

TRANSFORMATION OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY:
DEBATING POST-SECULARISM UNDER THE AKP RULE

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ABSTRACT

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Post-secularism literature has been developed to respond the need for resolving problem of pluralism in the Western societies by putting emphasis on inviting the religious to the public sphere. The main goal of this research is to transpose this literature to the analysis of Turkish experience which is an officially secular and predominantly Muslim context. Turkey under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) can be considered as an example of post-secularism. The AKP is seen as an evolution of political Islamist National Outlook movement which antagonised secularisation in Turkey. Dissimilarly, the AKP did not challenge the secular credential of the Republic of Turkey directly and acted in between secularism and Islam. This ‘in-between-ness’ can be seen as a reflection of post-secularism. Nonetheless, the main thesis in this research is: Turkey under the AKP-rule cannot be considered as post-secular and this is assessed along with the following criteria of conditions for post-secularism in Turkey: (1) consolidated democracy; (2) deeply established secularism as a political principle; (3) the objective guarantees on the freedom of religion and conscience; (4) management of problem of pluralism; and (5) analysis of the AKP in relation to post-Islamism.

Keywords: Post-Secularism, Turkish Secularism, AKP

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE LAİKLIĞIN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: AKP İKTİDARINDA POST-SEKÜLARİZM TARTIŞMASI

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Post-sekülerizm literatürü, Batılı toplumlardaki çoğulculuk problemini çözme ihtiyacına kamusal alana dinsel olanı davet ederek yanıt vermek üzere gelişti. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı da bu literatürü resmîyette seküler ve büyük çoğunluğu Müslüman olan Türkiye deneyiminin analizine aktarmaktır. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) yönetimi altındaki Türkiye post-sekülerizmin bir örneği olarak düşünülebilmektedir. AKP, Türkiye'nin sekülerleşmesine karşı konumlandırılan, siyasal islamcı Milli Görüş hareketinin evrimi olarak görülmektedir. Fakat AKP selefinden farklı olarak Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin sekülerliğine doğrudan meydan okumamış; sekülerizm ve İslam arasında hareket etmişti. Bu arada kalmışlık post-sekülerizmin bir yansıması olarak görülebilir. Ancak, bu çalışmanın temel tezi şudur: AKP yönetimi altındaki Türkiye, post-seküler olarak değerlendirilemez. Bu tez, Türkiye'de post-sekülerizmin koşullarını şu kriter üzerinden ele alır: (1) konsolide olmuş bir demokrasi, (2) siyasal bir ilke olarak kökleşmiş bir laiklik, (3) din ve vicdan özgürlüğünün nesnel güvenceleri, (4) çoğulculuk probleminin yönetimi ve (5) AKP'nin post-İslamcılığa bağlı olarak analizi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Post-Sekülerizm, Türk Laikliği, AKP

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Description of the Thesis

The relationship between religion and politics has been one of the mostly debated issues of political science. Concerning the proper place of the sacred within state and society relations, there are differing argumentations in theoretical and ideological respects. Rising influence of religion in global scale and in the field of international relations is observed. This puts religion on the front burner as well.

In the academic field, interest on religion contributed to emergence of expansive debates circled around the validity of the secularisation thesis, which claimed that the social role of religion would decline gradually.¹ In this work, I focus on a critique from within secular thought, namely the post-secularism approach. This approach rejects the ideological premise of the secularisation thesis on hostility towards religion. But this approach also does not question the fact that we live in a secular age.

The relevance of this approach in the analysis of Turkish politics during the single-party majority rule of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) since November 2002 parliamentary elections is my major point of departure. To put it in another words, I will discuss whether this approach has the potential of making an account of the recent developments in Turkish politics. The

¹ For example, Wallis and Bruce (1992: 8-9) note: "The secularization thesis (...) asserts that the social significance of religion diminishes in response to the operation of three salient features of modernisation (...), namely (1) social differentiation, (2) societalization, and (3) rationalization."

AKP has its roots in the political Islamist National Outlook movement and this movement was antagonised itself in comparison to secularisation in Turkey. The novelty of the AKP was that it was careful not to challenge secular credentials of the Republic of Turkey in the initial terms of office. The founders of the AKP as a political cadre having political Islamic origins pretended to represent right-of-centre and to democratise secular public sphere. Can this novelty in Turkish politics be analysed with post-secularism approach peculiar to Western societies? In other words, main question to be analysed in this research is: Did Turkish secularism reach a post-secular moment under the AKP-rule?

The problem in examining post-secularism in Turkey is: 'post-secularism' is treated as a normative concept developed by theorists in the West and then, applied to the Turkish case. Instead, post-secularism is to be presented as a debate among theorists and scholars both from the West and Turkey. In this respect, development of post-secularism paradigm as a critique of secularisation thesis and/or modernisation theory needs elaboration together with the debates on this relatively new paradigm.

My main thesis is: Turkey under the AKP-rule cannot be considered as post-secular and this is assessed along with the following criteria of conditions for post-secularism in Turkey: (1) consolidated democracy; (2) deeply established secularism as a political principle; (3) the objective guarantees on the freedom of religion and conscience; (4) management of problem of pluralism; and (5) analysis of the AKP in relation to post-Islamism.

In the final analysis, the interaction between secularism and Islamism resulted in an amorphous situation. This amorphous moment might not to be conceptualised as post-secularism. Firstly, a post-secular order is presented as an advanced social and political system where democracy is consolidated. Turkish democracy is far being fully-established, well-functioning and institutionalised. The AKP internalised the deeply-rooted majoritarian conception of formal democracy in Turkey as

manifestation of national will and this prevents consolidation of democracy in its full meaning and with its all basic requirements. Secondly, in a post-secular order, there is not any concern for secularism as statecraft doctrine or political principle requiring separation of state and religion. In other words, the ones having higher secular sensitivities do not feel that secularism is under the threat of a religious majority. However, in Turkey, secularism continues to be the major axis of polarisation in Turkish politics. The amorphous interlude would pave the ground for further democratisation in order to overcome polarisation in Turkey. Thirdly, the issues that were analysed with respect to the policies of the AKP revealed that the party has not developed an objective measure for freedom of religion and conscience. For example, while the AKP did everything to remove the ban on headscarf in public institutions, it remained unconcerned with the problems of Alevites. However, both issues have similar grounds about freedom of religion. Fourthly, post-secularism emerged with challenge of multiculturalism and in order to respond to the problem of pluralism, especially to the religious question, post-secularism suggests widening the scope of the democratic public sphere to the religious domain with the intention of including religious voices of the respective religious groups as well as the majority religion. Finally, it is not clear either the AKP is really an evolution of political Islam to post-Islamic politics or it is a temporary strategic hypocrisy.

In order to examine my research question, I organised this research as three major parts. In the first part (Chapter II), I reviewed the academic literature on secularisation thesis, its critique and post-secularism and I discussed basic concepts and theories are discussed as well as the debates on the development of secularism in Turkey. The first section of Chapter II shows how the discussion on post-secularism takes place and it is differentiated from the secularisation thesis. In this respect, secularisation and development of secularism are important components of my analysis. The theoretical discussion of secularism is composed of the meaning of religion; the meaning of secularisation both as a concept and as a theory; the effects of globalisation and multiculturalism on secularity and modernity; the

advent of post-secularism approach by treating Europe as an exception rather than a norm and criticising modernisation theory; the possibility of multiple modernities, the interaction with global market as marketisation of religion; the argument on public religions; the post-metaphysical thinking.

The Enlightenment philosophers' apotheosis of reason over revelation gave way to the 'secular age' of modernity. However, this process of secularisation might be a contingent phenomenon which would have taken different shapes in different contexts. In this respect, uni-linear understandings of secularisation thesis and modernisation theory are to be questioned, and so did some scholars. For example, for Charles Taylor (2007: 534-535), post-secularism does not represent a new age, but a challenge to the master narrative of secularisation thesis. In Habermasian sense, it represents the inclusion of religious voices into the public sphere. In this respect, for Habermas (2006: 18), it is a change of consciousness, rather than a change of reality. For Casanova (1994), this is de-privatisation of religion meaning re-politisation of private religious sphere as the public roles of religions increase. Hence, Stepan's (2000) conceptualisation of 'twin tolerations' comes to the picture: as long as democracy and rule of law are respected by religions, their increasing public roles are tolerated.

In this respect, democracy is an important component of post-secularism approach. Similarly, Rawlsian (1997) political liberalism is based on the idea of public reason as an ideal conception of citizenship for a constitutional democratic regime. In this research, the concept of 'ethics of citizenship' grounded on equality covers this ideal. This ideal is liberal-democratic constitutionalism in Bader's (2012) terminology. With minor differences all these conceptualisations and theorisations have parallels with Habermasian post-secularism approach. In this research, although I elaborate on these minor differences, I treat critiques from within secularisation thesis with their assertions on the inclusion of religious voices into liberal-democratic political order or into public sphere where everyone has to learn the language of toleration, as post-secularism approaches.

In the context of Turkish politics, this topic has special importance since Turkey is the only officially secular-democratic country having a Muslim-majority population. The secular orientation of the Republic of Turkey did not come out of blue; on the contrary, this research aims at showing its historical formation through the process of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation dating back to the eighteenth century. Therefore, in this research secularisation in Turkey is analysed historically. In doing so, theoretical discussion of the first section of Chapter II is merged with analysis of the Turkish experience in the second section. To put it another way, what the concepts like secularisation, secularism, modernity suggest in the first section is discussed in relation to the specificities of the Turkish experience. Through the end of the second section, I refer to the scholars who consider the Turkey under the rule of the AKP as post-secular. My research reflects disagreement with those scholars as I do not conclude that Turkey has reached a post-secular moment yet. The concept of modernisation is significant for this research since post-secularism is concerned with the modern societies of the West. The gap between the West and Ottoman and Turkish cases was aimed to be narrowed through modernisation. The Ottoman-Turkish modernisation is elaborated with reference to earlier examples of secularisation thesis on Turkey and their recent critiques.

For example, Niyazi Berkes's (2002: 23) historical analysis shows that the major motivation of secularisation is limiting or neutralising the scope or influence of religion in economic, technological, political, educational, sexual, informational realms of life. Therefore, it is not just separation of state and religion. In his work, he tries to demonstrate that unlike Christian world where temporal and sacred are demarcated, the problem of secularisation in Turkey is neither merely separation of jurisdictions of state and *Church* nor a problem of reconciliation of them; it is far more extensive. This peculiarity of the Turkish case is reflected in the secularism understanding in Turkey. In this respect, I believe that it is very legitimate to talk about 'Turkish secularism' to draw the attention to the uniqueness of the Turkish case.

The second part (Chapter III) of this research is composed of two sections. In the first section, the historical development of secularism and modernisation in Turkey is elaborated by referring basically to the scholars examined in the previous chapter. I mainly make use of Berkes's periodisation of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation. Firstly, Ottoman modernisation starting with the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II are elaborated. Then, the *Tanzimat* and the *Meşrutiyet* eras paving the ground for Turkish Revolution. The Republican modernisation reflected different priorities in early-Republican era and multi-party regime. The transition to multi-party regime changed the nature of Turkish politics in dealing with the question of religion. The military interventions also disturbed and affected the process of consolidation of Turkish democracy as well as normalisation of religious problem.

The Republican revolution in Turkey set the boundaries of religion in political system in a controversial sense as religion used to be controlled by the state in the form of provision of public service while laicism was introduced by the Constitution. The political history of the Republic reflected the clash of secular thought with religiously-oriented politics. Except for 'careful' embracement of religious motives by the right-of-centre parties, the most notable Islamic movement dating back to early-1970s in Turkey is the National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*). In this research, this movement is categorised as the political Islamic movement of Turkey. I attach importance to political Islam as it has been the major challenge to and critique of Turkish secularism.

The second section of Chapter III is an analysis of political Islam in Turkey. The evolution of this movement through change of phases which finally led to the emergence of a conservative political party, namely the AKP having Islamic roots. In the analysis of Islamism I show the different nature of Islamism in the Turkish context when compared to the other Muslim-majority countries since Turkey is the only officially secular-democratic state. In general sense, Islamism is an ideology that relates the economic, social and political problems of Muslims in the twentieth

century to alienation from the essence of Islam and it is organised for making Islam prevailing in society as a whole with all of its institutions and rules in legal, political, economic, social and cultural terms. The effect of Turkish Revolution on Islamism is beyond Turkey as with the abolition of the caliphate, the master signifier of the political order in Islamic societies is no more a fixated regulation. In other words, revolutionaries politicised Islam by displacing it from centre to periphery. Therefore, in the Turkish context, Islamism is associated with being 'reactionary'. It is a challenge to the *raison d'état* which is secularisation. This research draws a line between radical Islamism and political Islamism. The former is anti-democratic Islamic state project and the latter is seeking legitimacy through competition within a formal democracy. In this respect, the question of compatibility of Islam with democracy is an important concern of this research.

It is also important to analyse that the major motor of the rise of political Islam should be searched in the economic conditions rather than the failure of modernisation in Turkey. In this respect, I put emphasis on the political economy approach to the rise of Islamism. Together with economic conditions, I mention the class dynamics of political Islam to show how it becomes hegemonic over working classes.

In Turkey, there is another peculiarity concerning secularism: Islam is entangled with the official state apparatus and in this sense, state helps expansion of the social base of Islamism. In return, they help to preserve its semi-democratic and anti-pluralist form. Moreover, the 1980 coup is crucial in opening the way of religious right in politics and state apparatus by making Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a semi-official doctrine of the state. The *tarikats* and communities have important roles in the expansion of the social base of Islamism as well. They want to grasp power by mobilising a Muslim 'civil society'.

It is argued that a kind of syncretism is prevalent in the lives of Turks as they are religious in their private lives and secular in the public sphere. This syncretism

brings us to the argument that whether there is a possibility of a post-secular moment in Turkish politics. The argument goes further by asserting that in a post-Islamist context where Islamism became ordinary by deideologisation, on the one hand, religion is secularised; on the other hand, it influences secular spheres. The analysis of the AKP is crucial in this sense.

In the third part, (Chapter IV) which is the research chapter, the AKP is elaborated on by incorporating analysis of the electorate in consecutive elections in Turkey. The major indicator of a sustainable post-secular society is functioning of a full-fledged democracy. In this respect, the enthusiasm of the AKP on democratisation is examined by referring to its majoritarian tendencies, intentions on reforms, service to consolidation of democracy, struggle with tutelage, conservatism, approach to laicism, understanding of nation, openings on domestic ethnic and religious conflicts. Transformation of a party placing Islam as the backbone of its conservatism to a right-of-centre party is elaborated as well. The last point to be discussed is two issues that are directly related to the discussion of post-secularism: the headscarf issue and Alevis' demands. I referred to these two issues since they contributed to the release of the contradictions within Turkish secularism. I intentionally chose these issues as they provide me necessary knowledge to test the contours and reliability of the freedom of religion and conscience understanding of the AKP. The discussion of freedom of conscience is very significant in relation to post-secularism.

The AKP seems to be based on the values and norms of the Sunni majority in Turkey. Although both issues in question are concerned with freedom of religion and conscience, the AKP's attitude differs. The former was about the demands of majority on which political Islam in Turkey and the 'conservative-democratic' AKP relied. The AKP made use of a liberal discourse to solve headscarf issue. Nonetheless, the ruling party lost its liberal sight when it came to the problems of Alevis, which has been seen as a threat to their understanding of Islam. The AKP seems to refrain from recognising legitimate demands of Alevis may be in order

not to draw reaction of the privileged Sunni majority which composed its electoral base. These two issues also revealed that the AKP has no objective understanding of freedom of religion; its discourse and attitude change between the two.

In the concluding chapter, there is a general discussion on post-secularism approach and its viability in Turkish politics. At the very beginning of this research I would like to underline the point that post-secularism came to the fore as a conceptual response to the problems of liberal democracies concerning pluralism. This response has not gained a universal recognition yet.

It might be argued that the problems that are being generated with post-secular reorientation of the Western public spheres would prevent such a widespread recognition. In this respect, the current situation might be seen as an amorphous interlude rather than post-secularism. That is why I do not take post-secularism for granted. In addition to the problems observed in the West, in this research, I present flux of post-secular argumentation with respect to Muslim-majority context of secular Turkey.

If the existing gains of secular democracies are to be questioned via post-secular approach, fundamental freedoms of citizens might have lost their constitutional guarantees stemming from historical struggles or international conventions. Therefore, in this research, I focus mainly on the post-secular circumstances that strengthen or weaken democratic consolidation. In relation to being in between secularism and Islam, Nilüfer Göle (2012a: 10) defines Turkey with the rise of the AKP as post-secular:

One understanding of secularism, especially in the Turkish case, meant the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. (...) In Turkey (...) religion is making its way into public life even more, and the religious-secular divide is not maintained as it used to be. There are new compositions, new articulations. In that sense, Erdoğan and AKP power can be read as a post-secular experience, which does not mean the alternating choices between either Islam or secularism, but going beyond the divide and searching for new articulations that will not lead to exclusionary practices. Of course, each move is a test of whether the AKP can maintain this 'in-betweenness.' If they lose the in-between-ness, this articulation between the two, then I would not consider

the AKP experience as successful. Each time it is a new articulation between religious and secular, intermingling one with the other. The question is not becoming Islamic or secular, it is how to articulate both. (...) Pluralism must be a choreography among many actors, not just one. Otherwise it is totalitarianism or the tyranny of the majority.

When post-secularism is considered together with the demand of pluralism in Western public spheres as Muslims enter the stage, the multicultural challenge to Western democracies forces them to enhance their democratic capacities with post-secular response. In the Turkish case, the management of pluralism would reflect differences. This might be regarded in relation to what the AKP understands from pluralism. For example, as I mentioned above, the demands of Alevis and response of the AKP are crucial in depicting the factual situation in Turkey. To put it in another way, the Alevis in Turkey can be seen as the entrance of Muslims in European public spheres. However, it might be argued: while in Europe, there are responsive attitudes towards the demands of Muslims, the AKP of Turkey goes slowly. In this research, there are strong evidences about the AKP on the controversial attitudes towards religious freedoms of Sunnis and Alevis living in Turkey. In this sense, my thesis shows how problematic the factual and normative claims of the post-secular approach in Turkey. In Göle's terminology, I analyse whether 'new articulations of Islam and secularism' in Turkey would represent a durable institutionalisation of democratic consolidation or an amorphous interlude.

1.2. Methodology

This research on post-secularism in the Turkish context is mainly centred around to make an analysis of the rule of the Justice and Development Party having Islamic roots. Although the AKP came to power in 2002 November, the ideological background of its leaders necessitated examination of the preceding political Islamists, namely the National Outlook. Also the discussion of post-secularism should include the development of secularism in Turkey as post-secularism is a critique of secularisation thesis from a secular point of view. Therefore, an

historical approach to this subject matter is indispensable. In other words, the historical background of Turkish secularism is very important since repercussions of this background determine the contours today's discussions. Without such a historical analysis, it is difficult to examine the peculiarity of Turkish secularism and its critiques.

Another important dimension is the theoretical clarification of relevant theses and concepts. Since secularism is a product of Western modernity, the analysis of Western points of view on this issue is relevant. In this respect, a comparative discussion is a part of theoretical framework of this research. The theoretical framework driven from the Western experience is transposed to Turkish case. Especially, in order to analyse post-secularity in Turkey, the examples are chosen both from the discourse and practices of the AKP governments. This research shows how the AKP interprets and transforms Turkish secularism. In order to answer the main research question and set the argument of this thesis, I made a textual analysis of the AKP and speeches of its founders on secularism and selected issues since the foundation of the AKP in 2001. I looked at the major newspapers of Turkey and publications of the AKP.

Post-secularism is based on inclusion of religious voices to the public sphere with a pluralistic manner. In order to clarify the point that Turkey under the AKP-rule has not yet reached a post-secular moment and it is in an amorphous interlude, I looked at two specific issues that reflects important policy responses of the AKP in respect to post-secularism. The first issue that I analyse is the headscarf issue. This issue is based on the ban on veiling mainly in universities put into practice in 1980s in Turkey.

The AKP first attempted to remove the ban for several times despite the rulings of national courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Then the AKP managed to solve the problem with the support of the secular opposition. This issue is crucial as it is the major agitating instrument of the Sunni political Islamic

discourse raised against the secular state in Turkey. In other words, this issue shows how the ruling party articulated religious demands of the Sunni majority to the public sphere in Turkey.

The second issue is about the demands of the Alevi minority in Turkey. The Alevis compose the largest religious minority in Turkey. Together with the religious demands of the Sunni majority, the demands of Alevis contributed to the transformation of the public sphere in Turkey. Their demands are significant in three senses. Firstly, these demands are based on the rulings of the ECHR unlike the Sunni demands. Secondly, these demands show how the AKP approaches to the problem of pluralism in Turkey. The AKP seems to be indifferent concerning these demands while it has been more enthusiastic about the Sunni-Islamic agenda. Thirdly, Muslims in the West composing religious minorities contributed to the emergence of post-secular response to the problem of pluralism. In this respect, the Alevis in Turkey resemble to the Muslims of the West in contributing to the transformation of the public sphere. In the light of these two issues, I analyse post-secularity during the AKP rule in Turkey.

So far, I have introduced my research question and argument, major problem to be investigated, main thesis of this research and the method through which I deal with this research question. In the following chapter, I present the literature review on secularisation and post-secularism as well as the debates on Turkish secularism. This literature review will provide me with relevant theoretical and conceptual tools to analyse the transformation of Turkish secularism.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE ON SECULARISATION AND POST-SECULARISM

The literature on secularisation is a broad one. In this chapter, I mainly focused on the conceptual frame of this research. This chapter is composed of two sections. The first section is about making a general account of post-secularism with reference to secularisation thesis and moving to its criticisms from the perspective of post-secular paradigm. In the second section, I examine contributions to the literature concerning the Turkish case.

2.1. Concepts of and Theories on Secularisation

In this section, I am going to clarify basic concepts and theories that are relevant for analysing post-secularism in the context of Turkey. In this first section, I outline a general theoretical framework for the discussion of post-secularism. At the very beginning, I would like to assure the point that I will not try to propose a theory of post-secularism as it is not a theory at this very stage.

Rather than being a composite theory, it might be a new paradigm, a new awareness, a new consciousness or just a critique from within secularisation approach the major predicate of which is the attempt of incorporating or inviting the 'religious' or the religion *per se* into the 'public' rather than incurring enmity towards religion as was the case in secularisation thesis.

In other words, post-secular paradigm rejects the argument that religion being the categorical enemy of secular democratic order. To depict some remarks of this new

paradigm, in this work, I focus on four major scholars who took on basic premise of post-secularism: Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, Charles Taylor and José Casanova.²

I begin with the concept of religion in Western sense, its etymological roots, and I refer to some examples from philosophers. As far as I am concerned, the Enlightenment challenge to revelation as a war of position for secularity against religion up to date is the point of departure of post-secularism literature. In this sense, I slightly move to the second topic: secularisation. I make an account of this topic by making a distinction between secularisation as a concept and secularisation as a theory. By referring to some examples from Western history, I try to show the correlation between secularisation and modernity. But my point is: secularism may take different shape in different contexts even within the West. How globalisation affects modernity and secularity, and gives rise to multiculturalism and its embedded contradictions convey the discussion to the third topic: post-secular society. In relation to this topic, I mention 'Eurosecularity', i.e. European exceptionalism, critique of modernisation theory and Orientalism, possibility of 'multiple modernities', global commodification and commercialisation of religion, merger between religion and consumerism as a counter illustration to the argument of de-secularisation of modernity. Then, I move to José Casanova's criticism of secularisation thesis to exemplify the argument of 'public' nature of religions.

This section ends with the epistemological basis of post-secularism identified with post-metaphysical thinking as an alternative to the rivalry between naturalism and fundamentalism.

² Not all of these scholars are self-proclaimed post-secularists, but I find their contribution to the literature of post-secularism seminal.

2.1.1. Signification of 'Religion'

Analysis of the position of religion in politics is the major point of departure in this research. Therefore, it would be appropriate to start with the concept of 'religion' in social scientific sense.

Although there are some generic patterns in various settings such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc., it is difficult to treat religion as a once-and-for-all concept that account for how the followers of respective religions feel, behave, conceive differently concerning the meaning of religion. On the other hand, for the purpose of analytical consistency, it would be useful to discern some generic basis.

To begin with the etymological roots of 'religion' (*religio*) in Indo-European context, French structural linguist Émile Benveniste (1973: 516) refers to two distinctive roots: (1) '*relegere*' meaning to bring together or to harvest; (2) '*religare*' meaning to tie or to bind.

R. Harold Isaacs (1989: 145) mentions the two alternative roots and maintains that the Latin root *ligare* is seen in words like 'ligament' or 'obligation' related to a *bond*. In this respect, religion is a bond; a bond to God or suchlike, to vows, to a community of believers, to a tradition, etc. In Bryan Stanley Turner's (2011: 4) words:

The first meaning indicates the religious foundations of any social group that is gathered together, while the second points to the disciplines that are necessary for controlling human beings and creating a regulated and disciplined life. The first meaning indicates the role of the cult in forming human membership, while the second meaning points to the regulatory practices of religion as the discipline of passions.

Turner (2011: 4-5) infers that the distinction among these alternative roots forms the basis of Kant's philosophy of religion and morality. In Kant's analysis, religion is seen as a cult and as a moral action. In Kantian sense, Protestantism is a model in suggesting the autonomy of the individual believer; in underlining the

irrelevance of an intermediary religious institution between divinity and the believer; and in implying 'the death of God' that leads to the self-defeat of religion in Christian sense. As Turner (2011: 5) puts it, "the paradoxical consequence, which has been observed by many philosophers after Kant, is that the very success of Christianity in creating human independence is the secularisation of society." Kant's line of analysis is depicted in Max Weber's approach to religion, Protestantism and secularisation (Turner, 2011: 5). Similarly, it is argued that Habermas started to give religion an historical centrality, especially by emphasising the role of Judeo-Christian legacy in the understanding of democratic citizenship (Pecora, 2006: 48). For example, Habermas (2002: 148-149) writes:

In the West, Christianity not only fulfilled the cognitive initial conditions for modern structures of consciousness; it also demanded a range of motivations that were the great theme of the economic and ethical research of Max Weber. For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideal of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical re-appropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk.

At this point, it would be seminal to Charles Taylor's reference to religion. He (2007: 15) uses the concept of 'religion' in terms of the distinction between transcendent and immanent.³ For him (2007: 20), the debate between the two extremes, i.e. transcendent religion and its frontal denial, is a misfortune about modern culture. Similarly, Craig Calhoun (2010: 35) perceives this sharp binary opposition problematic as it obscures

(a) the important ways in which religious people engage this-worldly, temporal life; (b) the important senses in which religion is established as a category not so much from within as from 'secular' perspectives like that of the state; and (c) the ways in which there may be a secular orientation to the sacred or transcendent.

³ Veit Bader (2012: 10) agrees that there cannot be a universalistic definition of religion and instead he refers to Luhmann's approach to religion as a 'specific system of meaning and communication' distinguished with the rise of a binary code of transcendent/immanent.

The very source of this debate can be seen as dating back to the Enlightenment philosophers who praise reason over revelation. Similarly, for Hume the separation of Church and state is a *sine qua non* condition for individual liberties. Moreover, Turner (2011: 8) argues that the Enlightenment is hostile to the institutionalised religion, namely the Catholic Church, not religion *per se*. In this respect, the critical point is whether the Enlightenment's challenge to revelation is a war of position for secularity against religion up-to-date. This is one of the points of departure for the post-secularism approach.

2.1.2. Secularisation in the West

Before getting to the basic arguments of post-secularism approach, it would be conceptive to discuss what is to be understood from secularisation.⁴ Also, it seems to be facilitative to make a distinction between secularisation as a concept and secularisation as a theory. This concept reflects three semantic moments in historical sense: (1) secular meaning 'century, age, world;' (2) secularisation referring to 'legal action;' (3) secularisation as appropriation by the state from the ecclesiastical institutions (Casanova, 1994: 12-13). Although in modern usage it makes sense in contrast with religion, the root of 'secular' is juxtaposed to eternity as the Etruscans before Romans used *saeculum* with respect to a time unit equivalent to generation (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer & VanAntwerpen, 2011: 8). In Europe of the Medieval Age, the reality was divided into two heterogeneous realms of 'secular' and 'religious;' however, today the boundaries between them are

⁴ Casanova (2011: 54) makes an "analytical distinction between 'the secular' as a central modern epistemic category, 'secularisation' as an analytical conceptualisation of modern world-historical processes, and 'secularism' as a worldview and ideology." In this research, secularism, sometimes, is used to refer to the historical process especially in reference to development of secularism in Turkey in Niyazi Berkes's (1964) sense. In this work, political secularism is a legal principle (or principle of laicism in Turkish context) while social secularism refers to a process. For Casanova (2011: 57), laicisation as a form of secularisation is the emancipation of all secular spheres from clerical-ecclesiastical control.

ambiguous (Casanova, 1994:13). This comes with an attempt to put an end to this dualism by subsuming one under the other, and the historical development suggests that the upper hand has changed: While in the medieval age the Church having sacramental nature mediated the dualism of this world and the other world, in the secular age this relation is inversed (Casanova, 1994: 15).

The process of secularisation used to be explained with the assumption of the classical modernisation theory that the role of religion in social organisation would lose its importance with its relegation to the private sphere (Turner, 2011: 9). Far from being a testable theory, secularisation is alleged to be a taken-for-granted 'doctrine' and 'ideological bias' that reflect the internalised antagonism between religion and rationalism of modernity (Hadden, 1987: 595) or between the religious and the secular. However, there are increasing number of scholars that question this given animosity.

For example, Beckford (2003: 33) writes that “the boundary between the religious and the secular is by no means clear, fixed or impermeable. It is a highly contestable social construction.” While secularism was first defined by British George Holyoake in 1846, this socially constructed concept comes from 'secular' in the context of Roman civilisation. When Christianity became one of the religions in the late-Roman Empire, separation of religious and political authorities started to be identified with distinguishing the secular from the sacred (Beckford, 2003: 33). The modern usage of 'secularisation' is traced back to the spread of Protestantism. To illustrate, Beckford (2003: 34) recalls:

Lutheran doctrines of the Two Kingdoms and the more radical doctrines that developed in Holland and England concerning the sovereignty of groupings based on social contracts or binding covenants indirectly made it easier to conceive of a distinction between the realms of religion and the secular. The English State, under Henry VIII, forcibly removed property, functions and status from the Catholic Church (and from what became the Church of England) by acts of 'secularisation', thereby stamping a modern meaning on the term and establishing legal boundaries between what was in the sphere of religion and what was not.

Concerning the Western European history, the correlation between secularisation and modernity is incontestable that in most of the cases secularisation is the midwife or the catalyst of modernity. As Turner (2011: 10-11) notes it, secularisation involves: (1) social differentiation of society into distinct spheres one of which is religion as an institution. This differentiation brings about the contraction in the scope of authority structures. (2) In Weberian terms, 'disenchantment' is the weakening of religious power through rationalisation. (3) Religion as a traditional institution is undermined with modernisation which is in contest with the 'traditional'. (4) Rather than the reflection of a decline in religion, secularisation is the metamorphosis of religion keeping company with the changing conditions.

The correlation between secularisation and modernity does not necessarily mean a fixed causal relation, but a kind of contingent phenomenon. The options and conditions may vary from context to context. The process of secularisation does not lead to same or unitary consequences and forms of conducting religious affairs. To put it in another way, "secularism takes different shape in relation to different religions and different political and cultural milieus" (Calhoun, 2010: 45). The historical trends are in flux.

To illustrate, the English Civil War of seventeenth century and American War of Independence resulted in distinctively tolerant structures in Britain and in the USA where no direct attack on religion when compared to the French case following the French Revolution. Turner (2011: 129-131) notes that secularism never gained any dedicated base, for example, among the working class, and a pragmatic solution to the religious conflict emerged in the US with Thomas Jefferson's separation of church and state. However, there was a rigid replacement of confessional state with the laicity (*laïcité*) of republicanism in France. Turner (2011: 131) explains this situation with more influence of the Enlightenment seen in France and Germany when compared to Britain. Concerning the Enlightenment, he (2011: 131) writes:

Enlightenment rationalism sharpened the distinction between revelation and reason as the means of understanding natural and social reality. The Enlightenment associated political intolerance with monotheism in general and Catholicism in particular, and advocated the separation of church and state as a necessary condition of individual liberties. It was the Enlightenment that laid the foundation for the republican ideology of 'liberty, fraternity, equality' and contemporary French secularism.

Turner (2011: 131) contrasts British and French cases with reference to John Locke's 'freedom from state' and J. J Rousseau's 'freedom through state'. He (2011: 132) also associates the British case with negative freedom and the French case with positive freedom conceptions.⁵ He (2011: 132) maintains that veiling became a more problematic issue in France than in Britain due to these different understandings of freedom. Nonetheless, he (2011: 133) addresses to a research that shows how "French republicanism appears to have been more successful than British liberalism in incorporating Muslims into a multicultural democracy." Another significant aspect of French case regarding embrace can be depicted in Rousseau's *The Social Contract* ([1762] 1973) where for the state he referred to the social functions of religion in strengthening harmony through a 'civil religion' rather than bothering with the truth of religion in order to prevent divisions in society.

2.1.3. A Secular Age: Religion as an Option

In order to designate the link between modernity and secularity with reference to a religious thinker, Charles Taylor seems to be stimulating.⁶ He (2007: ix) presents his goal as telling a story of secularisation in the West. Taylor (2007: 1) agrees with

⁵ To illustrate positive and negative freedoms, Habermas (2008: 23) sees positive freedom of religion as the right to exercise your own faith, and the negative freedom as the right to be spared the religious practices of people of other faiths.

⁶ Taylor expresses himself as such: "I'm a Catholic Christian with a strong theistic outlook, and although I recognize that it's pretty clear that when you come from somewhere you get certain ideas that you don't when you come from somewhere else – in that sense my work reflects my standpoint – I nevertheless think that we can and ought to reason with each other... (Klaushofer & Taylor, 2000: 38)."

the idea that Western societies live in a secular age. His work is confined to the North Atlantic world roots of which were traced to Latin Christendom (Taylor, 2007: 21). On the other hand, as Talal Asad (2007: 12) notes it, although secularism came to the fore as a response to the political problems of Western Christian societies, Taylor admits its applicability in non-Christian modernised societies. Taylor depicts modernity as a 'secular age' "in which lots of people, including religious people, make sense of lots of things entirely or mainly in terms of this-worldly cause and effect" (Calhoun, 2010: 38). In other words, people think within 'immanent frame'. In Taylor' (2007: 19-20) account, the difference of secular age from earlier times is as such: "a secular age is one in which the eclipse of all goals beyond human flourishing becomes conceivable; or better, it falls within the range of an imaginable life for masses of people. This is the crucial link between secularity and a self-sufficing humanism."

Taylor (2007: 1-3) refers to three characterisations of secularity. The first one is separation of political institutions from religious ones in modern Western societies (Taylor, 2007: 1). In this respect, religion is left to the private domain.⁷ As Taylor (2007: 1) puts it, unlike today, in pre-modern societies where God was present in all social practices and religion was interwoven with everything else, no-one can engage in public activity without 'encountering God'. Taylor's (2007: 2) second characterisation of secularity is about the decline of religious belief and practice although some of the secular Western societies retain the vestigial public reference to God in public space. The third one, which is related to the second, calls for "a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others" (Taylor, 2007: 3).

⁷ The division between natural and supernatural and commitment to the possibility to live entirely in the natural frame made a call for an immanent order with the Reformation which reduced the belief in the transcendent to an 'optional extra' (Taylor, 2011b: 50). The social imaginary of such an immanent order relied on market economy, public sphere, citizen state (Taylor, 2011b: 51).

Secularity, on the other hand, is the default option in Europe (Casanova, 2011: 58).⁸ For Taylor (2007: 3), majority of Islamic societies lack this option and *what is to believe* is strictly determined as a norm. It is to be highlighted that differences between 'the options' does not necessarily to be understood in terms of creeds, but also in terms of differences of experience and sensibility (Taylor, 2007: 14). Taylor's focus on this third connotation is concerned with freedom of belief and conscience. He (2007: 437) writes:

(M)y own view of 'secularization,' which I freely confess has been shaped by my own perspective as a believer (but that I would nevertheless hope to be able to defend with arguments), is that there has certainly been a 'decline' of religion. Religious belief now exists in a field of choices which include various forms of demurral and rejection; Christian faith exists in a field where there is also a wide range of other spiritual options. But the interesting story is not simply one of decline, but also of a new placement of the sacred or spiritual in relation to individual and social life. This new placement is now the occasion for recompositions of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways of existing both in and out of relation to God.

The aspect of 'options' demands further elaboration. An egalitarian attitude in a diverse society necessitates a 'regime of secularism' in which the democratic state remains impartial and neutral towards religions, and towards different or incompatible worldviews, value systems and conceptions of the good either secular and philosophical or religious and spiritual (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 9-10). In other words, 'moral pluralism' of modern societies is to be secured via secularism. Freedom of conscience is protected when the state promotes the moral autonomy of the individual with equality of respect (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 11). This also means that certain forms of secularism like the French and Turkish ones which are argued to be neutral towards religions while praising the Rousseau type moral and political philosophy of 'civil religion' do not adopt true position of neutrality

⁸ Casanova (2011: 60) takes phenomenological experience into consideration and distinguishes between three ways of being secular: "(a) that of *mere secularity*, that is, the phenomenological experience of living in a secular world and in a secular age, where being religious may be a normal viable option; (b) that of *self-sufficient and exclusive secularity*, that is, the phenomenological experience of living without as a normal, quasi-natural, taken-for-granted condition; and (c) that of *secularist secularity*, that is, the phenomenological experience not only of being passively free but also actually of having been liberated from 'religion' as a condition for human autonomy and human flourishing."

(Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 14). This argumentation relies on the distinction between political secularisation (*laïcisation*) and social secularisation (*sécularisation*) where the former indicates independence of state from religion and the latter involves erosion of the influence of religion in social and individual's lives (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 15-16). This approach suggests that the state has to be secular politically without enforcing social secularisation (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 16).

In Taylor's account, a related component to this discussion is the interaction between social theory and social imaginary. For example, the very idea of popular sovereignty "starts off as a theory, and then gradually infiltrates and transmutes social imaginaries" (Taylor, 2007: 196). Concerning modern revolutionary transitions, Taylor (2007: 200) writes:

The transition can only come off, in anything like the desired sense, if the 'people', or at least important minorities of activists, understand and internalize the theory. But for political actors understanding a theory is being able to put it into practice in their world. They understand it through the practices which put it into effect. These practices have to make sense to them, the kind of sense which the theory prescribes. But what makes sense of our practices is our social imaginary. And so what is crucial to this kind of transition is that the people (or its active segments) share a social imaginary which can fill this requirement, that is, which includes ways of realizing the new theory.

In the following section, in analysing Turkish modernisation, to discuss how secularisation policies of the state, or to put it in another terminology mentioned below, secularism as a statecraft doctrine, affected the social imaginary, I will merge this approach with the argument of 'revolution from above'. In this case, the political elite dwelling on the Western repertory initiated a change or 'revolution' based on the idea of popular sovereignty. Therefore, the Turkish experiment can be seen as an example of how theory in Taylor's sense, penetrates into social imaginary to transform it.

Having parallels with Taylor's approach to conceptual clarification of secularism, Casanova (2011: 66) makes "an analytical distinction between secularism as statecraft doctrine and secularism as ideology." The former is the principle of

laicism which I prefer to use in this research. It entails separation of religious and political authorities to secure neutrality of state, protection of freedom of conscience and equal access of all citizens to democratic processes (Casanova, 2011: 66). As Casanova (2011: 71) notes it, every form of secularism as a statecraft doctrine involves principles of separation (i.e., 'no establishment') and state regulation of religion in society (i.e., 'free exercise'); and "it is the relationship between the two principles that determines the particular form of secularism and its affinity with democracy." The basic question for Casanova (2011: 69) here is how the boundaries between 'religious' and 'political' are drawn and by whom. Depending on the relations between political and religious authorities in the ancient regime during the formative years of modern state, the type of separation, either 'friendly' or 'hostile', determines the form of secularism (Casanova, 2011: 71). In this respect, an historical analysis is necessary to examine the form of secularism in a country. Therefore, the following chapter is concerned with this historical background of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation.

The doctrine of secularism does not require any substantive theory of religion in positive or negative sense (Casanova, 2011: 66). Secularism becomes an ideology when it incorporates such a conception of religion (Casanova, 2011: 66). For Casanova (2011: 69), fundamental problem of secularism as ideology is "the essentializing of 'the religious' but also of 'the secular' or 'the political', based on problematic assumptions of what 'religion' is or does." In addition to this,

(T)he question is whether secularism is an end in itself, an ultimate value, or a means to some other end, be it democracy or equal citizenship or religious (i.e., normative) pluralism. Indeed, if the secularist principle of separation is not an end in itself, then it ought to be constructed in such a way that it maximizes the equal participation of all citizens in democratic politics and the free exercise of religion in society. Taking the two clauses together, one can construct general gradual typologies of hostile/friendly separation, on the one hand, models of free/unfree state regulation of religion in society, on the other.

One could advance the proposition that it is the 'free exercise' of religion clause, rather than the 'no establishment' clause, that appears to be a necessary condition for democracy. One cannot have democracy without freedom of religion. Indeed, 'free exercise' stands out as a normative democratic principle in itself. Since, on the other hand, there are many historical examples of secular states that were nondemocratic,

the Soviet-type regimes, Kemalist Turkey, or postrevolutionary Mexico being obvious cases, one can therefore conclude that the strict secular separation of church and state is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for democracy. The 'no establishment' principle appears defensible and necessary primarily as a means to free exercise and to equal rights. Disestablishment becomes a necessary condition for democracy whenever an established religion claims monopoly over a state territory, impedes the free exercise of religion, and undermines equal rights or equal access to all citizens. (Casanova, 2011: 72)

Here, Casanova clearly exemplifies the dilemma of democracy and freedom of religion and he falsifies the proposition that free exercise clause prevails over no establishment clause. Although Casanova binds it to a specific situation, I find disestablishment as a necessary universal condition for democracy if there is the possibility that the established religion would jeopardise equality. Especially, as I mentioned above, if what is to believe has become a strict norm, the religion or religious way of life is more than being an option. In this respect, disestablishment is a refuge of individual freedoms.

Taylor and Maclure (2011: 28) too point out the need for an optimal balance between *ends* and *means* of secularism: equal respect for citizens' moral values and protection of freedom of conscience are the ends of secularism to be realised by means of separation of religious and political domains and of neutrality of the state. When the means gain overemphasis at the expense of ends, 'fetishism of means' takes place as a rigid conception of secularism (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 29). Another problematic aspect emerges when societies attribute additional ends to secularism like emancipation of individuals from religion and civic integration (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 29). This results in a negative conception of religion and conflict with freedom of conscience and moral equality (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 31). This also leads to supremacy of *raison d'état* over individual autonomy and thus, to impairment of liberal values and freedoms for the sake of public order.

In my opinion, emancipation of human reason from any sort of domination and conditioning by religion is an indispensable component of development of secularism. However, if secularism is treated as if it is a mechanic principle of

political organisation and if certain qualities are assigned to it among a set of alternatives in order to argue for 'good' or 'restrictive' conceptions of it preclude the possibility of a comprehensive analysis. In this respect, I assert for the need of an historical dimension of development of secularism and of differentiating between the historical process of secularisation and the political/legal principle of laicism. Implementation of principle of laicism may take different forms. But this does not mean that development of secularism is confined solely by the *raison d'état*. On the contrary, it is a multidimensional historical phenomenon. In the following section, Turkish scholar Niyazi Berkes's approach is presented as an example to the multidimensional aspect of development of secularism.

2.1.4. The Multicultural Challenge

It was simpler to set the link between modernity and secularity a few decades ago when Western modern societies were more homogeneous and non-Western societies were identified with classical modernisation theory. In his work on sociology of religion, Bryan S. Turner (2011: viii) sees globalisation as the major factor that leads modern societies to multicultural and thus multi-faith societies.

Therefore, increasing state intervention for 'the management of religions' becomes an important issue to regulate and organise society. Turner (2011: ix) refers to 'spirituality' as liquid religion representing the changing character of religion with unorthodox, post-orthodox, and post-institutional religiosity.⁹ He (2011: ix) addresses to an important contradiction since liberalism, democracy, civil society, stability and multiculturalism are under the threat of multi-faith aspect of society implying religious diversity, civil fragmentation, parallel communities, social enclavement, eruption of radical religious movements bringing with increasing

⁹ Charles Taylor (2007: 535) refers to this new Western phenomenon as being 'spiritual but not religious' which "designates a spiritual life which retains some distance from the disciplines and authority of religious confessions."

securitisation. In this respect, the conceptualisation of 'the enclave society' (Turner, 2007) implies the contradictory nature of multiculturalism.

Turner and Arslan (2011: 140) argue that legal pluralism in general, and recognition of *Şeriat* courts in particular, are an important test of the limits of multiculturalism. Legal pluralism and *Şeriat* courts are seen as "an acid test for the criteria of post-secularism" (Turner & Arslan: 2011: 147). They (2011: 145, 151) also argue that legal pluralism is problematic in the absence of common secular framework regarding citizenship and state sovereignty based on liberal democracy. They (2011: 145) set forth six preconditions for admittance of religious courts into the public sphere:

(1) strict secularization (the state's religious neutrality); (2) a level playing field in which there is strict neutrality between religious courts; (3) the presence of one authority ('the law of the land') as the final sovereign arbiter; (4) the enforcement of gender equality; (5) the defence of individual rights; and (6) the protection of common liberal values from legal judgments that represent values that are themselves incommensurable with secular liberalism.

However, any expert on Islamic law can easily point out the contrast between these principles and the nature of *Şeriat*. It is also evident that in a Muslim-majority society, there cannot be any guarantee for the longevity of these preconditions.¹⁰ The problematic situation for them (2011: 151) to admit the fact that "secularisation is paradoxically a necessary condition for the enjoyment of a religious life." In Taylor's terminology, *Şeriat* cannot remain as an option among many in a Muslim-majority society.

From the release of embedded contradictions within the Western liberal model through globalisation and concomitant multiculturalism, we see the emergence of

¹⁰ An-Na'im (2008: 4) addresses to the paradox of *Şeriat* and secular functions of the state: "By its nature and purpose Shari'a can only be freely observed by believers; its principles lose their religious authority and value when enforced by the state ... the state has its proper functions, which may include adjudication among competing claims of religious and secular institutions, but it should be seen as a politically neutral institution performing necessarily secular functions, without claiming religious authority as such."

approaches that discuss 'post-secular society'. In this sense, Habermas (2008: 21) recalls a normative question to be faced: "How should we see ourselves as members of a post-secular society and what must we reciprocally expect from one another in order to ensure that in firmly entrenched nation-states, social relations remain civil despite the growth of a plurality of cultures and religious worldviews?" As Turner (2011: 146) puts it, "the idea of 'post-secular society' has emerged in recent philosophical debate about the changing relationship between the religious and the secular in late modernity."

When compared to Turner, Taylor is more remote to the concept of post-secularism. In his massive book *A Secular Age* 'post-secular' is mentioned only once with a specification:

I use this term not as designating an age in which the declines in belief and practice of the last century would have been reversed, because this doesn't seem likely, at least for the moment; I rather mean a time in which the hegemony of the mainstream master narrative of secularization will be more and more challenged. This I think is now happening. But because, as I believe, this hegemony has helped to effect the decline, its overcoming would open new possibilities. (Taylor, 2007: 534-535)

This specification implies that we are living in a secular age; however, the content of the secularisation thesis has to be re-examined in order to come to terms with the new prospects in social theory. The major challenge to the alleged hegemony is towards the character of the public sphere. Jürgen Habermas, who is the namegiver of 'post-secularism', drew on the legacy of critical theory to initiate the debate on reason and revelation, and modern religion and public sphere. Nonetheless, Habermas (2008: 17) admits the controversial nature of the term 'post-secular society' as it is only applicable to the 'affluent' societies of Europe or countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For him, the peoples of these regions have declining religious ties in the post-World War II period and they are aware of living in a secularized society. But it should be noted that

In terms of sociological indicators, however, the religious behavior and convictions of the local populations have by no means changed to such an extent as to justify labeling these societies 'post-secular' even though trends in these societies towards

de-institutionalized and new spiritual forms of religiosity have not offset the tangible losses by the major religious communities. (Habermas, 2008: 17)

Calhoun (2010: 45-46) summarises that "the stakes of the discussion are whether the democratic public sphere (a) loses capacity to integrate public opinion if it can't include religious voices, and (b) is deprived of possible creative resources, insights, and ethical orientations if it isn't informed by ideas with roots in religion." Therefore, the most vital aspect of post-secularism approach is rethinking secularism as a way to provide a bridge between religious and nonreligious citizens to increase participation in shared public discourse of a common ground of citizenship (Calhoun, 2011: 88). To put it another way, with the need to rehabilitate secularism, post-secularism is to see secularism "as against a critical perspective not against religion but against religious homogenization and institutionalized religious domination" (Bhargava, 2011: 92).

2.1.5. Multiple Modernities?

As religion increasingly becomes an important element of public culture, it may be a mistake to treat it as simply a matter of private belief and practice (Turner, 2011: xi). Moreover, "it is unclear how far can we differentiate religion from culture, ethnicity, national identity, or a variety of other concepts constructed in secular terms" (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer & VanAntwerpen, 2011: 18). Turner (2011: x) notes that eruption of 'the religious' in public sphere questioned the secular foundations of modern societies, and arguments on de-secularisation, re-sacralisation and post-secularism raised in academic circles. For example, Davie (2006: 290) argues that "the relative secularity of Europe is increasingly seen as an exceptional, rather than prototypical case." Habermas (2008: 18) too mentions the same argument that Europe is an exception rather than the norm. This line of argumentation is crucial in order to analyse whether secularisation is intrinsic or extrinsic to the modernisation process. For example, Peter Ludwig Berger (2001: 194), who points out the importance of religion in world scale and rejects uni-

linear model of modernisation theory, conceptualises 'Eurosecularity' to assert for European exceptionalism.

Rather than analysing state and society relations in terms of uni-linear and 'Orientalist'¹¹ modernisation theory, there are approaches that take the relative contextual differences into consideration. For example, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt tries to show problems of conflating concepts like public sphere and civil society,¹² and disregarding differing dynamics in non-Western Muslim societies.

The notions of civil society in Western European context emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and its continental European conceptualisation by Hegel during the transition from absolutism to the formation of nation-states (Eisenstadt, 2002: 139). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the concept of civil society revitalised in academic circles (Eisenstadt, 2002: 140). In connection and conflation with this concept, in his book *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* Habermas (1989) pioneered the attention to the concept of 'public spheres' without any clear-cut distinction between them.¹³

¹¹ Eisenstadt (2002: 142) sees 'Orientalism' as the imposition of concepts and categories emerged in the West with the wake of modernity to the analyses of non-Western societies.

¹² 'Civil society' is a productive institutional network composed of church, family, club, guild, association, community, etc., remaining in between the state and individuals and it both relates individual to the authority and protects the individual from absolute political control (Turner, 2002: 48). This is a point of comparison between the Occident and the Orient. The political problem of the Oriental society was the absence of civil society which would have functioned to balance the arbitrary power of state over the isolated individual (Turner, 2002: 56-57).

¹³ Charles Taylor (2007: 185) overbuilds Habermasian 'public sphere' and he describes it as "a common space in which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these." This common space, for Taylor (2007: 196), is an extra-political, secular, meta-topical space.

The extra-political status of this space arises from being "supposed to be listened to by power, but it is not itself an exercise of power" (Taylor, 2007: 190). In this respect, public sphere is to be differentiated from official sphere. Taylor (2007: 190) maintains that "with the modern public sphere comes the idea that political power must be supervised and checked by something outside. What was new, of course, was not that there was an outside check, but rather the nature

Eisenstadt (2002: 140) addresses this problematic: Firstly, the relations between them are much more variable than assumed. For him (2002: 140), the qualification of 'public' requires at least two other spheres as 'official' and 'private' where public sphere lies in between. Secondly, while civil society implies a public sphere, it is not *sine qua non* for public sphere to entail civil society (Eisenstadt, 2002: 141).

Concerning Orientalism dimension of the problematic, Eisenstadt (2002:142-144) argues that transposition of taken-for-granted concepts having distinctively different cultural and historical background to the analysis of non-Western settings results in misinterpretation as relation between power and culture is disregarded. Following this line of analysis, non-Western societies have different dynamics and cultural framework composing their public spheres where power contestations take place in a unique way.

To illustrate, the view of Muslim societies as stagnant and reflection of Oriental despotism is not valid: There are autonomous public spheres crystallised out of the interaction of the *ulema* (men of religion, interpreters of the sacred law), the *Şariat* (the independent sacred law of an autonomous legal system), the *ummah* (the community of believers implying political equality of them), sectors of community and the ruler (Eisenstadt, 2002: 147-148).

In Weberian sense, modernity is associated with differentiation of value spheres like religious, economic, political, social and aesthetic. In understanding the nature of modernity, Eisenstadt (2000: 2) argues for “continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs.” This approach of 'multiple modernities' seems to be useful in differentiating theories of convergence from divergence concerning modernisation.

of this instance. It is not defined as the will of God, or the Law of Nature (although it could be thought to articulate these), but as a kind of discourse, emanating from reason and not from power or traditional authority. As Habermas puts it, power was to be tamed by reason."

The notion of 'multiple modernities' denotes a certain view of the contemporary world—indeed of the history and characteristics of the modern era—that goes against the views long prevalent in scholarly and general discourse. It goes against the view of the 'classical' theories of modernization and of the convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s, and indeed against the classical sociological analysis of Marx, Durkheim, and (to a large extent) even of Weber, at least in one reading of his work. They all assumed, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerge there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world. (Eisenstadt, 2000: 1)

Rather than rushing to global generalisations, Charles Taylor (2007: 21) too refers to the rise of 'multiple modernities' and maintains that "like other features of 'modernity' in fact find rather different expression, and develop under the pressure of different demands and aspirations in different civilizations." For Habermas, 'multiple modernities' signify the great culture forming power of great world religions over centuries (Mendieta, 2010). Habermas (2006: 1) argues, "the hopes associated with the political agenda of *multiple modernities* are fueled by the cultural self-confidence of those world religions that to this very day unmistakably shape the physiognomy of the major civilizations."

Casanova (2008: 106) finds the concept of 'multiple modernities' as a more adequate conceptualisation and pragmatic vision of modern global trends than either secular cosmopolitanism or the clash of civilizations. This concept highlights commonly shared elements and traits among 'modern' societies that make them different from the 'traditional' ones; however, these modern commonalities attain multiple forms and diverse institutionalisations (Casanova, 2008: 106).¹⁴ The

¹⁴ I should also note that Alfred Stepan (2011: 114) opts for conceptual reformulation of 'multiple secularisms' with similar reasons and grounds of Eisenstadt's concept of 'multiple modernities'. For Stepan (2011: 115), the major reasons for using this conceptualisation is "to get around some of the difficulties of a single meaning of 'secular' and to" clarify variations of state-religion-society relations within modern democracies. Stepan (2011: 139) refers to four patterns of secularism: (1) separatist, (2) established religion, (3) positive accommodation, (4) respect all, positive cooperation and principled distance. The USA, France and Turkey are considered to be examples of separatist secularism. Sweden, Norway and Denmark are examples of established religions while Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland are for positive accommodation. India, Indonesia and Senegal are examples of the fourth pattern. Stepan (2011) focuses on the problems of the first three models in respect to twin tolerations and minority

continuity and congruence of these institutionalisations with the 'traditional' shape the multiple modernities as there is both a civilization of modernity and the transformation of the pre-modern historical civilisations under modern conditions (Casanova, 2008: 106).

The multiple modernities position rejects both the notion of a modern radical break with traditions as well as the notion of an essential modern continuity with tradition. All traditions and civilizations are radically transformed in the processes of modernization, but they also have the possibility of shaping in particular ways the institutionalization of modern 'religious' and 'secular' traits. Traditions are forced to respond and adjust to modern conditions, but in the process of reformulating their traditions for modern contexts, they also help to shape the particular forms of 'religious' and 'secular' modernity. (Casanova, 2008: 106)

2.1.6. Marketisation of Religion

Another important aspect of post-secularism is introduced by Turner is global commodification and commercialisation of religion. Globalisation is an extension of the emergence of world economic systems and it is developed with localisation concomitantly (Turner, 2002: 26). Its linkage with post-modernity should be set forth: post-modernity is the fuzzyfication of the distinction between high and sub-cultures by the introduction of commercial procedures to our lives and the increase of the influence of mass-consumption cultures over cultural systems (Turner, 2002: 27).

The real threat to religious belief is the commercialisation of daily life as religion becomes part and parcel of a global system based on exchange of commercial goods where religious belief and religious loyalties become problematic (Turner, 2002: 27-28).

religions. He (2011: 140) makes a prediction that "in our increasingly globalized and multi-cultural societies, new state-society-religion patterns will have to be constructed, and old ones reconstructed, in order to respond adequately to new contingencies and new challenges to the twin tolerations in modern democracies."

The commercialisation of religion in modernity involves a global commodification of religion, the creation of religious sites as places of tourism, the emergence of religious salesmanship and the construction of mega-churches in societies where there is no longer a dominant Universal Church or a global Islamic community (*ummah*) with the power to enforce orthodoxy. (Turner, 2011: 150)

The relationship between religion and economics added to the picture by Turner (2011: 274-275) in a sense that his definition of secularisation “in terms of social relations as a whole religion no longer has a major impact on the dominant structures of culture and society, because religion is increasingly part and parcel of the market.”¹⁵ For him (2011: 275), with the expansion of consumerism, while the sacred¹⁶ is in retreat, commercialised religion is on the rise; however this differentiation does not mean that de-secularisation and re-sacralisation of modernity. In this respect, for Turner, post-secularism is not a challenge to secularisation. Turner's (2011: 278) own interpretation of secularisation encompasses “the merger between religion and consumerism and the destruction of the sacred by science, urbanisation and industrialisation.”

On the other hand, in modern times, the effective global communication systems, in fact, for the first time, enabled globalisation of Islam, which means Islamisation of cultures via norms and practices of Islamic fundamentalism (Turner, 2002: 133). The paradox of modern communication systems both at the same time made Islam open to the attacks of mass-consumption culture of the West and provided a mechanism for Islam to spread its global message (Turner, 2002: 133).

In Turner's (2011: 293) account of post-secularism, post-secular consumerism and passive consumerist citizenship suggests the interaction of religion and global

¹⁵ In other words, as Turner (2011: 179) summarises: “Religion becomes part of the global economic system in terms of the circulation of religious commodities (amulets, prayer books, pilgrimages and so forth), by the creation and promotion of religious lifestyles (often associated with body management, veiling, diet and dining), by the adoption of modern communication technologies (the Internet, videos, cassettes, TV stations, computerisation and so forth), by the creation of religious youth cultures that among other things blend secular music with religious themes and probably, in the long run, by the commercial cultivation of the religious body.”

¹⁶ For Turner (2011: 278), the sacred is the “actual foundation of the religious world.”

consumer market as religious commodification meaning accommodation to the world rather than Weberian ‘rejection of the world’ thesis. Also urbanisation and economic development brings with migration of peasants to mega-cities where they become more sophisticated in religious sense since these new urban lower-middle classes become more literate and pious (Turner, 2011: 294). But the changing condition is to be noted: While ultimate roots of community were sacred that bind people to powerful religious forces, these roots are eroded by passive consumer/citizen phenomenon of globalisation (Turner, 2011: 296). Moreover, this is the contradiction of the sacred: flourishing of religion as lifestyle, but also erosion of the social (Turner, 2011: 297).

As the political role of religion in public sphere comes into prominence, management of religion is more of an issue, especially if there is entanglement of nationalism, social crisis and religious identity, and if national citizenship cannot grasp the “cross-national loyalties of diasporic religious communities” (Turner, 2011: 279). Turner (2011: 278) tries to clarify this ambiguity by distinguishing between secularisation in public sphere, i.e. separation of church and state, and Weberian disenchantment thesis, i.e. secularisation in everyday life. To put it in another way, the former is political secularisation where state regulates religion to guarantee public order, while the latter is social secularisation coming with commodification and commercialisation of religions (Turner, 2011: 295).

In the following chapters, in which I elaborate of the rise of political Islam in Turkey, I refer to the economic aspect as well. I want to argue that religious political discourse is complemented with economic organisations and articulation with the world capitalism. Therefore, in this research I do not isolate political discussion from the dimension of economy. In other words, from marketisation of religion, I do not solely understand commodification and commercialisation of religion. In addition to post-secular consumerism, the role of capital accumulation process through religious communities to influence and reshape capital structure is peculiar to the Turkish case when compared to the West.

2.1.7. Public Nature of Religions

José Casanova's (1994) seminal book *Public Religions in the Modern World* is seen as an important contribution to the reconsideration of the secularisation thesis by focusing on its contradictions in order to analyse the conditions of possibility for modern public religions.¹⁷ Although he is critical to the theory of secularisation, Casanova (1994: 6) admits the validity of the core of it: "differentiation and emancipation of secular spheres from religious institutions and norms." His discussion is initiated with the argument that religion in 1980s 'went public' firstly as it started to take part in the 'public sphere' and secondly earned global 'publicity' with the help of Islamic revolution in Iran, rise of solidarity movement in Poland, contribution of Catholicism to the Latin American revolutions, revival of Protestant fundamentalism in the USA (Casanova, 1994: 3). During this period of religious revival, he (1994: 4) notes that religion reflected a Janus-faced characteristic by harbouring both exclusive, particularist, primordial, and inclusive, universalist, transcending identities with the simultaneous rise of fundamentalism and rise of the 'powerless'. For example, in the discourse of Islamic revolution, the Quranic term '*mostazafin*' (the disinherited) signified appeal to the urban lower classes. At this point, it is necessary to ask Mark Juergensmeyer's (2011: 185) question: "Why are social and political tensions in the twenty-first century imagined as confrontations between religion and secularism?" It is argued that when religious values, practices and identities are marginalised in the public sphere, the social and cultural frustrations turn to imagine the secular state as the source of alienation (Juergensmeyer, 2011: 185). In other words, the secular state becomes the imagined enemy (Juergensmeyer, 2011: 186).

Casanova's major point of departure is the thesis of 'deprivatisation' of religion in today's world. In this context it means:

¹⁷ Casanova (1994: 39) uses the term 'public' religions that "do not necessarily endanger modern functional differentiation."

(...) the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them. Social movements have appeared which either are religious in nature or are challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and the market economy. (...) One of the results of this ongoing contestation is a dual, interrelated process of repoliticization of the private religious and moral spheres and renormativization of the public economic and political spheres. This is what I call, for lack of a better term, the 'deprivatization' of religion. (Casanova, 1994: 5-6)

To clarify, he (1994: 7) ascribes to three sub-theses of theory of secularisation: (1) secularisation as religious decline; (2) secularisation as differentiation; (3) secularisation as privatisation. The validity of the core of the theory of secularisation that differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religion is not contested by Casanova (1994: 6); however, for him, the 'myth' of forecasted annihilation of religion is rejected as religions are here to stay with significantly increasing public roles. Moreover, in order to avoid this problematic aspect of privatisation thesis, it is necessary not to start from the imperative tension between religious and secular, and to recognise the contingencies (Casanova, 1994: 38-39). In this respect, Casanova (2011: 59) draws attention to the teleological understanding of secularisation thesis.

In Kuhnian sense, this is not the change of reality but the change of paradigm (Casanova, 1994: 11). Therefore, he (1994: 7) addresses to the need for theorising the intermesh of public and private spheres in a better way. In doing so, he only takes into account five case studies in the Christian world and for example, no Islamic society included in the comparative case studies. This seems to be an Orientalist reflection that modernity is related to the Christian world. This Western-centred preference might be accounted for the researcher's 'viability' and 'desirability' understandings. He (1994: 7-8) writes: "By 'viable,' I mean those forms of public religions which are not intrinsically incompatible with differentiated modern structures. By 'desirable', I mean those forms of public religions which may actually contribute to strengthening the public sphere of modern civil societies." Nevertheless, it is not clear that on what grounds this normative judgement is justified.

As social reality itself is not dichotomous, Casanova is sensitive to the drawbacks of making social analysis through binary oppositions, but he makes distinction between public and private religions.¹⁸ Also, the categorisation of established and disestablished religions is based on the distinction between public and private religions. For example, established state churches are formed as 'public' religions whereas others are regarded as 'private' (Casanova, 1994: 55). Similarly, the principle of separation has variations in relation to the state control over and aid to religion:

(1) A 'strict separationist' reading, based on radical sectarian, libertarian, or liberal 'neutrality' principles, consistently rejects not only any government support but also any government regulation of religion. (2) The 'benevolent separationist' reading, by contrast, based either on the principle of historical tradition and 'original intent' or on the functionalist argument of the positive societal functions of religion, rejects government regulation but demands general government support of religion. (3) At the opposite pole, the 'secularist' reading, suspicious of religion's negative functions, favors government regulation of religion while denying religion any government support. (4) Finally, even when it accepts formal separation, the 'statist' interpretation is also consistent with caesaropapist principles in favoring both government support and government's absolute control of religion. (Casanova, 1994: 56)

The nature of relationship between state and religion concerning separation has been grouped as seen above. However, today, the tension concerning this relationship imposes new forms of deprivatisation. The entrance of religion to the public sphere and thus, deprivatisation of religion is justified in three instances: (1) to prevent absolutism and authoritarianism, and to promote not only freedom of religion but also democratic civil society; (2) to contest organisation of secular spheres through functional differentiation (as seen in inhuman consequences of

¹⁸ Casanova refers to Jeff Weintraub's (1997: 7) classification of public/private distinctions:
I- The liberal-economic model which sees the public/private distinction primarily in terms of the distinction between state administration and the market economy.
II- The republican-virtue and classical approach, which sees the 'public' realm in terms of political community and citizenship, analytically distinct from both the market and the administrative state.
III- The approach ... which sees the 'public' realm as a sphere of fluid and polymorphous sociability.
IV- A tendency ... to conceive of the distinction between 'private' and 'public' in terms of the distinction between the family and the market economy.

capitalist economy) without any ethical or moral concern; (3) to protect tradition from state penetration (Casanova, 1994: 57-58).

In a recent article *Public Religions Revisited* Casanova (2008: 102) admits three main shortcomings of his approach: (1) Western-centrism; (2) restriction of modern public religions to the public sphere of civil society; (3) negligence of transnational global dimensions. He (2008: 103) addresses these shortcomings as such: (1) rethinking secularisation beyond the West; (2) public religions beyond ecclesiastical disestablishment and civil society (3) transnational religions, transnational imagined communities and globalisation.

In this article, he seems to be more into Islam when compared to his book. Casanova (2008: 1008) tries to show that historical narrative of thesis of secularisation is a historical myth by calling attention to the former discursive anti-Catholicism in the age of Enlightenment is replaced by anti-Islam today with similar premises and arguments about their anti-modern and undemocratic principles.

Casanova (2008: 113) mentions the argument that European countries are *de facto* so secularised that religion is not a concern; however, the state is not neutral especially regarding the minorities and immigrants. He (2008: 111) groups secularisms of European countries into three: (1) free exercise of church in society as in England; (2) formal strict separation of state and church as in France; (3) informal church-state entanglements as in Germany. In his later works, Casanova (2011: 70) argues that European democracies are not as secular as the secularist theories of democracy indicate and he also argues that European societies are highly secular when compared to European states which are far from being secular or neutral. He (2011: 71) exemplifies the privileged establishment of branches of Christianity in Europe as such:

the Anglican Church in England, the Presbyterian church in Scotland, the Lutheran church in all Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland) except Sweden, and the Orthodox church in Greece. Even in laicist France, 80 percent of the budget of the private Catholic is covered by state funds. Indeed, between the two extremes of French *laïcité* and Nordic Lutheran establishment, all across Europe is a whole range of very diverse patterns of church-state relations, in education, media, health and social services, and so on, which constitute very 'unsecular' entanglements such as the educational formula of pillarization in the Netherlands or the corporatist official state recognition of the Protestant and Catholic churches (as well as of the Jewish community in some *Länder*).

Casanova makes use of Alfred Stepan's intuitionist perspective and conceptualisation of 'twin tolerations' (meaning state tolerates church, church tolerates state) to counter the strict separationist secularist view.¹⁹ As an alternative to secularist principles or norms, Stepan's (2000: 37) model of the 'twin tolerations' is "the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions *vis-à-vis* religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups *vis-à-vis* political institutions." The religious domains (institutions, communities or individuals) are obliged to tolerate the legitimacy of democratic mandate without any supervision; and in turn they not only guarantee freedom of belief and worship privately, but also advance their values publicly in civil society and support organisations in political society as long as they do not violate institutional democracy and adhere to the rule of law (Stepan, 2000: 39). He (2000: 40) comes to conclusion that "within this broad framework of minimal freedom for the democratic state and minimal religious freedom for citizens, an extraordinarily broad range of concrete patterns of religious-state relations would meet our minimal definition of a democracy."

¹⁹ Rather than 'separatist' secularism, Stepan (2011: 116) proposes 'twin tolerations' as a necessary condition for democracy. However, this conceptualisation implicitly admits a secular framework for democratic consolidation. In this respect, the concept of 'twin tolerations' can be counted as a post-secular conceptualisation. For Stepan (2011: 116), minimal toleration to be received from democracy includes "not only the complete right to worship but also the freedom of religious individuals and groups to advance their values in civil society publicly and to sponsor organizations and movements in political society, as long as their public advancement of these beliefs does not impinge negatively on the liberties of other citizens or violate democracy and the law by violence or other means." Following a self-secularisation process in their pasts, today the Christian-Democratic political parties became examples to this (Stepan, 2011: 116).

After this brief summary of Casanova's earlier and recent views on public and private aspects of modern religions, I would like to touch upon Beckford's (2003: 61) critique of Casanova's original approach. For Beckford (2003: 61), Casanova's analysis cannot be regarded as "a rebuttal of secularisation theory as an attempt to extract privatisation from it." Rather than that, Casanova's understanding of deprivatisation of religion is "a rationalised programme for completing the Enlightenment project without falling victim to the Scylla of pre-modern traditionalism or the Charybdis of post-modern irrationality" (Beckford, 2003: 62). Beckford (2003: 62) finds Casanova's readiness to equate the privatisation of religion with its marginalisation as the most debateable aspect of his thesis.

When he considers the recent evidences from countries as diverse as the USA, Spain and Turkey, Beckford (2003: 62-63) sees Casanova's exaggerated would-be universal distinction between the private and the public too sharp as it excludes "the possibility that the force of privatised religious views could exercise influence over public opinion, public debates in the sphere of civil society and, possibly, strategies in the political sphere." Beckford (2003: 63) rightfully notes that although Casanova is clearly receptive to the possibility of 'multiple modernities', his notion of the public/private distinction is modern only in Western sense.

2.1.8. Towards Post-Secularism

So far, I have outlined basic concepts, theories and their criticisms relevant for this analysis. At this point, I will focus more on the epistemological basis of the Habermasian post-secularism approach. Habermas tries to mould his argumentation of post-secularism by departing from the observance of two contrary tendencies of our era: (1) spread of naturalist world view, and (2) rising political influence of religious fundamentalism (Habermas, 2009: 7). He (2009: 8) admits the fundamentalist acquisition that the secularising consequences of cultural and social rationalisation process are peculiar to the West. During this challenge

against the self-understanding of the post-metaphysical and nonreligious Western modernity, Habermas (2009: 7-8) also highlights the need for a naturalist conception, which is compatible with the cultural evolution, taking into account both inter-subjectivity of human mind and its normative qualities. He (2009: 12) defends Hegel's thesis that grand world religions belong to the history of reason. In this context, Habermasian post-metaphysical thinking sets its boundaries by not relying more on the syntheses of natural science than the truths from heaven (Habermas, 2009: 12).

Habermas (2009: 8) argues that an irreconcilable polarisation of political culture through the antagonism of secular and religious makes the ground for citizenship very difficult. Moreover, religious tolerance and equality of all religious communities with democratic polyphony are only possible in a secular, neutral, pluralist framework of rule of law where non-compulsive solidarity, mutual respect and mutual learning can flourish in public sphere (Habermas, 2009: 8-11).

Like the distinction between public and private spheres, in the discussions of secularisation and post-secularism, 'public reason' is a prevalently used concept. This concept is associated with liberal scholar John Rawls. In the literature on post-secularism, John Rawls is considered to have an important contribution since "Rawls developed his 'Theory of Justice' into 'Political Liberalism' because he increasingly recognized the immeasurable relevance of the 'fact of pluralism'. He did posterity a great service in thinking at an early date about the political role of religion" (Habermas, 2006: 20). For Rawls (1972: 206), the question of equal liberty of conscience is settled. It is one of the fixed points of our considered judgements of justice." Cécile Laborde's (2011: 1) comparison of Rawls's two major works shows: "In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls posited that religious liberty was the most basic of the basic liberties and, in *Political Liberalism*, he set out to show that sincere religious belief was not incompatible with principled commitment to the liberal state."

In Rawlsian terminology, "as an ideal conception of citizenship for a constitutional democratic regime," public reason "presents how things might be, taking people as a just and well-ordered society would encourage them to be" (Rawls, 1993: 213). In other words, public reason implies a well-ordered constitutional democratic society. In order to reach such a conclusion, John Rawls's (1997: 803) major point of departure is this question: "*Can democracy and comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, be compatible?*" In this approach, democracy is associated with reasonable pluralism meaning "plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines" (Rawls, 1997: 766). Hence, the term reasonable doctrine is qualified as accepting constitutional democratic regime and rule of law. Rawls (1997: 766) writes: "Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity."²⁰ In this sense, public reason is not paradoxical when 'overlapping consensus'²¹ of comprehensive reasonable doctrines emerge (Rawls, 1993: 218).

John Rawls's liberal conception constitutional state based on secular legitimation draws on the historical background in which religious wars and confessional disputes in early modern times ended with first secularisation and then democratisation of political power (Habermas, 2006: 4). The legitimation takes place with a democratic procedure based on equal political participation of all

²⁰ In this respect, religion is not dismissed from political arena with one condition which is explained by Rawls (1997: 782) as such: "While a constitutional regime can fully ensure rights and liberties for all permissible doctrines, and therefore protect our freedom and security, a democracy necessarily requires that, as one equal citizen among others, each of us accept the obligations of legitimate law. While no one is expected to put his or her religious or nonreligious doctrine in danger, we must each give up forever the hope of changing the constitution so as to establish our religion's hegemony, or of qualifying our obligations so as to ensure its influence and success. To retain such hopes and aims would be inconsistent with the idea of equal basic liberties for all free and equal citizens."

²¹ "When political liberalism speaks of a reasonable overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines, it means that all of these doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, support a political conception of justice underwriting a constitutional democratic society whose principles, ideals, and standards satisfy the criterion of reciprocity" (Rawls, 1997: 801).

citizens and deliberation that presumes rationally acceptable outcomes (Habermas, 2006: 5). This understanding of democratic self-determination is the basis of 'ethics of citizenship' leading to civic solidarity (Habermas, 2006: 5). In this context, Rawls (1993: 217) addresses to the duty of civility with reference to the use of public reason:

The ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty -the duty of civility- to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the values of public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.

However, as Habermas (2006: 8) notes, the cognitive basis of religiously oriented political convictions are different from secular ones. In this respect, the principle of separation church and state has to be shared by all citizens, but over-generalisation of secularisation beyond institutional level to the statements of organisations and citizens in the political public sphere would hinder religious citizens' freedom of expression (Habermas, 2006: 8-9). Therefore, Habermas (2011: 25) finds Rawls's "idea of 'public use of reason' an important but limited starting point for explaining how the proper role of religion in the public sphere contributes to a rational interpretation of the political."

Since Rawls's theory is much more demanding of the religious citizens than nonreligious ones in finding out good secularist reasons for their causes, Habermas (2011: 25-26) offers his *translation proviso* meaning translating religious language into a generally 'accessible language' before formal public sphere without restriction of the polyphonic diversity. So, the ethics of citizenship in Habermas's (2006: 16) sense requires complementary learning processes both for the religious and secular citizens to share the burden of translation. A new interpretation of the relationship between faith and knowledge would make possible "a self-reflexive manner toward each other in the political public sphere" (Habermas, 2006: 20) would open the way for complementary learning processes.

The *institutional translation proviso* is the key point of Habermasian post-secularism approach. Habermas (2006: 9) proposes an institutional threshold or filter with which only secular reasons are counted. This institutional threshold divides informal public sphere from formal like parliaments, courts, ministries and administrations (Habermas, 2006: 9).

In parliament, for example, the standing rules of procedure of the house must empower the house leader to have religious statements or justifications expunged from the minutes. The truth content of religious contributions can only enter into the institutionalized practice of deliberation and decision-making if the necessary translation already occurs in the pre-parliamentarian domain, i.e., in the political public sphere itself. (Habermas, 2006: 10)

Habermas (2006: 11-12) warns that if there is no institutional threshold, the parliaments would become a battlefield of religiously oriented convictions; the government would be an agent of religious majority to assert its will; and thus, the majority rule would turn into repression. In this sense, the *institutional translation proviso* is relevant for the functioning of democratic procedure based on discursive nature of deliberation. "The democratic procedure has the power to generate legitimacy precisely because it both includes all participants and has a deliberative character; for the justified presumption of rational outcomes in the long run can solely be based on this" (Habermas, 2006: 12).

In my opinion, Habermasian *translation proviso* is an immature formula to invite the devotees to the deliberative acts in the public sphere since he does not openly discuss the methods of translation. It can also be argued that if only secular justifications take the lead in formal public sphere, then it is superfluously assertive of the post-secular interpellation.

The democratic procedure of deliberation might be operative in a consolidated democracy of an affluent society where religious way of living is an option among many. However, in a society where ethics of citizenship based on civic solidarity is not well established, domination of religious majority would be the case. In this work, I will elaborate on this issue in the Turkish context. I should also note that I

do not find remarkable difference between Rawls's proviso or restriction and Habermas's *translation proviso*; on the contrary, they share a common secular basis.

Rawls draws a distinction between public political culture and background culture. The background culture of the civil society is "the culture of the social, not of the political" (Rawls, 1993: 14). The non-public political culture, such as the media, mediates in between the two. In Habermas's terminology, the background culture of the civil society is conceptualised as the public sphere where the ideal of public reason does not apply. Also in Habermas's approach, the democracy is radically democratic whereas in Rawls it is liberal. For Habermas (2009: 121), Rawls's 'laicist'²² liberal understanding of state/church separation is guaranteed under the condition of religious citizens' use of public reason in a limited sense.

Accordingly, public reason understanding of Rawls's (1997: 780) political liberalism treats philosophical secular arguments and moral or philosophical religious ones equally as they remain outside the domain of public reason. However, there is no restriction to the expression of religious or secular doctrines as well (Rawls, 1997: 784). In the context of political liberalism, separation of state and religion is justified as such:

The reasons for the separation of church and state are these, among others: It protects religion from the state and the state from religion; it protects citizens from their churches and citizens from one another. It is a mistake to say that political liberalism is an individualist political conception, since its aim is the protection of the various interests in liberty, both associational and individual. And it is also a grave error to think that the separation of church and state is primarily for the protection of secular culture; of course it does protect that culture, but no more so than it protects all religions. (Rawls, 1997: 795)

²² Habermas distinguishes between 'secular' and 'secularist' in order to clarify the point that he is not rejecting gains of secular public sphere. For example, he (2008: 27) writes "Unlike the indifferent stance of a secular or unbelieving person, who relates agnostically to religious validity claims, secularists tend to adopt a polemical stance toward religious doctrines that maintain a public influence despite the fact that their claims cannot be scientifically justified."

Rawls (1997: 804) argues that there is no need to have a war between religion and democracy in the sense of political liberalism which rejects Enlightenment liberalism as it attacked Christianity. As noted above, this 'useless' war situation is one of the major arguments of post-secularism approach. Veit Bader (2012: 5) sees this as a fight of politically and normatively loaded terms and suggests dropping them from legal language by replacing both secularism and post-secularism with the priority of liberal democracy or liberal democratic constitutionalism. While admitting the changing relations between religion and state/law/politics in the twenty-first century, Bader's (2012: 5) critique of post-secularism nourished by the comprehensiveness of liberal democracy without falling into the trap of simplistic and misleading 'buzzwords' that ignore historical contingency. Bader (2012: 13-14) thinks that Habermas gives an ambiguous account of secularisation due to the adherence to its basic arguments and he criticises Habermas in several respects: (1) he does not distinguish between secular state and secular society; (2) he reduces the scope of secularisation thesis to the 'affluent societies'; (3) he keeps distance from competing trends within secularisation thesis; (4) he treats separation of state and religion as a functional necessity; (5) his account is self-contradictory. The idea of *institutional translation proviso* is a good example to clarify this point. According to the Habermasian approach, religious reasons have to be 'translated' into secular ones as this is the only way to provide a language that all the citizens can understand (Bader, 2012: 17). This can be regarded as the basis for the need of a secular state of a post-secular society where everyone has to learn the language of toleration. From Habermas, Mark Redhead (2012: 8) infers the need for a change of mentality in both sides of religious and nonreligious individuals to become reflexive enough to engage in complementary learning processes. Nevertheless, he (2012: 10) addresses that "religious citizens who regard themselves as loyal members of a constitutional democracy must accept the *translation proviso* as the price to be paid for the neutrality of the state and authority toward competing worldviews." In this sense, the public communication cycles need secular filters as institutional thresholds to prevent confusion of voices and make dialog possible (Habermas, 2009: 128-129).

Instead of this post-secular 'ambiguity' Bader (2012: 18-19) is for liberal democratic proposal on associational governance of religious diversity as a realistic third way where pressures on institutionalised religions increased and old model of management of religions went into crisis. For Bader (2012: 19), this is "a moderately agonistic and libertarian, flexible version of democratic institutional pluralism." In this proposal, non-establishment is preferred and new or small religious minorities are encompassed in a more friendly way than French republicanism and European corporatism (Bader, 2012: 19-20). A secular state is required only in a minimalist sense that two autonomies are guaranteed: autonomy of state from church(es) and autonomy of churches from state (Bader, 2012: 21). Bader (2012: 21) asserts that in most of the liberal democracies, secularism is not explicitly recognised in constitutional texts and jurisprudence, and rather than secular versus religious, liberal versus non-liberal distinction is more comprehensive.

Bader (2012: 22-26) notes twelve different meanings of secularism derived from Indian and Turkish constitutions and jurisprudence in order to claim the uneasy relationship between secularism and liberal democratic constitutionalism. However, it is not that easy to treat them as they are in contradiction. His intention seems to be transferring the literal meaning of secularism to liberal democratic constitutionalism without mentioning the principle of secularism since it mystifies normative disagreements.

Eduardo Mendieta's (2010) interview with Jürgen Habermas includes some topics that need elaboration. In this interview he underlines the need for uncoupling the modernisation theory from secularisation theory in order to get rid of ills of prognostic statements like disappearance of religion. Habermas sees secularisation of state power as a liberal achievement; however, attributing 'good life' dimension to this achievement is to be dismissed. In other words, he rejects what Bader (2012: 25) calls ethical secularism.

Mendieta (2010) addresses to the 'post-metaphysical thinking' as the preceding step of post-secular world society. Post-metaphysical thinking is characterised as re-articulation of reason as procedural (linguistified) and historically situated. Nevertheless, Habermas rejects equation of post-metaphysical with post-secular by highlighting the disadvantage of using the preposition 'post' results in indeterminacy (Mendieta, 2010). He stresses that post-metaphysical thinking remains secular with the insistence of distinguishing faith and knowledge as two essentially different modes of taking-to-be-true even in the post-secular age (Mendieta, 2010). It suggests the awareness of secularistic self-misunderstanding. In this context, post-secular is not the society itself but a corresponding change of consciousness in it.²³ This new mode of consciousness is the realisation that it is not easy to clearly demarcate faith discourse from liberal public reason, and this redundant attempt would lead to theoretical impoverishment (Calhoun, 2011: 79). Mendieta (2010) notes that Habermas refers to three phenomena that account for this change of consciousness: (1) global media stressing the role of religion in fostering and reconciling conflicts; (2) awareness of how religions shape public opinion; (3) not yet completed transition to post-colonial immigrant societies.

It is also worth mentioning that Habermas (2006: 13) refers to 'modernisation of religious consciousness' since the Reformation and Enlightenment. This change in the form of religious consciousness is "a response to the challenge religious traditions have been facing in view of the fact of pluralism, the emergence of modern science, and the spread of both positive law and profane morality" (Habermas, 2006: 13). This particular reference shows the importance of the historical background of Western secularism in analysing the applicability of post-secularism approach to a context where there was no such a modernisation of religious consciousness. Other than this modernisation, concerning a post-secular

²³ In this interview, Habermas makes a distinction between a sociological predicate and a genealogical predicate. The former is a description from the observer's perspective, while the latter is from the perspective of a one who shares in the goal of self-understanding. For Habermas, the expression of 'post-secular' is a sociological, not a genealogical predicate.

leap forward based on complementary learning processes, there is a need for change of consciousness: "A change in epistemic attitudes must occur for the religious consciousness to become reflective and the secularist consciousness to transcend its limitations" (Habermas, 2006: 18). Post-metaphysical thought calls for this change. To put it in another way, while modernisation of religious consciousness provided the historical underpinning, post-metaphysical thought provides up-to-date condition for post-secular society. I find this point significant since in this analysis I dwell on the need for making an historical account of development of secularism in Turkey to assert for its specificities of Turkish modernity. Otherwise, an examination of post-secularism in Turkey would be incomplete without making an account of historical processes.

The critiques see this Habermasian 'change of consciousness' or in Casanova's terminology, 'change of paradigm', is unfair and deficient as the unwarranted asymmetrical demands on religious citizens are much more challenging *vis-à-vis* nonreligious. As Calhoun (2011: 83) notes it,

(...) Habermas seems to believe that in addition to their judgments of the issues at hand, and perhaps on a different level, religious people make a prior and less rational prejudgment but that the nonreligious are at least potentially free of such prejudgments, making only a variety of judgments. This seems a mistake. Both religious orientations to the world and secular, 'Enlightenment' orientations depend on strong epistemic and moral commitments made at least partially pre-rationally.

Taylor (2011a: 321) agrees with Habermas on the state to use a neutral language in formal public sphere as a response to diversity: "the state can neither be Christian nor Muslim nor Jewish, but by the same token it should also be neither Marxist nor Kantian nor Utilitarian." In this respect, discourses on values, identities, etc., and understandings on common good freely flow in the state level, and enquiry of reasonableness of non-theistic and theistic discourses would not be matter of this neutrality. However, for Taylor, post-metaphysical thinking raising post-secularism counts in a discriminative attitude on this ground (Mandietta & VanAntwerpen, 2011: 63). Therefore, it is debated whether post-secularism requires assimilation in the vista of translation (Redhead, 2012: 14).

Although the debate shares remarkable common grounds, it turns to be comparing apples to oranges when Taylor comments on the neutrality of the state as being neither Christian nor Muslim nor Jewish, but also neither Marxist nor Kantian nor Utilitarian. All religions oblige their followers to obey their rules. There are strictly prescribed dos and don'ts in all religions. And usually there is no room for negotiation or deliberation of those dogmatic requisites. Therefore, even for the *translation proviso* approach would come across with inextricable crises incompatible with the basic requirements of liberal democratic constitutionalism. In this respect, a religion and a 'secular' dogma cannot be treated call it categorically, ontologically or epistemologically equal and comparable. Being aware of this dilemma, Habermas (2009: 139-140) defends that post-metaphysical thinking, which is a consequence of the difference between dogma and publicly criticisable validity claims, is ready for learning from religion while remaining agnostic as it refrains from deciding on their rationality or irrationality. "Post-metaphysical thought's ambivalent attitude to religion corresponds to the epistemic attitude which secular citizens must adopt, if they are to be prepared to learn something from the contributions to public debates made by their religious counterparts, something that can also be expressed in a generally accessible language" (Habermas, 2006: 17). He (2009: 141) presents this against the danger of political disintegration of the divided community into the extremes of fundamentalist and secular poles where huge number of citizens lags behind the standards of the use of public reason. Then, can liberal democratic constitutionalism be handed over the number of citizens who are able to catch up with those standards of public reason? If public reason is prone to such danger of polarisation and collapse of political integration, what are the mechanisms to prevent it? Can mutual learning processes, in Habermasian terms, be proficient to sustain rights and freedoms of the nonreligious people? If there are the standards of public reason, are there any limits to learning from religion? These are the contradictions that come to mind at the first instance inherent to post-metaphysical thinking to which the fate of secular-democratic constitutionalism be left in post-secular accounts.

Rather than considering these aspects, most of the critiques of Habermasian post-secularism or Rawlsian ideal of public reason dwell on their devoid of courage in incorporating religious colours to main agenda of public sphere. For example, Mark Redhead (2012: 18) asserts the need for thinking in other terms by admitting "reasoning through baggage" as one's positions are restricted by ethical and political biases. He (2012: 17) constructs his approach on the criticisms that

Habermas' account of the post-secular seems more akin to a secular attempt to incorporate non-secular voices within its orbit rather than his intended goal of promoting a model of public reasoning built upon mutual learning processes between all reasonable voices. At best Habermas' post-secularism like Rawls' 'ideal of public reason' accommodates but doesn't critically engage reasonable theistic positions. Given that one large grouping of citizens will at best feel that they are being accommodated in a world fundamentally defined by the orientations of another large grouping but not themselves being equal partners in the creation of some shared understandings, it is hard to see what forms of durable solidarity can arise from the deliberative exercises Habermas builds his vision around.

Redhead refers to Taylor and Connolly's arguments to exemplify their reasoning through baggage. The Western secularity reflects the characteristic that there is no decline of religious faith but rising awareness of its variations (Redhead, 2012: 21). This is a new stage of secularism which went beyond earlier achievement of overcoming religious hegemony and came across with the religious diversity with the 'general minoritisation of twenty-first century identities' (Connolly, 2011: 60).²⁴ Therefore, "if the nobility of secularism resides in its quest to enable multiple faiths to coexist on the same public space, its shallowness resides in the hubris of its distinction between private faith and public reason" (Connolly, 2005: 59). Different from Habermasian *translation proviso*, Connolly argues for critical responsiveness to this diversity by creating a secular public forum "above faith through which to regulate diverse faiths" (Connolly, 2005: 59).

²⁴ It should be reminded that Habermas makes similar account by emphasising 'completed transition to post-colonial immigrant societies' (Mendieta, 2010).

2.1.9. A Democracy without Secularism?

So far I introduced basic concepts and theories that are relevant for the research on post-secularism. Charles Taylor, José Casanova, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas are the four major scholars to whom I referred to depict what is to be understood from post-secularism. I brought together these scholars under the rubric of post-secularism approach although they might not be comfortable with this categorisation. My interest here is to show their shared criticism towards the secularisation theses without rejecting the validity and necessity of principle of laicism. The question which is common to all these scholars is how to deal with religious problem in the public sphere. Another commonality of these scholars is their contextual preference: they mainly look at the Western context where democracy is consolidated; Christianity is the religion of the vast majority; pluralism is the key concern. However, my major concern in this research is to transpose post-secularism approach of the Western world to an officially secular, but a predominately Muslim context of Turkey. To put it in another way, the locus of analysis in this thesis is different from that of four scholars. This difference, in my opinion, contributes to the analytical value of my research.

I find realisation of a full-fledged democracy based on pluralism as the core of post-secularism approach. The discussion above reveals that the main pillar of democracy is the principle of laicism without which, leave aside being consolidated, democracy cannot be established. From this point, the inner conflict of democracy is being released: how to achieve a secular-democratic-pluralist-public order without harming individual rights and freedoms? Post-secularism comes to the fore as a response to this inner conflict. A normative analysis is necessary to come to terms with this conflict and in doing so, a hierarchical ordering of the norms of a substantive democracy is to be made. If not, it would become a deadlock and a chicken and egg situation. When a norm has priority over another and when there is a source of discrepancy, there can be some restrictions to secure the norm of top priority. Nonetheless, those restrictions cannot contradict

with the ultimate ends of universal rights and freedoms and with the principle of rule of law.

In the first instance, the democratic state has to be based on secular legitimation to realise popular sovereignty. Otherwise, if there is a divine source of sovereignty, the political authority would accompany with religious authorities and the citizens cannot interrogate the acts of administration that might be in the name of a religion or the enacted laws that have religious justifications and bases. In this case, the religion would become the major arbiter. Secondly, the state is to be impartial and neutral towards religions and beliefs. Otherwise, a religion or a branch of religion would become privileged and nonbelievers, members of different religious communities or some communities would be in a secondary position. Thus, thirdly, citizenship has to be based on equality and all citizens to have equal access to democratic processes. Otherwise, civic solidarity and well-being cannot be sustained. And finally, freedoms of religion, conscience, thought and expression of equal citizens have to be under the guarantee of the state. Otherwise, the majority would restrict freedoms of respective groups for the sake of their religious doctrines. In this respect, democracy in substantive sense cannot be understood as the rule of majority or as protection of plurality; on the contrary, it requires protection of pluralism.

In this respect, Talal Asad (2007: 15) maintains that Taylor finds modern state compelled to make citizenship the basic principle of identity in order to surpass differing identities based on gender, class, religion and to substitute conflicting perspectives with a unifying mediation of secularism.

Taylor and Maclure (2011: 84) note that it is impossible to find a common denominator for all religions and spiritual traditions. In this respect, it is difficult to develop an objective conception of freedom which encompasses all forms of beliefs. Secular-democratic framework is the necessary condition for freedoms. In a multicultural society, politics of recognition entailing accommodation of people

having respective religious lifestyles through measures of exemption and adjustment in terms of equity (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 9). However, it is a preferential treatment which is beneficial to whose religious practice or interpretation is more demanding when compared to nonbelievers, agnostics and believers of a privatised religion (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 70). Therefore, equity seems to be a relative concept *vis-a-vis* equality. The argument which compares equality of opportunities and equality of conditions suggests that one enjoys equal opportunity to find fulfilment but he/she must assume responsibility of the consequences of his/her decisions and choices (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 71). Similarly, religious accommodations can be regarded as inequitable since the believers have the ability to adopt their beliefs and life plans to the conditions that they have to confront (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 71). If an individual decides to adopt his/her beliefs that restrict the access to an opportunity, he/she cannot ask for compensation or preferential treatment from the state (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 71). For Taylor and Maclure (2011: 71), solution to this kind of conflict is a reasonable accommodation. The issue of public employees to wear religious symbols is to be examined with this perspective. For Taylor and Maclure (2011: 9), they are responsible for their duties rather than their appearances such as wearing headscarves. However, what is it for the ones, such as judges and policemen, having power to punish people? Reasonable accommodation for this issue, in my opinion, is to make a distinction on the basis of power. If a person opts to hold a public office having power, whether via appointment, selection or election, he/she has to adopt his/her beliefs to this condition and reflect the neutrality principle of the state with not only acts and decisions, but also appearance. As I will show in the following parts, the Turkish case is very fertile concerning such discussions.

As I mentioned above, Casanova's major justifications of his thesis are to prevent absolutism and authoritarianism, and to promote not only freedom of religion but also democratic civil society. When we consider non-Western contexts, rather than the danger of secular authoritarianism, religious authoritarianism is more common. The latter is more controversial in respect to freedom of religion and conscience. If

prevention from absolutism and promotion of civil society through freedom of religion is the case, then it is necessary to have such restrictions and mechanisms within the boundaries of democratic principles to these ends.

Post-secularism approach is proposed as a change of paradigm or change of consciousness rather than a change of reality. This means that the reality in the Western world is a secular age. However, in the non-Western, especially, in the Islamic context, without a change in reality, it is not possible to talk about a post-secular society. Otherwise, the argument on incompatibility of Islam with democracy would prevail over the demands of democratic civil society. I find the Turkish case significant as it is a state-sponsored project of changing reality through modernisation. In the following section, I review the literature on the development of Turkish secularism and critiques of secularisation thesis concerning the Turkish case.

2.2. The Debates about Turkey

This section on the debates about Turkey within the confines of secularisation is composed of theoretical exemplifications of how secularisation thesis used in the analysis of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation.

While this section is confined to secularisation of Turkey, confrontation of this process with rising political Islam and single party rule of the AKP having Islamic roots is analysed in the following chapters. Hence, how Turkish secularisation is understood and analysed by scholars is the major concern of this section. I also compare these analyses with post-secular arguments presented in the previous section. But the weight of post-secularity discussion is left to the fourth and fifth chapters. In this research, I argue that the historical background of Turkish secularism is very important since repercussions of this background determine the contours of today's discussions. Therefore, the significance of this section stems

from the historical analysis of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation and secularisation. This analysis also shows the peculiarity of Turkish context in terms of the argument of multiple modernities. Moreover, the analysis of development of secularism in Turkey cannot be confined to separation of religion and state in political sense. In this respect, understanding not only political but also social and cultural change is crucial. This obliges me to take concepts alike modernisation, Westernisation and revolution into account together with secularisation. This historical analysis helps to understand and explain social change. Without such an analysis, examination of post-secularism in Turkey would remain suspended.

In this section, I would like to refer to some scholars to search for the parallels between secularisation theses and their critiques. For example, among the Turkish scholars who worked on Ottoman-Turkish modernisation I took Professor Niyazi Berkes's historical analysis on secularism in Turkey, Professor Taner Timur's analysis through the usage of Marxian terminology, Professor Şerif Mardin's Weberian/culturalist analysis, and social historian Professor Halil İnalçık's evaluation of modernisation with reference to Eisenstadt's work and Turkish scholars using Weberian methodology. I find the first two scholars having parallels with secularisation theses and the latter more of a critique of the secularisation perspective. I also refer to other researchers on Turkish politics to enrich the discussion and to connect it with more recent arguments on secularism and post-secularism.

It is very suitable to start with conceptual clarification of our subject matter in the context of Turkish politics and its analyses. The most frequently-cited scholar on the subject of secularisation in Turkey is Niyazi Berkes. His work is an example of earlier discussions of secularisation and concepts like public sphere, public reason, multiple modernities, multiculturalism, globalisation, post-secularism were not topics of social sciences at his time. However, as I show in this section, some of Berkes's arguments have parallels with these concepts.

Berkes presents a comprehensive analysis of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation with special interest in the dissolution of the state-religion fusion in Ottoman Empire. He starts with explaining the meanings of the concepts that are related to this subject. Although 'laicism' is claimed to correspond to what is meant by secularism, he prefers '*çağdaşlaşma*' as the Turkish translation of his work having the title of 'development of secularism'.

Berkes (2002: 17) aims at examining modernisation of Turkey starting from the eighteenth century with the criterion of separation of worldly affairs from religion. In the Republican era, this took the form of principle of 'laicism', which came to Turkish from French term '*laïcisme*' with degeneration in its meaning (Berkes, 2002: 17). This term was alien to Islamic-Ottoman tradition of religion and politics since there had been no state-religion dichotomy and their union had been seen natural (Berkes, 2002: 17).

There are two false and contradictory viewpoints concerning the degenerated meaning of laicism: the first one is the belief that there was a same situation in Islam as the tradition of Christianity which this term came from, and the second is just the contrary as in Islam there were no such situation that in an Islamic society, laicism was irrelevant (Berkes, 2002: 17).

Since the meaning of 'laicism' in Christian world does not completely fit to Turkish context, Berkes (2002: 18) opts for 'secularism': the problem was not solely separation of religion and state; secularism meets the other dimension as the Turkish equivalent '*çağdaşlaşma*' subsume. When compared to Catholicism, Protestantism seemed to be more flexible in adjusting the relations between religion and worldly affairs. Thus, Berkes's preference for secularism over laicism stems from the fact that in secularism, rather than confrontation and contradistinction of *clericus* and *laicus*, the problem is to develop institutions and rules compatible with the necessities of contemporary age *vis-à-vis* traditional, hardened institutions and rules.

'*Laïcisme*' is used in languages of Catholic peoples. This word originates from Greek *laos* (the people), *laikos* (the lay) and under Christianity these words used to refer to the persons other than *clericus*, i.e. the clergy (Berkes, 2002: 18). Moreover, in modern French, '*laïcisme*' means granting persons or institutions aside from men of religion superior authorisation in worldly, if not religious matters (Berkes, 2002: 18). In countries where Catholicism was replaced especially by Protestantism, 'secularism' is the term for expressing similar meaning in English and German was derived not from Greek, but from Latin word *saeculum* originally meant 'age' or 'generation' and then in Christian Latin meant 'the temporal world' (Berkes, 2002: 18). In Turkish, '*çağ*' means 'age' while in Arabic '*asr*' is the equivalent. '*Asrilik*' was used for secularism/laicism up until negative connotations of 'changing for the necessities of that age' (*çağa uymak*), 'foppishness', 'rootlessness', 'shallowness', 'irreligiousness' articulated to it by the reactionaries (Berkes, 2002: 18). Then, Ziya Gökalp, Unionist (*ittihatçı*) ideologue and sociologist, started to use '*muasırlaşmak*' (to become contemporary) in this respect (Berkes, 2002: 18). Finally, the early Republicans took 'laicism' from French.

Religion has been the last resort of the tradition that the essence of the word '*çağdaşlaşma*' as 'laicisation' seems to imply, is to rescue the society from fever of religiosity (Berkes, 2012: 20).

Therefore, the meanings of '*laïcisme*' and 'secularism' go together although their linguistic roots were different (Berkes, 2012: 20). Besides that the lines of demarcation between 'spiritual' and 'temporal' realms are not clear-cut and lots of spiritual or religious matters are, in reality, temporal (Berkes, 2002: 20). In Taylor's terminology, this means that we live in an immanent frame. The lines of demarcation had been more distinctive in Christendom when compared to Islam, Judaism and other Asiatic religions (Berkes, 2002: 22-23). When compared to Christianity, in most of the Orientalist sociological analyses of Islam, there is an implication that rather than being a 'religion', Islam is completely a 'socio-political system' (Turner, 2002: 66).

In non-Christian world, there are religious affairs that the state performs and there are political issues that religion supports, encompasses or determines (Berkes, 2002: 23). In that case, the major concern of secularisation is limiting or neutralising the realm that is supposed to be *sacred*, in economic, technological, political, educational, sexual, informational life spaces (Berkes, 2002: 23). Reactionary movements are nourished from the opposition to this progressive development (Berkes, 2002: 23). Therefore, the basic conflict in secularism is not necessarily between religion and this world, but between the forces of tradition and the forces of change. This suggests that Berkes's understanding of secularism is more than principle of laicism or secularism as statecraft doctrine; it has a restrictive attitude for the sake of linear model of modernisation.

Similarly, he (2002: 28) notes that the entire world has to be Westernised; therefore, Westernisation is inevitable. However, the strength of Berkes's analysis lies in his emphasis on the specificity and peculiarity of the Eastern experiences. In other words, although he is aware of the indispensable nature of Westernisation, he does not fall in the trap of *Orientalism*.²⁵ His conception of change suggests that reactionary or retrospective attempts could have never been permanent. These

²⁵ I use 'Orientalism' in the sense that Edward W. Said (1979: 5) defined it: "Orientalism is a style of thought based upon ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'. Thus a very large mass of writers, among who are poet, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, 'mind', destiny, and so on the phenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally, not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a 'real' Orient."

The rejection of Orientalist and Eurocentric analyses of the non-Western societies, even within Marxist academic circles can be exemplified with Haldun Güralp's analysis of secularism and the left in Turkey. He (2009: 671) essential differentiation of Islam and Christianity that peculiarly Islam does not have the distinction between sacred and worldly laws. For him (2009: 671), by definition, this is the case for every religion, not only for Islam; besides that the states of Muslim societies, for example, the Ottomans both had secular laws (*örfî kanun*) and many components of a 'bureaucratic' administrative structure, which Weber sees the basic indicator of rationality and modernity, before modern states of the Western Europe. Concerning the development of secularism in the West, Güralp (2009: 673) argues that there is not a single model of secularisation which is valid for all of the modern and secular Western societies.

flames are doomed to be extinguished. That is why progression towards Western type of institutions and civilisation is indispensable.

This point of Berkes's approach (inevitability of Westernisation and at the same time rejection of the analysis of the Ottoman/Eastern system through Western terminology used in the analysis of Western experience) could be considered as accommodating a potential of contradiction. Nevertheless, in my opinion, it is just the opposite: Berkes is not mistaken in mixing up general philosophy of change and specificity of object of inquiry. To put it in another way, former is an ontological question, while the latter is an issue of epistemology.

I also want to note that Berkes's approach reflects the very essence of secularisation thesis as it sees Western secularism inevitable. Moreover, to use Eisenstadt's conceptualisation presented in the previous section, the possibility of multiple modernities is out of question in Berkes's analysis which perceives modernity in terms of cultural program of the West.

As the last chapter of his book, Berkes makes a general evaluation of secularisation of Turkey and asserts for the specificity of Turkish laicism. On the nature secularism that came out of Republican revolution there are two 'myths': "one is the belief that this secularism meant the separation of religion and state after the fashion of French laicism; the other is the belief that it was a policy of irreligion aimed at the systematic liquidation of Islam" (Berkes, 1964: 479). Berkes rejects these contentions with reference to historical comparisons. In the previous section, I maintained that principle of laicism is separation of state and religion without pursuing ideological stance of hostility to religion. When we use Casanova's analytical distinction between secularism as statecraft doctrine and secularism as ideology, the former argument above is secularism as statecraft doctrine and the latter is an ideology. In this respect, Berkes seems to get closer to the post-secular literature. However, this would be a selective conclusion at the first glance. The general outlook of his work reflects mainstream secularisation thesis of his time.

In his work, he (2002: 536) tries to demonstrate that unlike Christian world where temporal and sacred are demarcated, the problem of secularisation in Turkey is neither merely separation of jurisdictions of state and *Church* nor a problem of reconciliation of them; it is far more extensive. Although in Islam there is not a power base as *Church*, there is a mixture of political, judicial, educational and popular traditions of world order with imputed religious character (Berkes, 2002: 537). As a reaction, the tendency of giving religious character to everything which was traditional was strengthened when the process of secularisation gained pace (Berkes, 2002: 537). State and religion are like conjoined twins in the Islamic history (Berkes, 2002: 538). When compared to the West, this is the historical uniqueness of Islam. The two contentions against the nature of Turkish secularism mentioned above lose their sight since they are apathetic to this unique token: on the one side, there are ones sharing abstract laicism of French model and on the other side, there are ones attributing religious character to traditions and asserting for their independent existence on their own (Berkes, 2002: 537). The first viewpoint regards 'true' laicism as respecting the autonomy of religion from the state without any interference, whereas the second viewpoint claims that limitations are for the liquidation of religion, not for religious freedom (Berkes, 2002: 537). To illustrate, Kemal Karpat (2008: 387-388) argues, although the government did not intend to restrict freedom of worship and to coercively impose a new belief to the society, later it took an extreme anti-clerical, positivist character called 'the dogma of official irreligiousness'. The state control over religious activities was, for Karpat (2008: 388), violation of laicism that caused discontent among conservatives and common citizens. "The Islamists, who had strongly opposed separation when they were promoting the idea of an Islamic state, favoured the separationist interpretation of secularism following their defeat" (Berkes, 2002: 479). Thereby, the old liberal Westernist outlook and outlook of Islamic state merge in the same point by complementing each other (Berkes, 2002: 537).²⁶

²⁶ This has great resemblance with the liberal backup for the AKP in its first couple of years. This

However, for Berkes (2002: 537), rather than being a critique of principle of laicism, the major issue is to make a choice between theocratic state and democratic state since the latter viewpoint is doomed to take an extra-religious political shape.²⁷ In this respect, Berkes perceives secularism as a vital component of democracy. In this research, I adopt Berkes's elaboration on secularism with respect to democracy. In other words, I argue that secularism is *sine qua non* in democratic constitutionalism.

In the context of *Meşrutiyet* era, the question was '*What is the form of democracy in an Islamically conceived community?*' and the response was the Hamidian 'constitutional absolutism' that a democratically conceived state was found at that time to be inconceivable in Islam (Berkes, 2002: 540). In the Republican era the answer to the reverse question of '*What is the position of Islam in a democratically conceived political community?*' was introduction of secularism as a constitutional principle in 1937 (Berkes, 2002: 540).

In the first instance, sovereignty is based on tradition, whereas in the second instance, the state is based on national sovereignty (Berkes, 2002: 540). Therefore, theocracy, which is not inherent in Islam, becomes an anomaly in the second condition (Berkes, 2002: 540). The principle of freedom of conscience requires such a historical development as a sub-heading of principle of secularism (Berkes, 2002: 540).

In accordance with its own principle, which was accepted as a fact (without recourse to the *Şeriat* for legitimisation), the new regime would accept the freedom of religion not because religion should be implemented as the basis of the state, but it was the duty of the state to safeguard freedom. Freeing the conscience could be effected only when and insofar as the theocratic concept was eliminated from the body of the religious outlook. (Berkes, 1964: 482)

argument will be elaborated on in the following chapters.

²⁷ This means that every action to realise theocratic state is *political* against the political regime although it appears as necessity of religion or religious freedom. Thus, Berkes (2002: 541) rejects that autonomous religious freedom is a democratic principle.

This point is very crucial for analysis since in the theoretical underpinnings of Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches emphasise similar arguments on the incorporation of religion. In the previous section, I mentioned that Habermas argues for invitation of religiously oriented worldviews to the public sphere in order to enlarge the scope of and enrich the public sphere with a democratic polyphony if and only if they accept secular, neutral, pluralist framework of rule of law.

Translation proviso requires translation of religious language to a generally accessible language in public sphere. Similarly, for Rawls, both religious and nonreligious doctrines have to evolve to reasonable doctrines by accepting constitutional democratic regime and rule of law.

Berkes's analysis encompasses a wide time period in which we can find the roots of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation. The transition from one juncture to another was elaborated in a historical manner. In other words, the events and new developments do not seem to come out of blue. The linkages between events and lines of thought which brought these events into existence are set consistently. Also analyses of intellectual thoughts within their historical contexts, in other words, taking the historical conditions within which these thoughts were put forward was an important characteristic of Berkes's work.

Although it is a history of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation surprisingly Berkes refrains from using the concept of modernisation. Instead he opts for secularisation. In this terminology secularism includes being contemporaneous which was '*asrilik*' in Ottoman language. However, an analysis which is one of the building blocks of main theses of Turkish politics should reflect a contrast (if there is) with the concept of modernisation. In this respect, how the pre-modern Ottoman polity paved the ground to modern Turkish politics would be understood from a different angle as well.

If we had the opportunity to ask this point, Berkes might have said that his analysis distanced itself from the usage of Western terminology. It is true that modernity emerged in Western European context but once it comes out it gains a universal nature as the inevitability of progression. Therefore, it is not inconsistent with Berkes's emphasis on the specificity of Ottoman context as he had a linear understanding of history, progress and change. The sign of his linear understanding can be discerned in his claim that change (secularisation) is irreversible. The reason for Berkes to ignore the concept of modernisation might be that this concept had negative connotations when Berkes made his research in 1960s. Nevertheless, modernisation as a concept which is made free from value-laden usage of it in *modernisation school*²⁸ could be possible. Rather than disregarding it, Berkes could at least count on his deliberate antipathy to it.

Another reason for Berkes's ignorance of modernisation can be as such: Berkes's analysis remains within the lines of separation of state and religion. His major

²⁸ In the post-second-world-war era, there emerged a classification of countries as the first, second and third worlds. Early modernisation school dealt with the third world with the aim of preventing the third world countries from taking the 'wrong' side and of showing the way to become the first world countries. There were increasing numbers of studies envisaging what then should be the new world order.

Peace, prosperity and order for all people were the basic intentions of the new world order. Therefore, decolonisation had to be achieved. However, the experience was different than the formulation of one, new world order and bipolar world occurred. It was imperative from the Western point of view that the newly emerging powers, which were the third world countries, should be incorporated with the first world, at least in a 'limited geography'. According to the containment strategy of the US, this limited geography should be expanded (Kissinger, 2008: 427-453).

The first world had been described as 'free world' and then the first world tried to make third world to believe that it could be like the first world. In this context, "modernisation referred to the process of transition from traditional to modern principles of social organisation" (Leys, 1996: 66). In the categorisation of traditional versus modern societies, there had been some features attributed to each category and the absent features in traditional societies were analysed and dealt with. In other words, they made an ideal typical characterisation of modern societies.

Political development and industrialisation were the two facets of modernisation for its scholars. Institution building as state-building and nation-building became the key issue of this approach. The formulas set by the modernisation school were put into practice. However, some scholars focused on the gap between the theory and reality. Then, critics of modernisation school emerged.

conception of change is secularisation in this context. He tries to discern change from the thoughts of influential or well-known thinkers.

This means that he gives priority to the intellectuals' proposals and reactions to these proposals. To use Marxian terminology, Berkes's analysis focuses on superstructural change. Since modernisation has various aspects such as economic, political and cultural, it might have problematic reflections in Berkes's work.

As a general comment on Berkes's work, I find his contribution to the analysis of Turkish secularism from the perspective of secularisation thesis significant. His historical analysis is powerful in indicating the historical background of development of secularism in Turkey. Other important features of Berkes's work are: he attempts to defend secularism as a historical requisite which does not mean a war against religion and he enters into a dialogue with liberal and religious critiques of Turkish secularism by putting forward 'post-secular' arguments in relation to laicism and democracy long before the emergence of post-secular literature. This part of my thesis shows that Berkes's conceptualisation of secularism cannot be limited to principle of laicism; its social dimension is very strong as well.

Turkish secularism can also be analysed from the perspective of nation-building. For example, Taner Timur makes such an account via Marxian terms. Despite the use Marxian terminology, Timur's analysis relies more on the role of 'superstructural' institutions rather than economic 'base'. Concerning Timur's conceptualisation of secularism I would like to note that he has an understanding of secularism more than principle of laicism or statecraft doctrine; there is also an ideological aspect of secularism towards religion.

He (2012: 23) refers to Karl Marx to show how he was aware of the continuity of theocratic rule in Byzantine-Ottoman context obstructed Western progression as nation-building and capitalisation. The deadlock of Ottoman reforms was hidden in

the problematic relations between Muslims and Christians in a state structure based on religious law (Timur, 2012: 27). He (2012: 28) also notes from Marx two ways of revolutionary potentials in Ottoman Empire: (1) rebellion of Christians to end their dependency on Muslims; (2) secularism or in other words, enacting a secular civil code. The analysed historical process is seen as 'nation-building' by Timur, while Niyazi Berkes prefers the conceptualisation of 'secularisation'.

Timur's thesis on nation-building is based on Gramscian terminology: industrialisation and nation-building left their marks on the nineteenth century, and thus, 'secularisation' and 'modernisation' meant 'Westernisation' at the same time (Timur, 2012: 108). However, this process, on the one hand, was capital accumulation; on the other hand, took place in a dual structure with the development of superstructural institutions like state and ideology (Timur, 2012: 108). Beyond any doubt, these dual channels were not independent of each other and constituted unique structures, which Gramsci calls 'historical bloc', varying from country to country (Timur, 2012: 108). Historical bloc is integration of state and civil society/economy.

In Western Europe, capital accumulation occurred with financial capital accumulation and with direct separation of producer and means of production in rural and artisanal areas (Timur, 2012: 109). In this process, with its protective and compulsory function, nation-state phenomenon, as Marx called, played the role of 'economic agent' (Timur, 2012: 109). This process, in which modern bourgeoisie and working class came to the fore, was nourished by a culture which was a product of Enlightenment (Timur, 2012: 109). Hence, Weber, who looked from this perspective, saw this evolution as 'rationalisation', 'disenchantment' and 'secularisation' (Timur, 2012: 109).

In Ottoman Empire, capital belonged to non-Muslims and state to Muslims (Timur, 2012: 109). In other words, the administrative strata were composed of Muslims, while financial and commercial bourgeoisie was non-Muslim. These communities

would have come together in a secular nation-building. However, the non-integration of state and economy, and formation of historical bloc prevented industrialisation. In this context, the lack of secular nation-building process differentiated Ottomans from the West. Also, there was a lack of public sphere in Habermasian sense (Timur, 2012: 105). As Timur (2012: 157) puts it, two of the reasons for the failure of secular nation-building in Ottoman Empire were the lack of division between religion and school, and lack of unifying understanding in army and school. In the early-Republican era, the national identity did not dwell on an ideal-typical ethnic or racial nationalism and the 'Turkish nation' was ambiguously defined *vis-à-vis* non-Muslims of the collapsed empire (Tuğal, 2010: 53). In this respect, this implicit Islamic definition of Turkishness contributed to the assimilation of ethnic groups, except for the majority of the Kurdish Muslims (Tuğal, 2010: 53).

Timur (2012: 29) compares and contrasts German and French cases: in Germany, philosophy could not break off theology contrary to France where the Enlightenment philosophers surpassed this step with the laic philosophy principles in the manifesto of 1789 French Revolution. In this respect, German philosopher Kant maintained that the basis of the Enlightenment is to get rid of religious tutelage which is the most harmful and humiliating kind of tutelage (Timur, 2012: 29).

The illustration of Marxian point of analysis is seen in Timur's reference to the discussion that took place in the 1840s about the need for ending religious state in Germany. In the 'Jewish Question', Marx argues that the problem was the financially powerful Jewish community's demands of political equality with Germans. Timur (2012:30) refers to Bruno Bauer's radical objection: religion was an irrational ideology and an invention which became the opium of people and prevented their enlightenment; therefore, the solution of the 'Jewish Question' was to eradicate both Christianity and Judaism to realise equal citizenship. Marx rejected Bauer's fundamentalist proposal which remained only in political level and

indifferent to social dimension (Timur, 2012: 30). For Marx, Germany had to give up being a religious state in constitutional sense, but this did not require a fight for eradication of religious beliefs (Timur, 2012: 30). In a society that ends up being a religious state, religion would be free from its political status and become a part of civil society to be treated together with other components of civil society regarding relations of property and capital (Timur, 2012: 30). It is quite interesting that this Marxist response to the religious question shares a common ground with post-secular paradigm which asks for secularisation in official-political sphere while inviting the religious in public sphere.

In the nineteenth century, in the Ottoman Empire, there was not a 'rationalisation' and 'disenchantment' in Weberian sense (Timur, 2012: 153). The only exception was Mithat Paşa's attempts. Within 30-35 years when the discussion on Germany's 'Jewish Question' took place, in Ottoman Empire, Mithat Paşa achieved to take a 'national democratic revolutionary' step with 1876 Constitution: for the first time in Ottoman history, equal citizenship status before law was created apart from religious or sectarian ties (Timur, 2012: 34). Mithat Paşa's secular constitutionalism created an alternate power based on secular equality of Muslim and non-Muslims, defending coeducational schools, forming troops in which Christians participated (Timur, 2012: 70). Mithat Paşa was the man of reform as he attempted to transform the discourse of 'dominant nation' (*millet-i hakime*) to 'unification of components' (*ittihad-ı anasır*) for the integration of non-Muslims; however, his short-lived dreams ended with the despotic regime of Abdulhamit II who re-politicised Islam and made it the state doctrine with the understanding of 'unification of Islam' (*ittihad-ı İslam*) (Timur, 2012:157). This pan-Islamist regime pushed the Armenian community which is called 'loyal nation' (*millet-i sadıka*) by the administrators to a separatist line (Timur, 2012: 157).

Timur (1997: 109) states that the ideological expression of the class wars of the nineteenth century Europe was the class of idealism and materialism. The bourgeois interests are to be defended by the idealist ideologies one of which,

namely positivism, had been influential over Ottoman intellectuals starting from the Young Turks and became the basis of Turkish Revolution (Timur, 1997: 109). Similarly, Nilüfer Göle (1997: 48) sees secularism and positivism as the two pillars of modernisation in Turkey:

Positivism is a universal model only when it serves to dissociate Western modernity from a particularistic culture or religion and is perceived to be a rational mode of thinking and acting applicable to all societies. Positivism served to legitimize the Turkish Republican elites' modernization attempts. From the 'Young Turks' onwards, the secular vision of history shaped by the positivism of Auguste Comte provided the frame of reference for reform for progressive Turkish elites. Social engineering, seen as a corollary to positivism, became the reformist elites' model for a rational reconstruction of Turkish society. The positivist motto of 'progress and order' mirrored the views of the Turkish modernizers for a national order, without which, according to them, secularization could not be achieved in a Muslim country.

Auguste Comte's positivism emerged from the intellectual vacuum created by unprecedented development of positive sciences and fading of religious beliefs of middle classes and bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century France (Timur, 1997: 110). Positivism not only underlies laicism of advanced wings of middle class and bourgeoisie, but also became the instrument of industrial productivity with its emphasis on social harmony (Timur, 1997: 110). The Ottoman bureaucrats praised positivism as it both explained superiority of the West and being not involved with Christianity (Timur, 1997: 113). Halil İnalçık (2007: 39) maintains that Atatürk was strongly adhered to the positivist philosophy of the Enlightenment Age like the ones who achieved the French Revolution in 1789. Atatürk missed that rationality would replace tradition and positive science would guide the Turks' social relations and perceptions of universe (İnalçık, 2007: 39). For İnalçık (2007: 39), this ideal was more difficult than replacing the sovereignty of the caliph-sultan with national sovereignty in the minds of Turkish people since Islam is very different from the other religions regarding social relations and lifestyles. With positivist justifications, as Timur (1997: 120) contends, Atatürk believed that the Turkish Revolution departs from being a mere imitation of the Western civilisation since this civilisation is based on science and science is universal. It is evident that such a positivist line of thinking negates the possibility of multiple modernities reflected in post-secularism literature.

Timur (2012: 176) also mentions Durkheim's approach in Ottoman-Turkish context: the shift from religious divinity to secular/worldly sacredness. In Ottoman-Turkish context, while the former corresponds to the Ottoman era, the latter to the War of Independence (Timur, 2012: 176). Since he was not critical to religion and did not put it aside, Durkheim's approach was very popular among Ottoman thinkers (Timur, 2012: 176-181). Another important scholar for Ottomans was Bergson having parallels with Durkheim attaches importance to a hero to reach full and perfect morality, and a national survivor hero representing collective ideals like a religion (Timur, 2012: 180-181). In Weber's terminology, this is similar to charismatic authority turning to a cult (Timur, 2012: 184). This line of argumentation accounts for Mustafa Kemal's rise.

Concerning Turkish laicism, similar with Berkes, Timur (1997: 122) compares and contrasts Turkish case with the West. Beginning from its birth in Christendom and evolution in a couple of centuries, laicism gained a universal status with the meaning of separation of religion and state affairs (Timur, 1997: 290). Nevertheless, in Ottoman Empire, the problem of laicism did not emerge from a dialog or argumentation between theology and philosophy through the use of free mind (Timur, 1997: 294). In this sense, it was learned from the Western experience, not from self-criticism of incapability of governing a complex society by the use of 'Islamic' dogmas (Timur, 1997: 295). Therefore, laicism, as many other concepts, was derived from the West to explain and organise social life in Turkey; however, it has a different scope in Christian countries which is difficult to implement in Muslim countries (Timur, 1997: 122). This stems from characteristic differences among the two religions (Timur, 1997: 122). Although both religions are monotheist, their approaches to God substantially differ: while in Christianity, God came into being with Jesus Christ and the Church retains its worldly adventure, in Islam there is no intermediary between God and individual unlike Jesus (Timur, 1997: 122). The only intermediary is the Quran: the uncreated, eternal and everlasting, i.e. *ahistorical*, word of God (Timur, 1997: 122). Indeed, the Bible and the Torah narrate a holy history and the Church sustains this history (Timur, 1997:

122). The essence of Islamic religion requires worshipping only God, being in service of God, expecting everything if and only if from God; not from the ones God created (Timur, 1997: 123). The Quran is the entirety of moral, juridical and political principles and material and spiritual principles are concomitant in it (Timur, 1997: 123).

Although Islamic law spring out partially from secular sources, it became religious law, the *Şeriat*, lately (Timur, 1997: 123). However, for Timur (1997: 123), the essence of Islam is theocratic. As I mentioned above, Berkes thinks differently about this argument. Timur (1997: 124) questions whether 'laicism' contradicts with the essence of Islam and in dogmatic sense, he talks about a contradiction. Nevertheless, far from ideological or political attitudes, the process of secularisation in Ottoman Empire was a prerequisite of the evolution of Ottoman society in the nineteenth century (Timur, 1997: 124). Due to this line of argumentation, Timur's analysis is to be counted as an example of secularisation theses criticised by scholars of post-secularism literature.

Islam being the dominant ideology of Ottoman state had come along two planes: as formal religion of the state in the form of Sunni-Hanefi sect since Sultan Selim I, and as forms of Sufi *tarikats* in popular level (Timur, 1997: 125). In the nineteenth century, secularisation movements dealt only with 'formal Islam', whereas popular Islam played more significant roles in pre-capitalist society like the Ottomans (Timur, 1997: 125). From the thirteenth century onwards, *tarikats* were widespread in Anatolia and Turkish-Islamic guilds, *ahi*-order, was very important in the formation of Ottoman state (Timur, 1997: 125). In one way or another, they survived. Eventually, the Turkish Revolution confronted with Islam in these two planes (Timur, 1997: 125). However, without taking the social bases of Islam into consideration, it would be misleading to think that the problem of laicism was solved with superstructural precautions of the Republic (Timur, 1997: 126). Atatürk's attitude towards the two planes differed: while he was rationalist for 'true Islam', he struggled against the *tarikats* (Timur, 1997: 126). In Islamic Sufism, the

esoteric meaning of the *Şeriat* or word of God carries the ultimate reality, *Hakikat*; and the path to reality is through *Tarikat*. The sheik of *tarikats*, as the mentor, is the channel to the ultimate reality. In this respect, Islamic Sufism accommodates obscurantism and conservatism in itself (Timur, 1997: 127). For Atatürk, being the 'last' and the most 'absolute' religion, Islam suits to rationality, logic and reality; and the nation should be religious with its chasteness (Timur, 1997: 126). Once Atatürk declared:

In the face of knowledge, science, and of the whole extent of radiant civilization, I cannot accept the presence in Turkey's civilized community of people primitive enough to seek material and spiritual benefits in the guidance of sheiks. The Turkish republic cannot be a country of sheiks, dervishes, and disciples. The best, the truest order is the order of civilization. To be a man it is enough to carry out the requirements of civilization. The leaders of dervish orders will understand the truth of my words, and will themselves close down their lodges (*tekke*) and admit that their disciplines have grown up. (Timur, 1997: 126-127)

To put it briefly, Republican positivism had a dual attitude towards religion: on the one hand, in formal plane, Islam undergone a positivist interpretation and tried to be secularised; on the other hand, the *tarikats* based on superstitions were desired to be eradicated (Timur, 1997: 127). However, the social environment in which *tarikats* lived and the identity crises made this intention impossible to be realised (Timur, 1997: 127). For Timur (1997: 128), the bourgeois revolution had not been completed and thus, secularisation process continued. Concerning the illegalisation of *Tarikats*, Zürcher (2011: 284) makes such an evaluation that by extending the scope of secularisation from 'formal' Islam to 'popular' Islam, the secularists triggered resentment of the masses and this led to politicisation of Islam:

By extending their secularization drive beyond the formal, institutionalized Islam the Kemalists now touched such vital elements of popular religion as dress, amulets, soothsayers, holy sheikhs, saints' shrines, pilgrimages and festivals. The resentment these measures caused and the resistance put up against them was far greater than, for instance, in the case of the abolition of the caliphate, the position of *şeyhülislam*, or the *medreses*, which was only important to official 'high' religion. While the government succeeded in suppressing most expressions of popular religion, at least in the towns, this did not, of course, disappear. To a large extent, the *tarikats* simply went underground. But through the simultaneous imposition of an authoritarian and - especially during the 1940s - increasingly unpopular regime and suppression of popular Islam, the Kemalists politicized Islam and turned it into a vehicle for

opposition. One could say that, in turning against popular religion, they cut the ties that bound them to the mass of the population.

So far I have elaborated on the examples of secularisation thesis. At this point, I would like to move to Şerif Mardin's views to show that the cultural, and of course religious, dimension in the analysis of modernisation in Turkey is prevalent in his works. This dimension encourages Mardin to be critical to the secularisation thesis to an extent and makes him familiar more to the arguments of post-secularism literature. As a general assessment, I confidently note that Mardin is for secularism as statecraft doctrine and he opposes to secularism as ideology. Also, Mardin is to be treated among the critiques of Berkes's approach. While Berkes puts the emphasis on secularisation, Mardin appeals to the concept of modernisation. However, he sometimes uses the concept of revolution to refer to the Turkish modernisation. For example, he (1971: 202) writes:

The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented bourgeoisie, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal privileges, but it did take as a target the values of the Ottoman *ancien regime*. In this sense it was a revolutionary movement.

It is argued that the influence of Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Ottoman Empire and Turkey was declined due to the march of secularising policies of the state. For Mardin (2011b: 43), such an evaluation relies on Niyazi Berkes's (1964) work on secularisation in Turkey during Ottoman-Turkish modernisation. Mardin (2011b: 43) finds this approach limited as it is far from explaining the revival of Islam in contemporary Turkish society. He (2011b: 43) asserts that all the dimensions and internal transformations of this process have to be taken into account.

Concerning research on Islam, Mardin (1983: 1400) rejects treating Islam as a 'superstructural' institution and asserts for its 'base forming' capacity since Islam aims at evaluating social relations within the framework of divine message and at bringing the society to the Islamic ideal. In Mardin's analysis, "Islam constituted an integral element of self and society" (Davison, 1998: 155).

The other point that Mardin (1977) puts forward against secularisation thesis is about 'privatisation' of religion: the Republican intelligentsia anticipated that religion would become an individual issue of conscience; however, the Islamic resurgence proved just the opposite. In this sense, rise of Islam might be seen as 'deprivatisation' of religion. It is seen that Şerif Mardin conceptualised deprivatisation of religion long before José Casanova, a prominent scholar of post-secularism literature.

Mardin (2011b: 155) compares European secularity and the conditions of Ottoman Islam. While in Europe, there was a Church against which secularists struggle to limit its powers, in Ottoman Empire there was not such a distinct institutionalised religion; on the contrary, the Ottoman state controlled religion to secure its interests (Mardin, 2011b: 155-156).

In Ottoman context, the concept of 'religion and state' (*din-ü devlet*)²⁹ meant saving the integrity of the state and appraisal of Islam; in other words, survival of the state is vital for protection of religion (Mardin, 1991: 115). In this respect, state had priority over religion (Mardin, 1991: 116). From the nineteenth century on, so many Muslims, such as the *Selefi* movement, started seeking to free Islam from the state control (Mardin, 2011b: 155-156).³⁰

²⁹ '*Din-ü Devlet*' was the principle in Ottoman Empire meaning the integrity of religion and state. The theory of caliphate was based on an essential unity of state and religion: "religion and sultan are twins. (...) Religion is the principal, sultan is its watchman. As a building having no essence is doomed to collapse, anything that has no saviour is doomed to be annihilated" (Gazali, 1971: 177).

As Binnaz Toprak (1981: 26) writes, "the sultan-caliph symbolized the Islamic ideal of a political community based on religious legitimacy. That ideal was elevated into a political doctrine through the Ottoman concept of *din u devlet*, that is to say, the unity of religion and the state."

³⁰ The tolerant and culture-weighted Turkish Islam was opposed by fanatical movements in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (İnalçık, 2007: 226). These were *Kadızedeli* movement in the sixteenth century and *Selefi* movement in the seventeenth century (İnalçık, 2007: 226). Both opposition movements belonged to the dogmatic Hanbeli school when compared to more large-minded Hanefi school (İnalçık, 2007: 226).

The Ottoman model in which religious hierarchy (both Muslim and non-Muslim) was integrated to the state under the authority and scrutiny of the Sultan is different from Western Europe where the Catholic Church enjoyed an autonomous power from too many competing political power hubs. In historical sense, the struggle with the Church was a necessity for establishing a political order of territorial authorities. Therefore, Western European nation-states opted for either secularity as in French case or establishment of their own national churches as in the United Kingdom. This shows multiplicity of paths of secularism even within the West. This point reminds the argument of multiple modernities approach.

Şerif Mardin is a well-known Turkish scholar who applied the centre-periphery metaphor as an ideal-typical form of analysis of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation. The centre/periphery cleavage has been a 'useful' tool to caricaturise Turkish politics. The pioneer of this conceptualisation is modernist theoretician Edward Shils in 1961. The symbols, values and beliefs that govern society compose the centre of the society and membership to the society is through a relation with the centre (Shils, 1986: 566). Çınar (2009: 498) writes the source of the concept of 'centre' is the presumptions of the range of basic values and beliefs or the basic consensus represent the centre of society. As Çınar (2009: 498) notes it, for Habermas, the modern social system is not a unitary formation directed by a single set of values. Democratic politics as a unifying act requires a democratic state which allows differing ideas and receipts concerning the 'central' values and admissions of the society rather than having a static receipt to make redefinition of the centre possible through discussions (Çınar, 2009: 500-501). In other words, in a modern society, the 'centre' is not static.

Mardin (1973: 170) asserts, "until recently, the confrontation between center and periphery was the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to have survived more than a century of modernization." In this approach, state and society relations are analysed through dividing society in to two: centre and periphery. The former is associated with the state administration or

the establishment, and the latter with societal forces in general. In Ottoman Empire, centre is “supported by a sophisticated network of institutions” (Mardin, 1973: 169). The position of religion, namely Islam is important for the purpose of our analysis: in Ottoman administrative system, state officials were recruited and converted from the non-Muslim communities as ‘slave’ (*kul* in Turkish) of the Sultan; and thus, it is argued that free-born Muslims were excluded from the state administration (Mardin, 1973: 171). Mardin (1973: 171-172) writes, “friction also existed between the *kul* and the members of the religious establishment who, barring certain exceptions, were closer to the daily life of the lower classes. The religious institution was thus on the border line between the center and the periphery.” During Ottoman-Turkish modernisation, religion began to be identified with the periphery when men of religion alienated from modernisation process (Mardin, 1973: 172). This resulted in cultural bifurcation within society (Mardin, 1973: 173). Religion sometimes became the crosscutting basis of the opposition alliance or the last resort of authoritarian governments as in the case of final period of the DP rule (Mardin, 1973: 185).

Mardin (1991: 131) makes use of Arnold Leder's (1979: 83) description of centre-periphery polarisation: after *Tanzimat*, Western penetration had significant effects on the social relations and lives of the administrative elite, yet the culture of the local notables and the peasantry was not influenced. Although the disintegration of formal Islam and popular Islam had been an important contributor to the centre-periphery antagonism, Islam being accepted by the two poles made itself a junction.

As the discontent of the religious authorities from tendency of secularisation increased in time, and when they accused the centre of not striking an attitude against the beliefs and practices based on the traditional culture of the 'people' contradicting with the orthodox Islam, this junction dispersed. With this novelty of cultural division, the orthodox Islam found itself together with the periphery.

Essentially, the subject matter is the attempt of the centre to control periphery including Islamic socio-political structure (Mardin, 2011b: 238). About this theoretical framework when 30 years passed, he sincerely admits that this proposed metaphor turned out to be a taken-for-granted reality in which the two realms are distinguished with clear lines of demarcation (Mardin, 2011b: 224). However, the major issue of this form of analysis is to signify that in the course of modernisation, the ways of integration of social, political and economic structures of the West were different in Turkish case (Mardin, 2011b: 224). In other words, this is, in essence, an argument about the forms of social change: in the West, the components of civil society emerged in medieval times with patterns of internal tensions; whereas in the Turkish case, these internal tensions had been different and survived today with their repercussions in the political structure (Mardin, 2011b: 224). For example, in relation to the formation of civil society in the Ottoman Empire, the lack of 'contract' tradition was a significant drawback. When compared to the West, where civil society had its roots in the application of covenants and law from the thirteenth century onwards, in the Ottoman times, it was not possible to form civil society without such accumulations 700 years later (Mardin, 2011b: 232).

In this respect, concepts like 'public sphere' and 'civil society' are significant components of Mardin's analyses. In the Ottoman-Turkish context, the public sphere was created in relatively later times when compared to the West. It was not earlier than mid-nineteenth century. Şerif Mardin (2011b: 11-21) tries to exemplify the first attempts of formation of public in Ottoman Empire during the reigns of reformer sultans Selim III and Mahmud II. The public, in this respect, means citizens aware of their rights and obligations (Mardin, 2011b: 22). Concerning formation of the public, Mardin (2011b: 11-16) notes roles of vernacularisation and religion in appealing both to the people and the state officials in order to form a ground for unity and cooperation in politics. In discursive level, even the reform-oriented sultans used Islamic symbols and religious overtones to this end. In other words, a common Islamic culture was to be created as a precondition for reform. In

this prototypical 'public' sphere, religion was the major contributor and this is in sharp contrast with that of secular age in which religion, in Taylor's sense, became an option among many.

Different from Berkes and Timur, Şerif Mardin argues for the interaction of the 'traditional' and 'modern'. He (2005: 160) refrains from simplifying the history of modern Turkey as a warfare between Republic and sultanate or between secularism and Islam; on the contrary, it is complex, multifaceted and mutually transformative interplay of the traditional and the modern. Interestingly enough, he (2005: 160) objects to the claims of 'multiple modernities' not to cut corner: "Vague, general statements about the 'modernities' of Islam do not offer a clue as to the meaning we should draw out of the AKP's victory."

The AKP phenomenon raises the question of age-old controversy among Islamists and 'laics' on whether Islam was an organic component of Turkish culture. Nevertheless, Mardin (2005: 146) observes that while social scientists try to reveal some features about laic legitimisation on the grounds of Turkish modernity rather than paying attention to the prevailing Islamic voice which put Erdoğan to power, the Islamists see it as reintegration of Islam into Turkish society.

The historical background giving rise to confusion, for Mardin (2005: 146), is the Ottoman-Turkish 'exceptionalism'. This exceptionalism in academic sense is due to focusing only on Arab-*Selefi* Islam and disregarding the hidden characteristic of Ottoman Islamic structure transposed to secularism of Turkish Republic where Islam and secularism interpenetrate. Mardin (2005: 146) perceives Ottoman bureaucracy as having 'positivist' approach even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as it used a peculiar mix of state and religious discourse for hegemonic purposes. In this context, exceptionalism means that

(...) the Ottomans as well as the modern Turks shared the feeling that after all was said and done, despite skirmishes and rebellions against the state, they possessed a state; that the state was a life-form through which channels all authorities, whether

secular or religious, operated to achievement and success. That sharing, however, did not mean that a variety of practices could not develop. (Mardin, 2005: 147)

In mid-1990s, Mardin (1994: 168) writes that in Turkey, as a consequence of the heritage of legitimised Republican institutions and continuity of their social structure, the religion was secularised in general sense; and in the long run, it would be possible to talk about transformation of Turkish Islam to a 'civil religion'.³¹ As Sayyid (2014: 952) notes it, Turkish principle of laicism does not mean exclusion of Islam; it is definition of Islam as a religion which was shaped by the use of specific characteristics of Christianity as a model in an Orientalist manner.

Within more than a decade or so, Mardin did not showed any further argumentation about his expectation of a civil religion. On the contrary, in an interview in 2007, Şerif Mardin talks about peer-pressure or 'neighbourhood pressure' (*mahalle baskısı*) with special emphasis on the strengthened conservative values. Mardin (2008) refers to Ottoman-Turkish notion of *mahalle*, neighbourhood in English. In neighbourhood, there are collective values. These values prevail through 'eye', through looking/seeing; especially in men and women figures and relations, looking is way of control. In Ottoman Empire, at the centre of the *mahalle* there was the mosque, the imam of the mosque, the lodge, the *tarikât*, social complexes, tradesmen, etc. The Republic introduced new components to this structure: school, teacher, students, books. The Republican

³¹ As Mardin (1991: 119) discusses, the Ottoman understanding of primacy of the state became primacy of the 'modern state' (thanks to Durkheim) with Atatürk. Similar to Durkheim, he believed that the modern state would be supported by a 'civil religion' or 'civic religion' where religion has a secondary or marginal role as being a personal value. Therefore, to secure citizens' commitment, in Turkey, there was a need for creation of institutions which promote civic religion and personal responsibility as its extension.

In relation to this argument on replacing official religion with civil religion, Mardin (1971: 208) notes the function of 'official' religion in legitimisation for the lower classes. For Mardin (1971: 208-209), replacement of official religion with principle of *laïcisme*, the legitimising framework disappeared in the Republican era while the 'little man's' religion was ambiguous as being tolerated but not secure. Similar to the thesis of secularisation, Atatürk expected that this tension would work in favour of secularization in the long run (Mardin, 1971: 209).

teacher lost this rivalry since the Republican structure lacked a notion of good and right. However, Islam and its legal or illegal institutions fulfilled this necessity. To put it briefly, *mahalle* is a construct with eye and thus, it is a control mechanism of pressure. Here Mardin finds Republican model deficient in a sense that it lacks a notion of good and right. However, in Habermasian sense, as I mentioned in the previous section, it is argued that the liberal achievement of secularisation of state power needs to dismiss attributing 'good life' dimension. In other words, 'ethical secularism' is rejected. In this respect, Mardin's approach seems to be problematic.

In order to elaborate more on the modernisation approach and Eisenstadt's conceptualisation of 'multiple modernities', I would like to refer to Halil İnalçık's evaluations as well. For him (2007: 39), concerning modernisation, Atatürk's reform is a lump-sum revolution as this movement internalised the West with all of its philosophy of life and values.

The lump-sum change of the worldview makes Atatürk's project a radical revolutionary modernisation (İnalçık, 2007: 39). The purpose of this project was to transform social order, social relations, material and moral civilisation into Western type of civilisation through a radical social change, a revolution (İnalçık, 2007: 40). Modernisation was expressed with '*asrılık*', 'to reach the level of contemporary civilisation', 'Westernisation' (İnalçık, 2007: 40).

The concept of modernisation accommodates a value-judgement in itself as it indicates transition from a backward social system to an advanced one (İnalçık, 2007: 77). Trying to adopt itself to Western civilisation was a social event, an event of change of culture in Turkey (İnalçık, 2007: 78). Nonetheless, till Atatürk's radical modernisation, it was thought that modernisation could be divided into two: material and immaterial aspects of modernity were about technique and morality respectively (İnalçık, 2007: 78). The distinction between culture and civilisation was based on such a division. Because Atatürk rejected this and proposed a lump-sum project, the change he brought was revolutionary.

İnalçık (2007: 52) refers to S. N. Eisenstadt's analysis of Atatürk's revolution: in classical sociology, secularisation kept company with the concepts like 'rationality', 'progress' and 'freedom'; however in comparative analyses of traditional and modern societies take into account all the historical data concerning the social-cultural and technological-economic frames of reference. It is observed that the traditional societies have limited and exclusionist characteristic in their capacities of absorption of change and growth (İnalçık, 2007: 52). The early modernisation theory thought that the traditional societies would close the gap between Western world and them by complying with certain level of development of political, economic and social institutions through pursuing the classical evolution theory (İnalçık, 2007: 52). Atatürk too, thought in the same way that the purpose of modernity would be reached by taking certain precautions in the way of modernisation (İnalçık, 2007: 52). In other words, through building railways and factories, organising education in objective grounds of positive sciences would lead to the birth of modern Turkey (İnalçık, 2007: 52-53). Nonetheless, the researches in 1950s revealed that this kind of early modernisation theory was far from explaining unique changes in modernising countries (İnalçık, 2007: 53). In modernisation, socio-demographic or structural indicators show to what extent traditional society is on the way of resolution, but do not provide an explanation on the level of development and the composition of society (İnalçık, 2007: 53). Therefore, sweeping away the old and traditional lifestyles does not guarantee the development of modernity; on the contrary, in most of the cases, the disintegration of traditional family, old communities and political structures usually result in social disorder and chaos, increase of crimes (İnalçık, 2007: 53). However, in some cases, modernisation was achieved under traditional symbols (İnalçık, 2007: 53).

In this respect, what the traditional society is an object of inquiry in those researches and it was seen that although development did not stop, different models of society emerged (İnalçık, 2007: 53). Rather than convergence, divergence became the valid in the processes of modernisation (İnalçık, 2007: 57).

As discussed in the previous section, this is 'multiple modernities' in Eisenstadt's terminology. For example, for the Turkish case, he argues that the Turkish modernisation gave birth to 'Turkish' modernity (İnalçık, 2007: 56).

For Eisenstadt, in Turkey, the instability of the democratic regime, military interventions, unhealthy urbanisation, extensive activity of the public media are impossible to be explained with development; they are to be analysed within the framework of Kemalist regime stemming from the unique conditions of Turkey (İnalçık, 2007: 53). Especially, the direction of the basic culture, the structure and control mechanisms of the elite group are to be researched in Turkey (İnalçık, 2007: 53).

When compared to English, American, French and Russian revolutions, the Turkish Revolution has differing and resembling sides (İnalçık, 2007: 53). The common features of these revolutions are: social differentiation, opening to the international organisations, transition to the market economy, social mobility with the help of education (İnalçık, 2007: 54). In the Turkish case, the major point of difference from the old regime is in political principles, in the symbols of political society: a new Turkish nation wanted to be designated by distancing from the Islamic framework of the society (İnalçık, 2007: 54). The essential differences from the development in Europe were the abandonment of the old religious identity and replacement of the old administrative class with bureaucratic and intellectual elites (İnalçık, 2007: 54).

In the initial years of the revolution, political participation was totally under the control of the administrative group (İnalçık, 2007: 54). In ideal meaning, the duty of protecting the life of the *ummah* by the state in the direction of purity of religion had been survived as one of the features of the Ottoman regime and the Ottoman state-society structure found its open expression in the phrase of '*Din-ü Devlet*' (İnalçık, 2007: 54). By this way, for Eisenstadt, the political elite acquired autonomy and superiority within the state (İnalçık, 2007: 54). This historical pre-structure explains Kemalist revolution and the composition of the elite realised this

revolution (İnalçık, 2007: 54). It was realised by the military officers having modern educational background; secular, rationalist, nationalist worldviews; and being open-minded concerning religion (İnalçık, 2007: 55). In the pre-revolutionary era, their weak objectives on social policy prevented them from confrontation with upper and middle classes; and thus, lower classes were excluded from revolution (İnalçık, 2007: 55). But modernisation changed the patrimonial character of the Ottoman regime and there emerged possibilities to take part in the administrative class for the ones which had been excluded from the centre (İnalçık, 2007: 55). This is an essential distinctiveness of Turkish case, for example, when compared to the English revolutions (İnalçık, 2007: 55).

In Turkey, nation-state, secular education system, industrialisation and democracy showed development independent of each other (İnalçık, 2007: 57). Factories and railways did not bring about change of mentality (İnalçık, 2007: 57). Today, the increasing numbers of academic investigations and observations reveal the incapability of old uni-linear development theory that the cultural development principles of the Western modernity, for example, would certainly be realised with a secular education system as it inevitably gives way to structural and theoretical changes in society (İnalçık, 2007: 57). Westernisation does not indicate a very same development everywhere (İnalçık, 2007: 57). Hence, for İnalçık (2007: 58), the evolution theory is needed to be left aside regarding culture.

İnalçık (2007: 57) argues that recently, in the Islamic world, not only common people, but also the intellectuals educated in the Western universities, turn back to historical-religious values rather than Western cultural values. He (2007: 57) notes from Eisenstadt that modernity is widespread in most of the globe; however, it did not bring a single civilisation into being as the cultural dimensions of modernity are interacting with the external cultural systems of societies and their internal dynamics. Eisenstadt's such an observation reminds İnalçık (2007: 58) of Ziya Gökalp's argument that unique '*hars*' (culture) of the society has a formative and comprehensive power regarding its social life. Therefore, there are 'multiple

modernities' (İnalçık, 2007: 58). For İnalçık (2007: 58), this, to an extent, indicates the validity of argument of Western cultural imperialism and Orientalism.

İnalçık (2008: 59) asserts that it would be a mistake to set the European historical and sociologic data in its development process as the major criteria in the investigation of dynamics of other civilisations. He (2007: 59) describes the method to be used in scientific investigations as such: every civilisation has developed unique institutional formations and cultural infrastructures, and unique lines of those civilisations are not to be researched with their distance to the West, but within their conditions.

As the 'first' modernity, the European modernity has some institutions and cultural components that could be point of departure for any investigation (İnalçık, 2007: 59). Initially, formation of absolutist state as the origin of modern nation-state, then formation of civil society and capitalist economy, and consequently, emergence of new collective identities, territorial integrity, secularism, civility, strong education system bound to these scales are examples of those institutions (İnalçık, 2007: 59). In Republican Turkey, the nation-state ideology derived from the West suits this description: indivisible territorial integrity, compulsory Turkish citizenship and to realise that the state to be secular-laic, leaving religions to individual consciences, constitutional guarantees of these principles (İnalçık, 2007: 59). İnalçık (2007: 59) admits that in recent years there occurred strong trend of interrogation of and resistance to those concepts and institutions that came from the West. In Turkey, unique developments of nation-state are strengthening of current of Islamisation in society and politics, rising ethnic conflicts (İnalçık, 2007: 59-60). On the other side, Western model of nation-state is followed in whole Asia, Middle Eastern Arab states coming from colonial age; however, consciousness of Islamic unity manifests itself against this model (İnalçık, 2007: 60). For İnalçık (2007: 60), the incapability of European modernity in the analyses of those states is evident. In a similar manner, Andrew Davison (1998: 31) asserts for reconceiving modernity by referring to two interrelated aspects:

1. Multiple modernities do exist (in past and present), are meaningful in the lives of many people who participate in the politics of modernity, and must be understood as such. We need to understand modernity differently and seek to understand others as they understand themselves rather than exclude them from modernity, even if they might appear to exclude themselves (philosophically and ideologically). Modern or not, political actors of radically alternative ideological orientations participate in and are shaped by the politics of modernity, and their significance in that context should not be devalued under any set of criteria.
2. Secularism, despite its recent bruises, remains a vital political project in the world (as religiously conceived politics do). This political project, however, is not amenable to generalization. Rather, it is variously constituted by attempts to define the relations between religious ideas (or matters of conscience tradition more generally), institutions, practices, and politics. Moreover, the politics of modernity continue to center on these poles, and a judgement about the character of the history of modernity that enables us to reconceive secularism in political inquiry is fundamental to understanding our political world.

This understanding of the possibilities of multiple modernities and multiple secularisms helps to discern the post-secular approach that recognises alternative conceptions of the modern and accepts the secular nature of politics.

Halil İnalçık (2007: 60) touches upon the concept of civil society: it is to be investigated through reference to the Enlightenment Age of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially to the transition from the absolutist monarchies to nation-states (İnalçık, 2007: 60). İnalçık (2007: 60) notes the Hegelian explanation that in this age, the demand of autonomous area out of the authority of state created civil society. İnalçık (2007: 60) maintains that the concept of civil society is to be examined within the public sphere which is in between official sphere of the state and private sphere. For the interest of the people, the collective improvements in the public sphere realised by the groups that are not dependent on the state form the realm of civil society (İnalçık, 2007: 61). The power of the public sphere is bound to its distance to the centre (İnalçık, 2007: 61).

At this point, it would be relevant to highlight that the concept of 'public sphere' in Turkish politics is different from the Habermasian usage. In Turkey, the public sphere is "an area, directly or indirectly, related to the state" (Hazama, 2014: 163). This state-centred definition stems from the discourse that emerged from the headscarf issue (Hazama, 2014: 164). In other words, rather than the Habermasian

definition, the public sphere in Turkish politics countervails the official sphere or the state sphere. However, in this work, like in İncalcık's works, the Habermasian definition of public sphere prevails.

İncalcık (2007: 61) addresses to the Turkish sociologists and political scientists who analysed Atatürkism with Weberian concepts. Şerif Mardin's and Metin Heper's approaches are examples. For Mardin, Atatürk stepped into action to create a new form of society via reform with a new 'map of society' in his mind (İncalcık, 2007: 61). In Weberian sociology, *honour* and *rank* are the basic principles of social order, and in Ottoman era, they were determined by the will of sultan (İncalcık, 2007: 61). For Mardin, Atatürk's revolution replaced patrimonial honour and social stratification system with a new system of honour based on rules and laws (İncalcık, 2007: 61). Source of legitimacy was no more a person; religion was superseded by positive sciences; the concept of people came to end the distinction between commons and educated-cultivated class; in political arena, *ummah* was left for the sake of nation-state (İncalcık, 2007: 61-62). Mardin maintains, Westernisation was the 'utopia' or 'map of society' that came true with Atatürk's charismatic personality (İncalcık, 2007: 62). Mardin finds Atatürk's success in his extraordinary ability in setting balance between utopia and realism (İncalcık, 2007: 62).

Heper proposes that in Atatürk's era, charisma turned into a political objective model (İncalcık, 2007: 62). In other words, Atatürk consigned the values like national will, populism, etatism rooted in the French Revolution to a group of intellectual-bureaucrats raised with an education program under the control of the state (İncalcık, 2007: 62). This value system found its place in an ideal of state having centralist absolute sovereignty and in the concept of nation (İncalcık, 2007: 62). Atatürk used his charisma stemming from being a great soldier and saviour of the country not for his personal authority or for the interests of a class, but to create such a value system (İncalcık, 2007: 62-63). In the process of legitimisation and organisation of this value system, Atatürk also appealed to the formation of legal institutions and national congresses, Grand National Assembly and to the

traditional institutions like the mosque (İnalcık, 2007: 63). For Heper, Atatürk's revolution departs from other charismatic leaders' revolutions as it relied on a program; and he raised a new elite group of bureaucrats to this end (İnalcık, 2007: 63). Heper sees Atatürk's reforms imposed from above legitimate as they were aimed at the formation of a modern state (İnalcık, 2007: 64).

After this brief summary of İnalcık's analysis of Turkish Revolution, I would like to mention his approach to more recent repercussions of it. He (2007: 92-93) thinks that via modernisation, Ottoman state system was totally transformed to a secular Republican one without any doubt; however, Ottoman culture managed to survive and it is on the edge of resurrection as a thousand year old Anatolian-Islamic culture in sense of mores is an organic historical phenomenon. This results in a socio-cultural problem; a crisis of culture and identity (İnalcık, 2007: 92). He (2007: 92-93) believes that talking about an international culture is meaningless and total assimilation or affinity to a culture is impossible. Even the Western societies are not identical in cultural terms (İnalcık, 2007: 93). It should also be noted that belief system is the strongest instrument to get involved in a culture (İnalcık, 2007: 93). The religious components articulated in the culture can change and therefore, it is possible to talk about a Turkish Islam, an Iranian Islam, etc (İnalcık, 2007: 93-94). To illustrate, the merge of Turkmen substantial culture with Islamic culture in Anatolia gave birth to novel religious compositions (İnalcık, 2007: 94). Just like German romanticism, the Ottoman-Islamic cultural heritage and mythology make up a form of Ottoman romanticism remaining from the nineteenth century (İnalcık, 2007: 95-96). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the German romanticism was a matter of a century ago.

So far, I have outlined basics of some Turkish professors who worked on Turkish modernisation and before moving to the history of Turkish modernisation, for the sake of conceptual clarification, I would like to elaborate more on the concept of 'revolution'. As it is seen in the discussion above, scholars use this concept elusively sometimes implying social and cultural change, and sometimes referring

to the change of power relations between classes. This confusion forced some scholars to clarify the subject matter. For example, as Ellen Kay Trimberger (1978: vii) maintains, when she examined Japanese and Turkish cases, she realised that these do not fit into neither Weberian nor Marxist theoretical frameworks. Therefore, she (1978: vii) feels the need for making a distinction between revolution from below and revolution from above. While in the latter, military or civil bureaucrats direct modernisation by the control of state, the former takes place if "the state apparatus loses both its capacity to support the status-quo and to generate a revolution from above" (Trimberger, 1978: viii). In Turkey, the concept of 'revolution from above' usually used in a derogatory sense to assert alienated or unpopular nature of some reforms. Even the name of Turkish publication of Trimberger's book implies such derogation.³²

Trimberger (1978: 2) mentions the dissension among scholars to qualify Atatürk regime as a revolution by focusing on the lack of mass movement or mass upheaval. In this respect, she (1978: 2) makes a definition of revolution to differentiate it from reform and coup: "extra-legal takeover of the central state apparatus which destroys the economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime." The destruction of the dominant groups differs revolution from *coups d'état* since it is necessary to initiate positive and innovative change (Trimberger, 1978: 2). The five characteristics of revolution from above are as such:

- (1) The extralegal takeover of political power and the initiation of economic, social, and political change is organised and led by some of the highest military and often civil bureaucrats in the old regime;
- (2) there is little or no mass participation in the revolutionary takeover or in the initiation of change. Mass movements and uprisings may precede and accompany revolution from above, but military bureaucrats who take revolutionary action do so independently from, and often in opposition to, such movements;
- (3) the extralegal takeover of power and initiation of change is accompanied by very little violence, execution, emigration, or counter-revolution;
- (4) the initiation of change is undertaken in a pragmatic, step-at-a-time manner with little appeal to radical ideology. Both the third and fourth characteristics are the result of

³² The Turkish translation of this book is '*Tepeden İnmeci Devrimler*' rather than a more neutral translation like '*yukarıdan devrim*'.

control and use of a bureaucratic apparatus for radical aims; (5) military bureaucrats who lead a revolution from above—as opposed to a coup d'état—destroy the economic and political base of the aristocracy or upper class. This destructive process is basic to both revolution from above and from below. (Trimberger, 1978: 3)

For Trimberger (1978: 3), Atatürk regime was marginally revolutionary since Atatürk destroyed the political, but only a part of the economic, base of the Ottoman notables. But if we take removal of capitulations and economic privileges of the non-Muslim minorities and foreigners into account, and also etatist orientation of the economic policy to sponsor national bourgeoisie and industrialization, introduction of a new taxation system, the new Turkish state departs sharply from the old regime in economic respects.

Another argumentation on the 'top-down' nature of modernisation is centred around the distinction between Western and non-Western societies. It is argued that in 'mobilised' Western societies, modernisation was realised by internal dynamics, whereas non-Western societies require Western intervention or reform from above to become modernised (Kökler, 2005: 51). To use Heper's terminology, in Turkey, where strong state tradition or high stateness was inherited from the Ottomans, any transformation would be realised through state intervention. This line of analysis presumes that Turkish society is an Eastern society. However, in historical sense, the Ottoman Empire strongly attached to the West; in geographic sense, the Ottomans governed the Balkans for centuries; in political sense, the Ottoman Empire had been in close interaction and relations with the Western powers; and in economic sense, the Ottoman commercial bourgeoisie composed mostly of non-Muslims was integrated with the West. In these respects, it would be a simplification to categorise Ottomans as non-Western or Eastern. It is also contradictory to attach importance to the internal dynamics in differentiating the modernisation processes of the Western societies since the strong state tradition of the Ottoman Empire was clearly an internal dynamic.

With special emphasis on Charles Taylor's approach to social imaginary that I discussed in the previous section, I would like to elaborate more on İnalçık's

above-mentioned references to Heper and Mardin in respect to change of value system and map of society and on Trimberger's conceptualisation of revolution from above. These scholars attribute significant role either or both to the state and the political elite or to Atatürk's personality in explaining change. In a familiar sense, as I mentioned in the previous section, Charles Taylor argues for the role of theory in transforming social imaginary. In Ottoman-Turkish modernisation, the military-civil bureaucracy has great influence on the process of change. They believed that Westernisation is the only remedy to save the state. Positivism motivated their conception of political and social change. Using Trimberger's terminology, revolution from above in Turkey was accomplished through Atatürk's theory in his mind. In other words, the revolutionary change of political power Atatürk initiated formal reforms to shape social imaginary of the newly built nation. The nation-building process gained pace by the use of ideological apparatuses of the state such as education. Conception of unity of culture and civilisation in Atatürk's mind and of universality if not superiority of Western civilisation resulted in a diminished role and place of Islam in the public sphere. There was an attempt of creating a civil religion by designating a version of Hanefi Islam and by challenging power bases of popular Islam. By shaping social imaginary, as presented by scholars of Turkish politics, secularism partially gained a social base especially among the educated segments of society. This partiality is the source of conflict in politics. In other words, secular-democratic constitutionalism is not a universal ideal. A new social imaginary based on conservative and religious ideals promoted by the AKP governments will be the concern of the fourth chapter and I will discuss whether this new social imaginary would be characterised as post-secular.

For the sake of further theoretical and conceptual clarification other than earlier examples and some criticisms of secularisation thesis in analysing Turkish politics, I would also like to refer to some other classifications and evaluations of Turkish secularism and then move to the discussion of post-secularism in Turkey.

Adopting the basic tenets of Niyazi Berkes's secularisation thesis, Banu Eligür (2010: 6) writes:

The goal of infusing Turks with Western liberal ideas was to create a new type of citizenship, and hence a modern society, rather than an *umma* (Islamic community of believers), where there would be no room for individualism. It should be noted that the Turkish experiment in secularism represented not a gradual change but a drastic one, which also included a degree of forceful state imposition. The revolutionary movement headed by Atatürk aimed at removing Islam from public affairs and relegating religion to the private sphere through state control; thus, religious institutions were not just separated from the state, but became subservient to it.

For Eligür (2010: 378), the causes of this structure of control over religion had roots in the failed modernisation of the Ottoman past. For example, unlike the *Tanzimat* era reforms, the Republican modernisation was based on the creation of a modern nation and state which would be deterrent to Western domination and this project inevitably relied on secularism (Eligür, 2010: 43). Eligür's conception of secularism is closer to the secularism as ideology as she (2010: 43) refers to the goals of Republican reforms as cutting the historical link between religion and state, bringing Western culture to an Islamic context, diminishing power of Islam within society. Her reasoning for the authoritarian framework of initiating such goals under the single-party rule of the CHP and of controlling religion by incorporating men of religion to the state bureaucracy rather than separating it from the state is as such:

By attempting to infuse Turks with Western liberal ideas, the aim was to create a new type of citizenship and thus a modern society rather than an *umma*, in which there was no room for individualism. The emphasis was on the potentialities of the Turkish people; sovereignty that was taken away from the sultan-caliph was invested unconditionally in the nation by creating the Grand National Assembly. But because the masses were not familiar with Western notion of liberalism, having lived for centuries under an Islamic system dominated by the conservative *ulema* and Islamic brotherhoods, the newly established state was required to play a paternalistic role *vis-à-vis* its citizens, with the goal of removing religion from public affairs through state control. Thus, the Turkish experience with separation of church and state has not been in conformity with the Western conception. (Eligür, 2010: 46)

For Eligür (2010: 47), the Republican reforms did not mean irreligion, but liberation of the society "from the political, social, cultural, economic, and

psychological constraints of the Islamic system established by the conservative *ulema* and the Islamic brotherhoods." In this respect, like Berkes, Eligür attributes ideological stance to secularism rather than perceiving it as a statecraft doctrine. The basic structure of her thesis is based on the dichotomy of secularism and religion. Hence, her analysis is distanced to the approach of post-secularism which tries to come to terms with the place of religion in the public sphere. Her analysis is centred around the fall and rise of Islamism in relation to secularism. She (2010: 11) also considers Islamic movement in Turkey as an opposition to democracy and challenge to civil and secular state. In this research, I propose democratic consolidation as the major component of a post-secular order and I argue that secularism is the *sine qua non* of a democratic order based on freedoms. In the fourth chapter, I discuss the relationship between democracy and the AKP to look at the its potential for post-secularism.

In their attempts about conceptual and terminological clarifications on Turkish secularism, Parla and Davison (2008: 58) note the significance of Turkey as a showcase of secularisation and modernisation in a non-Western and predominantly Muslim environment. They take Kemalism in Turkey as a fixed regime without making any differentiation between time intervals. Therefore, they treat post-1980 context as being Kemalist as was the case for early-Republican era. They (2008: 58) reject equating Turkish principle of laicism with secularisation, Westernisation and modernisation. Such an equation is present in Timur's analysis below. They (2008: 59-60) maintain that secularism includes connotations like nonreligious, irreligious, anti-religious, other than this worldly and temporal; however, laicism is not necessarily anti-religious.

The reason for me to refer to their work is that Parla and Davison differ from Niyazi Berkes's views as they (2008: 60-61) find Kemalist laicism less than secularism and limited than other forms of laicism which indicate separation of religion and state, control of religion and disestablishment of religion. They (2008: 62-63) think that secularism leads to removal of religion from general human

enquiry. When compared to that of Berkes, this approach seems to be a radical version of secularisation thesis criticised by the post-secularism literature. They (2008: 66) argue that religion is being taught, administered and promoted by the state in Turkey. They (2008: 67) write: "Kemalists established (not disestablished) a modern, nationalized version of pristine Islam, combined with the accompanying sources of civic religion based on the national characterological virtues of the pre-Ottoman, Turkish national culture, that is, the old Central Asian one." Likewise, Cihan Tuğal (2007:7) regards secularisation in Turkey since the *Tanzimat* era as "expanding state control over religion." He (2007: 8) argues:

Turkish secularization may best be seen as an ongoing struggle over the nature and development of an 'official Islam', characterized by the public use of religion for national cohesion. Rather than reproducing some universalist (or Ottoman) logic, the secularization project was continually remade, its (partially unintended) outcomes the result of a series of interventions by different social forces. This process has involved conflicts both within the ruling power bloc constituted by the reforms of the late Ottoman period and the early years of the Republic, and with social layers excluded from it. Since the 1930s, the dominant sectors within this bloc -the military leadership, the modernizing layers of the civil bureaucracy, an officially protected industrial bourgeoisie and a West-oriented intelligentsia- have favoured a more or less authoritarian exclusion of religion from the public sphere. The bloc's subordinate sector -conservative elements of the bureaucracy and professional middle class, an export-oriented bourgeoisie, merchants, provincial notables- tended to advocate a larger space for Islam, albeit still under 'secular' control. This could also mobilize broader popular layers -workers, peasants, artisans, the unemployed, small provincial entrepreneurs, clerics- against the dominant sector, and often succeeded in extracting concessions from it. Meanwhile, although excluded from the power equation, the religious groupings themselves, as well as numerous semi-clandestine Islamic communities, put up quite powerful forms of passive or active resistance around questions such as education.

In his earlier hermeneutic inquiry of secularism in Turkey, Davison (1998: 140-142) interprets that separation and disestablishment accounts are limited in understanding secularism in the Republican Turkey and control account makes Turkish secularism more than disestablishment and less than separation. He (1998: 142) finds the tradition of state hegemony over religion in the Ottoman era is an important reason for this characteristic of Turkish secularism. For Davison (1998: 154), Republican secularism in Turkey was anticlerical to some extent, but not antireligious. Davison (1998: 151) also notes that Atatürk seemed to "sought a form of secularism that respected religion" on the basis of differentiating between

"Islam as a 'pure' faith and Islam as a political tool." Similarly, Rustow (1957: 84-85) argued:

The official pronouncements of Kemal's Republican People's Party commonly stressed that its secularism stemmed from a desire to rescue religion from its traditional entanglement with worldly affairs and thus to see it assume an even stronger position within its proper sphere of personal conscience. There is no doubt that from the lips of many Kemalists such statement were perfectly sincere. Nothing could have been more alien to the spirit and practice of Kemal's policy than any systematic persecution or molestation of clerics. The mosques remained open, and parents remain free to bring their children up in the precepts of Muslim ethics and the practice of worship. The two highest festivals -the *Kurban Bayramı* [feast of the sacrifice] and *Şeker Bayramı* [feast after Ramazan]- were recognized (...) canons and drums continued to sound during Ramazan; and boys at the time of the circumcision continued to parade in the streets in their blue caps and colorful sashes.

Drawing partly on Andrew Davison's approach, Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred Stepan (2013: 6) argue for an assertive secularism in Turkey where the state produces and promotes an 'individualised version of Islam' and at the same time tries to dismiss religion from the public sphere. They (2013: 92) propose two kinds of secularism: assertive secularism necessitates the state to pursue an exclusivist policy towards religion in the public sphere, whereas passive secularism requires the state to make visibility of religion in the public sphere available by attributing itself a passive role.

The development of assertive secularism is explained with the presence and absence of an *ancien régime* based on the cooperation of monarchy and dominant religion (Kuru & Stepan, 2013: 97). If the *ancien régime* was overturned with a struggle between the Republicans and allies of the regime, then assertive secularism was institutionalised (Kuru & Stepan, 2013: 97). An antagonism of Westernist elites and Islamic leaders in the late-Ottoman and early-Republican eras determined the nature of secularism in semi-authoritarian Turkey and assertive secularism emerged as a top-down project of the elites following their precedence over the *ancien régime* (Kuru & Stepan, 2013: 100). Kuru and Stepan (2013: 107) compares France and Turkey as cases of assertive secularism and they argue that in Turkey, assertive secularism is opposed by the large majority of the Turkish

society. In order to support this observation, they (2013: 107) refer to researches that in France, 28 percent of the population opposed the ban on headscarf in public schools, while it was 78 percent in Turkey. However, it is not very meaningful to rely on such researches as the medium of comparison since headscarf issue is an Islamic matter and France is not a Muslim context. They (2013: 108) argue:

The Kemalists have perceived Islam as a major component of the Ottoman *ancien regime* and then impediment to their Westernization reforms. This pejorative perception has affected their assertive secularist ideology and policies to exclude Islam from the public sphere. Conservative Muslims and liberals have tried to resist these policies and support passive secularism as an alternative. Despite popular opposition and the democratization process, assertive secularist policies have persisted in Turkey, mainly because of the authoritarian interventions of the military and the judiciary.

In this respect, they (2013: 108) perceive Turkey as moving from the assertive model to passive secularism due to the democratisation process. Since I consider democratic consolidation as one of the major components of a post-secular order, this move towards passive model can be discussed within the context of post-secularism. In the fourth chapter, I will look at the nature of this move during the AKP rule.

Analysing Ottoman-Turkish modernisation *vis-à-vis* tradition is common among scholars. Like Berkes, İsmail Kara (2003: 28) an expert on Islamism focuses on the relationship between modernisation and religion by perceiving the latter as equivalent of religion. Kara (2003: 28-29) thinks that this field of research has been full of negligence and ideological distortions due to distanced attitude of the political centre in the early-Republican era and closing itself to the Islamic world with the enforcement of international conditions as well. For him (2003: 29), when the aspect of religion in Ottoman-Turkish modernisation is disregarded or neglected, it becomes impossible to make a sound account of modernisation because modernisation movements in the Islamic geographies emerged not only as acts of secularisation, but also part and parcel of religion and attempts of interpreting religion.

Firstly, it is significant to get connected to religion in order to overcome the problem of political legitimacy (Kara, 2003: 29). This is the political aspect of the reasoning. Secondly, achieving social mobilisation and participation for modernisation is significant as well (Kara, 2003: 29). The actors of modernisation seemed to be realised that in the Islamic geographies, it is impossible to substitute the meaning of religion with other things such as race, language, territory, economic interests, etc (Kara, 2003: 29). It was also a widespread phenomenon that Islamic project remained as an important component in the minds of Turkish and Muslim intellectuals (Kara, 2003: 30). On the other hand, Kara (2008: 17), writes that along the history of modernisation in Turkey, it was Islam to be struggled with and aimed to be transformed.

Concerning religion-state relations, İsmail Kara (2008: 27-28) distinguishes between Ottoman modernisation and Turkish-Republican modernisation on two major grounds: Firstly, in the early phases of Ottoman Westernisation, transformation of religious culture was of secondary importance; however, for the sake of 'saving the state', a new interpretation of Islam was required to make modernisation, which was an 'indispensable evil', possible in the sense of securing social mobilisation (Kara, 2008: 27). Secondly, in every phase of Ottoman Westernisation, all the acts were deemed necessary to be explained through religious logic and content which showed that modernisation and Islamisation were tried to be implemented concomitantly (Kara, 2008: 27). This is to be seen as the attempt of reconciling modernisation and religion (Kara, 2008: 27). In the Republican modernisation, these attempts were left and modernisers aimed at modernisation through deactivating religion (Kara, 2008: 28).

For Kara (2008: 219), while the Turkish society becomes more religious in one way or another, it also becomes monotype in line with the demands of modernisation and secularisation project as it loses its historical and local types which have contributed to religion-centred different attitudes. Despite all the changes and disruptions, for Kara (2008: 219), the religiosity codes of the Turkish

people fed the struggle against positivist inclinations. He (2008: 237-238) also rejects the claim that the religious institutions like *medreses* and dervish lodges were not decayed and collapsed; on the contrary, they sustained their livelihood in their own dynamics and logic. For Kara (2008: 238), to raise such a claim, one should have internalised an 'alien' logic imported with modernisation and Westernisation. Nevertheless, he cannot ground his argument on tangible historical examples that how religious institutions had the capacity to renew themselves.

Kara elaborates on the approaches of the religious people to religion policies of the Republican administration. Firstly, the cultural codes of the Turkish people prevents them to perceive secularism as a state without religion / irreligious state / state in equal distance towards religions since state is a phase of religion and being a community and the political centre itself refrained from such interpretations of irreligion (Kara, 2008: 190). State and religion are integral parts of each other (Kara, 2008: 190). This is seen in the Ottoman concept of *din-ü devlet* (religion and state). Secondly, the intellectuals' doubts and indecisive situations about religion have never found a proper base among the people (Kara, 2008: 190). The indispensable relationship between religion and state is furthered by incorporating the 'nation' as well (Kara, 2008: 190). Thirdly, for the Turkish people, if there is irreligion or immorality, this stems not from the state or the Republic but from the incumbents (Kara, 2008: 191). Fourthly, the undisputable and positive relationship between democracy and secularism in theoretical sense does not function in a desirable level in the Turkish case and there emerge unexpected anomalous results (Kara, 2008: 191). The religiosity of the society, nation or the 'periphery' is stronger than the religiosity of the individuals one by one (Kara, 2008: 191). The Muslim Turkish people, almost instinctively, are aware of that the religious issue in Republican Turkey is a very sensitive as well as serious (Kara, 2008: 192). This deep awareness prevents the Turkish people from seeing religion as a direct tool of opposition or conflict; however, when the state cracks the door open, the people instantly takes the advantage of the situation to the full extent (Kara, 2008: 192). Finally, the people in Turkey refrain from using exclusionary expressions like

infidelity when there are acts against religion in their own sense of interpretations (Kara, 2008: 192). In his analysis, Kara seems to be proclaiming an ingenuous nature of the religious opposition to modernisation or political Islamic challenge to the Republican secularism by extending the views of the Islamists as if they represent the 'periphery' as a whole.

Hakan Yavuz (2009: xi) too analyses Turkish politics from the perspective of secularism-Islamism antagonism. He (2009: 144) argues, "modern Turkish history could be viewed as a 'conflict between two Turkeys,' that is, a division between secularists and Islamic groups." For him (2009: xi), "the conflict is between those who want a society based upon a Jacobin secular vision of social and political order (...) and those who embrace an Islamic conception of society and moral order." "However, the situation in Turkey is not that black and white" to overgeneralise (Çınar, 2011: 536). Yavuz (2009: 145) criticises the secularisation thesis "based almost exclusively on European experiences, assumed the removal of religion from politics and societal life through the process of secularization as part of an inevitable and linear historical progression that is seen as being positive and progressive." He (2009: 145) asserts that it is necessary to analyse secularism as a non-linear and unfixed process and the relationship between secularism and Islamism as not mutually exclusive.

Like some other scholars mentioned above, Yavuz (2009: 146) regards secularism as state control over religion. For Yavuz (2009: 146), the Turkish secularism aimed at creating an enlightened Islam to support modernisation and in its context, "*control of religion more than freedom of or from religion is the dominant mode of understanding.*"³³

³³ Control of religion in Turkish secularism has its roots in the Ottoman legacy. Yavuz (2009: 153) writes: "(I)n the case of the Ottoman Empire a separate religious institution was formed to control religious activities and to also create a state-centric Islam. This institutionalization of Islam prevented the autonomy of religion and Islam always remained under the control of the state. This tradition of institutional control continued under the Republican regime with the establishment of the DRA [Directorate of Religious Affairs]. This institutionalization might also

He (2009: 148) refers to Alfred Stepan's conceptualisation of twin tolerations to make an account of inclusive secularism and pluralist understanding of religion rather than intolerant secularism having hostile ideological stance against religion. In this respect, secularism should "not try to eliminate religious symbols and norms from the public sphere, seeks to accommodate a diversity of religious perspectives" (Yavuz, 2009: 148). The justification of a more intolerant understanding of secularism in the Republican Turkey was about the "exclusive nature of orthodox Islam" (Yavuz, 2009: 149). As Yavuz (2009: 149) notes:

When Mustafa Kemal established the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, his regime confronted three residual remnants of the Ottoman system: the loyalties of ordinary Muslims to the *ulema* and the caliphate, as the most important source of legitimacy and social order; the power and popularity of the Sufi orders, especially the *Nakshibendi* order; and the widespread presence of illiteracy and folk Islam in a population devastated by the recent war conditions.

Yavuz (2009: 150) also elaborates on the tension between liberal democracy which seeks secularism as a barrier between religion and politics and Islamism which sees secularism as suppression of religion. Therefore, twin tolerations is difficult to be maintained in an Islamic context (Yavuz, 2009: 150). However, for Yavuz (2009: 151), in Turkey, the evolution of secularism went together with Islamic reformation and secularism acquired legitimacy through democracy. Yavuz seems to propose a post-secular settlement via twin tolerations based on inclusive mode of secularism, pluralism and democracy for Turkey.

As a researcher of modernity and civil society, Nilüfer Göle seems to reduce the conflicts to tensions between Islamic society and secular state. She (2012a: 10) focuses on the place of religion within public sphere in relation to secularism. The changing relations between religion and public sphere are her concern as new compositions and articulations emerge. For Göle (2012a: 10), these novelties that lead to 'in-betweenness' when religious-secular divide is considered can be read as post-secularism, especially in the case of Turkey with the AKP. For her (2006: 7), it

explain the relative success of secularism in Turkey."

represents a challenge to "the secular definitions of the public sphere and intensifies the debate on the public presence of Islam."

In seeking "to make religious difference visible in public", Islam moved into the European public life with the effort of reshaping the boundaries of the religious and the secular defined by modern democratic compromises (Göle, 2006: 3-4). However, this is a two way journey as the social profiles of the Muslims in Western contexts "are an outcome of the Islamist movement and modern secular education, market values and political idioms" (Göle, 2006: 4). In other words, they "acquired a double symbolic capital, both religious and secular." (Göle, 2006: 27).

Islam as an extraneous matter has a crucial role in the development of Western post-secularity. Entrance of Islam to the European public spheres attracted attention of the Western social scientists. In the works of Habermas, the relation set between an ideal public sphere and functioning of a pluralist democracy required reconsideration and conceptualisation of public sphere with an interdisciplinary viewpoint and a pluralist framework (Göle, 2012b: 37). In Europe, the public sphere becomes an arena where conflicting intimacies and entanglements between different Islamic and European cultural and religious codes took place (Göle, 2012b: 36). "Public spaces becomes performative spaces in which the asymmetrical power relations between secular and religious actors and imaginaries are displayed" and "the public sphere denotes a space for the making of the Islamic self and habitus, in counter-distinction to the Westernized self" (Göle, 2006: 39). Consequently, "in the West, criticisms of the universalistic premises of the public sphere with its 'blindness' to gender, ethnic, and class differences, took the potential and promise for a democratic public sphere one step further" (Göle, 2006: 38). Globalisation contributes to autonomy of the public in post-national manner *vis-à-vis* the political sphere remaining national (Göle, 2012: 35). The demands of religion to realise public visibility causes public debates in different national and post-national contexts (Göle, 2012b: 35). Islam joins the formation of post-national European public, but this also challenges the norms and ethics of European secular

modernity. Within this Western context, the post-secularism literature argues for the inclusion of the religious to the public sphere. Therefore, democratisation of the public sphere through a pluralistic understanding is a component of a post-secular compromise. Göle (2006: 37-38) gives priority to this component as follows:

The question of establishing a social bond with the 'other', perceived as different, considered a 'stranger', and thus 'excluded', is an essential question of democracy. The public sphere derives its intellectual popularity and political importance from its democratic potential for building a common world out of social diversity. However, the links between the public sphere, modernity and democracy are not to be taken for granted in non-Western contexts. A strong public sphere does not mean a sign of modernity, or democracy. The Turkish republican public sphere endorsed a national sense of belonging and secular way of life, guaranteed by a secular Constitution, but refused to acknowledge political, religious and ethnic pluralism. We can observe the built-in tensions between public secularism and democratic pluralism in the edification of the public sphere.

Nilüfer Göle (2012b: 11) also assumes a necessity for differentiating secularism from the Western experience and admitting the multiplicity of secularism. For her (2012b: 11), the secular of a different historical path has different religious genealogies; however, they are all related to the hegemonic enforcements of Western modernity and colonialism. Secularism being a Western master narrative based on a 'domestic' discussion formed by the interaction with Christianity is in the process of devastating change when it encountered with Islam (Göle, 2012b: 12). This is the concern of post-secularism literature confined to the 'affluent' societies of the West. In this research, I examine this for the public sphere of Turkish context by taking into account the historical development and more recent motors of change.

The analysis of secularism in non-Western contexts may lead to two different attitudes: either to treat secularism as an alien ideology for the non-Western societies since it is inherent to the Latin Christian world; or to break the consubstantiality of the secular and the Western and to examine different formations and appearances of the secular in different historical and religious contexts (Göle, 2012b: 13). In this research, I pursue the latter attitude and look at peculiarities of the Turkish case.

Departing from the renewed role of religion in pluralistic public spheres, like Nilüfer Göle, Banu Gökariksel and Anna Secor (2015: 21) consider Turkey as a post-secular geography where there is an institutionally secular and democratic state. They (2015: 22) see Turkey as 'strong secularism' like the French model based on the immunisation of the political sphere from the dominance of religion as Turkish Constitution removed religion from the public sphere and initiated control over Sunni Islam.

For them (2015: 21), the AKP of Turkey represents a successful accommodation of Islamic and neoliberal economic values. The AKP calls for re-interpretation of secularism in Turkey (Gökariksel & Secor, 2015: 22). They (2015: 21) find "the integration of religious ways of being within a public arena" as the key of Hebermasian post-secularism. They (2015: 23) find post-secularism as an energising concept that contributes to the recognition of "the contingency of the secular and its dependence on a particular delineation of the categories of 'politics' and 'religion'".

In addition to that they (2015: 21) address to the problem of pluralism as a challenge to secular democracies. They (2015: 22) propose that headscarf-wearing women are the first step towards a changing understanding of religious-secular divide in Turkey. In this research, in the fourth chapter, I add the Alevi issue to this picture to depict post-secular potential in Turkey.

Another scholar elaborating of Turkey as a post-secular example is Massimo Rosati (2012). For Rosati (2012: 61), homogenous understanding of the public space stemming from the Kemalist legacy in Turkey is on the way of change with transition to post-Kemalism as alternative interpretations of nationalism, secularism and Western-like modernity emerge. He (2012: 69) is critical to the secularisation thesis. In his work, Rosati (2012: 69) takes Turkish secularism as control of religion as well as separation of public sphere from religion.

He (2012: 69) rejects that Turkey is moving from assertive secularism to passive secularism which means a shift from one Western model to the other; on the contrary, Turkey is experiencing an alternative 'local' modernity. Rosati (2012: 72) proposes that reflectivity of modernity and reflectivity of religions are the two defining dimensions of post-secularism as they "trigger a process of complementary learning between secular and religious forms of life that in turn will creatively give life to hybrid social practices reshape the borders between the two, negotiate identities, roles and spaces, and so on."

Nevertheless, before reaching to such a conclusion, I argue that such a post-secular order is bound to primary guaranties. In this research, I attribute consolidation of democracy and secularism as a statecraft doctrine (not ideology) to the basic components of a post-secular order. Rosati (2012: 68), however, sees Kemalist (secular) opposition to the AKP as the major obstacle to further democratisation of Turkey, even to the 'Kurdish opening' which was put an end by Erdoğan very sharply. In the fourth chapter, I will argue that the political process in Turkey proves just the opposite of this argument that the AKP relying on a majoritarian understanding of formal rules of democracy turned out to be more authoritarian than initial discourses.

When I compare my research with the discussions of post-secularity in Turkey during the AKP-rule, I find basic divergence between those discussions and my main thesis that Turkey under the AKP-rule cannot be considered as post-secular. In this research disagreement between the literature reviewed above and my main thesis stems from the criteria that I propose for the analysis post-secularism in Turkey: (1) consolidated democracy; (2) deeply established secularism as a political principle; (3) the objective guarantees on the freedom of religion and conscience; (4) management of problem of pluralism; and (5) analysis of the AKP in relation to post-Islamism.

2.3. Conclusion

This chapter is composed of two sections. In the first section, there is a discussion of secularisation thesis and its post-secular critiques. In the second section, I exemplify the secularisation thesis with earlier debates on Ottoman-Turkish modernisation and then I move to recent debates on Turkish secularism.

The first section begins with elaboration on the religious and the secular, both of which is identified with reference to the each other. The interaction and changing relations of these two realms compose the history of secularism on which Taylor makes an account. The confrontation of these two realms takes place in the public sphere where Habermas searches for a transformation. This transformation encourages Rawls to invite both religious and nonreligious comprehensive doctrines to the flourishing of public reason in a secular democracy. Rather than drawing clear-cut lines of demarcation, Casanova tries to show the embeddedness of the religious in the public sphere. These four major contributors to the literature of post-secularism help me to clarify it.

Since post-secularism is not a composite theory, it is difficult to be operationalised for a research. It is just a paradigm critical to secularisation theses. In this respect, I have tried to incorporate some auxiliary conceptualisations such as multiple modernities, twin tolerations, marketisation of religion, etc.

'Radical multiculturalism' and 'militant secularism' are the two warring positions that the post-secular approach tries to compromise. On the one side, 'enforced assimilation' of cultural minorities and on the other side, 'politics of identity' are the consequences of each position that lead either camp on alert. To sum up, the basic motivation of the post-secularists and their akin critiques is to offer a new mode of consciousness for an inclusive civil society in which equal citizenship and multiculturalism complement each other.

In this research, secular democratic constitutionalism based on ethics of citizenship is presented as the most reliable remedy to the multicultural challenge to pluralist democracy. In this context, secularism respectful and responsive to religious beliefs promotes reasonable accommodation of them in the public sphere. This kind of understanding of secularism is secularism as statecraft doctrine or principle of laicism, rather than an ideological standpoint which is hostile to any kind of religious belief. On the one hand, this approach has parallels with the post-secularism literature. On the other hand, in my point of view, complete secularisation of the official sphere is vital for the health of secular-democratic constitutionalism.

In this chapter, I put forward basic debates relevant for developing the theoretical criteria and conceptual framework presented above. In the following chapter, I outline a history of modernisation/secularisation and analysis of the development of political Islam in Turkey. This historical context and analysis of political Islam will help me in the fourth chapter to analyse the AKP in relation to secularisation, democratisation and post-Islamisation.

CHAPTER III

A HISTORY OF MODERNISATION AND THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

In the previous chapter, the conceptual framework of this research is presented. Also, the nature of modernisation of Turkey is discussed in the previous chapter. Moving from the theoretical dimension, in this chapter, I elaborate on the history of the development of secularism in Turkey. This chapter is composed of two sections. In the first section, there is a brief history of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation and of multi-party regime of Turkey till 2001. The scope of first section is to understand the historical background from which Turkish secularism emerged and gave way to tensions of the recent era in Turkey.

The second section is the analysis of political Islam in Turkey. Concerning the transformation of Turkish secularism, political Islam is a crucial contributor as it is the most powerful critique of Republican secularisation via cultural modernisation. Also, political Islamic movement stands in between Turkish secularism and the AKP. Hence, without analysing development of secularism and its critique by political Islamists, the implications of the AKP phenomenon cannot be depicted in a satisfactory level. In the following chapter, this subject matter will be dealt with.

3.1. A History of Modernisation in Turkey

The Ottoman-Turkish modernisation has deep roots in historical sense. In this respect, modernisation and secularisation of Turkey does not suggest an abrupt change without any historical background. In this section of this chapter, I focus on

major historical events and developments concerning secularisation and attempts to prevent it.

3.1.1. Sources of Ottoman Modernisation

Berkes traces the development of secularism in Turkey back to early 1700s. He makes a periodisation of this development as such: first steps (1700s-1830s); *Tanzimat-Meşrutiyet* (1830s-1910s); Republican Revolution (1920s-30s). Within the first period, the first phase emerges in the 1700s and there were first reform documents like *Takrir* (1718). İbrahim Mütefferika and printing issue was in this first phase as well. The second phase is about Selim III's *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Regime) reforms. Then come Mustafa IV and Mahmut II's reigns. *Şer-i Hüccet* and Charter of Alliance were in this phase.

Concerning some unfortunate issues such as print house, Berkes (2002: 53-58) rejects putting the blame on 'the *Şeriat*' or religion. For him, the delay of 250 years stems not from religion, but from political reasons and technical and economic restraints. In the eighteenth century, the traditional Ottoman institutions were aimed to be westernised rather than to be revitalised. There were two tendencies: supporting state power and technological-economic development. But in these two spheres the attempts were insufficient. He (2002: 78) argues that in Ottoman state of that era reaction to reform came not from religion (*Ulema*); it came from polity.

For example, Janissaries were used by some influential people to stop reformation. In this respect, Berkes makes a distinction between religion and tradition and he tries to show that development of secularism in Turkey is not a war against the essence of religion but against tradition which masquerade as religious. Although I counted Berkes's work as an example of secularisation thesis, this point is familiar to the arguments of post-secularism literature, especially of Charles Taylor.

Berkes touches upon nationalist movements of non-Muslim Ottomans. He (2002: 155) says that among Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire, this resulted in a religious reaction and except for Albanians, Ottoman Muslims' nationalism came to the fore at a later time: the Islamic tendency shadowed it.

Berkes (2002: 158-160) sees the rivalry between *Bektaşî* and *Mevlevî* orders to have a say in state affairs crucial in the dissolution of Janissary army. For him, *Bektaşî* fathers were source of rebellion and rising discontent. Therefore, rather than the *Şeriat* and Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic 'heresy' like *Bektaşî* order was the real reason for upheavals concerning eradication of Janissary army (Berkes, 2002: 161-163). Berkes (2002: 253) also maintains that the war against *Bektaşîs* had impact on rationalist thought that it remained in dark for more than twenty years till 1830s.

Rather than the *Mevlevî* order, Mardin attaches importance to the *Nakşibendis* in filling the place that *Bektaşîs* left. According to Mardin (2011a), the *Nakşibendi tarikat* started to become influential in state affairs when the state had march on the *Bektaşî* order (Mardin, 2011a). For a long time, Ottoman imperial army, the Janissaries, had been identical with *Bektaşî tarikat* and Sultan Mahmut II annihilated this army together with *Bektaşîs* in 1826. Ottoman historians named this event as 'the Auspicious Event' (*Vaka-i Hayriye*). Ottomans replaced *Bektaşî tarikat* with *Nakşibendi tarikat* in their army (Mardin, 2011a). At first, everything was all a bed of roses since the new *tarikat* had not been intervened in the state affairs (Mardin, 2011a).

Later on, Kurds outnumbered in this *tarikat* and Ottomans reflected in Turk-esque manner by throwing them out of Istanbul in 1827 (Mardin, 2011a). Then on, this *tarikat* survived in Anatolia (Mardin, 2011a). This point on *tarikats* is a historical example of the danger of governing though communities which would lead to disintegration of the state. In the following chapter, the rivalry between the AKP and its long-lasting partner Gülen community will be mentioned.

Between the collapse of *Nizam-ı Cedid* and 1830s, there was the problem of developing a new political regime with the probability of three directions: (1) Islamic state resting on the *Şeriat*; (2) a state based on transaction between a centralist despotic organisation and provincial power hubs; (3) under the sovereignty of sultan a centralist bureaucratic monarchy (Berkes, 2002: 169). For Berkes (2002: 169), through the end of Mahmut II's reign, the third direction gained strength, but the acts of illuminated monarch resulted in limitation of his own powers. That was the *Tanzimat*.

Mahmut II made distinction between the *Şeriat* and justice (Berkes, 2002: 175). He wanted to form an egalitarian justice system by reforming inegalitarian system (Berkes, 2002: 175). This is seen as a primitive step towards democratization of the state (Berkes, 2002: 176). This point is very important concerning Mahmut II's reign since he was called '*adli*' which referring to his introduction of justice into the Ottoman system (Berkes, 2002: 175). For Berkes (2002: 176), that time interval carried the real beginning of secularisation in Turkey as the new ways and attempts of separation of state and religion, constitutionalisation, Westernisation, becoming nations began at that time.

Understanding the *millet*³⁴ system as division into nations was aimed to be prevented through egalitarian tendencies (Berkes, 2002: 176). The reforms would pave the ground to the separation of religion and state. This would have an impact on the influence of *ulema*. Therefore, *ulema* started to distance themselves from the enlightened monarch to whom they supported against *Bektaşî* order (Berkes, 2002: 176).

³⁴ The connotations of the concept of 'nation' in the historical process in Turkey changed in time. The Ottoman/Turkish translation of 'nation' is '*millet*' and it referred to religious communities of the empire. In the *Meşrutiyet* era, the concept of nation was started to be used in political sense rather than religious meaning (Berkes, 2005, 408). In other words, *millet* was evolved to a political community with '*ittihatçı*'s. This evolution of the concept of *millet* represented an emergence of a new type of politics in Ottoman Empire, i.e. Turkism.

With Mahmut II, there emerged dualities or bifurcation of new and old. For Berkes (2002: 177), these bifurcations were natural and would remain until the Republican revolution. Nothing had been designated as 'non-religious'; the realms of life contained a mixture of temporal and religious elements and injunctions. But then, the 'religious' began to be identified unconsciously with which was unchanging and, hence, separate from or opposed to that was changing. The static or traditional was perceived as being 'religious', irrespective of its sources of inspiration, while the 'changing' and the 'new' were understood to be 'worldly' or 'non-religious' even though the sources may have been partially or wholly religious in nature. *Ulema* were one of the motors of reform in Selim III's reign; however, with the emergence of old-new duality in Mahmut II's term, religion and *ulema* became reactionary (Berkes, 2002: 205).

Following the death of Mahmut II, *Tanzimat* Charter (1839) was declared by Sultan Abdülmecit. He guaranteed that he would limit his powers. This was neither a constitution nor a law; but was a charter which would give way to enacting new laws (Berkes, 2002: 214). Reform Edict of 1856 was declared with the influence of Westerners to realise reforms promised in the 1839 Charter (Berkes, 2002: 216). This Reform Edict counts concrete reforms unlike *Tanzimat* Charter which had a constitution-like nature (Berkes, 2002: 216).

The reforms in 1856 Edict was neither welcomed by *ulema* nor by religious leaders of non-Muslim communities since their influence and interests were threatened (Berkes, 2002: 217). However, while with 1839 Charter Muslim people did not gain a constitution in real sense, the 1856 Edict became the starter of constitutional developments and national independence demands of non-Muslim '*millet*'s (Berkes, 2002: 218). In the previous chapter, I noted that the development of ethics of citizenship based on equality is very crucial in Habermasian post-secularism approach. The roots of such a development in the Ottoman-Turkish context are depicted here.

When tradition and reforms started to be conflicted, there emerged the need for law-making (Berkes, 2002: 220). It was for the first time in Islamic history with *Tanzimat* that European type of code enacting merged with the *Şeriat* law (Berkes, 2002: 221). The need for codification was a natural result of Mahmut II's differentiation of *adalet* (justice) from *şeriat* and *kanun* (Berkes, 2002: 220).³⁵ During the *Tanzimat* era, dualities, contradictions, incapability, and most importantly, the lack of modern economic base and formation, the *Tanzimat* reforms were doomed to be failure (Berkes, 2002: 246). The response to this failure was critical to the *Tanzimat* thinking and this response, at the beginning, incorporated two incompatible tendencies: constitutionalism and radical Islamism (Berkes, 2002: 247). Therefore, the first constitution of Ottomans, namely *Kanun-i Esasi*, came to the fore as a merger of Westernism, nationalism and Islamism. But this inhabited potential conflicts and contradictions as well (Berkes, 2002: 248). Berkes (2002: 248) conceptualises this desperate situation of Ottoman state as 'shadow sovereignty'.

During the *Tanzimat* era, the subscribed missions of the Ottoman religious class of *ulema* having religious, administrative and legal duties, started to be transferred to secular state personnel. For Mardin (2011b: 44-45), on the one hand, this transformation in the missions of *ulema* implies the destruction of balance in Ottoman administrative classes. On the other hand, the abstract justice understanding gave way to a very practical and interesting result in the formation of modern Turkey: following the enactment of Turkish Civil Code taken from Switzerland in 1926, all the experts of the *Şeriat* law recognised as experts of the new civil code; and thus, their statutes leaped upwards strikingly (Mardin, 2011b: 53). This incorporation, for Mardin (2011b: 53), is one of the major achievements of Republican Turkey. The philosophical justification of this incorporation is as

³⁵ As Zürcher (2011: 27) notes it, "Theoretically, the holy law of Islam ruled supreme in the empire, but in practice by the eighteenth century it had been confined to matters of family law and of ownership. Public, and especially criminal, law was based on the secular decrees of the sultans, called *örf* or *kanun*."

such: 'justice' is one of the worldly appearances of the attributions of God; the Islamic law derived from the revelation is solely a form of it. Although the *Şeriat* is the primary source, there are different appearances or forms of justice in different degrees, and the Swiss Civil Code can be one of these forms (Mardin, 2011b: 53-54).

The *Tanzimat* was followed by the Young Ottomans era. The thoughts of the prominent figures of Young Ottoman era show the intellectual trends and Berkes compares and contrasts them. For example, he focuses on the distinctive elements in Şinasi's and Namık Kemal's approaches. For him (2002: 283), Şinasi was the real pioneer of both laicism and nationalism. Kemal and Şinasi had different attitudes and approaches. Due to the contradictions raised in the *Tanzimat* era, although Namık Kemal was not supporter of sovereignty of Ottoman dynasty and of the *Şeriat*, he seemed to (or felt the need to) defend these (Berkes, 2002: 296). Due to the conditions, his thinking and suggestions appeared to be inconsistent (Berkes, 2002: 296). Concerning the debates on *Kanun-i Esasi*, Berkes compares Mithat Paşa's federalist approach with Namık Kemal's centralist agenda (Berkes, 2002: 312). Abdulhamit was supported after Murat V who was understood to be psychologically ill. He came to power with the condition of establishing a constitutional regime; nonetheless, Mithat Paşa, who was the architect of *Kanun-i Esasi*, did not understand the real purposes of Abdulhamit II. He exploited the complexity of discussions concerning the new constitution (Berkes, 2002: 328).

Kanun-i Esasi came to the fore as a guarantee for arbitrary administration of government which was under the influence of European powers (Berkes, 2002: 328). It had nothing to do with people's sovereignty. For Berkes (2002: 333), new regime was not constitutional monarchy; it was a 'constitutional absolutism'. The main reason for the failure of *Kanun-i Esasi* was the attempt of Young Ottomans to reconcile traditional-secular conflict and state-religion duality created by the *Tanzimat* regime (Berkes, 2002: 341). Berkes (2002: 364) notes that Abdulhamit's pan-Islamism was not a unifying ideology unlike pan-Slavism; it was a realist

political instrument of the caliph against Islamist separatists, Arab sheikhs, mehdīs, Egyptian khedives, etc. Moreover, Kemal Karpat (2001: 15) addresses the paradox of the Hamidian regime as such: "Abdülhamid preserved all the reforms introduced by his predecessors and opened new avenues of change, including the letters and sciences, that greatly widened the intellectual horizons of Ottoman modernization and, paradoxically, brought the elites closer to European culture."

Most of the intellectuals lived in the Hamidian regime was called the Young Turks. For the Young Turks, Berkes notes three lines of thought circled around three figures: Ahmet Rıza, Mehmet Murat and Prince Sabahattin. Berkes (2002: 393) writes that views put forward by these figures were usually incompatible with the name '*Jeune Turc*' suggests. Ahmet Rıza was aware of the importance of enlightened masses and lack of them in the Ottoman Empire (Berkes, 2002: 394). He was also supporter of pan-Ottomanism (Berkes, 2002: 401). Mehmet Murat was pan-Islamist while Prince Sabahattin was known with respectively liberal outlook (Berkes, 2002: 401). Berkes do not enumerate *meşrutiyet* regimes as *Meşrutiyet* I and II. For him, the regime established with the 1908 Revolution was '*meşrutiyet*', while the regime usually referred to as *I. Meşrutiyet* was a constitutional absolutism not a constitutional monarchy.³⁶ The Union and Progress and the Freedom and Accord were the two major political parties of the *Meşrutiyet* era established with 1908 Revolution. Concerning the nationalities question, these two parties had different approaches in order to sustain and realise Ottoman unity. While the Union and Progress was adherent to the term unity, the Freedom and Accord underlined the need for accord and reconciliation (Berkes, 2002: 405-406). In this *Meşrutiyet* era the integration of state and religion started to be seen as the main reason for lagging behind the West (Berkes, 2002: 412).

³⁶ The *Meşrutiyet* era is the period of constitutional monarchy in Ottoman Empire between 24 July 1908 and 5 November 1922. *Meşrutiyet* means constitutional monarchy in English. Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* in Turkish) ruled the country between 1908 and 1918. The word *ittihatçı* means member or supporter of Union and Progress.

Therefore, another source of problem in the discussions of this era was the Western question: Westernists saw humanitarianism as the essence of Western civilisation, whereas Islamists saw the essence of Western civilisation in its Christianity (Berkes, 2002: 415). That is the reason why these two were not reconciled (Berkes, 2002: 415-416). Nationalists' approach to the West differed both from that of Westernists and Islamists. They were at the same time supporters of Westernisation as Westernists and anti-Western as Islamists (Berkes, 2002: 417-418). For nationalists like Gökâlþ³⁷ and Akçura,³⁸ the West was the totality of unique national cultures (Berkes, 2002: 418). According to Gökâlþ's formula of Turkification-Islamisation-secularisation, Islam could only live within the national culture (Berkes, 2002: 419). Secularisation was not through Westernisation but through nationalisation (Berkes, 2002: 424). This solution freed the problem of secularisation from circling around discussions of 'imitation' (Berkes, 2002: 424).

3.1.2. Nation-Building

So far, as I have tried to explain, secularism emerged in the Ottoman Empire as a practical need and a prerequisite of modernisation gradually. Therefore, it became one of the major bases of the new regime (Karpát, 2008: 387). The last time interval in Berkes's periodisation was the National Independence War and the Republican Revolution. He (2002: 483) notes, at that time, there emerged an antagonism between Westernists and Easternists. Westernists were in favour of reconciliation with the West and/or of mandate administration (Berkes, 2002: 484). They did not intend to form a new republican/national regime; but they tend to save sultanate and caliphate (Berkes, 2002: 484). In the eyes of the Muslims, they had strong attachment to the Ottoman dynasty as it represented both secular (as

³⁷ Ziya Gökâlþ is seen as one of the founding fathers of Turkism in the *Meşrutiyet* era. He had a role of ideology production in the Committee of Union and Progress.

³⁸ Yusuf Akçura is considered to be an important figure concerning Turkish nationalism. The title of well-known article is *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, meaning three types of politics.

sultan) and religious (as caliph) entitlements (Ahmad, 1993: 39). Therefore, their rivalry to Mustafa Kemal was not in relation to contact and alliance with the USSR, but to the nature of the new regime (Berkes, 2002: 485). Berkes (2002: 489) at this point changes connotations of the term '*Batıcı*' (Westernist) and equate it with supporter of *Meşrutiyet* (*meşrutiyetçi*). This view saw the destiny of the nation on the shoulders of Western powers. It is obvious that this was different from Westernisation. Concerning his elaboration on the Easternists, Berkes (2002: 492-493) also draws on Mustafa Kemal's anti-imperialism: his anti-imperialism was not similar to that of Trotsky and Enver Paşa; it was realist and it was a war of secularism. An interesting interpretation on the response to Western colonialism as an 'Islamic reform' meaning the struggle with traditional and popular Islam is as such:

One response to Western colonialism was to adopt a deliberate policy of secularization which was legitimized by a return to Islamic sources. Islamic reform involved an attack on traditional and popular forms of Islam (in particular Sufism) which was associated with political decay and social stagnation. By returning to primitive Islam (defined as an ascetic and disciplined form of Islam), it was argued that Islamic societies could be modernized while also becoming more Islamic. One has therefore a somewhat paradoxical relationship between secularization and reformism in the liberal response of Islam to Westernism. These developments were probably most explicit in the Turkish case where Kemalist reforms involved a direct confrontation with traditional populist Islamic lifestyles (Shaw and Shaw, 1977). As a reformist regime, the Kemalist government was deeply influenced by Western ideas about, for example, education and nationalism. Educational reform (under the leadership of Ziya Gökalp) was directed in terms of Durkheim's concept of social solidarity. Secularization involved the creation of new legal systems which typically relegated Islamic holy law (the Shari'a) to the personal sphere, leaving public relations under European legal codes; and, second, secularization involved the separation of religious and secular institutions of education. Third, secularization involved changes in dress and custom, such as the introduction of the Turkish Hat Law of 1925. These changes in custom involved the differentiation of Islam culture and social structure on the model of Westernization. (Turner, 2002: 134-135)

The National Independence Struggle was not without opposition. This opposition was reflecting the old contours of centre-periphery cleavage in Mardin's (1973: 181) terminology. The National Struggle movement was directed by the Grand National Assembly where both supporters of Mustafa Kemal, the speaker of the Assembly and the head of the government, and the opposition group known as the 'Second Group' collided. This group was defeated following the victory of

revolutionaries in the War of Independence. However, this time, another short-lived opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party (TCP), was formed in 1924 with similar intentions as the preceding Second Group. Despite the similarities between the programmes of the CHP and the TCP, this party represented the political thought of the dying age (Ahmad, 1991: 65). As Feroz Ahmad (1993: 58) notes, this party "seemed to confirm the fears of religious reaction and counter-revolution, a fear which was real enough in a society in which the memories of the old order still flourished."³⁹

Şerif Mardin (2011b: 75-76) asserts that especially during the War of Independence and in early-Republican era, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk pragmatically made use of Islam as an instrument to cultivate support from peripheral provinces and to find basis for his project of civil participation. Similarly, Özbudun and Hale (2010: 22) maintain that "his popular legitimacy rested on his role as *Gazi*, the victor in a war of national resistance against the European (read, 'Christian') powers who tried to divide up most of Turkey's territory among themselves after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918." This type of traditional source of legitimacy successfully used to implement a modernisation programme based on an anti-traditional change (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 22-23). From the very beginning of the War of Independence, the peripheral provinces saw Mustafa Kemal as a brave commander to refresh the reputation of Islam and sided with him (Mardin, 2011b: 75). Vernacularisation of Islam by translation of the Quran and call to prayer to Turkish, and attempts of bridging the elite's religion with the people's religion are examples that show how Mustafa Kemal inclined to Islamic issues to mobilise peripheral provinces by endenising religion (Mardin, 2011b: 75-76). However, the Kurdish revolt of 1925 led to suspicion on this attitude in the minds of Republican cadres and Mustafa Kemal, and finally in 1930s, pragmatic attitude towards Islam started to lose its weight (Mardin, 2011b: 75-76). Although Atatürk

³⁹ In Turkish, *irtica* or *gericilik* means reactionism or being reactionary. In Turkish political context, *irtica* is used especially to refer to religious version of reaction (Özipek, 2014: 236).

had never emulated being a reformist of Islam, in reality, he achieved a deep revolution in Islam prospectively (İnalçık, 2007: 219).

Taner Timur's evaluation on Mustafa Kemal's attitude towards Islam during the war time is likewise. For Timur (1997: 31-32), Mustafa Kemal was a successful tactician in utilising Islam in a revolutionary direction while the Sultan's government in Istanbul using it in a counter-revolutionary way. He reflected his cause in the war as saving sultanate and caliphate (Timur, 1997: 31). In his manifesto addressed to the world of Islam he declared that the Greek infringement with the support of Western powers was not only against the Ottoman sultanate, but more than that, it was against the Islamic world seeing their freedom and independence in the post of caliphate (Timur, 1997: 31-32). In his speeches at that time, he frequently gave examples from the history of Islam and the men of religion were impressed by his religious knowledge (Timur, 1997: 32). In this respect, Islam had a significant place in the ideology of that time as it played a role of nationalism during the anti-imperialist national struggle (Timur, 1997: 33). In Turkey, the purposes of secularism having a multi-faceted characteristic as it entangled with those of nationalism: to help founding a modern national state neutral to religion; to rescue the society from the pressures of Islam; and to create a profile of a new and free individual by a rational, scientific, untraditional laicism that came out against clericalism (Karpat, 2008: 387).

From the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the cultural policy of the new Turkey was secular. The repercussions of such an orientation was seen in the newly enacted laws: the replacement of Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations with the Directorate for Religious Affairs; with the Law on Unification of Education, all the educational institutions are entrusted to the Ministry of National Education; the abolition of the caliphate held by Ottomans since 1517; abolition of *Şeriat* courts; the Weekend Act; the change of headgear and dress; the adoption of international time and calendar system; the introduction of the new civil code, penal law, obligation law and commercial law; the abolition of religious marriages

and polygamy; the removal of the article of '*The religion of the state is Islam*' from the Constitution; the adoption of Latin notation and alphabet; the adoption of international system of units; the law on surnames; the abolition of titles and by-names; the recognition of political rights for women to vote and be elected; the inclusion of the principle of *laïcité* in the Constitution. These developments are considered as 'institutionalisation of laicism' (Timur, 1997: 290).

On the occasion of secularising reforms in the early-Republican era, Mustafa Kemal tried to explain the necessity of secularism for the benefit of Islam as such: (1) they are Muslims and they do not reject Islam; (2) yet the history shows that religion has been instrumentalised in politics for interests and passions; (3) belief and sacred emotions of personal conscience are not to be exploited for such purposes and Islam has to be rescued from this situation; (4) separation of worldly and religious affairs is a must for the happiness of Muslims in this world and hereafter; (5) the real greatness of Islam would emerge with these developments (İnalçık, 2007: 68-69). In his mind, the inequality between the West and the Turks was only be eliminated via a secular state system (İnalçık, 2007: 70).

Also the Western values were universal for him and the Turks could reach the levels of Western societies by adopting Western cultural symbols and ways of life (İnalçık, 2007: 70). To this end, he tried to infuse them to the society with the laws enacted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TBMM) in a revolutionary manner (İnalçık, 2007: 70). It should also be noted that the necessity of secular laws was seen during Lausanne negotiations in 1922 when removal of capitulations and privileges of non-Muslim minorities came into question (İnalçık, 2007: 71). The delegation of Western states insisted on the continuation those privileges on the grounds of religious legal system in Turkey (İnalçık, 2007: 71). Then the Turkish delegation proposed that new laws were to be prepared in the Grand National Assembly (İnalçık, 2007: 71). The Article 39 of Lausanne Peace Treaty is:

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law. Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employment's, functions and honours, or the exarchate of professions and industries.

As İnalçık (2007: 71) notes it, these provisions made the enactment of a secular civil code to replace *Mecelle* inevitable. The new Civil Code, for İnalçık (2007: 72), implied a deep social revolution for Turkish society as it radically changed social relations of individuals and subjugated them to the Western lifestyle. This produced new problems for the Muslim society as Islam was an all-encompassing lifestyle from birth to death, the legitimacy of a legal system other than the *Şeriat* was contestable (İnalçık, 2007: 73-74). For İnalçık (2007: 75), it is impossible to associate democratic republic based on national sovereignty with *Şeriat* state based on rules of religion. In other words, secularism is a prerequisite for democracy. The concept of national sovereignty implies that sovereignty has to be national and secular (İnalçık, 2007: 92).

According to Zürcher (2011: 339), Republican conception of secularism required religion to become a component of the state bureaucracy in order for supervision, rather than a mere separation of state organs and religion. Especially, in 1930s, with an 'extreme' interpretation, secularism meant "the removal of religion from public life and the establishment of complete state control over remaining religious institutions" (Zürcher, 2011: 269). The reason for this was: the positivist⁴⁰ view like the preceding Unionists', compelled 'Kemalists' to perceive religion as an obstacle to the modernisation of the state and society (Zürcher, 2011: 339). "Kemalists sought to restrict the role of religion to that of a private belief system strictly outside the public sphere" (An-Na'im, 2008: 197). Mustafa Kemal was

⁴⁰ Concerning Republican positivism, it is argued that secularisation in Republican Turkey became the name of a anti-religious world designation, rather than extra-religious world designation, which means putting an end to the hegemony of the Islamic rationality as an obstacle to the critical rationality (Kurtoğlu, 2014: 209). However, this kind of argumentation is misleading when it is considered that the Republic did not take an anti-religion stance as it re-institutionalise religion as a public service.

aware of the significance of Islam concerning the social imagination and memory of the Ottoman society. In this respect, the essence of the Revolution was secularism and Mustafa Kemal openly addressed to counter-revolution would emerge in the form of a religious ideology (Şaylan, 1992: 80). Therefore, the Republican conception of laicism did not interpret religion as a wide area of freedom left to the civil society; on the contrary, it was to be taken under control (Şaylan, 1992: 80). According to the revolutionaries, the only way to ensure religion do not playing a political role was to subject it under state control (Tank, 2005: 6). The role of the religion was to be limited within private sphere (Lewis, 1993: 408). It is argued that "the Turkish Republic is a state of controlled secularity" (Tank, 2005: 14).⁴¹ In this respect, being totally a Republican institution, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, not only provided the state with necessary instruments to keep religion under control, but also promoted mainstream Sunni-Hanefi doctrine to suppress the so-called heterodox Islam, namely the *Alevi* community (Mardin, 2011b: 69). Being the major apparatus of the state in regulating religion in Turkey the Directorate of Religious Affairs composes the major discrepancy in practice when the theoretical separation between religion and state is taken into consideration (Kuru & Stepan, 2013: 93).

On the one hand, in the previous chapter, concerning the principle of separation of religion and state I mentioned Casanova's categorisation of variation of this separation takes shape. With the existence of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Turkish case seems to be closer to the 'statist' interpretation in which government both support and control religion. However, this variety of separation is contradicting with the Rawlsian model of political liberalism as it suggests protection of religion from state. It should also be noted that the liberal requirement of transferring the religious affairs to the communities is very controversial. For example, İsmail Kara (2014: 196) argues that there is not any

⁴¹ Pinar Tank (2005: 14) notes: "The idea prevails that religion should remain in the public 'controlled' sphere of the state rather than in the private sphere of the individual; as a result, the Turkish approach to secularity advocates the management and control of private religion."

community to assign the Directorate of Religious Affairs. However, for Kara (2008: 53), the Directorate has been the mostly debated institution along the history of the Republic on the grounds of legitimacy, status, authorities, responsibilities and activities in relation to the principle of secularism as it is not seen as a legal principle but an ideological instrument. For Kara (2008: 53), it was due to leaving the concept of laicism ambiguous rather than making its meaning and scope clear in the Republican context.

On the other hand, again in the previous chapter, I also referred to Eisenstadt's criticism on the grounds of Orientalism that in the analyses of non-Western societies' relation between culture and power is usually disregarded or misinterpreted. This point helps us to clarify the role of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in the Republic of Turkey: religion as an important component of social culture has a great potential for power; and the Turkish state tries to control this power base by regulating it. This peculiarity of Turkish laicism has to be highlighted in order for understanding the context within which secularism had a different path of institutionalisation in Turkey.

In the previous chapter, I referred to Berkes's categorisation of attitudes towards secularism in Turkey and as I mentioned, there were two groups opposing Turkish version of this principle: religious radicals and liberals. Kemal Karpat (2008: 390) makes a similar classification: conservatives who see religion as a spiritual need and an institution of discipline compose the first group; the second group is moderates who partially agree with the conservatives, yet perceive religious freedom as one of the fundamental human rights; the third group is the laicists who see religion as clericalism and oppose any kind of liberalisation of religious policy.

The first group was longing for the past, lost ethical and cultural values of the society, peaceful old days which were far from evils of the modern time (Karpat, 2008: 390). They attacked laicism with the argument that it weakened ethical-cultural basis of the society and for them, Islam was a great imperative for society

(Karpas, 2008: 392). Political role of Islam as a barrier to the rising left in Turkey was emphasised and they argued that anticlerical and positivist Republican philosophy was incapable to cope with the left (Karpas, 2008: 393). Militant Islamists criticised and attacked the Western appearance of the Republican women, modern family structure, marriages according to the Civil Code, the Latinised Turkish Alphabet, the ones not performing Islamic duties like daily prayer or fasting, and having foreigner friends, the *Alevis* with hatred (Karpas, 2008: 406-407). They wanted the Directorate of Religious Affairs to become independent (Karpas, 2008: 407). They made use of democratic slogans to mask the activities of their organisations (Karpas, 2008: 407). A contemporary view of Islam did not developed and it could not become a purely religious identity above worldly interests; thus, it remained open to be instrumentalised for exploitation (Karpas, 2008: 407). He warns that if Turkey has turned to Orthodox Islam, it would be drawn in it (Karpas, 2008: 408).

Albeit the second group, i.e. the moderates, saw religious freedom as a part of human rights, they were under the influence of conservatives' claims (Karpas, 2008: 393). For them, if laicism was the separation of religion and state, the state should not intervene in issues of religion (Karpas, 2008: 393). They think that in the past, there had been a state bound to religion, but then the religion became under the control of the state; both of the situations contradict with laicism (Karpas, 2008: 393). Therefore, without allowing religion to interfere with politics, administration, law or science, all religious matters have to be left to individuals and communities (Karpas, 2008: 393-394). Till reformation in Islam is realised, they adhere to supervision of the state over religion (Karpas, 2008: 394).

The extreme laicists as the third group thought that making concessions to religion was retreat from Republican principles (Karpas, 2008: 394). Even though they did not categorically reject Islam, they were against its dogmatism and reaction to every leap forward in the senses of social change and technology (Karpas, 2008: 394).

To sum up, if we entitle the periods as the *Tanzimat*, the *Meşrutiyet* and the Republic, in the former two the traditional Islamic-Ottoman was the base; however, the latter reflected national sovereignty and independence as the base. To put it another way, the basic motivation in the *Tanzimat* and *Meşrutiyet* eras was traditionalism while Republican era was revolutionary (Berkes, 2002: 522). Berkes (2002: 522) perceives this new direction as a historical necessity.

The revolutionary-Republican direction rejected separating material and moral sides of a civilisation (Berkes, 2002: 524).⁴² Turkish Revolution was a lump-sum project. Although it was anti-imperialist, following the War of Independence it was so devoted to be a part of the Western civilisation (Berkes, 2002: 525). This was not inline with Gökalp's culturalist approach which was based on the distinction between culture and civilisation (Berkes, 2002: 526). For Mardin (1981: 217), to replace religion and its culture with 'contemporary civilisation', Atatürk put into practice a policy of cultural Westernisation: Latinisation of the alphabet;

⁴² Berkes does not use the concept of 'revolutionary' in Marxian sense. Nonetheless, in Timur's analysis, it reflects Marxist usage: Timur (1997: 63) notes the class composition of revolutions determines their nature and revolution is the shift of power from one class or coalition of classes to another class or coalition of classes. In Western bourgeois revolutions, revolutionary bourgeoisie came to power by defeating feudal class (Timur, 1997: 64). During the War of Independence, there were two governments in Turkey: the first government was in Istanbul and it was the collaborator of occupiers; Ankara the government of Grand National Assembly was leading the nationalist cause in a revolutionary manner (Timur, 1997: 65). The collaborator government was dependent on imperialism and the commercial bourgeoisie in Istanbul, whereas Ankara government depended on the alliance of military-civilian intellectuals having petty bourgeois origins, Anatolian notables composed of big land owners and commercial petty bourgeoisie (Timur, 1997: 64). The power struggle following victory in the War of Independence took the form of dominant classes' opposition to Mustafa Kemal via Progressive Republican Party which was founded by influential figures of the national struggle movement in 1924 (Timur, 1997: 77). When Islamic-feudal, counter-revolutionary Eastern Revolt broke out, this party was closed down and the opposition having ties with imperialism and feudalism was suppressed (Timur, 1997: 76-78).

On the other hand, Şerif Mardin (1971: 197-198) elaborates on the concept of 'revolution' by referring to the French Revolution and underlining the bloodshed, terror and violence which Turkish case lacks: "If the French Revolution is seen as revolutionary because violence suffused it, and, in particular, marked the methods used by its political leaders, and if it is adopted as a benchmark for comparisons with the Turkish Revolution, then the Turkish Revolution was and is no revolution. This comparison is not as artificial as would seem at first sight, and the contrast between the two movements underscores characteristic features of the Turkish Revolution."

establishing a conservatory to teach opera, ballet, Western polyphonic music; banning Oriental music; publication of cultural periodicals; promoting modern Turkish painting; putting statutes; propagation of new Turkish culture by the 'People's Houses' are examples of this policy.

3.1.3. Softening of Secularism

In the second half of the 1940s, the transition to multi-party system was realised in Turkey. Before 1950 parliamentary elections, with the pressure of multi-party competition, the CHP government of Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay enacted laws on liberalisation of religious policies (Karpas, 2008: 397). Through the elections, as the pressure on religion softened, there emerged reactionary upheavals such as the activities of the *tarikats* of *Ticanis* and the honorary leader of the Nation Party Marshal Fevzi Çakmak's funeral ceremony (Karpas, 2008: 400). Concerning the liberalisation regarding religious issues, Karpas (2008: 404) thinks that there were little hopes for being optimistic as liberalisation came as a defensive precaution against the rise of the left in 1946; however, the danger in Turkey was insufficient realisation of a strong base for secularism, not distancing from Islam. Hence, this gave way to a reactionary puritan Islam rather than a progressive religious understanding (Karpas, 2008: 405). For him (2008: 405), control over religion in the early-Republican era did not stem from hostility towards Islam, but from the urgent necessity for strengthening the social bases of reforms.

In spite of the partial liberalisation, in the 1950 the major opposition party, the Democratic Party, came to power with fair and free elections while religiously oriented minor parties were liquidated. Among those minor parties only the Nation Party showed considerable existence till its closure with the claim of anti-secular clerical politics in 1954.⁴³ Like the CHP administrators, the majority of the

⁴³ In the 1950 parliamentary elections, the Nation Party got 3.11 % of the votes and Osman

founders of the DP in national level belong to the bureaucratic elite; however, they showed great ability to identify with the peripheral culture (Leder, 1979: 84). Despite the commonalities, the CHP could not escape from the appearance of the party of the 'bureaucratic' centre, whereas the DP was seen as the party of the 'democratic' periphery (Mardin, 1973: 186). In this respect, the DP became the first party to rally supporters and pull votes from rural Turkey as the defender of and speaker on behalf of the periphery (Leder, 1979: 84).

As 'the confederation of loose interests', the right-of-centre took its strength from conservative modernisation: it was representing the rising hopes of the masses who want to take advantage of material change in a known, familiar cultural climate (Taşkın, 2009: 458). In other words, the right-of-centre appealed to the electorate with an ambiguous position between tradition and modernity via a controlled or conservative modernisation strategy from which perspective nationalism and Islamism were re-interpreted (Taşkın, 2009: 458). This shows the difficulty to think nationalism, conservatism and Islamism as three distinctive political and ideological stances (Bora, 1998: 7-8). It is argued that the right-of-centre starting from the DP made use of this ideological oscillation for the sake of 'authentic representation' of the nation (Taşkın, 2009: 458). It can be said that the 'authentic representation' is directly related to the representation of the periphery.

In his analysis of the Turkish modernisation, Çağlar Keyder seems to make use of Şerif Mardin's culturalist centre/periphery framework; nonetheless, he adds economic dimension to it. Keyder (1989: 147) elaborates on the DP era in relation to populism. For him (1989: 147), the DP represented a shift from elite's politics to populism. He sets the dichotomy as if there was an antagonism between bureaucracy and the people. For Keyder (1989: 147-148), opposition to the CHP rule had two pillars: (1) economic liberalism and market economy in place of state intervention; (2) emphasis on religious liberties against ideological penetration of

Bökükbaşı became a deputy of parliament from Kırşehir province.

the centre. In other words, religion and market were the two dimensions of bourgeois opposition. In this context, bourgeoisie griped on market liberalism against corporatist unionism which praised national solidarity (Keyder, 1989: 148). Contrary to the general principle of populism, which is the attempt of realization of economic ends through politics of an anti-liberal approach, in Turkey, in 1950, the populist movement was based on a liberal resistance to the authoritarian government (Keyder, 1989: 153-154). In the following years, Menderes appeared to be a populist politician in a full meaning as the policy of economic booming was financed by inflationist measures (Keyder, 1989: 167). Despite its blur in counting bureaucracy as a social/economic class having distinctive interests, Keyder's (1989: 37) work shows the importance of economic motivations behind opposition to the CHP. Therefore, it was not simply a cultural cleavage. The role of bureaucratic elite in Keyder's 'class-based' analysis shows the importance of state apparatus during the Ottoman-Turkish modernisation and transition to multi-party regime. In this respect, I would like to refer to another version of centre/periphery approach, which attaches importance to the state. Metin Heper's (2006) work on the *'State Tradition in Turkey'* is an effort of finding answers about how the characteristics of state affected by and how the state influences political life, how the state was structured by which person and/or institutions in different time intervals in Ottoman-Turkish politics. As the name suggests, its major focus is the state. In other words, there is a state-centred analysis of Turkish politics and state-society relations in Turkey.

Heper's main concern is the formation of an independent civil society depending on economic rationality, which is prevented by the political centre or in Heper's terms, strong state/high stateness. The Weberian notion of 'stateness' depends upon the extent to which the major goals for society are designated and safeguarded by those who represent the state, independent of civil society (Heper, 2006: 24). Heper (2006: 38) emphasises the lack of control of the centre by peripheral forces in Ottoman society and defines the Ottoman rule as patrimonial. The Turkish Republic seems to have inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong state and a

weak civil society (Heper, 2006: 41). What lies behind the tribulations of Turkish politics, crises of legitimacy and integration is the duality between the strong state and weak civil society (Heper, 2006: 41-42). In other words, the asymmetric relationship between the strong centre and the weak periphery paved the ground for the emergence of a state autonomous *vis-à-vis* civil society in designating goals for it. It is possible to argue that the DP era was marked by the rivalry between the bureaucratic elite and the political elite. In this respect, the political elite of the DP made use of the culture of the fragmented periphery to appeal it. Religion, in this respect, provided a useful instrument to gather the electoral support of the periphery. Therefore, the weakness of civil society contributed to the consolidation of the electoral support.

Mardin (1981: 217) finds the experiment in the Westernisation of Turkish culture successful, but from the change of ruling party via multi-party regime in 1950, there had been pessimism about the future of the principle of laicism:

In fact, the principle had rooted itself sufficiently firmly never to be removed from Turkish constitutional practice. Even the Democrat Party, which was often accused of having undermined laicism, kept the principle in operation. Nevertheless, the military intervention of 1960 was caused in part by fear that that party was encouraging religious obscurantism which would endanger the constitutional foundations of the Republic. Since 1960 religious currents have not abated; if anything they have become stronger, but the constitutional principle of laicism, upheld by a large segment of the Turkish intelligentsia, is still the foundation of Turkish constitutional law.

Mardin (1991: 129) does not see the periodic military interventions as the reason for continuity of laicism: firstly, the most important factor is the new statuses created by the secular system. The possessors of these statuses have interests in the continuity of laicism (Mardin, 1991: 129). Secondly, there is no more a formal or informal community of religious scholars and specialists of Islamic law (Mardin, 1991: 130). Thirdly, religion is not the only instrument for the legitimisation of political opposition and discontent in Turkey; there are other channels of political participation (Mardin, 1991: 130).

In his analysis of the DP, Cem Erođlul (1990: 133) maintains that the DP leadership cadre were never in favour of a theocratic administration; however, under the condition that the public order was not endangered, they winked at reactionary behaviours for the sake of their political gains. On the one hand, the policies following its victory in the 1950 parliamentary elections, the DP disappointed the ones who hope turning to a more Islamic Turkey; the new government oppressed the *tarikats* sheiks accused of distorting public order; the new President Celal Bayar openly sided with protection of secularism; the DP majority in the parliament enacted 'Law on the Protection of Freedom of Conscience' prohibiting the use of religion to gain personal influence (Mardin, 1991: 122). On the other hand, in time, the DP tended to use religious mottos against the CHP; in the 1957 parliamentary elections, the DP made an alliance with the *Nurcus* until the 1960 military intervention (Mardin, 1991: 122-123). Through the end of its era, the DP unavoidably became identified with Islamic revival (Ahmad, 1992: 473). Eric Jan Zürcher (2011: 339) rejects to identify this period as 'Islamic revival'; it was just increasing visibility of rural culture in urban centres:

The relaxation of secularist policies under the DP made Islam much more prominent in everyday life in the cities, where the culture of the countryside was anyway becoming more visible through massive urbanization. Turkish intellectuals at the time –and later– saw this as a resurgence of Islam, but although there were fundamentalist groups at work, it was really only the existing traditional culture of the mass of the population, the former subject class, reasserting its right to express itself.

For Mardin (1991: 123), eventually, the military believed in the danger of theocratic regime and intervened in the political process to secure secularism. Although there were some doubts about the army to end liberalisation of the attitude towards Islam in 1950s, it helped normalisation of approach to religion (Ahmad, 1992: 481). It is argued that rather than turning back to early-Republican understanding of secularism, the military administration attempted to create an understanding of Islam which was under the control of the state and not in resistance to change through a reform not from above but from below (Duman, 1997: 56).

Following the military intervention 1960, the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP) achieved to resurrect DP by means of its effective organisation (Özbudun, 1966: 7). The AP continued to be moderate towards Islam, while being careful about not exceeding the secular boundaries of the new 1961 Constitution (Mardin, 1991: 123). While modernising the economic sector, Prime Minister and the leader of the AP Süleyman Demirel tried to please the traditionalists with a liberal policy towards religion (Ahmad, 1992: 484). In Demirel's words, it was acceptable to "serve Islam, but Islam cannot be pushed into the service of politics" (Demirel, 2004: 194). Like Menderes, Demirel was a successful representative of conservative modernisation with a partnership of interests around developmentalist 'modernist optimism' (Taşkın, 2009: 459).

Demirel's right-of-centre party started to be challenged by the Islamic rhetoric of the extreme right through the end of 1960s. For example, until 1969, ultra-nationalist Alparslan Türkeş was "an outspoken supporter of secularism, but in the run-up to the elections that year he changed course and began to emphasize Islam as a part of the Turkish national heritage" (Zürcher, 2011: 372).⁴⁴ The second example is Professor Necmettin Erbakan's argument that Demirel turned his back on Islam and his party was an instrument of Freemasons and Zionists (Zürcher, 2011: 372).⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Colonel Alparslan Türkeş was one of the members of the National Unity Council which organised the 1960 Coup. In 1965 he entered politics in a conservative party, the Republican Peasants' Nation Party. In a short time, he managed to be the chairman of the party and "he turned it into a hierarchically organized, militant party with an ultra-nationalist programme" (Zürcher, 2011: 371). In 1969, he changed name of the party to the Nationalist Action Party (MHP).

⁴⁵ In 1969, Erbakan was elected president of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TOBB). He contradicted with Demirel and was elected to the parliament as an independent deputy of Konya, the stronghold of religious conservatism in Turkey. In 1970 he, with two other independents, formed his own party, the National Order Party.

3.1.4. Educational Twist

Education is one of the main areas that secularisation took place. For example, Mahmut II founded the military school, the *Harbiye*. For Berkes (2002: 194) this might be the most important step in the process of secularisation since the main events then on were related to the military and intellectual effects of the education provided by this school; to the attitude of this institution towards political elite; and to the positions of its graduates in military, political and cultural circles.

While the Ottoman educational system started to be secularised in the *Tanzimat* era implicitly, following the reestablishment of constitutional monarchy in 1908, the Young Turks extended its room for manoeuvre more bravely (Mardin, 2011b: 57). Under the influence of secularising climate, when compared to the *ulema* of the previous era, the new Islamic intellectuals of that time seemed to be more 'civic' and 'intellectualised' (Mardin, 2011b: 57-59). However, there was also a gradual and often clandestinely development of *Tarikats* (Muslim brotherhoods), especially *Nakşibendis*, the impacts of which were overlooked by modern secularised Turkish intellectuals (Mardin, 2011b: 59-60). For İsmail Kara (2008: 188), closure of dervish lodges and ban on *tarikats* activities and culture did not lead to an open opposition to the Republican administration. If their own strong traditions are taken as unit of measurement, *tarikats* were weakened; if their ability to comply with the new conditions is taken into consideration, they got stronger (Kara, 2008: 188).

Religious education became one of the major issues of secularisation policy and its reactions. For İnalçık (2007: 75), since Republican change requires a change of culture, it has to be based on education and this is the reason for the education being a battlefield of secularists and Islamists. The Republic closed down the Muslim theological schools, the *Medrese*, in 1924 and replaced them with *imam-hatip* schools. The Directorate of Religious Affairs helped the Ministry of Education to implement secular curricula (Mardin, 2011b: 69). In 1930, these

schools were closed down due to the lack of students and religion courses started to be given in state schools (Mardin, 2011b: 71). In 1932, the Directorate opened Quran Courses. For Mardin (2011b: 70), the limited scope of the religious education carried by the state and the vacuum in advanced religious education paved the way to officially unlawful *tarikats* to meet this demand.

In the Republican era, there were two results of Islamic teaching remained on surface: the first, old *cliché*, the second, components of old culture survived (Mardin, 2011a). These were not removed and the Republic did not touch some components of Islam which was the all-encompassing culture of the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 2011a). The masses found the answers of "*who am I?*" in this encompassing culture and this fed the Islamic resurgence (Mardin, 2011a). When the Republic put laicism on its agenda, Şemsettin Günaltay a *medrese*-graduate became prime minister. This 'weird' example shows that the Republic allowed to cohabit something it cannot tolerate brought about a new life (Mardin, 2011a). This is one of the points that Berkes and Mardin fall apart: while Berkes asserts that the Republic ended the bifurcation in Ottoman-Turkish modernisation in a revolutionary manner, for Mardin, the Republic remained ambivalent.

During the single party rule of the Republican People's Party (CHP) in 1947, even a hardliner secularist Prime Minister Recep Peker addressed to religious education as an instrument to cope with 'poison of communism'. Then regarding this issue a commission was set and the recommendations of it were as such: parallel to the secular education, voluntary religious education courses to be given in fourth and fifth classes of the elementary school; in the villages where elementary education was three years, in the third year, religious education to be given to train imam; faculty of divinity to be established to give thorough religious education (Mardin, 2011b: 72).

Following the single party era, the victory of the Democratic Party in 1950, brought back call to prayer in Arabic again together with the votes of Republican

deputies; removed the restrictions on hajj (Islamic pilgrimage); in 1951, opened the four-year *imam-hatip* schools after elementary education; in 1953, opened *imam-hatip* high schools; in 1956, religion courses were added to secondary school curricula.⁴⁶ In its election campaigns, the DP prided itself with this attitude of liberalisation of policy towards religion. Once in his party congress Prime Minister Adnan Menderes said: "Without paying attention to reform fanatics' fusses, we made *Ezan-ı Muhammediye* (call to prayer) Arabic; approved courses on religion in schools; we read Quran in the radio. State of Turkey is Muslim and will remain Muslim!" (Yücekök, 1971: 90).

Concerning *imam-hatip* schools, Mardin (2011b: 73) notes that while, the secular left in Turkey has seen these schools as focal centres of enemies of Republican regime, the right wing parties like the Justice Party, took them under their guardianship. Moreover, the Islamic parties of Necmettin Erbakan saw these schools as building blocks of their ideal of 'Great Turkey' (Gökaçtı, 2005: 19). Also the graduates of these schools composed a new Muslim intelligentsia which contributed to Islamism to become an alternative hegemony project (Tuğal, 2007: 10).

The numbers of *imam-hatip* schools indicates their rising influence in Turkish education system and political arena. In 1960, the number of these schools was 19. With the 1980 *Coups d'état*, this number increased to 374. In 1996-97 school-year, the number of *imam-hatip* students was nearly half a million (Öksüz, 2015). Erbakan was in power in 1996-97 relying on the conservative but secular parties.

⁴⁶ The brief story of *imam-hatip* schools reflects the intensions and priorities of the governments. In the early-Republican era, the experience of these schools between 1924 and 1930 was to train religious functionaries. These schools were closed down with the justification of lack of interest. However, the real reason was probably to get rid of traditional education of the Ottoman era. Transition to multi-party politics increased the role of Islam in canvassing; thus, in 1949 *imam-hatip* courses opened and 1951 they became *imam-hatip* schools. The period between 1951 and 1973 can be regarded as energising, while the period between 1973 and 1997 transformed these schools to mainstream education institutions with their huge numbers and students. Between 1997 and 2003, these schools faced a sharp decline till the AKP came to power. Iren Özgür's (2012) work on religious schools in Turkey provides further information.

However, "it was forced out by the restrained but, in the end, effective influence of the Turkish armed forces" (Mardin, 2005: 145). Then a secular restoration process initiated with secular left and right wing parties. From 1997-98 school year on, with the law on compulsory 8-year continuous basic education, all secondary schools including *imam-hatip* were closed down. Also the graduates of vocational high schools like *imam-hatip* schools were restricted to select whatever university program they want by the Council of Higher Education. These measures resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of *imam-hatip* students. In 2000, the number of *imam-hatip* students decreased to a hundred thousand (Öksüz, 2015). In 2001, the percentage of *imam-hatip* students among the total number of high school students was only 2.5, while the number of *imam-hatip* high schools corresponded to 9.2 percent of the total number of high schools (Akşit & Coşkun, 2014: 400). The AKP removed the obstacles in front of *imam-hatip* schools and opened secondary schools again. In an interview broadcasted by *Anadolu Agency* (AA) on 11 July 2015, the head of foundation of *imam-hatip* graduates Ecevit Öksüz maintains that the number of *imam-hatip* high schools exceeded a thousand and there were more than 1.600 *imam-hatip* secondary schools. The number of students enrolled in these schools is about a million.

3.1.5. The MSP Event

In Mardin's analysis, the role of *Nakşibendis* is stressed. The *Nakşibendi* networks clandestinely survived after the birth of Republic and they became successful in being influential in provinces (Mardin, 2011b: 77). Moreover, in 1970s, they got on the stage with political impulses (Mardin, 2011b: 77). Said Nursi as the 'star' of *Nakşibendi* world called for the revitalisation of Islam in the lifestyles of Ottoman Muslims and saw family and community as the base of society (Mardin, 2011b: 85-86). For Mardin (2011b: 86), Said Nursi provided his followers with relevant instruments of building an Islamic personality within modern world. The emergence of new and modern *Nakşibendi* leaders that promote technology,

industry and commerce constituted new circles and sowed seeds of Islamist parties like the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*, MNP) and then the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP), the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP), the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP), the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP) (Mardin, 2011b: 83).⁴⁷ The founding declaration of the MNP clearly stated the party was to revive the moral qualities and the spiritual excellence dormant in the Turkish character so that Turkish society could regain peace, order and social justice (Toprak, 1981: 98). For Mardin (2011b: 86), the pressure stemming from the representative political system in Turkey led to a transformation of and deviation from the earlier communitarian and pre-political attitudes of the *Nakşibendi* leaders, and this made politisation of Islam a complex process. This is the reason for failure of the religion-based parties to realise their discourse via laws while they were very successful in spreading this social discourse (Mardin, 2011b: 86).

The positivist Republican environment having formative capacity in administrative and economic senses invited Islamic circles like *Nakşibendi* networks to be adopted to the market relations with the upper-hand of instrumental reason (Mardin, 2005: 154). The gradual learning-process based on this market rationality gave birth to a new group of businessman which undertook great role in the formation of Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan's 'Islamist' party (Mardin, 2005: 155). The sheik of the *İskenderpaşa* congregation (*dergah*) of *Nakşibendi* order Mehmet Zahit Kotku strongly encouraged the formation of an Islamic party, and Erbakan and some other founder of the MNP belonged to this religious community (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 31). Then, another influential Islamic community, the *Nurcu* (Disciples of Light) movement, joined the MNP (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 31). In the previous chapter, I referred to marketisation of religion as an important

⁴⁷ Erbakan's first party was closed down by in May 1971. His speeches were seemed to be designed to incur the wrath of public prosecutors when he openly criticised secular policies of the Republic and Atatürk's reforms (Ahmad, 1992: 488). He promised to close down cinemas, theatres, ballet schools and prohibit football matches (Ahmad, 1992: 488). But his new party, the MSP, behaved totally in a different way (Ahmad, 1992: 488).

factor of transformation in Turkish politics and economy. When Muslim brotherhoods make acquaintance with market rationality and start to get organised in economic sense, their influence in politics and march to the power gained pace. In relation to discussions on post-secularism, this aspect differs Turkey from the West. Hence, it is impossible to left economic dimension aside in analysing post-secularity in Turkey. I will elaborate more on this point in the following chapter.

This party and its successors were based on the networks of activists known as the Raiders (*Akıncılar*). As a report of the Turkish General Staff (1981) shows, the examples of the *Akıncı* grassroots legal organisations were AK-DER (Raiders Association), AK-MEM (Raider Civil Servants), AK-İŞ (Raider Workers), AK-SPOR (Raider Sportsmen). It is an interesting that there is a resemblance between the acronym of *Akıncı* organisations and the future's Justice and Development Party, i.e. AK-Parti.

Concerning the electoral base of Erbakan's party, Şerif Mardin (2007: 135) notes that there was a relationship between its votes and underdevelopment; but at the same time, the provinces that it was most powerful were not the least developed ones. Its support was coming from the provinces, which had income level under the average and conservative suburbs of big cities (Mardin, 2007: 135). Mardin (2007: 135) accounts for such an argument with reference to social change due to demographic shift from rural to urban areas. In this sense, migration played an important role. The cities having population between 50.000 and 100.000 increased and these became centres for educated Muslim elite in which tradition sustained and cultural modernisation (Mardin refers to this as Kemalism) could penetrate in (Mardin, 2007: 137). Moreover, voluntary associations, such as associations for construction of mosques, increased significantly and these helped religious revitalisation (Mardin, 2007: 137). The sectarian divisions within Islam as Sunni and Alevi communities had been more evident in Eastern Anatolia where this tension is politicised contributed to the success of the MSP in this region (Yavuz, 2003: 2010).

Erbakan, as a *Nakşibendi*-inspired leader, tried to acquire legitimacy throughout 1970s by taking part in coalition governments firstly with secularist CHP and then with right-wing parties. The party successfully practised patronage politics by taking line ministries (Ahmad, 1992: 488). In the foundation of his first party, the MNP, the major body of *Nakşibendi* order was crucial (Mardin, 2011b: 87). This alliance fell apart when this movement entered the parliament (Mardin, 2011b: 87). Erbakan's party got 11.8 percent of the votes in the first elections it entered in 1973. This party got 10.8 percent of urban votes while 12.4 percent of the rural votes. In 1977 parliamentary elections, their support decreased to 8.6 percent. The reason for this decrease might be *Nurcus'* abandonment of the party when they fell apart with Erbakan politically (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 32). With this break-up, there was a new turning point that daily political atmosphere started to dominate his discourse of Islamic revivalism (Mardin 2011b: 87). The main themes of his discourse were as such: since they impose their own culture and economic interests, both capitalist and socialist systems were to be forbidden; material advancement of the West was used to weaken moral fabric of the Ottomans and the country became dependent on foreign capital; the 'imitator' modernisation had to be stopped; the Turkish nation had great share in scientific improvement of the West; secular ideals degenerated familial and social lives (Mardin, 2011b: 87-88). The party was against Turkey's membership in the European Economic Community to prevent being in service of the 'Western Christian capitalism' (Mardin, 1991: 134). For the MSP, the degenerated families should be based on being respectful to the elders, gender discrimination, 'protection' of Muslim women (Mardin, 1991: 135). Despite its discursive hostility towards modernisation, Mardin (1977) perceives Erbakan's clerical party as successful in reaching a synthesis with modernism. In 1973, 40 out of 48 deputies in the parliament were college or university graduates (Ahmad, 1992: 489).

However, just a week before the 12 September 1980 Coup, the MSP organised a meeting in Konya province with the motto of 'Emancipating Jerusalem' and in this meeting radical Islamic symbols and slogans about caliphate, *Şeriat*, *ummah* and

destruction of secular state were striking (Ahmad, 1992: 496). This became one of the allegations of the army for intervention (Ahmad, 1992: 496).

3.1.6. Post-80 Settlement

At this point, I would like to elaborate more on an organisation which had ideological influence on the formation of the post-1980 Coup context: the ‘Hearths of the Enlightened’ (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) was founded in 1970 by influential people from the business world, the universities and politics with the purpose of competing with upper-hand of the left-wing intellectuals (Zürcher, 2011: 414). The ideological program of this society was called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.

Its basic tenet was that Islam held a special attraction for the Turks because of a number of (supposedly) striking similarities between their pre-Islamic culture and Islamic civilization. They shared a deep sense of justice, monotheism and a belief in the immortal soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and morality. The mission of the Turks was a special one, to be the ‘soldiers of Islam’. According to this theory, Turkish culture was built on two pillars: a 2500-year-old Turkish element and a 1000-year-old Islamic element. In the late 1970s, this ideology had become very popular on the political right, in the National Salvation Party, but even more in the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey. Notwithstanding the secularist traditions of the Turkish officer corps, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis also appealed to prominent military leaders, among them general/president Kenan Evren. The army had been conditioned to see socialism and communism as Turkey’s most deadly foes and it saw indoctrination with a mixture of fierce nationalism and a version of Islam friendly to the state as an effective antidote. It is no coincidence that it was under the military government after 1980 that ‘religion and ethics’ became part of the basic curriculum of all schools. This religious teaching was exclusively Sunni in content, and patriotism and love for parents, the state and the army was presented as a religious duty. (Zürcher, 2011: 414-415)

The idea of such synthesis dates back to the generation of Ziya Paşa and Namık Kemal in the mid-nineteenth century (İnalçık, 2007: 97). Since 1910, the increasing convergence between Islam and nationalism leads to a tendency and a social process (Mardin, 2011b: 82). Nationalism is a concept that describes the main point of intersection in Islam of modern Turkey (Mardin, 2011b: 97). When all Islamic movements, communities and groups considered, it is seen that anti-nationalist writers, thinkers or groups have remained marginal (Çetinsaya, 2014:

451). Conservative nationalism is usually in resonance with Islamism, and religion is thought to be the major (or first among the equals) component of nationalism (Bora, 2008: 20). In conservative-nationalism, nationalism is given meaning as the way of restoration of tradition. Exclusion of religious values and symbols in Atatürk's nationalism composed the basis for the emergence of conservative nationalism (Mert, 2000: 67). The degree of the link between nationalism, Islamism and conservatism is unsteady and "the deepest representation of this is the term 'nationalist-moralist' (*milliyetçi-maneviyatçı*)" (Can, 2000: 354).

Through the end of 1970s, a new form of conservative-nationalism emerged: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis replaced *Atatürk's nationalism*⁴⁸ after the 1980 *Coups d'état* and it became the formal ideology of the new regime (Copeaux, 2008: 44- 48).⁴⁹ This conservative nationalist current argued for a perfect conformity of Turkishness and Islam, and for the only possible way of realisation of Turkish identity within Islam (Copeaux, 2008: 46). This 'synthesis' was not an open rejection of Atatürk's nationalism, but it represented a conservative nationalist outlook that was aiming at articulating Islamic values to Turkish nationalism (Copeaux, 2008: 47).

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesists' views shaped the basic ideas of the right-of-centre parties in the post-1980 era; however, their approach to secularism is more akin to the Islamist parties: the secularisation of the state in real sense would require the state to leave every kind of religious services and organisation to civil society, to

⁴⁸ Atatürk's nationalism functions as a 'state and order' ideology and based upon founder/liberator Atatürk mythos. This modernist ideology is a compulsion of an authoritarian loyalty (Bora, 2008: 19).

⁴⁹ Özbudun (2010: 26) argues that unlike the previous interventions, the army in 1980 put into practice an kind of revisionist interpretation of laicism,"that they sought to promote a nationalised adaptation of Islam, as a replacement for the radical leftist ideology, which, they believed, had penetrated the minds of the young during the pre-coup period." The so-called 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' is an Islamisation of Republican nationalism. More controversially, they also added a provision to the new Constitution stating that "Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools."

initiate the political dialog as a way of functioning of democracy to represent religious views in political sphere (İnalçık, 2007: 101). Evidently, this kind of argumentation has parallels with Habermasian post-secular politics prescribed for the West. However, in Turkish context, the nature and the level of development of civil society is different from the Habermasian sense of the term. It is also clear that in Habermasian sense, the invitation of the religious voices into the public sphere does not mean their entry to the official sphere. Moreover, if secular-democratic constitutional framework is not internalised by the religiously oriented politicians, it is impossible to talk about emergence of public reason.

Zürcher (2011: 416) finds loss of secularist-positivist intellectual monopoly a sign of success of Turkish modernisation as conservatives took the advantage of the Republican institutions of education. Following the military administration, in 1983, this synthesis became a guiding principle of Turgut Özal's (former MSP candidate in the 1977 parliamentary elections) Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP) and in this party, it was linked with "the belief in technological innovation to catch up with the West" (Zürcher, 2011: 415). The liberal-oriented ANAP's accession to power in 1983 also represents a break-in point of *Nakşibendi* support and technological knowledge promoted by the secular Republic in a civil public sphere (Mardin 2005: 158). This novelty means that the 'civic' nature of the alliance cannot be described as 'Islamic' (Mardin, 2005: 158). However, it should also be noted that the transformation of the Republican institutions to become harmonious with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis gained pace. For example, Özal's "minister of education, Vehbi Dinçerler, a member of a *Nakşibendi* Sufi order, prepared a new curriculum on national history and culture that constantly used the term nation (*milli*) in the religious sense" (Yavuz, 2003: 2013).

Özal successfully took the electoral support of urban groups that were closer to the left-of-centre previously with the claim of unifying the four tendencies of Cold War era, although his party never incorporated the components of the left-of-centre (Taşkın, 2009: 466). When Mesut Yılmaz, leader of ANAP after Özal, eliminated

the 'conservative wing' and increased the weight of liberals or 'Westernist wing', the commitment of the right-of-centre to the claim of articulating periphery to the centre lost its persuasiveness (Taşkın, 2009: 468). Similar mistake was made by Tansu Çiller, the leader of competitor right-of-centre True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP), as she supported the nationalists who resisted every democratic change within the state and turn the party into advocate of status-quo (Taşkın, 2009: 468). This would be one of the factors that led to the rise of political Islam in Turkey.

The ban on wearing headscarf, namely *türban* by female civil servants and students in public buildings dominated the debates on secularism in the late-1980s. This ban was agitated and the governing party, the ANAP, enacted a law to lift the ban, but President Kenan Evren referred it to the Constitutional Court which decided on the unconstitutionality of the law. When Özal issued a decree to leave it to the rectors of the universities to allow or ban headscarf, the tension and bitterness in the early-1990s led to the murder of two prominent secularist professors, Muammer Aksoy and Bahriye Üçok (Zürcher, 2011: 417). The extreme Islamist groups at those times were followers of 'Black Voice' Cemallettin Kaplan, the *İBDA* (Raiders of the Islamic Great East) and the *Hizbullah* (Party of God).⁵⁰ On legal political arena, Erbakan returned to stage after the political ban of 1980 coup with the 1991 parliamentary elections in which his party the RP made an alliance with the ultra-

⁵⁰ Zürcher (2011: 436-437) touches upon the *Hizbullah* on the occasion of surfacing of its massacres at the beginning of 2000: "Memories of a darker Islamic past were rekindled in January 2000 with the discovery of a series of 'houses of horror' in which the bodies of dozens of missing businessmen and intellectuals were dug up. They were the work of the *Hizbullah*, a radical fundamentalist group inspired by Khomeini's revolution in Iran and the Muslim Brethren in Egypt. This organization had been started in the early 1980s by a man called Hüseyin Velioğlu and had operated in competition with the PKK in the southeast. The *Hizbullah* had split up and one section, with its epicentre in Batman, had developed close ties with the security apparatus, which had used it in its war against the PKK. As early as 1993 the *Hizbullah* organization in Diyarbakır had been dismantled in a wave of arrests, but the police commissioner responsible had immediately been transferred. A parliamentary commission of inquiry, which was formed in 1995, came under pressure to restrain itself and its report was subsequently buried, but when the war against the PKK had been won, the *Hizbullah* had outlived its usefulness and there followed a crackdown in early 2000, during which the killing fields were discovered and Velioğlu was killed."

nationalists and got 17 percent of the votes. This shows how quickly the electoral base of the far-right broadened. Erbakan's rise was a performance of populism with the emphasis on political process and expectations of households rather than references to Quranic verses to form a mass party like Özal (Mardin, 2005: 158).

However, this would be Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's destiny with the foundation of the AKP in 2001. On the other hand, it is argued that with the RP, the reification of Islamic identity took place:

Although Islamic political consciousness also was expressed through the center-right ANAP and DYP, there was a tendency to reify Islamic identity in politics with the RP. As a result of this process, for many people an Islamic identity beyond strictly personal concerns was reduced to a political party identity and used interchangeably with that of the RP in opposition to the Westernized secular identity. (Yavuz, 2003: 217)

Another shocking event of that time took place on 24 January 1993 when a car bomb killed famous journalist, Uğur Mumcu, "who had reported extensively on the connections of the fundamentalists with Iran and Saudi Arabia" (Zürcher, 2011: 417). With this event, the secularists started to feel their lifestyles threatened and polarisation between secularism and Islam increased (Zürcher, 2011: 417).

The Alevi-Sunni tension was another source of polarisation since the Alevis adhered to secular regime (Zürcher, 2011: 418). The *Madımak* incident of 2 July 1993 is one of the turning points concerning the insecurity issues of the Alevis. In this incident, 35 intellectuals participated in a Alevi festival in Sivas were burned alive in their hotel *Madımak* by Sunni agitators. Şevket Kazan, an important figure of the National Outlook movement not only became lawyer of the murderers but also visited them in the prison (Türker, 2006). The violence against the Alevi community in late-1970s and early-1990s has been identified with the extreme right in Turkey.

3.1.7. Political Islam on the Rise

Although his movement never used violence for political purposes, once Erbakan (1994) declared "We will definitely come to power; however, whether it will be through the shedding of blood or not is an open question." His RP continued its climbing in the mid-1990s as it got 19.1 percent of the votes in the 1994 local elections and 6 out of 15 metropolitan municipalities including the two major cities, Istanbul and Ankara. "This showed that the party had achieved a breakthrough. It was no longer predominantly a party of small businessmen, but had become the voice of the poorest sections of the population in the enormous conurbations as well" (Zürcher, 2011: 425). With this trend, the RP was the major party in the 1995 parliamentary elections with 21.4 percent. It is for the first time, an Islamist party achieved to outdistance right-of-centre parties in secular Turkey. Erbakan became the prime minister of a coalition government of the RP and the DYP after the collapse of the right-of-centre coalition of the ANAP and the DYP. As Tachau (200: 141) notes it, "the coalition was a surprise, since Çiller (leader of the DYP) had earlier declared that she would never work with the Islamists." Çiller and Erbakan came to an agreement with which the RP abandoned "its support of a parliamentary investigation of Çiller on corruption charges, showing that even pious Muslims are capable of pragmatic politics" (Tachau, 2000: 141). Nonetheless, by 1997, relations between the government and the army deteriorated due to inflammatory speeches of radicals in the RP (Zürcher, 2011: 430-431). Erbakan did not refrain from behaving provocatively.⁵¹ On 28 February, the army handed in a list of recommendations to the cabinet to diminish "the influence of the

⁵¹ Yılmaz (2012: 374-375) summarises this provocative acts as such: "One of his most daring actions was to hold a Ramadan banquet at the Prime Minister's residence, bringing together *tarikats* leaders, the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and leading professors from the theology faculties to dine at the break of fast, *iftar*. At one level, the television pictures of turbaned sheikhs attending a meal in the Prime Minister's house were a visual nightmare for committed secularists. More profoundly, it reflected a potential redistribution of power whereby Islamic forces, both within and outside the state, combined openly against avowedly secularist groups. Further, Erbakan's series of visits to Muslim Arab countries led to the impression that he was seeking outside ideological support to strengthen his domestic position and that the secular future of the country was in danger."

Islamists in the economy, in education and inside the state apparatus" and the government officially approved the demands, but it was reluctant to do implement the required measures (Zürcher, 2011: 431). Then on 21 May Chief Public Prosecutor Vural Savaş demanded the closure of the governing RP because 'it had become the focal point of criminal activity.' On 18 June, Erbakan stepped down with the expectation that his partner Tansu Çiller, the leader of the DYP would take the lead in; however, President Demirel appointed Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of ANAP, to form a government. When Yılmaz formed a coalition with Bülent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP) and a group of ex-DYP deputies' active participation and with the external support of Deniz Baykal's CHP, the 28 February Process to remove the RP from office was finalised.

In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the FP, the successor of the RP after its closure by the Constitutional Court, lost almost one fourth of its support in the previous elections and got 15.4 percent. However, in the local elections, it achieved to take 4 metropolitan municipalities (Istanbul, Ankara, Konya and Kayseri) out of 15. This shows that Islamists continue to appeal to a good amount of the electors. Istanbul Deputy Merve Kavakçı entered the TBMM Plenary to take the parliamentary oath with her headscarf. This caused tensions. And finally, the FP was accused of being a direct continuation of the closed RP and Vural Savaş again opened a case against it. Following the closure of the FP by the Constitutional Court led to a split within the National Outlook movement: on the one side, there were traditionalists having strict Islamist preferences and on the other side, there were innovators "who wanted to turn the party into a broad right-of-centre movement and jettison the Islamist rhetoric" (Zürcher, 2011: 436). Ruşen Çakır (2014: 549) summarises the dissolution as such: while the traditionalists wanted an ideological cadre-party, the innovators opted for ideologically backboneed mass-party. The traditionalists founded the Felicity Party and the innovators under the leadership of Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan formed the Justice and Development Party on 14 August 2001. Concerning the schism within the National Outlook and Erdoğan's role, first as the chairman of the RP's Istanbul organisation, then as the Mayor of

Istanbul, in becoming the leader of innovators Özbudun and Hale (2010: 39-40) remind:

Initially the difference seemed more concerned with party organisation and campaign techniques than with matters of ideology. Thus, Erdoğan, in his campaigns, used methods highly unconventional for an Islamist politician, such as visiting pubs, bars and even brothels. That does not mean, however, that at that time the modernists [innovators] were ideologically more moderate or liberal than the traditionalists. In the 1990s, Erdoğan was often quoted as firmly expressing his commitment to political Islam: 'My reference is to Islam'; 'democracy is not an aim, but a means'; 'the system we want to introduce cannot be contrary to God's commands'; 'human beings cannot be secular'; 'I banned alcohol, because I believe I am the doctor of this community'; 'in view of the future of our nation, I am the doctor of this community'; 'in view of the future of our nation, I am against birth control'; 'we always say that we are not Atatürkists, but we approve of his principles'; 'one cannot be both secular and Muslim'; 'they claim that secularism is being destroyed; of course, it will be destroyed if the nation so wishes; you cannot prevent it.' The modernists [innovators] took a more liberal position only after the closure of the RP and its replacement by the FP.

3.1.8. The Views of the Judiciary and Islamists on Secularism

In the last part of this section I would like to mention legal and judicial ground of secularism in the Republic of Turkey. The legal ground is the definition of secularism in laws and the judicial ground is the Constitutional Court's interpretation on secularism in the closure cases of the Islamist parties. In addition to official definitions and interpretation, how the Islamist parties interpret secularism in their pleas need elaboration.

The principle of laicism became a part of Turkish legislation in 1937 with the law having the number 2115 as one of the basic characteristics of the Republic. Previously, in 1935 Congress of the CHP, secularism was defined as such: in issuing all laws, by-laws and procedures, the latest scientific and technological fundamentals, and adapting to the requirements of the contemporary age would be the basic principle (Giritlioğlu, 1965: 108). Since religion is a matter of conscience, the party regards separating religion from worldly, state and political affairs as the primary conditions for the nation to catch up with the contemporary civilisation (Giritlioğlu, 1965: 108).

The second article of the 1961 Constitution maintains that the Republic of Turkey is a national, democratic, social, secular state based on rule of law and human rights. The closure case of the MNP in the early-1970s shows how the Constitutional Court comprehends the principle of laicism of the Constitution: (1) to admit the basic idea that the religion should not dominate or become influential in state affairs; (2) to take religion under the guarantee of the Constitution by granting unlimited religious freedom to the individuals without any discrimination; (3) in order to forbid exploitation of religion or to prevent religion from going beyond the individual spiritual life and influencing social life, public order or safety, there could be limitations; (4) the state is authorised to control religious rights and freedoms as the protector of public order (Constitutional Court, 1972: 67-68). The second article of the 1982 Constitution is: "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble." In addition, the Preamble maintains,

The determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values, or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk, and that as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever of sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics.

These provisions takes secularism under the guarantee of the Constitution as a principle that "may not be amended, nor may their amendment be proposed." In a verdict of the Constitutional Court in 1983, it was stated that the secularism understanding in Turkey is different from the thinking form and structure of Christian countries' as Christianity and Islam have substantial differences; and in a country where its religion and conception of religion is different from the West, even that country is open to the Western civilisation, it should not be expected to have very same secularism understanding as in the West. It was also maintained that Atatürk's revolution departs from the principle of secularism; it is the basic source of this revolution, and any concession would bring this revolution to an end.

In the bill of indictment concerning the case which was concluded in 1998 to dissolve the Welfare Party, principle of laicism was seen as such:

Secularism is a civilised form of life as it destroyed dogmatism of the Middle Ages and proposed primacy of rationality, enlightenment of science, understanding of liberty and democracy, nation-building, independence, national sovereignty and ideal of humanity. Contemporary science was born and developed with the destruction scholasticism. Although it is defined in narrow sense as separation of religion and state affairs, and there are different interpretations, secularism, in fact and in doctrine, is the final stage of the intellectual and organisational evolution of societies. It is the contemporary regulatory of political, social and cultural life based on national sovereignty, democracy, freedom and science. It is a principle to give an individual the opportunity for personality and freedom, by this way; it requires separation of politics, religion and belief to provide freedom of religion and conscience. In a religion-based society, where religious thoughts and evaluations are prevalent, political organisations and regulations are to have religious character. However, in a secular order, the religion is freed from politisation, instrumentalisation for administration; and is left to its real and proper place in the conscience of individuals. It is one of the basics of contemporary democracies that worldly affairs are regulated through secular law and religious affairs are through its own rules. It is impossible to think that public regulations would be based on religious rules. Religious rules cannot be the source of these regulations. The practice of principle of laicism in Turkey is different from the practices of some Western countries. It is natural for the principle of laicism to be inspired of the conditions and characteristics of the country and religion in question; and to occur in concurrence and non-concurrences which reflect in the diverse characteristics and practices. Despite the classical definition of laicism as separation of religious and state affairs, the distinctive features of Islam and Christianity, the conditions and results emerged in Turkey have been different from the Western countries. (...) Besides, in Western countries having same religion, there are divergent conceptions of secularism. While the concept of secularism

could be interpreted respectively in various countries, it can be interpreted differently by some groups according to their conceptions and political preferences in different time intervals. Secularism is not only a philosophical concept, but also a legal institutional one that is realised through with laws; and it is affected by religious, social and political conditions of the country in which it is implemented. Due to its specificity of historical development, for Turkey peculiar secularism is a Constitutional and protected principle.

On the one hand, it is clear that this official interpretation of secularism is more than principle of laicism securing separation of religion and state. In Casanova's terminology, other than secularism as statecraft doctrine, it is an ideology. It is restrictive towards religion not only in official sphere but also in public sphere.

On the other hand, the RP was critical to such an interpretation of secularism and democracy; it raised its claims on grounds of post-secular arguments as if Turkey was an affluent Western society. In its plea of defence, the Welfare Party argued: (1) secularism as a movement emerged not against religion but against the alliance of religion with feudalism; (2) in Turkey, secularism requires the state to be neutral not only in religious sense but also to philosophical and political views; (3) in the contemporary age, individual rights and liberties are under Constitutional guarantees and this liberties include freedom of religion and conscience, of religious education, open or private worship, perform religious ceremony and collective practice of faith, expression of religious belief; (4) concept of secularism can never be interpreted as 'irreligion' and it is for preventing discrimination; (5) thus, it is a necessary instrument for public peace, national solidarity, justice and respect for human rights; (6) the thing which is forbidden concerning principle of laicism is exploitation and abuse with an action; (7) laicism is not a way of living or thinking, but a characteristic attributed to the state; (8) it is a requirement of modern law to secure peaceful and side by side living of state and religion; (9) fanaticism is the only enemy of freedom of religion as it can be religious, political or philosophical and the only remedy to fanaticism is laicism; (10) laicism does not

mean the state being irresponsible to the religious services and necessities of the society; (11) the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms is bound with strict rules and removal of the restrictions is the Constitutional duty of the state; (12) political parties are vital components of political life as they sustain the formation of national will, and it is natural for them to have different views on the Constitution regarding provision of religious services; (13) in the classical understanding of democracy all the left and right thoughts must be free and the outcome of this freedom would be the best result.

In the plea of defence, the Virtue Party, successor of the Welfare Party reiterated similar points concerning the case which was concluded in 2001 to dissolve the Virtue Party. It is evident that while the Constitutional Court makes use of concept of secularism which has social dimensions, the party argues for the formal principle of laicism.

This point is clarified in the introductory chapter. In addition to the above-mentioned ideas, the Virtue Party stated that they were for the American conception of secularism based on 'liberation of religion', rather than French conception of 'liberation from religion' which is 'reactionary' and 'harmful' as the only way for political and social progress.

They also emphasised the need for integration with the contemporary democratic world. These aspects seem to be different from Erbakan's classical views on the West. In its plea, the party described its political personality as a conservative right-of-centre party which was the re-interpreted version of a political tradition coming from the early-Republican era in sequence: the Progressive Republican Party, the Free Party, the Democratic Party, the Justice Party, the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Motherland Party, the True Path Party, the Welfare Party. Similar points were repeated in the closure case of the AKP in 2008.

3.2. Political Islam in Turkey

Since 1979 with the influence of regime change in Iran, the question of whether Turkey would become closer to an Islamist regime has been central concerning political Islam. Therefore, an analysis of the rise of political Islam is significant and crucial to account for one of the major cleavages, between secularity and religion, in Turkish politics. Political Islam is assumed to be represented by the parties of the National Order Party (MNP), the National Salvation Party (MSP), the Welfare Party (RP), the Virtue Party (FP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The AKP is to be treated separately since it also accommodates some liberal credentials but most of its cadres were derived from 'National Outlook'⁵² movement associated with Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011). All of the other parties mentioned above (MNP, MSP, RP, FP and SP) are directly linked to this movement. As a short-cut evaluation of these parties Mardin (2005: 160) refers to comparison of party programs of 'Islamic' parties and he addresses to a dichotomy: while the MNP, the MSP and the RP aimed at "capturing the state and using it to bring about changes in society by adopting the centralism of the Republic", the subsequent parties, i.e. the FP, the SP and the AKP, "abandoned this stance and adopted a position much more synchronized with the world economy and liberalism." The confines of this section are limited to the rise of the National Outlook movement since it is the hardcore political Islam in respect to the AKP.

⁵² In Turkish, 'National Outlook' is *Milli Görüş* and the root of the word *milli* is *milla*, meaning the community composed of believers of a book which was attributed sacredness (Lewis, 2007: 57). In this respect, *milli* refers to religious community, rather than a national one. It is argued, since the it was forbidden to use 'religious' (*dini* in Turkish), the Erbakan movement used *milli* in a the meaning of *dini* (Albayrak, 1989: 118). Erbakan defines *Milli Görüş* as such: it is an outlook which is respectful to historical, traditional and all moral values of the nation (Albayrak, 1989: 82).

3.2.1. What Is 'Political' About Islamism?

It is evident that political Islam is not peculiar to Turkey. However, Turkey is a unique case in terms of analysing Islamism: "Today, Turkey is the only one of fifty-seven majority Muslim states in which secularism is constitutionally enshrined" (Tibi, 2009). On the other hand, Islamism came to the fore in the twentieth century in an age when independent nation-states were formed. In other words, it was a product of modern world and despite paradoxical appearance at the first instance; it was in essence, a modernising mission through the aim of participating in the modern world by building a new and unique identity (Bulaç, 2014: 51). The political authorities in Islamic world had been aware of the power of the *Şeriat* over the minds of Muslims, extensively benefited from the junction of religion-politics to reinforce and consolidate their rulership (Kurtoğlu, 2009: 628).

The most notable three Islamist thinkers were a Pakistani Mevlana Mevludi (1903-1979), an Egyptian Seyyid Kutub (1906-1966) and an Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini (1903-1989). The first two were Sunni, while the latter was Shiite. Islamism is an ideology that relates the economic, social and political problems of Muslims in the twentieth century to alienation from the essence of Islam which they call this situation *cahilye*, and returning to that essence is defined as an organised struggle of a political project (Gürel, 2012: 407).

In this respect, 'Islamic movement' can be defined as: the complete structures organised for making Islam prevailing in society as a whole with all of its institutions and rules in legal, political, economic, social and cultural terms (Teazis, 2011: 32). The radical Islamic thought defined Islamic movement as an organisation style to be carried out and led by a superhuman perfection rather than humans; presented the leadership of *ulema* as an ontological necessity and converted the consequences of certain events, so to speak, to religious provisions (Erkilet, 2014: 696). This tendency limited its scope and made itself an extra-societal, abstract thought (Erkilet, 2014: 696).

The abolition of the caliphate is argued to be important in the development of Islamism. For example, Sayyid (2014: 951, 957) asserts that (1) the abolition of the caliphate meant distortion of the more than a thousand year old deposited relationship between Islam and the state authority and (2) reactivation of Islam as a political discourse in a contingent direction by opening a way for reinterpretation of its role since its master signifier was no more a fixated institutional regulation. In this respect, for Sayyid (2014: 955), Kemalism's effect cannot be limited to Turkey; abolition of the caliphate and Westernisation project of the most important Muslim country had great reach beyond Turkey. Therefore, Turkish modernisation was not a simple parochial phenomenon peculiar to Turkey (Sayyid, 2014: 955). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's role of setting a new political paradigm for Islamic world is to be admitted without limiting researches on Kemalism to Turkey (Sayyid, 2014: 955). Sayyid (2014: 955-956) refers to the post-colonial regimes of the Muslim countries as 'Kemalist' rather than 'secularising', 'modernising' or 'nationalist' as Kemalism, then on, describes a hegemonic political discourse in the Muslim world where Islam was no more the master signifier of the political order. Paradoxically, Kemalists did not depoliticised Islam; on the contrary, as they detracting Islam from the centre to the periphery in their political construct, they politicised it by displacement (Sayyid, 2014: 957-958). Availability and reliability of Islam as a challenge to Kemalist hegemony increased its counter-hegemonic capacities by articulation with opposition discourse (Sayyid, 2014: 958). Therefore, Islamism came to the fore as an attempt to rewrite Islam, which was ready at hand, as a master signifier (Sayyid, 2014: 958-959). In other words, in most of the Muslim countries, political preferences are polarised between Kemalism and Islamism (Sayyid, 2014: 960). Here, Sayyid uses Kemalism as an ideology that draws boundaries to Islam in political, social and cultural lives in Islamic contexts. However, I find secularism a more convenient concept to meet this end.

In the Turkish context, it is argued that the concept of Islamism reflects double legitimacy crises: firstly, legal restrictions on Islamism due to being coded as 'reactionary'; secondly, lack of any unifying definition of Islamism which would be

admitted by all of the Islamists (Aktay, 2014: 15-16). It is also argued that Islamism in the Republic of Turkey would be categorised as such: cultural Islamism of intellectuals like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Sezai Karakoç who focus on epistemology, theory in politics and imagination of new world; social Islamism of the *tarikats* aiming at Islamisation in societal level, socio-cultural transformation and education; political Islamism of the National Outlook directly portraying political aims and methods (Akdoğan, 2014: 621). However, the economic aspect is disregarded in this categorisation. At this point, I would like to clarify what to understand from Islamism in this work: Islamic projects can be divided into two groups as fundamentalists or radicals and reformists. I associate the former with anti-democratic Islamic state projects as in the cases of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where sovereignty of God prevail over popular sovereignty, and *Şeriat* having supremacy over democratically enacted laws. The latter version can be conceptualised as political Islam since political competition within a formal democracy is regarded as a source of legitimacy.

The discussions preceding the proclamation of the *Meşrutiyet* in 1876 reflect a concern of legitimacy in a sense that novel concepts of democracy attempted to be presented with Islamic references and reserves like *meşveret* and *meşrutiyet* (Tekin & Akgün, 2014: 652-653). The issue of '*meşveret*', doing politics with consultancy, has been proposed to provide Islamic support for parliamentary regimes, yet in Islamist sense; those parliaments of this world cannot have a law-giver status before God (Mardin, 1983: 1403). This understanding left its mark on Islamic conception of democracy: unlike the Western case, parliament in Islamic sense cannot be an assembly where various strata and classes represented; it is a consultant organ of religious scholars for seeking ultimate reality (Mardin, 1983: 1403). In this work, the conceptualisation of political Islam does not reflect this kind of conception of democracy. This conception is closer to the radical understanding.

The Orientalist readings usually take radical Islam as point of departure and come to the conclusion that Islam as a religion and democracy as a political system are not compatible. The holistic nature of Islam is argued to be preventing the development of democracy in the Muslim world. For example, Eli Kedourie (1994: 5-6) asserts:

The notion of a state as a specific territorial entity which is endowed with sovereignty, the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the idea of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas of the secularity of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating autonomous groups and associations – all these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition.

Another example is Samuel Huntington's (1993) thesis of 'clash of civilisations' which is based on the hostility of Islam towards Western liberalism. Concerning Turkey, Huntington (1993: 42) argues that the Turkish society is a 'torn society' which is divided into two camps: on the one side, the political elite seeing their country closer to the Western world, and on the other side large segments of society consider their country within Muslim Middle East. The idea of polarisation of Turkish society is shared by important Turkish scholars like Mardin and İnalçık. In this work, I argue that such a polarisation is to be neutralised through a consolidated democracy based on secularism as statecraft doctrine.

Bassam Tibi's (2008) differentiation between Islam as the Muslim faith and Islamism as a political ideology is an example of a searching for a reconciliation of liberal democracy and Islam. He (2008: 84) writes, "Islam and Islamism are two different issues. In re-thinking Islam, one can reach positive conclusions about the compatibility of democracy and Islam, but this cannot be achieved by Islam." Political Islam can be considered as an attempt to build this bridge. However, political Islam, at first, is to admit the universality of secular democratic constitutionalism for social harmony and welfare.

It is argued that the political history of the Republic of Turkey can be read as the cleavage between *raison d'état* and social imaginary (Kurtoğlu, 2009: 617). This was because the Turkish society of the formation years did not understand why to give up not only its belief, but also religion representing its tradition and world of symbolic meaning; why have to live like a Westerner after defeating Western invaders; why to transform from Muslim nation into Turkish nation (Kurtoğlu, 2009: 618). Thus, rather than the ends of political will, it looked out for the values and world of religion in which it had been feeling itself secure, been acting confidently, and which it had known, understood (Kurtoğlu, 2009: 618). This kind of argumentation asserts to polarise modernisation and Islam and this polarisation creates political Islam as a challenge to the *raison d'état*, i.e. secularisation. In other words, the state itself in Turkey politicised Islam. I want to note that in the previous chapters, I referred to Taylor's use of social imaginary which can be shaped by a theory. Here, what Kurtoğlu calls *raison d'état* has the potential to shape social imaginary. In the previous chapter, I argued that with revolution from above in the early-Republican era, social imaginary based on Islamic identity stated to be transformed a secular-national one.

This line of analysis sees the state as being responsible for Islam to become a political actor since its conception of secularism turned into acts of anti-religion (Kurtoğlu, 2009: 633). With transition to democracy, rather than its own 'imagined nation', the state came up with social imaginary which had kept the tradition alive despite all the coercion and prohibitions, and then, forced the state to take it as a respondent (Kurtoğlu, 2009: 633). Hence, for the first time, the tension between the *raison d'état* and social imaginary became evident and objectified (Kurtoğlu, 2009: 633). Then on, the place religion occupied in social imaginary remained over by turning it to an amorphous religiosity with modern images; and besides religion, the society interiorised the myth of nation as one of the founding components of its identity and articulated to its collective consciousness (Kurtoğlu, 2009: 633). When the relationship between modernisation and Islam is set as an antagonism, Islamism comes to the fore as "a way to get out of the depression" (Aktaş, 2009:

652). As Islam became a political actor with the National Outlook movement, this movement "expanded the boundaries of political debate in society and integrated Islamic discourses into the political sphere" (Yavuz, 2003: 212). However, as I showed in the previous chapter, Turkish secularism has never been an act of anti-Islam; on the contrary, it created an environment where Islam can flourish without harming democracy. Rather than targeting religion *per se*, Turkish modernisation tried to eradicate tradition which contradicted secularism.

The religious apparatuses of the state played important roles in "the permanent enlargement of religious field since the mid-1970s" (Şen, 2010: 66). The major apparatuses are the Directorate of Religious Affairs, faculties of divinity, *imam-hatip* schools, compulsory religious education,⁵³ Quran courses. The official institutions are fully financed and run by the state; and these institutions help the dissemination of Sunni-Hanefi Islam to homogenise population in religious sense (Şen, 2010: 66).

The non-official organised Sunni Islamist groups have had strong ties with official religious apparatuses of the state and this enlarged the scope and scale of the official apparatuses (Şen, 2010: 66). All these apparatuses lead to the expansion of the social basis of Islamism. In this respect, Islamism have been entangled with the official state apparatuses. Drawing on the dichotomy of secularism and religion, on similar grounds, Banu Eligür (2010: xvii) addresses to such factors for the rise of political Islam in Turkey:

(First, the emergence of a political opportunity structure, created primarily by the adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis by the military regime in the aftermath of the 1980 intervention; second, the presence of movement entrepreneurs with significant organizational, financial, and human resources; and, third, the successful framing of issues by entrepreneurs to expand the appeal of the Islamist social movement beyond the population of Islamists to secular but socioeconomically aggrieved voters.

⁵³ Turkey continues the policy of compulsory religious education based on Sunni Islam despite rulings against the practice by the European Court of Human Rights and the Turkish Council of State (Hürriyet, 2008).

However, quite problematically, Eligür (2010: 8) constructs her approach on the grounds of a taken-for-granted but unjustified presumption that a social religious movement is by definition is 'noncivil' when it challenges a civil and secular state like the Republic of Turkey. For her (2010: 11), Islamists in Turkey compose "a noncivil, peripheral, and resource-poor movement opposed to democracy." Leaving aside its opposition to democracy, in factual terms, political Islam in Turkey have never been a resource-poor movement of the periphery; on the contrary, it always relied on Anatolian capital and leaders who gained significant roles in the political centre. Concerning democracy issue argued above, I would like to note: one of the major tenets of this research is that consolation of democracy is such an important aspect that without it, there cannot be post-secularism and without secularism, there cannot be a consolidated democracy. I discuss this interlinked issue in the following chapter.

3.2.2. Common Ground: Gülen and Erdoğan

"An Islamic current that grew quickly in importance in the early-1990s was that of *Hoca* Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the modernist wing of the *Nurcu* movement" (Zürcher, 2011: 419). For very long years being Said Nursi's follower, Gülen can be seen as the last important apostle of *Nakşibendi* order (Mardin, 2011b: 88). He proved his capacities as an organiser, a man of organisation. Young people gathered around him and he built dormitories and organised summer camps for those youngsters (Mardin, 2011b: 89). In 1974, he broke his connections with the community of Said Nursi's followers called *Nurcus* (Mardin, 2011b: 89). The intersection between Islamism and appraisal of Ottoman-Turkish line of understanding was one of the major characteristics of his thoughts (Mardin, 2011b: 90). The other important characteristic is the opportunism of his movement: he built close and warm relations firstly, with Turgut Özal's ANAP and then with the True Path Party; while distancing themselves from Erbakan's Islamist parties (Mardin, 2011b: 90). He tried to prove how they were for the state by advocating

law and order (Mardin, 2011b: 90). However, these attempts are not considered enough to persuade the Army and he was to flee. In other words, he "found political asylum in the United States by fleeing a pending court case. Turkey's Supreme Court upheld his acquittal in 2008, but he remains in self-exile" (Criss, 2010: 50-51).

Within the framework of Ottoman-Turkish nationalism, he compared Ottoman Islam and religion understandings of the Arabs: he found Arabs' Islam as 'primitive' (Mardin, 2011b: 90). Organisation of summer camps, opening schools throughout Turkey, the Balkans, Central Asia and Russia, building dormitories, press and media initiatives all show that he tried to establish a Muslim 'civil society' (Mardin, 2011b: 90-91). This *Nakşibendi* ideal was seen as the only way to grasp the power through the mobilisation of this 'civil society' (Mardin, 2011b: 91). According to Mardin (2011b: 106), the Western authors' 'slurry' conceptualisation of 'political Islam' makes researchers forget an important fact that the ground of Islamic revival is social and 'civil'; it is political only in some periods. This argument is another point that Berkes and Mardin dissents: although Berkes does not use the conceptualisation of 'political Islam', as I mentioned above, he argues that the critiques of principle of laicism from a religious point of view are to take an extra-religious, political form. In this sense, it is a political struggle against secularism.

Mardin (2011b: 103-108) maintains that underground network of sages cultivated *invisible colleges*⁵⁴ over Islamic communities and through esoteric teachings not to disturb the secular state in Turkey. This kind of spreading organisation resulted in a valuable accumulation for Islamists as it helped to establish an 'Islamic civil society'. Strategically, the Islamists showed outside how they were for the democratic ideals (Mardin, 2011b: 107). The historical process that led to this strategy is as such: The *Tanzimat* aimed at creating centralised state while the

⁵⁴ *Invisible college* refers to the way in which scientists in seventeenth century England pursued their activities and networks without drawing reaction of church.

supporters of old regime from the religious front oppose this (Mardin, 2011b: 107). They mobilised means of the old regime like building an education system parallel to the state's, networking activities of Sufi brotherhoods and preaching sermons (Mardin, 2011b: 107). However, strategically making use of institutions of democracy and constitutionalism led to a dilemma as representation, political parties and legislation were not Islamic constituents (Mardin, 2011b: 107).

Özbudun and Hale (2010: 49) state that the relationship between the parties of National Outlook and the *tarikats* and communities has not been based on loyalty. As I mentioned above, the *İskenderpaşa* congregation of the *Nakşibendi tarikat*⁵⁵ was influential in the formation of the MNP and some of the *Nurcus* supported the MSP till mid-1970s; however, then on, they usually supported the AP and the DYP (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 49). The *İskenderpaşa* community supported Erbakan in 1970s and 1980s, but in 1990, the leader of this community distanced from the RP (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 50). Fetullah Gülen community of the *Nurcus* usually supported the ANAP throughout 1980s and 1990s and was very careful about sustaining good relations with the secular order. Moreover, Gülen even supported the 28 February movement to suppress Erbakan (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 50). Community of the *Süleymançıs* usually supported the AP in 1970s and the ANAP in 1980s, while in the 2002 parliamentary elections; their support was divided into two between the ANAP and the AKP (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 50).

Mardin (2011b: 91) asserts, among the twentieth century *Nakşibendi* leaders, Fetullah Gülen was not the last example of diversified syntheses; it is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who interiorised transformative adaptation strategies when Islamists confront external imperatives. On the basis of Erdoğan's life Mardin (2006: 288) points out an important question:

⁵⁵ As Yeşilada (2002: 71) notes, "there were 15 branches of this order in the Ottoman Empire and some are still present in modern Turkey: Ahrariye, Camiye, Dehleviye, Halidiye, Kasaniye, Mazhariye, Melamiye, Muradiye, Müjeddidiye, N: aciye, Nuriye, Reşidiye, Sadiye, and Tayfuriye." Other than *İskenderpaşa*, influential congregations of this order are Menzil, İsmail Ağa, Kibrisi, Erenköy, and Çarşamba (Yeşilada, 2002: 73).

A theoretical question of considerable importance highlighted in Erdoğan's life and career is whether Islam in Turkey is a *form* or *content* of Turkish culture. Given the continuity and increasing liveliness of Islamic revival in Turkey, one would be tempted to judge religion to be the substantive content of the Turkish culture, a content Erdoğan has had to fit into the secular form imposed by the Turkish constitution. That, at least, would be the explanation provided by the Islamists, that is, believing Muslims with an ideological bent. Other observers, ideologues of secularism, would propound an almost diametrically opposed explanation, one in which Islam as a socio-political movement would be figured as a dangerous ideological residue in times when religion should be contained in the 'hearts' of Muslims. The difficulty with both explanations is that form and content are interrelated at many more levels than observers of religion in Turkey realise. The 'form' of secularism has been impinging on Islam at so many levels that Islam in that country can be described only as a quasi synthesis secular and religious values and, as such, a belief showing elements of 'exceptionalism'. The biography of Erdoğan allows us to retrieve this special relation of form and content in Turkish Islam.

Mardin refers to some tangled instances of Erdoğan's life to show his peculiarity. Erdoğan was born in Kasımpaşa a conservative lower-middle class neighbourhood in Istanbul, but not a place where Islamic revival activities were prevalent. He played football in a club. This is a very important thing for a leader of Islamic youth organisations as Erdoğan. His prominence was not only a result of his expressed religiosity but his nationalist and secular Republican rhetoric (Mardin, 2011b: 92). In Turkey, football promoted a secular youth image while Islamists disparaged it. This revaluation of youth culture represents an intergenerational threshold for Erdoğan to replace traditional Islamic youth figure with a more effective one (Mardin, 2011b: 93). The penetration of secular Republican culture had impacts on Erdoğan's generation (Mardin, 2011b: 93). This also gave Erdoğan necessary resource to legitimise the new and untested one in his struggle with Erbakan (Mardin, 2011b: 93).

When Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party was in power, Mardin (2011b: 93) claims that they look out for an ideological balance between Islam and secularism, and they were always adhered to democratic values in domestic politics. Moreover, he (2011b: 225) asserts that the AKP was the victory of Kemalism: the Republic brought out some instruments and opportunities for everyone to make use of, such as modern schools, understanding of citizenship, new economic possibilities and values, repeal of *ilmiye/ulema* class. They educated in modern schools; took

advantages of being citizen in legal sense; they made huge fortunes and opened banks; they asserted for legitimisations of themselves when the monopoly of *ulema* over religious issues was destroyed (Mardin, 2011b: 225). The opportunities provided by modernity were the real source of their power. In this respect, Mardin is right in underlining the contributions of the Republican processes to their victory. However, Mardin (2011b: 226) also warns about a paradox in Turkey of the AKP that there is an emergence of puritan Islam to which Ottomans were never inclined to.

On the other hand, it is functional for political Islam, which does not recognise the society as it is, proposing a kind of counter-social engineering project and seeing the society as the object of politics, to prevent the established order designed for controlling and shaping the society (Çınar, 2014: 176). Therefore, political Islamism does not oppose to the semi-democratic state structure in Turkey (Çınar, 2014: 176). In other words, while Islamists challenge the secular-Westernist content of the relationship that the state establishes with the society, they preserve its semi-democratic and anti-pluralist form (Çınar, 2014: 176). If the Kemalist state limits the social role of religion by controlling it and practicing an anti-liberal secularism policy, the very same control, this time by political Islam, would put into effect to promote an anti-liberal Islamisation and to increase social role of Islam (Çınar, 2014: 176). Both circumstances are polarising and preventing social integration, liberalisation, and modernisation (Çınar, 2014: 176). In the last part of the previous section I mentioned the RP's plea of defence when the party faced a closure case. In this plea, they argued for a liberal understanding of secularism in contrast with the secularist view of the judiciary. The RP's post-secular arguments based on democratic principles and freedoms would remain only on paper if anti-liberal social engineering is put into practice. In other words, post-secular ideals would lose their meanings if a full-fledged democratic order is not institutionalised. At first, both poles of the political spectrum, i.e. political Islam and secularists would come to terms with democratisation.

3.2.3. The Economic Dimension

The class dynamics behind Islamism need elaboration as well. The class dynamics of Islamism has two levels. First one is about the emergence of religious bourgeoisie which is the result of marketisation of religion, and the second one is about the economic discontent of the working classes. Like the other bourgeois political movements, the success of Islamists is bound to the ability of the religious bourgeoisie to become hegemonic over lower classes as seen in Khomeini movement in Iran and in Erdoğan movement in Turkey (Gürel, 2012: 410). Although there are too many Islamist intellectuals and political movements that interpreted Islam within an anti-capitalist framework, the majority of twentieth century Islamist movements did not aim at abolishing capitalist relations of production (Gürel, 2012: 409). Moreover, all Islamist regimes have extensive private sector in which bourgeoisie own forces of production (Gürel, 2012: 409). Despite this bourgeois character of Islamist movements, they seemed to be successful in establishing hegemony over working class, and thus, those movements are products of alliances between religious bourgeoisie and working class (Gürel, 2012: 409).

For Cihan Tuğal (2009: 426), "Islamism appeals to the poor not because it simply liberates them as against an oppressive state but because it successfully intervenes in the constitution of their subjectivity and absorbs their creativity when implementing its own project." In secular regimes, with a religious rhetoric, Islamist movements politicise the demands of the capitalists that were out of the power bloc (Gürel, 2012: 410). For example, in Turkey, the National Outlook movement gradually became an important actor of Turkish politics after 1970 by being the political representative of small-scaled and non-monopolistic religious capitalists of Anatolia against secular and monopolistic capitalists of Istanbul and Izmir (Gürel, 2012: 410). The National Outlook saw cambium, interest, unjust taxation, printing money without counterpart as ills of social and economic structure to be avoided (Teazis, 2011: 58-59).

It is argued that in all cases Islamist bourgeoisie took the lead of successful political movements in the second half of the twentieth century, it managed to get the support of working classes both in informal sector and the white-collared (Gürel, 2012: 410). The demographic and economic transformations in that case in those times tell the story: the population of Islamic world increased 50 percent between 1955 and 1970, and by 1975, the 60 percent of the population was under the age of 24 (Gürel, 2012: 410). At that time, the spread of capitalist relations of production in the rural and the development of industries around cities increased migration from the rural to the cities (Gürel, 2012: 410). Since the economic growth rate remained under the growth rate of population, unemployment was widespread (Gürel, 2012: 410). The infrastructure in cities was not capable of providing healthy environment to the newcomers, and thus, population of shanty towns increased sharply (Gürel, 2012: 410-411). While small amount of this population found jobs in formal sectors, the majority were to work in informal sectors with low income and without any security (Gürel, 2012: 411). Due to its high capacity of mobilisation, this urban poverty made up the most important target group of Islamist propaganda (Gürel, 2012: 411).

As it is mentioned above, the second group of the working class is the qualified workers having jobs or unemployed. In the same period of time, the second important development was the spread of middle and high education by the state to include classes other than the bourgeoisie (Gürel, 2012: 411). And again since the economic growth lagged behind the rate of the proliferation of education, unemployment or dissatisfaction of their rising expectations increased rapidly among the qualified graduates (Gürel, 2012: 411). This paved the ground to crises of hegemony in secular and relatively secular state and created the conditions for the spread of Islamism among these groups (Gürel, 2012: 411).

In order to be hegemonic over these working classes, the Islamists articulated leftist components to their discourses and argued that the injustices and the extensive struggle to earn a living were peculiar to the modern *cahiliye*, and to

avoid them Islam must rule over the state and social affairs (Gürel, 2012: 411). They also made use of anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist discourse to stalemate the secular elite (Gürel, 2012: 411).

In ideological level, Islamism have appeal not only to economic discontent but also identity issues of the people of Turkey. Mardin (1981: 218) thinks, in building the new national identity, the Republicans failed to depict the role of Islam for the Turks:

After all, Islam had an aspect which addressed itself to man's being-in-this-world, to his basic ontological insecurity, which enabled it to fasten itself on to psychological drives. It is a truism, but still one worth emphasising, that Islam has become stronger in Turkey because social mobilisation had not decreased but on the contrary increased the insecurity of the men who have been projected out of their traditional setting. This insecurity is sometimes 'cognitive' and appears as a search for a convincing political leadership or a bountiful economic system. Here Islam assumes an ideological guise and competes with Marxism. In many cases, the insecurity is deeper, more truly ontological, and Islam appears in its aspect of a cosmology and an eschatology. The revitalisation of Islam in modern Turkey is a very complex occurrence part of which is structured at the personal level, part of which relates to the attempt to bring back the full glory of Islam, and part of which is political.

This kind of argumentation on failing to incorporate Islam to new national identity is problematic. If we assume ethnic and religious homogeneity of a group in question, religion may have a unifying component of the national identity during the process of nation-building. However in the Turkish, the role of Islam would have had limits as people of Turkey was divided not only ethnically, but also terms of religion. The most evident division was between the Sunni and Alevi communities. It was not easy to construct a unifying Islamic identity due to the divisions dating back to centuries. So much so that the Republican state institutionalised Sunni-Hanefi doctrine which annoyed the Alevis, Islamisation of the new national identity beyond the limits would have led the people to fall apart. It can be argued that in Europe Christianity had greater influence on national identities. Three points are to be raised: Firstly, to put an end to religious conflicts and wars was one of the crucial reasons for secularism to emerge in Europe. Secondly, European nation-states were more homogeneous in religious sense when

compared to Turkey. Thirdly, equal access of all citizens to the democratic public sphere is a prerequisite of ethics of citizenship on which post-secular paradigm is set. If a national identity is encircled by a religious doctrine, how is it possible to talk about such ethics?

Turning back to the role of economy, as Binnaz Toprak (2005: 171) notes it, through the end of 1960s, there appeared reflections of economic development of that decade. The religious right came to the fore having then on its distinct political parties (MNP, MSP) in two specific areas of the country: in the most developed regions in which some segments lost their previous positions; and in the least developed regions with the hope of getting rid of diverse effects of capitalist development (Toprak, 2005: 171). In this juncture, the MSP appeared as the party of religious right having a discourse of industrialisation (Toprak, 2005: 171). A strong adherence to developmentalist discourse in the MSP can be seen as an influence of Kemalism's commitment to development. In that way or another, the MSP movement reflected the socioeconomic structure.

Toprak (2005: 179) also argues that if 1980 military coup did not take place, the political Islam would not have a chance to become alternative of the secular authority. The coup helped the legitimisation of political Islam via supporting the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Toprak, 2005: 179). In this respect, the coup had an impact on Turkish politics by opening the way for religious right. For Criss (2010: 48), this made generals of 1980 coup and Islamists "strange bedfellows and deepened the rift between secularists and Islamists at all levels of the state apparatus as well as society." As Criss (2010: 48-49) asserts,

Since 1980, Islamists professionally entrenched themselves in all state institutions. Hence, theirs is not a frontal attack but a siege policy to employ Islamist cadres in state institutions, dismantle checks and balances, a *sine qua non* in democracies, and finally transform Turkey into an Islamic republic. When people speak of *coups d'état* in Turkey they invariably refer to the military kind of coups. However, civilian coups, in the name of further democratization, remain a serious challenge. Dismantling operations take time, and the Islamists probably think that time is on their side.

Nonetheless, Toprak (2005: 184) does not see political Islam as a real threat to secularism of Turkey. It is considered to be a natural aspect of pluralistic society and politics. Göle's (1997: 58) views on secularisation in Turkey have parallels with Toprak's in a sense that the process of secularisation affected the counter-elite by modernising their counter-culture as well. However, Ergun Özbudun (1996: 133) argues that political Islam is among the most important factors that prevent consolidation of democracy in Turkey in the post-80 era. Similarly, in the beginning of 1990s, on re-Islamisation of Turkey, Mardin (1991: 234-236) anticipated the danger of creation of two nations in the lines of secular-Islamic antagonism. But for Mardin (1991: 236), a violent confrontation of these two is unlikely and it is a remote possibility that Islamist culture would prevail over secular culture unique to Turkey when compared with other Muslim societies. Özbudun and Hale (2010: 38) remark the double-entendre of laicism in the discourse of political Islam in Turkey throughout 1990s:

Although they never rejected secularism categorically, they did not openly called for the establishment of a regime based on the *sharia* [*Şeriat*], they described the current understanding of secularism in Turkey as anti-Islamic and oppressive towards devout Muslims. While they constantly emphasised the 'freedom of religion' aspect of secularism, they hardly every mentioned the separation of religion and the state as the fundamental characteristic of secularism. In the RP's view, freedom of conscience implied the 'right to live according to one's beliefs', a concept which inevitably created frictions with Turkey's secular legal system. In the 1990s, the RP went so far as suggesting the creation of multiple legal communities according to which each religious community would be entitled to be governed by its own legal system. The project reminds one of the 'Medina Covenant' that Prophet Muhammad concluded with the Jewish tribes of Medina. This proposal was among the major reasons behind the Constitutional Court's decision to ban the RP.

For Binnaz Toprak (1987: 218), secularism in Turkish politics became an axis for defining one's position whether progressive or conservative, modern or traditional, enlightened or obscurantist, revolutionary and reactionary. Moreover, secularist and anti-secularist antagonism became a substitute for left-right divide (Toprak, 1987: 218). However, on the one hand, in the minds of most of the Turks, such a contradiction between Islam and secularism do not exist since they are religious in their private lives, while secular in public sphere (Toprak, 1987: 221). On the other hand, the Islamist and the ones functionalise Islam as a protest against economic

change used to reject this syncreticism (Toprak, 1987: 221-222). It is also argued that Republican Islamism in Turkey represents a resolution of the dilemma between religious and worldly by rejecting this tension (Çiğdem, 2014: 26). In other words, Islamism in Turkey did not aim at establishing a political and social order compatible with the implementation of the *Şeriat* (Çiğdem, 2014: 26). In the post-80 era of Turkish politics, as the trend of the Islamist movements, in Turkey Islamism reflected to be benefiting from the economic discontent of the disadvantaged people, as Zürcher (2011: 416) notes:

What could make Islamic currents dangerous to the existing state and society was, and is, discontent among the have-nots, created by policies that have vastly increased the differences between rich and poor. Just as in so many other countries in Asia and Africa, so too in Turkey politicized Islam has taken over the role of the left as the voice of the have-nots. That Islamic movements have been able to play this role with such success is partially due to the extent to which the governments of Evren and Özal have embraced and thus legitimized them, but if the discontent among the mass of the city populations had not grown so much in the 1980s the movements would have remained fuses without any powder keg attached to them.

Concerning the post-80 and post-90 context of the Turkish politics, the political economy perspective tries to merge economic analysis with identity issues. For example, Galip Yalman (2002: 41; 2009: 308) argues that the 'restructuring' in the post-80 era put an end to class-based politics. This paved the ground for identity politics by curbing the power of class-based institutions of economic-corporate interests of the working classes. Political Islam fits to the context of identity politics.

It is argued that the equation of neo-liberalism only with economic policy is misleading since the social project of neo-liberalism should not be ignored (Şen, 2010: 69). Turgut Özal as the architect of 24 January 1980 Decisions of the Justice Party government played a significant role in transition to neo-liberal social, economic and political setting (Şen, 2010: 69).⁵⁶ Promotion of religious-

⁵⁶ Özal was the Undersecretary to the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in 1980. Then, he served in the government of the coup administration as the Deputy Prime Minister Responsible for Economy. With transition to civilian administration, Özal became Prime minister between 1983

conservative values in politics and culture was crucial to enlarge the religious field (Şen, 2010: 69). This accelerated articulation of neo-liberalism with Islamism and interpenetration of one another (Şen, 2010: 70, 73).

Similarly, the reasons for the rise of religious politics in Turkey is analysed by Ziya Öniş in relation to globalisation and neo-liberalism. Firstly, globalisation, policies aiming at distribution and elimination of poverty in the scale of nation-states lost its central focus. In this process, social democratic politics degraded and the vacuum led to the rise of extreme nationalism and religious fundamentalism (Öniş, 1997: 746-747). Economic globalisation had also impacts on right of the political spectrum through fragmentation as 'incompatible political movements' (Öniş, 1997: 747). Other than the economic outcomes of globalisations, the effects on cultural diversity and on tendency towards cultural relativism are central in evaluating the rise of Islamism. As Öniş (1997: 747) points out, “the pressures or impulses originating from the cultural sphere, associated with the dissemination of democratic values, acceptance of diversity and pluralism provide an extended public space for groups or communities to express their own identities and organise themselves around issues concerning individual or group identity.” The cleavage between Islamism and secularism could be analysed through this line of thought. In other words, identity politics opened a new ground for such a cleavage in the political spectrum overrunning the conventional left-right divide. The role of religious symbolism associated with political Islam in the formation of a cross-class alliance between the poor and the wealthy, but commonly 'excluded' segments of society, at the age of globalisation has significant repercussions both in political and socio-economic spheres. Öniş (1997: 748) describes this relationship as such:

The poor and the disadvantaged who form the principal electoral base of political Islam are excluded in the sense that they do not share in the benefits of growth in the

and 1989, and President between 1989 and 1993. In this respect, he found great opportunities to be ideologue and practitioner of neo-liberalism.

age of globalisation. The professionals, the businessmen and the intellectuals whom we would classify as the rising 'Islamic bourgeoisie', are clearly benefiting from globalisation and modernity, yet also feel part of the excluded by not being part of the real elite in society. In this sense, political Islam as a protest movement and the ideology of the excluded constitutes a challenge to both left and right-wing parties of the established secular political order.

The second set of reasons proposed by Öniş concerning the rise of political Islam, especially for the Welfare Party in 1990s, is associated with neo-liberalism. The first factor in this respect is about the role of military in the post-1980 context. For example, the military supported Turkish-Islamic synthesis “as a firm barrier against potential sources of instability” such as the left, in the consolidation of the post-1980 regime (Öniş, 1997: 750). The second factor is related to the measures in the new regime. Measures to prevent political fragmentation failed to achieve their objectives, these measures resulted in the opposite direction after the 1987 parliamentary elections, and the party system fragmented further. For Öniş (1997: 751), this fragmentation “provided a major avenue for the rise of RP as a political force in the context of mid-1990s.” The third factor is about the economic plane set by neo-liberalism. To illustrate, “rising inequality has been the mass exodus from rural, agricultural areas to the periphery of major metropolitan centres, with migrants emerging as a major element of support for the Islamic RP” (Öniş, 1997: 752). The fourth factor is deserves mentioning is the changing role of the state in the neo-liberal context. As a new trend, the state delegated substantial powers to local governments in rent distribution. Öniş (1997: 752) notes that

In retrospect, the neo-liberal state in Turkey exhibits a dual face, a duality which is of some significance in the context of our subsequent analysis. At one level, it is a major player in the economic arena and a major allocator of economic rents. As a result, the private sector's dynamism continues to be heavily dependent not only on its own initiatives but also on its ability to achieve access to state resources and incentives. The retreat of the state from the economy is, therefore, a myth. At another level, however, associated with the politicization of rent distribution is a loss of confidence and a decline in the moral authority of the state in Turkey. We hypothesize that a significant link exists between the dual face of the state and the rise of the Welfare Party.

In this research, I argue that the story of marketisation of religion in Turkey tells much about the power hub of political Islam. In the context of globalisation and

liberalisation, Islamism found an opportunity to leap forward by questioning centralist-bureaucratic structures and by using the link between liberalism and religion for the benefit of economic mobilisation (Gülalp, 2009: 685). With neoliberal transformation there was a severe change in Islamist bourgeoisie in the 1990s: they took the advantage of this transformation and became big capital as the popularised term 'Anatolian tigers' suggest (Gürel, 2012: 420). They founded the MÜSİAD (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*, Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) at time *vis-à-vis* secular bourgeoisie represented with the TÜSİAD (*Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*, Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen) and this organisation supported the RP. The Anatolian capital can be categorised as such: conservative-religious businessmen; *tarikat* and community companies; aggregate corporations (Can, 1997: 59-65). Demir (2014: 872) argues that following many unsuccessful partnership initiatives in 1960 and 70s like 'worker companies' based on savings of workers abroad, in 1980s, in many cities of Anatolia like Konya, Yozgat, Denizli, Çorum, Aksaray, Gaziantep, there emerged a revival of multi-partner capital accumulation and production. Other than economic transformation, Özal's neoliberal-oriented policies on foreign expansion contributed to this process (Demir, 2014: 872). As Yeşilada (2002: 77) notes, the Islamic capital "became an increasingly important force following the Özal government's decision to introduce Islamic banking as an alternative method of financing the Turkish economy. Islamic banks entered Turkey with this decision in 1983 and assisted in the establishment of a powerful network of Islamist businessmen." It is also argued that Islamic banking led to a radical change in the positions of the Islamists; it both empowered and 'tamed' them (Fuller, 2008: 96).

After the process of 28 February 1997 Decisions of the National Security Committee, which resulted in the revulsion of the RP from power and in its dissolution, the Islamist big capital searched for an alternative (Gürel, 2012: 420). Since in 1970s, the Islamist bourgeoisie did not have enough capital accumulation to become monopolistic and financial-capital, it was advocate of Erbakan's policies

on industrialisation under state control and for the benefit of small capitalists in towns by taking measures to spread capital accumulation geographically and reverse the trend of economic concentration (Gürel, 2012: 420-421). However, through the end of 1990s, this bourgeoisie was in the way of integrating with the world economy and international capital to turn into financial-capital (Gürel, 2012: 421). They started to find Erbakan's line archaic and they expected a reformist and younger leader (Gürel, 2012: 421). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was to meet this expectation as he had experience on governing and charisma, and comprehension of the needs of the business world. The MÜSİAD and 'Anatolian-Islamic capital' reflected a peculiar compliance with capitalism which can be seen as Islam being articulated with capitalism or integrated with the world economy (Özdemir, 2014: 841). In this respect, within the context of globalisation, the MÜSİAD seems to be an ideal-typical representation of modernising entrepreneurship in Turkey (Özdemir, 2014: 841). Cihan Tuğal (2010: 20) examines the process for the Islamic capital to become *hegemonic*⁵⁷ via coming to terms with MÜSİAD's position with the AKP as such:

I argue that the pious business community has established hegemony, that is, it has made its vision the vision of pious popular sectors and activists, through the AKP. Almost all Islamists have come to the conservative position of the MÜSİAD: support for unfettered markets, integration with the international business community, deregulation, privatization, and emphasis on a conservative morality (deemed to be universal). They no longer emphasize what differentiates Islam from other religions and secularism. Yet, this is not only MÜSİAD's hegemony but also that of the existing dominant sectors in Turkey and abroad.

Having similar grounds of analysis with Öniş, Binnaz Toprak also argues for the role of economic groups in the rise of political Islam. She (1987: 230) says that it is not appropriate to propose that the Islamic forces could not have a chance to increase their base if the military had not intervened in with 1980 coup. Its strength is highly in relation to the rise of some economic groups and a purely religious

⁵⁷ Tuğal (2010: 37) revises Gramscian concept of 'hegemony' and defines it as such: "(1) the organization of consent for domination and inequality (2) through a specific articulation of everyday life, space, and the economy with certain patterns of authority (3) under a certain leadership, (4) which forges unity out of disparity."

movement has no chance of becoming alternative in modern Turkey. Moreover, parallel to Öniş, for Toprak (1987: 230), revival of Islamism is the result of increasing pluralism in Turkey. To put it briefly, the rise of political Islam is highly related with the socioeconomic picture of the country which is largely under the influence of neoliberal restructuring. This argument does not dismiss the relationship between emergence of political Islam and discontent with the Turkish modernisation. However, the major motor of the rise of political Islam should be searched in the economic conditions rather than the failure of modernisation.⁵⁸ Besides that, it is argued: coming in contact with the public opportunities, especially with the economic ones, created an enormous trend of secularisation among the Islamic sector (Çaha, 2014: 492). Also surveys have shown the approval of the values like 'republic', 'democracy', 'laicism', 'freedom of thought and belief' by the majority of the Turks with more than 90 percent (Çaha, 2014: 492). Departing from these points, it is asserted that Islamic groups are not threatening political, cultural and economic dimensions of modernisation; on the contrary, they may add their colours and enrich modernisation (Çuha, 2014: 492). This post-secular assertion would be meaningful if Turkish democracy has been consolidated during the AKP rule. In the following chapter, I will elaborate on this point as well.

3.2.4. The Global Encounter

As I mentioned in the first chapter on general theoretical debates, there is an argument that post-modernity is the real threat for Islam in global scale. Therefore, Islamic radicalism comes as a reaction to this threat by making use of global communication system to deliver its message. However, this defensive and sometimes offensive psychology prevents a universalistic identity. Islamism is a

⁵⁸ Rather than being a failure, Atatürk's project proved to be successful in transforming the pre-modern political, social and cultural aspects of Turkey. Özbudun (2010: 22) writes: "Atatürk's modernist programme had sweeping successes: in fact, it seems safe to say that, without it, Turkey would be nowhere near the level of political, economical and cultural development, which it has reached today."

political discourse benefiting from many processes that accompany globalisation (Sayyid, 2014: 946). There is a possibility that Islamism may differentiate between Westernisation and globalisation and present itself as another paradigm beyond nation-state (Sayyid, 2014: 946). Turner (2002: 143-144) argues:

Islamization is an attempt to create at the global level a new *Gemeinschaft*, a new version of the traditional household which would close off the threat of postmodernity by re-establishing a communal ideology. Islamization is a political movement to combat Westernization using the methods of Western culture, namely a form of Protestantism within Islam itself. Islamization equals political radicalism plus cultural anti-modernism. Within this perspective, Islamic fundamentalism is a defense of modernization against postmodernism. The outlook for global ecumenicalism does not appear to be a realistic option since, for example, the Abrahamic faiths in their fundamentalist mood claim an absolute truth. The problem is that the Islamic Household must view alternative global households as threatening and dangerous and therefore Islam constantly finds itself forced up against 'lands of war'. It is difficult to imagine how one can have several universalistic, global, evangelical, religions within the same world political space. How can one have mutually exclusive households within the same world cultural system? There are in a sense two problems for Islam. First, there are the problems of external relations with other faiths and traditions or households where the traditional millet system will no longer work. Second, there are internal relations with 'deviations' such as the Copts in Egypt, or the Bahai faith in Iran, or there are the complications of the Islamization of women and the conflicting interpretations, for example, of egalitarian relations between men and women.

Concerning Islamism in Turkey, such problems have repercussions as well. For example, Mardin (2011b: 100-102) thinks that women issue is an unfortunate matter even for thinkers having 'modern' interpretations of Islam like Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel and Fetullah Gülen: they all supported the argument which degraded women to an inferior position. Concerning issues such as headscarf issue, Islamists, Islamic political parties and media organs with Islamic tendencies showed opportunist attitudes (Mardin, 2011b: 101-102). Nevertheless, they were not happy with 'Islamic' feminists' and intellectual Islamist women's critical viewpoint which is an unprecedented result of secular Republican education policies (Mardin, 2011b: 101). On the other hand, there is an argument asserting for Islamism being basically a 'feminist' movement since it rejected all forms of cultural hierarchies; admitting the equality of man and woman as being *kul* of God; having an attempt to integrate woman to culture and life; accommodating a criticism that links primacy not to privileges coming from birth, but to individual

attempts of piousness (Aktaş, 2009: 655). However, feminist Muslims' readings are not extendable to the whole Islamist movement as there are good amount of 'religious' claims for defining woman as an imperfect creation, a mischief-maker to be isolated from social life. Moreover, the issue of polygamy cannot be incorporated to any feminist approach.

Oscillation between propaganda of global communal solidarity and confusion about domestic problems of Islam renders Islamists helpless to effectively cope with rising Islamophobia in global scale. Even in Turkey, sectarian divisions and *tarikats* rivalry among Islamists prevent them to come to terms with a common ground for an Islamic *tecdit*, or in Western terminology, a reform. Mardin (2011b: 220) observes that there are many searches of and works on Islam; nonetheless they are not related. On the contrary, all these works belong to competing, rival groups abstain from forming a common forum (Mardin, 2011b: 221). In other words, consolidation of Islamist votes in a political party and its consecutive electoral victories do not mean that Islamism in Turkey is in a bed of roses. In the first years of the AKP rule, with comparison to Western European Christian-democratic experiences, Hale (2005: 306) warned about the risk that if the AKP succeeds a long-term power in Turkey, there may emerge 'internal factional divisions' and corruption. An example of release of internal contradictions is seen in the combat between the Gülen movement and the AKP.

The journey of political Islam or Islamism in Turkey has never been isolated from the international relations. For example, the idea of unification of Islam and calling for a holy war by the caliph against the Christian colonialists during the World War I were results of Ottoman alliance with Germany. In this respect, Islam became an instrument of international politics. Pro-*ummah* and nationalist rival orientations increased inconsistency and incoherency of Islamists. Sometimes anti-Westernist overtones of Islamists became blurred when pro-American attitude against the 'Godless' Soviet bloc gained significance during the Cold War era (Çalış, 2014: 893-894). The Palestinian and Cyprus issues have been important components of

their discourse. In the 1970s, Erbakan took an anti-European stance and anti-Zionist rhetoric for the sake of third worldist international Islamic solidarity and cooperation, while he opted for a prudent approach to the NATO membership (Çalış, 2014: 896-897). Regime change in Iran, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 12 September Coup forced Islamists to review their thoughts on international relations (Çalış, 2014: 899). Then, global developments made Islamists vulnerable to the winds of change and surrendering, rather than producing an alternative worldview (Çalış, 2014: 902). For İsmail Kara (2013), in modern world, international centres are crucial in activating Islamic movements since, in philosophical sense, Islam is the only source that stands against modern thinking and it is a potential threat to it. However, for the international circles, being a pro-*Şeriat*, nationalist or socialist movement is not important; the important thing is its convenience to be used and controlled. Therefore, they can easily support an Islamic movement (Kara, 2013).

Since it is a religious movement, it is assumed that Islamism has been more or less a dormant if not a fixed political worldview. However, in Turkey, Islamism demonstrates greater capacity of change more than other rooted ideologies of Turkish politics. The major factor is its exposure to direct confrontation with modernisation. For example, Islamism of the late-Ottoman era had pan-Islamist overtones, but in the post-caliphate era of the Republican politics, Islamism experienced a disembodiment in political sense when it lost its caliphate. While it had been in the ruling position in the previous era, in Mardin's terminology, it started to be identified with the periphery. The strict policies of secularism forced Islamism to change its priorities. In the post-1990 era, the economic conditions became determinant on Islamism as it was articulated with capitalism. It is argued that Islamism today has been transformed while the discourse of Islamism in 70s, 80s and 90s today perceived as an anachronism running after improbable politics (Aktay, 2009: 1258). The ones who presumed to be Islamists in recent times are far from presenting a project which could be diagnosed as being Islamic; on the contrary, they are in liberal direction compelled by parliamentary politics (Aktay,

2009: 1258). In this respect, highly politicised Islamism seems to be unrecognisable when compared to the stereotypes of the previous times (Aktay, 2009: 1258). From the early-Republican era to recent times, the trend is: firstly there was peripheralisation of Islamism, then its re-centralisation, i.e. the capture of the centre, took place. Hakan Yavuz's evaluation of ideology of the RP and the National Outlook in general sense, is an example:

The overall ideology of the RP may be described as a rather incoherent form of pragmatic liberalism, social conservatism, welfarism, and capitalism. One may treat the RP ideology as an eclectic and amorphous mixture of competing lifestyles, ideas, and politics based on different interpretations of Islam, nationalism, and the state. The party did not see Islam as a fixed doctrine that would obviate the need for politics but searched for ways to integrate Islamic identity and symbols into the political sphere. The younger generation of the party was more open to such liberal views than Erbakan and his generation. This generation wanted the RP to represent Islamic groups and views within the political domain but still believed that the political sphere would be autonomous from the purely religious one. The younger generation of intellectuals in the party, such as Abdüllatif Şener, Tayyip Erdoğan, and Abdullah Gül, did not seek to subordinate democracy to a particular interpretation of Islam.

Islamism's discovery of the political is argued to be an affirmation that politisation means peaceful expression of social demands while radicalisation and disassociation from the society means becoming militant (Aktay, 2009: 1269). This deliberative understanding of politisation or becoming political does not necessarily suggest a state-centred politics. In other words, it is not projected as power relations of capturing the state apparatus and transforming it into a *Şeriat* state. This line of argumentation brings us to the post-secular moment. As Roy (2014: 935) argues, in a post-Islamist⁵⁹ context where Islamism became ordinary by deideologisation, on the one hand, religion is secularised; on the other hand, it influence secular spheres.

⁵⁹ As Asef Bayat (2005:5) notes: post-Islamism "represents an endeavour to fuse religiosity and rights; faith and freedom; Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism to on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past. It wants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with democracy and modernity (something post-Islamists stress), to achieve what some have termed an 'alternative modernity'. Post-Islamism is expressed in terms of secular exigencies, in freedom from rigidity, in breaking down the monopoly of religious truth. In short, whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights."

3.3. Conclusion

The theoretical discussions in the Chapter II and the history of modernisation in Turkey in the first section of Chapter III show the grounds of understanding the problem of secularism in Turkey and possibility of a post-secularity. The first section of this chapter also provided the relevant knowledge about the historical developments from which political Islam found a place to take the lead and in the second section of this chapter, I elaborated on this subject. In that second section of this chapter, there is an analysis of the evolution of political Islamic movement to the AKP rule.

The nature of political Islam is very important to understand on which grounds it gave rise to an Islam-based dominant party in Turkish politics. How Islamisation of society from below is strategically put into practice by surviving within the boundaries of secular-democratic order is an important aspect. For example, to make an account of this aspect Eligür (2010: 276) treats Islamic strategy as a mobilised social movement to overthrow secular-democratic system:

The Islamist movement in Turkey is largely nonviolent. One of the major theoretical findings of this study is that political context constrains movement entrepreneurs' framing activities, even if the movement is antisystemic. In the Turkish case, the existence of a secular-democratic regime and its acceptance by the vast majority of citizens constrained Islamist entrepreneurs' strategies for mobilization. But it also created an opportunity to be exploited. Islamist entrepreneurs, while utilizing social networks to overthrow the secular order by Islamizing the society from below, also mobilized by forming a political party.

In the following chapter, there will an analysis of the reliability of such an attitude concerning the case of the AKP. In this chapter, I mainly focused on the development and the conditions of Turkish secularism, rather than analysing post-secularism. Without such an historical exploration, it is not possible to understand uniqueness of Turkish modernity. References discussion of modernisation and indicate that there is not a single reading of this historical process. This analysis helped me to clarify peculiarity of Turkish modernity and Turkish secularism in terms of multiple modernities approach. The arguments on modernisation in

Turkey also show that is not so easy to categorise them as examples of secularisation thesis and their critiques; they are intertwined.

From the examinations of Turkish modernisation, it became clear that Islam cannot be treated as a fixed and *ahistoric* phenomenon. It takes different forms in different intervals and conditions. Its merger with the state led to a strong state tradition *vis-à-vis* weak civil society. This also influenced the nature of public sphere which has been dominated by the official sphere. Although the ethics of citizenship dates back to the *Tanzimat* era, weakness of civil society is related to immaturity of ethics of citizenship as well. In this context, respective theories favoured by political elite shaped social imaginary in Taylor's sense and these social imaginaries competed with the traditional social imaginary usually took religious forms. The nation-building process in the early-Republican era and revolution from above are examples. Another important example is the Turkish Islamic Synthesis put into practice in the post-80 era. With the rise of the AKP to power, another conservative and religious social imaginary becomes prevalent *vis-à-vis* secular-Republican social imaginary. This antagonism prevents consolidation of democracy as well as possibility of post-secular order in Turkey.

CHAPTER IV

THE AKP: A POST-SECULAR MOMENT?

After drawing the theoretical frame of reference and the analyses of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation and political Islam, it is time for moving to the analysis of the Justice and Development Party, which is in power in Turkey since 2002. It is argued that the early-Republican era is "characterized by the privatisation of religion", the AKP era is corresponding to "de-privatization involving the increasing presence and visibility of religion in the public sphere" (Turner & Arslan: 153). In this research chapter, this argument is to be discussed. This chapter starts with a brief narration about the formation of the party and analysis of the Turkish electorate. Then, the relationship between secularisation and democratisation is analysed by referring to the roots majoritarian understanding, to the conceptions of secularism, nation and conservatism. The approach to the family in relation to social policy is analysed within the contours of social conservatism. Finally, I examine freedom of religion and conscience during the AKP rule with reference to the headscarf and Alevi issues.

4.1. Analysis of the Justice and Development Party Rule in Turkey

The analysis of the Justice and Development Party in relation to post-secularism with the criteria set forth in the introduction chapter is composed of (1) consolidated democracy; (2) deeply established secularism as a political principle; (3) the objective guarantees on the freedom of religion and conscience; (4) management of problem of pluralism; and (5) analysis of the AKP in relation to

post-Islamism. In this chapter, I examine the possibility of a post-secular moment of Turkish secularism by reference to these criteria, except for the fifth one, which I leave as a research question to be dealt with in another research.

4.1.1. Formation and Base of the AKP

The schism within the National Outlook movement became evident following the dissolution of the RP and the formation of the FP. The FP Congress on 17 May 2000 was crucial since for the first time in the history of the National Outlook an open competition took place for the leadership of the party. Since the leader of the innovator wing Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was convicted,⁶⁰ Abdullah Gül became the candidate to become the chairman of the party against Recai Kutan. Gül managed to get a successful amount of the votes despite the pressures of the Headquarters of the FP. Gül lost the competition with 521 against 633. The closure of the party on 22 June 2001 gave the innovators the opportunity to found their party. On 14 August 2001, the Justice and Development Party was founded officially under the leadership of Erdoğan. The founders' committee was composed of 74 members, 14 of which were women. On 16 August 2001, 51 deputies joined the AKP in respect to 48 deputies to the party of the National Outlook, the SP. Bülent Arınç became the head of the parliamentary group of the AKP. "The leaders of the AKP promised the secularist media and the military that they would not use religion for political purposes. They also visited the United States at intervals, where they held meetings-the contents of which never became public" (Tuğal, 2010: 66).

⁶⁰ In December 1997, Erdoğan recited Ziya Gökalp's poem written in 1912. His recitation included verses translated as "*Minarets are bayonets, Domes are helmets, Mosques are barracks, Believers are soldiers.*" However, these verses were not written by Gökalp. Under article 312/2 of the former Turkish penal code, the verses translated above was seen as an incitement to violence and religious or racial hatred. In other words, He had been convicted of 'anti-secularism' and 'provocation by religion'. Erdoğan was : imprisoned from 24 March 1999 to 27 July 1999. In addition to imprisonment, this verdict required Erdoğan to give up his official position as the Mayor of Istanbul and the political ban prevented him from participating in the 2002 parliamentary elections.

In the first parliamentary elections in 2002 that the AKP entered following its foundation, the party did very well and became the dominant party. The surprising results of the elections represent a dramatic change in Turkish party system which was seen as "the collapse of the old order" (Sayarı, 2007: 197). In 2002 elections electoral volatility reaching to 50.2 percent is the highest in Turkish political history (Sayarı, 2007: 200). "High volatility indicates that party identities remained weak, and that parties as institutions failed to anchor themselves as permanent entities in political lives of Turkish citizens, despite six decades of electoral competition" (Tezcür, 2012: 119). The electoral system furthered these changes.⁶¹ The political fragmentation till the 2002 elections ended with "strong majoritarian impulse" of the Turkish voters (Sayarı, 2007: 206). The three parties -the DSP, the MHP and the ANAP- of the coalition government faced a harsh defeat and none of them managed to pass the 10 percent electoral threshold to be represented in the TBMM. As Sayarı (2007: 199) notes it, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's deteriorating health and his physical incapacity during the election campaign had great impact on the dissolution of the electoral support of the leading party. The two major right-of-centre parties, namely the ANAP and the DYP, eroded with a drop from 51 percent to 14.6 percent between 1991 and 2002. For Sayarı (2007: 199), allegations of corruption and increasing discontent with the performance of these parties in the coalition governments resulted in this erosion. Sayarı (2007: 199-200) maintains that the fluctuations of the Turkish economy since 1990s had prominent impact on the 2002 elections:

The periodic economic crises that Turkey experienced in the 1990s stemmed largely from the unwillingness of the parties serving in the coalitions to curb government

⁶¹ Sabri Sayarı (2007: 200-201) notes the influence of the electoral system as such: "The Turkish electoral system—proportional representation with multimember districts under the d'Hondt formula and a 10 percent national threshold that parties must pass to qualify for seats—had a strong mechanical effect in translating votes into seats: the AKP won nearly two-thirds of the seats with about one-third of the vote; the CHP controlled the remaining one-third of the parliamentary seats with only one-fifth of the popular vote, and close to 45 percent of the votes were effectively wasted since they went to parties that failed to clear the 10 percent barrier." This distorted parliamentary representation of the political parties is to be regarded as a major formal concern for the Turkish democracy. This also helped the AKP and the CHP to consolidate right-of-centre and left-of-centre votes respectively under their banners.

deficits, impose fiscal and monetary discipline, and effectively fight inflationary pressures. Operating in a highly competitive political environment, which was characterized by wide swings in voter preferences and shifting parliamentary majorities, parties in the governing coalitions instead generally opted for populist economic policies. As a result, Turkey experienced protracted high levels of annual inflation rates, which averaged 78 percent during the 1990s. The country's economic woes became magnified following the financial crisis in 2001, which was one of the worst in recent Turkish history. The political credibility of the parties in Prime Minister Ecevit's coalition government was seriously undermined by the aftershocks of the economic crisis that resulted in massive layoffs of industrial and white-collar workers. Turkey was eventually rescued from an Argentinean-style financial disaster by an IMF bailout that stabilized the economy but also hurt large social groups and galvanized the opposition to Prime Minister Ecevit's coalition government, which bore the brunt of voters' dissatisfaction with the austerity measures of the economic reform program.

The political learning by the founders of the AKP that a pro-Islamist party seeking to undermine the secular order of Turkey would not have a chance to stay in power with anti-system violations and former influential politicians of the ANAP and the DYP joining the new party led to ideological moderation of the AKP (Sayarı, 2007: 201). This also helped the AKP to attract many voters of the centrist parties even of the DSP (Sayarı, 2007: 201). At the beginning, as observers write, "under directions from Erdoğan, the AKP has not only essentially kept its distance from political Islam, but has avoided even Islamic terminology and dress" (Heper, 2003: 131). In the meantime, poor performance of Deniz Baykal's CHP as the main opposition party and the asymmetry between the number of the seats of the government and the opposition marginalised the CHP in the policymaking process prevented it from becoming an alternative to the AKP (Sayarı, 2007: 202-203). Sayarı (2007: 203) argues: "In the absence of an effective political opposition in the parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Presidency have emerged as the two principal institutional sources of counter-majoritarianism in Turkish politics."

The analysis of the electorate in Turkey concerning their religious and conservative attitudes would provide us some information about the trend. In this respect, I mainly refer to Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak's researches on '*Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey*'. The first research was conducted in 1999 and the follow-up was in 2006. The comparison of the data tells much about Turkish electorate's religiosity in the sense of political behaviour. The vast majority of society in

Turkey is composed of religious and worshipping Muslim people. The survey in 1999 revealed that 96.9 percent of the participants defined themselves as Muslim, while 3 percent did not belong to any religion (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 13). 81.8 percent were Sunni; 5.5 percent not Sunni; 9.9 percent do not know whether Sunni or not (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 13). The sectarian distribution of the respondents is: 76.8 percent Hanefî, 5.8 percent Şafi, 3.9 percent Alevi, 0.3 percent Hanbeli, 0.2 percent Maliki, 0.2 percent Caferi, 0.1 percent Şii, while 9.6 percent do not know their sect (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 13). Large amount of the participants declared that they were regularly practicing religious duties. For example, 91 percent fast in Ramadan, while there were only 3.7 percent who never fast (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 13). 84.2 percent of the males participate in the communally performed Friday prayers (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 13). 45.8 percent perform their daily prayers. The Turks seemed to be more attentive to the practices of communal worship, while they were more flexible in individual practices. The percentage of the participants who thought that Quranic text lost its persuasiveness with scientific development is 22.9 (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 14). 34.6 percent felt the need for reinterpretation Islam parallel to the contemporary developments (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 14). 35.4 percent primarily define themselves as Muslim in the sense of identity (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 15). In this survey, it is evident that the project of secular-democratic Republic is supported by the vast majority. 77.3 percent believed that Republican revolution led to progress in Turkey, while 8.3 percent did not agree (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 16). 10.7 percent thought that polygamy according to the Islamic law should be allowed (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 16). 21.8 percent were for the formation of *Şeriat* state in Turkey (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 16). However, the survey also revealed the ambiguity of what was understood from *Şeriat*. For example, there were only 1.4 percent support punishment according to Quran concerning adultery (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 17). The researchers (2000: 17) thought that the percentage of the supporters of the *Şeriat* was lower than 21.8 if they had known it properly. They (2000: 17) stated that religious tolerance was high in Turkey. 6.1 percent saw themselves devout Muslims (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000: 19).

The follow-up survey in 2006 showed that religiosity increased in Turkey. For example, the percentage of 'very religious' people rose from 6.1 to 12.8 and (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 38). In the secular-Islamist axis, the percentage of secular camp was 20.3, while the Islamist camp was 48.5, and 23.4 in the middle (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 39). The percentage of the participants who define themselves primarily as Muslim rose from 35.7 to 44.6 (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 41). While the percentage among the CHP electorate primarily defining themselves as 'citizen of Republic of Turkey' was 46.1, it was 23.1 among the AKP electorate (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 41). On the contrary, while the percentage among the AKP electorate defining themselves primarily 'Muslim' was 60, it was 20.9 for the CHP electorate (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 41). In the secular-Islamist axis, tolerance is sharply higher in the secular side when compared to the Islamists (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 49). 82.1 percent support compulsory religious education in schools (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 54). The percentage of veiling among female respondents fell from 53.4 to 48.8 between 1999 and 2006 (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 58). While in 1999, the percentage of people supporting the view that there must be clerical parties in Turkey was 24.6, in 2006 this rose to 41.4 (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 74). Interestingly, the percentage of *Şeriat* state supporters fell from 21 to 8.9 between 1999 and 2006 (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 75). It should be noted that the stance against the *Şeriat* does not imply a stance against any political manifestation of Islam (Aktay, 2014: 15). 22.1 percent thought that secularism was under threat in Turkey (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 76). It is also argued that religion-based conservatism in Turkey was decreasing when compared to 1999 (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006: 79).

It is argued that the centre-periphery cleavage in Turkey had repercussions in political arena and this partly overlaps with class division: the CHP votes reflect positive correlation with the higher income and education levels, thus higher socioeconomic status, while the AKP electorate is relatively poorer and having lower education levels despite the rising Islamic bourgeoisie (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 79).

A survey before the 2002 parliamentary elections showed that the 27.4 percent of the AKP electorate had casted their votes to the FP in the previous 1999 elections, while 21.9 percent to the MHP, 9.2 percent to the ANAP, 7.3 percent to the DYP and 6.9 percent to the left-of-centre DSP (TÜSES, 2002: 70-71). In these elections, the AKP got 34.2 percent, the CHP 19.3 percent and the parliament composed of these two parties. More than 50 percent of the electorate were not represented in the parliament. Çarkoğlu's (2002: 152) analysis reveals that the collapse of the centrist parties continued and the right-of-centre increased its voter base.

Through the 2007 early parliamentary elections, the polarisation along the line of secularism increased due to the parliamentary deadlock on the occasion of presidential elections. The army declared an e-memorandum on its website on 27 April and stated that the Turkish Armed Forces was a party to the discussions on secularism as it was defender of this principle. Republican Rallies organised to protest the AKP government. Özbudun (2007: 49) explains the reasons for the crisis over the presidency as such:

The state elites who have always enjoyed a controlling influence on Turkish politics see the presidency as their undisputable property and as a guarantee against anti-secular tendencies. The broad powers granted to it by the 1982 Constitution makes it a particularly important prize in political competition. The secularist camp often expresses the fear that an Islamist president can gradually Islamize the Constitutional Court, the judiciary, and universities through his broad appointive powers. This fear is more dramatically expressed in the often-heard slogan that the presidency is the last citadel of the secular Republic.

The crisis was resolved with the early elections from which the AKP gained 62 percent majority in the parliament with 46.58 percent of the votes. The CHP-DSP alliance got only 20.88 percent and the MHP 14.27 percent. The independents, most of which was Kurdish nationalists, gained 26 seats in the parliament. The Kurdish nationalists became eligible to form a parliamentary group. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül became president. In this election since polarisation between the AKP and the CHP increased, surveys showed that 55 percent of the AKP electorate declared that they would never cast their votes to the

CHP, while 60 percent of the CHP electorate declared the same concerning the AKP (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 89). The surveys also revealed that the AKP got its support majorly from the electorate having lower levels of education. For example, while 20.3 percent of the CHP electorate was university graduates, this ratio is only 4.7 percent for the AKP (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 90). Concerning occupational aspects, the AKP mainly got its support from workers, farmers and housewives, while the CHP is relatively stronger among public sector workers, private sector workers, self-employed people, retired people and students (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 90).

The AKP seemed to be more rural party when compared to the CHP (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 90). The support of the AKP doubled especially in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 91). The AKP successfully approached to the centre with its candidates: only 90 out of 341 newly elected deputies had 'National Outlook' background, while liberals and comers from the right-of-centre parties were majority (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 91). Rather than regarding the AKP as conquering the right-of-centre, it is argued that the AKP emerged as the party of the new centre:

Past evidence suggests that the AKP had remained firmly to the right of centre on the conventional left-right spectrum. However, obviously the content of left and right in Turkish politics is also constantly changing. The AKP's strong pro-EU stand, commitment to further democratic reform, and cooperative foreign policy approach could be pulling its right-wing constituency towards a new centre in Turkish politics. Otherwise, the electorate at large seems more conservative and right-wing than ever. (Çarkoğlu, 2007: 517)

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu's (2010: 39) analysis on the 2007 electoral victory of the AKP also indicates that it is less influenced by ideological factors, but more from macroeconomic indicators. In addition to that "cultural factors as religiosity and ethnic identity seemed to play a relatively minor role in determining the voters' choice for the AKP" (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010: 39). It should also be noted, concerning the AKP electorate, while religiosity plays positive role for Sunni-Turks, ethnic identity plays negative role for Kurds (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010: 39).

With June 2011 elections, the AKP became the first incumbent party to continue its ascendancy in three consecutive parliamentary elections. For Tezcür (2012: 117-118), 2011 elections "signified an end to the guardianship by non-elected institutions, a feature that has characterized Turkish politics at least since the 1980 military intervention", other than the consolidation of the AKP's hegemony. In other words, the bureaucratic guardians of the secular regime were pacified. The opposition parties the CHP and the MHP failed to shake the AKP in its strongholds, while the Kurdish nationalists increased their seats in the TBMM. The disproportionality between the percentage of votes and the seats in the parliament and political fragmentation were declined in 2011 elections, whereas regionalisation of party system increased. The opposition parties in Turkey seemed to be regionally clustered. It should also be noted that the electoral volatility decreased to a very low level. It is seen that the CHP remained as a minority party in regions like the Central Anatolia having considerable amount of Alevi electorates. For Tezcür (2012: 123),

This sectarian distribution of the vote allows the CHP to gain seats in the region, but makes it extremely difficult for the party to appeal to the broader Sunni vote. In fact, AKP politicians highlighted the Alevi identity of the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu throughout the 2011 campaign in an effort to limit vote shifts from Sunni voters to the CHP.

In the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia with the exception of Tunceli province, the AKP was the only party to challenge the hegemony of the Kurdish nationalists despite the fall of its support when compared to the previous parliamentary elections in 2007 (Tezcür, 2012: 125). The AKP gripped on a religious discourse in these regions to compete with the secular-oriented Kurdish nationalists, while to stop the MHP, the intensity of Turkish nationalism was very high in rest of the country (Tezcür, 2012: 126). "An electoral geography perspective informed by statistical methods and fieldwork suggests that religious, ethnic, and sectarian divisions continue to shape party competition in Turkey with strong regional variations" (Tezcür, 2012: 129).

4.1.2. Conceptions of Democracy

In analysing the post-secular moment in Turkish politics with the rise of the AKP, it is very crucial to examine the dimension of democracy since as seen in Chapter II, a well-functioning liberal democracy is regarded as the *sine qua non* for post-secularism. In relation to this subject matter, for example, Turkish social historian Halil İnalçık (2007: 9) sees democracy is the only possibility to go beyond the antagonism on secularism in Turkish society as it provides a ground for reconciliation and social peace. Therefore, elaboration on the democratisation and the mainstream right-of-centre conception of democracy in Turkish politics which have great impact on the democracy conception of the AKP is significant. In doing so, a brief analysis of the issue in reference to the historical development of democracy since the foundation of the Republic would be helpful. My main argument is centred upon the impact of early-Republican period, transition to multi-party politics and the Democratic Party rule to the conservative conception of democracy in the following eras.

The first point to be clarified is the legacy of single party rule between 1925 and 1945. This legacy has repercussions both on left and right conceptions of democracy in Turkey. In the first analysis, the major question of democracy in a broader sense needs to be touched upon without limiting the process of democratisation only to free and fair elections. The literature on democratisation suggests that this process do not come out of blue and it has sub-processes such as transition and consolidation. Concerning the definition of democratisation, in this work, Jean Grugel's (2002: 5) is favoured: "democratisation is the introduction and extension of citizenship rights and the creation of a democratic state. Another way to think of this is as rights-based or 'substantive' democratisation, in contrast to 'formal' democratisation."⁶²

⁶² To put forward briefly the differentiation between formal and substantive democracy, I would like to refer to Kaldor and Vejvoda's (1997: 67) comparison: "Formal democracy is a set of rules, procedures and institutions ... substantive democracy [is] a process that has to be

To begin with, the approach towards oppositions, for Cemil Koçak, single party rule was within the boundaries of constitutional regime in appearance since a vibrant opposition group lived in the Republican People's Party. This made the system a classical parliamentary system despite the single party rule (Koçak, 2001: 119). For example, the assembly rejected a bill aiming at giving extensive authority to the president of the Republic. The parliament was elected through two-tier elections and the government was responsible to this parliament. However, that kind of system seemed to be based not on principle of separation, but on unification of powers. Suna Kili (2007: 205) notes that it is very difficult to initiate a revolutionary process, especially in a country having autocratic past for hundreds of years, with a respect for all freedoms in a full sense. Thus, separation of powers in the early years of Republican era was impossible. This approach was proved correct in a sense that counter-revolutionary initiations gained influence in situations of looseness.

As Koçak (2001: 120) notes it, when we look at the 1924 Constitution, the system worked perfectly, but in practice, it was closer to a system of chiefdom. This is due to the Statute of the Republican People's Party. The Statute provided the basic characteristics of the regime although in the Constitution there were no implications of chiefdom. Koçak (200: 123) argues that this mechanism resulted in a situation that the parliamentary system regarded in the 1924 Constitution remained only on paper. According to Koçak (2001: 135), system of chiefdom was inline with the dynamics of Ottoman-Turkish modernization and it was not a mere copy of another model but a natural result of historical evolution of the Turkish society. This point needs further elaboration.

Some scholars argue for the influence of other systems such as in Italy or in Nazi Germany. However, that system was a reflection of a more deep-rooted tradition in

continually reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in such a way as to maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence that conditions in which they live, to participate in and influence the debates about the key decisions which they affect society.”

Turkish history. In Turkish political tradition until the establishment of the Republic by Atatürk, as an extreme case of patrimonialism, there had been a figure of oriental despotic ruler. Atatürk represents a rupture in this historical tradition. The divine nature of legitimacy of the ruler was replaced by the sovereignty of the people with secular credentials. The transition to secular democracy was initiated by removal of sultanate and caliphate. In this process, a strong figure such as Atatürk was the guarantee of the revolutionary movement. This revolutionary progress was not realised through a totalitarian model, but on the contrary, through a parliamentary system. The single party era cannot be labelled as undemocratic or despotic unless this period is isolated from historical trajectory. Some scholars do so by ‘analysing’ that era without its historical background. However, this is not a scientific way of analysis. The historical juncture should be analysed by considering socio-economic, political and cultural facts not separately but in a holistic manner.

Another important point regarding the discussion of democratisation in the single party era is the establishment of the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, SCF). As Mustafa Türkeş (1999: 21) notes it, this party cannot be seen as a step towards democracy, or its closure was an implication of anti-democracy since Atatürk organised its formation and even made correction of its party program. Türkeş (1999: 21) writes that the SCF event was not a problem of democracy, but a signal of differentiation of economic policies within military-civil bureaucracy. Contrary to Türkeş, Taner Timur (1997: 164-178) sees the SCF as an option of increasing bourgeois democratic rights and freedoms, but on the aftermath of it, the regime drifted closer to totalitarianism. Laws on duties of the police and residence regarded as examples of such a tendency. After 1931, the Republic left relatively free atmosphere of 1920s and turned to authoritarianism (Karpas, 1991: 55). Nevertheless, Karpas (1991: 56) emphasizes the point that “neither Mustafa Kemal nor the party as a whole proposed to establish a dictatorial regime.” Etatism became the basis of increasing authority of the government and the party. The efforts of merging the party and the state were the results of this authoritarian

nature of the regime. Secretary-General of the CHP Recep Peker's speeches and some acts were examples of this. However, for Karpas (1991: 57), these kinds of speeches were not representing the situation and existing party structure in Turkey, but rather Peker's own ambitions. Following the Peker's ousting, Atatürk aimed at softening the authoritarian excesses of the party and the regime and in 1937; he replaced İnönü with liberal-minded Celal Bayar (Karpas, 1991: 58). Karpas (1991: 58) writes:

... one can never claim that Atatürk wanted to establish a dictatorial regime in Turkey. On the contrary, his aim was to found a pluralistic, democratic political and social system, although he believed that a period of strong rule was necessary to establish the necessary institutional foundations.

Following Türkes's line of analysis, we can compare the authoritarian tendencies of the Union and Progress (1908-1918) and single party era. For him, the authoritarian nature of both periods implies continuity and some kind of resemblance. However, there were essential differences among the two. For example, while Unionists paid no attention to legality and legitimacy, in the single party era importance was attached to these issues (Türkes, 1999: 45). It is impossible to reduce the discussion of continuity and rupture to total acceptance or total rejection.

Atatürk's revolutionary rupture was accommodating Western ideals of sovereignty of the people, industrialisation and secularisation. Some scholars choose to name this process as 'revolution from above.' However, Atatürk's strong adherence to revolutionary process did not mean to establish a dark and totalitarian regime. Both Atatürk and his successor İsmet İnönü believed in democracy and they attempted to form a suitable ground for a strong and long-living democracy. If it was not so, they had the chance to establish their own sultanate and no one could do anything against that will. Nevertheless, they never opted for a system without parliament. Their belief in the Western civilization was not a mere imitation of the West (Timur, 1997: 171). Their sense of Westernisation implies the substance of Turkish modernisation. The major aim was taking part in the civilised Western world. For

Berkes (1964: 463), Atatürk was aware of the fact that unless the country was not developed along the lines of Western civilization, exploitation would continue.

To put it briefly, despite the assertive and ambitious etatist and unpopular practices, the single party rule had never been a closed-system. The major notion of populism was always together with the principle of sovereignty of the people and Western substance. The cultural, social, political and economic transformation of the country represented the transition to a pluralistic and democratic rule of the people. The strength of the Atatürk's Republican system shows how healthy that transition was. There were of course some problems in the consolidation of democracy, but in my opinion the root was healthy and was due to the success of the transition period, namely the single party era. Similarly, Bernard Lewis (2009: 405-406) describes the transition from the CHP rule to the DP era as the unique historical moment in the history of the country and the region; and he thinks that this proves the positive attempt of the Kemalist regime. For Lewis (2009: 406), the defeat of the CHP in the 1950 parliamentary elections was the most important success of this party since it completed the previous revolution which had been the source of the CHP.

The second major time interval which effected conceptions of democracy in today's Turkish politics is the DP era started with 1950 elections and ended by the 1960 military intervention. The establishment of the Democratic Party is one of the most critical steps in the history of modern Turkish politics. It is a hotly debated issue that whether the DP represents a 'brake-off' in the Republican transformation or continuum of the reforms of the Republican People's Party.

I would like to focus on the era of transition to multi-party regime as the introduction of formal procedures of democracy and the Democratic Party rule between 1950 and 1960 in relation to democracy. In other words, here, the analysis of the DP in relation to democratisation and its commitment to democracy is the major point of departure.

The basic motives emphasised in the process of establishment of the DP were liberalisation and democratisation. For example, the founding figures of the DP – Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü- applied to the CHP Group Administration demanding some democratic developments such as real scrutiny of the nation over government, guarantees on basic human rights and freedoms, abrogation of anti-democratic provisions, ending the pressure, etc. (Eroğul, 1990: 28-30). This shows that founders of the DP attacked the authoritarian nature of the CHP single party rule. The major ideological instrument through the opposition years of the DP was the concept of ‘democracy’ and this concept almost gained an enchanted meaning (Eroğul, 1990: 89). However, their commitment to the principles of democracy was controversial when we look at the practices between 1950 and 1960.

Following the establishment of the DP, many deputies were expelled by the Group Administration. If there were any kind of opposition, the deputies were threatened to leave the party (DP). The party had a very questionable attitude towards democracy within itself (Eroğul, 1990: 65, 109). The arbitrariness in the administration of internal party affairs harmed democratic credentials within itself and resulted in disrespect for democracy (Eroğul, 1990: 150). Their attitude towards the press was not a democratic one as well. With the amendments in 1951 and 1954 in the penal code and arbitrary practices on publication of official announcements, the press was oppressed (Eroğul, 1990: 149). The columns of the newspapers were published without any news or articles due to the prohibitions. Moreover, ‘right to prove’ became a scandal of democracy.

The opposition parties such as the CHP and the Nation Party confronted many activities of terrorization and determent. In 1951 and in the following years, the parliament group of the DP decided to transfer real estates of the CHP to the state Treasury several times. Professors tended to work for the CHP and the DP prohibited participation of them to the party activities. In 1954, the Nation Party was closed down like an ordinary association without any concrete and serious

cause (Eroğul, 1990: 149). The cities that vote for the opposition parties were punished as well. For example, province of Kırşehir was turned to be a district, province of Malatya was separated into two. The *left* was also oppressed with terror and the leftists were arrested in masses. With the laws enacted in 1954, the government made it difficult to become candidates. For example, if someone was applied to a party and rejected, he or she cannot be a candidate in another party. The Secretary-General of the CHP Kasım Gülek was arrested while he was in a trip in the Black Sea region (Eroğul, 1990: 170-171). Several provincial congresses of the CHP were disbanded. These examples show how harsh the government was towards the opposition. As Eroğul (1987: 112) puts it, “Opposition to DP rule was made into an openly dangerous venture.” Following the 1955 local elections, to which the opposition parties did not participate, Hatay Deputy of the DP Şekip İnal said, “The affairs in the elections showed that the government returned to 10 years earlier and no sentiment of democracy left” (Eroğul, 1990: 183).

The Menderes government had an oppressive attitude towards not only political opposition parties or press, but also judiciary, trade unions, and the universities. To illustrate, starting from 1956, many high-ranking judges, especially members of Supreme Court of Appeals, were made retired (Eroğul, 1990: 191). Many trade unions in Istanbul, Çukuruova, Sakarya, Ankara, Bursa, etc. were closed down (Eroğul, 1990: 194). With a law enacted on 27 June 1956, meetings of the political parties that were not in the electoral propaganda period were banned (Eroğul, 1990, 194-195). The Secretary-General of the CHP Kasım Gülek was sentenced to six-month imprisonment. Moreover, the delegates of the CMP Congress in Giresun were sent to police station since they acclaimed Osman Bölükbaşı. The democratic values were overthrown to the degree that one of the four founders of the DP Professor Fuat Köprülü resigned from the DP on 6 September 1957, stating that all the Turkish citizens believing in democracy should cooperate to overturn Menderes (Eroğul, 1990: 198). Eroğul (1990: 149) states that the advancement years of the DP accommodated many examples of political and ideological corrosion and the party not only forgot changing the authoritarian and anti-democratic laws, but also

tended to make them more rigid. Concerning domestic politics, there were signs of decomposition everywhere and the promises of a democratic atmosphere were all forgotten. This decomposition would lead to the demise of the DP. The reflections of this situation became apparent when the DP changed the standing orders of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and made it difficult for the parliament to supervise. Moreover, there were deputies of the DP demanding closure of the CHP and parliamentary investigation process initiated. For Eroğul (1990: 239), this tendency of the DP and Menderes proved their project of a 'new style' of 'democracy' in which oppression was at the core. Attempts of eliminating democracy and Menderes's dictatorial aspiration could easily be depicted out in the articles of the law enacted by the TBMM in April 1960 regarding the functioning of the parliamentary investigation committee. Feroz Ahmad (1992: 132) evaluates all these signs through the end of Menderes era as a return from multi-party regime to a single party administration.

Also for Keyder (1989: 172), the DP was the rejection of control of the centre, reform from above and obstacles in front of the market. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the DP became an obstacle of democratisation. The Democratic Party era was full of questions concerning democracy, but it is crucial to note that this period was a leap forward to democratisation whether the DP wanted it sincerely or not.

The importance of the DP in this process was that it was the first opposition party coming to power via elections (Sunar, 1985: 2076) despite the democracy understanding of the DP was a limited and formal one.

Considering the analysis of the DP experience in Turkey in order to understand whether the procedural rules of democracy can be exploited by the political elite that is committed to these rules, it is apparent that Bayar and Menderes, as the leading figures of the DP, placed great emphasis on the electoral dimension of democracy. They spent effort to make the electoral regulations much more democratic when the DP was in opposition. However, contrary to earlier efforts to democratize the electoral system, due to the focus on legitimacy gained through elections, once in power, the DP leadership did not hesitate to manipulate both the electoral schedule and the electoral regulations. (Sütçü, 2011: 354)

However, democracy is not only coming to power via free and fair elections. It should have substantive meaning as well. The substantive approach to democracy should involve not only political, but also cultural, social and economic dimensions as well. The DP era lacked all of these dimensions. The DP era had many practices that wounded the essence of democracy. Eventually, these practices ended up with a sad outcome, i.e. 27 May 1960 military intervention. However, as Eroğul (1990: 258) notes it, 27 May Coup was a counter-coup since the DP itself realised the first one. The army did not destroy democracy, but it destroyed the government that eradicated formal democracy.

To put it in another way, the military intervention prevented the mono-party dictatorship of the DP based on the 'tyranny of the majority'. "The standing Constitution of 1924 was ineffective in recognizing the inalienable individual rights and liberties. It rather concentrated all powers in the hands of parliamentary majorities, which facilitated the merger of the CHP with the state during the single-party era and the DP's attempts to repeat the same pattern" (Çınar & Sayın 2014: 367-368).

In my opinion, this very brief review of the early-Republican and the DP eras sheds light on the mainstream conceptions of democracy in today's Turkish politics. I would like to re-underline the basics mentioned above and relate them to today. Firstly, during the transition to multi-party politics after 1945 and the DP era, the basic notion was grounded on majoritarianism. The DP held on to this principle which was firstly adopted by the CHP; and although the voting rates did not show huge gaps, the DP secured vast majorities in the parliament and hence power for three terms.⁶³ Taking this fact into account, Kemal Karpat (2008: 584) argues that majoritarian system prevents fragmentation of the parliament into small groups;

⁶³ The voting rates for the DP in the 1950s are such: for 1950 DP 52%, for 1954 DP 57%, for 1957 DP 48%. The ratio of DP deputies are consecutively as such: 87% (470/539), 92% (502/541), 70% (424/610). This values prove how majoritarian conception of democracy worked at those times.

however, it does not reverberate the votes of the electorate to the parliament. For Karpat (2008: 584), this is not only against democracy, but also it obstructs check of the leading party by the opposition in parliament.

Secondly, source of legitimacy is highly influential on the conception of democracy. While the CHP rested on the War of Independence as the source of legitimacy, the DP conceptualized ‘national will’.⁶⁴ The discourse on the national will became a magical tool of legitimization for the leading parties having absolute majorities in the TBMM. For example, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes once appealed to the masses saying: “If you want, you can bring caliphate back.” This sentence has a background perception of the absoluteness of ‘national will’ *vis-à-vis* the rest, namely the opposition.

The third feature which is related to the previous ones is the self-evident unwillingness and discomfort with the principle of separation of powers. Separation of powers is crucial for a well-functioning liberal democracy and it implies independence of judiciary at the first place and superiority of legislative body over executive. From 1920s on, this principle was not implemented in its full sense. Especially, the right-of-centre parties seek for getting rid of judicial ‘impediments’ to their practices. They usually think that the nation give them the right to rule on behalf of the majority and the ‘impediments’ are acts against the will of nation. Halil İnalçık (2007: 237) maintains that this kind of understanding stems from the principle of unity of authority in the old Eastern state philosophy. This perception is very problematic regarding the principle of rule of law.

To put it briefly, I argue that there is continuity in Turkish politics regarding mainstream conception of democracy of the right-of-centre parties that come to power on their own. The historical background and reference to the early-

⁶⁴ Yeşim Arat (2002: 99) refers to the concept of national will and its relation to the majoritarian understanding of democracy “where people’s will was identified with the results of national elections.

Republican and the DP eras strengthen this argument. In the post-1980 politics that was shaped by the coup administration, we can easily see how the previous liberal democratic formal/legal framework was turned into a more authoritarian nature that is parallel to the conservative tradition. For example, while the 1960 Coup put an end to the plurality principle by bringing proportional representation in the TBMM, the 1980 Coup administration opted for 10 percent electoral threshold to secure ‘stability’.⁶⁵ This threshold sustains the faith in the majoritarian perception in a loyal way. However, many problems arise when we consider consolidation of liberal democratic values in current Turkish politics.

In making the economic analysis of Turkish politics between 1908 and 2007, Korkut Boratav (2008: 145-169) refers to the post-1980 era as ‘counter-attack of the capital’ to eliminate relatively advantageous position of the labour and masses respecting their democratic rights. He (2008: 157) underlines the weaknesses of a liberal or ‘civil society’ approach in a sense that the economic and ideological attack of the capital against labour needed an authoritarian and fascistic framework in political sphere. This authoritarian framework was named as ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ (Boratav, 2008: 157).

I would like to elaborate more on the preferences of the military following the 1980 Coup and implication of these preferences on the post-80 political culture. As Ziya Öniş (1997: 750) rightfully points out, “the military elite conceived Islam as a major instrument for promoting social and political stability”. Simultaneously, ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ came to the fore as the legislative framework. Öniş (1997: 750) writes:

According to the military elite, a major source of political instability in the past has been the extreme fragmentation of the party system, with the existence of a large number of parties on both the right and left of the political spectrum. Also engineered

⁶⁵ The 1962 Constitution was obviously different from the previous 1924 Constitution in a sense that the parliament was to be balanced by other institutions within the state, and the consecutive monopolies of power of the CHP and the DP to be prevented (Zürcher, 2011: 356).

was a 10% national threshold as an electoral rule, designed to limit the participation of small and peripheral parties in the democratic process. What the military essentially wanted was a two-party system, with a right-of-centre party confronting a party mildly on the centre-left, under the direction of a strong executive, with political authority relocated from the parliament towards a strong presidency.

In the context of post-1980 politics, what the military intended was backfired. More serious threat to democracy resuscitated with the revival of religious motives. The danger of ‘tyranny of the majority’ had been (and *is*) substantial in Turkish politics.⁶⁶ In order to overcome such a problem, the decisions of the majority needs to be limited with preclusive methods such as supermajority rules, constitutional limits on the powers of a legislative body, separation of powers, or the introduction of a Bill of Rights (Przeworski & Maravall, 2003: 223). Whether call it national will or majority rule, the constitutional limits to the power of the leading party are crucial. These limits have always been presented as the limitations to the will of nation and thus democracy. Therefore, they have been open to the attack of the government party.

In the past, the DP acted with the desire of forming a ‘party-state’ by capturing the state apparatus in every range. Eric Jan Zürcher (1995: 324) argues that in the single party era, the CHP was only an instrument of the state to control and govern society; and the state apparatus and the party organisation were interwoven. However, the Democrats did not trust the military and civil bureaucracy which they had taken over from the old administration (Zürcher, 1995: 324). Therefore, the trend of state-party coalescence re-emerged during the DP rule. Nonetheless, this time it was not the not the bureaucracy prevailing over the party, but the party over the bureaucracy (Zürcher, 1995: 324). The very same intention has been resuscitated with the Justice and Development Party governments since 2002.

In the 1990s, former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s National Outlook tradition, which was the predecessor of the AKP, was envisaged as having a

⁶⁶ The phrase ‘tyranny of the majority’ was used by John Adams (1788: 291).

majoritarian rather than pluralistic or liberal conception of democracy (Özbudun, 2006: 545; 2010: 38). Özbudun and Hale (2010: 36) find the democracy conception of this movement ambiguous as it was not clear whether they had attributed an instrumental meaning to democracy or had taken democracy as an end. They (2010: 36) think that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's views and speeches as the Mayor of Istanbul at that time supported the latter stance. Moreover, the real meaning of democracy had never been defined by the parties of the National Outlook (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 37). Ruşen Çakır (1994: 128-129) comes to the conclusion that the Welfare Party was neither a supporter of the *Şeriat* nor of democracy alone; the RP argued for being the supporter of both views and thus, reflected a double-entendre. This kind of ambivalence is seen in their approach to secularism as well (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 38).

From the analysis of the Quran, there emerges two meanings of government: "according to one, all aspects of life in society must conform strictly and exclusively to Islamic prescriptions; according to another, the ordering of society in its political aspects should conform to the general norms and principles of Islam" (Heper & Toktaş, 2003: 177). The first view is parallel to the radical Islam which have institutionalised *Şeriat* state or in an armed and/or political struggle to form such a state. The second view is generally adopted by the political Islam. For example, in Turkey, the AKP project seems to be closer to this latter meaning of government (Heper & Toktaş, 2003: 177).

Özbudun (2006: 548) tries to vindicate democracy conception of the AKP as (1) pluralistic not majoritarian, (2) tolerant to the minority groups, and (3) secular. Özbudun's effort of vindication remains only at the discursive level. Özbudun and Hale (2010: 105) appraise the AKP's seemingly enthusiasm of democratisation and efforts on membership in the EU in its first governments.⁶⁷ They (2010: 114) think

⁶⁷ They (2010: 120) also admit that the pace of reforms slowed down starting from 2005 and liberal allies of the AKP disillusioned by this.

that the AKP maintained the democratic reform process seriously initiated by its predecessor i.e. three-party coalition government and this process resulted in the liquidation of the semi-authoritarian legacy of the coup administration of the 1980-1983 period to a large extent. Similarly, Binnaz Toprak (2005: 184) argues:

It is a paradoxical twist of history that it is the AKP of Tayyip Erdoğan, given its roots in Islamist politics of confrontation, which came up with a new understanding of political life which pays attention to the special attributes of modern democracies, namely, discussion, bargaining and compromise.

However, democracy conception of a leading party which is in power for four consecutive terms cannot not be analysed looking only at its program and at its first term in office; its practices are to be evaluated as well. It is also argued that the AKP "has successfully exploited Turkey's longtime quest for EU membership as a political opportunity to advance Islamist demands for change by utilizing a liberal tool kit" (Eligür, 2010: 248). The restrictions on labour and social rights, constitutional amendments to curb independence of judiciary, threatening secular capitalists, grasping anti-democratic law on elections and political parties, promoting Sunni-Hanefi values and neighbourhood-pressure on secular and Alevi-Bektaşî communities, easing down the processes of joining the European Union and democratisation, conservative and sexist attitude towards women, increasing police violence on youth, workers, protestors and irreligious people, etc. can be regarded as the examples of the defects of the AKP-type 'conservative' democracy. "Dangerous rise of conservatism in everyday life as well as (...) neighbourhood-pressure over secular sectors of the public" might have intensified concerns about democratic governance (Şen, 2010: 77). Nonetheless, at the beginning, the AKP openly demonstrated a pro-EU, pro-West and pro-democracy stance which convinced most of the liberals domestically and internationally to cope with the perennial problems of Turkey and to falsify Orientalist assumption about irreconcilability of Islam and democracy (Çınar & Sayın, 2014: 365). In addition, Nur Bilge Criss (2010: 45-46) addresses to Erdoğan's 'autocratic behaviour' and criticises the majoritarianist AKP for ignoring the majority who does not vote for them:

Since 2002, AKP is not only the majority party in the parliament, but it also employs a majoritarian discourse by dwelling on the will of the majority of the Turkish people. (...) Either way, the majority in the AKP's sense of the term ignores the 53 percent who did not vote for them. Secondly, contemporary democracies are consensual, not majoritarian.

Since transition to multi-party politics in 1946, Turkey had considerable steps towards democratisation in a way that political participation has been increased. The question of consolidation of democracy is about democracy becoming 'the only game in town' (Linz, 1990: 156). However, in my opinion, consolidation has another dimension, i.e. deepening of democracy. Deepening of democracy can be described as the spread and penetration of democratic values into the cores of social segments. At this point, in Turkish case, consolidation of democracy might be entrapped by the aforementioned conservative conception of democracy.

Similarly, Hakan Yavuz (2009: 170) perceives the conflict around secularism on the ground of majoritarianism:

Under the AKP government, Turkish society has become embroiled in bitter conflict, largely between Kemalist secularists and Islamic groups. The disagreements are deep and both sides seek to 'settle' the conflict either through the law or through majoritarian democracy. They disagree over the role of the state in education and religion, and about the definitions of secularism and freedom of expression. The conflict is about 'first order principles'-fundamental beliefs about the role of religion and state. The AKP is more interested in imposing religio-communal moral values upon society and protecting religious liberties, but less focused on protecting personal liberties or reducing economic inequality. The leadership of the AKP stresses the power of majority opinion in restructuring political power.

When the Turkish case is approached from 'the only game in town' point of view, the military is analytically devised as the only impediment towards democratisation due to its tutelary role and to the previous interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and finally 1997. It is an undisputable fact that there cannot be a liberal democracy with a military acting out of the civil control. But my argument is that this first and foremost condition to democratisation should articulate other dimensions specific to Turkey.

As Metin Heper (2002: 142) puts it, the tension between the state elites and the political elites stemmed from the former's perception of democracy as an *end* not as a *means*. Therefore, for them, democracy is finding what was best for the country not the promotion of the interests of the groups. This means: (1) "democracy is the ultimate, if not the immediate, goal"; (2) "whenever the military intervened, they blamed the politicians, but not democracy"; and (3) "the military did not consider staying in power indefinitely" (Heper, 2002: 143). Similarly, Bernard Lewis (1994: 44) maintains that this aspect of Turkish case remarkable where "the military withdrew to its barracks, and allowed, even facilitated, the resumption of the democratic process."

It is argued that the AKP is 'compulsorily democratic' in areas where power did not wanted to be shared with it and it was exposed to coercive politics (Çınar, 2009: 517). It is arguable whether the AKP has been sincere in institutionalisation of supremacy of civil politics and making the issue of membership in the European Union a central value with all of its dimensions (Çınar, 2009: 517). Moreover, there are good amount of proofs that Erdoğan does not fond of extra-electoral political activity (Çınar, 2009: 517).

The AKP did much to curtail the power and influence of the military elite.⁶⁸ And also it laid hands on most of the state apparatus. Thus, the state elite having the motivations mentioned above changed a lot. The main opposition CHP, which is

⁶⁸ The political role and influence of the Turkish military have diminished during the AKP governments. Four major factors that helped the AKP to transform civilian-military relations can briefly be summarised as such: "Under the AKP rule, civil-military relations have undergone a paradigmatic shift, with four major identifiable factors apparent in the changing balance of power between the AKP and the military: an EU-induced democratization/desecuritization process; the powerful mandate given to the AKP by the electorate; the changing balance of power between the Kemalist camp and supporters of the AKP; and finally the uncovering of the *Ergenekon* affair and a series of plots against the AKP government, and their influence in delegitimizing the political role of the armed forces (Bardakçı, 2013: 412)" For the fourth factor, i.e. the *Ergenekon* issue, the AKP changed its attitude when it openly confronted with the Gülen movement. By addressing the *Ergenekon* investigations, Erdoğan (2015) declared, "With these operations, first of all me and all the country is misdirected and deceived."

loyal to the founding principles of the Republic, internalised early-Republican legacy and in attempt of harmonising its past with social democratic political orientation, is critical to the AKP's conservative conception of democracy. Although the state elite changed, the CHP is associated with the state and its sincerity in reacting the AKP's attitude towards democracy is under discussion. For example, the liberal critics see the Republican legacy of the CHP as despotic, and as a requirement of democratisation, they demand a complete break from and rejection of its past (Ayata & Ayata, 2007: 216). I find this criticism of secondary importance when considering the Turkish democracy and its endurance. The threat of 'tyranny of the majority' was not and is not resulted from the CHP legacy and its attitude towards democracy. On the contrary, the CHP tradition has always been threatened by the conservative-majoritarianist movements.

I should also note that the root of the majoritarian practice in the form of plurality principle was in the early-Republican era, but the state elite came to understand the inconvenience of it during the DP rule. In this part of this section, I have tried to show how sickly did and does the mainstream conservative movements conceived democracy in Turkey. My argument is that the major threat to Turkish democracy is this conception, which lacks substantial understanding of democracy. The danger of tyranny of the majority in the name of national will cannot be legitimised with the number of votes a party scores. The consolidation of democracy has several dimensions other than democracy becoming 'the only game in town'. The other dimensions are about the quality of democracy associated with the dissemination of democratic values through society and with the formation of a democratic political culture.

İnalçık (2007: 226) asserts that different conceptions of democracy fuels political instability: the source of democracy was a philosophy of society and life emerged with French Enlightenment Age. The French revolutionaries understood democracy as equality of all humans and as a political system founded by equal citizens with their own will; not by the framework of God's commands (İnalçık,

2007: 226). Democracy is not an instrument for realising domination of any ideology or any belief system (İnalçık, 2007: 235). In other words, democracy is not simply a political party's coming to power with the majority of the votes; there is at the same time a life philosophy in Western understanding of democracy that functioning of the state is absolutely a worldly matter (İnalçık, 2007: 226). Without admitting this philosophy, acquiring the votes of the majority is contrary to the Western democracy; and in Turkey, these results in political instability when Islamic parties and secularists are at cross-purposes (İnalçık, 2007: 226). To use Özbudun's terminology, political Islam prevents consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

On the other hand, there is a view seeing secularists' attitude as a "serious obstacle for the consolidation of democracy" in Turkey (Heper & Toktaş, 2003: 178). Heper (1997: 45) argues, "a marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and set of values upon the Islamists; and if the latter do not undermine by word or deed the basic tenets of the secular democratic state." Heper and Toktaş (2003: 178) see Stepan's conceptualisation of 'twin tolerations' that is referred in Chapter II as "the distinguishing characteristic of Western European democracy" the only way out. In the early-2000s, quite optimistically, they (2003) also perceive Erdoğan's project of the AKP to this end.

In Özbudun and Hale's analysis, the linkage of secularism and democracy is evident and the distinction between secularism and laicism is seen in their analysis implicitly. They (2010: 20-21) write:

(T)he AKP avoids any attempt to refer to divine revelation as the basis for legislation. This is not to suggest that there will be no conflict between the party and those attached to a rigid version of secularism, or who reject cultural values based on religion. As in other non-Muslim democratic societies, there are likely to be fierce conflicts over such topics as the role of religion (and what religion) in public education, controls over the sale of alcohol, the acceptance of homosexual relations between adults, and the censorship of books, plays and films judged offensive to religious beliefs. Conflicts over divorce, abortion and artificial birth control have been high on the political agendas of several Christian countries, although less so in

most Muslim societies. On the other hand, the vexed question whether citizens should be allowed to wear dress reflecting their religious attachments in state institutions, especially if they are state employees, has proved highly divisive in Turkey, as it is now in some western European countries. Bringing these issues onto the political agenda cannot be said to be contrary to democratic principles, since in the many societies – Christian and Jewish, as well as Muslim – where religious beliefs play an important role in shaping public attitudes, this is an inevitable as well as a legitimate part of democratic processes.

In this line of analysis, the reference to revelation in legislation is considered as a direct offence of the principle of laicism of the Turkish Constitution; however, incorporation of religious elaborations to the public discussions and the political agenda is not seen as violation of laicism, but a requirement of democracy. In this respect, religion playing greater role in public sphere and this is seen legitimate in the Judeo-Christian world. The Turkish case is approached from this perspective by not taking into account the historical development of secularism in Turkey. This kind of analysis would easily come to terms with the Habermasian paradigm of post-secular society.

Having parallels with İnalçık's and Özbudun and Hale's approach to this issue, Binnaz Toprak (2005: 167-168) argues:

The Turkish experience demonstrates that secularization of law in Islamic societies is an important prerequisite of democracy. However, the recent history of Turkey also points to the contested nature of secularization, which leads to polarization and hence creates tension between democracy and secularism that can threaten both. (...) The division along the religious versus secular axis can only be resolved through the internal logic and mechanisms of democratic rule.

Toprak uses 'secularisation of law' in the sense of laicism as a legal framework. Secularisation as a lump-sum project with all of its processes and sub-processes is not the concern of these scholars. Before moving to the evaluation of this approach, at first, I would like to refer to the AKP's position regarding this issue. For example, Bülent Arınç's speech in the Georgetown University on 26 May 2005 accommodates some clues about how they understand secularism. Arınç says:

I believe that in investigating the sources of rising international terrorist actions and anti-Western attitudes, it is a huge mistake to refer to the basic references of Islam

feed terror. Likewise, I do not find the claims that the Christianity as a religion on its own is the source of criticisms against the Muslim people in Western Europe, in the North America, and in the Caucasus consistent. It is abiding in the divine texts that the two religions do not have hostile attitudes towards each other. Sometimes it is seen that the continuing dialog between religions for more than a thousand years interrupted; however, these do not stem from religious reasons, but from political ones. It is a sad fact that politics sometimes directs religion for its own interests. This is valid for both religions. For this reason, 'secularism' in American usage, laicism in ours, seem to be the best way out of this situation, for many countries and religion started to get relief from political influence. I believe that American understanding of secularism is more appropriate for Turkey than the practice of it in the Western European examples. I see that an understating of laicism respectful to religion, in favour of freedom of belief, and protecting individual rights is successfully implemented in America. The American model would create an opening for the debates in Turkey. (Teazis, 2011: 146-147)

When the AKP came to power, with reference to American conservatism, Ahmet İnsel (2003: 302) argued for its resemblance to the AKP. Rather than manifestation of dogma, religion is regarded as a body of moral teachings; thus "American laicism is extremely tolerant in allowing people to practice their religious beliefs fully and freely, but it is uncompromising about the principle that the requirements of religious dogma cannot be imposed on people despite their wishes" (İnsel, 2003: 302). However, this very early assessment which might become controversial as the AKP consolidated its values and voter base.

Also Erdoğan's speech in the Sun Wally Conference in July 2005 includes important messages concerning the issue of religion and politics. Erdoğan states that it is not possible to think Islam as encouraging terror and violence and rejecting democracy which is the most suitable form of government to the development of humans. He argues that the situation in Muslim societies as the failure in democratic sense stems not from the essence of Islam, but from the abuse of this essence for political ends and mistaken practices within a dogmatic system. Making politics through religion, turning it into an ideological instrument, dogmatising the religious thought, practicing a politics of exclusion in the name of religion, for Erdoğan, both damage social peace and political pluralism. He maintains that it is the deviation of religion from its purposes; thus, it is an assassination attempt against religion, democracy and humanity. He says, making religion an ideology and trying to transform society by state coercion are the worst

things to be done against religion and society. For Erdoğan, laicism has to be taken only as a principle of state administration. For him, it is also a principle of social peace. He sees Turkey as the most successful example to prove how a predominantly Muslim society can live in a democracy based on laicism. Erdoğan also addresses the need for reforming Islam concerning form of governing.

From these explanations, it is understood that democracy and rights and freedoms are equivalently used and from rights and freedoms, freedom of belief is meant (Teazis, 2011: 148). It is also seen that there is continuity between secularism understandings of the RP, the FP and the AKP and they admitted that the way of legitimisation of their understanding is to be through integration with the universal values (Teazis, 2011: 148).

In this work, democratisation is one of the major components of analysis of 'post-secular' setting in Turkey. The conception of democracy has much to do with this analysis. Democratisation in this context is the process of establishment of a full-fledged democracy or in other terminology, consolidation of democracy. So far, I have argued that majoritarian conception of democracy prevents democratisation in real sense. The danger of concentration of power in the hands of elected authorities with the assertion of 'national will' would prevent normative requirements like deliberation, compromise and consensus. To put it in another way, if democratisation is monopolised by a political force, it cannot be a real democratisation as anti-pluralist and exclusionary attitudes result in limited democracy.

4.1.3. Proactivisation in Islamic Agenda

A well functioning consolidated democratic system has to be based on the ethics of citizenship providing equal access to all citizens in public sphere. This equal access is guaranteed via principle of laicism with which direct or indirect discrimination

on the basis of religious beliefs is prevented and official sphere of the state is neutralised in terms of religion. Otherwise, conflicts and divisions on the bases of identity and interests would block the process of deliberation. Therefore, post-secular paradigm requires an overlapping consensus on such a constitutional framework. "Since societal conflicts are the source of democratic renewal and innovation, the paradigm of democracy in Turkey fails to appreciate how crucial it is to recognize identity and interest differences as the basis of a 'constitutive democratic politics'⁶⁹" (Çınar & Sayın, 2014: 367). Çınar and Sayın (2014: 378) note this problem as such:

The AKP's tendency to monopolize resolutions within the framework of its vision of the nation as a Sunni Islamic cultural unity results in an inconsistent and contradictory policy line oscillating between 'openings', postponement of 'openings' and even the denial of the need for the very 'openings' it has made in the first place. Even after the Alevi Opening, the AKP for example persistently refuses to recognize *cemevis* as places of worship for Alevis on the grounds that only mosques are places of worship for Muslims.

The AKP's conception of 'nation' also shows their attitude towards the recognition of the differences within a democratic framework. For Hakan Yavuz (2014: 603), while the AKP believes that it represents the values of 'the nation', it has not still developed a political discourse recognizing and protecting the differences that were silenced in its abstracted view of nation. For him (2014: 603), what the party understands from 'the nation' is restricted to the Hanefi-Turkish element and 'the demands' introduced by the party are also limited to those of the Hanefi-Turks.

Another example of the AKP's unilateral conception is about raising generations. For Erdoğan (2012), the AKP's mission is to raise devout generations and to prevent atheist generations which the CHP might intend to raise. He (2012) asserts, "We will raise a generation that is conservative and democratic and embraces the values and historical principles of its nation." This attitude of compulsory

⁶⁹ "Constitutive democratic politics refers to a rule-making and institution-building politics geared to more agreeable and accommodating social and political forms of co-existence through the compromise and consensus of conflicting identity and interest differences" (Çınar & Sayın, 2014: 381).

conservativisation is openly a version of social engineering from which the AKP and its leaders used to complain. By this way, rather than serving to consolidation of democracy in Turkey, the AKP might have opted for consolidation of its electoral base and its leader's position as the ultimate authority by relying on the age-old polarisations which allocate them absolute majorities in the parliament.

This, however, did not turn out to be costless when protests over a construction plan in Istanbul's Gezi Park rapidly turned into a fortnight-long country-wide protest against the AKP government in June 2013. The protests were an outburst of resentment with the AKP's increasingly denigrating rhetoric against the secular sectors as well as its unilateralist political style, justified in majoritarian terms. The demonstrations illustrated that Turkish democracy has reached a new threshold where the old cleavages between authoritarian secularism and Islam are surpassed. The AKP, however, retaliated by strengthening the tone of populism further. It has demonized and criminalized the demonstrators, and the CHP, as pro-tutelage, pro-coup figures, who take it to the streets and who collaborate with the external enemies, like the fictitious 'interest rate lobby', because they could never beat the AKP in elections. It has also mobilized its supporters by organizing a series of mass rallies to reassert the populist *ultima ratio* of mass support and its confidence in its electoral predominance and strength. The AKP, thereby, showed once again its incapacity to lead a paradigm-shift in Turkish democracy. (Çınar & Sayın, 2014: 380)

Another example of extreme polarisation which might have helped the AKP to consolidate its base was the Constitutional deadlock concerning the election of the president by the TBMM in 2007 after the termination of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's incumbency. For the secularist elite, the presidency was the last citadel of secular Republic and they feared that an Islamist president would gradually Islamise the Constitutional Court, judiciary and universities with his or her broad authorities in appointments (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 117). Starting from April 2007, Republican Rallies were organised all around the country and millions of people attended the campaign on preventing the AKP from choosing a candidate that secularists disaffirm. With the rallies, political polarisation reached its peak. On 27 April 2007, the Turkish Armed Forces issued a statement, which is known as 'e-memorandum', on its official website:

The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed

Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary.

This tutelary attempt polarised politics further. The Constitutional deadlock blocked the presidential election process. The major material of the crisis was about the quorum required by the Constitution: The Constitution of 1982 required two-thirds majority in the first two rounds of the election of the president. The CHP, President Sezer, the Constitutional Court and the adherent secularists were for the quorum of two-thirds as well. When the CHP and other opposition parties boycotted the presidential voting, the quorum was not realised. Then, the AKP amended the Constitution and called for early-elections. President Sezer planned to hold the a referendum on the Constitutional amendments. The elections resulted in the undisputable victory of the AKP with 46.7 percent. The new parliament elected Abdullah Gül as the eleventh president of the Republic with the participation of new opposition parties the MHP, the pro-Kurdish DTP and the DSP. Then the amendments were approved with the referendum and the subsequent presidents of the Republic were proposed to be elected by popular vote. The reason for Sezer to prevent these amendments was, for him, election of the president by popular vote would mean increasing political weight of this 'neutral' post, which was designated as a constituent of balance and stability towards the majority party rule (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 114). For Sezer, this would lead to semi-presidential or presidential system in practice (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 114).

The AKP's victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections encouraged it to be more proactive in issues on Islamic agenda like headscarf and *imam-hatip* schools (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 121). In other words, the politics of avoidance concerning Islamic cultural issues started to be changed (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 121). With religious inclinations, during its first term, the AKP attempted to criminalise adultery; however, the objections of the liberals within the party, the EU forced the AKP to withdraw its draft law. This shows flexibility and pragmatism of the AKP concerning internal and international reactions (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 126).

On 14 March 2008, the Chief Public Prosecutor of Court of Appeals initiated the process of closure of the AKP relying on the articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution. The Chief Public Prosecutor claimed that the AKP became the focus of unconstitutional acts to eradicate secular characteristic of the Republic. For Özbudun and Hale (2010: 129-130), the AKP's attempt to amend the Constitution to remove the ban on headscarf triggered this process. On 30 June 2008, although majority of the judges of the Constitutional Court approved the claims of the Chief Public Prosecutor, the Court could not close the AKP since the qualified majority of three-fifths could not be reached. However, 10 of the 11 judges concluded that the AKP violated Constitutional prohibitions; thus it became the focus of the anti-secular acts. The Court penalised the AKP by debarring it from state grants partially, rather than dissolving it. This tendency was also discerned by foreign observers. For example Tibi (2009) writes,

With reform and accommodation, Islam can be compatible with democracy, but Islamism cannot. In the world of Islam, Islamism aims at reversing the process of cultural modernization. Today, acculturation and secularization are reversed into re-traditionalization, de-acculturation, and de-secularization. The ongoing de-Westernization in Turkish society is clear.

It is also observed that the democratisation of Turkey is handicapped with domestic issues having international dimensions such as the EU process and relations with the neighbours in the Middle East. However, the AKP seems not to be consistent in its attempts of solving ethnic and religious questions regarding Kurds and Alevis.

As I (2012: 181) noted elsewhere, there are different identifications to refer to conflicting situation in Eastern and South-Eastern part of Turkey. The identifications vary as the ideological and political positions change: some prefer 'Kurdish issue', while others use 'issue of South-Eastern Anatolia' (Konuralp, 2013: 181). 'Kurdish issue' implies and emphasises aspects of identity and cultural discrepancy (Konuralp, 2012: 181). I prefer the identification of 'ethnic and regional conflict' since I consider this to be a more neutral and comprehensive identification. Its regional dimension does not indicate that this issue is limited to

the regions of Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia; there are Kurds living in the Western regions of the country.

However, the regional dimension implies the demands of the Kurds which compose the majority in the Eastern and South-Eastern provinces. Their demands vary from autonomy to independence.

The Kurdish question has a long history in Turkey with roots in the Ottoman Empire. Under Empire rule, Kurdish rebellions commenced and persisted into the early years of the Republic of Turkey. In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) added a new dimension to the Kurdish question when it initiated an armed insurgency against the Turkish state. Both in the Ottoman times and also after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, military means have characterized the state actors' response, first to the Kurdish rebellions and then to the PKK violence from 1984 onwards. (Pusane, 2014: 81)

The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured by the Turkish state in 1999 and the terror in the region was stopped. This "created an environment conducive for reforms" (Bardakçı, 2015: 349). Then the coalition government preceding the AKP gradually ended the state of emergency in the region, allowed television and radio broadcasts in Kurdish, legalised learning Kurdish language, removed the death penalty from the Turkish Criminal Code, helped the Kurds to return to their villages, which they had to leave due to the fight against the PKK (Pusane, 2014: 84).

During the AKP rule, the PKK renewed its violence in 2004. In 2009, the AKP initiated an 'opening' for the ethnic and regional conflict. The major purpose of this policy was to disarm the PKK and to find a peaceful resolution to this conflict (Pusane, 2014: 81). However, this opening has failed to reach a desired conclusion and "has turned into a disappointment both for the state actors and Kurds in Turkey" as the terror in the region renewed and increased (Pusane, 2014: 81-82). At the beginning of the opening, the AKP saw Kurdish cultural demands as reasonable requests and as Pusane (2014: 85) maintains,

Behind this perception was the AKP's emphasis on Islam as a unifying bond between Turks and Kurds. According to the AKP, granting cultural rights to the Kurds was not a step that would impair national unity. Rather, cultural pluralism and social diversity would act as a connective ingredient in Turkey and bring further richness to the society.

In order to appeal to the nationalist votes in Turkey, Erdoğan (2011a) started to argue, "From now on, the Kurdish question has ended for me; there are problems of my Kurdish brothers, but not a Kurdish question." He (2011a) criticised the PKK from religious point of view: "The terrorist organisation says 'Don't attend daily prayers behind the imams of the state'. How about you have any relation to daily prayer? I openly say; we don't have any business with the ones declaring Öcalan as prophet!" Moreover, he (2011b) asserted that if he had been a part of the government during the process of Öcalan's capture in 1999, he would have hung him.

The Kurdish question has political, social, economic and cultural dimensions fuelled with ethnic nationalist aspirations, whereas, generally speaking, the Alevis demand religious freedom on the basis of equality principle envisaged in the Constitution. In the following pages I elaborate on this issue.

In Chapter II, I referred to legal pluralism in the context of multiculturalism. The debate of legal pluralism includes incorporation of religious law, for example the *Şeriat*, to the secular legal system. The AKP remained silent about this issue; however, in the opening ceremony of Marmara University in 2010 Erdoğan addressed to legal pluralism as a future option:

Turkey will rise to a point of being an example in the world with its freedoms that will introduce advanced democracy and universal standards in basic rights and freedoms, and justice and law ... We are the successors of an understanding which throughout history respected different civilizations and religious groups having their own courts when necessary. A country which has this experience did not lose anything. It gained a lot. These are in the archives of history. I hope in the future we will again have a leading role in the world. I want our youth to believe in this and look into the future with self-confidence. As a government, we are struggling to build this self-confidence. (Turner & Arslan, 2011: 154)

The overlapping consensus in a society is realised through common grounds in cultural, educational, legal, etc domains. Otherwise, parallel communities might emerge and deeply divide society. Therefore, the secular democratic framework is necessary for harmony in society. Erdoğan's proposal is far from capable of realising this.

As I (2013: 181) mentioned elsewhere, the argument on religion for facilitating national unity and territorial integrity in an ethnically and religiously diversified country like Turkey is misleading as the other face of religion comes to the fore and when it gains political content, the national unity is usually damaged with the conflicts among religious sects and brotherhoods. As seen in European and Ottoman histories, bloodiest wars were stemmed from these kinds of conflicts. In this respect, secularism is the most substantial guarantee for both democracy and national unity, and the Sunnis and Alevis got closer with secular Republic. Without a secular-democratic framework, the ethnic, regional and religious conflicts of Turkey cannot be solved. In this respect, ethics of citizenship should be regarded as one of the major components of a secular or post-secular order.

4.1.4. Conservatism of the AKP

After the analysis of the AKP in relation to democratisation and ethics of citizenship, it would be helpful to discern the conservative direction of its ideological orientation and its attempts to approach to the centre. Following the spilt within the National Outlook, the innovators' route towards the centre with the AKP, for Mecham (2004: 353-354), stemmed from two reasons:

First, institutional constraints were ever present, much as they had been for the party's predecessors. the threat of several court cases against Erdoğan, in particular, motivated the party constantly to signal constitutional acceptability at the same time that it was calling for dramatic change. the party also refrained from challenging the military as Kutan [the chairman of the FP] had done, hoping to avoid providing any pretext for a confrontation. Secondly, the party was motivated by democratic incentives, recognising that the majority of Turks had consistently voted for centrist

parties. AKP leaders recognised that, if they could strike the fine balance between behaving like a religious protest party and brandishing secular credentials, their potential constituency greatly expanded. In the end, this strategy proved successful on both counts.

In addition, the failure of the right-of-centre might have paved the ground for the AKP to redefine and reshape it by making Islam the backbone of its conservatism (Taşkın, 2009: 469). This was impossible for the right-of-centre and nationalist traditions due to their close interaction with Republican modernisation; as the right-of-centre leaders were not too much different from the Westernist-secular elites (Taşkın, 2009: 469). In other words, Republican modernisation had been determinant even for its rivals (Taşkın, 2009: 470). The right-of-centre parties of Turkey have never opposed to modernisation of the country. However, they opted for a different form of modernisation when compared to the Republican elite: 'modernisation without modernists' (Taşkın, 2008: 55). Their synthesis of cultural and political conservatism with modernism is for benefiting "material gains of modernisation while preserving their identity" (Taşkın, 2008: 54-55). The political discourse and strategy of such a synthesis is 'conservative populism' based on the antagonism between the Republican elite and the alliance of counter-elite and the masses, i.e. 'silent Muslim majority' and on the authentic representation of them (Taşkın, 2008: 55).⁷⁰

The AKP defined Islam with a conservative content, managed to popularise it and has become rooted in society (Taşkın, 2009: 470). However, it is argued that in the sense of its conceptual and theoretical origins in the West, the AKP cannot be considered as a 'conservative' party if it is seen as a peripheral-oppositional movement:

⁷⁰ Yüksel Taşkın (2008: 56) compares and contrasts conservative populism with Bülent Ecevit's left-wing populism on the basis of authentic representation. While Ecevit's familial and educational backgrounds were elite, the conservative populists were 'genuine sons of the nation', i.e. 'silent Muslim majority' (Taşkın, 2008: 56). The upward mobility represented by the conservative populists seemed to be more convincing for the masses (Taşkın, 2008: 56). However, it should also be noted that the path to the upward mobility for the 'silent majority' was opened by the Republican modernisation, which they found alienated.

It aims to restructure the political center and public sphere in favor of the so far marginal and traditional groups at the expense of the secularist block in particular and the official establishment in general. In other words, it needs to reform the system first, and then conserve it. In the narrower sense, that is, culturally and religiously, it looks like a conservative party. (Şimşek, 2013: 438)

In this sense, it is evident that in Turkish politics, conservatism has a different process of development when compared to the West. This difference led to an understanding that conservatism

has stressed adherence to religious values, and social customs and traditions, as opposed to reasoning and rational inference in reforming the established institutions and practices of socio-political life. In a rapidly changing environment conservatism functioned in converting and adapting old concepts and practices into the new social milieu Turkey has come to experience. (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 235)

The AKP sees itself as a post-Islamist party and attempts to form its ideology as conservative-democratic which is not contradictory with its preference of defining Islamism through a conservative content (Taşkın, 2009: 470). In this respect, the AKP is more conservative than other parties of the right and for this reason, it has greater potential to become a stronger right-of-centre party with its persuasion capacity for authentic representation of the 'silent conservative/Muslim mass' (Taşkın, 2009: 470). It is also argued that, when compared to the National Outlook, the AKP is very eager to embrace right-of-centre (Taşkın, 2009: 470). The AKP distanced itself from developmentalist and third worldist resonances of the National Outlook and positioned itself near the right-of-centre tradition originated from the DP and supported integration with the dominant political and economic structures of the world (Taşkın, 2009: 470).

However, İsmail Kara (2013) as one of the most important scholars in Turkey studying Islamism argues that the AKP would be regarded in Islamic line that made accord to the system absolute. He (2013) refers to Erbakan as not being an anti-systemic leader. For him (2013), Erbakan effectively used a discourse of opposition which made his parties appear as if they were anti-system parties. His RP represented a conformist line when compared to the MSP (Kara, 2013). Kara

(2013) asserts that conformism is an important element of Islamism which not only brings electoral success, but also distortion of the essence. To come to power and to secure electoral victories, the AKP opted for this strategy (Kara, 2013).

The appeal of conservative belief system for Turkish electorate is observed in the results of elections since transition to multi-party politics in Turkey. Dwelling on a survey, Kalaycıoğlu (2007: 240-241) tries to delineate the relationship between economic indicators and attraction of conservative values:

The peculiar and irreconcilable relationship between a longing for rapid economic growth and social welfare, yet a simultaneous and similarly strong yearning to cling to the traditional, religious values of a bygone agrarian society has overwhelmed the Turkish polity. Only those political movements and parties that could create the illusion of standing for preserving the moral order of traditionalism while providing for rapid improvement in socioeconomic welfare seemed to enjoy the mass support of the plurality at the polls in the Turkish political system.

To put it in another way, the roots of the victory of the AKP lie in the irony about early-Republican ideology: the masses of Turkish people have been internalised the purpose of this ideology to catch up with the contemporary civilisation; however, the religious identity and laicism component of the very same ideological project have been, *a fortiori*, welcomed by the elite (Gülalp, 2009: 683-684). Large amount of masses are apathetic to normative laicism (Gülalp, 2009: 684). The AKP fits into this picture.

The AKP identifies its ideology as 'conservative-democratic', refrains from the label of 'Muslim-democratic' and rejects any continuity with the National Outlook (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 57).

For example, in an evaluation published in *Financial Times* in 2004, Erdoğan opposes labelling his movement as 'Muslim-democrat' and says,

Let me be quite open and clear in stating a fact—we don't find it appropriate to mix religion and politics. (...) We are not Muslim democrats, we are conservative democrats. Some in the West portray us as [Muslim democrats] but our notion of

conservative democracy is to attach ourselves to the customs and the traditions and the values of our society, which is based on family. This is a democratic issue, not a religious one. (Boland, 2004)

However, as Criss (2010: 46) maintain, "the terms are confusing because a conservative stance about family values is a personal as well as a political choice, especially in a patriarchal society like Turkey. It has nothing to do with democratic outlook." On the other hand, for Özbudun and Hale (2010: 57), it is very difficult to distinguish the AKP between the right-of-centre traditions in Turkey. Contrary to this view, Eligür (2010: 254) rejects the AKP's claim that it is a moderate party and she asserts:

(T)he personal histories of its leaders and the policies it proposed and/or adopted in power both suggest the continuing strength of Islamism in the party. Moderation of the party is a response to the demonstrated willingness of the military to intervene and the increased weariness/watchfulness on the part of a military leadership that has reaffirmed its commitment to secularism.

The emergence of the AKP signifies the end of the National Outlook type of Islamism in Turkey and while conservatism and Islamism cohabitated under the flag of right-of-centre parties, the AKP changed their positions in this cohabitation by subsuming the former to the latter (Çiğdem, 2014: 29-30). Arose from an Islamic movement, the AKP's description of itself as 'conservative-democratic' implies some religious demands of the society by 'conservative' and transformation of the Kemalist regime by 'democratic' (Duran, 2014: 155). However,

Despite its reformist politics, the AKP experience has been unable to establish a balance between its conservatism and its commitment to democratic consolidation. In fact, there has been a disconnection between conservatism and democracy in the conservative democratic political identity of the party. It has been conservative, for sure, but, the extent to which it has a political will to democratic consolidation has remained doubtful. (Keyman, 2010: 325)

Although the AKP leaders reject identification with 'Muslim-democrats', William Hale (2005: 307) finds great resonance with the European Christian-democrats regarding policies on moral, cultural, educational, international issues, support

structures. The major difference can be about their emergence: while the Christian-democrats emerged as conservative movements defending the status-quo, the AKP portrayed itself against the state-centred authoritarian secularists (Hale, 2005: 307). In this respect, the AKP has parallels more with neo-conservatism than conservatism. Neo-conservatives aim at reestablishment of authority by turning back to traditional values based on family, religion and nation (Türköne, 2003: 125). Neo-conservatism is a formation of reaction (Güler, 2007: 147). For Habermas (1991: 24), while old conservatism missed turning back to the pre-modern life-styles, neo-conservatism admitted the economic and technological features of the modernity, but tried to limit the corruptive effects of cultural modernism. Neo-conservatism coincided with post-modernism, both of which wanted to get rid of normative presumptions of modernity (Habermas, 1991: 24). Coincided with neo-conservatism, neoliberal hegemony is sustained through "the molecular Islamization of economic discourse" (Tuğal, 2010: 70).

The party program, the statute of the party, electoral manifestoes and declarations of its leaders show that its commitment to the universal values like democracy, human rights, rule of law, limited state, pluralism, tolerance and respect to differences is strong in discursive level. The party in its statute recognizes the 'national will' as the sole determinant and the Republic as the most significant administrative gain of the Turkish nation.⁷¹

⁷¹ In the fourth article of the party statute it is stated: "AK PARTİ believes that the most important administrative acquisition of Turkish People is the Republic, and that sovereignty rests unconditionally with the Nation. AK PARTİ acknowledges that the nations will is the unique determining power. AK PARTİ holds that the most supreme power which has to be regarded by entities and individuals using sovereignty on behalf of the Nation is the principle of supremacy of law. AK PARTİ favors intelligence, science, and experience as its guiding elements. AK PARTİ considers the elements of nations will, supremacy of law, intelligence, science, experience, democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and ethics as the foundations of its political administration.

(...) AK PARTİ emphasizes that individuals have an undisputable right to live the way they believe, and to voice what they think; that to promote and to make propaganda of beliefs and thoughts in a lawful manner is a right and authorization of individuals and non-governmental organizations; that each individual has equal and common rights before each institution and in every area of life, and thus the State should not favor any particular belief or thought in a manner detrimental

When compared to the parties of the National Outlook, the AKP has a clearer attitude towards secularism. In the Party Programme, it is stated:

Our party considers religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity, and secularism as a prerequisite of democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience. It also rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity against religion. Basically, secularism is a principle which allows people of all religions, and beliefs to comfortably practice their religions, to be able to express their religious convictions and live accordingly, but which also allows people without beliefs to organize their lives along these lines. From this point of view, secularism is a principle of freedom and social peace.

The AKP's view has parallels with the scholars' approach mentioned above, at least in the level of party statute and programme as secularism is evaluated on the bases of social peace, freedoms, democracy and rejection of the strict practices and interpretation of the previous eras. This view is also compatible with ethics of citizenship in Habermasian sense. Özbudun and Hale (2010: 59) argue that this is a passive secularism understanding. This passive secularism satisfies the expectations of majority of the Turks, while it is the only realistic policy, for them (2010: 67), to prevent cleavage. This does not mean that the AKP would not bring the religious issues to the political arena; however, it would do so as the concern of basic rights, rather than a matter of religion or religiosity as seen in the removal of *türban* ban in universities (Özbudun & Hale, 2010: 67). This can be seen as using universal values as a shield against the laicist setting in Turkey (Özbudun and Hale: 2010: 69). Özbudun and Hale (2010: 68-69) use Habermasian terminology and see the change of perspective starting from the post 28 February 1997 context within the political Islamic movement as a 'learning-process' as they came to terms with the risks of challenging secular state. Likewise, İhsan Dağı (2004: 140) argues:

to other ones; and that the principles of laicism and equality before law as defined in the Constitution are the assurance of this approach and perspective. AK PARTİ holds that the sole function which the State and the legal entity of the Party could play in this area should be limited to the establishment of a free environment which offers and secures the use of fundamental individual rights. AK PARTİ holds that fundamental rights and freedoms may not be subject to any kind of voting."

Since 1997, the Islamists have seen Islam's social bases with its educational, commercial, and solidarity networks disrupted by the politicization of Islam, which exposed Islamic networks to the assault of the Kemalists. Because the visibility and power of Islam in the political realm justified only the counter-attack of the Kemalists, the threatened Islamists have become more interested in keeping Islam's social and economic structures intact as the bases for social 'conservatism.' Therefore, ideas for a 'social' rather than a 'political' Islam have gained ground, perfectly displayed by the acknowledgement of the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP), despite its Islamic roots that all ideologies including Islamism have died in the age of globalization. The JDP [AKP], realizing that the rise of political Islam was detrimental to Islam's social and economic influence in Turkey, defined itself as 'conservative-democrat' in an attempt to escape from the self-defeating success of political Islam.

According to Jenny B. White (2005: 88), Islamic-inspired AKP not only came to an agreement that religion is personal, but also the ability of the religion to be incorporated into the public and political spheres without compromising the secular state system. In this respect, the contours of the private and the public, the personal, the civil, and the political have to be redefined (White, 2005: 88). White (2005: 88) also suggests that a new model of Muslimhood of the AKP replaced traditional Islamism:

When a secular person enters the political realm, she becomes secularist; when an Islamic believer enters the political realm, she becomes, by definition, Islamist. The Muslimhood model challenges this by asserting that believing Muslims can be secular politicians, that their qualities of personhood not only do not disqualify them from running the secular governmental machinery, but may even benefit the political realm by inserting personal ethics and a moral stance.

As Graham Fuller (2008: 107-108) notes, the concept of 'Muslimhood' is creative as it dislocates an explicitly religious agenda from the political program of the party while not excluding values coming from the nature of Islam. In this respect, the AKP is a sort of an Islamist party (Fuller, 2008: 108). Firstly, most of the AKP leaders came from Islamic movement, while there is an evolution together with some kind of continuity (Fuller, 2008: 108). Secondly, the real meaning of 'conservatism' of the AKP is the wish of appreciation of Islam and Ottoman heritage of Turkey, rather than suppressing them (Fuller, 2008: 108). Thirdly, the AKP is supported hotly by devotees as well as other segments of society and the party stresses some religious issues at the expense of polarisation (Fuller, 2008:

108). Fourthly, the AKP pursued many socio-religious policies such as removal of bans on headscarf, attempt of criminalizing adultery, full integration of the *imam-hatip* schools into the academic system, greater freedom of expression for Islam in the public life, work on Islamic banking system, support of Ottoman symbolism (Fuller, 2008: 108-109). Fifthly, the members of the AKP reflect religious characteristics deferent to God. Sixthly, the leaders of the AKP urgently searched for improving relations with Muslim countries, rather than isolating them (Fuller, 2008: 109). Therefore, for Fuller (2008: 109), the AKP is to be considered as a moderate-Islamist party. This is a result of evolution of Turkish Islamists to a more realistic and sophisticated vision by re-evaluating the negative examples in the Muslim world (Fuller, 2008: 110-111). The factors that contributed to this new understanding, for Fuller (2008: 113) are: (1) general development of Turkey with modernisation and democratisation processes which made Turkey open to world; (2) the tension between Kemalists and Islamists which unwittingly forced Islamists to search for new creative understandings of the role of Islam in a democratic society; (3) the relative isolation of Turkey by Western powers from bloody and polarising military and geopolitical struggles with the rest of the Muslim world in the last half a century. Bassam Tibi (2009), on the other hand, asserts for the contrary:

In the name of democratic reforms, as European diplomats have observed, the AKP has reduced the secular impact of the army, defamed judicial defence of the constitution as a 'judicial coup', expanded the *Imam-Hatip* religious schools and equated them to secular schools, and fired university presidents. Too many in the West praise the AKP as 'moderate Islamic'. The only difference, however, between moderate and jihadist Islamists is the use of the ballot box instead of violence to come to power. It may be important to include Islamists in democracy but certainly not with the Western naive notion that inclusion will tame Islamism.

Some would consider this argument as being aggressive towards the AKP; however, when compared to Fuller's rosy scenario, it reflects a more realistic evaluation. Either call them Islamists or Muslimhood, their conservatism based on religion might prevent democratisation in Turkey. The AKP makes use of democratic discourse to justify an issue from the Islamic agenda in the public sphere.

The ideological formation of the AKP could be summarised as liberal in economic sense, Islamic in social sense. This is transformation of political Islam in Turkey. This transformation took place with a learning-process which subordinated some universal values to the political agenda of the ex-Islamists. To put it in another way, "the Turkish version of secularism has been a successful project" as in time, "it led to a large number of people taking religion as a system of belief and morality rather than a prescriptive set of political rules" (Heper & Toktaş, 2003: 158).⁷²

Nonetheless, it is also argued that Turkey is no longer a secular democracy since the AKP conquered bureaucracy and changed the identity of the country (Sharon-Krespin, 2009). Sharon-Krespin (2009) also blames the Gülen community as not only try to influence government, but also to become the government itself.

Never before, though, has a single individual started a movement that seeks to transform Turkish society so fundamentally. Gülen now wields a vocal partisan media; a vast network of loyal bureaucrats; partisan universities and academia; partisan prosecutors and judges; partisan security and intelligence agencies; partisan capitalists, business associations, NGOs, and labor unions; and partisan teachers, doctors, and hospitals. (Sharon-Krespin, 2009)

As Sharon-Krespin (2009) maintains, the AKP facilitated this movement to reorient the Turkish judiciary by replacing and appointing thousands of judges and prosecutors:

The results of the AKP's targeting of the judicial system are already apparent as anti-secular, pro-AKP officials have been at the forefront of some controversial trials, such as the case against Van University president Yücel Aşkın, the Şemdinli investigation in which the prosecutor tried to implicate Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt before he became chief of the General Staff, and, most recently, the Ergenekon probe.

⁷² Heper and Toktaş (2003: 159) argue that from 1969 (formation of the MNP) when they saw religion and secularism as incompatible, the clerical political cadres have adopted themselves to the secular-democratic Republic. For them (2003: 174), Erdoğan successfully represents the change in merging Islam with democracy and avoiding the Islamic discourse. They (2003: 173) argue that Erdoğan's aim is moral development rather than *Şeriat*.

Criss (2010: 52) disagrees with the idea that seeing Gülen movement as a social phenomenon, since it is indeed a social engineering design to dismantle social texture of Turkey. "It may be akin to the Protestant missionary movement of the nineteenth century, yet the latter had no claim on state power" (Criss, 2010: 52). When police operations took place regarding the investigations on alleged corruption incidents on 17 and 25 December 2013 and related tapes were leaked, the AKP portrayed these incidents as a plot against itself (Hamisci, 2014). Then, government initiated counter-operations to Gülen community. This very event shows the importance of a secular-democratic framework for a government and the danger of governing through communities. Rather than relying on religious sects, *tarikats* or communities the government has to promote democratic public sphere on the basis of equality principle. Otherwise, public and official spheres become arena for extra-political organisations to seek power and to replace one another.

In the context of conservatism of the AKP, family as the micro 'foundation' of Turkish society and as a socio-political metaphor has been the locus of social policies. With a conservative political discourse, the women's roles in families, discussions on reproduction, abortion, birth control, gender inequality, regulation of sexuality, the AKP tries to transform modern family rather than preservation. Women issue is in the very centre of this attitude. The AKP sees ban on headscarf in official sphere as an intervention to basic human rights. However, on 10 November 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decided that the ban is not an infraction of human rights. Erdoğan (2005) criticised this decision and argued that the Court cannot have a say on religious issues; only the *ulema* has the right to decide. In the due course, the AKP managed to remove this ban.

Erdoğan (2014a) also openly rejects gender equality on biological grounds: "You cannot make women and men equal; this is against nature," for him, "What women need is to be able to be equivalent, rather than equal." In a parallel manner he (2013a) opposes to birth control and abortion. For him (2013a), abortion is a conspiracy to Turkish nation to leave it backward in the race of nation. As Zafer

Yılmaz (2015: 375) points out, the AKP's discourse of 'strengthening the family' through social assistance based on means test is a way of disciplining and re-organising society and of moralising social question in line with conservative values. Erdoğan's (2013b: 7) motivations behind prioritisation of strengthening family could be seen his opening speech of the *International Summit of Family and Social Policies*:

... nation and state exist if only family exists ...Therefore, we are admitting that any attack against family is an attack against humanity and we don't tolerate it in any case. Without any suspicion, this understanding exists at the base of all of our reforms that we carry out in every sphere, initially education. Strengthening the family with education, health and social policy, strengthening the family with economy, making politics a servant of family, on that basis we succeeded in developing Turkey and we will continue in the same manner.

The neoliberal structural reforms and increasing household debt forced governments to dwell on 'strengthening family' to cope with rising urban poverty (Yılmaz, 2015: 375-376). By equating social with familial, the AKP aims at "converging social and political forces so as to inject conservative ideology into the everyday life of individuals and fundamentally familialize the political support behind the conservative program of the ruling party" (Yılmaz, 2015: 377). 'The new welfare governance'⁷³ practiced by the AKP is parallel to a mixture of social conservatism and neoliberal populism suggesting "a liberal residualism, flavored with social conservative values, that are premised upon the centrality of the family and the significance of communal solidarity" (Buğra & Keyder, 2006: 213). By this way, the AKP becomes hegemonic over working class and successful in magnetising the poor. However, the AKP's social policy is far from universalistic, rights-based, secular orientation.

⁷³ Buğra and Candaş (2011: 517) note, "the debates around social capital, the rise of religious associations and brotherhoods as civil society initiatives and business partnerships, and the associated increase in philanthropic activity are, after all, some widely shared features of 'the new welfare governance' that are valid across various contexts today." The charity model which the AKP promotes is in sharp contrast with the rights-based social policy. "The fact that the poor, socially marginalized and excluded portions of society did not partake in an equal citizenship status prevented these groups from bringing their forces together to demand social justice in the form of a universal and rights-based social security regime that takes into consideration differences in the capabilities to exercise rights" (Buğra & Candaş, 2011: 526).

Mustafa Şen (2010: 75) refers to the neoliberal strategy of governing through community, rather than governing through society. This is very much related to the social policy preferences of the AKP to legitimise and sublimate religious communities discredited and suppressed by the state in the previous eras (Şen, 2010: 75). This goes together with marketisation of public services by withdrawal of the state during the AKP rule (Şen, 2010: 75). For example, the AKP restructured the Ministry of Health parallel to the shift of "its role from the health care provider to the organizer, coordinator, and purchaser of these services" (Şen, 2010: 75). The AKP also encouraged the private schools (Şen, 2010: 76). This conservative social policy helps the AKP to shape the social imaginary. In other words, the Republican social imaginary based on secular credentials are on the way of retreat. Here I argue that this retreat is not only a result of a political process but has socio-economic undergrounds.

Together with the social policy, the economic factors contributed to the electoral victories and hegemony of the AKP in a neoliberal environment. To illustrate, Ziya Öniş's (2012: 135) assessment of the political economy of the AKP era argues for 'the triumph of conservative globalism'. "However, as the AKP's policies have not so far significantly improved the conditions of popular sectors, political economic approaches have to resort to explanations regarding the cultural and religious spheres, and this does not neatly fit in with their overall theorization" (Tuğal, 2010: 33). Öniş (2012: 135) relates exceptional performance of ascendancy of the AKP in three consecutive parliamentary elections of 2002, 2007 and 2011, in which no sign of governmental fatigue due to incumbency was seen, to this triumphant character of their political economy. Although the one-party dominant political system in the AKP era owes much to the highly fragmented opposition, Şerif Mardin's 'centre-periphery' approach was turned on its head as the AKP has marched from the periphery to establish its hegemony at the very centre of Turkish politics (Öniş, 2012: 136-137). Similarly, Mustafa Şen (2010: 60) opposes the one-dimensional portrayal of Turkish politics like centre-periphery approach as it obscures complex and multifaceted socio-political and socio-economic processes

which transformed Islamism in Turkey. "The first is the gradual but continuous rise of Islamist movements; the second is the rapid enlargement of the religious field; and last but not the least is the uninterrupted march of neo-liberalism, which has diffused every sphere of social life" (Şen, 2010: 61). Cihan Tuğal (2010: 19) analyses the rise of the AKP from the perspective of establishment of hegemony by the religious business community through a *passive revolution*⁷⁴ with which the AKP absorbed the Islamist opposition and reinforced neoliberal order. The essence of the passive revolution achieved by the AKP is its unsystematic adoption of the Islamist strategies and then making use of them for non-Islamic purposes (Tuğal, 2010: 20). Tuğal (2010: 19) maintains that

The economy boomed under the AKP government, and the party turned out to be the most successful privatizer of public companies. Unemployment and poverty peaked, but the informal workers remained unshakable supporters. Many scholars and journalists have interpreted this process as one of rationalization. However, the ambivalences in Turkish Islamism's history, the indecisive mobilizations, and the still persisting contradictions lead me to read this transition as a passive revolution. Islamism had mobilized activists and workers, and the AKP appropriated this mobilization to reinforce neoliberalization in Turkey.

An indicator of passive revolution realised by the AKP the demise of the Islamic street action since the governing party has Islamic origins and any mobilisation against the ruling authority would damage Islamism (Tuğal, 2010: 237). When mosques and sermons become more activist limited to the inter-individual level, this leads to 'the mobilization of demobilization' contributing to the neoliberal hegemony, popular passiveness and religious people's increasing integration with the state (Tuğal, 2010: 237). The ruling party also appropriates counter-system mobilisation to strengthen the system itself (Tuğal, 2010: 242). It is argued that with the emergence of new religiosity conception based on being more capitalistic, liberal, tolerant, and individualistic, the Islamic civil society evolved to a modern direction (Tuğal, 2010: 242-243). "As a result of the AKP's passive revolution,

⁷⁴ The Gramscian term of Passive Revolution refers to the prevention of revolutionary potential emerging from the organic crisis of the capital through the absorption of revolutionary movements (Tuğal, 2010: 46-47).

political society and civil society -which had fallen out of sync at the end of the 1990s-were reintegrated" (Tuğal, 2010: 247). In this context, for Tuğal (2010: 247), "the regime was Islamized but did not become Islamic" and "Islam became a defining feature of national unity, without reducing the salience of Turkish identity." Interestingly enough, the name of the book in which the practices of the AKP governments between 2002 and 2012 narrated is '*Silent Revolution: Turkey's Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory*' (Başbakanlık, 2013). This name reminds passive revolution to sustain neoliberalism. Although, for Tuğal, Islamisation during the AKP rule is seen as a modernising reinforcement of the secular order, in the due course, the AKP could not achieve a balanced attitude to strengthen harmony within society and to ease down polarisation. That is why in this research I argue for dissociation of the AKP rule from post-secular direction.

The durability of the AKP in the contexts of post-2001 economic crisis in Turkey and post-2008 global crisis is also bound to the mix of domestic and global factors. Firstly, the 2001 crisis paved the ground for 'regulatory neo-liberalism' with the establishment of fiscal and monetary discipline together with strong regulatory measures concerning the banking and the financial system (Öniş, 2012: 139). This crisis not only made the AKP available to for a broad-based cross-class alliance, but also led to the demise of the parties of the coalition government which paid the costs of the crisis (Öniş, 2012: 139). In addition to that "the AKP was fortunate in the sense that its early years in government coincided with an unusually favorable global liquidity environment that enabled Turkey to attract large inflows of short-term and long-term foreign capital" (Öniş, 2012: 139). Öniş (2012: 141-142) conceptualises the political economy of the AKP era as 'social and regulatory neo-liberalism' as the AKP successfully brought together winners and losers of the neoliberal globalisation through effective use of aforementioned formal and informal redistributive tools. Nonetheless, Öniş (2012: 141) admits that the social policy of the AKP is exclusionary and far from the concept of universal right in a sense that social grants and aids depend on membership of the party and its affiliated informal networks. In fact, Turkey was negatively affected by the 2008-

2009 global financial crisis (Öniş, 2012: 142). However, for Öniş (2012: 137), the government was effective in the management of the crisis politically. Öniş (2012: 145) finds new foreign policy orientation of the AKP as the major contributor to the successful management of the global financial crisis.

For him (2012: 145), the proactive foreign policy behaviour and the strategy of 'zero problems with the neighbours' not only strengthened Turkey in the international arena but also provided the AKP with massive appeal in domestic politics. For Öniş (2012: 146), this new orientation represents a break with old-style defensive nationalism and leads to an interplay of nationalism with globalism:

The AKP's style nationalism is an outward-oriented nationalism, where integration into global markets and building co-operative links at the regional and global level could bring about significant benefits, clearly consistent with a broader understanding of 'national interest'. Stated somewhat differently, in the AKP context globalism and nationalism do not constitute contradictory terms in the sense that the AKP's globalism signifies effective management of globalization process in line with a more nuanced understanding of national interests. In the conservative globalist schema, nationalism of a different kind together with the traditional recourse to conservative-religious discourse constitute the very tools to build the broad-based, cross-class electoral coalitions. Conservative globalism, in other words, appealed to the wider nationalist sentiments of the Turkish electorate by skilfully combining a progressive and integrationist approach to globalization with a different style and understanding of nationalism, which, in retrospect, helped to swing the pendulum in Turkish politics further away from the control of the old-style defensive nationalists.

4.2. The Headscarf and Alevi Issues

At this point, I would like to elaborate more on the relationship between public sphere and the rise of 'religious nationalism' which corroded the boundaries between the secular and the religious. While for Tuğal (2010: 68) "the growing impact of religion on public life strengthened secular capitalist hegemony rather than undermining it", Hurd (2004: 239) finds this worrisome as the AKP support "a role for Islam in the public sphere and threaten Western-inspired boundaries between the sacred and secular."

Islam as an extraneous matter has a crucial role in the development of Western post-secularity. Entrance of Islam to the European public spheres attracted attention of the Western social scientists. Visibility of Islamic symbols, and thus Muslims in these public spheres gave way to interrogation of the secular boundaries of the Western modernity. In the works of Habermas, the relation set between an ideal public sphere and functioning of a pluralist democracy required reconsideration and conceptualisation of public sphere with an interdisciplinary viewpoint and a pluralist framework (Göle, 2012b: 37). In Europe, the public sphere becomes an arena where conflicting intimacies and entanglements between different Islamic and European cultural and religious codes took place (Göle, 2012b: 36). Globalisation contributes to autonomy of the public in post-national manner *vis-à-vis* the political sphere remaining national (Göle, 2012: 35). The demands of religion to realise public visibility causes public debates in different national and post-national contexts (Göle, 2012b: 35). Islam joins the formation of post-national European public, but this also challenges the norms and ethics of European secular modernity. Within this Western context, the post-secularism literature argues for the inclusion of the religious to the public sphere.

In this research, I want transpose this situation to the Turkish context, i.e. a secular state in a predominantly Muslim society. I choose two issues to discuss the very same confusion in the public sphere. The first one is the Islamic demands on the visibility in the public sphere symbolised with the headscarf issue. The second issue is the demands of Alevis living in Turkey. Just like what Muslim effect in Europe did to guarantee pluralism in public sphere, to take part in it, the Alevis of Turkey force the boundaries of the 'secular' public sphere which has been dominated by the Sunni-Turkish socio-cultural identity.

Nilüfer Göle (2012b: 11) assumes a necessity for differentiating secularism from the Western experience and admitting the multiplicity of secularism. For her (2012b: 11), the secular of a different historical path has different religious genealogies; however, they are all related to the hegemonic enforcements of

Western modernity and colonialism. Secularism being a Western master narrative based on a 'domestic' discussion formed by the interaction with Christianity is in the process of devastating change when it encountered with Islam (Göle, 2012b: 12). This is the concern of post-secularism literature confined to the 'affluent' societies of the West. In this research, I examine this for the public sphere of Turkish context by taking into account the historical development and more recent motors of change.

The analysis of secularism in non-Western contexts may lead to two different attitudes: either to treat secularism as an alien ideology for the non-Western societies since it is inherent to the Latin Christian world; or to break the consubstantiality of the secular and the Western and to examine different formations and appearances of the secular in different historical and religious contexts (Göle, 2012b: 13). In this research, I pursue the latter attitude and look at peculiarities of the Turkish case.

On the one hand, secularism grounded on the ideal of national community 'independent of religion'; however, in Turkey, this community, by implication, was defined contrary not only to the non-Muslim minorities of the cosmopolitan empire, but to the Alevis and Kurds, and defined around the Sunni majority (Göle, 2012b: 16). For Göle (2012b: 16), secularism became a homogenising vector in the process of Turkish nation-building. In the second section of Chapter II, in reference to Taner Timur's analysis, I mentioned the failure of secular nation-building during the Ottoman era.

In the due course, the Republicans opted for a secularly-inspired Turkish identity as the basis of citizenship in Turkey. However, ethics of citizenship in Habermasian sense has not been institutionalised and internalised at a reasonable level in societal and official realms. This resulted in conflicts within society. These conflicts and other problems of institutionalisation of secularism in Turkey prevent a post-secular compromise.

On the other hand, it is argued that the public context created by secularism reflects the emergence of new forms of religiosity and religion-based new national ideologies since 1980s (Çınar, Roy & Yahya, 2012: 4). The AKP is presented as an example of this (Çınar, Roy & Yahya, 2012: 4). The roots of this emergence is traced in the secular discourse that "relegated a unique and controlled place to religion as a consequence of attempts to establish secularism as a foundational principle during state and nation-building efforts" (Çınar, Roy & Yahya, 2012: 4). According to this account, the attempts of secularist discourse of systematic and controlled inclusion (not exclusion) of religion to the public sphere to maintain control and authority over religion is challenged and thus, secularism itself is being transformed (Çınar, Roy & Yahya, 2012: 4). In the Turkish case, this resulted in the rise of 'secular Islam'⁷⁵ (Çınar, Roy & Yahya, 2012: 4).

This post-secular reading of transformation of secularism is based on the assertion that by "the controlled inclusion of religions and religion-based movements in the public spheres was the primary means through which secular states established their authority" (Çınar, Roy & Yahya, 2012: 5). Despite post-secular interpellations, this approach reflects substantial difference from Habermasian public sphere as an ideal realm of deliberation and their focus in public sphere is on power relations. Alev Çınar (2012: 43) argues:

Contrary to the emancipator ideals attributed to the Habermasian public sphere, public visibility and voice do not necessarily promote political liberties. As a regime of visibility, the public sphere also operates to deny agency by constructing a public gaze that continuously marks and categorizes subjectivities.

The headscarf issue in Turkey is regarded as the visibility dimension of power relations in the public sphere. The ban on headscarf in public universities in 1986 was to sustain gendered power relations in secular public sphere of Turkey. Dress is seen as indicator of modern nature of Turkish revolution. The Hat Law of 1925

⁷⁵ In 1990s, there was a rise of notion of secular Islam suggested: "how secular in Turkey is defined in direct relation to Islam, and how it derives its authority and power from its ability to define, control and monitor the presence of Islam in the public sphere" (Çınar, Roy & Yahya, 2012: 11).

is an example of this visibility as it is stated in its justification: "We propose to abolish the hat worn currently, which has become a mark of difference between Turkey and other modern nations, and replace it with the hat that is the common headgear of all modern, civilised nations" (Çınar, 2012: 31). The Western dress was seen as a symbol of the break with the past (Çınar, 2012: 32). Çınar (2012: 36) argues,

When women wearing the Islamic headscarf appear in public spaces, especially in places like the university campus or public offices, which are the strongholds of secularism, this seemingly trivial piece of clothing imposes an Islamic frame upon the public-private distinction and unsettles the established secular norms that constitute publicness. Thus, the subversive effect of the Islamic headscarf lies in its power to redraw the boundaries of public and private spheres, thereby unsettling the authority of secularism over the body and the public sphere.

Çınar (2012: 37) also argues that with the ban, the secular norms of public sphere made headscarf a 'marked' identity, while unveiled women were unmarked, meaning invisible. However, when we consider a conservative context where headscarf is freely worn by public personnel and political power is dominated by a religiously oriented party, the religious way of living and taking part in the public sphere cannot be seen as 'an option' among many. On the contrary, it becomes *de facto* norm of public life and being unveiled is to be regarded as a marked identity. Then, it is an open ended question that how the other options are to be taken under guarantee in a post-secular manner. In addition, how *translation proviso* works becomes a matter. In a religiously-dominated context, the demands of the religious can neither be exposed to secular filters nor be deliberated. As İsmail Kara (2008: 190) puts it, religion is not an area of debate in a conservative context.

To illustrate: When an issue is presented as a command of the religion, the conservative party would derogate the ones debating the issue on the grounds that "how come the opposition can discuss a religious matter?" as the sacred is untouchable for the conservative party. They would also argue: "Don't you know the commands of our religion? Aren't you believers? Aren't you religious? If you dare to open a command of religion to discussion, then you cannot be believer."

This line of argument in politics is very dangerous and it is impossible to compete with this in a conservative society. Hence, 'untranslatable' religion turns to be a suppressive agent of the religiously-oriented political power depending on the religious majority. This is the major problem of post-secularity in an Islamic context. Therefore, post-seculars oscillate between granting freedom for religion in the public sphere and securing pluralism and freedoms for other options. The Turkish case is an evident reflection of this very problem.

As another example, it should be noted that the headscarf issue and some of Erdoğan's speeches on relegating the issue to the *ulema* provoked Islamic sentiments with anger and the Turkish judiciary became a direct target of such religious anger. Eligür (2010: 252) elaborates on this point as follows:

The tension between the JDP [AKP] and the secular segment of the society once again rose following a terrorist attack on the Council of State (*Danıştay*, the high court in administrative affairs) judges in Ankara in May 2006. On May 17, lawyer Alparslan Arslan opened fire inside the Council of State, killing Second Criminal Bureau Judge Mustafa Yücel Özbilgin and wounding four more judges. Arslan was protesting against a ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf (*türban*) in state institutions. After his arrest, he declared 'I am a soldier of Allah.' This was the first time a state official representing the secular Turkish Republic was targeted by an Islamist. Earlier, Prime Minister Erdoğan had declared that the issue of banning the Islamic headscarf in state institutions was an issue in the jurisdiction of the *ulema* (religious experts) rather than the Council of State. Parliamentarians from the main opposition party, the RPP [CHP], openly accused the JDP [AKP] government of 'emboldening religious extremists by voicing its opposition to the headscarf ban and through its frequent harsh criticism of court rulings.' Judge Özbilgin's funeral drew tens of thousands of Turkish citizens and became a bold message to the JDP [AKP] of public support for Turkey's secular order. Protesters shouted, 'Turkey is secular and will remain so,' and called Prime Minister Erdoğan a 'murderer;' they 'demanded the government's resignation and booted and jostled senior ministers attending the service.' President Sezer issued a veiled warning to the JDP [AKP] government by stating, 'those responsible for the attack need to reconsider their behavior. No one is strong enough to redefine secularism and in turn harm democracy.' Despite the fact that Prime Minister Erdoğan complained there was a 'conspiracy' against his government, then the chief of the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök, urged Turkish citizens to persist with their demonstrations in the defense of the values of the secular republic.

In Chapter II, I mentioned the *institutional translation proviso* as the key point of Habermasian post-secularism approach. Habermas (2006: 11-12) warns that if

there is no institutional threshold, for example, the parliaments would become a battlefield of religiously oriented convictions; the government would be an agent of religious majority to assert its will; and thus, the majority rule would turn into repression. In this sense, the *institutional translation proviso* is relevant for the functioning of democratic procedure based on discursive nature of deliberation. "The democratic procedure has the power to generate legitimacy precisely because it both includes all participants and has a deliberative character; for the justified presumption of rational outcomes in the long run can solely be based on this" (Habermas, 2006: 12). The democratic procedure of deliberation might be operative in a consolidated democracy of an affluent society where religious way of living is an option among many. However, in a society where ethics of citizenship based on civic solidarity is not well established, domination of religious majority would be the case. The discussion on the AKP illustrates this point.

The ban on headscarf in Turkey was brought to the European Court of Human Rights in several cases. The ECHR's decisions were parallel to the decisions of Turkish high judiciary. For example, the ECHR (2005: 4) stated:

The Court did not lose sight of the fact that there were extremist political movements in Turkey which sought to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts. Against that background, it was the principle of secularism which was the paramount consideration underlying the ban on the wearing of religious symbols in universities. In such a context, where the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others and, in particular, equality before the law of men and women were being taught and applied in practice, it was understandable that the relevant authorities should consider it contrary to such values to allow religious attire, including, as in the case before the Court, the Islamic headscarf, to be worn on university premises.

Despite the decisions of national and supranational courts, the AKP attempted to remove the ban on headscarf in universities in 2008. This legislative attempt was brought before the Constitutional Court by the CHP and the DSP. The Constitutional Court (2008), decided that the legislation was unconstitutional. In the due course, by not struggling for the unconstitutionality of the new regulations of the AKP government and new legislation, following the change of leadership,

the CHP contributed to the removal of the ban on headscarf not only for the university students, but also for the state personnel.

In Chapter II, I referred to Taylor and Maclure's (2011: 71) argument that religious accommodations, such as wearing religious clothes in public offices, can be regarded as inequitable since the believers have the ability to adopt their beliefs and life plans to the conditions that they have to confront. For Taylor and Maclure (2011: 71), solution to this kind of conflict is a reasonable accommodation. In this respect, the new legislation in Turkey can be seen as controversial in the sense of post-secularism approach presented in the second chapter.

I want to note the need for change of paradigm concerning the headscarf issue in terms of Turkish laicism. Against the traditional morality ascribing particular roles to women, restricting them to certain places, allowing polygamy, it is evident that the Turkish modernisation and Republican state had a strong commitment to make women visible in public sphere as citizens on the grounds of women's rights and their co-socialisation with male counterparts (Göle, 2012b: 55). In that context, veiling was the reflection of such a secondary role of the Muslim women. "In a Muslim context, secularism denotes a modern way of life, calling for the 'emancipation' of women from religion, the removal of the veil, and the end of the spatial separation of sexes" (Göle, 2002: 185). The Turkish state promoted a 'secular self' for women and made its will visible by Western appearance. However, today, besides secular elite culture, a counter-elite culture is being constructed (Göle, 2012b: 58). Islam is shaped by the secular age as well (Göle, 2012b: 66). "Islam displays a new 'stage' in the making of modern social imaginaries; a stage in which ocular, corporeal, and spatial aspects underlie social action, confrontation, and cohabitation" (Göle, 2002: 190). On the one hand, headscarf turns out to be a symbol of women's finding place in the public sphere, rather than their exclusion. This can be considered as a post-secular momentum. On the other hand, the religiously-oriented government party in Turkey seems to make use of this momentum to enforce its own social imaginary towards secular-self understanding

of the Republic. In this respect, consolidation of Turkish democracy might be prevented and social and political polarisation might be triggered.

From this analysis, I would like to clarify my point that if Islam displays a new stage and headscarf becomes a symbol of participating in the public sphere rather than exclusion to the private domain, a post-secular democracy should incorporate pious and veiled women on the condition that the rights and freedoms of the unveiled women are openly secured by the secular state. Otherwise, the freedoms of many unveiled women would be under the threat of neighbourhood pressure or social imaginary of the religious majority. Principle of laicism is the only guarantee for the freedoms of citizens. In a post-secular context, the public sphere should operate as a buffer zone between the religious and the official sphere which is to be strictly organised around the principle of laicism. The ones holding political power and having authority are to act within the contours of this principle. If a political party either having religious or secular background comes to power via elections, the secular-democratic constitutionalism is to limit the discourse and practice of the party in question.

Besides headscarf issue, the second issue concerning the boundaries of Turkish secular order is the demands of Alevis living in Turkey. I argue that the Alevi issue forces the boundaries of the 'secular' public sphere which has been dominated by the Sunni-Turkish socio-cultural identity. As the entrance of Muslims to the European secular public spheres change the nature of European secularisms and modernity, the demands of Alevis of Turkey have similar impact.

It is argued that the principle of laicism in Turkey contributes to the state to control the religious activities of the majority, while it allows the very same majority an unnamed privilege in relation to the non-Muslim communities and non-Sunni Muslims (Akgönül, 2011: 173). However, as Alevis found relief with laicism, they have been ardent supporters of this principle in Turkey (Akgönül, 2011: 185). In last decades, Alevis started to struggle for their distinctive identity and search for

meeting their demands in the public sphere. As an attempt of response to this rising struggle, in 2008, the AKP initiated the 'Alevi Opening' with 'Alevi Workshops'. As Özkul (2015: 85) notes,

The workshops had a top-down statist perspective since its inception. They were organized by the State Minister Faruk Çelik and an Assistant Professor Necdet Subaşı, who since 2011 has been an employee at the Diyanet's [Directorate of Religious Affairs] Strategy Development Presidency appointed by the government. The process of organization took place without prior large-scale consultation with Alevi community members and organization leaders. The organizers were largely Sunnis under the direction of Necdet Subaşı, who has been actively engaged in the AKP political organization, and he wrote the final report in line with the official conservative view.

The Alevis' demands are mainly about the position of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, compulsory religious courses, recognition of *cemevis* as the places of worship (Özkul, 2015: 85). These kinds of demands challenge the conservative Sunni-Hanefi identity of the AKP (Bardakçı, 2015: 350). "As a conservative party, the AKP had to walk a tightrope between not offending the Sunni-Hanefi segments of its electorate and not causing alienation within its party ranks, at the same time tackling the grievances of the Alevi community" (Bardakçı, 2015: 350). The workshops did not persuade the Alevis of the sincerity of the AKP since the reports openly reflected dominant Sunni perspective regarding the demands of the Alevis (Özkul, 2015: 86). The AKP tried to impose a paternalistic approach to the Alevi issue by playing on the divergences between Alevi organisations (Özkul, 2015: 86). The seemingly sectarian attitude of the AKP governments towards Syria crisis has repercussions on the Alevi opening as well:

The 'openings' came to a standstill at the time the AKP government criticized the Assad regime in Syria by highlighting the rule of Alawites. The official discussion of whether Turkey should be involved in the Syrian civil war made Alawites in Syria an external threat and Alevis in Turkey an internal threat and possible targets for political manipulation. (Özkul, 2015: 91)

It is also argued that with the *Gezi* protests of 2013, the status of the Alevis was turned into the 'other' within society (Özkul, 2015: 91).

The protestors were composed of people from different geographical, ethnic and religious origins who opposed the AKP government on freedom of expression, rapid urban transformation projects with little consideration of natural resources and local populations, and more broadly, their top-down policy-making processes. The fact that seven out of the eight killed people during the protests were Alevis echoed the assertion that *Gezi* protestors were predominantly Alevis, thereby rendering the protests as 'Alevis' affair'. (Özkul, 2015: 91)

The Police Organisation of Turkey declared a report on the sample groups' 'demographic analysis' of the protestors who got detention and claimed that 78 percent of the detainees had Alevi origins (Şardan, 2013). These examples show that the AKP government contributes to the 'othering' of the Alevis of Turkey despite the 'opening' attempts. Özkul (2015: 92) sees 'tutelary secularism' of Turkey put into affect by early-Republicans and sustained by the AKP with the purpose of the management and disciplining of the religious groups as the most enduring obstacle to the opening. However, this assertion is ontologically problematic as the Alevis of Turkey have never been a threat to secular-democratic characteristics of the Republic unlike Sunni orthodoxy. As Mehmet Bardakçı (2015: 367) notes, "Turkey will need to adopt a more liberal, non-religious and citizenship-based definition of Turkish nation if it is to come to terms with the Alevi demands in a satisfactory manner."

Far from institutionalising ethics of citizenship based on equality, the AKP's attitude towards the Alevis is evidently discriminatory. Despite the decisions of the ECHR on the demands of the Alevis, the AKP governments refrain from solving the problem on the grounds of equality and freedom of religion. When compared to the demands of extreme Islamism (like *Şeriat*), the Alevi demands (like religious freedom and non-discrimination) remain within the secular-democratic constitutional framework. These demands also do not contradict with the *translation proviso*. At this point, I would like to elaborate more on these demands in relation to the decisions of the ECHR in four cases.

The ECHR decisions are based on the European Convention on Human Rights Article 9 (on Freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination). It is stated in Article 9 that

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. (ECHR, 2010a: 10-11)

Firstly, in Sinan Işık case, the ECHR (2010b) decided that the citizen who wants to replace Islam with Alevi in his identity card has the right to do so. For the Court the assessment of the applicant's religion by the domestic authorities, on the basis of an opinion issued by an authority responsible for Islamic religious affairs (Directorate of Religious Affairs), is in breach of the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality.

The ECHR (2010b) also examined the case from the angle of the negative aspect of freedom of religion and conscience, namely the right of an individual not to be obliged to manifest his or her beliefs. The ECHR (2010b) states: "To construe Article 9 as permitting every kind of compulsion with a view to the disclosure of religion or belief would strike at the very substance of the freedom it is designed to guarantee." In this respect, the ECHR does not find any reasonable ground for the Turkish state to force its citizens to indicate their religious orientations and regards this issue as the negative aspect of freedom. The politics of recognition can be seen complementary to the identity politics on which the AKP grounded its discourse. However, compelling citizens to declare their religious views in order to be recognised cannot be a democratic attitude since every citizen has the right to remain anonymous. In other words, in order to acquire freedom of religion, Turkish citizens are not to be compelled to disclose their religious convictions and beliefs. The ECHR (2010b) regards this within the *forum internum* (internal

freedom) of each individual and this cannot be limited by state. In the Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief adopted by the Venice Commission, it is stated that "legal requirements mandating involuntary disclosure of religious beliefs are impermissible" (ODIHR, 2004: 10).⁷⁶ When I approach this issue from the angle of post-secularism literature, I observe that domination of the public sphere by a school of belief or a religion, the inner religious freedom of citizens is threatened. In this respect, together with ethics of citizenship, the *translation proviso* is a necessity to balance the influence of majority belief. Otherwise, the language of majority religion or belief would prevail over other options and secular way of life.

Secondly, Hasan and Eylem Zengin case is about compulsory religious education and the ECHR (2007) ruled that it is a violation of Article 9 mentioned above:

The Court concludes that the instruction provided in the school subject 'religious culture and ethics' cannot be considered to meet the criteria of objectivity and pluralism and, more particularly in the applicants' specific case, to respect the religious and philosophical convictions of Ms Zengin's father, a follower of the Alevi faith, on the subject of which the syllabus is clearly lacking.

At this point, it is necessary to refer to the 1982 Constitution of Republic of Turkey. Article 24 of the Constitution defines freedom of religion and conscience:

Everyone has the freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction.

Acts of worship, religious rites and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, as long as they do not violate the provisions of Article 14.

No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious rites and ceremonies, or to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions.

⁷⁶ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in consultation with the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe puts forward Basic values underlying international standards for freedom of religion or belief as such: (1) *Forum Internum*; (2) *Forum Externum*; (3) Equality and non-discrimination; (4) Neutrality and impartiality; (5) Non-coercion; (6) Rights of parents and guardians; (7) Tolerance and respect; (8) Right to association; (9) Right to effective remedies (ODIHR, 2004: 9-13). These values can be regarded as defining the contours of principle of laicism.

Religious and moral education and instruction shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and morals shall be one of the compulsory lessons in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.

No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political interest or influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious tenets.

This article has contradictory statements concerning freedom of belief. Although the third clause recognises *forum internum*, the following paragraph makes religious education compulsory. In addition, in Turkish curricula, religious education is exclusively in line with Sunni-Hanefi school and the children of citizens having Alevi faith are forced to take this education. In addition to compulsory religious culture and morals courses, during the AKP rule, some other religious courses added to the curricula in 'elective' status. However, in practice these courses are compulsorily given to the students.

Departing from the issue of compulsory religious education, I would like to make a dialogical exemplification of deliberation in the public sphere. Think that the opposition wants to argue for the ECHR judgement on compulsory religious education and on violation of freedom of religion of the Alevi citizens. The ruling party would argue that they are for raising religious generation and to challenge compulsory religious education is to challenge the morality of the devout Anatolian people. The party would take the issue to the political arena and blame the opposition of offending the religion. The government would dwell on creating the perception that the opposition is hostile to Islam. Then, the public would be polarised through the line of religion and secularism. For example, once Erdoğan (2014) criticised the ECHR ruling on compulsory religious education and defended it by saying that children with a lack of religion education try to fill the gap with other things: "Sometimes this is drug, sometimes violence, sometimes organized violence turned into terror." This example shows how an option like Alevi faith is

suppressed by the political power in the public sphere despite the rulings of a supranational judicial body.

Thirdly, in Turkey, Alevis usually worship in places rather than mosques. They worship in their *cem* ceremony every Thursday evening. This ceremony is distinctively different from Sunni prayers. The place that Alevis gather in and perform *cem* ceremony is called *cemevi*. The Turkish state does not recognise the *cemevis* as the house of worship of the Alevi faith. In Turkey, houses of worship recognised by the state are exempt from certain expenses. The ECHR's (2014) decision on the case of CEM Foundation showed that Turkish state violated Article 9 (Freedom of Religion) and Article 14 (Non-Discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court recognized the *cemevi* as the house of worship for the Alevis and in order to eliminate discrimination on the basis of religion, the Court ruled that *cemevis* are to be exempt from electricity bills like mosques and churches.

Finally, the case of İzzettin Doğan and others is an important stage for the struggle of Alevis to be recognised by the state. In 2005, the applicants made the requests from Prime Minister Erdoğan and following their refusal, they brought the issue before the court. Their requests were: for the administrative authorities to provide religious services to Alevi citizens in the form of a public service; for the *cemevis* to be granted the status of 'places of worship', for Alevi religious leaders to be recognised as such and recruited as civil servants; and for the subsidies required for Alevi worship to be set aside in the general budget. However, the applicants' claims were rejected by the domestic courts. The ECHR (2016) ruled that Turkey violated the aforementioned Article 9 of the Convention. The Court (2016) considered that the attitude of the State authorities towards the Alevi community, its religious practices and its places of worship is incompatible with the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality and with the right of religious communities to an autonomous existence. The ECHR (2016) was not convinced that the freedom to practise its faith which the authorities leave to the Alevi community enables that

community to fully exercise its rights under Article 9. The right enshrined in that provision (Article 9) would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of religion, such as the Alevi faith, of legal protection (ECHR, 2016).

The Court therefore concludes that the situation described above amounts to denying the Alevi community the recognition that would allow its members – and in particular the applicants – to effectively enjoy their right to freedom of religion. In particular, the refusal complained of has had the effect of denying the autonomous existence of the Alevi community and has made it impossible for its members to use their places of worship (*cemevis*) and the title denoting their religious leaders (*dede*) in full conformity with the legislation. Consequently, in the absence of relevant and sufficient reasons, the respondent State has overstepped its margin of appreciation. The interference complained of cannot therefore be considered necessary in a democratic society. (ECHR, 2016)

In this respect, the Alevis looked to the supranational judicial body find response to their demands which have been disregarded by national political authorities. Despite some workshops, they cannot reach to recognition by the state. In the Turkish context where Sunni majority dominates the public sphere and prevents pluralist deliberation, the supranational public sphere and its institutions like the ECHR help to transform discriminatory relations of power and restrictions on freedom of religion.

Not only the AKP itself but also some conservative academic circles remained distanced to the demands of the Alevis. For example, İsmail Kara (2008: 105-106) repeats the official discourse of the AKP that if the Alevi issue is to be discussed, rather than focusing on Directorate of Religious Affairs and mosque-*cemevi*, *imam-dede* antagonism, it should be done so within the context of the law on the closure of dervish lodges and in relation to other *tarikats* and religious communities. However, by so doing, the largest religious minority in Turkey is reduced to the status of a *tarikat* or community. Kara (2008: 98) criticise the Turkish Republic in its attempt to control Sunni Islam via Directorate of Religious Affairs, by repeating the above-mentioned Sunni attitude, he tries to control, set the boundaries and

determine the legitimacy of the Alevi demands which are legitimate on the grounds of pluralism, ethics of citizenship, freedom of religion and principle of secularism.

Hakan Yavuz (2009: 163) too, perceives the AKP as sectarian and not pluralist in conceptions of Islam:

There is a major conflict between the rhetoric and the practices of the AKP government. Although the rhetoric of the AKP is libertarian, its practices are deeply sectarian and intolerant towards different conceptualizations of Islam. One would expect the AKP government not to discriminate against any religious groups, including the Alevi minority. However, the AKP's definition of Islam is solely defined by Sunni–Hanefi teachings. Moreover, the AKP does not appreciate the significant difference between religious and secular reasoning. The AKP's libertarian rhetoric is disengaged from the realities of Turkey, where the historical legacy of the Ottoman state and a politicized version of Islam require a different settlement between religion and politics. A close examination of the AKP's policies indicates that the party wants religion to play an important role in policies and also favors only the Sunni–Hanefi version of Islam.

To conclude this final part of this chapter, I referred to two issues which contributed to the release of the contradictions within Turkish secularism. The first issue was the headscarf issue and the second one was about freedoms of Alevis living in Turkey. I intentionally chose these issues as they provide me necessary knowledge to test the contours and sincerity of the freedom of religion and conscience understanding of the AKP. The AKP is based on the values and norms of the Sunni majority in Turkey. Although both issues in question are concerned with freedom of religion and conscience, the AKP's attitude differs. The former was about the demands of majority with which political Islam in Turkey and the 'conservative-democratic' AKP relied on. The AKP made use of a liberal discourse to solve headscarf issue. Nonetheless, the ruling party lost its liberal sight when it came to the problems of Alevis, which has been seen as a threat to their understanding of Islam. The AKP refrains from recognising legitimate demands of Alevis in order not to share privileges that the Sunni majority have held. These two issues also revealed that the AKP has no objective understanding of freedom of religion; its discourse and attitude change between the two.

In terms of post-secularism, the AKP might be regarded as failing to achieve its requirements. Freedom cannot be exclusive to the religious majority. Ethics of citizenship is relevant for equal basis for all citizens to make other options available and eligible to all. Dwelling on religious nationalism and conservatism leads to suppression of some segments of society in a pleonastic manner. The ruling party representing the authority of the official sphere is to be respectful to the principle of laicism which obliges the state to be neutral and impartial. When conservative-religious social imaginary of the ruling party is promoted in the public sphere, ethics of citizenship and freedoms seem to be undermined. The disadvantaged groups have nothing than to take refuge in the supranational public sphere and its institutions. Therefore, in a religiously dominated context, external guarantees for principle of laicism cannot be regarded as tutelary.

4.3. Conclusion

The analysis of whether a post-secular moment is intrinsic to the Turkish case with the experience of the AKP directs us to an analysis of secularism in Turkey, and analysis of secularism together with the AKP compels us to discern the influence of political Islam presented in the previous chapter. I made an assessment of the AKP regarding secularism. In this research, democratisation is the key determinant of setting the relationship between secularisation and post-secularism approach. The other components such as social policy and selected issues were elaborated to find clues about the AKP's preferences.

I mainly argued that post-secularism literature is confined to the 'affluent' societies of the West where pluralist democracy is consolidated and secularism has deep roots in socio-political level. In Western context, the majority religion is Christianity and it is noted that this results in differences in Muslim context of Turkey. Hence, the examination of the role of political Islam in transforming the secular credentials of public sphere in Turkey was helpful. Actually, this research

shows that it is a mutually transformative process in Turkey that both secularism lost its authoritative content to a large extent and political Islam might evolve to post-Islamic politics with the AKP in the due process.

However, the transformation of the two has not brought about post-secularism yet in Turkey. Principle of secularism is deprived of relevant institutional guarantees. For example, despite its deep-rooted history, Speaker of the TBMM İsmail Kahraman (2016) having National Outlook background can argue for the need of removing this principle from the constitution and for making a religious constitution. The perpetuating attacks on this principle by the political Islamists prevent consolidation of democracy and of strengthening of ethics of citizenship. Also the AKP might perceive freedom of religion exclusive to the Sunni majority as seen in the discussion about headscarf and Alevi issues. This shows how far the Turkish public sphere is from pluralist public sphere.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this research, the main question to be analysed is: whether or not Turkish secularism reached to a post-secular moment under the AKP rule. The analysis of this research question has three levels: Firstly, what is to be understood from the concept of post-secularism is to be examined. Therefore, in Chapter II, the theoretical discussion on secularisation thesis and its relations with post-secularism literature, which is proposed as a secular critique of secularisation thesis, are introduced. These theoretical and conceptual clarifications shed light on the consequent section and following chapters regarding the context of Turkey. Therefore, how scholars elaborate on modernisation and secularisation in Turkey is elaborated with reference to several scholars of secularisation thesis and their critiques from culturalist point of views and from post-secular inclinations. In relation to this theoretical debate on Turkish politics, a history of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation is put forward. Then, how political Islam challenged Turkish secularisation is analysed together with its evolution to the AKP. In this respect, the historical roots of recent tensions and polarisations of Turkish politics centred around secularism are examined.

In answering the main research question, I paid sufficient attention to the historical background of the discussion. Firstly, peculiarity of Turkish context differentiates it from the Western trajectory. Secondly, post-secularism is not deviation of secularism; on the contrary, it is presented as advancement of the secular model. That is why this conceptualisation is confined to the 'affluent' societies of the West. Therefore, to analyse post-secularity, it is very important to depict the dynamics and formation of secularism in a context which is not based on the Judeo-Christian

legacy. It is impossible to talk about a post-secular society if secularism is not consolidated. Thirdly, secularisation thesis is challenged by inclusion of religion to the Western public spheres. In Turkey, secularism is challenged by political Islam. In this respect, an analysis of the development of political Islam is relevant to understand the conditions of change or transformation and in what ways the AKP differs from its predecessor. Finally, the focus is the conditions within which a change of paradigm is required, rather than reifying the subject matter by equating the discussion of post-secularism in Turkey with the AKP.

As it is shown in this research, post-secularism is not a drastic disengagement from the secular age. In certain respects, post-secularism added a religious flavour to the secular public spheres of the Western societies. While in classical understanding of secularism in Europe, religion is treated as a confined space of public sphere, post-secular approach attempts to develop a discourse of twin tolerations between official and religious spheres. The degree of toleration is very much bound to the institutional survival of liberal-democratic-constitutional framework. Therefore, the principle of laicism is the precondition for toleration. In other words, political liberalism necessitated free competition of reasonable comprehensive doctrines while protecting autonomy of individuals from church(es) and state. The *institutional transition proviso* is relevant for the language of toleration in a post-secular society. The language of toleration invited privatised religions to the public sphere and there emerged public religions. Post-secularism literature explicitly admits the necessity of a secular order as a precondition for democracy, but it does not alienate religion *per se*. As a result of this, post-secularism is a change of paradigm or consciousness rather than a change of reality.

The widening of the scope of religious realm with globalisation and commodification of religion has forced some scholars to conceptualise this recent trend. Post-secularism tries to meet this need. However, the rise of religious identity both in domestic politics and international relations is not a leap forward. On the contrary, this trend revitalised the sleeping monsters which had ensanguined

territories for centuries. Hence, the 'new' order does not mean advancement in global or national scales. The cohabitation of religion and secularism in political sphere is not an easy-going relationship. The assumed language of toleration is seen that it can easily turn into rivalry in the form of polarisation within society. The deepened fragmentation of society and high-tempered identity politics in international relations might threaten both domestic and global peace. Consequently, the vulnerability of peace might have been increased with the revival of the 'religious' as grievances are being transposed to religious appearances.

It is the implication of this thesis that secular democratic constitutionalism based on ethics of citizenship is presented as the most reliable remedy to the multicultural challenge to pluralist democracy. In this context, secularism respectful and responsive to religious beliefs promotes reasonable accommodation of them in the public sphere. This is secularism as statecraft doctrine or principle of laicism, rather than an ideological standpoint which is hostile to any kind of religious belief. On the one hand, this approach has parallels with the post-secularism literature. On the other hand, in my point of view, complete secularisation of the official sphere is vital for the health of secular-democratic constitutionalism.

The multicultural structure of post-colonial societies challenged the secular democracies based on ethnic and religious homogeneity or harmony. Post-secular steps in public and political spheres, however, have not guaranteed quiescence. These attempts are the concessions of current 'securities' of dominant cultures of majorities of nation-states to secure their positions against the liberal-democratic contentions. To put it in another way, the Western democracies lived in harmonious majorities which blinded politics to the demands of minority cultures in the name of secularism. When validity of this kind of secularity is started to be questioned, post-secular response came to the fore as a manoeuvre which is a temporal state in reality. In this respect, post-secularism is a moment of historical development of secularism in a multicultural environment. As tensions triggered with religious

fuel, a more durable order would be realised with further secularisation of the political sphere while impartiality of the state would be strengthened. Otherwise, a liberal democracy cannot survive in a polarised setting. Thus, consolidation of democracy goes hand in hand with secularisation.

This research also refers to the shortcomings of post-secularism in respect to functioning of secular filters and *translation proviso*. In Habermasian sense, secular filters are *sine qua non* in order to prevent the public sphere from becoming a battlefield of religious beliefs and interpretations. For example, if there is no such filtering mechanism, a parliament would turn into a forum of morality. In a society where there is a conservative religious majority, there would emerge problems to respond pluralism, freedom of conscience and open discussions in the public sphere. It would not lead to these kinds of consequences in a religiously homogenous society; however, in a heterogeneous society, the minorities would lose sight of equality. Therefore, ethics of citizenship based on equality requires secular immunities in the official and public spheres. Constitutional guarantees are necessary. The issue of *translation proviso* is very much related to the secular filters. In the absence of translation, religious discourse of the conservative majority would suppress secular ones and an accessible language cannot be flourished. A language of enforcement would prevail over language of toleration. If there is no secular framework in constitutional sense, translation would be a matter of minorities.

In this research, I maintained that the link between political liberalism and pluralism is very strong and this link has reflections on the discussions of post-secularism to set the public place of religion. As Laborde (2011: 3) puts it: "political liberalism holds the promise of responding to what Rawls calls 'the fact of pluralism'. It seeks to ground the legitimacy of the liberal state on its ability to justify its use of coercive power to all (reasonable) citizens under conditions of moral and religious pluralism." In this respect, pluralism is *prima facie* component of political liberalism. The multicultural challenge to Western liberal states forces

them to formulate new responses to the requirements of religious pluralism. Post-secularism is one of the responses to these requirements. This research shows the problematic aspects of this post-secular response.

Similarly, Gökarıksel and Secor (2015:24) take post-secularism "as an idea that poses problems and questions in response to which local, momentary, and variable solutions continuously emerge." Their objective is to engage post-secular geographies and the problem of pluralism:

Insofar as post-secularism poses a set of problems that have the potential to challenge secularism/religion as a socio-spatial binary, its various solutions are manifest in emergent formations of religion and 'the public' in everyday life. These formations, moreover, must necessarily embed within them a solution of some kind to the problem of pluralism - that is, to the question of how different religious ways of being are constituted in relation to one another and to other moral systems within a polity. (Gökarıksel & Secor, 2015: 24)

Gökarıksel and Secor (2015) take Turkey as a 'post-secular geography'; however, in my thesis, I raise the main question on the post-secularity of Turkey under the AKP rule. Likewise, Nilüfer Göle (2012a: 10) defines Turkey under the AKP rule as a post-secular experience since the AKP seems to in between Islam and secularism. For Göle (2012a: 10), pluralism is the central issue in this assessment and if it is not sustained there is the danger of the tyranny of the majority. In this thesis, I opposed to such claims on two grounds. Firstly, I showed that post-secularism cannot be conceptualised as 'in-betweenness'; on the contrary, it requires a strongly consolidated secular order which would not regard inclusion of religious voices to the public sphere as a threat to the rights and freedoms of the minorities and other 'options', in Taylor's terminology. Secondly, if pluralism is central to the discussion of post-secularism and otherwise the political order would corrupt into the tyranny of the majority, in this thesis I maintained that the AKP relied too much on the demands of the Sunni majority by losing sight of the legitimate demands of the Alevi minority which brought its demands before supranational public sphere via the ECHR and ratified them.

Another scholar arguing that Turkey is experiencing post-secularism under the AKP rule is Rosati. Nevertheless, before reaching to such a conclusion, one should not disregard the fact that a post-secular order is bound to primary guaranties. In this research, I attributed consolidation of democracy and secularism as a statecraft doctrine (not ideology) to the basic components of a post-secular order. Rosati (2012: 68), however, sees Kemalist (secular) opposition to the AKP as the major obstacle to further democratisation of Turkey, even to the 'Kurdish opening' which was put an end by Erdoğan very sharply. In the fourth chapter, I argued that the political process in Turkey proves just the opposite of this argument that the AKP relying on a majoritarian understanding of formal rules of democracy turned out to be more authoritarian than its earlier discourses. In this thesis, I agree with, for example, Menderes Çınar's (2015: 17) view on the democracy conception of the leaders of the AKP that the party successfully pursues a marketing strategy in presenting consolidation of its dominance as 'democratisation' which if and only if means putting an end to tutelage of the military-civil bureaucracy and of the judiciary.

Concerning the Turkish case, this research showed the historical background of secularisation through Ottoman-Turkish modernisation dating back to the eighteenth century. Secularism, in Berkes's sense, did not come to the fore all of a sudden; on the contrary, it was a historical process having political, social, economic, cultural, diplomatic and military dimensions. It was with the Republican revolution that secularism reached an official-constitutional framework with the principle of laicism. In this research, this legal framework and social process is differentiated. In Turkey, there has been no direct reference to religion in law-making or conduct of state affairs. In this sense, principle of laicism has been respected. However, when the broader definition of secularism is taken into account, the history of modern Turkey and the rule of the AKP seem to be reflecting fluctuations and regressions. Aforementioned researches revealed that Turkish society and politics face conservativisation which fuels polarisation and harms tolerance.

Berkes's and Timur's analyses having parallels with the secularisation thesis showed the inevitability of historical development of secularism. Due to its authoritarian nature, the critiques also showed that this development had deficits regarding institutionalisation of democracy. However, secularisation and democratisation are sub-processes of modernisation in general sense. Either implemented from above or in evolutionary ways, modernisation brings about political, social, economic and cultural changes which require a democratic order beyond its formal meaning. In other words, differentiation between modernisation of economy via industrialisation and other dimensions of it, is not viable since the sub-processes cannot be isolated from each other. Otherwise, social and political disorder or instability is indispensable. The only way out is a well-functioning, full-fledged democracy.

In this research, the issue of democracy has significant weight since its close relation to a post-secular order. A post-secular order is a liberal-democratic-constitutional order and a liberal democracy can only be realised with fundamental rights and freedoms. This means that protection of individual autonomy with regards to the state, church/religion or any institution that may cause pressure is a major concern for a democratic framework. Therefore, a consolidated democracy necessitates secularism. The majoritarian conception of democracy cannot be qualified as a consolidated democracy. In this respect, conservative-democratic orientation of the AKP might be in controversy with the pluralist democracy of political liberalism. Similarly, Gökarıksel and Secor (2015: 28) come to the conclusion that "the post-secularist vision of a polity within which religious ways of being participate in a pluralistic public life is not realised on the ground in Turkey."

Besides the quality of democracy, secularism in Turkey is problematic when compared to the West. If secularism has social and cultural dimensions, Turkey can be regarded as facing serious drawbacks during the AKP rule. The concerns and problems of Turkish secularism seem to be increased in this era. The Directorate of

Religious Affairs is one of the major institutional deficiencies of secularism in Turkey. In the early-Republican era, this institution emerged from a need; however, in the twenty-first century, both state control over religion and inegalitarian attitude towards beliefs other than Sunni Islam are unacceptable if the political order is secular in real sense. Compulsory religious education in schools is another example of ills of Turkish secularism. When conditions of Turkey in recent era are taken into account, Islam in Turkey appears to be a 'public religion' in Casanova's terminology. On the one hand, the case of Turkey shows how religion can easily transform public sphere in a conservative and anti-secular manner. On the other hand, it is the success of Turkish secularism to make a movement having political Islamic roots to accept the principle of laicism.

In the final analysis, the interaction between secularism and Islamism resulted in an amorphous situation. This amorphous moment might not to be conceptualised as post-secularism. Firstly, a post-secular order is presented as an advanced social and political system where democracy is consolidated. Turkish democracy is far being fully-established, well-functioning and institutionalised. The AKP internalised the deeply-rooted majoritarian conception of formal democracy in Turkey as manifestation of national will and this prevents consolidation of democracy in its full meaning and with its all basic requirements. Secondly, in a post-secular order, there is not any concern for secularism as statecraft doctrine or political principle requiring separation of state and religion. In other words, the ones having higher secular sensitivities do not feel that secularism is under the threat of a religious majority. However, in Turkey, secularism continues to be the major axis of polarisation in Turkish politics. The amorphous interlude would pave the ground for further democratisation in order to overcome polarisation in Turkey. Thirdly, the issues that were analysed with respect to the policies of the AKP revealed that the party has not developed an objective measure for freedom of religion and conscience. For example, while the AKP did everything to remove the ban on headscarf in public institutions, it remained unconcerned with the problems of Alevites. However, both issues have similar grounds about freedom of religion.

Fourthly, post-secularism emerged with challenge of multiculturalism and in order to respond to the problem of pluralism, especially to the religious question, post-secularism suggests widening the scope of the democratic public sphere to the religious domain with the intention of including religious voices of the respective religious groups as well as the majority religion. Finally, it is not clear either the AKP is really an evolution of political Islam to post-Islamic politics or it is a temporary strategic hypocrisy.

This thesis engages with the inherent problems of post-secularism approach both in normative and factual senses. As a concept developed within the Western world, post-secularism have not gained a universal approval even in the West itself. Some categorical familiarities and differences between the West and the Turkish case help to identify some points raised in this work.

Some of the familiarities are: firstly, the Turkish state is officially secular and have modern institutions in Western sense. Turkey wants to be a part of the Western world for long centuries. Turkey is interlinked to the European and Western supranational institutions, such as the ECHR. Secondly, post-secularism becomes significant with the multicultural challenge, that is, the pluralism demands of the minorities force the democracies to respond those needs. Both the Turkish society and the Western societies are multicultural. Muslims in the West and Alevis in Turkey want to take part in the public spheres. These demands initiate the transformation of the public spheres which have been in apathetic manner towards religious voices, especially, of the minorities. When it comes to minorities, post-secularism approach oscillates both in the West and in Turkey.

Some of the differences are: firstly, the West is based on the Judeo-Christian legacy while Ottoman-Turkish trajectory has had a different path. The historical analyses have shown that the meanings and development of some concepts reflect contingencies due to contextual peculiarities. Secondly, problem of pluralism might have different connotations in the West and in Turkey under the AKP rule.

For example, the AKP might have internalised a conservative understanding of pluralism based on Ottoman *millet* system, which does not apply to Alevis. If so, the demands of Alevis would become meaningless as they have been considered within the official understanding of Islam, whereas the non-Muslim religious communities would benefit from the fruits of pluralism. In this respect, the issue might become a matter of religious doctrine, rather than a problem of pluralism. Thirdly, at the first instance, rather than pluralism demands of minorities, political Islam asked for a change of paradigm in terms of secularism in Turkey. Fourthly, the comprehensive doctrine of the AKP is very much in touch with the conservative values of the Sunni majority in Turkey. Different from the secular consolidated democracies of the West, the AKP might have reflected the behaviour of getting this doctrine through to transform the secular social imaginary in Turkey. That might be the reason for rising polarisation of the Turkish society along the lines of secularism and Sunni Islam. This polarisation prevents consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

The problem of incorporating Islam to new national identity promoted by the early Republicans might be an issue for the post-secularists. If we assume ethnic and religious homogeneity of a group in question, religion may have a unifying component of the national identity during the process of nation-building. However in the Turkish case, the role of Islam would have had limits as people of Turkey were divided not only ethnically, but also terms of religion. The most evident division was between the Sunni and Alevi communities. It was not easy to construct a unifying Islamic identity due to the divisions dating back to centuries. So much so that the Republican state institutionalised Sunni-Hanefi doctrine which annoyed the Alevis, Islamisation of the new national identity beyond the limits would have led the people to fall apart. It can be argued that in Europe Christianity had greater influence on national identities. Three points are to be raised: Firstly, to put an end to religious conflicts and wars was one of the crucial reasons for secularism to emerge in Europe. Secondly, European nation-states were more homogeneous in religious sense when compared to Turkey. Thirdly, equal access of

all citizens to the democratic public sphere is a prerequisite of ethics of citizenship on which post-secular paradigm is grounded. On the one hand, if a national identity is encircled by a religious doctrine, how is it possible to talk about such ethics? On the other hand, as argued in this research, the national identity in Turkey might have reflected post-secularity due to the syncreticism of the Turkish people: in the minds of most of the Turks, a contradiction between Islam and secularism have not existed since they were religious in their private lives, while secular in public sphere. Whether disturbing this syncreticism would bring social and political relief in Turkey is a question to be analysed in the near future.

As the final assessment of this research, I would like to assert that it would be great prospect for Turkey is the AKP having political Islamist underpinnings had maintained its post-secular discourse by perpetuating democratisation and realising post-secularity in Turkey. However, the indicators at hand and deepened polarisations in Turkey obstruct such a prospective optimism.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

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KONURALP, E. (2013), *Ecevit ve Milliyetçilik*, Istanbul: Togan Yayıncılık.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY

Din-devlet ilişkileri hattı, özellikle son dönemde, siyaset bilimcilerinin ana gündemlerinden biridir. Bu ilişki hattı, yakın döneme kadar hakim paradigma olan sekülerleşme tezi kapsamında ele alınmış, din; siyasal/resmi ve kamusal alanlardan izole edilmiş; kendi sınırları içine ve/veya özel alana çekilmeye zorlanmış; bu da tarihsel gelişim sürecinin doğal bir sonucu olarak görülmüştür. Wallis ve Bruce'un (1992: 8-9) dediği gibi, sekülerleşme tezi, modernleşmenin sosyal farklılaşma, sosyalleşme ve rasyonelleşme biçiminde gelişen üç belirgin özelliği sonucu dinin sosyal öneminin azalacağı iddiasına dayanır. Oysa, sekülerleşme tezinin öngörüsünün tersine, dinin bırakınız özel alanı, sosyal açıdan etkisi azalmamış, hatta daha da artmıştır. Böylece, din, Jürgen Habermas'ın kullandığı anlamıyla, kamusal alanın sınırlarını zorlamaya, onu dönüştürmeye başlamıştır.

Batı dünyasının liberal demokrasilerinde, post-kolonyal göçmen toplumlarına dönüşümle, çoğulculuk sorununa bir yanıt verebilmek açısından, özellikle akademik çevrelerde, post-sekülerizm tartışması ortaya çıkmıştır. Küreselleşme, dinin piyasalaşması, sınıf tabanlı siyasetin yerini kimlik siyasetinin almaya başlaması gibi etkilerle de bu süreç hızlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla, post-sekülerizm literatürü, sekülerleşme tezinin bir çeşit içerden eleştirisi olarak sahnedeki yerini almıştır. Çünkü post-sekülerizm literatürü, bir politik/hukuksal ilke olarak sekülerizme veya başka bir deyişle, seküler siyasal düzene bir alternatif getirmek amacıyla olmaktan çok, sekülerleşme tezinin ortaya koyduğu ve dini ideolojik bir tavır alışla dışlayan sekülerizm tanımına karşılık, din-devlet-kamusal alan ilişkilerinde daha kapsayıcı olmayı önermektedir.

Türkiye'de Sekülerizmin Dönüşümü: AKP İktidarında Post-Sekülerizmi Tartışmak konulu bu çalışmada, 'gelişmiş' Batılı toplumlar için geliştirilen post-sekülerizm

literatürünün 2002 sonrasında siyasal İslamcı kökleri olan bir parti tarafından yönetilen Türkiye'yi analiz etmeye yarayıp yaramayacağı ele alınmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, çalışmanın temel sorusu, Türkiye'nin Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) iktidarıyla bir post-seküler uğrağa ulaşıp ulaşmadığıdır.

Post-sekularizm incelemelerinin temel problemi, bunun Batılı kuramcılar tarafından geliştirilmiş dört başı mahmur bir normatif kavram olarak ele alınması ve Türkiye vakasına uygulanmasıdır. Oysa, bunun yerine post-sekularizmi bir tartışma olarak ele almak ve bu tartışmanın Türkiye gibi, çoğunluğu Müslüman olan bir ülke için açıklayıcı olup olamayacağı ve Türkiye'nin bu tartışmanın kapsamına girip girmeyeceği üzerinde durulmalıdır. İşte o nedenle, bu çalışma, bu temel probleme bir çözüm üretme çabasıdır.

Bu çalışmanın, temel sorusuna yanıt vermeye çalışırken konu, üç düzleme ayrılarak ele alınmıştır. Birinci düzlemde, post-sekularizm tartışmasının gelişimi, temel kavramları genel ve Türkiye özelinde bir literatür incelemesi olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Yani bu birinci düzlemin ilk boyutu, genel post-sekularizm tartışması, ikinci boyutu, Türkiye ile ilgili literatürdür. Genel post-sekularizm tartışması, özellikle bu kavramın isim babası olan sosyolog ve felsefeci Jürgen Habermas'ın ve bu tartışmanın diğer önemli yapı taşlarını oluşturan siyaset felsefecisi ve siyasal liberalizm kuramcısı John Rawls, din sosyoloğu José Casanova ve felsefeci Charles Taylor üzerinden kurulan bir kuramsal ve kavramsal çerçeveyi içermektedir. Bu çerçevede, sekülerleşme tezinin, sekularizmin liberal demokrasiler için gerekliliğinin altını çizerek nasıl eleştirildiği ve aşılmaya çalışıldığı anlatılmaktadır. Adı geçen dört önemli düşünür ve kuramcının yanıt bulmaya çalıştığı ortak soru, kamusal alanda din sorunuyla nasıl başa çıkılacağına ilişkindir. Bu isimlerin diğer önemli bir ortak noktası, tercih ettikleri analiz bağlamının çoğunluk dininin Hristiyanlık olduğu, çoğulculuğun anahtar bir önem taşıdığı, gelişmiş Batılı ülkelerin konsolide olmuş demokrasileriyle sınırlı kalmasıdır. Ancak bu araştırmanın temel hedefi, Batılı düşünürlerin Batı'yı incelemek ve Batı demokrasisinin değişen gereksinimlerine yanıt vermek için

geliştirdikleri post-sekularizm yaklaşımının büyük çoğunluğu Sünni Müslüman olan Türkiye'nin resmi laik devlet yapısını ve devlet-toplum ilişkilerini açıklayabilmek üzere aktarılıp aktarılamayacağına bakmaktır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, bu tez için geçerli olan araştırma mahali ile post-sekularizm literatürünün temel taşıyıcılarından olan yazarların araştırma mahalleri kategorik olarak birbirlerinden çok farklıdır.

Bu tezin kavramsal çerçevesini oluşturan temel konular şu açılardan tartışılmıştır: 'Din'in anlamı; hem bir kavram olarak hem de bir kuram olarak sekülerleşmenin anlamı; küreselleşme ve çok kültürlülüğün sekülerlik ve modernlik üzerine etkileri; post-sekularizm Avrupa'ya norm olmaktan çok bir istisna olarak bakılarak ve modernleşme kuramı eleştirilerek ortaya atılması; çoklu modernliklerin olasılığı; küresel piyasalarla etkileşimle dinin piyasalaşması; kamusal dinler savı; post-metafizik düşünce.

Aydınlanma düşünürlerinin akli vahiyin önüne koyarak yüceltmesi, modernliğin 'seküler çağ'a ulaşmasını sağlamıştı. Ancak sekülerleşme sürecinin olumsuzluğu, bu sürecin farklı bağlamlarda farklı biçimler almasına da neden olmuştu. Bu nedenle, çizgisel bir gelişim anlayışını öngören sekülerleşme tezi ve modernleşme kuramı sorgulanmaya başladı. Örneğin, Charles Taylor'a (2007: 534-535) göre post-sekularizm yeni bir çağı temsil etmek yerine sekülerleşme tezinin dinin gerileyişini işleyen üst anlatısına karşı bir meydan okuyuştu. Habermasçı anlamda da, dinsel seslerin kamusal alana davet edilmesiydi. Bu doğrultuda, Habermas (2006: 18), post-sekularizmi gerçekliğin değişmesi olarak değil; bilinç değişimi olarak sunar. Casanova (1994) ise bunu dinin özel alana itilmesinin tersine dönerek dinlerin kamusal rollerinin artarak özel dinsel alanın yeniden siyasalaşması olarak okur. Böylece, Stepan'ın (2000) 'ikiz hoşgörü' kavramı, dinlerin demokrasi ve hukukun üstünlüğüne saygılı olduğu sürece kamusal roller üstlenmesinin hoş görülmesi anlamıyla devreye girmektedir.

Yani, çoğulcu demokrasinin post-sekularizm için çok önemli bir unsur olduğunun altını çizmek gerekmektedir. Benzer şekilde, Rawls'ın (1997) kuramsallaştırdığı siyasal liberalizm de bir anayasal demokrasinin dayandığı ideal bir yurttaşlık anlayışının temeli olarak böyle bir kamusal akıl düşüncesini vurgulamaktadır. Bu araştırmada, eşitlik üzerine inşa edilmiş bir yurttaşlık etiği kavramı tam da bu ideali karşılamaktadır. Bader'in (2012) terminolojisiyle söyleyecek olursak, bu ideal, liberal-demokratik anayasacılık olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Küçük farklılıklar barındırmalarına karşın tüm bu kavramsallaştırma ve kuramsallaştırmalar Habermasçı bir post-sekularizm anlayışıyla paraleldir. Bu araştırmada, küçük farklılıkları not etmenin yanı sıra sekülerleşme tezinin dinsel seslerin kamusal alanda kapsanması ve liberal-demokratik siyasal düzene herkesin hoşgörü dilini öğrenmesiyle eklenmesini öneren eleştirilerine post-sekularizm yaklaşımları olarak bakılmaktadır.

Bu tezde tartışıldığı üzere, laiklik ilkesi, demokrasinin temel direklerinden biridir. Bu ilke olmadan, bırakınız konsolidasyonu, bir demokrasi kurulamaz bile. Yani, laiklik, demokrasinin olmazsa olmaz bir koşuludur. Bu noktada, demokrasinin içsel çatışması ortaya çıkar: Bireysel hak ve özgürlüklere zarar vermeden laik-demokratik-çoğulcu-kamusal düzen nasıl kurulmalıdır? İşte post-sekularizm bu çatışmayı dindirmek amacıyla geliştirilmiş bir yaklaşımdır. Ancak burada normatif bir değerlendirme yaparak bu çatışmayı aşarken sağlam bir demokrasi için vazgeçilemez normları hiyerarşik olarak sıralamak gerekmektedir. Aksi takdirde, iş, çıkmaza girecektir. Şüphesiz, bir normun diğer bir norma üstün olması, daha öncelikli sırada olan normu güvence altına almak için bazı kısıtlamalar öngörülmesi, beraberinde anlaşmazlık ve uyuşmazlık kaynağı olabilecek bir durumu da getirmektedir. Ancak, öngörülen kısıtlamalar, evrensel hak ve özgürlüklerin ve hukukun üstünlüğünün nihai hedefleriyle çelişmemelidir.

İlk etapta, halk egemenliğini gerçekleştirmek üzere demokratik devlet, laik meşruiyete sahip olmalıdır. Yoksa, eğer egemenlik kutsal bir kaynağa dayanıyorsa, siyasal iktidara dinsel otoriteler eşlik eder ve yurttaşlar dinsel açıdan

temellendirilen yasaları veya yönetimin din adına yaptığı bazı uygulamaları sorgulayamaz konuma itilir. Bu durumda din kurumu temel belirleyici olur. İkinci olarak, devlet, dinsel inançlara yönelik tarafsızlığını korumalıdır. Aksi durumda, bir din veya dinin bir kolu ayrıcalık kazanırken diğer inanç grupları ve cemaatler veya inanmayanlar ikincil bir konuma itilebilir. Son olarak, eşit yurttaşların din, vicdan, düşünce ve ifade özgürlükleri, devlet güvencesi altında olmalıdır. Aksi takdirde, çoğunluk, diğer grupların özgürlüklerini kendi dinsel öğretisi uğruna kısıtlayabilir. Oysa, sağlam bir demokrasi çoğunluk yönetimi veya çoğunluğun korunması olarak algılanamaz; tersine demokrasi, çoğulculuğun korunmasını gerektirir. Dolayısıyla, Talal Asad'ın (2007: 15) da belirttiği gibi, Taylor, modern devletin toplumsal cinsiyet, sınıf, din temelli farklılıkları aşmak ve çatışan bakış açılarını elimine etmek için laikliğin birleştirici ara buluculuğuna başvurarak yurttaşlığı kimliğin temel ilkesi haline getirmeye zorlandığını vurgular.

Taylor ve Maclure (2011: 84), tüm dinleri ve inançsal gelenekleri kapsayacak bir ortak payda bulmanın olanaksız olduğunu söyler. Bu nedenle, laik-demokratik bir çerçeve olmaksızın, tüm inançlar tarafından benimsenebilecek nesnel bir özgürlük anlayışı geliştirmek çok zordur. Çok kültürlü bir toplumda tanınma siyaseti, çeşitli dinsel yaşam biçimleri olan insanların barındırılmasını olanaklı kılmak üzere hakkaniyeti baz alan bir muafiyet ve uyum önlemleri gerektirir (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 9). Ancak, uygulamaları ve yorumları inanmayanlara, agnostiklere veya özel alana çekilmiş inançlara kıyasla daha talepkar olan inançlar için daha tercih edilebilir ve yarar sağlayıcı bir ayrıcalıklı durum ortaya çıkmış da olabilir (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 70). Dolayısıyla, hakkaniyet, eşitlikle karşılaştırıldığında daha göreceli bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Fırsat eşitliği ile koşulların eşitliğini karşılaştıran sav, fırsat eşitliğinden yararlanarak gereksinimlerini karşılayan kişinin kendi karar ve tercihlerinin sonuçlarına katlanmak zorunda olduğunu ortaya koyar (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 71). Benzer şekilde, dinsel barındırma, insanların kendi inanç ve yaşam planlarını karşılaştıkları koşullara uyumlu hale getirme yetenekleri olduğu için hakkaniyete uygun olarak görülmemelidir (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 71). Eğer bir bireyin bir fırsata erişmek için kendi inancını o durumla uyumlulaştırması

gerekiyorsa, birey, herhangi bir tazminat veya farklı muamele talep etme hakkına sahip olmamalıdır (Taylor & Maclure, 2011: 71). Taylor ve Maclure'a (2011: 71) göre, böyle bir sorun, makul bir barındırmayla çözülebilir. Kamu çalışanlarının dinsel semboller giymemesi konusu, bu açıdan ele alınabilir. Taylor ve Maclure (2011: 9), kamu çalışanlarının görünümünden çok görevlerinden sorumlu olduklarını düşünür. Ancak, insanları cezalandırma yetkisi olan kolluk kuvvetleri, hakimler gibi kamu görevlileri için durum biraz daha karışıktır. Makul barındırma, bu konuda güç temelinde ayırım yapmada işe yarayabilir. İster atamayla, ister seçimle gelinmiş olsun, eğer kişinin otoriteye sahip bir kamusal makamı varsa, kişi, yalnızca uygulama ve kararlarıyla değil, görüntüsüyle de devletin tarafsızlık ilkesini yansıtmak üzere inançlarını bu koşullara uygun duruma getirebilmelidir.

Casanova'nın tezinin ana gerekçeleri, otoriter veya mutlak bir yönetimi engellemek ve sadece din özgürlüğünü değil, demokratik sivil toplumu da güçlendirmektir. Oysa, Batı-dışı toplumları gözlemlediğimizde, seküler otoriter yönetim tehlikesinden çok dinsel otoriterleşme eğiliminin yaygınlığı dikkat çekicidir. Bu da, din ve vicdan özgürlüğü açısından daha büyük endişe verici bir durumdur. Eğer otoriterleşmeyi engellemeye ve demokratik sivil toplumu din ve vicdan özgürlüğüyle güçlendirmeye öncelik verilecekse, demokratik ilkelerin sınırlarında kalmak koşuluyla bazı sınırlayıcı önlemler getirilebilir.

Diğer taraftan, bu çalışmada post-sekülerizmin seküler filtrelerin işleyişi ve translation proviso ile bağlantılı bazı sorunlarına işaret edilmiştir. Habermasçı anlamda, seküler filtreler kamusal alanın dinsel inançların ve yorumların savaş alanına dönüşmemesi için son derecede önemlidir. Örneğin, böyle filtreleme mekanizmalarının ve dinsel söylemi seküler söyleme çevirme kaygısının olmadığı bir sistemde, parlamento dinsel bir forum biçimini alacaktır. Özellikle dinsel bir çoğunluğun muhafazakar değerlerinin hakim olduğu bir toplumda, çoğulculuğa, din ve vicdan özgürlüğüne ve kamusal alanda açık tartışma talebine yanıt vermek olanaksızlaşabilir. Dinsel açıdan daha türdeş bir toplumda böylesi problemler çok göze çarpmayabilirken, çeşitli inanç gruplarının bir arada yaşadığı, heterojen bir

toplumda azınlıklar açısından eşitlik ilkesinden uzaklaşan sonuçlar doğabilir. Anayasal olarak seküler bir çerçevenin olmadığı bir durumda çeviri yalnızca azınlıklar için işleyen bir yükümlülüğe dönüşecektir. Bunun önüne geçebilmek ve hoşgörüyü dayalı, herkese açık bir dil geliştirebilmek için resmi ve kamusal alanda seküler bir bağışıklık sistemi geliştirmek gereklidir.

Post-sekularizm, gerçekliğin değil ama paradigmanın veya bilincin değişimi olarak sunulurken, Batı dünyasında gerçekliğin 'seküler çağ'da vücuda geldiğini göz önüne almak gerekmektedir. Fakat, Batılı olmayan, özellikle de İslami bağlamlarda gerçekliği değiştirmeden post-seküler bir topluma erişme durumu söz konusu olmayacaktır. Yoksa, İslam'ın demokrasiyle bağdaşmayacağı savı demokratik sivil toplum taleplerini baskın çıkabilir. Gerçekliğin devlet destekli modernleşme projesiyle değiştirilmesi olarak ele aldığımızda, Türkiye deneyiminin önemi bir kez daha ön plana çıkmaktadır.

Kuramsal ve kavramsal tartışmanın, Batı'nın tarihsel gelişim sürecinden farklı bir yol izleyen ve Osmanlı-Türk modernleşmesine dayanan Türkiye'yi ele alan boyutunda, sekülerleşme tezi bağlamında bu modernleşmenin nasıl değerlendirildiği, hangi açılardan eleştirildiği ve Türkiye'nin post-sekularizmin bir örneği olarak nasıl görüldüğü üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu konu, Müslüman çoğunluğa sahip ama resmen laik bir devlet olan, Hristiyan Batı deneyiminden farklı bir tarihsel süreci takip ederek modernleşmiş Türkiye için son derecede önemlidir, çünkü Türkiye bu yapıyla özel bir konumdadır.

Türkiye üzerine bir analiz olan bu çalışmada kullanılan terminolojiye de açıklık getirmekte yarar var. Türkçe'de sekularizm yerine Fransızca'daki 'laïcisme' teriminin karşılığı olan laiklik terimi kullanılmaktadır. Oysa, sekularizm ve laiklik, etimolojik kökleri açısından farklı sözcüklerdir. Birincisi, Latince'deki 'saeculum' kökünden gelir ve 'çağ' anlamındadır. İkincisi ise, Grekçe'deki 'halk' anlamındaki 'laos' kökünden gelmektedir. Aslında Türkiye'de laiklik teriminden önce bu terimin barındırdığı anlamı karşılamak üzere 'asrilik' sözcüğü kullanılmaktaydı ve

bu sözcük tam olarak ‘çağdaşlaşma’ anlamındaki sekülerizm sözcüğüne karşılık gelmekteydi. Türkiye’de sekülerizmin gelişmesi konusunda en eski ve en yetkin çalışmalardan birinin sahibi olan Niyazi Berkes de Türkiye’deki deneyimin sekülerizm terimi ile daha iyi karşılanacağına inanmaktadır. Sekülerizmi tercih nedenini açıklarken Berkes (2012: 19-20) şöyle der:

(...) bu terimde, laïcisme teriminden olandan farklı olarak, kilise ya da kilise adamı, kurum ve kuralları, yetkilileri ile onların dünyasal karşıtlarının (clericus ile laicus’un) karşı karşıya gelmesi, birçok ölçüte göre birbirinden iyice ayırılması durumu yerine geleneksel, katılmış kurum ve kurallar karşısında zamanın gereklerine uyan kurum ve kuralları geliştirme sorununun belirdiğini görürüz. Din ile dünya işlerinin ilişkisini ayarlama Protestanlık, Katoliklik’ten fazla esneklik gösterebilmiştir. Asıl sorunun, toplumsal yaşamın hangi yanları üzerinde gelenek gereklerinin yerine, zamanın gereklerinin insan davranışlarına yol göstermesi sorunu olduğu burada daha iyi görülür. (...) Din, geleneğin en son sığınağı, en son savunma kalesidir. (...) Çağdaşlaşma sözcüğünün özü, ‘laikleşme’ sözcüğünün söylemek istediği gibi toplumu bu dinselleşme hummasından yakasından kurtarma işi imiş gibi gözüküyor ve burada laïcisme ile secularism terimlerinin anlamları, ayrı sözcük kökenlerinden geldikleri halde birbirine uyuyor.

Bu çalışmada ise sekülerizminin içinde barındırdığı çeşitliliğe istinaden kullanılan terimle anlatılmak isteneni tam olarak ortaya koymak üzere ek ifadelerle başvurulmaktadır. Örneğin, “devlet idare doktrini olarak sekülerizm” ile “ideoloji olarak sekülerizm” arasındaki ayrıma sıkça başvurulmaktadır. Birinci ile Türkiye’deki hukuksal ve siyasal anlamdaki “laiklik ilkesi” karşılanmaya çalışılmıştır. İkincisi ise sekülerleşme tezini de kapsayan, dinin siyasal ve hukuksal düzlem dışında sosyal hayatta da etkisini kırmayı, alanını kısıtlamayı öngören çeşidini karşılamaktadır. Kimi araştırmacılar, dışlayıcı/pasif sekülerizm, siyasal/sosyal sekülerizm gibi ayrımlar yapmışlardır.

Türkiye’yi post-sekülerizm kapsamında değerlendiren bazı araştırmacıların tezlerini kısaca özetleyip, bu çalışmada, bu yaklaşımlara neden katılmadığını ortaya koymakta yarar var. Nilüfer Göle, Banu Gökarıksel ve Anna Secor ve Massimo Rosati’nin çalışmaları bu yaklaşımı örnekler.

Modernite ve sivil toplum araştırmacısı olarak Nilüfer Göle toplumdaki çatışmaları, İslami toplumla laik devlet arasındaki gerilime indirir görünmektedir.

Göle (2012a: 10), dinin kamusal alandaki yerine laiklikle ilgili olarak odaklanır. Din ve kamusal alan arasındaki değişen ilişkilere, yeni bileşim ve eklemlenmeler ortaya çıkardığı için ilgi duyar. Göle'ye (2012a: 10) göre, dinsel-seküler ayrımı üzerinden bakıldığında, bu yenilikler bir 'arada kalma' durumu yaratır ve özellikle AKP iktidarı döneminde Türkiye böyle bir arada kalmışlığı örneklediği için post-seküler olarak görülebilir. Bu, kamusal alanın laik tanımlarına bir meydan okumayı temsil eder ve İslam'ın kamusal varlığını üzerindeki tartışmayı yoğunlaştırır.

Göle'nin (2012a: 10) post-sekülerizm tanımlamasında çoğulculuk üzerinde durulmaktadır ve çoğulculuğun güvence altına alınamamasıyla çoğunluğun tahakkümünün ortaya çıkacağı uyarısı yapılmaktadır. Göle'nin arada kalmışlık ve çoğulculuk üzerinden yaptığı post-sekülerizm değerlendirmesine bu çalışmada karşı çıkılmaktadır. Çünkü, birincisi, post-sekülerizm, İslam ile sekülerizm arasında kalmayı değil, dinin kamusal alana girişini hoşgörüyü karşılarken kökleşmiş bir seküler düzeni de varsaymaktadır. Böylece, azınlıkların hak ve özgürlükleri ve din dışındaki diğer 'seçenekler' de korunmuş olacaktır. Aksi takdirde, Taylor'ın deyimiyle, İslam diğer seçenekler arasında bir 'seçenek' olmaktan çıkıp tek seçenek durumuna gelecektir. İkincisi, eğer çoğulculuk post-sekülerizm için merkezi öneme sahipse ve onsuz çoğunluk diktası ortaya çıkıyorsa, bu çalışmada AKP'nin çoğunlukçu demokrasi anlayışı ve Alevi konuları üzerinden anlatıldığı gibi, AKP çoğulculuk konusunda gerekli sağlam duruşu sergilememektedir. Batı bağlamında ise, modern-demokratik uzlaşının sonucu belirlenmiş olan dinsel ve seküler arasındaki sınırları yeniden biçimlendirerek ve dinsel farklılığı kamusal alanda görünür kılmak üzere İslam, Avrupa kamusal yaşamına doğru hızla yol aldı (Göle, 2006: 3-4). Fakat bu çift yönlü bir yolculuktu: Batı bağlamındaki Müslümanlar hem İslami hareket, hem de seküler eğitim, piyasa değerleri ve siyasal dil tarafından şekillendirilmişti (Göle, 2006: 4). Başka bir ifadeyle, hem dinsel hem de seküler olmak üzere çiftli bir sembolik sermayeye sahiplerdi (Göle, 2006: 27).

Bir dışsal malzeme olarak İslam, Batı post-sekularizminin gelişiminde son derecede kritik bir rol üstlendi ve İslam'ın Avrupa kamusal alanlarına girişi, birçok Batılı sosyal ve siyasal bilimcinin dikkatini çekti. Habermas'ın çalışmalarında, kamusal alan ideali ve çoğulcu demokrasinin işleyişi arasındaki ilişki, çoğulcu bir bakış açısıyla kamusal alanı yeniden düşünmeyi ve kavramsallaştırmayı gerekli kılmıştır (Göle, 2012b: 37). Avrupa'da kamusal alan, İslami ve Avrupalı kültürel kodların çatışma ve iç içe geçme arenasına dönüşmüştür (Göle, 2012b: 36). Kamusal yerler, dinsel ve seküler aktörlerin asimetrik iktidar ilişkilerine sahne olmuş ve İslami benliğin Batılılaşmış benliğe karşı kamusal alanda kendine yer açarak kendi tahayyülünü görünür kıldığı ortam ortaya çıkmıştır (Göle, 2006: 39). Sonuç olarak, Batı'da kamusal alanın evrenselci varsayımları toplumsal cinsiyete, etnisiteye, sınıfa karşı körlüğü açısından eleştirilerek demokratik bir kamusal alana doğru bir adım atılmış oluyordu (Göle, 2006: 38).

Küreselleşme, ulusallığını sürdüren siyasal alanla karşılaştırıldığında ulus-ötesi olan kamusal alanın özerkliğine katkıda bulunur (Göle, 2012: 35). Kamusal görünürlük talebi artan din, farklı ulusal ve ulus-ötesi bağlamlarda kamusal tartışmaları arttırmıştır (Göle, 2012b: 35). İslam, ulus-ötesi Avrupa kamusalının oluşumuna katılmaktadır; ancak aynı zamanda Avrupa'nın seküler modernitesinin etik ve normlarına meydan okumaktadır. Bu Batı bağlamında post-sekularizm literatürü, dinsel kamusal alana katılımını savunurken, kamusal alanın çoğulcu bir anlayışla demokratikleşmesini çok önemser. Göle (2006: 37) de bu noktaya vurgu yaparak farklı olarak algılandığı, 'yabancı' olarak düşünüldüğü ve dolayısıyla 'dışlanmış' olan 'diğer' ile bir toplumsal bağ kurma sorununun, demokrasinin temel sorularından biri olduğunu vurgular. Kamusal alan da entellektüel popülerliğini ve siyasal önemini, sosyal çeşitlikten bir ortak dünya inşa etmeyi sağlayan demokratik potansiyelinden alır (Göle, 2006: 37). Ancak, kamusal alan, modernite ve demokrasi arasındaki ilişki, Batı-dışı toplumlar için de geçerli farz etmek doğru değildir (Göle, 2006: 37). Göle'ye (2006: 37) göre, güçlü bir kamusal alan, modernlik veya demokrasi anlamına gelmez. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ulusal aidiyet duygusunu ve seküler yaşam biçimini laik Anayasa'sı

ile güvence altına almışken siyasal, dinsel ve etnik çoğulculuğu kabul etmemiştir (Göle, 2006: 38). Göle (2006: 38), Türkiye’de kamusal sekülerizm ve demokratik çoğulculuk arasındaki yerleşik gerilimlerin kamusal alanın gelişiminde gözlemlenmektedir.

Nilüfer Göle (2012b: 11) aynı zamanda laikliğin Batı deneyiminden farkının ortaya koyulması ve çoklu laikliklerin varlığını kabul etmek gerektiğini söylemektedir. Ona (2012b: 11) göre, farklı tarihsel süreçleri takip eden bir sekülerlik, farklı dinsel secerelere sahip olabilir; ancak, tüm bunlar Batı modernitesinin ve sömürgeciliğinin hegemonik zorlamalarıyla da bağlantılıdır. Hristiyanlıkla etkileşimin şekil verdiği bir ‘iç’ tartışmanın ürünü bir Batılı üst anlatı olan sekülerizm, İslam’la karşılaşınca büyük bir değişim sürecine girmiştir (Göle, 2012b: 12). Post-sekülerizm literatürü de bu nedenle kendini Batı’nın ‘zengin’ toplumlarıyla sınırlamıştır. Bu çalışmada da tarihsel gelişim ve daha yakın dönem değişim süreçleri dikkate alınarak Türk kamusal alanının incelenmesi yapılmıştır.

Batı-dışı bağlamlarda sekülerizmin analizi iki farklı tutuma yol açabilir: (1) sekülerizmi, Latin Hristiyan dünyaya içkin olduğu için Batı-dışı toplumlara yabancı bir ideoloji olarak görmek; (2) sekülerizm ve Batı arasındaki özdeşliği kırmak ve farklı tarihsel ve dinsel bağlamlarda, farklı sekülerizm oluşum ve görüntülerinin ortaya çıkabileceğini varsaymak (Göle, 2012b: 13). Bu çalışmada, Türkiye deneyiminin özgünlüklerini incelemek üzere ikinci tutum benimsenmiştir.

Nilüfer Göle gibi, dinin çoğulcu kamusal alanda değişen rolünden hareket eden Banu Gökarişel ve Anna Secor (2015: 21), Türkiye’yi kurumsal açıdan laik ve demokratik bir devletin olduğu post-seküler bir coğrafya olarak ele alır. Onlar (2015: 22), Türkiye’yi Fransız modelindeki gibi ‘güçlü laiklik’ örneği gibi görür, çünkü Türk Anayasası, dini kamusal alandan çıkardığı ve Sünni İslam üzerinde denetim kurduğu için siyasal alan, dinin egemenliğine karşı bağışık hale getirilmiştir.

Gökarıksel ve Secor'a (2015: 21) göre, Türkiye'deki AKP, İslami ve neoliberal ekonomik değerlerin başarılı bir uyumlulaştırma örneğidir. AKP, Türkiye'de laikliğin yeniden yorumlanması çağrısı yapmıştır (Gökarıksel & Secor, 2015: 22). Onlara (2015: 21) göre, Habermasçı post-sekülerizm, kamusal arenaya dinselliğin entegrasyonu üzerine kuruludur. Gökarıksel ve Secor (2015: 23), post-sekülerizmi sekülerin olumsuzluğunu tanıdığı ve 'siyaset' ve 'din' kategorilerini özel olarak betimlemeye dayandığı için dinamik bir kavram olarak görür.

Buna ek olarak Gökarıksel ve Secor (2015: 21), çoğulculuk sorununa seküler demokrasilere bir meydan okuma olarak dikkat çeker. Onlar (2015: 22) için başörtüsü takan kadınlar, Türkiye'deki dinsel-seküler ayrımı anlayışının değişmesine doğru ilk adımı temsil etmektedir. Bu çalışmada Alevi konusu, başörtüsü konusu ile birlikte Türkiye'de post-seküler bir potansiyel olup olmadığını incelemek üzere analize dahil edilmiştir.

Türkiye'yi post-sekülerizmin bir örneği olarak ele alan bir diğer araştırmacı olan Massimo Rosati (2012: 61), Kemalist mirastan kaynaklanan türdeş kamusal alan anlayışının Türkiye'de milliyetçilik, laiklik ve Batı tarzı moderniteye alternatif yorumların ortaya çıkarak post-Kemalizme geçilmesiyle değişim yoluna girdiğini iddia eder. Rosati (2012: 69), sekülerleşme tezini eleştirir ve Türk laikliğinin dinin kamusal alandan ayrılmasının dışında kontrol altında tutulmasını ön gördüğüne dikkat çeker.

Rosati (2012: 69), Türkiye'nin dışlayıcı sekülerizmden pasif sekülerizme geçmekte olduğu tezine karşı çıkar; çünkü bu, bir Batılı modelden diğer bir Batılı modele geçiş anlamına gelir. Oysa, Türkiye kendi alternatif 'yerel' modernitesini deneyimlemektedir. Rosati (2012: 72), modernitenin ve dinin yansıtıcılıklarının post-sekülerizmin tanımlayıcı iki boyutu olduğunu dile getirir; çünkü bunlar yaşamın seküler ve dinsel biçimleri arasında birbirini tamamlayan öğrenme süreçlerini tetikleyerek, bunların arasındaki sınırlarını yeniden biçimlendirerek, kimlikleri müzakereye açarak, vb. melez sosyal pratiklere can verir.

Oysa, bu sonuca varmadan önce, böyle bir post-seküler düzenin önemli garantilere bağlı olduğu unutulmamalıdır. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmada, demokrasinin ve laikliğin konsolidasyonu, post-seküler düzenin temel öğeleri olarak ele alınmaktadır. Ancak Rosati (2012: 68), AKP'nin Kemalist (seküler) muhalefetini Türkiye'nin daha fazla demokratikleşmesinin -hatta Tayyip Erdoğan tarafından ani ve keskin bir biçimde son verilen 'Kürt açılımı'nın- önündeki en büyük engel olarak görmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye'deki siyasal sürecin bu iddianın tam tersi doğrultuda ilerlediği, AKP'nin biçimsel demokrasinin çoğunlukçu anlayışına dayanarak iktidardaki ilk dönemlerindeki söyleminden daha otoriter bir noktaya sürüklendiği gösterilmektedir.

İkinci, düzlemde, Türkiye'de modernleşme ve sekülerleşmenin tarihi ile bu modernleşmenin din sorunu özelinde bir eleştirisi olarak ortaya çıkan ve yükselen siyasal İslamın incelemesi bulunmaktadır. AKP'nin kurucu siyasi kadrosu çok büyük ölçüde Milli Görüş hareketine dayanmaktadır. Milli Görüş, kendisini sekülerleşmenin karşısında konumlandırarak gelişmiş, Türkiye'nin en güçlü siyasal İslamcı hareketidir. Dolayısıyla, AKP'nin post-sekülerlik çerçevesinde bir incelemesini yapabilmek için onu önceleyen Türkiye'nin modernleşme sürecini ve bunun siyasal İslamcı eleştirisini göz önünde bulundurmak, tarihsel bir analiz ortaya koymanın gereğidir. Başka bir ifadeyle, siyasal İslamcılığı anlamadan AKP'nin getirdiği yeniliği, modernleşmeyi anlamadan da modernleşmenin eleştirisini ve/veya laiklik karşıtlığını anlamak olanaklı değildir.

Bu çalışmada, İslamcılığı analiz ederken, resmen laik-demokratik devlet yapısına sahip Türkiye'deki İslamcılığın diğer Müslüman çoğunluğa sahip ülkelerdeki İslamcılık hareketlerinden daha farklı bir doğası olduğuna dikkat çekilmektedir. Genel anlamda İslamcılık, yirmibirinci yüzyılda Müslümanların karşılaştığı ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal sorunları, İslam'ın özüne yabancılaşmaya bağlayan bir ideolojidir ve amacı, İslam'ı toplumun tümüne ve tüm kurumlarıyla, hukuksal, siyasal, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kültürel boyutlarıyla birlikte hakim kılmaktır. Türk devriminin Türkiye dışındaki ülkelerdeki İslamcılık üzerine de çok büyük

etkisi olmuştur. Çünkü Cumhuriyet devrimiyle, İslami siyasal düzenin ana göstergesi olan halifelik kaldırılmış ve böylece İslami toplum sabitlenmiş bir düzenlemeden mahrum kalmış veya kurtarılmıştır. Yani, devrimciler İslam'ı merkezdeki yerinden ederek onu çevreye sürmüştür. Bu nedenle, İslamcılık, Türkiye bağlamında tepkisel bir harekete dönüşmüştür ve devlet aklına, yani sekülerleşmeye meydan okumuştur. Bu çalışmada, radikal İslamcılık ile siyasal İslamcılık arasında bir ayırım yapılmıştır ve ikincisi üzerinde durulmuştur. Birincisi, bir anti-demokratik İslami devlet projesi iken, ikincisi meşruiyetini biçimsel demokrasinin sağladığı olanakları kullanarak kazanmaya amaçlamıştır. Bu nedenle, demokrasinin İslam ile bağdaşıp bağdaşmadığı konusu bu çalışma için önem taşımaktadır.

Bu çalışmada ayrıca siyasal İslam'ın yükselişi, modernleşme projesinin iflasi olarak değil, ekonomik koşullar ve sınıf dinamikleri üzerinden analiz edilmiş, siyasal İslam'ın nasıl çalışan sınıflar üzerinde hegemonik duruma geldiği tartışılmıştır. Türkiye'de sekülerizm açısından bir diğer özel durum da, İslam'ın resmi devlet bürokrasisiyle iç içe geçişi ve böylece, bir anlamda, İslamcılığın toplumsal tabanının devlet eliyle genişletilmesidir. Bunun karşılığında da İslamcıların yarı-demokratik ve çoğulculuk karşıtı yapının korunmasına hizmet ettiği görülmektedir. Dahası, 1980 askeri darbesiyle Türk-İslam Sentezi adını taşıyan anlayış yarı-resmi nitelik kazanmış, dinsel sağın önü hem siyasette hem de devlet içinde açılmıştır. Ayrıca, tarikat ve cemaatler de İslamcılığın toplumsal tabanının genişlenmesinde kritik rol üstlenmiş; Müslüman bir 'sivil toplum'u harekete geçirerek iktidarı ele geçirmeyi arzulamıştır. Bu bağlamda, siyasal İslamın modern kurum ve değerlerle hemhal olarak post-İslamcılığa doğru evrilip evrilmeyeceği geleceğe dönük önemli bir araştırma konusudur.

Üçüncü düzlemde, Türkiye'nin post-seküler bir uğrağa erişip erişmediği, AKP'nin iktidar deneyimi, partinin söylemi, liderlerinin vurguları göz önünde bulundurularak ve başörtüsü yasağı ve Alevilerin talepleri özelindeki politika ve yaklaşımları dikkate alınarak araştırılmıştır. Ardarda yapılan seçimlerdeki seçmen

davranışları ile çoğunlukçu anlayış, vesayetle mücadele, reform çabaları, laiklik, muhafazakarlaşma, millet anlayışı, etnik ve dinsel sorunlara yönelik açılım çabaları bağlamında AKP'nin demokratikleşmeye yönelik yaklaşımı değerlendirilmiştir.

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin din ve vicdan özgürlüğü ile çoğulculuk açılarından anlayışını araştırmak üzere seçtiğim iki inceleme konusu olan başörtüsü ve Alevi sorunları, post-sekülerizmi değerlendirmek için çok ciddi veri sağlamaktadır. Bu araştırmada, AKP'nin bu iki konudaki yaklaşımının nasıl farklılaştığı üzerinde durulmuştur. Birinci konu, çoğunluk inancıyla ilgiliyken, diğeri ülkenin en büyük inançsal azınlığıyla ilgilidir. Birinci konuyla ilgili olarak, AKP, Türkiye'deki Sünni çoğunluğun değerlerine yaslandığı, başörtüsü tartışmasıyla dinin kamusal alandaki görünürlüğü ve etkisinin arttığı; böylece Türkiye'de kamusal alanın dönüşüm sürecinin hızlandığı gözlemlenmiştir. Bu sorunun çözümünde AKP'nin özgürlükçü bir söyleme başvurusu; ancak Sünni çoğunluğun İslam anlayışıyla farklılaşan Alevilerin sorunlarına yaklaşırken bu özgürlükçü söylemin gözden kaybolduğu dikkat çekicidir. Alevilerin sorunları, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi kararlarıyla meşru taleplere dönüştüğü halde AKP, belki de kendi seçmen tabanını oluşturan ve dinsel olarak imtiyazlı konumdaki Sünni çoğunluğun tepkisinden çeki çekmemek adına bu meşru talepleri dikkate almamaktadır. Bu iki konu, AKP'nin nesnel bir din ve vicdan özgürlüğü anlayışının olmadığını ve söylemi ile tutumunun iki konu arasında değişkenlik sergilediği not edilmiştir.

Batı dünyasında post-sekülerizm literatürü gelişirken ve kamusal alana dinsel seslerin katılım süreci başlarken özellikle azınlıktaki Müslümanların çoğulculuk temelli taleplerinin önemli etkisi olmuştu. Türkiye vakasında Alevilerin talepleri de tıpkı Batı'da Müslümanların yarattığı etkiyle bu açıdan benzerlik göstermektedir. Ancak her iki bağlamda da konu, azınlıktaki dinsel inançlarının kapsanmasına gelince post-sekülerizm literatürünün normatif yanıtlarının uygulamada çok da başarılı sonuçlar vermediği tespit edilmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın temel tezi ise AKP idaresi altındaki Türkiye'nin post-seküler olarak tanımlanamayacağını beşli bir kriter üzerinden göstermektir. Türkiye'de post-sekülerizmin koşullarını ortaya koyan bu beşli kriter şöyledir: (1) konsolide olmuş bir demokrasi; (2) kökleşmiş bir laiklik ilkesi; (3) din ve vicdan özgürlüğünün dayandığı nesnel güvenceler; (4) çoğulculuk sorununun yönetimi; ve (5) AKP'nin post-İslamcılık üzerinden analizi.

Son tahlilde, sekülerizm ve İslamcılık arasındaki etkileşim Türkiye'de amorf bir durumla sonuçlandı ve bu şekilsiz uğrak, post-sekülerizmle kavramsallaştırılmamalıdır. Birincisi, post-sekülerizm, demokrasinin konsolide olduğu, gelişmiş bir sosyal ve siyasi bir sistem olarak sunulmaktadır. Türk demokrasisi ise ne tam olarak kurumsallaşmıştır ne de sorunsuz bir biçimde işlemektedir. İktidar partisi AKP de Türkiye'de derin kökleri olan çoğunlukçu bir biçimsel demokrasi anlayışını içselleştirmiş görünmektedir. Bu anlayış, 'milli irade'nin tecelli etmesini sağlayacak şekilde araçsallaştırılırken, demokrasinin de tam anlamıyla ve tüm temel gereklilikleriyle konsolide olmasını engellemektedir.

İkincisi, post-seküler bir düzende devlet yönetimi doktrini veya devlet-din ayrımını gerektiren bir siyasi ilke olarak laiklikle ilgili herhangi bir endişe bulunmamaktadır. Diğer bir anlatımla, post-seküler düzende, seküler duyarlılığı yüksek olanların laikliğin dinsel çoğunluğun tehdidi altında olduğuna ilişkin bir kaygıları yoktur. Fakat Türkiye'de laiklik, siyasetin temel kutuplaşma eksenini olmayı sürdürmektedir. Kutuplaşmanın sona ermesi için bu amorf ara dönemin yerini demokratikleşmeye bırakması gerekmektedir.

Üçüncüsü, AKP'nin politikalarını değerlendirmek için bu çalışmada incelenen konular göstermiştir ki, parti henüz nesnel bir din ve vicdan özgürlüğü ölçütü geliştirememiştir. Örneğin, AKP kamu kurumlarında çalışanlarına ve üniversite öğrencilerine uygulanan başörtüsü yasağını kaldırmak için her türlü çabayı göstermişken, Alevilerin sorunlarına karşı ilgisiz ve duyarsız kalmayı sürdürmüştür. Oysa, her iki konu da din özgürlüğü temellidir.

Dördüncüsü, post-sekularizm, çok kültürlülüğün liberal demokrasiye meydan okumasıyla ve çoğulculuk sorununa yanıt vermek gereksinimiyle ortaya çıkmış ve çoğunluk diniyle birlikte diğer inanç gruplarının da seslerini kapsayacak biçimde demokratik kamusal alanın dinsel alana doğru genişlemesini önermektedir.

Sonuncusu, AKP'nin gerçekten siyasal İslamın post-İslamcılığa bir evrimi mi yoksa geçici bir stratejik taktik içinde mi olup olmadığına netlik kazandırmak gerekmektedir. Bu araştırma, bu konuya etraflıca yanıt vermekten çok, bunu analiz edilmesi gereken bir araştırma sorusu olarak önermektedir.

Bu tez, post-sekularizmin hem normatif anlamda hem de gerçekleşme düzeyindeki içsel sorunlarına dikkat çekmektedir. Batı dünyasında geliştirilmiş bir kavram olarak post-sekularizm henüz evrensel geçerliliğe ulaşamamıştır. Bu çalışmada dikkat çekilen, Türkiye ile Batı arasındaki kategorik benzerlik ve farklılıklar da buna işaret etmektedir.

Bazı benzerlikler şunlardır: İlk, Türk devleti, resmi olarak laiktir ve Batılı anlamda modern kurumlara sahiptir. Türkiye, yüzyıllardır Batı dünyasının bir parçası olmaya çalışmaktadır ve hem Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi gibi birçok Batılı ulus ötesi kuruma bağlanmıştır. İkincisi, post-sekularizm, çok kültürlülüğün beraberinde getirdiği çoğulculuk taleplerine bir yanıt olarak gelişmişti ve hem Türk toplumu hem de Batılı toplumlar çok kültürlü toplumlardır. Batı'da Müslümanlar, Türkiye'de Aleviler bu anlamda kamusal alanda yer almak isteyen büyük azınlıkları teşkil etmektedir. Azınlıkların bu talepleri, dinsel olana karşı, özellikle azınlık inançlarıyla ilgili, duyarsız olagelmış kamusal alanı dönüştürmeye başlasa da, post-sekularizm hem Batı'da hem de Türkiye'de azınlıklar noktasında çok da tatmin edici bir çerçeve sağlayamamaktadır.

Bazı farklılıklar ise şöyledir: Birincisi, Batı, Yahudi-Hristiyan mirasa dayanırken, Osmanlı-Türk yörüngesi tarihsel olarak farklı bir yol izlemiştir. Atıfta bulunulan tarihsel tahlillerde bazı kavramların anlam ve gelişimlerinin bağlamsal farklılıkları

ve özgünlükleri olumsal bir biçimde yansıttığı görülmüştür. İkincisi, çoğulculuk sorunu, AKP yönetimindeki Türkiye’de ve Batı’da farklı çağrışımlar yapabilmektedir. Örneğin, AKP, Osmanlı millet sistemine içkin olan muhafazakar bir çoğulculuk anlayışını benimseyerek gayri-müslim azınlıkları tanıırken, konu Alevilere gelince aynı rahatlığı sergileyememektedir. Gayri-müslim azınlıklar çoğulcuğun getirdiği nimetlerden yararlanabilecekken resmi İslam doktrinin dışında kalan Alevilerin talepleri anlamsız bulunabilecektir. Yani bu sorun, çoğulculuk açısından ele alınmaktan olmaktan çok bir dinsel doktrin konusu olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Üçüncüsü, azınlıkların çoğulculuk istemlerinden çok ilk aşamada siyasal İslamcılar Türkiye’de laiklik konusunda bir paradigma değişimi isteğini gündeme getirdi. Oysa, Batı’da kamusal alanının dinsel olana doğru genişlemesi daha çok çoğulculuk üzerinden gerçekleşmeye başlamıştı. Dördüncüsü, AKP’nin dünya görüşü ve kapsamlı öğretisi, büyük ölçüde Türkiye’deki Sünni çoğunluğun muhafazakar değerleriyle örülmüştür. Batı’nın laik ve konsolide demokrasilerinden farklı olarak AKP bu öğretiyi Türkiye’deki seküler toplumsal tahayyülü dinsel/muhafazakar bir toplumsal tahayyüle dönüştürmeyi arzulayabilmektedir. İşte bu arzu da toplumda laiklik ve Sünni İslam arasında artan kutuplaşmada kendini göstermektedir ki bu da, demokrasinin kökleşmesini, konsolide olmasını engellemektedir.

Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde oluşturulmaya çalışılan milli kimliğe İslami bir açılım ekleme çabası, post-seküler bir nokta olarak ele alınabilir. Söz konusu bir grubun etnik ve dinsel türdeşliğini varsayarsak, din, ulus-inşası sürecinde milli kimliğin birleştirici bir ögesi olarak ön plana çıkabilir. Türkiye örneğinde, İslam bu açıdan çok sınırlayıcı kalabilirdi çünkü Türkiye halkı yalnızca etnik olarak değil, dinsel olarak da, Alevi ve Sünniler arasında görüldüğü üzere, derin bir çeşitliliğe sahipti. Bu nedenle, yüzyıllar öncesine dayanan bir geçmişi olan ayrımların üzerine birleştirici bir İslami kimlik inşa etmek çok da kolay değildi. Bunun yanı sıra, Cumhuriyet devleti Sünni-Hanefi öğretiyi devlet bürokrasisi içinde kurumsallaştırarak Aleviler başta olmak üzere birçok inanç grubunu ve cemaati ziyadesiyle huzursuz etmiş; yeni milli kimliği ayrımcılığı önleyecek dozun

ötesinde İslamileştirme yoluna girmişti. Avrupa'da Hristiyanlığın milli kimlikler üzerinde daha fazla etkisi olduğu iddia edilebilir. Bununla ilgili üç noktaya dikkat çekmek yerindedir: Birincisi, Avrupa'da laikliğin ortaya çıkış nedenlerinden biri, dinsel anlaşmazlıklara ve savaflara bir son vermektir. İkincisi, Avrupa ulus-devletleri, Türkiye'ye kıyasla dinsel anlamda daha fazla türdeştir. Üçüncüsü, post-sekülerizm paradigmasının dayanaklarından biri, tüm yurttaşların demokratik kamusal alana eşit erişimini güvence altına alan bir yurttaşlık etiğidir. Bir taraftan, eğer bir milli kimlik dinsel bir öğretille çevrelenirse, böyle bir yurttaşlık etiğinden söz edilemez. Diğer taraftan, Türkiye'de milli kimlikte, halkın büyük çoğunluğunun yaşamında sergilenen ve İslam ve laiklik arasında çelişki gözetmeyen bir bağdaştırıcılık bulunduğu yadsınamaz. Yani Türk halkı özel yaşamda dindar olmakla kamusal alanda seküler davranmayı bağdaştırabilmiştir. Bu bağdaştırıcılığın sarsılmasının Türkiye'nin toplumsal ve siyasal huzurunu nasıl etkileyebileceği, gelecekte analiz edilmesi gereken bir soru olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Bu araştırmanın son bir değerlendirmesi olarak şu söylenebilir ki, siyasal İslamcı bir altyapısı olan AKP iktidarının gerçek anlamda bir post-seküler söyleme ve icraata yaslanması, Türkiye'nin geleceği ve demokratikleşmesi açısından çok önemli katıklar sağlayabilecek bir konudur. Ancak eldeki veriler, işaretler ve artan kutuplaşma geleceğe dair bu iyimserliği gölgelemektedir.

C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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TURKEY: DEBATING POST-SECULARISM UNDER THE AKP RULE

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