

THE CONCEPTS OF (DIS)PLEASURE AND PAIN  
IN NIETZSCHE AND FOUCAULT

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## ABSTRACT

### THE CONCEPTS OF (DIS)PLEASURE AND PAIN IN NIETZSCHE AND FOUCAULT

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This thesis seeks to problematise Nietzsche's and Foucault's interpretations of the feelings of pleasure, displeasure, and pain. For this purpose, I firstly bring under discussion Nietzsche's treatment of the feelings in question on a physiological and a cultural level, by dealing with *The Will to Power* and *On the Genealogy of Morality*, respectively. In this part of the study, I examine the issues of, *inter alia*, the critique of the overvaluation of consciousness, the ineluctable yet predominantly forgotten significance of the body in human life, the novelty and radicality of immanency in the Nietzschean art of interpretation, and the possibility of a partial antidote to modern nihilism, as provided by ancient Greek life. Secondly, furthering my discussion on the cultural level, I investigate Foucault's conceptualisation of pain and pleasure in his two works, *Discipline and Punish* and *The Use of Pleasure*, respectively. I aim to demonstrate how Nietzschean Foucault is in his construal of the role of the body and pain, as the latter undergoes fateful transformations in modernity as regards the economy of punishment. Foucault's reading of ancient Greek (sexual) pleasures, *aphrodisia*, I claim, seeks to find a way out of modern asceticism or nihilism by revisiting *enkrateia*, namely asceticism à la the ancient Greeks.

**Keywords:** Nietzsche, Foucault, pleasure, displeasure, pain.

## ÖZ

### NİETZSCHE VE FOUCAULT'DA ZEVK(SİZLİK) VE ACI KAVRAMLARI

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Bu tez Nietzsche'nin and Foucault'nun zevk, zevksizlik ve acı duygularını yorumlamalarını sorunsallaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, ilk olarak, sırasıyla *Güç İstenci* ve *Ahlakın Soykütüğü* eserleri tartışılarak, Nietzsche'nin söz konusu duyguları fizyolojik ve kültürel bir düzeyde işleyişi tartışmaya açılacaktır. Çalışmanın bu bölümünde, diğerleri yanında, bilincin aşırı değerlendirilmesinin eleştirisi, bedenin insan hayatındaki kaçınılmaz fakat büyük ölçüde unutulmuş olan önemi, Nietzscheci yorumlama sanatındaki içkimselliğin yeniliği ve radikalliği, eski Yunan hayatından tedarik edilebilecek olan modern nihilizme karşı kısmi panzehirin olanaklılığı gibi konular irdelenecektir. İkinci olarak, kültürel düzeydeki tartışma devam ettirilerek, Foucault'nun acı ve haz duygularını kavramsallaştırması sırasıyla *Hapishanenin Doğuşu* ve *Cinselliğin Tarihi* eserlerinde görüldüğü şekliyle incelenecektir. Foucault'nun beden ve acı kavramlarının rollerini yorumlamasında, ikincisi modernitede ceza ekonomisi bağlamında can alıcı dönüşümlerden geçerken, nasıl Nietzscheci olduğunun kanıtlanması hedeflenmektedir. Foucault'nun eski Yunandaki (cinsel) hazlar, yani *aphrodisia* okumasının *enkrateia*, yani eski Yunan tarzı çilecilik mefhumunu yeniden değerlendirerek, modern çileciliğe veya nihilizme karşı bir çıkış yolunu aramaya çalıştığı savlanmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Nietzsche, Foucault, zevk, zevksizlik, acı.

To *Büşra*



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B.TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU .....	133

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- CA** Miller, James, “Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty”.
- DP** Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*.
- DR** Frede, Dorothea, “Disintegration and restoration: Pleasure and pain in Plato’s *Philebus*”.
- E** Hutchinson, Douglas, “Ethics”.
- GE** Foucault, Michel, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress”.
- GM** Nietzsche, Friedrich, *On the Genealogy of Morality*.
- HC** Nietzsche, Friedrich, “Homer’s Contest”.
- MU** Donner, Wendy, “Mill’s Utilitarianism”.
- NFL** Schrift, Alan, *Nietzsche’s French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism*.
- NH** Olivier, Abraham, “Nietzsche and Heidegger on Pain”.
- NP** Deleuze, Gilles, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.
- NPD** Diprose, Rosalyn, “Nietzsche and the Pathos of Distance”.
- NSG** Franck, Didier, *Nietzsche and the Shadow of God*.
- PaP** Frede, Dorothea, “Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle’s Ethics”.
- PE** Dorion, Louis-André, “Plato and *Enkrateia*”.
- SA** Bornedal, Peter, *The Surface and the Abyss: Nietzsche as Philosopher of Mind and Knowledge*.

- SK** Grosz, Elisabeth, “The Stomach for Knowledge”.
- SoM** Ansell-Pearson, Keith, “The Significance of Michel Foucault’s Reading of Nietzsche: Power, the Subject, and Political Theory”.
- PCP** Patton, Paul, “Politics and the Concept of Power in Hobbes and Nietzsche”.
- PoP** Santas, Gerasimos, “Plato on Pleasure as the Human Good”.
- PP** Katsafanas, Paul, “Philosophical Psychology as a Basis for Ethics”.
- UP** Foucault, Michel, *The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality*.
- VET** Sedgwick, Peter, “Violence, Economy and Temporality. Plotting the Political Terrain of *On the Genealogy of Morality*”.
- WP** Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Will to Power*.



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

There is no question that Western philosophy from Plato up until Nietzsche has been mainly concerned with issues which glossed over the role of the body in human life. One might state that underlying this habit of thinking is an otherworldly and hence life-defamatory conception of life: positing a realm of ideas, spirit, reason, etc. as opposed to that of the body, and declaring the former superior and the, or more, real sphere, whilst the latter the less real, or illusory one. I believe and seek to demonstrate throughout this thesis how Nietzsche's philosophy has been a serious challenge and even an attempt to overcome this nihilistic tradition by his radical bringing into play the indispensable and primary value of the body in human life. The radicality and complexity of the thought of Nietzsche no doubt reverberated in the subsequent philosophies, and, as I wish to prove in this thesis, Foucault has been one of those who closely followed Nietzsche in his general lines of thinking. By scrutinising Nietzsche's and Foucault's readings of the concepts of pleasure, displeasure, and pain, I wish to unpack the radicality in question.

In the following, I will firstly be narrating the thoughts of some philosophers that precede Nietzsche on the issue of these three feelings under consideration; secondly, the philosophies of Nietzsche and Foucault will be outlined; lastly, the body of the thesis will be summed up.

#### **1.1. A Brief Historical Survey: Pleasure and Pain in Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and J. S. Mill**

The first important figure in the history of Western philosophy who sought to give an account of pleasure and pain is Plato. Given that his ideas were far from systematic, we need to look at some of his dialogues separately to be able to grasp his thoughts on this issue. As Dorothea Frede points out, in Plato's *oeuvre* one can find such

varied positions as pro-hedonism, anti-hedonism, as well as an in-between one<sup>1</sup>. Having stated in the *Euthyphro* the absence of a solid criterion as regards the question what is just and unjust, the good and the bad, etc. such as the one which can be found in the sciences of number, measurement and weight, Plato maintains a hedonistic stance on pleasure and pain in the *Protagoras*: if, the argument goes, the good and the bad are equated with pleasure and pain, respectively, one can be said to have an objective criterion for determining the good and the bad, for pleasure and pain can be measured objectively<sup>2</sup>. As Dorothea Frede observes, positing the good (and the bad) as being measurable so as to assess them rationally was a recurrent theme in Plato – e.g. the same stance can be found also in the *Philebus*<sup>3</sup>.

In the *Gorgias*, which can be regarded as expanding on the hedonism of the *Protagoras*<sup>4</sup>, we see Plato's Socrates differentiate between different sorts of pleasure, and hence introduce the idea that there must be better and worse pleasures<sup>5</sup>. However, before reaching this verdict, Socrates dismisses pleasures, since he regards them as nothing but the unceasing replenishment of a painful lack – thereby, this never-ending process can never result in a desired satisfactoriness or undisturbedness in human life<sup>6</sup>.

The *Phaedo* can be taken to be Plato's most anti-hedonistic stance on pleasure<sup>7</sup>. By apparently disposing the differentiation between the higher and lower kinds of pleasure, which he had introduced in the *Gorgias*, Plato denounces pleasures as

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<sup>1</sup> Frede, Dorothea, "Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle's Ethics" in Richard Kraut (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, p. 255. Hereafter PaP.

<sup>2</sup> Santas, Gerasimos, "Plato on Pleasure as the Human Good" in Hugh H. Benson (ed.), *A Companion to Plato*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, p. 309. Hereafter PoP.

<sup>3</sup> Frede, Dorothea, "Disintegration and restoration: Pleasure and pain in Plato's *Philebus*" in Richard Kraut (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 434. Hereafter DR.

<sup>4</sup> PoP, p. 314.

<sup>5</sup> DR, p. 434.

<sup>6</sup> PaP, p. 255.

<sup>7</sup> DR, p. 435.



bodily fetters weighing down on the soul, which can be freed from the imprisonment of the body only upon death<sup>8</sup>. It is worth noting that underlying this assertion of Plato are the two assumptions that, firstly, pleasure is entirely associated with the body, and, secondly, the possibility of ‘higher’ or philosophical pleasures connected with the soul or the mind is not allowed<sup>9</sup>.

In the *Republic* Plato’s stance on the nature of pleasure takes a novel twist, thereby he adopts a mixed position by excluding both the hedonistic and the anti-hedonistic standpoints<sup>10</sup>. Accordingly, having introduced the tripartite conception of the soul, according to which the soul is composed of an appetitive, spirited, and logical component in the ascending order of purity, pleasures can be evaluated by specifying to which part of the soul the pleasure in question is connected<sup>11</sup>. In such a model only the pleasures of the rational part of the soul can be deemed genuine, since any pleasure belonging to the appetitive or the spirited part of the soul cannot be said to be pure and real<sup>12</sup>. Also, the latter are only the appearance of pleasure owing to Plato’s contention that they are nothing more than the filling of a painful lack, and hence not unadulterated with pain<sup>13</sup>.

In the *Philebus* as well, Plato maintains that pleasure is nothing but the re-establishment of a disturbance by way of filling a painful lack, and thereby, as regards its status among the other goods, it represents an inferior one<sup>14</sup>. The last dialogue to be looked at is the *Laws*, in which, although he continues to regard

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<sup>8</sup> DR, p. 435.

<sup>9</sup> DR, p. 435.

<sup>10</sup> PaP, p. 256.

<sup>11</sup> PoP, p. 318.

<sup>12</sup> PoP, p. 318; DR, p. 435.

<sup>13</sup> PoP, p. 318; PaP, p. 256.

<sup>14</sup> PaP, p. 256.

pleasure as having a secondary value, Plato assigns to them the function of educating so as to achieve the good citizens of the *polis*<sup>15</sup>.

As far as this brief survey of Plato's views on pleasure and pain demonstrates, he was far from committed to a systematic and coherent understanding of them. However, it should be noted that Plato's most noteworthy contribution on this issue can be said to be his construal of pleasure as the replenishment of a lack. Also, pain is generally considered to be the opposite of pleasure. All in all, one could point out that Plato's assertions on the feelings of pleasure and pain vacillate between hedonism (the *Protagoras*) and antihedonism (the *Phaedo*).

The second philosopher who gave an important account of pleasure and pain in ancient Greek philosophy is Aristotle, who, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "manages to integrate pleasure in his moral philosophy and to assign an intrinsic value to it without treating it as the ultimate motive of our actions"<sup>16</sup>. One problem about the treatment of pleasure in this work is that the discussion of the role of pleasure in a good life precedes Aristotle's interpretation of pleasure in itself<sup>17</sup>. He thereby states that in a happy life, in which one can exercise the best abilities of its own soul, one has the highest degree of pleasure as an intrinsic part of its life<sup>18</sup>.

Contending that pleasures are intrinsic elements in one's own life is a vital contribution on the part of Aristotle, since, by this insight, he forestalls the criticism directed at a hedonistic understanding of pleasure by regarding it as a feature of an action, not as the motive of an action<sup>19</sup>. In such a conception, in which pleasure is not an element taken to be considered on its own regardless of its pertinent action, pleasure is an indicator of one's abilities – so that, if one takes pleasure in a virtuous action, it would necessarily point to the intrinsically virtuous character of that

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<sup>15</sup> PaP, p. 256.

<sup>16</sup> PaP, p. 257.

<sup>17</sup> PaP, p. 258.

<sup>18</sup> PaP, pp. 258-9.

<sup>19</sup> PaP, p. 259.

person's soul<sup>20</sup>. According to this narrative, one cannot hold that pleasure is something which is good or bad in itself, since evaluating its goodness or badness is entirely contingent on the activity associated with the pleasure in question<sup>21</sup>. For instance, to Aristotle, a life full of accomplished activities in concord with one's abilities will, of necessity, be a happy life, which is pleasurable<sup>22</sup>.

As stated earlier, after discussing the role of pleasure in a virtuous or good life Aristotle takes up the issue of the nature of pleasure in itself. Pleasure, says Aristotle, is "an 'unimpeded activity [*energeia*] of a natural state/disposition" – through this view he refutes Plato's construal of pleasure as a process of restoration, i.e., the replenishment of a painful lack<sup>23</sup>. In other words, as Douglas Hutchinson remarks, pleasure for Aristotle is "involved in any unfrustrated activity that exercises our natural capacities"<sup>24</sup>. On the other hand, Aristotle criticises Plato's interpretation of pleasure as restoration on the grounds that, in addition to being unimpeded, pleasure is to be perfect at all times – hence, according to Aristotle's standards, pleasure in Plato cannot be perfect at every moment unless it reaches the moment of (temporary) full satisfaction<sup>25</sup>. In other words, in the *Philebus* Plato treats pleasure, not as good, but as "a process toward[s] something good", or towards the original state of fullness<sup>26</sup>.

All in all, whilst Plato characterises pleasure as a "perceptible process *to* a natural condition", Aristotle as an "unimpeded activity *of* a natural condition"<sup>27</sup>. I think that the 'to' in Plato and the 'of' in Aristotle neatly lays out the difference in their

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<sup>20</sup> PaP, p. 259.

<sup>21</sup> Hutchinson, Douglas, "Ethics" in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 211. Hereafter E.

<sup>22</sup> E, p. 211.

<sup>23</sup> PaP, p. 262.

<sup>24</sup> E, p. 211.

<sup>25</sup> PaP, p. 262-3.

<sup>26</sup> E, p. 211.

<sup>27</sup> E, p. 212, italics added.

views: the former takes pleasure to be an external element to the related action, whereas the latter gives it an internal, immanent or intrinsic sense by laying emphasis on the indissociability of pleasure and its action.

As for the feeling of pain, the *Nicomachean Ethics* provides us next to nothing, perhaps due to the fact that this work is devoted to the elucidation of a good life<sup>28</sup>. So that as regards Aristotle's understanding of pain, we have only the assertions that, taking it as the opposite of pleasure, it is connected either with the obstruction of an activity or with acting badly, and that the good life must include some pains as well, e.g. the pains of a brave life<sup>29</sup>.

The next figure is Epicurus, whose account on pleasure is heavily indebted to Aristotle, but also differs from the latter in some respects<sup>30</sup>. As for the similarities, Epicurus concurs with Aristotle that happiness (*eudaimonia*) constitutes the highest good, and that along with other intrinsic goods such as "pleasure, honour, virtue and friendship", happiness is desirable for its own sake, i.e., it is not an instrumental good<sup>31</sup>. However, although Epicurus accepts Aristotle's teleological account of the good, one should take note of the fact that the former rejects the latter's teleological understanding of nature – according to which all organs have a purpose, and, since reason is the highest organ, the happiest life must be the one including reasoning and rationality for the most part<sup>32</sup>. For Epicurus, even though it is true that our eyes are capable of seeing, our hands of grasping, etc., one should not infer from this fact that they were designed for the sake of carrying out such functions<sup>33</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> PaP, p. 263.

<sup>29</sup> PaP, p. 263.

<sup>30</sup> Due to the limitations of this introductory chapter, I cannot go into the subtle differences between Epicurean philosophers and hence point out if any assertion belongs to Epicurus himself or other lesser figures of this school. For this reason, I will be only treating Epicurus, at times presenting Epicureanism as if it were articulated only by Epicurus.

<sup>31</sup> O'Keefe, Tim, *Epicureanism*. Durham: Acumen, 2010, pp. 111-2.

<sup>32</sup> *Epicureanism*, p. 112.

<sup>33</sup> *Epicureanism*, p. 112.

As for the points on which Epicurus disagreed with Plato, for the latter, “we desire what is good because it is good, whereas [for the former], [we desire] pleasure [as] the highest good because we desire it”<sup>34</sup>. In addition, Epicurus maintained that the Platonic conception of the good *as such* is untenable, since Epicurean materialism held that goodness, like other notions, can attain its meaning only in its relation with other phenomena<sup>35</sup>.

After seeing on what points Epicurus concurred with and differed from his predecessors, now we can look at Epicurus’s account of pleasure in itself. We can call his ideas on this issue “psychological egoistic hedonism”, which rests on two main theses: i-) “the only thing we desire for its own sake is our own pleasure” – as is the case with a newborn baby, whose behaviours are almost entirely regulated by the pleasure principle; ii-) the raw experience patently shows that, just like the infant, we invariably consider pleasure good and pain bad<sup>36</sup>. Furthermore, relying on these two arguments of psychological hedonism, Epicurus thinks that it is possible to establish the “ethical egoistic hedonism”, which holds that “the only thing that is intrinsically valuable is our own pleasure”<sup>37</sup>. This narrative which seeks to examine not what ought to be the case, but what is the case *vis-à-vis* human beings’ most immediate experiences of pleasure, as elucidated by Epicurus was challenged firstly by the Stoics, who held that an infant’s behaviour is regulated by self-preservation, not by pleasures<sup>38</sup>. Secondly, Aristotle would state that, given his teleological understanding of nature, we should be investigating not an infant’s, but an adult’s (re)action to pleasures for such a discussion<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup>*Epicureanism*, pp. 112-3.

<sup>35</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 113.

<sup>36</sup>*Epicureanism*, pp. 113-4.

<sup>37</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 114.

<sup>38</sup>*Epicureanism*, pp. 114-5.

<sup>39</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 115.

In order not to misconstrue Epicurus' hedonism as espousing a licentious and voluptuous life, the discussion of the two distinctions that aim to differentiate between different sorts of pleasure is in order. In the first place, Epicurus makes a distinction between mental and bodily pleasures: unlike the latter, which are solely linked with the present, the former are connected with the past, the present, and the future<sup>40</sup>. Also, Epicurus is of the view that, even though the mental pleasures are determined by the bodily ones, we should be regarding the mental pleasures as constituting the more valuable side in this distinction<sup>41</sup>.

In the second place, Epicurus differentiates between kinetic and katastematic pleasures: whereas the former represent the pleasures which contain movement, the bodily process of satisfaction in everyday sense, the latter refer to a state of being freed from satisfaction, need or painful lack, i.e., a neutral state<sup>42</sup>. *Ataraxia*, or tranquillity, says Epicurus, denotes the mental katastematic pleasures, and the attainment of *ataraxia* is nothing but the highest degree of pleasure<sup>43</sup>. Additionally, *aponia* is the term Epicurus uses to designate the bodily katastematic pleasures<sup>44</sup>. In brief, according to Epicurus, *aponia* and *ataraxia* characterise the highest pleasures with the proviso that *ataraxia* depends on, but is far more crucial than, *aponia*<sup>45</sup>.

As we have seen, even though Epicurus' interpretation of pleasures can be said to have a hedonistic perspective, one should bear in mind that for him the apex of a happy life is the life of *ataraxia*, namely a life of total freedom from the fetters of constant need of pleasurable satisfaction of painful lacks. So that, so as to come close to this state, Epicurean hedonism recommends people to be dependent more and

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<sup>40</sup>*Epicureanism*, pp. 117-8.

<sup>41</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 118.

<sup>42</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 120.

<sup>43</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 120.

<sup>44</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 120.

<sup>45</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 120.

more on natural bodily needs, thereby a life of self-sufficiency not trapped by self-indulgence could become possible<sup>46</sup>.

The last figure, in whose thinking the concept of pleasure played an important role, is J. S. Mill. First of all, it should be noted that although one could hold that J. S. Mill is to be considered together with the other two important thinkers of utilitarianism, this contention needs to be qualified: it was J. S. Mill who modified and expanded on his predecessors' ideas by extending the purview of and enriching utilitarianism<sup>47</sup>. Hence, J. S. Mill could be regarded as representing the most fully fledged version of utilitarianism. However, in the following discussion only his views on the concept of pleasure will be pertinent.

Before going into this issue, we should firstly look at the basic tenets of utilitarianism, which is shared by its all thinkers. In general, utilitarianism as a moral theory holds that actions are to be evaluated on the basis of their utility, thus rules out the view that any action can have an intrinsic moral value on its own<sup>48</sup>. This moral theory contends that the good is more fundamental than what constitutes rights and obligations, and that the latter are to be ascertained according to the former<sup>49</sup>. As regards the interpretation of what the good is, all three important figures of utilitarianism maintain that “the good we seek to promote consists in mental states such as *pleasure*, happiness, enjoyment or satisfaction”<sup>50</sup>. In other words, utilitarianism holds in the main that what human beings ultimately want is their pleasure or happiness<sup>51</sup>. As a prime example of this view, in his ‘felicific calculus’, J. Bentham seeks to evaluate actions by quantifying their pleasures and pains on a scale according to their intensity and duration; as a result, “the higher on the scale of

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<sup>46</sup>*Epicureanism*, p. 117.

<sup>47</sup>Donner, Wendy, “Mill’s Utilitarianism” in John Skorupski (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Mill*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 255. Hereafter MU.

<sup>48</sup> MU, p. 256.

<sup>49</sup> MU, p. 256.

<sup>50</sup> MU, p. 256, italics added.

<sup>51</sup> MU, p. 256.

quantity each pleasure is placed, the greater is its value”<sup>52</sup>. However, on the issue of what constitutes the utility, the utilitarians give varying accounts.

After this brief look at the basic tenets of utilitarianism, we can proceed to Mill’s specifications on them. He asserts that utility is the bedrock of his moral theory and such a view espouses the greatest happiness principle: whatever promotes happiness is to be considered good, and what is meant by happiness is pleasure or the absence of pain<sup>53</sup>. In this scheme, the bad is the opposite of the good, i.e., the lack of pleasure and the presence of pain<sup>54</sup>. By relying on this structure, J. S. Mill establishes a what he calls ‘the theory of life’: only things that are good or desirable in themselves are either pleasure or avoiding pain, or any means which enable one to pursue pleasure or shun pain<sup>55</sup>.

This narrative of J. S. Mill diverges from J. Bentham in that even though both of them argue that the good consists in mental pleasures, the latter takes these mental pleasures to be sensuous pleasure, whilst the former much more complex mental experiences<sup>56</sup>. Secondly, J. S. Mill improved on Bentham’s quantitative hedonism by adding a new axis which takes also the qualitative aspect into account<sup>57</sup>. This new dimension focuses on an irreducible, qualitative superiority of an action, which is deemed preferable to any other action containing the same amount of pleasure with a lower quality<sup>58</sup>. As Wendy Donner states, it is by introducing this qualitative dimension and by enriching the understanding of mental pleasures that J. S. Mill can be said to provide a more insightful perspective in utilitarianism<sup>59</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> MU, p. 268.

<sup>53</sup> MU, p. 257.

<sup>54</sup> MU, p. 257.

<sup>55</sup> MU, p. 257.

<sup>56</sup> MU, p. 257.

<sup>57</sup> MU, p. 257.

<sup>58</sup> MU, p. 262.

<sup>59</sup> MU, p. 272.



## 1.2. Nietzsche's and Foucault's Thoughts in General

Now, after this brief historical survey on the values ascribed to pleasure and pain by Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and J. S. Mill, respectively, I would like to briefly discuss Nietzsche's and Foucault's philosophies in general. The discussion in the following will be revolving around their understanding of, firstly, the power (relations), and secondly, the conception of the subject.

One of the most radical and far-reaching contributions of Nietzsche to philosophy is his doctrine of will to power. According to this theory, life – organic or inorganic, human or non-human, etc. – is to be interpreted as an incessant, never-ending and purposeless will to become master of resistances standing in the way of this will, or will to expend more and more regardless of the outcome of this process. Against the backdrop of Western metaphysics, which has been predominantly mired in philosophising in terms of substance, Nietzsche's doctrine seeks to conceptualise life according to a monistic but polyvalent outlook.

As regards the monistic feature of will to power, it is at pains to replace the dualistic ontology of 'this world vs. the real world' with life as such – not *this* life since it would still refer to the existence of another life. As for its polyvalence, this doctrine seeks to interpret phenomena not according to some pre-given, solidified, universal and necessary (*pace* Kant) criteria whose 'truth' cannot be doubted. Instead, the novelty of Nietzschean interpretation is its commitment to treat each phenomenon in its specificity, by heeding the specific values the phenomena in question take up. As a result of this, one and the same word, notion, feeling, etc. can be construed as having even contrary meanings by looking at the articulator of these senses.

Furthermore, as Alan D. Schrift states, Nietzsche's ontology of will to power seeks to supplant the traditional focus on substances, subjects and things, which isolates them from life or relationality, by a method of investigation which mainly deals with the relations between these phenomena<sup>60</sup>. In order to dispel the probable

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<sup>60</sup>Schrift, Alan, *Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism*. New York, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 39-40. Hereafter *NFL*.

misunderstanding that Nietzsche's polyvalent doctrine or perspectivism is doomed to relativism and thus to nihilism, it should be noted that this outlook adopts a physiological criterion: phenomena are to be assessed according to whether they are the effects of a healthy or sickly will to power<sup>61</sup>.

Also, such an understanding of life warrants, *inter alia*, accepting and even perpetually affirming life as a whole with its dire predicaments. This yes-saying to life does not concur with the optimism of the Enlightenment (Kant, Hegel), which generally posits a model of linear progress in terms of the dominance of reason in life. Nor does it find the pessimistic stance tenable, which considers life as totally worthless (Christianity, Schopenhauer).

Having been influenced by all these Nietzschean elements, Foucault's *oeuvre* might be regarded as an attempt to dispose of the worldviews of both liberalism and Marxism, which "posit teleology and emphasise continuity [where] Foucault locates rupture and discontinuity"<sup>62</sup>. Keith Ansell-Pearson suggests that where Nietzsche's influence can be seen most is Foucault's novel understanding of power relations in political philosophy. Accordingly, this Foucauldian political philosophy seeks to get rid of the juridical model of power<sup>63</sup> by asserting that whereas the latter sees "a realm of freedom untainted by relations of domination", the former "detects a hidden will to power, a will which wants to gain control of reality and master it" for some *temporary* purposes of satisfaction<sup>64</sup>.

To unpack this point, Foucault contends that power relations do not have a substantive sense, which holds that power is a property possessed by a ruling class, or the state; instead, they refer to a variety of relations between forces to be found in

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<sup>61</sup>*NFL*, p. 42.

<sup>62</sup>Ansell-Pearson, Keith, "The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche: Power, the Subject, and Political Theory" in Peter R. Sedgwick (ed.), *Nietzsche: A Critical Reader*. Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995, p. 15. Hereafter SoM.

<sup>63</sup> In the main, the juridico-discursive conception of power assumes that power is to be understood in terms of law, sovereignty and repression. Thereby, power is conceived as something possessed, the origin of power can be said to be located in a concrete way by referring to the hegemony of the ruling class (*NFL*, p. 41).

<sup>64</sup> SoM, pp. 14-5.

the specific circumstances of a society, and to its exercise spread throughout the social body in decentralised ways<sup>65</sup>. In brief, Foucault's Nietzschean understanding of power relations deals not with "the *substantive* notion of power", but with "the multifarious ways that power *operates* through the social order"<sup>66</sup>. Furthermore, instead of the juridical model, which sees social relations as essentially prohibitive or exclusionist, Foucault proposes, by following Nietzsche's ontology, that power is fundamentally productive – e.g. productive of knowledge, discourses, truths, pleasures, things, etc<sup>67</sup>.

The second theme of the discussion at hand, namely Nietzsche's influence on Foucault on the issue of subjectivity, is one of the most crucial instantiations of the view that power is essentially productive. Foucault, by adopting a Nietzschean outlook, "sees power not in terms of the strenuous effects of a founding human subject, but rather that [he] sees power as *productive* of the human subject"<sup>68</sup>. As Pearson discusses, Nietzsche's genealogical account of the cultivation of the responsible human animal in *On the Genealogy of Morality* is directly linked with his critique of the metaphysical understanding of the subject, according to which the subject is a universally existing substance, the founder of the knowledge of the world, and essentially preoccupied with knowledge, sciences, etc<sup>69</sup>. By adopting the Nietzschean model of the subject Foucault maintains that the human subject or individuality should be construed "as the vehicles of power, not its point of application" or its originator<sup>70</sup>.

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<sup>65</sup> SoM, p. 17; *NFL*, p. 42.

<sup>66</sup> *NFL*, p. 40, italics added. For Foucault how power is operated is the ultimate question to be dealt with, since power cannot said to be existent unless it is exercised, namely power that is not exercised but assumed to be 'possessed' by a class is just non-existent.

<sup>67</sup> *NFL*, p. 42.

<sup>68</sup> SoM, p. 17. The elucidation of this idea is worked out by Nietzsche in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, and by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* – both of which will be treated in Chs. 3 and 4, respectively.

<sup>69</sup> SoM, p. 20.

<sup>70</sup> SoM, p. 21.

Foucault suggests that by stripping this subject of its so-called substantivity, autonomy and rationality one should be regarding it as the outcome of some relations of forces according to the doctrine of will to power<sup>71</sup>. For instance, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault works out what he calls disciplinary power relations by tracing the trajectory of the constitution of modern subjectivity, as we will see in ch. 4.

However, it should be noted that although *Discipline and Punish* treats the (modern) subject as the product of disciplinary power relations and thus gives it a passive role in its entirety, in Foucault's subsequent work, *The History of Sexuality*, the subject is regarded as having the power to constitute itself<sup>72</sup>. Nevertheless, this shift should not be taken as a turn back to a substantive model of the subject, for in the latter he focuses on the process of the constitution of subjectivity, or the production of the specific relations the subject begins to form with itself<sup>73</sup>. In other words, the later twist in Foucault's thought enables him to concentrate upon the *formation* of subjectivity in some specific areas, not to investigate a pre-given subjectivity in the substantive sense.

In brief, this non-juridical notion of the subject allows Nietzsche and Foucault to genealogically account for the way in which the subject is endowed with a so-called freedom and thus can be accountable for its actions<sup>74</sup>. Here, I would like to point out that the discussion in this thesis to a large extent aims to trace this development in the domains of (dis)pleasure and pain. After this brief look at the philosophies of Nietzsche and Foucault in general, in the next section, I would like to précis the body of the thesis.

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<sup>71</sup> SoM, p. 21.

<sup>72</sup> NFL, p. 44, pp. 49-50.

<sup>73</sup> NFL, p. 50.

<sup>74</sup> SoM, p. 22.

### 1.3. The Summary of the Main Discussion

In Chapter 2, an analysis of the physiological senses of the feelings of pleasure, displeasure, and pain is carried out, as elaborated by Nietzsche in his posthumous work *The Will to Power*. By interpreting them according to his monistic ontology, we see how Nietzsche evaluates them by not falling into the traps of the previous investigations on this issue, which we saw above in sec. 1.1. I thereafter bring up the question how to interpret these phenomena based on a Nietzschean framework: not consciousness, which is related to the secondarily important self-preservation, but the enhancement of power is to be the criterion. The establishment of this criterion to assess these phenomena is in keeping with Nietzsche's insight that not the conscious forces of self-preservation but the unconscious, creative forces of self-expenditure are more fundamental in life. Lastly, a brief look at the Homeric Greeks, as narrated by Nietzsche in one of his early philological essays, 'Homer's Contest', reveals that such an active evaluation of life as regards the feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain was more or less at work in their lives. To better grasp how life-affirming their lives were, one can contrast the Greeks' evaluation with the evaluation of the same feelings as articulated by the modern human being, which is the subject matter of the next chapter.

Chapter 3 engages with Nietzsche's interpretation of (dis)pleasure and pain on a social, anthropological, or cultural basis. For this investigation, I heavily draw on the second treatise of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, by of course raising the relevant points discussed in the first and third treatises. The question that traverses the entirety of the discussion in this chapter is 'how can the cultivation of a promise-keeping, responsible human animal be to a large extent achieved according to a genealogical outlook?'. To this end, firstly, the faculties of forgetfulness and memory are brought under discussion: whereas the former is connected with Nietzsche's critique of the overvaluation of consciousness (ch. 2), the latter points to the fateful and indispensable role that pain played in the cultivation of memory. Furthering the discussion on the latter, the torturous function of pain in strengthening memory is claimed to be found in the creditor-debtor relationship, with its equivalence 'injury

caused = pain undergone'. With(in) this equivalence, Nietzsche argues, the sadistic pleasure in making- and seeing-suffer is established. As I argue in ch. 4, Foucault elaborates this point in a different context in his most Nietzschean work *Discipline and Punish*.

Next, I explicate the hypothesis of the internalisation of human being, i.e., the hypertrophy of bad conscience, and the second fateful shift in the value of bad conscience, i.e., pain's taking on an inward meaning under the name of guilty conscience. Considering these points above, I firstly argue that this entire narrative of Nietzsche attests to the primacy of the role of the body. Hence, this novel perspective which takes into account the crucial role of the body can be considered a radical one, given the oblivion of the body in Western metaphysics. Then, on a more specific level, I argue that in this narrative there exists a self-lacerating relation between pleasure and pain, which excludes the active role of displeasure in human life. To better illustrate my point, I contrast this picture with the way the roles of pleasure, displeasure, and pain were articulated in the Homeric Greeks, in which I claim to find a life-affirming relation between pleasure and displeasure, and the absence of the negative role of pain in human life.

Chapter 4 aims to further the discussion of the previous chapter, i.e., the cultural value of pleasure and pain, by scrutinising Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*. In the entire chapter, I seek to emphasise the Nietzschean elements prevalent in the work by relating it with *On the Genealogy of Morality*. The main discussion in this chapter is what Foucault calls the historical shift in the economy of punishment, as can be seen in the West starting from the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Some of the Nietzschean elements I claim to detect in Foucault's narrative are the principle that one takes pleasure in making- and seeing-suffer (in the figures of the sovereign and the public); the presence of a Nietzschean ontology in the latter's discussion of the new power to judge; the similarity of the former's creditor-debtor relationship and the latter's narrative of the public execution, and of the role of the creditor in the former and that of the sovereign in the latter. Likewise, I argue that in both accounts the role of the outward exercise of pain diminishes; and, in the wake of this diminution, both of them chart a trajectory which

point to the movement from the outside to the interiority of the human animal – as regards the sadistic pleasure taken in making- and seeing-suffer in Nietzsche's case, the role of pain in that of Foucault.

The discussion in Chapter 5 centres around Foucault's interpretation of Greek pleasures (*aphrodisia*), as worked out in the works of the classical Greek philosophers and doctors. Such an undertaking is in order since, similar to Nietzsche's search for a novel way of living by examining the Homeric age unburdened by the nihilistic modern ways of living, in *The Use of Pleasure*, Foucault might be said to be seeking a way out of the disciplinary society by looking at Greek pleasures. Firstly, an interpretative modification is introduced on two levels: i-) instead of the simplistic picture of the licentious Greeks vs. the abstinent Christians as regards sexual pleasures, a 'quadri-thematics of sexual austerity' (on the themes of the body, the opposite sex, the same sex, and truth) is proposed; ii-) in lieu of the sole and misleading focus on the interdictions with regard *aphrodisia*, we can consider sexual pleasures based on these four main threads: *aphrodisia* (sexual pleasures), *chresis* (the use of these pleasures), *enkrateia* (asceticism in the manner of the ancient Greeks), and *sophrosyne* (moderation), respectively. After a brief examination of these four axes, in the rest of the discussion I delve into the third axis, *enkrateia*, because, I claim, an investigation of it carries the merit of offering a new way of practising non-nihilistic, life-affirmative asceticism untainted by the nihilistic Christian ascetic life.

In this discussion of *enkrateia*, I chart the trajectory of the term by indicating how it was firstly used almost synonymously with another related term *sophrosyne*, and only some time after it came to have a sense on its own. After looking at the nuances of this term according to five main axes, I claim at the close of the chapter that the Greek life of *aphrodisia* might prove helpful to a large extent in our battle against nihilism. Nevertheless, as I give the reasons in the discussion, I find this antidote against nihilism a partial one.

## CHAPTER 2

### NIETZSCHE'S UNDERSTANDING OF (DIS)PLEASURE AND PAIN ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL LEVEL

Nietzsche discusses what he understands by the concepts of pleasure, displeasure and pain mainly in the fragments of *The Will to Power*<sup>75</sup>. Before going into a discussion of it I would like to point out that Nietzsche did not entirely incorporate his fragmented thoughts on the physiology of (dis)pleasure and pain into his published works. Therefore, we should bear in mind that the fragments in question were generally far from Nietzsche's last word on this issue. My aim in this section will be to construct an interpretation of these relevant scattered fragments with a view to setting up a background for my discussion of the cultural values of the same concepts in the next section. In what follows I will first look at what Nietzsche understands by pleasure and displeasure in connection with his doctrine of the will to power, and then focus on the discussion of pain. Next, I will be discussing the Nietzschean criterion for the assessment of these concepts, and demonstrating how this was (mainly) performed in the Homeric age of ancient Greece by looking at one of Nietzsche's early philological writings.

#### **2.1. The Feelings of Pleasure and Displeasure, and the Doctrine of Will to Power**

Throughout his writings Nietzsche was at pains to dispense with the doxic views on (human) life. For him our holding to these entrenched interpretations reveals how we are stuck with nihilistic, pessimistic, or life-denying views in philosophies, sciences, religions, and arts. Given the paramount importance of Nietzsche's project of the revaluation of all values, it was inevitable that Nietzsche waged war on all those ingrained and sickly interpretations of life to be able to erect new ones which are life-affirming. Throughout this section I will thus be addressing the doxa in order to see

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<sup>75</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Will to Power*. Tr. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House, 1968. Hereafter *WP*.



how Nietzsche's interpretation of pleasure, displeasure and pain seeks to open up a new life-affirming perspective on human life.

*Prima facie*, it would not strike one as odd if anyone held that pleasure is the resultant feeling of "the satisfaction of the will"<sup>76</sup>, and that happiness is the state "after which every living thing is supposed to be striving"<sup>77</sup>. In fact, as we will see below, these two views represent for Nietzsche the hallmarks of the nihilistic Western metaphysical tradition. Nietzsche regards the first claim given above as superficial and absurd<sup>78</sup>; as for the second one, he claims that its relentless pursuit is the symptom of a herd mentality<sup>79</sup> – which is for Nietzsche equal with physiological weakness based on a grave misunderstanding of life.

To distance himself from the inevitable consequences of these two views Nietzsche does not conceal his contempt for all these evaluations deeply ingrained in this "pessimism of sensibility"<sup>80</sup>. He claims that once one held that it is the "satisfaction of the will" that results in the feeling of pleasure and that happiness is the ideal state after which we (are supposed to) strive relentlessly, pessimism or world-defamation would emerge as the unavoidable consequence. We could hear the supposedly coherent and convincing reasoning of this pessimistic stance as follows: "The sum of displeasure outweighs the sum of pleasure; consequently it would be better if the world did not exist"<sup>81</sup>; "the world is something that rationally should not exist because it causes the feeling subject more displeasure than pleasure"<sup>82</sup>.

In general, the metaphysical tradition could not extricate itself from this life-denying belief, as discussed above. Nevertheless, through Nietzsche's doctrine of the

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<sup>76</sup>WP, §696.

<sup>77</sup>WP, §688.

<sup>78</sup>WP, §696.

<sup>79</sup>WP, §688.

<sup>80</sup>WP, §701.

<sup>81</sup>WP, §701.

<sup>82</sup>WP, §701.

will to power we can gain an affirmative perspective on life. Nietzsche maintains that “Life is will to power”<sup>83</sup>; in other words, life is fundamentally will to more, to grow stronger, to appropriate, dominate, increase, etc<sup>84</sup>. Up until Nietzsche the dominant view of life in philosophy and the sciences was that, not the excess but the lack of energy, and not the expansion but the preservation of (the elements in question of) life was at stake. Therefore we should regard Nietzsche’s insight that life is fundamentally will to more, not will to preserve, as necessitating a fundamental shift of outlook in thinking, the sciences, art, and so on.

Given the purview of the subject matter of this thesis in general and this chapter in particular, it is not possible to give an exhaustive account of Nietzsche’s complex doctrine of the will to power. But it is possible to draw out some of its features which are relevant and hence crucial for my discussion. First of all, according to Nietzsche, the will to power never wishes to remain in a certain state, to preserve itself, or to enjoy permanent satisfaction, but rather it is a perpetual striving<sup>85</sup>. Secondly, this perpetual striving always manifests itself in a specific manner, that is, striving for resistances or obstacles<sup>86</sup>: “the will [to power] is never [permanently] satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance[s]”<sup>87</sup>; “the will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it”<sup>88</sup>. The third fundamental element that we can detect in the will to power is, contrary to the main metaphysical

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<sup>83</sup>WP, §254.

<sup>84</sup>WP, §689.

<sup>85</sup> Katsafanas, Paul, “Philosophical Psychology as a Basis for Ethics”, *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, vol. 44, 2013, 297-314, p. 301. Hereafter PP.

<sup>86</sup> PP, p. 301.

<sup>87</sup> WP, §696. Even though in this quotation Nietzsche speaks of the will, considering Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole, there is only the will to power, not the will as such as in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. As Nietzsche puts it in WP, §692, the will as such is an empty concept devoid of any content.

<sup>88</sup>WP, §656.

tradition, Nietzsche emphasises on the process rather than on the (so-called) goal<sup>89</sup>. Accordingly, the fundamental principle shifts its focus from the temporary equilibrium through the satisfaction of needs to the process of the expenditure of energy itself<sup>90</sup>. Thus, by asserting the process-directedness and thereby repudiating the goal-directedness of the will to power, Nietzsche tells us that “there is no object the attainment of which would bring the process [of the will to power’s perpetually striving after more and more resistances] to an end”<sup>91</sup>. Also, once we adopt the perspective of the will to power, we can interpret not only expenditure but also the self-preservation, self-destruction and self-overcoming of the organism without any recourse to external or *ex nihilo* principles<sup>92</sup>. We will see Nietzsche’s main instantiation of this point in his *oeuvre* in the next section.

Bearing in mind this brief discussion of the will to power, we can now come to Nietzsche’s description of pleasure. According to Nietzsche, the will to power always registers as striving after a maximal feeling of power by perpetually trying to overcome its resistances<sup>93</sup>. According to him, this striving results in the feeling of pleasure, if “that which is being striven for is attained”<sup>94</sup> – with the crucial qualification that this attainment is only momentary in that the will to power again seeks to overcome resistances after a temporary attainment or satisfaction. He then emphasises that the feeling of pleasure is nothing but an accompaniment of this attainment, or “a feeling of more power”<sup>95</sup>, thus the feeling of pleasure is never the motive of an action<sup>96</sup>. Therefore, the idea that we could assess the value of a

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<sup>89</sup>Patton, Paul, “Politics and the Concept of Power in Hobbes and Nietzsche” in Paul Patton (ed.), *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*. London, New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 152. Hereafter PCP.

<sup>90</sup> PCP, p. 152.

<sup>91</sup> PP, p. 309.

<sup>92</sup> PCP, 152.

<sup>93</sup> WP, §688.

<sup>94</sup> WP, §688.

<sup>95</sup> WP, §699.

phenomenon by taking pleasure as the criterion is not tenable in Nietzsche's thinking.

According to Nietzsche, "every living thing does everything it can not to preserve itself but to become *more*"<sup>97</sup>. For him, this will to become more always takes place as a mastering or overcoming of what is standing in the way of the will to power<sup>98</sup>. Therefore, Nietzsche argues, resistance – without which forces cannot expend themselves – is the indispensable ingredient of all actions<sup>99</sup>. For Nietzsche, this resistance registers as the feeling of displeasure in the organism and the will to power is always in need of it<sup>100</sup>. Nietzsche's conception of an organism which demands displeasure or resistances to achieve expenditure warrants the revaluation and eradication of the metaphysical and scientific dream of a world containing no displeasure, for such a world cannot be life, but would be nothingness.

Elsewhere, Nietzsche describes the will to power's overcoming its resistances one by one as a "game of resistance [i.e., displeasure] and victory [i.e., pleasure]", and thus shows us how displeasure is not the opposite of pleasure – as we are led to believe by the habits of language, which conceives displeasure (*Unlust*) as the opposite, or lack of pleasure (*Lust*)<sup>101</sup>. Here we can see one of the instances of Nietzsche's dispensing with the fabrication of doxic binary oppositions, which might be useful but is life-denying and nihilistic.

Moreover, for Nietzsche, there is not just one sense of displeasure: it could either mean "a lure of life"<sup>102</sup> by stimulating the will to power to overcome more resistances (as we have seen above), or the corollary of "an overexpenditure of

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<sup>96</sup>WP, §688.

<sup>97</sup>WP, §688.

<sup>98</sup>WP, §696.

<sup>99</sup>WP, §694.

<sup>100</sup>WP, §694.

<sup>101</sup>WP, §699.

<sup>102</sup>WP, §694.

power”<sup>103</sup>. In other words, the same resistance, which is seen as a stimulant to life according to the physiologically strong organism, could mean an insuperable resistance standing in the way of the physiologically weak organism. Apart from being only insuperable, this resistance could also pose a threat to the life of the weak, if there is no possibility of overpowering this resistance by the weak. According to Nietzsche, this second sense of displeasure represents the weakness or decadence of all nihilistic philosophies, sciences and religions, which are in pursuit of an eternal rest, in other words, nothingness<sup>104</sup>. As Bornedal states, a wide array of philosophies were more or less trapped in this nihilistic outlook, for instance, the “Marxist dream of the end of history in the Communist society”, the Platonic search for complete harmony in the name of justice, or Aristotle’s approbation of the contemplating philosopher, who is, after all, trying to imitate a desireless, and therefore not deficient, god<sup>105</sup>.

## 2.2. The Sickness of the Organism: Pain

After laying out how pleasure and displeasure are always intertwined in the will to power’s striving for more power, we can proceed to the discussion of pain. Compared to the fragments on pleasure and displeasure, Nietzsche’s discussions of pain on the physiological level are even scarcer<sup>106</sup>. But this does not mean that the value of pain had a lesser significance in Nietzsche’s thinking, and this will be seen more explicitly in our discussion in the next chapter, in which we will see how pain steadily became more and more articulated in human life.

Before going into the discussion of what Nietzsche understood by the physiology of pain, I would like to point out that, for Nietzsche, the word pain (*Schmerz*) in itself

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<sup>103</sup>WP, §703.

<sup>104</sup>WP, §703.

<sup>105</sup> Bornedal, Peter, *The Surface and the Abyss: Nietzsche as Philosopher of Mind and Knowledge*. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2010, p. 521. Hereafter SA.

<sup>106</sup>Only two fragments are of help to us: WP, §§699, 700.

was a unity only as a word<sup>107</sup>. In fact, as Abraham Olivier states, it comprises a number of different sorts of sensations: i-) bodily hurts or aches (*Weh*), ii-) suffering (*Leid*) in the sense of excruciating agonies, iii-) affliction which involves torments (*Qualen*), punishment (*Strafe*), torture (*Folter*), and other atrocities (*Grausamkeiten*)<sup>108</sup>. As we will see in the next chapter, it is the third level of meaning that will be pertinent to my discussion. What is crucial considering this chapter is that in all of these three levels, Nietzsche distinguishes a common characteristic as we will see just below<sup>109</sup>.

Before pointing out this common element, it is important to note that Nietzsche dispenses with the doxa that pain and pleasure represent the two opposite poles of the same scale, since pain is fundamentally and incomparably different from pleasure<sup>110</sup>. Nietzsche asserts that pain is an “intellectual” phenomenon, which stems not from, say, being wounded but from “the experience of the bad consequences being wounded can have for the whole organism”<sup>111</sup>. Nietzsche’s insistence on pain’s being an intellectual phenomenon, or a *Gehirnprodukt* lies in his contention that pain is merely a projection of the organism to the wounded place<sup>112</sup>. This projection functions, as it were, by erecting a signpost at the wounded place as a result of the prolonged disturbance of the equilibrium of the organism<sup>113</sup>. Hence we could say that this projection has a utilitarian aim in its attempt to preserve the integrity of the individual.

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<sup>107</sup> Olivier, Abraham, “Nietzsche and Heidegger on Pain”, in Babette Babich, Alfred Denker, and Holger Zaborowsk (eds.), *Heidegger & Nietzsche*. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2012, pp. 147-50. Hereafter NH.

<sup>108</sup> NH, p. 148.

<sup>109</sup> NH, p. 148.

<sup>110</sup> WP, §699.

<sup>111</sup> WP, §699.

<sup>112</sup> WP, §699.

<sup>113</sup> WP, §699.

According to this interpretation of the feeling of pain, in the case of an injury one does not react to the injury itself. Nietzsche observes that “in cases of sudden pain the reflex comes noticeably earlier than the sensation of pain”<sup>114</sup>. For instance, when someone is about to fall down the unconscious reflex precedes the conscious sensation of pain to be able to prevent that person from falling. To give another example, Didier Franck states that when “I burn my hand in contact with fire, I do not suffer before recoiling, but afterward. Thus, pain does not precede the reaction but follows it”<sup>115</sup>.

Therefore Nietzsche asserts that it is not the cause of painful feeling but this temporary loss of equilibrium that causes the suffering of the individual<sup>116</sup>. In fact, according to Nietzsche, our feeling of pain has no connection with the damage itself, but with the *value* of the damage<sup>117</sup>. In brief, the value of the damage is, as Boredal states, the product of an *interpretation*<sup>118</sup>, and therefore, for Nietzsche, “there is no pain as such”<sup>119</sup>. Based on this, Richard Schacht contends that how we interpret pain matters a great deal, for it reveals whether our evaluations are life-affirming or life-denying<sup>120</sup>.

Based on this interpretation of pain, we can grasp what Nietzsche means when he asserts that “the simple [human] always says: this or that makes me feel unwell – [s/]he makes up his[/her] mind about his[/her] feeling unwell only when [s/]he has seen a reason for feeling unwell”<sup>121</sup>. Here, again, Nietzsche tells us that our feeling unwell or painful is a phenomenon constructed after the ‘fact’, and therefore that

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<sup>114</sup>WP, §699.

<sup>115</sup> Franck, Didier, *Nietzsche and the Shadow of God*. Tr. Bettina Bergo and Philippe Farah. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2012, p. 149. Hereafter *NSG*.

<sup>116</sup>WP, §699.

<sup>117</sup>WP, §700.

<sup>118</sup>SA, p. 518.

<sup>119</sup>WP, §699.

<sup>120</sup> Schacht, Richard, *Nietzsche*. London, New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 364-5.

<sup>121</sup>WP, §479.

what we can consciously have is only its simplified interpretation in our judgments such as “this hurts”, “it aches”, etc<sup>122</sup>. “Pain is consequently nothing in-itself”<sup>123</sup>.

### **2.3. How to Interpret Such Epiphenomena as Pleasure and Pain?**

In the previous sections (secs. 2.1, 2.2) we have seen that, according to Nietzsche, the feeling of pleasure is the resultant feeling that the organism has on its conscious level when it has overcome its resistance; the feeling of displeasure denotes either the consciousness of this resistance which is to be overcome by the will to power, or the consciousness of not being able to become master of what is standing in the will to power’s way. Pain, as we have seen, is an interpretation of the organism as a result of the temporary loss of the equilibrium or unity of the body. Therefore, the feeling of pain has definitely no direct relation with the damage itself, and thus one does never react to pain itself. In this section, I would like to discuss the common elements that Nietzsche discerns in his interpretation of pleasure, displeasure and pain.

Based on the previous discussion, the most crucial common element Nietzsche detects in the feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain is that both of them are mere epiphenomena<sup>124</sup>. In other words, as Børnedal states, they are not self-given sensations, but interpretations constructed after-the-fact<sup>125</sup>. By emphasising their being mere constructs or their having an intellectual nature, Nietzsche contends that the feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain are what we can sense only on the conscious level. But Nietzsche does not ascribe a primary value to the consciousness of feelings: “The animal functions are, as a matter of principle, a million times more important than all our beautiful moods and heights of consciousness [i.e.,

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<sup>122</sup>SA, p. 518.

<sup>123</sup>SA, p. 534.

<sup>124</sup>SA, p. 518; *WP*, §702, §699.

<sup>125</sup>SA, p. 518.



(dis)pleasure and pain]: the latter are a surplus, except when they have to serve as tools of those animal functions”<sup>126</sup>.

To be able to get a comprehensive insight into this claim of Nietzsche it is imperative that we see how Nietzsche’s account stands in relation to the metaphysical tradition that he tries to overcome. He states in *Beyond Good and Evil* that “[w]hether it is hedonism [Epicureanism] or pessimism [Schopenhauer], utilitarianism [J. Bentham and J. S. Mill] or eudaimonism [Stoics] – all these ways of thinking that measure the value of things in accordance with *pleasure* and *pain*, which are mere epiphenomena and wholly secondary, are ways of thinking that stay in the foreground and naïvetés on which everyone conscious of creative powers and an artistic conscience will look down not without derision, nor without pity”<sup>127</sup>.

Here Nietzsche gives us the reason why he regards (dis)pleasure and pain as having a subsidiary role in human life due to the fact that they are solely the simplified manifestations of the more fundamental and complex animal functions of the organism. These primary animal functions for the most part do not enter into consciousness, hence they are unintelligible for us. It is for this reason that what we consciously experience turns into an overly simplified judgment, such as “this hurts!”, “it is painful!”, etc., or a simple sensation of the feeling of pleasure. In brief, the subsidiary role of our conscious feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain are directly connected with Nietzsche’s critique of the overestimation of consciousness. I would like to discuss briefly Nietzsche’s revaluation of the role of consciousness in what follows.

According to Nietzsche, “we are in the phase of modesty of consciousness”<sup>128</sup>, because it is time to dispense with the ingrained misunderstanding according to which all our conscious activities are ends in themselves, and instead to regard them just as mere means in the service of some ends that do not pertain to consciousness. We saw above that in Nietzsche’s thinking life is not essentially the will to preserve

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<sup>126</sup>WP, §674.

<sup>127</sup> Quoted from *Nietzsche*, p. 362.

<sup>128</sup>WP, §676.

but the will to become more regardless of any utilitarian aim. In Nietzsche's conception of life, in which life is explained mainly by (ultimately) purposeless expenditure, the value of self-preservation does not altogether disappear but is relegated to a secondary role. According to Nietzsche, it is through this subsidiary value of the will to self-preservation that we can understand the role of consciousness in human life. Nietzsche avers that "consciousness is present only to the extent that consciousness is useful"<sup>129</sup>. Consciousness exists, gains strength, and becomes dominant in human life to the extent that it is necessary for the self-preservation of the individual. Hence Nietzsche states that consciousness is by no means pre-given, but it develops as a result of the struggle for the maintenance of our lives in the social world<sup>130</sup>. In sum, consciousness in human life, which grows to the extent that the will to preserve becomes dominant, has only a secondary value vis-à-vis the will to power's endless, unconscious drive to expenditure. It is for this reason that, according to a Nietzschean understanding of life, we cannot posit the feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain as the ultimate criteria. This is so owing to the fact that they are mere tools, useful fabrications of the intellect in the service of something which is entirely unconscious and not utilitarian.

What is it that in relation to which consciousness plays merely a secondary role? Put in Nietzsche's terms, how are we to interpret such (epi)phenomena as (dis)pleasure and pain if we grant that they are mere subsidiary tools? To be able to answer these questions we need to look at the Nietzschean art of interpretation: "The 'conscious world' cannot serve as a starting point for values: need for an 'objective' positing of values"<sup>131</sup>.

According to Nietzsche, our 'objective' measure of value is "solely the quantum of enhanced and organised power"<sup>132</sup>. In other words, to be able to evaluate any

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<sup>129</sup>WP, §505.

<sup>130</sup>WP, §524.

<sup>131</sup>WP, §707. Here I would like to point out that Nietzschean interpretation operates not according to the classic question whether it is true or wrong, but according to the question whether it is life-affirming, healthy or life-denying, sickly. This is the reason the word objective is in inverted commas.

<sup>132</sup>WP, §674.

phenomenon we should heed Nietzsche's contention that any increase in consciousness and the feelings of (dis)pleasure or pain can be considered only as utilitarian tools rather than ends in themselves; but only the enhancement of power is to be considered as the 'objective' criterion, according to which we can decide whether any phenomenon is life-affirming or life-denying<sup>133</sup>.

Here, I would like to quote at length a fragment from the *Nachlass*, through which we can understand how the Nietzschean interpretation works:

All evaluations are the result of determinate quantities of force and of their degree of consciousness: these are the *perspectival* laws attuned to the being of a [human being] and a people – that which is proximate, important, necessary, etc. All human drives, as much as the *animal* ones, have taken, under specific circumstances, the form of *conditions of existence*, and have been placed in the foreground. *Drives* are the *subsequent effect of long-preserved evaluations*, which now function instinctively as a *system* of judgments of pleasure and pain. At first constraint, then habit, then need, then natural tendency (drive)<sup>134</sup>.

As stated by Franck, what we can infer from such a dense passage is that, according to Nietzsche, i-) the quantitative difference between forces is irreducibly constituent of the qualitative difference between forces; ii-) this qualitative difference establishes a hierarchy, without which there could be no evaluation; iii-) "the becoming drive of the forces is fulfilled once the evaluation becomes an instinct"<sup>135</sup>; iv-) "pleasure presupposes the values required for the intensification of power, of which pleasure is merely the symptom"<sup>136</sup>.

To my mind, Nietzsche's most insightful contention here is, firstly, that our judgments of (dis)pleasure and pain are not the ultimate ground, for behind them we see unconscious drives at work. Secondly, even our drives have a history, because

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<sup>133</sup>WP, §§707, 711.

<sup>134</sup> Quoted from NSG, p. 147.

<sup>135</sup>NSG, p. 147.

<sup>136</sup>NSG, p. 149.

they are the result of our “long-preserved evaluations”, which in turn points to the quantitative difference between forces.

After this brief and digressive yet hopefully helpful look at Nietzsche’s ontology, I would like to address another problem which is connected with the previous issue. In the *Antichrist* Nietzsche regards “everything that heightens the feeling of power in [human being], the will to power, power itself” as good, i.e., healthy in Nietzsche’s parlance<sup>137</sup>. Here, Nietzsche equals the feeling of power and the (‘real’) quantum of power as regards what is good according to him. But, one could ask, are they supposed to be equal or parallel? Could we not think that one could have an increase in one’s feeling of power and at the same time a decrease in one’s actual quantum of power? As we will see in the next chapter when I will be discussing the cultural significance of the concepts of pleasure and pain, Nietzsche admits and even substantiates the fact that those who cling to metaphysical thought and religious belief provide for themselves this enhancement of the feeling of more power, while in fact they represent a dangerously drastic decrease in the quantum of power<sup>138</sup>.

To interpret such a seemingly problematic view, I would like to assert that it is *also* true for Nietzsche that the feeling of power is not necessarily an actual indicator of the quantum of power. Firstly, it is for this reason that Nietzsche cautions us not to take our feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain as the ultimate criteria to assess phenomena, for they cannot give us any reliable clue as to whether our evaluations are life-denying or life-affirming. Secondly, even though in Nietzsche’s thinking the feeling of power is entirely subsidiary, it is through these secondarily important feelings that we can interpret the supremacy of nihilistic interpretations of life – namely, the metaphysical tradition from Plato to Kant and the monotheistic religions. In the next chapter, we will see how Nietzsche carries out such an interpretation.

Based on all the previous points we have seen in this section, and by also taking note of Nietzsche’s interpretation of (dis)pleasure and pain in the previous sections (secs. 2.1, 2.2), here I would like to make some assertions. I think, before we proceed

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<sup>137</sup>Nietzsche, p. 365.

<sup>138</sup>Nietzsche, p. 366; PCP, p. 155.

to the next section (sec. 2.4), in which we will see how life was interpreted in the Homeric age, and then to the next chapter in which we will see how humans were transformed from such Homeric times to that of modern humanity, it is important to see how groundbreaking Nietzsche's views on this subject are.

In the Introduction I briefly discussed the various views of philosophers from ancient Greece to modern philosophy up until Kant on the concepts of pleasure and pain. Given the dominant ways of thinking in this two millennia long tradition of Western metaphysics, Nietzsche can be said to be the one who wanted to overcome these dominant views on our feelings. Even though it would not be tenable to reduce all those views to some simplistic oppositions, I think we can detect two main tendencies of thought in this metaphysical tradition insofar as it pertains to our topic. On the one hand, there is the stronger pole whose views oscillate between the demand for an extirpation of our material feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain, and an indifference to them as if they had no value in human life at all. Christian ethics, the Enlightenment ideal of the ascendancy of reason in human life (Kant), and the scientific ideal of a so-called objective scientist who is supposed to be totally stripped of their material or bodily feelings in the quest for truth may be named as the most salient examples of this pole. On the other hand, there is the relatively less dominant view which holds that what matters ultimately is what we feel. Underlying this view is the assumption that our bodily feelings are "given, constant, universal, and invariable qualities that we as humans already positively know"<sup>139</sup>. The most salient examples of this outlook are the utilitarian philosophies of J. Bentham and J. S. Mill. In sum, according to this second pole, we can evaluate any phenomenon according to whether it enhances the feelings of pleasure or not<sup>140</sup>.

I would like to claim that even if these two main stances are positioned at the extreme poles as regards our feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain and hence seem as if they represent two divergent views, they are ultimately the results of the same mode

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<sup>139</sup>SA, p. 524.

<sup>140</sup> See SA, p. 524 for J. Bentham's 'hedonic calculus'; SA, pp. 519-21 for the nihilistic dream of the tradition, according to which the painfulness of life is to be eradicated whereas pleasures are to be maximised so as to have a perfect life.

of thinking that we can see in substance metaphysics. In other words, both poles regard these feelings as principal sensations, in possession of which a subject finds itself, whether in an attempt to exterminate or forget them altogether or to mark them as *the* value in human life. To my mind, Nietzsche's account of this subject in *The Will to Power* overcomes this nihilistic outlook by not falling into the misinterpretations evinced in either of these poles. In Nietzsche's thinking, our feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain play their roles in the economy of life, so that neither extirpating or overlooking them nor ascribing them unconditional value are counted as adequate responses.

Accordingly, I think that Nietzsche, by claiming that it is a reactive feeling, which is not related to expenditure of the will to power, does not want us to endeavour to feel no pain at all. Rather, his emphasis on the reactive characteristics of pain means putting an ever-increasing value on the role of pain in human life is a symptom of degenerating life. I hope that the next chapter will considerably substantiate this insight of Nietzsche.

In a similar vein, Nietzsche's emphasis on pleasure's having a secondary role does not mean that this material feeling is worthless at all. But it is just that we cannot evaluate this phenomenon by solely relying on what we experience in consciousness. As we will see in the next section, according to Nietzsche, even those who defame life are in fact in relentless pursuit of providing themselves with optimum conditions to be able to enhance their feeling of pleasure through nihilistic ways.

Lastly, even though it does not constitute a substantial part of my discussion, I think Nietzsche's emphasis on the irreducible and unique role of the feeling of displeasure is entirely crucial for my thesis. By stressing the need for resistances or obstacles, Nietzsche overcomes both the nihilistic poles that we saw above. Asserting the indispensable role of displeasure or resistances in (human) life means to be able to accept life as it is, that is, not having recourse to any *ex nihilo* principles to interpret life, or not trying to correct this life for it to conform to a non-existing ideal. In the next section (sec. 2.4), we will see how this indispensable role of displeasure comes to the fore in Nietzsche's discussion of the Homeric Greeks, and how the

feeling of the enhancement of power, i.e., pleasure, was approved by him without unduly increasing the reactive meaning of pain in human life.

#### **2.4. An Active Evaluation of Pleasure and Pain: The Homeric Age**

In this section I would like briefly to focus on at Nietzsche's text "Homer's Contest"<sup>141</sup> ("Homers Wettkampf") with a view to better explicating what a life-affirming evaluation of the feelings of displeasure and pain would be like. Before going into this discussion, I would like to make some remarks about the place of this article in Nietzsche's *oeuvre*. When we look at the list of Nietzsche's published works, at the beginning of it we see *The Birth of Tragedy*, which was published in 1872. But it does not mean that this was one of the earliest writings that Nietzsche composed. In fact, if we look at Nietzsche's writings that were not published or are generally not considered as fully philosophical, we can see that Nietzsche, as a classical philologist by profession, penned many articles mainly on ancient Greece. One of them, "Homer's Contest", completed in 1872, was intended as a Preface to a work that Nietzsche did not realise. As regards its content, we could regard it as a philosophical-cum-philological essay, which however contains the seeds of many thoughts that Nietzsche would later articulate especially in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. In this work, by a critical examination of the Homeric age, Nietzsche emphasises how modern humanity is estranged from those active, life-affirming and 'naïve' epoch<sup>142</sup>.

Nietzsche remarks that in ancient Greece there were two Eris-goddesses<sup>143</sup>. The bad Eris, promoting "wicked war and feuding", was regarded as despicable but from

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<sup>141</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich, "Homer's Contest", in Keith Ansell Pearson and Duncan Large (eds.), *The Nietzsche Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. Hereafter HC.

<sup>142</sup> The reason the word naïve is in inverted commas is that it was a technical term in Nietzsche's thinking. It refers in the main to the lack of, or better, the demand to overcome, the sickly Christian feeling of guilt, which includes *inter alia* interpreting human life by means of the concept of sin, seeing the (so-called) necessity of punishment almost everywhere.

<sup>143</sup> HC, pp. 96-97.

its necessity nobody could escape<sup>144</sup>. On the other hand, the good Eris, instilling the feelings of grudge, envy and jealousy in people, made even the most unskilled people endeavour to achieve something in order not to remain in the lowly situation in which they found themselves<sup>145</sup>. Nietzsche notes that to our modern minds such characteristics as competitive ambition or grudge are unfathomable<sup>146</sup>. Despite our situation, for the ancient Greeks, the finest Hellenic principle in life was “contest”<sup>147</sup>, and this used to be explained with recourse to the good goddess Eris, which would goad people to the action of the contest (*agon*). So that the will to more was stimulated not only in the lives of the strong, but also in that of the weak, who then could not wallow in regret, but seek the conditions to be able to become more.

Nietzsche says that every talent from philosophy to the arts and sports was developed through cultivating the sense of selfishness in people’s lives<sup>148</sup>. But, he qualifies, this trait of selfishness was not a boundless one but sufficiently curbed, for individuals regarded this trait as good to the extent that it was beneficial to the welfare of the *polis*<sup>149</sup>. Hence, an unbridled selfishness was deemed unacceptable since it would damage the good of the *polis*. As an example, Nietzsche claims that we can sense this Greek sense of selfishness even in the works of Plato, as if he told his interlocutors, readers, or fellow citizens that “Look: I, too, can do what my great rivals can do; yes, I can do it better than them. ...Only the contest made me a poet, sophist, and orator!”<sup>150</sup>.

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<sup>144</sup> HC, p. 96.

<sup>145</sup> HC, p. 97.

<sup>146</sup> HC, p. 97.

<sup>147</sup> HC, p. 100.

<sup>148</sup> HC, p. 98.

<sup>149</sup> HC, p. 98.

<sup>150</sup> HC, p. 99.



Moreover, Nietzsche notes that we can find the original meaning of ostracism in the Homeric “feeling that competition is vital”<sup>151</sup>. Accordingly, the *polis* would expel the unequalled one, not because that person was considered evil or frightening, but because citizens would dread the consequence that the spirit of contest would dry up if they did not oust the one who was unrivalled in the *polis*<sup>152</sup>. Neglecting such a measure would undermine the very basis of life in the *polis*, for these citizens recognised that “a monopoly of predominance” would preclude the awakening of “new contest of powers”<sup>153</sup>.

Lastly, Nietzsche points out that overlooking such a vital principle of life led Athens to destruction, when it oppressed its allies to the point of exterminating any rival with whom to struggle. “This proves that without envy, jealousy, and competitive ambition, the Hellenic state, like [the] Hellenic [person], deteriorates. It becomes evil and cruel, it becomes vengeful and godless”<sup>154</sup>.

Based on this brief description of “Homer’s Contest”, I would like to claim that Nietzsche presents us here with a historical example of what the active evaluation of displeasure and pain would be like. We saw that the concept of *agon* was indispensable for the Homeric Greeks, and it is through such a mindset that we can better grasp Nietzsche’s contention that the will to power is always in need of resistances – which, on consciousness, manifests itself as the feeling of displeasure – to be able to expend itself. Accordingly, the ancient Greeks would ostracise the unrivalled one because that person’s status would impair their feeling of displeasure, which was the *sine qua non* for their cultivation. To my mind, in contrast to the nihilistic moderns, the ancient Greeks had grasped the importance of the plurality of competing forces for the strengthening of life. Nevertheless, whenever they neglected the necessity of resistances, i.e., displeasure, and thus unduly oppressed their rivals, the deterioration was inevitable.

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<sup>151</sup> HC, p. 98.

<sup>152</sup> HC, p. 98.

<sup>153</sup> HC, p. 98.

<sup>154</sup> HC, p. 100.

Had the ancient Greeks not seen how vital the active evaluation of displeasure in their lives was, I would claim, their evaluation of pain could have given rise to a nihilistic interpretation of life. Therefore, an undue emphasis on the avoidance of pain would regard the self-preservation of the individual as the supreme value, and in such a mode of life human flourishing would not be possible. Nietzsche remarks, “how very typical is the question and answer, when a notable opponent of Pericles is asked whether he or Pericles is the best wrestler in the city and answers: ‘Even if I throw him he will deny having fallen and get away with it, convincing the people who saw him fall’”<sup>155</sup>. I think, unlike us calculating and calculable modern humans, those people would never deign to calculate how much pain they would feel before taking action, or devise a so-called perfect realm in which no pain or suffering could be possible.

As I pointed out earlier, in this article Nietzsche shows us how we are immeasurably distanced from such active evaluations of life. By carrying out a brief discussion of “Homer’s Contest” after investigating the values of (dis)pleasure and pain, and before looking at Nietzsche’s genealogy of the domesticated and sick modern human being, I tried to give the example of the life-affirming mode of living of the Homeric Greeks as a way of explaining and emphasising the contrast between the ancient Greeks and modern humans on this point.

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<sup>155</sup> HC, p. 98.

## CHAPTER 3

### NIETZSCHE'S UNDERSTANDING OF PLEASURE AND PAIN ON THE CULTURAL LEVEL

The *locus classicus* of Nietzsche's interpretation of the concepts of pleasure and pain on the cultural, social, or anthropological level is *On the Genealogy of Morality*<sup>156</sup>, in particular the second essay of this work, entitled "'Guilt', 'Bad Conscience', and Related Matters." Before going into my discussion I would like to make some preliminary remarks about the work in general and the second essay of this work in particular.

As the subtitle of the work suggests, *On the Genealogy of Morality* is a polemic (*Streitschrift*) in that it seeks to call into question what has hitherto been regarded in Western philosophy as given, unconditional, or fact, namely our moral values of good and evil<sup>157</sup>. The Nietzschean art of interpretation (which we partly saw in the previous chapter (sec. 2.3)) seeks to assess the value of these (moral) values by questioning whether they are symptoms of the impoverishment or degeneration of life, or signs of the fullness or the power of life<sup>158</sup>. Secondly, it should be taken into account that the title of the work is not "The *Genealogy of Morality*" but "On the *Genealogy of Morality*" (*Zur Genealogie der Moral*). I think this addition of the word "on" (*zur*) suggests that Nietzsche's account of the value of the values of good and evil is by no means an exhaustive or a conclusive one, and therefore the three essays that constitute the work could be expanded by a fourth and fifth one and so forth. In this regard, to my mind, we could consider Foucault's works in a way as the continuation of this project, and in the next two chapters (chs. 4, 5) I will be discussing the two of these works of Foucault.

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<sup>156</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich, *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Tr. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, 1998. Hereafter *GM*.

<sup>157</sup> *GM P*, 6, p. 5.

<sup>158</sup> *GM P*, 3, p. 3.

According to Nietzsche, the questions addressed in *On the Genealogy of Morality* point to an intricate web of issues, ranging over not only philosophical, moral, and historical, but also philological and psychological ones<sup>159</sup>. I think one of the implications of this multifacetedness is that the Nietzschean art of interpretation is no longer engaged in simplistic modes of thinking, e.g., setting up simplistic binary oppositions (e.g., the supposition that the law of excluded middle can hold true in (human) life), establishing unidirectional movements of thinking according to an assumed hierarchy (e.g., the Kantian distinction between the *a priori* realm stripped of empiricity and hence being ‘pure’, and the empirical and hence impure realm of the material world), imposing *ex nihilo* principles to explain the emergence of novel phenomena (which point to the still prevalent sway of religious thinking over philosophical thinking), and so forth. As we will see in the following, the Nietzschean interpretation of the concepts of pleasure and pain on the cultural level is couched in physiological terms. What is crucial in this mode of thinking is that it seeks to destabilise the ingrained Platonistic mode of thinking, which puts an inferior value on materiality and hence what is bodily in human life.

As for the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, I would like to quote Nietzsche’s comment on it in *Ecce Homo* which was published in 1888, one year after the publication of the former work:

The *second* essay gives the psychology of *conscience*: conscience is *not*, as is believed, ‘the voice of God in [human being]’, – it is the instinct of cruelty that is turned inwards after it cannot discharge itself outwards anymore. Cruelty is first brought to light here as one of the oldest and most persistent underpinnings of culture<sup>160</sup>.

As we can see in Nietzsche’s reiteration of the word “cruelty”, Nietzsche’s account in the second essay seeks to interpret the overgrowth of (bad) conscience not by relying on any principle, which are supposed to be the determinant factors in the

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<sup>159</sup>GM P, 3, p. 2.

<sup>160</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Ecce Homo* “Books”, GM in Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (eds.) *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*. Tr. Aaron Ridley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 136, translation modified.

material human life but are completely other-worldly. Also, as we will see (in sec. 3.1.4), even though in Nietzsche scholarship it is generally granted that in the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality* Nietzsche expounds his theory of the *origin* of bad conscience, a careful reading of the relevant passages on this issue can show us that he, in fact, deals with the issue of the *hypertrophy* or *overgrowth*. I think that unless this differentiation is heeded, one might fall into the fallacy that Nietzsche's genealogical account was engaged with 'discovering' so-called 'origins'. Such a study is in fact one of the instances of the ascendancy of the mode of thinking one can see in substance metaphysics, which Nietzsche attempted to distance himself from and overcome it in his entire corpus.

### **3.1. The Second Treatise: Memory, Cruelty, and the Internalisation of Human Being**

#### **3.1.1. The Active Forces of Forgetting and Memory**

At the beginning of his discussion in the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche asserts that "to breed an animal that is *permitted to promise*" is *the* issue regarding human beings<sup>161</sup>. He then insists that the paradoxical task of breeding a promise-keeping (human) animal has been "solved to a high degree"<sup>162</sup>. To be able to provide an insight into this issue, he characterises two active forces working in opposite directions and therefore in perpetual contest with each other<sup>163</sup>. According to Nietzsche, these two forces are forgetfulness (*Vergesslichkeit*) and memory (*Gedächtnis*), respectively<sup>164</sup>. However, the pivotal difference between them is that he takes the former as the primordial one, whilst the latter is thought to be cultivated forcefully<sup>165</sup>.

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<sup>161</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>162</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>163</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>164</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>165</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35; II, 3, p. 37.

After setting the agenda, Nietzsche describes the healthy and necessarily forgetful human animal, who has not yet been exposed to the breeding programme of producing a promise-keeping and thus responsible human animal<sup>166</sup>. In such a forgetful animal, Nietzsche tells us, the active and positive faculty, power, or force (*Kraft*) of forgetfulness enables it to live in a healthy way, so that psychic order, rest, happiness, new experiences, etc. become possible for this living being<sup>167</sup>. According to Nietzsche, active forgetfulness provides such a healthy state for, among other things, it does not let consciousness be disturbed by the unconscious inner workings of subservient organs, which imperceptibly perform innumerable tasks without cessation<sup>168</sup>. Likening it to incorporation (*Einverleibung*), i.e., the physical incorporation of nourishment into our bodies, he then asserts that the operation of forgetting can be called “inpsychation” (*Einverseelung*), characterising the psychic absorption of whatever we experience<sup>169</sup>.

I think that Nietzsche’s interpretation of forgetfulness as an active and positive force or faculty is part and parcel of his critique of the overestimation of consciousness (as we saw in sec. 2.3). For Nietzsche, it is through the active workings of forgetfulness, which enables one “to temporarily close the doors and windows of consciousness”<sup>170</sup>, that an organism can continue to live healthily. As we saw in the previous chapter (sec. 2.3), Nietzsche’s thinking tells us that the hypertrophy of consciousness results in various nihilistic modes of living and thinking, so that by emphasising the irreducible role of forgetfulness in human life Nietzsche gives a partial antidote to this nihilism.

After laying out the healthy state of a human animal in whom forgetting represents the active and dominant force, Nietzsche lays out the faculty working in the opposite direction, namely memory, which (as we will see in sec. 3.1.2) is the

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<sup>166</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>167</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>168</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>169</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>170</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

product of a breeding process<sup>171</sup>. It is through memory, says Nietzsche, that promise-keeping can be attained because memory renders forgetfulness inoperative<sup>172</sup>. For Nietzsche, just like forgetfulness, memory too is an active faculty in the sense that it is “by no means simply a passive no-longer-being-able-to-get-rid-of...but rather an active no-longer-wanting-to-get-rid-of”<sup>173</sup>.

As for both of the forces of forgetfulness and memory being active, I would like to address one issue which has been neglected or misinterpreted by some Nietzsche scholars. It is true that, for Nietzsche, memory and forgetfulness are two forces working in opposite directions in the sense that what the former struggles to keep, the latter wants to do away with. I think it is precisely for this reason that construing memory as the lack of forgetfulness or forgetfulness as the lack of memory severely distorts Nietzsche’s interpretation of these two forces. Upon a close inspection of the text, it can be seen that Nietzsche emphatically states that both forces are active in the sense that one of the two is *not* the mere absence of the other in a passive sense. We can see such a misunderstanding, firstly, in Bornedal’s *The Surface and the Abyss*, when he interprets the struggle between forgetfulness and memory as the “ability versus inability to forget”<sup>174</sup>, and secondly, in Rosalyn Diprose’s article “Nietzsche and the Pathos of Distance”, when she construes the active faculty of forgetting as “not-remembering”<sup>175</sup>. In the first example, memory unjustifiably becomes a passive faculty for it is regarded as the lack of forgetfulness; in the second one, forgetting erroneously becomes a passive faculty for it is taken to be the absence of memory. I think that even though their misinterpretations are seemingly the opposite of each other, they are in fact the result of the same misinterpretation that

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<sup>171</sup>GM II, 1, pp. 35-6.

<sup>172</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>173</sup>GM II, 1, p. 35.

<sup>174</sup>SA, p. 383.

<sup>175</sup> Diprose, Rosalyn, “Nietzsche and the Pathos of Distance” in Paul Patton (ed.), *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*. London, New York: Routledge, 2002. Hereafter NPD.

Nietzsche dispels in his text, i.e., neglecting Nietzsche's caution that both forgetfulness and memory are active forces.

Nietzsche was a thinker who sought to banish not only superficial binary oppositional thinking (such as we have seen just above in the two instances of misinterpretations by Bornedal and Diprose), but also the nihilistic tendency of unifying and solidifying what is in fact differential and fluid. One instance of the former sort of dispelling can be seen in Nietzsche's discussion of memory. We can infer from Deleuze's interpretation of memory in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*<sup>176</sup> that as long as we consider memory as only having one sense, we are doomed to misunderstand Nietzsche's pluralistic account of the faculty of memory in the human animal.

Accordingly, Deleuze differentiates between the two sorts of memory, i.e., the memory of traces and the memory of words<sup>177</sup>. For Deleuze, it is the memory of words that is to be cultivated in a breeding programme of the originally forgetful human animal<sup>178</sup>. On the other hand, as Nietzsche discusses in the first essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, the memory of traces characterises the memory of the slave, who is physiologically weaker than the noble, and out of this weakness they grow a festering *ressentiment*<sup>179</sup>. The slavish type of memory, i.e., the memory of traces, retains the past experiences of defeat, misery, and so on, and cannot digest those painfully past experiences. In sum, it is a reactive type of memory of the past, whereas the active type of memory of words is, for Deleuze,

a function of the future. It is not the memory of the sensibility but of the will. ... It is the faculty of promising, commitment to the future, memory of the future itself.

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<sup>176</sup> Deleuze, Gilles, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Tr. Hugh Tomlinson. London, New York: Continuum, 2002. Hereafter *NP*.

<sup>177</sup> *NP*, p. 134.

<sup>178</sup> *NP*, p. 134.

<sup>179</sup> *GM* I, 7, p. 16; I, 10, pp. 19-21. The elaboration of Nietzsche's physiological account of *ressentiment* is an issue on its own, and hence, given the subject matter of my thesis, I cannot here delve into this issue.



Remembering the promise that has been made is not recalling that it was made at a particular past moment, but that one must hold to it at a future moment. This is precisely the selective object of culture<sup>180</sup>.

In addition, I think that the term Nietzsche uses for promise-keeping in German is also helpful to grasp Deleuze's interpretation of the active faculty of memory as the memory of words: to promise is *versprechen* in German, which includes the root verb *sprechen*, to speak, which refers to the use of words. Similarly, in English there is the expression "to give one's word", which means to promise, and, again, refers to the use of words in promise-keeping. In sum, the centrality of the word in promise-keeping and in being oriented to the future of promises is the two central characteristics that Deleuze detects in his reading of Nietzsche on this topic.

Having addressed these two issues regarding memory, i.e., that both memory and forgetfulness are active forces, and that memory can be interpreted as having a double meaning, we can go back to Nietzsche's discussion in the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*. After laying out the fundamental characteristics of forgetfulness and memory, Nietzsche points out that the transition from a forgetful animal to a promise-keeping one involves a long history, such that without first making humanity "*calculable, regular, [and] necessary*", and then making it learn how to calculate, think causally, etc., breeding a human being answerable for their future actions would not have been possible<sup>181</sup>. In the following sections I will, firstly, deal with the specific means of cultivating a promise-keeping human animal (sec. 3.1.2), and then, with the specific site of this cultivation (sec. 3.1.3).

### **3.1.2. The Torturous Breeding: Mnemo-techniques**

As we saw above, for Nietzsche, forgetting represents the original dominant force in the human animal, whilst the constitution of memory requires a breeding

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<sup>180</sup>*NP*, p. 134.

<sup>181</sup>*GM II*, 1, p. 36.

programme<sup>182</sup>. He then takes up the issue of the content of this breeding<sup>183</sup>. He broaches the problem: “How does one make a memory for the human animal? How does one impress something onto this partly dull, partly scattered momentary understanding, this forgetfulness in the flesh, so that it remains present?”<sup>184</sup> The means for attaining this, Nietzsche says, probably constitute the most gruesome and dreadful aspects of the history of humankind: “only what does not cease *to give pain* remains in one’s memory”<sup>185</sup>. Here we have the cultural significance of pain for Nietzsche, according to which the constitution of the active faculty of memory is inextricably linked with engendering excruciating pains in the body.

Nietzsche claims that all human activities involving this element of cruelty, such as sacrificial rituals, laceration, or religious cults, hinge on this fateful function of pain on memory<sup>186</sup>. Moreover, Nietzsche lists a number of punitive practices seen throughout history to show us how “five, [or] six ‘I will nots’” were branded on the memory of the forgetful human animal<sup>187</sup>. Anticipating the opening pages of Foucault’s seminal work *Discipline and Punish* (as we will see in the next chapter), Nietzsche lists some of these practices: stoning, breaking on the wheel, casting stakes, being torn or trampled by horses (i.e., quartering), boiling the criminal in oil or wine, flaying, cutting flesh from the breast, and so on<sup>188</sup>.

As can be seen above, both the ancient world, as well as the medieval and modern periods are replete with those cruel punitive practices. I think that (and as I will try to demonstrate in the following), based on this observation, one could state that the

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<sup>182</sup>GM II, 1, pp. 35-6.

<sup>183</sup>GM II, 3, pp. 37-9.

<sup>184</sup>GM II, 3, p. 37.

<sup>185</sup>GM II, 3, p. 37.

<sup>186</sup>GM II, 3, p. 38.

<sup>187</sup>GM II, 3, pp. 38-9.

<sup>188</sup>GM II, 3, p. 38. Cf. Kafka’s short story “In the Penal Colony” (*In der Strafkolonie*), which was first published in 1919. In this story we read the minute details of body-writing. Kafka’s description of the malleable body and its most conspicuous feeling of pain during the execution of punishment are reminiscent of Nietzsche’s narrative of the cultural value of pain in *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

need for the infliction of pain, or cruelty, and its decisive function of being “the most powerful aid of mnemonics”<sup>189</sup> were enduring facts despite the passing of centuries. If that is true, could one also say that the infliction of pain and the effects of cultivating memory must be deeply entrenched even in our so-called postmodern, humane and scientific era? In the following we will briefly look at Nietzsche’s answer to this question in his discussion of the descent of (the hypertrophy of) bad conscience, and we will also scrutinise Foucault’s Nietzschean answer to the same question in the next chapter.

We saw above that through the cultural function of pain, the originally forgetful human animal forcefully and eventually learns to heed some (legal, religious, and moral)<sup>190</sup> imperatives as a result of having these “thou shalt nots” branded on his/her body. But the Nietzschean thinking in terms of plurality tells us that the result of these practices did not solely give rise to imperatives or obligations, but also to some other dispositions that we today assume to be the distinguishing and hence admirable features of human beings: “reason, seriousness, mastery over the affects [and] this entire gloomy thing called reflection”<sup>191</sup>. Nietzsche asserts that all these intrinsically human dispositions have a genealogy, which points to those aforementioned age-old, cruel, and punitive practices<sup>192</sup>.

### **3.1.3. The Creditor-Debtor Relationship and the Cultural Value of Pleasure in it**

In a Nietzschean mode of thinking, evaluations are never carried out on a universal scale in the sense that the descent of any phenomenon is explained away by recourse

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<sup>189</sup>GM II, 3, p. 38.

<sup>190</sup> Even though it is not germane to the discussion here, I would like to point out that the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality* in a way charts the development of responsibility in the social sphere by dividing its history into these three realms, i.e., legal responsibility, religious responsibility, and finally moral responsibility, respectively. For such a reading of the second essay in question, see Conway, Daniel, “The Birth of the State” in Herman W. Siemens and Vasti Roodt (eds.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political Thought*. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, p. 62.

<sup>191</sup>GM II, 3, p. 39.

<sup>192</sup>GM II, 3, p. 39.

to *ex nihilo* principles, as I discussed in the Introduction. Rather, the Nietzschean interpretation is always “local”, for what is at stake is always the specification of the emergence of novel phenomena in terms of their loci. Related to this facet of Nietzsche’s thinking is his interpretation of the cultural or anthropological significance of pain by relating it to its specific site in his narrative in the second treatise of *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

According to Nietzsche, the significance of pain in strengthening memory with a view to breeding a responsible human animal first and foremost takes on its meaning in the creditor-debtor relationship<sup>193</sup>. This relationship between the creditor and the debtor, Nietzsche declares, is “the oldest and most primitive relationship among persons there is” in that “here for the first time person stepped up against person”<sup>194</sup>. Through the constitution of this relationship, says Nietzsche, an equivalence between the injury on the part of the debtor and the infliction of pain on the part of the creditor is established<sup>195</sup>. Put differently, in Deleuze’s formulation, the equivalence is “[i]njury caused = pain undergone – this is the equation of punishment that determines a relationship of [human being] to [human being]”<sup>196</sup>. Therefore, Nietzsche continues, in the event of a non-payment on the part of the debtor, the creditor “is granted a certain *feeling of satisfaction* as repayment and compensation”<sup>197</sup>. This feeling of satisfaction consists in “being permitted to vent [the creditor’s] power without a second thought on one who is powerless”<sup>198</sup>.

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<sup>193</sup>GM II, 4, p. 40.

<sup>194</sup>GM II, 8, p. 45.

<sup>195</sup>GM II, 4, p. 40.

<sup>196</sup>NP, pp. 134. I think that Deleuze’s use of an equals sign here should not go unnoticed, for normally he could verbally characterise this relationship. To my mind, by using this mathematical symbol Deleuze wants to emphasise the *fabrication* of an originally non-existing equation. As is well known, Nietzsche was a philosopher of difference, so that the process of equaling non-equals always calls for a genealogy in his thinking.

<sup>197</sup>GM II, 5, p. 41.

<sup>198</sup>GM II, 5, p. 41.

As Elisabeth Grosz states, “the injury caused by the failure to keep promises, by the failure to pay off debts, by the failure to remember to what one is committed, is rendered commensurate with the degree of pain extracted from the body”, for instance, through “the extraction of organs, parts, forces, and energies from the debtor’s body”<sup>199</sup>. She then asserts that through the fabrication of the equivalence “injury caused = pain undergone”, the creditor’s memory is forcibly seared on the memory of the debtor<sup>200</sup>. In brief, as a result of the fabrication of this equivalence, the compensation of non-payment is procured through “a directive and right to cruelty”<sup>201</sup>.

However, before going into the discussion of the logic of this equivalence we should bear in mind that, according to Nietzsche, “throughout the greatest part of human history” punishment was *not* meted out due to holding the evil-doer responsible for their misdeed<sup>202</sup>. In fact, Nietzsche tells us, this interpretation is an extremely late phenomenon<sup>203</sup>, and it needs to be dismissed for it hinders us in understanding the real economy underlying this age-old equivalence<sup>204</sup>.

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<sup>199</sup> Grosz, Elisabeth, “The Stomach for Knowledge” in Paul Patton (ed.), *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*. London, New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 66. Hereafter SK.

<sup>200</sup> SK, p. 67.

<sup>201</sup> *GM* II, 5, p. 41. I think that another dimension Nietzsche’s elaboration of the creditor-debtor relationship could take on is that, as Deleuze states, “Nietzsche sees the archetype of social organisation in credit rather than exchange” (*NP*, p. 135) – contrary to the anthropologist Lévi-Strauss, according to whom the social order is founded, not on credit, but rather on exchange (SK, p. 66). It is well known that *On the Genealogy of Morality* was in many respects a precursor of psychoanalysis, but, thanks to Deleuze and Grosz, we can see that Nietzsche articulated a crucial insight also in the field of anthropology.

<sup>202</sup> *GM* II, 4, p. 39.

<sup>203</sup> *GM* II, 4, p. 39.

<sup>204</sup> For Nietzsche, “the doing is everything.” (*GM* I, 13, p. 40) and holding “the evil-doer responsible for [their] [mis/]deed” (*GM* II, 4, p. 39) is one of the most fateful consequences of positing an autonomous subject behind the deed, as he discusses in *GM* I, 13, pp. 25-6. Deleuze calls this fabrication “the paralogism” and carries out a detailed analysis of it in *NP*, pp. 122-4. To sum it up, Deleuze teases out three main moments in this fateful fabrication: i-) splitting force in two as cause and effect, ii-) hypostasising the split force, so that the subject is assumed to be autonomous in its actions, and iii-) moralising the so-called substantialised force, so that blaming the active force for performing the activity which is its own becomes possible (*NP*, pp. 123-4). Although Nietzsche’s analysis of “the paralogism” and Deleuze’s subsequent commentary on it are crucial themes in Nietzsche scholarship, I will not go into this at length, for it is not directly pertinent to my discussion.

If Nietzsche dismisses the modern interpretation of human beings' punishing those whom they hold to be wrong-doers, what is Nietzsche's own interpretation of this phenomenon? According to him, throughout the greatest part of human history the suffering of the insolvent debtor was a compensation for the non-payment of the debt to the extent that "making-suffer felt good"<sup>205</sup>. Therefore, the reasons why humans punish are not to be sought in the fact that one holds the 'subject' of 'evil-doing' responsible for their misdeed, but in that human beings take a sadistic pleasure in making- and seeing-suffer.

Nietzsche points out that we modern, domesticated humans may not see that earlier humans' need for cruelty and its manifestation in various social spheres, such as (religious) festivals, royal marriages, noble households with its slaves, etc., were omnipresent<sup>206</sup>. He interprets this need for cruelty as a sign of the pleasure the human animal takes in making- and seeing-suffer, although it is a harsh but central and irremovable element of human life<sup>207</sup>. More importantly, only by relying on this human-all-too-human fact can we interpret this fabrication of the equivalence between pain and injury discussed above.

Bearing these points in mind, we come to the point which reveals the connection between pain and pleasure, as Deleuze tells us in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*<sup>208</sup>:

we will never understand the cruel equation 'injury caused = *pain* undergone' if a third term is not introduced – the *pleasure* which is felt in inflicting pain or in contemplating it. But this third term, the external meaning of pain, has an origin which is completely different from revenge or reaction: it reflects an active standpoint<sup>209</sup>.

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<sup>205</sup>GM II, 6, p. 41.

<sup>206</sup>GM II, 6, p. 42.

<sup>207</sup>GM II, 6, p. 42.

<sup>208</sup>NP, pp. 129-30; p. 135.

<sup>209</sup>NP, p. 135, italics added.

As we saw in the discussion of the physiology of pain (sec. 2.2), pain is a reaction of a life form oriented towards self-preservation, and its only active meaning consists in its externality. Nevertheless, estranged from this active interpretation of pain, we domesticated modern humans display an ever-increasing hyper-sensitivity to pain, according to Nietzsche<sup>210</sup>. By contrast, in ancient Greece we can see an instance of the active evaluation of pain: “If the active [human being] is able not to take [its] own pain seriously it is because [it] always imagines someone to whom it gives pleasure”<sup>211</sup>.

Based on this insight, Nietzsche interprets the meaning of the early form of punitive practices and the equivalence in them, both of which were far from being the rare elements of the lives of earlier humans. But, as Nietzsche contends, insofar as the active practice of taking pleasure in seeing- and making-suffer seems to us a repugnant idea, it seems that we are quite alien to these practices<sup>212</sup>. Is that really the case? Or is it possible that the Nietzschean principle that “seeing-suffer feels good, making-suffer even more so”<sup>213</sup> is still at work, but this time in more imperceptible or spiritualised ways? As to the problematisation of this issue, in the next section, I will examine Nietzsche’s famous hypothesis on the origin of bad conscience, the internalisation of human being, and the concomitant shift in the value of pain<sup>214</sup>.

#### **3.1.4. Bad Conscience: The Internalisation of Human Being**

“Finding [themselves] enclosed once and for all within the sway of society and peace”<sup>215</sup>, Nietzsche maintains, was the “most fundamental of all changes” human

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<sup>210</sup>*GM* II, 7, p. 43.

<sup>211</sup>*NP*, p. 130.

<sup>212</sup>*GM* II, 5, p. 41.

<sup>213</sup>*GM* II, 6, p. 42.

<sup>214</sup>*GM* II, 7, p. 43; *NP*, pp. 127-9, 131-3.

<sup>215</sup>*GM* II, 16, pp. 56-7.

beings ever experienced<sup>216</sup>. Therefore, human beings eventually could no longer discharge their cruelty as they pleased, i.e., exercising it outwardly and actively, and in turn, “new and...subterranean gratifications” had to be sought<sup>217</sup>. Nietzsche likens this drastic transition to the fateful and forceful change when aquatic animals, whose lives were fully regulated by unconscious drives, “were forced either to become land animals or to perish”<sup>218</sup>. As a result of this transition, these formerly aquatic but now land animals lost the leadership of their unconscious and were “reduced” to their consciousness: thinking, inferring, calculating, establishing causal relationships, etc. were to become their new means for living<sup>219</sup>.

What is crucial for us about this analogy is that Nietzsche depicts this drastic change that befell human beings as the emergence of a sickness: it is not that human beings were elevated so that their consciousness was their novel guide, but that they were “reduced” to “their poorest and most erring organ”<sup>220</sup>. In addition, I think that we should read this point by recalling Nietzsche’s critique of the hypertrophy of consciousness as I discussed in the previous chapter (sec. 2.3).

The corollary of this blockage of the active and outward discharge of naïve cruelty was what Nietzsche calls “the internalising of human being”, since “all instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn themselves inwards*”<sup>221</sup>. Therefore, in the wake of this internalisation, one is irreversibly separated from the active evaluation of the (normally reactive) feeling of pain in its externality, the instance of which can be seen in the creditor-debtor relationship (as I discussed in sec. 3.1.3). Hence the not actively dischargeable pain turns inwards and results in the hyper-production of pain<sup>222</sup>. From now on, the Nietzschean principle that one takes

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<sup>216</sup>GM II, 16, p. 56.

<sup>217</sup>GM II, 16, p. 57.

<sup>218</sup>GM II, 16, p. 56.

<sup>219</sup>GM II, 16, p. 56.

<sup>220</sup>GM II, 16, p. 56.

<sup>221</sup>GM II, 16, p. 57.

<sup>222</sup>NP, p. 129.



pleasure in making- and seeing-suffer begins to operate in the interiority of the human animal: it takes pleasure in making or seeing *itself* suffer<sup>223</sup>.

Nietzsche thus gives us a genealogy of the virtues of selflessness, self-denial, and self-sacrifice: the pleasure we take in inflicting pain or cruelty on ourselves<sup>224</sup>. As Boredal states, “the human being, instead of enjoying inflicting pain on others, learns to enjoy inflicting pain on itself. Instead of the original joy in seeing others in pain, modern [human being], perversely, enjoys seeing [itself] in pain”<sup>225</sup>. In brief, the original and innocent pleasure embedded in the active meaning and exercise of pain takes a fateful inward twist and as a result, it turns into the sickly masochistic pleasure of the self-infliction of pain.

Before proceeding to the next point there is one issue that I would like to address briefly, and by so doing I hope to dispel one possible misreading of Nietzsche’s account on the interiorisation of human being. I think that a careful reading of the passage in question (*GM* II, 16) shows us that Nietzsche’s account here is not connected with the *origin* of interiority (or, soul) of the human animal, but with the unexpected and fateful *hypertrophy* of it: “The entire inner world, *originally thin* as if inserted between two skins, has spread and unfolded, has taken on depth, breadth, height to the extent that [human being’s] outward discharging has been *obstructed*”<sup>226</sup>. In my view, both here and in his critique of the predomination of consciousness in human life (see sec. 2.3), Nietzsche’s target is not the existence of soul or consciousness *per se*, but their excessive expansion in their roles in human beings’ lives.

To my mind, this differentiation can also better show us that in his works Nietzsche’s main concern was the question of health according to an immanent perspective on life, namely the question “is it life-denying or life-affirming?”. Accordingly, this question pertains, not to the metaphysical search for origins (i.e.,

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<sup>223</sup>*GM* II, 18, p. 59.

<sup>224</sup>*GM* II, 18, p. 59.

<sup>225</sup>*SA*, p. 394.

<sup>226</sup>*GM* II, 16, p. 57, italics added.

the *origin* of bad conscience), trapped in the illusions of historical realism, but to charting the growth or decay of any phenomenon in life (i.e., the *hypertrophy* of bad conscience or consciousness).

After pointing to this issue, I would like to go back to the main trajectory of my discussion vis-à-vis Nietzsche's famous hypothesis on the fateful twist that bad conscience took. I think that, when considering this famous hypothesis, we should never lose sight of Nietzsche's ontology of will to power (as discussed in the previous chapter, especially in sec. 2.1, and in the Introduction). As we saw, the incessant and insatiable will to become more is a fundamental element of life for Nietzsche in connection with his ontology of will to power. The will to expand, or the will to will, is the bedrock of a Nietzschean ontology.

Accordingly, it cannot be the case in the instance in question that instincts cease to discharge their active energy even if their outlet of venting is obstructed. Hence, a blockage in a more primordial outlet results in the production of another means of discharge. In sum, according to Nietzsche's conception of will to power, not lack or deprivation, but excess and (hyper-)production are more fundamental. In this instance, the restrictions of society and peace do not lead to the demise of the demands made by unconscious drives, but to the hyper-production of them in more spiritual and less perceptible ways. For instance, as we briefly saw before, the festive joy of making and seeing others suffer turns into the Christian morbid pleasure of self-laceration.

After this drastic twist, Deleuze states, we are confronted with "a curious, unfathomable phenomenon: a multiplication, a self-impregnation, a hyper-production of pain"<sup>227</sup>. Again, I would like to underline the necessity of heeding Nietzsche's conception of will to power: as we saw in the previous section (see sec. 2.1), life is will to power, hence any phenomenon can make sense only in relation to this ontology. Elsewhere Nietzsche states that "The will to power *interprets*"<sup>228</sup>; but, here I should caution that what Nietzsche means by interpretation should not be confused

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<sup>227</sup>NP, p. 129.

<sup>228</sup>WP, 643.

with the common usage of this word: “In fact, interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something”<sup>229</sup>. To grasp this notion better, I would like to recall the discussion of the physiology of pleasure and displeasure (see sec. 2.1): Nietzsche’s conception of interpretation is part and parcel of his insight that life is nothing but the process of overcoming resistances.

Secondly, in connection with the issue of the human being with a bad conscience who is rife with internalised pain, we can heed Nietzsche’s claim that “what actually arouses indignation against suffering is not suffering in itself, but rather the *senselessness* of suffering”<sup>230</sup>. Based on these two assertions, I would like to claim that if (human) life is will to power in the sense of ceaseless interpretations that seek to overcome resistances standing in the way of the will to power, there is no doubt that the emergence of the phenomenon of bad conscience and the concomitant internalisation and the hyper-production of pain had to be interpreted by the will to power by ascribing to them novel senses. It is in the third treatise of *On the Genealogy of Morality* that Nietzsche elaborates this issue, namely the question of how this novel phenomenon was interpreted by the will to power, and what the articulator of this particular interpretation was. Without problematising these questions one cannot understand the real nature of this eerie phenomenon, which is nevertheless pregnant with future, called bad conscience, whose burgeoning will be treated in the next section.

### **3.2. The Third Treatise: The Inward Meaning of Pain as the Feeling of Guilt**

The third treatise of *On the Genealogy of Morality* is, in the main, devoted to the interpretation of the ascetic ideal. The meaning of the ascetic ideal for artists, philosophers and scholars, the multitude, and finally for priests and saints is evaluated throughout this treatise. Moreover, within the framework of his monistic but polyvalent ontology of will to power, Nietzsche gives an account of how such a

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<sup>229</sup>WP, 643.

<sup>230</sup>GM II, 7, p. 44, italics added.

life-denying ideal could gain ascendancy. Considering the framework of my thesis, I would like to take into account only the pertinent issues of this dense treatise. Therefore, compared to my discussion of the second treatise, the treatment of the third essay will be shorter and less detailed.

According to Deleuze, what we have seen as the internalisation of human being (as we saw before in sec. 3.1.4) constitutes only the first aspect of bad conscience, as a result of which a sudden multiplication of pain is experienced<sup>231</sup>. However, Nietzsche's account by no means stops at this juncture. As will be seen in the following, it is only through its second stage that both bad conscience and the value of pain become what they fundamentally are. We saw that, in the first stage of bad conscience, the straight-jacketed human being cannot enjoy the healthy outward discharge of their instincts, and as a result of blockage, the hypertrophy of human interiority, or 'soul', takes place<sup>232</sup>. Hence, as we saw above (in sec. 3.1.4), the concomitant hyper-production of pain has to be given a meaning, since human beings could endure this torturous feeling only when a meaning is ascribed to it<sup>233</sup>. Also, this assertion of Nietzsche is entirely compatible with his ontology, since the omnipresence of will to power suggests also the omnipresence of interpretations which overcome resistances in a healthy way. This means, as for the feeling of pain, that it is inevitable that pain had to be interpreted in a novel fashion as a result of the interiorisation of the human animal.

Up until now, we saw the first aspect of bad conscience. According to Deleuze, the second stage of bad conscience is marked by the invention of a new meaning for the excruciating pains of the interiorised human animal:

[P]ain in its turn is *interiorised*, sensualised, spiritualised. What do these expressions mean? A *new sense is invented for pain, an internal sense, an inward sense*: pain is made the consequence of a sin, a fault. You have produced your pain because you have

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<sup>231</sup>NP, p. 129.

<sup>232</sup>GM II, 16, p. 57.

<sup>233</sup>GM II, 7, p. 44.

sinned, you will save yourself by manufacturing your pain. Pain conceived as the consequence of an inward fault and the interior mechanism of salvation [of Christianity], pain being interiorised as fast as it is produced, “pain transformed into feelings of guilt, fear and punishment”<sup>234</sup>.

Deleuze calls this second stage of bad conscience “bad conscience as [the] feeling of guilt”<sup>235</sup>. Once trapped by this internal meaning of pain, says Deleuze, the possibility of outward and active infliction of pain becomes impossible<sup>236</sup>. From now on, the *sine qua non* of human life, namely the feeling of pain, is deemed to be the result of a transgression before God. According to Nietzsche, this shift in the value of pain is materialised through the type of the Christian priest, who is the main articulator of it<sup>237</sup>.

In brief, in the first stage of the development of bad conscience, Nietzsche recounts how the naïve, outward manifestation of human cruelty is internalised. As a result, the human animal experiences an unexpected multiplication of pain in its now deepened interiority, with the result that the former, innocent pleasure in making- and seeing-suffer is now enjoyed masochistically in the interiority of the human animal. I treated this part of the discussion in the previous section (in sec. 3.1.4). In a similar vein, in the second stage of bad conscience, Nietzsche maintains that pain in turn is internalised in the sense that it is both interpreted as (the result of) sin and made the means of salvation by the Christian priest, as we have seen above. In the following, I would like to discuss briefly this second element, i.e., the question of how the pain and suffering of people are taken up by the Christian priest, who declares himself/herself to be the long-awaited healer of pain.

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<sup>234</sup>NP, p. 129.

<sup>235</sup>NP, p. 129.

<sup>236</sup>NP, p. 129.

<sup>237</sup>NP, p. 131. The detailed analysis of the Christian priest is an enterprise of its own, and due to the limitations of the subject-matter of my thesis I am only able to mention the significance of the Christian priest in Nietzsche’s narrative.

We have seen that the priest gives reasons for people's unbearable pains in order to be able to dull them, and now we see that, for Nietzsche, the priest also makes up some methods to be able to heal this feeling<sup>238</sup>. However, the doctor-priest is not a genuine healer, for their curative methods in fact exacerbate the situation<sup>239</sup>. No matter what the consequences of their healing techniques are, "to become lord over *sufferers* at all times" is the true vocation of the priest for Nietzsche<sup>240</sup>: "[t]he alleviation of suffering, 'comforting' of every kind – this turns out to be his very genius: how inventively he has understood his task as comforter, how unhesitatingly and boldly he has chosen the means for it! One might call Christianity in particular a great treasury of the most ingenious means for comforting"<sup>241</sup>.

Among these curative methods of pain, Nietzsche differentiates between 'innocent' and 'guilty' ones in the sense that the effect of the latter is considered by him more perilous for human flourishing<sup>242</sup>. The 'innocent' methods are i-) the reduction of the feeling of life to its lowest possible point ("[i]f possible no willing at all, not another wish; avoiding whatever stirs up affect, whatever stirs up 'blood'")<sup>243</sup>; ii-) the life of "mechanical activity", which includes "absolute regularity, punctual unreflected obedience"<sup>244</sup>; iii-) the prescription of "a small joy" (e.g., the Christian virtue of altruism in the name of so-called selflessness)<sup>245</sup>; and finally iv-) "herd-formation" ("wherever there are herds it is the instinct of weakness

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<sup>238</sup>SA, p. 416.

<sup>239</sup>GM III, 15, p. 90.

<sup>240</sup>GM III, 15, p. 90.

<sup>241</sup>GM III, 17, p. 93.

<sup>242</sup>GM III, 19, p. 99. The theme of human flourishing constitutes one of the main touchstones in Nietzsche's philosophy. As he declares, whether our concepts of good and evil have hitherto inhibited or furthered human flourishing is *the* issue for *On the Genealogy of Morality* (GM P, 3, p.3).

<sup>243</sup>GM III, 17, p. 95; SA, p. 419.

<sup>244</sup>GM III, 18, p. 97; SA, p. 420. As Bornedal states, in such life regulated by a clockword routine "there is no time for one's pain to surface" (SA, p. 420).

<sup>245</sup>GM III, 18, pp. 97-8; SA, pp. 420-1.

that willed the herds and the shrewdness of priests that organised them”)<sup>246</sup>. As for the ‘guilty’ techniques, Nietzsche states that they all aim at the anaesthetisation of pain through stirring up excessive emotions in humans<sup>247</sup>. According to Nietzsche, all suddenly dischargeable affects (e.g., anger, fear, lust, revenge, hope, cruelty, etc.) are capable of directing the inculpatory gaze of the weak to themselves (i.e., the soul-searching gaze of bad conscience)<sup>248</sup>.

I think that, based on these descriptions, it is manifest why Nietzsche calls the latter “guilty”. Even though the former is in no way held to be innocuous or inconsequential for human flourishing, Nietzsche calls them “innocent”: for it is only in the latter that Nietzsche detects the moment of inculcating an activity as evil – which is achieved as a result of the moralisation of an illegitimately hypostatised force, i.e., the paralogism of the physiologically weak (as I discussed in sec. 3.1.3). Hence, I would like to underline that Nietzsche takes great pains in *On the Genealogy of Morality* to show that the activity of condemning life as evil is his main target, for this is the sickly symptom of a degenerating life. Whether this condemnation takes place between two individuals or solely in the interiority of an individual is another issue. According to Nietzsche, behind both of these accusations there exists the type of the priest as the articulator of it.

Additionally, it should not be overlooked that both the ‘innocent’ and ‘guilty’ sorts of curative methods of pain discussed above can be considered to be at work in our modern, capitalist world. The imposition of mechanical activity, the demand to minimise creative forces in people with a view to maximising the stability and productivity of capitalist apparatus in schools, corporations, universities, etc., attest to the relevance of Nietzsche’s text for our contemporary world. In my view, the link between the techniques of the anaesthetisation of pain by various sickly methods and the life-denying, unproductive lives imposed on us by the capitalist society

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<sup>246</sup>GM III, 18, p. 98; SA, pp. 421-2.

<sup>247</sup>GM III, 19, p. 99.

<sup>248</sup>GM III, 20, pp. 101-2; SA, p. 424.

constitutes a theme of its own, which cannot be dealt with here due to the limitations of my topic.

Considering my discussion in the previous chapter (in sec. 2.4.) the anaesthetisation of pain through various techniques should be considered nihilistic, no matter what its consequences are: unlike the Homeric era, in which people were actively living without forgetting the necessity of *agon*, the modern, domesticated human animal cannot actively evaluate the feeling of displeasure without reactively exaggerating the negative meaning of pain in their lives. Accordingly, whether the healing techniques of the priest are successful or not, they are all indicative of the ascendancy of reactive forces in human life. “To attempt to make life ‘tolerable’ is a perversion and negation of life, since according to Nietzsche’s uncompromising life-affirmation, life is [gruesome] and should be affirmed as such”<sup>249</sup>.

We can see that Nietzsche’s interpretation of the cultural significance of pain contains such far-reaching points of discussion as I have discussed above. In the remaining part of this chapter I will try to lay out the implications of the cultural values of pleasure and pain in connection with the emphasis Nietzsche lays on the value of the body and his ontology of will to power.

### **3.3. The Role of the Body and the Feelings of Pleasure and Pain in Nietzsche’s Narrative vis-à-vis the Forgotten (Homeric) Value of Displeasure**

#### **3.3.1. “I am Body Entirely”**

In the concluding sections of this chapter on Nietzsche’s thinking on the cultural values of (dis)pleasure and pain, I would firstly like to broach the subject of body’s place in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Grosz states that in the narrative we discussed above, “Nietzsche outlines the rudiments of an account of body-inscription as the cultural condition for establishing social order and obedience”<sup>250</sup>. In other words, behind the phenomenon of the fabrication of subjectivity and a stable social

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<sup>249</sup>SA, p. 418.

<sup>250</sup>SK, p. 62.



sphere, the body plays a pivotal role in Nietzsche's account in *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

If we recall the trajectory of the previous sections in this chapter, we saw, firstly, the forceful cultivation of a future-oriented and socially imposed faculty of memory (of words) through the painful means of mnemo-techniques. This cultivation was made possible, one could infer, by nothing but the vulnerable presence of the body. "Body I am entirely", Diprose states by alluding to Nietzsche's phrase, "in so far as my [bad or guilty] conscience, sense of responsibility and uniformity are created by an ordering of sensations, and projection of the body into the future through a social disciplinary system"<sup>251</sup>. The question "how to evaluate the epiphenomenon of pain?" (as we saw in sec. 2.3) is not accessible to those malleable and submissive bodies inasmuch as their interpretation of pain is already socially captured: obey the communal rules and remember your duties to be fulfilled in the future, or the infliction of more pain on your (undesirably forgetful) body is inevitable for you – this is the recurrent either/or structure of the economy of memory-cultivation. One is obliged to remember, otherwise one will be made to remember through the agonies of one's body, namely the feeling of pain.

Secondly, we saw the specific site of these mnemo-techniques: the creditor-debtor relationship. The construction of the equation "injury caused = pain undergone" paved the way for the most fundamental social relation between people. In this sphere as well, the value of the body is of foremost importance: the unpaid "debts can be repaid through the body"; the fabrication of the equivalence is possible on the basis of evaluations carried out on the body<sup>252</sup>. In Nietzsche's account, the self gaining a discrete identity becomes possible in this primordial relation between the creditor and (the body of) the debtor<sup>253</sup>.

The last locale we looked at in the trajectory of this chapter was Nietzsche's hypothesis of the 'descent' of bad conscience, to wit, the internalisation of human

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<sup>251</sup> NPD, p. 5.

<sup>252</sup> NPD, pp. 9-10.

<sup>253</sup> NPD, p. 10.

being, human being's forceful, unexpected and fateful hypertrophy of interiority (which was later called 'soul'). Nietzsche accounts for this internalisation with recourse to the originally healthy forces he associates with the body. In the quotation below, Grosz points out how Nietzsche's immanent mode of elaboration of the descent of the hypertrophy of bad conscience reveals the irreducible productivity and the incessant overflow of active forces of the body:

The subject's psychical interior or 'soul' can be seen as nothing but the self-inversion of the body's forces, the displacement of the will to power's continual self-transformation back on to the body itself. ... [C]onsciousness, soul or subjectivity are nothing but the play of the body's forces that, with the help of metaphysics, have been congealed into a unity and endowed as an origin. The body's forces, instincts, are ... entirely plastic, fluid, capable of taking on any direction and attempting any kind of becoming. ... [T]he psychical interior is in fact a 'category', project or product of the body<sup>254</sup>.

Based on these three main points one could conclude that, in Nietzsche's account of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, the body is not a specific sort of expression of a more primary psychical interiority, nor is it "a mode of communication or mediation of what is essentially private and incommunicable" (contrary to Husserl's quasi-solipsistic phenomenology, in which the notion of intersubjectivity is worked out only after the interiority of the human has been established)<sup>255</sup>. But a Nietzschean understanding of the value of the body suggests that it is

a series of surfaces or energies and forces, a mode of linkage, a discontinuous series of processes, organs, flows and matter. The body does not hide or reveal an otherwise unrepresented latency or depth, but is a set of operational linkages and connections with other things, other bodies. It is a series of powers and capacities, micro-wills, forces, impulses, trajectories<sup>256</sup>.

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<sup>254</sup> SK, p. 56.

<sup>255</sup> SK, p. 52.

<sup>256</sup> SK, p. 52.

Before proceeding to the next section, I would like to conclude this section by quoting a remarkable passage from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* on the significance of the phenomenon of the body for Nietzsche:

*I am body entirely, and nothing beside: and soul is only a word for something in the body.*

The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herds[person].

Your little intelligence, my brother, which you call ‘spirit’, is also an intelligence of your body, a little instrument and toy of your great intelligence.

You say ‘I’ and you are proud of this word. But greater than this – although you will not believe in it – is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say ‘I’ but performs ‘I’<sup>257</sup>.

### **3.3.2. From the Healthy Pleasure-Displeasure to the Sickly Pleasure-Pain**

After focusing on Nietzsche’s radical reinstitution of the role of the body, in this section, I would like to make some claims about Nietzsche’s revaluation of the concepts of (dis)pleasure and pain. My discussion of Nietzsche’s ontology (sec. 2.1) and that of his reading of the Homeric Age (sec. 2.4) that we saw in the previous chapter will also be pertinent to the discussion below.

We saw in the previous section (sec. 3.3.1) how the body plays a prominent role both in the cultivation of memory and in the creditor-debtor relationship, as well as in the emergence of the overgrowth of bad conscience and in its getting an inward meaning in the name of guilt or sinfulness. Here I would like to specify that in all these main stages in Nietzsche’s narrative, it is always the reactive interpretation of the feeling of pain that comes to the fore more and more. What I mean by this is that without the fateful function of this interpretation of pain in the social realm, promise-keeping, the related emergence of the creditor-debtor relationship, and the development of this relationship from its legal to its religious and finally to its moral stages would not have been possible. In the same way, the internalisation of human

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<sup>257</sup> Quoted from SK, p. 60, italics added.

being and the interpretation of this internalisation as sin at the hands of the Christian priest were materialised by dint of the steadily increasing reactive value of pain in human beings' social life. Thus, neither only a malleable, obedient, future-oriented, calculating and calculable promise-keeping human animal, nor the constitution of a future-oriented, calculative and homogenising social sphere is viable without the accentuating role of pain in a reactive sense: "From its communal beginnings to its formalisation in the civil realm, Nietzsche's...narrative envisages *society* as being constituted through economies of pain. At every step in this narrative we see a *subjectivity* emerging that is shaped by violent economic procedures [of pain]"<sup>258</sup>.

On this score, I would like further to state that inasmuch as the increasingly effective role of the reactive assessment of pain lays the foundations for the constitution of the subject and society, society (in Nietzsche's terms, "the social straightjacket"<sup>259</sup> or "the sway of society and peace"<sup>260</sup>) in its turn is also constitutive of the subject. Nevertheless, the sway of society over the lives of subjects should not be construed as the imposition of some external laws on people, but rather as the fact that "social regulation *penetrates deeply into* the subject, so much so that such regulation is in part constitutive of subjectivity"<sup>261</sup>. As can be seen here, Nietzsche's conception of the subject regards it as being porous in that the subject is a relatively enduring phenomenon resulting from the formative interaction of social forces. In such a conception there is no place for the traditional understanding of hypostatized and self-sufficient subjectivity.

What then are the implications of this increasing ascendancy of the reactive value of pain in human life? Is it not also noteworthy that the concept of displeasure (as I discussed in the previous chapter in secs. 2.1, 2.4) seems to have almost no place at all in *On the Genealogy of Morality*? To be able to answer such questions recalling

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<sup>258</sup> Sedgwick, Peter, "Violence, Economy and Temporality. Plotting the Political Terrain of *On the Genealogy of Morality*", *Nietzsche Studien*, vol.34, 2005, 163-185, p. 172, italics added. Hereafter VET.

<sup>259</sup> *GM* II, 2, p. 36.

<sup>260</sup> *GM* II, 16, p. 56.

<sup>261</sup> VET, p. 172.

the physiological interpretation of (dis)pleasure and pain by Nietzsche is in order. Even though I am aware that giving a quasi-unified account of Nietzsche for different issues might be a misleading attempt and contrary to Nietzsche's thinking as a whole, I find it necessary for my thesis to make some such links between Nietzsche's conception of (dis)pleasure and pain he elaborates separately in *The Will to Power*, in "Homer's Contest" and in *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

Here I would like to compare Nietzsche's reading of the Homeric Age (sec. 2.4) and his genealogical account of the interiorised human animal (secs. 3.1, 3.2), who was firstly moulded by the morality of customs and later by the moral imperatives of bad conscience. In the former case, as we saw, the lives of the people of the *polis* were regulated by the incessant need for the *agon*, without which overcoming resistances would not have been practised in life. The struggle for overcoming resistances, which registers in consciousness as the feeling of *displeasure*, results in the feeling of *pleasure* if the attempted overcoming is temporarily<sup>262</sup> achieved. In this healthy relationship, I would like to claim, there is a life-affirming contest between the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, since this "game of resistance [i.e., displeasure] and victory [i.e., pleasure]"<sup>263</sup> relegates the reactive interpretation of the feeling of *pain* to a subsidiary level, by not positing its avoidance as the criterion of life. The interpretation of the feeling of pain, as we saw, is reactive for it is always the result of a perspective which aims at the preservation of life, rather than at its expenditure. In such a healthy contest between pleasure and displeasure, the evaluation of pain does not have the preponderance it would later have in the emergence of the promise-keeping, guilt-ridden subject.

By contrast, I would like to claim that in *On the Genealogy of Morality* there is an entirely different economy operating between the feelings of (dis)pleasure and pain. As I discussed at the beginning of this section, what is the more enduring element in Nietzsche's narrative, from the discussion of mnemo-techniques to the internalisation

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<sup>262</sup> The qualification that this achievement is only temporary is crucial in Nietzsche's philosophy in that the unceasing and purposeless demand to overcome resistances, not the momentary overcoming, is the bedrock of his ontology.

<sup>263</sup> *WP*, §699.

of human being, is the increasing role of the reactive interpretation of pain in human life. That pain is increasingly deemed to be something to be eschewed in human life means that reactive forces rather than active forces, self-preservation rather than self-expenditure, is emphasised. The other facet of this development is that Nietzsche detects the presence of an innocent *pleasure* in visiting punishment on the body of the still forgetful human animals, and a masochistic *pleasure* in the self-lacerating, guilt-ridden internalised human animal. In brief, I would like to claim that, in this new economy, there is a relation between the feelings of *pleasure* and *pain*, in which the latter causes the former, and out of the need for the former the latter is sought out more and more.

I think that the transition from the healthy contest between pleasure and displeasure to the self-lacerating relation between pleasure and pain is marked by the diminishing role of displeasure as a spur to action and the increasing role of pain as something to be avoided in human life. To my mind, this shift refers to the ever-increasing value of self-preservation and the subsequent forgetting of the healthy ingredient of displeasure as a spur to action. Hence, I would like to claim that, in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche in a sense works out the genealogy of “the last human being”, that is to say, the reactive human being who is replete with excruciating pains, who takes pleasure not in overcoming resistances (i.e., displeasures) but in the self-infliction of pain, and who has lost sight of the creative ‘dangerous’ pleasures of the Homeric era and is thus caught in the trap of petty pleasures. Nietzsche poetically characterises the last human being in the following passage from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves.

Alas, the time is coming when [human being] will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable [human being] is coming, [s/]he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the *last [human]*.

'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?' thus asks the last man, and he blinks.

The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small.  
His race is as ineradicable as the flea-beetle; the last [human] lives longest.

...

No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.

One has one's little pleasure for the day and one's little pleasure for the night: but one has a regard for health.

'We have invented happiness,' say the last [humans], and they blink<sup>264</sup>.

As is known from the closing sections of the second treatise of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche envisages a post-moralistic future not in the sense of the defamation of life but in that of embracing it in its entirety<sup>265</sup>. I believe that in such a future a life-affirming interpretation of pain would prevail and hence self-preservation would not be given so much importance, but it would be esteemed as a great teacher of life. In turn, the feeling of displeasure, i.e., the consciousness of overcoming resistances, would be celebrated as the *sine qua non* of human life, of the incessant expenditure of active forces. Similarly, the feeling of pleasure would not hedonistically be valued as *the* criterion of life, nor would it be sought to be extirpated or totally neglected in an ascetic manner, but it would be celebrated as the consciousness of an active, healthy and life-affirming life in successfully overcoming resistances. Pleasure as having a secondary importance would gain its active evaluation in its healthy relation with displeasure, and thus precluding the growth of the reactive evaluation of a life rife with the reactive interpretation of pain would be possible.

After my discussion of Nietzsche's interpretation of the concepts of (dis)pleasure and pain as physiological values in the second chapter and as social values in the third chapter, I will be discussing Foucault's interpretation of the social value of pain in the fourth chapter and that of pleasure in the fifth chapter. Therefore, the fourth and fifth chapters of the thesis (as we will see below) could be read as a further

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<sup>264</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Tr. Walter Kaufmann. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985, "Preface" 5.

<sup>265</sup> *GM* II, 24-25, pp. 65-66.

elaboration of Nietzsche's account of the social values of pain and pleasure by a self-avowed Nietzschean philosopher.



## CHAPTER 4

### FOUCAULT'S INTERPRETATION OF PAIN ON THE CULTURAL LEVEL

*Discipline and Punish*<sup>266</sup> gives us Foucault's interpretation of the shift in the value assigned to pain, the body, public cruelty, etc. in the context of the redistribution of the economy of punishment and the new emerging political power to punish that we can see in the last two to three centuries in the West. As is well known, almost Foucault's entire corpus and his declarations in his various interviews show us that he was greatly influenced by Nietzsche. *Discipline and Punish* too, published in 1975, was one of his works that bears this Nietzschean influence throughout: "If I wanted to be pretentious' Foucault remarked in an interview shortly after the publication of [*Discipline and Punish*], 'I would use 'the genealogy of morals' as the title of what I am doing'"<sup>267</sup>. Notwithstanding Foucault's declarations in interviews such as the one above, Foucault makes no mention of Nietzsche in *Discipline and Punish*, let alone critically discusses the Nietzschean threads in his seminal book. For instance, in an important footnote in which Foucault acknowledges his intellectual debt to the work of Deleuze, Guattari and some others in the formation of his book, even the title *On the Genealogy of Morality* is not mentioned<sup>268</sup>.

However, I do not think that this should be taken as a flaw on the part of Foucault: even though he does not nominally refer to the Nietzschean art of interpretation, he instead exercises it, puts it to use throughout his work, as will be discussed in the following. To be able to bring this characteristic of the work to the fore, in the following I will try to lay a special emphasis on the connections between Nietzsche's account in *On the Genealogy of Morality* (chs. 2, 3) and that of Foucault in the work in question.

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<sup>266</sup> Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Tr. Alan Sheridan. New York: Random House, 1995. Hereafter *DP*.

<sup>267</sup> Miller, James, "Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty", *Political Theory*, vol. 18, 1990, 470-91. Hereafter *CA*.

<sup>268</sup> Cf. *DP*, p. 309 for the footnote in question.

#### 4.1. Two Spectacles and Their Interpretations

The opening pages of *Discipline and Punish* recount the public execution of Damiens the regicide in Paris in 1757<sup>269</sup>. Provided with no clue what to make of this event, we just read its minute details, which Foucault describes by heavily quoting from the relevant chronicles and newspaper reports. We read that the regicide's

flesh [was] torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds.

...Though he was always a great swearer, no blasphemy escaped his lips, but the excessive pain made him utter horrible cries, and he often repeated: 'My God, have pity on me! Jesus, help me!'

...The horses tugged hard, each pulling straight on a limb, each horse held by an executioner. After a quarter of an hour, the same ceremony was repeated and finally, after several attempts, the

direction of the horses had to be changed... This was repeated several times without success. He raised his head and looked at himself. Two more horses had to be added to those harnessed to the thighs, which made six horses in all. Without success.

...After two or three attempts, the executioner Samson and he who had used the pincers each drew out a knife from his pocket and cut the body at the thighs instead of severing the legs at the joints; the four horses gave a tug and carried off the two thighs after them...then the same was done to the arms, the shoulders, the arm-pits and the four limbs; the flesh had to be cut almost to the bone, the horses pulling hard carried off the right arm first and the other afterwards.

...The four limbs were untied from the ropes and thrown on the stake set up in the enclosure in line with the scaffold, then the trunk and the rest were covered with logs and faggots, and fire was put to the straw mixed with this wood.

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<sup>269</sup>DP, pp. 3-6.

In accordance with the decree, the whole was reduced to ashes. The last piece to be found in the embers was still burning at half-past ten in the evening. The pieces of flesh and the trunk had taken about four hours to burn”<sup>270</sup>.

Just as abrupt as the opening pages of the book is the “rules ‘for the House of young prisoners in Paris”<sup>271</sup>: a meticulous and rigorous list couched by Foucault in dry and serious language, which aims to regulate the prisoners’ lives in a clockwork routine: the times of waking up and going to bed, working, praying, meals, school and instruction, dressing and undressing, making beds, washing hands and faces, etc. are painstakingly determined and no disruption is allowed thanks to the presence of the watchful supervisors<sup>272</sup>.

Having described the public execution and the timetable, which are unexpectedly and tellingly only eighty years apart, Foucault bases his discussion of the first half of *Discipline and Punish* on the redistribution of the economy of punishment. First of all, Foucault clearly specifies that this redistribution took place in (Western) Europe and in the United States at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century<sup>273</sup>. As I pointed out before (in sec. 3.1.3), the Nietzschean interpretation is not universal but local in that it is always the specification of the emergence of novel phenomena in terms of their loci that is the issue. Similarly, Foucault adopts this approach and thereby in *Discipline and Punish* we are always provided with the exact setting of the emergence of this new technique of punishing. Hence, before going into the discussion of the divergences and convergences between these two old and new punishment techniques, I would like to caution that Foucault in no way bases his discussion on sweeping generalisations of the two instances we have seen above. In order to dispel such a misunderstanding and to

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<sup>270</sup> *DP*, pp. 3-5. Just like Foucault I quote at length rather than to paraphrase the details of the execution in order not to spoil the tone conveyed by those reports.

<sup>271</sup> *DP*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>272</sup> *DP*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>273</sup> *DP*, pp. 7,8.

substantiate his claims, he invariably avails himself of the relevant reports, chronicles, and newspaper reports of that time.

Despite this being the case, in the following I will focus my discussion mainly on the comparison between the old and new models of punishing without taking into account the documents Foucault uses throughout his work. I will do so because this chapter is mainly concerned with the interpretation of the cultural value of pain and with drawing a parallel between Nietzsche's and Foucault's accounts, which we cannot openly find in *Discipline and Punish*.

Firstly, Foucault lays out the change in punishing on what we can call the surface and detects two main axes in it: "The first was the disappearance of punishment as a *spectacle*"<sup>274</sup>. As we saw in the case of the public execution of Damians in 1757, the old model of punishing included a ceremony, (in Nietzsche's terms) a festive joy, in which the punishment was meted out in a public place so that it could be witnessed not only by the sovereign and his agents who punished the malefactor, but also by the populace. However, Foucault states that starting from the end of the eighteenth century, punishment as a spectacle gradually withered away and became concealed instead<sup>275</sup>. Punishment as a spectacle proved to be an unstable mechanism, for it was thought that it exceeded the crime it was supposed to punish, acquainted the spectators with a brutality from which people were supposed to be diverted and above all, it could reverse the roles and thus make the executioner and judges look like murderers and the malefactor an admirable figure<sup>276</sup>. Underlying this shift from punishing publicly to punishing behind closed doors, Foucault says, is a growing shame on the part of those who mete out punishment: for however unpleasant it is to be punished, "there is no glory in punishing"<sup>277</sup>.

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<sup>274</sup>*DP*, p. 8, italics added.

<sup>275</sup>*DP*, p. 9.

<sup>276</sup>*DP*, p. 9. I think that this assertion of Foucault on the probable reversal of the roles bears a striking resemblance with Nietzsche's observation that "punishment makes hard and cold...for [the criminal] sees the very same kind of actions committed in the service of justice and then approved, committed with a good conscience" (*GM II*, 14, p. 54).

<sup>277</sup>*DP*, p. 10. Again, Foucault's point on the growing shame even on the part of punishing apparatus is very Nietzschean in that in *On the Genealogy of Morality* Nietzsche scrutinises the incessant

The second axis of change on the surface that Foucault discerns when a novel economy of punishing gradually arises is “a slackening of the hold on the *body*”<sup>278</sup> and the subsequent “elimination of *pain*”<sup>279</sup> from the scene. As we saw in the case of Damien’s public execution, in the old economy of punishing the physical infliction of pain on the body of the criminal in public stands out in sharp relief. However, a moment comes when this physical pain and its infliction on the body no longer constitutes the main object of punishment<sup>280</sup>. Now, the body functions not as the main target but just as a subsidiary instrument, an intermediary of punishment, through which punishment can be meted out “at a distance”<sup>281</sup>. In brief, the new principle in punishing vis-à-vis the body becomes in a sense ‘do not touch the body, if this is not possible, touch it as little as possible but this time for ‘higher’ aims than the sole aim of producing unbearable sensations of pain in the body as used to be the case’<sup>282</sup>.

To sum up these two fundamental changes in the emergence of new techniques of punishment, Foucault declares that

[a]t the beginning of the nineteenth century, then, the great *spectacle* of physical punishment disappeared; the tortured *body* was avoided; the theatrical representation of *pain* was excluded from punishment. The age of sobriety in punishment had begun. By 1830-48, public executions, preceded by torture, had almost entirely disappeared<sup>283</sup>.

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hypertrophy of bad conscience and the disappearance of aristocratic values, which do not contain this element of guilt.

<sup>278</sup> *DP*, p. 10, italics added.

<sup>279</sup> *DP*, p. 11, italics added.

<sup>280</sup> *DP*, p. 11.

<sup>281</sup> *DP*, p. 11.

<sup>282</sup> *DP*, p. 11. In the following I will indicate what these ‘higher’ aims were.

<sup>283</sup> *DP*, p. 14, italics added.

As can be seen above, the spectacle, the body and its feeling of pain can be said to be the three recurrent elements Foucault deals with in his discussion. In the following, I will be laying more emphasis on the elements of body and pain, since they are in direct connection with my thesis. Moreover, before proceeding to the next point of the discussion I would like to make some remarks as to the sense of pain Foucault deals with in *Discipline and Punish* as a whole.

Although in the discussion we saw above and as we will see in the following Foucault speaks of ‘pain as such’ and gives the impression that there is only one universal meaning of pain, I would like to caution that this is by no means the case, considering *Discipline and Punish*. In the introductory remarks I emphasised that Foucault relies on a number of Nietzschean insights and exercises them in his work, even though he does not mention or discuss them explicitly.

Accordingly, the issue of the meaning of pain constitutes one of the instances of this situation. As we saw in Nietzsche’s account of the physiological and cultural interpretation of the feeling of pain (in chs. 2, 3), in itself there is no such thing as pain, since it is entirely the result of an interpretation of the organism, whose unity is at stake in the event which causes this feeling. The feeling of pain, for Nietzsche, is entirely connected with self-preservation and thus it is always a reaction. We also saw how Nietzsche traces the hypertrophy of this reactive interpretation of pain in human life in the torturous programme of breeding a promise-keeping, responsible human animal, and in the resultant internalisation of cruelty. In addition to this, I tried to show how from a different perspective on life, i.e., the active interpretation of life in the Homeric era, the reactive interpretation of pain could be given a novel sense so that it could be relegated to a secondary importance, very different from how we domesticated, internalised human animals interpret it. I think that without taking into account these points, a more productive interpretation of *Discipline and Punish* would not be possible, since it is this reactive interpretation of pain which abounds in human life that Foucault really means when he speaks of pain. I think that this point will be of help to us also in the succeeding points of the discussion.

After the discussion of the shift in the manner of punishing on the surface, we now come to the issue of the shift in question on a more fundamental level. Foucault

observes that it used to be believed that, the (apparent) penal leniency in the last two centuries brought about some changes in terms of degree: “less cruelty, less pain, more kindness, more respect, more ‘humanity’”<sup>284</sup>. However, Foucault asserts that behind this change in degree there is a more profound one, which refers to “a change of objective”<sup>285</sup>: it is the object of punishment that has been changed, and this shift more importantly points to a qualitative change, not only to a quantitative one.

One might ask, if the very object of the punitive system has changed, what then is its new object of application? To answer this question Foucault firstly quotes from the eighteenth-century French philosopher Mably: “Punishment...should strike the soul rather than the body”<sup>286</sup>. As we will see in the following, this assertion of Mably will be of great help to him, even though he by no means adopts Mably’s principle altogether and uncritically. In his quest for more fundamental insights, Foucault skips stating the reason why such an assertion of Mably is untenable from a post-Nietzschean framework; however, I find it necessary to explain it briefly. When it is held that the object of punitive operations shifts from the body to the soul or the mind, then we could say that this is true insofar as one is thinking in a Cartesian framework: having established an exclusive disjunction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, one is inextricably trapped by a principle of thinking organised by the excluded middle. According to this manner of thinking, if punishment is no longer directed at the body, it should of necessity be directed at the soul. I am of the view that Nietzsche’s contention that “the logician...actually speaks of nothing but instances which never occur in reality”<sup>287</sup> is entirely relevant and to the point for this issue. Incidentally, I believe that the main reason that Foucault has recourse to Mably’s claim but never adopts it altogether is that he follows Nietzsche’s relentless critique of Cartesian mode of thinking.

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<sup>284</sup>DP, p. 16.

<sup>285</sup>DP, p. 16.

<sup>286</sup>DP, p. 16.

<sup>287</sup>WP, §478.

In fact, before going into a discussion of Mably's statement Foucault states that "imprisonment has *always* involved a certain degree of physical pain", and that "it is difficult to dissociate punishment from additional physical pain. What would a non-corporal punishment be?"<sup>288</sup>. Bearing all these points in mind, it is much more tenable to claim that by having recourse to Mably's principle Foucault does not hold that the object of punishment changed simply from the body to the soul of the accused. Rather, it is just that with the substitution of the object, the punitive apparatus begins to be directed at the soul or the mind as well as at the body. This change is therefore characterised better by the proliferation of the objects of punishment, rather than by a simple change from one element to the other.

To unpack the shift in the object of the punitive mechanism, Foucault asserts that the juridical investigation still passes judgments on crimes and offences, as has always been the case, but also many other elements have begun to be brought under juridical investigation: not only aggressions but also aggressivity; not only rapes but also perversions; not only murders but drives and desires believed to be associated with murder; "passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environment or heredity" and so forth now begin to constitute the elements to be investigated in the event of a crime<sup>289</sup>.

At this point, Foucault also objects to one interpretation of this novel phenomenon, according to which one could hold that these new elements come under scrutiny as well only because they are expected to explain the malfeasance. However, according to Foucault, this interpretation is untenable "for it *is* these shadows lurking behind the case itself that are judged and punished"<sup>290</sup>. What Foucault means by these 'shadows lurking behind' are the elements which are said to explain what is knowable about the criminal, what is expected of this person, the knowledge of his/her criminal past and future, etc<sup>291</sup>. Foucault cautions that if we are

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<sup>288</sup> *DP*, p. 16, italics added.

<sup>289</sup> *DP*, p. 17.

<sup>290</sup> *DP*, p. 17.

<sup>291</sup> *DP*, p. 18.



led into believing that the investigation of these elements is meant to explain the crime, we lose sight of the insight that by these techniques the definition of an individual and also the alteration of him/her is sought to be exercised<sup>292</sup>. Accordingly, the punitive apparatus is no longer simply and solely concerned with punishing the offence, but with supervising, neutralising, and altering the individual – so much so that it is also deemed necessary to maintain this set of operations even after the criminal has been ‘corrected’ in a desirable way<sup>293</sup>. As a result of this process, “a justifiable hold not only on offences, but on individuals; not only on what they do, but also on what they are, will be, may be”<sup>294</sup> is established.

In brief, Foucault insists that underlying the surface phenomenon of the increase in the leniency of punishment starting from the end of the seventeenth century, i.e., the disappearance of punishment as a *spectacle*, and the elimination of *pain* and the *body*, is this substitution of the object of punishment<sup>295</sup>. Through this substitution, novel elements to pass judgments on, to investigate, to alter, etc. emerge, which in turn point to an unprecedented shift in the economy of punishment<sup>296</sup>.

Foucault’s characterisation of the novel economy of punishment by no means stops here, but before proceeding to the other facets of it I would like to make some remarks about the issue we have seen above. I think that we can draw a parallel between Nietzsche’s account of the trajectory of pain as it gains new interpretations (as we saw in ch. 3) and Foucault’s discussion of the shift in the economy of punishment. Put generally, we saw how the outward interpretation of pain in the creditor-debtor relationship was obstructed, and then the cruel pleasure one takes in inflicting pain or in contemplating it began to operate in the interiority of the human animal as a result of the internalisation of human being.

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<sup>292</sup>DP, p. 18.

<sup>293</sup>DP, p. 18.

<sup>294</sup>DP, p. 18.

<sup>295</sup>DP, p. 22.

<sup>296</sup>DP, pp. 22-3.

As a later twist, this internalised pain was interpreted as sin before God at the hands of the Christian priest. In this narrative as I tried to discuss (in ch. 3), the locus of pain is repositioned from the outside to the inside, i.e., to the interiority of human being, or to the so-called ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ of it. I think that, as I discussed above, Foucault’s insight that one is no longer judged and punished only according to one’s crime or offence (the outside, the surface level of actions), but also according to one’s desires, inclinations, will, passions, etc. (the inside, the interiority of human being) does indicate the same shift in the locus of pain Nietzsche treats in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Accordingly, behind the seeming increasing leniency of punishment there is an incorporation of new dimensions: not only the action (the outside), but interiority of the offender begins to be treated. Therefore, I would like to suggest that Foucault’s narrative in *Discipline and Punishment* with regard to the shift in the economy of punishment adopts and adapts a Nietzschean movement of thought, which seeks to interpret phenomena from a polyvalent monistic perspective (which we saw in the Introduction). However, the Nietzschean threads running through Foucault’s work are far from limited to this issue, and in the following I will try to lay out additional points of comparison and similarities.

#### **4.2. The Old Economy of Punishment**

In the section of *Discipline and Punish* entitled ‘The Spectacle of the Scaffold’, Foucault reconsiders the economy of the old way of punishing. First of all, he contends that even though it is true that the public execution was never the most common way of punishing<sup>297</sup>, it is nevertheless unquestionable that every penalty used to involve “an element of torture, of *supplice*”<sup>298</sup>. Furthermore, Foucault teases out three rules which all punishments used to obey, no matter how torturous or

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<sup>297</sup> Thus, even though he does not make it explicit, we are informed that the public execution of Damians the regicide, one of the most famous parts of *Discipline and Punish*, constitutes a rare example, not an everyday practice even in the past before the eighteenth century in the West. By comparison, it is worth noting that the cruel confrontation between the creditor and the debtor Nietzsche narrates in *On the Genealogy of Morality* was far from a rare practice, but one of the most essential elements of communal life.

<sup>298</sup> *DP*, pp. 32-3.

lenient they were: i-) the production of “a certain degree of pain, which may be measured exactly, or at least calculated, compared and hierarchised”<sup>299</sup>; ii-) the regulation of this produced pain, for “punishment does not fall upon the body indiscriminately or equally; it is calculated according to detailed rules”<sup>300</sup>. iii-) This old way of torturous techniques of punishment are exercised as a ritual, according to a liturgy. To be able to achieve this third objective, punishment must, firstly, leave an indelible mark on the punished, so that the criminal is made to remember his/her wrongdoing by looking at the scar left on his/her body by the punishment<sup>301</sup>. Secondly, punishment must be spectacular so that the excessive violence visited on the body of the criminal can be seen by all as the triumph of the apparatus of punishment; the groans of the tortured body do not constitute a subsidiary element, but one of the most crucial ones of this ceremony<sup>302</sup>.

Compared with the account of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (as we saw in ch. 3), all three elements Foucault detects in the old technique of punishment bear a striking resemblance to Nietzsche’s characterisation of the creditor-debtor relationship. Both Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s accounts contend that the reactive interpretation of the feeling of pain is on the forefront in these torturous practices on the part of the punished; that how much this pain is to be inflicted is regulated by some communal norms; that branding the miscreant is the ultimate aim so as to turn this forgetful offender into a responsible, docile and calculable person, who can remember his/her responsibilities; and that these practices of breeding are executed publicly, i.e., outwardly.

I think that this commonality should not go unnoticed, since, as I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, such Nietzschean elements run through Foucault’s work – notwithstanding Foucault’s reluctance to making this facet of his work explicit. After his discussion of the three recurrent elements in the old technique of punishment,

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<sup>299</sup>DP, p. 33.

<sup>300</sup>DP, p. 34.

<sup>301</sup>DP, p. 34.

<sup>302</sup>DP, p. 34.

Foucault carries on his characterisation of the same subject: he discusses extensively two facets of these torturous practices, which can also be considered the further elaboration of the third rule as we saw above.

The first of these two facets is what he calls the ‘sovereign’s vengeance’<sup>303</sup>. According to Foucault, up until the eighteenth century, any malfeasance was regarded as an offence not only against its immediate victim, but also against the sovereign<sup>304</sup>. Accordingly, in the case of an offence both the kingdom of the sovereign (on a public level) and the sovereign himself (on a personal level) are attacked<sup>305</sup>. Therefore, in the old economy of punishment there exists, alongside the meticulously calculated punishment which aims to redress the injury of the victim, an excessiveness and imbalance of the sovereign<sup>306</sup>. Foucault asserts that it is the power of the sovereign who provides the excessive nature of old punishments, because the sovereign wants “to make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign”<sup>307</sup>. As a result of this torturous ceremony, the sovereign seeks to reactivate its power, not to reinstitute justice<sup>308</sup>. In this reactivation of the temporarily attacked sovereign power, people are made to remember the dissymmetry of forces, which includes that the sovereign is at once the executor of the law and the one who “could suspend both law and vengeance”<sup>309</sup>.

Based on this brief discussion of the fateful role of the sovereign’s power as regards the old economy of punishment, I would like to suggest that in this era the sovereign was the only one who could publicly and officially retaliate in the event of an offence. It seems that from the prehistoric beginnings of human history (as we

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<sup>303</sup> For its full discussion see *DP*, pp. 47-54.

<sup>304</sup> *DP*, p. 47.

<sup>305</sup> *DP*, p. 48.

<sup>306</sup> *DP*, p. 49.

<sup>307</sup> *DP*, p. 49.

<sup>308</sup> *DP*, p. 49.

<sup>309</sup> *DP*, p. 53.

saw in Nietzsche's account, in ch. 3) to the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century in the West, the proportion of those who could inflict pain on the body of the criminal in a community gradually decreased – so much so that, at the end of the process there was virtually only one person who had the power to do so. We saw before (in sec. 3.1.3) that the cruel pleasure in making- or seeing-suffer was one of the most persistent elements in human life, and also saw how Nietzsche accounts for the existence of the creditor-debtor relationship based on this principle: to be able to make one suffer or even to contemplate is the *raison d'être* of this torturous and cruel confrontation between the promise-keeping debtor and the forgetful creditor.

Based on this account of Nietzsche I would like to claim that what Foucault calls the 'sovereign's vengeance', as one of the most fundamental elements in the old technique of punishment, characterises the relations of power, thanks to which one could take the cruel pleasure in making-suffer. It was an exclusive privilege to be able to participate in this exercise of inflicting unbearable pain on the forgetful one, and in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault traces the continuation of it in the figure of the sovereign. We could therefore maintain that the Nietzschean principle that one takes pleasure in the infliction of pain on a forgetful human animal still continues to operate – this time not in the figure of the creditor, but in that of all-powerful sovereign.

Now, we come to the second facet of the old economy in punitive practices<sup>310</sup>. Foucault asserts that the presence of the people, the spectacle was the *sine qua non* of the public execution<sup>311</sup>. Unlike our modern age, any punishment executed behind closed doors was not worthwhile at that time, for the people had to be made to remember their responsibilities "not only by making [them] aware that the slightest offence was likely to be punished, but by arousing feelings of terror by the spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon the guilty person"<sup>312</sup>. On the part of the people,

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<sup>310</sup> For its full discussion see *DP*, pp. 57-65.

<sup>311</sup> *DP*, p. 57.

<sup>312</sup> *DP*, p. 58.

witnessing a public execution was not forced on but claimed by them<sup>313</sup>. For instance, when the guillotine was first introduced into the penal system it was reported that people were complaining about this novel device, which had annihilated the festive joy of the old type of public executions into a split second: “Give us back our gallows”<sup>314</sup>, thus the people were said to protest. “The vengeance of the people”, says Foucault, “was called upon to become an unobtrusive part of the vengeance of the sovereign”<sup>315</sup> during the execution.

Taking account of Foucault’s discussion of the role of the people in the old public executions, I think that this facet of the old economy of punishment can be associated with what Nietzsche interprets as the pleasure in seeing-suffer. In the discussion of the role of the sovereign’s vengeance I tried to show how the excessive, imbalanced and dissymmetric power of the sovereign is embodied in the public execution as the pleasure taken in making-suffer. Now, with regard to the role of the people in the old technique of punishment, I think that it cannot be understood without relating it to the less pleasurable side of the principle: the cruel pleasure the people takes in seeing the victim suffer in the public execution is so immense and irreplaceable that people generally did not wish this cruel practice to vanish, but demanded it to last – as we saw in people’s outcry over the introduction of the guillotine, which reduced the festive joy of seeing-suffer into a split second.

In addition, that Foucault draws on Nietzsche’s account vis-à-vis the relation between the pivotal role of the public and the pleasure in seeing-suffer is evident also from the words Foucault uses to describe these practices: the words “carnival”<sup>316</sup>, “festival”<sup>317</sup>, I suggest, refer to Nietzsche’s insight that “[w]ithout cruelty, no

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<sup>313</sup>*DP*, p. 58.

<sup>314</sup>*DP*, p. 58.

<sup>315</sup>*DP*, p. 59.

<sup>316</sup>*DP*, p. 61.

<sup>317</sup>*DP*, p. 63.

festival: thus teaches the oldest, longest part of [human being's] history – and in punishment too there is so much that is *festive*<sup>318</sup>.

### 4.3. The Novel Economy of Punishment

After interpreting the old technique of punishment in the section ‘The Spectacle of the Scaffold’, in the next section entitled ‘Generalised Punishment’ Foucault takes up the characterisation of the novel economy of punishment. Foucault reports that starting from the second half of the eighteenth century, there gradually began to be protests against public executions<sup>319</sup>. The old penal economy, in which the vengeful sovereign, the forgetful offender, and the public confronted each other directly and physically, proved to be unstable<sup>320</sup>. Thus, Foucault tells us that what can be called a “need for punishment without torture”<sup>321</sup> arose. *Noli me tangere*, he says, marks the new principle in the emergence of the (seemingly) more lenient techniques of punishment: “instead of taking revenge, criminal justice should simply punish” by having “‘humanity’ as its ‘measure’”<sup>322</sup>.

Put in Nietzsche’s terms, Foucault argues that as of the eighteenth century, the festive joy of taking pleasure in making-suffer (the pleasure of the sovereign) and in seeing-suffer (the pleasure of the public) was no longer to be practiced outwardly (and thus actively from the standpoints of the sovereign and the public) in connection with the excruciating pains of the forgetful offender. On the following pages, I would like to discuss Foucault’s interpretation of the emergence of this apparent leniency in punishment in the name of ‘humanity’.

First of all, according to Foucault, it is possible to conclude that starting from the end of the seventeenth century, “offences against property seem to take over from

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<sup>318</sup>GM II, 6, p. 42.

<sup>319</sup>DP, p. 73.

<sup>320</sup>DP, p. 73.

<sup>321</sup>DP, p. 74.

<sup>322</sup>DP, pp. 73-5.

crimes of violence; theft and swindling, from murder and assault”<sup>323</sup>, and so on. Moreover, we can see the gradual replacement of diffuse and occasional crimes of ‘unskilled’ criminals by the ‘skilled’ crimes of the crafty ones<sup>324</sup>. Accordingly, these new criminals began to work in smaller groups, in more furtive and less risky operations, thus reducing the possibility of bloodshed: a “general movement shifted criminality from the attack of *bodies* to the more or less direct seizure of *goods*; and from a ‘mass criminality’ to a ‘marginal criminality’”<sup>325</sup>.

It is also worth noting that, according to Foucault, this gradual slackening of violence in crimes preceded the process of becoming lenient of punishments<sup>326</sup>. I think that, based on this assertion, one can state that we are never to search for the reasons of any decrease in crime rates in the realm of punishment. In other words, as Nietzsche astutely observes, far from arousing the feelings of guilt in the convict, “punishment makes hard and cold;...it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power of resistance”<sup>327</sup>. Foucault too, in a Nietzschean gesture, insists that “[w]e must first rid ourselves of the illusion that penalty is above all (if not exclusively) a means of reducing crime”<sup>328</sup>.

It was according to this Nietzschean insight that I suggested above to interpret the old economy of punishment in terms of the pleasure in inflicting pain or in the contemplation of this infliction, not on the fallacious but ingrained belief that the aim of punishment is to reduce crime. Now, again, according to this insight, we ought to be interpreting the emergent leniency in punishing as a shift in technique not as the invention of new mechanisms, which aim to reduce criminality. As we will see in the

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<sup>323</sup>DP, p. 75.

<sup>324</sup>DP, 75.

<sup>325</sup>DP, p. 76, italics added.

<sup>326</sup>DP, p. 76.

<sup>327</sup>GM II, 14, p. 54.

<sup>328</sup>DP, p. 24.



following, this new technique of punishment is connected with other processes than the expectancy of less crime.

To come back to our discussion, Foucault claims that in this fateful shift from “a criminality of *blood* [i.e., the body] to a criminality of *fraud*”<sup>329</sup> we should be looking for not a respect for humanity in the name of the Enlightenment, but “a more finely tuned justice,...a closer penal mapping of the social body”<sup>330</sup>. So that underlying this shift is a proliferation of penal interventions, an increase in the control mechanisms of social life, a growing intolerance to economic offences, and so forth<sup>331</sup>.

Apart from this shift from the body to goods, one of the other reasons which proved the instability of the old punishment technique was the uneven distribution of justice<sup>332</sup>. Traditional justice mechanisms were being criticised by the reformers not because of the weakness or cruelty of old punishments, but because of the bad economy of power at work in them<sup>333</sup>. According to the reformers, the multiplicity of courts lacking a strictly hierarchised structure of administration, the interventions of the sovereign, who had the right to suspend courts, to alter the decisions taken by courts, etc. were among the most conspicuous instances of this bad distribution of power to judge<sup>334</sup>. In brief, this bad distribution resulted in many “discontinuities, overlappings and conflicts between the different legal systems”<sup>335</sup>, which in turn inhibited the possibility of “covering the social body in its entirety”<sup>336</sup>.

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<sup>329</sup>DP, p. 77.

<sup>330</sup>DP, p. 78.

<sup>331</sup>DP, p. 78.

<sup>332</sup>DP, pp. 78-80.

<sup>333</sup>DP, p. 79.

<sup>334</sup>DP, pp. 78-9.

<sup>335</sup>DP, p. 78.

<sup>336</sup>DP, p. 79.

In the face of this badly distributed, coarsely arranged regime of punishment, claims Foucault, “a new ‘political economy’ of the power to punish”<sup>337</sup> emerged and gradually replaced the old one. He contends that behind the emergence of these new political power relations was not so much the need for a more equitable justice to punish as to establish a more finely distributed economy of power<sup>338</sup>. This new economy was to ascertain the better distribution of power relations to punish by reducing the economic and political cost of the old model, and by operating more homogeneously and effectively “down to the finest grain of the social body”<sup>339</sup>. Furthermore, the emergence of this more effective and less costly power to punish was marked by the disappearance of sovereignty, which was not fine-grained enough to cover the entire social body, and by the emergence of ‘public power’<sup>340</sup>. With the emergence of the latter, it increasingly became possible “to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body”<sup>341</sup>. So that by the advent of a more finely distributed political power to punish, the leniency in punishment enabled the power to punish to operate on a more universal scale and with a more insistent efficiency<sup>342</sup>.

At this point I would like to make some claims as to Foucault’s interpretation of the emergence of new political power to punish. I pointed out above that Foucault adopts the Nietzschean principle that punishment or incarceration was never meant to reduce crime. Now, in his attempt to account for a positive response to this issue, Foucault maintains that behind the (seemingly increasingly lenient) punitive operations there exists a political power – and this political power is of such a disposition that it demands to spread its effects to even more particular elements of the social body. I would like to claim that in his interpretation of the emergence of a

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<sup>337</sup>*DP*, p. 80.

<sup>338</sup>*DP*, p. 80.

<sup>339</sup>*DP*, pp. 80-1.

<sup>340</sup>*DP*, p. 81.

<sup>341</sup>*DP*, p. 82.

<sup>342</sup>*DP*, p. 82.

novel political power to punish, Foucault thoroughly adopts Nietzsche's ontology of will to power. As I discussed before (in ch. 2), according to Nietzsche's conception of will to power, a perpetual, relentless demand for expenditure is the defining character of power relations, regardless of any specific telos. It is based on this Nietzschean ontology that, I would like to claim, Foucault interprets a new era in punishment starting approximately from the beginning of the eighteenth century in the West. I believe that without taking this Nietzschean outlook into account, interpreting such a claim of Foucault – namely “not to punish less, but to punish better”<sup>343</sup> – as regards new political power to punish would almost become incomprehensible.

As can be seen above, throughout *Discipline and Punish* Foucault takes great pains to substantiate his interpretation that the so-called increasing leniency in punishment (starting from the end of the seventeenth century) should be seen as a shift in the object and in the scale of punitive operations, a redefinition of tactics, invention of new techniques, a relentless demand for the regularisation and universalisation, a homogenisation with a view to becoming less costly and more effective, etc<sup>344</sup>. In a sense, Foucault tries to interpret the emergence of new technique in punishment as the effect of a reconfiguration of forces in the sphere of politics and law. That punishments become (apparently) more and more humane, Foucault contends, is just a fallacious interpretation of this process, which prevent us from understanding the emerging new ‘economic rationality’ in the techniques of punishment<sup>345</sup>.

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<sup>343</sup>DP, p. 82.

<sup>344</sup>DP, p. 89.

<sup>345</sup>DP, p. 92. It is not directly pertinent to my discussion in this thesis, but I would like to remark in passing that behind Foucault's insistence on dismissing this (mis)interpretation might be his attempt to distance himself from a progressive conception of history. As is well known, in his early years, Foucault's intellectual confrontation with Nietzsche had proved immensely helpful in his destabilising and breaking away from the Hegelian and Marxist traditions – both of which assume a progressivist framework in one way or another. According to such a conception, it is possible to interpret the apparent vanishing of cruel public executions from the scene with recourse to some developments in humankind, e.g., an increase in the role of reason in human life, a growing role of humaneness and a subsequent diminishing role of cruelty, etc. Nevertheless, as I aim to show in this thesis, neither does the role of cruelty gradually disappear from human life, nor do such human feelings as pity,

#### 4.4. The Shift in the Role of Pain

In the last part of the section ‘Generalised Punishment’, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault undertakes the elaboration of the novel meaning pain takes on in the new economy of punishment<sup>346</sup>. Before going into this, he discusses the changing role of the element of ‘preventiveness’ in punishing, which can be considered as an underlying factor in the novel meaning of pain in punishment<sup>347</sup>. He claims that up until the eighteenth century, punishment was meant to be, among other things, preventive, and this preventiveness was a side effect of public executions<sup>348</sup>. With the advent of new punitive economy, however, the preventiveness of punishment began to constitute one of the basic principles of this economy<sup>349</sup>. So that “the example [of punishment according to the new economy] is no longer a ritual that manifests [itself]; it is a sign that serves as an obstacle”<sup>350</sup>. One could therefore say that this shift refers to a change from a festive joy in public executions to punishing behind closed doors out of growing shame in punishing on the part of the punishing apparatus; from an outward and active evaluation of pain, in which the body (of the forgetful one) and its feeling of pain is at the forefront, to an abstract semio-technique of punitive signs, which aim to cover the social body with more effective methods<sup>351</sup>. In addition to this, Foucault elaborates some rules, on which this more calculating and calculable, more prudent and clever semio-technique rests<sup>352</sup>.

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compassion, etc. play a primary role in the economy of political and juridical forces as regards punishment, according to a Nietzschean framework.

<sup>346</sup> For its full discussion see *DP*, pp. 92-101.

<sup>347</sup> *DP*, pp. 92-94.

<sup>348</sup> *DP*, p. 93.

<sup>349</sup> *DP*, p. 93.

<sup>350</sup> *DP*, p. 94.

<sup>351</sup> *DP*, p. 94.

<sup>352</sup> Cf. *DP*, pp. 94-99. Although Foucault lays out six principles, I will be taking into account only the first three (*DP*, pp. 94-95) – which are the only relevant ones for this chapter of my thesis devoted to Foucault’s interpretation of the social value of pain. In addition, even though Foucault lists six

The first rule Foucault claims to detect in the novel economy of punishment is “the rule of minimum quantity”<sup>353</sup>. Accordingly, to the advantage thought to be gained from crime must be attached the idea that the disadvantage it brings about is in fact greater than the advantage, so that we have the preventive calculation “at the level of interests: a little more interest in avoiding the penalty than in risking the crime”<sup>354</sup>. As for the question how to engender such an idea in people’s minds, we should refer to the second rule described in the following.

“The rule of sufficient ideality”<sup>355</sup> seeks to explain the content of the mechanism formally described in the first rule. In the new way of punishing, the idea supposed to provide the element of preventiveness is ensured *not* by pain, but by the *idea* of pain<sup>356</sup>. Accordingly, not the physical sensation of pain extracted from the body of the offender in public, but the representation of pain, the pain of the idea of pain is the element standing out in the new technique of punishment<sup>357</sup>. Another facet of this development is that, contrary to old punishments, which demanded to maximise the bodily sensation of pain, in the new technique “what must be maximised is the representation of the penalty [i.e., the idea of pain], not its corporal reality”<sup>358</sup>.

The third rule, “the rule of lateral effects”<sup>359</sup>, lays out the social function of this maximisation of the representation of pain. On top of its punishing the offender according to a more effective economic rationality, the novel punitive technique

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principles in this discussion, on a closer reading of the said pages, one can clearly see that there are in fact two main axes – hence the first three and the remaining three rules can be said to constitute these two basic principles.

<sup>353</sup> *DP*, p. 94.

<sup>354</sup> *DP*, p. 94.

<sup>355</sup> *DP*, p. 94.

<sup>356</sup> *DP*, p. 94. Again, as I tried to point out at the beginning of this chapter, the feeling of pain meant here by Foucault should not be taken as pain as such, but as the reactive evaluation of pain, as we saw (in ch. 2).

<sup>357</sup> *DP*, p. 94.

<sup>358</sup> *DP*, p. 95.

<sup>359</sup> *DP*, p. 95.

“must have its most intense effects on those who have not committed the crime, so that in this more ‘humane’ technique, the minimisation of the bodily infliction of pain is coupled with a maximisation of the idea of pain so as to “leave the most lasting impression on the minds of the people”<sup>360</sup>.

Considering the subject matter of this chapter, i.e., Foucault’s (Nietzschean) interpretation of the cultural value of pain in *Discipline and Punish*, I think that these three rules regarding the semio-technique of the novel economy of punishment are of utmost importance to my thesis. First of all, I would like to suggest that these three rules we have seen above can and should be considered as constituting the three facets of one main axis with regard to the new social value of pain. Accordingly, the second principle Foucault discusses, i.e., ‘the rule of sufficient ideality’, provides the main element on which the new punitive technique rests to be able to have its desirable effects on the social body. As for what these desirable effects are, the first rule, ‘the rule of minimum quantity’ lays it out on the part of the criminal. The third rule, ‘the rule of lateral effects’ gives us the novel element in the semio-technique of punishment, i.e., the social, preventive effect of punishment on those who did not commit it. Therefore, I would like to suggest that these three principles constitute in fact the three inextricably intertwined elements of the newly emergent social value of pain as regards the new economy of punishment.

What I would like to claim further is that a comparison of this new three-tiered social value of pain and the old social value of pain in the old economy of punishment is strongly indicative of Nietzsche’s account of the shift in the locus of pain in *On the Genealogy of Morality* (as I discussed in ch. 3). According to Foucault, in the old economy of punishment, which was mainly at work in the West until the end of the seventeenth century, there used to be i-) the physical infliction of pain on the body of the criminal in public in sharp relief; ii-) the vengeful sovereign as the only one who can take a sadistic pleasure in making-suffer; iii-) the public, the momentary ally of the sovereign’s ceremony of restoring his power, as the one who can take (the lesser) sadistic pleasure of seeing-suffer. As we discussed above,

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<sup>360</sup>DP, p. 95.

Foucault detects a gradual shift from this age-old economy to a semio-technique of pain. No longer the bodily pain, but the idea or representation of pain should be the new deterrent element; less and less bodily infliction of pain, but always more and more branding of people's minds or memories through the circulation of these preventive representations of pain; from the sovereign's outward, vengeful, and glorious infliction of pain to a punitive apparatus, which finds shame in punishing but nevertheless seeks to punish better with a view to reaching the most remote and minute elements of society – these are the defining moments as regards the fateful shift as I have been discussing throughout this chapter.

I would like to claim that in all these changes Foucault follows Nietzsche's account of the trajectory of pain in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Both in Nietzsche's and Foucault's accounts, one can see how the bodily sensation of pain was constitutive of a calculable and calculating, future-oriented society – under the name of the creditor-debtor relationship in Nietzsche's case, that of the public execution in Foucault's. In both of these confrontations, one can detect (what Nietzsche calls) a festive joy, in which the principle that 'one takes pleasure in making- and seeing-suffer' is at work outwardly and formatively – the creditor in Nietzsche's account, and the sovereign in that of Foucault used to exercise this cruel and sadistic joy. After the fateful twist of the unexpected hypertrophy of bad conscience in Nietzsche's narrative and of the gradual emergence of a new punitive economy in that of Foucault, one can see how the outward and active evaluation of pain gradually disappears. In Nietzsche the principle that 'one takes pleasure in making- and seeing-suffer' begins to operate in the interiority of the human animal; in Foucault, the *now* shameful infliction of bodily pain in the public in the name of public justice is supplanted by the circulation of the abstract representations of pain in people's minds or memories. Just like Nietzsche's narrative of the sickly spread of bad conscience in human life, in *Discipline and Punish* we read how the punitive apparatus begins to operate by feeling guilty of what it is entitled to do. So as to cloak this shame, it avoids physical confrontation with the offender it seeks to punish as much as possible. On the other hand, this less and less physical and more and more abstract, representational, ideational involvement is much more in tune with the

new economy of punishment, for it enables the apparatus to operate more effectively and to keep a firmer hand on the social body by reaching even the most remote and minute elements of society. Considering all these points, I think *Discipline and Punish* attests to the relevance of *On the Genealogy of Morality* in our lives despite the passing of more than a century since its publication.

However, before proceeding to the next chapter I would also like to mention some divergences between Nietzsche's and Foucault's accounts in connection with the issue under discussion. As I briefly said in the previous chapter, for Nietzsche any interpretation is invariably in need of the specification of the details of an emergent phenomenon. According to this art of interpretation, we can never speak of, say, the feeling of pain or pleasure *as such*, since they acquire new evaluations to be interpreted according to their contexts. I think that, even though Nietzsche's genealogy of the responsible, guilt-stricken human animal follows this requirement successfully (as could be seen in ch. 3), *Discipline and Punish* in a sense exercises this principle more thoroughly. By this I mean that in Foucault's narrative we can see how he clearly specifies the locus of his discussion both in temporal and spatial terms: we read that *Discipline and Punish* focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth century and Western Europe, particularly France. Above all, Foucault's use of the relevant chronicles, newspaper reports, etc. throughout the book is also indicative of his unwavering commitment to the use of pertinent evidence and sources to be able to interpret phenomena.

In this section I confined my discussion to Foucault's interpretation, in *Discipline and Punish*, of the value of pain on the social level. As I discussed (in chs. 2 and 3), any interpretation of pain always calls for an accompanying interpretation of pleasure. To this end, in the following chapter I will be examining Foucault's *The Use of Pleasure*, in which the value of the feeling of pleasure becomes the main focus of the discussion.



## CHAPTER 5

### FOUCAULT'S INTERPRETATION OF GREEK PLEASURES ON THE CULTURAL LEVEL

We saw (in ch. 3) that the hypertrophy of human interiority, consciousness and self-inspection is, above all, the effect of hindering the active discharge of native cruelty by way of inflicting or witnessing cruelty in various ways. As we saw, the shift in the site where pleasure and pain are manufactured from the public to the human interiority was one of the most decisive turning points in Nietzsche's account. Similarly, as we saw in ch. 4, one of the main arguments of *Discipline and Punish* was the abolishment of cruelty as a public spectacle and its replacement by the new economy of punishment, which is preoccupied with the human interiority with a view to tightening its grip on society and individuals in more elaborate ways.

Considering both Nietzsche's and Foucault's accounts, this shift from the public to the human interiority indicates a blockage in the discharge of native human cruelty. In Nietzsche's words, this process is a forceful separation of human being from its animal past as a result of an age-old breeding programme<sup>361</sup>. In Foucault's words, this blockage is one of the most fateful consequences of the ever-spreading disciplinary power<sup>362</sup>, whose forces work against this animal past of the human animal.

More crucially for this chapter, just like Nietzsche envisaged the prospect of the *Übermensch* in the wake of this long process of domestication, I think one might consider *The Use of Pleasure* one of Foucault's attempts to offer a way out of the effects of normalising and homogenising disciplinary society. According to James Miller, the abolishment of cruelty as a public spectacle, which I discussed in the previous chapter, is in no way the end of the story: sexual pleasure offers us a novel

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<sup>361</sup>GM II, 16, p. 57.

<sup>362</sup> The entire fourth chapter of my thesis is a partial elaboration of this issue.

way of (re-)activating the active meaning of discharging native human instincts<sup>363</sup>. So as to attain an active evaluation on this issue, it might prove quite instructive to look at how human beings in ancient Greece conducted their sexual lives, as Foucault discusses in *The Use of Pleasure*<sup>364</sup>.

Before proceeding to the main discussion I would like to point out that the suggestion that *The Use of Pleasure* could offer us a way out of disciplinary society should not be taken to mean that a re-activation of ancient Greek way of exercising pleasures is thought to be possible<sup>365</sup>. Nevertheless, this impossibility should not prevent us from examining the exegesis of ancient Greek works in terms of the attitude to sexual pleasures evinced in them, undertaken by Foucault. Above all, such an undertaking carries the benefit of providing us with a different perspective on human life, namely one which is not Christianised, i.e., an interpretation of life without the concepts of guilt, sin, etc. As I hope to make it clear in the following, I believe that this was one of the main reasons for Nietzsche's life-long interest in ancient Greece as a classical philologist and philosopher, and for the fact that Foucault problematised ancient Greek ways of living in the works of the last period of his life.

### **5.1. Clearing Away the Dogmas**

According to Foucault, a re-reading of ancient Greek sexual mores would necessitate, above all, giving up the doxa that, whereas the Greeks favoured, or at least remained indifferent to, the sexual act, to polygamous and homosexual relationships, etc., Christianity renounced and prohibited all of them by hallowing

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<sup>363</sup> CA, p. 482.

<sup>364</sup> Foucault, Michel, *The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality*. Tr. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House, 1990. Hereafter *UP*.

<sup>365</sup> Cf. Foucault, Michel, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress" in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *Foucault Reader*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, p. 343. Hereafter *GE*. In this interview Foucault plainly makes this point: "I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people."

sexual abstinence, lifelong chastity, and virginity<sup>366</sup>. Foucault finds this simplistic picture rather fallacious, because, as the relevant works of that era<sup>367</sup> attest, ancient Greek sexual moralities too shared a similar (prohibitive, renunciative, etc.) concern for, for instance, masturbation, monogamous fidelity, homosexuality and sexual abstinence<sup>368</sup>. Therefore one can find this moral concern in these subjects both in the ancient Greek and the Christian ethical world. Nevertheless, according to Foucault, we cannot conclude that “the sexual moralities of Christianity and those of paganism form a continuity”<sup>369</sup>, since the latter never laid down universal and necessary principles binding everyone on the same level. Rather, in ancient Greece, we can see a fundamentally different manner of sexual conduct which was “proposed” to more than “imposed” on people<sup>370</sup>.

Rather than holding to these misconceptions, Foucault proposes, we can consider a so-called “quadri-thematics of sexual austerity”<sup>371</sup> in the moral thought of ancient Greece: this four-tiered structure deals with i-) “relations to the body, with the question of health, and behind it the whole game of life and death”<sup>372</sup> (dietetics); ii-) “the relation to the other sex, with the question of the spouse as privileged partner, in the game of the family institution and the ties it creates”<sup>373</sup> (economics); iii-) “the relation to one’s own sex, with the question of partners that one can choose within it, and the problem of the adjustment between social roles and sexual roles”<sup>374</sup> (erotics); and iv-) “the relation to truth, where the question is raised of the spiritual conditions

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<sup>366</sup> *UP*, pp. 14-5.

<sup>367</sup> As for what these works are, we will see some of them in the following.

<sup>368</sup> *UP*, pp. 15-20.

<sup>369</sup> *UP*, p. 21.

<sup>370</sup> *UP*, p. 21.

<sup>371</sup> *UP*, p. 21.

<sup>372</sup> *UP*, p. 23.

<sup>373</sup> *UP*, p. 23.

<sup>374</sup> *UP*, p. 23.

that enable one to gain access to wisdom”<sup>375</sup> (the true love). Foucault uses this quadri-thematics as a guiding thread in the bulk of *The Use of Pleasure*, in which he delves into the various works of ancient Greek philosophers and doctors of the fourth century B.C.E. with a view to interpreting how they morally problematised their sexual conduct<sup>376</sup>.

In brief, Foucault proposes to put this ‘quadri-thematics of sexual austerity’ into service in an attempt to do away with the entrenched view that, unlike Christianity, ancient Greece used to turn a blind eye to the issues of sexuality, including homosexuality, polygamy, and so on. After laying out this methodological rearrangement, we can come to the second shift in the focus of interpretation that Foucault proposes in his work. Foucault’s main aim in *The Use of Pleasure* is to question how the ancient Greeks came to recognise themselves as the subjects of a sexual morality regarding the issue of “the moral problematisation of pleasures”<sup>377</sup>. In Foucault’s view, the focus on the interdictions imposed on (sexual) pleasure needs to be replaced with an investigation of the issue by locating it in “the areas of experience and the forms in which sexual behaviour is problematised”, because, in ancient Greece, we can discern a moral problematisation of sexuality also in the absence of obligation or prohibition<sup>378</sup>.

Based on this (second) methodological recentring, Foucault teases out four main axes of the moral problematisation of (sexual) pleasures in ancient Greece: i-) *aphrodisia* (sexual pleasures): the ethical substance; ii-) *chresis* (use): the mode of subjectivation; iii-) *enkrateia* (self-mastery): the forms of elaboration (namely, ascetics à la the ancient Greeks); iv-) *sophrosyne* (moderation): the telos of the ethical subject<sup>379</sup>. Relying on this structure, he tells us, we can problematise the ontology, deontology, ascetics, and teleology, respectively, of this “moral experience

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<sup>375</sup>UP, p. 23.

<sup>376</sup>UP, p. 12.

<sup>377</sup>UP, p. 10.

<sup>378</sup>UP, p. 10; p. 23.

<sup>379</sup>UP, pp. 32, 37. For the elucidation of these four axes see pp. 26-8.

of sexual pleasures”<sup>380</sup>. The elaboration of these four axes constitutes the part of *The Use of Pleasure* which precedes those chapters in which he dwells on the quadri-thematics of sexual austerity<sup>381</sup>.

In the following, I will focus on the third axis, *enkrateia*, in which Foucault shows us how the free, male, adult Greek citizens of the *polis* elaborated their self-relationship as regards (sexual) morality within the hierarchy of the self, the household, and the *polis*<sup>382</sup>. Given Nietzsche’s discussion of Christian asceticism (as we saw in sec. 3.2), I think that Foucault’s use of the word ascetics so as to designate the ancient Greek practices of *enkrateia* merits careful attention, and, as I will elaborate it in the following, this issue invites a special treatment of its own. As I will try to demonstrate this in the following, by entirely focusing on the third axis of Foucault’s four-tiered discussion in this chapter, I seek to demonstrate that we are not condemned to one way of asceticism, i.e., Christian asceticism, since ancient Greek way of exercising it offers a non-nihilistic alternative to the former.

## 5.2. The Ancient Greek Practices of *Enkrateia*

In ancient Greece, the ethics of (sexual) pleasures, i.e., *aphrodisia*, was connected with specific forms of self-relationship, and this relationship used to be designated by the term *enkrateia*<sup>383</sup>. As for the relevant broad meaning of it for the following discussion, *enkrateia* characterises the Socratic conception of “self-mastery with regard to corporeal pleasures and desires”<sup>384</sup>. So as to expound this concept Foucault,

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<sup>380</sup> *UP*, p. 37.

<sup>381</sup> For the discussion of the four axes see *UP*, pp. 38-93; for the quadri-thematics in question see *UP*, pp. 99-246.

<sup>382</sup> *UP*, pp. 63-77; for the hierarchy in question see pp. 75-6.

<sup>383</sup> *UP*, p. 63.

<sup>384</sup> Dorion, Louis-André, “Plato and *Enkrateia*” in Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée (eds.), *Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus*. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007, p. 120. Hereafter PE.

first of all, surveys some ancient Greek works which contrast it with the term *sophrosyne*<sup>385</sup>.

On the one hand, notes Foucault, these two terms, *enkrateia* and *sophrosyne*, can be said to be used (virtually) synonymously as far as Xenophon's *Cyrpaedia* and Plato's *Gorgias* and *Republic* are concerned<sup>386</sup>. Both Xenophon, in his discussion of the five virtues, and Plato, in that of the four cardinal virtues, use these two terms interchangeably<sup>387</sup>. In addition, we should note that in ancient Greek philosophy the usage of *enkrateia* as a technical term starts with Plato and Xenophon<sup>388</sup>. Even though, as Louis-André Dorion observes, the usage of the adjective form *enkrates* precedes that of *enkrateia*, it is crucial that the former did not refer to the self-relationship (which is the subject matter of this section), but to "the control or power one exerts on things or other people"<sup>389</sup>.

More specifically for the first occurrences of *enkrateia* in Plato's and Xenophon's writings (and hence in Greek philosophy), in Xenophon's thinking *enkrateia* plays a vital role, so much so that he makes it the foundation of virtue in the *Memorabilia*<sup>390</sup>. As for Plato, who, unlike Xenophon, never posited it as the foundation of virtue in the entirety of his corpus, it is from the *Republic* onwards that we see him use the term *enkrateia*<sup>391</sup>. Also, the Socratic usage of the adjective form *enkrates* makes its first appearance in the *Gorgias*<sup>392</sup>.

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<sup>385</sup> *UP*, pp. 63-5. As for the meaning of *sophrosyne*, its interpretation by Aristotle will be touched upon in the following. I cannot go into the details of such a loaded and significant concept due to the limitations of my thesis.

<sup>386</sup> *UP*, pp. 63-4.

<sup>387</sup> *UP*, p. 64.

<sup>388</sup> *PE*, p. 119.

<sup>389</sup> *PE*, p. 119.

<sup>390</sup> *PE*, p. 120.

<sup>391</sup> *PE*, p. 126.

<sup>392</sup> *PE*, p. 127.

On the other hand, as Foucault explains, drawing on the classicist Helen North's interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle might be considered the first philosopher to differentiate between the terms *sophrosyne* and *enkrateia* in a systematic fashion: *sophrosyne* (moderation), whose opposite is *akolasia* (immoderation), designates the deliberate following of the right course of action, the capability of applying this and a specific kind of pleasure taken from displaying moderation in one's life<sup>393</sup>. By contrast, *enkrateia* (continence), whose opposite is *akrasia* (incontinence), characterises the struggle and resistance to be able to exercise self-control. In this tensional relationship with oneself, the individual has to exert himself<sup>394</sup> in order not to get carried away by the incessant demands of pleasures and desires<sup>395</sup>.

Relying on this nuance between *sophrosyne* and *enkrateia*, Foucault suggests that one might consider the latter as the necessary condition of the former<sup>396</sup>, since, as we have seen just above, *enkrateia* includes a continual and insistent effort in order not to give in to one's pleasures, whilst *sophrosyne* characterises one's effortless capability of choosing a reasonable and righteous conduct. As a rule of thumb, the main characteristic of *enkrateia* is "the *dynamics* of domination of oneself by oneself and...the *effort* that this [self-domination] demands"<sup>397</sup>.

After examining this differentiation between the terms *enkrateia* and *sophrosyne*, whose similarity might confuse one into thinking that they meant the same for all Greek philosophers, the discussion of what *enkrateia* meant on its own in classical Greece is in order. As an exegetical strategy, Foucault teases out five main threads in this elaboration, many of which (as I will try to show in the following) bear on Nietzsche's account of the *Genealogy of Morality* (which I discussed in ch. 3.). As

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<sup>393</sup>UP, pp. 64-5.

<sup>394</sup> Not him/herself but himself: remember that ancient Greek ethics were "thought, written, and taught by men, and addressed to men" (UP, p. 22).

<sup>395</sup>UP, p. 65.

<sup>396</sup>UP, p. 65.

<sup>397</sup>UP, p. 65, italics added. The following discussion includes the elaboration of this statement.

we follow the discussion of these threads as elaborated by Foucault, I will be making my claims, comments, and comparisons between Foucault and Nietzsche at the end of each thread.

First and foremost, this self-relationship of domination characterised by *enkrateia* refers to an agonistic relation, that is to say, “one could behave ethically only by adopting a combative attitude towards the pleasures”<sup>398</sup>. Faced with the possibility that pleasures can get the better of the individual, one should be poised to oppose, resist, combat and subdue them<sup>399</sup>. Foucault underlines that this agonistic self-relationship against the pleasures is couched in terms of rivalry and belligerence: not giving in to or resisting the assaults of the pleasures, defeating or being defeated by them, being armed or equipped against them, and more tellingly, the analogy of the assaulted *polis*, which is in need of defence by way of a solid garrison, etc<sup>400</sup>. By providing us with these metaphors, which regard the pleasures as an enemy and the individual as the fighting soldier or the wrestler in a competition, Foucault shows us how the theme or the tradition of ‘spiritual combat’ was a well-established phenomenon in classical Greece.

Before proceeding to the next thread, I would like briefly to remind us of Nietzsche’s account of the value of the *agon* in ancient Greece, as he discusses it in *Homer’s Contest* (which we saw in sec. 2.4). Having characterised the *agon* as “the finest Hellenic principle”<sup>401</sup>, Nietzsche shows us how Greek people would carry out their tradition of ostracism by expelling the unrivalled one, since this person could cause the sense of contest in the *polis* to dry up<sup>402</sup>. He also tells us how the Hellenic education would capitalise on this sense of *agon* with a view to cultivating the talents

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<sup>398</sup> *UP*, p. 66.

<sup>399</sup> *UP*, p. 66.

<sup>400</sup> *UP*, p. 67.

<sup>401</sup> *HC*, p. 100.

<sup>402</sup> *HC*, p. 98.



of its citizens – unlike we modern humans, who dismiss contest as the “the evil as such”<sup>403</sup>.

After this brief reminder, I would like to suggest that it is no coincidence that, with the help of this model, the Greeks sought also to overcome the intractable hold of the pleasures in their lives. As we saw before (in ch. 2), seeking to overcome resistances is the way in which the will to power is able to expend itself and thereby to have more power to be able to expend this further power again, and so on. According to Foucault’s description, one could therefore say that this time the resistances are the pleasures, which are taken to be the formidable foe in the individual’s spiritual combat against itself. In brief, this point of his discussion in a way could be considered as a substantiation of Nietzsche’s account of the social value of the *agon* in the *polis*.

In the second axis, Foucault maintains that this combative relationship with the pleasures is above all else “an agonistic relationship *with oneself*”<sup>404</sup>. Accordingly, the specific locus of the battles, victories, defeats, etc. vis-à-vis sexual pleasures is the individual itself<sup>405</sup>. Hence, in this battle, whilst one part of the individual is said to be the victor, the other part of the same individual the defeated<sup>406</sup>. Before proceeding to the discussion of this relationship as elaborated by Plato in the *Republic*, Foucault notes in passing that, unlike Christian ethics, the Greek ethics of pleasures (*aphrodisia*) did not take this adversary to be fought as “a different, ontologically alien power”<sup>407</sup>. On this score, the Greek ethics of *aphrodisia*, which held this self-relationship as a contest taking place entirely within the individual, well contrasts with Christian ethics, which could not deal with the secret, subterranean

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<sup>403</sup> HC, p. 98.

<sup>404</sup> UP, p. 67, italics added.

<sup>405</sup> UP, p. 67.

<sup>406</sup> UP, p. 67.

<sup>407</sup> UP, p. 68.

and insidious movements of desire without believing in the presence of the Other<sup>408</sup>. One could therefore claim that Greek ethics had a (more) immanent point of view as regards *aphrodisia*, whereas Christian ethics was far from committed to such an outlook.

For a different approach to this second axis, we should consider the *Republic*, in which Foucault finds one of the most elaborate treatments of this agonistic self-relationship. According to him, one might find Plato's contention that "a person is 'stronger' or 'weaker' than [itself]"<sup>409</sup> quite paradoxical. This paradoxicality is obvious if one sees that by claiming that one is stronger than oneself, one is at the same time and accordingly weaker than oneself, and vice versa. Nevertheless, with a view to shedding light on this statement, Plato supports it with his understanding of the dual nature of the soul, according to which there exists a better and a worse part of the soul – and he positions himself on the part of the (so-called) better part when he speaks of the victory or the defeat of oneself<sup>410</sup>. More specifically vis-à-vis Plato's corpus, the *Gorgias* is probably the first dialogue in which the conception of the soul as a monolithic entity is replaced with the understanding of the soul as having (at least two, i.e., reason and desire) parts<sup>411</sup>. It is also worth noting that Plato's commencement of regarding *enkrateia* in a Socratic fashion and that of the novel understanding of the soul as having parts are considerably interrelated<sup>412</sup>.

Furthermore, as Plato asserts in the *Laws*, likened to the ruling of a *polis*, the individual is always in need of a ruling and legislative authority: the smaller and better (i.e., rational) part of the soul should always get the upper hand against the larger and worse (i.e., irrational) part<sup>413</sup>. Finally, the victory of oneself over oneself,

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<sup>408</sup> *UP*, p. 68. As for the construal of this Other, it can be said that, through the construction of the notion of sin and linking it with the Devil, Christian ethics externalised the source of desire.

<sup>409</sup> *UP*, p. 68.

<sup>410</sup> *UP*, p. 68.

<sup>411</sup> *PE*, p. 130.

<sup>412</sup> *PE*, p. 130. I cannot go into the discussion of the whys and wherefores of this interconnectedness, since this discussion is far beyond the limitations of this section in particular and the thesis in general.

<sup>413</sup> *UP*, pp. 68-9.

endorsed to be pursued vigilantly and unceasingly, is extolled, so much so that it is held to be the most precious battle and victory in comparison to all other ones, and, by the same token, a possible defeat is regarded as the most shameful one<sup>414</sup>.

At this point, I would like to point to what I take to be a striking similarity between Plato's model of the soul as we have seen just above and Nietzsche's account of the internalisation of the human animal (as we saw in ch. 3). As I discussed previously (in ch. 3, especially in sec. 3.4.), the creditor-debtor relationship was established through its torturous equation that every injury has an equivalent, that is, the unpaid debt of the forgetful debtor is to be paid off through the infliction of physical pain on the body of the debtor without a second thought on the part of the creditor. Thereafter I discussed how this torturous relationship was interrupted as a result of the interiorisation of the human being, in which the roles of both the creditor and the debtor can be said to commence operating in the interiority of the human animal.

Considering this account of Nietzsche, I think that Plato's contention that there is a better and worse part of the soul and that it is the agonistic task of the former that it must be ruling the latter in a sense anticipates Nietzsche's account of the interiorisation of the creditor-debtor relationship: both Plato and Nietzsche speak of a division (of the soul, in Plato's case; of the individual, in that of Nietzsche). Also, in this division, both of them contend that one part of this division can be said to be the punishing and supervising one, whereas the other part the punished one which ought to be supervised.

In this similarity, one should not overlook the difference that whereas Plato is concerned with what ought to be in this agonistic relation between the parts of the soul, Nietzsche is at pains to demonstrate how this internalisation of the creditor-debtor relationship took place and is still at work in our lives. To unpack this difference between Plato's and Nietzsche's models further, it could be said that whereas Plato's account of the dual nature of the soul focuses on the demand that one should preside over, otherwise uncontrollable, *aphrodisia*, Nietzsche's account (as

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<sup>414</sup>UP, p. 69.

we saw in ch.3) concentrates more on the fateful role of pain in this process, without of course neglecting the role of cruel pleasure involved in this relationship as well. To unpack this difference a bit more, I would like to claim that whilst Nietzsche carries out the genealogy or formation of the constitution of this belligerent self-relationship with a view to showing how far the human animal has been separated from its animality (i.e., from the dominance of the original and healthy forces of forgetfulness), Plato is more concerned with the desired successful application of this model.

However, given the brevity of this discussion regarding the passage in discussion in the *Republic*, I would prefer not to pass judgment on this issue considering the entirety of the *Republic*. In other words, what I have stated above concerns only the selected passage from Plato's work<sup>415</sup>, which is in no way representative of the whole work. After this cautionary remark, I would like to turn back to the characterisation of *enkrateia*.

Thirdly, the corollary of this agonistic self-relationship used to be hailed as the most praiseworthy victory, and this victory can best be exemplified by the test of Socrates as narrated in the *Symposium*<sup>416</sup>. Unlike the Christian ethics of desire, in which the eradication of pleasures is aimed at altogether, Greek ethics seeks to control, rule, and mould *aphrodisia* without, most of the time, seeking to eradicate them<sup>417</sup>. It is by taking into account this characteristic of Greek ethics that we can interpret the way Socrates demonstrates that he can resist the temptation of touching the young man Alcibiades<sup>418</sup>. Such a resistance of Socrates in the *polis* is taken to prove that the better and smaller part of Socrates' soul is ruling the worse and larger part.

Nevertheless, Foucault cautions that this example, which used to be regarded as moral by ancient Greek ethics, would not be regarded as a morally good action by

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<sup>415</sup> The said passage is on p. 68.

<sup>416</sup> *UP*, p. 69.

<sup>417</sup> *UP*, p. 69.

<sup>418</sup> *UP*, p. 69.

Christian ethics – since the latter would claim that Socrates’s soul, despite resisting the temptation, is rife with concupiscence in the presence of Alcibades, which therefore proves his immorality<sup>419</sup>. Elsewhere, Foucault discusses the same point in a more plain language:

For the Greeks, when a philosopher was in love with a boy, but did not touch him, his behavior was valued . The problem was: does he touch the boy or not? That's the ethical substance : the act linked with pleasure and desire . For Augustine, it's very clear that when he remembers his relationship to his young friend when he was eighteen years old, what bothers him is what exactly was the kind of desire he had for him. So you see that the ethical substance has changed <sup>420</sup>.

I think that this crucial difference between what is counted as moral by ancient Greek and Christian ethics can also be interpreted by Nietzsche’s account of the role of displeasure in human life. As we saw before (in ch.2), the role of displeasure is to be deemed an indispensable feature of human life insofar as the will to power is in need of resistance – which is experienced in consciousness as the feeling of displeasure – for increasingly more expenditure of the organism. Accordingly, what we can see in the instance of Christian ethics, namely that one ought to root out all one’s pleasures, desires, etc. to be able to maintain one’s life morally, indicates the nihilistic wish of this mindset to do away with all resistance, i.e., displeasure, as regards sexual ethics. But according to the conception of will to power, such a demand is as nonsensical as life-denying, insofar as the will to power cannot continue to will more power in the absence of resistances. By contrast, it seems to be that the ancient Greek ethics of sexual pleasures was much more in keeping with this fateful and indispensable role of displeasure in human life, since, as we saw in the case of Socrates, it does aim at mastering this formidable resistance, i.e., the *aphrodisia*, not at getting rid of them completely to no avail.

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<sup>419</sup>UP, p. 69.

<sup>420</sup> GE, p.353.

However, I would like to further add that as long as the ancient Greeks regarded pleasure as an enemy, but not as a resistance that must be mastered to be able to establish a healthy way of living, one cannot say that they had a life-affirming stance on this issue. The main reason for my contention of this is that, according to a Nietzschean conception of life, as long as one keeps deeming some parts of life as an enemy that must be destroyed, one is *eo ipso* condemning life as a whole – for what is considered an enemy is intrinsically connected with the remaining parts of life. As Foucault admits, even though this aiming at a total extirpation of pleasures was one of the main characteristics of Christianity, it could occasionally be seen in ancient Greek ethics as well<sup>421</sup>. One could therefore never characterise the ancient Greek and Christian ethics of pleasure in black and white, regarding the latter as life-denying through and through whereas holding that the former was life-affirming in every respect.

In the fourth place, Foucault briefly discusses two models, which seek to characterise this agonistic self-relationship with regard to the ancient Greek ethics of pleasures. The first model he focuses on is the one elaborated by Xenophon in the *Oeconomicus*, which basically deals with “the role of the master of the house and the art of ruling one’s wife, one’s estate, and one’s servants”<sup>422</sup>. According to Xenophon, the schema of ‘domestic life’ well illustrates the moral condition of an individual as regards its life of *aphrodisia*: a properly managed household, which can be achieved only on the condition that the master of this house is respected, is likened to the soul of a moderate individual, who can rule its desires (e.g., gluttony, drunkenness, lust, ambition, etc.) “as if they were [its] servants”<sup>423</sup>.

The second model Foucault takes up is the schema of ‘civic life’ as elaborated by Plato in the *Republic*. Before discussing this, Foucault notes that also in the *Laws*, Plato argues that the desires of a person are like the vulgar of a *polis*, which ought to

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<sup>421</sup>UP, 69. For instance, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle likens the pleasures to be done away with to the Achaeans, who wanted to be ousted by the Trojans in the Trojan War.

<sup>422</sup>UP, p. 71.

<sup>423</sup>UP, p. 71.

be invariably kept under control lest they revolt against the order maintained by the master(s)<sup>424</sup>. Similarly but more elaborately in the *Republic*, Plato retains the assumption of a (so-called) “strict correlation between the individual and the city” throughout his work<sup>425</sup>. According to this civic model, Plato argues that the Greek ethics of *aphrodisia* can be grounded on the same pattern as the political structure of a *polis*: unless it is to be in the immoral service of inferior parts of the soul, the individual should be having the dominion over the rebellious desires, pleasures, etc. – and the individual who can achieve this dominion can be likened to the *polis*, in which the political, social, etc. order is maintained by its rightful rulers, not by the low-born populace<sup>426</sup>.

Lastly, in his characterisation of the ancient Greek practices of *enkrateia*, Foucault argues that this agonistic self-relationship vis-à-vis *aphrodisia* used to refer to the requirement of training. Foucault states that it “was one of the great Socratic lessons” that one had to undergo a process of preparation to be able to withstand and rule one’s pleasures, and this preparation was considered deficient as long as it was assumed that a mere *methesis* (mental discipline) was adequate, since without an *askesis* (training) this could by no means be complete<sup>427</sup>. Considering the Socratic tradition as a whole, *enkrateia* was regarded as, not a virtue or knowledge, “but a kind of ability or strength...that results from the training (*askesis*) imposed on body and soul”<sup>428</sup>. Furthermore, Foucault emphasises how this *askesis* was related to the *epilemeai heautou* (care of the self), which would necessitate not only “the need to know...but to attend effectively to the self, and to exercise and transform oneself”<sup>429</sup>.

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<sup>424</sup>UP, p. 71.

<sup>425</sup>UP, p. 71.

<sup>426</sup>UP, p. 71.

<sup>427</sup>UP, p. 72.

<sup>428</sup>PE, p. 137.

<sup>429</sup>UP, p. 73.

Without meeting these two preconditions of the care of the self, one could not be allowed to deal with other people's affairs in the *polis*<sup>430</sup>.

Having discussed the Socratic principle of *askesis*, Foucault adds that also in the Cynic life the role of training played an important role: the Cynics held that the good life was nothing other than one of continuous and strenuous exercises<sup>431</sup>. What is more crucial about this is that they thought that a proper *askesis* included "training the body and the soul *at the same time*"<sup>432</sup>. To be able to "face privations without suffering...and to reduce every pleasure to nothing more than the elementary satisfaction of needs"<sup>433</sup> with a view to triumphing over one's pleasures, the Cynics accorded equal importance to the body and the soul in their understanding of *askesis*<sup>434</sup>.

Implying that these practices of *askesis* were later taken up by Christianity, which interpreted them in quite different ways (e.g., Nietzsche's discussion of the values of self-abnegation, selflessness, etc. in *On the Genealogy of Morality*), Foucault detects the unique feature of ancient Greek *askesis*: excepting the Pythagorean tradition, whatever importance was given to them in the ancient Greek texts of the classical period, "one finds relatively few details on the concrete form that the ethical *askesis* could take"<sup>435</sup>. Considering the works of Xenophon, Plato, Diogenes, and Aristotle, as he discusses them in *The Use of Pleasure*, Foucault claims to discern two main reasons for this relative scantiness. Firstly, the specific contents of the practices of *askesis* were delineated relatively less, because the ancient Greeks would not regard the training as distinct from the goal that was to be reached via this training: so that endeavouring to reach the goal would constitute also the content of *askesis*<sup>436</sup>.

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<sup>430</sup>UP, p. 73.

<sup>431</sup>UP, p. 73.

<sup>432</sup>UP, p. 73, italics added.

<sup>433</sup>UP, p. 73.

<sup>434</sup>UP, p. 73.

<sup>435</sup>UP, p. 74.

<sup>436</sup>UP, p. 74.



Foucault states that this feature of ancient Greek *askesis* is well characterised by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: “By abstaining from pleasures we become temperate and it is when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them”<sup>437</sup>.

The second reason for the relative scantness in question Foucault finds in the *Oeconomicus*: according to Xenophon, in the life of a free, adult, male citizen of the *polis*, “self-mastery and the mastery of others were regarded as having the same form”<sup>438</sup>. To unpack this further, in such a life “governing oneself, managing one’s estate, and participating in the administration of the city were three practices of the same type”<sup>439</sup>. According to this schema, since the free, adult, male citizen of the *polis* would not regard managing his household and wife, and participating in ruling his city as distinct from governing himself, there used to exist less specific focus on the contents that *askesis* was supposed to take. For instance, according to Foucault, this characteristic of Greek *askesis* might account for Plato’s contention that “the best men for themselves [i.e., governing themselves, namely *askesis*] and for the city [i.e., governing others]”<sup>440</sup> are to be found in the same people with the help of a Spartan-like education that he recommends to exercise on the young of the *polis*<sup>441</sup>.

Taking into account these two reasons, which seek to explain the relative scantness in the elaboration of the specific forms Greek *askesis* used to take, Foucault draws a comparison between ancient Greek *askesis* and the subsequent tradition of Christian asceticism in the following quotation:

It would not be long before this ascetics would begin to have an independent status, or at least a partial and relative autonomy. In two ways: [i-] there was to be a differentiation between the exercises that enabled one to govern oneself and the learning of what was necessary in order to govern others; [ii-) there was also to be a

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<sup>437</sup>UP, p. 75.

<sup>438</sup>UP, p. 75.

<sup>439</sup>UP, p. 76.

<sup>440</sup>UP, p. 76.

<sup>441</sup>UP, p. 75.

differentiation between the exercises themselves and the virtue, moderation, and temperance for which they were meant to serve as training: their procedures (trials, examinations, self-control) tended to form a particular technique that was more complex than the mere rehearsal of the moral behaviour they anticipated. The time [of Christian ethics] would come when the art of the self would assume its own shape, distinct from the ethical conduct that was its objective. But in classical Greek thought, the ‘ascetics’ that enabled one to make oneself into an ethical subject was an integral part...of the practice of a virtuous life, which was also the life of a ‘free’ man in the full, positive and political sense of the word<sup>442</sup>.

In the following I would like to make some concluding remarks with the help of the above quotation. Here I would like to point out the main reason why, in the last chapter of the body of my thesis, I turn to a discussion of Foucault’s *The Use of Pleasure*, with a special emphasis on the ancient Greek practises of *askesis*: in Nietzsche’s case it was the need to search for novel interpretations of human life in the wake of the domestication of humanity through an age-old breeding programme, and of being fatefully stamped later by the Christian notions of guilt and sin (as we saw in chs. 2, 3). In Foucault’s case, the ever-spreading grasp of the homogenising disciplinary society, which seeks to produce docile and useful individuals stripped of their creative and active forces, warrants, *inter alia*, a re-reading of ancient Greek interpretations of life.

As my discussion of Foucault in this chapter shows, the practices of ancient Greek *askesis* were firmly related to the duties, responsibilities, tasks, achievements, failures, etc. of one’s body, of the household and the political life of the *polis*. In such a life, as the above quotation implies, the formation of oneself as an ethical subject would by no means refer to the guilty conscience or the sinfulness before God (as described by Nietzsche, as we saw in sec. 3.2). I think that the absence of such notions in the lives of the Greeks might provide us with a novel interpretation of human life. Unlike our modern ethical lives, which have been trapped by notions of guilt regardless of being an atheist, or strictly committed to science or philosophy in a secular fashion, the ethics of ancient Greece demonstrates what life without the

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<sup>442</sup>UP, p. 77, insertions added.

burden of guilt before God would be like in the domain of sexual pleasures (*aphrodisia*).

Furthermore, we saw above how the practices of *askesis* were inseparable from managing one's household and taking part in the political life of the *polis*, i.e., the three-tiered model of "governing oneself, managing one's estate, and participating in the administration of the city"<sup>443</sup>. As Foucault underlines in the above quotation, this three-tiered structure encapsulating ancient Greek *askesis* was to be supplanted by Christian asceticism, which separated these three social practices and, above all, laid an utmost emphasis on self-mastery – which would result in the formation of so-called pure, sinless, guiltless, etc. devotees of Christianity.

I think that in "Homer's Contest" (which I discussed in sec. 2.4), Nietzsche anticipates this point of Foucault, when he describes the transition from the ancient Greek interpretation of life to that of Christianity as regards their understanding of the motivation for contest:

From childhood, every Greek felt the burning desire within him to be an instrument of bringing salvation to his city in the contest between cities: in this, his selfishness was lit, as well as curbed and restricted [so as not to bring shame to his city]. For that reason, the individuals in antiquity were freer, because their aims were nearer and easier to achieve. Modern [human being], on the other hand, is crossed everywhere by infinity, like swift-footed Achilles in the parable of Zeno of Elea: infinity impedes [them], [they] cannot even overtake the tortoise<sup>444</sup>.

In brief, both Nietzsche explicitly and Foucault implicitly emphasise how the modern human is trapped by the nihilistic and unfulfillable demands of their guilty consciences. By contrast, as can be seen in this chapter, the people of ancient Greece were free from such a sick interpretation of life, since in their agonistic ethics of sexual pleasures the question of one's role in the life of the *polis* was always on the horizon – by contrast to the Christian horizon, which was, as Nietzsche implies

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<sup>443</sup> *UP*, p. 76.

<sup>444</sup> *HC*, p. 98, insertions added.

above, occupied by the so-called infinite, otherworldly, and life-denying demands of the monotheistic God.

After this comparison of Greek *askesis* and Christian asceticism, I would like to point out one feature of the former by drawing on Deleuze's interpretation of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, which we already encountered in ch. 3. As we saw there, Deleuze subtly differentiates between what he calls the first and the second stages of bad conscience: the former being marked by Nietzsche's account of the internalisation of human being, and the latter by his account of how this interiority was further stamped by Christianity under the name of guilt, i.e., sin, or guilty conscience. Having been reminded of this differentiation, I think that it is worthwhile to ask wherein the ancient Greek life would be situated in this narrative, as far as Foucault's discussion of the Greek ethics of sexual pleasures is concerned. I find problematising such a point fruitful insofar as, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter, both Nietzsche's and Foucault's philosophies were in search of different perspectives on life beyond Christianity.

Given our discussion of the Greek ethics of *aphrodisia*, one can straightforwardly point out that ancient Greek life was not mired in what Deleuze calls the second stage of bad conscience, since it is clear that they were far from the Christian interpretation of life with the notions of guilt or sin. However, I would like to claim that, granted that *aphrodisia* were part and parcel of the unconscious forces of ancient Greek's life, all these relentless, elaborate and painstaking discussions of this realm of life inevitably indicate that they were internalised human animals. In other words, the rationalisation of the intrinsically non-rational realms of life, as we saw in this chapter in the works of the philosophers of antiquity, demonstrates the growing consciousness and interiority on the part of the ancient Greeks. At this point, one should remember Nietzsche's contention that not their existence per se, but the hypertrophy of consciousness, interiority, "soul", etc. indicates a perilous, fateful, sickly but at the same time promising stage in human history. Bearing this in mind, I think that classical Greece in a sense can be said to have undergone the first stage of bad conscience, which means that they were considerably advanced in the way of internalisation.

On the basis of this assertion of mine I would like to further point out that even though a re-examination of ancient Greek ethics might prove fruitful (as we saw above especially when it was contrasted with Christian ethics), it cannot give us a sufficient perspective in Nietzsche's and Foucault's search for a possible way out of the nihilism of our era, because (as I discussed above) classical ancient Greece was already too rationalised a way of life. One could therefore conclude that a re-interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy as regards its ethics of sexual pleasures might provide us with only a *partial* antidote to nihilism. As I tried to lay out in this chapter, this partiality lies in the fact that the Greek sense of sexual pleasures was not trapped in the Christian notion of guilt, but was the perspective of an internalised human being.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

In the body of the thesis as a whole, I charted the various meanings that the feelings of pleasure, displeasure, and pain take on, as conceptualised and problematised by Nietzsche and Foucault, respectively. To be more precise, even though it could be said that the main discussion revolves around the cultural, social, or anthropological roles of the concepts in question, I started my discussion by examining the physiological understanding of these concepts – so as to shed light on Nietzsche’s conception of them on a more general level before going into the more specific ones in the subsequent chapters.

Accordingly, in Chapter 2 as a whole, I examined Nietzsche’s physiological or bodily interpretation of (dis)pleasure and pain. For this discussion I sought to construct a coherent narrative given that the pertinent fragments in *The Will to Power* hardly permit any systematic unity in themselves. In Section 2.1, I dealt with Nietzsche’s understanding of pleasure and displeasure, through which he seeks to overcome their dogmatic interpretations, which I touched on in the Introduction. To be able to dispel these misinterpretations, he undertakes their interpretations according to his doctrine of will to power, which I discussed briefly. One of the most conspicuous instances of these misreading is the view that pleasure and displeasure are opposites, i.e., the latter constitutes the lack of the former, and vice versa, as the English and German too suggest. However, with Nietzsche’s pluralistic interpretation, I claimed to show, such a simplistic conception is to be discarded.

In Section 2.2, I focused on Nietzsche’s discussion of pain, for which there are relatively less fragments in his posthumous work than for the ones devoted to the discussion of pleasure and displeasure. In his understanding of pain as well, he endeavours to do away with one ingrained view on this issue, i.e., pleasure and pain represent the opposite feelings: pleasure can be said to be the absence of pain, or the latter the lack of the former. Again, in Nietzsche’s understanding pain takes on a novel meaning independent of pleasure and displeasure. More crucially, pain is

construed as the interpretation of the organism: the organism evaluates the damage which causes pain according to whether it is harmful to its unity or not. So that, the feeling of pain, for Nietzsche, is not connected with the damage *itself*, but with the *value* of the damage. Further, this value is constructed apropos of self-preservation, which is not the primary value in Nietzsche's thinking. The corollary of this interpretation is that, granted that the increasing ascendancy of the role of pain in our lives points to rampant nihilism according to the will to power, Nietzsche's novel conception of pain seeks to overcome this ascendancy by ascribing a secondary value to it.

In Section 2.3, I dealt with the question of the evaluation of these feelings according to a Nietzschean art of interpretation. As we saw in the discussion, this kind of interpretation stipulates that being life-affirmative or life-denying of phenomena, namely being healthy or sickly of them, is the ultimate issue. The common element to be found both in (dis)pleasure and pain is that they are epiphenomena, i.e., they are only simplified constructions carried out on the level of consciousness after the 'fact' itself takes place. At this point, I briefly discussed Nietzsche's critique of the overestimation of the role of consciousness in human life. As we saw, consciousness mainly aims at the self-preservation of the individual, not the self-expenditure of it. Accordingly, these conscious feelings are far from being the ultimate criteria in the assessment of phenomena, since they are just the simplistic, reductive interpretations of what are in fact much more complex and fundamental, unconscious forces of life. Instead, whether the phenomenon in question is conducive to the enhancement of power or not is to be the question that must be addressed in a Nietzschean interpretation of life, which takes, not the conscious forces aiming at self-preservation, but the unconscious ones aiming at becoming more, as the criterion.

In Section 2.4, by scrutinising one of Nietzsche's early philological essays, 'Homer's Contest', I sought to demonstrate that, Nietzsche's interpretation of displeasure and pain on a life-affirmative basis was generally at work in the Homeric age of ancient Greece. Accordingly, in the *polis*, the agonistic life of the ancient Greeks used to regard the feelings of displeasure and pain as the *sine qua non* of life,

and hence the life-affirmative stance on life was put into action. At the close of the chapter I stated that, before proceeding to the next chapter, focusing on this issue is of great importance, since such an undertaking would better shed light on the next chapter by contrasting it with the way the ancient Greeks evaluated the same feelings.

In Chapter 3, which is the heart of my thesis, I delved into the evaluation of pleasure and pain on the cultural level by discussing *On the Genealogy of Morality*, especially the second treatise of this work. In Section 3.1, after discussing Nietzsche's contention that breeding a promise-keeping and hence responsible animal is *the* issue regarding human beings, the characterisation of the two active forces, namely forgetfulness and memory, was undertaken. Whereas, for Nietzsche, forgetfulness is deemed to be the more primordial one, memory is taken to be an active force that must be cultivated for it to be able to operate. After dispelling a common yet fallacious interpretation of forgetfulness and memory as considering the one as the lack of the other, and discussing Deleuze's subtle differentiation between the two sorts of memory, i.e., the memory of words and that of traces, I took up the issue of how to engender or strengthen a memory (of words). As we saw, it is through the infliction of bodily pain that one's memory can develop and gain strength against the forces of forgetfulness.

Then, I brought under discussion the encounter between the creditor and the debtor, with its torturous equation 'injury caused = pain undergone', as the locus of the social role of pain. Accordingly, through the fabrication of this equation, the sadistic pleasure on the part of the creditor and the memory-begetting pain on the part of the (insolvent) debtor are indissolubly linked. As the last point of discussion in this section, Nietzsche's account of the internalisation of the human animal was investigated. Having been under the fateful and forceful dominion of society, there comes a time when one could no longer exercise the infliction of pain in an outward fashion, but could only exercise it in the form of a masochistic pleasure of the self-infliction of pain. After describing this twist, I argue that, in his discussion of bad conscience, Nietzsche does not deal with the so-called *origin* of bad conscience, but with its unexpected, forceful and fateful *hypertrophy*.



In Section 3.2, I discussed the third treatise of the work in question, in which we saw how pain in its turn, after the internalisation of the human animal, is internalised at the hands of the Christian priest by interpreting it as sinfulness before God. Thereby, at this stage, how pain takes on a novel, inward meaning as the feeling of guilt was problematised. I argued that, given the fundamental feature of the will to power, i.e., perpetual becoming and expending more and more, pain's taking on a novel interpretation is entirely compatible with Nietzsche's ontology. Next, I treated the so-called curative methods of the Christian priest and argued that, regardless of its consequences, this priestly attempt at the anaesthetisation of pain is nihilistic – for, as we saw in Chapter 2, life is rife with pain, and the Nietzschean life-affirmation tells us to embrace life as it is.

In Section 3.3, I dealt with the issue of the significance of body in Nietzsche's account of the genealogy of the promise-keeping human animal. All the locales we looked at above in this chapter refer to the presence of the malleable and vulnerable body. In other words, what is groundbreaking in Nietzsche's account is that without taking the irreducible and primary role of the body into account, one cannot interpret the emergence of a subjectivity and stable social sphere. In the latter part of this section, I argued that the above discussion of *On the Genealogy of Morality* narrates the increasing dominance of the reactive value of pain in our lives. To better explicate this point, I contrasted this account with 'Homer's Contest' and concluded that whereas in the latter one can find a healthy relation between pleasure and displeasure without the negative role of pain, in the former there exists a sickly relation between pleasure and pain, which also dismisses the indispensable role of displeasure for human life.

Chapter 4 was devoted to Foucault's interpretation of pain on the social level, as discussed in *Discipline and Punish*. One of my main aims in this discussion was to bring the Nietzschean elements of this work to the fore, since, as I claimed and tried to demonstrate throughout the chapter, this work of Foucault can be seen as a further elaboration of Nietzsche's account we saw in the previous chapter. In Section 4.1, the shift in the economy of punishment in the West starting roughly from the eighteenth century was problematised by discussing it on two different levels. Based

on this problematisation I argued, firstly, that although Foucault speaks of as if there were only one, universal meaning of pain, he in fact means the reactive interpretation of pain, which aims at self-preservation; secondly, that Foucault's assertion about the shift in the economy of punishment on the second level runs parallel to Nietzsche's account of the shift in the locus of pain, which we saw in the previous chapter.

In Section 4.2, I investigated Foucault's characterisation of the old economy of punishment on three axes, and pointed to the similarities between these three features and the creditor-debtor relationship, as laid out in the previous chapter. Also, I claimed that the Nietzschean principle that one takes pleasure in making- and seeing-suffer can be found in the figures that Foucault claims to have detected in the further elaboration of the third axis in question.

Section 4.3 concerned with the elucidation of the novel economy of punishment based on two main levels. On the first level, I demonstrated how Foucault concurs with Nietzsche's contention that it is not sensible to hold that the aim of punishment is to reduce wrongdoing. On the second level of this new economy, I claimed that this second level too is Nietzschean in that the ontology of will to power is at work in Foucault's interpretation of the emergent new political economy of power to punish.

In Section 4.4, the central part of this chapter, I focused on the shift in the social value of pain, as elaborated by Foucault under the heading of the new semio-technique of punitive signs. After describing this change according to three main axes, I argued that this discussion too generally follows Nietzsche's account of the shift in the trajectory of pain. I sought to demonstrate this similarity on five points.

In Chapter 5, the ancient Greek (sexual) pleasures (*aphrodisia*) were scrutinized with a view to searching a way out of nihilism in the wake of the age-old process of domestication of the human animal. In Section 5.1, two main recentring in terms of the construal of *aphrodisiac* were introduced: firstly, in lieu of an understanding of ancient Greece as lacking almost all prohibitions, condemnations, etc. of sexuality that the later tradition of Christian ethics used to have, what Foucault calls a 'quadri-thematics of sexual austerity' was proposed. Secondly, the misleading focus on interdictions as regards sexual pleasures was replaced with a novel interpretation in which the manner of the problematisation of them becomes the focal point.

In Section 5.2, I delved into the interpretation of *enkrateia*, namely asceticism in the manner of the ancient Greeks. This examination was carried out by, firstly, contrasting it with the related notion *sophrosyne*, and, secondly, unpacking it on its own, as elaborated by Foucault on five main threads. I concluded the chapter by arguing that the main reason why I mainly focused on *enkrateia* by omitting the other three notions Foucault deals with in his work, i.e., *aphrodisia*, *chresis*, and *sophrosyne*, was that the sexual ethics of *enkrateia* might provide us with a novel interpretation of life unburdened by the nihilistic, Christian notions of sin or guilt. Nevertheless, I qualified that, despite this probability of a novel perspective, a re-reading of ancient Greece as regards *aphrodisia* can furnish us only with a partial antidote to our nihilism – since they had already a rationalised way of living, which is at odds with irrational and hence creative forces of life.

Considering the summary of my thesis above, one can see that this study aims to demonstrate how such ‘quotidian’ feelings as pleasure, displeasure, and pain are indissolubly linked with the consequential issues such as the constitution of subjectivity, the formation of a society, the fateful physiological and psychological transformations in the human animal, and so forth. Notwithstanding the richness and complexity of the accounts of Nietzsche and Foucault, it would be well Nietzschean to assert that this discussion on the values of (dis)pleasure and pain are far from restricted to these points of discussion. For instance, if, following the Nietzschean art of interpretation, one is never to assume any ‘given’ or ‘fact’ in life and seek to evaluate the value of phenomena in their flux of perpetual becoming according to a polyvalent but monistic ontology, one could point out that the genealogical account could be furthered: given the indispensable role of cruelty in this account (see ch. 3), the genealogy of cruelty itself is in order. I should point out that *On the Genealogy of Morality* does not go into this issue. What we saw in the said chapter as regards the role of cruelty is only its ubiquitousness in human life – not its genealogical account charting its development, hypertrophy, the fateful twists it is thought to take in history, etc.

As I reiterated in my thesis, I think that Foucault was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century who recognised this necessity, namely the

continuation of the genealogical project, and hence undertook this in his works. Of these works I discussed only the two of them in my thesis. So that, by means of Foucault, one can see how wide-ranging fields the genealogical method could be applied to: the shifts in the history of penalty, legal system, incarceration, etc. (ch. 4), and the radically unfamiliar yet far from utopian moral problematisation of *aphrodisia* in the ancient Greek world (ch. 5) constitute only two among many other fields that Foucault took up in his works.

I suggest that, given the long-standing tradition of Western metaphysics trapped in philosophising in terms of substance and Nietzsche's insistence that this habit of thinking must be overcome, Nietzsche's philosophy of will to power offers an unprecedented and seminal perspective in the quest for establishing a novel tradition of interpretation not encumbered by nihilism, otherworldly thinking, the religious or 'enlightened' inattention to the role of body in (human) life, and so on. And Foucault has been one of those who availed himself of this perspective with a gesture towards the posterity, who are tasked with opening up new horizons as the continuation of this project.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Plato'dan Nietzsche'nin zamanına kadar Batı felsefesinde hakim olan en önemli unsurlardan birisi bedenin insan hayatı içindeki rolünün yadsınması olmuştur. Denilebilir ki, bu ihmalin arkasında yatan en önemli etken söz konusu felsefi gelenekteki hayatı kavramsallaştırma alışkanlıklarıdır: 'bu' hayatı 'öteki' bir hayat uğruna sonsuz derecede değersizleştiren bu yaklaşım hiç şüphesiz ki modernitede nihilizm ile en problemlili haline kavuşmuştur. Bu durum göz önüne alındığında, bedene indirgenemez ve en üst önemde bir rol atfeden Nietzsche'nin düşüncesinin ne kadar radikal olduğu teslim edilmelidir. Bu radikallik ondan sonra da birçok takipçi bulmuştur, ve Foucault'nun yirminci yüzyıl Fransız düşüncesinde en sıkı Nietzsche takipçilerinden biri olduğu söylenebilir. Foucault, sadece takipçilikle kalmayıp Nietzsche'nin düşüncesini, yani onun monizmini, farklı alanlara uygulayarak bu yeni düşünsel perspektifte oldukça özgün eserler de vermiştir. Bu tezde, Nietzsche'nin ve Foucault'nun zevk, zevksizlik, ve acı (*pleasure, displeasure, and pain*) duygularının okumalarının izini sürerek söz konusu radikalitenin örneklemesini yapmayı amaçlanmaktadır.

Çalışma ana hatları ile şu şekildedir. Giriş bölümünde, ana konudaki tartışmaya yardımcı olmasından çok tartışmaya açılan zevk, zevksizlik, ve acı duygularının tarihselliğini göstermek amacıyla, sırasıyla Platon, Aristoteles, Epikür, ve J. S. Mill figürlerinin bu duyguları nasıl yorumladığı kısaca açıklanıyor. Bu kısa tartışmada, Plato'nun antihedonizmden hedonizme kadar çok geniş bir spektrumda görüş bildirdiği, Aristoteles'in *eudaimonia* öğretisi bağlamında zevk duygusunu yorumladığı, Epikür'ün Aristoteles'in etkisinde kalsa da zevk duygusunu hedonist bir açıdan açıkladığı, ve son olarak, J. S. Mill'in bağlı olduğu faydacılık okuluna göre zevk mefhumunu yorumladığına değinildi. İkinci Bölüm'de, Nietzsche'nin söz konusu duyguları fizyolojik bir perspektiften okuması, *Güç İstenci* isimli ölümünden sonra basılan eserindeki fragmanların mümkün olduğunca sistematik bir şekilde bir araya getirilerek tartışılmaktadır. En son kısımda ise Nietzsche'nin filolojik yazıları



olarak isimlendirebileceğimiz bir gençlik yazısı olan ‘Homer’in Mücadelesi’ (*Homer’s Contest*) tartışmaya açılarak, klasik dönem öncesi eski Yunan toplumunun aynı duyguları nasıl yorumlayıp hayata geçirdiği tartışılmaktadır. Üçüncü Bölüm’de, Nietzsche’nin söz konusu duyguları kültürel, sosyal ya da antropolojik bir perspektiften okuması tartışılmaktadır. Bu tartışmadaki ana kaynak *Ahlakın Soykütüğü* eseri olup, eserin birinci ve üçüncü bölümleri de ilgili konularda tartışmaya dahil olsa da, asıl tartışmanın ikinci bölüm üzerinde olduğu belirtilmelidir. Dördüncü ve Beşinci Bölümler ise Üçüncü Bölüm’ün devamı niteliğinde olup, bu sefer Foucault’nun sırasıyla *Hapishanenin Doğuşu* ve *Cinselliğin Tarihi* adlı eserlerinde sırasıyla acı ve zevk duygularının kültürel dünyada geçirdiği anlamsal değişiklikleri ve bu değişikliklerin sosyal hayatımıza olan etkileri tartışma konusu yapılmaktadır. Dördüncü Bölüm’de son iki/üçyüzyılda hayatımızda giderek daha fazla etkisini hissettiren ve önceden görülmemiş dönüşümlerin yaşanmasına sebep olan disipline edici toplumun gücü tartışılmaktadır. Beşinci Bölüm ise, Dördüncü Bölüm’deki hakim duruş olan bireylerin tamamen pasifize olup sosyal güçler tarafından şekillenildiği görüşüne adeta karşı çıkarcasına, bu sefer eski Yunan aristokratlarının nasıl ahlak alanında kendi kendilerine şekil verdiklerinin incelemesini yapmaktadır.

Nietzsche *Güç İstenci* adlı eserinde zevk ve zevksizlik kavramlarını tartışırken, bunu güç istenci adı verilen monistik ontolojisi ile yapmaktadır. Bu konuda aşılması gereken iki ana dogmatik görüş söz konusudur: i-) zevk, istencin tatmin edilmesiyle açığa çıkan bir duygudan başkası değildir dogması, ve ii-) mutluluk hepimizin peşinden koştuğu ideal bir durumu ifade eder sanısı.

Söz konusu monizme göz atacak olursak, güç istenci doktrininin sadece insana değil tüm evrene de uygulanabilen, yani kozmik bir öğreti olduğu görülecektir. Bu öğretiye göre, onun dışında hiçlikten başkası olmayan yaşam, en temelinde hiç sonu gelmeyen bir daha fazla olmak, daha fazla harcamak istencidir, ve bu istenç nihayetinde bir amaç uğruna değil tamamen irrasyonel bir şekilde, kısa süreliğine bir tatmin eşliğinde olmaktadır. Bu görüşe göre, ne Aydınlanma’nın iyimser doğrusal ilerleme modeli, ne de Schopenhauercu kötümserlik, yani yaşamın beyhudeliği, hiç olmamış olması gerekliliği, yaşamı kavramsallaştırmada başarıya ulaşabilmiştir.

Bu öğretiy göz önüne alındığında, Nietzsche'nin zevk duygusunu yorumlaması şu şekildedir: zevk, hedonistlerin inandığı aksine bir eylemin sebebi olmasının tersine, organizmanın önüne çıkan engeli aştığında, ancak bu aşma eyleminin sonrasında meydana gelebilecek olan bir eşlik-edici duygu durumudur. Aynı şekilde, zevksizlik duygusu ise işte yukarıda adı geçen engel (*resistance*) olarak tanımlanmıştır. Eşit derecede önem arzeden bir başka durum ise, bu engelin, yani zevksizlik duygusunun sadece bilinç seviyesinde yaşadığımız bir fenomen olduğudur – ki bu hususun açıklanması aşağıda yapılacaktır. Böylece, güç istenci modeline göre, eylemde olan organizmanın yaşamını devam ettirebilmesi için kendisini daha fazla harcaması gerekmektedir, bu harcama içinse engelleri, yani zevksizlik duygusunu aşması elzemdir. Böylelikle, zevksizlik gibi genel olarak negatif olarak yorumlanan bir duygunun olumlu olarak hayatın içindeki olmazsa olmaz yerine konulduğunu görmekteyiz.

Acı duygusuna geldiğimizde ise, Nietzscheci yorumlamayla aşılacak istenen en başta acı ve zevk duygularının zıt olduğu görüşü olmuştur. Zıtlıkların ortadan kaldırılmasının çoğulcu bir düşünce için ne kadar önemli olduğu göz önüne alındığında, acı duygusunu sadece zevkin yokluğu olarak yorumlamaktansa ona bağımsız bir anlam dünyası yaratmanın çok daha kavrayışlı bir yaklaşım olduğu kabul edilmelidir. Böylece, acı duygusunun, gündelik hayatta sanıldığı aksine, organizmanın yaralanması sonucu hissettiği bir duygu değil, yaralanmanın organizma üzerine yol açabilecek olası kötü durumlara karşı organizmanın yarattığı bir duygu olduğu görülür: kısacası, acı duygusu yaranın kendisi değil, organizmanın söz konusu yaraya atfettiği değer ile ilişkilidir. Şüphe yok ki, bu değer atfetme ise beden bütünlüğüne, yani hayatta kalabilmesi kriterine göre yapılmaktadır. Yukarıda kısaca açıklanmış olan güç istenci doktrinine göre ise, görüngüleri yorumlamadaki ana kriterin hayatta kalma değil daha sağlıklı olup olmama, yani daha fazla kendini tüketebilme (*self-expenditure*) olduğu görülür.

Bu yorumlamanın sadece acı için değil, zevk ve zevksizlik duyguları için de doğru olduğu göz önüne alındığında ise Nietzsche'nin bilincin aşırı değer kazanmasına dair yaptığı eleştiri hayati önem kazanmaktadır. Hem zevk ve zevksizlik, hem de acı duygularının, yukarıdaki okumalara göre, ikincil, yani

epifenomenal (ana fenomenden sonra yaşanan) olduğu düşünülürde, bu duyguların ana olaydan hemen sonra bilinç seviyemizde yaratılmış kurgular olduğu görülür. Buna göre, güç istenci doktrini bağlamında ikinci önemde olan hayatta kalma ile ilişkili olan bilincin, ondan çok daha kompleks, girift, ve yaratıcı olan bilinçaltı alemin sadece basitleştirilmiş bir yorumunu yapabildiğine kanaat getirebiliriz. Bu sebeple, bilinçli duygular olan zevk, zevksizlik, ve acı hayatta olup bitenleri nasıl yorumlamalı sorusundaki ana kriter olmaktan çok uzaktadır. Hedonizm, antihedonizm, monoteizmin vazettiği çilecilik gibi tüm görüşlerde ortak olan şey, söz konusu duygulara birincil önem atfetmeleridir. Tüm bunlara karşı hayatı olumlayıcı bir alternatifle karşı çıkan güç istenci öğretisi ise, asıl meselenin hayatı olumlayıcı mı inkar edici mi sorusunun ana kriter olduğunu ileri sürer.

Nietzsche'nin 'Homer'in Mücadelesi' makalesinin okumasında ise zevk, zevksizlik, ve acı duygularının yukarıdaki tartışma ışığında, ve sonraki bölümde göreceğimiz modern yorumla zıtlık oluşturacak biçimde, hayatı olumlayıcı bir şekilde olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Buna göre, genelde aşırıya kaçan ya da yadsıyıcı yorumlarla ya hayatın gayesi haline getirilmek istenen ya da tamamıyla yok edilmek istenen acı ve zevksizlik duygularının, arkaik dönem eski Yunan dünyasında yaşam içerisinde hakettiği yeri aldığı ispatlanmaktadır. Bu tartışma 3. Bölüm'de tartışılan 'sözünü tutan, borçları unutturulmayan modern insan' tartışmasıyla iyi bir zıtlık oluşturarak, modern insanın nihilizmden çıkması için ne yapmalı sorusunu cevaplamada yardımcı olabileceği olasılığı da tartışmaya dahil edilmektedir.

*Ahlakın Soykütüğü* eserinin ikinci denemesi ise zevk, zevksizlik, ve acı duygularının kültürel ya da sosyal açıdan yorumlanmasının ana metnini oluşturmakla birlikte, Dördüncü ve Beşinci Bölümler'in bu bölümde açılan tartışmanın devamı olması sebebiyle, Üçüncü Bölüm'ün bu çalışmanın en önemli kısmı olduğu söylenebilir. Söz tutan, sorumluluk sahibi insanın yetiştirilmesinin nasıl olabildiği olacağı ana sorudur. Bu meseleyi sorunsallaştırırken ilk uğraşımız, birbirine karşı işleyen, ikisi de aktif güçleri oluşturan unutkanlık (*forgetfulness*) ve hafıza fakültelerinin nasıl ortaya çıktığı meselesidir. Nietzsche'ye göre birincisi sağlıklı bir organizmada en baştan beri bulunup, onun yaşamı için olmazsa olmaz olan bir vazifeyi sürdürmesini sağlar: bilincin kapılarını bilinçaltı dünyaya karşı kapatıp

bedenin sağlıklı yaşayabilmesini sağlamak. İkinci fakülte olan hafıza ise binlerce yıldır sürmüş ve halen de sürmekte olan bir yetiştirme (*breeding*) süreci sayesinde/nedeniyle ortaya çıkabilmiştir.

Bu iki fakültenin karşılaştırmasında gözden kaçmaması gereken iki önemli nokta mevcut: i-) hafızayı unutkanlığın, ya da unutkanlığı hafızanın değillenmesi ya da yokluğu şeklinde okumamak – ki gündelik hayat yorumudur burada karşı çıkılan, ve çalışmada gösterildiği üzere Nietzsche uzmanları bile bu hatalı okumaya düşebilmektedir; ii-) Deleuze'ün *Nietzsche ve Felsefe*'de dile getirdiği gibi, hafızayı anlamca ikiye ayırıp bu tartışmada söz konusu olanın hangisi olduğunu belirlemek: kelimelerin hafızası (*the memory of words*) ve izlerin hafızası (*the memory of traces*) diye iki çeşit hafızadan bahsedebiliriz, ve burada tartışılan birinci çeşittir. Kelimelerin hafızası gelecekte verilmiş olan sözlerin tutulmasında işe yararken, izlerin hafızası ise, *Ahlakın Soykütüğü*'nün birinci denemesinde tartışılan, efendi ve köle ahlakı karşılaştırmasında kölenin geçmişte yaşadığı, bedensel güçsüzlüğünden ötürü üstesinden gelemediği yenilgilerinin onda bıraktığı izlere işaret etmektedir. Bu izlerde onda hınç (*ressentiment*) denilecek olan bir duygunun yaratımına işaret etmektedir – fakat bu konu tartışmanın epey uzağında kaldığı için buna değinilmez.

Ana tartışmaya dönecek olursak, hafıza (bunda sonra hep kelimelerin hafızası kastedilecek) fakültesinin nasıl geliştirilebildiği bize acı duygusunun kültürel rolünü verir: sadece bitmek tükenmek bilmeden acı veren şey hafızada kalır. Bu hususu anlamadaki en büyük yanlış bu acı dolu, işkenceyle kaplı fenomenin geçmişe ait olduğunu düşünmektir. Dördüncü Bölüm'de tartışıldığı üzere, modernite bu prensibi hala kullanmaya devam etmektedir. Peki bu prensibin işlerlik kazandığı yer neresidir? Bunun için alacaklı-borçlu ilişkisi (*the creditor-debtor relationship*) hikaye edilir: borçlu olan borcunu ödememesi durumunda alacaklıya ne kadar zarar vermişse, borçludan o kadar karşılığı alınır, o da bedeniyle çekeceği acılar vasıtasıyla. Burada başka bir modern yanlış okumanın önüne geçilmesi gerekli: alacaklıyı bu 'ne kadar zarar o kadar bedensel acı' eşitliğini kurdurtmaya itenin onun borçluyu modern anlamda sorumlu tutmasından çok, insanın acı çektirmeden veya acı çeken izlerken aldığı sadistik zevkten dolayı olduğu iddia edilir. Böylelikle, alacaklı-borçlu ilişkisinde, alacaklının aldığı sadistik, borçlunun bedeninde hiç

duraksamadan acıyı üretebilme zevki ile borçlunun bedeniyle ödediği cezada hissettiği hafıza geliştiren acı dolu zevklerin birbirinden ayrılmayacak şekilde bağlandığı görülür.

Tartışmanın sonraki eksenini ise Nietzsche'nin meşhur insanın içselleş(tiril)mesi (*the internalising of human being*) teorisi oluşturmaktadır. Stabil, barışın tesis edildiği, kurallara göre yaşanan toplum hayatında artık, alacaklı-borçlu ilişkisinde olduğu gibi, acı verme, yani işkenceci (*cruelty*) tarafını açığa çıkaramayan insan, bu mekanizmanın artık kendi iç dünyasında işlediğini görür. Böylece, sadistik başkasına acı vermeden gelen zevk, kendi kendine acı vererek alınan zevke dönüşür. Ayrıca, bu dönüşümün sayesinde bedenin öldürülmesini esas gaye edinen çileci geleneğin de soykütüksel bir hesabını vermek de mümkün olur.

*Ahlakın Soykütüğü*'nün üçüncü denemesinde yapılan, bu tezde görece daha kısa yürütülen olan tartışma ise, yukarıda görülen insanın içselleşmesinde açığa çıktığı iddia edilen vicdan (*bad conscience*) fakültesinin yeni bir rol yüklenmesini söz konusu etmektedir. *Nietzsche ve Felsefe*'de de belirtildiği gibi, birinci aşamayı insanın iç derinlik kazanması oluşturuyorsa, ikinci aşamayı ise birinci aşamadan ortaya çıkan vicdanın vicdan azabına (*guilty conscience*) dönüşmesi oluşturmaktadır. Bu yeni dönüşümde olan şey ise, aynı insan gibi bu sefer de kendine kendi kendine verilen acıdan alınan işkenceci zevkin yeni bir anlam kazanarak Tanrı karşısında günah şeklinde yorumlanmaya başlamasıdır.

Tüm bu tartışmalar göz önüne alındığında, söz konusu Nietzscheci soykütüksel öykülemeyi baştan sona kateden önemli bir nokta var: bedenin varlığı, daha açık söylemek gerekirse, kolay yaralanan, esnek, şartlara göre yeni anlamlar yaratılmasında adeta bitmek bilmeyen bir kaynak vazifesi gören bedenin yukarıda tartışılan insanlık tarihi bakımından en trajik, hayati dönüşümlerde hep baş rolü oynamış olması. Çalışmamın girişinde de belirttiğim gibi, iki bin yıllık felsefi geleneğin ruh, akıl, vb. vurguları karşısında Nietzscheci bu beden vurgusu oldukça radikaldir. Bu radikalliği açıp, tezin konusu olan zevk, zevksizlik, ve acı duygularına geldiğimizde ise, *Ahlakın Soykütüğü*'nde ikincil önemde olduğunu gördüğümüz acı yorumunun nihilist bir şekilde vurgu kazandığı görülür. 'Homer'in Mücadelesi' ile bir zıtlık kurabilmek de mümkün: arkaik dönem eski Yunan toplumunda görülen

zevksizlik ve acı duygularının olumlanması yerine, modernitede zevksizliğin, yani engelleri aşmanın rolünün ihmal edildiği, ve acı ile zevk arasında hayatı değilleyen bir bağ kurulduğu öne sürülüp kanıtlanılmaya çalışılan iddialar arasındadır.

Foucault'nun *Hapishanenin Doğuşu (Discipline and Punish)* isimli, ceza ekonomisinde son iki/üçyüzyılda yaşanan dönüşümleri tartışmaya açtığı eserinde ise bu çalışmayla ilintili olan acı duygusunun dönüşümleri meselesine odaklanılıyor. Tartışmaya girmeden belirtmek gerekir ki, Foucault kitabının hiçbir yerinde belirtmemesine rağmen bu eseri onun en Nietzscheci çalışmasıdır ve bu çalışmada eserin bu özelliği mümkün olduğunca ön plana çıkartılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu öne çıkartmada amaçlanan en önemli husus ise güç istenci doktrinin günümüz dünyasına nasıl başarılı bir şekilde uygulanabildiğini göstermektir.

Tartışmaya açılan ilk değişim, onyedinci yüzyılın sonu ile onsekizinci yüzyılın başından itibaren cezaların törenselliğini kaybedip artık açık alanda gittikçe daha az sayıda yapılıyor olması. Bu değişim doğal olarak kalabalık önünde acı çeken, işkence gören suçlunun bedeninin kaybolmasına işaret ederek ceza ekonomisinde *görünürde* yaşanan bir yumuşama (*leniency*) olduğunu ima edebilir. Bu eksenin yüzeyde olan değişimi açıklamaya yaradığı kabul edilip, daha derinde ya da arka planda olan değişime geçecek olursak, cezalandırılan şeyin artık sadece suçlunun bedeni ve alenen çektiği acı olmayıp onun ruhu, psikolojisi, davranış dünyası, zihni durumu, vb. nin de buna dahil olduğu görülür. Böylelikle, artık sadece suç addedilen eylemin değil bu suça sebebiyet veren unsurlarla ilintili olan suçlunun iç dünyası da cezalandırılması gereken unsurlara dahil olmuş olur. Tezde ileri sürüp kanıtlamaya çalışıldığı gibi, Foucault'nun tespit ettiği bu değişim Nietzsche'nin tartıştığı alacaklı-borçlu ilişkisinden insanın içselleştirmesine doğru evrilmesinde yaşanan dönüşümlerle koştur konumdadır.

Bu değişimi tartışıldıktan sonra sırasıyla eski ve yeni cezalandırma ekonomilerinin açıklanması geliyor. Eski ekonomide şu üç unsurun kendini tekrar ettiği ileri sürülür: i-) hesaplanabilir olan acının üretimi, ii-) bu acının düzenlenmesi, iii-) suçlunun bedeninde acının üretildiği bu halka açık infazların bir ritüele göre icra ediliyor olması. Buradaki üçüncü unsurun Nietzsche'nin alacaklı-borçlu ilişkisinde saptadığı özelliklere ne kadar benzediği de tartışılıyor. Yukarıdaki üçüncü unsur daha

sonra i-) egemenin intikamı ve ii-) halkın varlığı şeklinde başka bir boyutta tartışma konusu ediliyor. Foucault'nun bu iki figürün halka açık yapılan, törensel infazlardaki aldığını ileri sürdüğü rollerin ne kadar Nietzscheci olduğu da görülebilir: egemenin konumu alacaklıyı, halkın konumu ise acı çeken bedeni izlemekten zevk alan kişinin zevkini anımsatmaktadır.

Yeni ekonomiye geldiğimizde ise en başta göze çarpan husus, onsekizinci yüzyıldan itibaren alenen yapılan infazların azalarak, akla acaba daha mı akılcı, merhametli, vb. bir toplumda mı yaşıyoruz sorusunu getirecek şekilde bir 'insanileşme' sürecinin başlamış olması. Bu yeni ekonomiyi iki ana başlıkta incelemek mümkün. İlk olarak, suçların artık bedenleri değil, artarak daha fazla malları hedef alıyor olması. Burada önemli olan durum ise, bu değişimin cezaların 'hafiflemesinden' sonra değil önce gerçekleşmiş olmasıdır. Yani, hem Nietzsche'nin hem de Foucault'nun ısrar ettiği üzere, modern cezalandırma yöntemlerinin suç işlemeyi azaltmayı hedeflediği için tesis edildiği dogmatik bir ifade olmaktan öteye gidemez; burada da görüldüğü üzere olgular bu kanıyı çürütmektedir. İkinci olarak, çok daha kaba, heterojen bir cezalandırma tekniğinin yerini daha aktif, daha homojen bir şekilde toplumun en küçük unsurlarına kadar erişebilen bir yeni cezalandırma tekniğinin almış olması. Bu değişim Aydınlanmacı bir okumayla toplumda adaletin uygulanmasının daha başarılı olduğu şekilde yorumlanmamalı. Bilakis, bu yeni teknik ile toplum eskisinden daha fazla disipline edici toplumun güçleri tarafından kuşatılabilmektedir. Bu daha kuşatıcı olma ise, tezde kanıtlamaya çalışıldığı gibi, Nietzsche'nin ontolojisi temel alınarak açıklanabilir.

Çalışmamın son bölümünde ise, Foucault'nun *Cinselliğin Tarihi* eserinin ikinci cildinde ele alındığı şekliyle, eski Yunan toplumunun klasik dönem filozof ve doktorlarının metinlerinde sorunsullaştırılan cinsel zevkler, yani *aphrodisia* mefhumunun tartışması yapılıyor. Nietzsche'yle ilgili olan tartışmada 'Homer'in Mücadelesi' metnine bakarak nasıl modernitenin içinden çıkamadığı nihilizme bir alternatif yaşama imkanı incelendiyse, aynı şekilde, bu bölümdeki tartışmayla önceki bölümde incelenilen disipline edilmiş topluma karşı bir çıkış yolu aranabilir.

Söz konusu metinlerin tartışmasına girişmeden önce, Foucault'nun önerdiği iki farklı yorumsal düzenlemeye değinmek gerekiyor. İlk önce, eski Yunan'ın, cinselliği,

eşcinselliği, vb. tamamıyla yasaklayan Hristiyanlığın aksine, bu konularda katıksız bir müsamaha gösterdiği görüşünün reddedilmesi gerekiyor. Zira, eski Yunan toplumunda da birçok cinsel konularda benzer endişeler, kısıtlar, vb. vardı. Bu dogmatik okuma yerine dört parçalı bir cinsel perhiz/riyazet şeması takdim edilerek, kişinin sırasıyla kendi bedeniyle, karşı cinsle, hemcinsiyle, ve hakikatle olan ilişkisini kavramsallaştırabiliriz. İkinci olarak, cinsel ahlak üzerine sağlıklı bir okuma yapabilmek için sadece bu konuda getirilen yasaklara odaklanmak yerine cinselliğin ahlaki sorunsallaştırma biçimlerine eğilmek çok daha verimli bir okuma modeli olacaktır. Bu minvalde, söz konusu sorunsullaştırmayı açabilmek için dört ana eksen öne sürülebilir: i-) *aphrodisia*, cinsel zevkler, ii-) *chresis*, bu zevklerin hayata geçirilmesi, uygulanması, iii-) *enkrateia*, eski Yunanlılarca uygulandığı şekliyle çilecilik, ve iv-) *sophrosyne*, itidal ya da ölçülülük. Bu dört ana eksen kısaca açıklandıktan sonra, tartışmanın geri kalanı üçüncü eksen olan *enkrateia* üzerinden gitmektedir. Bu tercihin yapılmasının esas amacı ise günah(karlık), vicdan azabı gibi kavramlarla çıkmaz yola girmiş modernitenin nihilist çileciliğine karşı hayatı olumlama da çok daha fazla başarılı olduğu iddia edilebilecek olan eski Yunan yaşamında hayata geçirilen ve günah, vicdan azabı gibi kavramları da barındırmayan *enkrateia* egzersizlerine eğilmenin gerekliliğidir.

Öncelikle *enkrateia* nosyonunu onunla çoğu zaman eş zamanlı olarak kullanılmış olan *sophrosyne* ile karşılaştırmakta fayda var. Bu eşanlımlı kullanımı Platon ve Ksenopohon'da görebiliriz. İki kelime arasındaki sistematik anlam ayrışmasının ise Aristoteles ile yapıldığını görüyoruz: *sophrosyne* erdemli yolu kendini zorlamadan seçebilme yetisini ifade ederken, *enkrateia* ise zevkler tarafından yoldan çıkmamak için ancak büyük çabalarla (*agon*) ahlaki duruşunu koruyabilme durumunu açıklamaktadır. Yani, birinci duruma ancak ikinci durum elde edildikten sonra sahip olunduğu iddia edilebilir.

Bu karşılaştırmadan sonra, *enkrateia* mefhumunu kendi içinde açıklamak gerekiyor, ve bunun içinse beş farklı özellik öne sürülebilir. İlk olarak, bu kendi kendinle olan ilişki kavgacı, mücadeleci (*agonistic*) bir yapıdadır. İkinci olarak, *aphrodisia* ile yapılan bu kavgacı öz-ilişki (*self-relationship*) sadece ve sadece birey için, birey içinde, ve birey tarafından eyleme geçirilmektedir. Bu noktada, Plato'nun



ruhu üç bölmeye ayırarak kurduğu model kısaca tartışılıp, bu modelin birçok bakımdan nasıl Nietzsche'nin anlattığı alacaklı-borçlu ilişkisinin içselleştirilmesiyse bireyde meydana gelen bölünmüşlük haline benzeyip onu öncelediğine de değinilir. Üçüncü olarak, *Şölen* diyalogunda da görüldüğü üzere, bu öz-ilişkinin, başarılı olduğu takdirde, en önemli zaferi göstermektedir. Bunun yanında ise, bu yaklaşımının aynı konudaki Hristiyanca yaklaşımından olan farkı işaret edilir, ve son olarak bu modeldeki zevksizlik duygusunun oynadığı rolün de altı çizilir. Dördüncü olarak, cinsel zevklere karşı yürütülen bu kavgacı öz-ilişkinin Ksenophon tarafından ev hayatı modeli temel alınarak resmedildiği, Platon'da ise *polis* yaşamı modeline göre açmlandığı konu edilir. Beşinci ve en son olarak ise, yukarıda anlatıldığı şekliyle bu öz-ilişkinin idman, alıştırma olmadan mümkün olamayacağı durumu tartışmaya açılır. Bu alıştırma tekniklerini, Hristiyanlık-öncesi, nihilizme düşmemiş, hayatı çok daha fazla olumlama kapasitesine sahip olan eski Yunan tarzı çileciliği olarak isimlendirebiliriz. Özellikle Sokratik gelenekte çok merkezi bir rol oynayan bu eski Yunan çileciliğinin içeriğinin ne olduğu, yani hedeflenen ahlaki tutuma götürebilecek talimlerin açıklanmasının ve örneklendirilmesinin görece neden daha az olduğu ise tartışmanın son noktasını oluşturmaktadır.

Tüm bu beş eksen göz önüne alındıktan sonra, bölümün son kısmında ise şu iddialar temellendirilmeye çalışılır. Eski Yunan toplumunun klasik dönem yazarlarınca ele alındığı şekliyle *aphrodisia*, yani cinsel zevkler, bizim modernitedeki yaşama pratiklerimizden hayati bir hususta farklı bir perspektif sunabilir. Bu hayati husus ise eski Yunan'ın Hristiyanlık, daha genel ve kapsamlı şekilde söyleyecek olursak, monoteizm öncesi bir dönemde yaşanmış olmasıdır. Bu önceleme neticesinde, ne kadar modern, Aydınlanma süzgecinden geçmiş, bilimsel, ya da seküler olursak olalım bize monoteizmden miras kalmış olan öte-dünyalı düşünme geleneğinin sonucu saplanmış olduğumuz nihilizmin, eski Yunan'da söz konusu olmadığı görülecektir. Böylelikle, hayati anlamda farklı bir yaşama imkanı sunan bu *polis* yaşamı, en azından bu çalışmada görüldüğü şekliyle zevkler bağlamında bize bir çıkış yolu sunabilir. Bu konuya değindikten sonra ise, Üçüncü Bölüm'de açıklanan Deleuze'ün vicdan ve vicdan azabını peşisıra gelen iki bağlı aşama olarak ayırıp, vicdanı insanın içselleşmesiyle, vicdan azabını ise bu sefer acı

kavramının içsel bir anlam kazanması anlatısını, bu noktada yukarıda tartışıldığı şekliyle eski Yunan'a deneme girişiminde bulunulabilir. Buna göre, eski Yunanlıların hayatın bilinçaltı, irrasyonel, yaratıcı, tek bir kavrama indirgenemeyecek kadar akıcı ve kompleks parçası olan *aphrodisia*'yı akılcı bir süzgeçten geçirip onu kavramsallaştırdıkları, yani onu sistematik bir kalıba döktükleri ölçüde yukarıda adı geçen birinci aşamayı katetmiş oldukları iddia edilebilir. Yukarıda açıklandığı şekliyle, söz konusu ikinci seviyenin eski Yunan yaşamında söz konusu olmadığı ise kesinlikle görülmektedir.

## APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : KARATEKELİ

Adı : Emre

Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : THE CONCEPTS OF (DIS)PLEASURE AND PAIN IN NIETZSCHE AND FOUCAULT

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: