

PARTY-LEVEL EUROSCEPTICISM OF THE RADICAL POPULIST
POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES:
THE CASES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP)
AND THE COALITION OF THE RADICAL LEFT (SYRIZA)

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ABSTRACT

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In this thesis, I investigate the strategic and ideological aspects of the Euroscepticisms of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) as examples of radical populist parties which have been on the rise in Europe for the last three decades –especially since the 2014 European Parliamentary elections. I contest the way these parties are represented in media and academia, which is often alarmist and devoid of nuance, and claim that deeming these parties as a threat to the European integration without considering their historical and ontological differences is a capital mistake, as these parties’ perceptions of and expectations from the European integration are often very diverse. In order to reveal the specific elements of each parties’ Euroscepticism, I first examine their radicalism and populism both as an ideology and as a way of political communication. Then, I disintegrate the parties’ discourses on the European issue into four dimensions, *Economic*, *Political*, *Cultural*, and *Legal* and three categories, *Diagnosis*, *Prognosis*, and *Motivation*. Pursuant to an in-depth analysis of the selected parties’ and leaders’ Eurosceptic rhetoric, I

demonstrate that while SYRIZA and UKIP share some similarities with regard to their strategic considerations, their ideological inheritances rigorously separate them in terms of their stances vis-à-vis the European Union. In conclusion, I assert that the former is critical of the Union's current status but eager to take part in the integration with a more supranational nature, but the latter rejects to be involved in such an integration and calls for withdrawal from the Union.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Radicalism, Populism, United Kingdom
Independence Party, Coalition of the Radical Left

ÖZ

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ÜYE ÜLKELERİNDEKİ RADİKAL POPULİST SİYASİ PARTİLERİN PARTİ-DÜZEY AVRUPA ŞÜPHECİLİĞİ: BİRLEŞİK KRALLIK BAĞIMSIZLIK PARTİSİ (UKIP) VE RADİKAL SOL KOALİSYON (SYRIZA) ÖRNEKLERİ

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Bu tezde, Avrupa’da özellikle 2014 Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerinden bu yana olmak üzere son otuz yıldır yükselişte olan radikal popülist siyasi partilerden olan Birleşik Krallık Bağımsızlık Partisi’nin (UKIP) ve Radikal Sol Koalisyon’un (SYRIZA) Avrupa Şüpheciliği’nin ideolojik ve stratejik yönlerini araştırmaktayım. Bu partilerin medyada ve akademide genellikle nüanstan yoksun ve panik yaratan bir şekilde yer bulmasına karşı çıkmakta ve söz konusu partilerin Avrupa bütünleşmesine ilişkin algıları ve beklentileri genellikle büyük ayrışmalar gösterdiğinden, kendilerinin, tarihsel ve ontolojik farklılıkları göze alınmaksızın Avrupa bütünleşmesine bir tehdit olarak addedilmelerinin büyük bir hata olduğunu iddia etmekteyim. Her iki partinin Avrupa Şüpheciliği’ne dair özel unsurları ortaya koyabilmek adına, önce, radikalizmi ve populizmi hem bir ideoloji hem de bir siyasi iletişim biçimi olarak incelemekteyim. Daha sonra, partilerin Avrupa konusundaki söylemlerini *Ekonomik*, *Politik*, *Kültürel*, *Yasal* olmak üzere dört boyuta ve *Tanı*, *Tedavi*, *Amaç* olmak üzere üç kategoriye ayırmaktayım. Seçilmiş partilerin ve parti liderlerinin Avrupa Birliği’ne ilişkin şüphecî retoriklerinin detaylı analizine

verdiğim referanslarla, SYRIZA'nın ve UKIP'in stratejik değerlendirmeler açısından benzerlikler gösterdiklerini, ancak bu partilerin Avrupa Birliği karşısındaki duruşlarının, ideolojik mirasları söz konusu olduğunda keskin bir biçimde ayrıldığını göstermekteyim. Sonuç olarak, SYRIZA'nın Birlik'in mevcut durumuna karşı eleştirel bir tavır sergiler iken ulusüstü niteliklerin daha baskın olduğu bir entegrasyonda yer almaya istekli olduğunu, UKIP'in ise buna benzer bir entegrasyona dâhil olma fikrini reddederek Avrupa Birliği'nden ayrılmak için çağrıda bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktayım.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Şüpheciliği, Popülizm, Radikalizm, Birleşik Krallık Bağımsızlık Partisi, Radikal Sol Koalisyon

To my dear family, for their endless support and devotion

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
Brexit	British Exit from the EU
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DPP	The Danish People's Party
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EC	European Community
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
EU	European Union
EP	European Parliament
FPÖ	Freedom Party (Austria)
Frexit	French Exit from the EU
Grexit	Greek Exit from the EU
GUE/NGL	European United Left-Nordic Green Left
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
Jobbik	Movement for a Better Hungary
KKE	Communist Party of Greece
LN	Northern League
M5S	Five Star Movement
Nexit	Dutch Exit from the EU
PiS	Law and Justice (Poland)

PVV	Party for Freedom (The Netherlands)
RLPs	Radical Left Parties
RPPs	Radical Populist Parties
RRP	Radical Right-Wing Populist
SEA	Single European Act
SYRIZA	The Coalition of the Radical Left
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UKIP	The United Kingdom Independence Party
ZRS	Association of Workers of Slovakia

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1950s, the European integration has brought an unexampled transformation to Europe. What started as cooperation between the French and German coal and steel production industries has turned into a political, economic and social unification of 28 countries across the continent. Putting the unification of Germany, Yemen, and Vietnam aside, “the European Union is the only instance of large-scale political integration in recent world history” (Vollaard, 2014, p. 1). However, its history is not the only aspect that makes the European Union (EU) *sui generis*. The EU is “a complex international organization which involves a variety of different formal institutions, and which provides a large number of diverse and demanding principles and rules that regulate Member State behavior” (Phelan, 2012, p. 368).

Today, it has a single market and a common currency developed in the light of a common Economic and Monetary Policy. This policy is established by supranational legislative organs and inspected by a judicial body that is superior to any national one in the Union. As goods, services, capital, and people are freely floating across Europe; policies related to highly critical subjects like security, defense, justice, and home affairs are being constructed not by the member states anymore but by the institutions of the EU itself. Lately, the EU appears to move further towards an ‘ever-closer union’ by applying social instruments, along with longstanding economic and political ones, to “develop a common European culture into a European supra-national identity” (Stanley, 2013, p. 4). The EU citizenship which is conferred directly on every EU citizen according to the provisions of the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in 2007, the increasing use of Eurosymbolism¹ (i.e. flag, anthem, shared designs for passports and driving licenses, etc.), and a broad scheme of cooperation programs in areas such as education, research, art and sports² (Jacobs & Maier, 1998, p. 7) can be cited as the examples that are used on this path to ‘ever-closer union’.

It is no surprise that contestation among European people to such a set of transformation ensued over time. According to Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, “a series of perceived threats to the national community” (2002, p. 976) have been the primary reason for this contestation. With the fear of loss of sovereignty, national identity, or wealth, people started to question the way towards which the European integration proceeds –especially since the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which has introduced the most ambitious means of integration³. The Danish ‘No’ vote on the TEU in 1992 and on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership in 2001, the Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001, the Swedish ‘No’ vote to joining the EMU in 2003, the Dutch and the French oppositions to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, and negative outcome of the Irish referendum on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 have been the examples of the capitalization of the public scepticism towards the EU in the post-TEU period.

The 2008 Financial Crisis, the concomitant austerity measures, the Refugee Crisis following the Syrian War in 2011, and the recent Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) threat to Europe have recently fueled people’s scepticism towards

¹ For further information, please see Shore, C. (1995) *Usurpers or pioneers? European Commission bureaucrats and the question of European Consciousness* in A. Cohen & N. Rapport (ed.) *Questions of consciousness*. London: Routledge.

² The European Union has funding programmes, such as Horizon2020, Erasmus+, and Creative Europe, that are designed to invest in European-level research, remove the barriers to innovation, promote mobility among the citizens from member and candidate states, and encourage students, teachers, trainers and apprentices to study abroad. The EU has been increasing the budget for and the extending the scope of these programmes.

³ In 1992, the Treaty on European Union introduced the ‘three pillars’ structure of the EU organization. The three pillars which consist of the Single European Act (SEA), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) did not only reform the structure of the European Community (EC) through an establishment of a political union but also strengthen the economic integration with the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Thus, it highlighted the supranational nature of the EC more than the previous treaties.

supranational administration of the EU. They also have led citizens of European countries to accuse the mainstream parties of being advocates of the EU and failing to meet expectations of the public. One of the results of the people's discontent has been a shift of electoral support from the mainstream parties to Radical Populist Parties (RPPs) who seem to share the rage and concern of the ordinary citizen.

As the Eurosceptic sentiments have been growing significantly, the radical populist parties have capitalized their discourse on the issue. As a result, the European political arena witnessed more vehement and aggressive campaigns than ever during the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. The Northern League (LN) and Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, Golden Dawn and The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (PVV), The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), The Freedom Party in Austria (FPÖ), *Podemos* in Spain, Law and Justice in Poland (PiS), The Danish People's Party (DPP) and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) are some of political parties which had a strong, aggressive Eurosceptic discourse and appeared to be successful at mobilizing the electorate during the time.

The European Parliamentary Elections in 2014 was actually the first time the voters were given the power to influence the election of the President of the European Commission since it was introduced as a provision of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. It was also the first time the party candidates for the European Commission Presidency attended 'Presidential Debates' that was broadcasted by both national and the European media, and faced each other in front of the public (Clarkson, 2014). Moreover, the European Parliament (EP) launched two campaigns in September 2013, 'This time it's different' and 'Act. React. Impact.', in order to increase awareness among European citizens (Clarkson, 2014) and help them feel more included in the decision-making mechanisms. Elections were promoted as platforms for the people to be heard while the EP itself pronounced that the European politicians "want to listen to the many voices and act accordingly." ("Act React Impact", 2013)

Despite the efforts to reaffirm the principle of ‘subsidiarity’⁴, the results showed that the citizens of the EU member states were not ready to forget and forgive. While the mainstream parties did not do well in the EP elections, Eurosceptic parties gained vital achievements across the Union –even in traditionally pro-EU countries. In France, National Front came first in about 70% of the country's regions and won 24 seats. UKIP received 27.5% of the votes and sent 24 Members to the EP. With UKIP’s victory, a political party aside from the Conservatives or the Labour Party came first in an election on national level in the United Kingdom (the UK) for the first time over a century. In Spain, *Podemos*, which have had its roots in a popular social movement, *Indignados*, won 5 seats and nearly 8% of the vote, coming fourth in the country. In Greece, SYRIZA showed a significant rise and came first with 26.6% of the total votes. Interestingly, Golden Dawn, a political party that is often associated with neo-fascism and neo-Nazism (Robins-Early, 2015) came third with 9.4% of the votes in the same elections and eventually won 3 seats in the EP. The simultaneous rise of both radical left and extreme right in a single country shows that the shift in the electorate’s support is not due to a rise of one ideology specifically. It is rather an abandonment of the center-bloc parties for those that are situated at the both ends of the political spectrum.

The initial idea for this thesis came about due a paradoxical emergence of Eurosceptic, sometimes even anti-EU, members and political party groups in the European Parliament in the last decade⁵. Nevertheless, these parties’ electoral success is not limited by the EP. They have been on the rise on national elections in the last years, as well. (See Figure 1.) While the majority of political parties in

⁴ The principle of subsidiarity “aims at determining the level of intervention that is most relevant in the areas of competences shared between the EU and the EU countries” (European Commission, 2016a) While entitling the EU to intervene when it is able to act more effectively than the member countries at their respective national or local levels, the principle in fact purposes to “[bring] the EU and its citizens closer by guaranteeing that actions is taken at local level when it proves to be necessary” (European Commission, 2016a)

⁵ In the European Parliament that is formed after the 2014 Elections, the party groups the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) are known to be Eurosceptic along with numerous Eurosceptic or anti-EU non-attached MEPs. How Eurosceptic is the new European Parliament (2014, July 1). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28107633>

EU are still mainstream, the Eurosceptic parties are “currently holding 1,329 seats in 25 countries and [play] a role in government in 8 member states⁶” (Dennison & Pardijs, 2016, p. 1). As these parties keep gaining ground in their country of origin, their Eurosceptical attitudes have brought the issue of ‘European disintegration’ to the European public agenda (Vollaard, 2014; Lefkofridi & Schmitter, 2015). In fact, the discussions on potential exits of Greece from the Eurozone and Britain from the European Union have escalated during this time.




Figure 1. Approximate % of the votes won by Eurosceptic parties in the most recent national elections

The exits in question were often referred as ‘Grexit’ and ‘Brexit’ – abbreviations of ‘Greek exit’ and ‘British exit’⁷. When the pro- versus anti-bailout debate which was held before the Greek national elections in 2012 put the

⁶ The authors prefer to use the term ‘insurgent’ parties.

⁷ It is widely accepted that the term, Grexit, was coined in a report written by Ebrahim Rahbari and Willem Buiter (2012), economists at Citigroup. On the other hand, there is a disagreement on the creator of the term Brexit. It is known that the term appeared during June, 2012. Back then, there were no significant signs implicating withdrawal of the mentioned states –neither from the Eurozone nor from the EU.

possibility of a Greek exit into words for the first time⁸, only a few found it probable. However, three years later, the Prime Minister of Greece, Alexis Tsipras, indeed announced a referendum for voters to decide whether to accept a bailout deal offered by the international creditors. The referendum took place on July 5th, 2015 and the final result of the referendum, as published by the Greek Ministry of Interior (2015), was 61.3% 'No' against 38.7% 'Yes'. The 'No' vote was not followed by an instant Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone. The negotiations on the bailout between the parties continued after the referendum but the discussions over Grexit still have not ended⁹.

One year later, another shockwave -maybe one of the biggest ones in its history- hit the EU. On June 23, 2016, the UK had a referendum on its membership of the EU and actually voted to leave with 51.9% 'Leave' vote against 48.1% 'Remain'. The result of the referendum has had immediate effects on both national and EU-level. In the UK, the Prime Minister David Cameron announced his resignation, and the former Home Secretary Theresa May was assigned as the successor to him. A new government was formed, and the new Prime Minister May announced that she would respect the will of the people and give priority to Britain's exit from the EU (Dewan & Isaac, 2016). Meanwhile, several politicians from other EU member states called for their citizens to have their say on the EU membership of their countries (Lyons & Darroch, 2016). Marine Le Pen of the National Front in France and Geert Wilders of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands -two countries which will have national elections in 2017- hailed the Brexit vote in the following morning of the referendum and fueled the discussions on potential 'Frexit' and 'Nexit'. Other leaders from right-wing Eurosceptical parties and movements such as Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), *Alternative für Deutschland*

⁸ For an overview and analysis of the Greek elections of June 2012, please see Vasilopoulou, S. and Halikiopoulou, D. (2013) In the Shadow of Grexit: The Greek Election of 17 June 2012, *South European Society and Politic*, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 523–542.

⁹ For further information, please see Galpin, R. (2016, June 26). *Nervous Greeks worry Brexit may lead to Grexit*. BBC News. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36629145> and, Apostolou, N. (2016, June 24). *After Brexit, could there be Grexit?*, Aljazeera. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/06/brexit-grexit-160624155122668.html>

(AfD), and the Northern League (LN) also followed the trend by proposing variant referendums.

In order to leave the EU, the UK has to invoke the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty which gives the two sides two years to agree the terms of the split. The EU has conferred on the member states the right to withdraw for the first time with this article and no country has ever invoked it before. Therefore, the details of the break-up process and the possible consequences remain obscure but this obscurity does not seem to intimidate any of the RPP leaders who are dedicated to leave the Union.

The sceptical attitude against the European integration has become persistent and embedded at both national and EU-levels (Usherwood & Startin, 2013), and it does not seem likely to vanish any time soon. The latest Standard Eurobarometer Survey (2016) conducted in Spring 2016 made this fact clear once again. According to the survey, the EU conjures up a positive image to only 34% of Europeans. 27% of them state that they have a negative image of the EU while 38% of them remain neutral. On a national level, the positive image of the EU lost ground in 20 member states since Autumn 2015. This downward trend had also been visible in the previous Survey (Autumn 2015) with the EU losing ground in 24 member states since Spring 2015. The Spring 2016 Standard Eurobarometer also showed that the majority of EU citizens tend not to trust the EU (55%). It also demonstrated that the proportion of Europeans who disagree that their vote counts in the EU climbed up and reached 55% while only 38% of the attendants agreed on this argument.

For some, Euroscepticism can be perceived as an indicator of curiosity, awareness and interest of the people. It can be even argued to be 'healthy' since it invites ordinary people for closer examination of the policy options and thus increases their involvement in the EU's policy-making process (Milner, 2000). Similarly, having Eurosceptics in the parliament can be a gift since they speak more plain and clear than the ones blindly supporting the EU (Duff, 2013, p. 152) and therefore, make the issue of European integration easier to understand for the European citizens. For others, the increase in public Euroscepticism and support for Eurosceptic parties on national and EU-level are worrying due to several reasons: First, with Eurosceptic parties on board, the EP will probably be more sceptical of

free markets and find further integration less favorable. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front, for instance, already launched a month-long blitz against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which has been criticized for secretiveness and lack of accountability (“We must resist corporations”, 2015). Second, being in the EP will enable these parties to form a noisy opposition to initiatives of the European Commission and to cause deadlocks in the functioning of the EU organs. Finally, there will also be an indirect impact of these parties. As political parties are the key gatekeepers in the process of political representation, they will have a critical role in speeding up or slowing down the integration process by their statements and actions on their national political arena. They will have the ability to influence the domestic politics in their home countries and therefore, to constrain governments’ willingness to embark on risky European projects (“The Eurosceptic Union”, 2014). As a result, they will play a vital role in referendums over European issues as they are setting the agendas and shaping the content of politics at the domestic level.

After the 2014 EP elections, the media appeared to go along with the second group and focus on the negativity of having Eurosceptic parties in the parliament. The newspapers immediately labeled the Eurosceptic parties as those “who want to cut back the EU’s powers, or abolish it completely” (“Eurosceptic ‘earthquake’”, 2014) and accused them of dealing “a heavy blow to the European project” (“Ukip and Front National”, 2014). Moreover, they immediately started to seek for solutions to “quell voters’ ugly mood” (“The Eurosceptic Union”, 2014) and warned the public for possible “global repercussions” (“The Eurosceptic Union”, 2014). While assessing the Eurosceptic ‘earthquake’ or ‘storm’¹⁰, the majority of the media organizations tend to put all the radical parties in the same basket as if their Euroscepticism was based on the same values and beliefs. When they refer to the radical threat against the European integration, they named UKIP and National

¹⁰ Several other examples can be found on Uras, U. (May 26, 2014) *Eurosceptics surge in ‘earthquake’* *EU polls*, Aljazeera, available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/05/eurosceptics-make-big-gains-eu-polls-20145265223557836.html> or Leonard, M. (November 19, 2013), *Europe’s self-hating parliament*, Reuters, available at <http://blogs.reuters.com/mark-leonard/2013/11/19/europes-self-hatingparliament/>

Front along with SYRIZA and *Podemos*. This tendency was not solely specific to the media, either. The academic studies conducted back then also approached the radical parties in question in a similar way.

Brack (2015), for instance, focused on Euroscepticism at the supranational level and conducted a study on strategies Eurosceptic MEPs develop once they are elected. The author proposed a typology of four roles for the Eurosceptic MEPS, namely *absentees*, *public orators*, *pragmatists*, and *participants*. The problem with this typology was that while conducting interviews with the selected MEPs and calculating the numbers of their parliamentary documents to reveal the forms of “resistances engendered by this process at both national and European levels” (p. 338), the author did not make any distinction between the motivations of the left-wing and the right-wing Euroscepticisms.

Similarly, Leonard and Torreblanca (2014) included parties from both the right and the left in anti-establishment coalition which “has the power to block the appointment of the European Commission, to veto the majority of European legislation, to block the signature of international treaties and trade agreements, and even to hold up the EU’s annual budget” (p.2). Even though the authors recognize that the left-wing parties “are not Eurosceptic in traditional sense and do not share the right-wing Eurosceptics’ anti-immigration agenda” (p. 6), they claimed that regardless of their ideological background, these parties were a part of a Eurosceptic surge that possessed ‘the real danger’ to the European integration.

It is too early to say whether the concerns of the media and the academia are valid. Yet, it would not be wrong to expect these parties’ involvement in the national and European Parliament to bring a serious change in the political agenda. As Nigel Farage put it, the European integration once seemed inevitable but now, that sense of inevitability has gone (“The Eurosceptic Union”, 2014). It is critical, maybe more than ever, to understand what these Eurosceptic parties stand for, how they manage to mobilize the voters, and what they really expect from their relationship with the EU. However, this task should be done with a great discretion and sensibility. The analyses conducted on the issue of party-level Euroscepticism should leave no room

for subjectivity and exclusion. More importantly, they should not make the mistake of assuming all the Eurosceptic parties share the same expectations and objectives.

This thesis claims that despite certain seeming resemblances, the Eurosceptical political parties from the right and the left have disparate political agendas with regard to their relations with the EU. While they show similarities in the way they problematize the issue of European integration and use it in their electoral strategies, the right wing and left-wing parties have very different perceptions of the EU as an actor and as a structure. These differences can be proved historically and ontologically but in this thesis, it will be done through an in-depth analysis of the parties' and their leaders' own rhetoric on the European issue.

With this thesis, I aim to contribute to the literature on party-level Euroscepticism by comparatively inquiring how the selected right-wing and left-wing political parties establish their EU-related discourse, how they discern the dimensions of the European integration, and what they aim to achieve in their relationship with the EU. In this way, I aim to reveal the content of these parties' opposition, their use of the European integration in political competition, and the ways they differ from the mainstream parties and from each other. For this research, I adopt qualitative research methods, use a wide range of data sources, include the party leaders in the scope of analysis, cover a three-year period between 2013 and 2015, and therefore, greatly extend the scope of the earlier studies.

This thesis is comprised of five chapters. The first chapter provides an insight on the subject in question and the related developments that took part in the recent history. It propounds the necessity for further investigation on the subject and briefly summarizes the contribution this study undertakes. The second chapter presents a comprehensive review of the literature on the concepts of radicalism, populism, and Euroscepticism, which together appear to be the most salient characteristics of the parties in question. The third chapter gives detailed information on the rationale for the study, the case selection, and the data sampling

as well as the method of analysis. It is followed by the fourth chapter, in which the selected cases, UKIP and SYRIZA, are examined as examples of radical, populist, Eurosceptic political parties. The thesis ends with a conclusion chapter that indicates the main findings of the research.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2. 1. Radicalism and Populism of the Right-Wing and Left-Wing Parties

Starting from the first concept, the right-wing politics in radical or extreme forms is not a new phenomenon. Some nationalist, populist, far-right, extreme right-wing parties and movements such as *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, *Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque*, or French Poudajists can be traced back to 19th century but their presence in the modern European party system coincide with the immediate post-World War II period. Some of the political parties, which we are familiar from the political arena today, have been in fact actively involved in the European politics for decades albeit with varying electoral success (i.e. Front National, Freedom Party of Austria, Golden Dawn). Consequently, the literature on this subject is wide but suffering from a terminological fuzziness. There is no consensus on how to define the parties in question: Different studies use different terminology to identify them. *Right* (Betz & Immerfall, 1998), *Far-Right* (Marcus, 2000), *Extreme Right* (Ignazi, 1994), *Radical Right* (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997), *Populist Radical Right* (Mudde, 2007), *Anti-Immigrant* (Gibson, 2002; van der Brug, Fennema, van Heerden, & de Lange, 2014), and *New Populism* (Taggart, 1995) are only a few of the terms that have been used.

Some of these terms refer to a specific party family, like Far-Right, while others, such as Anti-Immigrant, focus on larger groups with sub-branches. On the one hand, there are no fundamental differences of opinion among the definitions of these terms: They are often used interchangeably (Mudde, 2007). On the other hand, it is claimed that only a few studies came up with unambiguous and clear definitions

for these terms (Kolovos, 2003; Mudde, 1995) which cause vagueness in the literature despite the wide range of works conducted on this topic. More and more studies are devoted to reach a consensus on this issue. Yet, the scholars are far from accomplishing this task.

In general, there are four schools of thought spotted in the literature of right-wing radicalism. The first group of scholars focuses on ‘discourse’ while working on the right-wing parties in question. They are less concerned with these parties’ ideology, their roots, or whether they are radical or extreme (Meny & Surel, 2002; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). Others tend to reject the use of the discourse as a descriptor of these parties. Instead, they tend to investigate the ideological links these parties have with neo-fascist organizations and emphasize ‘the extremist’ side of them (Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005). The third group of scholars refuse to use the term ‘extreme’ for the parties in question but rather define them as ‘radicals’ because, according to this group, these parties are not actually anti-system (Norris, 2005; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; van der Brug et al., 2014). They do not reject democracy; show any anti-Semitic or racist features; or make any policy suggestions that are beyond the boundaries of the existing political establishment. Therefore, they should be distinguished from the extreme right. The last group of scholars, in my opinion, has presented the most comprehensive and theoretically elaborated explanations. They argue that these parties’ ideological stances and the way they construct their political rhetoric are equally important in defining and understanding them. Therefore, they employ the term ‘Radical Right-Wing Populism’ (Mudde, 2007; Betz, 1994; Rydgren, 2007). It is the prepositions and approach of this fourth school that will be adopted in this thesis.

The emergence of the Radical Right-Wing Populist (RRP) parties, according to Betz (1994, p. 26-27), was “a consequence of a profound transformation of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European democracies”. This transformation, according to him, results in fragmentation, dissolution, and differentiation in the society. It also gives a way to a “flux of contextualized identities” (p.29) since it causes the elements that provide and sustain collective identities such as “established subcultures, milieus, and

institutions” (p. 29) to be eroded or destroyed. As the elements that hold the society together disappears like this, the importance of individualism increases among the people. Those who possess the ability to adapt to the conditions of the post-industrial societies -with the help of cultural capital, flexibility, and individual entrepreneurship- become ‘the winners’ (p. 29-30) of the new structure. ‘The losers’ who cannot cope with the “acceleration of economic, social, and cultural modernization” (p. 32) start to suffer from unemployment, lose their socio-economical stance, and become “superfluous and useless” (p. 32) to society.

There are three reasons why this transformation and resultant division of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ favor the emergence of RRP parties. First, the losers of this process are likely to become anxious, bewildered, insecure, and resenting (Betz, 1994, p. 33) because of the change of their status in the society. This may motivate them to return to the previous establishment where they were in a better socio-economical state. As a result, they become more likely to support any policy proposal that promises for it. Secondly, any negative development that is associated with this transformation may induce an impression that the established political parties are unable or unwilling to cope with the new circumstances. This might result in a discontent among the electorate, which eventually poses new opportunities to alternative political figures that are capable of exploiting this situation. Lastly, the transformation and the concomitant fragmentation may cause new issues, like immigration or terrorism, to become increasingly important, and the electorate to have more “differentiated and particularized values and priorities” (p. 34-35). This, as a result, may cause a decline of ‘cleavage politics’ which presume that “the political systems are built upon broad and long-standing political divisions, like center vs periphery or owner vs. worker, which emerge in the course of social and economic modernization” (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). If the established parties remain incapable of clinging to their so-called traditional lines of conflict, retaining their electorate’s loyalty, managing to mobilize the people, and sustaining their electoral strength; the particularized political supply becomes more likely to emerge.

According to Betz (1994), the radicalism of the RRP parties' derives from their rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political systems. First, they openly advocate the role of individual achievement over the role of the state, and question -not reject- the democracy as a principle time to time. This is what makes them 'radical' instead of 'extremist'. Additionally, they are populist because of the way they "diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment" (1994, p. 4), and emphasize the importance of 'the common man' and 'the common sense'. Lastly, they show the characteristics of the right-wing ideology by rejecting individual and social equality; opposing the social integration of marginal groups; and sometimes appealing to xenophobia.

Mudde (2007) adopts a slightly different approach and claims that these parties have three characteristics: Nativism, Authoritarianism, and Populism. Nativism can be defined as "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state" (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). Here, 'native' can be defined in terms of ethnic, religious, or racial components but it always has a cultural aspect. This characteristic of the RRP parties is significantly important for the parties located in Europe for two reasons. First, there is a serious intra-EU mobility of the Europeans that has been going on for several decades in consequence of the principle of freedom of movement. Second, while Europe has always been one of the main centers of attraction for the migrants and refugees from all over the world, the recent Syrian Refugee Crisis has aggravated the mass flows of people to the continent. In the light of nativism, the RRP parties are against any kind of integration -either on European or global level-, and these two reasons are likely to breed their nationalist rhetoric.

The second attitudinal element, Authoritarianism, indicates "the belief in strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely" (p. 23). The RRP parties place a strong emphasis on the importance of law and order -sometimes with an antidemocratic attitude. Accordingly, they are expected to attach importance to law enforcement and legislation mechanisms.

Lastly, Populism is defined as an ideological feature rather than merely a political style (p. 23). In populism, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupted elite’ are defined as two separate groups while they are individually homogeneous and antagonistic. It is claimed that the good people are constantly betrayed by the evil elite (Hawkins, 2010). There are no clear indicators to determine who actually belongs to the first group and who to the second. One thing that is certain is the negative attitude towards the elite (Canovan, 2004) which can be in political (politicians, government), economic (cartels, bankers, companies), bureaucratic (technocrats), or cultural (commentators, intellectuals) forms. In a populist democracy, the *volonte generale* (general will) of the people is the most important principle –even more important than human rights or constitutional guarantees (Mudde, 2004). Politics should be a direct expression of this will and not the interest of the corrupted elite (Mudde, 2004). Hostile attitudes towards anyone who takes part in the existing political establishment, from bureaucrats to political parties, from companies that fund these parties to the media that cooperates with them to deceive the citizens are very certain among populists.

Right-wing populist discourse often calls for a nativist state: ‘Our own state for our own nation’ is a very common motto among the RRP parties (Mudde, 2007). Constructing a nation-state which consists of exclusive inhabitants solely, and leaves the criminal foreigners and illegal aliens outside is essential for populists. According to Koch (as cited in Betz, 1994) there are two important elements for populist parties, integral homogenization and external exclusiveness. Not only the outsiders but also the nationals who break the strict rules of the authority should be excluded from the society unless they are willing to be rehabilitated. Compromise is out of question for anyone who misbehaves. Accordingly, strengthening the police force, elaborating the prison system, and constructing a stricter legislation system are necessary for the safety of the citizens and stability of the state.

As opposed to the radical right, it is argued that the radical left does not possess a long history in the modern party system of Europe: It was both in decline and in mutation since the 1989 (March & Mudde, 2005). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the radical left parties have shifted their ideology by either further

marginalization towards extremism or moderation towards central-left. What is left from the radical left as we knew has transformed into 'New Radical Left' by "employing new ideological approaches (...) and modern forms of trans-national cooperation" (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 24). Although they are critical against liberal democracy, the parties that adopt radical left as an ideology, just like RRP parties, are not anti-democrat. (Mudde, 2005). That is why, they are distinguished from the extreme left-wing parties. Moreover, these parties see 'radicalism' as a badge symbolizing their commitment to a systemic change (Benn, 2003; Mudde 2005 as cited in March & Mudde, 2005), and, in a way, self-describe their positions. As a result, it is widely accepted that reaching a consensus over the definition for these parties is relatively easy compared to the radical right terminology (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy, 2004; March, 2011; March & Mudde, 2005; Olsen et al, 2010).

The new Radical Left Parties (RLPs) which are on rise in the post-crisis European era maintain the old left tradition of anti-capitalism by rejecting the underlying values and principles of the existing socio-economic structure, such as income inequality, consumerism, unfair profit, and sometimes even private property (Dalton, 2002; March & Mudde, 2005; March, 2011). They call for a 'root and branch' transformation of capitalism and advocate alternative structures which involve redistribution of the resources from the economic and political elite to the common people. In addition to this legacy, they appear to have a natural affinity with social movements which concern with issues like environment, feminism, and youth. Moreover, they seem more prone to construct transnational electoral alliances and contacts via networks like the European Left Party. Although March finds the term 'European radical left' problematic (2011, p. 7), there is a noticeable attempt of RLPs to achieve a certain 'unity in diversity' (Dunphy & March, 2011) on a European level.

Populism, as mentioned earlier, is a phenomenon that is almost exclusively devoted to the radical right. Discussions on 'left-wing populism' have appeared only after the early 2000s with the emergence of Latin American leaders like Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales (March, 2011). Although it has gained popularity among

scholars in the last decade (March & Mudde, 2005; March 2007), RLP¹¹ leaders and members still find it problematic to be labeled as populists since the term still evokes “irresponsibility, demagoguery and opportunism” (March, 2011, p. 119) to them. In fact, left-wing populists, in theory, consider “the political establishment to be technically incompetent and morally corrupt” (van der Brug et al., 2014, p. 69) and distinguish ‘the moral people’ from ‘the corrupted elite’. They regard themselves as the defender of popular ‘common sense’ against the members of the establishment who hide their selfish interests behind a veil of democratic and technocratic rhetoric. “Demystification of the political elite, political resentment and external challenges to identity” (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 34) are the main drivers for them to support more direct forms of democracy and majority rule to save ‘the people’ from the nets of the bureaucracy.

The radical left populism can be identified in two forms (March & Mudde, 2005; March, 2011): Populist Socialist Parties and Social Populist Parties. The first group has a democratic socialist ideological core that is “overlaid with a far stronger anti-establishment appeal, greater ideological eclecticism and emphasis on particularistic identity” (March, 2011, p. 118). These parties’ socialist ideologies are still at the center in the face of populism. The second group of parties has a close “resemblance to classical populist movements with a dominant personalist leadership, relatively weak organization and essentially incoherent ideology” (p. 119). These parties often blend right-wing and left-wing themes under the anti-establishment appeal, their political rhetoric is unstructured, and they lack long-term prospects. March (2011) gives Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) as an example for this second group. The party was led by “demagogic Ján Ľupták [who] articulated a non-ideological anti-intellectual and anti-establishment image as the defender of blue-collar workers” (2011, p. 142). This party first had entered a coalition with populist and nationalist parties, and then started to attack them for allegedly unfair profit acquired from privatization. Moreover, while this party was

¹¹ In this thesis, I use the abbreviation ‘RLP’ to refer to the parties in question and do not add another ‘P’ for Populism in order to be in compliance with the existing literature but it should be noted that populism is accepted as a feature of these parties.

rejecting the EU membership, its written program openly and fully supported it – which, according to Lupták, was derived from a typing error (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). Because of inconsistencies as such, these parties are sometimes not included in the radical left party family.

2. 2. Support for the Radical Populist Right-Wing and Left-Wing Parties

Having the terminology enucleated for both right-wing and left-wing radicalism and populism, I can now proceed to the theories on the determinants of support for the parties that belong to these families. It has been less than a decade since the radical left ideologies have re-emerged after the collapse of communism in 1989 (March & Mudde, 2005). Although there is “a constellation of variegated parties and movements from motley backgrounds” (March, 2015) across Europe in the last years, SYRIZA in Greece and *Podemos* in Spain remain as the only ones that have received stellar results. Correspondingly, little is known about the electorate’s reasons to support the radical left. The growing body of literature consists of studies that have been conducted only in the last few years (March & Rommerskirchen, 2012; Visser, Lubbers, Kraaykamp, & Jaspers, 2013)

In their study, March and Rommerskirchen (2012) follow the ‘Supply and Demand’ conceptual framework which is originally developed for the radical right parties in their study (see, Mudde, 2007; Eatwell 2003). ‘Demand-side theories’, according to Mudde, “point to broad economic, historical, social processes” (2007, p. 202) that appear to have an impact on the support for radical parties. These processes form a demand, a breeding ground for the radical right parties although this demand does not necessarily result in parties’ electoral success. ‘Supply-side theories’, on the other hand, concentrate on parties’ strategies and establishment while including electoral systems and competition to the equation. Both theories distinguish between macro- (national), meso- (party), and micro-level (individual) explanations. Mudde (2007, p. 202) argues that almost all demand-side theories are situated at the macro-level and that they use national and international

developments, like modernization or crises, to explain the support for the radical right, while the latter's explanations are more complex since they have both internal and external determinants.

For their study, March and Rommerskirchen utilize macro-level explanations for both demand-side and supply-side theories “for reasons of practicality and clarity” (2012, p. 3). They conduct a large-n quantitative analysis which focuses on 39 radical left parties from 34 European countries. Their findings show that the success of the RLPs is “strongly rooted in demand-side factors such as poor economic conditions, high societal Euroscepticism and, above all, a legacy of past RLP success” (p. 15). To put it another way, in the countries where there is an economic hardship, widespread Euroscepticism, and a successful RLP experience from the past, the RLPs are more likely to flourish. From the aspect of the supply-side explanations, electoral thresholds and competition are found to dampen the support for the radical left parties significantly. March and Rommerskirchen also indicate that the anti-globalization and anti-EU sentiments are in fact linked and they both boost the support for the parties in question.

One interesting point to make is that “only ‘radical left’ placement of the respondents is positively linked to EU membership opposition” in the results of March and Rommerskirchen’ analysis (p. 11) “whereas ‘radical right’ is negative and not significant”. In other words, while the RRP parties are the ones that are perceived as Eurosceptics most of the time, the only linkage the study shows is between the EU-opposition and radical left.

Later, Visser et al. (2013) assessed the impact of individual-level explanations for the support for the radical left in Europe by applying ‘Group-Interest Theory’ to the individuals from European countries. The authors posit that the lower classes which hold capitalism responsible for their disadvantaged positions are, pragmatically, expected to prefer income differences in the society to be diminished. Accordingly, they are expected to be more likely to support the RLPs whose target is, traditionally, to reform the system in favor of the lower class and against the elite. Contrary to this promise, they found out that “a higher level of income inequality in a country reduces the likelihood of an individual supporting

the radical left” (2014, p. 14). They explain this unexpected result with the opportunity structure in a society that enables social mobility for the people. In other words, if the society is more open, and the people believe that they can move up to the social ladder, the public concern over income disparity is likely to reduce. Another possible explanation, according to authors, is the fragmented radical left movements in the countries, which are considered incapable of vocalizing the prominence of income inequality. Nevertheless, the authors agree that further investigation is needed to decide whether these explanations are enough to shed light on this phenomenon by themselves.

As mentioned above, for the radical right, the supply-demand side theories present one approach to understand the reasons of support. Alternatively, van der Brug et al. demonstrates four models to explain the support for the anti-immigration parties that involve both radical right and extreme right parties. These four models are socio-structural model, protest vote model, charismatic leadership model, and policy voting model (2014, p. 70).

The crux of the first model, socio-structural model, is that people who feel threatened by the rapid changes in the socio-cultural environment in their post-industrial societies, i.e. manual workers, poorly educated, and unemployed, tend to support the anti-immigration parties more than the economically stronger, well educated, white collar citizens do. Accordingly, the first group is expected to be overrepresented in comparison to the second one. However, that is not always true. Studies conducted in late 1990s and early 2000s show that “all [these] socio-demographic characteristics combined explain only seven percent of the differences in preferences for anti-immigration parties” (as cited in van der Brug et al., 2000). Although the link between the two variables, socio-structural conditions and support for anti-immigration parties, is stronger than it was before (Van der Brug et al., 2005), it still does not have much power to explain the increasing support by itself. Moreover, this model remains incapable to explain the anti-immigration parties’ very different levels of success in countries with very similar socio-structural conditions.

Secondly, the protest vote model relies on the idea that the support for these political parties arise from political discontent, which drives voters to be ‘protest voters’. According to this model, there are two elements of protest vote. First, it assumes that voters who are dissatisfied with the existing political establishment because of a certain political discontent of theirs tend to vote for anti-immigration parties to alarm or shock the political elite that belong to the establishment. Thus, protest vote is “rational, goal-directed activity” (Van der Brug et al., 2014, p. 73). Second, in order for a voter to cast a protest vote, “political attitudes (...) are expected to be of minor importance” (Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers, 2002). So, the voter penalizes the political establishment which he or she holds responsible for the discontent in question in a way which he or she does not believe will have a significant impact.

The charismatic leadership model, as the name suggests, underlines the potential impacts of the charismatic leader and the characteristics of the party. When van der Brug and Mughan (2007) test the supposedly strong bond between the party leaders and supporters for anti-immigration parties, and they reveal the fact that the impact of the charismatic leader for anti-immigration parties are only as important as it is for the mainstream parties. In other words, there is no distinct impact of the anti-immigration party leaders: Being a charismatic leader increases the potential to gain support for anti-immigration parties only as it does for mainstream parties. Moreover, regarding the party characteristics, van der Brug et al., claim that extreme right parties that “are perceived by the voter as posing threat to democracy are unlikely to be successful” (p. 75). Radical right parties, on the other hand, are often likely to surmount this perception -maybe not of the supporters of the mainstream or the radical left-wing parties but of their own voters and the voters that are close to them on the political spectrum. As a result, they are more likely become successful in parliamentary democracies.

Lastly, the policy-voting model suggests that supporters of the anti-immigration parties vote just as any other party’s supporters do –in accordance with their political preferences and motivations. The voters, according to this model, choose a party they think reflects their political positions best. They vote for certain

parties because the agenda of the party somehow shows parallelism with the voters'; the party's policies and principles reflect the interests and expectations of the supporters. Although the preceding models can be used to explain some specific groups in the anti-immigration parties' power base, this model appears to be the most comprehensive in explaining the overall support for these parties.

The most important factor in this model is the left-right spectrum. It is the most significant driver for the support as most of the issues that matters to the voters, like culture, economics, and politics are actually embedded in the ideology of the parties. The protest-vote model implies that the voter would prefer any minor radical right or left party instead of voting for the mainstream, which, in a way, indicates that radical right or left parties are not serious political competitors of the established parties but just temporary alternatives. The policy-voting model, on the other hand, reveals that the mainstream right-wing parties, which are the closest to the anti-immigration parties on the left-right spectrum, are the main competitors of the latter as they have the similar political view.

The RRP parties have never been seen as political competitors by the mainstream parties or their grass roots organizations. Today, they are receiving stronger reactions than ever because of the fear of a right-wing backlash. Parties such as Front National, United Kingdom Independence Party, and Danish People's Party are treated as political lepers, boogymen by both the media and the political establishment. These parties' harsh comments and policy suggestions on issues that are often humanitarian, like religion and ethnic origin, bring serious criticism and exclusion to them. Together with the well-known historical reasons to which Europe as a continent pay regard, they are more feared than the RLPs. However, taking the recent electoral success of the RRP into consideration, it can be argued that their exclusion is positively reflected in their voter base. These parties are turning their exclusion from the establishment into an advantage.

This brings us to Mudde's meta-theoretical argumentation on how the RRP should be approached. In his article, Mudde (2008) first explains the 'normal pathology thesis' which dates back to 1960s and presents the dominant position in the academic debate on the radical right-wing populism. The thesis in question

holds that the radical right constitutes pathology in the Western society after World War II and its success can only be explained by ‘crisis’ (Scheuch & Klingemann, 1967 as cited in Mudde, 2008). Scholars who adopt this paradigm often consider the radical right in psychological terms and associate it with medical disorders (Adorno et al, 1950; Reich, 1975; Hofstadter, 1964/2008). They find populist radical right values alien to Western democratic values and define them as a normal pathology as only a small potential of support exist for them in the societies of the European democracies. Mudde (2008) argues that even the most recent academic studies follow the suit: While working on populist radical right, the scholars tend to adopt an exclusionist paradigm; abstain from applying mainstream concepts and theories; search for some abnormal conditions to explain the support for these parties; and make decisions that are as much political as they are scientific.

Instead, he offers ‘pathological normalcy thesis’ which holds that Radical Right-Wing Populism ideologically and attitudinally constitutes a radicalization of mainstream views. In the light of this argument, there should be a paradigmatic shift in the academic study of the populist radical right. First, this topic “should be studied on the basis of concepts and theories of the mainstream political science” (Mudde, 2008, p. 10) and second, the studies should focus on supply rather than demand as the support for these parties is “generated ‘naturally’ by the complex multiethnic western democracies” (p. 10). van der Brug et al. (2014), as well, claims that the majority of these so-called dangerous anti-immigration parties are not actually as anti-democratic as they are perceived, and the voters of these parties are in fact showing great similarity with the ones who vote for mainstream parties. The main point to be emphasized here is that these parties are not lepers of the political system; their policy suggestions may not fit the existing establishment but the support they get from the electorate does not derive from some physiological anomaly. Therefore, they should be studied as such.

2. 3. Euroscepticism of the Right-Wing and Left-Wing Parties

The origins of the last and most important theoretical concept to be discussed in the scope of this thesis, Euroscepticism, lie in the land of Britain. Although it is a complex social and political phenomena that has various meanings today, when it first appeared in the British newspaper, *The Times*, on November 11th, 1985 (Spiering, 2004), it was simply used to describe Britain's doubtful attitudes towards further economic integration among the European countries. The British had been familiar with the distinguishing critical stance of their country from its continental neighbors through earlier political figures like Winston Churchill and Harold Wilson since the earlier years of the European integration. Yet, no political leader had ever used the term before (Topaloff, 2012). Later, with Margaret Thatcher's famous speech at the College of Europe which is also known as 'The Bruges Speech' (1988), Euroscepticism gained popularity and acquired the meaning of 'rejection'. As Thatcher challenged the way the European countries were integrating under the passionate leadership of Jacques Delors, she vocalized the opposition towards Brussels, drew the framework of the concept in general for the first time, and became "one of the great role models of all Eurosceptics" (Spiering, 2004). Since then, the use of the term has progressively taken root elsewhere and references to the term became more frequent "with the growth of a more critical European discourse during the debates over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s" (Harmsen et al. 2004, p. 17).

Paul Taggart was the first scholar who made a clear academic definition of the term 'Euroscepticism'. According to Taggart, Euroscepticism is "the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (1998, p. 366). Additionally, he claimed that there are three different positions towards the European Union in reality (p. 365). Firstly, there are those who take an anti-integration position and therefore, oppose to the idea of both the European integration as a process and the European Union as a project. Secondly, there are those who are not opposed to the idea of European integration in principle but question whether the European Union

is the best form of integration since it is too inclusive. Lastly, as opposed to the second position, there are those who are -again- in principle not opposed to the European integration but question the project of the European Union itself because it is, geographically or socially, too exclusive.

In a later elaboration of his work with Szczerbiak, Taggart made a distinction between 'Hard' and 'Soft' Euroscepticism (2001) of the political parties in Europe. The authors argued that Hard Euroscepticism "implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU" (p. 10), whereas Soft Euroscepticism "involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration and can, in turn be further sub-divided into 'policy' Euroscepticism and 'national interest' Euroscepticism" (p. 10). The authors also defined several methods to assess which type of Eurosceptic a political party really is (2002). For instance, if the party is a single-issue Eurosceptic party¹² whose *raison d'être* is opposing the European Union, then it is considered as a 'Hard Eurosceptic'. On the other hand, if the contestation over the European issue is only a part of the party's rhetoric, it is likely to be a 'Soft Eurosceptic'.

Despite the improvement of the original definition, Mudde and Kopecky (2002) criticized Taggart and Szczerbiak's typology in their subsequent work from several aspects. First of all, they claimed that the Soft Euroscepticism has been defined so broadly that it might cause every minor disagreement with the policy decision of the EU to be interpreted as a sign of Euroscepticism. After all, not every single difference of opinion is necessarily Euroscepticism. Another criticism from their side was that the reasons for each category to appear and the criteria to distinguish them were unclear. As a result, it does not seem possible to understand where one Soft Eurosceptic party crosses the line and becomes Hard Eurosceptic. Lastly, Mudde and Kopecky found the lack of distinction that was made between the 'ideas of the European integration' and the 'European Union as the current

¹² Taggart defines a single-issue party as a party that "exists only to express Euroscepticism and to mobilize electors on the European issue" (Taggart, 1998, p. 368).

embodiment of these ideas' unjust (2002). As a result, they developed an alternative categorization to define the party positions on European integration.

In the categorization of Mudde and Kopecky, there are two dimensions -first one to show the 'support for the idea of European integration' and the other one to show the 'support for the European Union'. These dimensions resulted in four categories, namely *Euroenthusiasts*, *Europragmatists*, *Eurosceptics*, and *Eurorejects*. Here, Euroenthusiasts represent the parties that are simultaneously supportive to the ideas of the European integration and the European Union as an institution. Europragmatists are the parties that are neutral against the ideas for European integration and yet, support the European Union. Eurosceptics, as opposed to the Europragmatists, support the ideas of European integration but are skeptical about the EU's reflection of these ideas. Lastly, Eurorejects consist of parties that endorse neither the ideas of European integration, nor the European Union itself.

Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008, p. 8-9) respond this typology with three main objections. First, they touch upon the terminological contradictions Mudde's and Kopecky's categorization has with the rest of the literature. They claim that, in general, the term 'Euroscepticism' refers to both principled and contingent opposition to the European integration and that differentiating these two aspects would lead to confusion. For instance, the typology in question requires the UKIP to be considered as Europhobic while in other studies, it is usually accepted as Eurosceptic. Second, the authors state that the 'Europragmatist' category is illogical as there is no political party, which opposes the European integration in principle but supports further deepening of the EU project. They claim there are no examples that can fit into this category in the current EU member states and therefore, it is not rational to make such a classification. Lastly, Taggart and Szczerbiak find the 'Euroenthusiast' category too inclusive as it place political parties with very different backgrounds and views in the same category. According to them, the Kopecky-Mudde classificatory remains incapable of reflecting different approaches that favor the European integration as much as it does for the ones that oppose it.

Criticism against each other's aforementioned typology and re-definition by extension continued between Taggart and Szczerbiak on one side, and Mudde and Kopecky on the other. Yet, both typologies remain as the most commonly referenced works of the literature. In this thesis, I follow Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) who argue that the operationalization and categorization of the parties get harder as the typology for Euroscepticism gets more complex and fine-grain (2008, p. 10). Therefore, I keep it as simple as possible following Taggart and Szczerbiak's Hard-Soft categorization. In fact, neither Taggart and Szczerbiak nor Mudde and Kopecky made a distinction between parties' attitudes towards different aspects of integration. They do not acknowledge that parties can have different, or even opposite, positions towards different areas of European integration. Even so, the categorization of the former appears to be more functional than the other while comparing the selected cases.

More and more studies attempted to understand the nature, the causes and the implications of Euroscepticism, and come up with different definitions and classifications in the last decade (See, for example, Forster, 2002; McLaren, 2006; Conti, 2014; Vasilopoulou, 2009). However, there is still evidence of diversity of views on these matters. Some commentators tend to explain political parties' stances vis-à-vis the European Union with their ideological underpinnings (Marks & Wilson, 2000; March & Mudde 2005; Bornschier, 2010, Hooghe et al., 2004). Marks and Wilson (2000), for instance, argue that "supranational institution building in Europe is interpreted by political parties through ideologies that reflect centuries of domestic conflict" (p. 459). According to the authors, focusing on the party families individually, rather than using national variations, would give the best explanation of the drivers in parties' responses to the European integration. Similarly, it is argued that the radical right and radical left parties have different reasons to oppose the European integration. While the former is highly focused on the issues like sovereignty, immigration, national defense because it shows authoritarian and nationalistic tendencies (Mudde, 2010), the latter is more critical against the neoliberal nature of the European integration and is "rooted in the

perception that European integration threatens cherished radical left goals” (Hooghe et al. 2004, p. 134).

As opposed to this first group, some scholars tend to explain party positions against the EU with regard to their strategic considerations within their national party system more than to the ideological roots of the parties. In his work, *Opposing Europe: Euro-Scepticism, Opposition and Party Competition*, Sitter (2002) acknowledges political parties as organizations “that seeks to propel candidates to elected office in pursuit of policy goals” with three fundamental aims: “shaping policy, maximizing votes, and gaining access to executive office” (p. 6). In the light of this acknowledgement, Sitter stresses three central variables in translation of the European question into party politics -along with parties’ ideological stances- in his later works: The importance of parties’ positions in the party system; their short and long term electoral strategies; and their office related incentives (Sitter & Batory, 2004; Sitter, 2008). Sitter further argues that a party’s opposition to the European Union has a dynamic nature that might convert into other forms over time and that the “Euro-sceptic parties should be expected to modify or avoid Euroscepticism to the extent that they aspire to or actually participate in governing coalitions” (Sitter, 2001, p. 24).

Taggart, similarly, makes a differentiation between Eurosceptic parties according to their positions in the party system. He argues that “protest-based Euroscepticism seems to be the most pervasive type of EU party opposition” (1998, p. 372) and that “any established parties that are Eurosceptical are likely to be minor parties” (p. 372). Accordingly, parties with the most negative attitude towards the EU are, most of the time, peripheral to their national party system. Later, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003) made a differentiation between ‘underlying party positions on Europe’ and ‘usage of the issue of Europe in party competition’. The former is “determined by a blend of the party’s ideology and what it perceives the interests of its members to be” (2003, p. 21) while the latter is highly related to “the party’s electoral strategy and coalition-formation and government participation tactics” (p. 21).

In conclusion, both Sitter and Taggart acknowledge that there is a difference between the party's assessment of the European integration and its pattern of Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008). While the former is the consequence of the party's ideological-programmatic factors, the latter is related to strategical-tactical ones that change due to the party's position or the electoral competition in the political environment in which it takes part. And how does this change affect the party's attitudes towards the EU? It either motivates the party to moderate or harden its stance on European integration (Sitter & Batory, 2004). For instance, a party might prefer to secure its stable, limited electoral support of their core votes by reflecting any Euroscepticism that is observed among its electorate and therefore, prefer to show signs of hard Euroscepticism. Conversely, it may adopt a 'catch-all policy' and weaken its hard Euroscepticism to broaden the party's base. In other words, "the extent to which adopting a Eurosceptic position can be expected to be a vote winner depends on the public opinion among the party's 'target' electorate and on whether the Eurosceptic space has been crowded out by other parties' (Sitter & Batory, 2004).

In this thesis, I follow the second group of scholars and claim that both the traditional ideological stances of the parties and their electoral strategies are important for them while constructing a discourse against the European integration. A party's Euroscepticism is often seen as a result of its standpoint as an anti-immigrant, nativist, anti-capitalist, or libertarian entity depending on the family it belongs but this explanation is not sufficient enough to explain what differentiates a party from the others with the same position when it comes to electoral support. Being anti-immigrant or objecting neoliberalism and the relevant criticism to the EU policies are not specific to radical populist parties that are currently on the rise. Any other party on the political spectrum may and often does have a varying degree of Euroscepticism for the very similar ideological reasons. Then why the electorate chooses to support these parties over the others?

I believe following Mudde's approach (2008) and accepting that the radical populist parties differ from the others only with the way they ideologically and attitudinally radicalize these mainstream views might give an answer to this

question. The literature on radicalism and populism tend to treat these two concepts as characteristics or part of the ideologies of certain parties and see these parties' Euroscepticism as an outcome of them but Nick Sitter actually gives a few examples of 'catch all populist strategies' among the electoral strategies in his work (2008).

Accepting that the electoral strategies drive a party to soften or harden its Euroscepticism is a useful approach but it leaves the possibility of changing *the discourse* rather than *the opinion* on the EU out. In a country with a traditionally high public skepticism against the EU and political parties representing this Euroscepticism with variant levels and types, the strategical considerations of a party might reflect not only on the extent of its Euroscepticism but the way it executes this attitude. What is more, the relationship between the radicalism and populism of a party and its Euroscepticism might not necessarily be unilateral. If a party tactically uses the negativity in political communication with a radical and populist discourse and actually gets rewarded in the elections, it is highly probable that it would attempt to escalate the discontent among the electorate which generates a continuing sequence (Figure. 2)

Taggart acknowledges that the European issue is useful for parties to take strategical positions (2008). The idea of using this issue in the elections with a radical and populist discourse to attract the electorate's attention can contribute to understand the simultaneous rise of the radical populist parties from both right and left by giving them a common ground. This would also be in line with the following paradigm shifts in the literatures of the concepts:

First of all, by applying the radical right-wing's supply and demand explanations to the radical left by March and Rommerskirchen (2012) and Visser et al. (2013) show that there is no *a priori* reason why we distinguish between the theories we use for the radical right on the one hand, and radical left on the other. There commonalities these parties and their electorate share with each other are claimed to increase by each passing day. The supporters of the radical right and the radical left often have similar opinions on certain issues with the impact of common fears like globalization, terrorism, and migration. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that the strength of the relationship between social class and political orientation

has diminished in most Western democracies since the World War II (Clark et al., 1993; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). As a result, radical parties are claimed to “become ‘proletarianized’ since the 1990s” (March and Rommerskirchen, 2012) and to start mobilizing the socio-economic strata which consists of unskilled working class, unemployed, and people on low-incomes (Norris, 2005). That being the case, the old depiction of the political spectrum as a linear left-to-right continuum is sometimes challenged by new approaches.




Figure 2. Continuing sequence of the relationship between Euroscepticism, and Populism & Radicalism

The political “Horseshoe Theory” which is attributed to Jean Pierre Faye (as cited in Visser et al. 2013) suggests that, instead of a linear bar with the far-left on the one end and far-right on the other, the political spectrum should be represented as a horseshoe (See Figure 3). On this horseshoe, the two ends should be closer to each other than they are to the center in order to symbolize the proximity of the edges. This interpretation is originally used to describe the party positions in Germany in the 1930s, from Communists to Nazis (Mayer, 2011) but later the

debate on ‘the converging extremes’ (Please see Adorno et al, 1950; Eysenck, 1954; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Transue et al., 2008).




Figure 3. Illustration of the Horseshoe Theory

According to this model, these far-right and far-left parties resemble each other with the ways they choose to achieve their goals (Visser et al. 2013). It implements the way these two sides of the spectrum are distinguishing from the more mainstream values such as socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. Recently, the arguments of this model is contested by Mayer (2011) who conducted a comparative research between the voters of two presidential candidates in France and demonstrated that these voters “do not occupy the same political space, (...) have the same social background, and (...) hold the same values” (p. 102). A similar conclusion was reached in a comparative studies of the activists of the extreme left and extreme right (Chirumbolo et al., 2006) and of the supporters of Le Pen and Besancenot, who voted ‘No’ during the referendum in France (Brouard & Tiberj, 2006). Therefore, even though the references to this theory increased by number in the last years, it is too early to accept its validity.

Secondly, Mudde (2004) claims that the Europe is witnessing a populist *Zeitgeist*. According to him, both the mainstream and radical left parties are increasingly using populist rhetoric. Thus, it is argued that populism is contagious (March, 2011; Bale et al., 2010; Meny & Surel, 2002), almost every political party tends to adopt it. Mudde interprets this trend as mainstream politicians’ attempt to

counter the populist challengers. It is also claimed to be a response to the socio-cultural developments that took place in the last decade: First, accession to the reliable and comparable data today makes it easier for people to see how corrupted the elite is. It also shows people that the gap between them and the elite has grown. Second, as the media gained independence from the political establishment, it started to focus on extreme and scandalous aspects of politics that strengthened anti-elite sentiments within the population. Lastly, as the people become more educated and emancipated, they become more aware of their expectations from the politicians and feel more competent to judge them. While Mudde's arguments might be true, they indicate a trend that involved all the political parties in the system rather than a specific convergence of the radical right and the radical left. Therefore, it does not conflict with the arguments of this thesis.

Finally, Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2012) recently contested the idea that radical right and radical left parties take opposite positions when it comes to issues related to the European Integration. They, instead, argued that radical parties from both left- and right-wing 'share elements of nationalist ideology leading to a common Eurosceptic stance' (p. 2). According to the authors, while the first group supports the civic elements of nationalism, the latter emphasizes the ethnic nationalism. Yet, both party families are argued to see the European integration as "a threat to the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation" (p. 506). In their study, Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou make a note for the case of SYRIZA, stating that SYRIZA's ideological position has not been examined in detail "because of its constantly changing structure and membership" (p. 10). Despite this explanation, representing SYRIZA as one of the most nationalist left-wing parties conflict with what is argued in this thesis. Moreover, even though SYRIZA gives a significant place to the Greek state and citizens, as it will be demonstrated in the following chapters, there is no sign of an interpretation of the European integration as a threat to the integrity of the Greek nation. Their study might be an important contribution to the literature of Euroscepticism with its approach but the findings of Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou remain incapable of demonstrating the Euroscepticism of SYRIZA at all points.

In the light of the discussions that are mentioned above, it is possible to claim that there is no significant evidence of disappearance of the traditional ideological stances of the parties. Therefore, one may still expect to see fundamental differences in the radical-right and radical left parties' perception on the European integration. However, considering the studies on the resemblances of the electorate or the shared populist discourse, identifying several common grounds of the parties seems possible as well. In this thesis, I question whether these resemblances are sufficient enough to accept that these parties threaten the European integration in similar ways and to put them in the same basket of Euroscepticism.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3. 1. Rationale for the Research Method

This chapter provides an overview of the operationalization of the method that is adopted for this research. Focusing on the Euroscepticism of radical populism parties, this research attempts to explore three issues: Specific contents of the selected parties' contestation against the European integration, strategic and ideological elements of their discourse a vis-à-vis the European Union, and the aspects they differ from the mainstream parties and from each other with respect to their Eurosceptic stances. Given the vastness and variety in the literature on Euroscepticism, one would think that every aspect of this phenomenon –including the ones that are listed above- has been studied with an application of different approaches on different groups of subjects. However, that is not the case. The studies that were conducted after the 2014 EP elections are mostly focused on one specific party (Nikolakakis, 2016; Sutcliffe, 2010; Ford et al., 2011); one country or region of Europe (Ciani & Conti, 2014; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002); or parties from the same historical background and party family (Vasilopoulou, 2009; Rooduijn, 2015; Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015). Even though there are numerous analyses that inquiry the concept with larger-scaled samplings including parties from the both families (Aguilera de Prat, 2013) a comparative analysis of the contemporary left-wing and ring-wing Euroscepticism together in detail is still lacking.

Another lacuna in the literature stems from the preferences on method and sampling among the scholars. There is a dominance of quantitative research methods in the studies on Euroscepticism (with an exception of Gregor & Mackova, 2015), which points out the need for qualitative analyses of the concept. While quantitative research provides a respectable statistical data on issues such as electoral success, future support, or demographic profile of the voters, it falls short to explain why these parties show sceptical attitudes toward the EU or how much they resemble each other.

Last but not least, the studies on Euroscepticism predominantly use ‘Euromanifestos¹³’ as sources of analysis (i.e. Caiani & Conti, 2014; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2012; Garcia, Fernandez & Miguel, 2010; Reungoat, 2008). The reasons for this is because these documents are assumed to “[be] rich in reference to the EU, provide valuable information on the party’s official stance, and represent (...) the main methodological tool to assess party positions on political issues” (Ciani & Conti, 2014, p. 186). It is true that Euromanifestos provide great information on political parties’ perception on the European integration. Yet, they are formal documents that accommodate very little unofficial, exclusive interpretation, which, in fact, can be crucially illustrative about the way a party frames the issue of European integration in its discourse.

This study intends to contribute to the literature by conducting a comparative analysis of one Radical Populist Left-Wing Party from the Southern Europe, SYRIZA, and one Radical Right-Wing Populist Party from the Northern Europe, UKIP. It employs qualitative research methods and uses a broader array of data sources, which include the documents that parties and the leaders have published on their websites for a 3-year period. It systematically disintegrates the parties’ rhetoric on the European issue, illustrate the resemblances and the differences these parties have in their approaches to the EU; acknowledges the time factor in explaining a party’s Eurosceptic rhetoric, and by this means, brings novelty to the discussion of the subject.

¹³ Euromanifestos are party programs that are issued by political parties ahead of the European Parliamentary elections.

3. 2. Case Selection and Data Sampling

The main objective of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis of the Euroscepticisms of the two radical populist parties that are tend to be studied together after the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections in order to investigate whether they have similar perceptions on the European integration like they are often claimed to. In line with this objective, the selection of the two cases, SYRIZA and UKIP, was made among the other radical populist parties according to the following reasons: First, both parties took part in the latest EP elections in 2014 and showed a significant success. They have the greatest national party representation in the EP among the political parties in their countries, with 24 MEPs out of 73 for UKIP and 6 MEPs out of 21 for SYRIZA. While they keep gaining support in electoral terms in the last decade, most of the Eurosceptical parties still do not have such representation, and some of them even refuse to take part in European-level politics. Considering that SYRIZA and UKIP had straight-put Eurosceptic discourse during the elections, the fact that they gained the greatest support to take part in the EP decision-making mechanisms, form party groups, and have Eurosceptic, sometimes anti-EU, representatives within the Parliament offered an interesting paradox.

In the following year, both parties participated in national elections and received an important share of vote. UKIP gained 12.4% of the total vote compared to 3.1% in 2010 (BBC, 2015), and became the third party although it could only gain one seat in the parliament. SYRIZA, meanwhile, had claimed 36.34% of the total vote in January and 35.46% of the total vote in September, becoming first in both elections (Hellenic Parliament, 2015). The national electoral participation and success of these parties are important for two reasons. First, it indicates that these parties have been and possibly will be active and influential in the political arena in the short term. Secondly, the elections lead the parties in question to produce national and EU-level documents such as manifestos, press releases, campaigns flyers, speeches, and articles. As a result, they extend and diversify the data to be collected.

Another reason of the selection of these cases is that the European integration appears to have a significant importance for both SYRIZA and UKIP. The appearance of the speculations about exits from the European Union in Greece and the UK, in my opinion, was not coincidental. Greece and the UK have very different socio-economic and socio-cultural historical backgrounds. The former is a Southern European country that has struggled from the austerity programs more than any other country in the continent did. It is the major entry point for refugees and migrants who try to enter the EU. Therefore, it has felt the impacts of the recent crisis very acutely. The latter, on the other hand, is one of the wealthiest countries in the EU, located in the Northern Europe, and therefore, affected less from the 2008 financial crisis, the austerity measures, or the migration flows. Moreover, Greece was once one of the biggest supporters of the European integration while the UK is known for its endemic Euroscepticism. It has always kept its distance with the EU's ambitious integration policies. Despite these historical differences, there is one thing these countries share today: a high level of public Euroscepticism. In fact, a recent report published by Pew Research Center reveals that 'about the two thirds of both British and the Greeks (...) want some powers returned from Brussels to national governments' (2016, p. 2). 68% of the Greeks and 65% of the British are against to 'ever closer union' and want to curtail EU power. According to the report, citizens of Greece and the UK, along with French citizens, have the least EU-favorability with only 27% of the Greeks and 44% of the British (including 53% of the Scottish) have a favorable opinion of the EU. Moreover, plurality of SYRIZA supporters (68%) wants their national government to regain their powers while majority of UKIP supporters (93%) request the same for their own.

At this point, it is not clear whether the public Euroscepticism drives the political parties to construct a more critical discourse against the EU or the political parties strategically do it to mobilize the people to reflect their discontent with the institution more visibly. Either way, a high level of public Euroscepticism among the citizens would provide the perfect ground if a party competes for electoral success in order to hinder the European integration as it is recently claimed.

One thing that should be kept in mind here is that SYRIZA is not a homogeneous party. It is a coalition of radical left movements and also the main pillar of the government in Greece. This makes it tricky to distinguish party politics from the government politics. It also makes it harder to define the discrete oppositions or enthusiasm towards the EU from different formations within the party. The selection of the primary sources might eliminate the first problem. The documents for SYRIZA and Tsipras were collected from their official pages solely. Therefore, it can be said that the content of these texts were appropriated by the party and the leader, and presented under the name of them. At that point, I believe, we do not have the chance to distinguish any hidden opposition within the coalition but accept what is presented as the perspective of the establishment. The second problem, however, still stands as a note to keep in mind.

As for the data the data sampling, I included interviews, articles, press statements, manifestos, and speeches which were published by the selected parties and the party leaders on their websites for three years between 2013 and 2015 in the dataset for this study in order to form a more comprehensive opinion about SYRIZA's and UKIP's stances against the EU before, during, and after the latest European Parliamentary elections. The extent of influence of a party leader on a party or on electorate is indeed difficult to assess. However, it is a factor one cannot ignore while studying discourse of the political parties. Keith (2007) defines the democracy as a 'governance through talk' (p. 2) and the leader is who does the talk. In most cases, the leader is the face of the party. Thus, the leader's rhetoric, ability to communicate with the public, and the way he or she constructs the discourse affect the people's perception of the political party but more importantly, give remarkable clues of the party's stance and mindset.

While the party documents adopt a more formal language and give us the information about party's policy recommendations and agenda, the documents that belong to the leaders provide an insight about the way the party' perception of certain events and actors. After all, a party is not a black box that generates decisions and judgements but a group of people that league together around certain ideas, beliefs and values. The person these people choose to represent them, I

believe, is a valuable source of information in that sense. That is why, I also sampled the documents the leaders of these parties published in the selected period.

While the documents SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras shared on their websites were sufficient enough to reach a saturation point, the limited number of document UKIP and Nigel Farage published on their websites fell short for this purpose. Therefore, data sampling continued from the party's and the leader's official social media accounts randomly. While the number of documents for UKIP is still relatively low, the party manifestos, which are actually very long and detailed texts, give the necessary information.

In the end, 176 documents were collected for the four actors. No visual or audio data was included in the analysis. The beginning of the data collection is set at the date of the first posted document (20.01.2013). The collection ended after the saturation point was reached for UKIP and SYRIZA (16.12.2015). Further information about the collected data can be found in Appendix A.

3. 3. Method of Analysis

In keeping with the aim of the thesis, first, I establish a conceptual and historical framework of the concepts that I refer during the analysis. In that sense, I present a literature review on "Radicalism", "Populism", and "Euroskepticism" to provide an insightful background for the following empirical analysis and to relate the findings of this thesis to previous knowledge on the subject. Unfortunately, this review only includes the most commonly cited elements in this research due to the limited scope of the thesis and therefore, cannot be taken as an exhaustive account of the studies available on subjects in question.

In the Findings chapter, first, I analyze the parties' interpretation of the existing political structure, the problems to which they draw attention, and the policy recommendations they make to change it. Next, I focus on both the parties' perceptions on democracy, representation and the ordinary people-elite division. I also analyze the representation of the actors in parties' discourses and distinguished

the *Us* versus *Them* categories for each party. By doing so, I both investigate the most salient characteristics that are attributed to these parties and approach them as elements of strategic considerations they parties take into while constructing their Eurosceptical discourse.

In the next section, I focus on the ideological aspects of the parties' Euroscepticism and conduct an in-depth analysis of their discourses on the EU to discover the specific contents of opposition. For this purpose, I utilize Caiani & Conti's (2014) method which they used to explain Euroscepticism of governmental and extra-governmental institutions in Italy. For their research, they "focus on 'frames', namely the 'cognitive schemes' that 1) help people give a meaning to social and political reality; 2) guide the choices of organizations; and 3) mobilize potential adherents" (p. 185) in order to understand the political ideology, interpretation, construction of reality of the political entities they investigated.

In this thesis, I follow Snow and Benford (1992) like Caiani & Conti did, and interpret frames as an "interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one's present or past environment" (p. 137). A frame, therefore, can be seen as a model of understanding which is produced and presented by actors—in this case political parties and their leaders—in order to influence or mobilize people's perception and understanding of social events and situations. Just like the name implies, it distinguishes the picture from the wall, brings what it is believed is important to front. In this case, the picture is what the parties want to be heard. The discontent or the political opportunities to exploit are not just 'out there'; they "have to be cognitively perceived, constructed, defined and mediated into public discourse, i.e. 'framed', to become a basis for action" (Caiani & Conti; 2014, p. 185) (Also see Snow et al., 1986; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

In the analysis, I consider three frames like Caiani and Conti did: *Diagnostic*, *Prognostic*, and *Motivational*. The first frame "refers to the identification of some events or aspects of social life as problematic and in need of alteration that need to be 'fixed' or 'changed'" (Caiani & Conti, 2014, p. 185). This frame often comes with

an attribution of blame to certain individuals, groups or structures that are believed to have caused the problem in question. The second frame suggests a general line of action or “possible strategies to be adopted to solve these problems” (p. 185) while the last one underlines “the motivations to act on the basis of this knowledge” (p. 185).

I also use the aforementioned frames along with four dimensions of the European integration: *Political*, *Economic*, *Legal*, and *Cultural*. This distinction is made in order to demonstrate the different aspects of European integration the parties find most problematic. The Political dimension includes subjects like enlargement, intervention, bureaucracy, and relations with the third parties. The Economic dimension is mostly represented by the austerity, actions taken after the financial crisis, neoliberal policies of the EU and their implications. The Legal dimension focuses on the law-making and law-enforcement mechanisms of the EU and their supranationality over the national systems. Lastly, integration with the other EU-member states’ citizens, standpoints against the candidate countries, and reaction towards migrations and refugees are discussed under the Cultural dimension.

It is important to note that these dimensions are in fact strongly intertwined. While Nigel Farage talks about the possibility of integration with the migrants, for instance, he mentions the burden they cause to the British economy criticizes the EU’s open door policy and complains about how the Britons cannot deport the foreign criminals because of the laws the EU imposes. In order to eliminate this complexity and approach the analysis more systematically, I make use of the QDA Miner software and a codebook (See Table 1), which includes the codes I developed inductively (by drawing from the documents themselves) and deductively (by considering the implications from the literature review). The coding was made according to the most related dimension the statement indicate and was undertaken by myself. I also developed metadata for the samples I had collected through variables that allow to match, array, or compare the documents on the parties and the leaders:

1. Title (Title of the document)
2. Actor (Whether it belongs to UKIP, SYRIZA, Tsipras or Farage)
3. Type (The type of the document, i.e. Statement, Article, Interview)
4. Date_Created (The publication date for the document)
5. Date_Collected (The date when the document was retrieved)
6. Priority (Whether the document possess a significant importance for the analysis)
7. Europe (Whether the document is highly occupied with the European issue)

At the end of the chapter, I discuss the ideological and strategical factors for each party's Euroscepticism and reveal the differences and resemblances they have. Moreover, I discuss the implications these findings might deduce on how these parties should be approached.

Table 1. The Coding Scheme that is used in the Analysis of the Documents

Coding Scheme used in the Analysis of the Documents			
Category	Sub-Category	Definition	Keywords
Political	Pol_Diagnosis	Political events, developments and aspects that are identified as problematic and need alteration.	European Institutions, European Commission, European Parliament, European Council, Council of the European Union, Democracy, Human Rights, Transparency, Supranationality, Subsidiarity, Intergovernmentalism, etc.
	Pol_Prognosis	Possible strategies to be adopted to solve the identified political problems.	
	Pol_Motivation	Intended outcome of solutions for the identified political problems.	

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Economic	Eco_Diagnosis	Economic events, developments and aspects that are identified as problematic and need alteration.	Troika, European Central Bank, IMF, OECD, The World Bank, Euro, Eurozone, Taxes, Austerity, Unemployment, Unemployment, GDP, Income, Foreign Aid, TTIP, Job Market, Workers, etc.
	Eco_Prognosis	Possible strategies to be adopted to solve the identified economic problems.	
Economic	Eco_Motivation	Intended outcome of solutions for the identified economic problems.	
Cultural	Cult_Diagnosis	Cultural events, developments and aspects that are identified as problematic and need alteration.	Migration, Refugees, Enlargement, Islam, Islamophobia, Xenophobia, West, East, North, South, Candidate Countries, etc.
	Cult_Prognosis	Possible strategies to be adopted to solve the identified cultural problems.	
	Cult_Motivation	Intended outcome of solutions for the identified cultural problems.	
Legal	Lgl_Diagnosis	Legal events, developments and aspects that are identified as problematic and need alteration.	Legislation, European Court of Justice, Acts, Laws, Supranationality, Law Enforcement, Deportation, Criminals
	Lgl_Prognosis	Possible strategies to be adopted to solve the identified legal problems.	
	Legal_Motivation	Intended outcome of solutions for the identified legal problems.	
Actors	Us	Actors that are perceived as 'Us'.	NA
	Them	Actors that are perceived as 'Others'.	

Table 1 (Cont'd)

	Pos_Comments	Positive comments and descriptions about the actors.	
	Neg_Comments	Negative comments and descriptions about the actors.	
Radicalism	Radicalism	Statements that imply radicalism.	Authoritarianism, Establishment, Order, Change, Transformation, Anti-System, Nativism, Libertarianism, etc.
Populism	Populism	Statements that imply populism.	Common will, Ordinary Citizen, the Elite, Democracy, etc.
Conspiracy	Conspiracy	Statements can be related to conspiracy.	Hidden agenda, secret meetings, secret agreements, etc.
Emphasized	Emph_SYRIZA	Issues that are emphasized by SYRIZA.	NA
	Emph_UKIP	Issues that are emphasized by UKIP.	NA
Other	Quotations	Other statements to be used in the analysis.	NA

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4. 1. Radicalism of UKIP and SYRIZA

In this chapter, I investigate UKIP and SYRIZA as examples of radical and populist parties, first, individually and then, comparatively. Here, it should be noted that these two concepts are closely interwoven in the coded segments. Even if I address them separately in order to be more systematic and to avoid repetition, the first two sections can be grouped together into one brief statement summarizing the way the selected cases vary from the mainstream parties. Later, I focus on the parties' Euroscepticisms and demonstrate the similarities and differences they have with regard to their stances against the EU. Finally, I revisit the premises that were adopted at the beginning of this study in the light of the findings of the research and make recommendations for future studies on the subject in question.

In the documents, SYRIZA proudly declares itself as a party of democratic and radical left. The party is claimed to have roots "in great independence, anti-fascist, democratic and labor movement struggles in Greece" (64) and to comprise "many different ideological currents and left cultures" (64). Allegedly, the members of SYRIZA want to demolish the old regime "with battles big and small, political and social, through elections and grassroots movements" (108). Their ultimate aim is "not just to rescue the economy from the death throes of neoliberal austerity" (56) but also "to change the dominant capitalist paradigm" (56) once and for all. This aim sums up "the claims and demands of the working classes and oppressed social groups" (53) from "the perspective of 21st century socialism" (53).

SYRIZA further professes that its identity is built through “a synthesis of the values of the labor movement with those of the ecological, feminist and other new social movements.” (64) That is why, there are three flags on the party’s logo: red, green and purple. This new “renovative, revolutionary, and liberationist Left” (53) seeks for a wide consensus and unity for political change in Greece but it appears that the national change of the Greek state is only the beginning of a wider international transformation. SYRIZA’s electoral victory is expected to be “a political multiplier, in favor of the European anti-austerity movement” (91), which “would create, on its own, the conditions for policy change and a new political balance in the entire European Union” (91). In line with this target, the party “aims at joint action and political alliance of the Left” (53) across Europe. Throughout the documents, there are numerous references to alliances with other left-wing parties and movements in Europe, such as *Die Linke*, *Podemos*, and Dutch Socialist Party.

Hereby, SYRIZA appears as a typical example of the new radical left. It holds on to the traditional values of the traditional left but also shows a new approach towards regionalization and globalization. It does not reject the existing socio-economic system but calls for a fundamental transformation of it. In line with this target, the party collaborates with the grass-root organizations and civil movements, and seeks for transnational alliances for a wider impact of its ideological achievements. Furthermore, it carries traces of secularism as it emphasizes the importance of “the principles of the separation of powers and the separation of church and state” (53).

UKIP, meanwhile, brings itself forward to “offer an alternative of direct democracy” (175). Just like SYRIZA, it appears to have peace with its reputation as a ‘radical party’ since it emphasizes that “at a time of great difficulty (...) you have to be radical” (165). In the documents, the three established parties are accused of being “all social democrats” (163) and offering the exact same policies which, in fact, fail “to engage with the electorate” (118) and speak for them. In return, UKIP is there to “bring a breath of fresh air into politics and offer the electorate a real alternative to the old status quo” (175).

According to Nigel Farage, UKIP members and supporters do not “want business as usual” (145). Instead, they “want real change” (145). What they are fighting against is “a *coup d’état* on nation state democracies” (145), which has taken away the people’s sovereignty and ability to govern themselves. Ultimately, they want to get rid of the “three parties that have virtually merged into one” (164) and make sure that members of the next generation of the British “can grow up in a country that they can call their own” (164). In this new establishment, “everyone who finds that Westminster does not represent them or seem to understand their needs” (111), especially “the weakest in society” (112) will be represented by UKIP. UKIP will “bring back power to the people with common sense, local policies which will make people's lives easier” (171).

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the term ‘Radical Populism’ implies that *how* a party tells is as much important as *what* a party tells. A radical party, by definition, is critical against the establishment; it seeks for a transformation of the existing structure. That is why, it is not surprising that both UKIP and SYRIZA challenge the political systems they are involved. It is, however, interesting that they share a similar discourse while doing so. For instance, in the party documents, UKIP repeats certain claims that might often be qualified as conspiracies about secret negotiations of the EU bureaucrats over TTIP, the EU’s malevolent moves to establish an EU army, the Labour’s “deliberate plan to ‘open up the UK to mass migration” (175), and the way Cameron becomes “a big supporter of the free movement of people” (135) with a single visit of Angela Merkel. It also constantly implies that there is a hidden agenda, which is followed by the mainstream politicians and bureaucrats “without people realizing what [is] being done to them” (145).

SYRIZA, similarly, warns the public by stating that “one can only suspect political motives behind the institutions’ insistence” (6) on application of the provisions of the memoranda. It brings up the dilemma which entails between a realistic exit plan for the economic crisis or a “the prospect of a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, along the lines of Julius Caesar” (25). In addition, there are numerous references pointing out the Greek state being treated as “the guinea pig in a huge

neoliberal experiment” (71) with the help “threats and blackmail[s]” (38, 40, 41, 45) made with the help of “loan sharks”, “oligarchs”, “cartels”, “companies”, and “media”. Party leader Tsipras, too, frequently repeats how the Greek people have been fooled, how the promises were not kept, and how the mainstream parties have lied to them.

Following these claims, both parties do not only emphasize the need for change but also how *they* alone can meet this need. Tsipras, for instance, announces that “[t]his is the time for the reforms that [the] country needs and which no government ever sought, because there were commitments with powerful interests” (1). He further stresses the necessity for a “left-wing party that feels the pulse of the times, knows what’s at stake and is after a wide consensus and unity for political change in Greece” (27). UKIP, likewise, declares that “[p]olitics in Britain needs a radical shake-up” (173) and that “UKIP is the party to get change moving” (173). According to the leaders of both UKIP and SYRIZA, the change they will bring needs to be radical. Tsipras argues that “when democracy conquers fear and blackmail (...) it also leads to redemption, and a way forward” (16) while Farage asserts that “[w]hen the country’s in trouble, you do need to be radical” (165). In a way, both leaders legitimize the stances of their parties’ unorthodox positions in the political system.

Finally yet importantly, these parties complain about the way they are alienated in the established political system in a very similar manner. Tsipras accuses former Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Samaras of “trying to present SYRIZA as an internal enemy” (61) and “mobilizing reserves from the state and para-journalism to spread insinuations, slander and baseless rumors” (61) about the party. Farage similarly states that “[t]he real threat to the old establishment isn’t so much votes cast but an existential threat to their entire way of thinking” (118). According to Farage (118), the party hierarchies divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’: In this division, ‘us’ is who decide and ‘them’ is who comply. Consequently, “UKIP is ‘them’ personified” (118). Finally, just like Tsipras, Farage accuses the former Prime Minister of the UK of “throw[ing] abuses at” (154) UKIP members and labeling party members as “‘nutters’ and ‘closet racists’” (154).

The similarities in the UKIP's and SYRIZA's radical discourses end here and points of conflict that arise from the ideological differences of the parties start. For instance, SYRIZA bases its anti-establishment position upon civil commotion against the brutal reign of capitalism. It represents and cooperates with women, youngsters, political and social activists. UKIP, on the other hand, does not appear to have any organic bonds with social movements that accommodate issues like ecology or feminism. On the contrary, UKIP promises to "end wasteful EU and UK subsidies to 'renewable energy scams' such as wind turbines and solar farms" (174, 175), which serve no purpose but "add hundreds of pounds to household energy bills" (172). While there are several references to the 'anti-establishment movements' in UKIP's documents, the definition and scope of these movements are not indicated clearly.

In addition, UKIP sometimes mentions "active and growing LGBT group within UKIP" (159) and the gay candidates standing for UKIP in the elections (159). However, it should be noted that in the mini manifesto that was released for Christian citizens, UKIP states that it "oppose[s] same-sex marriage legislation because it impinge[s] upon the beliefs of millions of people of faith" (176). In the same manifesto, the party repeatedly emphasizes the Christian culture of the country and shows negative attitudes towards euthanasia and abortion by stating it will encourage compliance with the existing legislations but also will "make gender abortions illegal" (176) in the UK. The emphasis put on religion by UKIP, along with party's other conservative statement constitute contradiction with SYRIZA's libertarian plans to weaken the influence of an official state church.

Another difference between UKIP's and SYRIZA's radicalism derive from their eagerness for international cooperation in the new establishment they will construct. While SYRIZA often calls for a Pan-European movement against austerity, UKIP does not appear to put an emphasis on such solidarity with the other radical right-wing parties. The party is a member of the EFDD group in the European Parliament, and yet there is no sign of eagerness through party documents for cooperation and solidarity with the other members of the group. The names of

the other parties or their leaders are seldom mentioned, showing parallelism with the nativist nature of RRP parties.

Finally, UKIP's radicalism differs from SYRIZA's as the party shows a great ambition to "support the Police" (174) and make them "more visible in the streets" (171) just as the radical right-wing literature suggests. To UKIP, terminating the cuts to the police force and increasing the number of "sworn and warranted police officers" (171) are highly necessary to strengthen the "internal national security [which] has been weakened again and again" (171) in the last years and to safeguard Britain's communities against suffering "from an unacceptable level of crime and anti-social behavior" (174, 175). There are signs of authoritarianism in UKIP's approach to national security as it suggests that not only the police forces but also the military forces should be extended and empowered because "the world is aflame with conflict" (173). UKIP argues that the British "need a well-resourced, properly manned and fit-for-purpose defense capacity" (171) for the sake of "the nation unprepared to face emerging threats" (171). For this purpose, UKIP even states that it "does not believe now is the time to be talking about or proposing nuclear disarmament" (171).

Meanwhile, in the documents of SYRIZA, the police are represented as a repressive power that collaborates with the political offices against the popular movements and protects "the fascist thugs" (56) against the immigrants who are under continuous attack in Greece. Moreover, SYRIZA frequently states that it will "act in favor of peace and democracy" (72) and "will fight for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the removal of foreign military bases in Europe" (72) since "the struggle for peace is in the DNA of the Left" (109).

In conclusion, the two parties show resemblances in the way they construct their discourses against the establishment in which the mainstream parties and the European Union take part. They demonstrate severe opposition to the way the political system operates, complain that they are tried to be precluded by other actors, legitimize their radical rhetoric by emphasizing the hard times the countries are getting through, and highlight their essential roles in the process of transformation. However, despite these certain seeming resemblances, the parties

differ in terms of their ideological stances. First, SYRIZA focuses on the cooperation among the actors, who share the same objectives, within the country and across Europe. It shows a more universalistic approach while UKIP seems more disconnected from other social movements and isolated from its European partners with the impact of nativism. Second, as opposed to SYRIZA, which claims to be committed to a secular breakthrough, UKIP puts forward the conservative, sometimes religious, characteristic of the party. Finally, SYRIZA underlines the importance of dialogue to achieve a consensus and unity in the society. UKIP, on the other hand, pursues a more authoritarian approach and gives ‘order’ priority over ‘unity’ in the society. While the former favors disarmament and nonproliferation, the former tends to put forward the role of the state and the law enforcement agencies in the face of enemies both inside and outside, who try to seize the control of the country. Despite the fact that both parties are considered simply ‘radical’, the differences in their approaches should hold us from considering them in the same group. If one attempts to study them together, he or she should at least acknowledge the fundamental divisions of opinion that are mentioned above, and avoid simplification.

4. 2. Populism of UKIP and SYRIZA

Nigel Farage might be upset with the *us* versus *them* approach of the political establishment against UKIP but in fact, that is exactly what he and his party do and this goes true for Alexis Tsipras and SYRIZA. In accordance with the literature on populism, there is a polarization made among the actors, which is derived from a sense of belonging, in the discourse of the selected parties and leaders. They identify and place themselves within a network of societal structures and relations, and accordingly, represent these structures and relations as *us* in their discourse. The ones, which these parties and leaders feel distant to or excluded from, are framed as *others*. Here, it should be noted that this polarization should not be understood as an implication of ‘allies’ and ‘enemies’ necessarily. *Us* versus *them*

polarization can be rather interpreted as “widespread methods of ideological manipulation” (Lauk, 2002, p. 4) or a “dimension, in which speakers of one group (...) generally tend to present themselves or their own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms” (van Dijk, 2011, p. 4).

In the previous section, while I address the radicalism of SYRIZA and UKIP, I made several references to their populism when necessary. In this section, first, I elaborate on the tenets of populism for each party by adverting their remarks on democracy, representation, and social bases in detail. Then, I analyze the *Us* versus *Them* approach of the selected cases. I start with coding and calculating the times each and every actor was mentioned in the documents of parties and leaders. By doing so, I demonstrate which actors take the widest place or possess the most importance in the discourse of SYRIZA and UKIP. After that, I focus on how the actors are described and presented. I inquire whether the way they are portrayed is in line with the populist literature and whether traditional classifications of actors for left- and right-wing still exist. Finally, I inspect the way the EU is painted as an actor for each party and investigate if there are any resemblances in the discourses or signs of usage of populism as a strategy in terms of parties’ Euroscepticisms.

Starting from UKIP, in the documents, Nigel Farage frequently states that people got tired of old same policies and politicians who are “so removed from the society they are supposed to serve that they have forgotten what it was they were in politics to do in the first place” (118). According to Farage, the current politicians “are not like their electorate, other than they eat and sleep” (119). They are maintaining different lives than the rest of the people even as they eat the “food in taxpayer-supported cafeterias, and they sleep without the worry of where to find the next meal to put on the table or coin to put in the meter” (119). He claims that he and his party want to “make politicians once again the servants of the people and not their masters” (122). According to him, no UKIP member is “concerned with the trappings of government, with the ministerial car, or with cabinet positions” (112); they are not like the “leaders of the so-called main parties, none of whom have ever had a job, lived in the real world” (154).

Nigel Farage further claims that they are “a party for the people - all the people”. He calls for everyone “who finds that Westminster does not represent them or seem to understand their needs” (111) to join UKIP. He asserts that UKIP will not be a part of “the establishment in Edinburgh [that] is an interchangeable professional class divorced from reality and living within a bubble of entitlement and bloated subsidy” (119), and that they will never “sacrifice the weakest in society to get what they need” (112) like the current politicians do. Finally, he states that UKIP is there to help the struggling Britons regain the control and to give the country back to them. UKIP also promises that the party is there to “bring back power to the people with common sense” (171) and apply “local policies which will make people's lives easier” (171). Accordingly, UKIP is there to put the people first. Furthermore it is claimed to be “the only party being honest about immigration, jobs and housing” (172).

Allegedly, UKIP councilors “come from different walks of life and really understand the communities they represent” (175). They know who the real boss is: They are ready to answer to the needs of the British citizens, “[roll] up sleeves and getting the job done” (171). Moreover, UKIP councilors are “expected to follow the best interests of their constituents, not just toe the party line as the other parties instruct theirs to do” (174). That is why, UKIP does not prescribe what they will do but leave this job to the electorate.

In the documents, the actor that is most mentioned by UKIP and Nigel Farage with a positive tune is the party itself (See Figure 4). UKIP is represented as “the only political force vigorous enough to perform [a] service for the nation” (121). It is claimed to be the “people's army of millions of supporters”, a formation that is “represented in all four corners of the United Kingdom” (159), and the only major political institution left in Britain that “still cherishes [the] Judaeo-Christian heritage” (176). What is more important is that UKIP introduced as a savior since it is supposedly the only party that is “prepared to get to grips with the immigration crisis” (122), “protecting British Jobs” (174), and “listening to what people want” (172). As a result, it is claimed to be the party people “can connect with and be proud to support” (122).




Figure 4. Most important actors: *Us* in the discourse of UKIP and Nigel Farage (%)

Note: Only the categories which reflect more than 5% of 2654 coded segments in total are presented here. (= 73.62% of total actors that were coded as “Us” for selected cases)

After the party itself, people that belong to different social groups in the society comes second in the list of actors that are attributed a positive image by UKIP and Farage. This category includes workers, front line army and medical personnel, single parents, disabled people, elders, self-employed small business owners, the veterans, the homeless, or anyone “who [has] to earn a proper living and strive to pay their own bills” (122). According to Nigel Farage, these fair and decent people “are facing the worst economic crisis of modern times” (148) because of the ineptitude of the current leadership and certainly deserve to “voice their concerns on the street, in public halls and (...) the occasional public house” (121).

Following, the British state and citizens come third and fourth in the list. UKIP asserts that Britain is an amazing country which “is not merely a European country, but part of a global community, the Anglosphere” (171). It is “a country

respected on the world stage” (171) with a great history of which it should be proud. Moreover, it has “a compassionate, caring nation” (171) who has “a commonsense idea of how [to] control [their] borders, of what [their] relationship with Europe should be, of what [they] should be doing about the looming energy crisis” (163). Although their voices have been entirely absent during the tenures of successive Labour and Conservative governments, they allegedly have set out to revise the entire system and regain the control of their countries.

In the documents, I also found several references to other countries and nations but, as mentioned earlier, UKIP does not put any significant importance on them even when they are attributed a positive image. Other than that, the actors who are addressed as a part of the collective *Us* identity constructed by UKIP and Nigel Farage consist of the British government of which UKIP will be a part, armed forces, anti-establishment movements, small businesses, and international organizations. However, these categories individually correspond to very small shares in the coded segments.

Against the actors mentioned above, the EU comes first among the ones that UKIP sees as *Others* (Figure 5). In the documents, the EU is described as an “undemocratic, bureaucratic and ultimately failing project” (176), which “crushes democratic rights and then actually crows about it” (152). It is introduced as an “empire, ever seeking to expand” (142) and “a club that costs [the] country a fortune” (161). According to UKIP, the EU is not a trading bloc for which Britain had signed up but “a failing super state” (171) with which the British should break loose immediately.

Beyond the EU, UKIP and Farage address other political parties and their governments among the actors to which do not feel close. Professedly, these parties assemble an “interchangeable professional class divorced from reality and living within a bubble of entitlement and bloated subsidy” (119). They deny the ordinary people, have no interest in looking after the citizens, and “let down students, parents and the elderly” (174). They are “no more than an intellectual metropolitan clique (122), and their governments -as it is expected- have not given the British people “a free and fair say on their future in Europe” (112). Also, the Prime Minister of

this government supposedly “has lost touch with the grass roots” (174), “broken too many promises” (174), and lied to the citizens by pretending that Britain “can restrict free movement and remain members of the European Union” (141).




Figure 5. Most important actors: *Others* in the discourse of UKIP and Nigel Farage (%)

Note: Only the categories which reflect more than 5% of 1965 coded segments in total are presented here. (= 76.74% of total actors that were coded as “Others” for selected cases)

Neither UKIP as a party or the leader Nigel Farage seem to show any desire to get into a deep cooperation with the third countries or nations. Of course, there are references to trade deals, memberships of international organizations, or financial aids that will take place with these countries, such as founder-members of the World Bank, the Commonwealth countries, or major players in NATO. Yet, neither Farage nor UKIP appears to have any special bonds with them. They mostly focus on the sake of Britain and develop relations with other countries accordingly.

The other actors that are excluded by UKIP and Farage are the European institutions, the British politicians, and the immigrants. Both the party and the leader accuse the European institutions for trying to make the British citizens ashamed of being British and “the two bosses of the European Union” (158), namely Donald Tusk and Jean Claude Juncker, of being 'chattering classes' who “denigrated [the British] culture” (171) and “highlighted [its] failings as a country, rather than celebrating [its] successes” (171). As mentioned previously, the British politicians are introduced as people who have no desire but to chase “a career path, from college to researcher to adviser to backbencher to minister” (118). According to Farage, these politicians ‘have ever had a job [or] lived in the real world” (154) and that is why, they are not capable of developing empathy with the ordinary people.

UKIP tends to generalize the people coming to the UK as “young, male, economic migrants, many of whom (...) behave in a rather aggressive manner, quite the opposite to what you would ever expect to see from any refugee” (124). Although the immigrants¹⁴ sometimes referred as the victims, they are not welcomed by the party the leader. They are rather seen as a crux of many problems, which the British people have to face but actually should be solved by the other countries that are involved or the EU itself.

Finally, the other actors who constitute the rest of UKIP's and Farage's *Others* list can be summarized as big businesses and the elite, the media, and all the misbehaving people from noisy neighbors that disturbs the locals to dangerous criminals who pose threat to the security of random citizens.

As for SYRIZA's and Tsipras' perceptions of actors, the Greek state and the Greek nation are very prominent among the mainly quoted *Us* characters (See Figure. 6). In the documents, Greece is described as a state that “opts for freedom, democracy, dignity, and social justice” (54) while the Greek citizens are illustrated as “the people that are brutally affected by the crisis in their everyday life” (53).

¹⁴ The ones coming from SYRIA, not from the other European countries like Bulgaria or Romania

The society “who may in turn be suffering, doubting, deliberating, expecting, and hoping” (108) are expected to end “the modern Greek tragedy that [they] are living through” (64) and gain back “the Greece of the intellect, of creation, of art, of thought, of dialectics, of questioning, that even in the darkest time know how to keep the light of civilization burning” (54). In the documents, there are references to both the Greece of yesterday, which was a country of democracy, popular sovereignty and pride, and the “Greece of tomorrow that cancels the memoranda, that puts an end to policies of subjugation, humiliation, and destruction” (54). The current state of Greece under the rule of mainstream parties who collaborates with the European politicians, however, is not attributed a positive image and therefore, does not take place in the *Us* list.




Figure 6. Most important actors: *Us* in the discourse of SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras (%)

Note: Only the categories which reflect more than 5% of 3452 coded segments in total are presented here. (= 78.39% of total actors that were coded as “Us” for selected cases)

Another actor that is included as a member of *Us* for SYRIZA and Tsipras is the social groups which include the labour, the poor, the pensioners, the housewives, the elderly, the unemployed, the homeless, the youth and many others. According to SYRIZA, these people are the vast majority who “have experienced poverty and indignity all these years” (45) and “[have borne] the oppressive burden of the Memoranda” (61) even though they “were not responsible for creating the circumstances they were facing” (38). To defend the interests of this social majority that were socially and ethically crushed during the years of the Memorandum's assault, SYRIZA and Tsipras call for “a national government with a massive popular support and the willingness to say ‘Enough’” (89). This government will be able to “set on the table the real demands and the preconditions for an exit from the crisis” (81) and supported by “all the social forces who have an interest in fighting corruption, cronyism, clientelism, and public sector inefficiency” (56). During the first two years of data collection, 2013 and 2014, this ‘government’ category is more of a fictional formation that represents SYRIZA’s and Tsipras’ best version of a government. After SYRIZA wins the national elections and become the first party, however, it is used to describe the existing government under SYRIZA’s ruling. In this government SYRIZA has formed, Tsipras claims that they were able to bring all the leaders of the political parties together “despite the ideological differences, despite issues that divide [the people] within the country” (43). In this context, SYRIZA, the fifth most mentioned actor of the *Us* list, is represented as “a unified, mass, democratic, multi-tendency party of the Left” (53), which “feels the pulse of the times, knows what's at stake and is after a wide consensus and unity for political change in Greece” (23).

Just like UKIP and Farage, SYRIZA and Tsipras also see the social movements (especially the Left), international organizations, and small businesses among the actors that are close to them. However, there are three actors among SYRIZA’s and Tsipras’ *Us* list that do not appear in the list of UKIP and Farage. The first two of them are the European Union and the European people. Just like they do with the ‘state’ and the ‘government’, SYRIZA and Tsipras make a differentiation between the EU of today and the EU of tomorrow. Accordingly, the

EU they see as one of them is the latter which is the “Europe of solidarity, economic and social security, employment and prosperity” (91). In this new Europe, “all the democratic and sensitive citizens” (93) who are against austerity are welcomed without looking at their ethnicity, religion, or nation as they will “together and united, co-decide for [their] future” (68). Lastly, immigrants are seen the “victims of the deepening humanitarian crisis” (53), who need the help of the Greek people rather than being accused of criminal invaders. Regardless of their status -migrant, refugee, or asylum seeker-, they are accepted as a part of the society to which they should be helped to integrate as soon as possible.

The Greek government of the time and the parties that take part in it are the most mentioned actors that are regarded as *Others* (See Figure 7). According to Tsipras, “the Greek governments created a clientelistic state for many years” (42), “supported corruption” (42), and tolerated “the interdependence between politics and the economic elite” (42). Similarly, the antecedent government has implemented “the worst, most disastrous policies that [the] country has seen in peacetime” (26). Tsipras claims that the members of that government were so uninterested in defending the nation’s interests that they “would have preferred that [SYRIZA] accept the devastating societal measures in line with the decisions of the previous government to not expose their political weakness and ineffectiveness” (47). The political parties, allegedly, did nothing but “executed orders and at the same time executed the Greek people” (50) for a long time. These parties’ members “who in recent years did not pay their share in the crisis and transferred their money abroad undisturbed” are accused by SYRIZA of deliberately pursuing the same policy that destroyed the country. That’s why they are supposedly be the main reason for people to support SYRIZA instead.




Figure 7. Most important actors: *Others* in the discourse of SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras (%)

Note: Only the categories which reflect more than 5% of 1585 coded segments in total are presented here. (= 81.51% of total actors that were coded as “Others” for selected cases)

According to SYRIZA and Tsipras, the Greek governments and its members were a part of a team that has ruined the country. They constituted the forces of old system who “schemed and incited fear, hand in hand with the most ruthless of the lenders” (108). Therefore, the team also included the European actors such as politicians, institutions, and the Troika itself. According to Tsipras, all these actors “seem more intent on dividing Europe” (40) rather than unifying it as they blindly repeat the policies of “a cruel and socially unjust neo-liberalism” (38) and “abduct it from its democratic tradition” (41). Their policies do not only affect Greece but the entire Europe because the EU under their rule only give its peoples “austerity,

unemployment, poverty, a fall in the standard of living and diminished expectations and prospects for the future” (91). Together, they created a “Europe that redistributes income to the rich and fear to the poor” (91), “a Europe that protects the market of monopoly, submits to money” (68) and a Europe that “doesn't work as a shield for the weak against the powerful” (68).

In the documents, there are also references to mysterious “tax evaders and black market barons” (108), who are protected by the political establishment and work with them in decimating the country’s future. These Greek oligarchs supposedly hide behind a legalistic protective shield and are responsible for “the destruction of the domestic market and the shrinking of the economy” (108). In cooperation with the Greek and European politicians, they “led the middle classes to a dead end, increased the debt claiming it was sustainable, and finally bequeathed to [the Greeks] a country on its knees faltering under the burden of the debt and the commitments” (108). According to Tsipras, these business owners control the media (29) and use it as a manipulation mechanism to protect the commercial and business interests. The media establishment that work for these business owners and the banks that give them huge loans are two actors of “the triangle of the corrupted relationship” (34) along with the political system. They are held responsible for the tragedy Greece has been facing, along several others like the armed forces, the far-right movements, and the international organizations.

The analysis shows that there are several resemblances between SYRIZA’s and UKIP’s populist discourses. First, both parties appeal to the common men against the corrupted elite. They frequently propound the will of the virtuous citizens as the essence of democratic politics and declares themselves as devoted servants of the people. They find the existing system and its members defiled and incapable, and thrust themselves to the forefront to change the entire establishment.

Second, both parties evidently use an exclusive and severe *Us vs. Them* rhetoric that divide the social, political, and economic actors surrounding them. This rhetoric comprises generalization, polarization, and accusation. It is not possible to determine whether this language is a sincere expression of opinions or a deliberate attempt to manipulate the people’s opinions. However, the SYRIZA

case shows that the political rhetoric hardens or softens depending on the party's position in the so-called establishment. This matter will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Finally, the EU is seen as one of the main reasons of the countries' dreadful situation by the both parties. It is criticized for being inefficient and nontransparent, involving in power relations, and dragging its citizens to suffering and indignity. Both the institution and its members are seen unreliable and dishonorable. It is indicated by both SYRIZA and UKIP that they need to change radically.

The division of opinion between the parties start here. While SYRIZA declares its desire to transform the EU for the better for both Greece and the other member states, UKIP clearly opposes the idea of involving in such an entity. That is why, the EU appears in both *Us* and *Others* lists of SYRIZA –with its current version in the former and its future version in the latter. While SYRIZA rejects to be a part of the EU as it is now, UKIP rejects the current and future alternatives once and for all.

Another difference between these two parties emerges from their ideological backgrounds. It is true that the current governments, the other politicians, the elite, and the media are common members both SYRIZA's and UKIP's *Others*. In addition to that, SYRIZA often uses the expression 'the people', and includes the members of other nations in its rhetoric. The parties' presentments of immigrants and the armed forces are also very different from each other. That is why, these actors appear in different categories for each party. Finally, there is a tricky appearance of social groups in UKIP's *Us* category, which can be interpreted as a shift in the traditional right-left rhetoric. It is true that UKIP mentions social groups more than SYRIZA numerically. This is mostly because of the long and very detailed manifestos the party published but more importantly, the members of the social groups in these texts -workers, housewives, disabled, elderly, children, etc.- refer to the British citizens. It is their nationality rather than their social status which is emphasized by UKIP. Therefore, it cannot be interpreted as an example of traditional left-wing concerns for social equality and egalitarianism. Similarly, when SYRIZA refers to the Greek state, it implies a principled organizations that

will bring welfare and prosperity to its citizens rather than an authoritarian, suppressive surveillance mechanism. As a result, even though the parties resemble each other significantly with the way they construct their populist discourse, the content of their populism differs after a certain point.

4. 3. Euroscepticism of UKIP and SYRIZA

At the outset of this section, UKIP's and SYRIZA's stances against the European integration as a concept and the European Union as a practitioner of this concept will be analyzed. As explained in the previous chapter, this analysis will be conducted with a categorization of four cognitive frames: *political*, *social*, *economic* and *cultural*. Each frame is also divided into three sections: *prognosis*, *diagnosis*, and *motivation*. The reason behind this methodological scheme is to analyze *why* UKIP and SYRIZA oppose to the certain aspects of integration and the institution, *how* they plan to solve the problems that originate from the policies or practices of the EU, and *what* they intend to achieve with their suggested solutions in detail. After SYRIZA's and UKIP's discourses are dissected individually but simultaneously for each dimension, I explain how their perceptions of the idea and practice of the European integration are connected with their ideologies. Then, I show the differences and similarities these parties have with regard to their evaluations of the given dimensions.

Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate that both SYRIZA's and UKIP's discourses on the European integration are multidimensional. They both identify series of problems related to all dimensions with variant intensities. For SYRIZA and Tsipras, economic dimension of the European integration has the most importance as it covers 50.71% of all coded segments. The political dimension is coming second after economics with 28.90%. They are followed by cultural dimension with 17.13%. Lastly, legal dimension of integration appear to take a really small place in the discourse of SYRIZA and Tsipras as it only corresponds to the 4.25% of the coded segments.




Figure 8. Division of categories in the coded segments for SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras (%)

Number of coded segments in total: 564

For UKIP and Farage, the order of priority for the dimensions of the European integration changes prominently. In the coded segments, the cultural dimension of the European integration takes the biggest place with 35.06%. The political dimension comes second in UKIP's and Farage's agenda with 27.47%. Economics follows with a slight difference, responding to 27.11% of the coded segments. Lastly, legal dimension of the European integration comes fourth with 9.52% on the list for UKIP and Nigel Farage.




Figure 9. Division of categories in the coded segments for UKIP and Farage (%)

Number of coded segments in total: 559

While these percentage distributions demonstrate that the importance the parties put on each dimension of European integration differ significantly, they do not give any details about the specific contents opposition. In order to clarify this subject, I retrieve and analyze the coded segments in detail below. Thereby, I reveal and compare SYRIZA's and UKIP's diagnoses, prognoses, and motivations for each dimension with their own statements.

4. 3. 1. Economic Dimension of European Integration for SYRIZA and UKIP

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Diagnoses for the Economic Dimension of Integration

Starting from the economic dimension of the European integration (See Table 2), SYRIZA claims that "the humanitarian crisis" (53) in Greece in a peacetime is

nothing but the inevitable consequence of a failed and destructive policy of “the troika of the European Union, IMF, and European Central Bank, with Germany playing a dominant role” (53). In a way, it “revealed both the inadequacies and the limits of the process of neoliberal European integration” (92). The integration “which is itself enveloped by a mere replica of the German Bundesbank under the title ‘European Central Bank’” (92) and “centered on financial liberalization and a monetary union” (92) is claimed to create “manmade poverty” (59) in the Southern European countries including Greece. That is why, in the countries like “Portugal, Spain and Italy, many businesses are trapped in a spiral of debt” (59). To SYRIZA, the Euro is “treated mostly as a vehicle of the German policy” (53) and “deepens inequalities between countries and between classes” (53). Similarly, the Monetary Union “divides its member states” (55), “divides the societies of its member-states” (55) and causes “social polarization” (55) since it is “responsive only to the needs of finance capital” (55). SYRIZA accuses not only the European Union but also successor Greek governments for approving the memorandum that is “a concentrated attack of the capital on the rights and achievements of the popular and labor movement” (54).

Tsipras shares similar arguments with his party on this matter. He draws attention to the current policies of the European Union that “generate poverty, unemployment and insecurity” (26). He claims that the rescue programs and the Memoranda “exacerbated the great injustices” (42) in Greece; they led to “the slow death of [the Greek] economy and the impoverishment of [the Greek] society” (15); and they brought “tremendous economic destruction” (4). He, however, does not see these failed policies as sincere mistakes of the European Union. To him, “the Memorandum was not just an economic mistake, a bad program, an oversight” (35). On the contrary, he accuses the European Union of “utilizing the crisis in order to rewrite the political history of Europe” (26) and using “duress and blackmail” (15); and the European Central Bank of “insist[ing] on asphyxiation tactics” (38). He often mentions “traps by the Memorandum establishment -both within Greece and abroad” (38) and secret deals with “various small and big cartels of established interests, which attempt, even today, to control public administration and the

economy” (1). He often underlines the tragedy that the Greek people are facing due to the austerity measures that caused poverty, unemployment, homelessness, and cuts in social services.

Table 2. The Economic Contents of Opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP against the EU

Economic Contents of Opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP against the EU					
Subject of Opposition	Category	SYRIZA	Subject of Opposition	Category	UKIP
<u>Economic Policies</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The policies of the Troika, together with Germany are destructive and condemned to fail.	<u>Economic Policies</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The EU is run by the big banks, the big businesses and big politics under German rule.
		D. 2. They generate poverty, unemployment, insecurity, and inequality.			D. 2. The EU's economic policies cause misery for the southern Mediterranean Eurozone countries
		D. 3. The process of neoliberal European integration has limits and inadequacies.			
<u>Economic Policies</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 4. The European integration which is centered on financial liberalization and a monetary union causes manmade poverty.	<u>Economic Policies</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	
		D. 5. The Euro is a vehicle of the German policy; it deepens the inequality among the member states.			

Table 2 (Cont'd)

<u>Economic Policies</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 6. The Memorandum causes a humanitarian tragedy in Greece.	<u>Economic Policies</u>		
		D. 7. Memorandum is a deliberate, concentrated attack of the capital.			
		D. 8. The EU utilize the crisis in order to rewrite the political history of Europe.			
		D. 9. The European institutions use asphyxiation tactics, duress, and blackmail for the sake of their own interests.			
	<u>Prognosis</u>	P.1. Find a collective, credible and definite resolution of the debt crisis.		<u>Prognosis</u>	P.1. End the open door policy for the European workers
		P. 2. Replace the Memorandum with a National Reconstruction Plan.			P. 2. Give British workers priority.
		P. 3. Initiate the Thessaloniki Program for financial recovery and redistribution of burdens and incomes.			P.3. Reregulate the taxes.
		P.4. Organize a European Debt Conference.			
		P. 5. Secure meritocracy, transparency, equal opportunities through Europe-wide reforms.			
<u>Economic Policies</u>	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 6. Make the EU accept a 'New Deal' to fight unemployment and to finance its future	<u>Economic Policies</u>	<u>Prognosis</u>	
		P. 7. Bring a stable tax system			
		P. 8. Fight corruption			
	<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Save Greece from being turned into a debt colony		<u>Motivation</u>	

Table 2 (Cont'd)

<u>Economic Policies</u>	<u>Motivation</u>	M. 2. Make the state an exemplary case of social protection and development			
		M. 3. End the Europe of neoliberalism, austerity, and minority.			
		M. 4. Establish the Europe of solidarity, economic and social security, employment and prosperity			
			<u>Cost</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. Being a member of the EU is too expensive.
				<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Leave the EU and spend the money on the NHS.
				<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Use the money to support the local people
			<u>Trade Relations</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The trade relations between the EU and the UK are unbalanced.
					D. 2. Britain is restricted by the EU and is unable to form its own economic relations with other countries and institutions.
				<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Leave the EU but keep trading with it.
			<u>Trade Relations</u>	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 2. Form new economic relations
				<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Rejoin the world and give the country the place it deserves.

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Prognoses for the Economic Dimension of Integration

As a solution, SYRIZA supports “a collective, credible and definite resolution of the Eurozone debt crisis” (91, 92) and calls for “a National Reconstruction Plan that will replace the Memorandum” (101). It wants to “renegotiate the loan contracts and cancel [the lenders'] onerous terms, conducting an audit” (53). It also requests “a European Debt Conference, predicated on the 1953 London Conference for Germany's debt” (91, 92) several times in the documents. Moreover, SYRIZA states that “Europe needs a ‘New Deal’ to fight unemployment and to finance its future” (55) and that they will “commit [themselves] to tackle any possible threats and blackmails from the lenders with all the possible means [they] can mobilize” (53) in order to achieve this goal. Tsipras, at the same time, brings Thessaloniki Program forward and underlines the necessity for “a program of financial recovery and redistribution of burdens and incomes” (50). This program is especially designed to be “expanded to cover food, housing, electricity” (35) and by so, to prevent the “humanitarian disaster” (53) the austerity measures have brought. He also demands “meritocracy, transparency, equal opportunities everywhere” (1) in Europe and credible Europe-wide reforms that respect social justice. Last but not least, he offers to establish a new “genuine European Central Bank, acting as lender of last resort not only for banks but also for states” (91).

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Motivations for the Economic Dimension of Integration

The initial aim for both SYRIZA and Tsipras, according to the documents, is “to prevent [their] country from being turned into a debt colony” (53) and not to “submit [themselves] to obligations taken on by others mortgaging the country” (53). They both claim that they want to “transform a state of the Eurozone from a neoliberal experiment to an exemplary case of social protection and development” (65). Coupled with that, they state that they “want Europe but (...) not neoliberalism” (91); “the Eurozone but (...) not austerity” (91). They are constantly

calling for “a democratic and progressive reorientation of the European Union” (92) by ending “neoliberalism, austerity and the so-called European societies of two-thirds, where 1/3 of society behaves as if there were no economic crisis and 2/3 suffer every day, more and more” (92). In this new establishment of theirs, the new Europe “redistributes income to the rich and fear to the poor” (55, 91, 92); it is a “Europe of solidarity, economic and social security, employment and prosperity” (91, 92). While the European Left is announced as the actor who “has the political vision and courage to build a wider social consensus on the programmatic goal to reconstruct Europe” (28, 92); “the financial oligarchy that has been left untouched by the four years of the crisis” (103) is declared as an enemy that is promised to pay for what it has done to the Greek people.

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Diagnoses for the Economic Dimension of Integration

The most emphasized matter by UKIP and Farage in terms of economic dimension of the EU integration is the cost of being an EU member state. Both in the party manifestos and the documents related to the party leader, it is asserted that the EU approximately costs Britain “£50 million a day” (111, 164, 168, 172). According to Farage, the Britons are “pouring money into bailing out Eurozone countries” (111) that should have never joined the Eurozone in the first place. Farage blames “the big banks, the big businesses and big politics” (127) for the “endless misery for the southern Mediterranean Eurozone countries” (146). He alleged that these countries were forced to join this structure and actually used by Germany, which “has a currency that is undervalued by 20% with a growing and massive trade surplus” (124) thanks to the German exports to the Mediterranean countries after the 2008 financial crisis. According to Farage, because of the profit it derives from the other European countries, Germany will do anything in its power to prevent the breakup of the Eurozone.

Another point Farage attracts notice is the unjustness in the EU-UK trade relations. Farage remarks that the EU sold [the UK] nearly 46 billion pounds worth of goods more than [the UK] sold them. He acknowledges that around 40% of Britain's overseas trade goes to the EU member countries but he also states that this ratio "declines every year as the EU itself becomes a smaller part of the global economy" (154). Moreover, he complains that ""the regulations of that market affect 100 per cent of the British economy" (162) while "[o]nly 15 per cent of the British economy is exporting goods to the European Union" (162).

Lastly, UKIP mentions "Britain has not negotiated a single trade deal since 1975" (171). According to UKIP, "[a]s a G7 member, a leading world economy" (171), it is unacceptable for Britain to be a "hostage to the trade deals which the EU allows [it] to be a part of" (112) and not have a seat in the World Trade Organization (WTO) while even the countries like El Salvador is represented there.

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Prognoses for the Economic Dimension of Integration

Nigel Farage affirms that Britain is "the biggest trading market in the world for the Eurozone" (162) and it surely "will continue to trade, buy and sell goods and services back and forth between Britain and Europe" (162) regardless it is member of the political union or not. He also argues against those who claim that the US will end its trade relations with the UK in case of Brexit. According to him, under no circumstances the US politicians would end its relations with "their oldest and closest global ally, UK, with whom they do enormous amounts of business" (162). As a result, he suggests that Britain should "have a simple free trade agreement with the European Union" (162) like Norway, Iceland and Switzerland do and have "the ability to make [its] own global trade deals with the emerging economies of the world -many of which, incidentally, are in the Commonwealth" (159).

UKIP, like Nigel Farage, assures that "Britain will continue to trade with the EU after Brexit" (171) and adds that saying otherwise "is a deliberate deceit on the electors of [the] country" (171). Moreover, it draws attention to "[m]ore than

sixty non-EU countries [that] have trade deals with the EU” (171) including “the six of the top ten countries that export to the (...): China, Russia, the USA, Japan, India and Brazil” (171). According to UKIP, Britain should leave the EU as soon as possible and “begin the process of undoing the damage caused by the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats” (172). For UKIP, “ending the current 'open door' arrangement for European labour” (171), reducing the overseas aid budget; removing the VAT from certain consumer goods, scrapping “the 2008 Climate Change Act and the EU's Large Combustion Plant Directive” (173) and encouraging the “British businesses to choose to employ British workers first” (173) come early on their ‘to-do list’. However, at the top of the same list, comes the money that will be saved by leaving the EU. UKIP emphasizes that Britain is able to “save £53 Million every day” (174) without the “EU directives adding artificial and detrimental costs” (174, 175). One of the biggest promises of UKIP’s election campaigns is to spend this money on NHS.

UKIP’s and Nigel Farage’s Motivations for the Economic Dimension of Integration

The biggest objective of UKIP as stated by the party itself to “rejoin the world” (162). Farage asserts that they want Britain to “have far more influence globally on trade by being an independent country with [its] own seat at the WTO, but - more important than that -with the ability to make bilateral trade deals” (162). UKIP also declares that they want the country to negotiate its own trade deals -in a stronger position and by looking out for the British interest. In addition, UKIP states that they “would like to help lift nations out of poverty by offering them free trade deals - which they can only do outside the EU” (176). According to UKIP, the party wants to spend the British taxpayers’ money “on the NHS, education, supporting older people and the disabled, defending our nation, honouring the military covenant, helping get the jobless into work, maintaining vital public services, and cutting the debts” (176) instead of spending it on the EU.

4. 3. 2. Political Dimension of European Integration for SYRIZA and UKIP

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Diagnoses for the Political Dimension of Integration

Regarding the political dimension of the European integration (See Table 2), SYRIZA and Tsipras criticize the EU for being “distant from the peoples of Europe in all respects” (91) and “alienating its citizens” (91). According to them, the troika is “actually leading Europe to division and polarization” (84). They also state that the European institutions in general are “lack of transparency, lack of legitimacy and lack of accountability and credibility” (91). Here, they again emphasize the German affect, claiming that the institutions’ decisions are all “German-inspired” (91). They point out the current establishment as the reason of people’s “apathy, distrust and Euroscepticism” (91). They also warn the EU by stating that “if the current neoliberal and authoritarian policies are not reversed, catastrophe awaits Europe and the world” (71) as they lead to “further decline of democracy, increase in poverty and inequality, destruction of the environment, the inexorable rise of extreme right-wing and fascist forces” (71).

Table 3. Political Contents of Opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP against the EU

The Political Contents of Opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP against the EU					
Subject of Opposition	Category	SYRIZA	Subject of Opposition	Category	UKIP
<u>Supranationality</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The EU is distant from the peoples of Europe.	<u>Supranationality</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The Britons lost their sovereignty to the EU.
		D. 2. Current neoliberal and authoritarian policies need to be reversed.			D. 2. The British politicians have no power over the faith of the country.
		D. 3. They lead the EU to division and polarization.			D. 3. The EU is ruled by the out-of-sight, unaccountable, pan-European bureaucratic elite.
		D. 4. The European institutions are lack of transparency, legitimacy and accountability and credibility.			
<u>Supranationality</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 5. Their decisions are all German-inspired.	<u>Supranationality</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	
	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. The should extend the scope of public intervention and popular participation		<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Leave the EU.
	<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. The EU must rediscover its original principles of peace, democracy and social justice		<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Get back the rights of self-government.
		M. 2. The EU should fight with nationalism, chauvinism and the extreme right".			
		M. 3. It should respect the popular sovereignty.			

Table 3 (cont'd)

<u>Security and Defense</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	P. 1. The EU needs to end its so-called humanitarian interventions.	<u>Security and Defense</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The EU is not about peace but power, division, and disharmony.
		D. 2. These interventions are undemocratic and anti-European.			D. 2. The EU Army cannot be formed and the British troops cannot operate under European command.
		D. 3. They undermine the authority and political neutrality of the Commission			D. 3. The EU's expansionist policies that put the member countries at risk must end
					D. 4. The EU needs to limit its external actions and become less involved in the conflicts outside.
	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. The EU should seek for a peaceful and democratic resolution of the extremely dangerous crisis in Ukraine		<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Leave the EU.
		P. 2. It should fight Jihadism.			
		P. 3. It should bring stability back to the Middle East region.			
<u>Security and Defense</u>	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 4. It should abolish the nuclear weapons and remove the foreign military bases in Europe	<u>Security and Defense</u>	<u>Prognosis</u>	
		P. 5. It should refund with no new divisions or cold-war alliances.			
	<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. The EU should response to the humanitarian crisis and restore peoples' dignity.		<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Determine the countries own foreign policy objectives.
					M. 2. Foster closer ties with the Anglosphere.

Table 3 (cont'd)

<u>Security and Defense</u>	<u>Motivation</u>		<u>Security and Defense</u>	<u>Motivation</u>	M. 3. Encourage peace efforts in the Middle East.
<u>Energy</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>		<u>Energy</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The renewable energy is unnecessary and expensive
					D. 2. The construction of the wind turbines destroys the British land.
	<u>Prognosis</u>			<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Withdraw subsidies for renewable energy
					P. 2. Prefer coal-fired power stations instead of wind or solar energy.
	<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Protect the environment		<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Diminish the costs for the citizens
					M. 2. Protect the natural beauty of the country
			<u>CFP</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. This policy was designed from the beginning to steal from the British.
					D. 2. It ravages the county's fishing industry and causes environmental damage
					D. 3. It cause environmental destruction in the African seas.
				<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Leave the EU
				<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Make decisions locally
			<u>CAP</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. It brings excessive regulations to the British agriculture
					D. 2. It brings financial burden to the British taxpayers

Table 3 (cont'd)

				<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 3. It restrains the agricultural trade with the third countries.
				<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Provide help through trade, not aid by removing the trade barriers.
					P. 2. Change the regulations by local decisions.
				<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Protect the interests of the British farmers.
					M. 2. Support the poorest people in the world

Apart from the points that are mentioned above, Tsipras often refers to the great European civilization that is once home of democracy. He states that what is happening in Europe now is “a great disgrace to Europe's democratic traditions” (13) and that they “do not have the right to bury European democracy in the place where it was born” (6). Then he calls EU to “stop behaving in an undemocratic manner” (14) and be worthy to the Europe’s ‘ancient roots’. He also shows a noteworthy interest to the “dead end trade wars and so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’” (34) conducted by the EU and “have proved their failure” (34). He expresses his concerns about the EU’s involvement in the crises in Ukraine and in the Middle East and states that he finds these “unprecedented interventions undermin[ing] the authority and political neutrality of the Commission and call[ing] into question the sovereignty of a member state” (86). He further adds that these practices of the EU are “undemocratic and anti-European and bring to mind the worst practices of neo-colonialism” (86).

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Motivations for the Political Dimension of Integration

For SYRIZA and Tsipras, “the European Union will either be democratic or will not exist” (84). The party insists that “the European Union must rediscover its original principles of peace, democracy and social justice” (71). Furthermore, it underlines that “Europe needs and deserves a new deal that places on a new basis the principles of liberty, equality and solidarity” (71). At this point, both the party and the leader accuse liberals and social democrats for betraying the values above, and state that no one should assist “this opportunistic operation with any direct or indirect means” (83). Tsipras paints a new Union which respects the popular sovereignty, responses to the humanitarian crisis, restores peoples’ dignity, supports welfare state, and brings social justice to everyone while fighting against “the emergence of nationalism, chauvinism and the extreme right” (28).

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Prognoses for the Political Dimension of Integration

To achieve the Europe they want, Tsipras suggest to “extend the scope of public intervention and popular participation in European policy making” (84) and to “allow room for political solidarity instead of policies imposing dead ends and failed projects” (9). Both Tsipras and SYRIZA associate “democracy and the empowerment” (84) of the EU with “direct and representative institutions” (84). Moreover, they list the required measurements for a better Europe as “support for SMEs, protection of workers, respect and protection of the environment, sweeping reform of civil administration, a stable tax system and a determined fight against corruption” (34). Regarding the EU’s humanitarian interventions, SYRIZA urges a peaceful and democratic resolution of the extremely dangerous crisis in Ukraine, based on the International Law and the principles of the U.N. Charter’ and repeats the need to fight the “devastating phenomenon of jihadism which is spreading” (34) and to bring stability back to the Middle East region. Furthermore, it states that it will fight for “the abolition of nuclear weapons and the removal of foreign military

bases in Europe” (72) and “the refunding of Europe with no new divisions or cold-war alliances, such as NATO” (64) for a peaceful and stable region.

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Diagnoses for the Political Dimension of Integration

UKIP's reasons of opposition is more various than SYRIZA when it comes to political dimension of the European integration. The party remarks that the Britons “have lost [their] rights of self-government in the stealth creation of a United States of Europe, which has its own flag, national anthem, parliament, central bank, court of justice, a vast civil service, and fledgling military and police forces” (171). It is insisted that the EU is not just the trading bloc that the UK signed up to but instead a club that aims “to create a United States of Europe” (172). Professedly, the “elected Westminster politicians are impotent” (171) as “the out-of-sight, unaccountable, pan-European bureaucratic elite (...) has the final say” (171) on many issues concerning the state. UKIP uses an octopus analogy to describe the EU and states that its tentacles “stretch into almost every area of [the British] national life” (171).

The most criticized policies of the EU are on common security and defense, fishery, agriculture, foreign aid, and environment. UKIP “wholly opposes the creation of an EU Army” (171) and confirms that it “will not tolerate British troops operating under European command, on British soil or elsewhere” (171). It is highly critical against the EU's external actions in the third countries like Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. It also finds Britain's increasing involvement with EU's expansionism in Ukraine quite risky as it “is putting [the state] increasingly, unnecessarily, at loggerheads with Russia” (171). Farage similarly states that the EU is no longer “a partnership of equals” (124) as Kohl and Mitterrand presented years ago. He argues that the EU today is not about peace but power, division, and disharmony. To him, wanting ‘more Europe’ only means wanting “more of the same failing” (124).

Moving to the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), UKIP professes that this policy “was designed from the beginning to steal” (171, 173) and merge the British

territorial waters into “one giant European fishery” (171). Purportedly, it “has ravaged [the British] fishing industry and caused catastrophic environmental damage” (171). The EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is also claimed to bring excessive regulations to the British agriculture and financial burden to the British taxpayers as they receive “£1 for every £2 they give” (171). Farage blames all the EU member countries -including the UK- for being hypocrites about the poverty in Africa. According to him, the CFP “rapes and pillages” (129) the African seas and cause environmental destruction there while the CAP puts barriers up to the Africans selling the EU members their agricultural produce. In the end, Farage claims, the EU members “just assuage [their] consciences by giving away a bit of foreign aid.” (129)

Both Farage and UKIP state that they want to “support the poorest people in the world” (173), and they feel “a responsibility to do so” (173). However, they raise their concerns regarding the money that goes to “countries with their own foreign aid programmes, with space programmes and nuclear weapons capability, and into dictators' pockets” (173). Thereby, they support the provide help through “trade, not aid” (173).

Lastly, UKIP opposes to the EU’s energy regulations. It finds the renewable energy expensive and announces that it will “withdraw taxpayer and consumer subsidies for new wind turbines and solar photovoltaic arrays” (171). It declares that the preference of renewable energy over “perfectly good coal-fired power stations” (171) is meaningless, especially while the UK’s “major global competitors -the USA, China, India- are switching to low-cost fossil fuels” (171). Farage, too, confirms that they will end the construction of “wind turbines all over [their] green and pleasant land” (164).

UKIP’s and Nigel Farage’s Prognoses and Motivations for the Political Dimension of Integration

According to UKIP, Britain should “once again take her place in the family of nations as an independent, sovereign state (...) and determine her own foreign

policy objectives” (171). In that way, Britain can “encourage peace efforts in the Middle East” (173); “foster closer ties with the Anglosphere” (171, 173); “remove trade barriers to provide sustainable livelihoods for the world's poorest people” (173); and maintain domestic policies that protect both the interests of the British farmers, workers, fisheries, miners and the natural beauty of the country through “decisions that are made locally” (175). Leaving the EU and, therefore, withdrawing from the supranational policies of the Union is suggested as the only way to achieve all these goals.

4. 3. 3. Cultural Dimension of European Integration for SYRIZA and UKIP

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Diagnoses for the Cultural Dimension of Integration

On its evaluation of cultural integration (See Table 3), SYRIZA remarks that “the refugee problem is the most important issue threatening Europe today” (107). It accuses the European Union of leaving Greece at the forefront of the crisis and not sharing the burden as it should. To SYRIZA, refugee crisis “is not a Greek problem” (107) but instead “a European and global problem” (107). It draws attention of the humanitarian aspect of this matter and repeatedly mentions the tragedy that is taking place in the Mediterranean. In fact, it claims that this global drama is “caused by erratic foreign policy and the West's military interventions” (107) and therefore, Europe should “act as a true Union” (107) and do its part. Yet, it claims that “the predominant states in the EU” (85) are “encouraging neo-fascist forces” (85) while the Greek government is “not hesitat[ing] to implement its catastrophic plans” (56) which, in the end, result in “the continuous attacks on immigrants by fascist thugs, under police protection or tolerance, create a sense of undeclared war” (56). Tsipras, similarly, announces that “the Mediterranean must stop being a sea-cemetery” (21) and “the European countries of the southern Mediterranean must stop being storage areas of human souls” (21). On this matter,

he calls for supranational solutions since the refugee crisis “is a universal and European issue and for this reason, it cannot only be addressed through national solutions” (34). Although he does not seem to have any support for their governments, Tsipras often shows solidarity with the people of the third countries such as Ukraine, Turkey, or Russia in cases of crisis. He interprets the current situation in Europe as “a revival of an obsolete Cold War” (9) which “leads to a vicious cycle of aggressive rhetoric, militarization and trade sanctions” (9).

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Prognoses for the Cultural Dimension of Integration

Instead, Tsipras proposes “greater economic and political cooperation in the region” (9) and “a coherent, effective and humane European plan” (52) among the EU countries and the neighbors in the region to make The Mediterranean “a cradle of civilization, communication, commerce and humanity” (21) like it once was. He stresses the importance of “solidarity and of proportional responsibilities within the EU” (52), as well as of the “cooperation with the third countries of origin and transit” (52) on the issue of migration. He demands “the revision of the legal framework on migration and asylum” (52) and “the activation of the existing solidarity mechanisms within the European Union framework” (52) in order to combat people trafficking, arrest of the traffickers and dismantle their networks. He also underlines the importance of the equal treatment to the immigrants who are currently working in Europe and of the “new citizenship law” (34, 38, 108) for the migrant children who are born in Europe.

Table 4. Cultural Contents of Opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP against the EU

Cultural Contents of Opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP against the EU					
Subject of Opposition	Category	SYRIZA	Subject of Opposition	Category	UKIP
<u>Migration</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The EU leaves Greece alone at the forefront and does not share the burden as it should.	<u>Migration</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. Migration causes pressure on the scarce resources.
		D. 2. The refugee crisis is a result of the West's erratic foreign policies and military interventions.			D. 2. It cripples the public services and disrupts the welfare state.
		D. 3. The predominant states in the EU are encouraging neo-fascist forces against the immigrants.			D. 3. It changes the structure of the British labour market.
		D. 4. The Mediterranean must stop being a sea cemetery.			D. 4. It puts the security of the citizens in jeopardy.
		D. 5. The current situation in the continent is revival of an obsolete Cold War.			D. 5. It poses a threat to the British culture.
	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. The EU should come with a coherent, effective, and humane plan.		<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Restrict the immigration for unskilled jobs for 5 years.
		P.2. It should promote greater economic and political cooperation in the region.			P. 2. Limit access to benefits and free health care for new immigrants.
		P. 3. It should cooperate with countries of origin and transit.			P. 3. Apply the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention.
		P. 4. It should revise the legal framework on migration and asylum.			P. 4. Adopt an Australian-style, points-based immigration system.

Table 4 (cont'd)

<u>Migration</u>	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 5. Solidary mechanisms across Europe should be activated.	<u>Migration</u>	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 5. End the open door policy by leaving the EU.
	<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Have a EU-level uniform policy on such critical issues.		<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Give priority to the local people.
		M. 2. Protect and respect the human rights, and strengthen social cohesion.			M. 2. Make sure they are able to benefit from the services of the welfare state.
		M. 3. Eliminate any sort of discrimination.			M. 3. Protect the country and the society from the incorrigible foreign criminals
		M. 4. Promote understanding and solidarity.			
		M. 5. Change the world for the better.			
			<u>Enlargement</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The South and the North of Europe are different and cannot be forced to act together.
					D. 2. Multiculturalism lead to an alarming fragmentation of British society.
					D. 3. Britain is more than just a star on someone else's flag.
				<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Leave the EU.
				<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Take the control of the country back.

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Prognoses for the Cultural Dimension of Integration

Instead, Tsipras proposes “greater economic and political cooperation in the region” (9) and “a coherent, effective and humane European plan” (52) among the EU countries and the neighbors in the region to make The Mediterranean “a cradle of civilization, communication, commerce and humanity” (21) like it once was. He stresses the importance of “solidarity and of proportional responsibilities within the EU” (52), as well as of the “cooperation with the third countries of origin and transit” (52) on the issue of migration. He demands “the revision of the legal framework on migration and asylum” (52) and “the activation of the existing solidarity mechanisms within the European Union framework” (52) in order to combat people trafficking, arrest of the traffickers and dismantle their networks. He also underlines the importance of the equal treatment to the immigrants who are currently working in Europe and of the “new citizenship law” (34, 38, 108) for the migrant children who are born in Europe.

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' Motivations for the Cultural Dimension of Integration

Tsipras summarizes his party's objective as to “uniform policy on these critical issues with an emphasis on the integration, the protection and the respect of human rights and the strengthening of social cohesion” (34). He states that they want to “eliminate discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, and sexual orientation” (108); “promote understanding and solidarity” (100); and “create a comprehensive safety net for those who are marginalized” (14). He often repeats his belief in “the regenerative power of democracy, of politics, of peoples” (26) and underlines European peoples' capacity “to change the world for the better” (26). SYRIZA also emphasizes that they “want to rediscover the origins of the Enlightenment and of political democracy” (26) in Europe.

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Diagnoses for the Cultural Dimension of Integration

Culture-related matters take the widest place in UKIP's discourse. UKIP argues that "the rapid pace of migration, especially from the expanded EU" (174) has had several negative impacts in the UK. First, it has "led to pressures on scarce resources such as housing" (174), "crippled the public services such as schools, hospitals, transport networks, power and water supplies" (174). By doing so, it disrupted the welfare state. The sudden increase in the population resulted in "energy bills and food bills out of control [and] hardworking people being dragged into hardship" (121). Nigel Farage, similarly, states that he finds it "completely unfair that people from outside the UK can enter (...) [the] country and claim benefits from the offset, subsidized by taxpayers who are struggling to make ends meet" (111). It is claimed to be a shame for Farage that the British countryside "will have to be sacrificed to build new homes for immigrants" (174,175).

Secondly, the migration flows professedly change the structure of the British labour market. Because of the incoming migrants, complaints among the British citizens have increased about "wages falling ever further behind the cost of living for year after year; people being undercut by migrant workers; [and] grown-up children unable to find any work at all" (121). Here, Farage saliently points out the Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants and blames them to be the reason of the difficulties "the ordinary folk" (116) faces in finding a day's work on building sites and in blue-collar industries.

Another key result for UKIP and Farage is the threats the EU's open door policy poses to Britain's security. Farage argues that the Britons are "making a massive mistake" (130) by accepting this policy which "has no means and no way of filtering out extremists in favor of people fleeing in genuine fear of their lives" (130). Both he and UKIP tend to associate the foreigners with perpetration. Accordingly, they claim that unless they control the borders and manage immigration, the country will become a "gateway for organized crime" (169), a home for Jihadists, traffickers, illegal migrants, and any other sort of criminals. Moreover, they alleged that even if these foreign criminals are caught on action,

“the likelihood is that they won't be deported” (115) due to the agreements with the EU. Farage here warns the Britons that they “must be mad to take this risk with the cohesion of [their] societies” (126).

Neither Nigel Farage nor UKIP makes a differentiation between migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers here. Most of the time, they use the term ‘migrant’ only, and even though they admit that this ‘migrant crisis’, which is “an existential crisis” (152), “begins to overwhelm the European Union” (152), they do not seem to feel any responsibility on this matter. Instead, they focus on criticizing the EU for “not just rowing with themselves, but clearly [being] incapable of coming up with a coherent policy” (161). They also seem to be strictly against the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal¹⁵. Farage, for instance, accuses Angela Merkel of “turn[ing] to somebody else to sort out [the EU’s] own problem” (150). Both UKIP and the party leader are against any further enlargement of the EU as well. They condemn the other political parties which “are still committed to the EU expanding to include Turkey, Albania, Moldova and many more” (172) fiercely.

Lastly and most importantly, it is emphasized in the documents that the uncontrolled migration poses “the biggest threats to [the British] way of life and [the British] civilization that [the Britons] have ever seen” (115). Nigel Farage, for instance, emphasizes the differences the peoples of Europe have by asserting that there is “a split between the north and the south of Europe” (127). According to him, if someone tries to “force together different people or different economies, without first seeking the consent of those people, it is unlikely to work” (127) and the plan is condemned to fail. This understanding is very visible in the party manifestos as well. UKIP openly admits that it rejects multiculturalism because it supposedly “has led to an alarming fragmentation of British society” (171). Moreover, it claims that “[t]he longer [they] stay in the European Union, the more [they] become like 'little Englanders', an isolated, insignificant, offshore province in a country called Europe” (171) and “less like the 'Great' Britain [they] really are”

¹⁵ It refers to the agreement which was signed between the EU and Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation in 2013.

(171). The passage below shows how aggressive the party's discourse can be on this issue:

We need to take pride in our country again and claim back our heritage from the 'chattering classes' who have denigrated our culture, highlighted our failings as a country, rather than celebrating our successes, and tried to make us ashamed to be British. UKIP will encourage pride in Britain among our young people, who have become detached from our national cultural heritage. (171)

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Prognoses for the Cultural Dimension of Integration

Farage believes that patriotism is “not something to be discouraged” (171). In fact, “it can be a unifying force for good” (171) and therefore, the Britons should never forget that “Britain is a remarkable country” (171) and surely “is more than just a star on someone else's flag” (171). UKIP's approach to this matter is more inclusive as it promises to “promote a unifying British culture, open to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain and British values, regardless of their ethnic or religious background” (171). However, it is remarked in the documents that the UKIP does not believe in a “doctrine whereby different ethnic and religious groups are encouraged to maintain all aspects of their cultures, instead of integrating into our majority culture” (171). This belief system clearly shows that UKIP wishes for a homogenous British culture, which contradicts with the EU's ‘unity in diversity’ motto.

UKIP acknowledges that the problem with the “[i]mmigration is not about race: it is about space” (171). According to UKIP, the UK needs to limit “the uncontrolled, politically-driven immigration” (171); “get tough on so-called 'health-tourism'¹⁶” (171); apply the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention; and

¹⁶ The term refers to the foreign nationals who come to Britain to deliberately seek health services.

adopt an Australian-style, points-based immigration system¹⁷. Moreover, UKIP suggests to restrict the immigration for unskilled jobs for a five-year period and “[e]nd access to benefits and free National Health System (NHS) treatment for new immigrants” (173) until they have paid the required taxes for five years. These measures are deemed fundamental in order to relieve the British public’s concerns and lighten the burden on the welfare state. However, according to Farage, the Britons “are forced to abide by the EU's founding, unshakable principle of the 'free movement of people'” (171) until the UK leaves the EU. That is why, leaving the EU has the highest priority for him and his party.

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Motivations for the Cultural Dimension of Integration

UKIP's manifestos confirm that the party has two major objectives: to take back the control of the country's borders and to give the local people priority. By leaving the EU and having a say on the issue of immigration, UKIP wants to make sure that the Britons are able to benefit from the welfare state like the way they deserve and pursue their intact way of life. Moreover, it wants the state to be able to “choose not just the quantity of people that come but the quality of people as well” (169) in order to make sure that both the country and the society are protected from the incorrigible foreign criminals.

4.3.4. Legal Dimension of European Integration for SYRIZA and UKIP

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras's Diagnoses for the Legal Dimension of Integration

From a legal perspective (See Table 4), neither SYRIZA nor Tsipras seem to have any opposition against the implications of the EU acquis or the supranational

¹⁷ It is a migration program that controls the variety and number of workers moving to the country depending on their skills and abilities.

nature of the institution. They often repeat that they fully respect their commitments to all international organizations of which they are a part. In many cases, they do not hesitate to share the burden with the European institutions or call for a pan-European initiative while offering a solution to a domestic problem of Greece. On the issue of environment, for instance, they confirm their decisiveness on “the full implementation of the European acquis” (84) which will enable them “to confront the ecological crisis” (84) and also “to narrow the sustainability gap between the European north and south” (84). However, they strictly oppose to the “very harsh measures that lead large parts of the population to a humanitarian crisis are implemented by the troika of the European Union, IMF, and European Central Bank, with Germany playing a dominant role in the European strategy” (53). SYRIZA claims that the modern Europe has betrayed the rule of law and democracy, and has chosen “a cruel and socially unjust neo-liberalism” (38). To SYRIZA, the EU has discredited its political system and institutions with its arbitrary treatments and unlawfulness.

SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras's Prognoses and Motivations for the Legal Dimension of Integration

As a solution to the problems mentioned above, SYRIZA offers “to change Europe's institutions, to steer them away from their neoliberal agenda, from their fixations and the ‘logic’ which brought the crisis about in the first place” (26). Furthermore, it repeats that they want to “modernize the judiciary” (29), eliminate excessive bureaucracy, and “defend peace, stability and the rigorous application of international law” (34) in the fragile region of theirs.

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Diagnoses for the Legal Dimension of Integration

UKIP, is not as contented as SYRIZA when it comes to legal integration of the EU. Nigel Farage asserts that the Community method indicates “the means by which the European Commission makes law and holds law” (140) and is “the very

enemy of the concept of democracy itself” (140) since it “means that in any Member State there is nothing the electorate can do to change a single piece of European law” (140). Nigel Farage finds it antidemocratic that once something becomes a European law, “it is the European Commission itself which has the sole right to propose, repeal or change that legislation” (140). UKIP also states that the European judges are given “far too much power over British law making and law enforcement” (171). Moreover, it claims that “[t]he European Parliament is no safeguard as the British Members of European Parliament (MEPs) are not allowed to generate or re-visit existing legislation” (171). Even though the British MEPs vote ‘no’ to proposals, when other EU countries do not agree, “measures will go on become British law anyway” (171). Allegedly, “[t]hey can only vote on decisions made by unelected Commissioners and, even then, their vote can be ignored” (171) thanks to the Community method.

Table 5. Legal Content of Opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP against the EU

Legal Content of Opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP against the EU					
Subject of Opposition	Category	SYRIZA	Subject of Opposition	Category	UKIP
<u>Law-Making</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The modern Europe has betrayed the rule of law and democracy	<u>Law-Making</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D.1. The Community Method is antidemocratic.
		D. 2. It chose a cruel and socially unjust neo-liberalism			D.2. The European Commission has the sole right to propose, repeal or change the legislation

Table 5 (Cont'd)

		D. 3. It discredited its political system and institutions with arbitrary treatments and unlawfulness			D. 3. The British MEPs are not allowed to generate or re-visit the legislation.
	<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Steer the European Institutions away from neoliberal agenda		<u>Prognosis</u>	P. 1. Establish a form of direct democracy that will increase participation and accountability.
		P.2. Modernize the judiciary and eliminate excessive bureaucracy.			
	<u>Motivation</u>	M. 1. Defend peace, stability and the rigorous application of international law			M. 1. Make Britain's own laws in the British Parliament.
			<u>Jurisdiction</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 1. The European judges are given “far too much power over British law
			<u>Jurisdiction</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	D. 2. Deployment of the Euro Gendarmerie police force in Britain is unacceptable.
				Prognosis	P.1. leave the “jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
					P. 2. Complement the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

Table 5 (Cont'd)

					P. 3. Terminate the British opt-in to the European Arrest Warrant.
			<u>Jurisdiction</u>		M. 1. Bring the British legal system back under British control
				<u>Motivation</u>	M. 2. Save the country from the laws, directives, processes, and compliances of Brussels.

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Prognoses for the Legal Dimension of Integration

As a response, Nigel Farage states that they want “a form of direct democracy [which] would increase participation and accountability” (143) and reiterate that “such measures are absolutely necessary in a democratic society” (143). UKIP, on this matter, suggests to scrap the British “opt-in to the European Arrest Warrant and uphold the principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’” (173). Similarly, it proposes to leave the “jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights” (171) and let the Parliament “decide fairer human rights laws” (172) that “complement the UN Declaration of Human Rights and encapsulate all the human and civil rights that UK citizens have acquired under UK law since Magna Carta” (171). Lastly, UKIP declares that they will not privatize the law enforcement forces and therefore, never “allow the deployment of the Euro Gendarmerie police force on the streets of Britain” (173).

UKIP's and Nigel Farage's Motivations for the Legal Dimension of Integration

Both UKIP and its leader, Nigel Farage, declare their objective as to be able to govern themselves instead of following “all the laws and directives and processes and compliances from Brussels” (156). They call for the British citizens who believe they “are big enough to make [their] own laws, in [their] own parliament” (171, 173) to “bring [the] British legal system back under British control” (171) and insist on “there being one law for all -British law” (173). Finally, as they suggest with regard to the other aspects of the integration, they both emphasize their ultimate aim: to be outside of the EU.

The common reasons of opposition for the parties arise from the lack of transparency and unreliability of the EU. Both SYRIZA and UKIP emphasize the German impact on the EU policies and declare the current administration as corrupted. The ideological differences of the parties, on the other hand, can be identified from the disparate contents of opposition at the first glance. SYRIZA focuses on the economic and political issues while UKIP prioritize culture-related issues most as it will be summarized in detail below.

4. 4. The Strategic and Ideological Aspects of SYRIZA's and UKIP's Euroscepticisms

The Strategic Aspect of SYRIZA's and UKIP's Euroscepticisms

In this thesis, I argue that both ideological and strategic reasoning play a role in a political party's Euroscepticism. For the ideological aspect of the parties' Euroscepticism, I disintegrate their discourse on the European integration and identify the specific contents of opposition for each party. For the strategic aspect, I focus on their radicalism and populism, and evaluate these concepts as not only the characteristics of the parties but also instruments of their political style on the European issue. These two concepts, by definition, indicate that the parties in question are demand of a transformation of the political establishment and a direct

form of democracy which favors the majority of the society against the corrupted minority. While demands are settled in principle, the question of how these parties vocalize them or whether they can use them to attract the electorate remain unanswered.

The statements in these parties' Eurosceptic discourses indicate a possible use radical and populist sentiments as a deliberate electoral strategy. In my opinion, public and party-level¹⁸ Euroscepticism in their countries has driven SYRIZA and UKIP to capitalize their criticism against the EU. Fueled by the EU's inadequacies to respond to recent crises, their loud-voiced critical stances resulted in a rise of electoral support, and the parties started to use the issue of European integration as an instrument to incite the discontent of the public. This, as a result, had led to a continuous relationship between the use of radical and populist discourse, and public and party level Euroscepticism like the one that was demonstrated in the previous chapter.

The indicators of this relationship are easily identified in SYRIZA's discourse. First, despite SYRIZA is seen as a populist danger (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014) or major threat (Leonard, 2013) to the European project, neither SYRIZA itself nor the party leader Tsipras hesitates to introduce the party as 'a pro-European force'. Tsipras argues that they actively proved their "attitude and commitment to the European project" (37). Even during the heated Grexit discussions in 2015, Tsipras decidedly emphasizes that they "must remain committed to being European citizens who want Europe to remain united" (2); that they "do not believe in a divided Europe" (2). He wants to assure the European people that "the Greek people express their will sovereignly is in no way a decision to break with Europe" (40). Instead, he presents the referendum process as a generator of "a decision of dignity against practices of raw economic blackmail" (40).

¹⁸ For instance, along with the well-known Conservative and Liberal Democrat party members in the UK, an official leave campaign within the Labour Party, Labour Leave, appeared during the Brexit debates. Similarly, in Greece, parties such as the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), Golden Dawn, Popular Unity, ANEL and LAOS and recognized as Eurosceptic parties with variant degrees.

During the time, he also gives his candidacy for the European Commission Presidency in 2014 as a great example of their commitment to the European Union since it puts forwards his identity “as a Greek and a European politician of the Left” (28) and shows his ambition to put an end “to today's Europe that has succumbed to the neoliberal hegemony” (28). He often calls the European peoples for solidarity and cooperation by stating that the ongoing situation in Greece is “not a Greek problem but a European one” (18, 42) so they should approach to this problem together. He adds that together, they can create “another Europe” which chooses “the path of bridging differences, the path of stability and mutual respect, and above all the path to democracy” (20). More importantly, he admits that “Greece - historically as well as today- is part of Europe, part of the European developments, an irreplaceable part of the European reality” (49). As a result, the party’s reputation as a menace to the European integration despite its enunciated support seems confusing.

This, in a way, brings us to the second point. There is a noticeable shift in the discourses of SYRIZA and Tsipras over time from 2013 to 2015. The documents from the first year of the data gathering, 2013, do not actually show any signs of eagerness of the party leader to cooperate. They do not contain a friendly and calm attitude of Tsipras as they are more strongly-worded than the subsequent ones. In these documents, Tsipras prominently uses a more aggressive tone. He accuses the European political establishment of being “a voluntary hostage to Ms. Merkel” (55) and of choosing the path of hegemony. He argues that Ms. Merkel reacted with anger “when the European Left and SYRIZA threaten the Europe of her ideology, the Europe of her interests that she has been building slowly but steadily over the crisis years” (91). German Chancellor, along with the European institutions and the predecessor Greek governments, is the main actor that is targeted by Tsipras and SYRIZA in 2013. However, she is not alone. All Merkelites around Europe, the European oligarchy, the pitiless lenders of Memoranda are also highly criticized. During the time the *Us vs. Them* discourse is much more visible both in Tsipras’ and SYRIZA’s discourse. They both frequently mention ‘the Greek side’ and ‘the EU side’ of the negotiations, who are in a constant conflict.

In the following year, the criticism towards the EU continues –but with a more complaisant tone. The aggression escalates only for a while, right before the European Parliamentary elections as Tsipras compares “the Europe of the peoples” with “the Europe of the bankers”; “democracy and solidarity that unite Europe” with “austerity that kills Europe”, and “the European Left” with “Ms. Merkel”. Moreover, he states that they certainly “say no to a Europe that protects the market of monopoly, submits to money and doesn't work as a shield for the weak against the powerful” (68).

Interestingly enough, right after the European Parliamentary elections with which SYRIZA acquired the biggest representation in Greece, the statements of the party leader revert to how it was in the earlier that year. The amicable stance of him, alongside of his party, continue for a while. The focus of their discourse during the time is the crisis in the country as a joint problem of Greece and the European Union. Tsipras often repeats his belief in cooperation with the Union on this matter. After the national elections and the establishment of SYRIZA government in January 2015 “the EU side” turns into “our partners”, the hegemony-supporting character of “Mrs. Merkel” becomes an ally of Greece; and the negotiations start being referred as “very constructive and congenial discussions”(23). The only time the discourse of the leader gets aggressive and antagonistic is short before Grexit referendum.

Prior to the Grexit referendum, Tsipras confesses that the bailout proposal that was submitted to him by EC President Juncker, on behalf of the three institutions, “came as an unpleasant surprise” (37). He states his disappointment of the institutions that submitted “a proposal that would not take into account the common ground reached following the three-month negotiation” (37) between Greece and the Brussels Group (It is not “our partners” anymore). Moreover, he describes this move of the institutions as “a bad negotiating tactic” (37) which will be retracted soon by “those who came up with it” (37). The anxious Greek people, according to Tsipras, want them “not to retreat from [their] just demands” (37) and “not to succumb to unreasonable demands or extortion from the creditors” (37). As a result, he calls on the other European nations to support them in their just war –a

war to eliminate “the IMF to be part of the agreement” (38, 40, 45); to stand against the “practices of raw economic blackmail” (40); to establish “the widest social and political consensus to defend Democracy and the right of a people to be rid of austerity” (40); and to say “a proud ‘No’ to subjugation and to indignity” (40).

As stated above, he simultaneously emphasizes that they have no intention to withdraw from the EU. Especially after the elections, he openly calls the people who insisted on “linking the referendum's result to the country staying in the euro” (14) liars and hypocrites. He repeats several times that “the brave choice of the Greek people does not stand for a break with Europe, but for a return to the founding principles of European integration, the principles of Democracy, solidarity, mutual respect and equality” (42). However, one comment that he made proves the fact that he used the Grexit debate to challenge the European institutions after they had come up with an offer that the Greek side did not expect. He states that “[he] would not have made the statements that [he] did, and interpret the outcome of the referendum -not as a mandate to break with Europe, but as a mandate to strengthen the negotiating effort to reach a better deal- immediately after the polls closed” (43). The critical point here is that he admits that they wanted “to strengthen the negotiating effort to reach a better deal” (43). Later, he also claims that he had no other choice but call for the referendum when the offer he and the Greek government were facing on June 25 was considered. Luckily for him, he was able to receive a new offer, one that “differs considerably from their pre-election commitments and policy statements” (45).

From the perspective of this study, the rises and falls in the SYRIZA’s Eurosceptic discourse against the EU corroborates the idea that SYRIZA uses this issue to strengthen its position in the political system and against the European actors. Regardless of how the European integration is assessed, the party shows a more severe or a more constructive criticism depending on its current strategy. Rather than taking hard or soft Eurosceptic position as Taggart and Szczerbak (2001) claimed, SYRIZA distort its discourse while keeping its stance against the EU same.

In the period of data collection, UKIP had a very limited representation in the national parliament despite its high voting rate. That is why, it is not possible to find out whether its discourse changes due to its position in the political system. However, the immediate response of the party leader to Brexit hints that UKIP's assertive policy suggestions against the EU were not well-grounded. In a few hours after the results are announced, Nigel Farage disowned the pledge to spend the money that is saved from the EU membership on NHS (Stone, 2016), which was frequently repeated during the campaign. While it was also included in the UKIP's several party manifestos, Farage claimed that promising for such a thing was one of the mistakes the Leave campaign did.

Moreover, the party leader was accused of showing his true colors and refusing to own the result of the referendum ("The Guardian view on Nigel Farage's resignation", 2016) after he resigned from the party leadership right after the elections. He actually had stated that their job would be done "when, firstly, [the British] become an independent self-governing nation; and, secondly, when [they] start to put into practice the things the British economy needs and the British people". His resignation, therefore, was interpreted as a sign of UKIP's unpreparedness for the unexpected referendum result. It was actually not the first time he resigned. He had done it before, in 2009 and in 2015, and yet, come back to continue leading the party. Repeating this once again caused Farage to be accused of not having an idea about what leaving would actually look like and stepping aside just until the immediate reactions settle. Interestingly, he stepped back in at UKIP after the new leader Diane James quitted the job after 18 days at the helm. Now that the UK is actually negotiating to leave the EU, the time will show whether UKIP will be able to hold on to its current position in the country.

Although it is not directly related to the rhetoric on the European issue, several contradictions between the discourse and the actions of SYRIZA implies the adoption of radicalism as a style rather than ideology by the party. First of all, SYRIZA was harshly criticized for forming a government with the Independent

Greeks (ANEL), a far-right populist party twice¹⁹. Secondly, after a year in the government, SYRIZA was still not able to keep the various promises it had made during the election. While the secularization of the state, reduction of the military spending have been frozen, and no significant step could be taken in regard to the refugee question, the ‘radical’ side of SYRIZA started to be questioned. (Petsinis, 2016)

The inability of UKIP and SYRIZA to materialize the diverse proclamations implies that they did not invest sufficient thought towards their radical policy suggestions. Therefore, their critical stances against the EU appears to be deliberately overdrawn. The moderation of SYRIZA’s criticism or discretion of UKIP when they had the chance to actually challenge the EU reaffirms it, too.

The Ideological Aspect of SYRIZA’s and UKIP’s Euroscepticisms

The detailed analysis of the content of opposition for SYRIZA and UKIP reveals that, on ideological terms, the parties assessments of European integration differ from each other in almost every subject of every dimension. The parties carry their traditional considerations of the right and the left with them with regard to their perceptions of diagnosis, prognosis and motivations on the issues related to the European Union.

SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras, for instance, focus on economic issues such as income inequality, manmade poverty, unemployment, and redistribution of the wealth most. They support the welfare state and criticize the lack of transparency, legitimacy, and accountability of both the national government and the EU. They hold the EU’s neoliberal economic policies accountable for the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Europe, especially in Greece, and argue that these policies are destined to fail.

¹⁹ For further information about the impact of SYRIZA-ANEL coalition on the Greek Foreign Policy, please see Grigoriadis, I. N. (2015). The Foreign Policy of Greece's SYRIZA-ANEL Coalition Government: An Early Appraisal. CIDOB Notes Internationals. Presented in Barcelona.

On the political dimension of integration, SYRIZA and Tsipras seem worried that the EU is moving away from its citizens. They blame the current administration of polarizing and dividing the people of using asphyxiation tactics and blackmail on them. Both SYRIZA and Tsipras support disarmament and removal of the EU's military bases. They also consider the EU's involvement in the conflicts between the third countries necessary and hold the institution responsible for humanitarian interventions as long as they are not driven by one's ambition for power.

Regarding the cultural dimension of European integration, they show constant support for social movements and repeat their antagonism against discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, and sexual orientation. They pursue an open-door policy for the immigrants and instead of perceiving them as a threat to the community, they endeavor for their integration to the Greek society. Neither SYRIZA nor Tsipras express their support for enlargement openly but they repeat their intentions to have good relations with the other European countries such as Macedonia and Turkey. They embrace a more internationalist approach and promote the EU to construct new global alliances.

Lastly, the party and the leader do not seem to have any problem with the supranational nature of the EU. On the contrary, both SYRIZA and Tsipras call for European-level solutions to the common problems of the members states frequently and appeal to the European institutions to solve the corruption and tax evasion in the country. However, they condemn the EU for betraying the rule of law and democracy. According to them, the political system and the institutions of the EU are discredited and therefore, they should immediately end their arbitrary treatments and unlawfulness.

As a result, SYRIZA's and Alexis Tsipras' criticism towards the EU remains in the limits of Soft Euroscepticism or, according to the typology of Mudde and Kopecky, Euroscepticism. The party and the leader advocate the idea of European integration and want to continue its involvement in the EU, but underline the necessity for a fundamental transformation. They repeat their faith in a better

European Union, a Union of solidarity, security, and prosperity, which will be formed with the collaboration of all the European nations.

UKIP and Nigel Farage, on the other hand, give the cultural dimension of the European integration the highest importance in their discourse. They utterly oppose the idea of accepting immigrants to the country for various socio-economic reasons. Among them, the anxiety of losing the national identity appears to be the most emphasized. They claim that having foreigners in the country would disrupt the homogeneous, preeminent nature of the British society. Because of the same reason, they do not differentiate between the refugees and the economic migrants and oppose any newcomers regardless of their reasons. Both the party and the leader also often underline the sociocultural differences the North and the South of the Europe have, and strictly oppose the idea of further enlargement.

When it comes to the political dimension of the European integration, the biggest concern of UKIP and Farage is the supranational nature of the European Union. The actors assert that the British nation has lost the control of the country to the corrupted, unaccountable elite of the European institutions as they no say in the policies that would affect them anymore. In addition, they are highly critical about the attempts to form an EU Army. They see the EU as an institution of power-seeking entity which pursues expansionist policies, and state that they would never let the British troops to be a part of its operations. They favor the limitation of the EU's involvement in the conflicts outside, demanding to put an end to risking the member states' security while iterating their wish to develop relations with other countries with a consideration of the country's interests and freely from the EU.

The party and the leader is also critical on the EU's common policies on energy, fishery, and agriculture. They claim that these policies only serve to the interests of the EU as they put financial burden on the British taxpayers and destroy the natural beauty of the country. They repeat their desire to save the country from the excessive regulations of the EU and to determine the policy objectives that would affect the British citizens locally.

From the economical aspect, the cost of being an EU member is the most stressed subject by UKIP and Farage. Instead of giving the EU millions of Euros a day, they suggest to spend this money on public services and support the British citizens. Also, they state that they want to rejoin the world and establish their trade relations as a country in a way that would benefit the British interests most. The problems deriving from the EU's economic policies come later in the party's and the leader's agenda. Even when they acknowledge the financial problems Greece has been going through because of the EU's policies, they do not seem willing to take an action. They only advise the other countries to leave the EU and save themselves but apart from that, do not any interest in the situation. The only time that they actually pay a regard to the economic difficulties is when the British workers and small business owners are involved in the issue.

Lastly, UKIP and Farage criticize the Community method for being antidemocratic. According to them law-making should be under control of the citizens and along with the rights to propose, repeal, and change the legislation. Similarly, the jurisdiction should be left at the country's control. The state must be the one who assures the order in the country instead of following the rules which were made by some other institution. There should be only one legal system which is the British one and that system should be accountable to the citizens with a direct form of democracy.

As a response to all the problems listed above, UKIP proposes one solution: to leave the EU. It does not hold any interest to transform the EU in any way. Being independent and sovereign is the main concern of the party and as a result, staying as a member of the European Union seems as an obstacle to pursue the country's interest. According to both UKIP and Farage, leaving the EU is the only reasonable option to secure the country's position in a world of dangers and should be done immediately. The other nations, if they want to gain back the control of their states, should do the same. With this attitude, UKIP appears a hard Eurosceptic or Euroreject.

In conclusion, SYRIZA and UKIP show very different reasons of opposition against the European Union. They clearly prioritize their ideological backgrounds

while setting their relationship with the EU. SYRIZA is concerned about the militarist, neoliberal, inhumane policies of the EU but supports a better form of European integration. UKIP, on the other hand, is caring about getting the national identity, authority, and sovereignty of the country back. As a result the former pushes for a well-structured pan-European structure that would favor the ordinary citizens across the continent while the other seeks for getting out of the Union once and for all but still does show any intention to abolish the project by calling for a Europe-wide surge against it. Therefore, these parties should not be included under the same umbrella category and be taken granted as ruthless enemies of the European integration.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The transformation the European Union has undergone for the last six decades resulted in an establishment of a political, social, and economic union, which is so unprecedented that the citizens and the politicians of its member states feel the need to approach it with caution from time to time. While there has always been sceptical perceptions and civic feelings among the people against the EU, the unique, supranational nature of this establishment that remained incapable of responding to the recent series of crises, has intensified this stance. As Euroscepticism has gained popularity among the public and appeared as a new *cleavage* in the European politics, the political parties have pragmatically focused on this issue and attempted to mobilize the electorate by capitalizing their critical discourse against the European Union as the practitioner of the idea of European integration and the other actors that have been cooperating with it.

The issue of Euroscepticism as a way-maker has in fact served the purposes of some parties, which are often labeled as radical and populist more than the others. While these relatively small, critical parties were gradually receiving attention and increasing their electoral support for the last decade, the 2014 European Parliamentary elections appeared as a milestone for them in terms of gaining representation. Followed by numerous national-level electoral victories, the representation of these parties in the governments started to be perceived as threat against the European political establishment. Without making any differentiation, they were all labeled as menace against the traditional European values of democracy, equality, liberty, and the rule of law. Both the media and the academia

introduced these parties' involvement in the parliaments using the expressions like "Radical Storm", "Populist Earthquake", "Eurosceptic Danger", and tended to treat these parties as if they pursue the exact same ideology and strategy.

In this thesis, I examined the party-level Euroscepticism of two political parties that have been recently on the rise in Europe and often mentioned together in the academic and non-academic documents with regard to their Euroscepticisms. One of these parties is a Radical Right-Wing Populist (RRP) Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), while the other is The Radical Coalition of the Left (SYRIZA), a Radical Left-Wing Party (RLP) that is uncomfortable with being called a 'populist' but often labeled as one. In addition to belonging to very different party families, these parties are located in countries that have very different socio-economic backgrounds. UKIP is from one of the wealthiest countries in the EU, which is located in the Northern Europe and therefore, affected from the 2008 financial crisis, the austerity measures, or the migration flows relatively less than the continental Europe did. Moreover, the UK is known for its endemic Euroscepticism: It has always kept its distance with the EU's ambitious integration policies. SYRIZA, on the other hand, is from a Southern European country that has struggled from the austerity programs more than any other country in Europe. It is the major entry point for refugees and other migrants who try to enter the EU. Moreover, it was one of the biggest supporters of the European integration during its accession process.

These two countries, however, appear as the EU-member states with the highest public scepticism against the EU today. Both the Greek and the British nations do not trust the European institutions, believe their voices count, and desire any more delegation of power to the EU anymore. If these radical parties really intend to challenge the European establishment as they are claimed, these countries social and political environment would give them the perfect opportunity. The discussions on Grexit and Brexit corroborate this possibility.

What is more, both UKIP and SYRIZA hold the biggest representation in the European Parliament from their countries which constitutes an interesting paradox considering their harsh language against the EU during the elections. Also,

in the national elections that were held in 2015, they both showed significant success: UKIP gained approximately 13% of the total vote and become the third party as SYRIZA finished the elections as the first party. Such an electoral success is still in not very prevalent among the other radical populist parties. Lastly, they both took part in national referendums to decide the faith of their relations with the EU and both achieved the results for which they had canvassed. The UK has started negotiations with the European institutions to leave the Union while the Greek citizens reaffirmed their desire to receive another bailout proposal. While it is too early to make an assumption about how these processes will end, the immediate inference is that these parties and their leaders have the capability to mobilize the people and to affect the political agenda on domestic and European level.

In my analysis, I particularly focused on the establishment of the selected parties' EU-related discourses. First, in order to understand the impact of radicalism and populism in their stances against the EU, I investigated the traces of these two concepts in the documents of the parties and the party leaders. After the examination of the parties as examples of radical populist parties individually, I demonstrated the EU's representation as a part of the political structure and as an actor. Later, I focused on the content of opposition for each party by disintegrating their discourses into four different dimensions of the European integration: Economic, Political, Cultural, and Legal; and three frameworks for each dimension: Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Motivation. Lastly, I revisited the evaluations for each three concepts for both parties and discussed the strategical and ideological aspects of their Euroscepticism. I finished the discussion with the comparison the parties' discourses and the revelation of key similarities and differences of them.

Several key findings emerged from the data: First, the data shows that even though the radical populist parties from the right-wing and the left-wing have certain seeming resemblances, the traditional ideological divergence between them is still crucial in establishing their EU-related discourse. In strategic terms, the parties are located in an environment where almost all the political actors are showing signs of Euroscepticism with varying degrees. As a response, the parties in question develop a new strategy to stand out amongst their competitors. They use

the radical and populist rhetoric as a tactic to fuel the discontent with the other parties and the European Union. Both radical populist right and radical populist left problematize the issue of European integration, use the fear and anxiety of the society in their favor, and embrace a very exclusive *Us* vs. *Them* rhetoric which hardens or softens according to the political environment the parties are involved.

Leaving their political styles aside, the contents of these parties' criticism against the political establishment, the other political actors, or the EU do not converge with each other. SYRIZA appears as a libertarian, secular, anti-capitalist entity who is very enthusiastic about building new relations with other countries and nations. UKIP, on the other hand, shows conservative, nativist, and authoritarian tendencies in its discourse. It pursues a more isolationist policy that focuses solely on the British state and its nation.

When it comes to the issue of the European integration, their criticism is systematic and coherent even though it is sometimes blended with conspiracy and demagogy. The areas to which they contest along with their solutions and motivations, however, are very different. Despite several commonalities, the essence of SYRIZA's Euroscepticism derives from the current administration and its policies. The party criticizes the harsh neoliberal policies the institutions have been following, condemn the inhumane attitude of the Union and the members in the issue of Syrian refugees, and disapproves the militarist, interventionist strategies of the Union against the third countries. In the end, however, SYRIZA wants to remain in the Union and transform it for the better with the help of the other European countries and nations. Its criticism does not go beyond Soft-Euroscepticism, or simply Euroscepticism as Mudde and Kopecky would say.

UKIP, as opposed to SYRIZA, rejects the idea of being a member of the European Union. The areas it criticizes are fundamental, unchanging aspects of the integration, such as the free movement of people. While SYRIZA calls for European-level solutions to the problems most of the time, the UKIP's suggestions often involve leaving the EU permanently. The party underlines its purpose of getting the control of the country back and leans towards having international trade relations with the member states and the EU rather than getting involved in a

supranational organization. By this means, it shows signs of Hard Euroscepticism or, in a different categorization, Eurorejectionism.

As a result, assuming that these parties have the same intentions and interests, and studying them together with this presumption would be a capital mistake. Unlike the common wisdom, they share very little in terms of their expectations from the EU. Even with an inspection of a very limited numbers of cases, the differences in these parties' approaches to the European integration are easily identifiable. While one of them wants to terminate its institutional relations with the EU, the other calls for a more supranationalist approach under a completely different administration. That being the case, simply naming these parties as Eurosceptics and putting them in the same basket would simply be wrong.

Another finding of the research corroborates Mudde's arguments on the way the radical populist parties should be approached. The in-depth analysis of these parties' documents elucidates that these parties' reasons of opposition to the EU, their suggested solutions, and their presented motivations are rational, defensible, and supportable arguments, which could be verbalized by any MP from a mainstream party. Even the inconsistencies in their statements can be seen as a common feature of the political parties in general. The documents do not contain any declaration that is anti-democratic, incompatible with human rights, or against the rule of law. Therefore, the exclusionist paradigm that characterizes these parties as aliens to Western democratic establishment or qualifies them as political lepers should be avoided. Moreover, in the last decade, these parties have proved that they have a remarkable support in almost every EU member state. There are more and more studies conducted on the demographics of their electorates, which shows that the votes these parties stealing are from the mainstream parties from the same party families. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that the support for both radical left-wing and radical right-wing parties is a natural consequence of the voters' deliberate choices and definitely not a symptom of pathology in the public.

Finally, this thesis contests the differentiation of the theoretical frameworks while studying the radical right-wing parties and radical left-wing parties. It demonstrates that while the resemblances the right-wing and the left-wing parties

have with each other are not enough to lump them together, they are not irrelevant. The convergences the parties show, especially in terms of their populism, exemplify an important inference. Keeping the ideological wall that divides the right and the left, there is no reason for not to apply the same theoretical and conceptual framework or the methodology for these parties occasionally as comparative analysis of these parties might reveal very interesting conclusions.

To conclude, this thesis suggests an emerging research agenda by introducing new methods to study the Euroscepticism of the radical populist parties. Further analysis on this subject might be useful in the following ways: First, the number of the cases can be increased in the qualitative analysis to achieve a greater comparison of the left-wing and right-wing parties. Alternatively, the time interval can be expanded for a longitudinal analysis of a party's utilization of radicalism and populism as a strategy in construction its Eurosceptic discourse. However, it should be noted that the nature of conducting a qualitative analysis, which makes it very difficult to work with wider range of cases or samples appears as a major constraining factor. Another contribution would be adding the globalization as a variable, and inquiry whether Euroscepticism and anti-globalism show parallelism in the discourses of the political parties. Lastly, a similar study to this one can be conducted in a county or several countries where the traditional public Euroscepticism is not significant in order to see whether the political parties still have strategic considerations while constructing their Eurosceptics discourse in such a political environment.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: ANALYZED DOCUMENTS OF THE PARTIES AND THE LEADERS

Table 6. List of the Analyzed Documents of the Parties and the Leaders

No	Actor	Title	Type	Date	Retreived On
1	1	<i>Tsipras' statement at Euronews</i>	1	27.02.2015	09.04.2016
2	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement after his meeting with the Chair of the Eurogroup of the Left GUE/NGL</i>	1	02.06.2015	09.04.2016
3	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement prior to his departure for Brussels in order to meet with the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker</i>	1	03.06.2015	09.04.2016
4	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement after his meeting with the President of the European Commission, Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker</i>	1	04.06.2015	09.04.2016
5	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement following his meeting with the President of the European Commission Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker</i>	1	11.06.2015	09.04.2016
6	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement in Efimerida Ton Syntakton (EfSyn) newspaper on the issues relating to the current negotiation</i>	1	15.06.2015	09.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

7	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement during the joint press conference with Chancellor Faymann</i>	1	17.06.2015	09.04.2016
8	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' article in Der Tagesspiegel: German taxpayers are not paying for Greek pensions</i>	2	18.06.2015	09.04.2016
9	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement at the Economic Forum in St. Petersburg</i>	1	19.06.2015	09.04.2016
10	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement upon arriving at the EU Summit</i>	1	25.06.2015	09.04.2016
11	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement after the European Summit</i>	1	26.06.2015	09.04.2016
12	1	<i>Prime Minister's A. Tsipras statement , upon arriving at the EU Summit in Brussels</i>	1	19.03.2015	09.04.2016
13	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement on the latest developments</i>	1	28.06.2015	09.04.2016
14	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' message</i>	1	01.07.2015	09.04.2016
15	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' message</i>	1	03.07.2015	09.04.2016
16	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement after voting in the July 5th referendum</i>	1	05.07.2015	09.04.2016
17	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement on the outcome of the referendum</i>	1	06.07.2015	09.04.2016
18	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement following the Eurozone Summit</i>	1	08.07.2015	09.04.2016
19	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement following the conclusion of the Eurozone Summit</i>	1	13.07.2015	09.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

20	1	<i>Prime Minister A. Tsipras' statement to Reuters</i>	1	16.04.2015	09.04.2016
21	1	<i>Prime Minister A. Tsipras' statement regarding the latest shipwreck in the Mediterranean</i>	1	20.04.2015	09.04.2016
22	1	<i>Joint statement following the phone call between European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras</i>	1	06.05.2015	09.04.2016
23	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement on meeting with fellow leaders at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga, Latvia</i>	1	22.05.2015	09.04.2016
24	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement following the meeting with the political negotiation team</i>	1	27.05.2015	09.04.2016
25	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' statement about the developments regarding the negotiation during his visit to the Ministry of Education</i>	1	02.06.2015	09.04.2016
26	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' interview with Lynn Stuart Parramore in Alternet</i>	3	12.02.2013	12.04.2016
27	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' interview with Yiannis Baboulias in New Statesman</i>	3	19.03.2013	12.04.2016
28	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' interview in EurActiv</i>	3	26.11.2013 Updated on 11.02.2015	12.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

29	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' interview with Manfred Ertel, Katrin Kuntz and Mathieu von Rohr in Spiegel</i>	3	07.03.2015	12.04.2016
30	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' interview in Corriere della Sera newspaper</i>	3	09.06.2015	12.04.2016
31	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' interview in Sto Kokkino Radio Station-Excerpts</i>	3	29.07.2015	12.04.2016
32	1	<i>Prime Minister's A. Tsipras statement during the joint press conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin</i>	4	09.04.2015	12.04.2016
33	1	<i>Prime Minister's Alexis Tsipras statement after the tripartite summit meeting of Cyprus-Egypt-Greece Summit in Nicosia</i>	4	30.04.2015	12.04.2016
34	1	<i>Primeminister A. Tsipras' speech, during the programmatic statements of the Government</i>	5	08.02.2015	03.05.2015
35	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech in The Economist's annual financial event in Athens</i>	5	16.05.2015	03.05.2015
36	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech in SEV (Hellenic Federation of Enterprises) Federation's annual meeting</i>	5	19.05.2015	03.05.2015
37	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech addressing Parliament on the issues relating to the current negotiation</i>	5	06.06.2015	03.05.2015
38	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech in the parliamentary group of SYRIZA</i>	5	17.06.2015	03.05.2015
39	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' address concerning the referendum to be held on the 5th of July</i>	5	27.06.2015	03.05.2015

Table 6 (cont'd)

40	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech to Parliament regarding the July 5th referendum</i>	5	28.06.2015	03.05.2015
41	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' address at the NO rally in Syntagma Square</i>	5	04.07.2015	03.05.2015
42	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech to the European Parliament</i>	5	08.07.2015	03.05.2015
43	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' summary comments at the European Parliament</i>	5	08.07.2015	03.05.2015
44	1	<i>Prime minister A. Tsipras' statement regarding the Eurogroup's joint statement</i>	5	21.02.2015	03.05.2015
45	1	<i>Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech in the Greek Parliament concerning the mandate to conclude the negotiation</i>	5	11.07.2015	03.05.2015
46	1	<i>Excerpts from Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech in the Greek Parliament</i>	5	23.07.2015	03.05.2015
47	1	<i>Excerpts of Prime Minister A. Tsipras' speech to the Ministerial Cabinet</i>	5	27.02.2015	03.05.2015
48	1	<i>Prime Minister A. Tsipras' keynote address at OECD</i>	5	12.03.2015	03.05.2015
49	1	<i>Prime Minister A. Tsipras' speech at the event of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens on "The Greek Revolution as a European event"</i>	5	26.03.2015	03.05.2015
50	1	<i>Prime Minister A. Tsipras' speech in order to inform the Greek Parliament of the issues concerning the current negotiation</i>	5	30.03.2015	03.05.2015

Table 6 (cont'd)

51	1	<i>Prime Minister A. Tsipras' statement during the joint press conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin</i>	5	09.04.2015	03.05.2015
52	1	<i>Main points of the Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras', intervention, at the EU special summit on migration</i>	5	24.04.2015	03.05.2015
53	2	<i>POLITICAL RESOLUTION of the 1st CONGRESS of SYRIZA</i>	6	July 2013	08.04.2016
54	2	<i>Introductory speech of the President of the Parliamentary Group of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras at the 1st Congress of SYRIZA</i>	6	?	08.04.2016
55	2	<i>Alexis Tsipras' speech at the 4th Congress of the European Left, Madrid</i>	5	15.12.2013	08.04.2016
56	2	<i>SYRIZA London: Public talk by Alexis Tsipras</i>	5	15.03.2013	08.04.2016
57	2	<i>SYRIZA press release on the new memorandum measures</i>	4	14.12.2013	08.04.2016
58	2	<i>Press release on the ban of house auctions and government's stance</i>	4	04.12.2013	08.04.2016
59	2	<i>AUSTERITY IS WREAKING HAVOC, BUT THE LEFT CAN UNITE TO BUILD A BETTER EUROPE - Article by Alexis Tsipras in the Guardian</i>	2	27.11.2013	08.04.2016
60	2	<i>SYRIZA on today's "invasion" of the special police units in ERT installations</i>	1	07.11.2013	08.04.2016
61	2	<i>Excerpts from the speech by Alexis Tsipras, President of SYRIZA, at the Central Committee meeting on 20 October 2013</i>	5	20.10.2013	08.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

62	2	<i>Excerpts from the speech by President Alexis Tsipras at the 2nd SYRIZA Youth Festival</i>	5	29.03.2013	08.04.2016
63	2	<i>Statement regarding the developments in Cyprus by the President of the Parliamentary Group of SYRIZA-USF, Alexis Tsipras</i>	5	19.03.2013	08.04.2016
64	2	<i>SYRIZA in Brief</i>	1	NA	08.04.2016
65	2	<i>Excerpts from Alexis Tsipras article in Sunday Avgi newspaper</i>	2	28.12.2014	08.04.2016
66	2	<i>HISTORIC DAY FOR OUR PEOPLE - Statement by SYRIZA President, Alexis Tsipras, regarding the election results of May 25, 2014</i>	1	26.05.2014	08.04.2016
67	2	<i>Statement of the President of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras after the first round of local and regional self-government elections</i>	1	18.05.2014	08.04.2016
68	2	<i>Excerpts from an interview and short bio of SYRIZA European Parliament candidate, Mr. Manolis Glezos</i>	3	13.05.2014	08.04.2016
69	2	<i>Konstantina Kuneva, one of SYRIZA candidates for the European Parliament</i>	1	13.05.2014	08.04.2016
70	2	<i>Alexis Tsipras' speech at the DIE LINKE Congress</i>	5	10.05.2014	08.04.2016
71	2	<i>Internationally renowned intellectuals' declaration of support for Alexis Tsipras' candidacy</i>	1	08.05.2014	08.04.2016
72	2	<i>SYRIZA press release for the 69th anniversary of the big anti-fascist victory</i>	4	08.05.2014	08.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

73	2	<i>A compilation of thoughts for international solidarity to Greece. Message to the Congress of Red Party Norway</i>	5	07.05.2014	08.04.2016
74	2	<i>Demarche by SYRIZA to the Embassy of Great Britain & Northern Ireland to protest about the arrest and detention of Gerry Adams in Northern Ireland</i>	1	03.05.2014	08.04.2016
75	2	<i>The people should become the protagonist. Elections Now!</i>	2	18.12.2014	08.04.2016
76	2	<i>Announcement of the Press Office of Syriza on the International Workers' Day</i>	7	01.05.2014	08.04.2016
77	2	<i>Manolis Glezos in SYRIZA's European Parliament list of candidates</i>	1	25.04.2014	08.04.2016
78	2	<i>Alexis Tsipras on the "exit" to the market</i>	5	10.04.2014	08.04.2016
79	2	<i>Alternatives to Debt & Austerity, Conference of the European Left</i>	1	10.04.2014	08.04.2016
80	2	<i>Statement by Giannis Milios, SYRIZA responsible for economic policy, regarding the "exit" to the international financial markets</i>	1	09.04.2014	08.04.2016
81	2	<i>Press office: Mrs Angela Merkel's visit to Athens is intended to confirm the total submission of Mr Samaras to the demands of the most reactionary political force in Europe</i>	4	09.04.2014	08.04.2016
82	2	<i>Letter addressed to the President of the Parliament by the President of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras requesting a Parliamentary debate</i>	1	03.02.2014	08.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

83	2	<i>Announcement of SYRIZA Department of Foreign Affairs and Defense regarding the commencement of the E.U. military operation in the Central African Republic</i>	7	03.04.2014	08.04.2016
84	2	<i>Alexis Tsipras' speech in Dublin: When they draft memoranda, we redraft the future</i>	5	11.03.2014	08.04.2016
85	2	<i>Statement of the Political Secretariat of SYRIZA on the issue of Ukraine</i>	1	27.02.2014	08.04.2016
86	2	<i>GUE/NGL slams Juncker's interference in Greek politics</i>	1	16.12.2014	08.04.2016
87	2	<i>Statement of the Political Secretariat of Syriza on the issue of Cyprus</i>	1	22.02.2014	08.04.2016
88	2	<i>SYRIZA's press office release on Syria's chemical weapons arsenal destruction in the Mediterranean waters, south of Crete</i>	4	10.02.2014	08.04.2016
89	2	<i>Statements of the president of SYRIZA Alexis Tsipras to Athens and Macedonian News Agency (AMNA)</i>	1	04.02.2014	08.04.2016
90	2	<i>Statement by SYRIZA's president Alexis Tsipras, concerning the visit of the delegation of the European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)</i>	1	29.01.2014	08.04.2016
91	2	<i>Alexis Tsipras' speech at a debate organised by the Dutch Socialist Party in Amersfoort</i>	5	18.01.2014	08.04.2016
92	2	<i>THE EUROPE WE WANT - article by Alexis Tsipras in the New Europe magazine</i>	2	13.01.2014	08.04.2016
93	2	<i>Kobane must win</i>	1	30.10.2014	08.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

94	2	<i>Sofia Sakorafa on the elections in Bolivia</i>	1	16.10.2014	08.04.2016
95	2	<i>Abstract from Syriza`s announcement on the one year anniversary since the assassination of Pavlos Fyssas</i>	1	17.09.2014	08.04.2016
96	2	<i>Parliamentarian group of SYRIZA: Immediate stop of the bloodshed and the blockade of Gaza</i>	1	17.07.2014	08.04.2016
97	2	<i>Statement of Alexis Tsipras, European Left candidate for President of the European Commission and President of SYRIZA</i>	1	29.05.2014	08.04.2016
98	2	<i>SYRIZA statement on Spanish Elections</i>	1	12.12.2015	08.04.2016
99	2	<i>SYRIZA MEP Dimitrios Papadimoulis and President of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem ECON Committee about the Greek government list</i>	1	24.02.2015	08.04.2016
100	2	<i>Excerpts from Alexis Tsipras' policy speech at the Greek Parliament</i>	5	08.02.2015	08.04.2016
101	2	<i>SYRIZA THE THESSALONIKI PROGRAMME</i>	8	12.01.2015	08.04.2016
102	2	<i>UE/NGL condemns scaremongering and gives its full backing to SYRIZA</i>	1	07.01.2015	08.04.2016
103	2	<i>On the Cusp of a Historic Change, Alexis Tsipras, President of SYRIZA</i>	5	05.01.2015	08.04.2016
104	2	<i>Telephone communication between SYRIZA Party Secretary Panos Rigas and Selahattin Demirtas</i>	1	12.10.2015	08.04.2016
105	2	<i>SYRIZA expresses its solidarity to the peoples of Turkey</i>	9	11.10.2015	08.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

106	2	<i>Press Release: On the murderous bomb attack in Ankara</i>	4	10.10.2015	08.04.2016
107	2	<i>Statement by the President of SYRIZA on the refugees</i>	1	06.09.2015	08.04.2016
108	2	<i>Alexis Tsipras speech at the nationwide SYRIZA conference</i>	5	01.09.2015	08.04.2016
109	2	<i>P.Trigazis: Certain good things are happening for the first time in this country, despite the fact that some people don't want to admit it "FIRST TIME" MANY TIMES</i>	2	12.07.2015	08.04.2016
110	2	<i>Stop TTIP protest in Brussels - SYRIZA, GUE/NGL Party of the European Left were there</i>	7	18.04.2015	08.04.2016
111	3	<i>Ed Miliband's running scared - and now UKIP will go after him and Labour</i>	2	27.01.2013	10.04.2016
112	3	<i>Why I love Scotland and want to see it prosper in a thriving United Kingdom</i>	2	22.02.2015	10.04.2016
113	3	<i>Biased BBC audience said 'La-la-la... We can't hear you Nigel!</i>	2	19.04.2015	10.04.2016
114	3	<i>Nigel Farage's Diary: the fallout from the elections</i>	2	23.05.2015	10.04.2016
115	3	<i>Get tough, defend our borders... and our citizens</i>	2	28.06.2015	10.04.2016
116	3	<i>Storming South Shields, dodging photographers and the rise of the Nigels</i>	2	NA	10.04.2016
117	3	<i>Comfort for Cameron, and the wonders of German traffic.</i>	2	05.04.2013	10.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

118	3	<i>UKIP is bringing the local people back to politics</i>	2	24.04.2013	10.04.2016
119	3	<i>: I'll buy Alex Salmond a beer...then I'll tell him how WE will change things in Scotland!</i>	2	12.05.2013	10.04.2016
120	3	<i>How to fix the Lords?</i>	2	NA	10.04.2016
121	3	<i>The main parties don't listen to the working classes.</i>	2	10.03.2014	10.04.2016
122	3	<i>Why did we win? Because WE don't play you for fools.</i>	2	11.10.2014	10.04.2016
123	3	<i>How I survived Dry January</i>	2	31.01.2014	10.04.2016
124	3	<i>Current situation in the European Union Statements by Mr François Hollande, President of the French Republic, and Ms Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany</i>	10	07.10.2015	13.04.2016
125	3	<i>Statement by the President</i>	10	17.09.2015	13.04.2016
126	3	<i>State of the Union (debate)</i>	10	09.09.2015	13.04.2016
127	3	<i>Conclusions of the European Council (25-26 June 2015) and of the Euro Summit (7 July 2015) and the current situation in Greece (debate)</i>	10	08.07.2015	13.04.2016
128	3	<i>European Agenda on Migration (debate)</i>	10	20.05.2015	13.04.2016
129	3	<i>Report of the extraordinary European Council meeting (23 April 2015) - The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies (debate)</i>	10	29.04.2015	13.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

130	3	<i>Report of the extraordinary European Council meeting (23 April 2015) - The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies (debate) -2</i>	10	29.04.2015	13.04.2016
131	3	<i>Preparations for the European Council meeting (19-20 March 2015) (debate)</i>	10	11.03.2015	13.04.2016
132	3	<i>Preparations for the European Council meeting (19-20 March 2015) -2 (debate)</i>	10	11.03.2015	13.04.2016
133	3	<i>Preparations for the European Council meeting (19-20 March 2015) -3 (debate)</i>	10	11.03.2015	13.04.2016
134	3	<i>Preparation of the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government (12 February 2015) (debate)</i>	10	11.02.2015	13.04.2016
135	3	<i>Conclusions of the European Council meeting (26-27 June 2014)</i>	10	02.07.2014	13.04.2016
136	3	<i>Statements by the President</i>	10	12.01.2015	13.04.2016
137	3	<i>Recognition of Palestine statehood (B8-0277/2014 , B8-0309/2014 , B8-0310/2014 , B8-0349/2014 , B8-0357/2014 , B8-0359/2014) (vote)</i>	10	17.12.2014	13.04.2016
138	3	<i>Commission work programme 2015 (debate)</i>	10	16.12.2014	13.04.2016
139	3	<i>Commission work programme 2015-2 (debate)</i>	10	16.12.2014	13.04.2016
140	3	<i>Presentation by the Commission President-elect of the College of Commissioners and their programme (debate)</i>	10	22.10.2014	13.04.2016
141	3	<i>Review of the Barroso II Commission</i>	10	21.10.2014	13.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

142	3	<i>Situation in Ukraine and state of play of EU-Russia relations (debate)</i>	10	16.09.2014	13.04.2016
143	3	<i>European Parliament resolution on the European Parliament's priorities for the Commission Work Programme</i>	10	01.07.2015	13.04.2016
144	3	<i>Situation in Ukraine and state of play of EU-Russia relations-2 (debate) 16.09.2014-Strasbourg</i>	10	16.09.2014	13.04.2016
145	3	<i>Statement by the candidate for President of the Commission (debate)</i>	10	15.07.2014	13.04.2016
146	3	<i>Conclusions of the European Council meeting (26-27 June 2014)</i>	10	02.07.2014	13.04.2016
147	3	<i>Conclusions of the European Council meeting-2 (26-27 June 2014)</i>	10	02.07.2014	13.04.2016
148	3	<i>Motion of censure on the Commission by the European Parliament</i>	10	18.11.2014	13.04.2016
149	3	<i>Preparation of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 December 2015 (debate)</i>	10	16.12.2015	13.04.2016
150	3	<i>EU-Turkey summit (debate)</i>	10	02.12.2015	13.04.2016
151	3	<i>EU-Turkey summit (debate) -2</i>	10	02.12.2015	13.04.2016
152	3	<i>Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 October 2015, in particular the financing of international funds, and of the Leaders' meeting on the Western Balkans route of 25 October 2015, and preparation of the Valletta summit of 11 and 12 November 2015 (debate)</i>	10	27.10.2015	13.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

153	3	<i>Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 October 2015, in particular the financing of international funds, and of the Leaders' meeting on the Western Balkans route of 25 October 2015, and preparation of the Valletta summit of 11 and 12 November 2015 (debate) -2</i>	10	27.10.2015	13.04.2016
154	3	<i>Interview with Jeremy Vine in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	20.01.2013	10.04.2016
155	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	28.09.2014	10.04.2016
156	3	<i>The Brussels sprout? It's 100% British! Interview with Craig Brown</i>	3	23.12.2014	10.04.2016
157	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	25.01.2015	10.04.2016
158	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	22.03.2015	10.04.2016
159	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	03.05.2015	10.04.2016
160	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr, together with Nick Clegg and Yvette Cooper in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	03.05.2015	10.04.2016
161	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	27.09.2015	10.04.2016
162	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	01.11.2015	10.04.2016
163	3	<i>Interview with Sophie Raworth in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	03.03.2013	10.04.2016

Table 6 (cont'd)

164	3	<i>Interview with Jeremy Vine in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	05.05.2013	10.04.2016
165	3	<i>Andrew Gimson hears Nigel Farage deny trying to destroy the Conservative Party</i>	3	17.07.2013	14.04.2016
166	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	06.10.2013	10.04.2016
167	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr, together with Theresa May, in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	06.10.2013	10.04.2016
168	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	02.03.2014	10.04.2016
169	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	04.05.2014	10.04.2016
170	3	<i>Interview with Andrew Marr, together with Ed Miliband, in The Andrew Marr Show</i>	3	04.05.2014	10.04.2016
171	4	<i>UKIP 2015 Manifesto: Believe in Britain</i>	8	NA	09.04.2016
172	4	<i>Create an earthquake: UKIP 2014 Manifesto</i>	8	NA	09.04.2016
173	4	<i>UKIP 2015 Manifesto Summary</i>	8	NA	09.04.2016
174	4	<i>UKIP 2013 Local Manifesto</i>	8	NA	09.04.2016
175	4	<i>UKIP 2015 Local Manifesto</i>	8	NA	30.06.2016
176	4	<i>Valuing Our Christian Heritage: UKIP Policies for Christians: Overview</i>	8	NA	30.06.2016

Notes:

The types of documents for Alexis Tsipras and SYRIZA is determined according to the categorization of their official websites.

The capital letters and the emphasis in the documents are derived from the original titles.

Because the documents are collected online, there are no page numbers which can be indicated.

Actors: 1. Alexis Tsipras 2. SYRIZA, 3. Nigel Farage, 4. UKIP

Type of Document: 1. Statement, 2. Article, 3. Interview, 4. Press Release, 5. Speech, 6. Congress, 7. Announcement, 8. Manifesto, 9. Message, 10. EP Speech in Plenary

APPENDIX B: TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

1950’li yıllarda Fransız ve Alman demir ve elik endstrileri arasında bir iřbirlięi olarak bařlayan Avrupa btnleřmesi, gnmzde Avrupa kıtası boyunca 28 ye lkeyi bnyesinde barındıran siyasal, sosyal ve ekonomik bir Birlik halini almıřtır. stelik bu Birlik’i benzersiz kılan yalnızca 60 yılı ařan kkl tarihi deęil, aynı zamanda ye lkeler iin ok sayıda kural ve ilkeyi, oluřturan ve denetleyen eřitli kurumları da iine alan rgtsel yapısıdır (Phelan, 2012, s. 368). Gnmzde Avrupa Birlięi’nde (AB) yer alan ye lkelerin pek oęu Ekonomik ve Parasal Birlik (EPB) kapsamında ortak bir pazarda, ortak bir para birimiyle ticari faaliyetlerini gerekleřtirme, bu srete Birlik’in ulusst yasama organlarının koyduęu kurallara gre hareket edip, yargı organları tarafından denetlenmektedir. Mallar, hizmetler, sermaye ve kiřiler Birlik ierisinde serbeste dolařırken, ye lkeler iin kritik nem arz eden gvenlik ve savunma gibi konularla ilgili politikalar gnmzde ulusal hkmetler tarafından deęil bizzat Avrupa Birlięi kurumları tarafından belirlenmektedir.

Avrupa Birlięi son yıllarda sz konusu ekonomik ve politik btnleřmenin yanı sıra ye lkeleri sosyal aıdan da birbirine yaklařtırmak ve ortak bir Avrupa kimlięi oluřturmak amacıyla eřitli adımlar atmaya bařlamıřtır. Avrupa Birlięi’nin İřleyiři Hakkında Antlařma kapsamında ye lke vatandaşlarına doęrudan bahředilen ‘Avrupa Birlięi vatandařlıęı’, giderek artan Avrosembolizm kullanımı (Bayrak, marř, ortak pasaport ve src belgesi tasarımı vb.); eęitim, arařtırma, spor ve ar-ge alanlarında iřbirlięini ve hareketlilięi arttırmak iin saęlanan finansal destekler bu ama doęrultusunda atılmıř adımlar olarak sıralanabilmektedir.

Avrupa Birlięi vatandaşlarının zaman ierisinde byleyi kkl bir deęiřime karřı tepki geliřtirmeleri řařırtıcı deęildir. Hooghe, Marks ve Wilson (2002) bu tepkinin sebebini topluma karřı algılanan bir dizi tehdit olarak aıklamaktadır (s. 976). Buna gre, vatandaşlar egemenliklerini, ulusal kimliklerini ya da

zenginliklerini kaybedecekleri korkusuyla Avrupa bütünleşmesine şüpheyile yaklaşmaktadır. Özellikle Avrupa Birliği'nin organizasyon yapısında köklü değişiklik önerileri sunan Avrupa Birliği Antlaşması'ndan bu yana bu şüpheli tavrı giderek yaygınlaşmaktadır. Anlaşma sonrası dönemde pek çok üye ülkede yapılan halkoylamalarının AB aleyhine sonuçlanması da Avrupa şüpheliğinin somut bir örneği olarak yorumlanmaktadır.

2008 yılında ortaya çıkan ekonomik krize, onu takip eden tasarruf tedbirlerine, 2001 yılında başlayan Suriye'de yaşanan savaşla yükselen Mülteci Krizi'ne ve Avrupa için giderek daha büyük bir tehdit haline gelen Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti'ne (İŞİD) karşı Avrupa Birliği'nin ulusüstü yönetiminin yetersiz kalması, Avrupa vatandaşlarını hem Birlik'i hem de onunla işbirliği içerisinde olduklarını düşündükleri ana akım siyasi partileri suçlamaya itmiştir. Bu durum, vatandaşların desteklerini kendilerinin endişesini ve öfkelerini paylaştığına inandıkları Radikal Popülist Partiler'e (RPP) kaydırmaları sonucunu doğurmuştur. Söz konusu partiler bu durum karşısında Avrupa Birliği karşıtı söylemlerinin dozunu arttırmış ve 2014 Avrupa Parlamentosu Seçimleri boyunca Birlik tarihinin en şiddetli seçim kampanyalarını yürütmüşlerdir.

Bu seçimlerde ana akım partiler hemen her üye ülkede düşüşe geçerken, Avrupa Birliği'ne karşı şüpheli tavırlarıyla gündeme gelen partiler önemli başarılar kazanmıştır. İtalya'da 5 Yıldız Hareketi ve Kuzey Ligi, Fransa'da Ulusal Cephe, Danimarka'da Danimarka Halk Partisi, Polonya'da Hukuk ve Adalet Partisi, İspanya'da Podemos Partisi, Avusturya'da Avusturya Halk Partisi, Macaristan'da Jobbik Partisi, Birleşik Krallık'ta Birleşik Krallık Bağımsız Partisi, Yunanistan'da Altın Şafak Partisi ve Radikal Sol Koalisyon bu noktada öne çıkan partilerden bazıları olmuştur.

Yukarıdaki partilerin seçimlerdeki başarılarını, takip eden yıllarda, ulusal düzeyde de sürdürmeleri Avrupa Birliği'nin geleceği hakkında tartışmaları da ortaya çıkartmıştır. Günümüzde Avrupa'da yer alan siyasi partilerin çoğunluğu ana akıma mensup olmakla birlikte, Avrupa bütünleşmesine şüpheyile yaklaşan partiler 25 ülkede 1,329 koltuğa sahip olup, 8 AB üye ülkesinde hükümette aktif rol almaktadır. Bununla birlikte, yakın zamanda alevlenen Yunanistan'ın Avro

Bölgesi'nden (Grexit), Birleşik Krallık'ın ise Avrupa Birliği'nden (Brexit) ayrılmasına ilişkin tartışmalar Avrupa Birliği'nin dağılmasına dair endişeleri arttırmıştır.

2012 yılında başlayan Grexit ve Brexit halkoylamalarına ilişkin tartışmaları başlarda pek gerçekçi bulunmasa da, Yunanistan Başbakanı Alexis Tsipras, Temmuz 2015'te bir duyuru yaparak halkı sandık başına çağırarak, yapılan oylama sonucunda Yunan halkının %61,3'ü Avrupa Birliği tarafından önerilen kurtarma programını reddederken yalnızca %38,8'i program teklifini kabul etmiştir. Oylama sonrası Yunanistan ve borç veren kurumlar arasındaki müzakereler devam etse de Yunanistan'ın olası ayrılığın ilişkin tartışmalar halen sona ermemiştir.

Yaklaşık bir sene sonra, Haziran 2016'da, Birleşik Krallık'ın, AB üyeliğinin devamına ilişkin halkoylamasına gitmesi ve %51,9 'Ayrılma' yanlısı oy kullanmasıyla Avrupa Birliği belki de tarihinin en büyük şoklarından birini yaşamıştır. Oylamayı takiben Başbakan David Cameron istifa etmiş, yerine seçilen Theresa May ise Birleşik Krallık halkın isteğine sadık kalarak AB'den ayrılma sürecini başlatacağını duyurmuştur (Dewan & Isaac, 2016). Ancak referandumun etkisi bunlarla sınırlı kalmamıştır. Başta 2017 yılında genel seçimlere ev sahipliği yapacak olan Fransa ve Hollanda olmak üzere, diğer AB üye ülkelerindeki pek çok şüpheli lider, oylama kararını büyük bir coşkuyla karşılamış ve kendi ülkeleri için de benzer adımlar atılması çağrısında bulunmuştur. Lizbon Antlaşması'nın AB'den ayrılmaya olanak sağlayan 50. Madde'sinin daha önce hiç uygulamaya konulmamış olması ya da Birlik'ten ayrılmanın ne gibi düzenlemeler getireceğinin bilinmemesi gibi etmenler dahi söz konusu parti liderlerinin cesaretini kırmaya yetmemiştir.

Bu tez kapsamında yürütülen araştırmanın konusu 2014 Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimleri sonrası Parlamento'da yer alan şüpheli, hatta bazen AB-karşıtı üyelerin ve parti gruplarının doğurduğu çelişkili durumla ortaya çıkmıştır. Bununla birlikte söz konusu partilerin aynı dönemde medyada ve akademik çalışmalarda Avrupa bütünleşmesine dair algıları ve gündemleri ortakmışçasına aynı kategoride değerlendirilmeleri ve Avrupa Birliği'nin geleceğine bir tehdit olarak lanse edilmeleri (BBC, 2014) araştırma konusunu son haline taşımıştır. Bu kapsamda, medyada Avrupa Birliği'nin güçlerini elinden alarak onu ortadan

kaldırmak istedikleri iddia edilen (BBC, 2014), Parlamento’da kuşkucu bir “deprem”e ya da “fırtına”ya yol açacakları öne sürülen bu partilerin bir ayrım yapılmaksızın şüpheli addedilmelerinin ne denli doğru olduğu sorusu bu tezin odak noktası haline gelmiştir.

Bahar 2016’ta yapılan Avrobarometre anketlerinin sonuçları değerlendirildiğinde, Avrupa şüpheliğinin hem ulusal düzeyde hem de Avrupa düzeyinde uzun süre etkisini sürdüreceği sonucu çıkmaktadır. Kimileri için Avrupa şüpheliği vatandaşlar arasındaki ilgi ve merakı ortaya koyan olumlu bir gelişme iken, kimileri için bu durum Avrupa Birliği’nin geleceği için endişe sebebidir. Bu nedenle, bu endişenin en büyük kaynağı olarak ortaya radikal popülist partilerin neyi temsil ettiklerini, seçmenleri nasıl mobilize ettiklerini ve Avrupa Birliği’nden ne beklediklerini araştırmak ve anlamak her zamankinden daha büyük bir önem arz etmektedir.

Bu tez, Avrupa’da giderek artan bir seçmen desteğini arkasına alan radikal popülist partilerden Birleşik Krallık Bağımsızlık Partisi’nin (UKIP) ve Radikal Sol Koalisyon’un (SYRIZA) Avrupa Birliği’ne ilişkin söylemlerini analiz ederek bu partilerin Avrupa bütünleşmesine karşı çıktıkları yönlerini, Avrupa bütünleşmesi konusunu siyasi rekabet kapsamında kullanma biçimlerini, Avrupa bütünleşmesinden -ve bu fikrin uygulayıcısı olarak Avrupa Birliği’nden- beklentilerini ortaya koymayı; bu sayede, bu partilerin birbirleriyle olan benzerliklerini ve farklılıklarını araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Söz konusu partiler hem tarihsel hem ontolojik açılardan büyük farklılıklar göstermektedir. SYRIZA, Avrupa kıtasının en doğusunda yer alan, üyelik sürecinde Avrupa bütünleşmesinin en büyük destekçilerinden biriyken son yıllarda hem ekonomik krizden hem de arkasından gelen tasarruf önlemlerinden dolayı önemli finansal sorunlar yaşayan, Mülteci Krizi’nde en ön saflarda yer alarak Avrupa Birliği’nin kapısı olma görevi üstlenen Yunanistan’da faaliyet gösteren bir radikal sol partidir. Öte yandan, UKIP, Avrupa’nın en kuzeyinde yer alan, görece zengin, son dönemdeki krizlerden minimum düzeyde etkilenmiş ve Avrupa bütünleşmesine karşı her daim mesafesini korumuş olan Birleşik Krallık’ın radikal sağ partilerindendir.

Tüm bu farklılıklara rağmen bu iki partinin birlikte bu teze konu olması şu sebeplerle açıklanabilir: Öncelikle, hem SYRIZA hem de UKIP 2014 Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerini birinci olarak tamamlamış, SYRIZA 6, UKIP ise 21 üyeyle Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda kendi ülkelerinden en geniş temsile sahip siyasi partiler olmuşlardır. Bu partiler aynı zamanda ertesi sene yapılan ulusal seçimlerde büyük başarılar göstermişlerdir. SYRIZA, 2015 yılında Ocak ve Eylül aylarında yapılan her iki genel seçimde de yaklaşık %35'lik oy oranıyla birinci parti olmuştur. UKIP aynı yıl yapılan seçimlerde ülkede uygulanan dar bölge seçim sistemi nedeniyle Avam Kamarası'nda yalnızca bir koltuk kazanmış olsa da, oy oranını yaklaşık dörde katlayarak %12,4'e çıkarmış, seçimleri üçüncü parti olarak tamamlamıştır. Genel bir yükseliş eğiliminde olsalar da bu denli bir oy artışı diğer radikal popülist partilerde sık görülen bir özellik değildir. Bunun yanı sıra, SYRIZA'nın ve UKIP'in Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki yüksek temsil oranları kendilerinin şüpheli söylemleriyle birlikte ilginç bir paradoks olarak göze çarpmaktadır.

Bu partilerin seçilmelerindeki bir diğer sebep, Grexit ve Brexit tartışmalarının Yunanistan ve İngiltere'de ortaya çıkmış olmasıdır. Farklı sosyoekonomik geçmişlere sahip olmalarına rağmen bu iki ülkenin günümüzde sahip oldukları ortak bir nokta vardır: Toplumlarında görülen yüksek düzey Avrupa şüpheliği. Pew Araştırma Merkezi'nin (2016) yakın zamanda yayınlanmış olduğu rapora göre hem Yunanlıların hem de Britanyalıların yaklaşık üçte ikisi Brüksel'in güçlerini ulusal hükümetlere aktarmasını istemektedir. Bunun yanı sıra bu iki ülke Fransa'yla beraber AB'ne karşı en olumsuz fikirlere sahip üç ülkeyi oluşturmaktadır. Yunan halkının yalnızca %27'si, Britanya halkının ise yalnızca %44'ü AB'yle ilgili olumlu düşüncelere sahiptir. Dolayısıyla, ayrılma tartışmalarının bu ülkelerde başlamış olması rastlantı değildir. SYRIZA ve UKIP özelinde baktığımızda da, seçmen tabanlarının çoğunluğunun (SYRIZA için %68, UKIP için %93) ulusal hükümetlerinin güçlerini geri kazanmaları fikrini destekledikleri görülmektedir.

Bu noktada toplumsal ve parti-düzeyinde Avrupa şüpheliikleri arasındaki ilişki tam olarak kestirilemese de, söz konusu partiler iddia edildiği gibi Avrupa

projesini engellemek amacıyla seçimlerde desteklerini arttırmak, dolayısıyla seçmenleri mobilize etmek kaygısı güdüyorlarsa, Yunanistan ve Birleşik Krallık, bu araştırma için en uygun iki ülke olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Çevresel etmenlerin yanı sıra bu iki parti sahip oldukları ideolojiler açısından karşıtlık göstermekte, dolayısıyla bu tezde yer verilen radikal popülist partilerin bir ayrım yapılmaksızın aynı kategori altında değerlendirilmesinin yanlışlığına dair savı desteklemek için tercih edilebilecek birkaç parti arasından öne çıkmaktadır.

Radikal sol ve radikal sağ partileri bir arada çalışmanın en büyük zorluklarından birisi bu iki aileye mensup partilere dair literatürün birbirlerinden oldukça bağımsız olmasıdır. Ancak, bu literatürleri detaylıca incelemek, parti ideolojilerinin AB'ye ilişkin söylemlerde ne denli yer tuttuğunu anlamak açısından önem arz etmektedir.

Radikal sağ partilere ilişkin eserlere bakıldığında, ilk olarak, literatürün kavramsal bir karışıklıktan muzdarip olduğu görülmektedir. Bu tür partileri nitelemek için yazarlar “aşırı-sağ”, “radikal sağ”, “düzen karşıtı”, “popülist”, “göç-karşıtı” gibi birbirinden oldukça farklı kavramlar kullansalar da bu kavramların arkasında düşünce genel olarak aynıdır. Bu tez kapsamında, bir partinin ideolojisinin ve söyleminin partiyi tanımlamada ve anlamada aynı derecede öneme sahip olduğuna işaret eden “Radikal Popülist” teriminin kullanılması tercih edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, teze konu olan partiler demokrasiye, insan haklarına ve hukukun üstünlüğüne aykırı bir söylem ya da eylemde bulunmadıklarından, kendilerinin “aşırı” yerine “radikal” olarak nitelendirilmeleri uygun bulunmuştur.

Radikal Popülist Okul'un öncülerinden Betz (1994) bu partilerin ortaya çıkışını Batı Avrupa Demokrasilerindeki köklü sosyoekonomik ve sosyokültürel değişimle açıklamaktadır. Buna göre, söz konusu değişim toplumu bir kimlik altında, bir arada tutmaya yarayan elementlerin ortadan kalkmasına ve kişiler arasında bireysellik ilkesinin öne çıkmasına yol açmaktadır. Toplumun değişim sonrası ortaya çıkan yeni ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel düzene ayak uydurmayı başaramamış üyeleri yeni düzenin “kazananlar”ı olurken; bu değişimle başa çıkamayıp önceki düzende sahip olduğu statüyü yitirenler yeni düzenin “kaybedenleri” olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Yukarıda bahsi geçen “kaybedenler”, tecrübe ettikleri bu büyük değişim sonucunda gergin ve güvensiz tavırlar sergilemekte, kayıplarından mevcut sistemi sorumlu tutmakta ve önceki statülerine dönmelerine dair yapılan her vaadi destekleme eğilimi göstermektedir. Bu durum, toplumdaki kaygıyı ve hayal kırıklığını kullanma eğiliminde olan radikal sağ partilerin yükselişine zemin hazırlamaktadır (Betz, 1994).

Mudde’ye göre (2010), ortaya çıkan aşırı sağ partilerin üç temel özelliği vardır. Bunlar nativizm, otoriterizm ve popülizmdir. Nativizm, toplumu mümkün olduğunca dış etkilere uzak ve homojen tutma isteğine işaret ederken, otoriterizm kısaca devletin, toplumu koruma ve düzeni sağlama görevini üstlenmiş esas aktör öne çıkartılması durumudur. Son olarak popülizm, Cas Mudde tarafından politik bir stilden çok bir ideoloji olarak yorumlanır. Mudde’ye göre popülizm, yozlaşmış elite karşı saf vatandaşların savunulması, umumi iradenin diğer her şeyin üstünde tutulması ve doğrudan demokrasiyle vatandaşların isteklerinin tamamıyla yönetime yansması amaçlarını taşır.

Bu noktada radikal sağ ve radikal sol popülizmleri büyük benzerlik göstermektedir. Radikal sol partiler her ne kadar popülizme olumsuz anlamlar yükleyip, bu şekilde anılmaktan rahatsızlık duysa da, yetersiz ve ahlaki açıdan yozlaşmış politik düzene (Van der Brug, vd. 2014) yapılan eleştiriler, bu düzene karşı savaş verdiği iddia edilen ahlaklı insanlara yapılan vurgular ve karar alma süreçlerinde öne çıkartılan sağduyu faktörü popülizme işaret etmektedir.

Radikal solun özellikle 1989’dan bu yana bir değişim ve düşüş içerisinde olduğu iddia edilmektedir (Moreau, vd. 1998; Mudde & March, 2005). Buna göre, geleneksel radikal sol, Sovyetler Birliği’nin çöküşünden sonra ya giderek marjinalleşerek daha uç bir noktaya taşınmıştır ya da ılımlaşarak merkez-sol çizgisine kaymıştır. Günümüzde yükselişe geçen “yeni radikal sol”, geleneksel sol ideolojinin antikapitalist, eşitlikçi, özgürlük yanlısı ilkelerine bağlı kalmanın yanı sıra küreselleşme ve uluslararası ilişkiler konularında daha ılımlı yaklaşımlar sergilemektedir. Bununla birlikte, bu yeni sol; çevre, kadın, gençlik gibi konularda faaliyet gösteren toplumsal hareketlerle yakın bir ilişki içerisinde.

Radikal popülist sağ ve sol partilerin Avrupa şüpheciliği konusuna gelindiğinde, bu terimin ilk kez 1985 yılında İngiltere’de bir gazetede ortaya çıktığı görülmektedir (Spiering, 2004). Margaret Thatcher’ın ünlü Brugge Konuşması’yla yaygınlaşan ve karmaşık bir hal alan Avrupa şüpheciliği, en geniş anlamıyla Avrupa bütünleşmesine karşı gösterilen mesafeli duruşa işaret etmektedir. Literatürde ilk kez Paul Taggart (1998) tarafından kullanılan bu terim, daha sonra yazarın bir başka eserinde Sert ve Yumuşak Avrupa şüpheciliği olmak üzere iki kategoriye ayrılmıştır (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001). Bu kategorilerden ilki Avrupa bütünleşmesinin çeşitli politikalarına yönelik rastlantısal veya nitelikli karşıtlığı ifade ederken, ikincisi Avrupa’nın politik ve ekonomik bütünleşmesine ilişkin projenin tamamıyla reddedilmesi ve ülkenin Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine karşı çıkılması anlamına gelmektedir. Avrupa şüpheciliği konusuna gösterilen ilgi arttıkça, bu kavram farklı tipolojilerle tekrar tekrar tanımlanmıştır. Öte yandan, Taggart ve Szczerbiak (2008) bu kavrama ilişkin tipolojilerin karmaşık ve detaylı bir hal almasının uygulamayı zorlaştırdığını ve parti sınıflandırmalarında çelişkili durumlara sebep olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Avrupa şüpheciliğiyle ilgili sık sık tartışılan bir başka konu partilerin bu duruşuna yol açan iç faktörlerdir. Bu noktada literatür ikiye ayrılmaktadır. Kimi yazarlar bütünleşmeye yönelik bu şüphecî tutumu partilerin ideolojik yaklaşımlarındaki farklılıklara bağlamakta ve partilerin temsil ettikleri kitlelerin değerlerini ve inançlarını ön plana koyarak Avrupa bütünleşmesine karşı duruşlarını belirlediklerini iddia etmektedir. Buna göre radikal sağ partiler Avrupa bütünleşmesini savunmakta oldukları nativizm ve otoriterizm ilkelerine karşı bir tehdit olarak algılamakta, radikal sol partiler ise bütünleşmenin liberal doğasına temkinli yaklaşmaktadır. Bir diğer görüş partilerin içinde bulundukları siyasi rekabet ortamında yürüttükleri stratejilerin söz konusu şüphecî tutumu tetiklediğini öne sürmektedir. Buna göre partiler seçimler aracılığıyla güç kazanıp iktidara yakınlaştıkça Avrupa bütünleşmesine olan şüphecî tavırları azalmaktadır.

Bu tezde, partilerin Avrupa bütünleşmesine karşı belirledikleri şüphecî tutumda hem ideolojinin hem de stratejinin etkisi olduğu savunulmaktadır. Buna göre partilerin bütünleşmeye karşı çıkma sebepleri ait oldukları parti ailesine,

dolayısıyla savundukları inanç ve değerlere bağlıyken, bu karşı çıkmanın nasıl ve hangi koşullarda ifade edildiği partinin o anki stratejik değerlendirmelerine bağlıdır. Burada iddia edilen, partinin Avrupa şüpheciliğinin azalması veya artması değil, aynı şekilde ve seviyede devam eden şüphenin daha sert ya da daha yumuşak bir tonla, bilinçli bir şekilde ve bir amaç güderek ifade edilmesidir.

Buradan yola çıkarak, bu araştırma için seçilmiş partilerin en belirgin özellikleri olarak ortaya çıkan radikalizm ve popülizm, Avrupa şüpheciliğinin yukarıda bahsedilen stratejik unsuruna işaret eden siyasal iletişim araçları olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu amaçla SYRIZA'nın ve UKIP'in söylemlerinde radikalizme işaret eden ifadeler araştırıldığında, iki partinin de içinde bulundukları politik sistemlere karşı sert eleştirilerde bulundukları ve bu sistemlerde yapılması gereken köklü değişikliklere vurgu yaptıkları gözlemlenmektedir. Benzer şekilde hem SYRIZA hem de UKIP, toplumun mümkün olan en geniş kesimini kapsayacak, doğrudan bir demokrasi formuna olan ihtiyaca dikkat çekmektedir. Bu partilere göre, mevcut politikacılar ve onların oluşturduğu hükümetler yetersiz ve yeteneksizdir; toplumun ihtiyaçları ve istekleri için çalışmamaktadır. Buna karşılık, her iki de parti de kendilerini zor zamanlarda gerekeni yapabilecek yegâne alternatif olarak öne sürmekte; mevcut politik düzende temsil edilmediğini düşünen ve ülkenin kontrolünü oligarşinin, kartellerin, tefecilerin elinden geri almayı amaçlayan herkesi kendilerini desteklemeye davet etmektedir.

Bu iki partinin benzerlik gösterdikleri bir diğer nokta, radikal tedbirlerin gerekliliğine yaptıkları vurgulardır. Buna göre, Yunanistan'ın ve Birleşik Krallık'ın günümüzde deneyimlediği gibi zor şartlar, radikal adımlar atılmasına olan ihtiyacı beraberinde getirmektedir. SYRIZA ve UKIP bu ihtiyacı gidermek istemekte, ancak ülkelerini kontrol altına alan yozlaşmış parti hiyerarşilerinin çıkarlarına bir tehdit oluşturduklarından siyasi arenada istenmemekte, mevcut siyasi düzen tarafından bastırılmaya ve yıldırılmaya çalışılmaktadır.

SYRIZA'nın ve UKIP'in sistem karşıtı tavırları çok benzer görünse de, vaat ettikleri değişimleri nasıl gerçekleştirecekleri sorusuna verdikleri cevaplar sağ ve sol ideolojinin farklılıklarını açık bir şekilde ortaya koymaktadır. SYRIZA, kapitalizme karşı gösterdiği mücadeleyi toplumsal hareketlere dayandırmakta, bu

yolda işçilerle, kadınlarla, gençlerle, LGBTI bireylerle yaptığı işbirliğine vurgu yapmakta, yeni düzenin ancak sivil iradeyle kurulabileceğine dikkat çekmektedir. Bu amaçla, yalnızca Yunan halkını değil, tüm Avrupa halklarını kıta düzeyinde dayanışmaya davet etmektedir. Dahası, SYRIZA barış arayışının sol hareketin vazgeçilmez bir unsuru olduğunu ifade etmekte; silahlanmaya karşı demokrasinin, kolluk kuvvetlerine karşı kitlesel hareketlerin rolünü öne çıkarmaktadır.

UKIP, SYRIZA'nın aksine, sistemde yapılacak köklü değişikliklerin kolektif hareketlerden ziyade devletin uğraşlarıyla gerçekleşeceğine inanıyor görünmektedir. Parti, bu amaç doğrultusunda polisi ve askeri, kanun ve düzenin koruyucusu olarak görmekte, kolluk kuvvetlerin görünürlüklerinin ve güçlerinin mümkün oldukça arttırılması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Dahası, bu önlemlerin sadece ülke içerisinde kalmamasını, dışarıdan gelecek tehditlere karşı ülkenin savunma kapasitesinin arttırılmasını da öngörmektedir.

UKIP ayrıca, ne ülke içindeki ne de Avrupa'daki toplumsal hareketlerle bir yakınlık göstermemekte; partinin zaman zaman kendi içerisindeki azınlık gruplara ya da üçüncü ülkelere ilişkin yaptığı pozitif yorumlar, Hristiyan kültürüne ve Britanya medeniyetine yapılan övgülerin gölgesinde kalmaktadır. Dokümanlarda, partinin içinde bulunduğu Parlamento grubu EFDD'ye ya da üyelerine ilişkin dahi referans bulunmamakta; diğer ülkelerle veya toplumlarla yapılacak işbirliği ve anlaşmalar ülkenin çıkarları çerçevesinde sınırlanmış görünmektedir. Bu noktada UKIP, SYRIZA'dan daha izole ve kendine dönük politikalar izlemektedir.

SYRIZA'nın ve UKIP'in popülizm anlayışlarına gelindiğinde, iki partinin en büyük benzerlikleri bu alanda gösterdikleri anlaşılmaktadır. Gerek SYRIZA, gerekse UKIP, bu alandaki literatüre paralel olarak söylemlerinde doğrudan temsil ve demokrasi yanlısı görünmekte, hükümetin şeffaf ve güvenilir olması gerektiğine olan inançlarını yinelemekte ve kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket eden siyasi ve ekonomik elite karşılık sıradan vatandaşın savunucusu olacaklarını iddia etmektedir.

Partilerin kendi aidiyet eksenleri üzerinden oluşturdukları *Biz* ve *Onlar* kategorilerine mensup aktörlere bakıldığında her iki parti için de kendi ülkelerinin,

milletlerinin, toplum içerisindeki sosyal grupların (İşçiler, emekliler, yaşlılar vs.) ve partilerin kendilerinin *Biz* kategorisinin üst sıralarını oluşturduğu görülmektedir. Öte yandan, hükümetler, ülkedeki ve Avrupa Birliği'ndeki politikacılar, Avrupa Birliği ve Kurumları, ve Elit her iki parti için de en çok rastlanan *Diğer* mensubu aktörlerdir.

Yukarıdaki ortak aktörlerden bağımsız olarak SYRIZA kendi kuracağı hükümeti ve köklü bir değişiklikten geçerek orijinal prensiplerine dönmüş bir Avrupa Birliği'ni *Biz* kategorisine yerleştirmekte, bu yaklaşımıyla bir açıdan Avrupa bütünleşmesine olan bağlılığını yinelemektedir. Parti, öte yandan ülkedeki finansal krizin ve beraberinde gelen trajedinin sorumlusu olarak gördüğü *Troyka*'yı *Diğer* olarak nitelendirmektedir. UKIP ise yalnızca politikacıları değil siyasi partileri de *Diğer* kategorisinde görmektedir, bunun yanı sıra, toplumun bütünlüğüne tehlike olarak algıladığı tüm yabancıları göçmen, mülteci ya da sığınmacı ayrımı yapmaksızın aynı kategoriye yerleştirmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, radikalizmin ve popülizmin partilerin Avrupa'ya ilişkin duruşlarındaki ve söylemlerindeki etkisi üç maddeyle özetlenebilir. Öncelikle Avrupa Birliği, söz konusu partilerin güvenilmez ve yetersiz buldukları siyasi düzenin önemli parçalarından biridir. Dolayısıyla, partilerin gerekli gördükleri ve talep ettikleri radikal değişimin Birlik'in kendisinden veya partilerin Birlik'le olan ilişkilerinden ayrı olması mümkün değildir. Ancak, partilerin etkisiz ve adaletsiz addettikleri, ekonomik ve siyasal elitlerle birlikte güç ilişkilerinin ortasında olduğuna inandıkları Avrupa Birliği'ne bu süreçte ne tür bir rol uygun gördükleri aşağıda değinileceği üzere ideolojileriyle doğrudan bağlantılıdır.

İkinci olarak, söz konusu partilerin etraflarındaki aktörlere karşı sert bir *Biz* ve *Onlar* yaklaşımı göstermeleri, zaman içerisinde ülkelerindeki toplumsal şüphecilik yükseldikçe söylemlerini sertleştirmeleri, abartı ve acındırma yoluyla seçmenler arasındaki hoşnutsuzluğu beslemeleri, radikalizmin ve popülizmin bu partiler tarafından yalnızca bir ideoloji değil aynı zamanda bir siyasi iletişim metodu olarak algılandığına işaret etmektedir. Özellikle SYRIZA'nın 2014 Avrupa Parlamento'su seçimlerinden, ardından gelen ulusal seçimlerden ve halkoylamasından hemen öncesinde üslubunu sertleştirmesi, seçimlerde başarı

gösterip Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda ve hükümette yer almasıyla eleştirel tavrını bir kenara bırakıp Avrupa Birliği'yle işbirliği arayışına girmesi, bu iki unsurun partiler tarafından stratejik olarak başvurulmuş yöntemler olduğu ihtimalini kuvvetlendirmektedir.

Son olarak, ne SYRIZA Yunanistan'da hükümeti kurma şansı elde ettiğinde, ne de UKIP uzun yıllardır savunduğu AB'den ayrılma kararı alındığında, vaat ettikleri radikal politikaları gerçekleştirebilmiştir. SYRIZA, kendi lehine sonlanan halkoylamasına rağmen müzakerelerde kayda değer bir kazanım gösteremeyerek sunulan kurtarma paketini kabul etmiş, Mülteci Krizi'ne dair somut bir adım atamamış, hükümette geçirdiği bir yılı aşkın süreye rağmen silahlanmaya ayrılan bütçeyi azaltmamış ve Kilise'nin yönetimdeki etkisini sonlandırmak için bir girişimde bulunmamıştır. Öte yandan UKIP lideri Nigel Farage, kampanya süresince ülkenin kontrolünü ellerine alana kadar işinin bitmeyeceğini ifade ederken, referandum sonuçlarının açıklamasının hemen arkasından parti liderliğinden istifa etmiş, dahası, seçim kampanyalarında büyük yer tutan Ulusal Sağlık Sistemi yatırımlarına dair verilen sözlerin kendisinden kaynaklı olmayan bir hata olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Bu yönüyle, hem SYRIZA hem de UKIP, içinde bulundukları Avrupa'ya karşı yoğun şüpheli siyasi ortamda seslerini yükseltmeyi seçimlerde kendilerine oy getiren bir yol olarak görüp, bu yolda altından kalkamayacakları politika önerilerinde bulunmuş gibi görünmektedir.

Seçilmiş partiler için Avrupa şüpheliliğinin ideolojik unsurları mercek altına alındığında, radikal sağ ve radikal solun yaklaşımındaki farklılıklar dikkat çekmektedir. UKIP'in ve SYRIZA'nın Avrupa bütünleşmesinin dört boyutuna (Ekonomik, Politik, Kültürel, Yasal) ilişkin söylemleri parçalara ayrılıp tanı, tedavi ve amaç çerçeveleri altında detaylıca incelendiğinde, SYRIZA'nın bütünleşmenin en çok ekonomik boyutuna, UKIP'in ise en çok kültürel boyutuna odaklandığı görülmektedir. SYRIZA, Avrupa Birliği'nin işsizliğe, eşitsizliğe, yoksulluğa yol açan neoliberal politikalarını eleştirmekte; başta Yunanistan olmak üzere Avrupa'nın pek çok ülkesinde insanlık krizine yol açan bu uygulamaların başarısızlığa mahkûm olduğunun altını çizmektedir. UKIP'in en büyük kaygısı ise Britanya'ya gelerek refah devletini sunduğu hizmetleri sekteye uğratan,

vatandaşların alışık oldukları yaşam tarzına tehdit oluşturan, ülke ekonomisinde yüke sebep olan ve güvenlik seviyesini aşağı çeken göçmenler ve AB'nin tüm bunlara olanak sağlayan açık kapı politikasıdır. Bütünleşmenin politik boyutu her iki parti için de ikinci sırada gelmektedir. SYRIZA, AB'nin kendi halkından uzak, baskıcı bir tutum sergilediğini ifade ederek bu tutumun Birlik'i bölünme ve zıtlasmaya ittiğini belirtmektedir. Ek olarak, AB'nin demokratik olmayan bir tutumla yönettiği sözde insani müdahalelerine bir son vermesi gerektiğinin altını çizerek, asıl düşmanın yükselen cihatçılık ve aşırılık olduğunu söylemektedir.

UKIP, SYRIZA'dan farklı bir yol izleyerek, AB'yi ülkenin egemenliğini ellerinden almakla suçlamaktadır. UKIP'e göre, Britanyalıların kendilerini ilgilendiren yasaların yapımında hiçbir rol oynamaması hemen düzeltilmesi gereken bir hatadır. Aynı şekilde, ülkenin güvenliğinin barış değil güç arayışında olan AB'nin silahlı güçlerine bırakılması kabul edilebilir değildir. Bunlara ek olarak hem SYRIZA hem de UKIP, AB'nin aynı zamanda Almanya'nın güdümünde hareket ettiğini iddia etmekte, Birlik'in kapalı kapılar ardında yürüttüğü güvenilmez politikalarını eleştirmektedir.

Son olarak, bütünleşmenin yasal boyutu her iki parti için de en az önemi arz etmektedir. Bu konuyla ilgili olarak SYRIZA AB'nin, hukukun üstünlüğü ilkesinden ayrıldığını ileri sürmekte, Avrupa kurumlarının haksız kararlar ve keyfi davranışlarla kendi itibarlarını sarstıklarını beyan etmektedir. Diğer yandan UKIP, Avrupa hukukun ulusal hukuka olan üstünlüğünden kaynaklı rahatsızlığını dile getirmekte, yasaları koyma ve uygulama işinin devletlerin kendilerine bırakılması gerektiğini savunmaktadır.

Yukarıda değinilen sorunlara karşılık olarak SYRIZA, Avrupa uluslarının ortak çabasıyla yeniden şekillenecek bir Avrupa Birliği önerisiyle gelmektedir. Bu yeni birlik özgürlük, demokrasi, sosyal adalet, haysiyet ilkelerini temel alacak; yaratıcılığı, bilgiyi, sanatı ve düşünceyi destekleyecek; her daim kendi halklarının yanında olacak şekilde betimlenmiştir. Kurulacak yeni düzende tüm sorunlar insan onurunu gözeterek, Avrupa çapında yaptırımlarla çözülecek; Avrupa kotası bir zamanlar olduğu gibi medeniyetin beşiği haline gelecektir. Tüm bunlar için mevcut

bozuk yönetimden kurtulmak ve halkların ihtiyaçlarını ve isteklerini gözetecek sol bir yönetim atamak gerekecektir.

UKIP, bu noktada SYRIZA'dan tamamen farklı bir politika izlemekte ve tanımladığı sorunlara karşılık tek çözüm olarak Avrupa Birliği'nden ayrılmayı öne sürmektedir. Partiye göre, Avrupa bütünleşmesi başarısızlığa uğramaya mahkûm bir projedir ve Birleşik Krallığın bu projede hiçbir yeri yoktur. Hem ülke hem de vatandaşlar, AB dışında kendi kaderlerini tayin edebilecekler, kendi ticari ilişkilerini kurabilecekler, başka bir kuruma bağlı olmaksızın kendi güvenliklerini sağlayabileceklerdir. UKIP'in iddialarına göre Birleşik Krallık kendi başına küresel düzeyde hak ettiği yeri bulacak ve AB'ye ihtiyacı olmadığını bir kez daha anlayacaktır.

Sonuç olarak, SYRIZA'nın ve UKIP'in Avrupa şüphecilikleri stratejik açılardan benzerlikler gösterse de, bu partilerin ideolojik mirasları Avrupa bütünleşmesine ilişkin çok farklı beklentilere ve programlara sahip olmalarına yol açmaktadır. UKIP'in şüpheciliği Birleşik Krallık'ın AB ile bağlarını koparması çözümünü öne sürerken, SYRIZA ulusüstü yönü çok daha baskın olduğu bir bütünleşme önerisiyle gelmektedir. Bu sebeple, söz konusu partilerin bir ayrım gözetilmeksizin “şüpheci” olarak nitelendirilmeleri ve Avrupa Birliği'nin geleceğine tehdit oluşturmakla suçlanmaları büyük bir hatadır. Bu partilerin beraber çalışılmalarında bir sakınca olmamakla birlikte, bahsedilen hataya düşmemek adına bu karşılaştırmaların büyük bir özenle ve sağduyuyla yapılması gerektirdiği unutulmamalıdır.

APPENDIX C: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ÖZBEY
Adı : EBRU ECE
Bölümü : AVRUPA ÇALIŞMALARI (EUS)

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): PARTY-LEVEL EUROSCEPTICISM OF THE RADICAL POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES: THE CASES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP) AND THE COALITION OF THE RADICAL LEFT (SYRIZA)

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☒ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☒

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: