TRANSFORMING CONSTRAINTS INTO STRATEGIES: THE ROLE OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF CAPITAL IN THE STATUS PASSAGE OF DOCUMENTED IRANIAN MIGRANTS IN ANKARA, TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

TRANSFORMING CONSTRAINTS INTO STRATEGIES: THE ROLE OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF CAPITAL IN THE STATUS PASSAGE OF DOCUMENTED IRANIAN MIGRANTS IN ANKARA, TURKEY

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This thesis focuses on the documented (regular) migration experiences of Iranians in Ankara by drawing upon the sociological conceptual tools of Pierre Bourdieu. The aim of this study is to understand, first of all, whether Turkey can be considered as a good destination for documented migration from the perspective of Iranian migrants. The author raises the question of why Iranians leave their home country, and what it is that they are looking for in the host society, which in this study is conceptualized as a "better life and lifestyle". Secondly, and more importantly, this study attempts to comprehend the roles of different forms of capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) and developed strategies in the status passage processes of documented Iranian migrants while they search for a better life and lifestyle. To achieve these aims, the study focuses on two different groups of Iranian migrants in Ankara, being temporary Iranian students and permanent settled Iranians, which allowed a comparison of their objectives, expectations and achieved goals in the host society. After analyzing the educational and occupational incorporation of documented Iranians into the host society, along with the transformation process of their constraints into strategies, the study attempts to comprehend the dispositions of the respondents within the "Iranian

habitus" in Ankara to answer the question of whether Turkey fulfilled their expectations as a destination country, and on what basis.

Keywords: Iranian migrants, Turkey, Regular Migration, Capital, Status Passage

ÖZ

ZORLAMALARIN STRATEJİLERE DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: FARKLI SERMAYE BİÇİMLERİNİN ANKARA'DAKİ DÜZENLİ İRANLI GÖÇMENLERİN STATÜ GEÇİŞLERİNDEKİ ROLÜ

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Bu tez Pierre Bourdieu'nun kavramsal araçlarını kullanarak Ankara'da yaşayan İranlıların düzenli göç deneyimlerine odaklanmaktadır. Tezin amacı, ilk olarak, İranlı göçmenlerin bakış açısından Türkiye'nin iyi bir hedef ülke sayılıp sayılamayacağını anlamaktır. Yazar, İranlıların kendi ülkelerini terk etme nedenlerini ve yerleştikleri ülkeden ne beklediklerini araştırırken, tez kapsamında bunu "daha iyi yaşam ve yaşam biçimi" olarak kavramlaştırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda tezin ikinci ve daha önemli amacı, İranlı göçmenlerin daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimi ararken hedef ülkede yaşadıkları statü geçişi süreçlerinde, farklı sermaye biçimlerinin (ekonomik, kültürel, toplumsal ve sembolik) ve geliştirdikleri stratejilerin rolünü anlamaya çalışmaktır. Bu amaçla, geçici konumdaki İranlı öğrenciler ve de kalıcı konumdaki yerleşik İranlılar olmak üzere Ankara'da yaşayan iki farklı göçmen grubuyla görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Bu iki grup sayesinde İranlı göçmenlerin amaçları, beklentileri ve de gerçekleştirdikleri hedefler arasında bir karşılaştırma yapmak mümkün olmuştur. Çalışmada, görüşülen düzenli İranlı göçmenlerin Ankara'ya eğitimsel ve mesleki uyumu analiz edilirken, zorlukların üstesinden gelmek üzere nasıl stratejiler geliştirdikleri de incelenmiştir. Çalışma, katılımcıların hedef ülkeden beklentilerini Türkiye'de karşılayıp karşılayamadıklarını

ve bunun nedenlerini, Ankara'da "İranlı Habitusu" içerisinde gösterdikleri çeşitli beğeniler ve eğilimler üzerinden inceleyerek son bulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İranlı Göçmenler, Türkiye, Düzenli Göç, Sermaye, Statü Geçişi

To my Akis family,

but especially

to my mother ***Neş'e*** who I believe is following me on my journey,

although I cannot follow her on hers.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis focuses on documented (regular) migration[1] experiences from the perspective of documented migrants, which is an issue that has to date been largely overlooked in international migration studies in Turkey. The choice to focus on this issue stems from two main reasons. First of all, the issues of documented migration and documented migrants in Turkey have attracted little attention, either academically or governmentally, despite the welcoming discourse of the Turkish government about high-skilled migration over the last decade. Secondly, and more importantly, the author desires to understand whether Turkey is viewed as a good and preferable destination, and on what basis, based on the perceptions of documented migrants. To this end, documented Iranian migrants, who can be considered exceptional in terms of their education level, class status and expectations, were interviewed. Analyzing not only documented migration, but also the perceptions of documented Iranians would lead to the creation of an essential data source for the field.

The study involved interviews with respondents from two different groups within the Iranian community: 1) Iranian students who came to Turkey, either for university or graduate education, and 2) with settled Iranians who came to the country originally on a temporary basis and then decided to stay. These two distinct groups operate as a continuation of each other, presenting an opportunity for

[1] While the terms of "un/documented migrants" are chosen for this study, the terms of "ir/regular migrants" are also used for the same purpose since some institutions, UN for instance, prefer that latter term for its reports regarding international migration. Although these two terms have the same meaning, for this study I preferred to use "un/documented migrants" as to emphasize the importance of the bureaucratic dimension of international migration.

comparison. A particular analysis will be made of those who came to Turkey as students and afterwards decided to settle in the country, with emphasis on the motivations for their decision. To answer these questions, the author will analyze their different forms of capital related to documented Iranian migrants that they have accumulated before and after settlement in the host country. As a relatively new approach to international migration studies, this thesis uses the sociological conceptual tools of Pierre Bourdieu in order to comprehend the processes of accumulation and the acquisition and conversion of different forms of capital of documented Iranian migrants in the host society. Another sociological concept, status passage, complements the analysis by showing the various strategies used by the documented Iranian migrants during their change in social position in the host society. Last but not least, the perception of the respondents of what constitutes a "better life" and "lifestyle" can be deemed vital in the analysis, and so an attempt will be made to understand what the documented Iranian migrants are expecting from a host country, and whether Turkey can be one of them.

Iranian migrants maintain special importance in documented migration, given their 100-year history of propensity for migration for work and education (Naghdi, 2010). Naghdi describes Iranian migration in the last century in terms of three periods: In the first period, during the Qajar Dynasty (1794–1925) students went to France, workers went to Tbilisi and Baku, and intellectuals went to Istanbul, Cairo and Delhi. In the second period, communists sought asylum in the Soviet Union after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, while students settled in Ukraine, India, Malaysia and the UK. In the last period, corresponding to the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, Iranians migrated to Baku, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab countries for work, and to the United States and Canada for education (Naghdi 2010, 198). Europe has been and remains a host for Iranian migrants, but despite this long-term trend, Iranian migration has a periodical intensification. Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranians migrated to the Caucuses rather than Europe and the United States, while in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, mainly many Iranians made their homes in Western Europe, Scandinavia and the United States, while Japan was a popular destination among

those who migrated for work. It has been suggested that after the 1979 Revolution, the leading reason for Iranian migration changed from being political to more economic in nature in the 1990s (Bozorgmehr, 1997).

Although Turkey would not at first sight be seen as a popular destination for Iranian migrants, in fact this is not the case, in that studies exist that date Iranian migration to Turkey back to the 13th Century (Pahlavan, 2004). It is estimated that after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, around 300,000 to 1.5 million (Ghorashi 2002) Iranian migrants had made their way to Turkey, most of whom used the country as a transit route on their way to Western Europe (Mannaert, 2003). Yet, the flow of Iranian migrants to Turkey continued, especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, with most being asylum seekers. According to UNHCR Turkey statistics, as of April 30, 2016 Iranians constitute the third largest group among asylum seekers registered in Turkey with 26,028 people. Despite the huge number of Iranian asylum seekers with temporary permission to stay in Turkey (based on Turkey's geographical limitation to the 1951 UN Geneva Convention and resettlement procedures), there are also documented Iranian migrants who have come for educational and/or occupational purposes, and who can be considered a highly skilled migrant group in Turkey (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2014). According to the numbers announced by the Directorate General of Migration Management, 14,276 documented Iranian migrants obtained residence permits in 2015 alone, although this group of migrants is not as visible as the former in the country, and still preserves a level of invisibility.

This study intends to shed a light on this less visible group of Iranian migrants in Ankara, Turkey, and emerged as a topic of interest in 2008, when the author met Sara, a female Iranian asylum seeker, who was in need of a translator during her temporary stay in Ankara to speak to some Turkish people who didn't know English. It was through Sara that the author came to understand that there were not only Iranian asylum seekers living in Ankara, but also many Iranian students and settled Iranians who came to Turkey as documented migrants. While some desire to stay in the country, others are making plans to move to other countries; and it was this that drew the attention of the author as a possible issue for academic

study. Among the respondents it was apparent that their reasons for migration were not always solely economic. Many are seeking better lives and lifestyles in a new country, which can considered to some degree as a political stance. The majority of participants stated that they were trying to find a host society in which democracy, secularism, economic opportunities and individual rights existed, and it is quite striking that many of the respondents thought that they "deserved" this better life and lifestyle, which may be connected top their middle-class status and expectations. For this reason, using Bourdieu's sociology perspective rather than theories of international migration to analyze the perceptions and accumulations of documented Iranian migrants can be considered an appropriate approach.

There was a further tendency among the respondents after leaving Iran for educational purposes to make lifelong plans not to return. For this reason, how and why they choose to migrate to Turkey serves as the starting point of the study. Following on from this, not all of the documented Iranian migrants decided to settle in the country, raising the question of how their resources (different forms of capital) influenced their settlement decisions. Finally, an analysis was made of the strategies they use when encountering problems. In short, the study aims to provide an understanding to the relationship between the resources of documented Iranians accumulated both at home and in the host society and the strategies they develop to overcome constraints in order to achieve better lives in the host society of Ankara.

Accordingly, the main research question to be answered in the study can be formulated as: **What are the roles of strategies and different forms of capital used by documented Iranians to achieve better lives and lifestyles in the host society of Ankara?**

The following sub-questions will help to answer the main question of this study.

1. What is the better life and lifestyle that the documented Iranian migrants are hoping to achieve in the host society of Ankara? Why they think they "deserve" it? Which country can offer this, according to their own perceptions, and why?

2. What has been the influence of different forms of capital (economic, social and/or cultural) in their search of a better life?
3. What different forms of capital have been acquired in the host country of Turkey, and which were brought from the home country of Iran? How have they affected the settlement and social positions of documented Iranians?
4. Which strategies are followed by documented Iranians to acquire a better social position in the host society?
5. How do the respondents evaluate the lives they have built in Turkey? Why?

As a first step, it is necessary to comprehend what the documented Iranians migrants understand from the concept of "a better life and lifestyle". Why they think they deserve a better life in another country, and how they can achieve it? In the second question, different forms of capital (such as economic, social, cultural, and finally, symbolic) will be analyzed in order to understand their efforts to achieve a better life. The third sub-question analyzes what different forms of capital have been acquired in the host country and which have been transferred from the home country? Following on from this, how have these accumulations influenced their social positions and settlement decisions in the host society? It is thus necessary to understand the reasons behind 1) decisions to move on to other countries after Turkey, and 2) decisions to settle, both of which are important within the study. The fourth question investigates he strategies put in place by Iranians in the host society to acquire different forms of capital and to achieve a better social position? In other words, how do they convert those their capitals assets into each other, especially when encountering problems? Last but not least, of the Iranian migrants who have already constructed a life and lifestyle in Ankara, where they display common aims, thoughts, tastes and values, how do they evaluate their current lives in Ankara? This last question attempts to unveil the commonalities among Iranians of diverse backgrounds.

To answer the above questions, the study will focus specifically on the "status passage" (Nohl et al. 2014) processes of the documented Iranians in the host

society. A "status passage" is a transition process in which the identity of "a student", for instance, turns into "an employee" after their occupational incorporation into the labor market. In this regard, a status passage can be considered as a turning point in the lives of documented migrants during which they need to use the majority of different forms of held capital to achieve a better social position. This is not an easy process, especially when the resources of the migrants, as well as government legislation related to documented migrants, are restricted or insufficient. In other words, this is a phase in which they encounter many problems, and for this reason, documented migrants need to develop various strategies and use the majority of their assets in the status passage processes. Furthermore, the difficulty in achieving a status passage can also direct documented migrants to other destinations, which is an issue that will also be addressed in this study.

According to Bourdieu's approach, the struggle and strategies used by agents in the field can be analyzed through their relationships at the point where both the agency and structure take effect. This is a very short explanation of his relational sociology, although he explained it better with an even simpler sentence: "The real is relational" (Bourdieu, 1998). He believes that social positions depend on the configuration of relationships that link and give the agents, in our case, migrants, their significance (Bottero, 2009). This relational sociology may also allow a better comprehension of the strategies developed by the documented Iranians in Ankara, or in other words their agency, that eventually influence their social positions. This will at the same time help the author to reflect upon their perceptions, or their "dispositions of habitus", as referred to by Bourdieu. This theoretical approach of Bourdieu will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3, along with its usage in this study of Iranian migrants. Bourdieu's relational sociology bears a striking resemblance to the meso-theories related to international migration, as expressed by the scholars of migration studies (Massey, Joaquin Arango, et al. 1993), and as the meso-theories of international migration suggest, Bourdieu attempted to bring harmony to the macro and micro perspectives.

Methodologically, this study make an analysis of the findings of the interviews and the statements made by the participants to comprehend their perceptions of what constitutes a better life and lifestyle, and about the past, present and future. As it will be covered in more detail in the theory chapter, Chapter 3, the documented Iranian migrants provided a number of unique reasons as to why they chose to leave their home country of Iran to search for a better life in another country. In doing so, they related their past experiences as, stories and sometimes romanticized their lived memories so as to provide a meaningful interpretation of their reasons for migration. This was valid especially among the settled Iranians who witnessed the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, while the Iranian students expressed their childhood stories or recalled their parents' memories as nostalgic flashbacks. For these reasons, *narrative inquiry* emerges as congruent for this study, especially after reading these following:

> People shape their daily lives by stories of who they and others are and as they interpret their past in terms of these stories. Story, in the current idiom, is a portal through which a person enters the world and by which their experience of the world is interpreted and made personally meaningful. Narrative inquiry, the study of experience as story, then, is first and foremost a way of thinking about experience.(Clandinin, 2006: 472)

Different methods were used in the data collection process. Before conducting the interviews in the field, a literature review was carried out between October 2010 and December 2011 that made an assessment of such previous scientific literature as academic articles and theses, which were reviewed together with the legal texts and research project documents. Additionally, some online news from regular media websites were selected to enrich the many examples of migrant experiences in Turkey. As a second phase, since perceptions are important for this study, qualitative research techniques were used to gather first-hand data, and this led the study to follow semi-structured interviews in the field (Davies, 2007). An initial pilot research was conducted at the end of 2011 to test the research questions, after which the field research was launched at the beginning of 2012. A total of 31 interviews were conducted with both Iranian students and settled

Iranians between January 2012 and April 2013, with each interview lasting between lasting from 45 minutes to 2 hours. The snowball sampling method was used to contact potential participants in Ankara (Storey and Scheyvens 2003), in that having a point of reference was important for the participants for reasons of trust. The analysis of the semi-structured interviews was carried out between May 2013 and November 2013. In addition to the semi-structured interviewees, the third phase of the study involved a participant-observation approach. As will be explained in more detail in Chapter 6, the author attended an Iranian Nowruz New Year party that took place in a hotel in Ankara, which was a valuable opportunity to see so many of the participants interacting together. Finally, some visual data were used in Chapter 6, including photographs from the respondent's daily lives, as the visual representations of the participants' aesthetic tastes and consumption practices related to cultural goods.

Gaining access to viable respondents was not easy in the beginning, and the first interview, with Nadine, was a very difficult one, since she was very reluctant to talk to me. Although I had explained my research, she could not understand my specific interest in "Iranians", who, she argued, caused no harm to the host society. The author had initial doubts about the subject of the study, as the intention was certainly not to make the participants uncomfortable, either during or after their interviews. This initial fear was destined to be unfounded, as only Nadine demonstrated a reluctance to talk about the topic. Still, after this first interview the author had business cards printed carrying her name, affiliated institution and personal mobile number, so as to assure the interviewees about the author's university affiliation. This approach worked very well, especially for the settled interviewees, as there was often a notable change of atmosphere among the respondents once they had been passed the card at the beginning of the meeting. I gave further assurances to all those involved that their real names would not be mentioned and that all of the collected data would be used only for the author's academic study.

The case was little easier with the student participants, given my position as a research assistant in Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara, as they

could see I was a student like them. The positive reputation of METU within the country, both for its successful university rankings and its unconventional atmosphere, was an additional benefit in this regard. The prestige provided by the university, which is referred to by Bourdieu as symbolic capital, helped the author reach prospective interviewees easier, and not only students, but also the settled Iranians in Ankara.

Ankara, the capital of Turkey, was selected as the field of research due in part to the fact that the choice of settlement among documented migrants tends to be the larger metropolitan cities, but also for reasons of convenience, and the fact that there have to date been few studies focusing on documented migration experiences in Ankara. Many of the interviewees stated that the popularity of Ankara for settlement among documented Iranian migrants was its size and population, which make it easier to live in, especially when compared to Istanbul.

It was notable to discover during the study that the majority of the people in the author's social environment were aware of documented Iranians living in Ankara. When asked, the author's friends would pause for a second or two, and then either remember a contact name or the name of someone who was in contact with a documented Iranian in some way. In some instances, the contact was the name of a shop in which the owner was Iranian, although not known personally. These factors strengthened the idea about the number of documented Iranians living in Ankara. Through the author's own network, she reached Iranians one-by-one, but couldn't continue after one or two contacts, because they would not be in touch with the larger Iranian community in Ankara. From this it can be understood that Iranians are individualized in the host society and don't retain strong attachments to their community, making it hard to identify further potential respondents. A further reason for the difficulty encountered in contacting other potential respondents is that they may not feel comfortable or secure in the host society, and so are reluctant to unveil their connections. One interviewee in particular was keen to introduce me to her friends, but after a week she called me back and told that none of her friends had accepted my request for an interview. This situation continued for a while until the author met Maarika, who was a friend

of a friend who had divorced her Turkish husband two years ago. Maarika had good connections with the larger Iranian community in Ankara, in which she was a much loved character, and became the *gatekeeper* (Neuman, 2009) in the field study. From this point on, the study became much easier, and the final interview was conducted in April 2013.[2]

A total of 18 interviews were conducted with settled Iranians in Ankara, with different backgrounds, ethnicities, gender and ages. All interviewees had been living in Ankara for at least five years at the time of the interview, and the majority were employed and/or were holding good social positions in various occupations. There were also some women interviewees who were not employed in the labor market, who will be discussed in Chapter 5. Conducting interviews with settled Iranians clarified a very important point, that majority of documented Iranians came to Turkey at the time of their university education. According to the numbers announced by the Directorate General of Migration Management, in 2015 Iran still ranked high among the countries sending students to Turkey in terms of numbers, ranking fourth after Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. This significant detail took the study to a second phase of interviews, this time with only Iranian students. The intention in this regard was, first of all, to understand whether the reason for settlement of all Iranians resembled the reasons given by Iranian students, and if so, what were they? What is more, what do the students think about settling in Ankara, and why? To this end, 13 interviews began being conducted with Iranian students who were studying in Ankara, but this part of the study was stopped after the results were found to be repetitive. The analysis of the students' interviews will be made in Chapter 4. The demographic profiles of the participants

[2] It is possible that the responses of the participants about Turkey as a destination country would be have been different if the interviews had been held after the Gezi Park protests that started on May 28, 2013. The Gezi Park protests began as a small peaceful demonstration to the proposed demolition of Gezi Park in Istanbul, but after a heavy-handed police crackdown, in a very short time it turned into one of the largest waves of protests against the urban and social policies of the governing party. The scale of the protests died down towards the end of August 2013.

will be presented at the beginning of Chapters 4 and 5, where the analysis will focus on these documented group of Iranians.

As will be shown in the following chapters, the respondents stated that from their perspective, Los Angeles in the United States offered the best life and lifestyle for Iranians. After completing the field study in Ankara in 2013 the author developed an interest in following the migration stories of the respondents to Los Angeles in the summer of 2014,[3] however this would constitute a whole new study area in terms of their living circumstances and developed strategies. For instance, while the documented Iranians emphasized their similarities with the host culture in Turkey, the Iranian community in Los Angeles tend to emphasize their distinction compared to other migrant groups, and usually refer to their Persian culture as a positive reference. Additionally, the global perception of Islam, especially after September 11, 2001 in USA, has emerged as a significant issue for discussion. All of these reasons, among others, prevented the author from adding this second field of study, which was a decision that was supported by the Thesis Advisor Committee (during the thesis writing process), which was greatly appreciated by the author. That said, the author believes that following the perceptions and dreams of documented Iranian migrants in the United States would be a tremendous addition to the present study, and may be considered in the future.

By focusing on the experiences of documented Iranians in Ankara, first of all, the author expects to comprehend the capacity and limitations of Turkey as a destination country from the better life and lifestyle perceptions of the respondents. Having said that, it is not claimed that the study is representative of all Iranian migrants, in that it focuses on only a small and specific group in the capital city. The migration experiences and perceptions of Iranian migrants may

[3] One of the largest Iranian communities outside Iran resides in Los Angeles, particularly in Persian Square on Westwood Boulevard between Wilshire and Pico Ave, which is officially recognized by Los Angeles and is commonly referred to as Little Persia.

vary not only in other cities, but also within the same city in which the study is conducted, and so this study presents the results reached through only the interviewed respondents. What is more, with this study the author expects to find common trajectories of documented Iranian migrants, such as "the mostly used different forms of capital" and "the common strategies developed by the migrants, especially at the time of the status passage processes". Bourdieu's sociological approach will reveal how these accumulations and conversions of different forms of capitals are realized and practiced by the migrants, and the two different groups will hopefully uncover any generational and status differences in this regard. Last but not least, analyzing the perceptions of Iranians about what constitutes a better life and lifestyle, which is directly related to their class, gender and ethnicity, will help the author to answer two of the core questions posed in the study: "Why do documented Iranians think they deserve a better life?", and "Do they think they have achieved the desired lifestyle in the host society of Ankara".

To this end, the study is divided into 7 Chapters. This first chapter introduces the study, stating the aim of the study, the main and sub-questions, the methodology and the methods of data-collections, and providing also the participant profiles. Following this, in the second chapter an attempt is made to understand Turkish law and policy related to documented migrants since the establishment of Turkish Republic. In this second chapter, the conceptualizations will be explained, stating why the study refers to the participants as documented migrants, and the basic and legal differences between them and undocumented migrants. In addition, information on the number of Iranians who have migrated to other parts of the world and to Turkey will be provided, along with the main reasons for migration, e.g. education, work, etc. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the migration experiences of the documented Iranians, including both Iranian students and settled Iranians, to comprehend the legal facilitations and barriers encountered in Ankara before and after their decision to settle.

After providing background information on the study in Chapter 2, the theoretical approach will be stated in Chapter 3. There have been various theories used for different cases of international migration. For this study, Bourdieu's

approach is used, since the accumulation of different forms of capital (cultural, economic, social and symbolic) were found to be significant in the respondents' settlement decisions, strategies and perceptions. Bourdieu's theory will provide a frame to the study through such conceptual tools as field, illusio, capitals and habitus. While focusing on the case of documented Iranians and their aims, structural influences will also be touched upon, which Bourdieu referred to as "fields". The importance of the fields of diplomacy, bureaucracy, economy and education will be discussed in brief for the study, and all of these theoretical tools will help throw light on some of the sub-questions to the main question, such as what documented Iranians understand from a better life and lifestyle, and why they believe they deserve a better life, together with the reasons for their leaving Iran. Finally, the assumptions of the study and the conceptual design will be structured in Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 will begin by providing some information about the field of education in Turkey, providing also the rules of education related to foreigners within the country, and the expected numbers and implementations for the future. After reflecting upon the reasons why Iranian students leave their home country, their first arrival to Turkey will be discussed. The chapter will go on to identify the different influences and forms of capital, especially cultural and economic capital, given the importance of the acquisition of different forms of capital of Iranian students in the host society will be investigated together with the transmitted capital from their home country. Finally their perceptions about Ankara, Turkey as a host society will be interpreted.

Following the case of Iranian students, Chapter 5 will concentrate on the interviews conducted with settled Iranians, with the initial question being what made the Iranians in question decide to settle in Turkey, i.e. was it due to the limitations of their capital that they couldn't go to other countries, or was it their choice? To reply these questions, again the acquisition and transmission of capital is an important issue for study. Although no analysis is made of the volumes of this capital, as mentioned above, the existence of different forms of capital were found to be significant and worthy of mention. In this Chapter, one particular point

of note will be to understand the status passages of documented Iranian migrants, in that this leads to conversion of capital, such as the conversion of cultural capital (such as a university diploma) into economic capital (finding an occupation with that diploma). In this respect, both the acquisition and conversion processes of this capital is of key importance in comprehending at the end of the chapter whether they had been able to build the life they desired. Furthermore, a consideration of their occupational incorporation processes would help the study in the classification of strategies and trajectories in the host society. Last but not least, an analysis will also be made into whether all interviewees in the study has accomplished their occupational incorporation or were there unemployed Iranians as well. Looking at those will, hopefully, respond other research questions of this study such as the strategies of settled Iranians in order to achieve better social positions in the host society.

In the last analysis chapter, Chapter 6, the perception of a better life and lifestyle of documented Iranians will be analyzed, together with the lives they have been able to construct in Ankara. Adopting the theoretical tools of Bourdieu, this chapter will concentrate on the Iranian habitus in which the documented Iranian migrants display similar dispositions in terms of thoughts, practices and aesthetic tastes, including also their expectations for the future. The new approach presented in this chapter moves away from the individual Iranian migrants' relationships with the host society to look instead at the intragroup relations and the distinctions they construct among themselves. Furthermore, this approach will provide an understanding of whether class, gender and ethnicity have any influence over their lives and lifestyle perceptions. This study has used in-depth interviews as a primary data source to comprehend the perceptions of the respondents, however the chapter will also present some photographs for analysis. Before concluding the chapter, the dispositions of the respondents about international migration will be evaluated to comprehend their migration strategies.

Finally, Chapter 7 will conclude the study, presenting the findings of the research together with a general summary of the conclusions reached. The study

will close with an explanation of its limitations, along with some end notes, and the underlining of some specific issues that may be addressed in future studies.

CHAPTER II

MIGRATION LAWS OF TURKEY AND STRATEGIES OF IRANIANS TO REMAIN "DOCUMENTED"

2.1. Introduction

Turkey's status as a host country became more pronounced after Syrians, fleeing the civil war at home, made mass crossings of the country's borders. Despite its frequent categorization as a source of international migration, Turkey has also a long history as host to migrants from other countries. The scope of international migration to Turkey is not limited to asylum seekers, being also a destination for "regular" or "documented migration", involving migration procedures that follow official permit and application processes for such reasons as marriage, work or education.

Documented migration to Turkey has so far drawn much less attention in the academia than the undocumented migration related to the latest security situation in the region. Aiming to expand the body of data on the subject, this chapter will focus on documented migration to Turkey. International migrants who come to Turkey as students and decide to stay after finding a job constitute one of the most common and well-known groups of documented migrants in the country, which includes also highly skilled migration flows. This type of migration is supported and is in great demand by the state, given the obvious benefits to education and the economy of the host country.

Documented international migrants face their greatest challenge when they look to join the labor market after completing their education. The transition in status from "student" to "working" can be problematic, especially in countries like Turkey where migration policies are not geared up for highly skilled professional

migrants. More challenges arise for professional migrants in Turkey, as they are faced with the risk of losing of their residence permits during their "status passage" and falling back into the category of "irregular" or "undocumented" migrants. In order to draw attention to these challenges, this chapter focuses on the strategies developed by documented Iranian migrants to avoid falling into an undocumented migrant status during their transition.

Since this study focuses on the settlement experiences of documented migrants from Iran who have come to Ankara, Turkey for work and/or education, the second half of this chapter will present their experiences to permit a more concrete analysis, and will put forward some substantial suggestions. Migrants from Iran are generally considered upwardly mobile as a result of the social and cultural capital they acquire both in Iran and in their host countries (Bafekr and Leman 1999; McAuliffe 2008). In this regard, investigating the settlement processes undertaken by Iranian migrants, as an example of a highly skilled migrant group, will allow a better understanding of the laws related to documented migration and their implementation in Turkey through the experience of documented migrants.

The chapter is organized in seven parts. Following the introduction, the second part provides a brief recent historical overview of international migration in Turkey, with the aim being to outline the patterns of international migration to Turkey and to show the types of migration that have witnessed a recent increase. In the third and the fourth parts, focus will be on the legal framework related to migration in Turkey, and looks at the mechanisms aimed at encouraging international migration in recent history. The fifth part draws attention to the contribution of Iran to the increasing levels of international migration to Turkey, while the sixth and the seventh parts focus on the experiences of the documented Iranian migrants who work and study in Turkey. The chapter will conclude with some concluding remarks.

2.2. Turkey and International Migration

Since its foundation, Turkey has been a migration country. Soon after the foundation of the Republic in 1923, Turkish and Muslim groups who were residing outside the new national borders started to be recalled back to the country, while as a result of international population exchange agreements, non-Muslim minorities were forcefully sent from the country. In a sense, the project of modernity and nation-building took place concomitantly in the first years of the Republic (Tekeli 1998). İçduygu (2010) examined the patterns and policies of international migration to Turkey in three periods: the Early Republican Period between 1923 and 1950; the deepening of modernization and nation-building between 1950 and 1980; and the intensification of the impact of globalization on migration after the 1980s. Abadan-Unat (2006: 36-37) discusses international migration from Turkey within the context of underdevelopment, believing that international migration generates "a new form of dependency" for the countries that have no infrastructure to hire the upcoming highly skilled cohort in the job market, and so end up exporting them to other countries. Turkey supplied labor for the restoration of European countries in the aftermath of World War 2, however the migrant workers never returned to Turkey as expected, and migration to Europe continued in with different motivations, including family unification, marriage and political asylum. On the other hand, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkey has become a destination county, along with other neighboring countries, for the migrant labor from the region. The implementation of easier visa procedures at its borders with the Soviet and Balkan countries has further contributed to increasing the numbers of people coming to Turkey from these countries (İçduygu and Kirişçi, 2009).

Migrants in Turkey are not limited to the groups mentioned above. Since the 1990s, Turkey has been drawing attention both as a transit and as a destination country by attracting migrants from Middle Eastern, Asian and European Union countries, and Turkey's changing role within the field of international migration actually became a topic of negotiations with the European Union in the early 2000s (Toksöz, 2006). By the mid-2000s, estimations of the number of undocumented

migrants ranged between 150,000 and 1 million in Turkey (İçduygu, 2006). At the time of writing this chapter, in the last quarter of 2015 the official number of the Syrian refugees had reached over 2 million. EU countries have become more aware of the situation, as refugees use Turkey as a transit route on their way to the EU, which compelled German Chancellor Angela Merkel to visit Turkey in October 2015 with the purpose of negotiating the terms of the refugee agreement between the EU and Turkey, and to talk about the "migrant crisis" in Europe. According to the Agreement, undocumented migrants who arrive to the EU region via Turkey will be sent back to Turkey, and for each migrant sent back, Turkey will receive an agreed sum of monetary compensation, while Turkish citizens will gain the additional benefit of visa-free travel to Europe in return for sharing the "EU's migration burden".[4]

Like in many other countries, migrants in Turkey are categorized into two groups: documented (regular) and undocumented (irregular). Documented migration refers to migration in compliance with existing legal regulations and permits, while undocumented migration refers to any other process whereby entry into a country happens outside the legal permits or visas issued by that country (Castles and Miller, 2009). Undocumented migration also refers to other cases, such as those who enter the country with a permit, and then overstay their permit, or migrants who reside in the country with a residence permit and work without a work permit. The term "illegal migrant" is not widely used by the academia, despite its use by some media outlets that have been criticized for criminalizing migrants.

[4] The first phase of the Readmission Agreement was signed between the Turkish authorities and Internal Affairs of the EU Commission member Cecilia Malmström in December 16, 2013, opening up negotiations on the Turkey-EU Visa Exemption Policy. However, when Merkel mentioned the "migrant crisis" in 2015, she was referring to the overloaded number of asylum seekers entering the EU, and considered it as a problem for the region. The solution was to send the overload of asylum seekers back to Turkey and balance their numbers inside the EU. In other words, there was no attempt to resolve the "migrant crisis" by resettling asylum seekers or refugees in different parts of EU. In this regard, the term "crisis" did not refer to the crisis of the migrants themselves, whose lives were at risk, but rather the crisis of the EU, which didn't want to deal with huge numbers of migrants within their borders (despite the lower numbers that the EU was dealing compared to countries in the Middle East).

The experiences of asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey bears similarities to the experiences of undocumented migrants. Although they register in refugee claims upon entry, while writing this chapter, asylum seekers cannot work or study legally in Turkey due to the laws in effect.

Table 1: Number of the Entries of Foreigners to Turkey (2005-2015)



Source: T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı (2016) "2015 Türkiye Göç Raporu", Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, Yayın No: 35, Ankara

Table 1 above displays the numbers foreigners entering Turkey, by either sea, airport, rail or land, from 2005–2015, showing a clear rise in numbers over the last ten years. To regulate these entries and the resident permits of foreigners, Turkey enacted a new Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) (*Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu*) that was ratified in April 2013. Up until this date, the regulations related to migration were based on a few laws that were reminiscent from the early Republican period, and a brief examination of these laws helps provide an understanding of Turkey's approach to international migration from a historical perspective, while offering a more comprehensive viewpoint for the impact of the LFIP and the experiences of the Iranian migrants in the following parts.

2.3. Legal Framework of Turkey's Approach to International Migration

The nation building and modernization efforts were significant in framing the legal approach to internal and international migration in the early periods of the Republic. One of the first activities of the Republican government after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was to bring the Turkish and Muslim population outside the borders of Turkey back to the country. Corollary to this, the Republic also established mechanisms to deport the non-Muslim resident population residing within the borders of the newly found Republic, who were thought to number around 3 million just before World War 1, of which 1.5 million were Greek and 1.2 were Armenian (İçduygu, Erder, and Gençkaya 2009: 54). The first population exchange started with the implementation of the Istanbul Treaty signed with Bulgaria, which facilitated the voluntary exchange of the groups who lived on either side of the border, and ten years later, the Laussane Treaty in 1923 stipulated a forced population exchange between Turkey and Greece. The exchange was considered at the time to be an important component of the nation building effort due to its facilitation of the ethnic and religious "cleansing" policies of the states involved in the exchange, although studies have since discovered that the population exchange had devastating impact on both the Turkish (Tevfik, 2014) and Greek (Küçük Asya Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2014) communities. Migration and Settlement Institute (*Göç ve İskân Kurumu*), which was established during the Ottoman period and continued its activities into the Republican era.

Following the population exchanges of the early Republican period, the Settlement Law of 1934 (*İskan Kanunu* Number 2510, 1934) is usually considered to be the first legal regulation of migration in Turkey.[5] According to the goals set by the Law, the population exchange and the migration of diverse groups (muhajirs, immigrants and exchanged migrants) would increase the rural

[5] Here the study focuses only on the relevant aspects of the law on international migration. The impact of the law on internal migration falls outside the scope of this chapter.

population in Turkey and would drive the much-needed rural development through agriculture. The Settlement Law further stipulated the eligibility of those migrating to Turkey as only "those who are of Turkish descent and culture". The implications of this definition have had a lingering effect that exists still today within the framework of Turkey's protection policies, for asylum seekers in particular, but also for other migrants and foreigners(İçduygu, Erder, and Gençkaya 2009: 154). Additionally, the law categorizes only those who are considered to be of Turkish descent or culture as migrants, with all others defined as "foreigners"(Erder, 2007). Between 1923 and 1939, approximately 200,000 people from Bulgaria, 400,000 from Greece and 150,000 people from different regions of the Balkans and Romania migrated to Turkey (İçduygu, Toktas, and Soner, 2008), with migration from the Balkans continuing until 1949. A new wave of migration from Bulgaria started in 1951 and 1952 that escalated into a massive scale with family unifications in 1989, having been triggered by the assimilationist policies of the Zhivkov government that assumed power in Bulgaria in 1984 (Karpat, 2004). It is estimated that between 1923 and 1997, more than 1.6 million migrants settled in Turkey (Özgür, 2012; Toksöz, Erdoğdu, and Kaşka, 2012), who under the Settlement Law can be considered part of the Turkification efforts.

International migration to Turkey is not limited to these movements, with other sources existing in the Middle East and Asia, as well as Europe. The Settlement Law comes into play again within the context of migration from these regions, and sustains Turkey's self-containment policy towards international migration through reservations included in international treaties. One of the most illustrative examples of this policy is the geographical and time reservation to the United Nations (UN) Geneva Convention in 1951. Turkey signed the Treaty with the reservation that it would accept only those who have "been harmed in the period after 1951" as refugees. Although the time reservation was lifted with an additional Protocol in 1967, the geographical reservation of not allowing Non-European refugees into the country has been retained, despite widespread criticism, which is why people who stay in Turkey are considered asylum seekers due to their temporary stay in the country. Turkey defends its official position by

suggesting that a geographical limitation is necessary on grounds of "national security" (Kirişçi, 1996). On the other hand, the 1960s saw mutual visa agreements signed with some of its neighbors, for example, with Romania in 1968, which remained in force until Romania's EU accession in 2004. A similar visa exemption was signed with Iran in 1964 and was in force even until after the regime change in Iran. These visa exemptions allow the citizens of the partner countries to stay for up to 90 days in Turkey for touristic purposes.[6]

Reflecting on Turkey's changing role as a transit country, the Turkish Asylum Regulation (*İltica Yönetmeliği*) entered into effect in 1994 as a substantive step towards the administration of undocumented migration. With this Regulation, Turkey commits to taking the necessary steps to provide temporary accommodation to asylum seekers from outside Europe, between the admission of their application and resettlement into a third country and their application to United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the practical result of which is that asylum seekers can stay in Turkey for a temporary period after filing their application.[7] In 1999 and 2006, amendments were made to this regulation, and in 2005, a National Action Plan on Migration and Asylum was prepared. The making of a new law in the spirit of the old Settlement Law in that year resulted in huge disappointment, as a more human-rights and recognition-oriented perspective was expected for the international migrants in Turkey. According to Article 4 of the current law, "Those who are not of Turkish descent or culture; those who are of Turkish descent and culture but have been deported before; and

[6] Restrictions applied to the citizens of visa-exempt countries after the LFIP came into effect. While it was possible to extend the initial 90-day period for another 90 days prior to the LFIP, meaning a total of 180 days in Turkey as a tourist, now foreign country citizens can only stay up to 90 days within any 180-day period. As such, the possibility of gaining an extra 90 days by exit and re-entrance has been recently removed.

[7] The experiences of the asylum seekers during their stay in Turkey falls outside the scope of this thesis, although the general conditions as well as gendered experiences is worth mentioning. Different reports on the asylum seekers prepared by related organizations highlight harsh conditions and sexual violence experienced especially by the female asylum seekers. For an introductory analysis to the field of forced migration and gender, see Akis, (2012).

those whose entry to Turkey is not approved on the basis of national security are not considered migrants." As Table 1 shows, the numerical increase of foreigners coming to Turkey has made it absolutely necessary to put in place a more comprehensive legal framework than the Settlement Law and partial regulations aimed at addressing ad hoc situations. In this context, a special commission drafted the LFIP to regulate international migration to Turkey, and the resulting law was adopted in Parliament on April 10, 2013 and entered into effect on April 11, 2014.

The LFIP can be considered a new vision of the state related to international migration and the goal of resolving historical problems related to the regulation of international migration. Furthermore, the establishment of the Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior can be considered a sign that the state wants to formulate a more comprehensive and serious approach to the issue. As this chapter examines the impact of the laws in Turkey on international migrants by focusing on the experiences of documented Iranian migrants, it is important to take a brief look at the changes brought by the LFIP. International migrants, aside from those who marry Turkish citizens, can apply for settlement as documented migrants under four categories: education, work, family and residence permit. The following part will look at the details of the legal regulations related to arrival and settlement status in Turkey for documented migrants.

2.4. Settlement Possibilities for Documented Migrants in Turkey

As mentioned in the previous section, the 1934 Settlement Law had a far-reaching impact on the migration policies of Turkey in defining the category of "migrant" as only those who are of Turkish descent or culture, with the remaining non-citizens being referred to as "foreigners". In this context, according to Turkey's settlement laws, individuals who can claim Turkish descent would always have a better chance of obtaining a residence permit or citizenship status that those who cannot. That said, in practice this is not always the case. For instance, Danış and Parla's study (2009) indicates that despite the Turkish descent of Iraqi and

Bulgarian Turks, obtaining citizenship has never been easy for them, and they have to fight in various ways to achieve it.

Another way of obtaining Turkish citizenship is through marriage to a Turkish citizen, although the gendered implementation of this rule is quite striking. If a non-citizen woman married a Turkish citizen man (in a marriage that takes place in Turkey), the citizenship process for the woman starts with a single document signed by the male spouse. In contrast, this was not the case for a non-citizen man marrying a Turkish citizen woman, with the processes of citizenship for the male spouse being tied to implemented proof of residency (Kaiser, 2010). However, in 2003, with an amendment to the new law, foreign nationals, whether male or female, acquired equal treatment in citizenship procedures, and new conditions for application were added, such as three years of continuous marriage and co-habitation in Turkey for this three-year period before fully obtaining the right to Turkish citizenship.

Permits for work, study and residency warrant further examination in the aftermath of the adoption of the LFIP. To begin with, work permits are given in two categories in Turkey: dependent or independent. An independent work application refers to those who are self-employed, and who have held legally obtained residency status for at least five continuous years in Turkey. Dependent work applications are for those who work in a company or an institution, with applicants being considered in two groups, being limited term work permit applicants and unlimited term work permit applicants. In order to obtain an unlimited work permit in Turkey, the applicant should have legally obtained residency status for at least eight years, or should have worked for at least eight continuous years in Turkey. Additionally, long-term residence permits holders are eligible to apply for unlimited term employment permits within the scope of the changes made to the LFIP in 2013. For limited term permits for dependent work applicants, this constitutes the majority of applicants among the newcomers to Turkey. The First step involves obtaining a one-year work permit, followed by a three-year extension, with the condition that the applicant holds the same job and same profession. Following the three-year work permit, it is possible to apply for

a six-year permit (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2014: 13). If the applicant's family has had residency status in Turkey for a minimum period of five years, they are also eligible to apply for limited term work permits. It is important to emphasize that these criteria describe only the requirements for eligibility, and do not guarantee any positive outcome. Also, limited work permit holders can only work in certain occupations that are defined by the law. Occupation restrictions do not apply for unlimited work permit holders.[8] Work permits for employment in free zones or as a university employees are regulated by the Free Zone Law (No. 3218) and Higher Education Council Law (No. 2547).

Table 2: Documented Migration to Turkey (2005-2011)

Migrant Groups	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	TOTAL
Work Purpose	22,130	22,805	25,475	18,900	17,483	19,351	23,027	149.171 (12%)
Education Purpose	25,240	24,258	22,197	28,597	27,063	29,266	37,260	193.881 (15.6%)
Other Purpose	84,224	139,523	135,365	127,429	118,780	128,327	156,919	890.567 (71.9%)
TOTAL	13,1594	186,586	187,757	174,926	163,326	176,944	217,206	1,238,339 (100%)

Source: Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Yabancılar Hudut İltica Dairesi Başkanlığı, from A. İçduygu, S. Erder, ve Ö. F. Gençkaya. (2009). "Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Göç Politikaları, 1923-2023. Ulus-Devlet Oluşumundan Ulus-Ötesi Dönüşümlere." SOBAG Proje No: 106K291. Ankara: TÜBİTAK, İçişleri Bakanlığı.

As shown in Table 2, of the documented migrants between 2005 and 2011, 12 percent came for work, 16 percent came for education and the remaining 72

[8] Limited work permit holders cannot work in regulated professions that include dentistry, midwifery, caregiving in health institutions, pharmacy, veterinary, managerial positions in private hospitals, lawyers, notaries, judges or prosecutors, security officers in public or private institutions, captains, divers or guides. With an amendment in 2007, previously restricted professions such as medical doctors and nurses were allowed for private health institutions.

percent for other purposes (on short term and long term residence permits). According to the latest statistics announced by the Directorate General of Migration Management, in 2015 the number of work permits issued grew to 62,756 and education permits to 67,529; while 202,403 short term permits and 73,705 family permits were issued. Countries seeking to attract highly skilled migrants usually design education programs for international students, and ease the procedure for obtaining a work permit, and a similar strategy was suggested in a report for the Special Commission for Migration in the Tenth Development Plan (2014–2018), prepared by the Ministry of Development. The Report, prepared in support of Turkey's future vision for 2023, shows that the changes in the strict policies of the Settlement Law related to external migration are underway:

> "... it is predicted that part of the needed labor force can be recruited internationally through a successful migration system equipped with flexible entry-exit procedures and empowering integration policies ... We should ensure coordination between the private sector, the public sector and the universities, and we should design and implement national and international programs that draw high-quality migrants to the country ... We need to design programs that take advantage of the experiences of the Turkish people who live abroad and the international students in Turkey. Finally, it must be strongly underlined that, in order to maintain a highly skilled labor force, it is absolutely necessary to implement rule of law and human rights" (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2014: 33).

As the quote suggests, the aim is not only to attract highly skilled workers to the country on a temporary basis, but to ensure their permanent settlement. One detail that is reminiscent of the spirit of the previous settlement law is the emphasis on attracting Turkish people living abroad back to the country, as well as international students. The quote also emphasizes the need to develop programs that help international students stay and work after they finish their degrees, and the requirement to fully implement human rights. The Report also took up the issue of integration, stating the need to facilitate the cultural integration and social inclusion of the new international migrants through different courses and activities. The LFIP does not regulate how these targets can be met, but paves the way for future steps in that direction (Section Four, Article 96). With the addition to these

new regulations, there has been a substantial increase in the number of international students in Turkey in the last few years, rising from around 30,000 in 2001 to 50,000 in 2013. Table 3 illustrates the increase in number of international students in Turkey.

Table 3. Change in the Number of International Students in Turkey (2000-2013)



Source: "Yükseköğretimin Uluslararasılaşması Çerçevesinde Türk Üniversitelerinin Uluslararası Öğrenciler için Çekim Merkezi Haline Getirilmesi" Araştırma Projesi Raporu, T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı

This rapid increase can be attributed also to the recent policies adopted to encourage international migration to Turkey. Scholarships offered by the Ministry of Economy and publicity drives targeting international students have also had a significant impact, having been publicized online on the "Study in Turkey" website. Having said that, according to the May 2015 *Making Turkish Universities Centers of Attraction within Internationalization of Education* report, substantial improvement is needed in the regulatory framework, bureaucratic procedures, application and admission processes, the adjustment of higher education institutions, and publicity and branding activities to ensure better education for international students (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2015).

The changes to the work permit regulations on documented migration, according to an OECD Migration Report, resulted in Turkey issuing 45,850 work permits in 2013, an increase of 42 percent on the previous year (OECD, 2013). This number includes not only the work permits issued to newly documented migrants, but also those issued after the work permit amnesty in 2012 that were granted to migrant workers who have been working informally, including, but not limited to, domestic workers, service workers and sweat-shop workers. In addition, the LFIP also contains a special regulation related to ministry-approved work permits for students. This special student work permit is limited to 24 hours per week, and is given only to students after they complete their first year of schoolwork. Additionally, the new law also allows the issuance of a short-term residence permit for international students if they apply within the first six-months after the date of graduation.

The "Other" categories of permits include both the short- and long-term permits given by the state, the majority of which are issued to retirees from European countries, who are not considered in the highly skilled migrants group, in that their intention is not to study or work during their stay. Migrants in this category need to declare their intention to own property, receive education in public institutions or obtain medical treatment to stay on a short-term residence permit rather than on a visitors' visa. Long-term residence permits are given only to foreigners who hold residency in Turkey for a minimum of eight years continuously on short-term permits. Migrants with long-term residence permits are also eligible to similar rights as Turkish citizens in terms of social security, but cannot vote or be elected, or work in public service. Furthermore, they are not obliged to do military service, but are able to import customs-free cars. Long-term permits are the second best option for those who are not eligible for citizenship for continuing their resident status; but as mentioned in the previous section, these are the minimum eligibility conditions and do not guarantee the issuance of permits.

Based on the legal framework, one may gain the impression that there are multiple options for documented migrants who want to take up residence in

Turkey. To understand how these options work in practice, the author explores the experiences of documented Iranian migrants in Part 6, but first it is necessary to provide information on international migration from Iran to Turkey and other countries.

2.5. Documented Migration from Iran to Turkey

The number of Iranian migrants in Turkey can be traced in part from the number of issued study and work permits. Using compiled data from different sources, Table 5 indicates that the number of documented Iranian students rank in the top three by country, while Iranian workers rank in the top ten. In this regard, documented Iranian migrants can be considered as making a substantial contribution to all documented migration to Turkey.

Table 4: Documented Migrants in Turkey by Country of Origin (for Education or Work)

Countries Sending International Students to Turkey (2013-2014)		**Number of Work Permits Issued to Foreigners by Nationality in 2015**			
Countries	**Total**	**Countries**	**Definite Permits**	**Indefinite Permits**	**Total**
1. Turkmenistan	6941	1. Georgia	8523	1	8524
2. Azerbaijan	6901	2. Ukraine	6023	0	6023
3. IRAN	4343	3. Kirghizstan	4274	0	4274
4. Afghanistan	2332	4. Syria	4019	0	4019
5. Syria	1785	5. Turkmenistan	3322	1	3323
6. Iraq	1585	6. Russia	2926	10	2936
7. Greece	1500	7. China	2879	3	2882
8. Kirghizstan	1410	8. Indonesia	1904	0	1904
9. Kazakhstan	1306	9.Moldova	1778	0	1778
10. Kosovo	925	**10. IRAN**	1521	1	1522
Source: (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2015)		**Source**: "Work Permits of Foreigners 2015", Ministry of Labor and Social Security (2016).			

Table 4 also reveals that Iranians constitute a key group among the high skilled migrants to Turkey. In this regard, looking at the experiences of Iranian immigrants will help in understanding how the legal regulations influence their lives in Turkey. The author will focus here more on the transition in status of Iranian migrants from study to work, which is referred to also as *status passage* (Nohl et al., 2014). This will be covered in more detail in Chapter 3. Status passage can be exemplified as passages or transitions from student status to worker status, or from "single" to "married". Although the former may be considered more relevant to the study, based on its implications on social life, both passages generate substantive differences in terms of status and symbolic capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2013). Although Bourdieusian concepts are not widely used in international migration literature, they provide a very useful framework for analyzing the changing social status of highly skilled migrants after migration (Akis Kalaylıoğlu 2014; Nohl et al. 2014). The concept of status passage is not only important in understanding upward mobility, like in the example of the transition from student to worker status, in that it is also an important concept in addressing the downward transition in status from "documented" to "undocumented" (or illegal). For international migrants, status passages are usually accompanied by legal changes in permits, such as residence or work permits. The examples below explain some of the strategies used by documented Iranian migrants to avoid a decline in status.

2.6. Changing Legal Status of Iranians after Status Passages

This section documents the experiences of Iranians who have been living in Ankara for between five to twenty-five years. The sub-sections below will present selected statements from interviews conducted with Iranian students in Ankara. The new LFIP law was not in effect when the interviews were carried out with these groups. All names are pseudonyms.

2.6.1. Different Experiences of Kaisa and Sabra in Acquiring Turkish Citizenship

Kaisa is an Iranian woman who was born and lived in Tehran until she was 20 years old, and who came to Ankara in the mid-1980s. She was accepted into a university in Ankara after passing the Foreign Student Exam, and possessed a student permit during her education in Turkey until she graduated from the degree program. After graduation she had difficulty finding employment, as she did not have Turkish citizenship. As a result, she took up a position as instructor in the university, as one of the few employment options open to her. As no tenured position was made available to her during her employment in the university, she decided to take a position at a large transnational organization. At the time of the interview, she has been working at the same organization for over 10 years, and sees her chances of finding another job as slim due to the reluctance of potential employers to apply for work permits for non-citizens. Although her qualifications are suitable for a higher position, she has been unable to get any job interviews for the positions for which she has applied. Kaisa's residence permit is renewed by her workplace. She is not happy about being dependent on the organization, and has also considered applying for Turkish citizenship, as she might not be able to find another job because of her current immigration status, despite her experience in Turkish job market. That is to say, if she becomes unemployed and cannot find a job quickly enough, her residency may be in jeopardy. She provides an account of her experience of continuous rejection, despite making a Turkish citizenship application each year, and voices her concerns and her general situation as:

> They are adamant about not giving [citizenship] to me. I made it to the last step of the procedure but was refused citizenship on the grounds "state discretion". At the moment I have my permit through work, and I extend it every year. I do not feel like I belong anywhere, as I don't have citizenship. If, out of the blue, they say "Iranians must leave (Turkey) within a week", I would not know what to do. It looks positive for Iranians for the moment, but in fact there is no solidarity among Muslims at all. (Female, 46, Single, Assyrian)

Kaisa says that her experience prevents her from feeling like she belongs in Turkey. When her concerns were much higher, she says she thought about applying

to the European Court of Human Rights, but decided against it. When asked whether she still likes Turkey, she replied "I was in love with the country until last year. I feel slightly distanced now. I feel like I will not be able stay here until the end of my life." She has begun to feel unsettled and unsafe in Turkey, which is the reason for her change of heart.

To understand the feeling of safety related to the citizenship status of immigrants, we can look at Sabra's interview. Sabra and her spouse were born into the Turkmen minority community in Iran and came to Turkey after getting married. Sabra's spouse had already started working in Turkey before the couple got married. They claim that were able to get Turkish citizenship easily, as they were considered Turkish by law (due to their Turkish descent). When asked whether citizenship status had made a big change to their lives, Sabra said that it provided them with a great sense of security:

> This is a joke, but at least when we have a disagreement I can say to my husband 'I am a citizen, so half of the property is mine.' Joking aside, this is a safety net in my sub-consciousness. God forbid, if something happens, I am a citizen and this country will protect me. This is a great thing ... Second, when I witness unfairness, now I can speak out in the public arena. I can say things like 'you cannot do this' as I am a citizen too. I can express this very easily. (Female, 35, Married, Turkmen)

It became apparent during the interviews that acquiring Turkish citizenship is important for the majority of Iranians like Kaisa and Sabra, due mainly to their plans for permanent settlement in Turkey. Citizenship is the safest way to guarantee permanent settlement, and a citizenship status can help migrants even if their status or circumstances change, like in the case of Sabra's imagined divorce. If the couple divorce (i.e. if Sabra's status changes from married to single), both parties can remain in Turkey separately. According to these two participants, it is evident that citizenship is seen as a more guaranteed solution than temporary work or residence permits.

2.6.2. Different Experiences of Nadia and Maarika in Extending their Stay

Nadia is a Tabriz-born Iranian woman who came to Turkey to study. After failing the Foreign Student Exam at her first attempts, she has spent the following years in Ankara preparing for the exam. As she had neither a student nor work permit, and ended up taking advantage of the visa exemption agreement between Turkey and Iran. As mentioned earlier, Iranians were able to stay in Turkey for up to 90 days with a tourist visa, after which they would have to leave the country, but would be allowed to re-enter and stay for another 90 days, according to the terms of the agreement. Taking advantage of the visa exemption agreement, Nadia would exit and re-enter the country in the mid-1980s, flying to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from Turkey and renewing her 90-day visa term at re-entry. She said, "I would take the next return flight right after I landed in Cyprus." Nadia ended up making 13 round trips in total, giving her approximately three years in Turkey as a documented migrant, but without any other permit. As of 2014, however, Iranian migrants can no longer use re-entry as a means of extending their stay continuously due to the previously mentioned LFIP regulation, which permits only a 90-day maximum stay in any 180-day period. Nadia had been unable to pass the Foreign Student Exam, but obtained a temporary residence permit through her husband who was a student, and with whom she met through the Iranian community in Ankara. In Nadia's case, her passage from single to married status changed her legal residency status, which became possible through her social networks, or social capital in the terms of Bourdieu, as will be explained in the following chapter.

After her husband graduated from school, at first he was unable to obtain a work permit, despite multiple applications. When asked how they solved this problem, Nadia said hesitantly that they had to ask a senior politician in Ankara for help, and so were able to obtain the permit. As the work permit needed to be renewed after it expired, they applied for citizenship as a long-term solution. As they are of Azerbaijani origin, which is accepted as a Turkish descent, they could have applied citizenship but without that senior politician, it could have been much

more difficult. In this respect, again it was their acquired social capital that helped them obtain Turkish citizenship, after which in 1996 Nadia was able to find work in the service sector. When asked if she was happy living in Turkey after all the effort, Nadia replied as follows:

> I don't miss Iran at all, if I may (Laughing). There is a saying in Turkish: 'Home is not where you are born, but where you are fed'. It is not because of the oppression or anything like that in Iran. When I go there, I feel like I miss it, but I get bored very quickly. My relatives are also not that close anymore ... My siblings come and visit me here (Female, 52, Married, Azerbaijani).

It is necessary to stress here that although Iranian migrants who are considered of Turkish descent are allowed to keep citizenship also of their country of birth after acquiring Turkish citizenship, other migrants are unable to hold dual citizenship. For example, Maarika, who has no Turkish background, has made many attempts to acquire Turkish citizenship without renouncing her Iranian citizenship. When Maarika had just started university in Iran, she had a serious disagreement with one of her professors and her family decided to send her to Turkey with her uncle in 1987 as a protective precaution. Her original intention was to apply for a US visa from Ankara and to go there to complete her university education. She met her future husband, who was Turkish, soon after submitting her visa application, but the things didn't go as she had expected:

> It took around three months to receive a reply to my application, and in the meantime my family came to visit us. Fortunately, my husband and my uncle became friends. After we found out that my visa had not been approved, I guess I was emotionally devastated ... My (ex) husband was a very good-looking and kind man. He took care of me and I fell in love. My family did not approve of our marriage but I went ahead anyway. That was my reason for settling in Turkey. (Female, 48, Divorced, Persian)

Maarika wanted to acquire Turkish citizenship after getting married, but was unable to make a claim for dual citizenship as she was not of Turkish descent, and as she did not want to give up her Iranian citizenship, she did not apply for Turkish citizenship. During her interview explained how she had had to go to Foreigner's Branch Directorate (*Yabancılar Şubesi*) each year for the last seven years to extend

her permit. Later, using her connections with a senior politician, she was able to acquire dual citizenship like Nadia, and so was allowed to remain in Turkey after being divorced from her husband based on her Turkish citizenship. She is self-employed and works freelance from home, which means that she does not have a place of work. If she did not have citizenship, she would not be able to stay in Turkey under these conditions. To recap, Maarika did not obtain student or worker status after arriving in Turkey. She married when she was in Turkey, and through marriage she was able to acquire a residence permit. She was unable to apply for dual citizenship, like the Azerbaijani or Turkmen Iranian respondents, as she was not of Turkish descent. Through her connections, she used her social capital to both keep her Iranian citizenship and to acquire Turkish citizenship. It is only due to her citizenship that she was prevented from falling into an "undocumented" status after being divorced.

2.6.3. Different Citizenship Experiences of Rahim and Arash

All of the interviewees presented so far held the belief that citizenship would be beneficial both for work and for studying in the country, although a minority of the respondents, like Arash, did not seek Turkish citizenship as a matter of choice. Arash (Male, 34, Married, Azerbaijani) came to Turkey in the 2000s to study, and has finished his PhD in one of Ankara's well-known public universities. He and his spouse lived in Turkey for a long time as students, and after finishing his PhD, he was able to remain in the country due to his spouse's continuing student status. Arash now owns a private business, and says that if he becomes a citizen the taxes he must pay for the business will increase substantially, and so although having the right to citizenship based on his Turkish descent, he has chosen not to apply. According to the new law, when foreigners own property in Turkey they can automatically receive a residence permit. When asked whether having a residence permit without citizenship has been an issue for him, he cites the new law, and says that he does not need to apply for citizenship at all. The interview took place while Arash was in the process of applying for a work permit, but he says that even if his application is not accepted, he believes he can take advantage of the residence

permit. Contrary to previous examples, Arash is relying on his economic capital, which would allow him to buy a house, rather than social capital. It is necessary to not that, as in Nadia's case above, there is no guarantee that migrants will receive work permits even, if they fulfill all the requirements. In this regard, migrants usually make alternative plans in order to remain documented in Turkey. Arash's alternative plan is to purchase a house, which will give him automatic access to a residence permit if his primary plan to obtain a work permit doesn't work. As in the previous cases, despite Turkey's recent encouragement to potential migrants, the work permit policy shows that the implementation of policy has not yet been fully developed.

In a contrasting example, Rahim (Male, 48, Married, Azerbaijani) provides details of his experience as someone who has applied for Turkish citizenship many times while in the country. After finishing his degree in a university in Ankara, Rahim started working for a company that applied for a work permit for him. Similar to the other participants, he believes that citizenship is the best option for staying in Turkey, adding that citizenship is very important when starting and running a business, as well as the for the lives of his children in Turkey. Despite being of Turkish descent, obtaining citizenship was not easy, and he ended up applying six times, and provided all requested documentation each time. Rahim's experience shows the difficulty in not only obtaining a work permit but also acquiring dual citizenship, even for people who are considered to be of Turkish descent.

Before moving on to the experiences of Iranian students, it is important to note the symbolic importance of migration status as a social status among Iranians in Turkey. Although moving to worker status from student status is considered a rise in status, acquiring citizenship and living as a Turkish citizen in Turkey is considered a much higher status than living as an "immigrant" or "foreigner" among Iranians. In this regard, differences in status can be found not only between categories of "citizen" and the "migrant", but also between "migrant" and "foreigner". There are many highly skilled Iranians who rate citizenship as a much preferred status, regardless of whether or not they are of Turkish descent. In

addition, it is clearly apparent that being referred to as "migrant" makes the Iranian participants uncomfortable. When the author first contacted the interviewees and told them that the research was about Iranian migrants, some informed the author that they do not consider themselves as such, in that they are here working in Turkey and are not seeking asylum or refugee status. This sensitivity is probably related to the negative connotations carried by the term "migrant" in Turkish, and so there is a desire to distinguish themselves from asylum seekers who are not considered as highly skilled, either in Turkey or elsewhere. This situation shows that the significance attached by the Iranian migrants to how they are defined (as documented or undocumented) is as much as how they are seen status-wise.

2.7. Iranian Students' Experiences of Documented Migration through Education

Iranian students can obtain a residence permit when they have a student status in Turkey, and so it is not possible to talk about their status passage experiences after their arrival in Turkey, since they have not yet joined the labor market. On the other hand, their experiences as students have a significant influence on whether or not they will decide to settle in Turkey in the future. It is well known that students who obtain a degree in another country often consider the option of settling there (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2014), and so this section will focus on the experiences and opinions of the Iranian students in Turkey in such a position with respect to settling in Turkey. The Iranian students whose experiences are presented in this part have been living in Ankara for different periods, ranging from one to five years. As in the previous part, pseudonyms are used.

2.7.1. Different Experiences of Nabila and Shirin Staying Turkey after Graduation

Nabila was a very successful student in Iran, having graduated with distinction from high school and majoring in Civil Engineering at university, however she was dismissed from the university after it was discovered that she was of the Baha'i faith, the adherents of which are prohibited from university

education. She came to Ankara with her family right after her dismissal and restarted her degree in Civil Engineering. As part of her degree, she completed an internship in a construction company, which made her think about staying in Turkey after graduation as an option. Her manager told her that they needed to apply for a special work permit for non-citizens, and that the process might not be easy, which discouraged her from continuing her career in Turkey:

> It is hard for me to work in Turkey. For example, today I asked my boss how they hire non-citizens. Obtaining work permits and insurance can be an issue, and [the process] is very complicated, meaning more responsibility for the company. It is also more expensive. For this reason they don't hire you like they would hire a Turkish person ... I would like to work in an office, but I like the field too. Today, for example was a good experience for me. They sent me to the factory, and the people I met there were different from my professors at university. There were a lot of workers around when we took a break for food, but the few women you could count on the fingers of one hand. There were looks all around when you entered and exited. Everyone was looking at us; it was a strange experience. I told them that I wanted to go return to the office, but they told me to stick around and learn. (Female, 24, Single, Azerbaijani-Baha'i)

What Nabila found out about her workplace was that it was not easy to obtain work permits for non-citizens, which is valid for all workplaces and many migrants. According to Article 13 of Law No 4817 on Work Permits for Foreigners, the applicant work place has to hire at least five Turkish citizens for each foreigner, and this rule makes hiring foreigners very difficult. Aware of this, Nabila is considering a move to a Western country to undertake a graduate degree, and will then continue her career. In other words, the difficulties of passage from student status to worker status have convinced Nabila against staying in Turkey for the longer term.

Shirin is a student in Ankara who, in contrast to Nabila, never considered staying in Turkey. Since she is Azerbaijani, it would be easier for her to apply for citizenship in Turkey than other international students, but she wants to leave Turkey because she does not like the "standard of living":

> Some things are very difficult here, but my experience is not normal. There is no rule, no standard! And even there is, it is not the same for

> everyone. I faced many difficulties about that. For example, the residence permit ... The University is supposed to provide a document at the beginning of each academic term. They gave me residency for five months, so it ends in the beginning of summer. I stayed here without a permit for three months for nothing, and I had to pay fines. There is no law that allows students to remain in school during summer. Some of these things are very difficult and they make me feel stuck. I just need to stay here to do research and I am really busy in the lab. These things effect my research ... For example, health insurance is the right of every individual; everyone should have it, this is how it works in Germany ... Here, there is nothing like that. I can see a doctor at the Clinic on campus, but the doctors are not very good there. I am really scared about this; what will I do if something happens? I looked into private insurance but it is very expensive. I looked for a plan for around three months, and then I gave up. I don't think this is normal. A reasonable standard of life is everyone's right. I feel stuck here for these reasons. Our lives do not have any standards. (Female, 26, Single, Azerbaijani)

What *Shirin* means by a reasonable standard life is the ability to live in a country where social conditions of health, education and work are guaranteed. She claims that she wants to live in a country in which social welfare is better. In other words, her aim is not to only make a status passage, but also to live in higher "standards" as a result of that passage. Unlike some of the settled Iranians detailed above, Nabila and Shirin could not overcome the barriers to status passage through their held social or economic capitals, hence what they use as a strategy is to migrate to other countries for education. On the other hand, the experiences of Nabila and Shirin show what highly skilled migrants look for in the host countries to which they migrate. The 10th Development Report mentioned above stipulates that Turkey needs to make various improvements if it is to become a country in which highly skilled migrants would want to stay.

2.7.2. Sami's Experience and Settlement in Turkey for his Family

Although all of the students whose experiences are covered in this chapter want to leave Turkey, there are also Iranian students who want to stay. Before finishing this chapter, we will look into their plans and their reasons for wanting to stay. Sami is part of the minority group of Iranian students who want to stay in Turkey. He says that his initial plans did not include staying, but after experiencing

the Turkish education system, he decided to settle. He thinks, as an Azerbaijani, he will have no difficulty in obtaining citizenship and will easily pass from student status to worker status in Turkey, although the examples above say otherwise. Sami was a young child during the Iraq-Iran war between 1980 and 1988, and still remembers the related feelings of insecurity. He says that he now wants to build a life in a safer country. In the same interview, Sami explains that his family, which is part of the minority Sunni sect in Iran, have supported his decision to settle in Turkey as a result of the discrimination they have experienced in Iran.

> I remember, I was three and the city was being bombed. Every time I heard the red alarm I would pick up my radio and go to the shelter in the basement. My mother was pregnant with my sister at the time, and would slowly follow me. We used to wait in the shelter until the alarm went off. I got used to it. I can see its impact on me when I look at my personal characteristics. Whether it's my wife or my kids, whoever is in my life, I want them to live in a safe place. If something happens to me, I will know that they will be safe ... For example, I gave up on my plans to go to the United States. You have to be very rich to go there, it is a real problem. In a country like Switzerland, however, everyone has a good life. Even if a child is an orphan, the state will take care them. There is security! I want my loved ones to live in such an environment. For example, I want to bring my mother and my father here (Turkey) in a few years. There is a new law now in Turkey that allows Iranians to own property. My father would not waste a second. If he came to Turkey, he would find something to do here. He listens to Turkish Classical Music on Turkish radio all the time. For example, they can live in a place that's not crowded, like Datça or Ayvalik. There is no war in Iran now, but there is no freedom either. I am Sunni and so is my family ... Sunnis are considered second-class citizens. My father was unable to be promoted to the highest position in the place he worked, having always remained in second place ... I will get my family settled here and I will start living my life after that (Male, 28, Single, Azerbaijani-Sunni).

It is obvious that for Sami the reason to live in Turkey is his family. He thinks he will be eligible for Turkish citizenship when he graduates from his Master's program. He wants to purchase property for his family and take advantage of the new law. Unfortunately, it is obvious that work permit does not provide the level of security that the citizenship provides among the students.

2.7.3. Roxane and her Decision to Stay in Turkey after Divorce

Another student who wants to stay in Turkey is Roxane, but for a different reason to Sami. Roxane came to Turkey for the first time after she married her Iranian husband, who was a graduate student at the time. She was able to start her graduate studies in Ankara after they moved, as she already had an undergraduate degree from Iran[9]. The economic conditions of her husband were good, so neither of them needed to work in the beginning. After a while, Roxane decided to divorce her husband due to problems in the relationship, and ended up returning to Iran. She did not have any permits that would allow her stay in Turkey as she had already completed her graduate degree at that point. After having lived in Iran for a while, she decided that she wanted to go back to her life in Ankara, and came back to pursue a doctoral degree. After studying in the doctoral program for some time, she discovered an interest in the arts and decided to take leave to prepare for examinations for Art School. After failing the talent exam, despite long preparations, as a last option she returned to her previous doctoral program, as she did not have any other opportunity if she wanted to stay in Turkey. The second time she came to Turkey, Roxane was unable to support herself without work, being divorced, and so she took up temporary jobs like freelance translation as a student, which requires no work permit. She also receives support from her family in Iran, which means she is transmitting economic capital from her home country. In order to stay longer after she graduates she will need to arrange her permits obtaining her degree. Although she is Azerbaijani, there is no guarantee that she will receive citizenship, as the above examples illustrate, as some participants had to look to their connections for help in acquiring citizenship status or permits. Roxane does not see the citizenship option as a guarantee. When asked whether she would choose Turkey if she had the choice, she said:

> My life has been a little different, as I started from the beginning at the age of 39 (the age she started her PhD). I realized that I had sacrificed

[9] The details of students in similar situations will covered in more detail in Chapter 4.

> certain things. Everything comes with a price. If I have a child though, I wouldn't prefer Turkey, to be honest. ... I want my child to grow up in a place like Canada, for example. I don't think things go well in Turkey. We need to be careful. (Female, 40, Divorced, Azerbaijani)

In her transition in status from married to divorced Roxane has experienced an economic decline, and she is worried about not being able to pass from student to worker status, as is the case with all of the other participants with a student status. These concerns intensify around entry into the job market. To put it differently, there are substantial obstacles to transitioning from student status to worker status for documented migrants in Turkey. In the majority of cases, Iranian students believe that it will be hard to establish a life in Turkey, and so they plan to continue their education in Western countries.

2.8. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has presented an analysis of the different settlement patterns of documented Iranian migrants with focus on two particular groups. The first group is Iranian residents who came to Turkey as students and then transitioned to worker status, while the second group is Iranian students who have not yet decided where to settle. Although these two groups will be analyzed in more depth in Chapters 4 and 5, it is necessary here to state that the main difference between these two groups is the guaranteed legal resident status of the first group. While some acquired Turkish citizenship during their stay, others have either not yet obtained citizenship, or have postponed their application. When each example is examined individually, it is apparent that the process of status passage is not smooth, and that the migrants have had to invent strategies using both social and economic capital to avoid falling into the "undocumented" or "illegal" migrant status. These strategies include, but are not limited to, permit extensions through the student status of a spouse, applications for work permits, border crossing and re-entry in order to restart the visa period and marriage to a Turkish citizen. The challenges faced when applying for residence or work permits have led some of the respondents to see citizenship as the most likely way of staying in Turkey. These strategies also illustrate that the legal framework in Turkey does not yet

provide the appropriate conditions for attracting highly skilled migrants to settle and work in the country.

The Iranians in the first group mostly achieved their incorporation process through either their own efforts or through the use of their social networks, aka social capital. The impact of the new law, the FIPL, on migrants who have arrived Turkey since 2014 should be researched further, however it is evident that in Turkey the problem lies with the implementation of existing laws as much as with the lack of an adequate legal framework. In other words, if the arbitrary and non-transparent implementation of the law does not change, the new law will not make a big difference in the experiences of highly skilled migrants.

It has been shown in this chapter that the efforts to attract more international students have worked, with more international students coming to Turkey over the last couple of years, however not all those who come to Turkey for education are necessarily willing to stay permanently and to establish residency. The Iranian students who participated in this study were in the process of considering the employment situation in Turkey. Among those who do not think Turkey is a feasible alternative for permanent settlement are those who are looking for other options, including doctoral or post-doctoral research in other countries. Here, they again aim to use their social capital, this time to migrate to Western countries where they believe they will have better lives. The two students who want to establish residency in Turkey are those who made their decision based on their special circumstances and for reasons of age.

In summary, the interviews show that Turkey's plan to attract highly skilled labor, starting from student stage, has begun to work; however these cases of Iranian students show that the full-scale reforms that would facilitate the settlement of Iranian students in the country are not yet in place. After Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Iran is the third largest source of international students for Turkey. Considering that the first two are culturally Turkic countries whose native language is a dialect of Turkish, and whose citizens are considered for legal purposes to be of Turkish descent, citizens of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have much easier access to the permits that facilitate their

settlement. Accordingly, the increase in immigration from these countries may lead to a contrary conclusion that the appropriate infrastructure for highly skilled migrants has not yet been achieved, as migrants from these two countries enjoy easier incorporation into Turkish society (including language sufficiency) and status passage (staying after degree or establishing work permit). In addition, although Turkey now permits one to apply for a work permit while studying, the greatest challenge for most of the participants in this study was, and still is, acquiring a working permit. In this regard, major changes to the legal framework and its implementation for the two groups of highly skilled documented migrants, i.e. students and employees, is necessary. This, in turn, shows that improving policies related to documented migration and its implementation should not be dismissed, due especially to the urgency and immediacy of the asylum-seeker crisis and the corollary attention to undocumented migrants. Instead, ameliorations for documented and undocumented migration should take place together.

CHAPTER III

THEORIZING THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION EXPERIENCE OF IRANIANS

3.1. Theories of International Migration

International migration has been studied from many divergent perspectives and by many different disciplines in academia. In line with the categorizations proposed by Castles and Miller (Castles and Miller, 2009), the main theories of international migration can be classified under four categories: economic theories of migration; a historical-institutional approach and world systems theory; migration systems and networks theory; and finally transnational theory. Defining a different classification, Karen O'Reilly (2012) mentions four more migration categories in her book *International Migration and Social Theory,* being labor migration; domestic labor migration; refugees and forced migration; and lifestyle migration. Despite the broad variety, any one of these theories by itself may fall short of explaining the situation of a specific case of international migration, and two or more theories may be required for an analysis. Furthermore, in some cases none of the mainstream migration theories may succeed in answering the essential question, in which case, rather than migration theories, it is the theories of the main disciplines (such as sociology, political science, etc.) that may be better suited to resolving the issue. The case of Iranian migrants living in Ankara falls into the latter category, with the sociological approach of Pierre Bourdieu rather than mainstream international migration theories providing a more appropriate means of addressing the complexity of the their international migration processes. The basis of this is the fact that this study focuses on the perceptions of documented Iranian migrants about both themselves and their host country, and considers their habits, practices

and strategies related to their settlement processes, and this lends itself to such sociological conceptualizations as those of Bourdieu.

Before explaining his sociological approach in more detail it is crucial to mention why Bourdieu's approach, rather than the more common theories of international migration, is congruent with this study. To this end, this chapter will open with a short explanation of the main theories of international migration, and why they can be considered inappropriate for this field research of documented Iranian migrants living in Ankara. It should also be stressed at this point that not all theories of international migration are given here, but rather only those that can be considered related directly to this study, in that many fall outside its scope. Accordingly, the following theories are those that may be related to Iranian migrants living in Ankara, and are presented giving reasons why they don't actually fit this study. The study will continue with a presentation of the concepts of Bourdieu and an explanation of the cases of documented Iranian migrants living in Ankara from his theoretical approach.

3.1.1. Economic Theories of Migration

International migration is a vast field of analysis, with one of the most well-known and oldest approaches to its study being the two distinct models of neo-classical theory: macroeconomic and microeconomic. These economic theories of migration have been inspired by economic development explanations. According to the macroeconomic model, geographical differences in the supply and demand of labor compel people to migrate to other countries, as do wage differences (Massey, Arango, et al. 1993). In this respect, macro-level neoclassical theory suggests that diminishing wage differences internationally will cease human mobility.

Contrary to macro level neoclassical theories, the microeconomic model suggests that it is not only wage differences among countries that shape the flow of international migration. Individuals may also decide to migrate as result of rational choices and cost-benefit calculations, leading them to move to places where they think they have the most to gain. In other words, both wages and

working conditions in different countries either push or pull people into migration, which is why economic theories of migration are also known as "push-pull" theories. Push factors include huge demographic growth, low living standards, lack of economic opportunities and political repression, while pull factors include demand for labor, availability of land, good economic opportunities and political freedom (Castles and Miller, 2009). These economic approaches, however, have been criticized for not addressing the role of history and structure, in that international migration cannot be based only on economic factors. In this regard, phenomenon such as forced migration cannot be explained by such theories, in that it has no connection with economic misbalance, but rather human rights. In the case of the Iranian migrants living in Ankara, these economic theories of migration cannot be considered helpful, as the reasons for their migration cannot be explained merely in terms of economic differences and needs. In addition, none of the economic theories of migration explain why the United States is idealized among Iranian migrants more than North European countries, as will be analyzed in the following parts.

3.1.2. Historical-Institutional Approach and World Systems Theory

While economic theories of migration understate the role of historical and structural factors, both historical-institutional and world system theories focus on the power relations between the poorer and developed nations to explain the flow of capital, in which the former provide cheap labor to the latter. This dichotomy is conceptualized also as a distinction between the core and periphery, and so these two theories of the historical-institutional approach and world systems theory draw attention to colonialism, wars and regional inequalities by laying the roots of such analysis in Marxist political economy and dependency theory (Castles and Miller, 2009). In this respect, these theories look at structures to explain the flow of migration rather than the actions of the people.

Initially, these theories were concerned with internal migration, but after 1970s, when migrant workers and the international circulated labor became more visible in the Northern economies, world systems theorists began analyzing

international labor migration (Castles and Miller 2009; Massey, Arango, et al. 1993). In time, however, both theories were criticized for not paying sufficient attention to human agency, and were found incapable of explaining how some host countries attracted more attention than others. For the same reason, these theories can be considered as lacking the perspective to comprehend and analyze the case of Iranian migrants living in Ankara, in that the positioning of Turkey and Iran are not very contradictory when compared to Western countries in terms of international migration. Besides, these theories tend to ignore micro-level agencies, which are crucial in understanding the international migration strategies of Iranians in Ankara.

3.1.3. Migration Networks Theory

Migration networks theory attempts to fill the voids in previous theories, and focuses on the human agency in a micro sense, while also addressing the systems at a macro level. For this reason, some migrant theorists refer to this model as a "meso-structure" theory (De Haas 2010).

Migration networks theory concentrates more on the bonds maintained by the migrants between their home and the host country (Castles & Miller, 2009). According to the theory, the developed networks between migrants help them to learn much relevant information before they migrate to the host country, which speeds up their process of incorporation into the new society and reduces risk in many aspects, since migrants draw upon any form of help through this network when needed. The family and community play a significant role in migration networks, often providing economic, cultural and social capital in the process of migration, although this may reduce the interaction of the migrant with local people in the host society and confine them into their own migrant community. Previous theorists have referred to this migration model as "chain migration" (C. A. Price 1963), expressing the impact of social networks and family/community decisions.

However, despite an increased attention towards this approach in recent years, this migration network theory has been criticized by some scholars as

attributing the massive changes in human mobility to a single cause, being the networks of migrants in other countries. For the case of Iranians living in Ankara, this theoretical approach can be considered insufficient in that according to those interviewed in the study, they rely more on their economic and cultural capital when migrating than their social networks. Although they benefit from Iranian social networks in the host country, they are not the primary reason for their international migration. In this regard, both a social network and chain migration approach would lack the ability, according to the author, to identify the cause of international migration of Iranians in this study.

3.1.4. Transnational Theory

Transnational theory has grown more popular in the last few decades with the influence of new technologies in transport and communication, which can be considered a result of globalization. Migrants in this era can easily maintain close links with their home country and communities in different parts of the world, and transnationalism and transnational communities bring the previous face-to-face communities to a new level, as virtual communities that communicate from a distance (Castles and Miller, 2009).

As Levitt and Glick-Schiller assert, the lives of migrants can no longer be understood by looking only at what goes on within the national boundaries of the host country (Portes and DeWind, 2008: 182), as looking at their ties with their home country can also reveal clues. This boundary-breaking approach of transnationalism has contributed the concept of *methodological nationalism* to international migration literature by criticizing the mainstream studies that focus only on the migration experiences in the host country (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003). A further contribution of this theory is underlined by (Özkul, 2012), who mentions the emphasis given to *methodological ethnicism,* which opens up a new path for multi-cited researches. Methodological ethnicism refers to an analysis that attempts to explain certain phenomena according to ethnicities, however this underestimates ethnicities as predetermined subjects (Dahlstedt and Neergaard, 2015).

Despite the popularity of transnational studies over the last few decades, many migrant theorists warn that most of the migrants who communicate via Internet or send remittances back to their countries cannot be considered transitional migrants, firstly because if one is to refer to the activities of migrants as transnational, those transnational activities between countries should take a central role in the migrants' lives (Faist and Reisenauer, 2010). Besides, in the case of Iranians, although transnational ties exist between the home and host countries, transnational theory falls short of explaining the migration and settlement processes of documented Iranians in Ankara, has witnessed a rise, especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Accordingly, this research doesn't use transnational theory as its main approach, although Iranians do develop and use transnational ties.

3.1.5. Lifestyle Migration

Considering the life and lifestyle preferences of the participants, it also seems necessary to understand why the *lifestyle migration* approach is not used in this study, despite its closeness. Lifestyle migration can be considered important for the study, considering the use of some of Bourdieu's concepts in migration studies. Briefly, lifestyle migration can be defined as a study field that analyses the individual quests of migrants for a better way of life. As perceived by Benson and O'Reilly, while lifestyle migration occurs among individuals of all ages for various reasons, the ethnographic accounts reveal an "escape" narrative and decision to migrate in which emphasis is on the negative associations of life before migration (Benson and O'Reilly, 2009: 609). In this regard, lifestyle migration involves a bid for freedom from prior constraints, and in this regard, becomes a search or project rather than an act that encompasses diverse destinations, desires and dreams (Benson and O'Reilly, 2009: 610). In a later version of her book, O'Reilly (2012) expresses that lifestyle migration can be expressed as a "downsizing" and/or counter-urbanization mobility in which people seek an alternative living in a bid to escape from the social ills of modern life. For this reason, lifestyle migration focuses primarily on the relationship and practices of consumption. In this respect,

lifestyle migration studies have similarities with other studies such as international retirement migration (with a particular focus on policy implications), leisure migration, second-home ownership, amenity-seeking and seasonal migration (Benson and O'Reilly, 2009).

However, within this study, lifestyle migration fails to take into account the motivations behind the decision to migrate, in that it is obvious that the Iranian migrants are not seeking a downsizing or counter-urbanization of lifestyles. Although this study uses the concept of "lifestyle" for its analysis, what is meant here, as already mentioned in the introduction, is a political battle of documented Iranians over the lifestyle that made them leave their home country and seek a host country in which to find a better life. Rather than the lifestyle migration detailed above, they want to benefit fully from the urban way of modern life, and aspire to migrate to Los Angeles in the United States or to other Western countries, as will be shown below. It is for this reason that lifestyle migration has been deemed unsuitable as an instrumental tool for this study.

3.1.6. Diaspora Studies

Last but not least, diaspora studies can be considered as having some relevance in an analysis of the Iranian migrants. In one of the most significant books on the diaspora, Cohen (2008) mentions the four phases and evolution of the concept. The term "diaspora" was first used to explain the Jewish experience, while in the latter 1980s the term began to refer to the expelled, political refugees, expatriates, alien residents and ethnic minorities. From the mid-1990s onwards, social constructionist critiques took over and identities were described in terms of deterritorialized eras, with de/constructions happening in a flexible way. By the end of the century the concept had returned to its origins, emphasizing "home" and "homeland" together with common features and ideals (Cohen, 2008: 1–2).

As it will be described in detail in the analysis section, this study does not look at political refugees or other groups of migrants who have been displaced from their homeland by force. The Iranian participants in this study have never attempted to organize migrant associations in Ankara in order to enhance

transnational politics (and influence politics back home), like some Iranian refugee groups do in Northern Europe. Their attempts at incorporation into the host society of Ankara are so strong that when asked why they didn't establish Iranian migrants associations in the host society, they replied that that wasn't what they wanted. In other words, the interviewees of this study emphasize primarily their cultural similarities with the host society of Ankara, Turkey, rather than their differences such, as is the case in other Iranian diaspora groups, either in Europe or the United States. For this reason, this study didn't draw from past diaspora studies, nor does it refer to documented Iranian migrants as a diaspora group when analyzing their experiences. The situation, however, is different to that of Iranian political asylum seekers in Ankara and in Turkey as a whole, since they have no intention of incorporating into Turkish society, although studying their experiences from the perspective of diaspora studies would make a valuable contribution to migration literature.

Although all of these theories of international migration have been useful in comprehending and analyzing the different stories of international migration, for the case of the respondent Iranians in Ankara, they have not been congruent matches for capturing and comprehending their situation. Part three of the study will explain and follow Bourdieu's sociological perspective and approach, and will explain why it fits better the purpose of this study. Before explaining the main theoretical perspective of the study, part two will make a brief analysis of other studies focusing on Iranian migrants, both in Turkey and in other countries.

3.2. Academic Literature on Iranian Migrants

To date, Iranian migrants have been the focus of many social science studies in different parts of the world with emphasis on their international migration habits. Although it is not possible to mention all related studies in this small part of the thesis, it may be helpful to reference the general trends in such literature. A search of online archives for studies related to Iranian migrants uncovers three basic geographical divisions: studies conducted in Western European countries; in the United States; and/or in other Social Welfare countries, such as Canada and

Australia. The majority of these researches concentrate on the diaspora, such as those in Sweden (Cederberg, 2012; Graham and Khosravi, 1997; Naghdi, 2010), although sometimes there is focus on the transformation of gender relations after migration (Ahmadi, 2003; Darvishpour, 2002; Khosravi, 2009). The diaspora have also been the subject of studies in Australia (McAuliffe, 2008; Tenty and Houston, 2013), the UK (McAuliffe, 2005; Gholami, 2014) and Germany (Bafekr and Leman, 1999; Sanadjian, 1995), while another body of work concentrates on the United States, given its unique importance for Iranian migrants (Alinejad, 2013; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009; Bozorgmehr, 1997; Bozorgmehr, 1998; Fayyaz and Shirazi, 2013; Karim, 2013; Maghbouleh, 2010). This unique importance of the United States has already been expressed by Karim (2013: 49–50):

> … as scholars committed to working on Iran and manifestations of Iran's rich cultural and historical heritage in a wide number of disciplines, we have increasingly felt the limitations of financial resources, access to documents and archival resources, and difficulties in traveling to and from Iran, particularly from countries like the United States that have had a continuously tense relationship with Iran over the past four decades. In seeking to understand the varieties and expressions of Iranian Diaspora experience, we also have an occasion to recognize and share the innovative and dynamic ways that our research and our fields of study are brought into conversations with other disciplines and are shaped by the realities of migration. In essence we now recognize that Iran's migrant, immigrant and, now, second-generation populations constitute part of the field of Iranian Studies.

In addition to these mentioned studies, the scope of studies of Iranian migrants can be extended when specific issues such as refugees or highly qualified Iranians are included.

For studies referring to Turkey, two main topics stand out, being documented and undocumented migrants. As mentioned in more detail in the previous chapter, due to the geographical limitations of the 1951 Geneva Convention, non-European asylum seekers are not considered as permanent refugees in Turkey, but have the right to stay in the country temporarily until they are officially resettled in a third country. Within this process, although being within the asylum seeking process, which is actually a documented process, the applicants'

poor living conditions resemble more those of undocumented migrants. In this respect, studies on asylum seekers and transit migrants in Turkey are considered as within the field of undocumented migration. For instance, Van, as the closest city to the Iranian border, has a proportionally high number of Iranian asylum seekers, and so there are many researches and theses focusing on this area, along with Istanbul, as one of the main urban cities to which they gravitate (Danış, Taraghi, and Pérouse, 2009; Koser Akcapar, 2006). The bulk of studies deal with the plights of Iranian asylum seekers as undocumented migrants, and while documented migrants tend to be attributed less importance, the following studies focus on this particular group in Turkey.

First of all, it is worth mentioning once again that finding researches about documented Iranian migrants in Turkey, in other words regular migrants, is quite difficult, despite the number of Iranians living permanently in Turkey. One of the reasons for this is their strategies not to distinguish themselves, unlike in the United States, as will be explained in the following sections. Secondly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Iranians seek Turkish citizenship as another strategy, aiming to fully incorporate into the host society, and once they obtain Turkish citizenship, it is almost impossible to follow them. Finally, the current migrant/refugee crisis that Turkey has been experiencing over the last couple of years in the form of Syrians fleeing the civil war at home has rightfully drawn all the attention related to this issue. The first academic study into documented Iranians in Turkey dates back to 1989, when Edman Nemati (1989), studying for his master's degree in the Education Faculty at Gazi University, penned a thesis entitled "A Field Study of Iranian Migrants Residing in Istanbul since 1979" *(1979 Sonrası İstanbul'da bulunan İran'lı göçmenler Üzerine Saha Çalışması)*. This was the first academic thesis addressing the issue in Turkey to be registered in the Higher Council of Education of Turkey, and was followed by another masters' thesis in 1992 by Media Royan (1992) entitled "Iranians in Istanbul" *(İstanbul'da İranlılar),* who was studying in the Geography Department of Istanbul University. Also in 1992, a study entitled "Socio-economic, Cultural and Political Situation of Iranian Students in Turkey" *(Türkiye'deki İranlı Öğrencilerin Sosyo-ekonomik, Kültürel ve Siyasi Durumları)* was

submitted to the International Relations Department of Istanbul University By Davut Gaffariye (1992). The years of these thesis are no coincidence, since the number of Iranians living in Turkey grew after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Apart from the above-mentioned studies and theses focusing on Iranian asylum seekers that are not stated here, there is only one academic thesis focusing on documented Iranian migrants within the field of social sciences, compiled by an Iranian student in Ankara: "A Study of the Problems of Post-Islamic Revolution Immigrants in Turkey" *(Türkiye'deki İranlı Göçmenlerin Kimlik Aidiyet ve Uyum Sorunları - 1979 İran Devrimi Sonrası),* written by Mehdi Haji Agha (2007) in 2007 while studying in the Sociology Department of Ankara University. In this research, the writer conducted 100 interviews with Iranians of Azerbaijani, Kurdish and Persian backgrounds living in different parts of Turkey, namely Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Antalya. Agha found that 69 percent of the respondents regretted their migration to Turkey, as their move had not lived up to expectations; and while 67 percent felt that they still belonged to Iran, 12 percent felt an affinity with both Iran and Turkey. One limitation of this study may be attributed to the assumptions made about documented Iranians in general, and these numbers may be representative merely of the group interviewed for the study rather than for all Iranians living in Turkey, since documented Iranians are dispersed across different parts of Turkey. Furthermore, Iranians have different socio-economic statuses across the country, and so a study of only 100 interviewees cannot be considered fully representative. That said, the study stands as an important reference point among other academic works in this field.

Last but not least, another field of research exists within the departments of Education and Training that focuses on Iranian students who are temporarily/permanently staying in Turkey. In these studies, Iranian students are taken into consideration for comparing Turkish and Iranian students on some specific issues such as: the Peer Selection of Iranian and Turkish University Students, or the relationship between motivational and cognitive learning strategies, with special reference to the differences between Iranian and Turkish learners of English. Another group of studies focuses only on Iranian students,

with particular focus on such issues as: a survey of the writings of Iranian students who learn Turkish as a foreign language, and a study of the effect of economic status and family background on Iranian high school students' foreign language achievements.

3.3. Ethnic and Religious Diversities of Iranian Migrants

Iran is home to various ethnic and religious groups, constituting a heterogeneous structure, and this obviously influences the diversity of Iranian migrants in different parts of the world. Before making an analysis of the diverse ethnic and religious characteristics of Iranians in other destination countries, it would be helpful to make a brief mention of the ethnic structure of Iran. Iran is located in the Middle East, and has borders with Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Oman, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan. Its population is estimated to be slightly more than 70 million, with much ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. According to Rashidvash (2013), in 2008, Persians constituted 68 percent of the population, with the remainder made up of Azerbaijani Turks (16 percent), Kurds (7 percent), Lurs (6 percent), Arabs (2 percent), Baluchis (2 percent), Turkmens (1 percent), Turkish tribal groups, such as the Qashqai (1 percent) and non-Persian, non-Turkic groups, such as Armenians, Assyrians and Georgians (less than 1 percent) (Rashidvash, 2013: 217). In Figure 1 below, the main ethnic minorities by region.

According to a 2008 report by the US Congressional Research Service, approximately 89 percent of Iranians are Shia Muslims, while "Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, Sunni Muslim and Jewish communities, constitute around 11%. Reportedly, all religious minorities suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in the areas of employment, education, and housing" (Hassan, 2008: 6). In this regard, contrasting Iran's popular representation as an Islamic country, it is a base to other communities and religions that include Assyrian and Armenian Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, etc. (Price, 2005).

Map 1: Ethnoreligious Distribution Map of Iran

Source: Vahid Rashidvash, 2013. "Iranian People: Iranian Ethnic Groups", *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 15 (3): 216-226.

This ethnic and religious diversification within the country is likely to have a significant influence on experiences of international migration. For instance, as McAuliffe states, the religious intolerance in Iran has ensured that religious minorities are overrepresented in the diaspora (McAuliffe, 2005). The Baha'i faith in particular that emerged in nineteenth century Iran constitutes the one of the most populous groups of Iranians in the diaspora. The Baha'is, currently number around 300,000 in Iran, and are considered an official apostasy by the Iranian regime that has been subject to systematic persecution, ranging from the confiscation of property and barring from tertiary education, through to

imprisonment and execution (McAuliffe, 2008: 66). As a result, the number of Baha'i Iranians rivals the proportion of Muslims Iranians in foreign countries.[10]

Similar to Baha'i example, the ethnic and religious minorities of Iran are well represented among the participants of this study, to some extent. The majority of the settled Iranians in the study are of Azerbaijani origin, who hold a devalued social position in Iranian society. Judith Zijlstra's unpublished master's thesis details the Azerbaijani Iranians' use of ethnic capital in their struggle to gain better social positions in Turkey (Zijlstra, 2009). The study features only a very small number of Baha'i interviewees, all of whom are students, given that the majority of the settled Baha'i Iranians live in Western countries, as mentioned above. The demographic profiles of the interviewed Iranians will be presented in Chapters 4 and 5, which will show the presence also of participants from other ethnic and religious backgrounds, such as Arabs, Persian, Assyrians, Turkmens, Christians and Sunnis. Despite the ethnic and religious diversification, the sample is far from being representative with this small proportion of interviewees of this study. It is necessary to restate here that this study is not intended to be an analysis of the internal diversity of documented Iranian migrants, although these ethnic and religious distinctions will be presented along with the study as part of the analysis of common strategies while using different forms of capital to settle in Ankara, Turkey. To provide more information about the aim and the tools used in the study, the following section will provide a description of the theoretical framework that is used to comprehend the fieldwork in Ankara.

3.4. Constructing International Migration as a Field

After providing a brief summary of other theories of international migration, as well as academic studies and trends both in Turkey and in other countries, this section describes the theoretical approach of the study. International migration can

[10] Research has found that Baha'i adherents from Iran generally focus less on contemporary Iran and more on a cosmopolitan and global religious worldview, while Muslim Iranians concentrate more on their homeland (Warburg, 1999).

be seen as a field in which different agents, such as migrants, organizations or institutions, are involved, each of which applies their own influence to the field and the rules of that field.

A field, for Bourdieu, refers to the environment of an agent in which all different forms of relations occur and structure those agents' positions. In other words, a field can be described as the universe in which practices and agents exist. A field is a notion that Bourdieu explains using the metaphor of a "game", in which the players in the game are the agents in the field who look forward to winning. These agents may be individuals, organizations or institutions, and just as players within a card game hold playing cards of different values, agents hold different amounts and forms of capital, giving them more or less powerful positions. Since the aim of the game is to win, players compete with each other, and agents struggle for better positions in the field. In this regard, a field is a dynamic space "with a set of objective power relations that impose themselves on all who enter the field and that are irreducible to the intentions of the individual agents or even to the direct interactions among the agents" (Bourdieu, 1985: 7). Just as every game has its own set of rules, every field has characteristics that the agents within learn, and in this regard, the field of international migration includes its own universe, its own set of rules, and distinct social positions for migrants and relevant institutions alike. In this respect, while migrants actively join and comprehend their field, in this case, the social space in the host country, they struggle for better positions by acquiring different forms of capital.[11]

One may pose the question, what is the importance and benefit of the concept of "field" in an analysis of Iranian migrants in Ankara? In the field of

[11] Although Bourdieu came from a structuralist background, he attempted to overcome the two dominant strands of French intellectual thought in this theorizing, namely existentialism and structuralism, especially in his book "Logic of Practice". His theory, however, could not avoid criticisms of being structuralist or determinist, due mainly to the so-called incapacity of the construction of social change. For more discussions, see: James Bohman (1997) "Reflexivity, Agency and Constraint: The Paradoxes of Bourdieu's Sociology of Knowledge."; Anthony King (2000). "Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A 'Practical' Critique of Habitus". Sociological Theory, 18, 417–433.

Iranian migrants, individuals struggle to attain better social positions within that structured space. In other words, Iranian migrants try continuously to attain higher socio-economic and prestigious positions in the host country. To attain these social positions, each migrant uses different forms of capital (cultural, economic, social and symbolic) in the field, while not underestimating the set of rules tied to that given environment, such as the education system, state policies, etc. For this reason, in Bourdieu's notion of "field" the individuals in the field are active agents, rather having only "passive" or "victimized" roles, and strive to incorporate themselves into the host society. The conventional understanding of "integration", especially in policy and public discourses, implies more of a linear process through which migrants adjust to the host society (Hatziprokopiou, 2006), however from Bourdieu's approach, both the migrants and the structures are considered influential and transformative. In this regard, Bourdieu's notion of field, is crucial when focusing on the mutual effects of both structures and agents, as in the case of meso-level theories of international migration.

The field of international migration comprises many agents, including migrants, institutions, organizations, and governmental bodies and/or states that are related to international migration, whether directly or indirectly. Although there are various focus areas within the field, this study concentrates mainly on documented Iranian migrants and their relationships within the host society of Turkey. Figure 2 provides a better picture of the field of international migration for Iranian migrants living in Turkey, including all those involved. It should be noted, however, that this figure is not representative of all international migrants in different parts of the world, but only the Iranian interviewees that have settled in Ankara, and uses data based on conducted interviews with Iranians between 2012 and 2013. In this regard, the agents mentioned in the figure are only those referred by the interviewees, and so newer institutions such as the Directorate General of Migration Management, which was established in 2014 by the Ministry of Interior, are absent. Along with documented and undocumented migrants, the figure shows all of the named institutions and governmental bodies. In short, this

figure provides a snapshot of the field of Iranian migrants living in Ankara from their own perspective.[12]

Figure 1: Field of International Migration in Ankara (For Iranian Migrants)



The figure indicates the majority of the agents involved in the international migration experiences of Iranians living in Ankara, as an output of the fieldwork of interviews conducted in 2012–2013. Transnational organizations such as the IOM and UNHCR retain a strategic position for both asylum seekers and transit migrants looking for asylum after leaving their home countries, while the figure also details the documented Iranian migrants who come to Ankara to apply for a short-term tourist visa or long-term migrant visa for the United States through the American Embassy in Ankara. Additionally, the Embassy of Iran is a significant address for documented Iranians in Turkey, being somewhere that they can contact

[12] This figure took inspiration from the doctoral study and table of Susan Thieme (2006: 47).

when they don't know how to resolve certain issues in Ankara. The same cannot be said of course for asylum seekers, who tend to try to stay away from the Iranian Embassy in Ankara due to their position. Within the grounds of the Iranian Embassy there is the Iran Culture House, which hosts cultural events, Persian language courses for Turkish citizens, and an Iranian High School for the children of Embassy staff. Ankara also has a number of non-profit organizations that are very significant in the field, such as ASAM,[13] which tries to resolve the problems faced by asylum seekers and refugees. There are also some local organizations whose primary mission is not related to migrants, but who have a crucial position in their lives. For instance, the KAOS GL[14] organization is of particular note, providing help to LGBT people fleeing prejudice and violence in Iran. Last but not least, there are also ethnic organizations that have been established by Iranians living in Ankara, such as the Turkish-Iranian Business, Culture and Education Association; various Iranian Tourism Offices and Iranian Restaurants. The Turkish-Iranian Business, Culture and Education Association is an example of an organization established by migrants at the beginning of 2014, while Iranian restaurants and Iranian tourism offices gained popularity and become more common in Ankara especially in recent decades. All of these agents that are active

[13] The Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) was established in Ankara on December 22, 1995 as a non-governmental and non-profit organization. The main objective of ASAM is to develop solutions to the challenges that refugees and asylum seekers encounter in Turkey and to support them in meeting their basic and social needs. For more information, see: http://www.sgdd.org.tr/en/

[14] The mission of the Kaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Researches and Solidarity Association (Kaos GL) is to support Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans individuals in embracing libertarian values, realizing their own existence and cultivating themselves in order to contribute to the development of social peace and welfare, while also promoting the development of individual, social and cultural lives and behaviors. In the Refugee Support Program, Kaos GL conducts refugee activities in the context of human rights monitoring, reporting and legal support. This support takes the form of social and legal activities involving LGBT individuals who come to Turkey as a transit country. Within the scope of this program, Kaos GL communicates and cooperates with NGOs, and national and international institutions working in the field of immigration and human rights. For more information, see http://www.kaosgldernegi.org/kaosgl_en.php

in the field, including the mentioned organizations and institutions, were stated as important for Iranians living in Ankara, especially at the time of the interviews.

International migrants can be divided into two basic groups on the basis of their residence status, being either documented or undocumented. Asylum seekers and refugees exist at the intersection of the two groups, in that although they have legal permission to stay in the country after applying to the UNHCR, their living conditions are much like those of undocumented migrants, which puts them in a disadvantaged position.[15] In addition, if, for some reason, they do not renew their residence permit, they may turn into undocumented migrants after a while, or they may first enter the country without a permit and then apply to the UNHCR, and obtain a residence permit after crossing the borders of Turkey. Another migrant group at this intersection is migrant workers. İçduygu and Aksel (2012) refer to this group as circular migrants due to the back and forth circular mobility they must endure to renew their visa. Documented migrants, on the other hand, are those who come to the country with a legal permit of stay, and include international students with a study permit; people who start working in Turkey with a work permit;[16] people who come to Turkey with a relative connection (such as partner or extended family); and people who came initially on a temporary permit and in time acquired a permanent one. Migrants who have acquired Turkish Citizenship fall outside this group. Undocumented migrants, as the final category in the figure, are those who have never registered their arrival in the country, or the group of migrants who previously had a stay permit but who work informally, or who used to have permits, but their validity has now expired.[17] Researchers focusing on

[15] The disadvantaged position of asylum seekers in Turkey stems mainly from Turkey's geographical limitation related to the Geneva Convention, as mentioned in the previous chapter on international migration to Turkey.

[16] Although a work permit is available to foreigners under Turkish labor law, it is usually very difficult to obtain one due to requirements of the employer and the employee, as mentioned in chapter two.

[17] Asylum seekers who overstay their residence permit and undocumented workers who are working informally in Turkey turn into transit migrants when once they continue their journeys other countries, either by themselves or through, smugglers without any papers. Easily changing

transit migration signify the Middle East and Asia as a common start point for routes that end up in Europe after passing through Turkey (Düvell, 2008).

3.5. Intersection of Field of International Migration with Others

The field of international migration intersects with, is influenced by and influences other fields in terms of the applied rules. This study asserts that international migration can be considered as a field, and so it can be deemed necessary to demonstrate its place among other intersecting fields and the influence of accumulated capital in expressing the constructions and power relations within the social spaces of Iranian migrants.

When stating and explaining a field, it is not only the power relations among the agents with different forms of capital that lead to distinctions in social status, in that other fields also intersect and apply influence. In the field of international migration, the fields of diplomacy, bureaucracy, economy and education are crucial and influential. To start with the field of diplomacy, this is where all international agreements are stated, and so whenever a migrant enters into that field, s/he is required to follow the rules of the diplomatic field and act within its boundaries. For instance, a special agreement exists between Iran and Turkey that ensures whenever an Iranian citizen enters Turkey, s/he will be given a 90-day tourist visa at the border, unless s/he has another visa. This special agreement has been used by many documented Iranian migrants to reside in Turkey for long periods by travelling out of the country and returning every 90 days, picking up a new visa at the border.[18] However, if they fail to renew their visa, they become undocumented migrants once it has expired. While documented migrants usually seek visa permits

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categorizations of migration (easily becoming an undocumented migrant for instance) are important, and serve to remind us of the slippery and transitive definitions of migrants.

[18] As mentioned in chapter two, this law has been changed, with only one 90-day tourist visa being granted in 180 days, limiting ability of Iranians to reside legally in the country for longer periods by leaving and for a short period of time. However, at the time of the interviews, this new legislation had not entered into force, and so the interviewees were familiar with the previous version of the law.

to allow their international mobility, undocumented migrants need to be aware of these diplomatic restrictions related to border crossings. Baha'i Iranians, for instance, do not share the same rights to study and work in Iran enjoyed by Shia Iranians, which results in many coming to Turkey to seek asylum through an application to the UNHCR. Many such cases are sent to the United States (after resettlement procedures, which may take some time), where there is a large community of Baha'i Iranians. Asylum seekers are required to apply to the UNHCR in the first country they enter in which the organization has an office, and will be returned to this country if they manage to make it to a second or third country, which constitutes influence from the field of diplomacy over the agents within the field of international migration. In a recent change, under the new Turkey-EU readmission deal mentioned in the previous chapter, as of April 2016, all irregular migrants passing into the EU via Turkey will be returned to Turkey, which once again emphasizes the importance of the field of diplomacy in international migration.

Another field affecting the field of international migration is bureaucracy that arranges formulates the relationship between the agents and state. In our specific example of the field of international migration, Iranian migrants living in Ankara are influenced by both the state of Turkey and the state of Iran, although they no longer reside in the latter. Under the influence of the field of bureaucracy, international migrants must learn how to leave their home country behind and incorporate into the host society. In the case of Iranians, undocumented migrants seek ways of crossing the border from Iran to Turkey, and remain there without being caught by the police. For documented migrants, however, they can enter and stay within the country for a while with a temporary permit, and may want to take Turkish citizenship unless they are doing only short-term business in the country. However, gaining Turkish citizenship is a very long and complicated procedure,[19]

[19] These procedures and legislations are covered in the previous chapter on international migration to Turkey.

and documented migrants need to follow strict regulations carefully and make investments into their applications (e.g. such as hiring a solicitor). In this regard, fulfilling the requirements of the bureaucratic field of the host society requires not only economic capital, but also cultural capital. As seen from the two examples presented here, the conditions for documented and undocumented migrants are quite distinct, and although both groups need to consider the rules of the field of bureaucracy, the existence of capital influences the different positioning of migrants within the field.

The field of education is very important for Iranians in international migration, but is more valid and influential for documented migrants, since they use education as a way of migrating, as will be shown in the next chapter. The most noteworthy example of this field is international Iranian students who come to Turkey for undergraduate or graduate level education. It may be beneficial to note that international education processes require a significant amount of economic capital due to the long study periods of students who are usually prohibited from working. The bureaucratic field influences the rights of asylum seekers and refugees to obtain education in Turkey, but in practice, they are generally unable to continue their education after high school. For this reason, not many undocumented migrants are able to enter university education in Turkey.[20] Another important fact about the field of education for international migrants is the process of "status passage" (Nohl et al., 2014), referring to the transformation of cultural capital into economic capital by taking up a position in the job market after the recognition of institutionalized cultural capital. The ability of agents in the field of international migration to use their institutionalized cultural capital (e.g. university diplomas) satisfies a significant requirement for entry into the job market, allowing these migrants to become more advantaged in finding a position

[20] There is only one known exception to this, which is a true success story. Afghan refugee Farzad launched an international campaign to fund his tuition and registration and begin his university education in Turkey. https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/make-a-dream-come-true-help-farzad-to-study

in the host society. Iranian families who are living in Ankara have two options for the education of their children: being the Iranian High School or a Turkish high school. Turkish schools are preferred by Iranian families who plan to stay in Turkey for longer periods, as they want their children to incorporate into the host society as much as possible. While the Iranian High School has been established primarily for the children of Iranian families working in the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, it is open to all the Iranian families. Some families have expressed that this high school has a more relaxed and easy atmosphere than Turkish schools, since the primary goal of the former is to prepare students for the university entrance exams[21] in Turkey. For this reason, the Iranian High School is usually preferred by the families who do not intend to stay in Turkey permanently, or who want their children to be raised in Islamic and Iranian traditional culture. As can be seen from these examples, the field of education is a strong determinant for the future plans and statuses of Iranian migrants within the field.

The last field of influence on international migration is economy. As in the field of education, a passage of status is possible with the conversion of institutionalized cultural capital into economic capital, although not all Iranian migrants are educated in Turkey, which is another dimension to be analyzed in the field of economy. According to previous studies, when international migrants obtain diplomas from foreign countries, it is usually more difficult to compete with the local people in that country (Nohl et al., 2014). This is indeed the case for Turkish people who graduated from a Turkish university and migrated to Germany. When looking at the basic division of undocumented and documented migrants, it is more likely for undocumented migrants to end up in the informal sector due the lack of recognition of their cultural capital in the host country. Research conducted into this topic has revealed that most undocumented Iranians

[21] In order to continue higher education, all citizens of Turkish Republic have to enter a university entrance exams organized each year by the Higher Commission of Education (*Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu*). This entrance exams is valid also for foreigners, for whom there is a special quota in each university in Turkey.

work in the construction sector in Turkey (Danış, Taraghi, and Pérouse, 2009), while documented migrants, who tend to have accumulated cultural and economic capital, are more likely have a better status in the host society.

The field of economy is also connected with the field of bureaucracy, in that to establish a business as a migrant in the host county such as Turkey, migrants need to have either special business permits or citizenship. The interview group of this study included Iranians who have started their own businesses in Turkey, which is something that will be covered in detail in Chapter 5.

3.6. Better Lifestyle outside Iran: *Illusio* of the Field

Bourdieu's metaphor of *game* can be drawn upon once again to express another of his concepts that is pertinent to this study, being *illusio*. Illusio refers to all the agents within the field agreeing to collectively play the game because it is worth playing. Bourdieu elaborated on this process in an interview: "There are as many practical understandings of the game, and thus interests, as there are games. Each field calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interest, a specific illusio as tacit recognition of the value of the stakes of the game and as practical mastery of its rules." (Wacquant, 1989: 42). In this regard there is a specific illusio that holds every single game or field together, which is valid also for the case of Iranian migrants, but due to the distinct positions within the game, different agents may have different specific interests that may influence the rules of the game (Bourdieu, 2010a). In the example of the present study, since the game is the field of international migration, migrants have goals and targets that influence their decision to play the game, or in this case, to migrate. This illusio then becomes a social reality, in that it convinces every agent to believe in that game. In the field of the present study, Iranian migrants believe in migration as a means of attaining their goals.

Taking all of this into account raises the question of what it was among the Iranian migrants that compelled them enter the field of international migration. To reply to this question it is necessary to look at the specific case of Iran and its migration history. Akcapar (2006) expressed that many Iranians had left Iran after

the 1979 Islamic revolution in the country, given their opposition to the Islamic regime. Many of those who left belonged to the middle and upper classes, as were generally educated and secular. Since they had a certain level of cultural and economic capital accumulation (they were well-off and educated, and the opportunities to migrate for highly skilled Iranians were significantly greater than unskilled migrants), they were able to incorporate into their new host countries easily, particularly the so-called developed Western countries, and mainly the United States (Bozorgmehr, 1997). Knowing this, the earlier question "What is the main struggle faced by Iranian migrants that compelled them enter this field?" becomes more important, as in international migration literature it is rare to find people who have migrated, especially if they have accumulated a significant degree of economic and cultural capital. Contrary to mainstream international migration theories, this situation denotes that in some cases, like in the case of Iranians, it is not economic reasons that are the main compulsion behind their migration. The political process that started with the White Revolution and lead to the 1979 Islamic Revolution was an upheaval in political life and in the atmosphere of everyday life in Iran. In this period: "Increasing numbers went abroad where they remained for good. By the 1970s, there were more Iranian doctors in New York than in any city outside Tehran. The term 'brain drain' was first attached to Iran" (Abrahamian, 2008: 142). Hence, this story of Iranian migration is not only related with economic capital, but also with cultural capital, which includes political struggle.

The interviews with Iranians in Ankara demonstrate that, the basic interest, illusio, of Iranian migrants is the A desire to build a better life and lifestyle outside Iran. The belief that a better life exists outside Iran convinces many Iranians to enter to the field of international migration to achieve their goals. In other words, they want to reconstruct a new lifestyle in the host society, full of the things that they think they had lost during the Islamic revolution. Maarika, one of the settled interviewees, expressed her disappointment of the Islamic revolution, and her wish to reconstruct her lifestyle as such:

> Oh, why did this revolution just happen in the middle of our lives? It destroyed everything. While people were living beautifully, suddenly the spell was broken, everything is broken. I remember our Newroz [New Year] celebrations. We were buying Newroz flowers and fish before going home to celebrate all together. It was so crowded that not everyone could fit in the house. Now all this beauty has gone. The day turned into night. Why did we end like this, we have all that beauty, all the Turks, Kurds, Christians in our culture … Why, after living with all this beauty, did this revolution hit us. It doesn't end, it doesn't. Why do they [the World] think bad things about us; why do they throw our passports in our faces when they see them, why? ... Why do people live according to the Islamic rules, why is our prestige so low; why? (Female, 48, Divorced, Persian)

This train of thought was common among her group of Iranian friends, who thought in general that life became worse after the Islamic revolution. Despite the beautiful picture painted by Maarika about the pre-revolutionary period, many studies actually state that the rules of Reza Shah (1925–1941) and his son Muhammed Reza Shah (1941–1979) were essentially anti-democratic (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2011: 7), oppressive and arbitrary, and even considered as an authoritarian regime. In this respect, Maarika's statement above is a romantic and nostalgic view of pre-revolution Iran, and is indicative of the advantageous position held by a privileged circle of people in Iranian society.

This perception and chain of thought among Iranian migrants will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, which focuses on the Iranian habitus. This study claims that the illusio of this field (of international migration) can be referred to as the belief (or interest, or aim) in Iranian migrants' ability to construct a better life and lifestyle in another country. That said, this illusio is not only valid among Iranian migrants living in Ankara, as other examples in different studies indicate the same illusio among other Iranian migrants who make plans to migrate at in an attempt to change their lives. Garousi, an Iranian living in Canada and working as a scientist, defined this belief of a "better life outside Iran" as follows:

> "As said, there exist some others who have an illusion,[22] in the sense that they have false impressions of real life outside of Iran. They imagine that one can have unlimited freedom, joy, trouble-free money and comfortable life in the foreign countries. However, those dreams rarely come true in the first years of immigration and they need patience and hard work. Real life experiences have shown that many new immigrants feel shocked when they first arrive in a Western country and find out that the real life there is generally different than what they had expected and dreamed of." (Garousi, 2003: 7)

Although one would expect that every migrant would aspire to a better life after migration, Iranians have a distinct feature in this respect. Documented Iranian migrants believe they can reconstruct a new lifestyle in the host country, where they hope to rebuild the "unlimited freedom, joy, trouble-free money and comfortable life" that they lost. This was mostly referred to by the participants as a Western-defined distinction, which include also secularism, democracy, individual rights and a free market economy (Fayyaz and Shirazi, 2013). In this respect, what Iranian migrants develop as illusio is influenced by a very Western formulation from their perspective. To put it differently, what Iranian migrants understand to be a better life outside Iran is deeply reliant on a perception that they define as a Western distinction. It makes no difference whether or not the illusio is real, in that no Iranian migrant living outside Iran would say that their dreams had come true, although this fact doesn't change or influence the existence of illusio. Needless to say, this illusio can differ depending on the capital held by the individual migrant, and this perception of the Western lifestyle is most common among the upper/middle class Iranian habitus, which will be analyzed in Chapter 6.

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[22] The illusion mentioned in the quote does not fully match Bourdieu's notion of illusio, in that while the former means a false impression, the latter implies the motivation of social agents to enter into the "game". In this regard, the illusio of a better life outside Iran motivates Iranians towards a new life experience, which may be prompted by different reasons. It is worth mentioning, however, that in his article Garousi (2003) focuses on highly skilled migrant Iranians, which he considered to be a "brain drain".

3.7. Different Forms of Capital

In order to understand the positioning of documented Iranians in the host country, it is necessary to unveil the most effective forms of capital within the host society, in that the relationships of Iranian migrants are shaped and influenced according to the distribution of this capital. Furthermore, comprehending the distribution of capital will help the study to comprehend and analyze the struggle for a better position in the host society, as well as the expectations from that specific field of international migration. To begin with the concepts, Bourdieu defines these different forms of capitals as follows:

> Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of nobility (Bourdieu 2010b, 3).

Like card holders in a game, agents (in this study, the Iranian migrants) bring different forms of capital to the field. In this regard, they are not pushed or pulled mechanically by structures within the field of international migration, but rather occupy positions based on the distribution of these forms of capital, and struggle for more powerful positions. In the case of Iranian migrants living in Ankara, it is a question of how they acquire this capital after their migration to Turkey, and whether they can transfer their previously owned (home) capital to the host society.

The conducted interviews revealed that the documented Iranian migrants possessed accumulated economic and cultural capital before leaving Iran and migrating to the host country of Turkey, which raises another significant question of how they transfer their capital to the host society of Ankara? Secondly, since a full transfer of previously acquired capital would be neither possible nor enough for incorporation into the host society, the migrants need to acquire new capital

that they must also convert into the host society. An accumulation of capital assures Iranian migrants a distinctive social positions within society, although it was understood from the interviews that one of the major struggles within the field is related to attaining cultural and economic capital through education and work in the host country. These two forms of capital are considered the most important for documented Iranian migrants in terms of their influence in aiding their incorporation into the host society. For this reason, this study, in Chapters 4 and 5, will make an analysis of the two distinct groups of documented Iranians (Iranian students and settled Iranians) to understand their means of acquisition of different forms of capital in the host society. Social networks are of great importance in accumulating such cultural and economic capital in the host society, being used by the participants of this study as part of a strategy to overcome barriers to the status passage processes, as analyzed in Chapter 2.

The transfer of accumulated capital from one's country of origin stands as one of the greatest hurdles faced by migrants, such university diplomas and other certificates awarded in the home country, which may not be accepted in the host country. To overcome this hurdle, Iranian migrants follow a strategy of education in the host country. From the interviews it was understood that Iranian migrants come to Turkey for higher education either to find a place in the job market in Turkey, or continue their education in Western countries. The latter strategy is used mostly by Iranian students who see Turkey as a transit country on the way to their final destination, while in the former, after transferring or enhancing their cultural capital in the host country, they try to find a job to earn a living, which means converting their cultural capital into economic capital. This struggle to accumulate both cultural and economic capital within the host society can be underlined as the primary obstacle within their field.

The second challenge in the field is the struggle to gain symbolic capital. Symbolic capital does not have a definitive meaning, referring rather to a cognitive situation that is socially constituted (Bourdieu, 1986) that serves as a value, such as prestige or honor. Symbolic capital can also be seen as a success which that has been accumulated in the host society. Since Iranian migrants strive to recreate the

lifestyle they lost with the Islamic Revolution, they maintain the perception that they had already *deserved* this symbolic capital due to their ethnic and historical background, as will be explained in the following chapters. In addition, they want to show that, being Iranian, they already known how to live that lifestyle. In other words, the capital they possess and the lifestyle they live serve as a means of displaying their symbolic capital in the host society, and this deserved symbolic capital is the second most significant struggle of Iranian migrants within the field.

That said, it should not be forgotten that symbolic capital demands recognition by all of agents within the field. The level of the host society's respect and recognition of the lifestyle or social positions of Iranians in Turkey influences strongly the acceptance of their prestige. In one of the student interviewees, Payam said:

> The reaction of literate and illiterate people is different towards Iranians. When I speak to the scholars at Middle East Technical University, they all say good things about Iranian culture, and they have an interest in Persia; but whenever I go out [of the university] they say 'what is Iran?' in a teasing way. (Male, 28, Single).

This indicates that the process of construction of symbolic capital by Iranians in the host country is difficult due to a lack of recognition. Another interviewee, Arash, put forward a similar view:

> The general perception about Iran was not good, but in the last few years it got even worse. Some people still ask whether we are talking Arabic, and then you have to explain 'no we don't speak Arabic'. […] City life there is like here in Turkey. If you don't get involved in politics, nobody bothers you. Ok, I know when you're going out you need to cover your hair [women in Iran], but although women must cover their hair, they can drive their car at 3 am after midnight, take part in sports, go to work. There is no such pressure as is shown by the foreign media. Iran's image is bad in the world, and because of this bad representation they always link terrorism with Iran. In my opinion, if more people [Iranians] show their qualities to other people [in the host countries], more people will understand the truth. People who really know our culture says this, they say that they know our Shah period, they say 'You were great!' The older generation knew it, they knew that magnificence! (Male, 34, Married, Azerbaijani)

Iranian people are also aware of the fact that their symbolic capital is not fully recognized by all of the local people in Ankara, with most of the interviewees claiming whether or not their symbolic capital was recognized depended on the level of education (or cultural capital) of the observer. In his statement, Arash first seeks to distance himself and his culture from the Arabic culture, claiming that he teases people who ask him if Iranians spoke Arabic; and when asked about the Islamic culture in Iran, he refers to the pre-Islamic Revolution era under the Shah, which had Western and secular representations according to his perception. Although Arash and some of the other interviewees presented the Shah Period as such, this was not the case for the majority of respondents, as will be mentioned below. In addition, "showing the qualities of Iranian people to other people" is was cited as a common approach, with Arash and a number of other interviewees stating a desire to promote their qualities and prove to the host society that they, documented Iranian migrants, essentially *deserve* that symbolic capital.

3.8. Acquisition of *Deserved* Symbolic Capital in Turkey

This deserved symbolic capital of the Iranian migrants can be acquired through different strategies in different host countries. All of the respondents, both the Iranian students and the settled Iranians, claimed that their better lifestyle idealizations were defined with Western way of life as will be covered in depth in Chapter 6 on the Iranian habitus. What the Iranian migrants actually seek in the host society is things that they were unable to find in Iran such, as secularism, democracy and individual freedoms. Hence, in Turkey, there is a specific lifestyle that holds symbolic importance for the documented Iranians, being seen as something to be embraced and defended, and this makes Turkey a key destination for Iranian migrants, being secular and modern in comparison to its neighbors in the Middle East. For instance, Atatürk[23] is one particular symbol that is

[23] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is credited with being the founder of the Republic of Turkey, and for breaking the bonds with the Ottoman Empire, putting in place reforms with the intention of creating a modern and secular nation-state.

appropriated by Iranian migrants in Turkey, with all of the interviewees mentioning him and his accomplishments as a role model for Iran, based on the perceived secular and modern images of their desired and idealized Western lifestyle. Many of the interviewees showed their gratitude towards him while commenting on the relationship between Turkey and Iran. For example, Maarika said: "When I hear his name [Atatürk], my eyes start to fill with tears. He was such a great and smart man"; while Arman who runs a dental surgery in Kızılay, expressed his love for Atatürk, pointing to his photo on the wall during the interview. He recalled one particular day when some patients in his office attempted to replace Atatürk's photo:

> They told me that if I took his [Atatürk's] photo off the wall, they would fill my office with patients. I replied them 'If his photo is ever off the wall, I will leave this country'. Nobody can tell me what to do! If someone says something like that, then there is no difference left for me between Iran and Turkey. For me, at this age, this is actually important [pointing Atatürk's photo on the wall], not the money or other things. (Male, 41, Engaged, Azerbaijani)

From this it can be understood that Atatürk and his reforms are quite congruent with the idealized Western lifestyle of documented Iranians, who see Atatürk as representative of the secularism and modernism that they lost in Iran after the revolution. The Shah Period was often defended by the interviewees for its secular emphasis, as it will be elaborated in the following chapters. In this respect, the removal of Atatürk's image from Turkey would be seen also as a threat to the lifestyles of Iranians in Turkey, in that the alternative, they stated, was why they fled Iran in the first place. One of the interviewees, Larissa, stated that they would consider leaving Turkey if it began to resemble Iran in the future:

> To be frank, I have a fear of this. If Turkey becomes more like Iran … then I would leave, because we know a country, culture and government that looks like this [unsecular and unmodern way]. Canada would be my choice [after Turkey], also for my son. (Female, 32, Married, Persian)

From this it can be understood that Iranian migrants endeavor not only to show their 'quality' to the host society, but also the potential of the better life and

a lifestyle in the host country that influenced their settlement decision. The decision to settle in Turkey would prove to be a poor one if the lifestyle in the country began to resemble their lifestyle in Iran, as this would constitute a loss of their perceived deserved symbolic capital in Turkey. In this regard, the interviewees reveal that it is their intention to acquire symbolic capital in the host society of Ankara after accumulating cultural and economic capital, indicating that the two struggles of documented Iranians within the field of international migration are both important and complementary.

3.9. Dispositions of Iranian Migrants in a New Habitus

It is necessary here to emphasize that these two struggles to accumulate different forms of capital within the field develop a different *habitus* for Iranian migrants in Ankara, and these function as the perceptions, appreciations and actions of the agents (Bourdieu, 1977: 88). After analyzing the accumulation of different forms of capital in Ankara, this study will focus on the habitus of documented Iranians in Chapter 6, although it is worth clarifying here exactly what is meant by habitus, and how it will be conceptualized in this study.

The behavioral activities and/or dispositions of agents are the outcomes of a habitus that is not rationally determined. In this sense, habitus reminds us of Marx's conceptualization of class consciousness, while Bourdieu uses the analogy of a "fish in water":

> "First and foremost, habitus has the function of overcoming the alternative between consciousness and the unconscious, and between finalism and mechanicalism. (…) Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. And when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it finds itself 'as fish in water', it does not feel the weight of the water and takes the world about itself for granted." (Wacquant, 1989: 43).

From this perspective, habitus as a concept refers to neither agent nor structure, but instead attempts to overcome the duality of the agent and structure by referring to an alternative to the conscious and unconscious dichotomy. Agents, in this case, Iranian migrants, with similar accumulation of capital act in similar

ways (in terms of perceptions, appreciations and actions). However, although habitus can appear to be characteristic of individuals, it is in fact structured by a system of social reproduction that perpetuates the social inequalities and power differentials in society (Nohl et al., 2014: 42). In this respect, the actions of the Iranian migrants are shaped also by their own habitus.

Noble argues that the habitus of migrants is a system of dispositions that needs to be both functional in familiar contexts and yet cumulative and generative under new circumstances. In this regard, it is both a stable and conservative entity, and yet one which is profoundly dynamic (Noble, 2013: 344) – habitus being a social construction. However, for migrants there is always a struggle between the home and host culture, and Bottomley asserts that this clash of the home and the host culture is:

> "Nowhere more clearly to be seen than in the body of the migrant, both because the migrant evinces an embodied experience of disorientation and reorientation central to resettlement, and because this experience demonstrates that the body is not simply the repository of social tradition; it is the means through which we re-orient ourselves in relation to the social field, and thus to new as well as old circumstances, making ourselves at home anew" (Bottomley, 2010: 123).

Similar perceptions of the host country were common among the Iranian migrants in the interviews. Maarika, for instance, clarified the confrontations between the two cultures, and explained her strategy to overcome the dilemma:

> You have to take the road [of adaptation] slowly, by digesting the process, you have to join those [people in Turkey] and understand the culture. When you understand what they value and what they do not, they will embrace you. I don't mean being like them. While feeling and living your own culture in yourself, understanding the new one and letting these two things go parallel to each other. I think I have succeeded in this regard. Develop yourself, but don't change! I maintain my own mentality, but respect you as well. (Female, 48, Divorced, Persian)

While the host culture is very important for Iranian migrants in Ankara, preserving the home culture is still a priority. The confrontations between the two cultures have been conceptualized differently by various scholars, being referred

to at different times as *transnational habitus* (Oliver and O'Reilly, 2010), *ethnicised habitus* (Noble, 2013) and *migrant habitus* (Parker, 2000). This study will follow Noble's conceptualization of the ethnicised habitus, namely the Iranian habitus, for two main reasons. Firstly, as Noble expresses, the concept of *migrant habitus* and other binary dispositions focuses on migrants as they are only integrating into the society and doesn't consider migrants' influence to host society (Noble, 2013). Secondly, Iranians prefer not to refer to themselves as migrants, but rather as "Iranians", or "foreigners" to a lesser degree, in Turkey. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some of the respondents showed their discomfort during the interviews when they were referred to as "migrants", and so rather than using other approaches, this study will follow the conceptualization of Iranian habitus to be more specific in indicating the characteristics of the agents within the field.

3.10. The Symbolic Power of the United States

United States is seen symbolically as the most important country for the Iranian migrants. While talking to Iranian students in Ankara, many spoke of their plans to move to the United States, while some of the settled Iranians plan to send their children there, despite being happy living in Turkey. As will be shown in Chapters 4 and 5, many of the Iranian migrants stated that the United States would be the best choice for the attainment of not only cultural and economic capital, but also symbolic capital, as well as their perceived deserved importance. In this regard, Iranian migrants who end up in the United States are automatically considered as "successful" within the field of international migration.

This "success story" of Iranian migrants of who end up in the United States is always retold by the people who were left behind in the home country of Iran, even though they don't know whether or not these stories were a true success, as voiced by Garousi in Section 6 of this chapter. This higher positioning of the United States, and Los Angeles in particular, as the best destination for Iranians has often been acknowledged many Iranians in the field of international migration. The "Tehrangeles" nickname, combining the names Tehran and Los Angeles, can

be given as an example of the impact of this idealization in the Iranian habitus and among migrants.

Tehrangeles surely constitutes a symbolic power (as a recognized power) for Iranians, being known as home to the highest number of Iranians outside Iran. Iranians are able to live the perceived deserved lifestyle (secular, Western, modern, etc.) in Tehrangeles, having lost these attributes in Iran after the Islamic Revolution. In this respect, the Iranian habitus in the United States has also been affected by the *illusio* of the field mentioned earlier, that Iranian migrants deserve better lives outside Iran. That said, the way they display their deserved lifestyle in Tehrangeles is significantly different from their dispositions in Ankara, Turkey. According to one interviewee, Mehdi,[24] who now lives in Tehrangeles:

> Iranians outside Iran are proud of their past and to show that they deserve the best. They usually buy the best cars, the best clothes, they go to the best schools, but if you do too much of it, then it is construed as showing off, you know. (Male, Late 50s, Married, Azerbaijani)

These dispositions of the Iranian habitus in Tehrangeles have been subjected to criticism by the older generations, who see it as painting a picture of mere consumption among younger Iranians. This is all too apparent in the American reality TV series entitled *Shahs of Sunset,* which first aired in March 2011 and is continuing today. The show follows the lives of a group of Iranian American friends living in Beverly Hills and in the greater "Tehrangeles" area, however one Iranian interviewee, Hassan, who lives in Berkeley, California in the United States, said that the show paints a poor light on young Iranians living in America due to the crazy consumption habits of the show's stars, and says that the symbolic capital of Iranians should not be represented in this way. This is the second show about Iranian Americans, the first being *Love is in the Heir,* which lasted only one season of ten episodes in 2004. These examples are important in showing the symbolic

[24] Interviews were conducted with Mehdi and Hassan in California, United States in the summer of 2014, but were not included in the fieldwork of this study, being part of another research by the same author.

power of the United States among Iranian migrants and in the field of international migration, being constructed as the perfect country in which to reclaim symbolic capital. This is a much exaggerated perception of the United States among Iranian migrants, resembling the unreal idealization of the "American Dream" in many ways. In other words, the symbolic lifestyle that one can supposedly find in the United States seems to be winning the symbolic struggle within the field of international migration, at least for Iranians, however this discussion, the symbolic capital and habitus of Tehrangeles falls outside the scope of this study, but may be subjected to further analysis in a future research.

CHAPTER IV

"STUDY ABROAD" EXPERIENCES OF IRANIAN STUDENTS

4.1. Acquisition of Cultural Capital in Ankara

Most studies that focus on highly skilled migrants explain their experiences in the host country in line with the theory of "human capital" (Castles and Miller, 2009; Faist, 2008), although in human capital theory, education is put forward as an investment that will be repaid to the investor in the long run. In this regard, some scholars shy away from the use of human capital theory in migration studies, questioning "whether migrants are able to receive a reasonable return on their investments in human capital" (Nohl et al. 2014: 7). For instance, a research analyzing the experiences of international migrants in Germany revealed that migrants who had made economic investments to education in their home countries and had obtained their diplomas before migrating to Germany had a worse positioning in the destination society than settled Germans, indicating that investing in education, as supported by human capital theory, does not provide direct returns to the investor, especially in the cases of international migrants (Nohl, Ofner, and Thomsen, 2011).

Bourdieu, in contrast, proposes that the education process reproduces the inequality in society (Bourdieu, 2010a), constructing a distinction (and taste) between those who hold different forms of capital, in general, and cultural capital in particular. Cultural capital, which merits special attention within this chapter and in the analysis of Iranian students in Ankara, has three different forms, and has been deemed more comprehensive than human capital theory within this study. According to Bourdieu (1986), cultural capitals exists in three forms: *embodied*, *objectified* and *institutionalized*. The *embodied* form is the dispositions of the process of socialization; the *objectified* form relates to goods such as books, cultural objects or

paintings, which are supposed to be representative of their cultural capital; and finally the *institutionalized* form, which contrary to previous forms, is the institutionally approved version of cultural capital, and includes university diplomas, certificates, etc. As will be explained in more depth later in the chapter, the institutionalized form not only implies a diploma, but also a socialization process and the education period that culminates in a diploma. The knowledge and skills learned by the migrants through this acquisition of cultural capital in the destination country leads also to them learning culturally specific information, such as the expectations of both the employer and the employee, which is necessary for the future phase of their economic incorporation after graduation. Following these reasons, among others this chapter will borrow from Bourdieu's conceptualization of the acquisition of cultural capital so as to comprehend the incorporation process of Iranian university students into society in Ankara. By understanding the process by which students accumulate cultural capital in the host society will answer the question of whether or not they want to settle in Ankara, and why.

4.2. Education, Socialization and Distinction

As mentioned in the Chapter 3, symbolic capital, which is a key resource in the destination society among documented Iranian migrants, is possible through the acquisition of economic and cultural capital. In this respect, it was acknowledged that the participants, who came to Turkey to study in universities to acquire cultural capital in the host society, already hold economic capital from their home country of Iran that they can transfer to the host country. In other words, the group of focus in this chapter already in possession of a certain amount of economic capital. A striking example of the importance of economic capital for upper/middle class documented migrants was indicated in a news article published in the leftist online Sol Portal magazine in Turkey, which claimed that rich Syrians living in Istanbul were uncomfortable around the poor Syrians who have come to Turkey seeking asylum who earn a living by begging on the street, seeing them as damaging the image of (rich) Syrian visitors (*Sol Haber* 2014). Although the distinction seems to be symbolic, the construction of this distinction is enriched

by the economic capital that influences the process of migration. That said, economic capital alone is not sufficient for immigrants to gain a prestigious status in the host society (Nohl et al. 2011b), as cultural and economic capital are also important, in that they dictate the status of an agent in the field (of international migration), while also being formed by it. In other words, they cannot be considered independent of each other, as one influence the enhancement of the other. In other words, while economic capital has an impact on the acquisition process of cultural capital, cultural capital maintains a level of control in the conversion of cultural capital into economic capital. This will be covered in more depth in the following parts and chapters.

Cultural capital, particularly in its institutionalized form, is crucial for this research for the reason expressed by Bourdieu that "The school system is one of the sites where, in differentiated societies, the systems of thought, which are the apparently more sophisticated equivalent of the 'primitive forms of classification', are produced." (Bourdieu, 1992: 13). In this respect, schools (and universities in our case) are not only places where people are educated on specific topics, but also where they learn, for example, to become part of a specific group or habitus. On this issue, Bourdieu asserts that within the process of education a simultaneous process of distinctions emerges (Bourdieu 2010a). When this is extended to the experiences of international students who were first educated in their home countries and then migrated to the host country, it is understood that they began to lose this socialization process during their education away from the host society. In this regard, the incorporation problem faced by migrants is due not only due their foreign diplomas not being recognized by the host society, but also the whole classification process associated with socialization in the host society, results in a naturalization of the dominant structures. For instance, a student learns the manners necessary for job interviews in the process of their education, which has aspects of both socialization and knowledge.

Considering the influence of the education system over the socialization process and its deeper impacts, this study underlines the education preferences of Iranian students, as this will simultaneously unveil their strategies and behaviors

related to their incorporation into Turkish society. What they systematically prefer or attempt not only highlights their individual stories, but is also related to the strategies and preferences that have been constructed as part of their international migration. Accordingly, the answer to the question of what Iranian students choose to study, and where and why, will shed light on similar patterns within the Iranian habitus. Needless to say, none of these variables are detached from age, gender or class. In order to highlight the common dispositions of Iranians, the interviewees were divided into two groups according to their positioning within the field. The first group comprises Iranian students who have come to Turkey for university or graduate education in different branches whose education experiences and future plans will be studied in more detail as the subject of this chapter. The second group comprises settled Iranians who have been living and/or working in Ankara at least five years, whose situation will be studied in Chapter 5, although their education process will be analyzed in order to comprehend the effect of their education process on their migration and incorporation experiences.

4.3. Field of Education and Iranian Students Living in Ankara

Although cultural capital has three different forms, it is institutionalized cultural capital that is very much linked to the settlement decisions of Iranians in Turkey. Before looking at these different forms, it is worth identifying some other features of this institutionalized cultural capital. As stated in the previous section, institutionalized form refers not only to the diplomas recognized by society, in that it includes also a socialization process. What is meant by socialization is the skills, education and knowledge that is learned through daily life, as well as through school education. Since cultural capital converts into economic capital in the following phase, the labor market requirements and education system qualifications also feed the content of this cultural capital (Nohl, Ofner, and Thomsen, 2011). In other words, a kind of negotiation is going on in the field that is shaped by the expectations of the agent (in our case, the migrants), culture and society, and which simultaneously forms cultural capital. Bourdieu expressed this relational character of capital as: "Capital does not exist and function except in

relation to a field. (…) As a space of potential and active forces, the field is also a field of struggles aimed at preserving or transforming the configuration of these forces." (Bourdieu, 1992: 101). In this respect, analyzing (institutionalized) cultural capital would mean also analyzing the relationships between agents, habitus and fields.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the field of international migration intersects with other fields, including those of bureaucracy, diplomacy, education and economy. For this chapter, in which a study is made of the acquisition of cultural capital through education in the host country, the field of education is of special importance. The field of education, as Bourdieu refers, concerns the relations between the institutions and agents so when analyzing the experiences of Iranian students in the Turkish education system, Turkey's approach to foreign students is also critical. In the Specialized Migration Commission Report of the Tenth Development Plan (2014–2018) prepared for the Turkish Ministry of Development, Turkey designated a number of goals related to both national and international migration flows. According to the report, Turkey needs to pay more attention to international students, in that education-based migration has been on the rise since 1970. There are three basic reasons for this. First of all, this flow, it is believed, enriches the mutual relations and understandings of the home and host countries; secondly, international students constitute a large (economic) sector; and thirdly, studying in the foreign county may be the first step in the settlement and fulfillment of the requirement of skilled workers in the long run (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2014: 39). To this end, Turkey also wants to enrich the opportunities open to international students and to ease their settlement and incorporation into to the country.[25]

[25] In Turkey's Tenth Development Plan it was announced that efforts would be made to monitor the brain drain from Turkey, and those who had left would be encouraged to return to their home country. Studies to date have indicated that Turkish people who go abroad to study do so with the aim of staying in the country in which they received their education. For more information, see (Tansel and Gungor 2003).

The High Commission of Education, in a press release, announced that in the 2013–2014 academic year, 47,000 foreign students studied in Turkey (*Hürriyet Gazetesi,* 2015), of which 33,000 were male and 14,000 were female. The greatest numbers came from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, accounting for 7,000 students, followed by Iran with 4,000 students. The remainder are from Afghanistan, Syria and Greece, who sent 2,333, 1,784 and 1,500 students respectively. For the 2014–2015 academic year, the top countries are shown in the tables below.

Table 5: New Admission Numbers of Foreign Students in Turkey by Nationality, 2014-2015

	NEW ADMISSIONS												NEW ADMISSIONS		
	VOCATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL			UNDERGRADUATE			MASTERS			DOCTORATE					
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
AZERBAIJAN	199	75	274	2402	542	2944	274	159	433	25	16	41	2900	792	3692
SYRIA	158	92	250	1549	749	2298	135	52	187	36	14	50	1878	907	2785
TURKMENISTAN	377	187	564	1406	603	2009	44	24	68	5	1	6	1832	815	2647
IRAQ	4	4	8	237	63	300	821	153	974	94	26	120	1156	246	1402
AFGHANISTAN	52	11	63	825	110	935	112	21	133	18		18	1007	142	1149
IRAN	**18**	**18**	**36**	**150**	**140**	**290**	**205**	**154**	**359**	**142**	**88**	**230**	**515**	**400**	**915**

Table 6: Total Numbers of Foreign Students in Turkey by Nationality, 2014-2015

	TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS												TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS		
	VOCATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL			UNDERGRADUATE			MASTERS			DOCTORATE					
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
AZERBAIJAN	524	154	678	6752	1602	8354	800	483	1283	222	101	323	8298	2340	**10638**
TURKMENISTAN	1168	525	1693	5234	1947	7181	135	49	184	30	4	34	6567	2525	**9092**
SYRIA	237	134	371	3245	1352	4597	354	109	463	101	28	129	3937	1623	**5560**
IRAN	**49**	**39**	**88**	**1003**	**736**	**1739**	**1161**	**781**	**1942**	**1075**	**458**	**1533**	**3288**	**2014**	**5302**
AFGHANISTAN	91	19	110	2612	408	3020	391	66	457	81	4	85	3175	497	**3672**
IRAQ	16	8	24	709	235	944	1338	314	1652	328	85	413	2391	642	**3033**

The first table lists new admissions by country of origin, with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq heading the table. Although Iran ranks only sixth overall in the table, for the 2014-2015 academic year, it has the highest number of admissions for doctoral studies. This indicates that graduate and

post-graduate studies in Turkey are crucial for Iranian students, who choose to come after obtaining a bachelor or master's degree in Iran. In the second table, the total number of foreign students in Turkey are shown, with Iranian students again topping the table among the doctoral students and signifying the importance of this group also within the highly skilled migrants of Turkey. In both tables, Azerbaijan holds the top position, which can be attributed to the fact that Azerbaijani Turks have greater access to such capital forms as language and culture, which aid in their incorporation into Turkish society. This issue will be looked at in more depth later in the study. The original version of this table contains 198 countries, but for reasons of relevance, this study only took only the countries with the highest admissions and total numbers into account.

A press release by the Higher Education Council of Turkey announced a target of 150,000 foreign students to be studying in Turkey in 2020 (Özay, 2015), and a newly established website entitled "Study in Turkey: Key for Future"[26] can be considered proof of a government strategy to attract more foreign students towards education in Turkey. Today it is widely accepted that attracting foreign students is one of the most efficient ways of bringing highly skilled migrants to the country, which simultaneously reinforces the government economy. UNESCO's statistics indicate that the United States and United Kingdom are still the most popular destinations for international students, where the governments earn significant revenues from education ("Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students", 2015), and Turkey has launched a similar education strategy to welcome more foreign students, especially from its Eastern neighbors.

In Turkey, international students are selected to fill the quota based on the results of the Foreign Students' Exam (Yabancı Uyruklu Öğrenci Sınavı)[27] held in

[26] The website, written in three languages (English, Turkish and Russian), can be reached at www.studyinturkey.gov.tr (15.01.2015).

[27] Up until 2010 the Foreign Students' Exam was given by the Measuring, Selection and Placement Center (Öğrenci Seçme ve Yerleştirme Merkezi), but has been given separately by each university since 2011.

each university. Since the dominant language of instruction is Turkish in many universities, the majority of such students come from the Turkic Republics, where the language barrier is easier to overcome. This highlights the importance of the language capacity of the migrants in the host country. Noble conceptualizes the language barrier of migrants as *language capital,* and emphasizes its influence within the incorporation process into the host society (Noble, 2013). As the Iranian population includes also people of Azerbaijani and Kurdish origin, as well as other ethnic groups (the ethnic and religious diversity in Iran is covered in Chapter 3), some are already able to speak Turkish, while those who do not speak Turkish tend to apply to universities where the language of instruction is English. As a result, Middle East Technical University is the primary university of choice for non-Turkish speaking students (*Hürriyet Gazetesi,* 2015).

For the purpose of this study, thirteen Iranian students were interviewed between November 2012 and January 2014 while studying at three different universities in Ankara: Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara University and Hacettepe University. The language of instruction at METU is English, while instruction at the Ankara and Hacettepe Universities is given in Turkish. A gender balance was attempted to be achieved in the interview list.

Table 7: Demographic Profiles of Iranian Students

STUDENT NAMES	F/ M	BIRTH PLACE	ETHNICITY / RELIGION	DATE OF ARRIVAL	MARITAL STATUS	AGE	FIELD OF STUDY	INCOME (TL)
BANU	F	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	2006	Single	22	Philosophy	1000
NABILA	F	Tabriz	Azerbaijani, Baha'i	2008	Single	24	Civil Engineering	700
NADINA	F	Khoy	Azerbaijani	2000	Married	40	Economics	4000
SHAHRAM	M	Bandar Lengeh	Persian, Sunni	2006	Single	30	Politics	700
PAYAM	M	Tehran	World Citizen	2010	Single	28	Mining Engineering	1000
PABLO	M	Zanjan	Azerbaijani	2006	Single	22	Engineering	1000

ROXANE	F	Urmia	Azerbaijani	2006	Divorcd	39	Biology	2000
SAMI	M	Urmia	Azerbaijani	2009	Single	28	Physics	1500
SABAH	F	Tehran	Azerbaijani	2009	Single	21	Sociology	650
SHAHRZAD	M	Tehran	Azerbaijani	2007	Single	28	Engineering	1200
SARA	F	Tehran	Persian, Baha'i	2006	Married	32	Bio Chemistry	1300
SHIRIN	F	Urmia	Azerbaijani	2012	Single	26	Energy Power	1000
AHMAD	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	2006	Single	24	Chemistry	1000

None of the Iranian students in the interviewee group had Turkish citizenship, meaning that all are in the country on a study permit. This gives a temporariness to their stay in Turkey, which compels them to organize further strategies for their post-education, either continuing their education/career abroad or staying in Turkey. These decisions are related directly to the recognition of their cultural capital in the host society, and the opportunities available to them to convert cultural capital into economic capital, which means incorporation into the labor market, as a form of status passage, which necessitates the acquisition and recognition of cultural capital in the host country.

4.4. Acquisition of Embodied Cultural Capital

There are three crucial levels the achievement of embodied cultural capital in Ankara: family support; (selected) fields of study; and the barriers to the socialization capacity of Iranian students in the host society. All of these will be explained in more detail below, and their influence on the acquisition process of embodied cultural capital in the host society will be explained, but first it is necessary to mention in advance that despite the acquisition of this capital in the host country, there is still remarkable transmission of different forms of capital from the home society, which will be covered in the part explaining family support. For this reason, although the author asserts that the acquisition process takes place

in the host society, there is always a relationship or connection with the home society that should not be underestimated.

Cultural capital, in any of its three different forms, cannot be downsized to a singular definition, which signifies the deepness of these conceptualizations. In the present study, institutionalized cultural capital is considered important in emphasizing the institutionally recognized accumulation of migrants. That said, institutionalized cultural capital is connected also with embodied cultural capital through the socialization process that begins with school attendance in the social field and host society, but also includes the education and socialization (such as the process of learning daily life knowledge and skills) that begins at home with the family. Home is the place where children first begin to learn and amass embodied cultural capital, and Bourdieu claims that mothers are mostly responsible for the transmission of cultural capital to the child: "It is because the cultural capital that is effectively transmitted within the family itself depends not only on the quantity of cultural capital, itself accumulated by spending time, that the domestic group possess, but also on the usable time (particularly in the form of mother's free time) available to it" (Bourdieu, 1986: 253).

Feminist researchers have criticized Bourdieu for not seeing the *emotional capital* which identifies the women's labor put in the household (Reay, 2005). In his book of Masculine Domination, Bourdieu speaks about this emotional input of women in the household, but never refers to it as capital: "… it has often been observed that women fulfil a cathartic, quasi-therapeutic function in regulating men's emotional lives, calming their anger, helping them accept the injustices and difficulties of life" (Bourdieu, 2001: 77). This cathartic quasi-therapeutic function of women in the household is not limited only to the service for men, in that it also includes other members of the family. For this reason, in accumulating cultural capital, as Reay writes, there is a strong and complex relationship between emotional and cultural capital, especially in the mother and child interaction

(Adkins, 2005). Emotional capital[28] will be covered in more detail in the gender part of Chapter 6, but it is necessary to mention it here before analyzing the influence of embodied cultural capital, since the socialization process at home is also influenced by women's emotional capital. Although this is not obviously expressed within Bourdieu's sociological approach, it has been unveiled by feminist scholars, and in this respect this study considers that embodied cultural capital begins in the household, and continues as family support in the lives of the Iranian students in Ankara. Accordingly, the following section will begin with the influence of the family on the students' educational success stories.

4.4.1. Influence of Family Support on Iranian Students

To comprehend the influence of the family in the process of cultural capital accumulation, this study begins with the case of Shahram, who had no family support, and whose experience turned out to be unsuccessful. At the time of the interview, Shahram had been living in Turkey for more than five years, and was studying computer science in a university in Iran before coming to Turkey. Studying computer science was the idea of his father, who was a former police officer in Iran. After a while Shahram decided that he did not want to study computer science, deciding instead to become a social scientist, however his father objected and insisted he continue his studies in computer science discipline. "It caused a really big problem," he said, expressing his father's reaction when he dropped out of university. He visited Turkey and learned about the education opportunities in 2007 and entered the Foreign Students' Exam (FSE). Although he passed the exam, he had to return to Iran for two years to complete his military service. His father was against him studying in Turkey. After Shahram's parents moved to Saudi Arabia he came to Istanbul to study, and he had little contact with

[28] While these feminist criticisms are reminiscent of other conceptualizations, such as "emotional labor" or "affective labor", the emotional capital mentioned here is different, drawing attention only to women's gender roles in society. For further discussion on those concepts of "emotional labor" or "affective labor", see Ayşe Akalın, (2007) "Duygulanım ve Duygulanımsal Emek Üzerine Notlar", Birikim, No: 217.

his family. He expressed that he hadn't visited them for the last three years and they didn't often talk on the phone. After three years in Istanbul, he transferred to Middle East Technical University to the Political Science and Public Administration department. He expressed his emotional status and his experiences of moving first to Istanbul and then to Ankara as follows:

> "I was feeling little bit depressed when I first came here. Everything was dark. I felt numb. I had a history of depression before that. My first impression when I first came [to Turkey], I was in Eminönü, a guy was selling saffron. He gave me some information about cheap hotels. I was worried, Istanbul was an expensive place, and my family was not fully supporting me. It was crowded, I didn't feel very safe because I didn't know anybody; I didn't know the language. I feel really good on the campus in Ankara because of the borders [of the campus] and the people."

Shahram was clearly depressed when he came to Turkey, mostly a result of his family's disapproval of his ambition to study social science abroad. He goes to speak about his success in university in Turkey, but it becomes clear that he was not successful at METU:

> The first semester was not bad, but in the second semester there were too much ideology in my department, like Marxism. They were talking about conspiracies and class … I never liked Marxist people. I always disagreed with people in the class, and once I told a guy "what you're saying is nonsense". That's why my GPA is around 1.1. (Over 4). I was not studying too much. Later, I tried to be more flexible, then I started to enjoy it. Turkish language is a must course for foreign students and while I passed the course, now I have forgotten it.

Soremski asserts that the role of the family in the decisions and successes of a child's education depends mainly on two principles (Soremski, 2011: 75). First of all, the family's expectations from education hold primary importance, and are related directly with their own education levels. Secondly, the idea of starting education at home at an early age shouldn't lead to the family transmitting all of its (embodied) cultural capital onto the child, in that the child should be able to find a correspondence to those cultural practices at school to either enhance or diminish this accumulation of cultural capital.

It can be understood from the above that Shahram's father had a negative influence on him, since he did not agree with his son's desire to study social sciences in Turkey. Despite his father's attitude, Shahram was still successful to a certain extent, in that he finally managed to come to Istanbul for education, and after a while even transferred to METU in Ankara, which is considered to be one of the best universities in Turkey. That said, his the discouragement from his family, particularly his father, influenced his incorporation into society. Although he said he was happier in Ankara than in Istanbul, he claimed not to have an active social life. Furthermore, he says that he was unable to learn Turkish, despite the obligatory language course at the university, and that daily life is hard in Turkey without knowledge of the Turkish language. That said, he expressed that he had started to enjoy university after deciding to take more interest in the lessons, or to be "flexible", to use his own words. In summary, Shahram's case indicates the importance of family support for a student's success in education and socialization.

A further two examples are presented here in which the family attempted to influence the decisions of their children related to their professions. First of all, Shahrzad applied to METU to study engineering after he came to Turkey to study, although his family wanted him to study medicine. "If I hadn't known how to say no [to his parents], then maybe I would be studying medicine right now," he said. Secondly, Sara, who has been studying and working in Ankara University, is living with her Iranian husband who is also studying in Ankara University. Sara said that her husband's family wanted him to study engineering, "because engineering is very popular in Iran," she said. Under family pressure, he first started studying computer engineering in Iran, but didn't want to continue in the field, and so he came to Turkey and entered the landscape architecture department, which he had always wanted to do. His success in the department led to him being recognized as the eighth most successful student in the university by the Erasmus Bureau. In addition to these examples, Pablo also said that he had wanted to study medicine since his childhood. Explaining his desire to study medicine, he said: "My two uncles are doctors in the United States, and my father loves them very much. I don't know, maybe I decided to be a doctor for this reason. I will study medicine in United

States, I have to do that!" The above examples show not only family interference in the life/education decisions of the respondents, but also the popularity of certain professions among Iranians, such as medicine and engineering. This issue will be analyzed in the following section under the title "Study Topics of Iranian Students".

Another significant example in which family support influenced the educational success of a child is a more positive than the Shahram case. Roxana, whose story has been mentioned in Chapter 2, first came to Turkey due to her marriage with an Iranian man who was living in Turkey at that time. They stayed together for couple of years, but their marriage didn't last and they were divorced. Roxana's residence permit was tied to her ex-husband's, so when they officially divorced, she couldn't stay in Turkey and had to return to Iran. Unable to adapt to life in Iran after living in Ankara from the age of 22 to 28, she decided to come back to Turkey, hoping to continue her education in doctoral studies. With the support of her family, she began studying in Turkey after so many years. Many times in our interview, she expressed that she was very grateful to her family for always believing in her and for supporting her, despite her age and her indecision about her field of study. During her doctoral studies, after she returned to Turkey for a second time, she changed her mind twice about her doctoral program. After first choosing to study biology, she was later attracted by modern arts and started to prepare for the special talent exam at another university that demanded very high talent scores to enter. In the end, she was unable to pass the exam, and so decided to study Biology again, returning to the program that she had left previously. At every step she spoke to her family, who told her to do whatever made her happy. Her connection with her family, and especially with her father, was very strong, which she spoke about in no uncertain terms:

> "We talk on the phone every Sunday because they don't have Internet. I especially talk to my father, we talk about everything, for instance Darwin [she was at the time studying a modern art project that was inspired by Darwin's Theory of Evolution], people, sexual relations, etc. [...] I visit them every year and stay there for a month. I usually spend very good times there. Most of young Iranians are studying

> abroad and they all come back in July and August, so we all come together in Iran. We have barbeques, go for walks, etc."

Her closeness with her family and especially her father was strongly expressed. This family support, both financially and emotionally, helped her to continue living in Turkey, although she did face financial difficulties from time to time. Roxane's experience (like Shahram's) supports Soremski's (2011) assertion about the influence of family support over the success of migrant children in education. What is also striking in the latter part of her statement is that she said most of her friends were also studying in abroad, and that they all meet every summer in Iran. Considering the large number of Iranian students residing both in Turkey and in other countries, it can be asserted that international studentship is very significant in the case of Iranians. According to the numbers given by the Washington Institute, there are 50,000 Iranian students studying outside Iran (Ditto and Baste, 2014), and while their enrolment in US schools has more than doubled after 2009, it still remains below the peak of 56,000 in 1980, corresponding to the period following the Islamic revolution in 1979. The United States maintains a dominant influence over Iranian migrants, described as the symbolic power of the United States in the previous chapter, and this is valid also for education.

The number of Iranian students who have applied to American universities points to two distinct results. First of all, applications to US universities rose immediately after eras of political unrest in Iran, such as the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the post-election protests of 2009-2010. This implies that applying to universities in the United States is a strategy of international migration for Iranians, and the same is valid for applications to Turkish universities, as can be understood from the conducted interviews with Iranians. What is distinct about the Turkish case is the opportunities for Iranian students to settle in Turkey, which will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. Secondly, studying abroad is very common among the young Iranian generation, which is supported by the statement made by Roxane above, that all of her friends meet back in Iran every summer. In this regard, studying abroad as a means of migrating to a new country is a common

strategy that is significantly valid within the Iranian habitus and their field of international migration.

4.4.2. Fields of Study as a Key to Attaining Well-off Social Positions

Following the study fields of Iranian students abroad will allow the tendencies learned via embodied cultural capital to be comprehended. Although university diplomas are considered as institutionalized cultural capital, the selection of which field to study is shaped by both embodied cultural capital and habitus, in that within the field of education, agents learn about occupations and social positions together with their offered capitals as part of the socialization processes. For instance, "What profession do you wish to follow when you grow up?" (*büyüyünce ne olacaksın?*) is a common question that is posed to small children in Turkey, and "doctor" is a very well-known answer due to its enhanced economic capital and the associated prestigious social position that is widely known in society. Similarly, the study fields selected by Iranian students provide clues to their perceptions of their desired occupations, as well as the capital and social positions they expect to achieve in the host society.

Before looking at the examples in Ankara, an analysis of the fields followed by Iranian students studying in the United States will provide a general perspective of their desired and expected positions. Statistics compiled by the Washington Institute (Ditto and Baste, 2014) indicate that 82 percent of Iranian students in America study at the graduate level, and the majority are enrolled in doctoral programs. Furthermore, 75 percent of these study STEM subjects, being science, computing and information technology, engineering and math, of which 56 percent study engineering. Another striking finding is related to their intentions after graduation, with 89 percent hoping to stay in the country after graduation. These numbers concur with the previously stated finding that Iranian students chose to study in US universities with the intention of settling in the country after graduation.

Unfortunately, there are few detailed statistics related to Iranians studying in Turkey, aside from the numbers presented at the beginning of this chapter, and so

interviews seem to be the only reliable data source for this study in this regard. From the conducted interviews it can be understood that Iranians in Turkey also tend to opt for STEM (science, computer and informative technology, engineering and math) subjects, and when the respondents were asked study fields were most common among them, aside from STEM subjects, they expressed that medical doctoral positions were very popular. As mentioned above, Shahrzad and Pablo were both steered towards medicine by their families when they said they wanted to study abroad, just as Sara's husband was forced to study engineering. Soremski (2011), in her research, found that migrants gravitated towards highly skilled professions, such as medicine, law or engineering in the host countries in order to overcome the institutional barriers often faced by migrants. In agreement with her research, the selection of highly skilled professions in Ankara by Iranian students not only allows them to overcome barriers, but also to enhance their social status and prestige, which is also related to symbolic capital. In other words, the loss of social status after moving to a host society has been referred to in migration studies as a loss of symbolic capital (Nohl et al., 2014), and so selecting highly prestigious professions such as medicine in Turkey or information technologies in the United States is a strategic choice among Iranian migrants. Shahram's case reinforces this argument related to the professions selection of certain professions. Shahram's father urged him to study computer science, and was strictly against his son's desire to study social sciences. In this regard, seeking education in a host country, but also selecting certain study fields with high prestige can be read as a strategy of Iranian habitus, with the aim being to acquire both cultural and symbolic capital in the field of international migration.

Looking at the study fields of the students in the interview group in Ankara, it was apparent that the field of social sciences was the least attractive among them, and although one interviewee, Roxanne, was studying fine arts, a year after the interview was conducted she failed the talent exams and returned to her former major discipline of Biology. All of the interviews conducted with Iranians, as well as previous studies of migrants in host countries, indicate that the Iranians in Ankara, like the migrant groups in most countries, choose certain disciplines as

part of a strategy to enhance their symbolic capital. For the case of Iranian students in the interviewed group, these specific disciplines are medicine, engineering (including computer engineering), natural sciences and mathematics; in short, STEM subjects, which lead to the most prestigious and highest paying professions in Turkey. That said, income, or in other words, the economic return from these professions, would be possible only through the conversion of cultural capital into economic capital, which will be analyzed in following chapter.

4.4.3. Barriers to their Socialization in Ankara

Adjusting to the school environment was one of the main strategies employed by Turkish migrants in Germany to incorporate into the host society (Soremski, 2011), but to adjust to the host culture and society, there is one crucial dimension within the field of education that has yet to be mentioned, which is speaking the native language of the host country in a proper accent. Language skills and capacities have been addressed as important form of capital that can enhance or diminish the quality of the adjustment process in the host country. Mcllwaine, expanding upon the concept of "linguistic capital" put forward by Bourdieu, explaining it "as important in influencing an individual's status and place in the social hierarchy [which] is even more important for migrants. in that it is not only that accent that affects their position, as Bourdieu suggested, but also the ability to communicate in the first place" (McIlwaine, 2011: 11). In addition to the capacity for communication and the status of the individual in the host society, linguistic capital can be one of the strongest barriers to the conversion of different forms of capital into each other.

Iranian students who come to Turkey for bachelor's or graduate education have two specific choices in the beginning: 1) if they don't speak Turkish, they can take courses at a university whose language of instruction is English, and 2) if they are fluent in Turkish, have some knowledge of the language, they can register at a university where the language of instruction is Turkish, which at the same time improves their linguistic capital. Azerbaijani Iranians speak Azeri or Azeri Turkish, which belongs to the Western Oghuz branch of the Turkic family of languages,

and it is not easy to understand and speak for Turkish people, since the language and accent is quite distinct. However, when compared to other ethnicities living in Iran, such as Arabs, Persians, Kurds, etc. it is easier for Azerbaijani people to adjust to the Turkish language, and so the majority of foreign students who enroll in universities that teach in Turkish are Azerbaijani.

While Iranian students who do not speak Turkish can choose to study at universities in Turkey in which instruction is in English, they must learn Turkish if they want to socialize with native students, rather than with only other than foreign students. This can be necessary not only for socializing with other university students, as for migrants, linguistic capital is also necessary if they wish to incorporate into different parts of society, or to be kept informed about that society through such paths as reading the news, communication with local people and understanding what is going on in the social space. Looking at the interviewed group from this perspective, only two Iranian students out of thirteen asked to conduct the interview in English, both of which were studying at Middle East Technical University (METU). They stated that while they understood Turkish, they couldn't write or speak well enough to respond to the questions. The Turkish of the other students was fluent, and so all other interviews were conducted in Turkish. Shahrzad, who is from Tehran and who speaks fluent Turkish with a very good accent, said that he had learned Turkish after coming to METU. He didn't speak Turkish language when living in Iran, but he had a Turkish girlfriend at METU, which made it easier for him to learn. His Turkish accent was so good that sometimes his Turkish friends at METU did not even realize that he was Iranian. He said that he had never taken a Turkish language course, as his Turkish friends had helped him to learn the language. It was common among the Iranian students who learned Turkish while in Turkey for them to learn while studying from their friends or partners, and via books and projects, rather than by taking language courses. What was also remarkable about their learning of the Turkish language was the influence of television and TV shows. Some of the students expressed that they had already learned a little Turkish before coming to the country from cable

TV in Iran, and with some practice they had developed and started to speak the language after moving to Turkey.

In contrast, Payam was very interested in politics, and so he was reading the news both in Turkey and Iran every day but; but since he didn't feel comfortable with Turkish, after meeting me and saying hello, he quickly switched to English, although he said he understood Turkish to some extent. Payam's lack of language capital was due to his low interaction with Turkish students at the university, which, as a result, lead also to a lack of socialization. Shahram also lacked language capital, and this also ended up with only limited interaction with local students. Shahram said he didn't feel pushed to learn Turkish, and this influenced his relationships with his friends at the university, and said that "hello, hi and bye" was a simple summary of his relationship with Turkish students. These two cases indicate that speaking the native language and acquiring linguistic capital have a direct influence on the capacity for incorporation into the host society.

When analyzing linguistic capital, it also seems worthy to mention the influence of accents. When talking to the Iranian students, they expressed that Azerbaijani Iranians had more problems with the Turkish accent, in that already speak a similar language with a different accent. Shirin, for example, said that she sometimes hesitated to introduce herself to Turkish people, because they would immediately ask about her accent. Shirin, who is of Azerbaijani origin, said that Persian people were luckier because they start to learn Turkish in Turkey, and so had no trouble with the accent, unlike Azerbaijani people. Shirin was fed up with being asked her nationality and said that this was why preferred to socialize with other foreigners at the university, or to not socialize at all. Understanding the importance of linguistic capital, and based on her plans for the future to study in the United States, she made the effort to develop her English through language websites and chat rooms.

What is also important about linguistic capital is its capacities within the process of incorporation into the host society. Socialization is very influential in the process of incorporation, and in the acquisition of cultural capital, and linguistic capital, in this sense, is a crucial tool facilitating socialization in the host society.

First of all, speaking the language of the host country not only helps with communication on daily basis for basic needs, but also supports the learning of cultural factors that will shape the quality of the incorporation. In this regard it affects the accumulation of cultural capital, in that cultural motives and can only be understood by living in the environment in question, immersing oneself in the culture, and understanding and acting like the natives of that society. In Bourdieusian terms, learning the native language and speaking it with a good accent helps in the conversion of linguistic capital into cultural capital.

Linguistic capital here has a further role to play for Iranian students in that it helps the students build their environment and social networks in society, and at some point, converts into social capital. The majority of the respondents (11/13) expressed that learning the native language of the host country is a must when migrating to a new country. Linguistic capital shapes the migrants' environment, and depends much on whether they socialize with native or foreign students. That said, some of the respondents claim that linguistic capital alone is not enough for the construction of a social lifestyle and for enhancing social capital in the host society. For instance, Pablo, whose Turkish is very good after staying for five years in Turkey, said that his social circle was still primarily Iranians:

> "I want to make friends with the Turkish people in my class, but it feels like they are resisting. On the first day they say hi and we talk, but the next day they don't say anything. I don't understand these things. A European person would never do such a thing. […] I really don't know. You cannot communicate easily with them. You can talk easier if the person is Iranian. Whenever they [Turkish students] talk to me, they ask me questions about Iran. I want them to see me as a human, but they see me as an Iranian. I want to be like a Turk in their eyes."

Pablo complaining about the hardship of the communication with Turkish people shows that while language capital may help to encourage communication, it doesn't guarantee one will make native friends, meaning that language capital does not always convert into social capital. However social capital refer exclusively to Turkish people for Iranians, as constructing groups of Iranian friends in Turkey also enhances their social capital, in that it helps them share and construct information and networks. Of the thirteen students, eight expressed that they

maintained strong contacts with Iranians living in Ankara. One group, named Dusten (meaning "friends" in the Iranian language), is an informal Iranian student group in METU that was established by Payam:

> We established this Dusten group, and now it has 70 members. After a vote, we changed the name of the group to 'Arman' which means hopes or ideals. I learned from the METU international office that there 500 Iranians here, but sometimes even I cannot recognize them because they speak Turkish even better than you.

Payam was one of the leading figures in this student group, although the group had never organized cultural activities or attempted to be recognized by the students' clubs in the university, with activities limited to going to cinema or celebrating special Iranian cultural days. For instance, for the thirteenth day of the Iranian New Year "Newroz" celebration, when they must stay out of their home, they organized a picnic at Eymir Lake within the METU campus that was attended by 25 Iranian students. In this respect, social capital in the host country cannot limited to social relations constructed with only native people, in that the Iranian students preserve their own embodied cultural capital as well. This was noticeable also among the settled Iranians, which will be elaborated more in the following chapter. As can be seen from those examples above, the socialization process of Iranians in Turkey leads to two dimensions of social capital: 1) with natives of the host country people, and 2) with fellow Iranians.

4.4.4. Social Prejudice Testimonies in Socialization Process

Symbolic capital, which can be gained from possession of economic and cultural capital, refers to a cognitive situation that is socially constituted (Bourdieu, 1986) and valid if recognized by the agents of that specific field, and can be linked to prestige or honor. It was seen throughout the interviews with the Iranian students that they would like to have a prestigious position as a result of their being Iranian in host society; in other words, they want their symbolic capital to be

recognized in Ankara.[29] Despite the positive examples that will be presented below, this wasn't always the case. Being a foreigner, and even an Iranian, in Ankara had a negative influenced their representation, and diminished the opportunity of acquiring symbolic capital. These incidents, however, cannot be referred to as discrimination, since the Iranian students didn't feel like they were being subjected to any systematic exclusion, and incidents were limited in number. For this reason, they can be thought of more as testimonies of social prejudice rather than discrimination or social exclusion.

Many Iranian students indicated that they want their distinction (as being an Iranian) to be recognized in the host society of Ankara, in that the representation of their Iranian image (social position) was an important issue. Nabila said that her instructor in the university liked Iranians, and once even told her, "Iranians are smart people and you have that light as well", indicating recognition of the symbolic capital of Iranians by her instructor. However, this was not always the case, as some of the interviewees expressed that being Iranian in Turkey didn't always lead to good reactions from people. Sami said that while looking for a house to rent next to the university, he was turned down by one landlord because of his nationality. Sami said "the landlord strictly refused to give his house to me, and openly told me that it was because I was Iranian". "I have no house for an Iranian," was the sentence he used to decline him.

In this case, being foreign resulted in poor treatment in the host society. Bourdieu claims that when symbolic power exists, it means there is a recognized

[29] Payam found it very important when local people said good things about his ethnic identity. "The people at the university and the people downtown are very different" he said, because people at METU know about the Iranian history and Ancient Persia, which dates back thousands of years before the Islamic revolution. However, people he encounters downtown, such as in Kızılay, the center of Ankara, ask him questions about Ahmedinejad (President of Iran 2005–2013) when they learn he is Iranian. Payam does not want to be seen as a citizen of the Islamic government, which is represented as bad in the world media and that is why he made the distinction between the Turkish people he meets downtown and those in the university. In other words, people in METU recognized his symbolic capital, which was converted from home culture to the host culture, but when faced with questions about Ahmedinejad, he could not establish any symbolic capital, and so didn't like it.

power in the social world, which means recognition of distinction (Bourdieu, 2010a: 251). Symbolic capital goes hand in hand with this symbolic power, and Sami's experience above underlines the existence of "nationalism" in Turkish culture, indicating that being "foreign" may become a target for prejudice or discrimination. Symbolic power is constructed around the concept of "Turkishness" in Turkey, which affects the recognition of the symbolic capital of Iranian nationality/ethnicity. It should be noted, however, that when the respondents were asked whether they had been treated badly due as a result of their nationality, most replied that they had not. Accordingly, aside from isolated incidents, no systematic prejudice was felt by the Iranian students.

4.4.5. "Iranian Femininity" as a Form of Symbolic Violence

The gender dimension cannot be unveiled easily when analyzing a social phenomenon from a Bourdieusian approach. The book "Feminism After Bourdieu" (Adkins and Skeggs, 2005) attempts to open a path for feminist analysis while using Bourdieu's sociological terms, and criticizes the blind spot in his theory to the gender dimension. The authors assert that gender is not a field at all, but rather a form of symbolic violence within the field. Shirin expressed in her interview that she had a Turkish boyfriend, but that she left him because his family was very traditional and would never want her as a bride due to her nationality. On the other hand, she chose not to date Iranians in Ankara, as they would always try to control her in terms of where she was going and with whom she was meeting. Shirin's case is not only related to social capital, as she was put in a disadvantaged position and experienced symbolic violence in her social environment by both her Turkish and Iranian friends for being an Iranian woman. In this regard, her femininity and the attempted control of her actions can be considered symbolic violence in Bourdieusian terms. Being a foreign woman, especially an Iranian woman, was attracting Turkish men, and so it can be said that "Iranian femininity" has a twofold connotation, leading to symbolic violence over foreign women in general and Iranian women in particular.

In Shirin's example above, as a result of symbolic violence she felt, she had to stop socializing with both her Iranian and Turkish friends, and started to look for other "foreign" people. Shirin was not the only Iranian woman among the respondents to experience such disadvantageous situations when socializing in Turkey. Banu, studying Philosophy at METU, when asked if she had ever experienced any negativity for being an Iranian woman in Turkey, said that Turkish men would try to flirt with her because of her nationality, and would often hear "You are very beautiful; your eyes and eyelashes! You Iranian women are more beautiful than Turkish women," from men around her. "They [Turkish men] pay you so many compliments that you understand they have another agenda," said Banu. She continued:

> "Once, a Turkish man started to pay compliments to one of my (Iranian girl) friends, he giving her so much praise, 'You're so beautiful, you talk so sweet' etc., but it was just because she was a foreigner and because she was new to Turkey. They dated for a week, but the boy dumped her after he reached his goal [meaning that they had sex, and that that had been his goal]. The girl was crying next to me and one of our Turkish friends, who was sitting together with us, said that the man had behaved this way because people here [in Turkey] think 'I can have sex easier with foreign women,' and they would not behave this way with Turkish girls."

I asked Banu whether she agreed with what her Turkish friend said, and she nodded, and told me another story. According to her, she resembles a Turkish girl, but one of her Iranian friends told her that her outlook and face were not so Turkish. They went to Bahçelievler in Ankara where there are lots of shops and cafes, and Banu said that everything was normal when they were walking together, but when they started to speak Farsi, all of the men started to look at them, and some even followed them down the street. The high point for her was when a man came and tried to give his telephone number to her friend, and even tried to throw a piece of paper into her bag with his telephone number written on it. "That was the moment when he pissed me off," she said:

> "I was trying to act like I didn't speak Turkish until that moment, because I knew that they would try to talk to me [to communicate with her Iranian friend] if they had known I spoke Turkish. But after seeing

> him throw that piece of paper into my friend's bag, I got crazy. I took that paper and tore it into pieces in the middle of the street and screamed 'I'll take you to the police!' Then he was shocked. 'You do speak Turkish!' he said and continued 'I knew that you were Turkish, but you have learned Farsi, right? You would not have torn up my number if you were a foreigner, you would either stay silent or liked that move'. 'No, I'm Iranian. Do not ever do such a thing to anyone again' I said, and we walked away".

In that man's view, a foreign woman would either stay silent or would appreciate hi approach, not recognizing his symbolic violence against foreign femininity. When listening to the female Iranian students stories, it could be understood that men feel they have a right to "try their chances" if they see foreign women around them, because there is a general masculine part of Turkish culture that says "foreign women" are conceptualized as *hafifmeşrep* in Turkish, meaning loose and easily attainable for a sexual relationship. In this regard, foreign women and femininity implies both admiration, and at the same time, hate. This complex set of feelings within masculine culture in Turkey puts foreign women in a disadvantaged and even vulnerable position. Pippa Bacca[30] and Sarai Sierra[31] were the victims in two very well-known incidents in Turkey, both being raped and killed while travelling alone in Turkey, primarily because they were foreign. However, in the case of female Iranian students, they are complimented on being Iranian, given their exotic and orientalist connotation. Being complimented often for her "Big eyes and eyelashes; you're more beautiful than Turkish women," Banu attracted attention from men not only for her foreign femininity, but also her Iranian femininity. As a result of this masculine understanding of "Iranian femininity," some of the respondents claimed feeling vulnerable to symbolic violence. Since they were coded as "sexual targets", Turkish men would "try their chances", while Iranian men attempted to control them under while claiming to be "protecting"

[30] An activist woman who was raped and killed during her march for world peace, which started in Italy and came to a tragic end in Turkey (*Milliyet Newspaper,* 2008)

[31] An activist and photographer who came to Turkey for her art but was brutally raped and killed by a scrap dealer (*Cumhuriyet Newspaper,* 2014)

their fellow citizen. In the habitus chapter, Chapter 6, more examples will be given related to the gender dimensions of documented Iranian migrants in Ankara.

4.5. Perceptions of Institutionalized Cultural Capital Abroad

This part is very important for the case of Iranian students, in that it reveals the positioning of Turkey within the field of international migration. To this end, the respondents were asked about their initial motivation in coming to Turkey to study, which will clarify whether Turkey is their final destination, and why. The Iranian students were also asked about their future prospects and plans to source additional data on their lifestyle preferences and whether their preferences match with Turkey as a destination country. In Bourdieusian terms, this section questions whether they are satisfied with the different forms of capital they acquire in Turkey, in whether it matches with their individual lifestyle ideals.

4.5.1. Turkey as a Temporary Step

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the numbers indicate that quite a significant proportion of Iranian students choose Turkey for further education, although as yet, no discussions have been made why this is the case, whether the defining factor are cultural, geographical proximity or education level, or something else altogether. In the thirteen conducted interviews, eight of the students said that they were actually planning to go to another country, but had decided to try Turkey after their initial applications to other countries had been declined. Sara is one such student, who had been accepted by Ohio University but was unable to obtain an American and so had to change her plans. "Getting an American visa has never been easy for Iranians," she said, to describe her situation. Sami is another interviewee who initially had not thought of coming Turkey. In Iran he had attended a special school called the National Organization for Development of Exceptional Talents (NODET), which hosts the most successful students from different parts of Iran. Sami said that Turkey was not considered as being suitably equipped for further education among Iranians when compared to Western countries:

> "In Iran everybody tries to enter state universities, for which, like in Turkey, there is a special exam. If they cannot enter these universities, they try to pass the private university exams, and if they fail again, they either attempt to register in open plan schools (distance education) or come to Turkey. The previous exam for foreigners in Turkey was very easy, but they have removed it now. It was a stupid exam and was very easy, so it gave the idea that studying here in Turkey was worthless. For this reason, from Iran, it was third or fourth level students who came to Turkey."

This was the common view of the education system in Turkey, and so most of Sami's successful friends chose to study in Western countries like the United States and Canada when they decided to go abroad. This made him think about foreign education for himself, but at the time of the TOEFL exam (English proficiency exam required for English-speaking universities), he was having some personal problems – childhood and love problems, he said, but did not elaborate – and so he failed the English exam. "That's why I'm here" he said, attributing his presence to his TOEFL grades, claiming that they prevented him from going to university in either the United States or Canada, and compelling him to "give a try to Turkey". One of his close friends at NODET was already studying in Turkey, and he told Sami about the country and METU, which convinced him to come. This common attitude among Iranian students indicates their high expectations in the field of education, and the common belief that Turkey is not as good as Western countries in this regard.

Pablo was first planning to go to the United States for education, and his uncle who lives there urged him to go there for his postgraduate studies. Pablo decided to come to Turkey first for his undergraduate studies, after which he planned to move close to his uncle for his graduate studies. "Yes, actually I was seeing Turkey as a jump, like a step, before going to the United States. However I'm indecisive right now." Payam, on the other hand, said that he never considered going to the United States, but he didn't want to stay in Iran either:

> "I didn't want to go the States, but before Turkey I had applied to Sweden. It was a money issue, my Erasmus Mundus only let me to come to Turkey. Now, if you ask me, I'm much more satisfied here rather than in other places, such as Europe, because here I have had

> the chance to go and visit other countries [since it neighbors Europe]. That's why I prefer Turkey, because of the [cultural] similarities. People are much more alive here than in other Western countries."

All these examples indicate that for the majority of students, Turkey was not their first choice, but was seen rather as a temporary stepping stone before continuing their graduate studies in another country. However, after living in Turkey a while, they changed their minds about the country's education system and level. Whether this influenced their decision to stay in Turkey will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Many of the interviewees stated that there were some technical reasons behind their choice to study in Turkey. First of all, the simple visa regulations that exist between Turkey and Iran, as mentioned in Chapter 2, makes it very easy for Iranian students to come to Turkey. It has been expressed many times by Iranians living in Turkey that obtaining a visa in particular for the United States, is not easy due to the strained political relations between the two countries, and that applying first to Turkey raises their chance of acceptance later. Secondly, the physical proximity of Turkey to Iran was also cited as a deciding factor in the choice of many, and the many different means of travelling to Turkey, including plane, train, bus or even private car. "When we (Iranian students) miss our families we can go to them or they can come to us. This is an advantage for us," said Sara during her interview. Last but not the least, culturally, Turkey is closer to Iran than Western countries, which makes settling easier. There are both similarities and differences when the two cultures are compared, but still many of the students expressed that it was easier to understand and adapt in Turkey. Considering all these reasons, it was striking that Nadine was the only interviewee who said that it was her first choice to come to Turkey, and had not applied to another country, and was still not looking to go to another country after living in Turkey for fourteen years. That said, Nadine's case is special, in that although she was studying in Ankara for many years, she came to Turkey in her late twenties after she married an Iranian academician who was living and working in Ankara. When she first came to Turkey, she started studying economics at Gazi University in Ankara, while at the

same time learning Turkish. In this regard, her experience is closely connected to her spouse's choice to live in Turkey.

As could be understood from the interviews, none of these technical and cultural reasons were enough to convince the respondents to come to Turkey as a first choice. Most of them stated that they had initially wanted to go to another country for education, but chose Turkey after being declined, with the intention of moving to another country for further education later. The choice to use Turkey as a stepping stone may be based on different reasons, such as visa rejections, a limited budget for foreign education, family issues, etc. However, the interviews also revealed that some of the Iranian students changed their minds about moving to another country after living in Turkey for a while, and most made further plans to live in Turkey for the rest of their lives. To answer the question of why some did not want to settle in Turkey, it is necessary to look at their future plans and prospects, which would help in the comprehension of their better life and lifestyle preferences.

4.5.2. Why not settle in Turkey, and where to go next?

When asked about their future prospects and plans, three of the thirteen Iranian students replied that they actually wanted to stay in Turkey, seven said that they were adamant about continuing their education in developed countries rather than in Turkey, and three said that it did not matter where they lived, whether it was Turkey or somewhere else, as long as they did not have to return to Iran.

Sami was studying for his master's degree in the department of Physics at METU at the time of his interview, during which he said that he had been planning to move to a developed country when he first came to Turkey. He soon realized that Turkish culture was very close that of Iran, and has stated a desire to bring his family to Turkey and start living his own life after he has put his family in a secure position. When asked what he meant by "secure position", he spoke about his childhood during the Iran-Iraqi War, and his memories of going to the shelter

beneath their building when they heard sirens.[32] "This incident affected my whole life I guess, I always wanted to put myself and my family into a safe and secure place before I start to live my life," he said. Turkey was very convenient in this respect, as he believed his family and sister would be able to adapt easily. "Then I can get married and settle; but first, my family!" he said. Along with the majority of the respondents, Turkey was not Sami's planned final destination, as he wanted to continue his education in the United States when he first came. "Now I have postponed, or even cancelled, my US plan because it is very expensive, and without money it is very hard to live there." At the end of our interview, he finally explained that his religious identity had contributed to his decision to live in Turkey in the future. As a Sunni Muslim in Iran, where more than 89 percent of the population are Shi'a Muslims (Abrahamian, 2008: 17), Sami explained that he was treated as a second-class citizen. He went on to tell a story about his father, who had been unable to be promoted to the top position in the institution in which he worked in Iran as he was a Sunni Muslim. Since his family in Iran were not treated equally due to their religious identity, he saw Turkey (99% Sunni) as being more comfortable for them, especially when compared to living with Christians or again Shi'a Iranians in the United States. To conclude, Sami's situation was different to that of other Iranian students, in that he had to take care of his family, and so looked to move somewhere where he could bring his family.

Roxane was another interviewee who initially wanted to stay in Turkey for the rest of her life. She said that she came to Turkey many years ago, and after spending so long in the country, she wouldn't want to start over and migrate to a new country. "I have a history here in Turkey. Starting a new life requires lots of money. I can't work as a waitress anymore I have a routine here; I have a house and a car." She was reluctant to start over because, as she said, she had invested many years into Turkey and could not have the energy or inclination to get used to a new country. After the interview, however, she changed her mind, and decided

[32] A longer version of this account can be found in Chapter 2.

to try the United States after she completed her doctoral studies. Nadina had been married to an Iranian academician who came to Turkey when he was young, and neither had wanted to move to another country. Last but not least, Sabah, a sociology student, said that she had no option other than Turkey unless she became a refugee due to her low economic capital. She said, however, that she didn't want to go anywhere as a refugee, and would prefer to go as a scholar:

> "A friend of mine proposed me a fake marriage, and suggested we go to Norway together as refugees. I cannot live in the exile, *hocam* [a local expression that is used in the region of Ankara and METU], I can live as an academician outside [in foreign country], and work like that."

This preference indicates her reluctance to lose her cultural capital after migration, and so she would rather go to another country as a scholar then as a refugee. Other students in the group had similar reservations, as will be stated below. Looking at all of these examples, the respondents who wanted to stay in Turkey were in special situations in terms of age, family, marital status or economic situation that prevented them from moving to another country.

In contrast to the students who wanted to stay in Turkey, ten of the thirteen respondents said that they wanted to move on to another country after completing their education in Turkey, with the United States and Canada being the most sought-after destinations for further education, or work if they could find positions. Pablo wanted to study medicine and became a doctor, like his uncles in the United States, and after accomplishing his studies in Turkey he made a plan to go there to study medicine. The United States was often mentioned as the priority destination among the respondents, hence they first need to decide whether they want to go to United States or not. For instance, when asked whether they wanted to continue their education abroad, they would begin by explaining whether or not the United States was their preferred destination, and why. This is a strong indication that the United States, and especially California, has become like a cradle for Iranians who have left Iran. As a result of the huge Iranian community in the region, Iranians people, including the respondents in the present study, are under pressure to decide whether or not they want to migrate there.

Similarly, Shahram said that he wanted to continue on to Canada, while Ahmad preferred Europe over the United States due to its social welfare system. "My application list is as follows: first, Europe, then the United States, then Turkey, and if I cannot find anything I'll go back to Iran, but I don't want to." Similar to Ahmad, Sara and her husband were making plans to go to Europe, and began their answer to the question by declaring their decision about the United States:

> "We have plans, but first my husband has to finish his master's degree. He will continue his PhD education while I'll continue to my post-doctoral studies. We are thinking of European countries. We don't want to live in a gaudy (*şatafatlı*) country. For instance, the dream of some Iranians is to go to America, but we pray for the opposite of that. For us, a silent town is enough, and so we can go anywhere. We learned Turkish in three to four years. If we need to, we can learn another language as well. We are not afraid of learning a new language. We are thinking of Norway because the living standards are very high. Many people are go there as refugees, but we don't want that. We want to go enter a place on a red carpet."

Sara's perspective was very significant in terms of the different means of migration. The "red carpet" she refers to means that she wants to be welcomed by the country "as an important or honored person", and so it is their intention to migrate as important people, not as asylum seekers or refugees who have to start at the bottom. In Bourdieusian terms, Sara didn't want to lose her (institutionalized) cultural capital such as her university diploma that they had acquired in Iran and Turkey.

Among the students in which Turkey has not been referred to as the final destination are those who are making plans for further education in Western countries, although the question why some Iranian students want to move to other countries is still to be answered. Banu, for instance, said that she would like to go United States because one of her friends had studied there as a student, so she said could make comparison between Turkey and the United States. She knew that she could not work in Turkey while she was a student, however this would not be the case in the United States, as international students are allowed to work under certain conditions. Aside from that, she had no guarantee of finding a job if she stayed in Turkey, while in the United States, students start working before they

have finished university. "I think life is better there. My friend easily bought a car there. We are the same age and he has already started to work in a very nice bank. We studied the same things in Iran but he is more comfortable now," she said. Shahram also declared an interest in going to a Western country for his graduate education because, in his words, "my future is not guaranteed here in Turkey. I told you, everything is related to this. I want to go to an Anglo-Saxon country." As can be understood from the above statements, many of the Iranian students were planning further education in Western countries, attracted by assumed better and safe economic conditions, which they say is not possible in Turkey. The majority of the respondents said that they do not want to return to Iran due to the "political situation" there.

> "I don't know what will happen in the future. Maybe I won't be able to go back to Iran in the future because of political issues. I would prefer and I hope to go back, and hope the situation in Iran gets better … and by that I don't mean it gets better to the level of European countries. I don't expect that much, but a little better."

It was expressed by some of interviewees that economy was not the only reason for their migration to Western countries. They were unhappy with certain things in Iran, and similar things annoyed them also in Turkey, and it is these insufficiencies in Turkey that are behind the decisions of the Iranians students not to settle in the country, and to make plans to move on to Western countries. In other words, the acquisition of cultural capital in Turkey does not satisfy the desired lifestyle expectations, aka symbolic capital, for the respondents. The following section will focus on what they did not like either in Turkey or Iran, and what they really want as their cultural capital in their daily lives.

4.6. Desired Lifestyles and Symbolic Capital

Until now, the acquisition of both embodied and institutionalized cultural capital has been presented from the perceptions of the Iranian students living in Ankara. The interviews revealed that the students are compelled to migrate to Western countries for a number of different reasons, the most significant of which will be summarized here under three titles. These subtitles serve as a reflection of

the perceptions and expectations of better lives among the respondents, and their goals to attain symbolic capital that motivated them to leave Iran in the first place. While these three subtitles will cover the emerging concepts among Iranian students, a broader comprehension, including also the perceptions of settled Iranians, will be presented in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.6.1. Economic Abundance of the Host country

Of the thirteen Iranian students, ten had plans to move on to Western countries if they could find an opportunity, but for two different reasons. At the time of the interviews with the Iranian students in 2003, Iran's national bank devalued its currency by more than half, and as a result, most of the students said that their economic status declined year-on-year. Shirin, along with some of the other interviewees, cited economic instability and a poor standard of living as one of the main reasons behind their decisions to leave their home country in the first place. Although this is related to the economic capacity of the home/host country in the economic field, the Iranian students' future plans about Western countries cannot be reduced merely to economic motivations, as it was apparent from the interviews that many had a reasonable level of accumulated economic capital in Iran, but still they chose to seek education abroad. For instance, Sara had established a company in Iran after graduating from university and earned a good income for a while, but after some time she found it hard to work as an engineer, being the only woman in a male-dominated profession, and had to close her company. At this point, she decided look for education opportunities abroad.

4.6.2. Individual Freedom

The interviewees gave different reasons for their decisions to leave Iran and for not settling in Turkey, among which was individual freedom, which was mentioned often during the interviews. According to some of the respondents, although they did not conceptualized their desires as an implementation of human rights, they wanted to live in a society where their individual rights would be secure. For instance, Banu said that she wanted to move to the United States because she

thought human rights were more prioritized there. When asked what she meant by human rights, she talked about the basic human rights that each person receives from the country, and gave the example of the health insurance problem that she encountered in Turkey as a reason why Turkey was not good enough for her. What she referred to as human rights was rather a social welfare system, which is also not available in the United States, and this is significant, in that many of the interviewees had the same perception.

Most of the students who were studying at METU faced a health insurance problem as foreign citizens. METU used to provide private health care for foreign students for a reduced price, but after some time the system was cancelled, and the students were left to find private insurance of their own. As a consequence of the cancellation of the system, the students could no longer benefit from the state hospitals, and so had use the medical centre of the university. This left most of them feeling very vulnerable in Turkey. Sara was one such example who spoke about the lack of standards both in Turkey and Iran, and raised the insurance issue as a problem in Turkey. She likened the situation in Turkey to that of Iran, where there is also a lack of capacity in the implementation of the rules to resolve people's problems. "If you die or not, this is the rule, they say in Iran," she said, describing the situation in her home country as unfriendly to its citizens, and said that she found it similar to Turkey. This is a reflection of what the Iranian students expect from the bureaucratic field in the host country. It should be noted that when they spoke about human rights, they are not referring to the issues covered by the third article of the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, which states "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights,* 2001). In other words, what the Iranian students referred to as human rights wasn't the human rights sought by asylum seekers, political refugees, disadvantaged groups or vulnerable people in society, but their expectations of social welfare and living standards through individual freedom.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the bureaucratic field is the place in which the implementation of the law and public administration take place, and any dissatisfaction in the implementation of legislation in this regard contributed to the

decisions of the respondents to move to another country where they believed Western bureaucracy was attainable.

4.6.3. Secular State as a Western Lifestyle

Another significant reason for leaving not only Iran, but also Turkey was given by some of the interviewees was secularism, which was part of the Western lifestyle that was often brought up by Iranian students as a criticism of the pressure applied by the state to accept Islam as a part of daily life or lifestyle. Although the students made no distinction between the concepts of laicism or secularism, in general they spoke about personal freedoms within the framework of secular lifestyles, meaning, in particular, the separation of religion and state as an essential dimension. This is also considered within the field of bureaucracy (government).

Almost all of the students interviewed spoke about the negative influence of the Islamic government on their lives as one of the strongest reasons to leave their country. Most of the students said that since the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, Islamic influence had taken control of their everyday lives. Sara provided examples of this:

> "One of the reasons that why I've came here is that in Iran they use religion very much. This has influenced the families; for instance, people say 'this daughter of mine is very religious,' but is your daughter very educated? And is your son very hardworking? They don't say that. Similar things are also being seen here slowly over time. I'm happy that people with headscarves have the freedom to obtain an education here, but lately they have [religious people] started to spread religion. I lived through that in Iran. For instance, they gather as a group and say 'oh look, they are atheists'. They don't have the right to do that, but they do anyway. You can come to the university either in shorts or a headscarf."

Several of the students said that they were starting to see similarities between Turkey and Iran. Roxanne, for instance, said that she could not move from Turkey after investing so much time into the country over the years, but that she would like to bring up her child elsewhere, because she didn't see a good future for Turkey in terms of secularism:

> "I find the current government [in Turkey] to be cunning in many ways, because they use religion as an instrument. I also see it in Bilkent (University); there are many girls who put on heavy makeup but also wear a headscarf, I find this very cunning. […] Turkey is another case. First of all, I think religion must be separate from politics. In Iran there is a very nasty government, it does whatever it wants and does horrible things to people. It only thinks of itself. If a person lives in Iran, s/he eventually becomes political."

Roxane claiming that "eventually everyone becomes political in Iran" is very important, in that most of the students interviewed in Ankara were extremely responsive when the issue of religion in Iran was brought up. Many said that they found Turkey to have more freedoms than Iran, although some of the interviewees, like Roxane, and Sara and her husband, were significantly hesitant about the country's future having seen the transformations over the last couple of years.

> My husband is an Ataturkist, and he doesn't like the course of events over the last couple of years. Neither do I. For instance, when I first arrived, this place was like heaven for me. Unfortunately I have to give an example now; in Iran I could never sit comfortably on a bus because at any time someone could annoy me. It gave me much discomfort, and I had never seen that in Turkey before, but now I do! For instance, I get on the subway and see people holding the Koran in one hand… this is a show off! If you want to read the Koran, you need to comprehend the content. I use the bus route 230 between Hacettepe and Sıhhıye; I had never seen such a thing before, but now they read the Koran on the bus. There wasn't such a thing in previous times. This is so much like Iran.

Finding similarities between Turkey and Iran raises the question in peoples' minds of whether Turkey will become like Iran in the future. Roxanne shared her fear of such a transformation in everyday life in Turkey.

> I hear that a lot [resemblances between Turkey and Iran]. I don't see it as impossible. I think those who say "that's impossible" have closed their eyes, because good things are being destroyed here; I really feel that way. I sometimes get nervous […] because here, people don't know or read, they don't see what's happening in other places. Turkish people really don't understand what they have in their hands. Turkey has great wealth. I don't like extremist Ataturkists, but he did some amazing things and people don't appreciate him enough. We need to learn from history. The things that happened in Iran were very painful. I'm very

> happy with my life here at the moment. Of course I'd have preferred living in my own country, but my country has become unliveable, which is why I'm here. The people here are insensible, they read very little. Turks should know what happened in Iran and learn their lessons.

The transformation of everyday life in Turkey has worried Roxanne and Sara very much in time they have been staying in Turkey. They both arrived in Turkey in 2006, and had been here for seven years at the time of the interviews, although not all of the students shared their concerns for the future. Pablo said that it was impossible for Turkey to become like Iran. He said that leftist people were talking about a revolution, but nobody was talking about the post-revolution era if such a thing occurred in Turkey. According to Pablo, the revolution in Iran ended badly, and people have been regretting the revolution ever since. In his opinion, there would be no point in attempting to change the flow of public administration in the Turkish government, in that revolution had not brought equality to Iranians. In other words, in his experience, there should be a place for religion in the society, as otherwise there would be an explosion of religious people in the country. For this reason, he found the current AKP (Justice and Development Party) government of Turkey necessary in terms of its religious efforts. He did add, however, that he didn't want to stay in Turkey after graduation, as his dream was to go to the United States, where his uncles live. This shows that although Pablo was not afraid of Turkey becoming unsecular, like some of the other interviewees, but that he would prefer not to stay in the country if given the choice, in that Turkey does not fit in with his long-term plans as a host country.

Similar to Pablo, Ahmad and Nabila disagreed with the notion that Turkey was on the way to becoming like Iran, saying that they saw people behaving as they like in Turkey (in the frame of personal freedom). That said, similar to Pablo, both Nabila and Ahmad had plans to move on to Western countries in the future. For Ahmad, the United States was not his first choice, as he thought it was overrated among Iranians. His preference for the future was Europe after graduation, based on his belief that the sciences and social welfare are better there. On the other hand, Nabila, who is from the Baha'i branch of Islam, had plans to go to the United States in the future due to the large Baha'i community there.

4.7. Conclusion

There is a large community of Iranian students in education all around the world, including Turkey, which makes them a unique and highly skilled migrant group. Most of the examples given in this chapter indicate that Iranian students see the education, bureaucratic (government) and economic fields as important variables in their quest for international migration. The influence of family support over the success of Iranian students, their socialization processes in Ankara and the accumulation of different forms of capital (social, cultural and language) within the process, are covered in the first half of this chapter, after which the question was raised as to why they choose Ankara for study. In attempting to answer this question, it has become apparent that Turkey was not the first choice for most, but despite that, it fulfilled their expectations of a host country to a certain extent. Finally, the chapter makes an analysis of what it is the respondents seek from a host country, in other words their perceptions of what constitutes a better lifestyle.

Economic capital was an important variable in their migration decisions, although they emphasized also the influence of scientific and cultural capital of the Western model. Their perspective in this regard is that people should have individual rights and freedoms in the country in which they live. Religion was seen within the framework of secularism, which they consider an essential ingredient in a host a country. In this respect, Turkey did not fulfil the expectations of most of the Iranian students as a host country, based on its economy, individual rights/freedoms or and an at-risk secular state. Furthermore, they do not believe its bureaucracy operates according to a standardized set of rules, unlike, they stated, in Western countries, and so their lifestyle expectations went beyond the limits available Turkey. While many stated that Turkey may be better than Iran in this regard, they do not believe it to be as good Western countries. Rather than using the metaphor of a "waiting room" or "limbo" (Danış, Taraghi, and Pérouse, 2009) for Turkey as asylum seekers, they see Turkey as a "stepping stone" at the start of their migration process, being somewhere they can acquire cultural capital through education and socialization before continuing on to Western countries. Coming to Turkey easier for Iranian students than countries further west due to the ease of

obtaining a visa, and geographical and cultural proximity, although this did not satisfy all their expectations from a host country. Only under special circumstances, for example family issues, do they think of settling here. In summary, Turkey holds a special for Iranian students as somewhere that they can accumulate as much capital of different forms as they can and prepare themselves for their final destinations.

When all forms of capital are considered, it can be understood that it is the Westernized lifestyle that Iranian students are actually trying to achieve in the host country. In other words, attaining both economic and cultural capital would not only lead to expected capital, but would also allow them to obtain their desired lifestyles and social positions. This is conceptualized as the Western lifestyle and is associated with economic abundance, personal freedom and a secular state. After considering these characteristics, most of the Iranian students in Ankara do not consider Turkey can fulfil their future expectations in terms of symbolic capital. Only Sami and Roxanne made plans to stay in Turkey, as a result of their special conditions, while the rest of the student group are planning to continue their migration to Western countries. The interviews also highlighted the United States as the perceived ideal host country for the Iranian students. Although not all students picked it as their first choice, they felt the need to explain why. This shows the pressure of the United States as a powerful symbol in their Iranian habitus, or, in other words, the United States has produced symbolically the "ideal lifestyle" for Iranian students. Obviously, some Western countries (such as Canada or European nations), and the United States in particular, are considered more prestigious than Turkey among Iranian students. These are common perceptions among the respondent Iranian students, however, the experience of international migration by Iranians continues with a study of those who settled in the country after graduation from Turkish universities. The following chapter will focus on the settled migrants who graduated and found a job in Turkey, and who were able to convert their cultural capital into economic capital in the field of international migration.

CHAPTER V

SETTLED IRANIANS AND THEIR STATUS PASSAGE PROCESSES

In the previous chapter, the experiences of Iranian students who came to Turkey to study for a certain period of time has been analyzed. In general, they believed that they would not be able to lead a better life or attain their desired lifestyle in Turkey due to such limitations in the country as the lack of economic abundance, secularism and personal freedoms. In this regard, the majority of the student group are compelled to continue their migration to Western countries through education. This was not the case, however, for all Iranians in Ankara, as the field research unearthed many Iranians who had already settled in Turkey, despite the negative characteristics stated by the students. This raises the importance of the question of how those settled Iranians living in Ankara constructed their perceptions of their stay in Turkey and their accumulation of different forms of capital.

As a motivation coming from their illusio[33] within the field of international migration, Iranians attempt to reach better lives and lifestyles, which is referred to in this study as symbolic capital. To this end, if Iranians living in Ankara think that they have attained their (desired and deserved) lifestyles in Turkey, then they have reached their goal of a better life and lifestyle in Turkey. However, there is also another option. If the settled Iranians in Ankara abandoned their dreams of better lives and lifestyles due to a lack of those characteristics mentioned in Chapter 3,

[33] These conceptualizations are explained in Chapter 3.

one may rightfully ask at this point how they overcome those constraints in Turkey, as a destination country. This chapter will also attempt to respond to this question.

5.1. The Field of Economy and Settled Iranians in Ankara

Status passage in a host society is an important process that usually starts with education for Iranian migrants in Ankara. The decision to either stay (settle) or continue migration comes usually right after the completion of studies. In the previous chapter it was seen that Iranian students who studied in Turkish universities mostly planned to continue their migration to Western countries through education, with ten out of thirteen students expressing a desire to move either to the United States or to European countries to settle after graduation. However, it was also seen that a few of the interviewees wanted to stay in Turkey for good, but these were not the only people who came to Turkey to study and then settle. Turkey is often seen as a "stepping stone" in migration to other countries, as analyzed in the previous chapter, and there are many Iranians who came to Turkey in the past, particularly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to settle for different reasons, which will be shown below. Accordingly, this chapter will look initially at their motivations and means of settling in Turkey after graduation from Turkish universities. Most of the Iranian interviewees said that the decision to settle in a host country is related directly to status passage; in other words, occupational incorporation, which makes the economic field of particular significance in this chapter. In order to comprehend the settling experiences of Iranians in Ankara, this field of economy will be the starting point of our analysis.

The occupational incorporation of migrants into the host country requires special knowledge of basic information regarding the implementation of the set of rules in the specific host country (Schittenhelm, 2011) and field.[34] In other words, these set of rules and requirements are the outcomes of that field of economy in a specific time and place, which is asked to be recognized from the migrants as well

[34] Borudieu's definition of set of rules within a field is mentioned in more detail in Chapter 3.

as other agents. Specific knowledge about the acquisition of economic capital in society can be attained through socialization among the agents, which requires also an accumulation of embodied cultural capital. In Chapter 4, the socialization processes of Iranian students was stated for a similar reason, with the aim being to reveal their means of acquiring embodied capital before converting it into economic capital. In this regard, the acquisition of economic capital in a host country requires also cultural capital.

Before analyzing the process of settlement and incorporation into the host society of Ankara, it would be helpful to learn more about the group of Iranians taking part in the study who made the decision to live in Ankara. Comprehending why and how they decided to settle will illuminate the positioning of Turkey as a host country, which is unlikely to coincide with the perception of Turkey among Iranian students as a "step" before migrating to Western countries. Last but not least, learning about their settlement and occupational accomplishments in the host country of Turkey will permit the comprehension of their strategies in the conversion of cultural capital into economic capital. The interviewee group comprises eighteen Iranians, most of whom came to Turkey after the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, with the exception of two who came in the 1960s. The study group comprised eight women and ten men. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the interviewees were reached via a snowballing method, and interviews were conducted either in Turkish or English, depending on the preference of the individual, but in the end, only one wanted to conduct the interview in English. The table below presents the full profiles of the respondents.

TABLE 8: Demographic Profiles of Settled Iranians

	F/M	BIRTH PLACE	ETHNICITY / RELIGION	DATE OF ARRIVAL	MARITAL STATUS	AGE	TURK. CITIZ.	OCCUPATION	INCOME (TL)
ARASH	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	2001	Married	34	No	(Bio-chem.) Tourism	12000
ARMAN	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	…	Engaged	41	No	Dentist	N/A
BAHMAN	M	Tehran	Persian	1980	Married	49	No	UN member	5000
CADOC	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	2004	Married	53	No	Iran Rest.	10000
ZAAN	M	Hoy	Azerbaijani	1987	Married	51	Yes	Academician	4000
KAISA	F	Tabriz	Assyrian	1987	Single	46	No	UN Member	5000
LARISSA	F	Tehran	Persian	2002	Married	32	Yes	Tourism	3000
ARDASHIR	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	1980	Married	80	Yes	Politician (Retired)	1000
MASUD	M	Maku	Azerbaijani	1986	Divorced	41	Yes	Journalist	5000
MAHMUD	M	Tehran	Arab	1998	Engaged	32	No	(Sociologist) Trader	12000
MAARIKA	F	Shiraz	Persian	1987	Divorced	48	Yes	Trade Interpreter	3000
NADIA	F	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	1986	Married	52	Yes	Beauty Centre Owner	10000
NALANI	F	Tehran	Persian	1960	Married	58	Yes	Teacher	5000
PARISA	F	Urmia	Azerbaijani	1995	Married	45	Yes	Teacher	4000
RAFAL	M	Tehran	Persian	1984	Married	50	Yes	Life coach, Yoga Master	30000
RAHIM	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	1983	Married	48	Yes	Trader (Electrical Engineer)	25000
SABRA	F	Hazar	Turkmen	1999	Married	35	Yes	Housewife (Environmental Engn.)	12000-13000
SUZAN	F	Tehran	Baha'i	1966	Married	53	Yes	NGO owner	10000

5.2. Reasons for staying in Turkey: Education? Or Something Else?

The majority of interviewees said that Iranian migrants come to Turkey either for education purposes or for familial reasons, e.g. marriage. Although their reasons for coming all stemmed from these two categories, the detailed stories of the respondents revealed that it was more than that. Kaisa, for instance, first came to Turkey to apply for a US visa, but after she was rejected due to technical problem on her application (her name was written wrong), her father let her enter the foreign students' exam in Turkey, and after passing, she started to study in the English Literature Department of Bilkent University. When asked how she learned about the university exam for foreigners in Ankara, she said that she learned from other Iranians that were staying at the same hotel with her in Ankara and they told Kaisa and her father about the exam after her visa application was rejected. She added that they had been directed to that particular hotel by a Turkish taxi driver in Ankara, who told them that many Iranians were staying there. Although they had not decided to come to Turkey based on their social capital and due to the social network of Iranians, they came across a social network that had been constructed in the host society in that hotel. Similar to Kaisa, Maarika first came to Turkey to apply for a US visa, as she hoped to move close to her uncle in the United States. After her visa application was rejected, her family started to look at Turkey for her education because, as mentioned in Chapter 2, she had argued with her departmental chair in the university back in Iran and so didn't think she could return. While searching for opportunities in Turkey, she met the man who would become her husband, who was Turkish but had Iranian friends in Ankara. She considered her marriage as "childish, but very beautiful for those times", and it was this that made her stay in Turkey, although she hadn't studied in Turkey at all. After being divorced, Maarika moved to Italy and tried to live there for a while, but found it difficult to start over in a new host country after so many years in Turkey, and finally came back. In this sense, her experience resembles that of Roxane, as mentioned in the previous chapter on Iranian students, as both women stayed in Turkey due to their marriage, and decided to live there even after their divorces.

Of the eighteen respondents, eight expressed that they had first come to Turkey for education and then decided to settle in the country, although their stories reveal that they had considered going to other countries before deciding to settle in Turkey. Arash's experience can be given as an example of this, in that he applied simultaneously to universities in Germany and Turkey for his graduate studies. Although he was invited to Germany for an interview, he didn't want to risk his small budget on a plane ticket because his scholarship was not guaranteed, and so he decided to study in Turkey. During the interview, however, he expressed his regret at not trying his chance in Germany, in that he couldn't continue working in his field of interest in the academia due to the limitations of that particular subject area in Turkey (Bio-chemistry). In the end, he opened a tourism office in the business center of Kızılay for cultural and touristic activities between Turkey and Iran.

As mentioned above, although the reasons for coming to Turkey first seemed to be divided between the categories of either education or family, the interviews indicate that rejected visa applications for other countries may also motivate Iranians to stay in Turkey. One further category became apparent during the study that was valid mostly for women, being those who came to Turkey to study, and while doing so, met someone who they eventually married. Consequently, they started to work immediately after settlement, and so the initial plan of education never took over. Larissa, for example, came to Turkey to study Law. During her application process she was working as an interpreter for Iranians who couldn't speak Turkish, and met her future husband through her small social network, who at the time was working in a hair dressers. At this point she found work in a tourism office where learned how to manage such a business, and after a while she started her own business with her husband. Similarly, Nadia came to Turkey to study after trying to live two years in United States with her relatives. She was planning to study in Turkey, but after becoming part of a social network of Iranians in Ankara, she met her husband, and stayed in the country with the residence permit of her husband's.

Although these examples can be expanded upon, the reasons why Iranians come to Turkey fall under three main categories: to make a US visa application; for educational purposes; and for familial reasons, including marriage either before or after coming to Turkey. The given examples indicate that Turkey was not the primary choice for most of the respondents, as was the case for most of the Iranian students, with the United States and Germany given as the most popular first choices, followed by the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden and Canada, but for different reasons they all ended up in Ankara. Needless to say, there have been exceptions, for instance two of the women interviewees, who directly came to Turkey after marrying Iranian men, never considered going to another country since their husbands were living in Ankara. Another interviewee who did not consider any countries other than Turkey was Ardashir, who fled from Iran due to his political activism. According to Turkish law, people of Turkish origin can apply for citizenship, and since Ardashir was from an Azerbaijani background, he came to Turkey first on a tourist visa, and after a while, he applied for and was granted Turkish with the help of his social capital, and so never had to seek asylum.

While only Ardashir came to Turkey for political reasons, two of the other interviewees, Rafal and Arash, who had said initially that they came to Turkey for education, said during the interview that the true reason was the political oppression in Iran.

> I had to get out of Iran anyway, because my worldview has always been different, since I was small. I was always more Western! When the revolution occurred in Iran, it was an opportunity to leave. I came here. We are very close with Turkey; when you compare us in the sense of culture, religion or tradition, we are the same. I came, and from here I was planning to go somewhere else, but when I talked to my (Yoga) supervisor, he told me that it would be better for me to stay in Turkey. And I did what I was told, I continued from here.

That was how Rafal explained why he decided to stay in Turkey. He was a Yoga teacher who had been taught by an Indian guru (supervisor), and his guru told him to stay in Turkey. That's how he decided to stay in the country, otherwise he would have gone to Western countries to practice Yoga.

Arash was similarly unhappy about his life back in Iran, and so he left so that he could do things that he couldn't do back at home:

> Sooner or later I was going to get out of Iran, I couldn't live there. I was always at home, studying music. You cannot go out and walk with your girlfriend in Tabriz; maybe in Tehran, so we were always at home, everything was done at home. When you saw the police on the street, you were scared, even when you hadn't done anything wrong; "you're wearing a short-sleeved shirt, your hair is very long (for a man), who is this (girl) with you?" were common questions posed by the police. In here police does not do such things in Turkey. Here they confirm the security but there they did something else.

The two above quotes indicate that some of the settled Iranians had chosen to leave Iran and migrate to another country due to the demands on their lives in their home country, which went against their own desires or their perceived deserved lifestyles. In short, the lifestyle imposed on them can be seen as a political battle that led them to leave their home country. Rafal described his political battle with the government, saying that his "worldview" had always been different and more "Western". In other words, as explained in previous chapters, they were unable to live their perceived deserved lifestyle in their home country, and this lead them to migrate to another country to construct a lifestyle that would not be possible in Iran.

It was understood that similar to Iranian students, the majority settled Iranians also used the education strategy in the host country to ease the acquisition of cultural capital. As has been addressed in other studies (Nohl et al., 2011a), the transfer of cultural capital from the home country to the host country had always been problematic, for example, recognition of university diplomas from the home country. Entering into education in the host country of Turkey was a first "step" for many of the respondents, although some of the women entered the labor market (and realized status passage) after marrying people who already had the right to stay in Turkey. In this regard, the settlement decisions of the respondents were related mainly to the options and the forms of capital already held in the field of international migration, and following section will analyze the means adopted by Iranian migrants to stay in Turkey within that field.

5.3. Different Options to Staying and Working in Turkey after Education

There are various available options for those looking to stay in a host country after education, however considering the field of international migration and the specific case of Turkey these opportunities are restricted for documented migrants, in that the related laws in Turkey do not resemble those of other countries. This chapter will make a brief mention of the means and strategies adopted by settled Iranians to this end. The information provided below includes the individual stories of settled Iranians and their taking up residence in Turkey, and goes deeper than the brief analysis provided in Chapter 2.

5.3.1. Extending a Tourist Visa

According to Turkish legislation, to stay in the country as a foreigner requires either a tourist visa or temporary/permanent permits, such as for work or education. According to a special agreement between Turkey and Iran, Iranian citizens can come to Turkey on a tourist visa that is issued at a land border or airport for ninety days. Prior to the enactment of the New Law (FILP), this was the most common strategy used by Iranians who found themselves between positions. For instance, some of the interviewees said that they had extended their tourist visa while staying in Turkey and studying for the university entrance exams for foreigners. Nadia, is one such case, who said that she had used this strategy for a long time, going to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and coming back on the return flight within the hour. In this way she could extend her visa for three months within just a few hours, and she did this 13 times, allowing her to stay in the country legally for three-and-a-half years to stay documented in the country. Sometimes she would also return to Iran to see her family, and so these journeys were "not a big problem", she said. Obviously, Nadia's strategy requires significant economic capital, especially in the late eighties when flying from Ankara to the TRNC was much more expensive.

Nadia was not the only person who used this method, as Maarika, Bahman, Rafal, Arash, Larissa and Mahmud all expressed that they had extended their tourist

visa by making short-term exits from Turkey. That said, this method was used mostly as a temporary solution until the interviewees could find steady positions in Ankara. Such was the popularity of this strategy that some Iranian tourism offices in Ankara even organized these visa extension tours, although the strategy was closed with the enactment of the New Law (FILP) in 2014.

5.3.2. Family Ties: Legal Status through Marriage

One of the most significant examples of such a situation marrying someone with the legal right to stay in the host country of Turkey. If the spouse has Turkish citizenship or a residence permit, either for education or work, then the foreign spouse has the right to stay with them.[35]

Obtaining a legal permission to settle through one's spouse usually has a gendered dimension, with most of those residing in Turkey on this basis being women. Some of the female respondents came to Turkey after marrying an Iranian who was already living in Turkey, and so they were able to gain permission to stay on their husbands' permits. As a second approach in this regard, there were cases like that of Nadia, who came to Turkey and were married after meeting their spouse in Turkey. Larissa had a similar experience, in that she was regularly extending her tourist visa until she married a Turkish man and was granted citizenship. Although Nadia's spouse was Iranian, and they had only a temporary resident permit, after some years they applied for citizenship together and were finally granted Turkish citizenship. Last but not least, there were also Iranian migrants in the interviewee group who obtained permission to stay through their wives. Arash, after graduating from a university in Ankara, was unable to find a job, but was able to stay in Turkey with his wife after she started to study and work for a university. The same strategy was used also by Rafal when he was unable to find a job, and managed to stay with his wife as the spouse of someone with a study permit. It should, however, be

[35] Fake marriages are uncommon among documented Iranians in Ankara, with no examples being found in the interview group of anyone who had even thought of doing it. This may be due to the special agreement between Iran and Turkey mentioned above.

noted that all of these examples (with the exception of citizenship) were temporary solutions for the Iranian migrants.

These examples indicate that either extending one's visa or obtaining permission to stay on the back of a permit held by a spouse can be a temporary solution for the Iranian respondents, but if the spouse holds Turkish citizenship, then they have a more guaranteed position. According to Turkish law, after three years of marriage to a Turkish citizen, foreigners may apply for citizenship, and this is one of the strongest means of settling for Iranian migrants. That said, there is no guarantee that foreigners will be granted either a work permit or citizenship, even if they fulfil all the requirements of application, and so people may need to use their social networks to ease the bureaucratic procedures mentioned in more detail in Chapter 2.

5.3.3. Obtaining a Work Permit in Turkey

The regulations in Turkey related to the granting of a working permit to foreigners are covered in Law no. 4817, although they are still referred to as "work permits for foreigners" rather than for "migrants" living in Turkey, which would regulate their economic incorporation into Turkish society. Law no. 4817, which contains details of the requirements related to the recruitment of foreigners in Turkey, has been valid for a long time, although there have been some changes over the last couple of years.[36] To start with, recruitment processes are not very easy for non-Turkish citizens in Turkey, despite the existence of the law. For example, Turkish employers seeking to recruit foreign workers must prove that no Turkish citizen with same qualifications has applied for the specific job. Secondly, employers are asked to pay much more insurance for recruited foreigners. Thirdly, for every foreign employee, employers should recruit five Turkish Citizens, and the list goes on. The resulting heavy fees and responsibilities tied to the recruitment of

[36] More information about the legislation and FILP is stated in Chapter 2.

foreigners has dissuaded many employers from recruiting foreign workers, thus restricting the participation of foreigners in the labor market.[37]

In general, foreigners can apply for four different categories of work permit in Turkey, which are: a temporary work permit (for a limited period of time); an unlimited time work permit; an independent work permit; and a permit for exceptional cases (including marriage, EU citizens, etc.). In 2015, the Ministry of Labor announced that the total number of (new application) work permits given to foreigners was 64,547, of which 1,521 were given to Iranians. The interviews indicate that only four Iranian migrants within the group obtained a work permit for foreigners Cadoc, who came to Turkey to work as the restaurant chef in the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, is one of these. After retiring from the embassy, he established Ankara's first Iranian restaurant in 2010. He applied for a work permit for a limited period of time, and said that he wanted to apply for citizenship fulfilling the requirements. Another interviewee in this situation was Arman, who had studied in Ankara University and had graduated as a dentist. Doctors, such as dentists, who are willing to open a medical center can apply for a work permit, and Arman applied and was granted such a permit, allowing him to stay in Turkey. At the time of the interview, Arman had become engaged to a Turkish woman and believed he would be eligible to apply for Turkish citizenship in the coming years. Another two interviewees, Bahman and Kaisa, were both working in the UNHCR, and so their work permits were organized by this international organization. Bahman also married a Turkish woman and so gained the right to extend his permit on the basis of marriage to a Turkish citizen. Almost all of the Iranian interviewees planned to apply for Turkish citizenship if they intended to stay in Turkey for good, although obtaining Turkish citizenship is not easy as it seems, which will be explained in the following part.

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[37] From time to time, the Turkish government grants permission for the recruitment of foreign workers for certain professions. In 2013, 445 members of the medical profession applied to Turkey for work, of which 49 were Iranians, as the second highest number in terms of nationality ("Türkiye'ye bir yılda en çok Azeri, en az Yunanlı doktor geldi," (*Time Turk Newspaper,* 2013)).

5.3.4. Obtaining Turkish Citizenship

Obtaining Turkish citizenship is the hardest, but also the strongest option for Iranians (or other nationals) looking to live and work in Turkey. Although both limited and unlimited work permits are valid in the legislation, they are very hard to achieve, according to the interviewees. Applying for citizenship may be the hardest strategy, but gives not only easy access to many things in Turkey but also a prestigious social position, and sooner or later, many begin the process. This section will focus on the motivations and strategies of the Iranian migrants to obtain Turkish citizenship.[38]

Before explaining the situation for documented settled Iranians living in Ankara, it is necessary to mention the importance of citizenship both for in literature of international migration and in the sociological approach of Bourdieu. Bauder focuses on Bourdieu's ideas of capital to argue that citizenship functions as a key mechanism of distinction that renders migrants vulnerable and exploitable (when lacking citizenship), and therefore particularly valuable to the economies of the global North (Bauder, 2008: 316). In the same study, Bauder suggests that citizenship must be considered as a form of capital in studies of international migration when analyzed in Bourdieusian terms. This assertion stems from the fact that obtaining citizenship is one of the most important goals of immigrants in a host country, given that it provides protection against social and economic exclusion, which is extremely valid also for Iranians living in Ankara. The interviews indicated that most of the settled Iranians had considered applying for Turkish citizenship, as this would provide them with the most comprehensive rights as a non-Turkish citizen looking to live and work in Turkey.

As seen from the demography table detailing the settled Iranians at the beginning of this chapter, thirteen out of the eighteen interviewees held Turkish

[38] "Dual citizenship" is not possible in some of the nation states, and so applying for Turkish citizenship may not be a solution for some. Iran is one such state that does not permit dual citizenship, except for minorities living in the country. That said, as Turkey does allows dual citizenship, Iranian citizens are able to apply for Turkish citizenship.

citizenship at the time of the interview, referred to as citizenship capital by Bauder (2008). As stated in the FILP legislation, there are different ways of applying for Turkish citizenship, including through marriage, and being of Turkish descent or culture. All of the requirements for Turkish citizenship are stated in the legislation, but several difficulties were mentioned over and over by the settled Iranians through the obtaining process, as will be seen below.

When asked how they achieved Turkish citizenship, some of the respondents that it was based on their Azerbaijani background, while others said that it was through marriage to a Turkish citizen. Although there are other ways of applying for Turkish citizenship, these two were the most common. Turkish legislation (FILP) stated that foreigners who buy real estate and who want to settle in Turkey have the right to apply for citizenship, although this route has never used by respondents. That said, a newer version of the legislation was published in 2014, changing the rules for foreign people who either buy or rent an apartment in Turkey, in that now they can apply only for a residence permit. FILP still applies to the situation of settled Iranians who do not yet hold Turkish citizenship. Bahman's parents were thinking of using this strategy to stay for six months in Turkey and for six months in Iran in a year. Although not common among settled Iranians, this strategy may be used as a means of staying in the country, although it does not constitute a permit to work.

This issue of Turkish citizenship, in other words citizenship capital, has been of obvious importance to the settled Iranians. First of all, as mentioned above, it eases the conversion of different forms of capital into each other, for example, cultural capital into economic capital, which is particularly valid for the settled Iranians, since the majority of the interviewees come to Turkey for education and work after graduating from Turkish universities. In other words, the education that they undertake in Ankara can be converted into economic capital easily, since they will be able to find employment easier than non-Turkish citizens, or will have an easier time establishing their own business. Secondly, the respondents spoke about a security dimension when asked whether citizenship had changed anything in their lives, stating that they felt more secure in Turkey after acquiring citizenship, since

they could "speak out" if they had any troubles in their daily lives. In this regard, citizenship can be seen as a powerful strategy for incorporation into the host society.[39] In short, holding Turkish citizenship, in concurrence with Bauder (Bauder, 2008), is very important for the case of settled Iranians, although as shown in Chapter 2, it is apparent that acquiring citizenship is not an easy task, and most of the time settled Iranians need to use their social networks, such as friendships with civil servants, to resolve this issue.

5.4. Settled Iranians' Preparation for the "Status Passage" in Ankara

"Status passage" is the term used to explain the macro-micro linkages in people's life histories, as conceptualized by Heinz (Heinz, 1996) in his quest for life course studies. More specifically, it expresses the passage from one status to another, referring to major changes in life. In migration studies, status passage has also been used to explain the duration of post migration, especially by scholars focusing on the incorporation process of migrants into the host society (Nohl et al., 2011a). However, status passage is rarely a smooth and unproblematic process, and there are various studies showing how skilled migrants in a host society are only able to find employment below their capitals (Hausen, 2011). As a result, migrants use certain strategies to overcome the barriers that prevent them from enhancing their social positions in the host society, and in this respect, the term status passage becomes important for the cases of the settled Iranians. This study focuses especially on the status passage between education and occupational incorporation processes, and looking at the status passages of the settled Iranians in Ankara will indicate whether or not they managed to achieve better social positions in the host country.

[39] For instance, undocumented Iranian workers lack the ability to complain or go to the police if they face any troubles, since their position is unsecure. This is often the case for Iranian asylum seekers working in the construction sector, who cannot apply for any other jobs or speak out if they are not paid by the employer, lacking the right to work (Danış, Taraghi, and Pérouse, 2009), and this disadvantaged positions can be exploited by employers.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, entering into education in the host country is one of the most significant and powerful strategies of Iranian students to acquire (institutionalized) cultural capital, and in particular, being awarded diplomas by universities in the host society. That said, university diplomas alone are not enough to fully acquire cultural capital, in that cultural capital also has an embodied form that is acquired within a socialization process, as mentioned in the previous chapter.[40] The accumulation of cultural capital (in both an institutionalized and embodied form), however, is different for Turkish citizens and Iranian migrants in society. As mentioned in many studies, the accumulation of capital by migrants is questioned again and again by the host country, especially in the processes of status passage (Nohl et al., 2011b), which restricts their participation into economic field, although this is not the case for natives. To address this, migrants develop strategies to overcome these limitations and to find a position in the economic field of the host country. The following part will analyze the processes adopted by Iranian migrants to acquire cultural capital in both its institutionalized and embodied forms in the host society of Ankara, Turkey.

5.4.1. Acquisition of Institutionalized Cultural Capital and University Education

It is often mentioned in this study that both the temporary Iranian students and permanent settled Iranians living in Ankara at the time of the interview had opted to study in Turkey as a means of overcoming the difficulties associated with the transfer their home country institutionalized cultural capital to the host country, predominantly the difficulty in getting their home country diplomas recognized in the host nation. Iranians use a strategy of foreign education not only as a means of international migration, but also an easy way of acquiring institutionalized cultural capital in the host society. These experiences of

[40] This socialization process includes an intersection of both the requirements of the labor market specific to that society, as well as the qualifications brought by the education system, specific to that culture and time. It is this socialization process, known also as embodied cultural capital that influences the status passage process and the conversion of cultural capital into economic capital.

institutionalized cultural capital among the settled Iranians are important in understanding the reasons behind their chosen fields of study, and helps also in learning whether they went on to find work in similar areas after graduation, or started working in an unrelated field. Answering these questions would help in the comprehension of the strategies of the settled Iranians living in Ankara, as well as the potential of economic capital in Ankara, as a destination society.

The interviews conducted both with the Iranian students and the settled Iranians reveal overlapping motives in terms of the chosen fields of education. The influence of family was very significant among the Iranian students, as detailed in the previous chapter, and similar to these temporary students in Ankara, the settled Iranians also indicated that they obtained support from their families to study abroad. For instance, one of the interviewees, Masud, told that while he was studying in Ankara, his family insisted that he continue his education in either Europe or the United States. From this it can be understood that not only the families of the current Iranian students, but also of the currently settled Iranians had an influence in the education decisions of Iranian students. In this regard, it can be said that studying abroad has long been a family decision for Iranians. Secondly, like the current Iranian students, the majority of settled Iranians picked STEM fields (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) in which to study, and studying medicine was also very popular among Iranians in Ankara, just as it was for Iranians in the United States, as mentioned by the Iranian students in the previous chapter. The fields mentioned so far all have a symbolically powerful positioning in Turkey, but also in the United States and in most developed countries. For the case of Turkey, there is another occupation that has symbolic power, and that is teaching in the field of education. Working as a teacher or scholar, either at a school or university, has a very prestigious connotations in Turkey, although it doesn't provide a high economic income, and the number of settled Iranians who chose to work in the field of education is quite remarkable. The distribution of occupations and their perceived social status will be presented in more detail in the following parts.

Last but not least, the interviews also indicate that after graduation, not all Iranians found occupations related to their fields of study in Ankara, with eight interviewees out of the eighteen saying that they had found jobs in unrelated fields. It is necessary to note, however, that this is common in Turkey, not only for Iranians but also for native university graduates, many of whom cannot find positions in fields related to their diplomas. When unable to find work related to their specific field of education, some of the Iranian respondents started working in ethnically related businesses, such as tourism offices dealing with tours between Turkey and Iran, or Farsi language education. There are other examples of such ethnic entrepreneurships, but before explaining the status passages and types, the acquisition process of embodied cultural capital will be subjected to a brief analysis in the following part in order to clarify the socialization processes of settled Iranians.

5.4.2. Acquisition of Embodied Cultural Capital and Socialization

The acquisition of embodied cultural capital through socialization has been explained in Chapter 4, where focus is primarily on Iranian students. This can be referred to as cultural knowledge not written down anywhere, but transferred via people and socialization, and this process of socialization is also very important for settled Iranians who in the past decided to settle in the host country, and make use these networks and linkages.

The acquisition of embodied cultural capital is significant in two stages of a status passage. First of all, for the case of settled Iranians, embodied cultural capital starts during education in Turkey, in others words, after they take on a "student" identity in Ankara. Secondly, and more importantly for this chapter, the transfer from a "student" identity into an "employed" identity is significant. Within this second phase, Iranian migrants learn specific information that enables them to reach a social position in the host society, in that they are unable to make direct use of the embodied cultural capital gained in their home society in Iran. For this reason, they need to spend longer in the socialization phase in the host society if they are to gain embodied cultural capital. To this end, socialization is an essential

process which demands the creation of social networks both with Iranians and locals in the host society in order to gather information and to overcome the barriers in the way of their incorporation and status passage. Comprehending the results of this status passage would help answer such primary questions such as whether Iranian migrants are satisfied with their social position, and their accumulation of symbolic capital in the host society of Ankara.

5.4.3. Types of Social Capital: Connections with Home and Host Country

Social capital is the term used by Bourdieu to express the construction and usage of social connections in society (Bourdieu, 1986). These social connections provide migrants with the opportunity to attain and keep their social positions in the struggle for better positions and status. For the case of settled Iranians, there are two different sets of social connections that can be derived from the host society of Ankara: social capital connected with Iranians (home country people); and social capital connected with local Turkish people (host country people). The interviews conducted with the settled Iranians reveal that both of these connections are valid and are used for distinct purposes by the Iranian migrants living in the host society.

To start with, the social connections formed by Iranians with each other in the host society, or the social capital acquired in Ankara, is used mainly to overcome the basic difficulties faced by Iranians in the host society. This social capital, in which the migrants can learn things from each other based on previous experience, may be called upon when struggling with accommodation issues or permit extensions. For instance, Iranians learn from other Iranians how to obtain work permits, or how to run businesses, and can get help whenever they encounter problems. The majority of interviewees expressed that their small Iranian groups are first people they turn to for help when they need information about daily life issues and problems, and the fact that they can speak in their mother tongue means that they feel more confident with this chain of social capital. This social capital that develops among Iranians can help, first and foremost, in the obtaining of basic

survival information, especially in the early stages of a status passages, such as while entering university or finding a job. The interviews also indicate that many Iranians in Turkey have established businesses with other Iranians, as will be shown below.

Before that, however, it is necessary to mention the negative side of social capital in the case of Iranians as well. Social capital is usually referred to in a positive light in the network theories put forward in international migration literature, but the interviews in this study also indicate that Iranian connections are not always to be trusted in the Iranian community abroad.[41] Many of the settled Iranians in the interviewee group expressed that they had Iranian friends, but that they were few in number. Although they expressed that they had come to know many Iranians living in Ankara, they had only a very small group of Iranians that they really trusted and shared their problems with, and who they would ask for help. In this regard, it was understood from the interviews that social capital among Iranians does not work for larger groups.

The second form of social capital is conducted with local Turkish people in society. Establishing a social connection with locals in the host society is very common and can be useful in overcoming problems related to incorporation for the Iranian migrants. The main difference between these two types of social capital is that connections with Iranians help them address the issues they face as a migrant, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, while connections with locals helps them to construct embodied cultural capital within the host society. To this end, when settled Iranians seek to incorporate into the host society, they mostly consult their Turkish ties. This second type of social capital requires additional forms of capital to the former, since it is constructed with Turkish people. The

[41] Although, the negative influence of social networks is usually referenced as "exploitation" in migration literature, such as the exploitation of family labor in ethnic entrepreneurship, the interviews indicated that "rumors" within the community also have a negative influence that foster distrust in a social network. This factor is especially important for Iranians, who have a proverb, "Shooting at each other's shadows".

most important form of capital within this second type of connection is language capital, in that it indicates the willingness and readiness to incorporate. If Iranians speak Turkish fluently, then they are more capable of interacting with their local environment, and this leads to a wider range of socialization and networks of information. Social capital developed with locals has the additional benefit of allowing one to engage in the "Eastern way of Bureaucracy"[42] of Turkey, in which knowing important people in society can provide significant advantages. During some of the conducted interviews it was acknowledged that settled Iranians living in Ankara who had been declined citizenship following their first couple of applications, finally found success after developing important political ties that allowed them to circumnavigate bureaucratic barriers. Although they didn't want to share it openly, two of the interviewees said that it was their ties to Parliament members at those times that helped them obtain Turkish citizenship. This was explained in more detail in Part 6 in Chapter 2. In this regard, social ties with Turkish people played a key role in the socialization processes of the interviewees, and the influence of those ties and capital will be elaborated in the following part.

5.5. Process of Status Passage: Conversion of Capital

The preparations of settled Iranians to make status passages, which in this case refers to completing the education process and starting work with the aim of gaining a better social position is identified in previous sections with explanations of the accumulation and influence of various forms of capital, such as cultural and social capital. The occupational incorporation of settled Iranians into Ankara society, in other words, the conversion of cultural capital into economic capital,

[42] A special kind of bureaucracy exists in Eastern countries like Turkey that differs from Western models, in which, as stated by Max Weber for instance, systematic processes take place to maintain order and eliminate favoritism (Weber, 1983). In contrast, Eastern Bureaucracy refers to relationships in which nepotism and corruption can take place from time to time under the vision of rational bureaucracy. This discussion can be considered a bureaucratic field, as explained in Chapter 3.

requires an enhancement of cultural capital (both embodied and institutionalized) and bureaucratic permits if the individual is to stay and work in the host society.

In this section, the occupational incorporation of the settled Iranians living in Ankara will be shown together with their upgrading or downgrading social status based on their accomplished educations and embodied/institutionalized cultural capital. Identifying the up/downgrading of social status among the respondents necessitates the design of some new trajectories, although these may be open to discussion and may change according to different perspectives. In this regard, this classification can be considered a representation of a snapshot taken at a certain time and place, being the time of the conducted interviews with settled Iranians in Ankara between 2012 and 2013. With this awareness, the following section identifies similarities among the settled Iranians in order to map their common motivations.

Throughout the interviews it was seen that Iranians, on the whole, utilized four different paths to find work and enhance their social status. The first one was using institutionalized capital, referring to the use of their university diplomas to find related occupations. The second one is the ethnically related occupations, occurring when they did not or were unable to enhance their institutionalized cultural capital in the host society, and so used the embodied cultural capital acquired in their home country of Iran. The third involves specialization in a new field through short-term education, such as vocational courses. These three basic approaches reflect the status passages of the settled Iranians, as well as their mobility of social status, although a final type should also be noted that refers to the exclusion of the individual from the process of occupational incorporation.

5.5.1. Occupations Following University Degrees

In this first type, settled Iranian migrants accomplished their incorporation and converted their cultural capital into economic capital. In general, if migrants are able to incorporate into the labor market, it can be assumed that they were able to do so based on their qualifications and capital, allowing them to achieve better social positions. However, this is not always the case, in that although they may

have incorporates into the labor market, it doesn't mean that migrants can use all of the capital they have accumulated, which would lead to an upgrading status (Hausen, 2011). Similar to this view, some of the experiences of settled Iranians indicate that they sometimes cannot upgrade their social positions, despite their successful incorporation into the labor market. For this reason, this part will be covered under two headings, identifying the different social statuses to which occupations lead: "upgrading trajectories" and "stable trajectories".

Type A: Upgrading Trajectory with Economic Capital

In this first type, settled Iranians manage to incorporate into the labor market through their accumulated capital and qualifications. Although these "success" stories are in the minority among the settled Iranians, they are worthy of analysis in order to comprehend the distinction of the Iranians falling under this category. Considering all the difficulties that a migrant may face, Rahim's experience can be given as a success story in terms of the upgrading of his social position.

Rahim was born in Tabriz to a well-income and educated family; his father was a professor and medical surgeon in a university and his mother was an English teacher. After the Islamic revolution, all the universities were closed in Iran for two years in order to prepare a new curriculum. In the following year, the Iran-Iraq war broke out and many young people were forced to join the army. Rahim said that his family decided to send him out of Iran for education because they didn't want their child fighting in a war that they did not believe in. This was the story of how Rahim came to Turkey. It is apparent that his family played a major role, in that he was OK with the idea of joining to army before his family stepped in. Since the borders were closed in order to restrict uncontrolled migration, his family gave money to a smuggler to take Rahim to Istanbul over the mountains between Iran and Turkey. Rahim said it took nine days to reach Istanbul from Tabriz, and he was passed to thirty different smugglers along the way, who hid him on donkeys

under large rolls of cloths or rugs. After many incidents on the way,[43] he finally reached Istanbul, and when he saw Bosphorus Bridge, he thought to himself that this was the greatest milestone in his life:

> I was seventeen years old then. I had no mother, no father with me; they couldn't come, although I wanted them to. It was the end of my youth and a milestone in my life. I was scared to death after seeing Istanbul. Then I pulled myself together and said to myself: "No, Rahim, you will do it!"

He didn't know anyone in Istanbul, and so he first found a hotel in which to stay for a while, and he couldn't start university right away since he had missed the entrance exams for foreign students. While staying in Istanbul and attended a private teaching institute (*dershane*) to prepare for the exams and learned Turkish in that first year.

A significant similarity can be noted between Rahim's experience and that of other Iranian migrants in his parents' intervention in his life decisions, and their insistence that he continue on either to Europe or the United States. Rahim liked Turkey very much and wanted to stay there, but that meant taking a stand against his family. Once he passed the exam and started to study electronics at METU, his family sent his younger brother to be close to him and to study for the same university entrance exams. During his interview Rahim, said that his younger brother had listened his parents and continued on to Canada for education, and eventually settled there after obtaining his diploma, although Rahim added quickly that thought he had a found a better life in Turkey than his brother did in Canada.

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[43] Smugglers have been working between the Turkish-Iran borders for so long that it isn't known when the practice started. Most of the time they use mountains to cross the border, as it is easier to hide. Shepherds use mountains to graze their animals while smugglers hide smuggled goods or people in the herds. The special military police (*jandarma*) is are responsible for the control of the borders, and sometimes get into gunfights with smugglers. Rahim said that he was almost caught when they were crossing the mountains, and that the smugglers had left him with the sheep herd for three days until things settled down. After three days, the smuggler came back and collected Rahim and they continued on their way.

The majority of interviewees said that they had considered going to the United States as the best option for them because Turkey was not fulfilling their expectations or desires in terms of access to the different forms of capital that would lead them in the end to the acquisition of symbolic capital. Enhancing symbolic capital requires both cultural and economic capital, and Rahim held one of the highest volumes of cultural and economic capital in the interviewed group. That said, he said that he had faced many difficulties and was very depressed during his studies at METU, which took him six years rather than four. Since he had arrived in Turkey over the mountains with the help of a smuggler, he was unable to visit his family in Iran in this period, and was afraid that the Iranian police would find him in Turkey:

> There was no e-mail, Internet or cable TV at those times, and so a letter was the only way of contacting them, which took a minimum of 15 days to reach Iran. When letters reached me, I would notice a very small tear on the right corner measuring about 1–2 cm. Initially I thought that it was due to wrinkling on the way, then I realized that they were being read (by the Iranian government). I send so many marked letters … [Silence for about half a minute, he was trying to stop himself from crying]. They were marked because of my tears. It was very hard for me. When there was no contact. I couldn't return to Iran (because he had come over the mountains), I was repeating my academic years, and I knew that I was being controlled (by Iranian officials). So, I was writing ten-page letters and the ink was smudging on the paper.

The ink was being smudged by his tears while writing to his parents, and he said those were the most difficult times of his life. After he graduated from METU he found short-term jobs for a while with very low pay, and eventually established a power company with some Iranian people that he met during his studies. In contrast to his early years in Ankara, he was certainly well off at the time of his interview, and claimed that he spent around ten thousand dollars every month in

2012 as pocket money. From this it can be understood that he held both cultural and economic capital, both of which are prerequisites of symbolic capital.[44]

When asked whether he felt the effects of that symbolic capital in Ankara, he said that his life in Ankara was better than his brother's in Canada, and that economic capital was very significant in his satisfaction, in that most of the Iranians, whether settled or student, had acquired institutionalized cultural capital, but not many had attained Rahim's level of economic capital. Arash or Arman, the first two interviewees on the list, also acquired institutional cultural capital in the host country, but were in a quite different social position to Rahim. This leads to the question of what Rahim did differently to end up so distinct from others. Was it related to something that he did/achieved (related to capital) or something that he already had that facilitated his upgrading?

The interviews revealed that in Rahim's case, the profession on which he built his career, being the energy sector, was significantly important. Rahim said he had seen its importance at the time of his education and had concentrated on the power sector in his final year.

> In the electric and electronics department there used to be nine different options to choose from. People usually picked the most popular, which were communications and computing at those times, while power was the least popular, and would be picked by all the low-scoring students… I picked that option not because it seemed better for earning money, but because I loved that section. Now everything has changed and the power section is now divided in two subsections, where they need much more lecturers due to the number of students in that field.

Rahim was very proud of his foresight at choosing the path that led to his current job, which he loved. A second important aspect in this was the influence of the capital transmitted from the home country, which proved to be critical alongside the acquired capitals in the host society. Rahim came from an upper

[44] Photographs of his factory and more information about his habitus will be referenced in Chapter 6.

middle-class family with cultural and economic capital, and his parents supported him and his younger brother during their education in the host country. Rahim continued to take money from them after graduation, although this gave his family both economic and emotional capital (support) over him. Finally, by establishing a power company, Rahim's life changed in terms of his economic capital. Coming back to the previous question, it was seen that the choice of profession and the capital transmitted from the home country were both significant in Rahim's case.

Similar to Rahim's social position in the host country, Sabra's husband had a similar upgrading trajectory. He studied medicine in Ankara University and completed his studies, after which he did his obligatory community service (*zorunlu hizmet*) in the city of Batman. There is an interesting intersection between the cases of Sabra's husband and Rahim, in that they both acquired their institutionalized cultural capital (diplomas) in the host society and converted them in to economic capital by investing a significant amount of economic capital. Rahim established a power company and opened a factory after graduating from the electronics department. While Sabra'a husband was a medical doctor who opened a private clinic with some of his Iranian friends in Ankara, which lead to a striking enhancement in the volume of his economic capital in the host society.

Sabra and her husband belong to the Sunni branch of Islam, and so were not treated equally in Iran, according to Sabra. After graduating in Ankara, returned to Iran to live and work, but found it very difficult, since her husband saw no opportunity for promotion in the hospital in which he worked, and so they decided to come back to Ankara. It can be understood from their position that Turkey wasn't their first choice, even after graduation. Like the temporary Iranian students for whom Turkey was not their first choice, and who planned to continue their studies in Western countries, Sabra's husband, who obtained his diploma in the host society, tried Iran once more, but finally decided settle in Ankara because they were pessimistic about the opportunities open to them in Iran due to their ethnicity. At the time of the interview, Sabra said she was very happy at their decision to return to Turkey, as their social position was much better in Ankara

than in Iran, and she said she was happier to live in Turkey: "It's hard to live there in Iran for good, but it's nice to visit every year".

Type B: Strong Positions but Stable Trajectory

In Type B, settled Iranians who had studied and graduated in Ankara continued to work in the same city. They converted the institutionalized cultural capital they acquired in Ankara into economic capital, although they were unable to accumulate as much as Rahim in Type A. In the previous type, Rahim converted his cultural capital into economic capital by making large investments into a specific sector, using his own strategy and volume of economic capital, and this had a significant influence in his ability to upgrade his status. To demonstrate the Type B trajectory, the experiences of settled Iranians who used their institutionalized cultural capital (acquired in the host society) to incorporate into the labor market, but who ended up with strong positions but stabile trajectories, will be presented, which is closely related to the positioning of their chosen profession in the host society.

A dentist, a teacher and an academician within the group of settled Iranians all hold such deserved and strong trajectories. What these respondents have in common is, first of all, that they all came to Turkey with limited funds, sufficient only to cover their immediate education expenses, and worked from time to time during their studies. After they decided to take up residence in the host country they attempted to convert all of their cultural capital into economic capital without any external support, such as economic capital sent from the home country (as was the case for the upgrading of social status above). This allowed them to achieve occupational incorporation into the host society, and they were able to reach the maximum level that their institutionalized cultural capital could provide in the host society. In this respect, their position can be referred to as successful in reaching the full capacity of the acquired capital.

To begin with, Zaan[45] was an academician in Gazi University who came to Turkey to study engineering after hearing about it from his friends, and he came directly to Ankara to where his Iranian friend was living. During the interview he said that he had also considered Germany for education, but decided to come to Turkey after learning about it from his friend, and the lower cost of education when compared to Germany. Besides, Zaan was Azerbaijani, and so it was easier for him to learn Turkish. He came to Ankara in 1987 and was granted citizenship in 1997 while he was working in a private company,[46] and then found a position in the academia, and joined the civil sector. As said before, the Type B Iranians do not hold much economic capital, but they do have secure and guaranteed positions. Although there was only one academician among the respondents in the study, there are many Iranian academicians working in Ankara and in Turkey as a whole. For the last few years, Iranian academicians have been organizing an international conference in Ankara for the discussion of various subjects. The Third International Scientific Conference of Iranian Academics in Turkey was held on February 15, 2013 in Ankara, although no detailed information could be found from the websites (2013b), and the fourth in the series was held on March 1, 2014. These conferences have been organized by Gazi University, where there are many Iranian scholars.

Similar to Zaan, Nalani also became a teacher at a high school after completing her education in Ankara, although her migration history was different. Nalani first migrated to Ankara due to her fathers' consulate work. After living in Ankara for many years, they decided that they didn't want to leave, and so stayed in the country after her father's retirement. Accordingly, Nalani studied both in high school and university in Ankara, and socialized more with Turkish people

[45] Since he didn't want his interview to be recorded, handwritten notes were made to record his thoughts, and so exact quotes cannot be given.

[46] All the interviewees who obtained Turkish citizenship said that it was a very hard process, but Zaan didn't want to talk about the issue, which indicates that he may have used his social capital to acquire citizenship.

than Iranians. Furthermore, Nalani's husband was Turkish, unlike the majority of interviewees. She had to wait for ten years after her marriage to be granted Turkish Citizenship, after which she could look for a job. Other than that, her experience was very close to the mentioned type, having completed her studies in a university in Ankara and starting to work as a teacher in a public high school in the Çankaya district. She is satisfied with her social position, since she had a guaranteed and secure position with a stable trajectory, although she is unhappy with the latest developments in the country and is looking to send her children abroad for education, although she wants to remain living in Turkey.

> Every day I see people are being more restricted in terms of personal freedom. Unemployment has risen and the environment of trust has diminished. I don't approve of the developments in the field of education, such as 4+4+4 (a newly adopted education program that caused huge discussions in the country) because it directs our children to religious schools. I sense a religious type of transformation. (…) My friends always tell me that "You were right! You told us all about it ten years ago". But we [Iranians] know them because we have seen them. (…) I want to continue to live in Turkey and maybe I can move to a place next to the sea in the future, but I want my children to live abroad, they need to go and take a good education, and then they can come back to start at a good university as a lecturer, such as Hacettepe or METU. That's what I would love to happen.

Her perception of Turkey also influenced her level of satisfaction related to the host society as a destination country, but these issues will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Another significant example of this type is Arman, who started working as a dentist in Turkey after completing his studies. Arman was working as a dentist in Ankara, but could only open a doctor's office rather than a clinic or big private hospital. Compared to the Iranians who made significant investments in their field, this group didn't enjoy such "major success stories" in terms of economic capital accumulation and volume.

Arman had managed to overcome many of the difficulties that migrants face in a host society, and converted his acquired cultural capital into economic capital in Ankara. Looking from this perspective, it would seem likely that Arman would be satisfied with his social position, since he had acquired a level of both cultural

and economic capital in Ankara, however that was not the case. When asked whether he was satisfied with his social position in the host society of Ankara, he was remarkably negative about his situation, since he believed he was not treated well enough in Turkey.

> If I had a second chance in life, I would again study dentistry, but I wouldn't study it in Turkey, because in Turkey, being a dentist, selling *simit* (traditional bread ring covered with sesame) and selling water are all in the same category. There are two countries of the world in which dentistry is a good profession … one is the United States and the other is Iran, and they are comparable in economic and social terms. Likewise, there are two countries in the world where dentistry is positioned very badly; one Turkey and the other is Northern Cyprus. Apart from these, there are no huge gaps between different countries. Here in Turkey, you operate on somebody for five hours and earn only 200–300 Turkish liras (around 110-170 US dollars at the time of the interview), but heart surgeon goes into an operation and earns 10,000 Turkish lira (5,500 USD).

The quote above indicates that Arman, although he has achieved occupational incorporation into the host society, was dissatisfied with his social and symbolic position, comparing the social prestige linked to his occupation with that of a *simit* or water seller. Compared to other fields of medicine, as a dentist, he earned much less, meaning he had a stable trajectory. After he voiced his regret at staying in Turkey, he was asked whether he thought about going back to Iran or moving on to other Western countries. In reply, he spoke about the difficulties of settling in a new country, and stated that he didn't want to move back in Iran due to its "restricting and confined lifestyle". It would seem that in this case, Turkey was not the best option for him, but that he had chosen it since it was the only option for him apart from Iran. Arman did not have Turkish citizenship, but he was engaged to a Turkish woman and was expecting to apply for citizenship after marriage. In Arman's case, the conversion of cultural capital into economic capital alone was not enough to ensure satisfaction with his social position in Ankara.

5.5.2. Occupations Following Ethnic Backgrounds

Under this title there are two distinct divisions in social status of the settled Iranians in Ankara. This group contains those who didn't use their acquired

institutionalized cultural capital, but rather the accumulated and converted embodied cultural capital acquired in the home society. Most of the time this occurs when migrants lack the forms of capital that are necessary for occupational incorporation, which motivates them to adopt a strategy of turning back to their ethnic roots as an easier approach, since no extra effort is required in the learning process. However, Iranian migrants who had used their common ethnic background in Ankara did not necessarily achieve similar social positions in society. While some turned to ethnic entrepreneurship, which will be explained below, others used only their embodied cultural capital, taking up positions teaching Iranian culture and language in a company or school. This has resulted in them acquiring different social positions and trajectories in the host society, and in this regard, there are two basic distinction within this category of occupation that follow ethnic backgrounds. The first group comprises Iranians who invested more in economic capital and established their own business, while the second group of settled Iranians chose not to invest into entrepreneurship, and rather than establishing their own business, joined an institutional body or organization. In the latter group, the language capital brought from the home country emerges as an important element in status passage and occupational incorporation.

Type C: Unstable Trajectories of Ethnic Entrepreneurship

The issue of ethnic entrepreneurship is a social phenomenon that has been studied in international migration literature with particular focus on the incorporation processes of migrants, including analyses and discussions of their labor market experiences. It is usually referred as the business emphasizing the common cultural bonds where migrants are mostly the owners or managers of that enterprise. A migrant's ethnic background and ties can help them to establish and benefit from the social capital they acquire in the host country.

Cadoc is a significant example of someone falling under this category. He came to Turkey to work as a cook in the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, and after his retirement he and his family didn't want to return to Iran and decided to open an Iranian restaurant, which was the first offering Iranian cuisine in Ankara. He had

acquired no institutionalized cultural capital since coming to the host society of Ankara, and so opening an Iranian restaurant represented the most likely way for him to stay in the country and find a place in the labor market. Although he had not studied anything related to tourism or cooking, he had been cooking for the embassy, and after his retirement, the Iranian Embassy was pleased to have an Iranian restaurant in Ankara where they could host their international visitors.

> I had a friend who told me that the Iranian Embassy in Ankara was looking for a cook. I first came here to stay just for two months, but we have been here for six years already. My duty in the embassy finished about a year-and-a-half ago, and my family and children love it here, which is why we have stayed. Iran is a very difficult place to live, and now it is even more difficult. We are very comfortable here. We are all working at the restaurant. At the weekends, we only work, we have no spare time. We come early in the morning and work till 10 pm at night. We have neighbors from Iran who are now living in the United States who call us to go there, but we are very comfortable here. It costs too much to visit the United States, but here it is different. It is very close to Iran, it takes only 2 hours by plane.

His family helped him run the restaurant and the kitchen, and so he didn't have to pay extra salaries to workers. This situation resembles other ethnic entrepreneurships in different parts of the world, such as in kebab shops in Germany that are run by Turkish families, who don't pay salaries to family members, especially to the wives (Dedeoglu, 2014; Rudolph and Hillmann, 1998), making free use of the family labor force. However, Cadoc's position gave him no sustainable guarantees other than the social capital acquired in the host society, referring to the Iranian environment and locals who came to the restaurant for Iranian food. Cadoc said that their customers were mostly Iranian, and that Iranian doctors, for instance, would hold their monthly meetings in the restaurant or international visitors who were visiting Iranian Embassy. As a cook, his situation was completely different to that of the other interviewees in the study. Cadoc didn't have Turkish citizenship, but during the interview he expressed that he was planning to apply in the coming years, which would reinforce his unstable trajectory.

Another example of this trajectory was Arash, who opened a Tourism Office to organize cultural activities and tours between Iran and Turkey. Arash studied biochemistry at Hacettepe University, but was unable to find a position in his specific field. In this regard, acquiring cultural capital in the host society didn't help him convert his cultural capital into economic capital due to the lack of opportunities in his chosen field at the time of his graduation. In addition, he didn't transmit any economic capital from his home country. During the interview he said that he had come to Turkey with only 2 thousand dollars to cover his living costs for a certain period of time, although this wasn't enough, and he had to work while studying at the university. He had very difficult times due to his financial situation, explaining one particular memory of the desperation he felt in his first years in Ankara. In the middle of winter, when Ankara was snowy, he was distributing company flyers on the street to earn some pocket money. A woman on the street pointed to him and said to her son: "You see, unless you study hard and finish your school, you'll end up like him distributing flyers on the street."

He said he felt very ashamed at that moment, and asked himself what he was doing. It was at that time when he decided that he wasn't satisfied with his social position in Ankara and started to look at new options. After completing his studies, he married an Iranian woman who was also studying in Ankara, and was able to extend his permit through his marriage to her for a couple of years. It was then that he established a tourism office. He said he didn't want to apply for Turkish Citizenship for a while, as responsibilities as an employer changed for Turkish citizens, and he found it more beneficial to remain as a foreign entrepreneur as he didn't need to pay extra insurance for the people working for him. This was his strategy for reducing company expenses, however he expressed that he was planning to apply for citizenship after fulfilling all the requirements. His tourism office started out organizing tours between Iran and Turkey, but he then started organizing cultural activities such as concerts by popular Iranian artists from different parts of the world. This did not bring him the high profits he was expecting, and he actually made a huge loss due to the lack of public interest. As a future plan, he is thinking of making different investments into such businesses as

rooms for rent to visitors coming from Iran, although his social position currently lacks stability or reliability, but this has not quelled his motivation to launch ethnically related activities.

Both Cadoc and Arash had different experiences in regards to their trajectories. Initially, neither of them transmitted a significant amount of economic capital from their home to the host society, and so were starting from the very bottom in Ankara. Secondly, while Cadoc made no attempt to acquire institutionalized cultural capital in Ankara, Arash's acquired institutionalized cultural capital wasn't converted into economic capital, and so he needed to find other ways of acquiring economic capital. Ethnic entrepreneurship was seen as the best option for both of them, since it didn't require the acquisition of any cultural capital from the host society. Besides, by selecting ethnic entrepreneurship, they were able to use the social networks acquired in Ankara, and both seemed to be well-known among Iranian migrants. They were owners of their own businesses, and so took more risks in their investments into their businesses. For Arash, as mentioned above, it didn't turn out well, since at the time of the interview he said he was in huge debt due to the failure in his latest event. Taking the findings of the interviews into account, it can be asserted that ethnic entrepreneurship does not necessarily lead to a constant acceleration in economic capital and social position in the host society.

Type D: Secure Positions related to Ethnic Background

Iranian migrants who belong to this group use the embodied cultural capital acquired in their home country, but prefer more secure social positions in the host society in which they don't need to invest economic capital into their businesses. Persian language teachers or Farsi-Turkish or English interpreters were common examples for this type. One of the most significant factors of this category is that Iranian migrants don't need additional education to take up such as occupation. In other words, they didn't acquire any institutionalized cultural capital, in that they had already known their mother tongue, and learn the host language via socialization (either social or embodied cultural capital in the host society).

Parisa and Maarika's experiences can be given as the best examples of this type. Maarika had argued with the administration at her university in Iran, and so her family wanted to send her to the United States, but she couldn't get the visa. She married a Turkish man and stayed in Turkey, but she couldn't continue to her education in Ankara as her husband didn't want her to. After couple of years, she divorced her husband, but by this time it was too late for her to start the university from the beginning, as she needed to earn a living. She explained that her ex-husband had a prestigious social position in society, so didn't want her to work in a low-level occupation, even after their divorce. He found her a job, and she became the assistant of the vice president of a very large company (which she didn't want to give the name of). She later left that position to try her chances in Italy. She lived there for some time, but again decided to return to Turkey because she felt she had already got used to it and didn't want to start over in Italy.

> My ex-husband was a well-known man, and as his ex-wife I couldn't work in a sloppy place, so he found me a job where they gave me a very low salary, but it was a family firm. I quit that job to try Italy, as I have my relatives living there. If there is a heaven on earth, it is Italy. I stayed mostly in Milan but we often went to the Sicilian part as well. I wanted to work and settle there, but at the time, just as my residence permit was about to be granted, I changed my mind. I had already constructed that confidence in Turkey and felt like a total stranger in Italy. I didn't want to struggle or start over from the beginning.

After coming back to Turkey, she started to work as a freelance interpreter for trade companies doing business between Turkey and Iran, which was work in which she didn't lose any time in learning, and so her status passage was smooth. She made no investments to establish her business, but used her Iranian network and previous work connections, i.e. social capital, to find customers. At the time of interview she was working as a part time freelance interviewer, because she also wanted to give some time to do volunteer work helping poor children living on the streets, but didn't want to elaborate.

This home language capacity of Iranian migrants, which helps them to realize a status passage, can also be referred as the language capital[47] of the home country, since it can be converted into economic capital in Ankara. In the previous chapter, language capital was given as an example of how one can socialize in the host society, and in this regard, learning Turkish language brought benefit to them in the form of language capital, which can be converted into social capital. This time, however, it is their embodied cultural capital in the form of the Farsi language that is converted into language and economic capital in the host society that helped the Iranian migrants incorporate into the labor market in Ankara. The benefits of this language capital can be considered twofold, providing both host country language capital and home country language capital. Another significant example of a respondent who used the language capital of their home country was Parisa, who studied economics in Iran but who did not study further or work after she married an Iranian and came to Turkey with him. She gave birth to two children after they migrated to Turkey, and when they reached their teens, she started working as a volunteer Farsi teacher at METU. In both cases, the spouse, one Turkish and one Iranian, didn't want their wives to work once they were married, which prevented them from acquiring the necessary institutionalized cultural capital to study in the host society. Hence, as soon as they found the opportunity to work, they had started their status passage from housewife to working woman. While ethnic entrepreneurship seemed to be used mostly by Iranian men in Ankara, the conversion of embodied cultural capital (coming from the ethnic background) into language capital, and then into economic capital in the host society, worked better for Iranian women when seeking a place in the labor market. Since they didn't make large investments in terms of economic capital, they earned only as much as they worked. For Parisa in particular, it was a more convenient job, since she still had household responsibilities.

[47] This conceptualization was explained in more detail in Part 2 of Chapter 4.

> I have always wanted to work, even when I was studying at the university. I won a place in the Political Science and Public Administration department of Middle East Technical University, but I was pregnant at the time and didn't have anyone to help me. That's why I waited until they grew up. My spouse was against my desire to work, as every man. "Don't bother" he said. If he had really wanted, he could have found me a job when we first came here. He could have helped me, but he didn't. Instead he said: "Where will you work, how will you look after the children?" He blocked me. When he saw that I was still trying to find something, he tried to help, but it didn't work.

This patriarchal control by her husband was obviously not unique to Parisa's case, as similar stories were heard from other female interviewees. This issue is actually familiar to the cultural habitus of Turkey, and will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter. Maarika didn't marry again, and so she became the head and the breadwinner of her household, and so needed to keep working. In contrast, in Parisa's case, she didn't earn much from her work as a Persian language teacher, and it was aimed more at social satisfaction and socialization outside.

Kaisa can be put forward as another example of this type. Different to Maarika and Parisa, Kasia was Assyrian and she came to Turkey to get away from the discrimination that her family had faced in Iran. Like the majority of Iranian groups on the interview list, she came initially to Turkey with a view to obtaining a US visa, but her application was rejected. She decided to stay in the country after she had learned about the education opportunities, and studied English literature at Hacettepe University, where she worked as a research assistant for a couple of years. After completing her master's degree at the university she understood that it would be difficult for her to find a position there due to her nationality, and so she started to look for other jobs on the market. She saw a vacancy at the UNHCR in a newspaper and applied for the position. They were looking someone who could speak a different language to communicate with asylum seekers coming from the Middle East, and her accumulated language capital of Turkish, English, Arabic, French and Farsi helped her win the position. In Chapter 2, Kaisa told her story in detail, saying how she used to love Turkey but after trying so hard to get Turkish citizenship and failing at every turn, she didn't see a future in Turkey anymore. Despite the conversion of both embodied and institutionalized cultural capital into

economic capital in the host society, she couldn't feel secure due to the lack of citizenship capital. In this respect, aside from cultural and economic capital, there are complementary capitals that strengthen a migrants' incorporation into the host society.

Similar to Kaisa, Bahman had studied English in Iran and came to Turkey to work in a private teaching institute (*dershane*) for a while, and then found a position at the UNHCR. Like many of the other interviewees, he had tried to settle in a developed Western country and had studied in England for a while, before returning to Iran. He then went to Dubai for work, but again returned to Iran because he didn't like it there, saying that it was too hot for him. He also tried to move to the United States when he was working as an English teacher in Ankara, but expressed why he didn't like it:

> Because of the restrictions in Iran, you know, I had been thinking of moving out. I tried the United States but I didn't like it, so I returned. I was there as a tourist, but I had a very good friend there so I stayed with him for three weeks. I had a job offer there as well, but I didn't like it there at all. I think I didn't like the lifestyle, everything is a rush, and everyone is in a panic. I think I consider myself a little bit lazy and wouldn't fit in in America [giggles].

In the end, he returned to his previous job in Ankara, and after a while he found his current position in the UNHCR. There are a number of similarities in the cases of Kaisa and Bahman: Turkey wasn't their first choice, as mentioned before. A couple of years ago, before the interview, Bahman married a Turkish woman that he met in UNHCR and had the right to stay with her as a spouse; he was renewing his work permit every year. His ethnic mother-language, helped him to find his position at the UNHCR, which enhanced the volume of both his economic capital and social status. Having seen many global cities and popular countries, both in the East and West, one may ask why he ended up in Ankara rather than Istanbul.

> Actually I don't like Ankara that much. I don't like it because of the climate. Yet my job is here so didn't consider other places. … The opportunities are higher in Istanbul, but I've never thought of going to a bigger city after a certain age. Because of my job, I stayed here. It's

> the nature of my work because I think I'm helping some people here; I don't want to lose this opportunity in any corporation or something like that.

Bahman repeated that he loved his job and said it was the main reason why he had settled in Ankara. Most of the interviewees found Ankara to be an easy city to adapt to, and also secure, from their point of view, in terms of its size and bureaucratic character as the capital city of Turkey.[48]

As to conclude this section, both Kaisa and Bahman benefited from the embodied cultural capital acquired in their home country, the distinction between Type D and Type C and the previous category is that they didn't transmit large amounts of economic capital to the host society, and so lacked the economic capital to launch their own businesses. Although they had institutionalized cultural capital acquired in the home/host society, it was primarily their ethnic background, i.e. embodied cultural capital that they used in the host society. In short, those falling under Type C and Type D achieved a status passage by converting their embodied cultural capital (acquired at home) into economic capital in the host society. It should be noted, however, that their accumulation of economic capital and their upward trajectory is limited when compared to Type A and B, in which Iranian migrants use their institutionalized cultural capital acquired in the host society to realize a status passage.

5.5.3. Entrepreneurs Specializing on a New Field

Another category among the settled Iranians in Ankara included entrepreneurs specializing in a new field, most of whom decided to start a new business after identifying an opportunity in the labor market of the host society. The majority of respondents falling under the Type E category had made investments into their new field as part of a learning process outside the university. More characteristics of this group will be discussed in the following section.

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[48] Many participants in the study spoke about the huge (documented) Iranian community in Istanbul, who belong to an upper class habitus that obviously requires further study or research.

Type E: Upward Mobility through a Brand New Enterprise

As mentioned above, settled Iranians who are considered among this type emerged with investments in brand new fields in which they had no previous work or educational experience. Within this group, Iranian migrants learn the essential knowledge required to run their business through their special interest on that area (such like self-education) or learning the process by taking courses related to the field. However, one common characteristic among those falling under this category is, most of the time, the availability of economic capital that they are able to use and invest into new fields to establish the business. In this respect, there is a resemblance to the Type A trajectory, in that their own investments allow them to become managers or owners of their establishment. What is also striking in this type is the result of the attempts at entrepreneurship in a new field that culminated in remarkable success that enhanced their accumulation of economic capital.

To begin with, Rafal left Iran due to his different worldview, as stated at the beginning of this chapter. After coming to Turkey, he sought ways of extending his permit, and for a while used the most common strategies adopted by many settled Iranians, that involved leaving Turkey and returning every three months to extend the tourist visa for ninety more days. After returning to Iran for a while, he decided to come back to Turkey, and this "toing and froing" was a common trait among the settled Iranians, indicating Turkey's indefinite position in terms of settlement. Also similar to other interviewees, Rafal said that he had thought about going to Western countries, but changed his mind and stayed in Turkey because, in his own words, he wanted to teach what he had learned from his Yoga Guru in Ankara. Before establishing his Yoga center in Ankara, he first went to Istanbul where he thought about opening a private teaching institute (*dershane*) for Iranians, after noticing the large number of Iranian students coming to Turkey for educational purposes, and the many Iranians in Istanbul preparing for the university exams. His family had owned a private teaching institute in Iran, and so he felt close to that investment. While evaluating his options in Turkey, he was also interested in becoming a karate teacher due to his military school background and

his ability in marital arts, and that's how he came to the decision to open a karate school. His ability to start his own business in Turkey indicates that he was able to transmit economic capital from Iran. Having made his decision, he moved to Ankara to be with his wife, then his fiancée, and was able to extend his stay on the basis of his wife's education permit after they were married. In the end, he opened a karate salon in Ankara and was able to obtain Turkish citizenship, and he claimed it had been easy for him to obtain citizenship, based not only on his Azerbaijani background, but the fact that he had established a business. Soon after, he started to practice Yoga and started to take courses from an Indian guru (yoga supervisor). In the end, he became a Yoga teacher and life coach, and his guru advised him to stay in Ankara (rather than going to Western countries), and he took his advice.

At the time of the interview, he was a very well-known Yoga teacher in Ankara, and said he was glad that he had decided to stay. He opened his Yoga center in the Gazi Osman Paşa district of Ankara, an upper-middle class area of the city. He claimed the highest monthly income among the entire group, which was around 30,000 Turkish Liras (around 17,000 US dollars per month) in 2013. This indicates that rather than acquiring institutionalized cultural capital in the host society of Ankara, identifying a growing trend in the market also helped him to convert his accumulations into economic capital.

He made some notable comments related to the fields of education and economy in Turkey during his interview when speaking about why he didn't want his wife to work. He openly expressed that he wasn't fond of the idea of his wife having a career, although she had acquired institutionalized cultural capital of her own in Ankara:

> Why should she (work)? There is no need to. We have students here (of Yoga), for instance an aircraft engineer, and his (monthly) salary is 1,400 Turkish Lira (approx. 800 USD in the time of the interview). Everything is money. Why do people want occupations, why better occupations? To earn money. But why? To realize our wishes and desires. […] The system doesn't change in the world; especially in Turkey, you work a lot but earn little. Why that much stress? That much work? You go early in the morning and come late at night. What can you do after 6 pm with that reduced energy? You bring your body home as an empty pulp in the evening, it isn't worth it! If you have a child,

> that's even worse. That's why children are non-believers and have no concentration; you cannot focus them. If mothers and fathers both need to work, due to the economy, who's going to discipline the child? Then children become delinquents (*serseri*). Women should stay at home.

Rafal expressed that the explanations of "working a lot but earning little" and the example of "aircraft engineer" described a negative situation, demonstrating his disbelief in the importance of diplomas in the process of status passage. To him, there was little point in studying at university because the world system was brutal and didn't return the fruits of their labor. He claimed that this would be the same for his wife; she would work long hours for little return, so "why should she (work)?" he said. Besides, he wanted his children to be raised with care and attention, and not to become delinquents, and according to him women were the ones who should be responsible for this emotional capital. He was adamant about the role of women in the family, which resembled Rahim and Sabra in Type A. The majority of settled Iranians mentioned in Type A or Type E, who had the highest economic capital in the interviewed group, were agreed with these gender roles in which the wives did not share the bread-winner role of the household, and were mostly responsible for emotional capital.[49]

Despite the resemblance of Type A and Type E in terms of gender roles in Iranian families in Turkey, there were also female interviewees who belonged to this Type E. Nadia first came to Turkey to prepare for the foreigners' university entrance exam, after which she studied pharmacy in Ankara. She met her husband at this time, who was also a student, and was studying engineering. After graduation, she chose not to practice pharmacy and decided to do something else, with similar motives to Rafal. She opened a beauty salon, but as a hobby rather than to gain institutionalized cultural capital. She made investments and put economic capital earned from the rental of property in Iran into the business, as capital transmitted from her home country, which was highly significant in her

[49] Meaning given in Chapter 2.

case. At the time of the interview they were still transferring economic capital from Iran, "without it, it would be impossible for us to survive here" she said.[50] Also similar to Rafal's case, she was very successful in her business and managed to expand it over the years. At the time of the interview, she was earning around 10,000 Turkish Liras (approx. 5400 USD) per month. Finally, and again similar to the other interviewees in the group, she and her husband applied for Turkish citizenship after working for a couple of years in the country. In general, she was very satisfied with life in Turkey: "If you don't have any economic problems, Turkey is heaven. In the United States a man is killed just for 2 dollars," she said.

This overview of all these types of trajectory shows that economic capital transmitted from the home country is a significant asset, both for investment into a business and for the enhancement of the volume of economic capital in the host society. In this respect, the Type A or Type E trajectories seem to hold the highest amount of economic capital. Furthermore, ethnic entrepreneurship (Type C) was most common in cases where the migrants' accumulated economic capital was limited, while the number of women was very low. The next type will show the dominant social positioning of the female Iranian interviewees.

5.5.4. Staying Out of the Labor Market

This type explains the positions of the settled Iranian migrants who couldn't realize a status passage by finding a position in the labor market of the host society in Ankara. What is striking about this type is the lack of intent to incorporate. In other words, they did not enter the labor market not due to their inability to convert their capital, but for other reasons.[51] The question of whether they experienced a

[50] The majority of the both Iranian students and settled Iranians in Ankara transmit economic capital at the beginning of their settlement in Turkey. However Nadia'a case is unique, in that the transnational transmission of economic capital continued, even years after settling.

[51] Not incorporating into the labor market, does not necessarily mean that housewives do not work within the society. Feminist studies have shown that women's household responsibilities and care work constitutes a direct input into the economy, and so is conceptualized as women's unpaid labor within the household. In Bourdieusian terms, it is conceptualized as "emotional

gain or loss of status is difficult to assess, and will be addressed at the end of this section.

Type F: Women's Loss of Status in terms of Labor Market Incorporation

This type refers mostly to the Iranian housewives who didn't convert their cultural capital (either embodied or institutionalized) into economic capital or accomplish incorporation into the labor market in Ankara. It should be noted, however, that this is not a result of social exclusion or discrimination within the economic field of the host society, but rather an intentional choice to stay out of that economic field. In general, international migration literature refers to marriage as a strategy for gaining access to the host country, or to be granted permission to stay in that host country (Nohl et al., 2014: 135), and this is referred to mostly as marriage migration or family reunification.[52] There is also another type of migration involving marriage known as instrumental marriage (Nohl et al., 2014: 97), which is when a fake marriage is entered into to obtain permission to stay in the host country. None of the settled Iranians met or heard about during the study had adopted a strategy of instrumental marriage to come and live in Turkey. The majority of marriages in the interview group had occurred in Iran after the men had completed their studies in Turkey, and they returned to Ankara again to start working. In this regard, the transformation of status from "student" to "businessman" and from "single" to "married" usually happened in quick

capital" by feminist scholars, emphasizing that it is an unpaid labor, which was also referenced in Chapter 3 (Adkins and Skeggs, 2005).

[52] This example is mostly given in the case of Turkish migrants living in Germany, based on the long tradition of finding brides from their home society to so as to remain with their cultural backgrounds. Besides, encouraging children who were raised in Germany and within the German culture to marry from their home country (by transferring the spouse from Turkey), either voluntarily or not, can serve as a means of "correcting" the degenerate lifestyle of the younger generation living in Germany.

succession.[53] This has been referred to as multidimensional status passage by some migration scholars (Nohl et al., 2014: 204).

Maarika and Parisa, whose cases have already mentioned in the Type D trajectory section, can be given again as an examples in Type F, in that while married, their husbands didn't want them to work. Maarika's husband was Turkish, and she only started to work after she was divorced, while Parisa, who was still married to an Iranian man, insisted on having a career, despite her husband's opposition. Recalling their experiences would help in the comprehension of the dominant perception among Iranian men that the man of the house should be the sole bread-winner in the host country. Congruent with the general trend mentioned so far, Sabra was married and made no attempt to incorporate into the labor market in Ankara. She had studied environmental engineering in Iran, but pursue either further studies or employment in the host society. She met her husband in Iran, and after they were married he wanted to move back to Turkey where he had completed his studies. Through him, Sabra acquired Turkish citizenship while he was studying. He became a medical doctor and first had to take up obligatory work in the east part of Turkey, and so they first moved to Batman. Sabra said that her life in Batman was very difficult due to terrorism and life-cycle of women, in her own words. They would heard gunshots when they were at home in the evenings, and so they were afraid to go out. Furthermore, the gender roles in Batman[54] were significantly different to what she had expected:

> People were very hospitable and warm there [in Batman], but they weren't like-minded, they were only serving their household and

[53] It can be also asserted that a "married" status can work as additional capital in the field of economy, where it brings prestigious and respected representation for both men and women.

[54] Batman is a city in the east of Turkey which can be considered conservative, especially in terms of the position of women in society. Due to the domination of patriarchal and traditional gender roles, the daily life experiences of women in Batman in terms of the division of labor within the household, incorporation into labor market and the gendered division of public sphere are different in terms of male domination when compared to the experiences of women living in the western part of Turkey. In addition, Batman ranks the highest in terms of violence towards women in Turkey.

> husbands. Their whole life was only serving their husbands. I was very young then and newly married. I was looking at them and thinking "Is this the meaning of marriage?" I had always wanted my life to be joyful; to hang around how I like; to meet my friends spontaneously ... We used to see some friends, but they were calling my husband "mister"; I couldn't adapt to that at that age. I also almost started to refer to my husband "Mister Mahmud" as well. After moving back to Ankara, I started to feel more comfortable.

She was very uncomfortable with traditional gender roles in Batman, where the women around her were mostly producers of emotional capital in the household, and felt much more relaxed after moving to Ankara. She didn't consider incorporating into the labor market after moving to Ankara despite her diploma from an Iranian university. As mentioned in the previous chapter, obtaining an education in the host country helps in the acquisition of not only institutionalized cultural capital, but also social and language capital. Sabra didn't attend a Turkish language course due to her children and workload in the house, but she bought a Turkish language book and studied it to overcome her language barrier. In addition, she established very good relations with her neighbors in the building in which she lived, and could even leave her children with her neighbors sometimes when she had to go out. She enriched her social connections, thus enhancing her social capital, through her neighbors.

These interviews show that the majority of settled Iranian men who have accumulated cultural and economic capital asked their wives to look after the children, using their emotional capital in the house rather than realizing occupational incorporation into the host society. While some of the female interviewees seemed comfortable with this situation, like Sabra, others were not, like Parisa and Maarika. That said, it could be understood from the interviews that work for Iranian women is still optional, taking second place to motherhood, which is conceptualized as emotional capital in this study. The husband's social status transfers to the female spouse, in an always a one-dimensional transformation, but despite this the social status of women does not increase, it being dependent to their husbands. If they are subsequently divorces, as was the

case for Maarika, their transferred social status is lost. This issue will be analyzed in more detail in the gender section of the following chapter.

Ardashir: The Sole Iranian Man who stayed Away from the Labor Market

Last but not least, there is one unique example within the interviewee group who had a loss of status in the host society. Ardashir was a political activist in Iran who fled the country when he understood that he would be executed:

> I came directly to Istanbul, as I had friends there. I was opposing Khomeini in Iran; the communists stood between us and Khomeini. When I realized that a civil war was ahead, I withdrew. I sold my furniture and stayed in Tehran for five months. Khomeini executed thirty six people from our group. Then I changed my surname after that five months and came to Turkey. I lived in Istanbul for sixteen years, and kept quiet for the first four years until my wife and children could join me. Then I started to talk about what I had lived through.

Throughout his life in Turkey did not work, or make any attempt to incorporate into the labor market (either in Istanbul or in Ankara). For many years, he transferred money from his home country through friends and people who visited him. After four years, his wife came to join him. He didn't work, but he was politically active in Turkey. He was an Azerbaijani and a defender of Turkish ethnicity, and worked voluntarily for Alparslan Türkeş, who was the leader a Turkish far right group. Since he had social connections with significant political figures in Turkey, he had no difficulty in obtaining Turkish citizenship. After his son started his education in METU, they moved to Ankara, where one of Ardashir's friends had given them a house with a garden for which they paid no rent. His daughter got married and moved to Germany. After his children's status passages were accomplished, he didn't have to worry about his economic conditions, as he and his wife's living expenses were being covered.

Ardashir should be considered as an asylum seeker, although he never applied to the UNHCR or the Turkish Police for asylum. He fled Iran for political reasons and started to live in Turkey under a pseudonym for a while, and although he was

a Persian literature teacher in Iran, he never intended to work in the host society. Furthermore, he couldn't incorporate into the labor market, nor did he participate professionally in politics. Since he had not achieved occupational incorporation either in Ankara or Istanbul, he wasn't like the other documented Iranians. The only thing he shared with other refugees and asylum seekers was his Azerbaijani background, which gave him access to full citizen rights in Turkey through his social network. The importance of social capital acquired in the host society has been already mentioned in this chapter, especially in the process of acquiring Turkish citizenship. Similar to those examples, Ardashir said that he had some friends who helped him while he was applying for Turkish citizenship.

5.6. Conclusion: From Constraints to Strategies

This chapter opened with the question of whether migration had lived up to the expectations of the settled Iranians in Ankara. In Chapter 3 it was shown how documented Iranians in Ankara construct their lifestyles in the host country, and how this is related directly to their accumulation of cultural and economic capital in the host society. As the examples put forward in this chapter have shown, settled Iranians in the interviewee group who were able to accumulate maximum economic capital were the ones who had transmitted economic capital from the home country, as this allowed them to make investments into their own businesses as entrepreneurs in the host society of Ankara. While some were using either the institutionalized cultural capital acquired in the host society of Ankara to establish a company related to their profession, others were investing their economic capital in a brand new, area such as Rafal who opened a Karate school and Yoga center. This indicates the power of accumulated economic capital when establishing a company, and highlights the strategies used to overcome barriers at the time of their occupational incorporation.

Furthermore, obtaining a diploma in the host society at majority was useful in attaining a stable and secured social status within the host society, as could be seen in the cases of Zaan and Nalani. Other respondents, such as those who could not find work in their specific study field, or those who did not obtain a diploma

from the host society, attempted to draw upon their ethnic background in entrepreneurship, such as was seen in the cases of Cadoc and Arash. While using their ethnic backgrounds didn't upgraded their social status directly, it helped them to acquire stronger and more stable social positions. The only distinction here can be seen in Type F, in which housewives (with a single exceptional case of Ardashir) are the dominant demographic. These respondents downgraded their social status, even though they were able to benefit from their husbands' social status and upward trajectories.

If the majority of these types can be considered successful in terms of their occupational incorporation into the host society, does this lead to the notion that they have achieved their symbolic capital, in other words, their desired lifestyles, in the host society of Ankara? In the previous chapter, in which focus was on Iranian students, the answer to this question was based on their intention either to stay in Turkey in the following years, or to continue on to other Western countries, taking into account their expressed reasons. Similar to this question, the settled Iranians were also asked whether they wanted to stay in Ankara in the future, or continue to another destination, and depending on their reply, what was their reason, and did it have any relationship with their social position within the host society of Ankara?

The answer to this last question can be deduced from the different trajectory types mentioned above. To begin with, Rahim compared his life to that of his younger brother who had moved to Canada after studying in Ankara for a couple of years, and he expressed distinctly that he was happier with his life and lifestyle here in Turkey. Contrary to Rahim, Sabra's husband, who also fell under the Type A category, was doubtful about the future of Turkey and the possible effect on their lifestyles. Sabra said that her husband often brought up the issue of moving to Europe due to the changes to daily life in Turkey. "I don't want to leave Turkey, but my husband is very pessimistic about its future. I never wanted to go to the United States, but I would go to England." Despite their years in Turkey, they had recently begun feeling dissatisfied with Turkey as a destination country. In short,

the upgrading trajectory in the host society hadn't brought the expected satisfaction.

This nervousness about the future of Turkey was common among all respondents, regardless of type. Despite their desire to stay in Turkey, many of the interviewees said that the role of religion in the state and its influence in daily life had changed for the worse since they had moved. While some of the Iranians thought that religion would not influence the general secular atmosphere of the country, such as Arash, others, like Nadia, said "they had seen this movie before" in Iran, using a metaphor to emphasize the approaching dangerous influence of an unsecular system that would eventually affect their daily lives and lifestyles. For the settled Iranians, this could be considered a political battle over a lifestyle. Despite their worries about their lifestyles in Turkey, the majority of Iranians expressed that they didn't want to move to another country, in that they didn't want to have to construct their lives again from the beginning. Arash said:

> I have no energy left to move to the United States. I used all of my energy establishing my life here in Turkey. If I had the chance, I would like to try the United States. One of my childhood friends recently went there, he is searching for the possibilities of moving there. If he can stay there, I can also try, but for now it seems that we'll continue to live here.

The majority of interviewees said that they couldn't move to Western countries, although most of them with children said that they had advised their children to look at Western countries, and as their parents they could visit them or live with them for a while after retirement. Although they didn't want to start over in a new place, as expressed by Maarika earlier in the chapter, they didn't want their children to live in Turkey. In this regard, there was a general uncertainty about the following years and their desired lifestyles in Turkey.

On the other hand, there were some who were not worried about the growing influence of religion on daily lives as long as it didn't interfere with the freedom of

other groups in society.[55] Rafal, who had the highest income among all those interviewed, like Rahim, was also very confident about the future of the country, and there were other interviewees who were happy with their social positions and accumulations in Turkey. The remainder of the satisfied group were not as well-off as the previous examples. Cadoc and Zaan were also very satisfied with Turkey as a destination country, and were not thinking about moving anywhere else; however they lacked the upgrading economic or social positions enjoyed by Rafal and Rahim, having come to Turkey with only limited economic capacity. Cadoc was happy because he could visit Iran whenever he wanted, and so they were very comfortable in Turkey, and never thought of moving to the United States, although their friends were trying to persuade them. Zaan, on the other hand, gained a prestigious position in Ankara by becoming an academician at one of the universities, although he still has limited economic capacity. This second group were satisfied with Turkey as a destination country, and considered themselves successful when comparing their estimation of their lives if they had stayed in Iran. In this regard, in their personal perceptions, they had attained the best social positions and status that they could ever reach.

To conclude, the general overview indicates that settled Iranians who transmitted capital from their home country or came to Turkey with a higher economic capacity and converted it into other capital in the host society, were satisfied with living in Turkey, along with the settled Iranians who had started their lives with very limited capital in the host society, but acquired stable but secured social positions. In Bourdieusian terms, they have acquired both economic and symbolic capital in the host society. Aside from these two groups is the middle group, which make up the majority of the settled Iranian interviewees, seemed to be unsatisfied with Ankara and Turkey as a destination. That said, they continued

[55] The dates of the interviews are important, given the political atmosphere in Turkey at the time. The interviews were conducted in 2012 and 2013, and were completed before the Gezi Park protests (of May 2013) erupted in Turkey. The Gezi Park protests are considered the largest urban public demonstrations against the ruling government.

that they didn't feel they had the energy to start again in a new host country, and so did not harbor thoughts of migrating, despite their apprehension about the future of Turkey. These were mostly about the continuation of a secular state, which, in their eyes, seemed to be under risk from the rising religious character of the government, and which would eventually curtail their personal freedom.

In addition, there was also disappointment among some of the interviewees, of which Arman can be included, with the unsatisfactory economic and symbolic return of their occupation. Arman regretted his decision to settle in Turkey, and said that he would not come again, given a second chance; but when asked whether he wanted to leave, he said that he had promised his patients in Ankara that he would always be there when they needed him. In other words, he presented his stay in Turkey as a choice or preference rather than a restriction or constraint of his options. Similar to Arman, most of the settled Iranians indicated that they wanted to settle and/or continue to stay in Turkey, although it was shown at the beginning of this chapter that for the majority Turkey was not the first choice of destination when they first left Iran, but rather a result of their limited opportunities. What is more, despite the so-called easier citizenship application procedures for Azerbaijani Iranians within Turkish legislation (since they have Turkish backgrounds), it was never an easy procedure for any of the documented Iranians in the group due to the implementation of the law, and as a result they had to circumvent the legal barriers by using the social capital they had acquired in the host society.

All those constraints, including legal limitations, concerns for the future of the country, and the lack of return of economic and symbolic capital in the host society, led the settled Iranians to develop strategies that would allow them to overcome constraints and to construct their desired lifestyle as much as possible. In this respect, settled Iranians tried to overcome the constraints which stop them achieving their desired lifestyles in Ankara by developing strategies. The situation is different for Iranian students, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, since they had plans to continue their migration to Western countries for education. However these distinctions and commonalities among Iranians, the general characteristics and

conflicts in other words, will be demonstrated in more detail in the following chapter, which focuses on the Iranian habitus.

CHAPTER VI

DISTINCTIONS IN IRANIAN HABITUS: DISPOSITIONS OF CLASS, GENDER, ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION

The previous chapters have discussed the process behind the migration to Ankara of the respondents and their settlement and status passage strategies of education or work, together with their acquired capital and their conversion to new forms. Revealing their strategies for educational and occupational incorporation into Turkish society, these chapters have also provided an understanding of their dispositions related to work and education. However, in order to understand the lifestyles, strategies and tendencies of documented Iranian migrants in Ankara from a more comprehensive perspective, there is one last dimension that needs to be addressed before concluding the thesis, and that is the representations of distinctions that take place in the Iranian habitus. According to Bourdieu, habitus is a socialized subjectivity, being the description of the self that is socially constructed (Bourdieu, 1992). In this regard, relationships within the Iranian habitus would focus particularly on documented Iranians as a group, and would reveal their schemes of perception, thought and action. This chapter will clarify those dispositions of Iranian migrants, drawing upon the clues already seen in previous chapters and with particular focus on four specific dimensions: class, gender, ethnicity and migration.

Although this study has made no analysis of the social space of documented Iranian migrants (looking at the volume, composition and trajectory of their accumulated capitals), it has been already mentioned that all the participants in Ankara started their journeys with both economic and cultural capital to varying extents. These two forms of capital, economic and cultural, are the same as those

emphasized in Bourdieu's class analysis, although he also mentions another form, being symbolic capital, which he considers to be distinctively important in that it signifies the symbolic struggle that includes the struggle for a desired lifestyle, and resembles also the political struggle of documented Iranians for the same lifestyle. Taking this perspective, this part will analyze class conditions by looking at the dispositions of the documented Iranians' class habitus, and will address the question of whether the accumulation of economic and cultural capital in the host society of Ankara has, in their opinion, been enough for the acquisition of symbolic capital.

6.1. Taste of Middle-Class Habitus

"Habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices … Consequently, habitus produces practices and representations which are available for classification, which are objectively differentiated" (Bourdieu, 1989: 19). For Bourdieu, the codes can be read and classified by looking at the judgement or taste of the agents, although this habitus consists the influence of class condition as he claimed that the "distribution of the different classes (and class fractions) thus run from those who are best provided with both economic and cultural capital to those who are most deprived in both respects" (Bourdieu, 2010a: 114). In this regard, when talking about the habitus of a certain group with similar tendencies and dispositions, we are also talking about a similar social position in that specific social space that is influenced by class conditions of that habitus.

Class habitus is the internalized condition of the class, and so the practices, dispositions and taste of the "lifestyle" of the Iranian migrants can be evaluated to acknowledge and identify their class habitus. Masih Alinejad defines the general lifestyle and class habitus of emigrants living outside Iran, as an Iranian woman and critical journalist living in the United Kingdom who launched the "My Stealthy Freedom" initiative for women living in Iran. In Iran, women have to cover their hair in public areas, in line with the dress rule that came into being after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. "My Stealthy Freedom" is an online social movement in which

Iranian women share photos of themselves without wearing a hijab ("My Stealthy Freedom", 2015). In order to promote the hijab-free movement, she posed for the Vogue lifestyle magazine wearing clothes that she had picked out herself, after which she gave an interview to CNN International, in which she said:

Photograph 1: Masih Alinejad on Vogue Magazine in 2015

"I think we sometimes forget what is going on in this battlefield. The real battle is between two different lifestyles. A part of Iranian have been forced by government to live in a special lifestyle that they don't like. And this is not really unrelated issue with lifestyle magazines. So when they asked me to interview with them [from Vogue Magazine], I accepted to do it because part of Iranian society has always been censored. We have never seen that part of Iran in Iranian state media. The face of Iran that we have seen through Iranian media is that chosen lifestyle from the government ... Hijab is not a culture of all part of Iran, hijab is a discrimination law."

Source: Vogue Magazine, April 20, 2015, Meet the Iconoclast Inspiring Iranian Women to Remove Their Headscarves (2015).

Masih makes a very strong statement related to the lifestyle that she wants to live and which, she says, is forbidden in Iran. She describes this as a battle between two different lifestyles, and says that the represented lifestyle of the Iranian government is not the one she wanted. To put it differently, the lifestyle promoted by the Iranian government doesn't match her own chosen dispositions, which is reminiscent of the symbolic struggle expressed by Bourdieu above (Bourdieu, 2010a). Similar to Masih, it has been displayed in the previous chapters of this thesis that there is strong tendency among the documented Iranian migrants in

Ankara (both students and settled) to migrate to other countries, not only for economic reasons, but, more importantly, for political reasons. In this study, this is referred to as a political battle over a lifestyle that they had wanted, desired or thought they deserved. In this regard, like Masih's "My Stealthy Freedom" movement for Iranian women, emigration by the Iranian respondents can be seen as a political battle against their government and the different lifestyle it demands. This is the distinction, according to the Iranian emigrants in Ankara, which they want to display through their aesthetic tastes, values and actions in another country.

That said, these aesthetic tastes, values and actions of documented Iranian migrants in Ankara are not free of class habitus, referring to "the internalized form of class condition and of the conditionings it entails" (Bourdieu, 1986: 101). For Bourdieu, class status doesn't rely merely on economic capital, but also on the accumulation of both cultural and symbolic capital. It has been already stated in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 that the participants of the study accumulated both cultural and economic capital before leaving Iran, and when they come to Turkey, both the Iranian students and settled Iranians acquired social and (institutionalized) cultural capital in the host society of Ankara as a strategy prior to incorporating into the labor market. Accordingly, this study considers the interviewees as relying on the middle-class habitus due not only to their transmission of economic capital from home society of Iran, but also their acquisition and use of different forms of cultural capital in the host society. It is this that distinguishes them from undocumented migrants and locals in the host society, as will be shown in more detail below. Furthermore, the majority of the documented Iranian migrants in Ankara, consider themselves middle class, as one of the interviewees, Rahim, states:

> If you are not an asylum seeker in Turkey, the only way to settle is to be granted citizenship, for which you need to have money to cover your stay in Turkey for about six to seven years. For this reason, people who come here (Turkey) mostly belong to the middle class.

Following Arman's classification, which was an opinion that was shared by other interviewees during the study, Iranian migrants who have a higher volume of economic and cultural capital go directly to the United States, while those with

lower volumes of these two forms of capital seek asylum.[56] Furthermore, those who stay in Turkey tend to be middle class, which strengthens Rahim's perception that the majority of (documented) Iranian migrants who stayed in Turkey rely on their middle-class status. Some of the interviewees, including Sabra, Rahim and Rafal, hold upper middle-class positions due to the higher volumes of economic and symbolic capital they acquire in the host society (as explained in Chapter 5), while the majority of the group rely on their middle-class status, which is based on their accumulations of both economic and cultural capital that they use to define their positions, values and tastes in the host society. This study is not intended to be a class analysis, although there is a need to draw attention to these internalized forms of class condition and the conditioning it entails, in other words, the middle-class habitus, through the dispositions of documented Iranians in Ankara. To reveal these distinctions of the middle-class habitus, Lawler (Lawler, 2004: 120), for instance, suggests that "disgust" be used as a "judgement stick" in the creation of hierarchies among the taste of the agents. Following this, the first part of this chapter will concentrate on the aesthetic tastes, values and actions of documented Iranians that they use as a "judgement stick" to distinguish themselves from other Iranians and locals in the host society.

6.1.1. Distinctions of Social Status

One of the best means of comprehend the distinctions within the middle-class habitus is to look at their relations, since a habitus is constructed based on one's relationship with another. For this reason, public events engaged in by Iranians in Ankara would be a good starting point in any attempt to identify those relations. One of the most important celebrations in the Iranian year is the New Year celebrations known as Nowruz. Although it is traditionally celebrated at home

[56] During the pilot research, the author saw that although some of Iranian asylum seekers had limited economic capital, this was not the case for all. For instance, followers of the Baha'i Muslim faith, who make up an important proportion of Iranian asylum seekers due to the wide discrimination towards the Baha'i religion in Iran, experience better conditions in general than other asylum seekers coming from the same region.

in Iran, Iranian migrants usually throw big parties in big venues when living abroad. The celebrations center on a traditional "Haft-Sin Table" on which seven symbolic items are arranged that all start with the letter sīn (س) in the Persian alphabet to symbolize new life and renewal, and people gather around the table as to make wishes for the New Year. Celebrating Nowruz and other cultural events together in a host society not only helps to reinforce cultural belongingness when abroad, but also transfers cultural heritage to the younger generations. In 2012, three different Nowruz parties were held in different parts of Ankara, arranged by different Iranian groups. I attended the one attended by most of the interviewees, which was held in one of the most expensive hotels in the capital and had a significantly high ticket price (almost 170 USD per person). According to the interviewees, the price indicated the quality of the party, which was different from the other two. The second party was also held in a luxurious hotel in Ankara, while the last one was organized in a small bar and was mostly attended by Iranian asylum seekers.

Photograph 2: Iranian band playing folk music in Nowruz Party

(Personal photos, March 2013)

Photograph 3: Iranian women on the dancefloor in Nowruz Party (Personal photos, March 2013)

Photograph 4: Iranian Men and Women dancing together in Nowruz Party (Personal photos, March 2013)

The environment was very high class and people were dressed very formally. I understood from the interviewees that this was an important occasion. I was sitting next to an Iranian doctor that I newly met who told me that I was attending the most prestigious Nowruz party in Ankara. When I asked what the "problem" was with the other events, he said "the people in the bar party are mostly thieves". I was quite shocked, and so asked what he meant exactly by "thieves", and he replied: "You see this party? The people here are mostly lawyers or doctors, or people with a prestigious position in society; but in the other party, you don't know them or how they live here". It is obvious that he was referring to the third party of Iranian asylum seekers[57] in Ankara. Far from feeling a connection to the undocumented Iranian asylum seekers, he wanted to distinguish himself and his group from them. Needless to say, he makes an unjustifiable generalization, however it showed a perspective of a certain code that their party was of a higher quality than the others. When I asked more eople what they thought about the party, most of them agreed that the party comprised a good group of people.

Photograph 5: Traditional Haft-Sin Table is a table-top arrangement of seven symbolic items, all starting with the latter "Sin" in the Persian alphabet. (Personal photos, March 2013)

[57] As mentioned in Chapter 3, although asylum seekers apply to the UNHCR and the Police Department in Turkey, and obtain legal papers to stay in the country, they are still considered undocumented due to their poor economic circumstances and the insufficient implementation of the immigration law, which restricts them from using their rights to the full capacity, such as obtaining formal work, etc. Accordingly, in this study asylum seekers are considered as undocumented migrants due to their circumstances in the country.

Here, the influence of a middle-class habitus is clearly apparent in Bourdieusian terms. Speaking in a condescending manner about Iranian asylum seekers or other documented Iranians [in the second party] in Ankara demonstrates a judgmental attitude towards other people, which can be categorized as a middle-class habitus. Lawler, for instance, claims that "disgust works … to pathologize the persons taking part – precisely because it is the authority instantiated in a middle-class habitus that can make such judgement stick" (Lawler, 2004: 120).

Similar to this example, referring to the Iranians in the other party as thieves and the use of the "judgement stick" to show disapproval of other people in the form of hatred or disgust creates hierarchies, which was all too apparent in the attitude of the Iranian doctor towards Iranian asylum seekers living in the same city. This example also highlighted the general distinction that exists between social statuses, in this case, between documented and undocumented Iranian migrants in Ankara.

It should be noted that the Iranian doctor was not the only person met who sought to distance themselves from the undocumented migrants in Ankara. One of the Iranian students, Sara, expressed that people looking to go abroad should do so through education or similar ways, rather than by seeking asylum. Before starting her studies in Ankara, Sara had worked for an international NGO looking after the rights of refugees in Istanbul, and explained the difference between social statuses as such:

> For instance, some Iranians go to other countries as refugees, but we [Sara and her husband] don't want that. We want to go to a place with a red carpet (…) I now tell everyone what I have seen in Istanbul. 'You have to decide for yourself; do not let anyone to decide for you. Go to a university in California. They give you so little money when you become a refugee. You can only buy water and bread, just enough not to die. Those people who think of seeking asylum most of the time say that their family will help them. If you have such a chance, you can use that money to go abroad and study. Then, why that way [asylum seeking]? Being a refugee seems to be the easier route, but actually it's not. (…) I have a Baha'i friend who would slap your face if you asked her to become a refugee. She would say 'I can study, why I shall use my religion?'

Here, Sara once again emphasizes the distinction between the social statuses of asylum seekers and highly skilled migrants. She says that when they go to a country, they want to be welcomed with red carpet, meaning they want to have a prestigious position in the host society and be part of the upper class. The striking thing here is that none of the documented Iranians who rejected the asylum route mentioned the human rights issue for people whose lives are at risk. According to some other interviewees, asylum was an easy means of migrating to other countries, but is a poor choice, as it erases all accumulated economic and cultural capital that could be transmitted from the home country. In contrast, studying abroad is considered to be a more prestigious and preferable route for migration, in that when you go to a host country as a documented migrant, for instance as a student, you can obtain a diploma within the host society, which means acquiring cultural capital in Bourdieusian terms, and this can later be converted into economic capital. This perspective of undocumented migration reinforces the middle-class habitus of documented Iranians living in Ankara.

There are two final examples of this middle-class habitus of documented Iranians and the perceived distance and hierarchy related to undocumented migrants. Bahman is a settled Iranian who came to Turkey for temporary employment until he found a secure job in the UNHCR after a couple of years, after which he settled in the country. While conducting the interview, I asked what he felt as an Iranian when Iranian asylum seekers demonstrated in front of the UNHCR building to protest the long waiting periods (which can take several years) for resettlement in a third country. Since he had also been in a temporary position in Turkey and had known how it felt, I wondered whether he felt any kind of connection or empathy with his countrymen who were trying to migrate to other countries:

> I don't put the blame on the staff what so ever. With this number of asylum seekers coming and with the limited staff [in the UNHCR], we are doing even more than we should, you know, so I don't feel bad at all (…). Due to the nature of my work, I cannot get close to Iranian society here. This is part of my job. I have to keep away, keep distant for security reasons. We don't expose ourselves to danger. I am working for the UN.

As a documented migrant in Turkey, Bahman's professional attitude to his job resulted in a similar detachment from Iranian asylum seekers as the previous interviewees. Although the question was about Iranian asylum seekers in particular, he chose to apply his answer to asylum seekers who apply to their organization from different countries. As can be understood from the examples given thus far, the social status of an asylum seeker is seen as low by the majority of documented Iranians living in Ankara.[58]

This middle-class habitus and the perceived distinction between the settled migrants and asylum seekers is not something that is seen only among the Iranians living in Ankara. McAuliffe identified a huge distinction and class diversity among Iranian migrants and asylum seekers living in Sydney and London (McAuliffe, 2008). In his study, he claims that class distinctions appears not only between the migrants and the natives, but also among the migrants within the "Iranian diaspora". "Fresh off the Boat" (FOBs or Fobes) was a commonly used phrase to describe the newly migrated Iranians among the Iranians who had come earlier, particularly when referring to refugees. According to the second generation Iranians, their families had warned them not to hang out with Fobes, since they were troublemakers and out of control. With a general stigmatization, these Fobes were "described as less wealthy, more religious and 'speaking in a funny accent'" (McAuliffe, 2008: 70). Like the comparison made here in Ankara by people in the Iranian habitus, a similar class habitus distinction set exists among the documented Iranians in London and Sydney. These middle-class habitus dispositions are based mainly on the idea that "we" are different from "them"; such like the disgust or "judgement stick" used to construct a hierarchy within the social space of the host society.

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[58] As mentioned in Chapter 2, some of the interviewees objected to being referred to as "*göçmen",* which means migrant in Turkish. When asked why, Nadia said that she wasn't a refugee since she had come to Turkey with documents and was working legally in the country. In fact, it was also the middle-class habitus that made them uncomfortable, in that they didn't want to be known as "migrants" which usually refers to refugees who hold no such capital.

6.1.2. Consumption for a Modern Life

The middle-class habitus of the Iranians living in Ankara is based on the consumption of both economic and cultural capital as a means of displaying their modern lives. In the study mentioned above, McAuliffe claims that according to his Iranian interviewees "class is a combination of socioeconomic and sociocultural characteristics based around style and consumption that serves to differentiate them from others" (McAuliffe, 2008: 69). Similar to this perspective, aesthetic taste and values can be considered important, being related directly to the middle-class habitus of documented Iranians in Ankara. That said, the interviewees in the study claimed that the distinction existed not only between themselves and the Iranian asylum seekers in Ankara, but also between the native people in the host society. The majority of interviewees, in both the student and settled groups, at the time of the interview were living in upper/middle class neighborhoods of Ankara, such as Gazi Osman Paşa, Yıldız, Tunalı, Ayrancı, Bilkent and Ümitköy. Kasia, who was living in Yıldız, complained that her neighborhood was not good enough:

> I live in Yıldız, in the Sancak neighborhood. I don't like the human quality here. This place used to be a village, a slum area. I don't want to be discriminative, I'm really careful about this issue, but the human quality was better in my previous neighborhood, in Tunalı. For instance, people didn't have money, but they were lecturers at universities, or civil servants, bankers or people who went to college … This place is literally a slum area. Once when I came back from work, my next door neighbor, who lives in Germany and comes to Turkey only for two weeks each year, opened a big piece of cloth on the garden to dry apricots, right next to the building entrance. In another time, I saw it from window, for two or three days, or even for a week, she aired the wool (which is inside the quilt) in the garden. I had never seen such a thing in Tunalı.

Kaisa said that she had bought a house in the Yıldız area to be closer to her work, but regretted changing her neighborhood due the lower "human quality" of her new neighborhood. She used to live in Tunalı Hilmi Caddesi, one of the oldest and well-known middle-class neighborhoods in Ankara. However in the new neighborhood, she was surprised when seeing people acting as if they were living in a slum area. Like the majority of the settled Iranians interviewed for this study,

Kaisa said that she wanted a high quality of life that was distinct from both Iranians and Turks at some point. She allowed me take photos of her house, which was decorated not like a typical traditional Iranian house, but in a more modern style, touched *elegantly* with Iranian details such as wall paintings and the silk carpets for which Iran is famous.

Photograph 6: Kaisa's sitting room with Iranian paintings on the wall (Personal Photos, April 2013)



Photograph 7: Dining area in the sitting room with an Iranian silk carpet (Personal Photos, April 2013)

As previously mentioned in the theoretical section in Chapter 3, these photos show not only Kaisa's accumulation of economic capital, as the décor in the house is also an outcome of the objectified cultural capital in which consumer goods are dispositions of the middle-class habitus. Objectified cultural capital, in other words, consumer goods or cultural objects with aesthetic tastes and value, indicate that the individual has the knowledge of how to consume. However Kaisa's next door neighbor, from in her opinion, didn't know how to live in an apartment, and acted as if she was living in a slum house. This cultural capital indicates recognition of the special knowledge that comes mostly from the habitus that taught the individual how to use that specific cultural good in their social space. Hence, here in the middle-class habitus, while Iranians were symbolically saying "we are

different from them", and indicating their distinctiveness through their aesthetic taste, were actually announcing their possession of that special knowledge of objectified cultural capital, and in this respect, their knowledge of how to live in a modern middle-class habitus. This also reinforces the *illusio* mentioned previously in Chapter 3, which denotes that Iranian migrants actually *deserve* this modern and better life due to their cultural heritage.

A parallel example can be given in Rahim's case, who insisted we conduct the interview at his factory. As mentioned in the previous chapters, Rahim graduated from an electronic engineering faculty in Ankara and started to run a business with two other Iranians from the same department. He said that they had worked very hard in the years following graduation, and everything went well. They finally opened their factory in Kazan, outside the city center of Ankara, where they produce generators and export them to other parts of the world. At first, I didn't realize why he wanted to conduct the interview at his factory outside the city, but finally understood when I was shown his factory. The factory is very modern, new and clean, and he was extremely proud of it, stating that the design of their factory had received an award for its design and construction.

Photograph 8: Manufacturing side of Rahim's factory (Personal photos, April 2013)

Photograph 9: Meeting room in the factory (Personal photos, April 2013)

Photograph 10: Rahim's office (Personal photos, April 2013)

Photograph 11: Modern paintings on the waiting room walls (Personal photos, April 2013)

Photograph 12: More modern paintings in the corridor (Personal photos, April 2013)

Despite being a facility for manufacturing generators, he showed me the original paintings on the wall that were bought from an artist and spread all around the factory. It was obvious that he was very proud of what they had done. This was about the consumption of cultural objects, and like Kaisa, Rahim expressed that they understood how to consume such cultural objects. In other words, while showing me the paintings on the walls, he was telling me that they actually hold embodied cultural capital.

Last but not least, the settled Iranians were not the only group who were able to consume cultural goods. From within the Iranian student group, Roxane's cultural activities demonstrated her kinship with the same middle-class habitus of the settled Iranians. Roxane said that she followed cultural activities, for which she would even go to Istanbul. She said:

> "I go to Istanbul Modern, SALT, Bilgi University. I definitely go to Istanbul for art exhibitions, and even went there for a day trip (a five or six hour bus journey, each way) just to see a gallery. In Ankara I go to CerModern and exhibitions in the Canadian Embassy".

Later in the interview she said that she was a member of Greenpeace in Turkey. All of these dispositions of cultural activities and NGO memberships point to a high level of aesthetic taste and cultural capital.

So far, this part of the chapter has presented the dispositions of the Iranian habitus that are related closely to the consumption of cultural goods and aesthetic taste. The documented Iranian migrants (both settled and temporary students) indicated that they not only held economic and cultural capital, which distinguishes them from other Iranians (asylum seekers) in Ankara, but also that they were living a modern lifestyle that distinguished them even from the people of the host society living around them. Roxane's taste for museums, Kaisa's values about living in an apartment and Rahim's state-of-the-art factory are presented here as examples of this modern lifestyle, which can be read as dispositions of a middle-class habitus. However, to complete this circle of middle-class habitus dispositions, there is one last dimension that was raised throughout the interviews, and that is the representation of a secular lifestyle.

6.1.3. Representing their Secular Lifestyles outside Iran

Throughout the interviews in Ankara, the issue of religion was brought up many times by the interviewees, and comparisons were made of lifestyles in Iran and Ankara. The majority of interviewees, both settled Iranians and Iranian students, expressed a belief in *Allah* (god), although they didn't consider themselves religious (*dindar*). It was worthy of note that the female interviewees tended to be more resistant to religious codes and expressive about this issue than the male interviewees, which was related directly to the compulsory headscarf rule in Iran. To begin, Roxane told what the headscarf meant to her and her life in Iran:

> Frankly, I distinguish between *Allah* (god) and religion. I believe Islam has benefits for women as well, but I don't see it in practice. In this respect, I consider myself more spontaneous and spiritual. These are relaxing practices, but I don't believe in religion. (…) In 1979 we had a revolution and we have been covering our hair since then because of that, but my family is very modern. Iranians are modern in general, but we have to cover our hair because of the state. Because of this [government restrictions], I could not meet a guy and hang around in my university years. I could only dress how I liked at home, but it wasn't as such outside in public. The movie "Persepolis" can explain many things to you. My life resembles that of the girl in that movie. Then when I first came here, I saw that girls and boys could hold each other's hands so easily. I liked that.

After talking about the 1979 Iranian revolution and the obligatory wearing of the headscarf in Iran, Roxane quickly added a "but", explaining that her family was modern, indicating that, in her opinion, the headscarf was an anti-modern element. She drew attention to the duality of her life inside and outside of Iran, and from time to time, posted family photos on social media (Facebook) taken before the 1979 revolution.

Photograph 13: Roxane dining with her parents in 1977 before the Iranian Revolution (Roxane's photo, with her permission)

Posting photos on Facebook of their lives outside Iran was common among the Iranian interviewees, with the female interviewees in particular expressing explicitly their secular lifestyles by posting photos of themselves in modern outfits, and sometimes even holding a glass of wine or bottle of beer. Roxane's photo was another dimension of these posted photos, showing, according to her, that Iran had not always been like "this", and demonstrating that they had a different lifestyle before 1979. Mentioning the pre-revolution period of Iran as proof of Iran's modernity was common also among other Iranian interviewees. According to them, their nostalgic flashbacks to the pre-revolution period signified that they had known this modernity, in that they had experienced it in Iran before 1979. Maarika is one of the settled Iranians who spoke about her past in a nostalgic way:

> Do you know what I am really sad about? The revolution occurred right in the middle of our lives; it destroyed everything! People were living beautifully, and then the spell was broken! I remember my childhood.

> At the time of Nowruz we used take our red fish and flowers (for the haft-sin table) and go to our relatives' houses, but they were so crowded that we couldn't even fit! We were raised as siblings, but now all the beauty is gone. If I had a chance to turn Iran back to the Shah Period, it would be magnificent for every Iranian! But now, if you tell me to return to Iran in this present situation… never! I'm living like royalty here now. There is nobody around to bully me, intervene in my lifestyle and tell me to cover my hair. Everybody has the right to live the life s/he wants, but there is no such a thing in Iran right now. If you want to go to the street, you have to cover your hair. Listening to music is a natural need, and now you can't even do that outside in Iran. Iran is like a living hell for these reasons.

Maarika said that the Shah period of Iran was over, and that she considered that it was magnificent period for every Iranian. This is debatable, however, since that period benefitted only some elite groups in Iran (Abrahamian, 2008). It is widely known that prior to the revolution, the close relations of the Shah, Reza Pahlavi, with Western countries lead to a growth of a secularized and consumption-oriented society that enlarged the gap between the social classes within in the country (McAuliffe, 2008). As mentioned in Chapter 3, prior to that, the rules of the Pahalvi Monarchs were authoritarian and anti-democratic (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2011; Groot, 2000) which lead to rising tension within the country that formed the basis of the dissatisfaction with the Shah that started the country along the road to the revolution (Keddie, 1981).

Some of the settled Iranians within the interview group remembered the pre-revolution period with nostalgia, due especially to its secular implementations, although they were holding advantaged positions in society at that time. Maarika said: "Instead of a religious regime in Iran, I am now living like royalty in Turkey" – a reference to the nostalgic past that indicates an attempt to continue living the previous "modern/secular lifestyles" in a new country that had been taken away from her with the revolution. To put it differently, Maarika was trying to re-build her pre-revolutionary past in the host country of Turkey. Her words, "I am now living like royalty in Turkey" refers to that perception. This memory of a glorious past is seen not only in the Iranian habitus in Ankara, but also in other studies

focusing on the Iranian diaspora[59] in different parts of the world. Here is one such example from Graham and Khosravi's study:

> Thus the version of the homeland that is being constructed is a version or memory of a place and a period that is no more. Much of this pre-revolutionary Iran has been physically erased by revolution, persecution, war and economic chaos. As might be expected, there are differences in the way exile Iranians and emigrant Iranians recall the past in Iran. Exile Iranians recall the revolution against the Shah, political persecution, and the struggle against the Islamic regime. Returning is about putting matters right. For emigrants, memories tend to revolve around family life and community, familiar locations, the climate, holidays and things unavailable in Sweden. Some of these things which they miss so much are now being recreated in Stockholm and elsewhere. (Graham and Khosravi, 1997: 128)

The difference seen here among the Iranian diaspora in Sweden was between Iranian exiles and emigrants, such like the documented and undocumented (asylum seekers) Iranians in Ankara. While the exiled Iranians were recalling more political events, and would return to Iran to set things right if given the chance; the emigrants were recalling memories about the family and community before the revolution, and were trying to recreate the same atmosphere in Stockholm. This situation was very similar to the Iranian habitus in Ankara. The settled Iranians did not recall the unrest or the struggle against the Shah, since they were the beneficiaries of that pre-revolutionary Iran. From the pilot interviews conducted with political Iranian asylum seekers before starting this study it was apparent that they dreamed of changing Iran's history if they had the chance. Since this study is focusing on the documented Iranian migrants and not the asylum seekers, Rahim's explanation can be given as an example of the same period of rule under the Shah:

> We – and when I say we, I mean the middle class who lived the good times in Iran – thought that nobody liked the mullahs, and so we could

[59] As mentioned in Chapter 3, this study does not conceptualize the documented Iranian migrants as a diaspora group, since they don't want to be known as a distinct ethnic group in Turkey, which is not the case for other Iranian diaspora groups in Europe or the United States. As understood from the interviews in Ankara, Iranians try to emphasize their cultural similarities with the host society of Turkey.

> never have realized how they could deceive us and take power… we had buried our heads in the sand. If the mullahs hadn't disrupted the economy, they wouldn't have lost their fanatics as well. People confuse economy and Islam, however there could be a very good Islamic government who could fix the economy, like the JDP (Justice and Development Party, which at the time of the interview were the governing party in Turkey). In Iran we, educated Iranians, were probably few in the 75 million (population), so they were in the majority; the mullahs are the community. Now I'm asking to you, do covered women in the street [in Turkey] outnumber us? Probably they do! Then they have the right to talk! I wish I had the capacity and power to educate them, but I don't. I hope they, who are covering their hair, have modern thoughts despite the hijab. … However, the most important thing is socioeconomic balance in the country. I think the JDP is doing good things in terms of the economy, although I don't support its social implementations. Fifteen years ago I could have never imagined that amount of investment that I see now. What I did in four years wouldn't be possible in ten years. This is so true.

This dichotomy of being against the religious implementations of the government but at the same time approving of its economic strategies is not unique to the Iranian middle-class habitus,[60] as recollections of the good times under the Shah and the modern and secular representations of the time were heard also from the Iranian diaspora in Sweden. Rahim states that it was the middle-class who benefitted during the reign of the Shah in Iran who remembered it with a longing. Similar to Rahim, Bahman also made a positive reference to the Shah period during his interview:

> People around the world refer to three different time phases: the past, present and future; but for Iranians, there are four time phrases, with the fourth one being the Shah period. We are talk to our Iranian friends who are from a similar generation. Iran was like this 30 years ago, and now Turkey is going that way.

[60] This study makes no class analysis of (documented) Iranians, nor does it compare the Iranian middle class with the middleclass of locals in Turkey, although there have been some significant similarities between these two groups, such as Rahim's perspective of the JDP government mentioned in the quotation. Further study would be required to extend the scope of the analysis.

This recollection of the period of rule of the Shah and nostalgia for the time brings to mind once again a crucial dimension of the Iranian middle-class habitus in Ankara, being their perceived deserved lifestyles. Iranians in the middle-class habitus say that they believe they actually deserve this secular lifestyle in the host country, in that their own had come to an end with the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. That is also a reason why they embraced the symbol of Atatürk so much, as shown in Chapter 5, in that the Shah symbolizes the secular lifestyle for the Iranian middle-class habitus, while Atatürk is an important symbol of secularism for them in Turkey. For this reason, they defend what Atatürk stood for, and recognize him as preserving the secular lifestyle in Turkey. This is based on their perspective that the symbol of secularism, especially the Shah Period, was taken away from them and "the spell was broken", as claimed by Maarika. In this regard, when referring to the Shah Period in Iran, they were not only remembering their economic accumulations that at the time, but also the lifestyle it promised to them. Before the Islamic Revolution Iran was a rich, modern and secular country that had close relations with the West. This is how the majority of the interviews saw it, and that is also why the majority of interviewees from this middle-class habitus believed that they *deserve* better lifestyles, because they had own it before. They deserve to achieve "better lives and lifestyles outside Iran", in that their *illusio* made them migrate and to rebuild their deserved lifestyles in another host country.

Last but not least, one final example will be given related to the Iranian habitus in Ankara to emphasize the importance of the secular lifestyle in the host society. Reactions against cultural and Islamic practices were striking on some occasions, one of which occurred when Mahmud's Turkish wife, Çağla, organized a Quran reading at her house (*Mevlüt*) to celebrate their anniversary, to which she invited relatives from both the Turkish and Iranian sides of the family.[61] Nowruz

[61] The *Mevlüt* is a religious ceremony in Turkey during which literary texts are read about the birth of the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic to celebrate a special day. *Mevlid* events are sometimes organized during the day by women, during which they gather at somebody's house and follow the Arabic verses from the Quran. Women are expected to cover their hair during such readings.

was approaching, so she designed a *haft-sin* table and her mother-in-law cooked traditional Iranian food to make her Iranian relatives feel at home. I was also invited to the event, being a classmate of Çağla at the Persian language course. Just before the *Mevlüt* started, Çağla and her mother-in-law handed out headscarves to the guests, in that it is a tradition for Muslim women to cover their hair while the Quran is being read. At that moment, one of the Iranian women guests, who was wearing a red mini skirt and high heels, took the headscarf from Çağla's Iranian mother-in-law, threw it on the floor and stepped on it, stating that she wouldn't put a headscarf on in a million years. Everybody was silent and acted like nothing had happened, and after a while the woman hodja started to read the Quran out loud.

Photograph 14: Traditional Iranian Haft-sin Table (Personal photos, 2013)

Photograph 15: Iranian sweets with almonds, peanuts and sesame seeds. (Personal photos, 2013)

Photograph 16 and 17: Special Iranian rice with saffron and chicken (Personal photos, 2013)

It is obvious that the woman was not directly against the religious ceremony, in that she had chosen to attend, her protest was rather against the veiling of women for religious purposes, and it should be noted that oppositions to the hijab were raised many times during the interviews. Recalling the online anti-hijab movement ("My Stealthy Freedom", 2015) mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is necessary to underline the importance of the strong anti-hijab thoughts of some of the respondents, both inside and outside their home country. Unveiled hair is seen as a part of Western way of life, being linked to both modernity and secularism by the interviewees. However, sometimes representations of a pro-secularism attitude can be more rigid, as was the case at Çağla's *Mevlüt,* or as can be seen in some other studies. For instance, Gholami raised a new concept, "intra-diasporic secularism", after observing Iranians in London while they construct or live a diasporic identity that excludes or eradicates only Islam (Gholami, 2014). Gholami saw that London Iranians accepted every cultural or diasporic motivation other than Islam because it had negative connotations for them. Despite the potential interest, this study does not follow the line of "intra-diasporic secularism", since Gholami's concept was suggested for London Iranians who were against the devout Iranian Shi'a in London, while in Ankara, no such devout group exists in the context of the Iranian habitus.

The first part of this chapter focused on the middle-class habitus of Iranian migrants in Ankara, in which modern and secular lifestyles are enjoyed together with distinctions both within the Iranian community (between documented and undocumented Iranians) and local people in Ankara society (between the documented Iranians and local people of Ankara). In addition, there is a gender dimension of the Iranian habitus that came to light throughout the interviews, involving both Iranian students and settled Iranians. The following section will concentrate on the gender dimension of the habitus, which will illuminate the internal gendered relations that exist among Iranians, as well as the heterogeneous relations between Iranians and the locals of Ankara.

6.2. The Iranian Habitus as a Gendered Habitus

We have already stated that habitus, as defined by Bourdieu, "expresses first the result of *an organizing action*, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designated a *way of being, a habitual state* (especially of the body) and, in particular, a *predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination*" (Bourdieu, 1977: 214). Bourdieu's emphasis on dispositions comes to the forefront with the issue of gender relations within the habitus, in that socially established meanings become naturalized and distinctions between the sexes become *structures of the spaces*. For instance, as will be shown below, not all of the female respondents were employed, but all of the Iranian men who had settled in Ankara were either running their own businesses or were engaged in the labor market. The system of male domination is reinforced by the dichotomies between the sexes, and so can be considered a *hexis*[62] way of differentiating between social positions. The lifestyles of the majority of the settled Iranians were similar to families in Turkey in respect to gender, where the women either earned less than their spouses, or were not working at all, with the exception of unmarried women (in the settled interviewee group) who work to earn a living. This section will make an analysis of these gendered relations within the Iranian habitus.

Bourdieu's conceptualization of habitus has been central to many critiques, especially feminist theorists who accuse him of not drawing sufficient attention to gendered relations, despite penning the book *Masculine Domination* (Bourdieu, 2001). He used the concepts of "sexual identity" and "gendered division of labor" rather than "gender", which, according to feminist scholars, undervalues the influence of social construction processes of fe/male distinctions, while "sex" is assumed to be biologically given (Kandiyoti, 1995). As a feminist theorist, Lovell (Lovell, 2005) claims that the concept of gender seems to be "hidden", "unofficial" or "secondary", and his work has been criticized for his insistence on the traditional

[62] Originally a Greek word explains while some parts are constantly changing, some other parts are becoming concrete and possessive as to determine the meaning.

model of the gendered division of labor and the symbolic violence, which offers no possibility of advancement beyond the traditional gender divisions (Skeggs, 2005).

Many feminist theorists emphasize the importance of the positioning of women in the social space, in relation both to the household and the labor market (Adkins and Skeggs, 2005), however this is not distinctively conceptualized in Bourdieu's sociological analysis. As explained in Chapter 3, feminist have proposed a new form of capital in Bourdieu's sociological understanding, namely emotional capital (Reay, 2005), which covers the undefined workload, and especially the childcare responsibilities of women within the household and family. Taking up this issue, this part of the chapter will unveil the gendered relations and sexual division of labor within the Iranian habitus that came to light in the interviews with both Iranian students and settled Iranians, and will look at the relationships that exist first within the household, and then in the broader social space.

6.2.1. Sexual Division of Labor and Emotional Capital

In order to analyze the gendered relationships and the sexual division of labor within the household, it is necessary to start by looking at the family unit in Iranian culture, which is primarily based on the traditional family structure in which the husband is considered the head of the family and is primarily responsible for its existence. The wife, on the other hand, is associated with domestic household responsibilities rather than breadwinner roles. The family structure in Iran is based on the Shi'ite laws that were formed after Iran's Islamization process. Ghazali, for instance, a Persian Islamic scholar who lived in early years of Islam and is still quoted today, referred to marriage as "procreation, the satisfaction of passion, intimacy with a wife, which leads to the anticipation and management of the needs of the household so that the man may be relieved of disturbances in his path to knowledge, action, and contemplation" (Nassehi-Behnam, 1985: 557). This definition of marriage posits the woman as the nurturer of the household, responsible for easing the man's life, who is, by definition, open to knowledge and action. The woman's role within the family is also described by another well-known

Islamic philosopher, Naslre od-Din Tusl, who said that the "the right wife" should be "the man's partner in material well-being and his replacement in managing the household in his absence, and the best of all wives is one endowed with patience, faith, chastity, compassion, modesty, and obedience" (Nassehi-Behnam, 1985: 557). All these requirements and responsibilities asked of a woman confine her to the boundaries of "wifehood". As seen in these quotes, in the traditional Islamic comprehension of marriage, the woman is responsible for emotional satisfaction and domestic labor within the house in full support of her husband, while the husband's duty is identified as the quest for intellectual knowledge, breadwinning and protection of the house, rather than supporting his wife in her presence outside the home.[63]

These perspectives have been presented to show the influence of Islam over the family structure in Iran, where the sexual division of labor within the household also demonstrates the dominancy of patriarchal relations. Furthermore, the emotional support expected from women, for both her husband and children, adds a further dimension to the female responsibilities, of which Bourdieu writes "it has often been observed that women fulfil a cathartic, quasi-therapeutic function in regulating men's emotional lives, calming their anger, helping them accept the injustices and difficulties of life" (Bourdieu, 2001: 77). In this respect, the sexual division of labor alone cannot explain the entire range of physical responsibilities and emotional support asked from women, and in this regard, emotional capital

[63] Over the last century the Iranian family structure has changed under the influence of both Islamic rules and the modernization process of the West. For instance, the civil code adopted by Parliament in 1925 on sharia rules. The modernization process in Iran influenced the family unit, while the 1967 Family Protection Law was accepted with many reforms, including a ban on polygamy and many other rights related to Iranian women, such as education and working without the consent of the husbands. However, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran, Islam came to dominate every sphere of daily life, including family life. According to Bastani, the Islamic movement strengthened the family: motherhood and the direct care and upbringing of children was seen as the primary role and major responsibility of women (2007). Besides, rather than the extended family structure that had been common, in which at least three or more generations would live together in the same place, the family structure in the capital city of Tehran was mostly transformed into the nuclear family type, in which parents live together with their unmarried children (Bastani, 2001).

refers to that lack of conceptualization in Bourdieu's sociological approach, being 'generally confined within the bounds of affective relationships of family and friends and encompasses the emotional resources you hand on to those you care about' (Reay, 2005: 62). Unlike other forms of capital, Nowotny claims that emotional capital develops adverse conditions, constructing barriers rather than possibilities (1981), as will be shown below in the case of the gendered habitus of Iranian migrants in Ankara.

Among the group of settled Iranians interviewed for the study, it is strikingly obvious that the majority of Iranian women did not enter the labor market unless they were divorced or fought against their husbands for permission to work outside the home. Parisa spoke about her fights with her husband, who was earning quite well, and who opposed her dream to work for many years, insisting she stay at home to look after the children. The emotional capital expected from Parisa, as defined above, confined her to the house until her children were grown up. However after the children started spending the whole day at school she no longer wanted to stay at home, and found a position as a Persian language teacher at a university in Ankara. Parisa's spoke about her husband's attitude towards her having a career:

> I have always wanted to work, even when I was at university; but when my children were born I had nobody here, so I didn't know with whom to leave them. I started working once they had grown up. My husband never wanted me to work, like all other men. "Don't discomfort yourself," he said. Actually, if he had really wanted to, he could have found me a job, even when we first arrived here. But he didn't really support me. 'Where will you work? Who is going to look after the children?' he said, and stopped me. When I attempted to find work, he understood my motivation and helped a little, but it didn't work.

She was upset with her husband because he hadn't understood her wish to work, and despite his large social network (social capital) in Ankara, he didn't lift a finger to help her. What is striking here is that the story repeats for Maarika, Sabra and some of the other interviewees, although in different ways. All of these women had to fight with their husbands to be allowed to work, or had to wait until they

were divorced in order to earn their own money, or for the purpose of this study, their own economic capital.

The role of women in the sexual division of labor are reduced for the majority to roles of nurturer within the household, and this is especially true for the settled Iranians in the Iranian habitus. This masculine mindset was verified by some of the male interviewees in the group, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Despite his wife's university education in Turkey, Rafal didn't want her to work:

> Why should she (work)? There is no need to. We have students here (of Yoga), for instance an aircraft engineer, and his (monthly) salary is 1,400 Turkish Lira (approx. 800 USD in the time of the interview). Everything is money. Why do people want occupations, why better occupations? To earn money. But why? To realize our wishes and desires. […] The system doesn't change in the world; especially in Turkey, you work a lot but earn little. Why that much stress? That much work? You go early in the morning and come late at night. What can you do after 6 pm with that reduced energy? You bring your body home as an empty pulp in the evening, it isn't worth it! If you have a child, that's even worse. That's why children are non-believers and have no concentration; you cannot focus them. If mothers and fathers both need to work, due to the economy, who's going to discipline the child? Then children become delinquents. Women should stay at home.

Here, Rafal identifies the roles of women as being primarily domestic, where the wife's family responsibilities are to look after the children and educate them not to become delinquents. In line with the sexual division of labor, he expects women to stay at home and look after the children, in other words, to provide the emotional capital conceptualized by feminist scholars (Adkins and Skeggs, 2005). This expectations and requests for emotional capital from women within the household may differ in different social spaces, but in the end, they confine women to the traditional gendered role of caregiver within the household.

Bourdieu claims that male domination is strengthened by the reduction of biology to nature (2001: 22); in other words, it is a "naturalized social construction" in which the division of labor is guaranteed through the dichotomization of roles in society. In the previous example, Rafal was earning money for his family, and his wife was taking care of their children. This can be considered a "naturalized" result of their sexual division of labor that they didn't need to reconsider. Rahim

was another interviewee who held similar expectations from his wife. In the previous parts of this chapter, Rahim was put forward as a cultural consumer, having bought real paintings to adorn the walls of his factory. Despite his accumulation of cultural capital, he claimed his wife's "housewife" status was a result of a mutual decision, which can be again criticized in terms of Bourdieu's identification of "naturalized social construction". His wife had graduated from a nursing department in Iran, and after she came to Turkey she entered a fashion design department in Ankara, which means she had acquired institutionalized cultural capital in the host society.

What is also striking here is that this emotional capital was expected not only from women with children, in that Maarika had no children, but still her Turkish ex-husband did not want her to work. In this respect, emotional capital was required not only for childcare, as in the cases of Rahim and Rafal, or represented as a result of a mutual decision between husband and wife to look after the children. Maarika said that her ex-husband was a very well-known man in his social environment and had a prestigious position in society, and it was for this reason that he didn't want his wife to work and downgrade their family's social status with a poor career. She hadn't acquired any institutionalized cultural capital (in the form of university diploma) in the host society of Ankara, as she and her ex-husband had decided to get married quickly after they met, at a time when she was waiting for the results of her US visa application in Ankara. For this reason, she became a "prestigious" housewife on the back of her husband's prestigious social position. This is in line with the findings of Delphy, who indicates that marrying a man from a capitalist class does not necessarily lead to a permanent change in status for a woman:

> Even though a marriage with a man from the capitalist class can raise a woman's standard of living, it does not make her a member of that class. She herself does not own the means of production. Therefore her standard of living does not depend on her class relationship to the proletariat; but on her serf relations of production with her husband (Delphy, 1984: 71).

In line with Delphy's finding, Maarika lost her social and class status after they were divorced and had to start her career from the beginning and, becoming a secretary to a well-known businessman with the help of her ex-husband. After a while she quit her job and started to work as an interpreter for trade companies working between Iran and Turkey. According to Sancar (2009), gender is a habitus as much as it is a type of capital, however Maarika's gender capital within the labor market is another story, in that this study doesn't refer to gender as a form of capital, claiming instead that the Iranian habitus is already gendered. The Iranian habitus in Ankara, as seen in these examples above, features a male-centered perspective in which the traditional and patriarchal family structure holds sway. When men are married and running their own businesses, the social status of their wives (such as housewife or employee) doesn't matter, because their marriages are used to maintain a respectful status within the social space, and so can be considered a form of capital. The occupational incorporation of women into the labor market in this case is not considered as essential as men's employment. Of the studied group, two of the male interviewees who earned more than 25,000 Turkish Liras per month (in 2013), and didn't want their wives to work. From their perspective, the wives of upper-class Iranians do not because "they don't have to earn money", although working or building a career is not always related directly with money. Despite expressing a desire for a modern lifestyle similar to Western countries for these male interviewees in particular, this obviously does not extend the incorporation of women into the labor market, and they actually see themselves as protecting their spouses from long working hours.[64]

Last but not least, incorporation into the labor market has the potential to lead to transformations within the family, as has been shown in other studies. For instance, the sexual division of labor changed for some Iranian families after migrating to Sweden, with Iranian women starting to work outside the household.

[64] Here, the gendered habitus of Iranians in Ankara is obviously closer to the traditional Turkish family model and lifestyle, which has patriarchal characteristics of its own.

Darvishpour (2002) found that having a career changed the social position of Iranian women within the family, which was a result of the high capacity of Iranian women in their incorporation into the Swedish culture and the acquisition of economic capital in the host society. Accordingly, the studied women started to become significant decision makers within the household. While Iranian women liked their changing roles, their spouses didn't, and even looked to returning to Iran after feeling their manhood and masculinity had been struck a blow. In another study, Khosravi (2009) states that in Sweden, the masculine identity of Iranian men has been re-negotiated and challenged by Iranian women who seek emancipation after migration. That said, this search for change is not so significant in the Iranian habitus of Ankara, since the traditional patriarchal gender roles aren't as challenging as they are in Sweden. More than half of the interviewees expressed that they had found Turkish culture to be very close to their own in terms of traditions, religion and rituals when compared to other Western cultures, and this could be taken as a proof of this relatively easier incorporation. In this respect, it would seem to be congruent to assert that the Turkish family structure does not represent a major challenge to Iranian migrants living in Ankara in terms of gender relations. In other words, since the family structure of the Iranian culture is closer to that of Turkey (compared to other Western countries), Iranians may not feel the urge to transform their gendered relations or alter or the sexual division of labor, may be an interesting subject for analysis in a future study. In summary, the situation in Ankara influenced strongly the continuity of the gender roles within Iranian culture in terms of the sexual division of labor and emotional capital in feminist Bourdieusian terms.

6.2.2. The Honor of Iranian Men in the Host Society of Ankara

So far, the sexual division of labor and emotional capital within the gendered habitus of Iranians living in Ankara has been discussed, however there are also relationships that form in the social space where Iranian migrants and locals of the host society meet. This section will focus on how the dominancy of honor in Iranian men in the host society is emphasized. For instance, as mentioned in

Chapter 4, Shirin, one of the female Iranian students, said that she had stopped socializing with her Iranian friends on the university campus because they were spying on her and asking her with whom she was meeting when away from her Iranian group, specifically whether she was meeting Turkish men. It is important to note that this was not the case for the male Iranian students, and so the concept of "honor" emerges as a valid issue in the gendered habitus of Iranians in Ankara.

Honor (*namus*) is a complex conceptualization, being a concept that is strongly connected with male control over female sexuality in the eyes of society. It is the "value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society" (Schneider, 2012: 43), or the estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, and also the acknowledgment of the claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride (Julian, 1966: 21). In this respect, any potential or sexual relationship of a woman with an unknown man can be considered a violation of honor that affects mostly the reputation of the male family members of the woman. For this reason, honor is attempted to be protected primarily by the men around woman. In this case, as the examples presented below will demonstrate, honor is synonymous with the control held by Iranian men over women within the Iranian habitus. Confirming Shirin's experience, a number of male interviewees said that it was their (Iranian men's) duty to protect the honor of Iranian women in Ankara, since native people could take advantage of them. Arash was one such man who expressed that Iranian women need their Iranian protection:

> Look, if we don't organize Iranian programs, Iranians will go to other places. They will drink, our (Iranian) girls will come, and other (non-Iranian) men will take them somewhere and they will say a thousand things about Iranian women. They will say, "Look, he took that Iranian girl". This will bring disrepute to our name. In the end, the girl will go out, will drink (alcohol), but if we organize (our own) programs, we can take care of her. No one can bother her there. We will protect her and won't let anyone to disturb her. … If you hear "that girl was Iranian, we went there and they took two Iranian girls". No! We are guests here and we don't want to besmirch our good name.

According to Arash, the sexuality of Iranian women needs to be controlled for the sake of their Iranian name. He considered it normal when Iranian girls go

out and drink, but after drinking, if they leave with a non-Iranian man, then the Iranian name will be dishonored. In this regard, he considered it the duty of Iranian men to protect the honor of Iranian women. Following Bourdieu's explanations of masculine domination, Nye (2013) states that masculinity is considered a natural thing, and is normalized in society as such:

> Masculinity has seemed to us to be a product more of the biological body, a matter of genes and hormones, than of social or familial cultivation. This development stimulates the illusion that masculinity is, finally, a natural thing, not, as I have tried to demonstrate, culture made into nature. But it would be a mistake to regard masculinity as a natural thing. The biology of the gendered body is no less a social construction than the cultural traits whose origins we can ultimately identify in family and cultural life (Bourdieu, 2001: 90; Nye, 2013: 302).

Nye claims that it would be a mistake to call either masculinity or patriarchy a natural thing, although these patriarchal perspectives and masculine practices are often normalized in the gendered habitus of Iranians, like in Arash's example above. It should be noted that honor is not only controlled by men, as women can also be a part of this social control. Maarika, as a divorced women, said that she had been subjected to control by other women since she was single, both in her Iranian habitus and in other social spaces in Turkey. Being a divorced woman is an unwanted situation, as for women who are married "you were seen as a threat towards their marriage". She complained that if a man looks at a woman, the woman is considered guilty for seducing him, rather than man for looking at her. As a result of such accusations, Maarika had stopped attending certain events, such as dances, etc., explaining her situation:

> Sometimes you want to join to an activity, but you can't since you don't have a partner, as people would see it as having another meaning. I'm talking about a typical underdeveloped mentality. I lived alone in other European countries, but I see it here (in Turkey). If there are some wives in an environment who don't know me, then I don't go there. Why? Because I'm a modern-classic person, and with my outfit style, I don't look bad. If a man looks at me, then there will be trouble, whether in Iran or here. After the mullahs came to power in Iran, the country changed so much. They (Iranian women) think "my husband doesn't look, and if he does, it means she must have seduced him". This is how women think. This is so rude, and actually they are humiliating

> themselves. If that man is a real man, and if he signed the marriage papers, then he is yours. We went on a vacation as five girls to a five star hotel in southern Turkey. One of the wives in the garden told my friend to look at her own direction (and seduce her husband). My friend is a very decent person, she would never look at someone's husband. When you have witnessed those things, then you apply limits to yourself.

Here the misogynistic perspective of other women towards Maarika can be considered a result of the reproduction of masculinity, but this time by women, condemning women. Single women in certain environments, as in Maarika's example, have the potential to be seducers of other (married) men, and for this reason could be referred to as dishonorable (*namussuz*) or even a whore (*orospu*). Maarika stopped attending some events due to the potential of being referred to as such. As seen from these examples, the gendered relations within the Iranian habitus and Turkish society apply influence and control over the preferences of Iranian women.

6.2.3. Distinction of Persian Men in Gendered Habitus

Last but not least, this part of the analysis of the gendered habitus will look at Iranian culture, drawing examples from the interviews of both the male and female respondents in the study. Iranian culture in general, and Persian culture in particular, is on the whole respectful of women in society. Many interviewees said that although the social positon of women in Turkey seems better, the status of women in Iranian families is stronger, and women face more violence in Turkey. Parisa, who was working as a volunteer Farsi language teacher at a university in Ankara, made a comparison of the two cultures:

> In Iran, men are generally more respectful of women, despite social pressure, contempt and the secondary position of women before the law … In Turkey, women are equal in the eye of the law, but families exploit them. In Iran, a woman has half the rights of a man in every sense, for example, heritage, but families value them and respect their rights. In this way, Iran is much better, especially the Persian area, where they value women very much. This is due to the culture that was transmitted from the pre-revolution era. In Iran, women have a secondary position before the law, but here (in Turkey), women have a

> secondary position in people's eyes. There, in Iran, femicide is very low when compared to here.

Comparisons of how women are treated in Turkey and Iran were made by many of the female interviewees, some of whom expressed specifically the distinction between the Persian and Turkish cultures. For instance, Banu's mother, who was an Azerbaijani, said that Turkish and Azerbaijani men are considerably different to Persian men:

> We are Turkish Azerbaijani, and we are like you, but Persian men understand women's souls. Out of ten Persian men, only one treats his wife badly, but in Turkey one in every two Turkish men is bad to his wife. Turkish and Iranian Azerbaijani men are similar.

For Banu's mother, aside from the distinction between the Iranian and Turkish habitus, there is also an ethnic hierarchy among Azerbaijani and Persian Iranians that will be analyzed in the following section. The poor treatment and violence towards women in Turkey was expressed many times during the interviews, by both the female and male respondents, with all saying that the situation in Turkey was worse than in Iran for women. For instance, Arash said that despite the Islamic revolution and the bad situation in Iran, the position of women was still strong: "When you look at history, governments destroyed everything in Iran but the power of women. There is no such thing as women's power in Turkey. Just because your hair is uncovered, it doesn't mean freedom." Despite the patriarchal structure in general, and the similarities between Iran and Turkey, both the male and female interviewees thought that there was a clear distinction between the two countries in terms of gender relations. The examples can be added to, but Kaisa's statement below will suffice, since her explanation covered the majority of the thoughts of the other interviewees:

> The men in Turkey are not easy to live with. In Iran, men are more polite to women. Here, men are more likely to cheat on their spouse, drink too much or become violent towards their women. In Iran, women are very dominant at home, but here in Turkey women are very nurturing (*anaç*). Of course Eastern women are devoted to their children, but Iranian women don't ruin themselves cleaning the home or for their children. Of course, children find food when they come home, but women don't sit and made pastries all the time. In Iran,

> women don't ruin themselves for the house, but here, Turkish women devote themselves to their husbands and children.

The male hegemony and the secondary position of women in Turkey, especially in the home, were at the center of many of the interviewees' critiques. Sharing Kaisa's view, Sabra said: "You see very modern women, but they serve their husbands. We can be housewives, but our husbands don't expect such treatment from us. Women are at home by the time her husband arrives, and she serves his dinner when he comes". As seen from these examples, the gendered habitus of Iranians distinguishes their lifestyles from the gendered habitus of the host society in terms of the positioning of women in the social space, and this distinction reinforces their belongingness to their Iranian habitus in Ankara, despite the existence of ethnic distinctions. The following section will focus on the ethnic distinctions within the Iranian habitus raised by the interviewees.

6.3. Ethnic and Religious Distinctions within the Iranian Habitus

This section will present some of the more specific distinctions of the ethnic diversity within the Iranian habitus. While ethnic diversities are not the main focus of this study, their influence on ethnic distinctions were very significant in some of the interviews. An overview of the ethnic diversities and religious minorities in Iran is presented in Chapter 3. According to some writers, religion can on some occasions be considered an ethnic division (Ngarachu, 2014), and within this study, Baha'i or Sunni Iranians can be considered different ethnicities since they don't belong to the majority Shia Muslim population. Interviews were conducted with people of different ethnic identities, such as Turkmens, Assyrians, Sunnis, Baha'i and also Azerbaijanis, and for different reasons that are presented in Chapters 4 and 5, these mentioned ethnic diversities or religious minorities face different forms of exclusion or discrimination in Iran. What is striking here is that despite the different ethnic identities coming from Iran, the Iranian migrants have constructed an Iranian habitus in Ankara in which they represent similar characteristics and unity. Of particular note here are the Nowruz celebrations,

which strengthen the sense of belongingness of the documented Iranian migrant community and the habitus in the host society of Ankara. That said, there were a number of ethnic distinctions mentioned during the interviews that deeply influence the unity of the Iranian habitus in Ankara. For instance, Maarika had a Persian background, and talking about her cultural background:

> I need to explain this by making a distinction between the Azerbaijani and Persian cultures, because in Turkey there are very few Persian Iranians who come from Shiraz or Tehran. Most Persian people come here to obtain a visa, and stay here when their application is denied. I kindly ask you to look at the people you have interviewed: typical Azerbaijani people are culturally very different, as is their lifestyle. We, as Persians, have both traditional and modern families, but people who were raised in typical Azerbaijani families, whether from a rural or city background, the majority are traditional. Persian people don't give their daughters as brides to Azerbaijani people. I don't say that as a good or bad thing, I just say that that's the way it is, there is a huge cultural difference. It is the customs, habits, lifestyle, life perspective, the food they eat, the vacations they go on that are different. I am talking about it for the first time to you. I'm proud to be Persian. My poems and my culture are studied in universities in America. You can't find any warriors among my people, they are moderate and positive. I don't talk about exceptions, but I always tell Azerbaijani people that they are number one in trading.

Maarika made the distinction between the Azerbaijani and Persian cultures, and voiced her pride in her culture in no uncertain terms. The details she provided of the distinctions between the two cultures were very striking, and Maarika expressed a whole distinct Persian habitus while counting the differences stemming from the customs, habits, lifestyles, life perspectives, foods and even vacations. It is obvious that she considers Persian culture to be superior to that of Azerbaijan, and it was a significant reference for many of the interviewees, with roots dating back to the Persian Empire that started in 550 BC until it was interrupted by the Islamic conquest in 651 AD. Persian history was often brought up by the interviewees who attested that the religion of Islam has dominated for the last couple of decades, while the glory of the Persian culture comes from earlier times. They also sought to distinguish Persian culture from the implementations of

Islamic Republic, so as to reinforce the idea that they are different and hence deserve better lives and lifestyle.

Maarika wasn't the only interviewee who made distinctions between ethnic diversities. Although not Azerbaijani, Kasia distinguished between two types of Azerbaijanis, since most of the Iranian migrants living in Turkey belonged to the Azerbaijani Iranian group:

> There are two types of Azeri people; first group is a separatist one that doesn't like Iran, and condemns it for assaulting Azerbaijani people, while the other group is like everyone everywhere, for instance, in our group of friends there are also Azerbaijani people like that. In our group there are Kurdish, Azerbaijani, Persian and Assyrian people, but the first group of Azerbaijanis I mentioned does not like us. They want to separate Iran into two, where one group would be Turkish and the other would be Kurdish, with the intention being to unite with Azerbaijan as a big Turkish group. We also have Azerbaijani people in our group, and you met them that night [Nowruz Party], but they are not that type of Azerbaijani. Those (separatist) Azeri people met up in another hotel that night.

Kasia's classification of Azerbaijani people into two groups, being separatist and normal, was very distinctive. According to her, the nationalist ones are harmful to Iran, as well as to the Iranian migrant groups in Ankara. In pointing out that the (separatist) group of Azerbaijani Iranians organized another party at a different hotel, she is stating that they are not part of the mentioned Iranian habitus, since they attach themselves more to the Turkish identity. While Kasia pointed out the basic ethnic differences between Persian and Azerbaijani Iranians, Sabra added another dimension to this picture by expressing that she had not witnessed any struggle or conflict among the Persian and Azerbaijani people, since they were both Shia. That said, as a Turkmen and Sunni Muslim, she said that she wasn't very welcome in Iran, and faced pressure or sometimes even discrimination:

> For instance, the people who took power in the government are mostly Azerbaijani, which is due to the fact that they are more numerous than Persian people, and since they are Shia, they support each other. They don't call you Azerbaijani or Persian there, in that they refer to everyone rather as Shia Muslim. Turkmens, on the other hand, come under pressure as Sunni Muslims, and are sometimes not even recognized as Muslim by some and asked whether they fast in Ramadan. For instance

> if there are two available positions in state, they would much prefer Persian or Shia people. Persian and Azerbaijani people, on the other hand, don't have any struggle between them since they are both Shia.

Sabra, a Sunni Turkmen, said the influence of religious identity was a highly determining factor in positioning within society, but added that she had never felt discrimination within her environment and in daily either in Iran or in Turkey. This religious influence was also mentioned by Sami in Chapter 4.

> I am Sunni and so is my family ... Being Sunni means second class citizenship. My father has never been promoted to the top position in the place he worked, he always remained as the deputy to the man in charge ... I will settle my family here and then I will start living my life after that.

Sami initially wanted to migrate with his family due to their religious identity, which had made it hard for them to live in Iran, as he said that his family felt safer in Turkey due to their Sunni Islam background. Despite the ethnic and religious diversities mentioned thus far, some of the interviewees said that they had never faced discrimination by other Iranian migrants within the Iranian habitus in Ankara. This was due mostly to the fact that since they had constructed their belongingness through their Iranian habitus in Ankara, their nationality as Iranian became more important, encouraging them to unite rather than construct differences such as the ethnic distinctions mentioned above.

6.4. Dispositions of Migration and Symbolic Power of the United States

Thus far in the chapter, discussions have been opened related to the main dispositions of gender, class and ethnicity within the Iranian habitus. This final part will present dispositions of migration of documented Iranians in order to give a brief and general overview about their preferences. Although some of the general characteristics of the Iranian habitus discussed previously will be repeated here, this part will also present a summary of the preferences of Iranian migrants related to their lifestyle after migration. Before providing more information about these dispositions, it may be useful to remind that the accumulation of different forms

of capital is useful for identifying the Iranian migrants' positioning within the field and habitus. For the case of the documented Iranian migrants in Ankara, it is clear that they have held both economic and cultural capital since the beginning of their migration, and these accumulations are important since they shape the possibilities and choices as Bourdieu puts it:

> This classificatory system, which is the product of the internalization of the structure of social space, in the form in which it impinges through the experience of a particular position in that space, is, within the limits of economic possibilities and impossibilities (…) the generator of practices adjusted to the regularities inherent in a condition. It continuously transforms necessities into strategies and constraints into preferences, and, without any mechanical determination, it generates the set of "choices" constituting life-styles, which derive their meaning, i.e., their value, from their position in a system of oppositions and correlations (Bourdieu, 2010a: 175).

This last part which focuses on international migration experiences of documented Iranians, considers the act of "migration" as a strategy to fulfil their necessity to achieve a "better life and a lifestyle" outside Iran. In other words, international migration is used as a strategy to transform the constraints of documented Iranians. The differences between the Iranian students and settled Iranians in the study have not been indicated within this chapter, due mainly to the statuses of temporary and permanent documented Iranians, which were in continuity with each other rather than in conflict. In other words, the explanations and dispositions of Iranian students and settled Iranians were very congruent with each other, aside from one big difference. While the majority of students aimed to continue their documented migration process in another country, the settled Iranians had already decided to stay in Turkey. This very much influenced their perspective and critical standpoint in regards to the host country of Turkey. There was a common thought among the Iranian migrants in the beginning that the majority of interviewees didn't think of Turkey as their final destination, but rather as a "stepping stone" to Western countries. Roxane, who came to Turkey as a student and decided to stay for good, expressed her thoughts about the country:

> Yes, actually we saw Turkey as a jump. I mean, we thought that it would be easier to come to Turkey and continue to some other place from here, mostly to (North) America. My uncle told me that it was hard to go to the United States for a bachelor's degree and that it would be better for me to go there after that.

Taking the advice of her uncle didn't work for Roxane, and she enrolled on a doctoral program in an Ankara university. At the time of the interview she said that she didn't have the energy to start over in a new country due to her age and the many years spent in Turkey, but when we met again three years after her interview in 2016, she said that she had once again started to think of going to the United States because she wanted to try it. This shows once again that students have more potential to be mobile and to change places than settled Iranians in Ankara, since their cultural capital has not yet been converted into economic capital in the host country. Sami is another Iranian student who can be given as an example of this mobility. As mentioned in the previous parts, he wanted to be close to his family in Iran, and if he could find the opportunity in the future, he wanted to bring his family next to him. In this respect, Turkey seemed to be a very good option for him and his family, and he believed they could easily incorporate into Turkish society, given their Sunni background. That said, Sami didn't see the future of Turkey as promising:

> Everybody wants to stay in their own country. You can go abroad for education but still you want to be around your family. But Turkey's future is not certain. There is the possibility of civil war, but I have big dreams. Maybe life changes them, I don't know. Maybe things will change back in Iran. Everything is possible.

These big dreams were about his future, and although he wanted to stay in Turkey, he said that he would continue to other countries if the circumstances in Turkey declined. That said, when the cultural capital of Iranian migrants is converted into economic capital in Turkey, in other words, when they start to earn a living in the host country, it becomes much harder for them to leave and continue their migration. In this respect, it can be observed that the Iranian migrants' definitions and perceptions of themselves within the current host society have

changed, and their criticisms of Turkey have softened, which can be considered a strategy of their incorporation into Ankara, Turkey as seen in the Iranian habitus.

Those who have no chance of continuing their migration, or have found an adequate reason to stay in Ankara tend to soften their complaints about the host country. Nye explains why this adaptation within the habitus occurs: "Expectations from the past seldom fit exactly with existing opportunities. There is a dynamic of adaptation and adjustment. Some degree of change is almost always occurring" (Nye, 2013: 32). This can explain why the Iranian students were so steadfast in their critiques of Turkey, in that they still have the chance to continue their migration to Western countries and so they have no need to adapt or change their expectations. In Bourdieusian terms, their *illusio* of a "better life outside Iran" is still valid and unchanged, while settled Iranians must adjust and adapt their previous expectations. This shows once again that Turkey was not the primary target for most of the documented Iranian migrants at the beginning of their migration process, but that it is still important for those who cannot continue migration. When all other options are eliminated, Turkey starts to be seen as a feasible choice. One of the settled interviewees, Arman, expressed the general perspective about migration to Turkey and other countries in the West:

> It is still a good option to come to Turkey as there is still a non-visa regulation for Iranians and it's the most developed one among our other neighbors in the Middle East. It's also very close to Iran in a cultural sense. Turkish people are good, hospitable. Iranians come here, they establish a business and they stay here. Iranians who have money or who win the green card lottery go to [the United States of] America. America is the cradle of world science! It collects all the good brains, especially Iranians. Europe is not preferred, as people get depressed there. Their houses are very small, in Iran we are used to big houses. You hear stories, people are living in Norway for many years or in Denmark, and then you see their houses are very small. You work for many years for that [little house]! They live in a place where six to nine months of the year are winter. They get happy and say "I'm in Norway". There are also still nationalists in Europe. For Iranians, the United States, Canada, Australia and England are the best choices.

This statement provides further clues to the lifestyle preferences and tastes within the Iranian habitus in the field of international migration. First of all, it can

be seen once again that Turkey is not considered an ideal destination to settle for Iranians, despite being considered a good option due to its easy visa regulations or its geographical and cultural proximity to Iran. Apart from that, Arman says that there is a distinction between Iranians with significant economic capital who mostly prefer to go to the United States, and who do not consider Turkey as a place for settlement, and those without, who stay in Turkey. It can thus be understood that at the beginning, staying in Turkey was seen as a symbolic drop in status, or a kind of an unspoken failure, and so if Iranians decide to stay in Turkey, then they need to change their perspectives about the country.

Arman's depiction of the United States as the best option as a destination country was again significant. Although various forms of capital can be acquired in different Western countries, it has been observed from many interviews in Ankara that the United States has symbolically become the most important migration destination for Iranian migrants. To put it differently, although the United States was considered a better place for Iranians in terms of maximizing on acquired capital (such as scientific capital, economic capital, etc.), these forms of capital were (and still are) valid in other Western countries as well. Accordingly, it was the size of the houses, the weather and the xenophobia that were given as reasons for Europe's insufficiency as a destination country. Chapter 3 provides more information about how the United States is perceived among Iranians, but it may be useful here to repeat the dominant perspectives about the United States among the migrants of the Iranian habitus in Ankara, for whom the United States represents their Western lifestyle ideals in contrast to their lives in Iran. These Western ideals, from their perspective, are conceptualized as secularism, democracy and individual freedom, although acquiring sufficient economic capital and being able to spend it freely (the American dream) is important as well. There is potential here for a future study analyzing whether or not those dreams and ideals came true for Iranian migrants who migrated to the United States, as obviously this falls outside the scope of this study. What is certain here is that the pre-expectations of the migrants who have settled in Turkey have not been fully satisfied, since some still mention the United States. Rahim, however, was among

the minorities who are happy not to go to other Western countries. The concept of *illusio* would again remind us here that the reason why Iranian emigrants left their home country was to search for a better life and a desired lifestyle that they could rebuild in another country, but form the interviews conducted in Ankara, it could be understood that Turkey cannot be considered as an ideal host country for fulfilling their expectations.

These expectations do not have to be related directly with economic and cultural capital, since the study has already stated that these two capital forms are valid from the beginning of their migration experience. Hence, it is the lack of symbolic capital that cannot be acquired by the Iranian migrants in the host society of Ankara, since their current life is not similar to the idealized lifestyle in United States, which has been identified as a political battle in previous chapters. Consequently, due to the constraints of achieving this deserved lifestyle, the documented Iranians who stayed in Turkey had to transform their negative views of the circumstances in the country into positive perspectives, which can be read as a livelihood strategy for living and incorporating into Ankara, Turkey.

This issue of the transformation of constraints into more positive views was discussed by Arman. Although the Iranian habitus refers mostly to those in advantageous positions (those who are documented and have already accumulated different forms of capital, rather than undocumented Iranians), the lack of prestigious status or "symbolic capital" that is recognized by the host society was highly significant for his situation. Arman said that he had not risen to a prestigious position due to his profession and its symbolic recognition in Turkey:

> Here, people say: "After all, he is just a dentist. Let it go!" In Iran it is impossible to find a dentist! In Iran I haven't gone to a bank even once, they always do my stuff for me. I go to Iran and I can't stay at home for a day; my friends always invite me, they take appointments months before I go there, but in Turkey it is not like that. I started studying here the year I came from Iran; other people [Iranians] usually hang around for two to three years. … I was expecting to open a dental surgery and have patients start to come immediately, but after opening an office here, it didn't happen quickly. Furthermore, patients are different here. Once I told my patient to spit into cuspidor, but he didn't know what a cuspidor was, so he spat in my face. You cannot find such patients in

> Iran. … If I had stayed in Iran I would be much more successful. It is incomparably clear. I would be more successful in America as well.

Arman got quite angry when telling his story, because although he has acquired a certain level of cultural and economic capital in Turkey, he has been unable to reach his expected level (recognition by society). He was very disappointed to hear, "After all, he is just a dentist". Such comments made him dissatisfied with his social position in Turkey, along with his inability to attain the expected or desired lifestyle that he had left Iran for. On the other hand, when asked whether his dissatisfaction would cause him to leave Turkey, he said that he was neither happy nor unhappy, but was just muddling along, but that he would continue living in Turkey, as he had made promises to his patients in Ankara and also to himself not to let them down. "I will stay here because my patients need to reach me whenever they want, even at 2 am in the morning. I can't let them down." It can thus be concluded that staying in Turkey was his own decision, and that making this promise was a significant strategy in his efforts to transform constrains into benefits, in that he wanted to show that he has the capacity to *choose* either to stay or to go.

Another significant incorporation strategy of Iranian migrants within the habitus was expressed by an Iranian student, Payam, who was studying the Iranian diaspora in different parts of the world, and had analyzed the general characteristics of especially Iranian migrants in Turkey:

> I have done some researches on the diaspora. Iranians, almost all immigrants try to be themselves (not lose their culture) but adjust to the new condition and culture better than others. If you go to their homes, they design it like they would in Iran, with carpets etc., but when they go to their office, they try to speak without an accent. They try to behave like native people. Sometimes they change the colors of their eyes or hair, even men do that! They even change their first name to try to be accepted by native people of the host country, especially in the United States. It's OK to try to do your best, to show that you want to adapt, but why try to speak like the natives? You are from another part of the world! They should be honored that you learn their language. I want to show that I'm an Iranian person in Turkey; I am civilized, I can be your friend and we can have a safe relationship. I'm a human being

> in front of you, but I'm still Iranian! I'm just an ordinary man that comes from there.

According to Payam, in general Iranian migrants around the world want to adapt to the host society so well that they are not seen as migrants, but for Payam, people dying their hair (men included) or trying to drop their Iranian accent at work was taking it too far. However, Iranian migrants' houses are often decorated display their Iranian culture and cultural capital, featuring Iranian carpets etc., as was the case with Kaisa's house shown at the beginning of this chapter. In contrast, Payam wanted to show to his host environment that he was a civilized Iranian living in Turkey, and had no need to change his physical appearance or pretend to be native. Maarika, a settled Iranian, made similar comments about adapting to a country, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, and so it is apparent that the incorporation capacity and endeavors within the Iranian habitus is another significant characteristic both for Iranian students and settled Iranians. Speaking about incorporation into a host society, Maarika said:

> You have to take the road [of adaptation] slowly, digesting the process. You have to join the people in society and understand their culture. When you understand what they value, they quickly embrace you. I don't mean being like them. While feeling your own culture and existence, you should sense them [host culture] and let these two things go in parallel to each other. I think I have succeeded in doing this. Develop yourself, but don't change (your identity)! I maintain my own mentality, but respect you as well.

This adaptation to the host society while preserving the cultural capital acquired in the home country was highly significant in the Iranian habitus, as can be understood from these examples. Nowruz celebrations can be given as a further example of this change and the preservation of cultural identity. Iranian migrants give much importance to preserving their home culture in the host society, and one of the interviewees, Rahim, even expressed that they wanted their children to get married to another Iranian in Turkey to ensure their cultural heritage will be maintained: "Staying away from your own culture is not right at all, we won't be here after three generations, and then they can decide what they want for themselves." Rahim said that their children could decide for themselves after three

generations, but until then he would be intervening in their decisions. In this respect, Rahim saw endogamy as a strategy for the preservation of their cultural heritage in the host society, but said that his children should study at Turkish schools rather than Iranian schools in Ankara in order to fully incorporate into the host society, as mentioned in more detail in Chapter 5.

The examples and statements presented in this last part are provided to shed light on the perceptions, thoughts and actions of (documented) Iranian migrants living in Ankara, with the intention being to understand their migration motivations. Together with the previous parts, which focused on the middle-class, gendered and ethnic habitus, this chapter has made a brief analysis of the dispositions of the Iranian habitus and the distinctions constructed in Ankara, including the conflicting examples of undocumented migrants and the locals of the host society. Their perceived *deserved* lifestyles, aesthetic tastes and expectations have been stated as a result of their accumulated capital (of different forms), which, at the same time, induced the transformation of constraints of symbolic capital into strategies in the host society of Ankara, Turkey.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This study has focused on a specific group of documented Iranians who have come to Ankara, Turkey to settle on an either temporary or permanent basis. The author has attempted to comprehend their objectives, their accumulations of different forms of capital and their expectations within the field of international migration through the use of the conceptual tools established by Bourdieu. To gain a detailed view and understanding of the issue, the perceptions of the migrants themselves were collected through interviews, the results of which were then analyzed. The analysis revealed that the respondents chose to migrate not only for economic reasons, as the majority of the group had cultural and economic capital before beginning their migration, as there was also a desire among them to "search for a better life and a more Western lifestyle". By Western lifestyle, some specific distinctions in the way the West is perceived were implied by the Iranian migrants, such as secularism, democracy, economic opportunities and individual rights, as discussed particularly in Chapters 4 and 5. Accordingly, this study asserts that what they seek in general, and in Ankara in particular, is a lifestyle that they are unable to find in Iran. In this respect, it can be said that documented Iranians are engaged in a political battle for a lifestyle. The intention in this study has been to better understand their strategies in the acquisition of different forms of capital (economic, cultural and social) in the host society, and their ultimate goal of acquiring the symbolic capital that would enable them to live the life they desire. These strategies have been used mostly in "status passage" processes, during which Iranian migrants commonly faced bureaucratic problems, as will be explained below. With the accumulation of different forms of capital in the host society of Ankara, documented Iranian migrants have been able to structure a significant habitus, presented here as an "Iranian habitus" by the author. This Iranian habitus,

which is analyzed in Chapter 6, takes into account their dispositions, aesthetic tastes and values related to their current lives, and helps Iranian migrants to distinguish between their lifestyle perceptions and those of the people around them, including both Iranian and Turkish people. Analyzing their Iranian habitus in the host society of Ankara provided the author with the answer the question of whether they thought they had achieved a better life and lifestyle in Ankara, and on what basis.

As mentioned in the Introduction, qualitative research methods were employed in the study, with data about the documented Iranian migrants garnered from semi-structured in-depth interviews and participant observation. Given the significance of the perceptions of the Iranian migrants, a "narrative inquiry" methodology was used in the thesis that relied on the migration stories of the participants, with the assumption that they use such stories to interpret their lived experiences about the past and the present. In total, 31 interviews were conducted with both Iranian students and settled Iranians in Ankara between January 2012 and April 2013. Ankara is important for the case of Iranian migrants, in that it is known that documented migrants reside mostly in larger cities and, what's more, the participants of this study consider the capital city to be a more secure and manageable city in which to live than some of Turkey's other large metropolises, such as Istanbul. Last but not least, while the majority of migration studies in Turkey focus either on asylum seekers or migration experiences in Istanbul, the documented migrants in the capital city of Ankara have to date been understudied, and this study attempts to contribute to filling this gap.

Documented Iranian migrants constitute a unique group due to their accumulations of different forms of capital and their lifestyle perceptions. As can be seen throughout the interviews, the majority of participants came to Turkey with a significant volume of economic and cultural capital, which has had an obvious influence on their strategies while incorporating into the host society. Accordingly, the main question raised in this study has been formulized as: What are the roles of the different strategies and forms of capital used by documented Iranians to achieve better lives and lifestyles in the host society of Ankara? Finding

an answer to this question would also help to reply to the initial question mentioned above of whether they think they have achieved a better lifestyle in Ankara, and why. Before concluding this thesis, it would be helpful to present the findings reached throughout the chapters.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the introduction chapter, a study was made of two groups of documented Iranians in Ankara. First of all, Iranian students who came to Turkey for educational purposes were selected as an interviewee group. The temporary nature of their permitted residency, being tied to their education, as well as their observations and evaluations of their migration experiences and Turkey offered a unique perspective, in that they could comment only on their short-term experiences in the country, unlike those with longer residency. The second group comprised settled Iranians, who reside in Ankara on a permanent basis. The reasons why they chose Turkey, the opportunities it presents as a destination country and their acquisition of different forms of capital were instrumental in answering the second question given above, which asked whether they thought they had achieved better lives. It was found that these two groups were like a "continuity" of each other, in that while the Iranian students were evaluating the option of settling in Turkey, the majority of settled Iranians had studied in Turkey before making a decision to settle. More information about the interviewees is given in Chapter 1.

A general overview of the numbers and status of Iranian migrants in different parts of the world and in Turkey is given in Chapter 2, from which it can be understood that highly skilled Iranians constitute a significant proportion of international migrants, and that they command a high volume of economic capital since they are able to cover the cost of their educational and other expenses in the host society for many years. The numbers and information presented in the chapter emphasize further the importance of looking at documented Iranian migrants in Turkey, in particular due to the limited number of studies on this issue to date. This chapter also presents details of the Foreigner Law and the legal options available to migrants in Turkey over the years that influenced the settlement processes of Iranian migrants and pushed them to develop strategies to achieve

legal permits in Turkey. For instance, since obtaining a work permit can be very difficult in Turkey, obtaining a diploma from within the host society has proven to be a worthwhile strategy when attempting to incorporate into the labor market, rather than relying on a diploma from the home country to open doors to employment. As can be seen from the interviews, due to the poor implementation of the Foreigner Law for documented migrants, most Iranian students look to continue their migration to Western countries after receiving education in Turkey, while those who decide to settle in Ankara after education use their social capital and social networks to overcome some of the bureaucratic barriers faced in the host society.

The theoretical approach of this study is discussed in Chapter 3, which includes also a discussion of literature on international migration theories, although the mentioned theories of international migration do not correspond with the aim of this study, since international migration is used as an instrument for achieving a better life and a desired lifestyle. In this respect, by drawing upon the sociological approach and conceptual tools of Bourdieu, a path was opened in this migration research to look closely at highly skilled migrants who attempt to acquire different forms of capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic). Furthermore, the concept of 'field' helps in Chapter 3 in the definition of international migration as an entity that commands its own rules and capacities, in which Iranian migrants and other agents (such as institutions with a role in migration) are represented. Bourdieu uses the metaphor of "battlefield" to describe the field in which the agents, including the Iranian migrants in the study, struggling against each other for better positions. Similar to this metaphor, within the field of international migration, the Iranian migrants who have taken up positions within that field in Ankara are trying to achieve better positions and achieve their ultimate aim, in other words, their *illusio* to the initial interest that made them enter the field, being to search for a "better lifestyle outside Iran" in the field of international migration. In other words, their quest is to rebuild their *desired* and *deserved* lifestyles in a host country.

Emphasis on these perceptions of "desired" and "deserved" are again crucial in this part. The majority of the interviewees, with no distinction in age, gender or ethnicity, expressed that they were unhappy with the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran and its global image. Their main complaint was the influence of the authoritarianism government on personal freedoms, especially in the public space, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. As stated in Chapters 3 and 6, most of the interviewees were proud of their Persian heritage, and stressed that it could not be reduced to the last thirty seven years or so. Some of the participants recalled the reign of the Shah as being better than today, given that relations with Western countries were closer and society in Iran was more "modern and secular". However, this period is also known for its undemocratic and authoritarian government, where only a small group of privileged people were able to benefit. Either for this or for other reasons, but mostly for their hatred of the Islamic Republic period of Iran, most believed that they had seen and lived better days and lives in Iran prior to 1979. Accordingly, they believe that they *desire* and they have already *earned* this better life outside Iran, and so migration is used as an instrument for the rebuilding of this *deserved* life and desired lifestyle in another country, which can also be considered a political battle. This reinforced the assumption that, in Bourdieusian terms, most of the interviewees that participated in the study were seeking symbolic capital in the host society that they thought they has lost in their home country. This symbolic capital is closely related also to the acquisition of economic and cultural capital. In this respect, the struggle of Iranian migrants is symbolic as well as economic and cultural.

In other parts of the world, studies have analyzed the migration experiences of Iranians within a diasporic approach due to the distinctions they construct in the host society as a migration group. However, the group of Iranian migrants discussed in the present study didn't dwell upon their Iranian backgrounds in the host society, but rather emphasized the similarities between the Turkish and Iranian cultures to play down their migrant statuses. What's more important here is that they seek to rebuild a lifestyle in the host society that they assumed they had lost with the Islamic revolution in Iran, and this lifestyle is influenced by the

symbolically dominant image of the United States as a destination country. On this point, the sociological approach and concepts of Bourdieu, being illusio, field, habitus and different forms of capital, have been congruent in unveiling the accumulations, struggles and expectations in their international migration experience. Using the conceptual tools of Bourdieu to analyze experiences of international migration is a quite new and unique approach in both sociological research and migration studies. This method helped the study to comprehend the migration experience from a sociological perspective, in which migration is an outcome of a search for a better life and lifestyle that is influenced by both the capitals and strategies developed by the Iranians.

At this conjuncture, it should be mentioned that the United States had a special symbolic importance for the majority of the interviewed Iranian migrants, based in part on the a huge Iranian community in Los Angeles California that has been dubbed "Tehrangeles". How the interviewees represented the city in particular, and the country in general, was quite remarkable. Arman, for example, said: "The weather, people, money, houses and even scientific knowledge is better there", and said that "the United States knows the value of Iranians". In this regard, the symbolic power of the United States as a destination country is clearly evident. Chapter 4 also analyzed the experiences of Iranian students in Ankara, finding once more that most planned to go to the United States for their further graduate studies. It should be noted that the families of the Iranian students were very influential in the educational decisions of their children, for example, when choosing universities, countries, and even the subjects to study. Chapter 4 identifies a direct relationship between the emotional and financial support supplied by the family and the success of their children. Moreover, their chosen fields of study group around certain occupations that are considered prestigious in Turkey and Iran, such as medicine, engineering (including computer engineering) and natural sciences.

What was also interesting in the case of Iranian students is coming to Turkey for educational purposes granted them a certain amount of immediate institutionalized cultural capital. This is a very significant strategy for documented

Iranians, in that when they start their lives in the host country through education, they not only socialize with the locals, but also ease their "status passages" after completing their studies, which means easier incorporation into the labor market. In addition, while socializing with local students in the host society, they also acquire "language capital" by learning the language of the host society. It has been acknowledged that most Iranian students in Ankara acquired their language capital through socialization (rather than courses), and only two of the thirteen respondents asked to conduct the interview in English. This indicates that the majority of the Iranian students acquired the language capital of the host society, and socializing with local people also allowed them to acquire (embodied) cultural capital in the host society. When all these forms of capital are considered, the students seem to have a distinct advantage over the undocumented migrants in terms of their ability to incorporate into Turkish society.

The concept of "'status passage", which has been discussed in depth throughout this study, briefly defines the passage in status from "student/unemployed" into "employed", although whether they want to settle in Turkey constitutes another dimension. The majority of the interviewed students said that they didn't want to settle in Turkey for various reasons, but one of the main reasons expressed by the students was that they didn't see Turkey's future to be very promising due to its growing resemblance to Iran. In other words, many of them expressed that they saw political and cultural similarities between Iran and Turkey in terms of the decreasing secularity in Turkey, and they fear these developments may diminish individual freedoms in terms of lifestyle. Alternatively, they consider Western countries in general, and the United States in particular, as being a more desirable destinations, especially for the potential of their accumulated economic and cultural capitals. In this respect, their perceptions of Turkey as a destination country were, on the whole, not positive. Only two students out of thirteen made plans to settle in Turkey, and both had special reasons, such as family.

If this is the general perception held by Iranian students, then one may ask why there are settled Iranians still living in Ankara. Most of the settled Iranians

decided to stay in Turkey after completing their studies, so what was it that made them stay? When asked, most of the settled Iranians said that staying in Turkey had not been their initial intention, and some claimed that they had not even considered didn't consider either studying or staying in Turkey when they first arrived, having come primarily to apply for a US visa. It was when their applications were rejected that they started to consider Turkey as a destination country, though it should be noted that none of the settled Iranians identified their migration stories as a failure or an unlucky accident, which actually reveals their self-perceptions, as will be re-covered below. Most of the settled Iranians came for similar reasons, chiefly to study in Ankara or accompanying their spouses. The latter group comprised mostly Iranian women who migrated to Ankara from Iran after marrying an Iranian man. There are only two exceptions in this settled group, one being an Iranian man who came to work in the Iranian Embassy as a cook and was unable to acquire (institutionalized) cultural capital in Turkey, and another Iranian who fled his home country for political reasons.

These settlement stories are crucial for this study, in that similar to the Iranian students covered above, they indicate that settling in Turkey was generally not the initial objective. Their reasons for staying are covered extensively in Chapter 5, but they can be summarized in Bourdieusian terms as, first of all, a lack of volume of capital that stopped them from migrating to Western countries; and secondly, the status passage that they made in the host society, in other words, their occupational incorporation in Turkey. The lack of volume of capital mentioned here refers to the lack of either enough economic capital to try to move on to other Western Countries, or sufficient social capital (networks and connections) that would help them to arrange other destinations. As previously stated, most already had a certain level of economic and cultural capital when they had first arrived to Turkey for educational purposes, in that most of the interviewees were being supported by their families during their education, but as mentioned in Chapter 6, although most of the interviewees are middle class, they said that they lacked the capital to move on to Western countries. Furthermore, if they lacked the necessary volume of social and economic capital to help them migrate to Western countries, as they

desired, then the only option left is to try to win an education scholarship within the host countries, which is usually a very competitive challenge. For this reason, it would be fair to say that those who ended up in Turkey held limited volumes of capital.

Chapter 5 divided the status passage processes of the settled Iranian interviewees under four different subtitles depending on their occupations following university (institutionalized cultural capital); ethnic backgrounds (embodied cultural capital acquired at home); new entrepreneur opportunities; and migrants who remained outside the labor market (mostly Iranian women). Under the first three of these four headings, how embodied and institutionalized cultural capital is converted into economic capital is presented. The last group who remained outside the labor market were mostly women who stayed at home to look after the children, who converted their acquired embodied cultural capital into emotional capital in the household by fulfilling the emotional needs of the children and their husbands.

What is remarkable when looking at the experiences of settled Iranians in their status passages is that, despite the existence of a "work permit" in the Turkish Labor Law (No: 4857), it is very difficult for documented migrants to acquire one. Sooner or later they attempt to obtain Turkish citizenship and to reach permanent positions, in that all the participants who didn't have Turkish citizenship shared a fear of insecurity, although they had already spent many years in the country. Obtaining Turkish citizenship is not an easy process, and at this point, social capital acquired in the host society emerges as a critical element among Iranian migrants in overcoming bureaucratic barriers. It was acknowledged throughout the interviews that some of the participants had applied for Turkish citizenship more than once, and were only granted it after calling upon their social connections to help. Under Turkish Law, foreigners who have a Turkish background can apply directly for Turkish citizenship without any work history in the country. However, the Azerbaijani Iranians interviewed, although of Turkish descent, said that their experience in this regard hadn't been easy at all. Nonetheless, as can be seen in the tables of demographic information of the Iranian migrants in Chapters 1 and 5,

most of the settled Iranians were finally granted Turkish citizenship. As one of the interviewees declared: "You need to get Turkish citizenship, sooner or later, if you want to live in Turkey!"

In addition to citizenship issues, the interviewees said that while they didn't attempt to hide their Iranian background, they also did not emphasizing it. Being in a dominantly Muslim country, Iranians in Turkey did not face any religious differences as a group, and while many said that they hadn't experienced any discrimination for being Iranian, they chose not to express their identities if they weren't required to. In addition, the documented Iranians migrants didn't want to be referred to as "migrants" or "foreigners" since such labels are not warmly welcomed by the host culture in Turkey given the association with asylum seekers.

Most of the settled Iranian migrants accumulated different forms of capitals in Ankara, including cultural and economic capital, which can be considered essential for the settlement of documented migrants. Yet can it be said that these are sufficient for Iranian migrants to acquire symbolic capital, and in turn, to attain recognized and prestigious positions that would lead them to live the life they want and the lifestyle they desire? When asked whether they were happy and satisfied with their lives and lifestyles in Turkey, the general reply was "yes", although there were some "buts". First of all, the majority wanted to send their children to Western countries for education because they considered Turkey had not fulfilled their expectations. As mentioned above, according to their perceptions, the growing similarity between Iran and Turkey in terms of the influence of religion on everyday life was worrying for some of them, and it was worthy of note that they embraced the symbolic figure of Atatürk as the symbol of secularism of Turkey, often expressing their deep admiration for him in a similar way to their nostalgic memories of the Shah Period. Furthermore, some of them also added that they were not satisfied with the occupational return of symbolic capital in Ankara, and still believed that the United States or some European countries would have been a better option for migration. In this respect, despite the acquisition of economic and cultural capital in the host society of Ankara, the lack of symbolic capital in terms of the *desired* lifestyle makes it clear that the United States, as a

symbol of the best destination country, won the symbolic struggle in the field of international migration of (documented) Iranian migrants, including both Iranian students who plan to migrate to other destinations, as well as settled Iranians in Ankara. This is also why their desired lifestyle is described as the "Western lifestyle" at the beginning of this concluding chapter.

What is striking here is that although the settled Iranians were unable to acquire symbolic capital or fully construct their desired Western lifestyles in Ankara at the beginning of their migration, they concluded by saying that they wouldn't want to leave Turkey in the coming years in that they were happy with what they had constructed. From their discourse it could be understood that all these constraints in the way of acquiring symbolic capital and the ideal lifestyle turned into strategies to accomplish their status passage processes and build the life and lifestyle they want and, from their perspective, their position cannot be considered a failure.

Last but not least, the lifestyles and the habitus they build in Turkey warrants special analysis within this study. Chapter 6 focused on the Iranian habitus and the lifestyle of the documented migrants in Ankara through their dispositions, practices and tastes. The chapter explains that the Iranian habitus is not free of class influences, with the internalized class conditions within the social space expressed as "class habitus". Although this study doesn't distinguish between classes, it has investigated the dispositions of Iranian migrants through their distinctions constructed by taste and/or disgust, in short by their class habitus. Taking into account their self-perceptions of the volume of held economic and cultural capital, the middle-class habitus of Iranian migrants has been identified based on their distinctions of taste and consumption. What's more, aside from the class habitus, the Iranian habitus is also influenced by other dimensions, analyzed under the subheadings of dispositions of gender, ethnicity and migration. All of these dimensions influencing the Iranian habitus signify the common practices, thoughts and values of (documented) Iranian migrants in Ankara, and have shown both their accumulations and perceptions through their dispositions in the host society.

As a consequence, while the accumulation of different forms of capital has been shown in the previous chapters (mostly economic and cultural capitals), this final chapter focused on classed, gendered and ethnicized habitus. The final part of Chapter 7, under the heading "dispositions of migration", has demonstrated that expectations of symbolic capital have not been fully satisfied in Ankara. In other words, as stated in Chapter 3, Iranian migrants face two significant struggles in this field of international migration: firstly, acquiring economic and cultural capital in the host society; and secondly, acquiring symbolic capital, which, they believe, can be achieved through a reconstruction of the lifestyle they *desire*. Although they have won the first struggle, acquiring sufficient economic and cultural capital, the second struggle, and the symbolic expectation of a better and deserved lifestyle, has not been acknowledged in the host society. As a result, the majority of the Iranian students and settled Iranians are still thinking of the United States their best option for migration, which shows the symbolic power of the country in the symbolic struggle within the field of the international migration of Iranians (due especially to such idealizations of West as secularism, democracy, economic abundance and individual rights, as mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5). Finally, as Bourdieu claims, the dynamic and changing characteristics of the habitus, and the perceptions of Iranians within the Iranian habitus transformed these constraints into strategies as a means of accomplishing status passages. This finding answers the main question posed in this study, pointing out that the roles and strategies of different forms of capital have been strikingly influential for status passages, leading consequently to better lives and lifestyles among the documented Iranian migrants. While it was the accumulations of different forms of capital that influenced their settlement decisions in Turkey initially, it is the struggle for better social positions and symbolic capital in the host society that embodied their strategies and helped them to build the lifestyle they desired. Although what they have constructed in Turkey does not constitute the "Western lifestyle" they defined previously, the Iranian habitus helped them to consider their lives as successful in Turkey.

This study is a modest attempt to better understand the situation of a small group of documented Iranians living in Ankara, hence the results of this study cannot be generalized, and there are many limitations as well. First of all, as an "outsider", not being of Iranian origin, the author was unable to comprehend some of the finer details, such as jokes made about ethnic and religious diversities, and so someone who is closer to the Iranian culture would probably catch those distinctions better. Secondly, relations between the Iranian migrants and the locals of the host society have been demonstrated only weakly, and one direction of a future study could be to analyze the perceptions of locals towards Iranian migrants, and vice versa. Thirdly, although this study uses Bourdieusian concepts as an instrumental tool, the three dimensions of the social space, being the volume, composition and trajectory of capitals accumulated by Iranian migrants, have not been analyzed. It would be very interesting to make a Multiple Correspondence Analysis in this respect, in short, a Bourdieusian sociological analysis.

The author is aware that this research could have been analyzed from an entirely different direction, with, for example, particular focus on middle-class migration, and while this would have been an interesting approach, but the decision to make the study in its current form was based the subjective opinion of the author. Last but least, it could also have been interesting to study other Iranian communities in Turkish cities, and especially the larger Iranian community in Istanbul, whose volume of capital is much higher than those in Ankara, as some of the interviewees asserted. It would have been fascinating to see the commonalities and differences, or in other words, distinctions of the Iranian migrants in Istanbul from those in Ankara, together with their internal struggles, if any. Further studies, may also concentrate on the transnational networks and spaces of Iranians in other parts of the world, where Iranian communities may exhibit cultural and political traits related to their home country of Iran.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWEE PROFILES

IRANIAN STUDENTS' PROFILES								
STUDENT NAMES	**F/ M**	**BIRTH PLACE**	**ETHNICITY / RELIGION**	**DATE OF ARRIVAL**	**MARITAL STATUS**	**AGE**	**FIELD OF STUDY**	**INCOME (TL)**
BANU	F	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	2006	Single	22	Philosophy	1000
NABILA	F	Tabriz	Azerbaijani, Baha'i	2008	Single	24	Civil Engineering	700
NADINA	F	Khoy, Urmia	Azerbaijani	2000	Married	40	Economics	3500 /4000
SHAHRAM	M	Bandar Lengeh	Persian, Sunni	2006	Single	30	Politics	700
PAYAM	M	Tehran	World Citizen	2010	Single	28	Mining Engineering	1000
PABLO	M	Zanjan	Azerbaijani	2006	Single	22	Engineering	1000
ROXANE	F	Urmia	Azerbaijani	2006	Divorcd	39	Biology	2000
SAMI	M	Urmia	Azerbaijani	2009	Single	28	Physics	1500
SABAH	F	Tehran	Azerbaijani	2009	Single	21	Sociology	650
SHAHRZAD	M	Tehran	Azerbaijani	2007	Single	28	Engineering	1200
SARA	F	Tehran	Persian, Baha'i	2006	Married	32	Bio Chemistry	1300
SHIRIN	F	Urmia	Azerbaijani	2012	Single	26	Energy Power	1000
AHMAD	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	2006	Single	24	Chemistry	1000

SETTLED IRANIANS' PROFILES

	F/M	BIRTH PLACE	ETHN./ RELIG.	DATE OF ARRIVAL	MARITAL STATUS	AGE	TURK. CITIZ.	OCCUPATION	INCOME (TL)
ARASH	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	2001	Married	34	No	(Bio-chem.) Tourism	12000
ARMAN	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	…	Engaged	41	No	Dentist	N/A
BAHMAN	M	Tehran	Persian	1980	Married	49	No	UN member	5000
CADOC	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	2004	Married	53	No	Iran Rest.	10000
ZAAN	M	Hoy	Azerbaijani	1987	Married	51	Yes	Academician	4000
KAISA	F	Tabriz	Assyrian	1987	Single	46	No	UN Member	5000
LARISSA	F	Tehran	Persian	2002	Married	32	Yes	Tourism	3000
ARDASHIR	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	1980	Married	80	Yes	Politician (Retired)	1000
MASUD	M	Maku	Azerbaijani	1986	Divorced	41	Yes	Journalist	5000
MAHMUD	M	Tehran	Arab	1998	Engaged	32	No	(Sociologist) Trader	12000
MAARIKA	F	Shiraz	Persian	1987	Divorced	48	Yes	Trade Interpreter	3000
NADIA	F	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	1986	Married	52	Yes	Beauty Centre Owner	10000
NALANI	F	Tehran	Persian	1960	Married	58	Yes	Teacher	5000
PARISA	F	Urmia	Azerbaijani	1995	Married	45	Yes	Teacher	4000
RAFAL	M	Tehran	Persian	1984	Married	50	Yes	Life coach, Yoga Master	30000
RAHIM	M	Tabriz	Azerbaijani	1983	Married	48	Yes	Trader (Electrical Engineer)	25000
SABRA	F	Hazar	Turkmen	1999	Married	35	Yes	Housewife (Environmental Engn.)	12000-13000
SUZAN	F	Tehran	Baha'i	1966	Married	53	Yes	NGO owner	10000

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Demographic information
    a. Age
    b. Gender
    c. Marital Status
    d. Place of Born
    e. Ethnicity
    f. Education
    g. Occupation
    h. Children
    i. Turkish Citizenship, Year of issue:
2. Knowledge of Turkish? Any other foreign languages?
3. Could you explain your story which starts in Iran and ends up in Turkey?

<u>If more information is necessary, these questions can be posed:</u>

4. Where do (or did) you study?
5. Where do you work now?
    a. Is it the first job you have in Turley?
    b. Did you get work permit?
    c. How did you find it (through a friend, advertisement, etc.)?
6. How do (or did) you support(ed) yourself before work?
    a. Family support?
7. Date of arrival to Turkey? The reason to come to Turkey (education etc.)?
8. Have you visited or considered any other country before Turkey?
9. Anyone, any network influenced your decision about Turkey?
10. How did you decide about Ankara, considered any other city before this?
11. Did you come to Turkey alone or has somebody accompanied?
12. How would you describe your adaptation process to the country?
13. Are you married?
    a. Where and when did you get married?
    b. Is your partner Iranian?
    c. Where did s/he studied?
    d. Does s/he work? Where?
14. If not married, do (or did) you have a partner in Turkey?

a. Is (or was) s/he Iranian or Turkish?
b. How did they meet?

15. Do you have any child?
    a. How old is s/he?
    b. Where do they study, in Iran school or Turkish school? Why?
    c. Do you want them to study in Turkey or in any other country?
    d. Are they happy to live here, would they prefer Iran or any other country?
16. Do you still in contact with the relatives or friends in Iran?
    a. How often they contact? Do they visit each other? How often?
    b. How do they communicate, via e-mail, internet, telephone?
17. Do you miss Iran? What do you miss the most?
18. Has it been easy or hard to get used to Turkey?
    a. What did you do to get used to the country?
19. How much is your monthly household income? – Is it below or above the minimum wage (700TL) in Turkey?
    a. Where do your spend the money you earn? (Bank loans, rent, groceries, education, clothing, investment, leisure activities, sending money to friends/families in other countries, payment for relevant associations?)
    b. Do you send money to someone in Iran? (supporting the family, investment, buying property)
    c. Do you have a car?
20. (If not mentioned before) Whereabouts do you live in Ankara?
    a. Is it your property or rental? How much do you pay as rent?
    b. How many people live in your place? Who are they?
    c. How did you find your place? (Real estates or acquaintances?)
    d. Have you experienced any trouble while looking for a place to live?
    e. How are your relations with your neighbors?
    f. Are there any other Iranians around you? Or other people of foreign origin?
    g. Are you contented with the place your live? (If no) where would you like to live instead?
21. Currently are you an employee or an employer? Who is the official owner of the job?
    a. Where is your workplace?
    b. How many people work in your workplace?
    c. Are you contented with the job you do?
    d. Who assisted you in finding this job/starting business?
    e. What job else would you like to do?

f. Do you receive any other additional payments or support for making a living?
g. Do you receive aids from or are you supported by any NGOs, persons, associations, municipality or else?
h. Do you receive a continual support from people living abroad? (Family in Iran or Turkey)

22. Are you informed about the status and the rights the foreigner's law provided for you?
    a. If s/he does not currently own citizenship, is s/he aware of what s/he is deprived of? Does this bring about any advantages?
    b. Pervious durations of visas, fees…
23. Do you have retirement plans in Turkey? (Do you have the opportunity to retire in Iran?)
    a. What do you do when you have health issues? Where/who do you apply/ask for help?
    b. Do you have health insurance? Private or social insurance? Which one?
24. From where do you get/ask legal support when you need it?
25. Who do you see or socialize with? Turkish or Iranian people mostly? Why?
    a. Your Iranian acquaintances, did you use to know them in your home country or did you meet them here in Turkey?
    b. Are these people your or your spouse's acquaintances? (Do you or your spouse contact with these people when needed?)
26. Do your think the Iranians in Ankara generally support each other? In what ways and about which issues?
    a. Did this situation use to be different in your former social environment/in Iran?
27. Which segments of the Iranian society the people coming to Turkey belong to? (in ethnic or economic terms)?
28. How do you live your daily life? What do you do in weekends and in your spare time?
    a. Things you do on your own? What kind of places do you enjoy visiting?
    b. How often (at least once a week, once in two weeks, once a month?) do you get out for leisure activities (like seeing a movie, sightseeing etc.) Whereabouts do you hangout?
    c. Are there any social groups (composed of women or men etc.) you hangout without the presence of your spouse?
    d. What are the social activities you do with your family?

e. Where do you travel in holidays? Abroad or domestic holidays?
f. Do you participate in any collective organizations such as activities within associations and/or cultural activities?

29. Who does the housework mostly? (You or your spouse?)
    a. Who gets the groceries or goes to shopping mostly?
    b. Where do you do your shopping? (Local groceries, supermarket, supermarket chains like Migros, shopping centres?) Whereabouts? (Close to home?)
    c. Who does the child raising or (if there are any) eldercare?
    d. If you continued to live in Iran, would there be any difference about this situation? (If working, sharing the responsibilities because that you are also working?)
30. Who does the bureaucratic works for you mostly?
    a. Who goes to pay the rent and bills mostly? Internet?
    b. Who goes to municipality or registry office mostly when needed?
    c. How was your relationship with these institutions until now? Have you ever faced a problem in these institutions?
31. Do you vote in Turkey? (If yes) in which elections?
32. Do you follow the political issues in Turkey? From which medium? (TV, newspapers…)
    a. (If yes) Do you have any other political pursuits beyond voting? Do you work for political formations, associations or political parties?
33. Are there any social associations you volunteer for or a member of in Turkey?
    a. Turkish Association?
    b. Iranian Association? (Iranian Friendship Association, cultural center, embassy etc?)
34. Do you follow the political issues in Iran? From which medium?
    a. Do you participate in the political activities there?
    b. Regularly writing for a newspaper or journal? Being a member to an association?
35. What do you think about the Iran-Turkey relations which progressively developed in recent times?
    a. Do you think these have negative or positive effects on your life in Turkey?
36. What do you think the important strategies are while getting used to living in a country? (Social environment, acquaintances, finding a job, learning the host country's language, becoming a citizen)?

    a. (If married) Do you think it was you or your wife who got used to living here in a shorter period of time? (If single) Do you there is a difference between men's and women's experiences? Why?

37. When compared to Iran, are there more positive and more negative things in Turkey? What do you think?
    a. Do you think there are similarities among Turkey's and Iran's traditions and customs?
    b. Are there differences? What are they?
    c. Any cultural similarities? Like music, food or language?
    d. (If you think so) did these similarities make any difference about your choice for living here?
38. Do you feel belonging to Turkey? Do you feel Turkey as if it was your home country?
39. What do Turkish people think and behave towards Iranians?
40. Were you maltreated because of your Iranian origin in Turkey?
    a. Social life?
    b. Workplace?
    c. Foreigner's police?
    d. Anything you noticed in media about this issue?
41. If you had a different profession, of another sex or age, do you think this will make a difference in your current life in Turkey?
    a. Do you think men and women experience these in same ways? Why?
    b. (If the respondent is woman) Have you ever been maltreated in Turkey because that you are a woman?
42. Do you think your life would be different, if you continued to live in Iran? In what ways?
    a. Do you think living in Turkey brings about more freedom or impose restrictions on your life? In what ways?
43. Do you plan to live in Turkey in forthcoming years or would you rather live in a western country or go back to Iran?
    a. Where would you like to live? Why?
    b. Where would you like your children to live in future? Where do they want to live? Why?

APPENDIX C: CURRICULUM VITAE

Yasemin Akis Kalaylıoğlu
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Born in İzmir/ Turkey, 1981
Married

University Degrees

- PhD: 2007- June 2016 *Sociology*, Middle East Technical University (METU), Turkey. (Two and a half years on leave for academic visiting).

PhD Thesis defence was held on 13 March 2016.

PhD Thesis supervisor: Prof. Helga Rittersberger-Tılıç (METU).

PhD Thesis Title: "Transforming Constraints into Strategies: The Role of Different Capitals in the Status Passage of Documented Iranian Migrants in Ankara, Turkey".

- MSc: 2003 -2006. *Gender and Women's Studies,* METU, Turkey
- BA: 1999 - 2003. *Sociology,* Ege University, Turkey.

Academic Visiting

- July and November 2014; Academic Student Researcher at University of California, Berkeley in USA, Department of Gender and Women's Studies.
- October 2010 and June 2011; Academic Visitor at Oxford University in Great Britain, *Centre on Migration, Policy and Society* (COMPAS).
- September 2007 – July 2008; Academic Visitor at Stockholm University, Sweden, International Graduate Program and Stockholm University *Linnaeus Center for Integration Studies*.

Occupation & Internship

- January 2008 – July 2016 Research Assistant department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
- 2014, Independent Assessor at Central Finance and Contracts Unit, Turkish Republic Prime Ministry, Undersecretaries of Treasury.

- April-July 2010; Intern in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ankara Head Office.

Fields of Interest

- Iranian Migrants, International Migration, Asylum-seekers and Refugee Studies, Feminist Theory, Gender Equality and Masculinity Studies.

Publications

- Akis Kalaylıoğlu, Yasemin (2016), "Ankara'daki İranlı Düzenli Göçmenlerin Farklı Sermayeleri ve "Düzenli" Kalma Stratejileri" (Different Forms of Capital of Regular Iranian Migrants in Ankara and their Strategies to Remain "Regular"), in Nufüsbilim Dergisi, Ankara. (in Turkish)
- Akis, Yasemin; Demirkol Esra; Hamit, Meltem; Karakılıç, Zeynep; Dağdelen, Görkem; Şahin-Malkoç, Nevin, Uzar-Özdemir, Figen; Zırh, Besim Can (2015) "Türkiye Göç Araştırmalarında Araştırmacı Deneyimleri: Göç Çalışmalarında Araştırmacının Konumu Üzerine Öz-Düşünümsel Bir bakış", (The Researchers Experience in Migrations Studies in Turkey: Self-reflexive perspective towards the position of Migration Researcher) in *Göçler Ülkesi,* eds: Körükmez, L.ve Südaş, İ., Schola Ayrıntı Yayınları, Istanbul. (in Turkish)
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- Akis, Yasemin (2012) "Uluslararası Zorunlu Göç Literatüründe Toplumsal Cinsiyet: Başlıca Yaklaşımlar ve Eleştiriler", (Gender Perspective in the International Forced Migration Literature: Essential Approaches and Critiques) Küreselleşme Çağında Göç: Kavramlar, Tartışmalar, ed: Ihlamur-Öner, G. ve Şirin-Öner, A., İletişim Yayıncılık, Istanbul. (in Turkish)
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- Akis, Yasemin (2009) "Profeminist Erkekler: Akademide Feminizmin gizli müttefikleri mi?" (Are Profeminist Men Disguised Allies of Feminism?) in *Türkiye'de Neo-liberalizm, Demokrasi ve Ulus-Devlet: 10. Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi Metinleri,* Yordam Kitap. (in Turkish)
- Akis, Yasemin and Özakın, Ülkü (2009) "Türkiye'de Feminizm ve Kadın Hareketi" (Feminism and Women's Movement in Turkey), interview with Serpil Sancar, in Cogito Journal, 58. (in Turkish)

APPENDIX D: TURKISH SUMMARY/ TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez uluslararası göç alanında daha az dikkat çeken bir konuya, Türkiye'ye gelen göçmenlerin düzenli göç deneyimlerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu konuya odaklanmanın iki temel nedeni vardır. Birincisi, Türkiye'de son dönemde uluslararası göç çok daha önemli bir konu haline gelmiş olmakla beraber daha çok ülkeye gelen Suriyeliler üzerinden ele alındığı için, düzensiz göçle ilgili acil düzenlemeler ağırlık kazanmış ve ülkeye gelen düzenli göç boyutu yeterince tartışılmamıştır. İkinci ve daha da önemli nedense, düzenli göçmenlerin perspektifinden Türkiye'nin bir hedef ülke olarak nasıl değerlendirildiğine ve ülkeye yerleşme sürecinde nasıl tecrübeler yaşadıklarına dair yeterince araştırma ve kaynak bulunmamasıdır. Bu nedenlerden ötürü, bu tez, Türkiye'ye düzenli göç kapsamında gelen ve yüksek eğitim seviyesi, üst/orta sınıfsal durumu ve de yerleştikleri ülkeden beklentileri açısından farklı bir grup olan İranlıların algı ve deneyimlerine odaklanmaktadır. Mülakat yapılan İranlı katılımcıların deneyimlerini analiz etmek için Pierre Bourdieu'nun sosyolojik kavramları kullanılmıştır. Bu kavramlar, İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin Türkiye'ye gelmeden önceki kaynak ve birikimleri kadar, Türkiye'ye geldikten sonra edindikleri sermayeleri (iktisadi, toplumsal, kültürel ve sembolik) ve bunların eğitimsel ve mesleki uyum (incorporation) sürecindeki etkilerini anlamaya yardımcı olmuştur. Bu tez kapsamında ayrı bir önemi olan statü geçişi (status passage) kavramıysa, İranlı göçmenlerin eğitimsel uyum (educational incorporation) sürecinden mesleki uyum (occupational incorporation) sürecine geçerken yaşadıkları sıkıntı ve zorlukları anlamak için kullanılmaktadır. İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin statü geçişi sırasında yaşadıkları kısıtlılıkların karşısında geliştirdikleri çeşitli stratejilerden hareketle, tez başlığı "zorlamaların stratejilere dönüşümü" şeklinde düzenlenmiştir. Bunlar aşağıda daha ayrıntılı olarak ele alınmaktadır.

Saha araştırması 2012-2013 yıllarında Ankara'da gerçekleştirilmiş; saha araştırması kapsamında, 1979 İran İslam Devriminden sonra ülkeye gelip yerleşmiş

İranlılar ile yakın zamanda Türkiye'de üniversitede okumaya gelmiş İranlı öğrenciler olmak üzere toplam iki grupla görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Yapılan saha araştırması göstermiştir ki, katılımcılar göç araştırmalarında yaygın olan kanının aksine sadece ekonomik nedenlerle değil, ağırlıklı olarak kültürel ve sembolik sermaye bağlamında "hak ettiklerini" düşündükleri "daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimi" için göç etmek istemişlerdir. Görüşmecilere göre daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimini hak etmelerinin sebebi, 1979 İran İslam Devrimi sonrasında yaşamlarının kesintiye uğramasıyla ilişkilidir. 1979 sonrasında Türkiye'ye gelip yerleşmiş İranlı görüşmecilerin ve son dönemde ülkeye okumaya gelen İranlı öğrencilerin çoğu daha iyi bir yaşamı hak ettiklerini düşünmekte, bu daha iyi yaşamı ise "seküler", "demokratik", "bireysel özgürlükleri koruyan" ve çeşitli "ekonomik fırsatları" sunan bir ülke çerçevesinde tanımlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda görüşme yapılan kişiler kendilerini çoğunlukla politik duruş olarak aktif şeklinde tanımlamasalar dahi, yaşam biçimi arayışları üzerinden politik sayılabilecek bir iddia ile ülkelerinden ayrılmış ve başka bir ülkede yaşamaya başlamışlardır. Bourdieu'nun sosyolojik yaklaşımı çerçevesinde değerlendirildiğinde, bu çalışma uluslararası göçü bir alan (field) olarak tanımlamakta, bahsedilen daha iyi bir yaşam biçimi arayışını ise İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin illusio'su yani onların oyuna katılmalarını sağlayan temel istek veya çıkarları olarak sunmaktadır. Bourdieu'ya göre her oyun nasıl oynayanlara farklı kartlar ve dolayısıyla da avantajlar verirse, her alan da başlangıçta faillerine sermayeleri kapsamında farklı imkânlar sunar. İranlı düzenli göçmenlerse ellerinde var olan özellikle kültürel ve iktisadi sermayeleri sayesinde eğitim veya iş üzerinden başka ülkelere göç ederek uluslararası göç alanına dâhil olmakta ve elde etmek istedikleri temel çıkar (illusio) olan "İran dışında daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimine" ulaşmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Bu genel çerçeveden hareketle çalışmanın temel sorusu ve diğer alt soruları şu şekilde formüle edilmiştir:

Ankara'da yaşayan İranlı düzenli göçmenler tarafından daha iyi bir yaşama ve yaşam biçimine erişebilmek için kullanılan stratejilerin ve farklı sermaye biçimlerinin rolü nedir?

1) Ankara'da yaşayan İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçiminden anladıkları şey nedir? Neden bunu "hak ettiklerini"

düşünmektedirler? Kendi algı ve bakış açılarına göre hangi ülke kendilerine istedikleri yaşamı daha iyi sunabilir ve neden?

2) Farklı formdaki sermaye biçimlerine (iktisadi, toplumsal ve kültürel) sahip olmanın daha iyi bir yaşam biçime ulaşma sürecinde nasıl etkileri olmaktadır?
3) Bu sermayelerden hangileri İranlılar tarafından kendi ülkelerinden taşınmış ve hangileri Türkiye'ye geldikten sonra elde edilmiştir? Bu birikimlerinin ülkeye yerleşme ve toplumsal konumlarını belirleme sürecindeki etkileri nelerdir?
4) Yerleştikleri toplumda daha iyi bir konum elde edebilmek için düzenli İranlılar hangi stratejileri belirlemişler ve sürdürmüşlerdir?
5) Görüşmeciler genel olarak Türkiye ve özel olarak Ankara'da kurdukları yaşamları nasıl değerlendirmektedirler? Neden?

Bu sorulara cevap verebilmek için tez, giriş ve sonuç bölümleriyle beraber toplam yedi bölümden oluşmaktadır. Bu bölümlerin içeriklerine ve odaklandıkları bilgilere yer vermek, yukarıda bahsi geçen soruların tezde nasıl cevaplandığını anlamak açısından gereklidir. Birinci bölüm olan giriş bölümünde tezin amacı belirtildikten sonra katılımcılara ilişkin bilgiler ve katılımcı gözlem sonucu elde edilen bazı veriler paylaşılmıştır. Bu bölüm ayrıca araştırmanın metodolojisine dair genel bilgilere de yer vermektedir. Öncelikle, Ekim 2010 ve Aralık 2011 tarihleri arasında genel bir literatür taraması yapılmış ve düzenli göç ve İranlı göçmenler alanlarında yazılmış olan tezler, makaleler ve yabancı kaynaklar taranmıştır. İkinci aşamada derinlemesine görüşmeler dizayn edilmiş ve 2011 yılının son aylarında pilot çalışma ile bu sorular alanda test edilmiş ve ufak çaplı bir saha araştırması yapılmıştır. 2012 yılının ilk aylarından başlayarak derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmaya başlanmış ve hem bu çalışma kapsamında yerleşik İranlılar olarak tanımlanan göçmenlerle hem de üniversite eğitimi için Türkiye'ye gelen İranlı öğrencilerle toplam 31 derinlemesine görüşme gerçekleştirilmiştir. Tez içerisinde görüşmecilerin gerçek isimleri takma isimlerle değiştirilmiştir. Görüşmelerin tamamı Ocak 2012 – Nisan 2013 tarihleri arasında tamamlanmış, bu süreçte ara ara tekrar referans okumalara geri dönülmüş ve sorular süreç içerisinde geliştirilmiştir.

Mülakatlarda kullanılan sorulara bu tezin arkasında yer alan ek kısmından ulaşılabilir. Görüşmelerin süresi ortalama 45 dakika ile 2 saat arasında sürmüş ve kartopu yöntemi kullanılarak diğer katılımcılara ulaşmak mümkün olmuştur. Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi bu tez açısından düzenli görüşmecilerin görüş, düşünce ve perspektifleri önemli olduğundan, referans yöntemiyle ilerlemek görüşmecilerin kendilerini daha güvende hissetmelerini sağlamıştır. Yapılan görüşmelerin analizi Mayıs ve Kasım 2013 tarihleri arasında gerçekleşmiştir. Ayrıca yazar mülakatlara ek olarak, tezin altıncı bölümde daha ayrıntılı olarak anlatılan İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin yeni yıl partilerine (Nevroz) katılımcı gözlemci olarak gitmiştir. Görüşmelerin tamamı Ankara'da gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ankara birçok katılımcı tarafından "daha küçük ve de güvenli" bir başkent olarak tanımlanmış ve bu nedenle düzenli göçmenlerin tercihi olduğu belirtilmiştir. Katılımcıların çoğu İstanbul'da önemli bir İranlı nüfusun olduğunu söylemiş olsalar da, çalışmanın sınırları gereği daha geniş ölçekli görüşmeler başka bir araştırmaya bırakılmıştır.

Giriş bölümünde tezin amacı, araştırma soruları ve de katılımcılarla ilgili genel bilgiler anlatıldıktan sonra, Türkiye'nin uluslararası göç politikalarına yer veren ikinci bölüm gelmektedir. İkinci bölümün amacı Türkiye'nin bugünkü göç politikalarını ve bunların düzenli göçmenlerin hayatları üzerindeki etkilerini ele almaktır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin mevcut politikalarını anlayabilmek için cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan itibaren uluslararası göçü ilgilendiren hangi kanunların çıkarıldığına ve bu kanunların yıllar içerisinde nasıl bir değişime uğradığına hızlıca bakılmaktadır. Bilindiği gibi, 1934 yılında yürürlüğe giren İskân Kanunu cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinin ilk göç kanunu olarak görülmektedir. Türkiye'nin sığınmacılara ilişkin düzenlemelerde bulunan özel bir göç kanunu çıkarması ancak 2013 Nisan ayında kabul edilen ve 2014 Nisan ayında yürürlüğe giren Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu (YUKK) aracılığıyla olmuş, bundan önce uzun yıllar imzalanan uluslararası antlaşmalara ek protokol ve düzenlemelerle hareket edilmiştir. Türkiye'ye göç edenleri ilgilendiren uluslararası genel yönetmeliklerden sonra, Türkiye'de yaşamakta olan İranlılara ilişkin mevcut istatistiklere yer verilmektedir. Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği rakamlarına göre Nisan 2016 tarihinde ülkede 26,028 İranlı sığınmacı kayıt yaptırmıştır. Göç İdaresi rakamlarına

göreyse, sadece 2015 yılında toplam 14,276 İran vatandaşı Türkiye'de oturmak için ikamet almıştır. BMMYK rakamları sadece sığınmacıları kapsarken, Göç İdaresi'nin verdiği istatistikler düzenli göçmenleri göstermektedir. Özellikle eğitim ve çalışma izinlerine baktığımızdaysa, 2013-2014 eğitim öğretim yılında İran'dan 4343 öğrenci gelmiş (Türkmenistan ve Azerbaycan'dan sonra yoğunluk bakımından üçüncü sırada) ve 2015 yılında çalışma izni alan İranlıların sayısıysa 1522 olarak (yoğunluk olarak onuncu sırada) belirlenmiştir. Bu rakamlar İranlıların sadece sığınmacı değil, düzenli göçmen kategorisinde de Türkiye içinde ciddi bir nüfus oluşturduğunu göstermektedir. İkinci bölüm, bu bilgilerden sonra, Türkiye'de yaşamakta olan hem yerleşik İranlı hem de İranlı öğrencilerin yasal deneyimlerine yer verip son bulmaktadır. Bu deneyimler, İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin hangi izinlerle Türkiye'ye geldiklerini, burada kalırken hangi izinlere başvurduklarını ve eğitim veya çalışma izni alamadıkları durumlarda ne tür stratejiler geliştirdiklerini göstermektedir. Katılımcılarla yapılan görüşmelerde ortaya çıkmıştır ki birçok İranlı düzenli göçmen Türkiye'ye öncelikle eğitim amacıyla gelmektedir. Bazı katılımcılar burada eğitim almak istedikleri halde üniversiteyi kazanamadan gelmek durumunda kaldıklarını ve üniversite sınavlarına hazırlıklarını Türkiye'deyken tamamladıklarını aktarmıştır. Bu sırada Türkiye'de eğer ikamet izni almamışlarsa, Türkiye – İran arasında imzalanmış olan vize antlaşması sayesinde ülkeye girişte verilen 90 günlük turist vizesinden faydalanmaktadırlar. YUKK'dan sonra bu antlaşmalar 90+90 (yani 180 gün içerisinde en fazla 90 günlük kalma hakkı) şeklinde yeniden düzenlenmiştir; ancak, 2014 yılına kadar birçok İranlı eğer ikamet, çalışma veya eğitim izinleri yoksa Türkiye'den arka arkaya çıkış giriş yaparak ülkede kalışlarını turist vizesiyle uzatmışlardır. Bu yöntem, İranlıların ülkede kayıt dışı duruma düşmemek için geliştirdikleri stratejilerden bir tanesidir. Diğer bir yöntemse eşlerinin izinleri üzerinden ikamet izni almaktır. Katılımcılar arasında, Türkiye'de kaldıkları sürede eşlerinin eğitim izni üzerinden ikamet izni alan ve o sırada kendilerine iş bakan kişiler de mevcuttur. Bu iş bakma süreci bir işveren yanında iş arama olabileceği gibi, kendi işini kurmak için yasal süreci takip etme ve hazırlık yapma şeklinde de olabilmektedir. Yerleşik İranlıların Türkiye'de mesleki uyum süreci beşinci bölümde daha ayrıntılı anlatılmıştır. İkinci bölüm tamamlanmadan önce yer alan

son kısımdaysa, hâlihazırda Türkiye'ye okumaya gelen İranlı öğrencilerin deneyimleri aktarılmakta ve incelenmektedir. Burada öğrenciler, en çok, Türkiye'de yaşamak istedikleri takdirde mesleki uyum ve çalışma izni edinme aşamasında çok fazla zorlukla karşılaşacaklarından dolayı endişeli olduklarını dile getirmişlerdir. Bazı öğrenciler üniversite eğitimi sırasında zorunlu staj yapmakta ve o sırada çalıştıkları kurumlara gelecekte onlarla çalışıp çalışamayacaklarını sormaktadır. Bu aşamada aldıkları cevaplardan dolayı gelecekte Türkiye'de kalmamayı düşünenler olmuştur. Bunun en önemli nedenlerinden biri olarak yabancıların çalışma izinlerine ilişkin sıkıntıları ve yasal düzenlemeleri göstermişlerdir. Bu bölüm daha çok Türkiye'nin yasal düzenlemelerinin İranlı düzenli göçmenler tarafından nasıl tecrübe edildiğine odaklanmakta ve İranlı öğrencilerle ilgili daha ayrıntılı bir analiz ise dördüncü bölümde yapılmaktadır.

Üçüncü bölümdeyse genel göç teorilerinden ve İranlı göçmenlerle ilgili yapılmış yurtiçi/dışı akademik çalışmalardan sonra tezin teorik inşası yer almaktadır. Yukarıda kısaca bahsedildiği gibi, bu tez hem Bourdieu'nun sosyolojik kavramlarını hem de Nohl ve diğerlerinin editörlüğünü yaptığı kitapta (2011) geçen statü geçişi (status passage) kavramını kullanarak İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin eğitimsel ve mesleki uyum sürecindeki deneyimlerini analiz etmekte ve bu süreçte katılımcıların geliştirdikleri stratejileri anlamaya çalışmaktadır. İran dışında daha iyi bir yaşam arayışı İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin alana (field) katılımını sağlar. Uluslararası göç alanı dışında İranlı düzenli göçmenler diplomasi, bürokrasi, eğitim ve ekonomi alanlarından da etkilenmektedir. Örneğin diplomasi alanı uluslararası antlaşmaları kapsarken, bürokrasi alanı ülke içinde göçmenlerin yaşadıkları yasal süreçlerin anlaşılmasını sağlamaktadır.

Bu alanlar anlatıldıktan sonra İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin yukarıda da bahsedilen İran dışında daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimine kavuşmak için hangi sermayelerden faydalandıkları bu tez açısından önem taşıyan konulardan birisidir. Bu anlamda genel olarak görülmüştür ki İranlı düzenli göçmenler daha kendi ülkelerinden çıkmadan birçok kaynağa sahiptirler ve bunların başında kültürel ve iktisadi sermaye gelmektedir. Türkiye'ye geldiklerindeyse benzer şekilde öncelikle eğitim alanına dâhil olmakta yani üniversite bitirip diploma almakta ve kültürel

sermayelerini geliştirmektedirler. Yerleşik İranlılar olarak ifade edilen birinci katılımcı grubu bu statü geçişi sürecini tamamlamış yani eğitimsel uyum sürecinden mesleki uyum sürecine geçmişlerdir. İranlı öğrenciler olarak ifade edilen ikinci grupta ise katılımcılar Türkiye'ye öğrenci olarak gelmekte ve kaldıkları süre boyunca Türkiye'de kalmaları halinde yaşayacakları statü geçişine dair bilgiler edinmeye çalışmaktadırlar. İranlı katılımcıların tamamına yakını üniversitede eğitim aldıkları süre boyunca çalışmamakta ve çalışma hayatlarına başlayana kadar kendi ülkelerinden getirdikleri ekonomik birikimle yani aile desteğiyle ihtiyaçlarını karşılamaktadırlar. Bundan sonraki aşamada, kültürel sermayenin iktisadi sermayeye dönüşmesi yani mesleki uyum süreci yer almaktadır. Yapılan saha araştırması göstermiştir ki, bu iki aşamaya veya diğer bir ifadeyle bu statü geçişine ek olarak, özellikle yerleşik İranlıların önemli bir kısmı sembolik sermayeye çok önem vermekte ve kendilerinin 1979 İslam devrimi öncesindeki kültürden (Fars kültüründen) geldiklerini söyleyerek tarihsel geçmişleriyle gurur duymaktadır. Ayrıca giriş kısmında bahsedildiği gibi, mevcut İran'daki yaşam biçiminden daha iyisini "hak etmelerini" yine bu İslam Devrimi öncesindeki döneme dayandırmakta ve devrim sonrasında kesintiye uğrayan yaşam biçimlerini başka ülkelere göç ederek yeniden inşa etmeye çalışmaktadırlar. Bu aynı zamanda tezin temel alt sorularından birincisini yanıtlamaktadır.

Öte yandan, katılımcılar gurur duydukları geçmişlerinin, diğer bir ifadeyle, sembolik sermayelerinin göç ettikleri ülke vatandaşları tarafından da kabul edilmesini istemektedir. Örneğin katılımcılardan bir tanesi, Arman, diğer birçok ülkenin İranlıların kıymetini bilmediğini, İranlıların kıymetini en iyi bilen ülkenin ABD olduğunu söylemiştir. Arman'ın bu yorumu farklı şekillerle başka görüşmeciler tarafından da dile getirilmiştir. Hem yerleşik İranlılar olsun, hem de İranlı öğrenciler olsun birçok katılımcı ABD'nin kendileri için çok daha fazla olanak sunduğunu ve daha iyi bir yaşam biçimi olarak tanımladıkları kriterleri orada çok daha sağlam bir şekilde elde edeceklerini düşündüklerini söylemişlerdir. Bu nedenle ABD'nin bir hedef ülke olarak konumu, özellikle Kaliforniya eyaletinde bulunan Los Angeles kenti, İranlı göçmenler açısından uluslararası göç alanı içerisinde sembolik bir iktidara dönüşmüştür. Birçok katılımcı "Tahrangeles" şeklinde

"Tahran" ve "Los Angeles" şehirlerinin isimlerini birleştirip kullanmakta ve bu ürettikleri yeni isimle Los Angeles şehrindeki İranlı nüfusun yüksek yoğunluğuna ve şehrin İranlılar açısından önemine işaret etmektedir. Analiz bölümlerinde de görüleceği gibi, katılımcılar ABD'ye gitmek istemeseler dahi bunun sembolik iktidarıyla hesaplaşmışlar ve görüşmelerde ABD'ye gitmek istememe nedenlerini daha sorulmadan anlatmışlardır. Son olarak, çalışma boyunca İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin Ankara'da inşa ettikleri yaşam biçimi ve beğenileri habitus kavramı içerisinde ifade edilmiş ve bu kısmın analizi altıncı bölümde yapılmıştır.

Tezin dördüncü bölümü sahanın birebir analizinin başladığı kısımdır. Bu bölüm İranlı öğrencilerin Türkiye'deki eğitim süreçlerine ve onların bu süreçte yaşadıkları göçmenlik deneyimlerine odaklanır. Bourdieu'nun kavramlarıyla ifade edersek, İranlı öğrencilerin burada öncelikli olarak diploma almayı hedefledikleri, dolayısıyla kurumlaşmış kültürel sermaye edinmeye çalıştıkları anlaşılmaktadır. Öte yandan Bourdieu'nun bahsettiği (2010a) gibi eğitim kurumlarının işlevi sadece bununla sınırlı değildir, bu kurumlar ayrıca belirli bir tür sosyalleşmenin ve devamında toplumsal eşitsizliğin üretildiği yerlerdir. Buna göçmenler üzerinden bakıldığında, İranlı öğrenciler Türkiye'de eğitim alarak sadece ülkeye ait bir diploma almayı hedeflemiş olmazlar, aynı zamanda burada sosyalleşerek bundan sonra yaşayacakları statü geçişine yani mesleki uyum sürecine dair yazılı olan ve olmayan bilgileri de öğrenmiş olurlar. Bu en başta toplum içerisinde yaygın olarak bilinen kuralların İranlı öğrenciler tarafından da öğrenilmesi ve iş piyasasına girecekleri sırada, örneğin dışarıdan gelen ve Türkiye'de eğitim almamış birine göre daha avantajlı bir konumda olmalarını sağlar. Buna ek olarak, Türkiye'de eğitim alan düzenli göçmenlerin toplumsal sermayelerinin yani tanışlarının ve çevrelerinin zaman içerisinde artması beklenir.

İranlı öğrencilerin eğitimlerini Türkiye'de almaları o ülkenin dilini yani Türkçeyi öğrenmelerini hızlandırmaktadır. Türkçeyi öğrenmeleri onların sosyalleşmesi açısından da en önemli araçlardan bir tanesini oluşturur. Noble (2013) göçmenler açısından göç ettikleri ülkede öğrendikleri dili bir sermaye türü olarak (language capital) kavramsallaştırmaktadır. Dil sermayesi üzerinden değerlendirildiğinde İranlı öğrencilerin çoğu görüşmeyi Türkçe yapmak istemiş, on

dört kişiden sadece iki öğrenci İngilizce konuşma talebinde bulunmuştur ve bunlardan bir tanesi de yukarıda adı geçen Shahram'dır. Diğer öğrencilerin çoğu kendilerini rahatlıkla ifade edecek kadar ve bu tezin arkasında bulunan soruları cevaplayacak kadar Türkçe bilgisine sahiptir.

Dil sermayesini takiben, İranlı öğrencilere Ankara'da hangi gruplarla daha çok sosyalleştikleri sorulmuştur; İranlılarla mı yoksa sınıflarındaki herkesle mi sosyalleştikleri sorulduğunda birkaç farklı yanıt türü olmuştur. Evli olan öğrenciler daha az ve gerektikçe sosyalleştiklerini ve hem İranlı hem de Türk arkadaşları olduğunu söylemişlerdir. Ankara'ya tek başına gelen öğrencilerin bir kısmı İranlılarla bir kısmı Türklerle daha çok sosyalleştiklerini söyleseler de, her iki gruptan görüştükleri insanlar olduğunu da eklemişlerdir. Son olarak bir öğrenci, Shirin, bu iki grupla da sosyalleşmediğini, daha çok Ankara'da yaşayan diğer yabancı öğrencilerle ve özellikle Batı ülkelerinden gelen kişilerle sosyalleştiğini söylemiştir. Bunun en önemli sebebi olaraksa, kendi cinsiyetinin kadın olmasından dolayı sürekli kendisinin nerede olduğu ve ne yaptığı konusunda kontrol edilmek istendiğini, yabancılarla konuştuğundaysa kendini daha rahat hissettiğini söylemiştir. İranlı öğrencilerin sosyalleşmelerine ilişkin daha ayrıntılı bilgiler bölüm içerisinden bakılabilir.

Son olarak öğrencilere niye Türkiye'yi tercih ettikleri ve onlar açısından iyi eğitim veren bir ülke olup olmadığı sorulmuştur. Bununla beraber vurgulamak gerekir ki Türkiye'de eğitim alan yabancı öğrenciler içinde İranlılar önemli bir grup oluşturmakta, özellikle yüksek lisans ve doktora aşamalarında İranlı öğrenciler birinci sırada yer almaktadır. Yapılan görüşmeler sonucunda İranlı öğrencilerin Türkiye'yi önemli bir eğitim veren ülke olarak gördükleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Birçok katılımcıya göre bunun birkaç belirgin sebebi vardır; Türkiye hem eğitim masrafları açısından Batı ülkelerine kıyasla daha uygun, hem de coğrafi ve kültürel yakınlık nedeniyle de öğrenciler açısından alışması daha kolaydır. Ayrıca eğitim seviyesini oldukça iyi bulduklarını ve Türkiye'deyken iyi bir eğitim aldıklarını düşündüklerini çoğu öğrenci dile getirmiştir. Görüşülen öğrencilerin hepsi en az bir senedir Ankara'da yaşamış ve ülkeye dair belli bir bilgi birikimine sahip kişilerdir. Bu nedenle Ankara'nın veya genel olarak Türkiye'nin onlar için geleceklerini kurmak

isteyecekleri ülke olup olmadığı da sorulmuştur. Görüşmelerden anlaşıldığı üzere Türkiye, İranlı öğrencilerin ilk veya temelli olarak yerleşmek isteyecekleri bir ülke olmamakta, daha ziyade Türkiye'yi Batı ülkelerine gitmeden önce bir "basamak" olarak görmektedirler. Bunun nedenleri sorulduğunda yine birkaç çeşit cevap alınmıştır. Öncelikle Türkiye'nin bazı açılardan (kültürel vb.) İran'a benzemesi önemli bir avantaj olarak görülse de, bu aynı zamanda görüşmeciler tarafından negatif bir sebep olarak da sunulmuş ve Batı ülkelerindeki bazı imkânların burada olmamasından yakınmışlardır. Bahsedilen bu imkânlar ayrıntılı olarak dördüncü bölümde anlatılmıştır. İranlı öğrenciler Türkiye'ye yerleşmek istememelerinin ikinci sebebi olarak buradaki mesleki uyum süreçlerine dair zorlukları göstermişlerdir. Hem eğitim aldıkları dönemde yaptıkları staj nedeniyle hem de çevrelerinden soruşturdukları kadarıyla, eğitimlerini Türkiye'de tamamlasalar dahi burada çalışma izni almalarının çok zor olduğunu düşünmektedirler. Bu nedenle çoğu öğrenci eğitimlerine devam etmek üzere, yani yüksek lisans veya post/doktora eğitimleri için Batı ülkelerine gitmek istediklerini söylemişlerdir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'ye geldikten sonra edindikleri kültürel, toplumsal ve dil sermayeleri onları çoğunlukla burada kalmaya ikna edememiştir; istedikleri daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimini halen Batı ülkelerinde daha rahat elde edeceklerini düşünmektedirler. On üç kişilik İranlı öğrenci grubundan sadece iki kişi Türkiye'de kalmayı düşünmekte, bunun sebebi olaraksa ailevi nedenleri (evli olmaları ve ailelerine bakmakla yükümlü olmaları) göstermektedirler. Son olarak, üçüncü bölüm anlatılırken bahsedildiği gibi birçok öğrenci ABD'nin kendi gelecekleri için daha iyi bir seçenek olduğunu düşünmektedir, ABD'yi istemeyen öğrencilerse Kanada veya Avrupa'ya gitmek istemektedirler. Türkiye'de kalmamayı planlayan birçok İranlı öğrencinin aksine, Türkiye'de yerleşmiş olan İranlılar bu karara nasıl varmışlar, bu sorunun cevabı beşinci bölümde anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Beşinci bölüm Türkiye'ye daha önceki senelerde gelip yerleşmiş İranlı düzenli göçmenlere ve onların Türkiye'ye yerleşme ve uyum (incorporation) sürecinde yaşadıkları deneyimlere odaklanmaktadır. Önceki bölümde çıkan sonuçlara benzer şekilde Ankara'ya gelip yerleşen İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin çoğunlukla eğitim amacıyla Türkiye'ye geldikleri anlaşılmaktadır. İranlı öğrencilerin durumunda

olduğu gibi birçoğu Türkiye'ye gelip buradan başka bir ülkeye eğitim amacıyla devam etmeyi planlamış ancak değişen koşullar nedeniyle en sonunda ülkede kalmaya karar vermişlerdir. Eğitim dışında yerleşik İranlıların Türkiye'ye gelme nedenleri arasında yurtdışı vize başvuruları da yer almaktadır. İran'da konsolosluğu olmayan ülkelerin vizelerine başvurmak amacıyla Türkiye'ye gelen ve vize alamaması halinde burada kalma imkânlarını değerlendirenler hiç de az değildir. Kasia ve Maarika bu gruba dâhil olan kişilerdendir. İkisi de ABD vizesi almak üzere Ankara'ya gelmiş ve vize başvuruları reddedildikten sonra burada kalmaya karar vermişlerdir. Kasia konakladığı otelde kalan diğer İranlılardan Yabancı Öğrenci Sınavlarını (YÖS) duymuş ve kendi şansını denemek istemiştir. Sınavda Hacettepe Üniversitesi'ni kazanması sonrasında buraya yerleşmiş ve mezun olduktan sonra buradaki iş olanaklarını zorlamıştır. Maarika ise vize almak için Ankara'da kaldığı sürede Türk bir işadamıyla tanışmış ve vize başvurusunun reddedilmesinden sonra Türkiye'de kalıp bu kişiyle evlenmiştir. Eğitim dışında bu tür vize almak gerekçesiyle gelen ve burada kalanların dışında son kategori ise ailevi nedenlerle Türkiye'ye gelen ve kalmaya karar verenlerdir. Nalani küçükken babasının konsolosluk görevi nedeniyle Ankara'ya gelmiş ve babasının görevi bittikten sonra da ülkede kalmaya devam etmiştir. Suzan da benzer şekilde küçük yaşlarda babasının rahatsızlığı nedeniyle ailesiyle Türkiye'ye gelmiştir. Yine aynı aile kategorisi içerisinde sayılabilecek bir başka eğilimse, evlenip Türkiye'ye gelen ve yerleşenlerde görülür. Parisa, Sabra ve Nadina eşleriyle İran'da evlendikten sonra onların işleri nedeniyle Türkiye'ye yerleşmişlerdir. İster eğitim amacıyla, isterse vize işlemleri veya ailevi nedenlerden dolayı Türkiye'ye gelmiş olsunlar, bu üç grubu ortak kesen şey aslında hiç birinin Türkiye'ye ilk geldiklerinde burada temelli kalmak gibi bir düşünceleri olmamasıdır. Bu anlamda yukarıda bahsedilen İranlı öğrencilere benzerlik gösterirler. Çoğunlukla eğitimlerini tamamladıktan sonra Batılı ülkeleri gitmek için yeterli iktisadi sermayelerinin olmaması, Ankara'da yaşarken buldukları iş imkânları (ya da mesleki uyumu kısa sürede gerçekleştirmiş olmaları), Türkiye'de yaşadıkları süreçte değişen medeni durumları veya zaman içerisinde Türkiye'ye alışmış olmaları, katılımcıların Ankara'da kalma kararlarında etkili olmuştur.

Beşinci bölümde yapılan analizin en önemli özelliği, daha önce bahsedilen statü geçişi kavramının İranlı katılımcılar arasında nasıl gerçekleştiğini göstermesidir. Eğitim ve mesleki uyum süreçlerini anlatmak için kullanılan bu kavram, Ankara'ya yerleşmiş olan İranlıların hangi aşamaları geride bıraktıklarını ve bu süreçte ne tür stratejiler geliştirdiklerini anlamamıza yardımcı olur. İranlı öğrencilerde görüldüğü gibi yerleşik İranlılar grubunda da eğitim vasıtasıyla göç etme öncelikle tercih edilen bir yöntem veya strateji olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Bu sayede Ankara'ya gelen düzenli göçmenler hem kültürel hem de dil sermayelerini kazanmakta aynı zamanda sosyal çevrelerini genişleterek toplumsal sermayelerini geliştirmeye başlamaktadırlar. Toplumsal sermaye burada çift yönlü çalışmaktadır; hem İran'da yaşayan akrabalar ve tanışları, hem de Ankara'da oluşturdukları yeni çevreleri kapsar. Toplumsal sermayenin her türlü temel bilgiden, statü geçişi sırasında göçmenlerin çevrelerinden alacakları özel desteğe kadar birçok alanda faydası olabilmektedir. Mesleki uyum (occupational incorporation) süreci, diğer bir ifadeyle öğrenci statüsünden çalışan statüsüne geçmek kabaca katılımcıların kültürel sermayesini iktisadi sermayeye dönüştürme sürecidir. Türkiye'ye geldikten sonra edindikleri kültürel sermayeyi iktisadi sermayeye dönüştürmenin çeşitli yollarını arayan katılımcılar bu süreçte birkaç farklı güzergâh geliştirmişlerdir. Aşağıdaki paragraf bu farklılaşmaları ve sonuçlarını anlatmaktadır.

Bu tez Ankara'ya yerleşmiş olan İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin statü geçişlerini ya da kültürel sermayeyi iktisadi sermayeye dönüştürme biçimlerini dört kategoride analiz etmektedir. Birinci olarak üniversite eğitimi sonrasında "eğitim aldıkları alanlarda iş kuran veya çalışan" katılımcılar grubu yer almaktadır. Bu grupta yer alan katılımcılar eğitimlerini Türkiye'de almış kişilerdir ve burada aldıkları eğitim doğrultusunda kendilerine meslek seçmiş, bu alanda çalışmaya devam etmişlerdir. Örneğin Rahim elektrik ve elektronik mühendisliği bölümünden mezun olmuş ve bu alanda eğitim alırken üçüncü sınıftan itibaren enerji alt dalında uzmanlaşmıştır. Mezun olduktan sonra bir süre elektrik firmasında çalışmış, daha sonraysa Ankara'da okurken tanıştığı birkaç İranlı arkadaşıyla birlikte enerji üzerine bir fabrika kurmuştur. Rahim katılımcılar arasında yukarı doğru toplumsal hareketlilik gösteren, statü geçişi sonucu oldukça başarılı bir pozisyon elde etmiş kişilerdendir.

Benzer şekilde yukarı doğru toplumsal hareketlilik gösteren başka bir görüşmeciyse Sabra'nın kocasıdır. Sabra'nın kocası tıp eğitimini Ankara'da tamamlamıştır. Sabra kocasının bu süreçte Türk Vatandaşlığına başvurduğunu ve Azeri olduğu için vatandaşlık almakta sıkıntı yaşamadığını söylemiştir. Sabra'nın kocası tıp eğitimini tamamladıktan sonra zorunlu hizmet için Batman'a gitmiş ve oradaki görevini tamamladıktan sonra tekrar Ankara'ya geri dönmüştür. Ankara'da birkaç doktor arkadaşıyla beraber özel bir tıp merkezi açmışlar. Sonuç itibariyle Sabra'nın eşi de bu ilk kategoride yani diploma eğitimlerini takiben iş kuran ve yükselen statüde yer almaktadır. Üniversite eğitimini takiben iş bulan ancak toplumsak hareketlilik anlamında ciddi bir sıçrama yaşamayan katılımcılar da eğitim alanından devam edenlerdir. Zaan ve Nalani bu grupta yer alan katılımcılardandır; ikisi de eğitimlerini Ankara'da tamamlamış ve sonrasında Zaan Ankara'da Gazi Üniversitesi'nde, Nalaniyse Çankaya bölgesinde bir lisede görev yapmıştır.

İkinci kategoriyi oluşturanlar ise "etnik kökenlerine" yani "İranlı olmalarına dayanarak iş kuran veya iş bulan" katılımcılardır. Cadoc ve Arash bu kategorinin ilk grubunda yani iş kuranlar arasında yer alırlar. Cadoc eğitimini İran'da tamamlamış ve Ankara'ya İran Büyükelçiliği'nde aşçı olarak çalışmak üzere gelmiştir. Buradaki hizmetini tamamladıktan sonra Ankara'nın ilk İran restoranını açmış ve ailesiyle birlikte işletmeye başlamıştır. Durumunun kendi ifadesiyle "fena olmadığını" söyleyen Cadoc, eşi ve çocuklarıyla beraber restoranı işletmeyi sürdürmektedir. Katılımcıların aylık gelirlerine tezin sonundaki ekler kısmından (Görüşmeci profillerinden) ayrıca bakılabilir. Arash ise, Cadoc'un tersine eğitimini Ankara'da tamamlamış ancak çalıştığı alanda Türkiye'de iş alanı olmadığı için turizm ve organizasyon sektöründe, çoğunlukla İranlılar için iş yapmaya başlamıştır. Etnik kökenlerini takiben iş bulan ancak iş kurucu olmayan ikinci alt gruptaysa, Farsça dili ve kültürünü bildikleri için iş bulan katılımcılar yer alır. Parisa, Maarika ve Bahman Farsçayı ve Fars kültürünü bildikleri için uluslararası şirketlerde ve örgütlerde çalışmaktadırlar.

Üçüncü kategorideyse hem üniversite eğitimini, hem de etnik kökenleriyle ilgili iş alanlarını takip etmeyen ve "yeni bir alanda iş kuran" katılımcılar vardır. Kendini karate alanında geliştiren ve daha sonra yoga eğitmenliğine başlayan Rafal

bu kategoriyi temsil eden kişidir ve Rahimden sonra en çok aylık kazancı sağlayan katılımcı olmuştur. Tüm bu üç kategorinin dışında kalan dördüncü grupsa "emek piyasasına girmeyenlerdir". Bu grubun temsilcilerinin çoğu İranlı kadınlardır. Bu katılımcılar eşleri üzerinden Türkiye'ye gelmiş ve burada kaldıkları süre boyunca ihtiyaçları olmadığı için çalışmamış veya eşleri tarafından çalışması istenmemiş kişilerdir. Örneğin Rafal maddi durumları iyi olduğu için eşinin çalışmasını istememekte ve onun çocuklarının eğitimiyle ilgilenmesini tercih etmektedir. Bu grupta yer alan bazı katılımcıların bununla ilgili bir şikâyeti olmasa da durum hepsi için aynı değildir. Parisa, eşinin maddi durumunun iyi olmasının kendi çalışma isteğiyle alakası olmadığını belirtmekte ve eşinin iş ararken kendisine hiç yardımcı olmadığını söylemektedir. Son olarak emek piyasasına girmeyenleri kategorize eden dördüncü grupta tek erkek katılımcı olan Ardashir yer alır. Kendisi 1979 İslam Devrimi sonrasında İran'dan siyasi olaylar nedeniyle Türkiye'ye kaçmış, sığınmacı olarak bir süre kaldıktan sonra Azeri olması nedeniyle Türk vatandaşlığına başvurmuş ve kabul almıştır. Bu noktada toplumsal sermayenin önemi bir kez daha anlaşılmaktadır. Ardashir Türkiye'ye ilk geldiği yıllar Alparslan Türkeş'in siyasi partisiyle (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) yakından ilişki içerisinde olduğunu ve oradan edindiği dostlarının Türkiye'de kalırken kendisine büyük destek gösterdiğini söylemiştir. İran'dan getirdiği iktisadi birikimle ilk birkaç yıl idare etmiş, daha sonra da çalışmaya başlayan çocukları kendisine ve eşine bakmaya başlamıştır. Ardsahir Türkiye'ye geldiği sıradaki sığınmacı statüsü gereği diğer katılımcılardan daha farklı bir pozisyondadır.

Beşinci bölümde yerleşik İranlıların statü geçişini nasıl tamamladıkları ve hangi alanlarda iş kurdukları ya da buldukları incelenmiştir. Burada ortaya çıkan önemli bir sonuç, Ankara'da yaşarken karşılaştıkları sıkıntıların ve engellerin onları çeşitli stratejiler geliştirmeye itmiş olmasıdır. Örneğin kendi eğitim aldığı alanda iş bulamayan katılımcılar ya yeni alanlara yatırım yapmış ya da etnik kökenleriyle alakalı işler ve organizasyonlar bulmaya yönelmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla tezin temel sorusu olan statü geçişlerinde farklı sermaye biçimlerinin ve geliştirilen stratejilerin rolü veya diğer bir ifadeyle etkisi, analizin yapıldığı dördüncü ve beşinci bölümlerde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Tüm bunlara ek olarak, İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin İran dışında

istedikleri daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimini Türkiye'de kurup kuramadıkları sorusuysa, sonuç kısmından önceki son bölümde yani İranlı katılımcıların Ankara'da oluşturdukları habituslarının analiz edildiği altıncı bölümde yanıtlanmaktadır.

Sonuç kısmından önceki bu altıncı bölümde yapılan habitus analizi dört ana başlık üzerinden tartışılmaktadır. Bunlar, İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin sırasıyla sınıf, toplumsal cinsiyet, etnisite ve de uluslararası göç eğilimlerine (dispositions) odaklanmaktadır. İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin kendi ayrımlarını (distinction) gördüğümüz kısım burasıdır. Örneğin, İranlı düzenli göçmenler kendi statülerini İranlı sığınmacılardan farklı görmektedirler ve mülakat esnasında da kendi statülerinin "göçmen" olmadığını, artık Ankara'da yaşadıklarını veya Türkiye vatandaşı olduklarını ara ara hatırlatmışlardır. Sınıf değişkeninden başlayacak olursak, katılımcıların çoğu kendilerini orta-sınıf kategorisinde tanımlamaktadır. Birçok İranlı düzenli göçmen, maddi durumları iyi olan İranlıların direk ABD'ye göç ettiğini, durumu kötü olanların sığınmacı olduğunu, durumları bu iki kategori arasında olanlarınsa Türkiye'ye gelip kaldığını söylemiştir. Arman'ın öne sürdüğü bu görüşe katılan başka katılımcılar da olmuştur. Öte yandan bu orta-sınıf habituslarını katılımcıların tüketim alışkanlıklarında da görmek mümkündür. Altıncı bölüm içerisinde katılımcıların evinden ve de iş yerlerinden fotoğraflar sunulmaktadır. Katılımcılar burada duvarda asılı olan yağlı boya tablodan veya apartmanda yaşama alışkanlıklarından bahsederek onlar için modern yaşamın ne ifade ettiğini tanımlamışlardır. Mesela Kasia, daha önce oturduğu Tunalı Hilmi mahallesinde insan kalitesinin çok yüksek olduğunu, daha sonra işi için taşınmak zorunda kaldığı Yıldız mahallesindeyse komşularından o kadar memnun olmadığını söylemiştir. Neden rahatsız olduğu sorulduğundaysa, bir örnek vererek, komşusunun yaz ayında apartmanın önünde yorganının içini açarak yünlerini dövdüğünü anlatmıştır. Bu ve benzeri diğer örnekler orta-sınıf habitus başlığı altında yer alır. Bu başlıkta yer alan son alt başlıksa, katılımcıların belirttiği seküler yaşam biçimi arzusudur. Katılımcıların çoğu İran'daki günlük yaşamlarında dini baskıdan rahatsız olduklarını, Türkiye'de geldikten sonra bu baskıyı hissetmediklerini ve bunun kendileri için çok önemli olduğunu söylemişlerdir.

Bu habitus bölümünde incelenen diğer bir başlıksa toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkileridir. Bu alt başlıkta, hem yerleşik İranlıların hem de İranlı öğrencilerin Ankara'da yaşadıkları deneyimlere ve bunları algılama biçimlerine bakılmıştır. Bir önceki bölümde bahsedildiği gibi, İranlı iş adamlarının eşlerinden çocuk bakımı gibi cinsiyete dayalı işbölümü beklentileri, İranlı kadınlar tarafından burada daha ayrıntılı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu kısımda ayrıca feminist teorisyenlerin Bourdieu'nun sosyolojik yaklaşımına bir eleştiri ve katkısı olan duygusal sermaye (Adkins ve Skegges, 2005) kavramı kullanılmıştır. Bu kavrama göre, cinsiyete dayalı iş bölümüne ek olarak kadınlardan ayrıca beklenen duygusal bir emek ve sermaye söz konusudur. Toplumsal cinsiyet başlığı içinde incelenen bir başka alt başlıksa, Ankara'da İranlılar arasında önemli olan "namus" konusudur. İranlı erkek bir katılımcı, İranlı genç kızlarla ilgili kötü laf çıkmasından çekindiğini ve bu nedenle İranlıların kendilerine ait ayrı organizasyonları olması gerektiğini, bu sayede İranlı kadınları koruyabileceklerini söylemiştir. Bu ve benzeri yorumlar, "İranlı erkeklerin namusu" alt başlığında analiz edilmektedir.

İranlıların Ankara'da inşa ettikleri habituslarını incelerken öne çıkan bir diğer konu da etnik ve dini farklılıklardır. Burada katılımcıların kendi aralarındaki, örneğin Azeri etnik kökeni olanlarla Fars kökeni olanlar veya Sünni Müslümanlarla Şiiler arasındaki ayrımlar İranlıların kendi perspektiflerinden anlatılmıştır. Fars kültürü hem Fars kökeni olanlar hem de Azeri kökeni olan bazı katılımcılar tarafından daha kıymetli görülmektedir. Öte yandan bazı katılımcılar Azeri kültürünü Türk kültürüne benzetmektedirler. Konuyla ilgili ayrıntılara altıncı bölümden bakılabilir. Bu bölümde işlenen son alt başlıksa İranlı katılımcıların uluslararası göçe dair eğilimleriyle ilgilidir. Yapılan saha araştırmasında ve mülakatlarda anlaşılmaktadır ki İranlı katılımcılar uluslararası eğitim fırsatlarını düzenli göç için bir strateji olarak kullanmakta ve çoğunlukla son eğitim aldıkları ülkeye yerleşme planları yapmaktadırlar. Bu nedenle İranlı öğrencilerin çoğu Türkiye'den sonra Batı ülkelerinde eğitimlerine devam etmeyi planlamaktadır, çünkü gelecekle ilgili planlarını Batılı ülkelerde yaşamak üzere yapmaktadırlar. Öte yandan, Ankara'da yerleşik olan İranlıların bir kısmı eğitimlerini burada tamamladıktan sonra yeniden başka bir ülkeye gitme imkânı veya enerjisi

bulamadıklarını söylemişlerdir. Peki, Ankara'da kalan İranlılar başta söylediğimiz daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimi isteklerini, ya da Bourdieu'nun kavramıyla ifade edecek olursak uluslararası göç alanına (field) girmelerine sebep olan illusio'larını elde edebilmişler midir? Rahim ve Rafal gibi bazı katılımcılar için bu sorunun cevabı olumlu olsa da, tüm katılımcılar açısından bunu söylemek pek mümkün gözükmemektedir.

Rahim ve Rafal Türkiye'de maddi ve manevi olarak yaşamaktan çok memnun olduklarını mülakat esnasında dile getirmişlerdir. Hatta Rahim kendi durumunu Kanada'da yaşayan kardeşiyle kıyasladığında kendisini daha şanslı gördüğünü dahi söylemiştir. Ancak Arman veya Arash gibi Türkiye'de istediği yaşamı ve yaşam biçimini oluşturamamış bazı katılımcılar için sembolik sermayenin kazanıldığını söylemek pek mümkün değildir. Arman Ankara'da diş hekimi olmasına karşın kendi durumunu "su satsam daha iyiydi" şeklinde ifade etmiş ve insanların kendisine saygı göstermediğinden yakınmıştır. "Dünya'ya tekrar gelsem yine diş hekimi olurum ama Türkiye'de olmam" lafı aslında duygularını anlatmaya yeterlidir. Öte yandan yıllardır Türkiye'de yaşayan ancak hala sınırsız oturma izni veya vatandaşlık alamayan Kasia'nın sözlerine yer vermek, onun neden kendini yeterince güvende hissetmediğini anlamaya yardımcı olabilir: "Şu an iş üzerinden izin alıyorum. Her sene iznimi uzatıyorum. Vatandaşlık olmayınca duygusal olarak kendimi hiçbir yere ait hissetmiyorum. Durduk yere deseler 'İranlılar bir hafta içinde çıkın gidin', ben ne yapacağımı bilemem". Yine de tekrar hatırlatmak gerekir ki katılımcılarla yapılan görüşmeler Nisan 2013 tarihinde tamamlanmış, Nisan 2014 tarihinde yürürlüğe giren YUKK'un etkilerini gözlemleme fırsatı olmamıştır.

Katılımcıların göçle ilgili eğilimlerini anlamak açısından kendilerine yöneltilen son soru, eğer kendileri veya çocukları için göç etme imkânları olsa hangi ülkeyi seçecekleri olmuştur. Bu soruya yukarıda da bahsedildiği gibi ABD yanıtı verenlerin oranı oldukça yüksektir. Bunun nedenleri kendilerine sorulduğunda, ABD'yi "seküler", "demokratik", "bireysel özgürlükleri koruyan" ve bireylere çeşitli "ekonomik fırsatlar" sunan bir ülke olarak tanımladıkları, diğer bir ifadeyle daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimini kendilerine sunabilecek bir ülke olarak gördükleri anlaşılmıştır. Bu anlamda, ABD'nin sembolik iktidar konumu tekrar ortaya

çıkmaktadır. Öte yandan, Türkiye'ye gelen İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin elde etmek istedikleri daha iyi yaşamı ve yaşam biçimini burada tam olarak kuramadıklarını düşünmeleri, yaşadıkları sınırlılıkları ve zorlanmaları stratejilere dönüştürmelerine neden olmuştur. Türkçe özet kısmının başında da belirtildiği gibi, tez bu nedenle "zorlamaların stratejilere dönüşümü" olarak adlandırılmıştır.

Tezin son bölümündeyse, tez boyunca geliştirilen argümanlar kısaca tekrar ortaya konulmuştur. İranlı düzenli göçmenler başka bir ülkeye göç etmelerini her ne kadar politik bir eylem olarak tanımlamasalar da, burada yaşam biçimi üzerinden politik bir mücadele verildiği söylenebilir. Katılımcılar hak ettiklerini düşündükleri yaşam biçimlerini artık kendi ülkelerinde elde edemeyeceklerini düşündükleri için yabancı bir ülkeye göç etmek istemişler ve hem sahip oldukları sermayelere, hem de habitusları ve faillikleri çerçevesinde geliştirdikleri stratejilere dayanarak daha iyi bir yaşam elde etmeye gayret etmişlerdir. Bu tezin sınırları imkân vermese de, bu konuyla ilgili olarak sonraki çalışmalar da incelenebilecek birçok soru ve alan bulunmaktadır. Bundan sonraki çalışmalar yine düzenli göç alanında başka ülkelerden gelen göçmenlerin deneyimlerine odaklanabileceği gibi, onların deneyimlerini İranlılarınkiyle karşılaştıran bir çalışma da yapılabilir. Bu çalışma sadece Ankara'da yaşamakta olan İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin deneyim ve perspektiflerine odaklanmakta, katılımcılar tarafından daha farklı bir profile sahip oldukları söylenen İstanbul'daki İranlı düzenli göçmenler hakkındaysa yeterince araştırma bulunmamaktadır, dolayısıyla bu da başka bir çalışma konusu olabilir. Son olarak, Türkiye'den sonra başka bir ülkeye göç eden İranlı düzenli göçmenlerin yerleştikleri ülkelerde ve özellikle bu tezde önemi iyice belirginleşen ABD'de, istedikleri "daha iyi bir yaşam ve yaşam biçimini" elde edip edemediklerini incelenmek oldukça ilginç bir çalışma konusu olacaktır.

APPENDIX E: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ■

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Akis Kalaylıoğlu
Adı : Yasemin
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI : Transforming Constraints into Strategies: The Role of Different Forms of Capital in the Status Passage of Documented Iranian Migrants in Ankara, Turkey.

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ■

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