recently they pay attention to the immigrant voter and publish some advertisements in Turkish or Russian. The regional organizations of the foreigners' councils take a role in mobilizing immigrant electorate through writing texts or producing leaflets in different languages. However, all in all, there is no notable non-partisan campaign for immigrant candidates (ibid: 17).

In 2009 municipal elections, compared to 2004 elections, proportion of immigrant representation increased from 2% to 4%. On the other hand, when the changes in the number of candidates are considered, there was no stable increase. Figure 5 indicates a comparison of 2004 and 2009 elections with respect to the numbers of selected candidates with a migration background. According to the figure, 79 of the 1995 councilors with a migration background were selected. In Figure 4, the number of candidates according to the political parties can be seen. It is clear from this figure that SPD increased the number of candidates from 66 to 92. However, CDU decreased the number of candidates with a migration background from 55 to 46. In spite of the general increase in candidates, big cities were still far from parity representation. In total, in the whole NRW, only 4% of the 15% voting-age immigrant population was represented (ibid: 21).

Figure 4¹² Immigrant candidates nominated per political party in 29 cities in NRW

Year	CDU	SPD	Greens	FDP	PDS/ Left	Total
2004	55	66	67	41	98	327
%	13	16	16	10	24	79
2009	46	92	72	45	128	383
%	8	17	13	8	23	69

Source: MPI-IMCO Database

¹² Ibid:21

Figure 5¹³ Municipal councilors with a migration background (MB) in 29 cities in NRW

Table 2: Municipal councilors with a migration background (MB) in 29 cities in NRW

City	2004			2009			Voting-age population with MB, Germans and EU-for-eigners in % of electorate	Trend 2004-2009
	Council seats	Councilors with MB	%	Council seats	Councilors with MB	%		
Aachen	58	1	2	74	2	3	19	+
Bergisch-Gladbach	66	0	0	62	1	2	n/a	+
Bielefeld	60	1	2	66	3	5	20	+
Bochum	76	3	4	82	4	5	15	+
Bonn	66	1	2	80	5	6	17	+
Bottrop	58	0	0	54	1	2	11	+
Dortmund	88	1	1	96	5	5	16	+
Duisburg	74	4	5	74	8	11	15	+
Düsseldorf	82	3	4	92	6	7	18	+
Essen	82	3	4	82	3	4	13	=
Gelsenkirchen	66	0	0	66	3	5	15	+
Hagen	58	0	0	58	0	0	19	=
Hamm	58	2	3	58	4	7	17	+
Herne	66	2	3	64	3	5	15	+
Köln	90	6	7	90	6	7	19	=
Krefeld	62	0	0	58	1	2	21	+
Leverkusen	66	2	3	68	1	1	20	-
Moers	54	2	4	56	4	7	n/a	+
Mönchengladbach	76	0	0	66	0	0	14	=
Mülheim an der Ruhr	52	1	2	58	1	2	9	=
Münster	74	1	1	80	3	4	13	+
Neuss	58	0	0	62	1	2	n/a	+
Oberhausen	58	0	0	62	3	5	7	+
Paderborn	58	1	2	68	1	1	n/a	=
Recklinghausen	58	1	2	54	1	2	n/a	=
Remscheid	58	1	2	54	1	2	26	=
Siegen	62	1	2	70	0	0	n/a	-
Solingen	68	5	7	72	6	8	23	+
Wuppertal	74	2	3	69	2	3	22	=
Total	1926	44	2	1995	79	4		+

Source: Municipal councilors 2004 and 2009: MPI-IMCO Database.

¹³ibid:20

A more recent set of data from a report written in German for *Heinrich Böll Stiftung* by Schönwälder et al. (2011) presents figures not only for NRW, but also for the big cities in Germany in different federal states. Since the election dates differ from one state to another, authors compare two periods instead of exact years. According to the general pattern, 21 cities had 4 or more municipal councilors with a migration background between the years 2006-2011. The same number of councilors was only seen in 7 cities between the years 2001-2006. Furthermore, the cities having less than 3 municipal councilors with a migration background were in decline. That is, there was a general increase in the ratio of councilors with a migration background. See Table 2 below.

Table 2¹⁴ The number of municipal councilors with a migration background and cities as grouped

Number of Municipal Councilors with a migration background	Number of cities (2001-2006)	Number of cities (2006-2011)	Change
0	24	15	-9
1-3	46	41	-5
4-6	6	15	+9
6>	1	6	+5

Source:
MPI-
MMG
MigrKo
m-
Studie
The

second part of the data indicates the changes and the trend in the number of municipal councilors with a migration background in big cities of Germany separately. Only the cities in NRW regarding these changes are presented in Table 3. According to this, Table 3 compares twenty-four NRW cities in terms of the number of municipal councilors with a migration background in two periods, the years between 2001-2006 and 2006-2011. No negative trends can be seen in the cities of NRW in terms of the number of councilors with a migration background, albeit the constant ones. See Table 3 below.

¹⁴Schönwälder et al. (2011) *Vielfalt sucht Rat Ratsmitglieder mit Migrationshintergrund in deutschen Großstädten* Eine Studie des Max-Planck-Instituts zur Erforschung multireligiöser und multiethnischer Gessellschaften, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Schriften zur Demokratie, p:24.

Table 3¹⁵ Number of the municipal councilors with a migration background (MB), trends from the previous to present elections


City	Municipal Council with MB (2001-2006)	Municipal Council with MB (2006-2011)	Change	Trend
Bonn	1	6	5	+
Duisburg	4	8	4	+
Dortmund	1	5	4	+
Düsseldorf	3	6	3	+
Gelsenkirchen	0	3	3	+
Oberhausen	0	3	3	+
Hamm	2	4	2	+
Bielefeld	1	3	2	+
Münster	1	3	2	+
Solingen	5	6	1	+
Bochum	3	4	1	+
Aachen	1	2	1	+
Bergisch Gladbach	0	1	1	+
Krefeld	0	1	1	+
Köln	6	6	0	=
Essen	3	3	0	=
Leverkusen	2	2	0	=
Wuppertal	2	2	0	=
Mulheim an der Ruhr	1	1	0	=
Paderborn	1	1	0	=
Recklinghausen	1	1	0	=
Remscheid	1	1	0	=
Hagen	0	0	0	=
Siegen	1	0	-1	=

Source: MPI-MMG MigrKom-Studie

¹⁵Ibid: 28-30

The ratio of immigrant candidates and members has also been examined according to political parties by Schönwälder in different studies (2010, 2011, and 2013). See Figure 6.

Figure 6 Municipal Councilors according to political parties, 2006-2011, total numbers and with migration background



The above figure indicates that all the political parties had councilors with a migration background. However, the difference between FDP (Free Democratic Party) and SPD was significant; that is, while FDP had only 8 councilors, this number was 68 for SPD. On the other hand, the Greens and the Left Party had the greatest portion with 8%.

Table 4 Municipal Councilors with a migration background according to political parties, 2001-2006 and 2006-2011

	SPD	Greens	Left Party	CDU, CSU	FDP	Other
2001-2006	49	27	10	21	4	5
2006-2011	68	50	27	27	8	18
Change	+19	+23	+17	+6	+4	+13

In the above table, an increasing trend in the number of councilors with a migration background can be seen with the most sizeable difference between the Greens and FDP.

Schönwälder (2013) also interprets the issue of representation in regional parliaments. There, she observes that immigrant representation level of city states, namely Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen, reflects the overall picture of Germany. That is, when “we exclude the three city states, the number of immigrant parliamentarians is reduced to 22 of 1860 seats in the state parliaments, or 1.4 percent; with the city states it is 2.85 percent” (Schönwälder, 2013: 639).

It can be concluded that although there are increasing trends in municipal councilors in terms of immigrant representation, in regional parliaments, the proportion of representation is very low when city states are left out. That is, NRW, which is “Germany’s largest state and home to a quarter of Germany’s immigrant population, did not have any immigrants in its regional parliament in the 2005-2010 electoral period. In May 2010, 10 immigrant-origin representatives were elected, but the state still lagged behind Berlin and Hamburg” (Schönwälder, 2013: 640-641). The puzzle of this uneven picture is explained by Schönwälder with this evidence:

It is much easier to become an MP in a city state. This is because the number of voters per seat is much lower. In the last elections, one seat was available per 5,857 members of the electorate in Bremen; in Hamburg the figure was one to 10,369, and in Berlin it was one to 16,278. In the territorial states this ratio is vastly different. In Hesse there was one seat per 37,079 potential voters, in North Rhine-Westphalia it was one to 73,299. Assuming a similar motivation to become an MP across Germany, there would be four times as many challengers for one seat in North Rhine-Westphalia than in Berlin (ibid: 644).

Accordingly, Schönwälder (2013) concludes that rather than the size of immigrant population, the group consciousness and mobilization are relevant for the dynamics of immigrant representation.

As stated earlier in the introduction to this chapter, political involvement of immigrants as electorals or potential electorals is another point that will be discussed in this section. The working paper of BAMF (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*), written out by Müssig and Worbs in the framework of Integration Report in 2012 will be the basis for this discussion.¹⁶ As stated in BAMF working paper, *Civic Voluntarism Model* (CVM) developed by Verba et al. (1995) identifies three factors regarding personal political involvement: *resources, political attitudes* and *networks*. There are also three specific factors influencing political participation according to CVM: *the general political attitude of the country of origin, the time spent in the country of immigration, and the political rights of immigrants*. To put it more clearly, people coming from non-democratic countries are less likely to have democratic attitudes, whereas people from democratic countries are more likely to support democratic ideas. The influence of time spent, on the other hand, is much more determinative in the behavior of political participation since the longer one stay in a country, the more they adopt the political attitude of the country of residence. Limitations in political rights are also directly effective in curbing the political participation of immigrants.

¹⁶The references of this report is based on the translation -from German into English- of Hanna Reiss who is my German friend studying politics and philosophy in Bielefeld University.

Before going through the empirical data, it would be useful to note that CVM is mostly adopted in analyzing American politics and in trying to understand political involvement related to social and personal environment of individuals just like in the case of their involvement in religion, work, school and family. The roots of this perspective are partially based on the rational choice theory and the studies of social psychology. It seems that the social scientist Olson's approach to the nature of collective action inspired the researchers in BAMF. Adopting the work of Verba et al., BAMF researchers follow the idea that immigrants' political participation could be measured in relation to certain factors such as, age, length of stay, education level and political past. It is true that these are factors affecting participation; however, the results of such kind of studies usually do not tackle with the questions such as why some people have such and such resources and others not, which institutional or political traditions affect individual choices while involving in politics, why people prefer to participate in politics in a certain way instead of another way, and what the implications of political attitudes with respect to the democratic society are. Instead, they only act to describe the factors influencing the behavior of political participation at individual level. The details of alike perspectives will be elaborated in Chapter 4 and will be discussed in Conclusion. Although the results of the research could be utilized in deeper analysis, and could be interpreted within a broader picture, here, my only intension is to present some descriptive data, or empirical observations, on the extents by which political behavior of immigrants are affected.

The data of the research is based on several databases. Three of the most important are: *European Social Survey (ESS)*, *Die Deutsche Wahlstudie – German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)* and *Sozio- oekonomishes Panel - Socio-economic Panel (SOEP)*. ESS is "an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted every two years across Europe since 2001... The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and

behavior patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations.”¹⁷ “The GLES examines the German federal elections 2009, 2013, and 2017 and therefore will be able to track the German electoral process over an extended period of time and at an unprecedented level of detail.”¹⁸ German SOEP “is a longitudinal survey of approximately 11,000 private households in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1984 to 2012, and eastern German *Länder* from 1990 to 2012. Variables include household composition, employment, occupations, earnings, health and satisfaction indicators.”¹⁹

In the research, political attitudes are addressed in two different titles: Political interest and political efficacy (political competence) of a person. The main assumption is that political interest motivates participation in political activities. Here, political interest means if political matters are important enough to be informed about, or even to get involved in actively. In the case of immigrants, political interest is generally lower. One reason for this might be the ongoing consciousness of having limited rights (Müssig and Worbs, 2012: 21). However certain patterns can also be observed. For example, formal education, language skills and age have positive correlations with political interest. Similarly, second generation have more interest compared to first generation migrants.

There is also a relationship between political interest and length of stay. Less than ten years in Germany results in less interest. However, a stay longer than twenty years seems to be a critical value. Considering this, one can argue that growing age and length of stay are positively related with political interest. More similar positions between migrants and natives can be seen among over 60-years-old, the unemployed, and the retired. The patterns of political interest according to the socio-structural factors are also comparable between migrants and natives: men are more interested

¹⁷<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/>

¹⁸<http://gles.eu/wordpress/english/>

¹⁹<http://www.eui.eu/Research/Library/ResearchGuides/Economics/Statistics/DataPortal/GSOEP.aspx>

than women; the old are more than the young, and the employed are more than the unemployed (ibid: 23).

Political efficacy is another factor in determining political attitudes. People who trust their own political competences participate more. One of the methods in measuring political efficacy is to ask people to find their own position regarding a certain political topic. The shares of people who think they can form their own opinion are lower in the groups of people with a migration background (ibid: 24). Other than this, differences between the sexes are clearly visible in both groups. The share of women with a high consciousness of political competence is lower than that of men. Older people, employees and retired people feel more competent than young people and people without employment. It can also be said that migrants with a foreign citizenship feel less competent than those with a German citizenship (ibid: 25).

Apart from political interest and political efficacy, left-right self-assessment is yet another factor which can be used to sort out political preferences regarding certain topics. In Western European countries and in North America the left-right scale is accepted as a help for political orientation. However, in Germany, this is not the case. Although this scale is valid for migrants from Arabic countries and countries of former Soviet Union, 20% of the naturalized citizens in Germany do not answer left-right questions. The ESS results show that approximately one fifth (18.8) of the first generation migrants cannot position themselves on the left-right scale. For people without a migration background, the share is smaller (8.4) and similar to the share of second generation migrants (9.6). Still, the obtained answers show a distribution indicating a stronger tendency towards the left part of the political spectrum both in the case of people with and without a migration background (ibid: 25-26).

Finally, affinity towards and identification with a political party is considered to be a factor in understanding participation behaviours. Identification means psychological membership here. This factor not only plays an important role in one's participation

patterns but also the reception of political reality. There two different models to understand one's affinity to a political party. One is the socio-psychological model and the other is the rationalist model. According to the socio-psychological model, the role of parents in childhood is important. Nowadays, however, the reverse is also possible. That is, as the children of a migrant family are better integrated in school, they are more familiar with political topics and influence their parents. Other factors, such as school, media, other institutions and actors could be influential besides parents' preferences. Similarly, some societal memberships which are regarded influential for identification with a party in Germany are adopted by migrants. For instance, every second Catholic person with a migration background supports the *CDU/CSU*. Highly educated people, on the other hand, tend towards *Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen* (The Greens). Other socio-cultural factors do not give any clue about identification with a particular party. Table 5 shows identification with a political party with respect to a migration background, according to the ESS results between the years 2002-2008.

Table 5 Identification with a political party, ESS 2002-2008 (in percent)

	Total	Without a migration background	With a migration background
CDU/CSU	17,2	17,8	14,1
SPD	15,7	15,8	15,1
FDP	2,5	2,5	2,5
Alliance 90/The Greens	7,0	7,1	6,3
The Linke	2,9	3,1	2,2
Others	1,2	1,3	Δ
None	53,5	52,5	58,7
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: ESS 2002-2008 (in percent) Question: Is there any party that you feel close among other political parties? And: Which are they? Δ = n<20.

As for the rationalist model, short-term connections to a party in relation to valuation of issues could be a reason for identification. Here, especially the attitudes of a party towards migration and integration are influential. The country of origin is also important for identification with a party, even in the second generation. This is a factor which is very specific for migrants, and it cannot be connected to either of the models (ibid: 27). In general, people with a German citizenship identify more often with a party. The share of identification in the second generation among migrants with German citizenship is as much as among native Germans. The result, then, to be derived here is that party identification increases in relation to citizenship and the right to vote. This is probably because migrants without citizenship cannot apply for political positions even if they can become a member of a political party. Duration of stay in Germany also goes parallel with the increase in identification with a certain party. In Figure 10 above, it is seen that migrants' sympathies focus more on the two big parties: *SPD* and *CDU/CSU*. According to the analysis of Kroh/Tucci and Wüst, naturalized people from Turkey and Poland identify with *SPD*, and people from former Soviet Union with the *CDU/CSU*. On the other hand, according to the analysis between the years 2000-2008, these tendencies according to the country of origin tend to decrease. That is, *spät-Aussiedlern* (ethnic Germans from former Soviet countries) identify themselves less with *CDU/CSU*; their interest towards *SPD* is on the rise (ibid: 28).

Overall, result of this research on participation is that participation of people with a migration background is lower than that of people without. There are literally four different factors affecting the participation patterns of migrants: Differences in generation, time spent in the country, socio-cultural factors and country of origin.

One final point to be analyzed in this section is the perception of parliamentarians on the issue of citizenship and political integration of immigrants based on Miera (2009). In the research paper derived from the EMILIE²⁰ project which was funded by European

²⁰“European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship: Legal Political and Educational Challenges”

Commission between years 2006-2009, Miera makes an analysis of political participation of immigrants in Germany by considering the opportunity structures which are, “regulation of voting rights and involvement in decision-making processes as well as the discourse behind these regulations of political inclusion and exclusion” (Miera, 2009: 1). Her approach to political participation is highly parallel to the understanding of political participation in this dissertation. That is, political participation should not be perceived only as formal participation in elections or in political parties; rather than that, a broader perspective is needed including other institutional mechanisms in consultation and civil society. For her, there are two reasons for considering informal political participation: First, it is important to learn about immigrants’ impact on policy making and decision making processes; second, despite the liberalization process in the citizenship policies in Germany, there are still considerable number of inhabitants living in Germany without German citizenship.²¹

If political participation is to be perceived as having the right to vote in the general and local elections, then it is proper to discuss the conditions of citizenship in Germany. It has been seen that in spite of the amendment of 2000, people did not prefer to apply for citizenship although they met the requirements. One of the reasons for this was citizenship tests and emerging hostility against Muslim population. Example interviews conducted by Miera show that even if people become German citizens, the feeling of exclusion does not disappear because of the names, such as, Hassan, Mehmet, Ali and so forth. Moreover, the research conducted in *NRW* reveal that %55.5 of people have an emotional affiliation to Turkish citizenship and they do not prefer to apply for German citizenship (Miera, 2009: 4, 8).

When the rights of local franchise are considered, the picture is not shiny either. Only the European citizen immigrants and German citizens can vote in the local elections in Germany. Furthermore, the arguments of parliamentarians from CDU and FDP

²¹%7.7 of the total 80.2 million total population (Demographics of Germany in en.wikipedia.org)

regarding non-European local franchise are highly striking. For them, citizenship can only be granted on the last stage of a successful integration process. One other claim is that if local franchise is granted to non-European immigrants, then no one will apply for German citizenship and it will be bad for integration. In the general picture, the Federal parliament do not show a real attempt to provide this right for non-European immigrants (particularly those with Turkey origin and living in Germany for long years), and citizenship is seen as the only criteria for a high level of *integration* (Miera, 2009: 14).

3.4. The National Integration Summit (*Integrationsgipfel*)

Among Germany's integration policies, National Integration Summits and German Islam Conferences are important corner stones. The First Integration Summit was held in the summer of 2006 and "it was the first time that migrants themselves sat at the table as players in the integration policy".²² Although the summit was organized at federal level, all levels of government including local, federal and Länder participated in the summit. Prof. Böhmer, the commissioner of Integration from CDU, was responsible for the coordination. Regarding participants, besides the administrative units, the representatives of migrant associations belonging to Turkish, Spanish, Vietnamese, Italian, African, Greek, Serbian and Croatian societies were present at the summit. Moreover, associations of ethnic Germans from Russia, bi-national groups such as German-Arabic organizations, migrant origin journalists, businessmen, lawyers and professionals were invited to the summit.²³ The selection process was informal, yet the

²² Maria Böhmer, "The National Integration Plan – A Contribution of Germany Towards Shaping a European Integration Policy" (Statement of Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees and Integration Berlin), www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Resources/Forum21/Issue_No10/N10_National_integration_plan_en.pdf

²³For the full lists of participants, see the link: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/BeauftragtefuerIntegration/nap/integrationsgipfel/_node.html

previously contacted and reachable ones, namely nationwide organized groups and specific ethnic groups with integration problems, were preferred. (Musch, 2012: 78-79).

As for the guests with Turkey origin, general secretary of DITIB was invited to all the sessions of the summit, except the second one. The representatives of Turkish Community Germany (TGD), Turkish-German Health Foundation and Turkish Parents Associations (FÖDET) were invited to all sessions. Turkey origin politicians and bureaucrats were also present. Other than these, mostly people with business affiliations such as representatives of Doğan Media Group, owner of Öger Tours and Ihlis Median Group were among those participated in the summit. In the Fourth Integration Summit held in 2010, general secretary of AABF was among the invited.²⁴

As an outcome of the first integration summit, six issues were determined to be worked on by six working groups:

- Integration courses
- German language knowledge and language improvement
- Education and vocational training
- The situation of women and girls/Gender inequality
- Local integration
- Integration measures that aim to strengthen civic engagement²⁵ (ibid: 80).

These issues were determined as a part of the National Integration Plan (NIP), which is the most important outcome of the first summit. With the NIP, a nationwide sustainable policy of integration was aimed. The NIP was formally adopted in the second Integration Summit on 12 July 2007 to be implemented. With the plan, major topics of integration were delivered to Federal states.

²⁴https://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/BeauftragtefuerIntegration/nap/integrationsgipfel/_node.html

²⁵www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/BeauftragtefuerIntegration/nap/integrationsgipfel/Integrationsgipfel1/_node.html

The plan aims to promote closer coordination and networking of policies across levels, establishing integration as a cross-cutting policy task, and demanding regular evaluation on the basis of specific indicators. At the same time, it defines integration as not only a task for the state that one that requires and active civil society and the concrete and sustainable commitment of all actors within the German state and society. (Bendel, 2014: 6).

During the Integration Summit held in 2012, it was decided that NIP be turned into National Action Plan (NAP). One can argue that NAP was introduced as a second phase of NIP. The specific objective of the NAP was to monitor and report all the implementations of NIP for a more solid program (Bendel, 2014: 21). In other words, “the objective of the Action Plan was to make integration more binding and create instruments in order to render the results of the integration policy measurable”.²⁶ In line with the principle of dialogue with the state and civil society, eleven dialogue forums were formed and all the local and federal governments agreed upon certain strategic goals.

With this development, the issues to be worked on proliferated and became more detailed. The major headings were: early childhood development programs, meaning equal opportunities for all children through offers of early education, learning and support; integration through sports, meaning inspiring enthusiasm for sports among underrepresented groups such as women and girls from immigrant families; making use of the media, meaning individualized depiction of immigrant groups, adequate participation of immigrants in media careers, and shared use of German-language mainstream media – newspapers, magazines, radio and television – to an adequate

²⁶http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/IB/2012-01-31-nap-kurzfassung-presse-englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1

degree by all population group; and living in cultural diversity, meaning strengthening intercultural skills, launching cultural facilities and projects for multiple cultures.²⁷

In addition to these issues, NAP also aimed to recover health policies on behalf of immigrants, to communicate with parents from immigrant families, to provide specific funding for schools with a high share of students with a migration background, and to offer special support for job-related language courses at vocational training schools.²⁸ The matter of labor market and work life of migrants was also included in NAP. There, following objectives were decided: First, creating opportunities for employment and raising qualification; second, getting cross-cultural and immigrant specific qualifications for the public advisory staff; third, improving the integration process in business life and enhancement of qualified staff among immigrants.²⁹

Six integration summits have been organized since 2006 and NAP was introduced in 2012, as mentioned earlier. In 2006, a preliminary session of German Islam Conference (DIK) was also held, which will be documented the next section. However, before proceeding to DIK, I would like to touch upon the criticisms towards the Integration Summits in Germany through scanning the mass media.

The First Integration Summit was held in 2006, and the second gathering was in 2007. However, four major Turkish immigrant associations, namely The Turkish Community in

²⁷ Maria Böhmer, "The National Integration Plan – A Contribution of Germany Towards Shaping a European Integration Policy" (Statement of Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees and Integration Berlin),
www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Resources/Forum21/Issue_No10/N10_National_integration_plan_en.pdf

See also: www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Anlagen/IB/2012-01-31-flyer-nap-englisch-barrierefrei.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3

²⁸ Maria Böhmer, "The National Integration Plan – A Contribution of Germany Towards Shaping a European Integration Policy" (Statement of Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees and Integration Berlin)

²⁹ www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/BeauftragtefuerIntegration/nap/integrationsgipfel/integrationsgipfel5/node.html

Germany (TGD), the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DİTİB), the Federation of Turkish Parent Associations (FÖDET), and *Türkisch-Deutsche Gesundheitsstiftung e.V. (Türk Alman Sağlık Vakfı)* (TDG) decided to boycott the summit because of the regulations within *Immigration Law 2005*, which were discriminative towards Turkish immigrants in terms of family unification and language knowledge.³⁰ With the new regulation, which was put into practice in mid-2007, new requirements for family unification of non-Germans, Germans, and third country nationals were imposed. However, “there is a fundamental distinction between privileged reunification rules for German nationals and for foreigners” (Kreienbrink and Rühl, 2007: 12). Those distinctions are enumerated in the original law as follows:

(1) A foreigner's spouse shall be granted a residence permit if

1. both spouses are at least 18 years of age,
2. the spouse is able to communicate in the German language at least on a basic level
3. the foreigner
 - a) possesses a settlement permit,
 - b) possesses an EU long-term residence permit,
 - c) possesses a residence permit pursuant to Section 20 or Section 25 (1) or (2),
 - d) has held a residence permit for two years and the residence permit is not subject to a subsidiary provision pursuant to Section 8 (2) or the subsequent issuance of a settlement permit has not been ruled out by virtue of a rule of law,
 - e) is in possession of a residence permit, if the marriage existed at the time of said permit being granted and the duration of the foreigner's stay in the federal territory is expected to exceed one year,
 - f) possesses a residence permit pursuant to Section 38a and the marriage already existed in the Member State of the European Union in which the foreigner has the status of a long-term resident, or
 - g) holds an EU Blue Card.

³⁰<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/zuwanderungs-streit-tuerkische-verbaende-boykottieren-integrationsgipfel-a-493694.html>

Note: Section 20 implies the research purposes, and section 25 implies well integrated young, that is, having successfully attended the schools for six years or attending a recognized vocational school in Federal Germany.³¹

As seen above, not only the Germans, but also the EU citizens have the advantage when they want to bring their spouses to Germany. However, foreign spouses have various difficulties when they want to marry non-Germans. Another striking point is that there are exemptions for basic level language requirement for nationals of certain countries. That is, if one's spouse is Japanese, American, New Zealander, Australian, Canadian, South Korean or from Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland or holding a EU citizenship, they do not have to prove their language knowledge since according to visa regulations of Germany, "citizens of Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America may obtain any residence permit that may be required after entering Germany" (BAMF, 2015).³² On the other hand, those who are not citizens of the above countries cannot even enter Germany unless they have the official proof of basic German language knowledge.

In June 2007, *Deutsche Welle* (DW) chose the title "Germany's Integration Summit Clouded by Turkish Boycott" for its internet news on the issue. The news was making a mention of Kenan Kolat, the head of Turkish Association in Berlin and Brandenburg (TGB). He had interpreted the law as ethnic discrimination and double standards. Also to him, the law had nothing to do with forced marriages.³³ Besides TGB, there was also a reference to DİTİB in the news. It was also one of the organizations that boycotted the summit. According to the internet news of DW, general secretary of DİTİB had expressed his disappointment and said: "This is political duplicity and there is no point

³¹http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_aufenthg/englisch_aufenthg.html#p0369 (last amended in September 2013)

³²http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Visabestimmungen_node.html

³³<http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-integration-summit-clouded-by-turkish-boycott/a-2678315>

taking part in the summit... We are not interested in playing bit parts at this meeting and thereby legitimating the law". He had also been offended that in the First Integration Summit they were not included in the discussions on the fight for residence regulations. According to DW news these developments had raised a new point of contention, *spousal immigrants*: "a foreigner who wants to bring his wife to Germany must be able to prove that she can earn her own living. Were a German national to bring a foreign wife to the country, this would not apply" (DW, 2007).³⁴

Another criticism was by Aydan Özoğuz, a member of Bundestag for *SPD*. She complained about the lack of seriousness in the summit in the sense that there were no concrete legal proposals, and she argued: "It's the ministers who get to talk instead of the people really involved in society... The really interesting discussions took place in the coffee breaks" (Conrad, 2013).³⁵

In spite of all these criticisms, German politicians and integration commission declared that the summits would continue, and they interpreted the boycott of the organizations as a counter-productive self-boycott. Böhmer said: "It is in the interests of Germany's 2.5 million Turks to be represented by these organizations at the summit." (DW, 2007) ³⁶

Similarly, in my interview, the consultant of interreligious dialog in DİTİB stated:

...We are the member of both DIK and Integration Summit...However, in the period of Schäuble; they brought the necessity of language for spouses coming from Turkey. For this reason, we boycotted the summit. Media insistently asked, why? We did, because we were against inequality. And this is a lobby work; this meant to give a message to politics. (P5)ⁱ

Finally, an important decision was made by the European Court in July 2014 for a particular case regarding the language barrier.

³⁴<http://www.dw.com/en/muslim-groups-threaten-to-boycott-integration-summit/a-2670743>

³⁵<http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-integration-summit-meets-with-criticism/a-16841129>

³⁶ibid.

According to the court, a lack of language skills shouldn't automatically lead to the rejection of an entry visa application. Instead, Germany must consider the unique circumstances of each individual case. The court went on to say that quickly granting visas for spouses improves the quality of life and promotes the integration of foreign residents (DW, 2014).³⁷

3.5. The German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz or DIK)

DIK was initiated by Schäuble, former Interior Minister, just after the National Integration Summit in 2006. The first session continued between the years 2006-2009. “The intention of Schäuble was to organize a specific platform for discussion on Islam and the integration of Muslim migrants into the receiving society” (Musch, 2012: 81). The argument on the website of DIK is follows:

“One specific aim of the German Islam Conference in its first phase was to improve dialogue between the state and Muslims, thereby making a contribution to the social integration of Muslims and their religious law and to social cohesion in Germany, and so counteract social polarization and segregation.” (DIK, 2010)³⁸

There were totally four plenaries within the first phase: in September, 2006, in May 2007, in March, 2008 and the last in July 2009. In the first phase, fifteen representatives from federal states and local authorities and fifteen representatives from Muslims parts, including Muslim organizations and particular individuals were present. As Muslim organizations, the representatives of IGMG, VIKZ, DiTIB, Central

³⁷<http://www.dw.com/en/european-court-overturns-law-requiring-german-language-skills-for-spouse-visas/a-17772143>

³⁸<http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/DIK/UeberDIK/WasIstDIK/wasistdik-node.html>

Council of Muslims (ZMD)³⁹ and AABF could be enumerated.⁴⁰ The leading issues opened to discussion were German social system, value consensus, democratic culture, secularization, family, education, German understanding of constitutions, separation of church and the state, and Islam lessons in German language. These issues were offered to be discussed around three major terms in order to reach a consensus about the definitions of them: *Integration, religious community, and value society (Wertegemeinschaft)*.

Accordingly, three working groups were set up.

- 1) German social system and German values
- 2) Religious issues in the German understanding of the constitution
- 3) The economy and the media as bridge-builders (DIK, 2010)⁴¹

In addition to these, a discussion group was established on the theme Islam and security. In this group, saving young Muslims from radical Islam groups and cooperation between security authorities and Muslims were discussed. After controversial debates in June 2009, three Muslim organizations agreed upon the meaning of major concepts and accepted the recommendations. However, Islamic Council (*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, IRD*)⁴² refused to sign the declaration because they were critical about the affiliation set up between Islam and

³⁹Having “founded in 1994 as the successor of the Islamic Working Committee in Germany (*Islamicsher Arbeitskreis in Deutschland, IAK*), it now comprises 21 organizations from Turkish, Arab, Albanian, Bosnian, multi-ethnic, and German backgrounds. According to its website, ZMD’s primary mission is to promote Muslim life and Islamic spirituality in Germany and make it easier for Muslims to practice their religion” (Kortmann and Williams, 2013: 45)

⁴⁰https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsche_Islamkonferenz#Teilnehmer_der_ersten_Phase

⁴¹<http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/DIK/UeberDIK/WasIstDIK/wasistdik-node.html>

⁴²Having found in 1986 IRD is an umbrella organization which “comprises 30 Islamic organizations from different national backgrounds. The organization defines as a common coordination and decision-making body which aims at establishing a bridge between Germany and Islamic World. IGMG is by far the largest member organization of IRD” (Kortmann and Williams, 2013: 45).

security in the conference (Munsch, 2012: 83). In my interview with P1, former general secretary of IGMG, he expressed “we participated in German Islam Conference; however, we did not sign the declaration because Islam was handled only within the framework of security; then, we were not invited to the next phase. CDU put a distance with us, but we want to negotiate. We have political demands: we want equal rights just like other religious communities” (P1).ⁱⁱ

In the second phase, the conference was chaired by Dr. Maizière, Interior Minister of the time. Despite the withdrawal of ZMD after IRD, the structure of the DIK continued as the same. Accordingly, “criticism was leveled at the established links between religious and security-related topics and the widespread lack of knowledge about Islam among ministerial officials” (Kortmann and Williams, 2013: 55). On the other hand, chair of DIK preferred to include other religious organizations into the conference such as Central Council of the Moroccans in Germany (*Zentralrat der Morokkaner in Deutschland*), and the Islamic Community of the Bosnians in Germany (*Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland*, IGBD). The Turkish Community in Germany (*Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland*, TGD) also took part as a representative of secular Muslims in Germany. Additionally, individual participants were replaced by new ones. Although more practical matters were taken into agenda such as Islamic religious education in public schools, Imam education and gender equality, security questions were still on the agenda (Musch, 2012: 83-84).

One of my other respondent from ATİB, expressed in the interview: “Two conferences were held, and the first one ended up with defeat. The second one, we should not have attended, yet some organizations did and it was a very big mistake...” To the question: What did you oppose? He answered:

If you invite the persons who are opposed to Islam to a conference titled as Islam, we seek malevolence under it. Instead of tackling with Islamic problems, they focused on security and safety issue. And they concluded that: Islam is dangerous.... There is Islamophobia in Germany, and it is an artificial fact created by German politics. We should defeat this through building good relationships with Germans, good relationships at localities (P8).ⁱⁱⁱ

As a response to the criticisms against the association between security and Islam in the conference, the views of the participant German political actors might be summarized as the follows: Minister of Interior “is prepared to guarantee religious freedom only to the extent that it does not hinder integration into society. By means of the DIK the Ministry gets the opportunity to find out which Muslim organizations are willing to cooperate with the government and which ones refuse to do so” (Musch, 2012: 84). This shows that Islamic organizations are expected to be seen as contact partners or points of cooperation in the process of integration and sustainable harmony in society as understood from the emphasis of promoting tolerance and social cohesion in society and from the shared social values which evoke the term *Leitkultur* in Germany. Despite the criticisms, Islam Conference continued with a third phase from 2010 to 2014. Three key areas produced as a result of the first two phases are as follows:

1) "Promoting institutionalized co-operation"

Supporting the introduction of Islamic religious studies at state schools throughout the country, by means of the Conference

Supporting the introduction of Islamic theology courses at state universities

Developing a guideline for training imams in German culture and language based on training programs introduced since 2011 throughout Germany at a local level.

Supporting the exchange of experience between the state and Muslims on issues of co-operation based on German religious constitutional law.

DIK study "Islamic community life in Germany"

2) "Gender equality as a common value"

Declaration against domestic violence and forced marriage

Assistance for multipliers in Muslim groups in dealing with role-related questions

Professional conference "Muslims and the labor market: supporting diversity, using potential more effectively"

"Better integration of Muslims into the labor market" publication

Integration competition for model projects by and with Muslims

Youth competition "Success stories" to promote a more positive attitude in reporting on Muslims in Germany

3) "Preventing extremism, radicalization and social polarization"

Declaration against social polarization

"Working together against social polarization" initiative

Professional conference entitled "Anti-Muslim prejudice - phenomenon and counter strategies (DIK, 2013)⁴³

Surprisingly, IRD participated in the third phase, after a four-year break, besides the other member organizations, AABF, VIKZ, DİTİB, and TGD. The participation of IRD, which heavily consist of members of IGMG, was due to the resignation of the general secretary. He was charged with corruption in a criminal case (DW, 2014).⁴⁴

All in all, in the National Integration Summit 2006, there was a boycott experience by certain Turkish immigrant groups; DİTİB and TGD boycotted the conference as a protest of *Immigration Law 2005*. Although they protested, they made their voice public and became visible with this action. In the guest list of the conference, besides the ethnic Turkish organizations such as DİTİB, TGD and Turkish-Parents Associations, people with business affiliations such as a representative of Doğan Media Group, owner of Ögel Tourand, İhlas Media Group, and Turkey origin politicians and bureaucrats were

⁴³<http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/DIK/ArbeitDIK/ArbeitDIK2009>

⁴⁴<http://www.dw.com/tr/islam-konferans%C4%B1-yeniden-yap%C4%B1lan%C4%B1yor/a-17516230>

present. Alevi Federation of Germany was invited to the Fourth Integration Summit held in 2010. In German Islam Conference IGMG, VIKZ, DITIB, ZMD and AABF were present. The aim was improving dialogue with Muslims and the state. However, it was a disappointment on the part of Muslim organizations because to them, Islam was taken as a security matter at the conference. After the conference, the Ministry of Interior stated that they had understood who was willing to cooperate with the government. It clearly indicates that Islamic organizations were tried to be designed as contact partners of cooperation. The issues worked on in the conference were the introduction of Islamic theology classes at universities, stressing on gender equality and preventing Islamic radicalization.

3.6. The Foreign Citizens Advisory Councils (*Integrationrats*) as Channels of Local Political Participation

The foundation of foreign citizen councils dates back to the 1970s when several West-German municipalities introduced them as *Ausländerbeiräte* (Foreign Citizen Advisory Councils, FCAC). The first idea behind the FCACs was the demand for a more local democracy by immigrants; thereby establishing a unique platform enabling immigrants to discuss their own problems. In the course of time, non-German citizens were entitled to elect a board and advise the municipalities about foreigners concerns and interests. Accordingly, in Bielefeld, the first election was held in 1986. Before 1986 when the members of the councils were not elected but appointed, the existence of the council was not much known by the foreign population.

The FCACs have been organized in *Länder* level, under the name of *Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft der kommunalen Migrantenvertretungen*, meaning the state-working group of municipal representative of migrants (LAGA) since 1996. It is the union of integration councils or integration committees that exist in the regions and cities of NRW. The function of it is to take on the pursuits and demands of the representatives from cities and regions thereby supporting their working areas. The

FCACs have also existed in federal level since 1998. *Bundesausländerbeirat*, meaning Federal Foreigners' Advisory Council, works as a central contact organization and gives advice to the Federal Government, the Federal Parliament (*Bundestag*) and the Federal Assembly (*Bundesrat*) about the issues related to the foreigners and immigrants. Other than the functions related to being a platform for immigrants' problems, two hidden functions of the councils are urging representatives from different nationalities and diverse ideas from the same nationalities to work together; the board members' becoming potential future activists of the German political parties (Miera, 2009: 17; Voßhans and Sağ, 2010; Interview with P12; Cyrus, 2005: 33).

Looking into the history, the transformation of FCACs can be summarized as follows: In the 1970s, their title was *Ausländerbeiräte* (Foreigner's committee). In 2004, that was changed into *Migrationsrat* (Migration assembly), and since 2010, they have been named *Integrationrats* (Integration assembly). However, this transformation should be explained in a more detailed way in order to explain the changing structure of the councils. Thus, at this point, I find it useful to focus on the example of Bielefeld to document the change in the structure of the councils. After that, participation and representation rates of the councils will be given by reference to NRW, which this study particularly deals with. Lastly, I will touch upon the controversial aspect of the councils, specifically regarding their limited functions.

To begin with "foreign council", nationwide, three methods were tried in order to render the councils more attractive to the foreign population. First, election of candidates by ballot after 1986; second, appointment system which was applied by head of administrations or local units; third, mixed systems within which a part of the advisory board is appointed, and the other part is elected. The mixed system was implemented in NRW (Voßhans and Sağ, 2010: 10)

In Bielefeld, the first foreign advisory board was founded with the name "Council for Foreign Employees Issues" in the early 1970s. Issues of Aliens' Law, right of settlement,

political activism, social care, vocational education, and language courses were among the discussed topics. In 1973, this council was transformed into a foreign advisory board. At the time, 21.500 immigrated employees, including their families resided in Bielefeld. It was thought that the inclusion of foreign employees and their families into the working and daily life was an important issue because labor force of immigrants provided an important basis for the entire economic life. Thus, local politics should work for immigrated workers in order to make them feel as accepted and as full members of the society. As in the current law, participation of non-German citizens in city's administration was not legitimate, active cooperation was possible in a foreign advisory board. One of the duties of the board was to "contribute to the diverse problems of immigrated employees and their families with respect to the social, health and cultural sector". In order to achieve this, preschool and school education of children should be assured. Furthermore, sufficient housing and organization of recreational activities should be the focus (ibid: 11).

Other competences of the foreign advisory board were as follows: Coordination of all action for immigrants and their families, encouragement of contact and trustful collaboration with all the other councils, acceptance of general desires, suggestions and ideas concerning immigrated employees. consultancy to further the general desires, suggestions and the ideas of immigrated employees towards the regarded authority, consultancy to the city's council, administration and to others who are concerned with immigrants' issues, analysis of immigrated employees' state, urging formulations to solve problems directed to the appropriate authority, making publications on immigrated employees' current state, and touting for immigrated workers' issues in associations with press, radio and television. Additionally, in case of demand, foreign advisory board should seek help from representatives of the authorities, organizations and associations (ibid: 12).

As for the composition of the council, it consisted of one representative who is suggested by the free associations and who is from the local residences of Italians, Yugoslavians, Turks, Spanish, Greek and Portugal (the countries predominantly having guest worker agreement with Germany); three representatives of the city council, and one civic representative; representatives of the authorities (local registration office school board, cultural office, welfare agency, child protective service, health office, housing office) who are appointed by the head of city council; one representative from Worker's Welfare Association and Catholic charities; one representative of (a) union(s); and one representative of employment agency (ibid: 12).

From 1986 on, representatives of residents started to be elected in ballots. New members were introduced, and a chairman and a vice chairman were elected. Another change was that decision on the functions of the board was left to its members. The incorporation into the system of local politics, decision making processes and taking of decisions had to be internalized by the members. To this end, an information seminar on request by foreign advisory board was held. The board invited representatives of cultural office, child protective services and the school board in order to inform them about the competences of the board. Subsequently, specific issues such as hostility against immigrants, asylum requests and problems, and support for the Greek school of Bielefeld and so forth were discussed together. One new topic was also opened to discussion: Preparatory consultancy of the annual budget under the aspects of immigration and integration. In fact, this was a real challenge and a new experience for many members (ibid: 24).

After a conference in October 1986, certain negative aspects of the councils were uttered by the board members. That is, foreign advisory councils were not taken seriously by the city council and political parties. In general, representatives of parliamentary groups agreed on and supported the suggestions of the council during the sessions, but when it came to the implementation, they abstained from realizing

the decisions. Therefore, the foreign advisory councils could not induce any fundamental changes in immigrant politics. Furthermore, the reason behind the latter was not only due to the city councils and political parties; there were also self-critiques such as diverse interests and motivations of the members and lack of incorporation among the members due to this. For instance, some members were just saying yes to the decisions without listening (ibid: 25).

The main change of the ballot occurred in the third ballot in 1995. The ballot was held on 7 March, 1995, in which 25, 000 immigrants were eligible to vote. It ended with a participation of 21.8 %, and the majority contained Turkish groups with a religious-Islamic or nationalistic classification (ibid: 26).

On 21 November, 2004, the elections for the “immigrant council” were held, which was the new council replacing “foreign council”. Actually the word “foreign” did not reflect the reality any more. The newly built immigrant councils held more competences and brought decision making chances. The immigrant council received 21 seats for voting members; 14 members (two-third), including their personal substitutes, were elected in a general, free, secret and equal ballot; 7 voting members (one-third), and their personal substitutes, were elected from city council. These 7 members were the representatives of the political parties elected to the city council. In the following year, in 2009, with the amendment in municipal law (NRW Law no: 27), encouragement of political participation in local authorities was targeted. For this law, between the years 2005-2009 countless sessions and discussions were held between LAGA (integration committees) and the federal state government in order to make the council of integration the only political participation council of migrants in NRW; to implement the distribution of 2/3 migrants to 1/3 city council members, to achieve active franchise for naturalized citizens and ethnic German repatriates without time restrictions, and to conduct the ballot of the council at the same time as local elections (ibid: 29- 30).

Today, “immigration councils” are called “integration councils”. The change was introduced in 2010 as stated earlier. These new councils are considered as regular councils. Only in the case of an explicit decision made by a city council, local authorities can change the council into a committee of integration. This committee of integration can consult to the city council, and it consists of appointed members of the city council. By 2009, the number of the members in the council had increased to 25 from 21. Out of 25, 8 members are from the representatives of the political parties elected to the city council. According to the law, local communities over 5,000 residents without German citizenship must set up an integration council. Local communities with 2,000-5,000 residents without German citizenship must set up a council if at least 200 residents are eligible to vote and request for a council. Local communities with less than 2,000 residents without German citizenship can set up a council voluntarily. Since 2004, councils of integration have had a legal basis according to Municipality Code, and thus today, they are more powerful and effective than before (ibid: 30).

The voting participation is generally low in the elections of integration councils. As Cyrus (2005), points out, the rate of the participation in 2004 elections in NRW was between 2.1 % (City Löhne) and 31.9 % (City Lünen) with the average 12.28 %. “In 85 municipalities altogether 1,048 council members of 47 different nationalities were elected...Turkish candidates received 56 % of the votes while candidates from other non-European countries received only 9 %. The share of women was 23.9 % by the year 2005” (Cyrus, 2005: 33).

With respect to the low participation rates in the elections, there is an argument that as the number of migrants eligible to naturalization has grown with the last amendment in the law, the representation in integration councils is lower. However, as the newly comers are always the potential case for European countries, there will be always a considerable number of non-citizen immigrants in Germany, too. Therefore,

this argument does not necessarily explain the lower rate of participation for the elections of integration councils.

Figure 7 shows the national background of immigrant councilors in 29 cities in NRW in 2009 (Schönwälder and Kofri, 2010:34).

Figure 7 National backgrounds of immigrant councilors

National background	Number of councilors
Turkey	43
Other 'Guest Worker' States	13
Greece	4
Italy	4
former Yugoslavia	3
Spain	1
Portugal	1
Eastern Europe	8
Poland	3
former Soviet Union	2
Bulgaria	2
former Czechoslovakia	1
Other European States	6
Austria	2
Netherlands	2
Albania	1
United Kingdom	1
Asia	4
Iran	3
India	1
Latin America	3
Argentina	1
Columbia	1
Peru	1
Africa	2
Congo	1
Morocco	1

Source: MPI-IMCO Database

In the above picture, the striking point is that Turkish nationals are markedly higher in number compared to the other nationalities. This over-representation of Turks is not specific to Germany and NRW. In other European countries such as Denmark and Netherlands, Turks are also usually represented with relatively high numbers. There can be four explanations of this fact according to Schönwälder and Kofri: First, Turks have a strong community structure. As Tillie (2004) showed already in the case of Amsterdam, ethnic social capital is the most important indicator of dense political organization and participation. Second, this fact is probably because of the higher rates of discrimination against Turkish population, connected to the hatred to Islam. Therefore, Turks have a stronger motivation to get organized and to be active. Third, the Turks in Germany are a highly politicized group and potential activists in German politics, which makes them more readily available than in other groups. Lastly, as the public debate over immigrants is concentrated on the Turkish population, political parties are interested in Turkish candidates thinking that a strong group consciousness has a positive impact on voter mobilization (Schönwälder and Kofri, 2010: 35).

However, the above research only focuses on the larger cities in NRW. Therefore, it should be kept in mind “the size of the immigrant electorate in national elections has been estimated at 9% whereas it ranges between 7% and 26% in the cities analyzed here” (ibid: 37). Furthermore, the numbers and percentages cannot explain the reasons behind the different local political participation patterns in different cities. Therefore, qualitative studies should analyze the dynamics of local politics to explore the reasons for different degrees of mobilization among immigrants and the attitude toward immigrant politicians.

As for the roles of integration councils, there are some controversies. The most striking one is their limited functions and impacts on the politics due to several reasons such as low rate of participation in the elections, lack of motivation of the members, loss of belief to the functions of it and the opposition to its very existence. The others could be

counted as “its lack of authority in local government, a low level of acknowledgement of the boards by German politicians, missing information on its existence and a low level of professionalism” (Miera, 2009: 18).

According to some, integration councils should be turned into “integration advisory councils” and no election should be held. The tasks of the advisory councils should be only to engage with the issues about integration or discrimination regardless of the background of representatives (migrant or non-migrant) (interview with P13; Miera, 2009: 18). An example of this exists in Berlin. Founded in 2003, it consists of “state secretaries, representative of Berlin districts, of associations, trade unions and other NGOs and six elected members of migrants organizations...The council meets three or four times a year as a permanent round table...” (Miera, 2009: 18).

However, such local councils can also be criticized for only being engaged in integration and the discrimination issues. To my impressions from the interviews, the council does not provide a platform for a wide range of political ideas. It is content with the inspection of the violations of anti-discrimination law, or the issues of integration. This should not mean that political activism against discrimination is not necessary; however, it seems that the expectations from the councils are not limited to this.

Several examples help to make clear the problematic aspects of the councils. One member of the council argues “What is true is the removal of these councils and giving all migrants right to vote regardless of their citizenship. In this way ,the higher the number in municipalities, immigrants can be much more effective at federal level, and there would be no need for integration councils” (P10).^{iv}

Another interviewee states:

There is not enough interest to the integration council. This is because first and second generations are not interested in political participation channels in Germany, rather they still follow the developments in Turkey, third generation on the other hand does not identify themselves with the word 'integration', they think they do not need an integration council as they were born and went to school in Germany (P13).^v

To the question of, 'what is the most important problem with the councils?' the head of the council answers: "There are many elected members who do not attend the meetings at the council regularly. Usually half of the members attend...Because of this, the success of the council depends on the personal attempts" (P12).^{vi} To the same question, another member answers: "I think all the German institutions should discuss their institutional identity once more. Because assimilationist approach still exists in Germany. Yet, there is a diverse, multi-cultural population living here. They should ask 'how we can answer the needs of this population'" (P13).^{vii}

Last but not the least, in Foreign Advisory Councils Turks and Turkish Islamic groups are more dominantly seen than any other group. This can be explained by their strong ethnic social capitals. Related to this, other Turkey origin groups abstain from participating in those councils because of two reasons: First, they do not believe in their functions. Second, they feel uncomfortable due the dominance of Islamic groups.

3.7. Civic Memberships of Immigrants in Associations, Political Parties and Trade Unions

Besides the participation in integration councils, a focus on immigrants' civic participation in host societies will be relevant to this dissertation. Therefore, in this section, I will present a picture of the civic memberships of immigrants in associations, political parties and trade unions, considering the various aspects of this participation. In that respect, I will focus on some specific projects. One example of such a project is

the project of POLITIS, which was funded by the European Commission. The full title is “Building Europe with New Citizens? An Inquiry into Civic Participation of Naturalized Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries”. The country report of Germany was written out by Cyrus (2005). The major concern of the report is to handle the five different dimensions of the political participation: participation in institutions and organization of the host society; participation in immigrant organizations; aspects of individual civic participation like motivations, interests, trajectories; and finally segregating and integrative impact of immigrant organizations. (Cyrus, 2005: 25- 26). Without going deep into the individual motivations and interests, these different dimensions will help to show the general picture of immigrant’s participation in trade unions, political parties, and associations.

Figure 8 A Comparison of participation in German associations and Turkish associations

Table 3: Membership of Turkish immigrants in North-Rhine Westphalia in German and Turkish associations and confederations (in percent)

German Association	Percent	Turkish Association	Percent
Trade Union	16.7	Religious association	18.3
Sports Club	12.9	Cultural Association	9.1
Business or trade association	4.1	Sports club	6.8
Cultural association	2.7	Educational association	2.4
Political association or group	2.7	Ethnic or national association	2.1
Educational association	2.1	Political association or group	1.5
Leisure time club	1.8	Other	1.3
Other	1.8	Business or professional association	0.9
Religious association	0.4	Leisure time club	0.4
National or ethnic	- / -	Trade union	- / -

Source: (Halm 2002: 4)

According to a telephone survey conducted in NRW in 2001, of the 998 respondents, about one third is a member of a Turkish association and another one third is a member of a German association; 15% of the respondents have double membership. As the above figure shows, membership in trade unions and sport clubs have the highest rates, on the other hand, religious organizations are on the top among the

Turkish associations (ibid: 26-27). When the memberships in German political parties are observed, the rates of membership is very low.

“0,4% of all Turkish, Spanish, Italian, former Yugoslavian and Greek nationals were members of a party...Among Turkish respondents only 3,4% were members of a political party or association” (ibid:32).

On the other hand, many of the political parties in Germany have started to be concerned with naturalized immigrants as immigrants have been considered more of a relevant part of the electorate. Except extreme right parties, all parties have established particular committees for the integration of immigrants.

In last years, politicians with a migration background took up higher positions in the party hierarchy and gained some public attention...Currently, only five members of the Federal Parliament are immigrants of foreign descent...In the 15 parliaments (of the federal state) 8 further naturalized immigrants are members (ibid: 32).

According to more recent data, there were about 80 deputies of Turkish origin in German parliaments in 2007 including independent candidates, considering 2.5 million residents of Turkish background and nearly 700.000 Germans of Turkish origin. By 2009, there were eleven deputies with a migration background in *Bundestag*. The following figure indicates the deputies with a migration background in German Federal Parliament in 2009 (Miera, 2009: 27-28).

Figure 9 Deputies with migration background in German Parliament (2005-2009)

Table 3: Deputies with migration background in German Federal Parliament (2005-2009)

Party	MPs with a migration background	Names (migration generation, country of origin)	Percentage of MPs of the party	Total of MPs
CDU/CSU	1	Michaela Noll (2 nd generation, Iran)	0.4	223
SPD	3	Lale Akgün (1 st generation, Turkey) Josip Juratovic (1 st generation, Yugoslavia) Sebastian Edathy (2 nd generation, India)	1.4	222
FDP	0	--	0	61
Green Party	4	Ekin Deligöz (1 st generation, Turkey) Jerzy Montag (1 st generation, Poland) Omid Nouripour (1 st generation, Iran) Josef P. Winkler (2 nd generation, India)	7.8	51
Left Party	3	Hüseyin-Kenan Aydın (1 st generation, Turkey) Hakki Keskin (1 st generation, Turkey) Sevim Dagdelen (2 nd generation, Turkey)	5.7	53
Total	11		1.8	612 ⁷⁵

Source: Wüst 2006: 233

A similar picture of Turkey origin deputies in German Federal Parliament (2013-present) can be seen in Table 6

Table 6 Turkey origin deputies in German Federal Parliament (2013- present)

Party	MPs with a Migration background	Names (birth of year, birth of place)	Total percentage of MPs with migration background	Total of MPs
CDU	8	Cemile Giousouf, 1978, Leverkusen	3.1	255
CSU	1		1.8	56
SPD	13	Metin Hakverdi, 1969, Hamburg Aydan Özoğuz, 1967, Hamburg Mahmut Özdemir, 1987, Duisburg Cansel Kızıltepe, 1975, Berlin Gülistan Yüksel, 1962, Adana	6.7	193
Linke	8	Sevim Dağdelen, 1975, Duisburg Azize Tank, 1950, Turkey	12.5	64
Grünne	7	Ekin Deligöz, 1971, Tokat Özcan Mutlu, 1968, Kelkit Cem Özdemir, 1965, Bad Urach	11.1	63
Total	37		5,86	631

Source: www.bundestag.de table format is prepared by me.

It is observed from Table 2 that deputies with a migration experience have increased to 37 from 11 compared to previous period. In a similar vein, the number of MPs with familiar references in Turkey has increased to 11 from 5.


Figure 10 compares the numbers of deputies according to the past two periods of Bundestag. One of them shows the numbers since 2013; the other indicates the years between 2009 and 2013. According to the figure, there is a visible increase in the numbers of deputies with a migration experience from the near past to the present.

Figure 10⁴⁵ Comparison of numbers of deputies with migration background with respect to last two election period

Parteien	Bundestag (ab Sept. 2013)		Bundestag 2009-2013	
	Abgeordnete insgesamt	Abgeordnete mit MH	Abgeordnete insgesamt	Abgeordnete mit MH
CDU	255	8	194	1
CSU	56	1	45	0
SPD	193	13	146	4
Linke	64	8	68	6
Grüne	63	7	76	6

⁴⁵*Abgeordnete* means member of parliament. *Insgesamt* means in total in English. MH is the abbreviation for *Migrationhintergrund* that means having migration background or having migration experience at least because of one family member.

Figure 11 Deputies with and without migration background in Federal German Parliament (2013-present)



Above, Figure 11 shows the current percentage of members of parliaments with and without a migration background according to the political parties in Federal German Parliament. It has been clearly seen that, *die Linke* (Left Party) is the party which represents the immigrants most; *Grüne* (Greens) is in the second place, and *SPD* (*SDP*) is in the last.

As for the interest groups, the trade unions are the most important. It is because immigrants have got organized in trade unions since the beginning as they came as foreign workers. Trade unions do not only protect immigrants' economic rights but also lobby for the fair treatment of immigrants. "Currently about 10% of the 7 million union members are immigrants..." On the other hand, "membership rates are decreasing... Among Turkish respondents the membership rate decreased from 51.4% in 1985 to 26.8 % in 2001". Still, foreign workers are over-represented in trade unions just because they heavily work in unionized industrial jobs (ibid: 34-35).

According to the research of Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IG Metall, Industriegewerkschaft Metall), in 2001, “about 10% of the 2.77 million IG Metall members were foreign nationals. In the industries in the domain of the IG Metall, 54% of the foreign employees are unionized”. This high share of immigrant workers is not only explained by the protection of economic rights, but also by the fact that trade unions are like political homelands and a human rights organizations for the workers as they feel as excluded from the political life. Also there is evidence that migrant worker organizations function as recruitment centers for the trade unions (ibid: 35).


When the immigrant associations are concerned, unfortunately, there is no precise figure available. However, a mapping study indicates that there are about 2500 formal and informal immigrant associations only in NRW. In the existing research studies, usually, formal participation is taken into consideration, yet, active involvement of the individuals is also a very important indicator for immigrant associations. Being an active member is even regarded as equal to formal membership. Some self-organized student groups, initiatives and various groups of immigrants meet informally in the rooms of churches or associations. Particularly, asylum seekers and refugees establish informal networks most probably because they have no chance to be registered formally. Newly arrived groups may also establish informal organizations. These groups usually cooperate with German grass-root associations (ibid: 38). Furthermore, political groups sometimes avoid being registered. As an example, unregistered Kurdish associations have a higher share due to the political sensitiveness and potential suppression.

If a categorization considering the functions of immigrant associations is to be made, Figure 16 below could be helpful to understand the variety of organizations. However, it should be noted that sometimes the functions of organizations overlap, thereby making a clear cut categorization problematic. As seen in Figure 12 below, cultural organizations and religious organizations could overlap, since there is considerable number of Islamic organizations named as Islamic cultural centers. In the chart,

meeting centers appointed a %17 share are described as worker clubs which were active in the 60s and 70s. They have recently been used as meeting places. An interpretation of these is also problematic as it is strongly possible to combine political associations with these meeting centers.

Figure 12 Share of immigrant Associations according to functions

Figure 2: Immigrant associations according to functional type



Source: Organisationsstudie Ausländische Vereine in Deutschland, IfPol, WWU Münster, quoted according to (Hunger 2002).

The raise and increasing strength of Islamic organizations could be understood from the number of members only for Islamic Community National View (IGMG), which is 27,000. Today, most of the religious associations are organized as part of a confederation at state, or federal level. Religious associations deserve particular attention because they have more than one function. They do not serve only places for pray, they also make lobby for Islamic religious concerns. Furthermore, they organize

leisure time activities via sport clubs. Almost all religious organizations have their own football teams especially for younger generations (ibid: 40-41).

Within cultural associations are also ethnic associations, organizing cultural activities such as folklore, music events and literature readings. On the other hand, it is also known that Kurdish associations organize such organizations along with their political characters. Religious activities of Alevi organizations can also be accepted as cultural since *saz* and *semah* are not only seen as religious activities, but also as cultural ones in their beliefs. There is also information that 90 % of the immigrant associations organize cultural events. Sometimes, they also organize common activities and share their places and meeting areas with each other.

There are also political associations dealing with the exile-parties of Turkish, Kurdish or African immigrants. In the 1970s, these organizations were highly focused on homeland politics as a response to their political situation. However, today, they have turned their faces more to host countries and struggle for their rights in Germany.

Parents and family associations are another group among the immigrant organizations. Since the children of immigrant families started to go to school in Germany, educational problems of immigrants' children have also become an issue. While Greek parents lobby for separate classes for their children, Turkish associations lobby for Turkish language classes and religious education. Spanish families, on the other hand, prefer their children's integration into normal classes.

Humanitarian aid associations are mostly common among immigrants from former Yugoslavia and Bosnia according to a survey conducted in NRW. They usually organize aid for the people in the homeland or for people in need of assistance in Germany. It is also known that religious organizations organize aid campaigns for people in poor Muslim countries, especially during religious festivals.

Immigrant business associations are another example. Their aim is to support the economic activities of immigrants and cooperate with the German business sectors. There are nearly forty Turkish business organizations, half of which are federations and unions. Confederation of Turkish Employers and Industrialist in Europe (ATIAD) is one of the most well-known unions. Lastly, there are associations particularly targeting groups such as the young, students, women or elderly people (ibid: 41-42).

Overall, considering the informal networks and groups, there are numerous organizations founded by the immigrants in Germany. Since many of them are multi-functioned, it is difficult to make a clear categorization of them. On the other hand, it is known that organizational patterns are diverse among different immigrant groups. For example, among Spanish immigrant organizations, family and parent associations constitute one quarter of all Spanish immigrant associations while among Turkish ones, religious associations constitute the same ratio. In fact, according to a survey, the share of religiously oriented associations is nearly 36% among the immigrants with a Turkey background (ibid: 42). This is probably due to the mobilization and organizational power of Islamic immigrant groups among the other groups in the same category.

To conclude, this chapter has elaborated not only on the legal processes related to the political membership of immigrants in Germany but also on the picture of various channels of immigrants' political participation with the help of interviews, official resources, reports and the project papers. By doing this, I have aimed at drawing the institutional trajectory, or borderline of the very subject of this study, *political participation of immigrants*. This chapter will be a base for my empirical research with a special emphasis on Turkey origin population's political status.

CHAPTER 4

APPROACHES ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF MIGRANTS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the studies around the issue of political participation of immigrants across different countries. Rather than merely focusing on the studies on immigrant organizations or political participation, I have also included the studies concerned with immigrants' participation. Moreover, I have examined different examples from Europe, the US, and Canada rather than limiting myself to the studies on Germany. As for the design of the sections, they have been organized according to the theoretical approaches of the authors. This has been thought to be useful to see how the issue have been perceived so far and how the approaches of scholars differ according to their theoretical basis.

The present literature on the political participation of immigrants can be categorized in four groups: *Institutional approaches*, *social capital approaches*, *transnational approaches* and *the critical studies on integration policies*. Scholars usually handle the issue of political participation in relation to some other concepts such as political integration, incorporation, question of citizenship, debates on inequalities, cultural rights, diversity, multiculturalism, multicultural democracy so on so forth. Since the latter concepts have been used or assumed in each of the four categories I suggested above, these two sets of categorization should not be taken as mutually exclusive. I believe that seeing different approaches attached to different empirical examples will both make it easier to assess the current literature and help the reader grasp the analysis of the cases in the Chapter 5.

In the following section, several studies adopting institutional and political opportunity structure approaches in explaining the participation of immigrants independent of their associational presence will be examined (Soysal, 1994; Boswell, 2007; Earnst, 2005; Koopmans, 2004; Oldman, 2009; Koopmans and Statham, 2000). The next section will be mostly focused on the associational participation of migrants as well as the triad relationship between political participation, social capital and the organizational characters of immigrant groups. (Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, 1999; Tillie and Slijper, 2007; Akçapar, 2009) Furthermore, the link between migrant's political participation and multicultural democracy as well as the characteristics of individual immigrants will be covered with reference to related literature. In the literature, there are also works which focus on the analytical measuring of different conceptual usages of political participation such as political integration, incorporation, assimilation. These studies aim at reaching a valuable measurement for political participation of immigrants dwelling upon the role of social capital on political participation (ed. Morales, L., Giugni, M., 2011). This line of perspective to immigrants' political participation also requires a focus on religious immigrant organizations. Therefore, I will also critically cover the works on organized Islam in Europe, and analyze religious political attachments and forms of participations.

4.2 Conditions of Participation: Institutional and Political Opportunity Structures

Soysal (1994) investigates the changing institution of citizenship in contemporary Europe through empirical evidences from various European nation-states. Written out in 1994, this work is highly comprehensive as well as critical. She suggests four membership models to describe emerging post-national regimes, namely corporatist, liberal, statist and fragmental. She points out that the presense of immigrants challenge the basic logic of national citizenship in the host countries and nation states' having various incorporation regimes gives them rights and protection since a more

universal model of citizenship is required. She calls this model post-national membership.

It is a highly referred study in political sociology since it was the first comprehensive comparative work questioning the sliding ground of nation-states due to the presence of migrant populations on the ground of rights, obligations, membership, participation, collective organization and eventually the conception of citizenship.

It is an interesting study also because it starts with different incorporation models of nation-states and suggests that these models affect the way in which migrants behave and participate in host societies. By doing this, it critically views the studies using migrants' peculiarities as explanatory in participation patterns or adaptation into host societies. In addition to this critical outlook, it also follows an institutional point of view in that it examines official statements, administrative and organizational structures as well as legal frameworks which define the rights of migrants. Finally, it ends up with the idea that nation-states are no longer the major determinants in drawing the borders of citizenship and political membership. Having admitted the role of the state as the agency in the implementation of rights, Soysal argues: "rights, participation, and representation in a polity are increasingly matters beyond the vocabulary of national citizenship" (Soysal, 1994: 165).

Another important point which makes this study significant is that it deals with how migrants participate into host countries' politics; in other words, how they take part in politics without questioning whether or not they have been well adapted to the society. Soysal calls this notion incorporation. Yet, she does not carry the matter further to question how the content of this incorporation is diverse through different migrant groups with respect to their understandings of political participation. This question, however, could have brought a detailed picture of the functions of migrant associations within the host society's polity. Therefore, in that sense, it is not a detailed work in explaining what has come out of the implementation of policies within a nation

state, or what kind of divergences appear in relation to the political membership of different migrant organizations and why. Furthermore, having presented new models of membership that transcends the boundaries of nation states, it does not consider how migrant organizations put themselves in public and what their self-descriptions of political participation are.

According to Soysal (2004), there are four basic incorporation models namely corporatist, liberal, statist and fragmental. The typology of membership is presented as below:

Table 7 Organizational Configuration of Incorporation

		Locus of Action	
		Centralized	Decentralized
And Authority			
Society		I. Corporatist Sweden Netherlands	II. Liberal Switzerland Britain
	State	Germany (mixed case) III. Statist France	IV. Fragmental Gulf oil Countries

In the corporatist model, there are intermediary structures sponsored by the state. Corporate groups defined by different identities such as gender, occupation, ethnicity,

and religion are assumed to have natural rights. Thus, immigrants are legitimate actors as long as they subscribe into a collective group (Soysal, 1994: 37).

In the liberal model, individuals are the sources of action and authority, and the labor market is the main instrument of incorporation. There is a horizontal and decentralized pattern of policy making and organization of migrants (Soysal, 1994: 38).

In the statist model, the state is the source of authority and organizes the polity. It deals with citizens in a similar vision to liberal model; however, as the individuals are subordinated to the state, the model of operation is realized through top-down mechanisms (Soysal, 1994: 39).

In fragmental model, the state has the sovereign rule and a limited interaction with the society. Migrants participate in labor markets, but not necessarily in other societal structures. Instead, primordial groups such as family, clan, and church dominate the social and public life (ibid).

When these models are concerned, Germany's membership model is a mixed one. Although it is a federative political system, it has a highly bureaucratic and centralized public sphere. There are complex institutions in federal level and these institutions, alongside churches, trade unions, and welfare institutions, are effective in policy making (ibid).

Another prominent name in the literature, Boswell (2007) depicts a critical question and discusses the role of the state in the existing migration theories. While doing so, she identifies two groups. In the first group are the political economy approaches, basically exemplified in the work of Freeman (1995)⁴⁶. Boswell criticizes Freeman according to cost and benefits analysis on the grounds of overemphasizing the role of individual choices and overlooking the role of the state. The second group identified by Boswell, on the other hand, consists of neo-institutional approaches, claiming that

⁴⁶ "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States" *International Migration Review* 24(4):881-902

nation states are under liberal constraints and that they encounter the notion of moral equality of all human beings. Soysal's work is categorized in this second group.

The criticism of Boswell to neo-institutional theories are based on the absence of two questions. First, "under what conditions are claims for rights successful?" (Boswell, 2007: 81). That is, under which conditions can societal groups have an influence on state policies? What are their sources of motivation? Second, what motivates the state to respond to them? She also criticizes these theories for not being predictive to future migration policies since "neo-institutional theory is a pattern theory helping us particularly to delineate the structures" (Boswell, 2007: 76).

Boswell concludes the argument by pointing out the twofold nature of the existing literature on migration theories. That is, while the first group overemphasize the role of the agent, it has the risk of falling into reductionism or generalizations, but it has the power of prediction; the second group gives more weight to institutions but lacks an adequate theory of the agency, and it is poor in its predictive power. Therefore, there should be a third formulation, an alternative theory of migration policy avoiding the major pitfalls of the two approaches.

In that respect, Boswell argues that the state must remain central since "it continues to be the focus of expectations concerning the delivery of security, justice and prosperity – even if this responsibility is difficult (some would argue impossible) to fulfill" (Boswell, 2007: 88). Accordingly, she offers "four criteria for assessing state legitimacy: fairness, accumulation, security and institutional legitimacy" (Boswell, 2007: 89). She reminds that states need to secure consent of migrant groups and ensure institutional legitimacy. The response of the states to these four functional imperatives is not aroused from the characteristics of institutions or societal groups; rather it is contingent. That is, there might be convergence between liberal pressures and each of these functional imperatives. For example, imperative of accumulation might make

states more liberal in labor-migration policies, or needs for legitimacy could encourage states to expand the rights of migrants (Boswell, 2007: 91).

Boswell’s alternative theory suggestion is a valuable endeavor and contribution to the institutional approaches in migration studies since it asks for the place of agency without overemphasizing the role of it, and without attributing objective interests to them. On the other hand, in the last instance, it adopts a state centered approach focusing on state legitimacy crisis as remarked by Offe (1972)⁴⁷ and Habermas (1997)⁴⁸ and suggests further empirical research on state conceptions to find out preconditions for its legitimacy (Boswell, 2007: 96). See the model below:

Table 8 Types of Policy Responses

	Type 1: Nonpoliticized	Type 2: Elitist	Type 3: Populist	Type 4: Nontransparent	Type 5: Uncontrolled
Security	+	+	+	+	Unstable
Accumulation	+	+	-	+	+
Fairness	+	-	+	Unstable	+
Institutional legitimacy	+	+	-	+	Unstable

According to Table 8, type 1 Boswell suggests “was the characteristic of labor migration and asylum policies in most continental European immigration countries between the 1950s and early 1970s” (Boswell, 2007:94). Type 2 would be postwar UK policy before the 1970s. Type 3 implies the considerations of homogeneity and security; this would be some of the Gulf countries. Types 4 and 5 denote many European countries. Germany, for example, is a typical case of type 4. Type 5, on the other hand, could show Italian migration policy (Boswell, 2007: 95).

⁴⁷J. Offe, *Struktureprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Piore, K.J.

⁴⁸J. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* Trans. T.McCharty. Boston, MA: Beacon press

To continue with a work with historical institutional perspective, David C. Earnest (2005) compares the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium with regard to political incorporation of noncitizen migrants. The major objective of the study is to examine the voting rights experiences of these three European democracies through a consideration of their historical backgrounds and their understandings of sovereignty, citizenship and democracy. Displaying how different meanings the extension of the voting rights and alien franchise have in these countries will also be helpful for my study. In Earnest's view, in order to properly grasp the different patterns of political incorporation of resident aliens, one must understand the unique historical experiences and social conflicts shaping citizenship as an institution (Earnest, 2005: 3).

Undoubtedly, national and transnational theses locate the changing boundaries of citizenship at the center of the debates. While nationalist analyses stress the link between nation and state, transnational analyses remind the weakening tie between these two by the help of international institutions and norms. This refers to the question of perceiving the nation as an ethno-national community or as a multinational political construction. Understanding of citizenship is also shaped according to this understanding on the basis of *jus soli* referring to membership in the state or *jus sanguinis* referring to membership in the nation. *Jus soli* states tend to provide wider range of rights in incorporation policies compared to *jus sanguinis* states (Earnest, 2005: 6). All having proportional representation systems, Earnest expects that these three countries are alike in their ways to enfranchise aliens and to embody civic norms for minority groups. However, this is not the case; each country has a different experience in voting rights and in their understanding of citizenship.

The Netherlands has a communitarian-liberal model of citizenship. Religious tolerance of the reformation and the cosmopolitan colonial heritage is the reason for the multicultural tendency of Netherlands. The emphasis on community rights rather than individual rights and emancipation of ethnic minorities are reflected in the integration

policy of Netherlands. Accordingly, the cities of Rotterdam in 1979 and Amsterdam in 1981 introduced noncitizen voting in local elections. Furthermore, an elite consensus on migrants' political rights is present in Netherlands. That is, all political parties whether right-wing or left-leaning support the enfranchisement of noncitizens at the local level (Earnest, 2005: 13-16).

In Germany, policies of incorporation mostly reflect the ethno-linguistic conception of nationhood. This can be explained by the fact that Germans were a linguistic and religious community for centuries, and the German unification in 1870 as well as the post war German history reinforced the ethnicization of German citizenship policies. Therefore, in contrast to the case in Netherlands, political parties are not in consensus in Germany. While social democrats and Greens have supported it, Kohl government and CDU/CSU have not supported the enfranchisement of aliens. Immigrant groups in Germany have had to campaign for the franchise. Thus, in Germany, the right to vote pertains to the political community rather than a state authority. This can explain why the Federal Constitutional Court discarded the local laws on enfranchisement just as it violated the Basic Law in 1992. It is underlined by Earnest that judicial activism in Germany need not be a progressive or liberal one in political rights while founding social and economic protections (Earnest, 2005: 16-23).

In Belgium, there are French-speaking Walloons, Dutch-speaking Flemings and a German-speaking population, all of whom are recognized as cultural groups within the nation. However, the accepted definition of citizenship and conception of political community on the basis of distinctive cultural and linguistic groups postponed the enfranchisement right for years (Earnest, 2005: 23-27). After an ongoing debate on the issue, in 2004, Belgium finally accepted voting right for the aliens in the local elections. Dutch speaking Belgians advocates the community-right model of the Netherlands;

however, there is a broader context which affects the political power balance in the country between dominant Walloons and Flemings.

Considering the practices in the countries documented above, it can be concluded that diverse historical conditions of countries are significant in understanding contemporary problems of political incorporation regimes, political participation patterns and conception of citizenship though they are not determinative.

Different from the institutional approaches mentioned up to this point, Koopmans (2004) adopts political opportunity approach and argues that migrants' characteristics and claims-making could be explained through different political opportunities presented at local and national levels. He suggests "local and national integration and citizenship regimes are seen as political opportunity structures that may stimulate, constrain or channel the degrees and types of migrants' political involvement" (Koopmans, 2004: 449). The empirical data of the research are based on a comparative media content analysis in three countries, namely Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The examination of the naturalization rates and the relative strength of conservative parties are also included. Other than the comparison across these countries, he also makes a comparison among sixteen different regions and cities in Germany. The most significant finding of the research is that national differences are bigger than local differences within a country, which shows the decisiveness of national policies in contrast to the prevailing view favoring the strength of post-national and local contexts on immigrant incorporation policies.

Political opportunity approach in migration studies is highly significant as it highlights the mediation channels of political mobilization. Furthermore, it makes use of resource mobilization theory while explaining the collective action of migrants. Koopmans (2004) makes a media content analysis and shows that media content could disseminate

negative or positive pictures of certain participation patterns or claims-making thereby justifying the legitimacy of collective action. To put it clearly, “while creating negative stimuli for other forms of claims-making, the political opportunity structure favors some collective actors, some expressions of collective identities, and some types of demands over others” (Koopmans, 2004: 451). The institutional aspect of the approach includes the structure of the political system, while the discursive aspect consists of the notions which are considered reasonable and legitimate. Importantly, these two aspects vary according to policy area and type of collective actor (ibid).

Scrutinizing the impact of these networks of opportunities on migrants’ political mobilization is a valuable pursuit in uncovering the hidden relations and power struggles among different migrant groups. On the other hand, to Koopmans (2004), the most salient opportunity structures are citizenship and integration regimes, and they definitely shape migrant identities, their patterns of organization and political participation. Koopmans states that countries such as Netherlands, Sweden, France and Britain have an easy and frequent process of naturalization for migrants while Switzerland and Germany set high barriers to grant citizenship (Koopmans, 2004: 452). This comparative perspective is useful to see the place of Germany among other countries and cross national variations of migrants’ collective action patterns.

Koopmans also focuses on three central features of migrant claims-making⁴⁹ in the research. Those are the degree of participation in public debates and mobilization around issues of immigration by migrants and their organizations, the degree of reference to homelands politics, and the degree of proactive claims about integration participation and rights in the country of residence. These three features are designed

⁴⁹Claims-making is described by Koopmans as “*the collective and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors*” (Koopmans, 2004: 454).

as indicators of political integration of migrants. To put it briefly, participation in public debates, political orientation towards the country of origin and the proactive stance for rights are seen as necessary elements of political integration for Koopmans (2004). These are also indicators of a stronger participation in and influence on the politics of the country or the city.

Other than the three features of dependent variable (migrants claims-making) mentioned above, he also uses three measures for independent variable (local opportunity structures), which are naturalization rates, public discourse on migration and ethnic relations, and lastly the percentage share of votes that went to Christian Democrats (CDU/CDU). The reason to measure the final element is that it is assumed that left-wing parties are generally more supportive of migrant rights than conservative parties. However, as there can be left-dominated regions having exclusive incorporation regimes, there are inconsistencies in cities which have inclusive regimes independent of the political party in power (Koopmans, 2004: 458).

The data of the research were collected from the content of quality newspapers during the 1990s, namely; *FrankfurterRundschau*, *Guardian* and *NRCHandelsblad*. Government decisions and politicians' public statements on migrants' rights as well as the migrants' organizations' statements are included in the data. He proclaims possible criticisms about the data collection method in advance since it is disputable whether these kinds of data could reflect a neutral picture of migrants' claims-makings, considering the biased news of national newspapers. Furthermore, it is highly difficult, even impossible, to assume that migrants' claims makings could be carried to national newspaper since they usually receive mention in local newspapers. Therefore, the data merely show the claims which have achieved legitimacy in the national context (Koopmans, 2004: 453-455).

Figure 13 Characteristics of migrant claims-making, indicators of political opportunities

Table 1 Characteristics of migrant claims-making, indicators of political opportunities, and migrant population in German regions and cities, 1990–99

	% share of migrant claims in all claims	% of migrant claims on homeland politics	% of migrant claims on integration citizenship rights	Average valence of public discourse on migration and ethnic relations	% conservative votes in 1998 elections	Naturalisation rate according to Foreigner Law 1992–95	% foreigners of total population	% Turks of total population
Regions								
Schleswig-Holstein	10.4	26.7	3.3	+ 0.25	35.7	27	5.1	1.6
Lower Saxony	6.1	52.8	6.9	+ 0.34	34.1	31	6.2	1.8
Northrhine-Westphalia	11.0	58.1	5.4	+ 0.23	33.8	24	11.1	3.9
Hesse	12.5	38.4	14.3	+ 0.46	34.7	24	13.9	3.5
Rhineland-Palatinate	5.4	54.6	4.5	+ 0.12	39.1	22	7.5	1.9
Saarland	5.7	45.0	5.0	+ 0.11	31.8	18	7.4	1.5
Baden-Württemberg	6.4	62.8	7.8	+ 0.03	37.8	21	12.5	3.4
Bavaria	4.4	47.5	6.8	- 0.16	47.7	13	9.2	2.2
Cities								
Berlin	13.9	31.4	18.3	+ 0.27	23.7	63	13.5	3.9
Hamburg	14.7	42.0	4.9	+ 0.13	30.0	37	16.9	3.8
Bremen	11.1	36.1	13.9	+ 0.27	25.4	19	12.0	4.8
Düsseldorf	5.7	44.8	0.0	+ 0.26			18.9	3.0
Cologne	13.1	68.5	2.7	+ 0.04			19.1	7.8
Frankfurt	15.0	37.3	14.4	+ 0.64			29.2	5.2
Stuttgart	2.5	77.8	7.4	- 0.21			22.9	3.7
Munich	2.6	65.6	6.3	- 0.20			24.0	4.5
Average	8.7	43.4	9.6	0.21	35.1	25		

Notes: Consistent 'inclusive' patterns (above average valence of public discourse, share of migrant claims, and integration and citizenship claims; below average score of homeland politics claims) are in bold type. Consistent 'exclusive' patterns are in italics. Note also that Northrhine Westphalia excludes Bonn, which was the seat of the government for most of the 1990s. Claims made in this city were almost exclusively made by national actors and cannot be meaningfully interpreted as local claims-making. Note that Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen are city-states with the same political powers as the regions. Claims occurring in the other cities have also been included in their respective states (Düsseldorf and Cologne in Northrhine-Westphalia, Frankfurt in Hesse, Stuttgart in Baden-Württemberg, and Munich in Bavaria).

Figure 13 indicates that there is a negative correlation between naturalization rates and homeland oriented claims-making. For the fourth column measuring the valence of the public discourse, one can conclude “the more positive the discourse climate, the more they participate in public debates, and the less they focus on homeland issues, the more they formulate proactive demands” (Koopmans, 2004: 460). Furthermore, in Berlin and Frankfurt, there is a larger place for public discourse on migration. Similarly, the state of Hessen (where Frankfurt is located) and city-state of Bremen also display inclusive public discourse towards migrants. The correlation between the naturalization rate and the share of migrant claims are not as high as expected, nor does the relation of the latter with size and composition of the migrant population give meaningful enough results (Koopmans, 2004: 460). On the other hand, a salient difference comes out between two cities, Frankfurt and Stuttgart. The share of migrants in public discourse is six times higher in Frankfurt compared to Stuttgart. Furthermore, when Düsseldorf and Berlin compared, it is observed that Berlin has a significantly higher rate

in the share of public discourse. This assures the argument that “local level is crucial for shaping the political mobilization and demands of migrants” (Koopmans, 2004: 462).

Having compared eight German cities with the cities of Netherlands and the United Kingdom by using the same measure, Koopmans (2004) concludes that cross-national differences are much more important than cross-local differences because, even in the case of Berlin, all German cities show lower levels in the share of migrants in public discourse.

Figure 14 Percentage share of migrant claims in all claims on immigration and ethnic relations

Table 3 Percentage share of migrant claims in all claims on immigration and ethnic relations in 15 cities/urban regions in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

Yorkshire (Leeds, Bradford)	48.2
West Midlands (Birmingham)	39.3
Amsterdam	21.4
Greater London	18.1
Rotterdam	16.2
Utrecht	15.3
Frankfurt	15.0
Hamburg	14.7
Berlin	13.9
Cologne	13.1
Bremen	11.1
Düsseldorf	5.7
The Hague	4.7
Munich	2.6
Stuttgart	2.5

To conclude, this study argues that local differences or universal claims are not so powerful when the regimes of national governments are considered. Having adopted the political opportunity structure approach, the study reaches the above results by taking the media content of national newspapers as examples.

Still, Koopmans (2004) also accepts that differences at local level should not be neglected as it is clear that local level is more easily accessible for migrants than

national political arena. In that sense, integration takes places at local level. However, he keeps to the major argument on the line that the characteristics of these local incorporations are drawn at national levels through integration and citizenship policies. In the end, he restates his criticisms towards the literature having a strong tendency to see migrants as transnational communities independent from the policies of the nation states who receive them (Koopmans, 2004: 467).

Koopmans clearly refers to the previous and recent works of Soysal (1994, 1998, 2012) while criticizing the post-national approach. He also keeps to his criticism to Soysal for her adaptation of Meyer's world society perspective to immigrants' rights realm referring to the claim of identification process of nation-state policies around the universal human rights, supranational forms of governance and international treaties.⁵⁰ He does so through basically indicating the examples of heterogeneous patterns in the European Union, one of which is the recent implementation of citizenship tests which is peculiar to Germany. Finally, he reemphasizes the persistence of cross-national differences and the role of nation-states and their domestic policies.

One other study focusing on the question of how different national contexts provide different avenues for political participation of migrants is by Odmalm (2009). Similar to Soysal (1994), Odmalm argues that different citizenship policies give rise to different types of participation. Differently however, Odmalm makes use of political opportunity model in analyzing the political participation. He makes a comparative study related to the citizenship regimes and political opportunity structures in Germany, France and the Netherlands. As new regulations on citizenship acquisitions are seen in many of the migrant receiving Western European countries, he pays attention to the raising importance of citizenship in spite of the arguments declaring the decline of it in post-

⁵⁰ See Koopmans, R. (2012) "The post-nationalization of immigrant rights: a theory in search of evidence" *British Journal of Sociology* 2012, Volume 63 Issue 1.

national era. Odmalm (2009) asserts that nation states have been more sensitive in demonstrating their authorities to decide who to enter the country, whose citizenship to be removed, and who is really willing to become a citizen in the last years. In fact, they not only consider citizenship as a security issue, but also as a reward mechanism rather than a tool for integration.⁵¹ The security aspect of the issue is interpreted as the fear of losing social cohesion; that is why, nation states give much more authority to its agents for quick denationalization.

With regard to political participation, Odmalm (2009) refers to the view that citizenship understandings of different countries give rise to different forms of political participations patterns. In France, the assimilationist and inclusive nature of citizenship gives rise to participations emphasizing the recognition of ethnic and cultural differences. In Germany, the impossibility of naturalization and the lack of political opportunities give rise to more alternative and civil society oriented participation. Dutch multicultural model, on the other hand, gives rise to cultural organizations and consultative bodies (Odmalm, 2009:153-154). In addition to this view, opportunity structure approach suggests that not only the states' regimes, but also various opportunities and resources or contextual structures do affect political participation. Therefore, not only the citizenship regime (whether they are corporatist or pluralist), but also the nature of political conflict and configuration of political institutions affect political mobilization.

In the German system, the political conflict lies in two sides, capital-labor and religious-secular groups. However, as there is no strong opposition or explicit political conflict since the elimination of their causes is a characteristic, a more elite, expert oriented

⁵¹ New restrictions in naturalization process could be exemplified by Germany because due to economic reasons Germany is reluctant to accept dependent migrants. Thus, it put certain requirements before applying for citizenship. That is, migrants are asked whether they receive social assistance from the state and if yes, their citizenship applications are rejected in advance.

and legalistic conception of politics is observed. Still it can be argued that there are opportunities for trade unions, welfare organizations, churches, and business organization to participate in public policy making (Odmalm, 2009: 155). As migrant organizations are not given a special role in integration policy, labor unions and churches play a more prominent role in Germany. On the other hand, lack of formal channels directs immigrants toward alternative ways of participation at supranational level or directly toward homeland politics.

Odmalm (2009) also critically evaluates the views explaining political behavior through economic reasons. He also criticizes views explaining migrant behavior as causes of race and ethnicity. He directs these criticisms on the grounds that neither approach takes the political institutional aspects into consideration. To him, political opportunity model, in addition to the institutional viewpoint, provides a useful tool in assessing group mobilization and collective action depending on the availability of resources and potential changes in institutional settings. Therefore, political opportunity approach is essential to understand why a certain political mobilization or a social movement becomes successful while others cannot by analyzing the opportunities for not only the emergence of them, but also the conditions of their sustainability (Odmalm, 2009: 157).

Odmalm concludes that influence of migrants in host societies depends on the particular institutional channels provided by the states. As a supplement to this, “the political opportunity approach helps in understanding why migrant mobilization takes different expressions, modes and courses of action” (Odmalm, 2009: 160). Accordingly, this approach might provide an answer to the question of which actions of migrants could be successful in the host society. The current preference of nation states is, on the other hand, properly integrated migrants’ using mainstream participation channels rather than ethnically exclusive political participation (Odmalm, 2009: 161). The

questions of what the implications of this preference are and which particular group of immigrants prefer or attempt to use the mainstream participation channels will be analyzed in further sections.

At this point, having overviewed different viewpoints on dynamics of migration policy and migrants' collective actions, another relevant issue to be discussed within the literature is migrants' discourses and perceptions, referring to Koopmans and Statham (2000). Koopmans and Statham address the issues in relation to collective action and social movements' literature thereby retaining themselves from the statist institutionalism and political elitist explanations. They suggest a new theoretical background including political institutions, public discourse, and other actors related to the process of political participation.

Koopmans and Statham (2000) describe immigration politics as contentious politics. Contentious politics both lie on the policies about migrants as well as minorities and influential political actors, parties and interest groups disputing the criteria of entering into national community (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 21). As they confirm, in the literature of integration, there are either studies focusing on migration considering the socio-economic or demographic factors or policy-centric studies focusing on elite concerns. These studies are usually based on statistical data and regard migrants as passive "objects" thereby overlooking the non-elite actors and political processes behind migration policies (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 23).

Koopmans and Statham make further criticism to the literature of migration and that of ethnic relations and xenophobia for two reasons. First, the existing studies leave the relationship between migrants/minorities and the political institutions undertheorized. Second, they are either too descriptive or based on empirical data or class bias as an explanatory tool. In their view, some studies focus on ethnic and racial identities in explaining collective action. However, while doing so, they have a "tendency to replace

the socio-economic determinism of class by the cultural characteristics of group itself” (ibid: 25). Therefore, these studies are as inefficient as class bias works.

Similarly, studies focusing on national integration paradigms are also problematic for Koopmans and Statham due to the handicap of labeling countries and their migration policies. This understanding also blocks the cross-national and transnational mind. There are numerous edited works including the experiences of different countries; however, what Koopmans means is that these cross national volumes offers large empirical data and end up with the specific single country cases without developing a common theoretical ground (ibid: 27).

In Koopmans and Statham’s view, certain endeavors related to theorization could be enumerated under the concepts of citizenship, nationhood, neo-institutionalism and political opportunity structures, post nationalism, and globalization. Examining each concept, they spot some deficiencies and put forward criticisms to the studies in the literature. For the concept of citizenship, for instance, they criticize the typologies of citizenship. One well-known typology of Brubaker (1992) explains the post war migration policies of France and Germany in relation to different institutional and legal traditions in these countries. However, for Koopmans and Statham, he ignores the cultural rights dimension of citizenship since citizenship does not only refer to a form of membership, but it also has a cultural dimension related to nationhood. The other group of authors to whom Koopmans and Stathams’ criticisms are directed are those who deal with this dimension through drawing typologies. Most of these scholars agree on three fold typologies, namely ethnic or exclusive, assimilationist or republican, and multicultural or pluralist. While these typologies are fruitful in a sense, they not only ignore the dynamic dimension of citizenship related to process of integration but also the important differences within states (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 31) Thus, citizenship should not be a static category, but rather a conceptual space within which

different actors, whether national or subnational, play a role in shaping and reshaping depending on the changing developments over time.

The following table shows the dynamic understanding of Koopmans citizenship:

Table 9 Dynamic Model of Citizenship

	Cultural obligations tied to citizenship	
	Cultural monism ←-----→	
	Cultural pluralism	
Formal Basis of Citizenship ←-----→ Ethno-cultural Civic-territorial	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: 100px; margin: 0 auto;">Ethnic assimilationism</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: 100px; margin: 0 auto;">Ethnic segregationism</div>
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: 100px; margin: 0 auto;">Civic republicanism</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: 100px; margin: 0 auto;">Civic pluralism</div>

On the vertical axis there is *formal basis of citizenship*. From bottom to top it changes from *civic-territorial* to *ethno-cultural*. According to this, one cannot find each categorization in a single country example since they are always in flux. In every

country, one can find a possibility of naturalization for immigrant groups as well as a territorial and cultural belonging to a nation in the conceptualization of citizenship.

Although there is a certain standard of pluralism in Western democracies as there are some boundaries of cultural pluralism with respect to individual human rights and notion of equality, for Koopmans and Statham, it is impossible not to see a clear difference between Netherlands and France in their degrees of cultural pluralism considering their different attitudes towards Islamic migrant organizations. Therefore, it is useful to make categorizations among countries for analytical reasons (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 33).

In Table 5, there are four boxes. This signifies that single countries could move from one to another through the history or over time. That is, they do not have a stable place. Since ethnic segregationism is the point of departure from migration to settlement, it is essential to understand that better. Ethnic segregationism signifies the policies for newcomers; that is, countries neither encourage migrants to assimilation nor do they force them to give up their cultural habits. It can be exemplified by policies of “guest worker”. In this approach, migrants are not given any political rights; however, they have cultural rights such as language courses in their own languages. It could have two different meanings. First, it means that migrants do not need to interact with the host society and they can learn their languages because they will return to their countries. Second, it could be conflated with the multiculturalism understanding of today since it is a good way of keeping migrants away from assimilation. Thus, one departure point could end up with another in this model of citizenship (ibid: 35). On the other hand, today, ethnic segregationist position is still hold by German authorities for asylum seekers and refugees because they are kept physically separated from the rest of the society. Certain migrant groups and organizations mostly closely linked with homelands could promote ethnic segregation as well (ibid: 36).

Table 5 denotes no fixed categories of citizenship, but rather conceptual spaces. That is, the categories do not only change from country to country, but also over time in every single country. Countries also shift their positions depending on different developments. However, despite these shifts, countries can be designated to certain spaces in the table: France is always around left corner and could be considered in civic republican, civil territorial understanding of citizenship. The Netherlands stands in civic pluralism, together with Britain, and Germany's policies remain close to ethnic segregationist corner (ibid: 41).

In that respect, it should also be noted that not only are the state regimes but also divergent actors and institutions take a role in policies concerning the migration and ethnic relations. In the post war era traditional conception of citizenship was eroded, but not in the same way by different countries. In Germany one can see different positions hold by different political actors. That is, "Greens take a civic-pluralist position, the Liberals and less outspokenly the Social Democrats tend towards a republican position, and the main Christian Democrat Party (CDU) has recently shifted towards the direction of the ethnic assimilations pole..." (ibid: 44).

Inspired by Koopmans and Statham, in my view, two categories could be added to segregation for the case of Germany, cultural segregation and political segregation. For instance, in the case of Islamic community, especially the community from Turkey, it is observed that they use all the legal channels to enhance their cultural rights and participate in politics in Germany so that German states respond to their demands to some extent. In fact, they are not only in contact with the German state, but also with Christian communities and churches. On the other hand, when the issue is viewed from the cultural participation perspective, it is observed that Islamic community usually live isolated from German society. They engage in host society as far as there are commonalities with respect to religious values with Christian culture. Then, they could

not be considered as politically segregated, nor could they be regarded as culturally integrated.

To conclude, although Koopmans and Statham suggest “no democratic state can uphold for very long in a situation in which a significant percentage of the permanently resident population is excluded from political rights” (ibid: 36), they do not mention the conception of *selective inclusion* in case of immigrants political and social rights. That means when a certain group of immigrants seem to be included in political and economic system as they use formal ways to participate in politics, another group could be selectively excluded.⁵² Therefore, the inclusion of one group might be accepted at the expense of the exclusion of another group. Still, it is possible to keep the idea that states usually have two clear options in the manner of citizenship. Either they will give up the ethnicity as an idea and accept multiculturalism, or they will sustain ethnicity as a basis of citizenship and make the ways to naturalization looser while encouraging assimilation in the majority culture. Germany sometimes shows a trace of civic pluralism, but still it mostly has the traces of ethnic assimilationist position. In my view, while practicing this ethnic assimilationist model, Germany shows tolerance to other cultures in a framework whose margins are clearly fixed. Thus, the questions of where these margins begin and end, who is tolerated, and who is selectively included as partners in drawing the picture of civic pluralism in Germany are relevant to my study, and will be elaborated in the further sections.

Koopmans and Statham (2000) also underline the dimensions of political opportunity structures. The first three of the four dimensions are *national cleavage structures*, *formal institutional structures* and *informal procedures* and *prevailing strategies*. The fourth is *alliance structures* (ibid: 49). The first two can easily be combined with each

⁵²For further knowledge on the conception of selective inclusion see:

Marin Ruth-Robio (2000) *Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and Inclusion in Germany and in the United States*, Cambridge University Press, UK.

Squire, Vicki (2009) “The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum” in *Migration, Minority and Citizenship*, eds. Zig Layton and Henry-Daniele Joy, The Open University Press, UK.

other according to Koopmans and Statham, but the last two show the loosest and the most slippery aspects of political opportunities. Therefore, skipping the first two and focusing third and the fourth dimension will be helpful have better understanding of them.

Informal dimensions “refer to the rules and procedures that have historically emerged within a polity for managing and resolving conflicts and for dealing with political challengers” (ibid: 50). It can be said that this aspect presents the ways of dealing with immigration problem, especially problems of Turks and Muslims, in Germany. Germany intends to deal with this problem, and they recognize relatively stronger Islamic organizations among others and make deals with them. Actually, German state tries to solve conflicts in the area of immigration through contacting Islamic organizations. On the other hand, it both excludes most of the other immigrant organizations with Turkey origin and helps to transform Islamic immigrant organizations into the preferable state partners thereby trying to legitimize its policies and dispense with other challenges in the immigration politics.

“Alliance structures refer to the specific balance of power relationships between actors at a given time and place” (ibid: 51). These actors can be political parties, elites or government institutions. When there is an elite division and one elite side is stronger, the weaker attempts to form strategic alliances with extra parliamentary actors and steer the power towards itself. For example, in Germany, an act on asylum rights’ restrictions met strong reactions by opposition parties in 1990s. Thereafter, with the rising public protest, there became substantial changes in the act (ibid). Therefore, political opportunity structures are volatile structures changing depending on time and place.

Koopmans and Statham (2000) concludes that there is little reason to discard nation states as a unit of analysis although there are factors like globalization leading to lack of autonomy of nation states, and political opportunity structures could be used in

different levels of governance, whether sub-national, national, or post national. However, most of the policies on regulation of labor markets, immigrant's integration or deportation decisions are determined at national level even if there are supranational institutions. Particularly, the field of immigration policy is the most salient area to show nation-states' capacities since nation states still have the power to determine who to be a member of political community and who will not to be (ibid: 58-67).

It is arguable that nation states hold the power on policies of migration within the boundaries of their nations; however, the following questions are yet to be answered: How the politics of migration brings about democracy crisis for nation states? In what ways they regulate the migrants' political participations? How participation understandings and discourses of different immigrant groups organized around ethnic, religious, class or gender interests differ? What kinds of migrant political participations have appeared simultaneously within the restrictive actions of nation states, and how do they gain legitimacy? These are the contestable questions that this study will deal with.

Nevertheless, debates around the institutional and political opportunity structures in Germany and other host Western countries as well as the different models explaining different migration policies are worth mentioning as they shed lights on the position of Germany among other Western countries, and present a background for different state traditions and for institutional structures about immigration policies.

Koopmans and Statham also suggests that in the literature on the role of institutions concerning migration and ethnic minorities, the general gap is that there are few studies considering the integration processes of migrants. Most of the studies in the literature mostly discuss the role of political elite, success of state policies and degree

of state control i.e. Joppke (1996) and Freeman (1992, 1995, and 1998) (ibid: 45). Many studies do not usually focus on the forms of political participation. On the other hand, Ireland 1994, (and also Koopmans 1999, and Statham 1999 and Garbaye 2000), who focuses on this aspect, states that migrant activism very much depends on the institutional channeling rather than the characteristics of migrant groups. He reaches this conclusion through a comparison of similar migrant groups in different countries (ibid: 45).

Neo-institutionally inspired studies focus on the role of elites and the state over migrants instead of the integration process of migrants or ethnic minorities themselves. Freeman (1998) can be considered as an example. He draws out several generalizations about the state capacity and role of sovereignty in the determination of migration policies: "Liberal states generally have more capacity to control migration that is typically recognized; capacity is growing over time, not declining; its extensiveness varies across nations, across types of migration flows, and across different aspects of migration policy" (Freeman, 1998: 93).

Indeed, Freeman tries to make a political explanation of various migration policies through giving examples of alliances in public discourse which changes over time and across nations depending on the context of domestic politics (ibid:103). Although this endeavor of Freeman (1998) in giving a prior role to politics itself is worth mentioning, as he suggests, "we need to develop theoretically informed analyses that account for the leading aspects of immigration politics and policy in the democracies" (ibid). In my account, as far as the sociopolitical aspects of the immigration politics are neglected, it is very difficult to give an account for dynamics of pro/anti migration politics. That is, it is significant to consider the dominant public discourse, the role of media, immigrants' own ways to make their voice public, the political culture of immigrants and the characteristics of the host countries. In other words, "there is an obvious need to

include a broad spectrum of actors and actions in the analysis, instead of focusing exclusively on elite actions and discourses” (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 47).

One other alternative is to have a short glimpse at social movement’s literature. According to Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2007), there were certain episodes in social movement literature from the 1960s to 1990s. Three main approaches could be depicted as *a structurally rooted political process model, a rational choice perspective and its resource mobilization variant, and a constructivist approach which makes use of collective behavior approach and cultural turn in social sciences*. Following the work of McAdam et al. (2007), political process model is very close to political opportunity structure approaches. In this line of analysis, American scholars like Eisinger (1973), McAdam (1982, 1999), Tarrow (1989) and recently Amenta (2006) understood collective action as “both a response to, and an influence on institutional politics” (McAdam et al., 2007: 7). While scholars like Alain Touraine (1971) and Claus Offe (1985) looked social movements from a new class perspective, scholars like Theda Skocpol (1979, 1994) analyzed the revolutions from a statist structuralist approach (McAdam et al, 2007: 8).

When the rational choice and resource mobilization perspectives are concerned, Olson (1965), who adopted economics to the collective action field with his rational choice theory, titled *The Logic of Collective Action* is considered as a prominent name in the literature. Olson puts forward the idea that all collective actions arise from the grievances of people. Furthermore, he posits that people actually avoid taking action when they see others do that instead of them. However, Olson’s theory received many criticisms since he approached human behavior as very rational and predictable. Furthermore, Olson’s theory is inadequate with respect to historical and institutional context. The resource mobilization theory, and its holders, McCharty and Zald (1977), on the other hand, focus on the resources of collective actors. This approach brought

up the view that organizational means, professionalization, financial support, and expanded personal resources increase the possibility of collective action (ibid: 9-10).

Another group of scholars put cultural and ideological factors at the center of their approaches in explaining collective action. For them, class based collective movements are in decline and other identities such as environmentalist, feminist, autonomist are much more salient. Furthermore, collective identities are not fixed categories; the constitution of them are more of a product of a dynamic process; therefore, those identities always shift. As examples, Melucci (1980, 1985, and 1989) and Diani (1995) can be given. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2007) conclude that either above three approaches or some endeavors to synthesize them are limited in some aspects. For example, they neither have a concern of violent social movements and civil wars nor of NGO advocacy at the international level, which is a growing research area.

The last but not the least endeavor as a contribution to put the actors and actions in the analysis is the approach of relational political economy which focuses attention on the “dynamic relationships, processes and structures of relative power between different actors involved in migration” (Collinson, 2009: 17).

This would aim to trace and explain the complex interaction of exclusionary and inclusionary processes and relationships between the very different actors, institutions and structures involved over time, and at different levels- micro, meso and macro. This approach is not concerned so much with *whether* people are included or excluded in particular migration or other livelihood processes, but *how* they are included or excluded, and with what the *implications of these terms of inclusion or exclusion* are for their and other’s welfare, for the dynamics of migration processes and for a wider social economic and political structures and change processes (Collinson, 2009: 17-18).

As can be seen, numerous works are present in the literature on collective action, social movements and contentious politics. The point aimed to be underlined is the ignored place of the actor against institutional structures of regimes. Social

movements' literature reveals that the organizational and associational aspects of collective action are generally neglected. Approaches of resource mobilization and opportunity structures are important for this study particularly to see how religious organizations make themselves adopted as legal partners of the state both in fulfilling the tasks given by the state and acting as a legal opposition party. On the other hand, while pursuing such an analysis, as Collinson (2009) underlined, dynamic relationships, processes and structures of relative power between different actors involved in the processes should also be taken into account.

In conclusion, it is true that institutional opportunities or contexts have effects on political participation patterns of migrants; however, this conceptualization of political participation is an *explanandum* which needs a set of *explanan*. That is, this model might firmly explain the institutional opportunity reasons behind the rising public appearance of Islamic migrant organizations; however, it might not deal with the effects or implications of this appearance on part of democracy or well-being of whole immigrant society in the manner of feeling of inclusion in every field of society. That is because it does not treat the fact of political participation as a tenet of democracy or as a means to protect legitimacy of state system. On the other hand, to put it again, for this study, it is significant to consider "the implications of the terms of inclusion or exclusion for their and for the other's welfare, for the dynamics of migration processes and for a wider social economic and political structures" (Collinson, 2009: 17-18).

In the next section, I will focus on the characteristics of participation, by the help of studies accounting for the characteristics of immigrant groups rather than the institutional structures around them. Within these studies, I will highlight the ones which have a concern for democratic characteristics of the organizations and for a democratic immigrant political sphere.

4.3 Characteristics of Participation

4.3.1 Associational Participation, Organizational Aspects and Ethnic Social Capital

Immigrants' political participation has also been analyzed with reference to the group-related factors, organizational dynamics, and social capital of migrant groups in this study. In this section, this aspect of the issue will firstly be examined through an overview of several articles covering the cases in Canada, Norway and North America. Later in the section, there will be a critical overview of the studies which links the level of political participation to the density of ethnic associations and the level of social capital produced depending on associational activities.

Beginning the overview of cases in Canada, Norway and North America with the journal of *Turkish Studies* will be quite relevant for this section since the 10th issue of the journal (June 2009) was totally dedicated to Turkish immigrant organizations in Europe. This collection of articles is particularly important because among them, there are ones treating migrant organizations as civil society actors; dealing with the problem of Islam and Alevis activism. There are also two articles, one of which is Odmalm's "*Turkish Organizations in Europe: How National Contexts Provide Different Avenues for Participation*" adopting the perspective of political opportunity structure that I have already mentioned in the previous part. The other is "*Immigrant Associations in Canada: Included, Accommodated, or Excluded?*" by Ozcurumez arguing that institutional avenues or opportunity structures of a country's regime do not necessarily lead to certain patterns of political participation. Rather than this idea, she proposes a historical and organizational perspective to grasp the picture of the Turkish immigrant organizations in Canada. She argues that the reasons behind engaging in associational activity is mostly raised by the need to promote community culture; however, the associations continue to be separately organized due to the group differences. Some associations make advocacy politics for people who come to the country because of political persecution; some come together on practical issues such as high taxes or

betterment of health services. However, Turkey origin religious organizations do not lead strong cohesion and solidarity among immigrants in Canada. There are also limitations because of the organizational factors such as constraints of human and financial resources.

Because of all the above-mentioned reasons, although citizenship regime in Canada is mostly unproblematic compared to European countries, political participation occurs in a limited degree and participation presents itself either in the form of adversarial politics, which make peak at the times of political discontent, or engagement in cultural matters or other practical issues through separate associations. Consequently, only in the times of resentments to the government's policies, people mobilize and take a collective action, and intra-group heterogeneity bars the ways of an effective political participation in Canada (Ozcurumez, 2009: 214).

When the case in Norway is concerned, Jon Rodstad (2009) underlines the low level of social capital and low political engagements via Turkish immigrant organizations in Norway. Assuming the significant role of voluntary organizations for a strong democracy and civil society, he argues for a need for the reexamination of the role of immigrant organizations in civil society. He also asks what the role immigrant organizations can give to the civil society for a developed democracy. From Wollebeack and Selle (2005), he adopts a definition of social capital which is threefold; "trust (in people and institutions), networks (via organizations or informal but regular meetings of friends and acquaintances) and civic involvement (an active interest in local politics)" (Rodstad, 2009: 289). According to the results of the study based on this definition, he concludes that social capital of Turkish immigrant organizations are low and this should be explained and overcome. Additionally, referring to the suggestions of Vermeulen (2005), he states that two factors are present in explaining political participation of the Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin, namely group related factors and receiving society factors. The latter clearly refers to political opportunity structure and the former refers

to three sub-factors which are “the immigration process, the character of immigrant population, and the organizational influence of the country of origin” (Rodstad, 2009: 292). He explains the low level of political participation with the characteristics of immigrants who mostly come due to economic reasons from underdeveloped regions of Turkey; they have low level of education and low level of employment compared to other immigrant groups. One youth organization of Turkish students is salient in this respect. This organization has an international character and founded by educated new generation. Another point made in that respect is the relative density of Kurdish organizations compared to that of the Turkish organizations. “Although Turkish Kurds make up only 20 percent of Turkish community in Norway, there are 30 Kurdish organizations with government funding” (Rogstad, 2009: 286) he says. The primary reason for that, the author argues, is their refugee status and the refugees are informed better about how to set up organizations and how the system works and so forth compared to economic immigrants. Furthermore, he says if immigrant organizations should be seen as democratic schools just as voluntary organizations, homogenous membership of Kurdish organizations creates a dangerous distinction between us and them instead of creating a heterogeneous civil society with diverse actors (Rodstad, 2009: 291).

As for the studies focusing on North America, voting behavior, non-electoral participation and the organizational dynamics of immigrants have mostly been mostly examined (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Barreto and Munoz, 2003; Akçapar, 2009). This is clearly because the USA has had a tradition of civic participation, immigration and voluntary organizations for longer years. Considering the ever famous work of Tocqueville (1835) *Democracy in America* and relatively recent work of Putnam (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, the path of social research affiliated to the USA on the subject of political participation of immigrants could be estimated. Since the countries like Canada and the USA have had migrants for long years and they are even known as immigrant countries, not much

emphasis is observed upon state structures, opportunity structures or institutional possibilities for immigrants' political participation in the related studies. Instead, the matter itself is directly focused on. That is, empirical and sociological questions are raised such as which characteristics of immigrants result in what kinds of organizational dynamics. These studies also question whether immigrants are from rural or urban areas, whether they are women, men or a married couple, whether they are young or old people, whether they are well educated or not, or whether they have a certain occupation or not and so on so forth. How these characteristics affect the participation behavior is also analyzed in relation to these questions. That shows a general line of studies explaining the dynamics and changes in organizational features through focusing on the characteristics of a social group. This also refers to the differences in study methods between the cases of North America and Europe. In the first case, there is a clear method of empirical research, such as surveys, quantitative data showing the characteristics of immigrants and patterns of their participation (Barreto and Munoz, 2003; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). It can be argued that since there is easier access to citizenship, and the characteristics of immigrants as well as the reasons for moving into the US compared to the case of Europe, immigrants have no political character. In relation to this, the scholars also prefer to focus on variables such as generational status, the duration of stay in the United States, political socialization in the home country, linguistic barriers to participation, ethnic residential concentration, all of which affect the types of political participation. (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001: 875-878). Undoubtedly, those kinds of factors have also been taken into account in the studies examining the immigrants' participation in the European countries; however, one can see a general tendency in the studies focusing on Canada and the US that social status, characteristics and relations of immigrants have been given much more concern. When the diversity within immigrant population in the US is considered, it is probably much diverse compared to Europe. However, for the tradition of establishing immigrant organizations on the part of Turkish immigrants, the same

diversity can hardly be seen in the USA. There is also little conflict among Turkish immigrant organizations in the U.S (Akçapar, 2009).

As it has been argued, there is not a problem of gaining rights to vote and being elected in the US on the part of immigrants. That is, “they did have the advantage of being accepted in the wider society much more easily than those in Europe thanks to citizenship laws, and more positive attitudes towards cultural differences...” (Akçapar, 2009: 179). Compared to Europe, Turkish immigrants in the US have not been much involved in politics, nor have they emphasized their Muslim identity compared to those in Europe. For example, there are no Alevi organizations in the United States (Akçapar, 2009: 180).

In Akçapar’s (2009) view, migration history of Turkish immigrants in the US is longer; however, their political presence is weaker compared to those in Europe. They only began to build up organizations when they discovered that it was an American policy to support organizations, and when they needed political power against other ethnic groups’ lobbies especially against Armenians and Greek Americans’ ones (ibid). Although there is still limited human capital for political participation of Turkish immigrants in the US, it is going under change through some political action committees and immigrant organizations, which have a potential role in the participation in politics. Currently, political leadership training is becoming popular among immigrant organizations especially targeting the new generation who speaks good English, and transnational ways of participation such as virtual campaigns on the internet is becoming wider (Akçapar, 2009: 181-182).

Having presented an overview of the cases in Canada, Norway and the US, as stated above in the introduction to this section, it is also deemed to be relevant to review the studies linking the level of political participation to the density of ethnic associations and the level of social capital produced depending on associational level.

Based on the conception of “ethnic civic community” of Fennema and Tillie (1999), Tillie and Slijper (2007) have studied the different ethnic groups in Amsterdam including Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese and Antilleans in the context of political participation. The data they have is based on five aspects of political participation: Voting at local elections (which were granted in 1985 for everybody who had lived for five years or longer in Netherlands), visiting municipal hearing meetings, the participation in interactive decision making process (in which citizens have chance to join interactive deliberation session with municipalities), the participation in the neighborhood committees, and finally the participation in the city referenda (Tillie and Slijper, 2007:7). They also examine the individual determinants of political participation depending on the variables of gender, education, organizational membership and social activities in the social network of the respondent. The results indicate that ethnic organizational membership and social activities in the social network of the respondent have strong influence on political participation among others. They conclude that contrary to the normative assumption that ethnic immigrant organizations are hindrance for political integration, “ethnic communities serve as a mobilizing device and promote the political integration of the members” (Tillie and Slijper, 2007:12). Similarly, Tillie (2004) argues for a network perspective in evaluating the political participation, which he regards as a different valuable social capital other than organizational membership. That is, not only the social capital of an organization, which is related to three aspects on group level, namely “the number of organizations, the variety of activities of the organizations, and the density of the organizational network” (Tillie, 2004: 531), but also the social network of the individual citizen is important for the amount of social capital in an ethnic community. The results to this respect show that Turks show the highest level of political participation according to the five aspects above. They have the highest level of civic community, followed by Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans. The connectedness of the Turkish organizational network is the highest although the number of membership in the organizations is the lowest.

Moreover, being a member of a Turkish organization has a stronger effect on the level of political participation than being a member of a Surinamese or Antillean organization (Tillie, 2004: 538-539).

It is clearly understood that, for Tillie and other scholars above, the level of political participation through local elections and democratic tools is related to the high social capital not only in an ethnic community but also in the network of individual citizens which is also connected to the structure of the ethnic civil community. This study in Amsterdam is a comprehensive one showing the differences among three most populated immigrant communities in the context of level of political participation. They pay attention to the connectedness of associations and argue that as the connectedness of the Turkish organizational network is much higher, the rate of political participation is also high. Furthermore, for them, this highly developed network among the Turkish organizations contributes to the democracy in a positive way (Tillie, 2004: 540). In other words, "civic engagement and social capital are the most powerful determinants for the quality of multicultural democracy" (Fennema and Tillie, 1999: 703).

One can also argue that Tillie and his fellows pursue a rational choice model of participatory democracy and argue that necessary degree of electoral participation is also a positive contribution to the democratic process in multicultural societies. Trust in political institutions is also significant for the political participation of ethnic migrants because if they do not trust, they do not vote and they may find the local channels illegitimate. To constitute this trust, some European countries grant local level voting rights, and some establish advisory councils (Fennema and Tillie, 1999: 704).

Multicultural democracy, then, is a democracy where ethnic minorities participate actively in the democratic process, thus providing the political elite with reliable information about their political preferences and the democratic institutions with popular legitimacy among the minority groups (ibid).

Showing a relation between civic community and political participation, Tillie and Slijper (2007) make use of Putnam's (1993, 2000) civic community concept and two types of social capitals, namely bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Putnam (2000) makes the distinction between bonding and bridging capital as follows: Forms of bonding (exclusive) social capital are "by chance or necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups. Examples of bonding social capital include ethnic fraternal organizations..." Forms of bridging (inclusive) social capital are "outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of bridging social capital include the civil rights movements..." (Putnam, 2000: 22).

Although both forms of social capital are necessary for a peaceful society, Putnam underlines the danger behind the excess of bonding capital because "by creating strong in-group, loyalty it may create strong out-group antagonism" (ibid: 23). Thus, more negative external effects are expected in this form of social capital compared to the bridging one. He states, "Patronage politics are often based on bonding social capital. While they may lead to inefficient government and reinforce ethnic cleavages, they are often highly effective at potential mobilization" (ibid: 495). Putnam asks what if one society builds too much bonding capital and little bridging, and concludes as follows: "for our biggest collective problems (such as; replacing the welfare system), we need precisely the sort of bridging social capital that is toughest to create" (ibid: 363).

Contrary to Putnam's concerns, Tillie and Slijper (2007) do not express any concern about the negative aspects of bonding capital; instead, they insist on the positive effects of bonding capital produced heavily in ethnic communities. They also do not specify which organizations have been picked up as ethnic organizations if the organizations are selected according to their mission statements, which is the declaration of the integration of Turkish immigrants, which are most probably the

Islamic or religious ones. They prefer to use ethnic instead of bonding, and non-ethnic instead of bridging social capital. Referring back to the study conducted in Amsterdam, the results show that organizational density of Turkish organizations are much higher considering the relative small size of the Turkish ethnic population compared to Moroccans and Surinamese in Amsterdam. This density refers to the bonding social capital. On the other hand, according to their data, social integration level of Turkish organizations is the lowest among others. That shows the low level of bridging capital produced by them, which has been described as the presence of network ties in Dutch ethnic groups, other communities, and variety of different multi-ethnic organizations. It can be inferred from this data that density of one immigrant organization does not necessarily lead to the social integration of those immigrants because of the lower level of bridging capital of individual members and organizations. On the other hand, Martinez (2009) underlines that bridging social capital has an indispensable role for an inclusive and active civil immigrant society, as well as for a true and fully fledged democracy (Martinez, 2009: 11).

As a result, while arguing for positive effects of ethnic organizations in political participation Tillie and Slijper (2007), in their later works, stand for the importance of both bridging and bonding capital in political participation. It is true that voluntary organizations create social capital and this enhances the political participation. Yet, if the political participation is merely understood as using the democratic tools presented by state authorities and as long as the necessary autonomies of the organizations from the state is ignored, then we should ask for whom this participation is, and what the implications of that are on social integration on behalf of all immigrant communities. Also, which immigrant organizations (not only ethnically based) prefer what type of a political participation or integration process and why, and what their differences are regarding the bonding and bridging capitals, are crucial questions to be concerned. That means not only the social capital they created within their own communities but also “their involvement in voluntary associations and other structures of social

interaction” (Morales and Giugni, 2011: 7-8) should be considered in order to be able to reach an adequate conception of political participation in a multicultural democracy.

Another study titled *“Political Integration by a Detour? Ethnic Communities and Social Capital of Migrants in Berlin”* by Berger, Galonska and Koopmans argues for the positive effects of ethnic migrant organizations on political integration. The study presents the implications of quantitative empirical data collected through a population survey by telephone conducted with four different ethnic groups, Turks, Italians, Russians and Germans (as control group), between November 2001 and January 2002 in Berlin. The objective of the study is twofold: to test the social capital argument, which suggests participation in voluntary organizations is beneficial for political integration, and to inquire the assumption that ethnic self-organizations are hindrance in front of the integration of ethnic groups. The participants were asked questions about their political interests concerning Germany, their political activities regarding Germany, and their organizational memberships in ethnic and non-ethnic organizations. They follow the research design of Fennema and Tillie (1999); however they test the political participation at individual level instead of organizational level. In non-ethnic membership, there are trade union memberships and cross ethnic memberships. The analysis of the data collected indicates that ethnic Turks (those who born in Germany) are more engaged in German voluntary organizations compared to national Turks (those who carry only Turkish citizenship) (Berger et al., 2004: 498). Ethnic and national Turks are also the most engaged groups in German trade unions compared to other groups. Another interpretation reveals that “when two migrants are politically interested to the same degree, the one with a membership to an ethnic organization will be less interested in political issues referring specifically to Germany” (Berger et al., 2004: 504). However, this does not negatively affect engaging in political activities in Germany, but rather negatively affect the interest on German politics. Furthermore, it can be inferred from the study that immigrants who have memberships in non-ethnic organizations are more interested in general highlights of German

politics. In other words, strong ethnic capital is not a hindrance for the immigrants to participate in German political system as associations or as individuals in the elections; however, it does not mean either that they are very interested in German politics. With this study, Berger and her colleagues reveal that strong ethnic ties might result in high degree of political participation, yet this does not mean those groups or individuals are really interested in Germany. They engage in political activities for their part in Germany but do not really care about the dynamics of German politics; they are interested as far as their problems are concerned. These outcomes imply the fact that Fennema and Tillie (1999) were wrong in assuming the benefits of high level of political participation for multicultural democracy. In other words, high level of political participation, density of the organizational network and the high number of organizations express only one aspect of the political participation.

Laure Michon and Floris Vermeulen (2009) present another example of ethnic community studies through examining political roles of the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam. Their data is based on a database containing 198 formal Turkish organizations which were established between the years 1965 and 2002. The data is based on interviews conducted with board members of those organizations and local Turkish politicians. It is useful to keep in mind that, contrary to Germany, in Netherlands, municipal voting rights of resident foreigners have been in practice since 1985. The study has revealed that “a majority of the municipal councilors of Turkish origin in Amsterdam have been on the board of a Turkish organization” (Michon and Vermeulen, 2009: 255). Although when the general elections are concerned, there are few elected politicians from those board members, one can still argue that at least at municipal level, Turkish organizations have a significant role in Amsterdam. In the study, another catching point is that there is a high rate of polarization in the whole picture of Turkish organizations predominated by religious organizations. Simply referring to my field research, this picture is evidently confirmed because the similar

polarization and predominance of religious organizations are also seen in the Turkey origin immigrant associations in Germany.

Another work in the field, arguing against the social capital understanding of Fennema and Tillie, (1999) is by Jacobs, Dirk et al. (2006). Having based on an empirical study of Turkish migrant organizations in Brussels, Jacobs and his colleagues compare them with other capitals of Europe, namely Amsterdam and Berlin. The study reveals that the positive effect of social capital on political participation of immigrants as it is reflected in the work of Fennema and Tillie⁵³ is disputable. The first reason for this is that it takes only ethnic social capital into consideration thereby neglecting the different effects of different types of organizations. As a second reason, there is no clear evidence that social capital, political trust and political participation are positively related (Jacobs et al, 2006: 155). The survey study in several European capital cities indicates that there is no significant relationship between active membership in an organization and political involvement. That is, the argument of Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2000) for Amsterdam is not valid for Brussels at least. The results of this survey also show that treating political participation only in related to the density of organizations and the amount of social capital in civic communities is problematic. Although making a distinction between the types of social capitals, namely bridging and bonding, approach of Fennema (2004) defines the concept of social capital only in the context of ethnic communities, and thus does not present a profound ground for other types of immigrant communities such as those who do not define themselves as ethnic. On that level, Jacobs et al (2006) underlines the importance of cross-ethnic social capital and concludes that "strong associational life and group strength" (Jacobs et al, 2006: 159) is not enough indicator for higher level of political participation and political involvement.

⁵³Fennema Meindert & Jean Tillie (2001) "Civic Community, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic Groups" *Connections* 24/1: 26-41.

"Political Participation and Political Trust in Amsterdam: Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25/4 (1999), 703-726.

Besides the organizational resources and characteristics, the conception of political opportunity structures as suggested by Koopmans and Statham, (1999) should be remembered here. In that sense, not only the institutional opportunities but also the configuration of political context as well as the dominant discourse of politics in the country of residence are significant in assessing political inclusion or/and participation. To put it clearly, discursive opportunities “determine which collective identities and substantive demands have a high likelihood of gaining visibility in the mass media, resonating with the claims of other collective actors and achieving legitimacy in the public discourse” (Koopmans, et al, 2005 quoted in Morales and Giugni, 2011: 10). In this respect, religious immigrant organizations grasp the dominant discourse of political participation and cooperate with the opportunities of the state. That is, widely and densely organized, with high bonding capital, and group strength, they have gained more visibility in media and local councils. This visibility and cooperation could also be explained with linking social capital, which describes the organizations’ capacity to reach the formal institutions which stand in a more powerful position. For Woolcock (2001) linking social capital is related to “the capacity of individuals and communities to leverage resources, ideas, information from formal institutions beyond the immediate community radius” (OECD, 2001: 41).⁵⁴ According to this, religious organizations also have a high degree of linking social capital.

Referring to another study in the field, Martinez (2009) makes an analysis to measure the impact of state support on the immigrant associations in Spain. In order to understand this relation, he suggests three dimensions:

- a) Organizations vertical relations, namely their relation to the state, especially through grants as well as mechanisms for their participation in policy-making
- b) organizations’ horizontal integration, that is to say the relationship between organizations and, the networks they build amongst

⁵⁴ Woolcock, M. (2001), “The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes”, in J.F. Helliwell (ed.), *The Contribution of Human and Social Capital to Sustained Economic Growth and Well-being: International Symposium Report*, Human Resources Development Canada and OECD.

them; and c) organizations' in-depth integration, referring to the participation of immigrants within the associations (Martinez, 2009: 4)

According to Martinez (2009), the form of immigrants' political integration shows the path of democracy in one land. That means if the immigrant organizations have vertical relationships with the governments; then, there is the problem of poor autonomy on the part of them. The vertical relationship hampers the autonomous civil society as well as the enhancement of genuine social capital since "the state and its political and administrative elites seek establishing relations with some immigrant organizations for legitimizing their decisions in the area of immigration and integration of immigrants" (Martinez, 2009: 7). Furthermore, there happens a competition among immigrant organizations to receive recognition by state, which occurs in the form of an invitation to public policy making, as a result of which immigrant associations might get public funding through projects. Martinez also critically approaches to the immigrant consultative bodies since in such bodies, the state usually appoints the members and shapes the agenda for consultation. Thus, this is also a vertical relationship. Again, he confirms, in order to talk about a strong immigrant collective action, and thus a horizontal dimension, strong ties with other members of civil society is more significant than strong ties with the state (Martinez, 2009: 12). For a healthy civil society, he argues for active participation of immigrants as subjects instead of merely being service users in the organizations' life. Later in the study, he shows that in Spain, there is a poor autonomy of immigrant organizations as well as a poor free formation of social capital because of high state intervention and vertical relationships. The last but the not least, Martinez warns that this analysis should not signify the insignificance of the state in building social capital since there are also views which underline role of the states in immigrants' active political engagement. The point is that there should not be an imbalance between the above-mentioned three dimensions (Martinez, 2009: 15-16).

Parallel to this, Morales and Pilati's (2011) endeavor to analyze the difference between bonding and bridging capitals could be captured in the difference between vertical and horizontal relations as Martinez exemplified. First, they argue that the production of bridging or bonding capital depends on the structure and interest fields of migrant associations. That is,

If migrants are embedded in social structures where they fundamentally interact with their co-ethnics, they will be more likely to be exposed to mobilization cues that relate to issues and concerns framed around their own 'ethnic' group. Instead, migrants who are exposed to more ethnically diverse social interactions will more frequently get political cues that are related to issues and concerns that affect the larger society (Morales and Pilati, 2011:88).

Second the study considered that, as underlined by Berger et al. (2004) again, it is useful to make the analysis not only at group level but also through considering individual attachments and involvements with other groups and people. That is, inquiring about ethnic background of immigrants' family members and looking at their personal attachments in their close environment, i.e. with whom they meet often, provide valuable information about the ethnic composition around them.

In brief, as it has been justified before by Berger et al. (2004) bonding social capital "hinders migrant's interest and engagement in the political affairs of their country of residence" (Morales and Pilati, 2011: 106). Furthermore, individuals who are often in contact with an ethnically homogenous environment show little interest to political issues in their country of residence. Rather, they are actively involved in the political issues related to their interests. In other words, isolated social relations in one group will limit people's engagement of politics more generally and compress them in one interest only, whereas bridging social relations bring about all kinds of political engagements in the country of residence (Morales and Pilati, 2011: 107-8).

Having suggested “the political participation and inclusion of migrants should be understood as a result of... the mutual influence of human capital, social capital and political capital” (Morales, Giugni, 2011: 273), the editors of this comprehensive and multidimensional research in this collection come to the conclusion that it does not seem reasonable to give a final policy recommendation leading to the best way for successful immigrants’ inclusion. Rather, it opens a debate whether multicultural democracy is the best way in achieving immigrants’ integration as well as whether it is necessarily detrimental for it. They give no certain answers to these question. In this vein, one can argue that the objective of this work by Morales and Pilati is really valuable since while explaining political participation of immigrants, it gives a description of three dimensional factors, human capital (individual characteristics), social capital (organizational characteristics), political capital (opportunity structures). It also values the factors depending on the agency vis-à-vis those depending on the structure. From these approaches, we understand that, different social capitals (bridging and bonding) result in different forms of political engagements. Then, are they both necessary for a democratic political sphere? Are they both good for minorities and immigrants’ political and social rights in general? Reminding the relational approach underlined by Collinson (2009) in the previous section, the answers of these questions are again hidden in the concern of the implications of those types of political participations or political inclusions for wider social, economic and political structures.

Overall, there are different views on characteristics of participation related to the title of this section, most of which is heaped up around Fennema and Tillie’s (1999, 2004) conceptions of social capital and ethnic civic community. Critics around bridging and bonding social capital are also related to this ethnic social capital. This section has presented an overview of the literature focusing on voluntary basis of immigrant organizations and the processes of different social capital productions by the associations. I have observed that studies held in Germany, Netherlands and Norway

clearly underestimate the importance of bridging capital, and few studies related to the immigrants in Spain focus on the significance of bridging capital. I think in order to reach a sufficient idea about the whole picture of political participation, what is needed is a perspective on the different types of social capitals and the consequences of those productions for the well-being of larger immigrant populations, for a better integration and social harmony.

4.3.2 Question of Islam and Islamic Political Participation

In this section, debates around Muslim immigrants, Muslim immigrant organizations and political participation will be discussed. In the last ten years, Muslims have been getting organized very fast around political, social and economic rights in Europe. Parallel to this, a proliferation of public discussions and academic writings on Islam is observed in Germany. It can be easily derived from the empirical part of this study that Islamic organizations tend to cooperate with each other in Germany and encourage their members to participate in political sphere more strongly compared to the past. Additionally, since September 11 terrorist attacks, the integration of Muslims has often been problematized in the public discourse. Thus, an increasing visibility of Islam both in media and academic literature is seen (Ramm, 2010: 188). Before proceeding with academic literature, it would be useful to begin with a brief introduction to the phases of Islam in Germany. Then, the literature on Islamic political participation will be evaluated.

Islam first became an issue after family reunifications in the 1970s and 1980s basically because the population started to increase thereby cultural and religious traditions becoming more apparent (Pauly, 2004: 72). Indeed, family reunification was the first step in that, “with arrival of women and children, the desire to cultivate religious tradition and passing it on to the next generation emerged” (Doomernik, 1995: 48). The first Koran school opened in the early 70s. In time, proliferation of mosque associations in the 80s and 90s gave signs of religious political extremism appearing in crowded

monthly gatherings in stadiums and in connections with other Muslim communities in the world. In this vein, the late 80s and the early 90s witnessed Cemalettin Kaplan's, who was a Turkish political exile in the 80s, declaration of independent Federal Islam State in Cologne. These kinds of suspicious examples were monitored and inspected by the German federal government during the 70s and 80s for many times (Göktürk et al. 2007: 196). In the course of time, religious organizations started to change their activities as the second generation immigrants grew up. They were not targeting an Islamized Turkey. Rather, they had a more European outlook and focused on "development of an Islamic law on minorities in a non-Muslim territory" (Schiffauer, 2006: 99). In their thought it was possible because European rule of law was guaranteeing freedom of religion and this could be a chance for the Islamic world. With the September 11 events in 2001, another phase began for Islam in Germany as it was the case in throughout Europe. Terrorist attacks on World Trade Center in the US resulted in an association of terror and Islam. Mosques and religious associations were accused of being terrorist shelters. This process not only changed the policies of European states, who started to perceive integration and naturalization processes as a security issue, but also those of Islamic organizations, targeting an organized life in Germany. They had to "declare their allegiance to the German Constitution and explicitly refrain from violence as a means of political action" (ibid: 98). It can be argued that Islamic associations became politicized after September 11th and became popular with the issues of political representation and mobilization. In addition to this, while proving their innocence and putting forward their cultural claims, some of the Islamic associations perceived the situation as an opportunity and managed to become state-supported associations. On the other hand, in the eyes of the state authorities and mainstream media, there have been always two opposite images of Muslim: Good or bad (Yurdakul, 2009: 87-88).

Currently, in the literature, Islam is discussed in two different groups. In the first group, there are studies which criticize state policies about Islam in relation to several

concepts such as, minority rights, integration, public recognition of Islam, multiculturalism, citizenship, exclusion and domestication of Islam (Amiriaux, 1997; Pauly, 2004; Schiffauer, 2006; Küçükcan 2002; Yükleyen 2010; Şahin and Altuntaş, 2009; Sunier, 2012). Studies approaching the issue from the perspective of national integration policies and the impact of them on Muslim organizations specifically are also included in this group (Yükleyen, 2010; Kortman, 2012, Kortman-Rosenow-Williams, 2013). Another recognized name in the same group is Yurdakul (2009). Similar to Kortman and Kortman Rosenow-Williams, Yurdakul directly focuses on Muslim organizations. Yurdakul analyzes their ways of political participation, their attitudes towards certain concepts such as, citizenship, multiculturalism, Islam as well as the effects of their relationships with state authorities, trade unions, political parties, and immigrant associations on their integration processes. She bases her study on in-depth interviews conducted with managers, clients and former members of five different immigrant associations. Yurdakul and Yükleyen also has studies focusing on the different characters and roles of Islamic organizations in immigrant integration (Yurdakul, 2006; Yurdakul, 2009; Yurdakul and Yükleyen, 2009; Yükleyen and Yurdakul, 2011).

On the other hand, in the second group, there are studies which critically approach the discourse of Islam in the existing literature and develop an alternative viewpoint which provides a further inquiry on the perception of Islam in Germany. Among them are some studies critically emphasizing the *Islamization* of all Turkish immigrants, as a result of which *integrationism* of Germany is reproduced (Ramm, 2010). Other studies critically approach the production of Islam image in the media (Spielhaus, 2010). Yet another set of studies in this group question the integration discourse associated with Islam (Tezcan, 2005).

Here I intend to critically overview some of the studies and related chapters of the books I have just mentioned above on Islam and Islamic organizations in further detail.

The research questions of Pauly (2004) are mostly related to the reasons behind the failure of Muslim integration in various European countries. He asks why Muslims are excluded by the majority population in France, Germany and Britain, and what policies are facilitated by the government to integrate Muslims in those countries. In his examination of German integration process, he critically overviews the integration process of immigrants in Germany and underlines various restrictions on Muslims by giving examples from legal arrangements. In 2000, Germany finally initiated a new citizenship law which enables foreign residents - no more foreigners- to apply for German citizenship providing they have worked and lived in Germany for eight years instead of fifteen years (Pauly, 2004: 81). With this confession by Germany of being an immigrant country, co-existence of different minority cultures in Germany has mostly become acceptable. However, the case of Islam has remained to be the most challenging example due to its societal implications such as *Islamaphobia*. In order to eliminate the hurdles about the integration of Muslims, Pauly makes four suggestions. First, the presence of Islam should be acknowledged in a positive rather than a negative manner; second, reducing the barriers in front of young generations of Muslims is necessary to eliminate the stereotypes about Islam; third, stressing municipal level on integration policies will be useful, and fourth and the last, when positive results are gained, the model should be applied at regional and national levels. He believes that these suggestions will help ethnic and religious harmony in Germany (Pauly, 2004: 88-89).

In a similar vein, Werner Schiffauer (2006) emphasizes the *moral panic* related to Islam in Germany and binds this panic to the fact that Muslims are increasingly obtaining German citizenship. That is, they are no longer being perceived as strangers, or unequal outsiders. They are participating in politics and struggling to utilize public funds concerning religious minority rights. What is more, the German state draws a line between Islam and Islamism while evaluating the legal position of religious associations. In this line, for example, IGMG is considered Islamist and could be linked

to Islamic Terrorism. This distinction between Islam and Islamism, on the other hand, gives organized Islam the opportunity to gain more visibility since once Muslim organizations declare that they are not “Islamist”, then there appears a chance to be accepted as political partners by the state. Still, the cases such as the withdrawal of the support for Muslim Youth Project by the Ministry of Interior, and certain negative actions by Muslim organizations are connected to the issue of *moral panic* due to the strengthening capacity of Islam in the migration process. Schiffauer implies that considering the actions of Muslim organizations, Germany is not totally wrong being in moral panic despite its failures in citizenship policies that are not compatible with transnational and multicultural visions. However, the current understanding of citizenship in Germany could further polarize Muslim community and German society, and also could be destructive for the ‘suitable Muslims’ who are chosen as ‘partners’ (Schiffauer, 2006: 94-116). As a result, this article affirms the partnership between German state and some Islamic organizations but do not touch upon the implications of the Islamization of migration politics in Germany. Therefore, despite displaying valuable points and good intentions in contribution to multiculturalism in Germany, both Pauly and Schiffauer do not account for the elite formation among immigrants and the potential roles of diverse immigrant organizations on part of democracy, without which it does not seem possible to truly assess the reflection of multiculturalism, and the meanings of citizenship or ethnic and religious harmony in Germany.

Further in the literature, Küçükcan (2002) underlines that Turkish workers are no more temporary in Germany; however, political exclusion of Turks, especially Muslims, persists due to the ethno centric interpretation of citizenship in Germany. He argues that while considering Turks as an ethnic community, Islamic identity is used to differentiate Turks from Germans since Islamic identity is the only distinctive feature of Turkish immigrants as different from other immigrant nations such as the Italians, the

Greeks, and the Spanish.⁵⁵ Furthermore, Germany has very exclusionary principles of citizenship as seen in the introduction of the strict criteria for naturalization in 2001. That is, “before application, foreign residents are expected to have unrestricted legal capacity and an unblemished character, to reside in their own dwellings and to have been proven capable of supporting themselves” (Küçükcan, 2000: 116). Küçükcan further argues that although dominant political discourse permanently differentiates Turks from Germans via those kind of restrictions in the naturalization criteria, Turks are keen to participate in the social and cultural life of German society (Küçükcan, 2000: 115). This argument could be better understood considering two facts. First, there is an apparent elite population in Islamic organizations, who have no difficulty meeting the required standards to become German citizens (see, Yurdakul, 2006). That is, they own a house and have a sufficient level of income, and thus they face no obstacles in the way of formal political participation since most of them have already gained German citizenship. However, this status is valid for the mass Muslim community affiliated with those Islamic organizations. Second, the results of my expert interviews show that there is almost no endeavor in Islamic organizations to contact with German society (except Christian communities). However, the same interviews also present an explicit emphasis on ‘political integration’, which is described as the participation in the local and federal elections, struggle for the religious education lessons and religious rights, and for the recognition of Islam as an official religion in Germany. Therefore, it can be argued that although Muslims have little contact with German society and culture (except religiously contacts), it is true that they have the potential to change or at least to put pressure on the policy making of the country.

It is clear that Germany’s immigration policies have been always disputable in the aspect of multiculturalism, however this ossified problem has become official after

⁵⁵In contrast to this thought Ramm (2010) argues that, “Turks have always remained alien to the Germans, not only because of their religion and cultural traditions” (p.188).

Chancellor Angela Merkel's declaration; "multiculturalism has failed in Germany".⁵⁶ Notwithstanding the fact that, Islam is undoubtedly a very significant subject of inquiry with respect to the immigrants in Germany, overemphasis on the questions such as; how are Muslims excluded, why are they marked as traditional, how do they differ from Germans culturally etc. will inevitably reproduce the dominant discourse on Islam in media and academic literature thereby reduce the whole question of migration or migration from Turkey into the question of Muslim population, Muslim identity and Muslim claim makings. That means, amount of debates in the literature unfortunately reflect only one side of the problem. In response to this tendency, we have to involve in various kinds of claims makings of various groups, whether economic, about working conditions, human rights, educational problems or gender originated problems to see the whole picture. Moreover, despite there is an emergence of middle class professional immigrants, still bulk of the immigrants are lower-wages workers (Ireland, P.2000: 270 ed. R. Koopmans). Considering this fact, it does not seem logical to analyze only the professional 'middle class' migrant organizations instead, various different small size but effective organizations should also be taken into consideration in order to comprise and evaluate the whole picture and have a much more comprehensive outlook of the question of immigrants' political participation via immigrants' organizations.

How state policies shape Islamic organizations is another issue addressed in the literature. Yükleven (2010) and Kortman (2012) focus on the influence of different political systems, policies and opportunity structures on Turkish religious organizations in two countries, Germany and Netherlands. According to Kortman, because of the relatively slight distinction between church and state in Germany compared to Netherlands, religious organizations in Germany have the opportunity to claim official recognition by reference to State Church Law; on the other hand, in Netherlands, because of the multicultural integration policy together with a stricter separation of

⁵⁶<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-germany-multiculturalism-failures>

church and state, religious organizations present themselves as cultural organizations (Kortman, 2012: 314-315). Kortman and Rosenow-Williams (2013) further the analysis through stressing Islamic organizations' intensified involvement in political process, their newly discovered roles as points of contacts in Germany, and their reactions to these constructed roles through cooperation at federal level. The study somehow compares the expectations of Muslims about *Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland* (Coordination Council of Muslims, KRM) and German Islam Conference, which was first handled by the federal state in 2006. As a result, the study presents a never ending dialogue but at the same time a tension between Muslim organizations and state institutions at federal level. The study also identifies the newly emerged roles of Islamic organizations as interest groups and politically active agents responding to the structures presented by the state.

In contrast to Kortman and Rosenow-Williams (2013), Yükleven (2010) argues that Dutch socio-political system promotes public recognition of Muslims in Netherlands, whereas Germany's exclusivist policies provide limited opportunities for participation and recognition for them. Comparing specific issues such as Islamic education, headscarf, citizenship and representation, it seems that Netherlands is one step ahead compared to Germany. Yükleven concludes that "multicultural policies provide the basis for trust by providing avenues of participation for Muslims and Islamic organizations in the European public sphere" (Yükleven, 2010: 461). The conclusions drawn by Yükleven imply that multicultural policies are very important in the recognition of Islam; thus, the critical issues such as citizenship, immigrants' education, representation and political participation are strongly tied to the recognition of religious rights of Muslims.

Other related studies worth mentioning are by Yurdakul and Yükleven. These studies co-authored by the two scholars are mostly based on the work by Yurdakul (2009) titled "From Guest Workers into Muslims". Their arguments follow the idea that since

September 11, popularity of Islam has increased and “Turkish immigrant associations began to articulate their political demands along religious lines” (Yurdakul and Yükleven, 2009: 217). Yurdakul asserts that as worker associations and trade unions have weakened, most of the immigrants pursue other ways such as Islamic rights to make their demands public. This statement seems reasonable when the rise of cultural and identity politics in Europe from the 1990s on is considered. However, the 2000s clearly had another character. During the 2000s, different kinds of political movements and struggles were observed, such as environmental activism, social rebellions in French ghettos in 2005, rebellions in other European capitals like Greece and Madrid, occupy movements, worker movements against decruitment and unsecured work, and movements against deportation of illegal immigrants and so forth. One salient reason for this rise of immigrants’ movements is that from the 2000s on, immigrant receiving Western countries began to change their immigrant policies on part of skilled worker; therefore, labor market of immigrants became more and more fragmented, flexible and unregulated. These changing policies, parallel to the needs of growth and flux of capital, turned immigrants into the weakest social stratum in European societies rather than specifically Muslims as Yurdakul states. Parallel to this, today, a big immigrant crisis is present as a specific consequence of the Syrian war. Therefore, it is not difficult to anticipate that an era has started, within which the living conditions of immigrants will be worse compared to the past.

Although there are many contestable points in Yurdakul’s way of approaching, it should be accepted that her analysis of religious immigrant associations is highly detailed. Her research on associations is really comprehensive and wide-reaching compared to the other works on the associations. She has a valuable assumption that immigrants are active agents instead of victims of the system. They have transformative power. That is, immigrant organizations are not passive receivers, rather they develop their strategies of action in front of the opportunities and they negotiate with the state in that way (Yurdakul, 2009: 2). Furthermore, they are political actors who “make claims, formulate

political decisions, organize campaigns, and develop strategies in relationship to the official political organizations of the receiving society” (Yurdakul, 2006: 436).

Another important point Yurdakul attracts attention to is the rising of immigrant political elites from the immigrant organizations, as mentioned above (Yurdakul, 2006). This conclusion that the rulers of Islamic organizations are strong candidates and could even be seen as the elites of the negotiation process between the state and immigrants is also an important point in my study. In her study, she compares *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* (TBB) and *Cemaat* as two elite organizations in Berlin and concludes that they have different strategies to make their claims public in their relationship with the official authorities. Comparing immigrants’ associations’ different strategies in becoming political actors is also a valuable attempt that Yurdakul has engaged in; however, it will be a broader attempt to compare different Islamic, non-Islamic, elite, and non-elite organizations’ strategies, activities and perceptions in becoming political actors in society, which is the major endeavor of this dissertation.

There are also a few more controversial points in Yurdakul’s study (2006). Although she conducted all the interviews in Berlin, she generalizes the results to whole Germany. Also, Yurdakul describes TBB as total assimilationist, while sees *Cemaat* as grassroots organization. This classification is also problematic since little evidence exists to see an Islamic organization as a grassroots organization, considering their distant relationship with their members or their target groups, and the clear distinction between the rulers and ruled in Islamic organizations. Therefore, before describing organizations as grassroots, it would be more useful to inspect the power positions and relations within them.

Besides the above approaches analyzing the characteristics of Islam and Islamic organizations, and the position of German state to Islam particularly after September 11, there are also studies scrutinizing the process of *Islamization* of immigration and/or popularized Islam debate in the media, official speeches as well as in academic

literature. The major difference of this literature compared to the ones above is that, they do not seek to explain how Muslims are oppressed due to the failure of state policies, rather they search the answers for what the possible consequences of this rising popularity of Islam and Muslim identity are in the literature and media, or how problematic the articulation of Islam is with the integration discourse and what the problems are in Islamic modernity. Now, I intend to overview several of these works of since they provide a useful apprehension of the visibility of Islamic immigrant organizations along with others.

Ramm (2010) depicts German “integrationism” as laden with values of Germany itself, and Islam is the only solid other in producing that German culture. This understanding is reproduced in two ways: First, diverse “lifestyles and hybrid identifications among Turkish-German immigrants are reduced to the imagination of a Muslim collective living in ‘parallel societies’” (Ramm, 2010: 183). Second, from left wing to conservatives, different intellectual camps stand against the vision of Islam, which is coded as far from secularism and emancipation of women while conceptualizing democratic German identity. Thereby, integration turns into an impossible project as the discourse of it functions as the acceptance of dominant German culture. Ramm (2010) presents many examples in order to show how Turkish immigrants are reduced to Muslim identity and to display the problems about conception of secularism, the role of Muslim women, and the discriminatory questions in citizen tests which directly target Muslim population. Later, he proceeds with the question of how the *Leitkultur*, which means a consensus on Western oriented values as a scheme, as a leading culture or as guiding cultural values, is revised through Islam. That is, *Leitkultur* is located between assimilation and multicultural segregation instead of a mere assimilation. However, with the help of Muslim identity and vivid discussions on Islam, German culture persists to be superior while trying to modernize Muslim population in order to help them out (Ramm, 2010: 193, accent is mine).

Ramm's emphasis on issues such as domestic violence, forced marriages and honor killings is also striking since the dominant discourse furbishes this so-called new cultural racism through the perception of women in Islam and thus contributes not only the otherness of Muslim women but also codes them as victims rather than social participants. This integrationist approach "transforms patriarchal violence into a fundamental characteristic of Muslims, wrapping the 'ethnicization of sexism' in a religious coat" (Ramm, 2010: 194). The overemphasis on the position of women in Islam also results in the negligence of many different immigrant feminist voices since, as my field work also shows, immigrant women have begun to become organized in their own associations recently, (since 2005) and there are many different problems of immigrant women other than the problems arising from merely being Muslim. Furthermore, a plurality of immigrant groups exists in Germany; there are various groups -even if they come from the same country- which become organized around different associations. Overall, Ramm presents different ways of discussion around Islam in Germany, and these kinds of alternative perspectives are of significant value for this study considering the repetitive literature on oppression of Islam in Germany.

In a similar vein, Spielhaus (2010) mentions *Islamization* of immigrants in Germany. Based on forty interviews with Muslim representatives from the media and politics, he makes a valuable analysis of "construction of a religious community as a minority" (Spielhaus, 2010: 15) in the national media of Germany. There are at least two significant points that he puts forward; first, it is problematic to approach people with Muslim background as exclusively religious as it overshadows other characteristics of them, and second, as the meaning of being a Muslim has turned into a social and cultural category, religion is not associated with faith or religious practices in Germany anymore, rather it is perceived as "set of cultural patterns that are assumed to be inherited" (Spielhaus, 2010: 16 quoted from Roy 2004, 124). This way of thinking can be seen as equal to ethnic discrimination as Germany reasserts its cultural homogeneity and national unity through the otherness of Muslim population no matter

they are well integrated or not. This has at least two consequences; first, immigrant groups prefer to raise their voices through using their Muslim identities in order to be considered in the public debates, and second, this new kind of neo-ethnicity results in a fertile ground for “Public Muslims”⁵⁷ since they try to broaden and reinterpret this public space on part of themselves. They also become aware of their new identities and raise solidarity (Spielhaus, 2010: 17-18, accents is mine).

Another relevant name investigating the question of Islam in Europe is Tezcan (2005). He particularly focuses on the articulation of Islam into the discourse of integration and modernity in European societies. In “The Problems of Modernity”, his analysis is based on the data collected in a context project, namely “Collective identity building processes of Muslims in public conflicts”. The major objective of Tezcan (2005) is to reveal how and why the integration discourse has been articulated with Islam in Germany, which symbols Islamic reformists have used to get integrated into European societies, and how they imagine the European society at all. The article is also crucial in that it underlines not only the turn in the literature from the problems of criminality, education, unemployment and language problems of immigrants towards the problems of Muslim population and Islam *per se*, but also the changing role of Muslim population from a suspicious position into the accelerators of modernization and integration.

Tezcan starts with scrutinizing the comprehension of multiculturalism parallel to the concepts such as the ‘multiple modernity’, borrowed from Eisenstadt and ‘alternative modernity’, used by Göle. The concept of ‘multiple modernity’ denotes that modernity is a plural condition and cannot be fixed with a certain society; that is Europe or Western societies. As culture should be grasped relatively, modernity can be seen in any other society.⁵⁸ Alternative modernity has slight differences but includes similar viewpoints with the conception of multiple modernities. Those understandings of

⁵⁷Public Muslims are social actors who participate in public spheres and negotiates with Public Islam created in Germany.

⁵⁸<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernity>

culture and modernity as bounded by cultural, ethnic and religious differences and relativities conduce two results according to Tezcan; first, the human right of being oneself regardless of religion, ethnic background or language; second, making the existing differences more permanent and deeper (Tezcan, 2005: 507).

The discourse of 'dialogue of cultures' is rooted from the notion of individualism, and cultural identity is seen as the most powerful tool for cultural globalization by some scholars from Europe and America. However, the interesting point is that, the perception of Islam is heavily collaborated with this approach in the contexts of the human right of being oneself, individualization of human beings and personal freedom as well. In other words, modern Muslims carry this culturalist and individualistic discourse into the rights of Muslim population as a collective difference. This is what Tezcan (2005) calls 'modern public Islamism'.

According to Tezcan (2005), ideological backstage of this 'multicultural modernism' is based on 'Treaty of Medina', which is interpreted as Islamic multiculturalism. The critique of Kemalism and Turkish secularism goes hand in hand with this idea in that, as seen in the works of two scholars of Turkish modernization, Göle and Mardin, Turkish secularism was enacted by a group of pro-Western elite and imposed on Muslim Turkish people, thereby alienating them from the state and creating a gap between the state and the society. However, this complaint is conceived as irrelevant by Tezcan (2005), arguing that connecting inner belief with political institutions in order to eliminate the gap between state and society would be a big failure, the results of which was witnessed in the Nazi regime and other totalitarian movements. Therefore, totalitarian dimension of Islamic reformism should not be neglected (Tezcan, 2005: 508).

Besides the above-mentioned debate over multiculturalism, Tezcan also discusses the reconciliation of Islam and European culture with reference to the modern

interpretations of the writings of Said Nursî, the leader of *Nur* community⁵⁹. According to the research by Tezcan, not only the emphasis upon the worldly virtues such as education and science but also the positive imagination of the Western modernization, which is seen as open to different cultures and more tolerant, give way to this reconciliation in the ideology of *Nur* community. The latter also helps to overcome the antagonism between Christianity and Islam. It is seen that *Nur* community is sensitive not to create an opposition between West and Islam; instead, the potential hostility is transferred to the Turkish modernization, or global materialistic powers trying to create conflict between Christianity and Islam, one example of which is the attacks of September 11. They also see the attacks as an opportunity to teach true Islam to Christians which, they suppose, are very close religions at the origin. The question, however, is what the practical relevance of this idea is. Are Christians really eager to learn Islam as they assume? Can Islam really be a pioneer in the Western society in order to constitute harmony between the two religions and eliminate global materiality? According to Tezcan, those do not bear any practical relevance and it is doubtful that this Islamic group has a realistic perception of its social environment. Moreover, despite this imagined affiliation and the closeness drawn, this group has little communication with German society and few contacts with German environments (Tezcan, 2005: 518-522). This lack of communication and idealism are also clearly seen in any other religious community organization. It is also an important indicator to the lack of bridging capital.

Still, a popularity of Islam in the public discussions and a harmony of political Islam and the discourse of integration in Germany is widely observed. Tezcan explains that this integration effort through religious groups meet the needs of neo-liberal understanding, which transfer the area of social policy to the religious groups. Religious

⁵⁹ Said Nursî was a Sunni Muslim theologian. He wrote the *Risale-i Nur* Collection, a body of Qur'anic commentary exceeding six thousand pages. Believing that modern science and logic was the way of the future, he advocated teaching religious sciences in secular schools and modern sciences in religious schools.

immigrant groups are also chosen as integration delivery services (Tezcan, 2005: 522). If I am to contribute further to this idea, I would first argue that religious groups are chosen because of their increased material wealth in the last decade, because of their visibility thanks to their mobilization power over larger groups in political elections, and finally because of their rapprochement to or union with each other on the grounds of economic and political reasons. Second, the discourse of multiculturalism is built in Germany via Muslim immigrants, and in that way, both Muslims are labelled as others and condemned to remaining as others together with all the other immigrants from Muslim countries, and Germany overstates its nationality by this way in order to protect its national authority. The last but not the least, popularity of debates on Islam camouflages other problems and the other matters of exclusion among immigrants as similarly suggested by Spielhaus (2010).

Within this broader aspect, at least three facts need to be assessed; first, certain immigrant groups become subject of inquiry very often in academic literature and public discourse; second, immigrants are seen as Muslims rather than as natural citizens; third, problems of all immigrants are reduced to the problems of Muslim population. Then, the reflection of immigrant's political participation in the literature is quite a limited and one-sided analysis. Having reminded the discussions upon the different functions of social capital in the previous section, one can also derive from the critical works on Islamic political participation that Islamic organizations has usually higher level of bonding and linking capital, and this has some negative effects on integration process of the immigrants as a whole.

Before going through the analysis of the cases, concluding this chapter with a brief summary of so far discussed theoretical approaches would be useful. As reviewed throughout the chapter, there are groups of scholars explaining the political participation of immigrants in a certain country with the help of citizenship models and other institutional structures pertaining to the state tradition of that particular country.

There are also hybrid discussions inspired by the theories of political opportunity structures, resource mobilization and social movements. These hybrid studies are helpful particularly to understand the visibility of Islamic organizations in Germany when each is construed as a part of organized social action. Additionally, considerable numbers of studies focus on the characteristics of the immigrant groups while explaining the political participation of immigrants. Within them, social capital studies deal with the relationship between level of social capital and political participation. While trying to present a broad picture of these critical studies on Islamic political participation as well as the social capital, realizing the different functions of bonding and bridging social capitals is significant for this study. To put again, not only analyzing the reasons for exclusion and inclusion but also revealing the implications of those processes regarding the interests of all immigrant communities is significant for this study.

CHAPTER 5

IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASES

Before going through the detailed descriptions of each immigrant association and their analyses, a short history of migration to Germany from Turkey, the foundation of first organizations and a short overview of currently active Turkey origin immigrant organizations in Germany will be useful to gain familiarity with the locus of my case study.

5.1. Migration to Germany from Turkey and the Foundation of First Organizations

Most of the immigrants from Turkey began to come to the country as “*Gastarbeiter*” starting from the 1960s on according to mutual agreements of labor export organized by the German state. Before this date, there were individual initiatives from the 1950s onwards. The concept of “*Gastarbeiter*” describes the foreign workers who migrated to Germany for short periods. The *Anwerbestopp* meaning recruiting the work force from other European countries was introduced in November 1973. However, the number of the workers dropped between 1973 and 1976, while the number of foreign residents increased. That means that most of the residents were not inclined to leave the country (Davy, 2005: 123-125). Abadan Unat (2002) specifies five certain periods in the history of migration from Turkey to Germany and describes the characteristics of those periods as follows:

...export of labor force; the 1970s, economic crisis the recruitment ban, the legalization of so-called tourist workers, reunification of families and child payments; the 1980s, educational problems of children, ghetto life, efforts for getting organized, increase in refuge, visa obligation, return laws; the 1990s, foreign law, the identity of foreigners, increase in xenophobia, the emergence of ethnic enterprises, the spread of ethnic and religious associations and demands for political rights (Topal, 2006: 42).

Although immigrants from Turkey were new comers compared to other immigrant groups, their number grew rapidly. "In 1961 there were 6,700 Turks in Germany, accounting for 1 percent of the total foreign population. By 1987, Turks constituted 34.3 percent of foreigners there and numbered 1,453,700" (Abadan Unat, 2002: 8). According to other data, "the number of workers sent to Germany reached 27,500 in 1963; in 1973 this number went up to 615,827. In 2002, the number of people with Turkish origin living in Germany reached 2,637,000" (Adıgüzel, 2009: 462).⁶⁰

In 1961, the majority of Turkish workers were male, and relatively skilled workers. Solidarity among workers was very strong. The integration issue was conceived as an integration to use machines. They did not have enough opportunity to improve their languages. They mostly maintained an isolated social life (Topal, 2006: 106-107). With the family unification law in 1974, most of the workers began to bring their wives and children to Germany. Although not too many workers were accepted from this date on, the population of Turkey origin immigrants increased because of the family unification and the new births in Germany (Adıgüzel, 2009: 469).

As for the first migrant organizations, they began to appear in the 60s and 70s mostly in Cologne by mostly workers and students. In 1962, Turkish Workers' Society of Greater Cologne (*Verein türkischer Arbeitnehmer in Köln und Umgebung*) was established (Adıgüzel, 2009: 467). In the late 1970s, immigrants gained a political character and

⁶⁰By 2013, this number is nearly 3 million.(2.998.000)
http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2012.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

participated in politics; however, this was more oriented toward Turkey considering the active political and social picture of those times in Turkey. The activities of the organizations were under the impact of socialist wind in Europe in general. "In 1963, there were 19 such associations active in West Germany. By 1974, there were 112 concentrated in Hamburg as well as many others that spread throughout the country..." (Abadan Unat, 2002: 19). The 1970s were also the years when first advisory councils for foreign citizens began to appear. The first advisory council for foreign citizens was founded in Troisdorf in 1972 in order to solve the problems of foreigners who came as workers (Adıgüzel, 2009: 468). These councils were also the first political representative bodies of immigrants. The major tasks of them were to accelerate the integration of immigrants by getting informed about their problems. Moreover, through accessing the councils, immigrants informed or/and gave advice to the city councils. These councils were lastly restructured in 2004 in North Rhein Westphalia (NRW), with further authorizations and with a new name, Integration Council (*Integrationsrat*), as different from Foreign Citizen Advisory Council (*Ausländerbeirat*).⁶¹

In the 1970s and 1980s, the first Islamic associations were established. In fact, initially, most of them were known as movements or with their affiliations in Turkish Islamic political movements and political parties. For example, the basis of *Milli Görüş* in Germany lies in the late 1960s as a movement. Then, they were organized as Turkish Union Association Germany (*Türkische Union Deutschland e. V. ATBD*) in Braunschweig in 1972, and later as European Turkish Union (*Türkische Union Europa e. V. ATB*) in Cologne in 1976.⁶² Most of the other Islamic organizations were established in the 1980s, two examples of which are Religious Affairs Islamic Turkish Union (DİTİB) in 1984 and European Turkish Islam Union (ATİB) in 1987.

⁶¹ My derivation from different interviews

⁶² Interview with P1 (European director of Islam Community Milli Görüş) also see <http://www.dw.de/alman-idare-mahkemesinden-milli-g%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9F-karar%C4%B1/a-3506507>

There were also *Grey Wolves (Bozkurt)* organizations in a number of cities in Germany. In 1973, National Movement Party (MHP) in Turkey had autonomous units in Berlin, Hannover, Cologne, Mannheim, Munich, and Stuttgart which constituted Grey Wolves movement. However, because of their fascist character, they were required to stop their activities by the objection of German parliament (Abadan Unat, 2002: 19).

In 1978, Federation of European Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations (*Föderation der Türkisch-Demokratischen Idealistenvereine in Deutschland*) were founded in Frankfurt. Today they are still active. The mission of the federation is defined in their websites as organizing cultural and social activities and protecting national and moral values of Turks as well as transforming these values to next generations in the framework of German regulations.⁶³

In the 1980s, other federations such as Federation of Democratic Workers Associations (*Föderation Demokratischer Arbeitervereine, DiDF*) and Berlin Brandenburg Society of Turkey were founded. In 1997, Atatürkist Thought Association (ADD) was founded in Berlin (Topal, 2006: 138).

5.2. An Overview of Various Currently Active Immigrant Organizations with Turkey Origin in Germany

In this section, I will introduce a number of important migrant organizations founded by Turkey origin immigrants in Germany, and shortly focus on their historical backgrounds and objectives based on their own descriptions. This section will not only cover the cases presented in the empirical part of my study, but also several more organizations that are commonly known in the public sphere.

Democratic Workers Federation (DiDF) is a migrant worker federation founded in 1980 as an umbrella organization of workers, students and cultural associations. It is an

⁶³<http://www.turkfederasyon.com/index.php/kurumsal/turkfederasyon/hakkimizda>

organization of mainly Turkish and Kurdish workers and students in Germany. It is also active in the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. Headquarter of the organization is in Cologne. Initially, they were mostly interested in human rights violations in Turkey; however, from the 1990s on, they turned their face to Germany since they accepted Germany as their life center. DIDF currently has more than 40 local associations in Germany. Their fields of activity extend from union work to active student initiatives at universities and other higher education institutions in order to promote mediation as well as social and cultural dialogue among groups.⁶⁴ The objectives of the organization as described by one of the board members of the association are as follows: “One of our objectives is to strengthen the common life of local and foreign people and struggle for our common rights”. DIDF does not present itself as a worker organization only. In their website they say, “DIDF is not only workers’, but also the young’ and women’ advocator without any concession”. That is, all workers, women, students, young people from any nation, any gender and any ethnic background are the target population of DIDF on the way of struggling for unemployment, current social cuts and the right to get organized against all assaults of employers.⁶⁵

Immigrant Workers Federation of Germany (*Föderation der Arbeitsimmigrant/innen aus der Türkei in Deutschland e.V. AGİF*), was founded by Kurdish workers in Cologne in 1991. It was under the roof of a confederation in Europe. As stated in their website, in different cities of Germany, different organizations of the Kurds, the Turks and asylum seekers came together in 1991 to found AGİF.⁶⁶

The Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany (*Föderation der Arbeiter aus der Türkei in Deutschland, ATİF*) is another workers’ organization federation. It was initially

⁶⁴http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%B6deration_Demokratischer_Arbeitervereine

⁶⁵www.didf.de

⁶⁶<http://avegkon.org/agif/>

founded by students from Turkey, and later transformed into ATİF. The aim of the federation was to reach the workers from Turkey, contact with them, get them organized and struggle for their rights. Later, workers from Turkey, outside Germany, joined the federation, which became a reference for other immigrant federations in Europe.⁶⁷

Alevis also became organized in the early 80s. However, it was not until the late 80s and after 90s that they became a federation. It is understood from the accounts of the interviewees that after Sivas events in 1993 in Turkey, there was an awakening among *Alevis* and there became politization and proliferation of *Alevi* organizations. However, it has been disputable in Germany whether Alevi belief is within Islam or not. This is because *Alevi* organizations are relatively new compared to Sunni Islam organizations in Germany. *Alevis* federation founded in Cologne is the first one throughout Europe. The Federation of European Alevis Union (*Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland*, AABF) is the only roof organization of Alevis in Germany and has 100.000 members represented by 140 local branches. The major objectives of AABF could be summarized as follows: revitalizing *Alevi* belief in Germany and Turkey, teaching and publishing books on *Alevism*, strengthening the dialogue between religions, raising awareness on human rights, democracy and discrimination, presenting consultation to the politicians and people in general, creating cultural memory of *Alevism*.⁶⁸ Along with these objectives, youth and adult educational projects and active participation in municipal assemblies are notable activities of Alevi organizations.

There are also a number of Islamic organizations with varying characteristics in Germany. Most of these are known as Mosque Associations since almost all have a separate Mosque and an association building near or connected to that mosque. They usually have a courtyard and within it, they have a supermarket, meeting halls,

⁶⁷<http://www.atik-online.net/atiktanitim/federasyonlar/atif/>

⁶⁸<http://alevi.com/TR/hakkimizda/genel-tanitim/>

educational rooms, small shops and an area for worship. In the 80s, when the Islamic organizations first appeared, they were separate from each other and relatively small without sufficient financial resources. The concern of this dissertation will be the five most known of these Islamic organizations. Below is a short history and descriptions of these organizations.

The Union of Islamic Culture Center (Verband der Islamische Kulturzentren e. V. VIKZ) was founded in 1973 in Cologne in order to meet the needs of Muslim workers from Turkey at the time. The association has nearly 300 independent mosques and educational associations across Germany. The objectives of the association are to work for religious, social and cultural needs of Muslims living in Germany. They are also known by their mystical orientation, which can be thought as close to *Sufism*. At the center of their thoughts and actions are the representatives of *Sufism*, whom they describe as those who set the absolute love of the creator. The mystical orientation of the association is characterized by the elements of the *Nakhshibendi* Sufi Community. The *Nakhshibendi* is a “sober-minded” Sufi Community of Islam, which arose in the 14th century in Central Asia. In the mid-20th century, it was built around the scholars of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan in Turkey, who also followed the principles of Naqshbandiyya. Some students of *SüleymanEfendi* immigrated to Germany and founded the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers in the 70s.⁶⁹ They are also known for their works in Canada, Australia, and the USA. They have quite a wide organizational structure. Due to the special importance attached to education within the community, they also have diverse and widely organized educational facilities. They run student dorms in Germany, within which religious education as well as tutorials for school students are given. They have also struggled to introduce Islamic higher education in Germany. One of the participant states that in Tübingen, Munster and Osnabrück, they have succeeded in opening Theology Faculties in Universities.

⁶⁹<http://www.vikz.de/index.php/ueber-uns.html>

Islamic Community National View (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs*, IGMG) is another religious community that emerged in Germany in 1976. However, it was in 1985 when they came to be known as National View, an ideology inspired by Erbakan. In the 1970s, it was affiliated to National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) of Erbakan, which was renamed as Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) in Turkey in the 1990s (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 130). According to one resource, the roots of IGMG is based on the Turkish Union Association Germany (Türkische Union Deutschland e. V.) founded in Braunschweig in 1972 and the European Turkish Union (Türkische Union Europa e. V) founded in Cologne in 1976. IGMG has branches in 10 European countries including Norway and Italy. Furthermore, according to their declaration, they have 514 mosque associations throughout Europe, 323 of which are in Germany. According to Federal Office for the Protection of Constitution, (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, BfV) they nearly have 27,000 members in Germany.⁷⁰ The head office of Europe is in Kerpen, near Cologne. In their websites, they declare the objectives and reasons of establishment as follows:

Even in the early 1970s, Turkish workers established prayer rooms in order to meet their religious demands. In the 1980s, these communities united first on the regional then on the national level. In order to fulfil certain religious duties and obligations a central administrative body had to be assembled. Consequently, the forerunners of the IGMG – among others – emerged. The Islamic Community Milli Görüş was founded in 1995. Its programmatic approach reflected the social and economic requirements as well as the realities of the contemporary world. As a result, the activities of the IGMG have been based on these references...The IGMG is undoubtedly a competent institution in terms of protecting the fundamental rights of Muslims, finding solutions for their problems, and encouraging their successful integration in European societies. Thus, the IGMG is qualified for both the development and implementation of concepts and measures in

⁷⁰<http://www.dw.de/alman-idare-mahkemesinden-milli-g%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9F-karar%C4%B1/a-3506507>

that regard, and offers itself as a cooperation partner for politics and society.⁷¹

Religious Affairs Turkish Islamic Union (*Die Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion* e.V., DİTİB) which is affiliated to General Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) in Turkey is the largest Islamic organization among its counterparts in Europe. DİTİB was founded as a roof organization in Cologne joining 230 Mosque associations in order to meet religious needs, to supply religious commissary, to build mosques and to organize the representation of Muslims in 1984. It nearly has 910 member associations, 850 of which are mosque associations while others are associations for sport or social activities. It represents approximately 500 to 600 thousand registered members. There are also nearly 2.5 million unregistered Muslims who regard DİTİB as their representative.⁷²

The objectives of the union have been explained by one board member from the Department of Intercultural and Interreligious Affairs as presenting religious services, enabling children to receive religious education, protecting religious sensitivities in holy days for Muslims, protecting our culture and identity as well as living in peace in German society, presenting services such as religious marriages, *haj and umrah*. The description of the union presented on their website also reveals that dialogue with other religious communities and support for mutual tolerance between people from different religions and cultures are among the objectives of DİTİB.⁷³

DİTİB is also known for its appointed Imams, who receive salaries from Turkey to serve for a five-year period in Germany. In recent years, appointments of such Imams have been made in increasing numbers, and most of them have become a matter of

⁷¹www.igmg.org/gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues/historical-development-of-the-igmg.html
www.igmg.org/gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues/standpoints-of-the-igmg.html

⁷²Interview with spokesman of DİTİB.

⁷³<http://www.ditib.de/>

complaint on the grounds of lacking the necessary education and language skills. One concern is that these appointed Imams are not quite aware of the problems of Muslim Turkish community in Germany. Their German competency is another issue. Due to their failure to communicate with German authorities, they have been required to take German language courses with the collaboration of Goethe Institute (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 129-130).

European Turkish Islam Union (*Türkisch-Islamischen Kulturvereine* e.V., ATİB) is another organization in Germany. A group separated from Federation of European Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations (*Föderation der Türkisch-Demokratischen Idealistenvereine in Europa*, ADÜTDF) founded the organization in October 1987, in Mainz as an umbrella organization. As they state, their reason for separation was their stronger religious sensitiveness. They also believed that staying in ADÜTDF meant to squeeze in a very limited working area; that is, either working for the diaspora or homeland. The association is also known as the first inventor of the term “European Turks”. The slogan of the union is “Hak neredeyse biz oradayız”⁷⁴. The major inspirational idea of ATİB is “our homeland is not Turkey anymore; we are not guests anymore; we are living here, so we should have the same rights as a German citizen does because we live and work here for long years.” Another statement of this idea is as follows:

Without gaining all political rights, it is impossible to solve cultural social and economic problems. From this fact, ATİB strongly encourages all Turkish immigrants in Germany to enter municipal, state and federal assemblies, administrative boards of associations, thereby participate in decision making processes and the future decisions on Turkish immigrants.⁷⁵

They are also proud of being Turkish and protecting Turkish national identity.

⁷⁴ This slogan could be translated into English as follows; “We are where there is justice.” However, the meaning of “hak” is not exactly justice but adherence to principles of justice. There is also another word “Hakk” which is one of the names of God in Koran and means infinite existence.

⁷⁵<http://www.atib.org/content.php?baslik=haberler&detay=hakimizda#gayeler> (Translation from Turkish into English is mine)

Kurdish Associations Federation Germany (*Föderation Kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland*- YEK-KOM e.V. NAV-DEM since 18.07.2014) is a federation that comprises 46 member associations in different cities in Germany. In their bylaw, they describe their basic objectives as working towards developing and protecting cultural identity, beliefs, and philosophical values of Kurdish people.⁷⁶ An additional objective is to enable Kurdish people living in Germany to have an equal relationship with other immigrant communities and local people. Furthermore, they believe that enhancing economic and social welfare of the Kurdish community will mean to enhance democratic rights for them. Therefore, the federation encourages its young members to receive education whether it is vocational or higher education. The federation also encourages people to take German citizenship and participate in politics in Germany. Their ultimate objective though is to win Kurdish national cultural identity a formal status in Germany. A reality that the federation also accepts is the sensitiveness of Kurdish people to the Kurdish freedom struggle in their homelands. Thus, another aim of the federation is depicted as working for the protection and approval of Kurdish cultural identity in Turkey.⁷⁷

In their operational program, they also underline that it is vital to remove the obstacles in the way of equality between German people and immigrants with respect to the political, social and cultural rights, which refer to equal participation in the elections, education in native tongue, and all the other cultural rights. Similarly, instead of the one-sided integration understanding of Germany, they defend a multicultural society within which various cultural identities live in mutual respect to each other without losing their particular identities.⁷⁸ They also emphasize their resistance to racism as it leads to the persistency of inequality among immigrants and local people. Thus, not only

⁷⁶<http://www.yekkom.com/html/modules.php?name=Satzung>

⁷⁷<http://www.yekkom.com/html/modules.php?name=Program>

⁷⁸ Ibid

the responsibilities but also the rights should be defined in legal terms for the immigrants because in this way, a rich immigrant society could emerge. Lastly, rights of asylum seekers are protected by the federation since the federation believes that all who suffer from pressure and cruelty should have the right to live in Germany. In this vein, rights for asylum should be expanded; asylum seekers should not be seen as potential criminals, and they should not be forced to live gregariously with other refugees without being granted the right to work.⁷⁹

The Confederation of Associations from Kurdistan in Europe (*Konföderation der Vereine aus Kurdistan in Europe*, KOMKAR) is another Kurdish Migrant Association. It was founded as Kurdistan Kurdish Workers Associations in 1979; however, in 2009 KOMKAR became a confederation with its new name. KOMKAR has similar objectives to YEKKOM's; however, it is known to focus more on legal status of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 192).

Woman immigrant organizations founded by women from Turkey are quite new in Germany compared to other organizations. Immigrant Women Union in Germany (*Bundesverband der Migrantinnen in Deutschland e.V.*) was founded as a result of the collaboration of 250 immigrant women in Cologne in 2005. Indeed, this was a call to get together with all separate woman branches of different associations. Not surprisingly, this idea was parallel with the difficulties that women immigrants had encountered in the recent years. The first difficulty to be addressed was honor killings. A number of measures were taken regarding this issue. Some limitations were imposed on women who wanted to come to Germany through marriages. The first action was regarding the language requirement, and the second one was to increase the marriage age up to 25 from 18 for only Turkey origin women. A second problem encountered by immigrant women is concerning the work opportunities and conditions of women. The current practice in Germany is that new-coming immigrants are entitled to a three-year

⁷⁹ibid

work and residence permit via their spouses. However, this practice affects women's liberty most because new-coming women immigrants via marriages are higher in number compared to man. Furthermore, in the last ten years, some low-paid and insecure jobs have emerged in Germany. Women immigrants are affected twice by this fact because there is no equality of wage between men and women and no enough opportunity for them in the labor market. Thus, they are forced to work as cheap labors, or to stay at home to raise children. Another problem for women is the language barrier. Most women do not have an adequate level of German, and thus they are mostly preferred in care and cleaning sectors as in these jobs language barrier might be overlooked.⁸⁰ Yet another problem is the difficulty in the social and cultural integration of woman immigrants since they are mostly coming from conservative family structures. As a result, if the situation is enough difficult for all immigrants, woman immigrants are affected twice because of the discriminatory laws and regulations. Therefore, the reason for the establishment of Immigrant Women Union in Germany was both to struggle with the above problems and to change the inward-looking psychology in women. That is, the association aims to provide women with opportunities of integration with local people and other immigrant women groups, and to get organized to create a platform to discuss common problems of women immigrants.⁸¹

Another woman immigrant association in Germany is the Union of Muslim Women (*Bundesfrauenverband*). It is an organization that constitutes representatives of different women branches of DiTİB in Germany. The first Muslim Women Union at state level was founded in Lower Saxony in 2010. Later, Muslim Women Unions of States (*Landes-Frauenverband*) started to work in different states of Germany. In November 2013, election of the representatives of Muslim women in federal level was

⁸⁰Interview with P19 who is one of the founders of the organizations.

⁸¹<http://bianet.org/kadin/kultur/57215-gocmen-kadinlar-birligi-kuruldu>

organized and the foundation of the union at federal level was declared. According to the statement of one of the founders, the most important objective of the union is enabling women to represent themselves since there are few women in administrative boards of DİTİB associations. Memberships of women are also low in number as memberships are granted at family level through one representative, who is the father of the family. This causes an inequality on the part of women. From room allocations to the content of activities, women are always taking a back seat.⁸² Thus, the objective of the Union of Muslim Women is to increase visibility of Muslim women in Germany and to deal with all the problems that Muslim women encounter in Germany including the headscarf ban in the public arena. The organization aims to organize informative educational meetings for women on the subjects such as gender studies, or family and social policies in Germany. By the existence of this union, it is expected that women will express themselves publicly, share their opinions, discuss the decisions related to them, and they will be encouraged to participate in political, economic and social life in Germany.⁸³

Human Rights Association Turkey/Germany (*Menschenrechtsverein Türkei/Deutschland*, TÜDAY) was founded by exiled writers, journalists and artists from Turkey in 1989 as a reaction to human rights violation in Turkey at the time. Due to the increased violation of human rights in Germany with regard to illegal immigrants in 1998, TÜDAY expanded its operational area and added “Germany” to its name. Defending human rights regardless of race, gender and ethnicity is the major objective of the association. The association is small with a low number of members; they only have an office in Cologne with no other branches in any other city in Germany. However, the association has been working much more effectively especially since they expanded their working area.

⁸²Interview with P4 who is one of the founders of the union

⁸³<http://www.ditib.de/detail2.php?id=805&lang=en>
<http://www.camiye.com/?Syf=26&Syz=295147>

Eliminating all kinds of discrimination and exclusion, promoting awareness of democracy and human rights, preventing the deportations of asylum seekers, publicizing human rights violations in Germany, supporting freedoms and human rights, and promoting participation of all people in society are all among other objectives of the association.

The above picture of the currently active immigrant associations in Germany reveals a highly fragmented organization of Turkey origin immigrants in Germany. This is the case even in relatively smaller-sized cities, like Bielefeld. Actually, this fragmented picture could be seen as a reflection of the pre-1980 period of Turkey. Most of the associations that I have contacted were founded or grew after the 80s and the 90s. Thus, the diversity of the organizations could be explained by the flow of various groups of organized people as asylum-seekers from Turkey to Germany during the 80s due to the military coup in the country. Following their foundations, they continued to get organized and to help each other to be in solidarity in Germany. This fragmented structure has persisted until today and has not transformed on the part of left-wing organizations. There are at least two well-known immigrants' worker federations as well as different fractions in Alevi and Kurdish communities. Although organizational patterns and objectives of them are considered as similar, worker's organizations do not plan to unite in one roof. On the other hand, various Islamic factions have been performing an unprecedented dialogue and interaction with each other in the last ten years in order to unite under one roof. One apparent indicator of this is Alliance for Innovation and Justice Party, namely, the 'BIG Partie' (*Bündis für Innovation und Gerechtigkeit, BIG*), which was founded in 2010. It is the first immigrant party of Federal Germany.

In the following section, I will be making more detailed descriptions and an evaluation of selected organizations with respect to their repertoires, targets, relations with other organizations, relations with state institutions, their internal decision making

mechanisms, organizational structures and their perspectives of democracy and political participation. Considering the value of migrant associations as political actors in host countries, the criteria for the sampling of the associations have been set as making a public voice in German politics, taking active roles in changing the laws on behalf of immigrants, seeing themselves as civil democratic organizations, and having a word to say in the political sphere in Germany. Therefore, those who heavily follow homeland politics and ethnic concerns only such as Ataturkist Thought Association (*Föderation der Vereinungen zur Förderung des Gedankenguts Atatürks in Europe*, ADD-Avrupa), Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist Organizations (*Föderation der Türkisch Demokratischen Idealisten Vereine in Deutschland*, ATF), and Freedom and Solidarity Party Germany (ÖDP –Avrupa) will be out of focus since they do not have an impact on any German political settings.

The two sections below will describe each organization and analyze the data respectively. First, in order to capture the distinctive features of the organizations, a more detailed description for each organization will be presented. The descriptions and expressions have been derived from both the interviews and the websites of the organizations. When necessary, I have translated them from Turkish or German into English myself. Second, organizations will be comparatively analyzed within two groups, namely religious and democratic organizations, based on the three sub features below

- current objectives, activities and interactions
- decision making processes and organizational structure
- the conceptions of political participation, integration, citizenship and democracy

5.3 Religious Immigrant Organizations

5.3.1 Islamic Community National View (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs - IGMG*)

As mentioned before, IGMG is one of the religious communities that emerged in Germany in 1976. In the 1970s, it was connected to National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, *MSP*) of Erbakan, which was renamed as Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, *RP*) in Turkey in the 1990s (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 130). However, they have been known as National View, which is an ideology inspired by Erbakan, since 1985.

The general secretary of IGMG describes the current general objective of the union as “to meet the needs of Muslim minority in Europe” (P1). One other board member states “our objectives are overwhelmingly focused on cultural and religious education of children in order for them not to forget their identities and prevent their assimilation... enable them to keep their traditions as Muslims” (P2). When I inquired about the major current activities and projects of the organization, the first respondent stated “...we have 245 nursery classes, and 5000 students; additionally, we have more than 100 thousand *Kuran* class students. We have sent 7 thousand people to *Haj* and *Umre*. We have donated 130 thousand animals to be sacrificed to Africa, Somalia and Palestine” (P1).

As for the meaning of National View, they underlined that IGMG is affiliated to “the views and the perceptions of the Abrahamic community”. That is, it follows the path of prophet Muhammed thereby the values of equality, mercy and justice. There is also no connection between the meaning of National and *millet* in Turkish. (p.9)

The IGMG is undoubtedly a competent institution in terms of protecting the fundamental rights of Muslims, finding solutions for their problems, and encouraging their successful integration in European societies. Thus, the IGMG is qualified for both the development and implementation of concepts and measures in that regard, and offers itself as a cooperation partner for politics and society.⁸⁴

This is a very clear expression from the organizational website showing their standpoint. The organization also makes their stance on certain topics clear, namely democracy, interreligious dialogue, parallel society and integration, education in the

⁸⁴<http://www.igmg.org/gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues/standpoints-of-the-igmg.html>

native language, the relation between men and women, dress code, and Islamic religious education. While describing democracy, having pointed out that they adhere to democratic basic order of Germany, they argue that the majority of Muslims are excluded from direct democracy, and that political rights should to be given irrespective of one's religious or national background.⁸⁵ They emphasize the importance of the dialogue between different religious groups, and state keeping their religion and traditions alive as their objective while organizing activities. They also state that they support the integration of Muslims in the society, and for this purpose, they offer language courses and trainings. Yet, they underline that integration is a mutual process, and requires the endeavors of both sides, the minorities and the majority.⁸⁶ They also stress the importance of education in native language. They note: "The act of learning and using one's mother tongue is one of the fundamental rights of every human being." With respect to the relationship between man and woman, they support women's active participation in society, their education and professionalism. On the other hand, they underline the importance of the family as a nucleus of society as long as it is established voluntarily. While expressing their adherence to dress code according to Islam, they manifest their sensibility about the issue by the following words:

Islam provides a certain dress code which has to be followed by both men and women. Men are to cover their body at least between their navel and their knees. For women it is the entire body except hands, feet, and face. Women need to cover their hair also. The purpose of this precept is not to oppress women in any manner but rather to withdraw them from the dictates of physicalness. In other words: The Islamic dress code aims at

⁸⁵ Self portrayal of IGMG (January, 2014)

<http://www.igmg.org/uploads/media/Selbstdarstellung-IGMG-Englisch.pdf> p.23

⁸⁶ Self portrayal of IGMG (January, 2014)

<http://www.igmg.org/uploads/media/Selbstdarstellung-IGMG-Englisch.pdf> p.24-25

disburdening women from the constraints of an attitude that far too easily judges them by their outer appearance.⁸⁷

They also add that wearing headscarves by choice is important, and that neither woman not preferring to wear headscarves nor those preferring that should be discriminated. Moreover, for Islamic religious education, they declare that the medium of instruction should be German in order to give Muslim pupils self-confidence in the society.

In accordance with the German constitution and the constitutions of the federal states, the IGMG approves the implementation of an Islamic religious education in state schools. The lessons should address Muslim pupils and be given in German language. In so doing it should support those juveniles in finding their place in society as self-confident citizens of Islamic faith. (ibid)

When the organizational structure is examined, it is noted in their brochure that local mosques are the smallest communities and they provide the necessary venues for religious activities, most important of which is praying.

The local communities are structurally bound together under regional organizations, of which there are 30 altogether. 15 regional organizations are located in Germany. They are Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Hanover, Northern Ruhr Basin, Ruhr Basin A, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Hesse, RhineSaar, Stuttgart, Swabia, Freiburg, Northern and Southern Bavaria (p. 10-11).

Regional organizations provide the linkage between the local communities. The coordination of the activities of the local communities such as religious and educational services as well as the organization of cultural events are also under the responsibility of regional organizations. They also undertake the coordination of *imams* in the communities (ibid). However, the assignments and the further education of *imams* are undertaken by the central administration. All the educational, social and cultural

⁸⁷ Self portrayal of IGMG (January, 2014)

<http://www.igmg.org/uploads/media/Selbstdarstellung-IGMG-Englisch.pdf> p.27-30

activities are also inherently coordinated by the central administration. Furthermore, the central organization decides on the general strategy and the essential topics as well as organizing the big events such as the Hajj, the Udhiyah (sacrifice) and the solidarity fund of the burial service, which cannot be handled by the local communities (p.12-13).

Further details on the organizational structure are stated in the organizational website as follows:

The IGMG maintains local mosque communities in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, England, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.


..The regional organizations in other European countries are the following: 4 in France (Paris, Strasbourg, Lyon, and Annecy), 2 in Austria (Austria-1 and Austria-2), and the northern and southern parts of the Netherlands (2 each). In the remaining European countries (Switzerland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and England) the IGMG is represented by only one national organization each.

...The IGMG maintains a total number of 1833 local facilities and for the time being has got around 87,000 members. Friday prayers are regularly attended by approximately 300,000 persons.⁸⁸

The below figure shows the organizational schema of the organization

⁸⁸<http://www.igmg.org/gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues/organisational-structure.html>

Figure 15⁸⁹ Organization schema of IGMG



5.3.2 Turkish Islamic Union of Religion (Die Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. - DİTİB)

DİTİB was founded in Cologne in 1983, at a meeting where 230 mosque association's administrators came together. The official date of foundation is 05.07.1984. DİTİB constituted a big roof organization to meet the needs of the Muslim community in Germany, such as supply of *imams*, mosque construction and collaborative action for the representation of the Muslims in Germany. It was registered according to the Association Law of Germany as the biggest Muslim community in Germany. It nearly has 910 member associations; whose number continues to mount up. 850 of the 910 member associations are only mosque associations; the rest of them are social and

⁸⁹<http://www.igmg.org/uploads/media/Selbstdarstellung-IGMG-Englisch.pdf> p.12

sport organizations. They have 500 thousand Turkey origin members, and represent nearly 600 thousand Muslims in Germany.⁹⁰

To explain the founding objective of DİTİB, a well-known board member expresses “the organization has been founded to build a big roof organization in Germany to meet the religious needs of Muslims living here, such as constructing mosques, providing religious officers (*imams*), and getting organized for the representation of Muslims”. Furthermore,

...Serving religious services, such as, providing officers for religious marriages, reminding our holy days and organizing Haj and Umrah services. Other than these, teaching children their religions, and providing them with a religious education in Germany, protecting our identity and culture while living in peace with the society we live in are among the objectives of our union. (P5)^{viii}

Furthermore, as different from Turkey, in Germany, mosques are cultural associations at the same time. We make exchange of views; we stand in solidarity; we build social and cultural assets and protect them, and we outreach at mosques...In previous years, we defined mosques as venues of sharing and living together, and we organized open mosque days. (P5)^{ix}

DİTİB is the largest Islamic umbrella organization in Germany. If we suppose that there are 3 million Turkey origin immigrants, 2.5 millions of them see the organization as their representative (P5).^x Different from other Islamic organizations, it is affiliated with the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Diyanet*). However, they express that except the recruitment and payments of *imams*, they do not have any financial ties with *Diyanet*; rather, they collect dues from the members and create their own finance. On the other hand, as an institution, they consider themselves as *Diyanet* of Germany; that is, “for the majority, the meaning of DİTİB is as the same as *Diyanet* in Turkey” (P5).

⁹⁰<http://www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=5&sid=8&lang=de> (Information has been supported by interviews)

The basic principle, aims and goals of the organization are expressed item by item in the organizational website. There are seven basic principles emphasized:

- The union depends on free democratic order and the constitution of Federal Germany; strictly abides by all the laws. All activities are executed under the law.
- The union is a non-partisan organization. It is equidistant from all political parties; it is not engaged in any political party or activity.
- According to the Association Law of Germany, workspace, duties and responsibilities are clearly stated in the bylaw, which has been registered by the relevant authorities.
- The union acts in accordance with the principles of love, respect, tolerance and solidarity, which are among the basic principles of Islam. All kinds of violence and call to violence are absolutely rejected.
- The union treats its members equally; it is transparent both toward its members and the other outside.
- The union pursues religious, charitable, cultural and sportive goals which only aim at directly benefiting the society.
- In order to fulfil the goals in the bylaw, the union performs all the activities voluntarily.⁹¹

The aims and goals are various. Besides providing basic religious services such as Hajj and Umrah, and providing places of worship and religious duties for the funerals, there are also other objectives:

- Dialogue with other religions and establishment of a good relationship
- To support the community culture in order not to forget the essence of our culture.
- To support mutual tolerance to live in harmony with people from different religions and cultures.


⁹¹<http://www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=5&sid=9&lang=en>

- To provide social counseling to our community living here.
- To coordinate religious, cultural and social activities of our affiliated communities throughout Germany.
- To organize integration related activities of our affiliated communities.
- To support the immigrants lacking the necessary language skills,
- To support the youth and sport activities.
- To support needy and elderly people.
- To support educational and scientific studies.
- To support the victims of natural disasters through campaigns.
- To provide in-service training for our affiliated communities.
- To support the work of our women's branches and women.
- To answer religious questions by phone.
- To give fatwa about religious matters with the capacity of experts.⁹²

The governing bodies of DİTİB is enumerated as general board, administrative board, advisory board, and cashbook controllers. The general board gathers once in two years and it is the highest decision body of the organization. The administrative board is elected for two years and consists of seven members; chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, accountant, assistant accountant and one member of the general board. The advisory boards are the highest consultation (*istişare*) and inspection bodies consisting of five religious male members in each federal unit. There is also a supervisory board, which is elected by the general board once in two years, consisting of two members. Below is the organizational schema of DİTİB:

⁹²<http://www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=5&sid=10&lang=en>

Figure 16 Organization schema of *DİTİB*⁹³



The general board is the head of the organization, then comes the supervisory board in the organizational hierarchy. There are two main boards, the higher religious consultation (*istişare*) board and the administrative board. On the left is the higher religious consultation board. The religious advisory boards existing in every federal state are bound up to the higher religious consultation board. Federal state unions, federal state regional unions, and member associations are under the religious advisory boards in hierarchy. Finally, the social solidarity center is within the operational network of the higher religious consultation (*istişare*) board (ZSU e.V.). On the right are the central units of the administrative board. There are ten different directorates:

Private Secretary, Media and Public Relations Directorate,

- Private Secretary and Editorial Office
- Media and Public Relations Bureau
- Strategic Planning Office
- Private Secretary Translation Bureau

⁹³<http://www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=5&sid=8&lang=en>

Guidance and Surveillance Service Directorate,

- Guidance and Surveillance Bureau
 - The Law Office
 - States' Unions and States' Regional Unions Coordination Bureau
- Hajj and Umrah Services Directorate,

Religious Services and Religious Education Practice Services Directorate,

- Religious Services and Guidance (*Irşad*) Bureau
- Mosque Guidance Bureau
- Mosque Religious Education Programs and Proactive Bureau
- Charity Services Bureau

Human Resources Department

Education, Research and Publication Services Department,

- Curriculum Development Bureau
- The Office of Library Services
- Research and Publication Services Bureau
- The Office of the Academy Ditib
- The Islamic Religious Education Coordination Office (*Kompetenzzentrum*)
- The Office of Student Affairs and Learning Aids
- Non-formal Education and Cultural Services Office (*Bildungswerk*)

Management and Financial Services Directorate,

- Accounting and Office supplies
- Documents and Archives Bureau
- Information Technologies Office
- Cleaning and Technical Services Bureau

Women, Family, Youth and Social Services Department,

- The Bureau of Women's Studies
- The Office of Family Studies
- Youth Work Office
- Social Services Office
- Spiritual Guidance Office

Construction and Real Estate Management Office

External Relations Directorate,

- Relations with Religious Organizations Bureau
- Relations with Government Civil Society Organizations Bureau
- Relations with Government Civil Society Organizations Bureau⁹⁴

5.3.3 The Association of Islamic Cultural Center (*Der Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V. – VIKZ*)

VIKZ e.V. is a social and cultural non-profit organization which performs its activities within the framework of Article 140 of the Basic Law. Islamic Cultural Center (*Islamisches Kulturzentrum*, 1973-1980) was founded in September 1973 in Cologne to meet the needs of Muslims who came to Germany as guest workers, particularly the needs of those with Turkey origin.⁹⁵

The association nearly has 300 independent member associations and 25,000 registered members in Germany. There are also nearly 300-400,000 people who benefit from the facilities or services provided by the association. According a research conducted by the association, 10 percent of the Muslim population and 7 percent of Turkey origin Muslim population living in Germany benefit from the facilities of VIKZ (P6).^{xi}

According to information given by Kortmann and Williams (2013), the roots of VIKZ go back to the Turkish Union (*Türkische Union*, 1967-1973). Both organizations, Turkish Union and VIKZ, were among the first umbrella organizations in Germany established at federal level. As mentioned earlier, the organization was “founded by the followers and students of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959). VIKZ follows the Sunni-Hanefitic tradition, which also embodies the mystic elements of Naqshibandi, a Sufi order founded in Central Asia in the fourteenth century” (Kortmann and Williams, 2013:45).

⁹⁴ibid

⁹⁵<http://www.vikz.de/index.php/organisation.html>

A previous board member and public relations representative of the VIKZ describes the objectives of the religious cultural center stating “bringing up children with Islamic identities and enabling them to have good jobs... Promoting the constitution of religious faculties in universities and the recognition of Islam as a religious community with an equal legal status to other religious communities in Bremen and Hamburg were our objectives and we have achieved all those” (P6).^{xii}

The principles of the organization are explained in the organizational websites as follows:

VIKZ is committed to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. His work and its objectives are consistent with the free democratic basic order. The association sees itself politically neutral and observes the principle of impartiality. It is financed by monthly contributions from member communities and by regular donations from Muslims.

According to its self-image, VIKZ pursues the following principles:

The association is committed to the common good and promotes the peaceful coexistence of people with different religious and ethnic backgrounds. Here mutual respect, respect and tolerance to everyone are very important. Anyone can claim to profit from the offers or programs of the VIKZ regardless of religious, ethnic and social backgrounds. The mission of the Association is based on the Messenger Muhammad (A.S.), who said: "The best man is the one who is useful for other people" (Hadith)⁹⁶

As mentioned before, the organization has also a mystical orientation. [The story](#) of the organization apparently depends on this. Therefore, it is useful to refer to the organization website to explain the meaning of *Süleymançılık* in detail.

VIKZ belongs to Sunni and Hanafi orientations of Islam. Among the members, there are a lot of Muslims, who practice mystic orientation of the Islam, too. Islamic mysticism is

⁹⁶<http://www.vikz.de/index.php/grundsaeetze.html> (translation from German into English is mine)

also defined as “Sufism”. Sufis, the representatives of the Sufism, put the absolute love of the creator at the center of their thoughts and acts. As well as carrying out the religious duties, a Sufi looks for the direct experience of the God (Marifetullah⁹⁷).

The mystical orientation of the association is coined by the elements of the Sufi society Naqshbandiyya. The Naqshbandiyya is a levelheaded or sober-minded Sufi society of Islam that was founded in the 14th century in central Asia. In the middle of the 20th century, the bookman Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (K.S.) created the society in Turkey and followed the principles of Naqshbandiyya. Some of the students of Süleyman Efendi immigrated to Germany in 1970s and founded there the associations of the Islamic Cultural Centers.

VIKZ took the possession of the following elements from the tradition of Naqshbandiyya: “truly through the allusion of Allah, thinking about Allah, the hearts will be peaceful. (Qu’ran 13:28). The “silent allusion” (zikri hafi), “Ihlas Hatim” and “conversation” (sohbet). The “silent allusion’ is a form of meditation, in which the participant inwardly turns his/her face towards God and thinks about Him. The “Ihlas Hatim” is a special form of the Qu’ran recitation. In the frame of the “Sohbet”, religious themes like mystical aspects Islam are handled in the community. Different from the Naqshbandiyya, VIKZ is not only organized as a Sufi-ordered community but also as a religious society. As Sufi master (Murshid), Süleyman Efendi (K.S.) who passed away in 1959 applied it.⁹⁸

Süleymançılık has also been a matter attracting attention in Turkey. After the 1924 Law on the Unity of Education, all the non-secular and religious educational activities started to be controlled by the state. Süleyman Efendi was one of those affected by

⁹⁷Marifetullah means spiritual knowledge of God. The word is very near to the meaning of Gnosis (<https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marifetullah>)

⁹⁸<http://www.vikz.de/index.php/mystische-ausrichtung.html> (Translation is from German into English is mine)

the law. Still, he did not stop his private teachings. He continued his lectures as a preacher. However, because of the state's approach to private religious education, members of the community refused to be entitled as *Süleymançı*; rather they identified themselves as students of *Süleyman Efendi*.⁹⁹

Returning to the objectives of VIKZ, the association primarily works for the religious needs of Muslims living in Germany, and supports them in everyday religious questions. First and foremost, daily rituals of pray are the premises of both the association and the member associations. Secondly, festive and Friday prays, religious lectures and Haj organizations are performed. Third, they are involved in the education of Muslim children and young people, and lastly, educational services to train *Imams* and female *Hodjas* (theologian) are offered.

The association also expands its offerings to include social and cultural services for its members and anyone interested. These services are offered particularly in the field of education in order to support educational, professional and academic advancement of children and young people. In this context, school support (especially homework), tutoring, English and computer courses are offered. Through strengthening the educational success of children and the youth, the association promotes a better integration into German society. Furthermore, it encourages young people to take social responsibilities through inducing them to engage in social involvements.

Funeral assistance is another service provided by VIKZ. Funeral funds are available for the relatives of the deceased. In case of demand, the association also deals with the transfer of the funeral to the country of origin and offers the religious rituals for the funeral of deceased Muslims.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Ibid (translation from German into English is mine)

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.vikz.de/index.php/taetigkeitsbereiche.html> (translation from German into English is mine)

One final significant detail about VIKZ is that it is a member of Coordination Council of Muslims (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM), which was founded on 11th April 2007. In fact, it is a member together with DİTİB, the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic Germany (*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, IRD*) and Central Council of Muslims in Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD*). VIKZ is also the member of DIK. The most important commitment of VIKZ is to ensure that Islam and Muslims become fully accepted parts of German society.¹⁰¹

Although the organizational schema is not presented in the organizational website, by reference to my interviews, it can be said that the administrative board is the most authorized body within the organization.

5.3.4 European Turkish-Islamic Union (Die Union der Türkisch-Islamischen Kulturvereine e.V. – ATİB)

As mentioned earlier, ATİB was founded in Mainz in October 1987 as an umbrella organization with the name, *Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations in Europe*. Headquarter of the organization is located in Cologne. In the organizational website, the number of member associations or the members are not given. Yet, based on my interviews, the union is claimed to have had more than 100 member associations and nearly 11.000 members in Germany by the year 2013. According to Wikipedia, the union has 123 connected mosque associations and nearly 11.500 members in Germany. ATİB also has an organization in Austria, where there are 63 member associations organized in eight of the nine federal states. Although not much detail is

¹⁰¹<http://www.vikz.de/index.php/krm.html> (translation from German into English is mine)

presented in the organizational website, ATİB is also known to have representation offices in Belgium, Holland and France, too.

The union actually dates back to the years before 1987 as integrated into another organization, the Federation of European Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations (ADÜTDF). The ATİB separated from the ADÜTDF in 1987 and was founded as a separate organization under the name Union of Turkish Islamic Associations. As a separate association ATİB put the emphasis rather on a synthesis of Turkish nationalism and Islam, and allowed more space for Islam within the ideology compared to the ADÜTDF. Another reason for separation was that ATİB preferred to stay away from the violent character of the Grey Wolves, who were active in Turkey in 1970s, and that it did not want to be a reflection of this in Europe.¹⁰² One other reason as expressed by one of my interviewees is as follows: “we are a supra political organization and actually we did not want to follow homeland politics because Turkey based works do not help or contribute to our people living in Europe” (P25). Since the year 1993, the Union has adopted the current name, which is ATİB.¹⁰³ In Turkish, the expansion of the abbreviation is European Turkish Islamic Union. However, in German, it is the Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations.

To gain detailed information about the structure of organization, it will be helpful to refer to the organizational website.¹⁰⁴ The objectives of the organization are as follows:

¹⁰²<http://www.bmfsfj.de/doku/Publikationen/engagementtuerkisch/1-Einleitung/1-4-verbaende,did=44816,render=renderPrint.html> (internet source from *Das Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ)*, no dates and author specified)

¹⁰³ Türkischer Nationalismus: 'Graue Wölfe' und 'Ülkücü' (Idealisten)- *Bewegung* (A report written out by *Verfassungsschutz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen*) available at https://web.archive.org/web/20041130110550/http://www.im.nrw.de/sch/doks/vs/tuerkischer_nationalismus.pdf (October, 2004)

¹⁰⁴<http://www.atib.org/de/content.php?baslik=haberler&detay=uber-uns#gemeinnuetzigkeit-der-atib> (translation from German to English is mine)

The general objective of ATIB is to represent cultural, social and legal interests of the Turkish Muslim minority in Germany. ATIB is committed to promote mutual understanding among nations for the acceptance and friendship of different cultures in order to ensure a life in harmony without any exclusion and discrimination in the society. The goal of the union is to maintain the cultural and religious identity of Turkish immigrants in Germany, as well as promoting the conception of integration not only as a one sided issue, but as an issue contributing to the enrichment of society.

The principles of the organization:

The union does not represent or serve to the interest of any political party. It always keeps its very distance from any political party and party politics. It promotes the social, cultural, religious and economic interests of Turkish citizens living in Europe. ATIB organizes actions and initiatives against racism, xenophobia and discrimination as well as focusing on works for peaceful conflict resolutions in districts with special renewal needs and seeks to cooperate with any association that works to achieve these goals. ATIB treats people equally without making any distinction between people from different nationalities, skin colors, religions and political opinions while organizing their activities. As a Muslim- Turkish minority in Germany, we see ourselves as a part of the society we are living in and see Germany as our second home. As ATİB, we are committed to free democratic basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The purposes and activities of ATİB:

ATIB addresses social, cultural, psychological, religious, linguistic, school-related and educational problems of Turkish citizens living in Europe.

We are dealing, among other things, with higher education problems of Turkish or Turkey origin students studying in Europe and search for possible solutions by trying to cooperate with the competent authorities... In addition, ATİB organizes educational trips, conferences, seminars and meetings by professionals in the industry, business

and science to allow students to gain an insight into the development of technology and science.

In order to better help the Turkish migrants in Europe, ATİB builds good relations with foreigners and other authorities, as well as cultural and educational offices. The Turkish migrants who want to improve their knowledge of German can apply to ATİB German courses.

The experience gained from these activities of ATİB will be passed on to all affiliated associations. To prevent the social isolation, besides cultural and folk evenings, a foreigner week including books exhibitions and sports events is organized with the advisory bodies for immigrants. The overall objective is the integration of our members into the country, which has already become a home for many of us.

ATİB has a non-profit character and is financed exclusively by donations, membership fees, income from events and from the sales of books, magazines and video / music cds.

Cooperations of ATİB:

In order to ensure the solution of socio-cultural problems of Turkish immigrants, and an interaction with each other in a multicultural society, ATİB mainly cooperates with public authorities and civil mass organizations.

The organization is a member of the Islamic umbrella organizations KRM and IRD. The organization is also a member of an institution named "Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance against Extremism and Violence" (*Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz gegen Extremismus und Gewalt*).

It also cooperates with an aid organization named Human Relief e.V. (*Menschliches Hilfswerk e.V.*, MHW) during the transfers of the funerals of members and the completion of related formalities. In addition, ATİB collaborates with "Hilal charity e.V."

(*Hilal Hilfsorganisation e.V.*) in order to help needy people and the victims of natural disasters in various regions of the world.

Administrative bodies of ATİB:

The administrative board is elected every two years and consists of one chairman, at least two deputies, a general secretary, and one treasurer. There are also two different bodies, namely the supervisory board and the advisory council. The supervisory board is elected by the general assembly with simple majority and consists of three members. It has the task of monitoring the activities of ATİB and submits written proposals to the administrative board for a better performance of tasks. The administrative board proposes several members for the advisory council as candidates. The advisory council works as a discussion forum to discuss all kinds of issues thereby providing the formation of opinion between the board and the base.

Major Activities of ATİB could be enumerated as follows:

- a) Yearly general meetings
- b) Educational activities for the young
- c) Educational and cultural tours to Turkey
- d) Panel discussions, conferences and seminars
- e) Religious trips
- f) Burial service funds
- g) Relief actions
- h) Theater Folkloric and sports activities

5.3.5 Federation of Germany Alevi Union (*Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland e.V. - AABF*)

Compared to its counterparts, AABF is the latest organization founded by Turkey origin immigrants in Germany. However, various organizations of Alevi have existed since

the 1960s and 1970s in European countries although Alevi identity was not overt. For example, they were organized in The Turkish Worker's Union (*Türk Ameleler Birliği*) in the 1960s. In the course of time, this union transformed into Patriot's Union (*Yurtseverler Birliği*). In the 1970s and 1980s, Alevi organizations were mostly affiliated with socialist movements and parties in Turkey. After the 1980s, in the wake of the increasing emphasis on cultural rights and multiculturalism in European political atmosphere, Alevis started to express themselves as a religious and cultural community. The tendency of European Parliament in promoting immigrant cultures and identities was also affective in this. (Özyürek, 2009: 239)

The Alevis organization gained a public fame in Germany after Sivas massacre on July 2, 1993, in which 35 Alevi citizens including intellectuals, musicians and poets were killed.

"In 1994, after the Alevi Manifesto was published, Alevis organized across Europe under the umbrella organization of the European Alevi Unions Federation in Cologne. As of summer 2005, the federation was organized in nine countries and had 184 affiliated organizations" (Özyürek, 2009: 240).

AABF is the only umbrella organization of Alevis in Germany and has 100.000 members represented by 140 local branches. According to the recent research data of German Ministry of Interior on Alevis¹⁰⁵, AABF represents nearly 255 thousand to 275 thousand Alevis living in Germany. On the other hand, regarding the Anatolian Alevis, AABF is the sole representative agent in Germany. With approximately 500,000 to 800,000 members, Alevis are the third major religious community after Christians and Muslims in Germany.

The most significant demand of the Alevi community was the existence of religious courses for Alevi pupils at schools. For this, courses on Alevisim were required be

¹⁰⁵ "Muslim Life in Germany" (A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam), Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009, Germany.
<http://www.npdata.be/Data/Godsdiens/Duitsland/fb6-muslimisches-leben-englisch.pdf>

added to the curriculum, and teachers needed to be supplied by the Alevi community itself. This demand of Alevi community was met by German authorities according to Article 7, Paragraph 3 of the German Basic Law, which is related to school systems.¹⁰⁶ That means “Alevi community is the first religious institution recognized by the state in Germany” (P9). This was first realized in Hamburg in 1998, with the inclusion of courses on Alevism in the school curriculum. Today, these courses are taught in seven *Länder* as included in different educational curricula. The adoption of Alevism courses at schools is interpreted as a sign of legal recognition of Alevism as a religious community in Germany.¹⁰⁷

Compared to the other immigrant organizations, AABF is a German origin association. That is, it was first founded in Germany without any precursors in Turkey. AABF is a member of German Islam Conference and German Integration Summit. Currently, the most important objective of the union is the establishment of research institutes in German universities on Alevi doctrine and the recognition of AABF as a public cooperative body.

It is important to underline the differences between Alevi beliefs and religious rituals and Sunni belief and rituals since these affect the organizational pattern of Alevism in Germany. Alevi belief is seen as the most secular among the other Muslims beliefs within the European world. Some of the reasons for this are they do not go to mosque; they do not pray five times a day; men and women pray together; women do not cover their hair... Because of those reasons, they have been seen as a tolerant and progressive religious immigrant group in Germany. Alevism have easily got incorporated

¹⁰⁶ English translation of the law article 7 (3), is the following: “Religious instruction shall form part of the regular curriculum in state schools, with the exception of non-denominational schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right of supervision, religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the religious community concerned. Teachers may not be obliged against their will to give religious instruction.” (www.bundestag.de)

¹⁰⁷ “Almanya’da Aleviler” written by Martin Sökefeld, 2014 http://ayrintidergi.com.tr/almanyadaki-aleviler/#_ftn4

into both political and social life, and they are known as the best integrated immigrant group in Germany (Özyürek, 2009: 239 and Sökefeld, 2014)

Returning to the the basic objectives of the Alevi Union, those are follows;

- Revitalizing Alevi belief in Germany and Turkey,
- Teaching and publishing books on Alevism,
- To strengthen the dialogue between religions,
- Raising awareness on human rights, democracy and discrimination.
- Presenting consultation to the politicians and people in general, creating a cultural memory of Alevism.
- Along with these objectives, youth and adult educational projects and active participation in municipal assemblies are notable activities of Alevi organizations.¹⁰⁸

Fields of activity is presented in four main categories on the organizational website;

Reminding – remembrance – responsibility: In memory of the victims of the partly state-organized and / or tolerated crimes against Alevis, AABF publicly maintains the memory with its continuing commitment to the "realization of the past". The federation introduces symbols against forgetting, against the relativization and trivialisation of (state) violent crimes, against the persistence of right, nationalist and Islamist ideologies and activities in daily life and society.

Participation - equality – inclusion: AABF challenges the fundamental and far-reaching change towards an inclusive society in Germany which goes far beyond the concept "integration" in traditional sense. Inclusion is not only an expression of a society that recognizes the equality and diversity of people and does not allow exclusion and marginalization, rather it is a human right which is applied self-evidently to all.

¹⁰⁸http://alevi.com/de/?page_id=90

Inform - action – change: Although both international human rights organizations and European Court of Human Rights condemned state policy of Turkey towards religious and ethnic communities, nothing has changed. AABF is committed to the protection of religious and ethnic communities and promotes political and public awareness of their rights.

Humanism - freedom – democracy: The Alevi community Germany stands for human rights, freedom and democracy. It defends the values of enlightenment and humanism. Mutual respect, acceptance and tolerance are also the basis of its joint action as well as the respect for human rights, the inviolability of human dignity and respect for the religious beliefs of each other.¹⁰⁹

Aims and goals of the union could also be enumerated as the following by reference to their bylaw:

1. AABF is in service to meet the religious, cultural and social needs of its members. It makes effort for Alevi to integrate into German society without losing their Alevi belief and Alevi culture.
2. AABF helps houses of worship (djemevis) and libraries that own written, visual and audial literature especially about Alevi belief and doctrine to be opened for its members. In addition, AABF makes efforts to promote Alevi belief and cultural traditions and to protect cultural heritage of Alevi leaders such as sayyids, mothers, fathers, abdals, poets and ozans.
3. AABF promotes the religion courses in which Alevism is taught in state schools of Federal Republic of Germany as assumed in Article 10, Sub-article 3 of the German Constitution. AABF promotes the introduction of an Alevism major in a state university and programmes to train teachers of religion courses where Alevism will be taught.

¹⁰⁹http://alevi.com/de/?page_id=94 (translation from German to English is mine)

AABF makes effort to acquire a legal entity status as assumed in Federal German Constitution.

4. AABF regards cultural diversity as the wealth and blessing of civil society. AABF, thus, supports and encourages its members to live peacefully with people from different religions, cultures and ethnicities. AABF advocates for all individuals' equally benefiting from rights and being exposed to equal treatment. AABF advocates for the integration of immigrants in Germany into the rest of the society. AABF promotes the spread of global values and determinedly stands up against all kinds of racism, religious fanaticism and the discrimination against minorities.

5. AABF regards the protection of women's rights in line with Alevism teaching as one of its most important principles and promotes the equal treatment of women in society. In accordance with this principle, a gender quota of 30 per cent is applied to ensure that there is enough number of women candidates in AABF boards, organs, commissions, regional representatives and unions.

6. AABF aims for Alevi children and youth to receive a modern education in line with Alevi belief, teaching and culture. AABF aims for the rights of children and youth to be strengthened in line with their daily needs. AABF calls for the protection children and the young's human rights, freedom of thought and liberty of conscious. It encourages children and the young to be open to new ideas and improvement, to receive scholarly education qualified enough to provide their productivity and creativity, and thus to contribute to society they live in.

7. AABF accepts the basic democratic liberal order and laws of Federal Republic of Germany unless they conflict with universal human rights. AABF accepts the immunity of human dignity unconditionally. AABF approves and accepts the freedom of thought and far reaching freedom of religion provided by the neutrality of state towards all religions.

8. AABF promotes works of humanitarian aid and solidarity. It's especially active in matters like nursing of the old and ill persons, child education, caring of youth and women, and helping those in need and injured such as the homeless. AABF may found social facilities such as kindergartens, hospitals and nursing homes. In addition, AABF makes efforts in providing humanitarian aid such as spiritual aid to institutions like jails and detention homes.

9. AABF accepts that art, culture and science cannot be separated from each other, and they are a must. With the aim of raising consciousness and sensitivity about the importance and protection of environment and nature, AABF cooperates with national and international state and civil organizations. In addition, AABF promotes sports activities.

10. AABF tries to reach its goals holding conferences, courses, seminars, podium discussions and press conferences and also publishing printed works. AABF supports TV and radio institutions and broadcasters that fit its purposes.

11. Suitable for its purposes defined in its code, AABF founds educational and social institutions and charitable foundations. AABF creates solutions to help its members with burial procedures.

12. AABF makes friendly contacts and shows solidarity with representatives and institutions of Alevi unions in Turkey, Europe and other countries.

13. AABF promotes activities and efforts for Alevi belief in Turkey to be recognized constitutionally.

14. AABF may affiliate with other organizations that fit its purpose.¹¹⁰

There are five bodies of AABF, namely the general assembly, administrative board, supervisory board, disciplinary board, sup ritual board, and regional representatives in

¹¹⁰<http://alevi.com/TR/hakimizda/tuzuk/>

different federal states, namely North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, North Germany, and Bayern.

The general assembly is the supreme decision-making organ of AABF. The ordinary general meeting takes place annually. Members of AABF exercise their membership rights by delegates in the general assembly.

The administrative board of AABF initially consists of twelve members and three alternates. They are elected by the general assembly for a period of three years by secret ballot. The chairman or chairwoman of the Spiritual Board, the Youth Association (BDAJ) and the Women's Association (Federation of Alevi women) are full members of the board, being barred from holding other board offices. These chairmen and chairwomen have the right to participate in meetings to speak and vote. With them, the number of board members increases to 15.

The disciplinary board shall consist of five members and three alternates. It is elected by the Annual General Meeting in a secret ballot for a three-year period. The board can present a written report when it decides that a member violates the purposes and objectives of the statute. Then, the board might decide on temporary or permanent exclusion of membership. Decisions of disciplinary board can only be appealed with the decisions taken in the general assembly.

The spiritual council consists of twelve clergies (*Dede-Ana*) and one representative from the board of AABF. The spiritual council is elected in the general assembly of clergies. At that meeting, each local member community sends two clergymen (*Dede / Ana*). The council holds its general meeting every 3 years by the call of spiritual board, within which all possible Alevi belief structures and faith centers are represented. The primary responsibility of the Council is the religious assistance to members of AABF and the training of clergy. It decides on matters relating to the content of faith. If there is

disagreement on individual religious issues or practices, the decision is taken until the next general meeting of AABF.¹¹¹

5.4 Activities and Interactions of Religious Immigrant Organizations

Religious and educational activities are the primary ones in IGMG. In addition to performing educational programs, publishing religious course books, haj and umrah organizations, they have Quran reading contests. They emphasize nursery classes and youth education particularly. In Belgium and in Berlin, they have educational structures:

“Nursery class and youth education is very important. We have İbn-i Sina Islamic Knowledge courses in Belgium. Many students attend these courses and they are taught in Turkish. In addition, Islamic Federation in Berlin is our educational branch” (P1).^{xiii}

To be effective they try to be in contact with local administrations such as federal state assemblies. In general, Hamburg, Bremen and Niedersachsen are the federal states which they have in good relations with. Equal legal status with other religious communities is the prominent demand from the state authorities. That is:

We made an agreement in Bremen on giving Islamic community the equal legal status with other religious communities; that was a big success. This way, we were recognized as a religious community; religious festivals will be public holidays now. And thus we have started a serious process on religion courses; and we will also receive German government’s support in this. I think this business will be institutionalized in the future; for now we are achieving state-level successes; in the future, there will be federal-level successes, Allah willing. In Niedersachsen, we changed the election results with 32 thousand votes; thus they saw our power. As a group, we are well organized; we are against racism, and we work against hostility towards Islam because after September 11, fear and marginalization has taken

¹¹¹http://alevi.com/de/?page_id=111

shape in society. Right after that, the economic crisis of 2008 happened; again we were to blame for the crisis. (P1)^{xiv}

My observations show that the scope of the activities is primarily educational or charity oriented. In educational activities, there are classes for school support and support for homeworks. In addition to them, there are courses on religious and customs education. Family educations to parents can also be considered to aim at increasing school success of students. Regarding charity activities, cooperations with churches in various social works are worth mentioning. For instance, 2000 Euro donation was made to a hospital looking after only mentally ill patients, and daily food allowance to the refugees or needies was supplied.

Dialogue among Islamic associations has started to rise with Islamic organizations as my interviews show. This tightening relationship among similar type of associations is also very meaningful because this introversive tendency brings about easy mobilization of Islamic communities all together. As an evidence,

Our most important recent success has been opening dialog between Islamic associations and gathering them together. Compared to the past, our unity and solidarity has come to a very good point. The mosques have a better dialogue with each other; we come together in organizations such as the holy birth week of Prophet Mohammed (P2)^{xv}

To continue with DiTİB, the prominent activity of the organization is religious services, such as guidance for the construction of mosques in Germany. Activities in certain religious days, such as holy birth of Prophet Mohammed, (*Kutlu Doğum Haftası*) Mosque Weeks and Religious Officers' day are the most important ones. Islam and Turkish courses, cross border aids for Muslim countries, such as Pakistan and Haiti after the earthquakes, and workshops such as, "*Türkçem, anadilim, geleceğim*" (My Turkish, my mother tongue, my future) are the other activities. As my respondent expresses;

Last year on May 31st, we did a “My Turkish, my mother tongue, my future” workshop; and the best part of it was that we gathered all Turkish immigrant organizations from right to left – both conservatives and liberals. We invited them all including parents’ association and teachers’ association and we created ten study groups. We defined problems and solution proposal; a serious amount of materials were piled up; the framework was determined, but the necessary steps should be taken urgently... (P3)^{xvi}

However among the supporters are dominantly the organizations with the emphasis of religious and ethnic identity; similarly, the executive committee consists of those organizations, namely the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD), DiTİB, ATİB, IGMG, VIKZ, Germany Turkish Students’ Parents Associations Federation (FÖTED), Germany Turkish Teachers Associations Federation (ATÖF) and European representative of *Zaman* Daily Newspaper¹¹² ,which is widely known with its Islamic line.

To understand the approach to the state and the religion relations in Germany, the below statement is highly useful. It is also highly challenging to see the relationship with the German state.

The affairs of state and religion work differently in Germany than in Turkey. In the historical development process of Germany, there are three main religious communities: Catholics, Protestants and Jews. During The Renaissance and Enlightenment period, the state bargained with the church; it was asked to withdraw from the areas that it was involved with; the way for state and religion to work together was opened, and it was ensured that the church would withdraw from areas about governance in public life. Christian intellectuals say we don’t do politics but we do groundwork for politics. Its influence still exists. For example, the Green Party is one of the most secular, most modern parties, but their co-president is also the vice president of the protestant church’s own parliament. There is backstein in Bavaria that comes from the Catholic Church. There is also this argument: there are various cults, there are communities. Some of them are in charge of science, governance, and collecting money. In bureaucracy, we still see the influence of these cults

¹¹²http://anadilim.eu/?page_id=72

that had those kinds of authorities during the middle age; this is an area of research (P3)^{xvii}

The state is not closed to religion or religious institutions. The word “community” has a positive meaning here; it’s possible for the established religious organization to be recognized and negotiate with the state. The state doesn’t interfere with the content of religious education; it says, “You decide, I’ll pay the salary of the teacher who studied protestant religious education teaching.” That’s the way they approach religious communities. And they also have a legal personality. Such a community can collect taxes, make their own internal regulations and bureaucracy does not interfere with its internal affairs. It collects church taxes and makes use of them.

For example, a church opens kindergartens, hospitals or faculties; the state meets 95 per cent of their expenses. It doesn’t come from the taxes that the state collects from catholic citizens; it spends the taxes here coming from everyone, but I, as a Muslim, don’t benefit from those services, still I pay taxes.

For example, at hospitals, priests go and talk to the patients; they provide emotional and moral support, and the state supports this. We as Muslims can’t benefit from this in German hospitals in the end. There may be developments about this issue in the coming 10-15 days (P3).^{xviii}

To continue with the relations with state authorities and civil associations, the other interactions of DITİB could be documented through its educational programs:

In general sense, we have organized dozens of training programs. Germany has defined itself as a country of immigrants since 2005. We organized a series of seminars called “Religions in a secular state.” German Ministry of Internal Affairs supported those seminars; federal office for migration and refugees –BAMF- also did. In every state, we gathered presidents of associations together and achieved mutual exchange of information. We covered woman problem, organized such a symposium. We organized a seminar called “controversy is a chance”; it was actually a workshop in which controversies were considered as positive. We also cooperated with visitors from different groups of universities.

... We also have a training unit. It organizes workshops and courses about Turkish culture and Anatolian traditions. However, we still haven’t been able to set up a substructure that addresses the whole Germany.

...We have serious existential problems. Both governments should take serious steps. Prisons and shelters are full of Turkish and Muslim youth; it

would be wrong to turn the other way. There should be a serious educational campaign and cultural revolution. Who goes to hauptschule (regular high school) most: Turks. Who drops out of school most: Turks. We can't ignore these (P3).^{xix}

Other than these, making use of integration funds, they perform some projects such as the highly broad scale project of "Pro-dialog", which was a two- year project ending up in 2011. It aimed at introducing Islam to German society through raising voluntary mentors in an educational program and organizing open-mosque days with the assistance of those mentors. In the European edition of *Hürriyet*, which is one of the most known newspapers in Turkey, the news about the project can be seen. The title reads, "Volunteers were given certificates". And continues, "...in DİTİB Hamburg, with the support of BAMF, *Pro-dialog* project has been completed and 41 volunteers, including 16 women have taken their certificates as voluntary dialogue guides"¹¹³

I have learnt from my respondent that there are also church congresses (*Kirschentag*) arranged by different churches in Germany, alternately by Catholics or Protestants each year. These congresses to which the media and politicians show interest have a religious content. We participate in those if we are invited; we contribute to and participate in panel sessions, and sometimes give explanations to the press (P3).

Projects funded and given a status of *Träger* (means the authority to carry out the project) by the BAMF also give them the opportunity to open courses to promote integration such German courses or other courses, for instance, offered only to women immigrants to inform them about the functioning of social system in Germany, from health system to social security, from municipal facilities to alternative activities that they can do other than practicing the religious duties (P4)

To understand their approach to Turkey, the following statement is highly clear; "Turkey learnt from us, a lot... With the influence of our Pro-dialog project, Turkey

¹¹³<http://avrupa.hurriyet.com.tr/haberler/gundem/774874/gonullulere-sertifika-verildi>

opened 250 mentor positions who will work in mosques for coming international tourists” (P5).

There are also grievances towards the Turkish state as well as the German state.

Germany brings in experts from abroad about the immigration problem. On one hand, many young immigrants are unemployed; but they should be seen as cultural treasure. Why doesn't Germany start an educational campaign? They want to lay their hands on this issue lately but the budgets they create are not enough at all.

People who grew here pay taxes but they can't get anything in return. For example, 80 per cent of the TV programs have negative news for immigrants. Second of all, immigrants have made investments in Turkey. They have to get something in return for what they have economically brought to Turkey somehow. Turkey doesn't do that.

For example, the ministry of national education and ministry of cultural affairs could send educators here. People are insufficient in art and culture; of course they have a certain cultural background; I don't mean an ignorant insufficiency. For example, my grandfather didn't know how to read and write but he is a wise person, he had wisdom. There are people here who took up Anatolian culture; and courses, seminars or folk song days could be organized for them; even they matter but they are not organized. Turkey can do those but it doesn't. They only make effort to make Turkey more attractive to tourists. Both states should do something about this.

People's level of education, culture and knowledge here should be raised. Youth should be looked after. For example: Turkish language. Forgetting Turkish would bring no benefit to people; it's also bad for the government. When a person who can speak Turkish also speaks German and maybe another third language, he/she will contribute to the development of this country. However, the state doesn't look at it that way, but it should. A person who can speak Turkish will have a chance to introduce Turkish culture here and it would be also positive for Germany. About this issue, religious communities have big responsibilities, as they are the biggest non-governmental mass organizations that reach people (P5).^{xx}

Recognition as a religious community is the general and most uttered objective of religious organizations, and perhaps DiTİB is the one expressing this aspiration the most. They say, “...we have almost been recognized in several federal states such as

Bremen, Hamburg and Hessen as a religious community; however, we do not have the same rights as churches and the Jewish community because they are legal communities, they have legal status..." (P5).

Recently, women branch of DİTİB have become organized as Muslim Women Union. When I ask about the objectives of the union, my professional respondent utters "our first objective is to represent Muslim women in Germany, in social, legal and social areas...our second objective is to truly inform them about Islam" (P4). I understand from the conversation that they need qualified women educators or theologians in order to teach Islam to Muslim immigrant women in Germany. As a second objective, they focus on education for projects presented by the institutions such as BAMF. Finally, they aim at country wide representation of Muslim women as a collective interest group. For all religious communities, it is very significant to learn about their rights, and utilize them. Mostly, they are eager to learn about the German system -or the ways for applying projects- in order to make use of them, thereby getting visible publicly, rather than enhancing integration with German society. They usually search for the channels to benefit from the existing rights, or try to achieve new rights as a community.

As for VIKZ, Islam teaching to children in German, participating in German Islam Conference, being involved in common works with other Muslim organizations, bridging relations with political parties for lobbying about Islamic issues are among their activities. Education is extremely important for this organization. Therefore, they have many student dormitories all over Germany.

As different from the other organizations above, VIKZ have project support to helping children with their homework.

About homework help, we received support from the ministries of family and internal affairs. There is also another project about educating parents. Within a project we carry out in cooperation with German governmental agencies and other organizations, we educate parents so that they pay

more attention to their children and attend PTA meetings. We tell them about the school system and inform them about their rights as parents (P6).^{xxi}

To the question about lobbying activities, my respondent answers:

About this issue, Muslims' lobby activities are newly starting in an intended way. We should group them under categories. As we are a religious community, we can carry out political lobbying activities for Islamic issues to be dealt with better; we talk to political parties and express our needs about this. We demand changes to be made in German educational system, we write press releases, organize meetings with various institutions about immigrants, about Turks, about Islam, about education... (P6).^{xxii}

Permanent dialogue is very important in achieving success they also say. They have been asking for Islamic rights for long years though they have only recently started to get results.

Our success in Bremen and Hamburg are the outcome of our negotiations and talks. For example, on a legal level, a Muslim butcher went to law and won the right to halal slaughtering. We seek solution by negotiating with political institutions; it's easier to be recognized that way. Otherwise, even if you gain your rights, you might come across problems (P6).^{xxiii}

To continue with ATiB, an 'over parties' organization, an active board member emphasizes the Islamic brotherhood and humanitarian aids to all Muslim countries as objectives of the organization. Moreover, "our language, our customs, traditions, practices, family structure and all the values belonging to us should be protected"^{xxiv} he adds. (P8). In the local branch of the organization, one respondent of mine comments about the activities of the association as follows: "we organize cultural nights, and youth camps in order to teach our youth their cultures... we have a football team, in order to save our young people from outside ... we have educational seminars about family, child rising, and our culture"^{xxv} (P7).

The family is perhaps the most vital institution in ATİB, compared to other Islamic organizations I have contacted with. As evidence:

Our family structure is in big trouble. We do family counseling as well. We have started a project and been carrying out that. As the Turkish community here, we don't have the knowledge and intelligence to protect family in a modern society. For example, we hold a wedding that costs 35 thousand Euros but we don't know how to make up after we have a quarrel. For example, church here is an institution, but the mosque in Turkey is a sole building. In Germany, the church mostly fulfills that duty. However, since our organizations here are newly competent on that kind of issues, we don't have institutions to protect our family (P8).^{xxvi}

When AABF is concerned, the primary activity for the organization is teaching Alevism.

While describing their working fields, my interviewee states:

Teaching Alevi belief, making historical researches, accumulation of knowledge about Alevi belief and transmitting it to children, keep vivid Alevi belief, organizing seminars in political area, panels, making cultural activities for women and men such as, theater, Saz, Semah, and folklore (P9)^{xxvii}

Currently, they also have activities around a non-profit company in Bielefeld called *Mozaik*. The company (they name it a non-profit organization) works for a database including the profiles of immigrant roof organizations in Germany. They are also interested in creating educational and job opportunities for young immigrants. Professionalization seem highly prevalent in Alevi organizations.

They also have a member in the city council, who is very active in using the social budget of the municipality. Generally, he focuses on educational activities for young immigrants and children. He provides mentorship for the young directing them towards proper jobs. He states:

I'm a computer technician, also a vocational counselor and trainer. I help young people who are looking for a job and I mentor them. I give computer

lessons at the youth center. Here is a center affiliated with the Church and it is supported by the state. The state makes a certain amount of contribution every year. Some is covered by the state and the Church covers some. The aim is to support children when their parents are at work. It's something like a study center. Field trips, activities and courses take place and 90 per cent of the children that come here are immigrant parents' children (P10).^{xxviii}

Annual activities of AABF can be enumerated as follows: 1st May, (Labor Day), 8th March, (International Women's Day), and 2th July Sivas Massacre (Massacre happened to Alevi intellectuals in 1993, in Sivas, Turkey)

There are side associations of AABF. The side associations follow the ideas and purposes of the AABF in their own institutional structure, and at the same time suggest their own ideas. They are established under the agreement of the AABF. They have their own statute. They are not allowed to have statutes contradicting the statutes of the AABF, and the agreement of the AABF's management is necessary. The management is allowed to intervene, if a side association loses its operational capability due to inactivity, or if they transgress against the statutes. In this particular case, the management of the AABF can disable the activities of the side association or call for a general meeting. Besides these internal organizational structures, AABF is integrated in a wide cooperational network with public and civil positions/locations in European, federal, state and municipal levels.

Side associations are the following:

-Federation of Alevi Youth (*Bund der Alevitischen Jugendlichen*, AAGB): AAGB is the youth branch of AABF. It works in coordination with administrative board of AABF. It presents reports at least one a year about the activities they performed. The administrative board of AAGB has the right to participate in all the meetings of AABF. The head of AAGB also has the right to vote, participate and deliver a speech in the administrative meetings of AABF.

-Federation of Alevi Women in Germany, (*Bund der Alevitischen Frauen Deutschland*, AAKB): The above rights are valid for the women branch.

-Science and Education Council (*Wissenschafts-Forschungs- und Bildungsrat*, BAEK): It is constituted for every three years in order to better fulfill the statutory objectives of AABF. The above rights are valid for BAEK.

-Council of Culture and Art (*Kultur- und Kunstrat*, KSK): KSK is constituted for every three years. Besides performing research and providing concrete results, it organizes or initiates visual presentations, concerts, discussion panels, handcraft and instrumental exhibitions, cultural and artistic events, photo exhibitions, activities in the fields of literature, poetry and compositions as well as establishing libraries. All the above rights are valid for KSK.¹¹⁴

To understand how AABF cooperates with the state authorities, their interactions should be examined. First of all, they are a member of both German Islam Conference and National Integration Summit. Also, as they are organized in Europe, they have broad network partners in various European cities. They cooperate with the Protestant Church in the manner of social work, education and publishing. A simple search can reveal that Protestant Church (*Evangelisch Kirche*) and its connected institutions such as Protestant Association for Religious and Ideological Issues (*Evangelischen Zentralstelle für Weltanschauungsfragen*) have published a book on Alevi community in Germany.¹¹⁵ When asked which association they are mostly affiliated in, one of my interviewees answers: “We have made a common project as Evangelischen Youth and Alevi Youth, and the activities were held in the church and in our association” (P11).

Other than this, another interviewee of mine states: “We make an important impact on the partnership of the state with the immigrant associations” (P9). We invite the mayor of the city to Muharram Fast (which is a fast peculiar to Alevi). Not only that; we also

¹¹⁴http://alevi.com/de/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AABF-SATZUNG_2014.pdf

¹¹⁵<https://www.evangelisch.de/inhalte/103606/09-02-2011/aleviten-das-wichtigste-buch-ist-der-mensch>

invite political parties and the churches; however, it is not enough; we should strengthen lobbying and we should be more active in political parties and perhaps prepare brochures for Germans about us.

Their successful campaign about Alevism courses at schools can be emphasized by the below quotation:

There have been panels and deputies have come and introduced themselves. Intensive campaigns have been carried out with the offices of governors so that Alevism courses would be started at schools. Now, if 12 kids at a class say 'I want Alevism course', German state has to open that course. It has become a right; whichever school it is and whether he/she is an Alevi child or not. We also have a right to have a voice about who the teacher would be. The kids draw pictures of Ali ibn Abi Talib at primary school; the courses are taught in German. A German can also teach this course; what matters is that we believe that he can. This first started 3 years ago in NRW and certain cities (P9).^{xxix}

The problems of the young are one of the major interests of AABF. In that sense, they work with institutions of education. AKE (Erwachsenen Bildung or Adult Education) is one institution they work with dealing with cultural and social problems of the young.

Religious education is also important. In order to educate the young, they invite *dedes* –who are religious and social leaders of the belief- as well as professors and knowledgeable people from Alevis institute to teach about religious rituals and ceremonies of Alevis; Cem (religious ritual of Alevis), significance of Khidr (who is a religious figure in Quran, believed in his immortality, Hızır in Turkish), and Muharram fast (which is different from Sunni fast practice, begins twenty days after Eid ul-Adha and lasts twelve days) are among the important topics in those educations.

AABF also cooperates with many other civic organizations in Germany. They usually work with other immigrant organizations through state-funded projects. For instance, AABF has taken part in the project group of the Project for Strengthening Immigrant Organizations (*Strukturelle Förderung von Migrantenorganisationen*), which is funded

by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Below seen other partners of the project are Arab, Croatian and Greek:

BAGIV – Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Immigrantenverbände in der BRD e.V.

BDAV – Bundesverband Deutsch-Arabischer Vereine in Deutschland e.V.

FdM – Forum der Migrantinnen und Migranten im Paritätischen, Der Paritätische Gesamtverband e.V.

FÖTED – Föderation Türkischer Elternvereine in Deutschland e.V.

KWKD – Kroatischer Weltkongress in Deutschland e.V.

OEK – Bundesverband Griechischer Gemeinden in Deutschland e.V.

*TGD – Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland e.V.*¹¹⁶

Accepting the financial disadvantages of immigrant organizations, the aim of the project is basically to support them financially, through creating resources and funds thereby strengthening their integrative potentials.

One other project to mentioned in this context is about social integration; promotion of democratic structures and education for democracy. The name of the project is 'Be a Model' (In German, *Zeichen Setzen!* in Turkish, *Yol Göster!*). It aims at a training program for democratic and non-violence education. Disseminators of this program are expected to work with parents, teachers and other educators and create targets and networks at local level. The particular objective of the project is to disseminate democratic values and tolerance among young immigrants through educational prevention and intervention. The promise of the educations is to prevent anti-Semitic, Islamic, right-wing extremist and ultranationalist ideologies among Turkey origin immigrant young. Developing an educational concept with actions is another objective

¹¹⁶BAGIV: Immigrant Association of Federal Labor Community, BDAV: Federal Association of German-Arabic in Germany, FdM: Migrants' Joint Parity Forum, FÖTED: Federation of Turkish Parents' Associations in Germany KWKD: Croatian World Congress in Germany, OEK: Bundesverband Greek Communities in Germany, TGD: Turkish Community in Germany. See http://alevi.com/de/?page_id=140

of the project. Therefore, educational institutions, public youth centers and schools could be practical venues of the project. Not only Turkey origin young immigrants are targeted in the project. As a principle of the project, building a cooperative grouping and intensive work with the cooperation partners and with young people with a German and a non-German background is deemed valuable in building common democratic values and tolerance. On the other hand, since the project is about the settlement of basic values of justice and democracy, it should be admitted that this is a long-term project.¹¹⁷

PROFEM is another project basically targeting to enhance qualification and professionalization of AABF organizations. With reference to the idea that only with the social participation of immigrants the integration process is fully fulfilled, it aims at training the volunteer leaders in 147 different branches of AABF. The project is funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). It has four different modules of education. The first is the association management. Establishment, registration, election of general assembly and obtaining charitable status are the main topics in it. The second is the internal affairs of association. Practical association functioning, youth and women's work and their activation are important headings of this education. The third focuses on the external affairs of association. Alevi local communities work more and more closely with local authorities, political parties, and public and civil society institutions in the recent years. Here, their presentation to the outside has an enormous importance. This education asks people not only to learn how to deal with public authorities and institutions, but also with communities of other religious and cultural circles. The fourth module is on fundraising in the association's work. Migration and integration work in Germany is encouraged and supported by governments at all levels - federal, state and local -. This means that the Alevi communities can benefit from it, and thus make their work more effective and professional. To that end, in the first part of this

¹¹⁷http://alevi.com/de/?page_id=138

fourth module, the funding opportunities are introduced and presented to the participants. As a second part, a project in the initial idea is implemented through an example application and implemented in practice.¹¹⁸

Another project 'My New Home' (in German, *Meine neue heimat* in Turkish *Yeni Vatanım*) is a pre-integration project, which is co-financed by AMIF, BAMF and European Union. The project considers the needs of the host society as well as the immigrants. In this sense, pre-integrative measures are important to meet both the requirements of changing demographic and social conditions and to ensure the claims of social justice and actual equality through guaranteeing equal treatment and equal opportunities in the "new home". The project includes the pre-integration of third country nationals from Turkey, the establishment and development of regional counselling centers in Turkey (locations: İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara), the training of disseminants, and delivery of seminars to immigrants. Among the major topics of the project are the following:

- Visa, work and residence permits
- Democratic constitutional and political system in Germany
- Democracy and democratic consolidations
- Basic social and labor rights
- Social systems of Germany
- Migration, integration and actual social developments in Germany
- Vocational guidance and career planning
- Possibilities of university education in Germany

Overall, those projects documented above indicate the cooperations of Alevi federations in Germany. The party affiliation of the community is known as SPD. As stated by one interviewee, "Alevis in Germany are strong in nearly 140 organizations;

¹¹⁸http://alevi.com/de/?page_id=136

they come second after Sunni associations. They participate in Islam Conference and they become active in SPD” (P9).^{xxx} They also say “We have German, Sunni, Alevi, even atheist members” (P9).^{xxxi}

“There are members affiliated to CDU, youth branch of CDU, SPD and the Left party. There are also members affiliated to Dersim associations” (P11)^{xxxii}. The last statement in the paragraph above also shows their interaction with Kurdish associations and Kurdish Alevi associations. It is a fact that they participate in panels and organizations of Kurdish Alevi community and Kurdish community, which also have a strong base in Germany. That is, they do not only interact with the similar. As long as the Alevis are denied the rights for Alevis and a valid status of *Cem Houses* in Turkey, they believe that they cannot be strong enough in Germany, either. The same problem is seen in the Kurdish community.

All in all, protecting cultural values, religious values, and traditions are prominent objectives in all the organizations examined above. All the religious organizations describing themselves as a religious community believe in collective and group rights, and shape their political struggle as a community. They all have a very close relationship and communication with other Muslim immigrant organizations or other religious organizations. That is, they try to tighten up group solidarity, to keep the community together and to become powerful as active political agents in Germany. This group solidarity also indicates their strong bonding social capital.

This attempt to keep communities together also appears in some other forms, namely a “roof” organizations of Muslims. The Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM), founded in Cologne in 2007, and is the largest umbrella organization in Germany that brings Muslims from Turkey together. KRM has four major organizations, which are also umbrella organizations: DİTİB is one of the founding members, and the others are the following: The Islamic Council for the Federal Republic Germany (IRD),

the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, (ZMD) and the Association of Islamic Culture Centers (VIKZ). One of my respondents from VIKZ says:

“We are also an umbrella organization; however, together with the other three umbrella organizations, we have founded a head organization, namely KRM, and now we are the spokesman of it; in the following months we will transfer it to ZDM” (P6).

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The common subjects they work for together are religious classes, curriculum works and other subjects such as NSU murders¹¹⁹. They work and present a collective voice as Turkish and Muslim organizations in Germany.

IGMG is not in the umbrella organization as namely; however, its influence is recognized in the Islamic Council, which translates in German, *Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (IRD)*. Islamic Foundation of KRM has also become visible in the national media. In Spiegel, the spokesman of DITIB, have been quoted:

KRM will represent the interests of all Muslims in Germany and it plans to open offices in each of the country's states.... individual mosques and associations will be welcome to join KRM... The member organizations are hoping that if they speak with one voice they will be able to have a greater influence over important decisions that affect Muslims in Germany, such as integration policy.¹²⁰

It should also be noted that KRM was founded as a reaction to the first German Islam Conference (DIK) held in 2006, in the period of The Federal Minister of Interior

¹¹⁹NSU murders were a series of xenophobe murders perpetrated by German far-right Neo-Nazi group National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund) between 2000 and 2007 throughout Germany, leaving ten people dead and one wounded. Primary targets were ethnic Turks. (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSU_murders)

¹²⁰<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-s-muslims-band-together-new-umbrella-group-founded-a-476563.html>

Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) since he declared that the government wanted to build a dialogue with Muslims in Germany. However, this request for a dialogue in Germany was, at the same time, a security related one, considering the impacts of September 11th attacks in the USA and terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, in 2004 and 2005 respectively (Munsch, 2012: 81).

In addition to the religious organization documented so far, one other collective of Muslims is the *Alliance for Innovation and Justice* (BIG), which is a local political immigrant party, founded by a Muslim political group in Köln in 2010. They describe themselves as an immigrant party that is sensitive to multicultural values, educational problems and enhancement of political participation of immigrants. They defend equal opportunity, fair treatment and recognition in all areas of life for immigrants. The major objective of the party is to encourage Muslims to participate in politics¹²¹ (Akbarzadeh and Shahram, 2014: 183). However, the name of the party is said to be very similar to Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and alleged to have founded under the supervision of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and non-transparent relations with Hamas, Kaddafi and Scientology. Also, its founders have been known with their extremist past, one of whom belonging to Milli Görüs in the 90s in Germany, and another defending Bekkay Harrach, a member of Al-Qaida.¹²²

To wrap up, Muslims have been getting organized widely, being more and more knitted through umbrella organizations since six or seven years, which is also apparent in formal political life with a new political party. They are becoming powerful political agents through developing a dialogue with the German state.

Regarding their relations with German society and their comprehension of integration, in our data, one can recognize a distinctive tendency that they usually have little

¹²¹<http://big-deutschland.de/uber-big/>

¹²²<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/migrantenpartei-big-erdogans-berliner-lobby-truppe-a-786207.html>
<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4014/islamist-turks-germany>

communication with the German society. The dangers of this fact were also underlined by Tezcan (Tezcan, 2005: 518-522). Actually, considering the major objective of these religious communities which is “to protect, customs, traditions, religious, family culture and Turkish language”, it is not quite a surprise that they have little contact with German environments. One of my respondent states “We have football teams; nearly eighty or ninety young members of us play in these teams; we compete with Germans in C league, but we do not want our players sitting in the same table with Germans” (P2). Along with the other Muslim communities, there is also a dialogue with the churches. As stated earlier, DİTİB is one of the performers of Pro-dialog project, which aims at introducing Islam to the Christian world. Additionally, every October, there are open mosque days. From this, one can get the impression that Islamic communities establish dialogue through institutional and formal ways. They are eager to learn Christianity, but they mostly do it by their own. Recalling the statements of one respondent from IGMG, “women branches make indoor gatherings to motivate women, or home gatherings to inform about how and why Noel is celebrated. Also they are taught about Islamic morals, identity and responsibilities of women” (P1). Similarly, they want to learn German institutional system, merely to learn about the rights that could be benefited on behalf of them as a community. That is, there is a functional and goal oriented attitude towards learning about the German legal structure. As stated by one of my respondents “We have to know about our rights and use them. We have certain rights in the integration councils, and if we use them effectively, then we can have the chance to be taken seriously” (P27).^{xxxiv}

In brief, the activities and interactions of all the religious immigrant organizations indicate that they consider themselves as a religious community. Rather than individual rights, they want to stick their community together and strive for their collective rights. Their activities are mostly about offering religious services, religious education and cross border aid campaigns to Muslim countries. Football teams for the young members are the most salient social activity for them. Educational activities,

particularly, Turkish classes, religious classes and supplementary lessons for school are the most prevalent activities for children. Furthermore, they have stronger and closer relationship with each other compared to the past, and although they are aware of the fact that Turkish Muslim community is so closed and isolated, they have difficulties to eliminate this problem. Lastly, as Alevi federation stands in a distinct place compared to other religious organizations, the proximity of Alevism to secular immigrant group parties in Germany makes a difference. One other difference can be seen in its interactions with various civil networks and associations rather than having solidarity only with similar religious associations. Furthermore, educational projects and creating vocational opportunities for young immigrants and the efforts to include them into German educational system indicate Alevi community's willingness to integrate in a social manner. On the other hand, project-focused works and cooperation with the state authorities in this manner can be seen as similar to other religious organizations.

5.5 Secular Immigrant Organizations

5.5.1 Federation of Democratic Workers (*Föderation der Demokratischer Arbeitervereine* - DİDF)

Mottos such as “a job, enough income and equal rights for everyone”, “solidarity against social restrictions and racism” and “together we are strong” can be said to sum up DİDF's goals. As mentioned earlier, DİDF was founded in 1980, many worker associations' coming together. Now, in more than 40 German cities, it is organized not only as an association but also as action committees or initiatives. As stated by DİDF Köln Board of Directors, the number of members is variable; however, it has recently decreased. In its first years, DİDF opened its doors to high numbers of political refugees parallel to the political atmosphere in Turkey. However, as the position of those persons has changed in time, DİDF has continued its life as a workers' and students' organization. Now in the state of North Rhein Westphalia (NRW), it has a power to

include a mass of 2500-3000 people in a protest and to include more than 10 thousand people in its activities.

In the brochure prepared for its 25th anniversary, the mission of DIDF is stated as such: "Standing up for the political, economic, social and cultural rights and demands of immigrant workers, youth and women from Turkey; securing uniformity of local/foreign laborers against all kinds of nationalism, dividedness and discrimination; and standing up for a common life." (Köln, 2006)

The current objectives of DIDF are slightly different compared to past since currently, their interests are not only the rights of immigrants from Turkey but also those of all the immigrants living in Germany. In this sense, they underline: "The doors of DIDF's member associations are open to each and every worker and laborer without discrimination based on language, religion, race, or gender" (Flyer of DIDF).

Similarly, a DIDF board member utters that in first years, the objectives of DIDF were mostly to follow the human rights violations in Turkey and to convey them to German public opinion; however, in the course of time, the life center of them had become Germany, and they had started to focus on Germany and political developments in Germany. In fact, he says "... if we are an organization founded in Germany, we have to inform and organize the people from Turkey about the problems in Germany; at the same time, we have to get organized together with Germans in schools, in workplaces and in trade unions." (P14).^{xxxv} Similarly, another interviewee stresses upon the importance of togetherness of indigenous Germans and immigrants and describe the association as "a bridge bringing Germans and immigrants together" and states one of their objectives as "being a part of this society and to struggle for being equal citizens" (P16). In the same vein, another board member says one of the objectives of the organization is "to strengthen the common lives of foreigners and indigenous people" (P15).

Struggle against racism, which is triggered both by Turkey and Germany's policies together with German people is another objective uttered by my respondents. This matter of togetherness between immigrants and indigenous people is restated in the sense that young Turks living in Turkish neighborhoods should be rescued from there and melt into the society since they are not successful in their educational life just because they live in isolation. Especially, third generation should be rescued from the trap of reactionary religious organizations since they are confused and disoriented by those organizations. They do not learn to be tolerant to differences.

If we are to continue describing DIDF: "DIDF is neither a lobby organization nor a nationalist organization. DIDF is not a neutral organization, either. Having taken sides with the interests and rights of workers since it was founded, DIDF is a laborer organization which fights for removing the obstacles to the fight against the common problems of laborers from Turkey and other nations" (Flyer of DIDF).

Furthermore, "DIDF is an uncompromising advocate for not only workers but also the youth and women. The youth branch of our federation, DIDF-Youth helps working, apprentice, student or unemployed youth with their specific problems" (Flyer of DIDF).

In a more specific manner, DIDF's aim is to struggle against unemployment and social restrictions. For example: "It advocates for the reduction of working time while keeping full-time pay, for a ban on working flexible hours and weekends, and for a job and enough income for everyone and for an opportunity for technical education" (Flyer of DIDF).

As for citizenship rights, "DIDF advocates for the removal of legal discrimination, which is an important obstacle to the unification of workers from all nations; DIDF advocates for the right of citizenship for all whose center of life is Germany, it advocates for the removal of reactionary and discriminatory laws, and of the visa requirement demanded for children; it also advocates for the closing down of racist-fascist parties and organizations" (Flyer of DIDF).

DIDF supports the fight of workers and laborers in Turkey for their democratic rights. It strengthens its solidarity with workers' unions and human rights associations in Turkey. It supports the fight against the practices that block "the freedom of thought and organization, forced disappearances and public enemy gangs." In addition, DIDF advocates for the recognition of Kurdish people and all peoples, and for the democratic solution of the Kurdish question (Flyer, DIDF).

"Advocating that the belief that all workers have a common culture no matter which nation they come from, DIDF puts special efforts for workers and laborers from Turkey to come together with German people's progressive and worker-friendly cultural values" (Flyer of DIDF).

Finally, it publishes *Tatsachen* (The Facts) and *Junge Stimme* (Voice of the Youth) in German and supports the daily workers' paper *Evrensel* with full effort.

5.5.2 Immigrant Women's Union Germany (Bundesverband der Migrantinnen in Deutschland e.V.)

Immigrant Women's Union Germany was founded in 2015 in Cologne after a conference taking place with the participation of 250 women all over Germany. The federation has 32 branches and organized in 23 different cities.

The major objective of the Immigrant Women Union is described as follows in the organizational website:

...unlike Turkish women's organizations that impose national and religious identities into women, strengthen their prejudices and cause them to be isolated from the society they live in; we as immigrant women's association aim to unite with local or international women with whom we have the same problems and to look for common solutions.¹²³

¹²³<http://www.migrantinnen.net/>

The reason for the foundation of the organization and the current objectives are expressed by my different respondents as follows:

We had been coming together with women and organizing various activities since the end of the 1990s, but we realized that we needed a different organization; we wanted a sole women's organization, not a women's branch any more. There were problems that stemmed from being from Turkey and being immigrants and we needed to tackle them as well. That's why we founded this association (P19).^{xxxvi}

The reason why immigrant women's association was born was to centralize the work of women, but its mission is to be the center of all women, not just foreign women. I think we have caused the other organizations with which we have relationships to look at the issue in the same way. We are an organization that centralizes women's work but as I said, we are open to everyone (P18).^{xxxvii}

We hold meetings for women including trainings, discussions about newspaper articles and current issues. Thus, women learn to express themselves both in German and Turkish (P17).^{xxxviii}

In general, the association combats for economic and social rights of all immigrant women in Germany. In this sense, equal pay, efficient social and cultural life, working and residence permit independent of the husbands, facilitation of naturalization for women, qualification opportunities for women and an equal participation in the labor market are among the objectives of the organization.

Similar to DiDF, they do not focus on only Turkish women immigrants; instead, they aim to comprise all women who encounter the same problems even if they are Germans. However, it is clear that the association mainly deals with immigrant women. Their current activity is a co-work on the rights of immigrant women who indispensably work in care and cleaning sector due to lack of education and language knowledge. They say, in the last years, immigrant women are more and more preferred in those sectors which are insecure, irregular and with very low wage.

It is well stated by one of my respondents:

... Cause immigrant women do very low paying jobs at the very bottom level. They are not qualified enough and have language problems. The most important problem is that they have a hard time in asserting their rights because they don't know their rights. And since they can't speak the language, they can't defend themselves. We take care of the problems they come across in their work lives (P19).^{xxxix}

Similarly, another respondent utters "In a co-work with unions, we collected information about the number of woman workers according to their origins and sectors; we made a list, then prepared a brochure and distributed them to women and unions to urge them organize in unions" (P18).

Dependency on husband is another vital problem that immigrant women must encounter. This is because in the first three years of their marriages, they do not have the right to divorce since they all get their residence and work permits as dependent on their husbands. Within these three years, women have no possibility to participate in social life and cannot socialize much except inefficient integration courses, as many integration course does not offer baby minding. Violence and discrimination are other problems of immigrant women. Although those problems are not unique to immigrant women, undoubtedly, they are exposed to more discrimination and violence compared to others. Forced marriages are the most salient example to this.

While working on the above problems, bringing women together and merging them into society they live in, rather than caging them into houses, and helping them feel as part of the society is one of the objectives. All of my respondents underlined that immigrant women feel powerless; they do not have self-confidence because they do not know much about the society they live in. In this sense, individual autonomy of women and raising awareness about the legal rights are like the philosophies of this association.

In a more concrete manner, they enumerate their demands and objectives in their website as follows:

-We say no to ghettos, parallel communities, disunity, forced marriages, domestic violence and outdated traditions' being used as a means of oppression.

We demand that:

-Discriminatory approach and laws towards women in all areas of social life be ended;

-Women be provided with equal opportunity and pay;

-Social restrictions that impoverish and isolate women out of social and cultural life be removed;

-Measures that promote women employment be taken; everywoman acquires a profession if they request, and opportunities be provided for women to become qualified;

-Immigrant women be provided with residence and work permit independently of their spouses;

-Acquiring citizenship be made easier;

-Immigrant women be encouraged to learn German free of charge, and childcare be provided for them as well;

-Social and cultural measures be taken for immigrant women to understand and get to know the country they live in, and that kind of projects be encouraged.¹²⁴

5.5.3 Turkey Germany Human Rights Organization (*Menschenrechtsverein Türkei/Deutschland e.V. -TÜDAY*)

Founded by exiled writers, journalists and artists, TÜDAY was a response to the human rights violations after the military coup of 1980 in Turkey. Today, they are interested in

¹²⁴<http://www.migrantinnen.net/biz-kimiz/>

fighting against all kinds of discrimination and exclusion in Germany, too. Basically, they defend the human rights of asylum seekers and people under the risk of deportation, and they support the participation of all people in society, and the freedoms and human rights in Germany.

TÜDAY is a smaller size organization compared to others. It does not have not so many members or no branches, only one office in Cologne. Actually, it was founded as a similar to İHD (Human Rights Association) in Turkey. However, like other immigrant organizations, they do not only work on the problems of Turkey. In the course of time, they have become sensitive to human rights violations in Germany, especially to the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. Therefore, one can argue that the very focus of TÜDAY is currently the rights of illegal immigrants.

Accordingly, my respondent reports:

The life standards of undocumented people who have entered Germany through illegal ways are very bad. They live in places like prisons or camps; in very small rooms live too many people. They can't leave the city. All these issues, unfortunately, remain out of German political agenda. This is a very serious problem. Some people even die. Last week, a decision of mass deportation was issued and there are still protests against it in Cologne... (P21).^{xi}

As I have learnt from my respondent, TÜDAY was in trigger position in the project of *Deutsch - Kurdisch - Türkische (Beziehungs) Geschichten* (German-Kurdish-Turkish Historical Relations). The content of the project included the coincidences in Kurdish and Turkish immigrants' personal historical stories over generations in Germany.

Still, one can argue that TÜDAY tries to catch public attention in Germany about the human rights violations in Turkey. In that way, they try to put pressure for human rights violations in Turkey. They say Roboski process, Hrant Dink assassination, unfair judgements about the Kurdish problem in Turkey are also the object of activities.

In addition to these, they think in Germany, TÜDAY is needed because it is the most established human rights association founded by Turkey origin immigrants in Germany. This makes them stronger in attracting many different immigrant organizations and put them in a reference position among German human rights organizations. That is, according to TÜDAY, German democratic organizations learn from them about what is happening in Turkey.

The objectives of TÜDAY are given in the organizational website as following:

- Elimination of all forms of discrimination and exclusion
- Awareness of democracy and supporting of human rights
- Prevention of deportations of asylum seekers to countries which do not guarantee life safety
- Residence rights of refugees
- Making human right violations public and supporting freedoms
- Promoting participation and social participation of all people.

Working principles of TÜDAY is described in the same page as following:

- Having democratic structures in all bodies
- Being independent and over parties
- Defense of human rights regardless of race, religion, sex, ethnicity and opinion
- Cooperation with other organizations and people who have the same goals and purposes.

5.5.4 Federation of Kurdish Associations Germany (Föderation Kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland- YEK-KOM, NAV-DEM)

As mentioned earlier, YEKKOM is a federation with 46 member associations in different cities in Germany. Although the exact official number of members is difficult to calculate, according to the interviewees, the federation has the capacity to represent

nearly 80,000 Kurds in Germany. In a broad sense, their basic goals are to work for developing and protecting cultural identity, beliefs, and philosophical values of Kurdish people. In a more detailed sense, enhancing economic and social welfare and the democratic rights of Kurdish community in Germany, bringing a formal legal status to national cultural identity of Kurds in Germany, working for the protection and approval of Kurdish cultural identity in homeland are among the objectives of YEK-KOM.

Equality in the manners of political, social and cultural rights of immigrants in Germany as well as equal political participation in the elections, enhancing education in native language and protecting all the other cultural properties of Kurdish community are important working areas of them. Fighting against racism, reaching a multicultural society and provision of mutual respect in Germany are their other goals of existence. Moreover, asylum seekers are particularly important for them. In this sense, they present legal assistance and protect all the rights of asylum seekers, including the right to be an asylum seeker.

The foundation process of the organization has been recounted by one of the active member as follows:

After the late 80s, we started looking for an association. The first generation was already here. We founded associations in 3 or 4 places. In the first organization we founded during 80s, there were unions of women, youth, workers and students. There was also a sports association. We co-founded that. Under the roof of that association, there was a Mesopotamia association, as well. We had women and youth branches. Under the youth branch, there was Kurdistan students' union. I was among those who declared the foundation of that union in Cologne. And I've been an active member since 1979 (P24).^{xli}

The objectives of the organizations are described by the same respondent as follows:

There are differences between today and the past. At first, our activities were directed more to the problems of being new to the country. People who came here had problems of education and translation. Right now, we

also have to take care of the problems of people living here, such as family or schooling problems. Young people have drugs problems; women have work and integration problems; they also have problems of unemployment, language, expressing and introducing themselves. Thus, the presence of this association is important (P24).^{xlii}

The more politically conscious they are, the better. I mean it's not only about speaking the language, but they also need to internalize and comprehend the political culture here. They need to internalize how the system works here; that's only how you can be effective. Of course citizenship and speaking the language is important, but they are not enough... We aim to integrate and raise consciousness about it among immigrants (P24)^{xliii}

The objectives about the approval of Kurdish identity have been expressed as follows:

We want the recognition of Kurdish identity; we don't want to be counted together with the Turkish population in Europe. We don't want to be taken into account as Turkish. They say, "The Turkish population in Europe is such and such"; however, there are Kurdish people among them. It's very unfair. What they want to calculate is the potential of voters there. The Kurds of Turkey is counted as Turks but "ethnic Kurd" should be written on their passports. They have to make such a distinction. Records should be kept like this (P22).^{xliv}

YEK-KOM was converted to NAV-DEM with a congress held in June 21 and 22, 2014 in Dortmund, Germany. They made a declaration in their new website, with the title '*YEK-KOM heißt jetzt NAV-DEM*'.¹²⁵ They explain the reasons for this change with the following words:

We have in the past two years made complex discussions on the problems and difficulties of our associations and structures in our branch organizations with our members and other Kurdish institutions. Based on these discussions we held the 20th annual congress of YEK-KOM in Dortmund with the aim of reorganization on June 21 and 22, 2014. In addition to the substantive restructuring, changing the name of the

¹²⁵YEKKOM is now NAV-DEM!
<http://navdem.com/de/yek-kom-heist-jetzt-nav-dem/>

Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany (YEK -KOM) to Democratic Society Centre of Kurds in Germany (Navenda Civaka demokratik ya Kurds li Almanya, NAV-DEM) has been decided and the 800 delegates adopted a statute for the newly created structure.

In annual congress alongside the delegates of our member associations and representatives of associations of various Kurdish religious communities, youth and women's clubs, art and culture clubs, Kurdish students and academics associations and Kurdish parents' associations participated. A total of 13 different Kurdish associations and institutions were represented.

One of our main objectives in the context of the reorganization was to make the structure more comprehensive through including not only well-known ones but also various Kurdish associations working in different social areas.

In order to prepare a suitable statute, firstly a group consisting of seven Kurdish lawyers worked together and made up a draft. This statute transformed the roof organization into a council and in the congress all the changes and additions in new statute have been discussed with our delegates profoundly, then we have reached the final draft of our statute.

In the discussions leading 20th YEK -KOM Annual Congress it quickly became clear that the former type of organization has not the right answer to the problems and difficulties of our society living here. YEK -KOM was a structure that had been formed in accordance with the circumstances of the 90s. At least since the 2000s, there was a need for restructuring. Although a bit late NAV -DEM will now meet this demand.

NAV -DEM sees itself as an umbrella organization. Our goal is to include not only the Kurdish associations but also the self-organization of Kurds in the political, religious, economic and cultural fields. Also participation of other Kurdish institutions, foundations and associations is encouraged to organize in NAV-DEM. It has already taken the support of 250 Kurdish clubs.

...

NAV -DEM is not only a nationwide umbrella organization. It is Democratic Society Centers of Kurds. These are the places offer an umbrella for all Kurdish institutions, associations, faith communities, initiatives and social groups. Each group kept under this umbrella with its peculiarities and works simultaneously in joint coordination with the other.

While we may call the old organizational model as a more unitary, constructed even by the nation-state mentality system, the new model comes closer to the understanding of the Democratic Nation.

...

With the reorganization, another objective is the construction of a democratic society. In this sense the goal of gender equality is extremely important because we adopt the understanding that, freedom of society depends on the freedom of women. Another goal is to spread ecological understanding in democratic society centers. We imagine the democratic societies as places where free individuals express their thoughts freely. So, wherever possible, experts in many areas of life together with the people of that region could organize their own ways to develop solutions for various problems of life. The idea of free individuals in a free society is related to this ability to join forces and develop own responses to own questions.

...According to our new Statute, co-chair, consisting of a woman and a man, in our structures is a necessity. This is an important first step to leave the question of gender liberation not only to the "goodness" of man.

...

In brief YEK -KOM was an umbrella organization for Kurdish associations while NAV -DEM coordinates the cooperation of women, youth, various Kurdish religious communities and 265 associations and institutions. The focus of NAV -DEM must again be emphasized: The co-ordination as the primary decision-making power lies in the social centers at the local level. The aim of the reorganization is eventually to build and promote democracy from the base.¹²⁶

5.6 Activities and Interactions of Secular Immigrant Organizations

In this section the activities and the interactions of the secular immigrant organization documented above will be analyzed in the order that they appeared in the previous section.

To begin with DİDF, in its campaigns and activities, the critical stand toward state policies could be easily seen. When asked what, in their opinion, the most effective campaign of theirs was, one member answers as the reaction against a campaign

¹²⁶<http://navdem.com/de/yek-kom-heist-jetzt-nav-dem/>

named “*Vermißt*”.¹²⁷ Besides Sunni immigrant organizations such as DİTİB, VIKZ and ZMD, DİDF was one of the organizations which launched a counter-campaign and succeeded in postponing the campaign as a result of a calling to *Bundestag*. The point here is that DİDF is not only sensitive to problems of immigrant workers but also to the rights of Muslims. As underlined above, their priority is to keep immigrants -whether Muslim or not- and indigenous people together, and sustaining peace instead of the conflict among them. Another example to such activities is the campaign of “wealth tax”.¹²⁸ In this campaign DİDF worked with a German social association, *Umfairteilen*, which is an action alliance of several trade unions, social organizations and non-governmental organizations in Germany. One of the members of board in Bielefeld utters:

This campaign was discussed in various democratic organizations and trade unions. We are discussing it through institutions that are important in life. All of them are going up and discussed again as it has been seen that there is a serious reaction. In this sense, I can say that we are effective in causing a public debate (P14).^{xiv}

Yet as another example, a woman board member says one of the biggest campaigns of DİDF was regarding the voting rights for foreigners during the years 1984-85 and they used the slogan of “*Wir sind gemeinsam stark*” (We are strong together). This slogan is

¹²⁷This campaign has been launched in 2012 by German Interior Ministry and strongly criticized by all immigrant organizations to be a racist campaign. During the campaign some posters are hanged all over Germany, on posters there were pictures of young people, who were allegedly trapped into radical Islamist terror organizations and acquaintances were called to renounce them as their potential criminal behaviour. The campaign is criticized in mass media too. See, <http://www.islamophobiawatch.co.uk/german-ministrys-racist-campaign-pushes-muslim-associations-to-react/>
<http://www.sde.org.tr/en/newsdetail/-vermisst-missing-the-loss-of-reason-and-conscience-in-germany/3025>

¹²⁸ Wealth tax is defended mainly by trade unions in Germany as against unfair tax policy and unequal income distribution. It argues that, social wealth is unfairly distributed due to unfair wealth policies. If rich and high income stratum of society pay more tax this would inhibit income gap between the two layers of society.
see also: <http://www.yenihayat.de/2013/09/02/toplumsal-zenginlik-adil-dagitilmali/>

also identified with the logo of DİDF, in which a foreign worker and a German worker shake hands. Other titles of the activities could be enumerated as the follows; campaigns for peace in Afghanistan, actions for the removal of university fees with youth groups, campaign for legal minimum wage, equal pay day actions for women, demo against mini-jobs and low wages, and various activities with German trade unions, woman and youth organizations.

According to another board member, fighting against the limitations in social rights, restricted unemployment benefits and welfare cuts in the name of social reforms are another operational area of DİDF. The campaign against *Hartz IV*¹²⁹ is the most striking example. Moreover, they work against cheap labor, subcontracting, and unsecure jobs besides working for higher wages and higher retirement age.

To the question “could you create public debate?” the same respondent answers as follows:

There are some provocative policies of government about racism. Especially the policies that are offending for Islamic organizations. And this resulted in more polarization in society, and prevented integration. In *Vermißt* campaign, we exposed them, discussed in media and kept in the agenda among trade unions, too... For example, murder of 19 foreigners. It is well known that they have removed the evidences about those murders. We made press releases with opposition parties at that time. It is more possible to bring voice when we are supported by German civil associations and political parties. It brings voice when it is carried out together (P15).^{xlvi}

¹²⁹Hartz IV is the last reform package following to Hartz I, II and III. The set of regulations are not only about the regulations of labour market but also bring restrictions to unemployment and social benefits. It has been accepted as the “most destructive attack on social welfare provision in Germany since the end of the Second World War” by some circles. After the proliferation of subcontracting, unsecure and mini-jobs in Germany, many workers, especially immigrants have been dropped in Hartz IV because they either did not meet the preconditions for unemployment benefits due to short work period or they stay as unemployed since twelve months. It has been alleged that Hartz IV has increased the overall poverty and urged social inequality in Germany.

<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/01/06/teny-i06.html>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartz_concept

<http://www.allmendeberlin.de/hartz%20IV%20brosuru.pdf>

Another respondent states:

For example, the campaign about university fees made a big impression. We had made a proposal that kids would stay together until a certain age, not until the 4th grade, and be separated later according to their successes and skills; so we became successful in raising awareness. We played a role in Turkish language's being accepted as a foreign language in high schools. Even if we could not make foreigners' the right of election be put into practice, we see that all parties except CDU have included this issue in their election campaigns (P16).^{xlvii}

When the interactions of DİDF are concerned, it is seen that they work with German trade unions most, yet they also are in a very close relationship with German and international democratic mass organizations. They value to be together with indigenous organizations and foreigners. They do not deal only with Turkey or people from Turkey; instead, they take care of the problems of all immigrants and foreigners in Germany. In that sense, they value to be human and believe in human rights. They struggle for universal human rights regardless of ethnicity or religion of people.

As for the political parties, Left Party (*die Linke*) and SPD are the most frequently interacted. There is a member of parliament, who is an old member of DİDF, Sevim Dağdelen, from *die Linke* in *Bundestag*, and they see her as the representative of DİDF. Instead of organizing in integration councils, they prefer to be in city councils in local politics since they do not believe in the effectiveness of the former.

German Red Cross (*Deutsches Rotes Kreuz*), Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and various German social forums are other groups they work together. Also they are a member of local social platforms, such as Antifa (anti-fascist) and Alliance against Right (*Bündnis Gegen Rechts*). They participate in all discussions and activities whether or not they are related to Turkey since they think that German groups may support their activities in return when there is something related to Turkey. This will strengthen solidarity among people.

DİDF is also in contact with Latin American countries and sensitive to their problems. In the near past, members of DİDF visited Venezuela and organized a youth camp there. DİDF also has interactions with Turkey origin immigrant's groups. For instance, they are present in a newly founded platform, *Avrupa Demokratik Güç Birliği Platformu* (Democratic Alliance Platform of Europe). This platform was founded in 2013 by 18 Turkey origin immigrant organizations, including AABF, ATİF, YEKKOM, and KOMKAR. Besides Alevis, Kurdish and Yezidi organizations, DİDF is also a founder of this platform. One of my respondent underlines "we would like to work together with Alevis and Kurdish groups though Alevi groups are not so eager to work against racism in Germany. However, we try to involve them; we also try to reach Mosque associations". Another respondent of mine points out "in wealth tax demonstration in Bochum, there were Churches callings against racism. However, we did not see any Mosque association there".

Moving onto the Immigrant Women's Association Germany, its activities usually involve campaigns and demonstrations with other organizations, whether immigrant or local women. One respondent of mine utters:

...for 4 years, we have been gathering almost 40 associations on the March 8th and taking them to the streets. March 8th used to be a day of eating cake; it was like a party that only women make pastries and cakes and eat them. Thanks to GKB, marches of 500-600 people have been accomplished. It has also become a reference point for Germans.

...in April, we hosted the immigrant women's conference held by the ministry. There are professionals in certain areas within our organization and our organization has branches throughout Germany. For example, two friends of ours are specialists who did their PHDs in honor killings. There are also legal experts; these people are famous, respected people who are taken seriously and invited to conferences. For example, we also have friends that have done researches about the situation of immigrant women who work in the field of healthcare (P17).^{xlviii}

In line with this vision, the interactions of the association are diverse and transnational. They come together with Iraqi, African and Argentine, Moroccan, Greek, Italian and German women in common activities, especially in 25th Novembers and 8th Marchs. They have affiliation with women groups in Switzerland and Netherlands. Accordingly, they are a member of European' Women Lobby.¹³⁰ Moreover, they are a member of *Deutsche Frauen Rat* (German Women Council) and they were entitled to receive an integration medal by the Minister of State for Integration, Maria Böhmer, in 2011. They are also in contact with municipal women department (*Gleichstellungstelle*), women braches of *die Linke* and *die Grünen*, and women groups from the universities and trade unions. Similarly, the objective of the association is to become wider and more efficient:

One of our aims is to do more efficient work that involves all groups of women. First we started with the public union and now we have expanded... and this is continuing; we are expanding more. We come together with feminist women's groups, with various women's groups of more local or central or state level, with Left Party's women' groups, with women's groups of unions, with women from universities and with women's groups of Social Democratic Party and Green Party (P18).^{xlix}

It can be seen that, including the problems of Muslim women, any other problem that immigrant women have to encounter is on the focus of this association. They approach gender sensitive to economic and social problems of women regardless of their religion and ethnicity, rather than behaving like an immigrant community from Turkey. That is, their aim is not to create an immigrant community; rather, they try to articulate into European civil society for the sake of women immigrants.

As for the activities and interactions of TÜDAY, deportations and *refoulements* (forcing to return home country) are the primary subjects among its activities. Although the international laws and United Nations conventions protect the rights of refugees,

¹³⁰<http://www.womenlobby.org/?lang=en>

nation states sometimes violate and re-interpret those laws according to their national interests. In that sense, TÜDAY is a defender of universal human rights and try to protect the human rights of anyone oppressed in any way whether Muslim, political refugee, or paperless living in Germany.

When the interactions are concerned, TÜDAY is affiliated with “*Kein Mensch Illegal*” (No one is illegal), the most known and popular group in Germany. One of my respondent explains the activities of this group as follows:

There is a group about undocumented people called *Kein Mensch Illegal*. This is an autonomous initiative but they are very efficient. They push the limits of the state. Helping undocumented people is a crime in this country. That group uses *Einewelthaus* (A World House) as a base and defends the rights of Africans, Kosovans, Kurds and Gypsies. Trying to get residence permit and all the bureaucratic permits, they work for them to be able to stay in this country. To support the refugees, they are involved in the protests such as school occupation or hunger strike. They distribute leaflets and put pressure on municipality. For example, they were able to stop a refugee camp that was wanted to be built somewhere near Cologne in bad conditions (P20).ⁱ

*Pro-Asyl*¹³¹ is another established German civil activist group having also a foundation since 1986. It is a national working group for the rights of foreigners and refugees. Human rights organizations are the friends of this group, and thus so is TÜDAY. TÜDAY supports the activities of *Pro-Asyl* besides those of *Kein Mensch Illegal*. According to my respondent, “pro-asyl has many important works. They are taken seriously by the state. They work professionally and respectfully and have an influence in Germany. They write reports about illegal immigrants” (P21).ⁱⁱ

Apart from those interactions, TÜDAY also has relations with municipalities and with UN Human Rights commission. This shows they work in local level but articulate into

¹³¹See the web site <http://www.proasyl.de/>

supranational level with respect to the human rights violations. The most striking motto of similar groups that I heard in a demonstration against the bad conditions of refugee camps was: “No border, no nation, stop deportation!”

To conclude this section with Kurdish Associations, commission works are very typical of them and represent the working style of Kurdish associations. Women, youth, external affairs and cultural and arts affairs are the most active and durable ones. They have people assembly¹³² which is constituted by all commission members inside the organization and they have civil networks outside the organization.

On the target of all activities there is one objective, states my interviewee:

Our civil works here address Kurds, Kurds’ problems, and Kurds’ demands. Those demands are legal and humane. The most important one is the Kurds’ wish for recognition of their identity and for living according to their culture and belief (P22).^{lii}

There is a broad range of activities from seminars about drug use to protecting the rights of women. For example:

Seminars were held last year about addiction. Families were informed about drug addiction. They were informed on where to resort in such a case. For example, our friend that came from integration council analyzed the latest process about our rights. Projects on how non-citizens could apply for citizenship keep coming, as well. We also inform young people on how to make a job application. Against the femicides, we have a feminist group run by only women. There are also campaigns on the identity problem of Kurds (P22).^{liii}

We try to bring young people together. For example, we hold football tournaments and folk dance contests. We give Kurdish lessons. We hold informative meetings about rights and responsibilities. If he/she is a refugee, we inform her/him about it. Other than that, there are works for women and youth education (P24).^{liiv}

¹³²The detail about the assembly will be given in the next section.

Looking at the activities of cultural commission, I also learn that they organize folk dance competitions in universities. Furthermore,

...we do research on people of various regions; we work on all kinds of folk cultures. Every year, we hold contests of Kurdish culture, folk dancing and music. We do research and work on culinary, clothing, costume, music and dance cultures of different regions (P23).^{lv}

Other than these, there are also some income generating activities such as instrument classes, festivals, breakfasts and selling their newspapers and magazine in stand activities.

Interactions and party affiliations of Kurdish organization are also highly interesting. They say they have lobbying activities at local level. Thereby, they have interactions with city councils. They say they have a more intense relationship with the municipalities compared to the past, resulting from their long stay here.

As an answer to how the relations with city councils and lobbying activities are:

We have a relationship based on sharing information. We have common receptions. They come when we invite them. The association hosts Newroz reception once a year and other associations are invited. Mutual dialogues and dinners are held. Socializing with other associations and Germans is aimed in those receptions. With leftist organizations, we carry out a common front work. We also have working groups together with various initiatives, and a project delegation work for Turkey in which many party members take place. In all of these, we aim to inform people in Germany about the oppression that Kurds go through in Turkey (P22).^{lvi}

...

We want to make ourselves heard by the associations in Europe. We want to inform them about the law of war implemented on the land in Turkey where Kurds live. We try to tell the people here that they shouldn't sit back and watch this issue (P22).^{lvii}

When I ask the party affiliations of the organization, they say they have interactions with all political parties. Even, one participant expresses his affiliation with the CDU. On the other hand, one interviewee says that SPD is the same with CHP for him; therefore, he feels closer to the Left Party. The other says they have members affiliated with SPD, FDP, Left Party and the Greens. DiDF and Anti-Fa are also among the groups which Kurdish youth works together and participates in the rallies and organizations.

All in all, in the objectives, activities and the interactions of secular immigrant organizations, close interactions with German civil society and democratic powers are seen. In terms of workers, they support the rights of all the most oppressed and fight against the unsecure working conditions of the immigrants; in terms of women, they defend the international rights of women, and deal with the particular problems of women due to their immigrant positions; in terms of human rights, they defend the supranational rights of refugees, rights of illegal immigrants and fight against deportation. They all have close relations with German democratic organizations related to their fields of work. Though they have sensitivity to the problems of Turkey and the Kurdish problem in Turkey, their understandings of immigrant struggle is not mainly related to the rights of one national community or one ethnic groups. In fact, they willingly join the activities of democratic organizations in and over Germany. For instance, they take part in the works on the problems of Roman people; they build social bridges with Latin American people, stand against the discrimination to Muslim community, collaborate with anti-fascist groups against the rising Neo-Nazis groups, or join trade unions for wealth tax... Therefore, one can argue that they have wide and various range of activities. The primary aim of the Kurdish associations, on the other hand, is the recognition of Kurdish identity in Germany. Without this, they believe that they would fall behind the immigrant struggles. Nevertheless, although they have a strong solidarity with Kurdish struggle in Turkey and Kurdish organizations in Germany, they do not only interact with them; rather, they prefer to be open to every political party and civil organization in Germany. They believe that this will bring integration.

5.7 Analysis of the Cases and Comparison of Immigrant Associations

In this section, two groups of associations will be compared and analyzed regarding their decision making processes and organizational structures; their understandings of political participation, integration, citizenship and democracy. The two subtitles within this section will give the necessary clues about associations' ways and understanding of political participation. Eventually, I hope to display clearly how peculiar are two groups of associations in above manners and where in-between groups stand.

In this first group are the religious organizations, namely Islamic Community National View (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş*, IGMG), Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (*Die Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V.*, DİTİB), Islamic Culture Center (*Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren*, VIKZ), European Turkish-Islamic Union (*Union der Türkisch-Islamischen Kulturvereine e.V.* -ATİB) and the Federation of Germany Alevis Union (*Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland e.V.*-AABF). In the second group are the secular immigrant organizations, namely the Federation of Democratic Workers (*Die Föderation der Demokratischen Arbeitervereine-DİDF*), Migrant Women Union (*Bundesverband der Migrantinnen in Deutschland*), and Turkey-Germany Human Rights Organization (*Menschenrechtsverein Türkei/Deutschland-TÜDAY*) and Federation of Kurdish Associations Germany (*Föderation Kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland-YEKKOM* now NAV-DEM). Two organization, the Federation of Germany Alevis Union (*Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland e.V.*-AABF) and Federation of Kurdish Associations Germany (*Föderation Kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland-YEKKOM*) are the groups in between. These two organizations cannot be included in the first two groups for several reasons which are mentioned below. What is more, analyzing the cases in two main groups is much more practice and preferable because of the salient differences between them with respect to their organizational structures, decision making processes, understanding of political participation, integration, conceptions of citizenship, and characteristics of their current activities. Therefore, Alevi and Kurdish

groups will not be included in the two major group, religious and secular groups, respectively. Basically, religious groups behave much more like a community, try to tighten their relationship within their similar, and are interested in group based rights and integration, whereas other groups behave like their European counterparts, as democratic civil organizations. They are more interested in fighting for the individual rights of their members and in individual based integration. As mentioned, Alevi Federations and Kurdish organizations are placed between the two major groups since they both behave like communities, as a religious or an ethnic one, and fight for the individual rights of their members depending on the case. For example, Alevi groups are characterized as the most integrated Turkey origin migrant group in Germany; they are also a religious community; however, they have the feeling of being individual much more than a Sunni community. They adopt a much more secular understanding of life and have closer relations with the German society and culture. They are not isolated from other organizations, either; that is, they have relations with leftist organizations; they work with them and participate in common campaigns. They also have relations with Kurdish organizations as they have Kurdish Alevi members, who are characteristically different from Sunni Anatolian Alevis. When the Kurdish organizations' case is concerned, they naturally give importance to their identity, and their most important expectation is to be recognized as Kurdish in legal manner. However, they are not isolated from other groups and they collaborate with German Anti-fascist organizations, Turkish leftist groups, *Alevi*s and German political parties. They also work to protect the rights of Kurdish refugees and support them in legal issues, or give them legal assistance in the applications. However, their prior objective or *raison d'être* is to protect Kurdish identity all over Europe and in Turkey.

As it has been mentioned in the methodology chapter, forty-four in-depth interviews with the active and/or board members of those organizations were conducted between the years 2012-2013. I tried to interview at least three different members of the associations. Yet, this was not possible for religious associations since spokesman of

those associations were determined before my arrival at the organization; therefore, I had no chance to reach other board members. In the previous section, an overview of the organizations has been already presented; therefore, this section will cover a comparative analysis of the two groups of associations regarding their decision making processes, and the conceptions of political participation, integration, citizenship and democracy.

5.7.1 Decision Making Processes and Organizational Patterns of Religious Immigrant Organizations

In religious organizations, the most frequent word that I have heard about the decision making was “*istişare*”, meaning exchange of consideration, or consultation. This word has religious connotations, too. It is widely known that in Islam, before taking a decision, it is suggested to ask older and experienced people in the community. Different than other religious organizations, ATİB is proud of making *istişare* with their own members, instead of taking directives from any political or religious leader. Vice chairman of ATİB in headquarter says “In our congress, the potential chairman is never decided before, in general congresses, we decide it through *istişare* with other members” (P25).^{lviii}

In the member organization in Bielefeld, the chairman says:

Usually the decisions are taken by the board, and activities are decided by the board. If the commissions ask for something, administration decides to implement or not.... Member participation is better in other organizations; what the elderly people say is applied, but it is not the case in our organization; however, in National View organizations, they do so and they are working very well (P7).^{lix}

As for DİTİB, the chair of the Bielefeld organization, who has been the chair since 2000, literally says, “usually, decisions come from above, what our superior says, we do it... we take the decisions in the administrative board” (Hüseyin Sevinç, p: 1). In the

headquarter, on the other hand, when I ask about the decision making processes, the answer was the following: “Every organization chooses their own administration, candidates vote and those who receive most of the votes are elected as chair... When we go to a change in statute, we invite and inform all our member organizations; if they do not accept, we do not dictate anything, and we are the only religious organization doing this” (P5).^{lx}

In the Europe headquarter of IGMG, on the other hand, my respondent, who is the general secretary and the person in charge of external affairs utters:

...Our regional representatives are determined via appointment, and they stay as chair for three years. On the other hand, in head quarter the administration changes every five years. In regional organizations, the elections are made optionally; however, we do not prefer elections usually, because it may raise a problem when elected and non-elected people praying at the same place, next to each other. For this reason, we prefer *istişare* as our first priority is agreement and alliance (P1).^{lxi}

A very structured decision making processing is prominent in IGMG;

Financial, political, educational decisions such as starting a new book series, all those decisions are made in the headquarters. The chairman and secretary general in the executive board make decisions as internal decision-making mechanism. The board of management consists of 23 people; there are also the representatives of education, women and youth units and they come together every two weeks. On the other hand, regional executive councils meet in the region (P1).^{lxii}

On the other hand, in Bielefeld branch, my respondent who is an active board member and the Koran teacher of the association says “our members elect the administration and the board members take the decisions; when there is a new decision, we ask our members; however, when our youth wants to take a decision, they first consult us” (P2). In his quote, there is very limited information about how things work in the association. In fact, IGMG members rejected the use of recorder and seemed highly cautious about what they are saying. However, based on my observations, I can argue

that my respondent in Bielefeld was in a quite private position in the association. Members were serving him and showing their respect all the time. That is, although board members say that they ask their members' opinions, the hierarchical relationship between the members and board members was highly explicit; in other words, respect and reverence to the leader is quite observable in the association.

Islamic Culture Association, in short, VIKZ is another Sunni Islamic Umbrella organization in this case study. According to the interview in headquarter, decisions about the association is taken by the board of directors through *istişare*. However, "when there are big decisions to make, the general council is assembled; however, under normal conditions board of directors performs the process of decision taking" (P6). Projects and activities are also decided by the board and as similar to the case of DİTİB, projects are state supported; that is, they are funded by various ministries of Germany.

Looking at organizational structure of the Sunni Islamic Associations in general, they have a relatively high number of members compared to secular organizations and widely organized throughout Europe and Germany. DİTİB is the largest Sunni Islamic organization with 910 member associations, 850 of which are mosque associations and the rest is social and sport clubs. The numbers of individual members are estimated as 500 thousand or 600 thousand. ATİB is also widely organized in Europe. They have branches in Belgium, Holland and France. However, European head office is in Cologne. According to the vice chair of the organization, they have more than 100 representative offices and approximately 11 thousand members. IGMG has 33 regional offices and 515 mosque associations throughout Europe. The general assembly gathers once a year and every weekend, visits are paid to branches from head offices; they call it 'getting into the field'. The head of the organization gives much more detailed information about their activities and number of members involved in those. For example, he says "we

have 5000 students in 245 nursery classes, more than 100 thousand Koran school students” (P1). VIKZ also has a very wide organization, including Canada and Australia. In Germany, they have nearly 300 branches. As P6 states;

We have 25 thousand members; we see them as our family members. However, this number increases to 300-400 thousand when we consider the people who attend the activities and education programs. According to a research we made, 10 percent of total Muslim community attend our offers (P6).^{lxiii}

The educations of religious teachers to be employed in branches are also provided in the head office. Educational commissions gather twice or more each year and make *istişare* about the educational activities.

Although active participation of members decrease compared to previous years, a more participant and democratic approach can be observed in Alevis organization. Decision making mechanism of Alevi federation is expressed by one interviewee as below:

“There is a working program and in the general assembly, it is shared with all members. Then, commissions such as faith commission decides how to implement it, women branch and culture and art branch decide similarly” (P9). Another interviewee:

The management changes every other year. The members hold meetings about regulations or construction. For example, the decision to postpone the elections was made at the general assembly with the members. However, the board of directors usually takes decisions. Aside from that, there are regional boards of faith. They are also called the council of pirlar. Those boards are elected in 5 regions of Germany. They serve as *analar* and *dedeler*. They organize all education works and organizations related to faith. The board president, the president of women’s community and the presidents of youth communities are regarded the members of the board by default (P11).^{lxiv}

About the organizational pattern of AABD in Germany, one point could be reemphasized; with approximately 500,000 to 800,000 members, Alevis are the third major religious community after Christians and Muslims in Germany.

In general, religious immigrant organizations are widely organized, centrally and hierarchically structured organizations that can reach large number of people far beyond their member numbers. Praying is the most populated activity of them. In addition, male and middle-aged members are considerably high in number as board members. The visibility of women is almost absent, except newly organized DiTİB's Muslim Women Union. However, this union is still strongly bound with DiTİB head office. There is also a hierarchical relation between the board members or the head of the association and ordinary members. In mosque associations, particularly in small city branches, the head of the association is like the *imam* of a mosque. As different from this pattern, Alevis' organization seems much more democratic; cult of the leader is not very salient. Hierarchical relationships are not so visible, and there is a relative autonomy of commissions. Thus, it can be said that AABF has a self-enclosed and self-disciplinary structure, resulting from the culture of their beliefs.

5.7.2 Decision Making Processes and Organizational Structure of Secular Immigrant Organizations

Secular immigrant organizations are evidently different from the Sunni immigrant organizations regarding their decision making processes and organizational structures. This difference first arises from their member numbers; their number of members is far less compared to the Sunni organizations. However, they are able to attract more people when they organize a demonstration or a solidarity night. According to my respondents, in the case of DiDF, when there is a demonstration, a local branch with

100 members could gather 2500-3000 people to join and, they can gather 10,000 people to join a solidarity night with concerts and speeches. DIDIF nearly has 40 local branches throughout Germany, and if it is assumed that each has 100 members on average, this equals to 4000 registered members in Germany. On the other hand, the numbers are not much of a concern for them; they rather consider important the range of people that could be attracted or just to be influential in public arena.

The below quotations will summarize not only the current decision making processes but also a critical self-reflection of the board members about the issue:

There are 15 associations of DIDF in NRW. We come together at least once every two or three months. We talk about who has done which activities in their own region. We discuss the following activities and campaigns of us (P14).^{lxv}

The ideal one is from bottom to up. But we sometimes call the administrative board to meet twice a month and we sketch what we can do. In the next meeting we offer those ideas to our members to discuss together and take their opinions. We do this because we want to join them into decision making process. In this way they make the work their own and participate much more actively compared to the works those directly come from the administration" (P16).^{lxvi}

In DIDF, firstly the administrative board is elected, and then the chairman is decided. It is not like we are suggesting someone for the chair, rather chairman is assigned in the first meeting of administrative board (P16).^{lxvii}

Currently we have nine people in administrative board. Because when there is a demand we do not want to reject it. We join her/him into administration and provide her/him to become active (P15).^{lxviii}

We have commissions, those are; woman, youth and culture. Each consists of three or four persons and decide their own programs. Members make preliminary sessions before constituting a commission. Everyone chooses a field that he/she is really interested in. There is also one another commission which works for corporation and dialogue with the political parties, other civil organizations and trade unions. They also transmit their gained experiences to the members, and present their ideas about the possible activities to administrative board (P15)...^{lxix}

Each member of administrative board has his/her own field parallel to the fields of the commissions and each member takes the responsibility of a different commission (P14).^{lxx}

For us, member gatherings are a part of decision mechanism, but sometimes we cannot explain this to our members. Because they perceive them as gatherings for taking information, sometimes we do the same. Then it passivates the members when they think that decision is not my business, it is difficult to settle it (P16).^{lxxi}

Our federation has a well youth branch. Sometimes they get help from us, sometimes they gather themselves. However, usually our helps remain in the background. Their agenda is usually different from ours because their living language is German. We are not feeling efficient for them at all in that sense. We just sometimes help them in preparation level of an activity. Also, they are publishing a youth magazine, namely, *Junge Stimme* (Voice of Youth) (P16).^{lxxii}

A brief idea about the inner functioning of the organization could be derived from the above quotations. It can also be stated that the relationship between the administrative board and ordinary members do not seem hierarchical. It seems youth branch has autonomy; the election process of the chairman is done after the election of the administrative board and the ideas of any member are significant in the eyes of the administration. Furthermore, an effort to join their members into decision making processes is clear; that is, there is an encouragement for the active participation within the organization. Moreover, the board members welcome the differences and diversities within the organization and perceive this as natural. In other words, they do not perceive the members as a united community, rather every member is seen as democratic individuals, each of whom might have different ideas. That is, although the association is a common platform, this cannot surpass the individual democratic rights. At this stage, when I ask the question “Is there any conflicts within the organization, if yes where do they usually arise from?” The answer was highly remarkable:

We take the conflicts positively, because we do not want our members to enter this organization like entering into a Mosque. There is a life outside.

There are conflicts outside. And here is not an artificial place. Criticisms and discussions help us to find the truth. Conflicts should happen thereby we can identify wrong and right (P16).^{lxxiii}

Moving onto Migrant Women Union, with its 32 branches in 23 different cities, it is the widest woman migrant organization in Germany. Although the head office is in Frankfurt, board members do not necessarily settle in Frankfurt, rather they are scattered in different federal states:

Each group in each city plans their own work. They are free in this sense. Of course, there are some common principles but other than them, all groups choose their own working systems and management; they choose their own commission... Cities determine their own board of directors. The congresses we organize throughout Germany are held not on commissioner level but open to all members. In addition, there are regional managements in the states. The women living in that region determine them... We have a central board of directors of 13 people and they are scattered in different cities of Germany. Those 13 people are active but there are also many active women locally (P19).^{lxxiv}

Another respondent states “we even do not use the word administrative board because this makes the women scared. We rather say commission to urge them participate in administration; urge them to speak in the congress and regional meetings” (P19).^{lxxv}

This effort shows how important the self-development of women is as free individuals in society for this association. This can also be easily captured from the below statement:

In all the meetings we make, we encourage them to participate in decision making processes. Because always other people decided on their life decisions, we encourage them to take their own decisions by themselves...When they participate actively in our meetings, they embrace the work more and more and they like this. We also observe concrete changes in their lives, their relations with their children and family members are changing, and they are even starting to breathe differently (P19).^{lxxvi}

It can be understood that they become conscious as far as they participate and gain self-confidence not only in the association but also in all aspects of their lives. The association turns them into powerful and conscious individuals.

Regarding organizational structure, TÜDAY is the only example, among my cases, without any branches. Their only office is in Cologne. There are few people who actively work in this organization. Accordingly, their member number is really phenomenal, less than a hundred. Following a restructuring period in the recent years, in the administrative board are relatively young and educated people. All work voluntarily. Among them, there are university students, engineers, businessmen, researchers, writers and unemployed people, all of whom make considerable efforts to be active and to keep the organization alive.

TÜDAY also gives importance to the participation of its members in the decision making processes. When I asked directly “how are decisions taken in this association?” the answers from three different respondents were the following:

“Decisions about the association are generally made by the board of directors with the majority of votes through the exchange of ideas” (P21).

“We sit down and make decisions together. As active members and board of directors, we decide together” (P20).

“Since it was founded, in TÜDAY, an atmosphere that is as open as possible, that includes organs of its own and where decisions are made with discussions has been tried to be built” (P26).^{lxxvii}

When YEK-KOM is concerned, since it was transformed into NAV-DEM, its organizational structure has expanded. Various Kurdish groups such as Alevi Kurds, Yezidi groups, Islamic party of Kurds, different youth, student, women and sports associations that have been active in different cities have joined this new platform. The

major components of NAV-DEM have been constituted by *Föderation der Demokratischen Alewiten (FEDA)*, *Föderation der Ezidischen Vereine*, *Föderation der Kurdische Islamische Gemeinde*, *Islamische Partei Kurdistan (PIK)*, *Kurdisches Institut in Deutschland*, *Mesopotamischen Kunts und Kultur Bewegung in Deutschland (TEVCAND)*¹³³ and all the previous associations of YEK-KOM.

When decision-making processes have been asked, the following depictions have been made by the interviewees:

Decisions are usually taken with one-thirds majority. We have to hold members' meetings every three weeks. When there is a case, we share it with our members. A congress is held every year, and a meeting at the headquarters every three months. We send our delegates there. The board consists of five people. Other than that, there is an advisory committee of ten people. We invite experts and consultants from various subjects (P24).

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If there is an issue about women, women's commission takes the decision; if it's an association work, the board does. For example, women's commission discusses analyses, finalizes and shares a project about women. In the members' meetings, members share their ideas and suggestions with us, analyze the course of affairs, and they have a right to make a suggestion. Members can oppose the board's decisions; they are entitled to. When this is the case, the board looks over the decisions (P22).^{lxxix}

In the members' meetings, recent events are discussed and members share their ideas if there are decisions to take about the association. All commission members constitute people's assembly. For example, if an annex is to be built for the association, people's assembly is asked about it. Let's say education commission takes a decision, but for that decision to be implemented, it needs to be put to vote. In the past few days, there has been a problem about the commission of culture. We wanted to ban someone. For that, we had to call all commissions, that is, the commissions of rights and justice, culture, education, language, youth and external affairs for a meeting (P23).^{lxxx}

¹³³Federation of Democratic Alevis (FEDA), Federation of Ezidi Associations, Islamic Party of Kurdistan, Kurdish Institute in Germany, Mesopotamia Cultural Centers in Germany.

All in all, secular immigrant organizations do not have many members; however, they are influential and work effectively with a few active people. A horizontal organizational structure is observed; that is, in contrast to Sunni organizations, there is no much distance between the board members and the ordinary members. Furthermore, there is an endeavor for bottom-up decision making processes. In other words, ordinary members are encouraged to take part in the decision making processes. The level of professionalization is also different among these two groups of associations. In Sunni organizations, professional workers such as secretaries are present, and the physical conditions are quite good, whereas in secular organizations, due to financial limitations, no professional workers are present, nor are good physical conditions. In fact, lack of these makes the relations more informal and in my part, that was easier to access those associations. In the case of Sunni organizations, I was asked to make an appointment by email and had to wait for their reply for a while. They told me that they needed time to decide on a spokesman. Another difference was the visibility of women; in secular organizations, it was quite common to see women as board members. Regarding the age, secular organizations' profile was obviously younger. The last but not the least, rather than bringing religious services to a community, secular organizations care far more about the self-development and self-actualization of their members. For the Kurdish federation, in particular, it can be argued that their decision making processes and inner functioning are highly participatory and democratic.

5.7.3 Political Participation, Integration, Citizenship and Democracy Conceptions of Religious Immigrant Organizations

Within my interview questions, there was a section related to the understanding of political participation and democracy. The most vital question of this section was "In your opinion, what is the most effective way of political participation of immigrants?" Answers to this question apparently differed from religious to secular organizations.

Other than this, there were questions on the perceptions of integration policies. Regarding the integration policies, almost all the associations were critical towards the Federal Germany; however, answers to this question as well my own observations and impressions as a researcher can still reveal how the expectations of organizations from the German state differ, thereby how their understandings of integration differ. The effects of getting German citizenship on political participation was also asked in the interviews in two different questions; the first was “what do you think about having German citizenship?”, and the second was second, “how important is the right to vote in German elections for the immigrants? A further related question was “Can there be ways other than voting and having German citizenship to participate in politics?” Answers to those questions were highly divergent among different organizations.

To begin with DiTiB, my respondent from the department of intercultural and interreligious cooperation of DiTiB describes political participation as follows:

First of all, the issue of dual citizenship has to be dealt with by us as soon as possible. And then, to be efficient altogether in state and political parties by collecting individual opinions and interests; the public’s being interested in itself and its problems. Many people including me can solve their individual and family problems but I would define political participation as discussing interests collectively, defending rights and freedoms in groups, more simply, rather than building a career, as fighting for the rights and freedoms of the society you live in and the association I represent (P3)...^{lxxxi}

Similarly, to the question: “what is the most effective way of political participation?” he says, suffrage is the most important one.

The following answer to the question “what do you think about the integration councils (city councils)?” gives an idea about the comprehension of integration and the role of the state in the eyes of DiTiB:

The integration council used to be the foreigners' council, but in fact it is advisory council, that is Integration *Beirat*. Even if its name has changed, it still works as a *beiret*. I have learned some things there; I have seen what political participation in local government means there. Those places may be used as politics schools, as stimulant institutions; maybe they can be used to convey the rightful wishes of our members as individuals to public... (P3)^{lxxxii}

The same respondent also thinks "integration is not an easy task; governments should provide a ground to immigrants to protect their languages and religions when we talk about freedoms. It is difficult but we believe that this will also be a richness for Germany" (ibid). When he critically mentions about the previous Interior Minister of Germany with his saying 'the best integration is assimilation', I understand that DITB is strongly against assimilation. As a matter of fact, they think if all the rights are given, it would be harder for immigrants to protect their own culture:

To be honest, I was not expecting the latest developments to happen. I was expecting them to make it easier but I have seen that blood relations are still very important in Germany and maybe these hardships open some doors for us. Maybe if the doors get wide open, if the gates of democratic rights are opened all the way, there will be more examples of living together and that will make the transition to *Leitkultur* easier, we can't know that. The issue of granting or not granting rights is very complicated (P3).^{lxxxiii}

An active board member of ATiB describes democracy as an element of Islam and he says:

Personally, I see it as an element of Islam in communities and political parties; I don't see it as its opposite because democracy means self-government and republic means public management. How does public manage itself? According to their belief, needs and understanding. In that sense, I think democracy is a must (P8).^{lxxxiv}

A critical understanding to integration policies of Federal Germany is also expressed by P8 as follows:

Integration is not assimilation, it is mutual tolerance, acceptance, respect, planning and applying together, thinking together, decide together... For this, Germany should give authority to us, in order to train necessary specialists. This is what the integration within dialog. Germany put our belief, culture and language into the third rank and did not do what it has to do (P8).^{lxxxv}

Therefore, it can be said that there is an expectation from German state to protect Turkish culture, belief, and language in ATİB, too. In the understanding of political participation, the same respondent from ATİB points out the importance of shaping government policies and utters “Churches produce opinion and give guidance to the state. But, we only try to protect our language and religion. We have to stop appealing to German state about these issues. We have to build our own institutions to raise opinions. German foundations, for example, are strong and produce opinion” (P8).^{lxxxvi}

Regarding citizenship, he emphasizes suffrage just as my respondent from DİTİB. According to him, Germany should make legal regulations to give suffrage to immigrants who work and reside in Germany. Also, political parties should have quota for immigrants. He says, “Citizenship is *sine-qua-non* for immigrants who live in Germany” (P8).^{lxxxvii}

As for IGMG, the General Secretary states “integration is assimilation for me”. He continues “Pluralism has been seen as problematic, language lessons become compulsory because they wanted to prevent forced marriages but it is impossible to accept those policies on our side” (P1).^{lxxxviii}

The answer I got to the question “how would you describe democracy?” was “democracy is a form of administration; we should not expect too much from democracy; the most important aspect of it is accountability, but this aspect is

problematic in Europe, too since there is ignorance in participation and in political consciousness” (P1).^{lxxxix}

When the questions on political participation and ideas on citizenship are concerned, my respondent assigns very much importance to participation in elections and to gaining double citizenship or German citizenship. While describing political participation as “consciousness of citizenship, social responsibility and sense of belonging to Germany”, he states the best way to participate in politics for immigrants is being active in the local parliaments and political parties. For this, citizenship is a must because without being a German citizen they do not treat you seriously; they do not recognize you, or they perceive you as Muslim or immigrant instead of as a politician. In short, participation in elections, being German a citizen, being active in political parties and local parliaments are the major venues for him to be visible in politics. In general, including other Muslim immigrant associations, citizenship is completely purified from its cultural meaning and perceived as a means to reach political power.

My respondent from VIKZ was responsible for media and local relations, communication with politicians and other religious institutions. His ideas about political participation are also similar to those of other Sunni Muslim associations. He says “if you want to change something in the state policy, you have to be a member of a political party” (P6). In a similar vein, “If you work in local level, you have to enter into the assembly and persuade people, for instance for the construction of a mosque near the city instead of outside the city, then people will justify that you are right” (P6).^{xc}

He gives the example of churches just like my respondent from ATiB: “Churches are given places in city planning; we have to struggle for the same right for Mosques” (P6).^{xc}

Voting rights is expressed again by P6 when I asked the question “how would you describe political participation?”

Suffrage is very important. We encourage Muslims to participate in elections and tell their demands clearly: Religious lessons, legal acceptance of Islam as a religion, recognition of Mosques as places of worship. Those are our demands and we tell Muslims to convey these demands... Our other demand is to vote in local elections also we stand up for double citizenship (P6).^{xcii}

Having equal rights is the first description of democracy for P6, and he continues as follows:

Equal rights must be given to minority groups because those who are in minority are weaker and they have to be more sensitive towards weak people... They are asking whether Islam and democracy comply with, if democracy is acceptance and co-living of different religions why do they ask this question. Why do they ask this question for Islam but not for any other religion (P6)?^{xciii}

It is clearly seen that there are demands from the German state, and all of those demands are religious. Another point is that seeking for rights is seen problematic for my respondent; he utters “when you have equal rights, then democracy can be realized. But it does not happen; we are forced to strive for our rights, if you are forced to seek for your right that means there is a problem with democracy” (P6).^{xciv}

My other respondent from VIKZ was also a member of Bielefeld city council. Similar to my respondent from IGMG, he sees integration as assimilation. However, when we talk about the religious lessons, he says “Kurds say it should be in Kurdish; the others say it should be in Turkish; another group says in another language; however, the language of those lessons should be in German because we live in Germany” (P27).^{xcv}

Again, for him, German citizenship is vital because affecting the decisions in assemblies sometimes depends on one signature of a German citizen; similarly, being electorate is significant because approach of Germans changes when you are electorate, he says.

It is seen that democracy is either perceived as a form of administration or described through religious motivation. A similar understanding is seen in the answer of my second respondent from VIKZ:

In my opinion, if the law enforcement people are sensitive and humble, a real democracy can exist. But if people there do not accommodate themselves to the common level, the style of executing democracy gets very different. Because he sees it as only something legal, the cultural and humane part is ignored (P27).^{xcvi}

Moving onto AABF, a board member of describes the political participation as first “being a member of a political party, and second as being a member of an association which produces projects and ideas, expressing political thoughts there... Yet, for me, the key point is, to be a member of a political party” (P9).^{xcvii}

The most effective way of political participation is delimited by the same person as follows:

First of all, associations and intercultural associations that express immigrants’ problems should be founded. Demands should be delivered written and in German to authorities with some lobbying. After that, you should be members of political parties and make sure that those demands would be discussed in the decision-making mechanisms (P9).^{xcviii}

Regarding the local political participation channels, i.e city councils, below statement is highly impressive:

In the city council, there are mostly religious associations; and most Alevis are German citizens so they don’t vote in the city council’s elections. If 70 per cent of mosque’s associations are Turkish citizens, we have 60 per cent Turkish citizens. I mean, if there are 12 thousand Sunnis, there are 6 thousand Alevis out of total 18 thousand people. That’s why they take the majority in the city council (P9).^{xcix}

Being a member of political party in Germany is also emphasized by other respondents from Alevi federation in their understandings of political participation: For instance:

“More young people should become members of political parties. Not just of leftist parties; it could be CDU or another party. Even if it’s a right-wing conservative party, it’s not an ill-advised situation” (P11).^c

Regarding integration:

If, after 50 years, integration is still a talking point, it indicates failure. Not only Germans and their government but Turkey and we are also responsible for this; and it means we failed. I prefer not using the word ‘integration’; integration doesn’t mean eating pork or drinking beer... A German also needs to be open to a foreigner; there should be no prejudice against someone because she is covered up or Muslim or has a different look. We are still guests here; some people still see us that way. But I don’t believe that the host has given us that sense of security. Generally speaking, both sides failed. As guests, we also need to make effort but the host doesn’t provide us with that comfort (P11).^{ci}

Regarding democracy:

In my opinion, the best indicator of democracy is elections. If the voter turnout keeps decreasing in a country, that state is losing its quality of democracy. In addition, democracy is a system that creates an environment in which everyone can live together the way they way within law, that enables people to choose the political system, that takes people’s opinions into consideration. It’s not a top-down system, not racist and is against discrimination (P9).^{cii}

Another participant:

Democracy is being a citizen and affecting the system. When you don’t vote, it’s not possible to have a voice and be effective. You can work at NGOs and protest but when you have a right to vote, your power increases because then you can be effective not just locally but also on state level (P10).^{ciii}

Regarding the meaning of having German citizenship:

The biggest advantage of being a citizen is to have a right to vote and stand for election. In addition, the problem of travelling goes away. There are 16 million immigrants and 7 or 8 million of them don’t have a passport, so they

are not interested in political parties. Immigrants make up of 20 per cent of Germany and half of that 20 per cent can't vote. With the new regulation implemented after 2000, children who are born here are provided with the right of dual citizenship (P9).^{civ}

Another participant:

If you have a right to vote and stand for election, you can have a power to change the politics. The rate might change according to where you live but even if it's 2 or 5 per cent, it still affects the politics (P11).^{cv}

All in all, Sunni Muslim associations' conceptions of political participation, citizenship, integration and democracy are bound on collective rights. That is, they value integration as far as their rights as a community are recognized; political participation means participation in elections, having the right of suffrage or being active in German political parties thereby fighting for the rights of Muslims. Here, DiTiB and ATiB also have sensitivity for the protection of Turkish identity. Democracy is perceived either as a form of administration or as having enough collective rights, literally religious, ethnic and cultural rights. They also assess their position in Germany as a minority group, and describe democracy as having equal rights with the majority of society. Another striking point is that they have demands from the German state or from Federal Germany to protect their religious, ethnic and cultural rights as a community. Although they have resentment to the German state in this sense, they are open to cooperation and eager to be recognized in the eyes of the state authorities. Alevi Federation also seems similar to Sunni Islamic immigrant organizations in their conceptions of democracy, citizenship and political participation. One difference is that they do not overtly prioritize the community rights of Alevis; rather, they yearn for a democratic system within which all immigrants, whether Alevis, Kurd or Sunni, could realize their rights of political participation without discrimination.

5.7.4 Political Participation, Integration, Citizenship and Democracy Conceptions of Secular Immigrant Organizations

Answers of the respondents in this group regarding political participation, integration, citizenship and democracy were not only impressive but also far different compared to the thoughts of Sunni Immigrant organizations. I have also seen that expressions from the three associations, namely DİDF, Migrant Women Union and TÜDAY were very close to each other.

Before anything else, secular organizations see citizenship as an individual right rather than rapidly associating it with electoral rights. In their minds, citizenship is a social right for people who fulfill all the responsibilities of it. They are also of the opinion that having German citizenship will pave the way for incorporation of individuals into the society. In other words, they will feel more of a part of the society they live in.

To them, political participation does not mean the utilization of the right of franchise only; it is also a part of daily life. Besides voting in the elections, membership in civic organizations, participating into demonstrations, being sensitive to all problems, i.e. being sensitive to the problems in their work places, -for students-, in universities -for women- women' problems, are all vital for political participation. From this point, their conceptions of citizenship and political participation go hand in hand with individual and social rights rather than group or community rights all together. For instance, they also fight for the Turkish language lessons. However, it is not the prior objective of their organizations.

Their understanding of democracy is critical because according to them, democracy is a concept that could be defined by certain hegemony. It is designed according to the interest of one class, or it is just a bourgeoisie democracy, and only within the limitations of it, working classes or oppressed classes are hardly able to experience the democratic rights.

The conception of integration is also very different. Actually, they support the full integration as democratic actors of the civil political arena. For them, integration is being together, living together irrespective of ethnicity or nationality. The focus of their agenda is the integration of all the immigrants rather than the integration of Turkish people and Kurdish people, or Sunnis and Alevis specifically. Regarding the issue, one interviewee of mine underlines:

...the state's definition of integration is different than ours; the state says "they should obey the laws, and integrate with the Germans. But what we understand from integration is creating the chance of living together, desegregating, removing ghettos. Prejudices should be ruled out at schools, factories and neighborhoods and that can only happen when two communities understand each other very well (P14).^{cvi}

Another interviewee complains about immigrants' being held responsible when a social or economic right is threatened with abolishment. In this sense, there is a critical standpoint towards German government that the immigrants are used as a guise to implement some restrictive reforms in the social system. That is:

... We have generally been critical of the policies of the German government. We as immigrants have always been the elements through whom policies are carried out. Conservative parties have listed our mistakes, and when some social rights are violated, immigrants have been put forward as a reason. Our attitude towards governments has always been critical but we have stated what we think are positive and contributed to them. We have more settled relationships with local authorities now; on the other hand, we have always kept the government at arm's length, we still do (P16)...^{cvii}

Integration councils are also exposed to some criticisms because they are not taken seriously enough:

When the integration council was first founded, we participated in the elections, brought up our demands, and always emphasized that foreigners should be taken seriously and they needed to have autonomy but in the meantime, neither foreigners have had autonomy nor their demands have directly been taken into consideration. It's just something done to stall (us). There is no right to vote and stand for election. They told us to make policies at foreigners' council or integration council but we have not been participating in their elections since we don't want to be in a council that has no decision-making power (P15).^{cvi}

Newly established institutions are welcome but it is underlined that they are not helpful in discarding prejudices in society:

Maybe new institutions are being opened and integration policies have been put on agenda but at the same time prejudices are being recreated and Nazi murders are just called as mafia revenge. And when they show good examples for integration, yes, there may be comedians and film makers but there is not an ongoing discussion of where the immigrants are in daily life (P19).^{cix}

Lastly, they are as reactive as religious organizations towards Nazi murders targeting Muslims and criticize the government as not being fair enough in going over those kinds of cases. They also support religious organizations' boycotting the Islam Conference in these conditions:

In the last 15 years, 160-170 foreigners have been murdered in Germany under racist attacks. That's the kind of a country we live in. They have a policy under which the cases are not solved. There is a Ministry of Interior that feels no responsibility of solving them. How can you expect a serious work for integration from this policy anyway? Muslims are seen as potential terrorists by the Ministry of Interior. In a political sphere which is dominated by such a mindset, how can a serious harvest be expected from the Islam conference (P26)?^{cx}

Shortly, all the respondent statements above indicate that for secular organizations mutual understanding, being together at all levels of life are important components of integration. They are as much sensitive as religious organizations to racist neo-Nazi attacks in Germany. They are also against the prejudices towards Muslim population

living in Germany. They think that the integration definition of German state is one-sided. These thoughts are similar to the thoughts of religious associations about integration policies. One difference is that they do not prefer to be in integration councils since they believe that those councils are nothing more than stalling the immigrants. It is also significant that they are in closer relationship with local authorities and keep their distance to the central government.

To further the analysis, examining more statements by respondents will be helpful. As stated above, secular organizations depict citizenship as a human right rather than just a right to vote. The point is not to get German citizenship formally, rather to have equal rights with local people. That is, if someone is working, paying taxes, and fulfilling all the responsibilities to the state, there should not be any other hindrance to get the same services and rights. Therefore, citizenship is not understood only as a legal status for secular organizations; having equal social rights is far more underlined by them.

... Our attitude is very clear. Everyone that works, pays his/her taxes and fulfills the responsibility of being an ordinary citizen should be recognized as a citizen here (P16).^{cx1}

We stand with foreigners' being citizens because people who have built their center of life here will be more sensitive towards the incidents and problems here if they become citizens. They will socialize (P15).^{cxii}

...what we demand is, whether we become citizens or not, that we will not be perceived as different as long as we work here and that this difference should be abolished. If our children grow up here, we are citizens of this place. (P18)^{cxiii}

We demand to obtain the same rights before being citizens, too. For example: the right to vote for the elections. Because it makes you a part of here only a little bit in legal sense; but it does not make you in social sense, because it only gives a legal status. During the process of applying for a job, (s/he) looks at your name and sees you as immigrant anyway (P17).^{cxiv}

When participation is concerned, to the members of the secular organizations. It is meaningful only when all the immigrants and local people take part together around common problems. In contrast to the religious organizations, formal channels of political participation, such as voting in the elections or being a member of a political party, are not considered as the only forms of political participation by the secular organizations. To them, there are many other ways; even having a word to say or reading a newspaper, or launching an initiative in the neighbourhood, or joining a civil organization are all considered as ways of participation. The best description of political participation, which has been specifically emphasized by most of the interviewees, is “being a part of society”.

We don't see people as immigrants, yet what we want to achieve can only happen when immigrants enter in the political life. As well as a German association, a German party, an association from Turkey, there should also be associations and parties that concern themselves with humans' common problems because Germans have problems, too; not only immigrants. Poverty is the same for all people (P14).^{cxv}

...In order to fight together and reach the goal, we should get together with everyone who is going through the same problem, not only with immigrants from Turkey or other immigrants (P17)^{cxvi}

There are different dimensions of political participation. Being involved in parties is one of them; the second one, I think, being involved in the extra-parliamentary opposition because there are many NGOs there like us. Taking part in non-governmental organizations which are interested in not only immigrants' problems but also society's problems as a whole and where locals and immigrants exist together. What is important is being a part of this society, standing wherever there is a fight to change the society, being active and doing something about your problem whether it be at civil society or at parliament (P16).^{cxvii}

Being a part of shaping life means shaping it yourself; it is being a part of life here rather than carrying along the problems of immigrants (P16)...^{cxviii}

I perceive it as participating in whatever there is in your neighborhood, your child's school or your work place. It's not only about voting or carrying out activities in a political party (P19).^{cxix}

...it can be many different areas. I don't find it right to limit politics within politics of political parties. You are also involved in political participation when you go out and want to make a change in your neighborhood, launch an initiative or even just get involved (P21).^{cxx}

One interviewee also expresses the importance of being active in the decisions that are related to her. In fact, she talks about direct democracy and does not accept the idea that someone else decides on an issue related to her own life, and even if it does not change anything, saying something out loud is a natural right for her:

Life itself is politics. No matter how old they are, people get affected even if they follow current news or not. Actually, even being neutral is part of the politics but if it is the case, then everything happens outside of you and others make decisions for you. Speaking for myself, I can't accept that. Even if it won't change anything when I say it out loud, I want to react and show my reaction because I want to have a voice in the decisions that will affect me; everyone should have. No matter from what segment of society they come, that should be the case, everyone should have a say (P20).^{cxxi}

Another respondent emphasizes that the best way of political participation is actually the civil organizations since he is sceptical about the political parties due to their hierarchical structures. He does not regard them as honest places. To him, horizontal organizations, civil initiatives and civil disobedience are vital because he feels that in civil organizations he can easily express anything that bothers him:

The closest path for immigrants to be involved in political participation is, I think, organizing non-governmentally. I think non-governmental initiatives and civil disobedience actions are much more important. I don't lean towards political parties because I think political principles are compromised very easily for more votes because of the bureaucracy and dirty games within. People can pull the rug out from under their friends for power here but civil society is a much cleaner means. It's much more effective. Civil, non-governmental organizations are the means of expressing what is bothering you no matter what and they are the places where you can say things out loud most directly (P20).^{cxxii}

How to describe democracy was perhaps the most difficult question for my participants. In the religious organizations, it was quickly connected to healthy functioning elections, having the right to vote and to be elected. Equal rights for the minorities was another point for the religious associations while describing democracy. On the other hand, in secular organizations individual based descriptions are predominant among the interviewees; that is, freedom of thought and that of expression are inevitable indicators for a well-functioning democracy. Other than this, life without discrimination, prejudice and exploitation is included in the descriptions for a democratic society. I have also observed that my respondents were aware of the fact that there can be different understanding of democracy, and one type could be allegedly considered as superior to the other. That is, description of democracy can change from one social class to another:

That people express their opinions freely and that the obstacles to be removed. If a person is under pressure and if he/she can't say what he/she thinks out loud, this is a means of pressure and democracy can't exist there; but people should not resort to violence and tyranny to get what they want (P15).^{cxiii}

That people live equally and proud; that they live worthily of their honor; that they live without being discriminated sexually or in other ways; that they live without wars. It is to live where we live without being exploited no matter what ethnical, sexual and national background we have. It's the fight for it (P18)^{cxiv}

As an example to different conceptions of democracy, one interviewee describes how bourgeoisie democracy functions in Germany and underlines the inspection and monitoring mechanism of the state against critical views:

It's a political sphere where every kind of opinion can be expressed and organized. Of course, it's different in terms of class, too. Bourgeois democracy is different than revolutionary democracy. We have understood much better how bourgeois democracy works after we have come here. In Turkey, a theoretical bourgeois democracy was being discussed because we can say it was experienced in Turkey only partially. On the other hand, we have seen and experienced it here much more clearly. There is a boundary here, too. It's a democracy limited with the regime's interests. Here too, the state imposes restrictions whenever it wants. It might not allow different organizations to exist. For a long time, only mild socialist organizations have been allowed to exist, not communist ones. Left-wing deputies are still monitored by Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Even though they are deputies, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution watches them, monitors them (P26).^{cxxv}

Another catching expression is about the teaching mechanism of democracy. My interviewee tells how he has changed after joining the civil organization he works for. He emphasizes the importance of free will of the free individuals and underlines the right to disapprove any decision taken in the organization:

My opinions about democracy have changed after I met with German democratic groups: I have started to think that civil groups should be more democratic. I think, no matter which institution it is, it should be participatory and democratic. And people should have individual rights. If TÜDAY wants something but you don't, you should have a right not to approve it. I should not be forced to get involved in something which I don't approve as an individual... For me, democracy is a system where the obstacles for a free individual to express himself/herself and to make her/his case are removed (P20)^{cxxvi}

The ideas of the interviewees from the Kurdish Federation upon political participation, integration, democracy and citizenship are only slightly different from other secular organizations mentioned above. Except their concentration on the activities demanding recognition of Kurdish identity as an ethnic community in Germany, perceptions of

political participation and democracy are similar to other secular immigrant organizations. They describe political participation as being aware of social problems, following the news from an unbiased newspaper, or participating in demonstrations and protests. In the below statements on political participation, there is very little emphasis on political parties, as a way of political participation:

To follow the current processes, trying to get informed about what is going around and producing thought eventually could be start for political participation (P22).^{cxxvii}

I think political participation starts with reading the paper. At least by reading an unbiased newspaper, you can find out what is going on around you. Other than that, it's attending the events of an organization or association that follows the footsteps of the party or ideology you are a fan of, if there is any. It's voting for a decent party during elections or founding one if there is no such party (P23).^{cxxviii}

Even if it's on association level, the activeness of individual is important. The more we engage in, the more power of changing we have. We should be interested not only in immigrant policy but other problems in Germany as well. The right to vote and stand for election is important but the most important thing is the individual's awareness (P24).^{cxxix}

For democracy, I have received two different views from the same organization. The first one tends to be in agreement with what have been presented to them by the state; he is in favor of obeying the rules, or solving the problems through a dialogue with the state. This very much reminds the descriptions of religious organizations. On the other hand, the second respondent mentions not only religious and cultural freedoms, but also political freedoms and the importance of living together in peace with German people:

I don't think democracy can exist in real terms. It has certain limits and it is how much you can experience it and carry it out within those limits. There are certain rules in Germany. It's possible to experience democracy within the scope of those rules. Among those rules, there might be laws that can violate human rights. However, we still have to internalize those rules. We should solve the problems through dialogue rather than violence (P24).^{cxxx}

For Kurds, associations represent democracy. If you ask whether political parties or associations outweigh, then I say my Kurdish identity outweighs and my German identity comes second. I'd rather be here than in a political party (P24).^{cxxxix}

For me, democracy means that every person has a freedom of religion, freedom of belief, freedom of politics. It means being able to live together without discrimination on any ground such as religion, race, rich or poor. It means that, in a place like Germany, immigrant young people can live with young German people (P23).^{cxxxix}

Regarding integration, I have also received two diverse ideas from two different participants:

I support Germany's integration policy. If a citizen has started living here, he/she has to integrate into here. If she/he doesn't, she/he can go. It has nothing to do with racism. For example, they need to learn German. According to laws, if you bring your spouse, you need not to receive social aid. Trying to prevent immigration with family reunification is also understandable. Our people still find a way and resort to family reunification, though (P24).^{cxxxix}

In my opinion, integration is immigrants' socialization and bonding with the society while preserving their language and culture. If that's not the case, you are either assimilated or isolated. For example: Women going to swimming together. They say when they don't show up, they stay away from integration; when they don't go in the pool, those women are not available for integration. How will you make a conservative Sunni woman who has not worn anything but scarf in her whole life wear a swimming suit? She doesn't have to be like you. You don't know her limits of embarrassment but still suggest something like that (P22).^{cxxxix}

The first participant seems to hold a more cautious attitude toward the state policies; he suggests that immigrants also have faults in the integration issue. This stance is similar to the cooperative and mild position of religious organizations toward the German state. I would explain this with the fear of inspection, or an effort not to attract attention. On the other hand, the second respondent's view is also interesting in that there is a stress upon preserving culture and language while describing integration. To

him, the process of integration should be attentive to cultural sensibilities of Muslim women. This emphasis is very similar to the sensibilities of religious organizations while describing integration.

Finally, on citizenship, there are again diverse ideas in Kurdish associations. One interviewee is in favor of full integration to the political culture of Germany while another thinks that citizenship as a legal status is not so valuable; it is significant to have the right to vote whether or not one gets citizenship formally:

Being a citizen means being under assurance and feeling safe (P23).^{cxxxv}

Citizenship is of course important; so is speaking the language but these are not enough for integration. The political culture should also be comprehended and internalized. People should internalize how the system works; only then they could be effective (P24).^{cxxxvi}

We seek the right to vote and stand for election even if we can't become citizens; and we have also had campaigns and works for that but I believe the more powerful we become locally, the more impression we would make on state level (P24).^{cxxxvii}

Based on the statements above, it can be concluded that Kurdish organizations are cultural and ethnic associations; over and above, they fight for the human rights and have a vision similar to that of DIDF in that they are on the side of all the oppressed.

To conclude, secular organizations hold a critical standing towards the state while describing integration, citizenship, democracy and political participation. To them, individual rights are invaluable; citizenship is a human right for all residents in Germany. They believe that the integration project of the state is unreliable, and instead of following the offered tools of the political participation, they are in favor of creating an alternative civil political arena. They seem to very closely work with local democratic organizations in Germany and very close to the understanding of European civil organizations, which aim to strengthen the individuals instead of the community. Emphasizing equal social rights through adopting universal values is another striking

character of those organizations. They also embrace all immigrants and all oppressed people in Germany regardless of their ethnicity or culture. That is, they always express the togetherness of local and immigrant people in the struggle of political participation. To them, it is the only way to be effective and visible in the society since problems such as poverty, isolation, violation of rights and discrimination are not only the problems of Turkey origin immigrants or Muslims; all the foreigners as well as the local people are exposed to all those problems. Therefore, they do not have any national or community or identity reference in their conceptions of democracy and political participation, the only reference of theirs is being human with universal rights. Kurdish federation however, is an exception among the others. To them, fighting for their identity rights is prior. Although they seem to give weight to individual rights, community rights are *raison detre* of their organizations. On the other hand, their conceptions of political participation, democracy and integration are similar to the other secular organizations; to be integrated and participated, they favor having a voice in the civil and political arena rather than “the voting right in the elections”.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, immigrants' political participation has been analyzed through the contributions of two groups of immigrant associations with Turkey origin in Germany, namely religious immigrant organizations and secular immigrant organizations. Within these two groups Alevi and Kurdish organizations have distinct patterns and can partially be included in either of the groups. The major endeavor of the study was to understand the political participation processes of immigrants with Turkey origin in Germany. While doing this, dynamic relations between and around immigrant associations, the role of state policies and institutional structures have been analyzed; various theories and approaches on political participation of immigrants have been reviewed. For the empirical part, thirty-six in-depth interviews have been conducted with the board or active members of the immigrant associations. My empirical data has revealed that while existing theoretical perspectives confirmed the results inferred from one part of the data, they have certain limitations in explaining the different types of political participation patterns that have been generated by different groups. In order to assess the whole picture of immigrants' political participation as well as the matters of inclusion and exclusion, we need a more comprehensive perspective based on a realist methodology. Before revising existing literature with reference to the data analyzed in Chapter 5, I would like to portray, briefly, my findings from the field.

First of all, there are common problems of all immigrants. All have a critical stand towards the German state and the integration policies although the perspectives are different. They also share certain problems about the immigration policies of Germany. However, their solution suggestions differ clearly.

Second, religious organizations give importance to legal and conventional ways to eliminate their problems. Having a place in local governments, participating in local and general elections, being a member of a political party, and having German citizenship are the ways they take to eliminate their problems. However, secular organizations suggest that political struggle outside the parliament is an indispensable part of the participation and of the solutions to the problems. They do not completely undervalue the elections. Yet, to them, the elections can only be a part of this struggle.

Third, religious organizations have a faith in democratic tools presented by the German state; they believe that the channels of bottom up democracy function well in Germany, and they prefer to follow this path when struggling for their rights. However, secular organizations are suspicious of those channels. Although they do not refuse to use them when they function properly, they do not have a complete faith in them. They rather prefer to create alternative ways of political participation through building horizontal relations with civil social democratic actors in the society.

Fourth, while religious organizations have an apparent solidarity and interaction with other religious organizations similar to them, secular organizations open their doors to a variety of organizations, with a consideration for the rights of all oppressed, irrespective of religious, ethnic or gender differences.

These two groups push each other in the immigrant civil political arena. That is, they do not prefer to occupy the political spaces of each other. For instance, being in the city councils is not preferred by the secular organizations since there is a domination of religious organizations there. My impression is that because of this pushing effect, the distinct playgrounds of each immigrant organization are reaffirmed.

To elaborate on their ways of political participation, the practical tendencies indicate that religious organizations seem to try to articulate their existence in the German political legal system through legal means such as elections. Since they are more populated and assemble more people, they have a stronger mobilization power. That

is, there have created Islamic immigrant civil areas within which participating in the elections and being able to change the results are extremely important. When their voting potential is concerned, they have become visible because of their power in changing the results of local elections, for instance. Although they have little effect, they continue to work as mobilizing actors in the political system of Germany. Moreover, they always give importance to hold the dialogue with state authorities on. They always care for learning and using their legal rights through learning about the legal functioning of the German state. They are interested in formal politics and behave like a pressure group; that is, they manage to change policies according to their religious and cultural demands as well as the related to being recognized as a community. Professionalization in the organization is significant for them. They have a considerable financial power; they are widely active in the business life. All in all, they seem not only as legal partners of the state in the immigration issues in Germany, but also in public discussions they are the target of multiculturalism discourse related to the immigrants in Germany. Lastly, they want to integrate as a religious community.

Secular organizations also use their rights similar to the religious organizations. However, they are more and more in contact with German civil democratic powers and opposition parties. Their perception of immigrant issue is much more comprehensive as they defend the rights of all the oppressed in German society. They participate in rallies along with German social democrat and civil groups. They usually do not prefer to use the expression *immigrants' rights*; instead, they use expressions such as *human rights, rights of all foreigners, equal rights, or living together as human beings regardless of ethnic or religious belongings*. Individual rights rather than the community rights are important for them. The data has also shown that secular organizations are not the main concern of the German state. Yet, secular immigrant organizations have another potential power which is much more comprehensive compared to their religious counterparts; that is the mobilization of all the oppressed foreigners including

Muslim population living in Germany. Lastly, they do not have any group concern; rather they want to integrate as individual persons.

There are also clear contrasts regarding their organizational patterns and decision making processes. There is an apparent hierarchical power relations and highly structured mechanisms in the administrations of Islamic organizations. One can easily recognize the distance between the administration and the ordinary members of the associations. On the other hand, secular organizations give their members the chance to participate in the decision making process, and they are open to different ideas. Accordingly, there is a smooth distinction between the administrative board and the members. As a result, in their inner functioning, while secular organizations are more participant and urge different ideas and active participation of their members in the decision making processes, Islamic organizations rather give importance to the integrity of thoughts within the association.

Alevi and Kurdish groups stand in between these two different patterns. That is, Alevis are also a religious community, yet they give weight to human rights and rights of other groups such as Kurds or Sunni groups. Although their ways of participation are similar to those of Sunni organizations, their organizational structures are not vertical at all. Kurds, on the other hand, are secular, yet their ethnic identity has the priority in struggling for the rights. Despite their emphasis on human rights, community rights always have the priority for them.

All in all, based on my perception of the data, I have identified three different tendencies of political participation:

-Participation as an Islamic community, which includes fighting for the legal and cultural rights of the community, participation in the elections at local, regional and federal levels, actively working in German political parties, and being in cooperation with the state authorities.

-Participation as individuals, which includes equal social rights as citizens through adopting universal values, participation in demonstrations, being sensitive to the problems in every aspect of life, struggling for equal rights in the civil arena, and being distant to the state authorities.

-Participation both as a community and as individuals, which includes struggling for community rights in homeland and in Germany, both participation in the elections and the civil political arena, being in cooperation with the state when it is necessary for community rights, and putting emphasis on individual rights, and universal human rights.

In Chapter 3, I have overviewed the immigration policies of Germany. Changes in the immigration law over the years, political representation rates of immigrants, the National Integration Summit, German Islam Conference and the functioning of foreign citizen advisory councils were discussed in the chapter. Among the other European immigrant receiving countries, the policies of Germany regarding the immigrant issue was heavily criticized. This is certainly not a surprise considering the fact that Germany has not accepted itself as an immigrant country for long years in spite of being one of the major immigrant receiving country. Parallel to this, political participation of immigrants has not been seen as a problem since it was understood that immigrants (majorly come as guest workers) had brought their families and did not want to back to their homelands.

To elaborate on the analysis made in Chapter 3, nearly 9% of the total number of electorates have migration background in Germany. However, only the European Union (EU) nationals have the right to vote in the local elections. Studies show that the rates of immigrant representation are highly low compared to other European countries such as Netherlands, Sweden, France and United Kingdom. This results from the fact that the naturalization processes of those countries are much more flexible compared to Germany. Although the rates are closer when big cities of Europe are compared,

looking at the overall picture of Germany, immigrant parliamentarians have only 22 of the 1860 seats in state parliaments excluding Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. This number refers only to 1.4 % of all the seats in the last local elections. In the Federal Parliament (*Bundestag*), 37 of the 631 seats belong to the parliamentarians with immigrant background and this number refers to 5.8 % of the total number of parliamentarians in Bundestag by the year 2013. According to the last micro census in 2014, 20.3 % of the total population has a migration background. As seen, except uneven dynamics at local levels, particularly higher representation rates of Turkish population in foreign councils, in total, representation rates of immigrants are highly low in Germany.

The same chapter also assessed the other channels of political participation presented by the German state for the immigrants. In this manner, German Integration Summits and German Islam Conferences are the examples indicating that state authorities are aiming at encouraging the political participation of the immigrants. However, it is seen that mostly business immigrant organizations and religious immigrant organizations have been invited to these summits. Moreover, in spite of their participation in the conferences, religious organizations utter their dissatisfaction about the comprehension of Islam in German Islam Conferences on the grounds that the conferences have been considered as a security measure by the government authorities. In fact, the first National Integration Summit was overshadowed by the boycott of four major Turkish immigrant associations, as a reaction to discriminative *Immigration Law 2005* towards Turkish immigrant in terms of family unification and language knowledge. The law imposed a basic German language requirement for the spouses of foreigners. When I asked my interviewees about the boycott, they assessed the law as a double standard to third country nationals, meaning to Turks, who are the most crowded group among immigrants.

Another point discussed in Chapter 3 was foreign advisory councils, which have emerged in the 1970s. They were the first official channels of political participation for non-German immigrant citizens. As an idea, those advisory councils were thought as contact centers for the government; they were giving advice to Federal governments and indirectly to the Federal parliament (Bundestag). After 1986, the members of the council started to be elected instead of being appointed by the city council as before 1986. Today, there is a mixed system in which a part of the advisory board is appointed and the other part is elected. In spite of those attempts to render foreign advisory councils more attractive to non-German population, today, their functions are highly contestable because of several reasons. First, the rates of participation in the elections for foreign councils are very low since people do not believe in its functions. Second, foreign councils are not taken as seriously by the city councils. That is, although it gives advice to the city councils, these are not implemented in full. Third, foreign advisory councils could not bring any fundamental changes in immigrant politics in general. The names of the councils have been changed as integration councils, and they have a legal basis according to Municipality Codes. They work as a control mechanism against the violation of antidiscrimination law and engage in the issues about integration. Still, it has been uttered often by the council members that there is not enough interest in the integration councils.

Regarding the memberships of immigrants in associations, political parties and trade unions, reports presented earlier in Chapter 3 indicate that Turkey origin immigrants' memberships in religious associations and trade unions have the highest ratio among any other membership types. The share of cultural and religious organizations among other types is between 33% - 36%. The registered members of the religious and cultural organizations are supposed to be higher considering Kurdish or political organizations because the latter do not prefer to register their members due to the political sensitiveness. Refugees and asylum seekers are not expected to be registered either. This fact also affects the visibility of religious and ethnic organizations as numbers. The

same research shows that 22% of the total share of various organizations belongs to the memberships in trade unions and political organizations. That is, religious and cultural organizations share the highest ratio among the other types. That refers exactly to the two different camps of political participation in my data.

Overall, Chapter 3 reveals that formal representation of the immigrants in general is low in Germany. On the other hand, I have witnessed over representation of Turks in the immigrant councils. Based on my findings in the field, although certain channels of political participation are offered by the government, German state usually aims at adopting immigrants into the existing institutional channels. The German state neither lets the immigrants create some permanent structures of participation nor exhibits a coherent and positive attitude towards relieving the prejudices toward and among the immigrants. First striking evidence to this is the implementation of citizenship tests. Those tests have not only further settled hostility against Muslim population, but also have deepened the feelings of exclusion among the Turkey origin immigrants. Second, granting citizenship has been highly problematic in Germany for years. For the German state, citizenship is the last stage of integration and still there is no real attempt to grant local franchise to non-European immigrants living in Germany. Due to this, it is highly difficult for the non-European immigrants to be influential in formal politics.

The above picture delineates the ground of play for the immigrant organizations. In the eyes of my interviewees, the policies of the German state have not resulted in a better communication between the local people and immigrant groups. There is neither a coherent group of immigrants with Turkey origin; the distance between religious and secular groups is similar to case in Turkey.

In Chapter 4, the theories inspecting the influence of institutional and opportunity structures on immigrants' political participation were analyzed. It has been seen that among the other European countries such as Netherlands or Sweden, Germany is known with its backwardness in introducing migration policies. In this chapter, the

obvious differences in the participation patterns that have resulted from the different policies of nation-states were also underlined. According to this, it seems reasonable that, as opposed to Soysal's (1994) argument, there is little point discarding the role of the nation states in immigration policies because they still have the power of determining who to be the member of the political community. On the other hand, it is problematic to explain the whole the issue with the success of the state policies or the degree of state control.

In that respect, the theory of Koopmans and Statham (2000) was analyzed in Chapter 4. They offer a critical view suggesting that not only the state regimes but also different actors and actions have a role in shaping the political participation of immigrants. That means opportunities and resources presented at local level affects the success of collective actions and claims makings. For them, citizenship and integration regimes are the most important political structures, and they shape the degree and the types of migrants' political involvements. Legitimacy of a collective action depends on which claims-making is favorable for that political opportunity structure. Considering the data based on the interviews, I have seen that religious immigrant organizations are the most responsive ones to the opportunities presented at local level. They are the partners of social and cultural projects funded by BAMF; they are the most active group in the integration councils, and they are the most influential in the political elections. That is, they have sustainable formal contacts with the state authorities. Furthermore, they are also more capable of mobilizing the resources to become visible in the media channels and to receive more mention in the dominant public discourse. They work as professionals; they get financial support and eventually become successful in their "claims makings". That is to say, when I relocate my unit of analysis from the success of states to that of the actors, there, I saw the success of the religious and ethnic organizations, and this success does not only depend on their effective use of resources, but also on German state's preference of properly integrated migrants using mainstream participation channels, as Odmalm (2009) underlined. Thus, I can easily

argue that there is a selective inclusion of religious organizations in that they are the formal integration partners of German state. Parallel to this, the expressions of other immigrant groups are excluded from the formal political arena. Although contestable, demands of religious organizations are at least seen as negotiable in the eyes of the state. Perhaps, it can be seen as an achievement of religious organizations as a result of their involvement in the negotiations as cultural activists, rather than ethnically exclusive groups. In brief, it is true that Germany tends to address the question of immigrants; however, its contacts with religious organizations as legal partners thanks to their legal political actions and visibility in formal politics. This fact results not only in the exclusion of other immigrant groups but also in the emergence of the problems related to the immigration process.

This alternative institutional approach by Koopmans and Statham (2000), namely political opportunity approach indicates how the religious organizations, as an example, have become successful utilizers of the resources, gained visibility and become legitimate collective actors. In other words, rising public appearance of Islamic migrant organizations could be explained through the analytical measures offered by the theory. True, religious immigrant organizations seem to be more legitimate collective actors in integration policies. However, the question is: What are the implications of this fact? That means social, political and economic consequences of this selective inclusion and the exclusion of the secular immigrant organizations cannot be explained by such kind of a theoretical tool. This is because indicating the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other group does not help to assess the consequences of this bipartition for the wider immigrant community, as Collinson (2009) have argued.

Considering this point of view, in Chapter 4, I also overviewed the studies focusing on the characteristics of immigrant groups with Turkey origin in different receiving countries, namely Norway, Canada and the USA. This analysis revealed that focusing on group related factors in immigrants' political participation is a tendency in North

American and Canadian studies. That is, while there is a stress upon the influences of national contexts in European comparative studies, the focus of the studies on the political participation of immigrants conducted in the US and Canada is heavily on group related and organizational factors. This is arguable because of the civic organization tradition of the US society for long years. Unlike the case in the US, in Europe, establishment of different organizations as well as the conflicts among the immigrants are more common. Still, there are studies conducted in Europe, focusing on the group characteristic of immigrants; they are mostly concerned with the production of ethnic or bonding social capital in and around the organizations. As for the studies conducted in Norway, they reveal that there is a density of Kurdish associations; therefore, they are the most visible. In Norway, this density of Kurdish associations negatively affects the immigrant political sphere due to their creations of us and them distinction. This example, which has been studied by Rodstad (2009), also suggests that economic difficulties and low level of education do not negatively influence the strong organizational capacity of Kurdish associations due to the factors such as being political refugees, and having group solidarity as well as a strong ethnic social capital.

In the Europe-based studies, analysed similarly in Chapter 4, ethnic community research is more prominent, specifically in the researches conducted in Amsterdam, Berlin and Brussels. For instance, focusing on different ethnic groups and picking up different aspects of their political participation is a widely seen way of studying the political participation of immigrants in the European studies. However, those studies mostly focus on the significant role of ethnic or bonding social capital in Turkish communities in different cities of Europe (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Tillie, 2004; Tillie and Slijper 2007; Rodstad, 2009; Michon and Vermeulen, 2009). They reveal that the Turkish organizations are very dense, higher in number and connected to each other. These factors indicate their high ethnic social capital and this leads to not only the higher solidarity and political participation of immigrants but also contributes to a multicultural democracy. To put it clearly, in these studies, it is argued that “ethnic

communities serve as a mobilizing device and promote the political integration of the members” (Tillie and Slijper, 2007:12). In another statement, “civic engagement and social capital are the most powerful determinants for the quality of multicultural democracy” (Fennema and Tillie, 1999: 703). On the other hand, my research has shown that not only the organizations with high ethnic or bonding capital but also those with bridging capital have an effect on democracy. In fact, the contribution of the latter is more valuable for integration and peace in the whole society.

Research studies of Tillie also show that although there is a high level of political participation by Turkish organizations at local level, there is also a high rate of polarization with the predominance of the religious organizations among the community from Turkey. Moreover, the social integration level of the organizations with Turkey origin is the lowest among the others. That means they have the lowest level of bridging capital among the other immigrant ethnic groups. In other words, communication with other communities and with a variety of different multi-ethnic organizations are very low. Those findings are also confirmed in my data revealing there is a high degree of polarization among the immigrant community from Turkey in Germany. There is almost no communication between the religious and secular immigrant organizations in that they have distinct ways of political participations. That means even if the research is supported by a measure of individual attachments, the result is that individual networks are usually related to the ethnic civil community itself.

In Chapter 4, the criticism of the relationship between the forms of political participation boosted by bonding social capital and the underestimation of bridging social capital was also analyzed referring to scholars belonging to certain groups (Berger et al., 2004, Dirk et al., 2006). Yet, neither of them sufficiently underlines the vital significance of bridging social for a democratic integration process of the immigrant community in general. Only few scholars studying immigrants in Spain clearly make the distinction between the bonding and the bridging forms of social

capitals (Martinez, 2009; Morales and Giugni, 2011; Morales and Pilati, 2011). Martinez emphasizes that, for Putnam (2000, 22-24), bonding social capital is the capital within particular ethnic or homogeneous social communities; bridging social capital, on the other hand, is the social capital among the heterogeneous communities in the whole civil society (Martinez, 2009: 11). Similarly, measuring social capital only on group level is problematic because individuals' involvement in other social networks and organizations other than their own organization is also an important resource. (Morales and Giugni, 2011: 7). In line with this vision, bridging social capital is more crucial than bonding social capital "as the latter lies within a specific community, whereas the former overcomes the ethnic cleavage" (Morales and Giugni, 2011: 8). Moreover, while bonding social capital is conducive to social and political cohesion, bridging social capital is significant for democratic engagement (Morales and Pilati, 2011: 90).

In my field research, I have encountered two main groups of immigrant organizations; religious organizations and secular organizations. The religious groups were high in their ethnic or bonding social capital; secular ones, in contrast, contributed to the bridging capital with their activities, decision making processes, with their interactions with the state and other groups, and with their opinions on political participation and democracy. I have seen that religious organizations are active and professional; they have dense networks within the religious community; their member numbers are higher and so are their mobilization powers; they demand religious and cultural recognition and have bargaining power with the state thanks to their electoral potential. However, their concerns are limited with the Muslim community; they have little communication with local people; they are not much interested in the general problems of Germany, and their attachments with other religious communities are limited those indicators show that they have strong bonding capital. It does not mean that their struggles are not valuable. In Germany, there is a high prejudice towards Muslim population due to wrong state policies, and certainly religious organizations fight to overcome this. They are critical towards the integration policies of Germany in

some ways, but they prefer to get along with the state authorities and use the democratic channels presented to them within the German political system.

However, in the literature, discussed in Chapter 4, there is one point that seems problematic to me; the question of Islam is over focused in Germany. This tendency is parallel to the literature overemphasizing bonding social capital; the religious organizations are the ones with high bonding social capital, and they are the most discussed. As to question of Islam, there are studies that mention the failures of state policies and offer some suggestions in overcoming the Islamophobia in Germany. (Pauly, 2004; Schiffauer, 2006). There are also studies that affirm the newly emerging roles of Islamic organizations in Germany as contact points of state through giving the example of German Islam Conference (Kortman, 2012). The Muslim identity of the immigrants from Turkey is perhaps mostly emphasized point in the studies of Yurdakul and Yükleven (2009). They also criticize the Germany state for not being inclusive enough towards Muslims; Netherlands trusts Muslims more through providing avenues of political participation. It is also highly contestable that Yurdakul sees *Cemaat* as a grassroots organization.

As also mentioned in Chapter 4, critical studies, in contrast to above literature, argue that this Islamization of the immigrant literature, articulation of Islam with integration discourse and popularity of debates on Islam in mass media should be inquired (Ramm, 2010; Spielhaus, 2010; Tezcan, 2005). They conclude that the vivid discussions on Islam are actually a tool for the persistence of a higher German culture, namely, *Leitkultur*. They criticize the popularity of the news in the media that identify Muslims as people who oppress women; having patriarchal violence; having honor killing and forced marriages. Repetition of those kinds of news is another version of racism, namely a cultural racism. Tezcan (2005), similarly, makes an objection to the idea that Islamic organizations or communities are seen as new modernizing agents as far as the Islam is associated with the integration discourse. This way of thinking is parallel to considering

higher bonding capital as good and useful for integration. Seeing Muslim population as integration agents and constructing the integration discourse only from this religious or cultural identity results in another one-sided analysis. Tezcan (2005) reminds that integration is a matter of having the right of being oneself, regardless of religious, cultural or ethnic identity. Tezcan (2005) also underlines that despite the imagined affiliation and the closeness drawn, Islamic organizations having strong bonding capital they have little communication with the German society and few contacts with German environments. He adds constructing the discourse of integration through cultural differences is no more than making the existing differences deeper and permanent in the society; when there is “other”, it is always easier to enhance national identity and protect national authority.

In my fieldwork, while discussing the integration, the conception of intercultural dialogue was used very often by my interviewees in the religious organizations. On the other hand, the other organizations did not use such a word. My impression from that is religious organizations are eager to integrate but in a particular way. They aim at reaching the status of the Christian elite in the German society in the long run. They feel politically powerful because of their relatively wider and visible participation in conventional politics; they see themselves as legitimate stakeholders of the material and the political power in Germany; they see themselves as interest groups or pressure groups with their projects at social level. However, they are not integrated in a social manner, and they only prefer to be in communication with the German society either to get informed about the formal or legal ways of striving for their rights, or to introduce their religious beliefs and culture.

Following my fieldwork observations, the group that is mostly neglected was secular organizations. When I asked about their thoughts on integration, firstly they noted that they do not prefer to use the word integration; instead, they prefer to use togetherness or coexistence. When I measured their interactions with the state

authorities and other groups, I saw that they have a distance to the state authorities and usually interact with the local social groups, always pointing out the togetherness of society. Their demands are social and economic rights at usually individual level. Instead of focusing only the problems of immigrants, or only the problems of Muslim, their endeavor is to comprise all the groups who are oppressed in any way. They are not only concerned with the problems of one ethnic or religious community but the problems of all society in general such as the welfare system. In other words, they address the whole society and problems of all people who are discriminated or excluded in any way. Their perceptions of democracy and political participation are also very different than the religious groups. Reading a newspaper or being aware of the problems in the neighborhood they live in are forms of political participation for them.

These indicators signal that they are the developers of bridging social capital among the immigrant community. Therefore, they have vital roles for the social integration of the immigrant community from Turkey. As Putnam (2001) points out, in contrast to the organizations with a higher bonding social capital, which are the exclusive ones, they are the inclusive organizations. Their vital importance is also underlined by Martinez (2009); bridging social capital has an indispensable role for an inclusive and active civil immigrant society as well as for a true and fully fledged democracy. Then, the groups with a higher bridging social capital are more related to the general issues of the host society; they are, in other words, are more concerned with the issues affecting the larger society.

At the beginning of this dissertation, I assumed that German state and the institutions have some policies of immigration and the immigrant organizations response to them differently. At this point, it has been revealed that different patterns of political participation in different immigrant groups do exist. I have elaborated on these differences and their possible implications for the integration and harmony in German society. In that respect, the literature on immigrants' political participation has certain

limitation; they can only partially explain the picture of the immigrant organizations with Turkey origin. They either depict the citizenship and immigration policies of different Western states or focus on the organizations with a higher bonding or ethnic social capital. That is, in the literature secular organizations with high bridging social capitals tend to be neglected.

Measuring the social capital only within the ethnic or religious communities through bonding capital creates serious problems in evaluating the whole picture of immigrants' political participation in Germany. The connectedness and networking of only one kind of organization hinder the visibility of the other existing networks around different immigrant organizations such as woman immigrants, immigrant workers and immigrant human rights organizations. Furthermore, an over-emphasis on the Islamic organizations with a higher bonding social capital is dangerous regarding the integration process, social harmony and the well-beings of larger immigrant communities since it reproduces the ossified differences in the society through Muslim identity.

My data has shown that there are different forms of political participation of immigrants depending on the social capital that produced by the particular immigrant groups. In my data, I have perceived two different groups with two different motivations of political participation, namely religious and secular organizations. Religious groups appeal to more people in number; they have highly dense inside networks and communication, they work professionally and have a bargaining power in policy makings regarding the rights of Muslim community, but they have very little contact with the German society and culture. They build more vertical relations with the state and inside their organizations. In short, they are the bearers of bonding social capital. On the other hand, workers, women, and human rights associations urge to promote bridging capital through building up horizontal relations with other associations and communities in Germany. They build more horizontal relations with

the state and inside their organizations. Therefore, they are the bearers of the bridging social capital. Yet, almost all the visible discussion of integration and political participation is squeezed in Muslim's integration problems or Islamic immigrant organizations in the literature, and this popularity is somehow endorsed by the political and public discourse as well as by the mainstream media. To put it again, religious organizations try to build up tighter relationships within their community whereas the secular organizations urge to integrate into a wider society. This study has shown that analyzing the political participation of immigrants only with institutional capacities of the states or with the high ethnic and bonding capital of certain groups of immigrants will be not sufficient to capture the whole picture. Therefore, I argue for a broader conception of political participation considering different social capital productions.

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ENDNOTES

ⁱAlman İslam Konferansı ve Uyum Zirvesi üyesiz... Schöble zamanında eşlere almanca öğrenme şartı getirildi, o dönem bu sebepten uyum zirvesini boykot ettik, o dönem medya neden gitmediniz diye çok fazla geldi...Biz eşitsizliğe karşıydık, bu sebepten katılmadık, bu bir lobi çalışması, bu siyasete bir mesaj vermedir. (P5)

ⁱⁱAlman İslam konferansına katıldık ancak imza atmadık çünkü olay sadece güvenlik boyutu ile anlaşılıyordu, öyle olunca ikincisine davet edilmedik. CDU mesafe koyuyor ama biz görüşmek istiyoruz. Siyasi taleplerimiz var, diğer dini cemaatlerle eşit haklara sahip olmak istiyoruz. (P1)

ⁱⁱⁱİsmi İslam konferansı ama İslam düşmanları davet ederseniz, biz burda alt niyet ararız. İslami meselelerin çözümü yerine emniyet ve güvenlik gözüyle bakıldı ve tehlikelidir İslam sonucu çıktı... Almanyada İslam korkusu ve düşmanlığı var suni olarak, siyaset bunu yapıyor insanlara ama bizim bunu yenmemiz gerekiyor, nasıl yapcaz, Almanlarla iyi ilişkiler kurarak. Yerel düzeyde iyi ilişkiler kurarak, çünkü bizim bu düşmanlığı yenmemiz gerekiyor. (P8)

^{iv}Zaman içerisinde uyum meclisi ortadan kalkmalı, zaten oy hakkı olursa belediyelerde daha çok göçmen olursa gerek kalmaz. Bu şekilde insanlar eyelet düzeyinde etkileme gücüne sahip olur. Böylece uyum meclislerine gerek kalmaz. (P10)

^vUyum meclisine ve seçimlere yeterli ilgi yok. Çünkü birinci ve ikinci kuşak hala Almanya ile değil, Türkiye'deki gelişmelerle ilgili çoğunlukla. Üçüncü kuşak gençler ise uyum meclisi ile kendilerini özdeşleştirmek istemiyorlar, uyum sorunumuz yok diyorlar, burda doğmuş büyümüş okula gitmiş insanlar gençler uyum sorunu olmadığını düşünüyorlar. (P13)

^{vi}Bir çok seçilmiş üye toplantılara düzenli gelmez. Yarısı düzenli gelir... Bu yüzden de bir çok şey bireylerin gayreti ile oluyor. (P12)

^{vii}Tüm kurum ve kuruluşlar kurumsal kimliklerini yeniden tartışmalı. Halen asimilasyonist bir anlayış var. Hala kişilerin tek taraflı uymaları gereken. Oysa ki nüfus olarak farklılaşmış bir toplumun beklentilerine nasıl cevap veririz diye sormaları gerekiyor. (P13)

^{viii}Derneğin amaçları, din hizmeti sunmak üzere, almanya yasalarına göre kurulmuş bir teşkilat, ama çeşitli sıkıntılarımız var, beş vakit namazın olması, çocukların din eğitimi almaları, kendi kültür ve kimliğimizi koruyarak yaşadığımız toplumda barış içinde yaşamak, dini nikah evlilik, kutsal günlerde dini hassasiyetleri korumak, hac ve umre hizmetleri gibi geniş hizmetler vermeyi amaçlıyoruz. (P5)

^{ix} Almanyada camiiler aynı zamanda kültür dernekleridir. Türkiyeden farklı olarak, fikir alışverişi olan insanların bir araya geldiği, omuz omuza gelen müslümanların yeridir, sosyo kültürel varlıklarını inşaa ettikleri korudukları ve dışa doğru açıldıkları mekanlar. Bir alman toplumundan enstütü en yoğun şekilde türk ve müslümanları en kapsamlı şekilde göçmenleri camiilerde bulurlar. Daha önceki yıllarda birlikte yaşamın ve paylaşmanın mekanı olarak tanımladık camiileri ve açık camii günleri yaptık. (P5)

^x DİTİB, kayıtlı üye olarak Türkiye kökenli 500bin, 600bin müslümanı temsil ediyor, ve kayıtlı olmayanlar da DİTİB'i kendilerinin temsilcisi olarak görüyorlar. (P5)

^{xi}300'e yakın şubemiz var Almanya çapında. Aslında hizmetlerden yararlananlar daha fazla, ama 25 bin üyemiz mevcut, bu kişilere aile fertlerimiz de diyebiliriz. Yaptığımız bir araştırmaya göre müslüman

cemaatinin yüzde 10 u da bizim hizmetlerimizden yararlanıyor. Türk kökenli müslümanların yüzde 7'si bizim İslam kültür merkezleri birliğinin hizmetlerinden yararlanıyor, 300-400 bin kişi ediyor. (P6)

^{xii} Eğitim faaliyetlerimiz var. Genç ve çocuklara yönelik dini ve okula yardımcı olmak üzere eğitimler bunlar. Amacımız İslami bir kimlikle yetişebilmeleri, iyi bir mesleğe sahip olabilmeleri.... Üniversiteler'de İlahiyat fakültelerinin kurulması için de uğraş verdik, şimdi Tübingen, Munster ve Osnabrück şehirlerinde fakülteler açıldı, ayrıca Hamburg ve Bremen eyaletinde İslam diğer dini cemaatlerle eşit yasal statü kazandı ve bu da bizim büyük bir kazancımız oldu. Üniversiteler konusunda ise bilimsel özgürlük de sağlanmış olur eğer İslam bilimi fakülteleri çoğalır. (P6)

^{xiii} Anasıfı ve gençlik eğitim çok önemli. Belçika'da İbn-i Sina İslami İlimler kurslarımız var. Bu kursların çok sayıda öğrencisi vardır ve dersler Türkçedir. Ayrıca Berlin İslam federasyonu ise bizim Berlin'deki eğitim yapımız (P1).

^{xiv} Bremen'de imzaları attık, bu büyük bir başarı idi, İslam cemaatinin diğer dini cemaatler ile eş hukuki statüde bulunmasına dair, bir dini cemaat olarak tanındık böylece, dini bayramlar artık resmi tatil olacak, din dersleri için ciddi bir süreç başlatmış olduk, bunda Alman devletinin de yardımını almış olacağız. Gelecekte bu iş kurumsallaşacak diye görüyorum, şimdi eyalet düzeyinde başarılar kazanıyoruz, gelecekte bu federal düzeye yayılacak Allahın izniyle... Aşağı saksonyada (Niedersachsen) otuziki bin oy ile seçim sonuçlarını değiştirdik, onlar da bizim gücümüzü görmüş oldular, iyi organize olan bir grubuz, ırkçılığa da karşı geliyoruz, İslam düşmanlığına karşı da çalışıyoruz, çünkü 11 Eylül sonrasında toplumda bir korku ve ötekileştirme refleksi oluşmuştu, bunun üzerine de 2008 ekonomik krizi oldu, krizin sorumlusu yine bizler olduk.(P1)

^{xv} Bizim en önemli başarımız da son dönemde İslami cemiyetler arasında diyalogu sağlayıp bir araya gelmeyi sağlamak, birlik ve beraberliğimiz geçmişe göre çok iyi bir noktaya geldi. Camiiler arasında diyalog arttı, kutlu doğum haftası gibi etkinliklerde bir araya geliyoruz. (P2)

^{xvi} "Geçen yıl 31 Martta Türkçem anadilim geleceğim çalıştayı yaptık, bunun en güzel özelliği, sağdan sola tüm Türkiye kökenli göçmen örgütlerini topladık, hem hem liberal, veliler derneğine ve öğretmenler derneğine kadar davet ettik, on tane çalışma grubu oluşturduk. Bizzat sorunlar ve çözüm önerilerini belirledik, ciddi bir materyal oluştu, çerçeve belirlendi, ama gerekli adımların atılması gerekiyor ivedilikle..." (P3)

^{xvii} Almanyada din devlet işleri farklı işliyor Türkiye'den. Almanyada tarihsel gelişme içinde, üç temel dini cemaat var, katolikler, protestanlar ve yahudiler. Devlet ortaçağ rönesans ve aydınlanmada kilise ile pazarlığa oturmuş, müdahil olduğu alanlardan çekilmesi istenmiş, din ve devletin birlikte çalışmasının yolları açılmış, kilisenin kamu hayatında yönetimle ilgili siyasal alanlardan çekilmesi sağlanmış. Hristiyan aydınlar siyaset yapmıyoruz ama siyasete zemin hazırlıyoruz derler. Hala etkileri mevcuttur. Örn. Yeşiller en seküler parti en modern partilerden birisi onların ikinci başkanı protestan kilisenin kendine ait parlamentosunun da başkan yardımcılığını yapıyor. Bavyara eyaletinde Backstein vardır, bu da katolik kilisesinden gelir. Bir de şu iddia var, çeşitli tarikatlar var ordnungsgemeinschaftlar (topluluk) var, kimisi bilim, yönetim, para toplamakla görevlidir, ortaçağda bu yetkileri olan bu tarikatların hala bürokratik alanda etkilerini görmekteyiz, bu bir araştırma konusudur. (P3)

^{xviii} Devlet dine ve dini kuruluşlara kapatılmamış durumdadır. Cemaat kelimesi burda pozitif bir anlam taşıyor kurulan dini organizasyonun tanınması ve devlet ile pazarlıklara girmesi mümkün. Din dersinin içeriğine devlet karışıyor, sen karar ver diyor protestan din dersi öğretmenliği okumuş öğretmenin

ücretini de ben öderim diyor. Almanya’da dini cemaatlere yaklaşım bu şekilde. Bir de kamu tüzel kişiliği mevcut, buna haiz bir dini cemaat vergi toplayabiliyor, kendi iç tüzüğünü hazırlıyor ve kendi iç işleyişine bürokrasi karışmıyor, kilise vergisi topluyor ve onları hizmetlerinde kullanıyor.

Örn. Bir kreş açıyor, hastane, fakülte açıyor bir kilise, bunların giderlerinin yüzde 95 ini devlet karşılıyor, devletin katolik vatandaşlarından aldığı vergiden kaynaklanmıyor, herkesten aldığı vergiyi buraya harcıyor, ama ben müslüman olarak bu hizmetten yararlanmıyorum, yine de vergi veriyorum.

Mesela hastanede, manevi duygular için papazlar gidiyor, hastalarla konuşuyor, moral veriyor, manevi destek oluyor, buna devlet destek veriyor, biz müslümanlar alman hastanelerinde bundan yararlanamamış oluyoruz, önümüzde 10 15 gün içinde bu konuda gelişmeler olabilir, şu anda değil. (P3)

^{xix} Genel anlamda onlarca eğitim programı gerçekleştirdik. 2005 yılından itibaren Almanya kendisini bir göçmen ülkesi olarak tanımladı. Biz seküler devlette dinler diye bir seminerler dizisi düzenledik...Bu seminerleri Alman İçişleri Bakanlığı da destekledi, federal göçmen ve sığınmacılar derneğinin(federal office for migration and refugees,BAMF), katolik ve protestan akademilerinin desteği oldu, her eyalette papazlar, yerel yöneticileri, dernek başkanlarını bir araya getirdik, karşılıklı bilgi alışverişlerini sağladık, kadın konusunu işledik, böyle bir sempozyum yaptık, ihtilaf şanstır isimli bir seminer gerçekleştirdik, esasen ihtilafların pozitif olarak değerlendirildiği bir çalıştaydı bu. Üniversitelerden çeşitli gruplardan ziyaret edenlerle de ortak çalışmamız oldu.

...Eğitim birimiz var bir de, o da Türk kültürü ve anadolu gelenekleri ile ilgili çalışmalar, kurslar düzenliyorlar. Ancak tüm bunlara rağmen Almanya çapına hitap eden bir altyapı oluşturamadık.

...Ciddi varlıksal sorunlarımız var, her iki devletin de ciddi adımlar atması gerekiyor, hapisaneler, sığınma evleri türk ve müslüman gençlerle dolu, buna gözümüzü kapatmamız, yanlış olur... Ciddi bir eğitim seferberliği ve kültür devrimi yapmak gerekiyor. En çok hauptschuleye (düz lise) giden Türkler, en çok okulu bırakan Türkler. Bunları gözardı edemeyiz (P3).

^{xx} Almanya göç sorunu ile ilgili dışardan uzman getiriyor, bir taraftan bir sürü göçmen genç işsiz geziyor, oysa bir kültür hazinesi olarak görülmeli, almanya neden bir eğitim seferberliği başlatmıyor. Bu konuya son zamanlarda el atmak istiyorlar ama yapılanlar ayrılan bütçeler çok çok yetersiz (P5).

Burda yetişen insanlar vergi ödüyorlar, ama geri alamıyorlar, örneğin TV deki programların yüzde 80 i göçmenler için olumsuz haberler içeriyor. İkincisi göçmenler Türkiyede yatırım yaptılar. Ekonomik olarak Türkiyeye getirdikleri getiriyi bir şekilde buraya sunmak zorunda, Türkiye bunu yapmıyor.

Örneğin milli eğitim bakanlığı, kültür bakanlığı eğitimler gönderebilir. Sanat ve kültür açısından insanlar çok yetersiz, onların da belli bir kültür yapısı var elbette, bilgisiz beceresizliği kastetmiyorum, örneğin benim dedem okuma yazma bilmezdi ama arif bir insandır, irfan sahibidiydi, anadolu kültürünü almış insanlar var burda da, bu insanlara kurslar, seminerler, türk günleri yapılabilir, bunlar bile önemli ama yapılmıyor, Türkiye bunları yapabilir, yapmıyor. Türkiyeyi turistik açıdan daha çekici hale getirmekle uğraşıyorlar sadece. Her iki devlet de bu konuya el atmalı.

Eğitim kültür bilgi becerileri artırılmalı buradaki insanların. Gençlere sahip çıkılmalı. Örneğin Türkçe, Türkçeyi unutmak insanlara hiç fayda sağlamaz, devlete de zararlı, Türkçe bilen bir insan, Almancayı da bildiği zaman üçüncü bir dil de bildiği zaman, bu ülkenin gelişimine katkı sağlayacaktır, ama devlet böyle olumlu bakmıyor bakması lazım oysa ki, Türkiyenin kültür yapısını burada tanıtmaya olanağı olacaktır türkçe bilen kişinin ve bu da almanya için olumlu olacaktır. Bu konuda dini cemaatlerin insanlara ulaşan en büyük sivil kitle örgütleri olarak üzerine büyük yükümlülükler düşüyor (P5).

^{xxi} Ödev yardımcıları ile ilgili aile ve içişleri bakanlığından destek aldık. Ayrıca velileri bilgilendirme konusunda bir başka proje var. Yine Alman devlet kurumları ve başka teşkilatlar ile ortak yürüttüğümüz bir projede velilerin çocukları ile daha çok ilgilenmeleri, veli toplantılarına katılmaları için bilgilendiriyoruz. Okul sistemini anlatıyoruz ve onlara veli olarak sahip oldukları haklarla ilgili bilgi veriyoruz. (P6)

^{xxii}Bu konuda istenilen manada Müslümanların lobi faaliyetleri yeni başlıyor. Farklı alanlara ayırmak gerek, dini cemaat olduğumuz için siyasi lobi faaliyetini, islamiyetle ilgili konuların daha iyi işlenmesi adına yapabiliriz, bu konuda siyasi partilerle konuşup ihtiyaçları dile getiriyoruz... Göçmenlerle ilgili Türklerle ilgili İslamiyetle ilgili eğitimle ilgili konularda Alman eğitim sisteminde değişiklikler yapılmasını söylüyoruz, basın bildirisi yapıyoruz, toplantılar yapıyoruz farklı kurumlarla... (P6)

^{xxiii}Bremen ve Hamburg'taki başarımız konuşma ve görüşmelerimizin neticesidir. Örneğin hukuki boyutta, kesim konusunda müslüman kasap mahkemeye başvurdu ve İslami usule göre kesme hakkına sahip oldu, biz daha çok consensus içinde siyasi kurumlarla görüşerek diyalog içinde çözülmesinden yanayız, böyle olunca kabullenmek (kabul edilmek) daha kolay oluyor öbür türlü hakkınızı alsanız da karşınıza sıkıntı çıkabilir. (P6)

^{xxiv}Dilimiz, geldiğimiz yer, örf adet anlayış neslimiz, aile varlığımız bize özgü değerleri korumak kollamak zorundayız. (P8)

^{xxv}Burda faaliyetler yapmak, kültür geceleri, gençlerle kamplar, futbol takımını gençlerimizi dışardan kurtarmak için kurduk. Aile çocuk yetiştirme ve kültürümüzle ilgili eğitim seminerleri düzenledik. (P7)

^{xxvi}Aile yapımız çok büyük sıkıntı içinde. Aile danışmanlığı da yapıyoruz. Bir proje başlattık ve devam ediyoruz. Modern bir toplumda aileyi muhafaza etme bilgimiz ve aklımız yok buradaki Türk toplumu olarak. Mesela 35bin euro ya düğün yapıyoruz ama kavga edince barışmayı bilmiyoruz. Mesela kilise burada bir kurum, Türkiye'de camii ise kuru bir bina. Almanlarda bu görevi kilise yerine getiriyor çoğunlukla. Ancak bizim burada teşkilatlarımız bu meselelere yeni yeni vakıf olduğu için ailemizi korumak için kurumlarımız yok. (P8)

^{xxvii}Aleviliğin kendisinin öğretilmesi, tarihsel araştırmalar, bilgi sahibi olunması, çocuklara aktarılması, inancın yaşatılması, onun dışında siyasi alanda bilgilendirmeler, seminerler paneller, ayrıca kültürel etkinlikler saz, semah, folklor, sosyal çalışmalar, kültürel çalışmalar, tiyatro, kadınların çalışmaları, anmalar, cemler. (P9)

^{xxviii}Ben bilgisayar teknisyeniyim aynı zamanda meslek danışmanı ve eğitimciyim (Ausbilder). Meslek arayan gençlere yardımcı oluyorum onlara danışmanlık yapıyorum. Gençlik merkezinde bilgisayar dersi veriyorum. Burası Kiliseye bağlı bir merkez ve devletten destekli bir yer. Devlet her sene belli bir miktarda yardımda bulunur. Bir kısmını devlet bir kısmını ise Kilise karşılar. Amaç aileler isteyken çocuklara destek olmak. Etüd merkezi gibi bir yer. Geziler etkinlikler dersler olur ve buraya yüzde doksan göçmen ailelerin çocukları gelir. (P10)

^{xxix}Paneller oldu, milletvekilleri gelip kendilerini tanıttı, valiliklerle birlikte Alevilik dersleri okullarda başlasın diye yoğun çalışmalar oldu...Artık sınıfta 12 çocuk Alevilik dersi istiyorum derse Alman devleti bunu açmak zorunda. Bu bir hak oldu, hangi okul olursa olsun, Alevi çocuğu ya da olmayan. Öğretmenin kim olacağı konusunda da söz hakkımız var, ilkokulda çocuklar Hz. Ali resmi çiziyorlar, dersler Almanca oluyor. Bir Alman da bu dersi verebilir önemli olan yapabileceğine inanmamız. Bu ilk olarak 3 sene önce başladı NRW'de ve belli şehirlerde. (P9)

^{xxx}Almanya çapında Aleviler 140'a yakın dernekle güçlüler, Sunni derneklerden sonra gelir. İslam konferansına katılıp görüşlerini dile getirir. SPD'de aktif olurlar.

^{xxxi}Almanlar da var, Sunniler de, ateistler de var üyelerimizin içinde. (P9)

^{xxxii} CDU'ya üye olanlar var, CDU gençlik koluna üye olanlar var, SPD'ye üye olan var, Linke'ye de var. Dersim derneklerinde çalışan da var. (P11)

^{xxxiii} Biz çatı kuruluşuz, dört büyük çatı kuruluş var, bunlar DİTİB, Milli Görüşün baskın olduğu İslam konseyi ve central rat. Ve bizim oluşturduğumuz Müslümanlar Koordinasyonları Kurulu. Biz şu anda sözcüyüz, önümüzdeki aylarda central rat'a devredeceğiz sözcülüğü. (P6)

^{xxxiv} Haklarımızı bilip kullanmamız gerekiyor siyasette. Yabancılar meclisi olarak bir takım yasal haklarımız var, ve bunları iyi bir şekilde kullanırsak o zaman ciddiye alınma muhatap alınma ihtimali var. (P27)

^{xxxv} Madem Almanya'da kurulmuş bir derneğiz, bu yüzden Almanya'da olan biten sorunlar konusunda Türkiyelileri bilgilendirmek, aydınlatmak, ve örgütlemek, aynı zamanda okulda fabrikada alman kardeşlerimizle birlikte mücadeleyi örgütlemek amacını taşıyoruz. (P14)

^{xxxvi} 90 lı yılların sonlarından itibaren kadınlarla bir araya gelip değişik etkinlikler yapıyorduk ama farklı bir örgütlenme ihtiyacımız olduğunun farkına vardık, biz artık bir kadın kolu değil, doğrudan kadın örgütlenmesi istedik. Türkiyeli ve göçmen olmaktan kaynaklı sorunlar vardı, bunlarla da mücadele etmek gerekiyordu, bu sebepten bu derneği kurduk. (P19)

^{xxxvii} Göçmen kadınlar birliğinin çıkma sebebi, kadın çalışmasını merkezileştirmek ama sadece yabancı kadınların merkezi değil de tüm kadınların merkezi olabilmek gibi bir misyonu var. İlişki içinde olduğu diğer örgütlerin de bu şekilde bakmasına yol açtığımızı düşünüyorum, kadın çalışmasını merkezileştiren bir örgütümüz ancak dediğim gibi herkese açtık. (P18)

^{xxxviii} Kadınlara yönelik eğitim, gazete yazılarını tartışma, güncel konuları tartışma gibi toplantılar yapıyoruz. Böylece kadınlar kendilerini hem Almanca hem Türkçe ifade etmeyi öğreniyorlar...

^{xxxix} ...çünkü göçmen kadınlar en alt seviyede vasıfsız ve çok düşük ücretli işlerde çalışıyorlar. Kalifiye değililer ve dil sorunları var. En önemli sorun da haklarını savunmak konusunda sıkıntı yaşıyorlar çünkü haklarını bilmiyorlar, dil bilmedikleri için de kendilerini savunamıyorlar. Onların çalışma yaşamında karşılaştıkları sorunlarla biz ilgileniyoruz. (P19)

^{xl} Yasadışı yollarla Almanya'ya girmiş insanların kağıtsızların yaşam koşulları çok kötü, barakalarda kalıyorlar, hapisane ya da kamp gibi yerlerde yaşıyorlar, çok küçük odalarda çok fazla insan kalıyor. Şehri terk edemiyorlar. Tüm bu konular alman siyaset gündeminin çok dışında kalıyor ne yazık ki. Bu çok ciddi bir problem bu. Ölümler bile olabiliyor. Geçen hafta toplu bir sınır dışı kararı çıktı ve Köln'de bunun için eylemler sürüyor hala. (P21)

^{xli} 80'lerin sonundan itibaren dernek arayışına girdik. Zaten burada birinci jenerasyon vardı. 3-4 yerde dernek kurma çalışmalarımız oldu. 80'li yıllardaki ilk örgütlenmede kadın, gençlik, işçi ve öğrenci birlikleri mevcuttu. Ayrıca bir de spor derneği vardı. Ortak olarak kurduk. Bu derneğin altında Mezopotamya derneği de var. Kadın ve gençlik kolumuz var. Gençliğin altında Kürdistan öğrenciler birliği vardı. Bu öğrenciler birliğinin Köln'de kuruluşunu ilan edenler arasında ben de vardım. 1979 senesinden beridir de aktifim. (P24)

^{xlii} Geçmişle şu gün arasında farklar var. Başlarda daha fazla ülkeye yönelikti. Gelen insanların eğitim ve tercümanlık işleri vardı. Şu anda da burada yaşayan insanların sorunları ile ilgilenmek durumundayız aile

okul sorunları gibi. Gençlerin uyuşturu sorunları, kadınlara yönelik çalışma entegrasyon kadınların ve gençlerin yaşadığı sorunların üstesinden gelme, işsizlik sorunu, dil sorunu, kendini anlatamama, tanıtamama sorunları var. Onun için de bu derneğin varlığı önemli. (P24)

^{xliii}Ne kadar politik olarak bilinçlenirse o kadar iyi. Yani sadece dil bilmek değil, buradaki siyasi kültürün içselleştirilmesi ve algılanması gerekiyor, sistemin nasıl işlediğini içine sindirmesi gerekiyor, ancak o şekilde etkili olunabilir. Vatandaşlık tabii ki önemli, dil bilmek de önemli ama bunlar yeterli değil... Entegre olmayı ve göçmenleri de bu konuda bilinçlendirmeyi hedefliyoruz. (P24)

^{xliv}Biz kürt kimliğinin tanınmasını istiyoruz, Avrupa içerisinde Türklerle bir arada sayılmak istemiyoruz. Türk olarak hesaplanmak istemiyoruz, AB’de Türk nüfüsü bu kadardır deniyor, oysa onun için de kürtler de var. Bu çok büyük bir haksızlık. Hesaplanmak istenen ordaki oy potansiyeli. Türkiye’li Kürtler Türk olarak sayılıyor... Oysa ki pasaportta etnik Kürt yazılması gerekiyor, böyle bir ayırım yapılmalı. Kayıtlar da bu şekilde tutulmalı. (P22)

^{xlv}Demokratik kitle örgütleri ve sendikalar içinde bu kampanya tartışıldı. Hayatın önemli noktaları olan kurumlar üzerinden bunu tartışıyoruz ve tartıştırıyoruz. Tüm bunlar yukarıya kadar gidiyor ve ciddi bir tepki olduğunu gördüklerinde ele alıp onlar da tekrar tartışma ihtiyacı hissediyorlar. Bu anlamda kamuoyu tartışmalarına sebep olmada etkili olduğumuzu söyleyebilirim. (P14)

^{xlvi}Hükümetin izlediği bazı provakatif politikalar oldu. Özellikle islami kuruluşları rencide eden bir politika izlediler, bu da insanların kendi içlerinde bir kutuplaşmasına neden oldu, toplumun kaynaşmasında bir engel. Biz bunu bir kampanya olarak başlattık medya da ve sendikalarda gündeme getirdik... Örneğin 19 yabancıнын öldürülmesi üzerine oluşturulan komisyon bilgilere ulaşmış ancak kanıtlar ortadan kaldırılıyor. O zaman muhalefet partileriyle birlikte basın açıklaması yaptık. Tek başımıza değil de, Alman örgütlerinin siyasi parti ve derneklerinin desteğini alarak yaptığımız açıklamalar ses getiriyor, tek başımıza yaptığımız çağrılar ancak yabancılar için bir bilgilendirme niteliği taşıyor. Birlikte yapıldığında ses getiriyor. (P15)

^{xlvii}Örneğin, üniversite öğrenim harçları ile ilgili süren kampanya ses getirdi ya da öğrencilerin okul sisteminin değişmesi için hamburgta yürüttüğü kampanya oldukça ses getirdi. Çocukların 4. Sınıftan sonra değil de belli yaşa kadar bir arada olup başarı ve yeteneklerine bağlı olarak sonradan ayrılmasına dair bir önerimi olmuştu, bu anlamda duyarlılık yaratmakla ilgili bir başarıımız oldu. Türkçenin yabancı dil olarak kabul edilmesinde liselerde etkimiz oldu. Yabancılar seçimi hakkını gerçekleştirmesek de bugün belli partilerin CDU dışında tüm partilerin bunu seçim programlarına aldıklarını görüyoruz. (P16)

^{xlviii}...8 Martlarda 4 senedir yaklaşık 40 derneği toplayıp sokağa döküyoruz. 8 mart daha önce pasta günüydü, sadece kadınların pasta börek yapıp yediği parti gibiydi. GKB sayesinde 500-600 kişilik yürüyüşler yapıldı. Almanlarda da bir referans noktası oldu bu.

...Nisan ayında bakanlık bünyesinde yapılan göçmen kadınlar konferansına ev sahipliği yaptık. Almanya genelindeki derneğimizde belirli konularda profesyonel kişiler var, örneğin iki arkadaşımız namus cinayetleri konusunda doktora yapmış uzmanlar. Aynı zamanda hukukçular var, bu kişiler, bilinen, saygı duyulan kişiler, ciddiye alınıp bir çok konferansa davet edilen kişiler. Örneğin sağlık alanında çalışan göçmen kadınların durumu ile ilgili çalışmaları olan arkadaşlarımız da var. (P17)

^{xlix}Hedeflerimizden birisi de tüm kadın gruplarını kapsayan daha verimli çalışmalar yapmak, ilk başta sadece kamu sendikası ile başladık şimdi genişledik... bu artıyor, daha fazla açılıyor, feminist kadın grupları çok çeşitli yerli, merkezi düzeyde ve eyalette daha çok Sol Partinin kadın grubu ve sendikaların kadın grubu ve üniversite kadınları ve Sosyal Demokrat parti ve Yeşillerin kadın grupları ile bir araya geliyoruz. (P18)

ⁱKağıtsızlar ile ilgili Kein Mensch Illegal grubu var. Bunlar inisiyatif ve otonom çalışan bir grup ama çok etkinler. Devletin sınırlarını zorluyorlar. Kağıtsız insanlara yardım etmek suç zaten bu ülkede. Bu grup Einewelthaus'u (Bir Dünya Evi) merkez olarak kullanıyorlar ve Afrikalı, Kosovalı, Kürt ve Çingenelerin haklarını koruyorlar. Onlara oturma izni ve tüm bürokratik izinleri almaya çalışarak bu ülkede kalmaları için çalışıyorlar. İlticacılara destek olmak için, okul işgali ya da açlık grevi gibi eylemler yapıyorlar, bildiriler dağıtıp belediyeye baskı yapıyorlar. Örneğin, bu gibi yöntemlerle Köln'e yakın bir yerde kötü koşullarda kurulmak istenen bir iltica kampına engel olabildiler. (P20)

ⁱⁱPro-asyl in çok önemli çalışmaları var, çünkü devlet nedzinde ciddiye alınan bir kurum, profesyonel çalışıyor, bir saygınığı ve etki gücü var, raporlar yazıyorlar. (P21)

ⁱⁱⁱBurdaki bizim sivil çalışmalarımızın hedefinde Kürtler vardır, Kürtlerin sorunları vardır, Kürtlerin talepleri vardır, ve bu talepler yasal ve insanidir. Bunlardan en önemlisi Kürtlerin kimliğini istemesi kendi kültürüne ve inancına göre yaşayabilmesidir. (P22)

ⁱⁱⁱⁱGeçen sene bağımlılık üzerine seminerler verildi. Uyuşturucu bağımlılığı ile ilgili ailelere bilgi verildi. Böyle bir durumda nereye başvurmaları gerektiği anlatıldı. Örneğin, uyum meclisinden gelen arkadaşımız haklarımız ile ilgili son süreci değerlendirdi. Vatandaş olmayanlar için nasıl vatandaşlığa başvuru yapılabilir konusunda da projeler geliyor... Gençlikle ilgili iş ilanlarına nasıl başvuru yapılır konusunda bilgilendirmeler yapıyoruz. Sadece kadınların yürüttüğü kadın kırımına karşı feminist bir grubumuz var. Ayrıca Kürtlerin kimlik sorunlarına dair kampanyalar var. (P22)

^{lv}Gençleri bir araya getirmeye çalışıyoruz. Örneğin futbol turnuvaları ve folklor yarışmaları yapıyoruz. Kürtçe dersleri veriyoruz. Haklar ve sorumluluklarla ilgili bilgi toplantıları. Eğer iltica olarak gelmişse, bu konuda onu bilgilendiriyoruz. Bunların dışında kadınlara yönelik ve gençlerin eğitimine yönelik çalışmalar var. (P24)

^{lv}...yörelere insanları ile ilgili araştırma yapıyoruz, her türlü halk kültürü ile ilgili çalışıp araştırmalar yapıyoruz. Her sene üniversitede Kürt kültür, folklor ve müzik yarışmaları yapıyoruz. Farklı yörelere farklı kültürleri yeme içme mutfak, giyim, kostüm, müzik ve dans çalışmaları yapıyoruz. (P23)

^{lvi}Bilgilendirme düzeyinde ilişkimiz var. Ortak resepsiyonlarımız var. Onlara davet ettiğimizde geliyorlar. Senede bir kez dernek Newroz resepsiyonu verir ve dışardan dernekler davet edilir. Ortak konuşmalar yapılır yemek yenir. Bu resepsiyonlarda diğer derneklerle ve Almanlarla kaynaşma hedeflenir.... Sol örgütlerle birlikte yürüttüğümüz ortak cephe çalışmamız var, çeşitli inisiyatiflerle çalışma gruplarımız ve bir çok parti temsilcisinin de katıldığı Türkiye'ye yönelik proje delegasyon çalışmamız var. Tüm bunlarda hedefimiz, Almanya'da Türkiye'de Kürtlere yapılan baskılar konusunda insanları bilgilendirmektir. (P22)

^{lvii}Avrupada'ki derneklere sesimizi duyurmak istiyoruz. Onları Türkiye'de Kürtlerin yaşadığı topraklara uygulanan savaş hukuku hakkında bilgilendirmek istiyoruz. Bu konuya seyirci kalınmaması gerektiğini buradaki kamuoyuna anlatmaya çalışıyoruz. (P22)

^{lviii}Kongrelerde asla kimin başkan olacağı baştan konuşulmaz, genel kongrelerde üyelerle istişare halinde başkan belirlenir. (P25)

^{lix}Kararlar yönetim kurulunca alınır. Etkinliklere daha çok kurucular, yönetim karar verir. Yönetimin kararı gecerlidir, komisyon çalışması bir şey sunar yönetime uyarıya tamam deriz. Üyelerin katılımı başka

yerlerde daha iyi, büyükler ne derse o yapıyor, milli görüş derneğinde öyle mesela. Onlar çok iyi çalışıyor. (P7)

^{lx} Herkes yönetimi kendisi seçiyor. Adaylar oy veriyor. Genelde en çok oy alan başkan olur. Diyelim ki yeni bir tüzük ortaya koyacağız, eyalet meclisinde arz edilir, ve genel kurulların kabulüne sunulur, üyelerin ve derneklerin kabul etmediği bir şey dikta edilmez, ve bu uygulamayı yapan tek dini cemaat yoktur. (P5)

^{lxi} Bölge temsilcileri atama yoluyla iş başına gelir, ve üç sene süre ile yönetimde kalır, genel merkezde ise yönetim beş senede bir değişir. Bölgelerde seçim isteğe bağlı olarak yapılır. Ama genellikle seçimi istemeyiz, çünkü rekabet oluyor, seçilen ve seçilemeyen birlikte namaz kılmaya gittiklerinde sorun oluyor, bu yüzden iştişare yolunu tercih ederiz, genel tavır mutabakat ve ittifaktır. (P1)

^{lxii} Mali, siyasi, eğitim, yeni kitap serisi gibi kararlar, bunların hepsi merkezde verilir. Başkanlık divanında genel başkan ve genel sekreter iç karar mekanizması olarak kararları alır. Yönetim kurulu 23 kişiden oluşur, eğitim, irşad, kadınlar ve gençlik birimlerinin temsilcileri de bulunur ve iki haftada bir toplanır. Bölge yürütme kurulları ise bölgede toplanır. (P1)

^{lxiii} Aslında hizmetlerden yararlananlar daha fazla, ama 25 bin üyemiz mevcut, bu kişilere aile fertlerimiz de diyebiliriz. Yaptığımız bir araştırmaya göre müslüman cemaatinin yüzde 10 u da bizim hizmetlerimizden yararlanıyor. Türk kökenli müslümanların yüzde 7'si bizim İslam kültür merkezleri birliğinin hizmetlerinden yararlanıyor, 300-400 bin kişi ediyor. (P6)

^{lxiv} İki senede bir yönetim değişir. Tüzük ya da inşaat gibi konularda üye toplantıları yapılır. Örneğin seçimlerin ertelenmesi kararı üyelerle birlikte genel kurulda alındı. Ama kararlar en çok yönetim kurulunun elinde olur genellikle. Onun haricinde bölge inanç kurulları vardır. Pirler meclisi de denir bu kurullara. Bu kurullar Almanya'nın beş bölgesinde seçilir. Analar ve dedeler olarak hizmet verirler. Tüm inançsal eğitim çalışmaları ve inançsal eğitimi yürütürler. İnanç kurulu başkanı, kadınlar birliği başkanı ve gençlik birliği başkanları yönetim kurulunun doğal üyeleri olarak kabul edilir. (P11)

^{lxv} Bizim 3-4 bölgede eyalet tarzında da birlikte çalışmalar söz konusu, mesela bizim NRW deki örgütlerle 15 örgüt var ver 2 ayda 3 ayda bir bir araya geliyoruz, kim kendi bölgesinde neler yapıyor bunları görüşüyoruz ve önümüzdeki dönem neler yapacağız üzerine konuşuyoruz, kampanyaları konuşuyoruz. (P14)

^{lxvi} İdeal durum tabandan tavana doğru olur, ama bazen yönetim kurulu ayda iki defa buluşmaya çalışıyor, neler yapılabilir gündeme geliyor, taslak olarak, ve ayda bir defa üye toplantısında bunları üyelere soruyoruz ve onların görüşlerini alıyoruz, bu onları karar mekanizmasına sokma ve karar alındıktan sonra görevlendirme için de önemli çünkü insanlar karar sürecine girerse daha aktif çalışıyor, sahipleniyor ama yönetim kurulundan gelirse o zaman katılım daha düşük oluyor. (P16)

^{lxvii} DİDF' de önce yönetim kurulu seçiliyor, daha sonra başkan seçiliyor, direk başkan seçilmiyor. Filancayı başkanlığa öneriyoruz ne diyorsunuz diye bir şey yok, yönetim kurulu ilk toplantısında başkanın kim olacağını belirliyor. (P16)

^{lxviii} Şu anda yönetim kurulunda dokuz kişi var. Çünkü talep varsa biz çevirmiyoruz, ihtiyaç varsa talebi olanı da yönetime alıp aktifleştirmeyi tercih ediyoruz. (P15)

^{lxix} Komisyonlarımız vardır. Bunlar kadın, gençlik ve kültürdür. Her biri üçer dörder kişiden oluşur ve kendi programlarını çıkartırlar. Üyeler kendi aralarında ön çalışma yapar, ve ilgi alanları doğrultusunda bu

komisyonlarda kimler olacağına karar verilir. Bir de siyasi partilerle diğer sivil toplum örgütleri ile sendikalarla iş birliği sağlanması ve diyalogun geliştirilmesi ile ilgili bir komisyon var. Onlar da buradan edindikleri deneyimleri üyelere aktarır buna dair yapılması gerekenleri ve faaliyet fikirlerini sunarlar yönetim kuruluna... (P15)

^{lxx}Her bir yönetim kurulu üyesinin komisyon alanlarına uygun kendine ait bir alanı vardır ve her bir üye farklı komisyonlardan sorumludur. (P14)

^{lxxi}Üye toplantılarının karar alma mekanizma olduğunu kavratmakta zorlanıyoruz, bazen üyelerimiz bunu sadece bilgi verme olarak algılıyorlar, bazen biz de öyle algılıyoruz, öyle olunca bu üyeleri pasifleştiren ve bekleyici durumuna getiren bir durum oluyor, benim işim burada karar vermek değil diye düşünüyorlar, bunu oturtmak çok zor. (P16)

^{lxxii} Bizim federasyonumuzun iyi bir gençlik örgütü var. Bazen bizden de yardım alarak, bazen kendi aralarında toplantılar yapıyorlar. Ancak çoğunlukla bizim yardımımız arka planda kalıyor. Onların gündemi genelde farklı oluyor, çünkü gençlerin yaşadığı dili Almanca. Biz yetersiz kalıyoruz zaten onlar için. Bizim rolümüz ön hazırlıklarına katılmak düzeyinde kalıyor. Ayrıca onlar Junge Stimme isminde bir dergi çıkarıyorlar. (P16)

^{lxxiii}Biz tartışmaların olmasına da olumlu bakıyoruz, buraya camiye girer gibi girmesinler, dışarıda hayat devam ederken, dışarıdaki kavgalar olurken burada da kavgaların olması çok doğal, burası yapay bir ortam değil, eleştiriler ve tartışmalar bizi doğruya götürür, yani kavgalar olacak ki doğru ve yanlış anlaşılın. (P16)

^{lxxiv}Her şehirdeki her grup kendi çalışmasını kendi planlıyor. Bu konuda özgürler. Elbette ortaklaşılan bir takım temel ilkeler var ama onlar harici tüm gruplar kendi çalışma sistemlerini ve yönetimlerini seçiyorlar, komisyonlarını seçiyorlar... Şehirler kendi yönetim kurullarını belirliyor. Almanya çapında yaptığımız kongrelerde ise delege düzeyinde değil tüm üyelere açık şekilde yapılır. Ayrıca eyaletler içerisinde yer alan bölge yönetimleri var. Bunları da o bölgede yaşayan kadınlar belirliyor... Merkezi düzeyde 13 kişilik yönetim kurulumuz var bu kişiler Almanya'nın farklı şehirlerine dağılmış durumdadır. Bu 13 kişi aktif ancak yerel düzeyde de aktif olan çok kadın var. (P19)

^{lxxv}Yönetim kurulu sözünü kullanmıyoruz, daha çok komisyon diyoruz, yönetim deyince korkuyorlar kadınlar, yönetime girmelerini de teşvik ediyoruz ve kongrelerde bölge toplantılarında onların da çıkıp konuşmasını teşvik ediyoruz. (P19)

^{lxxvi}Yaptığımız tüm toplantılarda karar alma mekanizmalarına katılmalarına teşvik ediyoruz çünkü kadınların çoğu için hep başkaları karar vermiş hayatları boyunca, ama biz kendileri ile ilgili kendilerinin karar alması için uğraşyoruz... Karar almaya katıldıkları zaman da çok sahipleniyorlar ve bu durumu çok seviyorlar. Ve somut farklar yaratıyor tüm bunlar hayatlarında aile bireyleri ve çocuklarla ilişkileri değişiyor bir farklılaşma oluyor değişimler oluyor, ve farklı nefes aldıklarını fark ediyoruz. (P19)

^{lxxvii} "Dernekle ilgili kararlar oy çokluğu ile yönetim kurulunca genel olarak fikir alışverişi ile alınır." (21)
"Birlikte oturup karar veriyoruz. Aktif üyeler ve yönetim kurulu birlikte karar veririz." (P20)
"Kurulduğundan bu tarafa TÜDAY'da, mümkün olduğunca açık, kendi içerisinde organları olan, kararların tartışılarak alındığı bir ortam oluşturulmaya çalışıldı." (P26)

^{lxxviii}Kararlar genellikle üçte bir çoğunluk ile alınır. Üye toplantılarını üç haftada bir yapmak zorundayız. Bir durum olduğunda üyelerimizle paylaşıyoruz. Senede bir kongre, üç ayda bir merkezde toplantı olur. Biz de

oraya delegelerimizi yollarız.. Yönetim kurulu beş kişiden oluşuyor. Yönetim kurulu harici bir de on kişiden oluşan danışma kurulu var. Farklı konularda uzman ve danışmanlar davet ederiz. (P24)

^{lxxxix}Karar kadınlarla ilgisi ise kadın komisyonu alır, dernek çalışması ise dernek yönetimi alır. Örneğin bir kadın projesini kadın komisyonu tartışır, değerlendirir, karara bağlar ve göre paylaşımını yapar... Üye toplantılarında üyeler fikir ve öneri getirirler, gidişatı değerlendirirler, öneri yapma hakkına sahiplerdir. Üyeler yönetimin kararlarına karşı çıkabilirler böyle bir yetkileri vardır. Böyle bir durum olduğunda yönetim kararı gözden geçirir. (P22)

^{lxxxı}Üye toplantılarında güncel olaylar tartışılır ve dernekle ilgili alınacak kararlar varsa üyelerin düşünceleri alınır. Tüm komisyon üyeleri halk meclisini oluşturur. Örneğin derneğe ek bir bina yapılacaksa bunun için halk meclisine sorulur. Diyelim ki eğitim komisyonu bir karar alır ancak bu kararın hayata geçmesi için halk meclisinin oylamasına sunulması gereklidir. Geçtiğimiz günlerde kültür komisyonu ile ilgili bir sorun olmuştu, bir kişiyi men etmek istiyorduk, bunun için tüm komisyonları yani, hak ve adelet, kültür, eğitim, dil, gençlik ve dış ilişkiler komisyonlarını toplantıya çağırılmaz gerekti. (P23)

^{lxxxıı}Öncelikle çifte vatandaşlık meselesinin ivedilikle bizler tarafından işlenmesi gerekiyor. Daha sonra bireysel düşünce ve interestlerin toplanarak kolektif hale getirilerek topluca devlet ve siyasi partilerde etkili olmaktır, halkın kendisi ile kendi dertleri ile ilgilenmesidir. Ben de dahil bir çok insan kendi bireysel ve ailevi sorunlarını çözebilirler ama çıkarların kolektif bir şekilde ele alınması ve gruplanmalar ve ayrı bir parti içerisinde hakların, özgürlüklerin savunulması, daha basit olarak, bir partiye girerek kariyere öte, birlikte yaşadığımız toplum, temsil ettiğim derneğin hakları için özgürlükleri için mücadele etmek olarak tanımlardım siyasi katılımı...(P3)

^{lxxxııı}Uyum meclisi, eskiden yabancılar meclisi idi, esasen danışma meclisidir yani Integration Beirat'dır. İsmi değişmiş olsa bile, hala da beiret olarak çalışmaktadır. Bazı şeyleri ben orada öğrendim, yerel yönetimlerde siyasi katılımın ne olduğunu ben orada gördüm. Buralar belki birer siyaset okulu gibi kullanılabilir, uyarıcı etkisi olan kurumlar olarak kullanılabilir, belki birey olarak üyelerimizin, haklı isteklerini kamuya taşımak ve kamu alanına iletmek olarak kullanılabilir... (P3)

^{lxxxıııı}Son dönemdeki gelişmeleri açıkçası beklemiyordum. Daha da kolaylaştıracaklarını bekliyordum ancak gördüm ki kan bağı hala Almanya için çok önemli ve bu zorluklar belki de bizim işimizi kolaylaştırıyor. Belki kapılar çok açılrsa, demokratik hakların vanaları sonuna kadar açılrsa, birlikte yaşamının örnekleri daha fazla olacak ve bu da Leitkultur'e geçişi kolaylaştıracak, bunu bilemeyiz, hakların verilmesi ya da verilmemesi mevzuu oldukça karışık (P3).

^{lxxxııııı}Cemiyetlerde ve siyasi partilerde şahsen ben İslamın bir unsuru olarak görüyorum, zıttı olarak görmüyorum, çünkü halk yönetimi demektir demokrasi ve cumhuriyet, halkın kendini idare etmesidir. Halk kendini nasıl idare eder? İnanışına, ihtiyacına, anlayışına göre. Bu manada ben demokrasiyi olmazsa olmaz görüyorum. (P8)

^{lxxxıııııı}Uyum asimilasyon değil, karşılıklı hoşgörü, kabul, saygı, birlikte planlama ve uygulama, birlikte düşünme, birlikte şekillendirme, karar verme ve uygulama, burada uzmanınız olacak bunu yapabilmek için, size yetki verilmesi gerekiyor bunun için. Diyalog içindeki uyum bu demektir. Almanya bizim inanç ve kültür ve dilimizi üçüncü sıraya attı yapması gerekeni yapmadı. (P8)

^{lxxxııııııı}Kiliselere fikir üretip, devlete yön veriyor. Biz ise dilimizi dinimizi korumaya çalışıyoruz... Bizim bu konularda Alman kurumlarından medet ummamız durumu ortadan kalkmalı, muhatab alınacak kurumlarımız olması lazım, fikir üreten kurumlarımız olması lazım. Mesela vakıflar var, onlar yönlendiriyor, biz bu konuda çok zayıfız. (P8)

^{lxxxvii}Vatandaşlık buradaki Türklerin olmazsa olmaz şartı. (P8)

^{lxxxviii}Entegrasyon benim için asimilasyondur, çoğulculuk çok sıkıntılı görüldü, dil kursları, zoraki evlilikleri için önlemek için konuldu aslında ama bu politikaları onaylamamız mümkün değil. (P1)

^{lxxxix}Bir idare şeklidir, çok büyük şeyler beklenmemesi gerektiğini düşünmekle birlikte en güzel tarafı hesap verme zorunluluğudur. Avrupa'da iyi işliyor demek de sıkıntılı, katılımı ve siyasi bilinçte cehalet var. (P1)

^{xc}Lokal olarak ya da eyalet veya federal düzeyde, mahalli olarak ele alınınca orda bir yol geçecektir ya da camii yapılacaktır, şehrin dışına değil de şehir içine yapılması için etkili olmanız için meclise girip insanları ikna etmeniz lazım, o zaman insanlar size hak verecektir. (P6)

^{xcii}Kiliseler şehir planlamasında yerler ayrılıyor, camiiler için de bunun yapılması için mücadele etmeniz gerekiyor. (P6)

^{xciii} Seçme ve seçilme hakkı göçmenler için çok önemli, basın bildirisi yaparız, ve Müslümanlara seçimlere katılmalarını ve beklentilerini açıkça söylemelerini teşvik ederiz, Müslüman olarak talepler nedir, din dersleri, İslam dininin kabul edilmesi, camiilerin ibadet yeri olarak tanınması bu talepleri söylemeleri gerektiğini söylüyoruz... Yerel seçimlere katılımı istiyoruz, siyasi taleplerimizden birisi bu, uyum meclisi değil, direk yerel seçimlerde oy hakkı gerekiyor. Çifte vatandaşlığı savunuyoruz. (P6)

^{xciv}Herkesin aynı hakka sahip olması ve azınlıklara hakların verilmesi olarak düşünülmesi gerekir... Daha çok güçsüz olan insanlara azınlıklara daha çok duyarlı olunması lazım... Almanya'da İslam ve demokrasi bağdaşır mı diye bir soru soruluyor, ama diğer dinlerle demokrasi bağdaşır mı diye kimse sormuyor ama eğer demokrasi farklı dinlerin bir arada yaşaması ise neden Müslümanlık ve demokrasi bağdaşır mı sorusu tartışma konusu oluyor? (P6)

^{xcv}Eşit haklara sahip olduğunda ancak gerçekleşebilir bu demokrasi ideali. Ama bu olmuyor ne yazık ki, hakkınızı arama mecburiyetinden kaldığınız zaman demokrasi açısından bir sorun var demektir. (P6)

^{xcvi}Örneğin din dersleri, Kürtler diyor, Kürtçe olsun falanca der Türkçe olsun, falanca der başka bir dil, ama biz Almanyada yaşıyoruz ve Almanca olması gerekiyor bu derslerin. (P27)

^{xcvii}Bence yasaları uygulayan kişiler ne kadar duyarlı olursa, halkın içinden olursa o zaman gerçekten demokrasi olabilir. Ama oradaki kişiler halka inmemişse demokrasiyi uygulama tarzı çok farklı oluyor. Çünkü yasal olarak bakıyor, kültür ve insani yönü göz ardı ediliyor. (P27)

^{xcviii}Siyasi katılımı partiye üye olmak olarak tanımlarım ilk etapta, sivil toplum örgütlerine üye olmak ve düşünce aktarmak, fikir ve proje üreten derneklere üye olup siyasi düşünceleri dile getirmek ama bana göre siyasi partilere üye olmak. (P9)

^{xcix}İlk olarak göçmen sorunlarını dile getiren derneklerin ve kültürlerarası derneklerin kurulması ve lobi çalışmasıyla isteklerin Almanca ve yazılı olarak yetkililere iletilmesi gerekir. İkinci aşamada ise siyasi partilere üye olunup bu taleplerin karar alma mekanizmalarında görüşülmesini sağlamak gerekir (P9).

^{cx}Uyum meclisinde (city council) daha çok dinci dernekler var bir de Alevilerin çoğu Alman vatandaşı, o yüzden o seçimlere (city council için yapılan seçim) katılmıyorlar. Cami derneklerinin yüzde 70'li TC

vatandaşı ise bizde yüzde 60 TC vatandaşı var, yani 12 bin Sunni varsa 6 bin Alevi var toplam 18 bin kişiden. Bu yüzden onlar uyum meclisinde çoğunluk sağlıyorlar. (P9)

^cGençlerin daha fazla siyasi partilere üye olması gerekli. Sadece sol partilere değil, CDU ya da bir başka parti de olabilir. Sağa kaymış conservative bir parti olsa bile orada çalışmak sakıncalı bir durum değildir. (P11)

^{ci}50 sene sonra hala entegrasyon konusuluyorsa bu bir başarısızlık göstergesi. Sadece Almanlar ve hükümeti değil, Türkiye ve biz de bu işte sorumluyuz, demek ki basaramadık. Ben entegrasyon kelimesini kullanmamaktan yanayım, entegrasyon domuz eti yemek, bira icmek değil... Bir Almanın da bir yabancıya açık olması gerek, baş örtülü ve Müslüman diye ya da dış görünüşü farklı diye bir önyargı olmaması gerekiyor. Biz hala misafiriz, bazıları hala öyle görüyor, ama ev sahibinin o güveni bize verdiğine inanmıyorum. Genel anlamda her iki taraf da sınıfta kaldı. Misafir olarak bizim de çaba göstermemiz gerekli ama ev sahibi o rahatlığı vermiyor (P11).

^{cii}Demokrasinin en iyi göstergesi seçimlerdir bana göre. Eğer bir ülkede seçimlerde oy verme oranı azalıyor o devlet gittikçe demokratik olma özelliğini yitiriyordur... Bununla birlikte, demokrasi herkesin istediği şekilde kurallar içinde birlikte yaşayabileceği bir ortamı yaratan, insanların siyasi sistemi seçebilmesini sağlayan, insanları görüşlerini dikkate alan, yukarıdan aşağı olmayan ve ırkçılığa ve dışlanma karşı olunan bir sistemdir (P9).

^{ciii}Vatandaş olmak, sistemi etkilemektir demokrasi. Oy kullanmadığında söz sahibi ve etkili olabilmek mümkün değil. Sivil kurumlarda çalışıp eylem yapabilirsin ama oy hakkın olduğu zaman etki gücün artar çünkü o zaman sadece yerel düzeyde değil, eyelet düzeyinde bir etkin olabilir. (P10)

^{civ}Vatandaş olmanın en büyük fayda seçme ve seçilme hakkına sahip olmak. Ayrıca seyahat sorununuz da ortadan kalkıyor. 16 milyon göçmen var 7-8 milyonunun pasaportu yok, bu yüzden de siyasi partilere ilgi duymuyor... Göçmenler Almanya'nın yüzde 20'si ve bu yüzde 20'nin yarısı oy kullanamıyor. 2000 yılında sonra uygulamaya koyulan yeni düzenleme ile burada doğan çocuklara çifte vatandaşlık hakkı tanındı. (P9)

^{cv}Seçme seçilme hakkın varsa siyaseti değiştirme gücüne sahip olabiliyorsun. Yaşadığın yere göre bu oran değişebilir, ancak bu pay yüzde 2 ya da yüzde 5 bile olsa siyaseti etkiliyor. (P11)

^{cvi}...devletin entegrasyon tanımı başka, bizimkisi başka, devlet diyor ki kurallara uysunlar, almanlara uysunlar, biz entegrasyondan şunu anlıyoruz bir arada yaşama, birlikte yaşama, içiçe yaşamının olanaklarını yaratmak, ırkçılığı ortadan kaldırmak, gettoları ortadan kaldırmak, okulda, fabrikada, mahallede önyargıların kaldırılması gerekiyor ve bu ancak iki halkın birbirini çok iyi anlaması ile mümkün olabilir. (P14)

^{cvi}...Alman devletinin politikalarına genellikle eleştirel baktık, biz göçmenler hep üzerilerinden politika yapılan unsurlar olduk. Muhafazakâr partiler bizim kötülüklerimizi çıkardılar, bir takım sosyal hak gaspları yapılırken, göçmenler öne sürüldü. Hükümetlere yönelik tavırlarımız hep eleştirel oldu ama olumlu bulduklarımızı da açıklayıp katkı sunduk, yerel yönetimlerle daha sürekli ilişkilerimiz var şu an, hükümete karşı hep mesafe vardı hala da var. (P16)

^{cvi}Uyum meclisi ilk daha önce kurulduğu dönemlerde seçimlerine katıldık, taleplerimizi gündeme getirdik, yabancıların ciddiye alınması ve karar haklarının olması gerektiğini savunduk sürekli ama süreç içerisinde ne yabancıların karar hakkı oldu ne de talepleri direkt olarak göz önünde bulunduruldu, sadece

oyalamak için yapılmış bir şey, seçme seçilme hakkı yok, yabancı meclisinde, uyum meclisinde politika yapın dendi, ancak karar verme yetkisi olmayan bir mecliste bulunmak istemediğimiz için de son dört dönemdir seçimlerine katılmıyoruz. (P15)

^{cix} Belki yeni kurumlar açılıyor uyum politikaları gündeme alındı ancak baktığımız zaman ön yargılar sürekli yaratılıyor, nazi cinayetleri için mafya hesaplaşması deniliyor, uyuma olumlu örnekler gösterilirken de komedyen, sinemacı evet olabiliyor ama gündelik yaşamın içinde göçmen nerede gibi bir tartışma yürütülmüyor. (P19)

^{cx} Almanya'da son onbeş yılda, 160 - 170 yabancı öldürüldü ırkçı saldırılarda. Böyle bir ülkede yaşıyoruz. Olayların açıklığa kavuşturulmadığı bir politika var. Bunların açıklığa kavuşturulma sorumluluğunu taşımayan bir İçişleri Bakanlığı var. Bu politikadan nasıl uyum konusunda ciddi bir çalışma beklenebilir ki? İçişleri Bakanlığınca Müslümanlar kategorik olarak terör potansiyeline sahip bireyler olarak görülüyor. Böyle bir zihniyetin egemen olduğu politik alanda bu tip zirvelerden, İslam konferansında nasıl ciddi bir sonuç beklenebilir? (P26)

^{cxii} ... bizim tavrımız çok net, vergisini ödeyen, çalışan sıradan bir vatandaş olmanın getirdiği her sorumluluğu yerine getiren herkesin burada vatandaş olarak tanınması gerekiyor. (P16)

^{cxiii} Biz yabancıların vatandaş olmasından yanayız, çünkü burda yaşam merkezini kurmuş insanlar burdaki olaylara ve sorunlara daha duyarlı olacaktır vatandaş olursa. Kaynaşacaktır. (P15)

^{cxiiii} ...bizim talebimiz, vatandaş olalım ya da olmayalım, bu ülkede çalıştığımız sürece bizim bir farkımız olmamalı ve bunun ortadan kaldırılmasıdır. Çocuklarımız bizim burada büyüyorsa biz buranın vatandaşıyız. (P18)

^{cxv} Elde edilen hakları biz vatandaşlığa geçmeden önce de elde etmesini talep ediyoruz, örneğin, seçme seçilme hakkı. Çünkü hukuki anlamda sadece biraz buranın bir parçası yapıyor, ancak toplumsal anlamda yapmıyor, bu hukuki bir statü veriyor. İş başvurusu sırasında senin ismine bakıyor ve sana göçmen kökenli olarak bakıyor. (P17)

^{cxvi} Biz göçmen olarak bakmıyoruz, bizim yapmak istediğimiz göçmen kesimin politik hayata girmesiyle olabilir. Bir Alman derneği, Alman partisi, Türkiyeli bir dernek, ama bu ülkede yaşayan tüm insanların ortak sıkıntıları dert edinmiş derneklerde partilerde olmalı. Çünkü Almanların da sıkıntısı var, sadece göçmenlerin değil. Yoksulluk insan için aynıdır. (P14)

^{cxvii} ...birlikte mücadele etmek için, hedefe ulaşmak için sadece Türkiyeli ya da göçmenler değil, bu sorunları yaşayan herkesle birlikte olmalıyız. (P17)

^{cxviii} Siyasete katılım deyince değişik boyutlar var, partilerde yer almak bunun bir parçası, ikincisi benim için parlamento dışı muhalefetin içinde yer almak. Çünkü orda bir çok sivil toplum örgütü var bizim gibi. İlla ki göçmenlerin sorunları ile değil genel olarak toplumun sorunları ile ilgilenen, bana göre yerli ve göçmenlerin bir arada yer aldığı sivil örgütlerde yer almak... bu toplumun bir parçası olmak, toplumu değiştirmek için nerde mücadele varsa onun yanında yer almak, parlamento da olabilir, sivil toplum da ama aktif olmak ve sorununa sahip çıkmak önemli olan. (P16)

^{cxix} Yaşamın şekillenmesinde pay almanız şekillendirmenizdir, göçmenlerin sorunlarını taşımaktan ziyade buradaki hayatın bir parçası olabilmektir... (P16)

^{cxix}Yaşadığın semtte, çocuğunun okulunda, çalıştığın iş yerinde ne varsa oradaki katılım olarak algılıyorum, sadece gidip oy kullanmak ya da herhangi bir siyasi partide faaliyet yürütmek değildir. (P19)

^{cxx}Çok farklı alanlarda olabilir. Siyaseti sadece parti siyaseti içerisine sınırlandırmayı doğru bulmuyorum. Aynı zamanda sokağa çıkıp semtinizde bir değişiklik yapmak istediğinizde yaptığınız ufak bir girişim başlattığınızda ya da müdahil olduğunuzda dahi siyasete katılmış oluyorsunuz.

^{cxxi}Hayatın kendisi aslında bir siyaset, yaş ne olursa olsun, güncel haberleri takip etse de etmese de etkileniyor insanlar, aslında tarafsız olmak bile siyasetin bir parçası ama öyle olursa her şey dışınızda gelişir ve başkaları sizin adınıza karar verir. Ben bunu kendi adıma kabul edemem benim söyleyişim ya da bağırımmam bir şey değiştirmese de bu tepkiyi ortaya koymak, göstermek istiyorum, çünkü beni etkileyecek kararlarda söz sahibi olmak istiyorum ve herkesin de olması gerekiyor. Hangi kesimden olursa olsun bu olmalı, herkesin söyleyecek bir sözü olmalı. (P20)

^{cxixii}Göçmenlerin siyasete katılımında en yakın yol bence sivil örgütlenmelerdir. Sivil inisiyatiflerin ve itaatsizlik hareketlerinin çok daha önemli olduğunu düşünüyorum, siyasi partilere çok sıcak bakmıyorum çünkü içindeki bürokrasisi, ayak oyunları sebebiyle seçim uğruna politik ilkelerin çok rahat çığnendiğini düşünüyorum. Burada iktidar uğruna arkadaşının ayağını kaydırmak da olabiliyor, ama sivil toplum çok daha temiz bir araçtır. Çok daha etkindir, ne olursa olsun rahatsızlığını duyduğunuz şeyi ifade edebilmenin en yalın yolu ve en doğrudan söz söyleyebileceğiniz yerler, sivil örgütlenmelerdir. (P20)

^{cxixiii}İnsanların düşüncelerini açıkça ifade edebilmesi ve önündeki engellerin kaldırılması. Bir insan baskı altındaysa kendi düşüncelerini söyleyemiyorsa bu bir baskı aracıdır ve orda demokrasi olamaz, ama herkes kendi istediğini elde etmek için şiddet zorbalık yoluna başvurmamalı. (P15)

^{cxixiv}İnsanın eşit ve onurlu yaşamasıdır insan onuruna yakışır şekilde yaşaması cinsel ya da başka şekillerde ayırım görmeden savaşız yaşamasıdır kökenden cinsiyetten ve ulustan bağımsız yaşadığımız ülkede sömürülmeden yaşamaktır bunun mücadelesidir... (P18)

^{cxixv}Her türlü düşüncenin ifade edilebildiği ve örgütlenebildiği bir siyasal alandır. Tabii sınıfsal anlamda da farklıdır bu. Burjuvazinin demokrasi anlayışı farklı, devrimci demokrasi farklıdır. Buraya gelince burjuva demokrasisi nasıl işliyor bunu daha iyi anladık. Türkiyede teorik anlamda bir burjuva demokrasisi tartışılıyordu, çünkü çok kısmi olarak bu Türkiye’de yaşanmıştır diyebiliriz. Burda ise daha net gördük tanıdık ve yaşadık. Burada da bir sınır var. Rejimin çıkarları ile sınırlı bir demokrasi. Burda da istediği zaman devlet bir sınırlama getiriyor. Değişik örgütlenmelere izin verilmeyebiliyor. İlimli sosyalist hareketlere sadece izin verildi çok uzun süre komünist örgütlere izin verilmedi. Hala sol parti milletvekilleri anayasayı koruma örgütü tarafından takip ediliyor. Milletvekili olmalarına rağmen anayasayı koruma örgütleri bunları izliyor takip ediyor. (P26)

^{cxixvi}Demokrasi ile ilgili Alman demokratik gruplarıyla tanıştıktan sonra fikrimde bir değişiklik oldu, sivil grupların daha çok demokratik olması gerektiğini düşünmeye başladım hangi kurum olursa olsun katılımcı ve demokratik olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Ve insanların birey olmaktan kaynakları hakları olmalı, TÜDAY istiyor ve sen istemiyorsan onay vermeme hakkı olmalı, birey olarak onaylamadığım bir işin içinde olmak zorunda olmamalıyım... Benim için demokrasi özgür bireyin kendini ifade etme ve eleştirel biçimde kendini ortaya koymasına dair önündeki engellerin ortadan kalktığı bir sistemdir. (P20)

^{cxixvii}Siyasi katılıma süreci takip etmek, ne olup ne bittiğinden haberdar olmaya çalışmak ve düşünce üretmekle başlanabilir. (P22)

^{cxxxiii}Gazete okumakla başlar bence siyasi katılım. En azından objektif yazan bir gazeteyi okuyarak etrafında neler olduğunu öğrenebilirsin. Onun dışında inandığın bir parti varsa, ideoloji varsa, onun yolunda giden bir örgütün ya da kuruluşun etkinliklerine katılmak, yürüyüşlerine gitmek, seçim olduğunda adam akıllı bir parti seçmek, eğer böyle bir parti yoksa da bunu yaratmaktır. (P23)

^{cxxxix}Dernek düzeyinde de olsa, bireyin kendisinin etkinkliği önemli. Biz ne kadar ve ne şekilde katılırsak o kadar değiştirme gücümüz de olur. Sadece göçmen politikası değil, Almanya'daki diğer sorunlarla da ilgilenmeliyiz. Siyasi parti ve seçme seçilme hakkı önemli ama daha da önemlisi bireyin bilinçli olmasıdır. (P24)

^{cxxx}Demokrasinin gerçek anlamda olabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Belli sınırları var ve bu sınırlar içerisinde ne kadar yaşayabilisen ve uygulayabilirsen odur. Almanya'da belli kurallar var. Bu kurallar çerçevesinde demokrasiyi yaşamak mümkün. Bu kurallar içinde insan haklarını zedeleyen kanunlar da olabilir. Ama yine de biz bu kuralları özümsemek durumundayız. Şiddet yerine diyalog yoluyla sorunları çözmemiz gerekiyor....(P24)

^{cxxxix}Kürtler için dernek, demokrasinin temsilidir... Deseniz ki, siyasi parti mi dernek mi ağır basar diye, o zaman derim ki, Kürt kimliğim ağır basar ve Alman kimliğim ikinci kimliktir. Siyasi bir partide olmaktansa burada olmayı tercih ederim. (P24)

^{cxxxii}Benim için demokrasi her insanın din özgürlüğü, inanç özgürlüğü, siyasi özgürlüğünün olmasıdır. Din, ırk, zengin fakir ayrımı olmadan yaşanabilmesi demektir. Almanya gibi bir yerde göçmen gençlerin Alman gençleriyle bir arada yaşayabilmesidir (P23).

^{cxxxiii}Almanya'nın uyum politikasını destekliyorum. Bir yurttaş burada yaşamaya başladıysa buraya uyum sağlamak durumunda. Uyum sağlamıyorsa gidebilir. Bunun ırkçılıkla bir ilgisi yok... Örneğin Almanca öğrenilmesi gerekiyor. Yasalara göre eşini getiriyorsan sosyal yardım almıyor olman gerekiyor. Aile birleşimi ile göçü engelleme çalışmak da anlaşılabilir bir şey. Bizim insanımız bunlara rağmen bir yolunu bulup aile birleşimi yapıyor.(P24)

^{cxxxiv}Bana göre entegrasyon göçmenlerin dilini, kültürünü koruyarak göçmenlerin sosyalleşmesi ve toplumla bir bağ ve denge kurabilmesidir. Bu olmadığı zaman, ya asilime olursun ya da isole olup içe kapanırsın. Örneğin: Kadınların birlikte yüzmeye gitmesi. Gelmedikleri zaman entegrasyondan uzak duruyormuş, havuza girmediği zaman entegrasyona müsait olmuyormuş kadınlar. Hayatında eşarptan başka bir şey giymemiş koyu Sunni bir kadına nasıl mayo giydireceksin? O senin gibi olmak zorunda değil. Sen utanma sınırının ne olduğunu bilmiyorsun ama böyle bir öneri getiriyorsun. (P22)

^{cxxxv}Vatandaş olmak daha iyi, güvence altında olmak ve güvende hissetmek demek (P23).

^{cxxxvi}Vatandaşlık tabii ki önemli, dil bilmek de önemli ama bunlar yeterli değil, uyum sağlamak için, buradaki siyasi kültürün içselleştirilmesi ve algılanması gerekiyor, sistemin nasıl işlediğini insanların içine sindirmesi gerekiyor ancak bu şekilde etkili olunabilir. (P24)

^{cxxxvii}Biz vatandaş olunmasa da seçme seçilme hakkından yanayız, buna dönük ortak çalışmalarımız da oldu ama yerelde ne kadar güçlenirsek, federal düzeyde de o kadar ses getireceğimize inanıyorum. (P24)



APPENDICES

A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Demographic information and the description of the organization

- ✓ Your age, education, occupation, (last school you graduated), birthplace, monthly salary?
- ✓ How long have you been actively working for this organization? What are your responsibilities?
- ✓ Do you have German citizenship? If yes, since when?
- ✓ Could you briefly talk about the organization? How does the organization work? What is the scope of its action and what is its status? What are the sources of its funds?
- ✓ What is the mission of this organization to you? Why there was a need for such an organization to be established?
- ✓ Is there any federation or umbrella organization that your organization has membership of it? Do you have branches? How is your relationship with your branches and your umbrella organization? How often and for what reasons do you meet and work?
- ✓ Members' profile, decision making processes, participation of members
- ✓ How many active and volunteer members does the organization have? How would you describe your member profile according to age, occupation and education?
- ✓ Do you know the number of members who also has membership or affiliation with political parties/other organizations in Germany or in Turkey?
- ✓ What are the eligibility conditions for memberships? Can anybody become a member at this organization?
- ✓ How does decision making mechanism work in the organization? Who does get to decide and how?

- ✓ Are there different mechanisms working for different kinds of decisions?
- ✓ How and by whom the projects, actions, activities and campaigns are decided?
- ✓ To what extent members are effective in administration and decision-making processes? In this respect, do you feel if there are any deficiencies in the decision-making mechanism? If so, how could you describe those deficiencies and what could be done to address them?
- ✓ Do you see any problems in active participation of those members? If yes, what are the reasons? What could be done to address this problem?

Fields of participation; influence and relationships at local, national, transnational levels

1. What projects and campaigns do you have? What conferences, meetings, seminars, demonstrations and training programs have you organized or attended?
2. As a Turkish migrant organization, do you think you were effective in German politics, Turkey's politics and/or at transnational level? If yes, how? On which areas do you see this organization's influence?
3. Are there any lobbying efforts on part of the organization?
4. Does your organization have partnerships with other organizations in Germany, in Turkey or in any other place? If yes, what kind of projects/activities do you work on together?
5. Does your organization have partnerships with trade unions, foundations, political parties, local governments? If yes, what kind of projects/activities do you work on together?
6. Does your organization have partnerships with integration/immigrant assembly, integration office? (Integrations rat, Amt für Integration und interkulturelle Angelegenheiten) If yes, what kind of projects/activities do you work on together?
7. Which organizations/parties/agencies/groups do you work more often?
8. Do you think, has the organization been influential in shaping the governmental agenda of the municipality, the region, the federal state, or Germany? If so, to what

extent or in what respects? If not, what are the most important obstacles or challenges that you encounter?

9. Do you think, has it been influential in becoming responsive toward your major concerns? If so, to what extent or in what respects they become responsive? If not, what are the most important obstacles or challenges that you encounter?

10. What do you think about integration and integration offices/programs and citizenship tests? Have you attended any of those courses or tests? If so, what were your impressions? If not so, why?

11. What do you think about having German citizenship? Is it encouraged in this organization? If yes, why? If no, why?

12. Do you think you/your organization has been participated in the decision making processes related to your concerns and interests? If yes, in what levels and how? If no, why? (Local, national and transnational levels)

13. Comparing to the past, how the organizations' relationships with local state agencies; such as integration/immigrant assembly, integration office have changed?

14. Do you have a website? How often your organization use internet while organizing your activities?

15. Do you think that widespread of internet communication technologies provide advantages for participating into politics on the part of immigrants? If so, can you give any examples about it?

Members' perception of political participation and democracy

16. How would you describe democracy and democratic struggle by your own? How has your perception(s) of those changed in the course of time?

17. How would you describe political participation? How would you describe political participation? How has your perception(s) of those changed in the course of time?

18. How the political participation of migrants is possible to you?

19. What it means to have the right to be elected and elect to you? What it means to be represented?

20. Is there any other effective way to be effective in politics without having German citizenship?
21. What are the most effective ways for migrants in participating in politics to you?
22. What it means to participate in politics as an organization to you?
23. If you have German citizenship, what has changed in your life after having it? If you do not have it, why?
24. What are the most crucial problems in becoming influential, and achieving objectives for this organization? What could be done to address those problems?

Roles and functions of the organization upon member's lives

25. What it means to you to be affiliated with this organization?
26. Have being a member of this organization made any changes in your life? When you compare your life prior to and after being a member at this organization what differences do you see?
27. What kind of an experience to be in this organization to you?
28. Is there anything that you would like to add?

Interview Questions for City Council Members

1. Your age, education, occupation, (last school you graduated), birthplace, monthly salary?
2. How long have been in Germany? How long have you been in this assembly?
3. Do you have German citizenship? If yes, since when? If no, why?
4. Who have been established this assembly/council? Who are the founders? Are founders still active?
5. What are the missions and objectives of this assembly to you?
6. How does the assembly work? How have been the decisions taken?

7. Could you briefly talk about how has been the assembly/council transformed by the year 2004? What kind of differences do you see when you compared to past?
8. As a member of this assembly do you think that this assembly is effective in politics in local, regional, federal, national or international levels?
9. Do you think that this assembly is influential in shaping the agenda of governments at local, regional, federal, national or international levels? If so, what kind of examples can you give? If not so, what are the most important obstacles or challenges you encounter?
10. Do you think that this assembly is influential in becoming responsive toward your major concerns? If so, what kind of examples can you give? If not so, what are the most important obstacles or challenges you encounter?
11. What important having German citizenship to be effective in German politics?
12. Do you think, is there any other effective way to be effective in politics without having German citizenship?
13. Do you think that this assembly has been participated in the decision making processes related to the concerns and interests of immigrants? If so, what kind of examples could you give? If not so, why?
14. Do this assembly have any relationships with other integration assemblies in other cities, or civil associations, and political parties in Germany and outside Germany?
15. Do this assembly have any common projects, works, and actions, campaigns together with other associations or political parties? If so, what kind of examples can you give?
16. Do you know that there are members of assembly who has membership or affiliation with political parties or other organizations in Germany or in another country?
17. How would you assess the interest toward the elections? If you find the rate of participation low, what could be the major reasons behind that?

18. What do you think about integration politics, citizenship tests and new amendments in law about all these?
19. What it means to you to be affiliated with this assembly?
20. Have being a member of this assembly made any changes in your life? When you compared to your prior life what differences do you see?
21. How would you describe democracy and democratic struggle by your own? How has your perception(s) of those changed in the course of time?
22. How would you describe political participation? How has your perception(s) of that changed in the course of time?
23. Do this assembly have any regular publication, reports?
24. What are the most crucial problems in becoming influential and achieving objectives for this assembly? What could be done to address those problems?
25. Is there any anything that you would like to add?

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Çoban Balcı, Aslıhan
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PhD Bielefeld University, Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS),
Germany, Guest Researcher, 2012-2013
MS METU, Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara 2006
BS METU, Sosyoloji 2003
High School Bahçelievler Cumhuriyet Lisesi, Ankara 1998

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year, Place, Enrollment

2006 to 2015, METU, Research Assistant
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FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English
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CONFERENCES

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AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

Faculty Development Programme (ÖYP) Scholarship for Research Abroad, Bielefeld Universität, Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS), Germany, Visiting Researcher, 2012-2013

FIELDS OF STUDY

Political Participation, Democracy, Immigration, Human Rights, Women' Rights

C. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Demokrasi teorilerinin çoğunun siyasal katılım kavramını demokrasiyle ilişkilendirmesi, siyasal katılım ve demokrasi ile yakın ilişkili kavramlardır (Dahl 1959, Pateman 1970, Young 2000, Norris 2002). Bu teorilerde sırasıyla Kant, Rousseau ve Mills'in düşüncelerinden esinlendiği gibi, siyasal katılımın etkili ve nitelikli bir demokrasi için bir son derece önemli bir etken olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bununla birlikte, yakın zamandaki çalışmalara (Zittel, T. Fuchs, D. ed.2007) göre, üst düzey siyasal katılımın kelimenin tam anlamıyla nitelikli bir demokrasiye yol açtığını varsaymak doğru değildir, çünkü ampirik çalışmalar göstermektedir ki, siyasal katılım için fırsatlar arttığında katılım seviyesi daha düşük gerçekleşmektedir.

Benzer araştırmalarda seçim ve seçim dışı olmak üzere iki farklı siyasal katılım yöntemi de analiz edilir. Her ne kadar modası geçmiş gibi görünmesine rağmen, siyasal seçimlerin halen ulusal siyasal sistemler üzerinde önemli etkileri olduğu kabul edilmelidir. Bununla birlikte, 60'lı yıllardan itibaren başlayan toplumsal hareketlerle, geçici gösteriler veya sokak protestoları gibi alternatif siyasal katılım yolları daha görünür hale gelmiştir. Daha sonra, soğuk savaş döneminden itibaren Doğu'dan Batı'ya göç dalgası, seçim dışı siyasal katılımın yaygınlığına katkıda bulunmuştur. Özellikle, göçmenlerin batılı ülkelerde varlığı nedeniyle ortaya çıkan bu siyasal hareketler, ulusların varlıklarının yeniden tanımlanması ve ulusal demokrasilerin yeniden teyit edilmesini gerektirmiştir.

Göçmenlerin Batılı ülkelere akışı bugün de devam etmektedir. Nitekim, son yıllar belki de Suriye Savaşı'nın etkisiyle Avrupa'daki en büyük göç krizine tanık olmaktadır. Avrupa Komisyonu istatistiklerine göre, Almanya'nın 2014 yılına kadar almış olduğu göçmen sayısı yaklaşık 884.900 idi ve bu sayı diğer Avrupa ülkeleri arasında en yüksek orana sahiptir. Benzer şekilde, yalnızca 2015 yılında, Avrupa genelinde 1.321.560 sığınma talebi olmuştur. Aynı yıl en çok sığınma başvurusu yapılan ülke Almanya olmuştur.

Açıkçası, Batı ülkelerinde bu yaygın göçmen varlığı, ev sahibi ülkelerdeki siyasi katılım meselelerini artırmaktadır. Göçmenlerin siyasi katılımının Batı ulus devletlerinin demokratikleşmesine katkıda bulunabileceğini iddia etmek mümkündür. Farklı etnik, dini ve dışlanmış gruplar, haklarını ulus devletlerin gündemine getirecek potansiyele sahip oldukları için birer gelişim ajanları olarak görülebilirler. Etnik azınlıkların ve dışlanmış grupların hakları konusunda halkın bilincini artırarak dolaylı olarak kendi bölgelerinin demokrasisine katkıda bulunabilirler. Öte yandan, göçmenlerin varlığı, ulusal demokrasilerin sınırlarına meydan okuyor ve böylece ulus devletlerin egemenliklerine göç ve vatandaşlık politikaları vasıtasıyla yeniden şekil vermelerine neden olmaktadır (Benhabib 2004).

Bu bağlamda, göçmenler için göçmen dernekleri vazgeçilmez unsurlardır. Göçmenlerin uyum ve kimlik oluşumunda önemli aktörlerdir. Göçmenlerin ev sahibi ülkeler ile ana vatanları arasında bağlantı oluşturabilirler. Ayrıca, göçmen topluluklardaki çeşitliliğin anlaşılmasına yardımcı olurlar (Akçapar 2009).

Göçmen dernekleri, çeşitli şekillerde gönüllü derneklerden farklıdır. Birincisi, göçmenlerin yeni bir topluma adaptasyonu açısından devletin alternatif ajanları olabilirler. İkincisi, belirli bir etnik topluluğun birleşik bir sesi olabilirler, böylece toplu bir kimliği ifade edebilirler. Üçüncüsü, farklı ülkelerdeki etnik toplulukların irtibat noktaları olarak hizmet edebilirler (Odmalm 2009).

Bu çalışmanın odak noktası, Almanya'da kurulan Türkiye kökenli göçmen derneklerinin Alman uyum/göç politikalarının etkileri ile Almanya'daki siyasi katılım modelleri arasındaki ilişkiyi araştırmaktır. Bu amaçla araştırma soruları şöyledir: Almanya'ya entegrasyon/göç politikalarının, Türkiye kökenli göçmen derneklerinin Almanya'daki siyasi katılım modelleri üzerindeki etkileri nelerdir? Benzer bir şekilde, göçmen dernekleri Almanya'daki göç politikalarına nasıl tepki verirler? Bu iki geniş soruyu desteklemek için bir takım alt sorular da tespit edilmiştir: 1. Türkiye kökenli göçmen derneklerinin Almanya'daki farklı siyasi katılım şekilleri nelerdir? 2. iddialarını ve

hedeflerini gerçekleştirmenin yolları ne kadar farklıdır? 3. Farklı dernekler, devlet yetkilileri ile nasıl etkileşim kuruyorlar? 4. Siyasi katılım biçimlerini ifade etmek için hangi kavramları ve katılım biçimlerini çoğunlukla kullanıyorlar? 5. Almanya'daki göçmenlere ve toplumsal uyuma bu farklı katılım biçimlerinin etkileri nelerdir?

Bu tezin ana kaygısı, Alman devletinin seçici kapsayıcı/ayrıcalıklı göç/uyum politikalarının, Türkiye kökenli göçmen dernekler tarafından kabul edilen siyasi katılım örüntülerine etkilerini incelemektir. Araştırmanın birincil argümanı, Türkiye kökenli göçmen gruplar arasında siyasi katılımın iki önemli örneği ya da kavramlaştırması olduğunu göstermektedir: İslami bir topluluk olarak katılım ve birey olarak katılım. Farklı göçmen gruplarının kendilerine özgü farklı siyasi katılım biçimleri vardır. Bu olağandışı yollar, ürettikleri veya temsil ettikleri sosyal sermayenin türüne dayanır. Buna göre, sosyal sermayeyi bağlama ve sosyal sermayeyi köprü kurma ile geliştiren başlıca iki göçmen grubu bulunmaktadır. Göçmen sivil siyasal alanda bu ikili farklılaşma, sadece göçmen topluluğun genel iyiliği üzerine değil, aynı zamanda ev sahibi ülkede yaşayan tüm toplumun sosyal uyumunu da olumsuz etkilemektedir.

Dokuz farklı Türkiye kökenli göçmen örgütün aktif veya yönetim kurulu üyeleriyle kırk dört derste yapılan röportajlara dayanarak, bu tezin başlıca bulgusu, Türkiye kökenli göçmenler tarafından kurulan derneklerin iki ayrı grubunun olmasıdır: dini örgütler ve laik örgütler. Bu örgütler, örgütsel yapıları, entegrasyon yolları, faaliyetleri, karar verme süreçleri ve demokrasi, siyasi katılım ve vatandaşlık kavramlarında farklılık göstermektedirler. Alevi ve Kürt dernekleri ise arada kalmış grup olarak tanımlanmıştır.

İslam üzerine artan dikkatin yanı sıra Avrupa'daki göç ve göçün İslamlaşması üzerine giderek artan literatüre karşılık, bugüne kadar ihmal edilen sosyal demokrat, insan hakları, kadın ve işçi göçmen dernekleri de (Seküler örgütler) bu çalışmanın ana odak noktalarından biri olmuştur. İki farklı dernek kampının iddialarını, faaliyetlerini, iç işleyişini ve siyasi katılım algılamalarını karşılaştırmak, Batılı demokrasilerin "çokkültürlü" siyasi alanlarındaki farklı yerlerini ortaya çıkarmakla kalmayıp aynı

zamanda sosyal sermaye üretimine dair farklı yolları da aydınlayacaktır. Göçmen dernekleri arasındaki farklılıkları bu şekilde ortaya çıkarmak, göçmen derneklerinin farklı şekillerde siyasal üyeler haline gelmelerindeki farklı kapasiteleri ve Alman devletinin iddialarına cevap verme sınırlarını görmek için bir fırsat sağlayacaktır.

Çalışmanın ampirik kısmı için, üç bölümden oluşan derinlemesine mülakatlar kullanılmıştır. Mülakatlar Almanya'da dokuz farklı Türkiye kökenli göçmen derneğinin aktif üyeleri veya yönetim kurulu üyeleri ile yapılmıştır. Mülakat soruları aşağıdaki önemli sorulardan çıkmıştır: 1. Göçmen derneğinin faaliyetleri ve katılım alanları nelerdir? 2. Kamusal alanda nasıl görünür olmaktadır? 3. Sorunlarını devlet yetkilileri veya diğer farklı sivil örgütlerle nasıl müzakere ederler? 4. Yerel, bölgesel veya federal bağlantıları nelerdir? 5. Siyasi alanda etkin olabilmek için hangi katılım yolları onlar için daha önemlidir? 6. Hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek için hangi yolları takip ederler? 7. Hükümetin göçmen politikaları hakkındaki görüşleri nelerdir? 8. Siyasal katılımı nasıl tanımlarlar? 9. İç işleyişleri ve karar alma süreçleri nasıldır? 10. Örgüt içi iş bölümü nasıl yapılmaktadır? 11. Demokrasi ve siyasi katılımı nasıl tanımlarlar?

Çalışmanın izleği şu şekildedir:

Girişten sonra, 2. bölümde metodolojik bakış açısı ve veri analiz yöntemleri açıklanacaktır. Bu bölümde ayrıca mülakatın yapısını, alan çalışması izlenimlerini, ve araştırmacının içeriden ve dışarıdan gördükleri konumlarını da içerecektir .

Bölüm 3'te, Almanya'nın göç politikası, güncel yasal düzenlemeler ve göçmenler üzerindeki yapısal kısıtlamalar hakkında tarihi bir bakış sunulacaktır. Bu bölümde, uyum meclisleri siyasi katılımın yerel kanalları olarak ayrı bir bölümde yer alacaktır.

Bölüm 4, göçmenlerin siyasi katılımına yönelik farklı yaklaşımları kapsayacak şekilde oluşturulmuş eleştirel bir literatür taramasını yapacağım teorik çerçeveyi ortaya koyuyor. Bu bölümün ilk kısmında, devlet politikalarının, vatandaşlık politikalarının ve siyasi fırsat düzeninin, siyasi katılım modellerini şekillendirmedeki rolünü belirten

kurumsal yaklaşımlar üzerinde duracağım. Bunu yaparak, kitle iletişim araçlarında olduğu kadar ulusaldan yerel veya bölgesel düzeylere kadar bazı yapısal fırsatlar sayesinde belirli grupların daha meşru ve görünür hale gelme yollarını göstermeyi amaçlamaktayım. Almanya'nın kurumsal tercihleri göz önüne alındığında, bu bölüm aynı zamanda Almanya'da İslam'ın görünürlüğüne analitik bir yanıt olacaktır. İkinci kısımda, göçmen grupların özellikleriyle ilgilenen yaklaşımlar incelenecektir. Farklı göçmen grupların karşılaştırmaları, kökenleri, özellikleri ve farklı ülkelerdeki katılımcı örnekleri üzerinde ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele alınacaktır. En önemlisi, sosyal sermaye türleriyle ilişkili analiz eleştirel olarak değerlendirilecektir. Aynı bölümde İslami politik katılım ve İslam meselesi de analizlerimin odak noktası olacak.

5. bölümde, her birinin ayrıntılı tanımından sonra göçmen dernekleri, araştırmanın önemli sorularına ve beklentilerine göre iki farklı grupta karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenecektir: dini ve laik göçmen dernekleri. Birinci grup İslami örgütleri kapsar: İslam Toplumu Milli Görüş (İGMG), Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (eV- DİTİB), İslam Kültür Merkezi (eV- VIKZ), Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği (ATİB), Avrupa Alevi Federasyonu (AABF), ikinci grupta işçiler, insan hakları ve kadın örgütleri analiz edilecek, bunlar: Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyon (DİDF), Göçmen Kadınlar Birliği, Türkiye Almanya İnsan Hakları Derneği (TÜDAY), Kürt Dernekleri Federasyonu (NAVDEM). İki grubun karşılaştırılması, bu iki ayrı siyasi alanın varlığının potansiyel sonuçları üzerinden yapılacak ve şu ana kadar ele alınmayan bir başka faktör ortaya atılacaktır: Heterojen sosyal gruplar ya da farklı göçmen ya da göçmen olmayan gruplar arasındaki ağı sembolize eden, *köprü kuran sosyal sermaye*.

Bölüm 6'da, teorik tartışmalar tekrar gözden geçirilecek ve araştırmanın ana bulguları ile birlikte nihai bir değerlendirme yapılacaktır.

Bu çalışma çoğunlukla niteliksel bir araştırmadır. Kalitatif metodoloji "insanlarla konuşmak, olgu ve süreçleri gözlemlemek, çoklu bilgi kaynaklarından öğrenmek ve sosyal durumlara katılmak" gerektirir (Iosifides, 2011: 231). Araştırma sırasında genel

sosyal çevreyi gözlemlemek, organizasyonların faaliyetlerine, toplantılarına ve gösterilerine katılmak, insanlarla rasgele konuşmak, gazeteleri ve TV yayınlarını izlemek, ilgili belgeleri, yayınları, raporları ve broşürleri örgütlerden toplamak, genel olarak çalışmayı yürütmeme katkı sağlayan unsurlar oldu. Görüşmelerimin çoğunu yaklaşık bir buçuk sene yaşadığım Bielefeld şehrinde yaptım. Bununla birlikte, görüşmelerimin bir kısmını yapmak için birkaç kez NRW'nin en büyük kenti olan Köln'e de seyahat ettim. Göçmen derneklerinin aktif ve yönetim kurulu üyeleri Köln'de on, geri kalanı Bielefeld'de olmak üzere toplam otuz altı derinlemesine görüşme gerçekleştirildi. Sınırlı sayıda katılımcı seçimi ve kullanımı, bana "detay, çok boyutlu olma ve bağlama vurgu olmaktan ziyade derinliğe odaklanma fırsatı verdi" (Iosifides, 2011: 175).

Metodolojik bir bakış açısı olarak, eleştirel realist perspektif, bu çalışma için diğer metodolojiler arasında öncelikli olarak benimsenmiştir. Genel olarak eleştirel sosyal araştırma "insanların koşulları değiştirmelerine ve kendileri için daha iyi bir dünya kurmalarına yardımcı olmak için maddi dünyadaki gerçek yapıları ortaya çıkarmak için yüzey yanılsamalarının ötesine geçer" (Neuman, 2000: 67). Toplumsal gerçeklik üç seviyesine sahiptir: "ampirik (duyusal deneyim), fiili (olaylarda eylem) ve gerçek (nedensel güç ayrı ancak ampirik ve fiili olarak her zaman belirgin değildir)" tezahürleri. Kritik realist metodolojiye göre "röportajlar gerçek eylem nedenlerini ortaya koymaz ve kısmi bir resim sunar ..." Öte yandan, fiili ve ampirik eylem tasvirlerini anlamak için bireysel tecrübeye ihtiyacımız vardır. (Smith ve Elger, 2012: 4). Bhaskar'ın (1989) belirttiği gibi, "toplum insan faaliyetinden bağımsız olarak mevcut değildir, ancak bunun ürünü de değildir" (Smith ve Elger, 2012: 5'de aktardığı gibi). Kritik araştırmalar aynı zamanda sosyal adaletle de ilgilidir. Açıkça ki, toplumsal bölünmeleri ve güç farklılıklarını anlama ve ortaya çıkarma gayreti, toplumsal adalet ihtimalini beraberinde getirir (Griffiths, 2009).

Genel olarak bakarsak, "eleştirel gerçekçilik, ampirik verilerin analizinin toplanması için analitik metodolojik prosedürler ya da belirli yöntemler ve teknikler değil, daha ziyade

esas olarak ontolojik ve epistemolojik sorularla ilgili bir sosyal bilim felsefesidir" (ibid: 127). "Açıklayıcı, kritik, özgürleştirici ve sosyo-politik açıdan alakalı" (ibid: 237) sosyal araştırma olarak tanımlanabilir.

Metodolojik bir araç olan mülakatlarda, dernekler için kırk yedi soru ve uyum meclisleri için yirmi altı soru sorulmaktadır. Görüşmelerin çoğunda soru setlerinin sırası şöyledir:1) Demografik bilgiler ve organizasyonun tanımı2) Üyelerin profili, karar alma süreçleri ve üyelerin katılımı3) Yerel, ulusal ve ulusötesi düzeyde katılım, etki ve ilişki alanları4) Üyelerin siyasi katılım ve demokrasi algısı5) Üyelerin hayatında örgüt rolleri ve görevleri.

Almanya'nın göç politikalarının tarihsel bir değerlendirmesine gelecek olursak, öncelikli olarak Vatandaşlık Yasası (2000) ve Oturma Yasalarından (2004) söz etmek yerinde olur. 2000 senesindeki yasaya göre, birinci nesil göçmenler Almanya'da yasal olarak çalışıyorlarsa Alman vatandaşlığı elde edebiliyorlardı. Ancak bu hakka sahip olmak için, bununla birlikte A düzeyinde Almanca bilgisi, Temel Alman Hukukuna (Anayasa) ait bilgiler, temiz bir kayıt, taahhüt ve kendilerinin yanı sıra ailelerini de desteklemek için yeterli bir gelir gerekiyordu. (Yurdakul, 2009: 42, Klusmeyer ve Papademetriou, 2009: 203-204). Ayrıca, 2000 yılından sonra Almanya'da doğan yabancı ebeveynlerin çocukları ebeveynlerinden biri Alman vatandaşıysa ya da, Almanya'da sekiz yıl yasal olarak çalışmış ve üç yıla kadar sınırsız oturma izni almışsa otomatik geçici çifte vatandaşlık alıyordu. Bununla birlikte, çocukların 18-23 yaşları arasında hangi vatandaşlığa katılmayı tercih ettikleri konusunda karar vermeleri gerekiyordu. Alman vatandaşlığını tercih eden çocukların vatandaşlarının vatandaşlıklarını bırakmaları gerekiyordu (Mueller, 2006: 421). Bu uygulama 2014 yılında sona ermiş ve bu durumda olan çocuklardan altı sene Almanya'da eğitim almış çocuklara çifte vatandaşlık hakkı verilmiştir. Göçü düzenleyen bir diğer yasa ise 2005 yılındaki Oturma Yasası'ydı. 2000 yılında Schily tarafından (Federal İçişleri Bakanı) başlatılan çalışmalar üzerine kurulmuştur. İlk taslak 2001 yılında önerildi ve amaç "Almanya'nın rekabet gücünü korumak, iş yaratmak ...

aynı zamanda göçü sınırlandırmak, kaçak göçü önlemek için modern bir göç hareketine sahip olmalı" (Klusmeyer ve Papademetriou, 2009: 251). Yine de, muhafazakârların itirazları nedeniyle 1 Ocak 2003'te yürürlüğe giren kanun taslağının sadece revize edilmiş bir şekli ele alındı. Yine de, vurgu Almanya'nın ekonomik ve işgücü piyasasının ihtiyaçlarına ve ülkeye göçün sınırlandırılması ve kontrolüne yönlendirildiğinde, yasa Federal Konsey'de (Alman Parlamentosu) kabul gördü.

Göçü düzenleyen diğer uygulamalara örnek olarak Ulusal Uyum Zirveleri ve Alman İslam Konferanslarıdır. İlk kez 2006, ikinci kez 2007 yılında düzenlendi ve "göçmenlerin kendilerinin, uyum politikasındaki oyuncular olarak masaya ilk kez oturmaları" olarak kabul gördü. Zirve federal düzeyde organize olmasına rağmen, yerel, federal ve eyalet dahil tüm düzeylerde hükümetler katıldı. Her ne kadar önemli bir zirve olmuş olsa da özellikle Türkiye'li ve Müslüman ülkelere uygulanan aile birleşimi ile ilgili ayrımcı uygulamalar sebebiyle ileriki yıllarda oldukça fazla eleştiriye maruz kalmıştır. Eleştirilere rağmen devam eden zirvelerin en sonuncusu olan dokuzuncusu 2016 senesinde yapılmıştır.

İlk kez 2006 senesinde başlayan Alman İslam Konferansının ilk turu ise 2009 senesine dek devam etmiştir. Konferans 2006 yılının Eylül ayında, Mayıs 2007'de, Mart 2008'de, Temmuz 2009'da olmak üzere toplam dört genel kurul toplantısı yapmıştır. Sonuncusu ile 2016 Eylül ayında gerçekleşmiştir. Birinci aşamada, federal eyaletlerden ve yerel yönetimlerden on beş temsilci ve Müslümanların on beş temsilcisi, Müslüman örgütleri ve özel bireyler de dahil edildi. Müslüman örgütler olarak IGMG, VIKZ, DİTİB, Müslümanların Merkezi Konseyi (ZMD) ve AABF temsilcileri davet edilmiş, ancak son konferansa AABF protesto ederek katılmamıştır. Alman İslam Konferansında tartışmaya açılan başlıca konular, Alman sosyal sistemi, değer fikir birliği, demokratik kültür, sekülerizasyon, aile, eğitim, Alman anayasaları anlayışı, kilise ve devlet ayrımı ve İslam dersleri idi. Buna göre üç çalışma grubu oluşturuldu. 1) Alman sosyal sistemi ve Alman değerleri 2) Alman anayasasında dinsel konuların anlaşılması 3) Köprü kurucular olarak

ekonomi ve medya. Bunlara ek olarak, İslam ve güvenlik teması üzerine bir tartışma grubu oluşturuldu. Bu grupta, genç Müslümanları radikal İslam gruplarından kurtarmak ve güvenlik kurumları ile Müslümanlar arasındaki işbirliğinden bahsedildi. Haziran 2009'daki tartışmalardan sonra üç Müslüman örgüt önemli kavramların anlamını kabul etti ve tavsiyeleri kabul etti. Ancak, İslam Meclisi (IRD) bildiriye imzalamayı reddetti, çünkü bu konferansta İslam ile güvenlik arasında kurulan bağlantıyı problemlili bulmuştu. Problemlili bulunan kısım büyük ölçüde din ve güvenlikle ilgili konular arasında kurulan bağlar ve Alman bakanlık yetkililerinin İslam hakkındaki bilgi eksikliğiydi.

Göç ve siyasi katılımı düzenleyen bir başka uygulama ise uyum meclisleridir. İlk olarak yabancı danışma konseyleri adıyla 1976 senesinde kurulan bu meclisler zaman içinde farklı isim ve işlevlere sahip olagelmıştır. Yabancı danışma konseylerinin ilk ortaya çıkışı göçmenlerin daha yerel bir demokrasi talebiydi. Zaman içerisinde Alman vatandaşı olmayan göçmenler, belediyelere tavsiyelerde bulunma hakkına sahip olmuştur. İlk seçim 1986 senesinde yapıldı ve etkisi yabancı danışma konseylerin göçmen nüfus tarafından daha fazla tanınmasına sebep olmuştur. Günümüzde uyum meclisleri adıyla çalışmalarına devam eden bu kurullarda 2009 yılı itibarıyla, meclis üye sayısı 21'ten 25'e yükseldi. 25'inin 8'i belediye meclisine seçilen siyasi partilerin temsilcileri oluşturmaktadır. Yasaya göre, Alman vatandaşlığı olmadan 5.000'den fazla kişinin yaşadığı yerel topluluklar bir uyum meclisi kurmalıdır. En az 200 vatandaşın oy kullanması ve bir konsey talebinde bulunması durumunda, Alman vatandaşlığına sahip olmayan 2.000-5.000 sakinin bulunduğu yerel topluluklar bir meclis oluşturabilir. Almanya vatandaşlığına sahip olmayan 2.000'den az kişiye sahip yerel topluluklar ise gönüllü olarak oluştururlar. 2004 yılından bu yana, uyum meclisleri belediye kanununa göre yasal bir dayanağa sahip olmuş ve geçmişe göre daha güçlü ve etkili oldukları görülmektedir. Yine de bu meclislerin etkinlikleri oldukça tartışılmış ve meclislerin varlığına dair ciddi eleştiriler yapılmıştır. Bu eleştirinin en önemli dayanak noktası katılım oranlarının çok düşük oluşudur. Bunun yanı sıra kategorik olarak bu meclislerin

varlığının sorunlu olduğunu savunanlar ve zamanla ortadan kalkması gerektiğini savunanlar da vardır.

Almanya genelinde göçmenlerin siyasi temsiline ve sivil örgütlenmelerdeki yerlerine bakıldığında Almanya'da yaşayan Türkiye kökenli göçmenlerin en fazla kültürel, dini ve sendikalarda örgütlü oldukları görülmektedir. Siyasi partilerdeki temsil oranları ise oldukça düşüktür. 2.500.000 Türkiye kökenli ve yaklaşık 700.000 Türkiye kökenli Alman vatandaşı göz önüne alındığında 2007 yılında Alman parlamentolarında bağımsız adaylar da dâhil Türkiye kökenli yaklaşık 80 milletvekili bulunuyordu. 2009 yılına gelindiğinde ise, Bundestag'da göçmen kökenli on bir vekil olduğu görülür.

Bu çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi iki farklı yazının tartışılması üzerinden çizilmiştir. Bunlardan ilki göç meselesine kurumsal çerçeveden bakan yani devletlerin uyguladıkları politika ya da fırsat yapılarının göçmenlerin siyasi katılımına şu veya bu yönde etki ettikleri yönünde inceleme ve değerlendirmelerden oluşmaktadır. İkincisi ise, göçmen derneklerinin ya da göçmenlerin kendi öz niteliklerine odaklanarak onların grupsal özelliklerinden kaynaklı katılım biçimlerini inceleyen ve değerlendiren yazındır. Bu yazının içerisine bu tezin bir gereksinimi olarak dini örgütlenmeler ve onları grup dinamikleri de dahil edilmiştir.

Katılımın koşullarını inceleyen teorilerin hemen ilk başında Yasemin Soysal'ın 1994'te yayınlanan "Vatandaşlığın Sınırları" isimli çalışmasından söz edilmiştir. Soysal vatandaşlığı siyasi üyelik çerçevesinde ele alır. Ona göre, dört farklı ulusal siyasi üyelik modeli vardır bunlar, korporatist, liberal, devletçi ve parçalı modellerdir. Bu çalışmada Soysal, göçmenlerin varlığının, ev sahibi ülkelerdeki milli vatandaşlığın temel mantığına itiraz ettiğine ve ulus devletlerin çeşitli kurumlaşma rejimlerine sahip olduklarına, hak ve koruma sağlayan ulus devletlerin daha evrensel bir vatandaşlık modeline kavuşması gerektiğine vurgu yaparak, post-ulusal vatandaşlık modelini tamamlamıştır. Korporatist modelde, devlet tarafından desteklenen aracı yapılar vardır. Toplumsal cinsiyet, meslek, etnisite ve din gibi farklı kimliklerle tanımlanan kurumsal grupların doğal hakları vardır.

Böylece, göçmenler toplu bir gruba üye oldukları sürece meşru aktörlerdir Liberal modelde, bireyler eylem ve otorite kaynaklarıdır ve işgücü piyasası kuruluşun ana aracıdır. Göçmenlerin politika yapımı ve örgütlenmesinde yatay ve merkezsiz bir model vardır. Devletçi modelde devlet, otorite kaynağıdır ve siyaseti düzenler. Parçalı modelde ise devletin egemenliği ve toplumla olan etkileşimi sınırlıdır. Göçmenler emek piyasalarına katılır, ancak diğer toplumsal yapılara katılmazlar. Bunun yerine, aile, klan ve kilise gibi ilkel gruplar toplumsal hayatlarına hükmeder. Bu modeller söz konusu olduğunda, Almanya'nın üyelik modeli karışık modeldir. Almanya her ne kadar federal bir siyasi sistem olsa da, oldukça bürokratik ve merkezi bir kamusal alana sahiptir. Federal seviyede karmaşık kurumlar vardır ve bu kurumlar, kiliseler, sendikalar ve refah kurumlarının yanı sıra politika yapımında etkilidir.

Elbette bu minvalde başka çalışmalar da mevcuttur. Örneğin Boswell (2007) ve Earnest (2005) farklı ülkelerdeki farklı kurumsal ve tarihsel yapılarak değinerek göçmenlerin siyasi katılım biçimlerini açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Ancak bunların içerisinde Koopmans (2004) ve beraberindeki araştırma grubunun geliştirmiş olduğu fırsat yapıları oldukça dikkat çekicidir. Bu yaklaşımın temel varsayımı göçmen gruplarının farklı fırsat yapılarından yola çıkarak tarih, bağlam, medyanın etkisi gibi faktörler ya da siyasi konjunktüre bağlı olarak farklı zamanlarda farklı katılım biçimleri geliştirdikleridir. Buna göre Koopmans dinamik bir vatandaşlık anlayışı ortaya koyar. Koopmans'a göre her ne kadar en önemli fırsat yapıları uyum ve vatandaşlık politikaları olsa da, göçmenlerin hak taleplerini ortaya koyup başarıya ulaşma şansları farklı bir takım etkenlerle de açıklanabilmektedir.

Göç çalışmalarında siyasi fırsat yaklaşımı, siyasi seferberliğin arabuluculuk kanallarını vurguladığı için son derece önemlidir. Dahası, göçmenlerin toplu eylemlerini açıklarken kaynak mobilizasyon teorisini de kullanmaktadır. Koopmans ampirik çalışmasında bir medya içeriği analizi yapar ve medya içeriğinin belli katılım modellerinin veya iddiaların olumsuz veya olumlu resimlerini yayabileceğini ve böylece toplu eylemin meşruiyetini

adil bir biçimde yerine getirebildiğini gösterir. Açık bir şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse, "diğer talep biçimleri için olumsuz uyarılar oluştururken, siyasi fırsat yapısı bazı kolektif aktörleri ve bazı kolektif kimlik ifadelerini ve diğerlerine karşı bazı tür talepleri desteklemektedir" (Koopmans, 2004: 451). Yaklaşımın kurumsal yönü, siyasi sistemin yapısını içerirken, söylemsel yönü makul ve meşru kabul edilen kavramlardan oluşmaktadır.

Koopmans ayrıca, göçmenlerin iddialarının üç temel özelliğine odaklanır: Kamusal tartışmalarda yer alma, anavatanla ilgili konulara odaklanma, uyum politikarı ve haklarla ilgili proaktif eylemler. Tüm bu bağımlı değişkenler şu üç bağımsız değişken ile analiz edilir: Yurttaşlığa kabul oranları, göçmen meselesinin kamusal söylemde yer bulma oranları ve CDU'ya oy verme oranları. Sonuncusu sol partilerin göçmen sorunlarıyla daha ilgili olduğu varsayımından yola çıkarak belirlenmiştir. Sekiz farklı Alman şehri, Hollanda ve İngiltere'deki büyük şehirlerde yaptığı araştırma sonucunda Koopmans Berlin'deki hak talebi arayışı oranlarını diğer ülke büyük şehirlerine göre düşük bulmuştur.

Koopmans Statham ile birlikte yürüttüğü bir başka çalışmada dinamik vatandaşlık modelini ayrıntılandırmakta ve sonucunda şu kaniya varmaktadır: Yalnızca devlet rejimlerinin değil aynı zamanda farklı aktörler ve kurumlar da göç ve etnik ilişkilerle ilgili politikalarda rol almaktadır. Belirli bir grup göçmen siyasete katılmak için resmi yollar kullandıkları için politik ve ekonomik sisteme dahil oldukları zaman, başka bir grup seçmeli olarak dışlanmış olabilir demektir. Bu nedenle, bir grubun dahil edilmesi, başka bir grubun hariç tutulması pahasına kabul edilebilir. Yine de, devletlerin vatandaşlık biçiminde genellikle iki net seçeneğe sahip olduğu fikrini korumak mümkündür. Ya etnik kökenden bir fikir olarak vazgeçip çok kültürlülüğü kabul edecekler ya da etnik kökeni vatandaşlığın temeli olarak sürdürecekler ve çoğunluk kültüründe asimilasyonu teşvik ederken vatandaşlığa kavuşturma yöntemlerini gevşetecekler. Almanya bazen sivil çoğulculuğun izlerini sergilemekle birlikte, çoğunlukla etnik asimilasyonist konumda

izleri taşımaktadır. Bana göre bu etnik asimilasyon modelini uygularken Almanya, sınırları açıkça sabit olan bir çerçevede diğer kültürlerle hoşgörü gösteriyor. Bu nedenle, bu sınırların nerede başlayıp bittiğini, kimin hoşuna gittiğini ve Almanya'da sivil çoğulculuğun nasıl şekillendiği konusu araştırmamla ilgilidir ve uygulama kısmında bu sorulara cevap aranmıştır.

Göçmenlerin grup karakterlerine odaklanan çalışmalara geldiğimizde bir çok farklı ülkede Türkiye kökenli göçmenlerin kurmuş oldukları dernekleri inceleyen veyahut onların oy verme davranışlarını ya da farklı ülkelerde nasıl farklı şekillerde siyasi katılım biçimleri sergilediklerine dair bir çok araştırma karşımıza çıkar. Bu araştırmalarda sosyal sermaye önemli bir yer teşkil etmektedir. Bu çalışmalarda göçmenlerin siyasal katılımları, grupla ilişkili faktörler, örgütsel dinamikler ve göçmen grupların sosyal sermayeleri de dikkate alınarak analiz edilmiştir. Bu bölümde, konunun bu yönü öncelikle Kanada, Norveç ve Kuzey Amerika'daki vakaları kapsayan birkaç makaleye genel bir bakışla incelenecektir. Bölümün ilerleyen bölümünde, siyasal katılım düzeyini etnik dernek yoğunluğuna ve dernek faaliyetlerine bağlı olarak üretilen sosyal sermayenin seviyesine bağlayan çalışmaların eleştirel bir özeti yapılacaktır.

Bir önceki bölümdek genel iddianın aksine, Özçürümez (2009) bir ülkenin rejiminin kurumsal yolları ya da fırsat yapıları, belli bir siyasi katılım biçimine yol açmaz iddiasında bulunur. Daha çok, Kanada'daki Türk göçmen örgütlerinin resmini kavramak için tarihi ve örgütsel bir bakış açısı önermektedir. Dernek faaliyetinde bulunmanın ardındaki nedenlerin çoğunlukla toplum kültürünün geliştirilmesi gereği sebebiyle gündeme geldiğini savunur. Ancak, grup farklılıkları nedeniyle dernekler ayrı ayrı organize olmaya devam etmektedir. Bazı dernekler siyasi zulüm yüzünden ülkeye gelen insanlar için savunuculuk politikası yapar; bazıları yüksek vergiler veya sağlık hizmetlerinin iyileştirilmesi gibi pratik konular üzerine bir araya gelir. Yukarıda bahsedilen nedenlerden ötürü, Kanada'da vatandaşlık rejimi Avrupa ülkelerine kıyasla çoğunlukla sorunsuz olsa da, siyasal katılım sınırlı derecede gerçekleşmekte ve katılım, siyasi

hoşnutsuzluk dönemlerinde zirveye ulaşan düşman politikalar şeklinde, kültürel konularda angaje olmaları ya da diğer pratik meseleler için ayrı dernekler aracılığıyla kendini göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak, sadece hükümet politikalarına karşı duyulan çekingenlik dönemlerinde, insanlar topluca hareket edip harekete geçmekte ve grup içi heterojenlik, Kanada'da etkili bir siyasi katılımın yollarını engellemektedir.

Norveç'teki duruma bakıldığında, Jon Rodstad (2009), Norveç'teki Türk göçmen örgütlerindeki düşük düzeyde sosyal sermaye ve düşük politik angajmanların altını çizer. Gönüllü örgütlerin güçlü bir demokrasi ve sivil toplum için önemli rol oynadığını varsayarak, göçmen örgütlerin sivil toplumdaki rolünün tekrar gözden geçirilmesine ihtiyaç duyulduğunu savunur. Ayrıca, göçmen örgütlerin gelişmiş demokrasi için sivil topluma verebilecekleri role dikkati çeker. Rodstad, Wollebeack ve Selle'den (2005) referansla üçlü sosyal sermayenin bir tanımını benimsemektedir; (İnsanlar ve kurumlar), şebekeler (örgütler veya resmi olmayan ancak düzenli aralıklarla yapılan arkadaşlar ve tanıdıklar toplantıları) ve sivil katılım (yerel siyasete aktif bir ilgi). Bu tanıma dayalı çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre, Türk göçmen örgütlerinin sosyal sermayesinin düşük olduğu sonucuna varır.

Düşük siyasal katılım seviyesini, Türkiye'nin az gelişmiş bölgelerinden ekonomik çoğunlukla nedenlerle gelen göçmenlerin özellikleriyle açıklar; diğer göçmen gruplara kıyasla düşük eğitim seviyesine ve düşük istihdam düzeyine sahiptirler.

Kuzey Amerika'ya odaklanan çalışmalarda genellikle oy verme davranışı, seçim dışı katılım ve göçmenlerin örgüt dinamikleri incelenir. Bunun nedeni ise açıkça ABD'nin uzun yıllar boyunca süren sivil katılım, göç ve gönüllü kuruluş geleneğidir demek yanlış olmaz. Bu çalışmalarda devlet kurumsal yapıları, fırsat yapılarından çok göçmenlerin hangi özelliklerinin örgütsel dinamikler türünden sonuçlandığı gibi ampirik ve sosyolojik sorular üzerinden gidilerek göçmenlerin siyasi katılımları açıklanmaya çalışılır. Bu çalışmalar aynı zamanda, göçmenlerin kırsal ya da kentsel alanlardan mı geldiği, genç, yaşlı, iyi eğitilmiş, kadın erkek ya da belli bir mesleğe sahip olup

olmamasından yola çıkarak, bu tip karakteristiklerin katılım davranışını nasıl etkilediği üzerine araştırmalar yapar.

Fennema ve Tillie'nin (1999) "etnik sivil toplum" kavramına dayanarak siyasi katılım bağlamında Amsterdam'daki farklı etnik grupları inceler, bunlar Faslılar, Türkler, Surinam ve Antiller'lerdi. Araştırmanın verileri siyasi katılımın beş yönüne dayanır: Yerel seçimlerde (Hollanda'da beş yıl ya da daha uzun yaşayan herkes için 1985 yılında verilecek) oy kullanma, belediye toplantılarını ziyaret etme, etkileşimli karar verme sürecine katılım ve belediyelerle etkileşimli görüşme oturumuna katılma), komşuluk komitelerine katılım ve nihayet şehir referandumuna katılım.

Fennema ve Tillie bu çalışmada, katılımcıların sosyal ağlarındaki cinsiyet, eğitim, örgütsel üyelik ve sosyal etkinlik değişkenlerine bağlı olarak siyasi katılımın bireysel belirleyicilerini de inceler. Sonuçlara göre, etnik organizasyonel üyelik ve sosyal faaliyetlerin, diğerlerinin yanında siyasi katılım üzerinde güçlü bir etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir. Etnik göçmen örgütlerinin siyasi uyumunun önünde engel teşkil ettiğine dair normatif varsayımın aksine, etnik topluluklar bir mobilizasyon aracı olarak hizmet eder ve üyelerin siyasi bütünleşmesini teşvik eder.

Tillie ve Slijper (2007), sivil topluluklar ve siyasi katılım arasında bir ilişki gösterirken, Putnam'ın (1993, 2000) sivil toplum kavramını ve sosyal sermayenin birleştirici ve sosyal sermayenin köprüleyen olmak üzere iki türünden faydalanmaktadır. Putnam (2000), birleştirici ve köprü kuran sosyal sermaye arasındaki ayrımı şu şekilde yapar: Birleştirici (özel) sosyal sermayenin biçimleri "tesadüfen veya zorunlulukla, içeriye bakar ve tek kimliği ve homojen grupları güçlendirmeye eğilim gösterir. Toplumsal sermayeyi bağlama örnekleri etnik kardeş örgütleri içerir ... "Köprüleyici (dahil eden) sosyal sermayenin biçimleri" dışı bakar ve çeşitli sosyal kesimlerdeki insanları kapsar. Sosyal sermayenin köprülenmesine örnek sivil haklar hareketleridir... "(Putnam, 2000)

Putnam'ın kaygılarının aksine, Tillie ve Slijper (2007), birleştirici sermayenin olumsuz yönleri hakkında herhangi bir endişe belirtmez; bunun yerine, etnik topluluklarda

üretilen sermayeyi biraraya getirmenin olumlu etkilerini ısrarla vurgulular. Amsterdam'da yapılan araştırmaya geri dönersek, sonuçlar Türk kuruluşlarının örgütsel yoğunluğunun, Türk etnik nüfusunun görece küçüklüğüne rağmen, Amsterdam'daki Faslılar ve Surinamlara kıyasla çok daha yüksek olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu yoğunluk, sosyal sermayenin birleştirici yönüne tekabül eder. Diğer taraftan, verilere göre, Türk kuruluşlarının sosyal entegrasyon düzeyi diğer gruplara kıyasla daha düşüktür. Bu, Hollanda etnik gruplarında, diğer topluluklarda ve farklı çok uluslu örgütlerin çeşitliliği içinde ağ bağlarının varlığı olarak tanımlanan, köprü kuran sosyal sermayenin düşük seviyesini göstermektedir. Bu veriden, bir göçmen organizasyonun yoğunluğunun, bireysel üyelerin ve örgütlerin köprülü sermayesinin daha düşük seviyesi nedeniyle, sosyal bütünleşmesinin oldukça düşük olduğu sonucu elde edilebilir.

Öte yandan, Martinez (2009), köprü kuran sosyal sermayenin, kapsayıcı ve aktif sivil göçmen toplumun yanı sıra gerçek ve tam teşekküllü bir demokrasi için vazgeçilmez bir rol oynadığının altını çizer.

Bu, yalnızca kendi topluluklarında yarattığı sosyal sermayeyi değil aynı zamanda "gönüllü derneklere ve diğer sosyal etkileşim yapılarına katılımlarını" (Morales ve Giugni, 2011) da kapsar. Bu da çok kültürlü bir demokraside siyasi katılımın yeterli kavranması için önemlidir.

Martinez'e (2009) göre, göçmenlerin siyasi bütünleşmesinin biçimi bir ülkedeki demokrasi yolunu da gösterir. Göçmen organizasyonların hükümetlerle dikey ilişkileri varsa, bu onlardaki zayıf özerklik sorununa işaret eder. Dikey ilişki, "göç ve göçmenlik alanındaki kararlarını meşrulaştırmak için bazı göçmen örgütlerle ilişkiler kurmayı" gerektirdiği için özerk sivil toplumu ve gerçek sosyal sermayeyi engelleyici niteliktedir. Buna paralel olarak, Morales ve Pilati'nin (2011), Martinez'in örneklediği gibi, dikey ve yatay ilişkilerin farkında yakalanabilecek başlıca köprüleme ve birleştirme arasındaki farkı analiz etmeye çalışır. Bu farklı sosyal sermaye üretimlerini göçmen derneklerin yapı ve ilgi alanlarına bağlı olduğunu savunurlar.

Göçmenler, kendi etnikleri ile temelde etkileşime girdiği sosyal yapılara gömülürlerse, kendi etnik gruplarının etrafında yer alan konulara ve sorunlara daha fazla odaklanır. Bunun yerine, etnik açıdan daha farklı sosyal etkileşimlere maruz kalan göçmenler, toplumun daha geniş kesimlerini etkileyen konular ve sorunlarla ilişkili olan politik katılımı daha fazla önemseyecektir (Morales ve Pilati, 2011) Bu bölüm, göçmen örgütlenmelerinin farklı sosyal sermaye üretim süreçleri üzerine odaklanan yazından bahsetmiştir. Almanya, Hollanda ve Norveç'te yapılan çalışmaların köprü kuran sermayenin önemini açıkça göz ardı ettiği gözlenir ancak İspanya'daki göçmenlerle ilgili az sayıdaki çalışma köprü kuran sermayenin önemine odaklanmıştır. Siyasi katılımın bütünlüklü bir kavrayışına ulaşmak için ihtiyaç duyulan şey farklı sosyal sermaye türlerinin nasıl ve ne şekilde üretildiği ve bunların daha geniş göçmen nüfusun refahı için ve sosyal uyum için ne gibi sonuçlar verdiği mutlakiyetle göz önüne alınmalıdır.

İslami göçmen siyasi katılımı yazınına bakıldığında bu konunun iki farklı grupta tartışıldığı gözlemlenir. Birinci grupta, azınlık hakları, entegrasyon, İslam'ın tanınması, çok kültürlülük, vatandaşlık, İslam'ın dışlanması ve evcilleştirilmesi gibi çeşitli kavramlarla ilişkili olarak İslam hakkında devlet politikalarını eleştiren çalışmalar bulunmaktadır. Konuyla ilgili olarak ulusal entegrasyon politikaları perspektifinden yaklaşan çalışmalar ve bu örgütlerin Müslüman örgütler üzerindeki etkisi de bu gruba dahil edilebilir. Aynı grupta bir diğer tanınmış isim ise Yurdakul (2009) 'dir. Kortman ve Kortman Rosenow-Williams'a benzer şekilde, Yurdakul doğrudan Müslüman örgütlere odaklanmaktadır. Yurdakul, siyasal katılım biçimlerini, vatandaşlık, çok kültürlülük, İslam gibi belirli kavramlara yönelik tutumlarını ve devlet yetkilileri, sendikalar, siyasi partiler ve göçmen dernekleri ile olan ilişkilerinin entegrasyon süreçleri üzerindeki etkilerini analiz etmektedir. Çalışmalarını beş farklı göçmen derneklerinin eski üyeleri ile yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelere dayandırır. Yurdakul ve Yükleyen ayrıca göçmen entegrasyonda İslami örgütlerin farklı karakter ve rollerine odaklanan çalışmaları da

yapmıştır (Yurdakul, 2006; Yurdakul, 2009; Yurdakul ve Yükleyen, 2009; Yükleyen ve Yurdakul,2011).

Öte yandan, ikinci grupta, mevcut literatürde İslam söylemine eleştirel yaklaşan ve Almanya'da İslam algısı hakkında daha fazla araştırma yapan alternatif bir bakış açısı geliştiren çalışmalar bulunmaktadır. Bunların arasında, tüm Türk göçmenlerin İslamlaştırılmasını vurgulayan bazı çalışmalar var ve sonuç olarak Almanya'nın bütünleşmesi yeniden üretiliyor (Ramm, 2010). Diğer çalışmalar medyada İslam imajının üretilmesine eleştirel yaklaşmaktadır (Spielhaus, 2010). Bu gruptaki bir diğer çalışma, İslam ile ilişkili entegrasyon söylemini sorgulamaktadır (Tezcan, 2005).

Sonuç olarak, tezimin bu bölümü, İslam üzerine mevcut literatürü ve Almanya'daki İslam algısını, bir dizi "kritik" çalışmaya atıfta bulunarak sunmuştur. Bu çalışmalar Alman devletinin başarısızlıklarını, kamu politikalarında yapılan hataları ya da Almanya'daki çok kültürlülüğün verimsiz uygulamalarını tartışmıştır. Son on yılda İslam'ın hem görünürlüğünün arttığını hem de İslam üzerine tartışmaların arttığını açıkça görüyoruz. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışmaların çoğu İslami örgütlerin faaliyet ve işlevlerine derinlemesine odaklanmamaktadır; vatandaşlık karakterlerini, politikada temsilci rolü, demokratik alanda yerleri ve bu bakımdan diğer göçmen örgütlerden olan farklılıkları yorumlanmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, Küçükcan'a (2000), Pauly'ye (2004), Schiffauer'e (2006), Yükleyen ve Yurdakul'e (2009) benzer bir bakış açısı ile yaklaşan çalışmalar meseleyi sadece göçmen uyum çalışmaları açısından ele almakta ya da İslam'ı bu konuda en önemli sorun olarak görmektedir. Öte yandan, Tezcan'ın (2005) ileri sürdüğü gibi, aşırı vurgu, gönüllü çalışmalar ve kamusal alanda İslam'ın görünürlüğü konusunda bir tehlike söz konusudur; çünkü bu aşırı vurgu yanıltıcı olabilir; meseleyi Müslüman azınlığın sorunlarının üstesinden gelmeye dayalı gibi algılamak ve bu olası uzlaşmanın göçmen kamusal alanda tüm göçmenlerin dışlanma sorununu çözeceği varsayımını ortaya çıkaracağı şeklinde yorumlanır. Tezcan'ın da belirttiği gibi (2005) bir diğer

tehlike, İslami reformizmin totaliter boyutu olup, İslami göçmen örgütlerin iktidar ilişkileri ve organizasyonel kalıplarında bu tehlike kolaylıkla görülebilmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın saha araştırma kısmı başta da belirtildiği gibi dokuz farklı Türkiye kökenli göçmen dernekle yürütülmüştür. Bu dernekler, İslam Toplumları Milli Görüş (İMG), Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DİTİB), İslam Kültür Merkezi (VİKZ), Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği (ATİB), Almanya Alevi Federasyonu (AABF); Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu (DİDF), Göçmen Kadınlar Birliği, Türkiye-Almanya İnsan Hakları Derneği (TÜDAY) ve Almanya Kürt Dernekleri Federasyonudur (NAVDEM). Başta da belirtildiği gibi mülakatın belli başlı bölümleri vardır. Bu bölümlerden ilki derneklerin, etkinliklerini faaliyetlerini amaçlarını; ikincisi, karar alma biçimlerini ve organizasyon yapılarını; üçüncüsü ise, siyasi katılım, uyum, vatandaşlık ve demokrasi ile görüşlerini ortaya çıkartmak için hazırlanmış sorulardan oluşmaktadır. Veri analizi bölümünde de dernekler bu üç başlık altında incelenmiş ve karşılaştırılmıştır.

Kısacası, dini göçmen örgütlerin faaliyetleri ve etkileşimleri, kendilerini dindar bir topluluk olarak gördüklerini göstermektedir. Bireysel haklardan ziyade, topluluklarını birbirine yapıştırmak ve kolektif hakları için çaba sarf etmek istiyorlar. Faaliyetleri çoğunlukla dini hizmetler, din eğitimi ve Müslüman ülkelere sınır ötesi yardım kampanyaları sunmakla ilgilidir. Genç üyeler için futbol takımları, kendileri için en belirgin sosyal etkinliklerdir. Eğitim faaliyetleri, özellikle Türk sınıfları, dini sınıflar ve okul için ek dersler, çocuklar için en yaygın aktivitelerdir. Dahası, geçmişe kıyasla birbirleriyle daha güçlü ve yakın ilişkileri vardır ve Türk Müslüman cemaatinin bu kadar kapalı ve tecrit edilmiş olması farkındalar da bu sorunun ortadan kaldırılmasında zorlanmaktadır. Son olarak, Alevi federasyonu diğer dini organizasyonlara kıyasla ayrı bir yerde durduğundan, Aleviliğin Almanya'daki laik göçmen gruplara yakınlığı fark yaratmaktadır. Bir başka farklılık, yalnızca benzer dini birliklerle dayanışma içinde olmaktan çok çeşitli sivil ağlar ve dernekler ile olan etkileşimlerinde görülebilir. Ayrıca, genç göçmenler için eğitim projeleri ve mesleki fırsatlar yaratmak ve bunları Alman

eđitim sistemine dahil etme abaları, Alevi topluluđunun toplumsal bir Őekilde katılma isteđini belirtmektedir. Öte yandan, proje odaklı alıřmalar ve devlet makamlarıyla bu Őekilde iřbirliđi, diđer dini organizasyonlara benzer Őekilde görülebilir.

Laik gömen örgütlerinin amalarında, faaliyetlerinde ve etkileřimlerinde ise, Alman sivil toplumuyla ve demokratik gülerle olan yakın iliřkileri göze arpmaktadır. İřiler aısından, tüm ezilenlerin haklarının desteklendiđi vurgulanmaktadır. Kadınlar aısından, kadınların uluslararası haklarını savunulur ve gömen pozisyonları nedeniyle kadınların özel sorunlarıyla ilgilenilir; İnsan hakları aısından mültecilerin uluslarüstü haklarını, yasadıřı gömenlerin haklarını savunuyor ve sınır dıřı edilmekle mücadele ediyorlar. Hepsinin, alıřma alanlarıyla ilgili Alman demokratik örgütleriyle yakın iliřkileri olduđu görülür. Türkiye'deki sorunlara ve Türkiye'de yařanan Kürt sorununa duyarlı olmalarına rađmen, gömen mücadeleleri konusundaki anlayıřları temelde bir ulusal topluluđun veya bir etnik grubun hakları ile ilgili kurmadıkları göze arpar. Almanya'daki demokratik örgütlerin faaliyetlerine istekli bir Őekilde katıldıkları, örneđin, roman vatandaşların sorunlarıyla ilgili eylemlere katılıyorlar; Latin Amerika halkıyla sosyal köprüler kuruyor, Müslüman topluluđa yapılan ayrımcılıđa karřı duruyor, yükselen Neo-Nazi gruplarına karřı anti-fařist gruplarla iřbirliđi yapıyor ya da servet vergisi iin sendikalara katılıyorlar... Dolayısıyla geniř ve eřitli alanlara sahip birer faaliyet yelpazesi oldukları iddia edilebilir. Öte yandan, Kürt derneklerinin birincil amacı, Almanya'da Kürt kimliđinin tanınmasıdır. Bu olmadan, gömen mücadelelerinin gerisinde kalacaklarına inanıyorlar. Yine de, Türkiye'deki Kürt mücadelesi ve Almanya'daki Kürt örgütleriyle güçlü bir dayanıřmaya sahip olmakla birlikte, sadece onlarla etkileřim kurmamaktadır; bunun yerine, Almanya'daki her siyasi parti ve sivil organizasyona aık olmayı tercih ediyorlar. Bunun uyuma katkı sađlayacađına inanıyorlar.

Karar alma süreçleri ve örgütsel yapı göz önüne alınarak yapılan kıyaslamada řunlar göze arpmaktadır. Genel olarak, dini gömen organizasyonlar, üye sayılarının ok

ötesine çok sayıda insana ulaşabilen, geniş çapta örgütlenmiş, merkezi ve hiyerarşik olarak yapılandırılmış kuruluşlardır. İbadetle ilgili faaliyetler, onların en önemli faaliyetidir. Buna ek olarak, erkek ve orta yaşlı üyelerin sayısı yönetim kurulu üyelerinde oldukça yüksektir. Yeni düzenlenen DİTİB'in Müslüman Kadınları Birliği hariç, kadınların görünürlüğü neredeyse yoktur ve bu birlik DİTİB merkez bürosuyla halen güçlü bağları olduğu görülür. Yönetim kurulu üyeleri veya derneğin başkanı ve sıradan üyeler arasında hiyerarşik bir ilişki vardır. Cami derneklerinde, özellikle küçük şehir şubelerinde, dernek başkanı bir caminin imamı gibidir. Bu kalıptan farklı olarak, Alevilerin örgütlenmesi daha demokratik görünüyor; Liderin kültü pek belirgin değil. Hiyerarşik ilişkiler o kadar görünür değildir ve göreceli olarak komisyon özerkliği vardır. Böylece, AABF'nin kendi inançlarının kültüründen kaynaklanan kendine kapalı ve öz disiplin bir yapıya sahip olduğu söylenebilir.

Laik göçmen örgütlerin üye sayıları azdır; ancak, etkili ve birkaç aktif üyeye etkili bir şekilde çalışırlar. Yatay bir örgüt yapısı gözlemlenir; yani, Sünni örgütlerin aksine, yönetim kurulu üyeleri ile sıradan üyeler arasında fazla mesafe yoktur. Ayrıca, aşağıdan yukarıya karar verme süreçleri için bir çaba var. Diğer bir deyişle, sıradan üyelerin karar alma süreçlerine katılmaları teşvik edilir. Bu iki dernek grubu arasında profesyonelleşme seviyesi de farklıdır. Sünni örgütlerde sekreterler gibi profesyonel işçiler var ve maddi koşullar oldukça iyi iken, seküler örgütlerde finansal kısıtlamalar nedeniyle hiçbir mesleki işçi mevcut değil, aynı zamanda fiziksel koşullar iyi değil. Aslında bu eksiklikler ilişkileri daha gayriresmi hale getirdi ve Sünni örgütlerde, e-postayla randevu alınarak görüşme yapılabilirken, benim adıma bu derneklere girmek daha kolaydı. Bir başka fark kadınların görünürlüğüdür; Laik örgütlerde kadınları yönetim kurulu üyeleri olarak görmek oldukça yaygındı. Yaşa gelince, laik örgütlerin profili açıkçası daha gençti. En azından sonuncusu, bir topluluğa dini hizmetler yerine getirmek yerine seküler örgütler, üyelerinin kendilerini geliştirme ve kendini gerçekleştirme konularında çok daha fazla ilgileniyorlar. Özellikle Kürt federasyonu için karar verme süreçlerinin ve iç işleyişin çok katılımcı ve demokratik olduğu ileri sürebilir.

Siyasi katılım, vatandaşlık, uyum ve demokrasi ile görüşleri kıyaslandığında şu sonuçlar elde edilmiştir. Sünni Müslüman derneklerin siyasi katılım, vatandaşlık, entegrasyon ve demokrasi kavramları toplu haklara tabiidir. Yani, bir topluluk olarak hakları tanındıkça uyum onlar için anlamlıdır; siyasi katılım, seçimlere katılma, oy hakkı ve Alman siyasi partilerinde aktif olma ve böylece Müslümanların hakları için mücadele anlamına gelir. Burada DİTİB ve ATİB, aynı zamanda Türk kimliğinin korunması için de hassasiyet göstermektedirler. Demokrasi, bir yönetim biçimi olarak ya da kelimenin tam anlamıyla dini, etnik ve kültürel haklara sahip yeterli toplu haklarına sahip olarak algılanır. Ayrıca, Almanya'daki bir azınlık grubu olarak konumlarını değerlendiriyorlar ve demokrasiyi toplumun çoğunluğuyla eşit haklara sahip olmak olarak açıklıyorlar. Bir diğer çarpıcı nokta, Alman devletinden veya Federal Almanya'dan topluluk olarak dini, etnik ve kültürel haklarını koruma talepleri olması. Bu anlamda Alman devletine karşı kızgınlık duymalarına rağmen, devlet makamlarının gözünde tanınmak isteği var ve işbirliğine oldukça açıktır. Alevi Federasyonu, Sünni İslamcı göçmen örgütlerine demokrasi, vatandaşlık ve siyasi katılım anlayışlarında benzerlik taşıyor. Ancak Alevilerin topluluk haklarına açıkça öncelik vermediklerini; aksine, Aleviler, Kürtler veya Sünni olsun tüm göçmenlerin ayrımcılık yapmadan siyasi katılım haklarını gerçekleştirebilecekleri bir demokratik sistem isteği içinde oldukları belirtilmelidir.

Laik örgütler, entegrasyonu, vatandaşlığı, demokrasiyi ve siyasi katılımı açıklarken devlete karşı eleştirel bir duruş sergilerler. Onlara göre, bireysel haklar çok değerlidir; vatandaşlık, Almanya'daki tüm sakinler için bir insan hakkıdır. Devletin uyum projesinin güvenilmez olduğuna ve siyasi katılımın önerilen araçlarını izlemek yerine, alternatif bir sivil siyasi alan oluşturmaya ağırlık verirler. Almanya'da yerel demokratik örgütlerle çok yakın çalışıyorlar ve topluluk yerine bireyleri güçlendirmeyi amaçlayan Avrupa sivil örgütleri anlayışına çok yakın bir çizgide çalışmalarını yürütürler. Evrensel değerleri benimseyerek eşit sosyal hakların vurgulanması bu örgütlerin çarpıcı bir karakteridir. Ayrıca, etnisite veya kültürü ne olursa olsun, Almanya'daki tüm göçmenleri ve ezilenleri kucakladıklarını her fırsatta dile getirirler. Ayrıca yerel ve göçmen topluluklarının bir

araya gelmesinin siyasi katılım mücadelesindeki önemini ifade etmektedirler. Onlara göre, yoksulluk, tecrit, hak ihlalleri ve ayrımcılık gibi sorunlar yalnızca Türkiye kökenli göçmenler veya Müslümanlar değildir bu sorunlara tüm yabancılar ve yöre halkı maruz kalmaktadır. Bu nedenle, demokrasi ve siyasi katılım anlayışlarında ulusal ya da topluluk ya da kimlik referansları bulunmamakta, referansları sadece evrensel haklara sahip insandır. Bununla birlikte, Kürt federasyonu diğerleri arasında bir istisnadır. Onlara göre, kimlik hakları daha önceliklidir. Her ne kadar bireysel haklara ağırlık veriyor gibi görünse de, topluluk hakları kendi örgütlerinin vazgeçilmez parçasıdır. Öte yandan, siyasal katılım, demokrasi ve entegrasyon kavramsallaştırmaları diğer seküler örgütlere benzer; örneğin "Seçimlerdeki oy hakkı" yerine, sivil ve siyasi alanda ses çıkarılmasını istiyorlar.

Sonuç olarak, bu tezde üç farklı siyasi katılım eğilimi tespit edilmiştir:

- 1) Topluluğun yasal ve kültürel hakları için savaşmak, yerel, bölgesel ve federal seviyedeki seçime katılmak, Alman siyasi partilerinde aktif olarak çalışmak ve devlet yetkilileri ile işbirliği içinde olmak gibi İslami bir topluluk olarak katılmak.
- 2) Evrensel değerlerin benimsenmesi, gösterilere katılımın sağlanması, yaşamın her alanında sorunlara duyarlı olma, sivil alanda eşit haklara sahip olma mücadelesi ve devlet yetkililerine uzak olma vasıtasıyla vatandaş olarak eşit sosyal hakları içeren birey olarak katılım.
- 3) Hem topluluk hem de birey olarak katılım, anavatandaki ve Almanya'daki topluluk hakları için mücadele, hem seçimlere hem de sivil politik alana katılmak, topluluk hakları için devlet gerektiğinde devletle işbirliği halinde olmak ve vurgu yapmak dahil olmak, bireysel haklar ve evrensel insan hakları üzerinde de durmak.

Son olarak bu araştırmanın sonuçları gösterdi ki, belirli göçmen grupların ürettiği sosyal sermayeye bağlı olarak göçmenlerin siyasi katılım biçimlerinin farklılık gösterir.

Verilerimde, dini ve laik örgütler olarak iki farklı siyasal katılım motivasyonu ile iki farklı grubu tespit ettim. Dini gruplar daha fazla sayıda insana hitap ediyor; kendi içlerinde ağ ve iletişimleri oldukça yoğun ve Müslüman toplumun haklarına ilişkin politika üretme konusunda pazarlık gücüne sahipler ancak Alman toplum ve kültürüyle çok az temas kuruyorlar. Ayrıca devletle ve devlet kurumlarıyla daha dikey ilişkiler kurdukları gözlemlenir. Kısacası, birleştirici sosyal sermayenin taşıyıcıları oldukları söylenebilir. Öte yandan, işçiler, kadınlar ve insan hakları dernekleri, Almanya'daki diğer dernekler ve topluluklarla daha yatay ilişkiler kurarak köprü kuran sermayeyi geliştirmeye çalışıyorlar. Bununla birlikte, uyum ve siyasal katılım konusundaki görünürdeki tartışmaların neredeyse tamamı, Müslümanların uyum sorunlarına ya da İslami göçmen örgütleri üzerinde yoğunlaşmakta ve bu popülerlik bir şekilde siyasal ve kamusal söylemlerin yanısıra ana akım medya tarafından da onaylanmaktadır. Tekrar söylemek gerekirse, dini örgütler topluluklarında daha sıkı ilişkiler kurmaya çalışırken, seküler örgütler daha geniş bir topluma entegre olmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma, göçmenlerin siyasal katılımlarını yalnızca devletlerin kurumsal kapasiteleri ile veya bazı göçmen gruplarının yüksek etnik ve bağlayıcı sermayesi ile analiz etmenin, resmin tamamını değerlendirmek için yeterli olmayacağını göstermiştir. Bu nedenle, farklı sosyal sermaye üretimlerini göz önüne alarak daha geniş bir siyasal katılım fikrini savunmaktadır.

D. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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YAZARIN

Soyadı : ÇOBAN BALCI
Adı : ASLIHAN
Bölümü : SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS AND
BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE CASE OF TURKEY
ORIGIN IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN GERMANY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

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