# THE MAXIMS OF RELEVANCE THEORY FOR DETERMINING THE REFERENT OF A PROPER NAME

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#### ABSTRACT

# THE MAXIMS OF RELEVANCE THEORY FOR DETERMINING THE REFERENT OF A PROPER NAME

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People use proper names to refer to certain objects and people. One of the problems with this use is that people use the same name to refer to many other people. There many different theories developed by philosophers to explain how we refer to a person using a proper name. We shall see that though many of the theories can explain to a degree how we use the same name for different people but fail to elucidate how we determine the true referent among the many people that they know who bear the same name. This failure of semantic theories will lead us to study the pragmatic theories or communication theories and whether they can provide an explanation to how people use the proper names. As we elaborate the communication theories we will see that only Relevance Theory, developed by Wilson and Sperber, provides the closest account to explain how we communicate. Even though Wilson and Sperber claims that Relevance Theory cannot solve the problem we asserted above, we will see that there is a solution of Relevance theory and this solution comes from the problem that we stated for the semantic theories.

Because semantic theories exclude the audience from the process of determining the true referent of a proper name, they cannot explain how we pick one of the referents. In Relevance Theory, however, the audience can enforce the speaker to increase the relevance. This enforcing is done with respect to certain maxims. In this thesis we will present these maxims.

Keywords: Proper names, reference, Relevance Theory, audience, maxims.

# ALAKA TEORİSİNİN BİR ÖZEL AD İLE KİMDEN BAHSEDİLDİĞİNİ BULMA KURALLARI

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İnsanlar öz adları belli kişilerden ve objelerden bahsetmek için kullanırlar. Bu kullanımdaki ana sorunlardan biri insanların aynı ismi birden çok kişiden bahsetmek için kullanmalarıdır. Felsefeciler bir özel adın nasıl bir kişiden bahsedebildiğini açıklamaya çalışan bir çok teori geliştirdiler. Bu teorilerden bir çoğu belli bir dereceye kadar bizim nasıl aynı ismi başka insanlar için kullandığımızı açıklayabilseler de aynı ismi taşıyan tanıdığımız bir çok kişi arasından nasıl doğru olanı seçtiğimizi açıklamakta başarısız olduklarını göreceğiz. Semantik teorilerin bu başarısızlığı bizi pragmatik teorilerin yahut iletişim teorilerinin insanların özel ad kullanımlarına açıklama getirip getiremediğini incelemeye yönlendirecek. İletişim teorilerini incelediğimizde ise aralarından sadece Wilson ve Sperber tarafından öne sürülmüş Alaka Teorisi'nin bizim iletişimimizi en doğru şekilde açıkladığını göreceğiz. Her ne kadar Wilson ve Sperber Alaka Teorisi'nin bu soruna bir çözümünün olduğunu ve bu

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çözümün aslında semantik teorilerin sorunundan geldiğini göreceğiz. Semantik teoriler dinleyiciyi bir özel ad ile kimden bahsedildiğini bulma sürecinden dışladıkları için hangi kişiyi nasıl seçtiğimizi açıklayamamaktadırlar. Alaka Teorisi'nde ise dinleyici konuşmacıyı alakayı arttırmaya zorlayabilir. Bu zorlama ise belirli kurallar çerçevesinde gerçekleşir. Bu tezde bu kuralları sunacağız.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Özel adlar, referans, Alaka Teorisi, dinleyici, kurallar.

to my mother and my father

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# **CHAPTER 1**

# **INTRODUCTION**

*Traduttori, traditori!* Translators, traitors!

This thesis is about the reference of a proper name. Any philosopher who developed a theory of reference asked himself/herself the same question 'how does a name refer?' Many of them chose the speaker's use of a name as a starting point for themselves. In this thesis, it is asserted that the picture on the wall was hanged upside down.

We make utterances as

(L1) Dr. Gustav Lauben is wounded.<sup>1</sup>

How do we refer to the person p with the name 'Lauben' is an important question. However we make utterances as (L1) to somebody, with the intention of being understood. In thesis we claim that masters of the language are not challenged by how they manage to refer to p; instead the problem that they encounter is The *Problem of Many Referents*, which we can formulate as:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Frege, 1956, p. 297.

#### The Problem of Many Referents

The problem faced by the audience of any sentence that includes a proper name is whom the speaker meant by her use of the proper name 'PN' among the many people who bear the same name 'PN'.

No one can know better than us to whom we referred to. Once we make an utterance, we translate our thoughts, along with the reference we make into another 'language' and *Traduttori*, *traditori*! In English, 'Translators, traitors'. Each translator is a traitor who will fail to transfer our thoughts correctly. Imagine a case where both the father, Gustav Lauben Sr., and the son, Gustav Lauben Jr., are doctors. Peter, as a messenger, visits the wife of Gustav Lauben Sr. and utters (L1). Though Peter knew which of the Dr. Laubens is wounded, he did not choose to specify it.

The mysterious thing is that in the most cases we are able to track down the true referent of a proper name. We are after a semantic theory that does not contradict with how we use the proper names. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to explain how we accomplish this, *i.e.* to answer the following question:

(Q1) How can the hearer of a sentence which contains a proper name can determine the true referent of that name among the many people who have the same name?

In Chapter 2, we give a brief summary of the theories on the reference of proper names in a chronological order. We will start with John Stuart Mill and finish with Gareth Evans.

In Chapter 3, we will see that none of these theories present a solution to *The Problem of Many Referents*. We will conclude that because these theories fail to answer this problem, they also fail to deliver the true semantics of the proper names. This will lead us to search an alternative theory. Recanati develops this

alternative. Though Recanati presents what seems to be the true semantics of proper names, he does not explain how we solve *The Problem of Many Referents*.

In Chapter 4, we will study the communication theories to grasp how we communicate. These theories can be grouped into two categories: Coding - Decoding Theories and Implication Based Theories. After finding the theory that captures best of our communication, we will try to solve the problem from their perspective. Even though the Relevance Theory seems to explain our communication in a successful way, they frankly admit that they fail to answer the problems similar to *The Problem of Many Referents*.

Finally, in Chapter 5, we will claim that Relevance Theory does indeed solve the problem. The masters of a language follows some maxims and tools to increase the relevance and in this chapter we will present these maxims that will help the audience in his quest of tracking down the true referent of a proper name. As Grice claimed about his maxims, we believe that these maxims are the guidelines that we use already. Maxims for the audience are *to wait, to ground, to guess,* and *to let go.* We claim that the masters of a language use them to find the true referent of a proper name, PN.

#### **CHAPTER 2**

### **THEORIES ON PROPER NAMES**

In this chapter, we will summarize some of the major theories on proper names. This journey will start with John Stuart Mill (1843) and will end with Gareth Evans (1973). Though traditionally scholars are inclined to reduce these theories into two views: Direct Reference Theories (or Millianism) and Description Theories, we will not make such a sectioning, at least in this chapter. Instead, we will follow the chronological order in explaining each philosopher. The structure in each subsection will be (i) the criticism of the previous account(s) made by that philosopher, (ii) the philosopher's own theory, and if available (iii) the response of

evious accounts.

#### 2.1. John Stuart Mill

In the beginning of the chapter on names in his book (1843), *A System of Logic*, Mill accepts the definition of Thomas Hobbes:

A NAME is a word taken at pleasure to serve a mark, which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had, or had not before in his mind.<sup>2</sup>

Yet, by saying "a sign of what thought the speaker had" Hobbes did not mean the ideas. Two pages before this definition, Hobbes differentiates *marking* and *signing*. "… MARKS, namely, sensible things taken at pleasure, that, by the sense of them such thoughts may be recalled to our mind as are like those thoughts for which we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Hobbes, 1839, p. 16.

took them".<sup>3</sup> "Now those things we call SIGNS are the *antecedents of their consequents, and the consequents of their antecedents, as often as we observe them to go before or follow after in the same manner*".<sup>4</sup> Therefore the difference between marks and signs is that we use the former one for ourselves, and the latter one for others. Mill asserts that names are the names of things in both cases. However, in its essence, a name has no meaning. A name only signs (or marks) a thing.

Later, Mill starts classifying the names. The upmost important divisions for this thesis will be the first and the third one (the division of general and singular names, and the division of connotative and non-connotative names). In addition to the divisions below, he also distinguishes univocal and æquivocal (ambiguous and unambiguous) names. However this distinction is related with a name's usage. Therefore this distinction shall not be presented here, but in further chapters.

## 2.1.1. Mill's Classification of Names

## 2.1.1.1. First Division: General and Singular

According to Mill a *general* name (or universal name) "is capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense, of each of an indefinite number of things".<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, a *singular* name (or individual name) "is capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense, of one thing".<sup>6</sup> Therefore a general name as 'man' can be used for Max, John, and many others, since those things qualifies being a man. Yet, a singular name as John is capable of being only affirmed of *one* person.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, original emphasis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Mill, 1843, p. 27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Ibid.

A general name should not be confused with a *collective* name. A collective name cannot be predicated of each individual particularly, but only of all together. Therefore a collective name as 'Anaheim Mighty Ducks' cannot be predicated over each player. Nonetheless it refers to all players in the ice hockey team, Anaheim Mighty Ducks.

## 2.1.1.2. Second Division: Concrete and Abstract

For Mill, "[a] *concrete* name is one that stands for a thing; an *abstract* name stands for an attribute of a thing".<sup>7</sup> According to these definitions, while names as salt, coffee, this cup, and Max are concrete names, their properties as whiteness, bitterness, roundness, and oldness are abstract. Mill's own example on the issue is 'Man' which is a name of many things. However the attribute version of it, 'humanity', is an attribute of things, which carries that name.

#### 2.1.1.3. Third Division: Connotative and Non-Connotative

The third division is where Mill constructs its theory of reference and called as "one of the most important distinctions which we shall have occasion to point out"<sup>8</sup> by himself. To give definitions of them "[a] *non-connotative* term is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A *connotative* term is one which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute".<sup>9</sup>

If we accept these definitions, then names that signify a subject as John or London are connotative; and the name that signifies an attribute as whiteness, bitterness, and oldness are non-connotative. Since the word 'white' denotes all the things that have the property of being white, as (white) paper do, 'white' implies the attribute of whiteness. On the other hand a name as 'man' not only denotes infinitely many individuals as Max, John, or Socrates, but also (indirectly) signifies certain

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29. My emphases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, my emphases.

attributes as being rational, or being mortal. In this sense Mill claims that all concrete general names are connotative. There are also abstract general names, on which Mill avers that some of them are connotative, since some attributes themselves include some other attributes.

Individual concrete names require a deeper analysis. As Mill accepts some individual names are connotative, as Sun or God, he does not regard proper names as connotative. As proper names serves to refer a thing without talking about it, it is not the case for a name that is applied exclusively to an individual. The same idea is also true for definite descriptions. When we construct a definite description as 'the father of Socrates', "[w]hat is here done by the word 'the' is done in other cases by the context".<sup>10</sup> Mill gives the example of 'Caesar's army'. It clearly refers to a particular army that he commanded in a particular battle.

## 2.1.1.4. Fourth Division: Positive and Negative

The fourth division is a very intuitive one; names can be positive and negative. Negative version of good is bad or evil. In this division, Mill's approach to negativity and positivity can be considered as a relativist one. For instance the word 'unpleasant', for him, states a positive attribute that is 'a lesser degree of painful'.

## 2.1.1.5. Fifth Division: Relative and Non-Relative

The fifth and final division made by Mill is relational one. He claims that relative names always given as pairs; as in 'father-son', 'equal-unequal', 'longer-shorter', and 'cause-effect'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

#### 2.2. Gottlob Frege

Frege presents his account on reference and proper names in (1948) "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (On Sense and Reference). Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell can be seen as the founders of analytical philosophy. Frege's understanding of names will be presented in this section, and Russell's thoughts will be delivered in the next one. As we deliver Frege's position we will cover his criticism of John Stuart Mill, his theory of reference and sense, and how he shapes his idea of proper names in the light of this theory.

#### 2.2.1. Frege's Criticism of Mill

To recall Mill's version of reference: he proposes that a name does not have any meaning; it only refers to a certain object. According to this, we can say,

(i) The Evening Star = the Evening Star

Since both of the names refer to the same thing, Venus. In the same sense we can also say,

(ii) The Evening Star = The Morning Star

due to the fact that 'The Morning Star' is also a name of the planet Venus. However, while the statement (i) is a priori, the statement (ii) is a posteriori. If this is the case, "then each name must have a different sense".<sup>11</sup> Simplified versions of these sentences are,<sup>12</sup>

- (iii) a = a
- (iv) a = b

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Searle, 1958, p. 166.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Frege, 1948, p. 209.

For Mill, these two statements, (iii) and (iv) have the same meaning. However Frege opposes this idea and claim that "[t]he Reference of 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star' would be the same, but not the sense".<sup>13</sup> Therefore (iii) and (iv) cannot be the same.

## 2.2.2. Frege on Names

Frege states what he considers as a name by these words: "It follows from the context that by 'sign' and 'name' I have here been meaning any designation that takes the place of a proper name".<sup>14</sup> He also asserts that the reference of a proper name cannot be a concept or a relation, but only be a certain object. Therefore his account suggests that all singular terms are names.

In the essence of his theory Frege claims that a name designates its *referent*, and expresses its *sense*. For example, a proper name could be used to designate the inventor of the bifocals. This proper name, in our case 'Benjamin Franklin', refers to a certain person. However someone else could have used another designation, 'the first Postmaster General of the United States of America'. A similar case can be found in a footnote of Frege's "On Sense and Reference":

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions as to the sense may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence 'Aristotle was born in Stagira' than will a man who takes as the sense of the name: the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect language.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Frege, 1948, p. 210.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> *Ibid*.

In other words, though these two descriptions refer to the same person, their senses are different. For Frege, there can be different senses, but these senses determine the referent. This is an imperfection of language.

## 2.3. Bertrand Russell

Russell defends his views on reference in "On Denoting" (1905) in which proposes a description theory similar to Frege did in "On Sense and Reference" (1948), along with some differences or 'upgrades'. Due to this similarity some philosophers are inclined to present their ideas together under the label of *Descriptivist Theory*, or *Indirect Reference Theory*. We will first deliver Russell's objections to Frege, which will be followed by his account of denoting, and his two-typed proper names.

#### 2.3.1. Russell's Objections to Frege

Russell's main objection to Frege focuses on names that do not stand for anything, as 'the King of France'. Currently there is no 'the King of France'. Nonetheless there is 'the King of Sweden', Carl Gustaf. We know what the proposition asserts, 'the king of x'. Therefore the proposition is not meaningless, *i.e.* has a sense. It just does not have a referent. For Frege this was not problematic; there could be empty names, (names that do not have any referent), *i.e.* they denote a null-class. Yet Russell disagrees,

[W]e must either provide a denotation in cases in which it is at first sight absent, or we must abandon the view that the denotation is what is concerned in propositions which contain denoting phrases. The latter is the course that I advocate.<sup>16</sup>

The former one, according to him, does not reveal a true picture of how denotation works. Instead of a two-leveled system, as Frege suggests with his sense and reference, Russell proposes one-leveled system. The essence of his thesis is that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Russell, 1905, p. 484.

proper names are definite descriptions, a topic, which shall be presented in detail below. For him this descriptivist view allows us to replace names with their descriptions. To use a bearless name as a subject, as in 'the king of France is bald', means that 'there is a king of France and he is bald'. Since the first part of this conjunction is false, then the statement itself is false. Therefore, unlike Frege claimed, empty name containing statements that can have a truth-value.

#### 2.3.2. Denoting

Russell proposed, "a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its *form*".<sup>17</sup> Meaning that it does not need to denote, such a phrase is a disguised definition. A proper analysis of a phrase would reveal what or whom it denotes. According to Russell,

- (a) "a phrase may denote, and yet not denoting anything e.g. the king of France is bald
- (b) a phrase may denote one definite objecte.g. the king of England
- (c) a phrase may denote ambiguously

e.g. 'a man' denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man".<sup>18</sup>

This categorization helps us to see what he considers as denoting, and how he classifies the denoted things. We have cleared above (at Russell's Objections to Frege) that for the phrases as 'the King of France', he does not think them as they are denoting. For the (c) type of denoting, we assume that he, deliberately, avoided discussing in (1905).

#### 2.3.3. Russell on Proper Names

Russell divides proper names into two categories, logically proper names (genuine proper names), and ordinary proper names. A logically proper name only stands

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 479. Original emphasis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ibid.

for an object. If it does not, then it is *meaningless*. For Russell to be a name of something is almost identical to designating something. It directly refers to an object. Additionally, they are the subjects of the sentence in 'subject and predicate' type sentences.

There are also ordinary proper names. They are the abbreviation of definite descriptions. A clear example of this kind of names is 'the king of France'. For instance, 'Louis XIV' is the abbreviated version of 'the king of France, coming from House of Bourbon, referred to *Louis le Grand*, and so on'.

## 2.4. Peter Frederick Strawson

Strawson gained his reputation shortly after publishing his criticism of Russell in 'On Referring' (1950). His main goal was to show that Russell's theory of definite descriptions does not represent the way we do referring. Russell was mistaken in trying to establish a system that can avoid the imperfection of natural languages. For Strawson this was an unnecessary move, because this is the source of a natural language's richness. In 1957, Russell replied Strawson in "Mr. Strawson on Referring". At the end of this section, the reader will find how Russell responds him.

## 2.4.1. Strawson's Criticism of Russell

Strawson builds his criticism of Russell on 'the king of France'. The main question is that is 'the king of France is bald' true, false, or just meaningless? For Strawson, it is not meaningless, on the contrary, "everyone would agree that it was significant"<sup>19</sup> and understand what it means. Hence it can either be true or false. Russell claims that if the logically proper name lacks its referent as in 'the king of France is bald', then the sentence is not about the king of France. Therefore the sentence is a false one. Yet, what this sentence asserts is that there is *a* king of France and the king of France is bald. Strawson rightfully asks, "How can the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Strawson, 1950, p. 321.

sentence [the king of France is bald] be significant when there is no king of France".<sup>20</sup> His main goal is that the truth-value of the sentence depends on its use.

## 2.4.2. Strawson's Type-Token Distinction

Strawson begins "On Referring" by listing what he considers as expressions, which are,

Singular demonstrative pronouns ('this' and 'that'); proper names (e.g. 'Venice', 'Napoleon', 'John'); singular personal and impersonal pronouns ('he', 'she', 'I', 'you', 'it'); and phrases beginning with the definite article followed by a noun, qualified or unqualified, in the singular (e.g. 'the table', 'the old man', 'the king of France').<sup>21</sup>

He, then, distinguishes,

- (a) a sentence from an expression,
- (b) a use of a sentence from a use of an expression,
- (c) an utterance of a sentence from an utterance of an expression.

According to Strawson it is natural to see 'the king of France is bald' as a sentence, and there is no problem with this. Let us name this position as *stage1*. However the difference arises in its uses. Clearly two people, one who lived in the reign of Louis XV and another one who lived in the reign of Louis XIV, understand the same sentence but may attribute different truth-values to the sentence. Let us name this position as *stage2*.

The same is also true for expressions as 'I'. There can be two people who say 'I am hot'), understand what the expression means, and each use would be different from the other.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 324.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 320.

Strawson names *stage1* as *type*, and it provides us the meaning. Just as we stated above, 'the king of France is bald' means that there is a king of France, and he is bald. It does not refer to any singular person. The meaning of 'I' is the speaker or the writer of the sentence. It does not refer to any singular person, but their uses do. Therefore a sentence-type cannot be true or false, but a sentence-token, its each use, can be true or false. Russell considers 'the king of France is bald' as false. However, Strawson asserts that Russell confuses the meaning with referring (*stage1* with *stage2*, or type with token). In its essence, reference is based on context. That is why its use carries a truth-value.

There is also a distinction between *implies* and *entails*. When we use the expression, 'the king of France', it does not entail a uniquely existential proposition. Instead, it signals "that a unique reference is being made".<sup>22</sup> For Strawson, then, 'the king of France' implies that there is a king of France. Strawson's theory says that if there is no king of France, then the sentence 'the king of France is bald' is neither true nor false. For Russell, on the other hand, 'the king of France' entails the existence of a king of France. In other words, Russell's theory claims that if there is no king of France then the sentence is false. Strawson believes that the difference between types and tokens solves the problem occurring in Russell's theory.

#### 2.4.3. Russell's Answer to Strawson

Seven years after Strawson published his "On Referring" article in *Mind*, Russell published his "Mr. Strawson on Referring" in the same journal in 1957 to reply Strawson's arguments. Russell claims that Strawson's biggest mistake in his analysis of Russell's theory of description was that he confused the problem of egocentricity with the problem of descriptions. Russell states "the meanings of all empirical words depend ultimately upon ostensive definitions, that ostensive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331.

definitions depend upon experience, and that experience is egocentric".<sup>23</sup> For Russell, Strawson's mistake was to analyze only the examples that does not have the egocentricity problem but the problem of description. Therefore Strawson's critics would fail to make a similar analysis on "the square root of minus one is half the square root of minus four".<sup>24</sup>

Another point Russell argues is Strawson's claim that the 'use' will determine the referent. However the 'use' happens in common speech. This was exactly what Russell tried to elucidate, since "common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy".<sup>25</sup> His theory, in its essence, aims "to find a more accurate and analyzed thought to replace the somewhat confused thoughts which most people at most times have in their heads".<sup>26</sup>

## 2.5. John R. Searle

In 1958, eight years after Strawson published his "On Referring", John Searle, presented his account, the so-called Cluster Theory of Names, with a small but an important objection. Searle's main intention is to answer the following question: How 'Tully = Tully' and 'Tully = Cicero' kind of statements are possible?

## 2.5.1. Searle's General Criticism on Descriptivist Theories

Searle analyzes the early theories on proper names, and analyzes Frege's identity statements. In Chapter 1, we mentioned Frege's identity statements 'a = a' and 'a = b'. To make it more understandable Searle replaces 'a' and 'b' with 'Tully' and 'Cicero', which results in,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Russell, 1957, p. 386.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 385.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 387.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 388.

- (i) Tully = Tully
- (ii) Tully = Cicero

Mill stated above that these two names refer to the same object. Names do this referring without describing any properties of the object. Hence (i) and (ii) are the same. On the other hand, Frege claimed that 'Tully' has a different sense and 'Cicero' has different sense. As a result, (i) and (ii) cannot be the same. However, Searle disagrees with both of them. If we think all the words as token-words, (i) and (ii) would be the same. Then the real question becomes, how (i) and (ii) kinds of identity statements are possible.

## 2.5.2. Searle's Theory

For Searle, to answer the question that he raised above, first, we need to answer another question: How do we teach the use of proper names? The answer he provides is as follows:

We identify the object, and, assuming that our student understands the general conventions governing proper names, we explain that this word is the name of that object. But unless our student already knows another proper name of the object, we can only *identify* the object by ostention or description; and, in both cases, we identify the object in virtue of certain of its characteristics.<sup>27</sup>

So far, Searle's theory might be seen as a classical descriptivist theory; yet, in the classical descriptivism, there is only one true description of an object. Searle, in lieu of this one and true description suggests a vague cluster of descriptions. In Searle's own example<sup>28</sup>, when we make a research on Aristotle, a Greek philosopher who was also the teacher of Alexander the Great, we learn that he was born in Stagira. However, another source corrects the first source, and assert that Aristotle was actually born in Thebes. Here we do not mean that the meaning of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Searle, 1958, p. 168. Original emphasis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ibid.

the name has changed, or the Aristotle that we defined did not exist. It was just a disagreement on the properties of a person. In Searle's theory the 'atomic' descriptions of a name, which are loosely connected with the name, are the speaker's mental representations of the object. Thus, what a name denotes depend on is this mental representation. Though some of our mental representations are shared with others, some are not. That is why what a name denotes is a vague cluster of descriptions.

#### 2.6. Keith S. Donnellan

Donnellan, in his paper "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions" (1970), asserts a basic principle, the *Principle of Identifying Descriptions*. According to him, this principle has two stages. In the first stage "the user(s) of a proper name must be able to supply a set of, as I shall call them, 'non-question begging' descriptions in answering the question, 'to whom (or what) does the name refer?"<sup>29</sup> In the second stage, "the principle states that the referent of a proper name, if there is one, is that object that uniquely fits a 'sufficient' number of the descriptions in the set of identifying descriptions".<sup>30</sup> With this principle he is after the answer of the following question: 'What is the referent?'

## 2.6.1. Donnellan's Criticism of Frege, Russell, Searle and Strawson

To find the source of the set of identifying descriptions that function as the criteria for identifying the referent of a name, Frege and Russell looked to the individual speakers who use the same name. Without the set of identifying descriptions, we should not be able to refer to the same person (or thing). Strawson claimed that each participant of a discussion/conversation about a person (or a thing) might have different information about this person. The most frequently mentioned properties make the set of identifying descriptions. Searle, on the other hand,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Donnellan, 1970, p. 339.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> *Ibid*.

averred that this set is made with the descriptions used by the users of the name of that person.

The problem with Frege's and Russell's claims is that there is a great difference in knowledge levels between an expert and a tyro. While a student might believe that Aristotle was only a teacher of Alexander the Great, a professor associates Aristotle with a greater set of identifying descriptions. The problem with Searle's view is that "[he] speaks of properties 'commonly' attributed to Aristotle. Commonly attributed by whom?"<sup>31</sup> Donnellan does not criticize Strawson in this particular case.

# 2.6.2. A Guy that You Met at the Party

In the Donnellan's example<sup>32</sup> a student meets with a philosopher, spends almost an hour with him; later talks about this with his friends by saying "Last night I met J. L. Aston-Martin and talked with him for almost an hour". At this point Donnellan raises a simple but a very important question: "To whom does he refer at this point? I strongly believe the answer should be, 'to the famous philosopher', and not, 'to the man he met at the party".<sup>33</sup> What the student does not know is that he actually spoke with Milton Berle. In this example, the same set of identifying descriptions determines two referents. That seems quite problematic. To solve this Donnellan asserts that there are two uses of definite descriptions<sup>34</sup>, the attributive use and the referential use.

(i) Attributive use: A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whomever or whatever is the so-and-so.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 341.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 350.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Donnellan, 1966, p. 281.

(ii) Referential use: A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing.<sup>35</sup>

When a boss sees her intern sitting in her desk, and scolds him by saying 'Is everything okay Mr. Manager', she refers to the intern with her use of 'Mr. Manager'. Even though she knows that he does not satisfy the set of identifying descriptions, she still utters that sentence to the intern. The same is also true for the famous statement "the present king of France does not exist". Then how can we determine which use is used? Donnellan's answer is that it depends on the use of the speaker.

## 2.7. Tyler Burge

About four decades ago, Tyler Burge (1973) eloquently summarizes the questions that challenges<sup>36</sup> each philosopher who studies the proper names:

- (i) How does a proper name designate an object?
- (ii) How can we speak about the non-designating proper names?
- (iii) What is the logical role of proper names in a formal theory of language?

In his article, "Reference and Proper Names", Burge mainly focuses on the third question. Traditionally there are two answers to this question: proper names are constants and proper names are predicates. In the following subsections, Burge will argue against the idea that accepts proper names as constants. This will be followed by his criticism of Russell and his modified predicate view.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Burge, 1973, p. 425.

## 2.7.1. Burge's Criticism of Constants View

Burge's main argument against the constants view is that it does not do well in justifying its claims. For instance, a proper name, according to the constants view must give different semantics in different occurrences of that name in different contexts. A proponent of this view has to defend this disunification. Second problem of this view is that it treats proper names as ambiguous constants. A defender of this view must index the same name to different objects in different contexts. Yet this violates the "condition of adequacy", raised by Burge to deliver a fully formalized truth theory. According to which, "the sense and reference (if any) of every expression of the theory should be unambiguously determinable from its form".<sup>37</sup> Even though we start doing this indexing, it seems that there is no limit on the quantity of the objects that bears a name.<sup>38</sup>

#### 2.7.2. Burge's Criticism of Russell's Predicate View

In the traditional predicate view, defended by Russell and Quine, proper names are abbreviated descriptions. According to Burge, this view contains three major misconceptions, and because of them, Russellian approach to the proper names suffers from artificiality. Firstly, it seems that proper names are lacking internal semantic structure; hence names do not describe anything. Because they do not describe, they cannot be abbreviations. The second is that Russell accepts proper names as singular terms. The final point is that "some sentences that involve failures of designation are neither true nor false".<sup>39</sup> Because of these artificialities, Burge advocates a modified predicate view.

#### 2.7.3. Burge's Theory on Proper Names

Burge asserts that natural languages have two kinds of context dependence:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 425 - 426.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 438.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 427.

- (i) dependence on context for determination of the intended reference of token-reflexive constructions, and
- (ii) dependence on context for determination of the intended reading of ambiguous words and grammatical constructions.<sup>40</sup>

For Burge, a well-founded theory of proper names should be consistent with these two context dependency. After establishing two fundamental points, namely the condition of adequacy and two kinds of context dependence, Burge starts analyzing how a proper name may function as an abbreviation. A proper name can either act as 'Aristotelizes' or 'the  $\alpha$ ', where ' $\alpha$ ' is a general term. In the 'Aristotelizes' case it abbreviates a string of descriptive general terms that can be grouped with an artificial predicate as 'Aristotelizes'. In the 'the  $\alpha$ ' case, while in a definite description we use 'the  $\alpha$ ', here, a proper name abbreviates into one symbol: the name itself. These two different abbreviation kinds leads Burge to claim: "proper names do not abbreviate predicates but are predicates in their own right" and "they do not abbreviate the roles of predicate and operator, but in some of their uses they play the roles of predicate and demonstrative".<sup>41</sup>

Vendler, on these claims, raises the idea that "[a name as] Joe is equivalent to something like person called Joe, and because this phrase fits many individuals, it should be treated as a general term".<sup>42</sup> Burge's famous examples on similar uses are,

- (1) Alfred studies in Princeton.
- (2) There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton. $^{43}$
- (2') There are many people called Alfred in Princeton.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 426.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 428.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Vendler, 1967, pp. 40 - 41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Burge, 1973, p. 429.

It seems that Vendler's use of a name is not 'proper' to any one object. As a result, proper names sometimes act as singular terms, and sometimes as general terms; yet in all cases they behave as predicates.

For Russell, a proper name as 'Aristotle' uniquely designates one object. But we use the same name for many people, as there are many Alfreds in Princeton. Burge may give an intuitive answer, 'context solves this ambiguity'; yet, the condition that he laid down above prevents him from saying so. This is why we must reject Russell's approach. Instead, we can defend the idea that proper names "play the roles of predicate and demonstrative". A proper name, therefore, has the same structure with 'that book'. Hence these two following sentences same in their truth-values:

- (3) Jim is 6 feet tall.
- (4) That book is green.

Both of them require the interpretation of the speaker reference. The speaker picks out a particular object or a person to make the sentence true or false, and the proper name of that object or person can only be the one that bears that name.

### 2.8. Saul Kripke

In the early 60s, Kripke's writings were mostly on modal logic. In the 70s, however, we see a shift of focus in his articles from logic to language. The most noticeable result of this shift is his three lectures in Princeton between January 20 and 29 of 1970. The transcripts of these lectures were published first in Davidson and Harman's *Semantics of Natural Language* (1972/2012) as an article in the book, then separately in 1980. For this thesis, the upmost important question he raised in these lectures is that how does a name refer to a thing.

## 2.8.1. Criticism of Descriptivism

At the beginning of the second lecture, Kripke summarizes the six theses of descriptivism and adds a non-circularity condition. Later, he objects to each of these theses and concludes that descriptivism is not a good theory to explain the reference of proper names.

- (iv) To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties  $\phi$  such that *A* believes ' $\phi$ X'.
- (v) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by *A* to pick our some individual uniquely.
- (vi) If most, or a weighted most, of the  $\phi$ 's are satisfied by one unique object  $\gamma$ , then  $\gamma$  is the referent of 'X'.
- (vii) If the vote yields no unique object, 'X' does not refer.
- (viii) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the  $\phi$ 's' is known a *priori* by the speaker.
- (ix) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the  $\phi$ 's' express a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker).
- (C) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of the reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.<sup>44</sup>

## 2.8.2. Criticism of Kneale

The first descriptivist theory that Kripke focuses on is Kneale's Metalinguistic Descriptivism Theory. Though we will later elaborate Kneale's theory. Let us summarize it with a sentence: the name 'Socrates' must mean 'the individual called Socrates'. Kneale's assertion seems quite intuitive and trifling. For Kripke, if we are talking about a past moment, this usage is not trifling but false. "...we know that *we* call him 'Socrates'; that hardly shows that the Greeks did so. On

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Kripke, 1980, p. 71.

fact, of course, they may have pronounced the name differently".<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, if we are talking about the present, Kneale's argument is trifling. Yet, it suffers from being circular. We use the name of that object to define it.

## 2.8.3. Criticism of Searle

After defeating one of the most intuitive approaches, Kripke focuses on another descriptivist, Searle. Searle claims that Aristotle is not the sum of exact definitions. Instead the name 'Aristotle' is a cluster of definitions. Therefore some of the properties that we attributed on Aristotle could be wrong. Kripke argues against this by claiming that if Aristotle has not had some of (or any of) these properties, then they are not necessary but contingent claims about Aristotle. This is the violation of the thesis (vi).

#### 2.8.4. Criticism of the Rest of the Arguments

To dispute the rest of the theses, Kripke provides various instances. For instance, to argue against the second thesis, he invites us to imagine a man who uses the name Richard Feynman. This 'Richard Feynman', though he shares the same name with the famous physicist, does not possess any of the properties of physicist Feynman. Yet, we still use the name 'Richard Feynman' for non-physicist one. Here is no uniquely identifying description.

For the third thesis, Kripke gives the example of Gödel. Let us assume that suspiciously murdered man named Smith proved the incompleteness theorem. Kurt Gödel, somehow, got the notebook of Smith and acclaimed that he proved the incompleteness theorem. Nonetheless people still attribute this property (the man who proved the incompleteness theorem) to Kurt Gödel. Thus somebody else might uniquely satisfy the description. Though this was an imaginary case, there are also real cases. For instances, Columbus is not the first European discoverer of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72

America, but according to Viking Sagas, the first European discoverer of America is Leif Erikson. Hence some of the descriptions can be based on misinformation.

Descriptivist theories also have the infamous problem of the name of the nonexisting objects. Hence the fourth thesis was already a problematic one; Kripke only summarized the already existing points. For instance, if there is no Santa Claus, but there is the name 'Santa Claus', the fourth thesis should be wrong.<sup>46</sup>

## 2.8.5. Kripke's Rigidity

Since the descriptivist theories suffer from the above stated problems, Kripke offers a new account called Rigidity Theory. Kripke's summary of his thesis: "When I say that a designator is rigid, and designates the same thing all possible worlds, I mean that, as used in *our* language, it stands for that thing, when *we* talk about counterfactual situations".<sup>47</sup> For instance 'Nixon' refers to Nixon in every possible world, but the '37<sup>th</sup> president of the United States' could have been Woody Allen. Similarly, 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' does not necessarily designate Aristotle; it can depict Socrates in another possible world. Yet 'Aristotle' rigidly refers to 'Aristotle' in all possible worlds within Aristotle exists.

### 2.8.5.1. Baptism and Causal Chain

Kripke claims that we are not born with the descriptions that are attributed to us right now. Instead, when a baby is born, his/her parents call the baby by a certain name. This is like baptism, the baby is baptized with that name. What follows is interesting: when other people meet the baby, or the parents talk about the baby,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Though Kripke also disputes the fifth thesis, due to its irrelevancy to our subject matter we will not summarize it. Also the thesis (i) is a definition, which does not require opposition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

"the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain".<sup>48</sup> Hence there are no descriptions that designates us all the time; these descriptions are contingent.

## 2.8.5.2. Kripke on Identity Statements

Kripke avers that the identities between descriptions are contingent. 'The man who invented bifocals' may not be 'the first Postmaster General of the United States'. Nonetheless, since names are rigid designators and refer to the same object in all possible worlds, the identities between names are necessary. For instance, Hesperus rigidly designates the object X in every possible world. Phosphorus also rigidly designates the object X in every possible world. Hence, it is necessarily true that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' in all possible worlds.

#### 2.9. Gareth Evans

Gareth Evans, a student of Strawson, as John Searle, gained his reputation with his first publication "The Causal Theory of Names" (1973). Though philosophy of language was an attractive subject in Oxford, Evans believed that philosophy of mind should get more attention. Thus one can see a mentalist approach in his writings, including the one we will scrutinize below.

#### 2.9.1. Criticism of Kripke

Evans claims that one of the major mistakes made by Kripke is that he did not consider the change of denotation. He provides two examples regarding this problem. The first one is, against Kripke's Rum example, that even though Malay or Arab sailors originally named a portion of African mainland as Madagascar, Marco Polo misunderstood it and used for an island close to Africa.<sup>49</sup> The second one is the "switched babies". Kripke claimed that there is a causal chain of transferring a name, starting from the initial baptism with a name of a baby by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Evans, 1973, p. 196.

his/her parents. Imagine a case, says Evans, where the nurse switched two babies already bestowed named by their parents. $^{50}$ 

## 2.9.2. Evans' Revised Causal Theory

Evans' goal is to sketch a hybrid theory, that will allow the change of denotation but also this denotation is **determined** a body of information but this is done by its causal origin. Hence the outline of his theory is:

The name 'NN' is the name of x if:

There is a community C that uses 'NN' to refer to x, and this is a common knowledge in the community C, and not on the knowledge that a predicate embedded in 'NN' is satisfied by x.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 202.

## **CHAPTER 3**

# WHY DESCRIPTIVISM AND MILLIANISM CANNOT PROVIDE A SOLUTION FOR THE PROBLEM OF MANY REFERENTS

The theories that are mentioned in the previous section are semantic theories *i.e.* those that try to answer the question how does a name refer. Though each account has its own unique contribution to the discussion, we can categorize them under two main category, as it is done by many philosophy of language scholars: ones that consider the meaning of a name is its referent, and ones that consider the meaning of a name is related with a set of descriptions. The former one is called *Direct Reference Theory* or *Millianism*, and the latter one is called *Description Theory*, or *Indirect Reference Theory*. In this section, we will analyze the possible answers to the original question (Q1) that is raised in the *Introduction* section. To remind the question:

(Q1) How can the hearer of a sentence which contains a proper name can determine the true referent of that name among the many people who have the same name?

On proper names Sam Cumming<sup>52</sup> eloquently puts one of the most notable question: "Is there just one proper name 'Alice' or are there many homonyms ('Alice-1', 'Alice-2', etc.)?" The first part of the question implies that there is only one ambiguous name that has different meanings as many as Alices, which is a problem for the Description Theories. The second part of the question implies that there are many different words written as same, Alice, but each of them refers to another person, which is a problem for the Direct Reference Theories. To put the question another way, we use the same name for different people; does your

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Cumming, 2013.

account provide a reasoning for that? In this thesis, it will be argued that both of these approaches cannot (or do not even try to) give an answer for this question without necessary *ad hocs*.

#### 3.1. Description Theories on Problem of Many Referents

For a Descriptivist a proper name is a set of descriptions or is a disguised definite description. The problem with this idea is that even though proper names do have a set of descriptions, or they are disguised definite descriptions, these description sets, or definite descriptions, are associated with the *same* name. Let us analyze both subviews of Descriptivism and show why they cannot provide a solution to the *Problem of Many Referents*.

## 3.1.1. Set of Descriptions

Take two people named Chris Evans, one is the new host of the show Top Gear, the other one is the actor who played Captain America. The set of descriptions that they denote are:

Chris Evans<sub>1</sub> = {Born in Boston, MA, born in the year 1981, ...} Chris Evans<sub>2</sub> = {Born in Cheshire, England, born in the year 1966, ...}

Let us create a case where a speaker utters

(CE) 'I saw Chris Evans yesterday'.

You can think (CE) as a generic sentence, that we can apply all the possible cases. If a speaker *S* saw a particular Chris Evans, she would utter a sentence as,

(CE1) 'I saw Chris Evans yesterday'.

The speaker clearly has one specific Chris Evans in his mind, Chris Evans<sub>1</sub>, the actor who played the role Captain America. As a response the hearer of this sentence says

(CE2) 'I [also] saw Chris Evans yesterday'.

This time, the audience<sup>53</sup>, meant Chris Evans<sub>2</sub>, the new host of the show Top Gear. So far syntactically and from the perspective of a third party (CE1) = (CE2). Yet, if we replace the proper names with their set of descriptions, we would get:

(CE1') "I saw the 'x such that x is born in Boston, MA and born in the year 1981".

(CE2') "I saw the 'x such that x is born in Cheshire, England, and born in the year 1966'".

Syntactically, and from any perspective,  $(CE1') \neq (CE2')$ . Hence, such a view cannot provide reasoning to solve this contradiction.

## 3.1.2. Disguised Definite Description

Russell's disguised definite description idea asserts that a name is associated with a definite description. Let us apply the same case to his view:

- (CE3) Chris  $Evans_1 =$  'the actor who played Captain America'.
- (CE4) Chris  $Evans_2 =$  'the host of the show Top Gear'.

and restate them:

(CE3') "I saw 'the actor who played Captain America' yesterday".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Even though he is in the position of the speaker to protect integrity of the story we will still refer to him as the audience.

(CE4') "I [also] saw 'the host of the show Top Gear' yesterday".

Clearly (CE3')  $\neq$  (CE4'). Yet the hearer would only hear the same proper name, 'Chris Evans'' in (CE1) and (CE2), and cannot differentiate the true referent of the proper name. Russell's alternative approach also cannot (do not want to) provide a reasoning for these phenomena<sup>54</sup>.

The question that one may ask is 'does it have to'. The initial answer is 'no'. It should not be forgotten that these accounts are semantic accounts and their goal is to reveal the meaning of a proper name, not the use of it. In the future studies they might try to come up with an *ad hoc* that will provide a response, however, now, they are lacking such device.

## 3.2. Direct Reference Theories on Problem of Many Referents

For a Millian the problem relating the proper names is that a name as 'Chris Evans' denotes the person who has (or tagged/baptized with) that name. Hence, in the case of Chris Evans(es), Chris Evans(es) refer to:

Chris Evans = XY1 (the actor who played Captain America) Chris Evans = XY2 (the host of the show Top Gear)

Though both speaker and the audience had different people in their minds they actually used *two* "univocal names with identical spellings".<sup>55</sup> For Perry<sup>56</sup> this creates ambiguity. Nevertheless, when speaker uttered (CE1) she had a specific person, XY1, in her mind, and when the audience uttered (CE2) he had a specific person, XY2, in his mind. If the meaning of a proper name is its reference, and if

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> As we have seen in *Chapter 1*, Russell denied that he was concerned with these phenomena.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Cumming, 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Perry, 1997, p. 7.

the audience cannot pick the true referent, hence the true meaning, then the speaker fails to transfer her thoughts to the audience. This will contradict with the main agenda of a communication: to be understood.

It is also mysterious how one can transfer his/her direct referring to an audience. In fact, for the question that we asked to the Descriptivists, a defender of Direct Reference Theory would assert that they are only giving a theory for semantics. After all the uses of the names are what speakers use in order to pick someone out. I believe that it is a fair thing to say that answering the problems caused by our initial question on 'how we pick the true referent among many salient candidates' is not their agenda.

## 3.3. An Alternative Theory

In the chapter that we presented the theories on proper names, it can be seen that the goal of the philosophers is to reveal how a proper name refers, *i.e.* the inner structure of a proper name. Their approach includes an understanding what speaker means by her use of a proper name, or how she uses that name. Yet the following points should not be forgotten:

- (i) For any utterance, speaker, *S*, makes it to an audience, *A*.
- (ii) When *S* uses a proper name, she utters it within a context.
- (iii) When S makes an ambiguous utterance, A is the one who has to disambiguate this utterance if he chooses to.
- (iv) If A chooses to disambiguate this ambiguous utterance, A uses the contextual information in this endeavor.
- (v) "If instead the meaning of a name corresponds to a rule determining, or constraining, its reference in a context, then there is no pressure to adopt either expedient"<sup>57</sup> that we encountered in both Millianism and Descriptivism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Cumming, 2013.

(vi) Such a stand would, on the other hand, require a clearly stated rule that will explain how we determine the reference of a proper name in a context.

In the analogy above, (i), (ii) and (iii) are (and one might even want to consider (iv) as) trivial. We have showed (in § 3.1. and § 3.2.) that Descriptivist Theories and Direct Reference Theories cannot provide a response to (vi). Because none of these semantic theories can explain fully how we use a proper name, it seems that our initial aim, to find a *semantic theory* which can *also* explain the way we use the proper names, has to be altered. This alteration forces us to study the pragmatic theories.

Francois Recanati provides a pragmatic theory for how a name refers. Recanati's solution is to separate the reference of a name from "a mode of presentation of the reference, a 'character'".<sup>58</sup> This view is quite similar to what Kaplan asserts in "Demonstratives" on indexicals. Kaplan claims that an indexical as 'I', has two parts, character and content. Character of any indexical remains the same in any context. For instance, the character of 'I' is 'the speaker/writer of an utterance'. Yet within a context, 'I' refers to the person who made that utterance. According to Recanati, the character of a name is its bearer:

The fact that a proper name has a 'bearer' — a semantic value directly assigned by virtue of a convention, *e.g.* the convention that 'Cicero' refers to Cicero — is part of what *defines* the category of proper names, in contrast to other categories of singular terms, such a pronouns. It is not necessary to know what a proper name is, and this involves recognizing that a proper name is supposed to have a 'bearer'. If this is true, then REF does not exhaust the meaning of a proper name. A proper name NN indicates not only there is an entity such that an utterance S(NN) is true if <x> satisfies S(), it also indicates — simply by virtue of the fact that it is a proper name — *that x is the bearer of the name NN*, *i.e.* that there is a social convention associating x with the name NN.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Recanati, 1993, p. 139.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Ibid.

The name that Recanati uses for this task is "Proper names as indexical". Since Recanati considers proper names as type names and its referring to a specific person as its token, this view can also be named as 'Type Theory of Proper Names'. He claims that when we use the same name within different contexts, this way it refers to the different people, just as it did above with our example of 'Chris Evans'.

Though Recanati provides an explanation how we use a proper name for different people in different contexts, he does not provide an explanation to (vi) raised by Sam Cumming, from the perspective of the audience. We believe that this is the mistake done by almost all the philosophers who studied the proper names: we make utterance to *somebody*; he is the one who has to solve (to determine) to whom the speaker referred to.

In the next chapter, we will study Communication and Conversation Theories to see which one of them comes the closest to provide the rule stated in (vi). We will see that even the best account that captures how we communicate will fail to assert a rule or method how the audiences determine the referent of a proper name. In Chapter 5, we will be after the audience's disambiguation process in detail; what kind of tools he uses in this process, and what kind of contextual information he uses in determining the true referent of a proper name or the true referent of the proper names. This way we will assert a solution to (vi).

## **CHAPTER 4**

## **COMMUNICATION THEORIES**

This chapter discusses the communication models and theories. First, we will explain coding models, where the speaker encodes her thought and sends the signal via a channel to a receiver who decodes this signal and reaches the thought of the speaker. First model we will look into is Shannon-Weaver Model, followed by Schramm's Model, Berlo's SMCR Model, and Becker's Mosaic Model. These sections will be followed by a brief comparison between coding models and Grice's Intention based conversation model. Grice's theory and Relevance Theory will succeed this transition. At the end of the chapter, we will find out that even though the Relevance Theory provides us the necessary theoretical base to solve the *Problem of Many Referents*, it does not produce a solution. In the next chapter, however, we will provide the maxims for the audience to show (i) bringing a meaning across is a mutual task, (ii) with some minor additions Relevance Theory can indeed solve The Problem of Many Referents.

#### 4.1. Shannon-Weaver Model

In his paper "A mathematical theory of communication"<sup>60</sup>, Claude Shannon, tries to formulate a theory of transmitting a 'message', in the best possible way. For Shannon, "[the] semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is the one selected from a set of possible messages".<sup>61</sup> To reach this goal, he designs a communication system:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Shannon, 1948.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.




Figure 1: Shannon - Weaver Model

Where the *information source* is the producer of the message, *transmitter*, or best known as *encoder*, encodes the message of the information source and sends it through a *channel*, which is "the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter to receiver". <sup>62</sup> In the transferring process, the signal might be interrupted/distorted to a degree by the *noise source*. The *receiver*, or best known as *decoder*, decodes the signal and reconstructs the message again. The *destination* "is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended"<sup>63</sup>.

Shannon's system pictures us the main outline of both computerized and natural communication. Despite of the fact that it is considered as one of the best models we use, it does not seem to present the human communication accurately. The main problem is that it does not transfer the content. We actually encounter with the same problem frequently in the systems developed from Shannon's Model. When you receive a text,

(H1) He is here.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

You only received 'He is here'. Yet the words 'he' and 'here' contains much more information other than their meanings, and transferring the content of this message is the reason that it is sent in the first place. As stated above, Shannon only focuses on the engineering problem and leaving even the semantics of the message, let alone the content.

## 4.2. Schramm's Model




Figure 2: Schramm's Model

Schramm<sup>64</sup>, asserts that the communication is a two way process. It is not just sending a message, but also receiving and interpreting the message and giving a response. Hence, his system includes *feedback*, and this feedback is what turns sending message to communication. He also replaced the information source with the *interpreter* who interprets the decoded messages. The advantage of this alteration is to allow Schramm to embody the concept of *content* into the system. After all, hearing 'right' from a GPS is different from hearing 'right' after asking a question.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Schramm, 1954.

### 4.3. Berlo's SMCR Model




Figure 3: Berlo's SMCR Model


David Berlo presented his SMCR Model in *The Process of Communication* (1960), which was based on Shannon-Weaver Model. According to Ehninger, Gronbeck and Monroe, Berlo's model is "[t]he simplest and most influential message-centered model"<sup>65</sup> of that time.

Berlo believed that the basic structure of human communication is more detailed, thus he applied the Shannon-Weaver Model to human communication. The result Berlo received is that each step in the Shannon-Weaver Model is more complicated in human interactions. Both the *source* and the *receiver* have *communication skills* that developed for their life along with *attitudes*, a certain position in the *social system*, and being in a *culture*. The message *includes*, as Schramm claimed, a certain *content* along with a *structure*, a *code*, *elements* and *treatment*. This message is transferred via a *channel*, our five senses.

According to Berlo, we encode our thoughts to words and other types of expressions, transfer it to another person, who decodes our expression to thoughts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Cited from Mortensen, 1972, p. 34.

Yet, the problem with Berlo's model is that even though we use correct words, or expression methods, to encode our thoughts and transfer it via the correct channels, the communication is, as Schramm put, is a two-way process. It is an agreement between two or more people. When you hear (H1), you have to understand whom is the speaker talking about. Otherwise you can misunderstand the speaker.



## 4.4. Becker's Mosaic Model

Figure 4: Becker's Mosaic Model

Becker (1968) and (1999) asserts that communication is not only act of delivering a single message (along with its content), but also being in a complex relation with that person and the topic, *i.e.* "a mosaic in which each of us exists".<sup>66</sup> This *mosaic* includes information bits "scattered over time and space".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Becker, 1999, p. 36.

Each individual must grasp from this mosaic those bits which serve his needs, must group them into message sets which are relevant for him at any given time, and within each message set must organize the bits and close the gaps between them in order to arrive at a coherent picture of the world to which he can respond.<sup>67</sup>

Becker grasps the communication as it is the interaction between two constantly changing cubes, where the layers are the layers of information and different bits (from previous communications) are simultaneously active in the (interpretation process of) communication.

## 4.5. From Coding to Intentions

The traditional understanding of language consists of encoding and decoding concepts. The speaker has a thought, which he encodes and transfers to the audience, who receives and decodes this encrypted thought. Shannon laid down the basic structure of this encoding-decoding process from an engineer process. He ruled out the semantics and just focused on the transferring step (signalization). Schramm asserted that Shannon's model is deficient since it lacks *feedback*. With Schramm we start to see the early idea that whole idea of a communication is understanding. Thus, in Schramm's model, both the sender and the receiver are actually only interpreters. However, this was only an improvement on both ends of the communication. Even though, he included *content*, this was rather an acknowledgment of its existence, not an effort to embody it to the system. With Berlo, we see an emphasis on the human interactions. His aim was to reveal the structure of human communication by including some channels that we use as touching and hearing along with the backgrounds that influence our interpretation. Becker took this project a step forward by embodying different information bits from different times that influence our interpretation.

Grice averred that the communication is more complicated than this. Speakers have *intentions*, and they imply their thoughts towards those intentions. We do not

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

simply just decode sentences, but we analyze any given thought within a context to understand the speaker's intentions. In the next section, we will elucidate Grice's claims.

## 4.6. Paul Grice

Paul Grice wanted to propose an intention based semantics. To accomplish this goal, first, he presents his ideas (with the persuasion of Strawson<sup>68</sup>) in *Meaning*<sup>69</sup>, and then in  $(1968)^{70}$  and in  $(1969)^{71}$ . Neale eloquently summarizes his agenda:

With respect to a particular sentence  $\varphi$  and an "utterer" U, Grice stressed the philosophical importance of separating (i) what  $\varphi$  means, (ii) what U said on a given occasion by uttering  $\varphi$ , and (iii) what U meant by uttering  $\varphi$  on that occasion.<sup>72</sup>

In *Meaning* he focused on the relation between (i) and (ii). Upon this foundation, he started working on what could be seen as the continuation of *Meaning*, what is *implied* by an utterer, which he presented in William James Lectures on *Logic and Conversation* in 1967. In this part of his research, he particularly focused on the relation between (ii) and (iii) in Neale's outline. For Korta and Perry his main goal in this work is to explain "What someone says is determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered and contextual processes of disambiguation and reference fixing; what she implicates is associated with the existence of some rational principles and maxims governing conversation"<sup>73</sup>. These *implicatures* are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> See the dissertation of Russell Dale, The Theory of Meaning, p. 34 (endnote: 31), where Dale claims that Grice gave his article to Strawson in 1948, reluctant to submit to publish, but Strawson submitted without Grice's knowledge and let him know after it is accepted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Grice, 1957.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Grice, 1968.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Grice, 1969.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Neale, 1992, p. 510.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Korta & Perry, 2015.

formed from one principle that aims to bring meaning across, and to move "towards a mutually accepted direction".<sup>74</sup>

## 4.6.1. Cooperative Principle

What is the purpose of a conversation? For Grice "[our talk exchanges] are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participants recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction".<sup>75</sup> Hence, each contribution to a conversation should be made with this in mind. Participants should (even one may argue that they 'will') cooperate to achieve mutual conversational ends. After all, the lack of such ends will result in *meaningless* babbles. The formalized version of this 'what conversation is based on' concept is called,

## Cooperative Principle (CP)

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.<sup>76</sup>

For Grice, this is not a command but the way people behave in a conversation. According to Bates<sup>77</sup>, Grice would claim that following the CP is "reasonable (rational)" behavior, because it will aid the speaker's interest. Since CP comprises four basic categories (*Quantity*, *Quality*, *Relation*, and *Manner*), which contains *maxims*, the people who follow CP are also implicitly obeying those maxims.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Grice, 1970, p. 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Bates, 1976.

## 4.6.2. Four Maxims

Though some philosophers name the four basic categories as Supermaxims contrary to Submaxims, some prefer using the name 'Maxim of [a category name]'. We will use the latter one throughout this thesis. Those four Maxims are:

- 1. Maxim of Quantity,
- 2. Maxim of Quality,
- 3. Maxim of Relation,
- 4. Maxim of Manner.

*Maxim of Quantity* is about the quantity of the information that one will provide in the conversation. You should,

- 1. "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)", and
- 2. "... not make your own contribution more informative than is required".<sup>78</sup>

In other words, give as much information that is required and no more.

*Maxim of Quality* is about the quality the information that one will provide in the conversation. You should,

- 1. "Try to make your one that is true", or to be more specific,
  - a. "Do not say what you believe to be false", and
  - b. "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence".<sup>79</sup>

In other words, do not lie, or tell anything that you cannot confirm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Grice, 1975, p. 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

The main focus of a conversation is to move towards "a mutually accepted direction".<sup>80</sup> Hence a conversation is not the collection of random and incoherent talks. Hence to follow the *Maxim of Relation*, one should,

1. "Be relevant".<sup>81</sup>

*Maxim of Manner* is about avoiding obscurity and ambiguity. Hence it is more about *how* you made your contribution. In your contribution, you should "be perspicuous", and,

- 1. "Avoid obscurity of expression",
- 2. "Avoid ambiguity",
- 3. "Be brief", and
- 4. "Be orderly". $^{82}$

Grice also adds that there are also maxims relating with aesthetics or morality, yet due to their irrelevancy to this subject matter we will exclude any discussions regarding them.

## 4.6.3. Violation of Gricean Maxims

Obeying all the above-mentioned Maxims may lead to a perfect conversation, yet we do not always follow them. The main problem, and the brilliant solution of it, arises from such *intentional* violations. Some of these violations are quite clear: For instance a speaker might "quietly and unostentatiously" violate the Maxim of Quality and just lie. In another case the speaker might *opt out*. For instance, if you ask an audience A

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Ibid.

(1) What do you do in the Military Research Facility?

A's answer could be,

(2) That is classified.

In another case, for the question,

(3) Where is he from?

One may answer in the following way:

(4) He is from 39 degrees, 57' minutes North to 32 degrees, 51' minutes East.

These are clearly a violation of "avoid obscurity of expression" under the Maxim of Manner.

The other violations are quite quotidian. Even though they seem to be problematic for classical semantics, Grice wants to reveal their essence and how the hearer is able to understand and cope with such violations. For instance, one may violate the Maxim of Manner by answering the question of

(5) What do you think of my new hair?

in this way:

(6) You are handsome as James Dean.

Grice's example on this one is:

A: "Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately".<sup>83</sup>

Another way to violate a maxim is to be in a position that you have to choose between two maxims. For the question (3), because you are exactly sure where he is from, hence you say,

(8) Somewhere near to Istanbul.

The answers we get in (6), (7), and (8) should not feel wrong for a competent speaker. In these answers, the speaker (the person who answers the question) *implies* a specific information. Sometimes, we imply that we do not know the exact answer, as the speakers did in (7) and (8). In another case, speaker assumes that the audience knows James Dean (not in personally) and (lets say) the fact that he looks great, and he (the audience) also looks good as the famous actor. Such cases are considered as *implicatures*. They do not create a logically valid reasoning, but they do make sense within a discourse.

Grice, later in his essay tries to deliver an analysis of such violations. Each explanation, while being quite important for the philosophy of language and may be the subject matter of future dissertations, the following statement and its analysis is the most relevant one to the subject matter of this thesis:

"Examples in which various maxims falling under the supermaxim 'Be perspicuous' are flouted".<sup>84</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Such cases are the results of (i) ambiguity, (ii) obscurity, and (iii) failure to be brief or succinct. Our initial question is neither related with obscurity nor failure to be brief or succinct, but is related with ambiguity. On ambiguity, Grice states:

We must remember that we are concerned only with ambiguity that is deliberate, and that the speaker intends or expects to be recognized by his hearer. The problem the hearer has to solve is why a speaker should, when still playing the conversational game, go out of his way to choose an ambiguous utterance.<sup>85</sup>

Grice's focus is on the intentional ambiguity and what a hearer should do is to solve why a speaker uses an expression, which its utterance will be an ambiguous one. However, we think people rarely create intentional ambiguity in our speeches. Additionally, the traditional pragmatics try to understand what speaker meant, or whom she referred to. Even though that is an important problem, when a speaker utters a sentence, she says that sentence with a reason: to be understood by the audience. We believe that the upmost important thing in a communication is what the hearer of any sentence understands by that sentence. Hence the problem of ambiguity the hearer has to solve usually results from the cases as:

(CE) 'I saw Chris Evans yesterday'.

In the previous chapter we have shown that because of the two possible interpretation of (CE), the same sentence led to two meaningfully different sentences, which is by definition an ambiguity. The most interesting thing is that the audiences of the similar sentences are able solve this problem quite easily. They are able to identify whom the speaker meant with her use of the proper name 'Chris Evans'. Even though speaker fails to follow the Grice's Maxim of Relevance, which we do naturally for Grice, the audience is able to track down the true referent. Therefore, we claim that there are hidden maxims, hidden guidelines

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Ibid.

that allow us in such cases. Before we elucidate them, let us study the relevance theory.

## 4.7. Relevance Theory

Relevance Theory (RT) is developed by Sperber and Wilson and presented firstly in their "An Outline of Relevance Theory" (1985). Throughout the years both Sperber and Wilson continued to work on the theory both together (1985, 1986, 1987, 1990<sup>86</sup>, 1990<sup>87</sup>, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2002a, …) and individually (by Sperber 1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2003, 2015; by Wilson 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2011). The aim of RT is to study how a hearer figure out the meaning meant by speaker based on the utterance she made.

"Relevance Theory claims that humans do have an automatic tendency to maximise relevance, not because we have a choice in the matter – we rarely do – but because of the way our cognitive systems have evolved".<sup>88</sup> Thus, we seek relevance in speakers' utterances. Wilson and Sperber put this idea into the following principle:

## Cognitive Principle of Relevance

Human condition tends to be geared to maximization of relevance.<sup>89</sup>

We believe that the principle put forward by Wilson and Sperber is a result of a more primal principle:

## Principle of Conversation

The primary aim of any conversation is to be understood by the addressee.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Sperber, D. and D. Wilson, 1990.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Wilson, D. and D. Sperber, 1990.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Wilson and Sperber, 2002b, p. 610.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Ibid.

If "the primary aim of any conversation is to be understood by the addressee", then what people should do is to maximize their relevance (of the subject-matter for the audience) to increase their chance to successfully transfer their thought. Thus, "human condition tends to be geared to maximization of relevance". Because every audience is also a speaker in other cases, they are aware of this fact. Therefore, for Wilson and Sperber, the audiences "assume that her stimulus is relevant enough to be worth processing".<sup>90</sup> This leads Wilson and Sperber to assert another principle:

## Communicative Principle of Relevance

Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.<sup>91</sup>

Speaker should not forget that not all encoding will result in decoding in the other side. The hearers show an effort if they believe what is uttered is worthy of their effort. Hence, the idea behind this principle is that any utterance "is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort".<sup>92</sup> What a speaker should do is to increase the relevance to reduce the processing effort of the hearer so that the hearer does not lose interest.

What would RT's approach be to a sentence as

(CE) I saw Chris Evans, yesterday.

As above mentioned, if the audience knows both Chris Evans(es) and both options are equally accessible, "[t]hen there would be no way of choosing between the two interpretations, the ambiguity would remain unresolved and neither interpretation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 611 - 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 612.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Ibid.

would be consistent with the principle of relevance since each could only be preferred". <sup>93</sup> Does that leave the hearer with an unresolved/unresolvable ambiguity? For Wilson and Sperber 'unambiguation' is the task of the speaker: "A speaker who does not intend this interpretation should rephrase her utterance to eliminate it", but they do not. We believe that this is the problem with the theories both on names and on communication: speakers do not always follow Gricean Maxims; speakers, believing that the hearer would understand whom they are talking about, they do not maximize their relevance and speak ambiguously.

#### 4.8. Conclusion

In this chapter we have studied the theories and models on communication. The first set of models that we examined were coding theories, in which the information source encodes a thought and sends it as signal to the destination and the destination decodes the signal to get the thoughts of the information source. The first coding model, Shannon-Weaver Model, was more of an engineering model, where Shannon tried to reveal the parts of any communication. Schramm claimed that any communication is based on the concept of feedback, which lead him to assert that communication is a two-way street. Berlo humanized the communication and added human communication channels as touching, hearing and seeing. Following Berlo, Becker averred that previous information bits or conversations affect any communication. Grice asserted that communication is more affected by human intentions. The responses we get from the audience are not always the direct answers of our questions, but they are the implicatures. Wilson and Sperber claim that what we do in any communication is to maximize relevance so that we reduce the effort of the hearer. However, none of these theories can solve The Problem of Many Referents. In other words, if there is an ambiguous use of a proper name, it is the task of the audience to find out the true

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Wilson and Sperber, 1994, p. 97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Ibid.

referent of that name. In the next chapter, we will present maxims for the audience in order to help him in this quest.

## **CHAPTER 5**

# THE PRINCIPLE OF CONVERSATION AND MAXIMS OF THE RELEVANCE THEORY

Almost all, if not all, philosophers who present their ideas on the reference of a proper name tried to answer one basic yet quite complicated question, eloquently put by Reimer and Michaelson<sup>95</sup>:

"How do [we] refer to George W. Bush by means of the name 'George W. Bush"?

The two main opponents trying to answer this question are *Direct Reference Theorists* and *Description Theorists*. As we have seen in Chapter 2, both approaches focus on the relation between a proper name and the thing that bears that name.

Although the question that they claim to have an answer to is quite important, this is not a challenge for the human beings. We, somehow, use the proper names in a successful way. The daily challenge for us, as masters of a language, is to find out the true referent of 'Chris Evans', among the many 'Chris Evans' that the audience knows, when he hears the following sentence,

(CE) I saw Chris Evans, yesterday.

In the third chapter, we showed that both approaches could not provide a solution for the problem which arises through examples as (CE). We claim that the problem that we encounter is not related with semantics of a name; instead, it is the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Reimer and Michaelson, 2016

pragmatics of it. Even though we have stated that it is a challenge for us, it is also mysterious how we manage to do it so well. Therefore the question we will try to answer is:

(Q2) How can we give a pragmatic explanation to the phenomenon that two people using the same name for different people in different contexts can coordinate and understand which of those people are referred to?

According to Grice's *Cooperative Principle*, when people participate in a conversation, they aim to cooperate in order to bring meaning across. To make the conversation meaningful (to communicate successfully), Grice gave us a guideline, the Maxims. He presented four maxims to be fulfilled by *the speaker* with the words 'make your conversational contribution such as'. However, there is an elephant in the room: Speakers do not always follow this guideline. For instance, they might say 'Hakan is here', which violates the Maxim of Manner, which asserts 'avoid ambiguity'. As John Perry<sup>96</sup> stated, this is an ambiguous use of a proper name.

According to the developers of Relevance Theory, Wilson and Sperber, speakers should minimize the effort of the audience and assure that their utterance is relevant enough. However, as we stated in Chapter 4, Relevance Theory cannot provide any answer in the cases as (CE). Yet, in many cases we are able to determine the referent of 'Hakan'. Hence even though we violate Grice's CP and/or his Maxims, by speaking ambiguously, we can have meaningful conversation. Therefore, in addition to Grice's *Cooperative Principle*, and Wilson and Sperber's *Cognitive* and *Communicative Principles of Relevance*, we propose an improved version of the principle we asserted in Chapter 4:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> 1997, p. 7.

#### Principle of Conversation

In an healthy conversation, the participants of the conversation refer to the same object, or person. Otherwise the purpose of the communication, sharing the same ground, bringing a meaning across, *i.e.* communicating successfully, would not be satisfied and the conversation would become unhealthy.

This is a step forward from Relevance Theory's central claim. We claim that the participants of a conversation can only bring a meaning across if they talk about the same thing. If you are not talking about the same person, as Chris Evans, how do you expect to develop a line of thought regarding that person?

*The Principle of Conversation* and (Q2) are actually a small part of the ambiguity that we face in our daily life. Just substitute the 'proper name' with a 'noun' and you will end up with the following ambiguity,

(Q3) 'Are you going to the bank?'

Although there are numerous possible answers to (Q3), let us assume that the hearer, Neslihan, is going outside, and her answer is positive.

- (B1) 'Yes, I am going to the bank [financial institution].'
- (B2) 'Yes, I am going to the bank [edge of the river].'

In which case is Neslihan's answer true? In order to determine the truth-value of it, we have to know what both speaker and the audience meant by the word 'bank'. Hence the problem with this question is related to the *Principle of Conversation*.

To keep within the limits of proper names, we will not work on ambiguity caused by the meaning of nouns and the problems that come with it. That leaves us with the original question: 'how does a hearer have to treat the proper name in order to coordinate with the speaker'.

## 5.1. The Conversation

A conversation is an active process among the participants. In certain conversations we may be more explicit about a person if we believe that the audience does not know that person thus increase the relevance. In others, since we know (or guess) that the audience knows or has met the bearer of the name, we may not provide extra information. This is where the problem starts to surface. Improving the Becker's Mosaic Model, a conversation includes the ability to not only move in our information and relation map, where we draw a family tree like structure, but also remember previous information (relations and properties) that we have transferred to the audience. As David Lewis<sup>97</sup> claimed, it is like scorekeeping in a game. "One central role of the score is to keep a record of what has already happened. In that way, score is influenced by what happens on the field, or in the conversation".<sup>98</sup> This phenomenon can clearly be seen with this use:

#### (M1) Mike - you know Mike - tried to cook ravioli today.

The cases as (M1) does not create a problem for the hearer, if our relational map shows us a that there is only one common Mike between the speaker and the audience. In such cases, where there is only one salient referent, the quest of the audience is easy. The complicated part begins when the speaker and the audience know more than one individual in common with the same name. Let us use another proper name and show an example of a problematic case.

(H2) Hakan is here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Lewis, 1979.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Weatherson, 2016.




Figure 5: Two Hakans known by two people

As the reader can see from the figure, Nesli knows two Hakans. Aliyar also know those Hakans too, which is a quite ordinary case for many couples. They meet some people while they are present at the same place, or they are the participants of the same conversation. In such cases, the speaker, Nesli, has two options: (i) not to give any clarifying information or, (ii) to give some clarifying information and maximize the relevance. Providing some information about the person would make everything easier for the hearer in tracking down the true referent that the speaker meant. However, we sometimes prefer not to give the relevant information, due to economy we try to establish between our thoughts and the amount of relevant information to provide. In such cases, where there are more than one salient person, the audience has to decide which arrow he is going to pick/follow. The *Principle of Conversation* gives rise to four maxims for the audience. These maxims are *to wait, to ground, to guess*, and *to let go.* 

#### 5.2. The Maxims for the Audience

*To Wait*: To wait is the most fundamental maxim of the audience. One should wait, if it is possible, for the speaker to provide more information. Nesli could tell Aliyar (H2) and a couple of seconds later, she might add 'it looks like he had a haircut'. Because Aliyar knows that the other 'Hakan[Dogan]' they know is bald, he can now easily conclude that she meant 'Hakan[Inan]'.

*To Ground*<sup>99</sup>: One may choose to ask the speaker whom she referred in the first place. We have many ways to do that, including small face or hand gestures, words like 'huh?' or 'who?', and repeating the proper name, 'Hakan?'

*To Guess*: The audience should guess one of the salient referents and construct a thought about him or her. For instance as the hearer of (H2), Aliyar may say, 'Please don't tell me that he is still walking around with that terrible haircut', assuming that 'Hakan' is Hakan[Inan].

*To Let Go*: The audience should follow this maxim when the true referent of the proper name is not related with the purpose of the conversation. Hence this is the attitude of letting go. If a person says,

(H3) Hans! Intelligent, handsome, gentle, rich... Oh, how I wish he would ask me for a date!

As the audience of (H3), we know the purpose of the sentence. Finding the true referent of the sentence is not the purpose of the conversation; it is an implication of the speaker. Hence we let it go. We also see similar attitudes in our daily lives. For instance Nesli tells Aliyar about a person she met earlier on that day. As the audience, Aliyar may conclude (correctly or incorrectly) that the name of this person will not be important in the future conversations. He lets go, and does not try to construct the necessary relational map about this person.

These maxims provide a guideline for an audience. Nonetheless a guideline is not enough for an audience in tracking down the true referent of a proper name. One needs a toolbox and to use the appropriate tool(s). For this he may use the following tools:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> For this maxim, I have inspired from Ginzburg (2012), Clark and Schafer (1987), and Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986)

*Directory Acts*: If both of the people who bear the same name are present in the conversation, the audience tracks down the *Directory Acts* of the speaker. We look at the eyes of the speaker, her bodily movements and their direction and, if it is available, the pointing done by the speaker. For instance, imagine a lecture with three students all named Jason. When the professor says,

(J1) Jason, would you please stop playing with your cellphone?

students look at the directory acts of the professor to find out the true referent of the proper name. This tool could be used in to *ground maxim*. Sometimes we point to ourselves with a confused face ask the speaker if he meant us, and show our failure in determining the true referent of the name to the speaker.

*Immediate Past Reference: Immediate past reference* helps the audience to track down the true referent. For instance, if we were talking about Hakan[Inan] in the last 5 minutes, we do not simply start talking about another Hakan[Dogan] without the necessary shifting words or the attitudes. This tool could be used as an auxiliary tool for all the maxims.

*Extra Information*: The audience also tries to catch the *extra information* regardless of whether they are directly about the individual or not.

(H4) Today, I went to the barber at the corner and I saw Hakan over there.

When Aliyar hears (H4), he tracks down both Hakans. Since he knows the properties of both Hakans, one being bald, he can infer that Hakan[Inan] had a haircut. Because the other Hakan[Dogan] is bald and it is extremely unlikely for him get a haircut. This tool could be used in *wait maxim*. For instance, Nesli may

tell him (H2) and add (H4) a couple of sentence later. This would make it much easier for Aliyar to track down the true referent of the name.

*Statistics*: Even though they know two Hakans, Nesli and Aliyar always speak about Hakan[Inan]. If Nesli tells Aliyar (H4), he will assume that she is talking about Hakan[Inan] and not about Hakan[Dogan]. This tool could be used in *guess maxim*. He tracked down the referent *statistically*, but it was still a guess.

These four tools are the ones we use mostly in determining the true referent of a proper name as the audience. It should be noted that we use these tools together, not separately. Yet, sometimes they are not enough for an audience to track down true referent of the proper name.

## 5.3. The Failure of the Audience

Our failure, as the audience, may have many reasons. In the directory acts, for instance, two Jasons may sit really close and the professor's acts may not be enough help to the students in finding out the true referent (assuming that both of them are playing with their cellphones). In the second tool, immediate past reference, the conversation might have stared with a specific sentence and there could be no immediate past. In the third tool, extra information, there could be no extra minor information that will help us. In the fourth tool, statistics, they could have talked about two Hakans equally. These maxims and tools are here only to increase relevance and thus to help the audience. However, it does not guarantee a successful track down. The reader may find such cases below.

## 5.4. Three Hard Cases

The tools that we have presented do not entirely solve (Q2). They just help the audience in tracking down and there will be cases that we will fail.

#### 5.4.1. Evil Ted

Adam tells us that

### (T1) 'Ted will show you around'

along with the exact time and location for my meeting with Ted[Good]. An evil Ted [Evil], hears Adam and shows up a minute earlier. He shows us around. A couple of days later Adam asks you whether Ted[Good] showed you around. We, assuming that Adam meant Ted[Evil] with his use of name 'Ted', answer affirmatively. We clearly gave a false answer to Adam.

## 5.4.2. Two-Faced Harvey

Assume that Harvey, the brother of Ted, is a good friend of Aliyar's. He helps Aliyar in almost any way possible, hence he considers him as a good person. However Harvey acts like a jerk to Nesli, hence she considers him as evil. Aliyar does not know that Nesli knows Harvey, and Nesli does not know that Aliyar knows Harvey. Aliyar starts talking about a good friend of him, Harvey[Good]. Nesli thinks this person as somebody else, because she thinks that there is no way that Harvey[Good] is/can be Harvey[Evil] she knows. Therefore she thinks Harvey[Good] as a different person and fails to track the true referent.

## 5.4.3. Fed-Up Twins

Evil Ted gets married and has identical twin sons now. As a fan of *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* he names them Jekyll and Hyde. They look so similar that they get confused by everybody, thus people use one of 'Jekyll' and 'Hyde' names to call one of them without paying attention to the bearer of the name. The twins give up correcting each use and go along with any wrong utterance. One morning, their father, Ted, sees one of the twins (Jekyll), and says,

(H5) Good morning Hyde!

Jekyll, got used by this situation, replies back:

(F1) Good morning father.

Even though Ted used the wrong name, Jekyll did not confuse by this wrong utterance, or even did not try to correct his father. Ted's intention was to say good morning to one of his sons, and grasping that intention his son replied back. We can produce two different problems in this case:

- Ted knows that he saw Jekyll but he does not care, or he is not careful enough to use the correct name. Yet, his son was able to track down the correct reference.
- (ii) Ted does not know (or not sure) who he saw and just used one of his sons' name, expecting that the audience will understand his intention and he does indeed.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we have studied the theories of references and of communication. As the theories of references try to explain how the proper names refer to a person or an object, the theories of communication try to elaborate the structure of any communication. We first presented some of the theories of references and their criticisms. Then, we raised a question, 'How can the hearer of a sentence which contains a proper name can determine the true referent of that name among the many people who have the same name' and claimed that these theories (Descriptivism and Millianism) cannot and do not try to solve this quotidian problem of masters of a language. In other words, the failed to provide an explanation to one of the most fundamental points raised by Sam Cumming: "a clearly stated rule that will explain how we determine the reference of a proper name in a context".<sup>100</sup> Though Recanati provides such a rule with his theory, he fails to provide a full answer. We claimed that his mistake was only to provide an explanation of how a speaker uses the same name for different people in different contexts, not how the audiences *determine* the true referent in different contexts. With this in our mind, we studied the theories of communication, which integrates the audience's importance in a conversation. Though early theories were based on coding and decoding processes, because such theories fail to explain the meaning transferred with our intentions, Paul Grice developed an intention-based model. However, we showed that people even violate the guideline proposed by him, and speak ambiguously. In this point we moved to the Relevance Theory, which was developed from a Gricean base. However, even the Relevance Theory could not be able to solve the cases where there are more than one salient referent of a name. In the last chapter, we claimed that though the relevance is essential, it is not enough

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Cumming, 2013.

to bring a meaning across and determine the referent of a proper name. Then, we proposed the *Principle of Conversation*, where we claimed that to bring a meaning across, the participants of any given conversation must speak on the same person, idea or object, otherwise we will fail to produce the thoughts the speaker wanted to transfer. Finally, we delivered the maxims for the *audience*, which will help in his/her quest, of figuring out the true referent of a proper name, which allows us to talk about the same person, idea or object.

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## **APPENDICES**

## 1. TÜRKÇE ÖZET

# ALAKA TEORİSİNİN BİR ÖZEL AD İLE KİMDEN BAHSEDİLDİĞİNİ BULMA KURALLARI

(L1) Dr. Gustav Lauben yaralandı.

Günlük hayatımızda (L1) gibi özel ad içeren cümlelerle sıklıkla karşılaşırız. Özel adların bir kişiye nasıl referans verdiği, yahut bir kişiden nasıl bahsetmemizi sağladığı üzerine pek çok çalışma bulmak mümkündür. Bu alandaki en önemli çalışmaları John Stuart Mill, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Peter Frederick Strawson, John R. Searle, Keith S. Donnellan, Tyler Burge, Saul Kripke, Gareth Evans ve Sam Cumming yapmıştır. Ancak bizler (L1) gibi cümleleri *birine* ve *anlaşılmak amacıyla* söyleriz. Bu sebepten ötürü bir dilin üstatlarının yaşadığı sorun bir özel ad ile p gibi bir kişiden nasıl bahsettiğimiz değildir. Karşılaşılan sorunu, *Birçok Bahsedilen Sorunu*un şu şekilde formüle edebiliriz:

## Birçok Bahsedilen Sorunu

Özel ad içeren bir cümleyi duyan kişinin yaşadığı sorun bu cümleyi kuran kişinin kullandığı özel ad 'PN' ile bu adı taşıyan pek çok insandan hangisinden bahsettiğidir.

"Dün Hakan bize uğradı" cümlesi kullanıldığı duruma bağlı olarak referansı değişen kelimelerle doludur. 'Dün' ve 'bize' kelimelerinin duruma bağlı olması Kaplan (1989) ve Lewis'in (1980) başlattığı calışmaları devam ettiren filozoflar tarafından kabul görmektedir. Ancak, bir özel adın duruma bağlı olarak kimden bahsettiğinin değişmesi, yani referansının duruma bağlı olması, yeni bir fikirdir. Diğer bir deyişle, Neslihan dinleyiciye: "Dün Hakan bize uğradı" cümlesini söylerse, ve dinleyici de iki tane Hakan tanıyorsa, Hakan ismiyle; Hakan[İnan]'dan mı bahsedildiği yoksa Hakan[Doğan]'dan mı bahsedildiği dinleyici için bir sorun yaratacaktır. Bu sorunu yukarıda kullandığımız örnek üzerinden açıklayacak olursak; Dr. Gustav Lauben'in oğlunun da adının Gustav Lauben olduğunu ve oğlunun da babasının izinden gidip doktor olduğunu düşünün. (L1)'i söyleyen kişi hangi Dr. Gustav Lauben'den bahsettiğini açıkça söyleyebilir. Ancak (L1)'de görüldüğü üzere bunu açıklamamayı da tercih edebilir.

Bu problemi sembolik dile çevirdiğimizde daha kolay anlayabiliriz. Hakan örneğimize dönecek olursak: 'Hakan geldi,' aslında FA gibi bir değişmez ile yazılmış gibi gözükse de, dinleyici için bu yapı, F(Hx) şeklinde bir yapıdadır. Her ne kadar bu cümleyi kuran kişinin, yani Neslihan'ın, aklında belli bir Hakan olsa da; bu, konuşmanın karşı tarafı için çözülmeyi bekleyen bir şifreli mesajdır. O yüzden, günlük dili konuşanlar açısından sorulması gereken soru, bir ismin nasıl bir kişiye referans verdiği sorusundan ziyade, bir ismin kime referans verdiğidir.

Dil ile ilgili en ilginç noktalardan biri bir çok durumda, kullanım ne kadar muğlak olursa olsun, dinleyiciler konuşmacının kimden bahsettiğini bulabiliyorlar. Bu tezde bizim özel adları kullanımımızla çelişmeyecek bir teori arayışı içindeyiz.

Birinci bölümde kısaca özel adlar üzerine yazılmış bazı semantik teoriler hakkında bilgiler vereceğiz.

İkinci bölümde iki ana kampa ayırabileceğimiz (Tanım Teorisi ve Doğrudan Referans Teorisi) teorilerin neden *Birçok Bahsedilen Sorunu*na çözüm üretemeyeceğini (daha doğrusu üretme çabasında olmadıklarını) göreceğiz. Semantik teorilerin özel adları nasıl kullandığımızı içermeyen görüşler öne sürmesi üzerine pragmatiğe yönelip iletişim teorileri üzerinden nasıl bir çözüm üretebileceğimize bakacağız.

Üçüncü bölümde iletişim teorilerini inceleyeceğiz. Bu iletiğim teorilerinin temel iddialarını inceledikten sona bu teorileri kısaca eleştireceğiz. Bu teoriler arasında insan iletişimini en iyi kavrayanının Alaka Teorisi olduğunu savunuyoruz. O yüzden Alaka Teorisi'nin *Birçok Bahsedilen Sorunu*na yaklaşımını inceleyeceğiz.

Dördüncü bölümde Alaka Teorisi'nin dinleyici için koyduğu kuralları belirteceğiz. Bu kurallar sayesinde dinleyici konuşmacının hangi kişiden bahsettiğini anlamak için konuşmacıyı alakayı arttırmaya zorlayabilecektir. Bu kurallar *beklemek*, *temellendirmek*, *tahmin etmek*, ve *bırakmak*tır.

## I. Özel Adlar Üzerine Teoriler

Özel adların yapısı, işlevi ve dildeki konumu üzerine ilk görüşlerden birini John Stuart Mill sunmuştur. Mill'e göre bir isim kişinin kafasındaki bir işarettir. Ancak bir özel adın anlamı yoktur. Özel adın anlamı işaret ettiği şeydir.

Gottlob Frege ise John Stuart Mill'e karşı olarak şu örneği verir:

- (i) Akşam Yıldızı = Akşam Yıldızı.
- (ii) Akşam Yıldızı = Sabah Yıldızı.

Eskiden akşam yıldızı olarak bilinen Venüs'ün aynı zamanda Sabah Yıldızı olarak adlandırılan gökcismi olduğu sonradan keşfedilmiştir. (i) ve (ii) arasındaki fark, (i)'i bu bilgiye sahip olmadan da bilebilirken (ii)'yi bu bilgiye sahip olmadan söyleyemeyiz. Bu durumda Akşam Yıldızı'nın anlamı ile Sabah Yıldızı'nın anlamı farklıdır. Ancak Mill'e göre iki isim de bir nesneyi işaret etmesi gerektiğinden (i) ve (ii)'nin aynı olduğunu iddia edilmelidir. Bu çelişkiden ötürü Frege, bir ismin birine referans verdiğini ancak bir anlamı ifade ettiğini söyler.

Mill ve Frege'nin başlattığı bu tartışma yüzyılı aşkın süredir bir çok filozof tarafından devam ettirilmiştir. Bu teorilerin herbirini tek tek inceleme fırsatımız olamayacağı için aşağıda bu tez açısından Frege'ye yakın ancak alternatif olarak görülebilecek bir teoriyi daha inceleyeceğiz.

John Searle, bazı tanımları yanı anlamları yanlış öğrenebileceğimiz gerçeği üzerine odaklanır. Örneğin Frege'ye göre Aristoteles bir kişiye referans verirken bu isimin farklı anlamları olabilir. Yani Aristoteles 'Plato'nun öğrenci' yahut 'Büyük İskender'in öğretmeni' olarak nitelendirilebilir. Ancak 'Plato'nun öğrencisi' olmasını yanlış öğrenmiş olabileceğimizi söyler. Varsayımsal bir durumu düşünelim: yapılan araştırmalar sayesinde aslında Plato'nun Pluto ile karıştırıldığını öğrendik. Bu demek değildir ki bu ismin anlamı değişti, yahut bizim bildiğimiz Aristoteles var olmadı. Searle'e göre burada olan şey sadece bir kişinin özellikleri hakkında yaşanan bir anlaşmazlıktır. Bu yüzden bir ismi kesin bir tanımlar kümesi olarak almaktansa John Searle bunu bir tanımlar topağı olarak almayı tavsiye ediyor. Bu topağın avantajı ise nerede bitip nerede başladığının tam olarak belirlenmesinin zor olmasıdır. Bu sayede Searle'ün teorisi bazı tanımların yanlış bilinebilmesine veya öğrenilmesine, yahut değiştirilebilmesine izin vermektedir.

Bir sonraki bölümde bu teorilerin neden *Birçok Bahsedilen Sorunu*na çözüm üretemeyeceğini göreceğiz. Semantik teorilerin çözüm üretememesi bizi pragmatik teorilere yönelendirecek ve bu pragmatik teoriler temelinde bu soruna nasıl bir çözüm üretebileceğimizi ve bu sorunu kolaylıkla çözen insanların nasıl çözdüğünü göreceğiz.

# II. Neden Semantik Teoriler Birçok Bahsedilen Sorununa Çözüm Üretemez

Tanım teorisyenlerine göre bir özel ad ya bir tanım kümesidir, yahut bir gizlenmiş belirli tanımdır. Tanım Teorisi'yle ilgili temel sorun; her ne kadar farklı kişiler için farklı tanım kümeleri, yahut gizlenmiş belirli tanımları olsa da, bu farklı tanım kümeleri, yahut farklı gizlenmiş belirli tanımlar, aynı isim kullanılarak dinleyiciye aktarılmaktadırlar. Bu iki alt görüşün neden *Birçok Bahsedilen Sorunu*na çözüm üretemeyeceğini ayrı ayrı inceleyelim.

Chris Evan ismini taşıyan iki kişiyi ele alalım; biri Top Gear isimli şovun sunucusu, diğeri ise Kaptan Amerika rolünü oynayan aktör. Tanım Teorisine göre biz bu iki adı farklı tanım kümelerini göstermek için kullanırız:

Chris Evans<sub>1</sub> = {1981 yılında Boston'da doğdu, Kaptan Amerika'yı oynadı ...} Chris Evans<sub>2</sub> = {1966 yılında Cheshire'da doğru, Top Gear'ı sundu ...}

Her ne kadar iki farklı Chris Evans olsa da aynı cümleyi ikisi hakkında da kurabiliriz:

(CE) Dün Chris Evans'ı gördüm.

Ancak aslında bu cümleyi kullanan kişiler şunları söylemektedirler:

(CE1) Dün x'i gördüm, x ki '1981 yılında Boston'da doğdu, Kaptan Amerika'yı oynadı ...'.

(CE2) Dün x'i gördüm, x ki '1966 yılında Cheshire'da doğru, Top Gear'ı sundu ...'.

Her ne kadar semantik açıdan bir gözlemci için (CE) cümlesi her iki kullanımı sonucunda (CE) = (CE) olsa da semantik açıdan (CE1)  $\neq$  (CE2)'dir. Bu açıdan Tanım Kümeleri görüşü bizim özel adları nasıl kullandığımızı açıklamada yetersiz kalmaktadır.

Aynı durum gizlenmiş belirli tanımlar için de geçerlidir. Bu görüşe göre bir isim aslında belirli bir tanımın kısaltmasıdır. Yani

- (CE3) Dün Kaptan Amerika'yı oynayan aktörü gördüm.
- (CE4) Dün Top Gear'ın sunucusunu gördüm.

Aynı şekilde her ne kadar semantik açıdan bir gözlemci için (CE) cümlesi her iki kullanımı sonucunda (CE) = (CE) olsa da semantik açıdan (CE3)  $\neq$  (CE4)'dir. Bu açıdan Tanım Kümeleri görüşü bizim özel adları nasıl kullandığımızı açıklamada yetersiz kalmaktadır.

Doğrudan Referans Teorisi de bu soruna çözüm üret(e)memektedir. Doğrudan Referans Teorisi'ne göre bir özel adın anlamı o objenin/kişinin kendisidir. Eğer dinleyici doğru Chris Evans'ı seçemez ise (yani konuşmacının kast ettiği anlamı oluşturamaz ise) konuşmacı iletişimin en temel amacını yerine getirememiş olur: Anlaşılmak. Buna ek olarak dinleyicinin doğrudan bahsettiği kişiyi dinleyiciye nasıl aktardığı ise tam bir gizemdir. Perry'e (1997) göre konuşmacı aynı ismi iki farklı kişi için kullandığında aslında *iki* farklı ancak aynı sesli ve yazılımı aynı olan kelimeler, yani sesteş kelimeler kullanmıştır. Bu da muğlaklık yaratmaktadır. Bu muğlaklığı çözme işi ise dinleyiciye bırakılmıştır.

Recanati ise bu görüşlere alternatif bir semantik-pragmatik teori sunmaktadır. Recanati'nin çözümü bir ismi hem tip (type) hem de jeton (token) olarak almaktır. Aynı paralarda olduğu gibi, '1 Lira' tüm 1 Liralardan bahsetmek için kullanılabildiği gibi aynı zamanda spesifik olarak masanın üzerindeki tekil 1 Liradan bahsetmek için de kullanılabilir. Aynı şekilde Hakan gibi bir özel ad tüm Hakan'lar için kullanılabildiği gibi 'Hakan geldi' gibi bir cümle içinde spesifik bir Hakan'dan bahsetmek için kullanılmıştır. Bu sayede aynı özel ad sorunsuzca bütün Hakan'lardan hem tek tek, hem de bir bütün olarak bahsetmemize imkan tanınmaktadır. Recanati'nin Tip Teorisi bizim özel adları nasıl kullandığımızı oldukça iyi açıklamaktadır. Ancak yukarıda açıkladığımız iki teoride olduğu gibi, Recanati bize hangi Hakan'dan bahsedildiğini açıklamamaktadır. Recanati'nin teorisinin avantajı ise bizim bu açıklamayı sisteme ekleyebileceğimiz bir esneklikte olmasıdır. Bu açıklamayı ise insanların iletişim kurarken hangi noktaya dikkat ettiğini gördükten sonra, bu noktaya dikkat ederek sunacağız.

## III. İletişim Teorileri

İletişimin nasıl gerçekleştiğinin incelenmesi her ne kadar John Locke'a kadar gitse de sistematik bir şekilde ilk defa Claude Shannon tarafından incelenmiştir. Shannon bir mesajın nasıl en iyi şekilde iletilebileceği üzerine bir model kurmayı amaçladı. Shannon'un modeli literatürde Kod Teorisi yahut Şifreleme Teorisi olarak adlandırılan bir görüşün taslağıdır. Buna göre bir bilgi kaynağı sahip olduğu bilgiyi bir verici vasıtasıyla şifreler ve bir sinyal olarak gönderir. Bu sinyal gürültü kaynağı tarafından zarar görebilmektedir. Bu sinyalin gürültü kaynağının zarar verdiği kadarı alıcıya ulaşır ve alıcı tarafından şifrelenmiş sinyal çözülür ve asıl mesaja ulaşılır.

Shannon'un modeli her ne kadar mühendislik açısından bir mesaj iletimini başarıyla modellese de insan iletişimini açıklamakta başarısızdır. Shannon anlamın iletilmesiyle ilgilenmediğini makalesinin başında açıkça söylemektedir.<sup>101</sup> Bu da sizin telefonunuza,

(CE3) O burada.

mesajının gelmesi gibidir. Bu mesajın içeriği zaten mesajı alıcı tarafından anlamlı kılan şeydir.

Schramm ise bu modeldeki bilgi kaynağını ve varış noktalarını *yorumcu* olarak değiştirmiştir. Bu Schramm'a hem yorumlanabilir verilerin aktarılabilmesini sağlamıştır hem de iletişimin tek yönlülüğünü ortadan kaldırmıştır. Zira insan iletişimi monologtan çok diyalogtur.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Shannon, 1948, s. 5.

Berlo ise Schramm'ın modeli üzerinden gitmek yerine Shannon'un modelini geliştirmeye çalışmıştır. Berlo'nun SMCR adı verdiği modeli (S = Kaynak, M = Mesaj, C = Kanal, R = Alıcı) iletişim teorileri arasında önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Berlo'nun yaptığı geliştirme Kaynak'ın aslında iletişim yetenekleri, tutum, bilgi seviyesi, kültür gibi farklı parçaları olduğu ve bunlar çerçevesinde şifrelediği Mesaj'ın da aslında yapı, içerik ve tür gibi özellikleri olduğunu söylemesidir. Buna ek olarak Berlo Mesaj'ın 5 duyu Kanal'ıyla iletildiğini ve Alıcı'nın da Kaynak'la aynı parçaları paylaştığını ve bu parçalar çerçevesinde şifreyi çözdüğünü söyler.

Berlo'nun SMCR Modeli'nin en büyük eksiği Shannon gibi tek yönlü bir iletişim modeli ortaya koymasıdır. Ancak buna ek olarak Berlo aynı zamanda konuşmalarımızın geçmişi olduğunu gözardı etmektedir. İnsan iletişimi sürekli olarak yeniden başlayan ve karmaşık çizgilerden oluşan şeyler değildir. İnsanlar geçmişte olan olaylara ve geçmiş konuşmalara referans vererek konuşmaktadırlar.

Becker ise bu sorunu çözdüğünü iddia etmektedir. Becker'ın çözümü insan iletişimini iki çok büyük küpün birbirleriyle ilişki içinde olmasına benzetmektedir. Bu küpler anlık olarak değişmekte ve küpün farklı yerleri aktive olmaktadır. Bilgi dediğimiz şey bu küpün küçük parçalarıdır ve belirli kişilerler konuşurken küpün belirli noktaları aktif olurken, başka kişilerle konuşurken o kişiyle yahut konuşmayla ilgili kısımları aktive olmaktadır.

Paul Grice ise iletişimin bundan çok daha karmaşık olduğunu savunmaktadır. Grice'a göre konuşmacıların *niyetleri* vardır ve bu niyetler doğrultusunda düşüncelerimizi şekillendiririz. Bu yüzden Grice'ın amacı niyet temelli bir semantik kurmaktır.

Konuşmalarımızın aslında birlikte karar verilmiş bir yöne doğru ilelerme amacı taşıyan işbirliği gayreti olduğunu öne süren filozof, insanların bu yönde ilermeye çalışacağını iddia eder. Zaten, böyle bir amaç taşımayan konuşmalar anlamsız saçmalamaktır. Konuşmacılar bu birlikte karar verilmiş yöne doğru ilerlerken dört temel kural çerçevesinde bir sohbete katkıda bulunurlar: Nicelik Kuralı, Nitelik Kuralı, Alaka Kuralı, Tavır Kuralı.

Nicelik Kuralın'a göre insanlar konuşurken gerekenden fazla bilgi vermemelidirler, daha fazla değil. Bu sayede konuşma hala aynı konu çerçevesinde kalabilir. Nitelik Kuralı'na göre yanlış, emin olunmayan bilgi verilmemelidir. Böyle bir bilgi verildiğinde önceden belirlenmiş yöne doğru ilerlemekte başarısız olunur ve bu da bizi anlamsız bir iletişime götürür. Alaka Kuralı ise konuşmayla alakalı şeyler söylemektir. Tavır Kuralı ise muğlak ifadelerden kaçınmayı, öz olmayı ve sıralı olmayı söyler.

Grice'ın koyduğu kurallar konuşanlar içindir. Günlük dilde konuşan insanlar ise bu kuralları sürekli olarak çiğnemektedirler. Örneğin bazı durumlarda bilgi vermekten kaçınırız. Bir casus karşısındakileri yanlış yönlendirmek için yanlış bilgiler verebilir. Buna ek olarak kendisini yakışıklı bulup bulmadığımızı soran birine "James Dean kadar yakışıklısın" dediğimizde bu kuralları çiğnemiş gibi olsak da aslında belirli bir bağlam içinde tutarlı bir şey söylemişizdir. Bu, belirli bir niyet içinde gerçekleşir. Bize göre Grice'ın ele almadığı bir kural ihlali daha vardır. "Dün Hakan bize uğradı" (ki günlük hayatta buna yakın yapıda cümleleri çok kolaylıkla bulabilirsiniz), cümlesi ise muğlaktır. Duruma bağlı olarak referansları değişen kelimeleri sabitleseniz bile ("22 Ocak 2016'da Hakan Neslihan'ın evine uğradı"), hala Hakan'ın kim olduğunun bilinmemesinden kaynaklı bir muğlaklık söz konusudur. Bu muğlaklığı çözmesi gereken kişi, yukarıda belirttimiz gibi, dinleyicidir. Bu da bizi dinleyiciyi de içeren ve dinleyiciye hakkettiği önemi veren bir teoriye, Alaka Teorisi'ne yönlendiriyor.

Alaka Teorisi'ne göre insanların maksimum alakayı kurmaya yatkınlıkları vardır. Yani dinleyiciler mümkün olan seçenekler arasından en alakalı olan anlamı/kullanımı/referansı seçeler. Dinleyicinin konuşmacı tarafından konuşmaya yapılan katkıyı incelemesi için göstereceği çabanın karşılığında öğreneceği şeye değeceğine inanması gerekir. Konuşmacılar ise dinleyici tarafından dinlenmeyi ve anlaşılmayı istedikleri için alakayı arttırmak için çabalarlar. Peki Alaka Teorisi *Birçok Bahsedilen Teorisi* için ne söylemektedir? Yukarıdaki örneğe geri dönersek,

(CE) Dün Chris Evans'ı gördüm.

(CE)'nin iki farklı yorumunun da mümkün olduğunu gördük. Wilson ve Sperber, Alaka Teorisi'nin kurucuları, açıkça iki yorum da eş olarak yapılabilir durumda ise bu iki durum arasından herhangi birini seçmenin bir yolu olmadığını öne sürüyorlar (1994).

## IV. Alaka Teorisi'in Kuralları

Yukarıda belirttiğimiz gibi semantik teorilerin *Birçok Bahsedilen Sorunu*na çözüm üret(e)memesinin temel sebebi bir konuşmaya/iletişime tek taraflı, yani konuşmacı tarafından bakıyor olmalarıdır. Ancak bizim bu tez boyunca üzerinde durduğumuz konu, konuşmacıların söyledikleri şeyi *birine* söylüyor olduklarıdır. O yüzden konuşmacının muğlaklıklarını çözmesi gereken taraf, ve belki de iletişimde en ağır yükü yüklenen taraf dinleyicidir. Bu yüzden dinleyicinin bu muğlaklığı çözme sürecinin bize nasıl bir semantik teori üretmemiz gerektiği konusunda yol gösterebileceğine inanıyoruz.

En temel nokta ile başlayacak olursak konuşmanın amacı anlaşılmaktır, yani kafamızdaki düşüncelerin dinleyicilerde doğru şekilde oluşmasını sağlamaktır. Bu yüzden:

### Konuşma İlkesi

Sağlıklı bir konuşmada, konuşmanın tarafları aynı obje veya kişiden bahsetmelidir. Aksi takdirde konuşmanın amacına - aynı zemini paylaşmak, bir anlam ortaya çıkarmak, yani başarıyla iletişim kurmak - ulaşamayız ve konuşma sağlıksız bir hale gelir.

Bir konuşmanın amacı anlamlı bilgiler değiş tokuşudur. Konuşmanın tarafları ancak aynı kişiler, nesneler yahut fikirler üzerine konuşuyorlarsa konuşma sağlıklıdır. Yukarıda bahsettiğimiz muğlaklık, konuşmanın tarafları için konuşmayı sağlıksızlaştıran yani ortak kişiler, nesneler ve hatta fikirler üzerine konuşamamaya yol açan bir durumdur. Bu ilke aslında daha önceki bölümlerde belirttiğimiz sorunların asıl kaynağıdır. Eğer aynı nesne hakkında konuşamıyorsak bir anlam ortaya çıkaramayız demektir ve bu ilke gözardı edildiği için semantik teorileri başarasız olmuştur. Peki bu durum özel adlar için nasıl çalışmaktadır? Eğer Nesli ve Aliyar, Hakan ismini taşıyan iki kişi tanıyorlarsa ve Nesli 'Hakan geldi' diyorsa Aliyar, Nesli'nin hangi Hakan'ı kastettiğini nasıl bulmaktadır?

Bu ve buna benzer cümlelerde konuşmacının önünde iki seçenek vardır: (i) Dinleyiciye gerekli alakayı kurmasını sağlayacak, yani kimden bahsettiği üzerine bilgi(ler) vermek, (ii) Bu bilgileri vermemek. Bazen konuşmacılar (i)'i seçip 'Hakan İnan geldi' gibi yahut 'Okuldan arkadaşınız Hakan Bey geldi' gibi cümleler kurarak alakayı arttırmaktadırlar. Ancak 'Hakan geldi' gibi muğlak cümleler de yaygındır. Bu gibi durumlarda, birden fazla yorumun eşit derecede erişilebilir olduğu durumda, dinleyici hangi kişiyi seçeceğini belirlerken dört kural çerçevesinde bu seçimi yapar. Bu kurallar *beklemek, temellendirmek, tahmin etmek*, ve *bırakmak*tır.

*Beklemek*: Bir kişi, eğer mümkünse, konuşmacının ek bilgi vermesini beklemelidir. Nesli 'Hakan geldi' dedikten az sonra 'galiba saçını kestirmiş' diye ekleyebilir. Aliyar Nesli ile ortak tanıdığı diğer Hakan'ın[Doğan] kel olduğunu bildiği için gelen kişinin Hakan[İnan] olduğunu çıkarabilir.

*Temellendirmek*: Bir kişi eğer bahsedilen kişinin kim olduğunu belirleyememişse konuşmacıya bu durumu belirtebilir. Böyle durumlarda bazı jest ve mimiklerle yahut 'kim?', 'Hakan?' gibi sorularla konuşmacının alakasını arttırmasını talep edebilir.

*Tahmin Etmek*: Dinleyici muhtemel seçeneklerden birini seçip o kişi hakkında bir düşüncesini aktararak konuşmacıyı kendisini düzeltmeye zorlayabilir. Örneğin 'Hakan geldi' cümlesine cevaben 'Hâlâ o uzun saçlarla dolaştığını söyleme' diyerek 'Hakan' ismi ile Hakan[İnan]'ı anladığını belirtebilir. *Bırakmak*: Bazen konuşmacının kimden bahsettiği aslında önemli değildir. Hatta konuşmacı varsayımsal birinden de bahsetmiş olabilir. Böyle bir durumda dinleyici konuşmacının kimden bahsettiğini bulmayı bırakmalıdır.

(H1) Ah Hans, zeki, yakışıklı, kibar, zengin... Bana evlenme teklifi etsen ne güzel olur!

Bu cümleyi kuran ve Hans adında hiç kimseyi tanımayan bir kişi aslında bir hayalini anlatmak için örnek vermiştir. Bu yüzden de spesifik birinden bahsetmediği için dinleyici bu ad ile kimden bahsedildiğini aramamalıdır.

Bu kurallara uyarken bazı araçlar da kullanılmaktadır. Bu araçlar:

*İşaretler*: Eğer aynı ismi taşıyan kişiler konuşmada mevcutsa dinleyici, konuşmacının hareketlerine bakar. Gözlerinin ne yöne baktığına, jestlerinin ne yöne doğru olduğuna, hatta mümkünse doğrudan kimi işaret ettiğine bakılır.

(J) Jason telefonunla oynamayı bırakır mısın!?

(J) gibi bir cümleyi kuran öğretmenin üç tane Jason olan bir sınıfta hangi Jason'dan bahsettiğini anlamak için öğrenciler öğretmenin ne yöne baktığına dikkat ederler. Hatta yakın oturan Jasonlar 'Kim? Ben mi?' gibi sorular sorarak yahut kendilerini işaret ederek, öğretmeni temellendirmeye zorlarlar.

*Yakın Geçmiş Referansı*: Eğer son beş dakikadır Hakan[İnan] hakkında konuşuyorsak, gerekli geçiş cümlelerini yahut kelimelerini kullanmadan başka bir Hakan[Doğan] hakkında konuşmaya başlamayız.

*Ekstra Bilgi*: Dinleyici bağlam içinde geçen kişiyle doğrudan alakalı olan yahut olmayan bilgilerle dikkat ederek konuşmacının kimden bahsettiğini bulabilir.

## (H2) Bugün berbere gittim ve orada Hakan'ı gördüm.

Hakan[Doğan]'ın kel olduğunu bildiğim için (H2)'yi söyleyen kişinin Hakan(İnan)'dan bahsettiğini çıkartabilir. Bu araç bekleme kuralı ile birlikte kullanılmaktadır.

*İstatistik*: Her ne kadar Nesli ve Aliyar iki Hakan tanısalar da hep Hakan[İnan] hakkında konuşmaktadırlar. Eğer Nesli Aliyar'a 'Hakan geldi' derse, Aliyar Hakan[İnan]'ı kastettiğini düşünecektir. Ancak bu dinleyicinin *tahmin etme*sini kolaylaştırmaktan öteye gidemez.