HEIDEGGER’S FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY
AS A POLITICAL PROJECT

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Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology has long been debated in relation to Heidegger’s personal political affiliations with National Socialism, and there is a wide scope of interpretations as to whether his thought is essentially linked to the Nazi ideology. The customary way of reading the Heideggerian corpus within this context is to investigate whether or not the fundamental ontology yields a discriminatory political stance in favor of Germans over the rest of the people (or a group of them), and both his proponents and opponents submit to pursue their examinations on the basis of a binary separation on the one side of which are Germans. The criticisms made from the perspective of liberal thought occupy the largest place in the literature. In this study, after giving a preliminary sketch of the Heideggerian thought, which shows that the fundamental ontology cannot be read as a distinct project than its political implications, the liberal response is examined and its inadequacy of evaluating Heidegger’s thought is shown. After that, concepts from the Derridean understanding of hospitality are borrowed to develop a new framework which provides a novel way of reading Heideggerian ontology as a political project. Through that reading, the complex nature of Heideggerian thought with regards to politics is expounded, rather than giving a yes/no answer. Accordingly, the political polarization is shown to have three poles—
Germans, non-German Westerners, and the rest of the people—and the interrelations between those poles are explicated.

Keywords: Heidegger, political thought, fundamental ontology, National Socialism
ÖZ

POLİTİK BİR PROJE OLARAK HEİDEGGER’İN TEMEL VARLIKBİLİMİ

Soysal, Zühtücan
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karmaşık yapıda ikili bir kutuplaşma değil, Almanlar, diğer Batılılar, ve geri kalan herkes olmak üzere üçlü bir ayrımın olduğu gösterilecek ve bu kutuplar arasındaki ilişki açağı çıkartılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Heidegger, politik felsefe, temel varlıktılım, Nasyonel Sosyalizm
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental ontology of Martin Heidegger seems to be fundamentally hyperbolic, in that, it traverses the traditional conception of ontology to reach, in its own particular way, the domain of the political, so much so that the Heideggerian ontology has been called by some as political ontology.¹ Thus, the Heideggerian ontology has never simply been an ontology caught up within the traditional dichotomy of ‘is’—the subject matter of ontology—and ‘ought,’ and the hyperbolic extension of the fundamental ontology has long been a major interest for both the adherents and for the critics of Heidegger, particularly in relation to his personal political engagements. The significance of the issue stems from a riveting predicament. On the one hand, there is the fact that he officially joined the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, which is responsible for one of the most horrific bloodsheds the world has witnessed. Yet Heidegger was not just one party member among others, because, on the other hand, Heidegger’s philosophy has changed the course of the Western thought by challenging its prevailing sedimented and unquestioned pre-acceptances; his decisive influence can be seen in many fields of thought, even today. Having said that, the contrast between his political attachment and the greatness of his thinking makes his followers raise the question whether his political orientation was essentially inscribed in his philosophy or it was merely a personal affiliation; in the latter case, it would be indispensable to differentiate between ‘Heidegger the man’ and ‘Heidegger the philosopher.’

¹ cf. Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger.
This question gained a magazinish popularity after Victor Farias’s book *Heidegger and Nazism* (1987), caught a second wave of attention with Emmanuel Faye’s *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy* (2005), and has finally been reigned with the appearance of Heidegger’s *Schwarze Hefte*² (2014). Those books served as the proof of Heidegger’s support for antisemitism and for the Nazi ideology in particular; however, the antisemitic aspects of Heidegger’s thinking had been thematized and discussed long before those publications by his followers in a much more rigorous way together with much greater attention to the details of the Heideggerian discourse. Among those, Emmanuel Levinas might be the first to denounce the alleged Hitlerism of Heidegger in his “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” (1934). His way of evaluating the suspicion concerning Heidegger’s discourse in a later essay exhibits the necessary respect for and responsibility to Heidegger: “It cast a shadow over my firm confidence that an unbridgeable distance forever separated the delirious and criminal hatred voiced by Evil on the pages of *Mein Kampf* from the intellectual vigor and extreme analytical virtuosity displayed in *Sein und Zeit*.”³ If Levinas, arguably the most fierce opponent of Heidegger’s alleged philosophical Nazism, does not speak out his protest against Heidegger without mentioning the excellence of his work, it is because Levinas acknowledges that a proper inquiry into the political facet of Heidegger’s thought must be undertaken with the respect and responsibility which take into account the fact that Heidegger opened a novel and radical way for philosophical endeavor. Therefore, substantially bound up with an emphasis on the novelty of the philosophical way commenced by the fundamental ontology, this study carries the objective to scrutinize Heidegger’s

² *Black Notebooks*, which is yet to be translated into English.

³ Levinas, “As if Consenting to Horror”, p. 485.
philosophical enterprise with regard to its political import, thereby uncovering what is philosophically significant in the depths of Heidegger’s thought and its Nazi affiliation.

Preliminary clarifications regarding the methodology and the subject matter of this study are needed to begin with. First of all, it has been said that the political facet of Heidegger’s philosophical project is to be explored. The proper treatment of this subject could not be made with the traditional dichotomy according to which ontology is conceptualized as something essentially exterior to or distinct from politics. Taking this dichotomy for granted yields two different methodologies, neither of which will be adopted in the present work. The first methodology would be to take the political action as something externally implied by the philosophical work. This methodology would take the Heideggerian discourse as essentially philosophical, and puts it into a position where specific themes externally relate to specific political stances. To give an example, Richard Wolin is concerned with whether the National Revolution was implied by Heidegger’s “metaphysical destiny.” He draws parallel between the two to show that his philosophy settles the ground for his Nazi partisanship. Here, the emphasized terms, namely, ‘implying’ and ‘settling the ground for’ are the supposed relationships between Heidegger’s political stance and his thought. The character of these relationships are critical, in that, Heidegger's texts are conceived as texts concerning politics, or texts about politics, but not as politics itself. Thus, the fundamental ontology is understood by Wolin within the dichotomy of ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Within this dichotomy, a work concerning ‘is’ may have implications for the domain of ‘ought,’ or it may lead one into a specific belief regarding ‘ought,’ but it is essentially separated from ‘ought.’ The reason why this present study cannot rely on this distinction is that

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4 The Heidegger Controversy, p. 4.
Heidegger himself makes it clear that this dichotomy “belongs thoroughly to modernity,”⁵ which cannot capture the complexity of the thought of Being elaborated by Heidegger. Therefore, to be attentive to the Heideggerian discourse, this distinction cannot be accepted promptly.

The second methodology would be to consider Heidegger’s work as essentially political. This approach could perfectly be exemplified by Faye, who claims that the fundamental ontology should not even be regarded as philosophical.⁶ Accordingly, it is as if Heidegger was a political strategist whose work is to be considered essentially as an enterprise to prepare the Germany for the National Revolution, and it was a contingent fact that he chose to interest himself with philosophy. Leaving aside the provocative side of this claim, the mutually exclusive relationship between philosophy and politics, or to be more precise, the traditional is/ought dichotomy, still holds for Faye. Furthermore, although it might disputably be claimed that reading Heidegger’s work as a philosophical propaganda serves as an adequate resource for an inquiry in sociology or political science, such a reading could not unveil the philosophical importance therein. Thus, to give a philosophical meaning to the Heideggerian politics, it must be acknowledged that it is the fundamental ontology itself which is political. In other words, it is the politics within ontology and not the politics induced by ontology that a philosophical survey must analyze, no matter how Heidegger’s actual political practices might have been motivated by his philosophy. The politics within ontology, as a result, has a different signification than that of the politics induced by ontology. The latter is about how ‘Heidegger the man’ makes of his own thought in the political sphere, whereas the former signifies a political

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⁵ *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 100.

interpretation of the text corpus of ‘Heidegger the philosopher.’ Hence, the politics-within-ontology is embedded in and inseparable from ontology, which is why it deserves the name ontologico-politics.7

Another point which is in need of clarification comes from the question what to look for in reading Heidegger in order to spot his philosophico-political stance. Since it is known that Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party, then it seems natural too seek for the Nazi ideology in the works of Heidegger. However, the term ‘Nazi ideology’ does not signify a single uniform political ideal, but it consists of several elements. When it is questioned whether Heidegger’s thought is bound up with Nazism, another question arrives immediately: Which part of Nazism? For instance, social Darwinism is seen as a constitutive element of it.8 When Heidegger’s thought is at stake, should social Darwinism be taken into account? A claim that Heidegger’s thought shows all the characteristics of Nazism would not only call for a set of problems about how the borders of the Nazi ideology is to be drawn, but also requires overinterpretation and distortion of Heidegger’s texts to make them fit into what is aimed to be shown. It is for this reason that even the most austere critics of Heidegger do not make such a claim. Hence, instead of seeking National Socialism, what is to be sought after in Heidegger’s ontologico-politics should be a more general and broader philosophical-political tendency on the basis of which National Socialism is a possibility to pursue.

7 The term ‘political ontology’ used by Pierre Bourdieu and others involves the same conception of the inseparability of politics and ontology, but refers to an ontology-regarding-politics rather than the politics-within-ontology, which is why it is in general employed in a sociological context.

Here, it is considerate to introduce the *Völkisch* ideology as the possible political direction which Heidegger’s thought might be claimed to bear. Having its origins in the 19th century, the *Völkisch* ideology brought forth the needed theme for the post-WWI Germans to unite against modernity; accordingly, the German folk [*das Volk*] whose salvation is to come with their unification around their common root, around their tradition, is polarized with the self-alienated modern man in the midst of a strive towards material gain.\(^9\) Therefore, the *Völkisch* ideology might be considered as a call for the Germans to return to their way of life prior to the advent of modernism, and it employs an understanding of the human subject which is in contradistinction to that of modern progressive liberalism. It is known that the modern understanding of human subject was introduced by the Enlightenment thinkers, and this is the point where the *Völkisch* ideology and Heidegger have their common opponent in their respective discourses.\(^10\) Therefore, it might be investigated whether Heidegger’s thought has more to share with the *Völkisch* ideology apart from disdaining the modern liberal subject. Nevertheless, such an investigation is not without any problem, because what has been said for the relationship between Heidegger and Nazism may as well be said for the apparent affinity of the Heideggerian thought and the *Völkisch* ideology. To be more precise, it is not only a homology but an essential link between Heidegger’s thought and a certain political stance which is to be established. Otherwise, all the apparent partialities are at risk of being a contingent result of a more primordial and essential ontologico-political principle, in which case it would be those


\(^10\) For the purpose and the scope of this introduction, the specifics of the divergence between the liberal subject and the *Völkisch* subject, and how the modernism serves as the common opponent for both are not needed. The modern liberal understanding of the human subject and how Heidegger responds it will be covered in detail later.
principles which are of philosophical significance. In other words, just as Heidegger’s National Socialism might stem from his submission to the *Völkisch* ideology, this submission may stem from a broader and more deep-seated ontologico-political tendency, and since the aim of this study is to uncover what is essentially political in Heidegger’s ontology, that most basic ontologico-political tendency is to be sought after. Thus, the displacement of the subject from National Socialism to the *Völkisch* ideology must be carried on to reach a broader and more basic political premise. The course of this study will show that this basic ontologico-political premise is the acceptance of the Western identity, that is, a totality of historical-historiographical circumstances which may be delineated to have the same source, which is essentially distinguishable from what it is not, e.g., the Oriental, the African, etc. By going this further, the unthought of Heidegger will be reached.

Understanding the conception of the Western identity as the seed of Heidegger’s ontologico-political stance, on the other hand, amounts in a way to equating his position to all others who in this or that way have the same conception. Is this to say that whenever one conceptualizes the West as a distinguishable totality, they share the same ontologico-political stance as Heidegger does? Absurd as it is to answer this question positively, a negative answer would not suffice either. What is to be examined, then, is the specific way of identification of ‘the West’ by Heidegger and the implications of it, and it is the objective of this study to unfold what it ontologico-politically means that Heidegger has a conception of the Western identity. Nonetheless, the specific way in which Heidegger pursues a conception of the Western identity would by itself be a mere edification if the designation of the concept within a politically meaningful schema is not elucidated. In other words, the examination of Heidegger’s way of interpreting what is to be considered as Western and what is not should be thorough enough to shed light upon whether that interpretation is a politically tenable one. But political tenability
itself is speculative, and this means an ontologico-political reading of Heidegger should derive the criteria of tenability from within the Heideggerian discourse.

Since a preliminary search for the ground on which the criteria of ontologico-political tenability will be sought in the Heideggerian discourse, it might be of help to restate the fact that ‘is’ and ‘ought’ do not designate mutually exclusive domains in this context. To concretize, Heidegger says “[Being] is surmounted by the ought”\(^{11}\) And elsewhere, “thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man, as one who ek-sists, is in itself the original ethics.”\(^{12}\) Thus, the Heideggerian ontology is already not far from providing an ethical interpretation, but in a more ‘original’ direction. In the same way, what Heidegger calls “thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man,”\(^{13}\) or rather, the way opened by that thinking, makes it possible for an ontologico-politics to sprout.

In order to better grasp the way on which an ontological politics could arise, the concept of ‘task’ needs to be construed in accordance with the Heidegger’s textual corpus, in which the term ‘task’ occurrence is frequently encountered, sometimes in the titles. Taking the seminal work, *Being and Time*, as an example, “The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being”\(^{14}\) is the title of the second part of the introduction to the book, under which Heidegger discusses the necessity to destroy the sedimented values and assumptions of the history of philosophy in order to ask the question of the


\(^{12}\) “Letter on Humanism”, p. 258.

\(^{13}\) ibid.

\(^{14}\) *Being and Time*, p. 36.
meaning of Being, which is the fundamental question of philosophy.\textsuperscript{15} Without delving into the implications of the concept of ‘destroying’ and how this task is to be carried out, which are to be elaborated later on in this study, it could be said even at this preliminary stage of investigation that according to Heidegger, the ongoing philosophical tradition blocks the possibility of asking the most fundamental question of philosophy. Therefore, it is the task of a genuine questioning first of all to claim its own possibility, that is, to question the unthought of the tradition. Since this tradition, to be more precise, the tradition of the Western philosophy, could not be conceived as a stockpile of formal abstractions but as a broader heritage of contemplative practices whose political significance cannot be discounted, the task necessitated by the Heideggerian thinking must also amount to the destabilization of the unthought of the political ideology inscribed in the tradition.

Hence, the criteria of the ontologico-political tenability of Heidegger’s conception of the Western identity should be sought in the ‘ought’ which is intertwined with the fundamental ontology. However, this conclusion might bring forward the suspicion of a circular reasoning in which the Heideggerian ontologico-politics will be judged by the Heideggerian ontology itself. To counter this suspicion, it must first be acknowledged that Heidegger’s thought does not consist of some principles set in stone. It would suffice to cite the first lines of Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” to demonstrate this: “Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is a way of thinking.”\textsuperscript{16} The way of thinking,

\textsuperscript{15} ibid., pp. 41-9.
\textsuperscript{16} p. 3.
then, is what will allow a reading with which it will be seen at the end of this study that the task delineated by the essence of the Heideggerian way of thinking is also the task of destroying the conception of the Western identity to which the Heideggerian ontologico-politics itself submits. Thus, the movement of this critical reading of Heidegger’s texts might be considered as a radicalization of his thought so as to ‘destroy’ the conception of the Western identity lying in the unthought of Heidegger’s thinking.

The purpose set for the study could then be summarized as follows. The way opened up by the Heideggerian thinking will be taken in a radicalized way to read Heidegger in order to explicate the ontologico-political aspect of his thought, and a particular conception of the Western identity will be shown to play a central role with regard to that ontologico-politics. On the way to the accomplishment of this purpose, the literature on Heidegger’s political stance, which is heavily focused on the relationship between his philosophy and National Socialism, will also be studied and interpreted in the Heideggerian fashion. The works of those who look from a liberal standpoint and direct their criticisms against Heidegger in relation to the alleged affinity and resemblance between his thought and his actual political engagements will be of particular interest in this regard, as their philosophical perspective stands in diametric opposition to that of Heidegger.

Having defined the purpose of this study, it would be guiding to give a description of the design of how it will be carried out. First of all, the Heideggerian thinking in general will have to be disclosed with an emphasis of his pre-WWII works, where his political side appears strongly. This will not only open the discussion on the basis of the Heideggerian thinking but also will allow to place his thought within the history of philosophy as a response to the tradition. This era of his thought may be characterized by his
seminal work *Being and Time*, in which *Seinsfrage*,\(^\text{17}\) propounded to be the most fundamental question of philosophy, is treated through a phenomenological-existential analysis of what it is like to be a human being.\(^\text{18}\) The analysis is far from giving an answer to *Seinsfrage*; it rather seeks to open a way to ask it, or even better, to open a way to work out the conditions of the possibility of its being asked. This immediately calls for a confrontation with the tradition, which is in the oblivion of *Seinsfrage*.\(^\text{19}\) This confrontation will make it possible to read Heidegger’s views as a critique of the traditional conceptualization of ‘subject,’ which will be shown to have an inherent ‘liberal’ tendency. The ‘task,’ then, will be put as the task of ‘destroying’ the liberal worldview. It will be this time that the parallel between the philosophical endeavor of Heidegger against the liberal worldview and the political strife between National Socialism against liberalism is examined. Secondly, what may rightfully be called ‘the liberal response’ to Heidegger will be scrutinized mainly with reference to the works of Faye, Farias, and Karl Löwith, who are the proponents of the claim that Heidegger’s philosophy is inseparable from his political affiliations.\(^\text{20}\) The works of those scholars are so controversial that their lack of critical competency has been found voice in many works. For instance, Jacques Derrida famously questions “whether Farias has devoted more than an hour to reading Heidegger.”\(^\text{21}\) In this study,

\(^\text{17}\) The question of the meaning of Being.

\(^\text{18}\) The term ‘human being’ might be deceptive to use in the Heideggerian framework because of the term’s anthropological implications; however, the meaning loaded to the term by the tradition may be suspended at this point in order not to delve into the complexity of his analyses, keeping in mind that Heidegger takes up the issue in a radically different way than what at first seems to be the case.

\(^\text{19}\) *Being and Time*, pp. 1-2.


\(^\text{21}\) qtd. in Rockmore, *On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy*, p. 265.
too, the adequacy of the liberal response will be under critical examination, and it will be shown that the readings which allows those liberal criticisms have no philosophical background apart from the liberal thought which is already caught up within the traditional understanding of ‘subject.’ Therefore, the inadequacy of the liberal response will make it necessary to carry out the study with a post-Heideggerian approach, and so, thirdly, one of Derrida’s later works, namely, Of Hospitality, will be read so as to find the needed ground for a proper discussion of the Heideggerian ontologico-politics. The concepts of ‘family,’ ‘foreigner,’ and ‘barbarian,’ as discussed by Derrida, will be introduced to serve as the grid on which to plot the respective positions of Heidegger, Hitler, and the liberals. On this basis will the ontologico-politics of Heidegger be understood in relation to National Socialism, and the position of the liberal critics will be specified as well. That picture will bring out the relationship between the Heideggerian ontologico-politics and the conception of the Western identity.

Rockmore classifies the approaches towards the political aspect of the Heideggerian thinking in six categories as follows.

First, there is Adorno’s extreme view that everything that Heidegger ever said and did was Nazi to the core. Second, there is the conviction that Nazism is not Nazism, most prominently associated with Beaufret, through his acceptance of the French historian Faurisson’s radical form of historical revisionism, in fact a denial of the historical reality of National Socialism. Third, there is the idea, now most prominently represented by Fédier, that Heidegger is not responsible for the political consequences of Nazism since they could not have been foreseen. Fourth, there is the belief, following Heidegger’s own view of the matter, that Heidegger’s Nazism was merely an insignificant moment in his biography unrelated to his thought, developed by Aubenque and Vietta, and hinted at by Habermas and Rorty, based on a distinction in kind between Heidegger the thinker and Heidegger the man. Fifth, there is the claim—rooted in Heidegger’s conception of the turning in his thought—due mainly to Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, that Heidegger’s early thought led to Nazism, but his later thought led away from it, a reading presupposing
a break between the earlier and the later Heidegger. Sixth, there is the organic analysis, presented by Löwith, and more recently by Bourdieu, Janicaud, Zimmerman, Wolin, Thomä and myself, according to which Heidegger’s philosophical thought and his Nazism are inseparable.\footnote{Rockmore, \textit{On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy}, pp. 282-3.}

It is an ancillary intention of this study to provide a seventh alternative to those already existing approaches, in which Heidegger’s actual ontologico-politics and an ontologico-politics which is made possible by the Heideggerian way of thinking are differentiated.

After this preliminary considerations, Heidegger’s pre-WWII thought in general will be outlined and put into context in the next chapter in order to begin to get beneath the surface of the discussion.
CHAPTER 2
THE EARLY HEIDEGGER

It should first of all be noted that Heidegger in his early studies takes Dasein as the subject matter of the entire analysis (Befragte), and tries to understand what it means to Be with the point of reference of Dasein’s Being. The period starting with Heidegger’s writings preceding his seminal work Being and Time (1927) and lasting until Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (1936-9) is generally considered to be Heidegger’s early period, which may as well be rightfully called the pre-WWII Heidegger. This specification becomes more significant when the alleged Nazism in his philosophy is at stake. Because, in the famous Der Spiegel interview on his Nazi affiliation, which took place after a long period of silence, he exemplifies his explicit criticisms against Nazism in his Nietzsche lectures dating back to 1936, coinciding with the lectures comprising Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). Thus, it is intriguing to search for Nazism in the works of the early Heidegger, which were produced during a time for which even Heidegger does not claim to be against Nazism. At this juncture, considering that the main difference between early Heidegger and the Heidegger after Kehre is customarily proposed to stem from the emphasis on Dasein in the early works towards a gradual shifting of the emphasis from it, even though

23 The interview is reported to have taken place in 1966 (“Only a God Can Save Us”, p. 92), and first appeared in Der Spiegel in 1976 (ibid., p. 91).

24 ibid., p. 101.

25 The alleged change of ideas or of the focal point of analyses in the Heideggerian corpus, which was supposed to take place between Being and Time (1927) and “Letter on ‘Humanism’” (1947), which may also be identified with the ‘turning in Being’ discussed by Heidegger in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (1936-9) (Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, pp. 231-3).
many claimed that the Heideggerian philosophy in total, both before and after the *Kehre*, has a tendency towards a National Socialistic ideology,\(^{26}\) it might also be the case that the difference between the pro-Nazi and counter-Nazi philosophies of Heidegger, if such a separation is ever to be found plausible to use, might stem from that basic shift of focus with which the primary interest of his philosophical inquiry becomes distant to Dasein.

### 2.1 The Unquestioned Presuppositions of the Western Metaphysics

The strongest part of Heidegger’s thought is at the same time what renders it obscure for the most. It has already been said that Heidegger challenges the most preemptive suppositions of the Western tradition of thought. The fact that those presuppositions lie in the very depths of the traditional understanding of the world makes Heidegger’s challenge cumbersome to grasp. Heidegger himself is aware of this, and for him, this arduousness signifies the climax of the spiritual decline of the mankind. Accordingly, to put it briefly, the Greek thought opened a great way of originary questioning, but this way has long been hindered by the tradition’s abandonment of that originary questioning. The climax of this abandonment is described by Heidegger as follows. “The spiritual decline of the earth has progressed so far that peoples are in danger of losing their last spiritual strength, the strength that makes it possible even to see the decline.”\(^{27}\) It is this climax of the decline that makes Heidegger’s project unreachable from a traditional point of view, because it consists not in a restructuring within the tradition but in the radical destabilization of its foundations.

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\(^{26}\) To name a few, Dominique Janicaud, Michael E. Zimmerman, Richard Wölin, Dieter Thomä (Rockmore, *On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy*, p. 283).

\(^{27}\) *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 40.
The need to destabilize the unquestioned roots of the traditional metaphysics is pronounced in *Being and Time* as “the task of destroying the history of ontology.”

At this point, it would make it more convenient to grasp Heidegger’s thesis to disrupt the line or argument he employs, and tell the story beginning from the result he arrives at. First of all, ‘Dasein,’ which literally means ‘being-there’ and is used in the meaning of ‘existence’ in everyday German, is the technical term to describe the entity for which its Being is an issue, that is, Dasein is human being.

Through the laborious readings and painstaking analyses, in the pages of *Being and Time*, Heidegger arrives at the two modes of Dasein’s being, authentic and inauthentic. Putting aside the details, it is Dasein’s task to be authentic and it is possible only by way of an inquiry into its ontological roots. As Heidegger says, “[Dasein] must first find itself.”

This ontological questioning begins with *Seinsfrage*, that is, the question of the meaning of Being. It is this question that the Ancient Greeks asked and thereby opened the way of thinking, and it is this reason that has been long forgotten by the tradition. Thus, “the task of destroying the history of ontology” to create a space for originary questioning requires first and foremost the elucidation of the barriers with which the Western metaphysics avoids *Seinsfrage*.

As put forward in *Being and Time*, there are three presuppositions regarding Being, which have rendered it unnecessary to raise the question of the meaning of Being throughout the history of ontology. First prejudice is that

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28 p. 41.

29 *Being and Time*, p. 32.

30 ibid., p. 43. ‘Authentic’ means belonging to oneself; thus, one’s finding oneself and one’s being authentic are one and the same in the Heideggerian jargon.

31 ibid., p. 41.
“‘Being’ is the most universal concept.”\(^\text{32}\) That is, Being is characterized as something whose conception is equally present in the conception of each and every being. Thus, in thinking of a rock or getting into a relation with an object, the concept of Being is already included. Even in defining something, as in the sentence ‘X is Y,’ the ‘is’ is there. As a result of this comes the second presupposition, with which “the concept of Being is [taken as] indefinable.”\(^\text{33}\) As it is indefinable, asking the meaning of it is rendered redundant. The fact that the universality of the concept of Being is of ultimate rank brings forth the third presupposition as well, which is the claim that an inquiry into the meaning of Being is unnecessary because its meaning is already self-evident.\(^\text{34}\) In all those hindrances in the way of raising the question of the meaning of Being, a conception which takes ‘Being’ as something always-everywhere selfsame in an abstract fashion is prevalent. Therefore, this conception might be claimed to be the source of the calcified prejudices of the Western tradition which have caused the oblivion of the question of Being by construing the question as unnecessary, and it is this conception that has to be destroyed in order for Seinsfrage to be risen.

Heidegger argues against this calcified conception which belongs to the Western tradition by stating that “Being is always the Being of an entity.”\(^\text{35}\) In order to grasp this opposition in a truthful manner, the German version of the assertion needs to be analyzed because of a meaning loss in J. Macquairrie and E. Robinson’s English translation of Being and Time. The sentence in the

\(^{32}\text{ibid. p. 22.}\)

\(^{33}\text{ibid. p. 23.}\)

\(^{34}\text{ibid.}\)

\(^{35}\text{ibid. p. 29.}\)
original Sein und Zeit is as follows: “Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden.” The German word ‘jeweils’ means ‘in each case’ rather than ‘always.’ The slight difference between the connotations of those two possible translations marks Heidegger’s opposition to the history of ontology. To be more specific, ‘always’ may be read and interpreted in a way that it calls for a concept which is of higher order than what is in question. Accordingly, if Being is always to be the Being of an entity, then it follows that Being and entities are separated by the theoretical abyss formed by the ‘always’ because of the universalistic implication of the word. That conception of Being amounts exactly to the traditional perspective where Being is separated by an absolute universality from beings, which renders it equally present in beings and hence undefinable. On the other hand, what the sentence “Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden” entails should be read in a way that Being and entities form an inseparable and yet irreducible relationship. ‘In each case’ gives the needed connotation. Indeed, there is no universal Being as such, but there are entities; and Being is but the ‘are’ in ‘there are entities.’ Therefore, there are cases of some entities’ being, that is, their being what they are, and Being is ‘in each case’ their being what they are. Being is thus envisaged not as the most comprehensive of all categories nor as a separate being which preserves its self-same existence while getting attached to different entities. All in all, Being is, as it were, the case-specific being of an entity, contrary to a Platonic form which is abstract, self-same and separated from entities. It should also be noted here that those considerations are in no way meant to give an answer to the question of the meaning of Being; instead, they try to open the way to raise the question.

36 p. 12.
37 ibid.
Freeing Being from an idea-like universality constitutes the starting point of the way of making it possible to ask the question of the meaning of Being. Further, as “Being is [in each case] the Being of an entity,” an entity is always an entity within the world, which, as will be seen later, is always understood to be a world of significations rather than a world as a stockpile of entities. That being said, it is not the intention of the present inquiry to expose the technicalities of the Heideggerian conception of the ‘world’ in detail, but the point at which this discussion arrives necessitates further elaboration on what the ‘world’ means in the Heideggerian lexicon, to the extent that Heidegger’s difference from the traditional metaphysics becomes apparent. To begin with, the concept of ‘world’ first appears in the phrase Being-in-the-World, which is Dasein’s basic state. Accordingly, Dasein is essentially in the world. Heidegger says that “it is not the case that man ‘is’ and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the ‘world’—a world with which he provides himself occasionally.” Thus, Dasein is always already within the world alongside with other entities, of which Being is the Being in each case. In other words, Being is in each case understood within the world. This understanding belongs to Dasein. Therefore, Dasein has an understanding of Being which shapes what it understands by entities and thus by its world, which in turn shapes its mode of being. Consequently, Dasein’s understanding of Being, its world, and its mode of being (authentic or inauthentic) are interdependently related to one other.

38 ibid.
39 Being and Time, p. 84.
2.2 Present-at-hand and Ready-to-hand

Now, to develop those ideas further, the Heideggerian account on how Dasein understands a single entity will be introduced. To conceive the relationship between Dasein’s understanding of Being and the world in which it is, a hammer, which is an entity, may be given as an example as regards the different ways in which Dasein may conceptualize its Being. Heidegger gives the example of its being heavy, and analyzes two ways of understanding what it means for a hammer to be heavy. Accordingly, on the one hand, Dasein may understand that fact by referring to the possible scenarios and use cases such as the hammer’s being hard to be manipulated or its being necessary in order to do this or that; on the other hand, the same fact could also show itself in a scientific understanding of the hammer as its having certain properties such as heaviness within the structure of gravitation, that is, as a theoretical object of knowledge.\(^{40}\) In the first case, according to the Heideggerian depiction of the world and Dasein, the hammer is understood as an equipment (\textit{das Zeug}), whereas the second case signifies a theoretical conception of it. From that theoretical perspective, a hammer is not ‘heavy’ \textit{in order to} do this or that, but its heaviness is specified with its objectively measurable characteristics, e.g., in kilograms, which do not change according to the situation in which it is to be used. The important step taken by Heidegger here is that seeing the hammer as a theoretical object does not take place privately between a particular Dasein and a particular entity, namely the hammer, but this conception is the product of the attitude towards things, that is, Dasein’s attitude towards the world, thereby determining its mode of being in the world.\(^{41}\) In the first case where hammer is seen as an object whose calculable

\(^{40}\) ibid. p. 412.

\(^{41}\) ibid. p. 413. It must also be noted here that the fact that Heidegger envisions the theoretical conception of the hammer as a general attitude does not prevent one
properties are always-already present, it is said that the hammer is taken as present-at-hand, whereas in the second case where the entity is understood within the in-order-to structure, it is said to be taken as ready-to-hand.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, it is with the scientific attitude and the modern understanding of the world that entities are \textit{essentially} taken for granted to be present-at-hand. Heidegger gives the historical account of the evolution of this understanding, and shows that the predominance of the mathematical conception of what is, including God and man and all that has happened and is happening, constitutes the ground of the metaphysical system of modernity.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, the modern-scientific understanding of the world incorporates, on the one hand, the metaphysical approach towards entities where they are taken to be essentially present-at-hand, and on the other hand, it is what does not differentiate entities with respect to their Being, that is, it hosts the underlying conception of Being as a universal concept.

Interpreting Being as a universal concept, which is the modernist interpretation, which is also the traditional one, calls for the concept of substance. The word is coming from the Latin translation \textit{[substantia]} of the Greek \textit{ousia}, as Heidegger states,\textsuperscript{44} and connotes the endurance of the underlying entity apart from the contingent properties it may have and accidental conditions it may be under, including how the entity is located within the context of signification (e.g., the in-order-to structure within which Dasein understands it). It is noteworthy here to mention that this does not

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Dasein to have different attitudes towards beings, but only shows that the understanding of Being, which is in each case the Being of an entity, opens up an understanding of world.
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{42} ibid. pp. 96-7.
\end{flushright}

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\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Being and Truth}, pp. 41-3.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}, p. 64.
\end{flushright}
necessitate the total ignorance of entities’ Being ready-to-hand. From the modern perspective, too, beings exist in the in-order-to structure, that is, their value as an equipment is not totally dismissed, but as Heidegger stresses, the point is the projection of Nature as something mathematical, calculable, and analyzable.\textsuperscript{45} Hence, it would in no way be tenable to suggest that ‘Heidegger rejects seeing entities as present-at-hand.’ This could again be explained by referring to the word ‘substance.’ As Heidegger’s reading goes on, it becomes explicit that it is not the word or the concept of ‘substance’ itself, but the usage of that word as the translation of \textit{ousia} [“beingness”\textsuperscript{46}] is what is stressed to be thoughtless and degenerative,\textsuperscript{47} primarily because the modernist claim is in the assertion that things are “continuous endurance” in \textit{essence},\textsuperscript{48} which is to regard entities apart from the world—i.e., the chain of signification and the structure of meaning—in which they come to be meaningful. And this, indeed, is problematized mainly in relation to the extreme radicalization of this idealization, where even human beings are construed as such beings which are, to sum up in one word, worldless.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{2.3 Authentic and Inauthentic Dasein}

At this point, it is necessary to move on with a consideration of the Heideggerian concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity and how those concepts relate to what has been said so far. Inauthentic Dasein is the one which is immersed in the everyday dealings without questioning its own

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Being and Time}, p. 413.


\textsuperscript{47} Heidegger, \textit{Introcution to Metaphysics}, p. 96, 207.

\textsuperscript{48} ibid., p. 208.

\textsuperscript{49} ibid.
Being. The entire existential analysis takes place in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger first explores the basic state of Dasein as Being-in-the-World, after which the discourse brings the reader to a point where the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity follows from the basic existential structure of Dasein. What those terms entail, on the other hand, can be understood more easily by looking at their real-world implications, as what concerns those analyses is in the end the human existence in the world. Charles B. Guignon’s reading may be followed to extract the filtered implications of the Heideggerian analysis whereas the framework itself is composed of many interlacing elements all of which requires respective elaboration, which is not the intention of this present work to provide. The inauthentic human being lives without questioning their routines; drawn in the immediate demands of the worldly issues, they repeat what is told to them to repeat. “Inauthenticity,” Guignon continues to summarize, “is characterized by ‘falling’ and ‘forgetting.’” What is forgotten is what belongs to Dasein’s innermost self; to put it in other terms, Dasein loses its authenticity in its everyday concerns. On the other hand, the authentic Dasein is the one who questions what it is doing, not in the sense of questioning the quiddity of the deed being done, but in the original sense of questioning where one asks for the ground of the deed. Thus, the authentic Dasein questions whether what it has been doing belongs to itself, thereby disrupting its “homely familiarity of everyday life.” Hence, the inauthentic Dasein resides in the comfort zone of the They by doing what everyone else does, that is, in the “average

50 *Being and Time*, Section 2 through 3.


52 ibid.

53 ibid., pp. 281-2.

54 Critchley, “Being and Time, part 7: Conscience”, para. 2.
everydayness,” whereas authenticity comes from evoking that which in truth belongs to that particular Dasein within that particular traditional heritage, for which an originary inquiry into one’s own Being and history is a sine qua non.

It will be shown that according to Heidegger, such an originary inquiry would lead to a transformation in the understanding of historicity. To this end, first, how Heidegger builds his way to what he calls “an ontological understanding of historicality” needs examination. The ontological understanding in question stands in contradistinction to ‘historiology.’ “Dasein,” Heidegger says, “does not exist as the sum of the momentary actualities of Experiences which come along successively and disappear.” The contrast here is between an inauthentic view of historiology, where Dasein’s past and future are considered to be a series of events, objectified and dispatched from Dasein itself, and an authentic view of historicity, where Dasein itself is seen to be “stretched along” in time. From the inauthentic perspective, Dasein’s being is seen as the free floating subject, present-at-hand, detached from the world in which it is enculturated, and connected with the entities in the world only externally, whereas the authentic Dasein itself is this world and has no existence apart from it. The traditional metaphysics thus detaches human beings’ essential Being from their history and from their tradition by

55 Being and Time, p. 69.
56 ibid., p. 427.
57 ibid., p. 426.
58 ibid.
59 The term ‘existence’ is employed by Heidegger with a reference to the word’s etymology, where ek-stasis means being ahead of oneself. In that regard, Dasein exists, that is, Dasein is not within itself but is enmeshed in its world (ibid., p. 236).
considering them as self-enclosed separate entities which come to interact with one another after they come to existence, and this runs parallel with the liberal construction of subject which is proposed to be “free, unconstrained author of meaning and action, the origin of history.”\(^{60}\) The tradition, one may say, then, separates individual from tradition,\(^{61}\) whereas Heidegger conceives no individual apart from the tradition. To be more precise, two different German words which are both translated as ‘tradition’ could be distinguished. *Tradition* is the Latin-originated word which entails the tradition to be destroyed. The *tradition*, thus, is what envisages Dasein as present-at-hand, that is, without essentially linked to a tradition [Überlieferung]. This second tradition, which is in the sense of historical heritage without which Dasein cannot exist, is what one must belong to in the authentic mode of Being. Hence, one appropriates one’s tradition [Überlieferung] by liberating oneself from the tradition [*tradition*].

Before focusing further on what, or rather, who Dasein is—a question anticipating another question, namely, whether a Jew could be in the authentic mode of Dasein or even be a Dasein—one of the general characteristics of the Heideggerian philosophy is relevant to discuss. That general characteristic is Being’s epochality, that is, its being meaningful only within a world which is historically situated. To begin with, Being cannot be conceived of as separate

\(^{60}\) Belsey, *The Subject of Tragedy*, p. 8.

\(^{61}\) Although different philosophies within the Western tradition are all taken to be under the same category because they all presuppose Dasein as present-at-hand, Heidegger discusses many of them separately to show the way in which they are read as belonging to the tradition. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* analyzes how Kant’s ‘subject’ is far away from an ontological interpretation; in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, ‘Cartesian idealism’ is discussed in relation to how the absolute separation between res cogitans and res extensa is ontologically groundless (cf. Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*, pp. 82-96).
from an understanding of Being,\textsuperscript{62} which \textit{ex vi termini} belongs to Dasein. The history of Being is therefore the history of the understanding of Being. Heidegger announces that this history was opened up by the Ancient Greek thought,\textsuperscript{63} and he also points Parmenides as the one who first discovered the Being of entities,\textsuperscript{64} after which he shows how the understanding mutates throughout the history of the tradition, thereby changing the entire network of conceptions regarding the world, truth, and meaning.\textsuperscript{65} Apart from the central location the concept of ‘history’ occupies as regards the understanding of Being, it was again how Dasein conceives ‘historicity,’ as shown above,\textsuperscript{66} which separates its authentic mode from the inauthentic mode of Being. Henceforth, Being is always understood historically. As a result, what differs in the two periods of the Heideggerian corpus might be sought after in how the concept of history is approached, that is, in the pre-WWII period, one might claim, the history within which Being is understood must essentially be analyzed as the history of Dasein, whereas in the later period the focus is directed towards the relationship between Being and history itself, rendering Dasein a being amongst others without giving it a higher status in terms of its rank in the course of the philosophical inquiry.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Being and Time}, p. 255.
\item \textit{Being and Truth}, p. 5.
\item \textit{Being and Time}, p. 256.
\item ibid., pp. 257-60.
\item p. 20 above.
\item In his later works, Heidegger goes even as far as saying that “the attempt to think Being without beings becomes necessary because otherwise, it seems to me, there is no longer any possibility of explicitly bringing into view the Being of what is today all over the earth” (\textit{On Time and Being}, p.2), attempting to eliminate the relationship between Being and beings, let alone that of Being and Dasein; however, the separation of the question of Being from an existential analytic of Dasein was even apparent in \textit{The Origin of the Work of Art}, where the relationship between Being and
\end{enumerate}
methodological difference or there is a substantial change in Heidegger's thought is not important as regards this present reading, as the supposed difference is only taken as a clue for where to look at in order to find ‘the most Nazi version’ of Heidegger's philosophy. And this only aims to find the essential link between his thought and his political affiliations, rather than to categorize those periods according to a Nazism scale, which would be a quite anti-Heideggerian gesture.

Returning back to the modern-scientific point of view which takes Being for granted as presence-at-hand, it must be remembered that in the end, it is Dasein who understands the world in the modern or any other way. Thus, as Dasein’s understanding of Being, it is related to Dasein’s own Being as well; that is, the inauthentic mode of being of Dasein and the unquestioned presumptions of the Western metaphysics are in an intertwined relationship within the Heideggerian depiction. The relationship is most explicitly stated in Being and Time where Kant and Descartes’ philosophies are scrutinized. Needless to say that both of the philosophers belong to the tradition of Western metaphysics according to Heidegger, and this points needs clarification. To begin with, since the tradition comprises many figures and texts heterogeneously, there is actually no single point to destabilize, even though the term ‘the history of ontology’ seems to delineate the Western history of thinking as a whole which arises out of a single set of premises, there are certain focal points which are particularly addressed in the Heideggerian corpus. Thus, Heidegger reads those philosophers, but at the same time he reads the tradition between the lines. Accordingly, in spite of the many differences between Descartes and Kant, Heidegger claims that both

truth (unconcealment, opening) is taken as a self-establishing openness, without paying as much heed to how this truth is understood by Dasein as Being and Time does (The Origin of the Work of Art, pp. 34-37).
thinkers take Dasein to be something present-at-hand.\textsuperscript{68} This conception refers to the abovementioned understanding which takes a hammer as the object of theoretical knowledge which is reachable to and knowable by the scientific rationality. As has already been said, this understanding is brought under the hermeneutical reading to the extent that it calls for a general attitude towards entities, and with the same attitude, Dasein, as an entity, is also taken up as something to be measured, analyzed and known by way of scientific reasoning. Thus, Dasein, taken up as an entity among others such as a rock or as a Helium atom, has only one mode, without any differentiation between the authentic and the inauthentic modes, and this is why it is a task for Dasein to destroy this understanding to find its authenticity.

What have been expounded could be summarized as follows. To make it possible to raise the question of the meaning of Being, one first needs to destroy the presuppositions of the tradition. Those presuppositions place Being at a universal place, which blocks Dasein’s way to Seinsfrage. On the other hand, Being does not hover above entities in its self-present identity, but always understood within a historical world of entities, which is a world of Dasein. Dasein’s giving a meaning to the things in its world, which is always understood as a historical world, that is, a world which is not comprised of a mere collection of separate entities but a world which is meaningful through Dasein’s concernful dealings therein, concurs with Dasein’s understanding of Being, thereby constituting Dasein’s mode of Being retrospectively. Understood this way, Dasein could be authentic, in the sense that it owns itself, or that they carry in the Heideggerian lexicon. It follows immediately that, then, raising the question of Being, or rather remembering it, calls for an inquiry into what it means for Dasein to be authentic.

\textsuperscript{68} Being and Time, p. 247.
It has already been stated that Heidegger first of all brings Being from its universal position, which is dictated by the Western metaphysical tradition, back to the historically constructed world of Dasein. And in doing so, Dasein is given the task to destroy the allegedly universal propositions of the tradition, which is the only way for Dasein to be its own. The difference between Dasein's being its own, in other words, its authenticity, and its being in the mode of inauthenticity runs parallel to the de-universalization of Being, and this similarity is crucial to construe Heidegger's ontological considerations not as purely ontological but also as a project which is immersed in politics. The concepts of Dasein's authenticity and inauthenticity lie at the hearth of this problematic. And this inquiry now necessitates to get beneath the surface of how Heidegger differentiate the two.

First of all, it should be noted that the German word translated as ‘authentic’ is eigentlich, which means ‘its own,’ so Dasein's becoming its own is no different than its being authentic, since it is precisely what ‘authentic’ means. But what is Dasein's owning itself? In order to understand this, it may be contrasted to the inauthentic mode, in which Dasein is said to be “dispersed in theyself [das Man]” and become “one.” To better understand what is meant by ‘theyself,’ the situation of the inauthentic Dasein could be elaborated as follows. The inauthentic Dasein, not being its own, is the Dasein in its everyday life, where it just follows whatever the public does, hence the inauthentic Dasein is the average person, conforming to the collectively produced norms of living. When to laugh, when to sleep and when to work

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69 *Being and Time*, p. 167.

70 Ibid. German ‘das Man’ is translated as both ‘the They’ and ‘one’ as the indefinite pronoun. The indefiniteness in the term is what makes it in-authentic, that is, un-owned self, in contrast to the self which one oneself owns.
are all included in those norms, consequently Dasein laughs whenever it is plausible for the public to laugh. To put it in another way, Dasein doesn't laugh; instead, ‘they’ laugh, thereby reducing whatever is peculiar to that particular Dasein to the commonness of theyself. Heidegger continues: it is the task of Dasein to find itself. Thus, the task of destroying the pre-acceptances of the tradition gives its way to this new task with which Dasein must find its way to its own self.

Dasein's everyday situation in which we all find ourselves is described by Heidegger as Dasein's fallennes. Accordingly, as the question of Being gets veiled by and forgotten during Dasein’s involvements in its everyday concerns, which amounts to the universalization of Being and thus the historiologization of the “ecstatico-horizontal temporality,” its lacking an authentic history divest it of its ownmost self. This concept of self is against many different versions of the traditional theory of selfhood, including the Cartesian cogito, the Kantian subject, the Hegelian Geist, and Anglophone philosophy's understanding of scientific self. All fall under the same category in which Dasein is understood as in a worldless isolation. Here, the

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71 ibid.

72 cf. p. 14 above.

73 Being and Time, p. 440. This dense phrase needs clarification. The oblivion of Being within the tradition renders Being an eternal presence-at-hand (cf. ibid., p. 131) where Dasein is portrayed as universal subject, which is confined within its inside which is radically distinct from its outside. Hence, there is no being-ahead-of-itself (ek-stasis) and no finitude (horizon). This also amounts to seeing history as a mere collection of happenings.

74 The scientific orientation of the Anglophone philosophy is referred here, as human beings are scientifically seen as rationally calculable and analyzable entities, which is obviously contrary to Dasein, who is stretched out within history.

75 ibid., p. 236.
‘world’ is to be construed as the world in which Dasein is in its most basic state of Being, whose difference from an ordinary understanding of the world as a collection of distinct entities which are external to Dasein is best formulated by Heidegger in the following quote. “Being-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which it could be just as well as it could with it.”\(^\text{76}\) With the oblivion of this very fact, the everyday Dasein and the metaphysical tradition are both in the oblivion of the authentic historicity. To be sure, Dasein dispersed into they is not the universal subject characterized by the tradition,\(^\text{77}\) but it is of utmost importance to recognize their alliance, in that, the way the tradition understands Dasein and the way Dasein understands itself in its everydayness share the same inauthentic conceptualization of historicity in which the entities are seen by way of a scientific-historiological objectification.\(^\text{78}\) Heidegger's proposition, on the other hand, calls for the epochality of Being, in that, whatever the understanding of Being is at stake, that understanding is always already limited by an element of time. In other words, time is the horizon of any understanding of Being. This aspect may rightfully be called the epochality of Being, which conveys—and elevates at the same time—the meaning of de-universalization of Being.

### 2.4 Where to Seek Nazism in Heidegger

The contradistinction between the Heideggerian thought and the traditional philosophy, as concerns what have been read until this point, may be summarized as follows. As has already been said, the relationship between

\(^{76}\) ibid. p. 84.

\(^{77}\) ibid. pp. 166-7.

\(^{78}\) ibid., p. 433.
Heidegger's philosophy and his Nazi affiliation might be sought after in his pre-WWI works, in which Dasein is taken to be the primary focus of interest. From this perspective, the main thesis of Heidegger could be said to be an objection—or rather, a destruction in the specific sense Heidegger utilizes—to the isolated, ahistorical subject surrounded by entities which are in an external relation to it. The best example where the ahistorical specification of the subject is seen is arguably the Cartesian *cogito*, which is substantially separated from the outer world it knows. This destruction has two sides, one which is related to the traditional understanding of the concept of subject, and the one which is directed against that of ‘object.’ To put it in better terms, the metaphysical subject is replaced by the structure which creates it, namely, Dasein, whereas the traditional object is replaced by what makes the objecthood of the object possible, that is, the world in which Dasein always already in with a historical understanding of Being. Thus, the metaphysical understanding of the concept of object corresponds to only one mode in which Dasein encounters entities, namely, as present-at-hand.

The rejection of the traditional conceptions of subject and object is not related to the specifics of how a certain philosopher characterized these notions. To the contrary, Heideggerian destruction is directed towards the system which is built around those notions, and therefore it might be said that the metaphysical characterizations of nature, history, time, etc. are all eliminated by that completely new understanding of the world where nature is not taken to be essentially present-at-hand, where history is not seen merely as the passing over of incidents which are distinctly meaningful, and where time is re-interpreted under the light of the originary understanding of historicity. In the Heideggerian depiction, all of them are interpreted around the basic ontological structure of Dasein, with which all of them are constitutive of Dasein’s Being. The wide scope of this criticism makes it available to relocate its direction towards a more politically oriented theme. As has been said, the
crux of the Heideggerian destruction is in that it destabilizes the metaphysical conceptualization of the subject. The political connotation of such a conceptualization may be interpreted in a way to allow one to construe the entire Heideggerian enterprise as a struggle against the legitimacy of the liberal subject. Heideggerian corpus is already seen by some scholars in this way. For instance, James Phillips is one of those who stresses the parallel between the isolated and ahistorical subject criticized by Heidegger and the autonomous subject proposed by liberalism.79 Furthermore, the repudiation of “a subject assumed to be author of his own actions, master of the universe, and perpetrator of his own misfortune” is seen in Heidegger’s both earlier and later works.80 The eventual consequence of the liberalist assumptions is individualism, as everyone is in control of their deeds, and is also liable for them. However, Heidegger’s position in this argument may be called more communitarian, where there is no such autonomous subject free from its world—and neither from its history, since the world is essentially historical—but a Dasein whose very Being is characterized by the world—and by the historical heritage which constitutes the world—in which it is thrown and enculturated. As Heidegger says, Dasein is not in the world as “the bench is in the lecture-room.”81 It might be claimed from all these that Dasein’s involvement in the world calls for a concept of ‘semantic world,’ ‘a context of signification,’ or ‘a web of meaning’ in which Dasein relates to entities understandingly. Deferring the discussion about the extent to which this characterization of the world reaches, the discussion about the free-floating subject construction could be summarized as that the individualist stance, by


81 *Being and Time*, p. 79.
assuming a spectator subject hovering above the world without touching it, is what might truly be placed to the position of that which is to be destructed in order to uncloak the ontological essence of Dasein who ek-sists within the history.

This situation may be approached from two interrelated starting points. First, the world above which the subject hovers cannot be called the world in the Heideggerian sense, since they are externally related to one another. Hence, the liberal subject, whose interference with its environment is the same as that of two different entities present-at-hand, may truly be characterized as the one which has no world. Secondly, devoid of a world, the liberal subject has lost its original historicality as discussed above, and thus understands itself in the structure of universal equality as the Enlightenment ideal suggests. Consequently, it conceives of itself as ‘one of them’ without having its proper particularization within a particular historical world, which would render it to be of its own; it has thus been lost in the they. Thus, the modern liberal subject has been thrown back to the worldview of the everyday Dasein of the modern era, where the ‘they’s commonsensical demand for universality has taken over the subject’s originary relationship with its fate. This fate is what must be uncovered and embraced, and it shows the communitarian aspect of

82 ibid., p. 81.
83 ibid., pp. 476-7.
84 Zafirovski, Liberal Modernity and Its Adversaries, p. 110.
85 Being and Time, p. 435.
86 As discussed, the main characteristic of the inauthentic Dasein is its specific relationship with historicity. This includes Dasein’s past and future. “Fate” here refers to Dasein’s having an authentic relationship with its essential temporality (ibid., pp. 436-7; cf. ibid., pp. 444-8).
the task Heidegger explicates when it is considered that the fate is always co-
fate which is shared among the members of a generation.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, this way of
thinking may be interpreted as a call to a generation which is suppressed by
the hegemony of the modern way of thinking.

### 2.5 The Concept of Ontologico-Politics

Heidegger’s dealing with the history of ontology, as has been seen, is not
simply an ontological endeavor but one that exceeds the limits of ontology in
the classical sense; it is ontologico-politics; however, a theoretical discussion
around the concept of modern liberal subject is still far away from making
any comment on Heidegger’s actual political ventures, let alone the political
atmosphere of the time. To relate those discussions with the real politics, then,
one might look into the consequences of the modern understanding of the
world in general, including but not limited to the liberal subject. What is at
stake in the existential analytic of Dasein is the objecthood of the object
inasmuch as it is the subjecthood of the subject. Entities conceptualized as the
object of theoretical reasoning stand at the core of the scientific understanding
of the world, which made available the industrial revolution, as a result of
which the industrial capitalism brought rapid advancements in technology,
which in turn caused a kind of enslavement by technology and by this very
worldview. As Hubert L. Dreyfus shows how those modern phenomena are
all at once protested by Heidegger.\textsuperscript{88} Heidegger draws a parallel between the
Medieval understanding of beings as \textit{ens creatum} (something created [by
God]) and the modern view of “machination” in which man is seen to be in

\textsuperscript{87} ibid., pp. 436.

\textsuperscript{88} “Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics”,
pp. 359-61.
control of and at the center of the world.\textsuperscript{89} That is, by objectifying beings as calculable and manipulable entities, the modern human conceives ‘technology’ as something to be mastered. Through this alleged mastery, the modern human becomes, in his or her own eyes, the master of the world and also of his or her own self, which is supported by the virtual success of the mathematization of the world in producing well-working utilities; in Heidegger’s own words

When machination finally dominates and permeates everything, then there are no longer any conditions by which still actually to detect the enchantment and to protect oneself from it. The bewitchment by technicity and its constantly self-surpassing progress are only one sign of this enchantment, by virtue of which everything is pressed forth into calculation, usage, breeding, manageability, and regulation.\textsuperscript{90}

Thus, the technological age which is shaped around the scientific-rational objectification of entities as present-at-hand appears as a danger in the Heideggerian line of thought. Not very surprisingly, this conflict runs in parallel with the actual political conflict in Germany of the time. On the one hand, we have the great industrial powers of the world which support and are recursively supported by the idea of the atomistic, uprooted individuals who face entities as manipulable objects at the discretion of the worldless subject, while idea of the rooted German was flourishing as a reaction to the global trend of machinated individualization together with all its roots and implications.\textsuperscript{91} As a result, it is the \textit{Völksch} ideology, which calls for the unification of the German folk around their common roots, that is, what bind them together as a community, viz., nationality, language, traditional heritage, etc. The Nazi movement may as well be seen as the post-WWI

\textsuperscript{89} Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), pp. 88, 91-3.

\textsuperscript{90} ibid., pp. 86-7.

implementation of the *Völkisch* ideology. In fact, Christian Lewalter writes that “the Nazi movement is a symptom of the tragic collision of man and technology.”⁹² Considering all these, it is not a very big step for the Heidegger commentators to classify the Heideggerian thought under the category which may be called communitarian, supported also by the fact that he actually was a member of the party which was the most fierce enemy of the modern individualist global powers.

The customary philosophical endeavor to put the political implications of the Heideggerian thought has always focused on how similar the details one finds in the way Heidegger formulates the idea of the destiny of the folk—and this idea itself as well—is with the political formulation of the National Socialist ideal. In this regard, Faye’s identification of the Heideggerian concept of the will of the *Volk* with the Nazi usage of the term *Führerschaft*,⁹³ or Farias’ drawing a parallel between *Waffengang* and the world wars⁹⁴ could be considered as the classical approach to the problem, because they simply try to find similarities without paying heed to the way that opened up the questioning. Why the classical approach is inadequate will be worked on throughout this study after the liberal response to Heidegger is formulated. What this present study will focus on, on the other hand, is what Heidegger

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⁹³ *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, p. 145. “*Führerschaft*” literally means leadership; in this specific context, it refers to Hitler’s leadership.

⁹⁴ *Heidegger and Nazism*, pp. 135-6. *Waffengang* means armed conflict or combat. Heidegger uses the term to describe the originary conflict which is the source of everything according to Heraclitus, whose resemblance even to the Big Bang would be more accurate than the wars on earth. What is tried to be shown here is the superficiality of the resemblance. The fact that reading Heidegger’s texts in such a manner without taking the necessary attention to the way the text evolves is inadequate will be discussed later.
chooses to interest himself with in his early works, that is, the entity which is privileged in the inquiry of Being, namely, Dasein. The question that will be asked a moment later has already been discussed at length by Heidegger in the early works, but the literature on Heidegger’s works has not given the necessary importance to that aspect. However, it will be shown that that aspect actually plays a central role in understanding what political philosophy could come out of the Heideggerian thought. This question is: “Whose task is it to destroy the history of ontology and to find itself?” This question seemingly has a straightforward answer: Dasein. Nevertheless, getting beneath the surface will show that the construction of the identity of those to whom the task is given lies at the hearth of the Heideggerian ontologico-politics.

The question concerning the true addressee of the task of bringing out the fundamental ontology and showing the essential dignity of humankind was answered by Heidegger, and also been scrutinized by his critics, although not in the same way as will be done here. The next chapter will explore the significance of the demarcation—if any—of those who are the bearers of the task, and will seek if a separation of ‘those whose mission is to destroy metaphysics’ and ‘the other ones’ may be construed in a way to allow an ontologico-political reading.
CHAPTER 3

US AND THEM

The concept of ‘task’ in the Heideggerian thought dates back to his lectures preceding *Being and Time*. In the 1925 Freiburg lectures, he had already developed his vision by which the West is seen as being in a spiritual decline, which by itself imposes a task to *some Westerners* to bring forward the essential dignity of the West.\(^95\) It is explicit in several texts that Heidegger refers to Germans, who are the bearers of *the* historical spiritual mission, as a distinct community from other Europeans.\(^96\) Furthermore, this task’s being given to a community [*Gemeinschaft*] instead of an individual person is elaborated in *Being and Time* through the distinction between fate [*Schicksal*] and destiny [*Geschick*]. To explain, Dasein as an entity, which is born and which dies, has a fate. The difference between the Heideggerian conceptualization of fate and that which involves materialistic-deterministic connotations is not the issue here, as this study is more concerned about the following difference. Heidegger notes that as Dasein is in-the-world, which is essentially historical, it is in the co-history with other Daseins; thus, its fate is always a co-fate, which calls for a counterpart term for fate which is

\(\text{\textsuperscript{95} In the lectures titled *The Present Struggle for a Vision of the Historical World*, Heidegger talks about a “spiritual nucleus” from which the historical facticity of the day should be understood; thus, a German milieu is designated to be the point where “we find the authentic roots of our existence” (Heidegger, qtd. in Faye, *Heidegger: Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, pp. 11-5).}\)

\(\text{\textsuperscript{96} “Heidegger too, like Baeumler, Scheler, Krieck, Spengler, and other conservative-nationalist thinkers, came to understand Germany as a nation caught in the middle, situated at the center of Europe which was itself situated at the center of a historical conflict between America and Russia” (Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks*, p. 137; the source also includes references to *Introduction to Metaphysics*—p. 40, 52—and “Europe and the German Philosophy” —p. 331—the related parts in both of which will be discussed below; cf. p. 34, 36).}\)
applicable to a community. Hence, as Dasein has a fate, communities have destiny, and it is a task for a community to revive the original roots of the tradition of the West.

3.1 The Communitarian Heidegger

Inasmuch as Gemeinschaft differs from an individual, it also differs from the society as a whole, and signifies a group of people who share something in common rather than the entire mankind. How Rockmore reads Heidegger is enlightening in understanding the difference between community [Gemeinschaft] and society [Gesellschaft]. To be sure, society incorporates more than one community. And the task in question here, also the destiny associated with it, is not given to the entirety of the mankind, nor to the entire Western ‘community,’ but specifically to “our people [the German Volk] as the people of the center of the West.” Indeed, Heidegger’s rectorial address has direct references to the truth of the German Volk being returned to itself, a theme which is close enough to be associated with the metaphysical destiny of a community which takes place in the discourse of Being and Time. Whether this resemblance is enough to accuse Heidegger’s way of thinking of being a National Socialist will be analyzed later. Rockmore’s reading is presented here in order only to see that a community is a group of people which might be said to be in-the-same-world, that is, have the same history and the same traditional heritage.

97 Being and Time, p. 436.

98 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 52;

99 “The Self-Assertion of the German University”

100 Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy, p. 66.
The question ‘Whose task is it?’ is especially important here, as it calls for an action on the part of that community. This task-giving is the hyperbole which makes the Heideggerian thought an ontologico-political project, as the task is not given by way of an extra to the ontological determination, yet there still is a task to be accomplished. Now, the who-question, whether directly as in ‘Who are we?’ or indirectly as in ‘Whose task is it?’, asks who the questioner is. Thus, it is a questioner questioning who himself/herself is. Then, the task is our task. Nevertheless, this is not an answer but only another form of the same question, because the extent of ‘us’ is still indefinite. In Heidegger’s case, especially in *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, since it is originally a lecture given to a definite group of people, ‘we’ may be taken to signify the potential audience, that is, the students of German universities, who are also addressed in “The Self-Assertion of the German University.” Notwithstandingly, it is the Germanness which is sought after, and it seems German is the one who is a student of a German university, who questions himself/herself and questions this question itself. The structure of this circular vortex is seen in different places in Heidegger. To exemplify, on the circular structure of ‘Dasein,’ ‘Dasein’s Being,’ and ‘Dasein’s understanding of Being,’ Heidegger writes “An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.”

Likewise, when differentiating the scientific attitude from an originary philosophical questioning, he states “Philosophy is always a vortex, which leads into abyss. In science, on the other hand, the object is objectively present-at-hand; we always stand opposite it in a certain manner, but never arrive at a philosophical formulation of a question with this.” Furthermore, this vortex also shows that the question itself is indispensable from ‘us,’ that

101 *Being and Time*, p. 195.

102 *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, p. 29.
is to say, it is constitutive of ‘us.’ Heidegger writes: “The asking of the question ‘Who are we ourselves?’ changes our former being, not in the manner that we add a further question to the previous questions, but that either we ourselves become questionable to ourselves or do not let ourselves be disturbed through this question.”103 Once the question is asked, this means, it becomes an always-already part of our being, since prior to the asking we were not ourselves. The reciprocally constitutive relationship between the who-question and ‘us,’ who asks the who-question and who is also the answer of the question, renders ‘us’ at the same time the interrogator and the interrogated.

It might be of help to distinguish at this point Seinsfrage from the who-question. And this distinction will also shed light on the constitutive relationship discussed above. To begin with, Seinsfrage opens a way. This opening has a double signification. First, as Heidegger says in the first lines of Being and Time, “[Seinsfrage] is the one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle.”104 Here, what Seinsfrage opened is the history of Being, and Heidegger refers to pre-Socratic Greek philosophy there, which was the “stimulus.” Elsewhere he writes of the inception of philosophy with the Ancient Greeks, who asked the grounding question of philosophy,105 after which the original questioning was forgotten throughout the tradition as extensively elaborated by Heidegger under the titles “The Development, Transformation, and Christianization of Traditional

103 ibid., p. 43.

104 p. 21.

105 It is important to note that Heidegger does not say ‘the Ancient Greek philosophers’ but instead attributes the original questioning to “the Greek people” (Being and Truth, p. 5).
Metaphysics,”106 where he reads the Latinization of the Greek texts as beginning of the decline of the West,107 and “The System of Modern Metaphysics and the First of Its Primary Determining Grounds: The Mathematical,”108 where he shows that the modern-scientific understanding is a continuation and development of the same decline.109 At the peak of this decline, in the 1930s modern Germany, Heidegger brings forth the possibility of re-raising Seinsfrage, which is not a mere possibility but also a task which is assigned to ‘our’ Volk: “[T]his people, as a historical people, must transpose itself—and with the history of the West—from the center of their future happening into the originary realm of the powers of Being.”110 However, raising the question, or rather, deciding for the necessity to raise it, is by no means the end of the path, but rather the beginning of it, as is the case with Being and Time, where Heidegger testifies through the end of the book that all his efforts up till that point “serve the one aim of finding a possibility of answering the question of the meaning of Being.”111 This brings forward the second signification of the fact that Seinsfrage opens a new way. In Heidegger’s works, one reads through that way. This new opening occurs at the peak of the decline of the West, where Heidegger firmly believes that Europe must give a decision between “overcoming of their own uprootedness


107 “[A]nother age begun. The greatness and range, the uniqueness of creative questioning and conceptual formation had faded away” (ibid. p. 18).


109 “Modern metaphysics begins with Descartes by neglecting its fundamental question, and by covering up this neglect with the illusion of mathematical-methodical radicalism” (ibid., p. 36).

110 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 41.

111 p. 424.
and splintering” and “go[ing] down the path of annihilation.” This decision, because of the reasons discussed above, does not belong to a free-floating subject who is independent of its history as suggested by the modern understanding of subjectivity. To be more precise, the stress on the word ‘is’ should be emphasized, in that, it does not mean that the modern subject is independent of history, but it means that the modern subject’s being is independent of history. In other words, the modern subject first is, without having any relation whatsoever with its history, and then, after being, interacts with the entities in the world; these essentially external interactions comprises the happenings in history, which are also juxtaposed one after another without having an organic relationship. To the contrary, this decision amounts to deciding for the world as a whole, including history. “[E]verything stands to be decided: history, nature, the gods and idols, the station of the human beings in the midst of beings; and the conditions, laws and standards of their steadfastness.” To sum up, ‘us’ refers to a Gemeinschaft who has to take a decision, a decision by which not only the states of affairs within its boundaries, that is, not only Germans, not even only Europe or Westerners, and not only the humankind in total, but also anything and everything including nature, gods and history will be decided. This aspect of the facticity of decision may be called hyperbolicity of decision, a tenet which will become important in the following chapters.

112 “Europe and German Philosophy”, p. 331.

113 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 41.

114 The relationship between the modern conceptualization of subject and how it entails the understanding of history which belongs to the inauthentic mode of Dasein was discussed above (cf. pp. 21-3 above).

115 “Europe and German Philosophy”, p. 331.
Thus, it follows from the central position given to the who-question by Heidegger that Dasein, which is the Dasein of its community, decides for itself and for its world. ‘Who am I,’ Dasein asks, and this question, too, has a double significance. First, this question appears when the questioner takes Dasein as that which is to be interrogated. Such a questioning, that is, the one that is seen in Being and Time, arrives at two possibilities; Dasein will either be of its own, which is the case for authentic Dasein, or it will be lost in ‘theyself,’ which is the mode of Being of everyday Dasein. As Heidegger says “The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self.”\textsuperscript{116} Secondly, it is the who-question that seeks the addressee and/or the contributors of this very discourse. Then, the answer is “‘we’ are Volk,”\textsuperscript{117} whose meaning is to be further elaborated later, but about which it would at least be rightful to say that it entails a Gemeinschaft that is built (or that builds itself) by a shared background, which is the historical heritage without which Dasein cannot Be, as Heidegger continues that it is “by virtue of decision” that we are Volk.\textsuperscript{118} Hence, the reciprocal circularity of decision and that which gives the decision has thus been expounded. To complete the picture, it is of utmost importance here to stress once more that Dasein is not ‘free’ from its world and from its history when making this decision. Consequently, the constitutive reciprocity between Dasein, its understanding of Being and its history—in the sense that its traditional heritage—is none other than the self-recursive play of decision-making.

\textsuperscript{116} Being and Time, p. 167.

\textsuperscript{117} Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{118} ibid. The word ‘decision’ summons the entire discussion on the decline of the West which necessitates the decision by which Europe will either choose itself or perish (cf. “Europe and German Philosophy”, p. 331).
Heidegger is not axiologically neutral towards the asking of the question, but sees it as a positive tenet for the questioner, as something with which the questioner becomes worthy.\(^{119}\) Insofar as he points out the Ancient Greek people as the first ones to raise Seinsfrage in an authentic way,\(^ {120}\) he praises this beginning and acclaims the Greek inception in many places. Indeed, the greatness of the Ancient Greek philosophers are often pronounced by way of a comparison with what comes after then, namely, the Latinization of terms, as in “with this Latin translation, the originary content of the Greek word phusis is already thrust aside, the authentic philosophical force of the Greek word is destroyed.”\(^ {121}\) However, there are handful of examples where the Greek inception is measured against what Heidegger calls ‘Asia’: “Are we farther away from Greece? Or are we already within the domain of its destiny, which was structured through its confrontation with ‘Asia,’ by transforming the wild and reconciling the passion with something ‘greater.’”\(^ {122}\) The example is from Heidegger’s travel book, and there he does talk about the Ancient Greek philosophy among other things such as the mountains of Greece and their culture as well. Thus, what is ‘great’ in Ancient Greece cannot be just entitled as their ‘philosophy,’ since extracting a few people’s—philosophers’—endeavor from the entire community would be against everything that has been read about Heidegger in this present study. A philosophy pertains to a people, Heidegger claims, and “philosophy of a people is what makes a people into a people of philosophy.”\(^ {123}\) These are all

\(^{119}\) ibid., p. 43.

\(^{120}\) Being and Time, p. 21; Being and Truth, p. 5.

\(^{121}\) Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 14.

\(^{122}\) Sojourns: The Journey to Greece, p. 25.

\(^{123}\) Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 30.
in line with his ideas regarding historicity. To clarify, the spiritual decline of the West has brought forth the "dying-out of all questioning [and] empty eternity of the decisionless."\textsuperscript{124} The state of being decisionless means two things, which may be thought as the two sides of the same coin; on the one hand, it refers to the Dasein of the modern world which is lost in its everyday concerns, and on the other hand, it signifies the liberal conceptualization of ‘man,’ which is uprooted from its historical heritage. The decision, then, that ‘our’ world, the Western world, is up to is the one between the historical roots, which are shown to be Greek, and the scientific objectification which among many things does promote the uprootedness of the individual. Consequently, the task of destroying the traditional ontology is the task of reviving the old roots from the “spiritual bankruptcy,”\textsuperscript{125} and it is the same task for Dasein to claim the self which belongs to itself.

3.2 The Ancient Greek as the Proto-German

What has been done so far is to put the philosophical enterprise of the early Heidegger into context, within which ‘our’ ontological task to destroy the history of the traditional metaphysics is shown to be the same as the ontologico-political mission of the German Volk to decide for itself. This would not be the decision for just anybody and everybody, precisely because whenever Dasein is just anybody and nothing more, it is not itself but theyself. This, to wit, is the decision for Dasein who is destined to make this decision. Moreover, it follows that the decision is for a Volk in whose fate this decision is inscribed, not because a supernatural power determines it, but because “Our

\textsuperscript{124} Being and Truth, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{125} ibid., p. 31.
asking of the fundamental metaphysical question is historical.”126 It should be noted here that Heidegger attributes the beginning of the history of originary questioning to the Greek people, whose originary understanding of the world which must be re-appropriated by ‘us’ in order to bring forth “our proto-German [urgermanisch] ethnic essence [Stammeswesen].”127 Thus, the historicality of ‘our’ asking of the fundamental question should be understood with the idea of the special relationship between the Greek and the German folks. This already suggests the twofold character of the task of re-raising Seinsfrage, one being ontological and other political, which are inseparable. The syllepsis of the necessity for the fundamental ontological questioning and the “emergence of the masses, industry, technicity [and] the dominance of reason”128 shows how inseparable the two sides of the fundamental ontologico-politics. Here, one side of the coin is the ontological questioning of the presuppositions of the Western metaphysics, the other side being the historicopolitical mission against the industrialization of the human essence. Through the undertaking of these tasks, Volk reinvents itself against the “instrumental misinterpretation” of the world;129 in other words, ‘our’ spiritual mission is “nothing less than to repeat and retrieve [wieder-holen] the inception of our historical-spiritual Dasein, in order to transform it into the other inception.”130

126 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 47.

127 Heidegger, qtd. in Bernasconi, “’The Misinterpretation of Violence’: Heidegger’s Reading of Hegel and Schmitt on Gewalt”, p. 221.

128 Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 38.

129 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 50. “Appropriation of the Greek words by Roman-Latin thought” is seen by Heidegger to be the beginning of the rootlessness of the Western tradition (“The Origin of the Work of Art”, p. 6); thus, both the heritage to be revived and the corruption to be removed are understood within the scope of the Greek-German relationship.

130 Introduction to Metaphysics p. 41.
The crux of this demonstration where ontology and politics has become one and the same is where Heidegger announces from his communitarian stance that the bearer of that mission can neither be Americans nor Russians, but it is the “German fate and German calling” whose experience seized ‘us’ so that “we experience the ineluctability of philosophizing and the urgency of taking up the fundamental question of philosophy once again.” German Volk is thus characterized to be the philosophical Volk, one which could hear the call of its own historical self. The justification of the Germans’ being the bearer of the mission of protecting/accomplishing [Bewahrung] the West comes from the idea that Germans are the descendants of the Greek Volk, and hence the heirs of the ‘inception,’ who are to initiate the new inception. Likewise, the opening sentences of Being and Truth, with the section title “The spiritual-political mission as a decision for the fundamental question,” goes: “The German people is now passing through a moment of historical greatness; the youth of the academy knows this greatness. What is happening, then? The German as a whole is coming to itself.” Consequently, it would not be wrong to associate the Volk whose fate is the spiritual mission prescribed by the ontologico-politics of Heidegger is the German Volk.

### 3.3 Non-Conservative Communitarianism of Heidegger

This is where one needs to question the Germanness. Does the term German signify a historiologically determinable group of people, while the entire

131 ibid., p. 48.

132 Being and Truth, p. 5.

133 “Europe and German Philosophy”, p. 331. A more Heideggerian translation of the word Bewahrung could be ‘setting something to be as it is to be.’ In this case, it is those who harken the call that will set the West to its ownmost destiny.

134 p. 3.
Heideggerian enterprise is seemingly to destroy the tradition which takes such determinations as having an essential place? After all, can one show the borders where Germanness ends and the non-German starts in the discourse of Heidegger? To put it in another way, can one take Germanness as a present-at-hand entity? Or rather: Can one disregard the ‘is’ in ‘What is Germanness?’

Taking for granted the fact that Heidegger submits the National Socialist definition of being a German is not an option for a serious reading. By the same token, that Heidegger actually was a party member, being just a crude historiographical fact, does not falsify this.

So, what is Germanness? Even if one takes a presumably non-philosophical work of Heidegger—for instance, the rectorial address, where he says “The concept of the freedom of the German student is now brought back to its truth”135—can one disregard the ‘is’ in the question ‘What is Germanness?’ That question cannot find an answer in a line of thought within the Heideggerian tradition without first focusing on the ‘is.’ Therefore, two different methods to tackle the question should be separated. First one takes the ‘is’ as something we all agree upon, and tries to reach out the relationship between the ‘historical destiny’ uttered in the philosophical works of Heidegger and the ‘historical destiny’ proposed by Nazism. The focus is on the historical mission of the Germans, whose historiographical delineation we all know. This is in fact Heidegger’s approach in the rectorial speech,136 and it is not the fact that the speech is not given in a lecture room, but the lack of the emphasis on the ‘is’ is what renders that speech one of his

135 “The Self-Assertion of the German University”, pp. 34-5.

136 ibid. Throughout the speech, Heidegger does not talk about what separates Germans from others, other than the fact that the historical mission is borne by them, and the entire speech does make sense and can be read without compromising coherence if ‘German’ is taken to be characterized by historiographical determinations and/or within the National Socialist framework.
non-philosophical works. Not surprisingly, the rectorial speech generally constitutes the crux of the arguments of Heidegger’s accusers, which will be addressed later in this study. The second approach to the question what Germanness is takes the way in which Heidegger embraces the issue, rather than focusing on individual words and sentences. This way is more plausible to take from a Heideggerian perspective, since it must also interest itself with the unthought of the text. In other words, this approach focuses on how the concept of Germanness is built up throughout Heidegger’s texts rather than assuming that the end product, that is, the sentences themselves, has the answer. As in a later work he says, “Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics.”\textsuperscript{137}

The second approach may also be justified by referring to what Heidegger says in the first pages of \textit{Being and Time}: “[I]n any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities—even in any Being towards entities as entities—there lies an \textit{a priori} enigma.”\textsuperscript{138} Germanness is by all means an entity, \textsuperscript{139} and one must not take it as something known to the rational subject as an object of scientific reasoning, since that would be what disregards the ‘enigma’ and forbids questioning it. Thus, how the ‘who’ of the ‘we’ is approached by Heidegger himself is of the utmost importance in understanding what separates ‘us’ from ‘them.’ The 1934 Freiburg lectures, taking place one year after the Nazi Party came to power and Heidegger became the rector of the

\begin{flushnote}
\vspace{1cm}
\textsuperscript{137} “The Question Concerning Technology”, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{138} p. 23.
\textsuperscript{139} The word ‘entity’ may sometimes sound inappropriate to designate non-object beings, but is in this context used as the translation of ‘das Seiende,’ whose scope is far reaching than ‘object.’ “Some elephant in some jungle in India is in being just as much as some chemical oxidation process on Mars” (\textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}, p. 4).
\end{flushnote}
University of Freiburg, include a lengthy discussion on what Heidegger calls the who-question, the question which asks the addressee of the task of destroying the history of ontology to revive the long abandoned roots. The German compilation of the lectures was published in 1998, and translated into English with the title *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*. In the lectures, “the task” is pronounced as “the task of a shaking up of logic.” The movement from the tradition towards the revival of its root is very similar to that in *Being and Time*, in that, conceptualizing logic as “the dried up collection of eternal thoughts” was seen as the traditional view to be destroyed, after which the logic as “the place of worthiness of question of human being [and] his greatness” appears. Both in the lectures and in *Being and Time*, what is under question is the human being, whose questioning has been blocked by the tradition, whose destruction will pave the way for reviving the greatness of the path opened up by the Greek thought. The difference between the two works, on the other hand, stems from the fact that in *Being and Time* an elaborate analysis of the existential disposition of human being is given, whereas in *Logic*, the equality of the questioner and the questioned is more apparent with the prevalence of the who-question as something above the what-question which takes the object matter as something present-at-hand. “Who are we, therefore, who are we, we, the questioners,” Heidegger asks, bringing together the questioner, the questioned, and the one whose task is to question.

All in all, it has been seen that in Heidegger, there is a separation between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ which is closely linked to the difference between the two

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140 *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, p. 6.

141 ibid. p. 8.

142 ibid. p. 33.
modes of Dasein, namely, authentic and inauthentic. This difference is in turn closely linked to the separation of the understanding of Dasein as being-in-the-World and the modern, individualist and liberal conception of the uprooted human being. While the former elements in these three pairs call for an emphasis to historical heritage, the latter elements in the pairs considers human beings as present-at-hand entities. The important factor here is that it is the task of the ‘us’ to destroy the sedimented presuppositions of the metaphysical tradition to become ‘ourselves.’ And when Heidegger asks ‘Who are we?’, the answer will—after a long way—end up being ‘our’ community.

In the following chapter, in order to work out the ground on which the fundamental ontologico-politics and liberalism may be brought into dialogue, how Heidegger’s German-centric communitarian stance could be construed in relation to National Socialism will be further elaborated on the basis of the fact that the liberal point of view constitutes the locus of conflict for both Heidegger and National Socialism. The differences between their respective approaches towards the conception of the modern liberal subject will be of great help in understanding and evaluating the liberal response to Heidegger’s ontologico-politics.
CHAPTER 4

THE COMMON ENEMY

Notwithstanding the fact that it may seem the point finally arrived at in the previous chapter—when the virtually similar characteristics of the National Socialist anti-liberalism and Heidegger’s communitarian stance against liberalism are taken into account—is only one step away from announcing Hitlerism within the ontologico-politics implied by the fundamental ontology, it has only been shown that what the concept of Germanness refers to is a community who seeks the truth of Being by paying heed to the original historicality, that is, by conceptualizing themselves and their historical heritage beginning from the Ancient Greek thought—which is not only the past but also the future by way of the ‘decision’\(^\text{143}\)—as in a constitutive circularity. It is certain, on the other hand, that this view does not point out all human beings but only a specific group of people, however vaguely the boundaries of that group are defined. Heidegger uses the term Volk to address that community. The term literally means folk, and is used by Nazis to refer to the German race, although the word in ordinary German language does not have to be associated with a racial or even national bond among the folk.\(^\text{144}\)

So, it is important to find out how Heidegger utilizes the term. The fact that he means the German folk by Volk was seen in the previous chapter, but what he means by German has no definitive answer, as he claims that “being-historical is nothing that one carries around with oneself like a hat; it is rather a deciding that is continually renewing between history and unhistory in

\(^{143}\) ‘Decision’ is used in the technical sense of the term, which was discussed above (pp. 44-5 above).

Furthermore, in the 1933 summer semester lectures, which are published in 2001—almost 70 years after the course—under the title *Being and Truth*, Heidegger states that the spiritual-political mission of the German people is indispensable from the empirical-political happenings of the time, but he also adds that one cannot grasp that mission simply with the help of the knowledge of the contemporary developments, since the “mission” is essentially about the future of the *Volk* rather than the present. Here, this loose approach to what Germanness is might make one recall the German identity described by Gottlieb J. Fichte: “those who believe in spirituality and in the freedom of this spirituality . . . wherever they were born and whichever language they speak” is German. By the same logic, would it be tenable for Heidegger to announce whoever asks the question of the meaning of Being is a German? This may or may not be true according to what has been read so far. Thus, while at one extreme is the National Socialist understanding of *Volk*, which is characterized by racial determinations, the other extreme hosts an absolutely indefinite notion of *Volk*, neither of which can be applicable to the case of Heidegger, as there are explicitly stated determinations pertaining to *Volk*, none of which has racial attributions.

Even the difference between community and society is enough to exemplify

145 *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, p. 94.

146 pp. 3-4.

147 *Addresses to the German Nation*, p. 97.

148 Even in Heidegger’s so called ‘political texts’ which are supposed to employ a different style and to be of different nature than his philosophical works, nationalistic terms do not employ a racial connotation. As an example, “Political Texts, 1933-1944” where he talks about a “young German hero who a decade ago died the most difficult and the greatest death of all . . . defenseless before the French rifles,” (p. 40) the contrast between being German and being French is apparent although no racial allusion is sensed—on the other hand, Heidegger does not abstain from using geographical determinations such as “the German people and its Reich with the Alemannic countryside before his eyes” (ibid., p. 41).
this. To be more specific about those determinations, on the other hand, two different aspects may be discussed in detail.

The first aspect to be discussed in order to examine how Germanness finds a place in what separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ is the positive characteristics defining the Heideggerian ‘us’, the most prominent of which is the Greek origin of ‘our’ community. Heidegger seemingly submits to both of those customarily accepted statements: That philosophy proper starts with the Ancient Greek thought, and that Germany is the land of poets and thinkers, whose provenance is shared by the Greece.\(^{149}\) Indeed, the frontispiece of *Being and Time* is from Plato’s *Sophist*, and Heidegger remunerates Plato and Aristotle by contrasting their work on the meaning of Being with the fact that this question is today forgotten.\(^{150}\) The spiritual tradition of the West has according to Heidegger begun with the Greek—i.e., proto-German—thought, which constitutes the root to be revived by Germans. The lineage from the Greek inception through the Latin contamination followed by the modern appropriation towards the German renovation is seen in many works of Heidegger, both before and after WWII. How he saw the Latinization as the corruption of the praiseworthy Greek questioning, which was followed by the modern understanding, which is to be destroyed by ‘us’ was exemplified above.\(^{151}\) Also in “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935-7), he draws on the same historical happening where the translation of Greek ὑποκείμενον [that which underlies] into Latin *subiectum* [subject] was seen as the beginning of the Western uprootedness,\(^{152}\) which is the basis of modern rationality and

\(^{149}\) *Being and Truth*, pp. 5-7; “Only a God Can Save Us”, p. 113.

\(^{150}\) *Being and Time*, pp. 19-21.

\(^{151}\) cf. pp. 41-3 above.

\(^{152}\) “The Origin of the Work of Art”, p. 6.
subjectivism. As for the later Heidegger, for instance, in “Question Concerning Technology” (1954), he both phenomenologically and etymologically scrutinizes how the Greek concept of *aition* has been translated and thereby interpreted by the Latin as *causa*, which is today’s ‘cause’ in English, which conveys the preconceptions of the entire history the concept has been through. Likewise, in “Letter on ‘Humanism’” (1947), the history of the concept of ‘human’ is shown to have been shaped by the Latin understanding, which ‘we’ have to destroy in order to place the human into its authentic ontological place. Thus, the history of the West as the lineage from Ancient Greece to modern Germany is a generic theme in the Heideggerian thought. What has been contaminated, translated, interpreted as well as the values worthy to be saved are all found within this history, that is, the history of the West, in particular, the Western metaphysics. The entire discussion is enclosed within the West, meaning that ‘us’ as well as ‘them’ are included within this history, at the center of which reside Germans as the nation of poets and philosophers, who have the task of overcoming the decline and thereby saving the West from annihilation by re-appropriating their Greco-Germanic roots. Therefore, what makes West what it is, and what separates it from its other constitutes the unthought of the Heideggerian discourse, precisely because the separation of the West from non-West has never been an issue of the same rank as the issue concerning the differences within the West, that is, how the Greek differs from the Latin and how it relates to the German. This point will prove to be of cardinal importance in understanding the ontologico-political project of Heidegger, but for the sake of the ongoing argument, it is enough to explicate that what is to be destroyed by the task given to the German nation has always been caught within the

153 ibid., p. 48.

borders of the West, and the non-West has no place in the struggle between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ even though, as was seen above, Germans’ historical mission will not only anticipate a transposition within Germany or within the West, but this will also amount to the world in toto being transposed, an idiosyncrasy which was referred to as the hyperbolicity of decision.155

4.1 Heidegger and Nazism against Liberalism

Apart from how ‘us’ stands in contradi distinction to ‘them,’ the fact that they are separated in this or that way—however the borders that separate them are not strictly defined—is itself significant. First and foremost, it amounts to the acceptance of the political significance of the existence of Gemeinschaft and of belonging to Volk, which by itself stands critical to liberal individualism, where the human population is taken to be a homogeneous bulk consisted of individuals who are formally, essentially and legally equal to one another, which is inscribed in the Enlightenment ideal ‘all men are equal.’ Thus, be it motivated by a crude nationalism or any other communitarian ideology, as opposed to those relativistic ideologies which regard communities as incommensurable and thus equally estimable, separating ‘us’ from ‘them’—in the sense it has been seen Heidegger does—amounts to the dismissal of the possibility of a metacultural neutrality. Heidegger explicitly rejects that individualist ideal, and associates it with the liberal thought as well.

In principle there are no experiences that ever set man beyond himself into an unentered domain from within which man as he is up to now could become questionable. That is—namely, that self-security—that innermost essence of “liberalism,” which precisely for this reason has the appearance of being able to freely unfold and to subscribe to progress for all eternity. Thus “worldview,” “personality,” “genius,” and “culture” are decorations and “values” to be realized, in whatever way.156

155 cf. p. 44 above.

156 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 38.
Thus, the liberal subject is the one which is free floating in a cultureless domain. This subjectivity is assumed to exist in the same form and in the same manner in each individual in the society, rendering all the cultural differences secondary. This individual may rightfully be called the uprooted individual, who is first and foremost a member of the human community as a homogeneous whole. The uprooted individual’s essential membership to the universal community of humanity does not disregard that the individual might have properties exclusively peculiar to them, but only categorizes those properties as those having no essential bond to the individual. Hence, the uprooted individual has a personality, culture, and worldview just as assets in control. This uprooted individual, adorned by the modern technological advancements, is what seems to Heidegger the most dangerous.\footnote{157 “Only a God Can Save Us”, pp. 105-6.} What stands in conflict to the uprooted individual, on the other hand, is Dasein which is authentically in-the-World, that is, by way of an ontologico-political interpretation, the human who constitutively understands himself/herself as essentially belonging to his/her community and to the history of this community. The ‘us’ is then comprised of those who belong to a Volk, as opposed to ‘them’ whose uprooted individuality has caused a fallen worldlessness. And it is ‘our’ spiritual mission to evoke this very fact. The task of destroying the history of ontology, as a consequence, is a task given to all in whose understanding of Being the ‘we’ belongs to a community, and are not uprooted.

Inasmuch as the modern liberal understanding of human being is in clash with the Heideggerian way of understanding the human existence in the world, the liberalism of the modern political powers of the world is in clash with the German Völkisch ideology. The last chapter showed that the similarity between the ontologico-political conception of Volk, which is based on a
specifically understood historical interpretation of *Gemeinschaft*, and a National Socialist ideal of *Volk*, which is based on racial determinations, social Darwinism and others,\(^{158}\) has its source in the two views’ respective oppositions to the idea of the uprooted individual. Heidegger’s ontologico-political critique has already been under inspection, though a National Socialist anti-liberalism might require more elaboration. Although pointing out a starting point for a social movement is itself problematic, it might be of help to research how the history is customarily construed. A perfect example to the standard reading of history is exemplified by Paul Weindling, who takes the beginning of the separation between the interests of the German nation and that of the rest of the West as the scientific developments during the nineteenth century, which is followed by a rapid modernization.\(^{159}\) The ‘happenings’ that may be said to collectively comprise that which is called ‘modernization’ might or might not form a unitary whole, but the interrelated functionality of the advancements of that era beginning with the developments leading to the First Industrial Revolution let themselves to be understood as falling under one conceptual umbrella, namely, modernity. The situation of the Germany in the face of those modern advancements are concisely depicted in the following quote: “[N]ineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany was in crisis in the eyes of most Germans due to its lack of unification, rapid industrialization, commercialization, technologization, and urbanization; in short, modernization.”\(^{160}\) One might also add ‘uprootedness’ in the Heideggerian sense to the list. Thus, the Nazi ideology is seen as the


peak of that Völkisch movement whose aim is to unite the German nation against modernity, whose disruptive evasion directly threatens national borders—in both spatial and ideal senses—by equalizing all humans with respect to their individuality. Carl Schmitt’s proposal that the politics should be done by first distinguishing ‘friend’ from ‘enemy’ exemplifies the National Socialist attitude to the fullest extent:

Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinction are between good and evil, in aesthetics good and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable . . . The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy . . . The friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors and symbols, not mixed and weakened by economic, moral, and other conceptions, least of all the private-individualistic sense as a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies.161 The National Socialist union against modernity in general thus stands diametrically oppositional to that which is based upon the overlapping self-interests of a bundle of self-contained capricious free wills. The German unification should, on the other hand, be based on the shared historical heritage and the common roots of the Volk with a complete repudiation of the emphasis on the individual.

4.2 Heidegger against Nazism

How does the Heideggerian version of anti-liberalism relate to that view? It is without any doubt that Heidegger’s detest of liberalism is rooted in the fundamental ontologico-politics. Notwithstanding the fact that ‘liberalism’ is their common enemy, the last chapter showed that the resemblance between the anti-liberalism of Heidegger and that of Nazism does not play a significant role in understanding the separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ forming the backbone of Heideggerian ontologico-politics, since what separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ is essentially the task, which is always understood within the horizon

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161 The Concept of the Political, pp. 26-8.
of the ontological-spiritual destiny of the Volk, which is structurally bound with the existential analytic of Dasein, which cannot have its source in a Darwinist, biologist or otherwise historiological domain. Whereas biologism and racial associations among the German Volk are indispensable elements of National Socialism, from a Heideggerian perspective, such “biological world views [are] historically and spiritually determined by the liberal conception of humanity” and thus fail to capture the historical essence of Volk. Moreover, Heidegger even accused Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction of being “typically liberal . . . because from his [Heidegger’s] perspective Schmitt adopted the standpoint of the individual with the result that he misunderstood the notion of the state and thought of politics as a sphere,” whereas Schmitt is considered to be one of the most prominent National Socialist political theorists and whose whole theoretical endeavors may be said to be against liberalism. Putting aside the specifics of the argumentation in order to focus on the shocking fact, Heidegger, even when he refutes National Socialism, continues to take liberalism as the ‘enemy.’ This shows the possibility of a third position which is neither liberal nor Nazi, and from within which Heidegger argues against both of those ideologies.

162 The main point of the previous chapter was that the way from the fundamental ontology towards a fundamental ontologico-politics cannot be boldly asserted, but it is understandable only through a careful examination of the relationship between the post-Greek understanding of Being as presence-at-hand and its implications regarding how Dasein interprets its world and itself. Here, the term ‘historiological’ is used to designate all convictions which do not find its source in the essential historicity of Dasein.


164 Being and Truth, p. 160.

Has it just been demonstrated that National Socialism falls under the category of ‘liberalism’ according to Heidegger? Not quite so, and to understand how the fundamental ontologico-politics is situated with respect to National Socialism, a distinction forces itself to be enacted. It is the distinction between what calls itself National Socialism and the inner truth of National Socialism, in that, Heidegger asserts “[W]hat is peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism, but which has not the least to do with the inner truth and the greatness of this movement [namely, the encounter between global technology and modern humanity], is fishing in these troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘totalities.’”

This quote, often cited in a way to show that Heidegger’s emphasis was on ‘the inner greatness of National Socialism’ and not on the fact that the disparity between that greatness and the actual Nazi movement, may be one of the most mentioned ‘assertions’ of Heidegger. As regards whether this shows a direct relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and Nazism, the fact that it does not take place in an interview or an honorary speech but in a philosophy course lecture should raise the awareness and the level of the rigor in reading between the lines. The parenthetical information is particularly important here, as it appears in the text version of the courses, namely, in Introduction to Metaphysics, but Heidegger admitted that he had not uttered those words in the class. In Der Spiegel’s interview, Heidegger states that

It was present in my manuscript from the beginning and agreed completely with my conception of technology at that time, though not as yet with the latter interpretation of the essence of technology as the ‘frame’ ['das Ge-Stell']. The reason I did not read the passage aloud was that I was convinced that my audience were understanding me correctly. The dumb ones, the

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166 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 213; the brackets are original, with the following footnote by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt: “This phrase is printed in parentheses in all the German editions, but it was almost certainly added when Heidegger prepared this text for publication.”
Two conclusions may be drawn from the above-cited passage. First, Heidegger admits a change in his ideas regarding technology; before that change, he considers himself as a proponent of ‘that movement,’ where that movement means the movement of the ‘modern humanity against global technology.’ Second, and more importantly, the actual National Socialist movement is not identical with ‘that movement,’ but is not something completely unrelated with it either. To be more precise, ‘that movement’ constitutes the inner truth of National Socialism. In any case, the differentiation between the actual movement and its inner truth cannot be overlooked, regardless of whether it is true or not that Heidegger actually wrote the parenthetical verse in the original manuscript.

Given these points, it may be summarized that the ‘us’ conceptualized by the fundamental ontologico-politics of Heidegger as opposed to ‘them’ could actually be interpreted as those who struggle against the powers of the modern technology. Thus, its politically construed ‘enemy’ takes the form of those who maintain the modern technological view. The enemy, in that regard, could be National Socialists themselves, just as the passage quoted above exemplifies. Thus, Heidegger’s views on National Socialists must be taken in their double significance, in that, the movement is praised on the one hand, and seen as nothing different than the liberal worldview on the other. “The same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology,” Heidegger writes to describe the spiritual conditions in which Russia and America find themselves.168


168 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 40.
Obviously, he could not accuse National Socialism of being a liberal worldview back in those years, but it is worthwhile to note this equation: “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry. As for its essence, it is the same thing as the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and the death camps, the same thing as the blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.” On this statement, one cannot fail to agree with Levinas: “This stylistic turn of phrase, this analogy, this progression, are beyond commentary,” since Heidegger seems to accuse National Socialism of having the same conception of technology as the modern liberalism has, but at the same time this equation amounts to considering those gas chambers and modern agriculture without differentiating the two. The first sentence also takes place in one of his other later works, namely, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in which Heidegger openly states that the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.

As is seen, for Heidegger, the fact that Jews or any other people have been treated as industrial waste is not the primary point of rejection, but it is the specific way which is common to both National Socialism and the modern

169 qtd. in Levinas, “As if Consenting to Horror”, p. 487. Levinas reports that the statement is from an unpublished talk given in 1949 in Bremen, and is quoted in Wolfgang Schirmacher’s book *Technik und Gelassenheit*.

170 Levinas, “As if Consenting to Horror”, p. 487.

171 “Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry” (p. 15). This text may also be seen as a culmination of the four lectures given in Bremen, since although the text is not exactly the same, the ideas presented in the text is said to have been developed in those earlier lectures (cf. Borgmann, *Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry*, p. 428).

172 “The Question Concerning Technology”, p. 28.
industrial powers that matters. It should also be noted that the last two quotes above belong to the later period of Heidegger.

Be that as it may, what do all these say about how to separate ‘us’ from ‘them’? Concerning the fact that Heidegger’s understanding of human existence, which is conceptualized as Dasein structure, cannot be taught as a singular ‘I’ but always as within a history and a heritage, putting aside all further determinations, this is in diametric opposition to that of modern liberal individualism in general, which is not to be taken as a set of predetermined rules and objectives but as a tendency which could even be observed in the groups that are called National Socialists, according to Heidegger, as was seen above. However, putting aside all further determinations would just be to reduce the Heideggerian ontologico-political enterprise to a crude anti-liberalism. Thus, the question is: What is there to be found in the fundamental ontologico-politics apart from a vaguely positioned communitarian attitude? The answer to this question will be determinative on the outcome of the present study, and the next chapter will focus on a reformulation and working out of this crucial question to understand the fundamental ontology as a critique of the liberal subject.

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173 The who-question, seeking for the authenticity, is also taken up by Heidegger as addressing Dasein (e.g. in Being and Time), but even then the interrogation opens a way which attaches Dasein to the world, and the world to the history, which in turn yields the concept of ‘generation,’ as in “Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full historizing of Dasein” (Being and Time, p. 436).
CHAPTER 5

THE CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL SUBJECT

The seemingly anti-liberal communitarianism of Heidegger is deeply seated in the fundamental ontology, which allows the delineation of the task of destroying the Western metaphysical thinking to be called ‘the critique of the liberal subject.’ The double genitive in ‘the critique of the liberal subject’ strikes back, since the phrase entails two things. On the one hand, it is the Heideggerian critique directed against the conception of the liberal subject. And it is not only a mere conceptual rebellion but an ontologico-political upheaval against the way of life of the modern individual. On the other hand, it also means the critique made by the liberal subject, that is, liberal perspective’s critical response to Heidegger, which constitutes the dominant portion of the literature on the political facet of Heidegger’s thinking.

Nevertheless, it is not the intention of the present work to assimilate Heideggerian approach by labeling it ‘anti-liberal’ without further elaboration. It has thus been asked what else it is there to be found in Heidegger’s ontologico-politics. This question is ultimately the same question as that which asks what separates ‘us’ from ‘them,’ that is, the who-question. An oversimplified version of the fundamental ontologico-politics, then, would define ‘us’ as those who understand that there is an ‘us’ separated from ‘them.’ This point requires elucidation.

5.1 That Specific Anti-Liberalism

The folk which is given the task of destroying the history of ontology and of reviving its historical roots by revoking its heritage to decide for the destiny of Europe to save the World against ‘them’ whose sources might be both
inside and outside Europe is the same folk whose spiritual mission is to raise the we-question instead of the I-question.\textsuperscript{174} This by itself posits an anti-liberal stance by disallowing individualism. ‘Disallowing individualism,’ it must be remembered, is on the other hand the task itself, as has been discussed so far. It follows without questioning then that ‘we’ are determined by the task, whereas the task is to decide for ‘ourselves;’ again, a circularity, or to better name it, a self-fulfilling task. Accordingly, a liberal, inasmuch as they lack a world in the sense that they interpret themselves as having no essential relationship with their historical heritage by advocating the idea of separate and distinct existence of human beings in their essence, would lack a task. Understanding the task in this way would amount to construing Heidegger’s call to be the one which calls for a unification under the empty umbrella term ‘history;’ because, with this reading, what matters—so to speak—is only the acceptance of the existence of human beings within history in an essential way, without further questioning the specific historical heritage that particular ‘generation’ exists within. This perspective, to be sure, does not equate all of the cultures, as the allegedly neutral stance of cultural relativism would do,\textsuperscript{175} since there are two different groups of people, that is, two different ‘generations’ and thus two different destinies; the first one having the task of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{174} Heidegger especially stresses the point that the who-question is directed to a ‘we’ rather than the individual ‘I’ (\textit{Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language}, p. 45); also see footnote 173 above.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Since the modern liberal subject is essentially cultureless, by the same token, all cultures are equally justifiable and at the same level of essential dignity; thus, liberalism and cultural relativism go hand in hand with each other (cf. Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)}, p. 68).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
destroying ontology\textsuperscript{176} of the second one, which is destined to collapse.\textsuperscript{177} This simple separation adds nothing to the dismissal of the modern liberal subject, and should be supported by a further developed reading on how Heidegger conceptualizes the German \textit{Volk}, which will show that Heidegger’s ontologico-political stance is not a mere anti-liberalism, but involves several positive elements.

To begin with, Heidegger makes it explicit that “We are a \textit{Volk}, not the \textit{Volk}.”\textsuperscript{178} Indeed, it would still be a universalistic attitude if Heidegger claimed ‘we’ are the \textit{Volk}. Because, in that case, there would be assumed one shared history to be retrieved, and one \textit{Gemeinschaft} of people with a unique heritage. The German \textit{Volk},\textsuperscript{179} then,— ‘our’ folk, which assumes the responsibility to decide not only for itself but also for the world in general\textsuperscript{180}—would be the community of whoever has a community. Hence, the fact that ‘us’ does not designate the \textit{Volk} but a \textit{Volk} accounts for the disengagement from such a universalistic attitude. How is then the German \textit{Volk} described? What makes it unique among all those other communities?

\textsuperscript{176} Since the ontological task of destroying the Western metaphysics is not separable from the political task of deciding for oneself (cf. p. 44 above), upon confrontation of the two cultures (authentic and inauthentic), it follows that it is the task of the authentic \textit{Volk} to destroy—in the specific sense Heidegger utilizes the term—the sedimented values of the other one which supports the uprootedness and individuation of human beings.

\textsuperscript{177} “Only the utmost decision from within and about the truth of be-ing still brings about clarity; otherwise what remains is the continual dawning of renovations and disguises, or even a total collapse” (Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)}, p. 68).

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language}, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{179} cf. footnote 96 above.

\textsuperscript{180} cf. pp. 44-5 above.
Giving an answer to those questions will reveal how the fundamental ontologico-politics is different than a crude radical anti-liberalism.

5.2 On-what-ground and In-which-manner of the Separation of ‘Us’ from ‘Them’

It has been stated that if the Heideggerian ontologico-politics revolved around a mere anti-liberalism, then the ‘us’ would not need any further determination than its being separated from the ‘them,’ since this separation itself constitutes a critique of the liberal subject with Dasein’s belongingness to a community instead of being an atom in the homogeneous strata of equalized human beings. How Heidegger differs from this sheer anti-liberalism lies in two interrelated structural elements in the originary understanding of the ‘us.’ The first one may be called the on-what-ground of the separation of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the second one is the in-which-manner of the separation. As already apparent in their naming, on-what-ground refers to the ground on which the separation is made, while in-which-manner describes the specific way Heidegger’s envisaging this separation.

The first aspect regarding what is there to be found in the fundamental ontologico-politics apart from an anti-liberalism embellished with void determinations, namely, on-what-ground of the separation, lies in the fact that the demarcation of what constitutes the basis of the historical man is asserted to be decision, engagement and freedom.\textsuperscript{181} Along the course of the related text, Heidegger does not differentiate between those terms, and since it has already been covered what is meant by the decision of the people, it necessitates no further explanation to describe the concept of decision in that

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Being and Truth}, p. 161.
context. However, to better evaluate what further determination Heidegger will talk about related to the concept of decision, it might be of help to give a contextual account of the passage. The discussion takes place in a section entitled “On 30 January 1933: Kolbenheyer,” whose first sentence goes “Every age and every people has its cave, and the cave dwellers to go with it.”\(^{182}\) This, from the outset, displays an anti-liberal character, which is also supported later as Heidegger analyzes Kolbenheyer’s cultural politics. The issue at stake is how to define the ‘cave.’ The anti-liberal part comes before this determination, as the fact that no one is without a cave is already a metaphor to the fact that every human being belongs to a community.\(^{183}\) What sustains a community as itself without its parts being crumbled, what demarcates its boundaries, as Heidegger claims there, cannot be based on any biological determinations; this includes any Darwinian way to define what Germanness is, as well as any racist ground on which the Gemeinschaft will be gathered together. Heidegger claims that “Kolbenheyer does not see [that the] Darwinian doctrine of life . . . is historically and spiritually determined by the liberal conception of humanity and human society that was dominant in the English positivism of the nineteenth century.” Thus, the bond that binds a cave’s dwellers together cannot be understood in Darwinian evolutionary terms. Darwinian evolution, to be sure, could be interpreted in such a way that the genetic heritage a species has means the historical bond which brings a species together with its ancestral roots; but that would also mean

\(^{182}\) ibid., p. 159.

\(^{183}\) It would be timely to mention here once more that for liberalism as well, people may belong to a community; but this belonging does not constitute an essential part of their existence. This principle is reflected in the liberal political tendency of cultural relativism, which depends on the principle of equality/incommensurability of different cultures, which amounts to the elimination of the significance of cultural heritage in the Heideggerian lexicon (for the principle of equality of cultures and how it leads to relativism, cf. Zafirovski, *Liberal Modernity and Its Adversaries*, p. 112).
disregarding the technical nature of the Heideggerian terms involved, such as ‘heritage’ and ‘roots,’ by using those terms in a promiscuous and scratchy way. What is demonstrated here is that one cannot use the term ‘historical heritage’ in the Heideggerian sense loosely, that the term connotes a specific meaning which excludes biological and Darwinian zeal, and that there must be another way to understand the historicity of the Volk. The following passage remarkably shows what else is not the on-what-ground of the separation.

In principle this way [Kolbenhery’s way] of thinking is no different from the psychoanalysis of Freud and his ilk. And in principle it is also no different from Marxism, which takes the spiritual as a function of the economic production process; whether I take the biological or something else instead of this is all the same for the decisive question regarding the way of Being of the historical people. 184

Thus, Marxism, as well as psychoanalysis, are ultimately a form of that unoriginal thought which could not capture the essence of how the separation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is to be made. Both of those perspectives, on the other hand, consider human beings as existing within a structure, contrary to liberalism which conceptualizes human beings as atomic individuals which are essentially beyond any structure. To explain, while in Marxism human beings are unthinkable without specific social relationships, psychoanalysis asserts that the human consciousness cannot conform to the free-floating subject as described by the Enlightenment thinkers—a description which may also be called the modern liberal understanding of subject—but must essentially be thought in terms of its relations to what lies beyond it, namely, the unconscious. Hence, for instance, ‘us’ may refer to the proletariat whereas ‘they’ describes the capitalists. The distinction is made, but not paying heed to the originary historicality of Dasein as described by Heidegger, which is supposed to be the true on-what-ground of separation.

184 Being and Truth, p. 161.
Finding out the exact characteristics of the on-what-ground of how ‘us’ is separated from ‘them,’ or of what the essence of Germanness is—which is the same question—may even be an impossible task for the Heidegger reader. Nonetheless, it is without question that this separation cannot be made on the basis of economical, psychiatric, or biological/racial classifications. This shows that the Volk, although the matter of fact is that it is not unique, is not just one Volk among others, but is the one whose determination lies in the decision for its very historicity. Thus, it cannot describe a Gemeinschaft based on a shared economic interest, regardless of the fact that shared economic interest could distinguish a Volk among others. Rather, it is a specific kind of determination of a Volk, that is, the concord of the Gemeinschaft with its history, that defines and renders a conglomeration of persons a Volk so that it is not an arbitrary community but a community whose spiritual mission is to claim itself by reviving its historical roots. In this depiction, the Volk pairs with Germans whereas the historical roots refer to the Greek heritage. This pairing has already been supported by various examples, and it is also possible to show it in the passage where all these are elucidated through a reading of Kolbenheyer, as Heidegger explicitly refers to Nazi’s acquiring the regime in 1993 by the words “1933, the revolution . . . but what remains decisive is helping to shape the historical-political reality so radically in all domains of Dasein that the new necessities of Being come to have effect and take shape without falsification.”185

The point at which the discussion of on-what-ground is brought is far away from a sheer anti-liberalism. The element of on-what-ground posits an understanding of Gemeinschaft whose historicity does not allow any interpretation which is essentially and ultimately based on scientific reasoning, be it economically or psychologically aligned, and this brings out

185 ibid., p. 162.
the second element, namely, the in-which-manner of the separation of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The in-which-manner will be the last station in the seeking of the determination of how the conceptual dwelling place (the “cave”, if one realizes that the discourse is still in the reign of the metaphor in “every people has its cave”\(^{186}\) of the German \textit{Volk} are demarcated, and it will play a key indicative role in ‘labeling’ a critique against Heidegger as a liberal response or not.

To begin with, how Heidegger differentiates the ontologico-politically determined \textit{Gemeinschaft} from the ‘them’ might be further elaborated. It has been stated that Heidegger referred Hitler’s party’s election as a “revolution;” here is how he characterizes this revolution: “Evolution—certainly! Development, solidification, and radically questioning obligation = clarification of the revolutionary reality.—But not: revolution is something over and done with.”\(^{187}\) The first thing that attracts attention here is the mathematical-like formality in the statement. Not to mention the equal sign, the statement is composed of a series of appointed words for what conforms to the true nature of the ‘revolution’ and what not. Accordingly, it is understood that as far as the historical heritage and roots, namely, the Greek roots, are concerned, the ‘But not:’ part of the equation says that they are not to be taken as the reference points having fixed nature so that the true German goes and redeems the ‘old values’ which are present-at-hand. Conceiving history in this way is indeed what Heidegger rejects outright and opposes in a most severe way. The most elementary yet as much decisive opposition to this understanding takes place in the analysis of the ordinary understanding of history in \textit{Being and Time}. As is discussed in Chapter 2, the traditional

\(^{186}\) ibid., p. 159.

\(^{187}\) ibid., p. 162.
metaphysical view of the world in general considers nature as an aggregate of things which are by themselves present-at-hand. This view also includes seeing history as a collection of happenings which are present-at-hand. Against this background, the tradition conceives ‘past as no longer present-at-hand,’ meaning, what was in the past is understood in relation to its being once present-at-hand. This, for Heidegger, is the historiological objectification of the primordial temporality of Dasein. On the other hand, he describes the authentic temporality of Dasein as “something futural which is making present—that is to say, in the temporalizing of its temporality.” It follows that what past is, for Dasein, is not left behind, but belongs to the future of Dasein. What does this fundamental distinction tell about the in-which-manner of the separation of ‘us’ and ‘them’? One must recall here that the separation belongs to the history of Dasein—not in the sense of a particular Dasein’s life story but in the originary sense of history where it is always understood in relation to the historizing of its generation’s (the Volk’s) co-historizing—and therefore it is to be found in a Volk has been separated from other Volks within history. The past’s not being left behind, then, signifies in this context that the in-which-manner of the separation employs a concurrent re-appropriation, where the heritage is not taken to be something statically present-at-hand whose determinations are cognized by the knowing subject, but as something belonging to future, that is, something which shapes the very moment and be shaped by it.

188 The essential historicality of Dasein is discussed on p. 25 above.
189 Being and Time, p. 433.
190 ibid., p. 432.
191 ibid., p. 436.
5.3 The Historicality of the Volk

The formal treatment of the subject in *Being and Time* allows a limited interpretation of historicality with regard to its political connotations, whereas in the works following it, a clearer picture of how the Volk is supposed to think of its past is given more clearly, based on the same conception of authentic historicality as temporalizing of temporality. When discussing the retrieval and repetition of the historical-spiritual Dasein of the Volk of the center of the West, i.e. of the German Volk, Heidegger expressly stresses the point that the repetition [*wieder-holen*] of the Greek inception is supposed to “transform it into the other inception,” and continues that

Such a thing is possible. It is in fact the definitive form of history, because it has its onset a happening that grounds history. But an inception is not repeated when one shrinks back to it as something that once was, something that by now is familiar and is simply to be imitated, but rather when the inception is begun again *more originally*, and with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity that a genuine inception brings with it. Repetition as we understand it is anything but the ameliorating continuation of what has been, by means of what has been. ¹⁹²

This remarkable passage summarizes the entire Heideggerian perspective as regards how to read history, in that, ‘returning to the roots’ cannot be understood within the framework of historiological objectification, precisely because that framework itself is the metaphysical *per se*. In the passage quoted above, it is also seen that the requirement of the reinvention of the roots is not dictated externally, but stems from the very fact that what is to be retrieved bears the name ‘inception.’ Thus, it is to be *repeated* in its being an inception as well. A constant reinvention of the originary roots without stopping questioning, a decision grounded on the groundless, a *Gemeinschaft* the strength and greatness of the common denominator of whose constituents lies not in the rigidness of its boundaries but in the very questionability and

¹⁹² *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 41.
undeterminedness of them... Such is the outcome of the Heideggerian reading of history, as the above paragraph clearly instantiates.

As a matter of fact, in *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, Heidegger gives two possible in-which-manners of how the ‘we’ is to be identified, namely, outer and inner identification of the ‘we.’ Accordingly, the outer identification is when the ‘we’ is “determined distinctly, perhaps by specifying the geographical place on the planet . . . At the same time, the point in time [as] the position in the numerical series of the years up to the day and hour . . . However, are we determined by this?”193 The emphasis on the word ‘we’ shows that this identification determines something, but whether that something is ‘we’ or not is still questionable, which shows that ‘we’ is still not determined by this outer identification. Thus, the in-which-manner of the determination of the ‘we’, Heidegger concludes, must be by the ‘we’ itself from within.194 The outer identification falls short in determining the ‘we’ as it takes ‘we’ to be a present-at-hand object, and tries to determine its objectifiable properties. As was already considered in Chapter 3 above, the inner determination amounts to the decision of the Volk who decides for itself, which is the right way to determine ‘we.’ Therefore, the in-which-manner of the separation of ‘us’ and ‘them is another way of saying in-which-manner of the decision, since the Volk will be determined by this very decision. As the determination of the ‘we’ was a task essentially against the traditional metaphysical conception of ‘determination’ as outer determination, the in-which-manner of the decision

193 *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, p. 48.

194 ibid., p. 49.
does likewise show a destructive tendency,\textsuperscript{195} which is seen in the following passages.

That erroneous main result of all science of history, which paralyzes our relation to history and which pronounces itself in the statement “There is nothing new under the sun,” . . . provides to knowledge the semblance of superiority and solidifies a condition, which I would like to call the condition of historical indolence.\textsuperscript{196}

That which has been is not an empty time-determination; beenness is not an indifferent space for storage, but it is that which essences from earlier on, that is, that which essences of our own essence.\textsuperscript{197}

Again, Heidegger positions his understanding against the modern liberal historiology by saying that the scientific view of history paralyzes it, meaning, it renders history a static collection of happenings. On the other hand, in-which-manner of the decision requires that what happened in the past needs to be rendered as what gives the essence ‘us’ today.

These all suggest that what Heidegger envisages when he talks about ‘historical heritage,’ ‘Greek inception,’ and ‘originary roots,’ those terms do not signify a fixed, present-at-hand set of norms. This idea is also supported by the distinction between decision and choice. He sets forth this difference as follows. “What is decision at all? Not choice. Choosing always involves only what is pregiven and can be taken or rejected.”\textsuperscript{198} Thus, the concept of choice implies that there are given options to choose among, which also suggests the existence of a choice-maker distinct from what is given to it as a set of options. Hence, it would be a liberal interpretation of the originary historicality of Dasein and of the Volk if the term ‘choice’ was employed

\textsuperscript{195} The term ‘destructive’ is used in the Heideggerian sense as in “the task of destroying the history of ontology” (cf. p. 30 above).

\textsuperscript{196} Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{197} ibid., p. 97.

\textsuperscript{198} Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 69.
instead of ‘decision.’ Because with ‘decision,’ as is the case with Heidegger’s
depiction of the historical-political mission of the Germans, what is decided
is the decision-giver itself, which is completely opposing to the liberal
choice-making. This carries the entire discussion on how the modern
understanding sees the world—and how Heidegger destroys the metaphysical
presuppositions behind it—to the issue of historical heritage, which renders
it natural to expect from the scientifically oriented technological worldview
of the modern liberalism to take history as present-at-hand.

5.4 Wieder-holen as the Essence of Decision and the Liberal Response

Consequently, wieder-holen of the Greco-Germanic roots resists being
interpreted in a way where the historical heritage to be retrieved-repeated has
a definite existence beyond the current situation in which the German Dasein
finds itself. That is to say, the German Dasein is to be created rather than
exported, and this is by no means an act of an autonomous free will; thus, the
history and ‘now’ are in a recursive relationship. Disregarding this fact and
interpreting Heidegger as if he promoted copying the thoughts and culture of
the Ancient Greeks—or as if he advocated embarking on a predetermined set
of norms—would amount to falling back into the paralysis of the
originally-dynamic history, and such an interpretation must first face the
Heideggerian destruction. To sum up, in-which-manner of the decision is
wieder-holen.

The fact that the characterization of in-which-manner according to Heidegger
is wieder-holen has three significant consequences. First, it shows that the

\[199\text{ In fact, the Volk decides not only for itself but because of the fact that the “decision [is] not only related [to] but determined only from within it [the truth of Being]” (ibid.), the decision embraces the entirety of what there is, which includes the Volk itself (cf. pp. 44-5 above).}\]
way how the political aspect of the fundamental ontology refutes modernity and liberalism. Second, it points out to the definite but thin borders that separate Heideggerian ontologico-politics from National Socialism. And third, it shuts the way of any liberal critique—liberal in the sense that an analysis which does not take into account the in-which-manner of the decision—that addresses to the tendency of the Heideggerian philosophy towards National Socialism. Nevertheless, current literature on this issue is mostly of the kind which disregards that Heidegger’s ideal is a constantly changing ‘Germany’ which creates and recreates itself without a reserve. Those critiques, which are also the ones with the most publicity, may rightfully be called the response of liberalism to Heidegger, a few example of which will be read below.

To pick several well-known examples from many, Farias’ study on the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and National Socialism is epiphanically liberal. To explain, as Farias reads Heidegger on the necessity “to revitalize the peculiar original power of the ‘German essence,’” he claims that

Heidegger replaced the biological-substance ideology of National Socialism (which he believed to deviate from the right way and to miss the metaphysical dimension of politics) with a “natural,” innate German essence that should now manifest itself “historically.”

200 It must be noted that the term ‘liberalism’ here is used strictly in the sense that has been referred throughout this study, that is, in the sense which includes even the thoughts of some National Socialist thinkers. Heidegger does not hesitate to call whoever conceptualizes history without paying heed to the originary historicality a liberal. Even Kolbenheyer, who is one of the leading pro-Nazi novelist and poet, was criticized by Heidegger on the basis of the affinity of his thoughts and liberalism (cf. pp. 71-73 above).

201 Heidegger and Nazism, p. 268.

202 ibid., p. 272.
Although the divergence between Heidegger and National Socialism is appreciated by Farias, the reason why there is a divergence is shown to be a mere disagreement on the object which is to be taken as the point of reference. Accordingly, for Farias, while this object is racially determined for National Socialists, it is determined by a ‘natural’ essence for Heidegger. The inevitable result of this reading is to attribute Heidegger with the idea of an innate nature that pertains to Germans. On the other hand, this approach clearly disregards the in-which-manner of the decision, with which an innate nature cannot be compatible. The difference between the ‘biological-substance ideology of National Socialism’ and Heidegger’s views cannot be resolved by changing the object which constitutes the basis of German’s essence, since the Heideggerian destruction is directed to the objecthood of that essence. Moreover, in-which-manner of the appropriation of the German essence cannot be applicable to any innate essence, because it is the crux of the idea of wieder-holen not to have a statically determinable code of living. Faye even goes further than Farias in his readings of Heidegger and claimed that Heidegger, when answering the question ‘Who are we ourselves?’, even submits the characterization of Germans on biological-racial terms proposed by National Socialism. “Lodged at the hearth of [his] ideas there is, explicitly assumed by Heidegger, the Nazi conception of the people as ‘unity of blood and stock’ and as ‘race.””\(^{203}\) Leaving aside the fact that what is explicitly stated by Heidegger many times—a few of which is also quoted above\(^{204}\)—is the affinity of such biological-racial determinations with liberalism, such a biological-racial orientation is already against all that Heidegger says and does. In the following pages, Farias quotes a passage from Heidegger where the Renaissance conception of human beings as homo universalis [the

\(^{203}\) Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy, p. 115.

\(^{204}\) cf. pp. 61-2, 71 above.
universal human] is examined with a critical look. Since the liberal conception of human beings depends on the universality of the nature of human beings, it might be said that the Heidegger’s passage quoted by Farias is one of the many texts of Heidegger, as also read in this study, where he takes up the task of destroying that liberal-metaphysical conception. Thus, Faye’s reading is based on the polarization of liberalism and National Socialism where one has to be one of them or the other; because, given that the passage only shows an opposition to liberalism, the only ground for him to accuse Heidegger’s philosophy of being based on National Socialist premises is to presuppose such a polarization. What is more, without actually showing his point about ‘biological-racial’ determinations submitted by Heidegger in any place under the section titled “State, People, and Race,”—a section in which there is only one direct reference to Heidegger, where Heidegger uses the term ‘race’ to show that what is essential to the Volk is beyond ‘race’—Faye assumes the right to put forth the allegation that Heidegger means ‘race’ when he says ‘state.’ All in all, Faye’s criticism falls under the category of ‘the response of liberalism,’ which disregards the in-which-manner of the decision.

Yet another liberal response comes from Löwith, who simply equates Heideggerian concept of ‘decision’ with that in Schmitt’s political


206 “But closely related to this is a term such as ‘public health,’ in which one also now feels the tie of the unity of blood and stock, of the race. But in the most comprehensive sense, we use the term Volk [instead of ‘public health’ which has racial connotations] when we speak of . . . a kind of Being that has grown under a common fate and taken distinctive shape” (Heidegger, Nature, History, State: 1933-1934, p. 43). Whereas Heidegger stresses the point that the Volk is to be defined by belongingness to a common fate, Farias quotes only the first sentence to show that Heidegger advocates a unification around racial identity (Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy, p. 118).
decisionism, without feeling obliged to show the correspondence between two different conceptualizations of ‘decision’ apart from drawing on the fact that both Heidegger and Schmitt reject the liberal understanding of human being as universal, essentially individualistic, and equal with one another regardless of their culture.207 This would only be acceptable if the liberal-Nazi polarization mentioned above is true without question. However, as is shown throughout the entire study, Heidegger’s stance can be categorized neither under liberalism nor Nazism, nor any version of them, nor any version of their sheer opposites, since the Heideggerian destruction is directed radically against the prevalent metaphysical thinking of modern times and hence requires the shaking up of all those categories to construe the concepts of historicity, fate, decision, and human being over again in a more originary way at the “new inception.”208 Furthermore, his drawing the similarity via the concept of decision is particularly worth an extra attention, because it clearly shows the liberal response’s ignorance and dismissal of the in-which-manner of the decision as wieder-holen. As a result of this ignorance and dismissal, Löwith’s reading of Heidegger fails to capture the essence of his political thought. The failure is even more apparent when Löwith’s interpretation of Heidegger’s ‘decision’ is considered.

He referred to this “potentiality-for-Being” both as a duty and as a “destiny.” . . . Whoever, on the basis of these remarks, reflects Heidegger’s later partisanship for Hitler, will find in this first formulation of the idea of historical “existence” the constituents of his political decision . . . It is not by chance if one finds in Carl Schmitt a political “decisionism” that corresponds to Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy, in which the “potentiality-for-Being-a-whole” of individual authentic existence is transposed to the “totality” of the authentic state.209


208 “[Germans are] the heirs of the ‘inception,’ who are to initiate the new inception” (p. 49 above).

There are two remarks to be made about this passage. First, Schmitt’s political
decisionism is expounded in his *The Concept of the Political*, and it is this
work which was referred in the Chapter 4 where it was discussed that for
Heidegger, even Schmitt’s interpretation of the essence of the *Volk* is based
on liberal assumptions.210 Heidegger’s explicit divergence from Schmitt was
apparent as early as 1934, to which year belongs Heidegger’s mentioned
criticism, which first appeared in “On Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’: 1934-
1935 Seminar and Interpretive Essays,” to which Löwith gives no reference
although his article dates back to 1947. Second, the somehow mutually
exclusive binary pair of liberalism-Nazism is reflected on the polarity of
individual-state, whereby the liberal thought is paired with the advocacy of
the basis of individuals, and Nazism—which is identified with the approach
of defining the political sphere on the basis of individual’s polar opposite,
namely, state—is presented to be all that is not liberalism. In this scheme, one
is either individualist or totalitarian, and all individualists are liberal where
all totalitarians are Nazi. This engrossing scheme renders Heidegger’s
political thought a National Socialist, to be sure, but at the expense of missing
the entire point of how in-which-manner of the decision is characterized.

It is the author’s view that the inability of the response of liberalism to capture
the crux of the fundamental ontologico-politics is not a coincidence, and such
an inability is not peculiar to the three scholars whose liberal responses are
given place above. On the other hand, the inability stems from the very fact
that the liberal response is liberal; that is to say, as long as Heideggerian
destruction is not embraced by liberalism, there can be no way from a liberal
perspective to speak the language of Heidegger and at the same time raise
such a critique against his thought.

210 p. 61 above.
To sum up, it has been shown that the Heideggerian critique of the liberal subject, which is decisively portrays the fundamental ontologico-politics, is based on the determination of in-which-manner of the decision as *wiederholen*, and that the response of liberalism, by falling short even to appreciate this essential merit within Heidegger’s thought, is inadequate to bring forth a conceptual framework in which the fundamental ontology as a political project may be evaluated properly. The following chapter will seek such a conceptual framework.
CHAPTER 6

FOREIGNER AND BARBARIAN

What has been demonstrated so far deems it necessary to start anew the discussion on a different level and a different ground. This new ground must first and foremost appreciate the fact that for Heidegger, the decision of the Volk, which is also its spiritual mission and fate, is considered to be a re-appropriation of a certain historical heritage rather than the retrieval of a historiologically determined present-at-hand set of norms or culture. This by itself stands on the excluded middle of the binary pair of the free individual versus the totalitarian state, supposed by the crude liberalism, as exemplified in the previous chapter. As was already said in the “Introduction” above, a reading which is attentive to the novelties of the Heideggerian path of thinking should be considered to be a Heideggerian thinking, regardless of whether or not it does have a critical stance against Heidegger, since there have never been rules, codes or principles set in stone in the Heideggerian thought, but to the contrary, the entire Heideggerian enterprise is directed against destroying such sedimented presuppositions. Thus, only a post-Heideggerian framework could suffice for the aim of this study, which is not unseen. The works of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Levinas and Derrida, to name a few, may be considered to be in that direction. Derrida’s Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question provides an extensive analysis of the political facet of Heidegger’s thought, taking the focal point of reading as how the concepts of spirit [Geist], spiritual [geistlich], and spiritually [geistig] are treated throughout the development of the Heideggerian corpus. However, from the perspective of this study, it would be more proper to employ another philosophical contrivance by Derrida, which was developed in a different context.
To begin with, so far the Heideggerian ontologico-politics has been considered mainly in relation to liberal thought. And this has been so in two respects; first, because of the fact that the fundamental ontologico-politics takes the liberal thought as its ‘enemy,’ and second, because the mainstream academic literature around this topic for the most part takes its source from liberalist grounds. The former is necessary as it is related to the subject matter itself, but the latter, especially after the findings of the previous chapter proves the inadequacy of pursuing such liberal readings when dealing with the fundamental ontologico-politics, could now be stripped out from the discussion. Against this background, to sum up the main point, those who belong to the same history—not just one group among others who share a common history but those who share that specific historical heritage which opened up the way of originary questioning, namely, the Greek heritage—are destined for the excluded-middle decision, a decision which has the power to save the West from collapse. The collapse, on the other hand, would mean the triumph of technological reasoning, which conceptualizes everything in the world with respect to their calculable, rationally analyzable, and objectifiable properties. This technological reasoning, which in this context is also called the modern liberal thinking or scientific rationality,\textsuperscript{211} is the result of what Heidegger calls the “spiritual decline of the earth”\textsuperscript{212} or the “rootlessness of Western thinking,” which began with the Latinization of the Greek words and hence the Greek world.\textsuperscript{213} The fact that the Greeks are thought to be proto-

\textsuperscript{211} Although ‘liberalism’ refers to a political stance and ‘scientific rationality’ may connote a broader worldview, they are the same with respect to how the human being is characterized (p. 28 above). Heidegger, too, discusses the relationship between the human being as conceptualized by liberalism as ‘isolated individual’ and the traditional/scientific definition of human being as ‘rational animal’ (cf. Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, p. 124).

\textsuperscript{212} Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{213} “The Origin of the Work of Art”, p. 6.
Germans, and the manner in which German Volk’s task to re-appropriate [wieder-holen] the historical heritage of its Greek roots, have been expounded throughout the study so far. Assuming the task would here mean deciding for its own self, and the decision is thus what makes the Volk what it is; as Heidegger says, “‘We’ are the Volk by virtue of decision.”214 By the decision, ‘us’ and ‘them’ are separated, and this separation is considered to be the one between the Germans and the rest. The liberal response is particularly against this separation, drawing on the equality among people. Indeed, the literature concerning the political facet of Heidegger’s philosophy, especially in relation to his personal affiliation with the Nazi Party, as was also categorized by Rockmore into seven,215 grounds its discourse mainly on certain separations/discriminations such as Aryan race versus Jews, Greco-German’s history versus Latinization, etc. That is to say, what is taken to be significant in the fundamental ontologico-politics is eventually related to how ‘us’ and ‘them’ are separated. However, all those analyses and readings, as well as those which pertains to Heidegger himself, overlook the decisive significance of the point that both ‘us’ and ‘them’ are enclosed within the West. Thus, there are not actually two camps that are separated but three. Therefore, the new ground on which the fundamental ontologico-politics, if it ever aims to reach at the unthought of Heidegger by still following the path of his thought, should recognize one more category alongside with ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Such a ground is provided by Derrida in _Of Hospitality_, and it is worth exploring what he means by ‘family,’ ‘foreigner,’ and ‘barbarian’ within the context of the deconstruction of the concept of absolute hospitality, as explicated by Derrida.

214 _Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language_, p. 49.

215 pp. 12-3 above.
6.1 Logos Xenos Hostis

It should be noted before getting beneath the surface that the concepts of ‘family,’ ‘foreigner,’ and ‘barbarian’ will be borrowed from Of Hospitality, and will be employed only to serve the purpose of interpreting Heidegger’s ontologico-political stance regarding non-Westerners. Those terms, on the other hand, in their native homeland in Of Hospitality, exist in a multidimensional lattice of interlacing philosophemes. Thus, their appropriation here will reflect only one possible application of their limitless implications. By acknowledging this, one thing becomes clear: In borrowing those terms, in exporting them from their homeland, there appears the relationship of hospitality, by which the foreign terms are welcome by the present discourse in the textual unfolding of the discourse. Henceforth, the question of hospitality, in whose formulation Derrida introduces the concepts ‘foreigner’ et al., has already been at work, which brings forth the awareness that the borrowing of the concepts does not consist in uprooting them completely from where they originally belong, but in submitting to an interpretation which allows the effacement of the radical separation of the two discourses. In other words, because of the fact that the very borrowing of the foreign concepts proves that the question of hospitality has already been at work, the appropriation of the Derridean lexicon does not amount to the deportation of the terms but to the nativization of them, that is to say, what those concepts signify are at work in the process of this very appropriation. Such is the meaning of ‘foreigner’ in Of Hospitality; to be more precise, the Derridean concept of ‘foreigner’ is foreign to this study, and this study shows hospitality to the concept by a double gesture in which, on the one hand, the concept is borrowed, and on the one hand, it is nativized. “[T]he foreigner [xenos] is not simply the absolute other, the barbarian [hostis], the savage
absolutely excluded and heterogeneous.” The difference between xenos and hostis marks the nature of the abovementioned nativization. To explain, hostis is what resists to any communication and therefore is what radically diverges. In the example of borrowing the terms from Derrida, that which hostis incommensurably diverges from is the present discourse. In general, what hostis diverges from is connoted by the third term, namely, the family. “[T]he right to hospitality commits a household, a line of descent, a family, a familial or ethnic group receiving a familial or ethnic group.” To sum up, the family hosts the foreigner by showing hospitality, whereas the barbarian denotes a party for which it is impossible to find a common ground to communicate. It is what the family cannot even consider to have as a guest or not.

Of Hospitality mainly explores the philosophical significance of the specific relationship between the family and the foreigner, while not much space is spared to explain how the barbarian stands with the family. This is precisely because the barbarian does not even take place in the discourse of the family. To understand this, it must be acknowledged that by showing hospitality to the foreigner, the foreigner is in no way rendered a part of the family. This could be examined by having a look at how the family receives the foreign as a guest. As a matter of fact, the foreigner who is welcome by the family can no more be just an indefinite someone, but the guest qua guest must gain the status of ‘this particular someone’ which the family hosts. ‘This definite someone’ ipso facto bears a name.

[T]his foreigner, then, is someone with whom, to receive him, you begin by asking his name; you enjoin him to state and to guarantee his identity, as you would a witness before a court. This is someone to whom you put a question and address a demand, the first demand, the minimal demand being: “What

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216 Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 21.

217 ibid., p. 23.
is your name?” or then “In telling me what your name is, in responding to this request, you are responding on your behalf, you are responsible before the law and before your hosts, you are a subject in law.”

Derrida thus demonstrates that in order to host the foreigner, in order to accept them as a guest, the foreigner must first be interrogated however trivial the questioning seemingly is. This question by itself, Derrida argues, goes against what he calls absolute hospitality, which drives Derrida to make the conclusion that in each welcoming, there is a fundamental betrayal, in that, the guest is not welcome as they are without any question, but always comes into a relation with the family by way of being the subject of the family’s law. This is the founding dilemma of hospitality: “Does it [hospitality] begin with the question [‘What is your name?’] addressed to the newcomer . . . Or else does hospitality begin with the unquestioning welcome?”

Hence, in this or that way, with varying degrees, absolute hospitality is repealed by the act of receiving the foreigner. The difference between the categories of foreigner and barbarian is the one that separates discourse from the outside. The everyday connotations of the terms do not apply here. Interpreted in this way, the family [logos] does not have to be at war with the hostis. Or, to state it in another way, the war between logos and hostis takes place by way of an exclusion of hostis from the discourse. Hostis is thus understood as that which cannot be captured by logos, thereby falling beyond the reach of hospitality.

How does it all stand with in-which-manner of the decision as wieder-holen? To get a better understanding of how Heidegger characterizes the non-West and how this characterization takes place within the framework of hospitality,

\[\text{218 ibid., p. 27.}\]

\[\text{219 ibid., p. 135.}\]

\[\text{220 ibid., pp. 28-9.}\]

\[\text{221 Coming into dialogue of the foreigner is depicted by Derrida as the shaking up “the threatening dogmatism of the paternal logos” (ibid. p. 5).}\]
it should first be recounted how he considers the Western world and history in general, from inception through degradation. The following passage gives an impressive insight in that regard.

[T]he final form of Marxism, which essentially has nothing to do with Judaism or with Russia; if anywhere a spiritualism still lies dormant and unevolved, then in the Russian people; Bolshevism is originally a Western, a European possibility; the emergence of the masses, industry, technicity, the dying off of Christianity; but insofar as the dominance of reason as equalization of all people is merely the consequence of Christianity and Christianity is fundamentally of Jewish origins—cf. Nietzsche’s thought on slave-rebellion in morality—Bolshevism is actually Jewish; but then Christianity is fundamentally Bolshevist! The above passage exemplifies the two extremes of Heidegger, and thus constitutes what is most peculiar to the fundamental ontologico-politics. It is the firm belief of the author and the outcome of his extensive studies that no other textual evidence within the Heideggerian corpus could summarize the negative aspect of the fundamental ontologico-politics with this level of clarity and in that concise manner. These comments require explanation. First of all, in the text, Heidegger equates Marxism, Bolshevism, Christianity, Judaism, modernism, technologism, liberalism, and rationalism. The list could be expanded further with the text’s connotations. Thus, this passage shines by way of contrasting among the technically precise endeavors of Heidegger, which is the first extreme. Besides, it is in this one sentence that Heidegger opposes to the entirety of the West, which is the second extreme point. Secondly, those two extremes, when taken together, serve a negative purpose, in that, as far as the particular citation of the text above is concerned, it is not directed towards the decision by retrieving the history but towards the destruction of what is not ‘us.’ This very negativity signifies a dialogue. Furthermore, it follows that what ‘us’ is always is in dialogue with is ‘them.’ Here, the actual confrontation between Germans (‘us’) and the liberals (‘them’) is irrelevant. ‘Us’ and ‘them’ exist in a discursivity where they are

222 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, p. 59.
constitutive of each other. Nonetheless, this constitutiveness should not be understood as a circularity which was the case with ‘us’ and ‘our’ historical heritage.²²³ It is therefore a heterogeneous constitutiveness, where ‘them’ is a threat to the integrity of ‘us’ and therefore needs to be subjugated by the authority of ‘us’ even if the subjugation could take place in the form of corroboration and attestation, where ‘us’ destroys ‘them’ in the Heideggerian sense, and where ‘their’ response—recalling the inadequacy of the response of liberalism discussed in the previous chapter—falls short to speak the language of ‘us.’ Consequently, it may rightfully be claimed by those three definitive and essential characteristics of the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that ‘us’ is the one which hosts ‘them.’ This relationship could not have been explicated by merely looking at the positive side of the Heideggerian perspective where the German Volk is to re-appropriate itself through its own history, because it calls for a true familial relationship.

### 6.2 Hospitality of the German Logos

Upon those considerations, Heidegger’s reading of the history of ontology is seen as the reception of the xenos by the German logos. Here, xenos denotes all the elements and facets that have been attributed to the spiritual decline of the West. In short, it is the uprootedness of men with all its previously mentioned connotations. Against this background, the non-West falls under the category of hostis, in other words, that which cannot be communicated, cannot be brought into discourse, and cannot be received to the family’s home. This does not imply a force that repels hostis from home. Quite the contrary, if there were such a force, that would indicate a sign of communication. After all, even to repel something, the question ‘what is your

²²³ cf. p. 45 above.
name?’ should be asked in whatever manner it is to be asked, meaning that the object to which the force is to be exerted must be identified, viz., must have an identity.

One must reckon here how far the exclusion of hostis could go. If logos cannot even identify the entity in question, or cannot even tell if it is an entity or not, if hostis cannot even bear a name, then how can it even bear the name hostis, or to better ask, what is the specific way in which hostis takes place in a discourse? This question may be answered in two ways. First, it may be examined how the term takes place in Of Hospitality, but what is aimed at by this approach would shortly prove itself to be fruitless, because the term hostis itself does here and now no longer belong to Of Hospitality, but is retained by this very discourse as xenos. Moreover, even an investigation of the use of the term in Of Hospitality, as an independent query which has not much to do with the present study, would not yield an elaborate answer, because Derrida focuses primarily on the characterization of xenos, which is the category for which hospitality applies. Be that as it may, the defiance of the text against understanding hostis in the Derridean context opens a way through which hostis-as-xenos provides an interpretation, which brings forth the second way the question how it can bear the name of hostis could be answered. It has been said that the presence of hostis in this very text is by way of hosting it. Thus, a very important distinction is shed light; on the one hand, appearance of hostis in a text is possible through borrowing-hosting, in which case one might call it hostis-as-xenos, and on the other hand, the irrecoverable absence of hostis-as-hostis. Summing up all these with the help of a purposefully oversimplistic choice of wording, the fact that there exists a third category which is beyond xenos is embodied in the text as hostis, while the hostis itself remains outside the home, that is, outside the discourse.
Given the above conclusion, it may or may not be a coincidental happening that *hostis* is not discussed at length in *Of Hospitality*, but it exists in the text only insofar as to coin its difference from *xenos*. Likewise, returning to Heidegger, what lies beyond the Western world is examined in none of the works which are considered here, apart from the places where non-West’s alienage is mentioned. A striking example is where Heidegger’s tone of communitarian attitude is risen high, namely, “Europe and German Philosophy”, whose opening lines are as follows:

Something shall be said, for the moment, about German philosophy and thereby about philosophy in general.

Our historical Dasein experiences with increasing distress clarity that its future is equivalent to the naked either/or of saving Europe or its destruction. The possibility of saving, however, demands something double: (1) the protection of the European *Völker* from the Asiatic, (2) the overcoming of their own uprootedness and splintering.²²⁴ Thus, Heidegger suggests that Europe must take action against to save itself from destruction, which has two aspects. Notwithstandingly, Heidegger never mentions the first aspect ever again throughout the lecture. Not only the *object* from which Europe is to be protected, that is, the Asiatic, but also the kind of relationship that Europe is to enter into with the Asiatic, namely, *protecting-itself-against* [*Bewährung von*], is never considered in the talk as a worthwhile subject. This is completely in line with the interpretation of the non-West as *hostis*, as it takes place in the discourse only insofar as to serve as the epitome of that which falls beyond.

With the deployment of Greco-Germans in the place of *logos*, Latin-modern-Jews in the place of *xenos*, and non-West in the place of *hostis*, the entire Heideggerian ontologico-politics is made clear, though nothing prevents the urge for clearing it further. As exemplified above through the special

²²⁴ p. 331.
condition of *hostis*-as-*xenos*, the categories of family, foreigner-guest, and uncompromizable barbarian do not exist side by side, as if in a Cartesian coordinate system. As a matter of fact, if their relationship with one another is to be understood by way of a similitude, the mythological gods—where one is not taken aback by a child being born out of the head of his father and where excluded middles are not to be considered extraordinary—would be the most prominent candidate from which a resemblance is to be drawn. Indeed, the textual presence of *hostis* was evinced through the category of *xenos*, whereas what was denoted as ‘*hostis*-as-*hostis*’ was explained by way of an understanding of ‘beyond-*xenos*.’ Therefore, the mythology-like obfuscation within the structure of interconnection between those categories necessitates more than a set of equivalences whereby the exclusion of the non-West is shown to be congruent to the exclusion of *hostis*. For this reason, the specific characterizations pertaining to the German, the Jew, and the Asiatic, together with their interrelations, within the fundamental ontologico-political context will be investigated on the basis of this new framework, namely, the framework of hospitality.

Whatness of the German has long been the issue of this study, which is, as a result, historical *wieder-holen*. Thus, the entire Greek-German relationship as was read above could be applicable in this framework as well. Who is a German and who is not does not have definite criteria, since the German is the one who brings forth their own German truth. The question is forthwith raised: Can someone whom the historiological understanding label as—for instance—French get involved in *this Völkish* decisionism? The emphasis is

225 The matter at stake here is not *logos et al.* themselves (whose relationship with one another has just been explained), but the conceptual organization of the categories of *logos et al.*

226 cf. p. 97 above.
on the word “this,” because it would be straightforward to think that a French—if the phrase “French Volk” makes any sense at all—could decide for their Frenchness so long as a German does for Germanness, in which case one arrives at nowhere but a communitarian cultural relativism where each culture decides for itself, leaving all the questions regarding the privileged position of Germans inevitably unanswered. Thus, what is ontologico-politically significant here is the question whether a French, by being also a Westerner, could partake in that very decision which is to protect the West. Recalling that for Heidegger “philosophy of a people is what makes a people into a people of philosophy,” this question could also be formulated as whether a French could think. The following avowal makes it explicit:

I have in mind especially the inner relationship of the German language with the language of the Greeks and with their thought. This has been confirmed for me today again by the French. When they begin to think, they speak German, being sure that they could not make it with their own language. Having ascertained that the unique position of German comes from its relationship with the inception of thought, i.e., the Greek thought, Heidegger sets forth a double assertion. On the one hand, the French is put in a position where the access to the originary thinking is mediated. That is to say, the French can think only by way of a language which does not belong to their own. On the other hand, by their ability to speak German and think German,

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227 Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 30.

228 The difference between philosophy and thinking in the Heideggerian lexicon, which has not been mentioned before because of its weak relevancy to the matter of discussion, provides a concise reformulation of the question, in that, whereas philosophy describes the metaphysical tradition’s way, thinking is specifically reserved for originary/destructive thinking (cf. “Only a God Can Save Us”, pp. 107-8). Because text does not always enforce this distinction and for convenience, ‘philosophy,’ ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ have so far been used without always acknowledging this distinction, and will be used interchangeably hereafter. Indeed, Heidegger himself is not strict about it (“thinking properly takes place in philosophy”—Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, p. 5).

229 “Only a God Can Save Us”, p. 113.
the possibility is granted for them to think in the originary way. This seemingly simple double statement does not let itself be as easily interpreted within the Heideggerian context. In that interpretation, it has to be kept in mind that originary thinking and decision are inherently connected. Henceforth, ability to speak German cannot be thought without partaking in the Volk’s decision. Furthermore, there is this not yet codified ordinance whose validity is unchallenged: Thinking, in connection to being destined for the decision, has never been depicted by Heidegger as that which all German-speaking human beings have at their disposal. On the contrary, Heidegger’s criticisms against those German-speaking German-born German nationalist Germans—for instance, National Socialists—230—are seen to be far from minor corrections to their thought, even accusing them of having a liberal point of view. In consequence, originary thinking has always been a possibility, and a result of an urge towards one’s finding what properly belongs to oneself, regardless of the language being spoken. Given these points, measuring the distance between the everyday Dasein of a German-speaking German and originary thinking, and comparing this distance to that of a French-speaking Jew would not only be impossible, but even if it was, such a practice would be all against the creed of the fundamental ontology. Therefore, despite all of Heidegger’s praises to Germans, and indeed, precisely because of the characterization of Germans in those praises, on no basis could it be claimed that a German-born has more right to be a German than a Jew does, should the Heideggerian way of thinking is followed strictly.231

230 cf. p. 71 above.

231 Here, ‘German-born’ connotes a biological-racial determination while ‘German’ is used in the sense of that Volk in whose destiny there is the decision.
6.3 A German and the Germanness

The above conclusion would still be problematic, and even be of the kind which, from a liberal point of view submitting the binary oppositional scheme of ‘either cultural relativist or National Socialist’,\footnote{cf. p. 68.} could be accused of being National Socialist, considering the fact that the only way of ‘saving the West’ is still attributed to Germans. Following the framework of hospitality, on the other hand, what is significant with that conclusion is that it shows the specific relationship between logos and xenos. Logos, as host, by allowing xenos in, opens up a domain in which various possibilities are granted. By being inside the home, xenos partakes in the history of the family. This co-historizing, applying it to the French who speaks the truth of Being through German language, allows xenos to share the historical destiny of logos. More importantly, according to the finding that German-born people, too, need to claim their share from the authentic historizing which is not granted to them by birth, it may be said that even logos itself has to ask itself its own name and to accept itself as a xenos to its own home. This is completely in line with the thought that Germans are to decide for themselves, and acclaim themselves which is not readily given to them, but which is to be retrieved-repeated. Just as in the case of the concept of hostis, hosted and thereby transformed into hostis-as-xenos, then, one sees that the concept of logos-as-xenos is at work in this situation. Logos-as-xenos would then correspond to the everyday Dasein, who follows the way of life which is readily given to it. Without questioning the origin of that way of life and without involving in the path of thinking its own roots, everyday Dasein is a foreigner in its own land, which is another way of saying logos-as-xenos.
What most strikingly appears in this depiction is the insuperable asymmetry between *logos-as-xenos* and *hosted-xenos*, the political connotation of which would be as follows: It is always the German who hosts the foreigner, and the German character of the host is not challenged by *logos-as-xenos’s* being German. Thus, however similar *a German* is as much far to the truth of Being as *a French* is, *Germanness* proves to have the privileged position as that whose members are the original dwellers of the house of Being, regardless of how foreign *a German* might be in their own home. This finding becomes more meaningful with the idea of German occupying the center of the Europe, between America and Russia. This geographical metaphor maintains two things. First, it shows the belonging-together of America, Germany and Russia under the heading of the West. Second, it reassures Germany’s spiritual rank among them through its central position.

### 6.4 The Category of the Asiatic

The asymmetry between *logos-as-xenos* and *hosted-xenos* can only depend on one thing, and that is the fact that *hosted-xenos* does not originally belong to the family. This notion calls for an outside, where the foreigner was, before received and welcome. It follows that the possibility of impossibility to be welcome, that is, of the radical difference between *logos* and *hostis*, is in play in the heterogeneity of *logos* and *xenos*. *‘Asiatic,’* here, is referred by *hostis*, and not the *‘Asian.’* As being outside of the meaning-network, the history—by being neither a part of the roots of *logos* nor of the element that threatens its originality—and the heritage, that is to say, as being outside of the domain of incomparability and communicability, the Asiatic is the alien per se, which allows itself to be interpreted in a way to include the African, the Native American, etc. It is not absurd for all them to be categorized under the name

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233 cf. footnote 96 above.
‘Asiatic,’ considering that Jews, Christians, Marxists and Americans are all included in one category.\(^{234}\)

It must be noted here that the categorical incommensurability between \textit{logos} and \textit{hostis} where \textit{hostis} is the Asiatic is at work when the ontologico-political/historical-spiritual mission of the Germans as regards saving the West. Indeed, in general, Heidegger might be said to have changing views against the Oriental philosophy. In \textit{Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy}, he distinguishes four periods in the history of Being, where the Asian “question[ing] of the Being of the world [and] nature” was the first.\(^{235}\) Elsewhere, he reads Laotse’s philosophy and interprets \textit{Tao} as ‘the way’—which it actually means—in the sense of the originary poetic way-making, which is beyond scientific rationality, hence drawing parallel between the Ancient Chinese thought and his own thinking.\(^{236}\) Furthermore, it is reported that in a letter to Albert Borgmann, he stresses the point where “it has seemed urgent . . . that a dialogue take place with the thinkers of what is to us the Eastern world.”\(^{237}\) On the other hand, Bret Davis reports that Heidegger, in \textit{Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-1963)} which is not translated into English yet, “says that there is no Asian philosophy, and Western philosophy is a tautology,” thereby equating philosophy with the Western philosophy.\(^{238}\) Also, when talking about the possibility of the originary thinking in Eastern languages, he clearly states that “thinking itself can be transformed only by a thinking which has the same origin and calling,” drawing attention to the fact

\(^{234}\) cf. p. 92 above.

\(^{235}\) p. 17.

\(^{236}\) “The Nature of Language”, p. 92.

\(^{237}\) qtd. in Davis, “Heidegger and Asian Philosophy”, p. 459.

\(^{238}\) qtd. in ibid., p. 460.
that to do fundamental ontology in those languages, one must re-think “with the help of the European tradition and of a new appropriation of that tradition.”\textsuperscript{239} This appropriation is not the same as Germans’ appropriating their Greek roots, because in this case it is hostis which appropriates/reinvents logos.

These all show that the relationship between logos and hostis is more complicated than a simple exclusion. To understand this specific relationship within the framework of hospitality, how Heidegger describes non-West requires an interpretative reading. To be sure, Heidegger never analyzes non-Western thinkers at length, and whenever they take place in his works, the issue is always about their exclusion or on the fact that there might be unprecedented ways to discover a ground for an interaction between two traditions. With that being said, it has also been said countless times that there is an unbridgeable gap between logos and hostis, which renders logos completely clueless about hostis. Nonetheless, because of this very element of radical mystery, logos’s own essence\textsuperscript{240} is under threat.\textsuperscript{241} To make it clear, it is already apparent that neither Heidegger nor Derrida takes ‘the home’—and all that it signifies—as something statically preserves its own identity. Thus, logos itself is open to change, and with a system composed completely of known or to-be-known elements, such a change is impossible, because in that case everything—both actual and possible—would be within the reign of

\textsuperscript{239} “Only a God Can Save Us”, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{240} By essence, it is to be understood logos’s being what it is.

\textsuperscript{241} The exposition of those terms by Derrida, too, supports this view, where logos’s authority over its home is threatened by the very law of hospitality (Of Hospitality, p. 55). One may also show the example Derrida gives, in which states’ intervention to homes is interpreted as “a violation of the inviolable” (ibid., p. 51).
Therefore, *hostis* and *logos* are actually in a relation—a relation which can be the only source of a change in *logos*—, but this relation is not in the form of communication. Because, communication is still the way of *logos*, without going out of which it cannot essentially change. To sum up this point, the dialogue of the West and non-West is an impossible one, but there might be another ways of interacting, which would amount to a re-invention of the truth of Being. The quandary in Heidegger’s sayings about the non-West could be understood, therefore, within the essential quandary that the relationship between *logos* and *hostis* provide.

It has thus been seen that the Asiatic, by being excluded in the specific way that has just been explained, gained an even more tolerable place than the Jew-Latin-modern, and from this arises the ontologico-political significance of the exclusion of the Asiatic as understood within the framework of hospitality.

All in all, it is not the exclusion of the Jews but the inclusion of them is what causes their intolerability as they are. On the other hand, inasmuch as the Asiatic is seen as barbarian, there appears to be a possibility of interaction between the German and the Asiatic. Nevertheless, Heidegger does not open the way for such a beyond-dialogue, but only acknowledged that there might be such a way.

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242 The main argument here depends on the fact that *logos* itself cannot change by accepting new and new xenoi. Therefore, for a radical change, a radical otherness is needed.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

To sum up the main points of Heidegger’s ontologico-political thought from within itself, one could begin with the concept of metaphysics. Compared to the ones in the early texts, a more mature definition of the term is found in a more mature work of his, dating to 1969: “Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole—the world, man, God—with respect to Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being.”

Metaphysics, thus, considers being not as the being of a being in each case but interprets it as a universal category, equalizing each being in their relations to Being. The same idea, which was discussed in Chapter 2 above, is present in the earliest texts of Heidegger as well. In Being and Truth, he defines that “Metaphysics is the knowledge of beings as a whole.”

The apparent resemblance shows that Heidegger’s views on what metaphysics does not show a significant difference, although the ‘mature’ work, which appeared in On Time and Being, is generally considered to be where the ideas in Being and Time—which also means that the early Heidegger in general—is reversed, as can be seen even in the title. “It wants to provoke an ‘immanent criticism’ of Being and Time,” writes David Farrell Krell in the introduction to the English translation of the essay. However, as far as the issues in this present study is concerned, ‘the task’ implied by the consequences of the analysis of the metaphysics which is such defined is important, and in both

244 pp. 16-7.
245 p. 41.
periods, there is an objection against the “incessant frenzy of rationalization and the intoxication quality of cybernetics”\textsuperscript{247} which was resulted by that very “technological-scientific rationalization,”\textsuperscript{248} on the basis of an originary understanding of truth as unconcealment \[\text{ἀλήθεια}\].\textsuperscript{249} Therefore, the entire task imposed by the Heideggerian ontology is the political task of unconcealing what is concealed by the modern rationalist thinking.

Structuring the conflict between concealing and unconcealing forces, one has a wide array of interrelated elements in each side. This does not mean that those elements are homogeneously forming a facade in a battle. Indeed, Heidegger appreciates the difference of each of the elements belonging to the same side, for example, modernism, urbanization, machination, and Christianity—all belonging to the metaphysical tradition of the West, which is to be destroyed—in their respective manners through different readings. However, all those readings in the end point out one direction, in that, the West has to make its \textit{decision}. The concept of decision plays a key role, both from the perspective of Dasein and from the community to which it essentially belongs. The outcome of this decision is anticipated by Heidegger to be either the destruction of the West or its finding its authenticity through turning back to its roots. The task is, then, to decide for oneself, recalling once more that the meaning of \textit{eigentlich} [authenticity] is that which properly belongs to oneself. The authenticity of the community and the self are here interlaced, because it is only the scientific rationality and liberalism that which consider the human being as essentially outside of its community. This is the same idea of considering Being as a whole, which in this case takes the

\textsuperscript{247} ibid., p. 449.

\textsuperscript{248} p. 448.

\textsuperscript{249} p. 445.
form of considering all human beings’ Being as one, resulting in the Enlightenment ideal of the universal human being, equalized and relativized, and it is this very idea that is to be destroyed; in other words, the battle is between those who understand their Being as belonging to a community and a historical heritage on the one hand, and those who are lost in uprootedness on the other. In *Being and Time*, the analysis is carried out on the basis of Dasein. From the ‘individual’ Dasein’s perspective, inauthenticity means being lost in the averageness of the daily concerns. Thus, the inauthentic Dasein deprives of itself, becomes ‘one.’ On the other hand, the authentic Dasein can find itself only by way of its history and within its community, which is the direct result of seeing the rationalist thinking as the concealment per se. A moment ago it has been said that this is from the perspective of an ‘individual’ Dasein; however, Dasein, when it is itself, can never be an ‘individual,’ and it is actually the discovery and appreciation of this fact that sets it authentic. Hence, it cannot decide for itself pure and simple, but this decision must also involve the decision by its community, which in turn means that the decision is to be for its community. In the works following *Being and Time*, Heidegger elaborates more on the decision for the community, that is, for the Volk. Accordingly, ‘we’ as a community, as a Gemeinschaft and not as atomic individuals, must decide for ‘ourselves.’

The tone of that line of thought is already communitarian, but it becomes easily associable with National Socialism when Heidegger declares that the Volk takes its sources from the Greek thinking, and the Greeks are the ascendants of Germans, putting the history of the Germans in a privileged position among all. The conflict suddenly becomes the one that is between Germans and liberals, former being the Volk proper and the latter being the political embodiment of the all that are named under the allied forces of ‘concealment.’ The concealment of the truth then is interpreted in the political domain as the concealment of the truth of the German Volk. Christianity,
Jewry and modernity all belong to that allied forces. The name allied forces is not given to them by accident, but it also describes the political stance of the Allied Forces in WWII. Heidegger’s thought, in this position, seems to be easily accusable of being an obvious Nazi philosophy.\footnote{One example from the many such discussed accusations belongs to Faye (cf. p. 66 above).}

‘The task to decide for oneself’ can be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be thought that there exists a ‘self’ out there which is to be captured. Indeed, without such an interpretation, the above accusation would be impossible. On the other hand, this would render Heidegger an outright essentialist, where all his aim is to go back to the Ancient Greek life. To be sure, Heidegger does not only not withhold such a position, but also such an unchanging essence to be attained is what he directly, openly and principally against. This is why the ‘decision as \textit{wieder-holen},’\footnote{cf. p. 82 above.} that is, deciding for oneself by not merely repeating but re-appropriating the historical heritage, plays a central role in understanding the political significance of the fundamental ontology. By not acknowledging this crucial point, liberal response, as well as all that may be said about the inherent Nazism within the Heidegger’s philosophical enterprise is revoked.

The above conclusion creates a dilemma, which is one of the driving forces of the Heideggerian ontologico-politics. Germans are what they are, though still they lack a definition, and indeed, the German is who is to define themselves. But this calls for the concepts of free will and autonomous subject, which again belong to the domain of Western metaphysical thinking, which is to be destroyed. The liberal response fails even to capture this dilemma, by not seeing the decision’s essential character as \textit{wieder-holen}.
Besides, in the course of this study, it has been unconcealed that not only liberalism, but also all analyses which consider the task as the conflict between two fronts fails to capture the essential dynamics of the Heideggerian ontologico-politics, in that, it is made clear that there are not only two fronts but three. The introduction of the third party, the Asiatic, into the scene is not a textual torture. To the contrary, it is what, in the determination of the ‘us’—Germans—and ‘them,’—the uprooted ones, e.g., Jews—is always at work. The Asiatic is at work by way of being excluded from the confrontation, and this exclusion is a clear and deliberate deed of the textual performance.

The introduction of a third category alongside with ‘us’ and ‘them’, with ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, or with ‘truth’ and ‘concealment,’ requires a different perspective to structure everything, and for this reason, Derridean conceptualization of logos/xenos/hostis was employed. Accordingly, it was shown that it is not the exclusion of the Jews but indeed the inclusion of them into the same historical heritage that makes them subject to the ‘task of destroying.’ Heidegger could not conceptualize such a task without the help of an establishment of an affinity. This is evinced by the fact that while for Heidegger the Christian, the Jew, the modern is always in the positon of the ‘enemy,’ whereas the Asiatic, despite of its complete incommensurability, and actually precisely because of it, has the possibility of coming into a different kind of relationship with ‘us,’ where ‘we’ may re-think the truth of Being.

All in all, in diametrical opposition to what the liberal reading of Heideggerian ontologico-politics yields, the source of Heidegger’s specific kind of hostility against Jewry—along with Christians, Russian Marxists, Americans, liberals, moderns, and others who pursue the way of scientific rationalism, which is, one must keep in mind, defined in the specific way in the sense of uprootedness—is not the exclusion of the Jews but the inclusion
of them by way of excluding the non-West. The Derridean reading of hospitality provides a way to shed light on the working of this structure, but it is the author’s belief that this reading may only be an Heideggerian introduction to an Heideggerian destruction of the Heideggerian ontologico-politics. Through the elucidation of categories, it is only seen how Heidegger thinks. Nevertheless, the Heidegger is never meant to be a set of code of conducts that is to be followed without questioning. Quite the contrary, the Derridean reading itself was an Heideggerian gesture, and this imposes ‘us’ a new task herein. This task would be to re-appropriate the Heideggerian ontologico-politics by way of radicalizing it, where the Western logos delves into those aforementioned different ways of getting into relation with non-West. This, however, must be a task for a different study.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY


252 Heidegger’in felsefesinde—özellikle politik açıdan—önem taşıyan bir kavram olan Gemeinschaft belirli bir tarihsel ortaklık üzerinden bir aradışı kurulmuş bir toplum anlamını taşır ve Gesellschaft [toplum] kavramıyla farklılığı açılarından incelenir. Gesellschaft atomik bireylerin çıkar ilişkileriyle ya da herhangi bir ilişki


254 Modernizm, liberalizm ve Aydınlanmacı düşünce üç ayrı akımı belirtiyor gibi görünmektedir, ancak Heidegger’in okumasi söz konusu olduğunda—her ne kadar bu görüşleri kendisi de ayrı ayrı ele alıyor olsa da—bunların her biri öz “Itibaryla” aynı adımlımlmaktadır. Şöyle ki, Aydınlanmacı düşüncede ortaya çıkan ‘farklı bir töz olarak özgür iradeye sahip evrensel insan’ fikri liberalizmin temelini oluşturmakta ve politik yönelimleri farklı da olsa temeldeki bu öz kavramsallaştırması liberalizmde sabittir. Ayni şekilde, doğanın matematiksel özelliklerini doğanın özgü olarak görüp onu matematiksel olarak ele alan rasyonalmaz de bu düşünceyi bir türlü sanayi devrimini ve peşisra gelen modern dünya algılanması ve yaşamı ortaya çıkartmıştır.


Bu çerçevede, yüzeysel bir okuma, Alman ırkıyla modern endüstri kapitalizminin karşı karşıya geldiği bir Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası

Mamafih liberal okumanın göz ardı ettiği çok büyük bir nokta vardır ki, Heidegger Antik Yunan’ı geri dönülmesi gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulması gereken bir yaşam rehberi yahut uyulmas


\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{256} Aydınlanma filozofları genel felsefe tarihi okumasında insannın Hristiyanlık’taki merkezi yerini alacağı edip onu Tanrı’nın yüzü olmaktan yeryüzü indirmiş olarak görülmesedir, ancak Heidegger gösterir ki Aydınlanmanın varsayıdığı evrensel insan kendisini doğadan ayrıştırma biçimi ve doğru bilimsel rasyonalite çerçevesinde algılayışla, nesneleri hesaplanabilir özelliklerine indirgeyerek manipüle edilebilir bir özellikler yığıını olarak görmektedir. Hristiyanlık düşünsesine kastedilen Latin düşünsesinin ta kendisidir ve insan ve nesneler arasındaki bu mutlak etken-edilenlik ilişkisi insani yine Tanrı’nın yerine koymakla kalmaz, bu atfedişin üstünü kapatara kapatacak yozlaşma basamaklarına bir adım daha atmış olur.
\end{flushright}


Derrida’nın Of Hospitality’sinde konukseverlik kavramını açıklarken ortaya koyduğu logos, xenos ve hostis kavramları bu noktada devreye girer. Bu kavramların Heideggerci düşününcenin politik yanını açıklamadığı yerine geçmeden önce belirtilmeldir ki bu kavramlar, Derrida’nın konukseverlik bağlamından çıkartılıp bu tezin amaçlarına uygun olarak yorumlanmıştır ve dolayısıyla Derrida’nın kendi okumasıyla olan ilişkisi göz önünde bulundurulacaksa bu okumının dikkatlice yapılışını gerektirmektedir zira buradaki xenos vs., konukseverlik bağlamındaki xenos vs. ile kavramsal köken ve işleyiş tarzı açısından aynı olmakla beraber birebir bir aynılık sergilemez. Bu uyarıdan sonra söylenebilir ki Heidegger için süregelen okumadaki Latin-Alman257 ikiliği durumu çözüme kavuşturmakta çok uzak bir yerdedir ve mesele üçüncü kategori olarak Asyatik’in ortaya çıkışıyla çözüm bulacaktır. Özetle Derridacı bağlamda logos, xenos ile diyalog içindeyken hostis tamamen dışarıya itilmektedir; aynı şekilde Alman’ın

APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Soysal
Adı : Zühtücan
Bölümü: Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology as a Political Project

TEZİN TÜRÜ: Yüksek Lisans X Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. X

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfasi, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: