HEIDEGGERIAN WAY-MAKING TO LANGUAGE

DAMLA SEZGİ

SEPTEMBER 2016
HEIDEGGERIAN WAY-MAKING TO LANGUAGE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY
DAMLASERZİ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
PHILOSOPHY

SEPTEMBER 2016
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

______________________________
Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

______________________________
Prof. Dr. Halil Şeref Turan
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

______________________________
Assist. Prof. Dr. Aret Karademir
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çirakman (METU, PHIL) ______________________
Assist. Prof. Dr. Aret Karademir (METU, PHIL) ______________________
Prof. Dr. Zeynep Direk (Koç, PHIL) ______________________
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name:

Signature
ABSTRACT

HEIDEGGERIAN WAY-MAKING TO LANGUAGE

Sezgi, Damla
M.A., Department of Philosophy
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Aret Karademir

September 2016, 174 pages

The main concern of the present thesis is ‘language’ in Heidegger. Beginning with a discussion of the place of the Heideggerian thought within the context of the history of philosophy, which at that time witnessed a shift which is called ‘linguistic turn’, the question ‘What is language?’ is scrutinized to show the dilemma which arises from the fact that this question itself is in language. After, from the Heideggerian perspective, the interrogation of the whatness of language is shown to be inadequate, requiring a reformulation of the question as ‘What is the essence of language?’ Under the light of this question, through an elaborate reading of Being and Time from Heidegger’s early period and On the Way to Language from his late period, it is demonstrated that the early Heidegger takes the issue of language on the basis of Dasein’s existential structure, whereas the later Heidegger elevates ‘language’ and takes language qua language, thereby putting ‘language’ itself at the position of the speaker and concludes that ‘language speaks’. The turning in the thought of Heidegger is further investigated and it is shown that this turning is not a change in his thought but a shift of emphasis. At the same time, it is also shown that Heidegger’s own performative language cannot be separated from his conception of ‘language’, which yields the conclusion that the shift of focus in
Heidegger’s thought is a making of another way to language, and by this very reason, is a ‘turn’ in his thought.

Keywords: Heidegger, philosophy of language, *Ereignis*, way-making
ÖZ

DİL DÜŞÜNÇESİNE HEIDEGGERCİ YOL-YAPIM

Sezgi, Damla
M.A., Felsefe Bölümü
Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Aret Karademir

Eylül 2016, 174 sayfa

durumun doğurduğu sonuç ise şudur; bahsedilen vurgu kayması, dile farklı bir yol-yapım olarak yorumlanmalıdır ve tam da bu yüzden düşüncesinde bir ‘dönüşüm’ gerçekleşmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Heidegger, dil felsefesi, Ereignis, yol-yapım
In dedication to my beloved feline friend, Kuzur.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitudes to my other half, Zühtücan Soysal, for his shoreless love and unreserved support in all fields of life, including the writing of this thesis.

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Assist. Prof. Dr. Aret Karademir, without whose efforts, attention and patience I would not be able to overcome this tough period. I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Elif Çırakman for everything she has done for me for the last seven years, and also for her guidance and support during the thesis writing process. I also would like to submit my gratitudes to Prof. Dr. Zeynep Direk, for honouring me with taking her precious time for me, for her invaluable recommendations and encouragement.

I would like to thank my sister, Zeynep Sezgi, since she has never stopped believing in me, and has always been there and made me laugh when I needed it most. Also, I would like to thank to my mother, Servet Arıkan, for her constant support as I go ups and downs, as well as her deep felt love.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM PAGE ........................................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... iv
ÖZ ...................................................................................................................................... vi
DEDICATION ..................................................................................................................... viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... x

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

2. HEIDEGGER AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN: THE OUTSET .... 4
   2.1 The Predecessors ...................................................................................................... 6
   2.2 The Contemporaries: Logical Positivism ............................................................... 10
      2.2.1 *Einheitwissenschaft* and The Centrality of Methodology ................................ 10
      2.2.2 Linguistic Turn and Metaphysics ...................................................................... 14
   2.3. The Impact of the Language Dispute & the Davos Debate .......... 17
      2.3.1 The Activity of Language: Spontaneous or Receptive? ..................................... 18
      2.3.2 Construing the Tonality in Heidegger’s Texts ................................................. 20

3. UNDERSTANDING THE QUESTION ‘WHAT IS LANGUAGE?’ ......................................... 21
   3.1 Thinking About Language ..................................................................................... 22
   3.2 Being Already in Language ................................................................................... 24
   3.3 Language and *Quidditas* .................................................................................... 26
   3.4 Language and *Wesen* ....................................................................................... 27

4. THE WAY TO LANGUAGE IN *BEING AND TIME* ..................................................... 30
   4.1 The Fundamental Ontology .................................................................................. 31
4.1.1 Recovering the Neighbourhood Lost in Translating

Seinsfrage................................................................. 32

4.1.2 The Task of Destruktion........................................ 35

4.2 Phenomenology as the Way to How................................. 39

4.2.1 The Problem with ‘Of’ as an Objective Genitive........ 43

4.2.2 Phenomenon............................................................ 45

4.2.3 Logos........................................................................ 47

4.3 Existence and Language................................................... 52

4.3.1 Being-in-the-world & Equipmentality............................ 54

4.3.2 References & Signs....................................................... 57

4.3.3 Does ‘Rede’ stand for a ‘Constitutionalist Conception

of Language’?.................................................................. 61

4.3.4 Evaluating the Vicinage of Language....................... 65

4.3.5 The Ontological Constituents of Language:

Understanding and Meaning........................................... 68

4.3.6 Discourse & Language............................................... 74

4.3.7 Being and Time: The “Locus” of Language............. 85

5. LATER HEIDEGGERIAN ‘LANGUAGE’................................. 87

5.1 Approaching the ‘Turn’.................................................... 89

5.1.1 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of

Language......................................................................... 91

5.1.2 Introduction to Metaphysics.......................................... 97

5.2. On the Way to Language................................................ 99

5.2.1 Way-making: Putting Language as Language into

Language........................................................................ 100

5.2.2 Saying as Showing....................................................... 109

5.2.3 Appropriation.............................................................. 112

5.2.4 Silent Speaking........................................................... 115

5.3 “The Way to Language” and Being and Time.................... 119

5.4 Word in the Neighbourhood of Poetry and Thinking........ 127
5.4.1 “The Event Words” ................................................. 128
5.4.2 The Poet and the Thinker .................................................. 134
6. STYLE AND SAYING ON A SINGLE ROAD .......................... 138
   6.1 Recapitulations and Elucidations ....................................... 138
   6.2 Heidegger’s Language ...................................................... 145
7. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 150
REFERENCES ........................................................................... 157
APPENDICES
   A. TURKISH SUMMARY .......................................................... 161
   B. TEZ FOTOKİPİ İZİN FORMU .............................................. 174
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the introduction of his book *Introduction to Philosophy — Thinking and Poetizing*, Heidegger speaks of the impossibility of an introduction to philosophy:

> Whoever plans an ‘introduction to Philosophy’ presupposes that those who are to be introduced to philosophy stand initially outside of it . . . Although this notion of philosophy is widespread, it misses the essence of philosophy insofar as there is no such outside—separated from the human essence—that could constitute the abode of philosophy where humans would first need to proceed in order to be in philosophy.¹

Thinking through this comment, an introduction to the way ‘language’ is treated philosophically seems to pose a double challenge. For one thing is, ‘language’, however it is understood and in whatever way it is practiced, seems to be so intimately belonging to the human being that ‘a philosophical introduction’ to it runs the risk of being either too idle or too assertive. Nevertheless, the urgency of the task of raising an inquiry regarding the essence of language immeasurably overweights the concerns for such a risk. In this light, the task of this thesis will be to investigate Heidegger’s thought of language and its transformation throughout his corpus. In order to achieve this, I will have five focal subject matters each of which follows from the other.

In the chapter following this introduction, i.e., chapter two, I study the overall historical situation which makes up the place of Heidegger in this historicity. Hence first I will mention the predecessors of his thought of language, his contemporaries and the overall discussions and the gist of the ‘Linguistic Turn’, as this period is frequently called.

In the third chapter, I will try to establish our subject matter, language, through beginning from an ordinary conception and naive probing, and thusly exposing the potential problems one may come across while contemplating on the essence of language. Accordingly, I will examine the potential culminations of thinking about language while being already in language. Followingly, I will attempt to expose the philosophical background of the implications of thinking language in terms of quiddity and wesen.

In the fourth chapter, I will focus exclusively on how Heidegger develops an account of language in Being and Time. In order to achieve this, I will study to what extent language possesses a determining role specifically in Being and Time. In this context, I will investigate language’s relation with the establishment of the fundamental ontology as the first philosophy; and next, I will inquire into the way language acquires an essential way for phenomenology—the way to how.

Subsequent to Being and Time, I will explore the later Heideggerian thought of language, firstly through focusing on his approaching to the turn; and then secondly, through maintaining an extensive exposition of the book On the Way to Language, I will elaborate on the essence of language in terms of saying, which is exposed as the mode of appropriation, which will yield an understanding of how language in the later period of Heidegger takes place as the grounding element of his thought. Then, the differences between Being and Time and the later period will bring forth the transformation of language in Heidegger’s thought.

In the sixth chapter, which I will begin with a summary of all previous points and elucidation of them within the context I would like to make my claim about the transformation of Heidegger’s ‘language’, I will argue that
the place of ‘language’ in the Heideggerian philosophy cannot be thought without the performative discourse in which Heidegger’s own exposition of the concept takes place.
CHAPTER 2

HEIDEGGER AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN: THE OUTSET

I: The transformation occurs as a passage.
J: . . . in which one site is left behind in favor of another.
I: . . . and that requires that the sites be placed in discussion.
J: One site is metaphysics.
I: And the other? We leave it without a name.

(Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language”)

It would not be fair to treat the history of philosophy as a sum of juxtaposed reflections of thinkers; and philosophical reflections should not be considered solely as the products of individual thinkers’ creative activity. Rather, it is a condensed whole burgeoning by way of bequest owing to the fact that all thinkers inherit certain concerns and ideas from one another; even when they reject or harshly criticise some others, it is possible to admit that, at some point, such denegations are forms of inheritance too. Therewithal, there is an undeniable historical force which produces the thinkers’ locus, and as a result, their thoughts and undertakings. Correspondingly, the deliberations that make up the history of philosophy are the offsprings of the historical background and cannot be thought as isolated, self-referring creations. It concludes that for any investigation on a philosopher to make sense and rise on cogent grounds, it is indispensable to place the philosopher on the historical context, to become capable of seizing cross references and allusions, as well as to grasp the subject at hand thoroughly. I also want to emphasise my belief that such an approach is respectably in line with Heidegger’s thought in general; hence, I suggest that this would be the Heideggerian way to explore Heidegger’s thought.

In that vein, discerning Heidegger’s historical position within the context of the most prominent topic of the era, i.e., language, will enable us to unfold
the concerns out of which he developed his insights about language, to understand the particular problems he is referring to, and to construe how he responds to and criticises the overall projections of the ‘Linguistic Turn’. Due to the apodeictic fact that his ideas concerning language is not entirely isolated from the subjects about which his contemporary colleagues are persevering to explore in depth, designating Heidegger’s locus within the intellectual-historical background could be a copious baseline to start from.

Therefore, in this chapter, I will focus exclusively on why Heidegger thinks that a transformation of our relationship with language is urgent and pivotal. To be more specific, this ‘why’ question will seek for the answers of the following questions: What is the historical background respecting language, against which Heidegger takes a critical stance? If there will take place a transformation, it will be the transformation of what? What was the predominant philosophical approach to language back then; and most importantly, what is the context which would enable us to make sense of Heidegger’s respecting references and allusions? If Heidegger was one of the ground-breaking thinkers of the 20th century philosophy of language, what was that ground which triggered Heidegger to undertake such a venture? What was the language-related inheritance that was legated to Heidegger, and why did Heidegger choose to appreciate this legacy by way of “Destruktion”?

Herein, the reason behind the recurrent emphasis on the interrogative ‘why’ is the fact that the purpose in this chapter will be to draw a map of Heidegger’s concerns without delving into the depths of his thought; because how Heidegger accomplishes this transformation and the technical details of his remonstrations quoted in this chapter will be suspended until the next chapters which will extensively explore his grasp of language and how it transforms over time. I believe that such a historical outlining will
ensure a smooth and cogent starting point for exploring such a deep-seated and condensed way of thinking.

2.1 The Predecessors

The philosophical discourses in the last two centuries have been marked by the wide recognition of the compelling character of the question of language, which has been a cardinal departure point for relegating the previous ontological and epistemological presumptions. This question is doubtless compelling, in that, it paved the way for the well-known 'Linguistic Turn'\(^2\) in the Western thought, and it was prevalingly endemic to the era that once the question was raised, language unflinchingly became the engine of philosophy, notwithstanding the radical discrepancies among various schools of thought. Needless to say, this was neither the discovery of, nor the very emergence of an interest in the relationship between meaning and the world. To give several examples, Plato and Aristotle had momentous evaluations respecting the ontological status of linguistic forms, the inference rules, and the relationship between speech and truth; in the Medieval times, the structure of language was examined in relation to the principles of reference and generalisation; and all these investigations were even furthered by "the Port-Royal logicians, Hobbes and Locke".\(^3\)

---

\(^2\) The phrase 'Linguistic Turn' is originally introduced by Gustav Bergmann in his influential book *Logic and Reality*, and it is predominantly used in order to refer to the tradition of analytic philosophy at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century. However, the era it signifies can actually be extended so as to include thinkers from Alexander von Humboldt to Jacques Derrida (Kelley, *Frontiers of History: Historical Inquiry in the Twentieth Century*, p. 7). It is in this extended meaning that it will be used in the present thesis.

\(^3\) *The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, p. 1.
Although language was not the central focus of philosophy until the incomparable momentum primarily incepted in the 19th century, the crux of important definitions and argumentations was marked by the crucial place attained to language. For instance, Aristotle’s famous definition of the human being, which is frequently translated as “the speaking animal”, held sway over philosophical notions for centuries. Recalling the Social Contract theorists who explained the possibility of society and state with the human being’s capability to speak, communicate and come into agreement, it is clear that the question of language was not a liminal issue.4

Nevertheless, the ‘Linguistic Turn’ was not a turning around the axis situated by Aristotle; instead, it was the very turning, or the transformation of the axis itself. In other words, language became the driving force of philosophy, (thereupon of the seek for truth) in the actual ‘turning’. When this turning de facto took place, language was no more a supportive element to be involved in the philosophical argumentation; it was conceived as the fundamental substratum on which thinking should rise and evolve. Needless to say, observing this era provides us with more direct evidence for imbibing the historical situation in which Heidegger’s thoughts on language flourished.

In the related literature, the roots of Heidegger’s reflections are frequently designated as the linguistic works of Herder and Humboldt who were the first thinkers to challenge the classical notion of language and to assign a separate semantic dimension to language, in that, language acquires a status of “common action” and is no longer merely a tool of the individual agent; rather, it turns out to be the fundamentally constitutive element of truth. This

4 Ability to enter into contract through speech is essential for social contract theorists. Rousseau’s “Essay on the Origin of the Languages” is a typical example of the central place given to speech by social contract theorists.
is entitled as “the constitutive theory of language”\textsuperscript{5} by Charles Taylor. Accordingly, language is attained as the basal factor which constitutes truth; and this suggestion is identified as the historical root on the line of which Heidegger develops his own thought of language. Taylor claims that “Heidegger’s own views on language stand squarely within this tradition”,\textsuperscript{6} so Heidegger’s mission is interpreted as “[transposing] this mode of thinking in his own characteristic fashion”.\textsuperscript{7} Cristina Lafont also supports Taylor by proclaiming that Heidegger’s understanding of language is a radicalisation of the Hamann-Herder-Humboldt tradition,\textsuperscript{8} by explaining how the idea of language as a world-disclosing force (rather than as a communicative tool) was initially introduced by Humboldt whose perspective was later on adopted by the prominent philosophers of the linguistic revolution in the German tradition, one of which was Heidegger.\textsuperscript{9} Of course, these evaluations are subject to critical review especially in consideration of the fact that Heidegger explicitly distances himself from Humboldt by portraying him as the peak of the Western-European tradition which veils the originary essence of language.\textsuperscript{10} Nevertheless, even if Heidegger cannot be thought “squarely” standing on the line of this tradition, his affinity with the German linguistic turn is valuable and should not be omitted starkly.

\textsuperscript{5} "Heidegger on Language", \textit{A Companion to Heidegger}, pp. 433-55.

\textsuperscript{6} ibid., p. 441.

\textsuperscript{7} ibid., p. 443.

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy}, p. x.

\textsuperscript{9} ibid., pp. 13-5.

To name another figure whose impact on Heidegger is widely appreciated in the related literature, we can mention Friedrich Nietzsche as a solid example. At such a time when the winds of change was bringing the issue of language into the bosom of philosophical endeavour, Nietzsche’s thought was a catalyst. Aubrey Neal comments as follows: “Nietzsche’s tortured word ‘God is Dead’ articulates the anomaly which drove modern thought to the linguistic turn . . . [Because his] preternatural sensitivity to language translated a crisis of faith into a critical suspicion of the way words correspond to things in the modern public world”.\(^{11}\) Despite Heidegger’s harsh criticisms of Nietzsche’s texts,\(^{12}\) he is indeed quite impacted by Zarathustra’s words to such a degree that, Mark Wrathall claims, Heidegger’s famous motto “language is the house of Being”\(^{13}\) is indeed an appropriation of Nietzsche’s own term “house of being”, and a rendition into Heidegger’s understanding of language.\(^{14}\) In the case of appreciating such an inheritance, Wrathall and Neal seems to be in agreement: “The words of Nietzsche’s Madman fell on Martin Heidegger like a dead dove crashing down on a stone-age Pentecost”.\(^{15}\) Hence, the relationship between Heidegger and Nietzsche can be considered as a vivid example of how a critical engagement may actually be an indication of an inheritance of some sort.

\(^{11}\) *How Skeptics Do Ethics*, p. 120.

\(^{12}\) The details of Heidegger’s vastly extensive reading of Nietzsche are not relevant to the issue of language *per se*, though the following quote is a striking one to exemplify his criticism: “Nietzsche, the thinker of the thought of will to power, is the *last metaphysician* of the West” (*Nietzsche: Volume III*, p. 8).

\(^{13}\) “Letter on ‘Humanism’”, p. 239.


\(^{15}\) *How Skeptics Do Ethics*, p. 210. Neal also quoted David Krell to exemplify Nietzsche’s impact on Heidegger: “[T]he death of God was that one experience on the basis of which *Being and Time* (1927) was thought” (ibid.).
2.2 The Contemporaries: Logical Positivism

The most renowned and conspicuous clash took place between Heidegger and the Logical Positivists; there is a vast literature regarding this interaction.\textsuperscript{16} Besides, the extent of the dispute is very palpable, seeing the references as well as the allusions in the texts of the related thinkers. Logical Positivism is a philosophical movement which arises out of the language-oriented spirit in the late 1920’s; back then, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell were truly influential figures, fortifying the linguistic focus in the philosophical investigations.\textsuperscript{17} Deeply impacted by them, the young Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote \textit{Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus} (1921) which immediately became the hub of the positivist and empiricist discussions\textsuperscript{18} and triggered the forming of the “Vienna Circle” through gathering together the similarly inclined philosophers.\textsuperscript{19}

2.2.1 \textit{Einheitwissenschaft} and the Centrality of Methodology

It is not surprising that these thinkers were not in a total agreement with each other; still they had a strong commonality: the mission to bring forth “an \textit{Einheitwissenschaft}, that is, a ‘unified science’, empirically connoted and comprising all the knowledge deriving from single scientific specialties”.\textsuperscript{20} This was also the constituting urge of Logical Positivism

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{16} cf. Luchte, "Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Carnap."
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{17} Bergmann, “Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics (in part)”, \textit{The Linguistic Turn}, p. 63.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{18} ibid.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{19} To note a few celebrated names other than Wittgenstein: Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel, Moritz Schlick, Gustav Bergmann, Otto Neurath and A.J. Ayer.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{20} Gattei, \textit{Thomas Kuhn's "Linguistic Turn" and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism}, p. 3.
\end{flushright}
which expanded thanks to the studies of the Vienna Circle. Accordingly, Bergmann propounds that “Logical Positivism is the current name of what is no doubt a movement”, and adds a strong emphasis, “they unmistakably share a philosophical style”.\textsuperscript{21}

This science and logic based movement, in general, is peculiarly concerned with generating a linguistic method in order to wipe away what they call the mistakes of the preceding philosophers. Hence, there is actually no \textit{philosophical} way to discover the truth; such duty is on the shoulders of science. What philosophy can achieve is to clarify the meanings of propositions with the most effective method possible. Bergmann proposes an assertive argument for this case by stating that the truth about language can be investigated exclusively by scientific approaches: “there is strictly speaking no philosophy of language. Rather than being philosophers of language, the positivists, who are all technical philosophers, are therefore philosophers through language; they philosophise by means of it”.\textsuperscript{22} Hereby we are canalised into the opinion that philosophy \textit{per se} is nothing other than the urge to find \textit{the} correct linguistic method which is to bring forth the “\textit{Einheitwissenschaft}” Gattei mentions.

This was undoubtedly the most common idea shared without any hesitation in the Logical Positivist linguistic turn. For instance, Ayer was the figure who popularised the term ‘Linguistic Turn’; besides he is the one who introduced the Vienna Circle to the Anglophone intellectual circles. He proclaims that finding the most suitable language is \textit{“the} linguistic turn, \textit{the}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{22} ibid.
\end{flushright}
fundamental gambit as to method”.\(^{23}\) As a result, the thought in the linguistic turn was dominantly that language is a tool, a gambit to method, that is, a means to analyse, decompose, clarify, logicalise, as well as to banish amphibologies and to dismiss meaninglessness when necessary.

This conviction is exactly what Heidegger criticises recurrently through countless explicit and implicit references which are vital to savvy in order to get an adequate grasp of his thought of language. For Heidegger, the way that the modern worldview conceives language has a lot to do with its technical-scientific basis. In “The Nature of Language”, he says “Method holds all the coercive power of knowledge. The theme [language] is a part of the method”\(^{24}\), and a few pages later, he repeats his thought with roundly hard-hitting words: “To the modern mind, whose ideas about everything are punched out in the die presses of technical-scientific calculation, the object of knowledge is part of the method. And method follows what is in fact the utmost corruption and degeneration of a way”.\(^{25}\) Hence for Heidegger, the conceptualisation of language as a method is the ultimate conceit which veils the essence of language, so he takes every chance to distance himself from his contemporaries with a straightforward negation: “From the point of view of the sciences, it is not just difficult but impossible to see this situation. In what follows we reflect, then, upon the way of thoughtful experience with language, we are not undertaking a methodological consideration”.\(^{26}\) What he refers to by “this situation” is the fact that the essence of language can never be available to scientific conceptualisations; and methodologies in general are nothing other than an abandonment of the

\(^{23}\) Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, p. 8. Italics mine.

\(^{24}\) On the Way to Language, p. 74.

\(^{25}\) ibid., p. 91.

\(^{26}\) ibid., p. 75.
possibility of a truthful experience with language. Why and how Heidegger takes such a radical position against his contemporaries will be extensively explored in the next chapters.

With the expansion of the linguistic turn, the philosophical circles turned into movements, and movements turned into ‘traditions’ within which thinkers were walking on a similar path while debating among each other, which, as a result, amplified the popularity of their styles. Hence a more general term appeared to gather this group under the same roof: the Analytic tradition. It is widely accepted that this emergence is a direct yield of the linguistic turn.\footnote{Dummett, \textit{Origins of Analytical Philosophy}, p. 121.} Despite the inner intellectual disagreements within this school of thought, the founding element of the unity of this tradition was the apprehension that philosophy is possible categorically and \textit{comprehensively} in the form of a linguistic investigation.\footnote{ibid., p. 5.} Clearly, this stands for the method which comprises decomposing propositions, focusing in the components of sentences, studying the syntax and the logical-mathematical aspects of meaning-formation. In light of this, it becomes apparent how the theme of thought is subordinated to the idea of a “comprehensive” method, substantiating Heidegger’s above-mentioned words \textit{verbatim}: ”The theme is a part of the method”.\footnote{Footnote 23.}

\subsection*{2.2.2 Linguistic Turn and Metaphysics}

Regarding the issue of language, the weight of the debate between Heidegger and the Analytic Tradition manifests itself barely in some cases. One of the quintessential examples for this is where Heidegger gets utterly
sarcastic whilst giving a direct reference to the misconceptions of the Analytic tradition:

But this, to undergo an experience with language, is something else again than to gather information about language. Such information-linguists and philologists of the most diverse psychologists and analytic philosophers supply it to us, and constantly increase the supply, ad infinitum. Of late, the scientific and philosophical investigation of languages is aiming ever more resolutely at the production of what is called "metalanguage." Analytical philosophy, which is set on producing this super-language, is thus quite consistent when it considers itself metalinguistics. That sounds like metaphysics—not only sounds like it, it is metaphysics. Metalinguistics is the metaphysics of the thoroughgoing technicalization of all languages into the sole operative instrument of interplanetary information. Metalanguage and sputnik, metalinguistics and rocketry are the Same.\(^\text{30}\)

In this quote, there are several indications regarding the previous discussions. First, his differentiation between “information about language” and “an experience with language” seems to be the essential divergence of Heidegger’s approach from the thinkers who embrace a comprehensively scientific pathway to cogitate language. Specifically recalling Bergmann’s colossal declaration which asserts there is no philosophy of language\(^\text{31}\) by the reason that the truth of language can be procured solely by “philologists, aestheticians, and scientists such as psychologists or sociologists”,\(^\text{32}\) what Heidegger particularly implies by the widespread resoluteness to produce non-ending “information” about language takes a clear shape.

Secondly, Heidegger’s quip about the sound similarity between the pronunciations of ‘metalinguistics’ and ‘metaphysics’ is a rather intriguing issue to pay attention. As of the impact induced by Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, for the Analytic school in general, the complication with the previous philosophical problems was diagnosed as the ‘metaphysical background’

\(^{30}\) *On the Way to Language*, p. 58.

\(^{31}\) cf. footnote 21.

which is destined to be untenable; and the cure to dissolve those infirm predicaments was to build up philosophical investigations around the axis of language. Then, Heidegger’s identification of metalinguistics with metaphysics, along with his entitlement of the analytical knowledge of language as “information”, is a very serious charge. Thereupon, how is it possible that the positivistic radical counter-position respecting metaphysics turns out to be the very metaphysical stance itself? The answer lies in the fact that what the term ‘metaphysics’ means for both sides are different without any reserve. It is already enounced that for the Analytic school, metaphysics means speculating about that which transcends the realm of scientific observation. For Heidegger, it is a far cry from such a notion. He posits that metaphysics “grounds an age [through] a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth”, and when the scientific activity and methodology become one and the same thing, then “[o]nly that which becomes object in this way is—is considered to be in being”. In another text, he provides a more concise form of this thought: “Metaphysics is the knowledge of beings as a whole”. If we recall the project of Einheitwissenschaft, which is the search for a “unified science”, and the general logical positivist urge to find the comprehensive method of philosophy, as well as the delimitation of truth to the scientifically

33 The following quote by Ayer sums up the collective stance of the Analytic philosophy apropos of the relationship between metaphysics, science, methodology and language in a condensed way: “The traditional disputes of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful. The surest way to end them is to establish beyond question what should be the purpose and method of a philosophical inquiry . . . For if there are any questions which science leaves to philosophy to answer, a straightforward process of elimination must lead to their discovery. We may begin by criticising the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense” (Language, Truth, Logic, p. 13).

34 “The Age of World Picture”, p. 115. Italics mine.
35 ibid., p. 127.
36 Being and Truth, p. 41.
observable (i.e., that which Heidegger calls “that which becomes object in this way”), what Heidegger tries to delineate becomes palpably epitomised.\(^{37}\) In other words, the search for one grounding method, the confinement of the ontological realm to the object-sphere, the mathematisation and logicalisation of truth, the priority of the analysable, calculable and decomposable facets of phenomena: These all are what makes up the modern scientific-technological worldview which is fundamentally metaphysical. Therefore, the analytical approach to language restrains the essence of language to this metaphysical object-sphere; it posits language both as the theme and the tool; it reduces the truth of language to only one way of its coming into light; and its declaration of comprehensivity is a confirmation of its search for the fundamental ground of all things.

Heidegger goes even further by stating that this will to method is actually a mathematisation of the Christian concept of God:

\[
\text{[T]he predominance of the mathematical method in the inner construction and claim to truth . . . must begin with the simplest concept and its grounding deduction, and in such a way that on the basis of this inception all other beings are derived—both what they are and that they are. . . If everything is subject to deduction, and if even and precisely the simplest concepts are to be subjected to a deductive definition, whence and how to we arrive at end in community?}\]

\(^{38}\)

It means, the deductive, logical, mathematical, analytical and positivist approach actually cannot, by itself, justify its search for the ground, since none of its methods are designed for such a justification. What’s more, no method, designed this or that way, is capable of such a justification. The reason is that ‘methodology’, in which science roots, is first and foremost a

\(^{37}\) A clearer account of the relationship between the ontological status of the objects of science and methodology is provided by Heidegger as follows: “Method is not one piece of equipment of science among others but the primary component out of which is first determined what can become object and how it becomes object” (“Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics”, p. 277).

\(^{38}\) *Being and Truth*, pp. 41-2.
dismissal of the essence of truth “with a lordly wave of the hand”. By striving to determine *what* language is and *that* language is through one and the same methodology, the analytical approach is fundamentally veiling the essence of language with a lordly wave of the hand.

### 2.3 The Impact of the Language Dispute & the Davos Debate

In order to catch the sight of the extent of this issue, it is necessary to note that the uncompromising stances of both Heidegger and the Logical Positivists pertaining to the question of language have actually caused a serious impact on the 20th century philosophy by and large. The widely debated and as much recognised divergence between the ‘Continental’ and the ‘Analytic’ traditions actually takes one of its vital roots from the discussion respecting the essence of language. Babette Babich elucidates the issue by stating that:

> [W]hat is called analytic philosophy grew out of the so-called language philosophy that aspired to match the logically empiricist claims of the Vienna Circle (and its brand of logical positivism) . . . It was this tradition . . . that came to be poised against the vagaries (and the vagueness, especially the vagueness) of the historical tradition of philosophy and all it was associated with, notable Nietzsche and Heidegger.

The arguments which support the idea that the Analytic-Continental distinction is substantial point out the linguistic turn as the genesis of this bifurcation in philosophy. One event which fortifies this embranchment is broadly accepted as the famous ‘Davos Debate’ where one of the most attention-attracting philosophical confrontations in the 20th century took place between Heidegger and Cassirer in 1929. At the peak of the linguistic turn, this meeting hosted important philosophical figures such as Emmanuel Levinas, Erich Maria Remarque, Ludwig Binswanger and Rudolf Carnap.

---


The main disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger was the disparity between their readings of Kant; and the radix of this disagreement was the fundamentally opposing philosophical inclinations of both philosophers. To explain in the way Ward sums up: “Human beings interpret the world, they can do no other, but each philosopher begins with a different understanding of the nature of human beings . . . [and this] difference leads to radically different perspectives on the nature of language”.41 Then, how are we going to encompass this difference, and what is its significance?

2.3.1 The Activity of Language: Spontaneous or Receptive?

According to Peter Gordon, the fundamental opposition was between “Cassirer’s philosophy of spontaneity and Heidegger’s philosophy of receptivity, or of ‘thrownness’ [Geworfenheit]”.42 Cassirer, depending on his extensive work *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, proposed that the human being is “the symbolic animal”43 who can unravel its infinite reason via the mediation of language.44 In respect to this, Heidegger asserts that “mere mediation will never amount to anything productive”,45 and in contradistinction to Cassirer’s endeavour to unify semiotics with epistemology,46 Heidegger insists on his idea that the truth lies in the ontological realm which nests the existential analytic of Dasein. Truly, Gordon’s scheme can be a fruitful starting point for beginning to grasp what


42 As quoted in Barash, “Ernst Cassirer, Martin Heidegger and the Legacy of Davos”, p. 436.


is peculiar in the way Heidegger conceives language. It is of great importance to discern that—including our example figure here, Cassirer—all the positivistic, logicalistic and rationalistic conceptions posit language in relation to a certain understanding of subjectivity. Accordingly, the root of the issue dates back to Kant, as was the case in the Davos Debate. Kant’s construction of subjectivity led to extensive discussions about the way the subject acquires knowledge: was it actively, or passively—and how did those modes relate to the issue of transcendence? Gordon claims that Cassirer’s position was on the “active” side, while Heidegger premeditated “passivity”. Truthfully, Gordon has a point. When we look at the texts of Heidegger delineating the originary experience with language, one can interpret his words as a advocacy for passivity; for instance, he says: “Speaking is of itself a listening. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we are speaking . . . We do not merely speak the language—we speak by way of it”. Hereby, it is easy to catch the apparent emphasis for what Gordon calls “passivity”. Besides, it rises to the surface that what Heidegger suggests demands a totally different notion of subjectivity, or let’s say, the human being. This also supports Ward’s argument that the fundamental divergence between the two philosophers is their radically different thoughts of the human being. Through this context, we can arrive at the following conclusion which is of utmost importance: the way that language is thought is intrinsically related to the way the human being is thought. Hence, the subject of language is indeed at the heart of philosophy, be it in the form of epistemology or ontology.


48 Although Gordon’s proposition is conveyed here as a somewhat eligible one for the context, it must also be noted that it is mentioned only as an elementary account which will be criticised in the next chapters. I will argue that the way Heidegger explains the ontological structure of human being cannot be evaluated via the traditional duality of activity/passivity.
Before finishing, it is noteworthy to mention that with the rise of the Nazi violence, Wittgenstein, Carnap and the remaining members of the Vienna circle, as well as Jewish philosophers such as Cassirer and Levinas, were all forced to flee from the ‘continent’ while Heidegger stayed as the rector of the University of Freiburg. In the literature investigating this subject, it is prevalently accepted that this was the emergence of the parting of ways between the ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ philosophy. Gordon claims that the Davos Debate had a huge impact on Carnap; after the event, he began studying Heidegger’s texts and involved in extensive logical-linguistic analysis of the “metaphysical pseudo-sentences” in Heidegger’s works. As he was one of the leading figures of philosophy in the first half of the 20th century, Carnap’s interest in the logical-linguistic analysis of Heidegger’s claims amplified the negative attitude in intellectual circles towards Heidegger’s philosophy. Hence, Heidegger’s language as well as his notion of language have become a focus of criticism. This is peculiarly momentous for understanding Heidegger’s texts regarding language, since he time and again becomes defensive, re-corrective and harshly critical in his texts; with covert or direct references and targetings, he writes in the mode of desiring to rectify misunderstandings and distortions. In order to be able to appreciate Heidegger’s own language, as well as his thought of language, it is indispensable to grasp why and how his writing style changes at times, and to which context he is referring while attending to make the reader realise that his thought of language is ‘another’ one. Thus, bearing this background on the whole in mind will allow us to penetrate our subject-matter more comprehensively.


50 ibid., pp. 22-3.
CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING THE QUESTION ‘WHAT IS LANGUAGE?’

I: Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an object.
J: And then its reality vanishes.
I: We then have taken up a position above language, instead of hearing from it.
J: Then there would only be a speaking from language . . .
I: . . . in this manner, that it would be called from out of language’s reality, and be led to its reality.

(Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language”)

The discussion of the relationship between Heidegger and the Linguistic Turn in the previous chapter introduced us the extent of the historical milieu, through specifying the reasons why Heidegger reflects that another beginning of thought concerning language is an exigency. I believe that to start ‘another’ way of thought is not instantaneously incubating alternative answers to the matter of debate, but to fundamentally reconstruct the question—surely, without befalling into irrelevancy. Therefore, this facet of the subject-matter brings about the necessity to examine the details of the difficulties confronted along the way of the construction of the question of language.

In parallel to this, in this chapter, through addressing the key points problematised by Heidegger, I will investigate the straits of formulating a question which can approach the truth of language in a proper way. The reason why this is an indispensable part of the ongoing inquest is that, when it comes to language, even before facing the conundrums of coming up with an answer, the inquirer confronts with entanglements at the level of devising the question of language. Discerning how Heidegger embraces this context will enable us to take one more step on the Heideggerian way to language.
3.1 Thinking About Language

Thinking about language, even at first glance, draws one into an intriguing discernment: Whilst speaking about language, one is already in language. What is gripping here is the appearance of language as belonging to two diverse strata: One speaks about language, in language. How to understand this maxim? Or more precisely, in this statement, what does the divergence between 'about' and 'in' signal us? From a traditional perspective, the explication would be the following: This is the situation where language activity (that is, speaking or discourse) takes language as its content. At this juncture, it is substantial to emphasise the central thought that governs it, which is the assertion that language can be thought as an 'activity' and as a 'concept' (concept, as the building block of philosophical content). Hence in the light of such a schema, the answer to our question arrives patently: Speaking about language means to conceptualise language, and being in language refers to the activity of language. By this way, reflecting on language is clarified simultaneously as the activity of this conceptualisation and the conceptualisation of this activity, which is the reason why, for some thinkers, the question of language at once becomes the question of self-reflectivity in a particular manner, concurrently entailing its peculiar problems, as we will see.

To trace the line of this traditional reasoning and to illuminate it, we can take one more step to see what reverberates in unveiling the essence of language qua 'activity' as well as qua 'concept', by asking 'whose activity is this, and in what way language eventually finds its niche as a concept?' This question, at the outset, may seem plainly redundant in that the answer is of

51 ‘Traditional’ here is used in the meaning of ‘traditionell’: The term used by Heidegger for referring to the historical way of thought which veils, within this context, the true essence of language.
an obvious character: It is the activity of the speaking subject; and it becomes a concept because systematical contemplation on language makes it an object of theorisation. Thereby another central thought in this perspective rises to the surface, which is the assumption that language is an activity of a subject, a tool for reflection, something which is graspable by means of theory, an object. Presented this way, behind the truism which cultivates both the common-sensical and the traditional metaphysical idea of language as a reifiable activity of a subject, there appears an ingrained ontology of subjectivity together with a modern epistemology readily adopted. This fact in its precision epitomises the reason why originally thinking about the question of language necessarily conveys one to carry ontological and epistemological inquiries in an original way, in contradistinction to the relatively rudimentary reflections of the previous thoughts, which are denominated by Heidegger contextually as 'traditional' and/or 'metaphysical'.

The play between speaking about language whilst being in language may be further probed by the following dialogue, through Heidegger’s own words in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter: “Speaking from language [but still being] led by its reality”. From this quote, the necessity to elaborate the plights of the urge to conceptualise language and rendering it as an object appropriated by a subject (i.e., the metaphysical/traditional/analytical urge) appears clearly. Heidegger means that when we speak of language, for instance, by asking and answering ‘what is language?’, we instantly begin to constrict it within the rigid

---

52 Theory: "[C]onception, mental scheme,' from Late Latin *theoria* (Jerome), from Greek *theoria* 'contemplation, speculation; a looking at, viewing; a sight, show, spectacle, things looked at,’ from *theorein* 'to consider, speculate, look at,’ from *theoros* 'spectator,' from *thea* ‘a view’” (Etymonline, “theory”).

boundaries of conceptuality; whereas the condition of possibility for this very activity is the speaking of language of itself, revealing its truth. Thus, Heidegger’s destruction of subjectivity very closely relates to his apprehension of language.

In order to understand this in relation to Chapter 2, we can commensurate the terms so as to render them articulate in the context of this chapter. In Chapter 2, it is explained that the contemporaries of Heidegger widely conceived language both as the theme and as the means of methodology to be adopted by the so-called anti-metaphysical investigator.\(^{54}\) From now on, the ‘thematisation’ of language will be studied from another perspective equivalent to this: Through the terms ‘conceptualisation’ and ‘theorisation’. The common point of the activities of thematisation, conceptualisation and theorisation is the fact that, in the last analysis, each of them posits language as an object before a subject. To wit, the fundamental problem which lies at the bottom and counterpoises these terms is the belief that language can be an object proper, be it a theme or a means intrinsic to a methodology.

### 3.2 Being Already in Language

To grasp the issue at first hand, it is of vital significance to pose the question in its most naïve and simple form by maintaining a thorough focus on it: What is language? Suspending the readily available answers is sine qua non if we are to start grasping the immense nature of this question. At the moment we pose this question, we are in language already. This issue may be considered unique even merely for this reason; it gives us an almost tautological and seemingly mundane start, but a harder step to take forward. The difficulty lies in alreadiness. To explain, let’s focus on the notion of

\(^{54}\) pp. 7-8.
language conceived as an object to be arbitrarily used and left. What is an object? It is *ob-ject*, *obicere* or *ob-iacere* in its linguistic roots: ‘*ob*’ means ‘against’ and ‘*iacere*’ stands for ‘thrown’ in Latin. In asking the question of language, can we actually ‘throw’ language ‘against’ us to render it into an *obicere*? There are two alternatives in this case: Either that our being *already* in language must somehow pose a limit to this thought, or we must be cognisant of the following *simultaneously*: (1) That we speak, and (2) the ground on which we are enabled to speak. In this case, this brings forth the conclusion that the ground and the knowledge of the ground must had—somehow—been rendered accessible to us in advance. We will see that Heidegger asks: somehow, but how? At least in principle, unless this *alreadiness* is propounded as a question and is explained properly, it must destabilise the legitimacy of the ‘against-throwing’ of language, namely, the objectification of language. Hereby, it comes to light that the above-mentioned ‘almost tautological and mundane start’ is not quite a naïve one, because if one, as the first step to take forward, postulates language as an object, one gets already entangled in a field which compels more demanding answers to weightier questions.

Heidegger elucidates this issue as follows: “We speak of language, but constantly seem to be speaking merely *about* language, while in fact we are *already* [italics mine] letting language, *from within* language, speak to us, in language, of itself, saying its nature”. Heidegger means that when we speak of language, for instance like in our case, by asking and answering ‘what is language?’, we instantly begin to constrict it within the rigid

---

55 Etymonline, “object”.

56 Presuming that we are not postulating the Cartesian self-transparent subjectivity as the *terminus a quo*.

boundaries of conceptuality. At that rate, on what grounds we are legitimised to do this—or are we legitimised at all—is actually the forerunning inquiry. Hence, in fact the question of language formulated in the form of ‘what is language?’ turns out to be a matter of grounding.

The relation between ‘question’ and ‘ground’ is explained by Heidegger at the beginning of Introduction to Metaphysics: “To seek the ground: this means to get to the bottom (ergründen). What is put into question comes into relation with a ground\(^{58}\).” Recapturing the previous discussion of the analytic approach to language which seeks for the governing principles of language by way of discovering the most proper method\(^{59}\), it rises to the surface that all the epistemological acts of thematisation, conceptualisation, theorisation, objectification, rationalisation and logicalisation (which are all incident to sciences dealing with the investigation of language) are inherently ground-seeking missions. In this respect, Heidegger’s criticism will begin from this point and will thrive a transformation of the modern-scientific experience with language.

### 3.3 Language and Quidditas

Continuing to scrutinise our subject-matter at first hand, we arrive at a vital juncture, because what is explored so far seems to put the the very legitimacy of the question ‘what is language?’ into a danger zone. The reason is exactly the fact that this specific inquiry asks for whatness—it demands a quiddity. Quiddity (quidditas in Latin)\(^{60}\) means ‘the essence of things’. In this respect, provided that presuming language as an object is not

\(^{58}\) p. 3.

\(^{59}\) ibid., pp. 11-2.

\(^{60}\) Etymonline, “quiddity”.

26
quite problem-free, trying to comprehend language in relation to whatness seems to imperatively make doubtful postulations.

Then comes the necessity to raise the question: “What is ‘whatness?’”. As just have been mentioned, etymologically, whatness is quiddity, and quiddity is the essence of things. What if we interpret the interrogative ‘what’ not as the essence of ‘things’, but as the question asking for essence? The result is the transformation of the question into the following: What is the essence of language?

This is exactly how Heidegger formulates the question of language. Most importantly, the crux of the issue at hand is not to give an answer to the question; quite the contrary, the current problem is how we formulate the question. The reason is, all questions are always-already, and in one way or another, partially self-answering by the very formulations themselves. This means to say that no question emerges ex nihilo, hence even for beginning to pose a question, one needs a prior apprehension of the object of the question. The way Heidegger expounds this issue is through maintaining that “inquiry and investigation here and everywhere require the prior grant of whatever it is they approach and pursue with their queries”.\(^{61}\) This is what we witnessed when we revealed above that the interrogative ‘what’ actually foists a hidden answer into the investigation concerning language, in that, inasmuch as it asks for quidditas, it incarcerates its object within the pale of the previously established frontiers of what it means to be an object. Hence even for beginning to formulate an inquiry, one needs a prior grant of what language is; and in the traditional thinking, the prior grant is knowing that language is a whatness. In other words, Heidegger will show us how it is possible to transform our experience with language through destructing

---

\(^{61}\) *On the Way to Language*, p. 71.
this traditional prepossession. He explains the path to follow so as to achieve a proper grasp of the essence of language: “Accordingly, when we speak of language we remain entangled in a speaking that is persistently inadequate . . . Therefore the proper bearing of thinking which is needed now is to listen to the grant, not to ask questions”.\(^\text{62}\) This means, the traditional/metaphysical thinking, which assuredly includes the prominent names of the Linguistic Turn, is incapable of attaining the originary essence of language through inquiring ‘what is language?’. For a genuine turn, or transformation in Heidegger’s term, the traditional way to investigate language through subject-centered, logical and analytical means would be in vain, and this is exactly the parting of ways of Heidegger and his contemporary thinkers.

3.4 Language and Wesen

In order to understand how Heidegger asks the question of language, it is necessary to grasp his understanding of ‘essence’ (Wesen). This is a vast subject to cover, but only just remaining in close relation with the context of the issue of quidditas, it is incumbent to mention that the originary Wesen does not mean “what-ness, quidditas, but rather enduring as present [Gegenwart]”\(^\text{63}\). Thus for Heidegger, the question of language can be asked only from out of an ontological ground, if one is not to pursue “unessential essences”:

> The essence gives itself in the generic and universal concept, which represents the one feature that holds indifferently for many things. This indifferent essence (essentia) is, however, only the unessential essence. What does the essential essence of something consist in? Presumably it lies in what the entity is in truth. The true essence

\(^\text{62}\) ibid., p. 75.

\(^\text{63}\) Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 76.
of a thing is fixed from out of its true being, from the truth of the given entity.\textsuperscript{64}

The essence of language is what appears out of its true being, Heidegger claims, and the priority of ontology over all other fields is presented in an assertive manner. Herein, it is substantial to catch that investigating the meaning of essence is propounded as mandatory—\textit{not} for giving a final answer, but for getting to the stead where one becomes capable of thinking of language in a truthful way. This is plainly in contrast with the remaining contemporary thinkers of language as well as the predecessors. Seeking for the essence of language remains necessarily deficient as long as it concerns itself with what language \textit{is}: “Inquiry is a cognisant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its Being as it is”\textsuperscript{65}; accordingly, the bedrock of the positive sciences is, actually, on the rocks. This is why the science-based approaches to language, from the Logical Positivists to the Structuralists, are destined to fail.

\textsuperscript{64} Dreyfus & Wrathall, \textit{A Companion to Heidegger}, p. 350.

\textsuperscript{65} H. 5.
CHAPTER 4

THE WAY TO LANGUAGE IN BEING AND TIME

And I dedicated Being and Time, which appeared in 1927, to Husserl, because phenomenology presented us with possibilities of a way.

(Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language”)

This surging of philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century resulted in the appearance of different schools; and the pathways were so diversified that even if they chose to give a reactionary response to the same figure from previous philosophers, they grew distinct in their focuses. To exemplify, Hegel was one of the foremost names against whom many reactions branched out; Existentialism made its way through focalising on the human existence against Hegel’s sublation of the individuality of the human being, whereas Logical Positivism reacted against Hegel’s absolutist idealism and developed a positivistic response, while Marxism upsurged against the political implications in the Hegelian philosophy. Nevertheless, the subject of language remained as a common theme despite the fact that it was handled through quite distinct methods. In 1927, Being and Time was born into such an environment, and opened up a unique space with a ground-breaking approach directed against the entire “traditionell” philosophy, a term which also implies Heidegger’s contemporaries.

Despite the fact that language is not the main pursuit of the investigation in this book, it still does possess a vital place, and the perspective Heidegger grants regarding the subject of language is of an utterly powerful and resolute character. Thus in this chapter, I will focus on Being and Time with the aim of revealing how the question of language is cultivated, and what sort of substantial place language holds in it.
In this regard, in pursuance of expounding the truth of language presented in *Being and Time*, it is required to delve into this work’s undertakings so as to set forth an overall line of vision. It goes without saying that this projection could only be far away from exhausting such a fathomless philosophical work; thereby our aim will be to trace the issues which are indispensable to attain a competent apprehension of the notion of language as it is maintained in *Being and Time*. Accordingly, as the presentation of the background required for achieving this, first I will discuss the general purpose of *Being and Time* with respect to the purport of the establishment of the fundamental ontology; and then, I will make a study of the phenomenological method through which language is rooted in the existential analytic of Dasein. Resultantly as having provided the general context in order to attain the way Heidegger focuses on language, I will try to explore the ontologically constitutive relationship between Dasein and language.

### 4.1 The Fundamental Ontology

*Being and Time* starts with Heidegger’s translation of an excerpt from Plato: “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.” 66 Hence for Heidegger, the perplexity primarily starts from the point one questions the meaning of Being; nevertheless, the history of philosophy has always disregarded and covered this essential inquiry by simply attributing various definitions to Being, which are not systematically and fundamentally exposed. To this respect, Heidegger’s principal way to repudiate his contemporaries as well as the philosophical tradition is by asserting the primacy of ontological

---

66 H. 1.
investigation, seeing that those thinkers’ exertions keep remaining only within the scope of trying to grasp entities “of such and such a type”, while disregarding the ontological conditions of the being of entities, blinded to the fact that they “already operate within an understanding of Being”\(^67\). Correspondingly, this initial blindness which omits the necessity of embarking a fundamental study on the meaning of Being insures an inevitable fail in their destination. This does not immediately run to the conclusion that those ventures are entirely useless and unnecessary; rather, Heidegger points out that what the fundamental ontology achieves is revealing the genuine ontological ground of the methods and concepts used by those investigators.\(^68\)

### 4.1.1 Recovering the Neighbourhood Lost in Translating Seinsfrage

In the way it is posited in *Being and Time*, the essential locus of language in its vicinity to Being is scrutable even at the incipience of the project, where the notion of *Seinsfrage* is introduced to the readers. The fundamental ontological undertaking comprises of bringing forth the inquiry which delves into the meaning of being, namely, *Seinsfrage*. Michael Gelven chooses to translate *Seinsfrage* as “to question what it means to be”, instead of the “question of Being”\(^69\). I think this is vital subtlety to fasten upon for our purposes. Although Gelven does not explicate why it would be better to translate it in the way that he does, Ivo De Gennaro maintains an erudite and concise interpretation of the meaning of *Seinsfrage* through discussing its alternative translations:

\(^{67}\) H. 11.

\(^{68}\) H. 10.

\(^{69}\) *A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time*, p. 23.
Who can deny that *Seinsfrage* means: the question of being? In fact, *Seinsfrage* simultaneously says at least two intertwined things: in the first place, it says the irruption (or the breaking) of *Sein* as a *Frage*, of the *Frage* “*Sein*”—the enigma of the ground of beings as such and in the whole . . . In the second place, then, the title *Seinsfrage* indicates the entirety of the thus claimed and tuned thinking in so far as it is, precisely, *ein Fragen nach dem Sein*, that is, an asking or interrogating that interrogates nach, that is, after being. Again, this interrogation “after” being has the twofold sense that, on the one hand, it comes second and, in coming second, seconds what it interrogates, and, on the other hand, in such seconding it maintains and grounds the nearness of being.

This exposition conveys two important issues: First, Being’s tuning into a question through breaking away from remaining as a preconceived concept brings about the necessity to investigate the meaning of being. Thinking in line with Gelven’s predilection for the translation of *Seinsfrage* (i.e., as ‘to question what it means to be’, instead of ‘the question of Being’), we may say that the investigation is not a chase after ‘the Being over there’; it is a fundamental ontological analysis of the meaning of Being. Or put another way, Heidegger’s project does not consist of ‘discovering’ the reality of ‘Being out there’; so when *Seinsfrage* is translated as ‘the question of Being’, there runs the risk of such a misinterpretation. This is definitely not to say that this translation is outrightly ‘wrong’; nevertheless, when *Seinsfrage* is rendered as ‘to question what it means to be’, the cardinal roles of understanding, meaning articulation, or above all, Rede, shine forth.

The second idea to seize from Gennaro’s words is the question’s seconding to what it plumbs. In the preceding chapter, it was adverted that no question emerges ex nihilo, so what the inquiry seeks is actually already pre-granted before the formulation of the question. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger remarks: “The question about the meaning of Being is to be formulated . . . Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought.

---

70 The Weirdness of Being: Heidegger’s Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage, p. 4.

71 H. 3.
So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way".\textsuperscript{72} This is why it is not possible to immediately pose a meaningful question regarding the meaning of Being; above all, it needs to be formulated on the way; thus, the question \textit{seconds} what it interrogates, as Gennaro states. Thereby appears the major thought to grasp: The fundamental ontology \textit{does not} take the precedence over other sources of investigations because it is able to pose questions which do not presuppose any baseline unlike the visions of sciences and philosophy; such a notion of a presupposition-free and unprecedented field is completely untenable for Heidegger. Indeed, he accentuates that “vague average understanding of Being” is anyhow “a Fact”.\textsuperscript{73} On the other hand, the fundamental ontological questioning is still a priority; “it must run ahead of the positive sciences, and it \textit{can}”,\textsuperscript{74} precisely due to the fact that, while \textit{seconding} what it seeks, it unveils the conditions for all kinds of ontologies and scientific bedrocks.\textsuperscript{75} What is notably differentiating in Heidegger’s project is that it treats the subject-matter in an essentially different way, in that, “\textit{what is to be found out by the asking}—the meaning of Being—also demands that it be conceived in a way of its own, essentially contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate signification”.\textsuperscript{76} At this juncture, we see that the design of the project is embedded on a path of meaning-seeking. Gennaro puts it in his own words as follows:

Why is what has thus been roughly outlined different from simply saying: \textit{Seinsfrage}—that is, the “question of being?” It is different, because it reminds us that it is not thinking \textit{per se}, or even a given manhood, somehow endowed with reason, that may find itself in the situation of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{72} H. 5. \\
\textsuperscript{73} ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{74} H. 10. \\
\textsuperscript{75} H. 11. \\
\textsuperscript{76} H. 6.
\end{flushleft}
questioning (or of having to question) something like “being”. A more careful understanding and translation of the title *Seinsfrage* makes sure that we pay attention, in the first place, to the primacy of that which, in breaking as an enigma, asks for a peculiar stance (a stance commensurate to it and in tune with it) in order to be sustained and warded.77

“Asking for a peculiar stance”: this is one of the hints to keep in mind throughout *Being and Time*. Interpreting the meaning of being, that is, developing an understanding through “[letting] that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself”,78 appears as the actual import of bringing forth *Seinsfrage*. We will soon see that language (*Rede*) will be referred as the very opening up of the field of the articulation of meaning. In this wise, even with the first pages of *Being and Time*, where the emphasis with the ontological questions is not on what Being is but on what Being means, we may begin to uncover that language is blinking in vicinity of Being. Throughout the course of the study, this vicinity will be concretized and it will become clear that, in a nutshell, all these manifest that ‘to question what it means to be’ and ‘to question what language is’ are originally neighbours.

### 4.1.2 The Task of Destruktion

As mentioned initially, *Being and Time* starts with the remark that the inquiry regarding the meaning of Being has been forgotten throughout the history of philosophy; the historical state of affairs demands a transformation of thinking through an undertaking of the exposition of this question in terms of its necessity, structure and priority. Nevertheless, this does not mean to thoroughly abandon the previous history of thought and to build a new philosophical structure. Contrariwise, it means to delve into this history through ‘destroying’ it—very performance of the construction of a

77 *The Weirdness of Being: Heidegger’s Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*, p. 5.

78 H. 34.

35
transformation. Initially it may sound contradicting, because it claims to be neither a clean-cut rejection, nor a plenary assent. This confusion stems from what is endemic in our everyday language (as well as in the majority of traditional thinking): Our process of meaning-making is preconditioned to such binary thinking, in that, we tend to think with the formal law of excluded middle in which thought is conditioned to think in terms of either/or structure. Nonetheless, one cannot make sense of the act of *Destruktion* through priorly settled and binary thinking structures. *Destruktion* is neither a total abandonment of the past, nor a Romantic endeavour to embrace it; and it is not a mission which aims at the creation of an absolutely pure non-metaphysical grammar and language, though it is not an ingraining into it. *Destruktion* is, on the other hand, the destabilization of the ground from within the ground.

On the whole, it is of utmost importance for the Heidegger readers to realise that the meaning of his texts builds up in a multi-dimensional manner. To explain, his practice of thinking does not correspond to the traditional claim-making process in which ‘truth’ (in the manner of being ‘true’ or ‘false’) is obtained via pre-established methods, and is construed as a quality of propositions. Hence, his texts do not move in a unilinear way; they are not composed of a summation of sentences which can be evaluated in isolation. Thereby, meaning is produced in the very performance of the unfolding of the text; that is, “in a relatedness backward and forward”,\(^79\) since Being requires to be interrogated through its own way\(^80\). This is precisely the reason why one has to break away with the stiff formal preconceptions, as long as their intention is not to resist the transformation conducted by the Heideggerian thought.

---

\(^79\) H. 8.

\(^80\) H. 7.
In line with this, ‘destroying’ the history of ontology is a task appointed to *Being and Time*, and it aims at the displacement of the mastery of the tradition over thinking on the whole. Accordingly, *Destruktion* is a productive interpretation of the history of philosophy; but its ‘productivity’ does not depend on a kind of explanatory or clarificationary power, and ‘interpretation’ is not an assignment for digging out what the previous philosophers actually tried to say in their very context. This dialogue with the ‘past’ should not be understood as a returning back to what was once present and is now bygone; this is expressly not the way Heidegger understands ‘history’. Far from it, Heidegger thinks the past is not something which remains ‘back over there’; if anything, it already goes ahead of thinking.\(^{81}\) Hence the task of investigating the meaning of Being is precisely to meet “the assignment . . . of becoming historiological”.\(^{82}\) In view of this, becoming historiological strictly does not mean to delve into the issues of the past; it is a laying of foundations by the way of “destructing” all that has been built upon those foundations—and it aims at the construction of today’s thought, in response to today’s historicity.\(^{83}\) It is a ‘task’ indeed, we may say, a duty to be responsible to the past—responsibility in the meaning of being *response-able*: If inquiring into the question of being is intrinsically related to becoming historiological, this is because this process enables us with the possibility of giving a response to it. This is why Heidegger emphasises ‘building a dialogue with the past’; fundamental ontology and its destructive interpretation is the only way to be able to respond to the past—to *Geschichte*, in contrast with the notion of

\(^{81}\) H. 20. Heidegger discusses historicality and the task of *Destruktion* primarily regarding the project of revealing the existential constitution of Dasein, which relates primarily to its future (this aspect will be suspended until the section 4.2 in which ‘Dasein’ will be studied in its relation to language).

\(^{82}\) H. 20-1.

\(^{83}\) H. 22.
‘history’ as construed by the human sciences, with forgetfulness of the question of being.  

Lastly, it is an immediate necessity to clarify that Destruktion is not the same as ‘annihilation’; Heidegger maintains that it “means keeping [the tradition] within its limits”.  

To wit, such a task is not intended to completely devoid the history of philosophy of any meaning so as to render it worthless. Contrariwise, it is a way to bestow it with meaning; precisely for the reason that meaning is produced within certain limits, or ‘grounds’. On the whole, the act of laying foundations of something is equivalent to the act of setting the limits of that thing; because when the foundations are veiled, there remains no traceable limits which bounds the entity at hand, hence no meaning. The performance of Destruktion is, in the way Heidegger puts it into words, a manifestation of the “birth certificates” of the traditional history, and a projection of the current historicity in pursuance of the meaning of Being. What Heidegger does through ‘displacing’ the tradition is actually a simultaneous re-placing of it, though not on the throne of mastery.

It follows that only against this background can Heidegger’s destruction of the traditional concept of language be understood. He will display the “birth certificate” of the concept of language, delve into its etymological investigation, interpret the modern philosophical approach to its truth through designating the discursive limits, and lay the foundations upon which the sciences objectify language via methodologies. In Being and Time, the design of such mission will preeminently focus on seeking the

---

84 H. 10-1.

85 H. 23.

86 H. 22.
meaning of Being, which would, in turn, free the “primordial ‘sources’” which are “blocked” by the tradition.\textsuperscript{87} In relation to our context, this will enable an unblocked field in which one can unveil the doors for an original experience with language. \textit{Tout court}, undertaking the task of destroying the traditional notion of \textit{logos} stands for meeting the responsibility for letting language show itself—“in the very way it shows itself from itself”\textsuperscript{88}. Indeed, this sort of \textit{response-ability} seems to be the the essential dynamic at stake, when we grasp that \textit{response} is actually hearkening to the original call of language, and the granted \textit{ability} is to be capable of hearkening to the speaking of language, as we will further explore in depth in late Heidegger.

\subsection*{4.2 Phenomenology as the Way to How}

In \textit{Being and Time}, the discussion for the proper method of investigation starts with the following wording: “In provisionally characterising the object which serves as the theme of our investigation (the Being of entities, or the meaning of Being in general), it seems that we have also delineated the method to be employed”.\textsuperscript{89} This is a preeminent expression in \textit{Being and Time} to hover around and scrutinise in depth, since it compactly gathers in itself the issues mentioned in the previous chapters in the course of the establishment of our subject-matter. To explain, this excerpt from Heidegger unambiguously presents the following: we have an investigation, and this investigation has an \textit{object} which stands as the \textit{theme} to be explored by the \textit{method} of this study. In Chapter 3, it was explored that Heidegger strongly criticised reducing philosophical prospection to the theoretical scheme in which the entire field of knowledge is oppressed by the coercive power

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{87} H. 21.
\textsuperscript{88} H. 34.
\textsuperscript{89} H. 27.
\end{flushleft}
exerted by the framework of *methods*[^90], besides, he argued against the restriction of what is sought after by the philosophical endeavour into the stark bounds of *thematicity* and *object-hood*[^91]. Given this elementary outlook, how are we to understand Heidegger’s use of these terms as he sets forth his project in *Being and Time*? What is provided respecting *Destruktion* so far acknowledges the task of inquiring the meaning of Being on a historiographical ground; but it does not specifically register *how* the truth of Being will be investigated.

Such *how* question, for the majority of truth seekers, immediately evokes methodological concerns which nest within the traditional epistemological framework. This apperception results from the way how this framework develops the notion of truth; when truth is conceived as a property of propositions, which can be captured by way of certain pre-defined methodologies and their tools, then the *how* question at stake immediately turns into an inquiry which hunts for appropriate methodological tools.

The will to investigate truth, as a matter of course, immediately brings about the *how* question concerning methods; yet one should ask: Is there actually an obligation to place the ‘*how*’ immediately within an epistemological framework? For Heidegger, the response is more than an adamant ‘*no*’. Far from being an obligation, placing truth and the proper method within an epistemological background is, indeed, a veiling of truth. The answer Heidegger gives to the ‘*how*’ is the adaptation of the phenomenological method based on the fundamental ontology, having the priority over epistemology.

[^90]: cf. p. 17.

[^91]: cf. pp. 24-5.
Heidegger asserts that the ‘how’ is originally a matter of ‘way’. Accordingly, the way, which satisfies the how question, is ‘phenomenology’. Heidegger clearly states that phenomenology has no specific standpoint or direction as such, therefore it “does not characterise the what of objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research”.\(^{92}\) It means that the proper methodology is not a pre-defined point of view which uses tools as such in order to walk the way to truth; rather, phenomenology asserts that there are no directions and tools, precisely because the way itself is the how. In other words, inquiring how truth is to be reached out is not incisively equivalent to probing which viewpoint should be adopted and what the suitable tools must be. In phenomenology there are no such reifications, in contrast with theoretical structures. Respectively, ‘truth’ is not an entity which stands out there waiting to be touched by the befitting tools; truth is the very unconcealing of its own, that is, it is the very way it is unconcealed—hence the process of the phenomenological-ontological investigation is the very course in which truth comes into light.

In a nutshell, the what is, in truth, the how. It also explains what Heidegger means by putting that “[o]nly as phenomenology, is ontology possible”.\(^{93}\) Ontology, as the study of the Being of beings, can open up the truth of the Being of beings only through investigating how they come into being. The reason is, as discussed in the previous chapters, ontological inquiry of whatness necessarily objectifies its subject, so it ends up in evaluating its objects in their ‘being such and such’—not in terms of the ground which brings them into light. So Heidegger’s remark indicates a substantial discernment: If fundamental ontology which evokes the question of Being is

\(^{92}\) H. 27.

\(^{93}\) H. 35.
capable of accomplishing a more essential undertaking compared to regional ontologies, this is due to the fact that it adopts a methodology which attains the how beyond the what.

This being the case, what we see during the course of this methodological employment is the phenomenological destruction of the mastery of the traditional understanding of ‘theme’ and ‘method’. What is also clarified through this is how Destruktion is not a thorough abandonment of the previous philosophy, but is an inner transformation of it. Later on, Heidegger will denominate this transformed and emancipated realm as the realm of ‘thinking’; and on a similar line, thinking will inquire language through breaking the ground of the traditional understanding which conceptualise language as a what, and Heidegger’s investigation will reveal how we originally experience language, that is, how language reveals itself to us. Evidently, this reflection is seeded in Being and Time.

All in all, these explications answer the question stated at the beginning: seeing all of his criticisms against objectification, thematisation and methodologisation in philosophy, how are we to understand Heidegger, stating that he delineates the ‘method’ to be employed by the time he characterises the ‘object’ of the investigation which “serves as the theme”? The answer lies in grasping the fundamental ontology proceeding by way of a destructive phenomenology. During the course of the phenomenological analysis of its “object” serving as the “theme”, fundamental ontology destroys “object-hood” by way of exposing its grounds. Similarly, in its being a ‘method’, phenomenology destabilises the legitimacy of epistemological ‘methods’.

This brings forth a very important fact: Heidegger constructs a peculiar discourse. What is more, the way that he uses language is intrinsically
related to the way he understands ‘language’; therefore, in order for us to understand his notion of language, it is indispensable to realise the way he uses language.

One of the ways to attain this realisation is being attentive to the hints Heidegger provides on occasion. In order to draw the reader’s attention to the possible metaphysical implications some wordings convey, he distinguishes himself from such connotations through alienating the words he uses, by way of inserting them in quotation marks.

4.2.1 The Problem with ‘Of’ as an Objective Genitive

As Heidegger explicates the phenomenological method, he makes special emphases by way of using italicization and quotation marks, so as to diligently distinguish his method from other studies:

The word [phenomenology] merely informs us of the “how” with which what is to be treated in this science gets exhibited and handled. To have a science ‘of’ phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly. Heidegger takes the genitive ‘of’ in quotation marks in order to indicate that he wants to cast out the belonging-relationship between ‘science’ as such and ‘phenomena’. This is because when two entities are related with the ‘of’ genitive, there may run the risk of a connotation of objectification. Wayne Owen also highlights the importance of this concern by citing a quote where Heidegger says: “Philosophical research will have to dispense with the ‘philosophy of language’ if it is to inquire into ‘the things themselves’ and attain the status of a problematic which has been cleared up conceptually”. Owen explains that the ‘of’ is generally interpreted as an objective genitive,

94 H. 34-5.

95 H. 166. as quoted in “Heidegger and the Philosophy of Language”, p. 49.
hence the phrase ‘philosophy of language’ connotes that the philosophical study as concerns language necessarily objectifies language. His point is also evinced by the fact that the philosophers of language often resort to “metalinguistics, which is the same as ‘metaphysics’” for Heidegger, as we have mentioned before.

Heidegger attracts notice regarding this objective genitive not only in Being and Time, but repeatedly throughout the entirety of his works. For example, in “A Dialogue on Language”, he propounds that instead of speaking about language—or in other words, engaging in philosophy of language—one must “hear from it”:

J: Then there would only be speaking from language . . .
I: . . . in this manner, that it would be called from out of language’s reality, and be let to its reality.

This reveals that when Heidegger uses the phrase ‘speaking of language’, actually he means speaking from out of language’s reality towards its reality. It is also possible to interpret the genitive ‘of’ here as a double genitive, as Heidegger expressly indicates this relation: “Speaking is listening to language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we are speaking . . . We do not merely speak the language—we speak by way of it . . . What do we hear there? We hear language speaking”. This also explains the way in which the phenomenological method’s speaking of language is characterised. Resultantly, we may construe how phenomenological methodology could evade objectifying language, thereby could uncover its ownmost truth.

---

96 “Heidegger and the Philosophy of Language”, p. 50.


Returning back to *Being and Time* and Owen’s evaluation, it becomes clear that where Heidegger asserts the uncovering of the genuine essence of language is the condition of inquiring into the things themselves, a cardinal place is designated for language. In other words, Heidegger thinks, as long as language remains subject to objectification by ‘philosophy of language’, philosophy is incapable of developing a proper problematic. Obviously, if there is no proper problematic, there is no proper answer.

As characteristic of Heidegger, the next step is construing the etymological roots of the term ‘phenomenology’. He explains that ‘phenomenon’ (ϕαινόμενον) and ‘logos’ (λόγος) composes the term, which may be, *ex tempore*, translated as the “science of phenomena”\(^{100}\). Regardless, illuminating what is meant by these terms is required in order to follow a deep prospection. This divulgement will also illume the central role of language in *Being and Time*.

### 4.2.2 Phenomenon

Heidegger starts to discuss what ‘phenomenon’ means by maintaining that it is rooted in the Greek term ϕαινόμενον, which comes from the verb ϕαινεσθαι, meaning, ‘to show itself’ in a middle-voiced way.\(^{101}\) Here, ‘voice’ indicates the modality through which the verb relates to the subject in a sentence. In other words, it indicates the way the subject acts. When this is grammatically posed in the form of middle-voice, the subject acts upon itself, i.e., the act comes out of the subject and affects the subject. Accordingly, Heidegger emphasises that “the expression ‘phenomenon’

---

\(^{100}\) H. 28.  
\(^{101}\) ibid.
signifies *that which shows itself in itself, the manifest*. Right after establishing this, he warns his readers about making a careful distinction between ‘phenomenon’ and ‘appearance’: While ‘phenomenon’ genuinely means showing itself from out of itself, ‘appearance’ may denote three different meanings: (1) That which announces itself through something which does show itself; (2) that which indicates something which does not show itself in its very showing-itself; (3) that which shows itself in itself from out of itself, without indicating something which does not show itself. Hereby, one can infer that the first two possible meanings of ‘appearance’ alludes to the traditional differentiation between the ‘referee’ and the ‘referent’. To exemplify, let’s focus on the following notion frequently adopted in the traditional philosophy: The subject cognises its object in the way that it appears to it, but it is presumed that what the object *is in reality* remains to be doubted. In Heidegger’s words, this notion denotes the situation where the object *announces* its being, but its actual knowledge remains subject to epistemological discussions. In other words, we may say that ‘announcement’ indicates a conveyance of knowledge; hence appearance as a conveyance of the knowledge of the object remains as an ‘announcement’ to be cognised; the referee does not show itself, and remains behind the referent. In this case, we see that the overall problem is projected as an epistemological issue, rather than an ontological one. Precisely this is what Heidegger tries to delineate by the ‘forgetfulness regarding the question of Being’. The very showing-up of things as beings *per se* is primarily evaluated as a matter of conveyance of knowledge; as a problem of ‘announcement’ of that which is to be cognised. Thus, ‘appearance’ may connote that which does not *show itself in its being* but rather *announces* itself in the medium of that which never comes into sight.

102 ibid.

103 H. 30.
In contrast to this, Heidegger asserts that there is no such presupposed mediation in phenomenology.\textsuperscript{104} ‘Phenomenon’ in the Heideggerian sense is, thereof, literally \( \varphi α i ν \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \nu \) : The manifest which shows itself in itself—in the way that it is, not from a mediated distance, in the form of an announcement. This is exactly the meaning of its being expressed in the modality of middle-voice.

Consequently, discerning the genuine import of the term ‘phenomena’ and eliminating the vagueness in its sense loaded with traditional conceptions will clear the vision in order to grasp the togetherness of ‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos’, which constitutes the phenomenological method. By this way, what is meant by logos will also be laid open. Hence, Heidegger analyses what makes up logos as the logos ‘of’ phenomena.

### 4.2.3 Logos

Heidegger initiates the discussion with a question, wondering:

‘\( \Lambda \varphi γ ος \) gets ‘translated’ (and this means that it is always getting interpreted) as ‘reason’, ‘judgment’, ‘concept’, ‘definition’, ‘ground’, or ‘relationship’. But how can ‘discourse’ be so susceptible of modification that \( \Lambda \varphi γ ος \) can signify all the things we have listed, and in good scholarly usage?\textsuperscript{105}

\( \Lambda \varphi γ ος \) is a ubiquitous concept in philosophy; we may say it is at least as old as the dawning of the love of wisdom. Hence, the various ways ‘logos’ is translated throughout the history of philosophy are specific to the grounding philosophical concerns of these eras. Heidegger’s words quoted above is a calling for seeking the proper translation of ‘logos’; and in \textit{Being and Time} he chooses to translate it as \textit{Rede}, contextually translated into English as ‘speech’ or ‘discourse’. Yet surely, due to the fact that translation is not a

\textsuperscript{104} H. 31.

\textsuperscript{105} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p. 55.
matter of a simple name-assigning activity, what Rede means is to be exposed along the way of its phenomenological treatment by following its etymological implications. Heidegger’s interpretation of logos is a prerequisite for constructing the overall frame of reference which will expose the way language is located in Being and Time, and for the meaning language will later be construed in relation to discussion.

Heidegger explains λόγος in connection with φαίνεσθαι; λόγος is what lets ‘that which discourse is about’ be seen—it is a letting φαίνεσθαι, i.e., letting something manifest itself in the very way that thing shows itself. It means to say that what is said is brought into light by way of λόγος; though such bringing is not performed ‘actively’; it is a ‘letting’. What is ‘let’ is manifested neither ‘actively’ nor ‘passively’; it shows itself from itself. To put in a different way, discourse is not what is said; it is the very coming into being of the whatness of what the discourse is about. Hence λόγος, translated as discourse, is not what manifests in the discursive communication. Instead, it is the bringing into light of that whatness, by the way of letting it to show itself from itself.

Correspondingly, discourse ‘points out’; it provides the site in which what is to show itself as it is shows itself. Thereby in communication, this site opened up by the pointing out of discourse turns out accessible to the other party, and appears in the form of ἀπόφανσις (statement). Eventually, discourse gets concrete in the form of vocal articulation, and gains the “character of speaking [Sprechens]”. The idea to grasp here is that speaking understood as vocal articulation, as of itself, is not discoursing; it

---

106 H. 32.

107 ibid.

108 ibid.
only is the fully concrete form. \(\text{λόγος}\), as \(\text{Rede}\), is the ontological ground on which ‘speaking’ of the human being as we know it becomes possible. Heidegger’s exposition also implies that ‘statements’ do not make up discourse; to the contrary, \textit{discoursing} makes up the statements, through granting them the site in which they are rendered meaningful in the way that they are manifested in their ownmost beings. It is important to realise that this is not a simple reversal, as the entirety of this delineation is founded upon the verb \(\phiαινεσθαι\) which signifies in middle-voice. So ‘discoursing’ (‘letting something be seen’\textsuperscript{109}) must not be thought as a kind of active force which procures meanings; it just lets beings to \(\phiαινεσθαι\). It amounts to the fact that this does not set up a hierarchical relationship between statements and discourse; ‘difference’ in the Heideggerian sense should not be understood as of a vertical character.

Additionally, Heidegger states that the structural form of \(\lambda\acute{\text{g}}\rho\varsigma\) is \(\text{συνθεσις}\) (synthesis);\textsuperscript{110} and such synthesis is to be construed as a “\textit{togetherness [Beisammen] with something—letting it be seen as something}”\textsuperscript{111}. He warns not to misinterpret this ‘togetherness’ as a kind of achieved unity between what lies out there and what representationally corresponds to it, as there is no place for such a duality in Heidegger’s thought in general. This once again demonstrates that the relation between that which \textit{discourses} and that which is \textit{discoursed}\textsuperscript{112} is neither a hierarchical bond, nor a rapport between ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ as such. It propels readers to a distinct understanding

\textsuperscript{109} ibid.

\textsuperscript{110} H. 33.

\textsuperscript{111} ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} Used in the sense of ‘discourse’ as a verb, ‘to discourse’, derived from Heidegger’s expression “discoursing” which highlights the temporal dimension of the issue.
of ‘difference’; a difference which comes before the establishment of strict boundaries and traditional dualities which try to comprehend difference as such from out of an ontical ground. Therefore, the difference of Rede from ‘statement’ is of an ontological character.

This thought indeed has profoundly far-reaching indications. The reason is that it asserts the claim that discursivity is not an agglomeration of statements. In a sense, it is not the summation of individual statements; it is the totality which brings forth the field functioning as the ground on which statements acquire their meaning. As such, it is in sharp contrast with the previously discussed analytic approach to language, on the grounds that those thinkers evaluate language with respect to its semantics and logical form with a particular focus on what is said. Hence, Heidegger diligently disengages discourse from this ontic structure and phenomenologically describes the ontological grounding of discourse in relation to its etymological roots. On this line, he exposes that the truth-revealing of discourse is not an establishment of accordance with ‘judgment’. Thereby, he makes a clear allusion to his contemporaries: “If, as has become quite customary nowadays, one defines ‘truth’ as something that ‘really’ pertains to judgment . . . [then] not only is this unjustified, but, above all, the Greek conception of truth has been misunderstood”.

As extensively exposed in chapter 3, the language-oriented philosophers of the era analysed language in the forms of ‘statement,’ ‘judgment’ or ‘proposition’; accordingly, the conception of truth was developed as a property of propositions. Heidegger asserts that such notion could only be “a secondary phenomenon of truth,

\[113 \text{ This is not to imply that statements first come into being and then gain sense: we will see that for an entity to appear in being, it is an ontological condition that it appears as something, i.e., as already interpreted and understood—as meaningful.}\]

\[114 \text{ H. 33.}\]
with more than one kind of foundation”.\textsuperscript{115} This is exactly why the analytical-positivist approach to truth cannot attain to the truth of language, hence cannot attain a fundamental thought of truth, and end up in ‘untruth’.

Heidegger concludes this discussion, namely, “the Interpretation of ‘apophantical discourse’”\textsuperscript{116} by clarifying that the essential function of logos is “merely letting something be seen”, hence it is not an obstacle for it to signify ‘reason’ when it lets entities be perceived, or to signify ‘ratio’ or ‘relation’ in its different ways of letting-be-seen.\textsuperscript{117} Nevertheless, those are only secondary to its truth and are the different manifestations of its fundamental exposing as ϕαινεσθαι.

All these concludes that a vital constituent of the investigation in Being and Time is seeking ‘truth’ uncovered by the letting-be-seen of logos, or Rede as Heidegger translates it—‘discourse’ or ‘speech’ in our terms. Albeit, still up to this point, it is not sheerly clarified how precisely ‘discourse’ relates to ‘language’—the general term we designated as the focus of our study. Heidegger utters as follows: “Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose disclosedness it Articulates according to significations, has, as its kind of Being, Being-in-the-world—a Being which has been thrown and submitted to the ‘world’”\textsuperscript{118}. With this, we see that the affinity between ‘discourse’ and ‘language’ is clearly exposed through the concept of ‘existence’. In accordance with this, in order to further trace the place of language for Heidegger, the next step must be taken towards the heart of Being and Time: The ‘existential structure’, Dasein as being-in-the-world.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{115} H. 34.
\textsuperscript{116} ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} H. 34.
\textsuperscript{118} H. 161.
\end{footnotesize}
4.3 Existence and Language

The fundamental analysis of Dasein constitutes the essential focus of the entirety of *Being and Time*, since Heidegger posits it as the entity which possesses both ontical and ontological priority over any other entity; besides, Dasein is “the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontologies”\(^\text{119}\). Against this background, Dasein’s Being is disclosed to it as an “issue”, meaning, it relates to its Being understandingly, thereby is rendered capable of posing the question of Being. The disclosure of this issue to itself constitutes the being of Dasein fundamentally as existence; Dasein is existence. This will be exposed through grounding that from being a *fait accompli*, Dasein always understands itself as a ‘possibility’—a potentiality-for-Being. So the elements of its ontological structure are not properties which are attached to its being; Dasein, as *Existenz*, is not a ‘whatness’ to be defined or evaluated through a theoretical undertaking.\(^\text{120}\) Rather, it is a potentiality-for-Being which is thrown into a world-structure, a structure which is to be interpreted and understood. As such amounts to a destruction of the traditional notion of subjectivity which conceives the human being as a “that-being”, meaning, a certain kind of presence among other entities—an ontic being—adorned with some special ‘properties’ in comparison to other entities, such as ‘the ability to speak’ (e.g., the famous description of the human being as *zoon logon echon*). Hence traditionally, the human being is always evaluated in terms of its being such and such, but never in terms of the Being as its being; as such characterises what Heidegger calls the forgetting of the question of Being by the tradition. Given the previously provided background for the necessity to re-raise the question of Being, Heidegger holds that: “Therefore *fundamental ontology*,

\(^{119}\text{H. 14.}\)

\(^{120}\text{H. 12.}\)
from which alone all ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the *existential analytic of Dasein*". For our purposes, it draws upon the fact that the relation between Dasein and language is to designate the place of language in *Being and Time*.

Indeed, Heidegger himself makes a very strong emphasis on the necessity to bring language into the focus of attention *exclusively* on the grounds of the ontological analytic of Dasein: “The fact that language now becomes our theme *for the first time* will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness”. As we have seen, Heidegger provides an interpretation of *logos* and poses its translation as *Rede* at the introduction of his project. Yet, the due consideration of language takes place under the fifth chapter of division one, titled “Being-in-as Such”. Considering the design of the project, evidently, the locus attained to language is to be grasped within the *existentialia* of “being-in as such”.

In this respect it is requisite to proceed with the founding elements of this context which nests language in its relation to Dasein. The necessary background is built prevalently starting with the discussion of ‘being-in-the-world’ as well as ‘the worldhood of the world’ in which, specific to our concern, Heidegger sustains an account of the ontological characters of ‘worldhood’ and ‘references and signs’, and later continues through discussing the terms ‘understanding and interpretation’, ‘assertion’, and finally, ‘discourse and language’. These terms are the aspects of the way language is posited as constitutive of Dasein’s being, therefore exposing

---

121 H. 13.

122 H. 161.

123 ‘Existentialia’ means the equiprimordial elements of the structure of existence; and this term is disparate from ‘categories’ which exclusively denote non-existing entities that could be interrogated as a ‘what’, in contradistinction to the interrogative ‘who’ proper to Dasein (H. 44-5).
them will accomplish the task of discerning the place of language in *Being and Time*.

### 4.3.1 Being-in-the-world & Equipmentality

The existential analytic of Dasein reveals the fundamentally constitutive elements of its ontological ground, each of which is called *existentialia*. Accordingly, the basic state of Dasein—its comportment towards Being in an understanding manner—is termed as ‘being-in-the-world’. The concept of ‘world’ is at the heart of Heidegger’s undertaking in *Being and Time*, and language can be thought at the bosom of it. To explain, Heidegger asserts that world is not an entity which relates to the human being by way of representations; instead, Dasein’s basic ontological state which grounds its existence is ‘being-in-the-world’. This means to say that Dasein is in the world—which means to say the same as ‘Dasein is the world’. The human being is not grasped as an entity which has an ‘internality’ in opposition to an ‘external’ world.\(^{124}\) In finding itself thrown into the world, Dasein’s ground of existence is structured by its being-in-the-world; hence the human being’s relation with the world is not primarily an epistemological concern in which the essence of the human being is evaluated respecting to the conditions of its epistemological ability to know the world. Above all, the ontological condition of being-there is a comportment towards Being in an ‘understanding’ manner, and such ‘understanding’ has nothing to do with acquiring a theoretical knowledge about the surroundings. Dasein’s very finding itself in a world already means that it comports itself with Being understandingly; hence the relation of the human being with the world is first and foremost an ontological relation. When the ontological question is not raised, this grounding relation remains concealed, and it leads to the

\(^{124}\) H. 62.
situation where both Dasein, as an internality, and the world, as an externality, are positioned as entities which ontically relate to one another; they are compassed as present-at-hand, meaning, both Dasein and the world are deficiently grasped from out of an ontologically secondary mode— the mode from which primarily the theoretical/scientific gaze is nourished.

For Heidegger, the state of being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon; despite the fact that it has ontological constituents, it does not mean that it can be broken into pieces so as to analyse and render sheer.\textsuperscript{125} Interrogating the ontological conditions of worldhood stands for the position which does regard its unitary essence. That the world is in its essence an exclusively unitary phenomenon is a bearing of great significance, since it will later be one of the quintessential points to attain the relation between the world and language.

In its entirety, ‘world’ can never be rendered completely transparent, either through scientific or ontological study. As the condition of beings to appear as beings, the world is, in each case and in every form, always presupposed.\textsuperscript{126} Thus, being-in-the-world is not a state in which the entirety of the world-structure is available to gaze. Instead, in its average everydayness, Dasein \textit{deals} with entities within-the-world through encountering them as what Heidegger calls \textit{equipments}. Indeed, Heidegger’s term of ‘equipmentality’ is the kernel of the explicit invitation of language to the forefront, because it marks as the crux in which the basic ontological state of being-in-the-world is depicted with respect to ‘references’ and ‘signs’. To explain, it is possible to depict a contrasting picture which can be associated with the thoughts of many philosophers in the history of thought,

\textsuperscript{125} H. 53.

\textsuperscript{126} H. 64.
a paragon for this may be exemplified as Plato’s ‘Forms’: The entities the human being encounters in the world is, in their essence, evaluated as self-referring, particular individuals. Accordingly, their ontological position external to the human being locate them as entities which are isolated in their beings and meanings. In that event, the main problematic becomes either how to reach them in their purity, or how to represent them validly. The interaction between them is conceived as that of an external relation, for instance, like in the case of the naturalistic worldview according to which the form of the relation between beings can be thought solely as of a physical character without reserve. In contradistinction to such a presumption, Heidegger claims that the very being of the entities Dasein encounters around is grounded in a structure of equipmentality. ‘Equipments’ are what Dasein deals with in its being-in-the-world, and they appear in the structure of ‘in-order-to’:

In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something . . . Provisionally, it is enough to take a look phenomenally at a manifold of such assignments. Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of [aus] its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These ‘Things’ never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room.127

Heidegger means that Dasein encounters entities in its environment always as beings which are conditioned by a system of reference, i.e., a dynamic totality, which is Dasein’s world. These signs and the system of references are not ‘representations’; this referential system is exactly the ontological ground which makes them possible to appear as beings at all. This is why Heidegger warns that “there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment”,128 he takes ‘is’ in quotation marks because he specifically implies the primordial ontological state of their being. Primordially, ‘an equipment’ would be a

127 H. 68.

128 ibid.
contradiction in terms, because to be equipment means to be in the structure of *equipmentality*; hence *before* any ‘individual’ entity shows itself, “a totality of equipment has already been discovered”.129

This issue is closely related to the remark that the world constitutes a unitary phenomenon the totality of which can never be rendered thoroughly available to gaze. Just like the fact that the world is always already presupposed in each case, for any ‘equipment’ as such to appear in the first place, the totality of equipments has to be presumed. This will enable us to grasp how the world, as a system of reference, nests language at its core as an ontological condition for being-in-the-world, namely, Dasein; and this will be clarified when, as we will see, language is constituted as the *existentialia* of this system of reference.

4.3.2 References & Signs

“Being-in-the-world, according to Heidegger’s Interpretation explained up to this point, was evinced by a non-thematic circumspective analysis of ‘references’ or ‘assignments’, which are constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment”.130 Through locating ‘meaning’ in an essential association with the ontologically basic state—being-in-the-world, Heidegger prepares the contexture in which *Rede* is to be enucleated in a proper way. Henceforth he proceeds into a more detailed exposition of the issue through focusing on references and signs, stating that so far the

129 ibid.

130 H. 76.
Interpretation of the structure of Being “which belongs to the ready-to-hand (to ‘equipment’)” remains “sketchy” and it needs further investigation.\textsuperscript{131}

First, he clarifies that signs themselves are characteristically equipments of indication or showing, which may be a \textit{kind} of referring. So when reviewed in a formal way, ‘indication’ in the form of ‘reference’ may be thought as a kind of ‘relation’. Nevertheless, such a formal evaluation which affixes references merely to ‘relations’ falls short, and it is necessary to reveal their ontological source.\textsuperscript{132} Next, he roundly distinguishes references from signs by averring that for some entity to have serviceability as an equipment, it does not have to eventuate in turning into a sign in each case: “the kind of reference we get in ‘serviceability-for’, is an ontologico-categorial attribute of equipment \textit{as} equipment”.\textsuperscript{133} Thereby, despite the fact that sign is an indispensable part of orientation for Dasein’s environment, it cannot subsume and exhaust ready-to-hand in its being, because sign necessarily emits itself to the structure of “concernful dealings” and brings about an express surveying of the environment.\textsuperscript{134} In line with this, Heidegger maintains an italicised and perspicuous explication of the relation between sign and the ready-to-hand: “A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather \textit{an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself}”.\textsuperscript{135} To paraphrase Heidegger, sign in its essence is not a medium of an

\textsuperscript{131} ibid.

\textsuperscript{132} H. 77.

\textsuperscript{133} H. 78.

\textsuperscript{134} H. 79.

\textsuperscript{135} H. 80.
ontic relationship between two things, such as in the case of Frege’s differentiation between ‘sense’ (Bedeutung) and ‘reference’ (bedeuten) which is constructed upon the thought that the indicative act is a matter of representing the thing out there in its singularity. Instead, for Heidegger, sign is that which evokes the entirety of the worldly constituents of the environment, in order to serve as the equipment through which the ready-to-hand—entities in their equipmentality—“announces” itself. It brings upon the fact that for a sign to appear as a sign, “that which gets taken as a sign . . . must have been apprehended before the sign gets established”. Nevertheless, this remains still deficient in this way, because as such does not explain the ‘worldly’ character of sign which also do factically appear present-at-hand, as something present right before us. To put it another way, if sign was exclusively an equipmental structure which is founded merely on the totality of referential relations, it would never be able to concretise that towards which the sign conveys us. The reason is, as stated before, the entirety of the world-structure can never be made completely bare before any kind of investigation, and since this referential totality is not reifiable at any point, Heidegger would remain unable to explain the appearance of entities in the mode of present-at-hand.

Resultantly, Heidegger reveals another characteristic of sign which makes up its very worldliness by way of which “the ready-to-hand announces itself”, and “the environment becomes in each case explicitly accessible for circumspection”: “A sign is something ontically ready-to-hand, which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of

136 H. 81.
worldhood". Hence, by the way of differentiating sign from reference, and designating references at the core of the ontological structure of the world in the form of ready-to-hand, Heidegger clearly takes an unprecedented and radical stance with respect to language, in comparison to his contemporaries. Be it the philological, analytic or structuralist studies of the era—notwithstanding the great differences among them, signs were not so fundamentally differentiated from references. Accordingly, the vital conclusion it brings is that, because traditionally both signs and references are conceptualised in one and the same ontological dimension (in contradistinction to Heidegger’s diligent ontological exposition), the due evaluation of language necessarily remains at the ontic level.

Indeed, there were many thinkers who asserted that the limits of the world is constituted by language, which may at first sight sound similar to Heidegger’s suggestions, and they are entitled as the holders of “the constitutionalist conception of language” in the related literature. Still, however profoundly radical they may be, as long as the way they discern the constitutive character of language remains as an ontic constitution, that is to say, insofar as they disregard the exclusively ontologically differentiated essences of references and signs, those constitutionalist thinkers of language fail to satisfactorily attain the truth of language—ironically in terms of the fundamentality of language’s ‘constitutive’ character. Of course, this is one way to read Heidegger; there is actually a wide discussion regarding this issue among Heidegger scholars, and interpretations are more than one. While some commentators lean towards nestling Heidegger straightly within the ‘remaining constitutionalist movement’, some of them argue that a proper reading of Heidegger does yield the specifications of the Heideggerian thought discerned in its uniqueness.

137 H. 83.
4.3.3 Does ‘Rede’ stand for a ‘Constitutionalist Conception of Language’?

For some scholars, one of which is Taylor who is mentioned in the second chapter,\textsuperscript{138} Heidegger’s idea of language is basically on the very same line with the remaining constitutionalist thinkers of language, hence Heidegger can be put squarely as a constitutive theorist.\textsuperscript{139} The tenet of Taylor to claim this is his idea that Heidegger assigns a ‘separate’ semantic dimension to language, thereby locates language at a position which rises in direct ‘opposition’ to the thoughts of thinkers who evaluate language as a tool of human communication\textsuperscript{140}. Taylor is supported by Lafont who alleges that Heidegger’s “conception” of language is an “idealistic view” because it “absolutises” the world-disclosing “function” of language.\textsuperscript{141} Therefore both thinkers choose to un-essentialise the essential nicety distinctions developed by Heidegger with respect to language, and to grasp Rede in its thematic similarity with the ‘concepts’ of other thinkers from the tradition. Nevertheless, the fashion of their discourse while commenting on Heidegger is, obviously, utterly problematical. For instance, bearing in mind what has been exposed so far, if we are to review the comment of Taylor, would it really make sense to claim that language is a ‘separate’ semantic dimension? In other words, at which point does Heidegger hints at all that the borders of language is established in ‘separateness’; from what is Rede ‘separate’, in the proper sense of the term? In this respect, can the ontological difference between Being and beings, which lies at the very core of Heidegger’s understanding of language, be re-posed as a ‘disparity’? In line with this,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{138} cf. pp. 8-9.
\item \textsuperscript{139} “Heidegger on Language”, p. 441.
\item \textsuperscript{140} ibid., pp. 437-40.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure, pp. 1-8.
\end{itemize}
does the non-derivability of *existentialia* mean that they are ‘separate’? Besides, how can there be an adamantine border, a properly *separate* dimension of any phenomena in the Heideggerian phenomenological methodology, regarding the fact that he over and over emphasises the unitary character of the world?

Even more problematic is the way Lafont reads Heidegger. Her words start with a dubious association of Heidegger’s thought of language with ‘conceptuality’; she indeed does qualify Heidegger’s path to language as a structure of conceptuality. Strictly speaking, Heidegger’s phenomenological exposition is not only a far cry from ‘conceptuality’ as such, but is a destruction of the primacy of conceptuality as such in the philosophical method. Next, she entitles Heidegger as an “idealist”, because she thinks he “absolutises” the “world-disclosing function” of language. Here one may first focus on the last phrase, “world-disclosing function” of language: Truly, without providing any preliminary background for the use of these terms, which is the case with Lafont, this wording insinuates the perception that language is an entity apart from the world, functioning like a magic wand to disclose the world *per se*. That this construal is indeed the case with Lafont is also evinced by her charging Heidegger of absolutisation and idealism; in this specific case, Wrathall provides a compact and condign answer directed to Lafont. Accordingly, Wrathall quotes Lafont as an epitome of how to misunderstand Heidegger, and he clarifies that Heidegger has never been a linguistic ‘constitutionalist’. The false attribution of linguistic idealism to Heidegger is the result of the dire confusion which takes what Heidegger means by ‘ordinary language’ to be that which is constitutive of entities in the world:

As we see in this passage, Lafont attributes to Heidegger a particularly severe, indeed, absurd version of linguistic idealism—language itself decides which claims made within the language are true or false, thus restrictions that language imposes on us that it cannot be revised by any
way . . . That no sensible person would hold such a view of the relationship between language and our experience of the world does not stop Lafont from attributing the view to Heidegger.\footnote{142} Thereby, Wrathall’s elaboration instills us a very crucial lesson to bare in mind: To say that language is an existentiale, in that it ‘constructs’ the being of Dasein, cannot be straightforwardly totalised under the title of ‘constitutionalism’. As such is especially the case with Heidegger, as the path he opens up is the very way of breaking such familiar and presupposed short-cuts, in order to undertake the mission of hearkening to the call of Being.

Barbara Fultner also contributes to the discussion by maintaining that Heidegger’s aim is not to pose a theory of language as the direct reversal of the thoughts which apperceive language exclusively as a tool. Despite the fact that scholars choose to take a position at one side of this seemingly opposing interpretations (i.e., either that Heidegger is a constitutionalist or that he is an instrumentalist), she asserts her view so as to break away with this binary commentary, holding that language moves between the two poles of functioning as an instrument and functioning as an existentiale.\footnote{143} In this light, she registers that language, as the totality of reference relations, is the worldly condition of possibility for ready-to-hand to appear as it is, hence it indeed has to appear within the ontic field:

While this supports an instrumentalist understanding of language, it is a somewhat puzzling claim. Heidegger does not mean by language something like what Saussure, for instance, means by langue, which in one variation or another has been the dominant conception of language. He does not, in other words, conceive it as a system of rules subject to objective inquiry, an abstraction from usage (parole) yet nonetheless logically or conceptually prior to it system of rules subject to objective

\footnote{142} “Discourse Language, Saying, Showing”, pp. 121-2.

\footnote{143} Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, p. 201.
inquiry, an abstraction from usage (*parole*) yet nonetheless logically or conceptually prior to it.\(^{144}\)

Fultner’s reading touches the core of the issue principally insofar as one underscores Heidegger’s recurrent emphases throughout *Being and Time* on the fact that the whole project is designed towards seeking the meaning of Being by way of investigating *the entity* which is capable of having an understanding of being and understanding itself in being. *Being and Time* is the ontological analysis of the structure of existence—namely, of Dasein. In consideration of the facticity that language *does appear* as something present-at-hand both as the object of scientific study as well as in everyday dealings, it would be inconceivable to think of a purposeful phenomenological inquiry which is decisive to close its eyes to this facticity as clear as light.

As things stand, it turns out to be rather unproductive to strive for encapsulating the entirety of Heidegger’s implications under the title of any ‘-ism’. Hereby, what we witness is the fact that his works overflow any unequivocal interpretation to be alleged as the final precipitation. Instead of trying to represent his thought by way of hinging upon the generality of a singular title, the way to read Heidegger and to construe his *thought of language* seems to necessitate attending the course of his *performance of language*. Characteristically destructive of poles, short-cuts and the ‘safe’ borders of familiar intuitions, this phenomenological journey does not seem to be encapsulatable under the static nature of an ‘-ism’. Maybe this was precisely what Heidegger meant when he stated that transformation occurs as a passage, and while one site is metaphysics, the other site has to remain without a name.\(^{145}\)

\(^{144}\) ibid., p. 215.

\(^{145}\) “A Dialogue on Language”, p. 42.
4.3.4 Evaluating the Vicinage of Language

Before taking language as the prominent focus of investigation “for the first time”, Heidegger exposes two other constitutive and equiprimordial elements of Dasein, which are “being-with” and “being-in”. This sequencing gives us a solid hint with respect to how Heidegger places language within the context of Being and Time, prevalently insofar as we ponder on Heidegger’s significative emphasis in italics, where he intends to draw our attention to the very locale in the sequence in which language eventually becomes the focal spot: “[L]anguage now becomes our theme for the first time”. Provided that this is an apparent clue given to us, those who are specifically interested in the due locale of language in Being and Time, then we are assigned to construe this site in consideration of the relationships that make up the vicinage.

Here, at this very site we have arrived within the context of Being and Time, it is possible to infer that one of the nearest equiprimordial neighbours of language is “being-with”, in relation to “being-one’s-self”. Briefly, the keystone of this part is Heidegger’s destroying the thought of self-same subjectivity (an exponent of which is the Cartesian ‘I’) within ‘the intersubjective field’—in the way it is traditionally denominated. Thereby, Heidegger demonstrates that the ontological ground of the “encountering of Others” is not founded upon a framework where one ‘internality’ relates to another ‘internality’ by sharing the same space on an external entity called the ‘world’. Contrariwise, being-with-others is an existentialia which works as a constitutive element of Dasein’s disclosedness; meaning that Dasein has a primordial understanding of Being, which “already implies the

---

146 H. 160.

147 ibid.
understanding of Others”. Hereat the consequential notion relevant to our investigation is the way the disclosedness of Dasein to itself in its understanding of Being is essentially and equiprimordially grounded in its being-with others; thus Dasein is not first and foremost disclosed to itself—prior to its encounter with others in the being-with structure. Dasein is its being-with others by virtue of the fact that the worldhood of the world is a priorly shared non-theoretical understanding which does not leave any place for “free-floating” subjects as such.

Dasein’s condition of possibility to be at all is grounded by these equiprimordial elements each of which is non-derivable from one another, and this is in fact what the term ‘equiprimordiality’ conveys. The essential structures of Being are ontologically non-derivable from one another, and each constitutes an entirety which cannot be broken apart by way of unfitting approaches, (e.g., theoretical undertakings be it either scientific or philosophical). However, they are still composed of “a multiplicity of characteristics of Being”, and as such does not present a contradicting picture inasmuch as one does not remain unyielding about questioning the traditional will to reach that ‘one ground’ on which every entity ontologically depends.

All the same, this recognition does not strictly restrict us to the idea that it would be unproductive or misleading to think about the relationship among those existentialia by way of keeping an eye on the very design of Being and Time in terms of the sequence of exposition and the course of thinking. In another saying, it can indeed be possible to be cognisant of

148 H. 124.
149 H. 123.
150 H. 131.
‘equiprimordiality’ whilst we try to catch the indications of the flow of the investigation. Accordingly, the issue of language is evaluated subsequent to the exposition of the structure of being-with and being-in. Particularly bearing in mind the fact that this is a phenomenological way-making to the meaning of Being, one may clearly grasp the fact that Being and Time is properly a journey to somewhere, rather than an agglomeration of assertions. When evaluated this way, the very manner of the flux of narration sure enough indicates something. As we have seen at the beginning of the section, Heidegger’s accentuation on language’s getting direct attention for the first time at that particular contextual milestone truthfully endorses this interpretation. Language possesses a spatio-temporal truth in Being and Time, which reflects itself contextually.

Presuming that these remarks legitimise the act of making an interpretation of the locus of language in Being and Time, what significant indication are we to grasp when we evaluate language in its contextual proximity? One clearly sees that the way to establish the site in which language eventually shines forth as the locus of direct attention is made in proximity to the existentiale of being-with—specifically in the form of being-with-others. It was stated that in having a primordial understanding of Being, Dasein already has an understanding of the Being of Others; it must not be misunderstood as if Dasein ‘acquires’ an understanding of others through the medium of Being: Dasein is by way of the fact that Dasein is a being-with-others, its understanding of being does not precede its encountering with others. It stands for the idea that the disclosedness of Dasein which renders it as the entity capable of grasping references and articulating meaning into a totality of understanding is in an ontological proximity with its encountering with other ‘Others’.
Hereby, we may ask: Remaining in complete recognition of the ontologically fundamental, equiprimordial and constitutive character of the *existentiale* of being-with-others, is it possible to interpret its proximity to the issue of language as an *emphasis on the communicatory function of language*? Doubtlessly, it is yet too early to come up with a cogent answer to this question; albeit, I think it is a question worthy of being kept in sight for the purpose of tracing the manner Heidegger’s treatment of the question of language blossoms forth throughout his career.

4.3.5 The Ontological Constituents of Language: Understanding and Meaning

The exposition of ‘being-with’ is followed by the analysis of ‘being-in’ through which the disclosedness of Dasein is brought into light. We know that at the beginning of the work, Heidegger introduced ‘Dasein’ as the entity for which its being appears as an issue to it; and having its capability to pose Being as an issue posits Dasein as that which *exists*. On this account, Heidegger reveals that Dasein’s having its existence as an *issue* to it corresponds to the fact that Dasein is disclosed to itself. When it is put in this way, it may sound as if Dasein primarily *is* and *then* it is disclosed to itself—which would be a tremendous misapprehension. Stating that Dasein *is* disclosed to itself exclusively means that “Dasein is its disclosedness”.151 In its disclosure as the ‘there’, Heidegger submits, there appears two equiprimordial constitutive elements: the ‘state-of-mind’ and the ‘understanding’. Of our concern will be the *existentialia* of ‘understanding’ which almost directly takes us to the core of the thematisation of language in *Being and Time*.

---

151 H. 133.
Heidegger starts with granting a clear explication of the association between existentials relevant to the subject matter:

To say that in existing, Dasein is its “there”, is equivalent to saying that the world is “there”; its Being-there is Being-in. And the latter is likewise ‘there’, as that for the sake of which Dasein is. In the “for-the-sake-of-which”, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called “understanding”. The disclosedness of understanding, as the disclosedness of the “for-the-sake-of-which” and of significance equiprimordially, pertains to the entirety of Being-in-the-world.\(^{152}\)

Hence the following purports the precise picture to grasp: Dasein is Dasein on the grounds that its being appears as an issue for it. It follows that Dasein, at the dawning of this issue, meaning, in its very being, is disclosed to itself, due to the reason that for there to appear ‘an issue’ in the first place, a field of disclosure is a condition. Accordingly, this field of disclosure posits Dasein in the world, as the world itself; so in its being-in-the-world, within the field of disclosure, Dasein comports itself into concernful dealings with its world. This, equiprimordially, corresponds to the fact that Dasein understands the referential relations the totality of which make up the world: Hence we roundly see how the Being of Dasein, as the world itself—that is to say, as having no existence outside the world and as being determinate not by single entities within the world but by the totality of that structure which is the world itself—is ontologically constituted by its understanding of itself in its understanding of Being, on the basis of its existential structure which is characterised by the disclosure of Being as an issue.

This may seem circular when reviewed in a formal way; yet what it fundamentally achieves exposing the ontological constituents of the entirety of Being-in-the-world. Indeed, at the very beginning of the book, Heidegger himself asks whether the design of Being and Time deserves of objection

\(^{152}\) H. 143.
based on its alleged ‘circular’ character. As the answer, he succinctly eliminates it:

Formal objections such as the argument about ‘circular reasoning’, which can easily be cited at any time in the study of first principles, are always sterile when one is considering concrete ways of investigating. When it comes to understanding the matter at hand, they carry no weight and keep us from penetrating into the field of study.\footnote{H. 7.}

Out of this elucidation, it is possible to seize the idea that for something to appear as meaningful (i.e., articulable in understanding), its ‘formal’ (i.e., reified) structure which is a “present-at-hand” is not an ontological condition. Then what does the investigation of fundamental ontology yield regarding the structure of understanding?

Heidegger expounds that the being of Dasein as “a potentiality-for-Being” is conditioned by understanding; and also the notion of ‘possibility’ here must be set apart from logical or contingent possibilities which are of an ontic character.\footnote{H. 144.} The notion of ‘possibility’ uncovered as an existentiale does not amount to “what is not yet”, neither does it stand for the situation where it connotes a kind of “liberty”. Dasein as Being-possible is a thrownness into possibility, in that, the kind of being Dasein has in relation to possibility, as an existentiale, does not import a thought of “free floating” subjectivity.\footnote{ibid.} In the light of this, Heidegger provides the meaning of understanding: “Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of”\footnote{ibid.}. Next, he assigns this relation between understanding and possibilities as “projection”. Dasein always already understands itself not as a fait accompli, limited to its facticity, but in terms...
of its possibilities, thus its existential structure is fundamentally grounded in its projectedness.\textsuperscript{157} To recapitulate, the world-structure which appears within disclosedness throws the ‘there’ into a structure of possibilities which are articulated through ‘projections’; and this is what brings forth being-there as understanding.

The exposition proceeds by designating the development of understanding as “interpretation” in which “the working-out of possibilities [is] projected in understanding”.\textsuperscript{158} Hereby Heidegger embraces ‘interpretation’ as an ontologically grounding element; hence, away from its ordinary sense which inclines towards taking this notion as an act of meaning-assignation to what is ‘out there’, interpretation is a development of the understanding of the world—the totality of the ways in which entities are possible. It means to say that interpretation is not of a secondary nature, functioning like a tool to ‘represent’ entities meaningfully; it essentially belongs to the worldhood of the world.

Correspondingly, the appearance of entities as ready-to-hand in the understanding of the world—which is a unitary phenomenon, occurs when they are “taken apart” from this totality as something. Therefore understanding a particular ready-to-hand means to interpret the purpose of it—its being “in-order-to”:

In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we ‘see’ it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; but what we have thus interpreted need not necessarily been taken apart by making an assertion which definitely characterises it. Any mere predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{157} H. 146.
\textsuperscript{158} H. 148.
\textsuperscript{159} H. 149.
The ontological condition for any entity to come into Being at all, that is, to appear in the world, is its appearing as something; the ‘as’ here sets forth fact that it is in the entities very appearing, it must be always already understood and interpreted. This demonstrates how pivotal the place of language is, considering the fact that language will be uncovered as an articulation of intelligibility within the structure of understanding a few pages later, as we will see in detail.

In the quote, there is another critical thought to catch: For anything to appear as a “ready-to-hand”, there is no ontological necessitation for it to be definitely characterised by an assertion. Therefore Dasein’s dealing with a present-at-hand is assuredly not an exhaustion of that entity without reserve, so as to render it completely definite in the form of a final assertion. If anything, understanding is not an absorption of a ‘definite’, and interpretation is not a summation of assertions made up of wholly transparent constituents. Heidegger says, “Articulation lies before our making any thematic assertion about it”.\(^{160}\) To exemplify, such an understanding of the articulation of entities in understanding and interpretation is diametrically different from the way science deals with its entities. It is imbedded in the methodology of scientific approach that its objects have to be defined in a clear and distinct way. So its handling with entities take place in an ontic manner through dealing with them in terms of their being such and such; while the phenomenological sight of a being as a being constitutes the possibility of such a handling.

It follows that for an entity to make sense at all, its thematisation in a clear and distinct form is not an ontological requirement. This brings us to the ontological analysis of what it means to mean something:\(^{160}\) ibid.
Entities within-the-world generally are projected upon the world—that is, upon a whole of significance, to whose reference-relations concern, as Being-in-the-world, has been tied up in advance. When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein—that is, when they have come to be understood—we say that they have meaning [Sinn] . . . Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. That which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call ‘meaning’.\textsuperscript{161}

Then originally, meaning is that which is understood in the ontological sense. This explains the reason why a phenomenological undertaking of an entity, e.g. by way of the interrogative ‘what’, has nothing to do with maintaining a clear and distinct definition. Phenomenological study cannot be evaluated as a totality of assertions regarding the whatness of a thing; rather, such study uncovers the condition of possibility for making any assertion at all: “Thus assertion cannot disown its ontological origin from an interpretation which understands”.\textsuperscript{162} As a result, the assertions regarding the ‘meaning’ of a thing indeed fundamentally depends on the original ‘meaning’ of that thing which appears in the form of ready-to-hand. It also evokes the previous discussion of the problems with defining language as a quiddity, and it becomes one more time apparent that phenomenological treatment of language can indeed be capable of attaining the truth of language without reducing it.

Hereby, what is enucleated so far provides the explications of notions which are indispensable for attaining the meaning and locus of language in Being and Time. It eventually conveys us to the crux whereby “language now becomes our theme for the first time”.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{161} H. 151.

\textsuperscript{162} H. 158.

\textsuperscript{163} H. 160.
4.3.6 Discourse & Language

Heidegger’s expounding on language begins with consecutive definitions which unravel the relations among the terms that have been explained so far; and they are recounted respecting their affinity with language in general. Each definition is due very close attention, since they are quite condensed and pregnant with many implications.

It was already stated at the very beginning of the chapter that *logos* is translated as *Rede* by Heidegger, and we will refer to it as ‘discourse’ or ‘talk’ depending on the context. Being the most primordial constituent within the context, discourse should be grasped clearly before proceeding further. In relation to what we are already familiar with, we may initially focus on the following definition: “Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion”.\(^{164}\) Considering the fact that ‘Articulation’ was explained as the development of understanding,\(^{165}\) and that ‘assertion’ was held as the ontologically conditioned by ‘Interpretation’,\(^{166}\) one may trace that discourse founds Interpretation; and Interpretation is that out of which assertion is made possible. It at the same time makes discourse equiprimordial with understanding, as both equally relate to disclosedness of Being-in-the-world.\(^{167}\) Within disclosedness, what is understood and thus gets Articulated...

---

\(^{164}\) H. 161.  
\(^{165}\) cf. p. 73.  
\(^{166}\) cf. p. 59.  
\(^{167}\) H. 160-1.
was defined as ‘meaning’\textsuperscript{168}; in this regard, such discursive Articulation in its totality is called “totality-of-significations”\textsuperscript{169}.

Heidegger continues to elucidate this ontological structure so as to make the most critical turning point which will, resultantly, lay the meaning of language bare. To evoke, the ‘there’ has a primordial understanding of the world even before it is Articulated; and such more primordial Articulation of intelligibility is termed ‘discourse’ which is a primordial existentiale of the ‘there’ as disclosedness—that is, the laying bare of beings in their Being. Hence, insofar as one regards the fact that disclosedness is made possible by Being-in-the-world, then, Heidegger puts, discourse must have a “worldly” character.\textsuperscript{170} It at the same time means to say that the disclosedness of the world in its intelligible Articulation is expressed in discourse.\textsuperscript{171} Such worldliness of discourse, or in other words, the appearance of discourse within the existential structure as an expression of Being-in-the-world, is called ‘language’: “The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk”.\textsuperscript{172}

Thereby we clearly see the following relationality: Being-in-the-world discloses, and disclosure means a primordial understanding is already assumed in the very appearance of beings; this primordial understanding gives way to Interpretation or assertion; therein, equiprimordially the Articulation of this primordial intelligibility appears as discourse. This

\textsuperscript{168} cf. p. 74.

\textsuperscript{169} H. 161.

\textsuperscript{170} ibid.

\textsuperscript{171} ibid.

\textsuperscript{172} H. 160-1.
narration depicts the way from the state of Being-in-the-world to discourse, and the cycle returns back from discourse to Being-in-the-world by way of _language_, as the _worldly_ (existential) being of discourse: “Discourse is existentially language”.\(^{173}\)

Next, Heidegger maintains that discourse is constitutive for the being of Dasein;\(^{174}\) the previously discussed concern\(^{175}\) regarding whether Heidegger is a ‘language constitutionalist’ or not indeed stems from this point. There comes a respective clarification: “What the discourse is about is a structural item that it necessarily possesses . . . in its own structure it is modelled upon the basic state of Dasein”.\(^{176}\) _Rede_ cannot be reduced into a tool possessed by Dasein, and it is not dependent on a kind of ‘free will’ which can turn it into a mere presence-at-hand; yet it is exclusively _modelled_ upon Dasein—in its _equiprimordiality with understanding_. _Rede_ is but an ontological constituent of the human being. Having clarified that this discussion will not continue with a desire to appoint a title for Heidegger’s notion of language in order to encompass it within the strict boundaries of a definition, it is still utterly significant to take cognisance of his emphases and the context in which he accounts for the being of language, since it will enable us to seize how the shifts in Heidegger’s emphases made language more of a central issue throughout his corpus.

_Discourse is modelled upon and constitutive for the being of Dasein. This calls upon the fact that the Being of the ‘There-being’ is _fundamentally discursive_; hence this ‘There-being’, as ‘Being-in-the-world’, is already in_\(^{173}\) H. 161.

\(^{174}\) H. 161.

\(^{175}\) cf. p. 55.

\(^{176}\) H. 162.
discourse: “Dasein as discursive Being-in, has already expressed itself”. Heidegger wants to manifest a pivotal thought here. Dasein is Being-in, and also is Being-in-the-world (which is parallel to saying that): Dasein is constituted by the states-of-mind and understanding, and also is absorbed in constitutive references or assignments. In this light, we can see that in its Being-in-the-world, Dasein is already constituted by its understanding of references—so by the very fact that Dasein is, Dasein is discursive. This notion of discursivity, which is posed as the original expression of the Being-in-the-world, destroys the traditional notion of subjectivity as well as the traditional understanding of language, since ex-pression is no more grasped as an act of an entity which has been “encapsulated as something ‘internal’ over against something outside”. To repeat, Dasein is discursive by the very fact that Dasein is; there is an ontologically constitutive circularity here, and such circularity is not the drawing of a ‘complete’ circle so as to demarcate the ‘internality’ of this circle transparently. Instead, Dasein “as Being-the-world it is already ‘outside’ when it understands”. It concludes that the worldhood of the world, as the totality of references, constitutes the Being-in-the-world as something which has always already expressed itself.

Where we stand now takes us to the preliminarily discussed issue of being already in language by the time we ask the question of language. The circularity inherent in this subject was signalled back then; but initially, it

---

177 H. 165.

178 H. 76.

179 H. 162.

180 H. 205.

seemed to be somewhat problematical, and the way this issue was posed demanded that one should either draw this circularity legitimately and properly—maybe ‘perfectly’—, or one should somehow demonstrate that no circularity is actually the case. Heidegger explains this situation as follows:

Yet according to the most elementary rules of logic, this circle is a circulus vitiosus . . . But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just ‘sense’ it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up . . . The ‘circle’ in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein—that is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.\(^{182}\)

This complements the circularity issue discussed in relation to equipmentality and understanding;\(^{183}\) at that case Heidegger was quoted stating that formal objections in association with circular reasoning are destined to remain incapable of undertaking concrete quests, because the borders of formal thinking are too secure to venture into a genuine investigation. After all, formal thinking, by its nature, operates on the ontic field, since for there to be a ‘form’ in the first place, it must be separated from a ‘content’; as such already connotes objectification, decomposition and inept analysis of the entity at hand—which is, properly, present-at-hand.

In the studies of the ontical, identification of firm lines is a priority, such as logical rules or natural/causal relationships. Nevertheless, it is not an overcoming of ‘imperfection’ or ‘vagueness’, it is more of a concealment of it. This concludes that if someone is resolute about un-concealing the truth of whatever s/he is inquiring about, it above all requires that “the Fact of this circle”,\(^{184}\) in Heidegger’s terms, should not be omitted without consideration.

---

\(^{182}\) H. 152-3.

\(^{183}\) cf. p. 78.

\(^{184}\) H. 152.
We may see that the facticity of “the Fact of this circle” is in evidence, maybe most clearly, during the analysis of the relationship between Dasein and discourse. What it also brings into light is that the formal handling of language, such as its decomposition into grammatical elements, amounts to a concealment of its truth. Surely, this assertion does not stand for arguing that ‘grammatical analysis of language is wrong’; it is not wrong, because the grammatical structure of language is also a fact. The main suggestion in Heidegger’s thought is that language must not be bounded strictly and only to its formal character whose ground is exclusively settled on the ontic realm:

[T]here emerges the necessity of re-establishing the science of language on the foundations which are ontologically more primordial. The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of in general. . . The doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein. Whether it prospers or decays depends on the fate of this ontology. 185

Apparently, criticising the analytical grasp of language does not constitute Heidegger as an ‘enemy’ of formal logic and linguistics; ‘destroying’ the notions of those sciences does not signify an act of nullifying their efforts and to straightforwardly rejecting them, but it comes to mean “keeping [the tradition] within its limits” 186, as previously mentioned. Overall, it stands for asserting the primacy of the fundamental ontological investigation and the phenomenological method. The quote above continues: “[p]hilosophical research will have to dispense with the ‘philosophy of language’ if it is to inquire into ‘the things themselves’ . . .”, 187 which is aforementioned during the course of our discussion on the problem with ‘of’ as an objective

185 H. 165-6.
186 cf. p. 39.
187 H. 166.
Accordingly philosophy needs to dispense with objectifying language and withholding it as a present-at-hand, and proceed towards a re-establishment of the science ‘of’ language; through this, Heidegger introduces that inquiring the truth of language is fundamentally a phenomenological way—hence it is first and foremost a way-making towards our original experience with language.

Heidegger reflects on language with respect to certain possibilities which belong to discursive speech. With discursive speech, he means ‘discursing’, or ‘speech’ where the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world is “significantly”, or signifyingly articulated. Those possibilities are defined as belonging to discourse, and discourse is attained as an existentialie primordial with understanding; yet Heidegger seems to primarily focus on its relation with a certain existentialie, which is Being-with-one-another: “Being-with belongs to Being-in-the-world, which in every case maintains itself in some definite way of concernful Being-with-one-another”.

Respectingly, he reveals the possibilities for Dasein’s ‘hearing’, ‘keeping silent’, ‘communicating’, ‘listening’ and ‘talking’, before he comes to the end of his thematic analysis of language in Being and Time. These possibilities are structurally inseparable from each other; hence as the exposition goes by, it is important to try to grasp their multifaceted inter-relational constitution, rather than approaching to this narration as a unilinear juxtaposition of definitions. In other words, Heidegger’s delineation, as characteristic of him, is not composed of an agglomeration of assertions which are put forward as final settlements to make away with the subject-matter; his words—which we elementarily see as present-at-hand

---

188 pp. 38-40.

189 H. 161.

190 ibid.
assertions in a book present before us—are actually a pointing towards somewhere which cannot be reduced into a sort of unidirectionality. In light of this, the phenomenological undertaking of Dasein’s discursive possibilities may be understood only by trying to attain the structural relationality between them.

Accordingly, ‘discursivity’ is revealed in its constitutive relationship with Being-with-one-another: “Such Being-with-one-another is discursive as assenting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as ‘making assertions’, and as talking in the way of ‘giving a talk’”.¹⁹¹ Heidegger takes assertion-making in quotation marks, since he wants to make us specifically discern that the discursive Being-with-one-another cannot be reduced into the mere act of assertion; such existentialia does not require an ‘expression’ of definitely characterised meanings. The underlying reason is that what discursing puts forward, meaning, that which is talked about, the “something said-in-the-talk”,¹⁹² is the way “discourse communicates”.¹⁹³ As we know, the world is that the totality of which cannot be completely rendered available through any investigation; besides, there is a primordially constitutive relationship between discourse and the world. Then it follows that discursing, as the ‘expression’ of the intelligibility of the world, is in no way restricted to putting forward a theme which is of a precise and unambiguous nature. Heidegger says, such ‘assertion-makings’ are only one type of communicating; whereas originally, communication is where “the Articulation of Being with one

¹⁹¹ H. 161.

¹⁹² H. 162.

¹⁹³ ibid.
another understandingly is constituted. Through it, co-state-of-mind gets ‘shared’, and so does the understanding of Being-with”. ¹⁹⁴

After opening up the way through focusing on ‘talking’ in respect to Being-with-one-another and communication, Heidegger goes on with a seemingly simple but actually dense suggestion: For somebody to talk, s/he needs to be able to ‘hear’; and for somebody to hear, s/he needs to be capable of ‘listening’. ¹⁹⁵ As such are not random and accidental properties attached to the human being; one needs to realise that this delineation of the possibilities of ‘hearing’, ‘listening’ and ‘speaking’ are phenomenological expositions. It means to say that, for instance, Heidegger does not refer to natural fact of hearing, like the rendering of sounds by way of the biological constitution of the human being. The phenomenological truth of being capable of hearing on an existential level is actually what lies prior to the possibility of ‘natural’ hearing. Hence, continuing the example, it would be absolutely senseless to think that the hearing impaired human beings are excluded from this existential structure. Actually this is the very meaning of its being an ontological condition; ‘hearing’ is necessitated by the fact that Dasein is; that being so, the condition of being hearing impaired is the accidental situation. Heidegger clarifies this issue through taking another step by remarking that ‘hearkening’ is possible due to its existential relation with ‘hearing’, and such ‘hearing’ does not stand for the psychological fact of hearing on the basis of ‘sensations’¹⁹⁶. To exemplify, one cannot originally hear a senseless noise; because “Dasein, as Being-in-the-world,

¹⁹⁴ ibid.

¹⁹⁵ H. 163.

¹⁹⁶ ibid.
already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world”.\textsuperscript{197} Therefore the phenomenon of hearing a voice is conditioned by the fact that we already have the fore-structure of understanding it. This is why the truth regarding the meaning of ‘meaning’ has nothing to do with its thematisability in clear assertions, in that, for a meaning to be meaningful, there is no requirement for it to be clear, distinct, transparent, definite or, say, ‘utterable’. Heidegger says “Dasein hears, because it understands”.\textsuperscript{198} Dasein hears, because it is capable of understanding; and understanding is a totality of meaning references; lastly, meaning appears as a result of the projection on the ‘intelligibility of the world’—the disclosedness of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Here we see, Dasein hears, because Dasein exists.

Returning back to the relationality between discursive possibilities, up to this point ‘talking’ and ‘hearkening’ is explained in their affinity with the existential possibility of ‘hearing’; accordingly, then, ‘listening’ also appears as a possibility on the basis of this discursive structure, constituted by understanding: “Listening to . . . is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others . . . Being-with develops in listening to one another”;\textsuperscript{199} therefore, “[o]nly he who already understands can listen”.\textsuperscript{200} Being-with is an existentiale of Being-in-the-world, and to be in-the-world means having a fore-structure of understanding; thus, Being-with in the way of Being-with-others amounts to sharing this understanding with others. Assuredly, one needs to construe that such a sharing is not the kind of act, for instance, like sharing a thing: “In discourse, Being-with becomes ‘explicitly’ shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as

\textsuperscript{197} H. 164.

\textsuperscript{198} H. 163.

\textsuperscript{199} ibid.

\textsuperscript{200} H. 164.
something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated”. The already-shared co-understanding of the intelligibility of the world gets ‘explicitly’ shared in discursing. Then, in order to be capable of listening, that is, to be in the structure of Being-with as Being-with-one-another, one needs to be capable of understanding. Similarly, to be able to ‘not listen’, still, one needs to have an understanding. It brings upon the fact that these are, overall, a structure; and as long as a structure is that which conditions something, and if ontological structure is the condition of possibility to be, then one cannot just simply refuse listening as such. ‘Not listening’ is but anyhow a kind of understanding, too.

The same picture applies to the possibility of ‘keeping silent’; a person who can keep silent can make the other understand something: “Speaking at length about something does not offer the slightest guarantee that thereby understanding is advanced. On the contrary, talking extensively about something, covers it up and brings what is understood to a sham clarity—the unintelligibility of the trivial”. As follows, Heidegger asserts that if one is capable of genuinely keeping silent, then it points out an actual possibility of conversation—conversation in the sense of the ‘explicitly’ sharing of what is already-shared in co-understanding. Being an existential possibility in the structure of discourse, ‘keeping silent’ is also an exclusive capability of those who exist. This demonstrates the context of Heidegger’s often quoted expression: “To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say—that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself”. One cannot sustain that ‘speaking’ is the essential nature of the human being; insofar as one cannot keep silent, one cannot

---

201 H. 162.

202 H. 164.

203 H. 165.
speak. Thereby the translation of zoon logon echon as ‘rational’ or ‘speaking’ animal is a covering up of the ontological constitution of Dasein. On this line, the human being is that which speaks insofar as it is at the same time capable of hearing, listening and keeping silent—to wit, insofar as it has a world, in the way of being thrown into it as the Being-in-the-world. It demonstrates that logos is essentially not the capacity of ‘speaking’ per se or having a ‘reason’; logos is discourse, and Dasein is the only being who can truthfully be discursive.

4.3.7 Being and Time: The “Locus” of Language

In Being and Time, Heidegger finishes his analysis of the being of language on the existential analytic of Dasein through putting forward questions over another, one of which is specifically interesting: “Is it [language] a kind of equipment ready-to-hand within-the-world, or has it Dasein’s kind of Being, or is it neither of these?” Hereby, Heidegger seems to admit that the extent of the analysis he provides in Being and Time is not a fulfilling answer to the question of the being of language; it may be also evinced by his statement which pieces together what he so far achieved regarding the subject matter: “Our Interpretation of language has been designed merely to point out the ontological ‘locus’ of this phenomenon in Dasein’s state of Being . . .” There are two significant hints to take heed of at this point: Firstly, he says that the design of the Interpretation is focused merely on a particular issue, the existential analytic of Dasein; then it must be the case that in its mere-hood, it proceeds through excluding some other essential considerations. He seems to connote that the thematisation of language as it

204 ibid.
205 H. 166.
206 ibid.
is in *Being and Time* is a partial one—not in terms of the integrity of the project in *Being and Time*, but in terms of thinking the being of language, which may indeed be, in its integrity, *another* project. Secondly, he takes ‘locus’ in quotation marks. Despite the fact that there is not enough evidence in the book for us to assert something firmly, we should still think of the reason why he needed to put a distance to this term in its relation to language. May it be the case that Heidegger does not think of language as belonging to a particular ‘locus’? Can the later Heideggerian motto, “language is the house of Being”,207 be shown as a hinge to this thought which seems to grasp language not as truly belonging to ‘a locus’, but as a ‘house’ to which all loci belong? In any case, insofar as one discerns the presence of these questions at the closure of the section where Heidegger thematises language in *Being and Time*, it is not possible to claim that the due consideration of the essence of language conclusively handled; what is more, even the pertinent question remains *yet* to be formulated.

---

207 “Letter on ‘Humanism’”, p. 239.
CHAPTER 5

LATER HEIDEGGERIAN ‘LANGUAGE’

J: But we are surrounded by the danger, not just of talking too loudly about the mystery, but of missing its working. 
I: To guard the purity of the mystery’s wellspring seems to be hardest of all. 
J: But does that give us the right simply to shun this trouble and the risk of speaking about language? 
I: Indeed not. We must incessantly strive for such speaking . . .
(Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language”)

The later Heideggerian thought takes off along with a transformation and another beginning; in this accordance Heidegger turns his thought to way-making. Studying this period teaches how and why ‘transformation’ does not simply mean a ‘change’; taking ‘another beginning’ does not amount to ‘starting anew’; hence the ‘thought’ which proceeds along with this turn does not add up to a ‘discovery’ of new thinking ways. What is more, this period cannot either be defined as a transformation in Heidegger’s thought. This may be concisely explained with the “guide-word” Heidegger sets forth: “The being of language: the language of being”.208 This is in the form of a ‘guide-word’ and not a statement; being so, it shows the way transformation takes place, not in the thought of Heidegger himself, but an event which takes place in Being. The shift in the sentence points out this event which takes place in Being: “. . . we may no longer say that the being of language is the language of being, unless the word ‘language’ in the second phase says something different, in fact something in which the withholding of the being of language—speaks” .209 Bernasconi elucidates

208 “The Nature of Language”, p. 94.
209 ibid., p. 81.
this point by saying that “it is the same event as that whereby aletheia comes to be heard as a-letheia, the entry into the recognition of the history of Being, the language of Being as it is recorded in the words for Being”. 210 What is unconcealed through this guiding word which brings us face-to-face with the ‘event’ can be briefly put as follows: What language has as its ownmost property never brings itself to Being; it never reveals itself, never puts itself in the ‘words’ of Being and always remains as a mystery. What is ownmost to language always remains concealed; therefore, there is an essential concealment proper to language—a concealment such ancient that it cannot even be put into words by Being’s own words. Simply, ‘transformation’ does not mean a shedding of light which renders the essence of language in toto naked and altogether unconcealed; the transformation unconceals only the truth that the essence of language is concealment. Bernasconi comments that, “[i]f there is a transformation of Heidegger’s saying of a turning it is not the adoption of a new basis of thinking, but a transformation of language so that the silent is heard and retained in the saying not-saying”. 211

This “saying not-saying” is exactly what Heidegger delineates in the epigraph provided at the beginning in this chapter; undergoing this experience with language puts the human being at the risk of “speaking too loudly” about the mystery of what is ownmost to language, yet it still puts forward undergoing this experience as a task.

In this chapter, I will try to give an exposition of the late Heideggerian thought of ‘undergoing a transformative experience with language’, which brings ‘way-makings’ along with it. In order to achieve this, I will mainly


211 ibid., p. 78.
focus on *On the Way to Language* which is composed of five essays which compactly includes the later Heideggerian ‘language’; in this regard, I will especially try to undertake an extensive investigation of one of those essays, titled “The Way to Language”. The reason for this is, I believe that this essay does powerfully transform the reader’s thought on the way. In saying this, I do not mean that the transformation occurs in this text; rather, the way in which this text flows is precisely an exposition of how this transformation takes place not in ‘thought’ but in Being. This will also enable us to understand what Heidegger means by ‘listening to language’; since this essay, in listening to language and reiterating what it says, exposes the transformation through bringing it forth in its way-making.

Before studying *On the Way to Language*, I will briefly mention the post *Being and Time* works in which language gains a more and more central position in thinking. Subsequent to prospecting *On the Way to Language*, I will try to provide a picture of the later Heideggerian thought of language in relation to *Being and Time*. Eventually, the chapter will end through maintaining a discussion of how to understand the difference of emphasis between the early and late Heideggerian works, and whether this can be named as a ‘change’ in his thought.

5.1 Approaching the ‘Turn’

Within the decade following the appearance of *Being and Time*, Heidegger gradually intensifies his investigations regarding the essence of language. Initially, he adopts the question of language as a theme so as to further expand the main thoughts he sustains in *Being and Time*; for instance, in *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, the gravity of the issue of revealing the truth of language is posited primarily within the scope the necessity to direct thinking towards the exposition of Dasein’s
historicality. In that context, revealing the essence of logos is put forth as a task so as to raise the question “who is Dasein?” and place it vividly in its constitutive historicality; and this task takes off due to the fact that language is “the ruling of the world-forming and preserving center of the historical Dasein of the Volk”.\(^\text{212}\)

Heidegger’s lectures which take place up until the initiation of his thoughts as we read in Contributions to Philosophy proceeds on a similar line with his Logic, and undertake the illumination of the fundamental concerns in Being and Time. Hence his treatment of language revolves around the exposition of the existential structure of the human being; for instance, in Introduction to Metaphysics, he reflects on the being of language through the inquiring the human being’s relation to Being, as ‘the sayer’.\(^\text{213}\) Joseph Kockelmanns elaborates the character of this period in comparison to his later works, and puts that the centrality of Dasein for the early works is displaced with the centrality of language in the later thought, because clearly:

[I]n his first period he describes the ontological difference in terms of man's thought concerning Being. In this process the initiative is originally taken by man. Being is already understood as the coming to pass of Truth (aletheia), as the process of unconcealment. However, that which sets Being apart from beings in the coming to pass of the ontological difference is man's thought. The setting apart takes place effectively in man's transcendence . . . [Whereas in his later works] Heidegger says that the coming to pass of the ontological difference takes place in language's saying; it is only in the saying of language that Being addresses itself to man. Thus, it is in language's saying that Being "thinks" and "speaks." Being is now no longer merely the coming to pass of Truth as unconcealment; it is now equally Logos in the full sense of the term.\(^\text{214}\)

Followingly, through the mid 1930’s, Heidegger focuses on maintaining an account of the neighbourhood of poetry and thinking. Although it was not

\(^\text{212}\) Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 140.

\(^\text{213}\) p. 86.

the first time Heidegger starts to mention Hölderlin’s poems in affiliation to his thought, he starts to give lectures on Hölderlin, who is, for Heidegger, “the poet’s poet”.215 The first lecture takes place in Rome in 1936, based on a perusal of five verses by Hölderlin and constituted of an interpretation chiefly on the basis of the question of the essence of language. This study makes up Heidegger’s first published essay on Hölderlin, titled “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry”, which appears just before the period Heidegger starts to his lectures which we read in Contributions to Philosophy. Those years are widely accepted as the beginning of the ‘turn’ in Heidegger’s thought.

In this lecture on Hölderlin, Heidegger describes the poet as the one who stands between the gods and the people and asserts that the words of the poet are original words,216 in this light the poet’s naming is not a mere name-assigning activity; it is an act of giving things into their own essences.217 For Heidegger, the poet’s task and the thinker’s task converge in the task of going back to the authentic roots and at this point language acquires a status of utmost significance due to its role of constituting the experience through which transformation appears as a possibility.

5.1.1 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language

The first time Heidegger gave a lecture on the question of the essence of language218 was in 1934, which was composed of Heidegger’s elaborations


216 ibid., p. 128.

217 ibid., p. 123.

218 From this point onwards, there takes place a change in Heidegger’s preferred term to denote the originary language. In Being and Time, logos was translated as
on the nature of logos. The logical positivistic inclination of the era (which was expounded in the second chapter in this thesis) was a reason for Heidegger to focus on how reductive and limiting it is to try to grasp language within the horizon of ‘philosophy of language’. Hence it is clearly on the line of the destruction of the metaphysical notions, and functions as a further elaboration of Heidegger’s assessments briefly mentioned in Being and Time. For instance, the book starts with the criticism of understanding ‘logic’ particularly as concerned with propositions—“assertions” as named in Being and Time. In the philosophy of language, Logic, meaning ‘concerning the logos’, is studied merely with regard to its propositional character which inescapably reduces language to a present-at-hand. This mileage marks the point where Heidegger propounds the investigation of the essential nature of language as a genuine task, and the task starts with the shaking up of ‘logic’ as has been understood by ‘philosophy of language’:

Whose proposition will we join? Well, no one’s. We want to shake up logic as such from its outset, from its ground, to awaken and to make graspable an original task under this heading—not out of any whim or in order to bring something new, but because we must; and we must out of a necessity. Hereby, destroying the ground of such ‘logic’ is asserted as a task; and in contradistinction to his contemporaries, Heidegger will think ‘logic’ as the essence of language, which is not originally a formal abstraction, but as the historical event of “exposedness entrusted to being into beings as a whole”; and questioning its essential nature is intrinsically related the task of understanding the meaning of Being: “Logic is not, and never is, for the

Rede (discourse or speaking in English); in Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, Heidegger decides to use the term Sprache (‘language’, as we will use). The survey of Heidegger’s various translation and the reasons behind his decisions to change the term that he uses to signify originary language will be discussed through Wrathall’s elaborations.

219 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 1.

220 ibid., p. 6.

221 ibid., p. 140.
sake of logic. Its questioning happens as the care of knowing about the being of beings, which being comes to power as the ruling of the world happens in language”.222 The task of destroying the ground of logic does appear as a task of its own, but is still presented as fundamentally related to the project in *Being and Time*. Therefore, it is indeed possible to see that the post-*Being and Time* early Heidegger investigates language as an *exposition* of the task of hearkening to Being.

The reflections Heidegger provides closely relate to the discussion of the third chapter, which focuses on the problems of objectifying language and treating as a tool, as well as conceiving it only in terms of its formal structure, as is the case with the logical and linguistic studies. He distinguishes the genuine task of thinking language from the task of ‘the philosophy of language’ which results in great difficulties such as shoving language aside beings present-at-hand, thinking it as secondary to the formal structure of logic and treating it as a means of expression.223 Accordingly, genuinely inquiring the essence of language partakes in questioning the fore-question at hand, which “questions ahead” in the sense that it paves the way to somewhere, i.e., it is a way-making; “questions forth” in the manner of revealing the essential structure of the inquiry; and it “precedes” because it is more fundamental than any other question that can be produced within the realm, for the reason that it inquires the already given answer behind the very construction of those questions,224 as already mentioned previously.225

222 ibid., p. 141.

223 ibid., p. 15.

224 ibid., pp. 16-7.

225 cf. p. 28.
In this light, Heidegger starts with construing language as it is in dictionaries, and proposes a distinction which will be of great significance for the later Heideggerian thought; he puts that in dictionaries one sees ‘terms’ (Wörter), not words (Worte). Krzysztof Ziarek explains this difference, “Heidegger plays on the divergence in German between the two plural forms of Wort (word): words (Worte) and terms or dictionary words (Wörter)”, and puts forward an utterly interesting claim:

The first important significance comes from the fact that Heidegger’s approach to language is non-Saussurean, since for him language is not primarily about signs and signification but about the tension between words (Worte), on the one hand, and terms (Wörter) . . . Therefore, language for him is not essentially a system of signs but rather the way in which emergence and manifesting, or being’s disclosure of beings, comes to signs. Ziarek asserts that this distinction reveals why Heidegger’s notion of language is actually much deeper than its structuralist/post-structuralist interpretation. If the Heideggerian thought of language is grasped merely as a ‘system of signification’, what is omitted is Heidegger’s displacement of ‘sign’ per se. He puts that the terms in dictionaries are those the totality of which make up what is called ‘the system of signification’, whereas “[w]ords’, by contrast, describe a different dimension of language, one that constitutes its originative momentum, that is, the clearing (Lichtung) as the manner in which language opens and traverses its ways (its Bewegung)”. Thus, Ziarek remarks a very special characteristic of the Heideggerian thought of language, in that, ‘language’ as the totality of words does not merely signify a dynamic and non-reifiable structure; rather, it is the originative momentum of that structure. Accordingly, language is the totality of Worte which is not the world structure, but the very opening up of that structure.

---

226 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 21.

227 Language After Heidegger, p. 4.

228 ibid.
Despite the fact that Heidegger puts forward this distinction in his lectures in 1934, surely, Ziarek’s claim does not particularly depend on Heidegger’s evaluations as we see in *Logic as the Question Concerning Essence of Language*; Ziarek reviews Heidegger at large, including his later works on *Worte*. Then we must ask, considering the whereabouts of our investigation so far, can we really see a picture precisely as Ziarek presents? As early as 1934, can one actually say that Heidegger grasps language as an *originative momentum*?

It seems hard to affirm this question without any concern, due to a couple of reasons. First, what we see in *Being and Time* as well as in the lectures we are studying right now is that Heidegger discusses the essence of language exclusively concerning its circular constitutive relationality with the human being: “This speaking happens among human beings. It is a human activity. Language is a characteristic of the human being. If we pose the question in its entire dimension, we thus arrive at the question: What is the human being?”229 It means that language is still elaborated based on the structure of the human existence; what is more, he states that the *entire dimension* of the inquiry regarding the essence of language necessarily relates to the ontological investigation of the human being. In other words, the inquiry regarding the essence of language *in its entirety* is fundamentally and circularly bounded to the ontological analysis of the human being. Nevertheless, in the later Heidegger, the main research will exclusively and assertively be understanding the essence of language *qua* language,230 and it will be thought *from the event*;231 and instead of Dasein’s speaking, ‘the speaking’ at the core of the investigation will be that of language itself:

229 *Logic as the Question Concerning Essence of Language*, p. 29.


231 ibid. p. 131.
“Language speaks”\textsuperscript{232}. In this light, we will then try to see whether the 
entire dimension of language belongs to the existential analysis of the 
human being, or ‘thinking from the event’ brings upon something more than 
this. Hence, the question to bare in mind must be the following: Is language 
construed as, in Ziarek’s words, the originative momentum, as soon as 
Heidegger differentiates \emph{Worte} from \emph{Wörter}, at 1934 lectures? Or 
Heidegger’s project of investigating ‘language \textit{qua} language’ and ‘from the 
event’ overcomes his previous overcoming? In those lectures Heidegger 
remarks: “Perhaps we do not need at all to pose the question concerning 
language beforehand as a separate one, but can take together human being 
and language and ask about the human being as the speaking human 
being”;\textsuperscript{233} whereas, the later Heidegger will asserts: “In truth, the way to 
language has its unique region within the essence of language itself”\textsuperscript{234}.

Heidegger proceeds his lectures through establishing the question of 
language within the issue of the historicity of the human being: The inquiry 
‘what is language?’ turns into, as we have seen, the question of ‘what is the 
human being?’; then it is transformed into ‘who’ as the proper interrogative 
for investigating the human being, ‘who is the human being?’; and all result 
in the interrogation ‘what is history?’ due to the similar reasons as we know 
from \textit{Being and Time}: Investigating the meaning of Being leads to the 
analysis of the existential constitution of Dasein, whereby the task of 
becoming historiological appears consequently.\textsuperscript{235} It provides that the 
centrality of ‘historicity’ for Heidegger’s thought in general is also the 
centrality of the thought of language; and he makes this point quite clear

\textsuperscript{232} ibid. p. 124.

\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Logic as the Question Concerning Essence of Language}, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{234} “The Way to Language”, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{235} H. 21.
through stating that the world’s ‘ruling’, meaning, its being manifested fundamentally “in the lore of historical being” happens in language: “By virtue of language and only by virtue of it.”

5.1.2 Introduction to Metaphysics

In fine, apparently in “Logic” lectures Heidegger’s emphasis on the hefty vitality of the issue of bringing forth a question proper to language and delving into its investigation seems to be expounded on the line of Being and Time. The following year’s (1935) lectures are also of the same character; published as a book with the title Introduction to Metaphysics and accepted as a companion to Being and Time, those lectures also mention ‘language’ pertaining to the the existential structure of the human being, and as a tenet to pursue the task of thinking the question of Being: “Because the fate of language is grounded in the particular relation of a people to Being, the question about Being will be most intimately intertwined with the question about language for us.”

To explain this remark, we may peruse Heidegger’s delineation of the uniqueness of the word ‘Being’. He puts forth an actual contradiction, namely, a contradiction nested in the human being’s existence: “The word ‘Being’ is thus indefinite in its meaning, and nevertheless we understand it definitely”. The word ‘Being’ is construed through various meanings throughout the history of metaphysics, it never overcame the status of a ‘genus’, the generality of which is so broad that it fades this word into meaninglessness. Heidegger argues that this word should not be thought

---

236 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 140.

237 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 54.

238 ibid., p. 82.
within such a futile framework, hence we must “. . . raise the uniqueness of this name. . . ”.\textsuperscript{239} The word ‘Being’ is unique in that it does not signify a genus; it is not an abstract totality of generalities. Rather, we may interpret Heidegger by putting that ‘Being’ signifies in-definitely: In truth it cannot be defined and factually, it always gets defined throughout history. Besides, ‘Being’ is understood in each case, in some way, despite the oblivion of the question of Being, since it is in the existential structure of the human being that it has to live in a pre-understanding of it. The reason why ‘Being’ is a name and a unique one is because Heidegger wants to expostulate the notion of the Being as the most general concept of all; and abiding in this uniqueness means to understand how Being signifies in-definitely.

He proceeds by way of considering this issue in relation to language, and expectedly, its affiliation with the human being. Accordingly, if the meaning of being was not signifying indefinitely, the beings would never show up as such, which means that there would be no ‘world’ and no ‘language’—hence no human being: “We would never be able to be those who we are. For to be a human means to be a sayer”.\textsuperscript{240} Surely, by ‘saying’ he does not refer to the vocal articulation; to be a ‘sayer’ stands for abiding in the original experience with language. In other words, the indefinite signification of the meaning of Being is what opens up the world as it is, where entities appear not merely as present-at-hand but in a structure of equipmentality. The very possibility of this structure was discerned as ‘language’ in \textit{Being and Time}; then, the human being as the Being-in-the-world is the entity which is capable of having the original experience with language. Then language as an existential constitutive cannot be thought as “derivative and incidental expressions of experiences . . . [or as] a

\textsuperscript{239} ibid., p. 85.

\textsuperscript{240} ibid., p. 86.
reproduction of the experienced being”.\textsuperscript{241} It is not a ‘reproduction’, because it is not an ‘externalisation’ of an internal and immediate experience: First, there is no such internality and immediacy; and second, language is not an act of ‘representing’ entities and reproducing them within certain grammatical and syntactical rules. No doubt that grammatical and logical rules of language are facts and refusing their facticity is straightly insensible. Yet insofar as we are studying the essence of language and the human being’s original experience with it, those facts do remain derivative. Therefore, factically language is a tool, yet as such is a derivative one. In truth language is the possibility of the human being as the sayer.

### 5.2 On the Way to Language

Heidegger’s intensified studies on language resulted in many lectures and publications as regards the issue, and some deeply striking ones were collected and published with the title “On the Way to Language”. It consists of five chapters: a dialogue with a Japanese professor named Tezuka, three essays composed based on various series of lectures and a published essay.

Pertaining to the title, a preliminary remark is necessary in order to set the general structure on a proper way. Making a way to language, within the Heideggerian structure, in no way connotes that we are somewhere else other than in language. Heidegger states: “A way to language is not needed, besides, the way to language is impossible if we indeed are already at that point to which the way is to take us”.\textsuperscript{242} We are always already in language, for it is a constituent of the existence; regardless, the original experience with language is concealed throughout the history of thought, as well as in

\textsuperscript{241} ibid., p. 91.

\textsuperscript{242} “The Way to Language”, p. 112.
everydayness. Making a way to language means hearkening to the essence of language and re-attaining our original relation with it.

In this light, I will begin with “The Way to Language”, which I find to be an utterly ground-breaking and fundamental exposition that holds the essential thought in the later Heidegger up to view clearly. Then around the context construed by it, I will try to investigate the other texts through addressing the key points which may further expand the line of vision.

5.2.1 Way-making: Putting Language as Language into Language

“Yet language speaks”.

The entire delineation of “The Way to Language” is a narration of how it is language which speaks originally. “But language is monologue. This now says two things: it is language alone which speaks authentically; and, language speaks lonesomely”. If language is a monologue, where does the human being stand in relation to language? How does the human being become “the sayer”? If language speaks, what do we hear when we hearken its speaking? If “a way to language is impossible” as maintained above, what is the task of way-making to language and what can it achieve?

Those inquiries are answered, one by one, on the way; but still, since the way is to somewhere and not a sole means directed at wiping away the questions which comes to mind, it is of utmost significance to pay attention to the way the text flows. It means to say that we are at a point whereby investigating the essence of language requires to hearken to? the way

---

243 ibid., p. 124.

244 ibid., p. 134.

245 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 86.
Heidegger’s language reaches to us; to wit, I claim that this text is a paragon of how the notion of language and the very performance which exposes this notion become intrinsically constitutive to each other. Briefly, Heidegger’s language will put ‘language’ as ‘language’ into ‘language’. The phrase “Heidegger’s language” seems ambiguous, because it does not clearly point out whether one is denoting Heidegger’s thought of language, or Heidegger’s very own language-performance which explains his thought of language. I think with this study, Heidegger shows us that this ambiguity is the truth itself—that language cannot be either mere performance or mere thought but their simultaneous manifestation. This thought was already rooted even back in Being and Time; in his criticism of understanding language as nothing but propositions in the form of assertions, he was connoting there is more to language than an agglomeration of statements presented to be immediately grasped. Likewise, in Heidegger’s words, there are more than assertions; there is a way, and this way is language itself.

Discerning this will also make clear what Heidegger means by “putting language as language into language”. This repetition is no coincidence but is loaded with vital connotations. To explain, what the first utterance of ‘language’ in the sentence stands for is not the same with the second one; and the last one is also different from the remaining two. Therefore, apparently there takes place a transformation in the text. The way itself transforms ‘language’; or maybe, language transforms language during the course the text. This exposes the way how Heidegger un-conceals the essence of language. Putting “language as language” signifies a breaking with the everyday understanding of language; hence the first utterance of ‘language’ in the expression amounts to our everyday understanding which is objectifying and concealing; whereas the second one implies ‘language’

\[\text{cf. p. 68.}\]
with its essence un-concealed. Then, putting ‘language into language’ means revealing the ground on which the essence of language has its truth. All three meanings belong to the truth of language, yet they are not the same. What makes them different is the differencing in the text. By this very fact, we should take heed of not only what the difference between them is, but precisely how they are differenced. This interpretation may in fact be supported by Heidegger’s preliminary remarks in the essay: “The undertaking of a way to speech is woven into a kind of speaking which intends to uncover speech itself in order to present it as speech and to put it into words in the presentation—which is also evidence that language itself has woven us into the speaking”. Indeed, the way-making is possible through a kind of speaking—an actual discursive performance—which sets sight on putting speech as speech, that is, uncovering the stiff layer of everydayness which conceals it. He says, one needs a kind of speech to put the essence of language “into words in the presentation”. In the teeth of the fact that language overflows any reification and always already signifies beyond what is asserted in the presence, it is an undeniable fact language lands onto words at some point; then what saves the unconcealment of ‘speech as speech’ is the way speech about speech undertakes.

This may also be explained in another way. We already know that ‘speech about speech’ objectifies language. What shakes the ground of this reification, by way of uncovering speech as speech, is the way this discourse temporalises itself. So discourse indeed has temporality; further to that, “[o]nly where temporality temporalises itself, does language happen; only

---


where language happens, does temporality temporalise itself”. 249 This way-making is the ground on which Heidegger asserts, as provided as an epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, that despite the risk brought upon by speaking ‘about’ language, “[w]e must incessantly strive for such speaking”. 250 Hearkening the original speaking of language and putting in “into words in the presentation”, in the way Heidegger expresses it, appears as a task by its own. Hence when he talks about ‘transforming our relation with language’, he does not mean to alter our ‘notion’ of it. What he aims with the narration in “The Way to Language” is a transformation of our experience with it. Therefore, it becomes possible to claim that reading this essay is an experience—precisely a discursive one. Granted that the Heideggerian understanding of ‘experience’ is not the immediate grasp of a presence, as we know since Being and Time, 251 we need to stand by the abode where Heidegger’s discourse temporalises itself. Henceforth there is guiding formula at the beginning: Speaking about speech qua speech. By the reason that the manifesting of language transcends limits such as the bonds of a ‘formula’, the unfolding of “The Way to Language” can be best discerned in Heidegger’s own words:

The more clearly language shows itself in its own character as we proceed, the more significant does the way to language become for language itself, and the more decisively does the meaning of our guiding formula change. It ceases to be a formula, and unexpectedly becomes a soundless echo which lets us hear something of the proper character of language. 252

The formula destroys itself and its bonds melt into the unfolding of the text. It is scrutable considering what we have attained so far; for a ‘formula’ per se to approach to the essence of language, it cannot remain as a formula, and “becomes a soundless echo” through self-destruction, whilst opening up a

249 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 140.

250 “A Dialogue of Language”, p. 50.

251 H. 405.

way. In other words, we will see how this formula proves itself to be impossible while bringing forth a possibility.

Heidegger begins with posing the question of what we are about to do right now: “We try to speak about speech *qua* speech”. Indeed, the intriguing character of this situation was the main discussion in chapter three; we tried to think about the intricacies of trying to speak *about* language while we are already *in* it, and we ended up with a tough situation in which one must either be capable of legitimising the possibility of objectifying language, or one must somehow dissolve this trouble all together.\(^{253}\) Now that we are entering Heidegger’s evaluation of this situation, the problem is reconstructed in another way: He says in trying to speak about speech *qua* speech, there is a triple repetition of ‘speech’, but all of them refer to diverse meanings while remaining “the Same . . . the oneness that is distinctive property of language . . .”\(^{254}\) This sameness which holds the difference raises the recurrent issue of circularity for him. Language initiates the movement and ends in itself; for language speaks, and it speaks of itself. Heidegger affirms this circularity, because it is “unavoidable yet meaningful”\(^{255}\). This circle is narrated as a web which is moved by language alone, and may be attained with the proper investigation which manages to hearken it.

What we have seen heretofore reveals the following decisive highlights: (1) Language speaks, and it is language alone which speaks; (2) the study has the guiding formula which aims at ‘speaking about language *qua* language’, and it proceeds through opening up the way to language—a way on which

\(^{253}\) cf. pp. 44-6.

\(^{254}\) “The Way to Language”, p. 112.

\(^{255}\) ibid., p. 113.
language, more and more seriously, manifests for itself; (3) the circularity, which is born out of the monologue of language, is a determination by language itself. These elaborations which take place in the first three pages of the work bring upon the necessity to attain a cardinal discernment. To explain, on the one hand we know that the topic of circularity in *Being and Time* had set forth the idea that an entity which is rendered capable of raising the question of its own existence has to be a circular one.256 Thereby, Heidegger affirms this circularity exclusively on the ground of existential constitution of the human being. The world, understanding, interpretation, questioning and projection constitutes the ‘who’ of Dasein, and in this respect, Dasein appears as a circular structure. ‘Language’ as *Rede* was a constitutive element of this circular motion. On the other hand, in the present work we are studying, Heidegger puts the emphasis on the thought that this circularity belongs to language itself and to language alone. Certainly, it does not mean to say that Heidegger thoroughly excludes the human being in this study. He obviously does not. Still, there appears a paramount shift of the locus of emphasis; it is once and again asserted that the guiding thought is to be thinking about language *qua* language—*not qua* Dasein. The relevant discussion delivered previously257 attracted notice on how Heidegger intends to clarify the focus of his analysis of language in *Being and Time* through italicisations: “The fact that language now becomes our theme *for the first time* will indicate that this phenomenon has its root in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness”.258 Besides, in his *Logic* lectures, we have read Heidegger arguing that “[p]erhaps we do not need at all to pose the question concerning language beforehand as a separate one, but can take together human being and language and ask about

256 H. 153.
258 H. 160.
the human being as the speaking human being”.\textsuperscript{259} Dissimilarly, in “The Way to Language”, one starts from language and is conveyed to language; the circular motion belongs to language itself, and the investigation on the essence of language is presented as a pivotal field of study of its own. In submitting this, I do not wish to either implicitly or explicitly connote that ‘there is a change in thought’; such conclusions will be the topic of the next chapter which will discuss how we can understand Heidegger’s development of thought on the issue of language. Albeit at this moment, I intend to present two distant contexts with alternate ‘formulas’, whose ‘distance’ is to be thought merely as a shifting of the locus of emphasis.

The path sets off with a recounting of the familiar and everyday understanding according to which language is a natural capability of the human being, manifested specifically in the vocal articulation of sounds. Heidegger puts that one may catch a sight of this communion in the Western languages by looking at the names given to language, “glossa, lingua, langue, language”, all of which connote the ‘tongue’.\textsuperscript{260} He traces the roots of this apperception in the studies of Aristotle, which “exhibits the classical architectonic structure” of language whose movement is discerned as “showing”.\textsuperscript{261} Language as ‘showing’ actually means bringing something into light; but in time, the act of showing is differentiated from that which is shown, and language ends up in the binary structure of ‘sign’ and ‘what sign signifies’. The origin of the movement of language was designated as the human being’s stipulation, and this movement was deemed solely as wandering among objects. This is indeed what has been inherited up until the peak of modern times; language is construed as ‘ex-pression’ which

\textsuperscript{259} Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 25.


\textsuperscript{261} ibid., p. 115.
originates from out of the internality of the human being and ‘shows’ the objects out there. For Heidegger, this transformation of language from that which ‘shows’ to that which ‘designates’ is actually grounded in the “the change of the nature of truth”.  

He shows Humboldt’s works to be nesting the “peak” of this conception; and suggests that Humboldt inserts the locus of language as the human activity itself, in the form speech whose basic structure is composed of articulated sounds. Humboldt’s linguistic works were briefly mentioned in chapter two, and it was stated that he is recognised as one of the thinkers who objected to the deeming ‘language’ a mere tool, hence re-thought language in consideration of its world-opening trait. Besides, we have seen that there are thinkers who place Heidegger in the same tradition with Humboldt. Against this background, Heidegger’s criticism to Humboldt carries a special significance so as to realise that it is not quite tenable to make an association between Heidegger and Humboldt through arguing that they may be deemed as belonging to the same tradition. In his analysis, Heidegger clearly states that Humboldt conceptualises ‘speech’ merely in relation to human activity and not qua speech; besides, he argues that what Humboldt refers to by ‘world’ is actually a ‘world-view’, a totalising ground on which the world is structured on the basis of

\[ \text{262 ibid.} \] 
\[ \text{263 ibid.} \] 
\[ \text{264 ibid., pp. 116-7.} \] 
\[ \text{265 cf. pp. 7-8.} \] 
\[ \text{266 “The Way to Language”, p. 117.} \] 
\[ \text{267 ibid., p. 118.} \]
As a result, Humboldt puts language into language not as language, but merely in the form of one of its manifestations, which appears within a ‘worldview’. This criticism posed to Humboldt also purports how Heidegger attributes a cardinal role to thinking about language qua language, and it further reveals the weight of this issue. It is clearly the case that investigating the essence of language is a task of its own, and it demands a particular type of treatment. He explicitly highlights the idea that language must be inquired, and this inquiry must proceed exclusively through pursuing language qua language. In contradistinction to the previous works which insist on questioning the truth of language exclusively on the ground of the structure of existence, Heidegger’s guiding task seems to have changed.

In contrast with Humboldt’s view of speaking as something which originates from the activity of the human being, Heidegger marks that speaking does indeed have speakers, but their relation cannot be thought as of a causal one; rather, speakers are “present in the way of speaking”, and such presence is dwelling in a neighbourhood where everything which constitutes the existence of the human being show itself. Subsequently he poses the question of the affiliation between “speech” and “what is spoken”; accordingly, it is not the case that in every speech, there is something ‘said’. To put differently, not all vocal articulation says something, because ‘saying’ means showing something, or bringing into appearance. The act of saying, thus, appears as the very act of bringing forth any meaning there

---

268 ibid., p. 116.

269 ibid., 119.

270 ibid., p. 120.

271 ibid., p. 122.
is to appear. Saying ‘shows’, points out through bringing forth the realm of clearing.

5.2.2 Saying as Showing

Heidegger takes the first turn by positing as follows: “The essential being of language is Saying as Showing”.²⁷² Saying shows not through grounding itself on signs; instead, it provides the ground on which signs come into being. This leads us to recall Ziarek’s comment previously maintained as regards the relation between Heidegger’s thought of language and signification; he argues that the later Heideggerian notion of language cannot be reduced to a system of signification, particularly because Saying is the ground of the possibility of the appearance of a web of signification.²⁷³ I think the present point we have reached in reading “The Way to Language” provides sufficient reasons for affirming Ziarek’s interpretation. Through explaining why ‘speaking’ and ‘saying’ are not the same, Heidegger takes a turn through freeing language from ‘tongue’, hence at this crux language appears as a system of signification which conveys meaning. Next, through putting saying as saying into ‘showing’, he goes beyond this web of signification, and the unity of language he mentions since Being and Time gets established beyond the unity of the components of this web of signification. Herewith, the transformation of the thought of language, which begins from the ordinary conception, has already surpasses two milestones.

Heidegger goes on with another reflection with which we initially got familiar whilst reading Being and Time; to be able to speak does not solely

²⁷² ibid., p. 123.
²⁷³ ibid.
mean vocal articulation since it also structurally necessitates the capability to listen to. Nevertheless, the way Heidegger establishes the affinity between the two seems quite different in the current work. To explain, in *Being and Time*, he says speaking and listening immanently require each other in communication which is the sharing of the articulation of Being with others.²⁷⁴ Besides, he explains ‘listening’ as “Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others”.²⁷⁵ He points out the locus of ‘listening’ as an ontologically constitutive element of Being-open is Being-open as Being-with for Others, and speaking is always a speaking to; so he establishes the analysis of those constituents specifically in relation to the possibility of communication. In “The Way to Language”, the narration is apparently different; he speaks of the “simultaneousness of speaking and listening” not as the equiprimordially grounding elements of communication, but as capabilities endowed to the human being in its relation to language qua language. In line of this, he says “[s]peaking is of itself listening”. So within this context, ’listening’ is a listening to the speaking of language which endows the human being with the capability to speak; it is not presented particularly in relation to Being-with another Dasein in a communicative manner.

Therefore speaking is primordially listening, and such listening “comes before all other kinds of listening that we know, in a most inconspicuous manner”.²⁷⁶ The human being is granted into language with this primordial listening; in order words, the human being comes to be a human being, the sayer, through its hearkening to the speaking of language. Such hearkening

²⁷⁴ H. 162.

²⁷⁵ H. 163.

is surely not a willing act; it is a letting-speak, in that, the human being is a ‘sayer’ only because it lets something be said to it. Then one may come to ask, what is it that is being said? What does language say? At this crux, such a question would only be idle and injudicious. The reason for this is that, the speaking of language, as of itself, cannot be evaluated on the same domain with ‘whatness’, as if the issue was a matter of correspondence between two objects. Language is the ground of all ‘presences’ as well as ‘absences’. In turn, the congruent inquiry to raise so as to delve deeper into the issue is: How does language say?

Before answering this question, it is worth taking a general look at what has been achieved so far. Through playing with and overcoming the binary structure of listening and speaking, Heidegger exposes language as language, and denominates it as ‘Saying’. Yet such naming is only the beginning of the way to language; it puts language as language, henceforth the next step to take is putting language as language into language. Putting language as language means to uncover the stiff layer over the truth of language and letting it show itself as it is, as ‘Saying’; but what does it actually mean to put language as language ‘into’ language? What does ‘into’ signify here? This may be answered as follows: Revealing the truth of language as language means showing the fact that language cannot be reduced into dictionaries, vocal articulations or systems of signification; so it means to differentiate the ground of language from the ground of presences and absences. Nevertheless, it is factually the case that language does come into dictionaries, vocal articulations etc. Hence merely putting an abyss between the being of language and the being of presences does not

277 ibid.

278 ibid., p. 126.
explain how exactly the speaking of language, at some point and somehow, comes into the sounded word. In line of this, putting language as language ‘into’ language amounts to explaining how language speaks and summons presences and absences. The way language makes the sounded word possible through descending into it dwells in this ‘how’. We once again arrive at the question; how does language say?

5.2.3 Appropriation

Heidegger says:

*The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning*. It is what brings all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind. This owning which brings them there, and which moves Saying as Showing in its showing we call Appropriation. It yields the opening of the clearing in which present beings can persist and from which absent beings can depart while keeping their persistence in the withdrawal.\(^{279}\)

The speaking of language, or namely, the Showing of Saying moves in the way of owning. Hence language is not the totality of words or of the web of signification itself, but the very opening up of this field of clearing. Appropriation is what releases the system of signification into itself; it shows not through signs but through bringing forth the ground of possibility for signs to appear in the first place. Accordingly, the event of Appropriation is not something which can experienced as it is; instead, “it can only be experienced as the abiding gift yielded by Saying”.\(^{280}\) This gifting appears in the form of presencing and absencing, and is handed down to the human beings in the abode of ‘listening’. So the original experience of language in which the human being gets ‘spoken to’ is the also where the human being becomes what it is. To explain, Heidegger remarks: “Appropriation grants to mortals their abode within their nature, so

\(^{279}\) ibid., p. 127.

\(^{280}\) ibid.
that they may be capable of those who speak”.\footnote{ibid., p. 128.} It appears that the gift of Appropriation to the human being is indeed the gift of being a human being; in becoming the listener by way of the Showing of Saying, it becomes the sayer. Then how exactly the listener starts to speak? The same question can also be posed as follows: How exactly this unrepresentable movement, which conceals itself from experience in its very releasing beings into presence and absence, alights on the sounded word? How are we to understand the human being’s nature in the simultaneousness of its being both the sayer and the listener?

Heidegger explains that, the encounter with Saying, in other words, the abode where the human being lets something be said to it, also renders it as the entity which is capable of answering to the speaking of language:

Every spoken word is already an answer: counter-saying, coming to the encounter, listening Saying. When mortals are made appropriate for Saying, human nature is released into that needfulness out of which man is used for bringing soundless Saying to the sound of language.\footnote{ibid., p. 129.} The sounded word is in truth an answer to the original speaking of language. Through characterising the articulation of language in the sounded word as ‘answering’, Heidegger demonstrates how language does not originally spring from the human being, as if it was a ‘natural’ property belonging to it. Rather, language is the ground on which the human being is released into its nature.\footnote{ibid., p. 130.} It is not language which belongs to the human being as a property; the human being belongs to language thanks to the gift given to it—the gift of being capable to listen and answer in turn. Whatever the sayer says is primarily an answer to the speaking of language; then it may be posed that to be the sayer means to be the re-sayer. In parallel, the Showing

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotetext[1]{ibid., p. 128.}
\footnotetext[2]{ibid., p. 129.}
\footnotetext[3]{ibid., p. 130.}
\end{thebibliography}
of Saying comes into the sounded word in the human being’s reiteration of what it hears: “Or is Saying the stream of stillness which in forming them joins its own two banks—the Saying and our saying after it?” To put this delineation in a simplificative manner, Appropriation delivers the human being into its nature as the listener-reiterator, “man is used for bringing soundless Saying to the sound of language” and simultaneously through this deliverance, Saying reaches into the sounded word. Hence language as language (i.e., the Showing of Saying) is put into language (the sounded word) by way of Appropriation.

To present the overall structure of the path we have walked so far, we may clarify the steps each of which takes a significant turning: (1) Realising the urgency of thinking the question of language; (2) grasping the necessity of speaking about language qua language; (3) defining this necessity with the guiding formula, “putting language as language into language”; (4) uncovering language as language through exposing the Showing of Saying, which stands for the moment where the sayer is posed originally as the listener; and in this light, proceeding away from the traditional conception of language which approaches to language as a property belonging to the human being, or as merely the sounded word which is nothing but a tool that originates from the nature of the human being; (5) explaining the movement through which, despite its irreducible essence, language comes into the sounded word by way of Appropriation.

---

284 ibid., pp. 124-5.

285 ibid., p. 129.
5.2.4 Silent Speaking

Such clarification, step by step, indeed makes this hard-to-think narration somewhat more conceivable. Nevertheless, it still remains incapable of giving one thing, which is the most vital to conceive: The transformation itself, which cannot be understood through ‘steps’ as such. Let me clarify. The transformation indeed includes our experience with language, meaning, this text actually transforms thought; yet, the outset takes off in a manner as if this transformation was brought forth specifically by the activity of the human being which reflects on language. In other words, simply, what we read is a speaking human being—Heidegger. As a result, it is of utmost significance to conceive that this is because we experience only the gift and not the giving itself: “That Appropriation, seen as it is shown by Saying, cannot be represented either as an occurrence or a happening—it can only be experienced as the abiding gift yielded by Saying”.286 Therefore, the ownmost essence of language always remains concealed, it never presences itself and thusly is never absent. This essential concealment, Heidegger calls ‘silence’. This is why clarifying the steps we take on the way to language cannot present what is the most vital to conceive, which is silence as “the soundless tolling of the stillness of appropriating-showing Saying”287, namely, language’s withdrawing itself in an the essential concealment. Because the giving itself cannot be experienced, the path opened up by the thinking-speaking human being seems as if the transformation is a creation of the agent of this thinking. In truth, the path is a gift handed to it. It is called ‘way-making to language’, though it is not a ‘making’ in the manner of ‘originating’; it is a bringing forth: “It means to bring the way . . . forth

286 ibid., p. 127.

287 ibid., p. 131.
first of all, and thus to *be* the way*. 288 The human being is appropriated into thinking as the means of transformation brought forth by Appropriation itself.

Grasping this properly explains the reason why the initial formula eventually destroys itself, and ‘the why’ can be put forth concisely with Heidegger’s own words:

> This way-making puts language (the essence of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the sounded word). When we speak of the way to language now, we no longer mean only or primarily the progression of our thinking as it reflects on language. The way to language has become transformed along the way. From human activity it has shifted to the appropriating nature of language. But it is only to us and only with regard to ourselves that the change of the way to language appears as a shift which has taken place only now . . . For, since the being of language, as Saying that shows, rests on Appropriation which makes us humans over to the releasement in which we can listen freely, therefore the way-making of Saying into speech first opens up for us the path along which our thinking can pursue the authentic way to language. 289 The formula, which is of itself a sounded word, is incapable of encompassing and opening up the way to the truth of language by its own. The shift does not take place thanks to what this formula conveys—or the shift did not take place because ‘we managed to find the right formula’. As soon as one realises that the way is a making of the movement of Appropriation, and that the human being belongs to Appropriation though being appropriated as a means of satisfying the needfulness of language for coming into the sounded word, there remains no formula as such. It stands for the moment of attaining the fact that the formula itself has been handed as a gift in the first place, and through directing the quest of speaking about language towards listening to the speaking of language, it eventually encounters the very borders of its possibility; it encounters something which cannot be reiterated: 'Silence'. Saying conveys the way-making of

---

288 ibid., p. 130.

289 ibid.
Appropriation into the human speech; since this movement cannot be experienced in any way, the abode in which the human being is appropriated into language originally tolls ‘silence’. The movement, in its gifting, always conceals itself and this is precisely why it cannot be reduced to the human speaking. The movement is not reiterable, it does not give itself into presences but it *presences* and *absences*.

It would be an acute misconception to think of the human being’s abiding in this silence as a kind of ‘ineffability’; strictly speaking, there appears nothing whatsoever before the Showing of Saying; what Heidegger means by the “silent tolling” is the withdrawal of what is peculiar to language. This is indeed why Heidegger initiates the essay through citing and interpreting Novalis: “The peculiar property of language, namely that language is concerned exclusively with itself—precisely that is known to no one”. In its Showing, Saying withdraws back to its dwelling which belongs to the movement of Appropriation. The moment Saying conveys us the gift of Appropriation, it shuns back; it cannot indeed be properly spoken about, for it does not “let itself be captured in any statement”. The ‘statement’ here does not merely signify a vocal articulation in actual speak, and this is why it does connote ineffability. The elusiveness of language and its silent tolling stand for an altogether mystery as regards the ownmost being of language. In the way stated in the provided epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, speaking about this mystery brings upon the risk of reducing the truth of language. On the other hand, not speaking about it at all amounts to the oblivion of the truth of language. It appears that to be a human being, a listener-reiterator, having the capability to respond to the speaking of

---

290 ibid., p. 111.

291 ibid., pp. 134-5.
language, being *response-able* to language, always already means to abide in this danger zone.

Heidegger concludes his main points through mentioning the belonging relationship between Appropriation and Saying through his renowned statement, “language is the house of Being”, initially posited in “Letter on ‘Humanism’”. He exposes this expression in relation to the current context: “Language has been called ‘the house of Being’. It is the keeper of being present, in that its coming to light remains entrusted to the appropriating show of Saying. Language is the house of Being because language, as Saying, is the mode of Appropriation”. It means language is the way, “a melodic mode”, through which beings are released into their beings, and Being is domiciled in this ‘melody’.

Then what does this conclusion yields us when thought in relation to *Being and Time*? Language, as ‘Discourse’, was delineated as equiprimordial with understanding, and added up to the structure of the world through which Being opens up itself. Yet now language, as ‘Saying’, houses Being. It does not appear as equiprimordial with the *existentialia* of Dasein, but it appears as a way-maker, a conveyer of Appropriation or a melodic mode of its Showing, a ‘silent tolling’ of a mysterious essence.

In this case we might go on asking, how are we to clarify this shift of emphasis? Yet prior to the investigation which seeks after an answer to this

---

292 cf. p. 44-5.

293 “The Way to Language”, p. 239.

294 ibid., p. 135. The import of this Heideggerian motto will be extensively discussed in the next chapter.

295 ibid.
question comes another inquiry, which is rather urgent: how we are supposed to develop a proper account of a ‘Heideggerian shift’?

5.3 “The Way to Language” and Being and Time

For now, my aim will be limited to further clarifying and describing Heidegger’s re-thinking of the essence of language in “The Way to Language” in comparison to what was posited in Being and Time. Compared in terms of the constitutive thoughts of these two investigations, there seems to be a disparity between, on the one hand, highlighting the necessity of inquiring the essence of language on the ground of the existential analytic of Dasein, and on the other hand, insisting on the vitality of investigating language qua language. In this accordance, I will try to provide a rough comparison between the prominent points in Being and Time and “The Way to Language”.

Firstly, in Being and Time, ‘listening’ and ‘speaking’ are established as possibilities granted to Dasein, as the constituents of Being-with-one-another. Previously, concerning the contextual vicinity of language, we have deliberated about Heidegger’s italicisations while introducing the analysis of language “for the first time . . . now”; therein it was suggested that Heidegger wants to draw the attention to the time and place of the site where language is made an issue, and that it might be considered as an emphasis on the communicatory facet of language. That being so, the formula in “The Way to Language”, ‘speaking about language qua language’, seems to take another way. The gist of the issue is not Dasein’s speaking, or the ontological exposition of Being-with-another; rather, it is language who speaks, principally in the investigation of being with and within language. Considering the fact that Being and Time does not provide a probe of this topic further than the context of being-with-one-another, in
comparison to the later Heidegger, language seems to be thought particularly as an ontological constituent of communication.

Secondly, in *Being and Time*, ‘listening’ and ‘speaking’ were elucidated as possibilities which are brought forth by Dasein’s capability of understanding: “Only he who already understands can listen”\(^{296}\). Accordingly, language is explained as the articulation of intelligibility “according to significations”,\(^ {297}\) and in this way discoursed is placed alongside understanding equiprimordially. What we see in “The Way to Language” is rather different; language, or namely Saying, is that which “brings all present and absent beings each into their own”\(^ {298}\), and the Showing of Saying as Appropriation is that which “grants to mortals their abode within their nature”.\(^ {299}\) Therefore language is not an articulation of intelligibility according to significations, but the movement of Owning which opens up the very ground of intelligibility and brings forth the realm of clearing in which significatory relations become possible. Ziarek may again help us construe this issue better; it was already addressed why he says Heidegger’s thought of language reaches beyond the perspectives which grasp language as a system of signs.\(^ {300}\) In this light, I may agree with Ziarek but merely apropos of the later Heideggerian thought which seems to haul language to a more fundamental locale in comparison to *Being and Time*, through putting Saying as Owning. It is significant to note that, the reason of this partial agreement with Ziarek is *not* because I suggest that

\(^{296}\) H. 164.

\(^{297}\) H. 162.

\(^{298}\) p. 127.

\(^{299}\) p. 128.

\(^{300}\) cf. p. 95.
"Being and Time" domiciles language strictly within the significatory context, but because I think that there is not sufficient textual evidence in "Being and Time" to support what Ziarek asserts. Hence making such a general conclusion in the way Ziarek does would seem to be an over-interpretation, especially if one keeps a watchful eye on the details of both the early and late Heideggerian texts.

In addition to these, a major thought which stands out in a similar way in both of these works is the emphasis on the unificatory movement of language. In this connection, Wrathall comments that the clue rests in the terminological shift. Accordingly, Heidegger had initially translated Greek *logos* as ‘discourse’ (*Rede*), which was later replaced with ‘language’ (*Sprache*); and in the last phase of his works, he used ‘saying’ (*Sage*) instead of ‘language’.\(^{301}\) He adds that despite those varying translations, Heidegger’s genuine effort remains the same: to translate the Greek *logos*—meaning “gathering fitting” (*sammelndes Fügen*) in the most proper way.\(^{302}\)

Wrathall is careful to address the necessity to pose the question of how to construe ‘a change of thought’ in the Heideggerian philosophy before immediately starting to discuss whether there is a ‘change’ in his thought or not:

I do not mean to deny that Heidegger’s views on language undergo significant changes. Something important shifts between his early treatment of language as accruing to nonlinguistic meanings in "Being and Time", and his later account of language as that which shows us everything by “forming ways” (GA 12:203). But, I will argue, the shift is in large part a change in thinking about what the word ‘language’ names, and thus it cannot be reduced to a simple change of view about the role of language in mediating our access to the world or in constituting the world.\(^{303}\)

---


\(^{302}\) ibid., pp. 130-6.

\(^{303}\) ibid., pp. 123-4.
This elaboration brings us to a crux where we cannot proceed without achieving the following cardinal realisation: Heidegger’s perseverance to properly translate *logos* shows that translation is not a matter of plain name assignation—words are constitutive; hence it is obvious that, what he does through ‘changing’ the way he names language throughout his corpus cannot be evaluated as a spontaneous and frivolous ‘shift’ from one name to another. In like manner, a ‘change’ in his thought of language cannot be grasped as if he abandons one ‘position’ for the sake of taking another ‘position’. Truthfully, this is exactly what the later Heidegger tried to convey through recurrently emphasising the importance of understanding ‘thinking’ in relation to *way-making*. Thinking does not mean to take a position; and in this case, I argue that it is not even possible to properly talk about a ‘change of thought’ in the Heideggerian philosophy; in and of itself, *thoughts differ*. ‘Change’ connotes a differencing on the basis of a constancy as its substratum; whereas ‘difference’, especially in the Heideggerian context, can be thought only through breaking away with the presupposition of substratum. This means to say that, Heidegger’s thought brings forth ways; for ‘thought’ *ipso facto* means the bringing forth of a way.

The gathering-fitting consolidation was indeed attributed to language at the in the introduction part of *Being and Time*; as we have initially mentioned, he explains *Logos* in terms of *συνθεσις* (synthesis). By the reason that the linguistic and logical approaches which unquestioningly treat language solely in terms of its individual elements fail to see this irreducibly consolidating movement of language, from his earliest works to the latest ones, Heidegger directs criticism to those analytical approaches and reproduces this denouncement in different ways, in numerous contexts. Still

---

304 cf. p. 50.
it is not textually supportable to say that *Being and Time* thought of this unity in the way “The Way to Language” does. Robert Bernasconi construes this issue in its detail as follows:

Heidegger was careful not to individuate constitutive items, but emphasised instead what he called ‘the structure of discourse’. The essence of language as the unifying unity of language is anticipated in this notion, but it is not experienced and is not named. Both the metaphysical attempt and that of *Being and Time*—whose relation to metaphysics is still an open question—fail in this. Bernasconi’s remark actually is of a factual character; Heidegger merely mentions the ‘structure of discourse’, and expects the reader to infer the due unity of language from out of the connotation ‘structurality’ conveys. This is surely not an unwitting negligence, since whilst closing the section of the analysis of discourse, he raises questions numerous to be investigated respecting the being of language, hence making it clear that the essence of language is not expounded there sufficiently.

I want to have a say apropos of this interpretation by Bernasconi, so as to draw the attention to a subtle but all-important detail, which again takes us back to the intricacies of drawing a line between the early and late Heidegger. To explain, I do not agree with the connotation Bernasconi tries to convey through putting that the unifying unity of language is *anticipated* in the notion of ‘the structure of language’. Let me ask, how can the exposition of the truth of language be *anticipated*, as if ‘thought’ by itself can be a kind of abstract potentiality embedded in certain notions? To put it differently, can we legitimately argue that the alleged unexposed ‘thoughts’ embedded as *notions* in *Being and Time* get exposed in the later Heidegger, and are conveyed into their fullest actualities? What can one *anticipate* from a Heideggerian text, in the sense that, apart from the flow of the text itself and the transformative experience the reader goes through, can the ‘thoughts’ presented there give birth to certain conclusions as if they follow

---

305 “The Transformation of Language at Another Beginning”, p. 199.
naturally or logically? Strictly speaking, I think in Heidegger’s philosophy, there is no place for such kind of anticipation; and the reason is, the Heideggerian ‘thought’ per se may only be understood in an intrinsic relation with the very performance which exhibits this thought. Heideggerian ‘thought’ is not an abstraction which carries along with itself some kind of potentiality to be actualised and concretised. As Heidegger repeatedly announces, thought is itself a way-making; it is the very act, or performance through which one lets truth bring forth itself. Therefore, apart from the gift which is experienced in the course of this gifting, which happens through the appropriation of the thinker into the thought, there can be no ‘thought’ that remains unexposed, hidden in a sort of abstraction waiting to be exposed. Here, it is of great significance to highlight that I do not mean to say that there can be no ‘unthought’ at all; truthfully; contrarily, ‘unthought’ is the condition of possibility in Heidegger’s philosophy by the reason that in every unconcealment, ‘giving’ withdraws itself in an essential concealment. Neither do I reject the possibility of maintaining an exposition of Heidegger’s text in an interpretive manner, which would be absolutely inconceivable. Instead, I aim at taking a position against the perspective which grasps varying moments in Heidegger’s philosophy by way of drawing a line of continuity between the early and the late Heidegger, and ends up with the conclusion that Heidegger’s thought of language ‘did not change’, or ‘was already anticipated in the previous works’. In the last analysis, such an evaluation would amount to insinuating the conviction that what we see throughout the corpus of Heidegger’s works is the unfolding of one and the same ‘thought’ which develops itself on the way to fulfilling its utmost potentiality. That would be a thorough misconception and an overlooking of the vital role of way-making. As Heidegger puts, “Way-making in this sense no longer means to move something up or down a path
that is already there. It means to bring the way . . . forth first of all, and thus to be the way”. In conclusion, the later Heideggerian way-making cannot be discerned as an exposition of ‘what is already there’ in Being and Time. Therefore, in order to be capable of appreciating the way Heidegger’s thought transforms itself, first and foremost, we need to problematize the way through which we will ‘compare’ his varying works, and be thoughtfull of this issue before rushing into a conclusion which states that Heidegger’s thought ‘did change’ or ‘did not change’. I think Bernasconi omits this crucial and constituting side of Heidegger’s philosophy as he establishes a rapport between Being and Time and “The Way to Language”.

To return back and continue to the previous issue, one of the prominent contexts in which Heidegger highlights the severity of the desertification of language by the way of objectifying and decomposing methodologies is “Letter on ‘Humanism’”, where he poses his renowned expression, “Language is the house of Being”. What ‘house’ means is concisely exposed in a late period lecture as follows:

“To return back and continue to the previous issue, one of the prominent contexts in which Heidegger highlights the severity of the desertification of language by the way of objectifying and decomposing methodologies is “Letter on ‘Humanism’”, where he poses his renowned expression, “Language is the house of Being”. What ‘house’ means is concisely exposed in a late period lecture as follows:

“House” here means precisely what the word says: protection, guardianship, container, relationship. In the talk of the house of being, “being” means being itself. But this means precisely the belonging together with thinking, the belonging-together that first determines being as being. In the phrase just cited, “language” is not conceived as speaking and thus not as a mere activity of the human, but rather as house, i.e., as protection, as relationship.

The unifying unity of language ‘protects’, in that, it works as the mode of the movement of Appropriation which releases beings into their own. This ‘protection’ is surely not a sort of keeping in constancy; to the contrary, it is precisely a ‘releasement’. This play between keeping and releasing is named


307 “Letter on ‘Humanism’”, p. 239.

308 Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, p. 158.
‘the unbinding bond of language’. Then how are we to further explore this ‘play’?

The expression ‘language is the house of Being’ formally has the tonality of a assertion; for it initially strikes as a definition. Yet considering the fact that a definition is supposed to clarify what it defines so as to make it familiar, Heidegger’s ‘definition’ does not seem to help with this familiarisation at all. Wrathall explains this through appealing to what Jacques Derrida calls a “catastrophic metaphor”, which is the elucidation of a well known term by way of a less familiar term, and provides an extensive exposition of this catastrophic metaphor house as the site of the play between language’s releasing and binding. He starts with quoting a passage from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where Zarathustra speaks with animals about “words” and “sounds”, and posits them as “rainbows and illusory bridges” which relate the “the eternally separated”. Wrathall comments that this signifies Zarathustra’s thinking of the language merely as an adornment and his depiction of the world before him as if it were made up of independently existing entities having external relations to each other. He enucleated that in this picture language is taken as a tool, as an external and impellent force which establishes bridges. Then he goes on to the animals’ response to Zarathustra; they say that entities themselves “dance” in the way that words do in the “house of being”. In this response, language is not regarded in a reified way, as a pushed force over

---


311 ibid., p. 135.

312 ibid.

313 ibid.
beings out there. Instead, it is grasped with respect to “dance”, which connotes a relational ontology where entities do not have independent and fixed meanings, but acquire their place as things gathered under the differing-deferring “dance” of the worldhood of the world. Dance amounts to the unifying unity of language, which was named synthesis in *Being and Time* (συνθεσις) and unbinding bond in “The Way to Language”. Wrathall asserts that Heidegger appropriates Nietzsche’s term “house of being”, and constructs his own view of language as logos which gathers things into a ‘dancing’ structure, and its being a house pertains to the fact that “a world is kept and preserved by a consolidation of the relationships that determine a thing as the thing it is”.314

5.4 Word in the Neighbourhood of Poetry and Thinking

The later period is not the first time Heidegger thinks through poems and poetry, though a great number of the later Heideggerian texts are devoted to reading certain verses of poets such as Hölderlin, George, Tralk and Rilke. The difference between these two periods is not limited to the degree of the intensity of Heidegger’s focus on poetry; thinking through poeticality and taking words of poets as his guide-words actually became the way for him to bring forth the event into his works. Those studies may be put forth as the peak of the Heideggerian thought of language, and there are quite a few facets of this issue. For one thing, we need to understand how thinking turns out to be the way-making of the event.

314 ibid., 154.
5.4.1 “The Event Words”

To begin with, Heidegger sets forth the task of undergoing a transformative experience with language which holds itself back in everyday speaking where we only speak out of the “habit of always hearing only what we already understand”\(^{315}\). The everyday experience with language moves in a realm of already established meanings; there rarely appears cases which genuinely demand us to take a distance to the way we construe the meanings. The common-sensical and unchallenging manifestations of meanings depend on a habitual relationship with the world; hence in such a situation there is no essential ‘hearing’, for in hearing we only hear and repeat what the fixed and present-at-hand meanings show. Those meanings are ‘fixed’, in that, one may easily open a dictionary and grasp the sense of any ‘word’ in a clear and distinct way.

This takes us back to Heidegger’s previously mentioned differentiation between Worte (words) and Wörter (terms), as he first established in *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language* and later reappropriated in a radical way.\(^{316}\) Ziarek, along with his claim that Heidegger’s grasp of language puts it in a site which transcends ‘the web of signification’,\(^{317}\) suggests that this differentiation amounts to the “withdrawal of words from signs . . . [since they] describe a different dimension of language, one that constitutes its originative momentum, that is, the clearing (*Lichtung*) as the manner in which language opens up and

\(^{315}\) “The Nature of Language”, p. 58.

\(^{316}\) see pp. 83-5.

\(^{317}\) see p. 96.
traverses its ways (its *Bewegung*).\(^{318}\) Accordingly, this *differentiation* between ‘words’ and ‘signs’ is based on Heidegger’s exposition of the essence of ‘difference’ as ‘departure’: “[T]he essence of difference [*Unterschied*] is not differentiation but the essence of differentiation is difference as departure [*Abschied*].”\(^{319}\) Ziarek explains that the transformation from *unter* to *ab* denotes the rethinking of difference out of withdrawal or abyss [*Ab-grund*].\(^{320}\) The uncovering of this abyss between ‘words’ and ‘signs’ stands for the appreciation of the *way* language essentially moves; and this *way* is poeticality.\(^{321}\)

This can be rendered more conceivable with the following example. As we seen, in the everyday language, the human being does not undergo any challenge so as to put itself at a distance with the fixated meanings of ‘words’. Hence ‘words’ seem to be in a dynamic chain of signification; if one looks at the meaning of a ‘word’ in dictionary, the dictionary supplies the definition in reference to another word, and another word leads to another word, and so on. This is the manifestation of ‘words’ through the differing-deferring movement of language. Nevertheless, it is not possible to approach the ‘words’ in a poem as if they are definable in dictionary; in order to somehow engage with the meaning produced in the poem, one has to put a distance to the already established significations of words. Doubtlessly, it would be idle for someone to resort to dictionary when s/he fails to make sense of a poem. The arising of meaning out of poetry has a fundamentally different way of movement; it resists everyday language and

\(^{318}\) *Language After Heidegger*, p. 4.

\(^{319}\) ibid., p. 8.

\(^{320}\) ibid., p. 9.

\(^{321}\) ibid., p. 5.
allows approximation to itself only insofar as one undergoes the challenge it poses.

Then what renders ‘word’ different from ‘sign’? Word is different from sign in the way of departure; the withdrawal of word from sign is the movement which opens up the abyss through which the event comes to word, and the word issues sign with meaning through its giving. The inception of meaning through the bringing of word to sign arises out of an abyss; therefore the word reveals itself but only in an essential concealment. In coming to sign, the word also withdraws itself; and the original experience with language means to dwell in the experience of this withdrawal.

Ziarek explains this picture in a diligent attendance to the way Heidegger speaks. We read Heidegger saying, “[t]he event comes to word”; in this expression it appears as if the event is ‘somewhere over there’ in a spatio-temporal distance and it comes to word. Yet Ziarek calls attention to the original way Heidegger expresses it: “Das Ereignis wortet”; and Ziarek explains: “Instead, it is the event that, literally, ‘words’, as the German phrase would need to be rendered in English by turning the noun word into a verb, ‘to word’ . . . In other words, the event and ‘its’ word are neither different nor identical”.322 The event words through the abyss; to wit, it issues sign with meaning without bringing what is ownmost to language into bare light. This essential withholding is what departs word from sign, and endows language with its essential richness which cannot be encapsulated by the everyday experience with language.

One example of how Heidegger exposes this thought is his thinking through George’s verse:

322 ibid., pp. 5-6.
So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.323

He suggests an interpretation of this and poses an inquiry subsequently: “No thing is where the word is lacking, the word which names the given thing. What does ‘to name’ signify? . . . Is the name, is the word a sign? Everything depends on how we think of what the words ‘sign’ and ‘name’ say”.324 A thing is lacking, if it lacks a name; then a name is that through which word brings the thing into its being. If we equate ‘word’ and ‘sign’ here, the result would be at least extravagantly inconceivable, as it would be equivalent to saying that unless the human being attributes a linguistic expression to a thing, that thing cannot be considered as existing. Actually, this is exactly the trap those who attribute ‘linguistic idealism’ to Heidegger fall into; and it exhibits the background of the previous discussion regarding, in the way Wrathall put it, the “absurd” interpretations of Heidegger’s thought of language resulted by the failure to properly attain why and how Heidegger differentiates ‘word’ from ‘sign’.325

Ziarek provides a narration of how exactly the word and sign relates:

   The fact that words arrive into signs as carried by the back draft of the event, that is, as already withdrawn from and denied to—in the sense of Abschied and Absagen—signs, makes repetition, and thus the functioning of sign systems and concepts, possible. Yet this backdrafting movement of language makes meaning possible without being captured by the play of signification.326 The one-time (einmalig) giving of the event backdrafts in its giving; this is what makes the signs possible. The reason for this is that, signs are ipso facto repeatable, whereas the event’s Abschied is singular and one-time; this

324 ibid., p. 61.
325 cf. p. 95.
326 Language After Heidegger, p. 9.
play between the ‘one-time’ and ‘repeatable’ is thus both constituted and
overcome by the movement of the event from the abyss. Hence language, as
the mode of the event’s appropriation, has its ownmost property in the
withdrawnness of the word. This is why it is called a ‘mystery’.

Properly construing what Heidegger means by ‘mystery’ is of great
importance for not to misinterpret this picture. By ‘mystery’ is not a being
whose knowledge is out of the reach of the human being; such an
interpretation would be a total misconstruction. It is not a being which hides
itself; it is not a source of despair for the incapability of the human being.
Rather, it is the unrepresentable source of the richness of language, and the
ground of the possibility of the human being to undergo this transformative
experience with language, and to abide in the silence—“the quiet force of
the possible”.327 Indeed, if one reads the rest of Heidegger’s interpretation of
the provided verse of George, there would remain no reason for ending up
in such a misconstruction. To repeat George’s verse:

So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.

The poet talks of ‘sadness’ in witnessing the ‘breaking off’ of the word.
This ‘witnessing’, Heidegger calls “renunciation”: “The poet has learned
renunciation. He has undergone an experience. With what? With the thing
and its relation to the word . . . The word avows itself to the poet as that
which holds and sustains a thing in its being”.328 The poet, being a poet,
seeks after what is utmost to words; but in witnessing the withdrawal, s/he
learns to renounce—not seeking after words but seeking the utmost, and
learns to abide in the silence. Hence at first, it appears as a sadness to the
poet; but Heidegger explains:

327 H. 394.

The renunciation is not a loss. Nor does ‘sadly’ refer to the substance of renunciation, but rather to the fact that he has learned it. That sadness, however, is neither mere dejection nor despondency. True sadness is in harmony with what is most joyful—but in this way, that the greatest joy withdraws, halts in its withdrawal, and holds itself in reserve. The poetical experience thus stands for the attendance to the essential withdrawal of word. Then we may ask, what happens to the speaking of the poet? How is this experience exactly reflected into poem? Or more clearly, how do we experience this transformative experience with language by way of the poet’s words? In another text, Heidegger elucidates: “Because this renunciation is a genuine renunciation, not just a rejection of Saying, not a mere lapse into silence. As self-denial, renunciation remains Saying. It thus preserves the relation to the word”. Exactly like the movement of Saying, which cancels itself in its giving, the poet speaks in self-denial. The poet says in not-saying, and doing so, “commits itself to the higher rule of the word which first lets a thing be a thing”. Therefore, through attending to this realm of poeticality by way of the poet’s words, the reader is also drawn into this experience.

At this crux, it is significant to take a moment and reflect on what Heidegger is doing; he is speaking about the speaking of the poet. How does it characterise Heidegger’s speech, then? How are we to understand thinking through poetry? Why is Heidegger not writing poems instead of thinking through poems—or is he?

---

329 ibid., p. 66.

330 “Words”, p. 147.

331 ibid., p. 151.
5.4.2 The Poet and the Thinker

In his readings of poems, Heidegger shows tremendous diligence in consideration of the risks of building a dialogue between thinking and poetry. He frequently disrupts his readings reminding of the risk, and his language backs off from the mode of elucidation into a kind of self-cancelling. Still, his withdrawal does not issue from a positing of poetry high upon thinking, or his reverence does not depend on a kind of thought which admits a hierarchical relationship between those two realms; in fact, he assertively puts forth the necessity of building a dialogue of poetry and thinking so as to uncover their “neighbourhood”:

But as for us, it must remain open whether we are capable of entering properly into this poetic experience. There is the danger that we will overstrain a poem such as this by thinking too much into it, and thereby debar ourselves from being moved by its poetry. Much greater of course—but who today would admit it?—is the danger that we will think too little, and reject the thought that the true experience with language can only be a thinking experience, all the more so because the lofty poetry of all great poetic work always vibrates within a realm of thinking. But if what matters first of all is a thinking experience with language, then why this stress on a poetic experience? Because thinking in turn goes its ways in the neighbourhood of poetry.332

Both realms are neighbours on the ground of their relationship to language; they are way-makings in their own rights on the same realm—the realm of language. What is peculiar to them is their distinctive Saying, such that both thinking and poetry “remain delivered over to the mystery of the word as that is most worthy of their thinking, and thus ever structured in their kinship”.333

‘Kinship’ as is used by Heidegger is an intriguing notion; since it both puts forth a unity between two parties while regarding their difference. Poetry

333 “Words”, p. 156.
and thought are in an affinity of kinship because they dwell on the same 'neighbourhood', and neighbourhood is explained through 'nearness', which means being 'face to face with the other'. \(^{334}\) Heidegger thinks of being 'face-to-face' as a non-hierarchical relationship; therefore the dialogue which is to emerge out of their nearness is essentially a non-dominating relationship, so neither of them can be thought as an authority in the realm of the other. They are akin to each other, since the thinker and the poet are both “message-bearers”. Heidegger says: “The message-bearer must come from the message. But he must also have gone through it”. \(^{335}\) As the bearers of the ways to get in a transformative experience with language, they dwell in nearness to each other.

Heidegger asserts the possibility of a non-coercive dialogue between poetry and language, then we arrive at the question: ‘How?’. The answer is, through facing the other while remaining at the border; and to remain at the border of the other means to esteem the way it moves. This dialogue might be achieved only insofar as the way-making of the other moves freely: “we must be careful not to force the vibration of the poetic saying into the rigid groove of a univocal statement, and destroy it”. \(^{336}\) The Heidegger readers should, then, attend to the way how Heidegger, in reading poems, respects the way the poem makes its own way. The furthest that we may clarify this issue is Heidegger’s own clear delineation of this question of ‘how’:

> Perhaps every elucidation of these poems is like a snowfall on the bell. Whatever an elucidation can or cannot do, this is always true of it: in order that what has been composed purely into a poem may stand forth a little clearer, the elucidating speech much each time shatter itself and what it had attempted to do. For the sake of preserving what has been put into the poem, the elucidation of the poem must strive to make itself superfluous.

\(^{334}\) “The Nature of Language”, p. 82.

\(^{335}\) “A Dialogue on Language”, p. 51.

\(^{336}\) “The Nature of Language”, p. 64.
The last, but also the most difficult step of every interpretation, consists in its disappearing, along with its elucidations, before the pure presence of the poem.\textsuperscript{337} The endeavour to make oneself superfluous before a poem does not render the endeavour itself superfluous; thinking through poetry is a must, since coming face to face in a dialogue preserves the realm of this neighbourhood.

Having said that, we have clarified how the thinker must approach to poem, and concluded that it is through regarding the way poetry moves. Thusly another ‘how’ question rises again: ‘How does poetry move?’ The answer is, “out of an ambiguous ambiguity”.\textsuperscript{338} Poetry moves in an ambiguously ambiguous way; Heidegger does not only say ‘ambiguously’, but also puts this ambiguity at a suspense. The reason for this is that we cannot even represent the way of poetry simply through the notion of amphibology. Poetry does not only present multiple meanings for us to choose one; we may say, if it did so, it would be an unserious suggestion. Rather, poetry speaks in a serious way, in that, it asserts multiple meanings decidedly, and it intends to mean each of them in their multiplicity. To explain, in our everyday language, we ask the question ‘what do you mean?’ as a request for a clarification and a dissolution of ambiguity. It appears that we generally presume ‘meaning’ to be unambiguous; if someone means something in a serious manner, it points out a final signification. In contrast, the way that poetry means, in its utmost seriousness, does not point out a final resolution of meaning. Therefore the doublet ambiguity of the way-making of poetry cannot be thought as a mere act of embellishment, for it is not an “aimless imagining of whimsicalities, and no flight of mere representations and fancies into the unreal”\textsuperscript{339}. The poetical way-making

\textsuperscript{337} Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{338} “Language in the Poem”, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{339} The Origin of the Work of Art, p. 45.
uncovers truth in the very way it moves, and this way, in Heidegger’s words again, “is never carried out in the direction of emptiness and indeterminacy”.\textsuperscript{340} Instead, the reason for such way of moving is the fact that the poet is used as the message bearer of the event, hence the poet learns to renounce. As we have seen before,\textsuperscript{341} speaking in such renouncement is the only way to stay true to the original Saying. Hereby, poetry, in its idiosyncratic way-making, transforms the experience with language. It is not because it is a means to be used for transformation, but precisely due to the fact that “[l]anguage itself is poetry in the essential sense”.\textsuperscript{342} Poetry appears as the very way-making of language. Then we need to further grasp the affinity between the two to the extent that it is possible; and such endeavour will be the subject matter of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{340} ibid., p. 47.

\textsuperscript{341} cf. p. 134.

\textsuperscript{342} The Origin of the Work of Art, p. 46.
CHAPTER 6

STYLE AND SAYING ON A SINGLE ROAD

Way and weighing
Stile and saying
On a single walk are found.
Go bear without halt
Question and default
On your single pathway bound.

(Heidegger, “The Thinker as Poet”)

We have learned that Heidegger thinks through poetry, and now with this quote maintained above, we attain that he also politicizes his thoughts. In this chapter, firstly and in the light of what we have attained so far, I will clarify my own arguments for how to construe the relationship between Heidegger and poetry. Later, I will restructure the question of language in Heidegger’s philosophy, through depending on the neighbourhood of poetry and thinking; and try to redirect the general investigation of this thesis to a new level which specifically understands language as it is found “on a single walk” with “stile and saying”.

6.1 Recapitulations and Elucidations

Wrathall comments that the “oscillation” of poetry in ambiguity is something Heidegger pursues to adopt in his own works. Indeed, Heidegger readers undergo a progressive un-familiarisation from the notions as they had construed them; Heidegger moves between the ordinary conceptions and his own expositions in such a way that the reader is not repulsed, but still is challenged. The oscillation in his texts, at times, remains ambiguous to the reader; but this is an ‘ambiguous ambiguity’ and

343 “Discourse Language, Saying, Showing”, p. 139.
is never ‘carried out in the direction of emptiness and indeterminacy’. While criticising the act of speaking through statements, he speaks through ‘statements’; while arguing against grasping the being of entities in terms of their whatness, he puts forth the ‘whatness’ of entities; while destroying the ground of metaphysics, he speaks in the language of ‘metaphysics’. What is of utmost significance to grasp is this that it is strictly not possible to understand these acts of Heidegger as ‘contradiction’; that would point out a true ineptitude to grasp what is de facto going on, and hence result in an unfortunate idle reading.

Let’s proceed step by step to expose the underlying reason for this. Sure enough, Heidegger’s texts are way-makings; hence they say in the way of showing. To wit, they do not say in the final assertions, they show something; in showing, they reveal. To ‘reveal’ something does not amount to grasping that thing in one’s hand, but it means only to remove the cover of the covered. And such kind of uncovering is not a ‘putting forth’—for instance, like in the way that one puts forth an assertion,—, but is a bringing forth. It is a bringing forth of what? It is a bringing forth of a way. We may remember Heidegger saying: “To clear a way . . . This verb, used transitively, means: to form a way and, forming it, to keep it ready. Way-making understood in this sense no longer means to move something up or down a path that is already there. It means to bring the way . . . forth first of all, and thus to be the way”.344 It is necessary to realise that way is not a matter of whatness, but is an issue of how. In showing, the way exposes the how; thus the way becomes the how. All these means that philosophy, or more properly, ‘thought’ does not make its way through putting forth assertions; it becomes a way through oscillating between asserting and withdrawing itself, or in Bernasconi’s words as quoted before, “in saying

344 “The Way to Language”, pp. 129-30. For the previous related discussion, see pp. 103-4.
Therefore, Heidegger’s texts cannot be evaluated in terms of contradictiveness; they are not simply composed of a juxtaposition of assertions whose formal structure can be properly evaluated, first and foremost because such evaluations depend on the assumption of a substantial difference between ‘form’ and ‘content’. In way-making there is no place for such an assumption. One thing is, the formal approach which assesses a thought apropos of contradictiveness fundamentally depends on the principle of the excluded middle—something either is or is not. Truthfully, the very oscillation in Heidegger’s texts are nothing but an overcoming of the absolute necessity to presuppose this principle. As a result, accusing Heidegger of violating this principle cannot be a proper criticism, because such an approach do not even remotely attain what is de facto the case in Heidegger’s thinking. Needless to say, for a criticism to be a proper one, it is initially required for it to have appreciated the thought it stands against. Without realising the purport of the oscillation in Heidegger’s way-making, making a pursuant reading of Heidegger is apparently the least possibility. This picture at the same time exposes the background of the analytical approaches (who get along with ‘-isms’ very well) to Heidegger which entitle his philosophy as ‘obscurantism’; since Heidegger’s thought, in the last analysis, does not fully recognise the pre-established formal structures, the formal principles adopted by the analytical stance in reading Heidegger are, in principle, destined to fail. These points demonstrate how important it is to understand Heidegger’s thought of language in a due way, so as to attain the core of his thought in general.

We have said that while criticising the act of speaking through statements, he speaks through ‘statements’; while arguing against grasping the being of

---

345 “The Saying of a Turning”, p. 78.
entities in terms of their whatness, he puts forth the ‘whatness’ of entities.\footnote{cf. p. 140.} Later, we have mentioned the risk of remaining stuck at a rudimentary level of reading, due to an unquestioned commitment to the exclusively formal ways of construing. At this juncture, we need to submit an account of how to embrace the language Heidegger uses; and I think, herein is embedded the gist of his (especially later) thought.

To begin with, it is necessary to recapture the “guide-word” mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter: “The being of language—the language of being”.\footnote{“The Nature of Language”, p. 94. For the previous discussion see p. 88.} Heidegger thinks that this guide-word actually preserves the essential way language moves, and explains: “Two phrases held apart by a colon, each the inversion of the other . . . [T]hat second phrase is more than just a rearrangement of the words in the first. If so, then what the words ‘being’ and ‘language’ on either side of the colon say is not only not identical, but even the form of the phrase is different in each case”.\footnote{ibid.} If the second phrase is more than a rearrangement of the first one, it means there is an excess which transcends the mere ‘arrangement’ of words. Indeed, such excess transcends not only the syntax, but also every other grammatical, logical or linguistic whit; and apprehending the purport of this excess is possible only through being guided by this guide-word. Then hereby we must learn the bearer of this excess. To turn to Heidegger again: “But we may no longer say that the being of language is the language of being, unless the word ‘language’ in the second phrase says something different, in fact something in which the withholding of the being of language—
speaks”. With this, we see that what we have named ‘excess’ has a transformative force, and this force constitutes the realm where language speaks by the time it withdraws itself. As such, it points out what Heidegger has called “the soundless tolling of the stillness of appropriating-showing Saying” in “The Way to Language”, namely, the way-making of Appropriation.

This guide-word, as the word of transformation, is actually what Heidegger literally performs in “The Way to Language”, through putting language as language into language; or put more properly, through listening to the way how language as language comes into language by way of the movement of Appropriation. This is in fact how Heidegger becomes a means for a transformation of our experience with language; in saying not-saying, reiterating the speaking of language through remaining silent, and thus being the way itself. In the very way language as language comes into language, or from another facet, in the very way the word cancels itself while granting the sign, Heidegger says and not-says; thusly, opens up the way for a transformation. How exactly does Heidegger say in not-saying? It is through oscillating between our ordinary conception of language and the original saying. Next, how exactly does Heidegger say in not-saying? It is through not trying to convey the silence itself into the sign, but through being the way itself, to wit, through the very discursive movement of his text; in the way he performs the discourse—a performance whose gist is unrepresentable, incapturable—even by Heidegger himself—, and is silent. This is precisely how the movement of the discourse of Heidegger’s texts is capable of becoming a means of the exposition of transformation. The spatio-temporal being of such sort of discourse dwells in the nearness of the

349 ibid., p. 81.

silent speaking of language. In saying not-saying, Heidegger learns to ‘renounce’ just like the poet. As a result, seizing this silent speaking of Heidegger leads to a transformation of our experience with language.

Again, this guide-word and its guiding into the truth of transformation is what constructs the ground of Heidegger’s so-called ‘contradictory’ expressions. To repeat one last time, while criticising the act of speaking through statements, he speaks through ‘statements’; while arguing against grasping the being of entities in terms of their whatness, he puts forth the ‘whatness’ of entities. By the reason that the ground of such speaking is a movement which leads to transformation, the ‘statements’ of Heidegger no longer remain as statements *per se*, in exactly the same way that his ‘definitions’ of the ‘whatness’ of entities do not sustain its theme as whatness *per se*. Through speaking the metaphysical language while oscillating towards the truth of Being, Heidegger transforms metaphysics. What I am trying achieve here is a reconstruction of Heidegger’s narration of the guide-word through showing the way Heidegger *becomes* the way. To explain, he says that when one first hears the guide-word, ‘the being of language: the language of being’, one gets in the expectation to hear the explanation of language on the ground of being. Yet the rest of the expression makes such a manoeuvre that this expectation is shattered, along with the notions of ‘language’ and ‘being’ which construct this expectation:

Understood less strictly, the phrase before the colon then says: we shall comprehend what language is as soon as we enter into what the colon, so to speak, opens up before us. And that is the language of being. In this phrase being, “essence” assumes the role of the subject that possesses language. However, the word “being” no longer means what something is . . . [The guide-word can thus be paraphrased as follows]: what concerns us as language receives its definition from Saying as that which moves all things.\(^{351}\)

---

\(^{351}\) “The Nature of Language”, pp. 94-5.
Heidegger’s last sentence is of particular importance; he says, *what concerns us as language* is granted by Saying. Why does he especially add “what concerns us” at the beginning? I suggest that it is not an accidental; he does not say ‘language receives its definition from Saying’, but specifically points out our concern. I think this is because he implies not only our exposition to the truth of language, but also our very performance of speaking; to remind, we are from the start concerned with *our speaking*, and we were puzzled by the question which inquires ‘what is language?’ because conceptualising our own activity was by itself confusing. The confusion stemmed from the fact that we had presumed a substantial differentiation between thought and practice, and the problem appeared as a problem of construing a fitting correspondence between those two substances. In this regard, *what concerns us as language* means *language as both the thought of language and the practice of language*. Hence, if what concerns us as language—both as the thought and the practice of it as we had presumed—receives its definition from Saying, then it means that language in its essence does not give place to a dichotomy between ‘thought’ and ‘practice’. Consequently, in seeing this, we have come a long and transformative way from where we began.

It is settled that there is no place for a dichotomy between ‘thought’ and ‘practice’ in Heidegger’s thinking. If so, would it make sense to understand Heidegger’s discursive ‘practice’ apart from his ‘thought’ of discursivity? Put another way, having grasped the issue at hand, would we still have a reason to seek for a definitive when we read the phrase ‘Heidegger’s language’, and remain confused about whether this phrase refers to the *way* Heidegger speaks, or it denotes Heidegger’s *thought* of language? Reasonably, it seems very unlikely.
6.2 Heidegger’s Language

To retain designation of the above-mentioned dichotomy for the sake of the argument, the way we have come illuminates that it not possible to attain a competent understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy in general, unless one adequately grasps both Heidegger’s ‘thought’ of language and his ‘performativa’ language. So far, our investigation have given weight on construing the ‘vital locus of language in Heidegger’s thought’ and its transformation by way of gaining a more and more central place. Yet considering where we have eventually arrived, it is not quite tenable to speak of a \textit{locus} of language \textit{in} thought. Instead, thought is the gift and language is the mode of Appropriation; and the human being is a means used so as to meet the needfulness of Appropriation for coming into words. Surely, all speech is the gift of Appropriation; but the thinker’s and the poet’s words are distinct, in that, listening to the silent speaking of language and learning to renounce, while incessantly striving for speaking, the gap between their ‘thoughts’ and ‘performances’ is narrowed, and this grants them the capability to bring forth the way through \textit{being} the way.

Generally speaking, philosophical endeavour aspires to work with ‘thought’, and tries to establish its own domain through investigating the domain which exclusively belongs to thought. Hence philosophers’ \textit{ways} of speaking are rarely recognised as proper subject-matters, while the \textit{structures} of their thoughts make up the main focus. I argue that this is an invisible and unquestioned principle which is adopted out of negligence. I do not suggest that the philosophical endeavour must urgently start analysing the styles of philosophers’ discourses; but I think it appears as a necessity to at least give an account of this negligence and reclaim philosophy’s access to truth which borns out of the intertwinement of
thought and stylistic way, instead of almost entirely abandoning it as an object of study exclusive to literature.

Since Heidegger’s texts are epitomes which reveal the truth that shines forth from out of the intertwinement of thought and way, the thematisation of this relationship is not too rare among Heidegger readers. For instance, Robert Mugerauer focuses exclusively on this issue in his book Heidegger’s Language and Thinking, and exemplifies the recognition of this subject matter through quoting J. L. Mehta:

The manner in which Heidegger handles language, both in the writings of the earlier phase and in those of the later, is inseparably bound up with what he has to say and must therefore be taken as an intrinsic part of the method or “way” of his thinking.

In these later writings what is thought and said becomes inseparable from the individual and unique language and manner of saying it; not only does the thought and the utterance merge into one but the particular language employed and the thought content expressed become indissoluble.

Mehta’s comment seems in line with our conclusion. We have seen that considering the later Heideggerian framework, we cannot aptly speak of a more central locus of language in Heidegger’s thought—for language does not belong to a locus in somewhere but it belongs to Appropriation—; yet the transformation in his account of language is evinced by the tightening of the gap between his employment of language and the thought he brings forth through this employment. Mugerauer goes on giving references to the scholars who agree on the cardinality of embracing Heidegger’s thought without overlooking to his way of writing:

Similarly, Albert Hofstadter, in his introduction to the translation of Heidegger's essays called Poetry, Language, Thought, writes of the language of Heidegger's thinking: “The style is the thinking itself.” And George Steiner, in his Martin Heidegger, holds that we cannot avoid

---

352 Heidegger’s Language and Thinking, p. ix.
Stylistic character, as the mode of the temporalisation of discourse, by itself, shows something. In all discourses meaning is articulated in this temporalisation; but what is specific to Heidegger’s manner of speaking is this: The meaning which is brought forth by the showing of the way of his speaking overweights the meaning conveyed in his ‘statements’. This is why overlooking the stylistic aspect of Heidegger’s expositions is destined to end up either in misconstruction or in a great loss of gift that one might receive from Heidegger. At times, it might indeed be overwhelming to preserve the attentiveness to the showing of his manner of speaking, and his oscillations might pose serious challenges to the reader. Nonetheless, his catastrophic metaphors, seemingly contradicting or tautological utterances, repetitions, hyperboles, neologisms, ambiguous definitions, abrupt distractions of the smooth flow of the texts, hyphenations, capitalisations and many other gestures which push the limits of logic and grammar—can all these tremendous efforts be overridden by a reductive act of titling which incarcerate them under the header of ‘obscurantism’? Name-assignation is maybe the simplest of all deeds, whereas remaining saying in not-saying is maybe the hardest of all. In this case, in reading Heidegger, it appears as a duty to take heed of the way he speaks; as such would be incomparably more productive than mere speculation over his assertions.

Ziarek is also assertive about the importance of recognising Heidegger’s language; and he presents a radical stance: “More than presenting insights about language, this mode of writing enacts the event of language—and language as event—in order to demonstrate how undergoing an experience with language remains irreducible to assertions or theories. . . . Thus it is critical to show how Heidegger’s thinking and use of language occurs

353 ibid.
within philosophy but crucially exceeds it.\textsuperscript{354} The Saying of language is irreducible to assertions, and hence must remain without a name. Heidegger expresses his endeavours for calling language with a proper name, but he submits that he fails each time:

\begin{quote}
for it was all of twenty years after my doctoral dissertation that I dared discuss in a class the question of language. It was at the same time that I, in class, made public my first interpretations of Hölderlin’s hymns. In the summer semester of 1934, I offered a lecture series under the title ‘Logic’. In fact, however, it was a reflection on the \textit{logos}, in which I was trying to find the nature of language. Yet it took nearly another ten years before I was able to say what I was thinking—the fitting word is still lacking today. The prospect of the thinking that labors to answer to the nature of language is still veiled, in all its vastness.\textsuperscript{355}
\end{quote}

The ownmost property of language, its name, remains veiled. Hereby we may turn back to our precursory discussion which introduces the theme of the investigation of this thesis through raising the question ‘what is language’?\textsuperscript{356} And next, we may deliberate the whereabouts of our conclusion at which we have arrived after coming all this way. One thing is for sure, we are no less perplexed about the \textit{whatness} of language in comparison to the beginning, but maybe more. Neither can we resolutely assert that we \textit{know} more about the essence of language. Yet in failing to \textit{know} the \textit{whatness} of language, we undergo a transformative experience; this transformation shatters the hope for grasping what we desire to know, but at the same time gifts the way itself. Put in other words, at the beginning of the way we had a final destination—to know about the essence of language. This being so, the endmost point that we have arrived turned out not a proper destination but a mystery. The temporalisation of this exposition did not handed out what we demand; instead, it gifted a way in which the transformation occurs. The ‘failure’ to attain our pre-defined goal

\textsuperscript{354} \textit{Language After Heidegger}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{355} “A Dialogue on Language”, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{356} cf. pp. 24-27.
seems very similar to how poet fails in seizing the word itself, and in turn learns to renounce; and in its renouncing, it undergoes a transformative experience. Consequently, Heidegger’s discourse, insofar as we can embrace its movement, shows the possibility of a transformative experience with language through bringing forth a way; so that walking the way, we become the way.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The investigation in this thesis has delved into the way Heidegger’s language has transformed, and the prominent aspiration was to construe how exactly the being of language turned out to be the language of being. In differentiating Heidegger’s corpus as ‘early’ and ‘late’, we took the attention to the turning in Heidegger’s thought; and while studying this turning, we have seen that this is not a turning in Heidegger’s thought, but one that shows itself through coming into the discourses of thinkers and poets who shoulder the challenge to listen to the speaking of language. Heidegger repeatedly emphasises that the turn is not a transformation put forth by him: “I find them only because they are not my own making”.357 His thought is not the subject but the means of this transformation.

These expositions put possible interpretations of the turn in Heidegger’s language on a very thin line. The underlying reason is the fact that any implication of a difference of thought in Heidegger’s language before and after Contributions to Philosophy runs the risk of getting interpreted as an argument which attributes a ‘change’ in his thought. I may suggest three constitutive reasons for why it is strictly not possible to interpret the transformation which occurs in his thought as a ‘change’. Firstly, since Heidegger’s works cannot be understood as an agglomeration of individual statements; in such a situation, the movement of his thought is not a jump from one statement to another, as if he abandons his initial stance and starts to dwell on another particular one. Precisely for the fact that the gist of his thought is embedded not in what it asserts but in the way that it moves, the

fitting designation for the difference we seize between his early and late works would be ‘transformation’, not ‘change’.

Secondly, seizing the difference between Heidegger’s discourses in his early and late works and immediately ending up in the conclusion that his thought ‘changed’ point out a construction in which Heidegger’s subjectivity is taken as the subject which owns those ideas as if they are properties; hence he throws one away and grabs another, hence changes his thought. In the term ‘change’, there is a readily available connotation of an active subjectivity; for instance, ‘change’ is something which may be done by hands which organise and order. Nothing is more evident than the fact that Heidegger strives to put a great distance himself and such a position.

Lastly, a ‘change’ happens by way of proceeding from somewhere to somewhere; whereas Heideggerian thought always moves through somewhere to somewhere. Heidegger, in his letter to William J. Richardson who writes a book on Heidegger with the title From Phenomenology to Thought, amends the reader and warns him about the possible misinterpretations such a title might give way to. Resultantly, the book, in which Heidegger’s letter to the writer is published as the preface, gets re-titled as Through Phenomenology to Thought.358 Walking from somewhere to somewhere connotes respectively a previous stable position, an abandonment, and a pre-determined directionality. Walking “through . . . to” connotes a preliminary subjection to something (a subjection to phenomenology in the exemplary book title), or an essential vulnerability which finds itself on a way, directed to somewhere, experiencing the transformation—being the means of transformation.

358 Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. xxii.
The whereabouts of the transformation in Heidegger manner of speaking is pointed out as Contributions to Philosophy; and the majority of Heidegger scholars show this passage as the appearance of another tonality in Heidegger’s speech; so there is a congruent recognition that “Contributions constitutes a development and progression along Heidegger’s path of thinking”;359 which can be explained by the fact that, “. . . it is from Contributions to Philosophy onwards that much of Heidegger’s thought proceeds literally by way of language”.360

The turn brings forth two different Heideggerian tonalities. It is probably out of an everyday habit that when a difference shows itself between two parties, we tend to quantify their difference and be primarily be interested in discerning which one is more in this or that way. In my comparison of the early and late Heideggerian language, I will decidedly try to put a distance to such an evaluation. Yet narration of qualitative differences occasionally proceed by way of spatial metaphors, such as in the case where we spoke of the tightening of the ‘gap’ between Heidegger’s thought and performance of language.361 Those sorts of delineations should not be understood as if I am trying to construe their difference through positing the neighbourhood they dwell in as a field of contestation.

In his retrospection of Being and Time in terms of the question of language, Heidegger himself addresses his thoughts by way of a spatio-temporal metaphor: “I only know one thing: because reflection on language, and on Being, has determined my path of thinking from early on, therefore their discussion has stayed as far as possible in the background. The fundamental


360 Ziarek, Language After Heidegger, p. 2.

361 cf. p. 146.
flaw of the book *Being and Time* is perhaps that I ventured forth *too far too early*. He especially sustains that *Being and Time* is actually directed to its way through the support of a thought of language; but it remains too young and too hasty back then. The hastiness and youth of *Being and Time* regarding the question of language is also exemplifiable with another case. While expounding Dasein’s relation to significance, Heidegger writes that “... in significance itself ... [there lurks the possibility] for Dasein ... to disclose such things as ‘significations’; upon these, in turn, is founded the *Being* of words and of language”. This statement means that it is Dasein who discloses the world, and this disclosing is *anterior* to language—which eventually means that Dasein precedes language. In examining Heidegger’s retrospect on *Being and Time*, Dieter Thomä remarks that in Heidegger’s own personal copy of *Being and Time*, with reference to the relevant quote, he notes: “Untrue. Language is not imposed, but *is* the primordial essence of truth as there [Da]”. It seems that the ‘place’ of language was somewhat unstable back then. Next, Wrathall also argues for the consequential radical stance of Heidegger’s later works in comparison to the early ones. Accordingly, the gravity of emphasis in *Being and Time* is discourse primarily in terms of the articulation of meaning and the significatory systems; besides, he claims that Heidegger talks of language as if it is a derivative phenomenon at times, and is most primarily a communicative function. He quotes Heidegger: “[d]iscourse has a distinctive function in the development of the discoveredness of Dasein; it lays out, that is, it brings the referential relations of meaningfulness into relief in communication”. Actually this seems affirmative of our interpretation which ended up with raising the question whether the spatio-temporal locus of language in *Being

---


363 H. 87.

and Time may give us a clue about a communicative emphasis as regards the essence of language.\textsuperscript{365}

Nonetheless, it does not mean to say that Being and Time did not profoundly contribute to the realm of the question of the essence of language; in sharp contrast, there does not exist a necessity that language as a theme must be on the forefront in a narration, so as to be ‘thought’ properly. There are more than one dimensions to this fathomless issue; accordingly, I argue that Being and Time made a huge impact, not through undertaking specifically a fulfilling phenomenology of language, but through uncovering the grounds on which phenomenology of language becomes possible. Put another way, I think there are two moments in Heideggerian thought of language. The first one is the very opening up of the subject-matter which takes place through the destruction of the traditional metaphysical thought of subjectivity and binary thinking; in fact, this may be supported by Heidegger’s recurrent emphasises on the task of undertaking the question of language on the grounds of the existential analytic of Dasein. Being and Time is the very call to hearken to the call of Being; it is the uncovering of the ground of Being as a question, and the demonstration of its necessity, structure and priority—all of which is a matter of an endeavour to bring the field of thinking into light. The task here, then, is the task of bringing forth the field of thinking as a field, which means to say, the very establishment of the discursive possibilities of thinking. Specific to our case in this thesis, Being and Time may be thought as the establishment of the discursive field in which transforming our experience with language becomes possible: Seen precisely from the axis of the question of language, it is the bringing forth of the field which establishes the necessity, structure and priority of investigating language

\textsuperscript{365} cf. pp. 66-9.
through the fundamental ontology and the method of phenomenology. The exposition of the reasons why language cannot be thought within the traditional metaphysical framework, thus, takes place in Being and Time. We see that, following the establishment of this possibility Heidegger then starts to expound this realm in his studies; for instance, seven years after the publication of Being and Time, in 1934, Heidegger starts to give lectures on the question of language where he reflects on, say, “structure, origin, meaning and necessary shaking up of logic”. Therefore it is possible to say that what was preliminarily established in Being and Time was further expounded in his following works. Heidegger’s letter to Richardson as pertains the possibility of making a differentiation ‘Heidegger I’ and ‘Heidegger II’ seems to directly justify our conclusive claim here: “The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II”. The issue is not a matter of being incepted in the other in terms of a sort of potentiality; the relationship between them is a relationship of possibility, which, as we should have understood up to this point, does not stem out of a sort of causality or potentiality; but it stems from Ab-grund and difference as de-parture.

There are adequate reasons to understand Being and Time as an establishment, and his later works as of an expounding character with respect to the issue of language. Nevertheless, it does not immediately bring

---

366 Based on the transcripts of his students his lectures are published as a book: Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language.

367 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 1.

368 Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. xxii.
upon the conclusion that during the very expounding of this way, the establishment was not surpassed. Undoubtedly it would be unreasonable to expect the due consideration of language to take place in *Being and Time*, as it would be too demanding when the extent of its investigation is viewed. Still, a thorough exposure of the essence of language, by itself, even as a single task, seems a demanding one to Heidegger: “To guard the purity of the mystery's wellspring seems to me hardest of all”.

To the extent that Heidegger recognises this task as a hard one, he manages to speak from out of his abiding in the realm of nameless; and the more silently he speaks, the more radically he paves the way for a transformation of our experience with language.

369 “A Dialogue on Language”, p. 50.
REFERENCES


Heidegger’in dil kavramı üzerinden yaptığı felsefe tarihi eleştirisinin temelinde, o zamanı dek süregelmiş anlayışın dilin hakikatının üstünü örtücü ve özünü indirgeyici nesneleştirmeler üzerine kurulu olması yatar. Özünde dil nesneleştiremez ve salt olarak insana ait bir mülkiyetmiş gibi ele alınmaz olmasına rağmen, metafizik tarihi bunun ayırdına varmaksızın, farklı biçimlerde gibi görünse de hep aynı türden bir indirgemeciğle yaklaşıarak dilin hakikatının üstünü örtmüştür. Felsefenin yanında biçimbileşmel, tümcebilimsel, mantıksal ve antropojik çalışmalar dili her zaman halihazırda ele gelebilecek, dışına çıkılabilecek ve bu sayede...


Örneğin, sondan eklemeli olması, Farsça ya da Çince olması, mantıksal formunun tutarlı olması, geldiği dil ailesinin yapısı vb. açıdan 370

162


Bu sonuca vardıktan sonra gelinen dördüncü bölüm, Heidegger’in dil kavramını Being and Time’da, varlıkbilimsel temelde yeniden nasıl

Metafiziği bozuma uğratma vazifesinin gerektüğinin ortaya koyulmasının ardından, Being and Time’in bu yolu izlerkenki metodunun ne olması gerektiğini tartışması gelmektedir. Heidegger bu yolu ontolojik bir temelde ilerleyecek olan fenomenolojik metod olarak belirlemektedir; bu da araştırma metodunun görünümleri Varlık’a gelmeleri açısından inceleneceğe yönelik anlamların gelmesi durumunda, fenomenolojinin araştırma temelini oluşturtur; nitekim bu metodun dilin neliğini ötesini işaret edebilmesi, ve dilin şeklesmiş halini değil, dilin bir şey olarak ortaya çıkmabilmesi mevcudiyet
koşulunun olasılıklarını gün yüzüne çıkarabilmesi de bu bağlantı sayesindedir.

İlk bakışta dilin ortaya çıkma demek, insan ufkunda ortaya çıkma demektir. Şöyle ki, insanın, dili öyle ya da böyle, ancak bir şekilde deneyimliyor olması hakikatının ta kendiini kast eder; yani dili ne olarak deneyimlediğimizden çok nasıl olup da deneyimlediğimizi, bu deneyimi mümkün kilan koşulların ne olduğunu sorgulama edimi, kendisini insanın varlık koşullarını sorar halde bulur. Bu nedenle Heidegger’in erken dönemine göre dil meselesi, doğrudan insanın varoluşsal yapısının ortaya çıkarması süreçinin doğurduğu mühim bir sorudur. Bu varoluşsal yapı—Heidegger’in ifadesiyle Dasein—dil ile varlıksal anlamda kurucu bir ilişki içerisindedir. Dilin ontolojik temelde fenomenolojik incelemesinin ortaya çıkardığı şey gösterir ki, dil insanların iletişime aracı olmanın çok ötesinde, Dasein’in düşünmesinin ona açılmasının mümkün koşuluştur. Yani dil, dünyanın anlamlandırılabilirliğini dışavurulması için bir kanal—yani salt olarak ikincil bir araç—değil, dünyanın anlamlandırılabilme olma koşulu ve olguları bu anlamlandırabilirlikte mevcudiyete taşma ediminin bizatılı kendi durur. Dil, varlıkların varlık olarak ortaya çıkmışındaki anlamlandırabilirlik koşuluştur; o halde böylese ne bir araç, ne bir mülkiyet, ne de bir şey yahut nelik olarak kavranabilir. Dünyayı oluşturan varlıkların kendilerini kendileri olarak göstermelerine izin veren dil, bir koşul olması bakımından değerlendirilecek olursa, koşullanana aynı şekilde ele alınamaz. Bu nedenle öyle ya da böyle ortaya çıkma bakımından değil, Dasein’in varoluşsal yapısının kurucu bileşenlerinden biri olması açısından düşünülmelidir; velhasil, varlıkların şu ya da bu şekilde Varlık’a gelmelerinin olasılığı olarak dil, yalnızca şeyeştirmeye izin vermeyen ontolojik düzeyde kendisini sorgulayana açar. Bu hakikatin ayrdına varamayan düüünceler ise dilin özüne dair bir şey belirleyebilmekte hep eksik kalmaya mahkum durumdadırlar.

Beşinci kısmın, Heidegger’in geç dönemde doğru gittikçe yoğunlaşan dil çalışmalarının incelenmesiyle başlamaktadır. Bu dönemde *The Question*


371 Bkz. Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry
İlk aşamada Heidegger, mevcut amacının öncekinden çok farklı oluşuna dikkat çekmek isteresine şu vurguyu yapmaktadır: Dili, öyle ya da böyle olması açısından, ve hatta kendinden başka şeyler için teşkil ettiği öneri bakımından dahei değil, safı olması bakımından incelemek gerekir. Yani buradaki başlangıç noktası, 

**dil**i, **dil bakımdan** (language qua language) ele alma gerekliği, 

**ve** kendinden başka şeyler için teşkil ettiği önemi bakımdan deşifre olmasın, 

Dili, böyle ya da böyle, 

ve başka bir araştırma alanı olarak ele alınması gereklidir; bu da dilin kendine ait bir araştırma alanının olması ve bu alanın ehemmiyetinin kendinden kaynaklanmasının anlamına gelmektedir. 

Diğer bir değişle, dilin artık Dasein’ın ontolojik bir tahsis bileşeni olarak da tarihteki metafiziksel kuruluşu bozuma uğratılarak yeniden yorumlanması gereken bir iletişimsel koşul olarak değil, salt olarak **kendisi** bakımından düşünülmesinin elzem olduğu iddiası ortaya çıkmasıdır. Böylece bu ilk aşamada başka bir yola girilmiş, dilin kendine götürdüğü yer eyleminin gerekliği tam görmüş ve bu göre üstlenmiştir.

İkinci aşamada Heidegger, dilin bir nesne ya da bir şey olarak alınamayacak olması üzerine teşekkür etmeye başlar. Bu açıdan insannın ‘konuşan hayvan’ (zoon logon echon) olarak tanımlanmasını araştırır ve bu tanımda dilin insanın bir niteliği olarak belirlenmekte öteye götürülmediğini gösterir. Bir organ olan dil ile konuşabilme yeteneği eşleştirilmiş, dil insanın bir mülkiyeti gibi anlaşılmıştır. Halbuki Heidegger’e göre konuşturabilme yeteneği dinleyebilme yeteneğinin bir sonucu olarak doğar; bu da şu demektir: İnsan esasen dilin menşesi değildir; dil **insandan** çıkmaz, dil **insana** verilir, ve bu verilisin koşulu almamak, yani **dinlemektir**. Bu nedenle insannın konuşabilme koşulu herhangi bir tabi yeteneğinden ya da doğasından gelen bir mülkiyetten değil, **dinleyebilmesinden** doğar. Peki insan neyi dinler?

Bu noktada Heidegger şuünü söylüyor: Bir, konuşur (“language speaks”). Yani orijinal olarak konuşan insan değil, dildir. İnsan, dilin konuşuşunu dinleyebilmesinden mütevellit, yani dilin bizatihi kendini söleyişiini kulak...
vermesiyle, anlam dünyasına kavuşur ve konuşabilme yeteneği ona verilir. Dilin olmadığı, diğer bir değişle *dilin konuşmadığı* yerde bir dünya açımlanmadığı için, insanın konuşması değil, varlığı dahi tahayyül edilemez. Bu nedenle insanın konuşabilimiyi olması doğasından gelme bir nitelik değil, dili dinleyebilmesi ile ortaya çıkabilen ikincil bir olgudur. Esasen insan konuşırken *dilin söyleyişini* dinlemektedir; neticede de insanın her söleyişi bir *yeniden-söyleyiştür* (reiteration); orijinal olarak konuşan dilin ta kendisidir, insanların konuşması dilin söyleyişini dinlemesi ve duyduğu tekrar etmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan bir olgudur.


çınlar (“the soundless tolling of the stillness of appropriating-showing Saying”) ve insan dilin hakiki konuşusuna kulak verince sessizlikle karşılaşır.

Dil, dil açısından incelendiği takdirde dilin kendisini dinleyeni götürdüğü bu alan, Heidegger’e göre şiirlerlik alanıdır ve varlıkların kendilerini oldukları gibi gösterdikleri bir riayet yeridir. Varlıklar kavramsallığın, nesnelliğin ve neliğin katı sınırlarının içine sıkıştırmadan da konuşulabileceğini gösteren bu şiirsel dilin özel söyleyişine en yakın yerdir. Bunlar, dilin söyleyişinin, yani anlamın ortaya çıktığını özünde, mantık, biçimlim vb. formal yaklaşımların dilden talep ettiği belirsizliğe yer vermeden imleme halı, önceden belirlenmiş rasyonel prensiplere uyma zorunluğunu gibi ancak bir nesneye atfedilebilecek kurallılık yapısından azade, çok farklı bir tür söyleyiş olduğunu göstermektedir. Nasıl bir şiirdeki kelimelere anlamları kendinden menkulmuş gibi yaklaşamazsa, ya da nasıl ki şiirsel bir ifadeden mantık ve gramer kurallarına uyma zorunluluğu beklenemese, dilin anlamı ortaya çıkarsındaki asıl hareket de bu tip sınırlarla belirlenemez ve anlaşılamaz.

Heidegger şairin dile bu yaklaşımını, ‘düşünürün’ dile yaklaşımına benzetmektedir; bu nedenle düşünce ve şiir komşu olarak niteler. Düşünürün sözleri de aynı şairin ifadeleri gibi yorumlanmak zorundadır; kendinden menkul bir takım evrensel fikirle işaret ediyor gibi görülemez. Bu yoruma bağlılık hali düşünürün ifadelerini keyfekeder yahut abes kılmaz; aksine Heidegger’e göre hakikatin ortaya çıkışı bu yorumda vuku bulan bir şeydir. Yine bu, yorumun kendisini de öznel ya da buyrultusal kılmaz; çünkü her yorum bir anlamlandırma zincirine, her anlamlandırma zinciri de tarihselliğe dayanır. Varlık, kendisini tarihsel olarak yorumda açık kılar, bu nedenle Heidegger’in yaptığı Varlık’ın hakikatini söze ‘öznelliğe’

Heidegger’ın dile yol-yapımı, dil **hakkında** bir konuşma edimi değildir; çünkü ‘hakkındalık’ her zaman, her neyin hakkındaysa onu halihazırla konuşanın dışında konumlandırır ve temaslaştırma suretiyle nesneleştirir. Bu nedenle Heideggerci yol-yapım, dilin kavramsallaştırılması, temaslaştırılması ve tanımlanması değildir. Aksine, dil hakkında **konuşmak** yerine, dil sessizliğini kulak vermek ve o dinleyiciye her ne veriyorsa onu halihazırla konumlandır ve temalaştırma suretiyle nesneleştir. Bu yüzden Heideggerci yol-yapım, dilin kavramsallaştırılması, temalaştırılması ve tanımlanması değildir. Aksine, dil hakkında **konuşmak** yerine, dilin sessizliğini kulak vermek ve o dinleyiciye her ne veriyorsa onu halihazırla konumlandır ve temalaştırma suretiyle nesneleştir. Bu yüzden Heideggerci yol-yapım, dilin kavramsallaştırılması, temalaştırılması ve tanımlanması değildir. Aksine, dil hakkında **konuşmak** yerine, dilin sessizliğini kulak vermek ve o dinleyiciye her ne veriyorsa onu halihazırla konumlandır ve temalaştırma suretiyle nesneleştir.

APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü X
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Sezgi
Adı : Damla
Bölümü: Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): Heideggerian Way-Making to Language

TEZİN TürÜ: Yüksek Lisans X Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. X
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. 
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: