

TURKISH PRESS AND THE EARLY COLD WAR
(1945-1950)

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis investigated how Turkish press' perceptions of the early Cold War were shaped from 1945 to 1950 by utilizing newspaper articles from the relevant period. The period at hand experienced Soviet demands from Turkey, Turkey's drive to the West, and domestic political (i.e., transition to the multi-party system) and economic (i.e., transition to the liberal economy) changes. In this atmosphere, the Turkish press, which had organic links with politicians, had a vital role in shaping the domestic public opinion according to the early Cold War dynamics. In other words, the press was instrumental both to make the Turkish public to believe that a change in Turkish foreign policy direction was absolutely necessary and to spread out messages to the world with regard to Turkey's understanding of struggles among foreign powers, which could not be uttered by Turkish political figures through the official channels. Early Cold War perceptions and presentations of the Turkish press, including governmental and oppositional newspapers did not follow a linear trend, in fact they had many inconsistencies; besides, the press did not perceive international developments in a uniform manner. Nonetheless, as this thesis argued, the abovementioned perceptions did not appear to be divergent from each other.

Keywords: Turkey, Press, Early Cold War

ÖZ

TÜRK BASINI VE ERKEN SOĞUK SAVAŞ (1945-1950)

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Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Bölümü

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Bu tez, dönemin gazetelerini kullanarak, Türk basınının 1945-1950 arasındaki erken Soğuk Savaş algılarının nasıl şekillendiğini incelemiştir. Bu dönem, Sovyetlerin Türkiye'den talepleriyle Türkiye'nin batıya yönelmesine ve çok partili sisteme geçiş gibi siyasi ve liberal ekonomiye geçiş gibi iktisadi dönüşümlere tanıklık etmiştir. Bu atmosferde, siyasilerle organik bağları bulunan Türk basını, erken Soğuk Savaş kamuoyunun şekillenmesinde anahtar bir role sahiptir. Basın, kamuoyunu Türk dış politikasındaki değişikliğin zorunluluğuna inandırmak görevini üstlenmiş ve ayrıca dış güçlere politikacıların resmi kanallardan veremeyeceği mesajları iletmek için aracı rolünü oynamıştır. Hem hükümet yanlısı hem de muhalefet destekçisi gazeteleri içeren Türk basınının, erken Soğuk Savaş algıları ve sunuşlarının doğrusal bir biçimde ilerlemediği hatta pek çok tutarsızlıklara sahip olduğu, bununla birlikte basının dış gelişmeleri algılamasının tek düze olmadığı gözlemlenmiştir. Ancak yine de bu tezin tartıştığı üzere, yukarıda bahsi geçen algılar birbirlerinden çok uzak görünmemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Basın, Erken Soğuk Savaş

To My Parents

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Cold War was defined as "*the constant confrontation of the two superpowers which emerged from the Second World War*"¹ by Eric Hobsbawm in his book examining the Short Twentieth Century. The same definition is used in this study, which examines the role of the Turkish press during a 'short' history of the Cold War. Indeed, the period from 1945 to 1950 was a very 'short' period, like in the development of the early Cold War in the international arena, in Turkey, too. It was a period of intensive political activities and reactions, which were very much developed in response to the international events as well as national priorities and needs.

In political terms, this period experienced the transition from the single-party system to the multi-party one. Throughout the period, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) (the Republican People's Party), vesting authority in the assembly, dominated the political life while new political parties began to emerge after September 6, 1945. As the oppositional parties began to take place in the National Assembly, the opposition within the CHP also increased. Having confronted by domestic pressure, the CHP tried to maintain its dominant position in the politics but *Demokrat Parti* (DP) (the Democratic Party), the main opposition party of the period which was established on June 6, 1946, came to power in May 1950.

In economic terms, there was a transition from protectionism to the economic liberalization, which was further speeded up by Turkey's drive to the West.² As will

¹ Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (London: Abacus, 1995), p. 226.

² Kemal Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), pp. 159-161; Mahmut Goloğlu, *Demokrasiye Geçiş (1946-1950)* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1982), pp. 164-166.

be discussed in Chapter 2, the understanding of etatism and economic development was shaped due to a combination of both internal (i.e., existence of high inflation rates) and external factors (i.e., integration to the world economy).

Regarding the foreign relations of Turkey at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union disclaimed its Non-aggression pact with Turkey in 1945, which was signed in 1925 and then was prolonged in 1935, and made territorial demands along with bases in the Straits from Turkey. This opened a new chapter in the foreign affairs of Turkey and prompted a new set of policies towards the Soviet Union.³ Additionally, while Stalin's Soviet Union increased its pressure on Turkey, which further accelerated its drive to the West;⁴ the Soviet threat, at the same time, allowed the American and British politicians to increase their influence in the region.⁵ Having exposed to the Soviet threat, the Turkish Government desired to strengthen its relations with the West, particularly with the United States and Britain.⁶ As a result, it pushed Turkey to the forefronts of the emerging Cold War in a global context.⁷

In this atmosphere, Turkey was trying to find a place for herself in the new international order since the aftermath of the Second World War, which, to some

³ Melvyn Paul Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952" *The Journal of American History* 71.4 (1985), pp. 807-808.

⁴ Sergey Radchenko, "Joseph Stalin", in Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright (eds.), *Mental Maps in the Early Cold War Era, 1945-68* (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 23; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), p. 36.

⁵ James Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 9; Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), p. 5; Nicholas Tamkin, *Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940-45: Strategy, Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 197.

⁶ Ahmet Haluk Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (1923-1968) – I" *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 23.03 (1968), p. 261; Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 810.

⁷ Kemal Karpat, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Some Introductory Remarks" in Kemal Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Essays and Articles* (Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. 509-510; Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye 1944 – 1950* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), p. 34.

extent, saw the birth of isolation of Turkey from the international system.⁸ As Turkey's drive to the West was accelerated due to the Soviet intimidation along with the economic developmental concerns, Britain's retrenchment from the region had begun as a result of its own financial problems in 1947.⁹ The United States gradually replaced the British position in the Middle East and began to have close relations with Turkey.¹⁰ Moreover, the exclusion of Turkey from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 increased its security concerns again, which became another dimension of Turkey's relation with the West.¹¹

From the point of dominant view in the literature on the Cold War, however, Turkey's drive into the West was seen as if it remained very limited up until 1950 when *Demokrat Parti* came to power and it was further hastened after 1952 when Turkey joined NATO. Furthermore, it was argued that *Demokrat Parti*, abandoning the policy of neutrality of the previous years, made Turkey a 'satellite' of the American imperialism.¹² This approach, however, might tend to obscure the political climate of the mid-to-late 1940s which must have shaped the Turkish way of thinking about the early Cold War. In addition, it is important not to lose sight of the turning points, which might prove to be of great consequence for Turkey in the following decades. Thus, a fundamental assumption underpinning this study is that the mindsets of the Turkish public regarding Cold War conflicts and their major actors had already been (re)shaped

⁸ Ahmet Yeşil, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Siyasi Hayata Geçiş* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001), pp. 40-41; Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), p. 208.

⁹ İsmail Soysal, *Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri için Kılavuz (1919-1993)* (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1993), p. 18.

¹⁰ Mahmut Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1990), p. 161.

¹¹ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 38; Bülent Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 70.

¹² Namık Behramoğlu, *Türkiye Amerika İlişkileri (Demokrat Parti Dönemi)* (İstanbul: Yar Yayınları, 1973), pp. 7-9; Metin Toker, *Demokrat Partinin Altın Yılları 1950-1954* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), p. 10; Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990), pp. 115-154; Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi 1838-1995* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1995), pp. 1619-1625.

by the Turkish press before the advent of the DP Government in 1950 and the membership in NATO 1952.

In this environment, the Turkish press, which had organic links with the political establishment, had a vital role in shaping the public opinion according to the early Cold War dynamics; that is, the press was instrumental to convince the public that a change in Turkish foreign policy direction was absolutely necessary and also to give out messages to the world regarding Turkey's understanding of struggles among foreign powers, which could not be said by politicians through official channels. Thus, this thesis examines how the perceptions of the early Cold War by the Turkish press evolved from 1945 to 1950, which included both governmental and oppositional newspapers. This study argues that although these perceptions did not follow a linear trend but they had many setbacks and inconsistencies and there was not a uniform perception of the international developments by the press, there was not a major difference among the Turkish newspapers regarding their perception and, more importantly, reflections of the early Cold War developments to the public.

In order to analyze the role of Turkish press in the making of the Cold War in Turkey, in the following chapters, different aspects of this process will be examined. Chapter 2, making use of both national and international archive material, analyzes the attitudes of the Turkish politicians to the early Cold War from 1945 to 1950, by dividing it into three sub-periods: January 1945 – July 1945: the end of the Second World War and Initial Demands of the Soviet Union from Turkey, July 1945 – July 1947: the Turkish government's search for the international support to counterbalance the Soviet threat and the gradually increasing support of the West to Turkey and July 1947 – May 1950: the Turkish government's early Cold War agenda both in national and global contexts. The reason for such a periodization is the changes in both Turkish political elite's and press' attitude to the international developments. In the first sub-period, for example, Turkey dealt with initial demands and accusations of the Soviet Union. In the second sub-period, Turkish political elite as well as the press understood that the Soviet Union would never give up their demands from Turkey in the existing international system and the international support which the government sought for remained very limited.

In the third sub-period, yet, the Turkish political elite and the press members thought that they found the international support which might counterbalance the so-called Soviet threat. Moreover, as this part of the study discusses, the anti-communism of the Turkish government increased in line with the worsening relations with the Soviet Union. The Turkish government, similar to previous periods, perceived communist ideology as a source of dangerous propaganda to manipulate the Turkish minds in this period. However, the anti-communism in this period had a tendency to affiliate communist activities with an external threat (i.e. the Soviet Union); accordingly, the government banned the publication of the books and journals whose ideological standpoint was very close to the Soviet Union. In addition to Turkish fears about the Soviet invasion, the concerns over economic development was also a determining factor for the political elite to find a place for Turkey in the capitalist world. As the policymakers regarded being a part of the Western Bloc and economic well-being as synonymous, the attempts and desire of the political figures to sustain a stable development path might help us to make better sense of the Turkish policy. Besides, this part of the chapter shows how the understanding of economic development changed from 1945 to 1950. Finally, this chapter examines the oppositional parties' approach to the government's Cold War agenda.

Chapter 3 examines how the Turkish press played a crucial role in creating, disseminating and propagandizing the Turkish perceptions of early Cold War both in internal and external contexts. The Turkish press, compared to the politicians, adopted a bolder attitude to the Soviet Union particularly after the introduction of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 and the Marshall Plan in June 1947. At the same time, it began to see the West as the protector of the 'world peace' and 'free world' against the communist aggression. In this chapter, it is also examined how the Cold War language of the press developed in this period and which factors contributed to its development. Furthermore, the Turkish press' coverage of the new international order in this period both in global and regional contexts are provided. Additionally, for the political opposition itself fell into several groups, a close examination of oppositional newspapers might shed light on perceptions of different oppositional newspapers.

Chapter 4 focuses the perceptions of the Soviet Union and the Communist World in general by the press. Within this, the Soviet Union increasingly was represented as an ‘enemy’. While the press, here, was committed itself to the creation of an image of an enemy, Turkish people were expected to condemn the Soviet policy towards Turkey with inside information available to them. As it was to become obvious in the interpretation of the global developments by the press, anti-Soviet attitude was considered the best way to preserve the Turkish interests in the international affairs within the framework of the early Cold War. Moreover, anti-communism was not restricted to official authorities; that is, journalists also made a great effort to counter Soviet propaganda in the country. As an essential factor related to security threat, anti-communism was constantly used by the press in order to create an enemy, which labelled communists as godless atheists with no loyalty towards the state. In order to spread the anti-communist and anti-Soviet messages among the Turks, Turkish newspapers laid stress on the communist countries other than the Soviet Union as well. They claimed that communism and the Soviet Union wanted to turn the entire world into a scene of calamity, where people suffered from hunger, scarcity and authoritarian governments that restricted freedom of speech and human rights. In spite of the general belief that most of them were satellites of the Soviet Union, the Turkish press reached the conclusion that there were also struggles and tension among communist countries as the particular cases of Tito’s Yugoslavia and later Mao’s China suggested.

Chapter 5 examines how the Turkish press took the practical steps of fostering friendship between Turkey and the West to prove that this was not only natural but also a desirable outcome. Seeing Turkey as a part of the western world and having prepared the ground with great care, the theme that the old imperialist West was being replaced by the peaceful and democratic one, which led by the US instead of Britain, hence also the US, took a key place for this purpose. Due to the fundamental features of the creation of an ally by the press, the Turkish people got more inclined to admire the United States as an ally, which also did much to restore Turkish self-esteem against the Soviet threat. The Turkish press was willing to be a part of the capitalist world but it hoped and tried to be treated as an equal partner by the West.

Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by presenting the main findings of the study.

Sources

This study is primarily based on the popular Turkish newspapers of that time which were *Akşam*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Tanin*, *Ulus*, *Vakit*, *Yeni Sabah*, *Yeni İstanbul* and *Zafer*. Focusing on these newspapers, which were either officially or semi-officially affiliated with the political parties, whether Turkish newspapers, each of which had its own world-view, differed from each other with regard to the foreign policy is examined.

To reach a better understanding with the Turkish perceptions of the early Cold War, archival documents from *Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi* in Ankara were consulted. These archives provide instructions issued by the government and official correspondence between Turkish politicians and their foreign counterparts. There are also documents ranging from those showing how the Turkish government took measures against communism and Soviet propaganda to those including translations from western press and consular reports from the Turkish embassies in the foreign countries, particularly the US, Britain, France and Yugoslavia.

Apart from these documents, *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanakları* (Turkish Grand National Assembly Records) were used to analyze official political atmosphere in this period. While explaining how the political decisions were made, these records provided information about the heated debates between the government and the opposition regarding the Turkish foreign policy within the framework of the Early Cold War. Moreover, these debates were published in the (particularly, governmental) newspapers.¹³ So, Turkish public was able to follow such debates held in the National Assembly.

¹³ For examples, see: "B. Barlas Mecliste Dün Etraflı İzahat Verdi", *Ulus*, 5 February 1949, pp. 1, 5; "Mecliste Bütçe Görüşmeleri", *Ulus*, 23 February 1949, pp. 4, 6; "Millet Meclisinde Bayındırlık, Ekonomi ve Ticaret İşleri Görüşüldü", *Ulus*, 27 February 1949, p. 5; "Dışişleri Bakanı Mecliste İzahat Verdi", *Ulus*, 17 March 1949, p. 5; "B. Millet Meclisi, Yeni Seçim Kanununu Kabul Etti", *Ulus*, 17 February 1950, p. 1; "Dışişleri Bakanımız Mecliste Dünya Durumunu İzah Etti", *Ulus*, 17 February 1950, pp. 4, 6; "Seçim Kanununun Metnini Neşrediyoruz", *Ulus*, 23 February 1950, pp. 5, 7.

Online archives that belong to the United States and Britain provided an insight for objectives of these states towards Turkey's position in the global politics. Although these documents showed how American and British diplomats reflected the Turkish understanding of the early Cold War environment, there is a possibility that these diplomats conveyed Turkish perceptions of the Cold War from 1945 to 1950. Moreover, these documents also provided information about the complex nature of Turkish multi-party system. While online documents from the British National Archives (TNA) helped to form an understanding of the Anglo-Turkish relations, the documents available to online access offered by Brill Publishers (Cold War Intelligence and U.S. Intelligence on the Middle East), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Digital Archive of Wilson Center, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Harry S. Truman Library & Museum and the National Security Archive (NSA) owned by the George Washington University were useful for a general understanding of the nature of the American-Turkish relations. Using the archival sources provided a better comprehension of the nexus between Turkey and the Cold War dynamics in a global context.

CHAPTER 2

THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION TO THE EMERGING COLD WAR

This chapter considers how the Turkish government tried to adapt itself to the changing circumstances and the early Cold War tension and then tried to create an array of institutions in support of its strategies regarding the foreign policy of Turkey. While the presence of the Soviet threat was a constant factor in the perceptions of the Turkish politicians of the emerging Cold War, their attitude to the international politics evolved in relation to support and guarantee which were provided by the West, particularly the United States and Britain. As both internal and external factors had decisive roles in the official perception of the early Cold War, not only the government but also the oppositional parties were trying to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances in the post-war international system. This chapter, making use of both national and international archival material, analyzes the attitudes of the Turkish political elite to the early Cold War from 1945 to 1950, by dividing it into three sub-period, which were determined by Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union and its drive to the West. In this regard, anti-communism, which was enormously increased in this period as a result of Turkey's drive to the West, and developmental concerns of the government, which were heavily shaped by Turkey's relations with the capitalist world, became cornerstones of the perception of the early Cold War by the Turkish political elite. Later, the differences and similarities between the government and the opposition with respect to their approaches to the international events will be examined.

2.1) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE COLD WAR

From 1945 to 1950, the Turkish government had developed different responses to the changing international environment and developments within the framework of the early Cold War. Although periodization of the development of the Turkish government's attitude to the Cold War is a very difficult one, this study divides the period into three short sub-periods. The first sub-period was from January 1945 to July 1945. It witnessed the end of the Second World War in Europe and although there were conflicts in Asia until August 1945, the Turkish government was more interested in the wars between the Allies and Germany because its relations with the latter during the war (such as selling chrome to and maintaining its diplomatic relations with Germany) became a particular concern with respect to Turkey's relations with the Allies. In this respect, declaring a war against Germany and Japan on February 2, 1945, Turkey also declared that it was on the side of the Allies. The attempts of the Turkish government to prove that it had always been on the side of the Allies continued in the first sub-period, but its relations with the Soviet Union, as a member of the Allies, were at the same time deteriorating. Moreover, in spite of certain disagreements over the post-war international system, the war-time alliance among the US, Britain and the Soviet Union had not ceased to exist yet. In such an atmosphere, the Soviet demands from Turkey, which were officially uttered by the Soviet Union in June 1945, led to alienation of Turkey in the international system. Therefore, at the end of the first-sub period, for the Turkish political elite, it became almost certain that the relations with the Soviet Union would not improve in the short-run.

The second sub-period was from July 1945 to July 1947. It witnessed the attempts of the Turkish government to find an international support to eliminate or at least to decrease negative impacts of the Soviet threat. The government's understanding of the international developments, yet, was not limited to its relations with the Soviet Union; rather, it was also depended on relations of the Soviet Union with the US and Britain. Additionally, a sharply increasing domestic pressure, which was a result of newly established oppositional political parties and economic problems, limited the

capabilities of the Turkish government in the international context. Getting closer to the West in the face of bipolarization of the world system and finding a limited support from the US and Britain against the Soviet aggression, the Turkish government tried to adopt itself to the changing circumstances and emerging Cold War environment. While the Truman Doctrine and later the Marshall Plan began to change the perception(s) of the Cold War by the government, until the end of the second-sub period, the Turkish government had to tackle with both international and national problems.

The third sub-period was from July 1947 and May 1950. It witnessed not only further bipolarization of the world system but also the last years of the CHP government. While the government was losing prestige and support at home, its further drive to the West became the main characteristic of this period. Even though the government, receiving military and financial aid from the US, found international support to guarantee Turkey's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it did not mean that this support had erased government's all concerns regarding the Soviet threat. Instead, having excluded from NATO in April 1949, the Turkish government tried to form regional security arrangement(s), which would initiated by the US and Britain, and to increase the bulk of the American aid. Hence, in the third sub-period, Turkey continued to engage with the Soviet Union in its own Cold War and became increasingly a part of the global Cold War conflicts. In three sub-periods, the Turkish government's foreign policy in the international context was constantly (re)shaped by both internal and external factors. Although priorities of domestic and international factors might change from time to time according to the needs of the period, both played a decisive role in shaping perception of the Turkish government from 1945 to 1950.

2.1.1) The End of the Second World War and the Turkish Government:

January 1945 - July 1945

In the first months of 1945, facing with the deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union as a result of the Soviet demands from Turkey, the Turkish government began to take practical steps in order to strengthen its relations with the Allies and to find a

place for itself in the emerging international system, which the winners of the Second World War (particularly, the US, the Soviet Union and Britain) would determine. On January 3, 1945, for example, Turkey announced that it severed its diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan. In explaining the reason for the government's action, Cemil Bilsel, Member of Parliament (MP) for Samsun, who would become the first chair of the United Nations Association of Turkey in 1946, said that the path of the Turkish government was the same with that of American politicians, which was the way of justice.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Allies were negotiating to determine the post-war world order in a series of international diplomatic meetings. The Soviet Union conveyed its demands regarding the modification of the Montreux Convention, which had determined the current regime in the Straits since July 23, 1936, to the US and Britain in January, 1945 and both countries declared their support for the Soviet Union to revise the Convention. Moreover, the Soviet forces, taking control of the Balkan states, reached the Turkish border, which further escalated tension in Turkey.¹⁵ As Zubok claimed, Stalin tried to destroy Turkey's ability to act as an independent player between the West and the Soviet Union. For this reason, Stalin asserted that “*there is no place for Turkey on the Balkans*” and the Soviet Union did want Turkey to become a major actor in the Balkans.¹⁶ While Stalin tried to increase pressure over Turkey and Greece through Romania and Bulgaria where the Soviet troops existed, Britain in fact was concerned with the Soviet challenge to the British influence in Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁷

¹⁴ 3 January 1945: Cemil Bilsel, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanakları (hereafter TBMM), 7. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 15. Cilt, 19. İnikat, p. 10. (accessed via the website www.tbmm.gov.tr)

¹⁵ Mehmet Gönlübol *et al.*, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1965)* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), pp. 199-201.

¹⁶ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, pp. 37-38.

¹⁷ William R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 21.

As the Soviet Union aimed to give the control of the Balkan states to the Soviet-sponsored governments,¹⁸ the position of Turkey in the post-war international system was being discussed among the Allies. During the negotiations at Yalta Conference, which was held from February 4 to 11, 1945, for instance, it was generally stressed that Turkey had not still declared war against Germany. As decided by the Allies, Turkey, similar to the other states, had to enter the war until the first of March, if it wanted to sign the United Nations Declaration and to become a founding member of it.¹⁹ Accordingly, Turkey declared war against both Germany, with which Turkey had severed its relations on August 2, 1944, and Japan on February 23, 1945, while it signed a mutual treaty of aid with the United States on the same day.²⁰

Despite Turkey's these attempts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the Allies in general, the Soviet Union was not satisfied with the foreign policy of Turkey, which had become its traditional friend after the First World War due to strategic partnership between two countries against the western powers. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union had a strong distrust for Turkey and it began to express its disappointment with Turkey's interwar and wartime policies. The Soviet Union perceived the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact of 1939²¹ and Turkey's wartime partnership with Britain and France as the rapprochement of Turkey to the West and also accused Turkey of supporting the Nazis by not attacking to them during the war. Particularly after the course of the war began to favor the Soviet Union, the Soviet attitude towards Turkey had become more critical and the Soviet politicians frequently urged the necessity to change the current regime of the Straits in the international meetings under the pretext

¹⁸ 9 January 1945: Wilson Center Digital Archive (hereafter WCDA), Record of I.V. Stalin's Conversation with the Head of the Delegation of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia, A. Hebrang. (accessed via the website www.digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org)

¹⁹ 8 February 1945: the National Security Archive (hereafter NSA), "Memorandum of Conversation -- Crimean Conference: Fifth Formal Meeting", pp. 5-6 (accessed via the website www.nsarchive.gwu.edu). It is important to note that the documents from NSA are collections of various global archives.

²⁰ "Türkiye, Birleşmiş Milletler Beyannamesine Katıldı", *Akşam*, 25 February 1945, p. 1.

²¹ It would provide assistance and aid to Turkey in case of aggression to her. Moreover, Turkey would have to give assistance to Greece and Rumania if Britain and France would participate a war (Tamkin, *Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union*, p. 2).

of that the current regime was increasingly damaging the Soviet strategic interests.²² More importantly, on March 19, 1945, the Soviet Union informed the Turkish government that they would not renew the Non-aggression Pact with Turkey, which had signed in 1925 and would be terminated in November 1945.²³

The immediate reaction of the Turkish government to both the Soviet demands on the modification of the Montreux Convention and the denouncing of the Non-aggression Pact revealed Turkey's willingness to come an agreement with the Soviet Union through diplomatic negotiations. As the Turkish Prime Minister Hasan Saka sent a telegram to the British officials on March 22, 1945, the Turkish government was not against the modification in the administration of the Straits while it really wished to improve its deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union as well.²⁴ Nonetheless, the Turkish government wanted to solve the problems between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the international meetings rather than through bilateral negotiations between solely two. This desire of Turkey might have been the Turkish government's belief that Britain would support the terms proposed by Turkey. Regarding the British policy, while Britain wanted the Soviet Union and Turkey to reach an agreement, the British were at the same time afraid of the increasing pressure and control of the Soviet Union over Turkey, which would diminish the British interest in the Near East. However, at that moment, Winston Churchill, the current Prime Minister of Britain, did not think that the free access of the Soviet ships from the Straits would harm British strategic

²² 5 March 1945: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA.), FOIA, 0000709437, pp. 1-2. (accessed via the website www.foia.cia.gov) Indeed, on December 25, 1939, when Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu visited Moscow, the Soviet diplomats demanded the change in the Montreux Convention. However, Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu rejected the Soviet proposal and claimed that it was impossible for the Turkish government to accept the Soviet conditions (Kamuran Gürün, *17 Aralık 1925 Türk-Rus Antlaşması, Türk-Rus ilişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), p. 214).

²³ Türkkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945* (Ankara: AÜ SBF Yayınları, 1965), p. 126.

²⁴ 23 March 1945: Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) frus1945v08.i0015, pp. 6-7. (Accessed by www.uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/frus) As this document demonstrated, there was a strong intelligence collaboration between the US and Britain in terms of the Turkish-Soviet relations.

interests in the region due to his belief that the Soviet naval power could not be stronger than that of the British in the Mediterranean.²⁵

In this environment, according to the American ambassador to Turkey, Laurence Steinhardt, Turks, in spite of their reluctance to fight with the Nazis since the beginning of the War, "*would almost welcome an armed conflict between Britain and the Soviets and would throw themselves into any such conflict on the British side with enthusiasm*".²⁶ As this report demonstrates, although the Turkish politicians were very worried about the Soviet demands and accusations, they tried to show Turkey's determination not to accept the Soviet terms regarding any change which would damage Turkey's national sovereignty to the US and Britain, which might be expected by the Turkish government to decrease the Soviet pressure over Turkey. As Saka stated to Steinhardt, for example, "*the Turkish Government will not be influenced by the 'customary methods' of the Soviet Government, will cede no territory or bases to the Soviets and will employ its armed forces if necessary*".²⁷

After meeting with the British and American diplomats, the Turkish government replied to the Soviet demands and declared that it was open to the Soviet proposals to renew the Non-aggression Pact on April 4, 1945.²⁸ So Turkey was ready to respond to the Soviet demands and to adopt an accommodating policy at that moment. Moreover, as the British wanted Turkey not to accept the Soviet proposals immediately but it expressed its support to Turkey only in the secret meetings, the American opinion on the Turkish-Soviet tension had remained almost neutral until the death of Roosevelt on April 12, 1945 when the Vice President Harry Truman took his place, which further accelerated the transition from the American isolationism of the inter-war period to the internationalism of the post-war era.²⁹ Nevertheless, although Truman's foreign policy

²⁵ John Kent, "British Policy and the Origins of the Cold War", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 142.

²⁶ 26 March 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, pp. 7-10.

²⁷ 31 March 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, pp. 11-12.

²⁸ Gönülbol *et al.*, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 200.

²⁹ Martin McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), p. 15.

was characterized as an anti-Soviet and anti-communist one in general,³⁰ as Henry Kissinger claimed, Truman's approach to the Soviet Union remained neutral until 1946.³¹ Therefore, the US and Britain might not respond to the demands from Turkey, in a determined manner, as the war was still going on and the Soviet Union was still their ally.

Failed to find the international support that they searched for at that moment and in spite of the growing tension between Turkey and the USSR, Turkish politicians, yet, did not express their concerns over the Soviet demands in public. Rather, they continued to express their gratitude to the Allies for their victory over Germany. For instance, following the defeat of Germans on May 7, 1945, Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu stated in his speech in the National Assembly on May 11, 1945 that Turkey celebrated the victory of Allies over the Nazis and the government congratulated not only Britain and the United States but also the Soviet Union: As Saraçoğlu declared “*the Soviets wrote many bright pages of the war and Stalin's vigorous face was always seen on each written page*”.³²

Nonetheless, after the German surrender in May 1945, the Soviet Union continued to raise their demands from Turkey.³³ On June 7, 1945, Vyacheslav Molotov, who was the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs from 3 May 1939 to 4 March 1949 and who was instructed by Joseph Stalin, and the Turkish ambassador to Moscow, Selim Sarper met. Molotov refused Turkish professions of friendship, which had proposed to sign a new treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union.³⁴ In effect, Molotov wanted Turkey to accept the Soviet offer regarding the joint protection of the Straits. This time, in addition to the revision of the Montreux Convention, the Soviet Union also wanted the provinces

³⁰ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 29.

³¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 433.

³² 11 May 1945: Şükrü Saraçoğlu, TBMM, 7-3-17-53, pp. 44-47: “*Bu cihan harbinin birçok parlak sayfalarını Sovyetler yazmıştır ve bu yazılan her sayfada daima Stalin'in diri yüzü görülmektedir*”.

³³ Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu – İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), pp. 251-254.

³⁴ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl Anılar – Yorumlar, 1* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1980), p. 146.

of Kars and Ardahan from Turkey, which had been ceded by the Soviet Union to Turkey in 1922, in order to renew the Non-aggression Pact with Turkey.³⁵ The reason for the Soviet territorial demands from Turkey was strategic importance of these provinces for the Soviet Union with respect to transfer of oil extracted from the Caucasus and Iran.³⁶

So, unlike the first demand, this new demand more directly threatened the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey.³⁷ On June 18, 1945, the Turkish ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sarper stated that the Turkish government could not accept any offer which would affect the territorial integrity of the country while Molotov stated that the current regime of the Straits was not able to provide the security of the Soviet Union, which wished to obtain bases in the Straits.³⁸ As Sarper stated to the American Diplomats, the Soviet Union would not advance a serious claim on the Turkish territories whereas he expected the Soviet Union to insist on the revision of the current regime of the Straits.³⁹

Indeed, at that moment, the Turkish diplomats believed that the new president of the US, Truman, would have a leading role in the West and would support Turkey against the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ Moreover, as Tamkin argued, the relationship between Turkey and Britain, which had been full of disagreements over Turkey's entry to the Second World War for the last six years, began to improve after the summer of 1945.⁴¹ Nonetheless, the British government suggested the Turkish government not to be completely negative towards the Soviet Union; instead, Turks might consider revision of the Montreux Convention, which would be discussed among four or five states rather than

³⁵ Gönübol *et al.*, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 200-201.

³⁶ Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), p. 55.

³⁷ Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 126.

³⁸ 18 June 1945: FRUS, frus1945berlinv01.i0024, pp. 72-74.

³⁹ 28 April 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, p. 15.

⁴⁰ Tamkin, *Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union*, p. 174.

⁴¹ Tamkin, *Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union*, p. 189.

only the Soviet Union and Turkey.⁴² Despite the British proposal to Turkey of staying calm against the Soviet pressure, both Britain and the US did not want any 'major' change in the current regime of the Straits, which might damage Turkish sovereignty together with its strategic position in the eyes of the West.⁴³ At the same time, the disagreements among the Big Three⁴⁴ were increasing particularly due to the division of Germany.⁴⁵

Under those circumstances, both the Americans and the British, being against Soviet insistence on having the bases in the Straits which might damage their own interest in the region, found the Soviet desire to have the privilege to send warships through the Straits in time of both war and peace reasonable.⁴⁶ That is to say, in spite of worsening relations of the US and Britain with the Soviet Union, their support to Turkey at that particular time was very limited.

To sum up, from January 1945 to July 1945, the Turkish government had to deal with the increasing pressure of the Soviet Union and found a very limited support from the US and Britain. While the wartime alliance between the Allies began to loosen gradually due to disagreements over the sphere of their own influence, the Turkish government tried to prove that Turkey had always been against Nazis in order to take a place on the side of the Allies. Although the Turkish politicians hesitated to assert their fear about the Soviet threat in public, they often mentioned how this issue was a real concern for Turkey in secret diplomatic meetings and stressed their disappointment about the attitude of the US and Britain towards the Soviet demands.⁴⁷

⁴² 20 June 1945: FRUS, frus1945berlinv01.i0024, pp. 74-75.

⁴³ 27 June 1945: FRUS, frus1945berlinv01.i0024, pp. 63-65. While the US and Britain regarded the Turkish foreign policy as “*a shift from the East to the West*”, they thought that the Soviet attitude to Turkey led to leaning of the latter upon Britain for support (29 June 1945: FRUS, frus1945berlinv01.i0024, pp. 67-69).

⁴⁴ The Turkish politicians and press used the word “*Üçler*” to define the “Big Three”, which were the US, the Soviet Union and Britain.

⁴⁵ Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey*, pp. 64-65.

⁴⁶ 15 July 1945: FRUS, frus1945berlinv01.i0024, pp. 105-106.

⁴⁷ For an example, see: 3 July 1945: FRUS, frus1945berlinv01.i0024, pp. 86-88.

2.1.2) The Reaction to the Soviet Demands and Accusations in Public: July 1945 – July 1947

After the Turkish government rejected the Soviet conditions in June 1945, the tension between two countries generated the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Turkey. By July 1945, it had become clear to the politicians that the Soviet Union would never give up their demands and accusations although the Turkish political elite did not completely lose their hopes to improve their relations with the Soviet Union. Besides, because there were major changes in the Turkish politics such as transition to the multi-party system and transition to the liberal economy, the Turkish government simultaneously had to face both internal and external challenges.

2.1.2.1) Transition from the One-Party Rule to the Multi-Party System and the Domestic Pressure in Turkey

The growing tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union overlapped with the increasing opposition in the domestic politics.⁴⁸ In the literature, there is an ongoing debate over the factors that led to the transition from the single-party system to the multi-party one. In other words, how and why CHP (and President İnönü) allowed the establishment of other political parties was a question tackled by the scholars. One of these explanations is related to the external factors; that is, Turkey's willingness to become a member of the United Nations and Turkey's post-war drive to the 'liberal democrat' west required a more democratic political environment. However, as Cemil Koçak pointed out, there was no obligation for Turkey, similar to most of the original members of the United Nations, to have a democratic system. Indeed, with only a few exceptions of the countries located in Europe, these countries, which became the original members of the UN, had either communist regimes or dictatorships.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, *Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-making in Turkey* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2009), p. 13.

⁴⁹ Cemil Koçak, *İkinci Parti: Türkiye'de İki Partili Siyâsî Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları (1945-1950)*. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010), pp. 80-81.

It was further claimed that there was also international pressure on the Turkish government to change the one-party rule.⁵⁰ However, Bernard Lewis found no evidence to prove that the US pressure caused the transition.⁵¹ Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, from the very beginning of the Cold War struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union, the US supported many authoritarian governments and regimes, which were assumed to be anti-Soviet and anti-communist. Besides, according to the scholarly writings of the period, even though Turkey had problems in terms of democratization, western scholars thought that the existing regime of Turkey was not similar to Nazism of Germany or fascism of Italy.⁵² Therefore, it is difficult to relate the roots of this change to external factors but better the internal economic and social factors should be examined.

The first one was the increasing opposition within CHP, which became more obvious in the mid-1945.⁵³ On June 7, 1945, for example, four members of CHP, who were Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Fuad Köprülü and Adnan Menderes, proposed to change certain articles of the constitution, as they thought that CHP did not allow the National Assembly's control over the government.⁵⁴ Besides, on June 11, 1945, the National Assembly accepted the *Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*, which aimed distribution of the land to the small peasantry. This event paved the way for the triumph of the opposition within the party because of some MPs, who were themselves big landowners.⁵⁵ One day later, the proposal given by the opponent group on June 7, 1945 was rejected and the four members later broke away from CHP and formed *Demokrat Parti* (DP) (the Democratic Party) in 1946. Adnan Menderes and Fuad Köprülü were

⁵⁰ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p. 129; Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), pp. 305-307.

⁵¹ Bernard Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey" *International Affairs* 27.3 (1951), p. 323.

⁵² A. C. Edwards, "The Impact of the War on Turkey" *International Affairs* 22.3 (1946), p. 392.

⁵³ Taner Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), pp. 13-14.

⁵⁴ Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), pp. 66-67.

⁵⁵ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 94.

expelled from CHP on September 21, 1945 while Refik Koraltan was expelled on November 27, 1945.⁵⁶

In parallel with the increasing opposition within CHP, the multi-party system officially began with the establishment of *Milli Kalkınma Partisi* (MKP) (the National Development Party), which was founded by Nuri Demirağ, Hüseyin Avni Ulaş and Cevat Rifat Atılhan on September 5, 1945. However, MKP remained as a 'symbolic' oppositional party due to lack of gain popular support and power in the National Assembly during the entire period.⁵⁷ The main opposition party of the period was thus *Demokrat Parti*, which was established on January 7, 1946 by the signatories of the proposal of June 7, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, Refik Koraltan, and Celal Bayar.⁵⁸

In addition to this political transition, there were also major changes in the national economic policies of Turkey such as liberalization of imports, foreign capitals and credits.⁵⁹ For Ahmad and Karpas, the main challenge that CHP had to tackle with was economic problems. In other words, rather than the existence of oppositional groups, the economic factors forced the CHP cadre to transform the current regime.⁶⁰ Regardless of the extent to which economic factors contributed the internal transformations, Turkey had severe economic conditions such as a sharp decline in exports and shortage of foreign exchange at the war's end although Turkey had only symbolically entered the Second World War.⁶¹ Among all economic obstacles, particularly the high cost of living increased discontent among public and both

⁵⁶ Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey*, p. 58. The founders of *Demokrat Parti* were influenced by the Democratic Party of the United States which was founded in 1828 (Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Yeni Bir Parti Kurulurken", *Vatan*, 3 December 1945, p. 1).

⁵⁷ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 94.

⁵⁸ Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 66-67.

⁵⁹ Ahmet Makal, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri (1946-1963)* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002), p. 26.

⁶⁰ Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye 1945-1980* (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 2010), p. 50; Kemal Karpas, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi: 1800-2012* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012), pp. 132-133.

⁶¹ Yahya Sezai Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), p. 61.

oppositional parties and newspapers did not lose the opportunity to utilize high levels of inflation to criticize the current government's economy policies.⁶²

Having confronted by economic problems, the CHP government took a set of actions in order to improve economic conditions. The most important one was the change in the value of the Turkish Lira from \$1 = TL 1.28 to \$ 1= TL2.8 on September 7, 1946, which was the first biggest devaluation of TL.⁶³ By this way, the government aimed to increase the bulk of exports and to accelerate integration of Turkey to the capitalist world economy.⁶⁴ As İsmail Soysal argued, this was not only a result of economic concerns of the government but also a result of political concerns, which aimed to accelerate Turkey's drive to the West.⁶⁵ Moreover, the government issued a special law which would liberate the capital inflow to the country on April 22, 1947. In effect, the business groups constantly declared their demands over the encouragement of the private entrepreneurship while criticized the protectionist policies of the government.⁶⁶ It was argued that the bourgeoisie and big landowners, who had been enriched during the Second World War and started to behave in relation to the American Cold War strategies, were great supporters of Turkey's close relations with the US following the end of the Second World War.⁶⁷ Moreover, the war conditions increased enmity among the capitalist class of Turkey towards CHP and they unsurprisingly began to support DP.⁶⁸ All these challenges forced CHP to abandon the protectionist policies in favor

⁶² Şerafettin Pektaş, *Milli Şef Döneminde, 1938-1950, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: Fırat Yayınları, 2003), p. 3.

⁶³ As the governmental press supported the devaluation of TL (Falih Rıfki Atay, "Yalnızca İşlerimizle Kazanacağız", *Ulus*, 16 February 1947, p. 1), the oppositional groups harshly criticized the government's action (Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, p. 19).

⁶⁴ Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, p. 322.

⁶⁵ Soysal, *Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri için Kılavuz*, pp. 15-16.

⁶⁶ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2007* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2011), p. 98.

⁶⁷ Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası: Soğuk Savaştan Yeni Dünya Düzenine* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1999), p. 59; Yıldırım Koç, *Kemalist Devrim CHP ve İşçi Sınıfı 1919-1946* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2013), p. 387.

⁶⁸ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, p. 18; Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Demokrasinin İlk Yılları 1947-1951*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1983), p. 140.

of economic liberalism.⁶⁹ Therefore, the Turkish government, having its own Cold War with the Soviet Union, had to take internal developments into account before projecting its Cold War agenda onto its foreign policy and now the Turkish government, under the domestic pressure of the new political environment and the changes in the international arena, sought to cope with these all.

2.1.2.2) Search for International Support

After rejecting the Soviet demands from Turkey, the members of CHP did not remain quiet regarding the Soviet demands and charges. Rather, starting from July 1945, they became more publicly vocal to respond to the Soviet demands. For example, on July 12, 1945, Foreign Minister Saka asserted, during his speech in London, that Turkey could not accept any proposal which was incompatible with its national sovereignty.⁷⁰ As will be discussed, this change in the government attitude to the Soviet Union was highly affected by the worsening relations of the Soviet Union with the US and Britain.

In this period, the Turkish government continued to search for international support (particularly from the US and Britain); yet, at the very beginning, the Turkish government felt alienated in the international system and failed to find the support that it looked forward to. During the Potsdam Conference, which was a peace conference held from 17 July to 2 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared its demands from Turkey before the US and Britain for the first time.⁷¹ While the Turkish-Soviet tension became a matter of discussion among the Allies, Churchill's Conservative government was replaced by Clement Atlee's Labour government in Britain on 26 July, 1945. Nonetheless, the new government of Britain, like its predecessor, tried to maintain the British hegemony in the world⁷² while trying to push the US to take an action against

⁶⁹ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1974), p. 218; Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, pp. 322-323.

⁷⁰ "Dışişleri Bakanımız Yakında Memlekete Avdet Edecek", *Ulus*, 13 July 1945, p. 1.

⁷¹ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 291-298.

⁷² Anne Deighton, 'Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1955', in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 113.

the Soviet Union.⁷³ While the British diplomats declared that they could not force Turkey to accept the Soviet proposals,⁷⁴ the American diplomats, supporting the control of the Straits by Turkey, favored the Soviet contention that the Montreux Convention was to be modified.⁷⁵ Later, the US declared that the Soviet proposals could be accepted in an international meeting, and the American view was very similar to that of the Soviet Union, which increased tension in Turkey.⁷⁶

In this atmosphere, confronted by the Soviet demands, the Turkish politicians came to see the United Nations (UN) as an organization which could both resolve the Turkish-Soviet problems and bring the world peace as well. Almost two months before the official establishment of the United Nations, for example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hasan Saka stated that the United Nations would aim to prevent a new war, which was equally important to win a war, and to maintain international order in harmony.⁷⁷ Despite all these supports to Turkey's membership in the UN, MPs sometimes criticized the structure of the UN. Recep Peker, CHP MP for Kütahya, protested the right of veto which was given to the five countries. For him, if one of them would attack other nations, it would be unpunished.⁷⁸ Therefore, although Turkey was very enthusiastic about being a member of the UN, it easily got frustrated with the UN's shortcomings and more importantly it did not bring an end to the Turkish alienation.⁷⁹

⁷³ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 43.

⁷⁴ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20 Yüzyıl Siyasi Siyasi Tarihi* (Ankara: Timaş Yayınları, 1995), pp. 415-416.

⁷⁵ David J. Alvarez, "The Missouri Visit to Turkey: An Alternative Perspective on Cold War Diplomacy" *Balkan Studies* 15.2 (1974), p. 225.

⁷⁶ Harry N. Howard, "The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations" *Middle East Journal* 30.3 (1976), p. 306.

⁷⁷ 15 August 1945: Hasan Saka, TBMM, 7-3-19-90, p. 8: "*Harbi kazanmak kadar yeni harbi önlemek ve milletler arası münasebetleri umumi bir ahenk düzeni içinde devam ettirmek amacı*".

⁷⁸ 15 August 1945: Recep Peker, TBMM, 7-3-19-90, p. 24: "*Yani beş büyük Devletten biri saldırgan olursa, bu Devlet kendi aleyhine oy vermeyeceği için cezaz kalacaktır*".

⁷⁹ Although the Turkish leaders declared that they lost their faith in the UN at home, they continued to claim that Turkey would remain loyal to the framework generated by the UN in the international meetings. For example, on April 16, 1946, Turkish Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, during the interview with the American journalists, containing no reference to the current relations between Turkey

Having disappointed by the UN, the Turkish politicians continued to meet their British and American counterparts in order to find solutions for the problems created by the Soviet pressure and to raise their concerns over the Soviet demands.⁸⁰ As the American intelligence reports stated, although the Soviet press, which was under the control of the Soviet government, remained quiet about the Soviet demands from Turkey, there were rumors in the Soviet Union which mentioned the possibility of a war with Turkey.⁸¹ In addition, as the British ambassador to the Soviet Union Harriman expected, the Soviet pressure towards Turkey would increase after November 7, 1945, when the Non-aggression Pact between two countries would expire. For him, the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union would depend on the Turkish determination to resist the Soviet demands along with the British and American support to Turkey.⁸² As the Western officials reported, the Soviet Union did not seem to be attacking Turkey after the expiration of the Soviet-Turkish Nonaggression Pact; instead, the Soviet Union would wage a war of nerves against Turkey in order to obtain its approval of the Soviet objectives.⁸³ As the American intelligence reports claimed, the Turkish authorities, in line with the opinions of the Western officials, thought that a military action by the Soviet Union did not seem to be possible in the near future⁸⁴ and the government was still willing to revise the Montreux Convention.⁸⁵

Nonetheless, having exposed to the further Soviet pressure, the ‘cautious’ attitude of the Turkish Government to the Soviet Union altered in November 1945. Since then,

and the Soviet Union, stated that Turkey would use the American credits to improve the infrastructure of the country. For him, Turkey, as a member of the UN and in line with the principles of the UN, would do its best for the sake of the world peace. As he stated, Turkey would be in favor of any treaty, which would be consistent with the framework of the UN (16 April 1946: BCA, 30 1 0 0 5 23 2.).

⁸⁰ 26 September 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, pp. 32-33.

⁸¹ 8 October 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, p. 34.

⁸² 24 October 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, p. 40.

⁸³ 1 November 1945: Cold War Intelligence and U.S. Intelligence on the Middle East (hereafter CWIO), RG-218, JCS Chairman's File - Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 20, File: Memos To/From President 1945, NA, CP. (accessed by <http://www.brill.com/products/online-resources/us-intelligence-middle-east-1945-2009>); 1 November 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, p. 50; 10 November 1945: CWIO, Intelligence Report, X-3636-S-45 U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁴ 2 November 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, pp. 52-53.

⁸⁵ 12 November 1945: FRUS, frus1945v08.i0015, pp. 57-58.

the politicians tried to reveal that they had a certain tendency not to fight with the SU; but, in case of any attack, Turks would be ready for defense to the death. They stated this quite categorically: First, they rejected the Soviet claims about the reluctance of Turkey to take up arms against Germany during the Second World War. Second, they declared that Turkey could not accept the terms proposed by the Soviet Union. On November 1, 1945, for example, President İsmet İnönü declared in his speech in the Turkish National Assembly that Turkey was the ‘only’ country among its counterparts, which had been on the side of UK and France since 1939. As he claimed, the Soviet government officially conveyed its appreciation for Turkey’s position to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Soviet embassy in Turkey on 19 January 1942, which was about how the position of Turkey had been useful for the Allies. He further accused the Soviet Union of signing a nonaggression pact with Germany, who later arrived to the “door of İstanbul”. As he concluded, Turkey owed nothing to anyone in terms of Turkish lands and rights and Turks would live and die as honorable people.⁸⁶

Even so, the Turkish government did not take any practical step against the Soviet Union; rather, it chose to wait the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, which was held among the US, the Soviet Union and Britain between December 16 and 26, 1945.⁸⁷ Prime Minister Saraçoğlu, for example, refused to discuss the Soviet territorial demands, when he was asked by the journalists in a press conference.⁸⁸ Indeed, according to Emin Karakuş who was a journalist working for *Tanin* in this period, President İsmet İnönü chose to remain quiet when he was asked about the Turkish

⁸⁶ 1 November 1945: İsmet İnönü, TBMM, 7-4-20-1, pp. 4-6: “1939 ilkbaharında ufuklar karardığı zaman, Türkiye kendi benzerleri içinde tek millettir ki, idealin doğru istikametini görerek açıktan İngiltere ve Fransa’nın yanında mevki almıştır. [...] Türkiye’nin durumunun Müttefikler için gerçekten faydalı olduğunu, Sovyet Hükümeti, Büyük Elçisi vasıtasıyla Dışişleri Bakanlığımıza, Sovyetlerin takdirlerini belirten tafsilat vererek 19 Ocak 1942 tarihinde resmen tebliğ edilmişti. [...] İstanbul’un kapısına gelmiş olan Almanlar, Sovyet Rusya ile Saldırmazlık Andlaşması ile daha önce bağlanmışlardı. [...] Açıkça söyleriz ki Türk topraklarından ve haklarından hiç kimseye verecek bir borcumuz yoktur. Şerefli insanlar olarak yaşayacağız ve şerefli insanlar gibi öleceğiz”. It was claimed that this speech was one of the cornerstones of transition to the multi-party system as İnönü promised to encourage establishment of new political parties (Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), p.15).

⁸⁷ Kristen Blake, *The US-Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945-1962: A Case in the Annals of the Cold War* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2009), p. 33.

⁸⁸ 5 December 1945: Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (hereafter BCA), 30 1 0 0 11 64 8.

policy towards the Soviet Union in a private meeting with the journalists, too.⁸⁹ Furthermore, as Metin Toker claimed, the government also tried not to reveal its concerns over the Soviet threat and its alienation in the international system to Turkish public.⁹⁰ Actually, in that time, as Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry Feridun Erkin claimed, Turkey was ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union and accept the Soviet proposal regarding the modification of the Montreux Convention if the US did not change its attitude towards the Soviet policy of the Straits.⁹¹ Therefore, CHP members, who had failed to find support from Britain and the US to reject the Soviet demands, were at that moment losing their morale of resistance to the Soviet pressure.

The Turkish government, yet, tried to show its determination not to accept the Soviet demands but at the same time they did not want to give up the hope for good relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. On December 20, 1945, Kâzım Karabekir, the commander of the Eastern Army during the Turkish Independence War and the speaker of the National Assembly in this period, said that as the Straits were the Turkish “national throat”, Turkey could not permit any attack on the Straits. For him, the Soviet Union needed to know that Kars was also the “national chine” and if it was to be broken, then Turks would be ruined. As Karabekir claimed, as long as Russians would insist on their demands, Turks would undoubtedly fight; but, the future would be dark both for Turks and Russians in this case. According to Karabekir, until the end of the world and only one Turk would remain, Turks would endeavor by spending everything they had.⁹² After threatening the Soviet Union, however, Karabekir said that the Turkish friendship was beneficial for Russians as well; therefore, he suggested

⁸⁹ Emin Karakuş, *40 Yıllık Bir Gazeteci Gözü ile İşte Ankara* (İstanbul: Hür Yayın ve Ticaret, 1977), p. 84.

⁹⁰ Metin Toker, *Türkiye Üzerine 1945 Kabusu* (Ankara: Akis Yayınları, 1971), pp. 8-12.

⁹¹ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), p. 302.

⁹² 20 December 1945: Kazım Karabekir, TBMM, 7-4-20-15, pp. 44-45: “*Boğazlar; milletimizin hakikaten boğazıdır. Oraya el saldırtmayız. Fakat şunu da bilmelidir ki; Kars yaylası da milli bel kemiğimizdir. Kırdırırsak yine mahvoluruz. Eğer Ruslar bizden yer istemekte ısrar ederlerse hiç şüphe yoktur ki dövüşeceğiz; fakat istikbal bize olduğu kadar kendileri için de karanlık olur. Cihan yıkıluncaya kadar ve tek bir Türk kalıncaya kadar varımızı, yoğumuzu ortaya koyarak uğraşacağız*”. Note that both the “Straits” and “throat” mean “*boğaz*” in Turkish.

the Soviet Union to trust Turks.⁹³ Moreover, Hasan Saka, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that Turkey did not lose its hope about the re-establishment of the sincere and friendly relations between two countries just like in the past. For Saka, even the Soviet decision not to renew the Non-aggression Pact had not diminished Turkish sympathy towards the Soviet Union.⁹⁴

Although the Turkish political elite tried not to lose the hope for having close relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet intimidation did not cease to exist at the beginning of 1946: As Erkin told to the American ambassador to Turkey Wilson on January 3, 1946, Turkey was very angry about the Soviet aggression and it had almost lost its patience.⁹⁵ Moreover, the Turkish politicians were wondering what the US and Britain would do in case of a Soviet attack to Turkey.⁹⁶ At the same time, the Turkish politicians were trying to prove that Turkey would not remain silent against the possible Soviet invasion. As Saka said in a secret meeting with the American ambassador Wilson on January 18, 1946, "*the Turkish people would meet such a situation with firm resolution and he was sure the result would be armed conflict*"⁹⁷ and as Acting Foreign Minister Sümer declared on February 13, 1946, the "*conception of Soviet bases in Straits is obviously incompatible with Turkish sovereignty*".⁹⁸

⁹³ 20 December 1945: Kazım Karabekir, TBMM, 7-4-20-15, pp. 44-45: "*Türk dostluğu Ruslara da kuvvet verir. Türklere güvensinler*".

⁹⁴ 20 December 1945: Hasan Saka, TBMM, 7-4-20-15, pp. 45-46.

⁹⁵ Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Şeytan Üçgeninde Türkiye* (Ankara and İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), p. 268. Meanwhile, the American intelligence reports regarded Turkey, together with Iran, as "*an area of friction*" for the US with respect to the Soviet aims toward these countries (1 March 1946: CWIO, RG-319, Entry 47D G-2 Intelligence Project Decimal File 1946-1948, Box 171, File: 350.09 F.E. thru 9-26-47, NA, CP). While the Soviet agents in Turkey began to act more boldly, the Turkish government, in belief that enemy living amongst us, increased their suspect of communist groups, for their sympathy with the Soviet Union (5 January 1946: CWIO: RG-226, Entry 190B, Box 30, Folder 311, NA, CP, p. 5.).

⁹⁶ 10 January 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 7-8.

⁹⁷ 18 January 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 9-10

⁹⁸ 13 February 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 15-17.

As the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union was deteriorating, the relationship of the Soviet Union with the US and Britain was also worsening.⁹⁹ The Soviet Union, which was supposed to withdraw its forces from Iran in March 1946 as was decided in Potsdam Conference, had not left Iran until May 1946. This situation, along with the Soviet pressure towards Turkey and Greece, convinced the British government that a friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union was impossible.¹⁰⁰ In this atmosphere, on March 5, 1946, the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in his famous 'Iron Curtain' Speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, stated that Turkey and Iran were under the pressure of the Soviet government.¹⁰¹ As a matter of fact, Churchill had an anti-Soviet attitude from the Bolshevik Revolution's outset and Churchill was very obsessed with the war-time Soviet-American rapprochement; that is, he tried to force the US government to take an action against the Soviet Union even after he lost elections in Britain.¹⁰² As this speech had a deep impact on the American policy of the Cold War and the US became more critical of the Soviet Union,¹⁰³ by the beginning of 1946, Turkey became one of the crucial strategic fronts where the Cold War borders were tried to be drawn.

Meanwhile, as reported by American intelligence service, while the Soviet propaganda machine and the war of nerves waged against Turkey continued and the Soviet Union aimed the isolation of Turkey in the region,¹⁰⁴ the American ambassador in Turkey Wilson believed that the Soviet Union would choose to benefit from an "*indirect*

⁹⁹ Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), p. 41.

¹⁰⁰ Sharos M. Hanes and Richard C. Hanes, *Cold War: Biographies* (Detroit: UXL, 2003), p. 3.

¹⁰¹ 5 March 1946: WCDA, Churchill's "Iron Curtain" Speech, "Sinews of Peace".

¹⁰² Fraser J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 107-109.

¹⁰³ Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain*, p. xii; Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 43; Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution, and Cold War, 1945-1991* (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 14.

¹⁰⁴ 14 March 1946: Truman Library (hereafter TL), Memorandum, "Background of Soviet Foreign Policy", pp. 1-4 (accessed by www.trumanlibrary.org); 29 March 1946: CWIO, RG-59, Entry 1561, Box 14, File: Soviet Interests, Intentions, Capabilities & Military Activities, NA, CP; 1 April 1946: TL, Memorandum, "Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East", pp. 1-2; 11 April 1946: TL, Telegram, Walter Bedell Smith to George Marshall, pp. 4-5; 17 May 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 24-25.

*methods of aggression against Turkey, such as employment of Armenian and Kurdish 'fronts' in Eastern Provinces, rather than take risks involved in open war".*¹⁰⁵ As the 'war of nerves' waged by the Soviet Union against Turkey intensified, the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union began to accelerate due to disputes over Germany, Trieste, Japan and the Middle East, for each state tried to increase its sphere of influence in these regions at the expense of the other.¹⁰⁶ In this atmosphere, on March 22, 1946, George Kennan, who was the American ambassador to Moscow, stated in his 'long telegram', which analyzed the Soviet foreign policy, that Turkey was one of the regions which the American government had to take immediate actions for the purpose of blocking the communist attempts. For him, the current government in Turkey was already against the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.¹⁰⁷ This telegram was a decisive factor in shaping the US attitude towards the Soviet Union while it made Kennan one of the most eminent American politicians who played an important role in shaping American Cold War politics as a member of the US State Department.¹⁰⁸

George Kennan's long telegram was followed by the visit of the 'Missouri' to İstanbul, which carried the dead body of former Turkish ambassador Münir Ertegün on April 6, 1946 and it changed the course of the Turkish-American relationship. In fact, Ertegün died on November 11, 1944 and his body was temporarily buried in the United States. What is more, the Japanese surrender had been signed in the Missouri in September 2, 1945.¹⁰⁹ That is to say, the Missouri had a symbolic meaning for the US. Accordingly, its visit to Turkey was perceived by Turkey and the Soviet Union as a gesture of the US to show its support for Turkey in the Turkish-Soviet tension. In effect, the US officials such as James Byrnes and James Forrestal expressed anti-Soviet attitudes in this period, which referred to a change in the US foreign policy towards Turkey and

¹⁰⁵ 18 March 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 18-19.

¹⁰⁶ Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, p. 61.

¹⁰⁷ 22 March 1946: WCDA, George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'.

¹⁰⁸ Allan M. Winkler, *The Cold War: A History in Documents* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.24.

¹⁰⁹ Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), pp. 309-310.

the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰ Moreover, as Erkin claimed, the Americans began to support Turkey in its resistance to the Soviet proposals following the visit of Missouri.¹¹¹ In response to the American gesture, on May 8, 1946, during his speech in the National Assembly, Saraçoğlu stated that Turkey was indebted to the US not only for financial issues but also for its moral support. For him, Turkey would try to pay its debt by being on the side of the US, whose policies aimed to achieve freedom, justice and world peace.¹¹² As Saraçoğlu's speech demonstrated, being on the side of the US, the government tried to send a message to the Soviet Union and the world about forming an alliance with the US.

As the Turkish government appreciated the US's friendly attempts to give support to Turkey; Britain, together with France, was 'still' an 'official' ally of Turkey as a result of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939. In other words, although the US had signed a couple of treaties with Turkey, there was no such a bilateral security treaty between two countries yet. As Avcıoğlu claimed, the US hesitated to form an alliance with Turkey in the beginning of the period due to its ongoing wartime alliances with the Soviet Union.¹¹³ Moreover, while the Second World War led to the rise of the US as a hegemonic power in the capitalist bloc and the US predominance over Britain, the British wanted to maintain its existence in the Mediterranean and southeastern Europe.¹¹⁴ More importantly, despite its decreasing national welfare during the course of the war, Britain was still the strongest 'European' country.¹¹⁵

For these reasons, the Turkish government closely watched the British foreign policy to understand what its 'ally' was doing and whether and how Britain would support

¹¹⁰ Alvarez, *The Missouri Visit to Turkey*, p. 236; Blake, *The US-Soviet Confrontation in Iran*, p. 37.

¹¹¹ Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 295-296.

¹¹² 8 May 1946: Şükrü Saraçoğlu, TBMM, 7-4-23-48, p. 7.

¹¹³ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün-Bugün-Yarın* (V.1) (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1976), p. 551.

¹¹⁴ Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (London: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 34.

¹¹⁵ David Reynolds, "The European Dimension of the Cold War", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 128.

Turkey in its 'war of nerves' with the Soviet Union. To demonstrate, as the Turkish press attaché in London reported to the government on May 29, 1946, the British had more opportunities to increase its influence in the Middle East than in China and Latin America and it had to compete with the United States in China and Latin America. However, it was stressed that Britain did not oppose the presence of the US in the Middle East; instead, the British regarded the American involvement in the Middle East as compatible with its own interest. According to this report, the Soviet Union, replacing Germany and Italy in this region, became the new enemy of Britain in the Middle East; therefore, the British had to expand its security line in the region to Turkey.¹¹⁶ As this report reflected the Turkish understanding of what was going on in the international arena by May 1946; from the Turkish perspective, the British and Americans formed a very tight alliance in the Middle East therefore Turkish policy towards Britain in effect was towards the USA, too.

In this regard, the clash of interests between the Soviet Union and other members of the Big Three began to decrease the Turkish alienation gradually. For example, on June 4, 1945, Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 27 July 1945 to 9 March 1951, stated "*Britain would honor its obligations to Turkey under the 1939 Alliance in case of a threat to Turkish independence*".¹¹⁷ While the Western support to Turkey was steadily increasing, the Soviet Union remained relatively quiet regarding their demands from Turkey during the mid-1946.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the first multi-party general elections of Turkey were held on July 21, 1946: while CHP gained the majority with 390 MPs of 465, DP had only 65 MPs and there were 7 independent MPs. Therefore, the official opposition took place in the National Assembly for the first time.

¹¹⁶ 29 May 1946: BCA, 30 1 0 0 101 623 12.

¹¹⁷ Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 242.

¹¹⁸ 24 June 1946: CWIO, RG-165, Entry 421 ABC, Box 251, File: 336 Russia (22 Aug 43) Sec. I-C, NA, CP., p. 6.

Following the elections, the new government in Turkey was further searching for the international support and the Soviet Union brought the issue of the Straits to the agenda again. On August 7, 1946, the Soviet Union, through a diplomatic note which was also sent to the US and Britain, proposed the joint management of the Straits by Turkey and the Soviet Union.¹¹⁹ After the US declared its negative attitude regarding the proposal to the Soviet Union on August 19, 1946,¹²⁰ the Turkish government, following its meetings with the American and British diplomats, replied to the Soviet note on August 22, 1946. For the Turkish government, while the revision of the Montreux Convention would be possible only in the international meetings, it was impossible to accept the control of the Straits by the Soviet Union.¹²¹ This rejection by the Turkish government was unquestionably much correlated with the change in the attitude of the US and Britain towards the Soviet Union.

Having support of the US and Britain, the new government in Ankara, similar to its predecessor, had to deal with the issues generated by the Soviet aggression. To be more precise, in August 1946, the Soviet Union increased its military pressure on Turkey by sending new troops to both the Balkans and the Caucasus in September 1946.¹²² On August 14, 1946, Recep Peker, the prime minister from 7 August 1946 to 10 September 1947, as a response to the Soviet accusations about Turkey's developing close relations with the US and Britain which threatened the Soviet Union, said that "*we cannot accept the claim that Turkey's relations in international affairs might cause any damage for the Soviet Union. Turkey wants nothing but friendships with all nations*

¹¹⁹ As the American ambassador in Turkey reported on August 12, 1946, "*Turks somewhat more concerned over Soviet note than impression gathered by British ambassador indicated*". However, it was stated in the report that "*fortunately Turks are tough obstinate people, determined defend their position*". (12 August 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 36-38.)

¹²⁰ Oral Sander, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1979), pp. 10-12.

¹²¹ Necdet Ekinci, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Düzene Geçişte Dış Etkenler* (İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 1997), p. 265.

¹²² Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953*, pp. 305-307.

(particularly, with its neighbors) together with its own national sovereignty and territorial integrity".¹²³

As the politicians started to respond to the Soviet Union more aggressively, during September 1946, the visits of important American public figures to Turkey, together with the messages of Turkish government to them and to the American public, might also show the presence of an avert confidence among the Turkish politicians as a result of the American and the British support. For example, when Prime Minister Peker met with Harold Dwight Lasswell, a prominent American academic who played a decisive role in the Cold War politics as the president of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and of the World Academy of Art and Science (WAAS), on September 3, 1946, Peker expressed the gratitude of Turkey for the shift in the American foreign policy from isolationism to internationalism.¹²⁴ Similarly, the Prime Minister, in his meeting with Jeannette Rankin, who was the first female American parliamentarian, stated that he was very pleased with the current American foreign policy, which had abandoned the principle of isolationism and the US decided to serve world peace through a more active role in the world politics.¹²⁵

In the face of worsening US-Soviet relations, on September 24, 1946, the Soviet Union sent a second diplomatic note to Turkey. While the Soviet Union repeated their demands, the second note was milder in tone compared to the previous one.¹²⁶ Although this new note had not been sent to the US, the US, sending a diplomatic note to the Soviet Union on October 9, 1946, said that this issue had to be resolved through

¹²³ 14 August 1946: Recep Peker, TBMM, 8-1-1-3, pp. 3-7: "*Türkiye'nin Uluslararası manzumede idame ettiği özel münasebetlerden Sovyetlere herhangi bir zarar gelebileceğini katiyen kabul etmiyoruz. Türkiye'nin bütün milletlerle, bilhassa komşu memleketlerle dostluk bağlarından ve kendi egemenliğine ve toprak bütünlüğüne riayetten başka hiçbir isteği yoktur*". Moreover, the new government continued to look toward the international support to counterbalance the Soviet pressure on Turkey. As claimed by Wilson, the New Prime Minister was attaching a great importance to "*increasing friendship, understanding with US*" (17 August 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 44-45). In effect, the US regarded Turkey as "*the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*" (23 August 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 57-58).

¹²⁴ 5 September 1946: BCA, 30 1 0 0 11 65 5.

¹²⁵ 10 September 1946: BCA, 30 1 0 0 101 624 9.

¹²⁶ Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet ilişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 302-303.

the international meetings rather than solely by the Black Sea countries.¹²⁷ Following the American note and replying the second Soviet note on October 18, 1946, the Turkish government stated that its answer was the same of the answer to the first note.¹²⁸

While the Turkish government needed the foreign support if the Soviet threat was to be resisted and the financial difficulties which it had to deal with were to be solved;¹²⁹ on January 24, 1947, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hasan Saka stated that throughout this period there had been no improvement in the relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union.¹³⁰ Whereas Turkey trusted its ally, Britain, for its support against the Soviet penetration, an unexpected situation emerged: Britain could no longer sustain military and economic aid to Turkey and Greece.¹³¹ On February 21, 1947, the British officially informed the US State Department that Britain was not able to provide financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey.¹³² This decision was a result of economic crisis in Britain; that is, the British government could not maintain country's imperialist policies any longer. Accordingly, Britain had to abandon the Palestine mandate and leave India.¹³³ While the British retrenchment caused a major change in the world politics, the presence of the Soviet threat led to the mobilization of Turkish army, which drained upon the national budget.¹³⁴ Naturally, the end of the British financial and military aid might lead to severe results for Turkey.

In such an environment, the communist threat in Greece, increasing power of the communists in satellite countries and Soviet domination in Poland following the

¹²⁷ Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953*, pp. 308-309.

¹²⁸ Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet ilişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 306-307; Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, pp. 42-49.

¹²⁹ 8 January 1947: FRUS, frus1947v05.i0006, pp. 2-3; 18 January 1947: BCA, 30 10 0 0 268 806 4.

¹³⁰ 24 January 1947: Hasan Saka, TBMM, 8-2-4-35, p. 8.

¹³¹ 25 January 1947: The British National Archives (hereafter TNA), CAB 129/16/34. (accessed via the website www.nationalarchives.gov.uk)

¹³² David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 282.

¹³³ Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War*, p. 282.

¹³⁴ 27 February 1947: FRUS, frus1947v05.i0006, pp. 60-62.

elections which was held in January 19, 1947 forced the US to take an action against the Soviet Union.¹³⁵ Following Truman's famous speech on March 12, 1947, which had led to the rise of the Truman Doctrine, the US started to take the place of Britain, as the main western ally of Turkey. Truman, during his speech which was also broadcasted by *Ankara Radio*, stated that *"the political independence and territorial integrity of Turkey are of great importance of the security of the US and of all freedom loving peoples. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nation I recommended to the American Congress on March 12, 1947 the extension of assistance to Turkey and to Greece"*.¹³⁶

Nevertheless, the American support to Turkey did not immediately erase the Turkish concerns over the Soviet threat. In the telegram sent by Turkish embassy in Bern on March 25, 1947, for example, it was written that the Soviet Union would re-affirm its claims on Turkey starting with the spring. This document also argued that the Soviet Union was making propaganda in the communist countries about the Straits and its territorial demands, which emphasized that these demands were a prestige issue for the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union would never give up these claims.¹³⁷ Similarly, on May 28, 1947, Feyzullah Uslu, who was CHP MP for Manisa, in his speech in the National Assembly claimed that the international system was not stable yet. He, giving examples of Iran, the Balkans and India which affected the national security of Turkey, too, mentioned a threat of the communist expansion in the world. Nonetheless, for him, the United States, in every part of the world, was defending these countries against a horrible power, which wanted to destruct the entire world. According to Uslu, not only Turkey but also the rest of the world were in danger of the communism; that's why Turkey needed to receive the American aid.¹³⁸ Therefore, as Uslu's speech shows, the Turkish political elite, linking the American aid to the Soviet threat, tried to justify

¹³⁵ Craig and Logevall, *America's Cold War*, p. 78.

¹³⁶ 12 March 1947: BCA, 30 1 0 0 101 624 13.

¹³⁷ 25 March 1947: BCA, 30 1 0 0 111 700 3.

¹³⁸ 28 May 1947: Feyzullah Uslu, TBMM, 8-2-5-65, p. 22.

receiving the US aid as a defensive measure.¹³⁹ Hence, from July 1945 to July 1947, in the existence of the escalating tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey, the Turkish government finally began to find the international support that it had searched for against the Soviet demands and accusations.

2.1.3) The Government Attitude to the Cold War: July 1947 - May 1950

In this atmosphere, following the introduction of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey found herself in the middle of the emerging Cold War conflicts between the US and the Soviet Union more. That is to say, Turkey, having already its own Cold War at home as a result of the Soviet threat since mid-1945, was also a part of the grand Cold War struggles in the international arena. Although there were rumors about new demands of the Soviet Union from Turkey both in intelligence and national and foreign press, the Soviet accusations and demands were dropped by the Soviet leaders following the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.¹⁴⁰ The Soviet Union perceived the Marshall Plan, along with the Truman Doctrine, as a deliberate attempt to create an anti-communist environment in non-communist Europe.¹⁴¹ Accordingly, Molotov, at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris from June 27 to July 1, 1947, rejected the proposal of a supranational organization including communist countries in Eastern Europe to accept the Marshall Plan since Stalin thought that such an organization enabled the US to interfere in domestic affairs of European countries.¹⁴² After the Foreign Ministers Conference which further increased bipolarization in the world system, Turkey signed the treaty of aid with the United States on July 11, 1947. Therefore by July 1947, the relations between Turkey and the US became very strong

¹³⁹ According to an American intelligence report, Turkey would be able to resist the Soviet aggression and even an attack by the Soviet Union as long as it would be aided by the United States and/or Great Britain (15 June 1947: FRUS, frus1947v05.i0006, pp. 233-237).

¹⁴⁰ Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 55.

¹⁴¹ Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics*, p. 24.

¹⁴² David Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* (London: Hodder Education, 2010), p. 58.

and Turkey began to be backed by the West through the Marshall Plan and bilateral treaties.¹⁴³

Regarding the internal politics in Turkey, the tension between CHP and DP had extremely arisen. However, President İnönü, calmed two parties down with his speech on July 12, 1947.¹⁴⁴ The new government led by Recep Peker obtained a vote of confidence from the National Assembly while 35 MPs from CHP did not vote for Peker's government on August 26, 1947. This had further increased the tension within the governing party. Nevertheless, the National Assembly ratified the American aid treaty unanimously on September 1, 1947. That is to say, in spite of tension between the government and the opposition as well as within CHP, no MP objected to the American aid.

Following the international support given to Turkey, the government members and CHP MPs began to rewrite history in order to prove that Turkey had been always on the side of the western democracies and tried to justify why Turkey received the American aid. For example, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saka, said that the US had demanded nothing but Turkey's interest so far.¹⁴⁵ According to Nihat Erim, CHP MP for Kocaeli, the main reason for the advent of the Second World War had been the isolationist policy of the US during the inter-war period. For Erim, the threat that Turkey, together with other countries, had to cope with, could not be stopped without the American aid.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, in the opinion of Kasım Gülek, CHP MP for Seyhan, Turkey had already supported and defended the principles of the Truman Doctrine since the very beginning of the Turkish Republic.¹⁴⁷

While the Turkish government tried to consolidate its relations with the US, Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was founded by the communist

¹⁴³ "Türk-Amerikan Anlaşması İmzalandı", *Ulus*, 13 July 1947, p. 1.

¹⁴⁴ "İnönü'nün Beyanâtı", *Ulus*, 12 July 1947, p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ 1 September 1947: Hasan Saka, TBMM, 8-2-6-79, p. 7.

¹⁴⁶ 1 September 1947: Nihat Erim, TBMM, 8-2-6-79, p. 8.

¹⁴⁷ 1 September 1947: Kasım Gülek, TBMM, 8-2-6-79, p. 9.

countries in September 1947 as a response to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and to increase cooperation among the communist countries.¹⁴⁸ While the relationship between Turkey and the US was improving day by day, the Turkish officials did not neglect the relations with Britain. Rather, along with the course of the Turkish-British relations, Turkey had signed a treaty of friendship with Iraq on September, 7, 1947. In effect, the good relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states were encouraged and supported by Britain since Britain assumed these relations might prevent the Soviet expansion in the region.¹⁴⁹ In fact, Turkey did not really want to alienate or threaten Britain and so it was very cautious to give assurances.¹⁵⁰

Hand in hand with the government authorities, the Turkish businessmen, who had close relations with the government, also tried to strengthen Turkish-American relations. To exemplify, on December 20, 1947, Vehbi Koç, who was the president of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce and Industry having close relations with CHP, following his visit to the US in 1946, met with the American ambassador to Turkey, Wilson. As Vehbi Koç summarized his opinion to Mr. Wilson, his greatest purpose was to enhance the commercial relations between Turkey and the US, as the representative of many American firms in Turkey. For him, as Turkey spent the most of the dollar reserves that it had possessed in order to purchase American products, it had to deal with scarcity of American dollars. For him, Turkey was only able to import goods from the US as much as it could export to the US. For this reason, he demanded

¹⁴⁸ Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Soviet Union and the World, 1944–1953”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 105.

¹⁴⁹ Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the early Cold War Era* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 104-107.

¹⁵⁰ In addition, the government attached to a great emphasis to the Turkish prestige in the eyes of the World. As reported by the Turkish ambassador to the US Erkin to the Foreign Ministry on September 27, 1948, the American movie ‘Turkey’s \$ 100,000,000’ waged a negative propaganda about Turkey and the Turkish government in the United States. As Feridun Cemal Erkin claimed, the movie showed only the poorest parts of Turkey to the American public. As suggested in the report, Turkey, as India had done before, needed to make propaganda in the US with its own money (27 September 1948: BCA, 30 10 0 0 268 806 17). Hence, on the one hand, Turkey wanted to get the American aid, on the other hand she did not want to be described as a poor country, which would not be civilized without American benevolence, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.

certain favors such as decreasing tariff rates or increasing the level of quotas from Wilson in order to boost the bulk of commerce between two countries to improve infrastructure of Turkey.¹⁵¹ Indeed, as Toker claimed, Vehbi Koç, the wealthiest businessman of that period, visited the US in order to improve the economic relations.¹⁵² In this regard, Vehbi Koç's report shows that the government's drive to the US was overlapped with the opening up of Turkish economy to the American business world.

While Turkey was trying to improve its relations with the US and Britain, the government was also closely watching the relations among the world powers as well due to its eagerness to become a member of international organizations as a part of its Cold War strategy. For example, on January 2, 1948, the Turkish press attaché in London Nuri Ateş sent a report related to the policies of the US, the Soviet Union and Britain, following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London from November 11, 1947 to December 16, 1947 which had failed to provide a progress on the peace treaties to be signed with Germany and Austria. According to the report, Stalin was not satisfied with current situation and Molotov regarded the Marshall Plan as a complete defeat of the Soviet Union.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ 20 December 1947: BCA, 30 1 0 0 42 250 4.

¹⁵² Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 178.

¹⁵³ 02 January 1948: BCA, 30 1 0 0 101 625 2. Similarly, the Turkish press attaché in the US sent a report to the government on January 21, 1948 about the American election campaigns. According to the report, while the Republicans manipulated Truman's domestic politics, Truman was doing his best and, even in the US which had enormous resources and income, it was not possible for Truman to solve all the internal problems. Moreover, the US, thanks to Truman's initiatives, was trying to enhance international trade (21 January 1948: BCA, 30 1 0 0 101 625 14). Hence, from the Turkish government's view, Truman had a positive image. Moreover, on May 22, 1948, the Turkish press attaché in Washington Nüzhet Baba sent a report to Ankara regarding the presidential elections of the US, which would be done in November, 1948. As Baba stated, the American public loved not only Truman but also General Marshall and General Eisenhower, for their patriotic characters which were deprived of political ambitions (22 May 1948: BCA, 30 1 0 0 101 627 14). While getting closer to the western countries, the government also tried to follow the developments in the West as well. On December 16, 1948, the Turkish press attaché in Washington sent a report to Ankara regarding the Second Presidency of Truman. As the report considered the foreign policy of Truman "the New New Deal", the US was expected to maintain its aid to the European states whereas it did not seem to send an aid to China due to antipathy towards the national Chinese government in the US. (16 December 1948: BCA, 30 1 0 0 101 628 11).

As this report suggested, the international events of that period prompted emergence of the West as the major factor in the Turkish foreign policy and further accelerated Turkish drive to the West. For example, the Brussels Pact was signed by Belgium, Britain, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands on March 17, 1948 and the US Congress approved the Marshall Aid on April 2, 1948. In this political climate, Turkey became a member of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) on April 3, 1948. After the American Senators, including both the Republican and Democratic ones, accepted the 'Vandenberg Resolution'¹⁵⁴ which had enabled the alliances and bilateral treaties of the US with other countries on June 11, 1948, Turkey signed the Treaty of Economic Cooperation with the US on July 4, 1948. Accordingly, the increasing close relations between Turkey and the US had both political and economic dimensions. In this regard, as Necmettin Sadak, who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 10, 1947, stated in the Turkish National Assembly on July 8, 1948, both the Marshall Plan and the treaty with the US would help Turkey in its developmental purposes in the long-run.¹⁵⁵ In effect, as will be discussed later, the Turkish concerns over the economic development were both a reason and a justification for Turkey's drive to the West during the early Cold War period.

At that moment, having found themselves in the middle of the Cold War tension and getting closer to the West, the politicians began to express their opinions over the Soviet threat in public more boldly but they were still cautious. For example, on November 1, 1948, President İsmet İnönü, in his opening speech for the new legislative year of the National Assembly, stated that the pains generated by the Second World War were not erased yet. As Turkey had tried to increase its national security, the military aid provided by the 'friendly' American government had helped Turkey to modernize its army. For the president, Turkey was collaborating with all peaceful democracies of the world, giving a higher priority to the 'ally' Great Britain and the

¹⁵⁴ Arthur Vandenberg was a Republican senator who played a key role in persuasion of American public that a foreign aid to Turkey and Greece was necessary for the US's own interests. His anti-communist position contributed to the justification of the Truman Doctrine at home (Andrew Hartman, *Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 58).

¹⁵⁵ 8 July 1948: Necmettin Sadak, TBMM, 8-3-12-85, pp. 37-41.

‘close friend’ United States. As İnönü stated, there had been no improvement in the Soviet-Turkish relations recently, although Turkey wished to have good relations with the Soviet Union. He concluded that Turkey had to consider its own national security and territorial integrity while also striving for the construction of the world peace.¹⁵⁶

Only a month after İnönü’s conciliatory speech, Sadak, in a conversation with Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, mentioned the necessity of the regional cooperation against the Soviet pressure.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, the Turkish government tried to convince the American and British authorities that Turkey absolutely needed to receive the American aid and a security arrangement had to be formed to stop the Soviet expansion in the region. As will be discussed below, both the Turkish political elite and press members urged the necessity of formation of a regional security arrangement at every opportunity.

In the meantime, the politicians publicly expressed their appreciation of the improving relations with the West. On December 24, 1948 when the transfer of the American aid was opened to approval of MPs, the Turkish MPs discussed the importance of the American aid to Turkey in the National Assembly. For Cemil Bilsel, CHP MP for Samsun, the US fortunately changed its isolationist policies following the end of the Second World War and, for him, the United States demanded only self-determination of all nations in the world, which was exactly the principle of the Turkish foreign policy.¹⁵⁸ For Sadi Irmak who was CHP MP for Konya, Turkey desperately needed to improve its national economy in order to serve the world peace in a better way.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, Foreign Minister Sadak, after giving his thanks to the United States, stated

¹⁵⁶ 1 November 1948: İsmet İnönü, TBMM, 8-4-13-1, pp. 4-7.

¹⁵⁷ 3 December 1948: TNA, F.O. 800-507, pp. 23-24: As Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadak claimed, *"Turkish foreign policy was based on the Anglo-Turkish Alliance of 1939. He suggested that recent events had shown that the Soviet Government was in a great hurry and in a mood for increasing pressure going beyond Czechoslovakia and Finland; and that, in the opinion of his Government, the time had come for frank political and military discussions between the two Governments"*.

¹⁵⁸ 24 December 1948: Cemil Bilsel, TBMM, 8-4-14-23, pp. 18-19.

¹⁵⁹ 24 December 1948: Sadi Irmak, TBMM, 8-4-14-23, pp. 21-22.

that the recent events were just the beginning of the collaboration of Turkey with the United States and European countries.¹⁶⁰

In this political environment, Turkey's drive to the West continued in 1949 and, from late 1948 to January 1949, the CHP MPs and the ministers were almost competing with each other to thank the US government for the aid which Turkey received. On January 24, 1949, for example, Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay, explaining the program of the new government which was formed following the cabinet reshuffle on January 16, 1949, stated that Turkey would do its best in order to benefit from the American aid by improving its own national economy.¹⁶¹ Similarly, on February 21, 1949, CHP MP for Diyarbakır Vedat Dicleli stated that the Turkish army was gaining strength thanks to the aid of the friendly American government.¹⁶² Further, President İsmet İnönü wrote a letter to President Truman and said that *"I should like to lay particular stress on the precious military aid which has been given to us by the United States in one of the most critical periods which the world is going through, and for which the entire Turkish nation is imbued with the most profound gratitude"*.¹⁶³

In this period when Turkey had apparently developed a close attachment to the US, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was founded as a military alliance involving Western Europe and the United States on April 4, 1949, appeared as an important factor in shaping Turkish politicians' perceptions of the Cold War. Before and after the formation of NATO, the Turkish concerns once more increased because of the exclusion of Turkey and its neighbor Greece, where there was an ongoing civil war between the government and the communist groups since 1945, which would end on October 16, 1949.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ 24 December 1948: Necmettin Sadak, TBMM, 8-4-14-23, p. 53.

¹⁶¹ 24 January 1949: Şemsettin Günaltay, TBMM, 8-4-15-36, pp. 2-5.

¹⁶² 21 February 1949: Vedat Dicleli, TBMM, 8-4-16-48, p. 40.

¹⁶³ 31 March 1949: FRUS, frus1949v06.i0014, p. 9.

¹⁶⁴ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1990), pp. 18-21.

In effect, there were two points about the relations between Turkey and NATO: Turkish political elite was not comfortable with the Turkish exclusion from NATO and the Turkish government asked for a very similar treaty such as a Mediterranean pact.¹⁶⁵ For example, as Sadak asserted before the official declaration of NATO, the Turkish government understood the exclusion of Turkey from NATO; instead he underlined the necessity of a Mediterranean pact, in which Turkey would have a leading role.¹⁶⁶ In agreement with Sadak, Erkin claimed, the Soviet Union was waging propaganda in Turkey about the Turkey's exclusion from the Atlantic Pact which, for the Soviet Union, proved that the United States was not really interested in Turkey.¹⁶⁷

CHP MPs, however, tried to show that the exclusion of Turkey did not generate a 'particular' nervousness on the part of Turkey in open meetings because Turkey had always been in danger with or without the formation of NATO. For example, on March 16, 1949, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak, in his speech in the National Assembly, said that the political turmoil in Europe had continued since the spring of 1948. As he stated, no one could be able to predict when the Cold War or the 'Fireless War' (*Ateşsiz Harb*) would end. As claimed by Sadak, Turkey was the most affected country from the current situation as it had to endure the heaviest burden for the defense of Europe.¹⁶⁸ On the same day, Yusuf Kemal Tengirşerk, CHP MP for Sinop, approving

¹⁶⁵ For examples, see: "Atlantik Paktı Bir Akdeniz Paktı ile Tamamlanmalı", *Ulus*, 18 February 1949, pp. 1-3; "B. Sadak Le Monde Gazetesine Bir Demeç Verdi", (*Le Monde*) *Ulus*, 22 February 1949, p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ 14 February 1949: TNA, F.O. 800-507, pp. 35-39; 12 April 1949: FRUS, frus1949v06.i0014, pp. 10-16.

¹⁶⁷ 17 February 1949: FRUS, frus1949v04.i0006, pp. 117-121. What is more, the inclusion of Italy raised certain questions regarding the exclusion of Greece and Turkey from the Pact while the British and American authorities explained the membership of Italy as the geographical continuity, which was not an applicable argument to Greece and Turkey (2 March 1949: FRUS, frus1949v04.i0006, pp. 141-143; 8 March 1949, FRUS, frus1949v04.i0006, pp. 175-177; 17 March 1949: FRUS, frus1949v04.i0006, pp. 235-236; 2 April 1949: FRUS, frus1949v04.i0006, pp. 270-271; 5 May 1949: FRUS, frus1949v06.i0014, pp. 23-33). From the viewpoints of the US, Turkey and Greece had strategic importance because they disabled the Soviet access to Mediterranean and the Suez region along with oil reserves in the Middle East. For McCauley, the US had three options to erase the concerns of local governments in Turkey and Greece which had arisen from their exclusion from NATO and inclusion of Italy and French Algeria: a bilateral agreement with them, a regional (Middle Eastern or a Mediterranean) pact or NATO membership. As McCauley argued, the first two options posed serious problems for the US (McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 73-76).

¹⁶⁸ 16 March 1949: Necmettin Sadak, TBMM, 8-4-17-56, pp. 4-5.

Sadak's claims, concluded that there was no need to worry for the exclusion of Turkey from NATO. For him, both the strategic position of Turkey and the existence of heroic Turkish soldiers made already Turkey as an indispensable ally in the eyes of the western powers. He only expected the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 'sell' these two features of Turkey to the western countries.¹⁶⁹ Further, the government assured the public about the continuation of the US support for Turkey. On May 11, 1949, following his three-day visit to the US and a special meeting with Truman, Sadak stated that Truman promised to do his best for the welfare and security of the Turkish people. As he stated, the Turkish foreign policy was based on Atatürk's famous motto "*Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh*" (Peace at Home, Peace in the World).¹⁷⁰

At the same time, the government authorities always stated that they really wished to have good relations with the Soviet Union but the Soviet Union did not respond the good-intended policies of Turkey. To put it another way, CHP members might have used the exclusion to decrease the tension with the Soviet Union. In this regard, on November 1, 1949, President İnönü mentioned that there had been no change in relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, but he underlined that Turkey wanted to improve its relations with its neighbor.¹⁷¹

Meanwhile, there were further developments which consolidated the link between Turkey and the West (particularly, the US); the National Assembly approved the membership of Turkey in Council of Europe on December 12, 1949 and Turkey signed a cultural treaty with the United States on December 27, 1949.¹⁷² As Turkey's drive to the West was accelerated in this atmosphere, there would be the general elections in May, 1950 and the Turkish concerns over the Soviet threat did not come to an end. Instead, the Turkish diplomats constantly told their concerns over Turkish national

¹⁶⁹ 16 March 1949: Yusuf Kemal Tengirşerk, TBMM, 8-4-17-56, p. 5.

¹⁷⁰ 11 May 1949: Necmettin Sadak, TBMM, 8-4-19-84, pp. 4, 8.

¹⁷¹ 1 November 1949: İsmet İnönü, TBMM, 8-5-21-1, p. 7: "*Sovyetler Birliği ile iyi olmasını samimiyetle arzu ettiğimiz münasebetlerimizde, bu sene dahi yeni bir gelişme ifade edecek durumda değiliz*".

¹⁷² "Türk-Amerikan Kültür Anlaşması", *Ulus*, 28 December 1949, p. 1.

security to their western counterparts in the secret diplomatic conversations.¹⁷³ In a similar way, the Turkish diplomats mentioned how the presence of the Soviet intimidation caused “*an extremely heavy burden of military expenditure*” in order to persuade the West to increase the share of Turkey from the Marshall Plan.¹⁷⁴

Although the Turkish politicians did not hesitate to mention their concerns over the Soviet threat and their desire to increase the bulk of the American aid, they never revealed their fear of the Soviet invasion in public while expressing their appreciation of the American aid and NATO, for it was formed against the Soviet aggression in Europe.¹⁷⁵ For example, on February 15, 1950, Hüsametdin Tuğaç, who was CHP MP for Kars, stated that the collaboration with the Allies (especially with the great friend of Turkey, the United States) consolidated the power of the Turkish army, while Turkey could not sustain military expenditure on its own.¹⁷⁶ In the meantime, the political transition in Turkey maintained with the change in the Election Law on February 16, 1950, which further accelerated transition to the multi-party system and strengthened the position of the opposition against the government.¹⁷⁷ Accordingly, as a result of the growing discontent against the CHP government, on May 14, 1950,

¹⁷³ 5 December 1949: FRUS, frus1949v04.i0006, pp. 359-361: For example, based on a conversation with Erkin, the American deputy undersecretary of state Rusk noted that “*they were conscious of the lack of any commitment on the part of the United States to assist Turkey if she were attacked. Until Turkish-American relations were ‘clarified’ by means of a formal mutual defense arrangement the Turkish people would never feel fully satisfied with their international situation*”.

¹⁷⁴ 1 February 1950: FRUS, frus1950v05.i0016, pp. 1-4.

¹⁷⁵ Nonetheless, the Turkish politicians tried to attract their western counterparts’ attention to the urgency of a regional security arrangements, which would be a complement security guarantee to NATO. For example, Feridun C. Erkin “*referred to his repeated approaches to the Department regarding the desirability of concluding a regional Near Eastern pact of which Turkey would be a member and which would be supported by the United States*” (15 February 1950: FRUS, frus1950v05.i0016, pp. 8-9). “*The Turks have periodically urged that they be included either in the Atlantic Pact or some similar regional arrangement and also moral support of the Allies*” (6 March 1950: FRUS, frus1950v05.i0016, pp. 13-15; 1 April 1950: TNA, F.O. 800-507, pp. 45-46; 5 April 1950, TNA, F.O. 800-507, pp. 47-48; 5 April 1950: CWIO, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001117974, p. 15; 3 May 1950: TNA, F.O. 800-507, p. 49).

¹⁷⁶ 15 February 1950: Hüsametdin Tuğaç, TBMM, 15 February 1950, 8-5-24-47, p. 17: “*Hükümetimizin müttefikler ve bilhassa büyük dostumuz Amerika ile işbirliği yapmakta olduğunu ve bizim takatimiz dışındaki hazırlıkların kısmen dostlarımız tarafından nazarı dikkate alınmış olduğunu memnuniyetle görmekteyiz*”.

¹⁷⁷ Mustafa Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti (1946-1960)* (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004), pp. 153-156.

Demokrat Parti won the elections and Adnan Menderes became the prime minister, Celal Bayar became the new president of Turkey on May 21, 1950.¹⁷⁸

To sum up, the Cold War agenda of the Turkish government in this period was (re)shaped by both the internal developments (such as the transition to the multi-party system or transition to the liberal economy) and international events (such as the introduction of the Truman Doctrine and the formation of NATO). In this political and economic atmosphere, the government shaped its attitude towards the Cold War both according to the perception of the Soviet threat and the Western support to Turkey. While speeches and opinions of CHP members might frequently change, sometimes even from day to day, two themes always remained in the Cold War agenda of the Turkish government: the perception of the Soviet threat and the desire to getting closer to the West.

2.1.4) Anti-Communism of the Government

In these changing attitudes of the Turkish government towards the early Cold War, anti-communism played a key role in the early Cold War agenda of the Turkish government. It is important to state that anti-communism in Turkey was not something new; instead, communist groups in Turkey had always been suspected by official authorities for their potential to destroy the regime. However, until 1945, the nexus between anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitudes had remained very weak. To clarify, although the government regarded the presence of the communist groups in Turkey as a threat to the survival of the regime, it had barely or publicly connected these groups with the Soviet Union and, more importantly, the Soviet Union had not been perceived as an external threat until 1945. As an example, on September 10, 1938, the government permitted for the publication of articles in *Ulus*, which were about the cultural and economic developments in the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁹ Nonetheless, as discussed

¹⁷⁸ "Yeni Kabine Bu Sabah İlk Toplantısını Yaptı", *Akşam*, 23 May 1950, p. 1. The Americans expected the new government in Ankara would cooperate with the US and the other western countries as well similar to its predecessor CHP because, in their minds, these two parties were united on the foreign policy of Turkey (22 May 1950: FRUS, frus1950v05.i0016, pp. 39-40.).

¹⁷⁹ After the Soviet ambassador to Turkey demanded from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey, CHP accepted the Soviet proposal. The approval was given by Celal Bayar, who was the Vice Chair of

below, communist groups in Turkey were perceived as Soviet spies following the Soviet demands from Turkey.

The development of anti-communism in Turkey was also related to the development of anti-communism in the West. Anti-communist campaigns of Truman administration (particularly during the presidential elections of 1948) exaggerated the power of communist groups not only in the United States but also in aid-receiver countries such as Greece and Turkey. Truman, by this way, tried to justify his anti-communist policies at home along with the American aid to European countries.¹⁸⁰ In Turkey where the Soviet threat and anti-Soviet waves already existed, anti-communism of the Turkish government went parallel with the anti-communist US campaigns.

The Turkish government's anti-communism in this period, which took shape within the framework of the early Cold War, was also related to the tension between CHP and other political parties and groups. To be more exact, CHP tried to benefit from anti-communist and anti-Soviet themes for the purpose of suppressing oppositional groups, which criticized CHP's internal and external policies. On December 4, 1945, for example, the newspaper *Tan* was raided by the university students and there was an anti-communist meeting in İstanbul.¹⁸¹ For Koçak, this event represented a new dimension in the Turkish-Soviet relations.¹⁸² In addition to *Tan*,¹⁸³ *Yeni Dünya*, a leftist journal, was devastated by the protestors and these events were perceived both in and outside Turkey as a message to the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁴ Namely, CHP tried to show that

CHP in this period, and it was decided that the Soviet newspapers, *Pravda* and *Isvestia*, would make news about Turkey in return (10 September 1938: BCA, 30 10 0 0 85 558 6).

¹⁸⁰ Hartman, *Education and the Cold War*, p. 79.

¹⁸¹ As Topuz claimed, the event of *Tan* was prepared and provoked by CHP (Hıfzı Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1973), p. 166).

¹⁸² Koçak, *İkinci Parti*, p. 817.

¹⁸³ There were leftist columnists of *Tan* such as Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav, Niyazi Berkes (Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi* (İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1987), p. 288).

¹⁸⁴ Onur Öymen, *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe: İktidar Uğruna Demokrasiyi Feda Edenler* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2011), p. 370.

an ‘internal’ threat, which threatened authority of the government, was related to the external powers (i.e., the Soviet Union).

As another example of how CHP accused the opponent groups of being a communist, on January 29, 1947, the members of the National Assembly discussed anti-communism in Turkey following the proposal of Ahmet Ulus, who was CHP MP for Giresun, regarding the measures taken by the Turkish government against the “communist provocations” (*komünist tahrikler*). Accordingly, the Minister of Internal Affairs Şükrü Sökmensüer divided the historical evolution of the communist activities in Turkey into five period: 1919-1925, 1925-1928, 1928-1935, 1935-1945 and 1945-1946. For the Minister, the communist activities either remained secret or observed outside the country during the first four periods, whereas the communists tried to benefit from democratization efforts of the government in the fifth phase. For him, the newspaper *Tan*, along with the ‘Socialist Workers and Peasants Party’ founded by Şefik Hüsnü and ‘Socialist Party of Turkey’ founded by Esat Adil Müstecaplıoğlu,¹⁸⁵ had tried to provoke Turkish workers by the directives of the Soviet Communist Party. In the words of Sökmensüer, the communists aimed to capture the government through the revolution and with the help of the Soviet Union. After reading the letters written by Zekeriya Sertel to Tevfik Rüştü Aras and to Fevzi Çakmak, he accused both Adnan Menderes and Fuad Köprülü of collaborating with the communists. As written in the letter, both Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar accepted to send articles for *Görüşler*, which was a leftist journal.¹⁸⁶ Taking floor after Sökmensüer, DP MP for İstanbul Celal Bayar refused to accept these accusations and said that the minister read letters written by ‘a few vagrants’.¹⁸⁷ After Celal Bayar’s response, the Minister seemed to be convinced that DP was not in support of the communist groups in Turkey.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ These two left-wing parties were established in 1946 but the government closed them only six months after their formation and arrested their members. The Soviet Union had influence over the communist parties in Turkey (Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey*, pp. 71, 118).

¹⁸⁶ 29 January 1947: Şükrü Sökmensüer, TBMM, 8-2-4-37, pp. 4-9.

¹⁸⁷ 29 January 1947: Celal Bayar, TBMM, 8-2-4-37, p. 10: “Birçok serserilerin mektuplarını getirmiş okuyorlar.”

¹⁸⁸ 29 January 1947: Şükrü Sökmensüer, TBMM, 8-2-4-37, pp. 9.

Nonetheless, the tension between two political parties was made worse by this speech.¹⁸⁹ Although Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, in 1947, claimed that *Demokrat Parti* had nothing common with the communists;¹⁹⁰ as Mumcu claimed, both CHP and DP accused each other of being communist during the entire period.¹⁹¹ That is to say, anti-communism became a practical tool for the government to suppress the opposition, which might imply the fact that the Cold War conflicts and the Soviet threat in general affected the domestic politics while the opposition accused the government of being a ‘Bolshevik’ particularly due to its etatism, as will be discussed below.

In this regard, starting from 1945, for the reason that the government perceived communist ideology as a source of dangerous propaganda to manipulate the Turkish minds, the government banned the publication of the books and journals whose ideological standpoint was very close to the Soviet Union. According to a report issued on January 4, 1946, some 'unknown' people put up an announcement entitled ‘*Vatansız Adamlar*’ (Stateless Men) at the door of the Graduate Business School (*Yüksek Ticaret Okulu*) located in Sultanahmet, İstanbul on December 7, 1945. As reported by the Ministry of National Defense, the announcement made communist propaganda and the Ministry wanted the government to institute an inquiry to find the people who put the announcement. It is important to note that, according to the announcement which the Ministry regarded as “communist”, the current government in Turkey abandoned the principles of “saintly” (*Aziz*) Atatürk and betrayed the country and the Republic.¹⁹² Although whether this announcement made communist propaganda or not is open to discussion, it seems certain that the government authorities were very sensitive to any kind of political manifests which criticized CHP policies and they had a tendency to regard such criticisms as ‘communist’.

¹⁸⁹ Goloğlu, *Demokrasiye Geçiş*, p. 157.

¹⁹⁰ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, *Benim Görüşümle Olaylar 4: Komünist Tahrikler Karşısında* (Ankara: Karagöz Matbaası, 1947), p. 42.

¹⁹¹ Uğur Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1990), p. 133.

¹⁹² 4 January 1946: BCA, 30 10 0 0 210 428 9.

Similarly, the government prohibited entry of books and journals into the country which had been published in communist countries because the government thought that they might threaten integrity of Turkey.¹⁹³ For example, on July 22, 1946, the government prohibited the entry of the newspapers of *Azat Millet* and *Azerbaycan* which were published in Soviet Azerbaijan, for these newspapers made Bolshevik propaganda and aimed to achieve a communist revolution in Iran.¹⁹⁴ Although there was no specific reference in the report mentioning that these newspapers made propaganda against Turkey, their communist content caused the prohibition. Moreover, even though the Soviet troops left Iran two months earlier, the Turkish government, taking its own interests into account, did not approve communist propaganda against the current pro-West regime in Iran.

Likewise, on December 21, 1946, the government prohibited both the short biography of Joseph Stalin and the book *Harman Yangını* (The Harvest Fire). As it was stated, the former was “obviously” full of socialist and communist propaganda including eulogies for Lenin and Stalin and the book aimed to spread the idea of world communism. According to the report, the book included a part of one of Molotov's speeches, which made the book more “provocative”. As stated in the report, *Harman Yangını* which consisted of short stories written by Sabahattin Ali, a communist Turkish novelist, poet and journalist who was killed in April 1948.¹⁹⁵ As claimed in

¹⁹³ Before 1945, there had been similar restrictions and prohibitions regarding the communist publications. However, compared to post-World War II period, such government actions remained very limited. See Seda Bayındır Uluskan, *Atatürk'ün Sosyal ve Kültürel Politikaları* (Ankara: Korza Basım, 2010), pp. 175-182 for a complete list of prohibited publications during the interwar period.

¹⁹⁴ 22 July 1946: BCA, 30 10 0 0 87 573 5. Moreover, on July 10, 1948, the government prohibited the newspaper of *Devamlı Bir Sulh İçin Bir Halk Cumhuriyeti İçin* published in Belgrade (10 July 1948: BCA, 30 18 1 2 117 50 2) and the journal of *Ogonek Kıvılcım* published in Moscow (10 July 1948: BCA, 30 18 1 2 117 51 4). On February 17, 1949, the government prohibited the journal of *Sovyet Ermenistan* and the album of *1920-1945 Sovyet Ermenistan* (17 February 1949: BCA, 30 18 1 2 118 100 18) and *Sovyet Haberleri Servisi* published in Syria and Lebanon (17 February 1949: BCA, 30 18 1 2 118 100 12). Moreover, on September 22, 1949, the government prohibited *the bulletin of Service de Presse et d'Information* published by Yugoslavia ambassador in French (22 September 1949: BCA, 30 18 1 2 120 71 6) On January 19, 1950, the government prohibited the book *La Tchécoslovaquie En Marche Vers Le Socialisme* published in Czechoslovakia (19 January 1950: BCA, 30 18 1 2 121 101 17).

¹⁹⁵ Kemal Sülker, *Sabahattin Ali Dosyası* (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1968), p. 5. Sabahattin Ali was one of the columnists of the newspaper *Tan* and he lost his job following the raid of the newspaper.

the report, these stories tried to provoke Turkish public against the authority of the government by increasing class struggles and creating hostility among Turkish people. In addition, the stories were believed to have an obvious admiration to the Soviet Union and focus on the Turkish youth.¹⁹⁶ In other words, CHP members seemed to be concerned with criticisms of CHP put forward by these publications rather than the communist threat itself.

As such, the struggle against communism took a central place in the agenda of CHP. For example, on June 8, 1948, CHP decided to form a special commission for the examination of the leftist publications, which made communist propaganda. As stated in the report, communists, who pretended to act in the name of justice, attacked CHP leaders by sometimes making secret communist propaganda.¹⁹⁷ Similarly, on September 17, 1948, the governor of Siirt, Turgut Başkaya, sent a report stating that the local authorities received letters via mail which said “Long Live Communism, Down with Republic” (*Yaşasın Komünizm, Kahrolsun Cumhuriyet*). The governor wanted to inform the government about the danger of communist propaganda in the city and also wanted to learn what the government suggested him to tackle with such a dangerous propaganda.¹⁹⁸

In reality, Turkish officials sometimes took this perception to exaggerate communist threat. To exemplify, on December 30, 1946, the government ordered confiscation of the copies of the poetry book *Rüzgarlarım Konuşuyor* (My Winds are Speaking) written by Cahit Saffet Irgat, who was a stage actor and poet, for it was believed that the book made communist propaganda. According to this report, Irgat's poems reflected an understanding of “dialectic materialism” and included “humanistic” and “leftist” ideas. The report included some of Irgat's poems and explained why they made communist propaganda: “*Are you in bloods of how many friends of mine, Pomegranate? You seem to be a blood brother of Poppy, Cornelian Cherry,*

¹⁹⁶ 21 December 1946: BCA, 30 10 0 0 87 575 7.

¹⁹⁷ 8 June 1948: BCA, 30 1 0 0 42 252 1.

¹⁹⁸ 17 September 1948: BCA, 30 1 0 0 66 410 1.

Watermelon. Our inside is like inside of the watermelon, it smells Poppy and Cornelian Cherry".¹⁹⁹ As stated in the report, there were many words (particularly, "Red") which might evoke communism.

In addition to the prohibition of communist publications, there were also some efforts to break the effect of communist propaganda by CHP. This was exemplified by the petition written to the government by R. Necati Yazgan, who was a member of the Court of Auditors, on April 14, 1949. Yazgan demanded the government to publish his book *Dünya İşçilerine Mektup* (A letter to the Workers of the World), which made anti-communist propaganda. As it was written in the book, the writer wanted the working class to become aware of the dangers of the communist regime. For example, Yazgan claimed that in all communist countries, people (especially, the workers) were suffering at the hands of the communist leaders. For him, the western democracies began to become aware of the damages of the communist movements.²⁰⁰ To sum up, along with its worsening relations with the Soviet Union and increasing relations with the West, anti-communism of CHP gained momentum during the period and the boundaries between the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet attitudes became unclear. Moreover, the government, sometimes exaggerating the threat, perceived the communist publications, which were written in and outside Turkey, as a potential threat to the survival of the Republic, regardless of whether they were communist or not.

2.1.5) Developmentalism of CHP in the early Cold War

In addition to the Soviet threat, the prosperity and economic development which presented as the natural outcomes of Turkey's drive into the West became a cornerstone of the Cold War agenda of the Turkish politicians. Before an analysis of how the Turkish political elite developed a developmental agenda during the course of the early Cold War, it is needed to understand how the understanding of

¹⁹⁹ 30 December 1946: BCA, 30 10 0 0 87 576 1: "*Kaç dostumun kanudasın Nar?, Kan kardeşi bir halin var Gelincikle, Kızılıcıkla, Karpuzla, İçimiz karpuz içi, Gelincik ve kızılıcık kokuyor*".

²⁰⁰ 14 April 1949: BCA, 30 18 1 2 119 32 8.

developmentalism had evolved until 1945 and which conditions contributed to the necessity of the economic development uttered by both political elite and intellectuals of that time.

The developmentalism and etatism of the Kemalist regime had been (re)shaped in an environment in which led to global economic crisis known as the Great Depression. The Turkish Republic, as a newly emerging state, had to deal with the shrinkage of exports and difficulties of paying foreign debt. As this situation created a more inward-looking understanding of economic policies, industrialization occupied a central place in the developmental purposes of the political elite and the first Five-Year Industrialization Plan began to be implemented in 1934. To put it differently, the Turkish government attempted to realize its developmental achievements through a rapid industrialization, which was one of the first state-led development strategies of the history.²⁰¹ As Kazgan pointed out, the plan was successful and industrial sectors were mainly driven by the public enterprises until 1945.²⁰²

Regarding the intellectual environment of that period, the members of the magazine *Kadro*, which was published from 1932 to 1934, such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Burhan Asaf Belge and Vedat Nedim Tör appeared as influential theorists in discussing etatism of the government and in shaping ideology of the Republic.²⁰³ Indeed, most members of *Kadro* movements had been leftist people and they lived in the Soviet Union in the past.²⁰⁴ However, as Aydemir explained, in an environment where liberalism was abandoned and Great Depression was the biggest crisis in the history of the capitalism, an inward-looking economy was necessary, but *Kadro* was also against the notion of ‘class struggle’.²⁰⁵ As will be discussed in the next chapter,

²⁰¹ John Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), p. 36.

²⁰² Gülten Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1999), p. 72.

²⁰³ Mustafa Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), p. 9.

²⁰⁴ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “Kadro ve Kadrocuların Öyküsü”, in Murat Gültekingil (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 8: Sol* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), p. 600.

²⁰⁵ Şevket Süreyya [Aydemir], *İnkılap ve Kadro (İnkılabın İdeolojisi)* (İstanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1932), pp. 11-32.

these people were also important figures of the Turkish press during the early Cold War period.

Although the CHP elite had aimed to apply the second Five-Year Industrialization Plan in 1939, the Second World War interrupted planning economy and severely diminished capital accumulation in the country. As soon as the war had ended, the planning economy was brought into the government's agenda again. A new development plan, which was heavily based on agriculture instead of industrial sectors, was prepared by the members of *Kadro* in October, 1947. This plan, to a large extent, abandoned the etatism of the 1930s and protectionist economic policies.²⁰⁶ Although the plan was never implemented, some of its aims such as support of private entrepreneurship was realized in the following years.²⁰⁷

The change in the understanding of the economic development was also related the political rivalry between CHP and DP. Samet Ağaoğlu, an influential member of DP argued that while CHP favored a 'revised' version of the etatism of 1930s which still gave priority to the state enterprises; individualism and private entrepreneurship took a more central place in DP's etatism.²⁰⁸ Moreover, according to Boratav, the only difference between CHP and DP with respect to their understanding of etatism was the former's reluctance to privatize the 'existing' state-owned enterprises (SOEs) while it had no objection to international free trade and foreign economic aid. On the other hand, as Boratav claimed, DP declared its desire to privatize 'all' SOEs.²⁰⁹ By the same token, Ahmad claimed that CHP members supported private entrepreneurship at least as much as DP members.²¹⁰

This approach, which asserted that there was only a slight difference between CHP and DP with respect to the understanding of etatism and economy policies in general,

²⁰⁶ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, pp.81-97.

²⁰⁷ Yalçın Küçük, *Planlama, Kalkınma ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1985), pp. 254-255.

²⁰⁸ Samet Ağaoğlu, *Demokrat Partinin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri: Bir Soru* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972), p. 144.

²⁰⁹ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, pp. 90-99.

²¹⁰ Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, p. 35.

is yet open to discussion. First of all, as a result of internal pressure over CHP and persistent high level of inflation,²¹¹ CHP had to change its economy policies. Indeed, on November 17, 1947, CHP, during its seventh party congress, decreasing importance of industrialization for the party, redefined the etatism and decided to support the private entrepreneurship more.²¹² Nonetheless, both the scope of etatism (i.e., to which extent the government should intervene in the economic sphere) and the nexus between the public and private sectors (i.e., to which extent the state should support private entrepreneurship) were points at issue between CHP and DP. Hence, each political party tried to show public that their economy policies were better than those of the other.

The rivalry between two political parties increased as the elections of May 1950 approached. In this atmosphere, the CHP cadre had to defend government's economic policies and give the message that CHP's developmentalism did not work at the expense of private sectors to both Turkish and foreign businessmen. On March 29, 1950, for instance, Minister of Economic Affairs Cemil Barlas stated that CHP would maintain its etatism after the elections.²¹³ As he later explained, CHP recognized 'private ownership' in economic terms but it was a socialist and peasant's party in terms of social and justice affairs.²¹⁴ As another example, in his article in *Ulus* written to respond Ahmet Emin Yalman of *Vatan* who had close ties with DP and claimed that CHP's protectionist policies resembled communism, Yavuz Abadan, who was CHP MP for Eskişehir, reminded the reader that CHP did not prevent free enterprise. Rather, as Abadan claimed, CHP had always supported private entrepreneurship.²¹⁵ Later, in his analysis of the "boundaries of CHP's etatism", Abadan argued that the "moderate" (*ılımlı*) and "reasonable" (*makul*) etatism of CHP was very different from

²¹¹ As DP members accused CHP of mismanaging the country, DP leaders asserted that CHP could not stop high inflation. For examples, see: "Celal Bayarın Demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 October 1946, pp. 1, 3.

²¹² *CHP'nin Yedinci Büyük Kurultay Tutanağı* (Ankara, 1948), p. 10

²¹³ "Devlet Bakanı Gaziantep'te Seçmenleriyle Konuştu", *Ulus*, 29 March 1950, p. 1.

²¹⁴ "Cemil Sait Barlasın Seçmenlere Hitabı", *Ulus*, 7 May 1950, p. 5: "İktisadi bakımdan mülkiyeti tanıyoruz, içtimai adalet bakımından sosyalist ve köylü partisiyiz".

²¹⁵ Yavuz Abadan, "İktisadi Hürriyet Bahsi", *Ulus*, 2 February 1949, p. 1.

communism.²¹⁶ As a matter of fact, while DP members accused CHP of being a 'Bolshevik' in applying protectionist policies, CHP members not only defended policies of their party but also tried to show how DP's economic policies were bad.



Figure 1²¹⁷

One of the arguments that CHP members pointed out was the political past of DP leader Celal Bayar because he was the minister of Economic Affairs from 1932 to 1937 then the prime minister until January 1939 when the government pursued protectionist economic policies. For example, one week before the elections of 1950, *Ulus* called Celal Bayar an "inconstant" (*dönek*) claiming that Celal Bayar, as an

²¹⁶ Yavuz Abadan, "Devletçiliğin Sınırları", *Ulus*, 3 February 1949, p. 1. For similar articles written by CHP-linked press members to defend CHP's etatism and to disprove DP's claims about the similarity between CHP's etatism and Bolshevik ideology, see: Esat Tekeli, "İktisadi Kalkınmanın Tartışmaları", *Ulus*, 31 July 1947, p. 2; Peyami Safa, "Plan ve Sistem", *Ulus*, 2 February 1949, p. 1; Yavuz Abadan, "En Hayati Mesele", *Ulus*, 10 February 1949, p. 1; Nizamettin Ali Sav, "Devletleştirme", *Ulus*, 23 February 1949, p. 2; Yavuz Abadan, "İktisadi Kalkınma Şartları", *Ulus*, 5 March 1949, p. 1; Feridun Osman Menteşeoğlu, "Zirai Kalkınmanın Görünüşü", *Ulus*, 10 March 1949, p. 2; Ali Rıza Erem, "Kemalizmin Devletçiliği", *Ulus*, 14 March 1949, p. 2; Feridun Osman Menteşeoğlu, "Bizim Komünizmimiz", *Ulus*, 16 March 1949, p. 2; Yavuz Abadan, "İktisadi Seferberlik", *Ulus*, 18 March 1949, p. 1; Yavuz Abadan, "Demokrasi ve Kalkınma Davamız", *Ulus*, 8 February 1950, p. 3; Bülent Büktaş, "Ekonomik Kalkınmamız", *Ulus*, 8 April 1950, p. 2; Bülent Büktaş, "Yurdun Ekonomik Kalkınması", *Ulus*, 28 April 1950, p. 2.

²¹⁷ *Ulus*, 10 May 1950, p. 1.

“excessive” (*müfrit*) defender of the etatism, currently pretended to favor private entrepreneurship and capitalists.²¹⁸ As another example of how the ‘etatism’ became a bedrock issue of the political competition between CHP and DP, the cartoon, which was published in CHP’s official newspaper *Ulus* just four days before the elections with the title of “*Inspirations from the Two Election Statements*” in Figure 1 could be considered. On the left side, Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay gives a speech on the podium in front of electors. The listeners were thin and common people wearing the poor-boy hats. Günaltay says: "*the factories which we founded in all parts of the country are belonged to you. They are the own commodities of the nation*". At the bottom of the caricature, "*etatism for the nation*" is written. On the right side, DP leader Celal Bayar gives a speech in front of fat and rich people, who wear the rich-man hats. Bayar declares that "*our party will not forget your help, these factories will be yours*". "*Individualism for filthy rich people!*" is written at the bottom of the caricature. Therefore, both understanding of and discussions over the economic development and etatism were shaped in an environment where political opposition emerged as an obstacle with which CHP had to tackle. Regardless of the similarity between CHP and DP with respect to their understanding of etatism as the current literature suggests, the government’s understanding of economic affairs was different from that of DP, at least in ‘rhetoric’.

In addition to internal factors, the understanding of developmentalism and etatism of the Turkish government must have been affected by the changing international system and world economy. If the Cold War is defined a struggle between a centrally planned economy and a liberal capitalist one, as Maier defined;²¹⁹ the Turkish government must have been closer to the second option; for one thing, there were economic problems at home and for another Turkey’s drive to the ‘capitalist’ West in this period. To be more exact, before this period both the Soviet Union and the Soviet experts played a decisive role in the economic development of Turkey. For example, in 1934, Turkey received

²¹⁸ "Celal Bayar'ın Dönekliği", *Ulus*, 6 May 1950, p. 3.

²¹⁹ Charles S. Maier, “The World Economy and the Cold War in the Middle of the Twentieth Century”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 45.

both financial and technical aid from the Soviet Union in order to realize its five-year industrialization plan.²²⁰ Etatism of Turkey during the 1930s was not a socialist one but it was not a 'liberal' version of capitalism either. In this decade, as Hobsbawm argued, the Soviet economy “*appeared to be immune to the catastrophe*” created by the capitalist crisis.²²¹ In such an environment where a Soviet-type economic planning seemed to be a better alternative, a centrally-planned economy existed in Turkey, as a newly established state.

However, this changed during the 1940s. When Turkey could not take financial and technical aid from the Soviet Union due to its worsening relations with the Soviet Union and/or the war-ravaged Soviet economy, the 'capitalist' western countries became the 'only' option for Turkey, from which it was able to get foreign aid. Accordingly, after the Second World War, Turkey continued to strengthen its relationship with the West by participating the Western Cold War institutions. For example, on March 11, 1947, Turkey became a member of both World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had further accelerated its drive to the West and integration to the world economy dominated by the US.²²² As Kemp-Welch argued, these liberal institutions, which promised to promote peace and prosperity in the capitalist countries, served to the US hegemony in the capitalist world economy.²²³ In such an atmosphere where the US economic liberalism began to dominate the capitalist bloc, of which Turkey tried to become a part, the Turkish government might not have been able to maintain its pre-war etatist and protectionist policies.

²²⁰ Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yentürk, *Türkiye Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1994), p. 68; Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, p. 213.

²²¹ Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, p. 107.

²²² Turkish politicians were very glad with Turkey's participation in Western economic organizations. For example, as Faik Ahmed Barutçu, the Minister of State and the Vice Prime Minister, claimed on May 21, 1948, the initial affiliations of Turkey with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was pleasing to Turkey as it would provide national economic development in the long-run (21 May 1948: Faik Ahmed Barutçu, TBMM, 8-3-11-61, p. 9).

²²³ Anthony Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 11.

Another factor which contributed to the change in the government's understanding of economic development stemmed from the change of Turkey's trade partners. As the Second World War approached, Germany became the main trade partner of Turkey while Turkey could not export its goods and products to Britain and France as much as it wanted due to their access to raw material at cheaper prices from their own colonies. When Turkey became unable to sustain its commercial relations with Germany as a result of both the course of the Second World War and the pressure of the Allies to cut off its relations with Germany, Turkey had two options in order to sell raw materials produced in the country and import manufactured goods, which were the US and Britain. Although these two countries tried to minimize Turkey's problem within the framework of international trade, their financial aid to Turkey remained limited in the very beginning of the period.²²⁴ Indeed, the US was regarded as the 'only' partner which would help Turkey in its developmental achievements following the end of the Second World War when European economy had been destructed and Turkey had lost most of its trade partners.²²⁵ Hence, both the advent of the Second World War and the defeat of Germany by the Allies contributed to the change of economic policies of the Turkish government.

Accordingly, both the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine appeared as the main pillars of the perceptions of the West. In economic sphere, by this way, the politicians tried to show the possible benefits of the shift in Turkey's foreign policy in the direction of the West and being a part of the capitalist world. It is important to note that, with respect to the pro-Western attitude which was based on how Turkey would have prosperity and economic development, the politicians, particularly through their speeches in the National Assembly, played a more active role compared to the press, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. By highlighting the US achievements, the

²²⁴ Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey*, p. 53.

²²⁵ Bilsay Kuruç, "Kemalist Ekonomi Görüşü: Kesitler", in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 2: Kemalizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), p. 304.

Turkish political elite underlined the Turkish underdevelopment and the US was represented as a beacon of development, civilization and prosperity.²²⁶

First of all, Turkey needed to obtain foreign credit at the beginning of the period. As Berç Türker, CHP MP for Afyonkarahisar, stated in the National Assembly on May 21, 1945, the alliance between Britain and Turkey and Turkey's friendly relations with the US might provide necessary credits to import products for the sake of development as both were friendly countries which desired economic and financial development of Turkey.²²⁷ However, when the Turkish government demanded a credit amounting \$ 500, 000, 000 from the US, the American officials stated that the US was not able to provide such a credit and gave a credit only amounting \$ 25, 000, 000 in 1946.²²⁸ Hence, the initial attempts of the Turkish government to find credit from the West, similar to its attempts to find an international support against the Soviet threat at that moment, were very disappointing. Moreover, as Tezel argued, the Turkish government failed to produce an independent economic policy after the Second World War, having relied foreign credit too much and, to some extent, it abandoned 'self-sufficient' understanding of the previous years. As he showed, the government tried to finance budget deficit through the foreign credits.²²⁹ Indeed, as the next section discusses, from the viewpoints of the opposition, the government was guilty of a lack of managing the American financial aid properly.

The agricultural sectors, which took an important place in Turkish national economy, were believed to develop in line with the increasing ties with the West as well.²³⁰ As

²²⁶ While the Turkish politicians constantly compared themselves with the US, they stated that 'Turks had to be like Americans'. For example, on December 30, 1947, İhsan Şerif Özgen, DP MP for Kütahya, said that it was necessary for a person to have five-year job experience before having his own drugstore in the US. As he stated, contrary to the US, those who newly graduated could set up their own drugstores whereas old and experienced druggists had to retire (30 December 1947: İhsan Şerif Özgen, TBMM, 8-3-8-27, p. 54).

²²⁷ 21 May 1945: TBMM, Berç Türker, 7-3-17-58, p. 18.

²²⁸ Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, p. 203.

²²⁹ Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, p. 169.

²³⁰ The mining sectors were also supposed to develop as a result of Turkish interactions with the capitalist world. For example, the Western investors were expected to do business in the mines located in Turkey. The US ambassador to Turkey sent a letter to the Turkish government about the American and British interests on chrome mines in Turkey. The ambassador suggested the Turkish Prime Minister

maintained by CHP MP for Denizli Abidin Ege, Turkey needed to send young engineers, whose specialty was irrigation, to the US, which had “similar (!)” climate conditions and agricultural techniques to that of Turkey, each year.²³¹ In the opinion of Ege, a considerable amount of the American aid was needed for agricultural sectors such as for mechanization of agriculture in order to improve conditions of Turkish peasants.²³² Indeed, as Avcıoğlu pointed out, the integration of the rural parts of the country into the national economy was accelerated in this period.²³³ Capitalization of agriculture was fastened when Cavid Oral became the Minister of Agriculture on June 11, 1948, who was a rich conservative landowner in Adana and he was a conservative person.²³⁴ For instance, on February 27, 1949, Cavid Oral, talking about agricultural pests and diseases, claimed that the government would solve these gravest problems facing Turkey by using both its own resources and the Marshall Plan in order to bring agricultural chemicals and machines from the US.²³⁵

Mechanization of the agriculture in Turkey was further accelerated by the purchase of tractors from the US. For instance, Turkey purchased 500 tractors from the US on November 20, 1948.²³⁶ As Bora pointed out, 60 % of the American financial aid given

a method to solve the chrome problem occurred in Guleman, a town of Elazığ Province, and he asked for ‘a mutually satisfactory settlement’ (6 December 1945: BCA, 30 10 0 0 268 805 24).

²³¹ 24 May 1945: Abidin Ege, TBMM, 7-3-17-61, p. 5.

²³² 30 December 1947: Abidin Ege, TBMM, 8-3-8-27, p. 109. Similarly, for the Minister of Finance İsmail Rüştü Aksal, in spite of certain deficiencies in the agricultural production, the American aid together with the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) enhanced Turkish export to an unprecedented level. He also pointed the increase of the investment level which would boost production in Turkey. As he further stated, that the year of 1949 had been a productive year with respect to economic collaboration among nineteen European nations thanks to the United States' unique huge and wise aid (13 February 1950: İsmail Rüştü Aksal, TBMM, 8-5-24-45, p. 3-4).

²³³ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün-Bugün-Yarın* (V.2) (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1978), p. 42.

²³⁴ Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, p. 49.

²³⁵ 27 February 1949: Cavid Oral, TBMM, 8-4-16-54, p. 76. The government's attempts to encourage agricultural production was also supported by DP members. For example, according to Hasan Polatkan, who was DP MP for Eskişehir, Turkey had to benefit from the American aid in order to improve agricultural products and decrease production cost in this sector. Otherwise, as he asserted, Turkey would hardly find buyers in the foreign markets to sell its agricultural products (27 February 1949: Hasan Polatkan, TBMM, 8-4-16-54, p. 43).

²³⁶ "Amerikan Beş Bin Traktör Getirilecek", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 November 1948, p. 1.

to Turkey was used in agricultural sectors.²³⁷ The higher priority given to the agricultural production was also related to the US economic policy. As Truman administration declared at home, the Marshall Plan was expected to provide raw materials to the US which were imported from the underdeveloped countries.²³⁸ At the same time, American businessmen and corporations saw the Marshall Plan as an opportunity that would increase the international markets, to which the US industries accessed.²³⁹ As Boratav pointed out, Turkey also tried to integrate into the world economy as an exporter of raw materials in this period.²⁴⁰ In this regard, Turkey, as a receiver of the American aid, gave a higher priority to the agricultural sectors, which might be another changing characteristic of the economic understanding; that is, while the industry had been the most important sector during the heyday of interwar period etatism, its priority for national economy began to be replaced by agriculture.

This shift from industry to agriculture, yet, did not mean that Turkish political elite entirely ignored industrial sectors. Indeed, industrial production was presented to enhance as a result of Turkey's drive to the West; that is, as CHP members assumed, Turkey would be able to obtain raw materials which it could not produce. To demonstrate, as General Eyüp Durukan stated on May 25, 1945, Turkey was still buying firebrick for military factories from the US and Britain. For him, if they did not give firebricks to Turkey, then factories could not be operated.²⁴¹ In a similar way, as Fuat Sirmen, the Minister of Economy, said that Turkey had to deal with difficulties to sustain production in the Paper Mill of İzmit (*İzmit Kağıt Fabrikası*) as it had been impossible to bring cellulose from Europe during the war. As the minister asserted, the government was trying to solve the problem by bringing cellulose from some European

²³⁷ Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Siyasal İdeolojilerde ABD / Amerika İmgesi", in Uygur Kocabaşoğlu (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 3: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 162.

²³⁸ Robert E. Wood, "From the Marshall Plan to the Third World", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 209.

²³⁹ Winkler, *The Cold War*, p. 29.

²⁴⁰ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, p. 101.

²⁴¹ 25 May 1945: Eyüp Durukan, TBMM, 7-3-17-62, p. 16.

countries and the US.²⁴² Hence, as politicians asserted, Turkey needed the West not only to export raw materials produced in Turkey but also to import raw materials to produce manufactured goods. Namely, although there was a gradual shift from industry to agriculture and industrialization began to be removed from the government's developmental agenda, industrialization still remained a part of the government's developmental rhetoric.

In line with the government's developmental agenda, Turkey's adherence to the West was necessary not only for economic development but also improvements in health conditions, which was another pillar of development and prosperity. On May 28, 1945, for example, as Sadi Konuk, the Minister of Health, said, the government ordered five tons of medicine from the US because one of the most important targets of the government was to provide health facilities to Turkish peasants.²⁴³ In other words, it was emphasized that Turkish population would be much healthier if Turkey was to become a part of the West.²⁴⁴ Accordingly, the contribution of the western countries to the health system in Turkey was often mentioned by the politicians. As an example, the Ministry of Health decided to send Turkish doctors to the US to increase the ability of Turkey in the campaign against malaria.²⁴⁵

²⁴² 26 May 1945: Fuat Sirmen, TBMM, 7-3-17-63, p. 3.

²⁴³ 28 May 1945: Sadi Konuk, TBMM, 7-3-17-64, p. 15.

²⁴⁴ For example, during the preparation of a specific law to found a medical faculty in Ankara, the reason was provided as the very low number of doctors per person in Turkey. As stated in the report, the number (excluding soldiers) was 5,516 in Turkey whereas it was 789 in the US, around 1,000 in Western Europe, 3,059 in Bulgaria and 3,568 in Yugoslavia (20 June 1945: TBMM, 7-3-18-76, pp. 41-42). The politicians later continued to compare the health conditions of Turks with those of the American citizens. For example, on 13 January 1950, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, CHP MP for Kırşehir, stated that one Turkish woman gave six births on average. For him, there were some women in Anatolia who gave birth for twenty-five times but most of children was not able to survive. According to Baltacıoğlu, while the birth rate in the US was increasing, its reason was the reduction in the child death at birth. According to him, the difference between Turkey and the US stemmed from the difference in their civilization levels: while the Americans had high level of civilization that of Turks was not so high. For Baltacıoğlu, although Turkish civilization was not high, Turks had a developed culture and determination. Whereas malaria continued to kill Turks, the self-sacrifice Turkish mothers did not cease to give birth (12 January 1950: İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, TBMM, 8-5-23-29, p. 18).

²⁴⁵ 17 December 1945: TBMM, 7-4-20-12, p. 390. In addition, the government brought laboratory supplies from the US and Britain for the science faculty in Ankara, which had been established by a special law (law number 4492) (17 December 1945: TBMM, 7-4-20-12, p. 102).

The US also served a model to be imitated for Turkey in terms of educational services.²⁴⁶ For example, Kamil İdil, CHP MP for Maraş, suggested establishment of night schools, which would be very similar to those of the western countries, in order to train people who were working during the day. For İdil, these schools would increase the efficiency of Turkish officials and contributed to the developmental level of Turkey.²⁴⁷ Moreover, Adnan Adıvar (Independent MP for İstanbul), in his comparison of Turkey with the US, thought that building libraries was a special issue and there were expert architects to design libraries in the United States.²⁴⁸ Similarly, for Niyazi Çıtakoğlu who was DP MP for Çanakkale, an American kid knew 700-800 words before going to an elementary school and learned 3000-4000 words after graduation. For him, if one would compare Turkey and the United States, it would see the terrible situation of the Turkish educational system.²⁴⁹ More importantly, for the Minister of Education Şemsettin Sirer, Americans changed their educational systems during the last fifteen years. According to Sirer, as the particular case of the US which had a 'developed' society, proved, it was necessary to improve educational programs regularly.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ Nevertheless, on 5 May 1945, the government took a measure to stop marriage of students and officials with foreigners who were sent to the US by the government. According to the secret document signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Hasan Saka, some officials engaged in commercial activities by quitting their duties. For this reason, the government aimed these officials and students to return to Turkey after completing their duties and education in the foreign countries (5 April 1945: BCA, 30 10 0 0 268 805 15).

²⁴⁷ 29 December 1947: Kamil İdil, TBMM, 8-3-8-26, p. 14.

²⁴⁸ 29 December 1947: Adnan Adıvar, TBMM, 8-3-8-26, p. 50.

²⁴⁹ 29 December 1947: Niyazi Çıtakoğlu, TBMM, 8-3-8-26, p. 32.

²⁵⁰ 29 December 1947: Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, TBMM, 8-3-8-26, p. 44. Within the framework of economic development and prosperity which Turkey's drive to the West might provide, there was a specific focus on how it would boost human capital. As Razi Soyer, who was CHP MP for Urfa, claimed on 26 February 1949, a course had been opened in İskenderun and about 500 technicians had been trained with the help of American experts (26 February 1949: Razi Soyer, TBMM, 8-4-16-53, pp. 23-24). Nonetheless, to some politicians, it was doubtful whether Turks might trust American experts or not. For example, when Bekata, CHP MP for Ankara, asked whether the American experts were qualified people in terms of education and politics, Minister of Transport Kemal Satır said that they were educated and honest American citizens as he had understood so far (6 June 1949: Kemal Satır, TBMM, 8-4-20-102, p. 21).

Related to the developmental purposes of Turkey, the improvement of the infrastructure system of Turkey was perceived as another possible benefit which Turkey would gain by becoming a part of the western world. Sanctioned by a special law, on May 21, 1945, for example, the government decided to send two engineers to the US in order to undergo training about road construction and the government provided perquisite for the training of Turkish engineers in the US.²⁵¹ To put it another way, even before the Marshall Plan, Turkey was receiving technical aid from the US. This aid was further increased following the Marshall Plan. For example, on December 29, 1947, Akif Eyidođan who was CHP MP for Kars, asking how Turkey would construct its new road system, said that the method of the ‘friend America’, which devoted a significant amount of money for this along with American engineers, would generously help Turkey to construct its own road system.²⁵² Eyidođan’s speech was indeed related to the speeches of American experts who visited Turkey within the framework of the Marshall Aid. For example, on June 14, 1947, an American committee came to Turkey in order to determine how Turkey needed to use the American aid. As the committee declared, Turkish people had to believe the utmost priority of construction of roads and ports before the economic development.²⁵³ Indeed, the construction of railways had been an important aspect of the early Republican political elite before the advent of the Second World War. While railways were aimed to increase integration of the rural parts into the national economy, they were also expected to increase national industrialization.²⁵⁴ Hence, the shift from railways to roads, which was affected by suggestions of the American experts, represented another dimension of the change in understanding of economic development.

The close relations with the western world were also believed to provide developmental strategies for Turkey. For example, as CHP MP for Zonguldak Barkın

²⁵¹ 21 May 1945: TBMM, 7-3-17-58, p. 110.

²⁵² 29 December 1947: Akif Eyidođan, TBMM, 8-3-8-26, p. 62.

²⁵³ Ahmad and Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili*, p. 33.

²⁵⁴ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, p. 47.

stated on January 28, 1946, there was a team consisting of thirty people, which affiliated to the presidency and planned economic development in the US. For him, Turkey also needed such a committee to give direction to the economic development.²⁵⁵ However, as discussed above, there was a significant difference between the Turkish and US governments with respect to their understanding of the economic development; while the Turkish one wanted an economic development plan for a 'self-sufficient' and 'independent' Turkey, the US officials tried to direct Turkish economy according to the US interests. As long as their interests matched with each other, the Turkish political elite seemed to be satisfied with the American aid.

As an example, the military expenditure which had increased due to the advent of the Second World War and then the rise of the Soviet threat over Turkey could be considered. As Foreign Minister Sadak asserted in the National Assembly on February 2, 1948, Turkey had allotted annually the half of GDP to the national defense, which inhibited economic development.²⁵⁶ As he later asserted, Turkey would be able to gain credits in order to improve its national economy and to decrease the burden of the military expenditure.²⁵⁷ For another example, as Feridun Fikri Düşünsel who was CHP MP for Bingöl, claimed on February 1950, the Turkish army was strong enough with its navy and air forces as a result of its close monitoring of the developments in the American army, which caused the highest technology of the Turkish army.²⁵⁸ As seen from these examples, the high share of the military expenditure constituted a problem for Turkey, which had to mobilize a large army due to presence of the Soviet aggression. As the US wanted to support Turkish army against the Soviet threat, the US military aid created a mutually beneficial background for both sides.

Indeed, the material progress of the Turkish army as a result of closer relations with the West created a 'non-material' connection of the Turkish army with its American counterpart. For example, when the law related to the Ministry of National Defense

²⁵⁵ 28 January 1946: Ruhani Barkın, TBMM, 7-4-21-29, p. 16.

²⁵⁶ 2 February 1948: Necmettin Sadak, TBMM, 8-3-10-37, p. 11.

²⁵⁷ "Dışişleri Bakanı N. Sadak'ın Beyanatı", *Akşam*, 25 February 1948, p. 2.

²⁵⁸ 15 February 1950: Feridun Fikri Düşünsel, TBMM, 8-5-24-47, p. 12.

was to be modified, the Minister of Defense General Gözcü suggested a close examination of American and British laws in order to have an efficient law.²⁵⁹ Moreover, when General Aşır Atlı proposed to give the title of ‘Marshall’ (*Mareşal*) to all the Turkish Chief of General Staff, Orgeneral Fahrettin Altay stated that it would be inappropriate to do this change because there was no such title in the American army, which Turkish army was its “little brother”.²⁶⁰

What is more, the US was interpreted as a friend, which gave Turkey not only money and aid but also discriminated a “favor” of Turks compared with other free nations. For example, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, the Minister of Transport, said that the government ordered twenty-two of the latest model of the MD Helicopters from the US at a good price. As he maintained, Americans did a “favor” (*cemile*) for Turks with respect to both sale and prices.²⁶¹ There years later, on April 19, 1948, the Minister of Transport Şükrü Koçak, talking about purchase of six cruise ships, two tankers and two Victorias from the US, said that the ‘friendly’ American government never hesitated to help Turkey in these purchases.²⁶² Similarly, on 21 April 1948, Cebesoy, who was not a member of the cabinet at that moment, stated that there had not been any country other than the American friend which was able to provide requirements for construction and transportation at the end of the Second World War.²⁶³

As the politicians expressed their gratitude for the American aid even before the Marshall Plan, they also claimed that Americans also knew how important American aid was for Turkey. For example, as Ziya Yörük, CHP MP for Ankara, stated on June

²⁵⁹ 15 May 1946: Niyazi İsmet Gözcü, TBMM, 7-4-23-50, p. 4.

²⁶⁰ 28 November 1947: Fahrettin Altay, TBMM, 8-3-7-12, p. 36: “*Bugün dünya durumunda Büyük Amerikan ordusunun küçük bir kardeşi sıfatını kazanmış olan kıymetli ordumuz erkânı arasında Amerikan ordusunda bulunmayan mareşallik rütbesinin bulunması uygun görülmeyebilir*”.

²⁶¹ 30 May 1945: Ali Fuat Cebesoy, TBMM, 7-3-17-66, p. 21: “*Son defa da Amerika'dan 22 şer kişilik en son sistem Douglas tipinde üç tayyare daha almaktız. Fiyatları da gayet müsaittir. Amerikalılar bize cemile de yapmışlardır*”.

²⁶² 19 April 1948: Şükrü Koçak, TBMM, 8-3-11-49, pp. 4-5.

²⁶³ 21 April 1948: Ali Fuat Cebesoy, TBMM, 8-3-11-50, p. 15. Moreover, for Şahin Laçın, DP MP for Afyon Karahisar, if the government would manage to bring wheat from the US at a reasonable price, Turkey would give thanks to God and would be grateful to the American government (28 April 1948: Şahin Lâçın, TBMM, 8-3-11-52, p. 5).

25, 1945, within the framework of American aid to Turkey, arrangements were to be made for the mutual benefits of both countries.²⁶⁴ Moreover, as Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata who was CHP MP for Ankara claimed on May 21, 1948, purchase of ships from the US was also an important issue in the eyes of Americans: while Truman was personally interested in the “business”, the American government issued a “special” law to materialize business. As Bekata asserted, both repair and increasing of the Turkish navy were urgently needed. For him, the only opportunity for development of the navy was Americans. As he said, although the American government prohibited export of ships and hence did not sell ships any longer, the US did a ‘favor’ for Turkey, which the Ministry of Transportation refused.²⁶⁵

As such, the US was not only considered as a perfect option for developmental purposes of Turkey in this period, it was also perceived as the ‘only’ option for Turkey to improve its national economy. As Cemil Barlas, the Minister of Economy and Commerce, stated on February 4, 1949, the only country that Turkey made agreement with free exchange was the United States.²⁶⁶ For another example, as Nazım Poroy, CHP MP for Tokat, stated on February 14, 1949, since Americans were so kind as to aid Turkey, it also had to give its all and try its hardest.²⁶⁷ Similarly, Vedat Dicleli, who was CHP MP for Diyarbakır, the firepower of the Turkish army was being strengthened thanks to the aid of friendly American government. Hence, he suggested a more strong collaboration between the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey and the American army.²⁶⁸

Regarding the developmental agenda and economic understanding of the Turkish government in this period, the etatism and protectionism of the 1930s were gradually

²⁶⁴ 25 June 1945: Ziya Yörük, TBMM, 7-3-18-78, p. 9.

²⁶⁵ 21 May 1948: Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, TBMM, 8-3-11-50, pp. 19-25.

²⁶⁶ 4 February 1949: Cemil Barlas, TBMM, 8-4-16-41, p. 13.

²⁶⁷ 14 February 1949: Nazım Poroy, TBMM, 8-4-16-45, p. 22: “*Diyorum ki, bugün de bize yine teveccüh etmiş bir fırsat var, Amerikalılar yardım ediyorlar. Amerikalıların bu yardımı karşısında biz artık ağzımızı açıp da ‘armut piş ağzıma düş’ mü diyeceğiz? Muhakkak ki, bizim de büyük bir gayret göstermemiz lazımdır*”.

²⁶⁸ 21 February 1949: Vedat Dicleli, TBMM, 8-4-16-48, p. 40.

replaced by a more liberal set of economic policies. This shift of course was not free of external pressures and changing balances of the power in the world economy, instead, all these changes could only be understood by evaluating the course of Turkish economy within a global Cold War context. On the one hand, the priority, which had been given to industrial sectors in a centrally-planned economy during the 1930s, began to be attached to agricultural sectors by the Turkish political elite after 1945. This was a result of Turkey's further drive to the West; i.e. the American intervention in planning of the Turkish economy and the role of the American experts who came to Turkey within the framework of the Marshall Plan. On the other hand, breaking ties with the Soviet Union, Turkey's integration to the capitalist world economy began to be based on exportation of raw materials, which was absolutely consistent with the US national interests. At the same time, the Turkish governments, which had to tackle with obstacles created by the heavy burden of the military expenditure on the government budget, saw the US perhaps the 'only' option of helping Turkey in economic terms. That is to say, not only existence of the Soviet intimidation but also developmental concerns of the government contributed to Turkey's drive to the West and shaped the Cold War agenda of its leaders.

2.2) OPPOSITION'S ATTITUDE TO THE COLD WAR

While the government had its own Cold War agenda, the oppositional parties also had their own Cold War agendas, which reflected their understanding of early Cold War conflicts and the Turkish foreign policy. In this regard, the opposition's criticism of the government's Cold War policies was important because, in a newly formed multi-party system, the foreign policy became an arena of political competition between the government and the oppositional groups. In spite of certain criticisms, the perception of the Cold War, however, did not differ widely between the government and the opposition. Instead, the assertive policies of the Soviet Union against the country and diplomatic leaning of Turkey towards the Western Bloc united all the political parties. In his analysis of the foreign policy and political parties of Turkey in the early Cold War, Esmer claimed that although there were ideological differences among the political parties of that time, none of the oppositional parties could provide an

alternative policy to that of the CHP government. For him, the government tried to use its successes in the foreign affairs in order to make pro-CHP propaganda at home.²⁶⁹ As Esmer's analysis showed, unanimous about what to do with the changing circumstances in the international system, the political parties understood the situation all too well and aimed to foster a common sense of the Turkish perception.

Having slightly different ideas, the opposition supported the government in its close relations with the West. For instance, the opposition approved Turkey's participation in international institutions such as the United Nations. One month after his expulsion from CHP, Fuad Köprülü, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 22 May 1950 to 15 April 1955, stated that there was only a minor difference of opinion between them and the government with respect to their orientation to the UN.²⁷⁰ On the same day, Adnan Menderes, MP for Aydın, said that "*we could approve the Constitution of the United Nations with happiness and confidence, which was completely in accordance with the principles of the Turkish Revolution for many years*".²⁷¹

In harmony with Turkey's affiliation with the UN, the opposition also approved the government's anti-Soviet agenda, too. For example, on December 30, 1947, Hasan Gedik, DP MP for Kütahya, stated that as the case of the Soviet Union proved, communism was harmful for public welfare, liberty and human rights.²⁷² Similarly, Ahmet İhsan Gürsoy, DP MP for Kütahya, stated on February 24, 1949, that he appreciated the participation of Turkey in the Second World War on the side of the democracies, remaining loyal to the British alliance. For him, as a result of the Truman Doctrine and the Turkish foreign policy, which aimed to work together with the democracies in favor of peace and security following the Second World War, Turkey

²⁶⁹Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Dış Politika ve Partiler", *Ulus*, 30 December 1955, p. 3.

²⁷⁰ 15 August 1945: Fuad Köprülü, TBMM, 7-3-19-90, p. 27: "*Esas itibariyle Adnan Menderes, San Fransisko Paktının bizim de iç ve dış siyasi ananelerimize uygun olduğunu söyledi. Arada ufak tefek bazı görüş farkları olursa neden dolayı hücum etmeli? Bugün San Fransisko Paktını imzaladığımız bu zamanda herkesin fikrine hürmet lüzumuna daha çok riayet edelim*".

²⁷¹ 15 August 1945: Adnan Menderes, TBMM, 7-3-19-90, p. 23: "*Çok uzun yıllardan beri Türk inkılabının teveccüh ettiği gayelere tamamen uygun ve mutabık düşen Birleşmiş Milletler Anayasasına iştirakimizi iç rahatlığı, sevinç ve güvenle tasdik edebiliriz*".

²⁷² 30 December 1947: Hasan Gedik, TBMM, 8-3-8-27, p. 13.

was cooperating with the United States for the sake of regional and global peace and security.²⁷³

As such, the oppositional parties were not against the close relations between Turkey and the West; instead, they favored the Turkish government's attitude to the capitalist countries. As Köprülü stated on March 16, 1949, he was satisfied with the Turkey's position in the Truman Doctrine.²⁷⁴ Similarly, for Ahmet Oğuz, DP MP for Eskişehir, the world was divided into two blocs and Turks "all together" chose the side of the Turkish state on the side of the western democracies.²⁷⁵ Moreover, Muammer Alakant, who was DP MP for Manisa, stated his gratitude of the anti-communist strand of the Turkish government along with its close relations with the United States.²⁷⁶

Other than *Demokrat Parti*, *Millet Partisi* (MP) (the Nation Party), which was founded on July 19, 1948 by Fevzi Çakmak, Osman Bölükbaşı, Enis Akaygen and Yusuf Hikmet Bayur who broke away from *Demokrat Parti*, was also in support of the government in the foreign affairs.²⁷⁷ Following Foreign Minister Sadak's speech regarding his personal meeting with Harry Truman, Sadık Aldoğan, MP for Gaziantep, for example, speaking in the name of the *Millet Partisi*, said that "*the target of the MP is to break every hand that threatens Turkish independence and future. [...] In this regard, I thank the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was already my desire*".²⁷⁸ So, both DP and MP members supported CHP in foreign policy context.

As even the election of 1950 was approaching, the oppositional attitude to CHP in terms of foreign policy did not change much; instead, the necessity to resist a common

²⁷³ 24 February 1949: Ahmet İhsan Gürsoy, TBMM, 8-4-16-51, p. 62.

²⁷⁴ 16 March 1949: Fuad Köprülü, TBMM, 8-4-17-56, p. 8.

²⁷⁵ 16 March 1949: Ahmet Oğuz, TBMM, 8-4-17-56, p. 10.

²⁷⁶ 8 June 1949: Muammer Alakant, TBMM, 8-4-20-104, p. 59.

²⁷⁷ For Ahmad, the formation of *Millet Partisi* made the things easier for CHP as the oppositional groups were divided into two groups (Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, pp. 49-52). For Öymen, *Millet Partisi* was against both CHP and DP (Öymen, *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe*, p. 374).

²⁷⁸ 11 May 1949: Sadık Aldoğan, TBMM, 8-4-19-84, p. 9: "*Millet Partisinin de dış siyasetteki hedefi; Türk istikbal ve hürriyetine uzanacak her kolu kırmaktan ibarettir. [...] Bu bakımdan Dışişleri Bakanına teşekkür ederim. Benim istediğim de bu idi*".

enemy united these parties. On February 17, 1950, Fuad Köprülü, speaking in the name of *Demokrat Parti*, after expressing *Demokrat Parti*'s full support to CHP in foreign affairs, said that "*against the communism, the attention and sensitivity of the government alone are not enough, citizens and other parties had to resist by the same way*". Moreover, for Fuad Köprülü, it was certain that the US was not following an imperialist policy in any part of the world. For him, as the Marshall Plan proved, the US made a sacrifice to save the humanity from destruction, which was an unprecedented humanistic action. For this reason, as Köprülü maintained, Turkey, as a nation which had resisted to any threat coming from [implying the Soviet Union] the North for centuries, was indebted in the US for its aid.²⁷⁹

In agreement with Köprülü, Celal Bayar stated later that DP agreed with CHP in terms of its foreign policy. In the words of Bayar, the world was divided into two blocs, which were Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet Union, and Turkey had to be a part of one of them due to its strategic geographical position. For Bayar, while the Anglo-Saxons demanded freedom of Turkey, the Soviet Union tried to damage Turkish national sovereignty. As Bayar concluded, for these reasons, DP was on the side of CHP in the foreign affairs.²⁸⁰

Regarding the opinion of CHP about the attitude of the opposition, the members of the CHP were aware of and grateful for the support of opposition in foreign affairs. From the very beginning of this period, the government tried to show that all political parties united against the Soviet threat and internal political conflicts did not affect the Turkish attitude to the developing Cold War conditions. For example, on January 9, 1946, Prime Minister Saraçoğlu, in conversation with the US ambassador in Turkey, said that "*result of their [the Soviets] activities has been that Turks have become completely united against Soviet demands*".²⁸¹ The satisfaction of CHP members with the support

²⁷⁹ 16 February 1950: Fuad Köprülü, TBMM, 8-5-24-48, pp. 70-71. "D.P. , İktidarın Dış Politikasını Her Zaman Desteklediğini Söyledi", *Yeni İstanbul*, 17 February 1950, p. 2: "D.P. namına konuşan Fuat Köprülü dedi ki: 'Komünizmin faaliyetlerine karşı yalnız Hükümetin dikkat ve hassasiyeti kâfi gelmez. Vatandaşlar ve partiler de buna aynı dikkatle karşı koymak mecburiyetindedir'".

²⁸⁰ "C. Bayar, Kastamonuda Mali Politikayı Tenkid Etti", *Cumhuriyet*, 1 May 1950, pp. 1-3.

²⁸¹ 9 January 1946: FRUS, frus1946v07.i0018, pp. 6-7.

of *Demokrat Parti* continued as the elections of 1950 approached. As an example, on February 16, 1950, Fazıl Ahmed Aykaç, MP for Diyarbakır, asserted that "*as Fuad Köprülü said, multi-party system in Turkey was for the benefits of the people through competition, not for exhausting each other*".²⁸² More importantly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadak said: "*as I told before, the support of the Democratic Party to the government in foreign affairs is always a source of power outside Turkey. This collaboration is a disappointment for our external enemies*".²⁸³ Hence, CHP members tried to show that Turkey was united against the common enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union). Moreover, they might have used this notion to prove that CHP's foreign policy was so successful that even oppositional parties supported CHP government in the foreign policy context.

However, this situation does not mean that CHP's foreign policy was never criticized by the oppositional parties. Instead, the foreign policy sometimes became an arena of political rivalry among different groups and as this rivalry intensified (particularly, before and after the elections), harsh criticism of CHP for its current foreign policy came from oppositional parties. Nonetheless, there were only four main issues through which the oppositional parties disapproved the government's foreign policy: exaggeration of the external threat by CHP, misrepresentation of Turkey in the international arena, corruption in using the foreign aid and CHP government's lack of success to obtain the NATO membership.

²⁸² 16 February 1950: Fazıl Ahmed Aykaç, TBMM, 8-5-24-48, p. 73: "*Fuad Köprülü'nün dediği gibi, hakikaten bizim memleketimizde başladığımız çok parti hayatının insanlar arasında birbirlerini yormak, için değil, hatta birbirleriyle mücadele ederek millet haklarını bulmak için çalışan kardeşler faaliyetinden ibarettir*".

²⁸³ 16 February 1950: Necmettin Sadak, TBMM, 8-5-24-48, p. 73: "*Bazı vesilelerle de arzettiğim gibi; memleketin başlıca Muhalefet Partisi olan Demokrat Partinin, dış siyasette Hükümetle beraber olması Türkiye Cumhuriyeti için dışarıda büyük bir kuvvet kaynağı olmaktadır. Fuad Köprülü'nün dediği gibi; Demokrat Partinin dış siyasette, Cumhuriyet Hükümetiyle, İktidar Partisi ile beraber yürümesi, partilerin beraber olması dışarıdaki düşmanlarımız için hüsrans vesilesi olmaktadır. [...] Bilhassa Türkiye birçok devamlı tehlikelerle çevrili bir sahada yaşamaktadır.*" See examples for how the governmental press claimed that all political parties had the same view in foreign affairs: "Türk Dış Politikasında Bütün Partilerin Aynı Görüşte Oldukları Bir Daha Belirtildi", *Ulus*, 17 March 1949, p. 1; "Dış Bakanımız Dünya Durumunu İzah Etti", *Ulus*, 17 February 1950, p. 1. See examples for how the governmental press commended support of the opposition to CHP in foreign affairs: "Dış Siyasetimiz", *Ulus*, 25 February 1949, p. 1; Yavuz Abadan, "Türkiye ve Amerikan Yardımı", *Ulus*, 16 February 1950, p. 1; Yavuz Abadan, "Dış Politikamızın Karakteri", *Ulus*, 21 February 1950, p. 1.

The first issue that the opposition criticized the government was related to whether there was an ‘actual’ danger for Turkey or not. For example, on August 1, 1946, Fuad Köprülü, during an interview made by an American newspaper, claimed that there was no currently external threat for Turkey. For Köprülü, CHP fabricated such a perception of threat in order to consolidate its authority at home.²⁸⁴ While CHP members and CHP-linked press harshly criticized Köprülü and claimed that CHP’s foreign policy was very successful,²⁸⁵ even some oppositional press members such as Abidin Daver of *Cumhuriyet* seemed to disagree with Köprülü.²⁸⁶ Köprülü’s claims regarding that CHP exaggerated the Soviet threat, yet, should be evaluated in a historical context. To be more exact, when a multi-party system began to be applied and only ten days after the first general multi-party elections in Turkey which resulted in existence of official opposition in the National Assembly for the first time, as one of DP leaders Köprülü might have wanted to increase his doze of criticism against CHP.

It is also important to note that, at that moment, the government was able to find a ‘limited’ support in the international arena. As Niyazi Berkes claimed, while Turkey’s alienation continued in the international affairs, oppositional groups became more vocal to criticize the government.²⁸⁷ Moreover, as discussed above, Fuad Köprülü expressed his hostility against the Soviet Union and concerns related to the Soviet threat in the following years when Turkey’s drive to the West accelerated for many times. In reality, this kind of criticism of the oppositional parties and oppositional press members (particularly, Ahmet Emin Yalman of *Vatan*) related to the degree of the external threat could also be observed before the general elections of May 1950.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁴ Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, p. 318.

²⁸⁵ "Fuat Köprülü Hücuma Geçti", *Vakit*, 2 August 1946, pp. 1, 5; Peyami Safa, "Lafçıbaşı Yine İftira Ediyor", *Vakit*, 3 August 1946, p. 1; Nihat Erim, "Dış Politikamız Başarılıdır", *Ulus*, 4 August 1946, p. 1.

²⁸⁶ Abidin Daver, "Dış Tehlike Vardır, Gaflete Düşmiyelim!" *Cumhuriyet*, 3 August 1946, pp. 1, 3.

²⁸⁷ Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, p. 319.

²⁸⁸ See an article written by Safa to respond such claims: Peyami Safa, "Dış Tehlike", *Ulus*, 8 April 1950, p. 1.

Hence, the opposition's attitude to the government's foreign policy might change according to international developments and internal political atmosphere.

Secondly, the opposition criticized the government on the ground that it was not able to seize the opportunities created by the increasing relations with the West. For example, on January 26, 1948, Celal Bayar, the leader of *Demokrat Parti*, accused the government of mismanagement of the American aid while the Minister of Finance Halit Nazmi Keşmir did not accept accusation.²⁸⁹ Similarly, on December 24, 1948, Kemal Zeytinoğlu, DP MP for Eskişehir, accused the government of not paying enough attention to the American aid and of failing to use it efficiently.²⁹⁰ And so, the oppositional critics accused CHP of the unprofessional use of the American aid but the opposition did not criticize why Turkey was receiving the American aid.

Thirdly, related to the second point, the opposition further accused the government of using the American aid for its own benefit. On November 24, 1948, Hasan Dinçer who was DP MP for Afyonkarahisar, for example, protested the transfer of 4 million Turkish Liras to *Halkevleri*, a CHP-affiliated enlightenment project, while Turkey was obtaining the American aid amounting 22 Million American dollars in the same year. For him, if *Halkevleri* would receive funding, they should have to be a separate organization, having independence from CHP.²⁹¹ Moreover, the opposition claimed that the American aid decreased employment of Turkish technicians and engineers as generally foreign experts worked in projects funded by the Marshall Plan; thereby, Turkey became dependent on the US.²⁹² Such a criticism was also related to the domestic issues rather than Turkey's relations with the foreign powers; that is, the

²⁸⁹ "Marshall'in Yardım Planı", *Akşam*, 26 January 1948, p. 1.

²⁹⁰ 24 December 1948: Kemal Zeytinoğlu, TBMM, 8-4-14-23, pp. 19-20.

²⁹¹ 24 November 1948: Hasan Dinçer, TBMM, 8-4-13-10, p. 14: "22 milyon dolar temin etmek için Amerika ile yaptığımız temaslar ve bundan duyduğumuz sevinç ortada iken şimdi tek bir parti emrinde olan bir müesseseye [*Halkevleri*] senede dört milyon lira ayırılım bu doğru değildir. Bunun bir şekilde halli mümkündür: O da halkevlerinin partililik cereyanlarından uzak, partilerin tesirinden uzak, memleketin hakiki ve Milli kültür müessesesi haline sokulmasıyla mümkündür".

²⁹² 1 February 1950: Emin Sazak, TBMM, 8-5-24-37, p. 16; 1 February 1950: Ali Ahmet Çınar, TBMM, 8-5-24-37, p. 23; 16 February 1950: Fuad Köprülü, TBMM, 8-5-24-48, pp. 69-72.

opposition did not oppose to the American aid but criticized use of the American aid and distribution of the government budget.

Finally, while the opposition's criticisms intensified more following the exclusion of Turkey from NATO, another point that the opposition criticized the government was related to the Turkish prestige in international arena. Bayar claimed that Turkey was not able to benefit from its crucial position in foreign affairs and that's why Turkey could not be a member of NATO.²⁹³ Therefore, the foreign policy sometimes became an issue within the framework of domestic politics and the competition between the ruling and oppositional parties, there were only a few topics that the opposition criticized the government's Cold War agenda, most of which were related to CHP's manipulation of the American aid or its failure in getting close relations with the West.

This chapter briefly examined how the Turkish politicians' attitude to the emerging Cold War evolved from 1945 to 1950. While the Turkish governments of the period were taking a position in the changing international system after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet demands and accusations led to alienation of Turkey in the foreign affairs. As this chapter argued, this alienation became one of key aspects of the Turkish political elite's policies in the early Cold War. While Germany, with which Turkey had strong commercial relations before, was defeated by the Allies, Turkey wanted and were forced to become a part of the Allies. However, the Soviet Union, which had an important share in defeating Nazis, pursued aggressive policies against Turkey. At the outset of the Second World War, European countries and their economies had been already devastated by the war conditions. The most of Balkan states had been under the occupation of the Soviet troops and later communist regimes were established in these countries. Although there was not a communist regime in Greece, a civil war between the royalists and communist groups existed. Regarding neighbors of Turkey in the East, there were Armenian, Azerbaijan and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics. In addition, even though Soviet occupation in Iran ended in May 1946, the Soviet aggression in this country continued until the end of the period.

²⁹³ "Demokrat Partinin Dış Politika Görüşü", *Zafer*, 15 May 1949, p. 1.

Taking the current situation of Arab neighbors of Turkey into account, they were only newly emerging states, which were weak in power and did not have close ties with Turkey. In such a regional and international context, the US appeared as the ‘only’ option for the Turkish political elite to counterbalance the so-called Soviet threat and to decrease Turkey’s alienation, particularly following the gradual decline of the British hegemony in the world.

Nonetheless, neither the Soviet threat nor the leading role of the US in the capitalist bloc solely affected the development of the Turkish political elite’s attitude from 1945 to 1950. In addition to these external factors, the newly emerging multi-party system and presence of the oppositional parties along with opposition within CHP both shaped and restricted government’s actions in the foreign affairs. Together with economic obstacles which could not be solved despite the end of the Second World War, the growing discontent among Turkish public with CHP government affected the Turkish foreign policy. Having confronted by many external and internal problems, the Turkish government gave a new shape to its anti-communism. The increasing anti-communism of the Turkish government in this period, yet, was not simply a response to the Soviet threat but it was a practical tool for CHP to suppress the oppositional groups, regardless of whether they were communist or not. Additionally, this period witnessed a major change in the understanding of economic development and etatism. This change was accelerated by Turkey’s drive to the West and at the same time it increased Turkey’s integration to the capitalist world economy. Therefore, such a transition in economic sphere could only be grasped within the framework of the early Cold War and political rivalry among the government and the opposition. This rivalry between CHP and growing opposition made the foreign affairs as an issue between two sides. While the opposition criticized the foreign policy of CHP government in certain issues, the foreign policy suggested by the opposition was not very different from that of CHP. Rather, both the government and the opposition united in creating an enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union) and creating an ally (i.e., the US). As will be discussed in the next chapters, this similarity between CHP and other political parties also existed between

governmental and oppositional newspapers with respect to their perceptions of the early Cold War.

CHAPTER 3

TURKISH PRESS AND ITS ROLE: REFLECTING THE COLD WAR TO THE PUBLIC

In the period between 1945 and 1950 when the Cold War conflicts were constantly changing, the Turkish press played a crucial role in creating, disseminating and propagandizing the Turkish perceptions of the early Cold War. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Turkish government and the political opposition in general pursued a more reigned approach and tried to keep the hostility towards the Soviet Union less pronounced in public. The Turkish press, on the other hand, adopted a bolder attitude to the Soviet Union particularly after the introduction of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. At the same time, it began to see the West as the protector of the world peace.

In this regard, this chapter is based on the Turkish newspapers of that time because the doctrines of the foreign policy might have been developed by the government and the oppositional parties through the press; that is, to attract an ever-greater audience for the campaign to create an enemy and an ally, as the next chapters argue, the press was an effective tool that shaped the world view of the public in Turkey. Although the press was not homogenous in its political orientation, as the seventh section of the chapter discusses; the attitudes of the oppositional press to the emerging Cold War, to large extent, were slightly different from those of the governmental press.

For the sake of consistency, this chapter follows the same periodization of the previous one. In this way, it is possible to examine whether the press spoke the same language with the political elite or not, and how the perception of the Turkish press of the early Cold War period evolved throughout time. This chapter, initially, examines the internal

and external roles that the press played throughout the period. After discussions of the press environment and the nexus between the press and the political authorities, it presents the development of the Cold War language in a historical context and sources of information of the Turkish press that contributed to shape the Cold War language.

In addition, while the following three sections of this chapter provide the image of the post-war international order in the eyes of the Turkish press, the fifth section examines the regional agendas (i.e., the Middle East, Mediterranean and Asia) of the Turkish press from 1948 to 1950, when the Cold War conflicts intensified. Focusing on the three parts of the globe, this section analyzes how the press perceived the course of the early Cold War in a regional context. While Turkey was regarded as a part of the first two regions, interpretation of the press of the developments which occurred in the third region (particularly East Asia) might provide both how the press saw the hostilities between two blocs in the rest of the world and also how the press closely watched the international events, which generally appeared on the front pages of the newspapers. The final section deals with attitude of the oppositional press to the government's Cold War; that is, it examines whether the oppositional newspapers disapproved the government's foreign policy and whether the oppositional newspapers put forward similar arguments to those of the oppositional parties.

3.1) TURKISH PRESS IN THE EARLY COLD WAR

In this period, the Turkish press had a vital role in shaping the public opinion within the early Cold War dynamics; that is, the press was instrumental to persuade the Turkish public that a change in Turkish foreign policy direction was absolutely necessary. Moreover, the press had a role to say things to the foreign powers, both the Soviet Union and the newly emerging allies and their press, which could not be uttered by the politicians through the official channels. Namely, in addition to internalization of the Cold War through the press, the articles of columnists, mainly those who had organic links with the Turkish leadership, demonstrated Turkish messages to the world regarding its understanding of struggles among foreign powers. In this regard, while the Turkish press was meticulously following the international events, it stood as an intermediary actor between Turkish politicians and foreign states and press.

To start with drawing a general portrait of the press in this period, it was argued that the government pressure on the press increased throughout the Second World War.²⁹⁴ According to Metin Toker who had started to work for *Cumhuriyet* in 1943, the government controlled even the font size of the news and articles because the government was afraid of sending wrong messages to the world about Turkey's position in the ongoing war because the international political environment was very fragile. To be more exact, it was believed by the Turkish political elite if news about the Allies would be written in bigger font size than those about the Axis Powers, the Allies might suppose that Turkey would support the Allies, or vice versa.²⁹⁵ Hence, according to the government, publications of newspapers was a concern in foreign affairs.

This concern of the government about the nexus between the Turkish press and international relations was more important for CHP-linked newspapers. For example, on May 29, 1939, during its fifth Party Congress, the CHP cadre decided that newspapers and journals, which were owned by the CHP members, had to take the interest of the party into consideration before publishing articles and news and they could not write anything contradicting the internal and external policies of the Party.²⁹⁶ Therefore, on the eve of the Second World War, CHP did not want the press (particularly owned by CHP members) to raise an issue between Turkey and external powers. Regarding the general structure of the press environment and the government's impact on newspapers, the government control further increased during the course of the Second World War. When the newspapers increased their criticisms against CHP during the mid-1944, the regime closed *Tan* on August 13, 1944 and *Vatan* and *Tasvir-i Efkar* on September 30, 1944.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁴ Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıçtan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın Sansürü* (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1990), pp. 138-140; Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 22.

²⁹⁵ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 21.

²⁹⁶ *CHP Nizamnamesi*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939), pp. 36-37.

²⁹⁷ Koçak, *İkinci Parti*, p. 137.

The government pressure on the press did not cease to exist at the end of the war; rather, as Koçak claimed although there were oppositional newspapers and journals in this period, the pressure on the press (especially, with regard to the Turkish foreign policy maintained in the post-war period) by the government continued.²⁹⁸ With respect to the role of the press within the framework of the foreign policy, as Arcayürek claims, the Turkish newspapers, which were under the control of the government, initially remained silent about the Soviet demands from Turkey.²⁹⁹ Correspondingly, Koçak affirmed that the press had a positive attitude towards the Soviet Union from the mid-1944 to the late-1945 not to damage the Turkish-Soviet relations.³⁰⁰ Therefore, the freedom of press in terms of conveying the course of international developments and Turkish foreign policy was restricted in the very beginning of the period.

Nonetheless, in harmony with the transition to the multi-party system, there were several developments in the Turkish journalism in 1946.³⁰¹ *Ankara Gazeteciler Cemiyeti* (the Association of Journalists of Ankara) and *Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti* (the Association of Journalists of Turkey) were founded on January 10 and June 10, 1946, respectively; which might have increased the organizational power of the press. Indeed, for Topuz, CHP had to appease the oppositional press in this period and most of the newspapers supported DP.³⁰² As Arcayürek claimed, DP, as a newly emerging political party and unlike CHP, tried to gain support. Accordingly, DP leaders tried to meet press members and displayed their ‘liberal’ attitude to the press.³⁰³ In effect, the

²⁹⁸ Koçak, *İkinci Parti*, p. 162.

²⁹⁹ Arcayürek, *Şeytan Üçgeninde Türkiye*, p. 290.

³⁰⁰ Koçak, *İkinci Parti*, p. 111. From 1945 to 1950, the government’s concerns over the possible negative effects of the press in the foreign policy maintained and, in fact, the government had some points. For example, on January 21, 1947, the Yugoslavian embassy to Turkey, complained about news published in *Tasvir* stating that the newspaper made “wrong” news about Yugoslavia and insulted its leader, Tito (21 January 1947: BCA, 30 10 0 0 253 705 12).

³⁰¹ Tefik Çavdar, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Tarihi (1900-1960)* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003), pp. 303-306.

³⁰² Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, p. 169.

³⁰³ Arcayürek, *Demokrasinin İlk Yılları*, p. 133.

political competition between the government and the opposition could also be observed in the press environment, too.

Moreover, regarding the legal framework regulated the link between the government and the press, on September 20, 1946, the National Assembly amended the press law in order to increase freedom of the press. This alteration, on the contrary to the claims of the government, led to increase in the government pressure on the press. For example, on December 16, 1946, the government closed several leftist newspapers and journals such as *Noror*, *Gün*, *Ses*, *Sendika* and *Dost*. On the same day, the government closed the journal of *Büyük Doğu* and the newspaper of *Yarın* for four months, which had Islamic orientation. The government censorship, which must have shaped the attitude of the press to the emerging Cold War, continued in 1947: the journal of *Büyük Doğu* was closed by the central authorities for four months on June 12, 1947. Furthermore, the owners and the editors of the newspapers, *Tasvir*, *Demokrasi*, *Demokrat İzmir* and *Yeni Asır* were arrested on July 30, 1947, for they published Adnan Menderes's speech in the National Assembly. This event must have lessened the influence of the oppositional press and, until the establishment of *Zafer* in 1949, the oppositional press had remained relatively weak in power although there were other oppositional newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet* and *Yeni Sabah*.

In this press environment, one of the most important newspapers of the period was *Ulus*, which was the official newspaper of CHP and it had been published since January 10, 1920 (with the name of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* until 28 November 1934). As Arcayürek claimed, CHP cadre demanded all employees of *Ulus* to become a member of CHP.³⁰⁴ There were columnists of *Ulus* who were either members of CHP or somehow affiliated with the government such as Falih Rıfkı Atay, who was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper until September 11, 1948 and CHP MP from 1923 to 1950. Moreover, Nihat Erim, who was CHP MP from 1943 to 1950, the Minister of Public Works from 10 June 1948 to 16 January 1949, the Vice Prime Minister from 16 January 1949 to 22 May 1950, was a young journalist and politician. He gained power

³⁰⁴ Arcayürek, *Demokrasinin İlk Yılları*, p. 36.

in CHP during this period as a result of his close relations with President İnönü. He met İnönü in secret meetings and they discussed both domestic and foreign affairs of Turkey.³⁰⁵ Indeed, as Toker claimed, Nihat Erim was the ‘closest’ person to the president among all CHP members at that moment.³⁰⁶ Besides, while Nazım Poroy and Kemal Turan who were CHP MP from 1931 to 1950, Yavuz Abadan was CHP MP from 1943 to 1950. Peyami Safa, who had written articles for *Tasvir-i Efkâr* (*Tasvir* after 1945) before,³⁰⁷ began to write articles for *Vakit* and later *Ulus*.

Ulus was funded by CHP and this link between *Ulus* and CHP was a very open one. For instance, on September 20, 1948, the members of CHP discussed an article published in *Ulus* reporting from American news agencies. They complained about this article mentioning that Turkey's attitude to the Marshall Plan had not been “sincere” (*samimi*). As concluded by İzzettin Tuğrul Nişbay, a member of the CHP cadre, the journal must have consulted the administration of CHP before publishing such an article because *Ulus* was the official organ of the party.³⁰⁸ Apart from its internal influence, *Ulus* had also some prestige outside Turkey. For example, despite this organic relationship between CHP and *Ulus*, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) invited members of *Ulus* to the Congress of IFJ, which would be held in Paris.³⁰⁹

Another newspaper, which had close links with CHP, was *Akşam*. According to Hıfzı Topuz, its political orientation was the left of the middle.³¹⁰ Necmettin Sadak was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper until January 16, 1947 when Sadak became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As the owner of the newspaper, he began to write articles for *Akşam* after *Demokrat Parti* came to power in May 1950 again. He had supported the Allies during the Second World War and its sympathy towards the US and Britain

³⁰⁵ Arcayürek, *Demokrasinin İlk Yılları*, pp. 129-130.

³⁰⁶ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 13.

³⁰⁷ Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, ppp. 166-167.

³⁰⁸ 20 September 1948: BCA, 30 10 0 0 85 564 7.

³⁰⁹ 15 October 1949: BCA, 490 1 0 0 1262 200 2.

³¹⁰ Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, pp. 166-167.

continued in the post-war period.³¹¹ Following Sadak's ministry, Kazım Şinasi Dersan, another prominent member of CHP as a member of the City Council of CHP in İstanbul, became the editor-in-chief of *Akşam*. Nonetheless, after 1947 when tension between CHP and the opposition grew vehement, Dersan tried to keep the newspaper out of domestic political discussions while there were many news regarding the foreign affairs.³¹² Mehmet Şevki Yazman, as a former member of *Kadro* movement and Şevket Rado as a famous person of the period also wrote articles for *Akşam*.

The third newspaper which had close links with CHP was *Tanin*, which was owned by Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, who had very close relations with the government, and it was published until November 14, 1947. Yalçın became a CHP MP for five times from 1935 to 1954.³¹³ As Emin Karakuş claimed, Yalçın regularly had meetings with President İnönü and they discussed both internal and external events, particularly following the Soviet demands from Turkey.³¹⁴ What is more, the government sent Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın to European countries in order to examine the press regime and organizations in these countries in 1946.³¹⁵ So, he took an important place in the nexus between the government and the press.

Moreover, regarding *Tanin*'s role in the Turkish-Soviet relations, Yalçın and other columnists of *Tanin* frequently condemned the leftist groups in Turkey after the end of the Second World War.³¹⁶ In other words, *Tanin* was not simply a newspaper reflecting the government views but took a leading and active role to condemn the leftist groups and even according to Kemal Sülker, Yalçın's provocative articles led to the raid of newspaper *Tan* by university students.³¹⁷ Besides, as Rasim Dirsehan Örs

³¹¹ Orhan Koloğlu, *Türk Basını: Kuvayı Milliye'den Günümüze: 70. Yılında Cumhuriyet Basını* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1993), p. 67.

³¹² Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, pp. 172-173.

³¹³ Sema Yıldırım and Behçet Kemal Zeynel, *TBMM Albümü, 1920-2010, 1. Cilt 1920-1950* (Ankara: TBMM Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 2010), p. 401.

³¹⁴ Karakuş, *40 Yıllık Bir Gazeteci Gözü ile İşte Ankara*, p. 82.

³¹⁵ 7 February 1946: BCA, 30 18 1 2 110 10 19.

³¹⁶ Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, p. 166-167.

³¹⁷ Sülker, *Sabahattin Ali Dosyası*, p. 26.

observed, Soviet newspapers closely watched Yalçın's articles as a result of his influence in Turkish public opinion.³¹⁸ After closing *Tanin*, he became the editorial writer for *Ulus* on September 11, 1948.

Apart from Yalçın, there were several columnists of *Tanin* who had close relations with CHP. For example, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer was a MP from 1939 to 1946 in the National Assembly who wrote articles regarding foreign policy. He supported the Allies (particularly, the US) from the very beginning of the Second World War³¹⁹ and participated in the San Francisco Conference, which was held from 26 April to 26 June 1945, as one of the Turkish delegates. After his service as an MP, he moved to New York in 1948 to establish a press bureau in the name of the government. As claimed by Esmer, his duty was to introduce Turkey to the foreign countries.³²⁰ When he returned to Ankara in 1949, he was appointed as the director of the General Press and Information (*Basın-Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü*).³²¹ That is to say, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer was not only a journalist working for a CHP-linked newspaper but also an influential person in regulating press-government nexus.

As another CHP-linked newspaper, *Vakit* was published until December, 1949 (but with the name of *Yeni Gazete* after January, 1948). Asım Us, as the owner and editor of the newspaper, became MP from CHP for five times from May 1, 1927 to August 5, 1946.³²² Moreover, there were people, who wrote articles for *Vakit* having

³¹⁸ Rasim Dirsehan Örs, *Rus Basınında Türkiye ve NATO: Soğuk Savaş Yılları* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 2011), pp. 73-74. In effect, Yalçın's articles had also been followed by Nazis during the WWII and he was regarded as a 'pro-British' columnist (Auswärtiges Amt, *German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey, 1941-1943* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1948), pp. 87-88).

³¹⁹ For example, see Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Ruzvelt'in Mesajı", *Ulus*, 7 January 1939, p. 3; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Türkiye-Birleşik Amerika", *Ulus*, 28 February 1939, p. 3

³²⁰ "B.A. Şükrü Esmer'in İlk Basın Toplantısı", *Ulus*, 10 March 1949, p. 3. See a similar article: Hikmet Tuna, "Hariçte Kendimizi Tanıtmak Davası", *Ulus*, 12 February 1949, p. 2.

³²¹ Yıldırım and Zeynel, Behçet Kemal *TBMM Albümü, 1920-2010*, p. 331.

³²² Yıldırım and Zeynel, Behçet Kemal *TBMM Albümü, 1920-2010*, p. 386.

connections with the government, such as Hüseyin Hulki Cura who served as an MP from CHP for three times from 1939 to 1950.³²³

While CHP had its own press, the oppositional parties, too, had their supporting press. One of the most prominent one at that point was *Cumhuriyet*, a newspaper traditionally associated with the Republic and of course its governing party. While *Cumhuriyet* was in support of the main political opposition, *Demokrat Parti*, in this period; *Cumhuriyet's* criticism of CHP grew vehement after the election held in 1946.³²⁴ *Cumhuriyet* had columnists such as Nadir Nadi who was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper in this period and became a DP MP from 1950 to 1954, Ömer Rıza Doğrul who wrote articles about foreign affairs and became DP MP for Konya from 1950 to 1954, Nizameddin Ali Sav who was a DP MP for İstanbul from 1954 to 1960, Abidin Daver who was CHP MP for İstanbul from 1939 to 1943 and Adnan Adıvar who was an independent MP for İstanbul from 1946 to 1950. According to Kayalı, Adıvar was one of the most prominent representatives of liberal ideology in Turkey.³²⁵ Moreover, Mirza Bala was another columnist of *Cumhuriyet*, who had migrated from Azerbaijan to Turkey in 1920 when the Soviet Union occupied the country. His writings about Muslims living in the Soviet Union contributed to creation of an enemy, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. As Mumcu argued, there were strong collaborations between the CIA and Muslim Turks who had lived in the Soviet Union, which aimed to increase anti-communism in Turkey.³²⁶

1949 was, in fact, an important year for the oppositional press as two newspapers started its publication life. *Zafer*, as the official newspaper of *Demokrat Parti*, began to be published on April 30, 1949. The editor of *Zafer*, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, who was

³²³ Yıldırım and Zeynel, Behçet Kemal *TBMM Albümü, 1920-2010*, p. 477.

³²⁴ Pektaş, *Milli Şef Döneminde*, p. 3.

³²⁵ Kurtuluş Kayalı, “Adnan Adıvar”, in Uygur Kocabaşoğlu (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 3: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 36.

³²⁶ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, p. 48. According to German intelligence reports, Mirza Bala was a member of Pan-Turkic movement and he supported Nazis during the World War II. (Auswärtiges Amt, *German Foreign Office*, p. 37). Arslan Bohdaroviç, who sometimes wrote articles for *Zafer*, also migrated from the Soviet Union to Turkey.

the editor-in-chief of the newspaper until 1957, was a vibrant personality among the members of DP. As an example, he gave a speech in the name of *Demokrat Parti* during the election campaign in 1946.³²⁷ As another example of how he was strongly linked with DP, the government decided to arrest him in February 1950 for his articles which criticized the government but his prison sentence was suspended because of his health problems.³²⁸ On May 14, 1950, he became a DP MP. Samet Ağaoğlu, who was a DP MP from 1950 to 1960, the Vice Prime Minister from 5 June 1950 to 10 November 1952, the Minister of Labor from 11 November 1952 to 8 April 1953 and the Minister of Commerce from 6 December 1954 to 8 February 1958 and Burhan Belge who was a DP MP for Muğla from 1957 to 1960 and became the editor-in-chief of *Zafer* in 1957, were also writing articles for *Zafer*.³²⁹

Yeni İstanbul, which was owned by Habib Edib Törehan and started to be published on December 1, 1949,³³⁰ was against the CHP government having columnists such as Burhan Belge and Vedat Nedim Tör who were the supporters of CHP before. For instance, Vedat Nedim Tör was the manager of the Directorate General of Press and Information (*Basın ve Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü*) from 1933 to 1937 while Burhan Belge served as a consultant in the same institution from 1933 to 1943.³³¹ Finally, *Yeni Sabah* was also critical of the CHP administration, which had been published since 1938 and it had close relations with *Millet Partisi*.³³² It was owned by Cemalettin Saraçoğlu who sold the newspaper to Safa Kılıçlıoğlu, a businessman, in 1948.³³³

³²⁷ 16 July 1946: BCA, 30 10 0 0 129 929 15.

³²⁸ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Allaha Ismarladık!..", *Zafer*, 28 February 1950, p. 1; "Mümtaz Faik'in Haksız Tevkifinin İlk Akisleri, *Zafer*, 1 March 1950, p. 1.

³²⁹ Fuat Süreyya Oral, *Türk Basın Tarihi 1919-1965 Cumhuriyet Dönemi* (İstanbul: Yeni Adım Matbaası, 1967), pp. 153-155.

³³⁰ Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, p. 172.

³³¹ Türkes, *Kadro Hareketi*, p. 234.

³³² 21 August 1948: BCA, 490 1 0 0 436 1811 3.

³³³ Enver Behnan Şapolyo, *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yönü ile* (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1971), pp. 238-239.

As such, in this study, while *Ulus*, *Akşam*, *Tanin* and *Vakit* were regarded as the supporters of the CHP cadre, *Cumhuriyet*, *Zafer*, *Yeni İstanbul* and *Yeni Sabah* were considered the newspapers of the opposing parties. However, as discussed later, there were differences not only between the governmental and oppositional newspapers but also within governmental and oppositional press, too. Moreover, it is possible to claim that the oppositional press might have felt itself freer in its attacks to the Soviet Union compared to the governmental newspapers because harsh criticism of the CHP-linked newspapers might lead to a problem between the government and the external powers, as discussed above.

Before an analysis of the early Cold War perceptions of the Turkish press, it is needed to examine the importance of individual figures, who were very experienced journalists with the exception of Nihat Erim, for the press environment and to show why this study is based on not only news reported in the newspapers but also articles written by columnists. Furthermore, it is needed to discuss how political position of columnists might change from time to time. Firstly, most of the press members were not only people linked with the political parties or the MPs but they were also themselves policy-makers who played a central role in determination of the domestic and foreign policies. For example, Necmettin Sadak of *Akşam* participated the meeting of the League of Nations in July 18, 1932 when Turkey had become a member of the League. Sadak was representative of Turkey at Geneva Conference of the League in 1932 and indeed he was the ‘permanent’ representative of Turkey in the League. He also participated in the negotiations of the Montreux Convention in 1936.³³⁴ Similar to Sadak, Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın of *Tanin* (later of *Ulus*) closely watched international developments. To demonstrate, he participated in the meetings of the United Nations; particularly, in those related to Israeli-Arab conflicts as a member of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.³³⁵ Hence, their analyses of

³³⁴ Hakkı Uyar, “Necmettin Sadık Sadak”, in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 2: Kemalizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), pp. 104-105.

³³⁵ 3 January 1949: BCA, 30 18 1 2 118 87 1; 13 January 1950: BCA, 121 95 15 30 18 1 2.

international developments were not based on solely what news agencies reported but also their own experiences.

Secondly, most of the press members had an academic career, in general from the universities located in the West and they could speak foreign languages very well. For example, Necmettin Sadak of *Akşam*, graduating from the University of Lyon in 1914, became a professor of sociology in 1916 and wrote several academic sociological books.³³⁶ Similarly, Adnan Adıvar, as a medical doctor, worked for academic institutions in Britain and France from 1926 to 1939.³³⁷ Burhan Asaf Belge graduated from the department of the civil engineering of the Humboldt University of Berlin in 1922.³³⁸ He could speak German, English, French and Arabic very well.³³⁹ As another example, Ömer Rıza Doğrul of *Cumhuriyet* was a religious columnist who had graduated from the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. He could speak both in English and Arabic very well and he translated many books to Turkish.³⁴⁰ Hence, the press members were very familiar with academic and western terminology and they could read western publications in their original languages rather than their translations, which must have contributed to their ability to analyze international developments.

Thirdly, columnists of the period could easily change newspapers, for which they wrote articles, and more importantly, their political positions. Many journalists who became the defenders of the oppositional press in this period, actually had written for the CHP-linked newspapers such as *Akşam* or *Ulus* earlier. For example, Burhan Belge, who was regarded as one of the most influential ‘theorists’ of the Kemalist ideology as a member of the *Kadro* movement, began to support DP following the transition to the multi-party system. Mehmet Şevki Yazman, as another member of the

³³⁶ Uyar, “Necmettin Sadık Sadak”, p. 102.

³³⁷ Kayalı, “Adnan Adıvar”, p. 36.

³³⁸ Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi*, p. 234.

³³⁹ Server İskit, *Türkiyede Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları* (V. 2) (Ankara: Tan Basımevi, 1943), p. 287.

³⁴⁰ Bernard Lewis, “Islamic Revival In Turkey” *International Affairs* 28 (1952), p. 45.

Kadro movement, wrote articles for CHP-linked *Akşam* in the very beginning of the period. However, he began to write articles for *Yeni İstanbul* later. Indeed, he became DP MP for Elazığ from 1950 to 1957. More importantly, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, as the founder of DP's official newspaper *Zafer*, was a columnist in CHP's official newspaper, *Ulus* in the very beginning of the period. This kind of shift might have been the result of the columnists' dissatisfaction with the change in CHP's policies and/or their desire to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances of the time. In any way, both political position and influence of the columnists might easily change throughout the period.

This kind of shift might occur in the opposite direction. For example, Refik Halid Karay, as one of '*Yüzellilikler*' (the 150 *personae non gratae* of Turkey), had been exiled from Turkey following the formation of the Turkish Republic due to his support to the Allies, which had invaded Turkey after the World War I. After he returned to Turkey in 1938, he changed his political position. Although Nuray Mert claimed that this change was mandatory,³⁴¹ he became one of the most prominent columnists of CHP-linked *Akşam*. Similarly, Peyami Safa had written articles for *Tasvir-i Efkâr* before, which had been closed down by the government during the Second World War, as discussed above. Having changed its name as '*Tasvir*' in 1945, the newspaper began to support DP.³⁴² Later, Peyami Safa began to write articles for CHP-linked *Vakit* and the official newspaper of CHP, *Ulus*. Although he continued to express his nationalist and anti-communist attitude in *Ulus*, Safa became a member of the governmental press.

In addition, the press was affected by changing balance of power among different interest groups within CHP. For example, Falih Rıfkı Atay quitted his job in *Ulus* as the editor-in-chief just before the seventh party congress of CHP, which would be held

³⁴¹ Nuray Mert, "Refik Halid Karay", in Ömer Laçiner (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 9: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), pp. 882-884.

³⁴² Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, p. 172.

on November 17, 1947³⁴³ and Atay's decision was a result of tension within CHP.³⁴⁴ At that moment, there were two main groups within CHP. The first group was the 'radicals', who criticized the transition to multi-party system and to liberal economy whereas the second group was the 'moderates' who believed that this transition was necessary. As one of the radicals, Recep Peker became the prime minister on August 7, 1946. However, both DP members and the 'moderate' CHP members harshly criticized Peker's government. Since President İnönü supported the 'moderate' group and DP members forced İnönü to take an action against the radicals, Recep Peker had to resign on September 10, 1947 and Hasan Saka became the Prime Minister, who was regarded as a 'moderate'. This change was regarded as the victory of the second group over the first one. Falih Rıfki Atay, as the defender of the radical group, expressed his criticisms against the 'moderate' ones.³⁴⁵ Although Atay continued to write articles for *Ulus*, his job as the editor-in-chief of the newspaper was taken by Nihat Erim, as one of the prominent member of the second group, then by Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın.

To conclude, in a political environment witnessing the transition from a single-party system to a multi-party system, newspapers became one of the arenas that the government and the opposition competed with each other. There were both government censorship and democratization efforts in the press environment. In this regard, as the newspapers did not simply reflect the views of the editors, newspapers owners or their writers but very much more was in the line with the political requirements or the views which could be expressed within the given restrictions. For these reasons, it is possible to examine the Turkish newspapers closely for a better examination of the role of the press during the early Cold War.

3.2) DEVELOPING A COLD WAR LANGUAGE

In this period, the Turkish press was instrumental in transferring, revising and popularizing the western terminology on the Cold War. In effect, internalization of the

³⁴³ 16 September 1948: BCA, 1250 163 3 490 1 0 0.

³⁴⁴ "Falih Rıfki Atay 35lere Hücum Ediyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 November 1947, p. 1.

³⁴⁵ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, pp. 203-205.

Cold War language by the Turkish press went hand in hand with the developments of the Turkey's own Cold War with the Soviet Union. It is important to note that the Turkish press meticulously followed not only the western press but also the communist one, too. However, while the Turkish press used the western press as a reference point and evaluated it as a 'reliable' source, it referred to the communist press both to respond to accusations about Turkey³⁴⁶ by the communists and to create an enemy (i.e., to mention the "awful" conditions in the communist countries). For example, on March 16, 1949, *Ulus* reporting from *Associated Press*, claimed that newspapers belonged to Cominform attacked the Turkish press in an "ugly" way. As *Ulus* claimed, communist newspapers described the Turkish press as the "frogs of Turkish bog" (*Türk bataklığının kurbağaları*). *Ulus*, replying this insult, stated that the press was under the total control of the governments in the communist countries.³⁴⁷ As seen from this example, the Turkish press followed the press of the communist countries but either reporting or translating from the western sources, which might be another proof of western influence in the developing of the Cold War language.

It is important to note that the Turkish press had not made use of the foreign news agencies until the advent of the Second World War and they accessed the news regarding the international affairs through the *Anadolu Agency* (*Anadolu Ajansı*), a state-run press agency which was founded on April 6, 1920. According to Öymen, during the Second World War, 20 % of foreign news which the *Anadolu Agency* reported came from the German News agencies while 50 % was taken from the *Reuters*. After the US entered the war, the *Anadolu Agency* began to report news from

³⁴⁶ See examples: Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Bolşevikler Hakkında Bir Müşahede", *Tanin*, 26 September 1945, p. 1; Nadir Nadi, "Profesörlere Cevabımız", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 January 1946, p. 1; S. Karanakçı, "Gene Boğazlar Meselesi", *Ulus*, 4 May 1950, p. 2.

³⁴⁷ "Kominformun Türk Basınına Çirkin Hücumu", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 16 March 1949, p. 1.

the *United Press*, too.³⁴⁸ Since 1945, Turkish newspapers directly began to translate articles and news from the western news agencies.³⁴⁹

These agencies were *the Associated Press (AP)* and *the United Press International (UPI)* of the United States, *Reuters* of Britain, and *Agence France-Press (AFP)* of France. There were also broadcasters, newspapers and magazines from which the Turkish press reported news and translated articles such as *the Voice of America (VOA)*, the *New York Times* and *Reader's Digest* of the United States; *the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)*, *the Daily Telegraph*, *the Sunday Times*, *the Yorkshire Post*, *the Times*, *Tribune* and *the Manchester Guardian* of Britain; *Le Monde* of France. Regarding these news agencies of that period, they had a monopolistic position in collecting news across the countries and selling them to the world due to either political reasons (i.e., the government's protection of these agencies) or their technological superiority (i.e., having worldwide telegraph networks).³⁵⁰ This monopolistic position of the western news agencies and government censorship must also have affected availability of sources to which the Turkish press could access. In addition to monopolistic power of these agencies, there was a government pressure on the press in western countries as well. Survey and studies focused on the freedom of press in the West (particularly, in the United States) showed that the governments restricted both access to and publication of foreign news following the Second World War.³⁵¹

As such, the Turkish press reported international news and reports from the western news agencies. These news agencies, which collected news from the different parts of the globe, were 'monopolistic' 'profit-maximizing' institutions; that is, they must have

³⁴⁸ Onur Öymen, *Propaganda Silahı Olarak Basın: Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Sansür, Baskı ve Yönlendirme* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2014), p. 248.

³⁴⁹ Adam McConnel, *The CHP, the U.S., and Ulus: The Portrayal of the United States in Ulus Gazetesi during WWII* (Unpublished Master's Thesis) (İstanbul: Sabancı University, 2007), p. 86.

³⁵⁰ Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, *The International Distribution of News: The Associated Press, Press Association, and Reuters, 1848–1947* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 226-230.

³⁵¹ David Randall Davies, *The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers, 1945-1965* (Wesport: Praeger, 2006), p. 33.

selected news which they could ‘sell’ both at home and abroad. At the same time, owing to the ‘government censorship’, they could not report news as they wished. Moreover, Turkish newspapers, which already had to tackle with the government control and pressure at home, chose to report news, which they ‘bought’ and were compatible with their publication policies.

Most probably, the Turkish press was aware of the fact that there was a censorship in western countries. For instance, on February 4, 1950, *Ulus* published an article titled “Censorship abroad (within the last six months)”. *Ulus*, reporting an article published in *New York Times*, explained censorship in foreign press. The article stated that there was a 'heavy' censorship in foreign countries (both in western and communist ones). Mentioning different parts of the world individually, *Ulus's* article evaluated how the press had tackled with this censorship recently.³⁵² As another example, on April 21, 1950, *Ulus* published an article about Truman's speech stating the “duty” of the press in the United States. As *Ulus* reported, Truman expected the US press to take a position against the “communist propaganda” and suggested American journalists to report news according to the “national interests” of the US.³⁵³ Nonetheless, the Turkish press members were able to interpret news which they reported from the western agencies; namely, reporting regional and international developments, they might attach different meanings to the ‘imported’ news. Indeed, as will be discussed below, self-perception(s) of the Turkish press allowed the development of its own Cold War language.

The development of the Cold War language in Turkey might also be understood through examining the translations of foreign books and articles by the press because these publications included the terms that had been most probably borrowed from the West. Translated books and articles were generally written by the western authors. To begin with, there were several serials which were translations of the western works, appeared in Turkish newspapers. The translation of ‘the Time for Decision’ written in

³⁵² "(Son Altı Ay İçinde) Hariçte Sansür", (AP) *Ulus*, 4 February 1950, p. 2.

³⁵³ "Truman Basına Düşen Vazifeleri Hatırlattı", *Ulus*, 21 April 1950, p. 1.

1944 by Sumner Wells, who had worked for the US State Department before, appeared on the pages of *Akşam* in 1945.³⁵⁴ As the book was about the author's memoirs related to Europe during the interwar period and provided the author's own projections for the future, this publication might have contributed to shaping Turkish perceptions of the New World Order following the Second World War. Well's writings also appeared on the pages of two other CHP-linked newspapers *Vakit*³⁵⁵ and *Ulus*.³⁵⁶ There were also translations of articles published in Turkish newspapers. These articles were either written by foreign journalists or Western former Diplomats.³⁵⁷ *Yeni Sabah*, for instance, translated former prime minister of France Paul Reynaud's article, which was about the war of nerves waged by the Soviet Union. In the article, Reynaud declared that the Soviet Union was not able to declare a war against the West but the US could wage a war against the Soviet Union as the US had atomic power.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁴ "Dünya Siyasetine Ait Meselelerin İçyüzünü Anlatan Eser", *Akşam*, 15 January 1945, p. 1.

³⁵⁵ Sumner Wells, "Şarki Avrupa ve Yakın Şark", *Vakit*, 17 February 1945, p. 2.

³⁵⁶ Sumner Welles, "Dünya Nizamına Doğru İlerleme", *Ulus*, 17 March 1947, p. 3.

³⁵⁷ "Komünist Rejimlere Hücum", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 June 1948, p. 3.

³⁵⁸ "Rusyanın Açtığı Sınır Harbi ve Atom Bombası", *Yeni Sabah*, 23 January 1948, p. 4. For other examples, see: Walter Lippmann, "İktibaslar: Kremlin'in Şüphesi", *Ulus*, 15 February 1949, p. 1; Charles Sawyer (translated by M. O. Beykozlu), "Amerika Tarihinde En Yüksek İstihale Doğru", *Ulus*, 20 February 1950, p. 1; William Hard and Andre Visson (translated by M. O. Beykozlu), "Avrupa ile Açık Konuşmalıyız", *Ulus*, 7 March 1950, p. 5; George F. Kennan, "Rusya ile Harp Kaçınılmaz mı?", 30 March 1950, *Ulus*, p. 5; Bertrand Russell (translated by M.O. Beykozlu), "Üçüncü Bir Dünya Harbi Mukadder mi?", *Ulus*, 2 May 1950, pp. 5-6; William Hard (translated by M.O. Beykozlu), "Yabancı Memleketler ve Amerikan Sistemi", *Ulus*, 12 May 1950, p. 2. The memoirs and speeches of the foreigners were shaping the Turkish perception of its neighbors as well. As maintained by *Yeni Sabah*, Christopher Holme, a journalist working for *Reuters*, said that American interests in the Middle East were refreshed after the introduction of the Truman Doctrine, which provided the defense of Turkey and Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union (Christopher Holme, "Orta Doğuda Kuvvet Siyaseti", *Reuters Yeni Sabah*, 10 January 1948, p. 4). Moreover, as *Akşam* translated, Ferdinand Otto Miksche, Czechoslovakian Military Attaché in France between 1946 and 1947 who joined French Army in 1948, said that the Soviet Union and Anglo-Saxons would fight against each other in the Middle East at first stage in case of another world war (Ferdinand Otto Miksche, "Yeni Bir Dünya Harbi Başlarsa Nasıl Gelişecek?", *Akşam*, 15 March 1948, p. 5). As *Akşam* conveyed, Jacques Duchesne, former manager of radio program 'French speaking to French' at the *BBC* in London, said that two blocs were constantly examining each other's powers but there would not be any sign of war (Jacques Duchesne, "Harb Olacak mı?", *BBC Akşam*, 4 April 1948, p. 1). What is more, from the late-1948 to the mid-1949, *Ulus* periodically published the wartime memoirs of the General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who would be the US President from 1953 to 1961, and Nurettin Artam translated this serial. See for example, Dwight D. Eisenhower (translated by Nurettin Artam), "Avrupa'daki Savaşımız" (V. 39), *Ulus*, 1 February 1949, p. 4.

What is more, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4 in details, these translations did not only contribute to developing the Cold War language but also to creating the Turkish perception of the communist countries. As an example, Sam Welles's, who was the associated editor of *Time*, book *Profile of Europe*, which was written in 1948 and about the social conditions in the Soviet Union, was translated by *Yeni Sabah* and it was titled 'What I Saw in Communist Russia'. His book was about how awful the life was in Russia such as the bad road conditions there.³⁵⁹ Translations of memoirs belonged to those who had migrated from socialist countries to capitalist ones also contributed to the creation of an enemy. For example, the serial which appeared on the pages of *Yeni Sabah*, '*Ne Vatan, Ne Hudud*' (Neither homeland nor border) was about a German communist's memoirs.³⁶⁰ *Cumhuriyet* followed this pattern, and published memoirs of Grigori Aleksandrovich Tokaev who served in the Soviet Control Commission in Berlin and then took refuge in Britain in 1948. In his memoirs, he warned the western world about Stalin's regime. For instance, he claimed that Stalin had nothing but one purpose: the domination of the entire world.³⁶¹ Obviously the aim of this publication was to increase hostility towards communism while increasing sympathy to the western democracies. Indeed, as Bora claimed, anti-communist publications in Turkey were mainly based on the translations of the American publications.³⁶²

As another factor, these translations and of course close following of the international publishing scene familiarized Turkish journalists with the newly emerging Cold War terms.³⁶³ As an illustration, the press took the term 'White War' (*Beyaz Savaş*)

³⁵⁹ Sam Welles, "Komünist Rusyada Neler Gördüm?", *Yeni Sabah*, 22 January 1949, p. 4.

³⁶⁰ "Ne Vatan, Ne Hudud", *Yeni Sabah*, 29 January 1949, p. 3.

³⁶¹ Grigori Tokaty Tokaev, "Rusya'nın Hazırlığı", *Cumhuriyet*, 30 January 1949, p. 2. See other examples: Janina Konar, "(Bir Kadın Gözüyle) Rus Esir Kampları", *Ulus*, 25 February 1949, p. 2; Pearl S. Buck (translated by M.O. Beykosoğlu), "Çin'in İç Yüzü", *Ulus*, 28 February 1950, p. 2; ungtä C. Lung, "Eski Patronum Mao Tse Tung", *Ulus*, 4 May 1950, p. 5.

³⁶² Bora, *Türkiye'de Siyasal İdeolojilerde ABD*, p. 156.

³⁶³ In effect, the Turkish press followed not only news and articles published in the western press but also cartoons appeared in the pages of the western newspapers and journals. For example, *Ulus* published some selected cartoons with the title of 'foreign cartoon(s)' (*ecnebi karikatür(ler)i*). See examples: "Ecnebi Karikatürleri", *Ulus*, 15 March 1949, p. 5; "Ecnebi Karikatürü", *Ulus*, 30 April 1950, p. 7; "Ecnebi Karikatürleri", *Ulus*, 16 May 1950, p. 1. Although these cartoons were not political ones,

referring to current struggles between the US and the Soviet Union. On January 8, 1948, *Akşam*, in its analysis of the Greek Civil War, said that the current situation in Greece was almost a small version of the world war. For *Akşam*, the armed conflicts in Greece was an example of the ‘White War’ (*Beyaz Savaş*) or the ‘Fireless War’ (*Ateşsiz Harb*), as the Anglo-Saxon press called. As further reported by *Akşam*, the reason for the ‘White War’ was the existence of the communist groups, the satellite Balkans countries and the Soviet Union on the one side while there were Greece, Britain and the US on the other side. For *Akşam*, the reason for the White War between these two groups was also the difference in their ideologies.³⁶⁴

As such, the Turkish press was very much in tune with the international publishing scene, particularly the Anglo-Saxon one, and the newspapers selected the kind of translations they wanted to publish according to the political atmosphere and the needs of the period. What is more, the influence of the western press in Turkish periodicals with respect to the Cold War terminology in this period was quite significant. Turkish journalists, like their counterparts in the West, used simultaneously both ‘Cold War’ (*soğuk harb*) and ‘War of Nerves’ (*sinir harbi*) to describe the world politics of the period. As another relevant example, the press continuously used the terms ‘Iron Curtain’ (*Demir Perde*)³⁶⁵ and ‘Red Curtain’ (*Kızıl Perde*) and these terms were copied either from western diplomatic discourse or from foreign press.³⁶⁶

Nevertheless, there was no consistency about what these terms exactly meant and which terms should be used to meet a particular meaning. Instead, each author selected their own Cold War terms according to what they understood. For example, claiming that it was coined by John Milton, Adivar also used the term ‘War for Peace’ (*Sulh Harbi*), in his article published in *Akşam*.³⁶⁷ One week later, *Yeni Sabah* referred to the

in general; there must have been some effect of them on the Turkish caricaturists. As will be discussed in the following chapters, cartoons helped the press to shape Turkish perceptions of the early Cold War.

³⁶⁴ “Yunanistan Hadiselerinin Askeri ve Siyasi Cepheleri”, *Akşam*, 8 January 1948, p. 1.

³⁶⁵ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Demir Perde Arkasından Sızan Haberler", *Akşam*, 13 May 1948, p. 5; Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Pasifikteki Demir Perde", *Akşam*, 24 May 1948, p. 3.

³⁶⁶ "Kızıl Perde Ardında Çekoslovakya", *Yeni Sabah*, 28 February 1948, p. 1.

³⁶⁷ Adnan Adivar, "Sulh Harbi", *Akşam*, 27 April 1948, p. 1.

existing Cold War as the 'Bloodless War' (*Kansız Harb*).³⁶⁸ The Cold War was also named as the 'War of Nerves' (*Sinir Harbi*) and was used by the Turkish journalists. To demonstrate, on March 5, 1949, *Cumhuriyet*, in its analysis of the counter-attacks of the communist bloc to NATO, stated that although almost four years passed after the end of the Second World War, Europe did not find the peace which it looked for yet. Rather, as *Cumhuriyet* asserted, the old allies were in a "weird" competition, which was called in different names such as the 'War of Nerves' or the 'Cold War'.³⁶⁹ Two days later, Yavuz Abadan of *Ulus* used the term 'the Dry War' (*Kuru Harb*) as a synonym to the Cold War.³⁷⁰ As another example, as Ömer Rıza Doğrul of *Cumhuriyet* claimed, the 'War of Nerves' had recently finished and there remained only two options: either an actual war or peace.³⁷¹ Additionally, Enis Tahsin Til, regarding the War of Nerves synonymous to the Cold War, said that it was as much exhausting as an actual war.³⁷² Similarly, Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın of *Ulus* stated that whether it was 'cold' or 'hot', the war was simply a 'war'.³⁷³

While the 'Cold War' or the 'War of Nerves' was used to describe the current international developments, for the Turkish press, the 'Cold War' or the 'War of Nerves' did not simply refer to the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union and the press occasionally used them in a different context. As reported by *Zafer*, the struggle between Stalin and Tito, for example, was also considered 'a new cold war'.³⁷⁴ Similarly, Nazif Süleyman named his article in *Zafer*, in 1949, the 'Cold War in Cyprus', referring to struggles between Turks and Greeks on the island.³⁷⁵ In another

³⁶⁸ "Kansız Harb", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 May 1948, p. 3.

³⁶⁹ "Şimal Atlantik Paktına Karşı Kızıl Taarruzu", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 March 1949, p. 1.

³⁷⁰ Yavuz Abadan, "Soğuk Harb", *Ulus*, 7 March 1949, p. 1.

³⁷¹ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Atlantik Paktının Son şekil", *Cumhuriyet*, 10 March 1949, p. 3.

³⁷² Enis Tahsin Til, "Beşinci Yıl Barış Getirecek Mi?", *Akşam*, 10 May 1949, p. 2.

³⁷³ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Bugünkü Çarpışma", *Ulus*, 6 April 1950, p. 1.

³⁷⁴ "Tito-Stalin Davası Had Bir Safhada", *Zafer*, 24 August 1949, p. 3.

³⁷⁵ Nazif Süleyman, "Kıbrıs'ta 'Soğuk Harp'", *Zafer*, 7 September 1949, p. 3.

example, Fenik used the term the ‘Wars of Nerves’ against *Demokrat Parti*, referring to the pressure of the government on the opposition.³⁷⁶

The inconsistency and lack of clarity about what the Cold War meant, in fact, persisted even until the end of the CHP era. For instance, on March 3, 1949, Yavuz Abadan of *Ulus*, used the term “peace attack” (*barış taarruzu*) to define the current international situation. As he claimed, it was an invention of a “mentality” (*zihniyet*) (implying the Soviet Union) which wanted to destroy universal values such as “ethics” (*ahlak*) and “law” (*hukuk*).³⁷⁷ Nine months later, *Yeni İstanbul* declared that the Soviet Union began to wage the “peace attack” (*sulh taarruzu*) in every part of the planet; that meant, a new era of the “War of Nerves” or the “Cold War” had just begun.³⁷⁸ Two months later, *Yeni İstanbul* expected that the Cold War might lead to the “Warm War” (*ılık harb*) which might lead to the “Hot War” (*sıcak harb*).³⁷⁹ Yalçın of *Ulus*, having the same idea with *Yeni İstanbul*, claimed that the “warm war” caused the “hot war” in many parts of the world.³⁸⁰ As he later asserted, whether it is warm or cold, the war had not yet ceased to exist.³⁸¹ Necmettin Önder of *Zafer*, having a different perspective, defined the Cold War as an economic war.³⁸² The press further enriched the Cold War vocabulary by adding different variations of names and depictions of the current

³⁷⁶ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "D.P. ye Karşı Sınır Harbi!", *Zafer*, 12 January 1950, p. 1.

³⁷⁷ Yavuz Abadan, "Barış Taarruzu", *Ulus*, 3 March 1949, p. 1.

³⁷⁸ "İç ve Dış Politika", *Yeni İstanbul*, 4 December 1949, p. 1. In effect, the term “peace attack” (*sulh taarruzu*) was also used by other newspapers and columnists. See as an example: Feridun Osman Menteşeoğlu, "Rusların Yeni Sulh Taarruzları", *Ulus*, 1 February 1949, p. 2.

³⁷⁹ "Fransa, Sovyet Rusya Münasebetleri", *Yeni İstanbul*, 8 February 1950, p. 1.

³⁸⁰ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Ilık Harb", *Ulus*, 8 April 1950, p. 1.

³⁸¹ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Garp Cephesinde Faaliyet", *Ulus*, 11 May 1950, p. 1.

³⁸² Necmeddin Önder, "İktisadi Harp Bütün Şiddetle Devam Ediyor", *Zafer*, 12 January 1950, p. 2.

situation in the international system. There were other types of the wars such as the “war of microbes” (*mikrop harbi*)³⁸³ or the “radio war” (*radio harbi*).³⁸⁴

Perhaps among those who used the Cold War terminology, Diplomat,³⁸⁵ writing for *Yeni Sabah*, was the only one who tried to engage the term ‘Cold War’ itself. He argued that, English newspapers, contrary to their American counterparts, did not like the term ‘Cold War’ because this term led to the perception that the Allies declared a war against the Soviet Union and it tried to conceive the world that they were being attacked by the West.³⁸⁶ To sum up, the Turkish press, having influenced by the foreign press and internalizing these terms, developed its own Cold War language throughout the period and used the Cold War related terms in order to explain the current structure of the international system. Although the western press was not the only source in accessing international events and the only factor in shaping the perceptions of the early Cold War by the Turkish press, they heavily shaped the way in which the Turkish newspapers and journalists reflected regional and global conflicts.

3.3) COVERAGE OF THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR BY TURKISH PRESS: JANUARY 1945 - JULY 1945

Benefiting from the Western-oriented terminology and having influenced by the western press, the Turkish press somehow created its own perceptions and interpretations of international developments, which were heavily shaped by the early Cold War conditions. During the initial months of 1945, the Turkish press tried to

³⁸³ "Mikrop Harbi", *Yeni Sabah*, 24 February 1950, p. 1; "Âlimler Bir Mikrop Harbi İhtimalinden Bahsediyor", *Ulus*, 24 February 1950, p. 3. Note that both newspapers mentioned the possibility of the “war on microbe” on the same day, which refers that they must have imported this term from the foreign press.

³⁸⁴ "Radyo Savaşı", (*Nafen Akşam*), 21 May 1949, p. 7; "Radyo Harbi", *Zafer*, 3 July 1949, p. 3; "Radyo Harbi Git Gide Şiddetleniyor", *Ulus*, 6 February 1950, p. 5; Diplomat, "Hoffman'ın Tahminleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 May 1950, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Radyo Savaşı", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 May 1950, p. 3.

³⁸⁵ Although whose nickname was Diplomat was not specified, he might have been Şükrü Baban, who wrote articles regarding foreign policy as the editor-in-chief of *Yeni Sabah* at that moment. He had served as a diplomat before, thus, it was logical to expect that Diplomat was Baban's nickname (Mustafa İnce, "A Biography of Hüseyin Şükrü Baban: Diplomat, Academic and Journalist" *International Journal of Turcologia* 7.14 (2012), pp. 105-112). However, since it was not clear who he was, only Diplomat is used in this thesis.

³⁸⁶ Diplomat, "Soğuk Harp", *Yeni Sabah*, 30 May 1950, p. 3.

project the new world order for the post-war era and they urged the necessity of the formation of the ‘world peace’, which was a quite popular term among columnists. The ‘world peace’ was a reference not only to the end of the six-year war but also to the end of pressure on Turkey by external powers. During the entire course of the Second World War, Turkey had been forced to enter the war by both the Allies and Axis powers. The Turkish government, resisting these pressures, maintained its neutrality until the early-1945 and it only became a member of the Allies after their victorious position against Germany became certain.

However, the upcoming end of the Second World War did not immediately bring the “world peace” for the Turkish press. Rather, the emerging Soviet threat did lead to mobilization of the Turkish army and the situation remained a serious burden on Turkish economy, which had already suffered from the devastating conditions of the war. Moreover, despite Turkey’s ‘symbolic’ participation in the war on the side of the Allies, the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union had worsened day by day. As Roberts argued, just after the war, many people had expected that the war-time alliance between the Soviet Union and the liberal members of the Allies (i.e., the US, Britain and France) would be maintained in the post-war period.³⁸⁷ In this atmosphere, the Turkish press regarded the ‘world peace’ as a state in which Turkey could sustain its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

³⁸⁷ Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics*, p. 2.




Figure 2³⁸⁸

Moreover, the 'world peace' would bring an end to the economic problems at home. Due to interruptions of the international trade and decrease in the agricultural production, even basic commodities could only be found on the black market. As Toker argued, even though Turkish citizens were grateful to CHP for its ability to remain neutral during the war, they still saw CHP responsible for the economic problems, which led to the anti-government anger among people.³⁸⁹ As demonstrated by the cartoon in Figure 2 which was published in CHP-linked *Tanin*, the peace is depicted an angel and holding an olive branch, which is a symbol of peace. The man on a donkey, having a big nose and hateful eyes, represents the speculator. While the peace is missing the speculator, it says "*too little, too late*". As this cartoon shows, the world-peace is expected to solve the war-time economic difficulties and so to decrease the opposition to the government.

Being worried about the world peace and hoping that it would solve the economic problems in Turkey, Turkish journalists also revealed their opinions regarding the course of the ongoing war and the upcoming post-war international system while the

³⁸⁸ *Tanin*, 9 May 1945, p. 1; *Tanin*, 16 May 1945, p. 1.

³⁸⁹ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p. 23.

Big Three was discussing the post-world order in the Yalta Conference, which was held from February 4 to 11, 1945. Although it was hoped that the Yalta meeting would solve many problems generated by the Nazis,³⁹⁰ Sadak complained about the secrecy of the Yalta Conference.³⁹¹ Similar to Sadak, Atay criticized the secret meetings of the Big Three and he hoped that the Allies would be able to solve the conflicts immediately.³⁹²

The writers, being pessimistic about the Yalta Conference in general, did not expect the world peace to be achieved immediately.³⁹³ For example, Yalçın, stating that the League of Nations had proved how the policies which had been formulated solely on the basis of the 'power' failed, claimed that he was not expecting an ideal outcome from the Yalta Conference although he did not lose his hope completely.³⁹⁴ Moreover, for Asım Us, one of the major changes, as the Yalta Conference proved, was the rapprochement between the US and the Soviet Union. For him, although the relations between two countries had been very weak before the war, the Soviet-American relations currently seemed to be more powerful than the Soviet-British relations.³⁹⁵ Indeed, the press tried to understand the background of the negotiations among the Big

³⁹⁰ "Barış İçin Hazırlıklar Yapılıyor", *Ulus*, 10 February 1945, p. 1; Falih Rıfki Atay, "Almanya'nın Son ve Barışın İlk Saati", *Ulus*, 10 February 1945, p. 1; Ahmet Şükrü Esmel, "Karadeniz Konferansında", *Ulus*, 10 February 1945, p. 3; Falih Rıfki Atay, "Küçük ve Büyük Devletler", *Ulus*, 13 February 1945, p. 1.

³⁹¹ See Sadak's articles critical of the secret meetings of the Big Three and the downplaying of the small powers in the peace conferences: Necmettin Sadak, "Üçler Konferansı, Eğer Toplanmışsa, Niçin Bu Derece Gizli Tutuluyor?", *Akşam*, 6 February 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Büyüklerin Kapalı Aristokrasiden Demokratik Usullere Geçmeleri Gerekir", *Akşam*, 4 March 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Üçler İlacı", *Akşam*, 5 March 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Ne Yazık ki Büyüklerle Küçükler, Kuvvetlilerle Zayıflar Var", *Akşam*, 19 March 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Tek Ölçü Yokluğu", *Akşam*, 20 March 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Büyük, Küçük, Ortanca", *Akşam*, 11 April 1945, p. 1.

³⁹² Falih Rıfki Atay, "Yeni Toplantıya Doğru", *Ulus*, 12 January 1945, p. 1; Falih Rıfki Atay, "Yeni Üçler Toplantısı", *Ulus*, 29 January 1945, p. 1; Falih Rıfki Atay, "Üçler Konferansı Bitti", *Ulus*, 14 February 1945, p. 1

³⁹³ Hüseyin Hulki, "Harpten Sonraki Dünya", *Vakit*, 9 February 1945, p. 2; Necmettin Sadak, "Üçler Konferansının İlk Tebliğinden Anladıklarımız", *Akşam*, 9 February 1945, p. 1.

³⁹⁴ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Kuvvete Dayanan Ahlak", *Tanin*, 6 February 1945, p. 1.

³⁹⁵ Asım Us, "Kırım Konferansından Sonra Amerika ve Rusya, Yalta", *Vakit*, 18 February 1945, p. 1.

Three and demanded the Allies to attach a more active role to the ‘small’ nations (particularly, Turkey) in peace-making process in this period.



Figure 3³⁹⁶

While heralding the victories of the Allies over the Nazis in Europe, as shown in Figure 3,³⁹⁷ the press aimed to show that Germany, together with Italy and Japan, had the responsibility for the arrival of the Second World War. As an example, in the first cartoon shown in Figure 4, the Allies, having the position of a judge, are interrogating a wounded Nazi soldier, which represents Germany. When the Allies ask “*whether you had any conviction before*”, he replies as “*yes, I had been condemned in 1918 as well*”. In the second cartoon, Heinrich Himmler, a leading member of the Nazi Party, ordering by pinpointing a knife on the back of German civilian, says “*come on, resist to the end!*”. In effect, as this cartoon demonstrated, in spite of the negative image of the Nazis in the eyes of the press, press members did not blame all Germans but only

³⁹⁶ *Ulus*, 9 May 1945, p. 1.

³⁹⁷ For other examples, see: "Batı Cephesinde", *Ulus*, 12 February 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Avrupanın Büyük Günü: 8 Mayıs 1945", *Akşam*, 8 May 1945, p. 1; Şevket Rado, "İyiliği Yaşatmak için Ölenler", *Akşam*, 10 May 1945, p. 2.

the Nazis, which could be explained by Aydın's reasoning published in *Tanin* on February 7, 1945. According to Aydın, a completely powerless Germany would constitute a danger for the world peace.³⁹⁸ In other words, it was highlighted that it was the Nazis that had been defeated by the Allies, not the German nation.



Figure 4³⁹⁹

While the press celebrated the victory of the Allies over the Axis powers, it had a tendency to exalt the role of the US and Britain in defeating the enemy more than the Soviet Union. While they emphasized the US and Britain as the protectors of the world peace in the future, the role of the Soviet Union, which the Turkish press attached to it, was relatively insignificant even though the Soviet Union was a member of the Allies. This was, of course, related to the current tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union. For example, as Yalçın claimed, the US had the responsibility to construct the peace and stability in the world, and, as he added, the US and Britain would not invade any countries, even those which had cooperated with the Axis powers all through the war.⁴⁰⁰ In agreement with Yalçın, Sadak gave a central role to

³⁹⁸ A.Aydın, "Kayıtsız Şartsız Teslim Arifesinde Almanya Meselesi", *Tanin*, 7 February 1945, p. 2.

³⁹⁹ *Tanin*, 6 February 1945, p. 1; *Tanin*, 7 February 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁰ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Dünya Siyasetinde Kuvvet", *Tanin*, 6 January 1945, p. 1.

Britain and the United States in constructing the world peace.⁴⁰¹ For him, without the intervention of the US, it would most probably have been impossible to defeat Germany.⁴⁰² Moreover, as Asım Üs of *Vakit* argued, Roosevelt and Churchill chose an unconditional agreement with the Nazis in spite of the criticisms of the opponents in their own countries.⁴⁰³



Figure 5⁴⁰⁴

The relative importance of the US and Britain in defeating the Axis powers, yet, did not mean that the press completely forgot the role of the Soviet Union in the Allies victory. As shown in Figure 5 which was published in *Vakit*, the Allies, which are represented by three men wearing hats with national flags of the US, the Soviet Union and Britain. As the Allies 'all together' saves the world from the Nazis. The demon of hell with a mace shows men, who carries the coffin of Adolf Hitler, the way to the hell. As this figure demonstrates, the press was well aware of the role of the Soviet Union

⁴⁰¹ Necmettin Sadak, "İngiltere Sulh Politikasını Değiştirebilir Mi?", *Akşam*, 18 January 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Avrupanın Yarınki Çapraşık Konularından Bir Kaçı", *Akşam*, 24 January 1945, p. 2; Necmettin Sadak, "Müttefiklerin Karşılaşacakları Harb Sonu Zorlukları", *Akşam*, 31 January 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰² Necmettin Sadak, "Avrupanın Büyük Günü: 8 May 1945", *Akşam*, 8 May 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰³ Asım Üs, "Kayıtsız Şartsız Teslim", *Vakit*, 8 May 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁴ *Vakit*, 9 May 1945, p. 1.

in defeating the Nazis. In effect, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, during the first months of 1945, the press sometimes exalted the Soviet Union and its leader Joseph Stalin for their victory over Nazis. However, compared to those of the US and Britain, the role of the Soviet Union was somehow neglected and the press approached the US and Britain in a more positive way.

In this regard, the reaction of the press to the death of Roosevelt on April 4, 1945 was another proof of the sympathy towards the US. The press uttered both its grief for the president's death and its appreciation of Roosevelt's achievements during the world war. As *Vakit* regarded his death as the big loss of humanity,⁴⁰⁵ Asım Us stated that Roosevelt had become the symbol of peace, who endeavored himself for the victory of the Allies and a continuous peace for the humanity.⁴⁰⁶ In the same way, as maintained by *Akşam*, his death deprived not only the United States but also the entire world of such a unique and idealist statesman.⁴⁰⁷ While *Ulus* reported the death as the big loss of the friend America,⁴⁰⁸ Turan believed that he was the man of both yesterday's war and tomorrow's peace.⁴⁰⁹

While the press underlined the crucial role of the US and Britain, along with their 'brave' leaders, it, on the contrary, seemed to be very concerned with and sometimes critical to the Soviet expansionist policies. For example, as Belge who was writing for *Tanin* at that moment claimed, the Soviet Union was against not only Fascism and Nazism but it also opposed to any kind of ideology which it considered "anti-Marxist".⁴¹⁰ Similarly, *Akşam*, reporting from *Economist*, alleged that the Soviet Union wanted to establish a security system ranging from Adriatic to the Baltic Sea

⁴⁰⁵ "Ruzvelt Öldü!", *Vakit*, 13 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁶ Asım Us, "İnsanlığın Büyük Kaybı", *Vakit*, 14 April 1945, p. 1; Asım Us, "Ruzvelt'in Mirası", *Vakit*, 15 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁷ "Büyük Bir Kayıp", *Akşam*, 13 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁸ "Reis Roosevelt Dün Ansızın Öldü", *Ulus*, 13 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁹ Kemal Turan, "Büyük Kayıptan Sonra", *Ulus*, 15 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴¹⁰ Burhan Belge, "Üçleri Ayıran Nedir?", *Tanin*, 10 May 1945, p. 1; Burhan Belge, "Avrupa", *Tanin*, 16 May 1945, p. 6.

following the end of the war.⁴¹¹ In a very similar way, the press inveighed the Soviet Union's disagreement with the US and Britain upon the post-war world order. For example, as Yalçın asserted, the Soviet Union did not want to make sacrifice to achieve the world peace despite the peaceful attempts of the Anglo-Saxons and, for him, the Soviet Union began to emerge as an imperialist power in the Middle East.⁴¹² These concerns over the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in Europe were of course related to the Turkish-Soviet relations; that is, at that moment, the Soviet Union began to revive their demands from Turkey.

In such an environment where the Allies were winning the war and the Soviet Union began to raise its demands from Turkey, the press, similar to the political elite, strove to identify Turkey as a part of the Allies (i.e., the 'winners') in the very beginning of 1945 and claimed that Turkey had always been the enemy of the Nazis. Accordingly, after Turkey severed its diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan on January 3, 1945, the press was trying to prove how Turkey resisted the Nazis and supported the Allies during the entire course of the Second World War. For example, for Asım Us, Turkey, as a peaceful state, which pretended to be neutral in the course of the Second World War, actually supported the Allies and remained loyal to the principles of the League of Nations.⁴¹³ Moreover, for Aydın, the last decision of the government regarding severing diplomatic relations with Japan was a convincing proof of the honest Turkish policy since the beginning of the Second World War.⁴¹⁴ Meanwhile, arguing how Turkey managed to resist the Nazis when most of the nations obeyed the Germans all through the war, Yalçın claimed that the Turkish press had always disapproved the Nazi invasions whereas the press in the most of countries, even in Britain, was afraid of disapproving the Nazis.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹¹ "Rusya'nın Politikası", (*Economist*) *Akşam*, 20 May 1945, p. 2.

⁴¹² Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Amerikadan İlk İntiba", *Tanin*, 25 May 1945, p. 1; Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Amerikan Düşüncesine Hakim Olan Hakikat", *Tanin*, 26 May 1945, p. 1.

⁴¹³ Asım Us, "Japonya ile Münasebetlerimizin Kesilmesi", *Vakit*, 5 January 1945, p. 1.

⁴¹⁴ A. Aydın, "Hadiseler Arasında", *Tanin*, 6 January 1945, p. 2.

⁴¹⁵ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Harpten Sonra Türkiye", *Tanin*, 5 February 1945, p. 1.

Similarly, the Turkish press noted with obvious approval why the Turkish government declared war against Germany and Japan on February 2, 1945. For the press, Turkey declared a war against the Axis powers not only because they were the enemies of Turkey but also because Turkey was a part of the Allies. For example, as Atay claimed, the recent decision of the government was not a coincidence but it was the natural result of Turkey's collaboration with Britain and its allies.⁴¹⁶ Yalçın draw a similar conclusion and claimed that the Turkish foreign policy had laid the groundwork for the Turkish-British alliance so far.⁴¹⁷ Moreover, for Esmer, the Turkish leadership made such a decision since the United States, for which Turkey had a deep feeling of friendship, and Britain, which was Turkey's ally due to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact of 1939, requested.⁴¹⁸ Similarly, as explained by Sadak, even though the decision would not impose a heavy burden on Turkey, the important point was its symbolic meaning rather than its possible benefits for Turkey.⁴¹⁹ Moreover, the governmental press underlined how the world public opinion became rejoiced after the decision of the Turkish government.⁴²⁰ This attitude was the result of both Turkey's desire not to be alienated in the postwar international system and its attempts to show how CHP's foreign policy was very successful during the course of the Second World War.

To this end, the press claimed that Turkey had pursued peaceful policies not only during the course of the Second World War but also from the very beginning of the Turkish Republic. For example, as Atay claimed, the Turkish Republican regime, defending the peace and opposing the expansionist ideas for twenty-five years, was undoubtedly doing its best for the sake of the world peace.⁴²¹ Similar to Atay, Yalçın evaluated Turkey's declaration of a war against Germany and Japan as a good response

⁴¹⁶ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Japonya ile Münasebetlerimizi Kestik", *Ulus*, 4 January 1945, p. 1.

⁴¹⁷ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Türkiyede İngiliz Ticaret Heyeti", *Tanin*, 5 January 1945, p. 1.

⁴¹⁸ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Japonya ile Münasebetlerimizin Kesilmesi", *Ulus*, 5 January 1945, p. 3.

⁴¹⁹ Necmettin Sadak, "Türkiye Siyasetinde Ahlak ve Fazilet Örneği", *Akşam*, 6 January 1945, p. 1: "Doğuracağı neticelerden ziyade, ifade ettiği mana büyüktür".

⁴²⁰ "Londraki Akisler", *Akşam*, 4 January 1945, p. 2; "Rooseveltin Demeci", *Tanin*, 5 January 1945, p. 1; "B. Roosevelt Türkiyenin Hareketini Memnuniyetle Karşıladi", (*London Radio*) *Akşam*, p. 1.

⁴²¹ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Dünkü Tarihi Karar", *Ulus*, 24 February 1945, p. 1.

to those who either did not understand its peaceful policies or watched for an opportunity to show their hostility towards her.⁴²² Although it was open to discussion who could want Turkey's fall in this period, the Turkish press tried to show that Turkey had always been a part of the Allies and a defender of the world peace.⁴²³

When Germany surrendered to Allied forces on May 7, 1945, the (particularly, governmental) press initially presented thanks to the Turkish government, for not allowing Turkey to be drawn into the war. But the press at the same time tried to get a share for Turkey from the victory over the Nazis. According to Sertoğlu, for example, Turkey had to make endless sacrifices during the war.⁴²⁴ For him, no one could underestimate Turkey's burden which it had to carry on at some stages in the war. As he claimed, mobilizing almost one million soldiers, Turkey was a country which had engaged in the war; thus, it deserved a vital role in the establishment of the post-war world peace.⁴²⁵ Similarly, in the words of Fenik writing in *Ulus* at that point, due to the services of Turkey to the world peace since even before the Second World War in spite of all pressures over the country by the Axis powers, Turks deserved to celebrate the end of the war in Europe.⁴²⁶ Moreover, as Belge claimed, the victory of the humanity was the victory of Turks.⁴²⁷ And so, not to feel alienated from the post-war world politics at the war's end, the press tried to draw a picture of Turkey, which had always been the enemy of the Nazis and a big supporter of the Allies.

During the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, which was held from 25 April 1945 to 26 June 1945, the press continued to express opinions about the post-war world

⁴²² Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Türkiyenin Son Kararı", *Tanin*, 24 February 1945, p. 1.

⁴²³ See examples: Necmettin Sadak, "Türkiye Birleşmiş Milletler Arasında", *Akşam*, 24 February 1945, p. 1; Asım Us, "Harb İlamı Kararımızın Manası", *Vakit*, 24 February 1945, p. 1.

⁴²⁴ Murad Sertoğlu, "Avrupa Harbi Bitti", *Tanin*, 8 May 1945, p. 3.

⁴²⁵ Murad Sertoğlu, "Türkiye 'Savaşmış' Bir Millettir", *Tanin*, 12 May 1945, p. 3.

⁴²⁶ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Zafer ve Bizim Sevincimiz", *Ulus*, 10 May 1945, p. 1.

⁴²⁷ Burhan Belge, "İnsanlığın Zaferi Bizim de Zaferimizdir", *Tanin*, 13 May 1945, p. 1.

order in a series of articles while celebrating the establishment of the UN.⁴²⁸ Many writers of the period declared that they wished to witness the rise of the world peace which would prevent the Third World War in the post-war period. In this period, yet, there were both pessimistic and optimistic people about the achievement of such a peace. For example, in spite of peaceful wishes, Necmettin Sadak thought that world peace would not be achieved soon but its establishment would be long-termed and painful and, for him, only collaboration among 'all' nations of the world would be able to sustain world peace.⁴²⁹ As Sadak claimed, there were still many problems because of differences of opinion among the Allies, which would most probably avert the coming of the world peace soon.⁴³⁰ As Sadak's discussions over the world peace demonstrated, the chagrin of the press members was the 'failures' of the meetings among the Allies. These 'failures' were the disagreements between the Soviet Union and the West, which appeared as the end of the war was approaching because the each member of the Allies wanted to expand its own sphere of influence and the Allies could not agree upon the determination of these spheres ranging from Germany to Far East.⁴³¹

⁴²⁸ Necmettin Sadak, "M. Truman'ın Cesaretli Nutku Konferansa İlham Kaynağı Olmalıdır", *Akşam*, 27 April 1945, p. 1; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Başkan Truman'ı Dinlerken", *Ulus*, 27 April 1945, p. 1; Asım Us, "Konferansın İlk Günü", *Vakit*, 27 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴²⁹ Necmettin Sadak, "Yeni Yıla Gिरerken", *Akşam*, 1 January 1945, p. ; Necmettin Sadak, "Kuvvet Politikası, Kuvvete Dayanan Siyaset", *Akşam*, 4 January 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Türkiye Siyasetinde Ahlak ve Fazilet Örneği", *Akşam*, 6 January 1945, p. 1.

⁴³⁰ Necmettin Sadak, "Harbin Sonu ile Sulhun Ara Dönemi", *Akşam*, 12 May 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Düşman Yenildi, Birbirine Zıt İki Dünya Görüşü Yeniden Çarpışıyor", *Akşam*, 21 May 1945, pp. 1-2; Necmettin Sadak, "Avrupada Esen Karşılıklı Güvensizlik Havası", *Akşam*, 28 May 1945, p. 1.

⁴³¹ Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, p. 61.



Figure 6⁴³²

In this regard, as the cartoon in Figure 6 demonstrates, there is snow on the top of a mountain. On it, it is written that 'Trieste question', 'Polish question' and 'Austrian question'. The mountain prevents the union of the 'peace', which is represented by an angel carrying on the olive branch, and the world, which is represented by a worried man in a suit. At the bottom of the caricature, '*Yeni Ferhad ile Şirin!*' (The New Ferhad and Şirin) is written. Ferhad and Şirin were a man and a woman who fell in love with each other according to a Middle Eastern legend. However, Şirin's sister, a noble ruler, laid down a condition that Ferhad, a craftsman, would have to dig a tunnel through a 'mountain' adjacent to the city, if he wanted to marry Şirin. So, the cartoon published in *Tanin* resembled the 'world' to Ferhad and the 'peace' to Şirin. According to the legend, Ferhad died of sadness when he was to complete his impossible mission because Şirin's sister sent a message to him about Şirin's death, which was not true. Şirin, after learning Ferhad's death, committed suicide. Therefore, *Tanin* resembled the current relations between world and peace to a legendary story with a 'tragic' ending.

⁴³² *Tanin*, 16 May 1945, p. 1.

Having an opposite reaction, Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın of *Tanin*, during his speech in San Francisco as one of the Turkish delegates which was also broadcasted for the Turkish citizens by Ankara Radio, specified that those who managed to end the war undoubtedly would find a solution to prevent the Third World War in future.⁴³³ Likewise, Yazman expected the permanent world peace to come soon.⁴³⁴ Whether they were pessimistic or optimistic about the establishment of the world peace, the all press, in harmony with the Turkish politicians, strove to get Turkey in a closer position to the Allies, particularly, after the formation of the United Nations. Accordingly, the press did not forget to give advice to the Allies. As an example, for Sadak, the Big Three had to solve the rifts among them before the San Francisco meeting.⁴³⁵ Similarly, Belge, warning the Allies about the primacy of the conference, proclaimed that if they would engage in demagoguery, then none of the problems would be resolved.⁴³⁶ Moreover, for Us, the Allies had to reach to an agreement immediately since, in his mind, there would either a continuous peace or an endless chaos after the end of the Second World War.⁴³⁷

These suggestions unsurprisingly were very much related to Turkey's place in the UN and in the international system, in general. The press, having consensus with the politicians on Turkey's role, demanded the Allies to take the interests of the small nations into account. Hence similar to politicians, the press was not comfortable with the right to veto and the powerful position of the Big Three compared to the other members of the UN. When the Charter of the UN was signed by fifty states in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, Şevket Rado stated that the members of the UN needed to take lessons from the mistakes made throughout the interwar period in order to thwart the Third World War.⁴³⁸ Likewise, Asım Us claimed that the possibility of the

⁴³³ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Başmuharririmiz Radyoda Konuştu", *Tanin*, 16 May 1945, p. 1.

⁴³⁴ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Uzak Doğu Savaşında Çin'in Rolü", *Akşam*, 23 May 1945, p. 5.

⁴³⁵ Necmettin Sadak, "Bugünkü ve Yarınki Zorluklar", *Akşam*, 22 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴³⁶ Burhan Belge, "Salahiyet, Evet İmtiyaz, Hayır", *Tanin*, 27 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴³⁷ Asım Us, "İkiden Biri", *Vakit*, 28 April 1945, p. 1.

⁴³⁸ Şevket Rado, "Bir Daha Harb Olmasın Diye...", *Akşam*, 26 June 1945, p. 2.

manipulation of the right to veto by the Five States was not something to be neglected. For Us, if any big power was to attack smaller nations, then the UN could not be able to do anything to protect small countries.⁴³⁹ For Turan, not to make the same mistake which the Allies had done under the banner of the League of Nations before, the main principle of the United Nations had to be the collaboration among all peaceful nations of the world.⁴⁴⁰ Similarly, for Sadak, the Third World War was unlikely to occur as long as both the big and small nations could come to an agreement.⁴⁴¹

To sum up, seeing the UN as a key institution of the post-war world order, the press preferred a more active role of the small nations in peace conferences to the secret meetings of the Big Three. For this reason, although they saw the United Nations (UN) as an international organization which would bring the world peace, they harshly criticized the veto power in the UN Security Council given to the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China. Namely, during the initial months of 1945, the Turkish press, seeking to the way which would bring the 'world peace', demanded a more active role for Turkey in the post-war international world order. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the Turkish press, Turkey was a 'big' country, which resisted the Nazis during the Second World War, but unfortunately it was not as big as the 'Big Three', which determined the world system on their own without consulting 'small' nations such as Turkey.

3.4) THE PRESS AND THE EMERGING COLD WAR: JULY 1945 – JULY 1947

Following the German surrender in May 1945 and the Soviet demands from Turkey in June 1945, the press tried to find a proper place for Turkey in the international arena. When Japan surrendered to the Allies on August 14, 1945, the press again celebrated the victory of the Allies. However, it was important to state that the press, in some measure, ignored the tragedies generated by the use of atomic bombs on Japan by the

⁴³⁹ Asım Us, "Birleşmiş Milletler Cemiyeti", *Vakit*, 27 June 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁰ Kemal Turan, "Milletler Anayasasında Azim ve Kararımız", *Ulus*, 28 June 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁴¹ Necmettin Sadak, "Üçüncü Harb Çıkılmıyacaktır", *Akşam*, 2 July 1945, p. 1.

United States. Instead, they seemed to be happy with the defeat of Japan. For example, on the cartoon on the left shown in Figure 7, the first man says “*the Japanese began to compete with the atomic bombs*”, the second man replies “*yes, they were committing suicide, committing hara-kiri*”. On the cartoon on the right, when the first man says “*as I heard, the temperature of the atomic bomb is very high*”, the second man replies “*yes, it melted even the resistance of the Japanese, a very stubborn nation*”. In other words, although the press expressed its grief for the tragedy which the Japanese had, they did not put forward a criticism against the use of atomic bombs by the US, of which Turkey tried to become an ally at that moment.




Figure 7⁴⁴²

Following the end of the war, the concerns of the press over the future of the world system continued. Reproaching the Allies, newspapers questioned why the peace had not been established yet even though the threat from Nazis and the Axis powers in general had faded. They tried to find possible reasons for the absence of the world peace. In this regard, the articles of Necmettin Sadak published in *Akşam* could be very useful to observe what kind of a world peace that the Turkish press demanded and how it complained about the delay to attain it. For Sadak, the main difference between the Second World War and the other international wars came from the conditions which led to the rise of the Second World War: while the previous wars stemmed from disputes over territories or conflicting interests among world powers, the Second

⁴⁴² *Vakit*, 14 August 1945, p. 1; *Vakit*, 15 August 1945, p. 1.

World War emerged from the conflicts among various ideologies. As he concluded, this difference was the reason for why the world peace following the world war had not been achieved yet.⁴⁴³

Furthermore, Sadak, complaining bitterly about the secret meetings among the Big Three once more time, stated that, regardless of several peace conferences which had been organized by the Allies, there had been no conclusive results in the name of the world peace. He regarded these meetings as a waste of time and, reminding the secret meetings between Hitler and Mussolini in the interwar years, asked whether the Allies were imitating fascist leaders.⁴⁴⁴ As Sadak further affirmed, he was unable to understand why the Allies were still awaiting for the construction of the world peace. Accusing all members of the Big Three, he spelled out that the Soviet Union was in support of the dictatorships in the Balkans for the growth of its influence in the region while the US and Britain were backing up the oppositional parties in these countries.⁴⁴⁵

In addition to Sadak, the other journalists seemed to be concerned with the non-existent world peace. Unlike Sadak, Hüseyin Yalçın of *Tanin* did not hesitate to mount a criticism against the Soviet Union. For example, Yalçın, picking the Soviet leaders to piece, pondered that they tried to reveal themselves at every opportunity which they could find and, in Yalçın's mind, they always stirred up trouble.⁴⁴⁶ The other columnists, despite their critical attitude to the Soviet Union and the delay in attaining of world peace, remained cautious about the tension within the Big Three. For example, after the first meeting of the UN in London on January 1, 1946, both Atay and Erim expected the members to obey the UN principles which had been determined in the San Francisco Conference.⁴⁴⁷ Consequently, in the very beginning of 1946 when

⁴⁴³ Necmettin Sadak, "Biten Harb, Gerçekleşmiyen Sulh, Gelmiyen Hürriyet ve Atom Bombası", *Akşam*, 3 September 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁴ Necmettin Sadak, "Hitlerle Mussolini Hep Gizli Konuşurlardı. Onlar Mı Taklit Ediliyor?", *Akşam*, 10 October 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁵ Necmettin Sadak, "Sulh Hareketine Girişilmek için Ne Bekleniyor?", *Akşam*, 26 October 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁶ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Birleşmiş Milletler Kurulu Açılırken", *Tanin*, 12 January 1946, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁷ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Londra Toplantısı Hakkında", *Ulus*, 11 January 1946, p. 1; Nihat Erim, "Londra Nutukları", *Ulus*, 12 January 1946, p. 1.

Turkey found a very limited international support from the West to counterbalance the Soviet threat, the press naturally was not satisfied with the absence of the world peace and, compared to the US and Britain, the press charged the Soviet Union of being responsible for the delay.

As a result, the Turkish press closely watched the Soviet foreign policy due to both Turkey's own security concerns and the Soviet attitude to the West. In this regard, the irritation of the press about the delay further enhanced after the Communist Party won the elections in Bulgaria on November 18, 1945. In effect, the presence of the Soviet army in Bulgaria since September 8, 1944 had been a constant source of threat to Turkey. Stalin tried to sustain the 'survival' of communist Bulgaria as Bulgaria had an important place in the eyes of Moscow. Moreover, as mentioned before, Stalin did not want to give "a place for Turkey on the Balkans".⁴⁴⁸ The US and Britain were also concerned about Stalin's policies in Bulgaria, which threatened the Turkish control of the Straits and endangered the British position in the Mediterranean.⁴⁴⁹

In this atmosphere, the communist control of Bulgaria, of course, alarmed the Turkish press. For example, according to Asım Us of *Vakit*, the Bulgarian government's holding elections despite the United States' demand to postpone the elections led to a new disagreement among the Allies.⁴⁵⁰ Similar to Us, according to Atay, as the Anglo-Saxon resources confirmed, only a small group of Bulgarians took the control whereas the majority did not support the current communist regime. As Atay further argued, Georgi Dimitrov, who was the General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party from December 1946 to July 1949, had recently turned after his visit to Moscow where he took orders from the Soviet Union.⁴⁵¹ *Tanin*, using a more assertive language compared to the other newspapers against the Soviet Union, stated that the Soviet Union was becoming more alone day by day. As Hüseyin Yalçın of *Tanin* commented on the current situation in Bulgaria, the US and Britain held the Soviet Union

⁴⁴⁸ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, pp. 37-38.

⁴⁴⁹ Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, p. 21.

⁴⁵⁰ Asım Us, "Bulgaristandaki Seçimler", *Vakit*, 19 November 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁵¹ Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Seçimler ve Sonrası", *Ulus*, 19 November 1945, p. 1.

responsible for the elections in Bulgaria, which had been conducted improperly.⁴⁵² From these viewpoints, the communist victory in Bulgaria meant not only the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence but also a threat to national sovereignty of Turkey, as the neighbor of Bulgaria; for these reasons, the Turkish press reacted so vehemently.

As such, watching Soviet foreign policy and communist activities in the world closely, the press reacted to any significant event in the communist countries immediately. When Stalin announced the five-year developing plan of the Soviet Union during his famous ‘Two Camps’ speech on February 9, 1946, he attracted the attention of the Turkish press immediately.⁴⁵³ Speaking in front of the Soviet citizens, Stalin declared that the uneven development of capitalism would divide the globe into two parts. This speech is considered as one of the events which started the Cold War.⁴⁵⁴ Atay, interpreting Stalin's speech, asserted that the big powers had to focus on the permanent interests of the small nations instead of their temporary benefits.⁴⁵⁵ In the same manner with Atay, Erim, in his criticism of the secret meetings among the world powers, stated that each power considered only its own interests as the Stalin’s speech proved.⁴⁵⁶ In agreement with Atay and Erim, Yalçın evaluated Stalin's speech in a global context. As he rarely did, Yalçın criticized the US and Britain and wrote that while Anglo-Saxons promised that there would be democracy everywhere, they neither defined democracy nor explained whether democracy was applicable everywhere or not.⁴⁵⁷ Therefore, while the Turkish press closely watched the Soviet foreign policy, it was

⁴⁵² "Ruslar Gittikçe Yalnız Kalıyor", *Tanin*, 20 November 1945, p. 2.

⁴⁵³ "Stalin Konuştu", *Vakit*, 10 February 1946, p. 4.

⁴⁵⁴ Frank Costigliola, "The Creation of Memory and Myth: Stalin's 1946 Election Speech and the Soviet Threat", in Martin J. Medhurst and H. W. Brands (eds.) *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2000), pp. 38-54.

⁴⁵⁵ Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Buhran Yolu Üzerinde", *Ulus*, 12 February 1946, p. 1.

⁴⁵⁶ Nihat Erim, "Gizli Anlaşmalar", *Ulus*, 12 February 1946, p. 2.

⁴⁵⁷ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Büyüklerin Hegemonyası", *Tanin*, 14 February 1946, p. 1. In effect, the Turkish press, as Chapter 5 argues, had a tendency to underestimate both democratization and developmental levels of the other countries, excluding Britain and the United States.

from time to time critical to the US and Britain, for it was believed that they did not take a step against the Soviet Union.

Similar to Stalin's 'Two Camps' speech, the former British Prime Minister Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech on March 5, 1946 also received attention in Turkish press. In this regard, the examination of comments on the Churchill's speech provides clues of how the perception of the emerging Cold War and bipolarization was taking shape in the spring of 1946 and how the each newspaper analyzed the speech in its own way. To demonstrate, *Ulus*, reporting from the Anatolia Agency (*Anadolu Ajansı*), stated that Churchill "accused" the Soviet Union of waging a war of nerves against the democracies. As *Ulus* claimed, Churchill assumed that the Soviet Union was trying to expand its power endlessly; consequently, Churchill wanted the formation of a British-American alliance against the Soviet Union, which was challenging the world peace.⁴⁵⁸ *Akşam*, reporting from *Reuters*, called this news item 'the Churchill's important speech'. As *Akşam* claimed, according to Churchill, the alliance between Britain and the US was absolutely necessary.⁴⁵⁹ Presenting the news item on this speech with the same title with *Akşam*, *Vakit*, reporting from *Reuters* too, called it 'Churchill's important speech'. According to *Vakit*, Churchill understood that the Soviet Union was casted a shadow on the victory of the Allies and the "enlightened scenes" (*aydınlanmış sahneler*) and the communists threatened the civilization.⁴⁶⁰

Compared to other newspapers, *Tanin* specifically emphasized the part of the Churchill's speech on Turkey. *Tanin*, reporting from *Associated Press*, titled this item 'Mr. Churchill harshly indicted the communists'. In the original speech, Churchill said that "*Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government*".⁴⁶¹ *Tanin*'s report was very similar to the original speech. According to *Tanin*'s report, Churchill invited the US to collaborate with Britain against the Soviet

⁴⁵⁸ "Churchill, Sovyetleri İtham Ediyor", (Anatolia Agency) *Ulus*, 6 March 1946, p. 1.

⁴⁵⁹ "Churchill'in Mühim Nutku", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 6 March 1946, p. 1.

⁴⁶⁰ "Çörcilin Mühim Nutku", (*Reuters*) *Vakit*, 6 March 1946, p. 1.

⁴⁶¹ 5 March 1946: WCDA, Churchill's "Iron Curtain" Speech, "Sinews of Peace".

desire of spreading its power and principles across the world. For *Tanin*, Churchill affirmed that both Turkey and Iran felt discontent due to the Soviet demands.⁴⁶²

Until Harry S. Truman announced the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, the newspapers had continued to express the Turkish anxiety regarding the conflicts between the capitalist and communist regimes while increasingly accusing the Soviet Union of preventing the formation of the world peace. Following Truman's speech, the press began to express their gratitude of the Allies (particularly, the United States) more while increasing doze of the criticisms against the Soviet Union. In this regard, the first thing to remember is the definition of the "Allies" (*müttefikler*) by the press at the very beginning of the period, which had included the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union had been a part of the Allies fighting against the Axis powers. However, after Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union worsened, the Turkish press used this term to imply only the capitalist bloc, in which the US had a leading position. Similarly, while the 'Big Three' meant the US, the Soviet Union and Britain at the very beginning of the period, later it began to mean the US, Britain and France. These changes obviously became clearer following Truman's speech.

The immediate reaction of the press to Truman's speech was very positive. As *Ulus* reported, Truman said that the future of Turkey, as an 'independent' country, had a great significance in the American foreign policy.⁴⁶³ Erim, appreciating 'the US's determined attitude', said that the US, having no imperialist intention, began to become more interested in the fate of the world after abandoning the isolationism. For Erim, it was impossible to prevent the Third World War without the American involvement in world politics.⁴⁶⁴ Moreover, Falih Rıfki Atay of *Ulus*, calling the US "the Peacemaker America", reassured his readers that the US had no intention of starting a war or constructing a hegemony in the world. As he claimed, the Second World War awoke the US from dangers of the 'isolationism' and now all the American

⁴⁶² "Mr. Churchill Komünistleri Şiddetle İtham Etti", (*AP Tanin*, 6 March 1946, p. 1.

⁴⁶³ "M. Truman 400 Milyon Dolar İstedi", *Ulus*, 13 March 1947, p. 1. Indeed, *Ulus* published the full article of the speech on March 16, 1947.

⁴⁶⁴ Nihat Erim, "Amerika'nın Kararlı Durumu", *Ulus*, 13 March 1947, p. 1.

citizens approved the new foreign policy of their country. For Atay, due to this change, the US gained two allies (i.e., Greece and Turkey) in the Mediterranean, to which the US could completely trust.⁴⁶⁵ Three days later, Atay wrote that the world was divided into two camps: on the one hand, there were free nations which wanted peace and on the other hand, there were dictatorships which threatened the world peace.⁴⁶⁶

In line with the political elite, the Turkish press saw the Truman Doctrine as a very critical turning point in the world history.⁴⁶⁷ Sadak, for example, regarded it as the most important defining moment of both world politics and American foreign policy in the twentieth century because the US finally got rid of the isolationism. In Sadak's mind, the world, witnessing unsuccessful international meetings, was losing its belief in the world peace until the Truman's speech. However, according to his assertion, Truman's speech appeared as an answer to these concerns. According to Sadak, Truman clearly put forward the reason for the introduction of the Truman Doctrine as the presence of a totalitarian state, which forced the free nations to obey the communist rule. As Sadak further claimed, saving the freedom and the future of nations was a duty facing the United States. For this reason, Sadak believed that the US entered the Second World War.⁴⁶⁸ As Sadak's article demonstrates, the Turkish press began to exclude the Soviet Union from the victory against the Nazis following the introduction of the Truman Doctrine.

The press also mentioned the place of Turkey in the speech and its importance for the US and the world peace. For example, as Sadak claimed, Turkey had a key position in the world peace and he argued that if Turkey and Greece were to be in danger, then both European and Near Eastern peace and even the safety of the US would run into danger.⁴⁶⁹ Similar to Sadak, *Ulus* asserted that the America's last decision (i.e., the

⁴⁶⁵ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Barış Kurucu Amerika", *Ulus*, 15 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁶⁶ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Hürriyet Nizamının Yolu", *Ulus*, 24 March 1947, p. 1

⁴⁶⁷ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Tehlike Karşısında", *Ulus*, 16 March 1947, p. 3; Falih Rıfki Atay, "İngiltere ve Taahhütleri", *Ulus*, 17 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁶⁸ Necmettin Sadak, "Dünya Siyasetinde Yüzyılın En Ehemmiyetli Dönüm Noktası", *Akşam*, 14 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁶⁹ Necmettin Sadak, "Türkiye için Yeni Bir Devir Açılmıştır", *Akşam*, 6 April 1947, p. 1

Truman Doctrine) was accepted as a turning point in the Turkish politics.⁴⁷⁰ Erim, writing in *Ulus*, argued that the world was currently experiencing great and dangerous crises and there were 'some' states which acted in a contradiction to the principles of the UN. Moreover, according to Erim, Truman's speech proved that Turkey and Greece were the most strategic important countries in regard to the world peace.⁴⁷¹

Another point of the coverage of Truman's speech by the press was related to the achievement of Turkey; to be more exact, the governmental press used the Truman Doctrine to congratulate the Turkish government for its successful policies. During the transition to the multi-party system, the Truman Doctrine appeared as a part of the domestic propaganda waged by the government and CHP-related newspapers. For example, according to Asım Us of *Vakit*, the decision which the US made (i.e., the Truman Doctrine) proved how Turkey was ruled very well because, as Us claimed, the Turkish government itself did not want the US to take such an action but the US government itself decided to give such an aid to Turkey.⁴⁷² For him, as a new era had just started for Turkey, Turkey took its place on the side of western democracies.⁴⁷³ In effect, the governmental press attributed a meaning to the American press, most probably more than the aid itself. According to Necmettin Sadak of *Akşam*, there had remained only Turkey and Greece, which had not been ruled by the communist regimes in the region. For him, rather than the amount of the American aid, the importance that the US attached to Turkey was significant for the Turkish public opinion.⁴⁷⁴ By the same token, Nihat Erim of *Ulus*, in his analysis of Truman's speech, claimed that CHP won the support of the majority of Turkish citizens with respect to its domestic and (especially) foreign policies. For this reason, he maintained that every Turkish citizen proudly read the news regarding the world's reaction to the speech.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁰ "Nutkun Akisleri", *Ulus*, 14 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁷¹ Nihat Erim, "Başkan Truman'ın Mesajı", *Ulus*, 14 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁷² Asım Us, "Beğenmemek ve Kötülemek Hastalığı", *Vakit*, 13 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁷³ Asım Us, "Türk Milleti için Yeni Bir İstikbal Hazırlanıyor", *Vakit*, 14 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁷⁴ Necmettin Sadak, "Sebepler ve Neticeler", *Akşam*, 15 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁷⁵ Nihat Erim, "Mr. Truman'ın Sözlerinden Çıkan Manalar", *Ulus*, 15 March 1947, p. 2.

As these article show, the governmental press made an effort to prove that Truman's speech (i.e., the American aid to Turkey) was the result of CHP government's successful foreign policy and CHP-linked newspapers referred to public opinion to support these claims. For example, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer of *Ulus* thought that Turks were cheerful for the close interests of the United States and its president.⁴⁷⁶

Regarding its reactions to the introduction of the Truman Doctrine, the press sent messages not only to the US but also to the Soviet Union. Having backed by the Truman Doctrine, the press responded to the Soviet accusations of the change in the Turkish foreign policy. For example, Sadak criticized the Soviet accusations which claimed that Turkey changed its foreign policy according to the Truman Doctrine and Turks tried to make propaganda as if the Soviet threat had really existed. Sadak stated that the American aid had no revitalizing effect on Turkish foreign policy because Turkey had followed the same policy since 1939 with or without the American aid. As he argued, the Soviet Union had to be pleased with the American aid as much as Turkey because it meant the development of 'its own neighbor'.⁴⁷⁷




Figure 8⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁶ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Amerika'nın Alakası", *Ulus*, 15 March 1947, p. 3.

⁴⁷⁷ Necmettin Sadak, "Amerikan Yardımı Dolayısıyla İki Yanlış Tefsir", *Akşam*, 16 March 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ulus*, 14 March 1947, p. 1.

In agreement with Sadak, Esmer also stated that the Soviet newspapers started to make propaganda against Truman and his speech and he resembled the present Soviet policies to those of the Nazis before the Second World War.⁴⁷⁹ In effect, as shown in Figure 8, the Turkish press was well aware of the fact that the Truman Doctrine was an action of Truman administration and was taken against the Soviet threat. In the cartoon, the man, who represented the president of the US, Harry Truman, is playing poker with Joseph Stalin. After smiling, Truman says "a very small bop" amounting \$400, 000, 000, which was of course a reference to the American aid. As the cartoon in Figure 9 depicted, the US outscored the Soviet Union through the Truman Doctrine. As these two cartoons demonstrate, the Turkish press resembled the current tension between the US and the Soviet Union to a poker game and a boxing match. In both cases, the winner was the US thanks to the Truman Doctrine. Erim, who also evaluated the Truman Doctrine in a global context, argued that, as everybody already knew, the last decision of the United States (i.e., the Truman Doctrine) was neither Greece's nor Turkey's issue; instead, it was the result of the conflicts between two opposite world opinions. According to Erim, Turks, who wanted to achieve the world peace as soon as possible, would be again the most affected nation from a possible war in future.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁹ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Nutkun Yankıları", *Ulus*, 20 March 1947, p. 3.

⁴⁸⁰ Nihat Erim, "Şimdi Ne Olacak?", *Ulus*, 17 March 1947, p. 2.




Figure 9⁴⁸¹

While Truman's speech won a general approval of the Turkish press, columnists somehow compared the policies of the US with those of Britain. For Esmer, the US, playing the role of the savior in the world, replaced the Britain's position in European politics. However, for Esmer, the US was different from Britain, for the former did not have imperialist aims.⁴⁸² Esmer was not alone in praising the US: Kuntay believed that Europe had desperately needed a referee to resolve its conflicts and the US responded to the need of Europe with the Truman Doctrine.⁴⁸³

Other than Truman's Speech, the press also welcomed the Marshall Plan as well, which was announced by George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947.⁴⁸⁴ As *Ulus* affirmed,

⁴⁸¹ *Ulus*, 11 May 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁸² Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Amerikanın Kurtarıcı Rolü", *Ulus*, 21 March 1947, p. 3.

⁴⁸³ Mithat Cemal Kuntay, "Truman'ın Nutku ve Lipmann'ın Makalesi", *Ulus*, 27 March 1947, p. 2.

⁴⁸⁴ Nadir Nadi, "Hayırlısı Olsun", *Cumhuriyet*, 24 May 1947, p. 1; Nadir Nadi, "Amerikan Yardımı", *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 1947, p. 1

Turkey and Greece would have the priority in the Marshall Plan, even a higher priority than the United States itself.⁴⁸⁵ As *Vakit* pronounced, the American generals said that if modern guns were to be given to the Turkish army, it would be more powerful than the German army, which used to be the best army in the world.⁴⁸⁶ Similarly, Nazım Poroy of *Ulus* argued that if one wondered how much awful the current situation in the world was, s/he might look at the positive reactions in Europe to the Marshall Plan.⁴⁸⁷ Atay, regarding the Marshall Plan as the division of the world into two camps, vocalized that it had not been possible to imagine a world without the Soviet Union before the Marshall Plan. However, as he claimed, free nations, after becoming aware of the real aims of the Soviet Union, began to take imperative actions against it.⁴⁸⁸

To conclude, the advent of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had a deep influence in the perception and interpretation of the Cold War by the press, which led to a more aggressive language towards the Soviet Union and a much more positive image of the US. The Turkish press, which had always looked at the US in a very positive way from the very beginning of 1945, increased its sympathy towards the US while Britain's importance for the Turkish press began to decrease following its changing position in the capitalist world.

3.5) THE APPROACHES OF TURKISH PRESS TO THE COLD WAR: JULY 1947 - MAY 1950

Following the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Turkish press responded to changes in the Cold War environment nationally, regionally and globally. While presenting the growing tension between the superpowers and worsening international conditions, the press examined the balance of power and discussed the possibility of a new war. Under those circumstances, the western democracies led by the US appeared as the guarantor of the world peace against the Soviet intimidation on the pages of Turkish newspapers. Starting from 1949 when a new episode in the Cold War had

⁴⁸⁵ "Amerikan Yardımı", *Ulus*, 6 June 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁸⁶ "Türk Ordusunun Eline Modern Silah Verilirse", *Vakit*, 8 June 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁸⁷ Nazım Poroy, "Büyük Amerika Yardımı Etrafında", *Ulus*, 27 June 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁸⁸ Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Dünya'nın İkiye Bölünüşü", *Ulus*, 7 July 1947, p. 1.

begun with the Berlin Crisis, the establishment of NATO and the communist takeover in China, the Cold War agenda of the Turkish press became more complex, which included inconsistencies regarding the course of the ongoing Cold War.



Figure 10⁴⁸⁹

Having confronted by the escalating Cold War, the Turkish press became a very useful and instrumental channel to shape the public opinion regarding the early Cold War because it put a strict eye on international developments and sometimes reflected the international developments anxiously. One of the reasons for why the press perceived the Cold War as a worsening process was the counterattacks of the communist bloc. The establishment of Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), which was formed in September 1947, for example, received very negative coverage in the press. For *Akşam*, the formation of Cominform deteriorated the worldwide conflicts.⁴⁹⁰ As

⁴⁸⁹ *Ulus*, 9 October 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁹⁰ "Dünya Buhranı Şiddetleniyor", *Akşam*, 24 September 1947, p. 2.

Figure 10 shows, the cartoon published on *Ulus* on October 9, 1947 depicted the formation of Cominform as the “portent of the demon’s day” (*kıyamet alameti*). In the cartoon, an old man representing the Soviet Union was letting the skeleton of Comintern, which was formed in 1919 by the Soviet Union in order to achieve the world revolution and was dissolved in 1943,⁴⁹¹ out of its grave. To be more exact, for the press, one of many goals of the enemy was to benefit from their old tactics in order to defeat the democracies.⁴⁹²

In addition to the counterattacks of the communist bloc, the press also mentioned the changes in the foreign policies of the western democracies. For example, on January 6, 1948, *Yeni Sabah*, in its examination of Clement Richard Attlee's, who was the prime minister of Britain from 1945 to 1951, speech about the anti-communist campaign in Britain, stated that the British changed its foreign policy to break off communist expansion in the world.⁴⁹³ Similarly, for *Yeni Sabah*, Europe was ideologically divided into two parts, where Britain began to implement a new strategy against the Soviet expansion in the continent.⁴⁹⁴ Even though it was argued that Attlee's foreign policy had always been based on stopping the Soviet expansion in Europe;⁴⁹⁵ having witnessed the constant bipolarization of the world recently, the Turkish press underlined that the British foreign policy became more aggressive towards. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Turkish press was from time to time critical of the British attitude towards the Soviet Union and the communist bloc.

Being very responsive to the so-called communist counterattacks, the communists' taking over the government in Czechoslovakia on February 25, 1948 was another event that had an extremely demoralizing effect. For *Yeni Sabah*, ‘the *coup d'état*’ in

⁴⁹¹ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 8.

⁴⁹² See other news which criticized Cominform "Kominformun Bir Teşebbüsü", *Yeni Sabah*, 7 June 1948, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Kominformun Yugoslavya ile Mücadelesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 March 1949, p. 3; "Kominform'un Kararlarından Sonra, Moskovanın Teşkilatlandığı Sözde Sulh Taraftarları", *Yeni İstanbul*, 1 December 1949, p. 1.

⁴⁹³ "İngiltere, Yeni Bir Dış Siyaset Takibe Başladı", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 January 1948, p. 1.

⁴⁹⁴ "Batı Avrupa Bloku Teşkili", *Yeni Sabah*, 9 February 1948, p. 1.

⁴⁹⁵ Hanes and Hanes, *Cold War: Biographies*, p. 30.

Czechoslovakia and the fostering Soviet pressure on Finland created a panicky atmosphere in Turkey.⁴⁹⁶ Moreover, on March 18, 1948, Yazman, commenting on the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union, claimed that only ‘God’ and ‘Stalin’ could know whether there would be another world war or not.⁴⁹⁷

Responding to the changes in the Cold War environment, the pages of the Turkish newspapers were full of worrying news about an imminence of a war between the capitalist and communist blocs. From 1947 to 1948, the possibility of a new war increased and, even though the press claimed that the tension in the international arena decreased, it continued to report the international developments with the similar arguments. In effect, there were sudden changes in the mood of the press within the framework of the emerging Cold War, as could be observed from the pages of *Akşam* and *Yeni Sabah*. For example, *Akşam*, taking up the question of whether there would be peace or war, stated that the current situation in world politics did not seem to be peaceful. Nevertheless, resembling the struggle between the US and the Soviet Union to a poker game, *Akşam* claimed that neither Truman nor Molotov was eager to declare a real war against his rival.⁴⁹⁸ In the same way, *Akşam*, reporting from *Le Monde*, claimed that the Soviet Union could not endure a new war due to economic obstacles. Furthermore, for *Akşam*, the Americans thought that the Soviet Union could only be able to carry out a defense war.⁴⁹⁹ However, on March 15, 1948, *Akşam*, claiming that the world politics were getting worse day by day, said that the US was taking actions such as preparing economic aid to Europe, which would be followed by military preparations.⁵⁰⁰ Although the formation of the Brussels Pact, which was signed by Belgium, Britain, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands on March 17, 1948, contributed to the moral strength of the press about the future of the Cold War, on the

⁴⁹⁶ "Sovyet Polis İmparatorluğu", *Yeni Sabah*, 2 March 1948, p. 5.

⁴⁹⁷ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Harb Olacak Mı?", *Akşam*, 18 March 1948, p. 4: "Gerçekten Üçüncü Dünya harbi patlak verecek mi? Bunun iç yüzünü ancak Allahla Stalin bilebilir".

⁴⁹⁸ "Harb Mi, Sulh Mu?", *Akşam*, 8 March 1948, p. 2.

⁴⁹⁹ "Rusya İktisaden Yeni Bir Harbe Tahammül Edebilir Mi?", (*Le Monde*) *Akşam*, 13 March 1948, p. 5

⁵⁰⁰ "Siyasi Gerginlik Artıyor", *Akşam*, 15 March 1948, p. 2.

same day, *Akşam* stated that the entire world was worried about the near future: the Americans, setting aside their internal issues, began to become more concerned about the problem of Europe as a result of the expansion of the communist regimes in the continent, which might threaten other non-communist European countries.⁵⁰¹

In addition to *Akşam*, the sudden changes of the press attitude to the ongoing worldwide political turbulences between two blocs could be observed from the pages of *Yeni Sabah*. For example, Ekrem Rize, asking whether the Third World would happen in the near future, said that the US did not want to declare a war against the Soviet Union although it was busy with long-term projects such as Marshall Plan. For him, emergence of the new world war might be possible if Stalin would die; otherwise, the conflicts between two camps would be occurred within the framework of the Cold War because Stalin would not be able to dare to attack the US.⁵⁰² On March 20, 1948, A. Cemalettin Saraçoğlu, the owner of *Yeni Sabah* who sold the newspaper to Safa Kılıçlıoğlu later in the same year, claimed that the democratic powers of the world united against the Soviet Union and even West Germany joined to the western bloc. Accordingly, he claimed that for Europe was not defenseless any longer, the Soviet Union had to halt their expansionism in the region. For him, stopping the communist expansion confirmed the resolute foreign policy of Turkey against the Soviet Union since the Second World War.⁵⁰³

Contrary to the optimistic opinion of its owner, Cemalettin Saraçoğlu, on March 25, 1948, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that foreign insurance companies raised the risk premium of the war.⁵⁰⁴ While claiming the Soviet Union began to be afraid of the United States owing to the military power of the latter on March 27, 1948;⁵⁰⁵ on March 28, 1948,

⁵⁰¹ "Bütün Dünya Heyecan İçinde", *Akşam*, 17 March 1948, p. 2. See other news and articles published in *Akşam*, which were 'pessimistic' in mood: "Harb Çıkacak Mı?", (*Reuters*), *Akşam*, 20 March 1948, p. 1; "Harb Tehlikesi", *Akşam*, 26 April 1948, p. 1; "Londra Radyosuna göre Harb Tehlikesi Artıyor", *Akşam*, 2 May 1948, p. 1; Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Pasifikteki Demir Perde", *Akşam*, 24 May 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁰² Ekrem Rize, "Üçüncü Dünya Harbi Yakın Mı?", *Yeni Sabah*, 12 March 1948, p. 5.

⁵⁰³ A. Cemalettin Saraçoğlu, "Kızıl Rusyaya İhtar", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 March 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁰⁴ "Harb Rizikoları Değişiyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 25 March 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁰⁵ "Rusya, Amerikadan Korkmaya Başladı", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 March 1948, p. 1.

Yeni Sabah depicted that the new world war was steadily approaching and no one would be able to predict its possible results.⁵⁰⁶ Moreover, on April 2, 1948, *Yeni Sabah* further repeated that as the rumor about the war was spreading across countries, the instability of both the national and international markets was also rising.⁵⁰⁷ *Yeni Sabah*, calling the current situation in international politics the “bloodless war”, argued that it was possible for Turkey to feel the pressure created by this bloodless war in the future.⁵⁰⁸ Reporting the speech of Kenneth Claiborne Royall who was the first Secretary of the Army of the United States from 1947 to 1949, *Yeni Sabah* also mentioned about the possibility of the Third World War.⁵⁰⁹

In this constantly changing volatile atmosphere, western democracies led by the US emerged as the guarantor for the ‘world peace’ against the Soviet threat and the press mentioned the preparations made by the West to defeat communists all around the world. The oppositional press, continuing to be suspicious of the Soviet foreign policy, trusted the US and Britain more compared to the CHP affiliated newspapers.⁵¹⁰ For example, in the case of the Third World War, *Cumhuriyet* argued that Turkey would not be able to remain neutral: unlike the Second World War, Turkey could not avoid from an invasion by remaining neutral; that is, it had to participate in the war on the side of the western democracies, which would protect the world from the danger of

⁵⁰⁶ "Harb Her An Biraz Daha Yaklaşıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 28 March 1948, p. 5.

⁵⁰⁷ "İç ve Dış Piyasalarda İstikrarsızlık Artıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 2 April 1948, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁸ "Kansız Harb", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 May 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁰⁹ "Üçüncü Bir Dünya Harbi İhtimali Var", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 May 1948, p. 3.

⁵¹⁰ See examples from *Akşam*: "Rus İdarecileri Nazi Usullerine Başvuruyorlar", (VOA) *Akşam*, 9 May 1948, p. 1; "Amerikan Teklifinin Akisleri", *Akşam*, 13 May 1948, p. 2; "Amerika Komünizminin Asyada Yayılmasına Seyirci Kalmayacak", (Nafen) *Akşam*, 26 May 1949, p. 1; See examples from *Ulus*: Peyami Safa, "Batı Kefesi", *Ulus*, 10 March 1949, p. 1; Yavuz Abadan, "Londra Toplantısı", *Ulus*, 15 March 1949, p. 1; Peyami Safa, "Sovyet Buhranı", *Ulus*, 17 March 1949, p. 1. See examples from *Yeni Sabah*: "İngiltere ile Amerika Arasında Müdafaa Planı", *Yeni Sabah*, 29 April 1948, p. 3; "Amerika, Komünizmi Bozguna Uğratacak", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 January 1949, p. 1; "Amerikanın Rusyaya Karşı Aldığı Cephe", *Yeni Sabah*, 28 January 1949, p. 3; Diplomat, "Amerika, Avrupada savaşacak", *Yeni Sabah*, 5 July 1949, p. 3. See examples from *Cumhuriyet*: M. Kenan Kan, "Harb İhtimaline Karşı Amerikanın Planı", *Cumhuriyet*, 1 November 1948, p. 2; "Soğuk Harb Mi, Kızgın Harb Mi?", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 March 1949, pp. 1, 3.

communism.⁵¹¹ To sum up, during its analyses of the Cold War developments, the press saw the West led by the US as the guarantor of the world peace.

To a large extent, 1949 represented a new phase in the Cold War due to the Berlin Blockade by the Soviet Union from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949, the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization on April 4, 1949, the first atomic bombs test of the Soviet on August 29, 1949 and the official recognition of the People's Republic China by the Soviet Union on September 1, 1949. Initially, the Berlin Blockade, as one of the first international crises of the Cold War, started on June 24, 1948 and it ended on May 12, 1949. While this event strengthened the "US commitment" to Europe,⁵¹² it accelerated the formation of NATO as well.⁵¹³ The Turkish press, in this regard, saw the blockade as a result of the Soviet aggressive policies. For example, according to Ömer Rıza Doğrul, the reason of the Berlin Blockade was the desire of the Soviet Union, which "betrayed" its old allies to expel them from Berlin.⁵¹⁴ For Süha Sakıp Taner, as the "White Book" published by the British government already demonstrated, the Soviet Union tried to occupy countries by creating chaos, as the Berlin Blockade proved.⁵¹⁵ When the US and Britain managed to break the blockade by providing supplies to West Berlin via air and this operation was regarded as a success of the West against the Soviet Union.⁵¹⁶ These successful maneuvers led to lifting of the blockade by the Soviet Union and created a positive atmosphere in the Turkish press.⁵¹⁷ Of course, journalists were aware of the importance of Berlin and

⁵¹¹ "Bir Dünya Harbinde Tarafsız Kalmak Mümkün Müdür?", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 March 1949, p. 3; "Bir Cihan Harbinde Türkiye Tarafsız Kalabilir Mi?", *Cumhuriyet*, 30 March 1949, p. 3.

⁵¹² John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 51.

⁵¹³ McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, p. 15.

⁵¹⁴ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Bolşeviklerin Terbiye Ettikleri Almanlar", *Cumhuriyet*, 7 October 1948, p. 3.

⁵¹⁵ Süha Sakıp Taner, "Berlin Buhranı Hakkında İngiltere Hükümetinin Neşrettiği 'Beyaz Kitap'", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1948, p. 2.

⁵¹⁶ Lawrence Freedman, "Berlin and the Cold War", in John P. S. Gearson and Kori N. Schake (eds.), *The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 3.

⁵¹⁷ "Batı Müttefikleri Sovyet Bölgesine Eşya Nakliyatını Durdurdular", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 5 February 1949, p. 3; Yavuz Abadan, "Kısasa Kısas", *Ulus*, 8 February 1949, p. 1; "Berlin'in Ablukası Ruslar için Başarısız Olmuştur", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 19 February 1949, p. 3.

Germany in general within the framework of the early Cold War. As an example, on March 12, 1949 Yavuz Abadan of *Ulus* argued that the Cold War would not end until the German question was solved.⁵¹⁸ Moreover, for Dođrul, the formation of NATO proved that the West would never surrender to the Soviet Union and the Soviet provocation in Berlin represented a failure.⁵¹⁹ That is to say, as the Soviet Union increased its influence in Europe, the perception of Germany by the Turkish press began to change, from an enemy led by Nazis to a possible strategic partner, which was to be protected from the Soviet threat.

In this period, the press continued to celebrate the victorious attitude of the West against the Soviet Union. One reason was the failure of the Soviet blockade in Berlin. Another reason for such an optimistic attitude of the press to the Cold War was related to the atomic bombs that two blocs possessed.⁵²⁰ Indeed, these two factors were related to each other: Batti argued that as the case of the Berlin Blockade crisis showed, its nuclear capability strengthened the bargaining power of the US against the Soviet Union.⁵²¹ In this regard, the Turkish press happily mentioned how the Soviet Union was unable to compete with the nuclear capacity of the US. For example, both *Zafer* and *Yeni Sabah* claimed that the Soviet Union had no atomic bombs, which meant the “alarm bell” (*tehlike çanı*) for it.⁵²² As the press trusted and exalted the superiority of the US concerning atomic bombs, the newspapers conveyed their gratitude about the absence of the atomic bombs in the communist bloc.⁵²³ For this reason, according to

⁵¹⁸ Yavuz Abadan, "Almanya Meselesi", *Ulus*, 12 March 1949, p. 1.

⁵¹⁹ Ömer Rıza Dođrul, "Müttefiklerin Kazandığı İki Zafer", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 March 1949, p. 3.

⁵²⁰ See as example: "Bir Harb Çıkarsa Amerika Atomu Kullanacak", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 6 February 1949, p. 1.

⁵²¹ Timothy J. Botti, *Ace in the Hole: Why the United States did not Use Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War, 1945 to 1965* (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), p. 16.

⁵²² "Sovyet Rusyada Atom Stoku Yok", *Zafer*, 3 October 1949, p. 1; "Rusya'da Atom Bombası Stoku Yok", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 October 1949, p. 1.

⁵²³ It is important to note that the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bombs on August 29, 1949, but the Turkish press was unaware of the situation at that moment.

the press, the West was generally a cut above the communist bloc.⁵²⁴ For example, on December 21, 1949, while both of them reported from *UPI*, *Yeni Sabah* stated that “the Cold War was continuing at the expense of the Soviet Union”,⁵²⁵ *Zafer* stated that “the West won the victory in the Cold War” in spite of the presence of communist groups in Western Europe.⁵²⁶

However, this positive atmosphere in the Turkish press pertaining to the course of the Cold War was suddenly altered with the formation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Mücahit Topalak of *Zafer* claimed that there been no need for a pact among the Pacific countries which could have been complemented NATO, because he thought that China, as the country which could have represented military power of such a pact, had already been lost by democracies while India did not seem to be ready to endure communist attacks, which would come from both the Soviet Union and China.⁵²⁷ Similar to Topalak, on January 9, 1950, *Diplomat*, in his analysis of the US-Soviet consensus, said that if the Cold War was to be ended, then the world would be able to have an actual peace. Nonetheless, according to *Diplomat*, there still existed serious unsolved questions such as Germany, Japan and China.⁵²⁸ For Topalak who analyzed Soviet actions and distrusted the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union distracted the attention of democracies and, as he resembled the Soviet tactics to a tennis game: the Soviet Union tried to compensate their loss of West Europe and Yugoslavia by increasing their influence in Asia.⁵²⁹

The press analyses of the Cold War sometimes had inconsistencies during 1950. For example, the gravity of the Cold War endlessly moved from Far East to Middle East or from Asia to Europe. Similarly, it was claimed that the Soviet Union prepared for

⁵²⁴ See examples, "Soğuk Harp ve Amerika", *Zafer*, 8 October 1949, p. 3; "1949, Stalin için Bir Hezimet Yılı Olmuştur", *Ulus*, 2 January 1950, p. 3; "Truman'ın Kongrede Verdiği Çok Önemli Nutuk", *Ulus*, 5 January 1950, p. 1.

⁵²⁵ "Soğuk Harp Ruslar Aleyhine Gelişiyor", (*UPI*) *Yeni Sabah*, 21 December 1949, p. 3.

⁵²⁶ "Soğuk Harbde Zafer Kazanıldı", (*UPI*) *Zafer*, 21 December 1949, p. 3.

⁵²⁷ Mücahit Topalak, "Pasifik Paktı", *Zafer*, 2 January 1950, p. 3

⁵²⁸ *Diplomat*, "Amerika-Rusya Uzlaşması Mı?", *Yeni Sabah*, 9 January 1950, p. 3.

⁵²⁹ Mücahit Topalak, "Sovyetlere Göre", *Zafer*, 12 January 1950, p. 3.

new attacks against the Western Bloc. There were also news about how the Cold War conflicts reached their peak, due to the equality between the blocs in terms of military power. However, the press sometimes claimed that the West had already won the war⁵³⁰ but rarely mentioned that the Soviet Union got the upper hand in the Cold War competition.⁵³¹ To put it differently, as discussed below, the press attitudes to the emerging Cold War was never homogenous; it was changing on a daily basis. As an example, while *Ulus*, reporting from *AFP*, claimed that the Soviet Union was not ready for the war on May 2, 1950; however, it, reporting from *AP*, claimed that the war between the US and SU might emerge immediately only one day later.⁵³² As seen from this example, one of the reasons for such a changing mood of the press was the sources, from which Turkish newspapers reported news. In other words, reporting international developments from different sources might have led to a sharply changing mood of the press.

Atomic rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union also affected the Cold War perceptions of the Turkish press and the rumors regarding the hydrogen bombs that the Soviet Union produced another point related to the inconsistent attitude of the press to the Cold War.⁵³³ As the atomic bombs that the US possessed seemed to be an advantage of the West over the Eastern bloc, the fact that the Soviet Union began to develop its own nuclear power alarmed the US in this period.⁵³⁴ The Turkish press, having similar concerns with the US, was not happy with the nuclear capacity of the Soviet Union. For example, *Cumhuriyet* claimed that the Cold War was currently in its most severe stage because there was an equality between two blocs, both of which

⁵³⁰ "Rusya ile Soğuk Harp Son Bulması", (*UPI Zafer*, 15 February 1950, p. 1; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Amerika Siyasetinde Yeni Gelişmeler", *Cumhuriyet*, 19 February 1950, p. 3.

⁵³¹ "Çok Karışık Durum", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 February 1950, pp. 1, 5; "Zaman, Sovyet Rusyanın Lehine Mi Çalışıyor?", *Yeni İstanbul*, 25 February 1950, p. 2; "Rusyanın Soğuk Harb Taarruzu", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 February 1950, p. 3.

⁵³² "Rusya Harbe Hazır Değilmiş", (*AFP Ulus*, 2 May 1950, p. 1; "Rusya ile Harp Her An Patlak Verebilir", (*AP Ulus*, 3 May 1950, p. 3.

⁵³³ "Amerika İdrojen Bombası Yapacak", (*UPI Ulus*, 1 February 1950, p. 1; "Rusların Daha Çok Uçakları Varmış", (*AFP Ulus*, 10 February 1950, p. 3; Mücahit Topalak, "Korkmaz a!", *Zafer*, 13 March 1950, p. 3.

⁵³⁴ Winkler, *The Cold War*, p. 32.

had atomic bombs.⁵³⁵ To put it another way, while the Turkish press had happily reported that the Soviet Union had no atomic bombs before, the progress in the nuclear capacity of the Soviet Union changed the perception of the balance of power between two blocs for the press.

As the Turkish general elections of 1950 was approaching, the Turkish foreign policy became relatively a secondary issue on the agenda of the Turkish press. Nevertheless, the press continued to articulate its anxiety over the mounting tension between the US and the Soviet Union, which might lead to the Third World War.⁵³⁶ In this period, there were three main themes covered in the press regarding its attitude towards the Cold War: the constant fear of the Soviet invasion, the power of the West to counterbalance the communist attacks and minor criticisms of the West. According to the press, the one who demanded continuation of the Cold War was not the West but only the Soviet Union.⁵³⁷ Even the Soviet Union was expected to stage a new attack in Berlin in May and so to start a new phase of the Cold War in the spring, which would adversely affect Turkey.⁵³⁸

Similar to the previous periods, the West was depicted as the counterbalancing power against the Soviet global aggression and the press claimed that western countries, having unified under the banner of NATO and taking the initiative, made the

⁵³⁵ "Soğuk Harbin En Şiddetli Devresi", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 March 1950, p. 1.

⁵³⁶ Diplomat, "Amerika-Rus İhtilafı", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 April 1950, p. 3; "Amerikalılar Durumu Vahim Görüyorlar", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 21 April 1950, p. 3; "De Courcy Önümüzdeki Yılı Çok Tehlikeli Buluyor", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 1 May 1950, p. 3.

⁵³⁷ "Rusya, Soğuk Harbin Devamını İstiyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 March 1950, p. 3; Mücahit Topalak, "Eisenhower'in Son Demeci", *Zafer*, 28 March 1950, p. 3; "Medeniyetimizin Ana Temelleri ve Dünyanın Güvenliği Tehlikededir", *Ulus*, 24 April 1950, p. 1; "Ruslar Kabadayımı Bir Tavır Takınıyorlarmış", *Ulus*, 27 April 1950, p. 3; "Sovyetler Tehlikeli Bir Şekilde Silahlanıyor", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 6 May 1950, p. 3; "Üçüncü Bir Dünya Harbi İhtimali", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 9 May 1950, p. 3; "Soğuk Harbin Doğurduğu Durum", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 10 May 1950, p. 3; "Komünizm Tehlikesi Daha Uzun Müddet Mevcuttur", *Ulus*, 11 May 1950, p. 3; "Harp Tesadüfen Zuhur Edebilir", *Ulus*, 13 May 1950, p. 1; "Vaşington'un İmhası İçin Rus Planları", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 21 May 1950, p. 1.

⁵³⁸ "Mayısta Rusların Berline Taarruz Etmeleri Muhtemel", *Yeni İstanbul*, 4 April 1950, p. 2; Abidin Daver, "Boğazlara Karşı Yeni Bir Soğuk Harb Taarruzu", *Cumhuriyet*, 24 April 1950, p. 1; "Soğuk Harpte Rus İlkbahar Taarruzu", *Yeni İstanbul*, 24 April 1950, p. 1; Mücahit Topalak, "İlk Bahar Taarruzu", *Zafer*, 24 April 1950, p. 3.

counterattacks against the Soviet Union in each front of the Cold War.⁵³⁹ What is more, the US was expected to deal with the Cold War seriously because Truman was trying to retrieve prestige that he lost after the communist revolution in China.⁵⁴⁰ In spite of seeing the West as a counterbalancing power against the Soviet Union, the press sometimes accused the West of not taking practical steps against communism. For example, in its analysis of Bernard Baruch's, who was the presidential adviser of both Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, speech about the Cold War, *Yeni İstanbul* discussed about the change of US policies towards the Soviet Union.⁵⁴¹

To sum up, press members, speaking more boldly compared to the previous years regarding their hostility to the Soviet Union and their friendliness to the West, produced a complex and sometimes inconsistent Cold War agenda. On the one hand, the Turkish press was satisfied with Turkey's drive to the West and being a part of the western security system. On the other hand, the exclusion of Turkey from NATO, the growing nuclear capacity of the Soviet Union and the rise of communism in Asia led to a pessimistic press outlook.

3.6) THE REGIONAL AGENDAS OF THE TURKISH PRESS

In addition to the perception of the Cold War by the press in a global context, the press analyzed the regional Cold War conflicts as well. There were three important regions of particular importance to the press, which the Cold War tension between the US and the Soviet Union appeared more. While the Middle East and the Mediterranean were

⁵³⁹ Falih Rıfıkı Atay, "Yakın Tarih, *Ulus*, 19 February 1950, p. 2; "Rusyaya Karşı Tedbirler Alınıyor", (*London Radio*) *Yeni Sabah*, 29 March 1950, p. 1; "Soğuk Harbde Amerikanın Mukabil Taarruzu", *Cumhuriyet*, 31 March 1950, p. 2; "Amerika Yakında Cüretli Hareketlere Girişecek", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 8 April 1950, p. 1; "Truman Komünizmi Bir Daha Tel'in Etti", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 25 April 1950, p. 1; "Bir Sovyet Taarruzuna Karşı Müşterek Plan", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 19 May 1950, p. 3; Selim Sabit, "Son Günlerde Dünyada Olup Bitenler", *Yeni İstanbul*, 24 May 1950, p. 1.

⁵⁴⁰ "Amerika, Soğuk Harbi Ciddiyetle Ele Alacak", *Yeni İstanbul*, 2 April 1950, p. 2; "Amerika Tehlikeye Karşı Tetikte", *Yeni Sabah*, 12 April 1950, p. 3; "Soğuk Harp'i İdare Edecek Müttefik Genelkurmayı", *Yeni İstanbul*, 15 April 1950, p. 1; "Sovyet Tehlikesine Karşı Amerika'nın Tedbirleri", (*UPI*) *Cumhuriyet*, 23 April 1950, p. 1; "Batılılar, Rusya'ya Soğuk Harp Açmak Kararında", (*UPI*) *Yeni Sabah*, 25 April 1950, p. 1; Mücahit Topalak, "Yüksek Atlantik Konseyi", *Zafer*, 27 April 1950, p. 3; Abidin Daver, "Sovyet Denizaltılar ile Amerika, Mücadeleye Hazırlanıyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 May 1950, p. 2.

⁵⁴¹ "Soğuk Harp Nasıl Kazanılabilir?", *Yeni İstanbul*, 2 April 1950, p. 2; Mücahit Topalak, "Niçin Yavaş Gidiyorlar?", *Zafer*, 1 May 1950, p. 3.

regarded as the regions of which Turkey was a part, Asia appeared as a part of the world, which the Soviet Union tried to extend its influence over and the US emerged as a power which aimed to stop the communist expansion. With the help of the regional analyses, the press somehow tried to affiliate Turkey with the global Cold War struggles, which directly or indirectly threatened Turkey's own national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

3.6.1) The Middle East in the Cold War

Before an analysis of how the Turkish press evaluated regional Cold War conflicts in the Middle East, it is needed to understand what the 'Middle East' meant in this period and how the Turkish press defined it. First of all, the definition of the 'Middle East' and 'Near East' has never been clear. While the term 'Near East' had been used to describe the Ottoman Empire and its successor states until the interwar period, the 'Middle East' became a more popular term (particularly after the Second World War), which mainly referred to the Arab states who had become a part of the Ottoman Empire before.⁵⁴² To clarify, the terminology was invented and made popular by the West and the term 'Middle East' had the Western dominated understanding. As Gerges argued, the definition of the 'Middle East', an artificial nineteenth-century abstraction, was an ideological and political one and the political orientation of the field and the focus on the area studies accelerated during the Cold War conflicts.⁵⁴³ As Khalidi pointed out, the term the Middle East in regional languages was just exact translation of the Middle East.⁵⁴⁴ In this regard, the Turkish political elite and press members used both the terms 'Near East' (*Yakın Şark* or *Yakın Doğu*) and 'Middle East' (*Orta Şark* or *Orta Doğu*).

Based on these definitions, the Turkish press saw the Middle East as one of the most vulnerable regions in the world, which was exposed to the Soviet threat. Accordingly,

⁵⁴² Malcolm Yapp, *The Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 1.

⁵⁴³ Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Study of Middle East International Relations: A Critique" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18.2 (1991), pp. 209-213.

⁵⁴⁴ Rashid Khalidi, "The 'Middle East' as a Framework of Analysis: Re-mapping a Region in the Era of Globalization" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 18.1 (1998), p. 74.

it was a pivotal region as Turkey was a part of it and the Soviet presence in the region affected Turkey's security concerns. Gaining a momentum after 1948, there were news about oil reserves in the Middle East, which was another thread concerning the region which run through the Cold War and enhanced the strategic importance of the region in global politics.⁵⁴⁵ For example, on January 27, 1948, *Yeni Sabah* declared that the Middle East was becoming the oil source of Europe.⁵⁴⁶ One month later, *Akşam*, using the same title with *Yeni Sabah*, affirmed that the Americans tried to transfer Saudi oil to Europe and the Far East.⁵⁴⁷ As *Yeni Sabah* mentioned the importance of Saudi Arabia for the capitalist states due to its oil resources,⁵⁴⁸ it emphasized the absence of Soviet threat in this country, unlike other states in the region.⁵⁴⁹ Moreover, as *Yeni Sabah* claimed, the western countries rejected any proposal by communist countries, which offered the joint control of oil reserves located in the Middle East.⁵⁵⁰

This importance attached to the Middle East (particularly, due to the oil reserves located in the region) was, indeed, related to the changes in the balance of power in the region at that moment. Following the end of the World War I, a competition between American and British oil companies had begun in order to access oil reserves in the Middle East. While Britain was able to control oil sources in Iraq and Iran, the US obtained oil concessions in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s. The competition between the British and the Americans was slowed down when two countries reached to an agreement in August 1944.⁵⁵¹ In addition, the Middle East oil was important not only for the US and Britain but also for Western Europe; that is, the access to cheap oil by war-torn western countries was a bedrock issue.⁵⁵² Although the US was still a net

⁵⁴⁵ For examples, see: "Rus-İran Gerginliği", *Akşam*, 7 February 1948, p. 2; "Kominform Ajanları Faaliyette", *Ulus*, 5 February 1949, p. 3; "Orta Doğu'da Komünizm", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 20 February 1950, p. 3; Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Orta Şarkta Komünist Nüfuzu", *Ulus*, 4 April 1950, pp. 1, 3.

⁵⁴⁶ "Orta Doğu Avrupanın Petrol Kaynağı Oluyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 24 January 1948, p. 4.

⁵⁴⁷ "Orta Doğu, Avrupanın Petrol Kaynağı Oluyor", *Akşam*, 2 February 1948, p. 4.

⁵⁴⁸ "Amerikanın Ortadoğu Petrol Politikası", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 February 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁴⁹ "Arabistan Petrolleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 26 February 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁵⁰ "Ortadoğu Petrolleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 April 1948, p. 3

⁵⁵¹ Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War*, p. 62.

⁵⁵² Craig and Logevall, *America's Cold War*, p. 154.

exporter of oil in this period, it did not want to lose such a strategic region to the Soviet Union.⁵⁵³ Moreover, as oil replaced the coal in European countries (particularly, in Germany), the Middle East increasingly became the center of oil production.⁵⁵⁴ As Britain and France began to withdraw their colonial armies and Middle Eastern countries began to gain their national independence, the US seized the opportunity by increasing its influence in the region not only to stop the Soviet expansion but also to increase its control over the oil reserves.⁵⁵⁵ Nonetheless, in spite of British pulling out of India and its declining hegemony in the West, Britain maintained its imperial commitments in the Middle East, which were threatened by the Soviet desires to access to the Middle Eastern oil.⁵⁵⁶ In other words, while Britain began to leave other parts of the globe, it was determined to maintain in the Middle East even after the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948.⁵⁵⁷

In this atmosphere, the press continued to write about how oil reserves in the Middle East made the region one of conflicting areas between the Capitalist and Communist Blocs and how the Middle East had a very important strategic place in international politics. For example, on January 28, 1949, Enis Tahsin Til asserted that any conflict arisen from the Middle East could easily spread into the rest of the world.⁵⁵⁸ Similarly, Tevfik Sadullah, a mining engineer who had graduated from the Palo Alto University located in California, the United States, stated that oil was the most strategic aspect of the Middle East. For him, the Soviet Union carefully played its political cards to get a

⁵⁵³ Warren I. Cohen, *America's Failing Empire: US Foreign Relations Since The Cold War* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 5.

⁵⁵⁴ David S. Painter, "Oil, Resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 490–493.

⁵⁵⁵ Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East - from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), p. 14.

⁵⁵⁶ Huw Dylan, *Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain's Joint Intelligence Bureau 1945-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 49.

⁵⁵⁷ Raymond P. Ojserkis, *Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and the US Arms Build-up* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), p. 9.

⁵⁵⁸ Enis Tahsin Til, "İngiltere ve Orta Doğu", *Akşam*, 28 January 1949, p. 2

share from rich oil resources of both Iran and Arab countries.⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, for *Akşam*, the reason why the Middle East attracted world's attention was the presence of oil wells, which had rarely been drilled.⁵⁶⁰

Following the formation of NATO, the press mentioned the oil and its importance for the Middle East even more. Doğrul, five days after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, stated that although NATO was a successful project of the West, it had to be complemented by additional measures. According to him, the establishment of NATO directed the way of 'the war of nerves' to the Middle East, which was one of the weakest points of the 'western' security system against the Soviet Union because the rest of the countries covered by this security system were now under the protection of NATO but those located in the Middle East seemed to be excluded from such a protection. For Doğrul, it was certain that the opposite side aimed to terrify the allies by threatening their presence in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.⁵⁶¹ Similarly, for Daver, the exclusion of Greece, Iran and Turkey from NATO heightened the necessity for a security pact among Middle Eastern countries.⁵⁶² Moreover, *Akşam*, reporting from *Nafen*, claimed that the Soviet Union would accelerate its own Cold War in the Middle East; hence, the first test of NATO would be both in the Middle East and Berlin.⁵⁶³ Indeed, the Berlin blockade still continued at that moment and the press tried to emphasize the importance of the Middle East by linking it both to NATO and the ongoing crisis between the West and the Soviet Union in Berlin.

The perception of the Middle East by the Turkish press was also related to the US foreign policy. To be more exact, Harry Truman saw Turkey, Greece and Iran as parts of a whole (i.e., the US containment policy) and he thought that the Middle East and Europe were connected through these states.⁵⁶⁴ The depiction of the region by the

⁵⁵⁹ Tefik Sadullah, "Yakınşark Meselelerinin Candamarı: Petrol", *Cumhuriyet*, 24 February 1949, p. 2.

⁵⁶⁰ "Orta Doğu Petrolleri", *Akşam*, 6 March 1949, p. 2.

⁵⁶¹ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Atlantik Paktını Tamamlayacak Tedbirler", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 April 1949, p. 3.

⁵⁶² Abidin Daver, "Ortadoğunun Emniyetini Sağlamak İçin", *Cumhuriyet*, 11 May 1950, p. 1.

⁵⁶³ "Rusya Orta Doğuda Soğuk Harbe Hız Verecek", (*Nafen*) *Akşam*, 11 April 1949, p. 1.

⁵⁶⁴ Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior*, pp. 64-65.

Turkish press was very similar to Truman's understanding; that is, Turkey was a part of the Middle East which included not only Arab states but also Iran and Greece. Accordingly, compared to other Middle Eastern states, concerns about the security of Iran, as the neighbor of Turkey, appeared as an important issue on the pages of the Turkish newspapers.⁵⁶⁵ For example, on April 10, 1949, *Yeni Sabah*, asking whether the Third World War would begin in Iran or not, claimed that this weak country again became the center of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West. For *Yeni Sabah*, the Soviet Union wanted to occupy Iran due to its key position in the Middle East and its rich oil reserves.⁵⁶⁶ In harmony with *Yeni Sabah*, Mümtaz Faik Fenik of *Zafer* laid stress on the fact that the Soviet Union followed expansionist policies toward Iran to compensate the loss of the Gulf region to the West. To control oil reserves in Iran, as Fenik claimed, the Soviet Union would initiate a revolt among Iranian Kurds led by Molla Mustafa Bozaran and to provoke Balkan nations against the Iranian government.⁵⁶⁷ He, two weeks later, interpreted Soviet pressure on Iranian oil as the war of nerves waged against Iran. However, he pondered that the Soviet pressure in Iran was related to the oil resources proved the failure of the Soviet policies in Iran.⁵⁶⁸ Hence, the tension between Iran and the Soviet Union attracted the attention of the Turkish press, which stemmed from the fact that the Soviet presence in Iran, as the neighbor of Turkey, might easily affect Turkey's national security. As Blake pointed out, in the years following the Second World War, the Iranian press was also concerned about the worsening relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union.⁵⁶⁹

Although the Turkish press was worried about the Soviet aggression in the Middle East, the US' position in the region had also a distinguished place in the viewpoints of the Turkish newspapers, particularly oppositional press, as could be observed from Diplomat's articles written in *Yeni Sabah*. For example, Diplomat was quite sure that

⁵⁶⁵ See examples: "İran Rusya'nın Kuvvet Göndermeğe Hazırlanması İhtimalinden Endişeleniyor", (*UPI Ulus*, 17 March 1949, p. 3; "İrana Verilen Sovyet Notası", (*UPI Ulus*, 18 May 1950, p. 3.

⁵⁶⁶ "Üçüncü Dünya Harbi İranda mı Kopacak?", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 April 1949, p. 1.

⁵⁶⁷ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "İran Sınırında Sovyetlerin Tahşidatı!", *Zafer*, 5 May 1949, p. 3.

⁵⁶⁸ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "İran'a Karşı Girişilen Sınır Harbi", *Zafer*, 17 May 1949, p. 3.

⁵⁶⁹ Blake, *The US-Soviet Confrontation in Iran*, p. 33.

Turkey, together with Iran and Greece, had a crucial place in the eyes of democracies and they were not on their own against the Cold War of the Soviet Union.⁵⁷⁰ Accordingly, Iran, demanding aid from the West, took a central place in the American foreign policy because the latter aimed to preclude the Soviet expansion to the south.⁵⁷¹ In this period, as McFarland argued, the interests of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, matched with those of the US and the US companies since the shah tried to counterbalance the Soviet threat in Iran.⁵⁷² On October 28, 1949, Diplomat, being aware of the mutual interests of Iran and the US, stressed that American politicians saw oil sources in the Middle East vital to American interests. For this reason, as he stated, the US aimed to strengthen defense of the Middle East by providing military equipment to its 'allies' there.⁵⁷³ Moreover, he, two days before the League Council consisted of Arab countries signed Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation in order to increase joint military defense measures of the Arab states, wrote that the United States had represented a strategic feature in the creation of the League of Arab States. For him, thanks to such a unity, the security system which the western countries had been following through the formation of NATO was also founded in the Middle East.⁵⁷⁴ That is to say, Diplomat took the Arab League as US creation despite its role in fighting against Israel. Moreover, on May 15, 1950, he asserted that, in addition to Saudi oil, the control of Yemeni oil by the US was not received well in the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union regarded each American success in connection with oil sources as another manifestation of American imperialism in the region.⁵⁷⁵

To sum up, the press regarded the Middle East as a pivotal region in the global Cold War dynamics. On the one hand, Turkey was a part of this region and the existence of

⁵⁷⁰ Diplomat, "Sadak'ın Temasları", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 April 1949, p. 3

⁵⁷¹ Diplomat, "İran Yardım İstiyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 August 1949, p. 3.

⁵⁷² Stephen L. McFarland, "The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Onset of the Cold War", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 254.

⁵⁷³ Diplomat, "İngilterede Tasarruf", *Yeni Sabah*, 28 October 1949, p. 3.

⁵⁷⁴ Diplomat, "Arap Birliği Pakti", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 April 1950, p. 3

⁵⁷⁵ Diplomat, "Yemen Petrolleri ve Amerika", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 May 1950, p. 3.

the Soviet threat directly affected Turkey's own national security concerns; that is, an increase in the Soviet influence in one of Turkey's neighbors might increase the Soviet threat in Turkey, too. On the other hand, the perceptions of the Cold War conflicts in the region by the Turkish press were heavily shaped by the western interests. First, the Turkish press used 'Western-oriented' terms, the 'Middle East' and the 'Near East', to define the region. Secondly, there were two regional countries which the Turkish press highlighted: Greece and Iran, which were parts of the US containment policy together with Turkey. Thirdly, the press members constantly underlined the importance of the oil reserves located in the region and presented this importance as a concern for world powers rather than Turkey's own interests. Lastly, the Turkish press was aware of the change in balance of power in the Middle East; while Britain and France lost their positions, the US and the Soviet Union gained power in the region following the end of the Second World War. In such a changing environment, the Turkish press attached a specific significance to the US and Britain, which was still perceived as an important actor in the region, in order to counterbalance the so-called communist expansion in the region.

3.6.2) The Mediterranean in the Cold War

Similar to the Middle East, the Mediterranean region was seen as another conflict area within the context of the Cold War which the press heavily emphasized. The press treated much of the region as a vital interest, particularly after the exclusion of Turkey and Greece from NATO. Indeed, the press used the term the 'Mediterranean' to denote Turkey, Greece and Italy. Although the press sometimes used the term 'Eastern Mediterranean', the Mediterranean did not 'generally' refer to a region including the Arab states. Abidin Daver, for example, in his article in *Cumhuriyet* on May 11, 1950, argued that the security system generated by NATO included Western Europe and Western Mediterranean but excluded Eastern Mediterranean, particularly, Turkey and Greece, which were exposed to the Soviet threat most.⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷⁶ Abidin Daver, "Ortadoğunun Emniyetini Sağlamak için", *Cumhuriyet*, 11 May 1950, p. 1.

Turkish journalists, in harmony with politicians, wanted the political authorities to arrange security treaties with the regional countries. In this regard, the press evaluated the developments in the region as a part of global conflicts, especially with regard to the presence of the Soviet threat in the region.⁵⁷⁷ While the oppositional newspapers attached a relatively more significance to the Middle East, the governmental press saw the Mediterranean as a more important region within the framework of the Cold War conflicts. However, both of them saw the US as a counterbalancing power against the Soviet penetration of the regional countries, particularly after the formation of NATO. For example, on February 2, 1948, *Akşam* claimed that the United States tried to increase its control in the Mediterranean at the expense of the Soviet Union, which caused irritation in the Soviet Union. For *Akşam*, the Soviet Union wanted the US to leave the Mediterranean whereas the latter had no such an intention.⁵⁷⁸ On the same day, *Akşam*, reporting from *AP*, recounted that the conflicts between the US and the Soviet Union would reach its peak within a few months. For this reason, the US was believed to make certain decisions in order to increase the security of the Mediterranean.⁵⁷⁹

Following the exclusion of Greece and Turkey from NATO but the inclusion of Italy, as a country which did not have border to the Atlantic Ocean, the concerns over the security of the Mediterranean region rose. In spite of such disappointment, the press expected NATO to be strengthened and consolidated by a Mediterranean security arrangement both to bring the Soviet expansion in the region to an end and to increase the collaboration between the Mediterranean countries. For example, according to Enis Tahsin Til of *Akşam*, as the speeches of American and British officials showed, a

⁵⁷⁷ "Balkan Hudutları", *Akşam*, 29 January 1945, p. 2

⁵⁷⁸ "Rusyanın İki Teşebbüsü", *Akşam*, 2 February 1948, p. 2

⁵⁷⁹ "Amerikan-Sovyet İhtilafı Önümüzdeki Aylarda En Had Devresine Varacak", (*AP*) *Akşam*, 2 February 1948, p. 1. In effect, this view which saw the US foreign policy as a defensive response to the Soviet aggression remained as the traditional interpretation of the start of the Cold War among both politicians and academics until revisionist historians began to assert that the US had some role in starting the Cold War conflicts during the late-1950s (Williamson, *Access to History*, pp. 69-70).

Mediterranean Pact would be formed as soon as NATO took a certain shape because both Britain and the US were aware of the primacy of the region in world peace.⁵⁸⁰

In this atmosphere, the press kept the Soviet threat alive to explain the necessity for a regional security arrangement. For example, Mücahit Topalak of *Zafer* believed that the exclusion of Turkey and other regional countries from NATO led to an increase in the Soviet threat. However, he thought that such a disappointment and insecurity felt by the regional countries (i.e., Turkey and Greece) could be eliminated by the creation of a security pact among Mediterranean countries.⁵⁸¹ As he stated one month later, Turkey could be connected to NATO through a Mediterranean security arrangement.⁵⁸² Repeating his apprehension over the security of Mediterranean on October 28, 1949, he stated that the Mediterranean Pact had to be taken as a security measure to complement the security system created by NATO.⁵⁸³ On April 2, 1950, Topalak claimed that the American weapons which had been given to non-communist states would be used initially in the Mediterranean.⁵⁸⁴

Hence, both the Middle East and the Mediterranean were the regions that the Turkish press attached a great importance to within the early Cold War context. The importance of these regions and concerns over the regional security of Turkey raised following the exclusion of Turkey and Greece from NATO. In order to erase such concerns, the Turkish press suggested a regional security arrangement, which would be formed by Turkey, Greece and Italy with the support of the US and Britain. However, there was no mention of France in this arrangement, although France was both a Mediterranean country and a charter member of NATO. Namely, for the Turkish press, not only geographical definition of the Mediterranean but also its position in the Cold War conflicts were not clear in this period.

⁵⁸⁰ Enis Tahsin Til, "Sıra Akdeniz Paktına Geliyor", *Akşam*, 2 May 1949, p. 2

⁵⁸¹ Mücahit Topalak, "Akdeniz Paktına Doğru", *Zafer*, 17 June 1949, p. 3

⁵⁸² Mücahit Topalak, "Atlantik Paktı ve Türkiye", *Zafer*, 22 July 1949, p. 3

⁵⁸³ Mücahit Topalak, "Akdeniz Paktı", *Zafer*, 28 October 1949, p. 3

⁵⁸⁴ Mücahit Topalak, "Gemiler Geliyor", *Zafer*, 2 April 1950, p. 3.

3.6.3) Asia in the Cold War

Not only the regions where Turkey was located but also further parts of the world, where the Cold War demonstrated its effects, attracted the attention of the Turkish press, hence there was a wide coverage of the political developments in these parts of the world. Until 1949, Asia, as one of these regions, had not been a front of the global Cold War conflicts. The defeat of Japan by the Allies in 1945 created a power vacuum in the northeast of the continent as the Empire of Japan had annexed Korea and a part of China (i.e., Manchuria) before the Second World War. In China, while Chinese nationalists had been weakened as a result of their resistance to the Japanese occupation, a civil war between the nationalist and communist groups began in March 1946. The nationalist groups led by Chiang Kai-shek was officially recognized not only by the West but also by the Soviet Union. Having failed to predict a communist victory over the nationalist government in China, Stalin even reached an agreement with the nationalists after the Second World War. But, the rise of Japan during the interwar period had encouraged anti-colonial movements in the continent and European colonies in the region began to revolt against the imperialists.⁵⁸⁵ The rise of the communist groups in China, however, changed the influence of the Cold War conflicts in the region and the orientation of the Cold War began to shift from Europe to East Asia.⁵⁸⁶ Within this framework, the developments in China were watched by the Turkish press very closely. The press members made predictions, reflected the fear of a communist takeover and emphasized the role of the Soviet Union in the region. By this way, the press used the developments in East Asia to instill fear of communism.⁵⁸⁷ Moreover, the columnists even suggested solutions to limit the Soviet influence in the region.

⁵⁸⁵ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 54-55.

⁵⁸⁶ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 2-3.

⁵⁸⁷ For example, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that the Soviet Union would form a new Comintern in Pacific region ("Uzakdoğuda Komintern", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 April 1948, p. 3). Close to *Yeni Sabah*, *Akşam*, reporting from *Reuters*, recounted that Asia would be one of the front lines of the new world war ("Uzak Doğuda Harb Hazırlıkları Başladı", *Akşam*, 2 May 1948, p. 1). See other examples: "Komünistler Kore'de İsyân Çıkardılar", (*London Radio*) *Ulus*, 17 March 1949, p. 5; "Çin de Tamamile Komünistleşirse", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 April 1949, p. 1; "Uzakdoğudaki Yeni Rus Oyunları", *Yeni Sabah*,

3.6.3.1) China

Among Asian states, the press viewed China as a vital component of the Cold War tension due to both its strategic position and relatively huge population. In the beginning of the period, China was supposed to take the practical step to halt the encroachments of Japanese imperialism in Far East, playing a very similar role to that of the Soviet Union against Germany in Europe.⁵⁸⁸ However, as the communist groups in China began to take control of the country, the press increased its concerns over communist expansion in the country. The doubts over the future of China were disappeared following the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949 and the press concerned about the relations between PRC and the Soviet Union as well as the spill-over effect of this event. Being sensitive to the conflicts between the nationalists and communists in China, the press focused on the communist intimidation which could spread into the rest of the continent.

Compared to the other columnists, the rise of communism in China became a particular concern for Ömer Rıza Doğrul of *Cumhuriyet*, and Diplomat of *Yeni Sabah*. On November 2, 1948, for example, Doğrul considered the Chinese case less problematic than the communist threat in Western Europe.⁵⁸⁹ However, only two weeks later, he thought that if the communists, which emerged in each country of Far East, would continue to remove nationalist governments from power; communism, similar to Europe, would create a trouble which would be expanded to the entire continent. For him, while Asia was becoming worse than Europe, the world politics were completely darkening.⁵⁹⁰ One week later, he argued that if a big communist country (i.e., the Soviet Union) made such a mess in the world system, then two big communist states (i.e., the Soviet Union and China) would bring about an unstoppable and horrible

10 July 1949, p. 3; "Uzak Doğu Bir Barut Fıçısı Haline Geldi", *Ulus*, 15 February 1950, p. 1; "Ruslar Kuzey Kore'ye Silah Gönderiyorlar", (*UPI Ulus*, 18 February 1950, p. 3; "Ruslar 1 Milyon Çinli İstiyor!", (*UPI Ulus*, 18 February 1950, p. 3.

⁵⁸⁸ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Uzak Doğu Savaşında Çin'in Rolü", *Akşam*, 23 May 1945, p. 5.

⁵⁸⁹ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Çin Meselesi Ön Safta", *Cumhuriyet*, 24 November 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁹⁰ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Uzakşarkta Komünistlik" *Cumhuriyet*, 2 December 1948, p. 3.

menace, which would eliminate any hope of the 'world peace'.⁵⁹¹ As he asserted two weeks later, for the reason that nationalism was still undeveloped due to the colonial past, Asian countries were too weak to resist the communist threat.⁵⁹² Nonetheless, on April 23, 1949, Doğrul supported the idea that industrialization of China, as an agrarian country, would take a long time and until that time either 'world peace' would be achieved or the things would even get worse.⁵⁹³

Diplomat, having similar concerns, claimed that the Soviet policy in Asia was attracting the attention of the world opinion. For him, the revolution's aftermath saw the epiphany of the Anglo-Saxons' grasping the actual power of the Soviet Union. He, talking about the enhancement of unfavorable infrastructure of China, said that there were seventeen big airports founded by the communists and, more importantly, the construction of railroads was almost finished, these railways would directly connect Moscow to Beijing. As Diplomat analyzed, the new target of the Soviet Union might be India and East Asia.⁵⁹⁴ Hence, the concerns of the press were related to the Soviet influence in the region and the rise of communist groups. In this regard, the cartoon in Figure 11, which was published in *Yeni Sabah*, depicts a man represented the Soviet Union running and sweating. He is carrying a huge head representing China on his back. He asks himself "*Can I handle this burden actually?*". As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the press wondered and hoped that whether Mao would come an agreement with Moscow or not at that particular moment.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹¹ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Birleşmiş Milletlerin Bu Defaki Toplantısı", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 December 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁹² Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Sömürgeciliğin İflası", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1948, p. 3

⁵⁹³ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Çin Komünistlerinin Yeni Taarruzu", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 April 1949, p. 3.

⁵⁹⁴ Diplomat, "Rus Politikası", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 October 1949, p. 3.

⁵⁹⁵ The concerns of the Turkish press about the communist control of China and the increasing relationship between the Soviet Union and China could be also observed from the pages of *Ulus*: "Rusya Kuzey Çin'i Yavaş Yavaş Kendine İlhak Ediyor", (*UPI Ulus*, 13 January 1950, p. 1; "Komünist Çin Rusların Emri Altına Giriyor", (*UPI Ulus*, 6 February 1950, p. 3; "Rusya Komünist Çin'le Anlaştı", (*AP Ulus*, 15 February 1950, p. 1; "Rusya Komünist Çin'e Her Yardımı Yapacak", (*UPI Ulus*, 16 February 1950, p. 3; "Çankayşek", (*AP Ulus*, 20 February 1950, p. 3; "Kızıl Çin'de İkilik", *Ulus*, 18 April 1950, p. 4.



Figure 11⁵⁹⁶

When the Soviet Union and the communist government of China signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950, the press perceived the treaty as the unification of two 'big' communist countries while the treaty completely removed the doubt over whether Mao would be another Tito or not. As an illustration, on February 17, 1950, Abidin Daver, calling the treaty as "the red alliance in the Far East", said that as long as democratic nations led by the United States would follow a strict and collective policy against the Soviet Union and its ally communist China, then it would be possible to halt the communist expansion; otherwise, as he predicted, these countries would gravitate towards the communist rule.⁵⁹⁷ On the same day, Doğrul warned the free and democratic world about the possible dangers which would be generated by the Sino-Soviet Treaty. For him, Asia was in a serious danger and democracies had to deal with the problem very carefully.⁵⁹⁸

As such, the communist takeover in China occupied a central place in the press' Cold War agenda of East Asia. The specific emphasis on China and East Asia given by the

⁵⁹⁶ *Yeni Sabah*, 20 January 1950, p. 1.

⁵⁹⁷ Abidin Daver, "Uzak-Doğudaki Kızıl İttifak", *Cumhuriyet*, 17 February 1950, p. 1

⁵⁹⁸ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Sovyet-Çin Anlaşması Dolayısıyla", *Cumhuriyet*, 17 February 1950, p. 3

Turkish press was related to the relatively weaker position of the US in this region, compared to Europe. In Europe, while the Berlin blockade ended with the failure of the Soviet Union, the communist parties lost elections and prestige. The only armed conflict in Europe was the Greek Civil War which ended on October 16, 1949 and the Yugoslav-Soviet split weakened the Soviet power in communist Europe. More importantly, for the Turkish press, thanks to the Marshall Plan, the Brussels Pact and NATO, non-communist Europe seemed to become more secured against the communist threat. On the contrary, the Soviet Union and communist bloc were gaining power in Asia while decolonization movements and Chinese revolution decreased the Western influence in the region. As a result, the Turkish press became more interested in how to save Asia from the danger of communism.

3.6.3.2) Saving Asia and the Western Role

With respect to the western role in Asia following the Second World War, it was argued that the rise of the communist groups in the Third World was not a central issue as much as the security of non-communist Europe for the US administration⁵⁹⁹ and China was not important as much as Turkey and Greece for the US until the Korean War which started in June 1950.⁶⁰⁰ In this atmosphere, the Turkish press demanded the US and the West in general to take an action against the communist expansion in the region. Consequently, witnessing the rise of communists at the expense of Kuomintang's nationalist forces in China since January 21, 1949, the press began to think about possible solutions for the problem of communism in Asia, which would prevent the Soviet Union from having any ambitions to infiltrate into the rest of the continent. On March 12, 1949, for instance, *Yeni Sabah* affirmed that unless the US would help Asian countries, then most probably communists would capture the whole Asia.⁶⁰¹ Similarly, *Akşam*, talking about the possibility of formation of a Pacific Pact, thought that the West tried to counterbalance communist control of China with support

⁵⁹⁹ Craig and Logevall, *America's Cold War*, pp. 109-110.

⁶⁰⁰ McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, p. 24.

⁶⁰¹ "Amerika, Çin'e Yardım Etmezse", *Yeni Sabah*, 12 March 1949, p. 3

of democracies in the rest of Asia.⁶⁰² Furthermore, Topalak, regarding Hong Kong as the second Berlin, proclaimed that Southeast Asian countries would be unified under the leadership of the United States and under the banner of Pacific Pact against communism.⁶⁰³

The press was, at the same time, searching for any power which might counterbalance the rise of the communism in the areas adjacent to China. As Doğrul stated on February 26, 1949, against the Soviet existence in the region and the rise of the communist China, there was only one country which would be able to resist with the help of the western powers, accepting the task of undertaking anti-communist policies: India.⁶⁰⁴ The United States, as *Zafer* pointed out, along with Britain and France, aimed to give the leadership of the anti-communist war to India.⁶⁰⁵ Similarly, for *Diplomat*, India took a creditable place in the American foreign policy, which had further increased after the communist victory in China.⁶⁰⁶ Moreover, on December 3, 1949, *Yeni İstanbul* claimed that the center of anti-communist struggle directed by the US in the Far East was transferred from Japan to India, which the US planned to make it the scene of a struggle for an anti-communist Asia. As *Yeni İstanbul* further added, the United States, Britain and France were unifying their powers against communist attacks in the region and they would support a 'non-communist' India.⁶⁰⁷

In addition to India, as one of the volatile countries of the region, Vietnam, as a former colony of France, appeared on the pages of Turkish newspapers. Following the end of the Second World War, the communist groups declared national independence of Vietnam and a war between communist and French-backed groups had begun. Starting

⁶⁰² "Güney Doğu Asyada Komünist Faaliyeti", *Akşam*, 17 March 1949, p. 2

⁶⁰³ Mücahit Topalak "İkinci Berlin Hongkong", *Zafer*, 7 June 1949, p. 3

⁶⁰⁴ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Sovyetlerin Asya Siyaseti", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 February 1949, p. 3; "Pandir Nehru Komünistleri Takbih Ediyor", *Ulus*, 1 March 1949, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Hindistanın Komünizm ile Mücadelesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 2 March 1949, p. 3; Yavuz Abadan, "Hindistan Cumhuriyeti", *Ulus*, 26 January 1950, p. 3; Perihan Kuturman, "Komünist Tehlikesi", *Ulus*, 23 March 1950, p. 4.

⁶⁰⁵ "Asya Liderliği", *Zafer*, 16 October 1949, p. 1.

⁶⁰⁶ *Diplomat*, "Hindistanın İtibarı", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 October 1949, p. 3

⁶⁰⁷ "Uzak Doğunun Siyasi Bakımdan Görünüşü", *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 December 1949, p. 2.

from 1947, the right-wing parties in France wanted to defeat communist groups in Vietnam while the leftist parties, which the Turkish press regarded as the ‘Fifth Columns’ of the Soviet Union as will be discussed in Chapter 4, wanted France to pull out of the country.⁶⁰⁸ Following the official recognition of the Viet Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the Soviet Union and China in January 1950 and official recognition of the State of Vietnam by the Western power in February 1950, the press became more concentrated on the internal conflicts of Vietnam. For example, Dođrul's analyses demonstrated his perception about the communist threat in Vietnam. On February 6, 1950, Dođrul, searching reasons for the French-Soviet conflict, said that if the western countries would fail to protect Vietnam from the communist threat, then the entire continent would have to cope with a serious threat because, as he understood, Vietnam had a strategic position in the expansionist policies of the communists.⁶⁰⁹ For him, the conflicts between communists and democracies in Vietnam came from the attempts of the capitalist countries in order to prevent communist advance. As he suggested, if communism would be stopped in Vietnam, then the rest of Asia would also be saved because communist groups would remain in power only in China. In reality, Dođrul's suggestion was a containment policy in Asia. According to Dođrul, the recognition of French-backed groups in the country by the US and Britain could be understood within the framework of these conflicts and the US containment policy.⁶¹⁰ Moreover, for him, following the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO, the Soviet Union would not attack democracies in Europe, but, searching for the weak points of democracies, and it chose to attack in Vietnam.⁶¹¹ Similar to Ömer Rıza Dođrul of *Cumhuriyet*, on February 25, 1950, *Yeni İstanbul*, claiming that Vietnam had become the center of the world politics, said that unless democracies

⁶⁰⁸ Edward Rice-Maximin, *Accommodation and Resistance: The French Left, Indochina, and the Cold War, 1944-1954* (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1986), p. 48.

⁶⁰⁹ Ömer Rıza Dođrul, "Fransa ile Rusya Arasındaki Gerginlik", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 February 1950, p. 3.

⁶¹⁰ Ömer Rıza Dođrul, "Asyayı Tehdid Eden Bir Cidal Sahası", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 February 1950, p. 3

⁶¹¹ Diplomat, "Sovyet Politikası", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 February 1950, p. 3.

were to come between Asian countries and the Soviet Union, then the entire continent would be controlled by communist regimes.⁶¹²

As a result, following the loss of China to the 'enemy', the press began to search for suitable means to avert communist expansion in Asia and the solution was of course the western powers.⁶¹³ Indeed, following the Second World War, the US, which the Turkish press regarded as a supporter of 'decolonization' as will be discussed in the next chapter, wanted a 'non-revolutionary' Southeast Asia since there was a possibility that the victory of the revolutionary groups might expand the Soviet sphere of influence in the region.⁶¹⁴ For example, Truman administration supported the French against the communist groups in Vietnam and the US support for the French was also existent in Laos and Cambodia.⁶¹⁵ Despite their agreement with the US policies in Asia, the Turkish press sometimes criticized the West of not doing enough to stop the Soviet Union. For example, Topalak, in its analysis of the Chinese Civil War, claimed that if there existed a free world, then it had to put an end to the Soviet invasion. He, yet, criticized both Britain and the United States, for they were escaping from the contending with the communists in East Asia.⁶¹⁶

After the communist groups captured all mainland China and the nationalist leaders had to flee to Taiwan on December 10, 1949, the press increasingly expressed its distress over the communist threat in Asia, which would be expanded outside China and would only be stopped by the western intervention. This frustration could be observed on the pages of *Yeni İstanbul*: On January 3, 1950, for example, *Yeni İstanbul*, talking about the counter-attack of democracies to the communist revolution of China in the Far East, Harry Truman took practical steps against the Chinese

⁶¹² "Vietnam Cihan Politikasının Fırtına Merkezi Haline Geldi", *Yeni İstanbul*, 25 February 1950, p. 4.

⁶¹³ See examples: "Truman'ın Yeni Programı Komünizme Sed Çekecektir", (*UPI Ulus*, 13 February 1950, p. 3; "Asya'da Komünizmi Önlemek için Amerika'nın Kararları", (*UPI Ulus*, 19 February 1950, p. 1; "Amerika'dan Çin Hind'i'ne Askeri Yardım İstendi", (*UPI Ulus*, 27 February 1950, p. 3; "Acheson'un Çin'e ve Rusya'ya Tavsiyesi", (*UPI Ulus*, 16 March 1950, p. 1.

⁶¹⁴ Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-45" *The American Historical Review* 80.5 (1975), p. 1295.

⁶¹⁵ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 157.

⁶¹⁶ Mücahit Topalak, "Çin Davası Son Safhada", *Zafer*, 6 December 1949, p. 3.

communist threat.⁶¹⁷ *Yeni İstanbul*, warning the new dangers which would be arisen in Asia, claimed that the communists tried to seize the entire Southeast Asia.⁶¹⁸ Two weeks later, *Yeni İstanbul* supported the idea that the desire of Moscow was to found a league of nations in Asia, which it would totally control. As *Yeni İstanbul* interpreted, such an initiative meant the Chinese counter-attack against the US while the US aimed to construct a security system in the Southeast Asian countries.⁶¹⁹ *Yeni İstanbul* also appreciated the American policy in Vietnam because the US was believed to eliminate the communist rebels led by Ho Chi Minh.⁶²⁰ In addition to Vietnam, *Yeni İstanbul* claimed that the US tried to block the Soviet-communist attacks in Indonesia.⁶²¹ In line with the communist expansion, the press continued to express its fear of any possible communist revolutions in non-communist Asian countries.⁶²² To sum up, the Turkish press saw these regions (i.e., the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Asia) through a Cold War trajectory but there was always an emphasis on the Turkish position, role and interest. According to the regional agendas of the press, the Soviet Union and the communist threat were existent in all parts of the globe, while the only counterbalancing power was the West, of which the press sometimes was critical.

3.7) THE ATTITUDE OF THE OPPOSITIONAL PRESS TO THE COLD WAR POLICIES OF THE GOVERNMENT

The press perceptions of the early Cold War nationally, regionally and globally were not uniform as discussed above. Rather, there were different viewpoints and interpretations of international events. The oppositional newspapers, having similar concerns with the governmental press about the Soviet threat, criticized the Turkish

⁶¹⁷ "Uzakdoğuda Komünizme Karşı Cephe Kuruluyor", *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 January 1950, p. 1

⁶¹⁸ "Asyanın Güneydoğusunda Yeni Tehlikeler", *Yeni İstanbul*, 11 January 1950, p. 4.

⁶¹⁹ "Moskovanın Arzusu: Asyada Milletler Cemiyeti Kurmak", *Yeni İstanbul*, 24 January 1950, p. 1.

⁶²⁰ "Hindiçini Meselesi", *Yeni İstanbul*, 11 February 1950, p. 1

⁶²¹ "Amerika ve Endonezya", *Yeni İstanbul*, 12 February 1950, p. 1.

⁶²² See examples: "Sovyetler Asya'da da Peyk Devletler Peylemeğe Başladı", (*UPI Ulus*, 2 February 1950, p. 3; "Rusya Yeni Bir Hücuma Geçecek", *Ulus*, 12 February 1950, p. 1; "Ruslar Yeni Bir Soğuk Harbe Hazırlanıyor", (*UPI Ulus*, 15 February 1950, p. 3; Yavuz Abadan, "Gerginlik Havası", *Ulus*, 18 February 1950, p. 1; "Tibet Sonuna Kadar Mukavemet Edecek", *Yeni İstanbul*, 17 April 1950, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Uzak-Doğu", *Cumhuriyet*, 22 May 1950, p. 3.

government over its foreign policy, particularly after the transition to the multi-party system. Regarding the oppositional press attitude to the government's Cold War, it naturally went parallel with that of the opposing parties. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the oppositional parties criticized CHP's relations with the West on the grounds that the government was not able to seize the opportunities provided by Turkey's drive to the West as much as it could and should. The organs of the oppositional press also produced similar criticisms against the CHP's Cold War.

The oppositional newspapers, needless to say, did not oppose the deepening political crises between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Instead, they thought that the interactions between Turkey and the West could have been much stronger. Therefore, the attitude of the oppositional press to the government's policies during the course of the Cold War remained within the scope of the Turkish foreign policy towards the West such as mismanagement of the American aid. Giving a half-hearted support to anti-communism and the western orientation with criticism, the oppositional press' total criticisms and accusations of the government of not benefiting from the American aid had further increased as the elections of 1950 were approaching.

Being unanimous about the seriousness of the external threat with the government, the oppositional press criticized the government for acting as if only the government had been in danger of the external threat. For instance, as Mümtaz Fenik asserted on September 9, 1949, it was wrong to evaluate the foreign danger as the responsibility of only one party. For him, domestic conflicts in Turkey were totally unrelated with the Turkish foreign policy; that is, the defense of the homeland was the business of both the government and the opposition.⁶²³ In harmony with their attitude to the Soviet threat, the oppositional groups approved anti-communist policies of CHP, but once more time they charged the CHP of manipulating the hostility towards communism in Turkey. For example, on April 15, 1950 Adviye Fenik, Mümtaz Fenik's wife, stated

⁶²³ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Dış Tehlikeler ve Parti İşleri!", *Zafer*, 9 September 1949, p. 1.

that although the government's anti-communist propaganda was admirable, the CHP used this propaganda for its own benefit not for the benefit of the country.⁶²⁴

Another point was related to the mismanagement of the Marshall Plan by CHP. To exemplify, on January 25, 1948, *Yeni Sabah* accused the government of representing Turkey's economic position better than the reality in order to show that the government was managing economy very well.⁶²⁵ *Yeni Sabah* further claimed that as it was generally accepted both inside and outside Turkey that the Turkish government did not place importance on the Marshall Plan as much as it had to do.⁶²⁶ Similarly, for *Zafer*, as the government had remained unconcerned and negligent in benefiting from the Marshall Plan, Turkey lagged behind other countries which were receiving the American aid.⁶²⁷ Although Mümtaz Faik Fenik of *Zafer* had no objection to the Marshall Plan and totally agreed with the government on the importance of it,⁶²⁸ as he later affirmed, the government was using the American aid to finance the budget deficit.⁶²⁹ Indeed, both CHP members and CHP linked newspapers did not reject this allegation and they expressed their gratitude for the aid used to finance some of the deficit.⁶³⁰ Nonetheless, as *Zafer* claimed four days before the elections, even some Americans protested CHP's use of the Marshall Aid for its propaganda and declared that Marshall Aid was for Turkish nation not for a political party.⁶³¹ Therefore, the use of the Marshall Plan rather than the American aid itself was a point which the opposition criticized the government.

⁶²⁴ Adviye Fenik, "Kızıl Tehlikeye Karşı Broşür", *Zafer*, 15 April 1950, p. 1.

⁶²⁵ "Amerikan Yardımının Esirgenmesi", *Yeni Sabah*, 25 January 1948, p. 5

⁶²⁶ Marshall Planı ve Türkiyenin Durumu, *Yeni Sabah*, 27 January 1948, p. 1.

⁶²⁷ "Marshall Planında da Yaya Kalıyoruz", *Zafer*, 15 May 1949, p. 1.

⁶²⁸ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Amerikan Yardımı ve Türkiye", *Zafer*, 9 June 1949, p. 1.

⁶²⁹ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Marshall Planı Tersine İşliyor", *Zafer*, 9 July 1949, p. 1; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Sam Amcanın Sihirli Değneği", *Zafer*, 11 December 1949, p. 1.

⁶³⁰ "Hükümet Bütçedeki 80 Milyon Açığı Kapamağa Muvaffak Oldu", *Ulus*, 5 February 1949, p. 1; "Dış Bakanımız İstanbul'da", *Ulus*, 10 February 1950, p. 1; Yavuz Abadan, "Türkiye ve Amerikan Yardımı", *Ulus*, 16 February 1950, p. 3.

⁶³¹ "C.H.P.nin Marshall Yardımına Ait Propaganda Velvelesi", *Zafer*, 10 May 1950, p. 1.

In a similar way, the oppositional newspapers asked why Turkey did not become a member of NATO. For example, *Yeni Sabah* saw the exclusion of Turkey from NATO as an unexpected event and a loss for the country.⁶³² Moreover, as Topalak claimed on June 17, 1949, the exclusion of Turkey from NATO and reluctance of the Allies to form a Mediterranean security pact created a gloomy atmosphere in Turkey. In addition, according to him, the Soviet Union intensified its pressure on the region.⁶³³ Hence, he emphasized unsuccessfulness of the CHP government without criticizing the nature of NATO.

Besides, compared to the governmental press, the oppositional press attached a more active role to capitalist countries (especially, the United States) both in regional and global politics. For example, it was claimed that the security of the Middle East, being the focus of the Cold War, was guaranteed by the efforts of the United States and Britain.⁶³⁴ Similarly, it was claimed that the United States was expected to take required steps both to stop the spread of communism in Asia and to preserve the American market in China.⁶³⁵ As another point which constituted a difference between the governmental and oppositional press, the latter saw the United States as a closer state to Turkey than Britain in comparison with the former. In other words, the governmental press saw Britain as an ‘official’ ally, the oppositional press was able to criticize the British policies more freely. For example, although the press appreciated the American policy in China, there were news that expostulated the ‘quick’ British recognition of Communist China. According to Daver’s assertion, in spite of its collaboration with the US all around the world against the Soviet Union and its satellites, the British chose to preserve its own interests in China.⁶³⁶

⁶³² “Sadak’ın Seyahati”, *Yeni Sabah*, 25 April 1949, p. 1.

⁶³³ Mücahit Topalak, "Akdeniz Paktına Doğru", 17 June 1949, *Zafer*, p. 3.

⁶³⁴ Mücahit Topalak, "Yakın Doğu Konferansı", *Zafer*, 13 November 1949, p. 3; "İç ve Dış Politika", *Yeni İstanbul*, 16 December 1949, p. 1.

⁶³⁵ Diplomat, "Komünizmin Çin Galebesi", *Yeni Sabah*, 17 October 1949, p. 3; "Amerikanın Doğuda ve Batıda Emniyet Meseleleri", *Yeni İstanbul*, 2 December 1949, p. 2; Selim Sabit, "Amerikalılar Çinden Çekilmediler" *Yeni İstanbul*, 5 December 1949, p. 2; Selim Sabit "Birleşik Amerika ve Mao-Tse-Tung", *Yeni İstanbul*, 19 January 1950, p. 2.

⁶³⁶ Abidin Daver, "Çindeki Realite Karşısında", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 January 1950, p. 1.

With the help of examination of various Turkish newspapers and their affiliations with the political authorities, this chapter discussed how the Turkish press perceived and reflected the early Cold War and in which ways the politicians and the press converged to each other. The government censorship, which had increased during the Second World War, continued in this period, too. Nonetheless, in parallel with transition to a multi-party system, new oppositional newspapers began to be published. As a result, despite government pressure on the newspapers, there were different voices coming from the press members. However, the governmental and oppositional newspapers did not differ from each other with regard to their orientations towards the Cold War conflicts. Accessing to international developments from the same sources, the Turkish press in general perceived the course of the Cold War in a similar way.

In their analyses of the Cold War, the Turkish press of course paid attention to national sovereignty and the Turkish position in the post-war international system. For this reason, they wanted the 'world peace' to be achieved immediately which would solve the problems at home, they tried to show Turkey had always been the enemy of the Nazis and a supporter of the Allies, they demanded a more active role for the 'small' nations in the international organizations and they wished to witness formation of a regional security arrangement which would decrease security concerns generated by the exclusion of Turkey from NATO. Although their approach to the ongoing Cold War might quickly change (even from one day to another), there were two main themes in the perception of the press in this period that remained at the core of the international agenda of the Turkish newspapers during the whole period: constant fear of the possible attacks by the Soviet Union and counterbalancing power of the West. As the following chapters argue, while the first theme was the main pillar of the creation of an enemy, the second one appeared the cornerstone of the creation of an ally.

CHAPTER 4

CREATING AN ENEMY: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD

This chapter examines how the process of creating an enemy by the press developed in Turkey from 1945 to 1950 and it provides a general image of the Soviet Union and the Communist World in Turkey, with a special emphasis on what the press of that period said. This period witnessed the ‘gradual’ transition from the Soviet image of being an ‘old friend’ to the ‘old enemy’ embodied in the Russian Empire and this enemy threatened the Turkish sovereignty and national integrity. Remaining silent about the Soviet demands from Turkey in the very beginning of the period, the press drew a negative picture of the Soviet Union and the Communist World in general to persuade the Turkish public that the Soviet Union was the vehement enemy of Turkey, particularly following the Truman Doctrine. Moreover, compared to the governmental press, the oppositional newspapers used a more aggressive language on the subject of the Soviet Union and the communists in world.

The first section discusses the Soviet image in Turkish press and how the press shaped public opinion in Turkey and gave messages to both the Soviet Union and the world in general regarding the Soviet demands from Turkey and the so-called Soviet threat. The second section analyzes the reflection of the anti-communism of the Turkish government, which was discussed in Chapter 2, on the press and how anti-communism became a central theme in the creation of an enemy. The third section examines how the Turkish press evaluated communism in world by focusing on communism in Europe, political oppression in the Iron Curtain, religious oppression in the communist countries and how communism brought poverty. The fourth section examines how the

press perceived the splits in the communist world and how it differentiated one enemy from another.

4.1) THE SOVIET IMAGE IN THE TURKISH PRESS (1945-1950)

The Soviet Image in the Turkish press was gradually shaped from 1945 to 1950 in line with worsening relations between two countries during the interwar period. Dating the shift in the attitude of the press to the Soviet Union is very difficult. However, until July 1945, there were only a few news regarding the Soviet demands and accusations; but the press exaggerated the US and British success in the Second World War while underplaying the Soviet contribution. Starting from this time, both the governmental and oppositional press began to use a bolder language towards the Soviet Union. By 1947 when political relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union dropped to one of the lowest levels of the history, the transition from the old friend to the ancient enemy had completed and the press fully drew a picture of the Soviet Union as the enemy of Turkey which threatened its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

During the first months of 1945, the press, along the lines of the government's cautious attitude towards the Soviet Union, approached to the Soviet Union as the winner of the Second World War and as part of the Allies. On January 4, 1945, for example, Yalçın claimed that there was currently no sign of the Soviet intention to form communist governments in the countries which the Soviet army occupied. Nonetheless, for him, communist groups and parties in these countries might take courage from the presence of the Soviet army in order to take control of governments⁶³⁷ and even he declared that the Soviet Union, different from the Nazis, had not become a threat for the world so far.⁶³⁸ Furthermore, Burhan Belge of *Tanin* argued in his analysis of the Big Three, that the Soviet Union had been attacked during the world war and it punished the invaders in return. For Belge, the Soviet Union was the ally of democracies and it saved many countries, which had been occupied by the Nazis. As Belge claimed, the

⁶³⁷ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Yapılacak İşler", *Tanin*, 4 January 1945, p. 1.

⁶³⁸ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Almanya Avrupadan Eksilirse", *Tanin*, 4 February 1945, p. 1.

biggest share in the defeat of Nazis belonged to the Soviet Union.⁶³⁹ As such, any Soviet expansionist aim was ignored by the press in this period.⁶⁴⁰

The press, particularly in the first months of 1945, mentioned about the Turkish-Soviet alliance which had taken an important place in the establishment and survival of both regimes. For instance, *Akşam* claimed that during the Second World War, the Turkish allowing access to the Straits eased the transfer of vital materials to the Soviet Union.⁶⁴¹ As the politicians tried to gain the international support against the emerging Soviet demands, the press also did the same. In view of that, in *Akşam*, the British was declared to be disappointed by Soviet decisions about the Straits and territorial claims.⁶⁴² The press, at the same time, tried to prove how Turkey had collaborated with the Allies and served to the interests of the western democracies during the Second World War.

In this way, the press wanted to discredit the Soviet claims regarding Turkey's close relations with Germany. For example, on March 26, 1945, Sadak, responding to the Soviet allegations about Turkish unwillingness to fight against the Nazis, asserted that Turkey was the only country which participated the Second World War on the side of democracies, without waiting for an attack by the Nazis. He further added that the reason why the Allies could not send aid to the Soviet Union through the Straits was not Turkey. To be more exact, for him, although Turkey allowed the passage of such ships with aid for the Soviet Union, the access had already been closed in Crete by Germans.⁶⁴³ To sum up, although the press responded to the Soviet demands against Turkey, it did not pursue an 'aggressive' approach but a 'defensive' one to the Soviet Union at that moment. The attitude of the Turkish press towards the Soviet Union of

⁶³⁹ Burhan Belge, "Üçler", *Tanin*, 7 February 1945, pp. 5-7.

⁶⁴⁰ For instance, Sadak supported the idea that the Soviet Union did not aim to occupy Iran. (Necmettin Sadak, "Müttefik Ticaret Gemilerine Boğazlar Yolunun Açılması", *Akşam*, 17 January 1945, pp. 1-2).

⁶⁴¹ "Rusyaya Harb Malzemesi", *Akşam*, 17 March 1945, p. 2.

⁶⁴² "Boğazlar Meselesi", *Akşam*, 24 March 1945, p. 1; "Türkiye-Sovyetler", (*Daily Herald*) *Akşam*, 25 March 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁴³ Necmettin Sadak, "İki Yanlış Görüşü Bir Daha Düzeltmek İçin", *Akşam*, 26 March 1945, p. 1.

course went parallel with Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union as well as with the relations of the Soviet Union with the US and Britain.

4.1.1) From a Friendly Neighbor to an Enemy

This cautious attitude of the Turkish press to the Soviet Union changed starting from mid-1945. However, this key shift was a very gradual one with many setbacks and inconsistencies in this period. The articles of Necmettin Sadak, who became the Foreign Minister of Turkey on September 10, 1947, published in *Akşam*, could be very useful to observe how the new Soviet image through the press was created. For example, following the German surrender to the Allies, not to offend the Soviet Union totally, Sadak did not forget to compliment the Soviet people and their leader. With his greatest appreciation, Sadak said that Stalin had the most rightful pride of the victory over Germany, for this victory was the result of both the sacrifice of the Russian nation and the unifying power of Stalin. Sadak further alleged that the crucial role of the Soviet Union had to be the establishment of peace in Europe through collaboration among European nations.⁶⁴⁴

However, one month later, Sadak stated that Soviet Union was jealous of the capitalist world. He further argued that, for the Soviet Union, unlike the US and Britain, democracy meant simply the communist regime which would be created after destruction of capitalism and bourgeois classes in countries occupied by the Nazis. For Sadak, that's what the Soviet Union and its propaganda agents everywhere understood from the words "Salvation and Democracy" (*Kurtuluş ve Demokrasi*). As Sadak concluded, from the point of views of the Soviet leaders, the security of the Soviet Union would increase as long as its neighbors were reliable (i.e., communist).⁶⁴⁵

Replying to the Soviet accusations about Turkey's 'secret' collaborations with the Nazis, on July 1, 1945, Sadak claimed that the Soviet Union collaborated with Germany against Britain and France at the beginning of the Second World War and it

⁶⁴⁴ Necmettin Sadak, "Sovyet Rusya'nın Zaferi ve Avrupa sulhu", *Akşam*, 11 May 1945, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁴⁵ Necmettin Sadak, "Avrupa Sulhunu Karşılıyan Zorluklar, Türkiye-Sovyet Rusya Münasebetleri", *Akşam*, 19 June 1945, p. 1.

only joined to the Allies after the German attack to Russia.⁶⁴⁶ Nonetheless, he was still careful not to go too far. In effect, Sadak claimed that the Soviet Union did not wish to replace Hitler's Germany in Europe as it needed neither territory nor influence. For him, at best, it might want to encircle its borders to provide security. However, according to Sadak, there remained no threat for the Soviet Union which might endanger its security.⁶⁴⁷ As Sadak tried to give assurance that Turkey would never damage the Soviet strategic interests, he continued to remind the good relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the past in order to emphasize the possibility that these relations might be ameliorated again. On July 14, 1945, he further underlined the friendship between Turkey and Soviet Union was not something new but the Soviet Union had always been the 'ally' (*müttefik*) of Turkey for twenty-five years.⁶⁴⁸

Although Sadak gave assurances and extended a peaceful hand to the Soviet Union, two weeks later, Sadak's perception of the 'ally' Soviets altered, unquestionably as a result of the Soviet demands from Turkey. Accordingly, Sadak thought that Turkey was the "first friendly" country that had approached to the Soviet Union. For Sadak, the only problem between two countries was the British-Turkish alliance signed at the beginning of the war. Nonetheless, according to him, the Soviet Union, having encouraged by its present unique victory, abandoned its policies of friendship as it wanted to solve its security problems in Europe radically. For this reason, as Sadak asserted, it was not in the hands of Turks to give trust to the Soviet Union.⁶⁴⁹

In spite of these criticisms, Sadak did not close the door on the Soviet Union completely. As an example, for Sadak, the Montreux Convention might be revised. As he claimed on August 5, 1945, as long as it would not violate sovereignty, integrity

⁶⁴⁶ Necmettin Sadak, "Durmayı Bilmek", *Akşam*, 1 July 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁴⁷ Necmettin Sadak, "Doğu Avrupa'yı Yeniden Herkese Açmak Teşebbüsü", *Akşam*, 10 July 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁴⁸ Necmettin Sadak, "Türkiye-Sovyet Rusya Münasebetleri Dolayısıyla Yanlış ve Şüpheli Görüşler", *Akşam*, 14 July 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁴⁹ Necmettin Sadak, "Türkiye'nin Büyük Suçu", *Akşam*, 26 July 1945, pp. 1-2.

and independence of Turkey and also because Turkey had no enmity against the Soviet Union, Turkey was ready to discuss any change which would guarantee security to the Soviet Union.⁶⁵⁰ As he later stressed, Turkey was open to negotiations and it was on the side of democracies.⁶⁵¹

Very shortly after the publications of the above articles, in parallel with the worsening relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, Sadak charged the Soviet Union of being an “imperialist country”. As he claimed on October 4, 1945, the Soviet Union was trying to control all the parts of Eastern Europe. In each country under its occupation, as Sadak asserted, the Soviet Union established its so-called democratic but in fact communist and despotic puppet governments. For him, uncontended with these countries, it attempted to reach both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.⁶⁵²

In order to show how the Soviet concerns over the Straits were unnecessary and to discredit the Soviet claims, Sadak thought that a revision of Montreux Convention would be logical only in case of peace. According to him, the right of passage through the Straits would become useful for the Soviet Union only with the condition that the Soviet navy was more powerful than the British fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. However, as he maintained, the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea could not be stronger than British Mediterranean fleet. In this case, as he concluded, passing of Soviet navy through the Straits would be a suicide.⁶⁵³ Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter 2, this idea of Sadak was very similar to that of Churchill about the British interest in the Mediterranean and the Soviet demand from Turkey at that moment. Moreover, from Sadak’s point of view, the Soviet Union exaggerated its role in defeat of the Nazis and it took advantage of the victory in order to realize its Russian, Slavic and Bolshevik

⁶⁵⁰ Necmettin Sadak, "Berlin Kararlarında Eksik Görünen Noktalar ve Boğazlar Meselesi", *Akşam*, 5 August 1945, p. 2.

⁶⁵¹ Necmettin Sadak, "Bir İtalyan Gazetesinin Yazısı Münasebetile", *Akşam*, 16 September 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁵² Necmettin Sadak, "İlk Sulh Konferansının Acıklı ve Heybetsiz Ölümü", *Akşam*, 4 October 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁵³ Necmettin Sadak, "Sulh Olmadıkça Boğazlar Andlaşmasını Yenilemek Boştur", *Akşam*, 15 October 1945, p. 1.

goals.⁶⁵⁴ As Sadak concluded, the Balkan nations were under Soviet occupation and the Soviet Union brought pro-Soviet governments in power in these countries.⁶⁵⁵

As such, Sadak continued to declare the Turkish determination to keep its territorial integrity while issuing friendly warnings to the Soviet Union. On November 12, 1945, for example, Sadak claimed that the Soviet Union experienced two types of depression: psychological and political. The first one was its jubilancy and its claim to be the main winner of war against Germany and Japan. The second one was its fear from western democracies and hence caused its desire to put up a wall around the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia to secure itself. For him, this desire was the reason of Soviet Union's present imperialist policies. In the opinion of Sadak, regardless of whether the Soviet Union was in a depression of fear or wanted to cover its imperialist policy by "war neurosis", there existed the fact that the Soviet Union had an insatiable appetite for land and domination, which wanted to enslave all nations. Contrary to his earlier claims, Sadak asserted that the Soviet Union dominated the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and replaced Hitler's Germany, and so succeeded the thing which Nazis wanted but failed to achieve.⁶⁵⁶

As his attitude to the Soviet Union was becoming more aggressive, Sadak was at the same time giving messages to the outside world, especially to the Soviet Union. On December 24, 1945, Sadak claimed that Turkey could not buy the Soviet friendship in exchange of land. According to Sadak, the entire country was very sensitive to any claim or rumor about the homeland regardless of whom did or regardless of the method (i.e. propaganda, joking, mocking or insanity).⁶⁵⁷ To sum up, while Sadak cautiously approached to the Soviet Union at the very beginning of 1945, he, changing his attitude

⁶⁵⁴ Necmettin Sadak, "Soğuma Devresi", *Akşam*, 17 October 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁵⁵ Necmettin Sadak, "Balkanlarda Gdlen Siyaset Bařtan Beri Yanlıřtır", *Akřam*, 18 October 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁵⁶ Necmettin Sadak, "Amerika, Atom Enerjisinin Iřıđı Altında", *Akřam*, 12 November 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁵⁷ Necmettin Sadak, "Rus Dostluđunu Toprak Pahasına Satın Alamayız", *Akřam*, 24 December 1945, p. 1: "*Propaganda, řaka, alay yahut mecnunluk [...] her ne olursa olsun, kimin tarafından yapılırsa yapılısın vatan toprakları hakkında ileri srlecek iddialara ve masallara karřı memleketin hassasiyeti byktr*".

to the Soviet Union gradually, began to charge the Soviet Union of being an imperialist power, and acting hostile to its old friend Turkey.

Nonetheless, there were different views in the Turkish press other than those of Sadak. So, it does not necessarily mean that there was a 'uniform' attitude of the press towards the Soviet Union and its demands from Turkey. For instance, compared to Necmettin Sadak, Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın of *Tanin* was bolder against the Soviet demands.⁶⁵⁸ As he claimed, the 'impostor' (*sahtekâr*) Bolsheviks finally removed their masks⁶⁵⁹ and the national interests of Turkey were above all things for the Turkish people.⁶⁶⁰ As he stated on September 24, 1945, the reason for the current political turmoil was the hostile attitude of the Soviet Union to Turkey. For him, the current regime of the Straits had never threatened the Soviet Union.⁶⁶¹ Yalçın, continuing to criticize the Soviet Union, made fun of the Soviet policies and said that "*do not cough loudly because you might threaten the independence and interests of the Soviet Union*".⁶⁶² Furthermore, he regarded the Soviet accusations of Turkey being an ally of the Nazis as "a fairy tale for kids" (*çocuk masalı*).⁶⁶³

On January 11, 1946, Yalçın related a telegram sent by Mithat Paşa, who was a prominent Ottoman bureaucrat during the late *Tanzimat* period, to the Ottoman ambassador to London in 1876. As Yalçın claimed, Mithat Paşa warned about the danger of the Russian propaganda about the Straits.⁶⁶⁴ The reason for such a historical reference, as will be discussed below, was the desire of the Turkish press to evoke the centuries-old hostility between the Ottoman and Russian Empires, which had ended

⁶⁵⁸ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Türk-Rus Münasebetleri", *Tanin*, 14 April 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁵⁹ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Bolşevikler Maskeyi Yüzlerinden Attılar" *Tanin*, 13 July 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁶⁰ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Vatan Menfaati Her Şeyin Fevkindedir" *Tanin*, 16 July 1946, p. 1.

⁶⁶¹ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Dünya Meseleleri Arasında Boğazlar İhtilafı", *Tanin*, 24 September 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁶² Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Günün En Mühim Hadisesi ve Bir Müjde", *Tanin*, 25 September 1945, p. 1: "*Aman, sakın hızlı öksürmeyiniz. Çünkü, Sovyetler Birliğinin istiklal ve menfaatlerini tehdit edebilirsiniz*".

⁶⁶³ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Yıkılması Lazım Bir Masal Daha" *Tanin*, 26 December 1945, p. 1

⁶⁶⁴ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Bir Vesikanın Ziyası Altında", *Tanin*, 11 January 1946, p. 1.

with the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Two days later, Yalçın, in his analysis of the current Turkish-Soviet relations, claimed that Turkish government managed to remain “unperturbed” (*soğukkanlı*) in spite of the provocative actions of the Soviet Union.⁶⁶⁵ As he thought, the Soviet Union, revealing their true faces, tried to realize their old imperialist dreams about Turkey.⁶⁶⁶ As Yalçın further claimed, the Soviet Union aimed to provoke the opposition in Turkey against the government.⁶⁶⁷

Unlike Yalçın, Nadir Nadi of *Cumhuriyet* adopted a more cautious approach towards the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, similar to those of Sadak, Nadi’s attitudes to the Soviet Union gradually changed. For example, on April 9, 1945, Nadi, in his analysis of the future of the Turkish-Soviet relations, stated that there was no reason to search for a bad intention of the Soviet foreign policy. After calling the Soviet Union as “the great northern neighbor of Turkey” (*büyük kuzey komşumuz*), he expected improvements in the Turkish-Soviet relations.⁶⁶⁸ However, on July 13, 1945, Nadi, after reminding the good relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union in the past, stated that it was not an appropriate policy to demand territory from a peaceful and free nation.⁶⁶⁹ Moreover, on October 13, 1945, Nadir Nadi stated that as long as the Soviet Union remained the friend of Turkey, then there would always be peace in Europe. For him, although Turks were the most sensitive nation to the Soviet demands and approached the Soviet Union in a friendly manner, the Soviet Union had not been satisfied with Turkey's peaceful attempts. In the words of Nadir Nadi of *Cumhuriyet*, there was no reason for the worsening relations between two countries. For him, if the Soviet Union would continue to refuse Turkey's well-intended proposals, then the end of the two decade long friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union would be a shame for both countries.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁵ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Kesmeyen Bir Silah", *Tanin*, 13 January 1946, p. 1.

⁶⁶⁶ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Ruslar Kendilerini Açığa Vurdular" *Tanin*, 6 February 1946, p. 1.

⁶⁶⁷ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Celâl Bayar ve Rus Meselesi" *Tanin*, 4 May 1946, p. 1.

⁶⁶⁸ Nadir Nadi, "Türk-Sovyet Dostluğunun Yarımı," *Cumhuriyet*, 9 April 1945, p. 1.

⁶⁶⁹ Nadir Nadi, "Bir Milletten Toprak İstemek," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 July 1945, p. 1

⁶⁷⁰ Nadir Nadi, "Türk-Rus Münasebetleri", *Cumhuriyet*, 13 October 1945, p. 1.

Similar to Sadak, Nadi's attitude to the Soviet Union became very negative during the late-1945. On December 28, 1945, for example, Nadi claimed that all Turks were ready to throw themselves into the fire in order to defend even one inch of their homeland. As he asserted, "brave Turkish men" from all parts of the country had already proved that imperialists could not occupy Turkey. For him, the Soviet Union was the enemy of civilization, which tried to occupy the free nations of the world.⁶⁷¹ Asım Us of *Vakit*, too, wanted to demonstrate the Turkish rightfulness pointing the fault of the international system. Asım Us claimed that Turkey had always protected the security of the Black Sea. For him, as Molotov had already admitted in 1939, the Soviet Union affirmed how Turkey was a guarantor of the regional security.⁶⁷²

Not only columns of columnists but also news of the newspapers were full of the Soviet related items. The first group of such items was related to the foreign press coverage, which showed rightfulness of Turkey and existence of foreign support to Turkey against the Soviet demands. In other words, making use of foreign press and speeches of foreign politicians as a reference point, the press tried to show how Turkey

⁶⁷¹ Nadir Nadi, "Milli Misak Şuuru," *Cumhuriyet*, 28 December 1945, p. 1. See his other articles: Nadir Nadi, "O Metod Bizde Sökmez," *Cumhuriyet*, 23 December 1945, p. 1; Nadir Nadi, "Profesörlere Cevabımız," *Cumhuriyet*, 8 January 1946, p. 1; Nadir Nadi, "Manzara," *Cumhuriyet*, 23 December 1946, p. 1; Nadir Nadi, "Rus İstekleri Karşısında Yapılacak Şey," *Cumhuriyet*, 14 August 1946, p. 1.

⁶⁷² Asım Us, "Türkiye Harpte Karadenizin Emniyetini Korumuştur", *Vakit*, 11 January 1946, p. 1. See also articles of Falih Rıfkı Atay of *Ulus*: Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Boğazlar Meselesine Dair", *Ulus*, 7 December 1945, p. 1; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Rusya ile Münasebetlerimiz Hakkında," *Ulus*, 22 December 1945, p. 1; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Olan Bitenler Karşısında," *Ulus*, 29 January 1946, p. 1; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Rus İstekleri Karşısında," *Ulus*, 15 August 1946, p. 1; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Amerika ve Boğazlar Meselesi", *Ulus*, 15 October 1946, p. 1. See also articles of Nihat Erim of *Ulus*: Nihat Erim, "Sovyet Notası Karşısında," *Ulus*, 14 August 1946, p. 1; Nihat Erim, "Sovyetlerin Yeni Notası," *Ulus*, 3 October 1946, p. 2; Nihat Erim, "Türk Milletinin Kaderi ile Oynanamaz", *Ulus*, 18 December 1946, p. 1. See also articles of Abidin Daver of *Cumhuriyet*: Abidin Daver, "Montreux Andlaşması ve Boğazlar Meselesi," *Cumhuriyet*, 22 July 1945, p. 3; Abidin Daver, "Boğazlarda Üs İstiyen Rusya, Akdenizi İstiyor Demektir," *Cumhuriyet*, 14 October 1945, p. 3; Abidin Daver, "Türk-Rus Dostluğunu Tekrar Kurmanın Tek Şartı", *Cumhuriyet*, 22 December 1945; Abidin Daver, "Sinirlerimiz Gevşemiyor Bilakis Çelikleşiyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1945, p. 3; Abidin Daver, "Amerika'nın Kurmak İstedığı Daimi Üsler," *Cumhuriyet*, 30 April 1946, p. 3; Abidin Daver, "Rusya Doğu Akdenizde Niçin Liman İstiyor?" *Cumhuriyet*, 15 May 1946, p. 3; Abidin Daver, "Türkiye Bir Peyk Devleti Olmayacaktır", *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, 7 June 1946, p. 3; Abidin Daver, "Dış Tehlike Vardır, Gaflete Düşmiyelim!" *Cumhuriyet*, 3 August 1946, pp. 1-3; Abidin Daver, "Sovyet Rusyanın Gerçekleştirmek İstedığı Emeller", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 August 1946, p. 3; Abidin Daver, "Boğazların Müstereken Müdafaasını? Asla!" *Cumhuriyet*, 23 August 1946, p. 3.

was being supported in the international arena.⁶⁷³ In another group of news, the press mentioned the Soviet expansionist aims, the Soviet guilt of war and the Soviet threat to the Turkish right of sovereignty.⁶⁷⁴ Moreover, the press claimed that the Soviet Union was provoking minorities against the Turkish government.⁶⁷⁵

Besides, in its efforts to create an enemy and cultivate a continuous sense of threat, the press highly benefited from the historical background of the Turkish-Russian relations as well. For example, *Tanin* published a historical document regarding the demands of the Russian Empire from the Ottoman Empire and the collaboration between Russia and Greece to capture the Straits.⁶⁷⁶ Curiously enough, there were also items proving how Soviet Union was harming itself. For example, as claimed by *Cumhuriyet*, since the Soviet Union chose the 'wrong path' after the Second World War, they lost prestige in the international arena.⁶⁷⁷ To sum up, the Soviet image in the press from 1945 to 1947 was slowly changed from the old friend 'Soviets' to the ancient enemy 'Russia' and the hateful image drawn by the press fomented hostility towards the Soviet Union.

⁶⁷³ See examples: "Türkiyenin, Kendi İstiklalinin Kaybı Demek Olan Şartları Kabul Edeceği Tasavvur Olunamaz", *Akşam*, 7 July 1945, p. 1; "Hasan Saka, Boğazlar İşini Görüşecek", *Vakit*, 28 June 1945, p. 1; "İngiliz Basınında Geniş Yorumlar Göze Çarpıyor", (*Reuters*) *Ulus*, 29 June 1945, p. 1; "Bir İngiliz Gazetesi Meselenin Muğlak Olduğu Kanaatinde", (*Yorkshire Post*) *Ulus*, 30 June 1945, p. 1; "Boğazlar Meselesinde Amerikan Görüşü", *Akşam*, 13 October 1945, p. 1; Necmettin Sadak, "Amerika Boğazlar Hakkında Düşüncesini Bildirdi", *Akşam*, 1 November 1945, p. 1; "Boğazlar Türkiyenin Fiili Kontrolü Altında Kalacak", *Akşam*, 5 November 1945, p. 1; "Boğazlar Meselesinde İngiliz Görüşü", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 November 1945, p. 1; "Rus Toprak İsteklerinin İngiltere ve Amerikada Akisleri", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 22 December 1945, p. 1; "Rus İstekleri ve Diğer Çetin Meseleler Siyasi Yollarla Halledilecek", (*UPI*) *Akşam*, 29 December 1945, p. 1; "Türkiye Bir Karış Toprak Vermemek Azmindedir", (*Times*) *Akşam*, 25 December 1945, p. 1; "Rus İsteklerine Dair Bir İsviçre Gazetesinin Fikri", (*Gazette de Lausanne*) *Akşam*, 26 December 1945, p. 1; "Bir İngiliz Gazetesinin Muhabiri Yazıyor", (*Daily Mail*) *Tanin*, 15 February 1946, p. 1; "Emperyalist Kimdir?", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 September 1946, p. 1.

⁶⁷⁴ See examples: "Türkiye'nin Kimseye Bir Karış Borcu Yoktur", *Ulus*, 1 January 1946, p. 1; "Bizim Yoldaşlar Nihayet Maskelerini Attılar", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 December 1945, pp. 1-3; "Soğuk Bir Şaka", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1945, p. 1; "Londra'dan Yükselen Ses", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 December 1945, pp. 1-3; "19 Milyonun Şiarı Olan 10 Kelime", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 December 1945, p. 1; "Yeni Bir Rus Planı", *Vakit*, 10 February 1946, p. 1.

⁶⁷⁵ "Rusyanın Ortaşark Siyasetini Tahlil", *Cumhuriyet*, 19 June 1946, p. 3; Hüseyin Erdoğan, "İki Cihan Harbinde Rusya ve Ermeniler", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 April 1946, p. 2.

⁶⁷⁶ "İstanbul ve Boğazlar", *Tanin*, 24 September 1945, p. 3.

⁶⁷⁷ "Kaybolan Prestij", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 March 1946, p. 3.

4.1.2) The Soviet Union: The ‘Enemy’

By 1947, the Soviet image as a rising enemy which threatened the Turkish territorial integrity and security was a well-established one. From then on, the job of the journalists and columnists was to refine it and blame the Soviet Union according to the political needs of the day. The press, in its attempts to reinvent the enemy (i.e. the transition from the Soviet ‘Union’ to Soviet ‘Russia’), asserted that the enemy was once again Russia. Accordingly, the Turkish press drew a picture of the Soviet Union as the betrayer, the historical enemy of Turks and an imperialist country threatening the world peace.

According to the Soviet image drawn by the Turkish press at that period, the Soviet Union betrayed the Turkish-Soviet friendship and threatened Turkish territorial rights. That is to say, for the Turkish press, the Soviet Union was wrong and Turkey was right. Accordingly, the press depicted Turkey responding protectively to the violent Soviet tactics. For example, on February 1, 1947, Nihat Erim claimed that the Soviet policy had changed following the Second World War and the one that changed was not Turkey but the Soviet Union.⁶⁷⁸ Namely, the press asserted that although Turkey had always approached the Soviet Union in a friendly manner, the Soviet Union betrayed its old friend Turkey after gaining power in international affairs.

At the same time, the press emphasized that the enemy was not only betraying Turkey but also it was betraying even its own ideology. As Atay of *Ulus* claimed on February 6, 1949, the communists did not even read Marx's books and they interpreted Marx and Engel's opinions as they wished.⁶⁷⁹ Similarly, Menteşeoğlu of *Ulus* claimed on March 2, 1949 that the current Soviet policies were not communist. As he claimed, both Marx and Engels were undoubtedly “great scholars” (*büyük alimler*); however, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin transformed communism something very destructive and dangerous. As Menteşeoğlu claimed, as these three leaders were not “patriots” and did not love Russian people, they created the “illness of communism” (*komünizm*

⁶⁷⁸ Nihat Erim, "Bilanço", *Ulus*, 1 January 1947, p. 1.

⁶⁷⁹ Falih Rıfık Atay, "Gerilik", *Ulus*, 6 February 1949, p. 2.

hastalığı). As he concluded, for these reasons, the Soviet regime was preparing its own end.⁶⁸⁰ As another example, for Topalak, communism was not an ideology any longer. For him, it was nothing but an impotent and ridiculous imperialism.⁶⁸¹ Fenik criticized the Soviet way of Marxism in the same manner as Topalak and claimed that the Soviet Union abandoned the Marxist principles and became only an imperialist country.⁶⁸² Hence, as will be discussed below, although the Turkish press saw communist ideology as a danger for the world peace and Turkish national security in particular, it claimed that the enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union) betrayed even Marxism and the current Soviet policies were not 'true' Marxism.

What is more, the press was always approaching the Soviet Union in a 'suspicious' way and claimed that the Soviet Union tried to hide its real aims. Fenik, for example, in his analysis of the Soviet policy in Germany, claimed that the reason the Soviet Union pretended to follow peaceful policies in Germany might be its secret preparations for more assertive policies which would be observed in the long-term.⁶⁸³ One day later, *Zafer* claimed that the Soviet Union prepared the Molotov Plan against NATO, which would help it to achieve the unification of the regions ranging from the Baltic Sea to China having only one currency, administration and army.⁶⁸⁴ For Fenik, the reason why the Soviet Union was softening its policy against western democracies as one could see from the present Soviet policies in Greece, was the conflicts between Belgrade and Moscow. According to Fenik, although the Soviet Union seemed to reverse its politics in Greece, actually it indirectly tried to control the country through Enver Hoxha's Albania.⁶⁸⁵ As such, the press always remained suspicious of the Soviet preoccupations and draw a picture of the Soviet Union which could never be trusted.⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸⁰ Feridun Osman Menteşeoğlu, "Kendi Kendini Yiyen Rejim", *Ulus*, 2 March 1949, p. 2.

⁶⁸¹ Mücahit Topalak, "Sovyet Rusya Gülünç Durumda", *Zafer*, 30 August 1949, p. 3.

⁶⁸² Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Barış Değil Teyakkuz ve Basiret Devri", *Zafer*, 22 September 1949, p. 3.

⁶⁸³ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Rusya'nın Almanya Politikası", *Zafer*, 3 May 1949, p. 3.

⁶⁸⁴ "Rusya Bir Molotof Planı Hazırlamış", *Zafer*, 4 May 1949, p. 1.

⁶⁸⁵ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Yunanistan Meselesi ve Rusya", *Zafer*, 7 May 1949, p. 3.

⁶⁸⁶ See examples: "Rus Emperyalizmi", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 May 1948, p. 5; "Fırtınadan Evvelki Durgunluk Mu?", *Akşam*, 2 June 1948, p. 2; Cemşit, "Sovyet Rusyanın Siyaseti Değişiyor Mu?", *Akşam*, 30 January

In this regard, as reported by the Turkish press, the Soviet Union was even provoking minority groups in Turkey, particularly Kurds and Armenians. Indeed, in this period, as Zubok claimed, Stalin wanted to use the “Armenian card” in order to annex Kars and Ardahan from Turkey.⁶⁸⁷ Moreover, there were strong relations between Moscow and Kurdish groups not only in Turkey but also in other regional countries and these relations had started during the Second World War.⁶⁸⁸ Naturally, Turkey anxiously watched the Soviet-Kurdish relations.⁶⁸⁹ The Turkish press, in response to the Soviet accusations and provocations, tried to show that minority groups were not suppressed in Turkey. For example, as *Yeni Sabah* claimed, inciting Kurds living in Turkey, Russians alleged that Turkey persecuted Kurds worse than Nazi persecutions of Jews.⁶⁹⁰ Five days later, *Yeni Sabah*, interviewing the son of Sheikh Said, claimed that Kurds had always been on the side of Turks.⁶⁹¹ The fear of Soviet threat conveyed through provocation of minorities was existent in neighboring countries as well and this situation was relevant to Turkey's own security concerns. On April 21, 1950, Çakıroğlu, for example, proclaimed that communists in Syria tried to incite minority groups such as Armenians, Kurds, and Circassians against Turkey.⁶⁹² In summary, according to the depiction of the Soviet Union by the Turkish press, they betrayed Turkey and ruined the Turkish-Soviet friendship of the past. Being always suspicious of the Soviet policies, the press asserted that the Soviet Union was the ones who started the ‘war of nerves’, who even used minorities against Turkey.

1949, p. 1; "Stalinin Sulh Taarruzu", *Yeni Sabah*, 31 January 1949, p. 3; "Dünya Ahvalı", *Akşam*, 25 June 1949, p. 1; Mirza Bala, "Komintern Asya Milletleri İçin Neler Düşünüyor?", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 February 1949, p. 2; Abidin Daver, "Soğuk Harbin Uzaması Hangi Tarafın Lehinedir?", *Cumhuriyet*, 15 April 1949, p. 2.

⁶⁸⁷ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, p. 37.

⁶⁸⁸ William G. Elphinston, "The Kurdish Question" *International Affairs*, 22.1 (1946), pp. 98-101.

⁶⁸⁹ Tamkin, *Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union*, p. 110.

⁶⁹⁰ "Kızıl Hezeyanlara Yeni Bir Numune", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 February 1948, p. 1.

⁶⁹¹ "Şeyh Saidin Oğlu'nun Moskovaya Cevabı", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 February 1948, p. 1.

⁶⁹² Sait Bilal Çakıroğlu, "Lübnan ve Suriye'de Komünistlerin Faaliyeti", *Yeni İstanbul*, 21 April 1950, p. 2.

As the notion of the old ally Soviets removed from the agenda of Turkish press, it began to be replaced by the notion of Russia, the ancient enemy. After the hostility of the previous centuries was revived, the press asserted that the Soviet demands were not something new; in fact, the Russians had always aimed to occupy Turkish lands but they could not dare such a thing due to the weak position of the Soviet Union in the world politics. According to Roberts, the Bolsheviks, indeed, had to tackle with many internal problems at the outset of the Bolshevik Revolution and then tried to maintain their revolutionary state; consequently, the Soviet Union became an isolated state in European continent. However, the Soviet Union emerged as a superpower at the end of the Second World War.⁶⁹³ The Turkish press, which was aware of the sharp increase in the Soviet power in international politics, tried to prove that the Soviet Union had ‘always’ been the enemy of Turks. For example, Nihat Erim, in his long analysis of the Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War, stated that although Turkey had always approached to the Soviet Union friendly, the Soviet Union had demanded to occupy Turkish lands from the war's outset.⁶⁹⁴ Similarly, on November 3, 1947, Kemal Turan claimed that the Soviet Union had always insisted on “bargaining” the independence and sovereignty of Turkey.⁶⁹⁵

For the press, the centuries-old perception of Russia served to reinforce the existing negative images of the enemy. For example, Atay claimed that existence of the Turkish state had been exposed to the Russian threat since the seventeenth century. As he claimed, the situation was reversed with Lenin and Turkey continued to approach Russia as an independent and equal country even after the death of Lenin. As Atay asserted, Turkey had always sought to advance the claim that its real security was only possible with friendship with Russia and Turkey still thought the same thing.⁶⁹⁶ By the

⁶⁹³ Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics*, p. 4.

⁶⁹⁴ Nihat Erim, "İkinci Cihan Harbinde Türkiye", *Ulus*, 9 April 1947, p. 2; Nihat Erim, "İkinci Cihan Harbinde Türkiye", *Ulus*, 10 April 1947, p. 2; Nihat Erim, "İkinci Cihan Harbinde Türkiye", *Ulus*, 11 April 1947, p. 2; Nihat Erim, "İkinci Cihan Harbinde Türkiye", *Ulus*, 12 April 1947, p. 2; Nihat Erim, "Sovyetlerin Gerçek Niyeti", *Ulus*, 13 April 1947, p. 2.

⁶⁹⁵ Kemal Turan, "Devlet Başkanının Nutku Üzerinde", *Ulus*, 3 November 1947, p. 1.

⁶⁹⁶ Falih Rıfık Atay, "Rusya ve Biz", *Cumhuriyet*, 1 October 1948, p. 2.

same token, on March 12, 1949, *Cumhuriyet*, in its examination of whether the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union might change or not, bridged pre- and post-Soviet periods and it focused on the long history of the desire of the Soviet Union over the Straits and Istanbul, which had originated in the Tsarist autocracy and aimed to reach to the Mediterranean.⁶⁹⁷ As another example, on March 3, 1949, Peyami Safa of *Ulus* claimed that there was no difference between expansionist policies of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.⁶⁹⁸ Hence, the press used historical references in order to attract attention of the public to the importance of the Soviet threat and to reinvent the enemy by claiming that they had always been the enemy of Turks.

Consistent with the creation of an enemy, the Turkish press asserted that the Soviet imperialism threatened the world peace and indeed Soviets (i.e. Russians) had always been imperialist. In this fashion, the press might have given the message that Turkey, having exposed to the Soviet threat, was not alone in international arena. For example, on March 23, 1947, Atay claimed that if the Soviet Union had collaborated with the UN and western democracies, then neither the tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union nor the polarization between the Soviet Union and the West would have existed.⁶⁹⁹ As he claimed one month later, it was impossible to make peace with the Soviet Union.⁷⁰⁰ Moreover, on June 12, 1947, Atay thought that all the free nations of the world had to unite against the Soviet imperialism.⁷⁰¹ In agreement with Atay, on May 5, 1947, Asım Us claimed that the Soviet Union had the responsibility for the absence of the world peace.⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁷ "Türk-Sovyet Münasebetleri Değişebilir Mi?", *Cumhuriyet*, 12 March 1949, p. 3.

⁶⁹⁸ Peyami Safa, "Barışın Silahı", *Ulus*, 11 March 1949, p. 1.

⁶⁹⁹ Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Kaybeden Bir Politika", *Ulus*, 23 March 1947, p. 1.

⁷⁰⁰ Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Slav Bloğunun Hücumu", *Ulus*, 9 April 1947, p. 1; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Moskova ve Ötesi", *Ulus*, 19 April 1947, p. 1.

⁷⁰¹ Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Rusya Karşısında Cephelenme", *Ulus*, 12 June 1947, p. 1.

⁷⁰² Asım Us, "Sulhün Kurulamamasından Sorumlu Olan Kim?", *Vakit*, 5 May 1947, p. 1.



Figure 12⁷⁰³

This depiction of the Soviet Union by the press, which was unwilling to collaborate with ‘free’ and ‘democratic’ nations of the world, could also be observed from the cartoons of this period. For example, in the first cartoon shown in Figure 12, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov says “*intention, intention*” and US Secretary of State Marshall asks “*whether it is a bad intention or a good one*”. Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Britain, replies “*intention in Russia*”. Note that ‘*niyet*’ means intention in Turkish and it means ‘no’ in Russian, too. As this cartoon demonstrated, the Soviet Union simply said “*no*” to any proposal put forward by the West. In the second cartoon, the man representing the US asked “*hey, where is Europe, I want to help it*”, and the very fat man, representing the Soviet Union, occupies the whole armchair representing Europe. Accordingly, while enemy Soviets tries to occupy non-communist Europe, the friend US tries to help it. Nonetheless, the press, sending message to the West, claimed that the Soviet Union was afraid of the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union was a persistent factor of threat for democracies. As an example, for *Ulus*, the Soviet Union was threatening the world and they pretended not to be afraid of atomic bombs that the US possessed.⁷⁰⁴

⁷⁰³ *Ulus*, 10 April 1947, p. 1; *Ulus*, 20 June 1947, p. 1.

⁷⁰⁴ “Rusya Tehdidediyor”, *Ulus*, 5 November 1947, p. 1.

Starting from 1948, the press laid stress on the ‘Soviet imperialism’ even more. For example, on January 1, 1948, *Yeni Sabah* concluded that Russia abandoned the places which it had been defeated by the West and started to attack in new places: after it was defeated in Italy and France and communist parties lost elections in these countries, for example, the Soviet Union turned its eyes to other regions.⁷⁰⁵ One day later, as Yazman noted, from Korea to the Baltic Sea, there were struggles and tension in all countries that had common borders with the communist world. For him, the communist attacks continued in various shapes across countries such as a direct war in China, political struggle in Iran, ‘war of nerves’ against Turkey, guerrilla war in Greece, internal struggles in Italy, Austria and East Germany.⁷⁰⁶ Therefore, talking about how the Soviet imperialism was a danger for the world peace, the press asserted that Turkey was a front line country in the global Cold War conflicts.

The press maintained very similar arguments about the role of the Soviet Union in the Arab-Israeli conflict to justify their 'self-defensive' measures against the Soviet Union.⁷⁰⁷ In the words of Yazman, the Soviet Union, opposing every step of Americans, agreed with them on only one issue: the division of Palestine into two separate states. For Yazman, this policy of the Soviet Union aimed to cause indefinite struggles in the region, which they would benefit from the chaos to promote their influence throughout the Middle East.⁷⁰⁸ Therefore, for the press, the enemy of the free world always changed its policies to ruin the world peace and the Soviet Union was accused of being an actor brought chaos to the Middle East. Nonetheless, as the Turkish press also reported, from the very beginning, the Turkish government interacted with the Israeli state⁷⁰⁹ and indeed Turkey was the first Muslim country which officially recognized Israel on March 28, 1949, almost one year after its establishment. That is to say, in an atmosphere where both Turkey and the US, even

⁷⁰⁵ "Dünyanın En Tehlikeli Noktaları", *Yeni Sabah*, 1 January 1948, p. 3.

⁷⁰⁶ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Harb Durdurulabilecek Mi?", *Akşam*, 2 January 1948, p. 4.

⁷⁰⁷ See also Abidin Daver, "Kan ve Ateş İçinde Doğan Bir Devlet", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 May 1948, p. 3.

⁷⁰⁸ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Sovyetlerin Filistin Politikası ve Filistindeki Harb", *Akşam*, 19 January 1948, p. 5.

⁷⁰⁹ "Türk-İsrail Ticaret Münasebetleri", *Ulus*, 19 March 1949, pp. 1, 3.

before many other states, recognized Israel, the Turkish press somehow blamed only the Soviet Union on emergence of such a Jewish state.



Figure 13⁷¹⁰

Moreover, as depicted by the press, the Soviet Union was the ‘most’ dangerous enemy of the humanity throughout the history. Aydınlı writing for *Yeni Sabah*, for example, stated that world came across a worse danger than Hitler.⁷¹¹ The press, resembling the current enemy to the enemy in the past, further consolidated the perception of threat. As an illustration, Karay, comparing pre- and post-war periods, resembled the Soviet policies to those of the Nazis. He concluded that the former was much worse than the latter and the world was in a worse situation in terms of economics and ethics.⁷¹² In effect, there was a tendency among politicians and press in the United States, too, to resemble ideologies of the Nazis and the Soviet Union with a specific focus on

⁷¹⁰ *Ulus*, 14 June 1947, p. 1.

⁷¹¹ Reşad Aydınlı, "Bugün Dünya Hitlerden Beter Bir Kızıl Tehlikeyle Karşı Karşıyadır", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 January 1948, p. 1.

⁷¹² Refik Halid Karay, "1938-1948", *Akşam*, 8 March 1948, p. 1.

authoritarian nature of both regimes.⁷¹³ The Turkish press followed the same trend. For example, as shown in Figure 13, the ‘bear’ (in fact, the bear cub) representing the Soviet Union follows the footsteps of the Nazis. To be more exact, identifying the enemy with a bear, an animal traditionally associated with Russia, the Turkish press asserted that the ‘bear’ (i.e., the Soviet Union) was occupying countries one by one similar to Nazis. Moreover, the Turkish press, in this period, seemed to totally forget the Soviet role in defeating the Nazis as the press itself had mentioned in the very beginning of the period.

This ‘Nazi-like’ enemy threatened the world peace at every opportunity, as the Turkish press claimed. As maintained by the press, the constant fear of the Soviet threat was also existent in the Soviet-sponsored international organizations. For instance, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that relying on either the Molotov Doctrine, which emerged as a counterpart of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, or the Machiavellian principles, the Soviet imperialism appeared in both the Far East and the Balkans.⁷¹⁴ Accordingly, Soviet Union was assumed to continue to fight simultaneously in different parts of the world, which adversely affected Turkey’s security, too.⁷¹⁵ For *Akşam*, as Comintern wanted to set all the world to revolutionary fire, Moscow radio and newspapers brought up the necessity of the world revolution by calling workers of the world to unite.⁷¹⁶

Within the framework of so-called Russian imperialism, the Soviet Union was believed to threaten not only Turkey but also the countries around her, which led to the conclusion that a regional and collective action was absolutely necessary to prevent the Soviet expansion in the region. For *Yeni Sabah*, in addition to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, as a whole region ranging from Greece and Turkey to Iran and Arab

⁷¹³ Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's-1950's” *The American Historical Review* 75.4 (1970), p. 1046.

⁷¹⁴ “Molotof Doktrini”, *Yeni Sabah*, 24 February 1948, p. 3.

⁷¹⁵ Şevket Rado, “Avrupada Ahval Endişe Verici Bir Süratle İnkışaf Ediyor”, *Akşam*, 29 February 1948, p. 1; “Dünya Sulhu İçin Endişeler”, *Akşam*, 1 March 1948, p. 2.

⁷¹⁶ “Hindistan'da Komünist Hareketi”, *Akşam*, 4 March 1948, p. 2.

countries, was exposed to the Soviet threat.⁷¹⁷ Hence, the Soviet Union was not only a national enemy but also a regional one and in this continuous perception of the fear, the press interpreted Turkey as only one of the victims in the world, all of which were exposed to the Soviet threat.

In this regard, the notion that the others (or at least Turkey's neighbors) had similar problems might have been useful to justify the idea that Turks were not the ones who started the fight but the Soviet Union began to wage a war against Turkey, i.e., Turkey's enemy was also attacking other free nations as well. For example, on April 20, 1949, *Cumhuriyet*, reporting from *UPI*, claimed that for the reason that the Soviet Union wanted the access to oil resources in these countries, it was in support of the separatist Kurdish groups in Iran and Iraq.⁷¹⁸ Similarly, Fenik claimed that the Soviet Union were relentlessly increasing its pressure on Iran.⁷¹⁹ In this regard, in a period when the Cold War was relentlessly taking shape day by day, the fear of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc did never lose its significance. For example, on September 22, 1949, Fenik put forward the argument that although communism had regressed in Greece and the Soviet policy failed in Yugoslavia, there was a serious preparation behind the Iron Curtain. From Fenik's point of view, the reason for why the Soviet Union became cautious in their actions was the determined attitude of the US and Britain against the Soviet attacks.⁷²⁰

Designing the recurrent anti-Soviet image to highlight danger of the Russian imperialism, the press continued to claim that the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union was the world revolution.⁷²¹ For instance, as *Yeni Sabah* claimed, in its imperialist pursuit, Comintern was the most important way, by covering its worldwide red

⁷¹⁷ "Komünist Tecavüzüne Karşı Yeni Bir Blok Teklifi", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 March 1948, p. 5.

⁷¹⁸ "Rusya İrandaki Kürdleri Kışkırttı", (*UPI*), *Cumhuriyet*, 20 April 1949, p. 1.

⁷¹⁹ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "İran Sınırında Sovyetlerin Tahşidatı!", 5 May 1949, p. 3.

⁷²⁰ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Barış Değil Teyakkuz ve Basiret Devri", *Zafer*, 22 September 1949, p. 3.

⁷²¹ See examples: "İç ve Dış Politika", *Yeni İstanbul*, 1 December 1949, p. 1; "Sovyetlerin En Mühim Derdi", *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 December 1949, p. 2; Mücahit Topalak, "Hür Sendikalar Konfederasyonu", *Zafer*, 19 December 1949, p. 3; "İç ve Dış Politika", *Yeni İstanbul*, 25 December 1949, p. 1.

revolution.⁷²² As another example, on January 1, 1950, Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın of *Ulus* claimed that the 'only' problem that the world had to tackle with was the "Russian question" (*Rus meselesi*). In Yalçın's opinion, as long as Russia would challenge the West, it would be impossible to have security and stability for the civilized world.⁷²³ Similarly, as claimed by *Yeni İstanbul*, the Soviet Union would never abandon their imperialist and expansionist policies and they had no intention to cooperate with democracies.⁷²⁴ For the press, the "sneaky" (*sinsi*) enemy was taking its steps very carefully and did not attack immediately. As stated by Topalak on January 24, 1950, the Soviet Union was assumed to launch first a political attack then an economic blockade, finally internal conflicts in order to make free nations its own satellites.⁷²⁵ Similar to Topalak, *Yeni İstanbul* regarded the Soviet tactics as political plots.⁷²⁶

Being an unceasing threat to the world peace, the press drew the Soviet image as a danger for both Asia and Europe, which favored the continuation of the Cold War.⁷²⁷ This 'imperialist' picture of the Soviet Union which was repetitively drawn by the Turkish press, yet, neglected the Soviet policy about colonialism at that moment. That is to say, Stalin's Soviet Union supported anti-colonial movements and hoped to seize opportunities created by 'third world' revolutions. During the Cominform meeting held in September 1947, for example, it was stated that the colonial system was currently in a crisis and a possible communist camp which would be consisted of newly

⁷²² "Kominform'un Kararlarından Sonra, Moskovanın Teşkilatlandığı Sözde Sulh Taraftarları", *Yeni Sabah*, 1 December 1949, p. 1.

⁷²³ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "1950 Senesi", *Ulus*, 1 January 1950, pp. 1, 3.

⁷²⁴ "Komünizm Âleminde", *Yeni İstanbul*, 13 January 1950, p. 1.

⁷²⁵ Mücahit Topalak, "Fin-Rus Münasebetleri", *Zafer*, 24 January 1950, p. 3.

⁷²⁶ "Bir Sovyet Manevrası Daha", *Yeni İstanbul*, 1 February 1950, p. 1.

⁷²⁷ See examples: "Sovyet Rusyanın, Asya Üzerinde Tazyiki Gittikçe Artmaktadır", *Yeni İstanbul*, 9 February 1950, p. 1; "Sovyetler Güney Asyaya Göz Dikti", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 February 1950, p. 3; "Sovyet Rusyanın Yeni Manevrası", *Yeni İstanbul*, 25 February 1950, p. 4; "Baltık Devletleri Tehlikeli Durumda", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 March 1950, p. 3; "Rusların Asya Politikası", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 March 1950, p. 3; "Rusya, Hür Dünya ile İşbirliği İstemiyor", (*Reuters*) *Cumhuriyet*, 20 March 1950, p. 1; "Yedi Dava", *Cumhuriyet*, 22 March 1950, p. 1; Ekrem Z. Apaydın, "Amerikanın Rusyaya İhtarı", *Yeni İstanbul*, 27 March 1950, p. 3; "Sovyetlerin Çekemedikleri, Milletlerin Dostluğudur", *Yeni İstanbul*, 1 April 1950, p. 1; Mücahit Topalak, "Amerikan Silahları", *Zafer*, 13 April 1950, p. 3.

emerging countries was emphasized.⁷²⁸ The 'two camps' theory coined by Stalin's speech was one of the most important mottos of Comintern, which supported national independence against the American imperialism.⁷²⁹ Whether Stalin really did care about the independence of the Third World countries or not,⁷³⁰ as Hobsbawm stated, the Soviet Union, similar to the United States, was against the European imperialism “*at least on paper*”.⁷³¹ To put it differently, although the Turkish press accused the Soviet Union of being an imperialist country, it did not mention the Soviet support of anti-colonial struggles at that moment. Rather, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the US was depicted as (perhaps the only) country which was totally against the colonialism even though the US favored continuation of colonialism in particular regions. To sum up, the Soviet image of the press was something the enemy of the ‘free’ and ‘peaceful’ nations and the Turkish press repeatedly referred to Soviets as imperialists, and the notion of Russian imperialism provided a vital outlet for the creation of an enemy by the press.

4.2) ANTI-COMMUNISM IN TURKISH PRESS

Anti-communism was not limited to the government actions which were discussed in Chapter 2. Instead, during its industrious efforts to create an enemy and drawing a very negative picture of the Soviet Union, the anti-communism of the press went parallel with that of the government during the early Cold War. Nonetheless, considering discussions whether communism constituted a crime or not, what was common to the general understanding of communism in the very beginning of the period was that only being a communist was not a crime. For example, as Sadak claimed on June 25, 1945, being a communist, like being a member of religion or a supporter of philosophy, was not a crime. The crime factor was use of communism as a way of propaganda and incitement consciously or unconsciously. If communism became a movement instead of a “belief” (*inanç*), it became an attempt of revolution to destroy the regime and the

⁷²⁸ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 158-159.

⁷²⁹ Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism*, p. 16.

⁷³⁰ Radchenko, “Joseph Stalin”, p. 23.

⁷³¹ Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, p. 175.

state. For Sadak, the difference between communism and other political movements was the former's dependence on a foreign center rather than being an independent domestic movement.⁷³²

The press also distanced Russian communism from the socialism in Western Europe, attributing a negative meaning to the former. For example according to Sadak, socialism was the strongest 'castle' against communism in everywhere it appeared.⁷³³ By the same token, *Akşam*⁷³⁴ made a distinction between communists, leftist groups and the ones who had tendency to the left. For *Akşam*, according to the Turkish Constitution, only being a communist who believed historical materialism of Karl Marx was not a crime: the crime element of communism was being dependent on an international communist party or waging communist propaganda as a Soviet spy. In (free and democratic) Turkey, leftism was not accepted as a crime by any means. Socialists, the most deadly enemies of communists, were leftists. In the eyes of Soviet Union, the number one enemy was neither capitalist and rightist Churchill nor Daladier but socialist and leftist such as Ernest Bevin, who was the Foreign Secretary of the Labor Government in Britain or Léon Blum, who was the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1946 to 1947. *Akşam*, then, asked, could socialism, the number one enemy of communists, be a crime in Turkey, where communism was a major offense? If the "tendency to the leftism" (*sol temayüllü*) was a crime in Turkey, then, as *Akşam* asserted, it was needed to sue those who established etatist regime and defended the present regime in Turkey. In short, as *Akşam* concluded, if they were communists, they had to be taken to court; if they were leftists, they deserved encouragement because of their hostility towards communism and if they had tendency to the leftism, they deserved to be congratulated as being

⁷³² Necmettin Sadak, "Ne Kara İrtica, Ne Kızıl İhtilal", *Akşam*, 25 June 1945, p. 1.

⁷³³ Necmettin Sadak, "Sosyalistler, Komünistler", *Akşam*, 20 August 1945, p. 1.

⁷³⁴ There is no signature under this article. However, it was written in the column that Refik Halid Karay usually wrote and the writing style of the article was very similar to that of Karay.

“progressive scientists”.⁷³⁵ Therefore, for *Akşam*, communism became a danger and even a crime only if it affiliated with the Soviet Union

In spite of the Turkish anti-communist attitude of the press, supporters of both CHP and DP, in unifying reinterpretations of the communists, suggested not to exaggerate anti-communist struggle. For example, on March 24, 1948, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that *Vatan* regarded everyone as communists.⁷³⁶ Similarly, Şevket Rado of *Akşam* pondered that communism was a danger for Turkish society and Turks needed to have a great care for the protection. However, in his analysis of the communism, ‘care’ (*dikkat*) and “groundless apprehensions” (*evham*) are different things and a hypochondriac person could not save from any danger herself.⁷³⁷ Moreover, for Daver, it was wrong to call anybody who were disliked, ‘communist’. According to Daver, as struggle against communism was a serious war, which could not be won by demagogy; it could be won only through the methods based on knowledge and expertise about psychology of ideological wars along with elimination of social injustice and decrease of discontented people.⁷³⁸ Curiously enough, *Zafer*, as the official newspaper of *Demokrat Parti*, opposed allegations about Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak and CHP MP Nurullah Sümer, which charged them with being communists by a journal published in İstanbul. It was *Zafer*'s contention that although Foreign Minister Sadak was an unsuccessful ‘diplomat’ and needed to resign, no one could accuse him of being leftist (*solculuk*). It was the same for Sümer although one might dislike him.⁷³⁹

However, later, the moderate view on communism and even sympathy with the socialists began to disappear from the anti-communist discourse of the press. Both the governmental and oppositional press mentioned the danger of the communist propaganda and marginalized communists as ‘treacherous’ people. Apart from official

⁷³⁵ "Komünist, Solcu, Sol Temayüllü", *Akşam*, 9 May 1948, p. 1.

⁷³⁶ "Vatan Önüne Geleni Komünistlikle Yaftalıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 24 March 1948, p. 1.

⁷³⁷ Şevket Rado, "Dikkat Bu Mudur?", *Akşam*, 20 February 1949, p. 2.

⁷³⁸ Abidin Daver, "Komünizmle Mücadelenin Yolu", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 February 1949, p. 3.

⁷³⁹ "Sadak ve N. Sumer'i Solculukla İtham!", *Zafer*, 7 May 1949, p. 1.

authorities,⁷⁴⁰ the press accorded high priority to the danger of communism, with priority given to Turkish communists.⁷⁴¹ For example, on April 19, 1948, *Akşam* suggested that public awareness about the ‘microbe of communism’ (*komünizm mikrobu*) desperately needed to be raised in order to explicate people lowdown and tactic of red propaganda.⁷⁴² In line with *Akşam*’s concerns, *Yeni Sabah*, appreciated the government’s actions in reaction to Soviet propaganda such as taking those who were suspected communists (and therefore Soviet spies) into custody, for they were the ‘enemy living amongst us’.⁷⁴³ Similarly, *Cumhuriyet* proclaimed that there was no room for communism in Turkish homeland and the real danger was communism rather than political reaction, for the reason that religious reaction was deprived of any provocation coming from outside whereas communism was supported by outside both secretly and openly.⁷⁴⁴ For another example, Mümtaz Faik Fenik of *Zafer*, with an appreciation of precautions and measures taken against communism in Turkey, took up the question of whether Turkey would cherish Soviet spies in its bosom. From his point of view, Turkey at least needed to take a lesson from its neighbor Iran in this issue, which had suffered from the Soviet pressure since the end of the Second World War.⁷⁴⁵

⁷⁴⁰ Indeed, from the Turkish official viewpoints, the Turkish public (especially the Turkish youth) formed a central part of anti-Soviet attitude. During his speech for the 19 May the Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day, President İnönü said that a merciless war had been waged against Turkey after the Second World War. Turkish nation had to reply deceptive impacts of foreign struggle not only by its faith and self-determination but also by its comprehension and judgment. The challenges of propaganda and deception created by this foreign and unfair struggle were more challenging than the actual war. As the president of Turkey, he suggested Turkey to remain in a body if it was required in foreign affairs and to endure democratic struggles in the country ("İnönünün Türk Gençliğine ve Türk Milletine Hitabı", *Akşam*, 20 May 1949, pp. 1-2). See other examples for how the Turkish press proudly reported anti-communist meetings and associations of the Turkish youth: "Adana Gençliği Bir Miting Yaptı", *Ulus*, 17 February 1949, p. 3; Feridun Osman Mentешеoğlu, "Asıl Cevap Gençliğe Düşüyor", *Ulus*, 23 April 1950, p. 2; "Erzurum Gençliği Komünizmi Tel'in Ediyor", *Ulus*, 8 May 1950, p. 3.

⁷⁴¹ "İzmit Kâğıt Fabrikasında Bir Komünist Şebekesi Bulundu", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 April 1948, p. 1.

⁷⁴² "Kızıl Propagandanın İç Yüzü ve Taktiği", *Akşam*, 19 April 1948, p. 2.

⁷⁴³ "Komünist Sabotajı", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 June 1948, p. 1; "Komünistlik Propagandası Yapan Öğrenciler", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 January 1949, p. 3.

⁷⁴⁴ "Türk Vatanından Komünistliğe Yer Yoktur", *Cumhuriyet*, 22 April 1949, pp. 1,3.

⁷⁴⁵ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Yurdumuzdaki Sovyet Ajanları", *Zafer*, 17 June 1949, p. 3: "*Komünizmle mücadele güzel! [...] Alınan tedbirler hepsi iyi[...] Fakat bu ajanları hala koynumuzda beslemeyecek miyiz? [...]Hiç olmazsa komşu İran'dan bir ders alalım!*"

While anti-communism of the press maintained in 1950, the presence of the communists in Turkey was regarded as a security issue and, accordingly, both the governmental and oppositional press appreciated the government's pressure on Turkish communists.⁷⁴⁶ As the elections of May 1950 approached, the governmental press tried to show that the Soviet Union and its fifth columns tried to put an end to the CHP government. To be more exact, CHP-linked newspapers and columnists tried to benefit from 'anti-communism' as a tool in electoral campaigns. They warned Turkish citizens about 'communist' and 'Bolshevik' propaganda which tried to provoke Turkish people against their own government.⁷⁴⁷ For example, on April 23, 1950, Peyami Safa of *Ulus*, suggested Turkish public not to forget "outside". In his opinion, while political parties focused on the elections, it seemed that people began to forget the "external threat". As he claimed, there were 'some' people (implying Ahmet Emin Yalman of *Vatan*) who claimed that there was no external threat in Turkey. Safa, calling such people as "unwary" (*gafil*), claimed that the external threat was not a propaganda tool of CHP but it was "a very red reality" (*kıpkızıl bir realite*). As he concluded, the existence of such an external threat was not only a concern of CHP and DP but also it was "a national cause" (*milli bir dava*) for all Turkish citizens.⁷⁴⁸

In effect, as an essential factor related to the security threat, the anti-communist attitude of the press claimed communists as godless atheists or people who lacked a deep sense of loyalty towards the state. Accordingly, Turkish communists were labelled as spies of the Soviet Union: *Yeni İstanbul*, for example, regarded hunger

⁷⁴⁶ "Kadrlide Komünist Propagandası Yapanlar", *Yeni İstanbul*, 26 April 1950, p. 3; "Bir Kısım Tahrikçi Daha Tevkif Ediliyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 17 April 1950, p. 2; "Komünist Şebekenin Yazdığı Beyannameler de Ele Geçirildi", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 May 1950, p. 1; "Ankarada Bir Komünist Şebekesi Meydana Çıkarıldı", *Yeni Sabah*, 3 May 1950, p. 1; "Komünist Tahrikâtından 6 Kişi Tevkif Edildi", *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 May 1950, p. 1; "Tevkif Edilen Komünistler", *Ulus*, 4 May 1950, p. 1; "Komünist Tahrikçileri Ankara'ya Getirildi", *Ulus*, 6 May 1950, p. 3.

⁷⁴⁷ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Komünistler Her Tarafda Nasıl Çalışıyor", *Ulus*, 10 January 1950, pp. 1, 3; Kemal Zeki Gencosman, "Bolşevik Oyununa Düşmiyelim!", *Ulus*, 28 January 1950, p. 3; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Kızılılık", *Ulus*, 12 March 1950, p. 2; Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "İki Düşmana Karşı", *Ulus*, 28 April 1950, pp. 1, 3; "Komünist Propagandası Şiddetlendirilmiştir", *Ulus*, 7 May 1950, p. 1; Peyami Safa, "Niçin Mi Halk Partisi", *Ulus*, 8 May 1950, p. 1.

⁷⁴⁸ Peyami Safa, "Dışarısını Unutmıyalım", *Ulus*, 23 April 1950, p. 1.

strike of Nazım Hikmet⁷⁴⁹ in jail along with demonstrations inside and outside Turkey as a part of provocation that had been deliberately planned.⁷⁵⁰ It is important to note that while Vala Nurettin of *Akşam* published Nazım Hikmet's letter to him in *Akşam*, *Yeni İstanbul* regarded him as a Soviet spy, too.⁷⁵¹ However, this difference stemmed from Vala Nurettin's personal relations with Nazım Hikmet⁷⁵² rather than differences between the governmental and oppositional newspapers since other governmental newspapers also harshly criticized Nazım Hikmet and considered him a 'Soviet spy'. For example, on May 12, 1950, *Ulus*, writing an open letter to Nazım Hikmet, claimed that Nazım Hikmet's strike was related to the Soviet provocations. As *Ulus* claimed, 'Nazım Hikmet' became a popular baby name in the satellite countries, which was inspired by Nazım Hikmet's communism.⁷⁵³ Or, *Ulus* expressed its pride how Turkish youth protested Nazım Hikmet's 'provocative' hunger strike.⁷⁵⁴ To sum up, seeing anti-communism as synonymous to the anti-Soviet attitude, the Turkish press, in parallel with the politicians, greatly utilized anti-communism in its efforts to support negative public perceptions of the Soviet Union.

4.3) THE TURKISH PRESS AND COMMUNISM IN THE WORLD

Following a brief and historical examination of the Soviet image and the progress of anti-communism in the Turkish press, this section analyzes how the Turkish press drew a picture of communism in world from 1945 to 1950. Being very negative, this image drawn by the press, similar to anti-Soviet attitude and the fear of the Soviet threat, had evolved throughout the period. Moreover, this perpetuated image of communists in the world became a critical tool in the creation of an enemy.

⁷⁴⁹ He was a communist Turkish poet, who later escaped from Turkey to Romania and went to the Soviet Union.

⁷⁵⁰ "İçeride ve Dışarıda Bir Tahrik Hareketi Başladı", *Yeni İstanbul*, 12 May 1950, p. 1.

⁷⁵¹ Vala Nurettin, "Nazım Hikmetin Son Mektubu", *Akşam*, 9 April 1950, p. 3.

⁷⁵² They were good friends in the past and, indeed, they escaped from İstanbul together in order to participate the Turkish War of Independence (Öymen, *Propaganda Silahı Olarak Basın*, p. 97).

⁷⁵³ "Bir Açlık Grevi ve Yankıları", *Ulus*, 12 May 1950, p. 3.

⁷⁵⁴ "Nazım Hikmet İçin Protesto Mitingi", *Ulus*, 16 May 1950, p. 3.

4.3.1) Communism in Europe: Destruction and Instability

In its analysis of communism in Europe, the Turkish press saw the world through a Cold War trajectory but also there was an emphasis on the Turkish position, role and interest. The Turkish press, using a western-oriented term the “Fifth Columns” (*Beşinci Kollar*), saw communists in Europe as spies of an external power (i.e., the Soviet Union). As Toker argued, the term ‘Fifth Columns’ had been used by the press during the Second World War⁷⁵⁵ but its meaning changed after 1945. Before 1945, the term had meant all spies in any country whereas, after 1945, the fifth columns implied only the communist groups and parties (i.e., the spies of the Soviet Union).

The development of anti-communism in Europe went parallel with that in the US. Anti-communism in Europe following the Second World War was not high as much as the US wanted and the anti-communist campaigns of the US had not initially been effective in Western Europe. The communist parties, which had become a member of the post-war governments in these countries, were perceived as the enemies of the Nazis. In other words, the communist groups were the ones who resisted the Nazi occupation.⁷⁵⁶ The prestige of the ‘victorious’ Soviet Union, despite its quick decrease, also disabled the spread of the US anti-communist campaigns.⁷⁵⁷ Moreover, the economic instability and low level of life standards increased sympathy towards the communist among Europeans.⁷⁵⁸ As a matter of fact, even before the Second World War, communism appeared an appealing alternative to capitalism among Europeans, who experienced the destructive effects of the Great Depression in the 1930s.⁷⁵⁹ Nonetheless, positive public opinion towards communist groups in Western Europe was altered following the introduction of the Marshall Plan. While European people suffered economic problems and the American aid seemed to improve socio-economic conditions, western governments and parties which had the pro-Marshall Plan and anti-

⁷⁵⁵ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, pp. 19-20.

⁷⁵⁶ Reynolds, “The European Dimension of the Cold War”, p. 126.

⁷⁵⁷ Kees Van der Pijl, *Global Rivalries: From the Cold War to Iraq* (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 34.

⁷⁵⁸ Winkler, *The Cold War*, p. 29.

⁷⁵⁹ George S. Prentzas, *The Marshall Plan* (New York: Chelsea House, 2011), p. 13.

Soviet attitude seized the opportunity created by the Marshall Plan in order to intensify the anti-communist campaigns and defeat their political rivals.⁷⁶⁰ As a result, communist parties in European countries, which benefited from the Marshall Plan, lost their prestige.⁷⁶¹

As communist parties were losing their prestige in their home countries, the Turkish press highly benefited from this situation in its process of creation of an enemy. Being the fifth columns of the Soviet Union, European communists were believed to create destruction and instability in their own countries. Showing declining power of communism in non-Soviet controlled Europe, the press discussed how communism was still destructive and how the Soviet Union used communists to occupy European countries in this period. For example, as reported by *Akşam*, Italian communists created difficulties; but, despite these challenges, the majority of Italians continued to support the current government.⁷⁶² Namely, the press claimed that Italian communists were not supported by the free people of Italy. But, in reality, the post-war coalition in Italy including communist party did not accept the US and Britain's offers to take an action against the Soviet Union due to a possibility of communist reaction. So, only after the introduction of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, communists were excluded from the government and anti-communism had settled in Italy and Italian public saw the US as a guarantor against the Soviet aggression and the communist threat.⁷⁶³

In this regard, there was a clear recognition of the American role in the elections held in non-European countries by the Turkish press, which closely watched these elections in order to understand what was going on in these. For example, *Yeni Sabah*, in its analysis of the Italian elections, mentioned a possibility of an American intervention

⁷⁶⁰ McMahon, *The Cold War*, p. 30.

⁷⁶¹ Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 179.

⁷⁶² "İtalyada İktisadi ve Siyasi Kalkınma", *Akşam*, 4 February 1948, p. 2.

⁷⁶³ Effie G. Pedaliu, *Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 52.

in the case of a victory of communists or a civil war in case of the loss of communists.⁷⁶⁴ Indeed, there was a struggle between the Italian Communist Party and the Christian Democrats in this period. While the communists opposed to the American aid and tried to sabotage it, Christian Democrats were in favor of the American involvement along with the Marshall Plan. Italian public, which desperately needed the foreign aid, supported Christian Democrats and the elections of April 1948 brought the defeat of the communist party.⁷⁶⁵ When the elections resulted in the victory of Christian Democrats, the Turkish press expressed its support declaring that Italians hailed the results for hours. As *Akşam* claimed, when Italy saved from the “red nightmare” (*kızıl kâbus*), the results diminished tension in the country and American way of propaganda performed an incredible role in the defeat of communists.⁷⁶⁶ Similar to *Akşam*, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that Italy had been saved from the “red nightmare”.⁷⁶⁷

For other European countries, there were similar news to those about Italy and the common element in these conflicts was the Soviet provocations. In this regard, although the press approached to Francisco Franco, who was Caudillo of Spain from 1936 to 1975, more cautiously due to his fascist standpoint, it sympathized with him owing to his anti-communist attitude. For example, according to *Yeni Sabah*, General Franco was very eager to receive the Marshall Aid and he stated that all Spanish people would revolt against communists in the case of an invasion by the Soviet Union.⁷⁶⁸ Indeed, Turkish press indirectly supported a fascist dictator. The shift from the war-time anti-fascist attitude to the post-war anti-Soviet one could also be observed in the United States. This was a reaction to the increasing Soviet aggression in the continent and the US saw Franco as a strategic partner who was already an enemy of the Soviet

⁷⁶⁴ "İtalya'da Seçimler Bugün Yapılıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 18 April 1948, p. 1; "İtalyadaki Seçimlere Dün Başlandı", *Yeni Sabah*, 19 April 1948, p. 1.

⁷⁶⁵ Williamson, *Access to History*, p. 63.

⁷⁶⁶ "İtalya Seçiminde Hristiyan Demokratlar Üçte İki Nispetinde Kazandılar", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 20 April 1948, p. 1; "İtalyan Seçiminden Sonra", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 22 April 1948, p. 1.

⁷⁶⁷ "Kızıl Kâbus İtalya'dan Nasıl Kalktı?", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 April 1948, p. 5.

⁷⁶⁸ "İspanya, Marshall Yardımına İstekli Görünüyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 2 February 1949, p. 3.

Union and its communist ideology.⁷⁶⁹ In effect, as Blum argued, the US supported 'anti-communist' dictators all around the world and made them members of the 'Free-World' club.⁷⁷⁰ Indeed, the Turkish press, which criticized authoritarian and oppressive communist regimes as will be discussed below, directly or indirectly supported the fascist dictatorships in line with the US global anti-communist strategy. What is more, while the Turkish press was trying to affiliate communists with the Nazis as was discussed above, it had some sympathy with all parties and groups which were against communism in Europe including Franco of Spain, who had collaborated with the Nazis. In this regard, Diplomat, trying to defend Franco of Spain, claimed that Franco managed to remain neutral in spite of the strong pressure of Germany during the Second World War. For Diplomat, the tale of Franco's support to Germany had been fabricated by the communist propaganda, which made people of the Anglo-Saxon countries believe.⁷⁷¹

Being suspicious of European communists, Turkish press perceived them as the spies of the Soviet Union.⁷⁷² For instance, on February 5, 1949, Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın of *Ulus*, in his analysis of the communist groups in France, claimed that "*a communist is a traitor*".⁷⁷³ Or, reporting from *AFP*, *Ulus* claimed that "*treason is the duty of a communist*".⁷⁷⁴ Similarly, as Ömer Rıza Doğrul of *Cumhuriyet* asserted, being the 'Fifth Columns' of the despotic imperialism, European communists proved their loyalty to the Soviet Union instead of their own countries.⁷⁷⁵ The writers also tried to shape public opinion in support of their anti-communist campaigns by stressing the

⁷⁶⁹ Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain*, p. 207.

⁷⁷⁰ William Blum, *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since the Second World War* (New Jersey: Zed Books, 2003), p. 83.

⁷⁷¹ Diplomat, "Franko Amerika Yardımı Peşinde", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 December 1949, p. 3.

⁷⁷² See examples "Komünist Liderler Hakkında Kanuni Takibat Yapılacak", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 25 February 1949, p. 3; "Rusya Fransa ve İtalya'yı Eline Geçirmek İstiyor", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 26 February 1949, p. 3; Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Bizim ve Norveçin Gösterdiğimiz Cesaret", *Akşam*, 3 March 1949, p. 4; "Finlandiyada Grevler", *Zafer*, 21 August 1949, p. 1.

⁷⁷³ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Bir Komünist Bir Vatan Hainidir", *Ulus*, 5 February 1949, p. 1.

⁷⁷⁴ "Bir Komünist İhanet Etmekle Mükelleftir", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 1 March 1949, p. 3.

⁷⁷⁵ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Atlantik Paktını Körletmek için Sarfolunan Gayret", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 March 1949, p. 3.

success of the anti-communism in Western Europe and by denigrating communists in these countries. For *Cumhuriyet*, as communists were losing their last castles in the Western Europe, communist parties in these countries lost their reputation, too.⁷⁷⁶ Nevertheless, for the Turkish press, although communists lost elections in non-communist Europe, they did not give up serving the Soviet Union and so harming their own countries. In other words, despite their defeat, communists did not keep quiet and continued to stir up trouble. For example, Diplomat of *Yeni Sabah* contended that Italian communists cheered up when they learned that the Soviet Union had also atomic bombs.⁷⁷⁷

The press continued to state how communism brought instability and crises in Europe.⁷⁷⁸ On January 3, 1950, for example, Doğrul, in his analysis of the fifth columns, stated that one could be either loyal to its own country or dependent upon a foreign country. For him, the second option meant treason since, in this case, people were fifth columns of an imperialist power (i.e., the Soviet Union).⁷⁷⁹ Similarly, on January 11, 1950, *Cumhuriyet*, reporting from *Reuters*, claimed that the fifth columns in Italy and France had recently started to sabotage the American aid following the orders of the Soviet Union.⁷⁸⁰ Similar to *Cumhuriyet*, *Yeni İstanbul* claimed that the Soviet Union, pretending to be the friend of European countries, supported destructive actions of local communists.⁷⁸¹

⁷⁷⁶ "Kızılıların Batı Avrupada Son Kaleleri de Çöküyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 March 1949, p. 1.

⁷⁷⁷ Diplomat, "İtalyan Kızılılarının Sevinci", *Yeni Sabah*, 9 October 1949, p. 3.

⁷⁷⁸ For example, see news and articles: Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Fransız Millet Meclisinde Muharebe", *Ulus*, 13 March 1950, p. 1; Feridun Osman Menteşeoğlu, "Beşinci Kol Gölgele", *Ulus*, 13 March 1950, p. 2; Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Avrupa'daki Parlamentoların Manzarası Değişiyor", *Ulus*, 30 March 1950, pp. 1, 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Batı Medeniyetinin Komünistliğe Karşı Muvaffakiyeti", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 April 1950, p. 3; "Komünistler Her Yerde Barışı Baltalıyorlar", (*Daily Telegraph*) *Ulus*, 13 April 1950, p. 3; "Komünist Sabotajı", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 15 April 1950, p. 3; "Bidault, Komünistlere Şiddetle Hücum Etti", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 17 April 1950, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "İtalyada Komünistlerin Yedikleri Darbe", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 April 1950, p. 3; "Komünistlerin Yer Yer Baltalama Hareketleri", *Ulus*, 30 April 1950, p. 3; Diplomat, "Batılı Memleketlerde Tahrikler", *Yeni Sabah*, 1 May 1950, p. 3; "Batı ve Doğu Berlin'de Nümayişler Yapıldı", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 2 May 1950, p. 3.

⁷⁷⁹ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Beşinci Kollar", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 January 1950, p. 3.

⁷⁸⁰ "İtalya ve Fransada 5 inci Kol Faaliyete Geçti", (*Reuters*) *Cumhuriyet*, 11 January 1950, p. 1.

⁷⁸¹ "Moskova ve Peykleri", *Yeni İstanbul*, 29 January 1950, p. 2.

In this period, among European countries, France had a central place in the anti-communist agenda of the Turkish press. As Williamson argued that the French Communist Party, as instructed by Cominform, initiated a series of strikes and arranged protests against the American aid.⁷⁸² The Turkish press, aware of these protests in France, supported Charles de Gaulle against communists as it supported Franco in Spain and the Christian Democrats in Italy. For example, according to *Diplomat*, during their efforts to sabotage American aid to Europe, French communists provoked workers to stop transfer of military stuff.⁷⁸³ But, according to *Akşam* and *Ulus*, the plans of the French Communist Party fell into the water as a result of the formation of NATO.⁷⁸⁴ Similarly, for Topalak, as it had the strongest communist party of Europe, France was the main target of the Soviet propaganda and intervention.⁷⁸⁵ Additionally, *Yeni İstanbul* claimed that French communists declared a war against supporters of de Gaulle and even socialists.⁷⁸⁶ Moreover, it was claimed that French communists, with their unruliness, tried to sabotage the daily life through strikes.⁷⁸⁷

To sum up, similar to its anti-Soviet and anti-communist attitude at home, the Turkish press regarded communists in Europe as collaborators and fifth columns of the Soviet Union who even harmed their own countries. Being the adjuncts of an imperialist power, as the press asserted, they were not supported by their own public. From the perspective of the Turkish press, Turkish and European communists were almost the same in their “betrayal” to their ‘own’ states by collaborating with an external enemy.

⁷⁸² Williamson, *Access to History*, p. 62.

⁷⁸³ *Diplomat*, "İşçi Mukavemetleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 29 January 1950, p. 3.

⁷⁸⁴ "Fransa Sabotajcılara Aman Vermeyecek", (*UPI Ulus*, 20 February 1950, p. 3; "Atlantik Paktına Karşı Taarruz Akim Kaldı", (*Nafen Akşam*, 21 February 1950, p. 1; "Komünizmin Yeni Taarruzu", *Akşam*, 24 February 1950, p. 3.

⁷⁸⁵ Mücahit Topalak, "Fransanın Yüğü", *Zafer*, 21 February 1950, p. 4.

⁷⁸⁶ "Fransada Komünistler Yeniden Harekete Geçti", *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 March 1950, p. 2.

⁷⁸⁷ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Fransada Komünistler", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 March 1950, p. 3; "Komünistliğin Yeni Bir Hezimetini", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 March 1950, p. 1; "Romanya", *Yeni Sabah*, 7 February 1948, p. 4; "Rusya, Rusya İçinde de 'Sınır Harbi' Yapıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 16 February 1948, p. 3.

4.3.2) Political Oppression in the ‘Iron Curtain’

In addition to the destructive actions of the so-called fifth columns, how communism brought political oppression and lack of democracy was another thread of the construction of an enemy by the Turkish press. The emphasis on political oppression in the Iron Curtain was also a component of the anti-Soviet US campaigns. Even in Truman's speech of 1947, he declared that there was an oppression and a controlled press along with suppression of political freedom in the communist countries.⁷⁸⁸ In this regard, while the Turkish press continued to demonize and dehumanize the Soviet Union, it was believed that social discontent in the Eastern bloc was at its peak as a result of political oppression.⁷⁸⁹ As demonstrated by the cartoon in Figure 14 entitled “*the Soviet Heaven (!)*”, two men are talking in front of a map of Asia. After the first man says “*those independent (!) Eastern Republics do not voice their opinion*”, the second man replies “*don't you know? Huh! They are already dead*”. This claim that the life in the communist countries was like hell continued throughout the entire period. It is important to note that some of press members such as Falih Rıfıkı Atay of *Ulus*⁷⁹⁰ and Nadir Nadi of *Cumhuriyet*⁷⁹¹ wrote many articles during the 1930s following their trips to the Soviet Union, which argued that the life in the Soviet Union, contrary to claims, was not a 'hell'. As expected, during the late-1940s, the press members did not claim such things but depicted the Soviet Union as a ‘hell-like’ place.

⁷⁸⁸ “*This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States*” (12 March 1947: WCDA, Truman Doctrine, “Recommendations for Assistance to Greece and Turkey”, p. 3).

⁷⁸⁹ “Rusyada Bir İsyân Havası Esmektedir”, *Yeni Sabah*, 18 January 1948, p. 3.

⁷⁹⁰ Hande Özkan, “Falih Rıfıkı Atay”, in Ahmet İnel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 2: Kemalizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), p. 69.

⁷⁹¹ Nadir Nadi, *İki Sovyet Rusya: 1935-1965* (İstanbul: Ararat Yayınevi, 1967).



Figure 14⁷⁹²

Human rights abuses in communist countries was another issue used by the press to create and reinforce the image of enemy: apart from material conditions that people of the communist bloc possessed, their freedom of speech was also restricted as a result of oppression. In effect, during this period, the US constantly complained to the UN about human rights abuses in communist countries.⁷⁹³ In this framework, as claimed by the Turkish press, the communist regimes were oppressive by their nature and it was true not only for the Soviet Union but also for other communist countries. As an example, after communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the press began to claim that the communists restricted human rights and democracy in this country.⁷⁹⁴ Using the same title, both *Yeni Sabah* and *Akşam* claimed that the communists closed borders and seized all newspapers other than communist ones.⁷⁹⁵ Both newspapers also claimed that western powers were discontent with the change in

⁷⁹² *Ulus*, 15 July 1947, p. 1.

⁷⁹³ Williamson, *Access to History*, p. 98.

⁷⁹⁴ See examples: "Çekoslovakya'da Komünist Sansürü Arttı", *Ulus*, 14 February 1949, p. 3; "Çek Komünistleri Sahte İhtilal Hazırlıyorlarmış", (*New York Radio*) *Ulus*, 13 March 1949, p. 1.

⁷⁹⁵ "Çekoslovak Buhranı", *Yeni Sabah*, 25 February 1948, p. 3; "Çekoslovakya Buhranı", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 25 February 1948, p. 1.

government, and the communist government in Czechoslovakia was expected to further restrict freedom of thought and press.⁷⁹⁶

As was discussed in Chapter 3, the press highly benefited from the memoirs of the people, who had escaped from communist countries to the West, in its efforts to create an enemy.⁷⁹⁷ For example, *Akşam* claimed that the wife of the commercial attaché of Russia to the US, Kiril Alexiev, said that it had refused to return Russia as it could not find it in its heart that its children would grow up in Russia. For her, many parents had to hide their religious and ethical values from their kids, otherwise kids would have had suspicious and dissatisfaction, which would have meant the end of their lives.⁷⁹⁸ The speeches of those who had visited or migrated from communist countries were also present in the press. By this way, the press aimed epiphany of the Turkish communists about the living conditions of the communist countries.⁷⁹⁹ In addition to refugees, as the press claimed, there were prisoners of war captured by the Soviet Union during the Second World War who were suffering in Russian camps. For example, *Akşam*, reporting from *Tribune*, claimed that Spanish republicans, the true enemies of Franco, were in pains in the hands of the Soviet Union, which pretended to be the enemy of Franco's fascist government.⁸⁰⁰

Besides, the press tried to raise a sense of responsibility for Turkish minorities in the communist countries, by mentioning how they were in pain and portraying them as the victims of communism, with a high priority afforded to Turkish people living in Bulgaria. It might have aimed to call the past; i.e., making people to remember the Balkan Wars, which was a series of conflicts among Balkan nations and the Ottoman Empire leading to loss of the most of its territories in the Balkans. Indeed, together

⁷⁹⁶ "Çekoslavakya Komünist Hâkimiyeti Altında", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 February 1948, p. 1; "Çekoslavakyadaki Hükümet Darbesi", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 27 February 1948, p. 1; "Kızıl Perde Ardında Çekoslavakya", *Yeni Sabah*, 28 February 1948, p. 1; "Çekoslavak Vakayii Amerikada Endişe Uyandırdı", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 28 February 1948, p. 1.

⁷⁹⁷ For an example, see: "Rusya'dan 2 Hava Subayı Daha Kaçtı", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 5 February 1949, p. 3.

⁷⁹⁸ "Çocuklarımla Rusya'da Yetişmesine Razi Olamadım", (*The Readers Digest*) *Akşam*, 23 April 1948, p. 4.

⁷⁹⁹ "Stalin Misafirlerini Nasıl Ağırılıyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 1 June 1948, p. 1.

⁸⁰⁰ "İnanılmayacak Bir Hadise", (*Tribune*) *Akşam*, 4 June 1948, p. 4.

with the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and increasing activities of the communist groups in Western Europe, the strengthening of the Bulgarian armed forces increased the concern of the West over the power of the communist bloc.⁸⁰¹ Moreover, the communist government of Bulgaria, which was controlled by Moscow stood as a threatening factor for national sovereignty of Turkey. Having faced by such a threat from near territory, the Turkish press regarded Turkish minorities as people of the same race groaning under communist oppression. For example, *Yeni Sabah* stated that it was not only hostility towards Turks but it was also simply savagery and monstrosity because of what the servants of communism did to Turkish people.⁸⁰² Indeed, communist attacks over the Turks perceived as a matter of honor. *Yeni Sabah* alleged that Russian soldiers chased young Turkish girls⁸⁰³ and communist Bulgarians executed twenty Turks by shooting them after they said ‘Long Live Stalin’.⁸⁰⁴ The important point was the belief of the press that communists did all this only because these people were ‘Turk’.⁸⁰⁵ For example, as reported by *Yeni Sabah*, the Bulgarian communists shaved Turkish women's head in order to humiliate them.⁸⁰⁶ As a matter of fact, seeking to justify the anti-communist attitude, Turkish women were represented as victims of communist subversion in the columns of the newspapers. For instance, *Cumhuriyet* claimed that communists in Romania called up

⁸⁰¹ Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), p. 49.

⁸⁰² "Bulgar Paçavraları ve 'Yeni Sabah'", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 June 1948, p. 1.

⁸⁰³ "Bulgaristandaki Türkler Neler Çekiyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 17 June 1948, p. 1.

⁸⁰⁴ "Bulgaristandaki Türkler Neler Çekiyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 18 June 1948, p. 1.

⁸⁰⁵ "Bulgaristandaki Türkler Neler Çekiyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 19 June 1948, p. 1;

⁸⁰⁶ "Bulgaristandaki Türkler Neler Çekiyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 June 1948, p. 4: See other news and articles how Bulgarian communists persecuted Turkish minority and made propaganda against Turkey: "Bulgaristanda Komünist Zulmü Altında İnlıyen İrkdaşlarımız", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 February 1949, p. 1; "Bulgarların Aleyhımızdeki Nümayişlerinin Manası", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 March 1949, p. 1; "Türlere Karşı Bulgar Mezalimi", *Zafer*, 20 August 1949, p. 3; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Şımarık Komşuya Haddi Bildirilmeli!", *Zafer*, 15 September 1949, p. 1; "Komünizmden Tiksinen Bulgar Komünistleri", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 November 1948, p. 1.

all women aging between 15 and 45 for army.⁸⁰⁷ Similarly, *Zafer* claimed that, Turks (particularly women) living in Yugoslavia suffered from the communist oppression.⁸⁰⁸

Apart from living conditions of Turkish minorities, allegations of the political oppression were also utilized to further discredit the communist leadership: it was claimed that the reason for such a political oppression was that the Soviet leadership was afraid of the opening the doors to the world as it would end their regime.⁸⁰⁹ For example, *Cumhuriyet* reported that as a Bulgarian refugee from Russia said that, if it had been free to leave Russia, only ‘bears’ would have remained there.⁸¹⁰ In order to consolidate its anti-communist attitude regarding the political oppression, the press benefited from the comparison of communist regimes with western democracies as well.⁸¹¹ A key aspect of creating an enemy was the belief that these countries, unlike their western counterparts were strictly controlled by the Soviet-sponsored communist governments very.⁸¹² For example, while *Yeni Sabah* claimed that there were half a million policemen in Bulgaria, which had about only six million inhabitants.⁸¹³ As *Zafer* claimed, a Russian pilot refugee said that the life in Russia was like “the tortures of hell”.⁸¹⁴ Similarly, Topalak, asking how a political and economic dictatorship could serve “humanity” claimed that people were used as forced-labor in each communist

⁸⁰⁷ "Rumanyadan Kaçan İki Türk Kızı Şehrimizde", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 April 1949, p. 1.

⁸⁰⁸ "Yugoslavya'daki Türkler", *Zafer*, 30 May 1949, p. 1.

⁸⁰⁹ "Rusya Atom Kontrolünü Niçin İstemiyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 19 June 1948, p. 3; "Peyklerde Komünistler Birbirini Temizliyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 October 1948, p. 1; "Kızılların Korkunç Tuzakları", (*BBC Cumhuriyet*), 19 November 1948, p. 1.

⁸¹⁰ "Rusyadan Kaçan Bir Bulgarın Anlattıkları", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 October 1948, p. 1.

⁸¹¹ See examples: "Doğu ile Batı Arasındaki Uçurum Gittikçe Genişliyor", (*UPI*), *Cumhuriyet*, 9 December 1948, p. 1; "Komünistlerde Kanun Anlayışı", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 8 February 1949, p. 1; "Rusya Peyklerde Baskısını Artırdı", (*Nafen*) *Ulus*, 18 February 1949, p. 1; "Rusya'da Mecburi Çalışma Kampları", *Ulus*, 19 February 1949, p. 3; "Rusya'daki Kamplarda Feci Hayat Şartları", (*London Radio*) *Akşam*, 21 February 1949, p. 2; "Mümkün Olsa Rus Halkının Hepsini Kaçarmış?", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 4 March 1949, p. 3; "Rusya ile Peyk Devletler Münasebetleri Gerginleşti", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 March 1949, p. 4.

⁸¹² "Rusya, Romanyada da Tasfiye Hareketine Girişti", (*BBC*) *Cumhuriyet*, 17 April 1949, p. 1; "Romanyada Komünist Mezalimi", *Yeni Sabah*, 23 April 1949, p. 2; Mirza Bala, "Rusya ve Rus Esiri Milletler", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 April 1949, p. 2.

⁸¹³ "Bulgaristan'da Polis Bolluğu", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 July 1949, p. 1.

⁸¹⁴ "Rusya'da Hayat Bir Cehennem Azabıdır", *Zafer*, 22 September 1949, p. 1.

regime.⁸¹⁵ Moreover, *Yeni Sabah* argued that Soviet government did not trust even its own citizens and violate human rights.⁸¹⁶

Furthermore, the Turkish press underlined the difficulties in getting intelligence about the Iron Curtain countries. For the press, although there was distrust among communist leaders, the outside world could not learn the situation due to the existence of political tyranny. The press, attacking political leaders of the Soviet Union, asserted that Russian leaders were themselves afraid of the future, and hence they did not reflect what was going on behind closed doors.⁸¹⁷ For example, as Topalak claimed, the ‘Red Russians’ knew how to throw their own people into fire and they managed not to leak information outside the Iron Curtain.⁸¹⁸ Likewise, *Yeni İstanbul* claimed that even ‘civilized’ socialists criticized the murders of the communist governments in the name of socialism.⁸¹⁹ Therefore, as depicted by the press, ‘socialists’ outside of Iron Curtain were ‘deceived’ by the Soviet Union and they did not know the ‘real face’ of the enemy.

⁸¹⁵ Mücahit Topalak, "Atom Enerjisini Kontrol Bahsi", *Zafer*, 29 September 1949, p. 3.

⁸¹⁶ "Kafkas Türklerine Rus Mezalimi", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 October 1949, p. 5.

⁸¹⁷ Grigosi Tokayef, "Rus İdarecilerinin Korkusu", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 November 1949, p. 2; Diplomat, "Rusyada İç İhtilaf", *Yeni Sabah*, 29 November 1949, p. 3; "Her Ay 2500 Kişi Kaçıyor", *Zafer*, 15 December 1949, p. 3; Mücahit Topalak, "Hür Sendikalar Konfederasyonu", *Zafer*, 19 December 1949, p. 3; Yeni Yılın İlk Günlerinde Rusyada Durum Karanlık", (*Nafen*) *Cumhuriyet*, 2 January 1950, p. 1; Mücahit Topalak, "Gaip Esirler", *Zafer*, 8 January 1950, p. 1; "Bulgar Siyasi Mahkûmları Ağır İşlerde Çalıştırılıyor", (*Nafen*) *Akşam*, 20 January 1950, p. 1; "Peyklerde Milliyetçilik Cereyanı Artıyor", (*Nafen*) *Cumhuriyet*, 26 January 1950, p. 3; "Rokosovski Leh Kızlarını da Askere Alıyor", *Ulus*, 20 February 1950, p. 3.

⁸¹⁸ Mücahit Topalak, "Kostof ve Ötesi", *Zafer*, 15 December 1949, p. 3.

⁸¹⁹ "İç ve Dış Politika", *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 January 1950, p. 1.



Figure 15⁸²⁰

In this regard, the Turkish press continued to argue that life was a simply hell in the Soviet Union. As an illustration, in the cartoon drawn by Orhan Ural, a famous political cartoonist of that time, two old Soviet citizens are talking. When the first man says “if Stalin takes an action, the US will turn places around us to hell”, the second one replies as follows: “never mind comrade, we are already living in hell”. It is important to note that on the floor there are mice, people are wearing old and patchy clothes. Along with spider webs, there is a picture of a big nosed Stalin on the wall. Considering cracks on the wall and mice on the floor together, it is possible to argue that there are mouse holes. Moreover, a man, leaning back on the bar and smoking cigarette, seems to be very drunk. This depiction of the Soviet citizen as the ‘inebriate’

⁸²⁰ *Yeni Sabah*, 7 February 1950, p. 1.

could be observed not only in Ural's cartoons but also in those of other Turkish cartoonists. Finally, the bar tender is a fat and angry woman. Hence, according to the Turkish press, Soviet people lived in a hell and they were so unhappy with their living conditions that the only thing which they could do was to drink alcohol (particularly, vodka).

Another important theme regarding the political oppression was the notion of the lack of democracy in communist regimes. For *Yeni Sabah*, as they had a fake democracy or fraud of democracy, the elections in the Soviet Union were regarded as a comedy.⁸²¹ As both *Ulus* and *Yeni Sabah* further claimed, despite such discontent, the Free World was not able to have heard of social unrest as dissonant voices were silenced; therefore, a secret resistance to the regime was assumed to exist in the communist bloc.⁸²² Similarly, for *Cumhuriyet*, the Soviet leaders were doing their best in order to suppress nationalist movements.⁸²³ Additionally, for Doğrul of *Cumhuriyet*, it was needed to tell all the people living in communist countries that other countries had no bad intention against them. In this case, Politburo would witness its worst period in its history.⁸²⁴

To sum up, the Turkish press asserted that there was a severe political oppression in the communist countries and the communist leaders were also the enemy of their own people. In construction of an enemy, the Turkish press attempted to persuade Turkish citizens of the evil of the Soviet and communist leaders in general. Focusing on the communist leaders' lack of humanity and benefiting from the demonization of the Soviet cadre, the Turkish press drew a picture of the communist countries, in which ordinary people were suffering at the hands of the brutal leaders.

⁸²¹ "Rus Demokrasi Sahtekârlığı", (*Nafes*) *Yeni Sabah*, 13 February 1950, p. 1; "Rusya'da Dünkü Seçim Komedyası", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 March 1950, p. 1. See a similar news from *Ulus*: "Rusya'da Sözde Seçimler", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 21 February 1949, p. 3

⁸²² "Rusya'da İhtilal Bekleniyor", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 2 April 1950, p. 3; "Peyk Devletlerde Gizli Mukavemet", (*Nafes*) *Yeni Sabah*, 25 April 1950, p. 3.

⁸²³ "S. Rusyada Milliyetçilik", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 March 1950, p. 1.

⁸²⁴ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Dünyada 1 Mayıs", *Cumhuriyet*, 2 May 1950, p. 3.

4.3.3) Religious Oppression in the Communist World

Even though it played a ‘peripheral’ role in the creation of an enemy compared to other themes, the press deployed religious themes in the construction of an enemy. In order to explain why ‘religious themes’ played a ‘peripheral’ role, Turkey’s image as the protector of the Islamic world could be considered. For instance, Vala Nurettin, basing on the speech of an unnamed Pakistani professor of Islam, said that Turks were ‘exemplary’ in the Islamic World.⁸²⁵ However, such an emphasis on the role of Turkey in Muslim World should not be exaggerated. For example, on December 10, 1949, *Yeni İstanbul* opposed to the speech of Çavduri Halikuzzaman, who was a Pakistani religious leader, stating that a union among Muslim countries had to be constructed which would replace the League of Arab States. According to *Yeni İstanbul*, it was obvious that such a union would be ineffective, if one would look at the position of the Arab League against Israel; that is, several Arab states could not defeat only one non-Muslim country. As it further claimed, Truman, who was the leader of a 'Christian' country, devoted the entire wealth of his country to help all nations, regardless of their ethnic and religious orientation. As *Yeni İstanbul* concluded, Turkey's target had to be “Civilization” (*Medeniyetistan*) instead of an “Islamic union” (*İslamistan*).⁸²⁶ Therefore, the religious themes, which were not a motivation behind the foreign policy of Turkey at that moment,⁸²⁷ were used by the press only to create an enemy.

The press emphasized how religious people, who lived in the communist countries, suffered under religious oppression but there was, of course, a specific emphasis on

⁸²⁵ Vala Nurettin, "Müslüman Dünyasında Türkler Örnektir", *Akşam*, 10 June 1949, p. 3.

⁸²⁶ "İç ve Dış Politika", *Yeni İstanbul*, 10 December 1949, p. 1.

⁸²⁷ As another proof of why ‘Islam’ did not occupy a ‘central’ role in Turkish foreign policy, one of speeches of Necmettin Sadak, who was the Foreign Minister at that moment, could be considered. Sadak said that "we do not believe that international relations cannot be solely based on the principle of religion in this century. We believe that unions can be based on only common aims and interests. If there are political and economic common interests and views among certain Muslim countries, Turkey is ready for collaboration with them, like with non-Muslim countries" ("Dışişleri Bakanı Necmettin Sadakın Mühim Beyanati", *Akşam*, 9 July 1949, p. 1: "Biz, bu sırada, milletlerarası münasebetlerin yalnız din esasına dayanabileceğine kani değiliz. Birliklerin ancak müşterek gaye ve menfaatler esası üzerine kurulabileceğine inanıyoruz. Bir kısım Müslüman memleketler arasında bu gibi siyasi veya iktisadi menfaat ve görüş birlikleri olduğu takdirde Türkiye, diğer devletlerle olduğu gibi onlarla da her zaman işbirliği yapmağa hazırdır").

Muslims.⁸²⁸ For instance, *Zafer* claimed that Muslims living in China were expected to revolt against the communist government. Moreover, *Zafer* called the leader of Muslims living in China, Ma Pu Fang, as the modern Genghis Khan.⁸²⁹ The reason why *Zafer* resembled a Muslim leader to Genghis Khan was most probably the Mongol invasion in China during the thirteen century; nonetheless, Genghis Khan was not a Muslim but 'a tengrist' who invaded Muslim countries. Therefore, it is possible to argue that, *Zafer*, thinking him as a 'Turk' who was adopted as a Turkish ancestor and hence had popularity of Genghis Khan as a name, referred to him in analyzing Muslims in Communist China. Nonetheless, *Zafer* was not alone in using Muslim minorities of the communist countries in creating an enemy: For *Yeni Sabah*, the Soviet Union persecuted Muslims living in the Soviet Union, which it regarded as a cold war against Islam.⁸³⁰ As claimed by *Yeni Sabah*, unlike Jews and Armenians, Muslim minorities could not find jobs in public enterprises in Soviet Union.⁸³¹ In other words, as the press claimed, Muslims were victims of discrimination in communist countries.

In addition to Muslims, the Soviet Union was believed to suppress Catholic and Protestant Christians by prohibiting worshipping, too.⁸³² *Yeni İstanbul* claimed that communism had neither tolerance of Islam nor tenderness of Christianity that ordered goodness.⁸³³ In this context, the press saw the Catholic Christians and the Pope as the strategic partners in the struggle against the common enemy.⁸³⁴ *Diplomat*, for instance, mentioning the Pope's proposal about establishing a front of religion against

⁸²⁸ See examples: "Müslümanlara Sovyet Mezalimi", *Zafer*, 28 October 1949, p. 3; "Sovyet Rusyada İslamlara Zulüm", *Zafer*, 4 November 1949, p. 3; "Sovyet Tazyikinden Kaçan Müslümanlar", (*Nafen*) *Zafer*, 12 May 1950, p. 1.

⁸²⁹ "Ölünceye Kadar Komünizme Karşı Mücadeleye And İçti", *Zafer*, 5 July 1949, p. 3; "Orta Asyada Asri Cengiz Han Çıktı", *Zafer*, 14 August 1949, p. 3.

⁸³⁰ "İslamiyete Karşı Rus Soğuk Harbi Arttı", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 July 1949, p. 5; "Rusyada İslamlara İşkence Yapılıyor", (*Nafen*) *Yeni Sabah*, 18 December 1949, p. 3.

⁸³¹ "Bir Bulgar Papazı Elleri Kelepçeli Olduğu Halde Türkiye'ye Sığındı", *Ulus*, 9 February 1949, p. 1; "Sovyet Rusyadaki Müslüman Azınlık", *Zafer*, 18 December 1949, p. 3.

⁸³² *Diplomat*, "Baltık Memleketlerinin Ruslaştırılması", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 July 1949, p. 3.

⁸³³ "Sovyet Politikasına Dair", *Yeni İstanbul*, 14 March 1950, p. 1.

⁸³⁴ "Komünistliğe Karşı Müslüman-Katolik Bloku", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 9 February 1950, p. 3; "Komünizme Karşı Bir İslam-Hıristiyan Cephe Birliği", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 19 March 1950, p. 4.

communism between Muslims and Catholic and Protestant Christians, said that the Islamic world had no leader like the Pope as the leader of Catholic world.⁸³⁵ Moreover, as *Yeni Sabah* claimed, the Vatican, fighting against “godless people” (*Allahsızlar*), anathematized those involving in communist activities.⁸³⁶

As such, for the press, the communists were against all religions but not Orthodox Christianity because the communist leadership managed to use the power of the Orthodox Church in Moscow. For instance, Asım Us claimed that the Russian Orthodox Church was under the control of the Soviet Communist Party.⁸³⁷ Indeed, as Psomiades argued, the Soviet Union tried to increase its control in the Middle East through the Orthodox Christians of the region at that moment.⁸³⁸ For this reason, although the press appraised the anti-communist character of the Catholic Church, there was an opposite view on the Orthodox Church. Topalak, talking about the fight against the Iron Curtain, said that communists did not intervene in the Orthodox Church although they were against the Catholic Church. As he maintained, the thing that the Soviet Union did not want or was afraid of was not religion but institutions which represented religion.⁸³⁹ Similarly, *Yeni İstanbul* claimed that Moscow, painting the old policy of being the defender of the Orthodoxy to red, rehashed it and it was gearing up for the invasion of the Balkans and Middle East with this “wooden horse”.⁸⁴⁰ In effect, *Yeni İstanbul*, resembling the Soviet policy to the 'Trojan Horse', which was a ‘trick’, claimed that the Soviet Union would invade countries just as the Greeks occupied the city of Troy. Therefore, a negative quality that the press assigned to the enemy was the notion that Turkey’s enemy was also the enemy of all religious people and groups, particularly Muslims, to whom particularly the oppositional press

⁸³⁵ Diplomat, "Komünizme Karşı Din Cephesi", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 February 1950, p. 3.

⁸³⁶ "Allahsızlara Karşı Savaş", (*Nafen*) *Yeni Sabah*, 27 February 1950, p. 1.

⁸³⁷ Asım Us, "Moskova Ortodoks Kilisesi Kızıl Komünistliğin Emrinde", *Vakit*, 7 June 1947, p. 1.

⁸³⁸ Harry J.Psomiades, “Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East” *Middle East Journal*, 11.4 (1957), pp. 371-381.

⁸³⁹ Mücahit Topalak, "Demir Perde Arkasında Dine Karşı Savaş", *Zafer*, 13 October 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁴⁰ "İç ve Dış Politika", *Yeni İstanbul*, 16 January 1950, p. 1: “Moskova, eski ortodoks hamiliği politikasını, kızıla boyayarak, yeniden ele alıyor ve Balkanlarla Ortadoğuyu, hususi surette imal ettiği bu tahtadan at ile fethetmeye hazırlanıyor demektir”.

had a sentimental attachment. Taking the fact that the Turkish foreign policy of that time was not based on religious theme into account, it is possible to claim that religious themes had a propaganda value for the Turkish press in creating a brutal image of the Soviet Union.

4.3.4) Communism – ‘Source of Poverty’

Another theme of the creation of an enemy by the press was the notion of how communism breeds poverty. Opposing the claims of communists, the press argued that there was poverty in the Iron Curtain and the Soviet leaders had no concern even for workers’ rights. In the beginning of the period, the anti-communist attitude based on how communism leads to poverty was relatively weaker compared to the post-1948 era. For example, on August 28, 1945, *Akşam* claimed that the discontent among Bulgarian farmers was increasing and they were attacking the communists.⁸⁴¹ Similarly, on November 10, 1947, *Ulus*, in its analysis of the “real” situation in the Soviet Union, claimed that communism meant “wretchedness”.⁸⁴²




Figure 16⁸⁴³

⁸⁴¹ "Bulgaristan'da Muhalefēt Artıyor", *Akşam*, 28 August 1945, p. 2.

⁸⁴² "Rusya'nın Hakiki İç Durumu", *Ulus*, 10 November 1947, p. 3.

⁸⁴³ *Ulus*, 15 March 1947, p. 1.

The press seized the opportunity in order to humiliate and brutalize the fabricated enemy at every turn. It was claimed that both due to government's bad economic policies and deterioration in agricultural production, there emerged a risk of hunger in these countries. As reported by *Yeni Sabah*, Russian people and “unfortunate” (*bedbaht*) citizens of satellite countries shed tears of blood because of hunger and fear in clutches of heartbreaking misery and under red fist.⁸⁴⁴ For the press, the risk of hunger existed not only in Russia but in other enemy-occupied countries as well: referring to the report of a Swiss journalist, *Akşam* said that there was no food in Yugoslavia, where the situation was getting worse day by day.⁸⁴⁵ As Figure 16 shows, it is stated in the cartoon that if the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) would not give wheat, Yugoslav people would die from hunger. When the disabled man representing Yugoslavia, knocks the door, UNRRA asks "who is it", the man replies "the hungry". It is important to note that “aç” means both “hungry” and “open” in Turkish.

As such, an important objective of creating an enemy was to demonstrate poor living conditions in communist countries. As reported by the press, communism and the Soviet Union turned these countries into a scene of calamity, where people suffered from hunger and scarcity at the hands of authoritarian governments, which restricted freedom of speech and abused human rights. The press also pointed out poor economic performance of communist countries.⁸⁴⁶ For example, Peyami Safa of *Ulus*, in his analysis of “communism and misery” claimed that communism, similar to “tuberculosis”, was a disease of poverty and misery. As Safa claimed, to destroy communism, similar to the struggle against tuberculosis, poverty had to be eliminated.⁸⁴⁷ Similarly, Fenik thought that the origin of conflicts between the Soviet

⁸⁴⁴ "Kızıl Propaganda ve Sovyet Rusya", *Yeni Sabah*, 19 April 1948, p. 1: "Rus halkı ve peyk memleketlerin bedbaht vatandaşları bugün içler acısı bir sefaletin pençesinde ve kızıl bir yumruğun altında hem açlıktan hem de korkudan kan ağlamaktadır".

⁸⁴⁵ "Yugoslavya Ne Halde?", (*Journal de Geneve*) *Akşam*, 28 May 1948, p. 5.

⁸⁴⁶ See examples: "Ekmek Yerine Açlık Veren Rusya", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 17 February 1949, p. 3; Diplomat, "Sovyetlerde", *Yeni Sabah*, 18 May 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁴⁷ Peyami Safa, "Komünizm ve Sefalet", *Ulus*, 7 March 1949, p. 1.

Union and the West was not the war of ideologies but the problem of economic cost; that is, people were cheap in Russia (in general, in the Iron Curtain) whereas people were invaluablely expensive in the western world. In western world, as Fenik believed, the people had all rights except from the death while the only right of people in the communist bloc was the death.⁸⁴⁸ Hence, for the press, the poor economic performance, and its 'natural' result of poverty, caused hunger in these countries.

Bulgaria was another 'poor' and 'hungry' country, as the Turkish press claimed. *Zafer*, regarding the current situation of Bulgaria as pathetic, reported that contagious diseases in Bulgaria increased and suspects were sent into camps.⁸⁴⁹ As both *Zafer* and *Yeni Sabah* claimed, Bulgaria was on the eve of hunger and drought.⁸⁵⁰ In addition to Bulgaria, there were news about how the communist China suffered from hunger and poverty. For example, *Yeni Sabah*, reporting from *AP*, claimed that there emerged the problem of hunger in China following the communist revolution.⁸⁵¹ Similarly, Topalak claimed that, since rice could not be cultivated sufficiently because of communists, Chinese people were exposed to the danger of hunger. He saw one solution to end hunger in China, which was the rapprochement of China to the West. However, as he asserted, the Chinese communist government could not get closer to the West because of its communist principles.⁸⁵² Similar to the oppositional press, for the governmental newspapers, both in the Soviet Union and Communist China, millions of people were expected to die due to hunger.⁸⁵³

⁸⁴⁸ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Sovyet Komedyası", *Zafer*, 30 May 1949, p. 3. See a similar article: Mücahit Topalak, "Demir Perde Arkasında Dinler", *Zafer*, 5 June 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁴⁹ "Bulgaristanın Acıklı Hali", *Zafer*, 4 July 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁵⁰ "Bulgaristan Bir Kıtık Arefesinde", *Zafer*, 12 November 1949, p. 3; "Bulgaristanda Açlık Tehlikesi", (*Nafen*) *Yeni Sabah*, 15 November 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁵¹ "Komünist Çinde Açlık Başladı", (*AP*) *Yeni Sabah*, 9 February 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁵² Mücahit Topalak, "Çin'de Açlık", *Zafer*, 25 March 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁵³ "Kızıl Çin'de Sefalet!", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 18 February 1950, p. 3; "Çinde 40 Milyon İnsan Aç ve Yardıma Muhtaç", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 16 March 1950, p. 1; "Rusyada Tarım İşleri Gittikçe Bozuluyor", (*Nafen*) *Akşam*, 18 March 1950, p. 1; ""Komünist Çinde Kıtık Başladı", *Ulus*, 18 March 1950, p. 3; "Komünist Çin'de Milyonlarca İnsan Açlıktan Ölüyor", (*Reuters*) *Ulus*, 23 March 1950, p. 3."

More essentially, the other important theme of the creation of an enemy was the so-called betrayal of the communists to the working class. As stated in Nadi's article, if one would look at the sad scene that the endless world behind the Iron Curtain showed, Cominform had lost its all guns. As known by itself, it was the one who betrayed the working class, for whom it pretended to wage a war against the capitalists.⁸⁵⁴ Similarly, for *Zafer*, even *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party, complained about the decline in production of state-owned factories.⁸⁵⁵ Giving such a bad life conditions to the working class as the communist leaders promised, Soviet communism was regarded as a degenerated system.

To sum up, the creation of an enemy by the press asserted that communism generated poverty and hunger and the communist leaders even betrayed the proletariat. Having drawn a cumulative hatred image of the Soviet Union and communism in general, the Turkish press utilized as many as themes it could use in order to create an enemy. Accordingly, for the Turkish press, this enemy might be anywhere, as the Soviet spies in Turkey, as the Fifth Columns in non-communist Europe, as the brutal leaders who persecuted not only religious minorities but also their own citizens. Consequently, by May 1950, the Soviet image, which the Turkish press had drawn throughout the period, represented everything that was 'evil' both in communist and non-communist worlds.

4.3.4) Opposition to the Soviet Union within the Communist Block

To a degree, the press differentiated one enemy from another and during its efforts to create an enemy, it searched for possible splits within the Communist Bloc, which might weaken the dominant position of the Soviet Union in the bloc because Stalin's Soviet Union was a more dangerous enemy than other communist countries. In effect, the press continuously complained about the Russian dominance over other communist countries. For example, as claimed by *Yeni Sabah*, there was Russian dominance in the bloc and Russia tried to destroy all potential leaders in the bloc despite the fact that the Soviet Union pretended to be the defender of peace (*sulh*

⁸⁵⁴ Nadir Nadi, "Bukalemun", *Cumhuriyet*, 15 March 1950, p. 1.

⁸⁵⁵ "Sovyet Rusyanın Ekonomik Durumu", *Zafer*, 28 April 1950, p. 3.

hamisi).⁸⁵⁶ For the press, there was the domination of the Soviet Union in the Iron Curtain but there were certain splits within the communist bloc. In other words, although they were all communist, therefore Turkey's enemy; they were not all the same.

4.3.4.1) Tito's Yugoslavia

The most important figure that resisted the Soviet dominance was Josip Broz Tito, who was the leader of the Yugoslavian Partisans in the resistance against the Nazis and was the prime minister of Yugoslavia from 1944 to 1953 and the president from 1953 to 1980. Pictures of Tito repeatedly appeared in the newspapers. In the beginning of the period, the press claimed that Tito had good relations with the Soviet Union. For example, on July 9, 1945, *Akşam* claimed that Tito would attack Greeks and, unlike 1941 when the Nazis attacked to Yugoslavia, he was not alone but he had the Soviet Union in his side this time.⁸⁵⁷ In reality, Tito was one of the few European leaders who resisted the Axis powers and he had a very limited help from Moscow.⁸⁵⁸ While the press, to some extent, ignored Tito's role in defeating the Nazis, Tito's image in the press as a supporter of the Soviet Union continued until the late-1948 and Tito remained as an 'ordinary' communist leader who obeyed the orders of his master (i.e., Stalin).⁸⁵⁹ For example, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that Tito regarded Russia as the only

⁸⁵⁶ "Kominformun Bir Teşebbüsü", *Yeni Sabah*, 7 June 1948, p. 3; For other examples, see: Halkçı, "Adalet Adalete...", *Akşam*, 20 June 1948, p. 1; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Bulgaristan'daki Tasfiye ve Biz", *Zafer*, 30 April 1949, p. 3; "Bulgaristan'daki Rus Baskısı Gittikçe Artıyor", *Zafer*, 3 May 1949, p. 2; "Sovyetler Marshall Planına Karşı Molotov Planı Hazırlamışlar", (*Nafen*) *Akşam*, 3 May 1949, p. 1; "Rusya Peyklerini Koruyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 June 1949, p. 1; "Her Şey Vasıta, Gaye: Rusya!", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 March 1950, p. 1.

⁸⁵⁷ "Tito Yunanlılara Hücum Ediyor", *Akşam*, 9 July 1945, p. 2.

⁸⁵⁸ Reynolds, "The European Dimension of the Cold War", p. 127.

⁸⁵⁹ "Tito Hükümetine Bir Nota Verildi", *Ulus*, 16 May 1945, p. 3; Mrl. Aleksander Triyeste'ye Gitti, *Ulus*, 2 June 1945, p. 1; "Yugoslavların Propagandası Son Haddinde", (*Daily Mail*) *Ulus*, 29 August 1945, p. 3.

country that he could trust⁸⁶⁰ and the Soviet Union appreciated Tito in return to his loyalty.⁸⁶¹

The key change in the perception of Tito by the press began to appear following the tension between Tito and Stalin. While Tito was trying to break Stalin's hegemony through bilateral relations with other communist countries and create an international organization as an alternative to Comintern, Moscow began to perceive him as a threat to its hegemony.⁸⁶² As a matter of fact, Tito's challenge showed limitation of the Soviet Union in the communist bloc,⁸⁶³ the Turkish press was unsurprisingly very pleased with Tito-Stalin split. There were four main points in this news perception of Tito. The first one was the fear of the press about a rebellion against Tito's regime in Yugoslavia, which would be provoked by the Soviet Union and Cominform.⁸⁶⁴ This fear was related to Tito's resistance to Moscow as the 'only' communist leader who could dare such a thing at that moment. Accordingly, there were sometimes compliments for Tito by journalists. Topalak, for example, said that Tito, in contrast to other communist leaders such as Dimitrov of Bulgaria or Ana Pauker, who was the Foreign Minister of Romania from 1947 to 1952, was a "smart man" since he had waited before taking an action against Moscow instead pretended to be loyal to Moscow until he became strong enough to revolt.⁸⁶⁵ Similarly, the press pointed out Tito's personality and

⁸⁶⁰ "Rusya Bu Anda Harbe Karar Verebilir", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 January 1948, p. 3.

⁸⁶¹ "Rusya, Balkan Federasyonu Teşkiline Neden Muarız?", *Yeni Sabah*, 30 January 1948, p. 1.

⁸⁶² Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism*, pp. 30-31.

⁸⁶³ Norman A. Graebner, "Myth and Reality: America's Rhetorical Cold War", in Martin J. Medhurst and Henry W. Brands (eds.), *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2000), p. 30.

⁸⁶⁴ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Mareşal Tito ile Kremlin Arasındaki Dava", 9 October 1948, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Kominformun Yugoslavya ile Mücadelesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 March 1949, p. 3; "Rusya, Titoya Karşı Hücumlarını Şiddetlendirdi", (*Nafen*) *Akşam*, 4 June 1949, p. 2; Enis Tahsin Til, "Kominform-Yugoslavya Gerginliği", *Akşam*, 18 June 1949, p. 2; "Balkanlarda Yeni Rus Tahrikleri", *Zafer*, 22 August 1949, p. 1; "Tito-Stalin Davası Had Bir Safhada", *Zafer*, 24 August 1949, p. 3; Mücahit Topalak, "Tito Meselesi Bir Balondur", *Zafer*, 28 August 1949, p. 3; "Rusya Yunanlılardan Sonra Titoya Döndü", *Zafer*, 18 October 1949, p. 1; "Rusya, Balkan Harbi Hazırlıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 December 1949, p. 1; "Rusya Tito'yu Ancak Silahla Yenebilir", *Zafer*, 12 December 1949, p. 1; "Tito ile Bulgaristanın Arası Gittikçe Açılıyor", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 23 January 1950, p. 1; "Rusya Titoya Karşı Hareket Hazırlıyor", (*Nafen*) *Akşam*, 12 April 1950, p. 2; "Yugoslav Dış Siyasetinde Büyük Değişiklik Oldu", *Yeni İstanbul*, 28 April 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁶⁵ Mücahit Topalak, "Tito Bir Muamma Değildir", *Zafer*, 20 June 1949, p. 3.

praised his anti-Soviet policies: being a bad example for other communist countries, Tito was assumed to threaten the authority and prestige of Stalin as nationalist policies were spread into the satellite countries.⁸⁶⁶ For this reason, *Yeni İstanbul* thought that Tito deserved a prize from the West for his success to limit Russian access to the Adriatic and Mediterranean regions.⁸⁶⁷ This sympathy towards Tito by the press members could also be observed from how they called him. The press had initially called both Tito and Stalin⁸⁶⁸ “Marshall” (*Mareşal*) due to their military successes during the Second World War, however, following the Turkish-Soviet tension, the press did not use this title for Stalin but for Tito.⁸⁶⁹

Nonetheless, all journalists agreed that Tito was ‘still’ a communist. *Akşam*, in its analysis of ‘Titoism’, reached the conclusion that the reason for Moscow's anger of Tito was not his separation from communism or his challenge to Russia in foreign affairs. As further claimed by *Akşam*, Tito was individually one hundred percentage communist, as a radical and red one, and Yugoslavia was completely a Sovietized country in its internal administration and organization. As *Akşam* claimed, the reason why Moscow did not like Tito was that he was reluctant to implement Russian orders blindly and he rejected certain policies such as agricultural ones since he thought that these policies were not applicable for local conditions of Yugoslavia.⁸⁷⁰ That is to say, in spite of all compliments about Tito’s policy towards the Soviet Union and his close relations with the West, the press was always aware of the fact that Tito was still a

⁸⁶⁶ "Peyk Devletlerde", *Zafer*, 21 June 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁶⁷ "Tito'ya Ödenmesi Gereken Mükâfat", *Yeni İstanbul*, 2 May 1950, p. 2.

⁸⁶⁸ Necmettin Sadak, "Sovyet Rusyanın Zaferi ve Avrupa Sulhu", *Akşam*, 11 May 1945, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁶⁹ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Mareşal Tito ile Kremlin Arasındaki Dava", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 October 1948, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Kominformun Yugoslavya ile Mücadelesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 March 1949, p. 3; Diplomat, "Yugoslavya Amerikaya Yanaşıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 July 1949, p. 3; Diplomat, "Tito ve Amerika", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 August 1949, p. 3; Diplomat, "Titoya Yardım", *Yeni Sabah*, 5 September 1949, p. 3; Diplomat, "Mareşal Tito'nun Amerikaya Yanaşması", *Yeni Sabah*, 16 October 1949, p. 3; "Rusya Tito'yu Ancak Silahla Yenebilir", *Zafer*, 12 December 1949, p. 1; "Mareşal Tito ile Bir Mülakat", (Reuters) *Ulus*, 9 April 1950, pp. 1-3.

⁸⁷⁰ "Titistlik - Titoculuk", *Akşam*, 26 June 1949, p. 1: "*Moskovanın Titoya karşı hiddetinin sebebi, Yugoslavyanın içeride Komünistlikten ayrılmış olması, yahud dış politikada Sovyet Rusyaya kafa tutması değildir. Tito, şahsen, yüzde yüz Komünisttir. Hem de mutaassıp, tam kızıl bir Komünisttir. Yugoslavya, iç idaresi ve teşkilatı bakımından baştanbaşa Sovyetleştirilmiş bir memlekettir[...] Bunun sebebi, sadece, Titonun bazı Moskova emirlerini körü körüne yerine getirmek istememesi ve bilhassa köylüye tatbik edilmesi istenen kararların, Yugoslav bünyesine uymadığını söylemesidir.*"

communist. For example, Diplomat was very sure that Tito had never abandoned the principles of communism and he had only a disagreement with Moscow.⁸⁷¹

Accordingly, the press was also critical of his communist policies in Yugoslavia. For example, as claimed by Diplomat of *Yeni Sabah*, Tito, benefiting from his struggles with the Soviet Union, constructed communism in the country more easily and accused the opposition of being Soviet spies.⁸⁷² Similarly, Yusuf Mutlu of *Yeni İstanbul* thought that despite his hostility towards Cominform, Tito strongly supported communism.⁸⁷³ Moreover, *Yeni İstanbul* argued that Tito's Yugoslavia was communist in terms of its ideology, but, only did not obey, so Yugoslavia separated its ideology from its foreign policy.⁸⁷⁴

Finally, for the Turkish press, the West had to benefit from the splits between the communist countries.⁸⁷⁵ As the tension between Tito's Yugoslavia and other communist countries were increasing, the press both expected and hoped the rapprochement of Tito to the West. Williamson argued that the split between Tito and Stalin in 1948 showed the fragility of the Communist bloc and provided an opportunity to undermine the Soviet hegemony. Consequently, the US provided military and economic assistance to Tito's Yugoslavia.⁸⁷⁶ According to Diplomat, for example, Tito also had to get closer to the West as he was completely isolated in the Balkans by other communist countries and, that's why he endeavored himself to be a part of the western

⁸⁷¹ Diplomat, "Titoya Yardım", *Yeni Sabah*, 5 September 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁷² Diplomat, "Tito Bir Oyun Mu Oynuyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 December 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁷³ Yusuf Mutlu, "Dünyanın Gözü Tito'da", *Yeni İstanbul*, 4 January 1950, p. 4.

⁸⁷⁴ "Tito'nun Seçim Nutku", *Yeni İstanbul*, 20 February 1950, p. 1.

⁸⁷⁵ "Yugoslavya ile Batılı Müttefikler Arasında Görüşmeler Oluyormuş", *Ulus*, 13 February 1949, p. 1; "Tito Yugoslavyası ve Arnavutluk", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 February 1949, p. 5; "Kominform Tito'ya Karşı Harekete Geçti", *Ulus*, 2 March 1949, p. 1; Diplomat, "İngilterede Tasarruf", *Yeni Sabah*, 28 October 1949, p. 3. Yusuf Mutlu, "Ruslar, 1950 Başında Batılılara Yaklaşma Manevrası Yapacak", *Yeni İstanbul*, 9 December 1949, p. 4; "Tito - Stalin Kavgası Kat'i Safhaya Giriyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 January 1950, p. 1.

⁸⁷⁶ Williamson, *Access to History*, p. 98.

world.⁸⁷⁷ In this regard, he wrote that the American aid to Yugoslavia as the first aid to a communist country during the course of the Cold War.⁸⁷⁸

In effect, for the press, Tito put forward an alternative third way, which refuted both Soviet communism and the western capitalism. For example, as maintained by *Yeni Sabah*, Tito wanted other countries to participate in his separatist movement such as through the establishment of a Balkan federation, which would be free of Soviet pressure and independent from both the East and the West.⁸⁷⁹ As *Ulus* claimed, Tito was against both capitalist and communist camps.⁸⁸⁰ Similarly, Dođrul argued that Yugoslavia taught a lesson to other satellite states as these countries could save themselves from the Soviet pressure, and this would be a very painful experience for the Soviet leadership.⁸⁸¹ As such, Tito appeared on the pages of Turkish newspapers during this period both as a ‘hero’, who managed to resist Stalin’s Cominform, and a ‘communist dictator’, who suppressed the domestic opposition.

4.3.4.2) Other Titos? Mao and Enver Hoxha

In addition to Tito, the press both expected and hoped that other communist leaders would also oppose the Soviet dominance in the Communist Bloc. In this regard, during this period, the rise of communism in China raised a number of questions for Turkish newspapers and the press continuously compared Mao Zedong of China with Tito with respect to his attitude to the Soviet Union. Similar to their counterparts in the US,⁸⁸² the Turkish press hoped that Mao would be a ‘Titoist’ leader who would not accept the Soviet hegemony. For example, as claimed by *Yeni Sabah*, Stalin was very afraid of Mao, as Stalin believed that Mao would be another “rebellious Tito” (*isyankar*

⁸⁷⁷ Diplomat, "Yugoslavya Amerikaya Yanařıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 July 1949, p. 3; Diplomat, "Mareřal Tito'nun Amerikaya Yanařması", *Yeni Sabah*, 16 October 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁷⁸ Diplomat, "Tito ve Amerika", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 August 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁷⁹ "Tito, Politikasını İzah Ediyor", *Yeni İstanbul*, 7 March 1950, p. 1.

⁸⁸⁰ "Mareřal Tito ile Bir Mülakat", (*Reuters*) *Ulus*, 9 April 1950, pp. 1, 3; "Tito Blokların Aleyhinde", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 29 April 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁸¹ Ömer Rıza Dođrul, "Hürriyet ve İstiklalden Kurtulmak", *Cumhuriyet*, 7 April 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁸² Robert C. North, "The Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1950" *Far Eastern Survey* 19.13 (1950), p. 125.

Tito).⁸⁸³ China, from the viewpoints of the press, was a different from Russia on account of its ideological orientation. Topalak used the term 'yellow communism' to differentiate it from 'red' one.⁸⁸⁴ For him, there were two Titos: Yugoslavia's Tito and China's Mao.⁸⁸⁵ Similar to Topalak, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that the communist leader of China would be Asia's Tito.⁸⁸⁶

While the relations between the Soviet Union and Mao began to improve,⁸⁸⁷ Topalak changed his mind and stated that Mao was a communist depended on Moscow whereas Tito was a communist who wanted to get rid of Russia.⁸⁸⁸ He called the establishment of communist China as "the sleeping giant awakened".⁸⁸⁹ In contrast to Topalak, Diplomat, being optimistic about China's relations with the Soviet Union at that moment, thought that China, covering a huge geography, might try to be the leader of communist world instead of being a satellite of Moscow.⁸⁹⁰ In agreement with Diplomat, for *Cumhuriyet*, Mao repudiated the Soviet leadership in industrialization of China and protected integrity of China.⁸⁹¹ Moreover, Doğrul pondered that China would not be a Soviet satellite by giving whole country to Russia.⁸⁹² To sum up, in the beginning of the Chinese Revolution, it was believed that Mao's China emerged as a rival to the Soviet Union.⁸⁹³

However, after the meeting between Stalin and Mao held in Moscow at the very beginning of 1950, the perception of Mao continued to change and there was a consensus that Soviet Union managed to come to an agreement with China about non-

⁸⁸³ "Stalin, Komünist Çinden Niçin Korkuyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 February 1949, p. 5.

⁸⁸⁴ Mücahit Topalak, "Sarı Komünizm", *Zafer*, 11 June 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁸⁵ Mücahit Topalak, "İki Tito Arasında", *Zafer*, 6 July 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁸⁶ "Çin Komünistleri Hükümet Kurdu", *Yeni Sabah*, 2 October 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁸⁷ Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 44.

⁸⁸⁸ Mücahit Topalak, "İki Haber ve İki Kıt'a", *Zafer*, 4 October 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁸⁹ Mücahit Topalak, "Uyuyan Dev Uyandı", *Zafer*, 6 November 1949, p. 3.

⁸⁹⁰ Diplomat, "Rusya ve Çin", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 January 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁹¹ "Komünist Çin, Sovyet Rusyaya Meydan Okuyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 18 January 1950, p. 1.

⁸⁹² Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Kızıl Çin", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 January 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁹³ "Moskovada Cereyan Eden Müzakerelerin İçyüzü", *Yeni İstanbul*, 11 February 1950, p. 4.

interference in each other's internal affairs.⁸⁹⁴ Jian argued that Mao was concerned with maintaining the revolution and this affected his relations with external powers, accordingly he strengthened his relations with Moscow rather than with capitalist western countries.⁸⁹⁵ Diplomat interpreted the Chinese-Soviet alliance as an expansion of the communist bloc, which ranged from Berlin to Far East.⁸⁹⁶ Contrary to Diplomat, Topalak contended that Chinese communism, contrary to Soviet communism, was depended on land reforms more and Mao, as a "peasant" (*köylü çocuğu*), had always wanted to reform the land system. So, as Stalin knew that a China that devoted all its sources to agriculture would become eventually dependent on the West, he did not approve Mao's agricultural reforms.⁸⁹⁷ Similarly, *Yeni İstanbul* noted that the Soviet cadre approached Mao very cautiously after taking a lesson from the case of Tito.⁸⁹⁸

Following the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which was signed on February 14, 1950, the press further lost its hope for Mao becoming a second Tito. For Diplomat, there was no evidence that Mao would be a second Tito.⁸⁹⁹ Based on this alliance, the Soviet Union was strengthened and had access to not only its own army but also that of China in its efforts to conquer the world.⁹⁰⁰ To criticize this alliance, *Yeni İstanbul* belittled "hungry China" (*Aç Çin*), which sent food stuff to the Soviet Union as required by the agreement between two countries.⁹⁰¹ Hence, by the mid-1950, the image of Mao in the Turkish press as the second Tito came to an end because of Mao's drive to Moscow.

⁸⁹⁴ "Çin Komünistleri Moskova'da Gözaltı Edildi", (*UPI Ulus*, 9 February 1950, p. 3; "Sovyet Rusya-Çin Andlaşmasında Çinin Ağır Bastığı Anlaşıyor", *Yeni İstanbul*, 16 February 1950, p. 1.

⁸⁹⁵ Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, pp. 47-48.

⁸⁹⁶ Diplomat, "Çin-Rus İttifakı", *Yeni Sabah*, 17 February 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁹⁷ Mücahit Topalak, "Mao Çe Tung Çine Dönüyor", *Zafer*, 19 February 1950, p. 3.

⁸⁹⁸ "Washington'ın Siyasi Görüşü", *Yeni İstanbul*, 18 February 1950, p. 1.

⁸⁹⁹ Diplomat, "Çin ve Rus Komünistleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 February 1950, p. 3.

⁹⁰⁰ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "İkisinden Biri", *Ulus*, 7 March 1950, p. 1; "Komünizme Karşı En Mükemmel Müdafaa", *Yeni İstanbul*, 13 April 1950, p. 1.

⁹⁰¹ "Aç Çin, Sovyet Rusyaya Gıda Maddesi Gönderiyor", *Yeni İstanbul*, 19 April 1950, p. 3.

Although it did not attach an equal significance to him to that of Mao, the press also expected Enver Hoxha, who was the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Albania from 1941 to 1985, to be another Tito. For example, as claimed by Mücahit Topalak of *Zafer*, the time of the decision for Enver Hoxha had already come: either he would die as a prisoner of Moscow or America or by taking care of his own affairs himself.⁹⁰² Similarly, *Yeni Sabah* mentioned about the possibility of Tiran's exit from the Iron Curtain and participation in Tito's movement.⁹⁰³ For *Yeni Sabah*, Enver Hoxha had already been excluded in the Balkans by the Soviet Union.⁹⁰⁴ Moreover, Diplomat claimed that the Soviet Union tried to raise a new leader that would replace Enver Hoxha and do whatever the Soviet Union would demand.⁹⁰⁵ However, the western powers tried to remove him from the power from 1949 to 1952 and there was no sign showing that Enver Hoxha would be another Tito at that moment.⁹⁰⁶ In other words, contrary to expectations of the Turkish press about Enver Hoxha for his capacity to become another Tito, in reality, Enver Hoxha had good relations with the Soviet Union in this period.

This chapter examined how the Turkish press became an effective tool for the creation of an enemy. In the face of worsening relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union, the Turkish press needed to create an enemy; that is, the 'War of Nerves' waged by the Soviet Union and the 'Cold War', which Turkey became a part of it, demanded an 'enemy'. And so, confronted by the Soviet demands, the press in Turkey drew a negative image of the Communist World (specifically, the Soviet Union). Presenting the perception that 'Turkey was under threat' and along the lines of the government's anti-communist actions, the press also approached to communist groups in Turkey in a very suspicious way. Making a maximum effort to justify the creation of an enemy, the Turkish press drew a picture of communism in the world as the fifth columns of the Soviet Union in Europe which caused nothing but destruction and instability, the

⁹⁰² Mücahit Topalak, "Arnavutluk Yaşayamaz", *Zafer*, 14 September 1949, p. 3.

⁹⁰³ "Arnavutlukta Bir İhtilal Havası Var", *Yeni Sabah*, 16 November 1949, p. 1.

⁹⁰⁴ "Enver Hoca, Balkanlarda Tecrit Edilmiş Oluyor", *Yeni İstanbul*, 14 February 1950, p. 4.

⁹⁰⁵ Diplomat, "Arnavutluk ve Rusya", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 December 1949, p. 3.

⁹⁰⁶ Williamson, *Access to History*, p. 98.

communist dictatorships which oppressed people in political and religious terms and a regime which brings poverty by betraying even the proletariat. Moreover, the Turkish press was very interested in the splits within the communist world, supporting the idea that communist leaders were not all the same and at least there were some people who was 'the lesser evil' such as Tito.

In a broader context, the enemy was the communist bloc, which was dominated by the Soviet Union. This enemy was a 'barbaric' threat not only to Turkey but also to the 'world peace' and 'free world'. Nonetheless, in a narrower context, the enemy was the leaders of the Soviet Union and other communist countries who were taking orders from Moscow as well as communist groups and parties all around the world. In other words, people living in the Soviet Union including both Muslim minorities and working classes, were 'desperate' people who were suppressed by the enemy leaders. In a similar way, in non-Soviet communist countries, the majority of people suffered from poverty and hunger at the hands of a small group of communists who collaborated with the enemy. All these attempts of both the governmental and oppositional press contributed to the construction of an image of an enemy, which threatened Turkey's national sovereignty. As the following chapter argues, this process became reversed during the creation of an ally. To be more exact, the ally (particularly, the US) became exactly just the 'opposite' of the enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union).

CHAPTER 5

CREATING AN ALLY: THE WESTERN BLOC

This chapter examines the process of creating an ally and developing relations between Turkey and the West, which attaches much importance to the question of how the Turkish press played a central role in the realization of the partnership with the West and in creation of the suitable political and social basis for the new allies. According to the definition of the West by the press, it was comprised of the countries located in the west of Turkey which were not ruled by communists. Based on this definition, this chapter argues that the press tried to create an ally (i.e., the West led by the United States), which was not any longer imperialist but a peaceful one thanks to the US's friendly and peaceful policies.

As the first section discusses, to convince the public that Turkish interests were better served in partnership with the Western Bloc, the process of creating an ally by the press began in 1945 and continued to gain momentum throughout the period. This section examines that in its desire to encourage positive public opinion towards the United States and Britain, the press asserted that how Turkish economy worked all too well and the country made huge fortunes thanks to the partnership with these countries and the Marshall Plan. The second section examines how the press claimed that the West needed Turkey at least as much as Turkey needed it. In this regard, seeing Turkey as a part of the democratic and free world, the Turkish press highlighted both the importance and superiority of Turks in the international system created by the early Cold War conditions.

5.1) DEFINING THE WESTERN BLOC

The process of creation an ally went parallel with the creation of an enemy but in the opposite direction. While the Turkish perception of the early Cold War was continuously designed by global events, the press attitude adopting towards the West was also (re)shaped by both internal and external factors. While the press, with very rare exceptions, perceived the West as an ally of Turkey, it also regarded differences between capitalist countries according to their relationship with Turkey: while the US was perceived as the biggest supporter of Turkey in its struggle against the menace of Soviet domination, the press emphasized both negative and positive aspects of other capitalist countries. While the European parts of the capitalist world were seen as the imperialist countries of the past, the US was believed to be the leader of the ‘new’ West, where the US did not permit the survival of imperialism.

5.1.1) Old Enemies and New Allies: Transition from the ‘Old’ Imperialist West to the ‘New’ Peaceful West

Accordingly, the period from 1945 to 1950 experienced the transition of the Turkish perception of the West from the old imperialist one to the new peaceful one, where the US heavily dominated. Although there were compliments about the British, the manner in which the press approached the British was not positive as much as that to the US. Particularly, in diplomatic and official environments, this difference was seen in the wordings: as the US was believed to be the “friend” of Turkey (*Amerikan dostumuz*), Britain was regarded as its “ally” (*Müttefikimiz Britanya*). In this regard, the press approached to Britain in a less friendly manner compared to the Turkish political elite, most probably because of the British policy of gradually pulling out of the region. However, newspapers did not utilize this image of Britain to create an enemy; contrarily, the image of Britain in the Turkish press was not negative as much as that of the Soviet Union and Britain was the official ally of Turkey, which was slowly trying to correct its past mistakes (i.e., imperialism).

The difference between the perceptions of the US and Britain was related to the historical relations of Turkey with the latter. In other words, Britain treated Turkey as

'the sick man of Europe' from the nineteenth century and it, together with France, was the one which occupied the Middle Eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire in 1916 with the Sykes-Picot Agreement.⁹⁰⁷ Moreover, Britain was depicted as an ancient enemy which had supported Greeks against Turks and invaded Turkey during the Turkish War of Independence from 1919 to 1923.

Even so, this does not mean that Turkey had always had good relations with the US. As Bora claimed, the Ottoman Empire wanted to use the US as a counterbalancing power against European powers; however, the US supported Bulgarian and Armenian minorities against the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁰⁸ More importantly, the relationship between the US and the Ottoman Empire was cut off in April 20, 1917 and until February 1927 the US had not officially recognized the Turkish Republic.⁹⁰⁹ That is to say, only two weeks after its participation in World War I on the side of the Allies, the US became an enemy of the Ottoman Empire and its relations with the Turkish Republic had begun only in 1927, after four years of the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Regarding the depiction of the West in Turkey and the position of the US in this picture, as Bora claimed, the US was a 'far away' country for Turkey until 1945 and what the West meant for Turks was Europe (particularly, France, Britain and Germany).⁹¹⁰ However, as will be discussed below, the definition of the West changed after 1945 and the US had a leading position in the 'new' West.

While Turkey had relatively weak relations with the US during the interwar period, as Samuel Hirst pointed out, two emerging regimes in Turkey and the Soviet Union collaborated and the 'anti-Westernism' consolidated the Turkish-Soviet relations during the interwar period.⁹¹¹ Following the deteriorating Turkish-Soviet relations, this situation was reversed; that is, there were simultaneous attempts to create an enemy,

⁹⁰⁷ Paul Johnson, *Churchill* (New York, Penguin, 2009), p. 60.

⁹⁰⁸ Bora, *Türkiye'de Siyasal İdeolojilerde ABD*, p. 147.

⁹⁰⁹ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetlerine Kısa Bir Bakış, 1800-1959* (Ankara: Doğu Matbaası, 1959), pp. 43-44.

⁹¹⁰ Bora, *Türkiye'de Siyasal İdeolojilerde ABD*, p. 149.

⁹¹¹ Samuel J. Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s" *Slavic Review* 72.1 (2013), p. 35.

as was discussed in the previous chapter, and to create an ally. To this end, during the first months of 1945, the US and Britain, defeating the Nazis, appeared on the pages of the Turkish newspapers as the winners of the Second World War. In this period, there was a very positive image of the West. For example, Turkish businessmen who visited the US declared their gratitude due to improving relations between two countries and said that the commercial relations would be beneficial for both countries.⁹¹² Similarly, as Sadak claimed on January 8, 1945, the most important factor for the establishment of world peace would be the US as its contribution to the victory over Germany was more than any other power. According to Sadak, construction of peace in Europe was also in need of America. He thought that the League of Nations, which was established on 10 January 1920 following the Paris Peace Conference, had failed to operate as it went without the US. He claimed that as the war could be ended with US faster, the peace would be achieved by the US earlier.⁹¹³ As he later stated, the reason for the advent of the Second World War had been neglect of the Wilson Principles, which might have maintained world peace during the interwar period.⁹¹⁴

The leading role of the US given by the Turkish press was related to the transition from the multipolar system to the bipolar one in Europe caused by the Second World War. While Germany's defeat by the Allies changed the balance of power in the continent, the war-torn European countries gathered around the US and the Soviet Union, which emerged as superpowers from the Second World War in the region.⁹¹⁵ In this regard, appreciating the US's more active involvement in international politics, the Turkish press wanted a more powerful West (particularly the US). For Sadak, a better future

⁹¹² "Beynelmillel Ticaret Odası Kongresine İştirak Eden Heyet Döndü", *Tanin*, 6 January 1945, p. 1; "Amerikan Firmaları, Türkiye ile Geniş Ölçüde Ticari Alış Verişe Hazırdır", *Vakit*, 6 January 1945, p. 1; "Ticaret Odası Meclisi Dün Toplandı", *Akşam*, 3 February 1945, p. 3. Moreover, on April 14, 1945, *Ulus* published a special edition based on the commercial relations between Turkey and Britain. In this edition, there were messages of both Turkish and British diplomats and businessmen, who mentioned the importance of the relations between two countries ("Türk-İngiliz Ticaret Sayısı", *Ulus*, 14 April 1945, p. 1)

⁹¹³ Necmettin Sadak, "Harb, Sulh Mesuliyetleri ve Amerika", *Akşam*, 8 January 1945, pp. 1-2.

⁹¹⁴ Necmettin Sadak, "Hazin Bir Doğumun Yirmi Beşinci Yıldönümü", *Akşam*, 13 January 1945, p. 1.

⁹¹⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War" *International Security* 15.1 (1990), p. 26.

for Europe would be built by the unification of European countries; however, its structure had to be different from that of Nazi plans and it had to attach a leading role to the US. As Sadak asserted, all nations fixed their eyes on the US, being the most important builder of peace in the future. As stated in Sadak's article, Americans, as an idealist nation which preserved not only its own self-interest, were relied on sacrifice of war and peace and the hope that Roosevelt cherished.⁹¹⁶

In addition to the leading role of the US in the West, the press also appreciated the change in the US foreign policy from isolationism to interventionism. For example, as Yalçın claimed on February 9, 1945, the US was becoming a central actor in the world politics after abandoning isolationism.⁹¹⁷ While the press approached to the communist leaders in a more hostile manner, it tended to exalt western leaders.⁹¹⁸ As Asım Us thought, the long journey of Churchill and Roosevelt from their countries to Yalta was very similar to the heroic soldiers' fighting in the fronts.⁹¹⁹ The press exalted not only current American presidents but also previous ones. For instance, as *Akşam* stated on March 1, 1945, Wilson was a peaceful man, who tried not to participate in the World War I and participated in the war only when it became a mandatory.⁹²⁰ However, the US and Wilson principles were very instrumental tool to bring the end of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish press somehow ignored it. Instead of mentioning the past of the Turkish-American relations, in the beginning of 1945, one of the most significant thread of the reinventing an ally was the emphasis on how peaceful the US leaders were. Similar to Roosevelt and Wilson, Truman was also represented by Turks and his speeches were followed in a more admirable and commendable way. For example, on

⁹¹⁶ Necmettin Sadak, "M. Roosevelt İşe Başlarken", *Akşam*, 23 January 1945, p. 1.

⁹¹⁷ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Amerika Dünya Politikasında Bir Amil Oluyor", *Tanin*, 9 February 1945, p. 1.

⁹¹⁸ Necmettin Sadak, "M. Roosevelt'in Ümitlendirici ve Sevindirici Nutku", *Akşam*, 3 March 1945, p. 1.

⁹¹⁹ Asım Us, "Uğursuz Harbin Acıları Karşısında Bir Düşünce", *Vakit*, 10 February 1945, p. 1.

⁹²⁰ "Amerikalılar Sulh Filmi Çevirmeye Hazırlanıyorlar", *Akşam*, 1 March 1945, p. 4. The press sometimes mentioned the Fourteen Points, which were introduced by Wilson following the First World War to provide world peace, In the viewpoints of the press, the current situation in the international system proved the primacy of the Fourteen Points for the world peace. As an example see "Wilson Prensipleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 24 February 1948, p. 3.

April 27, 1945, Sadak claimed that Truman was a “brave” man, who wanted nothing but securing world peace.⁹²¹ Even though Truman was the president of the US when the US dropped atomic bombs on Japan, the press made news in favor of the US having ‘peaceful’ leaders. For example, Sadak wrote that if the Great America had not devoted huge sums of its resources in the sake of defeating the enemy, then it would have been impossible to overthrow the Nazis.⁹²²

Although the press attached a relatively less importance to Britain and the British leaders compared to the US and American leaders, it did not forget to exalt the British leaders and Britain’s role both in regional and international politics. For example, Fenik thought that Churchill was a ‘very clever’ (*yaman*) man as his unique achievements during the course of the war had already proved.⁹²³ It is important to note that Churchill had been also responsible for the Dardanelles campaign carried out by the Allies in 1915 against the Ottoman Empire. However, when the Soviet Union appeared as a threat for Turkey, due to its claims about ‘the Straits’, the Turkish press seemed to forget how Britain and, in particular, Churchill had not been only a threat for the Straits but also they had attacked the Straits and later occupied İstanbul only thirty years earlier. That is to say, forgetting the part of the past related to Britain and remembering the part of the past related to the Russian Empire, the attitude of the Turkish press towards Britain was at large positive in this period.

In spite of the emphasis on Britain’s role in the West, the US was perceived and interpreted as a more important country compared to the other members of the bloc. For example, Asım Us of *Vakit*, in his analysis of the Turkish-American friendship,

⁹²¹ Necmettin Sadak, "M. Truman'ın Cesaretli Nutku Konferansa İlham Kaynağı Olmalıdır", *Akşam*, 27 April 1945, p. 1. See other examples for how the Turkish politicians and press exalted Truman and both his internal and foreign policies: M. Kenan Kan, "Amerikan Seçimlerinde Yapılan Tahminler Niçin Yanlış Çıktı?", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 November 1948, p. 2; "Truman'ın Mesajı", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 January 1948, p. 1; "Truman'ın Nutkunun Akisleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 19 March 1948, p. 1; "Truman'ın Türkiye'ye Yardıma Dair Raporu", (AP) *Akşam*, 19 June 1948, p. 1; "Amerika'da Rusya'ya Karşı İnfial Gittikçe Kuvvetleniyor", (Reuters) *Akşam*, 21 March 1948, p. 1; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Mister Truman'ın Yeni Başkanlığı", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 January 1949, p. 3; Sadi İrmak, "M. Truman Yeniden İşe Başlarken", *Ulus*, 1 February 1949, p. 1

⁹²² Necmettin Sadak, "Avrupanın Büyük Günü: 8 May 1945", *Akşam*, 8 May 1945, p. 1

⁹²³ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "O, Yaman Bir Adamdır!", *Ulus*, 11 May 1945, p. 1.

claimed that although Turkey was a small country compared to the US and it did not possess a great significance in the eyes of the US, particularly with respect to commercial relationship; the developing relations between two countries, which had started with the Second World War, would bring mutual benefits for both countries.⁹²⁴ Hence, while the US was reflected as a much stronger country than Turkey, it was perceived as a friend of Turkey.




Figure 17⁹²⁵

As was discussed by the previous chapter, during the creation of an enemy, it was asserted that Turks were not the only ones, which Turks' enemy seriously threatened; rather, Turkey's enemy also threatened other free nations as well. This notion was reversed in the process of creating an ally. To be more exact, Turkey's ally was not only its friend but it was also a friend and supporter of other free and peaceful nations, too. As an illustration, as shown in the cartoon in Figure 17, while the Soviet Union threatens the peace, which can be obtained through the United Nations, with the right to veto, the US saves the 'peace' from the Soviet Union. As this cartoon demonstrates, the peace, which is represented by a 'frightened' woman, cannot move because of

⁹²⁴ Asım Us, "Türk-Amerikan Dostluğu", *Vakit*, 28 June 1945, p. 1.

⁹²⁵ *Ulus*, 3 October 1947, p. 1; *Ulus*, 4 October 1947, p. 1.

knives, which represents the ‘right to veto’ given to the Soviet Union. However, the US, holding a gun in one hand and punching the face of the Soviet Union with the other, defeats the Soviet Union by using force. the Soviet Union, having beaten by the US, drops his hat having the communist symbol, a red star, and his ‘bald’ head appears, which is a reference to a Turkish idiom “*takke düştü, kel göründü*” meaning “now we know the embarrassing truth” Being a quite popular term in the Turkish cartoons of that time, it meant how the US showed the ‘true face’ of the Soviet Union. After the US saves the woman (i.e., the peace), it becomes happy and smiles. This image of the US, as a protector of the peace became one of the main themes of creation of an ally.

While the process of creating an ally (particularly, the US) continued, both the visits of the American fleet to Turkey and the presence of the American fleet in the Mediterranean took a central place in creating an ally throughout the period. For example, as *Ulus* claimed, American generals were very pleased with the Turkish hospitality.⁹²⁶ Similarly, as *Vakit* claimed, the American fleet left Turkey with ringing cheers of the public.⁹²⁷ In particular, these visit of the Sixth Fleet to Turkey was welcomed by the press and there were news about the visits such as “the friend American fleet has come”, “friend admirals”, “Welcome the Uncle Sam”.⁹²⁸ For Daver, the ‘guest’ American fleet consolidated Turkish-American friendship.⁹²⁹

⁹²⁶ "Amerikan Filosu Bu Sabah İstanbul'dan Ayrılıyor", *Ulus*, 7 May 1947, p. 1; "Amerikan Filosu İstanbul'dan Ayrıldı", *Ulus*, 8 May 1947, p. 1.

⁹²⁷ "Amerikan filosu", *Vakit*, 8 May 1947, p. 1.

⁹²⁸ “Kırkbeşbin Tonluk Missouri Zırhlısına Rower Torpidosu Eşlik edecek”, *Cumhuriyet*, 8 March 1946, p. 1; Abidin Daver, “Missouri Dünyanın En Kuvvetli Zırhlısıdır”, *Cumhuriyet*, 14 March 1946, p. 1, “Missouri Zırhlısı Cebelitarık’tan Geçerek Akdeniz’e Girdi”, *Cumhuriyet*, 1 April 1946, p. 1; Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Missouri,” *Ulus*, 5 April 1946, p. 1; Nadir Nadi, “Dost Amerika’nın Denizcilerini Karşılarken,” *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1946, p. 1; Burhan Felek, “Hoşgeldin Sam Amca”, *Cumhuriyet*, 6 April 1946, p. 3; Abidin Daver, “Amerika, Yakın ve Ortadoğunun Koruyucusu,” *Cumhuriyet*, 8 April 1946, p. 3. Dost Amerikan Filosu Dün Sabah 10 da Geldi”, *Cumhuriyet*, 28 January 1949, p. 1; "Dost Amiraller", *Yeni Sabah*, 31 January 1949, p. 1; Feridun Osman Menteşeoğlu, "Misafirlerimiz ve Kuvvetimiz", *Ulus*, 2 February 1949, p. 2; "Görüşmeler Çok İyi Netice Verecektir", *Ulus*, 4 February 1949, p. 1; "Amerikan Filosundan Bazı Gemiler Limanlarımıza Gelecek", *Ulus*, 3 March 1949, p. 3; "İki Amerikan Harp Gemisi Mersin'de", *Ulus*, 6 March 1949, p. 2; "Amerikan Filosu Bugün İstanbul'da Olacak", *Ulus*, 2 March 1950, p. 3; "Amerikan Filosu İstanbul'da", *Ulus*, 3 March 1950, p. 3; "Misafir Amerikan Filosu Komutanı Taksim Abidesine Çelenk Koydu", *Ulus*, 4 March 1950, p. 3.

⁹²⁹ Abidin Daver, "Misafir Amerikan Filosu", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 January 1949, p. 2.

Similar to Daver's approach, *Yeni İstanbul* regarded the visit as the most shining manifestation of the Turkish-American friendship.⁹³⁰ Moreover, the existence of American fleet in the Mediterranean was another source of pride and happiness for the Turkish press because the presence of the American fleet in the region was considered a support of Americans for Turkey, Greece and Italy and also a message to the Soviet Union guaranteeing the national sovereignty of the regional countries.⁹³¹

Following the advent of the Marshall Plan along with the increasing perception of the fear generated by the Soviet Union, the compliments about the peaceful America seemed to increase. As an example, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that the American aid to Turkey immediately lessened the tension generated by the encroachments of the Soviet Union in the region.⁹³² As *Yeni Sabah* further claimed, Truman declared that the US was giving aid to Turkey in order to protect its territorial integrity against the persistent pressure exerted upon Turkey by foreign powers.⁹³³ Similar to *Yeni Sabah*, for *Akşam*, the US was decisive of spending billions of dollars in Europe for the preservation of peace and confidence which were endangered by the communist ideology.⁹³⁴ Therefore, for both governmental and oppositional press, the US emerged as a guarantor of peace and security for Turkey and its non-communist neighbors.

In this regard, among all nations which received the American aid, Greece, as the neighbor of Turkey and whose security was crucial to that of Turkey, was regarded as the most important country due to the existence of both communist groups and Soviet aggression in this country. As *Yeni Sabah* claimed on February 6, 1948, for instance, American aid stopped Soviet expansion in the region and if there would not be such

⁹³⁰ "Altıncı Amerikan Filosu, İstanbul Limanında", *Yeni İstanbul*, 5 March 1950, p. 6.

⁹³¹ "Amerika Akdenizdeki Harb Gemilerine Deniz Piyadeleri Gönderiyor", *Akşam*, 3 January 1948, p. 1; "Akdenizdeki Amerika Filosu", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 January 1948, p. 3; "Amerikan Filosu Akdenizde Manevra Yapıyor", (*Moskova Radyosu*) *Akşam*, 10 January 1948, p. 1; "Amerikan Filosunda Karaya Çıkmaya Hazır Bir Piyade Kuvveti Bulunacak", (*Reuters*) *Akşam*, 28 January 1948, p. 1.

⁹³² "Amerikan Yardımı", *Yeni Sabah*, 3 January 1948, p. 5.

⁹³³ "Truman'ın Mesajı", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 January 1948, p. 1.

⁹³⁴ "Yunanistan Hadiselerinin Askeri ve Siyasi Cepheleri", *Akşam*, 8 January 1948, p. 1.

plan, communists would have most probably come to power in Greece.⁹³⁵ Therefore, according to the press, the salvation of Europe from both the destruction generated by the war and security concerns created by the Soviet ambitions to dominate the non-communist Europe was the US doing.⁹³⁶

As the US was represented as the protector and defender of the free world, it was frequently emphasized that the US self-sacrificed because of its desire to preserve the world peace and it was not a 'self-interested' country. In other words, contrary to the expansionist policies of the enemy, the ally was depicted as a 'selfless' guardian of the world peace and the press saw a counterbalancing power in the region around Turkey.⁹³⁷ However, in reality, as Truman already declared in his speeches, the US gave aid to the European countries for its own national security concerns; that is, Truman admitted that the 'freedom' of Turkey and Greece enhanced the US national security.⁹³⁸ To put it differently, the perception of the US by the Turkish press as a 'selfless' peacemaker was not true.

Whether this 'selfless' image of the US was true or not, contrary to the image of enemy which appeared a threat for the region around Turkey, the US was seen as a source of security for Turkey and its neighbors. Meanwhile, the press repetitively claimed that both countries were grateful for the strengthening ties between Turkey and the US. *Zafer*, for example, claimed that there would be an alliance between Turkey and the US and the US would participate the war as soon as Turkey was to be attacked.⁹³⁹ Moreover, *Zafer* mentioned how George C. McGhee, the 1st Assistant Secretary of

⁹³⁵ "Balkanlarda Sovyet Tipi Yeni Hareketler", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 February 1948, p. 3.

⁹³⁶ "Trumanın Nutkunun Akisleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 19 March 1948, p. 1; Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Askerleşen Amerika", *Akşam*, 7 May 1948, p. 2.

⁹³⁷ "Dışişleri Bakanımızın Sivastaki Mühim Nutku", *Akşam*, 24 May 1948, p. 1; "Amerika Orta Doğuda Tedbir Alıyor", *Akşam*, 28 May 1948, p. 4; "İngiltere ile Amerikanın Orta Doğu Menfaatleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 16 June 1948, p. 3; "Amerika ve Filistin", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 January 1949, p. 1.

⁹³⁸ Robert J. McMahon, "By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves: The Cold War Rhetoric Of American Foreign Policy", in Martin J. Medhurst and Henry W. Brands (eds.), *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), p. 235.

⁹³⁹ "Amerika ile Türkiye Arasında Bir İttifak Hazırlandı", *Zafer*, 3 December 1949, p. 1.

State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs of the US from 1949 to 1951, was sent off to Baghdad from Ankara in a 'very friendly' manner.⁹⁴⁰

Moreover, the press committedly and unanimously supported the US with respect to its disagreements with Britain and Western Europe in general.⁹⁴¹ For example, Topalak, evaluating the Point Four Program, which was a program offering economic and technological aid to the Third World countries,⁹⁴² and initiated by Truman on January 20, 1949, said that it had a great significance in a period when China was left to its own devices and communism was *fait accompli* accepted in Asia. For him, the primacy of the Truman Doctrine was highly related to the history of colonialism. According to him, if the US captured markets of emerging countries, which had been occupied by Europeans by force of arms and which they had to abandon again by force of arms, through its money and products, it was not only America's fault. Rather, the responsibility was belonged to both European imperialists and colonies, which had chosen to obey colonial rule and to accept their destiny.⁹⁴³ According to Hasan Ali Yücel of *Ulus*, the US, which he called 'New Europe' saved the 'Old Europe' twice.⁹⁴⁴ For this reason, the image of the US as the main actor which changed the 'old' Europe and this image was always reinforced by manifestation of sympathy.⁹⁴⁵ Additionally, the press thought that the friendship between Turkey and the US was not temporary but a permanent one because the US, just like Turkey, was a peaceful country.⁹⁴⁶

Although the press saw the US as the protector of Europe and democracies, which led to the transition of the imperialist West to the peaceful one, it sometimes criticized the

⁹⁴⁰ "Mc Ghee Dün Sabah Hususi Uçağıle Bağdada Hareket Etti", *Zafer*, 4 December 1949, p. 1.

⁹⁴¹ For examples, see: Mücahit Topalak, "Bu Ne Savaşdır?", *Zafer*, 3 May 1950, p. 3; Mücahit Topalak, "Müstemleke Savaşları", *Zafer*, 4 May 1950, p. 3; "Avrupanın, Batı ile Doğu Arasında Bitaraf Kılması İmkânsızdır", *Yeni İstanbul*, 2 May 1950, p. 3.

⁹⁴² Brandon Toropov, *Encyclopedia of Cold War Politics* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2000), p. 160.

⁹⁴³ Mücahit Topalak, "Dördüncü Madde", *Zafer*, 15 January 1950, p. 3.

⁹⁴⁴ Hasan Ali Yücel, "Amerika", *Ulus*, 11 February 1950, p. 2.

⁹⁴⁵ "Türk-Amerikan Dostluğu ve Tanışıklığı", *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 March 1950, p. 1; "Marshall'ın Nutku", *Yeni İstanbul*, 4 April 1950, p. 1.

⁹⁴⁶ "Marshall Planının Türkiyedeki Tesiri", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 April 1950, p. 3.

American policies after the Second World War since it thought that the US had been deceived by the Soviet Union and it did not attach enough importance to Turkey. As *Yeni Sabah* claimed on January 17, 1948, for instance, the Western civilization was assumed to be on the eve of destruction, they were suffering from abandonment of Europe to the Soviet Union with their own hands after the Second World War. For this reason, as *Yeni Sabah* supposed, the US and Britain cried like kids who broke their own toys.⁹⁴⁷ Similarly, as *Akşam* claimed on June 28, 1949, both the US and Britain, having deceived by the Soviet Union, made a big mistake at the war's end and they accepted division of Germany into two parts.⁹⁴⁸

Apart from its deception by the Soviet Union, the US was criticized by the press because of the insufficient share of Turkey in the Marshall Plan.⁹⁴⁹ For example, on February 3, 1948, *Yeni Sabah* found the amount of the American aid unsatisfactory for Turkey, which had already suffered from the unbalanced government budget and agricultural shortages.⁹⁵⁰ Moreover, on March 20, 1949, Peyami Safa of *Ulus* argued that "*Turks are stepchildren of the Marshall Plan*". As Safa maintained, Turkey carried the heaviest burden of the Cold War and, for this reason, it had to receive a higher share from the American aid.⁹⁵¹ This kind of criticism might in fact serve as a bargaining tool in the continuing Marshall Plan. To be more exact, Turkey, as a part of the US containment policy together with Greece and Iran, tried to increase the amount of the American aid given to Turkey. Although these three countries were all exposed to the Soviet threat, the degree of the threat was different for each country.

Regarding Iran, as was discussed before, it had been occupied by the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the Soviet troops had delayed their withdrawal in 1946. Since the end of the war, the Soviet Union provoked minority groups in Iran

⁹⁴⁷ "Batı Medeniyeti Batmak Tehlikesinde", *Yeni Sabah*, 17 January 1948, p. 3.

⁹⁴⁸ "Gerginliğin Azalmasına Doğru", *Akşam*, 28 June 1949, p. 1.

⁹⁴⁹ For examples, see: "Marshall Planı Hakkında Amerikaya Yanıldığı İzahedilecek", *Akşam*, 27 January 1948, p. 2; "Devlet Bakanı Dün Etraflı İzahat Verdi", *Ulus*, 20 March 1949, p. 1.

⁹⁵⁰ "Türkiyenin Marshall Planındaki Durumuna Ait Dış Bakanının Meclisteki İzahatı", *Yeni Sabah*, 3 February 1948, p. 1.

⁹⁵¹ Peyami Safa, "Marshall Planının Üvey Çocukları", *Ulus*, 20 March 1949, p. 1.

against the current regime. Iran, similar to Turkey, began to get closer to the West as a result of the Soviet aggression and the Iranian political elite increased its relations with the US. Although Iran did not benefit from the Marshall Plan, the US gave economic and military support and aid to Iran. In this regard, the Iranian Shah said he could understand the American aid to Greece as the Royalist groups were fighting against the communists, but he opposed to the higher amount of the American aid given to Turkey compared to that given to Iran; that is, the Shah thought that the communist threat in Turkey was not as high as in Greece.⁹⁵² Hence, even in Iran, as a neighbor of Turkey having similar problems with Turkey, there were some criticisms about why Turkey received the American aid and about the amount of the American aid which Turkey received.

Regarding the communist threat in Greece, the Greek Civil War between Royalists who had been supported by Britain and communists supported by the Soviet Union began in 1944. When the British declared that they could not afford to give aid to Greece, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were introduced in order to prevent a communist takeover in Greece.⁹⁵³ So, Turkey was not the 'primary' reason for the introduction of the Truman Doctrine; instead, it received the American aid, which was originally planned to give only its neighbor Greece. The reason for such a difference between Greece and Turkey was that, in spite of the Soviet aggression, there was not such a civil war in Turkey and the US government had said little about the communist threat in Turkey until the Truman Doctrine publicly.⁹⁵⁴ Regarding the power of communist groups in two countries, Greek communists were so powerful that they managed to become a part of a civil war and were able to maintain conflicts against the Royalists backed by the West. On the contrary, as Ahmad pointed out, Turkish left was very weak both quantitatively and qualitatively at that moment.⁹⁵⁵

⁹⁵² Blake, *The US-Soviet Confrontation in Iran*, pp. 44-51.

⁹⁵³ Josh Brooman, *The Cold War: Superpower Relations, 1945-1989* (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997), p. 9.

⁹⁵⁴ Robert H. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman and the Cold War Revisionists* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006), p. 31.

⁹⁵⁵ Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, p. 51.

More importantly, as Gökay argued, the Soviet leaders thought that a communist takeover was impossible in Turkey and all they wanted was just to counter-balance the western powers in the region.⁹⁵⁶ Therefore, the Turkish press had to exaggerate the threat of the Soviet Union and communism in general and tried to prove that Turkey needed to take such an aid from the US.

Having such a duty to urge the necessity of the American aid, the criticisms of the Turkish press related to the conduct of the Marshall Plan certainly began to increase after the exclusion of Turkey from NATO. Compared to the governmental press, the oppositional newspapers criticized the Marshall Plan more. For Topalak, the Marshall Plan produced a bad outcome because the aid receiver countries failed to reconstruct their economies. For him, these countries, at the same time, had to deal with Russian anger as the beneficiary of the aid and they missed the opportunity to trade with communist countries.⁹⁵⁷ According to him, it was certain that these nations would not become self-sufficient until 1952 when the Marshall Plan was planned to end. This was the mistake of both the US and Britain, which finally understood that they could not sell anything in the absence of an 'army' and 'police' (implying NATO) that would provide national security.⁹⁵⁸

Despite such minor criticisms, the press generally eulogized the US foreign policy, particularly in the regions around Turkey. For example, Yazman, in its analysis of the British-American collaboration in the Middle East, said that the US officially recognized the Israeli state only because of Israel lobby in the United States. For him, the West finally managed to move together against the Soviet Union in the region.⁹⁵⁹ *Ulus*, reporting from *UPI*, claimed that the US did not support the Israeli state.⁹⁶⁰

⁹⁵⁶ Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey*, pp. 117-118.

⁹⁵⁷ Mücahit Topalak, "İflas Eden Planlar", *Zafer*, 8 November 1949, p. 3.

⁹⁵⁸ Mücahit Topalak, "Yanlış Hesap", *Zafer*, 11 November 1949, p. 3. For other examples, see: Abidin Daver, "Acaba Hesab Mı Bilmiyorlar?", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 February 1949, p. 1; Abidin Daver, "Planlı, Süratli ve Hamleli Çalışmak Zarureti", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 March 1949, p. 1.

⁹⁵⁹ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Orta Doğuda Müşterek İngiliz-Amerikan Siyaseti", *Akşam*, 30 January 1949, p. 5.

⁹⁶⁰ "Amerika İsrail Taraftarı Değil", (*UPI Ulus*), 14 May 1950, p. 3.

However, the US strongly supported the establishment of Israeli state and it indeed became the first state which recognized Israel.⁹⁶¹ Therefore, while the criticisms of the US went hand in hand with the compliments, the Turkish press sometimes changed the reality and draw a very false but sympathetic picture of the US for the Turkish public opinion. Finally, it is important to note that the US was criticized due to its partnership with the Soviet Union after the Second World War whereas Britain was criticized due to both its past and present policies.

The difference between the Turkish perception of the US and other western countries (especially, Britain) was also valid for the differences between Turkish perception of the US and that of other capitalist countries. In this context, the term 'imperialism' was a key aspect of the Turkish perception of the West. Although some authors discussed that anti-imperialism had a peripheral place in Turkish intellectual environment of the early Republican era,⁹⁶² Turkey was a country which had fought against the (European) imperialism. Accordingly, 'imperialism' and 'colonialism', which the Turkish press regarded as synonymous to the former term, were important in the definition of the West by the Turkish press. To be more exact, the superior position of the US in the eyes of Turks compared to other capitalist countries also came from the American attitude to imperialism.

With respect to the Turkish understanding of imperialism, the first point was the protestation of the imperialism by Turks. For example, Sadak thought that, as everybody knew it, the French, the most liberal people of the world at home, were the least merciful and fair one in its colonies.⁹⁶³ As he later asserted, all nations had to get the right of self-determination, of which they had been deprived. For him, all nations in Asia and Africa, like their counterparts in Europe, had to elect their own

⁹⁶¹ Tim McNeese, *The Cold War and Postwar America 1946-1963* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2010), pp. 28-29.

⁹⁶² Ali Kazancıgil, "Anti-empereyalist Bağımsızlık İdeolojisi ve Üçüncü Dünya Ulusçuluğu Olarak Kemalizm", in Ahmet İnel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 2: Kemalizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), p. 236; Ahmet Kuyaş, "Yeni Osmanlılar'dan 1930'lara Anti-empereyalist Düşünce", in Ahmet İnel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 2: Kemalizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), p. 247.

⁹⁶³ Necmettin Sadak, "Sömürgeler Meselesi", *Akşam*, 29 January 1945, p. 1.

governments as they wished instead of those which had been imposed by foreigners. As Sadak asserted, these were exactly the principles of American foreign policy.⁹⁶⁴ As Sadak later proclaimed, America was so regretful to have invented atomic bomb that it would have buried its own invention to the darkness of nature forever if it was possible.⁹⁶⁵ This depiction of the US by Sadak as the protector of the “free world” (*hür dünya*) and “free nations” (*hür milletler*) and a superpower which was against imperialism was also followed by other columnists and the Turkish newspapers during the entire period. As Gerson argued, the term ‘free world’ was a reference to the US hegemony in the world during the Cold War.⁹⁶⁶ In a similar way, as Tim Smith suggested, the US practiced a new form of imperialism and opposed to the old world colonialism in order to justify its own hegemony in the capitalist bloc.⁹⁶⁷ Accordingly, American politicians of that period asserted that the 'American way' of foreign policy was completely different from the traditional European imperialism. The US press, using the same argument, continuously condemned European colonialism.⁹⁶⁸ This idea that the US was against imperialism also existed in the articles written by Turkish intellectuals and in the news reported by Turkish newspapers.

The press, on the other hand, was critical of European countries for their imperialist past. For example, as *Yeni Sabah* claimed on February 18, 1948, the welfare of Western Europe had entirely been dependent upon the colonies.⁹⁶⁹ However, as the press believed, the US, having nothing in common with its European counterparts, was not an imperialist country. For example, as Yazman declared his admiration to world-

⁹⁶⁴ Necmettin Sadak, "M. Truman En Ehemmiyetli Nutkunu Tam Sırasında Söyledi", *Akşam*, 30 October 1945, p. 1.

⁹⁶⁵ Necmettin Sadak, "Vaşington Kararı Sulhu Çabuk Getirecektir", *Akşam*, 19 November 1945, p. 1.

⁹⁶⁶ Joseph Gerson, *Empire and the Bomb: How the US Uses Nuclear Weapons to Dominate the World* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 16.

⁹⁶⁷ Tim O. Smith, *Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941-45* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 7-8.

⁹⁶⁸ John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 80-82.

⁹⁶⁹ "Sömürge Kaygıları", *Yeni Sabah*, 18 February 1948, p. 3.

view, understanding and tactics of American generals such as Dwight D. Eisenhower because they devoted the resources of a great nation to exterminate the enemy.⁹⁷⁰

While the focus on imperialism of the West continued, the press asserted that the West was gradually changing thanks to the leading role of the US, which was itself against imperialism. As Doğrul claimed on February 11, 1949, while NATO was being established to save democracy and civilization from the attack of the West, participation of some countries including Britain, France, Belgium and Netherlands, which had still colonies, constituted a problem by preventing establishment of the Pact. While the US was seeking to remedy this defect immediately, these colonizers were seeking a pretext to justify their policies and asserted that they had to benefit from colonies to sustain their development.⁹⁷¹ For him, the anti-imperialist attitude of the US was not welcomed by European colonists.⁹⁷² Similar to Doğrul, for Til, France and Netherland, as Britain did in India, might easily agree with their colonies over giving independence to these colonies because there was not any solution other than it.⁹⁷³ For him, imperialism had to be ended and it would certainly come to an end in the near future.⁹⁷⁴

In this respect, the Turkish press blamed each European imperialist country individually. For Topalak, the British had a horrible colonial past: if Britain did not occupy these countries and leaned its back against colonies, it would not have found the opportunity to intervene in internal affairs of Europe, which had already been devastated by the war.⁹⁷⁵ As he later asserted, the reason for the differences between the US and Britain in Asia was Britain's reluctance not to lose its market in China.⁹⁷⁶

⁹⁷⁰ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Eisenhower'in Demek İsteddiği", *Akşam*, 27 February 1948, p. 4.

⁹⁷¹ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Sömürgeci Devletlerle Atlantik Paktı", *Cumhuriyet*, 11 February 1949, p. 3.

⁹⁷² Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Mühim Bir Münakaşa", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 February 1949, p. 3.

⁹⁷³ Enis Tahsin Til, "Asya'daki Sömürgeler", *Akşam*, 12 April 1949, p. 2.

⁹⁷⁴ Enis Tahsin Til, "Sömürge Devrinin Sonu Yaklaşıyor", *Akşam*, 5 May 1949, p. 2. See similar articles: Mücahit Topalak, "Almanya'da Karışıklık", *Zafer*, 25 February 1950, p. 3; "Romada İmzalanan Pakt", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 March 1950, p. 1; "Avrupa Birliği Meselesi", *Yeni İstanbul*, 28 March 1950, p. 1.

⁹⁷⁵ Mücahit Topalak, "Keşmir İhtilafı", *Zafer*, 21 December 1949, p. 3.

⁹⁷⁶ "Uzakdoğuda B. Britanya Politikası", *Yeni İstanbul*, 22 December 1949, p. 4.

More interestingly, on December 23, 1949, *Yeni İstanbul* claimed that the US rejected the British proposal about the Anglo-Saxon dominance of the world as the US cared about the defense of Western Europe more than its own interests in the region.⁹⁷⁷ For Diplomat, Britain had the main responsibility for the conflicts between the US and Britain and, in his mind, Britain deserved criticism for its consideration of its own interests more than the war against communism.⁹⁷⁸

Unlike the imperialist European countries, the US was believed to be completely different for its anti-colonial position in world politics. For example, Bülent Yazıcı claimed that Truman's policies would solve the underdevelopment in the world and would bring an end to colonialism.⁹⁷⁹ Moreover, as Sav claimed on February 6, 1950, people misunderstood the meaning of the American aid and the US did not intend to invade the aid-receiver countries. As he maintained, there would be undoubtedly the end of the aid and each nation would have to take care of its own affairs itself.⁹⁸⁰ Similarly, as Tör claimed on February 8, 1950, the voices which had not been heard before were emanating from the United States, which became the strongest symbol of the advanced modern technology: fearless world, elimination of poverty, technical aid to backward countries, development plans, the Marshall Plan. Comparing the US with its European counterparts, Tör concluded that European imperialism and capitalism were an exploitation system based on technical superiority.⁹⁸¹ Hence, there was no increasing voices about the link between the US aid and colonialism in the Turkish press at that moment.

For the press, which claimed that the US was totally against colonialism, European imperialist damages for the free world were not only a thing of the past but it was also a problem confronting the world for the post-war period. As Topalak claimed on

⁹⁷⁷ "Anglo-Sakson Dünya Hâkimiyeti Planını Amerika Reddetti", *Yeni İstanbul*, 23 December 1949, p. 2.

⁹⁷⁸ Diplomat, "Amerikan Askeri Yardımı", *Yeni Sabah*, 24 December 1949, p. 3.

⁹⁷⁹ Bülent Yazıcı, "İktisaden Geri Memleketler", *Ulus*, 4 January 1950, p. 3.

⁹⁸⁰ Nizameddin Ali Sav, "Amerika Yardımından Faydalar", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 February 1950, p. 2.

⁹⁸¹ Vedat Nedim Tör, "Geri Millet-İleri Millet", *Yeni İstanbul*, 8 February 1950, p. 2.

February 18, 1950, although imperialists aimed the maintenance of control over their former colonies; communism, replacing influence of imperialists, would dominate the emerging nations. For him, the achievement of communism in these countries was generated by the colonial past and European colonists were responsible for the rise of communist regimes in the newly established states.⁹⁸² In this regard, he criticized 'some' Americans over their ideas that African nations were not ready for the independence.⁹⁸³ Nonetheless, the image of the US in the press was always more positive than its European countries and the Turkish press generally presented a 'peaceful' and 'anti-imperialist' image of the US.

The anti-imperialist rhetoric of the United States in the immediate post-war period, yet, had some critical points. First of all, despite its 'isolationism' until the Second World War, the US had pursued imperialist policies in Latin America starting from the nineteenth century and it had a former colony in Asia (i.e., the Philippines). Moreover, the US had collaborated with European colonists to defeat Japan during the Second World War.⁹⁸⁴ Secondly, while the US tried to 'sell democracy to the Third World', racial injustice in the US did not cease to exist which had received negative reactions from the rest of the world.⁹⁸⁵ The Turkish press, which constantly claimed that minorities were suppressed in the communist countries, did not criticize or at least mention racial injustice in the US.

Thirdly, as Engerman argued, the US was in favor of a decolonization process which was a 'gradual' and 'controlled' by the West.⁹⁸⁶ President Roosevelt and other American leaders of the period thought that the colonial people were not ready for self-government and any "pre-mature" step in favor of decolonization might damage the

⁹⁸² MÜcahit Topalak, "Westerling", *Zafer*, 18 February 1950, p. 3.

⁹⁸³ MÜcahit Topalak, "Afrika Konferansı", *Zafer*, 22 February 1950, p. 3.

⁹⁸⁴ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 155.

⁹⁸⁵ Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative" *Stanford Law Review* (1988), pp. 62-63.

⁹⁸⁶ Engerman, "*Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1962*", p. 40.

US strategic interests.⁹⁸⁷ Namely, rather than an immediate process of decolonization and national independence, the US cadre favored a system of trusteeship and tried to bring the issue to the United Nations.⁹⁸⁸ What is more, the US supported the Dutch presence in Indonesia where nationalists revolted against the imperial rule and the Dutch tried to regain the control of the country.⁹⁸⁹ Similar to the case of Indonesia, although the US administration was not satisfied with the French existence in Indochina, it chose not to put pressure on the French to withdraw from the country due to the presence of communist groups led by Ho Chi Minh.⁹⁹⁰ As was discussed above, the Turkish press ignored the US role in continuation of the imperialism and, indeed, claimed the opposite.

There were several points which might explain why and how the Turkish press 'ignored' the US imperialism and the US support for European colonialism in the Third World. As one of these reasons, Gaddis pointed out that the risk of decolonization for the US was that the Soviet Union and later the communist China might fulfill the gap generated by decolonization.⁹⁹¹ Therefore, for the Turkish press, decolonization, to a large extent in Asia, might mean an expansion of communist sphere of influence. What is more, as Callinicos defined, the period from 1945 to 1991 was a period of 'superpower imperialism'.⁹⁹² In this regard, the Turkish press, which constantly benefited from the image of the 'imperialist' Soviet Union to create an enemy, could not apparently use the same argument to create an ally (i.e., the US). To be more exact, as the Turkish press drew, the images of an enemy and an ally must have been somehow different. Moreover, the Cold War, to some extent, was a competition of ideologies; that is, it was a rivalry between American liberalism and

⁹⁸⁷ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 155.

⁹⁸⁸ Andrew Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. x.

⁹⁸⁹ Roadnight, *United States Policy*, p. 16.

⁹⁹⁰ Wood, "From the Marshall Plan to the Third World", p. 211.

⁹⁹¹ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 154-155.

⁹⁹² Alex Callinicos, *Imperialism and Global Political Economy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 138.

Soviet communism.⁹⁹³ As the Turkish press only had these two options to choose, for it, American liberalism was a better choice despite its imperialist characteristics. More importantly, for Turkish newspapers and columnists, it must have been very difficult to harshly criticize the US as a consequence of the pressure of the Turkish government on newspapers and the government wanted to get closer to the US, and because of the fact that Turkey received the American aid, which Turkey urgently needed as the Turkish press and political elite uttered.

The Turkish press, which did not or could not criticize the US harshly, did not present such a positive image of other members of the West, as that of Britain. Different from the positive image of the US, Britain was reflected as a completely ‘self-interested’ country by the Turkish press. As long as the press thought that Britain collaborated with the US, it favored the British foreign policy although it was always emphasized that Britain considered its own interests above all things. For instance, during the mid-1949, the image of imperialist Britain by the press became more positive because of the belief that Britain finally decided to cooperate with the US and to stay away from the Soviet Union.⁹⁹⁴ In effect, as Tyler argued, Britain collaborated with the US in order to stop the Soviet expansion in the region around Turkey.⁹⁹⁵ This collaboration of course created a relatively more positive attitude in the Turkish press towards Britain. For example, on May 8, 1949, Fenik stated that Britain, which had not played an active role for two years, finally returned to the Mediterranean. For him, this change was the result of the British interests in the Middle Eastern oil concessions.⁹⁹⁶ Moreover, *Akşam*, repeating the speech of Cevat Açıkalın who was the Turkish

⁹⁹³ David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 20.

⁹⁹⁴ See examples: "Türk-İngiliz Münasebetleri Çok Samimidir", (*AP Ulus*, 1 March 1949, p. 1; Yavuz Abadan, "Türk-İngiliz Münasebetleri", *Ulus*, 2 March 1949, p. 1.

⁹⁹⁵ Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p. 24.

⁹⁹⁶ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "İngiltere Akdenize Dönüyor!", *Zafer*, 8 May 1949, p. 3.

ambassador to Britain, stated that the alliance between Turkey and Britain was a very strong one.⁹⁹⁷

The reason for such a sympathy towards Britain was due partly to the belief that Britain was a source of security for democracies although it was not reliable as much as the US. As an example, for Enis Tahsin Til, the US and Britain agreed upon was the defense of Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion or the rise of communist regimes as the neutrality of Europe between Russia and America seemed to be impossible for Til.⁹⁹⁸ In line with relatively positive image of Britain compared to previous years, Britain's strategic importance for Turkey began to be mentioned more often. For example, on June 20, 1949, *Akşam* stated that Turkish foreign policy was based on the alliance between Turkey and Britain.⁹⁹⁹

Nonetheless, Britain was regarded as an opportunist country, which had always looked at its own interest. As an example, for Topalak, while Britain wholeheartedly supported German Christian-Democrats against the US, it buttressed leftist parties in Asia; but, Americans were not deceived by the Britain's self-interested policies.¹⁰⁰⁰ As he later claimed, Britain, considering its commercial interests about the Soviet Union and satellite countries, sometimes played both ends against the middle.¹⁰⁰¹ With respect to the British image in Turkey during the early Cold War, the press was more critical of Britain compared to the politicians while oppositional newspapers used a comparatively more aggressive language than the governmental press, which adopted the attitude of the Turkish government towards its 'official' ally.¹⁰⁰²

⁹⁹⁷ Türk-İngiliz Dostluğu Sağlam ve Kuvvetlidir", *Akşam*, 1 June 1949, p. 1.

⁹⁹⁸ Enis Tahsin Til, "Batının Müşterek Savunması", *Akşam*, 5 June 1949, p. 2.

⁹⁹⁹ "Türkiye, İngiltere ve Fransa İttifakı", *Akşam*, 20 June 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Mücahit Topalak, "Atom Bombası İngiltereye Verilebilir Mi?", *Zafer*, 23 July 1949, p. 3; Mücahit Topalak, "Uzak Doğu Meselesi", *Zafer*, 10 September 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰¹ Mücahit Topalak, "Bir Seçim Bir Siyaset", *Zafer*, 23 October 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰² For example, on 1 November 1949, President İnönü, during his inaugural speech for the new year of the Assembly, stated that Turkey's close and sincere relations with its ally Great Britain continued. For him, this relationship had always been effective in protection of the peace along with the peaceful attempts of the both countries. As İnönü stated, this relationship was improving for the mutual benefits and understanding of both sides. İnönü expressed his happiness to witness that Britain attached a great

As such, despite cooperation between the US and the UK, the press was well aware of the minor differences between the American and British foreign policies, particularly in the Far East after the rise of communist China.¹⁰⁰³ These minor differences were also related to nuclear policies as Britain tried to construct its own nuclear base and recognition of communist China by Britain as the American leaders did not approve it.¹⁰⁰⁴ Moreover, despite their anti-communist collaboration against the Soviet Union, national interests of the US and Britain conflicted with each other due to, to a large extent, the share of oil reserves in the Middle East.¹⁰⁰⁵ In the face of such conflicting interests between the US and Britain, the Turkish press of course chose to support the US. For example, in Topalak's mind, the danger for Britain was neither "red" (implying the Soviet Union) nor "yellow" (implying China) communism but simply money.¹⁰⁰⁶ Similarly, while Topalak appreciated the prolonged struggle of the US with imperialism, which went hand in hand with its anti-communist campaign, he criticized the official recognition of communist China by Britain. According to him, America, being an old colony itself, had to save old colonies not to throw these countries into the hands of communists.¹⁰⁰⁷

While the press mentioned the disagreements between the US and Britain, they urged the necessity of solution of these problems because of the claim that it would jeopardize Turkish interests. For Sav, the US interests came into collision with those of Britain due to the division of oil resources by them. According to his assertion, these two countries had to solve these problems because, in his mind, the Soviet Union would gain benefits from the tension within the democracies.¹⁰⁰⁸ For the Turkish press,

significance for this alliance just like Turkey, which gained a historical and national value. (1 November 1949: İsmet İnönü, TBMM, 8-5-21-1, p. 7).

¹⁰⁰³ "Çin Meselesinde İngiltere-Amerika Arasında Görüş Ayrılığı Var", *Ulus*, 3 January 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, p. 51.

¹⁰⁰⁵ S. Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil: Crisis in Iran* (Palgrave, 2003) pp. 10-12.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Mücahit Topalak, "İmparatorluk Konferansı", *Zafer*, 10 January 1950, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Mücahit Topalak, "Sıra Hindiçiniye Geldi", *Zafer*, 11 January 1950, p. 3; Mücahit Topalak, "Büyük Oyun", *Zafer*, 29 January 1950, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Nizameddin Ali Sav, "Amerika ile İngiltere Arasında Çıkan Petrol İhtilafı", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 April 1950, p. 2.

the image of Britain was a completely self-interested country, which sometimes collaborated with the enemy and opposed to the peaceful policies of the US. Nonetheless, the British existence in the Middle East was always welcomed by the Turkish press.

To sum up, changing circumstances in the foreign affairs forced the Turkish press to renew its perceptions and reflections of the 'West'. For the Turkish press, the 'West' had originally denoted Europe, which had a colonial past and invaded the Ottoman Empire before. However, after the interwar rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union came to an end and the US emerged as a superpower with whom Turkey would form an alliance and might help Turkey to counterbalance the so-called Soviet threat, the definition of the West naturally began to change. While the Turkish press (re)defined the West and created an ally, the new ally (i.e., the US) did not possess any negative quality, which the Turkish press assigned to the enemy. Rather, the US was completely different not only from the enemy but also other members of the West in its 'selfless' efforts to save the 'free world' and in its anti-imperialist struggles. In this regard, creation of an ally led the Turkish press members to believe (or at least pretended to believe) that the US was an 'almost' perfect ally, which would bring the world peace and defeat the enemy. However, neither 'selfless' depiction of the ally nor the 'anti-imperialist' rhetoric of the US was true. Rather, the US tried to construct its own hegemony in the world for its own benefits and, for this reason, it sometimes supported colonization in the Third World. The Turkish press, in its efforts to create an ally, rewrote the history, giving no direct or indirect references to Turkey's relations with the US and the West in general. Correspondingly, the press members either ignored or did not want to mention how the US government supported presence of European colonialism in the Third World.

5.1.2) NATO

In the definition of the West, the international institutions, of which the western countries were members, played a central role in the creation of an ally. As previously discussed, the press initially saw the United Nations as an important organization

which might provide the world peace. However, following the worsening relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union, it was claimed that the Soviet Union, manipulating its right to veto, made the UN ineffective.¹⁰⁰⁹ Contrary to the UN, NATO was reflected as a purely western and democratic organization, which the US had a leading role and the Soviet Union did not become a part of it. Indeed, NATO appeared as the most vital organization, which the press hailed its emergence in 1949 all through the: NATO served as a deterrent to the Soviet expansion in Europe, unified military resources of Europe and America, contributed to establishment of world peace and made the things easier for the US in its struggle with the Soviet Union during the course of the early Cold War.¹⁰¹⁰

Nevertheless, there were some people who criticized NATO. For example, Yazman thought that NATO would not be able to protect Europe from any possible attack of the Soviet Union, which was located in the middle of Europe and had more than 250 million people.¹⁰¹¹ Contrary to Yazman, for Doğrul, NATO, bringing two sides of the Atlantic together, represented an important step to stop the Soviet expansionist policies.¹⁰¹² For him, NATO emerged as a mechanism which would prevent the upcoming of the Third World War by increasing unification of Western Europe.¹⁰¹³

¹⁰⁰⁹ For examples, see: Nihat Erim, "Gene Veto", *Ulus*, 1 August 1947, p. 2; "Ruslar Ürdün'ün Kabulüne Gene İtiraz Etiler", *Ulus*, 1 August 1947, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Güvenlik Konseyinin Yüklendiği Tarihi Vazife", *Cumhuriyet*, 2 October 1948, p. 3; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Birleşmiş Milletlerin Karşılaşacağı Bir Mesele", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 October 1948, p. 3; "Vişinski'nin Bir Manevrası Daha", (*BBC*) *Cumhuriyet*, 3 October 1948, p. 1; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Güvenlik Konseyinin Mühim Bir Kararı", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 October 1948, p. 3; "Rusya'nın Bir Teklifi Oya Bile Konmadı", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 23 February 1949, p. 3; "Churchill'in Demeci: B. Milletler Bir Kör Döğüşü Meydanıdır ve Buna Sebep de Sovyetlerdir", (*Reuters*) *Ulus*, 27 February 1949, p. 3; "Rusya Şimdiye Kadar 9 Komisyon Terketti", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 20 January 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰¹⁰ See examples: "Kuzey Atlantik Paktı İçin Yapılan Temaslar", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 9 February 1949, p. 3; "İsveç Tarafsız Kalmak Kararını Açıkladı", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 10 February 1949, p. 3; Yavuz Abadan, "Atlantik Paktı", *Ulus*, 11 February 1949, p. 1; "İmzası Bulunan Devletlerden Birine Tecavüz Hepsine Birden Tecavüz Sayılacak", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 14 February 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰¹¹ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, "Prag'dan Sonra Ne Olacak?", *Akşam*, 15 March 1948, p. 4.

¹⁰¹² Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Atlantik Birliğine Doğru", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 October 1948, p. 3

¹⁰¹³ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Atlantik Paktı", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 February 1949, p. 2.

As Doğrul claimed on February 23, 1949, NATO was a guarantee of security not only for its own members but also all the nations of the free world.¹⁰¹⁴

Regarding the scope of NATO, there was a consensus on the necessity of a Mediterranean security arrangement, which Turkey would have a leading role. For this reason, according to the press, the geographical scope of NATO had to be extended into the regions other than Western Europe by additional security pacts among non-communist countries. The need for additional pacts appeared more in the regions such as the Middle East or Far East where the Soviet Union increased its pressure following its retreat from Western Europe. Such a pact was demanded not only by the governmental press but also by the oppositional newspapers.¹⁰¹⁵

Additionally, the press insisted on the idea that the Soviet Union was totally against NATO as it had been formed to diminish Soviet influence in Western Europe and the Cold War tide had turned in favor of the West thanks to formation of NATO. For Daver, Russia felt very angry and fretful about the establishment of such a pact since it weakened the Soviet position and political influence.¹⁰¹⁶ Similarly, as Diplomat claimed, thanks to NATO, Russia found itself in a defensive position within the framework of the Cold War and the West took a step further in its war against the Soviet Union.¹⁰¹⁷ As such, the press was trying to prove that NATO was a useful organization because communists were totally against it. For example, as Til claimed on March 21, 1949, even Yugoslavia, despite its exclusion from Cominform, was not happy with NATO at all.¹⁰¹⁸ Hence, although Turkey was not a member of NATO, the

¹⁰¹⁴ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Atlantik Paktı Emniyet Verici Bir Kuvvettir", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 February 1949, p. 3

¹⁰¹⁵ "Avrupa Barışı Bölünemez", *Yeni Sabah*, 18 February 1949, p. 1; Enis Tahsin Til, "Atlantik Paktı Hazırlandı", *Akşam*, 9 March 1949, p. 2; "Akdeniz Paktı ve Sovyet Endişeleri", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 March 1949, p. 1; "Kuzey Atlantik Pakıtının Metni Açıklandı", *Ulus*, 19 March 1949, pp. 1, 3; "Yeni Paktı Küçümsemenin Kendisi için Tehlikeli Olacağı Kremline İhtar Edildi", (*UPI Ulus*), 20 March 1949, p. 1; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Atlantik Pakıtını Tamamlıyacak Tedbirler", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 March 1949, p. 3; "Demokrasiler, İhtiyar Mareşalın Sözüünü Dinleyiniz!", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 April 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰¹⁶ Abidin Daver, "Atlantik Pakıtının Tekâmülüne Doğru", *Cumhuriyet*, 11 March 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰¹⁷ Diplomat, "Atlantik Paktı", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 March 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰¹⁸ Enis Tahsin Til, "Atlantik Pakıtının Akisleri", *Akşam*, 21 March 1949, p. 2. For other examples, see: Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Müttefiklerin Kazandığı İki Zafer", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 March 1949, p. 3; Enis Tahsin

initial reaction to its formation was usually positive because it was initiated by Turkey's friend and it was opposed by Turkey's enemies.

For the Turkish press' perception of NATO, Turkey's position in the organization was another point of discussion. As McCauley argued, there was no debate among the West about the membership of Turkey and Greece in that period and the US evaluated Turkey and Greece as an important partners which increased security of Eastern Mediterranean. Although the US was very interested in security of Turkey and Greece, NATO was perceived as an organization which provided security to Western Europe rather than European orbits.¹⁰¹⁹ That is to say, although both the Turkish political elite and the press constantly discussed, the membership of Turkey in NATO was not a particular concern for the US at that moment. In this regard, the press attitude to NATO was highly correlated with the speeches of politicians. For the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak, there was no relevance of Turkey to NATO, as understood by its name.¹⁰²⁰ In line with Sadak's idea, Diplomat also revealed that Turkey's membership was irrelevant to the scope of NATO.¹⁰²¹ On March 19, 1949, Yavuz Abadan of *Ulus*, in his analysis of NATO, advised Turkish people to trust first themselves rather than their friends (implying the West).¹⁰²²

Consequently, neither politicians nor the press did not seem to be dissatisfied with the exclusion of Turkey from NATO during the mid-1949. For example, as Daver claimed on March 21, 1949, although it had a name of North Atlantic, the pact was a source of security for the entire world.¹⁰²³ As another example, as Sadak stated on April 6, 1949, although Turkey was not crazy about the Pact, it was needed to prove that Turkey was

Til, "Atlantik Paktının İmzası", *Akşam*, 5 April 1949, p. 2; Diplomat, "Tarihi Bir Hadise", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 April 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰¹⁹ McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 67-71.

¹⁰²⁰ "Türkiye'nin Atlantik Paktı ile Hiç Bir Alakası Yoktur", *Ulus*, 10 March 1949, p. 1; 16 March 1949: Necmettin Sadak, TBMM, 8-4-17-56, p. 4.

¹⁰²¹ Diplomat, "Atlantik Paktı", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 March 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰²² Yavuz Abadan, "Önce Kendimize Güven", *Ulus*, 19 March 1949, p. 1. See a similar example: Yavuz Abadan, "Dünya Barışının Korunması", *Ulus*, 2 February 1950, p. 3.

¹⁰²³ Abidin Daver, "Türkiye, İran ve Yunanistanın Emniyeti", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 March 1949, p. 1.

a part of Western collective security system.¹⁰²⁴ On May 16, 1949, Fenik asserted that Turkey had to take an action in order to form a Mediterranean security pact.¹⁰²⁵ Nonetheless, on June 28, 1949, Sadak stated the benefits that Turkey would gain from NATO would be less than the responsibility that would arise. For him, the guarantee that the US had already given Turkey and the alliance between Turkey and Britain and France formed a more effective assurance than the NATO itself.¹⁰²⁶ In harmony with Sadak, Diplomat stated that there was no relevance between Turkey and NATO.¹⁰²⁷ In effect, he thought that the Soviet intimidation in Western Europe had been removed thanks to NATO.¹⁰²⁸ Hence, there was no expression of dissatisfaction with the exclusion of Turkey from NATO until the late-1949.

In spite of all compliments about its success to stop Russian expansion in the world, the press began to criticize NATO starting from December 1949. For example, Fenik was quite critical of secret arrangements between the US and the other members of NATO.¹⁰²⁹ Similarly, for *Yeni Sabah*, NATO seemed to be fragile against any possible attack by Russia.¹⁰³⁰ Moreover, as *Cumhuriyet* claimed, because the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union did not seem to improve in the near future, Turkey had to be added into the security system created by NATO through additional security arrangements, which would be regional in character.¹⁰³¹ To sum up, even though the press regarded formation of NATO as a successful move of the West and did not oppose the exclusion of Turkey from NATO initially, following the late-1949, the press (particularly, the oppositional newspapers) began to assert its concerns over Turkey's position in NATO. This exclusion absolutely created disappointment in the

¹⁰²⁴ "Biz Pakt Delisi Değiliz, Yalnız Şu Var ki...", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 April 1949, pp. 1,3.

¹⁰²⁵ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Akdeniz Paktı İçin Harekete Geçmeliyiz!", *Zafer*, 16 May 1949, p. 3

¹⁰²⁶ "Dışişleri Bakanı N. Sadak'ın Beyanatı", *Akşam*, 29 June 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰²⁷ Diplomat, "Atlantik Paktı", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 July 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰²⁸ Diplomat, "Atlantik Savunma Paktı", 3 December 1949, *Yeni Sabah*, p. 3.

¹⁰²⁹ Mücahit Topalak, "Atlantik Paktının Vecibeleri", *Zafer*, 23 December 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰³⁰ "Kuzey Atlantik Savunma Planı", (*Nafen*) *Yeni Sabah*, 3 April 1950, p. 3.

¹⁰³¹ "Türkiyenin Rusya ile Münasebatı", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 April 1950, p. 1; "Atlantik Paktı ve Rusya ile Münasebatımız", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 April 1950, p. 1.

Turkish press and it affected the creation of an ally. As the press members had tried to persuade Turkish public to the idea that the new allies of Turkey would protect Turks from the Soviet threat and give a place to Turkey in the western security system, exclusion might mean that the ally did not care about Turkey's national security any longer. To erase these concerns and to consolidate its creation of an ally, the press members asserted that the US would never give up supporting Turkey and a regional security arrangement would make Turkey a part of the western security system created by NATO.

5.1.3) Prosperity and Economic Development

As an important factor in shaping the Turkish perception of the West, the economic development and its success based on the American aid and guidance appeared as a cornerstone of the creation of an ally in order to justify its close relations with the West, particularly with the US. As the fact that almost one half of the national budget was devoted to defense expenses had been a major obstacle standing on the way of Turkey, the press expected the United States and, to some extent, Britain to support Turkey's developmental purposes by providing loans and expertise to realize economic reforms through the Marshall Plan; thereby, the Turkish official circles acted in the deliberate pursuit of the economic development, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the press also used this goal in shaping the Turkish public opinion regarding the emerging Cold War.

As discussed above, the press believed that getting close to the West would improve commercial activities, particularly in the beginning of the period when both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were absent. For example, on January 10, 1945, Sadak claimed that as a result of successful policies of the government, the port of İskenderun would be Turkey's door to Britain and the US. For him, as soon as the war would end, this port would be the commercial center of the whole Middle East.¹⁰³² Similar to Sadak, as Cevat Nizami of *Akşam* claimed on February 8, 1945, Turkey

¹⁰³² Necmettin Sadak, "Türkiye Cumhuriyet İdaresinin Büyük Bir Başarısı", *Akşam*, 10 January 1945, p. 1.

resembled, to some extent, the US in the nineteenth century because of its untapped resources. For him, Turkey needed to follow the way of America such as stimulating private entrepreneurship and encourage commercial activities if it wanted to become a developed country like the US.¹⁰³³ Nizami, in his analysis of the entry of Turkey to the Second World War on the side of the Allies, stated that Turkey needed to benefit from Britain and America as a commercial channel as he thought that Turkey did not seize this opportunity generated as much as it could.¹⁰³⁴ These ideas were very much related to the shift in economic policies of Turkey by taking the West a guide, as was discussed in Chapter 2.

Following the introduction of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the press mentioned how Turkey's drive to the West would contribute to the economic development of Turkey even more. For example, as Falih Rıfki Atay asserted on May 5, 1947, Turkey urgently needed the American aid for the purpose of realizing its long-term developmental plans. For him, as Turkey had to devote a huge sum of its resources to the Turkish army, the American aid would not only reduce the burden of the military expenditure on the government budget but also stimulate national industrialization.¹⁰³⁵

The military thread of the development was also related to the security concerns of the press within the early Cold War context.¹⁰³⁶ During his analysis of the meaning of the American aid, Rado, asking the question of whether political security or economic development was more important than the other, said that the first condition of economic development was political security. For him, only after the political stability

¹⁰³³ Cevat Nizami, "Milletler Arası İş Konferansı, Şahsi Teşebbüs ve Biz", *Akşam*, 8 February 1945, p. 5.

¹⁰³⁴ Cevat Nizami, "Muharib Vaziyete Girmemiz ve Piyasa", *Akşam*, 1 March 1945, p. 5.

¹⁰³⁵ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Amerikan Yardımının Kaynakları ve Türkiye", *Ulus*, 5 May 1947, p. 1.

¹⁰³⁶ See examples for how the press tried to show that the Turkish army strengthened as a result of the American aid: "Amerikanın Bize 2 Kruvazör Daha Vereceği Bildiriliyor", *Ulus*, 19 February 1949, p. 1; "Amerika'nın Bize Verdiği Destroyerler", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 20 March 1949, p. 1; "Amerika'dan Bize 2 Denizaltı Daha Veriliyor", *Ulus*, 7 April 1950, p. 3; "Amerika'dan Denizaltı Kurtarma Gemisi Aldık", *Ulus*, 16 May 1950, p. 1.

was provided in the world, the turn of economic development would come. In this case, as Rado guessed, there would be no need for American dollars.¹⁰³⁷




Figure 18¹⁰³⁸

While the press expressed their gratitude for the Marshall Plan and urged necessity of the American aid for the reconstruction of Turkish economy, the press, at the same time, gave the message that Turkish people were fully aware of the importance of the American aid. As demonstrated in the above cartoon, a Turkish Citizen who had lived in abroad for five years and then returns to Turkey by plane and tells to the pilot that "*we have completed a cycle of transition and came to the US*". To be more definite, a Turkish citizen, who had not come to Turkey for years, is not able to recognize her/his own country because Turkey is so developed during this period due to the Marshall

¹⁰³⁷ Şevket Rado, "Önce Siyasi Emniyet Mi, Yoksa İktisadi Kalkınma Mı?", *Akşam*, 8 March 1948, p. 2.

¹⁰³⁸ *Ulus*, 4 July 1947, p. 1.

Plan. The idea, which claimed that Turkey was developing very fast thanks to the American aid, was particularly used by the governmental press.¹⁰³⁹ It might be a result of a desire to justify why Turkey received the American aid or to show that the Turkish government was very successful in the use of the Marshall Plan. Accordingly, it was claimed that foreigners (especially Americans) appreciated Turkey's success within the framework of the Marshall Plan.¹⁰⁴⁰ Moreover, the governmental press supported Turkey's affiliation with western oriented economic and financial institutions.¹⁰⁴¹

¹⁰³⁹ "Yol Şebekemiz En Kısa Zamanda İhtiyacı Karşılacak Duruma Getirilecek", *Akşam*, 12 May 1948, p. 1; "Türk Ordusuna Verilen Amerikan Topları", *Akşam*, 15 May 1948, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴⁰"Amerika Yeni Krediler Açıyor", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 9 February 1949, p. 1; "Bu Yıl Yapılacak Amerikan Yardımı", *Ulus*, 11 February 1949, p. 1; "Marshall Programından Göreceğimiz Yardımlar", *Ulus*, 26 February 1949, p. 1; "Marshall Planı Türkiyede Başarı ile Tatbik Ediliyor", *Ulus*, 1 January 1950, p. 1; "Batı Linyitlerimize 1 Milyon 268 Bin Dolar Daha Ayrıldı", *Ulus*, 17 February 1950, p. 3; "Amerikan Ticaret Bakanlığında 2 Temsilci Geldi", *Ulus*, 2 March 1950, p. 4; "Marshall Planının Türkiye'de Tatbiki", *Ulus*, 11 March 1950, p. 4; "6 Amerikan Tarım Uzmanı Geliyor", *Ulus*, 19 March 1950, p. 1; "Marshall Planının Verdiği Neticeler", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 April 1950, p. 1; "Türkiye'ye Marshall Yardımı", *Ulus*, 19 April 1950, p. 1; "Trumanın Dördüncü Nokta Programından Türkiye de Faydalanacak", *Ulus*, 22 April 1950, p. 1; "Türkiye'ye Yeni Yardım", *Ulus*, 26 April 1950, p. 3; "Amrl. Ginder Dün Geldi", *Ulus*, 27 April 1950, p. 3; "Marshall Yardımından Bize Yapılan Tahsisler", *Ulus*, 29 April 1950, p. 1; "Marshall Planı Soğuk Harbin Kazanılmasında Birinci Amildir", (*UPI*) *Ulus*, 5 May 1950, p. 3; Necmi K. Aran, "Teknik Yardım", *Ulus*, 9 May 1950, p. 2; "Marshall Yardımından Sağlanan 118 Milyon Dolarlık Yardım", *Ulus*, 19 May 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴¹ See examples: Mekin H. Onaran, "Dünya Bankası", *Ulus*, 20 March 1950, p. 2; "İktisadi İş Birliği Raporu", *Ulus*, 16 April 1950, p. 1; Mekin H. Onaran, "Dünya Bankası", *Ulus*, 3 May 1950, p. 2.




Figure 19¹⁰⁴²

In spite of all these positive aspects of economic development which were to be stimulated by the Turkey's close relations with the West, there were some criticisms mounted by the oppositional press, too. For Abidin Daver of *Cumhuriyet*, Turkey was pinning all its hopes on the Marshall Plan, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) or the credits which would be provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). However, as he asserted, Turkey became very angry when it could not get as much as dollars it would like to receive.¹⁰⁴³ Nonetheless, it did not mean that the oppositional press was against the American aid or it did not mention possible benefits of Turkey's drive to the West.¹⁰⁴⁴ For example, in Figure 19, a cartoon drawn by Ramiz Gökçe, a famous political cartoonist of that time, is demonstrated. A very old, bearded man with angel wings flies in the sky. It is written on his hat, which was in the shape of a sack as well as looks like a *turban*, that the 'Marshall Aid'. In effect, this wise old man represented Khidr (*Hızır*), who was a

¹⁰⁴² *Yeni Sabah*, *Yeni Sabah*, 25 December 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴³ Abidin Daver, "Ekonomik Kalkınmamızın Temel Taşları", *Cumhuriyet*, 7 April 1949, p. 1: "Son zamanlarda bütün ümidlerimiz, Marshall planı, Avrupa İktisadi Kalkınması İşbirliği İdaresi ve Milletlerarası İmar ve Kalkınma Bankasının bize yapacağı kredi yardımlarına bağlanmış bulunuyor [...] Bu kaynaklar ise istediğimiz kadar bol dolar vermeyince üzülüyor, sinirleniyoruz".

¹⁰⁴⁴ For examples, see: "Amerikada Komünizme Karşı Planlar Hazırlanıyor", (*New York Radio*) *Cumhuriyet*, 19 January 1950, p. 1; "Marshall Planı ve Türkiye", *Yeni İstanbul*, 22 March 1950, p. 1.

mystic figure according to Islamic belief. He says that "*the world does not wait for Santa Clause any longer but me*". In other words, the American aid to Turkey was somehow affiliated with Islamic tradition and, more importantly, according to Gökçe, the 'god-sent' Marshall Plan came in time of need just Khidr helped true Muslims. As another example of how the oppositional press claimed that Turkey's affiliation with the West was beneficial for Turkey, *Yeni İstanbul* interpreted the opening of an industrial bank by the World Bank in Turkey as a crucial step to establish an economic defensive system against communism while this bank would stimulate private entrepreneurship.¹⁰⁴⁵

To sum up, in its efforts to create of an ally, the Turkish press tried to show possible benefits of being a member of the democracies for Turkey. While the governmental press tried to show that the Marshall Plan was a success of CHP government and to justify why Turkey was receiving this aid, the oppositional press was sometimes critical of the Marshall Plan despite its wholehearted support to the American aid. More importantly, the Marshall Plan was aimed to increase military capacity of the aid-receiver countries; that is, its main purpose was not to provide 'economic development' to these countries. However, both political elite and the Turkish press asserted how the American aid brought (and would bring) economic development and prosperity to Turkey. In reality, both integration to the capitalist world economy and involvement of the American experts in Turkish economy planning changed the course of the developmentalism; that is, a shift from industrial sectors to agriculture, a shift from construction of railways to highways and a shift from a protectionist economy to a liberal one further worsened Turkey's position in the world economy, as an importer of 'raw materials' and an exporter of 'manufactured products'.

In addition, although the war conditions led to shrinkage in international trade and the Soviet threat maintained mobilization of the army after 1945, which had always been a burden on the government budget; Turkey had tried to be a 'self-sufficient' country until this period as the industrialization and protectionism of the 1930s suggested.

¹⁰⁴⁵ "Dünya Bankası, Türkiyede Bir Sınai Banka Açacak", *Yeni İstanbul*, 6 March 1950, p. 2.

However, along with the drive to the West, the Turkish economy became more dependent on foreign aid and foreign loans to finance the budget deficit. Neither governmental nor oppositional press, yet, mentioned such negative impacts of the American aid on the national economy. Rather, the Turkish newspapers and journalists of the period, even former members of *Kadro* movement who played a key role in shaping etatism of the 1930s, celebrated the American aid and tried to show how Turkey would become a ‘developed’ country owing to its close ties with the West.

5.2) TURKEY’S IMPORTANCE FOR THE WEST

Another thread of the creating an ally to justify Turkey's close relations with the West was the emphasis that Turkey was a part of the “civilized and democratic world” (*medeni ve demokrat d nya*). Accordingly, the press members often paid greater attention to both strategic importance and superiority of Turkey within the framework of the Cold War politics. By this way, it was aimed that Turkey’s drive to the West was also beneficial for the West as well. To put it another way, the press underlined that ‘they needed Turkey at least as much as Turkey needed them’.

One of the reasons for why the Turkish press tried to show that Turkey was a part of western democratic world might be ‘democratization’ efforts in Turkey, which was a receiver of the Marshall Plan. As Craig and Logevall argued, for American public and political elite, the current governments in Greece and Turkey were authoritarian ones which might be contradicted with the 'democratic' American policies.¹⁰⁴⁶ In reality, in this period, some senators such as Henry Wallace and or Claude Pepper complained about the American aid to non-democratic governments.¹⁰⁴⁷ Having confronted by such an opposition, Truman tried to justify the American aid to these so-called ‘non-democratic’ countries by saying "*no government is perfect*" and reflecting the current situation in Europe as a war between democracy and communism.¹⁰⁴⁸ Accordingly, the most of the senators believed that regardless of whether the Turkish government

¹⁰⁴⁶ Craig and Logevall, *America's Cold War*, p. 79.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior*, pp. 70-73.

¹⁰⁴⁸ John Mason, *The Cold War: 1945-1991* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 9.

was a democratic one or not, Turkey had to be supported and given aid as long as it would resist the communist aggression.¹⁰⁴⁹ In this atmosphere where there were debates over whether Turkey deserved to take the American aid or not, the Turkish press might have felt obliged to prove that Turkey was a democratic and civilized European country. As an example, on February 6, 1949, Falih Rıfki Atay of *Ulus*, in his analysis of 'underdevelopment' claimed that 'Kemalism' had always fought against 'underdevelopment' in both economic and social terms. As Atay claimed, Atatürk's 'civilized' Turkey had been a 'role-model' for eastern nations, as a 'civilized' and 'Westernized' country.¹⁰⁵⁰ Or, as *Ulus* claimed, the new Republic of India took Turkey and Atatürk's revolutions as a role model in order to construct a 'secular' India.¹⁰⁵¹

This specific emphasis on 'secularism' might be related to the fact that Turkey was the 'only' Muslim country among sixteen aid-receiver countries. As Fousek claimed, US public firmly believed that the American aid to Europe and Asia was distributed for the sake of 'Christianity' and 'humanity'.¹⁰⁵² Although Turkey was a 'secular' and 'western style' country and 'religion' was not a major component of the Turkish foreign policy at that moment as was discussed in the previous chapter; its position in the Marshall Plan might be very different from the others, which were 'Christian' 'European' countries. This difference might have forced Turkish journalists and columnists to prove that Turkey was a part of the western civilization, regardless of its religious orientation.

For a better examination of how the press regarded Turkey as a part of the civilized world, it is needed to examine how it defined geographical position of Turkey because the creation of an ally led to discussion about how and why Turkey affiliated herself with the rest of the world. The first region was the Middle East. The Middle East, as

¹⁰⁴⁹ Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 21.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Gerilik", *Ulus*, 6 February 1949, p. 2. See another example, Falih Rıfki Atay, "Garp Medeniyetçiliği Yolunda", *Ulus*, 3 October 1947, p. 1.

¹⁰⁵¹ "M. Yunus Bir Basın Toplantısı Yaptı", *Ulus*, 18 April 1950, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵² Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, p. 71.

the press perceived, included Greece, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India along with Arab countries. Although Turkey was considered a part of the Middle East, the affiliation of Turkey with Europe had a more vital significance for the press. In effect, the press tried to distinguish Turkey from the Arab States. As Kürkçüoğlu argued, while Turkey's drive to the 'West' accelerated, Arab countries of the region tried to achieve their national independence against the 'West'.¹⁰⁵³ This situation might have marked a difference between Turkey and its Arab neighbors. As an example, as Doğrul claimed on November 15, 1948, the disaster endangering world peace was on the non-Arab states of the Middle East. For this reason, he thought that the term 'Middle East' referred to mainly Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and India whereas the Arab states came in mind later.¹⁰⁵⁴ According to Doğrul, regardless of where Turkey was located (the Middle East, East Mediterranean or the Near East), the strongest state of the region was the Turkish Republic. Namely, as Doğrul claimed, the most important factor which would provide regional peace was the heroic army of the Turkish nation.¹⁰⁵⁵

As another region which Turkey was regarded as a part of it, (Eastern) Mediterranean was perceived as a correlated region to the Middle East in both geographic and strategic senses.¹⁰⁵⁶ In this regard, on June 2, 1949, Topalak criticized Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın and Kasım Gülek who suggested the establishment of the Middle East security pact instead of a Mediterranean one when they participated in the Treaty of London which the Council of Europe was formed in May 1949. Topalak thought that the defense of the latter was much more important than the former.¹⁰⁵⁷

In the eyes of the Turkish press, the Mediterranean had a priority over the Middle East while Europe was superior through over the both. Indeed, from the US's view, too, Turkey needed to be a European country as a receiver of the Marshall Plan which was

¹⁰⁵³ Ömer E. Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Orta Doğusu'na Karşı Politikası (1945-1970)* (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1972), pp. 6-8.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Ortadoğu'nun Davası", *Cumhuriyet*, 15 November 1948, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Milletlerarası Âlemdede Mevkiimiz", *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1948, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵⁶ "Orta Doğu Paktı", *Akşam*, 1 June 1949, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Mücahit Topalak, "Çizmeyi Aşmamalı!", *Zafer*, 2 June 1949, p. 3.

delivered to European countries.¹⁰⁵⁸ In line with the basic significance of Turkey to Europe, the press asserted that Turkey's affiliation with Europe was not something new; instead, Turkey had become a European country long before. For example, as *Yeni Sabah* claimed on August 21, 1948, Turkey had aimed Europeanization for almost one and half centuries, perhaps more. For *Yeni Sabah*, this aim, witnessing material developments in Europe, had been sometimes increased or decreased throughout time. As *Yeni Sabah* claimed, Turkey needed to be a part of Europe through ideological transformations and revolutions rather than solely formalism.¹⁰⁵⁹ To clarify, 'Europeanness' of Turkey was not only related to the western security system, to which Turkey might contribute, but also it was related to socio-economic European institutions of Turkey. As such, the opposition, despite its more Islamic political orientation, was of the same mind with the governmental press regarding Turkey's affiliation with the West. On December 13, 1949, *Zafer*, for example, said that Turkey was a European state without any doubt.¹⁰⁶⁰ Similar to *Zafer*, *Yeni İstanbul*, evaluating the participation of Turkey in the European Commission on August 9, 1949, asserted that this was the result of Atatürk's revolutions that made Turkey European in terms of culture and civilization rather than solely geographical reasons.¹⁰⁶¹

Therefore, in harmony with the governmental newspapers, the oppositional ones also thought that the Europeanness of Turkey was a result of the historical events. For instance, as *Yeni İstanbul* claimed on December 14, 1949, if anybody wanted to criticize participation of Turkey in European Commission as a respectful member of it, which had been called as 'Sick Man of Europe', 'Turk lacking in understanding'

¹⁰⁵⁸ Tamkin, *Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union*, p. 197.

¹⁰⁵⁹ "Avrupalı Olmanın Yolu", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 August 1949, pp. 1, 7. What is more, there was a tendency to show Turkey's position in the Middle East as a continuation of its relations with the Western World. For example, as Ahmet Tahtakılıç, DP MP for Kütahya, claimed on December 12, 1949, the Turkish policy towards Middle Eastern states was compatible with the principles of the United Nations, which required economic, political and cultural relationship with these countries. For him, such a policy would be in favor of both European Commission and the idea of the United Nations (12 December 1949: Ahmet Tahtakılıç, TBMM, 8-5-22-16, pp. 24-25).

¹⁰⁶⁰ "Türkiye Avrupa Devleti", *Zafer*, 13 December 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶¹ "Avrupa Konseyine Katılmamız Hakkındaki Tasarı Görüşüldü", *Yeni İstanbul*, 13 December 1949, p. 1.

‘the Ignorant Turk’ (*Gayrikabili hitap türk*)" or ‘a backward Asian country’ before, it needed to learn the Turkish History from *Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca*, which was signed in 1774 and solidified Russian dominance on the Ottoman Empire, to *Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi*, which was signed in 1833 and provided several privileges to Russia restricting national sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. For *Yeni İstanbul*, the membership of Turkey to the European Commission would also increase Turkish prestige in the eyes of its Asian neighbors to a higher level. As *Yeni İstanbul* concluded, the Turkish politicians had constantly changed from *Misak-ı Millî* (National Oath), which was declared in 1920 in order to stiffen Turkish resistance to the Allies' occupation of the Ottoman Empire following the World War I, to European Commission, but the policy of Turkish state had never changed: Turkey became a member of European Commission as it captured Hatay.¹⁰⁶² Indeed, Turkey was seen as the last ‘castle’ (*kale*) of Europe in the East. To demonstrate, on February 26, 1950, Perin argued that İstanbul was the door of Europe which opened to the East.¹⁰⁶³ Hence, the press, using historical references to the enemy but not Europeans and through the metaphor of the ‘castle’, claimed that Turkey was undoubtedly perceived and interpreted as a European country by the press.

Nonetheless, Turkey’s three geographical affiliations (i.e., the Middle East, the (Eastern) Mediterranean, and Europe) were not ‘mutually exclusive’ ones; that is, being a Middle Eastern country did not damage its position as a European country. As an example, on February 19, 1949, Menteşeoğlu of *Ulus*, in his analysis of Council of Europe and Turkey, stated that Turkey was a part of Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, each of which contributed to the strategic importance of Turkey in

¹⁰⁶² "İç ve Dış Politika", *Yeni İstanbul*, 14 December 1949, p. 1: "Daha düne kadar 'Hasta Adam' yahut 'Gayrikabili hitap türk', yahut 'Geri Bir Asya Devleti' lakapları altında bahsi geçen bir teşekkül olmak yerine Avrupa Konseyinde müsavi vasıflı azadan biri olarak oturmak, eğer bazıları için bir değişiklik ve bir muvafakiyet ifade etmiyorsa bu bazılarının Lozan'dan Kaynarca yahut Hünkâr-İskelesi'ne kadar uzanan devrenin tarihini, oturup öğrenmeleri lazımdır[...] Bizi müsavi şartlarla Avrupalılar arasında oturmaya hak ve salahiyet sahibi kılan sebepler, aynı zamanda a Asyalı komşu ve dostlarımız nezdinde itibarlı kılmaktadır[...] "Milli Misak"tan Avrupa Konseyine girdiğimiz güne kadar, adamlar değişmiş, devletimizin politikası değişmemiştir. Hatay'a nasıl girdik ise Avrupa Konseyine de öyle giriyoruz".

¹⁰⁶³ Mithat Perin, "Karşımıza Çıkan Büyük Fırsat", *Yeni İstanbul*, 26 February 1950, p. 2.

the international affairs.¹⁰⁶⁴ As *Ulus* claimed on April 9, 1950, Turkey was a European country in all terms and it was at the same time an “element of stability” (*istikrar unsuru*) in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁰⁶⁵ More importantly, emphasis on geographical regions by the press was affected by the contemporary needs. For instance, when Turkey wanted to receive the American aid or when it tried to become a member of the European Commission, the emphasis on Turkey’s European identity increased. Or, when Turkey was excluded from NATO, the so-called urgency of the Mediterranean security arrangement led to the increasing discussions over Turkey’s Mediterranean identity.

In addition to the geographical definition of Turkey, the other point of the creation of an ally in the eyes of the press was the importance of Turkey for the global politics and the western democracies. First of all, Turkey’s primacy in its own regions appeared on the pages of the Turkish newspapers. For the both governmental and oppositional press, Turkey stood as a ‘castle’ in the Middle East and Mediterranean, which stopped Soviet expansion towards these regions. For example, on March 5, 1948, *Akşam*, reporting from *AP*, claimed that a report published by the Foreign Ministry of the US regarded Turkey as a ‘castle’ which protected Arab countries and the Eastern Mediterranean from the Soviet aggression. Similarly, *Yeni Sabah* argued that Turkey, being the unchanging owner of the Straits, was a ‘castle’ which protected the Eastern Mediterranean against the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶⁶

Moreover, as *Cumhuriyet* claimed on April 20, 1949, among all Middle Eastern countries, Turkey stood as a strong ‘castle’ with respect to both material and moral terms. It added that both the US and Britain were very interested in Turkey’s national security since they knew that any attack on Turkey would immediately spread into

¹⁰⁶⁴ Feridun Osman Menteşeoğlu, "Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye", *Ulus*, 19 February 1949, p. 2.

¹⁰⁶⁵ "Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Mevkii", *Ulus*, 9 April 1950, p. 3.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Amerika Dış Bakanlığının Raporu, (*AP*) *Akşam*, 5 March 1948, p. 1; "Türkiye ve Rusya", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 March 1948, p. 1; "Boğazlar", *Yeni Sabah*, 24 March 1948, p. 5; "Boğazların Değişmez Hâkimi", *Yeni Sabah*, 9 May 1948, p. 5.

other regions.¹⁰⁶⁷ In the same way, as *Zafer* claimed on September 19, 1949, the American politicians saw Turkey as a dominant actor of the regional stability in the Middle East.¹⁰⁶⁸ What is more, as Topalak claimed on November 10, 1949, although the West had comprehended the primacy of the Middle East recently, Turkey had always been aware of the significance of the region: the one who designed the unification of the Middle East was “brave” Atatürk and he materialized it through *the Saadabad Pact*, a Non-aggression pact which was signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937.¹⁰⁶⁹

As maintained by the press, Turkey had a vital place not only for its region but also for the world peace and international institutions. Particularly after the exclusion of Turkey from NATO, urging necessity of additional regional security arrangements, the press continued to state that Turkey stood as an asset which the West would like to use against the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁷⁰ In this context, even visits of the western diplomats and actors to Turkey were used by the press to show the priority of Turkey for the West.¹⁰⁷¹ Therefore, the Turkish press asserted that while Turkey needed to ‘receive’ the

¹⁰⁶⁷ "İrânın Azimkâr Siyaseti", *Cumhuriyet*, 20 April 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶⁸ "Türkiye Orta Doğuda Bir İstikrar Amili Olmaktadır", *Zafer*, 19 September 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Mücahit Topalak, "Cesur Mustafa Kemal", *Zafer*, 10 November 1949, p. 3.

¹⁰⁷⁰ "Rusya Türkiye Engelini Kırmaya Teşebbüs Ederse", *Yeni Sabah*, 1 March 1948, p. 1; "Türkiye Bir Sovyet Tecavüzüne Uğrarsa", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 25 February 1949, p. 1; "Başkan Truman Kongre'ye Yardım Raporunu Verdi", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 18 March 1949, p. 1; "Amerika'da Büyük Bir İlgi Uyandırdı", (*AFP*) *Ulus*, 18 March 1949, p. 1; "Türkiye'nin Bütünlüğünü Desteklemekler Azimliyiz", *Ulus*, 20 March 1949, p. 1; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Avrupa Konseyi ve Türkiye", *Zafer*, 4 May 1949, p. 3; "Avrupanın Müdafaası İçin Montgomery'nin Planı", *Yeni İstanbul*, 5 December 1949, p. 1; Cemal, Behçet, "Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri ve Yakınşarkın Emniyeti", *Yeni İstanbul*, 30 December 1949, p. 2; "Türkiye En Kuvvetli Milletlerden Biridir", *Ulus*, 3 January 1950, p. 1; "Türkiye ve Orta Doğu", (*AP*) *Ulus*, 4 January 1950, p. 1; "Amerikanın Yakın Doğu Siyaseti", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 January 1950, p. 3; "McGhee Türkiyenin Cesaretini Övdü", *Yeni İstanbul*, 21 January 1950, p. 1; "Türkiyeden Japonyaya Kadar, Amerikanın Yapacağı Yardım", *Yeni İstanbul*, 23 January 1950, p. 4; "Sovyetlere Karşı Emniyet Çemberi", *Yeni İstanbul*, 25 January 1950, p. 1; "Türkiye'de Başarılan İşler Yirminci Yüzyılın Mucizeleridir", *Ulus*, 1 March 1950, p. 1

¹⁰⁷¹ "Nancy Evans ve Norman Del Mar", *Ulus*, 21 April 1950, p. 4; "Bir İdealist Amerikalı Kadın Ankara'da", *Ulus*, 22 April 1950, p. 1; "General Crocker'in Ankarayı Ziyareti", *Yeni İstanbul*, 27 April 1950, p. 1; Geoffrey Glaister, "Türkiye Yabancıya 'Hoşgeldin!' Diyor", *Ulus*, 17 May 1950, p. 2; "Russel Dorr'un Dünkü Demeci", *Ulus*, 19 May 1950, p. 1.

American aid and to become a part of the Western world, the West (particularly, the US) also needed to 'give' aid to Turkey and make Turkey a part of it.

In the process of creating an ally by the press, while Turkey had a great significance for the West in general, the press gave a much greater role to the US, to which Turkey was a very similar country, in protecting the country from the communist intimidation.¹⁰⁷² For example, on June 19, 1948, *Akşam*, reporting from AP, claimed that Truman regarded the Turkish army as the protector of security and the most essential stabilizing factor in the region, where there were presently many struggles.¹⁰⁷³ Similarly, as *Cumhuriyet* claimed on March 24, 1949, Washington was aware of the fact that the Turkish army was very strong.¹⁰⁷⁴ Moreover, *Yeni Sabah* claimed that the ally Americans knew that the territorial integrity and political independence of Turkey were very important for the American foreign policy.¹⁰⁷⁵ Til, evaluating collaboration between Turkey and the US, also said that Turkey was the most peaceful country, which did not have designs over foreign countries' lands and aimed only peace for all nations.¹⁰⁷⁶

Similarly, for Oğuz Türkkkan who went to the US for medical treatment in 1947 and lived there until 1974, the American press, for the first time, began to understand the potential power of Turks for American eastern policy. For him, although there was no doubt that the US was leading the free world, it knew that it could not resist communist powers in the rest of the world on its own. As Türkkkan claimed, the Soviet Union was aware of the fact that attacking Turkey would mean declaring a war against the US.¹⁰⁷⁷ Akin to Türkkkan, Daver also wrote that the Americans already knew the strategic

¹⁰⁷² Yavuz Abadan, "Dış Politikamızın İtibarı", *Ulus*, 28 January 1950, p. 3.

¹⁰⁷³ "Trumanın Türkiyeye Yardıma Dair Raporu", (AP) *Akşam*, 19 June 1948, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷⁴ "Orta Doğuya Askeri Yardım Fazlaştıracak", *Cumhuriyet*, 24 March 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷⁵ "Türkiye'ye Verilen Kat'i Teminat", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 April 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Enis Tahsin Til, "Türk-Amerikan İşbirliği", *Akşam*, 17 April 1949, p. 2.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Oğuz Türkkkan, "Amerikanın Şark Siyaseti ve Türklük Dünyası", *Cumhuriyet*, 20 March 1950, p. 2.

importance of Turkey in the region around Turkey and therefore Turkey had to receive the Marshall Aid.¹⁰⁷⁸

Indeed, as the Turkish press claimed, Turkey's significance stemmed from its exceptional characteristic of being the 'only' country which was able to stop the Soviet expansion. For example, as *Akşam* maintained, the report issued by the US Foreign Ministry stated that Turkey was one of the few countries, which managed to stop the Soviet expansion.¹⁰⁷⁹ Similarly, on March 7, 1949, Daver, in his analysis of the political and strategic importance of Turkey, claimed that only one country which managed to escape from the communist control was Turkey, resisting against the "red flood" (*kızıl sel*) in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁰⁸⁰ As he later asserted, Turkey was the nearest country to the "Red Giant" (*Kızıl Dev*) and therefore it would be the most affected one by any Soviet penetration. According to him, Turkey, along with its stubborn resistance to the Cold War of the Soviet Union from the end of the Second World War, increased morality of other nations and bolstered self-assurance of all small nations to resist the Soviet aggression. As he concluded, Turkey was one of the strongest nations in Europe.¹⁰⁸¹

Nonetheless, despite these increasing relations between Turkey and the US, the press did not find the amount of the American aid sufficient and demanded the US to enhance it. It was emphasized that as Turkey served to the world peace,¹⁰⁸² the aid to 'the Turkish bastion' by the US had to be increased.¹⁰⁸³ As *Yeni İstanbul* claimed on February 9, 1950, for instance, Turkey demanded the American aid only in order to

¹⁰⁷⁸ Abidin Daver, "Milli Müdafaamız Bakımından Bir Zaruret", *Cumhuriyet*, 30 March 1950, p. 1. See other examples for how the press claimed that Turkey brought peace and security in the Middle East: "Türkiye Ortaşarkın İstikrar Unsuru", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 April 1950, p. 3; "Ortadoğuda Bilhassa Türkiye Desteklenmeli", *Yeni İstanbul*, 17 April 1950, p. 1. "Türkiye'ye Yardım, Dış Siyasetimizin Sıklet Merkezini Teşkil Ediyor", *Yeni İstanbul*, 25 April 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷⁹ "Amerika Dış Bakanlığının Raporu", (AP) *Akşam*, 5 March 1948, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Abidin Daver, "Türkiyenin Siyasi ve Stratejik Ehemmiyeti", *Cumhuriyet*, 7 March 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸¹ Abidin Daver, "Atlantik Paktı ve Türkiye", *Cumhuriyet*, 20 March 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸² "Dünya Sulhüne Hizmet", *Yeni Sabah*, 30 April 1950, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸³ Abidin Daver, "Türkiye Kalesine Yapılan Yardımlar Arttırılmalıdır", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 May 1950, p. 1.

help the West to sustain the world peace. As it concluded, that's why the US had to send aid to Turkey.¹⁰⁸⁴ As *Yeni İstanbul* later maintained, Turkey was the strongest point in the US strategic policies.¹⁰⁸⁵ For this reason, as it asserted, Turkey had to obtain a bigger share from the Marshall Plan and so would become a “first-class country” (*birinci sınıf bir devlet*) soon.¹⁰⁸⁶

More importantly, the Turkish press asserted that if Turkey had a key position for the West, then the West had to treat Turkey accordingly. For example, as Sav claimed on October 4, 1948, if the United States of Europe, ranging from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to Turkey in the East, was to be formed, Turkey needed to be treated according to its strategic importance.¹⁰⁸⁷ Moreover, for the press, the West had to realize the worth of Turkey for its own benefits. For example, as Daver claimed on April 5, 1949, the West had to accept that Turkey was one of the castles of the West and it had to take this fact into account before preparing a security pact (implying NATO).¹⁰⁸⁸ Similar to Daver, Doğrul stated that the first thing which had to be done after the formation of NATO was to consolidate Turkey's existing military and economic power. As he concluded, any attack to Turkey by the Soviet Union would lead to another world war.¹⁰⁸⁹ To sum up, as the press asserted, Turkey, standing as a ‘castle’ in its region, was very important within the framework of the western security system established against the Soviet aggression.

Apart from the importance of Turkey, superiority of Turkey, Turkish people and the Turkish army was another issue discussed in newspapers. While journalists were themselves proud of their strong army, they also referred to the speeches of foreign observers to prove the strength of the Turkish army. For example, on November 24,

¹⁰⁸⁴ "Türkiyeye Amerika Neden Yardım Etmelidir?", *Yeni İstanbul*, 9 February 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸⁵ "Amerikanın Strateji Politikasında En Kuvvetli Olan Nokta: Türkiye", *Yeni İstanbul*, 13 February 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸⁶ "Türkiye, Birinci Sınıf Bir Devlet Olmanın Yolundadır", *Yeni İstanbul*, 14 February 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Nizameddin Ali Sav, "Marshall Planında Türkiyenin Payı", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 October 1948, p. 2.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Abidin Daver, "Batının Bir Kalesi Olduğumuz Kabul Edilmelidir", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Atlantik Paktından Sonra Yapılacak İlk Mühim İş", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 April 1949, p. 3.

1948, as *Cumhuriyet* reported Karl Henry von Wiegand's words, a famous American journalist and war correspondent, that Turkey was ready for any 'sneaky' (*sinsi*) attack with its army composed of 700,000 soldiers.¹⁰⁹⁰ Moreover, as reported by *Akşam*, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, said that Turkey had the strongest army of the East, which was followed by the Arab bloc led by Egypt.¹⁰⁹¹ As *Akşam* further claimed, James Payne from the weekly magazine *Recorder*, said that Turks would defend even one centimeter of their homeland.¹⁰⁹² *Yeni İstanbul*, too, claimed that, as a result of having such a strong and an adamant army, Turkey was supposed to be the leader of the region.¹⁰⁹³

Moreover, the press employed the 'language of civilization' and asserted that Turkish civilizational level was as high as that of its allies. For example, as *Yeni İstanbul* reported on April 8, 1950, Robert R. McCormick, the owner and publisher of the *Chicago Tribune* newspaper, claimed that Turks were the most civilized nations after the Americans.¹⁰⁹⁴ Besides, for *Yeni İstanbul*, Turkey served as a model for other nations since it managed not to obey Soviet orders and followed peaceful policies.¹⁰⁹⁵ Similarly, for *Ulus* and Burhan Belge of *Yeni İstanbul*, the reason why European press had been so much interested in the Turkish elections of 1950 was Turkey's success in democratization, as a role-model for Europeans.¹⁰⁹⁶ Hence, believing that economic development would liberate the country from the Soviet control and the nation was to be given economic independence the Turkish press was willing to be a part of the

¹⁰⁹⁰ "Türkiye, Sinsi Bir Baskına Karşı Tetiktedir", *Cumhuriyet*, 24 November 1948, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹¹ "Türkiye Şarkın En Kuvvetli Memleketi", (*Nafen*) *Akşam*, 14 May 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹² "Bir İngiliz Muharririnin Türkiyedeki İntibaları", (*Nafen*) *Akşam*, 21 May 1949, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹³ "Türkiye, Yakın Doğu Lideri Mevkiindedir", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 October 1949, p. 1. See other examples: "Türkiye, Her Tecavüzü Önliyecek Durumdadır", *Ulus*, 20 April 1950, p. 1; "Türk Kalesi", *Ulus*, 28 April 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹⁴ "Birleşik Amerika Dışında Dünyanın En Medeni Memleketi Türkiye'dir", *Yeni İstanbul*, 8 April 1950, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹⁵ "Atlantik Birliğinin Geçirdiği Buhran", *Yeni İstanbul*, 24 April 1950, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹⁶ "Seçimler Bütün Dünyada Büyük Akisler Uyandırdı", (*New York Times*) *Ulus*, 18 May 1950, p. 1; Burhan Belge, "Dünya Huzurunda Bizim Seçimler", *Yeni İstanbul*, 21 May 1950, p. 1.

capitalist world but the press hoped that Turkey would be an ‘equal’ partner with the West (particularly, with the US and Britain).




Figure 20¹⁰⁹⁷

In this regard, although Turkey was depicted as a part of the ‘Western’ and ‘civilized’ world, the adoration of foreigners was harshly criticized by columnists. For example, as Rado claimed on February 10, 1948, there was somehow an adoration of foreigners among Turks and so they were deprived of a national self-esteem.¹⁰⁹⁸ Hence, in a period when members of the press and political elite were very keen to compliment the US and point out the Turkish underdevelopment, there were also voices at least among some journalists found this excessive and criticizes it. As a part of this feeling, the Turkish press felt sometimes compassion for Europe due to its weak position against the Soviet Union and dependency on the American intervention and the American aid. As the cartoon in Figure 20 demonstrates, Europe is presented as a

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Tanin*, 12 February 1946, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Şevket Rado, "Yabancı Hayranlığı", *Akşam*, 10 February 1948, p. 2. Similarly, CHP MP for Maraş Emin Soysal, discussing election system of Turkey in the National Assembly, said that none of current systems in the world, which included British democracy with kingdom, American democracy having an over-authorized president, European democracies which had led to destruction in these countries or “red dictatorship” (*Kızıl Diktatörya*), was better than Turkey (3 July 1948: Emin Soysal, TBMM, 8-3-12-81, p. 30.)

'chicken'. The cartoon criticized the attempts of 'hungry Europe' to protect the 'world peace'. At the bottom of the caricature, it is written that "*a hungry chicken dreams of herself in a granary*". As seen from the cartoon, the Turkish press saw the 'war-torn' and 'devastated' Europe as a 'weak' and 'passive' actor in the post-war international system. This 'weak' Europe, as the Turkish press depicted, was desperate to get the American aid. As an illustration, in the first cartoon in Figure 21, the man holding the money bag represents the United States while the man holding the door represents the Soviet Union. The US pays a 'ransom' for the 'frightened' young woman representing Europe, who is captured by the Soviet Union. In the second cartoon, the 'bear' representing the Soviet Union, climbing the tree, kidnapped the 'unconscious' young woman, who represents Europe and the man under the tree representing the US tries to save the woman from the hands of the bear. As these two cartoons demonstrate, the US plays a 'savior' role through the American aid, but more importantly, Europe is depicted as a defenseless woman, who is captured or kidnapped by the Soviet Union and waits to be saved by the United States.



Figure 21¹⁰⁹⁹

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Ulus*, 5 July 1947, p. 1; *Ulus*, 7 July 1947, p.1.

This 'weak' and 'miserable' image of Europe continued throughout the late-1940s and there were news about how the 'Western Civilization' was on the eve of destruction against the communist aggression.¹¹⁰⁰ For example, on November 1, 1949, Mücahit Topalak of *Zafer* claimed that "poor Europe" (*zavallı Avrupa*) could not survive without the American aid.¹¹⁰¹ One week later, Topalak criticized the exaggeration of anti-communism in Western Europe on the grounds that as precautions were taken against communism so unskillfully that Europeans regarded every non-communist action as American and every non-American thing as communist, which paved the way for an illness of fear in Europe.¹¹⁰² Similarly, Yavuz Abadan of *Ulus*, in his analysis of 'the disease of the European' claimed that Europeans were under the psychological pressure of the defeat of the World Wars and the Soviet aggression.¹¹⁰³ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın of *Ulus*, in his analysis of 'the weak points of the Western Civilization', claimed that Europe was currently 'weak', 'miserable' and 'scattered' due to its penetration between Moscow and the Anglo-Saxon world.¹¹⁰⁴ In a similar way, on May 8, 1950, Topalak claimed that Western Europe had 'inferiority complexity' as it had to make a choice between the US and the Soviet Union, which damaged collaboration between the US and European countries.¹¹⁰⁵

As such, the press members sometimes despised 'continental' European countries because of their 'desperate' and 'weak' position in the post-war international system. The first reason for such an underrating view was the need of European countries for the American aid (i.e., the Marshall Plan). However, as the Turkish political elite and press constantly emphasized, Turkey was also very much in need to receive the American aid both to finance its exhausted budget and to realize its long-term

¹¹⁰⁰ "Batı Medeniyeti Batmak Tehlikesinde", *Yeni Sabah*, 17 January 1948, p. 3; M. Şevki Yazman, "Prag'dan Sonra Ne Olacak?", *Akşam*, 15 March 1948, p. 4; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Sömürgeci Devletlerle Atlantik Pakti", *Cumhuriyet*, 11 February 1949, p. 3

¹¹⁰¹ Mücahit Topalak, "Zavallı Avrupa", *Zafer*, 1 November 1949, p. 3.

¹¹⁰² Mücahit Topalak, "Korku Siyaseti", *Zafer*, 9 November 1949, p. 3.

¹¹⁰³ Yavuz Abadan, "Avrupanın Hastalığı", *Ulus*, 15 February 1950, p. 4.

¹¹⁰⁴ Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın, "Batı Medeniyetinin Zayıf Tarafları", *Ulus*, 2 March 1950, p. 1.

¹¹⁰⁵ Mücahit Topalak, "Topyekûn Diplomasi", *Zafer*, 8 May 1950, p. 3.

developmental plans. Whereas European countries, which received the Marshall Plan, were regarded as 'desperate' ones to get the American aid, Turkey was not depicted such a 'desperate' country; instead, it was generally emphasized that Turkey received the 'foreign' aid to protect the 'Western Civilization' and the 'Free World' against the danger of communism. Moreover, the press, sometimes using the words of foreign politicians and press as reference points, asserted that Turkey was the 'most successful' country among all the aid-receiver countries. Hence, there was a 'double standard' in the perception of the American aid by the Turkish press members; that is, they drew a 'miserable' image of European countries whereas Turkey, which also benefited from the Marshall Plan, was not similarly depicted.

The second reason for why the Turkish press despised continental European countries was their need for the American support in resisting the Soviet Union. The Turkish press, by constantly mentioning the 'fifth columns' of the Soviet Union in Europe, tried to provoke public and to take control of the governments. In the existence of such a threat, the press urged the necessity of the American intervention to save Europe from communism. However, as the Turkish political elite and press repetitively asserted, Turkey had also been exposed to the Soviet threat from the outset of the Second World War. Again, there was a 'double standard' of the Turkish press in evaluating the position of European countries in the global Cold War conflicts. Namely, while the Turkish press claimed that the Western (or European) Civilization was on the verge of destruction, Turkey, which had to tackle with similar problems, was depicted as a 'role-model' for other nations because of its high level of civilization.

In effect, these European countries, which the Turkish press somehow despised, were the parts of the so-called 'Western civilization', which Turkey 'desperately' tried to become a part of it. What is more, in its industrious attempts to create an ally (i.e., the West), while the Turkish press tried to prove that Turkey was a 'European' country due to its European-oriented institutions, it did not hesitate mentioning the so-called destruction of the Western Civilization. More importantly, these European countries underrated by the Turkish press were the 'charter members' of NATO, from which

Turkey was excluded. In other words, the press wanted Turkey to be protected by the 'western security system' but ironically claimed that this system was not very 'secure'.

To sum up, the Turkish press tried to create an ally from 1945 to 1950 but this process included certain 'inconsistencies'. While the transition from the 'old enemies' to the 'new allies' was generally based on the notion of the peaceful America and its anti-imperialist rhetoric, the Turkish press somehow ignored the past of the Turkish-American relations and pro-imperialist policies of the 'peacemaker' US. At the same time, the 'geographical' definition of the West by the Turkish press meant non-communist countries located in the west of Turkey and Turkish newspapers tried to prove that Turkey was a European country not only in geographical but also in social and political terms. Moreover, the press criticized the members of the West other than the United States for their colonial past, which in reality the United States also had, and sometimes despised European countries for the conditions, which Turkey also had. That is to say, in a broader context, the West meant a 'democratic', 'free' and 'prosperous' world which was a perfect alternative to 'authoritarian', 'oppressive' and 'poor' communist bloc for Turkey. Nonetheless, in a narrower context, the West simply meant the United States, which appeared as the hegemonic power in the capitalist bloc following the end of the Second World War and as the ally of Turkey that protected it from the Soviet threat.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study examined how the Turkish press played a crucial role in creating, disseminating and propagandizing the Turkish perceptions of early Cold War from 1945 to 1950, when a new period opened for Turkey. Initially, for a better understanding of the political environment of that period both in national and international contexts, the attitudes of the Turkish political elite towards the early Cold War from 1945 to 1950 were analyzed, by dividing the period into three sub-periods, which were determined according to the political atmosphere and the needs of the period. In this period, Turkey not only had its own Cold War with the Soviet Union but it also became one of the fronts of the global Cold War conflicts.

As the course of Turkey's relations with the outside world and the balance of powers among the world powers frequently changed, the Turkish political elite tried to adapt themselves to the changing international system. Even so, external factors such as the presence of the Soviet threat and Turkey's close ties with the West could not *per se* explain the development of the Turkish foreign policy within the early Cold War context; that is, the political and economic transitions within the country also affected Turkey's position in the international system. Accordingly, an increase in already existing anti-communist government policies and a 'gradual' but also a 'radical' alteration (i.e., from the protectionist policies to liberal ones) in the understanding of etatism and economy policies could be grasped only within such a framework in which both internal and external factors simultaneously played a decisive role.

In a newly established multi-party system, the oppositional parties (to a large extent, DP) emerged as new actors in the Turkish politics. Although their own Cold War

agendas were only slightly different from that of CHP, the foreign affairs became another competition area between the government and the opposition. While the opposition 'sometimes' asserted that CHP exaggerated the 'Soviet threat', the oppositional parties did not oppose to Turkey's drive to the West. The 'half-hearted' support of the opposition to the government's foreign policy was also shaped by the Cold War context. On the one hand, from the view of the opposition, mounting a criticism of the government's policy towards the Soviet Union did not seem to be very likely. Having confronted by the Soviet demands and accusations and therefore the worsening relations between two countries, criticism of the government's Soviet policy might lead to a loss of prestige of the opposition in Turkish public while the newly established opposition was trying to gain support of Turkish people. As the case of the raid of *Tan* newspaper in December 1945 showed, such a criticism about the Turkish-Soviet relations must have created a very negative reaction from the government and public. Moreover, in an environment where the government constantly increased the doze of anti-communism and suppressed the opposition by occasionally exaggerating the threat of communism, there was clearly a danger of criticizing the Soviet policy of the government: being labelled as a 'communist'. For these reasons, the opposition was only able to assert that CHP 'exaggerated' the communist threat.

On the other hand, mounting a criticism of the government's policy towards the West could not be free of the existing international system. To be more exact, in a period when the West (particularly, the US) was regarded as the 'only' option which might counterbalance the Soviet threat and help Turkey in realization of long-term developmental plans, the opposition normally could not produce a harsh criticism of the Turkish-American relations. They could not oppose to the nature of the Turkish-American relations but all they could do was to criticize the extent of benefits which Turkey would gain from this relationship such as the use of the American aid by CHP and the lack of obtaining NATO member by the government. More importantly, criticizing Turkey's drive to the West would mean sending a 'wrong' message to the western powers for the opposition, which wanted to come to power in Turkey. Instead,

the oppositional parties tried to show that if they would win the elections, they would certainly collaborate with the West and accelerate Turkey's drive to the West. Therefore, whether the oppositional parties failed to produce an alternative foreign policy to that of CHP or they had to silence their voice of criticism because of such restrictions, the attitudes of the political parties towards the ongoing Cold War were very similar to each other.

This similarity between the government and opposition was also true for the governmental and oppositional newspapers with respect to their understanding and reflecting of the international developments. As a matter of fact, the distinction between the political parties and the newspapers was not an obvious one in this period. While these newspapers were semi-officially or officially affiliated with the political parties, most of the columnists of that period were (and would be) CHP and DP MPs. Having owned by people who were CHP and DP members or even directly owned by the parties, one could not expect that the Turkish newspapers of the period might produce very different arguments from those of the politicians regarding the Turkish foreign affairs and international developments.

In this context, having influenced by foreign press and diplomats but internalizing it, the Turkish press produced its own Cold War language, which took shape in line with the course of the Cold War dynamics. To whom the press spoke, it emphasized on the growing of communist aggression and the protector role of the West to counterbalance the Soviet threat. While these two themes occupied a central place in the perceptions of the early Cold War, there was only a slight difference among perceptions of the international system by the Turkish newspapers. In addition to the reasons listed above for such a 'slight' difference, the sources (i.e., Western news agencies and press) that the Turkish press were also effective in converging perceptions of the various press members; that is, 'importing' news from the 'same' international sources, the newspapers reflected the course of the Cold War in a very similar way.

Although perceptions of the Cold War by the press members were very similar to each other, these perceptions frequently changed throughout the period; namely, while the press might celebrate the superiority of the West against the communist bloc, it might

claim just the opposite one day later. Or, while it might talk about a possibility of a war between two blocs, it might change its ideas immediately. Such ‘inconsistencies’ increased in the end of the period when the Cold War conflicts intensified both in regional and global levels. First of all, in a quickly changing international environment, as expected, these perceptions of the press must have also changed rapidly. For this reason, the Turkish press, watching very closely international developments and reporting them in the front pages, had to change its perceptions and reflections of the Cold War developments accordingly. For example, after NATO was formed in April 1949 and Berlin Blockade ended with the Soviet failure in May 1949, the concerns of the Turkish press over the security of non-communist Europe seemed to be removed. However, following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 and the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the very beginning of 1950, the Turkish press worriedly watched developments in Asia. In other words, on the one hand superiority of the West against the Soviet Union in Europe and on the other hand relatively weaker position of the capitalist bloc compared to the communist one in Asia constantly changed the mood of the Turkish press. Moreover, as the Turkish press generally reported international developments from Western sources, this situation must have affected Turkish perceptions. While the American news agencies and newspapers, which evaluated the developments according to the American interests, might draw a pessimistic picture of the current international situation; the British ones, which analyzed international developments according to the British interest, might do the opposite, or *vice versa*. As a result, reporting news and translating articles from different sources, although they were all Western sources, might have contributed ‘inconsistent’ and ‘changing’ perceptions of the Cold War by the Turkish newspapers.

While Western sources interpreted international developments in their own ways and according to the national interests of their own countries, it was the same for the Turkish press, too. Even though Turkish press closely watched and analyzed the Cold War conflicts in regional and international contexts, the main concern of the Turkish press undoubtedly was the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey, particularly with respect to developments which were happening in the countries

around Turkey. For this reason, even in their analyses of the regions where Turkey was not a part of them, the Turkish press members emphasized directly or indirectly Turkish position and role in the world politics. Mentioning the communist threat all around the world, the Turkish press tried to show that other 'free' nations had also similar problems to those of Turkey (i.e., the Soviet threat).

Putting the Turkish case in a wider picture of the Cold War conflicts, the press members tried to create an enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union). Taking the worsening relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union into account, it is possible to grasp the reasons behind the negative image of the Soviet Union and the Communist World in general, which was drawn by the Turkish newspapers. According to the depiction of the Communist World by the Turkish press, with the exceptions of a ruling minority class, everybody in this world was discontent with the communist regime: (religious) minorities were suppressed by the communists, people of 'satellite' countries were 'prisoners' of the Soviet Union, citizens of the Soviet Union, even the working class, were living in the 'Soviet Hell', where hunger and poverty were persistent. Linking communist groups and parties in non-communist countries including Turkey with the enemy beyond (i.e., the Soviet Union), these groups were depicted by the Turkish press as 'traitors' who would damage their own people from within.

In addition, in parallel with the worsening relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union, the Turkish press began to rewrite the history. Ignoring the interwar alliance between two countries, which was greatly motivated by their anti-Western attitude, the Turkish press asserted that Soviet 'Russia' had always been the enemy; that is, the Soviet 'Union' was resembled to the Russian Empire for its imperialist policies, which fought against the Ottoman Empire for many times. In other words, while the depiction of the 'ally' Soviets removed from the pages of newspapers; as the Turkish press claimed, the enemy was once again 'Russia'. What is more, the new enemy, which had been an isolated country during the interwar period, emerged as a 'superpower' from the Second World War that increased the perception of threat coming from the enemy.

As the creation of an enemy was shaped in the foreign policy context, so did the creation of an ally. However, it was not easy as much as fabricating an enemy. As there

were wars and struggles between the Ottoman and Russian Empires until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Turkish press was able to use historical references to construct an enemy. Contrarily, the relations between Turkey and the West had never been so strong that the Turkish press might use historical references to ‘reinvent’ an ally. In reality, the Western (European) imperialism led to dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and invaded Turkey before. Having faced by such a historical background of the Turkish-Western relations, narrating the peaceful attitude as a characteristic part of the image of the ally and portraying the anti-imperialist stand, the press described a new West in which the US ruled over the imperialist European countries. Accordingly, the Turkish press had begun to rewrite the history for the creation of an ally. Ignoring not only the past of Turkey’s relations with the West but also imperialist past of the US, the press members tried to create an ally. This peaceful and selfless ally was ‘almost’ perfect for the Turkish press although it occasionally seemed to neglect Turkey’s national interest and give an aid less than enough to Turkey.

Nonetheless, the Turkish press assigned a leading role to the US in the capitalist bloc, which was ‘already’ happening after declining British hegemony in the world. The press members, who were satisfied with the splits in the communist bloc that might weaken the Soviet dominance, were concerned with the so-called ‘minor’ differences among the members of the West. Namely, while they wanted the leaders of the satellite communist countries not to obey Moscow by showing Tito of Yugoslavia as a role-model; they demanded western countries to accept the leading role of the US. Contrary to the image of the US, as a ‘selfless’ defender of the ‘world peace’ which was obviously not true, the images of non-communist European countries were not so positive that the Turkish press criticized their ‘imperialist’, ‘self-interested’ and ‘pragmatic’ policies as the particular case of Britain suggests.

The Turkish press, which accused European countries of being ‘self-interested’ and ‘pragmatic’, was also itself ‘self-interested’ and ‘pragmatic’. This characteristic of the Turkish press was not only a result of its concern over the Turkish national interests and the neglect of the US imperialism but it was also a result of its ‘biased’ perceptions of the early Cold War developments. As an example, ‘nationalism’ took a central place

in the anti-Soviet campaign of the Turkish press; that is, as it asserted, nationalism was the enemy of communism and increasing nationalist feelings among the world people would bring an end to communism. However, the Turkish press, despite its 'anti-imperialist rhetoric' against the European colonialism, did not support 'national struggle for independence' in Asia because of the belief that they were waged by communists and in case of the success of these movements, the Soviet Union would increase its influence in the region. In a very similar way, while accusing the Soviet Union of being an imperialist country which intervened in internal affairs of other countries, the Turkish press did not produce a similar argument for the US. As an example, when the communist party took the government in Bulgaria with the support of the Soviet Union, the Turkish press harshly criticized the Soviet role in Bulgarian elections. However, when the communist parties lost elections in Italy and France largely due to the American intervention, the Turkish press welcomed this intervention. What is more, the Soviet aid and support to the communist movements in Asia were regarded as an 'imperialist' policy whereas neither the Marshall Plan given to European countries nor American support to the colonial rules in Asia was not considered so.

Moreover, the Turkish press, instead of its emphasis on democratization, supported anti-democratic regimes, which were against the Soviet Union including Franco of Spain and the Shah of Iran. Similarly, supporting 'rightist' political parties in non-communist Europe against the so-called 'Fifth Columns' (i.e., the communist parties), press members supported the Democratic Party, led by Harry Truman who introduced the 'Truman Doctrine', against the Republican Party in the US and the 'Labour' Party against the 'Conservative' Party in Britain.

Finally, employing the 'language of civilization', the Turkish press tried to show that Turkey was undoubtedly a 'European country'. While criticizing and sometimes despising European countries and their level of civilization, the Turkish press somehow tried to affiliate Turkey with Europe and more importantly with the western security system. In this regard, exclusion of Turkey from NATO, which was founded by the US and 'European' countries, damaged 'European' and 'Western' identity of

Turkey in the eyes of Turkish press members. Together with such a partial alienation from the international system and western security system, the situation that Turkey, as an independent country, was receiving foreign aid also forced the Turkish press to emphasize how Turkey was an ‘important’ and even a ‘superior’ country for the world peace and Western civilization.

In conclusion, repetitively ‘changing’ mood of the Turkish press, ‘inconsistent’ analyses of the international developments, ‘double standard’ of the columnists in comparing Turkey with European countries and ‘language of civilization’ uttered by the press members could only be understood by taking both internal and external developments, which happened within the ‘early Cold War’ context, into account. In any way, by May 1950 when DP came to power, thanks to endless efforts of the Turkish press members, the US and the Soviet Union had already been an ‘ally’ and an ‘enemy’, respectively, in the eyes of Turkish public.

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APPENDICES

A.TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez dönemin gazetelerini kullanarak Türk Basınının 1945 ila 1950 arasındaki dönemdeki Soğuk Savaş algısını incelemiştir. Bu dönem, Sovyetlerin Türkiye'den çeşitli talepleri ile birlikte Türkiye'nin Batı Bloğuna eklememesine tanıklık etmiş bir dönemdir. Aynı zamanda, tek partili sistemden çok partili sisteme geçiş gibi siyasi ve devletçi ekonomiden liberal piyasa ekonomisine geçiş gibi iktisadi birtakım değişimleri de bünyesinde barındırmıştır.

Böyle bir atmosferde, siyasi yapılarla organik ve güçlü ilişkileri olan Türk basını, kamuoyunun erken Soğuk Savaş algısının şekillenmesinde etkili olmuştur. Bir diğer deyişle, basın Türk Dış politikasında bir değişikliğin olması gerektiğine dair kamuoyu algısının şekillenmesinde ve siyasiler tarafından doğrudan dile getiremeyeceği olguları ve yorumları dış dünyaya mesaj verme açısından aracı rolünü üstlenmiştir.

Bu tez, konusu ve amacı açısından dönemin iktidar yanlısı ve muhalif gruplarla ilişkili gazetelerine dayanmaktadır. İncelen bu gazeteler, Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Tanin, Ulus, Vakit, Yeni Sabah, Yeni İstanbul ve Zafer'dir. Ayrıca, politikacıların erken Soğuk Savaş algılarındaki dönüşümü anlamak açısından Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanakları kullanılmıştır. Ek olarak da, Amerika ve İngiltere kökenli ve internet üzerinden ulaşılabilecek arşivlerden de faydalanmıştır.

Tezin ele aldığı dönemin tarihsel bağlamını incelersek, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın bitiminde Sovyetler Birliği, Türkiye'den toprak talepleri, Boğazların ortak yönetimi ve Boğazlar üzerinde üs talebi gibi birtakım isteklerle Türk hükümetinin karşısına çıkmıştır. Bu yeni gelişen Sovyet tehdidi ile karşılaşan Türk hükümeti, bu tehdit karşısında Batı (özellikle de Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Britanya) ile olan ilişkilerini geliştirme arzusuna sahip olmuştur. Bunun sonucu olarak da, Türkiye, ortaya çıkmakta olan Soğuk Savaş'ın merkezlerinden birisi haline gelmiştir.

Tezin ikinci bölümü hükümet ve muhalefetin erken Soğuk Savaş algısını incelemiştir. Sovyet tehdidi döneme damgasını vuran dış etken olarak ortaya çıkmışken, Türk

siyasilerinin uluslararası siyaset karşısındaki tutumları da Batı'dan gelen destek ve garantilerle de şekillenmiştir. İç ve dış dinamiklerin etkili olduğu böyle bir ortamda, hükümetin yanı sıra muhaliflerin kendi Soğuk Savaş algıları da ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu bölüm, söz konusu dönemi üç alt döneme ayırarak incelemiştir: Ocak 1945 - Temmuz 1945 alt dönemi: Sovyetlerin ilk talepleri ve Sovyet tehdidinin ortaya çıkışı, Temmuz 1945 - Temmuz 1947: Uluslararası destek için arayış ve görece kısıtlı bir destek sağlanması ve Temmuz 1947 - Mayıs 1950: Erken Soğuk Savaş dönemi şartlarına adaptasyon ve Türkiye'nin aradığı desteği bulması.

İlk alt dönem, Türk hükümetinin Sovyetlerle gittikçe bozulan ilişkilerinin karşısında, savaş sonrası dönemde kendisine daha iyi bir yer bulmak gayesine tanıklık etmiştir. Örneğin, 3 Ocak 1945'te Japonya ile ilişkilerini kesen Türkiye, yaklaşık bir ay sonra da, hem Almanya hem de Japonya'ya savaş ilan etmiştir. Tam bu esnada, Müttefik devletleri Yalta Konferansı gibi çeşitli barış görüşmelerinde dünyanın geleceğini tartışmaktaydılar. Tartışılan konulardan birisi de, Sovyetlerin talepleri doğrultusunda, Boğazların rejimi idi. Sovyetlerin değişiklik talepleri karşısında ABD ve Britanya'dan gelen tepkiler, teklif edilen değişikliğin olabileceği yönünde idi. Böylesi bir ortamda, Türk hükümeti Sovyet taleplerine ihtiyatlı yaklaşmayı seçmişti. Türkiye, müttefik devletleriyle olan ilişkilerini güçlendirmeye çalışırken, Sovyet taleplerinin Boğazları ilgilendiren kısmıyla ilgili görüşmeye açık olduğu mesajını vermişti. Kısacası, Sovyetlerin Türkiye'ye doğru baskısının arttığı bu ilk dönemde, Türk hükümeti, uluslararası ortamda, oldukça sınırlı bir desteğe sahipti. Hatta bu durum, hükümetin dış politikada kendisini yalnız ve dışlanmış hissetmesine neden olmuştu.

İkinci alt dönem, içsel bir dinamik olarak çok partili yaşama geçiş ve korumacı iktisat politikalarının serbest ekonomi lehine terk edilmesine tanıklık etmişti. Başka bir söylemle, Türk hükümeti Sovyetlerle olan kendi Soğuk Savaşa ek olarak, içte de çeşitli muhalif ve baskı gruplarının taleplerine cevap vermek ya da en azından bütün bu içsel dinamiklerle baş etmek zorundaydı. Üstelik kuruluş aşamasında büyük umutlar bağladıkları Birleşmiş Milletler, veto hakkı gibi büyük devletlerin üstünlüğüne yol açan yapısı gereği Türk siyasi çevrelerinde hayal kırıklığına neden olmuştu. Aynı zamanda, ABD ve Britanya'nın Sovyetler Birliği ile olan ilişkilerindeki

bozulmalar da bu iki Batı devletinin Türkiye ve Boğazlar meselesine bakışlarında da değişimler meydana getirmişti. Gerginleşen Türk-Sovyet ilişkileri çerçevesinde, Türk hükümet kanadı konu ile ilgili kaygılarını ve düşüncelerini de yavaş yavaş kamuoyu ile paylaşmaya başlamıştı. Ancak yine de bu dönem itibariyle, Türk hükümeti ve ilgili kişilerin açıklamalarında, Türkiye'nin Sovyetlere kapılarını tamamen kapatmadığını görebilmekteyiz. Bu tedbiri elden bırakmayan tutum, Sovyetlerin 1946 ortasından itibaren Türk hükümetine gönderdiği daha sert ve talepkar diplomatik notalarla birlikte değişime uğramıştı. İşte bu ortamda, Türkiye'nin Batı devletleriyle olan bağları gittikçe artmış, özellikle de ABD, Sovyetleri ve Sovyet tehdidini dengeleyebilecek bir unsur olarak, Türk hükümetinin karşısına çıkmıştı. Öyle ki, ABD Başkanı Truman'ın 12 Mart 1947 konuşması, Truman Doktrini denilen yeni bir oluşumu gündeme getirmişti. Daha sonrasında Marshall Planı ile birlikte ABD ile yapılan ikili anlaşmalar bu ilişkiler bütünü yeniden tanımlayarak, Türkiye'nin ve Türk politikacıların erken dönem Soğuk Savaş algısını da derinden etkilemişti.

Üçüncü alt dönemde, önceki iki dönemde olgunlaşan şartların da etkisiyle, Türk hükümeti kendisini hâlihazırda devam eden Soğuk Savaş çatışmalarının ortasında daha fazla bulmaya başlamıştı. Türk hükümeti Batı devletlerindeki gelişmeleri ve Batı ile Doğu arasındaki gerginliklerin gidişatını yakından takip ediyordu. Bunlara ek olarak, hükümete yakın işadamları da Türkiye'nin Batıya yönelmesinde iktisadi ve siyasi bir aktör olarak görev alıyorlardı. Türkiye'nin Batı kökenli iktisadi ve siyasi organizasyonlara olan üyeliklerine its geçen gün bir yenisi eklenirken, Türkiye'nin ABD ile olan ikili ilişkileri gittikçe sıklaşmakta ve bu durum Türk hükümetinin özgüvenini de artırmaktaydı. Bununla birlikte, 4 Nisan 1949'da kurulan Kuzey Atlantik Anlaşması Örgütü (NATO), hem küresel hem de yerel anlamda Soğuk Savaş'ın gidişatını başka bir boyuta taşımıştı. Türk siyasileri bir yandan anti-komünist ve anti-Sovyet duruşu nedeniyle bu örgütü takdir ederken bir yandan da bu organizasyonda Türkiye ile Yunanistan'a yer verilmemesine de hem karşı çıkıyor hem de benzeri bir örgütün Akdeniz ülkeleri arasında kurulmasını öneriyorlardı. Bununla birlikte, tüm bu kaygılar, Sovyet tehdidine verilen tepkilere benzer biçimde, Türk kamuoyunun önünde pek fazla dile getirilmiyordu. Bu gelişmeler ışığında, Türk

hükümetinin Soğuk Savaş algısı hızla değişirken, Mayıs 1950'de yapılan seçimler Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin yıllardır süregelen iktidarına son vermiş ve Demokrat Parti dönemini başlatmıştı.

Türk Hükümetinin erken dönem Soğuk Savaş algısını şekillendiren ve bunun bir parçası olan olgulardan birisi de komünizm karşıtlığıydı. Komünizm karşıtlığı daha önceki dönemlerde de görülen bir şey olmasına karşın, artan Sovyet tehdit algısıyla ve Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerindeki bozulmalara paralel olarak, anti-komünizm olgusu anti-Sovyet duruşuyla birleştirilmiş ve hem komünizm hem de Sovyet Birliği bir iç tehdit olarak görülmüştür. Bunun bir sonucu olarak, Türk hükümeti komünizm propagandası yaptığını düşündüğü yalnızca Sovyetler Birliği'nde değil diğer sosyalist ülkelerde de basılan kitap, dergi ve broşür gibi yayınlara yasak getirmiş, bunların toplatılması yönünde kararlar almıştır. Bu bağlamda, CHP yönetimi, ülkedeki komünist grupların kendilerine yönelik tehdit oluşturduğu yönünde bir kanıya sahip olarak, komünizm ile olan mücadeleyi daha da sıklaştırmıştır.

Anti-komünizm, Türk hükümetinin Soğuk Savaş algısında önemli bir faktör olarak ortaya çıkarken, Türkiye'nin uzun dönemli iktisadi kalkınmasıyla ilgili sorunlar ve bu yöndeki kaygılar da önemli bir etken olarak, erken dönem Soğuk Savaş koşullarında yer edinmiştir. Öyle ki, Batı demokrasilerine yanaşarak, milli ekonominin sorunlarına çözüm getirebileceğine inanan Türk siyasetçileri, its fırsatta Batı ile artan ilişkilerin zeminini iktisadi bağlamda da pekiştirmeye çalışmışlardır.

Bu çerçevede, milli gelirin yaklaşık olarak yarısının ayrıldığı askeri harcamalar önemli bir yere sahiptir. Öyle ki, artan Sovyet tehdidi karşısında, Türk politikacıları, Amerikan yardımının ve Türk ordusunun modernizasyonu gibi konularla ilgili sevinçlerini ve minnettarlıklarını dillendirmekten çekinmemişlerdir. Dahası, iktisadi kalkınmanın mihenk taşı oluşturacak planların, tarımın ve sanayinin gelişmesinin, eğitim ve sağlık sektörlerinin de iyileşmenin anahtarının da Batıya yaklaşmak olduğu algısı oluşturulmuştur.

Hükümetin kendi Soğuk Savaş ajandasına ek olarak, 1946 sonrası ortaya çıkan muhalefet partilerinin de kendilerine ait Soğuk Savaş algıları mevcuttu. Bu algılar

bütünü hem Türk dış politikasına hem de Türk hükümetin uluslararası düzlemde şekillenen koşullara uyumu ya da tepkileriyle ilgiliydi. Muhalefet partileri, kötüleşen Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerine ve Türkiye'nin Batıya entegrasyonuna karşı olmamakla birlikte, hükümetin Türkiye'yi yeterince iyi temsil edemediği, Amerikan yardımının CHP tarafından kötüye kullanıldığını, NATO'ya üye olamayışın tamamıyla hükümetin sorumluluğu altında olduğu gibi konularda sert çıkışlarda bulunabiliyorlardı. Yine de, Birleşmiş Milletlere üye olmak gibi ya da Amerikan yardımını almak gibi konularda bir karşıtlık veya hükümetle uyuşmazlık yoktu. Tam tersine, muhalefet liderleri, dış politika kapsamında (özellikle de Sovyet tehdidine karşı) hükümetle hemfikir olduklarını açıklıyorlardı.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü, söz konusu dönemde, Türk basının rolünü ve basının nasıl bir Soğuk Savaş ajandası ürettiğini incelemiştir. İkinci bölümdeki dönem ayırımına devam ederek, hem küresel hem de bölgesel bağlamlarda Soğuk Savaş çatışmalarının basın tarafından nasıl algılandığı ve kamuoyuna nasıl yansıtıldığı irdelenmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası ortaya çıkan demokratikleşme eğilimlerinin bir ürünü olarak basınla ilgili bazı değişimler olmuştur. Yeni gazetelerin kurulması, basın ve gazetecilik cemiyetlerinin ortaya çıkması gibi değişimlere rağmen, hükümetin gazete ve dergiler üzerinde baskısı sona ermemiş ve dönem boyunca hükümetin sansür aracılığıyla basın üzerinde kontrolünü artırmaya çalışması gözlemlenmiştir. Yine de, muhalefetle ilişkili olan gazetelerin kurulması, kısıtlı da olsa Türk basınında çoksesliliği doğurmuş, hem iç hem de dış politika çerçevesinde değişik görüş ve yorumların ortaya çıkışına katkıda bulunmuştur.

Türk basını erken Soğuk Savaş gelişmelerine yer verirken, dış olayları ve yabancı basını da yakından takip etmiştir. Bu bağlamda, hem yabancı basın mensuplarının hem de batılı diplomatların yazdıkları kitap ve makalelerin çevirileri Türk gazetelerinde yer almıştır. Bu çeviriler bir yandan Soğuk Savaş algısına oldukça ciddi bir katkı sağlarken bir yandan da Türk basının Soğuk Savaş dilinin gelişmesine ve evrilmesine yardımcı olmuştur. Bunların sonucu olarak, Batı kökenli terimler Türk gazeteleri tarafından kullanılmış ve hatta bu terimler Türk gazetecileri tarafından daha da zenginleştirilmiştir. Ayrıca, söz konusu terimlerin içselleştirmesiyle beraber, Türk

basını kendisine ait bir Soğuk Savaş dilini üretmiş, its ne kadar bazen bu durum kavram karmaşasına yol açmışsa da, Türk basınının bazı açılardan Soğuk Savaşı özgün biçimde irdelemesine neden olmuştur.

Batı kökenli terimleri ve kavramları içselleştiren Türk basını, uluslararası ilişkilerdeki değişimleri de gün be gün takip ederek, zaman içerisinde şekillenen bir algı oluşturmuştur. İlk alt-dönemdeki basın algısı, dünya barışı için talepleri içermekle birlikte, Müttefikler (ABD, Sovyetler ve Britanya) arasındaki gizli toplantılar da eleştirilmiştir. Türk gazeteleri ve gazetecileri, Türkiye gibi görece daha küçük sayılan uluslara daha fazla söz verilmesi gerektiğine inanarak yapılan gizli görüşmelerin dünya barışına zarar vereceğini öne sürmüşlerdir. Benzer biçimde, Nazi Almanya'sını, İtalya ve Japonya ile birlikte, İkinci Dünya Savaşının sorumluları olarak görmüşler, Müttefiklerin savaş taraftarı olmadıklarını ve sayelerinde düşmanın yenildiği algısını oluşturmuşlardır. Politikacılara benzer biçimde, basının Birleşmiş Milletlere bakış açısı da ilk başta olumlu sonrasında ise veto hakkı gibi konularda olumsuz olmuştur. Ayrıca, basın mensupları dünya barışının yakın zamanda inşa edilip edilmeyeceği sorusuna verdikleri yanıtlar bağlamında olumlu ve olumsuz görüşlere sahip olanlar olmak üzere ikiye ayrılmıştır. Basın, Türkiye'nin yeni dünya sisteminde sahip olması yerin ne olması gerektiğini tartışırken de, Türkiye'nin ve Türk basınının savaşın başından beri Nazilere ve Nazi yanlısı gruplara karşı olduklarını öne sürmüşlerdir. Tüm bu çabaların gayesinin bir yandan da Türkiye'ye savaş sonrası dünya sisteminde daha aktif bir rol vermek ve Müttefiklere Türkiye'nin her zaman onların yanında yer aldığı mesajını verme kaygısını taşıdığını iddia edebiliriz.

Türk basının ikinci alt dönemdeki tutumu ve algısı, bir önceki alt döneme kıyasla, daha fazla ABD ve Britanya yanlısı olması ve Sovyetlere karşı daha düşmanca bir tavır ortaya koyma şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Türkiye'nin adı geçen ülkelerle olan ilişkilerini göz önüne aldığımızda, bu çıkarımın nasıl ve hangi koşullarda oluştuğunu da daha iyi anlayabiliriz. Dolayısıyla, Türk basını İkinci Dünya Savaşı bitiminde, bu olayı, savaşın yenilenlerini suçlayarak ve yenenlerini överek yorumlamayı tercih etmiştir. Bu ortamda, basın tarafından ABD ve Britanya'ya düşmanın yenilmesi konusunda Sovyetlere nazaran daha fazla bir rol biçildiğini de söyleyebiliriz. Basın üyeleri dünya

barışı ile ilgili tartışmalarına devam ederken, Üçler olarak adlandırdığı ABD, Britanya ve Sovyetler Birliği grubunu da, bir türlü barışı sağlayamadıkları için eleştirmekten çekinmemişlerdir. Paralel biçimde, basın Sovyet eleştirisi, Amerika ve Britanya'ya olanlardan daha yoğun ve daha sert olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Daha fazlası, Türk basını Sovyet dış politikasını ve Sovyetlerin Batı demokrasileriyle olan ilişkilerini oldukça yakından takip etmiştir. Bulgaristan'daki seçimlerin komünistlerin kazandığı seçimler gibi ya da Stalin'in 'İki Kutup' konuşması gibi gelişmeler anında ve olumsuz biçimde yansıtılmıştır. Benzer biçimde, Churchill'in ünlü 'Demir Perde' konuşması da basında yer bulmuş, basın Sovyetler ile Batı arasındaki gerginlikleri hem memnuniyetle hem de kaygıyla takip etmiştir. Kutuplaşan dünya siyasetinin, Truman Doktrini ile bir üst seviyeye çıkması ise, Türk basınında yer bulan bir diğer önemli konudur. Truman Doktrini, hem hükümetin bir başarısı olarak ele alınmış hem de ABD'nin ne kadar isabetli bir karar verdiği tartışılmıştır.

Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı'nın etkisiyle de Türk basını üçüncü alt dönemde de Soğuk Savaşın gidişatını hem küresel, hem de yerel düzlemlerde değerlendirmeye devam etmiştir. İki blok arasındaki gerginlikleri ve gittikçe kötüleşen siyasi ortamı endişeli gözlerle takip eden Türk basını, iki tarafın da ürettiği karşı ataklara yer vermiştir. Bu anlamda, Cominform'un kurulması gibi Komünist Blok tarafından gerçekleştirilen politikalar olumsuz biçimde yansıtılırken, Batı demokrasilerinin ve liderlerinin yaptıkları açıklamalar da olumlu biçimde aktarılmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak, iki blok arasındaki dengeden ve üçüncü dünya savaşının çıkması olasılığından da bahsedilmiştir. Böylesi bir ortamda, Batı demokrasileri dünya barışının garantörü ve Sovyet tehdidinin dengeleyicisi olarak sunulmuştur. Berlin Krizi, NATO'nun kurulması, komünistlerin Çin'deki zaferi gibi olaylar, basının Soğuk Savaş ajandasında yeni bir sayfa açmıştır. Komünist grubun atom bombasına sahip olmaması gibi gelişmeler, Türk basın çevrelerinde olumlu bir ortam yaratırken, Uzak Doğu'daki komünist zaferleri bu olumlu havayı değiştirmiştir. Yoğun gündemi takip eden Türk basını, günden güne değişen uluslararası gelişmeleri incelerken, hem oldukça karışık hem de bazen çelişkili bir Soğuk Savaş algısı oluşturmuştur. Ancak tüm bu karmaşaya

rağmen, Sovyet tehdidi, Batılılara olan güven ve üçüncü bir dünya savaşının çıkma ihtimali its zaman için Türk gazetelerinde kendisine yer bulmuştur.

Erken dönem Soğuk Savaşı'nı yakından takip eden Türk gazeteleri, Soğuk Savaşın bölgesel değişimlerini es geçmemişlerdir. Özellikle Orta Doğu, Akdeniz ve Doğu Asya coğrafyaları, basın mensupları tarafından yakından takip edilmiş, bu bölgelerdeki gelişmeler küresel Soğuk Savaşın bir parçası olarak görülüp, Türkiye'nin kendi güvenlik sorunlarıyla bağdaştırılmıştır. Basının Orta Doğu'ya ilişkin Soğuk Savaş analizlerinde, bölgedeki petrol yatakları önemli bir yere sahip olmuştur. Basın, Sovyetlerin petrol kaynaklarına ulaşmak istediğinden ancak ABD ve Britanya'nın buna izin vermediğinden bahsetmiştir. Ayrıca, bölgenin diğer ülkelerine kıyasla, Türkiye'nin komşusu olan İran'a ayrı bir önem verilmiştir. Sovyetlerin İran üzerindeki tehdidinden ve bu tehdidin Türkiye'yi olumsuz etkilediğinden şikâyet edilmiştir. Orta Doğu'ya ek olarak, Akdeniz coğrafyasını ele alan Türk basını için, NATO'nun kurulması ve bölge devletlerinden Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın bu organizasyona üye olmaması bir şikâyet konusu olmuştur. Bu iki ülkenin dışlanması, Akdeniz'in bölgesel güvenliğinin zedelendiğinden, dolayısıyla NATO'yu tamamlayacak bir Akdeniz güvenlik paktının oluşturulması gerektiği dile getirilmiştir. Bu iki bölgeden farklı olarak, Türkiye'yi doğrudan ilgilendirmeyen Doğu Asya bölgesi de Türk basının dikkatini çeken diğer bir bölge olmuştur. Özellikle, komünistlerin alt ettiği milliyetçi grupların ülkeden çekilmesi ve Mao önderliğindeki komünistlerin iktidarı ele geçirmesiyle birlikte bölgeye dair endişeler artmıştır. Bu endişeler karşısında, basın Hindistan ve Vietnam gibi henüz komünistlerin kontrolüne girmemiş ülkelere destek verilmesi gerektiğini söylemiş, Batılı devletlere önemli bir rol vererek zaman zaman da Batı demokrasilerini gerekli adımları atmadıkları için eleştirmiştir.

Bu gelişmelerin ışığında, muhalefet partilerine yakın olan gazeteler, Türk hükümetinin Soğuk Savaş politikalarına eleştiriler getirmiştir. Muhalif siyasetçilerinkine benzer bir biçimde evirilen bu eleştiriler, CHP'nin Amerikan yardımına gereken önemi vermediği, NATO'ya üye olamayan hükümetin başarısızlığı ya da Amerikan yardımının CHP tarafından, parti çıkarları için kullandığı söylemlerine dayanmıştır.

Yine de muhalif gazeteler, Türk hükümetini Sovyetlerle olan savaşında, anti-komünizm gibi konularda desteklemişlerdir.

Tezin dördüncü bölümü, Türk basının düşman yaratması olayını yani basındaki Sovyet ve komünist algısını üzerinden nasıl sürekli bir düşman imajı yaratmaya çalıştığını incelemiştir. Dönemin oldukça başlarında Sovyet karşıtı haber ve makaleler oldukça kısıtlı kalmışken, bu tutum zaman içerisinde değişikliğe uğramış ‘eski dost’ Sovyetlerden ‘eski düşman’ Rusya'ya uzanan bir değişim gözlemlenmiştir. Bu dönemde, Akşam gazetesi yazarı Necmettin Sadak ya da Cumhuriyet yazarı Nadir Nadi gibi gazeteciler görece daha ılımlı ve tedbirli bir yaklaşım ortaya koymuşken Tanin yazarı Hüseyin Câhid Yalçın Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı daha sivri bir dil kullanmıştır.

1947 yılına geldiğimizde ise 'düşman' Sovyet algısı iyice yerleşmiş, bu tarihten itibaren Sovyet karşıtlığı ve düşmanlığı hem hükümet hem de muhalif gazetelerde gözlemlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Sovyet imajı, Türklere ihanet eden, Türk-Sovyet dostluğunu bozan, Türklerin eski düşmanı, emperyalist ve dünya barışını bozan bir ülke olarak çizilmiştir. Basın mensupları, Sovyet tehditleri karşısında Türklerin its daim ölmeye hazır olduklarını da vurgulamışlardır. Sovyetlere karşı takınılan bu sert tutumun nedenlerinden birisi de hiç tartışmasız Batılılarca Türkiye'ye verilen destek olmuştur.

Türk basını, düşman yaratırken, anti-komünist temalardan da oldukça yararlanmış ve Türk hükümetinin komünizm karşıtı politikalarına da canı gönülden destek vermiştir. Ek olarak, dünyadaki diğer komünist ülke ve grupların da Türk basınında yer aldığı görülmüştür. Bunlardan Batı Avrupa komünistleri, Sovyetler Birliği'nin 'Beşinci Kolları' olarak görülmüş, bu grupların kendi ülkelerine ve kendi insanlarına zarardan başka bir şey getirmediği iddia edilmiştir. Benzer biçimde, Demir Perde ülkelerindeki siyasi ve dini baskılardan ve komünizmin fakirliğe neden olduğundan söz edilmiştir. Ek olarak, Türk basını bir düşmanı diğerinden ayırt ederken, Tito'nun Yugoslavya'sına ayrı bir önem vermiştir. Tito ile Stalin arasındaki çatışmaları yakından takip eden Türk gazeteleri, Mao'nun Çin'i ile Enver Hoca'nın Arnavutluk'unun da benzer bir yol izleyeceğinden bahsetmiş, yani Demir Perde

içerisindeki Sovyet-karşıtı hareketleri hem desteklemiş hem de bu hareketlerin daha da artacağını ummuştur.

Tezin beşinci bölümü, Türk basınının Batı'yı nasıl algıladığını ve Batı imajının bir dost yaratmada nasıl kullanıldığı üzerinde durmuştur. Bu anlamda, Türkiye'nin batısında yer alan ve komünistler tarafından yönetilmeyen bölgeleri 'Batı' diye tanımlayan Türk gazeteleri, Batı demokrasileri içerisinde, diğer ülkelere kıyasla, ABD'ye ayrı bir önem vermiştir. Ayrıca, Batı'nın eski Batı olmadığını, barışçıl ve anti-emperyalist ABD sayesinde değiştiğini ileri sürmüştür. Yani, ABD ile eskinin emperyalisti Avrupa'yı karşılaştıran Türk basını, Britanya gibi Avrupa ülkelerini 'benmerkezci' olarak ele almış, ABD'nin Batı demokrasi içerisinde üstün konumundan bahsetmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Türk basınının çizdiği 'Barış Kurucu Amerika' imajında, Amerika'nın bazı politikaları (savaş sonrası Sovyetlerle işbirliği yapması ya da Türkiye'ye gereken önemi vermediği gibi konularda) eleştirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, NATO'nun 1949'da kurulması da Türk basınının Batı algısında önemli bir yer edinmiştir. Her ne kadar NATO, anti-Sovyet doğası nedeniyle, takdir toplamışsa da, Türkiye'nin NATO'ya dâhil edilmeyişi hem tepkiye hem de hayal kırıklığına neden olmuştur.

Türk basınının Batı algısında, politikacılara oldukça benzer biçimde, Batı'ya yönelimin sonucu olarak artacak iktisadi kalkınma ve refah temaları da önemli yere sahiptir. Bu bağlamda, Amerikan yardımı, Türkiye iktisadi yaşamında kurtarıcı bir role sahip olmuştur. Türkiye'nin Batı'ya eklemlenmesiyle Türkiye'nin elde edeceği kazanımlardan bahseden Türk basını, aynı zamanda, Türkiye'nin Batı demokrasileri arasına girmesinin neden Batılılar için de elzem olduğunu tartışmaya açmıştır. Bu tartışmaların ana eksenini ise, Türkiye'nin Avrupalı bir devlet olduğu, Batı demokrasileri ve dünya barışı için ne kadar önemli bir yere sahip olduğu, medeniyet ve gelişmişlik anlamında ne kadar üstün bir konumda bulunduğu değinilmiştir. Bu argümanların temel amacı da, Türk basınının Türkiye'yi Batı'nın 'eş' bir müttefiki olarak göstermeye çalışmasıdır.

Sonuç olarak, bu tez, dönemin gazetelerini kullanarak, Türk basınının 1945-1950 arasındaki erken Soğuk Savaş algısını incelemiştir. Bu dönem, Sovyetlerin Türkiye'den talepleriyle Türkiye'nin batıya yönelmesine ve çok partili sisteme geçiş

gibi siyasi ve liberal ekonomiye geiř gibi iktisadi dnüşümlere tanıklık etmiştir. Bu atmosferde, siyasilerle organik bağları bulunan Türk basını, erken Soğuk Savaş kamuoyunun şekillenmesinde anahtar bir role almıştır; bir diğer deyiřle, basın kamuoyunun Türk dış politikasındaki deęişiklięin zorunluluęuna inandırmak ve dış güçlere politikacıların resmi kanallardan veremeyeceęi mesajları iletmesi açısından aracı rolünü oynamıştır. Hükümet sansürüyle karşılaşan hem hükümet yanlısı hem de muhalefet destekçisi gazeteleri içeren Türk basının erken Soğuk Savaş algılarının ve yansıtımalarının doğrusal bir biçimde ilerlemedięini fakat pek çok gerilemelerle birlikte tutarsızlıklara sahip olduğunu ve basının dış gelişmeleri algılamasının tek düze olmadığını gözlemlenmiştir. Yine de, Türk basınının erken Soğuk Savaş gelişmelerini deęerlendirilmesi ve Türk kamuoyuna aktarılması birbirinden çok fazla farklılaşmamıştır.

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