AN ETHNIC GROUP EMBEDDED IN MULTIPLE IDENTITIES: THE CASE OF IRAQI TURKMENS IN TURKEY

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The Iraqi Turkmens have remained on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy, media and society on different occasions for many years. They have been at the heart of many critical issues in Iraq due to their strategic location despite their relatively underestimated political position. In addition, the Iraqi Turkmen society offers an appropriate case to analyze different identities in the Middle East. With reference to these two interrelated facts, this thesis is an attempt to understand the identity of the Iraqi Turkmens. The analysis of the Iraqi Turkmens offers projection into the identity in Iraq in particular and in the Middle East in general since they are the bearers of, what I would argue, five main dimensions of identity in the Middle East region, including religious, sectarian, national, ethnic and tribal. In this framework, this study analyzes these dimensions by presenting the historical background of the Iraqi Turkmens and findings of the survey conducted by the authors of this thesis among the Iraqi Turkmen refugees living in Ankara.

**Keywords:** Iraq, Turkmen, Ethnicity, Multiple Identities, Nested Identities

Anahtar Kelimeler: Irak, Türkmen, Etnisite, Çoklu Kimlikler, İççe Kimlikler
I dedicate this thesis to my loving family.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM ........................................................................................................ iii
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ iv
ÖZ ....................................................................................................................... v
DEDICATION ..................................................................................................... vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................... vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................ xi

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
  1.1. Methodology .......................................................................................... 15
  1.2. Thesis Outline ....................................................................................... 17
2. THE IRAQI TURKMENS: DESCRIPTION(S) AND CHRONICLE(S) .... 19
  2.1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 19
  2.2. Iraqi Turkmen: Meanings, Contexts and Origins .................................. 19
  2.3. Turkmen Settlement Areas in Iraq: Turkmenland .................................. 24
  2.4. Population: Battle for Numbers ............................................................ 29
  2.5. Modern Political History of the Iraqi Turkmens .................................... 34
    2.5.1. Establishment of Iraq: Emergence of Iraqi Turkmen Identity ....... 34
    2.5.2. The Republican Era: Between Fear and Hope ......................... 41
    2.5.3. Post-Baath Period: New Opportunities and Threats .................. 48

viii
2.5.4. General Evaluation of the Turkmen Modern Political History, Activity and Actors ................................................................. 64

2.6. Conclusion .................................................................................. 72

3. THE IDENTITY OF THE IRAQI TURKMENS: A CASE OF ISIS-FORCED REFUGEES IN TURKEY .............................................. 75

3.1. Introduction ............................................................................... 75

3.2. General Profile of Surveyed Persons ........................................... 77

3.3. The Self-Identifications of the Respondents ............................... 84

3.4. Portrayal of the Dimension of Religion ...................................... 87

3.5. Sectarian Identity: Growing Sectarianism? ............................... 93

3.5.1. Views on Some Sunni and Shiite Regions .............................. 99

3.5.2. Views on Sunni and Shiite People .......................................... 104

3.6. A Complicating Dimension: Tribal Bonds ................................ 115

3.7. Embracing the Sense of ‘Being Iraqi’? ....................................... 119

3.8. The Dynamics of Ethnicity ...................................................... 129

3.8.1. Objective and Subjective Elements of Turkmenness ........... 132

3.8.2. Ethnic ‘Other(s)’? ............................................................... 139

3.8.3. Views on Actual Situation of Turkmen Community ............. 152

3.9. Conclusion ................................................................................ 161

4. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 164

4.1. Dimension of Religion .............................................................. 164

4.2. Sectarian Dimension ............................................................... 165

4.3. Tribal Dimension ................................................................... 168

4.4. National Dimension ............................................................... 169

4.5. Dimension of Ethnicity ........................................................... 170
4.6. Further Studies ................................................................. 171

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................. 173

APPENDICES .................................................................................. 188

A. QUESTIONNAIRE IN TURKISH (ITS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE) .... 188

B. QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH .................................................. 203

C. ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL FORM ................................. 215

D. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET ..................................... 217

E. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU .............................................. 229
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES
Figure 3.2.1. Age Distribution of the Respondents .................................................................... 78
Figure 3.2.2. Duration of Stay of the Respondents in Turkey .......................................... 80
Figure 3.2.3. Educational Levels of the Respondents .......................................................... 81
Figure 3.2.4. Occupations of the Respondents ..................................................................... 82
Figure 3.2.5. Levels of Income of the Respondents .............................................................. 83
Figure 3.3.1. Most Important Self-Identifications of the Respondents ......................... 84
Figure 3.3.2. Second Important Self-Identifications of the Respondents ...................... 86
Figure 3.3.3. Third Important Self-Identifications of the Respondents ............................. 87
Figure 3.4.1. Views of the Respondents on Islamic Rule ...................................................... 89
Figure 3.4.2. Participation of the Respondents in Religious Orders ................................. 90
Figure 3.4.3. Confidence of the Respondents in the Religious Orders ......................... 91
Figure 3.4.4. Views of the Respondents on Non-Muslim Neighbors .............................. 92
Figure 3.4.5. Attitude of the Respondents towards Marriage with Non-Muslims .... 93
Figure 3.5.1. Views of the Respondents on Sunni Attitude towards Shiites ............. 96
Figure 3.5.2. Views of the Respondents on Shiite Attitude towards Sunnis ............. 97
Figure 3.5.3. Proportion of the Respondents’ Sunni Friends ........................................... 98
Figure 3.5.4. Presence of Shiite Relatives of the Respondents ....................................... 99
Figure 3.5.5. Attitude of the Respondents towards Iran ................................................... 100
Figure 3.5.6. Views of the Respondents on Najaf ............................................................. 102
Figure 3.5.7. Views of the Respondents on Karbala ......................................................... 103
Figure 3.5.8. Views of the Respondents on Mosul ............................................................ 104
Figure 3.5.9. Attitude of the Respondents towards Friendship with Shiite People .......... 105
Figure 3.5.10. Attitude of the Respondents towards Sunni Arab Neighbors ............ 106
Figure 3.5.11. Attitude of the Respondents towards Shiite Arab Neighbors ............ 107
Figure 3.5.12. Trust of the Respondents in Sunni Arabs .............................................. 108
Figure 3.8.6. Views of the Respondents on the Relationship between Turkmenness and Language................................................................. 137
Figure 3.8.7. Views of the Respondents on the Relationship between Turkmenness and Culture................................................................. 138
Figure 3.8.8. Views of the Respondents on the Relationship between Turkmenness and Turkey................................................................. 139
Figure 3.8.9. Proportion of the Respondents’ Turkmen Friends................................................................. 140
Figure 3.8.10. Presence of Non-Turkmen Relatives of the Respondents ........ 141
Figure 3.8.11. Attitude of the Respondents towards Kurdish Neighbors ........ 142
Figure 3.8.12. Views of the Respondents on Marriage with Kurds ............... 143
Figure 3.8.13. Trust of the Respondents in Kurds ........................................ 144
Figure 3.8.14. Confidence of the Respondents in the Kurdistan Regional Government......................................................................................... 145
Figure 3.8.15. Confidence of the Respondents in the Kurdistan Democratic Party ......................................................................................... 146
Figure 3.8.16. Confidence of the Respondents in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan ......................................................................................... 147
Figure 3.8.17. Attitude of the Respondents towards Erbil ............................... 148
Figure 3.8.18. Views of the Respondents on Kurdish Attitude towards Turkmens ......................................................................................... 149
Figure 3.8.19. Views of the Respondents on Turkmen Attitude towards Kurds 150
Figure 3.8.20. Views of the Respondents on Arab Attitude towards Turkmens 151
Figure 3.8.21. Views of the Respondents on Turkmen Attitude towards Arabs. 152
Figure 3.8.22. Views of the Respondents on the Relations among Turkmens ... 153
Figure 3.8.23. Views on the Respondents on Armament................................... 154
Figure 3.8.24. Views of the Respondents on the Separation of Turkmenland from Iraq......................................................................................... 155
Figure 3.8.25. Willingness of the Respondents to Return to Iraq .................... 156
Figure 3.8.26. Views of the Respondents on Turkmen Leaders ..................... 157
Figure 3.8.27. Views of the Respondents on the Most Enormous Danger for the Turkmen ......................................................................................... 158
Figure 3.8.28. Views of the Respondents on the Second Enormous Danger for the Turkmen ................................................................. 159
Figure 3.8.29. Views of the Respondents on the Third Enormous Danger for the Turkmen ................................................................. 160
Figure 3.8.30. Future Expectation of the Respondents ................................. 161
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to understand the Iraqi Turkmens, a Turkish-speaking ethnic group in Iraq. Its fundamental premise is that the analysis of the Iraqi Turkmens might be helpful to understand broader subjects in Iraq in particular and in the Middle East in general. One has to divide them into their components to recognize their importance.

In the literature, the Iraqi Turkmens are generally mentioned in parenthetical statements together with the names of other ethnic or religious groups in Iraq. In this way, the literature written by non-Turkish and non-Turkmen authors has not raised enough interest in the Iraqi Turkmens. It has been primarily the Iraqi Turkmens themselves and some nationalist authors in Turkey that have mainly had a scholarly interest in the Iraqi Turkmens. Nevertheless, a literature review on their writings reveals that by repeating each other and focusing almost completely on the political history, a similar negligence has been apparent in these works having an implicit or explicit ethnic/nationalist agenda, trying to underline the Turkmen presence in Iraq.

This study is about the identity of the Iraqi Turkmens. With reference to the questions of what the components of identity of the Iraqi Turkmens and how strong these are, the thesis aims to develop a new point of view on the Iraqi Turkmens and shows the significance of the topic through three interrelated aspects: Firstly, in contrast to the general approach in the literature, the Iraqi Turkmens do not constitute a monolithic ethnic group in one specific form but they are rather composed of a wide range of dimensions of identity and consist of
at least two different sectarian communities (Sunni and Shiite). In fact, this phenomenon offers insight for interdisciplinary researches on identity and identity-related issues in Iraq in particular and in the Middle East in general. Therefore, as distinct from the previous studies on the topic, this study attempts to break down the identity of the Iraqi Turkmens into its components. Secondly, the Iraqi Turkmens constitute a ‘microcosm of Iraq’ to a certain extent, reflecting to a considerable degree the experiences of the Iraqi socio-political history and living side by side and together with almost all the components of the Iraqi society. In other words, an examination of Iraqi Turkmen identity is not only significant in itself but it is also relevant to an understanding of Iraqi society and politics at large. Thus, this thesis tries to reach broader conclusions with reference to the Iraqi Turkmens. Thirdly, they bear, what I would argue, five main aspects of the collective identities in the Middle East, that is, religious, sectarian, tribal, national and ethnic. This thesis is the first detailed study taking the Iraqi Turkmens in this context.2

In this chapter, I will draw general conceptual and contextual framework of this study. For one thing, it is important to note that a study of the issue of identity necessitates an interdisciplinary approach with the contributions of a great variety of fields and sub-fields. This results from the nature of identity since it is a product of dynamic relation or form of establishing relation with the social subjects and objects including social symbols, territory, ancestry, political parties

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1 A similar denomination was brought into prominence by then Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to describe Kirkuk. In the Iraqi cabinet extraordinary session in Kirkuk on 8 May 2013, Maliki said that Kirkuk is like a miniature version of Iraq. The denomination of the Turkmens as ‘microcosm of Iraq’ in this study is inspired from this usage. See Hussein Ali Daoud, "Maliki Sparks Controversy During Visit To Kirkuk," Al-Monitor, September 12, 2013, accessed August 1, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/05/maliki-kirkuk-is-iraqi-and-its-c.html.

2 One of the most insightful works studying the Iraqi Turkmens in the context of identity and ideology is Güldem Baykal Büyüksaraç’s PhD dissertation in Columbia University titled ‘The Politics of Loss and the Poetics of Melancholy: A Case Study on Iraqi Turkmen’. In her field research, she tries to understand the impact of ethno-nationalism on process of identification and collective political subjectivity. For the details of the study, see Güldem Baykal Büyüksaraç, "The Politics of Loss and the Poetics of Melancholy: A Case Study on Iraqi Turkmen," PhD diss., Columbia University, 2010, ProQuest (AAT 3448320).
and international organizations in its most general sense. This relation consistently produces ‘a dialectic between similarity and difference’³, and consequently, a broad array of factors from history education at schools, military service and religious doctrines to social structure, international developments and political actors influence this process interrelatedly.

In the first place, this study tries to examine an ethnic group, the Iraqi Turkmens, along five main dimensions of ‘the multiple identities of the Middle East’⁴ as in the work of Bernard Lewis. It can be said that almost all the people are the bearers of multiple identities and understandings of self and other, and thus, members of different groups including gender, occupation, class, tribe, ethnicity, and etc. The term multiple identities means multiple social positions held by the individual and tied into the complexities of social structure(s) in which the individual is embedded and an issue of the link between the social structure and the individual⁵ considering its social context.⁶ These positions draw the frameworks and boundaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, in this way, both socialize and politicize the individual or group of people. In the case of multiple identities, ‘us-them’ distinctions, boundaries and positions are not simple but rather, what Medrano and Gutierrez call, “nested”. Nested identities are lower- and higher-order identities such that the latter encompass the former.⁷

The literature has tended to treat identities as incompatible and as a matter of choice and to provide explanations for people’s choices between identities;


⁴ This usage is inspired from Bernard Lewis, who borrows the term ‘multiple identities’ from the field of psychology. See Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (London: Orion Books, 1999).


⁶ This study focuses on the social dimension of multiple identities rather than individual psychological and perceptual processes and mechanisms.

however, this tendency contrasts with the fact that people have multiple and situational identities empirically\(^8\) although some of these identities might have constraining and mutating impacts on some others in the process. The intensity of their identification with one or the other group may differ but individuals have been shown to be able to juggle different nested identities, and therefore, it is quite common for them to express surprise when they are asked as part of a survey to make a choice between a set of nested identities.\(^9\)

With reference to the Calhoun’s argument that any identity claim seeks for two goals that are differentiation and equivalence,\(^10\) Medrano and Gutierrez state that different identities might play different roles, some helping to differentiate individuals within groups of interaction and others contributing to making people feel that they belong to a community of equals.\(^11\) Similarly, Brewer argues that the superordinate of two nested identities satisfies the need for secure inclusion in a large collectivity whereas the subgroup identity serves the need for distinctiveness within the larger social category.\(^12\) By retaining Brewer’s and Calhoun’s points, Medrano and Gutierrez hold that local and broader identities might be seen as impinging on each other in some contexts, that is, local identities may sometimes be perceived as setting obstacles to inclusion in broader collectivities while broader identities might be perceived as threatening the survival of local identities in other contexts.\(^13\) In this regard, whenever local and broader identities are seen as threatening each other, a negative relationship between lower-order and higher-order nested identities may be expected while

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\(^8\) Ibid., 757-758.

\(^9\) Ibid., 758.


\(^11\) Medrano and Gutierrez, "Nested Identities," 759.

\(^12\) Marilynn B. Brewer, ”Multiple Identities and Identity Transition: Implications for Hong-Kong,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 23.2 (1999), 190.

\(^13\) Medrano and Gutierrez, "Nested Identities," 759-760.
the relationship should be positive given the potentially complementary character of nested identities.\textsuperscript{14}

In any case, measuring how multiple or nested identities simultaneously survive and how perceptions towards them change is a difficult task since they are often contextually defined,\textsuperscript{15} that is, one might be a Turkmen in one context, an Iraqi in another or a Çelebi tribesman in one, a Sunni in another, a Muslim in one, and two or three of them like Sunni Iraqi Turkmen in another. In this sense, nested identities fall within and move between Guntram and Kaplan’s three major scale divisions, which are fluid and interconnected or nested: macro (superstate), meso (or state), and micro (substate) scales.\textsuperscript{16} The contents of these scales depend on the context: Ethnic identity of an Iraqi Turkmen may be located in micro scale in the context of Iraq but it might appear in macro scale taking Iraqi and Syrian Turkmens together.

When it comes to the focal region of this study, by the multiple identities of the Middle East, Bernard Lewis means the following:

something of the complexity and variety of the different identities which can be held at one and the same time by groups, even more than by individuals – constant change and evolution of identity in the Middle East, of the ways in which the peoples of the region perceive themselves, the groups to which they belong, and the difference between self and other.\textsuperscript{17}

Why these five dimensions? I do not claim that each of these dimensions is simultaneously available in every community of the Middle East but some of them do come to the forefront while some might retreat into background depending on time and place. In addition, it is important to accept that some of

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 760.


\textsuperscript{17}Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, 1.
these might overlap in some instances. Nevertheless, these five come to the forefront depending on at least three aspects. Firstly, as a methodological explanation, it should be predicated that while fluid contextuality of macro, meso and micro scales mentioned above provides a useful analytical tool, it might complicate drawing the boundaries of contents of these scales. Secondly, it can be observed that it is these five, not class, not gender, and not others that mainly refer to the political in its most general sense today\(^\text{18}\) despite increasing visibility of others compared to the past century. Considering the uncertain and insecure political atmosphere of Iraq and similar countries, the importance of the political comes out more apparently. Thirdly, in relation to the second point, it can be argued that these are the broadest frames to classify the main identities or loyalties of the people in the region.

This categorization can be seen as a more general adaptation of Lewis’ classification of loyalties of the people in the Middle East\(^\text{19}\) without hierarchizing.

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\(^{18}\) Iraq can be considered as one of the clearest examples of this fact: The major political actors in the Iraqi parliament based on the 2014 general election results include State of Law Coalition (Shiite Islamist), Sadrist Movement (Shiite Islamist), al-Muwatin Coalition (Shiite Islamist), Muttahidoon (Suni Islamist), al-Wataniya (secular Iraqi nationalist) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (Kurdish nationalist). For more information about the distribution of parties based on the 2014 general elections, the last general election in Iraq, see “Iraqi Parliamentary Election Results,” Stratfor, July 22, 2014, accessed June 30, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/image/iraqi-parliamentary-elections-results. Also see “Election for Council of Representatives,” Election Guide, accessed July 30, 2016, http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2425/. Also see Ahmed Ali, “Iraq’s 2014 National Elections,” Institute for the Study of War Middle East Security Report 20, 2014. Considering the major political actors in numerous parts of the Middle East, which have had wide political agendas and enourmous political impacts both domestically and regionally, such as Islamist Hamas and secular nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization in Palestine, Islamist groups from Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam to the ISIS and Fateh al-Sham (former al-Nusra, Syrian branch of al-Qaeda) and Democratic Union Party (also known as PYD) in Syria, ethnic or religious/sectarian based groups in Lebanon from Free Patriotic Movement (Christian), Amal Movement (Shiite Islamist) and Hezbollah (Shiite Islamist), Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, warring tribes in Libya and large and small many other actors in different parts of the region, these dimensions appear as the most visible parameters of social, economic and political domains of the region and as the strongest identities in terms of at least economic and political power of representive actors, social mobilization catability and number of affiliates to these dimensions. However, the impact and audience of other identifications above, below and outside these dimensions have been limited in conformity with the criteria mentioned above.

\(^{19}\) Lewis classifies identities or loyalties of the region under different titles similar to Guntram and Kaplan’s general macro, meso and micro scales. He finds three levels of loyalty
In other words, Lewis’ three levels of loyalties in the Middle East still make sense as these five dimensions along which I claim to analyze Iraqi Turkmen identity can be considered as more general frames of Lewis’ levels. For one thing, Lewis’ highest level, that is, aspiration towards some greater unity, has fallen into decline compared to the past century. Since these aspirations are the extensions of ‘lower’ levels, they can be re-classified under ethnic, national, sectarian or religious dimensions. In addition, Lewis’ distinction between ethnic, national and sovereign state loyalties is blurred, and thus, I will try to distinguish their contents and draw the context of each dimension from this point on.

Firstly, because the most common answer of who the Iraqi Turkmens are is that they are a Turkish-speaking ethnic group in Iraq, I will begin with ethnic dimension. In other words, ethnic identity is the most distinct cultural classification that makes the Iraqi Turkmens perceive themselves as distinctive and makes other societies in Iraq define Turkmens as different. What is ethnicity or ethnic group? Are there any objective criteria for ethnicity? Loosely speaking, many primordialists, perennialists and ethno-symbolists take ethnicity as the natural nucleus of nation. It can be said that social constructivist approaches to hierarchically: the lowest is local level including tribal, ethnic, national or sectarian bonds; the intermediate is that of sovereign state; and the highest level is aspiration towards some greater unity such as pan-Turkism, pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. Indeed, as this classification demonstrates, some dimensions of identity like the third level of Lewis might lose their significance relatively whereas some unimportant or eluded ones like national identity that will be discussed later may come to the prominence. For the details of his levels, see Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, 141-142.

20 For instance, one of the most widespread movements of this kind in the past century was pan-Arabism, which was at its height in the 1950s and the 1960s, but it has lost its popularity. In fact, it can be said that the power of these aspirations is mostly connected to the political actors, and in this way, it verifies the significance of the political in the region.

21 Their language, a dialect of Turkish, is not unique determinant of their ethnicity but it is the fundamental diacritic of their community in the society which they are part of.

22 In the literature on nationalism theories that intersects ethnicity theories in many respects and borrows largely from the debate on ethnicity, Özkırmı prefers to call these approaches as essentialist. For the details of his categorization, see Umut Özkırmı, *Milliyetçilik Kuramları: Eleştirel Bir Bakış [Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction]* (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2015), 74-75. For the examples of these approaches, see John A. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
ethnicity are dominant in this discussion and most of them are built on Max Weber:

We shall call “ethnic groups” those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspire the belief in common ethnicity.  

Another most frequently referred approach is Fredrik Barth’s transactionalist study of ethnic boundaries emphasizing:

that ethnicity is a matter of social organization above and beyond questions of empirical cultural differences: it is about “the social organization of cultural difference”;

that ethnic identity is a matter of self-ascription and ascription by others in interaction, not the analyst’s construct on the basis of his or her construction of a group’s “culture”;

that the cultural features of greatest import are boundary-connected: the diacritica by which membership is signaled and the cultural standards that actors themselves use to evaluate and judge the actions of ethnic co-

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23 The approaches to ethnicity emphasizing social factors and processes and change also include assimilationism, circumstantialism and transactionalism. However, all these approaches dissent from social constructivism with slight differences, and thus, I take all these under the category of constructivism.  

members, implying that they see themselves as “playing the same game.”

For one thing, it is often claimed that ethnicity has to do with ‘a subjective belief in common origin, descent and history—a belief that is never finished but always subject to reinterpretations and adjustments depending on the present circumstances.’

According to Steve Fenton, ethnicity implies ‘the social construction of descent and culture, the social mobilization of descent and culture and the meanings and implications of classification systems built around them.’

To Ulf Hannerz, ethnicity is ‘primarily a social-organizational phenomenon, a matter of drawing boundaries between groups on the basis of a combination of criteria of ascription and diacritical cultural markers and thus channeling interaction.’

Bulmer defines ethnicity as ‘collectivity within a larger society real or putative common ancestry, memories or a shared past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the group’s identity such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance.’

For Nagel, ethnicity is ‘the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external opinions as well as the individual’s self-identification and outsiders’ ethnic designations –i.e. what you think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is.’

Moerman, who makes one of the most subjective definitions in the field, focuses on the Lue ethnicity, an ethnic group living in China, Thailand, Laos, Burma and Vietnam, and traces being a Lue to the virtue of

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believing and calling himself/herself Lue and of acting in ways that validate his/her Lueness.\textsuperscript{31} In his definition equating ethnicity with minority largely, Patterson states that ethnicity is a distinctive mode of human experience resulting from the interplay of an inner concourse, involving a distinctive form of consciousness of a shared crisis of alienation, resolution through a commitment to the groups sharing the crisis and symbolization of common memory, and of an outer concourse taking account of the sources of the crisis, its context and timing, the resources of the potential group, the arithmetic of its social relations with the wider society, and the policy of its leadership.\textsuperscript{32}

In all these and many other approaches, the dividing line between ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ (between ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ for that matter), and ‘ethnicity’ and ‘minority’ is blurred. In fact, the problem is often one of categorization. While some ground their definitions on ethnic minorities, some use nation as their base. However, nation is often defined in relation to nationalism, that is, in more political aspects, while ethnicity is defined with reference to more social aspects. For example, Thomas H. Eriksen distinguishes nation from ethnic group based on its relation to the state, or more precisely, on the presence of a demand to command or actual command over a state.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, in many anthropological, sociological and psychological studies, it seems that the researchers tend to find ‘authentic’ groups such as the Lue and the Fur ethnic while they incline to call more familiar groups like the French and the Arabs national.

Banton draws a useful distinction between primary ethnicity and secondary ethnicity: a primary ethnicity like that of the Italians or the Poles in Europe means the shared self-identification as members of a group based upon common descent


and culture that coincides with membership of a nation while a secondary ethnicity like that of the Italian-Americans or the Polish-Americans refers to the shared self-identification as members of a group based upon common descent and culture within a state containing other groups. Although Banton is not clear about the ‘content’ of secondary ethnicity, I do not take secondary ethnicity as necessarily interethnic, and in this way, I place the Turkmens on the category of secondary ethnicity and, the Arabs, for instance, on that of primary ethnicity. Indeed, it must be noted that these two definitions are not independent of the approaches mentioned above and there can be sub-classifications under these two categories depending on time and place. In this sense, I do not attempt to draw a clear distinction between nation and ethnicity and I acknowledge only their overlap in some instances.

Secondly, as it is argued, the ethnic identity is not the only social position held by the Iraqi Turkmens. Following the most distinctive dimension, ethnic identity, we can have a general look at national identity. In this study, I refer to the Iraqi identity as the national identity. Even though it is important to avoid equating the national identity with the state, it must be accepted that most of the national identities coincide with a state. Indeed, it is nationality (not nationhood) and identity of state that produce national identity in the case of Iraq as in many other Middle Eastern countries. This kind of national identity primarily emphasizes political aspects rather than cultural ones. With reference to distinctions of civic and ethnic nationalisms and nations, this kind of national identity, which is

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35 This distinction is called by different names and developed by several scholars to imply the similar points. According to Hans Kohn, who made this distinction popular based on Eastern and Western models of nationalism, in civic/territorial/Western/French/political model of nationalism, which corresponds to the models in France, England, Netherlands, Switzerland and the US, members of nation having a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity are voluntarily unified by their equal political status and their will to be part of the nation, and therefore, the state precedes (or coincides with) the development of nation. In ethnic/ethno-cultural/Eastern/German model, implying Central and Eastern Europe, the understanding of nation is deterministically based on the common heritage, aiming to ‘redraw to political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands’ (p. 329) and the nation precedes the state. See Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and*
civic, integrationist and identical with citizenship, can be defined in terms of non-ethnic political community, common territory and patriotism. Although this distinction is originated from the historical readings on Western and Central/Eastern Europe, it can be seen that the civic model particularly is also valid yet not fully realized in the Middle East.

Thirdly, in the words of Bernard Lewis, ‘not nationality, not citizenship, not descent, but religion, or more precisely membership of a religious community, is the ultimate determinant of identity’\textsuperscript{36} in the Middle East. As various surveys like that of Pew Research Center\textsuperscript{37} indicate, religion remains one of the most important dynamics in the region. Some might argue that taking religious identity as a monolithic phenomenon may be misleading and it can only be analyzed through sectarian dimensions. It can be true to some extent; however, religious

\textit{Background} (New York: Macmillan, 1946). In addition, Rogers Brubaker finds the French understanding of nationhood as state-centered, assimilationist and linked to the abstract idea of citizenship while he conceives the German understanding as Volk-centered, differentialist, organic cultural, linguistic or racial (p. 1). See Rogers Brubaker, \textit{Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany} (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1994). Furthermore, starting from the argument that the ideal of nation implies the sovereignty of the people and based on the interpretation of nature of this popular sovereignty, Liah Greenfeld claims that ethnic nationalism, in which membership in the national collectivity is believed to be inherent, a genetic characteristic and not related to the individual will, is necessarily collectivistic-authoritarian while civic nationalism, in which the membership is at least in principle voluntaristic and open, can be both individualistic-libertarian and collectivistic-authoritarian (p. 11). See Liah Greenfeld, \textit{Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity} (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1993). Moreover, Anthony D. Smith divides each model into two: pre-independence and post-independence movements. He claims that pre-independence movements of civic model are anti-colonialist nationalisms while post-independence movements are more associated with integration of a society consisting of different ethnicities. Pre-independence movements of ethnic model are separatist or diasporal nationalisms while post-independence movements of this model is irredentist and ‘pan’ nationalisms (pp. 133-134). See Anthony D. Smith, \textit{Milli Kimlik [National Identity]}, trans. Bahadır Sina Şener (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014).

\textsuperscript{36}Lewis, \textit{The Multiple Identities of the Middle East}, 13.

\textsuperscript{37}According to survey of Pew Research Center conducted between November 2011 and January 2012, majority of the Middle Eastern people see religion as very important in their lives. Data indicates that 89 percent of Muslims in Morocco, 85 percent of them in Jordan, 85 percent of them in Palestinian territories, 82 percent of them in Iraq, 78 percent of them in Tunisia and 75 percent of them in Egypt say that Islam is very important in their lives. See Kelsey Jo Starr, "Religion is Less Central to Everyday Life for Muslims in Israel than Elsewhere in the Region," \textit{Pew Research Center}, May 18, 2016, accessed July 30, 2016, \url{http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/18/religion-muslims-israel/}. 

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identity must imply general faith and practices and does not have to involve a sectarian ‘other’. Islam may at many instances be an important source of reference both individually and collectively, transcending most of the time a specific sectarian affiliation. The context of religious dimension will be better understood with that of sectarian dimension.

Fourthly, sectarianism has been one of the most frequently discussed topics about the region by primarily focusing on the struggle for economic and political power between Sunni and Shiite communities and political actors. However, based on Gellner, assuming that every member of these communities has a sectarian system of faith and values is not the case. I will not claim that there is no real sectarianism between the Sunni and Shiite communities at all but we tend to ignore the factors or structure feeding the hostility between the two. It is certain that sectarian segregation of communities was the case in many Middle Eastern countries before the rise of sectarianism but whether this kind of divisions has been the result of one’s own choices or stemmed from forces, pressures and constraints of the authorities and political actors has not yet been much studied. If you define Sunni and Shiite regions, quotas, institutions, or use sectarian segregation of any nature, this will inevitably cultivate a ‘structural sectarianism’. Under these circumstances, it can be expected that many Sunnis do not see the Shiite sect as real Muslims or vice versa. However, this is still not the case. The survey of Pew Research Center shows that 82 percent of Sunnis in Iraq, a level higher than any other part of the Middle East, see the Shiite as their Muslim

38 For one of the most recent and detailed studies on the topic, see Geneive Abdo, “The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and The Rebirth of the Shi’â-Sunni Divide,” The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Analysis Paper 29 (2013).

39 In his reference guide, Muslim Society, Gellner claims that explaining the members of societies on the dimension of their beliefs and values infers generally that each member has a system of beliefs and values related to the world but it seems that it is a great mistake. See Ernest Gellner, Müslüman Toplum [Muslim Society], trans. Müfit Günay (İstanbul: Kabalci Yaynevi, 2012), 209.
fellows and their distinctive practices as Islamic. In this sense, focusing on doctrinal differences, historical miseries and seeming hostility between these communities might be illusionary although explanatory to some extent. This is why I prefer to call the present circumstances as structural sectarianism.

Fifthly, it can be said that the context of tribal identity is clearer than that of other dimensions. In this sense, what is important is its complicating impact on social relations. Tribal structures might be embedded in different dimensions of identity as in the case of sectarian violence in Tal Afar. They may be catalyst both for social peace and conflict due to their strong influence on their members. By applying their own rules in their regions, they may act as a force providing order in their regions in harmony with central governments or a rebel movement that central governments have to check often. The ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) case has demonstrated the importance of tribal structures in that one of the most important factors providing the ISIS with easy control of Mosul as of many other regions such as Ramadi and Fallujah has been its alliance with the tribes in these regions. The political turmoil in Libya following the Arab uprisings has also been related to the tribal structure in the country to a large extent. In any case, tribes are not only still alive in the Middle East but also very strong in many respects.


41 The ISIS is also known as the ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), DAESH (the Arabic acronym of the ISIL) and the IS (the Islamic State). In this thesis, the term ISIS will be used.


44 For a detailed study on the power of tribes in the Middle East and how they adopted to the modern conditions, see Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawood, eds., Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2003).
1.1. Methodology

From the viewpoint of its objectives, a study can be classified as descriptive research attempting to describe systematically a situation, phenomenon, program, problem or service or providing information about, for example, the living conditions of a community or describing attitudes towards an issue; correlational research discovering or establishing the existence of a relationship or association or interdependence between more than one aspect of a situation; explanatory research attempting to explain how and why there is a relationship between two aspects of a phenomenon or situation; and exploratory research or feasibility research or pilot study being carried out to investigate the possibilities of undertaking a particular research. This study is predominantly a descriptive research which gives the descriptions of the dimensions of the identity or identities in an ethnic group, the Iraqi Turkmens, and their attitudes towards identity-related issues. However, it should be noted that the thesis does not confine itself to pure descriptions but rather attempts to find correlations and causal relations through moving between variables and benefiting from the comments of the respondents and the historical framework formed in the second chapter.

From the viewpoint of the type of information sought, although this survey is predominantly a quantitative research, its qualitative support provided by the comments of the respondents and historical background makes it a mixed research. Whereas the qualitative study aims to describe a particular phenomenon, situation, problem or event and to establish the variation in them without quantifying it by how and why questions, the quantitative study aims at quantifying the variation in a situation, phenomenon, problem or event and

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ascertaining the magnitude of the variation by mainly using quantitative variables\textsuperscript{46} by how many questions.

In the quantitative part of this study presented in the third chapter, the questionnaire, a form of survey, was used to collect data. In the questionnaire conducted in this survey, close-ended questions, were asked in order to measure the ‘levels’ such as level of willingness to fight for country and level of hostility between two communities. For creation of the sample, non-random sampling,\textsuperscript{47} firstly created by snowball sampling and furthered by purposive or judgmental sampling, was used. For this sample, I firstly reached the leading Turkish and Turkmen people (not opinion leaders but those who have unprofessionally led aid campaigns for the Iraqi Turkmen refugees in Ankara) to provide easier access to the field, and then I used their connections and address lists to avoid picking up the views of the same or similar circles and to reach different circles.

The survey was conducted in Ankara at Turkmen Home Aid Center in Cebeci, Turkmen Home Medicine Center in Cebeci, and homes of Turkmen refugees in Örnek Mahallesi in Altındağ, Abidinpaşa Mahallesi in Mamak, Akdere Mahallesi in Mamak and Saime Kadın Mahallesi in Mamak, from noon hours to evening hours between 2 February 2016 and 15 April 2016 by face-to-face 25-30 minute questionnaire aiming at quantitative measurement of identity-related attitudes of

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 10.

\textsuperscript{47}Sampling is basically divided into two: random sampling and non-random sampling. Firstly, random sampling includes simple random sampling in which each and every member of the population has an equal and independent chance of being selected and personal and structural reasons do not affect the creation of sampling; stratified random sampling in which non-intersecting sub-groups are created in the case of very large population and the research subjects are randomly selected from every group; and cluster sampling in which the population is divided into clusters and some of these groups are taken as research subjects. Secondly, non-random sampling involves quota sampling in which the researcher tries to reach pre-determined number of respondents; purposive/judgmental sampling in which the researcher deliberately judge and select the respondents whoever he/she considers as appropriate for his/her sample; accidental sampling in which the researcher has no control but only stand and select whoever accessible without attempt to randomize; and snowball sampling in which the survey depends on the recommendations of other people, mainly their acquaintances. This classification is mainly based on Özgehan Şenyuva’s 2015-2016 Fall Semester course titled Applied Research Methods in International Relations.
the Iraqi Turkmen refugees in Ankara. The feasibility/pilot study of the questionnaire was conducted with 20 Iraqi Turkmen respondents at Turkmen Home Aid Center in January 2016.⁴⁸

In total, 180 questionnaires were analyzed. All the respondents are the Iraqi Turkmen refugees who fled to Turkey following the ISIS occupations in Iraq. Those Turkmens who are not Iraqi, who have been in Turkey more than two years and who have been in Turkey for different reasons such as education and business are not included in the sample to ensure the consistency. Data coding and analysis of data which is mainly a descriptive analysis composed of frequencies and descriptive graphical figures were performed in SPSS23 statistical package software. An advanced statistics including cross tabular analysis of data is not used deliberatively in the study in order to not digress the purposes of the thesis.

1.2. Thesis Outline

Finally, I will give the general outlines of the chapters in this thesis. The next chapter gives a historical and descriptive background based mostly on the secondary literature, with a look at both Turkmen and non-Turkmen scholars’ works. The second chapter starts with etymological origins of the term Turkmen, the difference between other Turkmen denominations and Iraqi Turkmens and historical origins of the Turkmen presence in Iraq. Second, Turkmen settlement areas in Iraq that the Iraqi Turkmens call Turkmenland composed of most of the disputed regions of Iraq including Kirkuk demonstrates their strategic location. Third, population numbers about the Iraqi Turkmens given by different stances are compared and the complexity of reaching the ‘correct numbers’ is shown. Finally, the chapter narrates a long period from the 1920s to the present including royal, republican, Baath and post-Baath periods in a chronological order with

⁴⁸ The survey was approved by METU Human Researches Ethics Committee with 2016-SOS-077 protocol number. For the approval form of ethics committee, see Appendix C.
referring to main events in the Iraqi history and ends with the general evaluations of Turkmen political history, political activity and actors.

Chapter three tries to break down the Iraqi Turkmen identity into its several components, by presenting in a quantitative way, the responses to the survey questions. While the survey was made up of numerous questions, the aim has been to relate these responses to the questions along five main dimensions, which are religious, sectarian, tribal, national and ethnic.

In the fourth chapter, based on the findings of the survey, I will try to draw conclusions within the conceptual framework drawn in this chapter. In this sense, I will argue that the survey can give clues to explain the Iraqi society in general and the Iraqi Turkmens in particular.
CHAPTER 2

THE IRAQI TURKMENS: DESCRIPTION(S) AND CHRONICLE(S)

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will try to answer who the Iraqi Turkmens are in its most general sense through historical background based on mostly secondary literature. The descriptions and historical background are keys to understand the identity or identities of a group.

The chapter begins with the conceptual, contextual and historical origins of the term Turkmen and of Turkmen presence in Iraq. Following this, the Turkmen settlement areas in Iraq, which are called Turkmenland by the Iraqi Turkmens, are introduced and the population numbers given by different sources for the Iraqi Turkmens are compared. As the main body of this chapter, the modern political history of the Iraqi Turkmens starting from the Mosul question in 1920s and ending up to the present is given in a chronological order and the Iraqi Turkmen political history, activity and actors are generally evaluated.

2.2. Iraqi Turkmen: Meanings, Contexts and Origins

Etymological origins of the term Turkmen remains a contested issue. Contrary to the Turkmen politician Ziyat Köprülü, who claims that the use of the title ‘Turkmen’ for Iraqi Turks had begun in Seljuk times, the use of the term is even

\[\text{Ziyat Köprülü, } \text{Irak'ta Türk Varlığı [Turkish Presence in Iraq]} \ (\text{Ankara: Örnek Limited Şirketi, 1996}), 3.\]
older. It is generally argued that the name ‘Turkmen’ had started to be used after the Oghuz tribes converted to Islam in 10th century. In his broad study, Peter B. Golden shows that some medieval authors like al-Biruni, Marwazi and Mahmud al-Kasghari used the term ‘Turkmen’ in order to refer to Islamicized Turkic (and later exclusively Oghuz) populations although he reveals that there is one word which resembles the term Turkmen (trwkkkmn) in a 8th centenarian letter of Sogdia, a civilization of Iranian-speaking people in Central Asia between the rivers of Amu Darya and Syr Darya.50

Golden also shows that contemporary popular etymologies such al-Biruni and Mahmud al-Kasghari views the origin of the word Turkmen in combination of the words ‘Turk’ and ‘manand’ (meaning like, resembling, similar to in Persian) while modern scholarship tends to consider ‘-men’ as a suffix of strengthening.51 For instance, according to Larry Clark, the term is derived from the word ‘Türk’ (Turk) plus an intensifying element ‘-men’ which could mean ‘most Turkish of the Turks’ or ‘pure blooded Turks.’52 On the other hand, in his book, Erşat Hürmüzlü, president of Kirkuk Foundation, shows that Ibn Kathir and Nashri consider the word ‘Turkmen’ as the combination of the words ‘Türk’ (Turk) and ‘iman’ (meaning faith in Arabic).53 In any case, dating from the 13th century, the term Turkmen involved the title Oghuz and came to refer to all the Saljuk Turks from Fergana to Anatolia, Syria and Iraq.54

The term ‘Turkmen’ carries various and contested usages that might signify several intersecting connotations inherited from history and used by different


51 Ibid., 213.


53 Erşat Hürmüzlü, Türkmenler ve Irak [Turkmens and Iraq] (İstanbul: Kerkük Vakfı, 2003), 16.

54 Clark, Turkmen Reference Grammar, 4.
sources at different points. While the medieval usages of the term are generally broad, it can be observed that modern usages are contracted or shrunk. In its most general sense, this title implies the nomadic Muslim Oghuz tribes who migrated from the steppes of Central Asia to Anatolia and to its immediate neighborhood including Iran, Iraq and Syria. In its second general sense, the Ottoman Turkish-speaking subjects, particularly Turkish tribes in Anatolia, Iraq, and Syria living in rural areas, were called Turkmen during the Medieval Era. In a narrower sense inherited from the second general usage above, the term Turkmen indicates Yörüks of Anatolia, most of whom have adopted a sedentary life but few of whom are still nomads especially in Taurus Mountains. In another narrower sense, the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Turkmenistan, a Central Asian country, are named Turkmen. One of the narrowest and most recent usages of the term, but still one hundred-year-old, at the same time the most popular usage in Turkey, is its implication of the Turkish-speaking remnants of the Ottoman Empire in Iraq and Syria. It should be noted that when it comes to Turkmens, it was Turkmens of Iraq that used to spring to mind in Turkey until the Syrian Turkmens started to occupy the agenda of Turkish society due to the large-scale media campaign related to their resistance against Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. The primary focus of this thesis is the Iraqi Turkmens.

Generally, Turkmen authors do not distinguish the Iraqi Turkmens from the Syrian Turkmens and from the Turks of Turkey as a whole. On the other hand, the connection between the Middle Eastern and Central Asian Turkmens is a matter in question. Turkmen scholar Suphi Saatçı claims that the Turkmen of Iraq are far removed from those of Turkmenistan. 55 Similarly, Larry Clark argues that the only similarity between the Turkmens of Turkmenistan and of Iraq, Syria and Turkey is their ethnonym. 56 However, it can be seen that the names of certain contemporary tribes in Iraq, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Iran whose presences

55 Suphi Saatçi, Tarihten Günümüze Irak Türkmenleri [The Iraqi Turkmens from the Past to the Present] (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2003), 16-17.
56 Clark, Turkmen Reference Grammar, 11.
are known are the same: For instance, Turkmen tribe of Salir (Salur or Salar) is present in Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. The tribe of Bayat, the most populated and popular Turkmen tribe in Iraq, exists both in Turkmenistan and Iraq. In addition, Begdili (Begtili, Bekdili or Bektilli), an Iraqi Turkmen tribe, is a branch of Gökleng (Göklen) tribe which is present in Turkmenistan and Iran. Furthermore, the name of Iraqi Turkmen tribe ‘Eymür’ is the former name of Yemreli tribe living in Turkmenistan and Iran. In addition, the name of Iraqi Turkmen tribe ‘Sarılı’ (Sarılı) is the same with a branch of Ersarı tribe in Turkmenistan. However, the biggest Turkmen tribe in Turkmenistan, Teke, is not encountered in the Iraqi Turkmens. In short, the ‘kinship’ between the Middle Eastern Turkmens living in Iraq, Syria and Iran and Central Asian Turkmens living in Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan can be found in relation to the names of Turkmen tribes living there while cultural and linguistic similarities and differences between them remain more complex.

The first mention of the title ‘Turkmen’ or ‘Turk’ in Iraq goes back a long way although the exact date of first Turkmen settlements in Iraq is a question of debate. According to Suphi Saatçı, the Turks entered Iraq in company with coming of two thousand Turkish warriors, from Bukhara in Central Asia, deployed by the Umayyad in Basra in 674. As from 674, Turkish warriors came to different districts of Iraq at certain intervals to go in for the armies of Arab caliphs and governors and their number gradually increased. For instance, when it came to year 836, city of Samarra, which had a population of 70,000, was founded for Turkic Mamluk warriors by Abbasid caliph al-Mu’tasim. Nevertheless, it can be said that the Turkish presence in Iraq preliminarily

57 For the details of the names of Turkmen tribes, see Clark, Turkmen Reference Grammar, 8-11. Also see Suphi Saatçi, Irak Türkmen Boyları Oymaklar ve Yerleşme Bölgeleri [Iraqi Turkmen Tribes: Clans and Settlement Areas] (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2015). Also see Soltanşa Atanıyazov, “Türkmen Boylarının Geçmişi, Yayılışı, Bugünü Durumu ve Geleceği [Turkmen Tribes’ History, Expansion, Present Situation and Future],” Bilig 10 (1999).

58 Saatçi, Tarihten Günümüze Irak Türkmenleri, 20.

59 Ibid., 22.
remained more of military nature rather than permanent settlements through long ages.

Particularly after the Seljuk Sultan Tughrul Beg captured the Abbasid capital of Baghdad from Shiite Muslim Buwaihids in 1055, Turkic tribes more intensely settled in Iraq, particularly in northern districts such as Shahrizor. This can be counted as a more appropriate date for the start of permanent Turkish settlements in Iraq. As time passed by, the Turks reigned over lands of Iraq under the names of Seljuks, Mosul Emirate, Erbil Emirate and Kipczak Beylic. In addition, Turkish population in Iraq dramatically increased during the upsurge of Mongol invasions in the 13th century. After Karakoyunlu (Black Sheep Turkmens), Akkoyunlu (White Sheep Turkmens) and Safavid controls, the Ottomans took the possession of the region. Especially in the 17th century, the Ottomans settled several Sunni Turkmen tribes from Afyon, Tokat, Diyarbakır and Urfa in Iraq, particularly in Khanaqin, Kizlarbat, Mandali, Erbil and Kirkuk, to strengthen the bonds of the region with Anatolia and create a firewall against threats from the Safavids. According to Saatç, these Turkmen tribes have produced the Iraqi Turkmen community that has carried on until today. In addition, Turkmen politician Ziyat Köprülü accepts the Ottoman times as the actual settlement era of Turkmens in Iraq.

Vahram Petrosian argues that present day-Iraqi Turkmen community consists of descendants of Turkmens settled in the area around the 10th century, at the time of Seljuks and before; the offsprings of the Turkmen tribes settled in Iraq in the 11th-13th centuries; the descendants of the Azeri Turkish speaking groups from Maragha planted as garrisons by Shah Ismail Safavi (1502-1524) and Nadir Shah (1730-1747); and the Turks and Turkmens migrated there during the Ottoman

60 Ibid., 90.
61 Saatçı, Irak Türkmen Boyları Oymaklar ve Yerleşme Bölgeleri, 14.
62 Köprülü, Irak'ta Türk Varlığı, 4.
period. Although many Kurdish nationalist authors like Shorish Haji predicate the Turkmen presence in Iraq on forced migrations of the Ottomans and the Safavids, it can be seen that many historians like Abdurrazzak al-Hasani, Peter B. Golden, V. V. Barthold agree on the fact that the Turkmen arrived Iraq long before the Ottoman and Safavid times.

2.3. Turkmen Settlement Areas in Iraq: Turkmenland

The Turkmen of Iraq have been settled in a cross strip, which constitutes a kind of buffer zone and ethnical border relatively separating the Kurdish and Arab regions, extending from Iran-Iraq border in the middle of Iraq to the Syrian-Iraqi border in the northwest. This cross strip which lies between the 33rd and 37th parallels is concretized in motto of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, the most popular and active Turkmen organization: Turkmenland from Tal Afar to Mandali. This strip implies that the Turkmens live side by side and together with many other different groups and this makes Turkmenland and its immediate neighborhood one of the most heterogeneous regions of Iraq in which the Turkmen, the Kurd, the Shiite and Sunni Arab, the Yezidi, the Assyrian and the Christian live. Turkmenland (meaning Türkmeneli in Turkish), a denotation introduced by Turkmen political movement but popular within the Iraqi Turkmen community, has been denominated to define the territories in which they claim that the Turkmens intensively live both in history and present. In this sense, Turkmenland appears as both a realistic and an idealistic construction in that it not only implies

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64 To clarify what Turkmenland implies, it should be noted that Turkmenland and Turkmenistan indicate very different regions although their meanings are very similar. The term Turkmenland does not imply Turkmenistan of Central Asia in any shape or form. While the term Turkmenland was peculiar to the Iraqi Turkmen regions until recently, some Turkmen sources have started to use the terms ‘Eastern Turkmenland’ for Iraqi Turkmen regions and ‘Western Turkmenland’ for Syrian Turkmen regions. For an example of this usage, see Western Turkmenland news in http://www.avrupaturkmengazetesi.com/2016/08/25/bati-turkmeneli-turk-askeri-bizim-askerimiz/.
the demographic and historical facts and claims but also symbolizes what is desired or dreamed.

Turkmenland, in real terms, indicates an ever-narrowing geography from the outset due to various factors such as Arab immigrations, particularly in Saddam Hussein era, Kurdish immigrations, especially in post-2003 period, Turkmen emigrations in different times, and finally the ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) occupations. Many leading Turkmen figures argue that the lands of Turkmen were exposed to a process of Arabization during the period of Baath regime, when the ‘politics of disguise’ was very common. Turkmen regions have also experienced a process of Kurdification since the collapse of Baath regime in 2003 as a consequence of active mobilization of Kurdish parties. For instance, ORSAM researchers observed in 2009 that there were buildings just

65 This process not only includes the Arabization of Turkmen regions, but also of Turkmen people through various ways like prohibition of their language and changing their names.

66 The documents revealed in the Kurdish politician Shorish Haji’s book display the official character of the process. Most characteristic ones can be exemplified here: according to a document, Sulaymaniyah police commissioner commands all the assistantships to report their advices in order to strengthen the Arab presence, to give privileges for the settlement of Arabs and to obscure the presence of other ethnic groups in the cities and town where several ethnic groups live (p. 203). In another document, it is mentioned that the forced settlement of Arab tribes in Mosul and Tal Afar, highly populated by Turkmens, were completed (p. 214). Another document shows that a commission was set up to sustain the monetary assistance and land allocation for the Arabs who wanted to settle in Kirkuk, a city labeled by Turkmens as the heart of Turkmenland (p. 222). Another official document dated 1977 demonstrates that it is determined that one hundred Kurdish families from each vilayet be displaced every day to settle in Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, the last two of which are claimed by Turkmens as historical Turkmen settlement areas (p. 296). For even more examples of this kind of documents, see Şoriş Haci, Kerkükün Arablaştırılması: Belgeler [Arabization of Kirkuk: Documents] (İstanbul: Doz Yayıncılık, 2006). Some characteristic documents can also be found in the Kurdish politician Tarık Cambaz’s book: In a document dated 1995 sent to Kirkuk Agriculture Directorate, there are instructions to cancel the contracts of all the farms of Kurdish and Turkmen farmers in Kirkuk (p. 17). Another document dated 1997 declares that Arabization policy toward Turkmens has continued and their lands would be dispossessed even if they declare themselves as Arabs (p. 25). For other examples of these document, see Tarık Cambaz, Kerkük’te Kürt ve Türkmen Soykırımı (Kimlik Değiştirme) [Kurdish and Turkmen Genocide in Kirkuk (Disguise of Identity)] (Diyarbakır: Deng Yayınları, 2009).

67 It should be noted that the processes of Arabization and of Kurdification differantiate in, at least, one important respect for the Turkmen: The process of Arabization implies Arab identification of both people and land while the Kurdification connotes Kurdification of the land and of administration.
completed or under construction and prepared for Kurdish settlers
complimentarily on both sides of the road between Kirkuk and Tuz Khormato,
Turkmen regions. Yet, it cannot be said that the Kurdish mobilization is peculiar
to post-Saddam Hussein era in Iraq. For example, in an official document dated
1985, Sulaymaniyah Police Department is warned about the increasing Kurdish
migration to Kirkuk. In any case, almost all the Turkmen leading figures have
agreed on the fact that there have been planned demographic changes in the
regions where Turkmens live by large numbers.

Because there are overlapping claims of different ethnic or religious groups in
Iraq on the same lands, the lands called Turkmenland have been a part of this
debate depending upon its strategic location. It can be argued that Turkmenland is
the most fervent area of the clash of (Arab, Kurdish and Turkmen) ethnic
attachments and competitions in Iraq. For instance, contrary to the Turkmen
claims, Abdullah Keskin, editorial director of pro-Kurdish Avesta publisher in
Turkey, argues that the original boundaries of Kurdistan extend to Sinjar,
Khanaqin and Hamrin Mountains including Kirkuk and these regions are mostly
populated by Kurds. The debate might sometimes go into extremes: while some
Kurdish historians like Kemal Mazhar Ahmed try to find some connection of
Kurds to peoples who lived before Common Era emerge, there are some Turkish
or Turkmen authors such as Nefi Demirci who try to prove Turkishness or
Turkmenness of Summerians. In any case, conflicting Turkmen, Kurdish and
Arab parties compete with each other for the probation of the Turkmenness,
Kurdishness and Arabness of these intersecting regions. The use of itineraries of
foreign itinerants from the 16th century to the 20th century is very common in the
works of authors of conflicting sides to show historical evidence for their claims.

68 Oytun Orhan, “Yorgun Ülke Irak: Musul, Telafer, Kerkük, Tuzhurmatu, Bağdat Gözlemeleri
[The Exhausted Country Iraq: Mosul, Telafer, Kirkuk, Tuzhurmatu, Baghdad Observations],”
Ortadoğu Analiz 1.12 (2009), 39.

69 Haci, Kerkük’ün Araplaştırılması: Belgeler, 252-253.

70 Kemal Mazhar Ahmet, Kerkük: Tarih, Politika, Etnik Yapı [Kirkuk: History, Politics, Ethnic
Composition] (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2005), 11.
Kirkuk is one of the clearest examples of this debate and it appears as a symbol for the collective identity of the Turkmens including even those Turkmens who are not from Kirkuk. Many Turkmens have claimed that the demographic structure of Kirkuk has changed for years to the detriment of the Turkmens. Although this claim can be regarded as a concession, it also demonstrates that Kirkuk has been a part of Turkmenland regardless of its current demographic situation, in which it seems that the Kurds have outnumbered the Turkmens and the Arabs. However, Kurdish side argues that the Kurdish people who have come to Kirkuk in recent years are the families of or descendants of the Kurdish people forced out of Kirkuk, and thus, those people, in fact, are the indigens of Kirkuk. Nevertheless, many Turkmen politicians and authors have expressed their desire to make Kirkuk the capital of Turkmenland. In fact, while Kirkuk is the most important and clearest example, it is not the only disputed territory. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) specifies fifteen regions as disputed territories, which are districts of Sinjar, Tal Afar, Til Kaef, Sheikhan, Akre, Hamdaniya and Makhmour of Mosul Governate, Al Hawija, Dibis, Daquq and Kirkuk of Kirkuk Governate, Tuz Khormato of Salah al-Din Governate, and districts of Kifri and Khanaqin and the sub-district of Mandali of Diyala Governate. Except Sheikhan, Akre and Makhmour, all the twelve of them are highly populated by the Turkmen even if they do not constitute the majority in each one of all the mentioned areas.

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In any case, it can be argued that these patterns have caused existential insecurity among the Turkmens and their narrowing living space has had political and melancholic impact on Turkmen identity. Furthermore, unlike the Kurds, the Turkmens remain a non-territorial minority that does not have self-administration or any direct control over their claimed lands. These last points, existential insecurity of the Turkmen, politicizing and melancholic effect of their narrowing geography and being a non-territorial minority lead to a gap between the imagined or ‘ideal’ Turkmen territory and the reality. Firstly, it can be said that Turkmenland is a reflection of quest for solidarity and unity among the Turkmens who may constitute a divided society or a society of divided loyalties in many respects. Generally, the notion and feeling of Turkmen homeland is predominant in the literature of Turkmens in some abstract and concrete forms. For instance, the unifying symbol of Kirkuk appears as a dominant symbol in the poetry of Turkmen literature. Moreover, the same literature includes the poems written for the city of Erbil, which is the capital of Kurdistan Regional Government today.  

Secondly, Turkmenland is an argument against the claims of other groups over their territories. This argument narrates the ethnic objectives of the Turkmen community, and thus, Turkmenland also appears as a future dream.

Regardless of which group constitutes the majority, the Turkmen live mainly in districts of Kirkuk, Dibis and Daquq, sub-districts of Taze Khormato and Altun Kopru and several villages such as Bashir, Yaychi, Kümbetler, Türkalan, Chardakli, Kızılyar, Bolova in Kirkuk Province, districts of Tal Afar, Sinjar, Mosul, al-Hamdaniya and Tal Kayf and hundreds of villages in Ninevah Province; districts of Bayat and Tuz Khormato, sub-districts of Amirli, Bastamli and Suleiman Pak in Salah ad-Din Province, district of Khanaqin, Kifri, Mandali, Shahraban (Mikdadiyye), Baqubah and sub-districts of Qaragan (Celevla), Qara...

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Tepe, Kızıl Rabat (al-Sadiye) in Diyala Province, district of Badra, al-Aziziyya and Yusufiya in Wasit Province.\textsuperscript{75}

2.4. Population: Battle for Numbers

The role of the census and population figures become more political, ideological and subjective based on political history, present situation, future strategy and character of the identity or identities (ethnicity, religion, language, race, origin) of the population in the countries where the population is composed of different ethnic and religious groups.\textsuperscript{76} There is to date no certain figure of total Iraqi population and the gap between estimations for total population can amount to 6-7 million. From the outset, as in other ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, the population of the Iraqi Turkmen has been another contested issue. The population of Iraqi Turkmen community has been one of the liveliest discussions in the political experience of the Turkmen. The most frequently uttered number in Turkey and among the Turkmen authors and politicians is 2.5 million to 3 million and it is claimed that the Turkmen constitute 8-10 percent of total Iraqi population. However, it can be seen that Turkmen leading figures have no consensus on the approximate number of their community. To illustrate, while Erşat Hürmüzlü, former chief advisor to former Turkish President Abdullah Gül, claims that 2.5 million of present-day Iraqi population is composed of the Turkmen,\textsuperscript{77} Mahmut Çelebi, the president of İhsan Doğramacı Erbil Foundation, states that there are about 3.5 million Turkmens in Iraq for the time being.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} Sheth Jerjis, \textit{The Turkmen of Iraq: Underestimated, Marginalized and Exposed to Assimilation} (Nijmegen: Benda Print House, 2006), 120. See also Saatçi, \textit{Irak Türkmen Boyları Oynamak ve Yerleşme Bölgelere}, 78-88.


\textsuperscript{78} Mahmut Çelebi, interview by ORSAM (Orta Doğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi [Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies]), \textit{Ortadoğu Analiz} 4.48 (2012), 116.
On the other hand, the numbers given in the Western sources are more diversified than the numbers presented by Turkmens and Turks. In an Iraq background note of the US Department of State updated on 6 February 2012 and in Iraq section of the World Fact Book of CIA updated on 20 January 2016, it is argued that the Turkmen and other ethnic groups such as the Armenian and the Assyrian constitute approximately five percent of total Iraqi population of 30,399,572, which corresponds to around 1.5 million people, based on June 2011 estimate. In World Population Review of 2015, in which Iraqi population is estimated as 39 million, it is written that the Turkmen constitute the three percent of overall Iraqi population, which corresponds to approximately 1.2 million. On the other hand, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) gives the number of around three million as the population of Iraqi Turkmen community. In the briefing of European Parliamentary Research Service titled Minorities in Iraq Pushed to the Brink of Existence, the Turkmen population is given as three million. According to a 2011 Pew Research Survey, the ethnic groups other than the Arabs and the Kurds that constitute 78 percent and 16 percent of Iraqi population respectively represent 6 percent of the total population which equals to approximately two million. Brendan O’Leary argues that the Turkmen population is, at most, 300,000 while he sees the assertions of higher numbers as

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the Turkish government’s means to strengthen Turkmen card in Iraqi politics.\textsuperscript{85} Yossef Bodansky, the director of the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, claims that the Turkmen population in Iraq may be as high as 2.5 million.\textsuperscript{86}

As it can be predicted, the numbers given by Kurdish sources are around two-four percent. For instance, Sherko Kirmanj, a Kurdish scholar, claims that the Turkmen with other ethnic groups compose three percent of the total Iraqi population.\textsuperscript{87} On the other hand, according to a 2008 report prepared by the central statistics and central report bureau of Ministry of Planning of Iraq, the population of Iraq in 2007 amounted to 30 million and the Turkmen constituted 6.5 percent of this population, which amounted to about two million people.\textsuperscript{88}

In a country like Iraq where the identities come to the forefront in almost every aspect of life and identity-related disputes are normal state of affairs, the numbers given by Turkmens, Turks, Kurds and Arabs can be explained by an ethnic tendency to magnify the number of one’s own ethnic group. In fact, it seems not possible to reach non-political data under these circumstances. Non-political (non-Turkmens, non-Kurdish and non-Arab in fact) sources are also dependent upon the flexible estimations based on the unreliable political data of Iraqi administrations or other groups. It seems that unlike the relative autonomy of the Kurds, the registration and introduction of the Turkmens as Arabs by Saddam Hussein regime is actually the main reason behind the low Western estimations about the population of the Turkmen. It can be said that Western sources’ tendencies to underestimate the number of Turkmens are also derived from the


\textsuperscript{87} Sherko Kirmanj, \textit{Identity and Nation in Iraq} (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 5.

acceptance of only Kurds and Arabs as constitutive nations in Iraqi constitutions and from their estimations based on the 1957 national census accepted as the most reliable census to follow and the only census including all the ethnic identities of Iraq to choose. However, there is a certain discrepancy in the results of 1957 census because the first claimed results for the Turkmen population was 136,800 but the corrected version of the results released in 1958 shows the number of 567,000 as the Turkmen population out of 6,300,000 total Iraqi population. However, it should be noted that there was a change in the regime and government in Iraq between the release dates of the two results.

At any rate, it seems not possible in the short term to extrapolate the accurate numbers of ethnic groups of Iraq under the conditions of political crisis and uncertainty of administrative boundaries of certain districts. Most importantly, political situation in Iraq today makes the calculation of Turkmen population impossible partly because of the latest ISIS occupations: Great majority of Shiite Turkmens of Mosul have taken shelter in southern part of Iraq, particularly in Najaf and Kerbela while most of the Sunni Turkmens of Mosul have taken refuge in the cities and refugee camps in Turkey and Iraq. Some parts of Sunni and Shiite Turkmens have taken shelter under Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Peter Galbraith claims that the election results in Iraq can be seen as a good method for general census based on ethnic and religious identities because the Iraqis have voted with reference to their ethnic and religious identities, and thus, he concludes that the population of the Iraqi Turkmen is less than one million in contrast to the claims of Turkey and the Turkmen. However, the Turkmens offer a complex case in the Iraqi politics. Considering Turkmen people


who have voted for Turkmen candidates in different election lists and obscurity of their personal impact on voter preferences, of the divisions between the Turkmen political parties, of the security problems throughout the country, of the poor performance of the Turkmen political parties, of the shifting alliances in the Iraqi election system and of seriously low level of voter turnout, the calculation of the accurate number of the Turkmen becomes problematic. For instance, Galbraith deduces improperly that the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) is a Shiite Turkmen organization because they supported United Iraqi Alliance, one of the main Shiite blocs in Iraq, in 2005 elections.\textsuperscript{92} In fact, the ITF is a Turkmen organization mainly dominated by and appealed to Sunni Turkmens despite its non-sectarian attitude.

All in all, despite various numbers, it is generally well accepted that the Turkmen represent the third major ethnic group of Iraq. In other words, the Turkmen are the second largest ethnic ‘minority’ of Iraq following the Kurds. In addition, they constitute the major Shiite community in a Sunni-dominated northern Iraq. The proportion of Sunnis and Shiites in the Turkmen community is also not certain: According to different arguments, the proportion of the Shia Turkmens varies from 30 percent to 50 percent. However, among the Turkmen authors and politicians, it is generally said that today’s Shiite Turkmens are originally Bektashi Turkmens and thus different from Arab Shiites of Iraq but they have been evolved into Shiism. For example, it is claimed that there was no Shiite mosque in Tal Afar, where certain number of Bektashi and Shiite Turkmens live, until 1940.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 210.

2.5. Modern Political History of the Iraqi Turkmens

Because it is a very long period and includes numerous developments and actors, this section will be divided into four main parts: It starts with the Mosul question of the 1920s and the developments during the mandate period and royal era. Following that, the main events in republican era starting from the late 1950s extending to the toppling of the Baath regime raising both hopes and fears among the Turkmens are given. It ends with how the fall of Saddam Hussein opened a totally new era for the Turkmens as for other groups in Iraq and general evaluations of the Turkmen modern political history, activity and actors.

2.5.1. Establishment of Iraq: Emergence of Iraqi Turkmen Identity

The British occupation of Mosul vilayet on 15 November 1918 and the establishment of Iraq as a League of Nations mandate under the British rule on 11 November 1920 made the Turkmens the citizens of the state of Iraq and became the starting point of their transformation into an ethnic minority. It can be said that the Turkmens were not satisfied with and did not easily adopt these newly emerging conditions, and thus, could not make a good start. In 1920, uprisings against the British and the ‘appointed’ king of Iraq were launched in different regions of Iraq. The Turkmens participated in the mass meetings and demonstrations. Particularly in Tal Afar, one of the closest Turkmen regions to Turkey, the Turkmen revolted against the British but as a result of the British offense against the rebels, they had to take refuge in Karachug Mountains for three months. These events are named ‘Kachakach Year’ or ‘Glorious Kachakach Epic’ by leading Turkmen figures and they are consistently evoked and narrated in almost each book related to Turkmens and in their literature. In fact, the

94 At that time, Mosul vilayet implied a broader geography including today's Mosul, Dohuk, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah.
Turkmen authors generally consider ‘Kachakac Epic’ as the starting point of general revolt against the British in Iraq in 1920. 

In Lausanne Conference in 1923, the Turkish and the British sides could not strike a bargain about the future of Mosul, which was included in National Pact of Turkey, the founding document of the modern Turkey’s territory. In this conference, which witnessed the negotiations between İsmet İnönü, representing Turkey, and Lord Curzon, the British, the term ‘Turkmen’ was a contested issue. In negotiations between the Turks and the British, the British side put the term Turk in quotes with reference to claims of the Turkish delegation and they came up with the term ‘Turkmen’. In the memorandum on Mosul submitted by the British delegation, Lord Curzon argued that ‘Turks’ of Iraq are not Ottoman Turks but they call themselves Turkmens and their language resembles Azerbaijani rather than the Turkish of Istanbul. On the other hand, İsmet İnönü responded that “the dialect used by the Turks of Mosul is the same as that spoken in Anatolia; the difference between them is less than that between the French that is spoken in the north and that spoken in the south of France.” In any case, the Conference could not solve the problem and the solution was left to the future negotiations between the Turks and the British.

During correspondences between the Turkish and the British sides and two weeks before the İstanbul Negotiations, the Turkmen community of Kirkuk faced bloody events in Iraq. On 4 May 1924, the conflict between Tayyari soldiers

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95 For the details of ‘Kachakac Epic’, see Habib Hürmüzlü, “Türkmen Şehri Telafer ve Yabancı İşgaline Karşı Irak’ta İlk Ayaklanma [Turkmen City Tal Afar and First Rebellion against Foreign Occupation],” Ortadoğu Analiz 1.5 (2009), 31-38.


98 Tayyari or Levy soldiers were the Assyrian mercenary in command of the British in Iraq.
and the craft of Kirkuk expanded and Tayyaris attacked the Turkmen of the town. The British High Commissioner detracted the Tayyari soldiers from the town and called the town dwellers to order. It is said that several homes and workplaces were looted and also more than 200 people were killed and injured during the events which lasted three days. The leading Turkmen figures of the town, Hussein Naftchi, Suleiman Beg Dervish and Hayrullah Hassan Efendi were arrested by the British. According to Turkmen authors, Tayyari soldiers, who were responsible for the attacks, were not punished always. These authors also consider that these events were the product of well-conceived British plans. This event is called Tayyari or Levy Event by Turkmen nationalists and is introduced as one of the evidences of the discrimination against and attitude toward the Turkmen in Iraq.  

It can be said that the Mosul question, which was solved by the 1926 Ankara Agreement between the Turks and the British to the benefit of Britain, was more than a question of the Iraqi-Turkish border in the eyes of the Turkmen. Although the term ‘Turkmen’ has been inherited from the history, its usage in this sense was new. According to many Turkmen authors such as Erşat Hürmüzlü and Suphi Saatçi, the denomination of ‘Turkmen’ that emerged in this process was a British political designation whose purpose was to strengthen the British arguments that the Turkmen of Iraq do not have anything to do with the Turk of Turkey. Furthermore, the title has been used by different Iraqi administrations on the basis of this argument. The British rule shaped the categories and concepts that survived well after the official termination of the mandate and the term Turkmen is one of these inheritances. On the other hand, Bilal Şimşir, a retired

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99 For the details of the event, see Al-Hirmizi, The Turkmen Reality in Iraq, 79-89.

Turkish ambassador, says that Turkey continued to use the denomination of ‘Iraqi Turks’ in foreign affairs correspondences until last years.\(^{101}\)

In short, Mosul question was the major dividing line which distinguishes the political history of the Iraqi Turkmens from Turkey. Until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Iraqi Turkmens had shared the same political history with the Turks of Turkey but with the establishment of Iraq, ‘two cousins’ have had a very different political history, one as a sovereign power in an independent country and the other as a minority in a mandate government. Therefore, the Mosul question indicates the modern origins of Turkmen identity.\(^{102}\)

Nevertheless, it can be said that in the early history of modern Iraq, the Turkmens had relatively higher level of freedom and consideration and enjoyed a relatively trouble-free existence as old administrative and business class of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{103}\) For example, two Turkmen members, İzzet Pasha Kirkuki and Hasanefendizade Hayrullah Efendi, represented Kirkuk in Iraqi Election Board in 1920.\(^{104}\) Furthermore, the first constitution draft of Iraq installed in 1921 (and its final official declaration) was published in English, Arabic, Kurdish and Turkish. However, it can be said that the fundamental motivation behind their relatively trouble-free existence was the British attempts to balance different groups in Iraq and the attempts of Turkmen notables to benefit from these emerging conditions for the good of their communities and of themselves. To illustrate, in return for their participation in the election for the Constituent Assembly, whose purpose had been to formalize the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi mandate treaty, obtain support for the drafting of a constitution and the passing of the 1923 Electoral Law and bestow legitimacy upon the new rulers, the Turkmens of Kirkuk had stipulated four

\(^{101}\) Bilal Şimşir, interview by Oğuz Çetinoğlu, *Bilenlerin Dilinden Irak Türkmenleri [Iraqi Turkmens in the Sayings of Experts]* (İstanbul: Bilge Oğuz Yayınları, 2012), 80.

\(^{102}\) During conducting survey, a Turkmen respondent from Mosul expresses the context of this distinction: “If we had not been pulled apart from you a hundred years ago, both of us would have been Turks but you are Turks and we are Turkmens now.”


\(^{104}\) Hürmüzlü, *Türkmenler ve Irak*, 43.
conditions, second and third of which had been accepted by the British: non-
interference of the government in the electoral procedures; the preservation of the
Turkish character in the liwa’s administration; the recognition of Turkish as the
liwa’s official language; and the appointment of Kirkuklis in all cabinets to be
formed in Baghdad thereafter.  

From the outset, a struggle for power and wealth between the Kurds and the
Turkmens had emerged on getting the edge on each other. With the end of the
Ottoman rule, the Turkmen notables of Mosul vilayet, who had been in a top
position of power and wealth, were challenged by the Kurdish notables. Britain
and Iraqi administrations sought to balance the growing influence of the each
group, between the Turkmens and Kurds, on the one hand, and among the Kurds
themselves, on the other.  

For the realization of this balance, administrative boundaries were changed several times and distinct elements of population were
promoted at the expense of others in the pursuit of the British political interests.  

However, it can be said that these balancing acts and of struggles for power
mostly produced and re-produced by the British delayed the development process
of the Iraqi identity. The Turkmens and the Kurds had acted in Iraq in the domain
of the British and not in the domain of ‘Iraqi administration’. Considering all the
groups attempted to preserve their identities and their traditional loyalties to the
sheikh, agha and the murshid and did not to become Iraqis or produce a new
loyalty to Iraq, the things were in a jam. From the point of the Turkmens, there
was no room for game aside from the play in Iraq when Ankara Agreement was
signed between Turkey and Britain in 1926, solving the Mosul question on behalf
of the British and creating great resentment among the Turkmen waiting to be
‘saved’ by Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

106 Ibid., 40.
107 Ibid., 41.
108 Ibid., 43.
The end of the mandate and signing of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty brought great tension to the northern provinces of Iraq due to the lack of reference in the treaty to Britain’s commitment to the inhabitants of those districts, particularly the Kurds and the Turkmens, and absence of any mention of their status in Iraq and their relationship with the Kurdish and Turkish population across the borders.\footnote{Ibid., 35.}

As mentioned above, their existence, power and official relationships depended mainly on their relations with the British officials and decisions.

During this period of transition and uncertainty, it can be argued that the Iraqi administration attempted to provide certain kinds of guarantee and certainty about their future. Iraqi administrations and King Faisal replicated several times that there could not be any discrimination in Iraq on the basis of religion and language and that any community could give education and open private schools in their own languages. To illustrate, the official declaration published on 30 May 1932 for the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations recognized Turkish and Kurdish as official languages along with Arabic, guaranteed the preservation of some national rights of Kurds and Turkmens such as the right to open schools giving education in mother tongue, and indicated Kirkuk and Kifri as Turkmen-majority cities.\footnote{Hürmüzlü, Türkmenler ve Irak, 22.}

For the implementation of these commitments, Local Languages Law no. 74 that determined to give Turkish education and to use Turkish as official language in the courts in Turkmen settlement areas was enacted.\footnote{Ibid., 23.} Turkish journals such as Kerkük and Afak were published during these years. Moreover, in his speech on 11 June 1935, King Faisal declared that ‘whether Kurd or Arab or Turk, each citizen should have education in their mother tongue.’\footnote{Ibid., 22.} Nonetheless, according to Erşat Hürmüzlü, these commitments and guarantees did not satisfy the Turkmens because their main demand was to be
regarded not as a minority but as a constituent nation and to be seriously included in Iraqi decision mechanisms. Hürmüzlü also claims that the Turkmen disapproval and reservation on the British and King Faisal was one of the main sources of their ignorance although they have never attempted revolt after 1920 general revolt against the British and the King Faisal.

In the late 1930s, the successive events deteriorated the position of the Turkmen in Iraq. Firstly, it is claimed that the deep interest of Turkmens in the Kirkuk visit of a Turkish committee which came to Iraq for Sadabad Pact in 1937 caused great resentment in Iraqi government. In addition, after the fall of Hikmet Suleiman from the government in 1938, the position of Turkmen in the use of cultural and educational rights was seriously weakened by the successive Iraqi governments. This manner change could also be associated with concerns and miscalculations by the Iraqi governments regarding Turkish acquisition of Hatay. This event also cherished the hopes among Turkmens, and thus, drew the reaction of Iraqi government on Turkmens. Bilal Şimşir also mentions a telegram from Kirkuk about the death of Atatürk, in which it writes that ‘the great savior (Atatürk) would absolutely emancipate the unfortunate Kirkuk one day’. Therefore, the Turkmens entered the 1940s in a relatively weakened complexion and under the mistrustful eyes of their administrations. On 12 June 1946, another event consistently evoked by Turkmen authors occurred: In the protests of workers of Kirkuk Petroleum Company in Gavurbaghi Square, the police officers opened fire on protestors and many workers and other civilians were killed. This

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113 Ibid., 23.
114 Ibid., 26.
116 Çetinoğlu, Bilenlerin Dîlinden Irak Türkmenleri, 84.
117 Ibid., 85.
118 Ibid., 85.
bloody event is called Gavurbaghi Massacre by Turkmen authors. And the years until the late 1950s were passed in inaction for the Turkmen.

2.5.2. The Republican Era: Between Fear and Hope

The Turkmens were one of the hopeful communities of Iraq after 14 July 1958 coup d’état. In the declaration of republic on the radio by General Abd al-Qarim Qasim and General Abd as-Salam Aref, it was declared that Iraq was composed of three essential ethnic groups, the Arab, the Kurd and the Turkmen. However, the new administration gave an equal status to the Kurds while the name of the Turkmen was not cited in provisional constitution issued on 27 July 1958. In succeeding provisions, amendments and regulations, it became clear that the Kurdish reality was accepted by the Iraqi administrations while the ethnic groups except for the Arabs and the Kurds were merged under the title of ‘other’. The negligence of Turkmens by the new administration resulted most probably from the rapprochement between Kurds and the Iraqi administration. Moreover, as a result of declaration of general amnesty in 1958, Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, in an embracing relationship with Qasim for a short time, came to Iraq from Moscow and this raised tensions among the Turkmen. After the return of Barzani, the small-scale conflicts between the Kurds and the Turkmens started to appear. Barzani launched the Kurdish campaign on Kirkuk both via propaganda claiming that Kirkuk has always been a Kurdish town and through mobilization of Kurdish population into Kirkuk. Expectedly, this caused greater resentment among the Turkmen than among the Arab since Kirkuk was still a non-Arab town during those dates.

In addition, the immediate aftermath of the revolution was the years of growing animosity and of the strategic alliances between different ideological and ethnic groups which tried their best to maximize their sphere of influence and to retain


their political gains against others. It can be said that during these years, Kurds and communists of all ethnic groups were on the one side and the rest was on the other although it was not the case for all the time and regions. For instance, in Tuz Khormato in February 1959, an alliance between the Kurds and Turkmens which was formed to prevent leftists from strengthening their influence in the town brought about the setting on fire of a bookshop owned by a communist and led to their joining forces in attacking the communists assembled on the spot. Growing tensions also turned into bloody conflicts in different locations of the country at different times such as in Mosul in March 1959 and stroke Turkmens on 14-16 June 1959. In the revolution’s first year, the tension between Iraq Communist Party and more traditionalist parties, particularly that of Qasim, was reflected on the Turkmen and there occurred horrifying events in Kirkuk: 120 houses, stores and cafes, largely belonging to the Turkmen community, were burned to the ground, some with their occupants still inside, on the ground that they belonged to members of an ‘anti-communist’ ethnic minority. After the events, despite the sentence to death for those who committed the crimes, the executions were not carried out, and hence, the Turkmen community was in a heat. In fact, as the bloody events of 1959 reveals, 1958 revolution made the starting point of the struggle between Kurds and Turkmens for Kirkuk apparent. According to leading Turkmen figures, the main reasons behind these events


124 Astarjian, The Struggle for Kirkuk, 147.
were the Kurdish conspiracies for the sake of Kirkuk and the anti-communist orientation of Turkmens.\textsuperscript{125}

In an emergency situation stemmed from these events and growing tensions and in a relatively free environment, Turkmen Brotherhood Association, the first Turkmen organization in Iraq, was founded in 1960. The Organization ministered to cultural and social requirements of Turkmen community and to the sustainment and development of national sentiments\textsuperscript{126} and demanded rights for Turkmens from the Iraqi administrations. Meanwhile, in February 1963, Qasim was overthrown by the coup of Abd as-Salam Aref. In the period of Aref brothers, started in 1963 and lasted until 1968, the Turkmen attracted attention and support of the administration. In this period, Kirkuk Massacre responsible were executed; a Turkmen minister, Nizamettin Aref, was appointed; Turkish publication in Latin characters was allowed; Turkmen Brotherhood Association found chance to meet the committees from Turkey;\textsuperscript{127} and Kirkuk television was allowed to broadcast in Turkish.\textsuperscript{128} However, on 17 July 1968, Baath party took control with coup d’État and an uncertain period started for the Turkmen.

This new period started with a short-term favorable development for the Turkmen. On 24 January 1970, the Iraqi administration declared several cultural rights for the Turkmen including education in their own language at primary school level in Turkmen regions, teaching and enhancing their language, establishment of Turkmen Education Directorate under the Ministry of Education, right to establish Turkmen Litterateurs Association under Iraq

\textsuperscript{125} Most probably, anti-communist orientation of Turkmens came from the strict Turkish anti-communist stance after the World War II and from the possible impact of growing pan-Turanist ideology in Turkey which has mostly embraced Turkmens.


\textsuperscript{127} Demirci, Iрак Türklerinin Düny Bugünü, 26.

\textsuperscript{128} Güçlü Demirci, “Iрак’taki Türkler [Turks in Iraq],” in Irak Dosyası II [Iraq File II], ed. Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu et al. (İstanbul: TATAV Yayınları, 2003), 111.
Litterateurs Association, the establishment of Turkmen Culture Directorate under Ministry of Information and Culture, right to publish newspaper and journal and prolonging of TV broadcasting in their own language in Kirkuk. \(^{129}\) The declaration of these rights was most probably related to Iraqi signing of 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of the United Nations on 18 February 1969 with the aim of showing its commitment to the convention. \(^{130}\) However, according to Fazıl Demirci, the declaration pointed deliberatively to ‘Turkmen’ language and these rights had aim to emphasize that the Turkmen are not Turkish and their languages are also different. \(^{131}\) On the other hand, the Turkmen were not satisfied with the operationalization of these declared rights and one year after the declaration, these rights were abolished.

According to Târık Oğuzlu, these changing attitudes of Iraqi governments towards Turkmens varied according to the relations between the governments and Kurds. \(^{132}\) He claims that during the times of open conflict between Kurds and governments, Turkmens were approached with sympathy for a balancing power against Kurdish claims of autonomy. \(^{133}\) For instance, as it can be seen in the mid-1970s, after the signing of an accord between the Iraqi regime and the Kurdish fractions to grant autonomy, the situation of the Turkmen began to worsen again. \(^{134}\) However, it can be said that the approach of Iraqi governments to Turkmens was not only dependent on its relations with the Kurds but also on


\(^{132}\) Oğuzlu, "Endangered Community," 316.

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 316.

\(^{134}\) Ibid., 316.
Turkish foreign policy. Cyprus Peace Operation of Turkey could be also seen as a reason for the regime’s change of attitude as it can be seen in the case of Hatay issue of 1939.

In 1980, when Saddam Hussein tried to consolidate his power in his country after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, he launched a ‘discipline campaign’ for the leading Turkmen figures and community. It is claimed that about seventy Turkmen leaders and intellectuals were executed in 1980. Also, large numbers of the Turkmen were said to have gone to Iran to fight against Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and this caused Hussein’s accusations of Turkmen for spying for Iran. The crimes credited to the Turkmen also included spying for Turkey and pan-Turkism. On the other hand, a wide number of Turkmens fled to Iran and Syria to protect themselves from the poor conditions of the Iran-Iraq War in consequence of Turkish closing of Iraqi border. Among these people, there were some personalities who went into politics in Iran and have recently done politics in different political organizations and have served as deputies such as Sheikh Muhammad Taqi al-Mawla, Abbas al-Bayati, heading the Turkmen Islamic Union, Faryad Omar Abdullah Tozlo, head of Al-Wafaa Turkmen Movement, and Mehdi Tozlo. In 1980, as a reaction to the execution of Turkmen community leaders, Iraqi National Turkmen Organization, the first political organization of the Turkmen, was declared in Syria by the Turkmens

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135 Çetinoğlu, Bilenlerin Dilinden Irak Türkmenleri, 87.


137 İzzettin Kerkük, “İnsan Hakları Açısından Irak Türklerinin Durumu [The Status of the Iraqi Turks from the Point of Human Rights],” in Irak Dosyası II [Iraq File II], ed. Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu et al. (İstanbul: TATAV Yayınları, 2003), 120.


139 Ibid., 24.
who fled to Syria but its operation was stopped in 1985. In 1988, the first political party of the Turkmen in Iraq, National Turkmen Party, was established. During these years, Turkmen Brotherhood Organization was also seized by Baath regime.

The Gulf War and its immediate effects brought many Turkmens about rejoicing in prospect of collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein and many young Turkmen took up arms. In addition, during and after the Gulf War, as a consequence of weakening of Saddam Hussein regime and Iraqi army, authority gap emerged in certain regions of Iraq, particularly in its northern parts. Peshmerga who tried to take advantage of the situation entered Kirkuk, and hence, confrontations between the Turkmens and the Kurds took place. Then, Iraqi army entered Kirkuk as part of wholesale operations to suppress the riots in the whole country and many Turkmen were arrested and killed in the sub-district of Altun Kopru. The events dated 28 March 1991 is memorialized and called Altunkopru Massacre by Turkmen authors. Turkmen politician Ziyat Köprülü mentions the names of 75 Turkmen people who were killed in these events.

Furthermore, after the Gulf War, the issue of the defense of the Turkmen emerged on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy and in the statements of Turkish authorities. As a result of emergence of a de facto administration in Northern Iraq and the impact of Turkey on the political structure of the region, the political visibility of the Turkmen and the number of Turkmen political organizations increased. In 1995, the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), which united the Iraqi National Turkmen Party, Turkmen Solidarity Party (latter Turkmenland Party),

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141 Scott Taylor, Among the ‘Others’: Encounters with the Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq (Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 2004), 93.
142 Köprülü, Irak’ta Türk Varlığı, 71-72.
Turkmen Independents Movement, Turkmen Brotherhood Association, Turkmen Cooperation and Cultural Foundation and Iraqi Turks Cultural and Fraternal Organization, emerged. This process of high-speed politicization of the Turkmen and increasing visibility of their political activities cannot be explained only by looking at their own threat perception, namely de facto Kurdish administration in the north. The changing political situation in northern Iraq provided by ‘safe haven’ alarmed Turkey because of the possibility of the emergence of an independent Kurdish political entity which had been known as a ‘redline’ of Turkish foreign policy toward the region. Therefore, two points came to the agenda: first, to increase Turkmen political activity in the region, and second, to promote Iraq’s territorial integrity through Turkmen political actors. This point can also explain the point of why Turkey has not supported and not desired the armament of Turkmens. In addition, it has been even argued that the reason behind the deployment of the headquarters of the ITF in Erbil was to provide Turkey with more reliable communication and easier travel access.

On the occasion of its image of an umbrella organization, the ITF has not only focused on political activities but also on cultural and social activities and it has seemed to be the broadest and the most organized organization of the Turkmen community. In its founding declaration, the ITF emphasized the lack of cooperation between Turkmen organizations and indicated its main principles as providing the unity and solidarity for the Turkmen and gaining the constitutional rights of Turkmen community in political, legal, cultural and economic areas. In the First Turkmen Congress on 4-7 October 1997, the Declaration of Essential Principles was announced. In this declaration, the uniqueness of the Iraqi Turkmen Front about the representation of the Turkmen and bindingness of the

145 As a result of Saddam Hussein's persecution of the Kurds following the Gulf War, a UN resolution was passed to provide the Kurds who fled with a 'safe zone' above the 36th parallel.

146 Taylor, Among the 'Others', 102.

declaration for the Turkmen community were claimed and the activities of and
the claims of representation of other Turkmen organizations outside the Front
were rejected.\textsuperscript{148} In addition, the discourse of ‘From Tal Afar to Mandali’ was
adopted and the geographical region this discourse involved was indicated as
Turkmenland.\textsuperscript{149} However, it cannot be said that ‘the spirit of solidarity’ did not
go a long way. The Second Turkmen Congress held on 20-22 November 2000
was one of the earliest expressions of the conflicts among Turkmen leaders, in
which personal problems between the Turkmen occupying the Turkmen political
experience emerged.\textsuperscript{150}

\textbf{2.5.3. Post-Baath Period: New Opportunities and Threats}

American occupation of Iraq and toppling of Saddam Hussein was the starting
point of a totally new era for the Turkmen as for the other ethnic, religious and
ideological groups in Iraq. The Third Turkmen Congress on 12-15 September
2003 was one of the most critical congresses of Turkmen political history
following the occupation. In this congress, the headquarters of the ITC was
transferred from Erbil to Kirkuk, which has been stated as the center of the
Turkmen.\textsuperscript{151} However, it can be said that the ITF’s weak position against
increasing Kurdish activity in Kirkuk has harmed the reputation of the ITF.
Furthermore, the established structure in Erbil was collapsed; the majority of the
delegates of Erbil withdrew from the umbrella and the ITF’s position against the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),
which attempted to establish Kurdish order in Northern Iraq, was weakened.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 58.
Moreover, transfer of the ITF from Erbil to Kirkuk meant also transfer of political activity center of Turkey from Erbil to Kirkuk and it amounted to going down of Turkish impact in northern Iraq. Nevertheless, the fall of Saddam Hussein enabled the ITF and the Turkmen who had lived under his direct pressure to increase their activities in broader scope. Therefore, in the third congress, the number of participants increased. For example, the main branch of Turkmen Brotherhood Association in Baghdad which had been under the control of Baathists since 1980s joined the Iraqi Turkmen Front.

However, it cannot be said that Turkmens found an opening with the fall of Saddam Hussein. Tarık Oğuzlu retains two fundamental reasons of this outcome: first, mismatch of Turkish and the US interests, which appeared particularly in the refusal of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to back a military mandate opening a second front in the Iraqi war; and second, increasing Kurdish power due to their support to the US military efforts during the campaign. These two points can be symbolized in Hood Event on 4 July 2004: together with Peshmerga, the US soldiers raid on Turkish safe house in Sulaymaniyah housed by some members of the Iraqi Turkmen Front and Turkish Special Forces soldiers. According to the editorial director of pro-Kurdish Avesta publisher in Turkey, Abdullah Keskin, the scene of accident was an office of the ITF. In any case, according to many Turkmen politicians, the Turkmen have paid for the rejection of the resolution during the post-2003 era in Iraq. Shortly after the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the Turkmen community was drifted into a state of turmoil. For instance, in August 2003, the tomb of Imam Musa Ali in Tuz Khormato, blessed by the Shia, was exploded by the militia forces of the PUK of

156 Ahmet, Kerkük: Tarih, Politika, Etnik Yapı, 17.
Jalal Talabani and the events gave way to the protest movements in Kirkuk, intervened by the American forces and Kurdish militias.157

At the same time, while Turkmens were not represented in Leadership Council of Paul Bremer, the provisional government formed after the occupation of Iraq led by American Presidential Envoy to Iraq, they were included in 25-person Iraqi Governing Council of thirteen Shiite, five Kurdish, five Sunni Arabs, one Assyrian and one Turkmen, Sondul Chapouk, the leader of Iraqi Women’s Organization but not a member of the ITF, considered as unrepresentative of and unaware of the Iraqi Turkmen community by the Turkmen leaders. It is worth noting that all the major political organizations of ethnic and religious groups other than the ITF were included in the council. On the other hand, there was one Turkmen minister in Iraqi Provisional Administration declared in June 2004 but again he was an independent representative. Then president of the ITF, Farouk Abdurrahman, says that the exclusion of the ITF from administration was not decided by Iyad Allawi, interim prime minister of Iraq from 2004 to 2005, but by Paul Bremer, American Presidential Envoy to Iraq.159

In the meantime, on 9 September 2004, the coalition forces supported by Kurdish Peshmerga militia launched Operation Black Typhoon, the start of military campaign on Tal Afar that would last for three years and causing death of more than 1000 people, trials of thousands of people, imprisonment of one thousand Turkmen and displacement of tens thousands of families. The operations were justified on the occasion of the entry of militants of Mahdi army of Muqtada al Sadr, a strong Shiite militia leader, of foreign fighters from Syria, of insurgents who fled from Fallujah, and of militants of Ansar al Islam, which later merged


159 Taylor, Among the ‘Others’, 156.
with ISIS. Due to operations, it is stated that 70 percent of Turkmen of Tal Afar had to take refuge in neighboring districts, sub-districts and Mosul. However, because of growing insurgency in Mosul and Fallujah, the US could not leave adequate forces (only five hundred soldiers) to sustain the control in the region and the operations ended.

However, it is argued that the insurgents recuperated Tal Afar, besieged police stations, and forced terrifying residents to flee the district or retreat into tribal compounds within a month following the end of the operation, and at the end of the day, Tal Afar replaced Fallujah as a center of insurgency by November 2004. In addition, it is claimed that Tal Afar became a base for the organization, training and equipment of insurgent cells throughout northern Iraq and a transit point for foreign fighters from Syria. Furthermore, the insurgents took the passive support of local population by using any means of terrorism like kidnappings, beheadings and public executions and made Tal Afar a centerpiece of their propaganda campaign after the fall of Fallujah. It can also be said that the insurgency and counterinsurgency of this period planted the seeds of sectarianism within the Turkmen community. While many Shiite Turkmens became the victims of these terrorist activities, many Sunni Turkmens suffered under the practices of the Iraqi police force as well as the Iraqi and American


161 Ibid., 42.


163 During conducting survey, a Turkmen from Tal Afar commented that that there have been narrations among the Turkmens of Tal Afar about the impact of telephone call between then Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül and the American secretary of state Colin Powell on the ending of operation and they named a street in Tal Afar after Abdullah Gül.

164 Ibid., 62.

165 Ibid., 62.

166 Ibid., 63.
army. Furthermore, both before and after the American operations, the strong tribal structure of Tal Afar has come to the forefront in the issues of sectarian conflicts among the members of Turkmen community to be intensified in the next five years and in the activities of Sunni, Shia and Kurdish groups. This tribal system allowed some Sunni insurgent groups to ally with Sunni Turkmen tribes and some Shiite militant groups with Shiite Turkmen tribes\(^\text{167}\) and this situation made most of the conflicts ‘blood revenges’.

When looking at the political stage during this period, the ITF, which was not able to get involved in the Iraqi Provisional Administration, went along with other Turkmen parties in Iraq under the name of the Front of Iraqi Turkmens for 30 January 2005 elections\(^\text{168}\). The coalition received 93,408 votes throughout Iraq (one percent of total votes), 73,791 of which came from Kirkuk, and gained only three deputies, all of whom were Sunni Turkmens.\(^\text{169}\) Furthermore, five Shiite Turkmen candidates in the list of Iraqi National Alliance and four Turkmen candidates in the list of Kurdistan Alliance were elected in this election.\(^\text{170}\) In the cabinet, only one Turkmen minister, who was not a member of the Turkmen Front, was nominated by Jaafari government. Either way, the results were clear failure for the ITF, which mainly resulted from the highly low voter turnout of the regions where Turkmens live, security considerations and the pressures in the regions particularly under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Peshmerga.\(^\text{171}\)

The election results were the courier of new conflicts within the ITF, a fact that became all the more evident with the emergence of 28 candidates for its


\(^\text{169}\) Ibid., 59.


\(^\text{171}\) Ibid.
Moreover, there emerged a tendency for cooperation with other groups in Iraq’s political landscape. Furthermore, the Turkmen of Erbil completely broke ties with the Front due to their claims of negligence. Indeed, the election results echoed not only inside the ITF but also in Ankara. Turkish then Prime Minister Erdoğan uttered his dissatisfaction with the results and the performance of the ITF and he said: “Our Turkmen brothers did not take enough interest in the elections contrary to our expectations. They either could not be organized or were under pressure. In any case, their leaders could not bring them to the polls.” However, as an answer to Prime Minister Erdoğan, Sadettin Ergeç on behalf of the leadership of the ITF did not accept that they could not discharge their responsibility and complained of gerrymanders. What is interesting is his answer of the question of where he was in the election day: “I was on pilgrimage.”

In the field, things were also getting worse for the Turkmen. As a consequence of growing terrorist activity in Tal Afar, the US and Iraqi forces conducted vanguard operations starting from April 2005 and launched one of the largest counterinsurgency operations of the post-2003 Iraq and the largest one in 2005, Operation Restoring Rights, with five to six battalion, about 8500 American and Iraqi security personnel, on 26 August 2005. It is said that a great majority of

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173 Ibid., 59.
174 Ibid., 59.
175 Ergin, “Iraklı Türkmenler Buharlaştılar Mi?”.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
the people of Tal Afar left the district during the operations.\textsuperscript{180} Therefore, these events together with the experiences during and after the Operation Black Typhoon were described by some Turkmen authors as an unnamed Kachakach Movement.\textsuperscript{181} An American regimental surgeon serving in these operations describes the operations from summer 2005 to winter 2006 as ‘battle for Tal Afar’.\textsuperscript{182} During the operations, some insurgent groups in Iraq threatened the US and Iraqi administrations to revenge what happened in Tal Afar even by using chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{183} Furthermore, Tal Afar was, at once, in a state of heavy sectarian conflicts to be continued intensely until 2009.

As for the political landscape, in the commission making the constitution, the Turkmen were represented with two members, one of whom was the president of a party within the ITF, and the other of whom was the member of United Iraqi Alliance, a Shiite party, both of whom were elected from among the Shiite quota, not Turkmen.\textsuperscript{184} In the Constitution of Iraq approved on 25 October 2005, which was predominantly rejected by Turkmens and Sunni Arabs, it is implied that Arabs and Kurds are two core elements of Iraq by accepting Arabic and Kurdish as official languages while it sees Turkmens and Assyrians as minorities by accepting their languages as official languages only in the regions highly populated by them.\textsuperscript{185} However, one of the main demands of Turkmen political organizations has always been acceptance of the Turkmen as one of the

\textsuperscript{180} Duman, “ABD Güçlerinin 2004-2005 Operasyonları ve Braktığı İzler,” 42.
\textsuperscript{181} Hür müzülü, “Türkmen Şehri Telafer ve Yabancı İşgaline Karşı İrak'ta İlk Ayaklanma,” 36.
constituent nations of Iraq. On the other hand, the wording ‘highly populated regions’ has had a complicating effect on the political situation in Iraq because there is no authority of common consent to determine the borders and populations of these regions. On the other hand, the Iraqi Turkmen Front, which participated in the final elections held on 15 December 2005 on its own, received 87,993 votes (0.7 percent of total votes). In these elections, the divisions within the Turkmen political movement became all the more obvious: Turkmen Resolution Party allied with the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmed Chalabi; Turkmen Reconciliation Party and Iraqi Turkmen Islamic Union allied with the United Iraqi Alliance; and Turkmen Fraternity Party allied with Kurdish Alliance. Totally, nine Turkmen deputies, only one of whom was the candidate of the ITF, were represented in the parliament and two Turkmen ministers were nominated in the cabinet.

In 2008, a change in the ITF’s decision-making system attracted attention: While executive committee of the ITF was composed of party leaders appeared in the ITF in 2005 congress, the provincial heads determined by the ITF administration were appointed to executive committee in 2008. This was a sign of ITF’s attempt to acquire the qualification of an organization on its own right. Another sign was seen in ITF’s self-proclamation to be a political party in the framework of preparations for local elections in 2008 but as a result of great resentment within ITF, Turkmen Independents Movement, National Turkmen Party, Society of Nationalist Turkmens, Turkmen Islamic Movement and Turkmen Justice Party withdrew from the ITF.

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188 Ibid., 61.


190 Ibid., 60.
In mid-2009, the start of official dialogue between Turkey and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) matched with decrease in Turkish support for and cooperation with Turkmens in general and the Iraqi Turkmen Front in particular. Strengthening relations between Kurdistan government and Turkey emerged as a new political situation for the Turkmen. It is claimed that the reason behind Turkish de-emphasis of the Turkmen is that half or more of the Iraqi Turkmens, which are claimed to be Shiites, are aligned themselves with traditional Iraqi Shiite groups and Turkmens as a whole were not as loyal as it has been claimed. In this sense, the ITF’s extremely poor performance in 2005 elections can be interpreted at three ways: First, the results may be a reflection of Turkmen population, second, of a great organizational inability, and third, of a dividedness of Turkmen community in general. In any case, the results could be counted as the indication of the weakness of the Turkmen card from the viewpoint of Turkey. Indeed, it cannot be said that Turkey has completely discredited the Turkmen because she also tried to persuade Turkmens that Turkish-Kurdish cooperation would empower the Turkmen in Iraq. In addition, one of the main objectives of Turkey concerning Iraq was still the acceptance of the Turkmen as one of the founding nations in Iraq.

2010 election process demonstrates that how the Iraqi Turkmens has become a part of polarization in the country. In this sense, the ITF allied with liberal and secular Iraqiyya List, composed of Arabs, Turkmens, Kurds, Christians, Sunnis and Shiites, under the leadership of Iyad Allawi while in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah ran by itself. According to Sadettin Ergeç, former chairman of the ITF, the motivation behind the alliance with Iraqiyya was the position of Iraqiyya which remained the only group that defended Kirkuk. On the other hand, Iraqi

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192 Ertan Efegil, “Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question,” Insight Turkey 10.3 (2008), 70.

193 “Türkmen Cephesi: El-Irakiye Kerkük’ü Savunan Tek Grup [Turkmen Front: Al-Iraqiya is the Only Group to Defend Kirkuk],” Yakin Dogu Haber, February 12, 2010, accessed May 15,
Turkmen Islamic Union and Turkmen Resolution Party allied with State of Law Coalition of Nouri al-Maliki, Turkmen Fidelity Movement and Turkmenland Party allied with al-Muwatin Coalition under the leadership of Ammar al-Hakim, Turkmen Justice Party allied with Iraqi Accord Front, Turkmens of Erbil List joined Kurdish Alliance. As a result, the ITF received 127,989 votes across the country and for the first time after 2003, took part in the government with two ministers. Ten Turkmen candidates, six of whom were nominated by the ITF, were elected and three Turkmen ministers were appointed in the cabinet in total. However, it cannot be said that Turkmens were in an absolute compliance with the lists they allied. For example, Iraqi Education Minister al-Timimi, who was elected in Iraqiyya which was main ally of the ITF during 2010 elections, said that he would never give Turkmens the right of education in the mother tongue. In addition, the polarization of the Iraqi Turkmens manifested itself also in election results. It seems that the Turkmens did not exactly vote based on their ethnic affiliations. For instance, the Shiite Turkmens in Ninewah Governate tended to vote for sectarian Iraqi National Alliance.

In the meantime, on 24 February 2011, a commission of 47 composed of the chiefs of Turkmen tribes in Tal Afar and two Iraqi Turkmen deputies of Tal Afar, Sheikh Taki al-Mavla and Nebil Harbo, visited Turkey to discuss with the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and foreign minister Ahmet

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Davutoğlu the conflict between Sunni and Shiite communities of Tal Afar. In the final declaration of the meeting of ‘Tal Afar National Peace Commission’ on 26 February 2011, all the homicides of Tal Afar’s Sunni and Shiite people were condemned; all kinds of violence, notably sectarian one, were rejected; it was promised that the responsible would not be defended by their families and that a fair balance would be compensated in the public and security services. Taki al-Mavla, a Turkmen deputy from Tal Afar, said in 2012 that restoration attempts have come to fruition and the marriages between Sunni and Shiite families have come into sight again.

Furthermore, depending upon the developing Turkey-KRG relations, the relations between the ITF and KRG has started to develop by 2011. For instance, a contact office of the ITF that had not been allowed by the KRG since 2003 when the ITF had transferred its headquarters from Erbil to Kirkuk was opened in Erbil in 2011 as a sign of developing relations between these two actors. As a result, two sides paid reciprocal visits for further development of relations. Moreover, the report about the affairs of the Turkmen discussed in the special session of Iraqi parliament in 2012 was accepted with the support of the Kurdish alliance.

In April 2014 general elections, twelve Turkmen deputies were elected from different political currents. Therefore, the problem of underrepresentation was still on the agenda of the Turkmen politicians in spite of an increasing trend of

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representation. According to a Turkmen academic, Ziya Abbas, Turkmens have the potential to have about thirty deputies in the parliament when their population is taken into consideration.²⁰² Ziya Abbas gives four main reasons of this problem of underrepresentation: First, Arabization and Kurdification of Turkmens, second, the influence of sectarianism in Iraq and Middle East on Turkmen society composed of Sunni and Shia, third, Turkmen distrust in the functionality of political processes, and fourth, erroneous political decisions of Turkmen political parties and politicians splitting the votes.²⁰³ He also argues that the motivations of the voters who voted for Turkmen candidates have been personal successes and images of candidates to a large extent but not their political background and parties.²⁰⁴ The elections are a good indicator of Turkmen political movement because they reveal the disunity of Turkmen political currents even on the issue of Kirkuk. For example, the Turkmens came to the 2014 general elections within two different lists in Kirkuk, one of which was composed of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, Iraqi Turkmen Justice Party, Turkmenland Party, Turkmen Decision Party, Iraqi Turkmen Nationalist Movement, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Ammar al Hakim and Sadr Movement by name of the Kirkuk Turkmen Front List; the other of which were constituted by Free Turkmen Front, Turkmen Islamic Union, Badr Movement, National Reform Movement of Ibrahim Jaafari, and al Sadiquyn Bloc by the name of Kirkuk Turkmen List.²⁰⁵ These lists also show that the struggle between Shiite groups has been reflected on the Turkmens.²⁰⁶


²⁰³ Ibid., 64-65.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 65.


²⁰⁶ Ibid.
On the other side, deteriorating relations between Iraqi and Turkish governments have negative impacts on Turkmen society. In addition, according to Bilal Şimşir, a retired Turkish ambassador, Turkey was able to carry out military operations in northern regions of Iraq in the framework of a power vacuum in these areas in pre-2003 era and this could provide Turkmens with moral support thanks to Turkey’s proximity to their regions; however, in post-Saddam Hussein era, this is not the case.207 At the same time, deteriorating position of the Turkmen is not only dependent upon the relations between Turkey and Iraq and Turkey and the KRG but also related to the increasing visibility of insecure environment of Iraq in general. In a 2013 human rights report of the UN, it is mentioned that the Turkmen community was increasingly targeted in the acts of terrorism, assassination and kidnapping208 and UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) declared that it had particular concerns regarding the situation of the Turkmen community in the disputed areas.209

Finally, the regions where Turkmens densely live in Iraq come to the fore due to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) attacks. The neighborhoods of Tuz Khormato and Amirli such as the villages of Yengice, Bastamlı, Çardaklı, Biravcılı and Karanaz and the settlement areas in Ninewah Province, notably Tal Afar, were occupied by the ISIS and the inhabitants of these regions had to leave. It is claimed that about 300,000-350,000 Turkmens have been displaced due to the ISIS. Generally, after the ISIS attacks, most of Shiite Turkmen families moved to the Shia-majority southern regions of Iraq while most of the Sunni Turkmen moved to Turkey, the KRG-controlled regions and different parts of Iraq such as Yahyava refugee camp near Kirkuk. Furthermore, the ISIS has used chemical weapons against Turkmens regions of Bashir and Taze Khormato.

207 Bilal Şimşir, interview by Oğuz Çetinoğlu, Bilenlerin Dilinden Irak Türkmenleri, 79.
209 Ibid., 21.
Tal Afar has been of particular importance about the issue of the ISIS. The resistance in Tal Afar could not be strong enough to fight against the ISIS for a long time. The only group strong enough to fight against ISIS through its own means has been the largest Sunni Turkmen tribe of Tal Afar, the Abbasiyun. At the end of the day, all the Shiite Turkmens of Tal Afar had to leave their home due to massive ISIS operations in the Shiite regions. In addition, it is claimed that almost all the Sunni Turkmens of Tal Afar except for the sick, the elderly and the disabled left Tal Afar following the ISIS occupations. Other than those people, there have also been some Sunni Turkmens who have tried to stay even if they have not been ISIS-sympathizers; a great majority of them have been deprived of financial possibilities to flee from these regions; and some of them have wanted to ally with this newly-rising power of the region. These people have also been damaged by the operations against ISIS. On the other hand, while the number of Turkmens joining ISIS is unknown, it is suggested that some Turkmens are now in the high ranking positions in the ISIS.

Large numbers of Shiite Turkmen of Amirli, Tuz Khormato, Bashir, Daquq, Taze Khormato and of displaced Shiite Turkmens of ISIS-controlled areas, particularly Tal Afar, have joined or organized Hashd al-Shaabi brigades to fight against ISIS. In late April 2016, the village of Bashir, a large Turkmen village in the south of Kirkuk which was under the control of ISIS from the beginning of ISIS occupations, was rescued as a result of joint operations of Hashd al-Shaabi, the

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212 Ibid., 6-7.

213 Ibid., p. 7.

214 Some respondents argued that the militia unit of ISIS that took control of Sinjar region, the west of Tal Afar, was mainly composed of Turkmens.

Iraqi army and Peshmerga in which many Shiite Turkmens were involved. It is stated that about 14,000 Turkmens have been armed and trained to fight against the ISIS and rescue the Turkmen regions. On the other hand, it is claimed that the Iraqi government and army have been distrustful of migrated Sunni Turkmens and thus have not allowed them to join the fight.

Moreover, the ISIS has made the issue of disputed territories more complex. Disputed territories of districts of Sinjar, Tal Afar, Til Kaeif, Sheikhan, Akre, Hamdaniya and Makhmour of Mosul Governate, Al Hawija, Dibis, Daquq and Kirkuk of Kirkuk Governate, Tuz Khormato of Salah al-Din Governate, and districts of Kifri and Khanaqin and the sub-district of Mandali of Diyala Governate are now under the control of either ISIS or Kurdish Peshmerga or Shia militants. It seems that the immediate ISIS threat has put a freeze on the conflicts among the communities of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens to some extent today. However, it also seems that these regions (especially Kirkuk and its surrounding area) may revert to their pre-ISIS conditions of high probability of conflict about which many international reports have warned for years. These regions have had a great potential to take place an armed conflict as in Tuz Khormato on 12 November 2015 and 24 April 2016. Moreover, the Kurds have availed of the operations against ISIS in increasing their sphere of influence, which has worried the Turkmens. Moreover, there have been other developments related to the Kurds that have provoked the Turkmen. It is argued that in the first stages of displacement of Turkmens of Tal Afar, the KRG has not let them through Kurdistan region. In addition, it is stated that when ISIS launched its attacks on Tal Afar, the people of the district offered resistance to terrorists for two days, and within these days, there were negotiations between tribal chiefs of Tal Afar and KRG about the help of KRG to protect Tal Afar, which ended up with

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217 Duman, IŞİD Operasyonlarının Türkmenler Üzerindeki Etkisi, 5.

218 Ibid., 6.
disagreement due to Kurdish demands of disarmament of Turkmens and the acceptance of Peshmerga access and deployment to the district center. In addition, it is claimed that the KRG has discriminated against the Turkmen refugees and disbursed the financial aid only to the Christians and the Yezidis.

The developments in Kirkuk were already worrisome for the Turkmen. Peshmerga has consolidated its power due to the ISIS threat to the region. All the twenty directorates of Kirkuk have already been at the hands of Kurds as a consequence of Kurdish attempts to clamps down on Kirkuk. One of the most interesting examples of these attempts was the events in the University of Kirkuk: on 4 May 2015, Turkmen rector of the University of Kirkuk, Abbas Taki, was forced to resign by armed Kurdish PUK militias and a group of armed students and Salam Hoshnav, who has Kurdish ethnic origin, succeeded him. On the other hand, Arshad al-Salihi, the president of the ITF, declared that the Turkmen will not accept to be part of Kurdistan if the KRG declares its secession from Iraq. He also declares that if a separate Kurdish state is established in Iraq, they will also call for the establishment of a Turkmen state.

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222 Ibid.


224 Ibid., 2.
2.5.4. General Evaluation of the Turkmen Modern Political History, Activity and Actors

According to many Turkmen authors, the Turkmen are one of the most suffered and unprotected communities of the Iraqi society. They argue that assimilation campaigns of Iraqi administrations against the Turkmen were not only limited to alteration of Turkmen names, the exile of Turkmen nationalist figures, prohibition of their language and arbitrary executions but also included the destruction and omission of historical buildings reflecting Turkmen culture like the destruction of historical Kirkuk citadel, forced migrations of several Turkmen villages, re-zoning of administrative boundaries, prohibitions on property rights, confiscation of lands and privileges for Arabs to move to Turkmen regions. It can be said that the assimilation campaigns are not peculiar to Baath regimes but had started before them. For example, during the Royal regime, the project of the government for Kirkuk called ‘Haweeja Project’ aimed at conversion of land from arid to fertile, urbanization of Obeyd and Jboor nomadic Arab tribes and change in ethnic balance of Kirkuk in favor of Arabs. Nonetheless, the intensity of these campaigns was increased during the Baath regime. It is possible to find many examples for these in the official documents. For instance, an official document dated 1999 bans Turkmens, Kurds and Assyrians from speaking their mother tongue in the schools even during breaks.

225 Astarjian, The Struggle for Kirkuk, 14.

226 Cambaz, Kerkük'te Kürt ve Türkmen Soykırımı, 45. In Tarık Cambaz’s book, there are many other examples: A document dated 2000 reveals that Turkmens who have not affirmed (in fact, ‘corrected’) their nationality –change from Turkmen to Arab– could not transact official acts and even if they affirm their nationality they could not have the right to buy house, shop or land (p. 51). Another document dated 2000 bans non-Arabs from renting, purchasing or buying vehicles, trading with neighboring countries, bidding and more of the same (p. 57). A further document dated 2000 pronounces decisions on strengthening the ideological connections of Kurdish and Turkmen young people to Baath party, on defaming Kemalist ideas and ‘bad intentions’ of Turkey and on propaganda about terrorism of Turkmen parties (p. 59).
Turkmen authors argue that in the eyes of the Iraqi administrations, the Iraqi Turkmen have been the remnants of the Ottoman era and the extension of Turkey, and hence, they have been often charged of spying for Turkey. In fact, it can be said that there has been a general tendency of Iraqi governments, particularly of Baath regime, to consider Turkmens as ‘spies’ or people whose loyalty is first to Turkey. To illustrate, in a specific guidance in an official document sent to Special Office of Kirkuk Governorate dated 1999, Turkmens are accused of racism and it is declared that Turkey have already kept an eye on oil wells and most of Turkmens have cooperated with Turkey and thus have betrayed Iraq.  

In post-2003 Iraq, Turkmens have been enormously affected by the political and social polarization in Iraq, corrupt administrative system, political pressures, terrorism, and in a nutshell, by the drivers of ethnic, religious, geographical, administrative and political conflicts due to their geographical and demographical structures. Unlike the situation in Kirkuk, the Turkmens have acknowledged and been integrated to the Kurdish administration in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk and have not been had important problems with the other people of these regions. In addition, they seem to be comfortable with the developing Turkey-

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227 Ibid., 39.

228 Some Turkmen respondents said that when they encounter a problem which can be solved in state agencies in Iraq, government officials say “Go to your uncle!” implying Turkey.


KRG relations. On the other hand, it is stated that similar to other components of the region, the Turkmens of KRG have been disconnected to the general Iraqi politics. Nevertheless, the Turkmen groups in other regions have been on the verge of conflict with other groups, notably with Kurdish ones, particularly during each election period in Iraq.

In the debate of disputed areas in Iraq, it seems that the Turkmen have remained above the fray and the debate has taken place mainly between Arabs and Kurds. According to Barzani, these regions are not disputed but snatched away from Kurdistan forcefully. The fact that there are two politically weak and neglected actors, which are Sunni Arabs and Sunni and Shiite Turkmens, strengthens Kurdistan’s hand and thus, disputed lands grows into ‘detached regions’ in the hands of Kurds. However, this condition has paved the way for the conflict between the Arab, Kurdish, and Turkmen communities. Particularly, when it comes to the division of Iraq, Turkmenland will constitute one of the most disputed regions of Iraq and witness fervent conflicts between these communities.

The post-2003 period has not been more secure for the Turkmen leaders. Many leading Turkmen figures such as Mosul supervisor of the ITF, Yavuz Efendioğlu, and ITF’s vice president, Ali Hashim Muhtaroglu, were assassinated and many of them including the ITF president Arshad al-Salihi were attempted to be assassinated. The Turkmen have been exposed to the atmosphere of insecurity in Iraq in post-2003 period. The explosion of sectarian violence particularly following the al-Qaeda attack on al-Askari Shrine in Samarra in 2006 infected Tal Afar to a large extent. Furthermore, the Turkmens of several settlements particularly Tal Afar, Tuz Khormato and Kirkuk have confronted acts of terrorism. As a result of attacks, many Shiite inhabitants of Tuz Khormato

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231 Ibid., 24.

232 Ibid., 27.

migrated to Najaf and Karbala. In 2013, 500 people were dead and 3500 of them were injured due to terrorist attacks in Tuz Khormato\textsuperscript{234} while in Kirkuk, 392 people were dead due to terrorist attacks in the same year alone.\textsuperscript{235}

In fact, it cannot be said that the Turkmen have seriously been on the agenda of the Iraqi governments in the post-2003 period. For example, in the population data published on the website of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in May 2011 but removed after the objections, the Turkmen was not mentioned.\textsuperscript{236} It seems that the voice of Turkmens has been valid only for the problem of Kirkuk.\textsuperscript{237} For instance, while the ITF allied with the Iraqiyya List in 2010 general elections and was a part of it in the opposition, the Turkmen in the representation of the ITF were not being summoned to the meetings and decision-making mechanism of the opposition.\textsuperscript{238}

When it comes to the Turkmen political actors, according to Jason E. Strakes, presence of several Turkmen political parties and NGOs shows that they are politically more mobilized and possibly better represented in comparison with much smaller identities like Armenians, Yezidis, Assyrian and Sabaean Mandeans.\textsuperscript{239} However, considering the claims of Turkmens, such a comparison between Turkmens and mentioned identities does not give an explanatory picture because a better indicator of conditions of Turkmens would be based on

\textsuperscript{234} Habib Hürmüzülü and Habibe Yağmur Gökler, \textit{ORSAM Irak Türkmenleri Güncesı [ORSAM Iraqi Turkmen Diary]} 31 (2013), 13.


\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.

comparison with Kurds or Sunni Arabs. On the other hand, Strakes draws a clear cut line between pro-Turkish Turkmen groups and those Turkmen groups that mostly affiliate themselves with Iraqi national polity and Kurdistan Regional Government. However, a clear cut separation between two groups, which are not clearly distinct, is not possible because in pro-Turkish Turkmen groups, there has been a tendency to advocate their Iraqiness and in the last years, there has been a tendency in Turkey to integrate Turkmens into the KRG. Therefore, the divisions in the Turkmen politics and community offer a more complexity. In any case, these divisions have decelerated the success in Iraqi political arena, and thus, have produced what the Turkmen leaders call underrepresentation.

The Turkmen political movement is today divided into many organizations of various sizes and different kinds including Sunni, Shiite, religious, secular, militant and moderate. The division is also manifested among the Turkmen deputies in the parliament. Because the Turkmen deputies have come from different political currents, common action between them is often not the case. For instance, while the ITF signed the list of motion of non-confidence in Maliki government in 2012, other Turkmen deputies out of the ITF did not sign the

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240 Ibid., 366.

241 These organizations include the Iraqi Turkmen Front, secular ethnicist, non-sectarian and supporter of the unity of Iraq; Turkmenland Party, secular ethnicist, non-sectarian, supporter of the unity of Iraq; the Association of Nationalist Turkmens, secular ethnicist, non-sectarian, supporter of the unity of Iraq; the Iraqi Nationalist Turkmen party, secular ethnicist, non-sectarian, supporter of the unity of Iraq; Turkmen Nationalist Movement, supporter of the unity of Iraq; the Iraqi Turkmen Justice Party, conservative, non-sectarian, supporter of the unity of Iraq; Turkmen Resolution Party, secular ethnicist, non-sectarian, supporter of the unity of Iraq; Turkmen Independents Movement, secular ethnicist, non-sectarian, supporter of the unity of Iraq; the Islamic Union of the Iraqi Turkmens, Shiite Socialist, friendly toward Iran, supporter of the unity of Iraq and claimed to be supported by the Dawa Party; Turkmen Fidelity Movement, Shiite-dominated, supporter of the unity of Iraq, claimed to be supported by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq; Turkmen Islamic Movement, Islamic ethnicist, non-sectarian and supporter of the unity of Iraq; the Iraqi Turkmen Nation Party, liberal, nationalist, supporter of the unity of Iraq and claimed to be supported by the Kurdish groups; the Iraqi Turkmen Unity Party, nationalist and pro-Kurdistan Regional Government; the Iraqi Turkmen Brotherhood Party, nationalist, supporter of the unity of Iraq and pro-KRG; Turkmen Democracy Movement, a local party in the KRG; Liberal Turkmen Movement, a local party in the KRG; Turkmenland Cultural Center, a local party in the KRG; and Turkmen Reform Movement, a local party in the KRG. For more information about these parties, see Duman, “Irak’ta Türkmen Varlığı,” 24-41.
list. On the other hand, it can be said that there has been a general distrust and exasperation in political parties and politicians among the Turkmen due to general weakness of Turkmen political organizations, unrealized promises and unmet expectations, and hence, low voter turnout.

The Iraqi Turkmen Front, the largest Turkmen organization, has a dominant Sunni majority in its administration and appeals mainly to the Sunni majority of the Turkmen although the Front does not define itself as sectarian. The current president of the Front, Arshad al-Salihi, has several times declared that his sect is just Islam. Another example is the ITF’s opening of a dormitory in Najaf for the Shiite Turkmen students receiving education in madrasas there. Nevertheless, mere existence of Sunni Turkmen majority in the Front results in a pro-Sunni image in addition to its predominantly ethnic aspirations. In addition, the Turkmen Front has the image of extension and de facto representative of Turkey in Iraq although this image has been weakened in recent years due to the weakening of pro-ITF and pro-Turkmen emphasis of Turkish foreign policy particularly following 2005 general elections in Iraq. However, a close relationship between the Front and the Turkish governments is still continuing.

The essential principle of the Front is to provide uniformity and cooperation among the Turkmen and to acquire ethnic, political, cultural, economic and legal rights of the Turkmen community. In addition to its political campaigns as a political party now, the Front is also active in the area of opening schools giving education in Turkish and dispensaries and it embodies several branches in different fields such as associations of artists, women, teachers, and various fields of occupation and comprises TV and radio channels. Although Abdullah Keskin, editorial director of pro-Kurdish Avesta publisher in Turkey, accuses the ITF of

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242 Duman, “Irak’ta Siyasi Krizde Türkmenler Nerede?.”

243 Duman, “Irak’ta Seçimler ve Kerkük’te Seçim Öncesi Türkmenlerin Durumu.”

being a paramilitary organization,\textsuperscript{245} ITF has not performed any activity of armed struggle with its security personnel of around 500 people. In this sense, ITF’s position in Iraqi politics posed a dilemma for the position of the Turkmen in the increasingly tense political atmosphere of Iraq. While ITF has used all political means, such as dialogue with different groups of Iraqi politics (even with KRG) and the use of international platforms to pronounce the situation of Iraqi Turkmen, to be an active participant of Iraqi politics, it has never opted for the use of force which has been very influential in the Iraqi politics. In fact, this situation has been not only the result of its own choice but also of Turkish pressure to force ITF not to use arms and to be active only in legal political framework. For instance, as a result of pressures from Turkey, Turkmen security forces were cut in half immediately after American occupation.

On the other hand, the ITF has reached a certain degree of success in political arena. For example, as a result of attempts of the ITF, a special session was organized in the Iraqi parliament on 6 July 2012 to represent the problems, grievances and demands of Turkmen for the first time in the history of Iraq.\textsuperscript{246} This session ran a report which has been statutory and in which there were provisions about the acceptance of the Turkmen as one of the primary components of Iraq by the Iraqi parliament, the establishment of High Commission of Turkmen Affairs, allotment of allowance from the federal budget for the Turkmen and special status of Tal Afar.\textsuperscript{247}

The relationship between the KRG and the ITF has generally been paradoxical. The ITF had not accepted the term ‘Kurdistan’ at the outset while gradual moderation in its attitude toward Kurdistan could be observed. For instance, on Turkmeneli TV, a satellite television channel of the ITF, the denomination of the

\textsuperscript{245} Ahmet, \textit{Kerkük: Tarih, Politika, Etnik Yapı}, 11.

\textsuperscript{246} Duman, “Irak'ta Tarihsel Süreç İçerisinde Türkmenlere Yönelik İnsanlık Suçları ve 2003 Sonrası Türkmenlerin Hukuki Durumu,” 104.

\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., 105.
KRG has gradually been changed from Northern Iraq and Northern Region to Kurdistan.\textsuperscript{248} Moreover, the ITF did not participate in the parliamentary elections of the KRG on 25 July 2009, in which five seats were allocated for the Turkmen, while it competed with Erbil Turkmen List, Turkmen Progressive Movement, Turkmen Change and Renaissance List, and Turkmen Democracy Movement in the elections held on 21 September 2013.\textsuperscript{249} The occasionally emerging cooperative relations between the KRG and the ITF resulted mainly from the Turkish accord with the KRG. However, it does not mean a consensus between the Turkmen and Kurdish parties. For example, the ITF’s attempts to register Turkmen voters are generally problematic for the Kurdish parties. Moreover, the Iraqi Arab and Turkmen parties, mainly the ITF, have acted in concert to address the situation of Kirkuk, which has been claimed by the KRG.

While there are also some Turkmen representatives in Kurdistan Regional Government and Kurdish parties, it can be said that these Turkmen people are not seen as legitimate representatives of their own community but rather spokespersons of their parties.\textsuperscript{250} Even so, the Kurdistan region incorporates a lot of Turkmen political movements including Turkmen Reform Movement, Turkmen Liberal Movement, Kurdistan Democratic Turkmen Party, Kurdistan Turkmen Democracy Movement, Erbil Turkmens Independents List, Turkmen Brotherhood Association, Kurdistan Turkmen Cultural Center, Turkmen Independents Movements, and Turkmen Solidarity Movement.\textsuperscript{251}

On the other hand, the Shiite Turkmen politicians have tended to ally with the Shiite Arab politicians and some reject the idea that they are a national diaspora


\textsuperscript{249}Duman, “Irak Kürt Bölgesel Yönetimi Parlamento Seçimleri ve Türkmenler.”


\textsuperscript{251}Duman, “Irak’ın Kuzeyindeki Türkmenlerin Siyasal Durumları,” 25.
of Turkey\textsuperscript{252} while Turkey has already been accused of overlooking the Shiite Turkmen communities. The affiliations of Shiite Turkmen with Shiite organizations are not only peculiar to post-Saddam Hussein political environment. For instance, during the Baath regime, many Shiite Turkmen were executed for their affiliation with the clandestine Da’wa party.\textsuperscript{253} On the other hand, it is known that the Shiite Turkmen have played an important role in the set-up of Badr brigades, Shiite militia organization, in Kirkuk and its immediate environment.\textsuperscript{254} For instance, the northern manager of the Brigade has become Yılmaz Şahbaz, who are the vice president of Turkmen Vafa Movement.\textsuperscript{255} Additively, Shiite Turkmen have had a part in the units of Kataib Hezbollah, the armed wing of the Iraqi Hezbollah, in Kirkuk and northern part of Iraq.\textsuperscript{256} However, interesting cases of divided loyalties still exist. For instance, Fevzi Ekrem Terzioğlu, a Turkmen politician within Sadr movement, declares his loyalty to Muqtada al Sadr, a strong Shiite leader in Iraq, while announcing Turkmenland as his fundamental cause.\textsuperscript{257}

2.6. Conclusion

The Iraqi Turkmen are a community of uncertainties and disputed issues in many respects. Most of these issues are not the ‘internal affairs’ of the Turkmen community; however, they refer to many external factors. For example, the origins of the Turkmen presence in Iraq are also a part of propagation campaign

\textsuperscript{252} O’Leary, \textit{How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity}, 157.

\textsuperscript{253} Stansfield, \textit{Iraq: People, History, Politics}, 72.


\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{257} Fevzi Ekrem Terzioğlu, interview by Bilgay Duman and Ogün Duru, \textit{Ortadoğu Analiz} 2.24 (2010), 52.
between Turkmens and Kurds. In this sense, the issues of Turkmen population and settlement areas come to the forefront as ‘a matter of life and death’ for the Turkmens. It can be seen that both of them are the most problematic ones and the issue of Turkmenland particularly carries the risk of open conflicts.

The historical background given in this chapter highlights that the Iraqi Turkmens have not been isolated from hardly any experience of the Iraqi history, have even been at the heart of the most of the critical issues of the Iraqi political agenda such as the disputed lands, the ISIS and Kirkuk issues, and have lived side by side and together with most of the communities constituting the Iraqi society. The political history of the Iraqi Turkmens can be read as a history of existential insecurity of a community influenced and divided by and exposed to the atmosphere of uncertainty/unpredictability and the political standpoints of different (and mostly conflicting) collective identities producing divided loyalties. Therefore, the creation of ethnic consciousness among the Turkmen society has been one of the most problematic issues for the Turkmen politicians. In this sense, the affiliation of many Turkmens with sectarian organizations and politicians has interrupted the Turkmen ethnic movement.

The conflict in Iraq is not simply a conflict among social groups with different heritages and reciprocal complaints but rather an emblematic example of the complexity of identity politics.\(^\text{258}\) The Turkmen political actors could not be effective in the Iraqi politics; on the contrary, they have endured the consequences of the struggles and bargaining between the larger players of Iraqi politics.\(^\text{259}\) In fact, this situation is not only a matter of Turkmen political actors but also concerns the Turkmen society. The Iraqi Turkmens have been compressed between the major developments and socio-political actors both


inside and outside Iraq since the establishment of the country. Their experiences in Iraq have been one of the most important determinants of their identities.

In this framework, this chapter tried to clarify the conceptual framework drawn in the first chapter, the context of the questionnaire and its findings presented in the next chapter and how the study attempts to draw conclusions for the Iraqi Turkmen community and Iraqi society through these findings in the last chapter.
CHAPTER 3

THE IDENTITY OF THE IRAQI TURKMENS: A CASE OF ISIS-FORCED REFUGEES IN TURKEY

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will present the findings of the survey. Within the conceptual framework I give in the first chapter, the attitudes of 180 Iraqi Turkmen respondents towards the topics related to the five dimensions of their multiple identities are shown. The chapter three starts with the general profile of the respondents including personal information about age, gender, hometown, duration of stay in Turkey, educational, occupational, income and sectarian distributions of the respondents. To draw a general picture about the attitudes of the respondents, the self-identifications of the respondents based on six options including religion, sect, Turkmenness, tribe, Iraqiness and hometown are introduced. As the main body of this chapter, the attitudes of the respondents towards the topics related to these five dimensions, which are religious, sectarian, tribal, national and ethnic, are respectively presented as an application of my conceptual framework presented in the first chapter.

Before presenting the findings of the survey, it may be necessary to have some explanations about the story of the field to say. As it is mentioned in the methodology in the first chapter, the survey was conducted at Turkmen Home Aid Center, Turkmen Home Medicine Center and homes of Iraqi Turkmen refugees in Ankara. Turkmen Home Aid Center is an association whose main purpose is to coordinate the unprofessional aid campaigns for the Iraqi Turkmen refugees in Ankara. It also attempts to give unprofessional education including
mathematics, language education in Latin alphabet and kindergarten to the
refugee children by the helps of volunteer university students studying the
relevant departments. The association which is located in a small apartment in
Cebeci in Ankara is mainly administered by a doctor and a teacher, who are
Turkish citizens and my acquaintances. They greatly helped to introduce me to
the Iraqi Turkmens who are recognized among the Iraqi Turkmen refugees in
Ankara. The survey was started with these people and their acquaintances in the
association. Apart from its regulars, it is daily visited by several Iraqi Turkmen
refugees for a variety of reasons such as registration of new-coming families,
demand for all kinds of aid and meeting the friends or relatives. In addition,
Medicine Center, which is located next to Aid Center and a part of it, tries to
provide the Iraqi Turkmen refugees with medicine obtained through aid
campaigns and charitable givings. In this place which is my second survey field
and daily visited by more people, the regulars of Aid Center daily introduced me
to the visitors of Medicine Center to conduct the questionnaire. In Medicine
Center, the number of people refusing to response to the questionnaire was
clearly higher than in Aid Center. Particularly when there was no another
Turkmen who introduced me to them, the people tended to refuse. My third
survey field is the homes of refugees. Aid Center already registered the addresses
of most of the Iraqi Turkmen refugees in Ankara to coordinate the aids for them. I
used these address lists to reach them by the great helps of contact Turkmen
people who are like the representatives of Aid Center in Altındağ and Mamak.
Again, in the cases of absence of these contact people, the number of refusals was
dramatically increasing. In general, it should be noted that the number of those
refusing to respond is at least half of the number of those accepting. While the
number of households is really many at these homes, I applied the questionnaire
to one respondent from each home to avoid taking the views of the same circles.
3.2. General Profile of Surveyed Persons

Before starting the explanations and descriptions for the attitudes of the Iraqi Turkmen respondents, it would be helpful to clarify by giving general personal information about them. Although the personal information of the respondents is not analyzed as independent variables in relation to their attitudes in the survey, it might still draw a framework for the general objective features of the sample.

As for age distribution of the respondents, a broad range of age distribution starting from age 16 extending to age 81 is available in the sample. In addition, the data include almost all the age numbers up to age 67. As it can be seen in the histogram below (Figure 3.2.1), the age data are concentrated on mid-twenties while main body of age distribution is the range between age 19 and age 48. Furthermore, 60 percent of the participants are under the age of 35 years. Therefore, the age distribution of the sample might verify the argument in the previous chapter that mostly the elderly and the disabled have stayed in the ISIS-held territories. In addition, it can be said that the majority of the respondents are in combat and working age.
When it comes to gender distribution of the respondents, the study includes the answers of 11 female respondents (6.1 percent of the sample) and 169 male respondents (93.4 percent of the sample). A male dominance was apparent in the field. To make the complication plain, it should be noted that women sat in a different room whose door was kept closed apart from us (me, Turkmen contact person –if available– and participant) at the homes of participants until we left their homes.²⁶⁰ It can be said that a male character has already been both quantitatively and qualitatively dominant in every domain of the Turkmen society and politics such as in universities, businesses, public places and political parties as it can be predicted. Furthermore, it is observed that Turkmen men have still been more visible both in businesses and communication with other people in Turkey like those in aid and medicine centers.

²⁶⁰ This explanation should not be understood as my complaint; in fact, it was me that disturbed them.
In regard to hometowns of the respondents, depending on the large presence of Turkmens of Tal Afar in Turkey, the main body of the participants of this study involving 154 respondents (85.6 percent of the sample) is composed of Turkmens of Tal Afar who fled to Turkey following the ISIS assaults in June 2014. The second largest group in this study, composed of 20 respondents (11.1 percent of the sample), is Turkmens of Mosul who shared the same fate with Turkmens of Tal Afar. 6 respondents from Sinjar, Taze Khormato, Chamcamal and Kirkuk constitute 3.3 percent of the sample.

As concerns duration of stay of the respondents in Turkey, a great majority of the respondents are those who fled from Tal Afar and Mosul shortly after the ISIS assaults while the remaining is Turkmen people who attempted to live under the rule of the ISIS for a while (Figure 3.2.2). It is worth noting that most of the Turkmens of Tal Afar and Mosul fled to Turkey or other parts of Iraq shortly after the offensives of the ISIS. Therefore, the duration of stay of the sample is in accord with the time period of general tendency of ISIS-forced Turkmen refugees to leave their regions. Moreover, it can be said that majority of the respondents

261 The population of Tal Afar is more than 400,000 people, most of which fled from the town following ISIS occupation. While its center is almost completely composed of Turkmens, 70 percent of the district consists of Turkmens and other 30 percent consists of Arabs and small minority groups such as Gergeris taking into account the villages of Tal Afar. Tal Afar with its economic and sectarian problems comes to the forefront as socially most problematic Turkmen settlement area. Tal Afar distinguishes from other Turkmen regions in several dimensions: First, together with Sinjar district, Tal Afar is a buffer zone between Kurdistan Regional Government and self-proclaimed Federation of Northern Syria, mainly dominated by Democratic Union Party known as PYD; second, it is the only region which is almost completely inhabited by the Turkmen; third, it is the most populated Turkmen region in Iraq; fourth, it constitutes a corridor for Turkmen-Turkish and Turkmen-Sunni Arab which is not under the control of the KRG. See Serhat Erkmen, “Unutulmuşluğun Karanlığından Umudun Aydınlığına Uzanan Bir Türkmen Kenti: Telafer [Talafar: A Turcoman City from the Darkness of Being Mislaid to the Luminousness of Hope],” Ortadoğu Analiz 1.5 (2009), 7-9.

262 Mosul ethnically consists of Turkmens, Kurds and Arabs and religiously consists of Sunni, Shiite and Christian groups. The region, mainly dominated by Sunni Arabs, is the second demographically biggest city of Iraq following Baghdad. Due to very broad insurgent activity, especially by al-Qaeda, Mosul was the most unsafe city of the world until a few years ago following the American occupation according to many. It is claimed that the city of Mosul posed danger for the Shiite people still before the ISIS occupation and after the end of the insurgency.
have fresher memories to analyze particularly in comparison with Turkmen university students who have been in Turkey for longer time.

![Figure 3.2 Duration of Stay of the Respondents in Turkey (N=180)](image)

Figure 3.2 2 Duration of Stay of the Respondents in Turkey (N=180)

Regarding educational levels of the respondents, as it can be seen in Figure 3.2.3, those respondents who has bachelor degree constitute the majority of the sample (18.9 percent of the sample) by a narrow margin whereas there are slight differences between the proportions of those who have different educational levels. There are very few people at the extremes (only 5 illiterate respondents and only 1 respondent with post-graduate degree). It can be said that overwhelming majority of the respondents is able to read and write in Arabic at least. In the study, the educational levels of respondents are below:

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263 In Iraq, the formal education is composed of six-year primary school, three-year secondary school and three-year high school. Before university-level education, there is a middle level including a two-year degree.
The occupational groups of the respondents vary from craftsman, civil servant and unskilled worker to skilled worker, farmer and security personnel. The category of students includes those who left their colleges and universities after they came to Turkey following the ISIS occupations. The category ‘other’ includes occupations like driver, watchman, artist and poet. Figure 3.2.4 shows that former students and employer or manager of a business with less than ten employees constitute the largest groups (with 16.2 percent for each) in the sample. In terms of professions, it can be said that the respondents have different skills and capabilities.
As to levels of income of the respondents, Figure 3.2.5 demonstrates that 30.1 percent of the respondents have a low level of income (under 600,000 Iraqi dinars) while 60.2 percent of the respondents have a middle level of income (varying from 600,000 Iraqi dinars to 2 million Iraqi dinars). Only about 10 percent of the respondents have a high level of income (2 million Iraqi dinars and over). It can be said that this is in line with the general conditions of the Turkmen society. In addition, it may seem that these levels are really low but some informed respondents claim that these are enough or really high in their living standards and market conditions. Most of the respondents who commented on the issue complained about cost of living in Turkey.

264 1 Iraqi dinar corresponds to 0.8-0.9 USD.
As respects sectarian distribution of the respondents, the sample includes 174 Sunni Turkmen respondents, 4 respondents not affiliated with a sect and 2 respondents refusing to answer. The study was originally planned to have 40-50 percent Shiite Turkmen and 50-60 percent Sunni Turkmen in the sample but it has predominantly been Sunni Turkmens that have fled to Turkey following the ISIS occupations. Although, the questionnaire was applied to 201 respondents, the answers of 21 Shiite respondents were excluded from the sample since their number is too small to draw conclusions about the views of Shiite Turkmens but too big to manipulate the percentages of the sample. In fact, there have been Shiite Turkmens in Ankara and other cities of Turkey but almost all of them are undergraduate and graduate students most of whom have been in Turkey for several years. Therefore, they are out of field of this study.

*A clear difference between the views of the Sunni and Shiite Iraqi Turkmen respondents on many different topics drew attention during the analysis of data.*
3.3. The Self-Identifications of the Respondents

Islam appears as a common denominator in the self-identifications of the respondents (Figure 3.3.1). A great majority of the respondents (90.6 percent of them) regards Islam or Muslim identity as their first choice to identify themselves. The ethnic identity falls into their second rank among the first priorities with a percentage of 5.6 pointing to a considerable gap between the two. The options of Iraqiness, their hometown and sect come after Islam and Turkmenness as a result of choices of very few people. No respondent picks the option ‘tribe’ as the most important to define themselves.

The common denominator as Islam to identify themselves may be illusionary. The high percentage of Islam among the self-identification priorities could not be transformed into comments on the social unity based on denominator of Islam.
since conflicting identities come to picture as it will be discussed later in detail. After the first priority, the things get more complicated. Among the second self-identification priorities, the ethnic identity leads the way by far with a percentage of 43.9 while the sectarian identity comes to the fore following ethnic identity with 20.5 percent (Figure 3.3.2). It is not surprising to find ethnic identity at the first rank among the second priorities because the ethnic identity is the most distinctive feature of Turkmens to distinguish them or themselves from the other segments of the Iraqi society.

What is interesting is relatively high proportion of other self-identifications in spite of fragmented status of percentages. Especially, sectarian identity’s relatively high proportion may be explanatory in many respects, which will be discussed later in this chapter in detail. The options of Iraqiness (14 percent of the respondents), hometown (9.4 percent of the respondents), tribe (7 percent of the respondents) and religion (5.3 percent of the respondents) follows the ethnic identity respectively.
The proportions for the third self-identification priorities are more fragmented. As it is quite clear from Figure 3.3.3, the ethnic identity again takes the lead with a percentage of 30.5 while the option ‘hometown’ takes the second place with 22.8 percent of the respondents among the third priorities. It should be specified that the respondents’ self-identification with their hometowns is not discussed separately in detail in this study but will be mentioned in the titles of patriotism, Turkenland and Iraqiness. Nevertheless, it might be interpretational to specify that what I would call ‘districtism’ is a very popular phenomenon among the Turkmens in general and Turkmens of Tal Afar in particular, who constitute the largest section of the sample of this study and who are one of the most representative communities of this phenomenon. Subsequently, the options of tribal identity (26.2 percent of the respondents), sectarian identity (14.4 percent of the respondents) and Iraqi identity (13.2 percent of the respondents) come to the
fore with slight differences in turn. There are only a few people (3 percent of the respondents) who choose religion as their third self-identification priority.

Figure 3.3. Third Important Self-Identifications of the Respondents (N=167)

3.4. Portrayal of the Dimension of Religion

As it is mentioned above, it seems that Islam is the most important common denominator of the respondents. It should be noted that this study does not focus on the religious practices, the level of religiosity, the amount of the Islamic knowledge of the respondents or the impact of Islam on daily practices in detail but it focuses on the impact of Islam as it relates to their identity perceptions. How do they see Islam and Muslim identity and how do they look at non-Muslims? In this part, the views of the respondents on the status of Islam in their self-identifications and their lives, Islamic rule, religious orders and non-Muslims will be presented.
To begin with, Islam is included in the top three priority of self-definition of 163 respondents out of a sample of 180 which corresponds to 90.6 percent, 5.3 percent and 3 percent of the respondents considering the religious identity as their first, second and third priority respectively as it is mentioned in the previous section. In any case, it should be indicated that they want to be primarily defined or known as Muslims.

There is no respondent who sees religion as irrelevant in his/her life. The overwhelming majority of the respondents (98.9 percent of them) consider Islam as very important in their lives. It can be said that they put Islam in a very determinant position in their minds. However, this does not automatically mean that Islam is the sole determinant of their lives because of the presence of the dividing identities or loyalties which can conflict with Islamic principles or practices. Practices such as tribal system of Tal Afar might force the individual to act in a conflicting way with religion. Also, we do not have enough information about their Islamic knowledge and their separation line between Islam and tradition, and thus, we cannot know how they decide how they act in conflicting situations. Therefore, this may be the topic of a more detailed research on the relationship between social structure(s) and religion.

Furthermore, a large majority of the respondents (85.3 percent of them in total) look favorable at sharia. By looking at the slight difference between the level of importance in their lives and the level of support for sharia, it can be concluded that although the respondents see religion as very important in their lives, some of them may not be favorable to sharia. As it is observed from Figure 3.4.1 below, 66.7 percent of respondents strongly agree with the statement that Iraq must be an Islamic state while 18.6 percent of them agree with the statement. On the other hand, 13.6 percent of respondents are unfavorable to sharia in total. There are only 2 respondents (1.1 percent of the respondents) who are neither favorable nor unfavorable to sharia in the sample. In addition, it should be noted that the question does not investiage what kind of Islamic rule is sought by the respondents but it may be partially inferred from their flight from the ISIS that
the ISIS version of sharia does not attract the respondents in general. As it can be understood from the previous chapter, since the insurgency period in Iraq following the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the people of Tal Afar have already been familiar with the similar versions of Islamist ideas and practices that could be considered as roots of the ISIS.

On the other hand, it may not be said that the religious orders such as Naqshbandi and Qadiriyya, which are very active and influential in the Sunni regions of Iraq, particularly in its northern parts, are as popular among the respondents. Figure 3.4.2 indicates that only 9 percent of the respondents declare that they are member of a religious order. This question does not attempt to measure the level of religiosity or similar topics but rather it tries to look at whether a sub-loyalty under the title religion, that is, a loyalty to jamaat, tariqa or religious order, is present or not.
Even if the overwhelming majority of the respondents are out of religious orders’ practices, they may have confidence in them. As it is quite evident from Figure 3.4.3 below, 48.2 percent of the respondents have *some* or *a great deal of* confidence in religious orders, which 9 percent of the respondents participate in. Nevertheless, it can be said that the level of no-confidence in them is very high for a sample whose vast majority seek for an Islamic rule. At this point, two possibilities could come to the forefront: first, there may be clear distance between the Islamic practices and principles of these religious orders and those of these people; and second, the network and relationships of these orders with other actors in their regions might be considered harmful by the respondents.
On the other hand, it can be stated that the views of the respondents on non-Muslims are complicated. While 27.4 percent of the respondents would not like to have non-Muslims even as neighbors, 81.6 percent of them consider the marriage of their children with non-Muslim people as a big or some problem, with 73.2 percent of the respondents regarding such a marriage as a big problem as Figure 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 clearly demonstrate. Based on these results, it can be concluded that there is no large scale religious xenophobia among the respondents although they are predominantly chary of making room for non-Muslim people in their lives.

The negative attitude might be related to three phenomena: Firstly, it is Islam that directs them in most of the domains of daily life; and therefore, most of them do not approve such a marriage from a religious point of view. At the same time, most of those who do not mind having non-Muslim neighbors referred to Islam and the life of the Prophet by giving the example of non-Muslim neighbors of the
Prophet. Secondly, it can be predicted that American military personnel is the unique non-Muslim case that most of the respondents have come across with. Based on the conversations with respondents during and after the applications of questionnaires, it can be concluded that the memories of this period of operations mentioned in the previous chapter are still alive in the minds of many respondents and these memories are generally based on the negative pictures from the past. As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, a lot of families (70 percent of Tal Afar according to some arguments) had to leave their hometowns during these military operations. Thirdly, based on the conversations with the respondents, it can be said that there is a widespread belief among the Turkmens in the primary responsibility of the US for the befalling experiences of Iraq in general and Turkmens in particular depending upon its ‘games, ambitions and puppets’.

Figure 3.4. Views of the Respondents on Non-Muslim Neighbors (N=179)
Figure 3.4. 5 Attitude of the Respondents towards Marriage with Non-Muslims (N=179)

3.5. Sectarian Identity: Growing Sectarianism?

Iraq has long been discussed as a sectarian country and it is stated that almost all the components of the Iraqi society have received their shares depending upon rising and waning of sectarian agenda.\(^{266}\) Generally, Turkmen authors claim that sectarian problems among the Turkmen society do not have a long history.\(^{267}\) In their opinion, many Turkmen were not informed of the sects of their friends or relatives and even of their own sects until recently and growing sectarianism.

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\(^{267}\) Suphi Saatçi, interview by the author, İstanbul, March 8, 2016; Kemal Beyali, interview by the author, İstanbul, March 9, 2016; Mehmet Tütüncü, interview by the author, İstanbul, March 10, 2016.
within the Turkmens community is not their ‘default format’. At this point, a conversation with a respondent from Tal Afar may be telling:

“A few years ago, my father had a medical operation and stayed in a hospital in Mosul. One of my uncles who did not come to visit my father called up me to wish my father get well soon. I asked my uncle about his reason not to come to the hospital. His answer shocked me: ‘I could not come to Mosul and I am Shiite and I could not predict what would happen to me there’, he said. This was the point at which I learned his sect. In other words, until a few years ago, I did not know.”

In line with the arguments of these arguments, 96.6 percent of the respondents think that sectarian conflicts between Sunni and Shiite Turkmens are relatively new phenomenon and emerged after the fall of Saddam Hussein. How have sectarian dynamics in Iraq influenced the Turkmen society? When we look at the present situation, it seems that sectarianism has a certain effect. Without finding anyone guilty, 86.7 percent of the respondents consider that the sectarian conflicts have divided the Turkmen society. Therefore, it can be concluded that the respondents are aware of the fundamental effects of the sectarianism on Turkmen society in general.

In this part, the general views of the respondents on their own sects, some regions known for their sects and Sunni and Shiite people will be presented. Because the sectarian ‘us’ and ‘them’ might be a better indicator of sectarian tendencies, the primary focus of this part will be their views on Sunni and Shiite regions and people.

First of all, when we look at the general sectarian picture of Turkmen respondents, it is observed that the sect is included in the top three self-identification priority of 60 respondents (one-third of the respondents) whereas the sectarian identity is ranked at number two among the second self-identification priorities following the ethnic identity. Moreover, in the sample, 89.8 percent of the respondents think that their sect is very or rather important with a 85.3 percent seeing their sect as very important. The remaining 10.1 percent of the respondents that have more ethnic tendencies do not consider that their sect is important as it is understood from the conversations with them and
from their answers to the questions of the questionnaire. It must be noted that these respondents expostulate about growing sectarian tendencies of their people in our conversations.

Furthermore, 97.7 percent of the respondents say that they would never give up their sects while there are only four respondents declaring that they might give up their sects. In addition, 93.2 percent of the respondents express that if they give up their sect, their friends and relatives will be angry with them while the remaining 6.8 percent of the respondents think that their friends and relatives will not react negatively to them.

In addition, their ‘observation’ or, more precisely, their prediction on the level of hostility between Sunni and Shiite communities of Iraq may be explanatory in explaining their views on the regions and people since their views could also be influenced by this picture largely. Figure 3.5.1 shows that most of the Iraqi Sunnis are hostile to the Iraqi Shiites according to 34.7 percent of the respondents while the percentage of those considering that only some or none of the Iraqi Sunnis are hostile to the Iraqi Shiites is 33.3.
Figure 3.5. 1 Views of the Respondents on Sunni Attitude towards Shiites (N=174)

On the other side, Figure 3.5.2 demonstrates that all of the Iraqi Shiites are hostile to the Iraqi Sunnis according to 25.3 percent of the respondents while 37.7 percent of the respondents thinks that most of the Iraqi Shiites are hostile to the Iraqi Sunnis. The percentage of those thinking that some or none of the Iraqi Shiites are hostile to the Iraqi Sunnis is 22.4. It appears that most of the respondents observe more hostility within the Shiite community of Iraq. This can be partially dependent upon their own sect but can also be connected to the large-scale visibility and current political power of the Shiite organizations.
Furthermore, the practical situation and the actual relations of the respondents with the Shiite can give clues for the sectarian practices of the sample. Figure 3.5.3 indicates that while 34.7 percent of the respondents declare that all of their friends shares the same sect with them, 28.4 percent of the respondents express that most of their friends are Sunni. The percentage of those saying that half of their friends are Sunni is 30.7. In any case, those respondents whose friends are mostly and completely Sunni constitute the majority though not necessarily an absolute majority in the sample.

However, this may not be the result of their own conscious choices but rather they might choose their friends depending on their neighborhood. Nevertheless, even if the second option is valid, this may imply the structural division of the society. For instance, Tal Afar is mainly divided between Sunni north and Shiite south although this is still not an absolute division due to the existence of some
Shiite Turkmen tribes in the northern Tal Afar and presence of some Sunni Turkmen in southern part of Tal Afar. Furthermore, in the recent times before the ISIS occupied the region, the entries of vehicles from the north to the southern part of Tal Afar had been stipulated on official dispensation obtained from the police department due to a vast number of bomb vehicle attacks on the Shiite south resulting in the loss of many lives.

Another practical indicator is the presence or non-presence of non-Sunni relatives particularly when considering the strong tribal and family bonds of Turkmens. 60.3 percent of the respondents say that they have Shiite relatives (Figure 3.5.4). Although this percentage may be the inheritance of ‘once-non-sectarian days’ mainly, it can be concluded that the presence of such a situation will affect the other sectarian practices of the respondents. Furthermore, rather than their agreement on the statement that the sectarian conflicts among the Turkmens appeared after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the level of those declaring the
presence of Shiite people among their relatives is a more accurate indicator of their sectarian practices. However, a level of 39.7 percent of those declaring that they have no Shiite relatives is still too high percentage to manifest the low level activity of non-sectarian practices.

3.5.1. Views on Some Sunni and Shiite Regions

This part presents the views of the respondents on Iran, Najaf, Karbala and Mosul. This part’s question of how much you like the following region does not necessarily refer to the people of these regions. In fact, it attempts to measure the attitudes of the respondents towards the titles ‘Iran, Najaf, Karbala and Mosul’ in general because these have strong sectarian self-images and symbols.

Firstly, it seems anti-Iranian attitude is one of the most common denominators of this sample. As it can be seen in Figure 3.5.5, a clear majority of the respondents
are unfavorable to Iran. Only 3.9 percent of respondents are very or somewhat favorable to Iran while 90.4 percent of the respondents declare that they do not have any positive feeling about Iran. However, it should be reserved that their unfavorable opinion on Iran is not just associated with ‘pure’ sectarian reasons but they are also related to the intervention of Iran in the Iraqi politics. Nevertheless, it can be said that these interventions and political actions causing unfavorable attitude on Iran cultivates the image of sectarian ‘other’ outside since they consider these actions as connected with the sectarian ‘ambitions’ of Iran. Therefore, finding Iran as sectarian ‘other’ outside seems plausible.

Figure 3.5. 5 Attitude of the Respondents towards Iran (N=178)

Secondly, the comparison between the views on Najaf, Karbala and Mosul will provide insight into sectarian tendencies of the respondents. This comparison can be made between different Sunni and Shiite cities of Iraq not mentioned in the questionnaire. Indeed, Mosul is aimfully selected in that it can be easily predicted that most of the respondents have seen Mosul with their own eyes at least once
due to its central character for most of the settlements in its neighborhood. In other words, it can be assumed that the respondents are better informed of Mosul than other Sunni cities of Iraq such as Salah ad-Din and Anbar. In addition, Najaf and Karbala are better-known Shiite cities in comparison with other Shiite cities of Iraq like Basra.

It can be observed from the figures below that the sample’s common view on the Shiite parts of Iraq seems more divided yet unfavorable. Some of the respondents express clearly that these regions belongs to only the Shiite people. Najaf and Karbala are the two of the most shrined Shiite regions in Iraq. Najaf is the intellectual and spiritual capital of the Shiites in Iraq while Karbala is annually flooded with millions of Shiite visitors to commemorate the Battle of Karbala, a cornerstone of Shiite collective memory.

38.4 percent of the respondents have very or somewhat favorable opinion about Najaf while 45.2 percent of the respondents do not have any positive feeling on Najaf as it is evident from Figure 3.5.6. The close proportions are also valid for Karbala region. 38.2 percent of the respondents have very or some favorable opinion on Karbala while 44.4 percent of the respondents do not feel close to Karbala at all as it is clear from Figure 3.5.7.
Figure 3.5. 6 Views of the Respondents on Najaf (N=177)
On the other hand, it would appear that the respondents feel close to Mosul, which is a Sunni Arab-dominated region, contrary to their views on Shiite-dominated Najaf and Karbala. 96.1 percent of the respondents have very or somewhat favorable opinion on Mosul, with 87.2 percent liking it very much, and there is no respondent who declares that he/she does not like Mosul at all (Figure 3.5.8).
3.5.2. Views on Sunni and Shiite People

For a general picture, first of all, it should be noted that 77.7 percent of the respondents declare that they do not consider being friend with people from different sects harmful. However, it appears that about one fifth of the sample is still unfavorable to being friend with non-Sunnis (Figure 3.5.9).
Figure 3.5.9 Attitude of the Respondents towards Friendship with Shiite People (N=179)

When it comes to the views of the Turkmen respondents on the Sunni and Shiite Arabs, it should be noted that while the overwhelming majority of the respondents has had the opportunity to meet Sunni Arabs due to the proximity of Sunni Arabs’ and Turkmen respondents’ regions, it is less likely that the respondents have known Shiite Arabs as a community depending on geographical distance between them. Governmental officials and security forces have most probably been one of the unique cases to know Shiite Arabs.

In any case, it can be seen that there is a certain difference (more than a twofold difference) between the views of the respondents on the Sunni and Shiite Arabs. It can be easily argued that the sectarian motivations determine their views. Firstly, Figure 3.5.10 points that the great majority of the respondents (79.3 percent of them) are favorable to a Sunni Arab neighbor while 20.7 percent of the respondents would not like to have Sunni Arabs as neighbors. In this sense,
because the sample does not include any Shiite respondent, it can be argued that ethnic tendencies determine unfavorable view on Sunni Arab neighbors. In addition, for the majority favorable to a Sunni Arab neighbor, it may be stated that the sectarian proximity influences the opinions of the respondents positively although it is not valid for the whole group that do not mind having Sunni Arab neighbors.

On the other hand, their views on Shiite Arabs seem more unfavorable. Figure 3.5.11 indicates that 45.3 percent of the respondents would not like to have Shiite Arabs as neighbors. Although ethnic tendencies can influence the opinions of the respondents on the Shiite Arabs still, the difference between the percentages of those unfavorable to Sunni Arabs and to Shiite Arabs as neighbors gives a sectarian explanation. Furthermore, ethnic tendencies might also include anti-Shiite elements depending upon their reading on the Iraqi politics and society. In
other words, those bringing their ethnic identity forward might also be unfavorable to Shiite Arabs in that they may regard Shiite Arab political activity or social pressure as an enormous danger for the Turkmen existence in Iraq.

Moreover, 78.3 percent of the respondents have a great deal of or some trust in Sunni Arabs, with 47.2 of the respondents having a great deal of trust in Sunni Arabs as it is observed from Figure 3.5.12. What is interesting here is that the trust level in Sunni Arabs is higher than their trust level in Shiite Turkmen, which will be discussed later in this part. The distrust of more than one-fifth of the respondents might be associated with ethnic motivations again. Similarly, sectarian proximity between the respondents whose overwhelming majority is affiliated with Sunni sect and Sunni Arabs can also affect relatively high level of trust in Sunni Arabs.
On the other hand, 42.2 percent of the respondents have a great deal or fair amount of trust in Shiite Arabs, with only 24.4 percent of the respondents have a great deal of trust in Shiite Arabs (Figure 3.5.13). The clear difference between the level of trust of the respondents in Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs (almost twice as much) is on the nail again, and therefore, the same comments on sectarianism as in the unwillingness to have a Shiite Arab neighbor is still valid at this point.
In addition, it seems that the issue of marriage reveals lower levels of favorable attitudes in terms of intercommunal relations. However, Sunni Arabs are preferred than both Shiite Turkmens and Shiite Arabs. While 33.3 percent of the respondents find the marriage of their children with Sunni Arabs inconvenient, the majority embraces the issue in one form or another as it can be seen in Figure 3.5. Furthermore, when their opinion on marriage with Sunni and Shiite Arabs is compared, it can be seen that the difference is almost twice as much again as in the level of trust. The same comments made on the ethnic tendencies to reject Sunni Arabs as neighbors and on the level of distrust are again valid for 33.3 percent of the respondents’ rejection of the marriage of their children with Sunni Arabs.
On the other hand, 61.7 percent of the respondents do not want to see their children marrying with a Shiite Arab while only 18.3 percent of them are all right with this as it is quite clear from Figure 3.5.15. It can be argued that sectarian tendencies manifest themselves in the issue of marriage more apparently.
The views of the respondents on the Shiite Turkmens might be a better indicator to explain the sectarian tendencies. As it can be derived from the previous explanations on the views on the Shiite Arabs, the sectarian situation of the country has influenced the views of the respondents. Furthermore, as it is mentioned in the first and second chapters, Tal Afar has a short but deep history of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiite Turkmens. In line with this fact, the majority of the respondents have a memory of sectarian conflicts among the Turkmen community. 47,5 percent of the respondents say that they have very often witnessed sectarian conflicts of some kind including armed conflict, brickbats and quarrels whereas 15,6 percent of the respondents point out that they have often witnessed these conflicts between Shiite and Sunni Turkmens. Only 13,4 percent of the respondents have no memory of sectarian conflicts between Sunni and Shiite Turkmens (Figure 3.5.16).
When it comes to their views on the Shiite Turkmens, firstly, it can be said that a large majority of the respondents can be considered as willing or at least not rejecting to live side by side with Shiite Turkmens. Figure 3.5.17 demonstrates that more than three-quarter of the respondents do not see having a Shiite Turkmen neighbor as problematic.
In addition, Figure 3.5.17 shows that 51.1 percent of the respondents have *a great deal of* trust in Shiite Turkmen neighbors while 20 percent of the respondents have *some* trust in Shiite Turkmen neighbors. As it is mentioned earlier in this chapter, the level of trust in Sunni Arabs is higher than the level of trust in Shiite Turkmen although the level of *a great deal of* trust in Shiite Turkmens is slightly higher than the level of *a great deal of* trust in Sunni Arabs.
On the other hand, the issue of marriage of their children with the Shiite Turkmens seems more challenging and demonstrates that the feature of the problems between Sunni and Shiite Turkmens is more structural rather than individual. 41.3 percent of the respondents think that the marriage of their children with Shiite Turkmens would be very or somewhat problematic. Furthermore, only 26.8 percent of the respondents could say that the marriage of their children with Shiite Turkmens is not a problem by no means (Figure 3.5.19).
3.6. A Complicating Dimension: Tribal Bonds

As it is known, tribal and family bonds of Turkmens are very strong especially in rural areas. Particularly in Tal Afar as in the most of the rural Turkmen areas, it is known that almost every Turkmen is tied to a specific tribe. In urban areas such as Kirkuk, the family names are more frequently mentioned than tribal affiliations. In any case, these families can be counted as minor tribes adapted to urban settings. In line with this fact, there is only one person not connected to a specific Turkmen tribe in this study. How important are these tribes in the views of Turkmens?

To begin with, almost one-fourth of the sample place their tribal identities in second or third rank in their self-identification priorities. 7 percent of the respondents and 16.2 percent of the respondents want to be defined by their tribes.
among the second and the third priorities respectively. Indeed, it seems that the views on the tribe are one of the most common denominators of this sample as it is the case in their views on Islam. In the survey, 92.7 percent of the respondents say that their tribes are very or somewhat important in their lives. 77.2 percent of the respondents agree with the statement that Turkmens act on the words of tribal chiefs (Figure 3.6.1). This last point can show that the power of tribes is not only symbolic but also practical. It should be noted that those disagreeing with the statement argue that the power and effect of tribes and tribal chiefs have had its day.

Moreover, 97.2 percent of the respondents agree with the statement that it is proper to support one’s own tribe. In addition, 92.7 percent of the respondents express that they much or somehow like their own tribes. Almost all the respondents have a great deal or fair amount of trust in their own tribes, with 86.7 percent of the respondents having a great deal of trust in their tribes. None
of the respondents see harm in being neighbor with the people of a different Sunni Turkmen tribe. Except for 3 female participants, all the respondents consider their children’s marriage with people of different Sunni Turkmen tribes as not problematic. These points show that the tribal identities are strongly internalized among the respondents.

Secondly, how do the tribes influence the order in the Turkmen society in general? 20.1 percent of the respondents think that tribes divide the Turkmen society today while the majority of the respondents disagrees with the statement (Figure 3.6.2). It can be said that there is no ‘pure’ tribal issue deteriorating the conditions of the Turkmen community according to the majority of the respondents.

![Figure 3.6.2 Views on the Impact of Tribes on the Division of Turkmens (N=179)](image)

When it comes to practical situation, there are more divisions in the views. 26.7 percent of the respondents express that they have very often or often witnessed
tribal conflicts while 24.4 percent of them state that they have not had a memory of tribal conflicts of blood revenge (Figure 3.6.3). In fact, this point is the complicating part of the issue. The conversations with the respondents reveal that there is a clearly sectarian dimension of some tribal conflicts and also there is a clearly tribal dimension of some sectarian conflicts among the Turkmens. Therefore, it can be said that some of the respondents do not see some sectarian conflicts as actual tribal conflicts yet sectarian-motivated. Based on the stories of some respondents like the conflicts between Shiite Çolak tribe and Sunni Hayyo tribe, one anonymous example can clarify how this point makes the issue complicating: An anonymous Sunni Turkmen of a Sunni Turkmen tribe of Tal Afar joins an anti-Shiite terrorist group. Then, he executes a bombed attack or a different kind of attack killing Shiite Turkmens in Shiite south of Tal Afar. Based on strong tribal structure of the region, the attacker is identified and asked to be turned in from his tribe by the tribe or tribes of the victim(s) but tribal rules do not permit it to deliver the attacker. The conflicts begin. This narration can also be read as the starting process of the sectarian conflicts in Tal Afar.

As it is evident from the example above, in fact, most of the sectarian-tribal conflicts have been transformed into the conflicts of blood revenge, and therefore, it could be difficult to distinguish tribal conflicts from sectarian conflicts or vice versa. The sectarian division of most of the tribes has paved the way for the expansion of this kind of conflicts. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are also tribes within which there are both Sunni and Shiite Turkmens together.
3.7. Embracing the Sense of ‘Being Iraqi’?

Iraq is often described as an artificial state which has failed to produce a national identity incorporating its ethnic, sectarian and religious groups.²⁶⁸ Can ‘artificial’ states develop their own national identities? Do their people have patriotic agendas? This survey reveals contrary findings to the popular belief in the non-existence of or very low level of existence of national identities or consciousness in those countries via the views of a putative ethnic minority whose political leaders generally declare the willingness of their society to be considered as one of the constituent nations of the country, Iraq.

First of all, Iraqiness falls into the second self-identification priority of 14 percent of the respondents and into the third self-identification priority of 13.2 percent of the respondents while there are only three respondents whose most important self-identification is Iraqiness. Among the second priorities, the national identity is placed on the third rank following the ethnic and sectarian identity while it is placed on the fifth rank following ethnic, hometown, tribal and sectarian identities respectively. In short, the national identity falls within the top three self-identification priorities of 49 respondents out of 180 (more than one-fourth of the sample).

In addition, the great majority of the respondents thinks that the Iraqi identity is important (81.7 percent of them see very important and 6.1 percent of them see rather important) while 12.2 percent of them consider Iraqiness as unimportant. Interestingly, those who do not regard it important do not tend to assert the non-existence or artificiality of Iraqiness but they tend to put their outsiderness or anomalies forward in general. Moreover, 95.5 percent of the respondents much or somewhat like Iraq depending on various reasons, particularly including their affiliation with their hometowns.

In addition, Iraqiness is a source of gratitude for 81.6 percent of the respondents saying that they are fortunately an Iraqi. Moreover, 81.4 percent of the respondents point out that they will happy with the successes of Iraq. While 83.8 percent of the respondents declare that being an Iraqi make them feel very honored or honored, 79.3 percent of the respondents express that the Iraqi flag make them feel very honored or honored (Figure 3.7.1 and 3.7.2). It seems that the feeling for the Iraqi flag has relatively lower level of attachment but as understood from the comments of the respondents, the main reason for that is the recent change in the form of Iraqi flag.
Figure 3.7. 1 Attitude of the Respondents towards Iraqiness (N=179)
Furthermore, 70 percent of the respondents tend to consider every part of Iraq as their motherland, whereas a relatively high level of the respondents tends not to embrace every part of Iraq as their motherland (Figure 3.7.3). 30 percent of the respondents claim mostly that only Turkmen regions or hometowns are their motherland. The main reason for this relatively high level might be the divided image of Iraq. Considering structural division of Iraq as Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite regions, those people who do not feel that they belong to these regions or who are excluded from them may be alienated from Iraq in general and might be affiliated with their hometowns and the regions seeming to be closer to them.
When it comes to the issue of willingness to fight for their country, a more complex picture confronts us. 19.8 percent of the respondents say that they will fight for Iraq if it fights against a foreign country while 53.1 percent of the respondents declare that their willingness to fight for Iraq depends on who the enemy is (Figure 3.7.4). 27.1 of the respondents directly reject the fight for Iraq. In any case, about three-quarter of the respondents tend to fight for their country in one way or another.

Among those who choose the option ‘it depends’, all of the respondents (72 valid answers in total) point out that they will fight for Iraq if it fights against the US while all the respondents except for one respondent (72 valid answers in total) utter that they will against Iran also. Moreover, all the respondents among them (72 valid answers in total) reject the fight against Turkey. In addition, while 56.3 percent of the respondents in this minor sample (71 valid answers in total) are not
willing to fight against Syria, 43.7 percent of them are willing to fight against Syria.

Moreover, 68.4 percent of the respondents seek for the unity of Iraq whereas remaining 31.6 percent of them are favorable to a divided Iraq (Figure 3.7.5). The question does not ask the respondents about what kind of division they want but it should be noted that the group of those favoring the division of Iraq does not only include those seeking for independence of Turkmenland or its unification with Turkey but also involve those favorable of a sectarian division of Iraq as understood from the comments of the respondents during the applications of the questionnaires.
On the other hand, the confidence of the respondents in the three fundamental institutions of a state, the parliament, security forces and courts, is really low. Although the confidence in these institutions is not directly related to the national identity, it could be meaningful in understanding the attitude towards the Iraqi state. Furthermore, in spite of such low levels of confidence in these fundamental institutions, such high levels embracing the Iraqi identity should be remarkable.

The respondents’ confidence in the Iraqi parliament is really low. As it is quite clear from Figure 3.7.6, only 18 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of confidence in the Iraqi parliament while 73 percent of the respondents have no confidence in the parliament at all. It should be noted that the Iraqi parliament was dominated by Nouri al-Maliki government, the leader of Shiite Islamist Dawa Party, when the respondents left Iraq. Nevertheless, the respondents did not refer to Maliki government in their answers but rather tended to bemoan the deputies of all the parties including the Turkmen deputies that they
voted for. Therefore, it can be concluded the problem is not necessarily connected to the former ruling party and leader but it seems more structural and ‘institutional’.

In addition, only 28.5 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of confidence in the Iraqi security forces whereas 64.2 percent of the respondents have no confidence in the Iraqi security forces at all (Figure 3.7.7). Based on the conversations with the respondents during and after the application of the questionnaire, it should be remarked that some of the respondents tended to see the Iraqi security forces as ‘the servants of Iran or Shiites’ while the fundamental motivation of the most of the respondents has been perceived as the inability (even unwillingness according to some of them) of the Iraqi security forces to protect them from multiple immediate threats.
Additionally, 26.6 percent of the respondents have *some* or *great deal of* confidence in the Iraqi courts while 66.4 percent of the respondents have no confidence in the Iraqi courts *at all* (Figure 3.7.8). It should be noted that most of the respondents do not regard the Iraqi courts as just courts but consider them as corrupt to a large extent. As a sign of institutional crisis and breakdown, some of the respondents argued that the Iraqi courts could do everything they want through bribery.
To demonstrate the institutional crisis in Iraq, it may also be sufficient to reveal the views of the respondents on the past. One of the most interesting results of this survey is that 42.3 percent of the respondents have *some* or *a great deal of* confidence in Saddam’s party, Baath party (Figure 3.7.9). Because it is generally known as Saddam’s party among the Turkmens, the mentioned party is asked as Saddam’s party. It should be noted that some of the respondents tend to consider that if Saddam Hussein was to rule today, they would not experience such kind of disasters. However, the majority of the respondents are still unfavorable to Saddam Hussein.
3.8. The Dynamics of Ethnicity

As it is mentioned, it is the ethnic identity that mainly distinguishes the Iraqi Turkmen from the other segments of the Iraqi society. Do they have a consensus on their ethnic identity? What are the components of their ethnicity?

In the survey, 5.6 percent of the respondents place their ethnic identity on the first priority to identify themselves while 43.9 percent and 30.5 percent of the respondents regard Turkmenness as their second and third self-identification priorities respectively. It should be noted that the option ‘Turkmenness’ takes the lead explicitly among both second and third self-identification priorities. In sum, the ethnic identity falls into top three self-identification priorities of 136 respondents out of 180 (three quarter of the sample).
Furthermore, all the respondents indicate that Turkmenness is important in their lives. With the exception of two respondents, all the respondents emphasize that they tend to pride themselves on Turkmenness whereas all the respondents without any exceptions indicate that they tend to pride themselves on Turkmen flag. This is an adequately clear consensus.

In addition, as it can be predicted, almost all the respondents except for two respondents are favorable to Turkey and all the respondents have some or a great deal of trust in Turks of Turkey. In terms of manifestation of their affiliation with Turkey, some of them say that they were called Türkiyeli (implying that they are not Turkmens but they are from Turkey) in Iraq by both some Arabs and Shiite Turkmen. In addition, it must be marked that most of the respondents were reproachful of Turkey by asserting that Turkey has not sufficiently supported Iraqi Turkmen. Furthermore, 98.9 percent of the respondents think that there is no difference between them and Turks of Turkey whereas there is only one respondent who disagrees with the statement. High levels of the positive attitude towards Turkey and the Turks of Turkey are also in parallel with their views on the relationship between Turkmenness and Turkey, which will be discussed in this part later.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the level of confidence in Nationalist Movement Party (NMP), the largest nationalist party in Turkey, and Ülkü Ocakları (Grey Wolves), the largest nationalist organization in Turkey, is higher than that in Justice and Development Party (JDP). While 98.8 percent and 98.7 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of confidence in Ülkü Ocakları and NMP respectively, 76.5 of them have some or a great deal of confidence in JDP. Very high level of confidence of the respondents in the most known nationalist organizations of Turkey can be associated with their mass aid campaigns for the Turkmens both in Iraq and different cities of Turkey to some extent. On the other hand, some of the respondents tend to consider that AKP has neglected Turkmens both in Iraq and Turkey.
Additionally, 90.6 percent of the respondents indicate that they used to watch Turkish televisions in Iraq. The statement of one of the respondents on the issue could clarify their divided loyalties between Iraq and Turkey in a simple analogy: ‘In Iraq, we used to have two satellite dishes, one of which used to be rotated toward Turkey, and other of which used to be adjusted to Iraq.’ It should be noted that some of the respondents say that they learned the Turkish accent and many Turkish words from the Turkish television programs. In addition, some claim that the speaking of Turkmen children in Turkish accent and their wide use of Turkish words are mostly related to the cartoons broadcasted in Turkish.

Moreover, 94.8 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of trust in Syrian Turkmen, whom they have most probably never met. In addition, 92.4 percent of the respondents see no difference between Syrian Turkmen and Iraqi Turkmen. Furthermore, 66.1 percent of the respondents are favorable to Azerbaijan while 27.8 percent of the respondents are unfamiliar with Azerbaijan (Figure 3.8.1). For this question, the option ‘Don’t know’ is not evaluated under the category of missing data. However, if they knew that the great majority of Azerbaijan is Shiite, it is safe to say that the results could have been different.
3.8.1. Objective and Subjective Elements of Turkmenness

Up to this point, it can be understood that the ethnic identity might be influenced by many different factors. What are the components of Turkmenness? Their definition of Turkmenness may answer the different questions about the views on a wide range of topics from nationality and sect to religion and language.

36.9 percent of the respondents agree with the statement that a Turkmen must spend most of his/her life in Iraq (Figure 3.8.2). In spite of still high percentage of affirmants, it can be deduced that the majority of the respondents does not associate Turkmenness with Iraq. In other words, Iraq is not a prerequisite of Turkmenness for the majority of the respondents.
Figure 3.8. 2 Views of the Respondents on the Relationship between Turkmenness and Iraq (N=179)

On the other hand, 83.8 percent of the respondents, one of the highest levels of approval in these elements, agree on the statement that a Turkmen must be Muslim (Figure 3.8.3). Again, it seems that Islam comes to the forefront as a unifying component of Turkmenness without considering its challenging identities.
Furthermore, 26.8 percent of the respondents confirm the statement that a Turkmen must be Sunni (Figure 3.8.4). Although the majority of the respondents does not consider a specific sect as a must condition for the Turkmenness, it can be said that the percentage of those seeking for Sunnism as a component in Turkmen identity is still relatively high. This principle may also show that the rising sectarianism among the Turkmens does not only depend on anti-Shi’ism but also depends on pro-Sunnism even though it cannot be said that pro-Sunnism is completely independent of anti-Shi’ism.
63.7 percent of the respondents approve the statement that a Turkmen’s mother and father must be Turkmen (Figure 3.8.5). It can be said that although the majority of the respondents seeks for ‘pure Turkmen blood’, blood is not one of the common points of the respondents depending on the relatively high percentage of decliners to the statement.
Figure 3.8.5 Views of the Respondents on the Relationship between Turkmenness and Blood (N=179)

In addition, 74.9 percent of the respondents acknowledge the statement that a Turkmen must speak his/her own language, a dialect of Turkish (Figure 3.8.6). In fact, the language is most clear precipitator of the Turkmen society to differentiate Turkmens from other societies of Iraq. However, even in an absolute Turkmen region like the town center of Tal Afar, almost all the Turkmens are bilingual. This is why percentage of affirmants of the statement is relatively low.
Moreover, as it is observed from the figure below, 84.4 percent of the respondents share that a Turkmen must comply with Turkmen traditions (Figure 3.8.7). This is the second highest-level percentage to approve a statement in these elements. In a comparison with the previous statement, it can be concluded that the Turkmenness perception of the respondents are more cultural/language-oriented rather than race-oriented.
Finally, 90.5 percent of the respondents agree with the statement that a Turkmen must like Turkey (Figure 3.8.8). It can be thought that their answers in this question do not reflect their real opinion because they may not want to express their original views depending on their current presence in Turkey. However, as it is mentioned, Sunni Turkmens have already been accused of being Türküyeli but not Turkmens by Arabs, Kurds as well as Shiite Turkmens. Therefore, it is likely to identify Turkmenness with Turkey in their opinion.
3.8.2. Ethnic ‘Other(s)’?

As it is mentioned in the previous chapters, the Iraqi Turkmens have lived in one of the most heterogeneous regions of Iraq and side by side and together with almost all the components of Iraqi society. Does this situation produce ethnic ‘others’? To begin with, looking at the practical situation can give clues into the ethnic-affiliated practices.

While 52.8 percent of the respondents express that all of their friends are Turkmens, 36.7 percent of them point out that most of their friends are Turkmens (Figure 3.8.9). However, this image can be illusionary in terms of evaluation of ethnic-affiliated practices because the town center of Tal Afar, where great majority of the respondents came from, is mainly composed of Turkmens. Therefore, this practice may not be explained by ethnic motivations alone.
However, the marriages tend to say more about selective motivations and practices. At least one non-Turkmén is included in the relatives of 50 percent of the respondents (Figure 3.8.10). In other words, half of the respondents are not close to the ‘foreigners’ in their families. However, it should be noted that almost all the non-Turkmens among these relatives are Arabs but not Kurds.

![Figure 3.8.9 Proportion of the Respondents’ Turkmen Friends (N=180)](image-url)

Figure 3.8. 9 Proportion of the Respondents’ Turkmen Friends (N=180)
It seems that Kurds receive relatively lowest levels of positive attitude in this survey although they are generally settled in relatively distant regions from the hometowns of the most of the respondents. 48.6 percent of the respondents, a percentage higher than attitude toward Shiite Arabs, would not like have Kurds as neighbors meaning that around half of the respondents do not want to live side by side with Kurds (Figure 3.8.11). Furthermore, 62.2 percent of the respondents regard the marriage of their children with Kurds as very or somewhat problematic (Figure 3.8.12). In addition, 34.6 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of trust in Kurds whereas only 16.8 of the respondents have a great deal of trust in Kurds (Figure 3.8.13).
Figure 3.8. 11 Attitude of the Respondents towards Kurdish Neighbors (N=179)
Figure 3.8. 12 Views of the Respondents on Marriage with Kurds (N=180)
When we look at the views of the respondents on Kurdish political actors, a higher level of negative attitude towards them emerges. Only 21.2 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of confidence in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) while 65.9 percent of the respondents have no confidence in the KRG at all (Figure 3.8.14). It should be noted that the hometowns of the most of the respondents are outside of the sphere of influence of the KRG and Peshmerga.
Furthermore, while only 10.7 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of confidence in Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Barzani, 73.4 percent of the respondents do not have confidence in the KDP at all (Figure 3.8.15). What is interesting is that there is a clear difference between the confidence levels in the KRG and KDP. Although the Kurdistan Regional Government is predominantly administered by the KDP of Barzani, some of the respondents put a small yet clear difference between the Kurdish government and ruling party.
In addition, only 10.2 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of trust in Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the second largest party of Kurdish political movement in Iraq and main competitor of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, whereas 74.2 percent of the respondents have no confidence in the PUK at all (Figure 3.8.16). It seems that the respondents tend not to make a distinction between these two rival Kurdish parties.
Interestingly, as it is understood from Figure 3.8.17 below, 68.3 percent of the respondents are favorable to Erbil, which is now the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Administration (KRG). Most of them still regard Erbil as a Turkmen city not only historically but also demographically. Erbil is also commemorated in the writings of Turkmen authors and Turkmen literature.\textsuperscript{269}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.8.png}
\caption{Confidence of the Respondents in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (N=167)}
\end{figure}

On the other hand, because the sample is almost completely composed of Sunni Turkmens and their attitude towards Shiite Arabs can be influenced by sectarian hostilities, it is relatively appropriate to look at the attitude towards Sunni Arabs to determine their attitude towards Arab ethnicity. Firstly, 20.7 percent of the respondents would not like have Sunni Arabs as their neighbors. Secondly, 33.3 percent of the respondents consider their children’s marriage with Sunni Arabs as a problem. Thirdly, 78.3 percent of the respondents have some or great deal of trust in Sunni Arabs. Given these results, the respondents tend to have a relatively positive attitude towards Arab ethnicity as it is seen in the figures in the section 3.5.3 in this chapter.

When it comes to the views on the intercommunal relations between Turkmens and other main ethnic groups, that is, Kurds and Arabs, the situation appears problematic. On the one hand, the respondents tend to consider Kurds as hostile to their own community. Figure 3.8.18 demonstrates that 15.2 percent of the
respondents think that the whole Kurdish community is hostile to the Turkmens while 39.2 percent of the respondents regards that most of the Kurds are hostile to the Turkmens. The percentage of the respondents regarding only some or none of the Kurds are hostile to the Turkmens is 27.5 percent.

Figure 3.8. 18 Views of the Respondents on Kurdish Attitude towards Turkmens (N=171)

Figure 3.8.19 manifests that 8.1 percent of the respondents tend to think that their whole Turkmen community is hostile to Kurds while 28 percent of the respondents see most of the Turkmens as hostile to the Kurdish community. Nevertheless, 51.4 percent of the Turkmen community consider that only some or none of the Turkmens bear hostility towards the Kurdish community. In sum, they tend to regard the attitude of Kurds towards the Turkmens as more hostile than the attitude of the Turkmens towards Kurds.
On the other hand, in the minds of the respondents, the level of the hostility between the Turkmens and the Arabs is lower than that of between the Kurds and the Turkmens. 42.3 percent of the respondents consider that only *some or none* of the Arabs bear hostility towards the Turkmen community. While only 5.7 percent of the respondents see the *whole* Arab community as hostile to the Turkmens, 14.3 percent of the respondents think that *most* of the Arabs are hostile to the Turkmens (Figure 3.8.20).
When we look at their views on Turkmen attitude towards the Arabs, a more peaceful picture emerges. 63.3 percent of the respondents think that some or none of the Turkmen are hostile to the Arabs. While only 5.7 percent of the respondents regard that the whole Turkmen community bears hostility towards the Arabs, 14.3 percent of the respondents see most of the Turkmen as hostile to the Arabs (Figure 3.8.21).
3.8.3. Views on Actual Situation of Turkmen Community

45.8 percent of the respondents regard that there are serious divisions among the Turkmens not only in their hometowns but also throughout Iraq. However, it appears that the Turkmen respondents are divided about the issue with close percentages whereas the majority of the respondents do not read serious divisions among the Iraqi Turkmens in general (Figure 3.8.22).
On the other hand, 87.1 percent of the respondents confirm the statement that Turkmens must possess their own armed security forces (Figure 3.8.23). This percentage demonstrates their sense of insecurity whose environment was mentioned in the second chapter. Unsurprisingly, they think that they need protection in a sort of way. In addition, this is also related to their distrust in institutions which is previously mentioned. They tend to think that if they possessed their own weapons, they would overcome all these terrible events.
33.9 percent of the respondents are favorable of separation of Turkmenland from Iraq (Figure 3.8.24). It should be noted that the question is asked in this form on purpose. If the question was asked in the form of whether Turkmenland should be a part of Turkey or Iraq, the result would be most probably different. However, by asking in this form, it is asked for giving their priority on Iraq and thinking of the possibility of such situation. This is the exact case confronted during the pilot test of the questionnaire. Among those favorable of separation of Turkmenland from Iraq, 84.7 percent of them thinks that Turkmenland should be attached to Turkey rather than becoming and independent state. For both questions, it must be predicated that most of the respondents favorable of separation of Turkmenland from Iraq lean their answers on a hopeless realism. In other words, they tend to consider that the separation of Turkmenland from Iraq will not be permitted by regional powers like Kurds, Iran and Shiite militia and if they are
not attached to Turkey, the result will be a disaster for the Turkmen community in general. These are the comments of most of the respondents.

On the other hand, 71.5 percent of the respondents specify their desire to return to Iraq while remaining 28.5 of them express that they want to stay in Turkey by acquiring citizenship (Figure 3.8.25). Among those seeking for return, there are only two respondents who declares that they will go to a more secure region than their hometowns while the remaining part points out that they will go to home but no other places.
In addition, 92 percent of the respondents have some or a great deal of confidence in the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), the largest and most active Turkmen organization and party. However, this percentage can be illusionary. It can be said that this confidence is ‘confidence in principle’. They tend to have higher level of confidence in the principles of the Iraqi Turkmen Front but confidence in their practices is relatively low.

When we look at the actual image of the Turkmen leaders, the clear difference between the principles and actual situation would be more apparent. As it is quite evident from Figure 3.8.26 below, 58.4 percent of the respondents think that Turkmen leaders value the demands and needs of the Turkmen society in one way or another, with a 34.1 percent of the respondents regarding that their interest in the Turkmen society amounts to a great deal. Some of the respondents expressed that the Turkmen leaders look after their own interests alone but not those of Turkmens as a whole. Some of them said that those leaders want to help Turkmen
society but they do not have capability to realize the demands of the Turkmens. In any case, it can be concluded that a considerable amount of the respondents are not satisfied with their leaders while the majority find them satisfactory. Repeatedly, the difference between the level of confidence in the ITF and level of satisfaction with interests of Turkmen leaders in Turkmens is still important.

Figure 3.8. 26 Views of the Respondents on Turkmen Leaders (N=173)

When it comes to the threat perceptions of the respondents, an interesting picture emerges. Among the top three enormous dangers for the Turkmens, 31.5 percent of the respondents consider that the US is the most enormous danger for the Turkmen (Figure 3.8.27). This is not only related to the massive military operations of the US in Mosul and Tal Afar during the insurgency period following the fall of Saddam Hussein mentioned in the previous chapter but also to what they perceive the American role in all the catastrophic events that have happened to the Turkmens and Iraq. In addition, it should be marked that the American war on Iraq is seen as occupation by 96.1 percent of the respondents.
Only 3.3 percent of the respondents see it as liberation while there is only 1 person who see it as occupation but good for the Turkmen.

Among the most enormous threats, the Peshmerga with a percentage of 23.6, Shiite militias and the ISIS with 20.2 percent for each follows the US.

![Chart showing the percentage of respondents' views on the most enormous danger for the Turkmen.](chart.png)

Figure 3.8. 27 Views of the Respondents on the Most Enormous Danger for the Turkmen (N=178)

Among the second enormous dangers for the Turkmens, 30.3 percent of the respondents place Shiite militia on the first rank. ISIS with 28.6 percent, Peshmerga with 21.7 percent and the US with 14.9 percent follows the Shiite militia among the second enormous danger for the Turkmen (Figure 3.8.28).
Among the third enormous dangers for the Turkmen, 24 percent of the respondents place Shiite militia on number one again. The US with a percentage of 22.2, Peshmerga with a percentage of 20.6 and the ISIS with 16.8 follows the Shiite militia (Figure 3.8.29).

It is really remarkable that 129 respondents out of the sample of 180 (almost three-quarter of the sample) regards Shiite militias as one of the top three enormous dangers for the Turkmen. What is interesting about that is the geographical distance between the hometowns of the respondents and the sphere of influence of Shiite militias in Iraq. It is necessary to remind that great majority of the respondents are from Tal Afar and Mosul, where Shiite militias have almost no direct impact.
Finally, how do they look at the future? 16.3 percent of the respondents think the situation of the Turkmen in Iraq will be better in the next year while 7.9 percent of the respondents have no expectation of change. While 32 percent of the respondents expect that the situation of the Turkmen in Iraq will get worse, 43.8 percent of the respondents say that they could not predict anything due to complexity of the situation (Figure 3.8.30). This is the other question in which the option ‘Don’t know’ is not evaluated under the category of missing data.
The responses to the survey questions reveal the complexity of the issue of identity. It may affect a wide range of subjects from marriage, trust and neighborhood to friendship, political preference and views on foreign actors. In fact, these subjects can also shape identity. In any case, the analysis of the issue of identity entails an examination of wide social network(s). While this chapter tries to address these networks, the fact that the overwhelming majority of the respondents see five dimensions of their identity as very or somewhat important verifies the validity of these dimensions.

As it can be seen in the section 3.4, the religious identity provides a wide consensus among the respondents. It seems that this consensus extends to fundamental issues like Islamic rule as it can be seen in Figure 3.4.1. However,
taken five dimensions all together, it seems that the power of religion is disturbed in many respects.

Considering the statements of Turkmen authors and some of the respondents claiming that there was no sectarian problem among the Iraqi Turkmens in the past, the sectarian identity emerges as a new but strengthening phenomenon. Actually, the sectarian dimension has remained as the one that will have the most unpredictable impacts. It is certain that the Iraqi Turkmens, particularly Turkmens of Tal Afar, have harsh experiences of sectarian conflicts as it can be seen in Figure 3.5.16. Moreover, even if not a majority, some segments of the society have been certainly motivated by sectarianism. When the developments in Iraq directing people to act in a sectarian way are taken into consideration, it seems challenging to predict the future of sectarianism among the Iraqi Turkmens.

The responses to the questions related to tribal identity demonstrate that tribal loyalties are internalized to a considerable degree as it is clear from the section 3.6. Although this study focuses mainly on the general image of tribes among the respondents and the impact of tribes on the conflicts, based on the results presented in the section 3.6, it can be predicted that tribes are very influential in a wide range of areas in social life. In addition, as it can be seen in Figure 3.6.3, more than half of the respondents have witnessed tribal conflicts more than seldom and this means a widespread social violence, which might be potentially recalled.

National identity seems weaker compared to the religious, ethnic and sectarian identities as it can be seen in the section 3.3 but it looks strong enough on its own. It is really striking to reach such high levels related to Iraqi identity and patriotism presented in the section 3.7. Some might associate such high levels with the general tendency of ‘non-resident’ people. However, as people whose loyalties are divided between Iraq and Turkey and who have already been in Turkey, they might have opted for their ‘original’ motherland. In any case, their responses to different questions related to national identity seem informed and
conscious choices. In other words, their loyalty to Iraq is tested from various aspects. The emotional comment of one of the respondents who is a poet is highly explanatory: “Iraq was a garden of roses in which there were flowers of every stripe and color. It has been attempted to disperse for years.”

It can be said that ethnicity appears as the main carrier of these dimensions. As it can be understood from the section 3.8.5, other dimensions of identity can become meaningful in the framework of ethnic identity. This indicates a more active interaction between the ethnic identity and other identities. In addition, as it can be seen in many responses to the questions, the ethnicity is strong enough to carry these dimensions. However, this might not equate with high level of ethnic solidarity and activity since it would be a ceteris paribus assumption. As it is evident in the responses to other related dimensions, particularly concerning the Shiite Turkmens in the section 3.5.3, there is no absolute harmony between all the dimensions but rather their relations might be conflicting time to time. Furthermore, institutional crisis and no-confidence especially evident in the section 3.7 and 3.8.3 and political turmoil in the country whose fundamental effects will be discussed in the next chapter might pave the way for more uncertainty and produce unexpected results.
CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This chapter is going to analyze the findings of the previous chapter. In other words, the aim here is to draw a more conceptual framework of the Iraqi Turkmen identity as it relates to, what I argue, five principal components: religious, sectarian, tribal, national and ethnic dimensions. It is important to note that this analysis does not claim to generalize these findings based on the survey. Nevertheless, I would argue that the findings of this study can, to a certain extent, give clues into the main dynamics of Iraqi Turkmen community and Iraqi society in line with the historical background in the second chapter.

4.1. Dimension of Religion

Muslim identity seems one of the most unifying and crucial components among the respondents. Could Islam unify the whole Turkmen society under one banner? Given the other conflicting identities and resulting divided loyalties in the case of the Iraqi Turkmens as in most of the Middle Eastern societies, it appears that the religious identity alone have not established a peaceful order among even the people of the same sect. Considering that at least 40 percent of the Turkmen society is affiliated with the Shiite sect of Islam, it can be predicted and beheld that the sectarian identity have marginalized and will endanger the unifying forces of religious identity in practice to a certain extent due to different Islamic references in principle. When it comes to the more complicating issues like sharia, the conflict of principles has been and will be more apparent both in the minds of people and in socio-political sphere. In fact, it can be argued that
religion is tend to be strong to provide consensus on more general issues such as the importance of religion or core tenets of Islam while its power weakens as the issue becomes more specific. Moreover, it can be said that the power of religious identity might fade depending on the weight of other loyalties such as tribal, ethnic and national identities. At this point, some may argue that the religious identity can incorporate into these loyalties, and in this way, it might remain strong. However, because this incorporation generally changes the composition of incorporating identities, it is not plausible to say that religion remain strong in this situation. In addition, it seems that these considerations are also valid for the Iraqi society in general when we compare the current political and social crisis and the prominence of Islam in Iraq in the surveys of Pew Research Center, World Values Survey, Gallup International Survey or similar value-focused researches. All in all, it appears that Muslim societies are too divided to define as Muslims alone but too united to underestimate the connective impact of Islam.

4.2. Sectarian Dimension

When the subject is sectarian identity and sectarianism, the survey offers an insight into the Iraqi Turkmen community and the Iraqi society’s main characteristics. For one thing, the absence of the Shiite respondents in the survey might be telling about an important dynamic of the Iraqi Turkmen society. Why is the survey incapable to find sufficient number of Shiite Turkmen respondents? In a sentence, this is because they are absent in Turkey to a large extent. Why are not they present in Turkey? Some respondents claim that they are not here since they feel more intimate with the Shiite parts of Iraq due to sectarian proximity.

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270 According to Gallup's survey in 2009, 84 percent of Iraqi respondents express that religion is important in their daily lives. For the list of all the countries surveyed, see Steve Crabtree, "Religiosity Highest in the World's Poorest Nations," Gallup, August 31, 2010, accessed July 21, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx. In addition, one of the most recent surveys of Pew Research Center shows that 91 percent of Iraqi respondents support sharia as official law. For some of the important findings, see Michael Lipka, "Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the US and around the World," Pew Research Center, July 22, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/22/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-us-and-around-the-world/.
between them. On the other hand, some argue that the Shiite Turkmens feared ‘potential Turkish suppression’ based on sectarian differences and its predominant ‘pro-Sunni’ foreign and domestic politics. In tandem with this argument, some state that it has been Turkey that has alienated them by focusing overwhelmingly on Sunni Turkmens and neglecting Shiite Turkmens, and therefore, it was not them that have chosen to be alienated from Turkey but rather they have had no other choice. In any case, no matter which side (Shiite Turkmens themselves or Turkey) is primarily responsible for the growing distance between Turkey and Shiite Turkmens, it demonstrates that a sectarian dimension has been absolutely added to the Iraqi Turkmen society. This is a conclusion of the survey inferred from their absence.

What kind of sectarianism occupies the minds and actions of Turkmens? It is almost certain that it is not a war of all Sunnis against all Shiites or vice versa. As a matter of fact, it is not the position of the majorities of the conflicting sides. Instead, I will seek for more structural explanations. For one thing, how can we evaluate respondents’ relatively high level of distrust in and hostility towards the Shiite Arabs while the hometowns of the overwhelming majority of the respondents are out of the sphere of influence of the Shiite Arab political or militia actors and there is hardly any Shiite Arab settlement area in those regions? It seems that it is the political atmosphere created by the political turbulence in Iraq\(^271\) that directs the views of the respondents. Political atmosphere is created by various political actors,\(^272\) who are, in turn, subjected to structures which are images spreading via multiple channels such as the media and indoctrination of political actors. Some can claim that the distrust in and hostility towards the Shiite Arabs result from the assumed doctrinal and historical antagonism between the two sects. However, this argument presupposes a superior sectarian identity

\(^{271}\) It is a turmoil in which almost half of the respondents declare their trust in Saddam Hussein.

\(^{272}\) I use the term ‘political actors’ in its general sense not only including political parties and state institutions but also involving supreme religious leaders, tribal chiefs and militia and terrorist organizations by referring to their impact on the political atmosphere.
that does not distinguish the Shiite Turkmens from the Shiite Arabs, which is not the case. In any case, because they are not isolated from the general political conditions in their country and perceive direct threats from several actors as in the case of ISIS for the Shiite Turkmens reported in the second chapter and as in the case of Shiite militia for Sunni Turkmens presented in the third chapter, it can be predicted that the structural impact of political atmosphere has motived the Turkmens in a sectarian way to a certain extent.

How can we explain the relationship between the Sunni and Shiite Turkmens? The respondents’ differentiation between the levels of willingness to have the Shiite Turkmens as neighbors, of trust in the Shiite Turkmens and of willingness to permit their children’s marriage with the Shiite Turkmens could bring us to the structural explanations again. In addition to the discussion related to the political atmosphere above, it seems that this issue has some peculiar reasons also. First and foremost, before understanding the conflicts of blood revenge, the sectarian conflicts cannot be understood at least among the Turkmens. In other words, we have to pay attention to the embeddedness of the sectarian conflicts into the strong tribal structure. This is why the negotiations in Turkey to solve the sectarian problems among the Turkmens of Tal Afar were basically conducted between the tribal chiefs. However, the most dangerous part begins when people see even pure tribal conflicts as sectarian conflicts. Secondly, if the levels of willingness to have the Shiite Turkmens as neighbors and of trust in them are higher than the level of those allowing their children to be married with the Shiite Turkmens, there are factors constraining not mainly the minds of people but primarily their actions. This ‘structural sectarianism’ influenced by the political atmosphere and social structure directs the people to act in a specific way. What is more dangerous is that people might force themselves to think in this specific way through social learning.

Do the people start to think in this specific way? For the Turkmen society, as it is understood from the explanations above and in the previous chapters, it seems
that there is a certain level of sectarian-minded people. For Iraq in general, their reading on the intercommunal relations might be explanatory to some extent by accepting that at least some of the views are prejudiced in a sectarian way. As it is understood from the section of sectarian dimension in the previous chapter, they think that almost half of the Sunni community and more than half of the Shiite community of the country are hostile to each other completely or mostly. However, it can be said that they assume these levels of hostility not by observing the sectarian communities in their surrounding but by being influenced by the socio-political atmosphere in the country. In any case, this may produce a vicious cycle, which is very dangerous. This image might force and have forced two communities to think in this way. It emerges as some kind of prisoner’s dilemma in which communication between the actors is not mainly established by themselves and each actor tries to maximize their gains. Eventually, the result appears: I am hostile as long as they are hostile. However, it must be recognized that what is mentioned here is a frequently encountered observation within both the Iraqi and Turkmen societies but it is not the whole story. Lastly, it must be reserved that although the structural explanations seem not to give a possibility of change generally, the turning points might pave the way for even in this kind of explanations. For instance, the ISIS case and other acts of terrorism might perform as a unifying and mobilizing force under the banner of Iraqiness and counter-terrorism although the developments about these issues in Iraq have argued against up to now.

4.3. Tribal Dimension

Although the most important part of the issue of tribal identity, which is the embeddedness of some tribal conflicts in some sectarian ones and vice versa, is mentioned in the discussion above, it seems that the tribes have large impact on a

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273 For the sample, I consider the level of those sectarian-minded people between the range of one-fourth and one-fifth by looking at the level of those rejecting the Shiite Turkmens as even neighbors, of those considering friendship with Shiite people harmful and of those approving that a Turkmen must be Sunni. See Figure 3.5.17, Figure 3.5.9 and Figure 3.8.4.
wide variety of fields in Turkmen social life as it is observed from the level of those agreeing with the statement that Turkmens act on tribal chief’s words. It is not only the power of tribal chiefs that directs them to see their tribes as important but also they think that it is proper to support one’s own tribe. In other words, it can be concluded that tribal structures are internalized. It must be noted that the phenomenon of tribe is the most frequent in the rural Turkmen areas while the family names rather than tribal connections come to the forefront in urban Turkmen settlements to some extent. Nevertheless, these family names might be regarded as adaptation of the tribal structure to the urban conditions. In any case, kinship relations in its broadest sense are strong and visible in almost all the Turkmen regions. Therefore, a large majority of events in social life cannot be explained without tracing the tribal structure or kinship relations. Furthermore, the predictions of the past century that the modernization would dismantle the tribal structures in the Middle East have proved to be questionable as it can be observed in the case of the Iraqi Turkmens. In fact, these predictions have also been questioned in Iraq in general when we look at very adaptable social organizations of tribes in Iraq. Furthermore, as it is mentioned in the first chapter, recent developments in Iraq, particularly in the ISIS case, highlights the importance of tribes in Iraq to rule and control the regions.

4.4. National Dimension

One of the most important results of the study is that it reveals the high level of those embracing the sense of being Iraqi. Given the fact that almost all the respondents in this study are connected to Sunni sect and their rising voices about the discriminatory sectarian (in fact, Shiite) and ethnic (in fact, Arab) tendencies of the Iraqi state in general, it should be surprising to obtain such highly embracing levels related to the Iraqi identity. Most importantly, they do not want to secede from Iraq, where the discourses of secession are very popular. From this

274 Most of these family names are originated from the occupational names such as Neftçi meaning 'oilman', Saatçi meaning 'watchmaker', Demirci meaning 'blacksmith'.

169
point of view, it can be predicted that similar or even higher levels will appear within the Shiite Turkmen community considering their sectarian proximity. However, relatively lower level of willingness to fight for Iraq and relatively higher level of those seeking for the division of Iraq can be explained by institutional crisis and uncertainty in Iraq. It can argued that these people seek for the options that they see more secure and certain in these conditions, and therefore, they tend to have more embracing attitudes towards the issues that do not have potential practical impact but that are only principal declarations such as feeling about Iraqiness and Iraqi flag. On the other hand, they tend to be relatively careful and skeptical of the issues that have more immediate impact such as willingness to fight for the country or seeking for unity or division of Iraq. Hence, people might not necessarily automatically choose what is expected from their individual ideological stance but may seek for practically more secure options. When their high level of no confidence in fundamental institutions is considered, their seeking for seemingly more secure options might seem clearer. Moreover, if the results of an unofficial minority, the Iraqi Turkmens, tend to embrace Iraqi identity, it can be estimated that the dominant components of Iraq, Shiite and Sunni Arabs, will have more embracing attitudes towards the Iraqi identity in principle. The secular nationalist Iraqis, mostly represented in the Iraqiyya list, have already propagated for the Iraqi identity. Kurds, who have kept distance from Iraq to some extent and have generally stayed out of the sectarian conflicts in the country, might constitute an exceptional case as in the most of the related issues.

4.5. Dimension of Ethnicity

It seems that the prominence of ethnic identity comes to the fore following the religious identity. Indeed, when it comes to the dimension of ethnicity, we should pay attention to especially four points. To begin with, the attitude of the respondents towards Turkey paves the way for division of their loyalties between two states, namely Turkey and Iraq. As for Shiite Turkmens, a low level of
divided loyalty case between the two is more likely to exist but their possibly positive attitude towards Iran is also notable according to comments of some respondents. Secondly, in opposition to popular belief in Turkey, the results of the survey can easily demonstrate that the Iraqi Turkmens do not constitute a monolithic ethnic group. Thirdly, intercommunal relations between the Turkmens and Kurds bear the seeds of conflict considering the findings of the survey\textsuperscript{275} and their experiences of conflict both in history and today. The high level of perceived Kurdish hostility gives the signs of a negative Kurdish image within the Turkmen community and it can be predicted that a more aggressive Kurdish movement, seeking to further expand its influence, will provoke higher levels of insecurity and of perceived hostility, directing them to arm. Given the fact that most of the disputed lands of Iraq are Turkmen settlement areas either as a majority or as a minority, the situation seems open to conflict. In conjunction with the last point, fourthly, who will protect them and who have protected them not only in a wide conflict with the Kurds but also against any other danger in the Iraqi territory? When considering their perceived hostilities, appearing threats, no confidence in institutions, inability of their leaders to take measures and even relatively high level of embracing Saddam Hussein’s stability with all his atrocities, their sense of insecurity and uncertainty can come to the light more apparently.

4.6. Further Studies

Analyzing the Iraqi Turkmen society from different perspectives is very likely to offer many projections into a broad field of topics. As it is indicated in the first chapter, this study does not use advanced statistics such as cross tabulation. In fact, a study analyzing the relationship between the socio-economic status and identity might give insight into broader topics. For instance, a detailed research on the relationship between tribal structures and social status or between the

\textsuperscript{275}The results show that they are not absolutely hostile to Kurds but at least half of their community has very negative feelings about Kurds.
views on tribal identity and urban versus rural cultures will be useful in explaining tribal behaviors. In addition, it is highly likely that comparative studies analyzing the views of male and female respondents, of Sunni and Shiite Turkmens, of Iraqi and Syrian Turkmens, of Iraqi Turkmens and other communities of Iraq, of Turkmens living in different regions of Iraq particularly including the Turkmens of the KRG region and of those Turkmens who have lived in Turkey for years and those in Iraq will produce insightful results. Moreover, the Iraqi Turkmens constitute a good case to observe the impact of Turkish TV channels on ‘Turks abroad and related communities’ that Turkey has raised its interest in for many years. All these topics will have also broader implications for the analysis of larger issues, and therefore, it can be said that the analysis of the Iraqi Turkmens from different perspectives is not just important in itself but also useful in understanding many other different issues.


Beyathl, Kemal. Interview by the Author. Personal Interview. İstanbul, March 9, 2016.


180


Murphy, Alexander B. “Rethinking the Concept of European Identity.” in *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale*,


Saatçi, Suphi. Interview by the Author. Personal Interview. İstanbul, March 8, 2016.


Tütüncü, Mehmet. Interview by the Author. Personal Interview. İstanbul, March 10, 2016.


APPENDICES

A. QUESTIONNAIRE IN TURKISH (ITS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE)

Cinsiyet:
☐ Erkek
☐ Kadın

Tarih:

Başlangıç Saati:

Bitiş Saati:

Anket No:

İlk olarak bazı şahsi sorular soracağım.

1. Yaşınızı:

2. Irak’ta nerede yaşıyordunuz? (Örnek cevap: Musul/Telafer/Toptepe Mahallesi)
   ☐ Vilayet adı:
   ☐ İlçe/kaza adı:
   ☐ Köy/mahalle adı:
   ☐ Cevap yok

   ☐ Türkmen
   ☐ Arap
   ☐ Kürt
   ☐ Diğer:
   ☐ Fikrim yok
   ☐ Cevap yok

4. Irak’ta yaşadığıınız ilçede hangi mezheplerden insanlar vardı? Sünni, Şia, vs. hepsini belirtiniz.
   ☐ Sünni
   ☐ Şia
   ☐ Diğer:
   ☐ Fikrim yok
   ☐ Cevap yok

5. Ne zamandan beri Türkiye’desiniz?
   ☐ 1 aydan az
6. Eğitim durumunuz nedir? En son hangi mektebi bitirdiniz veya yarım bıraktınız? (Irak’ta eğitim sistemi 6 yıl ilkokul, 3 yıl ortaokul ve 3 yıl liseden oluşmaktadır)
   □ Hiç okula gitmedim
   □ İlkokuldan ayrıldım
   □ İlkokul mezunuyum
   □ Ortaokuldan ayrıldım
   □ Ortaokul mezunuyum
   □ Liseden ayrıldım
   □ Lise mezunuyum
   □ Üniversiteden ayrıldım
   □ Üniversite mezunuyum
   □ Lisansüstü (master veya doktora derecem var)
   □ Şu anda lise öğrencisiyim
   □ Şu anda üniversite öğrencisiyim
   □ Cevap yok

7. Irak’taki işiniz neydi?
   □ En az 10 kişinin çalıştığı işyeri sahibi veya yöneticisi
   □ 10’dan daha az kişinin çalıştığı işyeri sahibi veya yöneticisi
   □ Avukat, doktor, mimar, öğretmen gibi bir profesyonel (tam ne olduğunu yazınız ..................................................)
   □ Müdürü, âmir
   □ Memur
   □ Formen, atölye şefi, işçi şefi
   □ İşçi
   □ Çiftçi, kendi toprağı var
   □ Güvenlik kuvvetleri, silahlı kuvvetler mensubu
   □ Öğrenci
   □ Hayatında hiç işi olmamış
   □ Diğer:
   □ Cevap yok

8. Irak’ta iken hanenizin toplam aylık geliri, aşağı yukarı kaç Irak dinarıydı?
   □ 400.000 Irak dinarından az
   □ 400.000-599.999 dinar arası
   □ 600.000-799.999 dinar arası
   □ 800.000-1.000.000 dinar arası
   □ 1.000.000-1.499.999 dinar arası
□ 1.500.000-1.999.999 dinar arası
□ 2.000.000-2.499.999 dinar arası
□ 2.500.000-2.999.999 dinar arası
□ 3.000.000 dinar ve üstü
□ Cevap yok

□ Hiçbir mezhebe bağlı değil
□ Sünni
□ Şiа
□ Diğer:
□ Cevap yok

10. Aşiretiniz var mı?
□ Evet
□ Hayır
□ Cevap yok

Şimdi bazı konularda fikirlerinizi soracağım. Doğru ya da yanlış bir cevap verdiğiınızı düşünmeyin; önemli olan şahsi fikirlerinizi.

11. Şimdi okuyacakların sizin için ne kadar mühimdir? Yani bunlar sizin için çok mu mühim, biraz mı mühim, pek mühim değil mi, yoksa hiç mühim değil mi?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Çok mühim</th>
<th>Biraz mühim</th>
<th>Pek mühim değil</th>
<th>Hiç mühim değil</th>
<th>Ne mühim ne mühim değil</th>
<th>Fikrim yok (FY)</th>
<th>Cevap yok (CY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dininiz</td>
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<td>Mezhebiniz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraklılık</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irak’taki memleketiniz</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

□ Dininiz
□ Mezhebiniz
□ Türkmenlik
□ Aşiretiniz
□ Irak vatandaşlığı/Iraklılık
□ Irak’taki memleketiniz
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok
13. Şimdi okuyacağım bölgeleri ne kadar seversiniz veya sevmezsiniz? Yani bu okuyacaklarını çok mu seversiniz, biraz mı seversiniz, pek sevmez misiniz, hiç sevmez misiniz?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Çok severim</th>
<th>Biraz severim</th>
<th>Pek sevmem</th>
<th>Hiç sevmem</th>
<th>Ne sevirim ne sevmem</th>
<th>Fikrim yok (FY)</th>
<th>Cevap yok (CY)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
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<td>Azerbaycan</td>
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<td>Kerkük</td>
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<td>Kerbela</td>
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</tbody>
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14. diyelim evinizin yanına bir komşu taşınacak. Şimdi okuyacağım insanlar komşunuz olabilir mi yoksa komşunuz olsun istemez miydiniz?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Komşum olabilir</th>
<th>Komşum olsun istemem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Müslüman olmayanlar</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Başka bir Sünni Türkmen aşiretinden olanlar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sünni Türkmenler</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Şia Türkmenler</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kürtler</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sünni Araplar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Şia Araplar</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

15. Diyelim ki bir gün çocuğunuz şimdi okuyacağım kişilerden biri ile evlendi. Bu sizin için sorun/sıkıntı olur mu? Olursa ne kadar büyük bir sorun/sıkıntı olur?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Çok büyük bir sorun olur</th>
<th>Biraz büyük bir sorun olur</th>
<th>Pek sorun olmaz</th>
<th>Hiç sorun olmaz</th>
<th>Ben karışımda</th>
<th>F Y</th>
<th>C Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Müslüman olmayan biri ile evlenirse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farklı bir Sünni Türkmen aşiretinden biri ile evlenirse</td>
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<td>Sünni Türkmen ile evlenirse</td>
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<td>Şia Türkmen ile evlenirse</td>
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</table>
16. Size muhtelif insanlara ne kadar güvendiğinizi/itimat ettiğinizi soracağım. Yani bunlara tamamen mi güvenirsiniz, biraz mı güvenirsiniz, pek güvenmez misiniz, yoksa hiç güvenmez misiniz?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tamamen güvenirim</th>
<th>Biraz güvenirim</th>
<th>Pek güvenmem</th>
<th>Hiç güvenmem</th>
<th>Ne güvenirim ne güvenmem</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irak’taki mahalleniz (veya köyününüz)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aşıretiniz</td>
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<td>Sünni Araplar</td>
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<td>Türkiye Türkleri</td>
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<td>Suriye Türkmenleri</td>
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</table>

17. Peki, şu okuyacağım müesseselere ne kadar güvenirsiniz/itimat edersiniz? Yani bunlara tamamen mi güvenirsiniz, biraz mı güvenirsiniz, pek güvenmez misiniz, yoksa hiç güvenmez misiniz?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tamamen güvenirim</th>
<th>Biraz güvenirim</th>
<th>Pek güvenmem</th>
<th>Hiç güvenmem</th>
<th>Ne güvenirim ne güvenmem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irak Türkmen Cephesi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irak meclisi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irak güvenlik güçleri (ordusu, polisi, vb.)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Irak mahkemeleri
Irak Kürdistan Yönetimi
KDP (Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi: Barzani’nin partisi)
KYB (Kürdistan Yurtseverler Birliği: Talabani’nin partisi)
Baas partisi: Saddam’ın partisi
Dini tarikatlar (Nakşibendî, Kadiri, Kesnizani gibi)
Ülkü Ocakları
MHP
AKP

18. Şimdi, şu sayacaklardan hangi üçü sızce Irak’taki Türkmen varlığı için en mühim tehlikeyi oluşturmaktadır? Lütfen en önemliden başlayarak sıralayınız.
   □ Peşmerge
   □ Sünni Arap aşiretleri
   □ Şia milişiyat
   □ DAİŞ (DAEŞ)
   □ Irak Hükümeti
   □ Amerika
   □ Fikrim yok
   □ Cevap yok

Gayet iyi gidiyoruz. Şimdi konuyu biraz değiştireceğim.

19. Nakşibendi, Kadiri, Kesnizani gibi bir tarikata mensup musunuz?
   □ Evet
Hayır
Cevap yok


| Irak, İslam/şeriat devleti olmalı. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |

21. Peki, Irak’ taki yakın yoldaşlarınız/arkadaşlarınızın ne kadarı Sünni’ydi?
- Hiçbiri
- Birazı
- Yarısı; yarına yakını
- Çoğu
- Hepsi
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

22. Akrabalarınızdan başka mezhepten biriyle evli olan var mı?
- Evet
- Hayır
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

23. Yaşadığınız bölgede Türkmenler arasında Sünni-Şia ihtilafına (her türlü tartışmalar, kavgalar, silahlı olaylar, vb.) ne kadar sık şahit oldunuz? (Şıkları soru olarak oku: çok sık mı, sık mı vs. şeklinde.)
- Hiçbir zaman
- Nadiren
- Bazen
- Sık
- Çok sık
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok


| Kesinlikle | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
Asla mezhebimi değiştirmem.

Mezhebimi değiştirirsem akrabalarım, yoldaşlarım bana kızar.

Şialarla arkadaş olmakta bir sıkıntı görmek yok.

Türkmenler arasında Sünni-Şia ihtilafı, Saddam’dan sonra çıktı.

Gününümüzde, Sünni-Şia ihtilafı, Türkmenleri böllüyor.

25. Sizce, Irak’ı taki Sünnilerin ne kadarı Şialara düşmandır?
   □ Hiçbiri
   □ Birazı
   □ Hemen hemen yarısı
   □ Çoğu
   □ Hepsi
   □ Fikrim yok
   □ Cevap yok

26. Sizce, Irak’ı taki Şiaların ne kadarı Sünnilere düşmandır?
   □ Hiçbiri
   □ Birazı
   □ Hemen hemen yarısı
   □ Çoğu
   □ Hepsi
   □ Fikrim yok
   □ Cevap yok

Gayet iyi gidiyoruz, yarısı bitti bile.

195
27. Aşiretinizi ne kadar seversiniz?
□ Çok severim
□ Biraz severim
□ Pek sevmem
□ Hiç sevmem
□ Ne severim ne sevmem
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok

28. Yaşadığınız bölgesinde aşiretler arasında kan dava olayları olur mu? Evetse, ne kadar sık olur?
□ Hiçbir zaman
□ Nadiren
□ Bazen
□ Sık
□ Çok sık
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ne katılıyorum</th>
<th>Kesinlikle katılmıyorum</th>
<th>Katılıyorum</th>
<th>Katılmıyorum</th>
<th>Kesinlikle katılmıyorum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Aşireti tutmak iyidir.

Türkmenler, ağaların sözlerine uyarlar.

Bugün, aşiretçilik/ aşıretler Türkmenleri böülüyor.

Teşekkür ederim. Şimdi konuyu biraz değiştireceğim.

30. Yaşadığınız bölgeden Türkmenlerin Irak’ta takriben nerelerde yaşadığını biliyor musunuz?
□ Evet
□ Hayır
□ Cevap yok

196
31. Sizce İrak’taki Türkmen nüfusu ne kadardır?
□ 1 milyondan az
□ 1 milyon ve 1 milyon – 2 milyon arası
□ 2 milyon ve 2 milyon – 3 milyon arası
□ 3 milyon ve 3 milyon – 4 milyon arası
□ 4 milyon ve 4 milyondan fazla
 □ Fikrim yok
 □ Cevap yok

32. Türkmen olmak size ne hissettiriyor? size hazzettirir mi?
□ Çok şeref duyguyorum
□ Biraz şeref duyuyorum
□ Hiçbir şey hissettirmiyorum
□ Biraz utanç duyuyorum
□ Çok utanç duyuyorum
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok

33. Türkmen bayrağım/alemini gördüğünüzde ne hissediyorsunuz?/hazzeder misiniz?
□ Çok şeref duyuyorum
□ Biraz şeref duyuyorum
□ Hiçbir şey hissettirmiyorum
□ Biraz düşmanlık hissediyorum
□ Çok düşmanlık hissediyorum
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok

34. İrak’taki yakın yoldaşlarınızın/arkadaşlarınızın ne kadarı Türkmen’di?
□ Hiçbiri
□ Birazı
□ Yarısı; yarıya yakını
□Çoğu
□ Hepsı
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok

35. Akrabalarınızdan Arap’la, Kürt’le vs. evli olan var mı?
□ Evet
□ Hayır
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok

| Türkmen ille ömrünün çoğunun Irak’ta geçirsin. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Türkmen ille Müslüman olsun. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Türkmen ille Sünni olsun. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Türkmen’in ana babası ille Türkmen olsun. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Türkmen ille Türkmence konuşsun. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Türkmen ille Türkmen orf-advertine uysun. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Türkmen ille Türkiye’yı sevsin. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |


| Buradaki Türklerle aynıyz, bir farkımız yoktur. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Şuriye Türkmenleriyle aynıyz, bir farkımız yoktur. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Irak’ta Türkmenler birbirleriyle iyi geçinemiyorlardı. | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
| Türkmenlerin (peşmerge gibi) | Kesinlikle katılıyorum | Katılıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum | F | Y | C | Y |
bir silahlı kuvveti olması lazım.

Türkmen topraklarının, Irak’tan ayrılaması lazım.

38. *(Ayrılması lazım diyenlere)* Peki, Türkmeneli Irak’tan ayrıp Türkiye’ye mi bağlanmalı yoksa hiçbir yere bağlanmamalı mı?
- Türkiye’ye bağlanmalı.
- Hiçbir yere bağlanmamalı.
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

39. Sizce Türkmen büyükler/başkanlar/vekiller (mesela Erşat Salihi, Aydın Maruf) Türkmen halkının fikirlerine ve ihtiyaçlarına ne kadar kıymet veriyorlar? /Türkmenlere bakıyorlar mı?
- Çok kıymet veriyorlar
- Biraz kıymet veriyorlar
- Pek kıymet vermiyorlar
- Hiç kıymet vermiyorlar
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

40. a) DAEŞ tehlikesi bitince ne yapmak istiyorsunuz?
- Irak’a dönmek istiyorum.
- Türkiye’de vatandaşlık elde edip kalmak istiyorum.
- Batı ülkelerinden birine gitmek istiyorum.
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

b) *(Dönmek isteyenlere)* Irak’a döndüğünüzde nereye yerleşmek istiyorsunuz?
- Geldiğiniz yere
- Irak’ta daha güvenli bir yere
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

41. Sizce Irak’taki Kürtlerin ne kadar Türkmenlere düşmandır?
- Hiçbiri
- Birazı
- Yarısı; yarıya yakını
- Çoğu
- Hepsi
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok
42. Sizce Irak’taki Türkmenlerin ne kadarı Kürtlere düşmandır?
- Hiçbiri
- Birazı
- Yarısı; yarına yakını
- Çoğu
- Hepsı
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

43. Sizce Irak’taki Arapların ne kadarı Türkmenlere düşmandır?
- Hiçbiri
- Birazı
- Yarısı; yarına yakını
- Çoğu
- Hepsı
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

44. Sizce Irak’taki Türkmenlerin ne kadarı Araplara düşmandır?
- Hiçbiri
- Birazı
- Yarısı; yarına yakını
- Çoğu
- Hepsı
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

45. Irak’ta Türkiye’nin televizyonlarını seyreder miydiniz?
- Evet
- Hayır
- Cevap yok

Son kısma geldik, çok az kaldı. Yine konuyu biraz değişireceğim.

46. Iraklı olmak size ne hissettiyor?/size hazzettirir mi?
- Çok şeref duyuyorum
- Biraz şeref duyuyorum
- Hiçbir şey hissetmiyorum
- Biraz utanç duuyuyorum
- Çok utanç duuyuyorum
- Fikrim yok
- Cevap yok

47. Irak bayrağını/alemini gördüğünüzde ne hissediyorsunuz?/hazzeder misiniz?
- Çok şeref duuyorum
- Biraz şeref duuyorum
□ Hiçbir şey hissetmiyorum
□ Biraz düşmanlık hissediyorum
□ Çok düşmanlık hissediyorum
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok

48. a) İnşallah hiç savaş olmaz ama İrak bir ülkeyle savaşsa siz de İrak için savaşır mıydınız? (Kadınlara “İrak’ı tutar mıydınız?” şeklinde sor.)
□ Evet
□ Hayır
□ Hangi ülkeyle savaştağın bağılı
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok

b) (Hangi ülkeyle savaştağın bağılı diyenlere) Peki, okuyacağım ülkelere hangilerine karşı İrak için savaşmazsınız? Birden fazla seçebilirsiniz. (Kadınlara “İrak’ı tutmazsınız?” diye sor.)
□ Amerika
□ Türkiye
□ İran
□ Suriye
□ Cevap yok

49. 2003’te Amerika’nın İrak’a girmesi işgal midir, kurtuluş muydu yoksa işgal ama Türkmenler için iyi miydi?
□ İşgal
□ Kurtuluş
□ İşgal, ama Türkmenler için iyi
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok

50. Şimdi okuyacağım iki cümleden hangisi sizin için doğrudur?
□ Keşke İrak parçalanmasa.
□ Keşke İrak’tan ayrılmak isteyen her halk bağımsız olabilse.
□ Fikrim yok
□ Cevap yok


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>İrak’ın her kısmını</th>
<th>Kesinlikle katılyorum</th>
<th>Katılıyorum</th>
<th>Kesinlikle katılmıyorum</th>
<th>Ne katılyorum ne katılmıyorum</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

201
vatanım olarak görüyorum. (sadece Arapların ve Kürtlerin yaşadığı yerler de dahil)

Elhamdülillah Iraklıyım.

Irak başarılı olursa hazzederim. (mesela savaş, ödül, maç kazanırsa vs.)

| □ Daha iyi olacak |
| □ Daha kötü olacak |
| □ Aynı kalacak |
| □ Fikrim yok |
| □ Cevap yok |

52. Peki, son sorum; tabii inşallah iyi olur ama size önumüzdeki 1 sene içinde Türkmenlerin Irak’taki durumu daha mı iyi olacak, daha mı kötü olacak yoksa aynı mı kalacak? ("İnşallah iyi olur" gibi muallâk cevaplar verilirse “fikrim yok” seçeneğini işaretle.)
B. QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH

Gender:
☐ Male
☐ Female

Date:

Starting Time:

Ending Time:

Questionnaire Number:

Firstly, I will ask some personal questions.

1. Your age:

2. Where did you live in Iraq prior to your coming to Turkey?
   ☐ Province:
   ☐ Town:
   ☐ Village/Neighborhood:
   ☐ Refuse to answer

3. Which ethnic groups live in your town in Iraq?
   ☐ Turkmen
   ☐ Arab
   ☐ Kurd
   ☐ Others:
   ☐ Don’t know
   ☐ Refuse to answer

4. Which ethnic groups live in your town in Iraq?
   ☐ Sunni
   ☐ Shiite
   ☐ Others:
   ☐ Don’t know
   ☐ Refuse to answer

5. For how long have you been in Turkey?
   ☐ Less than one month
   ☐ 1 month and from 1 to 3 months
   ☐ 3 month and from 3 to 6 months
   ☐ 6 month and from 6 to 12 months
   ☐ 1 year and from 1 to 2 years
6. What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
- No formal education
- Incomplete primary school
- Complete primary school
- Incomplete secondary school
- Complete secondary school
- Incomplete high school
- Complete secondary school
- Incomplete university-level education
- Bachelor degree
- Graduate degree
- High school student
- University student
- Refuse to answer

7. What was your last profession in Iraq?
- Employer/manager of a business with 10 or more employees
- Employer/manager of a business with less than 10 employees
- Professional lawyer, accountant, teacher, etc.
- Foreman and supervisor
- Civil servant
- Unskilled worker
- Skilled worker
- Farmer: has own farm
- Member of armed forces, security personnel
- Student
- Never had a job
- Other:
- Refuse to answer

8. In which of these groups did your monthly family income, from all sources, fall in Iraq?
- Under 399,999 Iraqi dinars
- 400,000 to 599,999 Iraqi dinars
- 600,000 to 799,999 Iraqi dinars
- 800,000 to 999,999 Iraqi dinars
- 1,000,000 to 1,499,999 Iraqi dinars
- 1,500,000 to 1,999,999 Iraqi dinars
- 2,000,000 to 2,499,999 Iraqi dinars
- 2,500,000 to 2,999,999 Iraqi dinars
- 3,000,000 Iraqi dinars and over
- Refuse to answer
9. Your sect?
☐ Not affiliated with a sect
☐ Sunni
☐ Shiite
☐ Other:
☐ Refuse to answer

10. Are you affiliated with a tribe?
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Refuse to answer

Now, I will ask some questions about different topics. Do not think that you are right or wrong. What are important are your personal views.

11. For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Rather important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Refuse to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqiness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. When you want to define yourselves, which of the following do you pick as the most important for you? Please, prioritize most, second and third important ones.
☐ Religion
☐ Sect
☐ Turkmenness
☐ Tribe
☐ Iraqiness
☐ Hometown
☐ Don’t know
☐ Refuse to answer

13. For each of the following, indicate how much you like. Would you say:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Like much</th>
<th>Like somewhat</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>Not like at all</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Don’t like</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>From different Sunni Turkmen tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sunni Turkmens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shiite Turkmens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sunni Arabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shiite Arabs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. For each of the following, indicate how big problem is for you if your child marries with:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All right</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big problem</td>
<td>Somewhat problem</td>
<td>Not big problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslims</td>
<td>From different Sunni Turkmen tribes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Turkmens</td>
<td>Shiite Turkmens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Sunni Arabs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite Arabs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. I am going to name a number of groups. For each one, could you tell me how much trust, in general, you have in them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None at all</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Turkmens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite Turkmens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Arabs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite Arabs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks of Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Turkmens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17. I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence, in general, you have in them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>A great deal</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Not very much</th>
<th>None at all</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Turkmen Front</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi security forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi courts</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saddam’s party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious orders</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey Wolves</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMP</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Which of the following is the most enormous danger for the Turkmen? Please, prioritize most, second and third important ones.

☐ Peshmerga
☐ Sunni Arab tribes
☐ Shiite militant
☐ ISIS
☐ Iraqi government
☐ The US
☐ Don’t know
☐ Refuse to answer

It’s going well. Now, I will change the subject.

19. Are you a member of a religious order?
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Refuse to answer

20. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq must be an Islamic state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. How many of your friends in Iraq share the same sect with you?
☐ None
☐ Some
☐ Half
Most
All
Don’t know
Refuse to answer

22. Among your relatives, is there anyone who married with a person from a different sect?
Yes
No
Don’t know
Refuse to answer

23. How often have you witnessed the sectarian conflicts in your hometown?
Never
Seldom
Sometimes
Often
Very often
Don’t know
Refuse to answer

24. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I never give up my sect.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I give up my sect, my friends and relatives will be angry with me.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I do not consider being friend with people from different sects harmful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The sectarian conflicts among the Turkmens emerged after the fall of Saddam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The sectarian conflicts have separated the Turkmens.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. How many of Iraqi Sunnis are hostile to Iraqi Shiites?
None
Some
Half
Most
All
Don’t know
Refuse to answer
26. How many of Iraqi Shiites are hostile to Iraqi Sunnis?
   □ None
   □ Some
   □ Half
   □ Most
   □ All
   □ Don’t know
   □ Refuse to answer

   It’s going well. Half of it has been just completed.

27. How much do you like your tribe?
   □ Like much
   □ Like somewhat
   □ Not like much
   □ Not like at all
   □ Neither
   □ Don’t know
   □ Refuse to answer

28. How often have you witnessed the tribal conflicts of blood revenge in your hometown?
   □ Never
   □ Seldom
   □ Sometimes
   □ Often
   □ Very often
   □ Don’t know
   □ Refuse to answer

29. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is proper to support own tribe.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmens act on tribal chief’s words.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today, the tribes divide the Turkmen community.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thank you. Now, I will change the subject again.

30. Do you know the settlement areas of Turkmens other than your hometown?
   □ Yes
   □ No
   □ Refuse to answer
31. In your opinion, how many Turkmens live in Iraq?
   □ Less than 1 million
   □ 1 million and 1 million to 2 million
   □ 2 million and 2 million to 3 million
   □ 3 million and 3 million to 4 million
   □ 4 million and over
   □ Don’t know
   □ Refuse to answer

32. What does being a Turkmen make you feel?
   □ Very honoured
   □ Honoured
   □ Nothing
   □ Ashamed
   □ Very ashamed
   □ Don’t know
   □ Refuse to answer

33. What does Turkmen flag make you feel?
   □ Very honoured
   □ Honoured
   □ Nothing
   □ Ashamed
   □ Very ashamed
   □ Don’t know
   □ Refuse to answer

34. How many of your friends in Iraq are Turkmen?
   □ None
   □ Some
   □ Half
   □ Most
   □ All
   □ Don’t know
   □ Refuse to answer

35. Among your relatives, is there anyone married with non-Turkmen?
   □ Yes
   □ No
   □ Don’t know
   □ Refuse to answer

36. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Turkmen must spend most</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of his/her life in Iraq.
A Turkmen must be Muslim.
A Turkmen must be Sunni.
A Turkmen's mother and father must be Turkmen.
A Turkmen must speak Turkmen language.
A Turkmen must comply with Turkmen traditions.
A Turkmen must like Turkey.

37. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no difference between us and the Turks here.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no difference between us and the Syrian Turkmens.</td>
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<tr>
<td>There are serious divisions among the Turkmens in Iraq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmens must possess their own armed security forces.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenland should be separated from Iraq.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38. If so, should Turkmenland be a separate state or attached to Turkey?
☐ Attached to Turkey
☐ Be independent
☐ Don’t know
☐ Refuse to answer

39. How much the Turkmen leaders value the demands and ideas of Turkmen society?
☐ A great deal
☐ Some
☐ Neither
☐ Not very much
☐ None at all
☐ Don’t know
☐ Refuse to answer

40. a) Do you want to return, stay here or go to the West?
☐ Return
☐ Stay
☐ Go to West
☐ Don’t know
b) When returning to Iraq, where do you want to settle?
□ Hometown
□ More secure region
□ Don’t know
□ Refuse to answer

41. How many of Iraqi Kurds are hostile to Iraqi Turkmens?
□ None
□ Some
□ Half
□ Most
□ All
□ Don’t know
□ Refuse to answer

42. How many of Iraqi Turkmens are hostile to Iraqi Kurds?
□ None
□ Some
□ Half
□ Most
□ All
□ Don’t know
□ Refuse to answer

43. How many of Iraqi Arabs are hostile to Iraqi Turkmens?
□ None
□ Some
□ Half
□ Most
□ All
□ Don’t know
□ Refuse to answer

44. How many of Iraqi Turkmens are hostile to Iraqi Arabs?
□ None
□ Some
□ Half
□ Most
□ All
□ Don’t know
□ Refuse to answer

45. Did you use to watch Turkish television channels in Iraq?
□ Yes
We have come to the last section.

46. What does being an Iraqi make you feel?
- Very honoured
- Honoured
- Nothing
- Ashamed
- Very ashamed
- Don’t know
- Refuse to answer

47. What does Iraqi flag make you feel?
- Very honoured
- Honoured
- Nothing
- Ashamed
- Very ashamed
- Don’t know
- Refuse to answer

48. a) Do you fight for Iraq if it fights against a foreign country?
- Yes
- No
- Depends on who the enemy is
- Don’t know
- Refuse to answer

b) Against which country or countries you don't fight for Iraq?
- The US
- Turkey
- Iran
- Syria
- Refuse to answer

49. Was the American war on Iraq an occupation, liberation or occupation but good for the Turkmen?
- Occupation
- Liberation
- Occupation but good for the Turkmen
- Don’t know
- Refuse to answer

50. Which of the following related to the future of Iraq is true for you?
☐ I wish Iraq was not divided.
☐ I wish each component of Iraq had its own state.
☐ Don’t know
☐ Refuse to answer

51. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every part of Iraq is my motherland.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fortunately, I am an Iraqi.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>When Iraq succeeds in anything, I am happy.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. In next one year, what is your expectation about the situation of the Iraqi Turkmens?
☐ Will be better
☐ Will be worse
☐ Will remain the same
☐ Don’t know
☐ Refuse to answer
İLK DEĞERLENDİRME SONUCU

Sayın İletken,

Asağıda yer alan üç seçenekten birini işaretleyerek değerlendirmenizi tanıyalıyorsunuz. İttifak "Revizyon Gerektir" ve "Ret" değerlendirmeleri için gerekli açıklamaları yapınız.

Değerlendirmeye Tarihi: \[ \frac{27}{7} \]

Ad Soyad:

[ ] Herhangi bir değişikliğe gerek yoktur. Veri toplama/ağlaşması başlatılmaktadır.

[ ] Revizyon gereklidir

[ ] Gremium Katılım Formu yoktur.

[ ] Gremium Katılım Formu eksiktir.

- Gereçleriizi ayrıntılı olarak açıklayınız:

[ ] Katılım Sonrası Bilgilerinizi Formu yoktur.

[ ] Katılım Sonrası Bilgilerinizi Formu eksiktir.

- Gereçleriizi ayrıntılı olarak açıklayınız:

[ ] Rahatlama yok

- Rahatlama eksikliği hateninizi açıklayınız:

[ ] Diğer

- Diğer hateninizi açıklayınız:

[ ] Ret

- Ret gereçleriizi ayrıntılı olarak açıklayınız:
D. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET


Tezin ikinci bölümünde, kimlik konusunun daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için ikincil kaynaklara dayanarak tarihsel ve olgusal bir arka plan sunulmuştur. Buna göre, ilk olarak, Türkmen kelimesinin etimolojik kökeniyle alakalı farklı perspektifler karşılaştırılmış ve egemen görüşe göre Türkmen kelimesinin Müslüman Oğuzlara atıfta bulunmak için kullanıldığı belirtilmiştir. İkinci olarak, Türkmen kelimesinin tarihsel ve çağdaş farklı kullanımlarının olduğu, Müslüman Oğuzlara, Türkçe konuşan Osmanlı tebaasına, Anadolu’da Yörüklüğe kadar bilinen topluluklara, Türkmenistan vatandaşlarının büyük çoğunluğuna ve Suriye ve Irak’taki Türkçe konuşan Osmanlı mirası topluluklara atfen kullanıldığı ve bu çalışmanın odakının

Son olarak, İngilizlerin Irak’ı işgal ettiği 1918’ten günümüzü kadarki Türkmen modern sosyo-ekonomik tarihi Irak’taki temel olaylara temas edilerek verilmiştir.


220

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde, Iraklı Türkmen kimliği bileşenlerine ayrılarak analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu analiz, yukarıda belirtilen beş temel kimlik boyutuna yönelik sorular içeren anket sorularının sonuçları verilerek kantitatif biçimde sunulmuştur. Öncelikle, örneklemi oluşturan kişilerin yaş, cinsiyet, memleket, Türkiye’de bulundukları zaman dilimi, eğitim düzeyi, meslek, gelir düzeyi ve mezhep dağılımları verilmiştir. Bu noktada, yaş, eğitim, gelir düzeyi, meslek dağılımı gibi ölçeklerde örneklem Türkmen toplumu için temsili bir karaktere sahip olsa da mezhep ve cinsiyet dağılımları örneklemin temsil edebilirliğini düşürmüştür. Örneklemin çok büyük çoğunluğunu erkek ve Sünnet katılmayanlar oluşturmuştur, görülen 21 Şii Türkmen’in sonuçları Şii Türkmenler için çıkarımda bulunabilme madde yeterli olmadığından örneklemden çıkarılmıştır. Dolayısıyla, çalışma, Türkmen toplumu için tam temsili olduğu iddiasından hareket etmemiş ancak önemli ipuçları ve çıkarımlar yapılabileceğini öne sürmüştür.

İkinci olarak, ayrıntılı olarak her bir boyuta yönelik sorulara verilen cevapların daha açıklayıcı hale gelmesi amacıyla katılımcıların kendilerini tanımlamak için din, mezhep, Türkmenlik, Iraklılık, aşiret ve memleket kimlikleri arasındaki hangilerine öncelik verdikleri gösterilmiştir. Bu noktada, katılmcıların birincil önceliklerinde Müslüman kimliği açık ara farklı ön çarkken, ikincil önceliklerinde etnik kimlik ön plandadır. Ayrıca, birincil önceliklerde Müslüman kimliği tartışmasına yer bırakmaksızın ön plandadır, ikincil ve üçüncü önceliklerde daha parçalı bir dağılım söz konusu olmuştur.


Yedinci olarak, etnik kimliğin bileşenleri ve motivasyonları diğer boyutlarla ilişkili olarak ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. Katılımcıların hemen hemen hepsi Türkmenlik’ten ve Türkmen bayrağından gurur duygularını belirtmiştir. Katılımcıların çok büyük çoğunluğu, Türkiye’ye duygusal olarak yakınlık hissettiklerini ve Türkiye Türkleri ile kendi aralarında bir fark görmediklerini ifade etmişlerdir. Yine çok büyük çoğunluk, Irak’tayken Türk televizyonlarını izlediklerini beyan etmiştir. Ayrıca çok büyük çoğunluk Suriye Türkmenlerine duygusal olarak yakın hissettğini belirtmiş, diğer oranlara nazaran daha düşük
savunmaktadır. Ezici bir çoğunluk olmasa da katılımcıların çoğunluğu Türkmeneli’nin İrak’tan ayrılma teşebbüsüne girmemesi gerektiğini düşünmektedir. Ayrıca, büyük çoğunluk IŞİD işgalleri sona erince İrak’a dönmeyi istediğini beyan etmiştir.

öngörülebilen ve öngörülemeyen pek çok konuyu etkileyen kimlik meselesinin karmaşılığını ortaya koymaktadır. Ayrıca, kimlik meselesinin analizinin çok geniş ve farklı sosyal ağların incelenmesi gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Ek olarak, katılımcıların ezicinin çoğunluğunun ilk bölümde mahiyetleri anlatılan beş ana kimlik boyutunu çok önemli görmesi bu boyutların geçerliliğini ortaya koymuştur.


E. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☐
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐
Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN
Soyadı : Yıldız
Adı : Tunahan
Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : AN ETHNIC GROUP EMBEDDED IN MULTIPLE IDENTITIES: THE CASE OF IRAQI TURKMENS IN TURKEY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz. ☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

229