

A RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE WORLD SOCIETY CONCEPTUALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

A RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE WORLD SOCIETY CONCEPTUALIZATION

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This dissertation argues that non-state actors were more apparent, and relatedly, more capable of controlling and transforming the international relations in the pre-modern period than they are in the modern. The role of non-state actors is dramatically limited in the modern international society because of the nation-state, the most centralized and penetrating polity that humankind have ever established. The organizing principles of the pre-modern international relations were more suitable for non-state action. World society conceptualization of the English School is adopted in order to develop this argument. As the existing accounts of the world society concept particularly concentrate on the possible effects of the values having the potential to be shared globally in the modern international society, they simply neglect interest-seeking and pre-modern forms of non-state action. For this reason, this dissertation makes a distinction between the value-based (ideational) and interest-seeking (functional) world society elements and analyzes their impact on the international system/society with respect to their aims. According to this distinction, functional world society elements only aim to control a specific sphere of international relations, while the ideational world society elements seek to reshape the core foundational principles of the international system/society. In order

to support its main argument, the dissertation analyzes four distinct cases, namely the Roman Catholic Church, Amnesty International, the Hanseatic League, and International Chamber of Commerce, and compares them with each other. Main findings of the study show that the non-state dimension of international relations prevails against the state dimension in the pre-modern international relations.

Keywords: World Society, the Roman Catholic Church, Amnesty International, the Hanseatic League, International Chamber of Commerce

ÖZ

DÜNYA TOPLUMU KAVRAMININ YENİDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

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Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez devlet dışı aktörlerin uluslararası ilişkileri dönüştürmede ve kontrol etmede modern öncesi dönemde modernitede olduklarından daha görünür, ve ilişkili olarak, daha etkili olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Modern uluslararası toplumda devlet dışı aktörlerin rolleri insanlığın kurduğu en merkezi ve nüfuz eden devlet yönetim biçimi olan ulus devlet yüzünden oldukça kısıtlanmıştır. Modern öncesi uluslararası ilişkilerin kurucu prensipleri ise devlet dışı eyleme daha uygundur. Bu çalışmada ana argümanı geliştirmek için İngiliz Okulu'nun dünya toplumu kavramı benimsenmiştir. Dünya toplumu kavramının var olan tanımları özellikle uluslararası toplumda küresel olarak paylaşılma potansiyeli taşıyan değerlere odaklandığından, devlet dışı eylemin çıkar odaklı ve modern öncesi şekillerini göz ardı etmektedir. Bu sebeple bu tez, değer temelli (fikirsel) ve çıkar temelli (işlevsel) dünya toplumu unsurları arasında bir ayrım yapmakta ve bu unsurların amaçları doğrultusunda uluslararası sistem/toplum üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Bu ayrıma göre, işlevsel dünya toplumu unsurları sadece uluslararası ilişkilerin belirli bir sahasını kontrol etme amacı güderlerken, fikirsel dünya toplumu unsurları uluslararası sistem/toplumun kurucu ilkelerini yeniden şekillendirmeyi amaçlamaktadırlar. Bu tez ana savını desteklemek için dört ayrı vakayı incelemekte ve birbirleri ile karşılaştırmaktadır. Bu vakalar Roma Katolik Kilisesi, Uluslararası Af Örgütü,

Hansa Cemiyeti ve Milletlerarası Ticaret Odasıdır. Bu çalışmanın temel tespiti modern öncesi uluslararası ilişkilerde devlet dışı boyutun devlet boyutuna üstün geldiğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dünya Toplumu, Roma Katolik Kilisesi, Uluslararası Af Örgütü, Hansa Cemiyeti, Milletlerarası Ticaret Odası.

To My Wife, Elem

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|---|
| AI | Amnesty International |
| EU | European Union |
| GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| ICC | International Chamber of Commerce |
| IR | International Relations Discipline |
| ISIS | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| U.S.A. | United States of America |
| U.S.S.R. | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| UN | United Nations |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A person is surrounded by the present. His/her ideas, experiences, lifestyle, appearance and way of thinking are inevitably under the great influence of the time period that he/she lives in. He/she can acquire the knowledge of the social events and collective experiences of the past only indirectly. Moreover, he/she can merely predict the future. A person is also surrounded by the locality. Effects of the events occur around him/her on his/her life are often much greater than the impact of the events occur in a remote part of the world. These limitations also apply to the discipline of IR. Structure, climate and the ideas of the present international relations would unavoidably have an influence on the student of the discipline. International conduct around him/her, for instance, his/her country's international relations, would have much more impact on his/her way of conceiving the disciplinary debates. That is why scholarly efforts to understand and explain present international relations occupy more space in the discipline, than the attempts to discover dynamics of international relations in the past. For the same reason, it is not surprising to see a high number of foreign policy analyses in a particular country's academic journals.

In the IR literature, focusing largely on the present and extending the generalizations derived from present to the past are two general tendencies. This trend in the IR is conceptualized as chrono-fetishism and tempo-centralism (Hobson 2002, 6). Mainstream theories of the IR are often criticized by the historical sociology school for examining the history with the lenses of the present as well as for ignoring the historical context in the analysis of the past events. Furthermore,

particularly neo-realism is often harshly criticized for referring history only to find appropriate evidence to support the main theoretical claims of the theory. These examples derived from the history are only used to explain core dynamics of the international system of the present (Hobden and Hobson 2002).

Viewing international relations with the lenses of the present and explaining international conduct with reference to the locality may be seen as an inescapable habit. This may also be regarded as a major setback of the mainstream IR theory. The activity of theorizing includes a high degree of abstraction. A student of IR abstracts the reality of the international in order to communicate it with his/her peers (Yurdusev 2005, 157-158). This high degree of abstraction can be the first reason for ahistorical international relations theory. Or, the critics may be accusing the mainstream international theory of ahistoricism because of the high degree of abstraction in their scholarly activity. Naturally, the activity of abstraction pulls the abstracted thing off the reality to some extent. Language is a good instance of the abstraction. For example, there is no physical connection between the word of “pen” and the writing tool that we use every day. Nevertheless, every English speaker understands what we refer to by saying the word “pen”. No one brings a cup, for instance, when someone asks for a pen. This is because the activity of theorizing includes not only abstraction, but also concretization. Concretization establishes the bond between the reality and the theory. We name “pen” the instruments for writing with ink, not to the drawing tools with graphite. We do not call “pen” to the cylinder shaped containers for drinking by the same token. This is because the word “pen” contains abstraction as well as concretization. We theorize all writing tools with ink in the real world by the word “pen” on the basis of their similarities. By abstraction, we reformulate a thing, an idea or a feeling into a communicable concept. By concretization, we dissolve this concept into reality again. We communicate the abstracted reality with others in a way to invoke an idea, a feeling or a thing in their minds. This is the brief description of theorization.

The process of theorization is not fundamentally different in the discipline of IR. When a student of international relations refers to the concept of “sovereign-state”, his/her colleagues understand the same phenomenon. The concept of sovereign-

state is abstracted from the concrete reality of the modern type of polity with the features of territoriality, centrality, nationality and sovereignty. This is why the term “sovereign-state” does not invoke the Ottoman Empire or Sparta in the minds of the IR students. Thus, by the help of theorization, the human mind can transcend the limitations set by present and locality. The activity of theorizing enables a person to communicate the similar forms of international conduct with others. A person can also acquire the knowledge of the main dynamics of the past and the present international relations. He/she can also predict the future to some extent by reaching generalizations about the functioning of international relations.

This dissertation is the outcome of such a theoretical inquiry. It aims to theorize the non-state dimension of international relations by strongly referring to the past and present forms of non-state action in international politics. Drawing largely on the English School¹ theory, it delineates the realm as “world society”² where non-state actors, ideas, beliefs, values, and interests that transcend the state interact with each other and with the state system. The study defines the actors founded on shared values or shared interests of individuals as world society elements. It seeks to abstract concepts from the concrete examples of non-state actors in modern and pre-modern international relations. It classifies the present and the past forms of non-state actors in respect to their similarities. Based on this classification, this study aims to compare the impact of different types of world society elements on the state system. In other words, it abstracts the concrete reality of non-state dimension of international relations in reference to the present and past forms of non-state action.

¹ The English School can be defined as a group of IR scholars largely educated in Britain. They introduced an alternative view of world politics against to the dominant American IR perspective in 1960s. These scholars are often associated with their concept of international society. The concept of international society and their contribution in general are usually regarded as a “via media” in international relations theory between the two extreme positions occupied by realism and the so-called idealism. Despite the fact that international society is the key concept for understanding the English School’s way of conceiving international relations, focusing merely on this concept brings along the neglect of the holistic approach of the school. Indeed, the English School’s basic tenet is pluralism (Little 2000, 396-397)

² The original “world society” definition from the extant English School literature adopted in this study is Hedley Bull’s (1985, 279). “By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built.”

In this context, it aims to reach generalizations on the relationship between the non-state and state dimensions of international relations.

In order to theorize the non-state dimension of international relations and to scrutinize its interaction with the state system, this study will focus on the extant theoretical inquiries within the English School. The main reason for adopting the English School theory for this inquiry is its holistic approach. Compared to the other existing approaches to the non-state actors in the IR literature adopts a broader perspective than the English School. They either view the non-state actors as of secondary importance, or frame them as parasitic entities in the state system. However, the English School defines a realm where non-state actors and individuals form institutions and rules on the basis of their shared interests and common values. This realm, namely world society, is one of the three dimensions of international relations, together with the international system and the international society. Moreover, the English School's theoretical framework allows one to analyze different dimensions of the international realm without necessarily separating them from each other. In other words, the complex reality of international relations, which is composed of systemic and societal relations among states, as well as actions of individuals and groupings of individuals, can be studied both altogether and individually. Therefore, as the aim of this study is to analyze how the dimension of states and the dimension of non-state actors interact, the English School theory best suits this objective. After reformulating the English School theory in a way to comprehend past and present forms of non-state activity, the study will focus on four examples of world society elements, namely, the Roman Catholic Church, the Hanseatic League, Amnesty International and International Chamber of Commerce. In this study, the examples of world society elements are categorized according to the basic commonality among their members as well as their aims. World society elements based on shared values among individuals are named as *ideational world society elements*. The main objective of this kind of elements is to reshape the state system according to their values by introducing new norms. World society elements based on shared interests of individuals, on the other hand, are named as *functional world society elements*. These elements aim at

controlling and influencing a specific sphere of international relations such as trade, sports, environment politics etc. While the present and past forms of the ideational world society elements will be compared according to their ability to reshape state system, examples of functional world society elements will be contrasted on the basis of their capacity to control a specific sphere of international relations (international trade in this study).

1.1. Research Question

In this context, main research question of the inquiry is “how do the world of states and world of non-state actors interact in international relations?” Within this study, two additional questions are asked to provide significant answers to this question; “does the influence of non-state actors over state-system change throughout the history?” and if yes “what are the reasons for the change in the effectiveness of non-state actors?” Not surprisingly, these questions occupy significant space in the literature of the IR discipline and they are not simple yes or no questions. Different perspectives on the role of non-state actors are represented by various theoretical traditions. Nonetheless, although the influence of non-state actors over modern state system is often scrutinized, historical non-state actors are generally overlooked. Thus, the supplementary questions to the main research question gain additional importance in this inquiry.

Number of the studies analyzing the role of non-state actors considerably increased particularly after the end of the Cold War. The demise of the bipolar world politics also aroused interest in the studies examining the influence of norms and ideas in the international politics. It is true that non-state actors have started to be more apparent since the 1990s compared to the beginning of the last century. The number of studies focusing on the functions of non-state actors in world politics started to increase accordingly. However, the post-Cold War era is not the only time period that non-state actors have an influence over world politics. Individuals who share common interests and common values did not pop out from nowhere in the last three decades. Non-state actors and non-state dimension of world politics as well as

states and state system have always been existent throughout the history of mankind. Therefore, limiting our studies to the present forms of non-state actors and non-state action would inevitably narrow our understanding of the non-state dimension of international relations. Especially for this reason, this dissertation aims to shift the focus of the analysis of non-state actors and non-state dimension of international relations from present to the past. In order to have generalizations on to what extent non-state actors are able to reshape international system and in which ways they seek to control particular spheres of the world of states, we should compare and contrast similar forms of non-state action in the different periods of world history. Thus, the main research question of this study will be answered by concentrating on the analysis of concrete examples of such world society elements.

1.2. Main Argument

The main argument of this study is the significance of non-state actors and of the non-state dimension of international politics was greater in the pre-modern international relations than the modern. In other words, all types of world society elements were more effective and influential in the international relations before the emergence of modern (global) international society. The absence of the nation-state as a form of policy was the major, if not the only, reason for the effectiveness of non-state actors in the pre-modern international relations. Since the nation-state is the most penetrating, controlling and centralized form of polity that mankind ever established, non-state actors' ability to influence modern state system is quite limited. The existence of an established and well-functioning global international society also hinders the effectiveness of non-state actors in the modern international relations. Thus, in the pre-modern international relations when polities were more de-centralized and feeble than the modern type of polity, non-state actors were more effective in re-shaping and controlling the international realm. If the international relations is defined as an entity where international systemic, international societal and world societal elements are at interplay, one can argue that world societal relationships prevailed against the social and systemic relationships between states in the pre-modern era.

1.3. Method

The principal aim of this study is, therefore, to compare and contrast the impact of different types of world society elements on the international system/international society in the pre-modern and in the modern periods of the history. Although world society describes the non-state dimension of international politics as a whole in terms of its definition, the main focus of the study will be the past and the present examples of the non-state actors for the sake of simplicity. It is quite hard to observe a shared idea, belief, feeling or interest among individuals unless it is mobilized by some kind of an actor. For this reason, the study will analyze the effects of values such as Christianity and human rights through the organizational bodies of the Roman Catholic Church and the AI. This is also applicable for the shared interest. Maximizing the profit or establishing a trade monopoly are not easily observable interests shared among individuals. Moreover, it is even not possible to identify them unless they are sought by an actor. Therefore, it would not be tenable to assess the effects of such interests or values on the international system without concentrating on the actor behavior. Hence, the organizational bodies which mobilized these interests will be the principal focus.

Except the second chapter, all three chapters include a brief description of the main dynamics and the fundamental characteristics of the international relations that respective world society elements operate in. The main reason for including such a section at the outset of each chapter is the necessity to introduce the international system/society dimension of international politics. Since this dissertation argues that world society elements aim to exert influence over state system in one way or another, and their effectiveness is highly determined by the prevalent type of polity, the main dynamics of international system/society of their time have to be explained.

The comparison between the past and the present examples of the ideational world society elements will be made on the grounds of their ability to reshape state system. An ideational world society element promotes its basic value, such as

sharia, Christianity, human rights, the superiority of a race etc. as a new norm of the state system. If an ideational world society element's basic value is adopted by the international system/international society as a norm, state behavior changes. In this study, the ability of an ideational world society element to reshape international relations will be measured in terms of the acceptance of the new norms by the international system/international society. To put it differently, the hypothesis of the study will be tested according to the success of ideational world society elements in introducing new norms to the state system. Thus, the Roman Catholic Church and the AI will be compared on the basis of their ability to transform the state behavior. This study, in this respect, argues that Christian unity and Church's supremacy were established as the norms of international relations of the medieval Europe. Political units of the medieval were acting according to these norms. Human rights, on the other hand, is also emerging as a norm in the modern international society; however, it is still far from being abided by the majority of states in their actions. It should also be noted that existence of a norm and strength of a norm do not mean the same thing. Thus, a norm can exist but it does not exert an influence on the state system unless it gathers support from the actors of that international system.

Norm change, therefore, is the key measurement unit in the comparison of the significance of the ideational world society elements. The term norm implies expected behavior. As our focus is international relations, by norms, we discuss international norms. International norms, in this sense, mean expected state behavior, "normal state practices" (Thomson 1993, 81), "standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). A norm is the expected behavior of states in international relations accordingly. It is the normal way that states behave. As Onuf (1998, 679) states, "norms do prompt expectations about conduct."

After the constructivist turn, it is widely accepted in the IR discipline that norms shape state behavior (Thomson 1993, 72). However, this is not the sole role played by the international norms. There are also two other principal roles played by the norms in an international system. In addition to regulating actor behavior, norms constitute actors and enable their actions (Björkdahl 2002, 15). They define how

actors are constituted, and they also identify the sources of actor preference. Most importantly for this study, norms do not only simply constrain but also enable and empower action (Hurrell 2002, 193). International society is based on these roles that norms play. Consequently, the nature of international society is also shaped according to its norms. Analyzing the norm change is, thus, the principal endeavor of this study in examining the relationship between state system and ideational world society elements in international relations.

So how do international norms emerge and change? Björkdahl (2002, 16-20) argues that norm emergence occurs in three ways. First, common practices among states create norms. However, not every common practice necessarily turns into a norm. Norms can be created as a consequence of a single precedent. Second, a demand can create its supply of a norm. For instance, an international crisis can necessitate a new norm and this demand can be satisfied by the introduction of the norm. Third, norm emergence occurs as a result of the internalization of a domestic norm by the international society. Florini (1996, 373-387) also examines the reasons for the availability of particular norms instead of others at a particular point in history. She makes an analogy between genes and norms. As genes are in competition with other genes, deterministic over human behavior and transmitted from one individual to another; norms shape state behavior, are contested by other norms, and culturally transmitted from one actor to another. Based on these similarities, as a result of the evolutionary natural selection, she argues, norms change over time as genes do. Both genes and norms require favorable conditions including initial prominence, coherence with existing counterparts, and advantageous environmental conditions in order to spread and become dominant.

It is true that norms determine state behavior and state behavior causes the emergence of new norms as Björkdahl suggests. Florini's approach to the norm change in terms of defining a competition among new and existing norms and her emphasis on the requirement of a suitable environment for a norm to emerge are also useful implications for the aims of this study. Nonetheless, two of the extant explanations of international norm change (Sandholtz and Stiles 2008; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) in the literature particularly comply with the objective of making

a comparison between ideational world society elements of modern and pre-modern eras. These two studies agree on three basic assumptions on norm change. Norms compete with the existing norms. Reformulation of state conduct according to the new norm is crucial for a norm change to take place. And, new norms are not merely provided by states but they can also be introduced by actors external to the state system.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896-905), norms have a life cycle. Norms first emerge as a result of the efforts of norm entrepreneurs. In their study, norm entrepreneurs are defined as individuals supported by organizational platforms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897). Then, during the stage of norm cascade, norms are accepted by states, international organizations, and networks. In the third stage, norms are internalized by all elements of international relations. After the internalization of the norm, none of the actors questions its existence. For Finnemore and Sikkink, the peak point between the norm emergence and norm cascade is crucial in the process of norm change. When a majority of states or states with critical importance accept the norm as the new standard of behavior, norm cascade occurs.

The second explanation of norm change claims that the change occurs as a result of a some kind of dialectic relationship between existing norms and the need for new norms in the international system. For Sandholtz and Stiles (2008, 4-6), norm-driven state action causes disputes, and these disputes confront new arguments. New arguments on the nature of the existing norms induce norm change. This creates a cycle of norm change which links action to disputes, disputes to arguments and arguments to norm change. Thus, there is not an endpoint in the norm change where norms reach a historical end and become indisputable.

Norms are inherently normative. They include a sense of “ought”. A norm always carries instructions for appropriateness in a given social environment. Actors are expected to behave according to these instructions in their social relationships. “Norms indicate and involve what is appropriate. What is appropriate is only known by reference to a social community” (Björkdahl 2002, 15). As the social community

this study refers to is the international society, the appropriateness of an action of a state can be assessed by analyzing what is seen as a good act by the society of states. A good act, in this context, can be known by analyzing the common practices of states. International norms define and constitute an international society as much as they determine state behavior. It is because an international society is founded by states and ordered by their institutionalized patterns of behavior. Thus, as the definition of international norms implies, in order to detect a norm in the international system, state behavior must be analyzed. States carry the behavioral instructions of the norm (Florini 1996, 374) and the best way to detect the functioning of norms in a state system is to analyze the actor behavior (Annika Björkdahl 2002, 13). A simple formula can be formed accordingly. If patterns of state behavior change in a way to regard the new norm, norm change occurs.

For this reason, this study will examine the state behavior in order to measure the effects of the norms provided by ideational world society elements. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 900) point out, gaining the support of states is crucial for a norm to be adopted by the international society. In other words, international society adopts a norm when the norm-driven state conduct is accepted as the standard type of behavior. The influence of the norm promoted by an ideational world society element will be regarded greater if states act according to this norm and if state system adopts norm-driven behavior as the standard practice. Thus, if states act according to the norms promoted by the ideational world society element, this world society element is able to influence the state system.

In sum, this study adopts the following formulation in its analysis of the norm change. First, it starts its analysis by accepting the assumption that norms compete with each other (Florini 1996, 364; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897; Sandholtz and Stiles 2008, 14-15). This means there are existing norms of the state system and there are new norms which represent a challenge to these existing norms. Second, norms can emerge as a result of state practices, as a result of a demand in international society or as a result of adopting a domestic norm as an international norm. Norms can also emerge as a result of a norm entrepreneur's effort. Third, norm change occurs when an older norm replaced with a new one. States and state

behavior play a crucial role in the acceptance of new norms as the norms of international society (Sandholtz and Stiles 2008, 13; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 900; Björkdahl 2002, 13, 18). Norms, in this sense, have to be backed up by states in order to be accepted as an international norm of international society. When a norm, either as a result of a particular pattern of state behavior or of a norm entrepreneur's effort, is accepted by a state system as the standard of behavior, norm change occurs.

In this study, according to the framework of the norm change template described above, the norm entrepreneur is regarded as ideational world society elements. Ideational world society elements promote their basic values as a new norm for the state system. These actors establish institutions upon the basic values shared among their members to promote the new norm and to embed it in the state system. The new norm introduced by the ideational world society elements compete with the existing norms of the state system. When the states' behaviors change according to the new norm promoted by the ideational world society element, and when the new norm is adopted as the appropriate behavior in international relations, that element reshapes the state system.

The second comparison will be made between the functional world society elements. As this type of elements does not provide any new norms to the state system, their ability to control a specific sphere of the state system will be measured in a different way. The study will concentrate on the institutions that dominate international trade rather than focusing on the data such as the volume of imports or exports. There are two reasons for looking at institutions instead of the trade statistics. First, trade statistics for the Hanseatic League are not available. Second, even if that kind of data were available, it would still be insignificant to compare the trade statistics of International Chamber of Commerce and the Hanseatic League since their area of operation and scope is quite different. Therefore, as far as the institutions of a functional world society element are fundamental in controlling a specific sphere of international relations, in this study trade, that functional world society element will be regarded as influential. In other words, if a functional world society element is successful in reaching its aim, it will be regarded as an effective

world society element. Moreover, as the trade simply implies the act of buying and selling goods, the comparison will be made on the grounds of whether states or functional world society elements control the buying and selling of goods. Thus, if states and state system are able to stop the flow of goods or restrict the act of buying and selling of goods, it will be concluded that the functional world society element does not control trade.

1.4. Contribution of the Study

There are two principle contributions of this study to the English School theory in particular and to the field of IR in general. First, it will contribute to the debate on the non-state actors by explaining the different aims of interest-based and value-based world society elements. Second, it will introduce the historical forms of non-state action to the IR literature in order to represent the fact that the interaction between states and non-state actors are much older than it is usually conceived.

In order to contribute to the English School literature specifically, this work aims to widen the scope of the world society leg of the English School theory in a way to grasp different types of world society elements of international relations. By introducing the distinction between functional and ideational world society elements, non-cosmopolitan and non-global forms of non-state action can be analyzed within the world society leg of the English School theory. In the contemporary English School studies, there is a strong tendency to conceptualize world society dimension merely as globally shared values among individuals. This also inevitably causes establishment of a hypothetical link between the world society dimension of international relations and modernity. Furthermore, in the extant literature, there are a few studies that conceptualize concrete entities, actors or organizations as examples of world society. However, the non-state dimension of international relations is and has always been a wider realm. Reducing the world society analysis merely to the analysis of human rights' effects on international relations simply narrows the holistic approach of the English School. Moreover, the non-state dimension of international relations has always been existent. It affected

and still continues to affect the international system and international society. Therefore, this study extends the historical scope of the world society concept by returning to the original argument of the English School which theorize the international reality as an interplay between international system, international society, and world society. Further, this dissertation also supports the core argument of the English School by providing historical examples of the world society elements. Based on this objective, this study seeks to contribute the debate on the world society leg of the English School theory by widening the definition of the world society in a way to include all types of non-state activity, as well as shared culture, ideas, values, beliefs, and interests.

The central focus of the English School has always been the theory-led investigation rather than being simply the theory (Neumann 2001, 504). Theory-led investigation simply means investigating the diplomatic history while bearing a theoretical approach in mind, in order to compare and contrast different types of entities to reveal the functioning mechanisms of international relations. The method applied in this study is not different. By comparing and contrasting concrete examples of different types of world society elements in the different periods of history, this study aims to draw a conclusion about how these different aspects of non-state activity influences, transforms and enhances international society of states. Its main goal is to reveal how world society and other dimensions of international relations are related to each other and how individuals and non-state actors play their roles in international relations.

1.5. Organization of the Study

The dissertation adopts following chapter outline in order to elaborate its main argument. The study consists of six chapters including the introduction and the conclusion. In the second chapter of the study, the core arguments and the key concepts of the English School will be analyzed. A detailed literature review on the world society concept will follow this part. After setting the theoretical framework of the study, the chapter concludes by introducing the distinction between ideational

and functional world society elements. The third chapter concentrates on the Roman Catholic Church as an example of a pre-modern ideational world society element. It first delineates the nature of international relations in the medieval Europe. Then, the chapter examines the main values and characteristics of the Roman Catholic Church as an ideational world society element. Lastly, the third chapter seeks to introduce the institutions built upon Christianity by the Church, in order to reshape international relations of the medieval Europe. The fourth chapter introduces the Hanseatic League as an example of a functional pre-modern world society element. At the outset of that chapter, core features of international relations of the Northern Europe in respect to international trade are overviewed. The second section of the chapter defines the common interests of the Hanseatic merchants. The chapter ends by defining the institutions the Hanseatic League founded on its members' common interests in order to control the international trade of the Northern Europe. The fifth chapter is devoted to modern examples of world society elements. As the modern international society is global, and its institutions and rules are homogenous, both functional and ideational types of modern world society elements will be analyzed within this chapter. The chapter first designates the principal aspects of the modern international society. It does so by strongly emphasizing the role of the nation-state in shaping the organizing principles of the modern international society. Following this, the AI is represented as a modern example of the ideational world society elements. The third part of the chapter examines the International Chamber of Commerce as a functional world society element and analyzes its effect on the modern international relations. The conclusion part of this study will represent the comparison between the world society elements in different periods. In that part, the main theoretical findings of the study will also be discussed.

1.6. Additional Notes

As this introduction provides the legend for reading the rest of the dissertation, some explanatory notes should be listed here. Firstly, the concept “state” is used to imply “polity” in this dissertation. Thus, “state” does not mean the modern type of polity unless otherwise is stated. This could be seen as anachronic usage of the term

since the term “state” and the state as a modern form of polity were absent in the pre-modern international relations. However, it is acknowledged that “states” of the pre-modern period does not have the same features with the “states” of the modern international society. The notion of state in the sense that is used in this study refers to an organized society, a form of government or more generally, a political entity. That is why terms such as nation-state, sovereign-state, city-state, and empire are employed in this dissertation when a particular kind of polity is referred. Therefore, the notion of non-state refers to the elements that are not allied to any particular polity. Non-state, in other words, signifies non-polity.

Secondly, international relations with the lower cases does not merely imply relations among states. It includes the state conduct as well as any action, idea, belief, value and interest that are beyond local.

Thirdly, the institutions of the world society elements that will be scrutinized in the following chapters do not merely order the relationship among the members of that world society. These institutions both order the relationship between members of that world society element and interact with the state system in order to reshape it or to control a specific sphere of it.

Fourthly, I do not make any claims about the rightness or wrongness of the values promoted by the ideational world society elements. These values are taken into consideration in a totally natural manner. I do not make any hierarchical categorizations between religions and human rights. Rather, I argue that all values that transcend the realm of the state have the capacity to influence the state system, however, this capacity highly depends on the prevalent type of polity in that state system.

Fifthly, the term cosmopolitan does not necessarily mean universal. Although some cosmopolitan values and ideas have universal coverage, not all of them have to encapsulate all humankind. Rather, a cosmopolitan idea or value implies in this study that this value transcends the realm of the state. In other words, it is considered as cosmopolitan when people from different countries and/or from different geographical regions share this value or idea collectively.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF WORLD SOCIETY

The aim of this chapter is to draw the theoretical framework of the study in order to elaborate its main argument. It will provide the basic analytical tool to compare different yet similar types of non-state actors in international relations which are named in this study as “world society elements”. The chapter will first focus on the pluralism of the English School theory and its understanding of the reality of international relations as a composition of different dimensions such as international system, international society, and world society. In accordance with the aim of providing a comparative analysis of the role of world society elements in different historical periods, interaction and co-constitution among the distinct dimensions of international reality will also be examined. Second, the chapter will concentrate on the existing accounts of world society, and analyze the various perspectives on the concept. Third, the concept will be defined on the basis of the distinction between functional (interest-seeking) and ideational (value-based) world society elements. In using this distinction, the chapter will demonstrate that the world society elements in international relations do not represent a monolithic body; rather, different types of world society elements can be identified. Lastly, the chapter will conclude by laying the groundwork for the comparison of similar types of world society elements in different periods of history.

2.1. International Reality and the English School's Pluralism

All studies in IR either explicitly ask “what is international relations?” or implicitly accept one of the existing answers in the literature. This question is essential because one has to acquire some knowledge of the whole in order to deal with a particular part of it. An analogy can be made between physics and IR in here. Take the well-known experiment to determine boiling point of water at different heights for example. The boiling point of water varies with atmospheric pressure, which is measured in different degrees at different heights. In other words, the results differ according to the circumstances; different environments cause different outcomes. This also applies to the IR. For instance in the 13th century, the kingdom of Sicily was ruled by a sovereign king and the king of Sicily was also a prince of the French royal house, which makes Sicily both an independent political unit and a dependent part of French Kingdom. This means Sicily possessed actor qualities for conducting international behavior despite the fact that it was under the authority of French king (Strayer 1970, 83). To put it differently, the external and internal affairs were not distinguished from each other with certain borders.

On the other hand, the twenty-first century portrays a completely different picture since no territory in the world is now ruled by two different powers, including Sicily. It is a part of Italy, and the Italian government has the ultimate authority over it. In the contemporary international relations, there is no political unit that can possess external sovereignty and be subject to a superior authority at the same time. Areas like Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, Western Sahara, and Somaliland still exist with overlapping authority claims on them. However, these territories are areas of dispute, rather than being officially accepted multiple sovereignty areas. Thus, as in the previous example, different circumstances cause different outcomes. While Sicily in the thirteenth century may make alliances or can conduct any type of relationship such as war, diplomacy, and trade with other external political units though it was subject to a higher authority, it may not do the same in the twenty-first. The nature of international relations, or more generally, the political context has dramatically changed between the thirteenth and the twenty-first centuries.

Political context simply implies the political structure (or the political organization) of international relations. While the political structure is composed of independent political communities, empires, the Papal States, principalities, duchies, and medieval type of political unity in the thirteenth century, it is limited to nation-states in the twenty-first. Changes in the strength of political units and changes in the political context are not the same thing although they sometimes may occur simultaneously. This is why Waltz (2000) defended the argument that neo-realism was still explanatory at the time when the Cold War ended, because the change was *in* the system but not *of* the system. If we go back to the analogy between physics and international relations, we see that the ways the physics and international relations student should study have quite lot similarities. A physics student must know under which conditions he/she performs his/her experiment. Similarly, a student of international relations must be aware of the political context of the era that he/she deals with.

As it is valid for all social sciences, the reality of international relations is subjected to a high degree of change. The human phenomenon is flexible, ever-changing either slowly or rapidly, but it is never fixed or stable. Student of physics can enjoy the benefits of repeating the experiment to determine boiling point of water at infinite times and getting the same results under the same conditions. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the student of social sciences, including that of IR. Nevertheless, it is also true that some widely applicable arguments and theories can still be framed within the IR discipline. The crucial point for theory building in IR is to comprehend the general framework, to put it in another way, to conceive the political structure of international relations. One should know how different units in international relations are positioned against each other, the organizational principle of political units in the world at a given time and in which ways these political units conduct their relationships with one another. That is why the context of the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Wallachia in the sixteenth century is not the same with the relationship between Mexico and Venezuela now although both of them are international relations.

The main inquiry of the IR may seem as an endeavor to comprehend and analyze the relations among nations by definition. Indeed, this was the case when the discipline was first founded in the early twentieth century. However, contemporary IR widened its scope to involve all types of human relationships that occur beyond the limits of local. In other words, IR has become the study of the problematic of separate human groups' peaceful coexistence. Throughout the history, distinct groups of people may be organized under diverse political units. Nation-state is only one of these different entities. If the disciplinary boundaries of IR were limited to relations among nation-states, then, it could only cover three hundred years of the known history of men. Thus, IR produces concepts, theories, and analysis in order to explain and understand how individuals, non-state actors and political units conduct their relationships with one another in different political environments.

The question of "what is international relations", therefore, does not necessarily point out a single subject matter, but many. Nevertheless, answers given to this question are not infinite as well. Although every single student of IR may give different answers, they would use similar concepts and terms to communicate with and to be understood by each other. This process of abstraction from the practice is called theorization. The reality of international relations, the phenomenon of it, or the events taking part in the real world are theorized in order to be intersubjectively communicable. Given that the reality of international relations is neither single nor fixed, it varies and changes over time and space, the theory of it would not be single (Yurdusev 2005). Thus, different schools of thought, to use Wight's terminology, realism, rationalism and revolutionism, would give different answers to the question. While realists conceptualize international relations as an international system, rationalists identify it as an international society. Revolutionists, on the other hand, see international relations as a coherent community of mankind rather than of states (Wight 1991, 48).

Within the discipline of IR, it is widely accepted that the English School theory occupies a position between realism and the so-called idealism (Little 2000, 396). However, it would be unfair to reduce the distinctive characteristics of the English

School theory to international society or to the “via media.”³ Indeed, its basic tenet is pluralism (Little 2000, 397). The English School scholars posit that international reality is composed of international system, international society and world society. All of these dimensions coexist throughout the history of international relations. One of these forms of social relationships may prevail against others at any particular point in history; however, none of them completely disappears (Bull 1985; Wight 1977, 1991; Watson 2002; Donelan 1990).

The English School adopts a methodological starting point instead of an ontological one in its analysis of international relations. Little (1995, 15) clarifies the method of the English School by stressing the importance of the English School scholars’ separation of the key elements that characterize the international relations for methodological convenience. For Wight (1987, 221; 1991), there are three different elements both in international thought and in the practice of international relations. These are international anarchy, international society or as he names “habitual intercourse”, and world society or in his own terms “moral solidarity.” What constitutes the discipline of IR is, then, the interaction and cross-fertilization among them (Wight 1991, 7, 260). As Little (1995, 15) asserts, international relations is a complex phenomenon and in order to examine it, one must adopt different perspectives. On the grounds of treating different traditions of thought as diverse yet interrelated parts of a single philosophical inquiry, the English School suggests three different levels for the analysis of this single complex reality. One may adopt one of these levels in his/her analysis but he/she can never ignore the others. In order to comprehend the reality of international relations, all three levels of inquiry should be considered. All these three different levels are associated with a tradition of thought in Wight’s study, and they are not just analytical categories in the world of ideas but they are also concrete realities (Wight 1991, 7) as Bull (1985), Watson (2002), Wight (1977) and many others demonstrated in their analysis of states systems in history.

³ The English School’s original idea of international society is often regarded as a middle way between realism and idealism. International society in this sense occupies a position which remains distant from extreme arguments of these two theories.

Wight (1991, 31) associates the first tradition of thought with Hobbes, and defines its basic view of international relations as “war of all against all”. For realists, international relations is a state of nature and in the Hobbesian sense of the term, it refers to a “pre-contractual condition.” The principal feature of this pre-contractual condition is the endless struggle for power. International relations, therefore, can be defined either as an international anarchy, in all meanings of the word from the absence of a higher authority to chaos, or as the relations of great powers (Wight 1987, 222, 1991, 32). The latter definition stems from the first one, because the absence of a higher authority forces states to seek power for their survival with great powers being the actors who accumulate the power most. Bull describes international anarchy in this sense as an international system (1985, 14); “two or more states, may be in contact with each other and interact in such a way as to be necessary factors in each other’s calculations without their being conscious of common interest or values, conceiving themselves to be bound by a common set of rules, or cooperating in the working of common institutions.” The definition of international system often qualified as mechanical/functional, and for this reason, it resembles the neorealist meaning of the term (Buzan 1993, 331). In the neorealist thought, particularly in Waltz’s study (1979, 79), a system consists of two parts, which are structure and interacting units. The structure is independent of the relations between those units but it fundamentally depends on their positioning against each other. Structure defines the arrangement of the units in the system (Waltz 1979, 79-81). Unlike domestic politics, which is ordered by hierarchy, the ordering principle of international system is anarchy. Units (states) are functionally undifferentiated and distribution of capabilities is the main difference among them (Waltz 1979, 88-97). This is why international orders are defined by the changing fate of great powers (Donnelly 2005, 35). This picture of international relations leads us to basic tenets of neo-realism; self-help, national interest, power balancing and security dilemma. States are alike units in an anarchical environment where none of them are in a position to lay down the law. States have an endless interest in power, and they seek their national interest, because the structure, the international anarchy, forces them to do so while restraining their behavior.

Wight names the second tradition of thought as rationalism and that tradition is often associated with Grotius and Locke. For them, international relations is also equal to the state of nature; however, the state of nature is not equal to the state of war. Rather, it is “state of goodwill” (Wight 1987, 223). International relations is a society of states, which operates without a government, but not with the total absence of law. Customs and interaction among states create international law. States act in accordance with the international law which emerges as a result of their behavior (Wight 1991, 39; 1987, 223). International society in the rationalist tradition is defined as (Bull and Watson 1984, 1); “a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.” This definition indicates that anarchy does not necessarily mean disorder and chaos (Wight 1978, 100) but it points out the absence of any higher authority over states. The relations of states, then, can be ordered by rules and institutions. These institutions may differ from one society of states to the other, but particularly in global international society, they are defined as balance of power, diplomacy, great power management, war and international law (Bull 1985).

Revolutionism or Kantianism, Wight’s third tradition, suggests that international relations cannot be reduced to the relation of states, since states are not living organisms as men are. In this respect, they should be regarded as intermediary institutions that man has founded for its own purposes. Thus, international relations is the society of mankind (Wight 1987, 223-224). Revolutionism obviously takes the individual as the principal actor of international relations, while the first two traditions see international relations from a statist point of view, and only differ from each other on normative grounds. Revolutionism asserts that mankind as a whole constitutes a single society. It can be achieved either by the transformation of the society of states into a single state via the spread of a single great power, or by the realization of a doctrinal uniformity among all states within the state system

(Wight 1991, 40- 44). A third variant, which Wight (1991, 45) calls as “most revolutionary of revolutionist theories” presumes that the single society of mankind can be achieved via proclamation of world society, which simply connotes the single society of mankind without a polity. Bull (1985, 279) defines world society in a similar vein, but from a broader perspective; “by a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built.”

The pluralistic viewpoint adopted by the English School is subjected to criticism by different perspectives. For instance, Alan James (1993, 272-276) argues that there is no difference between international system and international society, particularly in the existence of rules, common interests, and regular communication. A distinction, therefore, is insignificant. Martin Shaw (1992) has the same claim, though from a different perspective. He asserts that international society can be regarded as an ideological term especially for reflecting the political environment of the Cold War. According to his argument, international society is given ontological priority by the English School (Shaw 1992, 423). For him, world society should be central in the analysis of international politics given that it largely identifies the post-Cold War era in international relations. From a sociological point of view, he argues, a (domestic) society comes into being without any need for common rules and values among its members. It only requires mutual expectations and understandings as well as possible mutually oriented actions, and for this reason, the meaning of the term “international system” is akin to the meaning of society (Shaw 1992, 428). Buzan (1993, 331) finds the distinction useful, particularly because of its reference to the difference between interaction among states and volitional association. Elsewhere, however, he argues the contrary and discards the international system as a political form of international relations since it is ambiguously defined by Bull and rarely existed in history (Buzan 2004, 99-101).

According to Brown (1995, 186; 2001, 433), the system/society distinction in the English School thinking is tenable as states are ontologically prior to the existence of international society. Therefore, the term international system refers to the

interplay between these units, while the society implies a normatively based order. Watson (1987, 147), on the other hand, regards the distinction between an international system and an international society as central to the analysis of international relations, though he explicitly accepts “no international system as defined by Bull has operated without some regulatory rules and institutions” (Watson 1987, 151). Jackson defends the distinction in a similar way and asserts that Bull’s definition of an international system is social and historical but never mechanical or functional (Jackson 2000, 113). For him, the human activity can be categorized as being instrumental and non-instrumental. While the “instrumental human activity conceived as driven by pure self-interest”, non-instrumental refers to the activities when actors consider legal and moral obligations (Jackson, 2000, 114). For this reason, Bull’s distinction between system and society is not based on the mechanical or non-mechanical actions of actors, but his theoretical standpoint takes into consideration if those actions are voluntary or not. This is the main difference between neo-realism and the English School in the context of their international system conceptualizations. Waltzian conceptualization of international system directly refers to functional, mechanic and non-social relations between states, but Bull’s conceptualization defines the condition where states choose not to be bounded by any type of commonality and prefer to interact without it.

Pluralistic understanding of the English School suggests that in order to understand and explain international relations, one should scrutinize all three levels as well as the interaction among them. A student of international relations should consider the scope of the systemic level where states see each other as necessary factors to be taken into account in conducting international behavior. On the other hand, he/she should also look for common interests and institutions shared among states at the societal level, and investigate how states see themselves be bounded by a common set of rules. Moreover, he/she should study the world society level, in order to capture the realm beyond states, and to understand how individuals and groupings of them are related to each other, what they share in common and how they conceive themselves in terms of being a community. In other words, one should expand its inquiry to all these three levels to provide a proper analysis of

international relations. Pluralism and methodological diversity, that are central to the English School theory, ensures that different parts of a single complex reality are explained and understood from different viewpoints (Watson 1987, 153).

The pluralistic understanding introduced by the English School is not limited to the levels of inquiry. As abovementioned, these levels are also interrelated parts of the international reality. To put it differently, the English School's pluralism covers the area of ontology. The English School theory ontologically accepts the existence of international anarchy (Bull 1985), hierarchy (empires) (Watson 2002; Wight 1977), and medieval type of overlapping authorities (Wight 1977, Bull 1985, Watson 2002).⁴ Indeed, Wight (1977, 44) asks, "for what reasons are we inclined to judge states-system as per se a more desirable way of arranging the affairs of a great number of men than the alternatives, whatever these may be?" Watson (1990, 2002) takes Wight's question as a starting point and introduces a typology of the political structure of international relations. He claims that making clear-cut distinctions among different types of political structures does not provide any analytical leverage in the analysis of international societies. Rather, these types should be scrutinized along a spectrum (Watson 1990,103-4; 2002,13-4). According to his argument, at any particular point of history, "the organization of system will fall somewhere along a notional spectrum between absolute independence and absolute empire" (Watson 2002, 13). Between these two, there are categories of hegemony, suzerainty, and dominion. Categories of absolute independence and absolute empire are regarded as being notional. In other words, the political structure of international relations, or a particular system, never represents the characteristics of absolute independencies as voluntary action among states limits the independence of the units. Absolute empire never realized in the history as well. Involvement with other communities works as a natural limitation for imperial governments and no imperial center in the history was ever able to directly control its periphery. Hegemony in this spectrum describes a power's (actor's) ability to lay down the law in the system

⁴ Little (1995, 21) argues that the English school accepts at least two different types of international entities, namely, state-systems (international anarchy) and imperial systems (empires). Scholars such as Wight (1977, 26) and Watson (2002, 252) explicitly accept medieval as unique and quite different than a state system and thus, medieval type of overlapping authorities can be accepted as a third type.

without interfering domestic issues of others. Suzerainty is defined as the situation where one state claims legitimate political control over another state (Wight 1977, 23). Dominion, on the other hand, signifies the designation of internal governments of lesser states by a great power (Watson 1992, 13-18; 1990, 102-106). Watson's spectrum is a clear example of English School's ontological pluralism. Contrary to realism, the English School does not necessarily limit its area of inquiry with anarchical environments.

Watson uses a pendulum metaphor to illustrate the change along the spectrum. For him, "no actual system remains fixed at one point in spectrum" (Watson 2002, 16). Thus, the pendulum's swing moves along the spectrum to specify the political structure of international relations. The "gravitational effects" impede the pendulum to show two extremes (Watson 2002, 17; 1990, 105). For Watson, gravitational effects like sovereignty, balance of power (in terms of equal balance of power), anti-hegemonic coalitions, juridical equality of states, non-intervention, and splendid isolation pull the pendulum towards the left, while effects like management of the international system, privileges and responsibilities of great powers and rich nations, intervention, standards of civilization, human rights, donor and recipient states, derogations of sovereignty and limits to independence pull it towards the right (Watson 2007, 82). When the pendulum moves towards left along the spectrum as it did in the decolonization process, independence of actors increases, when it moves to the right, like it did in the Cold War period, independence of actors decreases.

The English School adopts a pluralistic understanding of international relations both in methodological and ontological terms. It is, therefore, important at the outset to state that this study will focus on the non-state actors as one part of a larger complex reality of international relations. This means that world society elements in different periods of the history will be examined with respect to their interactions with other two dimensions of international relations. The individual action does not occur in a vacuum. The non-state dimension of international relations, in general terms, is not an independent part of the broader international relations. Nor it is a parasite of the state system. It is a fundamental part of international relations

together with the other two dimensions, and it should be analyzed within this framework. One of the three dimensions of international relations may prevail against others in a particular time period or in a particular geographical region, however, this does not necessarily mean that the other two completely disappear (Bull 1985, 41, 51). Thus, the main point of inquiry is not merely limited to the role of non-state actors in international relations; but rather, this study focuses on how non-state dimension constitutes the reality of international relations in conjunction with the international system and the international society.

2.2. The Idea of World Society in the English School

The term world society is neither invented by the English School nor used solely by them. It has been studied by different international relations traditions such as Stanford School, and it is also used to define professional associations, e.g. World Society of Cardio-Thoracic Surgeons. Nonetheless, it is the English School scholars who first put forth the idea that the world society is a fundamental dimension of international relations together with the international system and the international society (Wight 1991; Bull 1985; Little 2000; Buzan 2001). The main aim of this study is to assess the role of modern and pre-modern examples of world society elements in regard to their interaction with the international system/society. Hence, the English School's conceptualization of the non-state dimension of international relations best serves the aims of this study.

The terms international system and international society are both analytically clarified (Bull 1985) and historically studied (Bull and Watson 1984; Wight 1977; Watson 2002; Buzan and Little 2000) in the classical writings of the English School; however, world society is largely marginalized and neglected. As Buzan (2004, 21) accurately puts, the concept was treated as an “intellectual dustbin” in the British Committee years. However, it is also equally true that the contemporary English School literature continue to take the concept very seriously, especially after the period called “reconvening” (Buzan 2001). The concept now occupies a

significant place for the analysis of the non-state dimension of international relations in the English School research agenda (Pella 2013, 67).

Manning defined the world society concept for the first time within the English School. In his analysis, “the nascent society of mankind” is the underlying element of the society of states (Manning 1962, 177). Likewise, Wight (1977, 33) treats cultural unity as a precondition for a state system to come into being. He usually conceives the concept within the boundaries of Kantian tradition. In Wight’s study, the Kantian interpretation requires the concept to be defined within the context of a world state (Wight 1991, 8, 45; Wight 1987, 223). He, nonetheless, does not limit his understanding of the realization of the world society with the foundation of a world state. For him, *civitas maxima*, the single society of all mankind, can be achieved via the spread of a single great power throughout the world (doctrinal imperialism) or, via the acceptance of the same doctrine by separate states (doctrinal uniformity) (Wight 1991, 41-45). Bull’s approach to the concept is not different than other classical figures’. He generally uses the term within the context of the cosmopolitan conception of humanity (Bull 1985, 279) and forges a direct link between human rights and world society (Bull 2002, 222). For him, cosmopolitan justice is equal to world society. Given the fact that it does not have enough support in world politics, it is far from being realized (Bull 1971, 276).

Vincent was interested in the analysis of the universal justice claims in the international relations much more than any other classical figure of the English School. He usually treated world society concept as a complementary element of the international society. For him, by assuring the human rights and accepting it as an international issue of the society of states, states dissolve international society into a world society (Vincent 1995, 93). In general, his aim was to find a common ground between international society and universal justice claims. He defines his area of interest as “in the domain outside the diplomacy and international relations”, and “beyond international society to world society” (Vincent 1978, 20). World society, in his words, is described as “the framework of morality that encompasses groups of this kind whose claims, not being accommodated by the society of states, are voiced in a tone which is hostile to it” (Vincent 1978, 28). He acknowledges the

contradiction between norms that enable international society to operate such as non-intervention, and norms that world society stands on such as “respect to human rights.” In order to resolve the tension between “order” and “justice”, Vincent adopts the basic rights approach of Henry Shue. According to this approach, intervention in international society can only be justified if a state violates the basic rights of its citizens, which are defined as the right to life and the right to subsistence. For Vincent, “it is the attraction of the idea of basic rights as the minimal modification of the morality of states: it seeks to put a floor under the societies of the world and not a ceiling over them” (Vincent 1995, 126).

Linklater’s approach to the world society concept can also be regarded in line with that of Vincent’s. His study essentially focuses on the vulnerability of the individual in international relations, and it takes the so-called border between solidarist international society and world society as a starting point for analysis. In an earlier study, he reformulates the debate between pluralism and solidarism around the contradictory nature of being a man and a citizen. For him, the tension between these two types of morality has been the central issue in international relations (Linklater 1981, 25). According to him, the society of states should adopt a cosmopolitan conception of humanity in order to deal with different types of harm that individuals suffer from (Linklater 2002, 327).

As it can be inferred from Vincent’s and Linklater’s analysis of the subject, the normative ground for intervention in the international society, namely solidarism, is usually seen as the starting point for further analysis of world society. However, Williams’s study of the concept diverges sharply from others as he builds his theory upon the pluralist version of international society. Williams (2005, 20) defines world society as a shift in the focus of political activity from states to individuals. He also takes it as a universal normative progress. For him, the world society would emerge through the separateness of states which is also potentially an ethically desirable way (Williams 2005, 19). Williams (2005, 27) stresses the importance of the institutions of international society that generate “new organizations, practices, and normative propositions.” He further supports this argument through the examples of the WTO and International Criminal Court, organizations that

transcend the interstate domain and reach inter-human domain of international relations. He indicates that these organizations are founded by states and they continue to need interstate order to function properly. Pluralistic international society can, therefore, provide the basis for the emergence of the world society (Williams 2005, 27).

Clark (2007, 16), on the other hand, takes a non-theoretical standpoint while trying to discover how world society relates to international society within the context of some historical examples. He basically emphasizes the importance of world society level in providing legitimacy for international society (Clark 2007, 6, 18). Nevertheless, he admits that world society is an analytical category and can never be found in its absolute form in international relations (Clark 2007, 22). For him, “world society is the realm of the individual, of the non-official group or movement, and of the transnational network of nongovernmental agents” (Clark 2007, 6). Although his definition seems promising in the initial phase, particularly in terms of containing all types of non-state elements, his case studies prove the opposite. In order to examine the relationship between international society and world society, he takes the historical development of values that had and continue to have major impacts on the modern international society such as human rights, racial equality, democracy, and abolishment of the slave trade (Clark 2007). For this reason, it would not be wrong to place his study of world society within the tradition that treats world society as equal to the cosmopolitan conception of humanity, as Pella (2013, 67) asserts.

In his recent work, Ralph treats Rome Statue together with International Criminal Court as the two fundamental constitutional elements of world society. These two institutions are able to respond to crimes against humanity (or universal values, in his terms) when the society of states is reluctant or incapable of to do so (Ralph 2007, 21). For him, the English School propounds two different conceptualizations of world society in order to achieve the “cosmopolitan consciousness.” Cosmopolitan consciousness, in his study, implies the basic value of the world society that is shared among all humanity. These two conceptualizations are defined

as the revolutionary and Kantian versions of world society. Whereas states no longer exist in the revolutionary type of world society, they remain to play a complementary role in the work of supranational institutions in the Kantian version (Ralph 2007, 18). Moreover, he draws a line between the Kantian conception of world society and the solidarist version of international society through the implementation of Buzan's categories of "convergence" and "confederative" interstate societies (Buzan 2004, 160, 194). Ralph argues that intervention that is carried out by states as a political tool to restore the values of world society continues to exist in the solidarist international society where it disappears completely in the Kantian world society. Because in the latter, supranational institutions play the role of principal agents in implementing "cosmopolitan consciousness" (Ralph 2007, 19). He further claims that cosmopolitan conception of humanity (or more generally, human rights) is the fundamental value of the Kantian conception of world society as it is the only principle that can be universalized. In his analysis, it is therefore not possible to have geographically limited, or regionally defined world societies, since the world society and its basic value are inherently global (Ralph 2007, 91). Ralph's account of world society clearly falls into the cosmopolitan category for two essential reasons. First, he analyzes the concept within the framework of how international society/world society responds to crimes against humanity. Second, he excludes all non-state activities from his analysis unless they are somehow related to cosmopolitan conception of humanity or human rights in general.

Among the contemporary English School members, Buzan can be accepted as one of the most productive scholars. In addition to many of his contributions to the field, he devoted a full volume on the world society concept, entitled "*From International to World Society?*". This volume, indeed, does not simply focus on world society, but it has a wider aim to redefine and widen the scope of the English School theory. In line with this purpose, international society purports the international realm as a whole which consists of all three levels of social interaction within it. Buzan defines these social interactions in three different categories. The first category, interstate society, is simply equal to the classical definition of an international society or a

society of states. The second one, transnational society, refers to the dimension of non-state organizations. On the other hand, inter-human society means the social structures among individuals. (Buzan 2004, 120-127). The non-state dimension of international relations, then, is composed of inter-human and transnational levels. Buzan calls them together “world society” (Buzan 2004, 90-138; Buzan 2009, 26).

The distinction between inter-human and transnational dimensions is profound in Buzan’s approach. Drawing insights from the sociological distinction between community and society, he examines the nature of cohesion at transnational and inter-human levels. For him, the individual (inter-human) level largely concentrates on the questions of identity and community, while the transnational level is limited to society. Community, in this sense, signifies the feeling of we-ness and shared identity. Society, on the other hand, means “agreed arrangement concerning expected behavior” (Buzan 2004, 111). In this redefined context, it is possible for the English School theory to widen its non-state dimension to all kinds of activities of individuals and non-state actors. The reconfiguration of the English School theory also is the key for accepting the existence of the non-global world societies. Buzan (2004, 18) asserts that the meaning of “world” and “international” are not limited to global, but they can also refer to regional phenomenon. The sense of community, in particular, is most likely to be found among individuals who live in defined geographical areas/regions (Buzan 2004, 124).

Buzan’s analysis of world society can be accepted as a path-breaking effort in many aspects. This is particularly because of its recognition of non-global world societies and his study differs from others’ especially for extending the scope of world society beyond the cosmopolitan understanding of humanity. However, Buzan’s typology of world society has its shortcomings. As Pella (2013) clearly shows with the mini-case study of the slave trade in Africa in the early fifteenth century, the ontological distinction between individual (inter-human) and non-state organizations (transnational) disappears quite easily when it is applied to different cases. Since individual activity and transnational companies were almost at interplay and had a similar influence over the course of the slave trade, Buzan’s distinction between inter-human and transnational dimension does not help in our

understanding of the difference between the role of these dimensions (Pella 2013, 72). Moreover, the world society analysis should not merely focus on how non-state actors (individuals and non-state actors in Buzan's terminology) come together but their main concern should be why and what for non-state actors come together. Only by mainly focusing on these questions the world society leg of the English School can be widened in a way to include interests as well as values.

Extant scholarly work on world society within the English School can be classified into two broad categories (Pella 2013, 65). The classical interpretation which mainly treats world society as shared values among individuals (particularly cosmopolitan conception of humanity) with an influence over international society and a Buzanian version which approaches world society as distinct interacting non-state units. The first category can also be divided into two sub-categories (Ralph 2007, 18); a revolutionary version of world society where states disappear, and a Kantian version where states remain to play a complementary role in supranational institutions. In addition to these common points, the literature review made so far indicates that Buzan and other scholars have diverse views on recognition of non-global world societies. Moreover, almost all world society conceptualizations accept a direct link between the modernity and the emergence of world society, either implicitly or explicitly.

The concern within the classical interpretation of world society is whether the world society and international society are complementary or contradictory. Manning, Wight⁵ and Bull share the idea that world society is exactly the opposite of international society. Bull generally defined world society and cosmopolitan justice ideals as destructive factors for international society. The "order" has priority over the "justice" in most of his works, particularly in his earlier studies. He regarded world society in terms of the cosmopolitan conception of humanity, and accordingly, as a threat to the existence of the international society (Bull 1971, 1985, 1979). Bull argues that realization of world society necessarily brings the end

⁵ Although Wight asserts that revolutionism mainly aims at discarding international society, he also claims that all state systems are founded on a degree of cultural unity. Therefore, Wight can be assessed on both sides of the debate.

of international society. Wight also treats world society within the revolutionist tradition. According to him, the main objective of world society is to abolish the society of states. The main concern of other scholars like Vincent and Linklater is also to discover the potential grounds where the cosmopolitan conception of humanity can comply with the pluralistic nature of international society. Furthermore, Wight's (1977), Buzan's (2004), and Ralph's (2007) studies demonstrate that shared values among humanity, especially in the form of common values or common culture, can also be the basis for the emergence of state systems. Therefore, it would not be erroneous to claim that world society, as it stands, takes complementary, opposite or supportive forms in its interaction with international society in the English School literature.

Except Buzan's (2004, 18), the geographical extent of existing accounts of world society is the whole globe. This is largely because the other English School scholars take the concept as something equal with the cosmopolitan conception of humanity. In addition to this reason, two other factors also contribute to the global understanding of world society; the word "world" and holistic approach of the English School. The term "world" simply refers to the totality of individuals on the face of Earth. However, one should also bear in mind that "world" is not something geographically fixed. The world was not global before 1492. Instead, it was only composed of Europe, Middle East and parts of Far East, which corresponds to barely forty percent of today's world. Phrases as Christian world, Muslim world, Arab world, world of sports, old world, and new world do not necessarily refer to a particular territory, albeit sometimes may overlap with it. They also correspond to a shared identity, values, interest or a profession. Further, the English School does not totally exclude sub-global phenomena. Especially regional international societies are extensively studied by scholars like Hurrell (2007a), Buzan (2009), Quayle (2013), Schouenborg (2013) and Pella (2015). There are no theoretical or empirical limitations for the sub-global analysis of the world society elements in the English School theory. Since an ultimate unity among mankind is absent, and almost impossible to achieve, the emergence of a global world society is unlikely. Furthermore, the written history of mankind does not provide any record where all

the individuals on the Earth, being aware each other's existence, united around a single idea, value, interest or polity. Thus, accepting the existence of regional world societies would allow us to define and analyze non-state activity while also providing the basis to apply the English School's theoretical framework to a particular part of the world.

Another aspect that the existing scholarly works on the world society have in common is the assumption that there is a coherent link between the modernity and the world society. The first argument raised here is that existing studies on the world society conceptualization assume a linear understanding of the relationship between international system, international society, and world society. The original argument of the English School theory is that international system, international society, and world society co-exist despite the fact that some of the classical figures of the school tacitly treat the international society as a more desirable way of politically organizing the international relations. As it is discussed in detail in the previous section, none of these elements of international relations is given ontological priority by the English School. However, the interplay between these three is often misinterpreted and overlooked. The world society is conceptualized as the last phase of a continuous historical process that would only emerge after the phases of the international system and the international society. One can easily see in Vincent's study that world society is/can be established only after the acceptance of human rights as the basic norm of the international society. Williams also takes the fragmental nature of international relations as his starting point. He argues that world society can only be achieved via norms emerged within the pluralistic international society. Linklater's definition of international relations revolves around the contradictory nature of being a man and being a citizen. This definition emphasizes the importance of adopting moral priority of being a man over being a citizen as the normative position in the state system. The rationale, here, is the protection of individuals. Similarly, Ralph sees the emergence of world society as a result of the acceptance of "cosmopolitan consciousness" in the society of states. The linear understanding of the English School triad can also be seen in the analysis of the relationship between the international system and the international society.

Bull (1985) and Buzan (1993) treat the international system as a historical stage before the emergence of international society (Little 2000, 405). As a consequence, the triad of the English School, as it is portrayed in those works, is reformulated in a way to represent progressivism.

However, the English School theory, or international relations in general, is inherently non-progressivist. For Wight, one of the two reasons for the absence of international theory is the “belief in progress” (Wight 1966). Hence, it would be misleading to apply a progressivist understanding to an inherently non-progressivist theory. There is also no *de facto* reason for the morally prior position of international society over international system. This also applies to the relationship between world society and international society. For example, what humanity suffered most in the twentieth century were the devastating effects of wars; that is wars between sovereign-states, when international society was in its heyday. One can, therefore, argue that the pros and cons of the modern period of history are almost equal. Massive developments in the science and technology prolonged human lifespan and provided safety and comfort. These can hardly be refuted; however, it is also true that humanity witnessed peace and prosperity in the times of Pax-Romana, Pax-Ottomana, and Pax-Britannica as in the modern times.

Second, modernity and the existing accounts of world society also have a two-way relationship. On the one hand, world society, as it stands, is defined merely within the limits of shared values among individuals. Those values have/will have particular impacts on the functioning mechanisms of international society. On the other hand, modernity provides both human rights as the globally shared value and maximum interaction among individual human beings. Modernity in international relations, in this sense, can be defined by the sovereign-state, nationalism, industrialism, secularism, individualism and humanism (Yurdusev 2003). World society in the existing literature requires something global in its extent and individualistic in its content. Modernity provides the human rights as a global value which is also intrinsically individualistic. Thus, it is not striking to see the human rights as the starting point of analysis of world society. It is always seen as something attached to international society (Jackson 1995, 111) and therefore, its

pure form can only be human rights or justice claims within the modern international society. There can be no entity of world society beyond an ideal, if it is limited to shared values among mankind (Jackson 2000, 112). Nevertheless, even on the issue of human rights, consensus cannot be found among seven billion people on earth. For instance, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 18) lists freedom to change religion as one of the basic human rights, however, Abrahamic religions do not allow one to leave his/her original religion and adopt another one. Atheism is also forbidden in these religions. The freedom to change religion is simply in contradiction with the believer's faith. Human rights are naturally universal; however, they are not universally accepted. There is a compromise, rather than consensus over the issue of human rights.

2.3. The World Society Conceptualization Revised: Values and Interests

The previous section has clarified that the world society concept of the English School is somewhat disorganized. The concept is substantially adopted to define the role of non-state elements in international relations. Nevertheless, elements that transcend the realm of the state are analyzed in a large spectrum ranging from values to interests, and the extant analysis does not make any categorization between them. However, this study does not exclude any conception of world society but acknowledges all types of non-state elements, based either on the cosmopolitan conception of humanity or some other cosmopolitan value or interest, as forms of world society. As was previously noted in the introduction part, the central aim of this study is to assess the role of world society elements in the pre-modern and modern periods of history. Accordingly, it is argued that all kinds of non-state elements in the pre-modern period of history were more apparent and influential than they are in the modern period. To put it in a different way, world society was the predominant form of social relationship in the pre-modern international relations.

To provide such a comparison accurately, the study will analyze different non-state actors in different historical periods. Here, the categorization will be made in terms

of the aims that non-state actors pursue. This section, therefore, will introduce the basic characteristics of this categorization as an attempt to widen the world society pillar of the English School theory. The categorization will also provide a basis for the comparison of similar types of non-state elements in different historical periods. This comparison will be made in terms of their impact on the international system/international society dimension of international relations. This section will assert that the value based and interest based world society elements have different effects on the dynamics of international system/society dimension of international relations. It will also represent that the fundamental difference between modern and pre-modern period is the prevalent type of polity together with the extent of the political structure.

Bull's world society definition, albeit with two major revisions, is adopted in this study. Bull (1985, 279) defines the concept as follows; "by a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built." According to this definition, world society is a realm where common interests and common values of individuals enable institutions and rules to be founded. Although Bull usually defines the common values that human community can have in terms of human rights, he sets no limitations where the commonality can be found among the members of world society. The fact that common values and common interests of individuals can be infinite enables world society to be defined as the realm where ideas, beliefs, values, and interests that transcend the state interact with each other and the international system/society. Therefore, every idea, belief, value and interest that is beyond the state and international system/society are the fundamental elements of world society dimension of international relations. As discussed in the introduction, it is not easy to observe the impact of an idea, value or interest on international system/society unless it is mobilized by an actor. Particularly for this reason, and generally for the sake of simplicity, the actors that mobilize ideas, beliefs, values and interests are the principal focus of this study. Thus, non-state actors that mobilize the ideas, values, beliefs and interests in the world society

dimension of international relations are also world society elements. World society elements, in terms of this definition, are fundamental parts of world society dimension of international relations. World society, in this sense, composed of the totality of these ideas, values, interests as well as non-state actors.

Drawing insights from Buzan's (2004, 18) study, the first major revision to Bull's definition suggested in this study is the recognition of the existence of non-global world societies. By this revision, world society does not necessarily correspond to the whole globe. It is possible to identify sub-global versions of world society in international relations. Furthermore, it is also possible to identify world societies that are based on a cosmopolitan value other than human rights. Defining world society as a global phenomenon requires a worldwide understanding of individual elements, and a universal basis which all non-state actors can agree on. This theoretical presumption is promising, but in reality, it is very unlikely to find any value, belief, idea or interest that all individuals can internalize. Moreover, it narrows the analytical power of the world society concept by limiting its scope to the cosmopolitan conception of humanity.

The non-state dimension of international relations is in interaction with the world of states (international system/society dimension) in various ways. As discussed above, even the human rights are yet to be universally accepted. It is more likely to find values or interests shared among non-state actors in the sub-global scale. A value has to transcend the realm of the state in order to be conceptualized as a world society element. However, that value does not necessarily have to be shared by all humankind. Moreover, interests can be shared among a particular group of people. Therefore, if the world society is a concept to define the non-state dimension of international relations, it can refer to both global and sub-global non-state elements.

Recognition of the sub-global definition of world society will also allow us to examine the interaction between different international societies from a world society perspective. For example, the relationship between Ottoman Empire and European state system has been immensely studied within the context of international system-international society distinction (Bull 1985; Watson 1987,

1992; Yurdusev 2009). However, this interaction has not been analyzed as a relation between European and Turco-Islamic world societies due to the absence of a world society approach in the sub-global level. This means, as a result, world society can also be understood in the plural meaning of the term and different world societies can co-exist in world politics.

Second major revision to the definition makes a distinction between world societies that are based upon *common interests* and *common values*. Although interests and values sometimes overlap, making a distinction between them would allow us to include interest-seeking non-state actors into our analysis. These non-state actors only aim at pursuing particular interests and thus, having an impact on international relations accordingly, instead of trying to transform international society towards their values. Thus, while interest-seeking world society elements play a *functional* role, the roles of the others remain *ideational*. Ideational world society elements, in this sense, are in line with Wight's revolutionist tradition and have the aim of "assimilating international society into the condition of domestic politics" (Wight 1991, 41). They seek to reshape the international relations via the introduction of new norms. These elements promote the idea that true role of states is to mediate the affairs of their citizens. Functional world society elements, on the other hand, intend to control a particular sphere of international politics. These elements also aim at minimizing the effect, or reducing the influence of states and the state system in that particular sphere.

The distinction between the ideational and functional world society elements are also consistent with the existing classifications of the world society concept reviewed above. Accounts of world society conceptualization with a cosmopolitan understanding of humanity fall into the ideational world society category, whereas Buzan's version partly complies with that of functional. Here, it should also be noted that case studies may reveal different versions of world society elements which can fall into both categories. To put it differently, a world society element can pursue an interest in international politics while having a value based motivation. However, this does not necessarily blur the borders of our categories since functional world societies never have cosmopolitan motivations to redesign

international politics. Therefore, world society elements such as Al-Qaeda, Human Rights Watch or Christianity etc. remain in the ideational category even though they act in order to pursue particular goals such as damaging U.S.A military interest, stopping an execution or rallying supporters. Functional world society elements, on the other hand, such as International Olympic Committee, Greenpeace or International Chamber of Commerce may underline their area of interest with an emphasis on a particular value like Olympic spirit, environmentalism or liberal trade. However, they still fall into the functional category because their motive is not based on any cosmopolitan value.

This revised version of the world society concept defines the layer within the international realm where individuals, groupings of individuals, ideas, values, and interests that transcend the state interact with each other and with two other dimensions. This conceptualization, in this context, is in accordance with the core assumption of the English School that international system, international society, and world society coexist in the international relations throughout the history. Ideational world society elements can generate hierarchical or solidarist forms of international society as they provide cosmopolitan norms to the state system. Similarly, ideational world society elements, such as common culture, can also provide the basis for the emergence of an international system/society. Functional world society elements can mitigate the capacity of states in controlling a particular sphere of international relations. These elements may also wipe the state control away in that sphere. However, they do not have any fundamental effect on the main political structure of international relations. Therefore, world society elements are at interplay with other dimensions of international relations either to replace them with some other form of political organization or simply to seek particular interests within them. Based on this, the structure of the international system and the international society are not independent of the functioning of the world society dimension.

In addition to the distinction between the values and interests, the distinction between the forms of world society elements also stands on the difference between their aims. The need for such an analytical standpoint stems from the absence of

world society in its absolute and concrete form in the universal history. World society is not a concrete entity like international society. It is also far from being a well-defined analytical concept to be understood on its own and therefore, it must be analyzed according to its interaction with international system/society. Another reason that justifies this standpoint is that the ontological distinction between individuals and groupings of individuals is not tenable as such a differentiation does not provide any analytical leverage in the study of the interaction among the world society elements and the state-system. Moreover, contrary to Buzan's (2004, 124) argument, non-state units may come together to pursue cosmopolitan interests, as many human rights organizations do in the contemporary international relations.

The world society conceptualization is more comprehensive in its revised formulation. It can be used to conceptualize sub-global non-state activity. It can also be employed to analyze both historical and contemporary forms of non-state actors. One can argue that including all forms of non-state action into the scope of the world society conceptualization might result in an ambiguous approach. This is partly true. For example, adding the rules of a field of sports in to the scope of the concept just because these rules are set up by a non-state organization might cause a loss in the analytical power of the world society approach. However, the world society conceptualization as it stands is too narrow that its scope should be extensively expanded at the risk of blurring its borders.

A world society approach can be used to compare the impact of ideational and functional world society elements in different historical periods. As this dissertation builds its main argument on the differences between the modern and pre-modern periods of history, 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is accepted as the virtual line that divides the history of international relations into pre-modern and modern. The reason is evident. Treaty of Westphalia marks the beginning of a new period when the principle of mutually exclusive sovereignty has started to be recognized by the European powers. This principle has later become the organizing principle of the modern international system.

It is also acknowledged that the role attached to the Westphalian settlement in the discipline of IR is controversial. For example, scholars with a materialistic point of view such as Teschke (2003) argue that the means of production have not been changed after the Treaty of Westphalia. There was no separation of the political and economic sphere, and production continued to depend highly on territory. Hence, it would be misleading to take Westphalia as the birthplace of the modern international system. Krasner (1999) also claims that Westphalia never had its golden age as sovereignty is never absolute but always shared among some internal and external powers over a defined territory. Osiander (2001) examines the peace of Westphalia in detail through historical data, and he argues contrary to the view that the Thirty Years' War fought against hegemonic claims of the Holy Roman Empire. Instead, he asserts, viewing the Treaty of Westphalia as a milestone in modern sovereignty is a nineteenth century myth. The list can be extended. However, the point is that even at the time of Westphalian settlement, mutually exclusive sovereignty was non-existent and nation-state was not a form of polity. Distinct political units of the Westphalian era were not totally separable from each other in terms of absolute sovereignty and territoriality. That is compounded by two different yet interconnected facts; the modern international system actually emerged after the signing of Treaty of Westphalia and before the treaty, international system, if the term is relevant in any sense, was not composed of sovereign-states. In other words, the organizing features of the international relations have definitely changed from pre-modern periods of history to the modern era. Therefore, as the change is evident, the Treaty of Westphalia is only considered in this study as an illustrative point in history.

The essential difference between the pre-modern and modern periods of international relations is, therefore, the prevalent type of polity. The nation-state is the one and only polity of the modern international relations which was absent in the pre-modern era. As a form of polity, the nation-state is characterized by centrality, territoriality, nationality and sovereignty (Yurdusev 2009, 85). These characteristics of the nation-state make it one of the most penetrating entities in history. Thus, finding effective non-state actors in the era of nation-states is an

uneasy task at its minimum. Furthermore, the analytical capacity of the world society conceptualization should not be limited to the modern international relations as it is currently impossible to find a territory free of nation-state control. It is hard to describe any layer of international politics free from the influence of the nation-state. A national flag had been planted even on the Moon. For Wight (1966, 20), “moral prejudice imposed by the sovereign-state” is one of the two obstacles that impede us from achieving the international theory. For this reason, it would be more pertinent to look for a time period when the sovereign-state was non-existent, as we have a concept to define and analyze non-state domain of international relations.

The other feature of the pre-modern international relations is the non-global character of the international system. Before the nineteenth century, no political organization in international realm encompassed to the whole globe (Bull 1985, 20), and members of international society did not establish efficient global institutions to organize each other’s conduct in an orderly manner. Consequently, non-state actors had more freedom their actions before the emergence of global international society. It is well studied in the literature (Bull and Watson 1984; Gong 1984; Keene 2002; Watson 2002) that the expansion of international society was not limited to the enlargement of borders, but also covered the area of values, practices and institutions. Further, nation-state, the most fundamental product of the European state system, became the universal type of polity following the expansion process (Yurdusev 2009, 85). In the contemporary international relations, all nation-states are almost the same, particularly in their functions, and generally in their participation in the institutions of global international society.

The absence of the nation-state and the non-global extent of the international society enabled the advanced influence of world society elements over international system/society in the pre-modern international relations. Through the institutions of modern international society, nation-state controls every sphere of the international realm and gives no room for non-state activity. In other words, everything must be internationalized by the nation-state. Global international society imposes separateness as a value. As a result, world society elements, particularly the ones with cosmopolitan values, are seen as a threat to that basic value.

2.4. Concluding Remarks

The tripartite structure of this chapter sought to reformulate the world society conceptualization in a way to comprehend global, non-global, value-based and interest-based non-state activity. As scrutinized in the first part of the chapter, the pluralistic understanding of the international relations requires the study of world society dimension in relation to other dimensions, international system and international society. Therefore, the revised version of world society introduced here is conceptualized in accordance with the complex reality of international relations. The cases in the following chapters will be examined and compared within this framework. The second part of the chapter, the review of the literature on the issue, implies that the non-state elements in the English School theory are often dealt within the cosmopolitan agenda. Here, there is generally a false connection between the world society and modernity. Those two factors together constitute the limitations of the existing accounts of the approach. It is for this reason that the third part of the chapter introduces the distinction between functional and ideational world society elements particularly in order to widen the scope of the world society leg of the English School. This distinction will be utilized as the analytical tool in the following chapters, especially in comparing the cases in the modern and pre-modern periods of the history.

The non-state dimension of international relations is not merely composed of values shared among all individuals. It is true that globally shared values matter in international relations. However, it is also true that other cosmopolitan values shared by a particular group of people play a significant role. Moreover, values are not the mere thing that is shared among individuals. Shared interests, too, have the capacity to affect the dynamics of international relations. The relationship between the world society, international society, and international system can also be examined by focusing on the aims of non-state actors. For this reason, a comprehensive world society conceptualization is a non-negligible component of the IR.

The concept of world society that is employed in this dissertation defines the layer where non-state elements interact with each other as well as with the state system and society of states. Moreover, this concept can also be used to define and analyze the sub-global non-state phenomena that have transformative or regulative effects on the international relations. The theory of world society, in line with the concept, assumes that different world society elements with different aims have different effects on the international system/international society dimension of the international relations. As the main aim of this study to support its major argument, that is non-state actors were more effective in the pre-modern international relations than they are in modern, the world society concept fits this purpose of this study.

CHAPTER III

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The main objective of this chapter is to elucidate the role of the Roman Catholic Church in promoting Christian unity and its supremacy as the main norms of international relations between mid-eleventh and early fourteenth centuries. The focal point of this part of the study is the struggle between the Church and secular powers such as emperors, kings and local princes to gain political control over Europe. As the framework set in the previous chapter suggests, the Roman Catholic Church is defined as an ideational world society element with the aim of shaping international relations according to its values. The first part of the chapter will outline the key organizing principles of international relations in the medieval era. The second part will examine basic values of the Roman Catholic Church. Then, the chapter will particularly focus on the four distinctive institutions of the medieval period, namely coronation, excommunication, investiture, and crusade with specific reference to their substantial effect on the nature of international relations.

3.1. “International Relations” of the Medieval Europe?

Familiar concepts of IR may fall short to identify the political structure of the medieval Europe. This is not because the medieval period is too unclear and complicated to be conceptualized, but because the most of the concepts in the IR are invented to describe the relations between sovereign-states. Contrary to the principal characteristics of the modern international relations, such as separateness and absolute sovereignty, the distinctive features of medieval Europe were

hierarchy and heterogeneity. These core characteristics limit the analytical capacity of the classical concepts such as anarchy, sovereignty and balance of power.

Nonetheless, the pluralistic approach of the English School can still provide fruitful analytical support to understand the main dynamics of the medieval international relations. In order to carry out such an analysis, one should concentrate on the different yet interwoven dimensions of international politics.

Take a political map of the twenty-first century Europe as an example. Today, sovereignty areas of nation-states can easily be read from it. Such a map of Europe shows nearly fifty different colors and each color indicates the absolute authority zone of a nation-state. Drawing a political map of medieval Europe with borders can still be useful to provide a shadowy picture of the medieval international relations. Nevertheless, this map would not help much in the analysis. In this virtual map of medieval Europe, three states would occupy significant space; the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom of France and the Kingdom of England. Using the classical IR concept, these three can also be described as “great powers” of the medieval Europe. One can also add the Kingdom of Burgundy, Kingdom of Sicily, Byzantine Empire and the Papal States to this medieval map. Davies (1997, 278) includes the activities of the Vikings, the Magyars, the Mongols and the Turks to this picture due to their significant role in the international affairs of Europe. However, whether one considers these actors or not, it would still not be possible to examine the relationship between these units by using the classical concepts of IR, since they were not monolithic and centralized entities. The international relations of the medieval must be analyzed from a different perspective.

Studies directly addressing the political structure of the European continent in the medieval period are quite a few. In the field of IR, international politics of the era is usually analyzed in comparison with the modern international system. Furthermore, existing studies generally concentrate on whether or not these two resemble each other. For instance, Waltz (1979, 88) implicitly characterizes the organizing principle of the medieval as anarchy. For him, supranational agents have to acquire some capabilities of states in order to act effectively in international politics. Waltz

gives the papacy in the era of Innocent III as an example of an effective non-state actor. This supranational agent, according to him, acted effectively in the medieval international relations because of possessing the capacity of a state. Fischer (1992) also emphasizes the power political tendencies of the medieval actors. He acknowledges the existence of prevailing discourses medieval such as Christian unity and feudalism. Nevertheless, he argues, these were only discourses that have never been realized (Fischer 1992, 434, 438-443). He identifies tiny political units such as duchies, counties, and castellanies as the principal actors of medieval international relations. For him, all of these actors were behaving like “modern states” (Fischer 1992, 428, 439). Largely concentrating on the frontier zones, functional cooperation for defense and power politics among castellanies, Fischer aims to prove the validity of realist principles in the medieval era (Fischer 1992, 442-466).

Realist explanations of the medieval international relations largely stand on the assumption that the tiny polities of the medieval Europe were separated from each other by impermeable borders. Some scholars even argue that multi-state system’s foundational elements, such as separateness of political units, can be traced back to the demise of the Carolingian Empire (Strayer 1970, 23). Bloch (1989, 379, 401), for instance, sees the first hints of fragmented European political map in the emergence of castellanies as political actors. Likewise, Van Caenegem (2007, 176-178) treats castellanies as the basic political units of the age. According to him, these units were not subjected to any higher authority. He further claims that chaos and disorder in Europe had lasted among these small units until the emergence of strong monarchies (Van Caenegem 2007, 181, 185, 187). Barraclough (1955) even dates the beginning of the European balance of power back to the beginning of the twelfth century. It is true that medieval Europe was excessively fragmented among counties or castellanies. However, these units were hardly possessing any actor qualities. In addition to the fact that their boundaries were extremely flexible and transient (Southern 1977, 16), these units lacked absolute and exclusive sovereignty. Castellans and counts were usually subordinated to a feoffee, or to a lord, as a consequence of the feudal relations, notably because of fief and vassalage

(Hall and Kratochwil 1993, 483). Furthermore, the main organizing principle of the medieval international relations was overlapping authority zones, since lord-vassal relationships were too complex and interwoven to represent any exclusive authority over a particular territory. This means lords and vassals could be one another's feoffer and feoffee (Ruggie 1983, 274-275). The modern interpretation of sovereignty is so irrelevant for the medieval era that kings were even able to decide investiture of lords and succession of dynasties without having any coercive measures that modern states have today (Hall and Kratochwil 1993, 486). This also evidently indicates the absence of the distinction between internal and external politics (Ruggie 1983, 274). Thus, there was no state system in the realist sense of the term in the medieval Europe.

The political structure of the medieval Europe can also be conceptualized as an empire as Zielonka (2007) purports. According to him, defining characteristics of medieval empire are multicentred governance mechanisms and fuzzy boundaries (Zielonka, 2007, 11-13). He also points out that empires are not controlling but penetrating entities. Doyle (1986, 30) defines the empire as "effective control, whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society." Flexible units and co-centric administrative cycles are other characteristics of empires (Watson 2002, ch1; Buzan and Little 2000, 177). Given these characteristics, empire could be regarded as the right concept to define the political structure of the medieval Europe. It had a multilevel and polycentric governance system with the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy in the center and the small kingdoms and principalities in the periphery. Its boundaries were fuzzy and flexible. Christianity was the prominent unifying element among distinct actors (Zielonka, 2007, 1, 12) as it can clearly be seen both in everyday politics and in large-scale events such as the crusades.

Defining the medieval Europe as an empire is more tenable than defining it as an international system in the realist sense of the term. Existence of the Holy Roman Empire and its impact on the broader international relations of the medieval Europe is a fact. However, in addition to several problems of conceptualizing the medieval Europe as an empire, the term has its own shortcomings. It is rather an ambiguous

term. The term is adopted to describe political units which are essentially different from each other both in the field of history and IR. Furthermore, it both defines different forms of polity and characterizes outstanding powers of any given era. For instance, the term is used to describe the Roman Empire, the Assyrian Empire and the Macedonian Empire in the antiquity, the Holy Roman Empire in the Middle Age, the Ottoman Empire in the early modern period and the British Empire in the colonial period though all these political units possessed different characteristics. It is even used to define some great powers of the modern international system such as the U.S.S.R and the U.S.A. Heterogeneous political structure of the Holy Roman Empire is another difficulty for defining it as an empire. It is obvious that there was a degree of unity among European powers in the medieval era; nonetheless, this unity was neither a single state nor a league of states. The territory which is assumed to be controlled by the Holy Roman Empire was too politically fragmented to represent a single polity (Watson 2002, 140). The historical evidence also clearly demonstrates that imperial control over the Europe was seldom found. The emperor and the pope are often assumed to have political control over the empire. However, these actors usually lacked central authority as well as military power to rule the Holy Roman Empire single-handedly (Ruggie 1983, 273; Mundy 1991, 228). In addition, the relationship between the center and the periphery in the medieval Europe was quite different than the concept of “empire” suggests. Given that lord-vassal relationships were mostly independent of the imperial control, the imperial center and its periphery are not easily definable in the medieval Europe. Thus, as Motyl (2006, 230) accurately puts forward, “empire is everything and everything is empire”; even there is no other entity sharing the same characteristics, some polities are still defined as “empires.” Empire is a vogue term, yet it lacks analytical clarity to define the political structure of the large entities such as medieval Europe.

The political structure of the medieval Europe can lastly be defined as a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties (Bull 1985, 254). This system was characterized by two fundamental elements. The first element, feudalism, constituted the main governing mechanism of the continent. It is far beyond the scope of this study to present a detailed analysis of feudalism, however, at the same

time it is still crucial to point out essential operating mechanisms of it in order to explain international system/society dimension of medieval politics. Feudalism is based on fief, basically meaning the conditional property (generally a land) that is given to a vassal by a lord. The condition of holding the property for vassal was to provide an agreed number of knights to lord. In exchange for providing soldiers, the vassal was receiving the income of the property and the right of jurisdiction over all inhabitants of the land (Davies 1997, 295). The main bond between the vassal and the lord, in this regard, was the oath of fealty, or homage. Vassalage was largely based on the mutual faith and trust. Both for the vassal and the lord, the oath was a life-long and obligatory contract. The only condition for resistance to the oath for one of the parties was the infidelity of the other (Luscombe 2007, 159-160). Feudal system was existent and functioning in every part of the medieval Europe, from the smallest castellany to the biggest kingdoms. Even the pope was seen as God's vassal and vicar. However, the system was not a pyramid with the ruler of a country at the top and his tenants are placed under him hierarchically (Davies 1997, 296). On the contrary, a functioning feudal system was possible even in the absence of a king (Luscombe 2007, 161). Thus, medieval society was standing on the "diffuse network of agreements between individuals in groups" (Luscombe 2007, 162). The relationship among political actors, in this context, was built on a "confused mass of conflicting dependencies" (Davies 1997, 296).

The bigger kingdoms of Europe in the medieval were not free from the dynamics of feudalism. The political power of kings or overlords was limited to the lands they directly owned. Generally, rulers were not able to intervene in the disputes and the affairs between the holders of large fiefs and their vassals (Luscombe 2007, 161). Therefore, the kings and the emperors were not true suzerains. However, it can still be argued that the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of France were more centralized than the Holy Roman Empire. This is because, the monarchies were generally hereditary in these two kingdoms, institutions were more centralized than the Holy Roman Empire and the kingdoms were relatively independent of the authority of the Church (Mundy 1991, 230, 248-250, 253-254).

The second major element of the system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties of the medieval Europe was Christianity. The ground for commonality in the medieval Europe, both in the international relations and in the everyday life of medieval man was Christianity. Indeed, it was the main motive of all types of social relationships and international relations was not an exception (Yurdusev 2003, 113). For instance, Southern (1977, 137-138) states that the map of Europe between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries is not the map of political or commercial centers but it is the map of sanctuaries. Medieval man was a believer, and Christianity was the essence of his world view. History or other forms of knowledge were not perceived as independent processes with their own laws. Rather, they acquired meaning in fulfillment of God's design. Art and artisanship were also highly affected by Christianity (Gurevich 1985, 6, 9, 10-11). The individual in the medieval Europe was related to the society on many different levels such as family, guild, and clan, but "above all Latin Christendom was perceived as a spiritual and juridical unity, with common religious and moral beliefs and practices" (Black 2007, 591). The overarching statue of Christianity as a value system was not mere ideational, but it was also real. As Watson (2002, 144) indicates, the feeling of we-ness between people hardly transcended the boundaries of the local, but the idea of being a member of the Christendom was always existent.

Christianity can also be regarded as the most important source of the good life in the medieval period of European history. Hence, it was the cornerstone of the ethical code that determines the right and the wrong. In the medieval Europe, no actual or spiritual thing was perceived as ethically natural. Instead, they were seen as the elements of the cosmic conflict between the good and the evil (Gurevich 1985, 288). Given that the question of right was much more important than the question of interest in the medieval (Wight 1977, 27) Christianity, embodied in the Roman Church, was the main reference point for justifying the behavior of the political actors. For example, just and unjust wars were the reflections of the interpretation of right and wrong by the Christian doctrine. According to St. Augustine for a war to be just, it has to be waged either for defensive purposes or for establishing justice against an enemy (Markus 2007, 115). The holy war, or

more generally crusades, remarkably rests on the just war theory. The Church had right to declare war on infidels in response to the injustices caused by them. The fact remains that ambiguous reasons and causes for a crusade such as punishing heretics, defending the Church and reclaiming the Holy Land were also considered valid. Moreover, the Church might permit some wars between Christians as long as fighting parties did penance. Therefore, Christianity played a significant role in the medieval politics not only for being a ground for unity but also for being one of the major motives of political behavior.

The Christian doctrine was also the main source of the social construct in addition to its role as an ethical code. As a consequence of the cosmopolitan nature of Christian doctrine, the type-cast structure of the medieval society was far more apparent than the borders in the medieval Europe (Gurevich 1985, 7). Nobility, clergy, townspeople (burghers) and peasants (serfs) were the four central classes. Each one of these classes had a particular function and role in the society. The governing function was shared between the nobility and clergy. Nobility was also responsible for protection and military. The townspeople were generally artists and merchants while the peasants were bounded to land and generally responsible for agricultural production (Watson 2002, 140). As Davies (1997, 297) argues, the medieval mind was formed of feudalism and Christianity. Therefore, the history of medieval Europe can be analyzed in connection with the interaction and struggle between nobility and clergy. As it will be exemplified in detail in the rest of the chapter, the international character of medieval politics stems from the conflicting interests of nobility and clergy on right to rule. Both clergy and nobility were highly mobile in Europe. They could claim authority almost anywhere in the continent. As a result, their interactions were inherently international (Ruggie 1983, 275).

Watson (2002, 151) and Wight (1977, 29) share the idea that medieval Europe was not a state system. Given the fact that there were no clear borders between states and no absolute sovereignty over territory, it is true that medieval Europe can hardly possess systemic characteristics. It is also abovementioned that medieval Europe unlikely resembles an empire since there was no clear sign of effective imperial control over the continent. The political structure of the medieval Europe can be

identified as an imperial state system or a hierarchy, nonetheless, a derivative type of it. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, in the hierarchical international systems, one of the political units in the system is implicitly or explicitly accepted as suzerain by other actors. In contrast with this theoretical assumption, although the Holy Roman Emperor was generally accepted as superior by other rulers, the relations between lords and vassals were mostly independent of his political control. In addition, the Kingdom of France and the Kingdom of England can be considered as distinct parts of the Latin Christendom. For this reason, the unique character of the political structure of the medieval Europe was ontologically a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties.

To sum up, the political structure of the medieval Europe represented a loose unity on the basis of Christianity and feudalism. Political units and individuals, as well as other actors such as groupings of individuals and other associations were united on the basis of Christianity. Christianity, in this sense, can be identified as an ideational world society element from the English School perspective. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that this unity was a loose one. Disunity is equally descriptive as unity in the definition of the political structure of the medieval European society (Southern 1977, 15). The political units of the time did not represent a complete hierarchy. They were not centrally governed either. Therefore, the political structure of medieval Europe can be regarded as a suitable environment for a world society element to be effective.

3.2. Roman Catholic Church as an Ideational World Society Element

As previously stated, ideational world society elements aim at transforming international relations toward their values. As these values are always portrayed in cosmopolitan nature, the major defining characteristic of the ideational world society elements is their conception of state as the mediator of its people's affairs. The values shared by people are always above the values shared by states. Therefore, the mission of the institutions that is built by the people prevails against the institutions constituted by states. Above all these core features, for a political

unit to be qualified as a world society element; it must be non-state. The Roman Catholic Church, as it was the tangible organizational body of the Christianity, totally meets these conditions to be regarded as an ideational world society element in the medieval Europe.

Christianity both in the form of religion and in the form of a value system possesses the characteristics of an ideational world society element. It was both the prominent unifying factor and the common value among individuals in the medieval Europe. As Black (2007, 592) indicates, the body of Christ was not only a metaphor, but also a real, over-arching entity. However, head of this entity, the Roman Church, is sometimes regarded as the true state of the medieval Europe (Wight 1977, 28). The underlying reasons for this view are Church's predominant position in the medieval politics and its robust administrative machinery. Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church controlled territories which are named together as the Papal States.

Still, these features are not sufficient to qualify the Roman Church as a state. Even in its heyday, the Roman Catholic Church did not represent the basic characteristics of a state. For instance, until the sixteenth century, the Holy Roman Emperors and German princes had great influence over the Papal States, although these territories were officially under direct rule of the pope. In other words, the papacy's capability to directly control the Papal States is a controversial issue.

Rather than being a polity, the Church was an entity that is composed of supranational and individual elements. It was supranational in the sense that all other secular powers accepted its existence and authority even at their most powerful times (Southern 1977, 124). It also retained individual elements since it hardly had a corporate body independent of the pope, bishops, papal legates and other members of clergy (Black 2007, 596). As Ullmann (1949, 138) emphasizes, the tension between the empire and the Church in the medieval Europe was quite similar to the tension between state and individual on the issue of freedom in modern times. For all these reasons, Roman Church was not a state in the medieval and did not officially become one until the Lateran Treaty of 1929.

As a non-state actor, the cosmopolitan claim of the Roman Catholic Church stems from two major standpoints. The theological one can be traced back to emergence of the belief that all humans on Earth will be saved by Christ. In fact, the Catholic message is believed to be addressed to all humanity (Cunningham 2009, 13). Even one of the meanings of the word catholic is “the whole” (Cunningham 2009, 3). The comprehensiveness in the medieval era was expressed in every sphere of the social, material and artistic activities. The history was written from Adam and Eve to the salvation (including the future), the cathedral was built to reflect the cosmos, and historical characters, such as saints, Jesus and kings, lived centuries apart were portrayed in the same composition of the artwork (Gurevich 1985, 6, 289). Christendom was clearly seen as a single and universal body, and conceived as equal to mankind (Chadwick 2007, 11, Gierke 1913, 10). For example, the argument that pope had extensive dominion all over the world was the prevalent political doctrine of the Roman Church. Emperor’s authority, on the other hand, was seen as limited to the Christian world (Ullmann 1949, 78). Although Church’s authority claims were universal and its dominion sometimes went beyond the borders of the Christendom (Ullmann 1949, 115), in fact, the radius of Christianity was often restricted with the influence area of Islam. In other words, the universal claims of Christianity and the Church were pretty much limited to Christian society in practice. For this reason, Christianity or the Roman Catholic Church is a non-global world society element.

The second and less apparent standpoint for the cosmopolitan claims of the Roman Church was the legacy of Roman Empire. Declaration of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire had a major boosting effect on universal authority claims of the Church. After the demise of the Roman Empire, a great majority of European population remained Christian. As a matter of fact, this strengthened the state of Christianity both as the core common value and as the cohesive factor among individuals. The Roman Church conceived itself as the symbol and the head of universal Christianity (Ullmann 1955, 100) since it was the main institution that Europe inherited from the Roman Empire (Watson 2002, 139). On this basis, it claimed ultimate authority all over the former realm of the Roman Empire.

It is made clear that the Roman Catholic Church was a non-state actor and its universal/cosmopolitan claims are originated in Christian values. The definition of an ideational world society element suggests that value based non-state actors seek to reshape the international relations according to their values. Therefore, in order to analyze how and to what extent the Church was able to influence international relations at the time, its basic value should be explained. As briefly discussed above, the most prominent value that the Church imposed on international relations was unity. In this manner, unity is conceived as indivisibility of Latin Christendom. The source of the unity and the harmony was divine to the medieval mind, and it was believed that the society was held together neither by material elements, nor by force, nor biological and linguistic bonds, but by the spiritual element of the Christian faith (Gierke 1913, 9; Ullmann 1955, 285). Popes including Leo I and Gregory VII were well aware of the widespread belief of the Christian society in the divine source of unity. For this reason, they implemented the notion called *Corpus Christi* as the official doctrine of the Roman Church (Ullman, 1955, 7, 276-277). The society was seen as an organism (body) and every individual part (limbs) of this body, such as clergy, nobility and so on, had its particular function (Black 2007, 593; Gurevich 1985, 61). Indeed, those parts were perceived as micro counterparts of the greater whole, yet the whole had a different final clause of its own, independent of the composing parts (Gierke 1913, 8-10). The components of the whole were not independent but were smaller copies of it (Gurevich, 1985, 288). Therefore, the relationship between the state and the individuals largely reflected the organic understanding of society in the medieval era.

Church's attitude towards the international relations was quite similar to its general understanding of Christianity as a universal doctrine. In parallel with this view, the Church regarded unity as the only type of political structure and the international relations has to be organized according to this type. For its part, the international realm was the corporate union of Christians (Ullmann 1955, 9). Basically, the borders between the external and internal affairs were not clear enough in the medieval thought to develop distinct ideas about the social interaction of large-scale human groups. In fact, as Gurevich (1985, 294) remarks, to medieval mind "the

world does not need explanation, it is directly apprehended.” Thus, for the Church, there was no principal difference between a small village and the whole Europe. Latin Christendom should remain undivided and its members must obey the Church and serve Christianity. Independent of being small or big, all human groups were composing the body of Christ. They were not separable from each other in this sense. Indeed, there was no need for splitting them. God was one and it created the mankind as a single mystical body that has one purpose, needs one law and one government (Gierke 1913, 10). The importance of the society and the community was so high in the medieval era that even the word individual was non-existent in Latin (Black 2007, 591). Gierke (1913, 9) also underlines the significance of the subordination of plurality to unity in the medieval thought. In international relations too, separate kingdoms and principalities were seen as subordinated to Latin Christendom. The kings and the emperors should renounce their independence and surrender to the pope. The division between the temporal and the spiritual powers was merely practical in the eyes of the papacy (Gierke 1913, 12). The pope was claiming to be the wielder of both powers. The Church was claiming that the secular rulers were exercising the temporal power on behalf of the pope by his permission (Robinson 1993, 298-299). Thus, according to the papal propaganda, there was no need for different states, or any kind of fragmented political structure in the Latin Christendom. Even if different states exist, they had to unite under the leadership of the pope.

The idea that the Roman Church had the right to rule was originated in the argument that there is only one celestial ruler and there must be only one terrestrial (Ullmann 1949, 116). As abovementioned, one of the images of church (the totality of all churches) in the medieval society was the body of Christ (Robinson 2007, 253). The pope (or the roman church) was claiming to be the head of this body. This argument was substantially referring to the Aristotelian understanding of hierarchy. Each body in nature has one head. If the mankind constitutes a single body, the *Corpus Christi*, then, it must have only one too, and this head could only be the pope, not someone else, because he is God’s vicar (Ullmann 1949, 117). Given that all earth belonged to St. Peter and the Roman Church was his divine and single

representative, kings, princes and other secular rulers should be vassals of the Church.

Superiority claims of the Church virtually arose from two texts in the New Testament. The first one is Luke 22:38, “And they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords. And he said unto them, it is enough.” The allegoric interpretation of this text by the Roman Catholic Church suggests that Christ pointed out the coercive power of the secular government with the material sword, and signified the ecclesiastical power of the excommunication with the spiritual sword (Robinson 1993, 297). According to the Church’s interpretation, the material sword is subjected to the spiritual one and only wielded by the permission of the pope (Robinson 1993, 298). The spiritual leader of the Latin Christendom, the pope, is superior to the material ruler, to the emperor. Therefore, it was emperor’s duty to serve and protect the superior leader. The second text from the New Testament, Matthew 16:18 and 16:19 say “And I say also unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.”⁶ From the Church’s perspective, these texts were clear evidence of the supreme position of papacy since the pope was the vicar of St. Peter. Thus, possession of all earth and authority were transferred from St. Peter, the founder of the Roman Church and the first Roman Pontiff, to his successors, to the popes.

In this context, the duty of the emperor and the secular rulers was to protect the Christendom and the head of this body (Robinson 1993, 302-304; Ullmann 1955, 13). According to the Church’s viewpoint, the emperor must rule the government in line with the priesthood’s directions (Ullmann 1955, 20). Service and fidelity were central values. Whereas the spiritual leader was superior to the temporal, the pope was the ultimate ruler of the world. Since the pope had the power of binding and loosing both in heaven and on earth, it was every human’s duty to obey and serve

⁶ Both are exact quotations from the King James Version of the New Testament.

him. Kings and all other secular rulers had to believe in God and serve Christianity as all individuals had to do. This was their reason d'être. Even the law was regarded as a part of the Christian morality. In order to enjoy rights, an individual had to be a Christian (Gurevich 1985, 196-197). Therefore, secular rulers were required to act harmoniously and follow the authority of the Roman Church.

Although the Roman Church was a strong proponent of unity in the medieval Europe, in practice Christian society's absolute collectiveness was rather a myth. Significance of being part of a society in the medieval Europe is beyond any doubt; however, especially for ordinary individuals, sense of belonging to a community was mostly limited to family, clan or village and rarely transcended the local borders. This does not necessarily mean that individuals did not conceive themselves as members of the Christendom, but only refers to the practice of individual's daily life. As Black (2007, 606) stresses, the propaganda on unity of Christendom gradually increased in late medieval period when the papal power was declining. Nevertheless, the Church as an ideational world society element was influential enough to direct international relations in a way to hold the secular rulers together in a loose formation.

3.3. Institutions of the Roman Catholic Church and the Norm Change in the Medieval Europe

So far I have explained the factors that qualify the Roman Catholic Church as an ideational world society element. I also asserted that the main motive behind the Church's values was Catholic Christian doctrine which has an intrinsically cosmopolitan message. The Church promoted unity and supremacy in international relations of the medieval Europe, based upon the cosmopolitan nature of Christianity. In the time period this study focuses on, the Roman Church exercised four major political means of power in order to direct international relations according to its cosmopolitan values. These political tools can be listed as coronation, excommunication, investiture and crusade. Surely, papal institutions were not limited to these political tools but included a large spectrum of institutions, such as controlling the dynastic marriages, acting as a court ratifying treaties

between kings and countries, prohibiting trade with certain localities and imposing embargos on towns (Ullmann 2003, 148). Ullmann (1949, 78) describes all of these actions as the expressions of papal plenitude of power. Likewise, Gurevich (1985, 301) defines them as “mechanisms which feudal society used to subordinate individual to the ruling system.” Nonetheless, each of these political tools can also be regarded as an institution of medieval world society because all of them were the established practices of international relations. By these institutions, the Church was seeking to establish Christian unity and papal supremacy as the principal norms of the medieval international relations.

As the introduction part of this dissertation suggests, the actor behavior should be examined in order to detect the norm change in the international relations. Hence, if the behavior of princes, kings, emperors and other political actors/units changed in a way to follow the norm of Christian unity and the Church’s supremacy in the medieval international relations, then, the Church can be regarded as an influential ideational world society element. The analysis below will show that, In addition to their function in directing state behavior, the institutions of the Church also replaced the institutions of the state system in the medieval Europe.

3.3.1. Coronation

Coronation of the kings and the Holy Roman Emperors was one of the most effective political tools of the Roman Church. Coronation was especially the leading symbol of papal supremacy in the medieval international relations. In order to be recognized as a legitimate ruler by the Christian society, the Holy Roman Emperor ought to be coronated by the pope. From the Church’s point of view, it was also a clear demonstration of emperor’s subordination to the pope. Kingship and emperorship were qualified as church offices and the person that would fill this position should be approved by the spiritual authority of the Christian society. As a point of fact, coronation served to the Church’s supremacy claims over the secular rulers and became a major element of the papal institutions. In practice, coronation ceremony and suitability principle were two inseparable political tools that Roman

Church possessed. While the coronation was indicating the God's consent over a newly elected ruler, suitability was providing the main criteria for that ruler to be divinely approved.

The coronation ceremony was originally a Byzantine practice with a pure symbolic meaning. It was held to show to the public that the new emperor is divinely approved (Ullmann 2005, 14). The later adaptation of the coronation ceremony in Western Europe can be characterized as a papal action against the growing dominion of the Byzantine Empire over the legacy of demised Roman Empire. In the western part of the continent, the first coronation ceremony was held in the Christmas night of 800 and at that night, Charlemagne is coroneted by Pope Leo III as the Holy Roman Emperor. For Davies (1997, 283) neither Leo III nor Charlemagne had such a right over the imperial title, however, they still held the ceremony. In addition to parties absence of authority over the imperial title, the papacy's and Charlemagne's views on coronation were quite different as well. While papacy's purpose was to revive the old undivided Roman Empire under its spiritual leadership, Charlemagne's intention was to build a western counterpart of the Byzantine Empire (Ullmann 2005, 53). Contrary to the Church's intention, the outcome of the first coronation was the foundation of Carolingian Empire. Charlemagne, coroneted as the Holy Roman Emperor, would stand against the Byzantine ideal of restored single exclusive empire in the Christendom instead of pursuing papal interest (Nicol 2007, 58).

The symbolic and circumstantial nature of the coronation ceremony has substantially changed in the early High Middle Age. Admittedly, Charlemagne was in no need of the papal approval to achieve the title of emperor at the time of first coronation ceremony. His authority was already acknowledged by the nobles and by the people he ruled (Nelson 2007, 231). Nevertheless, as Luscombe (2007, 168) emphatically asserts, this unnecessary coronation of Charlemagne and subsequent imperial and royal coronations gradually provoked the idea that the emperorship and the kingship should be approved by the Church. Eventually, by the help of the *Donation of Constantine*, the forged papal decree indicating that Emperor Constantine I had transferred the authority over Rome to the Roman Catholic

Church, Pope Gregory VII declared the roman pontiff's right to depose and absolve emperors in his famous *Dictatus of Papae* (Dictates of the Pope⁷). The central aim of this document was quite clear; it was designed to restore and extend papal authority over temporal matters. Although this attempt of Gregory VII unsurprisingly and immediately started a conflict between the papacy and the empire, coronation ceremony maintained its importance such that Gregory VII's enemy, Henry IV was still in need of a coronation even by the antipope Clement III in 1084.

The act of the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV is a clear example of how coronation is established as a new institution in the medieval international relations. Pope Gregory VII was Henry IV's biggest enemy. The coronation was the practice that is used by the pope to depose Henry IV from his throne. However, the institution of coronation was so established and acknowledged in the international relations that, Henry IV was still practicing the coronation ceremony, even with an antipope, in order to show the public and to the other rulers that he was divinely approved. This simply implies that the norms of the Christianity, which in this case requires a ruler to be approved by the Church, was above the norms of the state system since holding power was not enough for a ruler to be accepted as a legitimate actor of international relations.

In accordance with the papacy's main views on the political structure of the Latin Christendom, the coronation ceremony mostly helped the Church to establish its supreme position in international relations. Furthermore, the coronation was also an assurance of the Church's freedom from imperial control. In terms of papal views, the end of empire and the emperor was to serve and protect the Roman Church. This is because the coronation ceremony has founded the emperorship as a church office. Such an argument on the origins of the empire and the emperorship intrinsically provided a basis for the papacy's claims on right to veto unsuitable emperors (Watt 2007, 383). This essential political tool of the medieval Church was indeed supported by the doctrine of suitability. Suitability simply indicates that an emperor

⁷ The decree that includes the basic statements of Gregory VII's reform programme.

must be obedient, devoted and useful to the Church. The kingship and suitability were so interrelated in the eyes of the Church that even the Latin word for king, *regium or reges*, was derived from *regere* meaning to act correctly and justly (Gurevich 1985, 292). According to Pope Gregory VII, “a Christian kingdom must be ruled by a suitable king for the honor of the Holy Church” (Robinson 1993, 312). It is evident that Gregory VII was pointing out the Church’s right to approve and depose emperors and kings, as he deposed Henry IV because of his unsuitability for the crown. However, the suitable emperor was not only expected to devote itself to the Church but was also supposed to secure Church’s freedom from the empire. Hence, kings and emperors who are elected by disputed royal elections were only approved by the pope if they assure Church’s independent authority from the empire (Robinson 1993, 316).

Given that the application of suitability principle was not limited with the Holy Roman Emperors and direct papal vassals, but extended to all secular rulers (Robinson 1993, 314), its efficacy was quite significant in international relations. Considered together with the excommunication, the Roman Catholic Church as an ideational world society element was strong and influential enough to indirectly control who would rule the actors of the medieval international relations. By the same token, coronation was an institution of the medieval international relations with the main function of appointing suitable kings and emperors who will rule in terms of Christian principles. In other words, being suitable for the kingship and acting according to the Christian principles were the effective norms of the medieval international relations.

3.3.2. Excommunication

Excommunication simply means the exclusion and total isolation of a person from the Christian society by virtue of clergy’s decision on him/her. Despite the fact that excommunication was the most severe punishment that clergy can sentence, in its early implementations, especially before the ninth century, the effects of excommunication were pretty limited in the civil life. An excommunicated person

was only prohibited from receiving church services and participating in Christian activities (Ullmann 1955, 140). However, the scope of this ban has increasingly extended. Eventually, making contact with an excommunicated person turned into a major reason for excommunication. Excommunicating someone has become equal to excluding him/her from the humanity as well as from the Christian society. An excommunicate was on the outside of the religion and the earthly law (Gurevich 1985, 301). The excommunication was a state of being rather than a sentence. The excommunicate was no longer a part of the Christian community; he was set apart from the God (Töbelmann 2010, 95).

The right to excommunicate, of course, was exclusive to clergy. As the St. Peter inherited the right to loose and bind in heaven as well as on earth from Jesus Christ; his vicar, the pope and the Roman Catholic Church had the same right for expelling someone from the Christian society (Watt 2007, 384). The philosophical background of the excommunication goes back to notion of Corpus Christi, which construes all Christians as forming the body of Christ. Since all individuals were conceived as parts of this body and given that the Roman Catholic Church was the head, it had the right to exclude infected parts in order to prevent contamination of others. Heresy and infidelity were conceived as highly contagious diseases, therefore, other persons who continue to have contact with the infected part of the body must also be excluded (Ullmann 1955, 140, 300; Ullmann 2003, 100).

The implications of excommunication were large and diffuse in the Christian society. These implications were ranging from expelling someone from a particular area to confiscating his/her property. While the primary effect of the excommunication was spiritual, that is people strongly believed that their souls will be damned forever if they are excommunicated (Mesquita 2000, 101), its secondary effects were highly social. A comparison between spiritual and temporal consequences of excommunication would clearly indicate that the latter was harsher than the former. The possible spiritual outcomes were permanent damnation, loss of sacraments and prohibition from entering churches. The social and concrete ones, on the other hand, were total isolation, public disapproval, ostracisation, indignity and loss of wealth. Furthermore, an excommunicate was forbidden from holding

offices and most importantly from taking oaths (Töbelmann 2010, 103). There was no exception for rulers, kings, and princes. As Watt (2007, 384) purports, if the excommunicate was a ruler, his ministers and officials should refuse obedience to him. Moreover, in case of an excommunication, a ruler's subjects were automatically released from their oaths. As the oath was the backbone of the feudal system, its invalidation was resulting in the loss of wealth and power for secular rulers. An excommunicated ruler was no longer allowed to communicate with his ministers, issue binding decrees, and govern (Ullmann 1955, 300-301).

Excommunication of a prince or a ruler could also cause a call for crusade since the subjects of prince were released from their oaths and his country should be opened for re-occupation of Catholics (Ullmann 1949, 124). Secular rulers were also threatened with excommunication in case the Church postulates they did not properly fight with heresy. Raymond VI, count of Toulouse, for example, was excommunicated by Innocent III, just because the Church was of the opinion that heretics harbored in his lands (Watt 2007, 384-385). It was an expression of the Church's conviction that it is prince's duty to compel the excommunicate to ask for readmission to the Church. If a prince has not fulfilled this duty, the prince himself would face the threat of excommunication (Ullmann 1949, 123; Töbelmann 2010, 98). In fact, the threat of excommunication was quite often utilized by the Church so much so that in the second half of the twelfth century, Pope Alexander III threatened all secular rulers with excommunication in case they fail to show their determination to fulfill their temporal jurisdiction against heretics (Robinson 1993, 319).

Contrary to the Church's intention of ensuring obedience of secular rulers by utilizing the excommunication as a tactical weapon, secular rulers did not easily surrender to this threat. Excluding an excommunicated king totally from the Christian society was not as easy as isolating an ordinary Christian. Given that secular rulers were capable of finding some ally bishops or other high-ranking church officials to revoke the excommunication, the possible consequences of excommunication of a ruler were not equally severe when compared with other excommunicates (Töbelmann 2010, 105). The Sixth Crusade can be regarded as a

clear evidence of mild effect of excommunication over secular rulers. The Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II embarked on a military campaign to regain the Holy Land even though he was already excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX at that time. Nevertheless, excommunication was still seen as a serious and imminent threat by laymen. Secular rulers were well aware the fact that the Church could abuse the excommunication for political ends. In order to restrain the Church's excommunication power, German princes decreed the famous *Mirror of Saxons*. The decree was substantially a major law document with the purpose of restricting the papal powers. According to the decree, the pope had no authority for excommunicating a validly elected secular ruler unless that ruler destroys churches in his country, disposes his wife, or someone proves his infidelity. However, the Roman Church, in return, strictly prohibited implementation of the decree and declared that any secular ruler or ecclesiastical tribunal referring to it would be excommunicated (Ullmann 1949, 123).

In sum, almost every person who contested the essence of the papal doctrines was threatened with excommunication. In order to achieve political ends, the Church either excommunicated or threatened to excommunicate the secular rulers. Excommunications of Henry IV, Victor IV, Frederick Barbarossa, Frederick II and Otto IV are clear examples of this. What makes the excommunication a strong political tool in the hands of papacy was not its extensive use or severe consequences, but its radius. While a decree of an emperor or a secular ruler was valid, functional and effective only within the area his power can efficiently reach, excommunication, like any other law of the Church, had effects throughout the whole Latin Christendom (Ullmann 1955, 141). A king or any other secular ruler had to take advantage of coercive power of state in order to enforce their laws or decrees. Church, on the other hand, was not in need of legitimatization of its actions or did not require extensive use of force, since its actions were based on the common values of individuals in the medieval Europe. Excommunication's sphere of influence is an obvious demonstration of the norm change in the medieval international relations. The true, efficient and functioning institutions of the Europe in Middle Age were not the institutions of international society but the institutions

of world society. That is why Van Caenegem (2007, 177) ranks excommunication and hell-fire among the institutions which hold the so-called “international system” of castellanies together.

3.3.3. Investiture

The political impact and historical significance of the investiture of high-ranking church officials are highly related with the administrative structure of the medieval Europe. In the late Roman Empire period, Europe was administratively divided into dioceses. After the empire adopted Christianity as the official religion in the fourth century, the Church also established an organizational structure parallel to this Roman administrative system. Nevertheless, this organizational body of churches was not hierarchical as Roman administrative body was. In this context, the pope was no more than the bishop of Rome, and his supremacy over other members of clergy was yet to be established. As a consequence of the gradual decline of the Roman rule, the civil services and public authority in dioceses have remarkably diminished. This vacuum has been filled by churches and high-ranking members of the clergy such as bishops, abbots, and archbishops. The fuzzy boundary between bishops’ spiritual and temporal role also contributed to the growing authority of these officials in civil life as much as power vacuum left by the demised Roman administrative system. Moreover, majority of the church properties and officials were covered by feudal immunity, meaning exemption from taxes and some other obligations. These all factors were substantial elements of the constitution of overlapping authorities throughout the medieval Europe. Hence, as a result of this administrative structure of Europe and the church offices’ growing temporal authority in the medieval, the right of investiture of these officials gained profound importance.

Contrary to bishops’ civil authority over dioceses, the Church’s political power was limited until the eleventh century. In addition to the lack of established hierarchical structure in the organization of churches all around Europe, feudalism in the continent has also compelled Church to follow secular authority. In the era of the

Carolingian Empire, together with the power of sword and chivalry, the public authority in Europe was established by the cooperation between the Church and Charlemagne (Davies 1997, 282). However, the collapse of Carolingian rule by the death of Charlemagne affected church's political power negatively. On the surface, interdependence between secular rulers and clergy continued to exist after the demise of the Carolingian Empire. But in reality, the fate of clergy was more and more left in the hands of secular rulers. Church officials owed their seats to the lords who established and owned most of the churches, and these secular rulers inherently monopolized right to appoint clerical nominees within their zones of control. Lords, kings, and emperors, on the other hand, owed to the Church either their royal titles, as it was the case in the Carolingian Empire, or practical support, as divine approval was a must in the eyes of the public (Luscombe 2007, 167). In theory, both the church and the state mutually required each other's support to govern their lands and establish their authority. Nevertheless, in practice, the Church was more dependent on the secular rulers to have a say in temporal matters. Feudal lords, kings, and princes were in control of the bishops and other church officials (Davies 1997, 298). However, this balance had dramatically changed in the eleventh century with the implementation of Gregorian reform program.

Prohibition of the appointment of the church officials by the lay rulers was of paramount importance in Gregory VII's reform program. Indeed, early hints of this reform program can be observed in the policies that Pope Leo IX implemented twenty-five years before the pontificate of Gregory VII. In the papal council summoned during the Feast of St. Remigius, Leo IX asked bishops and abbots to declare whether they paid money to get their offices. At the end of this council which witnessed many controversies, some of the papal legates who declared simony have been forgiven and some of them excommunicated and removed from their offices. The crucial point is it was the first time in the history of the Roman Catholic Church that a pope was openly stood against simony (Southern 1977, 128). It was Gregory VII who took up where Leo IX left off. For Gregory VII, the decline of the Church's spiritual and temporal authority as well as its dignity was largely a consequence of the increasing simony and heredity in the appointment of the church

offices. In order to strengthen the Church's authority and to regain its dignity, Gregory VII declared simony as a major reason for excommunication and confirmed celibacy to prevent hereditary bishoprics (Robinson 1993, 295). In the Dictates of the Pope, among others manifesting the Church's universal authority, there are five statements that decisively note that the authority to appoint bishops and other clerics is peculiar to the Roman Pontiff. As Robinson (1993, 400) stresses, the main reason for vehement opposition of Gregory VII's to lay investiture was the conviction in the Church for decades that the core cause for simony was the lay investiture of papal legates.

After Gregory VII's decree, the investiture of bishops and other papal legates inevitably turned into a major divisive issue between the lay rulers and the Church, or more particularly, between the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. As abovementioned, investiture of church officials implies more than just an assignment of religious offices, it was basically a direct source of political and economic power. Thus, the underlying reason for the conflict between the Church and secular rulers, known as the *Investiture Contest*, was mainly the dispute on who had right to rule the temporal matters. That is why Davies (1997, 320) rightly defines investiture contest as a straightforward struggle for power, "despite the high-flown legal and theological language in which it was conducted." While the Church, as the head of Corpus Christi, was claiming itself as the possessor of all earthly and divine power, secular rulers tend to think its authority is limited to spiritual matters. Apart from its philosophical background and political importance, the right of investiture also carried practical significance for the kings. Southern describes the viewpoint of secular rulers, "no doubt it was wrong to give a church to an unworthy person for money: but it was foolish to give it to a stranger for nothing." For their part, secular rulers did not think that they were selling the holy things; they were selling the temporal things attached to the holy things (Southern 1977, 124-125).

This major disagreement between the Church and the state sparked off a violent conflict. The civil war and violence in the Holy Roman Empire have started by the deposition of Henry IV, the then Holy Roman Emperor, by Gregory VII, and lasted

until the agreement known as the Concordat of Worms.⁸ According to this agreement, the pope gained the right to nominate bishops in exchange for acknowledging king's right to approve them. The newly elected bishop was also expected to do homage to the king, and in return, the king would grant him regalia which consists of the ring and the staff, symbols of bishop's authority (Robinson 1993, 437). This resolution was an adaptation of almost the same practice in the Kingdom of England and partially in the Kingdom of France. The papacy, at least, gained right to nominate bishops in the various areas of Latin Christendom.

The Concordat of Worms can be regarded as a success for both parties, although it is sometimes seen as an approval of the papal victory (Ullmann 2005, 111). On the other side, some scholars argue that (Mesquita 2000) the agreement included the first hints of the establishment of nationalized sovereignty. But in fact, each party's success was partial. Furthermore, the peace established by the Concordat of Worms only lived for thirty years, until the reign of Frederick Barbarossa. The nomination of papal legates by the papacy more or less lasted until the fourteenth century. This practice is often interrupted by strong secular rulers or by other circumstances. The essential point in the investiture contest from this study's perspective is the peace of Concordat of Worms has modified the state practice. The Church officially gained right to directly intervene in the domestic affairs of kingdoms, principalities and empires relying on Christianity as an ideational world society element. In addition to the strong influence of Christianity on the patterns of political behavior, the papacy by the right of investiture transferred Christian values into a basis for

⁸ The immediate response of Henry IV to his deposition and excommunication was to depose Pope Gregory VII and elect an antipope, Clement III. Gregory VII, backed by the German princes, has also coronated an anti-king, Rudolf of Rheinfelden. The conflict continued by various excommunications and the mutual elections and depositions of anti-popes and anti-kings. Henry IV later invaded Italy and entered Rome with a large army which resulted in Pope Gregory VII's escape from the city and death in exile. The unrest and devastating effects of civil wars among the German Princes including his son Henry V, forced Henry IV to ease off the political and military pressure upon papacy. Later, Henry V gained the throne by defeating his father in the battlefield and continued the struggle with papacy. However in the end, he was the emperor that accepted Concordat of Worms. An excellent account of the detailed history of the sequence of events known as the Investiture Controversy can be found in I. S. Robinson, *The Papacy 1073-1198: Continuity and Innovation*, pp. 398-441, also see Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy*. For a comparison of the different ideas about the events and motivations that caused the Investiture Contest, please see Stanley A. Chodorow, *Ecclesiastical Politics and the Ending of Investiture Contest*, pp. 613-640.

political action. System of overlapping authorities has also given a rise to the Roman Church's political power. The Church both ensured the loyalty of the parts of Latin Christendom and its supremacy, with the right to appoint church officials.

The ideational background of clash between the papacy and secular rulers on the right of investiture was also based upon aforementioned two swords allegory. According to the hierocratic interpretation of the allegory adopted by the Church, Christ had given both swords to St. Peter, one symbolizing the spiritual and other temporal authority, together with the keys of heaven. The pope, by virtue of being the vicar of St. Peter, was exercising this authority on behalf of him. Since the clergy shall not shed blood, the temporal authority could be exercised by the laymen, but with the permission of clergy (Watt 2007, 379). For this reason, it was quite common in the Church to conceive the secular rulers as elements of the ecclesiastical hierarchy (Gierke 1913, 13). Thus, these offices should be assigned by the Church and they were expected to obey the commands of the pope.

The second interpretation, mostly shared by secular rulers, emphatically points out the autonomy of both swords. According to this interpretation, two swords are separated yet coordinated. The temporal sword was not given to the secular rulers by the pope but by the God himself (Robinson 1993, 300-301). This secular stance still accepts church's independence and authority over the spiritual matters. For them, clergy must confine itself purely with this realm. Gierke (1913, 16-17) claims that proponents of the state construe two powers as coordinated sides of organized oneness of the mankind. Acceptance of the unity of mankind by the secular rulers is an evident example of the Christianity's penetration in international relations. Gierke also notes that the single state was not necessarily mere expression of oneness of mankind in the medieval Europe, especially in France. The unity, he says, was sometimes understood as a "vaulted dome of an organically articulated structure" (Gierke 1913, 20). Nevertheless, as McCready purports, papalist and anti-papalist views on the source of power were not fundamentally different. They, instead, had much in common. The two parties were particularly sharing the view that the Church could intervene in the temporal matters as long as spiritual issues were at stake. Papalists were well aware of the practice that secular authority had

freedom to limit papal action in the temporal realm. Anti-papalist, on the other hand, were conscious of Christian values' importance for the community, and they were keen to allow the papacy to intervene in the temporal matters if the protection of those values makes that necessary (McCready 1975, 252). However, there was no straightforward distinction between a sin and a crime. The elusiveness between the temporal and spiritual realms enabled the Church to intervene frequently in the temporal matters.

Investiture of bishops, archbishops, and other high-ranking church officials had been a major source of political power for the Roman Catholic Church during the medieval period, even though this right has never been fully exercised. Basically, three key aspects of the investiture were strengthening the Church's political capacity. Firstly, by the right of investiture, the Church was compensating the mobility of nobles as well as legitimizing its authority claims all over the Europe. Secondly and more importantly, right of investiture allowed the Roman Catholic Church to share economic and civil power with secular rulers in the remote areas of Europe. This unavoidably reinforced the Church's authority claims since rights and duties of papal legates were not merely limited to spiritual matters but also included temporal and civil issues such as collecting taxes, providing knights to the armies and controlling large-scale properties. Thirdly, the demarcating line between the spiritual and temporal realms has increasingly blurred, as a direct result of the efficiency of Christianity as an ideational world society element of international relations.

3.3.4. Crusade

Military campaigns collectively known as crusades lasted almost four centuries. These expeditions took place within an enormous geographical space including the Middle East, North Africa, Anatolia, Iberia, Sicily and North and North East Europe. These large-scale military events can be described as "holy wars" launched by popes against the so-called "enemies" of Christendom. I already made some brief points on the connection between the just war theory and ideational

background of holy wars. Presenting a full detailed historical analysis of crusades exceeds the framework of this study. What is intended to scrutinize under this sub-heading is the importance of crusades for the Church's, and therefore Christianity's, capacity in changing the norms of medieval international relations. In this context, crusades, as an institution of world society, helped the Church in reaching its aim of redesigning international relations of the medieval era in two ways. First, the institution of crusade united different kingdoms, principalities, and other micro-polities in the Latin Christendom against an external enemy. Second, crusades enabled papacy to establish their supremacy in international relations.

Pope Urban II has propounded two major reasons when he declared the first crusade in 1095; freeing Christians from the yoke of Islamic rule and liberating the tomb of Christ from Muslim control. It is usually claimed that responding to the appeal of Byzantine Emperor Alexius for help against growing threat of Seljuk Turks was another reason in Urban II's mind, however, he never publicized it (Riley-Smith 1999a, 1-2). For Mundy (1991, 44), the Church was justifying these "grand aggressions" by the themes of superiority of Christian faith and the recovery of lands "wrongly" taken from the Christian Roman Empire by Muslims. Similarly, John France (2006, 21) argues that promoting and preserving the papal supremacy in Christendom were two subtle elements of the Church's attempt to call for a crusade. According to Latham (2011, 232-234), in the tenth century the Roman Church established a new identity around four elements; reassertion clergy's monopoly over spiritual issues, establishment of clergy's supremacy over secular authorities, achievement of Christian unity and ensuring justice via intervention to the temporal affairs. Interests of this newly constituted identity of the Roman Catholic Church inevitably clashed with the empire's, heretic's, pagans' and Muslims' interests. The Church's attempts to find advantageous resolutions to these conflicts were eventually transformed into the main motivation for the establishment of an institution like crusade.

In sum, preserving unity of Christians, extending the boundaries of Christianity and constituting the papal supremacy are often propounded in the literature as the three genuine motivations of papacy for establishing the institution of crusades.

Therefore, crusades seem to be a straightforward example of an institution of ideational world society with regard to Church's aim in rallying Christians against a common enemy. Obviously, abovementioned reasons are aims of the Church, not the motivations of crusaders. The Church recruited Christians from all over Europe for crusades by promising them heaven, martyrdom, and penance for their sins. They would do the best service for Christianity by making pilgrimage and fighting for Christ. However, from another point of view, motivations of secular rulers, knights and other nobles for participating in these expeditions could be different than just doing penance for their sins, winning redemption and eternal salvation, achieving martyrdom and gaining other pure spiritual rewards. By taking part in the crusades, these people could have sought material interests such as gaining wealth, acquiring booty, extending lands and increasing power hidden behind the apparent spiritual motivations. If crusaders took part in these wars in order to gain earthly rewards, then, the influence of the ideational world society element, and the effectiveness of its institution is negligible.

In the literature of the history of the crusades, there are some works explaining the motivation of crusaders with material gains (Runciman 1951, 1954; Mayer 1972). Some other scholars in the field of IR also conclude that the crusading movement was a result of crusaders' pursuit of material interests and power political gains. For instance, Teschke (2003, 9) argues that aristocracy's hunger for land and peasants, which were the main wealth-generating mechanisms in the medieval Europe, underpinned the crusades. Fischer (1992, 438, 443) asserts in a similar vein that religious motive was of secondary importance in the minds of the crusaders compared with the mundane gains, particularly desire for power. Achieving glory, fame and winning reputation could possibly be the other non-spiritual motivations for crusaders (Flori 2005, 27). Furthermore, many crusaders could have participated in these expeditions for short-term reliefs, given that a knight who took the crusading vow was granted some economic, political and social privileges including exemption from taxes, delay in feudal obligations, debt relief, and even release from excommunication (Riley Smith, 1999b, 72).

None of these explanations for the motives of the crusaders, of course, can totally be objected. It is hardly convincing to claim that all individuals who took part in the crusades were sharing the same reasons and motivations. Indeed, an event like crusades, which lasted for several centuries and attracted men and women of all classes, could not be underpinned by a single motivation. Nevertheless, a generalization can still be made here. It would not be wrong to claim that non-material factors were dominant for crusaders to take part in these expeditions. Particularly until the end of the thirteenth century,⁹ the primary motivation for knights and masses to crusade was religious. The material or political gains, on the other hand, remained as secondary reasons for crusading. There are two fundamental reasons for reaching such a conclusion. First and foremost, according to the contemporary studies, empirical evidence is almost completely against the claims that crusaders expected material gains for joining the crusades (Riley-Smith 1983, 1999a; Bull 1993; Flori 2005; Latham 2011). The expenses of taking part in the crusades were too high that crusaders and their families often faced huge debts and financial difficulties (Lloyd 1999, 53). When crusaders returned home, a vast number of them did not bring back anything valuable (Riley-Smith 1999a, 7; 1983, 723, Flori 2005, 29; Latham 2011, 226). Therefore, it is most unlikely for majority of crusaders to expect any material gains in return for taking part in these expeditions.

Second, the motivations of the people who took part in the crusades are inexplicable from a realist perspective. The basic tenet of realism maintains that primary interests of the main actors in international system are survival and security, and therefore, these units endlessly try to maximize their powers. However, the actors of international system in the medieval, that is to say, castellanies, were acting in a way exactly opposite to realist assumptions. From a realist point of view, it is

⁹ It should be noted that beginning from the late twelfth century, the institution of crusades gradually started to be secularized. Even though it preserved its “holy war” identity symbolically, the capacity of papacy for making war decreased. The primary reason for this, in line with the arguments of this study, can be asserted as the relative increase in the capacity of knighthood and centralization of old kingdoms respectively. On the changing nature of crusades please see, James M. Powell, “Church and Crusade: Frederick II and Louis IX”, pp.251-264. For the factors that strengthen the role of knighthood and chivalric elements in crusades, John Riley-Smith, “the State of Mind of Crusaders to the East, 1095-1300”, pp. 85-88.

expected from these actors to act rationally, and not to wage a war against an unknown enemy, situated quite far away from their territories without posing an imminent threat (Alkopher 2005, 730; Latham 2011, 226). As Hall and Kratochwil (1993, 486) rightly state, rulers of castellanies would not leave their possessions and go on a crusade which lasted for years if they were acting according to the realist principles. The realist principles and the practice of crusading are incompatible because the modern and pre-modern international relations' foundational norms are totally different from each other. While in the modern international relations the primary norm of state system is the mutually exclusive state sovereignty, it is Christian unity and Church's supremacy in the pre-modern.

In conclusion, crusaders were mainly participating in these military campaigns because of religious reasons. As Marcus Bull suggests (1993, 27-29) joining crusade was pretty attractive for the knights, since they had the chance to do the devotional act of pilgrimage by joining it. In this context, Pope Urban II was quite successful to associate the war with pilgrimage. He preached the first crusade around this motive. Crusading was described as an armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem. He gave opportunity to warriors to do penance for their sins by the holiest act of fighting for Christ (Riley-Smith 1999b, 78; Flori 2005, 19-23).

In the medieval Europe, every sphere of the civil life was seriously influenced by the Christian doctrines. This created a communal pressure over people and normalized to take action in order to gain spiritual welfare. In this context, nobles and masses took part in the crusading act in order to reach eternal salvation and guarantee martyrdom if they die while completing their vows. Moreover, the connection between the religion and space was extremely serious for the ordinary Christian in the medieval era. That is why relics, tombs of saints, and some places where important events for Christianity took place were accepted as holy, and attached spiritual importance. In this context, the holiest of the holy spaces, the tomb of Christ had to be freed from the rule of non-Christians. This constituted a

major motivation for taking part in these expeditions for the crusaders.¹⁰ These personal reasons, of course, had social reflections. Flori (2005, 23-27) lists these social motivations driven by Christian faith as religious solidarity, conversion of infidels and perception of temporality. As explained in depth previously, it was very common in the medieval Europe to apprehend the world as a scene of the never ending struggle between Christians and infidels. Thus, Christendom as a whole had to expand and convert infidels in order to spread the justice all over the earth. The earthly life, to the medieval mind, was created for a purpose. Every single action in the world was perceived as a design of the God. Thus, Jerusalem, the Holy Land that fell into the hands of infidels was a warning of the God to the Christians, and now it was God's will to retake it.

Considering the religious motives of the crusaders, crusades were one of the principal institutions of Christianity as an ideational world society element in the medieval Europe. These military acts played a major role in reshaping international relations via the norms provided by the Church/Christianity. The core functions of crusades as an institution of the ideational world society element were uniting and subordinating. As already stated, the Church was politically uniting all the fragmented political units in the Latin Christendom by declaring a crusade. It is obvious that unity existed among political actors in the medieval Europe, and crusades were both a cause and effect of it. The Roman Catholic Church was reproducing the unity in the Latin Christendom by directing highly fragmented political structure of the medieval Europe to an external enemy. States, on the other hand, was responding to the call of a crusade. Therefore, the norm change occurred in the medieval international relations. There was no bond between people in the Levant and the crusaders, except Christianity. Thus, for an anonymous knight taking part in crusades, the opponents were not the enemies of a particular country

¹⁰ It is obvious that taking part in the crusades directed to elsewhere than the Holy Land was not equally prestigious as joining expeditions to the East in the eyes of noblemen. However, Riley-Smith (1999a, 9-13) argues that notably for the clergy and for the majority of faithful Christians all crusading was qualitatively the same. He also stresses that after the thirteenth century local nexuses can be regarded as more significant for warriors to join crusading movement. This difference between the motives of the crusades represents a shift in the nature of crusading movement from spiritual to temporal.

or a king but they were enemies of God and the Christendom (France 2006, 5). In other words, the Church as a norm entrepreneur was successful to change the state behavior and norms of the pre-modern international relations.

On the other hand, crusades were also strengthening the Church's supremacy in the international relations of medieval Europe. The pope was the only person holding the right to call for a crusade by the virtue of being the head of the Latin Christendom. The other reason for Church's monopoly over the right to declare crusade was the absence of systematic thought in social classes other than clergy on the world outside of the Catholic Europe. A great majority of the clergy was literate and interested in understanding and learning the world outside Europe, which was a direct result of the universal claims of the Church (France 2006, 4). In addition to these two basic functions, crusades also provided the base for the establishment of a sub-institution for the Church. This institution can be described as the papal protection of the crusaders' lands, families, and properties. The direct result of this sub-institution was another mechanism that enables Church to intervene in the temporal matters. The lands that owned by the crusaders were left under the authority of the Church, and in some cases, the Church even had right to appoint or dispose regents (Robinson 1993, 305-306).

3.4. Concluding Remarks

The profound impact of the Roman Catholic Church on international relations was not simply a result of papacy's material strength or its accurate and timely maneuvers, but it was largely a consequence of Christianity's impact as an ideational world society element. The absence of strong and centralized entities in the medieval age was the key factor for the efficiency of Christianity. As an ideational world society element, Christianity was the common value and cultural ingredient that brought individuals and grouping of individuals together in the medieval era. With the great help of this unifying ground, the Church subordinated kingdoms, principalities, castellanies as well as individuals to its political leadership. As Ullmann (1955, 1) notes, there was no single individual that is not

affected by the Church's authority in the medieval Europe. From the theoretical perspective adopted in this study, the efficiency of the Church denotes that the world society dimension of international relations prevailed against the international society and international system in the medieval Europe.

Efficiency of the institutions established by the Church can also be explained from this theoretical standpoint. The international society was pretty weak in the medieval that there were almost no established institutions between states. Institutions of ideational world society element, coronation, excommunication, investiture, and crusades were effectively replacing the mechanisms that could be established between states. These institutions were, moreover, ordering the relations between states. With the help of these institutions, the Church changed the understanding of the appropriate behavior of states in the medieval international relations. The two dimensional function of the institutions, one in the world society dimension providing the basic values for the unity of individuals and the other one in the international society dimension holding the political actors together under the Church's supremacy, was the main driving force of the norm change in the medieval international relations.

CHAPTER IV

THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE

The Hanseatic League (also known as *the Hansa*, *the German Hansa* or *the Hanse*) will be analyzed as a functional world society element of the pre-modern international relations in this chapter. The Hanseatic League can roughly be described as a merchants association that effectively controlled the trade in the northern Europe and the Baltics, between mid-twelfth and mid-fifteenth centuries. As the second chapter of this work asserts, functional world society elements do not aim at a fundamental change of the political structure of the state system by promoting cosmopolitan values. They rather pursue particular interest within a specific sphere of the international relations. It is also previously stated that unlike ideational world society elements which are founded on shared values, the functional world society elements are based on the common interests of individuals. In the case of the Hanseatic League, the common interest that is shared between merchants was to gain and preserve the control of the trade in the northern Europe and the Baltics. In order to achieve this end, institutions such as collective privileges in cities (*kontors*¹¹), armed action and assemblies (*diets*) are founded on the common interests shared among the merchants of the Hanseatic League. In the first part of this chapter, the political status of the northern Europe and its effects on the international trade will be represented shortly. This part will be followed by the general overview of the Hanseatic League, and a detailed explanation of its functions. Lastly, the chapter will focus on the institutions that enable Hanseatic

¹¹ Name of the Hanseatic merchant settlements (trading posts) in the non-hanseatic cities. In the last section of the chapter kontors and their functions will be defined and analyzed in detail.

merchants to control international trade for several centuries in a significant geographical area of the medieval Europe.

4.1. The State of International Relations in the Northern Europe with Regard to the International Trade

In the previous chapter, I have analyzed in detail the profound impact of feudalism and Christianity on the political structure of the medieval European international relations. Until the first half of the sixteenth century, central Europe was politically fragmented into atomic political units which were largely held together by Christianity and by the nexuses of the feudal relationships. In the medieval Europe, on the one hand, the system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties was the main element that provided some degree of unity in international relations. On the other hand, local princes' and the other territorial rulers' ambitions for power was essentially responsible for the normalization of violence and the political turmoil. The political status of the northern Europe was not fundamentally different from the rest of the continent during the time period that the Hanseatic League was founded (mid-twelfth century) and reached its zenith in terms of economic and political power (mid-fifteenth century). Although the Hanseatic League lived much longer than that (until the mid-seventeenth century), its effect on the international relations as a functional world society element has gradually decreased starting from the 1450s. This decrease in the effectiveness of the Hanseatic League was substantially a result of the emergence of strong monarchies in the Europe. In addition to the system of overlapping political authorities and multiple loyalties, the rise of cities as political forms, insecurity, and financial barriers can be propounded as the three defining features of the international trade in Europe, during the time period that the Hansa dominated the region's commerce to a large extent.

The geographical area that the Hansa dominated can be sketched as a line between London in the west and Novgorod in the east, including the cities between them, Bruges, Cologne, Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Rostock, Danzig, and Reval (Tallinn). The sea route involving the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and the English Channel was the main transport line that Hanseatic merchants primarily used.

Although the sphere of influence of the Hansa varied in time, and their trade extended to Setubal in the west and Smolensk in the east during some periods, its principal area of operation can roughly be defined as the northern Europe. The Hanseatic League was operating in a region which is politically, albeit not effectively, controlled by the English Kingdom, Denmark, Flanders, the Holy Roman Empire, and Russia. Trading activity in the region was also shared by the merchants from these countries. Flemings were controlling the trade in the Bruges and had a significant share in London market together with the Cologne merchants, Gotlanders were active in the east and the west Baltic Sea, English merchants were pretty much in control of the south Baltic and the White Sea and Russians were dominating the Novgorod commerce. Germans were vigorously trading in the area; however, it is not possible to speak of their dominance in the region before the foundation of Hanseatic League (Dollinger 1971, 9).

Despite the fact that the Hansa has never been a centralized entity, the heart of the Hanseatic League can be still be defined as the northern German cities including Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg. This is because these cities, particularly Lübeck, often played key roles in determining and defending Hanseatic interests. These cities were officially under the legal authority of Holy Roman Empire. It should also be noted that, like other parts of the Europe, this region was not independent of the dynamics of feudalism. The small castellanies and duchies were political units, and rulers of these units were only in effective control of limited areas around the centers of these castellanies. This political situation inevitably created authority vacuums in the geographical areas between the administrative domains of these tiny units. During the middle ages, borders of the Holy Roman Empire, if it is possible to speak of any borders in the pre-modern international relations, lay between the rivers of the Elbe and the Oder. However, the imperial authority was hardly reaching to the north of the Harz Mountains. As Dollinger (1971, 10) indicates, the Holy Roman Emperors of the time were highly involved in the Italian politics, and almost never paid attention to the northern cities of Germany. Moreover, imperial diets usually had pretty weak executive authority. The coercive and juridical power of the emperor was limited with the regions he can physically intervene. In contrast

with the *de jure* authority of the Holy Roman Empire over the central Europe, maintenance of the territory and establishment of order was pretty much left to the local princes and cities (Jenks 1992, 137). As well as the turbulent situation of the Holy Roman Empire, the chaotic political conditions of the Scandinavia, Russia, and England paved the way for the Hansa's success. When these monarchies gathered strength and copied mercantilist policies of the Hanseatic League, they started to replace the Hansa and dominated the trade in the region (Dollinger 1971, xix). For instance, after the rise of tsarist rule in Russia around the mid-sixteenth century, direct trade agreements have been made between Russia and England, which inevitably resulted in complete loss of Hansa's privileges (Cramer 1949, 88).

The system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, which can be described as several official and recognized sovereignty claims over a single territory, weakened the governing capabilities of the secular rulers and generated feeble political actors in the medieval Europe. Alongside framing a suitable environment for the emergence of non-state actors, this political condition had two other primary effects on the international realm. First, it caused extremely unsafe atmosphere for civil actions on the international scale, and second, it gave rise to the emergence of free cities as a political form. Indeed, the success of these non-state actors such as Hansa was not a mere consequence of taking the advantage of the political conditions, but these actors equally owe their existence and success to the fact that they fulfill the need for protection in the international area, a function states usually failed to perform. That is why the need for merchant guilds to secure merchant's rights and provide protection have dramatically declined when the state system have evolved and established institutions (Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994, 773).

The reason for widespread insecurity in the Central Europe was twofold. On the one hand, as a direct result of the authority gap in Holy Roman Empire, wars and conflicts were apt to break out almost all the times between local princes. On the other hand, together with the unfavorable physical conditions, the war-prone international realm was creating a suitable environment for piracy in all trade routes. For Nash (1929, 2) insecurity in Europe was so widespread that without

some protection, the international trade could never be established let alone flourished. Jenks (2007, 140) also maintains that rulers were not the mere obstacles in front of the international trade; merchants equally had to deal with the insecurity that was brought on by the pirates and ill-conditioned trade routes.

The land routes were slightly safer than the sea routes in terms of piracy. However, their physical conditions barely allowed traveling. Almost all of the highways between countries were inherited from the Roman Empire and received almost no maintenance since the collapse of it. For Nash (1929, 5) they were “hardly” roads always covered with foot depth mud. Notably because of the hazardous conditions of roads, land transport was slow. Thus, merchants usually preferred sea routes, which were more suitable especially during the summer months. These roads allowed faster and farther transfer of goods. Nevertheless, as Postan (1987, 189-190) indicates the security of sea traffic was entirely the responsibility of merchants. Piracy was a common issue of the sea trade, and often exercised by other merchants with the official help of territorial rulers. Furthermore, navigation skills of the merchants were pretty weak due to the absence of advanced navigation devices. Thus, trade cogs had to follow the shoreline instead of traveling in the high seas, which made them an easy target for the pirates (Nash 1929, 6). Trading was seen as an adventurous occupation since the merchants received nearly no help from the rulers in terms of securing the trade routes. In fact, common threat of piracy was mainly an outcome of the frequent wars and armed conflicts between local rulers. The security of trade routes and highways were usually left to the local princes since the overarching authority of the Holy Roman Empire was seldom found. Nonetheless, those princes’ aims and intentions were generally unreliable as well as unpredictable. The war between them usually meant increased pillage and piracy, taxation, forced loans and physical hazards (Postan 1987, 189).

In addition to the physical obstacles in front of the transportation of goods, financial barriers and other regulations were also hindering the European trade’s development. The costs of trading were so great that exports were principally dependent on them, rather than other factors such as the volume of production, social structure, season or climate (Postan 1987, 185). Tolls and taxes were vast,

further, buying and selling goods in a territory were up to the permission of its feudal ruler (Fink 2012, 201). The medieval trade was so strictly controlled in the cities that even where, when, and how the exchange of the goods would be carried out were subjected to extensive regulations which, for the most part, was in favor of the local ruler (Gustafson 2013, 129). For instance, the ancient law called “strandgut”, meaning all merchandise washed up on the shore belonged to the owner of the land, was applied comprehensively (Nash 1929, 6). This means, even though they were able to dodge pirate attacks, merchant’s commodities were scarcely safe.

The most prominent financial burden that merchants of the medieval Europe had to face was road tolls. Tolls in the medieval often levied as payments on the frontiers of a country, duchies or castellany. Postan (1987, 183-186) says that in the medieval Europe no major trade route was entirely duty-free, on the contrary, there were more than sixty toll stations belonging to territorial rulers on some of the main arterial waterways, such as the Rhine. Given the fact that there were quite lot “frontiers” each with a toll in the Europe thanks to its politically fragmented structure, trade mainly remained local. Merchants were not merely suffering from heavy taxes and tolls; they were also under the constant threat of confiscation. Barons could always confiscate a merchant’s goods by alleging a recently invented law if they were strong enough, because most of the merchants were escorted by mercenaries,. Although there were always alternative routes to be used in case of physical hazards or insecurity (Postan 1987, 188), a trader could forfeit his life if he were seized traveling a by-road (Nash 1929, 5-6).

Despite several unfavorable conditions hindering commercial traffic in the medieval Europe, the emergence of independent cities had a positive effect on the development of the international trade. Von Brandt (1956, 26) argues that it is even possible to speak of an international trade system of cities in the medieval Europe because of the high degree of integration among those independent cities. Trade in the medieval Europe, indeed, inclined to flourish when local rulers and kings were strong and eager enough to keep the roads safe during both times of peace and war, nevertheless, this was generally impossible (Postan 1987, 190). However, free cities

were facilitating the trade by providing a safe environment and protection from consequences of unreliable actions of the rulers. Therefore, they had a major positive effect on European international trade.

By free cities, it is not meant a political unit judicially independent of a territorial ruler. Rather, almost all independent cities of northern Europe had overlords who actually own the territory. These rulers also could acquire the rights to the lands where cities are founded with various feudal bonds. Nevertheless, free cities were principally governed by a council of burghers. The freedom of cities was a privilege that burghers gained from the local feudal rulers. The city was remaining as a territorial part of the country of a local prince or duke, but it was almost totally independent of overlords' political control. Cities were extensively independent of the authority of the Holy Roman Empire as well. The emperors were not interested in the northern cities unless these cities were interested in the monarchy (Jenks 1992, 138). This also does not necessarily mean that free cities were totally neglected. On the contrary, princes were quite uncomfortable about the autonomy of cities. It is basically for this reason that there was frequently a struggle between the princes and the city councils in terms of economic and political dominance over cities (Lloyd 2002, 8).

Cities with their large markets, ports, professional merchants and civil laws can be regarded as trade centers of the medieval Europe. However, despite their key importance in the development of trade, these urban settlements did not have a long history in the medieval. In fact in the northern Germany, Cologne was the only city that founded in the Roman period. Foundation of the majority of the Hanseatic cities can be dated to a later time, to the eight or to the ninth centuries. These cities, of course, were not built upon non-populated lands. There were settlements around places such as Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Tallinn, Danzig, Lippstadt and Stendal, however, a process that Dollinger (1971) names as "amalgamation" changed the character of these settlements. These tiny towns have been transformed into merchant cities by amalgamation. This term can be defined as a process when the newly established permanent merchant settlements start to amalgamate with the administrative and commercial centers of the old towns within a single fortified

area. For Dollinger (1971, 13) the common characteristics of these amalgamated cities were an administrative center; a uniform code generally dealing with real estate and trade; a community of burghers including merchants; great influence of rich families and patriciate on government; growing independence of the town in relation to local feudal lord and development of administrative institutions under the control of burghers, such as *Rat* (city council). The urban characteristics of these cities played a significant role in the development of international trade in the northern Europe.

The emergence of cities as a political form in the medieval Europa is closely related to the rise of the burghers as a social class. Two major reasons can be propounded as key factors in the rise of the burghers. Firstly, local princes' endless need for money to finance the frequent wars has strengthened the political status of the merchants who mainly settled in cities as a part of burgher community. The medieval warfare was quite expensive, and local princes often needed external funds in order to finance these wars. Generally, merchants who raised funds by generating incomes from trade were financing their overlords' extravagant war expenses in exchange for significant privileges (Nash 1929, 3). As a result, burghers gradually became the strongest bargaining group against local princes. As Cramer (1949, 84) states, from their overlords, burghers were buying privilege after privilege and eventually, they were gaining the freedom of their cities.

Secondly, growth in the volume of the production and the increase in the frequency of the exchange of goods created a need for "trader" as a professional occupation. In other words, the traders as a social class have emerged as a result of a production surplus. Fertile lands around fortified locations were providing secure areas to increase the volume of production. Eventually, the relative safety of these rural areas enabled production to exceed the basic demand of the castellany. The difference between the supply and demand created opportunities for the producers to trade with neighboring areas (Nash 1929, 4). Basically for this reason, there emerged a need for a new profession. As a result, the division of labor started to be sharpened between the producers and the merchandisers.

In addition to the increase in the volume of production, the goods that could not be produced locally had also promoted trade. The castellanies did not only need luxury goods, they were also in need of the basic goods. Therefore, these basic goods had to be imported from other regions. For instance, wool was largely produced in England. Cloth industry which depended on the wool imports was in Northern Germany. Copper and iron were found in southern shores of Sweden. Armors and swords were manufactured in Cologne by exporting these Swedish raw materials. Herring was mainly caught in the Baltic. Stockfish was produced in Norway. Beer and butter were also largely produced in the Northern Germany. The wine was a product of southern Europe. Wax and honey were Russian products. Luxuries and oriental products were flowing into Europe from the Italy and Byzantine (Postan 1987, 168-178). Thus, the need for exchange of the goods and the surplus generated in the rural areas required people to do trading permanently as an occupation. It was no longer possible for the peasants in the rural areas to sell their goods and buy their needs from neighboring markets. This created a kind of division of labor in the Europe. While lords were mainly dealing with war and administration, peasants were responsible for agricultural production. Trading, on the other hand, was the job of merchants. The need for freedom to do trade whole year required the merchant to dwell in cities (Postan 1987, 219-220). As cities were trade centers, merchants settled in cities in order to control the flow of goods, to arrange business and most importantly, to free themselves from the control of the feudal lords.

In sum, the international trade in the medieval Europe was basically dependent on the physical conditions, security of routes, territorial rulers' regulations and freedom of cities. While the poor physical conditions, unreliable actions of territorial rulers and widespread insecurity was creating a quite disadvantageous environment for the trade to prosper in Europe, the safe-heavens established in free cities by merchants was improving the trade. The states were feeble in terms of lacking centralized political authority and extensive sovereignty. Moreover, there were nearly no established institutions between the political actors to control and regulate international trade. These conditions of northern European trade were quite suitable for world society elements for functioning and being effective.

4.2. The Hanseatic League as a Functional World Society Element

In the second chapter of this work, a distinction was made between the world society elements on the basis of whether they are bounded by common values or common interests. It was stated that while the value based world society elements seek to shape the international system according to their values, interest based ones aim at dominating a specific sphere of international relations. Drawing on this distinction, in this chapter, I argue that the Hanseatic League is a functional world society element that is made of groupings of individuals and non-state actors, whose main purpose is to control and dominate the international trade of the northern Europe. Within this framework, there are two principal definitive factors need to be clarified in order to analyze an organization like the Hanseatic League as a functional world society element. First, the Hanseatic League has to be a non-state actor of international relations and second, the members of the Hanseatic League must collectively pursue a particular interest without having a value based cosmopolitan motivation within the international system.

Before searching for these two particular key factors in the history of the organization, what I mean by the Hanseatic League should be clarified. By the Hanseatic League, I refer to a merchants' association that lived in the medieval roughly between the twelfth and the seventeenth centuries. The Hanseatic League was an association of merchants, and later, of cities. This organization was mainly formed to gain and preserve trade interests. In his article on the Hanseatic League in the 1966 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica, Hibbert notes that the origin of the Hanseatic League is groupings of traders and trader towns. The word *Hansa* or *Hanse* implied a "merchant guild" long before the foundation of the Hanseatic League. Individual merchants of the League were also called *Hanse* or *Hansa* (Cramer 1949, 84). Even before the foundation of the Hanseatic League, the term Hanse was widely used to describe a group of merchants settled abroad (Dollinger 1971, xix). However, the word Hanse has other meanings too. The term also means a band of combatant men, and was used to name a tax on trade goods (Nash 1929, 1-2). Another meaning of the word, according to Wubs-Mrozewicz (2013, 6), was

right to conduct trade jointly. In England, the word Hansa was used to designate the right of merchants to form associations. The associations that are founded relying on this right were also named as Hansas. This simply indicates that there could be more than one Hansa in a particular city before the foundation of the Hanseatic League. For instance in London, both Flemings' and Cologne merchants' settlements were named as Hansas (Postan 1987, 273-274). Thus, the term Hansa has not been used specifically to define German merchants' association until the thirteenth century although its origin is ancient German (Dollinger 1971, xx).

These Hansas established in foreign cities¹² were the milestones in the foundation of the Hanseatic League. Unification of these merchant groupings (Hansas) trading abroad, particularly in London, paved the way for the establishment of the Hanseatic League. In other words, the Hansa was established as a league of towns after it was founded as a merchant association (von Brandt 1956, 31-32). Nash (1929, 7, 8-10) claims that it is almost impossible to trace the Hansa before the 1200s; for him, the history of Hansa begins after it gained special rights from England to conduct trade freely in London with the help of Frederick Barbarossa in 1157. Nonetheless, the formation of the Hansa is often dated back to the foundation of Lübeck in the mid-twelfth century (Dollinger 1971, xviii). Beginning from its first years, Lübeck had played a leading role in the Hansa thanks to its central location¹³ in Baltic trade (Colvin 1915, 33). Moreover, it attracted merchants from all over Germany, who brought population and prosperity to the town (Rotz 1977, 10). As early as 1200s Hamburg and Lübeck agreed on a type of a common law to defend their merchants and their goods against dangers of the trade routes. The foundation of the London and the Bruges Hansas and establishment of the Gotland community by the defeat of Visby can be regarded as the first steps on the way that lead to the formation of the Hanseatic League. In the late thirteenth century, towns and merchants extended their trading region geographically. They started to gain privileges abroad and begin to establish kontors in the key ports, particularly in the

¹² By foreign cities/towns I mean non-Hanseatic cities.

¹³ Lübeck is right in the midway on the sea route between Novgorod and London.

sea route between Novgorod and Bruges. These towns, merchants and Hansas in the foreign cities bound together in a single league including every port from Bremen to Reval. In sum, Hansa has started as merchant groupings in foreign towns. Then, the merchant associations provided the basis for the foundation the loose association of towns. Unification of these associations and active participation of cities created the Hanseatic League.

Given that Hanseatic merchants came together to form a type of broad alliance containing their home cities, the political status of the Hanseatic League is sometimes interpreted as an organization of economically integrated towns, or a type of confederation. Daenell (1909, 47-48), for example, claims that in order to protect the privileges they gained, Hanseatic merchants needed to form a federation and a constitution. Therefore, he defines the Hanseatic League as a “close confederation of German cities” that is established to fulfill the needs of these merchants. Colvin (1915, 32-33) also characterizes the Hanseatic League as a federation of German cities that are united around the common interest of pushing the foreign trade. Frey and Eichenberger (1996, 321) qualify the Hanseatic League in a similar manner, though they do not define it as a federation of cities. They argue that the Hanseatic League was a governmental unit with a function of providing rules to facilitate trade. A common view that can be observed in all these three arguments is that the Hanseatic League carries out a state-like function. This argument is mainly grounded on the existence of a close economic cooperation among member cities. According to these arguments, the economic interests of the cities necessitated a close political cooperation as well as an economic integration, which can more or less be defined as a confederation or a type of governmental unit.

However, none of these arguments can truly grasp the non-state character of the Hanseatic League. First and foremost, the Hanseatic League was an association of merchants and the cities became members of the Hanseatic League through their burgher traders (Wubs-Mrozewicz 2013, 4). The Hansa merchants were not gaining the title of Hansa as a result of being a citizen of a Hansa town, but Hansa towns were called “Hansa town” because of their merchants (Lloyd 2002, 3). As Harrison

(1970, 390-393) stresses, Hanseatic cities were neither economically integrated nor political cooperation of the cities was based on a free trade area or customs union. The political cooperation among the cities was indeed a repercussion of an aim of protecting the privileges that are gained in an external trading system. The commercial system that is founded in the northern Europe was an achievement of the merchants. This system as well as the unity and cohesion among merchants owed its existence to the economic facts, not to the political ties of the cities (Postan 1987, 273).

The arguments on the Hansa's state-like character also stem from the Hansa's organizational structure. The Hansa of the merchants organized itself as a league of towns around the fourteenth century. But the transition from an association of merchants to an association of towns was actually a direct consequence of merchant's need for political support. The Hanseatic merchants were already holding a significant share of political power in their own cities, and transferring this political power to the international arena could help them to withstand the increasing competition in the Baltic Sea. Especially in the late thirteenth century, the trade privileges of the Hanseatic merchants were started to be seriously challenged particularly by Hollanders and Germans from the southern parts of the Holy Roman Empire. The local merchants of the towns were extremely uncomfortable about the privileges that Hanseatic traders enjoyed in their home towns. This inevitably created a political pressure over the rulers of these cities. Such economic and political problems could only be dealt with a political basis. However, the Hanseatic merchants were deprived of any political support from German princes. As a result, the Hansa of the merchants has transformed itself into the Hansa of the towns around the second half of fourteenth century in order to create a political basis to face the increasing threat of losing their dominant position in northern European trade (Dollinger 1971, xviii-xix). This transformation, nonetheless, did not change the essence of the Hansa. It remained as a community of commercial interest (Lloyd 2002, 7).

The Hansa, in its entire history, was an association of individuals despite the fact that it accepted cities as its members. Basically for its civil character, the name

“Hanseatic League” is often regarded as problematic. Many scholars writing on the Hansa, such as Dollinger (1971), Jenks (2007) and Wubs-Mrozewicz (2013), substantially claim that calling the Hansa a “league” is an improper usage, even though this name is widely accepted in the literature. The main problem with the term is its implication of a precise organizational body (Dollinger 1971, xx) which Hansa never had. Hansa cities, in fact, were members of different city leagues while their merchants were Hanseatic. Thus, the Hansa has never been an urban league. Jenks (2007, 134) share the same opinion that is expressed in 1966 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica by Hibbert in the Hanseatic League article. The members of the Hansa never had a common property, common seal, a leader, a navy or an executive mechanism. The Hansa even lacked common trade. Every individual member of the Hanseatic League was doing business for itself. It was not a corpus either, since it did not have a legal body. The Hansa never had a separate juridical power other than its cities. In this context, its political situation can be defined as some kind of a polycentric structure. Furthermore, the Hansa never directly controlled any territories except the Kontors, or never had instruments to fulfill juridical functions over its members such as taxation and coercion. Except maximizing the profits, the Hansa also lacked general principles. For instance, Bremen have been excluded from the Hanseatic League when it denied putting an embargo on Norway, but the towns that were reluctant to provide military support to the war against the Kingdom of Denmark did not share the same fate (Fink 2012, 209). Even the regulations of the Hansa diets had to be self-enforcing since these meetings were not assembled to govern the Hansa members but to carry out the function of reconciliation (Fink 2012, 195-196, 204-205).

The Hansa was equally distant from all types of state-like entities such as confederation, corpus, league or alliance. That is the most prominent characteristic that enables us to describe the Hansa as a true world society element. The non-state feature of the Hansa is not just an implication of contemporary studies. The Hanseatic merchants too, define the Hansa as a non-state entity in a reply to a memorandum when an English court intended to arrest them and confiscate their properties. In this document, before describing what the organization is, the Hansa

denies all claims that define it as a *societas*, as a *collegium*, and as a *universitas*. For Hanseatic merchants, the Hansa was not a *societas* since it did not have any common property or common business enterprise. They denied being a *collegium* on the grounds of never having an integrated entity. The lack of common civil or canon law between the Hansas also shows, for them, that the organization is not a *universitas*. The Hansa is “a firm *confederatio* of many cities, towns and communities for the purpose of ensuring that business enterprises by land and sea should have a desirable and favorable outcome and that there should be effective protection against pirates and highwaymen, so that their ambushes should not rob merchants of their goods and valuables” (Dollinger 1971, 411-412, Document no. 26). As the Hansa’s own definition of the organization shows, the Hansa was not a state or state-like entity. Mainly for staying on the non-state grounds for not having anything common other than interests, the Hanseatic League also departs from other medieval city leagues such as Rheinischer Bund, Lombard League or the Swabian League. These leagues were principally sought political ends where the Hansa only required political support to maintain its trade privileges.

The Hanseatic merchants define their organization as a “confederation of many cities, towns and communities”, nevertheless, on the grounds of sharing a common political status, this confederation was not a state either. In other words, the Hansa towns were not under the authority of a single sovereign. On the contrary, the towns were politically fragmented between different legal owners, rulers and feudal overlords (Colvin 1915, 36; Jenks 1992, 134). The Hansa towns were only in a partnership in pursuing common trade interests, and in reality, their political alignments were quite incompatible (von Brandt 1956, 34). The rulers’ political positions were so irrelevant for the Hanseatic League that two cities may have the same overlord but one could be a Hanseatic city while other was not (Fink 2012, 205). The main reason for this was the fact that Hanseatic cities were not accepted as the members of the League because of their overlords. The Hanseatic cities were remaining as the legal subjects of their different territorial rulers when they were becoming a member of the Hanseatic League (Dollinger 1971, 71). Moreover, territorial rulers were not eligible for the Hansa membership. As Wubs-Mrozewicz

(2013, 4) mentions, being a non-state actor was not the mere criterion for the Hansa membership, but it was the only fixed rule. This criterion was crucial for the Hansa, because, as already stated, the emergence of the free cities in the northern Europe played a key role in the rise of the non-state elements. These elements could only retain their independence as long as they were successful to keep states and territorial rulers out of their sphere of influence.

Despite all its efforts to restrict its membership to the non-state actors, the Hanseatic League had a non-civil member. The master of the Teutonic Order was the only territorial ruler that is qualified for the Hansa membership. Moreover, the cities under his control, the Prussian cities, were also regarded as the natural members of the Hansa. Teutonic Knights, unlike other rulers in Germany, were well organized, efficient and highly centralized. The Prussian towns, as a result, never enjoyed the same independence as other northern German cities did. Therefore, as Postan (1987, 278) asserts, the Hansa had to accept the Master of the Teutonic Order as its member in order to be efficient in the trade of the Prussia. The membership of the Master of Teutonic Order to the Hanseatic League evidently shows that the efficiency of the world society elements strongly depends on the strength of the state.

Hibbert in the article on the Hanseatic League in 1966 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica lists being German, independent, prompt payer of all dues imposed and able to be represented in diets as the general qualifications for Hansa membership. He also adds that there were always exceptions such as accepting non-Germans and non-independent cities as members. Cramer (1949, 87) also maintains that only Germans were eligible for the membership of the Hanseatic League. On the other side, he emphasizes that although Germans could only qualify, being a German or a German town was not solely enough for eligibility. Thus, if one puts being German at the core of the Hansa, it simply fails to notice the original international character of the League. That is why Harrison (1970, 390-392) emphatically argues that the principal characteristics of the Hansa are not German city and German merchant but the medieval town and medieval merchant. For him, Hansa was socio-economically oriented and the organization was in European character.

After having situated the Hanseatic League within the broader context of non-state elements in international relations, the ground for commonality among its members can be discussed. The arguments on the non-state character of the Hansa clearly represent that the members of the organization did not share a common sovereign, a common country or a common value. Rather, the Hanseatic League was a patchwork in this respect. It had several territorial rulers, its merchants were from various countries and most importantly, there was no cosmopolitan value among individuals to denominate the Hansa. In fact, three features can be listed as commonalities among its members. All members were merchants, their common purpose was to control the northern European trade and majority of them were German. Two of these three commonalities can easily be dropped from the analysis. Being a German and being a merchant were not equal to being Hanseatic. Therefore, the essence of the Hansa was not the combination of these three. The prominent commonality among their members was their mutual interest in controlling the northern European trade. Thus, the Hanseatic League was based on common commercial interest (Dollinger 1971, xviii, 71; Wubs-Mrozewicz 2013, 6; Liggio 2007, 138; Lloyd 2002, 10). Given that these individuals were not held together by a common sovereign, a common country or a common value, the only shared thing among this people was maximizing their profits. Zimmern (1889, 208) defines the core of the Hanseatic solidarity as “personal advantage” and “fear of losing the great advantages obtained from the League membership.” Some writers such as von Brandt (1956, 31) and Hibbert include the common ancestry too among the bonds that hold Hanseatic members together. However, this does not change the fact that the common interest among members was the life blood of the Hanseatic League. The Hansa survived as long as the common interest among its members existed. When this common interest started to disappear in the fifteenth century, the kinship of its members was not sufficient to keep the Hansa alive (Lloyd 2002, 365-366; Wubs-Mrozewicz 2013, 5).

As an interest based world society element, voluntary action and common consent were the underlying characteristics of Hanseatic merchants. Dominating the northern European trade by eliminating competitors and territorial rulers from their

area of influence was their main interest. This common interest, indeed, was the basis of the voluntary character of the organization. For this reason, the main interest of the Hansa was not only limited to gaining some privileges and enjoying advantages in their competition against non-Hanseatic merchants. They had an equally important purpose; establishing the monopoly of the Hanseatic League in the northern European trade (Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994, 773; Daenell 1909, 51). Basically for these two simple common interests, the merchants of the Hanseatic League were aiming to protect their sphere of influence both from competitors such as non-Hanseatic merchants and from the territorial rulers. From early to the contemporary, almost all studies on the Hanseatic League have a general consensus on the aims of this merchant association. Its main aims were to gain privileges in foreign countries, protect the prevalent position of its merchants in the northern European trade, take measures to coordinate its merchant's activities in order to facilitate their trade, and prevent armed conflicts among its members (Cramer 1949, 86; Postan 1987, 273; Fink 2012, 201-204). Protection from the attacks of pirates and of territorial rulers can also be seen as the other motivations of the Hanseatic traders for establishing institutions (Nash 1929, 6-7; Jenks 1992, 134; Daenell 1909, 50).

In line with these aims, the Hanseatic League never set overthrowing the international system, or at least changing its main dynamics as its principal target. Rather, the elements that constitute the Hansa almost always tried to keep the organization within the limits of international trade. Their struggle with the international system was no more than a continuous effort to protect the international trade and cities from territorial rulers' sphere of influence. That is why a closer solidarity can be seen between the Hansa towns when one of them is oppressed by a territorial prince to follow a non-Hanseatic economic policy. The same reaction can only be seen in the Hansa when one of the members is forced to revise its economic interests in favor of a territorial ruler (Dollinger 1971, 107, 114). Merchants of the Hansa were equally against any policy change that draws the Hansa away from its principal commercial aims. For instance, most of the merchant citizens of Lübeck revolted in 1408 when Lübeck city council tried to transform the

city into a territorial state. As Lübeck was the unofficial head of the Hansa, its policies were directly affecting the Hanseatic affairs. Merchants of Lübeck were clearly against this new path of policy which could eventually convert Hansa to a political power. For them, their taxes and resources were misused, because they were supporting the city council by all means in order to keep the Hansa as an economically based organization. Rotz (1977, 41) explains the cause of Lübeck uprising by the same token, “merchants felt that League’s struggle for political power, like the town’s (Lübeck’s) land and castles, cost too much, and serve the councilors’ glory more than merchants’ interests”. Therefore, as long as merchants were able to control the Hansa, the organization adhered to the aim of providing secure transfer of its members’ goods. It also tried to gain privileges in order to secure its trader’s low costs of transport. It principally endeavors to maintain its cities independence of territorial rulers. That is the main reason for the Hansa to be seen sometimes as an enemy by the imperial government and princes. Since it did not have any cohesive factor other than common interest, it generally failed to resist this pressure in the periods that common consent between towns and merchants was lacking (Rotz 1977, 4). The common interest among the Hanseatic merchants was essential for Hansa’s survival.

4.3. Institutions of the Hanseatic League and the Structure of the Trade in the Northern Europe in the Medieval

In order to control the northern European trade effectively and to establish a monopoly, institutions have been built by the Hanseatic League upon the interests shared between its merchants. These institutions can be listed as armed action, privileges in foreign cities and diets. It should be noted that all of these institutions directly points to a functional world society element by the virtue of being limited to the commercial interest. None of these institutions have been operated by the Hanseatic League for an aim other than establishing a monopoly or maintaining its prevalent position in the northern European trade. For example, although the extent of armed action is sometimes extended by the Hanseatic League in a way to involve warfare, the Hanseatic merchants never intended to gain the control of a state. They,

rather, almost always preferred to confine themselves and the functioning of their institutions with trade interests. The principal function that the institutions of the Hanseatic League fulfilled, therefore, was to engender a sphere in international relations that is independent of territorial rulers as well as other competitors. Together with this function, institutions such as common civil law and diets also helped to enhance the harmony between the actions of Hanseatic merchants.

4.3.1. Armed Action

Armed action as an institution served two purposes in the history of the Hanseatic League. First, in the form of war, it was directed to the territorial rulers as an instrument to gain new trade privileges or protect the existing ones. Second, in the form of armed protection, it is directed to pirates. Wars between the members of the organization cannot be neglected either. However, the main conflict resolution mechanism of the League was diets. Armed resolution to the conflicts between members has always been a last resort for the Hanseatic League since such an action was fundamentally inconsistent with its main purpose of establishing a collective monopoly in the northern European trade.

The war against external threats as a form of armed action has always occupied a significant place in the Hanseatic agenda. Though it never had a permanent army or navy, the Hansa experienced armed conflicts with territorial actors on several occasions. Major reasons for the Hansa to wage war can be listed as protecting its members from attacks, defending existing privileges or attaining additional ones (Fink 2012, 203). In line with its *raison d'être*, the Hansa did not use armed action unless its trade interests are threatened or attacked (Zimmern 1889, 59). The most known war of the Hanseatic League, the war in 1362 between the Cologne Federation¹⁴ and Valdemar IV of Denmark, broke out as a result of Valdemar IV's intention to wipe out Hanseatic merchants from the Baltic Sound (Bjork 1932, 450-452). The conflict between Valdemar IV and the Hansa began with Valdemar IV's attack on Visby. Though a few armed attempts have been made by Hansa in

¹⁴ Cologne federation is the name of the alliance between Hanseatic cities, merchants and some of the German Princes who suffered from Valdemar's expansionist policies in northern Europe.

response to Valdemar IV's aggression, these small scale battles did not turn into a major war until 1366. Beginning from 1366, Valdemar IV started to demand extortionate fees for the renewal of the agreements that granted trade privileges to the Hansa (Zimmern 1889, 59). This inevitably sparked off a war between the Hansa and Valdemar IV. The war ended with the ultimate defeat of Valdemar IV, and the famous peace agreement of Stralsund was signed between the parties. During the peace talks, the Hansa only demanded the conformation of previous trade privileges, the abolition of duties that levied on the Hanseatic ships, and complete freedom of trade in the Baltic. To assure that, the Hansa also demanded the right to control several castles controlling the Baltic Sound (Dollinger 1971, 68-71; Bjork 1932, 462). In addition to satisfying the Hansa's demands, the Peace of Stralsund also granted the Hansa the right to choose the succession of the Danish throne for fifteen years after the death of Valdemar IV. However, as Bjork (1932, 448, 453) purports, Hansa never truly used this right. This is because; commercial interest was foremost for the Hansa.

The Danish-Hansa war was not the single armed event that Hansa challenged territorial rulers in order to defend its trade interests. For example in 1438, the Hansa carried out armed action against Hollanders when they levied heavy taxes in trade and threatened Hanseatic merchants with a new military fleet (Lloyd 2002, 174). The Anglo-Hanseatic war that fought between 1468 and 1472 is another instance of commercially motivated Hansa wars. The war broke out as a result of long-lasting conflict between the Hansa and the Kingdom of England on reciprocity of trade privileges. Local trades in London were putting pressure on English rulers in order to gain privileges in Prussia to an equal degree with Hanseatic merchants' benefits in London. As a result, the Kingdom of England canceled all the Hansa privileges though the Hansa exports were vital for the country and the king was reluctant to block the Hanseatic trade. The war for the Hansa part was essentially an act of piracy. They were financing pirates and transforming merchant cogs into pirate ships to attack English and French merchant and war ships. The war ended with the treaty of Utrecht in 1474, giving neither side total victory. The Hansa

restored its privileges in London and granted English merchants the same in Prussian towns (Dollinger 1971, 306-310).

Piracy was a threat as well as a foreign policy instrument for the Hanseatic League. Hanseatic merchants were under the constant threat of pirate attacks because of the insecurity of sea routes. Armed protection was of utmost importance. The Hanseatic League have taken diverse measures, including arming the trade cogs, sailing together as fleets and prohibition of the voyage in winter, at all times. The ships were built in a shape like floating castles, always provided with enough men, weapons, and ammunition (Daenell 1909, 49-51). Despite all their efforts to protect ships from pirate attacks, Hanseatic merchants could never totally avoid the loss of goods, ships and men. Particularly, a band of pirates named “Victual Brothers” can be regarded as the biggest enemy of the Hanseatic merchants. In fact, this group of men was sponsored by the Hansa to carry out attacks to Valdemar IV’s navy during the Danish-Hansa war. However, they did not give up pirating after the end of the war and concentrated their attacks on wealthy cities and merchants of the Hanseatic League between 1392 and 1402. They have sacked Bergen and Gotland where later became a kind of pirate heaven. Their activities were so severe for the Hanseatic merchants that they had to abandon herring fisheries around Skane almost for three years. The Hansa could only eliminate the Victual Brothers threat in 1402, after sending several navies beginning from 1394.

In sum, armed protection played a crucial role in protecting trade interest of the Hanseatic League and traders and the towns never hesitated to use armed force against an external threat when their trade interest was in question. Armed action basically was an instrument of the Hansa to fulfill its aims. Moreover, the Hansa was using this institution as a practice of dealing with the state interference in the international trade. The territorial rulers were aware of the fact that the Hansa had the capacity to wage war.

4.3.2. Diets

Diets or *Hansetags* can be regarded as the only tangible and official institution of the Hanseatic League. They are usually seen as equal to the Hansa since there was no other common institution between member cities. With regard to its importance in the Hanseatic history, the last diet held in 1630 is often accepted as the official date of the Hansa's death (Cramer 1949, 87). From an English School perspective, the Hanseatic diet can be labeled as a pseudo-institution as well. The main task of the Hanseatic diets was to coordinate the actions of the members by reconciliation and discussion. Thereby, diplomacy was the fundamental institution of the Hanseatic world society, while diets were a derivative form of it. Diplomacy as an institution was not peculiar to relations between the members of the Hanseatic League. Hanseatic merchants always used it as a form of action in their relations with the other merchants, non-Hanseatic cities, kings, and princes. In this regard, the diets as the concrete form of diplomacy had a double sided function in the history of the Hanseatic League. On the one hand, diets facilitated the reconciliation among members; and on the other, they were a tool for conducting foreign policy. However, from this study's point of view, the former function is prior to the latter. Diplomacy was the cement of the members of the Hanseatic League in their relations with each other since voluntariness was the key factor that held the members of the Hansa together. In order to maintain the volitional essence of the Hanseatic League, interests of the members had to be harmonized in the diets.

Official functions of the *Hansetags* can also be divided into two categories accordingly. Diets fulfilled such functions as ratification of treaties, conducting diplomatic relations with foreign cities and countries, dispatching embassies, taking decisions of a blockade, war and peace in the Hansa's relations with the outside world. Exclusion and admission of members, mediation of the disputes between Hansa towns and harmonizing interests were the internal functions of the Hanseatic diets. All these critical decisions were taken by simple majority vote in the diets (Dollinger 1971, 92). Given that the *Hansetag* was the only official executive organ of the Hansa, one should expect that it was convened regularly. However, this was

not the case. There was no fixed time period for a diet to be held. The frequency of diets was changing in accordance with the urgency of the issues. For instance, if there was an imminent threat of war or loss of benefit, diets could be held more than once in a year, but if there were no urgent issues, a decade could pass without a diet. Moreover, in none of the diets all towns were represented. Usually, diets were attended by only the representatives of the towns which have a close interest in the agenda. In addition to the lack of interest in the issues discussed, the high cost of sending delegates was one of the main reasons for towns to be reluctant to send representatives to all diets (Dollinger 1971, 93). Nevertheless, diets were taking decisions on behalf of all Hanseatic towns regardless of their representatives' availability in the meetings (Zimmern 1889, 202).

These functions portray the Hanseatic diets as the controlling organ of the League. As the only official institution of the Hansa, the Hansetag was officially responsible for taking decisions on the political and economic issues¹⁵ (Cramer 1949, 87). But as mentioned, diets were irregular and attendance of the towns' representatives was usually low. In order to keep the Hanseatic business going in the years that diets were not held, two auxiliary institutions were established by the Hanseatic merchants.

First, there were regional diets. The regional diets were playing a key role in identifying general principles that regions within the Hansa will follow in the next Hansetag although all of them were not particularly in Hanseatic character (Dollinger 1971, 96-97). It should also be noted that regional diets were not organic parts of the Hanseatic diets. They were rather independent of the Hansetag; however, still they carried out the function of governing the regional affairs of the Hansa to some extent.

Second, big cities, particularly Lübeck, were crucial in maintaining Hanseatic affairs in the time periods between irregular diets. Especially Lübeck's role within the Hansa was so great it can be argued that both between and during the diets the

¹⁵ For Lloyd (2002, 11), Hansetag was only dealing with the political issues if they were related with the economic interests of the members. This also indicates the strength of trade benefits as common interest in the existence of the Hanseatic League.

city was pretty much in control of the Hansa (Dollinger 1971, 72). That is why Hanseatic diets were almost completely ineffective and Hanseatic power began to decline when Lübeck was in political turmoil around the beginning of the fifteenth century (Jenks 1992, 144; Rotz 1977, 16). Although the city council of Lübeck usually took decisions and implemented them on behalf of the Hansa between the diets, the city's policies were not completely independent of the Hansetag's control. The decisions taken and implemented by the Lübeck city council were usually had also to be accepted in the following diet. Thus, Lübeck was not transforming its own interest into Hansa's general interest. To the contrary, Lübeck city council was guarding Hansa's general interest in order to keep the Hanseatic merchants together (Dollinger 1971, 97). That is why Jenks (2007, 141) defines Lübeck as "the great consensus builder of the Hansa."

Frequently, conflicting interests and contradicting policies could be seen among the members of the Hansa (Fink 2012, 207). Since the regional diets were not subordinated to the Hansetag, their policies implemented to secure the regional interests were inducing conflicts with other regions' interests. Moreover, some member towns could pursue policies against the general decisions taken and principles defined by the Hansetag (Jenks 1992, 140). Therefore, consensus building and reconciliation were crucial functions of the diets. Although it never refrained from waging war and taking armed measures to protect its commercial interests in its relations with the outside world, the armed action between its members was always last resort for the Hanseatic League. According to Hibbert's article on the Hanseatic League in 1966 edition of *Encyclopedia Britannica*, as a rule, in case of other measures failed to prevent war between member cities, no member could wage war against another member without obtaining the permission of its neighbors. Instead of allowing an armed conflict between the member cities, diets took decisions such as exclusion from the league¹⁶ and imposing fines when a member city acted against the Hansetag's decisions. For example, Bremen was expelled from the League in 1356 when it continued to do business with

¹⁶ Although exclusion from the membership was an instrument of the diets to deal with the wayward towns, Jenks (2013, 202) argues that diets were usually unwilling to exclude a town from the League based upon the difficulty of building a consensus for readmission of expelled towns.

Netherlands in spite of a diet's decision banning the trade with this country (Cramer 1949, 87).

However, the decisions of the Hanseatic League were not binding automatically. I have already stated that the Hanseatic League absolutely needed the consent of its members in order to take any action. In this context, the decisions taken in the Hansetag were binding as long as the same interests were shared between the members. Technically, the Hansa had no executive authority over the member cities; hence, the decisions taken by the Hansetag had to be ratified by the city councils of the member towns (Fink 2012, 209; Wubs-Mrozewicz 2011, 1). Despite the fact that Hansetag was the one and only apparent institution and controlling organ of the Hansa, its decisions', impositions', and regulations' power highly depended on member cities' willingness. Lloyd (2002, 7) says that penalties imposed by the diets were rarely implemented without disobedience. Except its members' volitional decisions, the diet had no authority to implement laws or any individual regulations. For instance, implementation and integration of similar codes or maritime laws in different towns by the diets were only possible if all related towns agreed on such a regulation (Frankol, 2013, 118).

In sum, the double function of the diets, conducting foreign policy and harmonizing members' interests, was quite compatible with the aims of the Hansa as a functional world society element. The only common principle of the Hansa members, maximizing profits by controlling the northern European trade was too general to be implemented as a policy. Thus, diets had played a crucial role in harmonizing the specific interests of the member towns and of the merchants. By functioning as a consent builder, Lübeck also helped Hansa members to stand together in their pursuit of common interest. Despite the fact that the Hansetag had quite a limited executive authority and coercive measures over the members, the Hansa lived successfully for centuries on the basis of common interest. In order to achieve the common end, members kept diets as a functioning institution of the Hanseatic League. The diets, in this sense, can also be regarded as the organ where the decisions on the fate of northern European trade were taken. Given that the states of the time were incapable of building institutions, the Hansa was almost in full

control of the international trade. Therefore, the Hanseatic merchants in the Hansa diets constituted the rules, policies, and practices that governed the northern European trade.

4.3.3. Kontors and Privileges

In its essence, the Hansa was founded on privileges in non-Hanseatic cities. These privileges were not merely building stones of the commonality among members, but they were also institutions of the Hanseatic world society. In the form of institutions, privileges had two primary functions. First, they were the main practices that enabled the Hanseatic League to control the northern European trade and second, their deprivation was a mechanism of punishing members. Thus, privileges were collectively an institution that was put to use by the Hansa in their internal and external affairs. Whereas the Hansa was maintaining its relationship with the non-Hanseatic world and keeping its trade outside of territorial rulers' and other competitors' influence with the help of privileges such as kontors, it has also strengthened the key practices that constituted the common interest among its members by the same institution.

The various privileges that the Hansa members enjoyed were neither spontaneous nor unilateral. They were, to the contrary, granted either due to a necessity or conditionally. The Hanseatic trade was not solely beneficial for the Hanseatic merchants, the cities were utilizing from the flow of goods as well. Some goods such as grain and herring were of vital importance in the medieval people's diet. Any problem in their flow to the markets was a potential risk of famine in the medieval towns. The well-grounded Hanseatic trade route between London and Novgorod was the main line for the transportation of such goods. Grain was carried from the east to the west via this trade route. Herring and cloth were transported aback. The Hansa was satisfying that need in the cities for these crucial goods in exchange for specific privileges. In this context, imposing an embargo or moving the kontor elsewhere were instruments used by the Hanseatic merchants to keep their privileges steady. These measurements were used by the Hansa especially in

the times when there was a dispute between them and the foreign cities. Surely, an embargo was damaging the Hanseatic interests too. However, the situation of the country facing the embargo was more severe. The embargo was not merely pulling down the volume of trade of that country but it was also causing a serious shortage of food. Therefore, it was only a matter of time for the Hansa to gain its privileges back from the country under the embargo (Dollinger 1971, 110). Moving kontors had similar effects on hosting cities. The volume of trade in the hosting city was dramatically decreasing and access to vital products was getting hard when a kontor was closed or moved to another city (Cramer 1949, 87).

The privileges of the Hansa merchants were also gained largely by their close financial relationship with the territorial rulers. Similar to the way burghers gained independence of their cities, Hanseatic merchants were generally eager to lend money to the foreign cities' princes or kings when these rulers were experiencing financial difficulties. The credits they provided were even used by the English Kings (Colvin 1915, xxv). However, the Hanseatic merchants generally were not willing to be paid back. Instead of repayment, they preferred the trade privileges such as tax exemptions or higher quotas for import. These financial links between rulers and merchants were so strong that when English merchants were complaining about the unilateral privileges that Hanseatic merchants enjoyed in London, English Kings were continuously ignoring their demands to protect the Hansa's privileges (Zimmern 1889, 179). Therefore, considering the method of establishing a system of privileges in foreign cities, "buying" was carrying equal importance with the "necessity" for the Hansa.

Mainly, the privileges granted to the Hanseatic merchants were toll, tax and customs exemptions and/or reductions, lower tariffs, immunity from some local laws including strandgut, permission to re-export unsold goods without paying dues and guarantee of security of merchant and his goods (Dollinger 1971, 186-191). It is noteworthy that these privileges were not granted to merchants on the individual basis, but, they were granted to the all Hanseatic merchants collectively independent of their town of origin. Thus, free from where he came from, all Hanseatic merchants had the right to enjoy these privileges (including benefiting

from kontor) when they arrived at the foreign cities (Fink 2011, 176). These privileges, as stated, were the anchor of the Hanseatic trading system. By those privileges, the Hansa established a trading system which none of its competitors could challenge for centuries. In terms of trade, the Hanseatic merchants formed a close association which controlled the main trade route of the northern Europe. As mentioned, foreign cities were in need of such a transportation system and the Hansa was using privileges both for establishing their monopoly in the northern European trade, and for holding its members together.

The Hansa persistently used the threat of excluding wayward towns and merchants from its privileges system. The effects of exclusion for towns and merchants could be devastating. Thus, in order to stay inside the Hanseatic trade system, they were obeying the policies of the Hansa. For instance, for a Hanseatic trader to do business within the borders of the kontor and benefit from its privileges, he must adhere to the internal regulations and administrative rules of the kontor. However, acceptance of these constitutional rules was totally volitional (Fink 2011, 179). None of the Hanseatic merchants were forced to do so. They were obeying the internal regulations because of these constitutional rules were based on their common interest. Indeed, administrative authority and legitimacy of kontor were also built upon the common consent and common interest of those merchants.

Kontors which was an essential part of the privileges of the Hansa can be regarded as the most substantial element of the Hansa's success against territorial rulers of the northern Europe. The institution of kontor was basically a Hanseatic settlement in a foreign town. This settlement was composed of several buildings including a merchants' hall in where administrative business carried out, a church or a chapel, residential buildings and warehouses. All these buildings were surrounded by a fortified wall. Entry of non-Hanseatic merchants behind these walls was strictly prohibited. For a kontor to be established in a foreign city, two conditions were of crucial importance. First, the city had to be an important commercial center and second, local authorities should be eager to grant privileges. There were many kontors in various towns which satisfied these conditions, but for the history of the

Hanseatic League, four of them, namely, London, Bergen, Bruges and Novgorod kontors were the most prominent (Dollinger 1971, 98).

Kontors were representing the Hansa merchants to local authorities. These settlements also ensured internal control and cooperation among members in order to secure previously gained privileges. Besides, kontor was providing shelter, protection and legal security to the Hansa merchants (Burkhardt 2010, 62; Fink 2011, 182). The kontor was administered by an “alderman”, a merchant who is elected by other merchants or by diet.¹⁷ During some different periods in the Hansa’s history, some of the kontors could be governed by a council of alderman. Independent of their numbers, alderman was the head of the kontor, highest judge within it and responsible for representing the kontor outside its walls.

Kontors were unique based upon their legal status, although there are various examples of merchant settlements or trading posts in the world history such as *Dejima* in Nagasaki, *The Company’s Garden* in Cape Town or *York Factory* in Manitoba. In addition to the specific privileges granted to the residents of kontor, in their internal affairs they were almost totally independent of the local rulers’ authority and jurisdiction in the country they were settled in. Most especially, the life within the walls and the legal issues between the Hanseatic merchants were subjected to the internal jurisdiction and regulations of the kontor (Colvin 1915, 87). For instance, Hanseatic merchants were enjoying extensive privileges in the London Steelyard¹⁸ including the right to wholesale without paying customary taxes, the right to use their own standardized units of measurement, denizenship, freedom from arrest and speedy justice. In fact, the merchants of the London Steelyard were pretty much independent of the English laws (Palais 1959, 853-854).

¹⁷ Before the organization was transformed from the Hansa of merchants to the Hansa of towns, the alderman of the kontor was elected by the merchants. However, after the Hansa of cities was established and diet was introduced as an institution, kontors were started to be controlled directly by cities. The right to elect alderman of kontors too transferred to diets (Fink, 2011, 177; Fink, 2012, 208-209; Dollinger, 1971, 100-101). That is why kontors had a unique legal status in the medieval history. Unlike the Hansa, kontors had their own seal, treasury and armed men (Dollinger, 1971, 98-99). They were the only territorial entities that was not controlled by a territorial or ecclesiastical ruler but directly governed by a world society element.

¹⁸ Name of the kontor in London.

The court of the kontor had complete authority over resolving the disputes between Hanseatic merchants (Wubs-Mrozewicz 2011, 9). In some cases, coercive measures that can be taken by the alderman was extended in a way to include death penalty (Dollinger 1971, 187; Fink 2011, 180). The authority of alderman over Hanseatic merchants of the kontor was helping the Hansa maintain its internal discipline.

Although there were slight differences in each kontors' constitutional rules, their core principles were the same (Wubs-Mrozewicz 2011, 1, 9). The uniformity of these core principles represents how kontors were regulating the internal affairs of the Hansa. By kontors, the Hanseatic diets were designating the main principles that Hanseatic merchants had to follow. In order to benefit from the privileges that are granted to the Hansa, the Hanseatic merchants had to trade within the legal and physical borders of the kontor. However, the choice of entering into the kontor and accepting its jurisdiction was left to the merchants. In other words, trading within the borders of the kontor was a right, not an obligation. This volitional characteristic was allowing the Hansa to maintain its non-state character, by refraining from any coercive action. This was essential for the Hansa to direct the general interest of its members to concrete ends. The legal independence of the kontor was crucial for the Hansa to regulate its relationship with the outside world as well.

As Dollinger (1971, 98) states, the kontor was the backbone of the Hanseatic trade. It constituted the legal status of Hanseatic merchants in foreign towns and provided them the mechanism that enabled the use of privileges. By those privileges, which give them a great comparative advantage against other competitors, merchants built the Hanseatic monopoly in the northern Europe (Burkhardt 2010, 62). Moreover, the legal independence of the kontor from the jurisdiction of the hosting town endowed the Hansa with the space that it needed to keep states outside of the trade system.

Kontors' independence, in this sense, was recognized by the local rulers. The importance of the kontors from the theoretical viewpoint of this study is their capacity of creating a territory totally free from the control of a state. This is unimaginable even in the modern international society that a territory is ruled by a

company almost completely free from a nation-states' jurisdiction although "free trade" is the motto of the world particularly after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, one can argue that the impact of Hansa as a functional world society element on the medieval international trade was so great that it was able to control territories. The kontors, in addition to their help in establishing a trade monopoly, allowed the Hansa to exclude states and state-related institutions totally from the northern European trade.

4.4. Concluding Remarks

As a functional world society element, the Hansa was successful in controlling the northern European trade. The Hansa tried to create a sphere free of state influence in the medieval international relations by the help of its institutions. The functional world society element, in this regard, was largely successful because the political units in the medieval were neither centralized nor penetrating. Moreover, the absence of the established institutions among political actors at that time enabled the Hansa to regulate international trade with its well-functioning mechanisms. For example, there were not enough mechanisms between states to agree on a common trade policy. There were no strong territorial units to constitute efficient control over the flow of goods to the internal markets either. These conditions were nearly perfect for an association like the Hansa to pursue interest within the international system. The Hansa, contrary to the medieval states, had institutions to implement policies to regulate the international trade. It was also nearly had complete control over the flow of goods in the northern Europe, as it had the capacity to put and lift embargos.

The Hanseatic League was also successful for establishing a trade monopoly in the northern Europe. The Hansa prevailed against its competitors by the help of institutions such as kontors and armed action. The kontors, particularly, were giving the Hanseatic merchants special privileges that none of its competitors could enjoy. Armed action, on the other hand, was giving the power of deterrence to the Hansa. Although it has sometimes gained remarkable military success, it never changed its

aims towards building a state, or state-like entity. In contrast with its capacity in war-waging and administrating, the Hansa remained as a functional world society element. This was particularly because of the fact that the Hansa was founded on the common interests of its members in establishing a trade monopoly.

CHAPTER V

MODERN COUNTERPARTS TO PREMODERN WORLD SOCIETIES

The central purpose of this chapter is to represent the main characteristics of the modern world society elements within the wider context of the modern international relations. The chapter will analyze the roles of the ideational and functional world society elements in the modern international society in order to compare their effectiveness with their pre-modern counterparts. In this chapter, Amnesty International will be defined as an ideational world society element which promotes human rights as the main norm of the international society. The International Chamber of Commerce, on the other hand, will be regarded as the modern counterpart of the Hanseatic League, with an aim of controlling the main mechanisms of the international trade. In order to examine the relationship between the world society dimension and international society dimension of the international relations, the first section of the chapter will represent the basic features of the modern international relations. The second section will concentrate on the AI and analyze its ability to change the norms of the modern international society. The third part of the chapter will examine the ICC and its basic interests. The section, then, will assess the role of this functional world society element in controlling the international trade of the modern international society.

5.1. The Modern International Society

IR theories interpret the constitutional principles of the modern international relations in different ways. In fact, defining the modern international relations constitutes the principal endeavor of the IR discipline. Thus, it is not striking to observe that every major IR theory has its own standpoint on the principles that constitute the modern international system. While realists treat the main constitutional element of international relations as anarchy and consider the balance of power as its principal dynamic, liberals view the issue from a progressivist viewpoint. In general, they argue that war and conflict are not unavoidable in international relations. On the contrary, they say, interdependence among actors, international regimes, institutions, republican regimes, and bonds established between human beings help to increase cooperation among states. These factors also mitigate the effects of anarchy. In their analysis, Marxists take a similar theoretical starting point with the realist and liberal schools of thought. For them, material structures determine both the actor behavior and all other dynamics of international politics.

Constructivists strongly oppose the realist/Marxist/liberal core argument which gives ontological priority to the structure. They claim that the constitutional elements of international relations are not only determined by the structure. They purport the argument that actor behavior equally constitutes the nature of international reality. Thus, shared ideas, beliefs and norms have to be taken into consideration in the analysis of the nature of international politics. The English School defines international relations in a similar way with constructivism. For them, states are social entities for being formed by inherently social human beings. For this reason, the relationship between states constitutes an international society that is ordered by rules, norms and institutions. In other words, every relationship that is established between separate actors would be regulated by institutions which are also built upon the practices created by that regular relationship.

The list of answers given by different schools of thought to the question of “what is the nature of international relations?” can be extended. Although there is a plurality of answers, still, some principal constitutive elements and dynamics of the modern international system can be abstracted. There are three major characteristics of the modern international relations that every theory can agree upon to some extent: anarchy, nationalism, and globalism. The global character of the modern international system is beyond controversy. By global, I mean two things. First, every corner of the world today represents the same characteristics. The way international relations is conducted between South Africa and Namibia is not principally different than the international relations between the U.S.A. and Canada. Second, any action in any part of the world has global reflections. A decrease in the fish prices in Catania Fish Market can have a bearing on the economic policies of Aarhus municipality.

The first meaning of the globalism stems from the effects of international anarchy. States accept no higher authority other than themselves in the modern international relations. As a result, their relations are anarchic. International anarchy also necessitates equality among states. In contemporary international relations, thanks to the decolonization, no state is subordinated to another one. In this sense, all states are equal on the legal grounds. Nationalism, on the other hand, underpins international anarchy. In order to maintain anarchy in international relations, actors must be dissociated. Given that each state in the modern world represents a nation, nationalism functions as one of the main mechanisms that keep actors separate. The impact of nationalism can be observed even in the main legal principle of the modern international relations, namely self-determination of peoples (U.N. Charter, art. 1.2). Thus, nationalism is the main separating institution among states, people and ideas today.

The main characteristics of the modern international society are originated in its institutions. Wight (1978, 111) states that “the institutions of international society are according to its nature.” However, he does not clarify what he means by the “nature of international society.” Nevertheless, it is obvious that by institutions, Wight refers to the practices that regulate the international society since he lists

alliances, diplomacy, war, guarantees and neutrality as institutions of international system on the following page (Wight 1978, 112). And if these institutions are according to the nature of international society, then, by the “nature” he was most likely implying the fundamental constitutional element of international society. In international relations, institutions both constitute the main principles of international act and determine how international relations is conducted. One can list sovereignty, the balance of power, diplomacy, great power management, international law, and war as the main institutions that generate general dynamics of the modern international system. Nonetheless, there is a crucial difference between sovereignty and other institutions. Sovereignty, in its mutually exclusive and absolute form, is the constitutional principle of the modern international relations. The other five institutions, on the other hand, are founded on this constitutional principle in order to regulate the international conduct. To put these institutions crudely into Wight’s formula, mutually exclusive sovereignty is the nature of the modern international society. All other institutions, in this context, are framed according to this nature.

Sovereignty, therefore, is the distinctive characteristic of the modern international relations. Modern understanding of sovereignty is also essential for defining the difference between the pre-modern and modern international relations. I have already discussed the essence of this difference in the second chapter. In a nutshell, the distinction between the modern and pre-modern international relations is on the grounds of constitutional principles or so to say on the fundamental institutions. Whereas overlapping and multiple authorities over the same territory is the major constitutive element of international relations of the medieval Europe, mutually exclusive sovereignty is the defining element of the modern international relations. To put it differently, the modern international system is composed of separate actors (sovereign nation-states) which have ultimate and exclusive authority over their well-defined territories. As mentioned in the second chapter, the other main characteristics of sovereign-state are centrality, territoriality, and nationality (Yurdusev 2009, 85). It should also be noted that the first two features of the modern state are based upon mutually exclusive and absolute sovereignty. Since the

modern state accepts no authority other than itself over its territory, its governmental units are highly centralized. It is territorial because the limit of sovereign-state's authority is defined by its borders. The sovereign-state is also national. These states are either built upon a nation or they created their nations by themselves (Yurdusev 2003, 105). Thus, today all sovereign-states are nation-states.

The core constitutional principle of the modern international relations indeed has repercussions on every sphere of international relations. By various ways, modern sovereignty frames international relations in a way that no actor can be decisive other than the sovereign nation-state. First and foremost, with the rise of the sovereign-state, no geographical area in the world could stay outside of its authority. Obviously, sovereign-state, after its emergence in the seventeenth century, gradually became the prevalent type of polity of modern international relations. However, today, thanks to the expansion of European international society, the nation-state is not just the prevalent, but the only type of polity in the international society. In other words, there is no single polity in the modern international relations that does not represent the characteristics of a nation-state. All polities in the modern international relations possess absolute sovereignty over their respective territories, even though some of them are still officially named as kingdom, empire, principality or emirate. The nation-state is so well-accepted in the modern international relations that even some non-state actors that fundamentally challenge the main constitutional elements and norms of international society such as ISIS call themselves "state"¹⁹ and act like one of it. The dominance of the modern state in international relations hypothetically²⁰ means that there is no territory in the world that is not controlled by a nation-state. Given that the nation-state is a highly centralized entity, and takes all decisions on its territory and people

¹⁹ Sovereign-state.

²⁰ It is well known by the students of international relations that the Westphalian definition of territoriality and sovereignty has never been fully realized and the sovereign-state has always shared and continues to share its authority over its territory with some internal and external actors (Krasner, 1999). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily falsify the claim that most of the sovereign-states possess ultimate, even if not full/absolute, authority over their territories. In other words, a great majority of sovereign-states in the modern world have the last say over their territories despite the fact that their authority is limited by external or internal actors in one way or another.

single-handedly, there is left no geographical area in the world for a non-state element to operate without intruding state authority.

Second, sovereign-state's ultimate authority within its certain and impermeable borders does not only limit the effectiveness non-state activity but also impede its counterparts' intervention in its domestic affairs. The well-known principle of the modern international relations, conceptualized as non-intervention, is the foundational norm of the modern international society. The modern international relations was founded on the pluralist morality of states. As Bull (1985, 70) asserts, respecting each other's sovereignty over territory and citizens is the key principle for sovereign-states to co-exist within an international society. That is why all external attempts by a state to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state, may the reason be protecting human rights or pursuing some other interests, is regarded both illegal according to the international law and considered as exceptional by the international society.

Nonetheless, current conditions of the international relations might be interpreted differently. There may be found some studies in the literature on how pluralist founding norms of international society evolved/should evolve through a solidarist way (Wheeler 2000; Mayall 2013; Wheeler and Dunne 1998; Donnelly 1998). Or, one may argue that modern international society developed or has to develop a global consciousness/responsibility to protect individuals (Linklater 1981; Linklater 1998). However, this does not change the fact that there is still no standard in international society for protecting humankind from state oppression and/or any kind of inhumane conditions. The modern international society's fashion of dealing with the humanitarian crisis in the last twenty-five years, including Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraq, Syria, Kosovo, and Nepal etc., leaves no doubt that there is not any consensus among sovereign-states on under which conditions they ought to/may take action. The divineness of state sovereignty still remains as an obstacle in front of developing such standards.

Third, alongside being widespread and exercising full authority over its territory and people, the sovereign-state is also penetrating. It controls or tries to control

every action in its territory. Either by coercive mechanisms or by its giant bureaucratic machine, the sovereign-state aims at subordinating every civil behavior within its borders to itself. Let alone crucial political and economic areas, nation-state seeks to control even tiny administrative mechanisms within its realm. For instance, according to an article published online in one of the national Turkish newspapers, *Radikal*, on January 12, 2015, some state and municipal officials assigned by the governor included into the Grand Bazaar's management board, despite the fact that the board only consisted of shop owners for more than five hundred years. This can be an example of how the Turkish government takes this historical place's management seriously, but at the same time, this can also represent how Turkey as a nationalized sovereign-state wants to rule this bazaar from its administrative center. The sovereignty of the modern state is so penetrating that even the only permanent space station that humanity ever built is "international." In that station, the U.S.A. and Russia have full authority over their segments. The modern sovereign-state extends its sovereignty rights to space where no territory exists.

One can argue that the modern state shares its authority with internal or external actors from the very beginning (Krasner 1999). It allocates its authority over its territory to some internal actors such as a local ruler, or it can share its authority with an external actor such as the European Union. It is true that nation-state is not the sole actor that possesses authority in the modern international relations. Yet, it continues to be the most powerful one, despite some argue that nation-state is obsolete. The way which recent problems in the Eurozone tried to be handled can be regarded as a second instance for the ascendancy of the sovereign nation-state. In the recent Euro crisis, though financial integration is usually seen as one of the powerful areas of European supranationalism,²¹ all attempts to get all member states agree on treaty changes in order to introduce new budgetary rules to tackle future crisis were failed because of the objections of the United Kingdom and Hungary.

²¹ Nineteen of the twenty eight EU members share a common currency, central bank and monetary policy that give the Eurozone its supranational character. Nonetheless, member states retain control over taxation and spending, or in general, over their fiscal policy which denotes the governmental control over the supranational institutions of the EU.

The debt problem of economically fragile members of the EU such as Greece, Portugal, and Ireland is tried to be solved by an intergovernmental attempt and failed because of the disagreement among member states. This example evidently demonstrates how the intergovernmental agreement is pivotal for supporting supranational character of international organizations, including the EU.

Fourth, in the modern world, there is a tendency to think of nationalized sovereign-state as the most advanced type of polity that humankind can ever reach. Accordingly, the society of states is usually conceived as the ultimate form of international relations. This way of thought inevitably leads us to idea that sovereign nation-state is something valuable and every individual needs its protection in order to live peacefully and prosperously (Wight 1966, 21). If we recall the theory of the social contract, all men live in the state of nature, either state of nature is defined as the war of all against all or as a social condition where all men bounded with the natural law. It is the foundation of the state that ends the endless war of all against all or provides justice and equality. Therefore, in the tradition of the Western political thought, sovereign-state has an important function for the society since its absence creates inequality, insecurity, and injustice. In line with that, the society of states is usually considered as a “more desirable form of arranging a great number of men’s affairs than the alternatives” (Wight 1977, 44). The primary goal of the international society is to preserve the existence of the society of states itself (Bull 1985, 16). In fact, there is a close relation between the preservation of the society of states and maintaining the continuity of the sovereign-state (Wight 1966, 22). Institutions of international society function in a way to keep states away from each other. The balance of power, for instance, prevents any state from subordinating others to itself. Nationalism too helps to keep humanity scattered all across the state system. The long desire of humankind to live under separate political entities²² have finally realized by the sovereign-state and the

²² French Revolution, obviously, is the point of origin for the modern nationalist thought, however, quite interestingly, the idea of humankind should live under separate entities has its roots in the medieval thought. According to medieval way of thinking, diversity was the wish of the God. Given that the God have distributed men all over the world, diversity should be the fundamental feature of the universe (Kedourie 1979, 56-58). Gierke (1913, 20) also refers to the medieval France where lay

society of states. Therefore, these two are intrinsically valued. Sovereign-state is regarded as an end in itself. It is not a mechanism that generates other entities to reach the ultimate political ends of the individuals; rather, it is the end of all the struggles of the mankind to achieve the peaceful and prosperous social life.

Fifth, the sovereign-state controls the international realm not only by exerting authority over its territory but also by the institutions of the modern international society. Explaining the functions of these institutions is beyond the framework of this study. They are already well defined (Bull 1985; Buzan 2004) and historically analyzed (Hurrell 2007b; Jackson 2000; Watson 1982). However, from the theoretical viewpoint of this work, it is noteworthy that these institutions are founded on the practices that were created by the states' behavior. Thus, the institutions that order the modern international relations are exclusive to states. Since the modern international relations are governed by these institutions, it is almost not possible for a non-state element to get in these processes and have an effect on the functioning of international society. As Wight indicates (1966, 20-21), "international society has been so organized that no individuals except sovereign princes can be members of it". Indeed, in the modern world, the act of foreign policy of a state is directed to the other states. All other acts aimed at non-state actors are subordinate (Donelan 1990, 14-15). The modern sovereign-state controls the non-territorial dimension of international relations as well with the help of the institutions of the international society.

In sum, the founding principle of the modern international relations is mutually exclusive sovereignty of states over their respective territories. International anarchy stems from this principle, which leads to the establishment of the international realm as a separate entity peculiar to states. This realm is constituted by states. It is also ordered by the mechanisms that are originated from the practices and habits generated by the relations between states. Moreover, separateness is still considered within the limits of international society as a value. Accordingly, cosmopolitan aims of ideational world society elements are a controversial issue in

rulers were accepting the oneness of mankind in principle but at the same time, defending the idea that oneness should be politically represented by the plurality of states.

the world of states. Global characteristic of the modern international society also hinders the non-state elements' impact. The international realm peculiar to the states corresponds to the whole world without leaving any place in the world free from sovereign-state's authority. Further, the institutions established by sovereign-states are global as well, restricting the non-territorial realm to the non-state elements. These characteristics of the modern international society clearly furnish an unsuitable environment for the world society elements, both ideational and functional.

5.2. Amnesty International as an Ideational World Society Element

The AI is an example of a modern ideational world society element. Founded in 1961, it started as a civil movement for the amnesty for prisoners of conscience. Peter Benenson is the founding father of the organization. The foundation of the organization can be traced back to an article by Benenson published in the Observer. This article, which criticized unjust imprisonment of two Portuguese students just for making a toast for freedom, had a broad repercussion in the international press. Following the publication of the article in various languages, the idea of supporting people who are unjustly jailed attracted remarkable attention in the international community. In its initial phase, the original idea that the AI gathered its members around was to “condemn persecution regardless of where it occurs, who is responsible or what are the ideas suppressed” (Clark 2001, 11).

The organization has begun its life as a project to raise awareness of the public to the prisoners of conscience rather than as an institution aiming to establish international standards for human rights. However, the scope of the human rights issues that the AI has dealt with has widened in time (Buchanan 2002, 590). The organization started to focus on torture in the 1970s and death penalty in the 1980s. Today, the AI considers human rights violations all around the world from a broader perspective. For them, human rights issues cannot be limited to freedom of speech or right to liberty. For this reason, the organization advocates “all of the

human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments” (Amnesty International, 2005, art. I).

According to the theoretical framework set in the second chapter of this work, in order to qualify an organization as an ideational world society element, it must be a non-state actor. This non-state actor is an ideational world society element if its aim is to reshape the international society by introducing new cosmopolitan norms. In this context, the AI properly fits the definition of ideational world society element. It is both a non-state actor, and it aims to establish “respect to human rights” as the main norm of the modern international society.

From its earliest days, the AI preserves its non-state character. For example, it accepts no governmental funds²³ from states, it defines impartiality and independence as its core values and its membership mechanism is based on voluntarism (Amnesty International, 2005, art. 2 and art. 5). Especially, its impartial and independent character helps the organization to stay in the non-state dimension of the world politics. In its first years, the organization has established its working methods in a way to enhance its impartiality. The working groups, namely the *threes*, were formed to work on three prisoners of conscience, one from each of the three regions of the world; West, East, and the third world. Members of these groups were not allowed to work on the prisoners of conscience from their country of citizenship (Clark 2001, 14). The principles of impartiality and independence constitute the primary difference between the previous campaigns for the amnesty of prisoners of conscience and the AI. In the previous campaigns, e.g. Appeal for Amnesty in Spain, the main focus was the views that led to the imprisonment of a person. Contrary to that, in the AI’s campaigns, the organization concentrates on the fact of imprisonment independent of the views of the prisoner (Buchanan 2002, 581). Adaptation of these characteristics by the AI has strengthened the universal and impartial character of the organization. Based on its independence from the jurisdiction of any state, and largely because of its impartiality, the AI is a non-state actor.

²³ Amnesty International occasionally accepts intergovernmental funds from intergovernmental organizations such as the U.N. and the EU in particular circumstances (Clark, 2001, 15)

The main aim of the AI is promoting human rights as a universal value in the international society. In its statute, its principal objective is defined as “to undertake research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of these (human) rights” (Amnesty International, 2005, art. 1). The AI is often regarded as a human rights monitoring organization. However, its objective encompasses a much broader area than simply monitoring human rights abuses in the world. The organization seeks to encourage international society to take action against human rights violators (Amnesty International, 2005, Article 3). Some studies on the organization also indicate that the AI either takes action by itself or mobilize international society to stand against human rights violations. For instance, Hendrix and Wong (2013, 30) describe the main aims of the organization as rallying states to take action against human rights violators and monitoring the human rights violations. Clark too defines the purpose of the AI as “translating human rights practices into practical action” and advocating the basic changes in international norms (Clark 2001, 3).

Both in the AI’s statute and in the scholarly works on the organization, it is explicitly expressed that the organization does not merely define its purposes as monitoring human rights abuses and raising international public awareness of human rights all around the globe. The organization also clearly identifies that it aims to take action, or encourage states to take action against human rights violations. Regarding this aim of the organization, it can be stated that the international society can take action in two ways against human rights violations in a particular country. The first method that international society can implement is putting various political and economic pressures on the country where human rights violations take place or on the person who is responsible for such acts. These sanctions include placing an embargo, isolating the country from the governing mechanisms of the international society, condemning publicly, or prompting the instruments of international law such as International Criminal Court. Secondly, international society may get involved in the situation more directly by putting military pressure on the human rights violator via using instruments defined in international law such as humanitarian intervention.

In either case, taking action against human rights violations brings along intervention in the domestic affairs of the targeted country. That is the key point to understand how the AI aims to reshape international relations. It promotes the universal human rights as the main norm. There is a close link between the norms, particularly norms like human rights, and sanctions.²⁴ This is because punishing a human rights violator (a state or a person) after the abuse has taken place does not bring the victims back. That is why these abuses require immediate action. There is no turning back after the damage is done. Particularly, human rights violations including the right to live and the right to subsistence are irreparable. Clearly, human rights, which are mostly regarded as intrinsically universal, have the capability of shifting the focus of international politics from states to the individuals. This shift can lead the international society into a solidarist direction. In other words, the AI urges the international society to take action against the human rights abuses, and all actions that international society could take are various forms of intervention. Thus, in line with the effects that could be brought along by the establishment of human rights as the main norm of international relations, the aim of the AI is to reshape the modern international society.

In order to regard a value as the basis of an ideational world society element, that value has to be in cosmopolitan characteristic. If a value or an idea which has the capacity of bringing people together does not transcend the realm of the state, it cannot be regarded as the basis of an ideational world society element. Human rights, the main value of the AI, are definitely a cosmopolitan value. However, there is still much controversy on their universality. In those debates, particularly cultural relativism is at stake. The third generation²⁵ of human rights, which defines the

²⁴ Sanctions, according to Björkdahl (2002, 14) are the essential component of the international norms. Norms are not merely composed of “oughts”, but they are enforced as far as there are sanctions.

²⁵ Human rights are generally categorized chronologically. While the first generation of human rights includes political rights such as freedom of speech or freedom of assembly, second generation of rights consist of economic and social rights. Third generation of human rights is named as rights of peoples, such as the right to preserve culture.

rights to preserve one's culture, is mostly regarded as in contradiction with the universal character of human rights. There are relatedly three sets of arguments against the universality of human rights. First type of arguments states that some countries may protest particular articles of human rights regimes by arguing that these rights' incompatibility with their culture. Second set of arguments claims that some repressive countries may also hide behind the cultural relativism to hide human rights abuses within their borders. The third one purports that some countries may regard human rights regimes as a specific instrument of the western countries to impose their values on the other parts of the world.

Despite the fact that human rights are not inherently universal, arguments on the cultural relativity of human rights are not included in the analysis of norm change in this study. In other words, I do not argue that human rights regimes are not completely followed by nation-states because these rights are culturally relative. There are two reasons for adopting such a position. First, the AI treats human rights as a universal value. As stated in its statute (Amnesty International, 2005, art. 1) "Amnesty International's vision is of a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments". The organization does not make any distinction between the right to life and right to marry and found a family. For the AI, all mankind in the world must enjoy all the rights secured by the international agreements. The AI as an ideational world society element, in this sense, rests on the cosmopolitan conception of humanity. The second reason for accepting the universality of human rights is this study's focus on the basic individual rights²⁶ of people. In no culture or in no country, genocide, torture, inhumane or degrading treatment can be accepted as normal. Thus, this study analyzes whether the basic individual rights defined in the first seven articles Universal Declaration of Human Rights is adopted by the international society.

²⁶ The basic individual rights are derived from the classification by Donnelly (1986, 606-607). He categorizes the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Human Rights Covenants under seven broad categories (personal rights, legal rights, civil liberties, subsistence rights, economic rights, social and cultural rights, political rights). The category of personal rights includes rights to life and protection against inhumane treatment. In this study "basic individual rights" refers to this category.

5.3. Institutions of Amnesty International and the Norm Change in the Modern International Society

The AI qualifies as an ideational world society element for being a non-state actor and for aiming to reshape international relations by promoting universal human rights as a norm. In order to raise awareness to human rights violations and in order to force international society to take action against these violations, the AI basically utilizes two institutions. Both of these institutions are founded on the shared values of individuals. These institutions emerged as a result of common practices among individuals and grouping of individuals, such as reacting against human rights violations or generating pressure over governments to take action against human rights abuses. Therefore, although human rights are often regarded as a part of the international law, institutions to promote these rights are principally founded in the non-state dimension of international relations.

First of these institutions can be defined as “naming and shaming”. In fact, naming and shaming is the framing institution that consists of different forms of action against human rights violations. The fundamental part of naming and shaming is reporting. Reporting, in the way that the AI uses, completely fits the definition of information politics. Information politics, in this sense, defines the ability to move the information quickly to the areas where it can have the most impact. As Keck and Sikkink (1999, 95-96) indicate, information politics constitute an alternative way to provide information that otherwise would never be available. It is not surprising that nation-states generally do not provide impartial and honest information about their human rights records. The AI consistently prepares and publishes background reports which focus on the human rights records of countries. These press releases aim to inform the international community about the human rights violations in different countries. The main purpose of publishing such reports is to direct international society’s attention to the human rights violations all around the world. The second part of the naming and shaming is rallying or targeting. The organization organizes letter writing campaigns to rally its supporters against the human rights violator country or the person responsible for human rights abuses. By

rallying, the AI seeks to gather the international community around a specific issue, and tries to force the mechanisms of international society to act against that specific human rights abuse.

Naming and shaming, in this sense, constitute one of the main institutions of the AI to promote human rights. It names the human rights violators and shames their inhumane actions on the basis of the close connection between human rights and legitimacy of an authority. There is a growing tendency in the western world that for regarding human rights violators as illegitimate. For this reason, a government/country risks its legitimacy in the eyes of the western world, if it violates human rights. Thus, naming and shaming of the AI works as a mechanism to deter governments from abusing human rights of their citizens in order to stay as a legitimate actor of the international society.

The other institution that the AI uses to influence international society on the basis of its main value is its consultative status in particular intergovernmental institutions. The AI gained consultative status at the U.N. in 1964 and at the Council of Europe in 1965. The organization's efficiency has particularly increased in these intergovernmental organizations after the 1990s, as a result of the end of the Cold War. This institution is of utmost importance for the AI since the modern international society is a realm restricted to states. Two critical functions of the consultative status of the AI can be listed in here. First, consultative status enhances the AI's lobbying capacity by allowing the organization to establish dialogues directly with the representatives of sovereign-states as well as intergovernmental organizations' officials (Martens 2006, 379). For example, in the years following the foundation of the AI, there was no body within the institutional framework of the U.N. that can establish a dialogue with the NGOs (Clark 2001, 8). As Buchanan (2002, 579) states, there was even no common language of human rights. By this institution, the AI establishes a mechanism to have a permanent dialogue with sovereign-states.

Secondly, this institution enables the AI to get involved in the drafting processes of the critical human rights documents (Martens 2006, 380). These human rights

agreements are usually binding for signatory countries. Given that the consultative status of the AI allows the organization to participate in the preparation of these documents, this institution carries key importance for shaping state behavior and establishing the norm of respect to human rights in the international system. In other words, human rights as a shared value among individuals are translated into the form of a legal rule of the state system via this institution. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that this institution enables the AI to play a complimentary role together with the U.N. in norm creation, monitoring, and enforcement (Thakur 1994). Thus, consultative status of the AI allows the organization to get into the governing bodies of the modern international society.

The institutions of the AI are founded on the values shared among individuals. Main features of the AI's organizational structure, in this sense, support the functions of these institutions. Clark (2001, 11) defines three features that enable practices to be established as institutions. The first one of these features is loyalty to the principles. The organization sticks to its main principles that are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These principles are universal and unassailable. In this regard, they provide a legitimate basis for the AI to take action without being aligned to any political ideals or beliefs. The second feature of the AI which supports its institutions is impartiality. Being a third party organization helps the AI to fight human rights abuses all over the world. This feature also provides a legitimate basis for an intervention in the domestic affairs of a country. One of the main arguments against humanitarian intervention is the risk of abuse. It is true that sovereign-states are reluctant to permit other states to intervene into their domestic affairs due to the risk of misuse of this institution. Impartiality of the AI provides a basis for the legitimacy of such an action. Monitoring the human rights violations by a third party minimizes the risk of manipulation of intervention by other states. This also allowed the AI to get into the U.N. organs as a consultative non-governmental organization. Thirdly, the principle of attention to the facts is also crucial for the AI's ability to introduce human rights as a norm to the international society. In order to blame a state for its oppressive behavior, there must be strong evidence of its human rights abuses. Therefore, the AI uses its extensive monitoring

capacity efficiently. Rather than speculating about human rights abuses in a particular country, the organization punctiliously monitors the targeted country and gathers information about the human rights violations. This intensifies the AI's appeal for action in international society.

In the modern international society, human rights have started to emerge as a norm by the end of the Second World War. Particularly in the last years of the Cold War, human rights are adopted as a foreign policy instrument by the Western Bloc. However, the end of the Cold War did not change the states' eagerness to use human rights. Particularly in the years following the demise of the bipolar world politics, human rights issues have become one of the major arguments of the western countries in their relationship with the rest of the world. Although human rights have more than fifty years of history as an issue of international law, states are still reluctant to support human rights with international action. The main reason for the lack of the international action against human rights violations is state sovereignty. Regarding this, the AI seeks to provide a ground for human rights supporters in their struggle to introduce human rights to the international scene as a norm.

In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, many international agreements have been signed and ratified by the majority of the countries in the modern international society. In the preparation of such agreements, and in the introduction of human rights as the new standard of behavior in the international society, non-governmental organizations including the AI have played a significant role. It is also true that modern nation-states have started to loosen the absolutist perception of state sovereignty in a way to include human rights as an international issue (Dağı 2001, 3). Nonetheless, existence and enforcement of a norm are two different things. International human rights agreements exist. Furthermore, the international society is well aware of their existence. However, standards for fighting human rights violations are still not set. In which cases and under which circumstances that international society can/should take action continues to be a decision left to the states or to the intergovernmental organizations. Particularly for this reason, modern international society was reluctant to act against mass murders

and genocides took place in the last two decades. For example, in Somalia, in Rwanda and in Srebrenica, the international society either acted too late or did not take any action against the violations of the most basic right of individuals, the right to life. Nation-states were not eager to embark military missions against these humanitarian crises because there was no standard for humanitarian intervention in the international society.

The project of responsibility to protect, which is initiated within the United Nation organs by the Canadian government in 2001, aims to set the standards for the international society to prevent those humanitarian crises that took place in different parts of the world in the 1990s. From the theoretical perspective adopted in this study, it can be argued that “the responsibility to protect” provides the basis for norm change. Accordingly, the establishment of responsibility to protect as a common practice of the state system could drive international society to take action against crimes against humanity. The AI, in this sense, can be regarded as an instrumental ideational world society element for providing the norm of taking action against human rights violations, and for establishing the norms for a solidarist type of international society.

The initiative of “responsibility to protect” has been initiated with the purpose of ending the tension between the inviolability of state sovereignty and the need to fight systematic and gross human rights violations. The mass atrocities of the last two decades created a demand for a new norm, and members of the U.N. have started to work on the new standards for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The responsibility to protect includes three pillars defined in the U.N. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (U.N. General Assembly Resolution, A/Res/60/1) and in the report of the U.N. Secretary-General (U.N. Secretary-General Report A/63/677). These documents suggest that a strategy composed of three steps has to be implemented to protect populations from crimes against humanity. According to this strategy, first, each state carries a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement. Second, states carry the responsibility to assist each other in preventing such crimes. Third, the

international community is responsible for taking timely and decisive action against these crimes if a state fails to do so (U.N. General Assembly Resolution, A/Res/60/1, para. 138-140; Bellamy 2014, 7-8).

Concerning its scope, responsibility to protect can be regarded as an initiative which had the potential to put a legal ground under the humanitarian intervention in the world politics. Moreover, the project was also designed to encourage the international society to take action in order to prevent a humanitarian crisis from turning into an atrocity. Nevertheless, the final document of the 2005 World Summit of the U.N. also states that (U.N. General Assembly Resolution, A/Res/60/1, para. 139.) the international community decides whether to take action or not against a human rights violation on a case by case basis. This statement is the biggest obstacle in front of the success of the project of “responsibility to protect.” This is because, the project can hardly provide any standards for fighting the crimes against humanity in that form. Furthermore, the document addresses the Security Council to guide the international society in taking action against such crimes. The Security Council, however, is well known for its members’ veto power. Unanimous decisions are quite rare in the history of the Security Council.

The empirical evidence also shows that the norm of “responsibility to protect” still lacks the capacity of changing the state behavior. The practice of “responsibility to protect” is often unable to go beyond the condemnation of human rights violations by the Security Council. Within the context provided by the responsibility to protect, the international society took timely and decisive actions merely in Libya and in Ivory Coast. However, the Security Council has not taken any decision to take action against the similar threats in Yemen, Syria, and Central African Republic. The responsibility to protect is a starting point for establishing the norm of respect to human rights. However, that norm has not been established yet since the state behavior has not changed accordingly.

Foundation of the International Criminal Court can also be regarded as another example of the implementation of the human rights standards in the international society. Some scholars even argue that the establishment of this court means the

emergence of the “world society” in the international relations (Ralph 2007). The court has been founded by the Rome Statute in 2002. The primary goal of the court is to try persons who accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. By 2015, 123 states ratified the Rome Statute, which gives the court a large legal basis within the international society. The International Criminal Court does not have the right to prosecute states. Nevertheless, it has right to find guilty persons who are responsible for such crimes. The court can also impose punishments upon those persons by using the enforcement mechanisms of the signatory states.

The existence and legal structure of the court might represent evidence for the emergence of the norm of “respect to human rights” in the international society. However, the jurisdiction of the court is not universal. Here, this means the court can only exercise jurisdiction if the accused is a national of a signatory state of the Rome Statute or the national of a state accepting the jurisdiction of the court. The court can also judge persons if the alleged crime took place on the territory of a signatory state. The court can only judge a person irrespective of his/her nationality and the location of the crime, if the U.N. Security Council refers the situation to the prosecutor (Rome Statute, art. 12.2; art. 13.b). Therefore, persons in non-signatory countries can still commit these crimes with impunity. In fact, during the preparation of the Rome Statute, some countries are reported to have asked for universal jurisdiction of the court. However, many others objected because of the excessive threat to national sovereignty that International Criminal Court with a universal jurisdiction could possess (Goldsmith 2003, 91). In its current conditions, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over the non-signatory countries’ citizens unless Security Council refers the situation. This enables perpetrators to use national sovereignty as a shield against accusations of human rights violations. For this reason, absolute and mutually exclusive sovereignty is still the biggest obstacle in front of the universal standards for taking action against human rights violators.

Norms also include a sense of “ought.” Regarding this, appropriateness can also be a key factor in explaining the norm change in the modern international relations. In

the contemporary state system, human rights violations are definitely not seen as an appropriate behavior. Most of the nation-states condemn human rights violators. There is also a growing tendency in the international society to clearly define and secure the rights of individuals by international agreements. By the year 2015, 130 out of 193 member states of the U.N. have signed and ratified ten or more of the total eighteen international human rights treaties (The United Nations, 2015). This can represent how members of the U.N. have taken the human rights seriously. Furthermore, by signing and ratifying the international human rights agreements, nation-states also accept obligations for following the standards set in these documents. Thus, it can be asserted that violating human rights are not regarded as an appropriate type of behavior in the international society.

As the theoretical framework for the international norm change suggests, state behavior is key for detecting the norm change. This simply means a country should also act according to the international human rights agreements that it have previously signed and ratified. However, similar to the examples given such as “responsibility to protect” and International Criminal Court, there is a lack of harmony between the state practice and the articles of international human rights agreements. Freedom House’s annual reports, in this context, provide very useful statistical data to compare the state practice and the obligations documented in human rights agreements. The freedom report of 2015²⁷ (Freedom House, 2015) represents an incompatibility between the number of human rights documents signed by a country and the freedoms enjoyed by its people. For instance, Russia signed and ratified eleven out of eighteen international human rights agreements. Nonetheless, in that report, the country is categorized as “not free” with the rating of six. The U.S.A. is defined as “free” with the rating of one, although the country only signed five out of eighteen human rights agreements. Uzbekistan ratified ten human rights agreements, but it is classified as “worst of the worst” with the rating of seven. India, on the other hand, signed only eight human rights treaties; however

²⁷ This annual report gives each country a rating between 1 and 7, on the basis of rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enjoyed by the population of that country. In this scale 1 indicates the most free and 7 indicates the least free countries. Countries are categorized as free, partly free, not free and worst of the worst according to their ratings.

it is defined as “free” with the rating of two point five. This empirically shows that there is not a direct correlation between the number of human rights treaties signed and the human rights enjoyed in a particular country. Therefore, human rights agreements are providing a basis for the norm of “respect to human rights” in the international society, but they do not guarantee individuals to enjoy the human rights.

States do not only individually resist the emergence of the solidarist practices in the international society. In fact, the modern international society is collectively structured against any type of a cosmopolitan value. In this sense, two fundamental mechanisms of the international society hinder human rights from working as standards of behavior. The first one is the institutions of the modern international society. Institutions, such as the balance of power and great power management usually work against the establishment of standards in international society to react against human rights violations. That is why the secretary-general of the Amnesty International, Salil Shetty, is right when complaining about the Security Council’s veto system for hamstringing the ability of the U.N. to fight with crimes against humanity (Shetty, 2015). It is true that the Security Council prefers following the practices of the international society, instead of respecting the human rights. For instance, any resolution that might imply humanitarian intervention in Syria is consistently vetoed by Russia and China in the Security Council. Furthermore, this case is not something new. Between 1974 and 1988, several Security Council decisions against Apartheid South Africa were also vetoed by the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom. These vetoes²⁸ clearly show that the members of the Security Council usually blocks decisions concerning human rights issues in order to follow the requirements of the institutions such as the balance of power.

National interest can be regarded as the second mechanism that prevents human rights to be established as the norm of the international society. States usually prefer to ignore the human rights violations if their national interests are at stake. For example, Saudi Arabia, which is known by its terrible human rights record, is the

²⁸ For a detailed list of vetoes in the Security Council please see. <http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>

biggest Middle Eastern ally of the U.S.A., one of the most democratic and liberal countries in the modern international society. This simply means that in the modern international society, sovereign-states pursue their national interests and act according to the balance of power, instead of following human rights norms. Thus, against the institutions that are founded on the common values shared between the individuals, international society has its own practices and institutions.

The principle of respect to human rights is not just marginalized in particular states' foreign policy, but it is often ignored as a value. The recent refugee crisis that Europe faces is a good example of this. Europe is traditionally accepted as the heart of liberalism and humanism. Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights totally represents a summary of the Western values. "Right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution" (The United Nations, 1948, art. 14.1) is accepted as a human right in this document, which should be enjoyed by all humanity. However, the way that Europe deals with the refugee surge across its borders is almost completely against to the principles which are named as the Western values. In a recent deal between the EU and Turkey, it is agreed that the EU will pay three billion dollars to Turkey in order to help the country to prevent Syrian migrants from crossing the Aegean Sea. According to an online article published in BBC website on November 29, 2015 Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, on the other hand, described the agreement as a "historic day" since the agreement may provide the right to the Turkish citizens to travel without visas to the Schengen zone. This agreement is a concrete example of how states, even the most westernized, democratic and humanitarian ones, are selective in accepting the human rights as a value. For the same reason, a vast majority of great powers have joined the military operations against the growing threat of ISIS in the Europe. However, the same great powers were unwilling to suppress the Syrian government forces which also accused of gross human rights violations in the country.

In sum, nation-states are still pretty much jealous of their sovereignty even though the human rights regimes continue to deepen. Some argue that efforts of the AI have transformed and developed the norm of non-intervention and sovereign inviolability (Clark 2001, 5). Some others also admit that it is quite hard to measure

the success of an organization such as the AI. For this reason, partial success of the AI does not necessarily diminish the worth of its efforts (Thakur 1994, 150). It is true that several organs have been established within the U.N. to set standards for the human rights, and to call nation-states to take action against human rights violations. It is also well known that organizations such as the AI have gained particular success in drawing the attention of international community to specific human rights violations. However, although many nation-states have accepted international human rights agreements, they retained the right to implement internationally accepted standards of human rights within their borders (Donnelly 2014, 229; Clark 2001, 3). Still, humanitarian intervention is emerging as a norm for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Nevertheless, state sovereignty continues to provide shelter to human rights violators. Moreover, humanitarian intervention remains as a right of international society rather than being an obligation (Donnelly 2014, 232). In other words, there is still no authority over sovereign-states to implement internationally accepted standards of human rights in international relations. The close connection with norms and sanctions shows us that international standards for the human rights can be recognized as a norm in international society; nonetheless, enforcement mechanisms for this norm are still missing. Therefore, the existing norms of the modern international society such as non-intervention and exclusive sovereignty are not replaced with “respect to human rights” and humanitarian intervention. In this context, the AI as an ideational world society element can be regarded as inefficient in promoting its values as a new norm of the international society.

5.4. International Chamber of Commerce as a Functional World Society Element

Functional world society elements are founded on the common interests of their members. Unlike the ideational world society elements, functional world society elements do not seek to transform the functioning mechanisms of the international relations according to their values. These non-state elements, rather, focus on the functioning of a particular sphere of international relations in order to control that

sphere. Here, controlling a sphere of international relations simply implies keeping the state and the institutions of the international society out of that sphere. A non-state actor, for instance, can be regarded as a functional world society element for setting the worldwide standards for civil aviation on the basis of its members' interests. National interests of the governments, in this example, would not be represented in those standards. The ICC, in terms of this definition, qualifies as a functional world society element.

The ICC was founded in 1919 by a group of entrepreneurs in order to represent businessmen in international politics in the aftermath of the First World War's devastation. These businessmen have defined themselves as the "merchants of peace" in accordance with the Wilson principles which were assumed to be the cornerstones of the new world order in the beginning of the twentieth century (International Chamber of Commerce 2015a). In its first years, the organization was strongly supporting the idea that liberal values could bring along the peace in a world scale. In line with this idea, the organization vehemently opposed the mercantilist policies of the states in the interwar period. However, in fact, the organization was in pursuit of a world trade system, which would have the capacity for establishing the rules of the international trade and for abolishing the trade barriers (Kelly 2005, 259). After the end of the First World War, there was almost no functioning international mechanism. The ICC, for this reason, was trying to establish a mechanism and institutions to govern international trade. Today, the organization still provides standards for international trade, counseling services for governments and intergovernmental agencies, and arbitration services for its members.

In the preamble of its constitution, the ICC's objective is defined as "to further the development of an open world economy with the firm conviction that international commercial exchanges are conducive to both greater global prosperity and peace among nations" (International Chamber of Commerce 2015b, preamble). It is also stated that the organization is committed to fighting all forms of protectionism. In order to achieve this objective, the organization aims to eliminate obstacles to the international commerce. Other purposes of the organization are promoting the

market economy system and free competition and the fostering economic growth and integration worldwide. The ICC, from the first day of its foundation, aimed at representing the businessmen's interest in free trade. Even in a congress held in 1937 in the Nazi Germany, the organization adopted a resolution to work in order to mitigate all trade barriers in the world (Anonymous, 1937, 14-15).

According to its objectives defined in its statute, the ICC is only interested in the main principles of the international trade. The organization does not have any concern on the structure of international relations. The international structure might be a hierarchy, a solidarist version of international society, suzerainty or anarchy as long as international trade is constituted according to the principle of free trade. In other words, the organization only focuses on the interests of a defined group of people. It further tries to mobilize these interest-seeking people in order to establish trade openness as the main principle of the international trade (Wilk 1940, 245).

The membership profile of the organization is composed of international traders and businessmen. The organization, in this sense, is in pure civil character. More importantly, the statute of the organization sets the criteria for membership as "sharing the objectives as set forth in the preamble" (International Chamber of Commerce 2015b, art. 2.1). As the objective of the organization defined as promoting free trade and removing all types of trade barriers, a person, an association or a company has to share these objectives in order to be accepted as a member. An Indonesian corn trader, for instance, cannot be accepted as a member of the organization, if it aims to maximize its profit by getting higher customs for corn import to the Indonesia. The organization, thus, is a functional world society element for defining its membership criteria as sharing the common interest of free trade all around the world.

5.5. Institutions of International Chamber of Commerce and the Structure of International Trade in the Modern International Society

ICC has institutions that are founded on the common interests of its members. These institutions basically aim to establish the free trade as the main feature of the international trade structure. Moreover, these institutions do not only facilitate the relationship between the international society and the organization, but they also harmonize the interests and resolve the disputes among the members of the ICC. These institutions are established as a result of common practices among the members. There are two basic institutions of the ICC; mediation and consultative status.

The primary aim of the mediation institution is to mediate and harmonize the different interests of the members. The institution has various mechanisms within it such as arbitration, standards or international commercial terms (incoterms), and world congress. The arbitration mechanism especially serves the aims of the organization by providing a legal area independent of the jurisdiction of a state. Arbitration is a mechanism that is founded to resolve the disputes between businessmen in their international trade activities. It is usually preferred by the businessmen in their disputes because of its impartiality and efficiency.²⁹ The arbitration mechanism also provides a basis to remove the problems that could stem from the different legal mechanisms of the different countries. In other words, the arbitration mechanism is universal. However, it is also international since it has no authority over the international laws of arbitration (Derains 1985, 592).

Basically, the arbitration functions as a court with binding decisions. The significance of the arbitration mechanism from the theoretical viewpoint of this study is its function as a non-state jurisdiction area. The arbitration mechanism, in this respect, allows the members of the organization to resolve the disputes among them without being interfered by the jurisdiction of a state. Since the modern

²⁹ Since 1923, the arbitration mechanism has administrated more than twenty thousand cases (ICC website, <http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/> 09/12/2015).

international society is founded in a way to give states unlimited sovereignty rights over every action taking place within their territories, leaving the dispute resolution to the states would harm the interests of the members of the ICC. A court in the Venezuela, for example, might take a decision according to the national interest of the Venezuelan government, in a dispute between two foreign companies that taken place within its territory. The arbitration mechanism, therefore, allows the members of the ICC to resolve the disputes among them without being interfered by a sovereign-state.

Incoterms, or standards of international trade, is the second mechanism of the institution of mediation. Incoterms simply means the common terms, regulations, and definitions that members of the organization use for international trade agreements. These terms both define the main standards of the international trade, such as measurement units, and provide the accepted rules and definitions of the international trade. By this mechanism, the ICC set supranational standards for its members. Moreover, it provides the rules of the trade internationally. Since the organization is a functional world society element, by incoterms, the ICC aims to regulate the international trade among its members without being subjected to the standards of any country.

The third mechanism, namely world congress, is simply designed to harmonize the interests of the members of the organization. Exchanging ideas, building networks and harmonizing different views on the nature of the free trade are pretty important for the organization as there is a great diversity among the members of the ICC. Moreover, the links between the interests of the members are strengthened by such meetings. The mechanism also enhances the reconciliation of interest among the different members. Therefore, the congresses help the ICC to decide the strategies that it will follow when seeking the main interest of establishing the free trade.

The other institution that the ICC has built upon the common interests of its members is the consultative status in intergovernmental agencies. The organization has a special consultative status in the U.N. since 1946. Before the foundation of the U.N., the organization had close ties also with the League of Nations. Within the

League of Nations system, the ICC was cooperating with the organization by making formal or informal contacts with the representatives of the member states as well as officials of the League of Nations. Particularly, the ICC was providing information about the issues concerning the international trade. Moreover, the ICC was taking action in the preparation of critical decisions on the international trade within the League of Nations system (Wilk 1940, 232). ,

The role that the ICC plays at the U.N. is not fundamentally different than its role within the League of Nations system. The organization attends some of the meetings that are related to the international trade. It also does lobby activities to the representatives of the states, and presents reports summarizing the views of international businessmen on trade-related issues. The consultative status of the organization enables it to canalize the interests of the business people to the governing mechanisms of the modern international society. In this sense, the function of the consultative status of the organization is same with the AI's. Since the international relations of the modern world is restricted to the states, consultative status allows the ICC to represent its members' interests in the international society.

In addition to its consultative status at the U.N., the organization also works together with intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, International Labor Organization, the OECD and the WTO. Particularly, its engagement with the WTO is an important institutional mechanism for the ICC given that the WTO is the main intergovernmental governing mechanism of the international trade. The ICC usually attends to the public forums of the WTO and submits reports to the organization in order to represent the views and the ideas of the businessmen on world trade. Moreover, a parallel institution to the G20, named B20 helps the organization's members to make direct contact with the world's biggest twenty economies' leaders. National committees of the organization also target national governments to promote the free trade, as the general committee of the ICC does in the international level (Kelly 2005, 267).

In sum, the institutions of the ICC are designed to achieve the aim of establishing free trade as the main principle of international trade structure. In the introduction, two criteria set for assessing the influence of such interest-seeking world society elements. The functional world society elements aim to control a specific sphere of international relations. The impact of a functional world society element on the international system/international society, thus, can be assessed in line with its success in controlling that sphere. In other words, if the international trade is controlled by the businessmen, or by the ICC, then, the organization is an effective world society element. In this case, the rules and the general principles of international trade are the main concern. The efficiency of a functional world society element can also be assessed by analyzing its aims. The main aim of the ICC is removing all kinds of barriers hindering the international trade. Therefore, if the members of the organization can trade freely, without being interfered by states and their institutions, the ICC will be regarded as an influential world society element. However, the empirical evidence shows that the ICC is not an influential world society element with respect to the both of the criteria. The international trade is neither free nor controlled by businessmen. This is because states still have intact mechanisms to stop the flow of goods at any time and principles of the international trade are determined by intergovernmental institutions.

Analyzing the general status of the international trade is a good starting point in order to assess whether the ICC reached its aim of establishing free trade. Although there is not a general trend in the structure of the international trade in the last two centuries, it is usually argued that there is a strong tendency among states for removing the trade restrictions in the last fifty years. The last quarter of the nineteenth century was the lower tariffs period while the beginning of the twentieth century international trade structure was more and more mercantilist. The interwar period, on the other hand, was the era of strict protectionism. The tide of the international trade structure after the end of the Second World War turned towards loosening the trade restrictions. 1948 GATT marks the beginning of a less protectionist era in the world trade. However, as the 2013 annual report of the WTO (World Trade Organization 2013, 53) indicates, the process of trade liberalization

was uneven between 1945 and to 2000s. Nevertheless, with the help of the 1986 Uruguay Round and the foundation of the WTO in 1995, “trade liberalization” has become the motto of the last three decades. In fact, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the aim of removing the tariffs has gained a great success. Today, bound tariff rates in the industrialized countries are extremely low. Moreover, there are even no-tariff zones in the world trade system like the EU. Thus, the aims of the ICC and the structure of the international trade seem symmetrical.

According to Milner (1999, 95-107), particularly after the 1980s, states had three primary motivations for removing the tariffs and other trade restrictions. First, trade policy preferences among domestic actors have changed in a way to support free trade. These domestic actors have acknowledged the advantages that free trade could bring to their countries. Therefore, they have started to implement policies in favor of the free trade. Second, changes in the political institutions enabled such a policy change. Democratization wave in the world after the 1990s transformed institutions of the state and therefore, these institutions have been reformed in a way to embrace trade liberalization. This view is also in line with the often voiced argument in the political economy literature that democracies tend to remove the trade barriers, particularly in their trade relations with each other (Bliss and Russett 1998; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorf 2000; Milner and Kubota 2005; Peterson and Thies 2014). Thus, the trade will be freer as long as states continue to be democratized. Third, the change in the international political system has given rise to the rush to free trade in international politics. Institutions and agreements such as GATT, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, General Agreement on Trade in Services, and WTO have a positive effect on the removal of the trade barriers. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the U.S.S.R. facilitated the free trade.

Although international trade structure is moving towards to a freer trade area, from the very beginning the ICC has faced serious resistance from the states in reaching its aim. According to the organization, different forms of protectionism have presented powerful challenges to the ICC in reaching its aims, particularly in the last three decades. For instance, in the 1980s, the spokesperson of the organization

complains about the barriers that states set in front of the free flow of goods, despite all the efforts of the organization (Gingold and Blackaway 1982, 34). At the end of the 1990s, the secretary-general of the ICC also argues that quantitative restrictions and anti-dumping measures negatively affect the exports especially in developing countries (Cattai 1999, 44). The organization today continues to criticize the trade restrictions, particularly the protectionism in the form of technical and localization³⁰ barriers (International Chamber of Commerce 2014a, 1-2).

The continuous complaints of the ICC are quite striking because the market economy, which facilitates freer trade, prevailed against its ideological competitors after the end of the Cold War. The value of the world trade has increased ninefold between 1980 and 2011. The removal of tariffs has remarkably contributed to this expansion (World Trade Organization 2013, 55). Moreover, all the main governing bodies of the international trade are founded on the principle of free trade. The WTO stands for principles such as non-discrimination between foreign and local products as well as between trading partners, more open and more competitive trade (World Trade Organization 2015b). However, despite the existence of these principles, and although world trade has expanded both in terms of volume and value, protectionism in other forms continues to exist. This is why the current structure of international trade is not seen satisfactory by the ICC.

Nations states' persistence on the trade barriers is also scrutinized by some scholars. For instance, according to Krasner, free trade is not the norm of the international trade structure (Krasner 1976, 318-324). Despite all the economic and political gains that free trade could provide to the state, Krasner argues, nation-states are inclined to implement protectionist economic policies. This is because the state seeks a broad range of interests such as political power, aggregate national income, economic growth and social stability. The structure of international trade has a significant influence over these interests. The size of a country can also have positive or negative effects on the pursuit of these interests. Therefore, it is not possible for all states to benefit from the free trade. Some states, particularly bigger

³⁰ Localization barriers defines the policies mandating a certain percentage of local content in products, or rules that require companies to localize activities.

states, would continue to seek protectionist policies. Similarly, Barfield (2001, 410) claims that the structure of the international trade is quite compatible with the absolute sovereignty principle of the modern international society. All international trade organizations are built upon a government to government basis. These intergovernmental bodies encourage states seeking their national interests rather than following win-win policies. The international trade, especially with regard to its intergovernmental structure, is determined by states in the modern international society.

Reports on the structure of the international trade support the arguments of these scholars. These reports portray how non-tariff measurements have increased in the last two decades both in terms of the number of the products covered and in terms of the number of the countries utilizing them (World Trade Organization 2013, 56). Contrary to the growth in the volume of the world trade, and despite the low tariff policies, international trade structure is still far from being totally free. In fact, trade barriers still stay almost intact in order to be used by states within the structure of the WTO. For instance, in 2014, technical barriers to the trade were the highest since the foundation of the WTO. Moreover, nation-states invent new types of non-tariff barriers every year (World Trade Organization 2015a, 16). Trade-restrictive measures have grown fourfold between 2010 and 2014 (World Trade Organization 2015a, 83). The WTO (2015a, 82) statistics indicate that the number of trade restrictive measures per month is also at its highest level.

The members of the ICC also see the non-tariff measures as the new barriers to the international trade. According to a recent survey among those businessmen, the most burdensome barriers to the international trade are customs delays, unnecessary inspections, physical examinations, and licenses together with the duties, (International Chamber of Commerce 2014b, 6-7). As the WTO and ICC reports indicate, the tariffs have been replaced by non-tariff measurements. In other words, the empirical evidence also supports the view that nation-states still have measures other than tariffs, in order to control the flow of goods.

One can propound that the structure of the international society impedes the establishment of openness as the main principle of international trade. As I mentioned, the modern international society is founded on the principle of mutually exclusive sovereignty. Nation-states, therefore, aim to control the flow of goods across their borders, given that they have full authority over their territories. Particularly for that reason, trade barriers are usually seen by states as an extension of their sovereignty rights. Based on this, governments have the right to outlaw the trading of some goods in their territories. Governments, furthermore, often utilize these trade barriers as foreign policy instruments. That is why governments sometimes ban companies from trading with a particular country. For instance, it is not possible for an American oil company to sell its products to a North Korean firm or a German building contractor cannot build a nuclear plant in Iran.

Gowa and Mansfield (1993) empirically prove that alliances between countries have a significant positive effect on the trade flows. In other words, allies are inclined to improve trade among them. Thus, state preferences have a significant effect on the flow of goods. That is why economic dimension of the bilateral relations between states is among the first things that are strongly affected by the conflicts among countries. The recent crisis between Russia and Turkey is a very good example of this. Russia has quickly reacted to the downing of its military jet by Turkey by banning Russian companies from trading with their Turkish partners. The Russian government, for instance, have banned the imports of vegetables and fruits from Turkey. It also banned Russian tourism agencies to sell touristic travel tours to Turkey. These examples show how the free trade principle is fragile when it is applied to the modern international relations. Nation-states, nearly in any case, continue to put their national interests in front of the principle of free trade.

The economically integrated world also urges nation-states to control the flow of goods. Since any economic activity in a country affects others, states usually intend to take possible measures in order to minimize the effects of economic changes in other parts of the world. The globally integrated world also has its repercussions on the international trade. Our world today is so economically integrated that a small change in the volume of trade in a remote part of the world may have significant

effects on the others. That states do not implement mercantilist policies in today's liberally governed world is obvious. However, they use other measures in order to minimize the effects of the changes in the global economy. Therefore, global character of the modern international society has a twofold effect on the international trade. On the one hand, it facilitates the flow of goods by providing wide-reaching transportation and communication lines. On the other hand, globalism transforms international trade into a national interest area for governments. As a result, governments are more inclined to intervene into the international trade.

The main features of a nation-state also hinder the trade openness. As I mentioned, the nation-state is the most centralized polity in the history. The national economy is not free from the effects of the centralization of government mechanisms in a nation-state. That is why a great majority of nation-states have various instruments to control their national economy. These instruments including government spending, tax regulations, fiscal policies, and national standards for manufacturing are widely used by governments to frame the trajectory of their economies. From the perspective of the trade openness, one can argue that a governmental decision on the national economy would naturally affect the free flow of goods. For example, an intervention in the foreign exchange markets by the central bank of a country can have a great impact on both exports and imports. Hence, nation-states also have internal means to control the trade.

The centrality of nation-state also impedes the free flow of goods for applying the same principles to the whole country. For instance, the conditions of the Izmir harbor in terms of climate, hinterland, demand, volume of production and population is pretty different than the conditions of the customs gate in Gürbulak/Ağrı. Applying the same standards and principles to these two different ports of entry to Turkey inevitably would be at variance with the local conditions. Thus, not just the structure of international society, but also the features of nation-state obstruct the establishment of free trade.

In fact, the nation-states are able to control the flow of goods because the international trading structure is established by them. The WTO, in this sense, is not founded by governments merely with the aim of establishing free trade. It is rather founded to control all the mechanisms that govern the international trade. The establishment of the WTO stands on the Uruguay Round. According to the WTO (World Trade Organization 2015c) website, during these negotiations, governments have discussed almost everything that is related to trade, “from toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, from the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatments.” This simply shows the concern of governments even on the minor details of the international trade. The organs of the WTO, such as dispute settlement, anti-dumping, and safeguard mechanisms are also founded on intergovernmental basis. In other words, these WTO mechanisms are founded by governments in order to order the trade relations among them. Hence, the international trade is governed by the WTO and the WTO is governed by the nation-states.

5.6. Concluding Remarks

This chapter sought to represent the relationship between the organizing principles of the modern international society and the aims of modern world society elements. The AI’s ability to establish human rights as the norm of international relations is limited because of the organizing principles of the modern international society. Nation-states are still jealous of their sovereignty. They simply do not want to renounce their sovereignty in order to secure their citizens’ rights. The modern international society is also unwilling to act against human rights violations. Rather than establishing justice, the modern international society prefers to protect the society of states itself. Therefore, the AI, in particular, and human rights, in general, are not effective ideational world society elements.

Based on the same reason, the ICC is not able to control the international trade. International trade is often conceived as another area of power politics by the nation-states. Governments of these nation-states, thus, do not want to give up their

trade restrictive measures. The international trade structure is also governed by nation-states via intergovernmental organizations. To put it differently, international trade is free to the degree that nation-states desire it to be. Non-state actors are only accepted as observers to the governmental bodies of the international trade. Therefore, they neither able to control the flow of goods nor have the capacity to shape international trade principles. ICC, in this sense, is not an effective functional world society element.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation sought to show that the impact of the world society elements on international system/international society was much greater in the pre-modern international relations than their effect on the modern. In order to support this argument with historical evidence, its main aim was to compare and contrast different forms of non-state activity in the different periods of history. This kind of an inquiry inevitably requires a comprehensive approach. On the one hand, it requires concepts to understand and explain how separate political units conduct relations with each other. On the other hand, it necessitates concepts to understand and examine how different individuals and groups of individuals are organized around an idea, value, belief or interest that transcends the realm of states. Moreover, this kind of an inquiry also requires a theory to analyze how these two dimensions interact.

The English School theory already has an inbuilt mechanism to carry out such an inquiry. In this context, the core argument of the English School can be summarized in three points. International relations is composed of the international system, the international society, and the world society. The interaction among them constitutes the international reality. These three dimensions are not distinct entities from each other; to the contrary, they are cross-fertilized and interwoven. In this formula, the international system describes a non-voluntary relationship among states while the international society defines a voluntary and rule bounded type of social relationship. World society identifies a dimension of international relations where individuals and grouping of individuals can build institutions and rules upon their

common values and common interests. The English School theory, in this sense, has concepts which have the capacity to define the social relationships among states as well as the social relationships among non-state actors separately. The English School also has the analytical framework to understand and explain the interaction between these three dimensions. That is why the English School theory has been adopted in this study.

However, the existing version of the English School's world society concept was not able to provide much analytical leverage for this dissertation's purposes as it stands, since it was limited to the analysis of the possible effects of the cosmopolitan conception of humanity on the modern international society. The world society conceptualization needed to be developed in a way to include all forms of non-state activity in the international relations. In line with this purpose, I have added the non-global and non-cosmopolitan dimensions to the world society concept in order to widen its scope. While the non-global dimension has enabled concept to analyze the non-state activities that occur at a sub-global scale, the non-cosmopolitan dimension has allowed the approach to examine interest-seeking non-state actors.

In order to compare and contrast different types of world society elements in the different periods of history, I have introduced the distinction between the ideational and the functional world society elements. This distinction is based on the two features of the world society elements; their aims and the commonality among their members. The world society elements that are built upon the common interests of their members are named as functional world society elements. These elements aim to control a specific sphere of the international relations. They do not have purposes such as changing the main dynamics of the international system/international society. The second type, namely ideational world society elements, is founded on the common values among individuals. Ideational world society elements' main objective is to reshape the international system/international society by promoting new norms.

Based on this distinction, the world society approach is adopted to investigate the differences in the various world society elements' impacts on the international system/international society dimension of the international relations. The Roman Catholic Church, in this context, is defined as a pre-modern ideational world society element. The Roman Catholic Church was built upon the cosmopolitan values of Christianity. The main purpose of this organization was to establish its supremacy and Christian unity in the medieval Europe. In order to change the norms of the medieval international relations according to its purposes, the Church has built institutions such as excommunication, coronation, crusades and investiture upon the shared values of its members. The AI, on the other hand, is identified as the modern example of an ideational world society element. The members of the AI share the human rights as a common value of humanity. The organization aims to establish human rights as the main norm of the modern international society by using the institutions such as naming and shaming and consultative status in intergovernmental organizations.

According to the theoretical framework of this study, there are many similarities between these two organizations. They both aim to reshape international relations by promoting new norms. The Roman Catholic Church was promoting its values in order to establish a hierarchy in the medieval Europe. The AI, on the other hand, seeks to transform the pluralist foundational principles of the modern global international society into solidarism against human rights violations.

The detailed explanation of the aims, cosmopolitan values, and institutions of these ideational world society elements clearly showed that the impact of the Roman Catholic Church was much more on the pre-modern international relations than the AI's impact on the modern international society. In the both time periods, the new norm promoted by the ideational world society element is in conflict with the existing norms of the international society. In other words, promotion of a new norm by the ideational world society element is resisted by the other norms that were already operational in the international relations. In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, the existing norm of the medieval international relations was the independence of the secular rulers. Before the demise of the Carolingian Empire,

lay rulers were in a much higher position than the clergy in the politics. In fact, secular rulers were able to control the Church. Moreover, in the late ninth century, the empire was divided between several lay rulers, which were in no intention to unite. Thus, the Church's aim to establish Christian unity and its supremacy were in conflict with the dynamics of the medieval relations among the secular rulers.

In the case of the AI, the conflicting norms were the human rights and the non-intervention principle. Especially after the end of the nineteenth century, the international society has evolved through an extreme pluralist direction. As a result, the modern society of states is founded on the principle of mutually exclusive and absolute sovereignty. The primary norm of the modern international society still continues to be the non-intervention principle. Therefore, in the both cases, the new norm promoted by the ideational world society element challenges the existing norm of the state system. In the pre-modern case, the main value of the Church, unity under its leadership, opposed the operating mechanism of the state system. In the modern case, the norm promoted is respect to human rights which is in contradiction with the exclusive sovereignty principle of the states.

A comparison between the Roman Catholic Church and the AI represents that the norm change has only occurred in the pre-modern international relations. The Church's institutions were more effective than the AI's in promoting the new norm. Moreover, the political actors of the medieval international relations were respecting the Church's supremacy and Christian unity in their international actions. For instance, the kings and the princes of the medieval Europe were taking part in the crusades. They were also coronated by clergy. Any action against the Church was punished with excommunication. Excommunication, for these rulers, had serious negative consequences both in the domestic politics and in the international affairs. As these examples indicate, the norm of the medieval international relations was the Church's supremacy and Christian unity. To put it differently, the rulers of the medieval Europe were united under the leadership of the Church. Contrary to the modern international relations where values of individuals are subordinated to the values of states, Christianity was the basic code of both social life and of the international relations.

However, the foundational norms of the modern international society remain intact. The non-intervention principle and absolute and exclusive sovereignty are still the norms of the modern international society. Although human rights regimes are accepted by a majority of the states, there is not enough evidence to assert that they respect human rights in their international relations. It is clear that nation-states put their national interests in front of the human rights. There are several attempts in the modern international society to establish institutions, such as initiating the project of “responsibility to protect” or founding the International Criminal Court, in order to set standards for state action in respect to human rights. Nevertheless, such initiatives are far from changing the state conduct. Nation-states continue to act according to the principles of exclusive sovereignty and non-intervention. The modern international society also prefers to protect its main principles rather than securing individual’s rights. The institutions such as the balance of power and diplomacy work in a way to keep the states separate. Therefore, cosmopolitan values such as human rights are subordinated to the state sovereignty in the modern international relations. Norm change, in this case, has taken place.

The institutions of the AI, though they are less apparent than the institutions of the Roman Catholic Church, canalize the demands of individuals (or non-state actors in general) for justice to the international society. While the Roman Catholic Church was in direct contact with the state system of the medieval Europe, individuals with human rights demands can only indirectly express their arguments. The modern international society is exclusive to nation-states. It is for this reason that the AI’s institutions do not have the capacity to shape state behavior. In contrast with the AI’s, The Church’s institutions were not merely the institutions of the world society dimension but they were also the institutions of the medieval European international relations. Therefore, these institutions were both regulating the social relationships among the individuals, and ordering the international relations among states. As the AI’s institutions could not penetrate into the society of states, the norms of the modern international relations have not changed. In other words, the outcome of the efforts of the AI, from an IR perspective, was not the establishment of a solidarist

international society. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, reshaped the medieval international relations and established a hierarchy.

According to the distinction between the shared values and shared interests in the world society conceptualization, the Hanseatic League is described as the pre-modern example of the functional world society elements. The Hanseatic League was founded on its members' shared interest in establishing a trade monopoly in the Northern Europe. The members of the Hanseatic League were also in pursuit of trading without being interfered by territorial rulers. The Hanseatic League sought to order the international trade of the northern Europe in the medieval by utilizing the institutions such as armed action and kontors. Similarly, the modern example of the functional world society element, the ICC, is founded on the common interest of businessmen. This common interest can be defined as freedom of trade. The main objective of the members of the ICC, in this context, is to minimize the effects of the state and state-related institutions in the international trade. In order to harmonize the interests of its members, the ICC uses the mediation mechanisms. The ICC utilizes its consultative status in several intergovernmental organizations to convince government officials to remove the barriers in front of the free flow of goods.

The Hanseatic League and the ICC have parallel motives and aims in terms of the theoretical framework that I suggested in the second chapter of this study. While the interest of the members of the Hanseatic League was establishing a monopoly and conducting trade freely in the northern Europe, for the members of the ICC, this interest is supporting the free trade as the main principle of international trade structure. Both of these aims require the minimization of the state control over the international trade. These two organizations also share the same features for not being interested in any type of value or norm that could reshape the main dynamics of the international relations. Neither the Hanseatic League nor the ICC pursues the adaptation of a value that transcends the realm of the state in the international relations. The promotion of peace is instrumental for securing the free trade for the ICC. Likewise, direct control of territorial dynasties was only a means for establishing a trade monopoly for the Hanseatic League. All of the political

maneuvers of these organizations, in this respect, are subjected to pursuing interest. Thus, the ICC can be regarded as the modern version of the Hanseatic League in terms of being founded on the common interests of its members.

A comparison between these two similar world society elements clearly shows that the Hanseatic League was more efficient than the ICC. The flow of goods in the medieval northern Europe was controlled by the Hanseatic League single-handedly. The organization was so strong that it was imposing embargos on countries. The ICC, on the other side, is the party that is affected by the trade barriers of the nation-states. Additionally, rules of international trade were laid down by the Hanseatic diets. The Hansetag had the authority to forbid sailing in winter, using non-Hanseatic measurement units, or trading of particular goods. In the modern international relations, all these regulations are implemented by nation-states or intergovernmental organizations such as the WTO. The Hansa was also able to trade in a foreign city by being completely free from the jurisdiction of its ruler. Moreover, the Hansa was so powerful that it embarked military missions against its competitors as well as territorial rulers. However, the ICC has none of these capacities. Other than lobbying, the ICC almost has no means to penetrate into the modern international society.

The Hanseatic League, therefore, was much more successful than the ICC in terms of achieving its objectives and controlling the international trade. In the northern Europe, the main transport line was controlled by the Hansa. By the help of the kontors and privileges, the Hansa wiped out almost all of its competitors and established a trade monopoly in the northern Europe. However, the international trade in the modern international society is not fully structured according to the principle of free trade. Nation-states still have various instruments to interrupt the free movement of goods whenever they want. It is true that they have abolished most of the tariffs; nevertheless, nation-states continue to invent new types of trade barriers.

The case studies have demonstrated that the arguments of this dissertation are well grounded. Both functional and ideational world society elements were more

effective in the pre-modern international relations than they are in modern. As I have described in detail, the same type of world society elements in different time periods have significant similarities. The primary difference between the modern and pre-modern world society elements are in terms of their effectiveness. The main reason for such a difference is not modern world society elements' disorganization or low capacity. To the contrary, in the modern international relations, individuals, or non-state actors in general, have much more instruments to come together and organize around a value or an interest. The reason for the marginal effect of modern world society elements is the structure of the international relations. While the pre-modern international relations was founded on the principle of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties over the same territory, the modern international relations is based on mutually exclusive sovereignty. The organizing principles of the pre-modern international relations create a suitable environment for world society elements to exert their influence over the international system/international society. This is because, the political units of the pre-modern international relations, that is to say, kingdoms, principalities, and castellanies, were less centralized, penetrating and controlling than the nation-states. This enables the individuals and groupings of individuals to establish more coherent links among them. A separating institution such as nationalism was also absent in the pre-modern international relations. Therefore, it was easier for individuals to gather around an interest or a cosmopolitan value.

One can argue that if the political and juridical power of polities increases the effectiveness of world society elements decreases. The comparison between the effectiveness of the world society elements in the pre-modern and modern international relations supports this argument. The analysis of the world society elements revealed that the type of polity and the extent of the state system's institutions are deterministic over the effectiveness of non-state actors. The research certainly represented that loose entities such as empire, dominion and suzerainty allow greater space in international politics for individual conduct than strict and penetrating entities such as nation-state and international anarchy. In addition, the geographical borders of the state system also have a large influence on the

effectiveness of world society elements. The global international society is so established and well-functioning that it allocates the international relations merely to the nation-states.

The institutions of the global international society also hinder the world society elements' impact. The modern international relations is established in a way to restrict the international realm to the states. Therefore, any value, interest, idea, belief, and/or action that has the capacity to transcend the realm of the state is tried to be internationalized by the nation-state and by the institutions of the modern international society. That is also for the same reason that the effectiveness of the pre-modern world society elements has dramatically decreased beginning from the fourteenth century. The emergence of strong monarchies in the medieval Europe inhibited the individuals from coming together in the international realm. The decline of the effectiveness of pre-modern world society elements, the Hanseatic League and the Roman Catholic Church in this study, also underscore the connection between the impact of world society elements and the characteristics of political units in an international system/international society. In sum, the institutions founded by penetrating and strong polities restrain the affecting ability of individuals and non-state actors.

The analyses of the pre-modern and modern examples of the world society elements also indicate that in the pre-modern international relations, world society dimension designates the international society dimension of international relations to a significant degree. For instance, in the medieval international relations, the Kingdom of Denmark's effectiveness on the international trade was determined by the Hanseatic League. However, in the modern international relations, the relationship between two nation-states, such as the relations between Russia and Turkey, determines the fate of free trade. Similarly, that is why the institutions of the Church, such as excommunication, prevailed against the institutions of the state system. The institutions such as the responsibility to protect or International Criminal Court, nevertheless, are of secondary importance compared to the institutions of the modern international society.

The case studies in this work also supported Bull's (1985, 41, 51) argument of international system, international society and world society coexist, but one of these dimensions may prevail in a particular point of history. In the pre-modern international relations, there were effective world society elements, but there were also distinct political units. However, the world society elements and institutions prevailed against the institutions that may be founded on the behavioral patterns created by states. The modern examples also represent that the functioning of the modern international society is not totally free from the impact of the world society elements. Although not as influential as the Church's, the values that the AI promotes definitely affect the functioning of the modern international society. The modern international society, for instance, tries to develop new instruments to deal with the increasing human rights demands. Similarly, states work together within the organizational body of WTO in order to satisfy some of the demands of the business world.

In this context, one can argue that the interaction between the world society and the international society underpins the key argument of the English School in two ways. Firstly, the historical evidence shows that the interaction between the different dimensions of international relations is not a linear relationship. That is to say, the structure of the international relations does not follow a course from international system to international society and from international society to world society. It can be clearly seen that world society elements were existent in the pre-modern international relations. Furthermore, they were much more effective than the modern world society elements. Therefore, the world society dimension of the international relations was available long before the foundation of the modern international society.

Secondly, the relationship between the world society and the international society is not a one-way relationship. In other words, it is not only the world society dimension that penetrates into the international society and transforms it. The vice versa is also true. As the analyses of the modern international society and the modern examples of the world society elements indicate, the organizational principle of the international society has a great impact on the dynamics of the

world society dimension. In other words, pre-modern examples of the world society elements shows that the international society dimension does not necessarily prevails against the other dimensions of international relations. The modern examples of the world society elements demonstrate the fact that the international society dimension is not independent of the dynamics of world society dimension. So “the international system, international society, and world society coexist” is not just a theoretical argument, but also a historical fact.

The analysis of the pre-modern world society elements also strengthens Wight’s (1977, 33) claim that all state systems are founded on a degree of cultural unity among its members. The profound impact of the Christianity and the Church on the foundational principles of the modern international society are non-negligible. Most of the institutions, practices, and dynamics of the medieval international relations evolved to the institutions, rules and laws of the modern international system. It is obvious that the unity established in the medieval Europe constitutes the background of the European international society. Thus, a world society can also provide a basis for the emergence of a state system.

The world society dimension of the international relations, in this framework, can be a good starting point for the analysis of how international anarchy transforms into a hierarchy or into a solidarist version of international society. The international society dimension, on the other hand, can provide various standpoints on the effects of world society elements. This dissertation sought to represent that world society is not a monolithic body. It has at least two different types of elements in it. To put it differently, interest-seeking and value-based types of world society elements have different effects on the international relations. This analytical viewpoint can also contribute to the studies of globalism. It is clear that globalism has different implications on the international relations. It is also well known that the role of the non-state actors gradually increasing after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, a distinction between the world society elements in terms of their aims can provide fruitful analysis of different non-state actors’ reactions to the globalism.

This study also shows that non-state actors do not necessarily act on a global scale. To put it differently, both global and non-global non-state actors exert influence on the dynamics of international relations. The case of the Roman Catholic Church clearly indicates that the geographically limited value-based world society elements may have more profound impact on the international relations than the global world society elements. The analysis of the Hanseatic League also shows that the interests shared between the particular people in a geographically limited area have the capacity to control a specific sphere of the international relations.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

DÜNYA TOPLUMU KAVRAMININ YENİDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Bu tezin ana amacı uluslararası ilişkilerin devlet dışı boyutunu kuramlaştırmaktır. Bu amaç çerçevesinde çalışma modern ve modern öncesi devlet dışı unsurları birbirleri ile karşılaştırmaktadır. Tezin ana savı modern öncesi devlet dışı unsurların, modern devlet dışı unsurlara göre uluslararası ilişkilerin belirli bir alanını kontrol etme ya da uluslararası ilişkilerin temel kaidelerini dönüştürme konusunda daha etkin ve başarılı olduğudur. Ulus devletin bir devlet türü olarak varlığı ve modern küresel uluslararası toplumun uluslararası ilişkilerin temel örgütlenme biçimi olarak mevcudiyeti, modern devlet dışı unsurların etkinliğini günümüz uluslararası ilişkilerinde baltalamaktadır.

Tez giriş ve sonuç dahil olmak üzere altı ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Çalışmanın birinci bölümü bu tezin temel çalışma sorusunu, iddiasını, literatüre katkısını ve inceleme yöntemini ele almaktadır. Çalışmanın ana sorunsalı, uluslararası ilişkilerin devlet boyutu ile devlet dışı boyutunun nasıl etkileştikleridir. Bu bağlamda iki yan soru daha sorulmaktadır. Bu sorulardan birincisi “devlet dışı unsurların uluslararası ilişkilere olan etkisi tarihin akışı içerisinde değişmekte midir?” iken, ikincisi, “eğer böyle bir değişim söz konusu ise bu devlet dışı unsurların etkilerinin değişiminin sebepleri nelerdir?” sorusudur.

Bu araştırma sorusunu cevaplayabilmek için, tez uluslararası ilişkilerde farklı tarihsel dönemlerdeki farklı devlet dışı unsurları birbirleri ile karşılaştırmaktadır. Bu kapsamda çalışmada, devletlerin (devlet bu çalışmada modern yönetim biçimi olan

ulus devleti tanımlamak için değil, genel olarak İngilizcede yönetim biçimini tanımlamak için kullanılan *polity* sözcüğü yerine kullanılmaktadır.) sınırlarını aşan her türlü fikir, değer, çıkar, inanç ve aktör birer dünya toplumu unsuru olarak tanımlanmıştır. Dünya toplumu ise, bu dünya toplumu unsurlarının hem birbirleri ile hem de uluslararası sistem ve uluslararası toplum ile etkileşim içerisinde bulundukları uluslararası ilişkiler boyutunu tanımlamaktadır.

Çalışma esasen modern ve modern öncesi dünya toplumu unsurlarını belirli kıstaslar çerçevesinde birbirleri ile karşılaştırarak, uluslararası ilişkilerin politik yapısının bu dünya toplumu unsurlarının etkinliklerini ne ölçüde etkilediğini araştırma amacı gütmüştür. Farklı tarihsel dönemler içerisinde var olmuş farklı dünya toplumu unsurları arasındaki karşılaştırma, bu tezde iki kıstas vasıtasıyla yapılmıştır. Değer temelli dünya toplumu unsurları norm değiştirmede ne kadar başarılı oldukları kıstası ile değerlendirilirken, çıkar temelli dünya toplumu unsurları uluslararası ilişkilerin belirli bir katmanını, örneğin ticaret gibi, kurumsal olarak ne derece kontrol edebildikleri kıstası ile değerlendirilmiştir.

Çalışma ana savını destekleme amacı ile Uluslararası İlişkilerde İngiliz Okulu olarak bilinen kuramsal yaklaşımı benimsemektedir. Bu kuramsal yaklaşımın temel ilkesi, uluslararası gerçekliğin tekil olmadığıdır. Başka bir deyişle İngiliz Okulu'na mensup düşünürlere göre uluslararası gerçeklik, uluslararası sistem, uluslararası toplum ve dünya toplumunun birbirleri ile etkileşiminin sonucunda oluşmaktadır. İngiliz Okulu düşüncesinde uluslararası sistem kavramı, devletler arasındaki mekanik olan, kurumsal ve normatif düzlemde gerçekleşmeyen sürekli ilişkileri nitelerken; uluslararası toplum kavramı, devletlerin ortak değer ve çıkarlar çerçevesinde kurdukları kurumlar ile ilişkilerini düzenlediklerini uluslararası ilişkilerdeki siyasal örgütlenme biçimini ifade etmektedir. İngiliz Okulu'na göre uluslararası toplumda bir üst otorite var olmasa dahi, başka bir deyişle uluslararası ilişkiler anarşik olsa dahi, devletler arasında düzen, kurumlar, kurallar ve değerler vasıtası ile kurulabilir; devletler arasında sosyal ilişkiler tesis edilebilir.

Dünya toplumu kavramı ise klasik İngiliz Okulu düşüncesinde, dünyadaki tüm insanlar arasındaki etkileşime dayanan, bu insanlar arasında paylaşılan ortak çıkar

ve deęerler anlayıřıdır. Bu ortak ıkar ve deęerler zerine insanlar arasında, daha genel bir ifade ile devlet dıřı unsurlarca, kurumlar ve kurallar inřa edilebilir. zetle uluslararası gereklik, devletler arası sistemik ve toplumsal iliřkiler ile insanlar arasındaki paylařılan ortak deęer ve ıkar temelli iliřkilerin birbirleri ile etkileřimlerinden oluřur.

Uluslararası sistem, uluslararası toplum ve dnya toplumu kavramları uluslararası iliřkilerin birbirlerinden hibir zaman tamamen ayrılamayacak, ancak farklı boyutlarını kuramlařtırmaktadırlar. Uluslararası sistem ve uluslararası toplum kavramları odaklarına devletler arası iliřkileri alırlarken, dnya toplumu kavramı uluslararası iliřkilerin devlet dıřı boyutuna eęilmektedir. Bu nedenle bu alıřmada dnya toplumu kavramından uluslararası iliřkilerin devlet dıřı boyutunu kuramlařtırırken faydalanılmıřtır. alıřmanın ana sorunsalı gereęince İngiliz Okulu kuramı erevesinde uluslararası iliřkilerin dnya toplumu boyutu ile, uluslararası sistem ve uluslararası toplum boyutlarının iliřkisi incelenecektir.

alıřmanın ikinci blm dnya toplumu kavramının var olan aıklamalarını incelemekte ve kavramı bu tezin amaları doęrultusunda revize etmektedir. İngiliz Okulu dřncesindeki dnya toplumu kavramı, uluslararası gereklięi oluřturan dięer iki kavram olan uluslararası sistem ve uluslararası toplum kavramlarına gre kuramsal olarak geliřtirilmemiř olarak yer almaktadır. Kavram oęunlukla modern uluslararası toplumdaki insan haklarının bir deęer olarak uluslararası iliřkilerin politik organizasyonu iin bir standart saęlayabileceęi grř erevesinde tartıřılmaktadır. Uluslararası toplumun dayanıřmacı bir versiyonunun tesi olarak grlen dnya toplumu, bu baęlamda varlıęı modern dnem ile sınırlı ve deęer odaklı bir kavramdır. Dahası, dnya toplumu kavramının var olan incelemeleri, İngiliz Okulu'nun temel tezlerinden olan "tarihin herhangi bir noktasında uluslararası sistem, uluslararası toplum ve dnya toplumu bir arada mevcutturlar, ancak bu boyutlardan biri dięerlerine baskın ıkabilir" (Bull 1985, 41) iddiasının aksine iřaret etmektedir. nk dnya toplumu kavramının var olan incelemeleri İngiliz Okulu'nun klasik argmanlarına aykırı olarak uluslararası sistem, uluslararası toplum ve dnya toplumu arasında doęrusal bir iliřki ngrmektedir. Bařka bir deyiřle bu incelemeler, uluslararası sistemin zamanla devletler arasında

oluşan ortak değer ve çıkarların kurumsallaşması ile uluslararası topluma, uluslararası toplumun da insanlar arasındaki ortak çıkar ve değerlerin kurumsallaşması ile dünya toplumuna evrileceğini üstü kapalı bir biçimde öne sürmektedirler. Bunun bir yansıması olarak var olan dünya toplumu kavramlaştırmalarının biri hariç tamamı, kavramı küresel olarak paylaşılan değerlerin –genellikle insan hakları– uluslararası toplumu dönüştürme potansiyelini tanımlamada kullanmaktadırlar.

Var olduğu hali ile dünya toplumu kavramı hem İngiliz Okulu’nun diğer kavramlarına göre en az gelişmiştir, hem de bu çalışmanın amaçlarına ile tam olarak uyuşmamaktadır. Ancak İngiliz Okulu’nun genel olarak uluslararası ilişkileri kuramlaştırması, uluslararası ilişkilerin farklı boyutlarını hem ayrı ayrı hem de birlikte inceleme olanağı sunduğu için tezin amaçları ile bire bir örtüşmektedir. Bu nedenle İngiliz Okulu’nun dünya toplumu kavramı iki ciddi revizyon ile tezin uluslararası ilişkilerin devlet dışı boyutunu kuramlaştırma çabasına uyarlanmıştır.

Bu revizyonlardan birincisi, küresel olmayan ancak devletleri aşan değer ve çıkarları da dünya toplumu unsurları olarak kabul eden bir dünya toplumu yaklaşımını benimsemektir. Başka bir deyişle çalışma, dünya toplumu kavramının tüm dünya üzerindeki insanlar tarafından paylaşılan değer ve çıkarlara ek olarak, bölgesel olarak paylaşılan değer ve çıkarları da tanımlamak için kullanılabileceğini iddia etmektedir. Bu şekilde kavramın kapsamı genişletilerek, dünya toplumunun küresel olmayan, ancak yine de geniş coğrafyalar ve geniş insan topluluklar tarafından paylaşılan çıkar ve değerleri tanımlamasını sağlamak amaçlanmaktadır.

İngiliz Okulu’nun tanımladığı dünya toplumu kavramına yapılan ikinci revizyon devlet dışı unsurları bir araya getiren değerler ile çıkarlar arasında yapılan ayrımdır. Bu ayrım çerçevesinde insanlar arasında paylaşılan ortak değerler temelli dünya toplumu unsurları “fikirsel dünya toplumu unsurları” olarak tanımlanırken, insanlar arasında paylaşılan çıkarlar temelli dünya toplumu unsurları ise “işlevsel dünya toplumu unsurları” olarak tanımlanmışlardır. Bu ayrım temelde bu dünya toplumu unsurlarının amaçlarındaki farklılıklara dayanmaktadır. Fikirsel dünya toplumu unsurları uluslararası ilişkilerin temel politik organizasyon biçimini kendi değer ve

normlarına göre dönüştürmeyi amaçlarken, işlevsel dünya toplumu unsurları uluslararası ilişkilerin belirli bir katmanını –örneğin ticaret, spor, bilim gibi– kontrol etmeyi amaçlarlar.

Dünya toplumu kavramına getirilen bu iki revizyonun başlıca amacı kavramın kapsamını genişleterek, uluslararası ilişkilerdeki her türlü devlet dışı aktiviteyi bu yaklaşım ile incelemeye olanak sunmaktır. Dünya toplumu kavramı daha önceki incelemelerinin aksine bu revizyonlar vasıtasıyla hem küresel olmayan, hem de modern olmayan devlet dışı unsurları da incelemekte kullanılabilir. İngiliz Okulu literatüründe var olan dünya toplumu kavramının tanımladığı alan ise sadece modern dönemde bulunan küresel ve değer temelli devlet dışı unsurlar ile sınırlıydı. Bu sınırlamalar, kavramın hem analitik gücünü azaltmakta, hem de İngiliz Okulu'nun ana savlarına aykırı olarak uluslararası ilişkilerin uluslararası sistem, uluslararası toplum ve dünya toplumu boyutları arasında doğrusal bir ilişki tesis etmekteydi.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü Roma Katolik Kilisesi'ni modern öncesi bir fikirsel dünya toplumu unsuru olarak ele alıp incelemektedir. Roma Katolik Kilisesi Ortaçağda Hristiyanlığın temsilcisi olarak ele alınmış ve bu devlet dışı unsurun uluslararası ilişkileri dönüştürme kapasitesi kurumları üzerinden incelenmiştir. Roma Katolik Kilisesi'nin ele alındığı Ortaçağda, uluslararası ilişkilerin politik yapısı feodalizm ve Hristiyanlık tarafından belirlenmekteydi. Hristiyanlık hem bireyler arasındaki temel bağ, hem de değerler sistemi olarak uluslararası ilişkileri belirlerken, feodalizm de Ortaçağdaki devletlerin birbirlerine olan konumu tayin etmekteydi. Özetle Ortaçağ uluslararası ilişkileri, bugün içerisinde yaşadığımız egemen eşitliğine dayanan yerleşik uluslararası toplumdan ziyade, aynı toprak üzerinde birden fazla meşru otoritenin tanındığı bir sistemdi. Bu sistem de fikirsel bir dünya toplumu unsuru olan Roma Katolik Kilisesi'nin etkin olarak uluslararası ilişkileri Hristiyanlığın temel değer ve normları uyarınca dönüştürmesi için uygun bir politik ortam yaratmaktaydı.

Bir devlet dışı unsur olarak Roma Katolik Kilisesi'nin temel değeri papanın otoritesi altında birleşik bir uluslararası ilişkiler yaratmaktı. Başka bir deyişle,

Hristiyan aleminde farklı devletlere gerek yoktu, tüm politik yapılar tek bir amaç uğruna –Hristiyanlığa ve dolayısıyla kiliseye hizmet etmek– bir araya gelmelilerdi. Dünyanın hakimi Aziz Peter’den aldığı yetki ile papa olduğuna göre, bu bir araya gelmiş politik yapı papaya koşulsuz olarak itaat etmeliydi. Dolayısıyla Roma Katolik Kilisesi papanın otoritesi altında birleşik bir Hristiyan alemi yaratmayı temel norm olarak uluslararası ilişkilere sunmaktaydı.

Roma Katolik Kilisesi’nin bu ulus aşan değerleri iki noktadan kaynaklanmaktaydı. Bunlardan birincisi Roma İmparatorluğu’nun mirasıdır. Roma İmparatorluğu zamanında Roma Katolik Kilisesi, imparatorluğun idari yapılanmasına benzer bir yapılanmaya gitmiştir. İmparatorluk zayıflamaya ve merkezi otorite aşınmaya başladıkça, Roma’nın hükmettiği geniş topraklardaki otorite boşluğu, kilisenin bu yapılanması tarafından doldurulmaya başlanmıştır. Bir diğer ifade ile kilise yetkilileri, özellikle de piskoposlar, Roma İmparatorluğu’nun yıkılmaya yüz tutması ile birlikte ruhani yetkilerinin yanında, dünyevi yetkileri de kademeli olarak elinde toplamaya başlamıştı. Bu durum da Roma Katolik Kilisesi’nin kendisini Roma İmparatorluğu’nun yasal mirasçısı olarak görmesine ve bir zamanlar Roma tarafından hükmedilen tüm topraklar üzerinde otorite iddiasında bulunmasına olanak vermektedir.

İkinci kaynak noktası ise katolik inancın evrensel mesajı idi. Bu mesaj bir çok şekilde kilise öğretilerinde vücut bulmuştur. Örneğin İsa’nın kurtuluş gününde tüm insanlığı kurtaracağı, Hristiyan aleminin İsa’nın vücudunu, kilisenin ise bu vücudun başını temsil ettiği gibi öğretiler, Roma Katolik Kilisesi’nin ulus aşan iddialarına nirengi noktası oluşturmaktaydı. Bunların yanında katolik kelimesi bir çok anlamının yanında “bütün”, “tam” gibi anlamlara da gelmektedir. Roma Katolik Kilisesi’nin evrensel otorite iddiaları sadece Hristiyan dünyası ile sınırlı da değildi. Öyle ki, Roma Katolik Kilisesi tarafından papanın otoritesinin tüm dünyayı kapsadığı kabul edilirken, Kutsal Roma İmparatorunun yetkisinin Hristiyan alemi ile sınırlı olduğu kabul edilmekteydi.

Roma Katolik Kilisesi temelde dört ana kurum vasıtasıyla yukarıda sözü edilen temel değerlerini uluslararası ilişkilerde tedavüle sokmaktaydı. Bu kurumlardan

birincisi aforoz müessesesiydi. Aforoz, aslen dinden kilise kararıyla çıkarma anlamına gelmekte olsa da, Roma Katolik Kilisesi tarafından birincil olarak politik amaçlar ile kullanıldı. Hristiyanlığın kurallarından sapmış olanların dinden çıkarılma ve soyutlanma mecburiyeti, yöneticilerin Hristiyanlığın kurallarına tamı tamına uyan kişiler olması zorunluluğunu beraberinde getiriyordu. Aforoz edilmiş bir yönetici artık yönetme kabiliyetine sahip değildi. Roma Katolik Kilisesi ise “iyi Hristiyan” olmanın kıstaslarını belirlemeye yetkili yegane kurumdu.

Taç giydirme töreni de benzer bir biçimde tüm yöneticilerin kilise tarafından onaylanmış olması zorunluluğunu getirerek, bir bakıma papa tarafından onaylanmamış yöneticileri Hristiyan topluluğunun dışarısında bırakıyordu. Aslında taç giyme töreni bir Bizans ritüelidir. Ancak dokuzuncu yüzyıldan başlayarak bu ritüel Kutsal Roma İmparatoruna papa tarafından taç giydirilmesi şeklinde Batı Avrupa’da da uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. Bu uygulama gittikçe yaygınlaşarak tüm yöneticilerin Roma Katolik Kilisesi tarafından onaylı olma zorunluluğuna dönüşmüştür. Bu durum Hristiyan aleminde ve Ortaçağ devletleri arasında öylesine kabul görmüştür ki 4. Henry atama yetkisi için papa ve Roma Katolik Kilisesi ile düşman olmuşken dahi, taç giyme töreni düzenlemiştir. Diğer bir deyiş ile taç giyme töreni o kadar önemli bir kurumdu ki, bu töreni gerçekleştirmemiş olan yöneticiler, yani papa tarafından onaylanmamış kimseler, devlet yönetemez olarak addedilmişlerdir.

Atama yetkisi ise Roma Katolik Kilisesi ve Kutsal Roma İmparatorluğu arasında başlı başına bir güç mücadelesi konusu olmuştur. Bu kurum temelde dünyevi yetkilere de sahip olan piskoposların atamasının kim tarafından yapılacağı üzerineydi. Roma Katolik Kilisesi piskoposların aslen kilise yetkilileri olduğu savından hareketle atama yetkilerinin kendisine ait olduğunu iddia ederken, yöneticiler piskoposların temel yetkilerinin dünyevi olduğunu öne sürerek –vergi toplama, asker sağlama, belediye hizmetleri gibi kimi yetki ve görevleri ülkesel/mülki (territorial) anlamda ellerinde tutmalarından ötürü– atamalarının prensler, krallar ya da dükler gibi kilise mensubu olmayan yöneticiler tarafından yapılması gerektiğini savunmaktaydılar.

Haçlı seferleri de bir kurum olarak Roma Katolik Kilisesi'nin Hristiyanlığın büyük etkisi vasıtasıyla etkinliğinin başlı başına bir göstergesidir. Haçlı seferleri sayesinde farklı devletler tek bir dini amaç uğruna, neredeyse hiçbir stratejik, ekonomik ve siyasi çıkarları olmamasına rağmen, doğu Akdeniz'de büyük askeri operasyonlara katılmışlardır. Kimi yazarlar haçlı seferlerinin tamamen ekonomik ve stratejik çıkarlar için yapıldığını iddia etmektedirler. Ancak son araştırmalar göstermektedir ki haçlı seferine katılan soylular ve sıradan insanlar, herhangi bir ekonomik fayda ile evlerine dönmenin aksine çoğunlukla büyük borçlarla yüzleşmekteydiler.

Haçlı seferlerinin birbirleri ile bir araya gelemeyecek yöneticileri ortak çıkarları olmamasına rağmen çok uzak coğrafyalara askeri operasyonlar düzenlemeye yöneltmesi bu kurumun Roma Katolik Kilisesi'nin birleştiricilik değerini uluslararası ilişkilerin temel prensiplerinden biri yapma konusunda ne kadar başarılı olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra Haçlı seferi ilan etme yetkisi de yalnızca papaya aittir. Haçlı seferlerinin birleştirici gücü ve ilan etme yetkisinin sadece papaya ait olması bu kurumun Roma Katolik Kilisesi'nin başlıca normu olan “papanın liderliği altında Hristiyan birliği” düşüncesini gerçekleştirmede ne kadar önemli olduğunu açıkça göstermektedir.

Özetle Roma Katolik Kilisesi bu dört kurum vasıtasıyla norm değiştirmede oldukça başarılıdır. Devlet davranışı bir fikirsel dünya toplumu unsuru olan Roma Katolik Kilisesi/Hristiyanlık tarafından sunulan norm gereğince değişmiştir. Dolayısıyla uluslararası ilişkilerin dünya toplumu/devlet dışı boyutunun uluslararası sistem ve uluslararası toplum (devlet) boyutunu etkilemekte Ortaçağda başarılı olduğu söylenebilir.

Çalışmanın dördüncü bölümü Hansa Cemiyeti'ni modern öncesi bir işlevsel dünya toplumu unsuru olarak ele almaktadır. Hansa Cemiyeti kısaca bir tüccar topluluğudur. Kuzey Avrupa'da temel ticaret yollarını elinde tutan, belirli bir politik amaç gütmeyen, sadece karlarını arttırmak ve ticaret tekeli kurmak amaçları çerçevesinde bir araya gelmiş tüccarlar, bu cemiyeti kurmuşlardır. Bu cemiyeti diğer benzer şehir birliklerinden ayıran nokta, prens, dük ya da baron gibi yöneticilerin yalnızca bu sıfatlarından ötürü üyeliğe kabul edilmemeleriydi. Üye

olmak için tüccar olmak ve diğer Hansa tüccarları ile ortak çıkarları paylaşmak zorunluydu. Dahası, Hansa Cemiyeti'nin bir ortak ticarete sahip olduğu da söylenemez. Her tüccar kendi hesabına ticaret yapmaktaydı. Hansa Cemiyeti'ne üye olmuş şehirler de siyaseten büyük farklılıklar gösterebilmekteydi. Ancak bu şehirlerin tüccarları ortak ticari çıkar etrafında birleşmişlerdi.

Hansa Cemiyeti'nin temel amacı kuzey Avrupa'da serbest ticareti sağlamak ve bu coğrafyadaki ticari faaliyetlerde bir Hansa tekeli kurmaktır. Kuzey Avrupa'da Ortaçağda ticareti belirleyen temel faktörler arasında, yaygın güvenlik sorunları, ağır vergi, gümrük ve geçiş ücretleri, bağımsız şehirlerin birer politik yapı olarak ortaya çıkması sayılabilir. Hansa Cemiyeti bu koşulların sağladığı dezavantajları ortadan kaldırmak amacı ile bir araya gelmiş tüccarların çıkarlarını birleştirmesi neticesinde kurulmuştur. Cemiyete daha sonra tüccarlarının vasıtasıyla şehirler de üye olmuş ancak cemiyet hiçbir zaman politik amaç gütmemiştir. Temel amacı uluslararası ilişkilerin belirli bir katmanı olan uluslararası ticareti kontrol etmektir.

Ana çıkarını gerçekleştirmek ve devletleri uluslararası ticaretin belirleyicisi konumunun dışarısında tutmak için, Hansa Cemiyeti üyelerinin ortak çıkarları üzerine 3 kurum kurulmuştur. Bu kurumların birincisi silahlı mücadeledir. Silahlı mücadele, Hansa tüccarlarının hem kendi gemilerini korsan saldırılarına karşı korumak amacıyla, hem de ticari çıkarlarını devletlere ve diğer tüccarlara karşı korumada kullandığı bir kurumdur. Hansa hiçbir zaman politik bir amaç gütmemekle birlikte, ticari çıkarlarının zarar görmesi/görme ihtimali belirmesi durumunda işletmekten çekinmediği bir kurumdur. Örneğin Hansa, silahlı mücadele vasıtasıyla Danimarka'dan gemilerin geçişine izin vermesi ayrıcalığını almış, İngiltere'nin geçiş ücretlerini ve alınan vergileri sabitleyen daha önce yapılmış anlaşmaya saygı göstermesini sağlamıştır.

Hansa Cemiyeti'nin ikinci önemli kurumu meclistir (diet ya da Hansetag). Meclis aslen Hansa'nın tek resmi kurumudur. Meclis vasıtasıyla Hansa Cemiyeti üyeleri arasındaki küçük sorunlar çözülüyor, birliğin genel kararları alınıyor ve çıkar birleştirilmesi sağlanıyordu. Aslında meclis, Hansa'nın kuzey Avrupa ticaretini

yöneten organıdır. Meclis vasıtasıyla ambargolar uygulanmış, malların fiyatları belirlenmiş ve ticaretin temel kuralları konulmuş ve işletilmiştir.

Meclis düzenli olarak toplanmamakla birlikte, yine de Hansa Cemiyeti'nin üyeleri üzerinde etkili olmuştur. Aynı zamanda meclis toplantılarına tüm üyelerin katılımı da oldukça sınırlıdır. Bunun temel sebebi üyelerin mecliste alınacak her karara ilgi duymamasıdır. Meclisin düzenli toplanmadığı zamanlarda ise Hansa Cemiyeti'nin ortak işlerini Hamburg, Lübeck gibi büyük şehirler yürütmektedir. Fakat bu şehirler meclis toplanmadığında kendi çıkarlarını Hansa'nın çıkarları gibi uygulamaya koymanın aksine, tüm cemiyetin çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmişlerdir.

Ticaret temsilcilikleri ya da kontorlar Hansa Cemiyeti'nin en önemli kurumdur. Bir kontor esasen yabancı bir şehirde Hansa'nın serbest ticaret bölgesi olarak tanımlanabilir. Ancak günümüz serbest ticaret bölgelerinden farklı olarak Hansa meclisinin bu kontorlar üzerinde tam otoritesi bulunmaktaydı. Bu bölgelere bulundukları şehrin yöneticisinin kolluk kuvvetlerinin, başka tüccarların ve Hansa damgası taşımayan malların girmesi kesinlikle yasaktı. Üstüne üstlük, bu bölgelerin sınırları içerisinde tüm siyasi otorite Hansa meclisinin atadığı *alderman* adı verilen yetkililerin elindeydi. Öyle ki bu yetkililer, malların satış fiyatını belirleme, mal akışını durdurma, Hansa tüccarlarını yargılama ve hatta ölüm cezası verme otoritesine sahipti.

Bir çıkar temelli dünya toplumu unsuru olarak Hansa Cemiyeti uluslararası ilişkilerin belirli bir katmanı olan uluslararası ticareti kontrol etmekte oldukça başarılı sayılabilir. Kurumsal kontrol kıstası çerçevesinde değerlendirildiğinde Hansa, hem malların akışını, hem ticaretin seyrini hem de fiyatları kurumları vasıtasıyla kontrol edebilmekteydi. Dahası, kuzey Avrupa uluslararası ticaretini devletlerin etki ve kurumlarından neredeyse tamamen soyutlamış, tüm kontrolü eline almıştı. Aynı zamanda Hansa Cemiyeti, kendisinden olmayan tüccarları, başka bir ifadeyle ortak çıkarları paylaşmadığı unsurları, kuzey Avrupa ticaretinden dışlayarak bir ticaret tekeli kurmuştur.

Çalışmanın beşinci bölümü fikrîsel ve işlevsel dünya toplumu unsurlarının tarihin modern döneminde var olan örneklerini birlikte ele almıştır. Hem fikrîsel hem de

işlevsel modern dünya toplumu unsurlarının bir arada ele alınmalarının sebebi, modern uluslararası ilişkilerin küresel olmasıdır. Küresellikten kasıt, hem uluslararası ilişkilerin dünyanın her yerinde tıpa tıp aynı özellikler göstermesi, hem de dünyanın rastgele bir noktasında meydana gelen bir değişim ya da olayın kendisinden çok uzakta olsa dahi başka bir noktasında etki yaratmasıdır. Modern uluslararası ilişkileri küreselliğin yanında belirleyen diğer iki unsur ise milliyetçilik ve anarşidir. Anarşi, bilindiği üzere, uluslararası ilişkilerde bir üst otorite bulunmamasını ifade etmektedir. Milliyetçilik ise modern uluslararası ilişkilerde devletleri birbirinden ayırıcı bir rol oynar. Böylelikle ulus aşan (cosmopolitan) her görüş ya da düşünce, modern uluslararası ilişkilerin doğasına aykırı bir biçim alır.

Modern uluslararası ilişkilerin bu çok bariz üç özelliğinin ana nedeni yahut belirleyicisi, ulus devlettir. Ulus devletin özelliklerinin yansıması modern uluslararası ilişkilerin her noktasında kendisini göstermektedir. Bu özellikler modern uluslararası ilişkilerin devletlere özgü, her türlü devlet sınırını aşan fikir, çıkar, değer ve düşünceye kapalı, Wight'ın (1966, 20-21) deyişiyle, bireylerin ancak ve ancak devletler aracılığıyla üyesi olabildikleri bir uluslararası toplum şeklinde tezahür etmesine yol açar.

Ulus devletin modern uluslararası toplumu belirleyen beş temel özelliği bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan birincisi ülkeselliktir. Ülkesellik, hem ulus devletin tam egemenliğini ifa ettiği sınırları belirlemekte, hem de sınırları dahilindeki tüm unsurları kendi eli ile uluslararasılaştırmasını sağlamaktadır. Aynı zamanda ülkesellik, müdahale etmeme prensibini beraberinde getirmektedir. Modern uluslararası ilişkilerde diğer ulus devletlerin her türlü müdahalesi bu prensip sayesinde katı bir biçimde yasaklanmıştır. Ulus devlet aynı zamanda insanoğlunun kurduğu en nüfuz edici yönetim biçimidir. Öyle ki ulus devlet sınırları dahilindeki sadece politik olayları değil, hemen hemen her şeyi –en küçük yönetim birimlerinden insan hayatındaki detaylara kadar– kontrol etme isteğindedir. Ulus devlet sadece kendi sınırları dahilindeki yönetsel yapıları değil, uluslararası alandaki yönetsel hemen hemen her şeyi de kontrol etme eğilimindedir. Uluslararası toplumun kurumları vasıtasıyla uluslararasılaşmış her şey ve uluslararası alanın tümü, ulus devlet tarafından kontrol edilmekte/edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu

kurumların fonksiyonlarının dışında kalan hemen hemen hiçbir şey, uluslararası alanın konusu değildir.

Ulus devlet aynı zamanda bir değer olarak uluslararası ilişkileri etkilemektedir. Günümüzde ulus devlet sanki bir son, ulaşılması gereken hedef, insanlığın kurabileceği en gelişmiş yönetim biçimi olarak algılanmakta, bu nedenle kendiliğinden bir değer arz ettiği kabul edilmektedir. Benzer biçimde uluslararası toplum da, uluslararası ilişkilerde bir nihayet, geniş insan topluluklarının en iyi örgütlenme biçimi olarak görülmekte ve değerli olduğu farz edilmektedir. Kısaca modern uluslararası ilişkilerin ulus devletin aşırı güçlü bir yönetim biçimi olarak mevcut olduğu bu politik yapısı, devlet dışı unsurların etkili olabilmeleri için elverişli bir politik ortam sunmamaktadır.

Beşinci bölümün ikinci kısmında Uluslararası Af Örgütü, fikirsel dünya toplumu unsurlarına modern bir örnek olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu kısmın odak noktası sadece Uluslararası Af Örgütü ile kısıtlı olmaktan ziyade, genel olarak uluslararası ilişkilerdeki insan hakları taleplerinin, yahut bir norm olarak insan haklarının üstünlüğünün, uluslararası ilişkileri dönüştürmede ne derece başarılı olduğudur. Bu nedenle bu kısımda uluslararası toplumda insan haklarını bir norm olarak yerleştirme çabasında olan tüm girişimler, örneğin koruma sorumluluğu ve uluslararası ceza mahkemesi gibi, uluslararası ilişkileri dönüştürebilme kapasiteleri bağlamında değerlendirilmiştir.

Uluslararası Af Örgütü dünyanın çeşitli coğrafyalarındaki düşünce suçlularını özgürlüklerine kavuşturma amacıyla kurulmuş bir örgüttür. Ancak bu amaç daha sonra genişlemiş ve örgüt, insan haklarına saygı göstermeyi uluslararası ilişkilerin temel ilkesi yapmayı ana hedefi olarak belirlemiştir. Örgütün tarafsızlığı, gönüllü yardımlarla ayakta durması ve şeffaflığı, Uluslararası Af Örgütü'nü uluslararası ilişkilerde bir dünya toplumu unsuru olarak önemli kılmaktadır.

Bu kısımda yapılan inceleme göstermiştir ki Uluslararası Af Örgütü, bilgi sağlama ve yayma, propaganda yapma ve uluslararası örgütlere danışmanlık yapma gibi kurumlar vasıtası ile insan haklarına saygının uluslararası ilişkilerin temel normu olmasını sağlamaya çalışmakta, ve devlet davranışını bu norma göre değiştirmeyi

amaçlamaktadır. Ancak modern uluslararası ilişkilerin politik yapısından ötürü ulus devletler egemenlikleri konusunda hala oldukça kıskançtırlar ve devlet dışı unsurların hareketlerini kısıtlayıcı davranmaktadırlar. Bu nedenle insan haklarının üstünlüğü henüz bir norm olarak uluslararası ilişkilerde yerleşmemiş, başka bir ifade ile, devlet davranışı bu yeni norma göre şekillenmemiştir.

Örneğin modern uluslararası ilişkilerde devletler hala hangi insani kriz durumunda müdahalenin meşru olup olmadığı konusunda bir standart oluşturamamışlardır. Dahası, bir değer olarak da insan haklarının evrensel bir değer olarak kabulü tartışmalıdır. Bu hakların doğduğu yer olan Avrupa kıtasında bile hala bu hakların herkese uygulanması, son mülteci krizinin gösterdiği üzere, oldukça sıkıntılıdır. Dolayısıyla Uluslararası Af Örgütü ya da genel olarak insan hakları, uluslararası ilişkileri dönüştürmede başarısı oldukça sınırlı fikirsel dünya toplumu unsurları olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Çalışmanın beşinci bölümünün üçüncü kısmında, Milletlerarası Ticaret Odası bir işlevsel dünya toplumu unsuru olarak ele alınmıştır. Milletlerarası Ticaret Odasının üyeleri, serbest ticareti uluslararası ticaretin ana kaidesi yapmayı amaçlamaktadırlar. Bu sebeple, uluslararası ticaretin özgürce gerçekleşmesi için tüm engellemeleri kaldırmak, devlet ve tüm devlet ilişkili kurumların müdahalelerinden uluslararası ticaret alanını arındırmak, bu devlet dışı unsurun üyelerinin etrafında birleştiği temel çıkar olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır.

Uluslararası Af Örgütü'nün kurumlarına benzer bir biçimde Milletlerarası Ticaret Odasının da kurumları, bilgi toplama-standartlaştırma, uluslararası örgütlere danışmanlık yapma, genel kurul ve arabuluculuk olarak sıralanabilir. Bilgi toplama-standartlaştırma ve arabuluculuk kurumları vasıtası ile üyeler arasındaki ticaretin kuralları devletler dışarda bırakılarak konulmaya çalışmakta ve üyeler arasındaki sorunlar devlet müdahalesi olmadan çözülmeye çabalanmaktadır. Uluslararası örgütlere danışmanlık yapma kurumu ise uluslararası ticareti doğrudan ilgilendiren konularda iş dünyasının sesini uluslararası topluma duyurma açısından Milletlerarası Ticaret Odası için önem arz etmektedir. Genel kurul ise bir çıkar birleştirme kurumu olarak işlemektedir.

Genel olarak uluslararası ticarete bakıldığında da ulus devletlerin özellikle kendi aralarında kurdukları kurumlar vasıtası ile bu alanı kontrol ettikleri görülmektedir. Her ne kadar serbest ticaret modern dünyanın mottosu olarak değerlendirilebilirse de, ulus devletler malların akışını kontrol edebilecek her türlü mekanizmaya sahip olmaya devam etmektedirler. Dahası, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü gibi uluslararası örgütler vasıtasıyla da ulus devletler, uluslararası ticaretin her alanını kontrol etmekte ve kurallarını koymaktadırlar. Örneğin Hansa Cemiyeti yaşadığı dönemde ambargo koyup kaldırma gücüne sahip iken, bugün devletler ambargo koyup kaldırma gücüne sahiptir. Milletlerarası Ticaret Odası'nın üyeleri ticaretin her alanında devlet denetimine tabi iken, Hansa tüccarları özgürce mal alıp satabilmekteydiler. Bu nedenle Milletlerarası Ticaret Odası bu çalışmada etkin bir işlevsel dünya toplumu unsuru olarak değerlendirilmemektedir.

Çalışmanın altıncı ve son bölümü sonuç kısmına ayrılmıştır. Bu bölüm genel olarak bu farklı tarihi dönemlerde yaşamış işlevsel ve fikirsel dünya toplumu unsurlarını birbirleri ile karşılaştırmakta ve çalışmanın teorik bulgularını ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışmanın temel bulgusu modern öncesi dönemin uluslararası ilişkilerinin politik yapısının devlet dışı unsurların etkisini arttırmaya daha elverişli olduğudur. Başka bir deyişle ulus devlet ve modern küresel uluslararası toplum, devlet dışı aktörlerin ve diğer devlet dışı unsurların kapasitelerini sınırlamaktadır.

Uluslararası Af Örgütü ve Roma Katolik Kilisesi arasında yapılan karşılaştırma göstermiştir ki Roma Katolik Kilisesi uluslararası ilişkileri sağladığı normlar doğrultusunda dönüştürmede daha başarılıdır. Bunun temel nedeni Ortaçağ uluslararası ilişkilerinde devletlerin ulus devletler gibi güçlü, merkezi ve ülkesel olmamalarıdır. Aynı şekilde Hansa Cemiyeti ve Milletlerarası Ticaret Odası arasında yapılan karşılaştırma da Hansa Cemiyeti'nin kuzey Avrupa'da Ortaçağda güçlü ve derinlemesine kontrol kabiliyeti olan yönetim biçimleri olmamasından ötürü uluslararası ticareti kontrol etmede daha başarılı olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu iki karşılaştırmadan tezin vardığı genel sonuç, “yönetim biçimlerinin gücü yükseldikçe, dünya toplumu unsurlarının etkinlikleri azalmaktadır” şeklinde özetlenebilir.

Çalışma teorik olarak farklı tarihi dönemlerde yaşamış olsalar dahi, devlet dışı unsurların birbirleri ile amaçları ve üyelerini bir araya getiren ana ortaklık bağlamında benzerlikler taşıdıklarını göstermeye çalışmıştır. Bu yaklaşıma göre örneklerin de gösterdiği üzere dünya toplumu unsurları değer temelli olanlar ve çıkar temelli olanlar olarak kategorize edilebilirler. Bu sınıflandırma aynı zamanda dünya toplumu unsurlarının amaçlarına da işaret etmektedir. Çıkar temelli dünya toplumu unsurları belirli bir uluslararası ilişkiler alanını kontrol etmeye ve devletleri o alandan mümkün olduğunca dışlamaya çalışırken, değer temelli dünya toplumu unsurları uluslararası ilişkileri dönüştürmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu teorik bağlama göre karşılaştırılan Roma Katolik Kilisesi, Uluslararası Af Örgütü, Hansa Cemiyeti ve Milletlerarası Ticaret Odası örnekleri göstermektedir ki, bu sınıflandırma var olan dünya toplumu kavramının analiz gücünü önemli ölçüde arttırmaktadır.

Çalışma aynı zamanda İngiliz Okulu'nun temel savı olan "uluslararası sistem, uluslararası toplum ve dünya toplumu uluslararası ilişkilerde aynı anda bulunurlar ancak bunlardan biri diğerlerine tarihin belirli bir noktasında üstün gelebilir" iddiasını da onaylar niteliktedir. Bilhassa Roma Katolik Kilisesi özelinde Hristiyanlığın bir fikrîsel dünya toplumu unsuru olarak incelemesi göstermiştir ki, dünya toplumu bir politik organizasyon biçimi olarak uluslararası ilişkilerde uluslararası toplumu önceleyebilmektedir. Başka bir deyişle İngiliz Okulu'nda var olan dünya toplumu incelemelerinin aksine, uluslararası sistem, uluslararası toplum ve dünya toplumu zincirleme bir tarihsel akış içerisinde bulunmamaktadır.

Bu tez aynı zamanda dünya toplumu kavramı ile incelenecek devlet dışı unsurların küresel olmayabileceklerini de göstermiştir. Başka bir deyişle insanlar ya da devlet dışı unsurlar arasında paylaşılan ortak değer ve çıkarlar illa ki tüm dünyaya nüfuz etmek zorunda değildir. Küresel olmayan ancak bölgesel olarak paylaşılan değer ve çıkarların da uluslararası ilişkileri bir hayli etkileme kapasiteleri vardır. Bu tez Hristiyanlık ve Hansa cemiyeti örneğinde bölgesel dünya toplumu unsurlarının var olabileceğini ortaya koymuştur. Kavramın bu kullanımı sayesinde dünya toplumu yaklaşımının analitik gücü geliştirilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Bunlara ek olarak bu çalışma dünya toplumu kavramını tarihsel devlet dışı unsurların incelenmesinde de kullanılabilecek şekilde geliştirmiştir. Var olan dünya toplumu kavramı çalışmalarının aksine bu tez kavramı küresel uluslararası toplumda insan haklarının ne derece ortak değer olarak kabul gördüğü tartışmalarının dışına taşımış ve bu kavramı uluslararası gerçekliği oluşturan temel üç boyuttan biri olarak ele almıştır. Böylelikle hem dünya toplumunun uluslararası toplum ve uluslararası sistem üzerinde dönüştürücü güce sahip olduğunu, hem de insanlar arasında paylaşılan ortak değerlerin bir uluslararası sistem ortaya çıkarabildiğini göstermeye çalışmıştır. Tez aynı zamanda uluslararası sistem ve uluslararası toplum boyutlarının da dünya toplumu boyutunun dönüştürücü ve kurucu etkisini sınırlayabildiğini örneklerle ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır.

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

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| 2007-Present | Ege University, Department of International Relations | Research Assistant |
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FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English.

PUBLICATIONS

1. Tepeciklioğlu, Ali Onur, Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu, “Teoriden Pratiğe: Suriye Krizi ve Uluslararası Toplum” (From Theory to Practice: Syrian Crisis and International Society), SBF Dergisi, vol. 70(1), 2015.
2. Tepeciklioğlu, Ali Onur, Tanju Tosun, “Siyasi Partiler, Siyasi Katılım ve Propaganda” (Political Parties, Political Participation and Propaganda) Siyaset Bilimi (Introduction to Political Science), ed. Halis Çetin, Orion Kitabevi, Ankara, 2011.

C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

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|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Enformatik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |

YAZARIN

Soyadı : TEPECİKLİOĞLU
Adı : ALİ ONUR
Bölümü : ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER

TEZİN ADI : A RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE WORLD SOCIETY
CONCEPTUALIZATION

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☒

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☒
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☒

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: