

DISCURSIVE CONTINUITY OF POLITICAL NATIONALISM AS A FORM OF
OPPOSITION POLITICS IN MODERN IRAN

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ABSTRACT

DISCURSIVE CONTINUITY OF POLITICAL NATIONALISM AS A FORM OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN MODERN IRAN

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The dissertation examines political nationalism as a transformative power of modern Iranian politics at the societal level through historical-sociological study of four mass opposition movements, which are the Constitutional Movement (1906-11), National Front Movement (1949-53), Iranian Revolution Movement (1978-79), and Green Movement (2009). The appeal to nationalism by these opposition movements leads to ask why and how nationalism becomes an overarching ideology of political opposition? What are the structural conditions that gave rise to nationalist opposition movements? To answer these questions, the framework of non-Western political nationalism was employed, which helped to identify independence from Western impact of colonialism/imperialism and establishment of modern nation state through constitutionalism and popular sovereignty as the two aims of nationalist movements. However, this framework does not explain the rise of nationalist opposition against a nation state. Thus, the dissertation develops the framework of ‘opposition nationalism,’ which is defined as a modern political movement whose driving force is nationalism and manifests itself in opposition to foreign interventionism and state authoritarianism. Nationalist opposition movements are mass movements with a

political motivation of obtaining and using state power. They emerge when different political groups are coordinated and mobilized by nationalist ideology. On the basis of this framework, the dissertation argues that despite the state authority shifts to three different polities since the beginning of Iranian modernization, the four nationalist opposition movements display discursive continuity of anti-imperialism and anti-authoritarianism due to the continuity in the structural conditions of the foreign influence and the strong state vis-à-vis the society.

Keywords: Non-Western political nationalism, state-society relations in Iran, modernization, anti-imperialism, mass opposition movements.

ÖZ

MODERN İRAN'DA SİYASAL MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİN BİR SİYASAL MUHALEFET ŞEKLİ OLARAK SÖYLEMSEL SÜREKLİLİĞİ

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Bu tez siyasal milliyetçiliğin modern İran siyasetinde toplumsal düzeyde dönüştürücü gücünü tarihsel-sosyolojik yöntemle çalıştığı dört milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi çerçevesinde incelemektedir. İncelenen dört hareket Anayasa Hareketi (1906-11), Milli Cephe Hareketi (1949-53), İran Devrimi Hareketi (1978-79) ve Yeşil Hareket (2009)'tir. Muhalefet hareketlerinin milliyetçiliği benimsemesi şu soruları doğurmuştur: Neden ve nasıl milliyetçilik siyasi muhalefet için kapsayıcı bir ideoloji haline gelmiştir? Milliyetçi muhalefet hareketlerini doğuran yapısal durumlar nelerdir? Bu sorulara cevap vermek için tezde Batı-dışı milliyetçilik çerçevesine başvurularak milliyetçi hareketler için iki amaç tanımlanmıştır. Bunlar kolonializm/emperyalizm şeklinde tezahür eden Batı etkisinden bağımsızlık kazanmak ve anayasacılık ve halk egemenliği yoluyla modern ulus devleti kurmaktır. Ancak bu çerçeve ulus devlete karşı ortaya çıkan milliyetçi muhalefeti açıklamamaktadır. Bu nedenle tezde, itici gücü milliyetçilik olan ve yabancı müdahalesi ile devlet otoriteciliğine karşı kendini gösteren modern bir siyasi hareket olarak tanımlanan 'muhalefet milliyetçiliği' çerçevesi geliştirilmiştir. Milliyetçi

muhalefet hareketleri devlet gücünü ele geçirmek ve kullanmak şeklinde siyasi amaçları olan kitlesel hareketlerdir. Bu hareketler farklı siyasi grupların milliyetçi ideoloji ile koordine ve mobilize olmalarıyla ortaya çıkmaktadır. Tezde muhalefet milliyetçiliği çerçevesi temelinde İran modernleşmesinin başlangıcından bu yana devlet otoritesi üç farklı siyasi yapıya kaymasına rağmen dört milliyetçi muhalefet hareketinin yabancı etkisi ve toplum karşısında güçlü devletin varlığı olarak süreklilik gösteren yapısal koşullar nedeniyle emperyalizm karşıtlığı ve otoritecilik karşıtlığı söylemlerini süreklilik içerisinde üretmeye devam ettiği iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Batı-dışı siyasal milliyetçilik, İran'da devlet-toplum ilişkileri, modernleşme, anti-emperyalizm, kitlesel muhalefet hareketleri.

To my family;

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a product of a research journey to understand role of nationalism in Iranian politics. The idea for this dissertation on nationalism in Iran occurred after the 2009 Qods (Jerusalem) Day rally in Iran. It has been an Iranian national day since the 1979 Revolution where Iranians have been reasserting their solidarity and support to Palestinian people in their struggle for independence against Israeli state. The events of September 18, 2009 Qods Day, however, displayed a challenge to the Islamic Republic with the slogan chanted by the Green Movement protestors. On that day, the protestors mobilized to support Green Movement, which emerged as a political opposition movement after the allegedly-rigged June 2009 presidential elections, shouted in the streets “No to Gaza, No to Lebanon, I Give My Life for Iran”.

The appeal to nationalist ideology by the Green Movement during the 2009 protests presented two dilemmas. The first one was that Iranian political space had been organized by a theocratic state that rejected nationalism as a Western idea, but a social movement operating in that space appealed to nationalist ideology. Secondly, the Green Movement did not appeal to secular nationalist ideology in its opposition against the theocratic state but claimed to be follower of idelas of Islamic Revolution. Thus, the dissertation is inspired by the questions how can the salience of nationalist ideology be explained in Iranian politics that is organized by the theocratic state and why nationalism has been appealed by a political opposition movement that claims to be follower of Islamic Revolution’s ideals.

The initial analysis of the challenge of political opposition movement to the state in nationalist terms was re-assertion of Iranian national identity vis-à-vis the transnational Islamic identity of the Islamic Republic. This analysis is based on the inclination that there is a continuous Iranian national identity that has been disrupted

by the Islamic Republic and it has been emerging again within the framework of political reformism. Thus, I asked the question if there was a continuous national identity conception, which was different than the Islamic identity conception of the Islamic Republic. If so, how could we explain the salience of the Iranian nationalism in the theocratic system established after the Islamic Revolution? If there was no continuity, then how could we contextualize the nationalist tendency expressed by the Green Movement? What is the difference between the national identity conception before and after the Islamic Revolution? If there is a difference, is it because the Islamic Revolution is anti-Western and rejection of Western ideas leads to rejection of nationalism? If the Islamic Republic rejects nationalism, then how does the political system rationalize its national interest and act as a nation state?

With these questions in mind, I went to Tehran to conduct field research for the dissertation and spent nine months from September 2010 to May 2011. It was during the second term of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency. There was intensification of security atmosphere after the protests in 2009 by the Green Movement that unsettled my research. While some scholars were not welcoming to meet me due to the xenophobic attitude of the government, some silently told the stories of their regular interrogations by the intelligence officers and asked me not to take notes. Thus, I could not openly ask questions related to the Green Movement and nationalism, but tried to understand the national identity conception in general and Islamic Republic's attitude towards nationalism in particular.

In most of the interviews I conducted, I got the answer that Iranian national identity was composed of two components, which were Islam at all without the thinking Shi'ism separately, and nationalism that was understood as Persianness. Although some interviewers also added Western identity and some few added Shi'i identity within the definition of Iranian national identity, the dominant conception of Iranian national identity appeared to be a whole made up of religious and national parts. On the question of Islamic Republic's attitude towards nationalism, there were two explanations. The general argument was that Islamic Republic emphasized the

Islamic component more than the national component on the contrary to the Pahlavi state, which had emphasized national component more than the religious one. An alternative explanation was that the Islamic Revolution was a reaction to the competition between national and Islamic identities in the political space dominated by the state and it actually provided an alliance between the two. This explanation also identified three phases through which the national and Islamic identity components reached alliance in the period of Islamic Republic. Accordingly, the first phase was immediately after the Islamic Revolution where there was a transnational identity understanding based on Islamic unity. With the Iran-Iraq war, the politicians tried to reach an equitable balance between religious and nationalist values. In the third phase, nationalism has begun to be perceived more important than religion and Islam is understood to be a tool for the realization of national interests. On the question about Islamic Revolution's rejection of nationalism and rationalization of its action as a nation state, most of the interviewees argued that Islamic Revolution was not anti-nationalist, albeit it was anti-Western. The Islamic Revolution opposed the Western identity and influence in Iran and the ideal was to reach an independent, progressed Islamic Iran in the world of nations.

On the basis of the field research that displayed the continuity of the conception of national identity that was composed of nationalist and religious elements, I avoided to employ an Islamic nationalism perspective separate than the Iranian nationalism perspective for the politics of Islamic Republic as the two competing "ideologies of order," the first one being religious and the second one being secular.¹ As one of the interviewees argued, people participated to the Islamic Revolution not because they were against secularism but because they reacted against the forced elimination of plurality with the establishment of Rastakhiz Party that Mohammad Reza Shah demanded all Iranians to become a member of the single party. Although it was commonly stated that nationalism gained utmost appeal in Iran during the Pahlavi

¹ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, (USA: University of California Press, 1993).

period, this was not immune from different trends of nationalism such as the anti-imperialist nationalism of Mohammad Mosaddeq and the Iranian national movement which had challenged the nationalism of the state. Many of my interviewees supported this view by pointing out the nationalism of Mosaddeq period as the ideal for Iranian nationalism with its democratic credentials that also respected religion. The Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the Green Movement in current politics appeared to be other versions of this nationalist challenge to the nation state. Thus the dilemmas posed by the nationalist appeal of the Green Movement led to question the role of nationalism in state-society relations, the place of nationalism in secular and religious state ideologies, and relatedly, the disposition of nationalism in Western and non-Western contexts in general.

Considering the Mosaddeq period's anti-imperialist movement that aroused rival to the Pahlavi nationalism, the Islamic Revolution as a nationalist movement that aroused against secular nationalist Pahlavi state, and Green Movement that aroused against the religious nationalism of the Islamic Republic but within the context of ideals of the Islamic Revolution, I came to the conclusion that components of Iranian national identity can become associated with both nationalism of the state and nationalism of the rival political movements of the society. However, political nationalism at the state level and political nationalism at the societal level can operate through different dynamics different dynamics stemming from the state-society relations. To study nationalism of the political mass movements against the state authority, some scholars I met during the field research also informed me that the Constitutional Revolution of 1906–11 when Iran was introduced the idea of nationalism, constitution, and popular sovereignty should be the starting point. The debates of the Constitutional Revolution, interviewees stated, determined the terms of the nationalist political movements in modern Iran.²

² I am especially indebted to Prof. Dr. Mahmoud Sariolghalam, who insistently stated that it was impossible to understand nationalism in Iran without studying the Constitutional Revolution.

On the whole, the fieldwork in Iran contributed to the argument of this dissertation in three ways. Firstly, Iranian national identity is a whole composed of different sources of attachment that have selectively been employed by the state authority. Thus, I should study political nationalism in Iran at the societal level as a political movement that is not necessarily associated with a certain definition of national identity. Secondly, I realized that the hegemonic government nationalism and the nationalism of the masses are not always complementary. On the contrary, as the anti-government nationalist movements demonstrated, there is the need for analytical differentiation between the hegemonic government nationalism and mass-based political nationalism. Thirdly, since political nationalism is a phenomenon of modern politics, I should develop a historical approach to include Iranian encounter with modernity and to identify the ambivalence between acceptance/imitation and rejection that influenced the masses' subversion to or resistance against the dynamics of modernization.

The third contribution led me to search for the Iranian place in the world as a once semi-colonial and late-modernizer country. Thus, I studied how nationalism was received in the non-Western world with the aim to locate the development of nationalism in Iran into a structural context. As stated by Hermidas-Bavand, a National Front leader and former Iranian ambassador to the U.N., if one question to define national identity was 'who we are (kiisti-ye ma)' whose answer was in historical and cultural identity, the second question was 'how we are (chiisti-ye ma)' to identify the proper place of Iran in the world and in the region.³ The study of non-Western nationalism, which constitutes the second chapter of this dissertation, has enabled me to define the 'opposition against foreign interventionism' as a primary characteristic of political nationalism in Iran, which is valid for both government nationalism and nationalism of the opposition political movements; but it is stronger

³ At this point, I owe greatly to the post-colonial insight of Prof. Hamid Dabashi that I was introduced in his classes on Iranian cinema, literature, and politics during my stay as visiting researcher at Columbia University in New York.

for the opposition political movements since governments usually regards foreign alliances necessary for obtaining resources and support for Iranian modernization.

Departing from the observation that the hegemonic governmental nationalism and mass-based nationalism should be analytically differentiated, I employed John Breuilly's approach that considered the nationalist movements significant enough to challenge the state authority with the aim of obtaining and using state power.⁴ On the basis of Breuilly's historical-sociological analysis that I found consistent with the findings of my field research, I identified four moments in modern Iranian history when political nationalism emerged as a significant opposition movement that challenged the state power. I also employed Breuilly's two conditions of possibility for the nationalist movement to arise, which are the coordination and mobilization functions of the political nationalist ideology. Although Breuilly's approach was functional in differentiating nationalisms of state and society, his classification of nationalisms as separation, reform, and unification nationalism either opposed to non-nation states or nation-states does not fit the Iranian case where I found a discursive continuity in nationalist movements opposed to non-nation state (Qajar) and nation-states (Pahlavi monarchy and Islamic Republic). Thus, I developed a new classification named 'opposition nationalism' to understand nationalist opposition movements in modern Iran and to conceptualize the discursive continuity of the mass-based nationalist ideology that coordinates and mobilizes nationalist movement against the state authority, and that is not dependent on any specific political ideology.

1.1. Research Questions, Argument and Methodology

The dissertation analytically differentiates between the hegemonic state nationalism and the nationalism of the mass opposition movements against the state authority. It asks why and how nationalism becomes an overarching ideology of political

⁴ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, (USA: Chicago University Press, 1994), pp. 2- 8.

opposition? Secondly, it aims to find out what are the structural conditions that give rise to the four political nationalist opposition movements in Iran that are identified within the framework of opposition nationalism. Thirdly, the dissertation tries to reveal the factors that enabled the coordination and mobilization of these four nationalist opposition movements as mass movements.

The field study revealed that the paradox does not lie between nationalism and religion. On the contrary, they are the two components of Iranian national identity. However, the paradox lies in the contradiction between authoritarian state policy and people's demand to exercise popular sovereignty. The historical study of Iranian politics demonstrated that the nationalist political opposition movements in modern Iran were coordinated and mobilized against two threats to the nation: imperialism (*este'mar*) as external threat and despotism (*estabdat*) as internal threat. The nationalist opposition movements espoused to obtain state power to eliminate the threats to the nation's interests and values. They gained significance when different class and groups interests who independently pursued different ideological agendas united under the umbrella of nationalist ideology and became mass movements. These characteristics are observed in different types of polities and under different international conditions in modern Iranian history.

There are four such moments of opposition political nationalism scrutinized in this dissertation. At the beginning of the 20th century, when Iran was endowed with a traditional polity that faced with the challenge of modernization and trying to accommodate with modernity, nationalist opposition movement of Constitutional Revolution (1906-11) rised to end imperialist penetration of Britain and Russia, and to end arbitrary politics by adopting a constitution through which the nation could exercise popular sovereignty with the establishment of a parliament. In 1953, when the traditional authority had been abolished and Iranian nation state with institutional and cultural organization was established, the nationalist opposition movement of National Front (1949-53) was coordinated and mobilized to end British imperialism over the use of country's oil resources and to end arbitrary politics of the

constitutional monarchy through proper implementation of the constitution and exercise of people's rights which was neglected by the state authority that did not respected elections and freedom of expression. In 1977- 79, the nationalist opposition movement of Iranian revolution was coordinated and mobilized by the nationalist ideology to terminate American imperialism and despotic state authority whose modernization was accompanied by political repression, abuse of human rights, and severe restrictions on freedom of expression. Islamic government became the ideal for the nationalist opposition that was dreamed to provide national independence from foreign intervention and freedom for participation. In 2009, the constitutional monarchy had been abolished and a theocratic-popular political system was exercising state power. The nationalist opposition movement of 2009, the Green Movement, was coordinated and mobilized by nationalist ideology to end the transnational definition of the state's national interest that treats the Palestinian and Lebanon resistance as an Iranian national issue, and to ensure the exercise of constitutional rights of the Iranian people.

Thus, this dissertation argues that despite the state authority shifts to three different polities since the beginning of Iranian modernization, the four nationalist opposition movements display discursive continuity of anti-imperialism and anti-despotism due to the continuity in the structural conditions of the foreign influence and the strong state vis-à-vis the society.

The dissertation provides a general framework to understand why nationalist ideology has been the driving force for the political opposition movements in modern Iran. It pursues a historical-sociological method to study modern Iranian politics and establish casual linkage between opposition movements raised under different governmental systems and world conditions. The primacy of state as the ultimate power in the society and as the organizer of political space is acknowledged in the analysis. The conditions for appeal to nationalist ideology in the society are determined in relation to state policies. Secondly, the dissertation benefits from the post-colonial insight in defining the notion of 'resistance against foreign powers,'

which in the Iranian case are the early-modernized, developed, materially superior powers of the West and Russia.

The argument and structure of the dissertation is based on the findings of the field study in Tehran. The twenty-five in-depth interviews with scholars, intellectuals and researchers provided the key sources to historicize and contextualize the nationalist ideology. The observations drawn from interaction with ordinary Iranians in the street and in various gatherings in different cities of Iran contributed essentially to the understanding of Iranian self-conception, their expectations from the state, their past and current contentment and discontent, their aspirations for the Iranian nation's honorary place in the world. These insights provided the critical lenses necessary to develop a new approach that aims to transcend the hegemonic understanding of nationalism through the binary opposition of secularism-religion. In addition, Persian books obtained by the research at libraries of Tehran, examination of Persian journals and newspapers that introduced the Iranian debates on identity, modernity and tradition also contributed greatly to the argument and structure of this dissertation.

Persian resources are used extensively in writing the chapters of the dissertation as primary sources. The books written by Iranian historians and political figures, memoirs of politicians, intellectuals, and bureaucrats that participated in nationalist opposition movements, the statements and speeches of the leaders of nationalist movements, and the statements of the political parties are also used as the main sources to identify the nature and dynamics of the opposition. The transliterations of the Persian words are made according to the transliteration scheme provided by the International Society for Iranian Studies.

The secondary sources in English language used in the dissertation are largely the books and articles written by Iranian or non-Iranian scholars who mostly based their analysis on their readings of Persian resources and archival work. The interviews conducted with Iranian scholars in New York also provided a valuable source for the

dissertation. They provided a further scholarly insight about the similarities and differences of thought on Iranian identity, modernity, tradition, and nationalism between the scholars residing in Iran and in the U.S. in terms of their interaction with global culture.

1.2. Relevance of the Dissertation to the Literature on Nationalism in Iran

Despite almost all the books on modern Iranian politics reserve sections for the importance of nationalism in the analysis of political developments, the literature on nationalism in Iran is not profound. There are a few scholarly works that deal with the issue methodologically and comprehensively. One of the earliest works on nationalism in Iran is authored by Mostafa Vaziri, titled “Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity.” Published in 1993, Vaziri’s study is very much inspired by Benedict Anderson’s 1983 work, “Imagined Communities.”⁵ It has been an attempt to challenge the European orientalist imagination of Iran on racial and national methodologies to provide a non-racial and non-national explanation for identity formation in line of historical events. According to the writer, it is these philological and archeological works of the Orientalists that created the consciousness of a distinct Iranian identity rooted in the remote pre-Islamic past. On the basis of a single language in continuity through a linear history of an entire geographical zone, he argues, the Orientalists created the nationalist link between language and territory. Asserting that this historical Iranian national identity is an anachronistic conception, he searches the answer to when the present Iranian identity began to emerge. He finds the answer in modernization of Iran in the nineteenth century and the efforts of the ruling elites, intelligentsia, state and the clerics to homogenize people into nationhood.⁶

⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (USA: Verso, 1983).

⁶ Mostafa Vaziri, *Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity*, (USA: Paragon House, 1993), pp. 1 – 11.

Then, in 2008, Afshin Marashi published his work on nation-formation in Iran, entitled “Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870 – 1940.” Influenced by Anthony Smith’s ‘ethnic origins of nations’ thesis⁷, Marashi’s study is an attempt to “reframe Iranian historiography by situating the nationalism of Reza Shah period within a larger process of *nationalization* that cuts across the conventions of political periodization”⁸ which focuses on the major political epochs of the modern Iran. Thus, he seeks to provide an alternative historiography of modern state-society relations. Marashi basically examines two dynamics that gave rise to modern Iranian nation state. The first one is the changing conception of state by introduction of the European late-nineteenth century imperial state models into Iran, which constituted the political basis for the nation state. The second one is the works of intellectuals that constructed the cultural and historical memory of Iran as the basis of national identity. The congruence of these two dynamics paved the way for the formation of Iranian nation-state by Reza Pahlavi, which rendered state, society and culture congruent. Marashi’s work emphasizes the use of cultural symbols in the process of national culture formation to transform the state-society relations and to create a modern nation, such as ceremonies, pre-Islamic culture, commemorations, and education, all of which are means available to the nation state to transform the state-society relations.

A more recent study about nationalism in Iran is Ali M. Ansari’s “The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran,” which was published in 2012. Defining nationalism as a “political mobilization of a particular identity⁹,” Ansari narrates the history of Iranian nationalism through a new historiography. Ansari’s historiography is not based on significance of political events but on the significance of grand narratives,

⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (USA: Blackwell, 1987).

⁸ Afshin Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870 – 1940*, (USA: University of Washington Press, 2008), p. 7.

⁹ Ali M. Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 3.

the dominant ideas, which are regarded as reflections of facts at the micro level and determinant of political events at the macro level. Thus, he examines history of nationalism in modern Iran in three ages, which are the age of radical enlightenment from constitutional revolution to the 1960s, the age of extremes from 1960s to Khomeini's death in 1989, and the age of contestation from 1989 onwards. His analysis refers to mythological symbols in the nationalist history-making to the extent that they influenced political ideas but he avoids constructions for the purpose of nation-formation. Thus, Ansari's analysis provides an amazing and cunning interaction of myths and realities, pre-modern and modern historiographies, narratives and structures.

The latest book on nationalism in Iran is titled "Rethinking Iranian Nationalism and Modernity," which was edited by Kamran Scot Aghaie and Afshin Marashi in 2014. The book reconsiders the historiography of Iranian nationalism and modernity through the recent developments in scholarship. The edited volume develops new perspectives on old assumptions and paradigms without problematizing the historiography of Iranian nationalism and modernity.¹⁰ Within this framework, the book reconsiders the Iranian interactions with orientalist conceptions, the contested conceptions of land, ethnicity and place, and the place of religion and nationalism in Iranian historiography as the two contested visions of modernity.

None of these works examined nationalism in Iran as a political movement. Although they were instrumental in the preliminary stages of this dissertation to understand the Iranian cultural and political self-conception and national identity formation, methodologically they did not inspire the dissertation. In this sense, this dissertation benefited extensively from the earliest work on nationalism in Iran, which was authored by Richard W. Cottam in 1964. Titled "Nationalism in Iran," Cottam's work employ's the phenomenon of nationalism as the key to understand

¹⁰ Kamran Scot Aghaie and Afshin Marashi (eds), *Rethinking Iranian Nationalism and Modernity*, (USA: University of Texas Press, 2014).

Iranian political behavior. Following the Western scholarly endeavor of the early 1960s to understand the impact of modernity in the non-Western countries not on the basis of stereotypes but on the basis of analytical categories, Cottam identifies cohesive and social basis of nationalism in Iran. His analysis of nationalism concentrates on two levels, which are the level of ethnic minorities and tribes, and the level of state. This dissertation mostly benefitted from Cottam's analysis of nationalism as a political movement on state level on the basis of impact of imperial powers on the formation of Iranian national consciousness that transformed the political behavior. However, the traces of dominant modernist paradigm in the Western academia of 1960s are evident in Cottam's analysis. Accordingly, his motivation of scholarly attention on nationalism in Iran is to demonstrate that a non-Western nation who does not historically possess a liberal tradition can be inculcated with liberal norms through nationalism.¹¹ Thus, while he is criticizing the Western scholarship because of its negative attitude to Iran's development, he falls short of making a critical observation of Iran's responses to modernity in his search for identifying liberal values in a developing culture.

This dissertation resumes Cottam's analysis of political nationalism in state-society relations but avoids endowing nationalism with any pre-assumed ideology. Hence, this dissertation revives the older and long-unattended approach of political nationalism as a transformative power of politics. However, it also employs critical stance to consider political nationalism as facilitator of secularism, liberalism, and linear progress, which will distort and reshape the Iranian political reality, and will bound the analysis to the dead-end of binary oppositions.

¹¹ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 10.

1.3. Scope of the Dissertation

As stated by Elie Kedourie “nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.”¹² It was invented due to economic, technological and social changes occurred in Western Europe, which constituted the conditions of modernity and bestowed the Western countries an overwhelming superiority. Nationalism then spread to the non-Western world due to the modern condition. Imperialism was the agent of modernization that carried modernity in material and ideational terms to the non-Western world.

Although the Western impact is the initiator for nationalist development in the modern non-West, it is not the constitutive factor of this dynamic situation. The non-Western world has its own history of nationalism, which was very much intermingled with the modernization process. Nationalisms of the non-Western countries have their own historical, cultural, and intellectual origins that came out of a combination of factors that rooted in tradition and those introduced by modernity. They are shaped both by indigenous traditions and by the dynamics of relations of a specific people with the Western powers. Therefore, it is not viable to produce a general theory of nationalism for the non-Western world. However, non-Western peoples’ movements for independence from colonial domination, state formation, modern development, territorial integrity and societal mobilization gave rise to nationalism. Thus, nationalism has been the driving force for the political movements in the modern non-Western societies.

On the basis of the above argument, this dissertation on nationalism in Iran does not deal with the historical, cultural and/or intellectual origins of nationalism but with nationalism ‘as a form of politics’. As Breuilly states:

¹² Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism (Fourth, Expanded Edition)*, (USA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), p. 1.

To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernization is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state. The central task is to relate nationalism to the objective of obtaining and using state power. We need to understand that why nationalism has played a major role in the pursuit of those objectives. To understand that we need to examine closely how nationalism operates as politics and what it is about modern politics that makes nationalism so important.¹³

Political nationalism in Iran has three manifestations. One is the state nationalism that paved the way for the foundation of the modern Iranian nation state under Pahlavi monarchs. This was the nationalist ideology in government mixed with Iranian imperial legacy. Not only this was the ideology of the power-holders, but it also produced the hegemonic cultural nationalism in Iran that was disseminated by state machinery as the nation-constituting ideology.

Second nationalist manifestation in Iran is the separatist nationalist movements. This form of nationalism appeared when the state power was weak and unable to exert political control over the country. Azerbaijani and Kurdish separatist nationalist movements challenged the state authority during the years of First and Second World Wars, due to weak governmental authority in the face of foreign occupation of Iran. Besides tribal revolts in Mashhad and Khuzestan, the revolts of Khiabani and Pishavari in Azerbaijan, and establishment of autonomous Kurdish republic inside Iranian territory for a brief period were the major manifestations of separatist nationalism.

Thirdly, political nationalism manifested itself in Iran in the form of opposition nationalism. Opposition nationalism is put forth as an approach in this dissertation to understand political nationalism in non-Western world in general and in Iran in particular. The opposition nationalism approach identifies two common conditions for political movements, which are the basic premises of the nationalist opposition

¹³ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, pp.1-2.

movements. These are their opposition to foreign interventionism and to state authoritarianism. The theme of foreign intervention is related to the effects of imperialism and Western colonialism. Either exercised in the form of direct colonial domination or in the form of cooperation and collaboration of authorities of independent states with the Western/imperial powers due to the technological and material advancement of the latter, the nationalist movements oppose foreign intervention since it is regarded against the nation's independence and sovereignty. The second condition, state authoritarianism, is related to the nation-building process by state nationalism. Since modernization was an outside factor in non-Western world, modernizing states employed social and economic reform policies that aimed to transform the people into a modern nation. The imposition of drastic reforms to yet-traditional societies meant sudden break from the tradition. However, political modernization lagged behind the social and economic transformation and modernizing rulers continued to use state power through authoritarian and oppressive means. Added to this situation was the cooperative and collaborative stance of the modernizing states with Western powers for reasons of obtaining aid for reform as well as security of the state. Thus, on the one hand, limited representation under an authoritarian state led to a widening gap between state and society; and on the other hand, its foreign links facilitated the perception on the part of nationalist opposition that the state itself became a threat to the nation's freedom and independence.

The two conditions of foreign interventionism and authoritarianism had dual function for opposition nationalism approach. First and foremost, they provide an umbrella for ideologically different groups in society, which facilitated coordination of their diverse interests and their mobilization with nationalist ideology. Secondly, the identity of the interventionist foreign power and the nature of violation of freedom of citizens by authoritarian state determine the discourse of the nationalist opposition movement. In a once semi-colonized society such as Iran, opposition nationalism targets the foreign power with which the state authority acts in collaboration with. Thus, state authority's collaborative relationship is definitive for the opposition nationalism to define the foreign threat to the nation.

Therefore, opposition nationalism emerges in Iranian politics through coordination and mobilization of ideologically diverse political groups united in opposition to foreign interventionism and state authoritarianism, which are in collaborative relationship. The presence of diverse groups under the umbrella of opposition nationalism gives the movement its strength and distinctiveness. Thus, opposition nationalism can become a significant political movement that poses a serious challenge to the state authority.

The four nationalist opposition movements in modern Iranian history display the above-mentioned characteristics of opposition nationalism. However, there are also some points to be mentioned in order to show that the opposition nationalism approach is not a tautology in its approach to society but an analytical category. Firstly, we cannot talk about the participation of all the existing political groups in a society to opposition nationalist movement. This is not only because there are no concrete boundaries of nationalist opposition movement, but also a group may first declare participation and then may give up at certain point or visa versa. This brings the questions what are the conditions for any social group to be in opposition to a modernizing state and why some opposition groups do not participate in nationalist opposition movement. There are two variables that help to understand the blurred boundaries of a nationalist opposition movement. These are international context and state cooptation as a function of state-society relations.

International context brings both possibilities and challenges for the opposition nationalism to coordinate and mobilize political groups. In the case of Iran, for instance, rise of the U.S. in world politics as a neutral power for Iran served the nationalist opposition until 1953 in their struggle against the historically “evil-powers”, Britain and Russia, to balance the two. Nationalists opted for American military advisors, financial aid, and even mediation to break the deadlock in oil crises with Britain. In the National Front Movement, however, international factor played a challenging role for nationalist mobilization. The communist Tudeh party, which propagated pro-Russian politics after the establishment of Soviet Russia and

tried to preserve Soviet interests in Iran, did not join the National Front movement because of the Front's anti-Soviet stance. Moreover, the party propagated anti-National Front ideas by denying the Front's nationalist ideology and blaming them to be the agents of American imperialism. Having the greatest mobilization capacity, the lack of support from the Tudeh party played an important role in the failure of the movement to obtain and use the state power. Then, in the nationalist opposition of 1979 Iranian Revolution, international context provided opportunity for opposition nationalism. On the eve of the revolution, the U.S. policy to foster global human rights compelled Mohammad Reza Shah to ease oppression on political opposition since he could not risk friendly relations in order to obtain the U.S. aid. In addition, the détente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. interpreted by the opposition as a prospect for decrease in the importance of Iran for the U.S. as barrier against communist Russia; hence, the U.S. support for the monarchical regime in the face of opposition encouraged the nationalist opposition to mobilize against the authoritarian Iranian state in 1978. In 2009 Green Movement opposition, global communication tools played an important role in the mobilization of the movement. The protestors used Facebook and Twitter intensively to organize street protests and disseminate information not only to Iran but also to global world. However, the tide of velvet revolutions in the former Soviet republics alarmed the Islamic Republic establishment for a possible foreign-instigated coup against the state in Iran. The fear of a velvet revolution led to consider the protests of the Green Movement for democratic rights as a threat of revolution against the state and ended up with the state's use of severe coercion against the protestors.

The second variable is the state cooptation as a function of state-society relations. In authoritarian states, since the political space is limited and the gap between state and society is wide, opposition does not emerge as long as the state is powerful enough to employ repressive means. Modern authoritarian states in non-Western world are in need of external military and economic aid to continue repressive power, and internal distribution of resources to maintain cooptation of increasingly urbanized population. In the case of Iran, the cooptation capability of state is also dependent on effective

use of oil rent. By utilizing the oil revenues, state can implement social welfare programmes, facilitate education and health services for the public, and provide subsidies for basic needs and energy products. In addition, state resorts to social cooptation by enabling participation of educated people into bureaucracy. Thus, opposition nationalism emerges in moments when these means of cooptation are barely utilized; thus, the state fails to coopt large segments of population.

In a modernizing authoritarian state, the failure of state cooptation stems from two dynamics. One is the disturbance among the traditional segments of society with rapid reforms of modernization. In the Iranian case, landlords, clergy, and bazaar merchants were the traditional social groups who would continue to support state if the modernization scheme had not destroyed their societal power and financial interests. The secular reforms of Reza Pahlavi during the 1920s and 1930s destroyed the authority of clergy in education and jurisprudence. The economic modernization schemes proposed by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi decreased competitive power of the bazaar merchants in the face of foreign capital and created dissent against the state at critical moments. The landlords were the most loyal traditional group in Iran and provided an important power base for Pahlavi state. However, the land reform of 1963 created disturbance among the landlords and weakened their support to the government. Yet, these groups were not uniform either. In all four nationalist moments in Iran, some members of a social group aligned with nationalist opposition while some remained coopted by the state power.

The second dynamic for the failure of state cooptation was the extent of repressive control of the state on the political space. The authoritarian measures to control participation of politically aware groups in political space and to prevent any opposition to emerge widen the gap between state and society, which gives rise to the desire of freedom from oppression among the society. Nationalist ideology channels the anti-state feelings of the oppressed society into coordination of a mass movement. Thus, at a moment when the state's oppressive power weakens, the oppressed political groups mobilize with opposition nationalism against the state. In

the Iranian case this dynamic was effective in the mobilizations of Constitutional Revolution Movement of 1906–11, the National Front movement in 1949–51, Iranian Revolution Movement of 1978-79, and in the first phase of the mobilization of the Green Movement in 2009 before the presidential elections.

Thus, social and political groups may or may not act in cooperation with nationalist opposition due to international opportunities or challenges present to them, and effectiveness of state cooptation. Another point to consider is that the international context and state's cooptation capacity are also very much interrelated. For a non-Western authoritarian state to continue to exert power, it has to have support of advanced Western countries in military technology and economic aid besides the internal support it gets from loyal groups. This link between the two variables necessitates combination of international opportunity for the state and high cooptation capacity to prevent opposition nationalism. Combination of international opportunity for nationalist opposition and weak state cooptation may end up with emergence of opposition nationalism, although there may be non-participant groups due to these same two variables.

In conclusion, opposition nationalism approach is not only helpful to understand political nationalism in Iran and it will also provide a framework to study other non-Western nationalisms since they emerged under similar political conditions of foreign impact and undemocratic governments. In addition, considering the fact that there are different social and cultural dynamics of non-Western countries, opposition nationalism approach can also be employed as a framework for comparative study of non-Western nationalisms.

1.4. Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is composed of seven chapters, including the introduction to the subject of enquiry and the conclusions drawn from the analysis. The second chapter following introduction, titled “Nationalism in Non-Western World and Political

Nationalism as an Opposition Movement” firstly aims to introduce modernist understanding of nationalism in the relevant literature. It portrays the Western origins of nationalism and its appeal in the non-Western world. With the discussion on non-Western nationalism, the chapter secondly aims to portray structural conditions for the development of nationalist ideology among non-Western societies while also showing the efficacy of nationalism in the modernization of the non-Western world. This chapter ends with the introduction of nationalism as a political opposition movement. This perspective of opposition nationalism has been developed to understand discursive continuity of nationalism in modern Iran in nationalist opposition movements since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 11 until Green Movement of 2009.

Opposition nationalism in Iran emerged as a political movement in four moments in modern Iranian history, which are Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 11, National Front Movement of 1949 – 53, Iranian Revolution of 1978 – 1979, and Green Movement of 2009. Each of these moments is examined in separate chapters. Thus, the examination begins with the third chapter, which is titled “Nationalism as a Form of Opposition Politics in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 11.” The chapter starts with an evaluation of the dynamics of encounter with modernization by a traditional authority and its responses. The sub-section on foreign intervention and domination portrays the impact of military defeats of the Qajar state and its loss of territory to Britain and Russia, and the impact of concessions given to imperial powers that resulted in loss of economic resources. The second sub-section deals with modernization and centralization initiatives by the Qajar state to counter the destabilizing impact of modernization. This section also addresses the increasing authoritarianism in the face of popular demands from the state. The second part of the chapter is on the formation of political nationalism as an opposition movement. It portrays the coordination of groups with diverse interests in nationalist ideology. Merchants, clergy and intellectuals are mentioned in separate sub-sections as three groups in nationalist coordination. The chapter continued with the mobilization of these diverse groups in nationalist opposition movement. Societies (*anjumans*), street

demonstrations and sanctuaries (*basts*) are the two headings of the chapter where means of mobilization and the interaction of nationalist groups with the state are scrutinized in detail.

The fourth chapter is titled “Nationalism as a Form of Opposition Politics in the National Front Movement.” From 1911 to 1953, there was a significant change in Iranian polity. The military coup d’état by Reza Pahlavi, commander of Cossack Brigade, abolished the traditional Qajar authority, which tumultuously experienced parliamentary monarchy in the last couple of years. He declared the formation of Pahlavi monarchy and embarked on the foundation of the modern Iranian nation state. The consequences of this change in authority and ideology of the state are portrayed in first section of this chapter titled ‘nationalism in the new state: Pahlavi nationalism in government.’ The modernization scheme of Reza Pahlavi is addressed in two sub-sections: institutional and economic modernization, and the cultural modernization. Next, the chapter deals with the formation of nationalist opposition movement that declared itself to be against colonial domination and state despotism. The sub-section on oil politics and foreign intervention portrays the interest of foreign powers in Iranian oil and the impact of this interest on Iranian politics. The next sub-section is about the increasing authoritarianism of the Pahlavi state after the liberal interregnum of World War II as a result of occupation of Iranian land and the nationalist opposition’s assertion against authoritarianism. Then, how oil has become a symbol of national independence is explained in the third sub-section. The third part of the chapter elaborates on the coordination of National Front movement, mainly by socialist, pan-Iranist and religious parties and groups. The last part, which is on the mobilization of the National Front movement, portrays the mobilization process that started in the parliament and continued with the workings of oil commission that also received mass support in street protests.

The fifth chapter, which is titled “Nationalism as a Form of Opposition Politics in the Iranian Revolution of 1978 – 1979”, is about the third moment in modern Iranian history when opposition nationalism aroused in a mass movement. The chapter starts

with portraying the secular modernization of monarchy and reforms under the authority of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The first section of the chapter, which is about the foreign influence in Iran since 1953 coup d'état, aims to provide the roots of anti-Americanism of the nationalist opposition movement. The second section is about the authoritarian policies of the Pahlavi state, which is dealt in two sub-sections; the first one demonstrating the means of the state to control the political space, and the second one demonstrating impact of repressive state apparatus for social control. The next part of the chapter deals with the coordination of communist, Musaddiqist, and clerical parties and organizations in the nationalist ideology of opposition. Then the chapter portrays the mobilization of the movement starting from 1977 and the dynamics of mass protests that enabled the movement to achieve revolution. Since the nationalist opposition movement of 1979 Iranian Revolution has been the only mass movement among the four movements analyzed in this dissertation that is successful to attain state power, the conclusion of the chapter deals with conditions that facilitated the realization of the revolution.

The sixth chapter, 'Nationalism as a Form of Opposition Politics in the Green Movement of 2009,' deals with the recent emergence of nationalist opposition in modern Iranian history. The structure and ideology of Iranian polity has changed with the 1979 revolution. Pahlavi monarchy has been abolished and Islamic Republic is established with a new constitution, political organization, and political and cultural ideology. Islamic Republic is a theocratic government based on popular sovereignty. However, since from the establishment of the new state, there has been a tension between groups who tried to bestow more power for religious institutions and those who demanded more power for the republican institutions. The Green Movement of 2009 is portrayed within this dilemma in the beginning of the chapter. Then the chapter continues with definition of foreign interventionism according to the nationalist opposition. This section portrays the impact of transnationally defined state interest and the Islamic Republic's policies mainly centered on Palestinian issue, which has been redefined by the Green Movement as non-preservation of the nation's interests by the state. The next section is about the authoritarian Islamist

politics of the Islamic Republic to the detriment of republicanism despite the rights of the people are ensured by the constitution. In the third section, coordination of reformist groups in nationalist ideology of the Green Movement is elaborated. Lastly, the chapter deals with the mobilization of the Green Movement that started before the 2009 elections for electoral competition and continued after the elections in the form of street protest.

The last chapter, conclusion, provides an assessment of the previous chapters on the basis of the argument of the dissertation. It also reassesses the premises of the argument by adopting a critical approach.

CHAPTER 2

NATIONALISM IN NON-WESTERN WORLD AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM AS AN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT

The argument of this dissertation departs from the assumption that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, which has originated in Western Europe and spread to the whole world ideationally through modernization and materially through imperialism/colonialism. With the beginning of modernization process in traditional non-Western polities, nationalism has become the defining and justifying principle of political movements in the non-Western societies.

The idea developed in this dissertation that is ‘political nationalism as an opposition movement’ is contingent upon the modernist paradigm of nationalism. This is because the argument of this dissertation regards nationalism as a political expression that is associated with modernization of Iran. The historical, social and cultural bonds in a community of common descent that then constitute national consciousness and take the form of a nation is taken as given in this dissertation. Therefore, this dissertation does not question the heritage and characteristics of Iranian nation – in other words, the proto-national bounds – but searches for the historical and structural conditions that has enabled the emergence of nationalist ideology in Iran and the influence of nationalist ideology on Iranian politics. Indeed, in line with the constructivist approach, main idea of this dissertation departs from the idea that the heritage and characteristics of a nation, which are absolutely historical and may have perennial nature, are selectively incorporated into the idea of nationalism as instruments of ideology. However, these are secondary to the political nationalism that arises as an opposition movement. With the formation of political concept of nation, the internal and external structure affecting the nation becomes primary concerns for the nationalist opposition movements.

Starting from this point of view, this chapter aims first to put forth a framework for the appeal of Western concept of nationalism in the non-Western world in modern condition. Then, it will sketch out the structural conditions of political nationalism in the non-Western world, which give rise to anti-imperialist tenet to nationalist opposition movements. Thirdly, the chapter will develop a framework for political nationalism in Iran and portray the basic premises of opposition nationalism as a second trait to governmental nationalism.

2.1. Western Origins of Nationalism and Its Appeal in the Non-Western World

Modernist thinkers developed theories of nations and nationalism phenomena according to certain characteristics of modern age. Due to the complexity of the issues and differences between the national phenomena on the ground in different parts of the world, no grand narrative of nationalism has been produced. By observing and examining dynamics and effects of an all-encompassing phenomena in societies; that is, modernity, thinkers made explanations through emphasizing certain aspects of modern transformations. What is common in all of these explanations is that since nationalism was a product of modernity and modernity first appeared in Western world, nationalism was first a Western phenomenon. Due to the modern condition, it then spread to the non-Western world.

Elie Kedourie starts his book, *Nationalism*, by stating that “nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.”¹ It was invented due to economic, technological and social changes occurred in Western Europe that constituted the conditions of modernity. Within this framework, the spread of nationalism to the non-Western world has been best explained by Tom Nairn, Ernest Gellner, and Eric Hobsbawm. Nairn puts emphasis on the new dynamics of world political economy, which is characterized by uneven material development from the core to the periphery areas of the world. Gellner focuses on the formation of a new

¹ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism (Fourth, Expanded Edition)*, (USA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), p. 1.

type of society necessitated by the industrial development, which conquered the world through colonialism and imperialism. These economic and political developments are combined in Hobsbawm's analysis of nationalism where he portrays the change in the understanding of nationalist principle in Europe and how this change affected the political map of Europe as well as the entire world.

Tom Nairn argues that there is a powerful connection between nationalism and the concept of development or social and economic growth. For him, nationalism can be understood only within the context of general acceleration of change since about 1800. Therefore, the origins of nationalism are 'in the machinery of world political economy'. According to Nairn, development of world economy since 18th century represents an *uneven development of history*, which is a material fact about modern history.²

European Enlightenment had foreseen an even and progressive development of material civilization and mass culture. Elites of the time were convinced that progress would be more favorable for the 'uncivilized' and they would catch up in time and with help. The instrument of this diffusion of acculturation was capitalism. In the words of Nairn:

Modern capitalist development was launched by a number of West-European states which has accumulated the potential for doing so over a long period of history. The even-development notion was that this advance could be straightforwardly followed, and then the institutions responsible for it copied—hence the periphery, the world's countryside, would catch up with the leaders in due time.³

This diffusion process would proceed through the formation of international or 'cosmopolitan' elite. However, the impact of leading countries was experienced as

² Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, (Australia: New Left Books, 1997), pp. 322-323.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

domination and invasion instead of diffusion or copying.⁴ Outside the core-areas of the new industrial-capitalist world economy, people experienced that “progress in the abstract meant domination in the concrete”⁵ by foreign powers. “Humanity’s forward march signified in the first instance Anglicisation or Frenchification, ... later on, more globally: ‘Westernisation’ or ‘Americanisation’.”⁶ Therefore, the elites of the periphery had to mobilize against progress, which meant domination in the concrete sense, but they also had to set out to progress themselves. They had to copy the factories, schools, parliaments etc. but they had to reject the implementation of these by direct foreign intervention and control. Nairn states that this procedure is called ‘uneven and combined development’ where the periphery countries try to advance through associating progress with their own native inheritance of social forms.⁷ For this end, the newly-awakened elites of the periphery countries had to mobilize their societies through forming an inter-class community who was aware of its own identity on the face of the outside forces of domination. Since there were no economic and political structures of modernity already available, this mobilization had to be in terms of the people and the peculiarities of the region; *i.e.* the inherited ethnos. This had paved the way for a populist nationalism, through which the new elites of the periphery countries drugged masses into history by the help of their own culture, which was quite remote from Enlightenment rationalism. Therefore, the periphery countries attempted to overcome their ambivalent situation, which was resulted from their resistance to domination and efforts to take over the vital forces of development for their own use, by taking nationality as a basis for political and ideological mobilization.⁸

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 328.

Ernest Gellner argues that nationalism is one of the consequences of industrial society, which has emerged in Western Europe and conquered entire world by European powers.⁹ He considers emergence of industrial society as the formation of a new social order whose roots lie in the Weberian principle of rationality.¹⁰ According to Gellner,

Industrial society is the only society ever to live by and rely on sustained and perpetual growth, on an expected and continuous improvement. It was the first society to invent the concept and ideal of progress, of continuous improvement. But the improvement was never perpetual, nor expected to be so. Something unusual must have happened to have engendered so unusual and remarkable expectation. This is the conception of the world as homogeneous, subject to systematic, indiscriminate laws, and as open to interminable exploration, offered endless possibilities of new combinations of means with no firm prior expectations and limits: no possibilities would be barred, and in the end nothing but evidence would decide how things were, and how they could be combined to secure desired effects.¹¹

Industrial society's productive system was based on cumulative science and technology; and mankind's commitment to this type of society was irreversible. The age of transition to industrialism was also an age of nationalism, "a period of turbulent readjustment, in which either political boundaries, or cultural ones, or both, were being modified, so as to satisfy the new nationalist imperative which now, for the first time, was making itself felt."¹² The cultural homogeneity, which was a concomitant of industrial age, was demanded by nationalism. However, it was not nationalism that created this cultural homogeneity. Conversely, "a homogeneity

⁹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (USA: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 42.

¹⁰ For Gellner, the Weberian principle of rationality is "central and important" in the functioning of this new social order. There are two elements of rationality, which are the secret of the modern spirit. These are coherence or consistency, and efficiency. While coherence implies "like treatment of like cases", which is "the very soul of a good bureaucrat", efficiency implies "rational selection of best available means to given, clearly formulated and isolated ends"; that is "the spirit of an ideal entrepreneur." *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.”¹³

Therefore, nationalism is not separate from other consequences of industrialism and “it is not the *only* effect of the imposition of this new social form”.¹⁴ To a better understanding of nationalism, we should look at the social and cultural developments associated with industrialism and conflated with nationalism. Firstly, there is a strong relationship between nationalism and Reformation. According to Gellner, “the stress of the Reformation on the literacy and scripturalism, its onslaught on a monopolistic priesthood, its individualism and links with mobile urban populations make it a kind of harbinger of social features and attitudes that produce the nationalist age.”¹⁵ The second one is the direct consequences of industrialization itself. Population explosion, rapid urbanization, labour migration are the social features of early industrialism that indicate a substantial social difference from the pre-industrial age. Also, previously inward-turned communities come under the economic and political penetration of a global and centralizing polity.

These developments are associated with the third effect, which is the link between nationalism and the processes of colonialism, imperialism and de-colonization. According to Gellner, “European conquest of the world was carried out and completed by nations increasingly oriented towards industry and trade, not by militaristic machine, nor by a swarm of temporarily cohesive tribesmen.”¹⁶ Enabled by economic and technological superiority, this conquest had not been planned. It was neither a total occupation nor a military orientation. However, coming to the 1950s and 1960s, diffusion of technology and increasing economic power in other

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

parts of the world led to a change in the balance of power, which had ended the ‘pluralistic European empire’.¹⁷

For Gellner, nationalism is not only a reaction to industrial conditions but to an imperative consequence of social and cultural transformations of industrialization. He observes that “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that political and national unit should be congruent.”¹⁸ Nationalism can be defined as a sentiment or as a movement. “Nationalist sentiment is a feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind”¹⁹ Indeed, to make culture and polity congruent is an effort to endow a culture with its own political roof.²⁰ This political roof is the state. Therefore, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy; and this legitimacy “requires that the ethnic boundaries should not cut across the political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state – a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation – should not separate the power-holders from the rest.”²¹ In the industrial age, the presence of the state as a contingency is also inescapable.

In Weberian terms, the state is an agency within society, which possesses monopoly of use of legitimate violence. Although its distinctiveness lies in the specialization and concentration of order maintenance, the state is the entity that ensures division of labor in the society. This division of labour enables high levels of social mobility in industrial societies. When there are now no longer ascribed roles that are being

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

reinforced by culture, now shared culture plays a more active role.²² Therefore, in industrial societies, there occurs a different relationship between power and culture than before. Nationalism, which is a consequence of a new form of social organization, is based on education-dependent high cultures that are protected by their own state. It uses pre-existing cultures generally by transforming them in the process and turns them into nations. For Gellner, this is an inescapable reality.²³

Eric Hobsbawm also argues “the basic characteristic of modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity.”²⁴ The whole analysis of Hobsbawm’s two books, *The Invention of Tradition* (1983) and *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality* (1990), reflect analysis of nations and nationalism based on European experience. This is because nations and nationalism has come out as a novelty in Western Europe. From the French Revolution until 1830s, “the equation nation = state = people, especially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territory, since structure and definition of states were now essentially territorial”²⁵ was the characteristic of nationalism in Western Europe. This political nationalism has evolved to liberal bourgeoisie nationalism between the years 1830 – 1880. The principal of nationality, which changed the map of Europe in this period, was applied to only nationalities of certain size; i.e. referred by Hobsbawm as ‘threshold principle’.²⁶ However, this has been different when it comes to the political phenomena of nationalism. Bourgeois liberal conception of nation and nation-states regards development of nations as “a phase in human evolution or progress from the small group to the larger, from family to tribe to region, to nation and, in the last instance, to the unified world of the future in which science and art

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

²⁴ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 14.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.19.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.31.

would prevail over race and ethnicity.”²⁷ Since this perspective saw nation as ‘the stage of evolution reached in the mid-nineteenth century’, this idea of ‘nation as progress’ also implied assimilation of smaller communities and peoples to larger ones.²⁸

The nationalism of 1880 – 1914, however, was different. In this period, the threshold principle was abandoned. The nineteenth century principle of nationality accepted claim to self-determination by any size of people who considered themselves as a nation. This brought ethnicity and language to the central importance for the criteria of nationhood. Moreover, a shift to the political right of nation and flag occurred and this affected not only non-state national movements but also national sentiments within the established nation-states.²⁹ This new principle of nationality reached at its peak at the end of the First World War due to two developments: First, “the collapse of the great multinational empires of central and eastern Europe and the Russian Revolution which made it desirable for the Allies to play the Wilsonian card against the Bolshevik card.”³⁰ One other phenomenon that came out of European order at the end of Versailles Settlement was “the geographical spread of nationalist movements, and the divergence of the new ones from the European pattern.”³¹ With this argument, Hobsbawm refers to colonial and semi-colonial liberation movements outside of Europe. The leaders of these movements learned the language of nationalism in or from the West and they spoke with it even if this language did not fit to their situation. However, the anti-colonial struggles were influenced by the anti-fascist nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s in the West, which combined internationalism and patriotism. The association of nationalism and international left

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.38.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.39.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.102.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.131.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.136.

was reinforced by anti-colonial independence struggles, which were tied to international left. According to Hobsbawm,

the general movement towards independence and decolonization, especially after 1945, was unquestionably identified with socialist/communist anti-imperialism, which is perhaps why so many decolonized and newly independent states, and by no means only those in which socialists and communists had played an important part in their struggles for liberation, declared themselves to be in some sense 'socialist'. National liberation had become a slogan of the left.³²

However, in the 1970s emerged alternative discourses for national independence apart from the leftist one. Hobsbawm stated that "in the 'Third World' the rise of religious integralism, notably in various Islamic forms but also in other religious variants, provided a foundation for both revolutionary nationalism and national repression."³³ The question Hobsbawm asks, i.e. "how have the fortunes of nationalism been affected by the spread of nationalist sentiments and movements beyond the geographic regions where they first appeared?", has clearly points to the fact that nationalism has been a Western phenomena which dispersed to the non-Western world. His answers classify anti-imperial movements under three headings: "local educated elites imitating European 'national self-determination', popular anti-western xenophobia, and the natural high spirits of martial tribes."³⁴ He further suggests that there is no need for a further theoretical reconsideration for these cases since because in few of the cases the anti-imperial movements were endowed an existing political or ethnic entity at the time the imperialists came, and consequently the development of nationalism since decolonization has occurred in the nineteenth century European understanding of national principle. Nationalism since 1945 has directed not against foreign oppressors but against newly emancipated states claiming a national homogeneity which most of the time they did not have. They

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.151.

protested against the ethnic or cultural artificiality of the territories portioned by the imperial powers as well as against the ideologies shaped by the Western thinking and the ruling modernizing elites who performed these ideologies.³⁵

2.2. Political Nationalism in the Non-Western World

As Carlton J. H. Hayes states, “the sentiment of nationality is not new. The sentiment of patriotism is not new. But nationalism is new.”³⁶ He argues that it has only since the 18th century that the political map of the world has been drawn along national lines by a conscious and purposeful attempt. This attempt is also for and leading to instill a supreme loyalty to the hearts and minds of the human beings to their respective nationalities and nation states. Therefore, as Hans Kohn defined, “the growth of nationalism is the process of integration of the masses of the people into a common political form”, which is the modern state that emerged in the period from 16th to 18th century.³⁷

Nationalism in the non-Western world, whether dispersed through dynamics of uneven development, European conquest through industrialization or trade, or by geographical spread due to change in nationality principle in Europe that made alliance with international leftist movement available, created desire and motivation on the part of the peoples of traditional polities to acquire an independent state where people could enjoy popular sovereignty. The concept of popular sovereignty, Kamenka writes, “replaces the concept of divinely or historically appointed ruler; the concept of the citizen replaces the concept of the subject.”³⁸ In these circumstances

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.153.

³⁶ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, (USA: Russell&Russell, 1966), p. 61.

³⁷ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, (USA: Transaction Publishers, 2005), p. 4.

³⁸ Eugene Kamenka, “Political Nationalism: The Evolution of the Idea,” in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), p. 14.

where “a radical change on the basis of traditional sovereignty and the kind of legitimacy sought and claimed by political institutions” occurs, “the rise of true political nationalism” could be found.³⁹ According to Kamenka, this political nationalism “turns its attention inward to the organization and basis of the polity as opposed to mere national consciousness or even nationalistic xenophobia, which arises from external threats and fears.”⁴⁰

However, for an inward-looking political nationalism to develop in the non-Western world, the traditional states first went through the phase of colonialism/imperialism of the West. Without taking into account “the reaction to the conquest of the alien rule, specifically the European rule” Elie Kedouri states in his book on nationalism in Asia and Africa, nationalism cannot be explained. According to Kedouri, non-Western nationalism acquires its anti-colonial character not just with the presence of a colonial authority but the reaction against it.⁴¹ Thus, the national sentiment develops to a degree that activates masses for a movement of opposition to the foreign rule or domination.

Historically, this situation is a consequence of a structural change, which is the capitalist development in the Western world, and which reverberated in the non-West in the form of Western economic exploitation until the early 20th century. The early capitalist expansion was called ‘imperialism’, which, according to British publicist J.A. Hobson, signified a modern phenomenon of a number of competing empires largely set to a scramble for the division of Africa and Asia.⁴² Lenin then reserved

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Elie Kedourie (ed.), *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, (USA: Meridian Printing, 1970), p. 21. The inadequate and misleading theories and doctrines which are debated by Kedourie: Marxist explanation that holds nationalism in Asia and Africa as the natural consequence of European exploitation of these areas and exploitation, *i.e.* the existence of European imperialism and colonialism; destructive impact of industrialization; the argument that there is a link between nationalism and economic conditions.

⁴² John Atkinson Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, (USA: The University of Michigan Press, 1971), p. 12. As to the question why European states (including Russia, Germany, France, Italy, the

the term to distinguish modern imperialism from earlier imperialisms. In 1916, he defined modern imperialism as the ‘highest’ stage in capitalist development, in which finance-capital had come to dominate the metropolitan capitalist economy.⁴³ Lenin further defines imperialism as capitalism at a “stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.”⁴⁴ Whereas the pre-19th century colonial trade consisted principally luxuries such as silk, spices etc., modern imperialist trade involves the export of raw materials from the underdeveloped countries to the industrialized ones. In the same vein, Stalin writes in 1913, “A nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism was at the same time a process of the amalgamation of people into nations.”⁴⁵ Thus, nationalism was a

Netherlands, Portugal, and Britain) seemed so willing to amass new territories, John Darwin summarizes three answers. Firstly, territorial expansion was a response of governments pursuing the national economic interest by means such as race for markets, supplies, and fields of investment. Secondly, empire-building was seen as political theatre and a way to appease the chauvinism of masses. Ideologically, as an outgrowth of European nationalism, having an empire became evidence of national vitality, vindication of national project and strengthening of national community. Thirdly, competition for colonies was seen as the unavoidable by-product of European rivalry within Europe; which was imperialism as national diplomacy. John Darwin, “Nationalism and Imperialism, c.1880-1940” in John Breuilly (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, (Great Britain: The Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 342-343.

⁴³ “The principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism is the domination of monopolist combines of the big capitalists. These monopolies are most firmly established when *all* the sources of raw materials are captured by one group, and we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist combines exert every effort to make it impossible for their rivals to compete with them by buying up, for example, iron ore fields, oil fields, etc. Colonial possession alone gives the monopolies complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle with competitors, including the contingency that the latter will defend themselves by means of a law establishing a state monopoly. The more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate is the struggle for the acquisition of colonies.” Vladimir Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Pamphlet Published in Petrograd, April 1917, p.31.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.33.

⁴⁵ Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2003), p. 13.

phenomenon that came to existence with the development of early capitalism when bourgeoisie, which played the leading role in this development, needed to establish a unified nation for a large capitalist market to work. When this capitalism acquired overseas colonies in the form of finance capitalism, the exploitation that peoples of Asia and Africa created resistance that led to national liberation movements. Therefore, this doctrine, which claimed a connection between the existence of European imperialism and colonialism to the nationalism in Asia and Africa, envisioned that nationalism was the expression of industrial capitalism in Europe and the reaction to European imperialism in the colonies that were acquired with the development of finance capitalism.⁴⁶

The term ‘imperialism’, which referred to the unprincipled acquisition of overseas territories by the European powers after 1850 often by the force of arms, was soon after to be replaced by the term ‘colonialism’, which “denoted a system of legislation in a different and politically independent territory, with its mainly European features adapted to local conditions.”⁴⁷ Indeed, there are two theoretical approaches to the changes in world from the Western point of view. The first one suggests a universal transition from a feudal mode of production and social structure to a capitalist one in the West, and a process of development in parallel with the Western experience in non-Western world whether from a pre-capitalist or non-capitalist form to a capitalist, dependent, or peripheral capitalist society and mode of production. The second theoretical approach suggests a universal development from a traditional society, economy and culture to a modern one.⁴⁸

Essentially, what differs a traditional society from a modern one is the greater control of modern man over his natural and social environment, which is based on scientific

⁴⁶ Elie Kedourie (ed.), *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism*, (Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 25.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

and technological knowledge. Intellectually, it means a huge knowledge accumulation about man's environment and diffusion of this knowledge through society by means of literacy, mass communications, and education. Modern society is urban rather than rural; there is diversification of economic activity whose geographical scope is greater but centralized at the national level with the emergence of national markets, national sources of capital and other national economic institutions. Also, commercial, industrial, and other nonagricultural activities take place of agricultural activity. Such a society is endowed with modern polity that is characterized by rationalized authority, differentiated structure, mass participation, and capability to accomplish a broad range of goals.⁴⁹

Although the transition from traditional society to a modern one is deemed to be universal, John H. Kautsky adopts a two-tiered approach that separates Western and non-Western transition to modernity, which is 'modernization from within' such as happened in Western Europe, and 'modernization from without' that happened outside Western Europe.⁵⁰ Accordingly, modernization from within is gradual and organic process initiated by the natives of a society with the ideas, processes and material elements of native origin. Modernization from without, on the other hand, is a sudden break from the traditional past that can be brought to a society either by foreigners or by some of its own natives or both with the ideas, processes and material elements of foreign origin.⁵¹ The two different modernization ways are also linked with the development of two different nationalism forms; western nationalism and eastern nationalism. Karl W. Deutsch differentiates between Western Europe and Eastern Europe in terms of modernization and social mobilization towards

⁴⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics" in Norman W. Provizor (ed.), *Analyzing the Third World: Essays From Comparative Politics*, (USA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 33-35.

⁵⁰ The aim of Kautsky's the two-tiered approach is to save the explanations of modernization from cultural relativity and develop a structural view of differences between modernization of societies that were all traditional before modernity, and Western Europe was not an exception.

⁵¹ ⁵¹ John H. Kautsky, *The Political Consequences of Modernization*, (USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 48.

nationalism. In Western Europe, modernization was early, slow and integrative, which implied while growth of cities, spread of markets, development of mass audience, the reduction of Latin-derived vernacular languages to written form occurred hundreds of years before 19th century, the age of industrialization had direct impact on voting and mass voting and mass literacy in the last hundred years. In the Eastern Europe, however, social mobilization and development occurred late and quick compared to Western Europe and it was also secessionist. In Western Europe, there were only seven nations that formed through secession from larger units, which are the Swiss, the Dutch, the Portuguese, the Belgians, the Norwegians, the Irish and the Icelanders. However, in Eastern Europe, so many nations were formed through secession from the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the non-Western world, according to Karl Deutsch, modernization and social mobilization is still later and still faster. In this vein, the nationalization process in Asia and Africa resembles more to the Eastern European process. This part of the world witnessed a fast break up of large colonial empires and rise of strong ‘unassimilated populations.’ This is because when the social mobilization process is gradual such as in Western Europe, social and national assimilation happens more firm. Conversely, when social mobilization is late and rapid, various aspects of the mobilization such as language, monetization, mass audience, literacy, voting, urbanization, industrialization, is late to be achieved and assimilation into national identity happens slowly.⁵²

John Plamenatz employs the same differentiation between western and eastern nationalisms but unlike Deutch he does not take the European experience as a model. Instead, Plamenatz argues, although the two forms first appeared to the West and East of Europe, it is the same “desire to preserve and enhance a people’s national or cultural identity when that identity is threatened, or the desire to transform or even create it where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking.”⁵³ The Eastern nationalism that

⁵² Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, (USA: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 68-73.

⁵³ John Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism” in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), pp. 23 – 24.

flourished among the Slavs in Europe, among African, Asian and Latin American peoples, is both imitative and competitive. It is imitative because it arises from the feeling of disadvantage vis-à-vis the developed nations, and competitive because it arises in a world where social mobility, trade and a cosmopolitan culture are growing fast in a world where similar standards of and ambitions for development are dispersed globally.⁵⁴ However, the desire for transformation through imitative and competitive conditions also bears the forces of rejection. According to Plamenatz, the Eastern nationalism is “both imitative and also hostile the model it imitates,” thus “it has involved both acceptance (imitation) and rejection (the demand for independence and the claim to be innovating as well as imitating).”⁵⁵ The rejection is two-fold, both ambivalent: “the rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity.”⁵⁶

Political nationalism in the non-Western world, which has aroused from the structural conditions created by European modernity and development, has come to dominate the consciousness of all modernizing societies that aspired to challenge Western superiority and claim their place in the stage of history. Intensified in the post-World War II period, the imitation of Western ideas and ways of development has constituted a transformative force for the traditional forms of politics and society. The interaction of Western ideas with local and indigenous forms has produced different implications for non-Western societies than the original Western experience. According to Peter Worsley, while nationalism in the 19th century Europe was unitary in which the nationality is not separate from the state, in the non-Western world nationalism acquired different meanings. In colonial context, nationalism referred to movements that establish, or seek to establish, independent

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 32.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

states on the basis of common citizenship of novel political and cultural entities, which means the entities created by foreign colonial powers. In the colonized countries, the 'nationals' do not necessarily share the same traditional cultural system, but they share their colonial fate in common. The other meaning of nationalism in non-Western world is the pan-movements in Asia and Africa, which transcend the established state boundaries and built much larger religious (Pan-Islamism), cultural and linguistic (Pan-Arabism, Slavophilism), physical (négritude) or continental (Pan-Africanism) affiliations. Yet, Worsley argues, the general framework for the non-Western nationalism is the common fate of 'subjection to modern capitalist imperialism' and the disruption of traditional society and economy in the newly independent states.⁵⁷ Thus, once the non-Western peoples achieve independence, Alter states, nationalism continues to be "a method of spiritual mobilization, of eliciting, activating and canalizing dormant political energies."⁵⁸

Therefore, the aim of political nationalism in non-Western world is two-fold: to achieve independent nation state and to organize it in line with European ideals of popular sovereignty, equality, development and progress, which are basically the ideals of French Revolution. Nationalism, thus, has been received as a progressive force for the new states of non-Western world, "a conscious-raising medium for collective self-discovery following the often traumatic experience of colonial oppression and enforced westernization."⁵⁹ According to Dawa Norbu's definition, it is "politicized social consciousness centered upon a common national identity rooted in a shared tradition, and the ideological belief in the structure of the modern nation-state as the most efficacious instrument of national unity, national independence and national interest."⁶⁰ It is differentiated from the Western

⁵⁷ Peter Worsley, *The Third World*, (USA: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 69.

⁵⁸ Elie Kedourie (ed.), *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, p. 70.

⁵⁹ Peter Alter, *Nationalism*, (Great Britain: Edward Arnold, 1991), p. 146.

⁶⁰ Dawa Norbu, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*, (London&New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 26.

nationalism by “the salience of culture in national identity formation, the voluntaristic process of mass mobilization as a means for nation-in-the-making, and such a nationality struggling to create or seize state power structure as the basic goal of any non-Western nationalism.”⁶¹

However, the concomitant forces of imitation and rejection that transform the society in interaction with indigenous political forms suggest that there is no single pre-defined way to reach these goals. Likewise, the nationalist movements in the non-Western societies cannot be associated neither with a single Western political philosophy nor with a certain social class. They are trans-class movements that appeal almost all the classes in society.⁶² The common denominator of the non-Western political nationalist movements is the demand for Western style parliamentary democracy.⁶³ It is the impact of earlier nationalism in Western Europe, which was based on the Enlightenment ideas of natural rights of individual, parliamentarianism, liberalism and democracy, and which was also expressed by the American Declaration of Independence and French Revolution.⁶⁴ To the peoples of non-Western world, parliamentary democracy functionalized by constitutional authority is the solution to assert popular sovereignty both against the foreigners and

⁶¹ European experience has been used as a measure to understand and define nationalism in non-Western world. For instance, Anthony Smith clearly indicates that the aim of his work, *State and Nation in the Third World*, is “to develop some general arguments about the formation and role of states and nations in non-European societies in the light of the West European experience.” He further states that he follows the tradition of taking Western experience as a baseline for comparisons because it was in Western Europe that modern state, national communities, ideologies and sentiments, and formation of new strata, namely, bureaucrats, bourgeoisies and intelligentsia made their first appearance in Europe; and secondly, all these were transported and transplanted into the non-European settings through the agency of the West. See, Anthony D. Smith, *State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism*, Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983, p. 1. Dawa Norbu refuses this vision or, as expressed by Smith, tradition by stating that “European paradigm is often uncritically used as the standard measurement for the study of Third World nationalism” and he identifies three respects that the two differs from each other. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁶³ Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, (USA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 11.

⁶⁴ Louis L. Snyder, *The New Nationalism*, (USA: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p.36.

arbitrary use of domestic power by traditional authority. However, according to Snyder, since the non-Western societies did not experience their own enlightenment, the individual liberties are very limited in favor of a powerful state. Instead, “the tendency was to exalt the state, produce a strong leader, and keep the individual in a secondary position.”⁶⁵

2.3. Political Nationalism in Iran as a Form of Opposition Politics

The analysis of non-Western nationalism, which also applies to modern Iran, envisages the fulfillment of nationalist aspirations when the peoples, who redefined their proto-national bonds as national identity through the modern consciousness they gained, reach the independent modern statehood, which is the nation-state. The success of the nation state project depends on its ability to survive against external threats and functionality in homogenizing the society into one hegemonic high culture of nation; thereby, eliminating the challenge of any sub-cultural ethnic or racial nationalist mobilization. From that point on, the scholars observe the success and failure of nation-state project, and the formations of sub-nationalism within nation-states. David E. Apter, for instance, mentions party solidarity, the use of political religion and the role of youth in relation to it, the role of military, and the role of civil servant as means for effective mobilization for nation states. He also considers traditional coercion techniques as a means for successful popular mobilization for the modernizing monarchies.⁶⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, on the other hand, considers modernization of the 19th century as an attempt to thwart imperialism but the modernization of the 20th century to thwart revolution.⁶⁷ To thwart revolution, he advises survival strategies to the modernizing centralized monarchies

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁶⁶ David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, (USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 359 – 405.

⁶⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (USA: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 155.

of nation states. According to Huntington, although centralization was necessary for the monarchy to promote social, cultural, and economic reform, it was also an obstacle to expansion of power and assimilation of new groups produced by modernization. He advises the modernizing rulers to transform into modern reigning monarchies, expanding the power of the political system, organize political party of the state and institutionalize popular support to his rule through the party.⁶⁸ Giving the example of Iranian monarchy in the beginning of the 1960s, Huntington offers the option of maintaining authority in the face of opposition to reforms “by continuing to modernize but by intensifying the repression necessary to keep under the control those conservatives who disapprove of the reform and those liberals who disapprove of the monarchy.”⁶⁹ The Iranian nation state, which was ruled by a modernizing monarchy, used all these possible means for the success of its nationalist state-formation scheme and for sustaining its power over the political system. However, it faced with two significant nationalist opposition movements against the state, the second one of which resulted in overthrow of the monarchy in 1979. From the point of modernization theory, this signifies the failure of the modernizing nation state, thus nationalism.

Although the non-Western nationalism framework is applicable to the Iranian case especially for the emergence of nationalist movement against foreign domination and arbitrary state, the fact that non-Western nationalism often ends up with strong states is also valid for Iran. Political nationalism that emerged under the traditional Qajar authority against British and Russian domination and arbitrary politics of the state ended up with the establishment of constitutional monarchical order. When the state authority changed to Pahlavi monarchy, Iranian nation state was established as a strong state with secular nationalist ideology. Then, the state authority changed to Islamic Republic that emerged as another strong nation state with religious nationalist ideology. This reading on the basis of shifts in state authority contiutes the

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 177 – 185.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

conventional historiography of Iranian political nationalism at the state level. The periodization according to shifts in state authority leads to interpretation of ruptures in nationalist politics. In the rupture reading, political nationalism becomes the driving force of transformative changes in state authority and shifts in definition of national identity by the state.

This dissertation, however, argues that the examination of modern Iranian history displays second trait of nationalism, which is as old as the emergence of national consciousness and concurrent with the formation of the nation-state. This second trait of nationalism in modern Iran is rival to the state-nationalism, or the kind of nationalism that has been propagated as a unifying ideational and material structure on the way to national progress. This rival nationalism does not have state power; but it aims to influence and handle the state power in order to implement the goals that deemed to be serving the national interest better than the state nationalism serves. That the rival nationalism is lacking state power is the reason for I refer it as 'secondary' to the primary nationalism of the state. On the contrary to the rupture reading at the state level, this second trait of political nationalism, which is the driving force of opposition movements at the societal level, demonstrates continuity in modern Iranian history.

The examination of modern Iranian history reveals that the secondary or rival trait of nationalism appears in opposition to two general conditions whose content changes over the time depending on the forces that have influence over the society and thus defined as specific threats of the time. These two general conditions are foreign interventionism and state authoritarianism. The content of foreign interventionism and state authoritarianism depends on the actor and nature of the foreign intervener and the actions of state authority that restricts the people's sovereignty in government affairs. Thus, this rival trait of nationalism can be referred with a general term, which is 'opposition nationalism.' For definition, opposition nationalism is a modern political movement whose driving force is nationalism that displays itself in opposition to foreign interventionism in political, economic, cultural affairs of the

country, and to state authoritarianism that restricts the political space and limits the exercise of popular sovereignty by the people. The nature of state's authoritarian policies and the foreign actor that the state involves in collaborative relationship determines the discourse of opposition nationalism. Thus, the two threats of state authority and foreign influence are convergent elements in the nationalist discourse of the opposition.

There are five characteristics of nationalist opposition movement. Firstly, it is a mass movement with a political motivation of obtaining and using state power. Secondly, it emerges through the coordination and mobilization of different groups with diverse ideologies and interests around the common nationalist cause; thus, it cannot be associated with any specific ideology. Although the ideological tendency of the movement's leadership may exert its weight in specific demands from the state, the driving force for the masses to be coordinated around the leadership is not its ideology but the common nationalist goal of terminating the authoritarian state power that is permissive to foreign intervention. Thirdly, the ambivalence between acceptance and rejection vis-à-vis modernization accompanies the nationalist opposition movement. Thus, the movement can include traditional elements that have been redefined in the process of modernization. However, political nationalism is certainly not grounded on tradition but in modernity. Fourthly, it is a mass movement that expresses discontent through street mobilization in most of the cases, and also through other available means for mobilization. Finally, the nationalist opposition movement ceases to be an opposition movement when it captures state power. The impellent motive for the nationalist opposition movement is to inflict change in state policy which is regarded contrary to the nation's interest. In this sense, it is a revolutionary force that desires to change the power and organizational structure of the state. Once nationalist opposition movement attains its aim, it becomes a status quo power that works for preserving the change it attained. It is no longer the 'secondary' rival nationalist trait to power, but transforms itself into the hegemonic primary state nationalism. The hegemonic state power, no matter it has emerged out of the success of nationalist opposition movement in removing the

previous state authority, is doomed to face with future nationalist opposition movements as long as the state authority continues to restrict the exercise of popular sovereignty by the people and permits the foreign actors to influence the national decisions to the detriment of the people.

2.4. Conclusion

This dissertation regards nationalism as a political movement that seeks to exercise state power. Nationalist ideology defines the nation as having a distinct identity from other nations on the basis of historical and cultural characteristics of the nation. Nationalism seeks independence of this nation through attainment of political sovereignty. It also suggests that the interests and values of the nation take priority over all other interests and values.⁷⁰

The dissertation regards nationalism as a phenomenon associated with modernity. It appeared first in the Western Europe as a result of political and material changes provided by the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. With the imperial expansion to the non-Western territories, the modern phenomenon of nationalism gained importance for the non-Western peoples. Thus, political nationalism emerged in non-Western states with the aim to gain independence from colonial powers and attain political sovereignty. The assertion of the 'rights of the nation' gave way to the formation of nation states on the basis of popular sovereignty. Although it did not necessarily mean democracy, a level of popular representation through constitutionally formed parliaments began to be exercised. Nationalism became the organizing principle of the new nation states that initiated reforms for modernization and development.

The disposition of the traditional and modernizing polities in the non-West in the face of dynamics of modernization rendered nationalism an ideological ground

⁷⁰ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, (USA: Chicago University Press, 1994), p. 2.

where both acceptance and resistance has come into play. Nationalism received acceptance by the non-Western societies as an ideology of freedom and dignity, as a counterweight to threats of modernity in the modernizing polity, as a shield to preserve the communal being and identity. It also created resistance to outside influence in the form of colonial or non-colonial domination, and to domestic pulses to control the limits of people's freedom in the form of authoritarian or totalitarian political power.

Nationalism in modern Iran has appeared at the end of the 19th century within the structural conditions defined for non-Western nationalism; that is, attainment of independent state by terminating imperialist penetration and terminating arbitrary traditional authority through a constitution that ensures popular sovereignty and asserts will and rights of the nation. With the overthrow of traditional dynasty, the new Iranian nation state was established in mid-1920s. Proclaiming itself a constitutional monarchy, the new Iranian nation state embarked on organizing the polity in the line of its nationalist ideology. However, the traditional and modern forces of rejection whose interests were threatened by the top-down reforms of the Iranian nation state and who could not find suitable political space for participation due to restrictive apparatus of the authoritarian state formed a rival trait of political nationalism to the state. Thus, opposition nationalism emerged in Iran in a discursive continuity throughout the modern Iranian history as a mass political movement that mobilized in opposition to foreign intervention and authoritarian state.

CHAPTER 3

NATIONALISM AS A FORM OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF 1906 – 11

Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 was the first significant nationalist opposition movement in modern Iran that posed a serious challenge to the state authority, which was being used by Qajar monarchy. The Constitutional Revolution was a political opposition movement aroused with the coordination of three social groups, namely merchants, clergy, and intellectuals, who mobilized the society around the nationalist cause of eliminating the British and Russian imperialism in Iran and limiting the state power with the adoption of a constitution and formation of a parliamentary assembly through which popular sovereignty could be exercised.

The Constitutional Revolution was also the first significant opposition movement in modern Iranian history where nationalist ideology gained a mass appeal. In the modernizing world where ideals of French Revolution and material gains of industrial revolution was changing the traditional state and society structures, the appeal to nationalist ideology emphasized distinctiveness of a specific community from other communities. In general, independence and dignity of the community were the main objectives for nationalist ideology. They stemmed from the belief that a specific community constitutes a nation, which was a political community entitled to independent statehood and having a primary loyalty.¹ In this sense, Iran was possessing objective bases of nationalism, such were “a distinctive national history, a distinctive language, a distinctive religion, a distinctive literature, a distinctive art, and is even inhabited by a distinctive subrace.”² However, nationalism in Iran appeared as the primary determinant of politics at the end of 19th century with the development of Iranian modernity. The Constitutional Revolution was the first of

¹ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 3.

² Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*, (USA: University of California Press, 1962), p.77.

this type of nationalist politics, which was a form of opposition politics to the existing state and imperialist influence.

The opposition in non-nation states, such as the Qajar state, where the ultimate source of authority is God and the people are subjects of the ruler who rules upon divine grace, arises from the disruption of the belief in the justness of the ruler. This is not only peculiar to national oppositions but also to various kinds of oppositions to the state in pre-modern era. It is the political changes associated with modernity that makes an opposition nationalist. Political modernization is accompanied by centralization of state authority, which appeared as increasing control of the central state on matters of taxation, justice, and religious authority. “As the state takes more and more resources from those it governed, in such forms as increased revenue, conscripts and legal powers, it reduces the importance of local and provincial institutions as places where decisions have been made and enforced.”³ Disruption in the traditional power structure causes people to direct their attention to the central government for either to stop change or to have an influence in the direction of change. Indeed, modernizing and centralizing state leads to the emergence of a modern concern about the relationship between state and society, in other words, between public and private. This is because the increased intervention of the state to the affairs of its subjects changes the image of the state in the eyes of the people. The monarchical state comes to acquire an absolute sovereignty, “as a ‘public’ authority standing for some general principle or interest over and above the myriad ‘private’ interests which made up society.”⁴ In this new definition of public and private, it is the family life, economic dealings, cultural and religious preferences regarded as private whereas the attacks on persons and property by force regarded as public. In fact, this is a process where the traditional distinction between the ruler and the ruled acquired modern meaning as the distinction between the state and society. It is at this point that nationalist ideology comes into existence. It seeks to abolish this

³ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, (USA: Chicago University Press, 1994), p. 81.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

distinction between the state and the society by establishing a link between the two. In the nationalist understanding, the modern state, which “both shapes nationalist politics and provides that politics with its major objective, namely possession of the state”⁵, is no longer perceived as rule from above but it begins to be defined by negotiations between monarchs and the political community within which their rule operated.

In general, “a nationalist movement seeks to bind people together in a particular territory in an endeavor to gain and use state power.”⁶ Nationalist ideology provides a guide for the national movement for how to attain state power. Being mostly an intellectual endeavor, nationalist ideology becomes a specific movement when it becomes a political action. This political action comes into existence through two conditions of possibility that are coordination and mobilization functions of nationalist ideology. Co-ordination function is the co-ordination of diverse interests of heterogeneous elites who seek to challenge the state. Heterogeneity of elites may either stem from different levels of action, such as local, intermediate, or national, or from divisions between different kinds of elites or different kinds of institutions through which those elites are engaging in action. The second requirement for nationalist ideology to become political action, *i.e.* mobilization, is the process in which new groups assume role in politics. Mobilization provides these groups political objectives and justifications for resistance to the existing state. Mobilization first emerges within the existing institutional context in which political action takes place. However, for a nationalist opposition to succeed, it has to go beyond the confines of the existing political boundaries. Only then it can be translated into nationalist politics. Since nationalist movements claim to speak for the whole nation, and nationalist politics is always mass politics, mobilization establishes links with large numbers of people and creates capacity to insist on political representation. Nationalism provides not only a means for coping with this mobilization but it also

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 366.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

serves as culmination of political purposes in a movement where the people's interests are redefined in a changing political context determined by changes associated with modernity.⁷

The first section of this chapter will portray the factors and processes that altered the traditional relationship between the ruler and the ruled in Qajar state. These factors and processes, namely the foreign intervention, economic concession, and modernization and centralization initiatives by the state, created the perception for political community that there was a growing distinction between the state and the society. Both the material and ideational impact of the West through the above-mentioned three factors prepared the basis for the emergence of nationalist opposition to the Qajar state.

The second section of the chapter will demonstrate the coordination and mobilization functions of the nationalism in Qajar Iran that culminated in the first nationalist mass movement. As for co-ordination, the elites that coordinated their political interests into the nationalist opposition were heterogeneous due to divisions between different kinds of elites according to their social backgrounds. These elites belonging to the merchants, clergy, and intellectuals had diverse political interests. They came together in a single movement, which was the constitutional movement, with a unity of purpose; that was to bring an end to the foreign political and economic intervention, and to restrict the authority of the shah with the formation of new and participatory institutions, one of which was the national assembly. The interests of these three social groups in the nationalist movement will be laid out in three subsections.

Mobilization of these diverse groups around unified political objectives in the constitutional movement ensured in two ways, which constitute the two subsections in the chapter. The first one was the mobilization provided by the semi-clandestine

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 382 – 386; *Ibid.*, pp. 19 – 20.

societies in the two big cities of Iran, Tehran and Tabriz, which were also unified at some point. These societies provided forums for debate in the closed circles and dissemination of nationalist ideas through pamphlets and publications circulated in the cities. Initially established by intellectuals having socialist, liberal, religious ideological backgrounds, they became societies where members from three groups, namely intellectuals, merchants, and clergy, established links and worked for the nationalist cause. Secondly, the street demonstrations and mass protests in the specific Iranian form that was to take sanctuaries (*bast*) in safe places from government force such as big mosques and shrines performed the mobilization condition for nationalist opposition. It was in these sanctuaries that members from all three groups of the society came together around a single cause, negotiated demands with the government, and effectively ensured political change towards political participation, formation of national assembly and institution of rule of law in the country.

3.1. Factors for Destabilization of Traditional Qajar State: Impulsive Political Modernity

Nationalism in non-Western world is “simply a reaction to conquest and alien rule”; specifically to European rule.⁸ Iran has never been colonized. However, its encounter with colonial powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries was a factor in the formation of national space. Particularly, these encounters led to a perception that the state is weak and unable to enforce its authority.⁹ This is because, firstly, Iran was subjected to territorial expansion attempts. Due to imperial rivalry over Iranian territory and Qajar state’s policy of balancing imperial powers, Iran was not occupied by one colonial power. However, it faced with humiliating defeats in wars that also cost territorial losses. Secondly, economic concession given to foreign subjects by the

⁸ Elie Kedourie (ed.), *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, (USA: Meridian Printing, 1970), p. 21.

⁹ Homa Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis*, (India: I.B.Tauris, 2006), p. 25.

Qajar state paved the way for the economic exploitation of Iran by foreigners. This also added to the perception of decay and weakness of the Qajar state.

3.1.1. Foreign Intervention and Domination

3.1.1.1. Military Defeats and Loss of Territory to Britain and Russia

One major development that paved the way for the events leading to the Constitutional Revolution was Iran's encounters with the Britain and Russia, the two imperialist powers with interests in Iranian land, in the 19th century. As a matter of fact, Iran remained independent in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when much of Asia and Africa fall under the colonial control of European powers. Iran has never been officially colonized. According to Cottam, who has defined early imperialism as the genesis of nationalist mythology, this is due to Iran's geographical position. Iran, together with Afghanistan, constituted "a geographical belt at which dynamics of Russian expansion and British expansion met."¹⁰

Territorial impact of colonial powers was characterized by the territorial expansion attempts of Great Britain and Russia, which has been referred in the literature as Anglo-Russian Rivalry. For Russia, Iran was a scene for Russian territorial expansion. As 1723, Russia occupied parts of Azerbaijan and Gilan. For Britain, Iran was strategically important for the British since it constituted a link for Indian territories. In the face of an imperial rivalry on Iranian land, the Qajar court resorted to a policy of balancing Great Powers. Its first alliance with a European power was in 1801. Facing threat to its Indian territories from both Afghanistan and France under Napoleon, Great Britain secured routes to India by a treaty with Iran. In return, Iran would receive military equipment and technicians in case Afghanistan or France attacked Iran. This aid was crucial for the Iranian army that suffered from consecutive defeats against Russians. However, when Iran demanded British military

¹⁰ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, p. 158.

assistance under the treaty in its war with Russia, Great Britain was reluctant to aid due to improved relations with Russia in 1804. According to Ramazani, this was the early sign of Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* owing to their alarm at the intrigues of Napoleon in Albania and Morea.¹¹

Disillusioned by Great Britain, the Qajar court opted for an alliance with France to secure Georgia and to obtain military equipment and training for Iranian forces, and assistance for the construction of military facilities. Known as Treaty of Finckenstein, it was the first time that Iran tried to balance Russia and Britain with a third power.¹² Under the terms of this agreement, Napoleon sent Lucien Bonaparte, the most able of his brothers, to fill the post of Ambassador at Tehran and dispatched a military mission to Tehran under General Gardane. The mission began reorganizing and modernizing the Iranian army. However, soon the alliance was broken due to Iranian officials' interest in personal gains, rapprochement of France with Russia in 1907, and opposition of Great Britain to French activities in Iran.

With the alliance of France and Russia, Qajars turned to Great Britain again and signed a new treaty in 1809. With this treaty and subsequent three treaties signed between the two states until 1814, Great Britain ended Iran-France alliance and Iran secured financial aid in case it was attacked by any European power.

Meanwhile, Qajars fought two disastrous wars with Russia in 1804 and 1826, which left a profound memory of defeat against an imperial power. There were two agreements signed with Russia at the end of these wars, which are Treaty of Golestan in 1813 and the Treaty of Turkmenchai in 1828. With the Treaty of Golestan, Iran acknowledged the sovereignty of Russia over Karabagh, Georgia, Shaki, Shiravan, Derbend, Kobeh, Daghistan, Abtichar, a part of Talish, and all the territory between

¹¹ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs 1500 – 1941*, (USA: University Press of Virginia, 1966), p. 40.

¹² Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989), p. 18.

the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. Iran also conceded to Russia the exclusive right to sail ships of war on the Caspian Sea. The Treaty of Turkmenchai, as stated by Ramazani, “has gone down in Iran’s diplomatic history as the most humiliating treaty Iran ever signed with a foreign power.”¹³ Russia not only annexed Erivan and Nakhichevan but also dictated that no Iranian official was allowed to enter the premises owned by Russian subjects residing in Iran without prior authorization by Russia. Also, under the Treaty of Turkmenchai, all litigations involving the subjects of Russia came under the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian authorities in Iran. Another humiliating provision of the treaty was Iran’s obligation to pay twenty thousand silver rubles as indemnity for Russian war sacrifices.¹⁴

On the whole, the military defeats and territorial losses to imperial powers led to a sense of humiliation in Iranian society. This situation provided the necessary ground that the Qajar statesmen as well as Iranian intellectuals began to search for solutions to end humiliation and to gain power against the imperial intruders. It provided the introduction of nationalist ideas to Iran.

3.1.1.2. Concessions to Imperial Powers and Loss of Economic Resources

Added to the perception of Qajar state’s weakness regarding its politics of balance, retreat, defeat and loss of territories vis-à-vis imperial powers, economic concessions played significant role for fuelling up public’s grievance against the state.

Naser al-Din Shah’s granting of an all-encompassing economic concession for a period of seventy years to a neutralized British subject, Baron Julius Reuter, in 1872 gave way to uneasiness among the public. The concession, which was purchased for £40,000 and 60 percent of the profits, gave exclusive right to construct all railways, dams, and canals throughout Iran, to regulate rivers, and to exploit all mines, except

¹³ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 47.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 45 – 47.

those of gold and silver. Reuter was also promised priority over any person or corporation that might in the future seek concessions for the establishment of banks and industrial plants or for any other purpose.¹⁵ As described by George Curzon, this concession was the most complete grant ever made by a country over its resources to a foreigner.¹⁶ This was regarded as a serious threat to economic and political independence by the notables, *ulama*, and others opposed to Western innovations, and by those influenced by Russia that was against this concession.¹⁷ Due to the popular opposition, but also because of Reuter's inability to secure guarantee or protection for forming a company in England, which rendered implementation of the concession impossible, the Shah had to cancel the concession in 1873.¹⁸

After the cancellation of the Reuter concession, Iran granted a wide variety of concessions to Great Britain and Russia. In 1888 Great Britain obtained a concession for the establishment of regular commercial navigation on the Karun River. In 1889, Iran granted to Reuter a new concession, for the establishment of the Imperial Bank of Persia, as a compensation for the first concession. It was given the exclusive right to issue bank notes in Iran for a period of sixty years and the Iranian government would receive 16 percent of the net profits of the bank. This was responded by Russia that it demanded the right to introduce Banque d'Escompte de Perse, which it received the right in 1891.¹⁹ Reuter was also given the right to exploit the mineral

¹⁵ John Foran, *Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution*, (USA: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 109 – 110; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 67.

¹⁶ Lord George Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 2 vols., (London: Longman, Green and Co, 1892, I), p. 480 quoted in John Foran, *Fragile Resistance*, pp. 109 – 110.

¹⁷ Russia claimed that the grant had completely repudiated Iran's claim to adhere the principle of equilibrium between the great powers. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 68.

¹⁸ Nikki R. Keddie, *Qajar Iran and the Rise of the Reza Khan 1796 – 1925*, (USA: Mazda Publishers, 1999), pp. 38-40.

¹⁹ Russia managed to acquire a railway concession and also the consent of the Shah to establish the Banque d'Escompte de Perse (1891), a branch of the Russian Ministry of Finance and a part of the Central Bank of Russia. The bank became a powerful instrument of Russian policy in Iran since it began to wield increasing control over a number of princes, a few influential clergymen, and some

resources of the country, with the exception of precious stones. He formed the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation and began to drill at a site at Daliki on the road between Shiraz and Bushire, and then in Gulf island of Qeshm and in the area of Semnan in northern Iran. The company failed to strike oil and gave up exploration in 1893. When Reuter was dead in 1899, his mineral concession also expired.²⁰

In 1890 Naser al-Din Shah granted another sweeping concession to a British subject, Major G. Talbot, for a period of fifty years. The concession granted the exclusive right to sell and export tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes to a British company, *Imperial Tobacco Cooperation of Persia* (also known as Régie). The company was exempted from all customs duties and taxes on all the materials necessary for its work. In return for all those privileges, the Shah would receive a fixed amount, £15,000 annually, and would also receive 25 percent of net profits annually after the deduction of all business expenses and after the payment of dividends of five percent on its capital to shareholders.²¹

Protests against the concession began when Talbot arrived in February 1891 to set up the company and the Shah announced the concession publicly. Sixty tobacco merchants petitioned the Shah in March and they offered to pay a tax that would be more profitable than the concession. Actually, tobacco concession was different from other concessions in that although other concessions were on unexploited products, tobacco was a widely grown, sold and exported product. Therefore, many landlords, merchants, and shopkeepers who profited from tobacco were affected badly from the concession. With the encouragement of merchants and guilds people, *ulama* also campaigned against the concession. On March 6, all the Tehran tobacco merchants

merchants by providing them with loans on easy terms in the years immediately after its establishment. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 70,

²⁰ Chris Paine and Erica Schoenberger, "Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers: 1872 – 1954", *MERIP Reports*, No. 37, May 1975, pp. 4-5.

²¹ Charles Issawi, "European Economic Penetration, 1872 – 1921", (Cambridge Histories Online, Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 604.

took *bast* (sanctuary) at Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim shrine and declared non-compliance with the Régie. In April 1891, the first serious uprising occurred in Shiraz, which ended with the exile of a prominent religious leader in the protest. Seyyed ‘Ali Akbar, who was exiled to Iraq, met with Jamal al-Din Afghani in Bushire and Afghani wrote a letter to Hajji Mirza Mohammad Hassan Shirazi that castigated the Shah for his concessions to Europeans.²² In August and September, a massive protest occurred in Tabriz, where the *ulama* of Tabriz preached against the concession. The protests then spread to Mashad, Isfahan, and Tehran. In December 1891, based on a fatwa by Hajji Mirza Mohammad Hassan Shirazi, a *mujtahid* who had previously wrote to the Shah that the concession was contrary to the Qur’an, the protests culminated in a boycott in whole country against the sale and use of tobacco products. At a mass demonstration in Tehran, soldiers shoot to unarmed crowd and caused several deaths. This caused larger protests and the government had to cancel the concession on January 5, 1892.²³ Referred by Kasravi as “the beginning of the awakening of masses in Iran”²⁴, tobacco protest was successful due to the participation of broad social forces comprised of merchants, *ulama*, artisans, small shopkeepers, urban poor, women; and use of telegraph which facilitated communications among the *ulama* leaders in different cities to spread the cause of protest between themselves and to the public.²⁵

²² John Foran, *Fragile Resistance*, p. 164.

²³ Nikki R. Keddie, *Qajar Iran and the Rise of the Reza Khan*, pp. 47-48. For further information also see Nikki Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891 – 1892*, (Northern Ireland: Frank Cass, 1966); Mansour Moaddel, “Shi’i Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movement of 1890 – 1892” in *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 1992), pp. 447 – 468.

²⁴ Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran* (History of Iranian Constitutionalism), (Tehran: Seda-ye Mo’asser, 1378 (1999/2000)), p. 74.

²⁵ In 1860, a line was laid from Tehran to Tabriz and soon extended to Julfa. There it connected with the Russian network. In 1863, work began on a British sponsored line linked at one end to the Turkish telegraphs at Khanaqin, in Iraq, and at the other, by a submarine cable to Karachi. Indeed, this telegraph concession was the first major concession, which was granted to Great Britain in 1863 by Nasir al-Din Shah. It planned to serve the British interests as an alternative line to India. By the 1880s, Iran possessed 4,000 miles of telegraph lines. Charles Isawi, “European Economic Penetration”, p. 592; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 66.

The resistance to the tobacco concession was successful, but the cancellation of the concession led to even greater immediate economic and political difficulties for the country. When the company demanded £650,000 as indemnity for its concession and got £500,000, Iran was able to pay the amount by borrowing from the Imperial Bank of Persia at six per cent interest as foreign debt.²⁶

In 1900, Iran witnessed the second biggest concession of history. It was the D'Arcy concession. Antoine Kitabchi Khan, Armenian-origin Director-General of Persian Customs, asked the former British Minister in Tehran, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, who was then in Paris, to find someone in London who would be willing to invest in Iranian oil. Kitabchi Khan's attention had just been called to the findings of a French archeologist, Jacques de Morgan, which had been published in *Les annals des mines* in February 1892. According to Morgan's findings, oil existed in the Qasr-i Shirin region near Irano-Turkish border in Mesopotamia. Kitabchi Khan purchased a monopoly of oil rights throughout Iran from a small private Iranian firm. Some time later Wolff, who had known Kitabchi Khan in Iran during his mission in Tehran, summoned him to London. There Kitabchi Khan explained his plan to William Knox D'Arcy, a British millionaire who had made his fortune as a shareholder in the gold mine of Mount Morgan in Australia. He agreed to purchase Kitabchi Khan's oil rights for an amount of £50,000.²⁷

After the completion of investigation into the possibilities of the Iranian fields by a geologist, H. T. Burls, D'Arcy dispatched his representative, Alfred Marriott, together with Kitabchi Khan to acquire an oil concession from Mozaffar al-Din Shah. Knowing of the firm grip of Russia over the ruling elite in Iran, Wolff was convinced that without the support of the British government the efforts of a private investor would fail. He therefore asked his successors as Minister in Tehran, Sir

²⁶ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 70; Nikki R. Keddie, *Qajar Iran and The Rise of the Reza Khan*, p. 48.

²⁷ Chris Paine and Erica Schoenberger, "Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers", pp. 4-5; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 70

Arthur Hardinge, to intervene in D'Arcy's behalf. The concession granted by Mozaffar al-Din Shah to D'Arcy gave him a special and exclusive privilege in natural gas, petroleum, asphalt, and ozocerite "throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire," except the five northern provinces, for a period of sixty years. It also set that the first exploitation company was to pay the Iranian government, within a month of its formation, £20,000 in cash and the equivalent of this sum in paid-up shares. It was also to pay the government annually a sum equal to 16 percent of the annual net profits of any company or companies that were formed. It was guaranteed in the concession, after Reuter experience, that if the concessionaire failed to establish the first of these companies within two years, the concession would become null and void.²⁸

The first exploitation company was formed in 1903, within the period specified by the concession. The Iranian government received the sum of £20,000 and also the equivalent of that amount in paid-up shares. Another £25,000 in shares was paid to various leading personalities of the court, including Atabak, Mushir al-Dowleh, and Muhandis al-Mamalik.²⁹ D'Arcy concession was the beginning of Iran's tumultuous history of oil.

According to Cottam, the anger and humiliation aroused by these foreign economic inroads led to rise of nationalism more than any other factor, including the intellectual impact of the West³⁰ In addition to economic penetration, the collaboration of Qajar elites with the colonial powers further exacerbated the public anger. The diplomatic missions of Britain and Russia tried to influence the individual Iranians to use their position in state. The Qajar court, especially under Naser al-Din

²⁸ John Foran, *Fragile Resistance*, p. 110; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 71.

²⁹ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 71; Paine and Schoenberger stated that £30,000 was paid to the Shah and £20,000 to other court personalities. Chris Paine and Erica Schoenberger, "Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers", p.6.

³⁰ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, p. 160.

and Mozaffar al-Din Shah, utilized the financial advantages from playing the two powers against each other, that generated revenues for the state but also put increasingly more resources under foreign control. This system of collaboration led to a perception in the public that politicians were sold either to Britain or Russia, and that foreign intervention was a daily occurrence.³¹

Qajar state's inability and weakness vis-à-vis foreign powers led to modernization initiatives by some court members and officials. Understanding the technological and economic power of the modernized states that territorially and economically intervened Iran as imperialist powers, these modernizers embarked on projects to strengthen the state militarily and economically by imitating the modern experience of the powerful Western states. Their efforts were appreciated as being servants of the country and as genuine modernizers of a ramshackle administrative system crippled with corruption. However, increasing centralization of the state, which was not accompanied by social participation, created further disturbance on the part of the existing social power structure towards the state. The next section will dwell on this process.

3.1.2. Authoritarian Politics: Modernization and Centralization Initiatives by the State

Imperial domination of Iran that caused territorial losses, economic penetrations of Western powers that disturbed the economic system to the detriment of local producers, and budget deficit in an era of concessions responded by a number of Qajar statesmen with modernization attempts. Modernization projects were thought to increase military and economic power of the apparently weakening state authority.

Indeed, Qajar system of government was based on manipulating rival factions, whether tribal, religious or racial, against each other. They employed existing local

³¹ *Ibid.*

governments to collect taxes and raise military units. But their obedience was secured by threats of attack from their rivals. Thus, their supreme rule was depended on their exploitation of the country's social fragmentation.³² In this sense, the power of Qajar state had already been dependent on delicate balances and alliances. When the imperial powers, mainly Britain and Russia, came into contact with Qajar state, Iranian rulers attempted to continue the same internal manipulation policy against these powers in order to survive their rule. However, imperial powers benefited from the internal weakness of Iran and established "economic hegemony over separate spheres of interest."³³ As a result, modernization was regarded by some court members and administrators as the only remedy to defeats in wars with imperial powers, economic exploitation of resources exacerbated by Qajar court's lavish spending and constant need for money from foreigners. However, the potential remedy, unable to transform the system, turned out to be a thorny factor that disturbed the existing power structure and became a source of social distrust towards the Qajar state, which culminated in the constitutional revolution against Qajar power.

Abbas Mirza, crown prince and governor of Azerbaijan, initiated the first derive for modernization. During the first Russo-Iranian war (1804), he realized that the tribal cavalry was not a resource for protection against the mobile artillery of the imperial powers. Modeling himself on contemporary reformer of the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Selim III, he constructed his own modern army similar to Ottoman Nizam-i Jadid (New Order) in Azerbaijan. Abbas Mirza's modern army, consisted of six thousand troops, was equipped with modern artillery and weapons, and paid regularly by the state. Troops were dressed in uniforms, settled in barracks, and trained by European officers. For the supply of his army, Abbas Mirza opened a cannon factory and a musket plant in Tabriz. Also, he established a translation office for the translation of military and engineering manuals. Abbas Mirza also opened the first permanent

³² Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 14-15.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

abroad mission of Iran in Paris and London. He sent students abroad to study military science, engineering, gun making, medicine, typography, and modern languages. All these were financed by cutting court salaries, pensions and extravagances, and raising revenues through protective tariffs.³⁴

The clergy and many tribal leaders did not welcome Abbas Mirza's modern army. Although he obtained a declaration from Shaykh al-Islam of Tabriz that the army organization was in full accord with Islam, *ulama* was not comfortable with his innovations, especially the Western style uniforms, drill and Western instructors, and claimed that the new army was un-Islamic. Tribal leaders, however, were at unease with the new army since it might limit their role in administration and their autonomy. Moreover, the corrupt army officers of the Qajar military system were opposed to Abbas Mirza's reforms.³⁵ However, real blow to the new army came when Fath 'Ali Shah proclaimed jihad on Russia in 1826 to get back the lost territories of the Gulistan just after the establishment of the modern army. The defeat of Iranian army and loss of more territory to Russia as well as Russia's setting of a fixed low tariff for Russian goods "served to confirm Fath 'Ali Shah's conviction that the best weapon was still the 'ancestral lance.'"³⁶ As stated by Keddie, "Abbas Mirza was the only Qajar in the dynastic line who was devoted to self-strengthening reform ... during his governorship of Azerbaijan."³⁷ With the death of Abbas Mirza in 1833, the chances for reform of the army were missed against a traditional state structure.

³⁴ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (USA: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 52-53. Arjomand also states with regard to the military organization in that to break the military power of tribes and to create the standing army were the two constant aims of the Qajar state throughout the 19th century. Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 23.

³⁵ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, (USA: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 40.

³⁶ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 53.

³⁷ Nikki R. Keddie, *Qajar Iran and The Rise of the Reza Khan*, p. 24.

The second drive for modernization was initiated by Mirza Taqi Khan Farahani, known as Amir Kabir (The Great Lord). Grown up in the household of Abbas Mirza as the son of his cook, he served as a special secretary for Abbas Mirza's modern army. Then he appointed as special envoy to the Ottoman Empire, where he gained better knowledge of Tanzimat Reforms. After his return to Iran, Naser al-Din Shah, with whom Mirza Taqi Khan Farahani had close relations, ascended to the throne in 1848. Naser al-Din Shah invested Amir Kabir with the titles *Amir-i Nizam* (Lord of the Army) with full responsibility of the army and then *Sadr 'Azam* (Prime Minister), and encouraged him to implement reforms. Indeed, it was Amir Kabir who changed the foreign policy of balancing one power with making alliance with or waging war against the other since the defeats of Iran in wars with imperial powers in the 1800s. He introduced the policy of "negative equilibrium" as a strategy to deal with Anglo-Russian rivalry, which was to refuse concessions to both Britain and Russia and not to make alignment with both powers.³⁸

Amir Kabir's reforms were initially in the military affairs. He continued the efforts of Abbas Mirza to have a disciplined standing army equipped with modern materiel. In order to lessen the dependence of Iran on Russian and British arms and to cut imports, he established fifteen factories for the production of cannons, light arms, uniforms, epaulets and insignias, woolens, cloths, calicoes, carriages, samovars, paper, cast iron, lead, copper, and sugar.

Besides military reforms, Amir Kabir also initiated cultural projects for the modernization of Iranian society. He founded the country's first official newspaper, the *Ruznameh-ye Vaqa-ye Ittifaqiyeh* (Newspaper of Current Affairs). The newspaper not only served as elaboration of Persian as the medium of communication, but also brought government decrees to the attention of the public and educated people on political and scientific development of the world.³⁹ But his

³⁸ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 65.

³⁹ Hamid Algar, "AMĪR KABĪR, MĪRZĀ TAQĪ KHAN", available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/amir-e-kabir-mirza-taqi-khan>, accessed on 22 March 2015.

most lasting initiation was the foundation of the country's first secular high school, the *Dar al-Fonun* (Abode of Learning) in 1851. The *Dar al-Fonun*'s curriculum included foreign languages, political science, natural science, military science, higher mathematics, agriculture, mineralogy, medicine, veterinary medicine, and band music.⁴⁰ The subject matter of the traditional *madrasah* received no attention in this modern school. The purpose of the school was to train officers and civil servants for state service, but the modern ideas disseminated in this school created the constitutionalists of the early 1900s.

Amir Kabir's economic reforms created finances for his reform projects. To balance the state budget, he employed policies to increase the sources of revenue and to decrease expenditures. He took the collection of customs duties from the hands of individuals and put it under the direct control of the state. For the taxation of land, he introduced the basis of yield and productivity instead of the size of land area. His drastic reduction in the salaries of the civil servants and elimination of a large number of stipends paid to pensioners, however, brought him unpopularity and disgrace.⁴¹ Britain and Russia were also disturbed by protective tariffs and Iran's seeking technical assistance from France and Austro-Hungarian Empire. Unfortunate coincidence of the Babi revolt with Amir Kabir's reforms also created a political instability. Most importantly, Amir Kabir's reforms that aimed to strengthen the authority of the central government disturbed the clergy when it came to the policies regarding law matters. Amir Kabir's establishment of indirect control over the *shar'* courts through *divankhaneh* (the higher instance of 'orf jurisdiction) with his indication that "all cases were to be referred to it before being passed on to a *shar'* court of the state's choosing, and any verdict the *shar'* court then reached was valid only if endorsed by the *divankhaneh*"⁴² created frustration among the clergy. At the

⁴⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 54.

⁴¹ Hamid Algar, "AMĪR KABĪR, MĪRZĀ TAQĪ KHAN", available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/amir-e-kabir-mirza-taqi-khan>, accessed on 22 March 2015.

⁴² Ibid.

end, Amir Kabir was dismissed in 1851 and executed soon after, but the legacy of this modernizer's short and influential reform period survived in modern Iranian psyche.

With the dismissal of Amir Kabir, the era of rapid modernization and centralization gave its place to a slower process of change during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah. Mirza Hossein Khan Sipahsalar composed a *nizamnameh* (rules of procedure) for the judicial system that strengthened the central judiciary authority. When he was appointed as prime minister (*sadr 'azam*) in 1871, he changed the organization of ministers according to European model. Until then, there were some ministries but they were unorganized, and the Shah himself or the prime minister directed all the state affairs. Sipahsalar proposed to form a cabinet of ten ministers that would meet once a week, would be responsible for the affairs under their responsibility, and would be answerable to the prime minister. He also organized the first trip of the Naser al-Din Shah to Europe with the purpose of having the Shah acquainted with the European ways of government, their development and collaboration of European rulers with the people.⁴³

The last straw that led to the development of revolution in 1905-6 was the reformist policies of Amin al-Dowleh, Amin al-Sultan, and Ain al-Dowleh, the last three *sadr 'azams* before the revolution. Amin al-Dowleh, served as *Sadr 'Azam* of the Qajar court between 1897 – 8, was determined to solve the financial problems of the state. He appointed Abu'l Qasim Khan Naser al-Molk, who studied the financial organizations of European states, as the minister of finance to develop a financial reform plan. The plan envisaged abolition of control of local tax farms by the employment of Europeans in all the major ports to control customs revenues. Thereby, the authority to collect taxes would be transferred from the local governors to the central government. Also, the central administration of finances was to be

⁴³ Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran*, p. 69.

reorganized by European officials.⁴⁴ Therefore, Belgian officials arrived Iran in 1898. Meanwhile, financial difficulties brought the fall of Amin al-Dowleh, and he was succeeded by Amin al-Sultan in 1898.

The leader of the Belgian customs administration, Joseph Naus, whose dismissal later would be one of the demands of the revolutionaries, proposed a programme of reform, which was accepted and put into force in late 1898. According to this, a uniform tax of five percent *ad valorem* on all exports and imports was introduced regardless of the origin of the goods and nationality of the trader.⁴⁵ The plan proved effective and the customs revenues rose almost two-folds by 1900.⁴⁶ However, since the customs receipts were not enough to finance all domestic expenditure, Amin al-Sultan borrowed £2,000,000,000 from Russians in January 1900. Exhausted quickly the first loan, he made a second loan agreement with Russia for £1,000,000 in January 1902. These developments created a public discontent that had already reached to a certain level in August 1901 when “a proclamation was posted in public places accusing the government of selling the country to Russia.”⁴⁷ With the second loan, leading *ulama* in Tehran demanded dismissal of Amin al-Sultan.

⁴⁴ Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism*, (USA: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 34; Vanessa Martin, *Islamism and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906*, (Great Britain: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989), p. 45.

⁴⁵ “The prevailing system had certain anomalies, the most significant of which was that trade in the hands of foreigners was subject to a 5 per cent *ad valorem* duty, while that in Iranian hands paid duty at 2-4 per cent. The trade of Iranian subjects was also subject to many and various internal duties such as road tax.” See Vanessa Martin, *Islamism and Modernism*, p. 46. The proposal of Naus, therefore, came as an innovation in the existing system at the expense of local traders.

⁴⁶ By September 1900 the new administration had raised the customs revenue from about £200,000 per annum to £350,000 - £400,000 per annum. See Vanessa Martin, *Islamism and Modernism*, p. 46.

⁴⁷ “The *ulama* of Atabat, who were now being incited by the British, as well as by numerous complaints against the authorities from all over Iran, sent a remonstrance to the Shah accusing government officials of embezzling state money, so that money had to be borrowed from Russia and even then was not used for general good. They also protested at the employment of Europeans in the customs administration, which they termed ‘oppressive’, and at the possible involvement of Europeans in the collection of taxes. The proceeds of the second loan had now been spent, and since a third was likely to arouse intransigent opposition, Amin al-Sultan could find no more money, and was forced to resign.” See Vanessa Martin, *Islamism and Modernism*, p. 49.

The tariff reform adopted by Naus had already raised opposition among merchants who benefited from the former system of customs collection. The *ulama*, arguing that there must be no foreign administration in the country, came to lead the opposition of the merchants. There were demonstrations against the tariff reform in Shiraz, Tehran and Isfahan during 1900, and in Tabriz, Tehran and Kashan in early 1901. On the face of mass opposition, Naus offered to resign in August, but the Shah did not accept his resignation. The campaign against Naus continued with protests in Mashhad in January 1904, in Tabriz and Kermanshah in April 1904, and again in Tabriz in January 1905.⁴⁸

The *Sadr 'Azam* of the Qajar court at the time of the revolution, Ain al-Dowleh, continued economic reform schemes. He increased taxation, proposed to reorder the *maliyat* (taxation) from the crown lands and fixed salaries for the provincial authorities. In May 1904, he introduced a 10 percent tax on salaries and pensions. He also attempted to revive a proposal of Amin al-Dowleh's to impose a tax on *shari'a* documents, but could not be successful due to resistance from the *ulama*. The prime minister's economic reform schemes were helpful to balance the budget by 1904. However, a fall in customs revenues and lavish court expenditures created a large deficit in 1905.⁴⁹

The invitation of foreign officials into Iran to control state finances, the substantial amount of loans from foreign governments that put the state under unfavorable obligations and were spent uselessly, the economic reform schemes designed to increase the state revenues in the face of increasing expenditure which imposed centralization of the taxation system while also introducing extra taxes were the main events that marked the premiership of the last three courtiers. These developments were the last straw for the discontented masses to prompt revolutionary uprising. According to Algar,

⁴⁸ Vanessa Martin, *Islamism and Modernism*, p. 48 – 49.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

Europeanization in Iran, as elsewhere, had begun with the improvements of military techniques, no more than a detail, however important, in the national life; now the state was adopting measures touching its own organization which were of almost explicitly European origin. Not only the purpose of these measures – the strengthening of the state – distasteful to the *ulama*, but also their origin was unfamiliar and alien. The traditional context for relations between the state and the *ulama* was being disturbed, and this disturbance was bound to lead to an intensification of hostility.⁵⁰

But it was not only the clergy who were disturbed by modernization and developed hostility against the state, the merchants and intellectuals were also disturbed by despotism, inadequate government, and injustice that prevailed in the country. These segments of society were also influenced by ideas of modernization to develop their own consciousness of the modern condition and willingness to change the ineffective policies. In the words of Arjomand, the relative improvement in economic life, increasing international contacts, and political awareness made the unchanging dismal political life intolerable, and thus, created a revolutionary situation.⁵¹

3.2. Political Nationalism in Opposition to Foreign Intervention and State Authoritarianism

The mass upheavals and revolutions in the modern Iran tend to be interpreted within the general framework of ‘contradiction between state and nation (*tezadd-e dowlat va mellat*)’ as the inherent feature of Iranian political and social fabric.⁵² Despite the explanatory power of this theory, the meanings attributed to state (*dowlat*) and nation (*mellat*) before the constitutional revolution should be clarified.

⁵⁰ Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785 – 1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period*, (USA: University of California Press, 1969), p. 171.

⁵¹ Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 36.

⁵² For further discussion also see Homa Katouzian, *Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society*, (Great Britain: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Homa Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis*, (India: I.B.Tauris, 2006); Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 75 – 87; Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905 – 1906*, (Great Britain: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966), pp. xviii – xx.

Until before the constitutional movement, there was no political force that could oppose and seize the government apart from the clergy since there were no political parties under the authoritarian rule of Qajar state. The social power in Iran was divided into two: religious authority and court authority. Since there was no civil society, the Shah, grand vizier and other viziers constituted the superstructure of state (*dowlat*), whereas the clergy constituted the superstructure of nation (*mellat*). The term “nation” meant to be *shari’a*, religion and tradition and sometimes the followers of that religion and tradition. The term “state” meant to be sultanate, government, and those associated with it. The nation, meaning the clergy, was responsible for legal tribunals, registration of property, agreements, verification of judicial litigations and adjudication. Political governance of the nation was the responsibility of the state. Taxation system was also consisted of two types: Clergy was getting the taxes predicted by *shari’a*, and statesmen were getting the customary taxes. Any intervention of these two forces to the authority of each other caused conflict, impasse and social grievance.⁵³

Therefore, separation of political and religious authorities and the autonomy of religion from the state was the most important feature of the 18th century Iran, which has often been referred in the literature as “dual structure of authority.”⁵⁴ The modernization attempts by certain state officials and administrators in the 19th century, however, disturbed this structure. Modernization and the ensuing centralization led to expansion of the state authority at the expense of the religious authority, which disturbed the balance between traditional realms of authority between the state, meaning the court, and the nation, meaning the hierocracy.

However, this is not an adequate explanation for the inclusion of different social groups that were outside of these traditional realms of authority in the formation of

⁵³ Mashallah Ajudani, *Mashruteh-ye Irani* (Iranian Constitutionalism), (Tehran: Akhtaran, 1382 (2003/2004)), p. 165.

⁵⁴ Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 77.

nationalist ideology manifested in the constitutional revolution against the Qajar state. The Western economic penetration that activated the merchant's grievances towards state, and the formation of an intellectual class who came into contact with Western ideas of liberalism, nationalism, scientific and social development earlier and played the leading role in the dissemination of Western ideas in the society, appeared as influential groups with claim on national politics of Iran during and after the 1906 revolution. Therefore, the outcome of the revolution was not the restoration of previous traditional court-hierocracy realms of authorities but formation of a new national and relatively plural political space. While the clergy played a leading role in the constitutional revolution in line with the traditional role as being "leaders (*ru'asa*) of the masses" to protect them in the name of Islam if the ruler failed to carry out his responsibility of protecting Islam and Shi'ite community,⁵⁵ the participation of merchants and especially intellectuals brought out novel dynamics that the restoration of traditional dual basis of legitimacy became obsolete. The subsequent discrepancy between revolutionaries and clergy after the revolution and during the process of establishment of constitutional order was a result of this situation. Mashallah Ajoudani explains this new dynamic as such:

Constitutionalism (*mashruteh*), with foundation of rule of law and view of constitution (*qanun-e esasi*) disrupted the classical foundations of these two political and social powers and by limiting the monarchical and clerical powers and it brought out a new power. This power was manifested with the government of rule of law and people became equal before law. However, the challenge for the constitutional movement was to transform the dual structure of power and the opposition between nation (*mellat*) that was religion, and state (*dowlat*) that was sultanate, into government of rule of law and government of common law. Both religious and lay intellectuals participated in the constitutional movement with the aim of limiting the powers of both the monarchy and religion. However, the clergy participated the revolution with the aims of limiting the power of the monarchy and "preserving of the core of Islam". Even if they argue about limiting the power of clergy, they meant limiting the power of "bad *ulama*."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁵⁶ Mashallah Ajoudani, *Mashruteh-ye Irani*, p. 172.

There is also a further need to clarify what is understood by “constitutionalism (*mashrutiyat*)”. The constitutional movement was born out of two causes, which were opposition to foreign political and economic domination, and restricting the authority of the “supreme ruler”, the Shah. However, constitutionalism (*mashrutiyat*) in Iranian context was not understood as a movement whose primary objective was the establishment of democratic institutions. Rather, it was understood as parliamentarism. Some supporters of the movement even understood “re-establishment of Islamic law (*mashru’iyat*) as the foundation of the “new” order.”⁵⁷

The term *mashru’eh* was used to describe constitutionalism based on the *shari’ah*. Its most ardent supporter was Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri, who gave up his support to constitutionalists when it became clear that *mashruteh* and *mashru’eh* were not serving the same purpose. While constitutionalists (*mashruteh-khahan*), especially the intellectuals were advocating to condition both authorities, the court power and the clerical power, with the establishment of rule of law and equality of all citizens before law, the proponents of *mashru’eh* wanted to replace the *estabdat* (despotism) of the Qajar state with an “authoritarian government based on *shari’a* while at the same time maintaining the existing traditional social framework intact.”⁵⁸

Despite these differences, various groups gathered around the idea of constitutionalism simply because it was regarded as the only way to ensure the independence of Iran. Both traditional and modern elites, the former comprised of the bazaar merchants and the clergy; the latter comprised of the intellectuals familiar to Western thought, were united around this nationalist cause. In the words of Ramazani, “nationalism cloaked in constitutionalism was the predominant feature of the movement.”⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 82.

⁵⁸ Homa Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran*, p. 42.

⁵⁹ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 83.

3.2.1. Coordination of Groups with Diverse Interests in Nationalist Ideology

3.2.1.1. Merchants

Merchants were enjoying good relations with the Shah and with the provincial governors, but did not constitute a political force until the 19th century. They engaged in domestic and foreign trade of manufactured goods and agricultural products, acted as bankers in the traditional sense by controlling money transactions and financing bazaar activities in towns, handled letters of credit and commercial papers, exchanged currencies, and remitted payments in cash inside and outside the country. Some wealthy merchants also invested in land, cultivated cash crops for export and controlled the distribution and market price of agricultural produce.⁶⁰ However, by the mid-19th century, new socio-economic and political conditions; *i.e.* the Western impact in the country and the way the court responded to it, created tensions between the merchants and the court that paved the way for emergence of the merchants as a politically active segment of society. In the words of Bayat;

The merchants' lack of sufficient capital to expand their international trade; the archaic monetary system that no longer suited – and sometimes even hampered – mercantile activities in the world markets; the decline of local industries, which lost the ability to compete with the foreign manufactured goods that were flooding the Iranian bazaars; the absence of means to protect life and property; the bad roads and inadequate transport systems – these serious grievances all contributed to the merchants' increasing participation in national politics.⁶¹

Iranian merchants increasingly became disadvantaged vis-à-vis foreign merchants since the latter enjoyed extraterritorial privileges; Russians after the Golestan (1813)

⁶⁰ Mangol Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution: Shi'ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909*, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 45.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* Foran further argues that the composition of foreign trade of Iran also took the shape of classic colonial pattern. While exports of textiles fell, raw silk, cotton, rice and opium rose. In exchange, European textiles, processed sugar, and tea were imported. John Foran, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran's Populist Alliance: A Class Analysis of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 – 1911," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 6, December 1991, pp. 799 – 800.

and Turkmenchai (1828) Treaties, and the British afterwards demanding similar privileges. The expansion of foreign trade led Iranian merchants to learn the European system of the international economics. Bayat states that Western economic penetration in Iran led to growth of mercantile bourgeoisie by the end of the 19th century. This group of merchants engaged in debates on national economic development, published essays in Tehran official gazette where authors expressed their “conviction that the prosperous trade was the nation’s road to wealth and power” and urged the government to take measures to restrict foreign competition and encourage Iranian merchants.⁶² In 1884, in response to the demands of the Iranian merchants, Naser al-Din Shah allowed the formation of Council of Merchants in Tehran that had branches in all major towns, whose members were elected by the local community of merchants. The Council assumed the duty to oversee the country’s national economic development and to defend national interests against foreign penetration.⁶³ The Council lasted a year due to opposition from the clergy to the council’s establishment of a bureau of registration for sale, purchase and lease of land, and other court and government officials who were disturbed by the formation of such a powerful council. However, wealthy merchants continued to invest in economic development of the country by investing capital in industry, financing new schools in Western style, a public library, and cultural clubs for dissemination of new ideas. Hajji Mohammad Hossein Kazeruni and his partners established the first national company (*sherket-e melli*) in Isfahan in the late 1890s. The name of the company was *Sherket-e Islami* (The Islamic Company) and it was the first stock company in Iran. The aim of the establishers was to preserve country’s independence by fostering modern industries such as textiles, and by protecting the traditional handicrafts such as the miniature arts. Therefore, clothes would not be imported from

⁶² Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution*, p. 47.

⁶³ “Deploring special privileges granted to foreign merchants, the council demanded equal treatment, the abolition of road taxes, and the right to pay a one-time, flat rate for their export-import merchandise. It called for government protectionist measures that would curb foreign competition and promote domestic trade and industry. . . . Finally, the council asked the government’s help in the construction of roads and railroads and in establishing a small Iranian commercial bank, modeled after the European system.” Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution*, p. 47.

foreign countries but would be produced locally in the Iranian industry. In a very short time, the company had branches in various Iranian cities and domestic commodities were in demand all over the country. According to Malekzadeh, it is this national company that became the nucleus of factories built and operated on the basis of new techniques, and limited the needs of Iran from outside to a certain extent.⁶⁴ “As burgeoning capitalists,” Bayat states, “merchants were attracted to the ideas of nationalism, liberalism, and separation of religion from politics.”⁶⁵ Abrahamian refers to this small group of merchants as comprador bourgeoisie, who flourished outside bazaars with the introduction of European capital and the capitulations granted to the European businessmen. But the native bourgeoisie in the bazaars were affected very badly from the influx of foreign goods, capital and merchants. What linked these two groups and paved the way for the expression of similar feelings of dissent that ended up a common stance against the state’s economic policies was the introduction of telegraph lines, publication of newspapers, building of new roads, and inauguration of postal system in the 1870s; all that facilitated communication between urban centers of the country.⁶⁶

What is more, nationalism’s call for independence and elimination of foreign interference attracted the merchants to the nationalist cause. The institutional control on the court was necessary for the improvement of their commercial interests vis-à-vis the foreigners. The increasing international links demonstrated to the merchants that a stable and unitary state like the imperialist states would increase their benefit in domestic and international economic dealings. Therefore, nationalism’s demand for such a state for Iran had a strong natural appeal for the merchants.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Mahdi Malakzadeh, *Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashruteh-ye Iran*, 3 volumes, (Tehran: Entesharat-e Sokhen, 1387 (2008/2009)), pp. 136-138.

⁶⁵ Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution*, p. 49.

⁶⁶ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 58- 60.

⁶⁷ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, p. 43. On the issue of international links of the merchants Farsani states that the growth of commercial activities with foreign countries required travelling to the West and thus, they acquired knowledge of how trading was conducted in the advanced countries and

3.2.1.2. The Clergy

As the other powerful segment in the traditional middle class, the clergy enjoyed power and influence within the Qajar system. Their social power was firmly affirmed as *sarparast* or *vasi* (guardian) of the believers by the end of the 18th century.⁶⁸ They were using this power especially through taxation and law. The financial resources derived from religious foundations (*vaqf*), religious taxes (*khums*, *zakat*), government stipends and pensions, fees from legal documents and contracts constituted sources of income that enabled the clergy to function as an independent power from the state. In addition to the sources of income, the clergy enjoyed privilege of exemption from paying taxes except land tax if they own land, and immunity from prosecution. These privileges strengthened the position of the clergy as economic and social power base. The changes in the political and economic conditions since the beginning of 19th century, *i.e.* the foreign influence and the Qajar government's mixed response to it in the form of collaboration with the foreigners on the one hand and reform and modernization schemes on the other, disturbed the clergy's function as the most important social power base. The clergy demonstrated its opposition against certain state policies inside the country and contact with outside forces. However, coming to the 1900s, the target of the clergy became the monarchy itself. According to Algar, "Constitutional Revolution is the culmination of a process: the doctrinally-based enmity of the *ulama* to the monarchy was intensified in practice as the danger of foreign dominance increased."⁶⁹

the social prominence of the Western traders. This developed the class-consciousness of the merchants that led them to adopt new ways in accordance with this new knowledge. The Merchants' Council was as a result of this process that united the merchants under their first association. Sohiela Torabi Farasani, "Merchants, Their Class Identification Process, and Constitutionalism" in H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (eds.), *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris, 2010), p. 119.

⁶⁸ Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period*, (USA: State University of New York Press, 1980), p. 25.

⁶⁹ Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785 – 1906*, p. 234.

The clergy had already been subjected to reforms of Amir Kabir and Sipahsalar that aimed centralization of the juridical affairs in order to prevent the clergy's intervention in state affairs. Amin al-Dowleh, who became *Sadr 'Azam* in 1897 under the reign of Mozaffar al-Din Shah continued this earlier policy of juridical and administrative reform. Amin al-Dowleh's inference was that since the clergy intervened in state affairs due to their charges of corruption and injustice, they would lose this legitimate ground if the administration were reformed.⁷⁰

The second source of discontent on the part of clergy was the opening of modern schools. Started in 1851 with the opening of *Dar al-Fonun* by Amir Kabir, modernization in education continued with Mirza Hossein Khan Sipahsalar's establishment of the Ministry of Education in 1860 by a decree to re-organize Iranian cabinet along the example of France.⁷¹ By the end of the 19th century, there were three other government-established schools, which were the School of Political Science, which was affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and designed to train diplomats, and the two military schools. Amin al-Dowleh extended this scheme to the establishment of primary schools by the government. The attempt to establish Rushdiyya School in 1897 (named after the founder of first school in Tabriz, Mirza Hassan Rushdiyya) was opposed by the clergy. Mirza Hassan Ashtiyani declared that the new type of school would bring about weakening of religious faith.⁷² According to Algar:

The opposition of many of the *ulama* to the Rushdiyya should be interpreted as a defense of their traditional privileges and functions. In the same way as the extension of '*urf*' jurisdiction restricted their judicial power, the new kind

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 223. Likewise, Ahmad Kasravi states that Amin al-Dowleh thought that the reason for the disorder in state affairs was lack of law and he set to laying down laws for the country to persuade the shah to accept them. Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran*, p. 79.

⁷¹ Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*, p.105.

⁷² Mehdi Malikzadeh, *Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran*, p. 150 quoted in Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785 – 1906*, p. 234; Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, pp. 32 – 33.

of school represented an intrusion into another traditional domain of the *ulama*, one where their monopoly almost had been complete: that of education.⁷³

Shahroukh Akhavi argues the fact that opposition to the opening of new schools was extended to all members of clergy, including Seyyed Tabataba‘i and Seyyed Behbehani who fought for the constitution, “indicates that the clergy’s role in the constitutionalist movement cannot facilely be interpreted to have been a modernizing one.”⁷⁴

As a matter of fact, the clergy was not united in their response to difficulties that Iran was facing. There were two factions; one led by Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri, accepted as the most learned cleric at his time although disliked by some *ulama* because of his conservative views, and the other led by Seyyed Mohammad Tabataba‘i and Seyyed Abdallah Behbehani. According to Akhavi, this division was a result of different perceptions of sovereignty among the clergy. The pro-monarchist faction did not accept the idea that sovereignty rests in the nation. This faction continued to advocate that sovereignty solely belonged to God, and relinquished to prophets and imams, and finally those who were most learned in religious law.⁷⁵ This difference in views were reflected in the ‘*mashru’eh – mashruteh*’ struggle between these two camps. Although this division was apparent from the beginning, the factions aligned to save the country from foreign intrusion and curb the powers of the ruler who was regarded as responsible for the country’s weakness and for the implementation of policies contrary to *shari’a* in the name of modernization. When revolution was over and the constituent assembly gathered for the writing of the constitution, the division among the clergy became clear. While the faction led by Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri

⁷³ Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785 – 1906*, p. 224.

⁷⁴ Akhavi further argues “*ulama*’s overwhelming support for the constitution helped in the long process of attenuation of clergy power in educational matters.” See Shahroukh Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, p. 35.

⁷⁵ Shahroukh Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, pp. 25-26.

advocated for ‘*mashruteh-ye mashru’eh*’, meaning *shari’a* constitution, the other faction led by Behbehani and Tabataba’i were firm on their support for constitutional government (*mashruteh*) as the solution to the country’s problems.⁷⁶

3.2.1.3. Intellectuals

Intellectuals were the modern elites of the era who were influenced by the Western ideas of Enlightenment and shaped the social imagination with nationalist ideas that culminated in the constitutional revolution. Not only they were among the aristocrats, royal princes, civil servants, and army officers but also clerics and merchants were among the members of this class.⁷⁷ The factor that united them was their common desire for fundamental economic, political and ideological change in line with Western values. This change would enable the establishment of a powerful central state with a unified society and would be able to protect the country from foreign penetration.⁷⁸

‘Intellectual’ as a term is a product of modernity in Iran. Ali Gheissari states, with reference to Fereydoun Adamiyat, that one of the earliest references to “intellectual”

⁷⁶ Homa Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran*, pp. 41 – 45.

⁷⁷ The reformist ideals of the Constitutional Revolution found their expression in a generation of critical tracts (*resaleh*), clandestine papers (*shab-nameh*), and the press (*rouz-nameh* and *majalleh*). In many cases, the authors of this literature were political activists writing from exile. They had the financial support of some Iran’s Merchant families, many of whom lived abroad and had commercial offices in India, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. These merchants also helped the spread of modernism by providing an extended social network through which ideas and fashions in foreign cities could reach Iran. Moreover, Iranian workers and merchants who had offices in commercial centers of Caucasus mainly in Baku and Tiflis helped the spread of socialist and communist ideas in Iran. Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century*, (USA: University of Texas Press, 1998), pp. 17-18. There were also cleric intellectuals who wore the garb in the constitutional movement until the coup, but then demonstrate their distance from traditional religious institutions. Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh and Seyyed Sadiq Tabataba’i, son of Seyyed Mohammad Tabataba’i were among them. Mangol Bayat, “The *Rowshanfakr* in the Constitutional Period: An Overview” in H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (eds.), *Iran’s Constitutional Revolution*, p. 174.

⁷⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 61.

can be found in the writings of Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1853 – 1896).⁷⁹ As an admirer of philosophies of French Enlightenment, Kermani describes “intellectuals” as “*monavvar al-‘oqoul*” meaning the enlighteners of mind, and as “*rafe‘ al-khorafat*” meaning the refuters of superstitions. During the constitutional revolution, other terms used for intellectuals were *motajaddedin* (modernists) and *ma‘aref-parvaran* (educators). However, the most commonly used terms for intellectuals were *monavvar al-fekr* and *rohsanfekar* (both mean enlightened thinkers).

Cottam states that the Iranian meaning of the term ‘intellectual’ refers to “the most highly educated people, including almost the entire professional class.”⁸⁰ In the same way, Gheissari also argues that intellectuals were given a particular status and value and being referred as an intellectual was a source of prestige during the constitutional movement. Further, it was regarded as “identical with being a nationalist, a reformist, a Constitutionalist, and, later, a modernist.”⁸¹ Intellectuals, inspired by the Enlightenment ideas, believed in the attainability of human progress once they could abolish royal despotism, which was against liberty, equality and fraternity; clerical dogmatism, which was against rational and scientific thought; and foreign imperialism, which was exploiter of non-Western countries. These Western-originated ideals were regarded as necessary goals to be attained for the establishment of a strong state and a modern society. Constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism were the main motives since because constitutionalism would restrict the arbitrary government (*estabdad*) of the monarchy, secularism, *i.e.*

⁷⁹ Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Andisheha-ye Mirza Aqa Khan-e Kermani* (The Ideas of Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani), (Tehran, 1346/1967), p. 241 cited in Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century*, p. 15. Negin Nabavi states that “Mirza Fath ‘Ali Akhundzadeh (1812 – 1878), Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1853 – 1896), and Mirza ‘Abd al-Rahim Talebof (1834 – 1910) are often cited as examples of early *monavvar al-fakr*. They can be characterized as writer-reformers who had little sense of dilemma with regard to their role. That is, they admired the French *philosophies*, aspired to the achievements of a cultured Europe, and saw their task to be that of changing the attitude prevalent in Iranian society according to the Western model.” Negin Nabavi, *Intellectual Trends in the Twentieth Century Iran: A Critical Survey*, (USA: University Press of Florida, 2003), p. 2.

⁸⁰ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, p. 39.

⁸¹ Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century*, pp. 15-16.

separation of religious and state affairs, would eliminate the conservative backlash of the clergy against modernization, and nationalism would end colonial exploitation.⁸²

As explained in the first section of this chapter, there were attempts of modernization within the Qajar government. Especially certain statesmen regarded modernization of military, economic, and juridical system as solution to the hardships of the country. These statesmen were critical of the Qajar society in their writings. Although they did not target monarchy, they were calling for a new system of government. Likewise, they respect the clergy and religious institutions, but they insisted on the separation of religion from public and national affairs. Moreover, they tried to change the nature of relations between the state and the people, where state was not answerable to the nation. For instance, Mirza Mohammad Khan Sinaki Majd al-Molk, father of the reformist *Sadr 'Azam* Mirza 'Ali Khan Amin al-Dowleh, wrote an essay that was “considered a masterpiece of the new literary genre of social criticism”⁸³ developed in the second half of the 19th century. Majd al-Molk, “expressing a profound disenchantment with the existing form of bureaucracy and a genuine concern for the nation-wide economic, political, and social decline, ... insisted on the government’s moral obligation to safeguard the interests and material well-being of its subjects.”⁸⁴ In his view, one of the basic foundations of state power was the people. Actually, many members of the intellectuals were educated in *Dar al-Fonun*, the first non-religious school established by a reformist statesman. These graduates constituted the most important source of support for nationalist reformers. *Dar al-Fonun* played an important role in dissemination of Western ideas with the translation of European textbooks into Persian. Concepts of nationalism, patriotism, representative government, equality of all citizens before law, individual’s rights and freedoms found reflections in the thought and actions of these intellectuals.

⁸² Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 61- 62.

⁸³ Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution*, p. 37.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

There were two streams of thought that shaped the universe of the intellectuals of the 19th century. These were ideas of liberal democracy that was acquired through Ottoman Empire and British in India, and ideas of socialism that was acquired through Russia.⁸⁵

Mirza Fath ‘Ali Akhundzadeh (1812 – 1878) and Abdol-Rahim Talebof (1834 – 1911) were chief among those intellectuals who studied and lived in Tiflis. Akhundzadeh, who “regarded himself as the heir to a hidden tradition of materialism in the Islamic world,”⁸⁶ was a play-writer. He was also known by his project to reform Arabic alphabet in its application to Turkish and Persian. He was one of the representatives of contemporary nationalism. In his essay named *Maktubat-e Kamal al-Dowleh* (Letters of Kamal al-Dowleh), he developed national thought, reform and development of society through establishing constitutional government and rule of law, religious reform by means of “Islamic Protestantism”, separation of religion and politics, and removal of the mundane matters from the possession of religion.⁸⁷

The other eminent intellectual, Abdol-Rahim Talebof was referred as reformist, liberal, social democrat, revolutionary, who was also influenced heavily by European ideas. He was also known as a firm advocate of modern education. In one of his books, *Safina-ye Talebi ya Ketab-e Ahmad* (Talebi’s Vessel or The Book of Ahmad), he criticized the traditional education system and condemned both the clergy and Qajar administration for their reluctance to promote modern knowledge. His other major work, *Masalek al-Mohsenin* (The Pathways of the Benevolent), portrayed Qajar administration as oppressive and incompetent. However, different from

⁸⁵ Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century*, p.18.

⁸⁶ Hamid Algar, “ĀKŪNDZĀDA”, available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akundzad-playwright>, accessed on 28 March 2015.

⁸⁷ Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Andisheha-ye Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh* (The Ideas of Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh), (Tehran: Entesharat-e Kharzemi, 1349 (1970)), p.109.

Akhundzadeh, he was not hostile to Islam; rather he advocated for the reinterpretation of Islamic principles according to the contemporary conditions. His involvement with such religious reinterpretation stemmed from his precision about European colonialism, which could be fought through bringing religion and government up to date rather than unqualified imitation of European manners. This issue was further discussed in his last book, *Siasat-e Talebi* (Talebi's Politics), published in 1911 after his death, in which he pointed to religious superstition and lack of rule of law as the main reasons for Iran's weakness.⁸⁸

The other prominent intellectual of the constitutional movement was Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1854 – 1896). Unlike Akhundzadeh and Talebof, he was acquainted with Western thought during his stay in the Ottoman Empire. He contributed to Persian reformist newspaper published in Istanbul, *Akhtar*, and he began to correspond with Mirza Malkoum Khan, a prominent intellectual and statesmen who was ambassador to London and publisher of the reformist newspaper abroad, *Qanun*. Being a prolific writer on political issues and an activist, he was one of the earliest to perceive the social and intellectual backwardness of Iran when seen through European lenses. In his view, the traditional education system, religious institutions and the Qajar style of government were the reasons of the country's bad situation.⁸⁹ According to Kermani, receiving Western science, industry, art, and institutions was necessary for development in the new world. However, he was against shallow imitation of the West and the colonial penetration of the Europeans. As stated by Adamiyat, he was the voice of independence and national government, and an intellectual of the constitutional movement who agreed on the method of socialism.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Cyrus Masroori, "TĀLEBUF, 'ABD-AL-RAḤIM", available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/talebuf>, accessed on 28 March 2015. For the assessment of British and Russian politics towards Iran see Abdol-Rahim Talebof, *Siasat-e Talebi*, (Tehran: Entesharat-e 'Elm, 1357 (1978)).

⁸⁹ Mangol Bayat, "ĀQĀ KHAN KERMĀNĪ", available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aqa-khan-kermani-iranian-writer-and-intellectual-d-1896>, accessed on 28 March 2015.

⁹⁰ Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Andisheha-ye Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani*, p. 240.

Kermani not only expressed views on Western civilization and political philosophy, but also on nationalism. On the views of Kermani about nationalism, Adamiyat states that nationalism was different from science in that Western science was exported to Iran but all the constituent elements of the Western nationalist philosophy were already there. The ideas of Iran-zamin (land of Iran), Arian nation and pride of ethnicity, common language and religion, and soberness of history and common Iranian understanding were not exported phenomena. However, Iran's encounter with the West paved the way for the formation of a complete ideology of nationalism. Kermani's views on nationalism not only led him to be an active constitutionalist during the revolution, but also gave him an important place in the Iranian history as an intellectual who contributed eagerly to the formation of Iranian national space.⁹¹

According to Cottam, the intellectuals played the least important role compared to the merchants and the clergy in the nationalist constitutional revolution. However, they were enthusiastically active in the parliamentary politics after the revolution. They assumed the role of educator to explain the concepts of democracy and liberalism as well as nationalistic values of equality of citizens and rule of law.⁹² This argument seems valid considering the relatively liberal political space after the revolution where ideas expressed more freely and the voice of intellectuals became louder in parliamentary politics. But role of intellectuals in the making of the revolution should not be underestimated. They introduced ideas of enlightenment and modernity to Iran. They established links between Western forms of thought and Iranian ways of thinking, between the political developments in the modernized countries and Iranian social and political problems. The nationalist ideas disseminated by intellectuals both in societies (*anjumans*) and associations, and through publications served for the unification of interests of the merchants and the

⁹¹ For further information on Kermani's ideas on Western civilization, political philosophy and nationalism see Faraydoun Adamiyat, *Andisheha-ye Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani*, pp. 241 – 287.

⁹² Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, pp. 40 – 41.

clergy in their nationalist opposition to the state. Therefore, although being intermediary rather than leading, the role of intellectuals in the constitutional movement was crucial.

3.2.2. Mobilization of Nationalist Opposition Movement

The constitutional revolution occurred as the culmination of nationalist opposition with its claim on the Qajar power. The main aim of the opposition was to limit the absolute power of the monarch. This was regarded as the requisite to bring an end to the difficulties of the state facing the “new world” determined by the Western powers. This opposition was nationalist not only because of the terminology of the revolutionaries who persistently referred to “Iranian nation”, but also because of their claim on state power in the name of the unified, historic Iranian people. Moreover, the nationalist opposition was composed of diverse groups with different interests in the movement. What is important is that these diverse groups were mobilized in the constitutional uprising for the same national cause.

The mobilization of the nationalist opposition occurred through semi-clandestine societies (*anjuman*), street demonstrations and sanctuaries (*bast*) by the coordination of groups composed of the merchants and the clergy and supported by the intellectuals. Realization of the national cause of the Constitutional Revolution further became a scene of either unification or clash of interests in the domestic political game. However, this process re-shaped the social and political structure of Iran that constituted a milestone in the formation of Iranian modernity.

3.2.2.1. Mobilization through *Anjumans* (Societies)

The first base of mobilization of nationalist groups through the constitutional revolution was the semi-clandestine societies (*anjuman*)⁹³. They were formed

⁹³ The term “*anjuman*” means association or society. This term acquired three meanings in two different contexts. For the pre-revolutionary period, it referred to secret societies whose purpose was

benefitting from the relative liberalization under the reign of Mozaffar al-Din Shah (1896 – 1907). In fact, his economic policies such as increasing tariffs on native merchants, withdrawing tax farms from their previous holders, decreasing court pensions especially to the clergy, tightening controls over *vaqf* (religious endowment) holdings as well as foreign loans he obtained and D’Arcy concession for monopoly of exploiting oil were constant sources of unrest. His appointment of a Belgian citizen, Monsieur Naus, as the country’s director general of customs became a clear indicator that the country’s revenues came under the control of foreigners and it aroused anger among anti-shah groups. But the liberal stance of the Shah in cultural and public affairs, such as lifting ban on travel that was employed by Naser al-Din Shah after Tobacco uprising, permitting the import of liberal newspapers published abroad, such as *Habl al-Matin* (The Firm Cord) from Calcutta and *Parvaresh* (Education) from Cairo, relative liberalization in police controls, and encouraging the formation of commercial, cultural, and educational associations enabled formation of semi-clandestine opposition groups.⁹⁴ Although, according to Abrahamian, Mozaffar al-Din Shah hoped that liberalism would appease political opposition, the increasing Western penetration had a diverse effect of encouraging the opposition to form such organizations benefitting from liberalization.⁹⁵ Chief among these organizations regarding the role they played in Constitutional Revolution were the Secret Center (*Markaz-e Ghaybi*), the Social Democratic Party (*Hezb-e Ijtima‘yun-e Amiyun*), the Society of Humanity (*Jame‘eh-ye Adamiyat*), the Revolutionary Committee (*Komiteh-ye Enqelabi*), and the Secret Society (*Anjuman-e Makhfi*). Among these groups, there were differences of opinion reflecting the main

to discuss the political and social problems of Iran. In the post-revolutionary period, it referred to the municipal (*baladi*), departmental (*wilayati*) and provincial (*ayalati*) councils provided for in the 1906 constitution to supervise local affairs. These were official *anjumans*. There were also unofficial *anjumans* after the revolution. These were clubs or societies of persons having some local, political, or other common interest, which were also sanctioned by the Supplementary Laws of 1907, and they played an important political role in popular action. See Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905 – 1906*, pp. 244 – 245.

⁹⁴ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 74-75.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.76.

currents of thought of the period. While some were advocating social democratic views, some gathered around the opposition by clerical or pro-court conservatives. For instance, modern intellectuals and socialists organized the Revolutionary Committee, the Society of Humanity, the Social Democratic Party, and the Secret Center. The Secret Society, however, had its members mostly from bazaar merchants and the clergy.⁹⁶ These semi-clandestine societies were also important for the mobilization of national cause not only because they actively involved in the revolutionary opposition against Qajar state but also they constituted the nucleus of political parties that would operate under the national *Majles* after the revolution.

The Secret Center (*Markaz-e Ghaybi*) was organized in Tabriz in 1903 by twelve young radicals. Headed by a merchant, ‘Ali Karbalayi, nicknamed “Monsieur” because of his interest in French literature and French political philosophy, this *anjuman* was consisted of merchants, artisans, clerics and intellectuals.⁹⁷ It gathered around the influential journal *Ganjineh-i Fonun*, published by the joint efforts of Mirza Mohammad-‘Ali Tarbiat, Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, Mirza Yusuf Ashtiyani E’tesam and Mirza Sayyed Hoseein ‘Adalat. Regarded as the first scholarly Persian journal, it was operated from a bookstore owned by Tarbiat (*Ketabkhaneh-ye Tarbiat*) in Tabriz and widely circulated in Tehran.⁹⁸ Apart from publishing one of the most influential newspapers that contributed to the intellectual space with translations from European philosophers, this *anjuman* “assumed the responsibility for defense and internal security, ran the schools, repaired the bazaar, established contact with the foreign consulates, and operated bakeries that provided bread for the

⁹⁶ Nikki R. Keddie, *Qajar Iran and The Rise of the Reza Khan 1796 – 1925*, pp. 57 – 58; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 76.

⁹⁷ Members of the *Markaz-e Ghaybi* were “Tarbiyat’s younger brother, three merchants who often traveled on business to Baku, two tanners, a civil servant, and a young linguist who had studied Russian, German, English, as well as French at the local French missionary school.” Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p.76.

⁹⁸ Nassereddin Parvin, *GANJĪNA-YE FONŪN*, available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ganjina-ye-fonun->, accessed on 29 March 2015.

armed volunteers and their families.”⁹⁹ Later, during the resistance to 1908 coup, *Markaz-e Ghaybi* constituted the radical wing of the Tabriz provincial *anjuman*.

The Social Democratic Party (*ijtima'iyun-e 'amiyun*) of Iran was formed in Tabriz around 1904. There are two accounts for the origin of this group based on researches of two Russian historians. Nariman A. Hasanov argued that the Secret Center and the Social Democratic Party were in fact one and the same. According to his account, Iranian Social Democratic Party was formed in Baku by the *Hemmat* (Endevaour) group, had members of Iranian migrant workers, and received support from Tabriz radicals. The other account is based on Hassan M. Hasanov who argued that the Social Democratic Party was first established in Iran in 1903 or 1904, officially organized by Nariman Narimanov in December 1905, worked closely with the Muslim social democratic *Hemmat* group, and was under the supervision of Baku committee of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party which came under the domination of Bolshevik current.¹⁰⁰ Janet Afary also emphasized that the Social Democratic Party was founded in Baku in association with *Hemmat* group, had contacts with Tabriz revolutionaries and when the party sent members to Iran to establish branches of the party, the Secret Center became the first of these branches established in Tabriz in 1906.¹⁰¹ According to the account of Abrahamian, the party was first formed in Baku in 1904 by immigrants, headed by Nariman Narimanov, and concentrated its effort among Iranian workers mostly employed in the Baku oil fields. The Secret Center, however, later established close contact with the Social Democrats and helped circulation of the party program within Iran. This party program consisted of mostly economic demands such as “the right of workers to organize and strike; an eight-hour day; old-age pensions; a progressive income tax; distribution of land among those who tilled it; housing for the homeless; free

⁹⁹ John Foran, *Fragile Resistance*, p. 187.

¹⁰⁰ Mangol Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution*, p. 101.

¹⁰¹ Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, p. 82.

schools; reduction of consumer taxes; freedom of speech, press, and public meetings; and the toleration of all religions ‘acceptable to the *shari’a*.’¹⁰²

These different accounts show that there was a close contact and cooperation between the social democrats in Baku and in Iran that it is hard to distinguish the two groups.¹⁰³ However, Iranian social democrats’ advocacy of the rule of law, equality of citizens, rights and freedoms were as important as their active participation in Constitutional Revolution for the formation of national space.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the Social Democratic Party merged into nation-wide Democratic Party in the second constitutional period from 1909, became an important political actor, and continued to advocate major social reforms as well as land reform.¹⁰⁵

The Society of Humanity (*Jame‘eh-ye Adamiyat*) was another semi-clandestine society that participated in the nationalist coordination and mobilization. Founded in Tehran, the society was inspired the radical positivism of Saint Simon and the liberal humanism of Auguste Comte. The founder to the society was Mirza Abbas Quli

¹⁰² Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp.76 – 77. For further information on the party see Sohrab Yazdani, “The Question of the Iranian *Ijtima‘iyun-i Amiyun* Party” in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *Iranian – Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions Since 1800*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 189 – 206.

¹⁰³ What is clear is that all accounts give credit to *Hemmat* group, so the nucleus of Iranian Social Democrats could be traced through the ideas of this group. The group originally formed within the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party with the purpose of mobilizing Muslim workers, engaged in autonomous action, and in October 1905 they began to publish their journal *Hemmat* in Azeri language. Nariman Narimanov, Soltan Majid Efendiev, Mashadi Azizbekov, Mohammad Amin Rasulzada were the founders of the group. Emphasizing the Moslem Azerbaijani identity, the articles published in *Hemmat* advocated for Enlightenment ideals, importance of new sciences, reform in the education system and emancipation of women, for reaching the aims of liberating the society from conservative influence of clergy although the party was not against the religion itself, educating the nation, promoting growth of trade and industry and encouraging the formation of independent Azerbaijani capitalist class powerful enough to fight against European and Russian economic penetration. See Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution*, pp. 86 – 97.

¹⁰⁴ For further information on Social Democrat Party of Iran see Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Fakr-e Demokrasi-ye Ijtimai dar Nehzat-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran* (The Idea of Social Democracy in the Iranian Constitutional Movement), (Tehran: Entesharat-e Gostareh, 1387 (2008/2009)), pp. 129 – 153.

¹⁰⁵ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran*, p. 181.

Khan Qazvini, who later surnamed *Adamiyat* (Humanity). He was a senior official in the Ministry of Justice and also had close relationship with Mirza Malkum Khan. According to Fereydoun Adamiyat, son of Abbas Quli Khan and a well-known historian, the aims of the society were “to use social engineering to attain national development; to gain individual freedom so that human reason could blossom, and to obtain legal equality for all, irrespective of birth and religion, to secure dignity for all citizens.”¹⁰⁶ The Society of Humanity was advocating moderate views and became a center for reformist personalities espousing different political views. The premier Sa‘d al-Dowle, moderate politicians like Ihtisham al-Saltaneh and Premier Amin al-Sultan were among the members of the organization.¹⁰⁷

The Revolutionary Committee was another society founded in Tehran in May 1904 by fifty-seven “radical intellectuals” who gathered around the National Library (*Ketabkhaneh-ye Melli*)¹⁰⁸ and headed by Malek al-Motakallemin. Seyyed Jamal al-Din Va‘iz, Yahya Dowlatabadi, Shaykh al-Ra‘is Qajar, Mohammad Reza Musavat, Sulayman Maikadah were the core of the society. They agreed on the necessity that the despotic government should be overthrown and rule of law and justice should be established in the country. For this to be realized, they drew up a plan to spread the

¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the society had a secret initiation oath where members declared that “Equality in rights and duties is the only true foundation of human relations. Equality alone can create firm bonds of national solidarity. Equality alone can guarantee the individual his just rewards and obligations” Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Fekr-e Azadi va Moqaddimeh-e Nehzat-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran*, Tehran: 1961, pp. 206 – 217 quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 77.

¹⁰⁷ Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, pp. 76 – 77.

¹⁰⁸ The National Library was founded in 1904 by liberal intellectuals who had gathered as the Society of Learning (*Ma‘arif Anjuman*) in 1897 – 1898, whose members include liberal premier Amin al-Dowleh, Yahya Dowlatabadi, and Mohammad Hossein Amin al-Zarb as one of the most wealthy merchants of the era, and a popular preacher Hajji Mirza Nasrallah Malek al-Motakallemin, who had relationship with Asadabadi and was known for his advocacy of modern civilization. The important task of the society was to establish modern schools and promote education. It opened fifty-five private schools in Tehran until the revolution. The national library that the society founded served as a place for gathering for political and social discussions. It was a free library that educated the people in patriotic ideas. Hajji Seyyed Nasrullah Akhavi, Mirza Aqa Khan Isfahan, Hajji Mirza Hassan Rushdiyya, Majdu‘l Islam of Kirman, later became the editor of *Nida-ye Vatan* (Country’s Call) were its other supporters. See Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905 – 1906*, p. 116; Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution*, pp. 66 – 67; Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, p. 41; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp.75 – 76.

idea of constitutional democracy through establishing contact with reformist clergy, avoiding non-Islamic activities, publishing leaflets that would advocate political and social reforms, translating histories of European revolutions into Persian, using sermons and lectures for propagation of ideas.¹⁰⁹

The Secret Society (*Anjuman-e Makhfi*) was founded in Tehran by Nazem al-Islam Kermani, in February 1905. The Secret Society had an important role for the establishment of links between the intellectuals and the clergy in nationalist mobilization. Rallying its members predominantly from the traditional middle class, the society established contact with two influential constitutionalist *mujtaheds* of Tehran; namely, Seyyed Abdullah Behbehani and Seyyed Mohammad Tabataba‘i. The son of Seyyed Mohammad Tabataba‘i, Mohammad Sadiq Tabataba‘i, was also an active member of the society who facilitated links between the Secret Society, bazaar merchant and the clergy in Tehran. The society formulated a code of conduct, “taken as a vow on the Koran, promised secrecy, opposition to oppression, respect for the *ulama*, prayers at the end of each session, and acceptance of the Mahdi as the one and only true protector of the society.”¹¹⁰ Their demands were abolishment of absolutist government, formation of a House of Justice (*Adalatkhaneh*), institution of social and political reforms including a survey for the registration of lands, a just tax structure, and military reforms, placing restrictions on concessions to Europeans and encouragement of internal trade, investigation into government salaries and pensions, and the implementation of the *shari’a*. The members of Secret Society all agreed that for any substantial social change in the country, the first step that should be taken was the institution of a constitution and a national assembly.¹¹¹ Still, the prevalent debate about *mashrutiyat* and *mashru’iyat* among the members of the society was moderated by Nazem al-Islam Kermani as such: “*mashrutiyat* and *mashru’iyat*,

¹⁰⁹ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 78; Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, p. 41.

¹¹⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 80.

¹¹¹ Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, p. 42; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 80,

application of the Islamic law and justice, or knowledge and civilization, the result is the same, freedom.”¹¹²

According to Browne, the programs of the Revolutionary Committee and the Secret Society discredited monarchy as being despotic and proposed rule of law as the best system of government. The state should be reformed in line with the form of government that the progressive nations had. Reforms should cover taxation, army, and judiciary system.¹¹³ In general, these nationalist semi-clandestine societies were effective in giving direction to the growing discontent with the inadequacy of government to find remedies to the problems of the day. They also effectively directed the ensuing protest movements.¹¹⁴

3.2.2.2 Mobilization through Street Demonstrations and *Basts* (Sanctuaries)

Iran in 1905 was rapidly moving toward a political revolution. The traditional middle class was now economically, ideologically and politically alienated from the ruling dynasty. The modern intelligentsia, inspired by constitutionalism, nationalism, secularism, was rejecting the past, questioning the present, and espousing a new vision for the future. Moreover, both the traditional middle class and the modern intelligentsia, despite their differences, were directing their attacks at the same target: the central government. Both were forming their own secret and semisecret organizations, societies, and political parties. Both were aware that the Qajar dynasty was not only financially bankrupt but also morally discredited, administratively ineffective, and most important of all, militarily incompetent.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Nazem al-Islam Kermani, *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iraniyan*, 3 vols, Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhang-e Iran, 1967, p.50 quoted in Mangol Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution*, p. 74. *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iraniyan* (History of Awakening of Iranians) is the diary of the constitutional revolution written by Nazem al-Islam as an eye-witness account of the events of the day.

¹¹³ Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905 – 1906*, p. 420.

¹¹⁴ Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 36.

¹¹⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 80.

Revolutionary mobilization around the nationalist cause was realized most effectively through street demonstrations and sanctuaries. Different social groups with varying interests came together in the demonstrations against the government in the streets and in the sanctuaries. Their demands for constitution and national social and economic policy were expressed in these mass uprisings.

The period between the spring of 1905 and summer of 1906 witnessed three mass protests. The catalyzing event was the economic crisis in 1905. The increase in inflation and rise in the prices of basic commodities, such as 33 percent rise in the price of sugar and 90 percent rise in the price of wheat, coincided with a year of bad harvest that led to further deterioration of economy.¹¹⁶ This situation precipitated the first demonstration in March 1905, which was also the month of Muharram whence large crowds had already been in the street for religious mourning. Led by Seyyed Behbehani, who incited protest by showing the picture of Belgian customs officer Joseph Naus and his colleagues showing themselves in mullah attire at a customs party two years before, the protestors called for the dismissal of Naus. It was this protest where Seyyeds Behbehani and Tabataba'i, the two clerical leaders of the Constitutional Revolution, established an alliance in action.¹¹⁷ The protests continued in April 1905 when the merchants and shopkeepers had closed bazaars and moved to the Shrine of Shah 'Abd al-'Azim to take sanctuary. They demanded dismissal of Joseph Naus, repayment of debts and establishment of a committee of merchants within the Ministry of Commerce.¹¹⁸ It was before Mozaffar al-Din Shah's trip to Europe and at the end of negotiations that lasted two weeks the sanctuaries were promised by the crown prince Mohammad 'Ali Mirza that the demands of the merchants would be fulfilled upon the Shah's return. The first uprising, which can be regarded as the result of the deprivation of economic system with outside penetration

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81; Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, p. 51.

¹¹⁷ Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran*, pp. 118 - 120.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 120 – 121; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, , p. 81.

since the mid-19th century and the attributed responsibility of the non-Iranians in this, was the expression of merchants' grievances.

Added to the economic deprivation, the event that created sense of injustice among the merchants was the bastinadoing of the two leading sugar importers, Hajji Seyyed Hashim Ghandi and Seyyed Ismail Khan, with the order of governor of Tehran, Ahmad 'Ala' al-Dowleh.¹¹⁹ This event led to the second protest in December 1905. The news of the act of the governor triggered public anger in the streets and merchants closed bazaar in support of the two sugar traders. "Behbehani, Tabataba'i, and their followers organized a protest that included merchants, small shopkeepers, trade guilds, and members of the *ulama*, calling for the dismissal of the governor."¹²⁰ Accused by Imam Jum'eh of Tehran with disrespect for the Shah and being heretic and Babi, the nationalist leaders took sanctuary at Shah 'Abd al-'Azim shrine. They were joined by two thousand merchants and theology students, and were financed by diverse supporters including the members of the secret societies. The demands of the sanctuaries were replacement of the governor of Tehran, dismissal of Naus, enforcement of law of Islam for all people of the country, and establishment of House of Justice (*Adalatkhaneh*)¹²¹ in all over Iran.¹²² The Shah accepted the

¹¹⁹ Faced with unrest because of the rise in sugar prices among the public, the governor summoned Hajji Seyyed Hashim Ghandi, the leading sugar trader demanded aged seventy-nine years and known with his benevolence that he build three mosques in Tehran and financed the repair of bazaar. 'Ala' al-Dowleh accuse the sugar traders with hoarding and demanded them to cut the price; but Seyyed Hashim replied that it was not possible since the revolution in Russia and the Russo-Japanese war caused shortages and led to price increases. Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran*, pp. 126 – 127.

¹²⁰ Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, p. 51.

¹²¹ Kasravi reserves a separate section on the questions "what is *adalatkhaneh* (House of Justice) and why did *ulama* want it?" He states that it was regarded as the courthouses of today. The need for *adalatkhaneh* had three reasons. Firstly, there was a ministry of justice and Nezam ol-Molk was the minister of justice in 1905. However, the operation of those courts of justice (*adliyah*) was arbitrary. They discriminated among the powerful and weak and did not preserve righteousness and justice. Therefore, the sanctuaries demanded establishment of such offices for administration of justice to end the arbitrary operations of courts. Secondly, the state inevitably had to enact a law to set up courts of justice (*adliyah*), which was the demand of *ulama*, and this was a step towards establishment of law in the country. And this was one of the desires of the sanctuaries. Thirdly, the sanctuaries who migrated to Shah 'Abd al-'Azim by leaving their families or works behind had to have a hope for concrete result of their action. Behbehani and Tabataba'i, who were aware of this situation, thought that

demands of sanctuaries and they returned Tehran after one month of *bast*. When the sanctuaries were entering the city, the streets were full of crowds shouting “Long Live the Nation of Iran.” According to Nazem al-Islam Kermani, this was the first time that the phrase “Nation of Iran” (*Mellat-e Iran*) was heard in the streets.¹²³

The premier Ain al-Dauleh, who assumed responsibility to execute the demands of the sanctuaries in Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim, was soon evidently showed reluctance. He dismissed the governor of Tehran but did not establish *adalatkhaneh* or dismiss Naus. There was unrest going on because of the arrest and exile of nationalist leaders. The last event that incited large protest that ended with sanctuary in Qom and in the British legation was started with the arrest of a constitutionalist preacher, Shaykh Mohammad Sultan al-Va‘izin, on July 17, 1906, in the month of Muharram.¹²⁴ On the order of Behbehani, *tullab* (theology students) attacked the building where he was kept arrested. One of the students, who also was a seyed, was shot death in the clashes. The clashes on the next day, when the crowd organized a public funeral for the seyed, were bloody. Cossacks interrupted the crowd and shoot twenty-two people to death.¹²⁵ Behbehani, Tabataba‘i, and nearly a thousand supporters, who had already taken sanctuary at the Friday Mosque, were now joined by even a larger group of *tullab*, shopkeepers and guild members, and members of

nothing other than establishment of house of justice (*adalatkhaneh*) would serve the best to cherish the hopes for change for the sanctuaries. However, as Kasravi states, “it would be clear quite soon that the house of justice (*adalatkhaneh*) was not enough for contentment and the two *seyyeds* would expose their ultimate demands for a parliament (*majles*).” Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran*, pp. 137 – 138.

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 131 – 134.

¹²³ Nazem al-Islam Kermani, *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iraniyan*, 2 vols, (Tehran: Farhang Press, 1967, I), p.124 quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 82.

¹²⁴ Translation of his speech available at Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p.81. On the role of preachers in mass communication in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution see Asghar Farhi, “Preachers as Substitutes for Mass Media: The Case of Iran 1905 – 1909” in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (Eds.), *Towards a Modern Iran: Studies in Thought, Politics and Society*, (Great Britain: Frank Cass, 1980), pp. 169 – 184.

¹²⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 83.

secret societies. They were wearing white shrouds (*kafan*) demonstrating their willingness to die for the nationalist cause. The sanctuaries decided to move to the holy city of Qom, the center for religious learning in Iran, where they called for the support of all other members of *ulama*. The conservative cleric Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri, who was discontent with constitutionalism (*mashruteh*) and arguing for the establishment of religiously sanctioned government (*mashru'eh*) in the country, also joined the sanctuaries in Qom and gave his support. The situation was so severe that the sanctuary in Qom not only left Tehran without members of clergy but also impeded juridical actions and legal transactions in the absence the authority in charge. This situation would continue until the Shah fulfilled their earlier demands.¹²⁶

The brutal action of the government against the protestors created fear among the sanctuaries and led them to search a safer place that ended up in the garden of the British legation. Letter of Behbehani together with members of secret societies on July 18, 1906 to the acting-chargé d'affairs of the British legation, Evelyn Grant Duff, asking assistance for the constitutionalists to take sanctuary safely in the British legation was replied with declaration of respect to the ages-old custom of *bast* in Iranian land. Fifty merchants and clergy as well as theology students who moved to the garden of the British legation in Tehran the next night became twelve thousand people on July 30, and fourteen thousand on August 2.¹²⁷

The mobilization for the nationalist cause reached its peak with the sanctuary in the British legation. The large crowd was included the clergy, theology students, merchants and guild members from the richest to the poorest ones. They were joined by students of *Dar al-Fonun* and members of secret societies of Tehran. Women also joined the protests in the streets but the legation officers did not accept them to the garden of legation to take sanctuary. The sanctuaries were financed by wealthy

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, p. 55.

merchants.¹²⁸ As quoted by Abrahamian from Nazem al-Islam Kermani, especially after the arrival of students of Dar al-Funun, the legation was turned into “one vast open-air school of political science” that lectures on European constitutional systems were given and ideas that had been regarded as dangerous to express before Iran were expressed.¹²⁹

The protestors, who took sanctuary because of fear of death and lacked self-confidence because of this, conveyed their demands to the state by the help of Grant Duff. Their demands were: return of *ulama* to Tehran; assurance for not arresting anyone with a pretext and not to put to the torture; security of the country which nobody had for his life and property at that day; opening of House of Justice (*adalatkhaneh*) that the clergy, merchants and other guild members would participate in the investigation of lawsuits; retaliation (*qesas*) for the murder of the respectful seyyed. The reply they got from Ain al-Dauleh was insolent, to the extent that he refuted all the demands. Especially for the establishment of House of Justice, he stated that there was *adalatkhaneh* operating for years under the state and it was unprecedented that subjects (*re'aya*) had participated in the affairs of that courthouse (*divankhaneh*).¹³⁰ Along with other negative replies, this was a direct insult to the people by the state. Kasravi writes that after this reply, Iranian people in the legation started to talk demanding constitution and in those a few days some of them taught the meanings of freedom, constitutionalism, and parliament to people.¹³¹

Meanwhile, a telegraph from *ulama* of Tabriz sent to all major cities with the order of crown prince Mohammad ‘Ali Mirza who resided in Tabriz changed the course of events. The impact of the telegraph, which stated their support to the clergy in *bast*,

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹²⁹ Nazem al-Islam Kermani, *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iraniyan*, 2 vols, (Tehran: Farhang Press, 1967, I), p. 124 quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 84.

¹³⁰ Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran*, p. 166.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

was to make the people aware of the happenings in Tehran and awaken the clergy in other major cities. Afterwards, telegraphs from clergy of other cities such as Isfahan and Shiraz as well as Najaf in support of the sanctuaries in Tehran started to be received. With the courage they took from this support, sanctuaries wrote once more their demands to the Shah and presented these demands by the help of Grant Duff. The demands of the sanctuaries showed that things were changing radically and the opposition to the Qajar state became firm about the nationalist cause. Hence, they were now demanding a constitution and a parliament. Among the demands of the people were: return of the distinguished *ulama*; opening of consultative assembly (*dar al-shura*); retaliation for murderers of the martyrs of the fatherland (*shuheda-ye vatan*); return of the all those rejected by the state such as Rushdiyya and others.¹³² With the increasing mass support and mobilization in the national struggle, a significant change in the discourse is also visible. The demand for *Adalatkhaneh* gave its place to a more comprehensive nationalist institution, *dar al-shura*. The concept of ‘martyrs of fatherland’ was also coined by the constitutionalists, which reflected the formation of national consciousness and a sense of sharing the same time and space with the fellow nationals. Moreover, Rushdiyya whose initiatives for modern education were previously opposed by conservative clergy as being Western and un-Islamic, now came to be seen in the same camp of nationalist opposition against the state. This change in the words shows how nationalist discourse became loud and clear, and marks the formation of national space.

Mozaffar al-Din Shah dismissed ‘Ain al-Dowleh and appointed the liberal premier, Mushir al-Dowleh. He invited the protestors to return to the city, and on August 4, 1906 he issued an imperial decree for the establishment of the consultative assembly (*ferman-e mashruteh*). However, the text of the decree disappointed the nationalists. Since the word nation (*tudeh- mellat*) was not pronounced in the text, they regarded the sentences as being unclear. The Shah issued a second decree on the next day that

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 166 – 167.

the phrase “nation of Iran” was written down.¹³³ The second decree also ordered the formation of “Islamic Consultative Assembly”, but the nationalist opposition insisted that the parliament should be called as “national consultative assembly” and called for a third decree. On August 9, 1906, formation of a “national consultative assembly” was finally accepted.¹³⁴

Nationalist opposition was mobilized against the arbitrary administration of the state. It wanted justice through implementation of religious law and bringing the foreign economic penetration to an end. The clergy and merchants, initial core of the opposition, thought that these ends could be reached with the establishment of *adalatkhaneh* through which they could participate in administration. This idea of participation, in the end, was extended in meaning thanks to the intellectuals who taught people concepts of constitution, freedom, and parliament, which they regarded necessary for enlightenment and progress to take root in Iran. Certain personalities from clergy, merchants, and courtiers had already been in favor of the establishment of a constitutional regime; but they were not loud in their ideas in traditional Iranian society where state was arbitrary and clergy was prone to regard modern ideas as un-Islamic and stood against them. Indeed, clergy’s attitude towards nationalism was ambivalent. “Insofar as nationalism merely affirms the distinctive language and religion of Iran, even insofar as it insists on national independence, it is acceptable to the *ulama*.”¹³⁵ However, brutality of the state, reluctance of the administrators to the softer demands of the opposition, and disregard of the power of the people paved the way for more radical ideas to be expressed for a change in the system. Nationalism was inherent in these ideas. The ultimate aim of the revolutionaries was to create an independent and strong country with rule of law and equality of all citizens. The nationalist opposition was successful to achieve a share in state power and authority

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

¹³⁴ Nazem al-Islam Kermani, *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iraniyan*, I, 2 vols., (Tehran: Agah Press, 1983), p. 562 referred by Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, pp. 57 – 58.

¹³⁵ Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*, p.79.

through constitution. It did not demolish the state and grasping the authority; thus, there was no change in state authority. However, that the elections were held, parliament was established and representatives of the people started to enact laws for the administration of the country was already a revolutionary achievement of political nationalism that emerged as a transformative force of politics in the society.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to demonstrate how nationalism appeared in Iran as a form of opposition politics and became a significant nationalist movement in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 1911 against imperialist domination and traditional Qajar authority. A nationalist opposition in a non-nation state governed by traditional authority emerges when there is a disruption in that authority that changes the nature of state-society relations. Hence, the first section of this chapter dealt with the conditions for emergence of nationalist opposition against the Qajar state. These conditions were created by military defeats and territorial losses, foreign economic intervention, and reforms carried out by the state in line with modernization and centralization. Then, coordination and mobilization functions of the nationalist ideology in the emergence of nationalist opposition movement were scrutinized in the chapter. In this vein, firstly, the coordination of diverse interests of heterogeneous groups in nationalist ideology was discussed and the interests of social groups participated in nationalist movement, namely merchants, clergy, and intellectuals, were identified. Secondly, mobilization function of nationalist ideology in Constitutional Revolution was examined. In this section, mobilization of heterogeneous groups through semi-clandestine societies, street demonstrations and sanctuaries was discussed. The coordination and mobilization of diverse groups in nationalist opposition showed nationalism was the overarching and inclusive ideology for heterogeneous groups with diverse interests in politics and united them in the demand for a strong, modern state independent from foreign intervention and facilitator of popular sovereignty exercised through constitution and the parliament.

Nationalist opposition movement achieved the right to have a parliament and a constitution. However, constitutional politics became highly contentious then. Especially the process of drafting of the constitution and afterwards when the politics of the national space started to take shape, the confrontation between “liberal and radical supporters of the constitution” and “conservative *ulama* and government” continued.¹³⁶ The diverse interests coordinated in nationalist ideology began to be dissolved after the revolution.

The main controversy appeared on two grounds. In the parliamentary politics the controversy was between the royalists and liberal seculars. Moderates in the parliament were shifting grounds according the scope of law in discussion.¹³⁷ This controversy stemmed from the challenge that the legal framework of the constitutional government as Fundamental Law and Supplementary Fundamental Law posed to the traditional authority, *i.e.* the court authority and the clerical authority. In the political space both inside and outside the parliament, the controversy was between traditional conservative forces and the secular intelligentsia. Mainly, the attacks of liberal seculars on the traditional authority were the source of controversy.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 – 1911*, p. 59.

¹³⁷ The Constituent Assembly convened with delegates mostly from merchants, clergy and guild elders, electoral law was formulated, and national assembly was opened in October 1906. The three groups in the first assembly were royalists, who were princes, notables and landowners; moderates, who were merchants supported by clergy; and liberals who were from intelligentsia who belonged to Revolutionary Committee, Society of Humanity, or the Muslim socialists. See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 88.

¹³⁸ Drafted on the basis of Belgian constitution and entitled as “The Supplementary Fundamental Laws”, the constitution envisaged a parliamentary system of government, guaranteed equality before law, protection of life and property for citizens, prohibited arbitrary arrest of citizens, ensured freedom for publication and association of societies. It also envisaged approval of the court budget by the assembly. The sovereignty of the shah is described as such: “The sovereignty is a trust confined (as a Divine gift) by the People to the person of the King.” The ministers were responsible only to the parliament and the shah did not have authority to dissolve the parliament. Provincial councils were to be formed under the constitution to administer local affairs. Judiciary was divided into civil and religious courts. Twelver Shi’ism was declared as the official religion of the country. A “supreme committee” of *mujtaheds* was to be established which would scrutinize all bills introduced into parliament to ensure that they were not contradicted the *shari’a* and this was indicated as their

The power struggle created chaos, whose terms were defined by the proponents of *mashruteh* and *mashru'eh*. The Shah, who was at unease with the serious restrictions on his authority, wanted to continue with the old system of government that was leaned on balance with the clerical authority under the new constitutional system. Therefore, he cooperated with the conservative clergy and acted as supporter of *mashru'eh*. The liberal secular constitutionalists, however, propagated for establishment of a more secular government in which *shari'a* would be separate from *qanun* (secular law). In this situation, the conservative clergy led by Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri, in cooperation with the royalist forces, organized mass protests in *Tupkhaneh* (Cannon Square) in Tehran at the end of 1908. The struggle became bloody when Russian Colonel Liakhoff of the Cossack Brigade bombarded the parliament and broke the resistance of armed constitutionalists in June 1909. This gave Mohammad Ali Shah the opportunity to re-affirm his absolute authority. He dissolved the National Assembly and declared martial law. This time, severe struggles took place in *shehrastan*, the cities other than Tehran. Tabriz leading the constitutional fight, armed tribal forces mainly from Tabriz and Isfahan came to Tehran and surrounded the city until the re-opening of the Majles. The new Majles deposed the Shah and hanged Shaykh Fazlullah after trial in the revolutionary court. It was on August 5, 1909 that the Second National Assembly could be convened after the ratification of new electoral law.

This course of events demonstrates two things. One is the power struggle in political space after the nationalist movement reached its goal of constitutional government. Secondly, the content of debates shows the resistance of religious structure of the country to modernization when it was accompanied by secularization. In other words, for conservative forces, to bring an end to the *estebdad* government of the Qajar and to establish a just authority which could not be separate from religion and constitution were the only a means to this end. But for the liberal, radical socialist,

responsibility until the appearance of Mahdi from occultation. See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 90.

and secular forces constitution was itself an end to establish a modern democratic government that would be free from monarchical control and religious conservatism. Contentious parliamentary politics continued under the shadow of such developments until the 1921 coup that brought the end of Qajar state and carried Reza Shah Pahlavi to power in 1924. These developments were the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which divided the country under British, Russian, and neutral spheres; British and Russian occupations in the south and north of the country after 1911; Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 with which a loan obtained in return for British monopoly to arms supply, military training, and administrative advisors; and revolts in Azerbaijan and Gilan. Therefore, the nationalist goal of a strong and independent state free from foreign intervention and a functioning parliamentary democracy had not been achieved yet in this period.

With Reza Shah's ascendance to throne, the period of institution of modern Iranian nation state and modernization-cum-state started. Until the emergence of National Front, there was not any significant opposition to Reza Shah's policies. However, with the emergence of National Front and the leadership of Mosaddeq, Iran experienced the second significant nationalist movement that challenged the state authority. The next chapter will deal with this second nationalist movement as a form of opposition politics against British domination of oil industry and authoritarian state policy.

CHAPTER 4

NATIONALISM AS A FORM OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN THE IRANIAN NATIONAL FRONT MOVEMENT OF 1949 – 53

The second significant nationalist opposition movement in Iran started to take shape with the formation of National Front. Formed as a coalition of political forces with the aim to fight against the colonial domination and despotism of the Iranian state, National Front challenged both state authority and foreign domination in the country through oil industry.

National Front was formed in 1949 as a nationalist political movement. It was not organized as a structured party but as an umbrella organization that any political party or organization, or any individual who belonged to any organization in Iran that would declare allegiance to the National Front and its aims. Parties with socialist ideology, pan-Iranist ideology, and religious ideology were coordinated their diverse interests in political system with nationalist ideology and came to be united under the National Front umbrella. The leader of the movement was Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq, a respected politician having a degree of doctorate in law from Switzerland and being active intermittently in parliament since the last years of Qajar dynasty. The nationalist ideology of National Front was determinant of political developments in Iran from 1949 until 1953.

The nationalist ideology of National Front was often referred as ‘Liberal nationalism’ in the literature and the period between 1949 – 53 was referred as the sole brief period of liberal nationalism in Iran’s modern history.¹ This stems from the fact that National Front was defending the proper establishment of constitutional

¹ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), pp. 259 – 285; Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement*, (USA: Westview Press, 1990). Also, Azimi refers to National Front Movement as civic-nationalism, combining leftist-liberal or social-democratic leanings with nationalism. Fakhreddin Azimi, *The Quest For Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle Against Authoritarian Rule*, (USA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.133.

order, which had been violated by the unconstitutional behavior of the ruling shah and his loyal governments. The Front viewed the constitutional order as the main condition for freedom of the Iranian nationals in the public domain and for the state to become a respected independent actor in the international domain. Thus, when the members of the Front were elected to the Majles in 1949, their priority was to reform the electoral law and press law to ensure equality of citizens and freedom of speech in the country. However, for the aim of this study that considers a discursive continuity in the nationalist ideology in Iran as a political opposition movement, this chapter would emphasize the ‘resistance’ aspect of the National Front movement more than its liberal nationalist arguments. Indeed, the nationalist movement of 1949–53 was a national resistance movement to the unconstitutional use of state authority and to the domination of colonialism, both of which came to be seen in a collaborator relationship at some point of the struggle.

The nationalist opposition movement of 1949 – 53 raised not against a traditional authority such was the Constitutional Movement of 1906 – 11 but against a newly formed modern Iranian nation state. Reza Shah, the first Pahlavi monarch of Iran, has been regarded as the founder of the modern Iranian nation state. He is the first ruler in Iran whose adherence to nationalism served to ‘promote and justify creation of a nation’ and an independent nation state was ‘the starting point for the construction of this new society.’² Hence, Reza Shah used state power to gain complete independence from imperial powers – in the case of Iran, they were Britain and Russia who established territorial, economic, and hence, political control in Iran in the past century – and to initiate modernization and development of Iran in the way to attain progress and to become a respected actor in the world of nation states. Thus, the first section of this chapter is on the modernization and development scheme of Reza Shah. The importance of this section stems from the fact that the nationalist movement of 1949 – 53 was coordinated and mobilized against the governmental

² John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, (USA: Chicago University Press, 1994), p. 390.

nationalism of Pahlavi state. Therefore, this section will provide the basis to make a better sense of the nationalist policies adopted for modernization and development by the state and the condition of political space in the new Pahlavi state.

For the purpose of this study that asserts continuity in the idea of nationalism at the societal level as a form of opposition politics in Iran, Pahlavi state-building nationalism will not be considered as a nationalist moment. This is because, idea of nationalism as a form of opposition politics rises at the moments of resistance as a mass movement and as a liberating appeal by the people. However, the state nationalism in Iran, albeit its modernization and development objective, is authoritarian when it comes to the use of state power and despotic in its relations to the people. This nationalism of Pahlavi state falls short of creating, in the words of Breuilly, “a distinct notion of a private civil society which is regarded as the source of sovereignty” that would ultimately rest power with the nation that is defined in ‘private’, *i.e.* in cultural terms. Instead, the urgent problems of development and control eliminate any chance of formation of nation state on the basis of liberal nationalism. On the other hand, the modern society makes limited authoritarian control of traditional government impossible. Thus, the nationalist governments of the new nation states resort to arbitrary use of existing cultural practices in deciding the use of relevant aspects of traditional identity in exerting state power.³ Hence, a balanced relationship between the state and civil society is hard to be established. In the case of Pahlavi state, this situation paved the way for the formation of nationalist opposition in 1949.

Indeed, the authoritarian rule of the Pahlavi state was in full control of the public space and there was no room for the formation of any opposition movement except separatist nationalist revolts in regions.⁴ However, the Allied invasion in Iran in 1941

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Revolts in Khorasan, Khuzistan, and Khiabani revolt Azerbaijan by 1922 were the cases in point. After the dethronement of Reza Shah by the Allied forces, Iran faced with two serious ethnic separatist revolts that were Pischevari’s revolt in Azerbaijan in 1944, and Kurdish revolt and

and simultaneous dethronement of Reza Shah, the take-over of the governmental authority practically by the occupying forces due to war conditions with a new shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who had not established his power base yet, eased state control over society and enabled the formation of nationalist opposition. When the new Shah resorted to retain his father's power base and made himself absolute monarch with the constitutional amendment in 1949, the liberal nature of opposition became more visible. Besides, the memory of humiliation by foreign occupation was so fresh that the end of any foreign influence for complete independence of Iran was the utmost priority for the opposition. Thus, one source of years-long humiliation, *i.e.* the oil concessions and exploitation of Iran's national resource 'unjustly' by foreigners was a major retention for the nationalist opposition. Given the fact that the Iranian oil industry was run by a British company, AIOC, oil became the symbol of foreign domination in Iran for the nationalist opposition. Thus, there was a tangible impact of colonial domination; hence, the nationalist opposition, from the very start, aimed at nationalization of oil industry and using the country's resources for the benefit of the Iranian nation by the hand of the state. The second section of this chapter will try to shed light how colonial domination and despotism were identified as two targets for struggle, and how they were related to independence and freedom of Iranian nation by the nationalist opposition.

The third section will demonstrate the formation of nationalist opposition of 1949 – 53 through the coordination function of nationalist ideology. The coordination function was culminated in the formation of National Front in 1949. Parties that constituted the main political forces with strong social basis declared allegiance immediately after the formation of the National Front. The parties with socialist, pan-Iranist, and religious ideologies, each having different political visions, were united under the charter and program of National Front by coordinating their diverse interests through nationalist ideology. The Iran Party, The Toilers' Party, The

establishment of Mahabad Republic in 1946. See Richard W. Cottom, *Nationalism in Iran*, pp. 65 – 133.

National Party, and The Society of Muslim Warriors were the parties that joined the National Front with their strong leadership, organization, and social base.

The fourth section of the chapter is on the mobilization function of the nationalist ideology in the National Front movement. Since one major aim of the National Front was to restore constitutional order as a guarantee for freedom and independence of Iranian nation, they used constitution as the means and the parliament as the base for their opposition. Thus, mobilization of nationalist ideology in National Front movement was through the parliament, which started when members of the group were elected to the parliament in sixteenth Majles elections (1949) where the Front worked to strengthen the powers of the Majles vis-à-vis the Shah. The mobilization of nationalist opposition in the Majles occurred on two grounds: the proper functioning of the Parliament by exercising its constitutional powers vis-à-vis a ruler who resorts every means to increase his powers to the detriment of the Parliament; and the workings of oil commission headed by Mosaddeq that persuaded the commission, the parliament and finally the senate against any agreement with Britain other than nationalization of oil industry. From time to time when the struggle between the National Front and the government intensified, the people in the streets joined the nationalist mobilization through public demonstrations in support of the National Front against the court and pro-court opponents.

In conclusion, after the nationalist movement of 1949 – 1953 achieved its major aim of nationalization of oil industry in 1951, the movement's leader, Dr. Mosaddeq was elected as the Prime Minister for the first term. Nationalist Movement became the government of Iran and embarked on implementation of oil nationalization. However, the break down of the negotiations with the company and British officials, and internal strife within the National Front that drifted some influential members to join opposition against Mosaddeq sealed with the final blow in his second term of premiership by a foreign-instigated coup on 19 August 1953 (*28 Mordad coup d'état*). Thus, the National Front lost the governmental power that he achieved

through its nationalist struggle with the previous pro-Shah governments and politicians and the constitutional era of modern Iranian history came to an end.

4.1. Nationalism in the New State: Pahlavi Nationalism in Government

Reza Pahlavi, who ascended to throne in 1925 by a vote of Majles and constitutional amendment⁵, is known as the ‘founder of the modern Iranian nation state.’ He was the nationalist leader of the new Iranian state who aimed at development through modernization. This section is about the modernization and development scheme of Reza Shah and it aims to shed light on the content and function of the governmental nationalism that aimed to create a developed society and that organized the new nation state.

The nationalist ideology in new Iranian state was a means of guiding and promoting development.⁶ Development in Pahlavi state was named as *tajaddod* (renewal), a word that refers to ‘modernization’. In Pahlavi nationalism, *tajaddod* denoted “remaking of every Iranian, man and woman.”⁷ The idea that “the modern Iranian literally had to embody this message of renewal in mind, body, and attire” was the idea of nationalism in the new state, which was distinct from the nationalism of the former Qajar state.⁸

⁵ To vest the monarchy in Reza Shah and his male successors, the Constituent Assembly amended the articles 36, 37, and 38 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 7 October 1907 on 12 December 1925. L. P. Elwell-Sutton, “Reza Shah the Great: Founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty” in George Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under Pahlavis*, (USA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 27.

⁶ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 269.

⁷ Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iraniennes: The Evolving Polemic of Iranian Nationalism” in Nikki R. Keddie and Rudi Matthee (eds.), *Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics*, (USA: Univeristy of Washington Press, 2002), p. 170.

⁸ Nationalism in the Qajar period after the victory of constitutionalists in the civil war of 1908 – 1909 displayed prominence of certain strands of Iranian nationalism. These were the promotion of the Persian language and Shi’i identity, and a stress on the cultural modernity. These strands, while were useful for national identity, had potentially excluded sections of population which would in turn undermine national unity. Towards the last years of Qajar state, territory, history, and language became the symbols of identity. In the Pahlavi state, however, Reza and Mohammad Reza Shahs self-

“Development in the new nation states requires the partial or complete abandonment of traditional values and practices. It also produces new, functionally defined and specialized elites.”⁹ This statement by Breuille was the case in the Reza Shah period in Iran. In the speech at his coronation, Reza Shah declared that he had two concerns for the ‘duty of fundamental reform’ of Iran: One was showing respect to religion as the traditional basis of national identity and unity, and the other was reform of the country by the specialized work of the elites of the new state.¹⁰

For renewal (*tajaddod*), Reza Shah initiated several reforms to modernize the institutions and infrastructure, and Westernize Iranian citizens in mind and appearance, which eventually diminished the influence of the most influential traditional power base of the country, the clergy. The reforms were conducted for the purpose of independence, nationalism, and formation of a strong government for a powerful country. Hence, nationalist ideology bound the new elites for a national identity and facilitated support for abandonment of traditional values for modernization¹¹ Reza Shah’s policies for *tajaddod* had material and cultural

consciously and in an orchestrated, public way ingrained their selected ideas of Iranian nationalism among the people. Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iraniannes”, p. 168 – 170.

⁹ John Breuille, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 269.

¹⁰ Related part of Reza Shah’s speech: “Firstly, my particular attention has always been and always will be directed to the preservation of the principles and foundations of religion for ... one of the most effective means of ensuring national unity and strengthening the spirit of community of the Iranians is the fortifying of the bases of religious faith. Secondly, I ... always preferred action to speech, and any position that I may have achieved in the task of reforming our country has only been the result of work and effort. I desire therefore that every employee of the state and every individual in the realm shall understand this general truth and shall set this fundamental principle before him as the watchword of his life of duty. ... My imperial governments must therefore remember without fail that the duty of carrying out the fundamental reform of the country – the establishment of security, the spread of education, proper attention to the public health, the improvement of the economic situation, the increase of national wealth, the completion of communications, the welfare of agriculture and commerce, and urgent reform of judicial system – leave no time for contemplation and laxity.”Abdorreza Sadeqipur, (ed.), *Yadgar-e Gozashte: Majmu‘e-ye Sokhanraniha-ye A‘lahazrat-e Faqid-e Reza Shah-e Kabir*, Tehran: Javidan, 1968, pp. 72 – 74 quoted in L. P. Elwell-Sutton, “Reza Shah the Great”, pp. 28 – 29.

¹¹ “Although Iran was not completely Westernized, all the changes that took place were motivated by Western ideals. This distinction between complete emulation of and identification with the West, and adoption of Western-inspired ideals and activities, must be borne in mind at all times as a key to

dimensions. Material dimensions were institutional reforms and reforms for economic development. Cultural dimension was the reforms made for the formation of a shared sense of cultural identity.

4.1.1. Institutional and Economic Modernization

Materially, Reza Shah's initial move was to institute his strongest power base: the army. He changed the army cadres of old guards and put his loyal officers from the Cossack Brigade in positions of command. On June 6, 1925, the Majles passed the bill for compulsory military service of two years for every male citizen at the age of 21 upon the proposal of Reza Shah. This law had the social effect of amalgamation of rural and urban population, increase in literacy due to literacy classes in the army, introduction of Western uniforms and more secular morals of the urban life. This law was also important for creating one of the bases for fellow unknown citizens to imagine and share sense of unity and common fate as citizens of the nation state. Moreover, with a new law on the reorganization of the army passed on February 15, 1936, army ranks were given new Persian names, and the basis of promotion, the retirement pays and other pensions were regulated. Persian navy was established and assumed duty in the Persian Gulf. As a result, by 1941, a modern army of nearly 400,000 men was available both as a military and a political force, who could maintain the authority of the central government.¹²

Secondly, Reza Shah enacted administrative reforms for the efficiency of central authority in all over the country. Under his premiership on December 12, 1922, the Majles enacted the first law for the regulation of the civil service. The laws on November 7, 1937 and January 9, 1938 abolished the old administrative system of four *ayalats* and divided the country into ten geographically and economically

understanding the Iran of the Reza Shah era” See Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921 – 1941*, (USA: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 45.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 52 – 57.

unified *ostans*. In addition, the duties of local officials were set by the central government and the Ministry of Interior started to appoint mayors, police officials, and other municipal officials. These officials were now chosen among the educated men mostly from the middle class.¹³

Thirdly, Reza Shah embarked on renewing the judiciary system. Although his priority with legal reform was to abolish the legal base for the continuing capitulations and to ensure the country's independence from foreign powers¹⁴, he was also motivated by decreasing the power of the clergy in the administration by taking their privileges as the chief executers of law. Reza Shah dissolved the old Ministry of Justice in 1927 and established a new one in the same year with new personnel many of whom were Western educated. A Swiss-educated lawyer, Davar, became the Minister of Justice and a commission under him wrote a new civil code in 1928. A judicial reorganization bill establishing hierarchy of courts was also presented to the Majles and it was approved on May 8, 1928. On March 17, 1932, the Majles enacted a law on the registration of documents and property, which vested registration of legal documents, documents of ownership and transactions on secular state courts. This law was taking away the monopoly of *shari'a* courts on the matter, which was also the greatest source of income for the clergy. A further blow to the clergy was the secularization of employment criteria for judges. A law enacted on December 27, 1936 required judges to be graduated from Faculty of Law of Tehran University or a foreign university. Consequently, the influence of the clergy in judiciary was eliminated. By 1940, the Civil and Penal Codes that were written on the basis of Western laws were completed.¹⁵

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 58 – 61.

¹⁴ This was because the capitulations included the right of foreign nationals to be tried by their own consular courts on the basis of reasons put forward by foreign powers. Accordingly, they were claiming that the corrupt Iranian courts were also in conflict of jurisdiction because of the co-existence of *shari'a* courts and state courts. Thus, judiciary reform was necessary for the abolition of capitulations that Reza Shah announced in 1 May 1928. See Roger M. Savory, "Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era" in George Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under Pahlavis*, (USA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 91 – 92.

¹⁵ Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921 – 1941*, pp. 68 – 76

Fourthly, reforms were initiated for economic development. Economic reforms were not only vital for changes of the attitudes of people who got used to traditional economic structures towards a modernist nationalist program, but also for extensive spending on modernization of the army and programs of internal security necessitated increase in state revenue. Therefore, Pahlavi state embarked three measures to increase state revenue. Firstly, the government started up renting and selling state lands to private tenets. Secondly, regulations for collecting internal taxes were put into place. In a society where the biggest source of income, the land taxes, could not be collected due to political power of the local large landowners, a team of thirteen American financial experts headed by Arthur Millspaugh was put into charge of regulating internal taxes from 1922 until 1927. The Millspaugh team, who made revenues for Reza Shah's reform of the army, fought against tribal revolts and maintained internal security. However, their mission was terminated due to deterioration of their relations with the Shah especially because of his insistent demands for increase in army funds to the detriment of other projects after he acquired absolute power in 1925. Then, in 1925, levies on sugar and tea were introduced. In 1930, Majles put into force a new tax legislation including corporation tax, abolition of payments in kind, introduction of non-agricultural real-estate tax to be collected by municipalities. However, these measures could not be executed efficiently.¹⁶ Thirdly, Pahlavi state relied on foreign trade tariffs as the most productive source of revenue, which was under the management of the efficient collectors, the Belgian officials, since 1911. The foreign advisors from America, Belgium, Germany and Britain, who were employed by the Ministry of Finance during the rule of Reza Shah, modernized the structure and operation methods of the ministry as well.

Apart from revenue-generating reforms for economic development, Pahlavi state also initiated economic reforms in banking and agricultural sectors, development of transportation and communications, and industrialization. Until 1927, British and

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 113 – 115.

Russian Banks were active in economic life of Iran as a result of foreign concessions. In 1927, Bank Melli Iran was found as national state bank and commercial bank of Iran with the powers to issue currency and regulate fiscal policy. The agricultural reforms were given the least priority. Still, with the Land Development Act of 1937, measures were taken for the “optimal utilization of land and responsibility of the landowner.” However, no matter steps were taken for agricultural modernization and productivity increase, the old land-tenure system was largely remained intact. That the land ownership was one of the bases of monarchical power where Reza Shah himself acquired vast land resources, and that many high-ranking officials in the army and government service were also large landowners had a major role in the policies that strengthened the positions of the large landowners.

In the area of transportation, Reza Shah had two major achievements. The first one was the building of a railroad to connect the north of Iran to the south, which was completed by 1938 by a Scandinavian consortium. Secondly, the building of the Trans-Iranian railway was the major long-belated project that was completed by Reza Shah. Completed in 1938 largely on funds driven from state monopoly on sugar and tea imposed in 1925 to generate revenue for the railway project and by the cooperation of foreign experts and engineers employed by government, the railway project was a source of prestige for Reza Shah that meant progress, sovereignty, and national economic development. In addition to improvements of transportation, a major achievement was the improvement of communications by expanded telegraph lines, telephones, and radio communications. Lastly, by 1930, Reza Shah’s efforts for industrialization were intensified. Cotton, wool, silk textile industries were the first to be built and measures taken for the production of these local industries. Until 1941, eight state-owned sugar refineries were constructed. Although he started a project of heavy industrialization by his attempt to found an iron factory, which was deemed to be necessary for the construction of railroads and other construction operation, his scheme was not completed at the time of his abdication in 1941.¹⁷

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 118 - 141.

4.1.2. Cultural Modernization

The material advances at the time of Reza Shah elevated him in the eyes of both Iranians and outsiders to a position of the “father of modern Iran.”¹⁸ However, material reforms and technical and institutional Westernization was not immune from cultural changes from a traditional society to a modern one. It was the Enlightenment ideas of secularization and progress, and nationalist goal of cultural homogenization by making all citizens subsume to a national high culture that gave a new state its national character. Reza Shah’s ideas and the state he founded also passed through the same path of progress. Although secularization was not explicit in Reza Shah’s path, his dislike for the religious structure and clerical power was obvious in many of his anti-clergy acts. In this vein, educational reforms had the utmost priority. After all, it was through education that modern nation state disseminates homogenous national culture most effectively and it could westernize the new generations in a non-Western society. Moreover, reforms in education and establishment of modern schools were not only vital for the cultural renewal but also politically would serve his purpose of breaking the monopoly of the clergy in education that they traditionally enjoyed for centuries. Thus, cultural renewal in the new Iranian state started with the educational reforms. As quoted from Issa Sadiq, who held the position of Minister of Education for six terms, the educational program of modern Iran had the following aims:

(1) to create in the minds of the people a living consciousness of the past by showing the great achievements of the race; ... (2) to train boys and girls to become good citizens of modern Persia; ... (4) to teach the rural people and the tribes how to live, ... make a home, ... prepare food and clothing, ... prevent disease; ... (5) in secondary schools and ... the university the gifted youth must be trained for leadership and service in the State. They must be given a vision of Persia’s place, past and present in the world, with the ideals of leading the country in culture, science, technology, business, statesmanship, and government to such heights as befits a progressive State.¹⁹

¹⁸ Roger M. Savory, “Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era”, p. 98.

¹⁹ Issa Sadiq, *Modern Persia and Her Educational System*, (New York, 1931), p. 53 quoted in Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921 – 1941*, pp. 109 – 110.

For these aims, High Council of Education was created under the Ministry of Education in 1921 with the duties to consider the curriculums of European schools and to prepare a curriculum for teachers' training college for men and women. In the same year, the Ministry of Education issued the first full program for elementary and secondary education.²⁰

The modern educational system engendered need for new textbooks and educated teachers. The textbooks were written following the example of French textbooks and by 1939 Ministry of Education was able to publish textbooks covering the entire subjects in the curriculum. It was especially in the case of history textbooks that government's nationalist indoctrination was most ardent. The nationalist historical narrative of Pahlavi state not only endorsed the Orientalist reading of Aryan race, but also served for linking the past to the present by amplifying Persian culture and antiquity as glorious ancient heritage for modern Iranian state.²¹

By 1928, a program for sending Iranian students abroad regularly for education was put forth. Different ministries selected students for education abroad in technical, social, military, legal subjects. When these students came back, they were not only influential in education of the public but also in dissemination of Western ideas and traditions. Reza Shah allowed operation of private schools founded mostly by religious minorities but gradually Ministry of Education established full control over these schools. The establishment of University of Tehran by an act in 1934 was a remarkable achievement of the new state in higher education. Moreover, the Teacher Training Act, which was envisaging establishment of twenty-five teachers' training colleges in the country within a five-year period, was accepted on March 1934 for

²⁰ The subjects in the first elementary curriculum were Persian, Arabic, which was confined to the secondary school in 1930, penmanship, arithmetic, Persian history, Iranian and World geography, physical education, and in 1936 art and music were added. See Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921 – 1941*, p. 92.

²¹ On the narrative symbols of nationalist history that crafted national identity see Mohammad Tavakkoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography*, (Great Britain: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 96 – 112.

the education of teachers. In addition to the education of new generations, Reza Shah realized the importance of adult education for his nationalist program. Thus, Ministry of Education started a program for adult education first in elementary then in secondary levels and evening classes by 1936. The new state not only controlled the inputs in minds but also the bodies by establishing Council of Physical Training in 1933 within the Ministry of Education. The Council regulated physical education in schools and organized annual nationwide championship games. According to Banani, the characteristics of the educational system created in Iran between the years 1921 – 1941 were as such:

Free, rapid, and unquestioning borrowing of Western methods, all mobilized for a feverish assertion of nationalism, glorification of the past, statism, and autocratic centralism; defensive sensitivity in the face of criticism by foreigners; growing xenophobia too often springing from a feeling of inferiority, and an unhealthy, disdainful air of superiority over the neighboring countries.²²

The impact of educational reforms on constructing modern Iranian nation was supported by the formation of Organization of the Cultivation of Thought (*Sazeman-e Parvarash-e Afkar*) in 1939. The main aim of the organization was “to spread nationalist ideals of the state through various media, including the press, the theatre, and public lectures.”²³

The new nationalist state also sought renewal of its citizens in appearance. The dress code law accepted in 1928 by the Majles defined the proper dress code for male citizens. Pahlavi hats, jackets, shirts and pants were introduced, with an exemption for the clergy and seminary students. The renewal of the women was also one of the concerns of the new state. To this aim, the Society for Women (*Kanun-e Banovan*) was established in May 1935. Later in 1936, mandatory unveiling of women was introduced to complete the image of modern Iranian women as “both a patriotic

²² Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921 – 1941*, pp. 108 – 109.

²³ Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iraniannes”, p. 173.

mother and a skillful professional.”²⁴ The Society for Women, which was an institution for the state control on women, was active in women’s modernization and unveiling campaign. Mandatory unveiling, however, alienated not only religious women but also those who accustomed to veiling, and it was no longer enforced after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941.

Overall, in the words of Banani, “a complete dedication to the cult of nationalism-statism; a desire to assert this nationalism by a rapid adoption of the material advances of the West; and a breakdown of the traditional power of religion and a growing tendency toward secularism, which came as a result of the first two ideals”²⁵ were the changes under the new state in Iran from 1921 coup of Reza Pahlavi until his abdication in 1941. These changes became possible owing to the absolute power of Reza Shah. His sources of absolute power were the new army, the government bureaucracy, and the court patronage.²⁶ The army, having the greatest portion of public expenditure, served primarily to strengthen the government’s authority within Iran. The government bureaucracy that was steadily growing as the second important power base was composed of new elites who acquired professional, technical, cultural, intellectual, or administrative expertise through modern education on Western lines.²⁷ Reza Shah acquired his third power base, court patronage, through outright confiscation of vast areas of land that was used to finance construction, companies, charities and foundations, court pensions, and salaries. Thus, the court “grew into a wealthy landed-military complex offering lucrative posts, favors, and futures to those willing to serve the Pahlavi dynasty,”²⁸ which facilitated state cooptation over the society to thwart opposition.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 170 – 171.

²⁵ Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921 – 1941*, p. 45.

²⁶ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (USA: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 136.

²⁷ Roger M. Savory, “Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era”, p. 94.

²⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 137.

This background suggests that, as it is generally the case in many non-Western countries that acquired independence along nationalist terms and embarked on formation of a modern nation state, the Pahlavi state in Iran could not establish a balanced relationship between the state and society. Nationalism was used “to promote and justify the creation of the nation state”²⁹ by Pahlavi state. The excessive measures to control and maintain development simultaneously in a society whose identity lies in tradition and existing cultural practices provided the new Pahlavi state the power to use tradition in accordance with the goals of the modern state. Then, nationalism in the new state became an “arbitrary nationalism”, “because the ideological case of cultural nationality producing certain sorts of politics was in reality reversed by state power.”³⁰ Instead, the state came to select the traditional components of identity and use them to create a new modern national identity. Eventually, the distance between state and society widened.

In the case of Pahlavi nationalism, the changes made for modernization and development under the unifying ideology of Persian nationalism were indeed exclusive rather than being inclusive. The reforms benefited certain classes in the society, mainly government employees, army officers, students, professionals, and merchants. When it comes to the rural population and the poor, they did not benefit from Reza Shah’s modernization.³¹ In political sphere, Reza Shah eliminated his potential rivals either by terrorizing or jailing them.³² Reza Shah handpicked the

²⁹ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 390.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, (USA: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 92.

³² “By 1937, few early reformers remained in the public life. Davar, the Minister of Justice, committed suicide, probably in anticipation of being either disgraced or murdered. Taqizadeh lost his ambassadorship in Paris. ... Suleyman Iskandari went into retirement in 1927 ... Farokhi, the outspoken poet from the Socialist party died in a prison hospital. Tadayon, who had played an important role in the Revival party and the republican campaign, was thrown out of the cabinet into jail when he complained that the budget allocated too little to his Education Ministry and too much to the War Ministry. ‘Ali Dashti, a prominent writer whose paper *Shafaq Surkh* (Red Twilight) had helped Reza Shah since 1922, found himself deprived of parliamentary immunity and detained in a state sanitarium. ... Kasravi lost his provincial judgeship soon after ruling in favor of a group of small

parliamentary candidates in the elections, chose the prime ministers and all ministers, and Majles only approved his choice, banned political parties that he perceived as challenge to his absolute rule, and closed down independent newspapers. There was no room for organized union activity in a state where trade unions were officially banned in 1926, and also no toleration for oppositional politics.

In addition, the law of safeguarding security in 1931 came as a forced suppression of the opposition. It was in the midst of activities of dissident students in Europe who convened a special congress in Europe and “demanded the release of all political prisoners, called for establishment of a republic, and denounced Reza Shah as a tool of British imperialism.”³³ Reza Shah, alarmed by growing opposition, ordered Majles to issue the law that stipulated a ten-year prison term “for members of organizations either endangered the “constitutional monarchy” or propagated a “collective ideology.””³⁴ Thus, the state coercion did not enable any opposition to flourish in the Pahlavi monarchy under the Reza Shah.

Besides the political suppression and authoritarianism as a result of absolute rule of Reza Shah, the ‘arbitrary nationalism’ described above created exclusionary politics that alienated social groups from the mainstream nationalist-statist rhetoric.³⁵ Those

landowners who had been dispossessed by the shah.” See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 153.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

³⁴ Judiciary Committee, “Law for Safeguarding National Security,” Parliamentary Proceedings, 8th Majles, June 31, 1931 cited in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 154. The nucleus of the formation of Tudeh, the first organized and widespread communist party of Iran was also coincided these years of severe suppression. Fifty-three men organized a secret collectivist (*ishtiraki*) organization and published a May Day manifesto, organized strikes in Technical College and in a textile factory in Isfahan. They translated Das Kapital of Marx and Communist Manifesto. They were detained by police in May 1937 on the accusation of these acts as illegal. The groups, “the famous Fifty-three”, formed Tudeh Party a few years later. See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 155.

³⁵ According to Kashani-Sabet, “Iranian nationalism, like other nationalisms, became at once a statement of inclusion and a policy of exclusion.” During the constitutional revolution, unity did not mean complete erasure of individual differences, but the acceptance of an Iranian identity that acknowledged difference but privileged certain characteristics over the others was prevalent. After the

who felt excluded from the Pahlavi nationalist-statist discourse were mainly the ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities, and traditional-conservative classes. In the case of minorities, Reza Shah worked to lessen the discrimination against minorities in his initial years in the throne. This was mainly because of his ideal of national unification and to break the power of “organized Shi’ism.”³⁶ However, especially the efforts of the state to homogenize the educational system towards a direction to Persianize the country created resentment among the minorities.³⁷ Baha’i schools lost their license to teach in 1931, the Armenian community schools in 1938. The printing press in minority languages was closed down. The Jewish deputy in the Majles, Samuel Haim, was executed in 1931 and Zoroastrian deputy, Shahroukh Arbab Keykhosrow, was gunned down in the street by the police in 1940 because of political activities of his son in Germany.³⁸

The authoritarian Pahlavi state that experienced a brief period of liberalization after the Allied occupation in Iran that led the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 and ascendance of his 22-year-old son to the throne by the help of the British, witnessed the re-emergence of perhaps the most profound opposition nationalist movement, the National Front movement of 1949-53 led by Dr. Mosaddeq. Although the prevalent discourse of National Front was anti-colonial opposition to all foreign influence in Iranian land, which was materialized in oil nationalization action, the movement was

end of civil strife in 1909, certain strands of Iranian nationalism became prominent, such as the promotion of the Persian language and Shi’i identity, and a stress on the cultural modernity. Territory, language, and history were the symbols of Iranian identity in the last years of Qajar state. The Pahlavi’s, however, strikingly orchestrated a selection of ideas for Iranian nationalism in a self-conscious and public way. See Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iraniannes”, pp. 167 – 169.

³⁶ “Zoroastrians, as followers of an ancient Iranian religion, had already seen their low status reversed by many nationalists. The Baha’is, though still seen as secedes from Islam by the orthodox, were freer than before and did not experience the persecutions felt earlier in the century; attitudes towards Jews, Iranian Sunnis, and Armenian and Nestorian Christians also improved.” See Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iraniannes”, p. 171.

³⁷ For a critical analysis on racism in Pahlavi nationalist ideology and exclusion of Iran’s diverse ethnic and linguistic groups see Alireza Asgharzadeh, *Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles*, (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

³⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 163.

also mobilized against the unconstitutional politics of Pahlavi state and sought for establishment of rule of law in the country. Before dwelling upon the nationalist movement that was coordinated and mobilized in opposition to the Pahlavi state, this chapter will continue with the next section on the assertion of nationalist ideology against colonialism and despotism.

4.2. Nationalism as an Opposition Movement: Assertion Against Colonialism and Despotism

The nationalist opposition movement of 1949 – 53 was coordinated and mobilized with two aims: to eliminate colonial domination and to bring an end to the despotic government in Iran. For the Iranian nationalists, colonialism was an evil external force that manifested itself in territorial intervention and economic exploitation since the beginning of the 19th century. Maintaining the country's independence and territorial integrity had been a major goal for the governments after the Constitutional Revolution, albeit the strategies to attain this goal changed under different governments and due to changing world conditions. With the end of the Second World War, when the anti-colonial nationalist movements in non-Western world began to fight against colonial domination to attain self-determination³⁹, the Iranian nationalists acquired an anti-colonial stance, which precipitated the change in the meaning of oil issue. Until the rise of nationalist movement of 1949 – 53, oil was handled only as a source of revenue and share of profits as well as the level of oil income was the only problem between the Iranian governments and the British-owned oil company. However, by 1949 oil acquired a new symbolic meaning as a national resource of the country. It was asserted by the nationalist movement that this national resource should belong to Iranians; meaning that it should be extracted and sold by national government. Thus, nationalization of oil industry became the means to counter colonial domination in Iran as well as assertion of national independence,

³⁹ See Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, (USA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 22 – 85.

pride and dignity. This section aims to shed light on how oil issue became a problematique for Iran and a nationalist symbol for the opposition movement of 1949 – 53. It will continue with elaborations on how the oil problematique intermingled with the despotic government and became source of indignation for the nationalist opposition.

4.2.1. Oil Politics and Foreign Intervention

The roots of anti-colonial nationalist resentment lies in the territorial occupations by the Russian and the British during the First and Second World Wars, and concessions to either or both powers by the Iranian governments to survive where politics meant to play with Russian and British intrigues during late Qajar period. In the First World War, the third Majles declared neutrality in January 1915; however, the imperial powers invaded Iranian territory. Russian troops in the north, which had been there since 1911, fought with the Turkish army. In the southwest, the British, who had established alliances with the Khazali and Bakhtiari tribes for the safety of oil activities, landed troops and established their own South Persia Rifles force for the same purpose due to disruption of their tribal alliance in the face of German influence. It was against this background that the nationalist resentment was increased and the Majles did not accept the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement signed by Vusuq government that put Iran under British sphere of influence.⁴⁰

Despite continuation of the policy of playing Britain and Russia against each other by Iranian governments, there was intensification of nationalist sentiment to ensure territorial integrity and independence of Iran vis-à-vis these two powers by the end of the First World War. At the time of the war, Iran was occupied by the British and

⁴⁰ Secretly dealt between Vusuq al-Dowleh and Sir Percy Cox, the friendship agreement confirmed Britain to supply expert advisors for Iranian administration and officers and munitions as well as to improve communication system of Iran in return for guaranteeing British access to southern oil fields. Approved by the cabinet on August 9, 1919, the agreement was confronted with the opposition of Iranian nationalists in the Majles since it meant a complete surrender of the country to the British influence. It was after this agreement against the Russians that Vusuq government decided to close Iranian Embassy in Moscow.

Russian forces, central authority declined, and local landowners and tribal chiefs reasserted their independence. A quote by Kashani-Sabet from the newspaper *Ettehad* reflects the mood in Iran in the face of occupation: “The poor Iranian nation. ... In spite of its neutrality ... its northern and southern regions have been subjected to the attacks of the troops of the countries at war ... and each day a new attack is being made on its independence.”⁴¹ According to Hunter, “the war’s disruption awakened many Iranians to the need for strong and independent government.”⁴² The opposition to the 1919 Agreement and support for the suppression of regional revolts were demonstrations of a popular demand for a strong central authority which could eliminate internal and external threats, and ensure territorial integrity of the country.

Reza Khan entered into political scene with the February 20, 1921 military coup that he carried out as the head of Cossack Brigade, together with Sayyed Zia’ al-Din who became prime minister after the coup. Becoming Minister of War in the post-coup government, Reza Khan explained the philosophy of the coup within the framework of “oppression by foreigners, the treachery of the national leaders, the crisis of Gilan, and the degradation of the army.”⁴³ During the First World War, in addition to foreign intervention, the lack of central authority led local nationalist wartime revolts, mainly in Gilan and Azerbaijan, with the aim of spreading reform all through Iran. Thus, Iranian nationalists welcomed Reza Shah’s maintaining the authority of central government after the 1921 coup until his crowning as the shah of Iran in 1925.⁴⁴

⁴¹ *Ettehad*, 30 Rabi’al-avval 1333/15 February 1915, 1 quoted in Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iranianness”, p. 169.

⁴² Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran*, p. 75.

⁴³ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 140.

⁴⁴ Reza Khan first served as commander of armed forces after the coup of 20 February 1921; then as Minister of War after June 1921; then as Prime Minister after 29 October 1923; and lastly he overthrew Qajar dynasty and declared himself as the first shah of Pahlavi dynasty when the Majles accepted the bill – presented in October 1925 – in 25 April 1926. It should be noted that Mohammad Mosaddeq, who was a Majles deputy at that time, had been supporting Reza Khan as prime minister. But he strongly opposed the bill for his coronation on the basis that it was against the constitution, which itself was a product of “twenty years of bloodshed for freedom and democracy” and it would

From 1921 to 1925, Reza Khan's priority was to ensure territorial integrity of Iran. After suppressing the regional revolts and putting into force the treaty of friendship with Russia, Reza Khan took steps for independence from Great Britain. Upon the refusal of ratification by the fourth Majles, Prime Minister Seyyed Zia' al-Din announced that the 1919 Agreement with Britain was cancelled. Therefore, the fate of the 1919 agreement and the British presence in southern Iran remained as the major problems confronting Iran in its way of independence. Reza Khan engaged military operations in Khuzestan over Sheikh Khaz'al, who had commitment with the British for safety of oil operations in return for security of his authority; thus, refused to obey the central government. By December 1924, Reza Khan managed to establish authority in southern Iran, and Khuzestan region was put under the control of central government. When he crowned himself as Reza Shah in 1925, he had ensured "unification and control of the army (and) establishment of central authority over the provinces."⁴⁵

After establishing control in all over the country and forming a strong central authority, on May 10, 1927 Reza Shah notified all Western powers that had capitulatory privileges in Iran that these privileges would be abolished exactly after one year.⁴⁶ At the end of this one year, Iran signed a new commercial agreement with Great Britain on May 10, 1928 by which Great Britain recognized Iran's tariff autonomy, agreed abrogation of capitulations, and in return secured treatment of its nationals in Iran according to the modern Iranian legal system that Reza Shah established through his scheme of modernization of the legal system by 1927.⁴⁷

lead to "pure reaction and pure istibdat (despotism)." For full text of Mosaddeq's speeches in the Majles see Hossein Makki, *Duktur Mosaddeq va Nutqha-ye Tarikhi-ye U* (Dr. Mosaddeq and His Historic Speeches), (Tehran: Ilmi, 1945), quoted in Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1999), p. 25.

⁴⁵ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 177.

⁴⁶ See Michael Zirinsky, "Reza Shah's Abrogation of Capitulations, 1927 – 1928" in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Reza Shah, 1921 – 1941*, (Great Britain: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 81 – 98.

⁴⁷ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, pp. 246 – 247.

However, oil issue remained one of the main grievances of the nationalists, which reached apex by signing of the 1933 agreement with Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Although Reza Shah acted with the aim to cancel the D'Arcy oil concession in 1932, he ended up with the much-debated agreement of 1933 with Great Britain.

The contested story of oil in Iran had started with the concession given to William Knox D'Arcy in 1901 by Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar. Exploration activities began in 1905 and first oil was burst out in 1908 in Masjid-e Sulayman in southwest Iran. In April 1909, Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was established. When Sir Winston Churchill announced the policy of conversion of British navy from coal to oil on March 3, 1913, the British government became a major and controlling partner in the company to ensure supply of oil. Due to disagreement on the definition of the 'profits' of the company,⁴⁸ Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith from British Treasury negotiated an agreement for profit sharing with the APOC in 1920 in his capacity as financial advisor to Iranian government. Reza Shah declared this agreement as invalid and a new round of negotiations were opened between Sir John Cadman from APOC and Court Minister 'Abd al-Hosseini Teymurtash in 1928.

Although a new agreement was signed in May 1932, it came out that the royalty payments for 1931 would be less than a quarter of the previous year and the lowest since 1917. The nationalists in Iran started to campaign against the company with the claim that "it falsified accounts to defraud Iranian Treasury."⁴⁹ This campaign ended

⁴⁸ "From the Iranian point of view and even during the last years of the Qajar dynasty, the main consideration from the oil activities within the country was purely economic and the government was mainly interested in revenues from oil operations. In this regard disagreements developed from the early years of oil operations, between the government and the APOC. The disagreements centered on the company's calculation of 16 percent of its net profits that formed the basis of the annual payment to the Persian government. The heart of the problem was the definition of profits, about which expert opinions differed. For example, the profits of the APOC's subsidiaries operating abroad were excluded and the discount granted on oil sold to the British Navy was deducted." See Parviz Mina, "Oil Agreements in Iran", July 20 2004, available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/oil-agreements-in-iran>, accessed on 15 May 2015.

⁴⁹ Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath*, (USA: Syracuse University Press, 1992), p.31.

up with Iran's cancellation of D'Arcy concession of 1901 on November 27, 1932. In the note to the company sent by Taqizadeh as the Minister of Finance, Iranian government declared that it would not negotiate terms of a new concession unless the company would take into consideration the interest of Iran on the basis of justice and fairness.⁵⁰ British government rejected the cancellation as being unlawful and referred the issue to the League of Nations on December 19, 1932. Upon the League's decision to give time to the parties for negotiation, Sir John Cadman went to Tehran in April 1933, and met with Reza Shah to negotiate a new agreement. It finally came out and ratified by the Majles in May 28, 1933.

The new agreement reduced the concession area from 480,000 square miles to 100,000 square miles, but the duration of the concession was extended by additional 32 years, which would be until 1993. The company's profits were agreed to be calculated not on a fixed level of 16 percent as it had been, but on a basis of volume of oil produced and the financial distribution that the company would make to its shareholders. This agreement also changed the name of the company to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in line with Reza Shah's changing the name of the country from Persia to Iran in 1935. The AIOC would recruit Iranians for technical and commercial staff, and would develop Naft-e Shah oil field for domestic consumption.⁵¹

4.2.2. Rise of Nationalist Opposition Against Authoritarian Nation State

The nationalist opposition, who defined management of oil resources by foreigners and government of the country by unconstitutional means as central problems for the nation's independence and freedom, came to the fore largely due to Second World War conditions. When Germany invaded Soviet Union in June 1941 during the

⁵⁰ Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sale Naft-e Iran*, (Tehran: Entesharat-e Payam, 1358 (1979/1980)), p. 292.

⁵¹ Robert B. Stobaugh, "The Evolution of Iranian Oil Policy, 1925 – 1975" in George Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under Pahlavis*, (USA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 203 – 205.

Second World War, Iran was under the influence of Germany and Germans wanted to use Iranian territory as their base.⁵² On the other hand, Iranian territory was vital for the Allies as a supply route to the Soviets. Upon the Shah's reluctance to expel German's from Iran, which was demanded by Britain and Russia, they invaded Iran on August 25, 1941. Occupying forces pressured Reza Shah to abdicate in September 1941, and his son, Mohammad Reza, was crowned as the new shah of Iran.

According to the Treaty of Alliance between Iran, Soviet Union, and Great Britain signed on January 29, 1942, the occupation was to end six months after the end of the war. Moreover, the imperial powers guaranteed to protect Iran's economy in the face of difficulties of the war. Although the Allied powers declared respect to territorial integrity and political independence of Iran, it was Iran's obligation to cooperate by all means with the Allied powers for deployment of land, sea, and air forces in its territory.⁵³ With the occupation, Iranian territory came under the direct domination of Soviet Union and Great Britain.⁵⁴

The Second World War had two effects in Iranian politics both of which worked for the formation of nationalist opposition movement of 1949 – 53. One was the war-related economic and social problems that were related with the domination of the country by imperial powers. The other was end of a one-man rule with the removal of Reza Shah.⁵⁵

⁵² See Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, pp. 277 – 300.

⁵³ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy 1941 – 1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations*, (USA: University Press of Virginia, 1966), pp. 50 – 53.

⁵⁴ As Hambly writes, "None of the three Allies had any immediate interest in country itself. Their concern was primarily strategic: to keep the Germans out, ensure the flow of oil, and assist the Soviets with war-materials transported across Iran's mountains and deserts by rail and road." See Gavin R. G. Hambly, "The Pahlavi Autocracy: Muhammad Riza Shah, 1941 – 1979" in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, Charles Melville (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. 7 From Nader Shah to the Islamic Republic, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 244.

⁵⁵ Mostafa Elm makes a similar argument. He writes "The fall of Reza Shah's dictatorial regime and the occupation of Iran gave rise to two major forces in the internal politics of the country in the 1940s. The first liberated the democratic forces who fought for constitutional rule. The second widened the

The Allied occupation in the war years created instability in the country and unrest among the Iranian people, both of which increased the feeling of humiliation. Besides Russia and Britain, the U.S. also sent troops to Iran after entering into war in order to ensure the transport of supplies across the Trans-Iranian Railway. Moreover, in May 1943, Iran's finances, banking, government industry, commerce, and emergency wartime controls were put under the control of Arthur Millspaugh, who was invited by the Iranian government for the second time as administrator general of finances in November 1942 in order to ameliorate Iran's ruined wartime economy. According to Keddie, it was in these years that the American influence in Iran reached to its highest level until then.⁵⁶ With Allied invasion, as Amin Saikal writes "Iran was humiliated, and lost its real sovereignty. The conduct of its domestic and foreign affairs was directly subjected to the dictates of the occupying forces."⁵⁷ Nationalism, thus, became the means to bring an end to this colonial conquest and domination.⁵⁸

The second effect, end of one-man rule and a period of interregnum of despotic government, paved way for the freedom of political space. Bureaucracy and court patronage, two of the three power bases of the Pahlavi state during Reza Shah, were eliminated in the years of occupation. Mohammad Reza could retain only the army as his power base. He granted amnesty for all political prisoners, returned court lands to religious foundations, took his oath before the deputies in the Majles and reintroduced immunity for deputies. Unlike his father who had chosen the prime minister himself, the new shah left the election of prime minister to the Majles as it was stipulated in the constitution. In these circumstances parliamentary politics

influence of Britain and Russia in the internal affairs of Iran during the occupation while fueling nationalistic sentiments." Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle*, p. 44.

⁵⁶ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran*, pp. 106 – 107.

⁵⁷ Amin Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah: Iran from Autocracy to Religious Rule*, (USA: Princeton University Press, 1980), p.26.

⁵⁸ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 156.

became important again. Fractions were formed in the Majles, each pursuing their own interests. Prior to the elections for the fourteenth Majles between November 1943 and February 1944, there were six parties effective in the political scene.⁵⁹ The fourteenth Majles that convened in February 1944 witnessed formation of shifting alliances under seven fractions. Press was flourished and several newspapers appeared as party organs or by individuals affiliated with the groups in the political space. This liberal environment enabled nationalists to express their views.

However, the liberal interregnum ended by 1949 when Mohammad Reza Shah began to strengthen his position as “ruler” vis-à-vis the parliament. Since he crowned, he acted in line with the views of nationalist constitutionalists who argued that the Shah should reign, not rule.⁶⁰ Relying on the army that he preserved as his power base, the balance of royalist, pro-British, and democrat fractions in the fifteenth Majles (June 1947 – June 1949) that rendered formation of a stable cabinet impossible enabled the Shah to intervene by selecting Prime Minister against his constitutional position. This marked the change in the attitude of the Shah towards absolutism.

Failed assassination attempt in February 1949 against the Shah in his visit to Tehran University gave him the opportunity to act against opposition. After this event, he declared martial law, closed down newspapers in opposition with the court, outlawed Tudeh party because of the charges that the plotter of assassination attempt was

⁵⁹These parties were: Tudeh Party (Marxist, formed by the Fifty-Three men jailed by Reza Shah), Comrades Party (radical, Mostafa Fateh, a high ranking Iranian in APOC as its leader), Iran Party (secular nationalist developed from the Engineers’ Association, Mehdi Bazargan was one of the founding members), Justice Party (formed by old intelligentsia against communist Tudeh, regards both socialism and capitalism dangerous, pro-American), National Union Party (Royalist, pro-American as a balance against Britain and Soviet Union), Fatherland Party (Seyyed Zia was the leader, pro-British).

⁶⁰Chief among them was Mohammad Mosaddeq who persistently argued for his constitutionalist position in several occasions. For example, in his parliamentary speech on 15 October 1944 Mosaddeq stated: “...the shah’s position is ceremonial, that is the shah should assent to acts of parliament in a symbolic and ceremonial sense, for if you eliminate its ceremonial nature we would no longer have a constitutional government. If the shah were to appoint and dismiss the ministers then there would be no Majles, the constitutional regime, and all that Your Excellency (the acting Minister of War) says about democratic government.” See Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 54.

affiliated with a communist-religious conspiracy against him. The lands confiscated by Reza Shah and returned to the people in the first years of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign were taken back. He convened a Constituent Assembly that granted the Shah the right to dissolve Parliament, and the right to rule over his own decision when a dispute occurred between the consultative assembly and the senate. Therefore, Za'im writes, "the Shah assumed the executive power for the first time since 1942 and the legislative power of the country lost its real power."⁶¹ Thus, the period of constitutional politics under occupation ended and 'modern arbitrary rule'⁶² which was marked by unconstitutional behavior of the shahs in a country governed by a constitution, once again prevailed in Iran.

4.2.3. Oil as Symbol of National Independence

While Mohammad Reza Shah was strengthening his bases of power and authority after the Allied forces were withdrawn by 1946, the oil issue remained as a source of continuing humiliation. During the war years, the general view regarding the 1933 Oil Agreement was that "it was imposed on Iran and it should be modified at the

⁶¹ Kuroush Za'im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran: Az Peydayesh ta Kudeta-ye 28 Mordad* (The Iranian National Front: From Foundation to 19 August Coup d'Etat), (Tehran: Entesharat-e Iranmehr, 1379 (2000/2001)), p. 58.

⁶² 'Modern arbitrary rule' is a description used by Homa Katouzian for Reza Shah's dictatorship after 1930s. He writes that "by 1928, the Shah's dictatorship was turning to autocracy (i.e. absolute rule but not arbitrary power)... During the rise of dictatorship, which dated back to Reza Shah's premiership, there had ... been growing deviations from some basic tenets of the country's constitution. ... But government was still constitutional in so far as it was not purely personal, and there was still a considerable amount of ministerial discretion and parliamentary argument, check and balance. This after all is what distinguishes a dictatorship, even autocratic government, from arbitrary rule." Katouzian further elaborates on the differences between traditional and modern arbitrary rule. He argues that, firstly, modern technology made the application of arbitrary rule much more effective and comprehensive, with modern police force, gendarmerie, and the standing army all at the shah's disposal. Secondly, modern arbitrary rule had been established after the Constitutional Revolution, *i.e.* where there are systematic laws, modern legal and administrative system, and judicial and administrative bodies to implement them. Thirdly, whereas mediation of respectable leaders and officials and sanctuaries were two mechanisms for mediation in the traditional arbitrary rule, they were no longer functional in modern arbitrary rule." See Homa Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis*, (India: I.B.Tauris, 2006), pp. 304 – 324.

earliest opportunity.”⁶³ Reza Shah, who made the agreement, was seen as a British agent not only because the British financed the 1921 coup but also because of the unfavorable terms of 1933 Agreement for Iran.⁶⁴ During the occupation, the British involvement in daily politics made the British influence all pervasive and clearly visible.⁶⁵ Indeed, distrust towards Britain was a deeply ingrained characteristic of Iranian politics.⁶⁶ The report of General Patrick Hurley, who was sent to Iran as a personal emissary of President Roosevelt to examine the situation in Iran when the U.S. joined the British occupation clearly portrays the pervasive distrust towards the British. He writes:

⁶³ Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sale Naft-e Iran*, p. 300.

⁶⁴ Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S. – Iranian Relations*, (USA: The New Press, 2013), p. 28. Also see Zirinsky, Michael P., “Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah, 1921-1926,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1992, pp. 639-663.

⁶⁵ Abrahamian writes that British involvement in internal affairs of Iran was visible “in the choice of ministers in Tehran; in the appointment of governors in the provinces; in the election of deputies to the Majles; in the negotiations with the local tribal chiefs; in the buying of food supplies from landlords; in the recruitment of local labour; and in the election of military commanders, police chiefs, town mayors, and even village heads in Khuzestan.” Moreover, Britain opened consulates in almost every city of Iran to manage the occupation. See Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup*, p. 30.

⁶⁶ Despite contemporary enemies in the rhetoric of the Islamic Republic are the US and Israel, the famous phrase, “kar kar-e Engilisihast” (Whatever happens is English doing) is still alive in Iranian daily speech; thus in social psyche, demonstrating the deep mistrust towards Britain that remained as a heritage of modern Iranian political history. Personal Interview, Dr Laleh Ghadakpour, Iranian Philosophical Society. See also Ahmad Ashraf, “Conspiracy Theories”, available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/conspiracy-theories>, accessed on 17 May 2015. Ashraf writes “Belief in the *siasat-e Engelis* led many Persians also to believe that most political events were stage-managed by the British (*kar-e Engelisiha*) and that almost all politicians were British agents (‘*amel-e* or *nowkar-e Engelis*). ... The myth of *siasat Engelis* was applied retroactively to the history of the 19th century, during most of which Russia had actually been the dominant foreign power in Persia. For example, in his influential book *Dast-e panhan-e siasat-e Engelis dar Iran* (The hidden hand of British policy in Iran) Khan-Malek Sasani, an influential diplomat and ardent conspiracy theorist, described a supposed great British plot to dismantle Persia. ... The myth of *siasat-e Engelis* surfaced once again during the Allied occupation of Persia in 1320/1941 and its aftermath. It was firmly believed by many people that the British raised Reza Shah to glory and threw him out when he became useless. The accession to the throne of the crown prince Mohammad-Reza; the selection of cabinet members; the results of Majles elections; the rise and fall of personalities, political parties, social clubs, and newspapers; and even famines and food shortages were all attributed to British scheming.”

The Iranians distrust the motives of Britain and Russia and believe that the future existence of Iran as an independent nation is threatened. ... For the most part the attitude of the Iranian officials, and indeed of the Iranian people who are in a position to appraise conditions, is one of intense bitterness towards Great Britain. ... Towards Russia there is less bitterness. ... The Iranians openly charge and believe that Britain has been guilty of conduct akin to that of the Nazis in Europe. If the Iranians had to decide today between Britain and Russia they would in my opinion unquestionably choose the Russians.⁶⁷

Hassan Taqizadeh, who had been a member of negotiation team in 1933 Agreement as Minister of Finance, wrote in his memoir in 1958 that under the threat of the company to break negotiations because of refusal by Iranian negotiators to the unfavorable terms proposed by Cadman, Reza Shah became fearful of consequences and personally intervened. For unknown reasons to Taqizadeh, Reza Shah accepted to settle the unfavorable terms of the agreement. Since he had absolute power, no one in the negotiation team, including Taqizadeh himself, could oppose Reza Shah's personal decision.⁶⁸ The dissatisfaction with the agreement grew after the end of occupation because of the fact that the British government was earning more income than the Iranian government through taxation from AIOC, the company that was extracting the resource unquestionably regarded as 'national' by Iranians.⁶⁹ Thus, both the Pahlavi dynasty and the British came under heavy distrust by Iranian nationalists. While the "main national enemy was Britain,"⁷⁰ the Pahlavi shahs were collaborators with the enemy.

⁶⁷ General Patrick Hurley, "Memorandum to the President, State Department" *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1943*, Vol. 4, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 364 – 366, quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup*, pp. 30 – 31.

⁶⁸ Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, *Zandagi-ye Tufani: Khaterat-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh* (A Stormy Life: Memoirs of Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh) (prepared by Iraj Afshar), (Tehran: Entesharat-e Mohammad 'Ali Elmi, 1368 (1989)), pp. 236 – 242.

⁶⁹ John H. Bamberg, *The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. ii, The Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928-1954*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 325.

⁷⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup*, p. 31.

It was against this background that the goals of the National Front, formed in October 1949 during the elections for the sixteenth Majles (July 1949 – February 1950), was to fight against ‘*solte-ye este‘mari*’ (colonial domination) and ‘*hokumat-e estabdadi*’ (despotic state).⁷¹ Before the Shah’s departure for the U.S. to seek for economic aid for his first 7-year economic plan, anti-court politicians, bazaar connected politicians and Western-educated radicals under the leadership of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq were gathered in front of the royal palace to protest the Shah’s autocratic measures and the interior ministry’s rigging of elections. In the absence of Majles that had not been convened yet, there was no other authority than the Shah, who was also accused by acting unconstitutionally, that Mosaddeq and his supporters could appeal.⁷² Their effective ‘silent protest’ ended with the Shah’s promise to ensure free elections after negotiations between the Court Minister Hezhir and the group of twenty-men⁷³ that were accepted in the palace garden and held a sit-in for four days. This group was the nucleus of the National Front that they declared its formation in October 1949.

⁷¹ Manshour-e Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran (Iranian National Front Charter adopted in the first congress of Iranian National Front), *Komiteh-ye Entesharat va Tabligat-e Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, Nashr-e Dakheli, reprinted in Farvardin 1378 (1999).

⁷² According to Azimi, Mosaddeq appealed to the Shah with the aim of persuading him to comply with his constitutionally prescribed role and endorse his image as guardian of the constitution that was desired by the people. See Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris & co Ltd, 1898), p. 208.

⁷³ Abd ‘al Qader Azadkhorasani (editor of newspaper Azad), Shams al-Din Amir-Alai (Judge, former minister), Dr. Mozaffar Baqai (Associate Professor at Tehran University, Member of Fifteenth Parliament, Editor of the newspaper Shahed); Seyyed Abol Hassan Haerizadeh (Judge, Member of Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fifteenth Parliaments); Arsalan Khal‘atbari (Lawyer, Writer); Abbas Khalili (Editor of newspaper Aqdam); Ahmad Zirakzadeh (Mechanical Engineer, One of the leaders of Iran Party); Dr. Karem Sanjabi (Professor at Tehran University, One of the leaders of Mihen Party, Mihenparastan Party, and Iran Party); Dr. Seyyed ‘Ali Shayegan (Professor at Tehran University, former minister); Hossein Sadr (Lawyer, Editor of newspaper Qiyam-e Iran); Abol Hassan Amidi Nouri (Lawyer, Editor of newspaper Dad); Dr. Seyyed Hossein Fatimi (Editor of newspaper Bakhtar-e Emrooz); Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Ja‘fari Ghoruri (Imam of the community); Dr. Reza Kaviyani (PhD in Economics, government employee); Yousef Moshar (Member of the Parliament); Seyyed Hossein Makki (Officer in Air Forces, Member of the Fifteenth Parliament); Ahmad Maleki (Editor of the newspaper Setareh); Dr. Seyyed Mohammadreza Jalali Na‘ini (Lawyer, Writer); Seyyed Mahmud Nariman (Former Minister, Mayor of Tehran). Kuroush Za‘im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, pp. 69 – 70.

The demands of the National Front in its formation from the court were “honest elections, lifting of martial law, and freedom of press.”⁷⁴ As a result of their insistent protest, the elections in Tehran was suspended on January 6, 1950, the votes-casted declared null and a new election was organized on February 14, 1950 in Tehran by which members of the National Front were elected to the sixteenth Majles.⁷⁵ However, the National Front was not an organized party but a broad coalition of forces that together formed the nationalist opposition. The following section, with the aim to demonstrate the diverse interests of the social forces coordinated in the National Front, will dwell on the coordination of the nationalist movement of 1949 – 53.

4.3. Coordination of Groups with Diverse Interests Under National Front

Iranian social movements, according to Katouzian, have futures of their own. These features are “the unity of *all* the communities and social classes, as such, to bring down the regime which then represents the arbitrary state; the implicit belief that once the regime collapses the entire arbitrary state will have been destroyed; the role of an individual leader as savior, the ‘good’ counterpart to the ‘evil’ person they confront; the consequent lack of a programme *for dismantling the arbitrary state itself*.”⁷⁶ The national opposition movement of 1949 – 53 was also carrying these features. This section will focus on unity of heterogenous groups and social classes through which coordination of diverse interests for the nationalist cause facilitated; and the role of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq as the leader of the movement.

⁷⁴ National Front, “Declaration to the Public”, Shahed, 24 October 1949, quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 252.

⁷⁵ Za‘im notes that corruption and direct involvement of state in Tehran elections became such scandalous that even Seyyed Mohammad Sadegh Tabataba‘i, head of the supervisory committee and supporter of the regime, raised his objection to the elections. Kuroush Za‘im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, pp. 80 – 81.

⁷⁶ As a consequence of the last feature, the arbitrary state survives in the new regime. Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 42.

The national opposition movement of 1949 – 53 came to the fore with the coordination of different social and political groups under the umbrella of the ‘National Front’, which took the leading role in the mobilization of nationalist opposition. Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq, who was vocal for anti-colonial and anti-despotic demands of people, was elected as the chairman of the front. Being formed in 1949 at the time of elections for the sixteenth Majles, National Front’s initial demand was to have free and fair elections for the parliament. On October 17, 1949, the group issued a statement that the election rigging would led to misappropriation of Iran’s national assets; *i.e.* oil.⁷⁷

The National Front was a union of different forces that came together for “the establishment of social justice and protection of the constitutional laws; free elections and free expression of political opinion; and the improvement of economic conditions”⁷⁸ as declared in the program of the Front that was published a few months after its formation. National Front was organized as a loose coalition with a central council established by the charter, and it avoided becoming a structured political party. Thus, organizations such as student unions, professional associations, and political parties were invited to join the front. Indeed, Mosaddeq, the Front’s leader, persistently declared his will to speak for the whole nation, not for any one party.⁷⁹ This approach of Mosaddeq, which was immune from communal identity

⁷⁷ Bakhtar-e Emrooz, 18 October 1949, cited in Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 73. This statement was also displaying the discontent of the developments regarding oil resources since 1947. Firstly, on 21 October 1947, the fifteenth Majles rejected the bill that envisaged granting oil concession to the Soviet Union in northern Iran. This bill was the result of Qavam’s deal with the Soviet Union in his premiership. Being a tactical move indeed, Qavam promised the concession to the Soviet Union in 1946 when the Soviets were reluctant to obey the Treaty of Friendship of 1942 and withdrew their troops from Iranian territory after the end of the war without securing a concession for oil. Then came the Supplemental Agreement with the AIOC in July 1949 after a decision of the Majles to open negotiations with the company for a better deal. Especially after the Saudis had ‘50-50 agreement’ of profit sharing with Aramco in 1950, this supplemental agreement which envisaged only a 2 shillings increase per tone of crude oil as Iran’s royalty, was too little a gain for Iranian nationalists.

⁷⁸ The Program and Charter of National Front, *Bakhtar-e Emrooz*, 1 July 1950 quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 253.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

manifestations, was to prevent any polarization. In addition, it had only been possible to mobilize around the task of establishing genuine independence for Iran if the movement remained as a coalition of diverse groups.⁸⁰ Thus, “in 1949, the National Front had been formed as a coalition of nationalist groups and parties from a broad spectrum of Iranian politics.”⁸¹ The Iran Party, The Toiler’s Party, The National Party, The Society of Muslim Warriors were the main parties that were united under National Front shortly after its formation. The ideologies of these parties were ranging from socialism to political Islam. Yet, as emphasized by Sussan Siavoshi, anti-despotism and anti-colonialism were the common causes that united these parties under the National Front.⁸²

4.3.1. Parties of Socialist Ideology

4.3.1.1. The Iran Party (*Hezb-e Iran*)

There were two parties leaning to socialist ideology that declared allegiance to National Front. The first one, the Iran Party (*Hezb-e Iran*) was founded in 1943, whose membership was composed of primarily by foreign educated intellectuals and engineers, university graduates employed in government bureaucracy, lawyers and

⁸⁰ Richard Cottam, “Nationalism in Twentieth-Century Iran and Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq” in James A. Bill and WM. Roger Louis (eds.), *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988), p. 33.

⁸¹ Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989), p. 182

⁸² Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, p. 2. She refers this union as “melli movement” which was a continuation of political ideology of 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution. She identifies the ‘melli movement’ as liberal nationalist movement. Further, liberal nationalist meant in the Iranian context, and also in non-Western world in general, that “a desire to (value) and efforts (behavior)” for an independent nation state.” In economic philosophy, adherents of this movement came mostly from upper class and they were sympathetic to Marxist and socialist economic ideas. In general, they reflected interests of the “oppressed nation” against the “oppressive state”. Moreover, liberals of the melliun included not only secular members but also lay religious people and clergy. See Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, pp. 2 – 4.

law professors, modern educated women, and college students.⁸³ Iran Engineers Association, which had been founded in 1942, was the basis of Iran Party. In 1943, some non-engineers, especially Allahyar Saleh, proposed the association to become a party, and lawyers and law professors joined the party ranks.

The Party adopted socialist ideology, which had a moral appeal and was in favor of gradual change.⁸⁴ According to this, rapid industrialization and establishment of true democracy, elimination of class war between the rich and the poor, and recognition of religion and national identity could only be achieved through socialism. The party program included “land redistribution, economic modernization, a democratic government based on majority rule that guarantees minority view, and the creation of a “just society”.”⁸⁵ The party’s views were disseminated through a newspaper, *Jebheh-ye Azadi* (Freedom Front), which “called for the strengthening of the constitutional monarchy, establishment of national independence, ouster of the landed aristocracy, and creation of socialist society.”⁸⁶

The Iran Party entered into a coalition with the major communist party of Iran, the Tudeh Party, in 1944. The coalition lasted less than two years during which led to

⁸³ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 253; Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, p. 71.

⁸⁴ Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, p. 71.

⁸⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 256; Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, p. 71.

⁸⁶ “By strengthening of the constitutional monarchy, it meant breaking the ties between the court and the officer corps, revoking the amendments of the Constituent Assembly, and transforming the shah into a ceremonial head of the state. By establishment of national independence, it meant pursuing a strictly neutral course in foreign affairs: opposing imperialism, ending the American military mission, nationalizing both the British-owned oil company and the Soviet-run fishing industry, and waging an ideological struggle against the Tudeh party’s “uncritical admiration for foreign communism.” See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 253. By ouster of the aristocracy, it meant using peaceful means, such as land reform, laws against corruption, and penalties against favoritism in the military, in order to erode the power of the “feudal families.” And by socialist society, it meant full equality between all citizens, including women, and social ownership of the main means of production.” See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 256. The daily also referred to Montesquieu’s ‘Spirit of Laws’ to demonstrate that concentration of power in the king would lead to corruption and a weak society. See Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power and Principle*, p. 95.

splits within the Iran Party. The pro-Soviet stance of the Tudeh Party in the Azerbaijan revolt was in contradiction of the Iran Party's advocacy of independence from both Britain and the Soviet Union. The party, having the motto "for Iran, through Iranian initiatives, under Iranian control"⁸⁷ joined to the National Front in 1949. It was the first party that declared allegiance to the National Front.

4.3.1.2. The Toilers' Party (*Hezb-e Zahmatkashan*)

The second important party with socialist ideology that participated the nationalist coordination under the National Front was the Toilers' Party (*Hezb-e Zahmatkashan*). It was founded as Supervisory Organization for Freedom of Elections (*Sazeman-e Nezaret-e Azadi-ye Entehkhabat*), which was formed by National Front during the elections for the sixteenth Majles under the leadership of Mozaffar Baqai, who was a French-educated philosopher and the editor of his own newspaper, *Shahed* (Witness) that he started to publish in 1949. After the elections, the organization's name was changed into Organization of Freedom Watch (*Sazeman-e Negehbani-ye Azadi*). Khalel Maleki, the Marxist intellectual who had formed a division with a group of intellectuals in Tudeh because of party's close affiliation with the Soviet Union in 1947/48, left the party due to the party's support to Soviet demand for oil and support to Azerbaijan and Kurdistan separatist movements in 1950/51, and joined the Organization of Freedom Watch. Indeed, Baqai and Maleki were already collaborating in newspaper *Shahed*, where Maleki started to publish on being persuaded by Jalal Al-i Ahmad, the writer who would publish a very influential critique of Western negative influence on Iranian society, *Gharbzadagi* (Westoxification), in 1962. According to Za'im, "political knowledge and organizational experience of Khalil Maleki and his associates increased the importance of their organization and its spread among the intellectuals and

⁸⁷ "Rosva'i-ye Estabdad: Dar Defa'iyat-e Mohandes Bazargan", (The Scandal of Despotism: In Bazargan's Defense), *The Liberation Movement Documents*, (Tehran, 1971), pp. 108 – 109 quoted in Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, p. 71.

workers.”⁸⁸ On the other hand, Baqai’s links with bazaar merchants especially with the shopkeepers in Tehran bazaar from his hometown, Kerman, and with street organizers such as Shay’ban ‘the Brainless’ who was the most influential street organizer, strengthened the popular base of the organization. After one year, the Organization of Freedom Watch was transformed into a permanent and influential party, the Iranian Toilers’s Party (*Hezb-e Zahmatkashan-e Iran*), in May 1951. While Baqai was active in leading the party in the Majles and in the public meetings, Maleki was the theorist and responsible for publications; *Shahed* (Witness) as the daily publication, *Niru-ye Sevvom* (Third Force) as youth paper published every Friday, and *Ilm va Zandagi* (Science and Living) as intellectual monthly periodical.⁸⁹

Not only the party became a source of appeal for university students, civil servants, members of strong labour unions, and bazaar merchants, but it also became a center for the dissemination of anti-colonialist nationalist ideology of Khalil Maleki. Indeed, the party’s allegiance to the National Front introduces ‘new ideas and theories’ to the movement.⁹⁰

Khalil Maleki with his ‘Theory of Third Force’ gave an anti-colonial response to the colonial mindset internally in Iran and externally in Iran’s relations with the colonial powers. Emphasizing that he was not denying the influence and unequal position of the colonial powers, he opposed prevalent views about colonial powers in Iran. According to him, such views that were destructive barriers to Iran’s social and economic development were:

⁸⁸ Kurosh Za’im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 92.

⁸⁹ The party’s two newspapers, the youth newspaper *Niruyi Sevvom* (The Third Force) and intellectual journal ‘*Ilm va Zandagi* (Science and Life) were widely circulated in Tehran university that caused appeal among the students. The role of the Shay’ban the Brainless in organizing the people in the street could not be underestimated since as a *verzeshkar* (stalwart athlete) he was a source of fear for his opponents because of his fame as a *chaquqash* (cut-throat) and was admired by his supporters as a *luti* (reveler /ruffian) hero. Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 257.

⁹⁰ Kurosh Za’im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 92.

(a) all the country's ills were due to colonialism and imperialism; (b) all (including even minor events) in the country's affairs were due to the underhanded machinations of these powers; (c) all the main actors in the Iranian government, politics, and opposition were agents of one or another of the great powers; (d) it was not possible for the country to develop and progress except by joining one or the other of the Cold War blocs; (e) all seemingly independent efforts and achievements were bound to be smokescreens motivated by a great power so as to throw dust into the people's eyes and get in through the back door.⁹¹

Writing first in 1951 and 1952, Maleki provided 'Third Force in general' and 'Third Force in particular' as a category besides the categories of Eastern, *i.e.* pro-Soviet, and Western, *i.e.* pro-US. While the Third Force in general was an attempt to break away with these socialist and capitalist categories, the Third Force in particular provided a socialist road to progress, which was independent from the Soviet camp and was to be pursued on the basis of culture and historical experience of each country.⁹² It was in the Cold War context that the world is divided in socialist and imperialist camps when Maleki positioned the Third Force as independent of Western imperialism and the Soviet Union externally, the Tudeh party and ruling class internally. He identified the Third Force with the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and social democratic movements of Europe who wish to cooperate "to protect their own national and social character" outside of the two world powers.⁹³

In the article, "What is Third Force?" (*Niru-ye Sevvom Chiist?*), Maleki states the ideology that defines Iranian Third Force. According to this,

All those who have no hope in the decadent ruling establishment, and no expectations from the leaders of the Tudeh party ..., belong to the Third Force. All those who support the nationalization of Iranian oil everywhere in

⁹¹ Homa Katouzian, "Khalil Maleki: The Odd Intellectual Out" in Negin Nabavi (ed.), *Intellectual Trends in Twentieth-Century Iran: A Critical Survey*, (USA: University Press of Florida, 2003), p. 35.

⁹² Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, pp. 100 – 101.

⁹³ "Niru-ye Sevvom Piruz Mishavad", (Tehran: Zahmatkashan Party Publications, 1951), p.3, quoted in Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 101.

the country, that is nationalization of all the resources and industries which either Britain or Russia hopes to possess at one and the same time, are part of the Third Force. All those who find it possible to maintain Iran's political and economic independence without its attachment to the Eastern or Western Bloc, who believe in the power of their own people, and the ability of their own leaders, and who think it possible for the people of Iran to hold their destiny without blindly following this or that foreign power, belong to the Third Force...⁹⁴

Therefore, the Toilers' Party, who found the symbol of Third Force in Mosaddeq as the leader of the National Front, constituted an ardent supporter of the nationalist opposition movement. As identified by Maleki, the Toilers' Party and the Third Force philosophy in general was the left wing of the National Front, whereas the national bourgeoisie was at the right wing.⁹⁵ The party's views were nationalist in the sense that it was genuine and not foreign inspired. "But it was not nationalist in the racist, chauvinist or expansionist sense of this term."⁹⁶

The two parties espousing socialist ideology were once in close association with the communist Tudeh Party but then they splintered due to ideological disagreements. The main point of controversy was Tudeh Party's unconditional support for the Soviet Union and its desire for Iran to become a Soviet ally in the Cold War. According to the Tudeh Party, Iran's national interests were in association with Soviet Union's interests against Western imperial domination of the non-Western world. The Iranian nationalists, however, regarded the Soviet Union as an imperial intruder, which had roots in the Russian territorial and economic interference in Qajar state at the end of the 19th century. Thus, before the 1953 coup d'état, Iranian nationalists favored the U.S. in the Cold War as a big power that did not symbolize any bitter historical memory; on the contrary, helped Iranian nationalists during the

⁹⁴ "Niru-ye Sevvom Chist", (Tehran: Zahmatkashan Party Publications, 1951), pp.2 and 4, quoted in Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 104.

⁹⁵ Khalel Maleki, "What is the Third Force?", *Niru-ye Sevvom*, 22 August – 29 September 1952, quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 257.

⁹⁶ Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 105.

Constitutional Revolution. Although it gradually replaced Britain as the new imperial power of the world against the Soviet Union and the Iranian nationalists did not favor any association with any imperial power, the U.S. was perceived as a more neutral power with regard to Iran. As a result of this controversial reading of the world situation, the Tudeh party did not join the National Front. The party propagated anti-National Movement ideas during the oil negotiations of Mosaddeq government with Britain and the U.S. The Tudeh Party continued its anti-authoritarian struggle against the state on its own as an officially banned communist party. Although the party benefitted from the liberal environment during Mosaddeq's premiership after 1951 and intensified its anti-shah activities, it did not give a full support to the National Front in the oil negotiations. The National Front's lacking Tudeh Party in its ranks deprived off the Front from Tudeh's support base and organizational capability. This was regarded as one of the major flaws to the success of the National Front.⁹⁷

4.3.2. Party of Pan-Iranist Ideology

The National Party (*Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran*) that joined National Front was formed in 1947 by "xenophobic passionate patriots" who belonged to the "school of pan-Iranism".⁹⁸ Actually the first party in Iran espousing to pan-Iranism had been the Pan-Iranist Party (*Hezb-e Pan-Iranisti-ye Iran*) of Dairush Forouhar and Mohsen Pazashkpour, both had been university students. The Sumka Party and the Arya Party were two other parties that espoused to pan-Iranism. All three parties traced their roots to Lieutenant Mohsen Jahansouz, who had been arrested and executed in 1937 on the charge of organizing a "fascist plot" against Reza Shah.⁹⁹

After Pan-Iranist Party joined National Front in 1949, a split occurred between Forouhar and Pazashkpour. In 1951, Dariush Forouhar left Pan-Iranist Party after his

⁹⁷ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 318 – 325.

⁹⁸ Kurosh Za'im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 93.

⁹⁹ Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, p. 72.

disagreement with Pazashkpour on supporting Mosaddeq¹⁰⁰ and he founded National Party (*Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran*). The National Party was “vehemently anti-court, anticommunist, anti-capitalist, anti-Semitic and even anticlerical.”¹⁰¹ Being purely racist, the party claimed that the Iranian race was under the threat of not only imperial legacies of Soviet communism and British capitalism, but also expansionism of Arabs and Turks. According to the party, Iran’s backwardness in the face of threat, however, was stemming from ““reactionary mullahs,” “exploiting landlords,” “foreign powers and religious minorities, especially the Jews and the Baha’is.”¹⁰² In addition, the party had irredentist ideas such that it argued for regaining the lost territories of Bahrain, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus that it regarded vital for rebuilding the glorious Iran. According to Za’im, “the National Party was always been a faithful supporter of National Front and it always struggled for establishment of national sovereignty (democracy), and freedom (*feza-ye azadi*).”¹⁰³

4.3.3. Party of Religious Ideology

The Society of Muslim Warriors (*Jame’eh-ye Mujahedin-e Islam*) was a loosely structured but an effective group espousing to religious ideology and joined the National Front. Ayatollah Kashani and his family, and some wealthy bazaar merchants were the leaders of the society that drew its members from guild elders, seminary students and shopkeepers.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ “The faction led by Pazashkpour sided with the Shah whereas Forouhar’s faction remained loyal to Mosaddeq and called itself the Party of the Iranian Nation.” See Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, p. 73.

¹⁰¹ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 258

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Kuroush Za’im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 93.

¹⁰⁴ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 258.

The society was a nationalist society whose nationalism was defined by anti-Westernism and anti-secularism. Advocating to the return of *shari'a* as the law of Iran, the party aimed to repel secular laws of Reza Shah. In this regard, the party demanded re-imposition of veil and protection of national industries. Anti-Westernism and anti-secularism shaped the party's ideological stance. In this regard, the party struggled against the Tudeh Party. Muslim unity against the West was a broader objective of the party to prevent ills coming from the West.¹⁰⁵

The Society of Muslim Warriors was highly religious, but it was not fundamentalist. A small, dogmatically fundamentalist organization known with its terrorist attacks on government officials and intellectuals, *Fada'iyān-e Islam* (Devotees of Islam), who had close relations with Kashani but led by another cleric, Sayyid Navvab Safavi, gave support to the National Front; yet it did not officially declare allegiance. Their main purpose was to fight against all forms of irreligion. Their wider ambition was to create an Islamic state in Iran and achieve unification of all Islamic states.¹⁰⁶ Formed in 1945, one of the objectives of the group was to defend the rights of Palestinian people and to fight against Israel. The first terrorist act of *Fada'iyān-e Islam* was to assassinate secular essayist and historian Ahmad Kasravi in 1947.

The movement aligned with Kashani against the state, organized bazaar strikes against the government and public meetings in support of Palestinian Arabs. However, the two societies were not identical both in ideology and social base. Kashani's group was politically pragmatic and enjoyed the support of elites of traditional middle class. Navvab Safavi's group, however, was dogmatically committed to fundamentalist Islamic ideology¹⁰⁷ and got support from youth employed in the Tehran bazaar.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, pp. 160 – 161; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 258.

¹⁰⁷ “*Fada'iyān's* goals included strict enforcement of the Shari'ah and the ending of irreligiousness. They combined fundamentalism with violent xenophobia, and considered attacks on foreigners and

In terms of ideology and social base, the parties with socialist, pan-Iranist, and religious ideologies that came together under the National Front umbrella were representing two divergent forces: one was “conservative, religious, theocratic, and mercantile”, the other was “modernistic, secular, technocratic, and socialist.”¹⁰⁸ These divergent forces were coordinated by nationalist ideology because of their common opposition to the despotic rule of the Shah, which was mainly sustained by his possession of army as power base, and the British colonial influence and exploitation of Iranian oil resources through AIOC. The charter of the National Front, adopted after the proclamation of its formation, was manifestation of the common aims that brought the diverse groups together. Accordingly, Iranian National Front was composed various nationalist groups who were supporters of securing social justice and protection of constitution (Article 1). Its aim was establishment of national government through assuring freedom of elections and freedom of thought (Article 3). This aim was decided in the meeting of the National Front together with the aims of social and economic reform (Article 4).¹⁰⁹

Many historians of Iran noted that national movement of 1949 – 1953 was a continuation of the ideals and principles of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 11. This idea found its most firm expression in Mostafa Fateh’s words who stated that “It is beyond doubt that the oil nationalization movement, like movement against tobacco régime, constitutional movement, movement against dismissal of Shuster,¹¹⁰

politicians with foreign connections a defense of Dar al-Islam. The *Fada’iyan* proclaimed the government of ‘xenophiles’ illegitimate, and called such men enemy spies whose blood must be shed.” Nikki R. Keddie and Abdol-Hossein Zarrinkub, “Fada’iyan-e Islam”, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1965, p. 882 quoted in Farhad Kazemi, “The Fada’iyan-e Islam: Fanaticism, Politics and Terror” in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, (Hong Kong: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984), p. 170.

¹⁰⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 259.

¹⁰⁹ Esasnameh-ye Jebhe-ye Melli in Kuroush Za’im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 87.

¹¹⁰ Morgan Shuster was American national appointed as Treasury-General of Persia by the Majles after Constitutional Revolution to regulate Iranian finances and served from May to December 1911. In a time when Iran was under heavy influence of Britain and Russia who agreed to divide Iran into their spheres of influence by 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty, the choice of a American for Treasury-General was a solution to balance British and Russian rivalry by a aligning with a third power. Russia,

the movement for the termination of the Qajar reign, was a movement hundred percent national and it was originated from the deep source of national feelings of Iranian people (*mellat-e Iran*).”¹¹¹ Mosaddeq’s leadership should be read with the same lenses. Besides his doctorate in law from University of Neuchatel, Switzerland, and various articles he authored on law, constitution, and public finance, his ardent cause for constitutional government gained him popularity as ‘man of law.’ His anti-court moves as minister of finance and governor-general as well as his fame for his incorruptibility, his opposition to establishment of Pahlavi monarchy and military dictatorship of Reza Shah, his critical judgments in government affairs that he regarded against freedom, democracy, and law, his firm opposition to foreign concessions, his insistence on the necessity of Iranians managing their own affairs were the often-cited factors in his biography that elevated him to the leadership of the National Front and to the nationalist opposition movement of 1949 – 53.¹¹² As an aristocrat who lived most of his life modestly in the village of his own, Abrahamian writes, “he came from the upper class but spoke with and for the middle classes.”¹¹³ He had such popularity among people during his membership of the fourteenth parliament that one newspaper wrote: “People love Dr. Mosaddeq because of the fact that when he speaks he reveals the secrets of their hearts.”¹¹⁴ Thus, Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq became the leader of nationalist ideology of Iranian people that were

disturbed by this appointment, gave an ultimatum to Iranian government demanding the dismissal of Shuster. Britain also advised the Iranian government to accept the Russian ultimatum. Majles rejected the ultimatum for it meant to preserve liberty and sovereignty of Iran. The move ended with Russian invasion. See W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, (USA: Greenwood Press Publishers), 1968.

¹¹¹ Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sale Naft-e Iran*, p. 515.

¹¹² See Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, pp. 1 – 37; Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran*, pp. 49 – 58; Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup*, pp. 30 – 47; Fakhreddin Azimi, “The Reconciliation of Politics and Ethics, Nationalism, and Democracy: An Overview of the Political Career of Dr Muhammad Musaddiq” in James A. Bill and WM. Roger Louis (eds.), *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988), pp. 47 – 68.

¹¹³ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 260.

¹¹⁴ Keyhan, No 13, Esfand 1324 (March 1946) quoted in Kuroush Za‘im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 36.

activated by colonial domination of the country's resources and despotism of the state, both of which would only be cured by proper implementation of the country's constitution.

4.4. Mobilization of the National Front Movement

After the effective protest of Mosaddeq and his supporters for the nullification of the elections that was proclaimed by the government on January 6, 1950 and the formation of National Front simultaneously, the protestors worked vigorously in the re-organized elections and succeeded in entering the sixteenth Majles. Mosaddeq, who had already been popular, was re-elected as the First Deputy for Tehran with the announcement of the election results for Tehran on April 11, 1950, together with some other members of the Front.

National Front organized in the sixteenth Majles, which was officially opened on February 9, 1950, as 'Homeland Faction' (*Fraksiun-e Vatan*). The faction was composed of the members of the National Front who were elected as a result of re-organized elections; namely, Mohammad Mosaddeq as the leader of the Front, Abol Hassan Haerizadeh, Hossein Makki, Mahmud Nariman, 'Ali Shayegan as deputies from Tehran, 'Abd al-Qader Azad as deputy of Sabzevar, Mozaffar Baqai as deputy of Kerman, and Allahyar Saleh as deputy of Kashan.¹¹⁵ The popular power of the faction aroused from the fact that its members were free of corruption charges and allegiance to any of the foreign powers. Their competency as man of letters and activism for establishment of constitutionalism and freedom in the country were other factors that increased their popularity in the society. Therefore, they had a

¹¹⁵ Besides the Homeland Faction composed of the members of National Front, there were three groups in the sixteenth Majles. These were a pro-British faction mainly composed of conservative representatives from southern oil-producing cities, independent notables comprised of forty people such as Abol Qasem Amini, Khosrow Qashqayi, and Naser Zolfagari, and royalists who formed the majority in the Majles. This royalist majority also relied on the Senate, which had been composed of veteran royalists such as Esfendiari and Matin-Daftari, and politicians who despite earlier differences now began to support the shah, such as Taqizadeh, Hakimi, Malekzadeh, Farrukh, and Abbas Mas'oudi. See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 261.

broad support base outside the Majles from the urban middle class; *i.e.* the intelligentsia, the university students, politically active merchants, shopkeepers in the bazaar, and guilds.¹¹⁶

Although the National Front was minority in the Majles, their opposition proved to be effective in the Majles discussions. With the National Front in the Majles, the nationalist opposition to the state mobilized under the roof of the parliament. The constitution was at the center of the ideology of nationalist opposition that was coordinated by the National Front. In fact, it was the unconstitutional behavior of the despotic monarch and the severe restrictions put by the dictatorial rule on freedom of speech, press and organization that brought different parties and actors together and resulted in the formation of National Front as the nationalist opposition. Therefore, their aim was to use the means provided by the constitution to balance the excess powers of the Shah. To this aim, they worked to strengthen the power of the parliament vis-à-vis the ruler. This meant to strengthen the place of people who were presented by their elected representatives in the parliament in a constitutional system.

The mobilization of nationalist opposition in the Majles occurred on two grounds: One was the parliamentary functioning such were mobilization against the Shah's interference to the parliaments through constitutional amendments that enabled him to increase his powers vis-à-vis the parliament, his selecting prime ministers without consulting the parliament first, and proposing bills in line with his opted policy through the prime ministers. The second ground for nationalist mobilization was the workings of oil commission headed by Mosaddeq that persuaded the commission, the parliament and finally the senate against any agreement with Britain other than nationalization of oil industry.

¹¹⁶ Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 220.

4.4.1. Mobilization Against the Shah's Interference in Parliaments

Mohammad Reza Shah had already stirred up resentment in the parliament when he changed the conventional method of appointing the prime minister. Beginning with the appointment of Prime Minister Sa'ed on November 1948, the Shah abandoned the tradition to have 'vote of inclination' (*ra'y tamayol*) from the Majles for the prospected candidate before appointment. Conversely, he personally chose and appointed the Prime Minister and sent him to the Majles to get a vote of confidence for his cabinet. In addition, he decided to activate Senate, an upper house that had been envisaged by 1906 Constitution but had never been realized. The bill for the formation of the Senate that was submitted to the Majles one year before was approved on May 4, 1948. Since constitutionally half of the members of the Senate were to be appointed by the Shah, its activation meant to increase his constitutional power to the detriment of the parliament. Resentment against the Shah within the opposition grew when he decided to convene a Constituent Assembly to propose constitutional amendment. The formation of the Constituent Assembly came after the assassination attempt to the Shah on February 4, 1949, which enabled him to declare martial law, to silence all his opponents and officially ban the Tudeh Party. Convened under martial law on April 21, 1949, members of the Constituent Assembly were consisted of the Shah's loyal supporters. After three weeks negotiations, the Constituent Assembly decided to amend Article 48 of the 1906 Constitution in May 1949 and gave the Shah the power to dissolve the Majles and the Senate when a reason occurred and with the condition that he ordered new elections.¹¹⁷

The issue of appointment of 'Ali Mansur as Prime Minister was further problematic. He was chosen and appointed before the completion of the elections on March 23, 1950 by the Shah's decision with the approval of the British; thus, without 'vote of inclination' from the Majles which had not been convened yet. Though, his cabinet

¹¹⁷ Said Amir Arjomand, "Constitutional Revolution III: The Constitution", available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-iii>, accessed on 29 May 2015.

got approval of the Majles after the elections on April 10, 1950.¹¹⁸ Mansur tried to establish good relations with the National Front and offered Finance Ministry for Mosaddeq. However, Mosaddeq refused the offer in order to “promote and realize objectives of the National Front.”¹¹⁹

As stipulated in its charter (Article 3), the goal of the National Front was to establish national government through ensuring the freedom of elections and freedom of thought.¹²⁰ Thus, National Front displayed its opposition in the Majles on the issue of constitutional reform regarding the revision of electoral and press laws. This opposition was against Prime Minister Mansur’s proposal regarding the establishment of a joint commission from the parliament and the senate for the amendment of some articles of the constitution offered by the Constitutive Assembly upon the request of the Shah. For Mosaddeq and the National Front, amendments to press law and election law were more urgent, and constitutional amendment could only be discussed afterwards. Premier Mansur accepted the offer of the National Front and replied that the election bill had already been ready and the press bill would be prepared soon. This was the first success of the nationalist opposition in the Majles.¹²¹

However, Shah’s insistence on the constitutional amendment continued and Premier Mansur introduced the bill to the Majles. The bill for the constitutional amendment was introduced for the purpose of granting the Shah the power to dissolve the parliament. National Front was not only against this amendment, but also it regarded the Constituent Assembly as unlawful. This was because, as Mosaddeq expressed in

¹¹⁸ As stated by Abrahamian, “it was for the first time since 1941 that the court had managed to exclude all other groups from the government.” Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 261.

¹¹⁹ Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 221.

¹²⁰ “Esasnameh-ye Jebhe-ye Melli” in Kuroush Za’im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 87.

¹²¹ Kuroush Za’im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 99.

his long and powerful parliamentary speech on July 25, 1950, the constituent assembly was not established as a result of public opinion and its members were not representing the people; therefore “they will not protect the constitution; that is, the blood-money of the martyrs of freedom.”¹²² In the same speech, he also addressed the Shah and said that “the ruler of the constitution is he that nobody is in opposition to him ... and interference to the affairs of the country is not to the benefit of the Shah and the country by any means.”¹²³

Mansur was forced to resign by the Shah on June 26, 1950 mainly due to his sympathetic behavior to the opposition of the National Front. His reluctance to submit the bill for the ratification of the Supplemental Oil Agreement signed with AIOC further ignited not only the Shah’s disappointment towards government but also those of the Britain and the U.S., who in cooperation with the Shah, desired him to become a strong ruler who have control over the government and the parliament. Chief of Staff General Hajj ‘Ali Razmara was appointed as Prime Minister immediately and again without prior consultation with the Majles. Having asserting “his respect for democracy and reliance on the Shah and the people”, he declared a program for his cabinet, which was comprised of establishment of regional, local and provincial councils, improvement of economy through seven-year plan of the Shah, ensuring independence of the judiciary, improvement of living standards, health and education through the local councils.¹²⁴

National Front was against the appointment of Razmara right from the start and issued a statement regarding its opposition. Calling the appointment of General Razmara as a military coup d’état, the statement written by Mosaddeq and issued in the name of National Front on 27 June proclaimed that Iran once again experienced dictatorship and individual domination, which was an attack on the constitution and

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹²⁴ Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 229.

tradition of constitutionalism (*mashru'teh*). The statement, after accusing the foreigners as supporting such unconstitutional behavior and disregarding the opinion of the Iranian nation, spoke to the world people that the National Front would not give consent to the government imposed by the foreigners in contradiction to the wishes of the public.¹²⁵ Ayatollah Kashani, who issued another statement on opposition to the appointment of Razmara, which was also read by Mosaddeq in the Majles, argued that those in charge of country's affairs did not take a lesson from the past and they were repeating the same experience of the past once again. Kashani denounced the government by claiming that it was imposed contrary to the public opinion, and invoked people to resistance against the government.¹²⁶ When General Razmara entered the Majles with his cabinet on the same day, the representatives of National Front shouted like: "Iranian nation did not officially recognize you. You are servant of oil politics. ... This place is the house of people. This place is not barracks."¹²⁷

After Razmara took office, the first clash between the Prime Minister and National Front occurred regarding the establishment of local councils. Razmara submitted the bill on the issue on July 13, 1950 to the Majles where Mosaddeq, Kashani and their supporters opposed it on the grounds that it would lead to disintegration of Iran. The memory of the invasion of Britain, Russia, and the U.S. in Iran was so fresh that the nationalist opposition, being already suspicious of the foreign links of Prime Minister Razmara, reminded the parliament the aims of the imperial powers to divide Iran into their spheres of influences and would be dangerous in Cold War context.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ "Elamiye-ye Jebhe-ye Melli" 27 June 1950 in Kuroush Za'im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, pp. 110 – 113.

¹²⁶ Kuroush Za'im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 113.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹²⁸ "Baqai charged that "decentralization was a British plot to dismantle Iran." Shayegan argued that Qavam had accepted provincial assemblies only because he wanted to "save" Azeribaijan. Makki warned that administrative decentralization was unwise in a country with so much linguistic diversity. Kashani sent a telegram to the Majles proclaiming that "no true Muslim would want to dismantle the thousand-year-old-state." See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 265.

4.4.2. Mobilization Through Oil Commission and Mass Support in the Streets

The second ground for mobilization for the nationalist opposition in the Majles was the Oil Commission. Established on June 13, 1950 upon the proposal of the Premier, the Oil Commission comprised of eighteen members was assigned the task of examining the entire oil issue and all the documents related to the agreement. The reason for the establishment of this special commission was that the Supplemental Agreement had been introduced first to the Fifteenth Majles but the details of it were unclear; so it should be studied entirely by the Sixteenth Majles, which was to approve the Agreement. Among the eighteen members of the Oil Commission, Dr. Mosaddeq, Allahyar Saleh, Hossein Makki, Abol Hassan Haerizadeh, Dr. 'Ali Shayegan were the five members from National Front.

In the first meeting of the Oil Commission on June 25, 1950, Mosaddeq was elected as its chairman. The Oil Commission's second meeting, which was convened on July 26, 1950 in the premiership of Razmara after his move for the approval of the Supplemental Oil Agreement in the Majles. The government had not sent the oil file to the Majles yet; thus, the meeting witnessed covert inclination that the government could draw the oil file back from the commission since because Razmara did not want Mosaddeq and members of National Front to study the file. Upon this threat, Mosaddeq, Makki, and Haerizadeh insisted on receiving the oil file and completion of the commission's work so that people would be assured that the commission performed its duty.¹²⁹ However, the government did not send the file to the Commission for its third meeting on August 29, 1950 on the pretext that the file had not been ready yet. Thus, Mosaddeq had to intervene in the name of the Commission by writing a letter to the Prime Minister Razmara on September 18, 1950. The letter stated that if the government would not send the file to the Commission in three days and if it would not deliver its opinion on the bill in ten days, there would be an interpellation in the Majles. Upon his letter, the oil files were finally sent to the

¹²⁹ Kuroush Za'im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 115.

commission on September 21, 1950 and Razmara announced the government opinion on 24 September. Therefore, Mosaddeq and National Front members in the Oil Commission countered the Razmara's attempt and managed to receive the oil files.

Meanwhile, in the Senate Meeting on 18 October, Seyyed Baqer Khan Kazemi, delivered his opinion and said: "The Iranian people do not give consent to the D'Arcy Concession and the 1933 Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement (Gas-Golsha'iyān Agreement) is not enough to secure the vital resource of Iran by any means."¹³⁰ This fierce speech in the Senate inflicted Razmara to respond by saying that if the government were against the Agreement then it would withdraw the file and would not send a representative of government to the Commission. The representative of government, Gholamhossein Forouhar, gave a speech in the Majles to defend the Supplemental Agreement on 19 October, and said "government who delivered the file to the commission and sent its representative there, certainly agrees with it. If it did not agree with the bill, it would not deliver the file and introduce a representative."¹³¹

Razmara's official defense of the Supplemental Agreement, according to Za'im, was the beginning of a fierce struggle between the National Front and the government.¹³² The opposition against the Supplemental Agreement from the conservative members of the commission led by Jamal Imami, who turned against Razmara when he revealed at the commission meeting on November 4, 1950 that covert negotiations had been continuing between the government and the oil company. The conservative members' changing their position against the Supplemental Agreement changed the fate of the oil bill in the commission.¹³³

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹³³ Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 91.

On the twenty-third meeting of the Oil Commission on 27 November, prior to the final decision of the Commission, National Front members introduced the proposal that was put forward by Hossein Fatemi and had been accepted by other members of the Front on the meeting of National Front Council (*Shura-ye Jebhe-ye Melli*) on 6 November. The proposal stated: “In the name of welfare of Iranian people and for world peace, the signatories are proposing that the Iranian oil industry should be declared as national in all regions of the country without any exception. That is, all the operations of exploration, extraction and exploitation should be performed by the government.”¹³⁴ Since this proposal could not get the approval of all the members, the Commission decided to declare its final decision by stating that the Supplemental Agreement was not enough for the preservation of rights of the Iran; therefore, the commission declares its opposition with this statement. The final meeting of the Commission was on December 9, 1950 and Hossein Makki delivered the final report to the Majles on the next day. The report announced to the Majles representatives that the Supplemental Agreement was not enough for the preservation of rights of Iran and time was needed to prepare a new proposal.¹³⁵ This marked another success for the National Front. Although the ultimate goal of the National Front, the nationalization of oil industry, was not realized yet, the Front managed to have the commission to prepare a report against the Supplemental Agreement.

However, Prime Minister Razmara was continuing his efforts to get approval for the Supplemental Agreement. He not only carried on secret negotiations with Britain, the U.S. and even with the Soviet Union to have support for his policy, but also facilitated the escape of Tudeh leaders from jail on December 15, 1950 in order to get sympathy of the Soviets for his goal. In addition, getting the support of Tudeh, which was the biggest opposition party against National Front on the basis of the argument that its nationalization scheme would serve to the interests of the U.S. and

¹³⁴ However, those who signed the proposal were only Dr. Mosaddeq, Dr. Shayegan, Abolhassan Haerizadeh, Allahyar Saleh, and Hossein Makki. See Kuroush Za‘im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 120.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

would replace British imperialist influence with American capitalism in Iran, would give him the power to influence public opinion to surrender the claims of nationalists.¹³⁶

After the commission concluded its investigation, the final bill was introduced to the Majles on December 17, 1950. In that meeting, National Front suggested to the Majles that the oil industry should be nationalized with the signatures presented by Dr. Mosaddeq, Dr. 'Ali Shayegan, Hassan Haerizadeh, Dr. Mozaffar Baqai, Dr. Mostafa Makki, Allahyar Saleh, Mahmood Mariman, Hossein Makki, Abdolghader Azad, Mir Sayyed 'Ali Behbehani, Abbas Eslami, and Kazem Shaibani.¹³⁷ During this meeting, the government banned two newspapers associated with the National Front and critical of the government, namely *Shahed* of Baqai, and *Bakhtar-e Emrooz* of Hossein Fatemi. This became the moment when the nationalist mobilization in the parliament became united with the mobilization of nationalists in the street.

The government assault on the people's representatives in the Majles to undermine the National Front sparked mobilization of public opposition outside the parliament. Indeed, the people were curiously following the oil issue and journals and newspapers provided main forums of discussion. The newspapers *Shahed* and *Bakhtar-e Emrooz* were the main print platforms of National Front to introduce and disseminate the ideas of the opposition. The mass protests in the streets started with the ban of newspapers and arrest of members of opposition. On the day of the introduction of the final bill signed by members of National Front in the Majles, the

¹³⁶ Fakhreddin Azimi, *The Quest For Democracy in Iran*, p.142.

¹³⁷ Mosaddeq, in his parliamentary speech at the meeting of 17 December, clarifies the aims for oil nationalization proposal. Accordingly, with nationalization of oil industry Iran would free its biggest source of revenue from the hands of foreigners, namely the British, the Russians and lately the Americans, and eliminate their influence in Iranian politics. Oil nationalization would also end the perception of humility since the Qajar period that led Iran to lag behind world civilization; thereby, would serve Iranians to grasp their own fate in the path to progress. See Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sale Naft-e Iran*, p. 518.

police arrested Fatemi and closed down *Bakhtar-e Emrooz*. The police also attacked on the *Shahed* newspaper; however, it faced with public reaction and clashes occurred between the police and the people that prevented the detention of Baqai. The attacks of government led the people of press rise against the government and 35 people who were directors of newspapers took sanctuary in the Majles. Mosaddeq, in support of press, stated that the members of National Front would also take sanctuary in the Majles until the elimination of this situation. Many of the representatives in the Majles also criticized the attacks on *Shahed* and *Bakhtar-e Emrooz* offices and arrest of Dr. Hossein Fatemi, and they came to support of the opposition.

According to Za'im, negative public opinion regarding Razmara government was intensified with the attacks on press and opposition in general. He continues, "with the announcement of sanctuary by the representatives of National Front in the Majles, the country was divided into two camps which were the government and the National Front and its supporters."¹³⁸ On December 21, 1950 a group of Tehran University students gathered in the Baharestan Square in support of the National Front and they declared their support for the proposal of oil nationalization and opposition to the 1933 Agreement. One day after, upon the call of Ayatollah Kashani, leader of the Society of Muslim Warriors, and *Howze-ye Ilmiye-ye Tehran* (Tehran religious learning center), a few thousand people from different social strata of the country gathered in *Masjid-e Shah* in support of nationalization of oil industry and annulment of 1933 Agreement.

Hence, the mobilization of nationalist opposition in the Majles against the state was dispersed to the streets and activated public furor. Moreover, nationalization of oil industry came to be the main cause of struggle for nationalist opposition of masses. As the state put more pressure on nationalist opposition, the contention became more fierce and widespread. The oppressor state was openly against the nationalization

¹³⁸ Kuroush Za'im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 123.

and working for a deal with the British, backed by the U.S., for reaching an agreement with the AIOC. This collaborative stance of the state with foreigners, from the viewpoint of nationalist opposition, would definitely lead to intensification of colonial domination and exploitation of the country's resources. It was upon the shoulders of nationalists and their supporters among Iranian people to rise against the oppressor and collaborator state to ensure independence of the country and freedom of the people. Recalling Katouzian's conceptualization, 'dialectic of state and people (*tezadd-e dowlat va mellat*)', and once again after constitutional movement, a politically significant nationalist movement posing a serious challenge to the despotic state power raised within Iranian people beginning from 1949 and changed the course of events in 1950-51.

The friction between the state and society sharpened with Premier Razmara's parliamentary speech on December 24, 1950 in an unofficial meeting of the Majles. In support of Supplemental Agreement, Razmara argued that Iranian nationalization of oil industry would not be to the benefit of country since because Iran did not possess such an industrial power; it could not run even a cement factory. He continued that the factories of the country were making loss because of lack of scientific knowledge. Razmara insulted the Iranian engineers by further saying that the Iranian engineers could not even produce a "pipe." To him, oil nationalization was the biggest betray to the country.¹³⁹ Meanwhile, the government decided to withdraw the bill from the Majles, which ended with the fierce opposition from representatives of National Front and other representatives in the Majles that they declared the government as a traitor. This led to the biggest nationalist demonstration against the state that took place upon the calls of National Front and Ayatollah Kashani in Baharestan Square on December 29, 1950. After this event, a split occurred even in the cabinet that the Finance Minister Gholamhossein Forouhar, who had been a supporter of the Supplemental Agreement before in the Commission, submitted his resignation. The public protests led amendment of press law in January

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 123 – 124.

1951. On January 26, 1951, a group of protestors from bazaaris, tradesmen, and supporters of National Front gathered in Masjid-i Shah and declared their demands for nationalization of oil industry. On March 1951, the National Front and the Society of Muslim Warriors came together in another huge demonstration in Masjid-e Shah where demonstrators shout against AIOC and its oppression and injustice against Iranian people. The clergy charged Prime Minister Razmara with sedition and declared that nationalization of Iranian oil industry is a necessity. It was on the same day that Razmara participated the oil commission meeting and stated that Iran did not have the capacity to run its oil industry; therefore, nationalization would be to the detriment of Iran. However, the nationalist opposition had already lead the public tide that conceived the preservation of Iranian national independence and freedom could only be assured by the nationalization of oil industry.

Razmara's claim in the last oil commission meeting that he attended came after the news, which made public that the British and the Americans were protecting the AIOC and their interests. The reports appeared in the Iranian press that the company offered a 50/50 agreement and a £2 million loan. On February 23, 1951 a letter from Sir Francis Shepherd, the British Ambassador, to Prime Minister Razmara accused the Iranian government for not publicly expressing the conciliatory steps of the company and stated that it led hostile attitude towards Britain among Iranian people.¹⁴⁰ Khalil Tahmasbi, a member of Navvab Safavi's *Fada'iyān-e Islam*, who shot Razmara when he was attending a religious ceremony in Masjid-e Shah on March 7, 1951, said in his interrogation that he committed this act because Razmara was a traitor.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 131 – 133. Za'im states that Razmara was probably waiting for a moment publicize this offer that would be suitable to claim of victory on the part of himself in his negotiations with the British company. This argument becomes more likely to be true since, as Katouzian notes, it was Razmara who wanted from the company officials to keep the 50/50 offer confidential. See Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 92.

¹⁴¹ Kuroush Za'im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 133.

One day after Razmara's assassination, on March 8, 1951, the oil commission unanimously rejected the Supplemental Agreement and approved the proposal for nationalization of oil industry.¹⁴² The next day, Hossein 'Ala approved to become the new Prime Minister by the parliament's vote of inclination.¹⁴³ The same day witnessed a big demonstration in Baharestan Square upon the call from the National Front, the Iran Party, and other groups supporting the National Front where people showed their support to nationalization of oil industry. The proposal for nationalization of oil industry was announced in the public meeting of National Consultative Assembly (Majles) on March 13, 1951, and the representatives of the people in the Majles unanimously approved the proposal on March 15, 1951. The Majles decision was celebrated vigorously in Tehran and in all other cities by the people in the streets shouting and carrying lights at night.¹⁴⁴

With the approval of nationalization of oil industry bill by the Senate March 20, 1951 and the Shah's signing the decision on the same day, the nationalist struggle of Iranian people against colonial domination and state despotism became victorious. According to Abrahamian, "a small parliamentary minority, supported enthusiastically by the general public, had frightened the royalist and pro-British

¹⁴² However, the National Front members incurred the wrath of the state and Ayatollah Kashani, Mahmud Neriman, Dr. Mozaffar Baqai, and Hossein Makki, who participated to the demonstration for the murder of Razmara, were detained. Apparently, Ayatollah Kashani's statement on the same day to foreign press saying that Razmara should necessarily be killed and Tahmasbi was the savior of Iranian nation provoked state officials.

¹⁴³ According to Abrahamian, the vote of inclination was realized because of the public rejoicing after Razmara's death that scared the deputies and led them reclaim their parliamentary rights. Hossein 'Ala's premiership was due to two factors: he got the trust of conservative landowners as he himself was a titled aristocrat and a court minister; he was acceptable to the National Front due to his reputation of being a former anti-British diplomat. Accordingly, his appointment of a member of National Front, Amir 'Alai, into the cabinet, his permit for the return of Kashani to Tehran, his silent acceptance of the nationalization bill when it was introduced by Mosaddeq and approved first in the Oil Commission and then in the Majles and Senate were the pro-National Front acts of his premiership. See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 266.

¹⁴⁴ Kuroush Za'im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, pp. 134 – 135.

deputies into voting against their better judgment”¹⁴⁵ and secured the approval of nationalization bill.

Despite the nationalists brought the Shah and the foreign powers on their knees with securing the bill for nationalization after hard struggles, its implementation was not easy either. This was mainly because the nationalist movement that achieved what it was fighting for within the confines of the constitution did not work for a change in the ruling system. The Shah, his army, the court apparatus, and his connections with foreign powers were still there.¹⁴⁶ Mosaddeq, aware of this situation, accepted premiership without hesitation when Jamal Imami made the offer after ‘Ala’s resignation. It was a tactical move by Imami to soothe opposition with the expectation that Mosaddeq would turn down the offer as he had done once before. But Imami’s strategy backfired, and Mosaddeq called for an immediate meeting of the Majles for vote of inclination. Getting 79 votes out of 90 deputies, and 29 votes out of 43 senators, Mosaddeq became Prime Minister with the Shah’s decree issued on April 29, 1951, prior to the Shah’s formal proposal. Thus, as stated by Azimi, the nationalization of oil and the premiership of Mosaddeq became inseparable and irreversible.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 266.

¹⁴⁶ Besides the internal obstacles, the oil cartels and monopolies were the external obstacle for the implementation of nationalization. Mostafa Fateh, after giving excerpts from speeches of the National Front members in the parliament, agrees with the National Front in their nationalization policy politically; but he finds the economical assumptions of National Front totally ignorant. Politically, they calculated that in a changed world where great powers were the signatories to the charter of United Nations and declaration of human rights, none would attack Iran; and even if one of them would attack the world public opinion would be on the side of Iran. Economically, they were arguing that the world needs Iranian oil in the face of increasing demand for oil on the part of developed powers. Accordingly, Iran would sell its crude oil to the ships from countries in need of oil and would get its payment in cash. It was that easy. To run the industry, the Iranian state would be employer for the workers instead of the company; nothing would change. However, Fateh argues, the economical calculations of the National Front shows that they were not aware of the international oil trade and procedure to sell oil. They also did not have an idea of oil cartel and knowledge that the oil cartel would not let Iranian oil to be sold in the market at a higher price. Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sale Naft-e Iran*, pp. 517 – 523.

¹⁴⁷ Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 258.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to analyze the second nationalist opposition movement that became significant enough to pose a serious challenge to the state authority, which was the Pahlavi state. The National Front Movement of 1949 – 53, led by the National Front which was an organization of coalition of different social and political forces, came out as a nationalist resistance movement against the colonial domination (*solte-ye este'mari*) and despotic state (*hokumet-e estabdadi*). Therefore, the goals of the National Front as stipulated in its charter were social justice and protection of constitution, and establishment of national government through assuring freedom of elections and freedom of thought. Non-observance of the constitution by the ruler, which was regarded by the nationalist opposition as the assurance of Iranian nation's freedom from the despotic rulers that people achieved as a result of years fighting for it, and system of exploitation of Iran's resources by foreigners were the factors that diverse groups were coordinated under National Front and their diverse interests were mobilized in opposition to the government and the British-owned AIOC.

The National Front Movement emerged and operated in the new Iranian state established by Reza Shah. Nationalism, which came to mean modernization and development for Reza Shah and his loyal nationalist men in court-bureaucracy, was central ideology of the new Iranian state. The driving ideological force behind the material and cultural reforms initiated by the Shah to transform the traditional state and society to a modern nation state was Pahlavi nationalism. However aimed modernization, Pahlavi nationalism was not liberal. On the contrary, securing army, government bureaucracy and court patronage as the power basis of his reign, Reza Shah exercised this power through authoritarian means. With no toleration to differences and almost no freedom of thought, his nationalist uniformization of cultural and political space and selective choice of elements of traditional identity by using state power, ended up with a dictatorial state that he had to abdicate by force upon the Allied invasion 1941.

Allied occupation of Iranian territory, while increased public grievance as well as humiliation due to violation of Iran's independence and territorial integrity, it also created a liberal political space where various political groups could organize and expressed views through freer press in the absence of a despotic shah. When the new Pahlavi Shah, Mohammad Reza, retained despotic powers by manipulating constitution by 1949, the nationalist opposition who had already begun to appeal to the public on the need to terminate all foreign influence by nationalizing British-owned oil industry, took the advantage to oppose against the unconstitutional acts of the Shah by claiming that it was as much a threat as foreign domination since both were threat to independence of Iran and freedom of Iranian nation.

This was the framework that the National Front Movement was organized and mobilized as a significant nationalist movement and nationalism became a form of opposition politics for the second time in modern Iranian history after 1906. The National Front Movement succeeded to nationalize Iranian oil industry and to curb use of unconstitutional powers by the Shah. With the premiership of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the leader of the National Front Movement, the triumph of the nationalist opposition reached an apex. Implementation of oil nationalization bill for governmental take over of the exploration, extraction and exploitation of oil resources was the next step.

Mosaddeq's cabinet got the approval of the Majles with a programme that was consisted of two items: (1) implementation of the oil nationalization law all over the country on the basis of the law for nationalization of oil industry and utilization of revenues for the improvement of the country's economy, welfare and security; (2) reform in parliamentary election law and election law for the provincial councils.¹⁴⁸ Since Mosaddeq claimed not to be the leader of one party but to be the leader of whole nation, he opted for formation a "national coalition cabinet" with representatives from different political ranks in order not to frighten different

¹⁴⁸ Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sale Naft-e Iran*, p. 411.

segments of state apparatus. Thus, they would not prevent the government to work through intrigue or obstruction.¹⁴⁹ However, Mosaddeq was firm on his condition to accept the premiership, which was the immediate approval of his nine-article law of dispossession that he presented in the Majles on April 25, 1951¹⁵⁰, on the same day with the end of general strike in Abadan oil refinery.¹⁵¹ Indeed, it was this strike that gave nationalization campaign a major boost and as Za‘im writes, “throughout the month of *farvardin* (22 March-21 April), there was almost no day that demonstrations in support of nationalization of oil industry did not occur in any place.”¹⁵² In addition, Mosaddeq formed a committee of five-men, who were elected by the Majles assumed the task of helping the government in implementation of the nationalization law. Thus, with the premiership of Mosaddeq, after the nine-article bill was approved to be law and signed by the Shah on 1 May, Majles granted the National Front with the political power that was necessary to implement nationalization of oil industry in its fight against the domination of colonialism in Iran.

The negotiations with the AIOC, which started immediately after Mosaddeq’s assuming premiership produced no result. In early August 1951, a mission led by Richard Stokes, the British Lord Privy Seal, arrived in Iran. However, the

¹⁴⁹ Bakhtar-e Emrooz, 20 April 1951 quoted in Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 259.

¹⁵⁰ For the text of nine-article bill see Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sale Naft-e Iran*, pp. 409 – 410.

¹⁵¹ On 26 March 1951, after the AIOC cut the salaries and benefits, especially rental allowances of the workers of the oil industry in Khuzestan on 21 March, they went on a strike. The government declared martial law to end the strike. However, the crisis continued on 12 – 16 April, when the military governor tried to arrest strike leaders and order shoot into rallies in Abadan and Bandar Mashur. Besides better living conditions, the rallies demanded the nationalization of the oil industry. In the clashes occurred, nine company workers, English personnel (two engineers and one sailor), and students were killed. The strike continued until 25 April 1951 and ended when the company declared that it would cancel the decision for housing, increase minimum wage and pay workers for the period of strike. See Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup*, pp. 63 – 73.

¹⁵² Kuroush Za‘im, *Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*, p. 139. Also Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup*, p. 71. For a detailed analysis of oil strike in Khuzestan and how it was related to Mosaddeq’s nine-article law of dispossession see Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sale Naft-e Iran*, pp. 408 – 411.

negotiations again broke down as it became clear that the British were not ready to offer more than a share of profits on 50/50 basis on operations in Iran, which was also supported by the Americans, and they insisted that a British manager would be in charge of the oil production process. In the face of these demands, which were in contradiction of Mosaddeq's nine-article bill for nationalization, he threatened to expel the company's officers with his speech on September 5, 1951, unless the company would make an offer acceptable for Iranians. This turned out to be the point when Britain broke of the negotiations with Mosaddeq government. Subsequently, Iranian government began to implement the nationalization law and the company's British personnel were evicted on October 2, 1951. Meanwhile, the British appealed to the UN Security Council and after the negotiations that took more than a month the Council postponed taking a decision before the conclusion of the decision of The Hague Court to which Britain referred the case. Paradoxically, the British appeal to the UN Security Council gave Mosaddeq a chance to propagate Iranian cause and an opportunity to make the voice of Iran heard by all the world powers and members of UN. Though the trip to UN was a success for Mosaddeq in domestic politics and international arena, it produced no positive outcome. Eventually, on October 22, 1952, diplomatic relations with Britain was broken off.¹⁵³

Being an ardent supporter of constitutionalism against arbitrary state power, Mosaddeq's suspension of the elections for the seventeenth Majles after the election of seventy-nine deputies when it became clear that it was enough to form a quorum in the Majles. Mosaddeq had not been able to pass his electoral reform bill in the Sixteenth Majles due to opposition; thus, he acted contrary to his principles when he realized that royalist land-owners would gain majority in the provinces. When the seventeenth Majles officially convened in February, thirty deputies out of seventy-

¹⁵³ Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, pp. 261 – 263. The British indeed did not take nationalist opposition seriously. They thought the National Front Movement was 'artificial, spuriousness and transitory nature.' For instance, according to British Ambassador Shepherd, "to conceive of Iranian nationalism as a coherent and positive movement of national regeneration was false and a mistaken basis for policy formation." See Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 267.

nine belonged the National Front.¹⁵⁴ However, Mosaddeq faced serious opposition from royalist and pro-British conservative representatives. On July 16, 1952, he used his constitutional right to nominate Minister of War, but the Shah refused his nomination. In response, Mosaddeq submitted his resignation by saying that "...I have come to the realization that I need a trustworthy war minister to continue my national mission. Since His Majesty has refused my request, I will resign and permit someone who enjoys royal confidence to form a new government and implement His Majesty's policies."¹⁵⁵ Publicly accusing the Shah with unconstitutional behavior, Mosaddeq's speech stirred up mass demonstrations against the Shah organized by the National Front and supported by Tudeh whose support was ensured by Mosaddeq's tactical approach to the party in order to invoke communist threat to gain the U.S. backing in oil issue. In the bloody protests of July 21, 1952 (30 Tir 1331) that students, bazaar merchants, workers, government employees attended not only in Tehran and in all other major towns, the Shah was compelled to retreat the army to barracks and ask Mosaddeq for premiership.¹⁵⁶

21 July uprising was the turning point for Mosaddeq's becoming the most powerful prime minister since 1925, but for growing opposition to Mosaddeq as well. After 21 July, which was recognized by the Majles as 'the National Uprising', Mosaddeq enjoyed popular mandate behind him and attained plenary powers. In this period, the Shah was reduced to a position "consisted with the non-royalist interpretation of the constitution."¹⁵⁷ A further rift that helped Mosaddeq to reaffirm his popular mandate occurred when the Senate objected to bills for reform of taxation, judiciary, education and electoral laws. In protest of the Senate, members of National Front in the Majles resigned. However, this left the Majles without a quorum, which meant

¹⁵⁴ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 269.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

¹⁵⁶ Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, pp. 290 – 291.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

the dissolution of the Majles. Mosaddeq had to hold a referendum in July 1953 in order to legitimize the dissolution of the Majles by getting vote of confidence from the people.¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, internal resentment within the National Front started to weaken the movement and the powerful position of Mosaddeq as the head of the government. Kashani, Makki, and Baqai, the three driving forces of the National Front, as well as Haerizadeh withdrew their support due to clashes of opinion with Mosaddeq.

In the tumultuous politics briefly summarized above, the military option to solve the oil stalemate increasingly became a viable option not only for Britain and the U.S. but also for the domestic opponents of Mosaddeq and the National Front Movement. The economic situation was facing with difficulties due to the international boycott of Iranian oil since September 1951 that very few countries remained as buyers of oil. On June 29, 1953, Eisenhower wrote to Mosaddeq that the U.S. would not provide financial aid unless a settlement that would envisage the compensation to be paid by the Iranian government to the company in return for the loss of its physical assets would be reached. However, Mosaddeq turned down the suggestion. On August 19, 1953, Iran lived through one of the most enduring experiences in its modern history.¹⁵⁹ The military coup instigated by General Zahedi, with the support of the U.S. embassy, the CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt, MI6 agents, Kashani, Baqai and Haerizadeh who had been organizing anti-government activities for some time and also cooperating with Zahedi, the small pan-Iranist parties who had been active in anti-Mosaddeq street mobilization, the British and the American money pouring in the country for some time to buy the support of anti-Mosaddeq opposition and to organize the coup, and with the support of Mohammad Reza Shah, Mosaddeq's government was overthrown. For some, *kudeta-ye 28 Mordad* (19 August Coup) was

¹⁵⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 273.

¹⁵⁹ James A. Bill and WM. Roger Louis (eds.), *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil*, Great Britain: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988, p. 11. Also on the coup see Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup*, pp. 149 – 205. For an alternative discussion of the 1953 coup see Darioush Bayandor, *Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited*, (Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

the end of liberal nationalism in Iran. For others, it marked the end of parliamentary politics. This study concludes that the *28 Mordad* coup d'état marked the defeat of anti-colonial and pro-democracy nationalist movement of Iran. It went dormant until it re-emerged before 1979 Revolution in the form of strong anti-Americanism and anti-authoritarianism.

CHAPTER 5

NATIONALISM AS A FORM OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF 1978 – 79

Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 has been the third moment in modern Iranian history that opposition nationalism was observed as a mass movement. The Iranian Revolution embodies the two definitive characteristics of opposition nationalism, which are resistance against foreign interventionism and domestic authoritarianism. In the discourse of opposition nationalism of the Iranian Revolution, foreign interventionism was symbolized with anti-Americanism, whose seeds were planted with the U.S. involvement in the 1953 coup d'état against Mosaddeq's nationalist government. Domestic authoritarianism was symbolized with the Shah's political and security apparatus for control. For the opposition, Shah's constitutional place was a ruler. However, Mohammad Reza Shah granted excessive powers in the body of monarchy that turned his rule in an arbitrary despotism. The opposition's catchphrase, "the Shah should rule, not reign" was the epicenter of all opposition groups until 1977, the time when the opposition began to unified around the ideas of the termination of monarchy.

Mohammad Reza Shah was a modernizer and his reforms for modernization were imbued with secular nationalist ideology. "If our nation wishes to remain in the circle of the dynamic, progressive, free nations of the world" the Shah writes in 1967 in the book that he authored on the White Revolution, "it had no alternative but to alter the old and archaic order of the society completely, and build its future on a new order compatible with the vision and needs of the day."¹ He considered the domestic opposition to his 'modernization project' as the "unholy alliance of the two forces of black reaction and red destruction."² The mass uprising that culminated in 1979

¹ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *The White Revolution*, (Kayhan Press), p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Revolution, however, proved that the Shah's consideration was flawed and far from reality.

Huntington's thesis on three patterns of political modernization explains the Iranian condition well. Accordingly, the first pattern of political modernization involves rationalization of authority; *i.e.* the replacement of large numbers of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single, secular, national political authority. In the second pattern, there occurs the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions. This pattern envisages rise of autonomous, specialized, subordinate organs to discharge the legal, military, administrative and scientific areas. More elaborate, complex and disciplined administrative hierarchies arise where offices are distributed more by achievement and less by ascription. The third pattern of Huntington is increased participation in politics by social groups throughout the society and development of new political institutions – such as political parties and interest associations – to organize this participation. According to Huntington, whereas in the totalitarian states broadened participation may increase control of the people by the government, in democratic ones it may increase the control of the government by the people.³ Iran under the Mohammad Reza Shah passed through these three patterns. However, in the last pattern, increased political participation ended up increased control of the people by the government, leading an authoritarian state.

The modernization projects embarked by the Pahlavi state after 1953, which were more economically and socially ambitious than those initiated by Reza Shah in 1930s, generated the changes in the Iranian society that were defined in the first two patterns. With the help of the continuous flow of oil money after the 1954 consortium agreement, Mohammad Reza Shah aligned Iran with Western states and

³ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America Vs. Europe" in *World Politics*, Vol. 18, No.3, April 1996, p. 378.

foreign capital. The ambition of Mohammad Reza Shah to reach his primary power base, the army, to the utmost level of strength, he put oil money to the arms and technical warcraft whose major supplier was the U.S. governments. Mohammad Reza Shah built a security state with the investments he allocated to the armed forces and intelligence services of the country. The Shah also embarked on economic and social reforms that would weaken the traditional landed classes and capital owners and would create corporatist state structure with expanded bureaucracy and industrial capitalists. He introduced land reform to abolish the feudal landlord and peasant system, and profit-sharing scheme for the workers of the factories, assured women's enfranchisement, established literary corps, health corps and development corps to increase the public welfare and development. Specialized agencies were created to implement the reforms and the government-hired experts for the implementation of reform necessitated technical expertise hired experts. Thus, Mohammad Reza Shah reached a political stability through the "strong and effective institutional base for coercion" and "ability to satisfy the basic material demands of a critically significant sector of the population."⁴ However, in the last pattern of political modernization, the Shah failed to liberate the political space that would satisfy the demands of political expression by different groups. He resorted to an arbitrary implementation of the constitution, convened pre-organized parliaments through fraudulent elections, established state-controlled parties and excluded the liberal, nationalist, religious, and communist groups from political participation. Thus, the modernizing Pahlavi state became an authoritarian power over the people. The fact that the modernizing state leaned its power to the Western technology and capital, mainly the alignment with the U.S. in the global Cold War, once worked for state coercion with the image it crated that "the external powers would never allow the Shah to fall from power,"⁵ increased public resentment after a decade of authoritarian rule. Thus, the factors of

⁴ Richard W. Cottam, "The Iranian Revolution" in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, (USA: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 77.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

foreign interventionism and authoritarianism paved the way for the coordination of opposition nationalism after 1977 as a political movement.

5.1. Foreign Influence and Pahlavi State: Roots of Anti-Americanism

This section aims to explain the roots of anti-Americanism, which was regarded as the main agent of foreign interventionism in Iranian affairs by the nationalist opposition movement of 1978 – 79. After the 1953 coup against Mosaddeq government and restoration of the power of Mohammad Reza Shah, the U.S. became the major ally of Iran. Indeed, the overthrow of Mosaddeq government by a British – U.S. secret operation named AJAX had drastic consequences for the Pahlavi state in the period of 1953 – 1979. According to Mohsen Milani, who provides an excellent summary of the consequences of the coup, the suppression of National Front movement led to the following consequences for Iranian politics in terms of state-society relations:

First, because it was generally believed that the United States had saved his throne, the Shah lost his legitimacy. From then on, he was tainted as an American puppet, a label that stuck to him throughout his life. Second, the coup marked the start of Iran's ever-increasing dependence upon the United States and became the catalyst for the emergence of the United States as the hegemonic power in Iran. It also created for the Shah a psychological dependence on Washington, thus depriving him of the ability to act independently during crisis, which proved fatal during the last year of his reign. Third, the coup strengthened the prevalent conspiratorial view that without foreign support, no government, even as popular as Mosaddeq's, can survive for long. ... Fourth, the coup irrevocably damaged the relationship between the Mosaddeqite nationalists and the Shah, thereby stripping the monarchy of an effective deterrent against radicalism of the left and fanaticism of the right. ... Sixth, shaken by Mosaddeq's meteoric rise to power the Shah was determined never to allow any prime minister to become too powerful. In a way, Mosaddeq's nationalist movement provided the Shah the personal justification to become an autocrat. Seventh, and most important, the foreign-orchestrated coup seemed to have touched the very sensitive pride-nerve of some middle class Iranians who perceived the monarch as America's Shah. This was the very class whose participation was essential for the success of the Shah's modernization program.⁶

⁶ Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic*, (USA: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), p. 76.

The change of the orientation of Iranian foreign policy after 1953 was formulated as “positive nationalism” by the Pahlavi state, defined as “a policy of maximum political and economic independence consistent with the interests of one’s country, essentially meant to reject nonalignment, which the shah called ‘supine passive neutrality’.”⁷ Positive nationalism approach stemmed from two considerations of Mohammad Reza Shah. The first one was the bitter memory of 1941 invasion by the British and Soviet forces that persuaded the Shah to search a balance through aligning with the third power, the United States. However, the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged as the two superpowers in the 1950s and there was no longer a third power that Iran could rely on. The legacy of Russian involvement in Iran’s affairs since the 1800s, the pro-Russian communist groups inside Iran who had emerged as fierce opposition to the Pahlavi state since 1940s, and the U.S. role in his regaining authority vis-à-vis nationalists led by Mosaddeq prompted the Shah to align with the Western powers in the Cold War. The second consideration of the Shah in formulating positive nationalism was to assert his image as ‘nationalist’ against the legacy of Mosaddeq government. Mosaddeq’s nationalist government had acted on the policy of ‘negative equilibrium’ that had implied non-alignment of any imperialist power in order to preserve Iran’s independence. Mohammad Reza Shah, however, regarded Soviet imperialism as the most dangerous enemy of Iran’s independence; hence, Iran’s national interest would best be protected through alignment with the West in the Cold War conditions.⁸ According to Binder, the idea of positive nationalism also meant

Iran must cooperate with those countries that offer it aid; must not follow a sterile neutralism while confronted by the threat of communist subversion or Soviet aggression; must not embark risky social adventures such as expropriating landowners and nationalizing large enterprises; progress must be planned, slow and steady; must not change or shake its inherited

⁷ Jahangir Amuzegar, *The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavi’s Triumph and Tragedy*, (USA: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 142.

⁸ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941 – 1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations*, (USA: University Press of Virginia, 1975), pp. 256 – 260.

institutions, which represent all that is positive and worthy in the national culture.⁹

The U.S. policy towards Iran until 1953 coup was more a conciliation rather than intervention. According to James A. Bill, there were four reasons that the U.S. changed its policy and intervened in the 1953 coup. These were “the U.S. preoccupation with the communist challenge in Iran, American concerns about the accessibility of the rich Iranian oil reserves to the Western world, Britain’s successful campaign to bring the United States to accept their approach to the crisis and finally Mosaddeq’s own methodology (to augment the U.S. concerns with communist threat in order to get the U.S. aid for his government), which ultimately proved to be counterproductive and self-defeating.¹⁰ Besides these, the rise of nationalist movements in the Middle East in the course of 1950s, especially in Egypt with Nasser and in Iraq with the rise of nationalist forces, the U.S. formulated a policy of “alliance with traditional regional regimes and opposition to strongly pro-change and nationalist regimes.”¹¹ In the case of Iran, that the much-needed help asked by Mosaddeq from the U.S. and delayed by the U.S. came directly to the Zahedi government in a few months after the 1953 coup was regarded as a clear indication of the U.S. government’s choice to support the Shah’s government against Iranian nationalists. The continuing aid throughout the 1960s led to perception among the Iranians the U.S. aid programme was a tool employed by the U.S. government to exert control over policy-making in Iran.¹²

⁹ Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*, (USA: University of California Press, 1962), p. 78.

¹⁰ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*, (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 79.

¹¹ Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study*, (USA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), p. 118.

¹² Prime Minister Zahedi asked for US aid with a letter he wrote to President Eisenhower on 26 August 1953. Eisenhower replied immediately stating that the US was ready to help Iranian government. On September 3, 1953, the Foreign Operations Administrations announced the US would give Iran 23.4 million dollars aid for technical assistance. On September 5, President Eisenhower announced a 45 million dollars aid for economic assistance to Iran. US aids continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, pp. 113 – 114.

The adoption of Eisenhower doctrine on January 5, 1957 which authorized the U.S. president “to employ ... American armed forces to protect the integrity and independence of any nation or groups of nations in general area of the Middle East requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism”¹³ and the military coup d’état in Iraq against the monarchy in 1958 enabled the Shah to propagate that Iranian government needed protection. Thus, Iran secured a defense agreement with the U.S. in 1959, which further solidified the U.S.-Iran alliance. According to this agreement that was concluded on March 5, 1959, “the United States regarded as “vital to its national interest” Iran’s independence and integrity and undertook (1) to continue to furnish Iran military and economic assistance, and, ... (2) to come to Iran’s assistance in case of aggression.”¹⁴ The agreement was regarded as the “first direct and efficient American commitment to Iran’s national security.”¹⁵ Indeed, when turmoil in the country heightened tremendously in 1978 with the continuous strikes in oil and gas sectors on the eve of the revolution, the Shah would question desperately if his foreign allies with whose backing he had been able to preserve his power in throne were not interested in his keeping power any more. In his book, *Answer to History*, Mohammad Reza Shah would write: “It was at this time that I increasingly questioned my allies actions: Did the U.S. still hold to our bilateral agreement that obligated them to come to our aid in case we were attacked by a communist country? Did they want it annulled?”¹⁶ This statement makes it clear that the Shah was still sticking to the 1959 U.S.-Iran defense agreement for the survival of his power when people were demonstrating against him in the streets in 1978.

¹³ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941 – 1973*, p 279.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p 282.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

¹⁶ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, (USA: Stein and Day Publishers, 1980), p. 169.

Two years before the conclusion of the U.S.-Iran defense treaty, Mohammad Reza Shah had started his project of reconstruction of military and police to safeguard the survival of his rule. Within this project, a new institution for preserving internal security which was the Intelligence and Security Organization of the Country, better known with its acronym SAVAK (*Sazman-e Ittila'at va Amniyat-e Kashvar*), was established on June 9, 1957 and was put under the command of General Teymur Bakhtiyar. According to Gasiorowski, the intention of the Shah in creating SAVAK was “to create a modern, efficient intelligence agency that would be capable of monitoring and combating both domestic and foreign threats to his rule and would be free from petty rivalries and bureaucratic inertia that plagued the existing intelligence agencies (i.e., units of army, Gendarmerie, and National Police).”¹⁷ However, as James Bill states, SAVAK became a ‘police-state monster’ in time and it acquired a reputation of brutal domestic force in time with increasingly extreme and ruthless tactics.¹⁸

SAVAK symbolized American influence in Iran that enabled harsh authoritarian measures taken by the Shah against opposition in the country. This stemmed from the fact that it was established under the auspices of American advisors and with the U.S. assistance of intelligence. Actually, the Eisenhower administration initiated training and equipping police, intelligence services and paramilitary forces in the Third World countries against the Soviet threat. Within this framework, Iran had also started to receive training for police, gendarmerie, paramilitary force in rural areas, and for SAVAK. The U.S. sent an army colonel to train the new intelligence unit in 1953. In 1956, when SAVAK was granted legal powers by a bill approved in Iranian parliament, the Shah requested a permanent team of five advisors from the CIA. The team served in Iran until 1960 and provided training for SAVAK personnel on intelligence techniques as well as modern methods of information gathering. When

¹⁷ Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran*, (USA: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 117.

¹⁸ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 98.

the CIA team left Iran in 1960, a MOSSAD team replaced their place to provide a similar training. They remained in Iran until 1965 when SAVAK became capable of continuing training on its own. However, intelligence cooperation between CIA and SAVAK, and the close relationship between MOSSAD and SAVAK continued for the next two decades.¹⁹ For the nationalist opposition against the Pahlavi state, SAVAK was the symbol of Iranian alliance with the U.S. that exerted force of authoritarian state fatally over its people.

During the period of Eisenhower administration, Iran had received American aid and assistance mainly because of ‘communist threat’ and the need for Iran to restore economic stability to counter it.²⁰ However, with John F. Kennedy’s presidency in 1961, political reform and development in the Third World countries became important for the U.S. in order to prevent violent revolutions from below. The second of the two reports that Iran analyst at the Department of State, John W. Bowling, presented to the Kennedy administration contained fourteen points of what to be done for the appeasement of middle-class based nationalist opposition of the time and for strengthening the Shah’s rule vis-à-vis the opposition. Bowling analyzed that a nationalist revolution would be too costly for the U.S. since it mainly would break up CENTO, harm U.S. oil interests in the consortium, lead to communist infiltration and acceptance of Soviet aid by Iran besides other disadvantages. Thus, stability should be maintained by supporting the existing monarchy, but also by appeasing the opposition. The fourteen-point advice of Bowling included taking moves that would restore the Shah’s prestige that was deteriorated because of his unpopular prime ministers, reduction in military and budget cuts for trips to Western countries, removal of the U.S. advisors gradually from government affairs, appointment of pro-Mosaddeq people to government positions, publicizing the details of the operations

¹⁹ Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah*, pp. 117 – 121.

²⁰ President Eisenhower’s speech in May 1957 that quoted by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi affirms it as such: “Under the courageous leadership of the Shah, the people of Iran met that danger. In their effort to restore economic stability, they received indispensable help from us. ... Iran remains free. And its freedom continued to prove of vital importance to our freedom.” Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, pp. 90 – 92.

of Pahlavi Foundation and appointment of a few moderate Mosaddeqists as its supervisors.²¹ The recommendations in Bowling's fourteen points constituted a guideline for the Shah's reform program over the next two years.

Meanwhile, reform together with repression led the discontented opposition to become vocal. In 1961, the National Front had resumed its public political activities by organizing street demonstrations and issuing proclamations. In May 1961, teachers went on a strike because of low wages and the riots widened after the security forces opened fire on teachers. In October 1961, demonstrations against the government intensified in Tehran University, which continued until the brutal suppression by regime's security forces in January 1962. The Shah dissolved the Twentieth Majles on May 9, 1961 for he saw the composition of the Majles as an obstacle to his reforms. To secure the support of the Kennedy administration whose policy was that the "Third World nationalism should be enlisted in the United State's struggle with the Soviet Union,"²² the Shah dismissed Sharif-Imami from premiership and appointed a leading figure of independent opposition and a reformist, Dr. 'Ali Amini.

The appointment of 'Ali Amini to premiership foresaw the introduction of economic reforms, fight against corruption, and elimination of infamous reactionary people from government. The head of SAVAK, General Teymur Bakhtiyar, was first removed from his office in March 1961 and then forced to leave country in January 1962. Manuchahr Eqbal, a loyal royalist politician, also left Iran for a vacation beginning on May 16, 1961. Moreover, revolutionary personalities were appointed to head the Ministries of Education and Agriculture. However, the Shah used Amini as a scapegoat to protect his prestige by pointing his government as responsible for the unsuccessful reform attempts and turmoil. After the brutal attack on Tehran

²¹ The fourteen points of the Bowling's second report are available at James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 134.

²² Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States*, p. 126.

University students by the military on the command of the Shah on January 21, 1962, Amini had no choice but to resign from premiership. The Shah appointed his loyal childhood friend and a conservative politician, Asadollah Alam to presidency.

On January 9, 1963 Mohammad Reza Shah initiated his most ambitious top-down modernization program and called it as ‘White Revolution,’ or ‘the revolution of the Shah and the people’ which was pejoratively referred by the opposition as the ‘revolution of the Shah against the people’.²³ He even submitted his program to a referendum on January 26, 1963 in order to ensure the full support of the Iranian people for the reforms as well as for his authority. The proposed reforms, mainly the land reform, nationalization of forests, public sale of state-owned factories, profit sharing in industry, enfranchisement of women, establishment of literacy corps, created discontent among the various segments of Iranian society. Landlords were discomforted by the land reform. The clergy regarded the reforms as an attack to their power base. The professionals and intelligentsia were at unease with the content of reform program since it did not contain any items to enhance political participation and social justice. Thus, despite harsh measures taken by the state, the riots continued in the streets over the year in 1963 and repressed with brutal measures taken by the state against its people. The twenty-first Majles had not convened until after the state-controlled elections were held on October 6, 1963.

In this tumultuous environment, the only initiative of the U.S. government that created a positive outlook towards the United States among Iranian people was Kennedy’s Peace Corps program. Following the arrival of the first forty-three volunteer Peace Corps to Iran in September 1962, almost two thousand other volunteers arrived and worked together with the Iranian people in the countryside. According to James Bill, “the American Peace Corps volunteer was generally the

²³ Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926 – 1979*, (Hong Kong: New York University Press, 1981), p. 216.

antithesis of the “ugly American” and gained the United States some badly needed credibility.”²⁴

After Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson, who had developed a personal relationship with the Iranian Shah in his visits to Iran during his term as vice-president in Kennedy administration, became the new president of the United States in November 1963. Johnson’s foreign policy approach regarding the Third World countries was to continue with the reforms on human rights as well as to use military force to guarantee stability in the American allies. Thus, Johnson supported the Shah’s reform program and White Revolution and his brutal suppression of the opposition. However, the U.S.-Iran relations during Johnson’s presidency witnessed the second devastating anti-American opposition among Iranian people after the 1953 coup. This was the opposition against the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which was approved to become a law by the Iranian Majles on October 13, 1964. According to this law, the American citizens serving in military advisory positions, the U.S. military personnel or civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense and their families forming a part of their household would be immune from Iranian law.²⁵

²⁴ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, pp. 149 – 150.

²⁵ “...(T)he United States Government believes that it would be in the interest of the two governments to have a general understanding covering this matter so as to remove any reason for uncertainty and thereby facilitate the efficient functioning of these advisory personnel. To that end, the Embassy has the honor to suggest simply that such personnel shall have the privileges and immunities specified for “Members of the Administrative and Technical Staff” in the Convention annexed to the final act of the United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities signed at Vienna, April 18, 1961.

The Embassy further suggests that in the interest of uniformity and ease of administration the foregoing principle be made applicable to any other United States military personnel or civilian employees of the United States Department of Defense and their families forming part of their households whose presence in Iran is authorized by the Imperial Iranian Government.” United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 776 (1971), nos. 11051 – 64, “Exchange of Notes concerning an Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Iran,” March 19, 1962, p. 290 available at <https://treaties.un.org/pages/SearchResults.aspx?flag=Treaty&tab=UNTS>, accessed on 1 August 2015.

The approval of SOFA, known in Iran as the ‘Capitulations Agreement,’ was followed by approval of another bill on October 25, 1964 that allow Iranian government to get a two hundred million dollars loan from the U.S. to be used for purchasing the U.S. military equipment. To the opposition, this was a clear indication that the U.S. government was paying Iran for the acceptance of the Immunities bill. Although there were negative votes and opposition against these bills in the Majles, the bills were approved at the end of parliamentary discussions. Due to harsh repression in 1962 – 63, there was not any major mass protest against these bills. The only protest movement at the time was a three-day-strike of taxi drivers in Tehran and other cities on 28 – 31 November, which occurred due to austerity measures that increased the cost of oil. However, the British Ambassador to Iran, Mr. Wright, noted that despite even better relations with the U.S., the criticism inside and outside the Majles against the Immunities and American loan bills was a sign that anti-American feelings were on the rise and “xenophobia was not far beneath the surface.” He further gives his personal opinion that the Western-educated Iranians of new generation were more nationalist and neutralist in their heart than their fathers. That the inclination towards the West was “brittle and almost entirely dependent on the will of the Shah.”²⁶

The harsher reaction against the approval of Immunities and the American loan bills came from Ayatollah Khomeini. Speaking to audience in Qom on October 27, 1964, he condemned the bills and those who gave vote for it by saying that “they have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog.”²⁷ Khomeini’s harsh attack on government in his speech went on as following:

Other people imagine that it is the Iranian nation that has abased itself in this way. They do not know that it is the Iranian government, the Iranian Majles – the Majles that has nothing to do with the people. What can a Majles that is

²⁶ Robert L. Jarman (Research ed.), *Iran Political Diaries 1881 – 1965*, Volume 14: 1952 – 1965, (Oxford: Archive Editions Limited, 1997), p. 722.

²⁷ Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Imam Khomeini*, USA: Kegan Paul, 2002, p. 182.

elected at bayonet-point have to do with the people? ... What disasters this loan has brought down upon the head of the nation already! This impoverished nation must now pay 100 million dollars in interest of America over the next ten years.²⁸

In the following part of Khomeini's speech, the anti-imperialist and especially anti-American stance of his thought, which would be the dominant discourse appealed by the people in nationalist opposition movement of 1978 – 79, is clear:

If this country is occupied by America, then what is all this noise you make about progress? If these advisors are to be your servants, then why do you treat them like something superior to masters? ... Are we to be trampled underfoot by the boots of America simply because we are a weak nation and have no dollars? America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. ... But today it is America that we are concerned with. ... All of our troubles today are caused by America and Israel. Israel itself derives from America; these deputies and ministers that have been imposed upon us derive from America – they are all agents of America, for if they were not, they would rise up in protest.²⁹

Khomeini's 1964 speech, which ended with condemning the government and the senate with committing treason against Iran, against Islam and against Quran, led the Ayatollah to be exiled by the Shah on November 4, 1964 first to Turkey for a brief period and then Iraq that he settled in Najaf. By Khomeini's exile, the Shah wanted to curb his appeal to the discontented masses.

In the face of growing opposition inside, Mohammad Reza Shah continued to seek the U.S. support to strengthen his military power and to acquire funds for his modernization projects. Given the initial reluctance from the U.S., he even tried to establish relations with the Soviet Union to threaten the U.S. to accept Iran as indispensable to American Cold War foreign policy.³⁰ The formulation of Nixon

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 182 – 184.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 184 – 187.

³⁰ See James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 171.

doctrine in July 1969 by the newly elected U.S. president Richard Nixon paved the way for the Shah's efforts to produce result.³¹ Accordingly, Nixon declared Iran as one of the twin pillars together with Saudi Arabia for the Gulf Security after the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. Thus, Iran became the most important regional proxy for the U.S.³² The proclamation of this role served the Shah to acquire the arms he had been longing for. The United States arms sale to Iran which had been less than 96 million dollars between 1967 – 68 quadrupled to 289 million dollars between 1969 – 70, including F-4 Phantom aircrafts, missiles, helicopters, naval fighters and motor gunboats.³³ However, nationalist and religious groups appeared on the street to protest Tehran Investment Seminar, which was organized as a six-day event on May 17, 1970 to which many leading American investors participated to seek lucrative business opportunities of the oil-rich Iranian economy. The protestors condemned the conference as an imperialist event and attacked Iran-America Society offices in Tehran. A cleric named Mohammad Reza Sa'idi, who was a student of Ayatollah Khomeini, publicly denounced the American investors and accused the Shah of selling the country to the Americans. The death of Sa'idi under torture on June 10, 1970 infuriated the anger among the opposition and the cleric became a hero for the opposition.³⁴

October 11, 1971 marked the extravagant Pahlavi show off whence Mohammad Reza Shah commemorated the 2500 years of Persian monarchy in one-week events in Persepolis near Shiraz with the presence of the distinguished guests from all over the world. After this event, the Shah depicted himself not just the heir of Cyrus the

³¹ According to the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. would heavily arm some of its Third World allies and encourage them to combat in proxy wars with the Soviet Union in order to avoid direct involvement in proxy wars. Iran became one of the country's that was encouraged by the U.S. to play the role of a policeman in regional conflicts with the help of the American sophisticated weaponry. Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 100.

³² Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America*, (USA: Random House, 2004), p. 103.

³³ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 173.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 180 – 182.

Great but as the “Just Aryamehr as the Custodian of the Land of Iran” appointed by God.³⁵

Between 1972 – 74, the state commenced moves that would destroy the religious establishment in the country. Economically, the government took charge of Endowments Organization (*Sazeman-e Awqaf*) and put it under the control of Prime Minister. In 1973, government closed down *Hosseiniyeh-i Ershad*, a place for religious gathering and sermons that had turned to be a main center for anti-government discussions, and arrested ‘Ali Shari‘ati who was the most appealed lecturer of the institution. In addition, the government closed down publishing houses and arrested clerics. In the face of strengthening U.S.-Iran relations, the opposition increasingly blamed the U.S. for the authoritarianism of the Shah. The U.S. diplomats, military personnel, scientists as well as American facilities in Iran became targets for guerilla groups.³⁶

The Iranian opposition had another martyr in 1974, who was a leftist poet and writer Khosrow Golsorkhi. He became the first opposition member who refused to recant and public apology; instead, he publicly accused Pahlavi government as “corrupt, repressive, and illegitimate.” He was executed by the Shah’s men and became a hero of the opposition. However, the more the opposition became fearless, the more the Shah sought more weapons. On May 30 – 31, 1972, the Nixon administration promised the Shah that he could purchase any conventional weapons he would like from the U.S. inventory.³⁷ The oil boom and quadrupling oil prices in 1973 were the major factors that helped Iran to increase its spending on arms.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

³⁶ On 30 November 1971, opposition guerillas attempted to kidnap the U.S. ambassador to Iran, Douglas Mac Arthur II. On 2 June 1973, they killed a military advisor Lt. Col. Lewis Hawkins. On 21 May 1975, US Air Force colonels Paul Shaffer and Jack Turner were assassinated. In August 1976, three American civilians working on an electronic surveillance system were killed in the street. Between 1971 – 75, American organizations and facilities in Iran were subjected to thirty-one bombings. See James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 191.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

By 1977, the increased guerilla activities made the Shah recognize that repression was not a solution to eliminate opposition. In the face of economic difficulties that threatened the Shah's cooptation capacity, and the growing criticisms from the Western states and human rights organizations, he changed his rhetoric and began to mention the importance of human rights. By mid-1976, he initiated liberalization policy through which the prison conditions were bettered, measures taken with the aim of elimination of torture, and a sizeable number of political prisoners were released.³⁸ He tried to expand his power base by resorting to individual participation of the U.S.-educated technocrats in the new government in summer 1977.³⁹

If one aim of the Shah's liberalization was to contain opposition in a period of economic fragility, the other aim was to ensure the U.S. support to his rule under the new presidency of Jimmy Carter. Carter was elected as the thirty-ninth president of the U.S. with his election campaign based on promotion of human rights and end of the U.S. support to dictatorial regimes. At his inaugural speech on January 20, 1977, Carter explained the new U.S. policy as such: "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights."⁴⁰ Moreover, Carter's intention for betterment of relations with the Soviet Union and later the U.S. involvement in Camp David negotiations for peace between Egypt and Israel became the factors that alarmed the Shah about deterioration of Iran's regional importance for the U.S.⁴¹

³⁸ Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States*, p. 158.

³⁹ In the cabinet formed by Jamshid Amuzegar in August 1977, ten new technocrats assumed cabinet posts that marked the change towards the new strategy of reform by technocrats. James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 223.

⁴⁰ "Carter and Human Rights, 1977 – 81," available at <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/human-rights>, accessed on 1 August 2015.

⁴¹ Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah*, pp. 100 – 101.

Meanwhile, the Iranian opposition became vociferous since the conditions became appropriate. In May 1977, fifty-three lawyers sent an open letter to the Shah and “accused government of interfering in court proceedings and announced the formation of a special commission to protect the judiciary from the legislative branch.”⁴² In June 1977, three liberal intellectuals, namely Sanjabi, Forouhar, and Bakhtiyar, wrote a letter to the Shah and demanded him to avoid “use of the royalist calendar and the title Aryamehr.” The letter also accused “the regime both of wrecking the economy through inflation and neglect of agriculture, and of violating international law, human rights, and the 1905 – 1909 Constitution.”⁴³ The intellectuals demanded the Shah to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, abolish one-party system, permit freedom of press and assembly, release political prisoners, allow exiles to return home, and establish a government that would enjoy public confidence. In Iran since 1963, such an act had at least faced with imprisonment of the writers, but it was tolerated within the liberalization perspective of the Shah, although Sanjabi and Forouhar were arrested later in 1978 on other charges.⁴⁴ In June 1977, the Writers’ Association that had been suppressed since 1964 revived its activities. Forty prominent poets, novelists, and intellectuals sent an open letter to Prime Minister Hoveida where they “denounced the regime for violating the constitution, demanded an end to censorship, protested that SAVAK stifled all cultural, intellectual, and artistic activity, and argued that many citizens were in prison for the “crime” of reading books disapproved by the police.”⁴⁵

⁴² Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (USA: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 501.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 502.

⁴⁴ Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*, (USA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 18.

⁴⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 502. Abrahamian also states that the forty signatories were among all political opinions of Iranian politics. For instance, the pro-Tudeh writer Behazin, a Marxist intellectual who left Tudeh in mid-1950s Baqer Momeni, non-Tudeh Marxist theorist and brother of Khalel Maleki, Hossein Malek, an independent Marxist essayist Maonuchehr Hezarkhani, a professor of economics from previous Maleki’s socialist circle Naser Pakdaman, professor of history sympathetic to feminist causes and a member of National Front Homa Nateq, feminist writer Simin Daneshvar, psychologist and play writer Gholam Hossein Sa’edi, a secular liberal Fereydoun Adamiyat, former Tudeh member in the 1940s who joined Maleki’s socialist group

Despite the early statements of the U.S. administration emphasized the importance of observance of human rights and democratization, it did not change the course of relations with Iran and remained aloof on the issue of human rights when dealing with the Shah. When Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Tehran in May 1977, the issue of human rights was ‘barely mentioned.’⁴⁶ The Carter administration continued with the twin pillar policy and agreed to supply Iran more sophisticated arms and intelligence equipment. Vance promised the Shah with sale of 160 F-16s and 7 AWACs (advanced early warning electronic systems) aircraft, and promised further increases in aircraft sales.⁴⁷ When Ayatollah Taleqani, a leader of Freedom Movement, was arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison in summer 1977, there was no reaction from the U.S. officials against his arrest. On November 15, 1977, Mohammad Reza Shah and Empress Farah visited President Carter and in the new years’ eve of 1978 Carter visited Tehran. These visits fortified the alliance of the U.S. and Pahlavi monarchy albeit the protests in the streets. The Shah’s visit to President Carter, for instance, gave opportunity for the Iranian students in the U.S. to raise their voices against the Shah and made their opposition heard in the world by the global media.⁴⁸ The U.S. reluctance on applying pressure on the Shah in support of the opposition, however, not only encouraged the Shah to force opposition into silence through coercion but also put out the initial hopes for the U.S. help towards political liberalization and led the opposition to condemn the U.S. – Iran alliance in the streets.

In 1978 there were two divergent views among the U.S. officials about the situation in Iran. One was the view of Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State, informed by the experts in the State Department that the Pahlavi monarchy was collapsing. The

in 1950s and became popular among lay religious leaders in 1970s ‘Ali Asghar Hajj Seyyed Javadi were among the signatories. See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 502.

⁴⁶ Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle*, p. 122.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

second one was the view of the President's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski who was mainly informed by the Iranian Ambassador to the U.S. Ardeshir Zahedi that the Pahlavi monarchy was strong enough to suppress the opposition with the help of its powerful army. The U.S. Ambassador to Iran, William H. Sullivan, was reluctant to consider the fragility of the Pahlavi monarchy when he assumed post in June 1977. However, by November 1978, he realized that the Shah's regime was in danger and advised the U.S. government that contingency plans should be prepared in case the Shah did not survive politically.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Brzezinski's approach prevailed in the U.S. decision-making and the U.S. invested in the Shah's survival. The U.S. government sent a military mission led by Gen. Robert Dutch Huyser Huyser on January 4, 1979 with the charge to "hold Iranian military together and to send a sharp signal that the United States stood behind the current regime."⁵⁰ James Bill states that another target of this decision was to preserve the valuable intelligence sites in northern Iran, specifically Bihshahr and Kapkan sites, where the U.S. closely monitored the Soviet missile and space activities from these super secret, sophisticated electronic listening posts.⁵¹

The arrival of Huyser added negatively to the revolutionary opposition's anti-American stance. Ambassador Sullivan was considered moderately by the opposition as a man who was knowledgeable about the situation in Iran. Huyser mission, however, was regarded as "an obvious U.S. attempt to intervene directly and militarily in a last-ditch effort to save the Pahlavi regime."⁵²

⁴⁹ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 248.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

5.2. Authoritarianism of the Pahlavi State (1953 – 1979)

Authoritarianism of the Pahlavi state under the second Pahlavi Shah, Mohammad Reza, was the second definitive condition that gave rise to opposition nationalism in the 1978 – 79 Iranian Revolution. After the 1953 coup against Mosaddeq government and return of Mohammad Reza Shah to the country as the monarch of Iran who triumphed over the nationalist opposition with the help of British and American efforts, “Iran moved steadily from a loose authoritarianism in the direction of totalitarianism” until 1960.⁵³ The Pahlavi state’s authoritarian power after 1953 aimed at total control of the political space accompanied with a goal of economic and social modernization. The instruments of Pahlavi control were the state-controlled political space through elimination of political freedoms, and a repressive security apparatus.

5.2.1. Political Space under the State Control

The state-controlled political space was created by controlling parliamentary elections so that court-favored candidates would be elected, banning independent political parties and creating state-controlled parties to give appearance of a participatory system. To control the parliamentary elections, the first measure taken was to extend the term of Majles from two to four years; so that the nineteenth Majles, which had been convened in 1956 after the fall of Mosaddeq, would serve for an additional two years until 1960. In the meantime, Pahlavi state would have time to prepare for the next elections and create state-sponsored two-party system.⁵⁴ The *Melliyun* (Nationalists) Party was created in 1957 and put under the leadership of the Prime Minister Manuchehr Eqbal. The second state-sponsored party, the *Mardom* (Peoples’) Party, was created in 1958 and was headed by the Minister of

⁵³ Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States*, p. 288.

⁵⁴ Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution*, p. 78.

Interior Asadollah Alam who was also the Shah's childhood friend and always loyal to the Shah.⁵⁵

According to Katouzian, the Shah created the two-party system within the constitutional framework in order "to show his American patrons that he was in favour of 'liberal' democracy; to make it impossible to get into the National Assembly through any genuine political grouping, or as an independent candidate; and to let his own henchmen and cronies play the role of Tweedledum and Tweedledee."⁵⁶ Thus, as stated by Binder, the idea behind the creation of the two-party system was "to permit renewed public political activity while retaining control"⁵⁷ over the political space. Between these two parties, while *Melliyun* party assumed to be the majority party, the *Mardom* party assumed to be the opposition party.

Mardom party's program stressed the reformist policies such as land distribution, labor welfare, social insurance and equal rights for women. The *Melliyun* party's program, however, was focused more on labor benefits, free medical service, Persian language, physical exercise and scouting. Membership to both parties was motivated by opportunism, *i.e.* while people who had satisfactory positions were enthusiastic to join *Melliyun* party, those who had less satisfactory positions and would like to invest in Asadollah Alam's prospect of premiership tended to join *Mardom* party. In their relations with other social forces, the *Melliyun* party opted for extending its appeal to key individuals such were ministers, directors-generals, agency heads, bank officials, industrialists, landlords, and professional personnel. The *Mardom* party, however, worked for establishing relations with workers, guilds, women's groups, and the nationalists of Mosaddeq era. However, because the party was not

⁵⁵ Asadollah Alam (Introduced and edited by Alinaghi Alikhani), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969 – 1977*, (India: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2008).

⁵⁶ Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 197.

⁵⁷ Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*, p. 222.

demonstrating a genuine and effective opposition to the government and because of the existence of effective security apparatus that was suspicious of any potential social opposition group, the party was not successful to win the support of the social groups it claimed to represent.⁵⁸

Despite there was no permission to establish a political party other than the two state-sponsored ones, the announcement that the twentieth Majles elections would be free created hopes for opposition individuals to enter into the parliament. After all, a limited opposition was permitted under the government control with the formation of *Mardom* party. The campaigning process for the elections witnessed an expanding opposition that prominent professionals like Dr. ‘Ali Amini, who had been Minister of Finance after the 1953 coup and an ambassador to the U.S. The liberal president John Kennedy’s election in January 1961 provided an imperious condition for the Shah to continue with his limited liberalization to ensure the U.S. support for his government; thus, it further strengthened the liberal opposition inside Iran. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Eqbal, who “announced that pro-Mosaddeq or Tudeh candidates would not be elected.”⁵⁹ Massive fraud reports during the elections for which the polling had started on July 30, 1960 convinced the Shah to dissociate himself from the growing unpopularity of Eqbal and the government.⁶⁰ He did not give his confidence to the prime minister and consequently Manouchehr Eqbal and his cabinet resigned from post on 28 August. The Shah appointed Ja‘far Sharif-Emami to presidency on 30 August and all the elected deputies resigned upon the Shah’s request on September 1, 1960. The next elections held on January 1961 were

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 222 – 226.

⁵⁹ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, (USA: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 140.

⁶⁰ According to a report of British embassy in Tehran, while the Shah was “proclaiming, on the one hand, complete freedom at the polls, he intended, probably from the start, to rig the elections to bring about a certain result.” Reports continue by stating that the government, the security services and the local authorities employed tradition methods to secure the election of the official candidates. However, their actions were made public by the press and the Shah had to admit personally that the elections had not been free. While dissociating himself from the conduct of fraud, he asked the nation if they demanded annulment of the elections. His simultaneous dismissal of Eqbal from premiership gave him credit. Robert L. Jarman (Research ed.), *Iran Political Diaries 1881 – 1965*, p. 661 - 667.

again subjected to accusations of fraud, however through more discreet methods. So, the Majles convened on 21 January and Sharif-Emami formed his second cabinet. But the legacy of government corruption of the previous elections continued to create unease. Student protests in Tehran University led to the frequent closures of the university in March and April 1961.

The major event that shook the government at that time was the nation-wide teachers' strike in the spring of 1961. On May 2, teachers went on a strike throughout the country due to low wages; thousands marched to Baharestan Square in Tehran to make speeches in front of the Majles. Armed forces opened fire on the protestors, killed a high school teacher, Dr. Khanali, and wounded three other teachers and a student.⁶¹ The act of security forces further mobilized the opposition and the protestors, who were joined by university students, bazaar merchants and workers. They demanded the government to be dismissed. The teachers' strike and the ensuing protests brought the end of Shari-Emami government.

To appease the opposition and to demonstrate his Western allies, mainly the Kennedy administration in the U.S., that he was trying to establish parliamentary democracy in Iran, the Shah appointed the prominent figure of the independent opposition, Dr. 'Ali Amini, as the new prime minister on May 6, 1961. Three days after, Amini dissolved the Majles and the Senate "on the grounds that it had been corruptly elected and that satisfactory elections could not be assured without revision of the electoral law."⁶² However, Amini failed to call for new elections and he governed unconstitutionally upon a decree of the Shah issued in November 1961 that allowed the cabinet to legislate without a parliament.

⁶¹ *Ittila'at*, May 3, 1961 referred by Misagh Parsa, "Mosque of Last Resort: State Reform and Social Conflict in the Early 1960s" in John Foran (ed.), *A Century of Revolution and Social Movements in Iran*, (USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 146.

⁶² Robert L. Jarman (Research ed.), *Iran Political Diaries 1881 – 1965*, p. 679.

Meanwhile, the Amini cabinet took the issue of land reform to the lead. The land reform was opposed as being unconstitutional since enforced in the absence of the parliament. The nationalists, the landed bazaar merchants and the clergy united in their opposition against the government. As stated in British embassy reports, the year 1962 became the year when the Shah “emerged to rule as well as reign,”⁶³ which had been a major concern that should be prevented for the pre-1953 nationalist opposition. Following the approval of land reform law by the Shah on January 15, 1962, wide protests against Shah’s reform started in Tehran University on January 21, 1962 which were supported by nationalists as well as big landlords. The security forces suppressed the protests severely. Protest leaders, mainly from National Front members, were arrested and the newspapers were closed. Shah’s compromise after the severe suppression was to take the head of the security apparatus (SAVAK), Taimur Bakhtiyar, out of office and permit his exile. Thus, the responsibility of attack on protestors would be evaded from himself. Although Amini government continued with reforms and initiate a fight against corruption, lack of parliament severely damaged his credibility for the opposition. After almost a year of premiership, Amini had to resign upon a dispute with the Shah on budget-cut proposal for the ministries in April 1962. The Shah refused to cut army budget and Amini resigned in July 17, 1962. Two days later, the Shah appointed his close friend, Asadollah Alam, as prime minister.

Alam’s premiership began with his meetings with the National Front, who assiduously opposed the unconstitutional government of the country and asked for free elections. Their demands were refused. Thereafter, the Front convened a congress on December 25, 1962 and formed a unified council, but most of the members were arrested on the charge of their resumed open attacks against the Shah.

On January 9, 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah announced his ambitious reform program that he thought it would be a bloodless revolution; namely, the White

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 696.

Revolution. The reform program was consisted of six points: land reform, public sale of government-owned factories as security for the land reform, reform of electoral law including woman suffrage, the nationalization of forests and pastures, establishment of national literacy corps, and profit-sharing in industry to give workers a share of industrial profits.⁶⁴ The Shah called for a national plebiscite on January 26, 1963 “to demonstrate his own and his regime’s popularity.”⁶⁵ Demonstrations against Shah’s reform started prior to the plebiscite in Tehran, after the announcement of woman suffrage in Tabriz, where security forces clashed with the clergy protesting against the electoral law. The protests continued in the form of tribal revolts in Fars province during the spring 1963. The most serious protests, however, started in Tehran during the Muharram mourning in June. Abrahamian notes “thousands of shopkeepers, clergymen, office employees, teachers, students, wage earners, and unemployed workers were poured into the streets to denounce the Shah.”⁶⁶ The leading social forces in the call for protest were the National Front, guild elders and bazaar merchants, and Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini.

Ayatollah Khomeini, was a long time critique of the Shah’s rule, but obeyed the quietest stance of the grand ayatollah of the time, Ayatollah Boroujerdi, until he passed away in 1961. When the *ulama* had called for a boycott of the plebiscite for White Revolution, Khomeini had suggested a strike for the clergy during the month of Ramadan by not attending to mosque and giving service. To end the strike, the security forces attacked Fayziyah madrasa in Qom on March 22, 1963, killing and wounding seminary students. It was during this event that Khomeini began to emerge as a leading opposition figure among the clergy who mobilized masses against the government. In the June 1963 uprising, while condemning the assault on Fayziyah, Khomeini reminded the people that foreign countries had attacked Iran during the World War II, ending the reign of Reza Shah. He warned Mohammad Reza Shah that

⁶⁴ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *The White Revolution*, Kayhan Press.

⁶⁵ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran*, p. 145.

⁶⁶ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 424.

the same would happen to him unless he would listen to the advice of *ulama* who desired the welfare of the nation. Reporting that preachers in Tehran had been taken to SAVAK offices and asked “not to say anything bad about the Shah, not to attack Israel, and not to say Islam was endangered”, Khomeini said that these three things were the only problems with the government; otherwise, the clergy had no dispute with it.⁶⁷ In response, the government imposed martial law in Tehran and Shiraz, and detained Khomeini on June 4, 1963 alongside the arrests of other ayatollahs and preachers.⁶⁸

Finally, the elections for the parliament were held on September 17, 1963. It was for the first time in the parliamentary history of Iran that the elections were completed in one day and women were permitted to vote as well as got elected. The Majles convened on October 6, 1962. According to British embassy report, “through a careful preparation,... the Shah ensured that the Majles would be packed with carefully vetted nominees. In place of the landowners, ... this new Majlies was to be largely composed of civil servants, academics, professional men, workers and peasants who could be relied on to support the reform programme.”⁶⁹ It was after the elections that martial law in Shiraz and Tehran was lifted. The Shah reappointed Asadollah Alam as prime minister on October 21, 1963.

Majority of the parliament representatives were members of *Iran Novin* (New Iran) Party, which was established by the Shah instead of *Melliyun* party. *Iran Novin* was thought to be the party that would support and foster the Shah’s reform program. Members of the party were mostly the U.S. educated civil servants and technocrats

⁶⁷ Ayatollah Khomeini’s Speech on 3 June 1963 in Fayziyah Madrasa, Qom, in Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 179.

⁶⁸ Khomeini was arrested on 5 June 1963. Upon his arrest, Ayatollah Sharifatmadari wrote to the authorities that the arrest, imprisonment or exile of the highest ranking *ulama* was exempted by the Constitution and demanded his release. According to Rahnema and Nomani, it was this letter of Sharifatmadari that saved Khomeini from death. See Ali Rahnema, Farhad Nomani, *The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics and Economic Policy in Iran*, (UK: Zed Books Ltd, 1990), p. 194.

⁶⁹ Robert L. Jarman (Research ed.), *Iran Political Diaries 1881 – 1965*, p. 712.

who constituted a new dependent clientele to perform the Shah's reforms. Thus, by 1963, "the Shah succeeded in replacing the post-war practice of competitive elections and came to dominate all the major institutions of the state: the army, the Prime Minister's office, the cabinet, parliament, government and the ruling party."⁷⁰ By the time that the twenty-first Majles of Iran convened, the Shah's authoritarian regime was consolidated and the constitutional politics was suppressed. *Iran Novin* party controlled the political space as 'the Shah's party' in a two-party system until 1975. With the abolition of *Iran Novin* and *Mardom* Parties and creation of a single party named as Resurgence Party (*Hezb-e Rastakhiz*) on March 2, 1975, Iran became a one-party state where every Iranian was required to be a member of it. The creation of the one-party aimed to ensure the popular support for the state through more powerful political mobilization at a time when there was deterioration in economy, bureaucracy, and infrastructural capacity, while excessive powers of the security apparatus were causing unrest in the society. In this environment, *Rastakhiz* Party was created for the continuation of cooptation of population by the state.⁷¹ The five foundations of the Shah's authoritarian regime, as laid down by Bashiriyeh, were the factors that sustained state cooptation and social participation until the crisis was deepened in 1977. These were:

state control of large financial resources made available through the massive oil billions; the success of the economic stabilization and growth programme and the intervention of the Shah in the economy to ensure economic stability; intermittent attempts at mass mobilization and the creation of equilibrium of classes through their economic control and intervention in the economy; establishment of patron-client relations with the upper bourgeoisie and the Shah's control of private enterprises through participation in entrepreneurial activities; and the expansion of the coercive forces of the state, and reliance on Western and especially U.S. support.⁷²

⁷⁰ Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and the Revolution in Iran (1962 – 1982)*, (Great Britain: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 22.

⁷¹ Jerrold D. Green, *Revolution in Iran: Politics of Countermobilization*, (USA: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 53.

⁷² Since the Shah's authoritarian regime was not direct class rule but a bureaucratic one, he tried to maintain some autonomy from the dominant class interest by establishing a corporatist political structure. His establishment of *Iran Novin* Party was an initiative for this end. Indeed, the party's

5.2.2. Repressive State Apparatus

The second instrument of the authoritarian state was the repressive security apparatus, which was composed of the army, the National Police (military police, the town and city police, imperial guard, imperial Iranian Gendarmerie), and intelligence units (military intelligence, Imperial Iranian Inspectorate, Special Bureau, and SAVAK).⁷³ Among these units, SAVAK (*Sazeman-e Ittila'at va Amniyat-e Kashvar*) played the most important role in Pahlavi state's dictatorial behavior against the opposition due to its vast means of authority and use of force.

SAVAK was created in 1957 under the command of General Teymur Bakhtiyar, who served until his exile in 1961. Established under the prime ministry, its area of responsibility was to obtain information for the maintenance of national security, uncovering espionage, revealing people suspected of violating laws related to anti-monarchical activity, especially the 1931 law that declares advocating any 'collectivist' idea as treason. The SAVAK law also authorized its officials to act as a military magistrate regarding crimes under their jurisdiction.

Having assumed these responsibilities legally, Halliday writes that SAVAK went beyond limits of a secret police work in the execution of these tasks. SAVAK was the agent of censorship that also published books and magazines, ran government trade unions, acted as mediators between workers and factory owners, and mobilized support among workers for the regime. It also worked outside Iranian borders for intelligence gathering in other Middle Eastern states, cooperated with CIA and

function was to channel interest groups under the state control. Trade unions, bazaar guilds, civil service associations, employers' associations, rural cooperatives established under the land reform all came under the control of the *Iran Novin* party. See Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and the Revolution*, pp. 29 – 30.

⁷³ Although political trials were held before military courts between 1963 – 78, the army was not the most active repressive force in the country. Rather, it was the intelligence agencies enjoying the backing of army. Moreover, the Shah used different intelligence units to promote rivalry and mutual surveillance to prevent any force to become strong enough to act independently from himself. See Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 76.

MOSSAD. In the 1970s the “SAVAK brutality ... had become a byword for the systematic application of cruelty by a government agency.”⁷⁴ The report of Amnesty International on trial for political prisoners stated in 1972 that SAVAK resorted to exertion of confessions by torture, no juridical authority had competence to inquire into the treatment of SAVAK’s prisoners, civilian political defendants were being tried by military courts and by military lawyers appointed by the courts and their confessions after torture were being taken as evidence by the court. The same report pointed to an irony that Iran hosted international conference on human rights in 1968 during when Iran continued to violate the resolution on the rights of detained persons after its adoption, which it had already been violating under SAVAK law.⁷⁵ According to November 1976 Amnesty International Briefing on Iran, although the Shah and the deputy director of SAVAK stated that the number of total political prisoners in the country is around 3,000, foreign journalists and exiled groups estimated the number ranging from 25,000 to 100,000; and due to lack of detailed information about arrests and releases it was impossible to know the accurate situation. It was also reported

those imprisoned because of their opposition to the Shah’s policies included Muslim dissidents, members of ethnic minorities (Kurds, Baluchis, Azerbaijanis etc.), and the Marxists but the distinctions between these groups are often blurred, so that the Muslim dissidents, for example, may be motivated by their opposition to western capitalism, rather than by purely religious objections, and the Kurds may have leftwing views, as well as a desire for a degree of autonomy.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁷⁵ The resolution that was mentioned in the report was: “Recalling ... that ... the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides ... that anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be entitled to trial within reasonable time to release, considering that nevertheless infringements of these rights continue to occur, recommends the member states that they review their laws and practices relating to the detention of persons and take all possible steps to insure that persons are not detained in prison for a prolonged periods without charge and that the detention of persons awaiting trial is not duly prolonged.” Amnesty International, *Iran Trial Procedures for Political Prisoners*, August 1972.

⁷⁶ Amnesty International Briefing, *Iran*, November 1976, p.6.

The report also pointed to a contradiction between the alleged crimes of prisoners by the Shah and their actual actions. Accordingly, the Shah claimed that all the political prisoners were terrorists, which the Shah himself narrated the situation as “unholy alliance of red and black,”⁷⁷ but there was no evidence that the imprisoned theologians, writers, theatre directors, actors and university teachers had participated the armed terrorist activity that had been going on in the country by urban guerilla groups. Thus, the report concluded, the alleged crime of violent political activity to these people was not certain. Although some changes in the certain articles of military penal code were made on August 10, 1977 in line with the Amnesty’s criticism on arrest, pre-trial detention, preliminary investigation, preparation of the defense case, trial, and appeal procedures, the report by Brian Wrobel who observed a trial on 1977 on behalf of the Amnesty International and with the approval of the Shah stated that the changes in the code did not effect the procedure of conduct.⁷⁸

Despite the effective use of mechanisms for control and abuse of the constitutional system, the authoritarian rule of Mohammad Reza Shah faced with both peaceful and armed opposition since 1960s until 1977. However, this opposition did not become a coordinated movement and mobilized as a significant mass movement until 1977. Thus, the Pahlavi state survived from anti-government opposition in the years of White Revolution until 1977. The survival of the regime was not dependent only on powerful mechanism of control and repression, but also the regime’s moves that bestowed the state a high capacity of cooptation. The two factors that enabled state

⁷⁷ He devoted a chapter to this conceptualization in his book where his term ‘black’ denoted the clergy and the religious fanatics, and ‘red’ denoted to Tudeh party and communist elements. See Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, pp. 145 – 174.

⁷⁸ Amnesty International, *Human Rights in Iran: Testimony on Behalf of Amnesty International by Brian Wrobel*, 28 February 1978. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi writes in his ‘Answer to History’ that when the first signs of organized opposition to his rule came toward the end of 1976 from liberals, left-wingers, and people of wealth and power inside Iran, he had already allowed the International Red Cross, the International Association of Jurists, and Amnesty International to review Iranian criminal justice system, and asked their comments, criticisms, and suggestions. Despite the reports by these organizations stated that their investigation was conducted under surveillance and information was not provided on many issues, Mohammad Reza Shah accused media with paying more attention to the abuses than the changes he made as a result of these missions. See Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, p. 149.

cooptation were granting privileges and recruitment to new elite groups, and economic growth that improved living conditions and decreased resentment in all social strata.

Fred Halliday described Pahlavi state in 1979, just on the eve of 1979 Revolution, as a developing capitalist dictatorship. This definition implied that Iran was a state that guaranteed the condition for reproduction and expansion of capitalist ownership and production but without being directly responsive of the influences of the Iranian bourgeoisie. It was a developing capitalism in which state promoted the growth of capitalist social relations and the expansion of productive forces along capitalist lines. The developing capitalist Iranian state was a dictatorship in that no independent political activity was allowed; individuals or organizations critical of the regime were suppressed by SAVAK; there was no freedom of press and any publication; all trade unions were government-run which operated to mobilize support for the regime; the religious leaders were under government surveillance.⁷⁹ In this picture, it was the benefits of a developing capitalist system that enabled the Shah to effectively coopt elites, mainly aristocracy and upper-middle classes, and the newly burgeoning bourgeoisie, and created reluctance within these groups for an active participation to the opposition if not to mobilize support for his rule.

After the 1953 coup, Mohammad Reza Shah suppressed the National Front and Tudeh under the martial law with excessive security measures as well as arrests. By purging these two groups from the political space, the Shah excluded the modern middle class and the industrial working class from political participation. Until 1963, the traditional wealthy class and the army were the two power bases of the Shah's rule. However, with the reform programme he called 'White Revolution', he not only increased pace of capitalist development but also level of elite integration. After the appointment of Hassan 'Ali Mansur as prime minister in 1964, the Shah broadened his elite base by coopting the former members of opposition through providing them

⁷⁹ Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, pp. 38 – 50.

rewards and bringing young educated professionals to important government positions. Marvin Zonis, who named this dynamic as “recruitment by cooptation,” writes that “all elites and those who because of unusual popularity, charisma, wealth, skills, or knowledge are considered potential elites or counterelites are co-copted into elite membership by being offered prestigious offices or other rewards.”⁸⁰ Thus, the Shah was able to control the size and composition of the politically influential, to uncover talent and hinder the formation of counterelites, and to restrain the formation of counterelites through outright pensions, facilities and conveniences.⁸¹ Besides controlling the elite and formation of counterelite, James Bill states that the Shah’s concerted effort to include them selectively into the political elite was stemmed from his need for the professional intelligentsia to guide and implement his reform programme. He also argues that the U.S. factor was also in play in elite cooptation since because the educated, reform-minded professionals were also favored by the U.S. for they could provide capitalist development and modernization so that Iran could remain as a powerful regional state under the stable rule of the Shah supported financially and militarily by the U.S.⁸²

The creation of *Iran Novin* party in 1964 served the purpose of elite cooptation thoroughly. The party’s nucleus was the Progressive Club, a circle of young technocrats and intellectuals, including Amir Abbas Hoveyda and Hassan ‘Ali Mansur. The party became a channel through which educated professionals participated in the system and interest groups were united under the state protection. The party extended its base to all employers’ associations, rural cooperatives, labour unions, traditional bazaar guilds, civil servants and professionals under the party organization, all of whom functioned as members of the party. With such extensive

⁸⁰ Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, (USA: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 23.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 23 – 24.

⁸² James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 164.

social control, the party ended the conflict over the control of the parliament either.⁸³ The Shah, however, handpicked the high-ranking politicians. He also controlled recruitment to the security apparatus according to the members “complete loyalty to the person of the Shah and subservience to his system of rule.”⁸⁴ The cooptation of middle class professionals not only provided the system the expertise necessary to implement the Shah’s reforms, but it also served two other purposes. These were the purposes of demonstrating the outsiders that political participation was widening, and dividing the modern middle class so that its power of opposition would be seriously curbed.⁸⁵

The serious opposition to modernizing reforms of 1963 by religious, liberal, and communist groups did not turn into a significant nationalist challenge to the state. Effective state cooptation and coercive power of the state prevented the opposition to realize the coordination and mobilization functions of nationalist ideology and emergence of a nationalist opposition movement was curbed. Richard Cottam categorized the society who was coopted by the Pahlavi regime into three. Accordingly, there were enthusiasts, accommodators, and acquiescers. Enthusiasts were those who had found opportunities in the new system of the Shah and had vested interest in the continuation of the system in order not to lose them. These were mainly the officers in security forces, those who acquired enormous wealth, and

⁸³ Hossein Bashiriye, *The State and the Revolution*, p. 32. Bashiriye provides a comparison of social backgrounds of parliament members between the first Majles convened after 1953 coup under the parties of *Melliyun* and *Mardom* and the last Majles convened under the *Iran Novin* party. Accordingly, of the deputies of the twenty-first Majles, 95 were civil servants, 32 professionals, 24 cultivators, 9 workers, 8 traders, 7 landlords, 11 employees of the private sector, and 4 members of bazar guilds. In the last Majles under *Iran Novin*, 121 deputies were engineers, judges, lawyers and journalists, 46 were civil servants, 23 were farmers, 22 were industrialists and businessmen, 21 were teachers and 15 were workers. On the basis of this information, the change in the social background deputies from more traditional classes to modern middle class and professionals was demonstrating the party’s fulfilled function to be a channel for cooptation of the modern middle class and their much-needed participation into the system during the period of Shah’s modernization and reform after 1963.

⁸⁴ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 164.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 167. On political participation and repression in Pahlavi state also see Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution*, pp. 67 – 70.

those who benefited from land reform and acquired land as a source of prosperity. The accommodators were those who benefitted from the system but also did not feel security in it. These were mainly professionals and technocrats who might desire a pro-Mosaddeqist government but accommodated in the Shah's system due to high salaries and loose of hope for change, sons and daughters of conservative elite who felt threatened by vanishing influence of their families, skilled workers who desired free trade unions but also satisfied with high salaries, bazaar merchants who prospered under the developing economy but were also anxious of their loosing influence, clerics who benefited from subsidies but also discontented with being influential in government policy. The third group, acquiescers, were those who less benefited from the capitalist development process but aspired to participate in the system to increase their chances. This group included the lower middle class, small merchants and white-collar workers, unskilled laborers, the dispossessed in the urban areas, and those peasants who had not profited much from the land reform.⁸⁶

As evident in the above categorization, much of the society was coopted by good salaries and better economic conditions. Thus, the growth in the economy, which led by Halliday to describe Iran as 'developing capitalist state', was the second factor in effective state cooptation. Oil revenues, which were collective economic rent paid directly to the state, were the major source of economic growth and it enabled the government to enlarge public expenditure with very low levels of taxation. Katouzian states that oil revenues making up at least 10 per cent of the total national revenue denote a level high enough to afford the state economic and political autonomy from the productive forces and social classes. In the case of Iran, the share of oil revenues in total government revenues increased from 45 percent in 1963 to 56 per cent in 1971 and 77 percent in 1977.⁸⁷ Katouzian writes,

⁸⁶ Richard W. Cottam, "The Iranian Revolution" in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, (USA: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 79 – 80.

⁸⁷ Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 245; Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and the Revolution*, p. 36. Also, on the emergence of Iran as an oil power between 1953 until 1975 see Amin Saikal, *Rise and Fall of the Shah: Iran from Autocracy to Religious Rule*, (USA: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 97 – 131.

For society at large, these revenues become an invisible (almost mysterious) source of growing 'welfare' through the state, until they begin to appreciate its hidden mechanism. ... However, given the technical and sociological features of oil revenues, they also afford the state a great deal of flexibility in its disbursements. ... To the extent that the oil revenues make the state independent of the domestic means of production and social classes, the latter become dependent on the state for employment, direct hand-outs and privileges, borrowed capital for investment, booming domestic markets for high profits in production, trade and speculation, as well as welfare schemes ranging from education and health to food subsidies. ... The expanding military – bureaucratic complex, the professional and other educated groups and even the business class together make up the *clientele of the state*.⁸⁸

Thus, the increasing oil revenues of Iran since 1960s⁸⁹ and the welfare schemes implemented by the state enabled state cooptation over various classes of Iranian society. The main organization that served to deliver pensions, managed funds for imperial projects, provided grants for clients and controlled key economic sectors such as agriculture, housing, manufacture, insurance, banking, tourism, automobiles, textiles, housing and construction, publication, food-processing, mining, metal works was the Pahlavi Foundation.⁹⁰ Created in 1958 as a charity exempt from tax with the oil money that had started to accrue again after the conclusion of oil consortium agreement, the Pahlavi Foundation had 3 billion dollars worth at the end of 1970s. The Foundation controlled almost all key economic sectors through its share in 207 companies and had also shares in international corporations such as Krupp and General Electric. The Pahlavi Foundation was also a source of funds for the royal family, *i.e.* the Shah and sixty-four family members whose fixed assets were incorporated into the foundation assets in return for lucrative commission. The Pahlavi Foundation was a giant organization in the hands of the Shah that he exerted

⁸⁸ Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 245 – 246.

⁸⁹ According to Bank Markazi Iran (Central Bank of Iran) sources quoted by Katouzian, the rise in Iranian oil revenues were illustrated as such: for the years 1962 – 3 the revenues were 40.0 million rials, for 1967 – 8 were 92.4 million rials, for 1972 – 3 were 1333.3 million rials, and for 1977 – 8 were 1284.9 million rials. See Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 262.

⁹⁰ John Foran, *Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution*, (USA: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 312 – 313.

control over the economic system and coopted population with the rewards given through the foundation.⁹¹

The modernizer Pahlavi state was able to survive until 1979 by resorting repression and cooptation, which was also facilitated by its alignment with the U.S. However, in the face of simultaneous implementation of reform and repression for centralization of power and the Shah's failure to expand political participation, Huntington's logical result of such situation,⁹² *i.e.* revolution, occurred in February 1979.

5.3. Coordination of Revolutionary Opposition

The revolutionary movement of 1977 – 79 had one leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Different parties and organizations from different political views united around nationalist cause under the leadership of Khomeini against the Shah. These organizations were mainly adhering to three different political ideologies, the communists, the Mosaddeqists, the Islamists. The communist political groups were the Tudeh (Masses) Party and the two major guerilla organizations, the Guerilla Organization of Peoples' Devotees (*Sazeman-e Cherikha-ye Fada'iyān-e Khalq*) and the Organization of People's Strugglers (*Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq*). The Mosaddeqists were the Iranian National Front (*Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*) and the Freedom Movement of Iran (*Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran*). The religious groups were the Islamic Coalition of Mourning Groups (*Hay'atha-ye Mo'talefeh-ye Islami*) and the Association of Combatant Clergy (*Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyat -e Mobarez*).

⁹¹ Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 127. For a list of assets of the Pahlavi Foundation by December 1977 see Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, (USA& Canada: Routledge, 2011), pp. 214 – 217.

⁹² Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (USA: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 190 – 191.

5.3.1. Communist Political Groups

5.3.1.1. The Tudeh Party

The Tudeh Party was active since the 1930s as the major Marxist organization in Iran. The party had been very active at the time of National Front Movement and it was in opposition with both the Shah and the National Front. It had advocated a Marxist system of government and pro-Soviet policy. Thus, with the restoration of Pahlavi rule after 1953 coup, the Tudeh Party was one of the two most harshly crushed organizations together with the National Front. The suppression of Tudeh was carried on under the 1931 anti-collectivism law and the party went underground due to police operations. With the establishment of SAVAK, operations against the underground cells of Tudeh party were conducted to eliminate all remnants and aspirants.⁹³ Despite repression by security forces, anti-Tudeh campaign by the government accusing the party as being a Soviet spy network, social mobilization and cooptation by the state through modernization, reform, education and distribution of benefits, and internal splits within the party⁹⁴, the Tudeh managed to survive in the early 1970s.

On January 4, 1979, the Tudeh party, whose headquarters were in Leipzig, Germany, replaced its secretary general Iraj Eskandari with a son of a cleric, Nur al-Din Kiyanuri. This marked the change in party's policy and Tudeh declared full support to the nationalist opposition movement in January 1979. Kiyanuri began a campaign

⁹³ For a detailed analysis of Tudeh Party's history, class bases and ethnic bases see Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 281 – 415.

⁹⁴ Abrahamian gives detailed information on the most influential parties spitted from Tudeh. Accordingly, in 1964 the Kurdish intellectuals left the party and formed Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran. Then in 1965 two senior members of Tudeh's central committee, Qassemi and Foroutan, left the party and formed Tofan Marxist-Leninist Organization (*Sazeman-e Marksist-Leninist-e Tofan*). In 1966, Tudeh youth section members left the party and formed Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party Abroad (*Sazeman-e Inqilabi-e Hizb-e Tudeh dar Kharej*). Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 453 – 454. Also for all the communist groups after 1953 until 1982 see Torab Haghshenas, "Communism iii. In Persia after 1953", *Encyclopedia Iranica*, originally published in 15 December 1992, last updated in 27 October 2011, available at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/communism-iii>, accessed on 15 August 2015.

in support for Khomeini and declared cooperation with the National Front. Tudeh under Kiyanuri declared the opposition movement as “democratic, anti-imperialist, and revolutionary”, and the Shi’i Islam represented by Khomeini as “anti-imperialist, democratic, and tied to the people.” Thus, the Tudeh Party played a minor role on the eve of the revolution in coordination of the opposition movement.

According to Tudeh under the leadership of Kiyanuri, all opposition groups should become united under the opposition led by Khomeini who pursued the goals common to all opposition groups: “(1) the overthrow of the Shah; (2) elimination of “Western” imperialist rule in Iran and true national independence; (3) “far-reaching democratic rights for the people”; and (4) greatly improved living conditions for “all working people”.⁹⁵ The party coordinated its activities during 1979 through its clandestine organization, *Ettihad-e Demokratik-e Mardom-e Iran* (Democratic Unity of Iranian People), and the clandestine publication, *Navid* (Harbinger) in Tehran, and *Shu‘leh-ye Jenoub* (Southern Flame) in Khuzistan.

As to the anti-government activities of the party, by the early 1970s, it had managed to organize together with other opposition groups the protests of 16 Azer every year in commemorating the national student day in honor of the three students killed in Tehran University in the protests against the visit of Vice-President Nixon on December 7, 1953. By 1977, the appeal for Tudeh was still higher than the other communist parties and organizations that had split from Tudeh. After the 1979 revolution, most of the exiled Tudeh leaders returned to Iran and the imprisoned Tudeh members were released. The party also gave support to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and cooperated with the new state in all political and security issues.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Kiyanuri in an interview with *Horizont*, No 14/1979 – DR, 10 April quoted in David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, (USA: Homes & Meier Publishers, 1990), p. 75.

⁹⁶ Torab Haghshenas, “Communism iii. In Persia after 1953”; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 457.

5.3.1.2. The Guerilla Organization of Peoples' Devotees (*Sazeman-e Cherikha-ye Fada'iyān-e Khalq*)

The Guerilla Organization of Peoples' Devotees, commonly known as *Fada'iyān*, was formed in mid-1960s after the brutal repression of opposition in 1962 – 63. It was one of the most effective guerilla groups that participated in the 1977 – 79 opposition movement.⁹⁷ According to Abrahamian, the factors that led especially the younger members of the opposition to pursue armed struggle were “the ability of the armed forces to crush the Muharram demonstrations of that year, the efficiency of SAVAK in rooting out the underground parties, and the reluctance of the main opposition organizations – especially the Tudeh and the National Front – to give up nonviolent means of resistance.”⁹⁸ Searching for new methods to confront the authoritarian regime, circles of university students began to study guerilla warfare in other non-Western lands, such as China, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Palestine and they translated works of Mao, Che Guevera, Giap, and Fanon. There were two currents inside *Fada'iyān*; one led by Bijan Jazani who advocated for political organization, the other by Masoud Ahmadzadeh and Amir Parviz Pouyan who advocated got

⁹⁷ All the guerilla organizations classified in terms of their political background by Abrahamian were: 1. *The Sazeman-e Cherikha-ye Fada'iyān-e Khalq-e Iran* (The Organization of the Iranian People's Guerilla Freedom Fighters), known in short as the Marxist Fada'i; 2. *the Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran* (The Organization of the Iranian Peoples' Freedom Fighters), generally known as the Islamic Mujahedin; 3. the Marxist offshoot from the Mujahedin, known simply as the Marxist Mujahedin; 4. small Islamic groups on the whole limited to one locality: *Gorueh-e Abu Zarr* (Abu Zarr Group) in Nahavand, *Gorueh-e Shi'iyān-e Rastin* (True Shi'i Group) in Hamadan, *Gorueh-e Allah Akbar* (Allah Akbar Group) in Isfahan, and *Gorueh-e al-Fajr* (al-Fajr Group) in Zahedan; 5. small Marxist groups. These included both independent groups, such as the *Sazeman-e Azadibakhsh-e Khalqha-ye Iran* (Organization for the Liberation of the Iranian Peoples), *Gorueh-e Luristan* (Luristan Group), and *Sazeman-e Arman-e Khalq* (Organization for the People's Ideal); and cells belonging to political parties advocating armed struggle – the *Tofan* group, the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, and a New Left organization named *Gorueh-e Ittehad-e Komunistha* (Group of United Communists). Moreover, some of the *Fada'is* had at the time of their death joined the Tudeh party. Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 481 – 482.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 482.

armed struggle. The brutality of government armed forces in 1963, however, persuaded them that the only way to fight was guerilla warfare.⁹⁹

Siahkal incident in 1971 was the first armed operation of *Fada'iyan*. The organization had sent thirteen of its members to mountains of Gilan in northern Iran to establish a base and links with peasants of the region. Upon the arrest of two sympathizers by the gendarmerie, the guerillas attacked the gendarmerie in Siahkal on February 8, 1971 to rescue them. Although they could not find the two arrestees, they killed three gendarmeries, took weapons and ammunition, and went back to the mountains. The Siahkal incident was the beginning of an era of guerilla warfare inside Iran that continued until the 1979 revolution.¹⁰⁰

In terms of ideology, *Fada'iyan* described itself as a Marxist-atheist organization. Its goals were establishment of “a form of direct democracy of elected councils in factories, government offices, military camps, etc; the creation of a popular militia; the nationalization of all means of production; freedom for all religious and philosophical ideologies; and equal rights for all citizens.”¹⁰¹ A pamphlet written by Parviz Pouyan explains the rationale behind the formation and activities of the *Fada'iyan* as such:

⁹⁹ “Armed Struggle”, *Mujahed*, 2 (November 1974), 5-6 quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 482; Misagh Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*, (USA: Rutgers University Press, 1989), p. 180.

¹⁰⁰ “In the period between the Siahkal incident and October 1977, when the Islamic revolution began to unfold in the streets of Tehran, 341 guerillas and members of armed political groups lost their lives. Of these, 177 died in gun battles; 91 were executed, some without trial, others after secret military tribunals; 42 died under torture; 15 were arrested and never seen again; 7 committed suicide to avoid capture; and 9 were shot “trying to escape” – after the revolution their jailors admitted that they had been murdered in cold blood. Moreover, some 200 others suspected of being guerillas were sentenced to terms ranging fifteen years to life imprisonment.” in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 480.

¹⁰¹ *Ettela'at*, 21 January 1979; *Kayhan International*, 24 February, 19 March 1979 quoted in David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, p. 76.

The defeat of the anti-imperialist movement has enabled the reactionaries to establish a fascist state, destroy the opposition organizations, and coopt opportunistic elements. ... Terror, repression, and absence of democracy have made it impossible for us to create working-class organizations. To break the spell of our weakness and to inspire the people into action we must resort to revolutionary armed struggle.¹⁰²

After the Siahkal incident, *Fada'iyān* carried out several political assassinations. They assassinated a wealthy industrialist, Fateh Yazdi and a SAVAK torturer, Nik-Tab, the chief military prosecutor who ordered the execution of guerillas involved in Siahkal incident, Farsiew, attacked police headquarters, bombed American establishments and the Iran-American Society. However, the organization faced with merciless crush by the Pahlavi police and SAVAK and its organizational capabilities were curbed. By 1976, many members of the organization were imprisoned or killed and almost all the original leadership was eliminated. Although *Fada'iyān* was the most able guerilla organization to operate by 1979, it could not reach cities other than Tehran, Tabriz, Abadan, Shiraz, and Caspian region.¹⁰³

Despite problems of organization, the release of *Fada'iyān* members from prison and permission for the members abroad to return to the country in the final weeks of the revolution by the Bakhtiyar government, helped the organization to find a ground for mobilization especially among students and workers. The demonstration they held at Tehran University on February 10, 1979 for the eighth anniversary of the Siahkal incident was participated by more than fifty thousand protestors and supported by

¹⁰² Amir Parviz Pouyan, *The Necessity of Armed Struggle and the Rejection of the Theory of Survival*, 1972, pp. 7 – 9 quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 485.

¹⁰³ Misagh Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*, pp. 182 – 183; Maziar Behrooz, “The Iranian Revolution and the Legacy of the Guerilla Movement” in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*, (Great Britain: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 189 – 205. According to the information provided by Abrahamian, SAVAK infiltrated into the group four years after its formation and arrested fourteen members, including Bijan Jazani and Abbas Sorouki, who were kept in prison until April 1975 and were shot when they –reportedly- tried to escape. Ali Akbar Safa'i Farahani and Mohammad Ashtiyani escaped to Lebanon and spent two years with al-Fatah before they returned to Iran to join Hamid Ashraf who survived in Iran until he was killed by government forces in 1976. Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 483.

several statements from the factory workers, the Air Force Cadets, communication employees, physicians, university students, faculty members, etc.¹⁰⁴

5.3.1.3. The Organization of People's Strugglers (*Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq*)

The Organization of Peoples' Strugglers, commonly known as *Mujahedin-e Khalq*, was established in 1965 as a Marxist-Islamist guerilla organization by Mohammad Hanif Nejad, Sa'id Mohsen, Mohammad Asgharizadeh, Rasoul Moshkinfam, 'Ali Asghar Badi'zadegan, and Ahmad Reza'i. It declared its existence after the Siahkal incident by *Fada'iyān*, and started guerilla war against the Pahlavi state. The first *Mujahedin-e Khalq* operation was bombing Tehran electrical works and hijacking an Iran Air plane in August 1971 with the aim to disrupt the commemorations of 2500-year anniversary of monarchy. In the next four years, the organization robbed six banks, assassinated a U.S. military advisor and Tehran police chief, bombed Reza Shah's mausoleum, offices of Shell, British Petroleum, British Overseas Airways, and El Al Airlines. By 1975, fifty members of the organization had been killed by the security forces.¹⁰⁵

Mujahedin-e Khalq's ideology was a fusion of a reinterpretation of traditional Islam and modern political thought. Reza'i's book, *Nehzat-e Hosseini* (Hossein's Movement) argued that the monotheistic order (*nezam-e towhid*) that had been sought by the Prophet was a classless society based on common good and the Imams, especially Hossein, revolted against those who betrayed the true cause of monotheistic society through exploitation and oppression. Thus, he argued, all Muslims should continue this struggle "to create a classless society and destroy all forms of oppression, which, in the modern age, included imperialism, capitalism,

¹⁰⁴ *Ayandegan*, 11 February 1979 referred in Misagh Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*, p. 184.

¹⁰⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 491.

despotism and conservative clericalism.”¹⁰⁶ Although *Mujahedin* had formulated its ideology before Ali Shari‘ati started his lectures in *Hosseiniyeh-i Ershad* in 1967, the intellectual ground of the *Mujahedin-e Khalq*, which was so close to Shari‘ati’s ideology, nourished and developed with Shari‘ati.¹⁰⁷

The *Mujahedin-e Khalq* had a major split by May 1975 when some of its members regarded Islam as ideology of the middle class that could not lead to the salvation of the working class. They declared the formation of *Mujahedin-e Khalq Marxist-Leninist Organization*. Both organizations continued armed struggle against the Pahlavi state until 1977, the year when the *Marxist-Leninist Mujahedin* rejected armed struggle and opted for political activity. Due to heavy losses in the face of state repression exerted by the security forces, the *Islamist Mujahedin* also intensified its propaganda activities in universities, and worked for disseminating Shari‘ati’s ideas after 1976.¹⁰⁸

To make a general assessment of the role of guerilla organizations in the coordination and mobilization of the nationalist opposition movement of 1977 – 79, they were not leading the opposition and they fell short of mobilizing large masses.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ ‘Ali Shari‘ati was the eminent ideologue of the 1979 revolution who had bestowed the revolutionary movement its Islamist ideology and enabled ideological mobilization of masses. Having a doctorate in sociology from Sorbonne University, he collaborated with Algerian FLN, read works of Frantz Fanon and translated them into Persian, followed the course of Louis Massignon and Jacques Berque, became a founder of Freedom Movement of Iran Abroad while he was in Paris from 1960 to 1965. In 1967 he started his lectures in *Hosseiniyeh-ye Ershad* in Tehran and continued five years. His lectures became so popular that they were widely circulated with pamphlets and cassette tapes. He was arrested in 1972 with the charge of propagating Islamic Marxism and remained in prison until 1975. He advocated for a formation of just, dynamic and classless society through a revolution that would be carried on by intellectuals marching on the line of the Prophet who tried to establish a monotheistic order and a unitary society (*nezam-e towhid*). This could be achieved by struggle against corrupt rulers for justice, equality, and public good just like the example of the struggle of the Imams against the corrupt caliphs. See Ervand Abrahamian, “Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution”, *MERIP Reports*, Vol. 12, January/February 1982; Ali Rahnama, *An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari‘ati*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988).

¹⁰⁸ Maziar Behrooz, “The Iranian Revolution and the Legacy of the Guerilla Movement” in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran*, pp. 189 – 205.

However, as Behrooz argued, the activities of guerilla organizations after 1963 when the state security forces had crushed all opposition and people were not hopeful for a change, helped to overcome the despair and to show that the Shah's forces were not "as invincible as it claimed."¹⁰⁹

5.3.2. The Mosaddeqist Groups

5.3.2.1. The National Front (*Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran*)

Although most of the leaders and members of the National Front had been arrested after the coup d'état of 28 Mordad (19 August) 1953, they were released by the end of 1954, albeit deprived of political activity. In the late 1954, some members of the National Front revitalized the movement under the name of National Resistance Movement (*Nehzat-e Moqavemat-e Melli*). Old veterans as well as younger members, mainly Karim Sanjabi, Khalel Maleki, Hasebi, Zirakzadeh, Asghar Pasha, Dariush Forouhar and Shapoor Bakhtiyar, Mehdi Bazargan, Hojjat al-Islam Mahmud Taleqani, remained active within the opposition in the following years.

The National Resistance Movement was important for its composition of religiously minded and secular-minded leadership. They developed the concept of '*Islam-e Novin*' (new Islam), which was "an attempt to reconcile Islamic values and doctrines with modern scientific achievements and rational thought in order to solve the problems of contemporary Iranian society."¹¹⁰ Accordingly, it was the implication of true Islam that would help the society to be healthy and to fight against the foreign domination. The National Resistance Movement was dissolved after the arrest of its leaders in 1957.

¹⁰⁹ Maziar Behrooz, "The Iranian Revolution and the Legacy of the Guerilla Movement" in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran*, p. 202.

¹¹⁰ Sussan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement*, (USA: Westview Press, 1990), p. 89.

In July 1960, the National Front members were united again to form the Second National Front and to resume their political activities against the increasingly authoritarian Pahlavi state. Karim Sanjabi and Shapoor Bakhtiar from Iran Party, Allahyar Saleh and Mehdi Bazargan were the prominent leaders in the Second National Front. The objectives of the front were: “to restore the basic individual and social rights of the Iranian people guaranteed by 1906 Constitution; to establish a legal government through free public election; to adhere to an independent foreign policy which, although in accord with the United Nations Charter, would give priority to Iran’s national interests.”¹¹¹

The harsh suppression of 1963 uprisings led to the disintegration of the Second National Front, which was afflicted with organizational problems but more importantly with internal disputes. Like the National Front of Mosaddeq, the Second National Front was consisted of different groups, parties, and individuals, but was a more structured one with a central council, a plenum, an executive board and several committees. However, since its establishment, there were two factions competing inside the front. The first faction was led by Mohammad ‘Ali Khonji, who was the leader of Socialist Party that had split from Maleki’s Third Force. This faction was supported by the influential members of the central council, such as Salehi, Sanjabi, and Bakhtiar. Khonji’s perspective was to abolish all independent parties and organizations within the front and to form a single party (*hezb-e vahed*) for an effective counter with the single ruling apparatus, the state. The second faction, which was included younger generation members and the influential leaders of the then-dissolved National Resistance Movement, such as Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleqani, who had formed Liberation Movement in 1961 and Khalel Maleki, who was the leader of Socialist Society, favored to preserve the Second National Front as a coalition of parties and organizations. They disagreed with the political negotiation method of the Khonji faction and argued for the need of organizing popular support for the establishment of a ‘*melli*’ (national) government.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

According to Siavoshi, the main reason for this division was not ideological orientations but the disagreement on the degree of militancy against or conciliation towards the regime.¹¹² The fact that the Shah relied on the members of central council of the Second National Front to appease the irrepressible opposition by appointing Bakhtiar as prime minister in January 1979 was a clear indication of the long-existing division among the Mosaddeqist opposition.

The internal discrepancies combined with the state repression and the Second National Front was dissolved in 1963. The Liberation Movement of Bazargan and Taleqani, the Mellat Party of Dairush Forouhar, the Socialist Society of Khalel Maleki, and the Organization of University Students came together and established the Third National Front in 1964. However, this attempt was also short lived and the Third National Front components decided to carry its activities outside Iran as an alliance of autonomous organizations. They became active among the Iranian students in North America and France, and published two newspapers, – *Iran Azad* (Free Iran), and *Khabarnameh* (Newsletter), and established relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini, who was exiled in Iraq.¹¹³

5.3.2.2. The Freedom Movement of Iran (*Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran*)

The Freedom Movement of Iran was formed by twelve men, most prominent of them were engineer Mahdi Bazargan, cleric Ayatollah Taleqani, and Dr. Yadullah Sahabi on May 17, 1961 under the umbrella of National Front. The group's leadership included influential intellectuals and politicians, such as Yadullah Sahabi, Ezzatullah

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 100 – 103.

¹¹³ As a demonstration of the rationale behind the support of the National Front abroad to religious leadership, Abrahamian quotes from an article published in *Khabarnameh* titled as “The Lessons of 1963” as such: “The major lesson to be drawn from 1963 is that the *ulama* have a crucial role to play in our anti-imperialist struggle – just as they did in the tobacco crisis of 1891 – 1892, in the constitutional revolution of 1905 – 1911, and in the nationalist movement of 1950 – 1953.” “The Lessons of 1963,” *Khabarnameh*, 7 July 1962, pp. 1 – 2, quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 461.

Sahabi, Hassan Nazeh, Dr. Abbas Shaybani, Sadeq Tabataba‘i, Mansur Ata‘i, Rahim Ata‘i, Abbas Radnia, Ahmad ‘Alibaba‘i, and Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi. The Freedom Movement played the most important role both during the revolutionary mobilization of 1979 and in the formative years of the Islamic Republic.

The group’s ideology laid the foundations of a thought in Iran that is termed as “religious modernism,”¹¹⁴ which is an attempt to reconcile religion with modern thinking in a way to solve the problems related with changing social and cultural environment of a society in the face of modernity. Thus, religious modernism was a reactive movement of those religiously-committed individuals who were aware of scientific developments and societal change and who try to prove that “*true* religion is by no means opposed or irrelevant to the modern world.”¹¹⁵ In the non-Western world, religious modernism appears as an ideology that is affiliated with nationalism and fundamentalism so long as the foreign domination exists.¹¹⁶ In the Iranian case, Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, Mehdi Bazargan, and ‘Ali Shari’ati were the main ideologues of religious modernism, which was also characteristically Shi’ite modernism.

¹¹⁴ Religious modernism was defined by Chehabi as such: “an attempt to reestablish harmony between religion and a changing cultural sociopolitical environment in which the forces of change regard religion as dysfunctional in the process of development.” Houchang E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement*, (USA: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1990), p. 26. Hamid Dabashi conceptualizes this modern religious thought as “Islamic ideology.” He argues that Islamic ideology was born out of the unwanted marriage of Islam and the West. In a period of Western cultural hegemony when the world was changing, the kings and the clerics became outmoded, whereas the secular radicals began to hold the monopoly of political truth against the outmoded kings. According to Dabashi, the clergy invented Islamic ideology to compete with the monopoly of the secular radicals’ vision that had turned the clergy to be outmoded. In doing this, the clergy adopted the language of secular radicals that changed not only Islam but also generated an illusion of speaking a more global concern and enabled them to reach an ‘Islamic’ consensus against ‘The West.’ Dabashi further argues that having reaching a moral high ground against the monarchical state which it targeted as the epitome of corrupt and ‘Westernized’ despotism, the ‘Islamic ideology’ assumed a reality *sui generis*. Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (USA: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 499 – 503.

¹¹⁵ Houchang E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, p. 26.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

As a political movement, religious modernism found its appeal with the formation of Freedom Movement of Iran. In the inauguration meeting of the Freedom Movement, Bazargan, who gave the first speech, defined the movement as “Muslim, Nationalist, constitutionalist, and Mosaddeqist,” and set the aims of the movement as to struggle against despotism (*estabdad*) and corruption.¹¹⁷ Although the movement applied for the National Front membership after the first meeting, the discrepancy between the religious emphasis of the Freedom Movement and the secular leadership of the Second National Front council was always a source of controversy.

The Freedom Movement of Iran held regular meetings, issued internal publications, digests, and translations, wrote an open letter to Mohammad Reza Shah in July 1962 introducing the movement and criticizing current situation in the country. It was banned after 1963 uprising; its leaders were arrested and were kept in prison for many years. The Freedom Movement could not exist as a political party until 1977. Due to the severe repression inside the country after 1963, the movement could not continue its activities inside Iran but members of the movement outside Iran pursued the goals of Freedom Movement mainly in the U.S. and France. In the U.S., members of former National Resistance Movement and Organization of Students of National Front who left for the U.S. and France to continue higher education formed the Freedom Movement of Iran Abroad. While Ebrahim Yazdi, Mostafa Chamran, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, Mohammad Nahshab and Abbas Amir Entezam were active in the U.S, Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr and ‘Ali Shari‘ati were active in France.¹¹⁸

The members of the Freedom Movement of Iran Abroad played very important roles both during and after the 1979 Revolution. Coming from different backgrounds and

¹¹⁷ For the explanations and implications of the terms ‘Muslim, Nationalist, constitutionalist, and Mosaddeqist’ see Bazargan’s speech quoted in Houchang E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism*, p. 158.

¹¹⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 463 – 464.

advocating different methods for realization of revolutionary cause, the opposition abroad coordinated activities for the revolution. Ebrahim Yazdi was a leader of Society of Islamic Students in Tehran University and supported Mosaddeq at the time of 1953 coup d'état. He was active in National Resistance Movement before he went to the U.S. in 1960. He was one of the leaders of Freedom Movement Abroad in the U.S. and a supporter of armed resistance against the Shah. He went to Egypt to receive education on guerilla warfare in 1964 and spent two years in Egypt. He then went to Lebanon with Mostafa Chamran. After the Islamic Revolution, he served as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in Bazargan government.

Mostafa Chamran was one of the members of Society of Islamic Students in Iran and he became a student member of National Resistance Movement in 1954. He then left for California where he established Society of Islamic Students. He left the U.S. in 1964 and spent two years in Egypt and Lebanon to receive guerilla education. He worked with the leader of Lebanese Shi'is Musa Sadr and cooperated with Lebanese Shi'i militia organization, Amal. He turned back Iran after the 1979 Revolution and became Defense Minister in the interim government. When the war with Iraq began, he left to the front with a group of guerillas he educated and became martyr while in fighting a few months later.

Sadeq Qotbzadeh was a supporter of National Front who became a member of National Resistance Movement after the 1953 coup. He left for the U.S. in 1959 to pursue his studies. He was one of the seventeen students who protested the Shah in September 1960 in front of the UN building in New York at the time of foundation of the Second National Front in Iran. He became a member of the Central Council of National Front in the U.S. Upon the Iranian government's refusal to extend his student permit in the U.S., he left America to Europe in 1962 and then to Lebanon, Algeria and Syria. He also received guerilla education in Egypt. Together with Chamran and Yazdi, he established close relations with Musa Sadr in Lebanon. In 1963 he met with Ayatollah Khomeini in Iraq. In late 1960s he went Canada for education and then settled in Paris. Although he was known as a senior member of

Freedom Movement in the U.S., he was more active in establishing contact with the Muslim Students Association and the Arab radicals in the Middle East. His major controversy with the Liberation Movement was his solid belief in armed struggle. Bazargan and Talaghani, however, were not supportive of armed struggle and more prone to political resistance within the framework of constitution. Thus, he left the Freedom Movement in 1978 and entered the entourage of Khomeini in Paris. Qotbzadeh came back to Iran with Khomeini on February 1, 1979. He served as a member of Revolutionary Council, spokesperson of Khomeini and became the director of state radio and television (*Seda-o-Sima*) on 11 February. He also served as minister of foreign affairs for a short period of time. At the time of occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Iran he worked for the resolution of the crisis in the negotiations with Hamilton Jordan in Paris. He became candidate for the first presidential elections of the Islamic Republic in January 1980, and lost to Bani-Sadr. In April 1982 he was accused for the second time with planning assassination of Khomeini and involving a plan to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Although he denied accusations, he confessed the existence of a plan for toppling down the Islamic Republic and establishing a republic. In September 1982, he was executed by a firing squad.

Mohammad Nakhshab was a member of Iran Party in 1944 but he objected the party's unification with the Tudeh and left Iran Party. He first became a member of God-worshipper Socialists (*Sosyalistha-ye Khodaparasti*) and then he established Iranian People's Party (*Hezb-e Mardom-e Iran*). He was arrested and upon his release from prison he went to the U.S. There he became the representative of the Third National Front in the Iranian Students Confederation American Branch. He left the Confederation in mid-1960s and worked for the foundation of Society of Islamic Students. He also authored articles for the *Mujahed* newspaper, the publication organ of the Freedom Movement Abroad. He died in the U.S. on the eve of the 1979 Revolution.

Abbas Amir Entezam was the first member of the Freedom Movement. He left Iran for the U.S. with the help his wealthy family and he became active in Iranian Students Confederation and Islamic Students Association. He got permission of the Iranian government to come back to Iran in the beginning of 1970s, however he continued his close relations with Ebrahim Yazdi. After the 1979 Revolution he became the speaker of the government and deputy prime minister of Bazargan. He was arrested in December 1979 on the charge of espionage based on the documents retrieved from the U.S. Embassy takeover. The allegations against him have not been proven and he has still been in prison.

‘Ali Shari‘ati was the most famous member of the Freedom Movement. Known as the Iranian sociologist and the ideologue of the revolution, he began his political activities when he was a student in Mashhad. He then received government scholarship and went to France. He was a member of the National Front in France and the idea of formation of Freedom Movement Abroad under the umbrella of National Front was actually proposed by Shari‘ati. He participated activities in support of Algeria and cooperated with the Algerian Nationalist newspaper. In 1963 he became the editor of Persian-language newspaper, *Iran Azad* (Free Iran), in the congress of National Front in Germany. He was arrested on the border upon his return to Iran and prisoned for six months. In 1965, he started his lectures in *Hoseiniyeh-e Ershad* on Islamic studies, sociology, and history of Islam, and continued for six years. In these lectures, he defined a new interpretation of Islam, which was a combination of religion and radical revolutionarism. He advocated that Islamic religion carried out the most important revolution in the history of humanity; but the revolutionary nature of true Islam was forgotten in the hands of dominant classes who turned religion into a tool for despotism. He criticized both traditional *ulama* and all the –isms of the West, albeit praising Marxism among them as the most appropriate understanding of the condition of humanity. Thus, in his view, return to true Islam could only be possible by the efforts of enlightened intellectuals. These ideas appealed a large audience in *Hosseiniyeh-ye Ershad* not only within the educated middle class but also within the newly urbanized people. His ideas and their

appeal led to Shari‘ati’s arrest by SAVAK in 1973. *Hosseiniyeh-ye Ershad* was closed, and his books were banned. During his 18-month stay in prison, the government received intense international pressures from French intellectuals and Algerian leaders that played a significant role in his release. After two years under government surveillance, he was permitted to leave Iran for England where he died from heart attack upon his arrival to British soil on June 19, 1977.¹¹⁹

The Freedom Movement of Iran was able to resume its activities inside Iran after the inauguration of the Shah’s liberalization programme in early 1977. The movement contributed greatly to both ideological basis of the 1979 revolutionary opposition through the works of intellectuals such as Shari‘ati, Bazargan, and Taleqani, and to the mobilization of ntationalist opposition through its appeal within its social base, who were students both inside and outside Iran and the bazaar merchants, and through the relationship that the movement established with Khomeini in exile. However, it could not lead the revolutionary opposition after 1977 since the appeal of the clergy under the leadership of Khomeini was greater than the Freedom Movement among its social base. Nevertheless, after the 1979 Revolution, Bazargan established the provisional government as the first prime minister of the Islamic Republic, and many members of the Freedom Movement of Iran assumed government positions. Karim Sanjabi and Ibrahim Yazdi served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yadullah Sahabi became minister for revolutionary projects, Sadr Hajj-Seyyed Javadi became minister of interior, Abbas Amir-Entezam became the deputy prime minister for revolutionary affairs, Mostafa Chamran became minister of defense, Sadiq Qotbzadeh became the minister of National Iranian Radio and Television. Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr later became the first president of the Islamic Republic in February 1980.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran (History of Political Parties in Iran)*, (Shiraz: Entesharat-e Novid-e Shiraz, 1380 (2001/2002)), pp. 115 – 120.

¹²⁰ John Foran, *Fragile Resistance*, p. 372.

The prominent ideological contribution the Freedom Movement of Iran was the conception Iranian political identity that also became influential after 1979 Revolution. It was Bazargan's analysis of national identity (*hoviyat-e melli*) and religious identity (*hoviyat-e mazhabi*). According to Bazargan, national identity was an idea originated in the West and influenced Iran since the constitutional revolution. However, national identity as conceptualized in the West was not genuine to Iranian land. Although the notion of geographical national identity that was a legacy of Iranian epic story *Shahname* could be regarded definitive to the concept of 'Iran', this conception was also a product of eastern history that was different from the western history that reinforced the concept of 'nation.' Bazargan argued that the identity of Iranian nation is religious identity. The religious identity of Iran could have merged with national identity through a transition process, which had not completed in Iran yet. He added that even if one day this transition would be completed, religion would still preserve its social presence. Thus, Bazargan argued, Iran recognized itself first as Moslem and then Iranian.¹²¹

The discussion made by Bazargan was relevant to the question if there was a change in the conception of Iranian identity before and after the 1979 Revolution in the personal interviews conducted with scholars and researchers in Iran. Many of the interviewees answered this question that Iranian identity had two components: one was religious (*mazhabi*), the other was national (*melli*). This had been the case since the constitutional revolution in modern Iranian history. According to some researchers, the history of this dual conception of Iranian identity had gone even before, to the establishment of Shi'ism as a state religion by the Safavids as an indication of religious-Iranian identity vis-à-vis Arabs and Turks. Albeit the religious-national identity of Iran was constant, the Pahlavi monarchy emphasized the national component of this identity whereas the Islamic Republic put emphasis

¹²¹ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran*, pp. 107 – 109.

on the religious component.¹²² Thus, it is relevant to argue that Bazargan's ideas were disseminated through the Freedom Movement of Iran and received support from other revolutionary personalities are still valid for the self-conceptualization of Iranian identity under the Islamic Republic.

5.3.3. Clerical Opposition

5.3.3.1. The Islamic Coalition of Mourning Groups (*Hay'atha-ye Mo'talefeh-ye Islami*)

Commonly known as *Mo'talefeh*, the Islamic Coalition of Mourning Groups was formed in 1963, approximately two years after the death of Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi when the clergy was deprived of leadership and the environment became suitable for the religious groups to pursue political activities. The nucleus of *Hay'atha-ye Mo'talefeh* was the small religious mourning groups (*hay'atha-ye azadari*) formed around the mosques for the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hossein and other religious rituals. Initially three mourning groups, which were Shaykh 'Ali Mosque group, Amin-al- Dawla mosque group, and the Esfahanis group, separately established contact with Ayatollah Khomeini in October 1962 to express their support for his anti-government campaign and distribute his declarations and letters. Following the government security forces attack on Fayziyah seminary in March 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini introduced these groups into each other and organized the three mourning groups into a coalition around April 1963.

The members of *Mo'talefeh* declared their rationale for resuming political activity in the charter of the organization as such: "We, who are Moslem people believers of tradition of Islam, regard spiritual and material welfare as well as its physical and

¹²² Interviews with Akbari Babai, Vice Director of National Studies Institute, Tehran; Karim Sajjadpour, Scholar of Political Science, Homeira Moshirzadeh, Scholar of Political Science, Davood Hermidas-Bavand, Intellectual and Politician.

moral well-being of ours, women's, children's, our society's and nation's as contingent upon triumph of Islam, following Islamic injunctions and their application. There is only one way to ensure spiritual and material peace and welfare of humanity and this is the way of God.”¹²³ The four objectives of the coalition were determined as attainment of a better understanding of Islamic teachings in the private and social realm and the personal and social responsibilities of every Moslem individual, an improved exposition and presentation of Islamic teachings to others, greater application of these teachings in the practical realm, and choosing a clear and practical way for creating a model Islamic society.¹²⁴ The coalition regarded Khomeini as its only leader and accepted obedience to Khomeini as a *shari'a* duty.¹²⁵

Organizationally, Khomeini urged the coalition to be organized as ten-people circle, from which one person among the ten would establish another ten-people circle, and the organization would be spread through organizations of several circles. Upon the request of the coalition, Khomeini appointed four clerics, Motahhari, Beheshti, Mohi-al-Din Anwari and 'Abd-Allah Mawla'i, to form the clerical council of the coalition to give advice for matters required religious opinion and to act as representatives of Khomeini.

The coalition's major activities were to organize demonstrations, public speeches, and religious sermons on political matters, and to mobilize sympathizers in the form of mourning groups. Since the mourning groups had strong connections with bazaar merchants, the activities of coalition were supported by the bazaaris by providing funds and closing their shops as a sign of support to the protests. Bazaar merchants also provided funds for the activities of the coalition. The coalition also had an armed branch whose major act was the assassination of Prime Minister Hassan 'Ali

¹²³ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran*, pp. 161 – 162.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Vanessa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of New Iran*, (India: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003), p. 68.

Mansur on January 21, 1965. The coalition's main figures were arrested and imprisoned after Mansur's assassination, which rendered the coalition ineffective until the release of its leaders in 1977.

After the assassination of Mansur and arrest of its leaders, the coalition became almost ineffective. The members of the coalition began to cooperate with *Mujahedin-e Khalq* organization. Thus, on the eve of the revolution, the coalition was not an effective political force. However, it reorganized itself and appeared as an effective force for mobilization of people during the Ashura commemorations of December 10 – 11, 1978. It was during this demonstration that the slogan of “death to the shah” was orchestrated in the streets of Tehran for the first time.¹²⁶ Nozari states that there was no exact timing for the re-organization of the coalition before the revolution; however, it was clear that some of the initial members of *Mo'talefeh* such as Asgharowladi, Araqi, Badamchian, Shafiq, Eslami, and Derakhshan started to organize political activities without using the name of *Mo'talefeh* in their pamphlets with the slogan “Be established the just Islamic state (bargharar bad hokumat-e adl-e Islami)”.¹²⁷ According to Martin, the coalition and the bazaar's support were very important for Khomeini to establish “institutional links with the urban poor who looked for guidance of the clergy.”¹²⁸

5.3.3.2. The Association of Combatant Clergy (*Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez*)

The Association of Combatant Clergy, known as *Ruhaniyat*, was created by the clerical council of *Mo'talefeh* in 1977. The need for an institution for the

¹²⁶ Ali Rahnema, “Jami'yat-e Mo'talefe-ye Eslami ii. Jami'yat-e Mo'talefe and the Islamic Revolution”, June 23, 2008, *Encycloedia Iranica*, available <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/jamiyat-e-motalefa-ii>, accessed on 16 August 2015.

¹²⁷ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran*, p. 161.

¹²⁸ Vanessa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State*, p. 69.

organization of the clerics came to be seen vital after the defeat of the opposition in 1963 uprising. Although prominent clerics had begun to organize regular gatherings, such an organization was not established until 1977. The first circle of *Ruhaniyat* was formed upon the advice of Khomeini, who was in Iraq, and was organized by the efforts of his student, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari. The writings of Mohammad Hossein Beheshti, one of the most prominent members of *Ruhaniyat*, became important sources of coordination for the movement. Beheshti argued for the necessity of Islamic government in which the political authority would be exercised by people learned in religion and on whom the people would bestow authority. For Rajaei, Beheshti was “instrumental in legitimizing the new revolutionary position of the clergy among the people.”¹²⁹

The charter of the *Ruhaniyat* was prepared under the guidance of Khomeini just after its formation simultaneously with the revolutionary mobilization. Accordingly, the objectives of the *Ruhaniyat* were set as such: scholarly preservation of the Islamic revolution and its attainments, controlling political affairs of the country for the establishment of justice and rights, establishment of regular contacts with the domestic and foreign news and broadcasting centers, establishment of research centers for religion and culture, active and decisive encountering of domestic and foreign developments, supporting all organizations and institutions that serve for the Islamic Republic. To realize these objectives, eight chambers were established, which were chamber of political and social activities, Islamic propagation chamber, chamber of mosques, chamber of services, chamber of education, chamber of religion and culture, chamber of scholarly research, chamber of seminaries.

According to the charter, *Ruhaniyat*'s area of activity was the entire country. In December 1979, the provisions regarding the activities of the association were narrowed down upon the advice of Khomeini, who became the first religious leader

¹²⁹ Farhang Rajaei, *Islamism and Modernism: The Changing of Discourse in Iran*, (USA: University of Texas Press, 2007), p. 126.

of the Islamic Republic (*Rahbar-e Enqelab-e Islami*). Eventually, the initial charter of the association was changed and the name of the association became *Jame'yat-e Mobarez-e Ruhaniyat -e Tehran* due to limitations of the field of activity.

Ruhaniyat was one of the most active organizations in the mobilization of opposition movement. They organized sermons in the mosques and street protests. They also planned the slogans for the street protests. Upon its formation, *Ruhaniyat* played a very active role in coordinating and organizing the anti-government struggle during the revolutionary upheaval.¹³⁰

5.4. Mobilization of Revolutionary Opposition

The opposition political groups that had been active since the beginning of 1960s were not succeeded achieving their political demands which could be summarized under three points: end of the U.S. influence in Iran, political freedom, constitutional rule. Security forces harshly repressed opposition groups by arrests, death sentences, or exiles. The effective cooptation by the Pahlavi state's policies also had decreased appeal among the people for joining opposition activities. Thus, revolutionary mobilization of the nationalist opposition began in 1977 through a series of events. The leader of the mobilization was Ayatollah Khomeini, as the leader of the most effectively coordinated opposition force for the realization of the "Islamic revolution," the revolutionary clergy.

1977 marked the Shah's liberalization initiative and his decision to release political prisoners to end the accusations of human rights organizations that endless torture and illegal detention was implied in his country. In a way, he opened the safety valve as a precaution to counter the pressure inside and outside the country against his rule.

¹³⁰ "Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez", *Daneshnameh-ye Jahan-e Islam* (Encyclopedia of Islamic World), available at <http://rch.ac.ir/article/Details/10232>, accessed on 16 August 2015.

However, it became the starting of a series of events that eventually he was pushed away from his country that he ruled for almost thirty-eight years.

In 1976, Amir Abbas Hoveida had been the prime minister since almost thirteen years from January 1965 to August 1977. There was a single party in the political system, the *Rastakhiz* (Resurgence) Party, created in March 1965 to eliminate the opposition party in order to gather all the social forces under a single command immune from party politics.¹³¹ The Shah demanded the allegiance of political people with his verdict that stated “those who believe in the Iranian Constitution, the Monarchical regime, and the principles of the White Revolution, must join the new party. Those who do not believe in these principles are traitors who must either go to prison or leave the country.”¹³² The general atmosphere in the country was worsening economic situation and rising inflation, shortages of energy, restriction on all kinds of political activity as well as publication, growing resentment against Hoveida government due to corruption, and unrest among the state-coopted industrialists, shopkeepers, merchants, and general population who were badly affected by inflation.¹³³ These difficulties convinced the Shah to replace Hoveida with Jamshid Amuzegar, a U.S. trained technocrat who had served as Minister of Interior and Minister of Finance in Hoveida’s cabinet. Amuzegar’s presidency was marked by austerity program to slow down the pace of economic growth and to compensate loss due to decrease in oil prices. By 1978, “every major segment of the economy suffered from declining oil revenues and the austerity program of Amuzegar.”¹³⁴ Thus, the state’s cooptation capacity, which was dependent on the rewards and benefits given by the state to the population, was in serious decline.

¹³¹ Misagh Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*, p. 183.

¹³² Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, p. 124.

¹³³ Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution*, pp. 95 – 98.

¹³⁴ For the measures taken under the austerity program see Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution*, pp. 99 – 100.

In a society ruled by despotism and experiencing economic crisis, the most effective way to counter the unrest which would turn into opposition against the state was to loosen the grip of state on social freedoms. Thus, in 1977, Mohammad Reza Shah initiated the liberalization program. The international pressure also played a role in liberalization. Upon the insistence of human rights organizations reporting on the torture and abuse in Iran, for instance, the Shah made amendments in the code in December 1977 that enabled civilian lawyers to defend civilian political detainees who were tried by military courts. In June 1978, the Shah dismissed the head of SAVAK, Ne'matollah Nasiri, whose name was the symbol of SAVAK's torture since 1965. The government considered the letter of sixty-four lawyers from Bar Association and Iranian Association of Jurists issued in July 1977 within the framework of liberalization and promised to take steps to ensure independence of judiciary in July 1978. The press freedom was another issue in concern and a bill presented to the Majles in May 1978. However, it was short of ensuring press freedom and withdrawn due to severe criticisms. Amuzegar government also took initiatives to fight against the wide corruption among government officials. He issued decrees to forbade officials to make promises to the public, forbid the government agencies to issue false statistics to impress the government and the public, brought officials to trial in charge of corruption, ordered the officials to contact with the public as public servants not as their masters. The Shah also instructed the court members to refrain from business deals. The poor quality of education was short of public demands and the politicization of high school students was becoming the case. The independence of universities from government interference was also a demand raised by university professors.¹³⁵

The initiatives of the Amuzegar government under the liberation programme, however, were not adequate to meet the demands of Iranian people for a better life and exercise of social freedoms. Certain developments also augmented public anger towards the government. The first incident of revolutionary mobilization occurred

¹³⁵ David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, pp. 35 – 38.

after the news of death of Mostafa Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini's eldest son, in Iraq on October 23, 1977. Religious people, including the people from the organization of *Mo'talefeh*, organized mourning ceremonies in various cities, such as Tabriz, Yazd, Shiraz, Mashhad, and Ahwaz. It was reported that the slogan "Death to the shah" was chanted for the first time during these ceremonies in Tabriz and Shiraz.¹³⁶ The fortieth-day (*erbain*) ceremonies for the death of Mostafa Khomeini in Qom on 2 December 1977 witnessed the presentation of a fourteen-point resolution of demands from the state. These were: "return of Khomeini from exile, the release of political prisoners, the re-opening of religious and university institutions shut for their oppositional activity, the protection of freedom of speech, the banning of pornography, the right of women to wear *hejab*, attention to the plight of the poor, economic independence from international capitalists, the ending of relations with Israel, and the return of the Islamic calendar."¹³⁷

The second incident of revolutionary mobilization against the state that sparked a chain of protests in many cities started in Qom upon the publication of an article in *Ittla'at* newspaper insulting Ayatollah Khomeini on January 7, 1978. Alongside personal insults against Khomeini, the article titled "Iran and Red and Black Colonialism" portrayed Khomeini as an agent of colonialism who revolted against the state in cooperation with the feudal lords. On 9 January, large crowd of seminary students and clerics as well as bazaaris and ordinary people gathered in Qom. The protests continued two days and countered with government aggression. The police fired arms against people and five people were killed. This incident sparked larger protests in other cities especially among the university students. The fortieth-day ceremonies for the deaths of the Qom uprising witnessed bigger crowds in major cities of Iran, including Tabriz and Yazd. According to Madani, it was during these protests that the slogan "independence, freedom, Islamic Republic" became a

¹³⁶ Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*, p. 27.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 28 – 29.

popular motto.¹³⁸ The fortieth-day ceremonies became a chain of protest after every death caused by the armed intervention of government in the *erbains*. Bakhash argues that these groups of people laid the ground for these mass protests, which were “religious leaders with national standing, lesser clerics working at the local level, and non-clerical political activists and propagandists.”¹³⁹ Accordingly, national religious figures such as Ayatollah Shari‘atmadari, Golpayagani, Ruhani and Ha’eri-Yazdi gave their support to the mourning ceremonies and permitted the mosques under their supervision to be used for mourning gatherings. Although they did not issue any proclamation against the Shah, the lesser clerics who were students or supporters of Khomeini issued radical statements against the Shah and the regime. Ayatollah Mohammad Sadduqi in Yazd, Ayatollah Montazeri in Najafabad, Mohammad Mehdi Rabbani in Shahr-e Babak, ‘Ali Khameneh‘i in Iranshahr, and ‘Ali Tehrani in Saqqez were among those mentioned by Bakhash. These lesser clerics were supported by the non-clerical activists and propagandists, who were mostly newly urbanized population due to the 1970s economic boom. They were exposed to opposition political ideas through the state’s education system and mosques. Bakhash argues that the pamphleteering activities of these people contributed to the radicalization of the opposition movement.¹⁴⁰

The cycle of *erbains* came to an end on June 17, 1978 by the decision of three leading ayatollahs, Shari‘atmadari, Golpayagani, and Najafi-Mar‘ashi. The statement that they issued for the 17 June ceremony instructed the mourners not to leave their homes to prevent further casualties. This silent protest not only broke the chain of *erbaeen* protest cycles but also became another way of expressing dissent. After the silent protest, the religious groups showed up in the streets through the end of June

¹³⁸ Dr. Jalalad-dine Madani, *Islamic Revolution of Iran*, (Tehran: International Publishing Co., 1996), p. 345.

¹³⁹ Shaul Bakhash, “Sermons, Revolutionary Pamphleteering and Mobilisation: Iran, 1978” in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, (Hong Kong: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984), p. 180.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

and increased their activities in the month of Ramadan in August. However, these protests remained local and did not spark up nation-wide demonstrations. Then by the end of August the tragedy of the putting fire of the Cinema Rex in Abadan while people were inside and locked from outside, which led to death of hundreds of people, became the catalyzer event of the revolutionary mobilization. Blaming the government on this crime that its committer was unknown, huge crowds of people gathered not only in Abadan but also in many cities including Mashhad and Qom to protest. The government declared martial law in eleven cities to control the pace of events.

On August 26, 1978, the Shah, with the aim of making a compromise to the protestors as a method to control the situation, appointed a name closer to the clergy, Jafar Sharif-Emami as prime minister. He was from a religious family and had contacts with many clerics. The Shah and the Prime Minister promised to hold free elections, to ensure freedom of press, assembly, expression, and independence of judiciary.¹⁴¹ His government was proclaimed by the state as to be a government of national reconciliation. As conciliatory steps in line with the demands made in 2 December statement by the religious groups, the imperial calendar was removed and replaced with solar Muslim calendar, casinos and gambling houses were ordered to shut down, press freedoms were announced, distribution of pornographic publications were banned, and a number of religious leaders were released. Furthermore, the Shah allowed the demonstrations scheduled for *Eid-e Fetr* at the end of Ramadan on September 4, 1978. The official permission convinced many people to participate since it meant no guns would be shot. In addition, the Shah already asked the military not to intervene in the protests. The event witnessed the highest numbers of people attending until that time and an emphatic exchange between the protestors and the security officers and soldiers watching the event without interfering.¹⁴² For the next demonstration, organized three days after the

¹⁴¹ David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, p. 38.

¹⁴² “Two trucks of soldiers, with a machine-gun battery, are at their posts. The procession, which had grown, it appears, roars and dances in the sun: “Soldier, my brother, why do you shoot your brothers.”

Ramadan festival on 7 September, the military was ordered even not to carry firearms to prevent any casualties.

The formation of Sharif-Emami's government of national reconciliation did not bring the result expected by the state. Although the press started publication about opposition leaders including the interviews with Khomeini, fifteen parties were established overnight after the legalization of party formation, a crackdown on corruption was declared, restrictions on leaving the country were abolished, financial and academic independence for universities was promised, schemes for lowering the housing prices and cost of medical care promised for the low income earners, all these measures did not persuade the opposition for conciliation. Regarding the attempts by the state as a sign of weakness, the opposition became united around the aim of "overthrow of the Shah and termination of monarchy" rather than conciliating with the state.¹⁴³ The resumption of protests on 4 and 7 September began within this framework.

On 8 September, the demonstrators gathered again in Jaleh Square in Tehran. However, this time the state decided to act repressively and declared martial law in the morning of September 8th that was announced in radio at 6 am. Kurzman states that it was not clear that the protestors heard the news and stayed at their homes since because the crowd gathered at 8 am in the morning was far small than the previous day.¹⁴⁴ The protestors were met by the armed forces with tear gas and machine gun fire, supposed to be directed in the air but directed on the protestors. The massive casualties in Jaleh Square made the day to be known as 'Black Friday' by the

A spray of flowers falls on the machine-gun barrel, the crowd touches the tarpaulins and the poles on the trucks. Emboldened, it shakes the hands of the soldiers, kisses them, covers them with bouquets. ... The officers of the convoy speak up: "We belong to the people, but we are in the service, do not commit any violence, we do not want to shoot." Claire Brière and Pierre Blanchet, *L'Iran: La Révolution au Nom de Dieu*, Paris: Seuil, 1979, pp. 45 – 46 quoted in Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*, p. 63.

¹⁴³ David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, p. 44.

¹⁴⁴ Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*, p. 74.

protestors.¹⁴⁵ After this massacre, the opposition became silent for almost two months upon the decision of Khomeini and Shari‘atmadari. They appealed to the people to stay in their homes to prevent clashes with the armed forces. Many opposition leaders were also arrested by the government including Karim Sanjabi, the leader of National Front, Daryoush Forouhar, the spokesman of the National Front, and Muqaddam Maragheh’i, the leader of the Islamists in Jaleh Square. Many other religious leaders were also ordered not to leave their homes.¹⁴⁶

Up to Black Friday, it was the street protests that led the revolutionary opposition. At this point, the general strikes began in the country. The first strike was in the Tehran oil refinery on 9 September and they spread to many sectors. As stated by Kurzman, by the beginning of November, journalists, national airlines, railroads, customs officials, power workers, banks, oil workers, all engaged in strikes as a way of protest. The most effective one for the survival of government was the oil workers strike that significantly decreased the oil production, thus the revenue that was essential for the government. The strikes that started with economic demands eventually turned out to be political protests. The political demands made by the workers were lift of martial law, release of all political prisoners, Iranization of the oil industry.¹⁴⁷

Simultaneously with the strikes, the university students were also mobilized in the campuses. On 5 November, students of Tehran University marched from the campus outside to the city, and set fire several buildings on including the British Embassy. The Shah reacted uncompromisingly by dismissing the prime minister and appointing a military government led by the Chief of Staff General Gholam Reza

¹⁴⁵ According to Desmond Harney, the rumors next day about the casualties were eighty-five people. Desmond Harney, *The Priest and the King: An Eyewitness Account of the Iranian Revolution*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), p. 17.

¹⁴⁶ David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, p. 45.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

Azhari. It was the end of national reconciliation. The military government abolished press freedom, attacked newspapers, arrested journalist and many opposition leaders. While repression was going on in the streets, the Shah's speech on air accepting the brutality of the regime, apologizing for the past casualties, and promising free elections and establishment of basic freedoms came as an irony for most Iranians. Kurzman argues that this was a sign of the Shah's method of combination of concession and repression to deal with the events.¹⁴⁸

With the continuing strikes, economy was brought to a halt in the country. The military government acted to compensate the strikes by handling the running of industries. However, it soon came out that the knowledge of military was not enough to run the industries in the absence of skilled workers. The electrical workers, who had been cutting the electricity for two hours every evening in December to disrupt the TV programs of the state and to help the protestors to violate curfew in the evenings by not being seen in the dark, refuse to cooperate with the military government. The news personnel refused to show up at work since the military established censorship. The oil workers refused to cooperate either, which exposed that the military men were by no means capable of running the industry. Thus, the military government threatened the strikers with coercion to make them go back to work. Although the strikers agreed, they re-initiate strike at the nearest possible time, and when faced with threat of coercion they went back to work again. This cycle of events continued until mid-January.

Ayatollah Khomeini, the ideological and directive leader of the opposition who was operational for mobilization through revolutionary clergy in Iran, was expelled from Najaf, Iraq on October 4, 1978 and arrived France for shelter. His stance towards the conciliation efforts of the government was not to agree on any compromise until the Shah would leave the country and the monarchy would be overthrown. In the declaration issued by Khomeini on October 11, 1978 for the fortieth-day

¹⁴⁸ Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*, p. 107.

commemoration of Jaleh Square martyrs, he called for the people to continue opposition. He stated: “Continue your sacred movement in unison for the sake of the ultimate goal, which is the overthrow of the corrupt Pahlavi regime and the liberation of the destiny and resources of our country from foreign control. Fear nothing in your pursuit of these Islamic goals, for no power can halt this great movement.”¹⁴⁹

Khomeini’s approach was accepted by clerics in Qom (most importantly by the most respected cleric Shari‘atmadari), the National Front, and the Freedom Movement, the three groups that started to act in harmony and cooperation with Khomeini in Paris. His residence in Paris became the headquarters of the revolutionary movement. From Paris, his speeches and instructions were distributed in Iran through cassette tapes and pamphlets. Khomeini met Mehdi Bazargan on 22 October and Karim Sanjabi a week later. Khomeini and Sanjabi agreed on joint principles for revolutionary movement on November 4, 1978. These points were: “(1) The monarchy, having constantly violated the constitution, spread corruption and submitted to foreign powers, had forfeited its legitimacy and should therefore be abolished; (2) The national and Islamic movements would not agree to any compromise to government serving ‘under the present illegal regime’; (3) Future policies must be based on the principles of democracy and national independence, and on the precepts of Islam.”¹⁵⁰ The Tudeh Party also issued a communiqué on the necessity of unity of the opposition to form an anti-dictatorship front¹⁵¹ although it did not give explicit support for the leadership of Khomeini until January 4, 1979.

The protests intensified once again in the Muharram of 1978 beginning from 1 December. One week before the Muharram, Khomeini had issued a proclamation

¹⁴⁹ Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 240 – 241.

¹⁵⁰ Kayhan International, 10 January 1979 quoted in David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, p. 55.

¹⁵¹ *New York Times*, 21 November 1978 quoted in David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, p. 58.

from Paris demanding people's attendance to Muharram mourning assemblies to show their protest against the monarchy and declared silence and apathy as "suicide, or even aid to the tyrannical regime." He said:

The leader of the Muslims taught us that if a tyrant rules despotically over the Muslims in any age, we must rise up against him and denounce him, however unequal our forces may be. ... Now the regime of the Shah is ruling tyrannically over our oppressed people today. ... It is the duty of the entire nation that has now risen in revolt to pursue and broaden its struggle against the Shah with all its strength and to bring down his harmful, disastrous regime.¹⁵²

Iran was under the martial law and the military government of Azhari declared nightly curfew. To tear out the pressure, people started shouting in the streets, from their gardens or rooftops "Allahu Akbar" as a shout of their protest.¹⁵³ On the days of *Tasu'a* and *'Ashura* (10 and 11 December), two rallies were organized by the opposition, which were attended by the largest crowds until that time. These two rallies were held peacefully without government intervention.

The massive attendance of the population to the demonstrations and the knowledge that the Western powers would not tolerate the military government in Iran for a long time compelled the Shah to search for a coalition government led by a civilian politician. Khomeini, however, was firm on his stance against any coalition of opposition with the state. The Shah, first, met with former Prime Minister 'Ali Amini to head the new government. His response that he would accept the offer only under the condition that he would control the armed forces and SAVAK was refused by the Shah, who was also constitutionally the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Then the Shah sought for the cooperation of National Front leaders and approached to a younger member of National Front, Shapur Bakhtiyar. He accepted to form the government on the condition that the Shah would leave the country for an

¹⁵² Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 242 – 243.

¹⁵³ For a compilation of the slogans of the Islamic Revolution see Mohammad Hossein Panahi, *An Introduction to the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Its Slogans*, (Great Britain: Al-Hoda, 2001).

unspecified period of time. On December 31, 1978, the Shah declared the premiership of Shapoor Bakhtiyar and the new government declared itself to be a social-democratic government.¹⁵⁴ Nine-member Regency Council was formed on January 13, 1979 that would constitutionally fulfill the function of monarchy in the absence of the monarch. Mohammad Reza Shah left the country on January 16, 1979, a day celebrated cheerfully by the opposition in the streets of the country.

The Shah had left the county, but monarchy was still there. Khomeini and the revolutionary clergy did not accept any coalition or compromise with the new government. Khomeini even declared the cabinet of Bakhtiyar as illegal. Contrary to the hopes of the government, the National Front not only show support to Bakhtiyar government but also became a staunch opponent. At the beginning of January, the Tudeh party also joined the ranks of Islamic opposition and gave support to Khomeini. The only major opposition groups who were organized against the Shah but did not submit to the revolutionary leadership of Khomeini were the *Fada'iyan* and *Mujahedin-e Khalq*.

On January 12, 1979, four days before the Shah left Iran, Khomeini issued the declaration of the formation of the Islamic Revolutionary Council assigned with the task of examining conditions for the formation of a transitional government and making all necessary arrangements. Although not declared until the triumph of the revolutionary movement, the members of the Revolutionary Council were: The five clerics of the *Ruhaniyat* (namely Morteza Motahhari, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Musavi Ardabili, Dr. Bahonar, and Dr. Beheshti), Mahdavi Kani, Taleqani, Khameneh'i, Engineer Bazargan, and Dr. Sahabi.¹⁵⁵ The declaration entrusted the transitional government with “(a) the formation of a constituent assembly composed of the elected representatives of the people in order to discuss for approval of the new constitution of the Islamic Republic; (b) the implementation of elections based on the

¹⁵⁴ Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution*, p. 125.

¹⁵⁵ Dr. Jalalad-dine Madani, *Islamic Revolution of Iran*, p. 466.

principles approved by the Constitutive Assembly and the new Constitution; (c) the transfer of power to the representatives chosen in those elections.” After stating that the struggle of the Iranian people was not confined with the departure of the Shah or the abolition of monarchy but it would continue until the establishment of an Islamic Republic that would guarantee the freedom of people, independence of the country, and attainment of social justice, Khomeini addressed the army and assured that they would not suffer any harm as a result of the Shah’s departure.¹⁵⁶

Bakhtiyar government resisted for Khomeini’s return to Iran because he believed the fall of his government would lead to a military take-over and more bloodshed.¹⁵⁷ The account of revolutionaries, however, was that the U.S. tried to prevent the return of Khomeini, which resulted in demonstrations in Tehran University for the return of Khomeini. To this account, it was these demonstrations that resulted in the lifting of the ban on his return.¹⁵⁸ At the end, Bakhtiyar announced the permission for exiled political leaders to return the country on 30 January and Khomeini came back to Iran on February 1, 1979 after fifteen years of exile. Four days later, on 5 February, Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan as the head of the provisional government. Thus, Iran had two governments at the same time for a short period. Meanwhile, the revolutionary *komitehs* and guards had taken control of some towns and had been carrying on police and security duties since the beginning of the revolutionary mobilization. After two days of demonstrations demanding the resignation of Bakhtiyar that witnessed clashes with the army, the government of Bakhtiyar resigned on 11 February. The same day, the army commanders proclaimed neutrality and ordered the troops to be withdrawn to the barracks. It was the day that the Islamic Revolution was achieved. All political forces in the society that were coordinated by the single aim to end despotic regime and all foreign influence, and

¹⁵⁶ Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 246 – 248.

¹⁵⁷ Keyhan International, 25 January 1979 quoted in David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution*, p. 66.

¹⁵⁸ Dr. Jalalad-dine Madani, *Islamic Revolution of Iran*, p. 473.

were mobilized under the leadership Ayatollah Khomeini and revolutionary clerics, became victories in their struggle.¹⁵⁹

5.5. Conclusion

In 1979, the movement of opposition nationalism went beyond engendering a serious challenge to the state authority. After years of struggle vacillated between government pressure and cooptation, the opposition nationalist movement had begun to coordinate the diverse interests of political groups into a single aim. The mobilization of diverse groups that took place in several stages in 1977 and 1978 culminated in the revolutionary movement of Iran in 1979. At this moment of modern Iranian history, the opposition nationalism that operated through the discourse of Islamic revolution captured and seized the state power. The Iranian polity since 1925, Pahlavi monarchy, had been abolished and a new polity started to take its shape. Eventually, the new polity came to be a theocratic state, the Islamic Republic. Hence, different than the opposition nationalism movements of Constitutional Revolution and National Front movement, the opposition nationalism of 1979 Revolution was a full-scale revolution that changed the existing order.

The two aims of the opposition nationalism movement of 1978 – 1979 were the termination of monarchy and elimination of foreign influence in the country that meant to be the U.S. influence at large. The revolutionaries reached their first aim when Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979. Elimination of the foreign power, *i.e.* the U.S., that dominated the politics of Iran since 1953, was the struggle continued after the abolition of monarchy. The second aim was irretrievably fulfilled with the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 by a group of

¹⁵⁹ For some eyewitness accounts of the 1979 Revolution see Desmond Hanrey, *The Priest and the King*; Ehsan Naraqi, *From Palace to Prison: Inside the Iranian Revolution*, (USA: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1994).

students who defined themselves as the ‘followers of Imam’s line’ (*peyrovān-e hatt-e Emam*).¹⁶⁰

The mobilization of opposition nationalism movement of 1978 – 79 was realized through effective mobilization of masses in the streets and in the work places against the authoritarian Pahlavi state. Jerrold Green, who defines the revolutionary movement of 1979 as ‘countermobilization’ vis-à-vis the mobilization policy of Pahlavi state, determines nine conditions that facilitate ‘countermobilization’. These are: (1) Declining coercive will or capacity of the state; (2) A simplification of politics; (3) An oppositional, positive pole boasting high popular legitimacy, widespread visibility, social integration, and helpfully, charisma; (4) A negative pole may be termed as “repellent center” (the State); (5) the politicization of traditionally non-political social actors; (6) a diminution in the import of ethnic, tribal, socioeconomic, generational, educational, religious, geographic cleavages; (7) competitive mobilization in which the two poles actively compete for popular support, a process which could turn into full-scale revolution if (8) one or a series of crisis initiating events will happen and if (9) the regime gives exacerbating responses to those events.¹⁶¹ Looking retrospectively to the course of events between 1978 – 79, it is clearly evident that all these nine conditions are present in the revolutionary opposition movement in Iran. Factors such as the change in the U.S. policy towards softening the grip of Cold War with the Soviet Union, the insistence of the U.S. on establishment of parliamentary democracy under Iranian monarchy, Iran’s dire economic and social situation that crackled state cooptation, were the reasons that compelled the Shah to initiate a programme of liberalization. Thus, from the beginning, there was a decline in coercive will as well as capacity of the state. At the same, the period witnessed simplification of politics by the oppositional, positive pole by the revolutionary clergy, mainly *Ruhaniyat* society, and by senior clerics

¹⁶⁰ L. A. Reda, “*Khatt-e Imam: The Followers of Imam’s Line*” in Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (ed.), *A Critical Introduction to Khomeini*, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 115 – 136.

¹⁶¹ Jerrold D. Green, *Revolution in Iran*, pp. 80 – 82.

who supported Khomeini, by religious intellectuals such as Shari‘ati, Bazargan, Motahhari who appealed to educated middle class as well as the urban poor, and most importantly by Khomeini himself who set the aims, terms, methods of struggle by his declarations to the opposition. On the contrary, a negative pole or the repellent center, *i.e.* the state, was at work in competition with the oppositional pole for mobilization. Pahlavi state employed methods of conciliation and coercion simultaneously for this aim. The competition by the state caused many more people to participate the opposition to struggle against the state that caused the grievances. The increasing participation to the opposition politicized all social actors, whether they were traditionally non-politicized or were not in support of the oppositional pole previously. In Iran, as the participation increased in urban centers, groups that had been outside the oppositional pole such as workers and government employees, rural people, leftist opposition groups, secular opposition groups, men and women from all ranks of society, even the soldiers in the army came to join the ranks of opposition. The state’s armed response to civilian protests in various occasions and cities, imposition of martial law, consecutive arrests and releases of opposition leaders and permissions and bans on publications, imposition of military government were the crisis-initiating events that were reacted with exaggeration by the state, which turned the opposition into a full scale revolution.

The Islamic Republic was established with the referendum held on March 30 and 31, 1979. After long debates between the divergent views in the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic was adopted by the October 24, 1979 referendum. Khomeini’s theory of *Velayet-e Faqih* (Guardianship of the Jurisconsult), which was a theory of politicized religion on the grounds of necessity of fulfillment of supervisory role by the *fuqaha* over politics, was institutionalized in the 1979 Constitution.¹⁶² The Constitution also guaranteed the republican feature of the new system by bestowing people political rights of electing the parliament, prime

¹⁶² Amr GE Sabet, “Wilayat al-Faqih and the Meaning of Islamic Government” in Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (ed.), *A Critical Introduction to Khomeini*, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 69 – 87.

minister, and provincial councils. Thus, the Islamic Republic was based on dual sovereignty of religion and the people. This system was designed as the manifestation of demand by the people that had participated to the revolutionary mobilization; “independence, freedom, Islamic Republic” and was accepted by majority of the population in 1979. However, the Islamic Republic faced with a significant movement of opposition nationalism in 2009 based on the argument that the Islamic Republican order deviated from these ideals of the revolution. For many Iranians, according to Asef Bayat,

the revolution was a nationalist, anti-imperialist movement in which *estiqlal* (independence) was a key goal. ... However, for [the revolutionary leaders], the national “independence” was a protective shield against external interference and influences, which was a critical tool for securing the regime’s social control. ... In the public discourse of 1970s, *azadi* (freedom) was essentially linked to “justice.” It implied liberation from repression, from the fear of despotic bosses, bureaucrats, traffic police, the village gendarmeries, and, above all from the fear of SAVAK. Freedom represented a desire for inclusion without fear. ... This understanding of “freedom” differs from that of the Islamist leaders. ... In the 1980s and 1990s, most of them equated *azadi* with hedonism, moral laxity, decadence and westernization; even more so when it became the main outcry of the banished democrats, liberals, middle-class women and urban youngsters. ... In the late 1970s, the term [Islamic Republic] clearly signified a regime change from monarchy to republicanism, from autocracy to democracy. ... However, ... hardline Islamists succeeded in pushing through the ... Islamized constitution, which eventually would help secure the power of a new religious oligarchy in the Islamic Republic.¹⁶³

The disillusionment of the Iranian people due to the distance between what they dreamed for the nation and what they experienced in practice led to the formation of Green Movement in 2009 as anti-authoritarian and anti-imperialist nationalist opposition.

¹⁶³ Asef Bayat, “A Wave For Life and Liberty: The Green Movement and Iran’s Incomplete Revolution” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future*, (USA: Melville House Publishing, 2010), pp. 42 – 47.

CHAPTER 6

NATIONALISM AS A FORM OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN THE GREEN MOVEMENT OF 2009

The Green Movement of Iran is the fourth moment in modern Iranian history when opposition nationalism is manifested as a political movement. Although it has not aimed at capturing state power or overthrowing the regime, it has been coordinated and mobilized to attain a constitutional power, *i.e.* presidency, and to change the political paradigm of Islamic order. According to the charter of the Green Movement drafted on June 12, 2010, exactly one year after the 2009 presidential election, it identifies itself as “an extension of the Iranian people’s quest for freedom, social justice and national sovereignty, which had been previously manifested in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, the 1951 Oil Nationalization Movement, and the 1979 Islamic Revolution.”¹

Similar to previous movements, the Green Movement is also “launched both against foreign intervention and domestic tyranny.”² However, unlike the previous movements, there is no one or more target as imperialist/colonialist foreign enemy that the movement appeared to be in opposition against. Rather, the movement opposes to the definition and implementation of national interest by the Islamic Republic that is rooted in the Islamic ideology of the revolution. Accordingly, the movement claims to stand against ignoring Iranian national interests and foreign policy adventurism.³

¹ “The Green Movement Charter” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future*, (USA: Melville House Publishing, 2010), p. 336.

² Hamid Dabashi (edited with and introduction by Navid Nikzadfar), *The Green Movement in Iran*, (USA: Transaction Publishers, 2011), p. 135.

³ “The Green Movement Charter” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 336.

Being a civil rights movement, the targets of Green Movement that represents state authoritarianism are “emergence of totalitarian tendencies among some government officials; the violations of the basic of rights of citizens; insult to human dignity; government mismanagement; a growing gap among economic classes and poverty; neglect and even violation of the law by those responsible for enforcing law.”⁴ According to the charter, this domestic and foreign policy behavior of the state were deviations from the Islamic Revolution, which was achieved through the ideals of justice, independence, freedom and Islamic Republic.

In organizational and mobilizational terms the Green Movement was a product of sudden and unexpected movement given the fact the state repression on opposition rendered the population who desired a change in the system politically indifferent in the last decade since 1999. Ideationally, however, Green Movement was a product of post-revolutionary debate that gave rise to reform movement in 1997. Since the end of war with Iraq in 1988, Islamic modernist ideology of the 1979 revolution has given its place to Islamic reformism due to changing national and international conditions. Initially, the war with Iraq between 1980 – 1988 that led to thousands of deaths and destroyed economic infrastructure including oil facilities in southern Iran. The migration of around three million Iranians mostly with middle class backgrounds, expansion of education in primary, secondary and university levels under the new state, new technologies of communication such as internet, satellites, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter were other major conditions that changed the social fabric of revolutionary society. Internationally, the end of Cold War and fall of communist bloc decreased the appeal of Islamic radicalism, which had previously been adhered by both Islamists and leftists. Thus, in the beginning of 1990’s a new interpretation of Islamic ideology was born, which was Islamic reformism. The reformist ideas began to be disseminated in the universities and publications by the religious intellectuals (*rowshanfekran-e dini*). Abdolkarim Soroush, Mojtabeh

⁴ *Ibid.*

Shabestari, Mostafa Malekian, Mohsen Kadivar, Yusuf Eshkevari began to speak about the necessity of separating religion from the political realm and restricting it to spiritual realm. These intellectuals who operated in the framework of Islam argued that an Islamic democracy was possible only by the restriction of religion to the inner life of the believer. The large appeal the ideas of the religious intellectuals found reflection in politics when the popular vote elected an Islamic reformist president, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, in 1997.⁵ His agenda of two-term presidency was restoration of rule of law, establishment of civil society, protection of human rights, which were regarded necessary for a functioning Islamic democracy (*mardomsalari-ye dini*).

The Green Movement in 2009 was not only a political continuation of Khatami's reform movement but also deeply inspired by ideologues of Islamic reformism. However, it went beyond the Islamic reformism of a decade ago. The Green Movement was not vocal on religion as a realm separate from politics like the religious intellectuals argued. Instead, they were silent on religion in that they accepted Islam but also accepted the political realm was an autonomous field of human activity that was not based on religion. In the words of Khosrokhavar, they separated politics and religion quietly and spontaneously "without any antagonism to religion or any acrimony towards Islam." Accordingly, "politics are the realm of nation's sovereignty and as such, religion should be mute, not out of weakness, but out of its very nature."⁶ Khosrokhavar calls this understanding as "secular Islam,"

⁵ Khosrokhavar further argues that the failure of the Islamic utopia at the end of two decades of revolution and the end of Communism in 1989 were the factors that opened up the reformist period in Iran experienced between 1997 – 2005. According to him, the Islamic theocracy, despite being a totalitarian ideology, could not coopt the secular middle class and ensure ideological recruitment of the new generations due to its lack of a single organization such as Communist Party or the Nazi Party to implement the ideology in civil society. The middle class basically resisted Islamization through various ways such as "family strategies, renewal and reinforcement of group identity through leisure and new forms of socialization" including peer gatherings among the youth and university socialization. Thus, the new generations were driven towards new interpretations of religion that was more open to religious pluralism and freedom. Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The Green Movement in Iran: Democratization and Secularization from Below" in Ramin Jahanbegloo (ed.), *Civil Society and Democracy in Iran*, (USA: Lexington Books, 2012), pp. 43 – 45.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

which has appeared in the discourse of a movement that defined by Dabashi as grassroots democratic movement.⁷ Its democratic because of its demands, which are “freedom, social justice and the formation of [legitimate] national government” and the method it employed for express these demands, which is ‘nonviolent resistance’.⁸

The two conditions of state authoritarianism and foreign interventionism were at the center of the nationalist ideology of the Green Movement opposition. In 2009, the state authority that the nationalist opposition rised against has shifted from Pahlavi monarchy to Islamic Republic; hence nationalist ideology has shifted from secular nationalism to religious nationalism that incorporated Islamic internationalism. However, despite the change in state authority, the strong state structure continued to survive after 2009. Therefore, just like the previous three mass movement of opposition nationalism, the Green Movement has emerged against the unconstitutional policies of the strong state, which disregarded popular sovereignty, and restricted the use of social freedoms by the poeple. However, the Green Movement was different from the previous three movements in its description of foreign intervention. The discourse of opposition nationalism in 2009 did not target the structural condition of Western imperialism as a threat to the nation’s independence, although it declared to be against any kind of imperialism and imperialist power. Instead, the structural condition targeted by the Green Movement was the one was created by the state itself after the 1979 Revolution. It was the

⁷ Hamid Dabashi (edited with and introduction by Navid Nikzadfar), *The Green Movement in Iran*, p. 135.

⁸ Khosrokhavar argues that after the first week of demonstrations following the announcement of election results the movement entered another phase with the initiation of government violence and repression. In this period, he notes, the Persian translation of the 1973 book by Gene Sharp, ‘The Politics of Non-Violent Action’ became reference for the Green protestors. Farhad Khosrokhavar, “The Green Movement in Iran”, p. 57.

involvement of the state in the liberation struggle of Palestinians and Lebanese against the Israeli state.

The difference of Green Movement's conceptualization of foreign threat stemmed from two conditions. Firstly, in the first three nationalist opposition movements the state was in a collaborator relationship with the imperialist power. Thus, the nationalist opposition movements targeted both the strong state and the influence of imperialist power over that state, which was acting in collaboration with. Therefore, the two threats to the nation converged in the discourses of the nationalist opposition of Constitutional Revolution, National Front, and the Iranian Revolution. However, in the case of Green Movement, the Islamic Republic was not in a collaborator relationship with the imperialist powers, Instead, fight against imperialism was a priority. In order to fight against imperialism not only in Iran but also in other oppressed Muslim societies, the Islamic Republic developed a collaboration relationship with Palestine and Lebanese struggles against Israel. Thus, the nationalist discourse of the Green Movement targeted this outside factor with which the state was in the collaboration with. In addition, the Green Movement's Islamic sensibility led the movement not to disregard the impact of imperialism on Islamic societies totally, but to develop a nuanced definition of national interest. Therefore, the Green Movement raised his opposition to the state's national interest definition and argued that the interests of the Iranian nation had priority over the interests of the Islamic *umma* and its unity.

The second condition of the difference of Green Movement's foreign threat conception than the previous three opposition nationalism movements was more political than ideational. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic under Ahmadinejad's presidency developed an aggressive rhetoric against the U.S. as the biggest imperialist power and against Israel as the regional agent of the U.S. imperialism. This aggressive rhetoric of Iranian state was garnished by the U.S. administration's aggressive responses such as declaring the Iranian state as 'evil,' using threat of war in order to stop Iranian nuclear enrichment, and finally the U.S.-led imposition of

international sanctions that crippled the Iranian economy and the living conditions of the Iranian people. Although the Green Movement declared its awareness of the world situation and the workings of the imperialist powers, its nationalist discourse put the blame of that situation on the strong state structure where power was being used by certain elites and there was no freedom of expression. Thus, the Green Movement did not target the ‘enemies of the Islamic Republic’ appropriated by the state ideology as the threat of foreign interventionism. Being an opposition movement, the foreign threat it targeted was the states and foreign actors that the Islamic Republic was acting in collaboration.

6.1. Foreign Interventionism: Islamic Republic’s National Interest Definition and Action

Article 152 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran stipulates “The foreign policy of Islamic Republic of Iran is based on rejection of all forms of domination – both assertion of it and submission to it – preservation of the country’s all round independence, its territorial integrity, defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of peaceful relations with all non-belligerent states.” This article defining the basis of Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is a reflection of Islamic ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini, supported and developed by other revolutionary clerics and intellectuals. Accordingly, the principle that determines Islamic Republic foreign policy stance was “neither West, nor East, Islamic Republic.” This principle implied not only the ideal of total independence from imperialist/usurper powers, mainly America, Britain, and Russia, but also identification of these powers as a constant sources of threat for Iran’s independence and sovereignty.

The reflection of this principle for the Muslim lands of the Middle East was to target Israel, which was regarded as an agent of the USA in the region, as an oppressor for Muslims and a constant source threat. In accordance with the constitutional article which gives Islamic Republic responsibility of defense of rights of all Muslims, and

in another article (154) the responsibility of supporting the oppressed against the oppressors for their rights in every corner of the globe, the Islamic Republic's ultimate aim is to support Palestine and Lebanon against Israel's intervention. Thus, the post-revolutionary state's definition of national interest is indeed transnational, reaching the outside of Iranian borders.

The definition of Iranian national interest beyond borders had two discursive foundations that brought about policy results. The first one is the anti-Western orientation of the revolutionary movement. Rejection of the West was not only 'negating' the West but also putting Islam, the source of Muslim identity, as the truth of the 'self' against a hostile 'other'. The hostile 'other' was the 'West' as a monolithic entity, source of all moral corruption and illegitimate domination of the world.⁹ According to Khomeini, the state of Israel was the most intolerable symbol of the Western conspiracy against the Muslim world. Since he began to preach his political ideas in Najaf in early 1960s until his death, Khomeini, without referring to any sectarian division as Sunni or Shi'i, called all Muslims to unite against the oppressor Israel and to defend the rights of the oppressed Muslims of Palestine.¹⁰ Thus, according to Khomeini, among many dangers that was posed by the Western powers to subjugate, exploit and dominate the Muslims was the idea of nationalism; that he regarded identical with the promotion of race. He said in his message to pilgrims on September 12, 1980 that

To love one's fatherland and its people and to protect its frontiers are both quite unobjectionable, but nationalism, involving hostility to other Muslim nations, is something quite different. It is contrary to the Noble Qur'an and the orders of the Most Noble Messenger. Nationalism that results in the creation of enmity between Muslims and splits the ranks of the believers is

⁹ Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (USA: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 507 – 509. Also see Hamid Dabashi, *Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the Empire*, (USA: Routledge, 2008).

¹⁰ Khomeini's declarations, speeches, letters, and all other writings were compiled in a twenty-one volumes titled as Sahife-ye Nur. Online version of the volumes are available at http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/1/صحيحه_امام_خميني/جلد1, and <http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=58950>.

against Islam and the interests of the Muslims. It is a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are disturbed by the spread of Islam.¹¹

For Khomeini, protecting Muslims in Lebanon was the other objective within the above framework. After the Lebanese civil war, he called all Muslims to provide material assistance to the miserable survivors of the civil war, women and children, and ordered to spend portion of religious taxes paid to him for this purpose.¹² To him, Palestine and Lebanon were the two victims of Israeli occupation and domination of superpowers in Muslim lands.¹³

The second discursive foundation for the definition of national interest in post-revolutionary Iran was the long-standing debate between *Iraniyat* and *Islamiyat*, the two elements of Iranian national identity that may be deemed complementary in personal disposition but are conflicting in political choices.¹⁴ The best reflection of this duality can be represented with the debate between Morteza Motahhari and Abdol-Hossein Zarrinkub at the end of 1960s. Zarrinkub, prominent scholar of Iranian history, culture and literature, published one of his classic books on Iranian history and culture, *Do Qarn-e Sokut* (The Centuries of Silence) in 1951. In that book, he argued that in the two centuries following the conquest of Iran by Muslim Arab armies in 651 A.D., Iranian civilization was severely destroyed due to attack of Arabs on Iranian language, culture, and society. Referring the Arab conquest as the beginning of a disaster, he argued that the resurgence of Iranians had begun after the death of Abbasid Chaliph al-Ma'moon in 833, after two centuries of civilizational

¹¹ Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Imam Khomeini*, (USA: Kegan Paul, 2002), p. 302.

¹² H. E. Chehabi, *Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years*, (Great Britain: Centre for Lebanese Studies & I. B. Tauris, 2006), p. 196.

¹³ Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 287;

¹⁴ For the impact of *Iraniyat* and *Islamiyat* in Iranian identity and their implications in policy choices see Shabnam J. Holliday, *Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance*, (Great Britain: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011).

devastation.¹⁵ Against this interpretation of Iraniyat vis-à-vis Arabs, which was also the official nationalism discourse of the Pahlavi Shahs, Morteza Motahhari raised his criticism. In his talks in *Hosseiniyeh-ye Ershad* in 1968 – 9, which were later published in 1970 – 1 under the title of *Khadamat-e Motaqabel-e Islam va Iran* (The Reciprocal Services of Islam and Iran), he dealt with the problem of nationality and Islam, the services of Iran to Islam and the services of Islam to Iran. On the services of Islam to Iran, he argued that Iran was shattered among different religions before Islamic conquest and there was no unity among the people. Iranians reached unity after they embraced Islam. Moreover, Islam opened the doors of Iran to other cultures and as a result of this interaction the powerful Iranian civilization developed. Another service of Islam to Iranian civilization was liberation of Iranian people from the authority of Zoroastrian priests who monopolized education; thus, all Iranians had the opportunity of learning.¹⁶ On the services of Iran to Islam, Motahhari argued that Iran had been a source of powerful civilization before Islam, and this civilization became one of the sources of Islamic civilization. Iranians, he stated, served Islam in many ways such as propagation of Islam, services of military and state, science, culture, arts.¹⁷ In the last section of his book, Motahhari questioned the arguments of Zarrinkub's 'Two Centuries of Silence' without mentioning the name of the author. According to Motahhari, Zarrinkub was influenced by the ideas of orientalist such as Sir John Malcolm who defined the first century of Islam in Iran as the period of silence. However, according to Motahhari, after the fall of Umayyads, who pursued anti-Alavite policy and did not treat Iranians well because of their affection with 'Ali, Iranians were elevated to the position of vizierate in the first century of the Abbasid period. The fact that the Iranians did not have an independent state for two centuries, Motahhari said, did not undermine the benefits of unprecedented change

¹⁵ Abdol-Hossein Zarrinkub, *Do Qarn-e Sokut (Two Centuries of Silence)*, (Tehran: Entesharat-e Sohen, 1978 (1999/2000)).

¹⁶ Morteza Motahhari, *Khadamat-e Motaqabel-e Islam va Iran* (The Reciprocal Services of Islam and Iran), (Tehran: Entesharat-e Sadra, 1376 (1997/1998)), p. 307 – 312.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 332 – 333. Also see Mahmood T. Davari, *The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari: An Iranian Theoretician of the Islamic State*, (Great Britain: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).

they experienced in cultural and all fields. Besides, he argued, there was no evidence that Arabs prevented Iranians from using their own benevolent language.¹⁸

The understanding of reciprocal services of Islam and Iran, best portrayed by Motahhari, was the prevailing discourse in the Islamic Republic. Accordingly, Islamic Republic did not differentiate the interests of Iran from the interests of Islam. In a world where Western imperialism and domination was defined by Khomeini as the biggest threat to Islam, and that the Iranian Revolution was achieved by the people to counter this threat, Islamic Republic assumed moral responsibility of protecting all Muslims from Western domination, and Palestine and Lebanon from Israeli occupation.

The support of Islamic Republic to Palestine and Lebanon was not only rhetorical but also practical. Soon after the establishment of Islamic Republic with the referendum conducted on March 30- 31, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the last Friday of Ramadan each year as International Jerusalem (Qods) Day on August 7, 1979. Symbolizing the Muslim solidarity against Israel, International Qods day has been the most important occasion for the anti-Israelite mobilization through speeches, marches, parades and rallies and dissemination of anti-Israelite propaganda materials.

Indeed, close cooperation of Palestinian Liberation Organization and the radical revolutionaries in Iran dates back to the revolution. During the 1970s, many Iranian guerillas were trained in the PLO camps in Lebanon. Yasser Arafat visited Ayatollah Khomeini a few days after the revolution on February 17, 1979 and “hailed the common goal of Iranian and Palestinian revolutions.”¹⁹ PLO delegation opened offices all over Iran. In the words of Ramazani,

¹⁸ Morteza Motahhari, *Khadamat-e Motaqabel-e Islam va Iran*, p. 577 – 584.

¹⁹ R. K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East*, (USA: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 152 – 153.

The revolutionary rhetoric depicted Israel as the illegitimate offspring of the Great Satan, and the United States as the godfather of the twin evils of Zionism and American imperialism. Beyond the virulent anti-Israeli rhetoric, however, the revolutionary leaders seemed to have concluded that under no circumstances could Iran compromise with Israel, and that Iran should oppose any nation or non-state actor that tried to do so.²⁰

When the Israeli invasion of Lebanon occurred in 1982, Iranian government declared its readiness to declare war against Israel. Iranian militias, who had already started to join PLO as volunteer fighter, began to influx to Lebanon. Shireen Hunter stated that three thousand revolutionary guards allowed by Hafez Assad to enter Lebanon.²¹ The Revolutionary Guards establish informal close relations with Lebanese Hezbollah and Islamic Amal Organization. In the Syrian occupation of southern Lebanon, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards assisted the Lebanese Hezbollah during 1987–1988. In the 1990's, Hezbollah realized that Islamic Republic in Lebanon in the Iranian line was not possible due to Lebanon's demographic conditions. Although it did not give up the ideal of an Islamic state, Hezbollah entered into a process of 'Lebanization' and joined parliamentary elections in 1992.²² However, Iranian arms support to Hezbollah continued throughout the 1990s. During the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, Iran was reported to supply huge sums of money to compensate Hezbollah's losses and aid to rebuild its military construction.²³

Iran-PLO relations were strained because of Arafat's joining Arab camp during Iran-Iraq war and his declaration of recognition of Israel's right of existence in 1988. Arafat did not visited Iran until 1997 meeting of Organization of Islamic Conference held by Iran. Meanwhile, Iran established closer relations with HAMAS, which was

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

²¹ Shireen T. Hunter, *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade*, (USA: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 123.

²² H. E. Chehabi, *Distant Relations*, pp. 294 – 298.

²³ Emile Hokayem, "Iran and Lebanon" in Robin Wright (ed.), *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy*, (USA: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), pp. 178 – 181.

established in 1987. In a visit in early 1990s by HAMAS delegation, Ayatollah Khameneh'i assured military and financial support to HAMAS. The amount of financial aid was reported to be 30 million dollars annually, and the military training was provided for HAMAS militias by the Revolutionary Guards bases in Iran and Lebanon. Iranian aid to HAMAS steadily increased and Iran became the main provider for HAMAS after the party won 2006 elections. It was reported in 2006 that Iran promised 250 million dollars aid to HAMAS during the Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh's visit to Tehran. In the 2008 Gaza War, Iran was reported to be the main provider of equipment to HAMAS.²⁴

In the years of the reformist presidency of Khatami, Iran's revolutionary foreign policy rhetoric changed slightly to the direction of conciliation. Khatami's interview with Christian Amanpour of CNN in January 1998 where he called for Iranian-American cultural dialogue was a case in point. In relations with Lebanon, although Khatami continued close ties with Hezbollah, he also tried to expand direct state-to-state contacts. While he continued to condemn Israel for its unjust behavior towards Palestinians, Khatami iterated in December 1997 Tehran summit of Organization of the Islamic Conference that Iran would accept Palestine-Israeli peace if it was the choice of Palestinian people.²⁵ This was the biggest shift in non-conciliatory foreign policy rhetoric of Islamic Republic towards Palestinian issue.

The period of Iranian détente with outside world gave its place to the rhetoric of enmity with the Ahmadinejad's presidency in 2005. According to Ehteshami and Zweiri's 2007 analysis of the Iranian foreign policy, Ahmadinejad's foreign policy conduct was "leading Iran down a path of isolation and painful reaction."²⁶ In 2005,

²⁴ Rachel Branderburg, "Iran and the Palestinians" in Robin Wright (ed.), *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy*, (USA: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), pp. 171 – 174.

²⁵ See H. E. Chehabi, *Distant Relations*, pp. 301 – 307; Michael Eisenstadt, "The Military Dimension" in *Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment*, (USA: Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 1998), p. 89.

²⁶ Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Mahjoob Zweiri (eds), *Iran and the Rise of Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2007), p. 107.

Iranian government organized “The World Without Zionism” conference in Tehran where Ahmadinejad made his infamous speech about “wiping Israel off the map”. He said:

Our dear Imam (Ayatollah Khomeini) said that the occupying regime must be wiped off the map and this was a very wise statement. We cannot compromise over the issue of Palestine. Is it possible to create a new front in the heart of an old front? This would be a defeat and whoever accepts the legitimacy of this regime has in fact, signed the defeat of the Islamic world. Our dear Imam targeted the heart of the world oppressor in his struggle, meaning the occupying regime. I have no doubt that the new wave that has started in Palestine, and we witness it in the Islamic world too, will eliminate this disgraceful stain from the Islamic world.²⁷

On December 11, 2006, in International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust, popularly known as the holocaust-denial conference, Ahmadinejad reiterated his previous remarks on Israel and said: “thanks to people's wishes and God's will the trend for the existence of the Zionist regime is [headed] downwards and this is what God has promised and what all nations want. Just as the Soviet Union was wiped out and today does not exist, so will the Zionist regime soon be wiped out.”²⁸

The hostile rhetoric of Ahmadinejad had two dimensions. On the one hand, it was rooted in the already-formulated security crisis perception by the state since George Bush’s pointing Iran within the “axis of evil” on January 29, 2002 coupled with increased U.S. presence in the Middle East region. On the other hand, it increased threat perceptions of regional states from Iran. Especially Ahmadinejad’s uncompromising stance on the nuclear negotiation with the West that had been going on since 2003 but had come to a halt in August 2005, just a few months after Ahmadinejad assumed office, added to the concerns of the outside world. Although

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²⁸ Available at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/ahmadinejad-at-holocaust-conference-israel-will-soon-be-wiped-out-1.206977>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

Ahmadinejad's stance was in accordance with the general concern of state that was the right of Iran to peaceful development and use of nuclear technology and know-how within the confines of NPT, the hostile foreign policy rhetoric as well as possibility of attack on Iran by the U.S. became a threat for GCC countries and Saudi Arabia, as well as Turkey.

The nuclear issue did not remain as a security matter but became a social issue with the imposition of U.N. and U.S. sanctions on Iran after the negotiations had broken off. Since Iran continued uranium enrichment, the Western powers began to impose sanction for pushing Iran back to the negotiation table. The U.N. sanctions started in 2006 and continued with adoption of resolutions in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012. With the implementation of sanctions the assets of Iranian corporations and individuals were frozen, financial interactions with Iranian banks were limited, new branches of Iranian banks in member countries were banned, financial institutions were prevented from doing business in Iran, arms embargo was tightened, and travel bans were put on individuals. In June 2010 the U.S. started to implement unilateral sanction with the approval of the Congress. The decision of the U.S. tightened the already-imposed sanctions since 1980 and expanded them by targeting the supply of refined petroleum products sent to Iran by non-U.S. firms. The U.S sanctions also banned all Iranian-origin imports, put sanctions on Iranian financial institutions, and banned selling aircraft or repair parts to Iranian aviation companies. Although the impact of sanctions had not been severely felt during the Green Movement protests in 2009, the on-going policy of confrontation would make the situation worse.²⁹

For Green Movement, Islamic Republic's confrontational foreign policy rhetoric that reached its zenith during Ahmadinejad's first term of presidency in 2005 – 2009 was the major threat to the Iranian nation. For the Greens, this was a foreign policy

²⁹ Between 2010 and 2012, the U.N. and U.S. sanctions severely reduced Iranian oil income, caused devaluation of Iranian rial by 80% in 2011, increased inflation to around 45%, disconnected Iran financially from the world by removing Iran from SWIFT banking network, created severe shortage of drugs for medical treatment, affected imports of agricultural products.

adventurism that was ignoring Iran's national interests. National independence of Iran and resistance against any foreign intervention was priority for the Green Movement. However, the Charter of Green Movement states, "it does not seek isolation from or direct animosity toward other countries and it is not captive of prejudicial tendencies regarding foreign policy."³⁰ With this statement, the Green Movement negated the definition of Iranian national interest outside Iranian border by the Islamic Republic and the aggressive foreign policy of Ahmadinejad.

The Green Movement's opposition to the foreign policy choices of the Islamic Republic were also evident in the slogans that the protestors shouted during the rallies after the first week of the announcement of 2009 election results. For instance, in the International Jerusalem Day on September 18, 2009, the Green Movement protestors in Tehran, Isfahan, Yazd, Tabriz and Shiraz shouted the slogan "No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I will give my life for Iran." According to Yadollah Eslami, this slogan was based on the premise "why are the people were allowed to march for Qods but not for matters concerning Iran itself?" He further states that "this slogan was not voiced in enmity toward anyone but as a protest against the government's overwhelming preoccupation with issues in Palestine and Lebanon, while ignoring matters that concerned the Iranian people."³¹ In the same vein, on November 4, 2009 protest on the occasion of anniversary of American hostage crisis, the Green Movement negated the Islamic Republic's slogan of "Death to America" and instead shouted "Death to nobody." That day also witnessed the Green protestors demand on Iran's nuclear policy stated the slogan "A Green Iran doesn't need nuclear weapons."³² One year after this slogan was chanted, the Charter of Green Movement

³⁰ "The Green Movement Charter" in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 338.

³¹ Yadollah Eslami, "Decoding the Green Movement's Slogans", available at <http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-en/Decoding-the-Green-Movement-s-Slogans.html>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

³² Abbas Milani, "The Green Movement" in Robin Wright (ed.), *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy*, (USA: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 42.

stipulated “security does not imply security only for the government, but security for every Iranian. Security must be established for all Iranians, so that they can live free of fear under protection of law.”³³ According to the same article, “independence of judiciary, nonintervention by military forces in political and economic affairs and dealing with the organizers and members of the so-called plainclothesmen” were the demands of the Green Movement that would ensure security of Iranians, obviously not the nuclear bomb.

6.2. Authoritarianism: Islamism at the Expense of Republicanism

The Green Movement declared itself to be against authoritarianism of the government of Iran. The Green Movement Charter addressed “the totalitarian tendencies among some government officials, the violations of the basic rights of the citizens, insults to human dignity, government mismanagement, a growing gap between economic classes and poverty, neglect and even violation of the law by those responsible for enforcing the law, ignoring our national interests and foreign policy adventurism and the gradual and painful abandonment of ethics” as deviations from the ideals of the Islamic Revolution.³⁴ Affirming its Iranian-Islamic identity, the Green Movement declared its commitment to work within the framework of the Constitution. Accordingly, constitutionalism would foster the rights of the people and would end government authoritarianism. It called for the execution of all articles of the Constitution and particularly the articles related to the rights of the people. The movement, which affirmatively declared itself as non-violent civil movement, proposed return to lawfulness as the only solution to resist state organs that break law and ensure development and progress for Iran. In this vein, the importance of elections, independence of judiciary, non-intervention of military in politics and economics were emphasized in the Green Movement Charter.

³³ The Green Movement Charter” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 341.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

The political system of the Islamic Republic, adopting religion and people as the two sources of its legitimacy, consists of appointed and selected government bodies; thus Islamic and Republican institutions. The Supreme Leader (*Rahbar*) and the Guardians Council (*Shura-ye Negehban*) are the most powerful appointed bodies. The Supreme Leader has the ultimate say in every domestic and foreign affairs of the country. The Guardians Council approves the laws made by the Parliament with the criteria of accordance to the constitution and religious law, and decides the competence of the candidates to compete in parliamentary and presidential elections. Thus, appointed bodies of the system have mandate over the elected bodies. Objectively, this hybrid system where religious power have control over the popular power is a factor that curbs the regime's claim to be an Islamic democracy. The system is regarded by the reformist section of the population as being Islamic rather than being democratic.³⁵ The Green Movement, however, did not challenge any political institution that had been arranged by the constitution. It did not aim a change in the system or a revolution. Nevertheless, the aim of the Green Movement was proper implementation of the Constitution and prevention of the abuse of the rights of the people by totalitarian tendency, which were the rights that had been laid down in the third chapter of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. According to the constitutional rights of the people, all people of Iran had equal rights and did not have the right to enjoy any privileges; all citizens of the country enjoyed equal protection of the law; no one might be molested or prosecuted for holding a belief; publications and the press had freedom of expression; all kinds of censorship was forbidden; the formation of parties, societies, associations were permitted; public gatherings and marches were allowed; affronts to the dignity, and repute of the persons arrested, detained, imprisoned or banished were forbidden. However, most of the clauses for people's rights include the condition that the rights could be

³⁵ This point was also a debate of scholarly attention. See Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban For the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 141 – 174; Olivier Roy, "The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran" in *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 201 – 216; H. E. Chehabi, "Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic is the Islamic Republic?" in *Daedalus*, Vol. 120, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 69 – 91; Asghar Schirazi, *The Constitution of Iran: Politics and State in the Islamic Republic*, (Great Britain: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1997).

exercised if they were in conformity with the Islamic criteria or if they were not against fundamentals of Islam. This gave the totalitarian tendency a free hand to intervene and suspend these rights to preserve the fundamentals of Islam or to prevent domestic threats to national security.

6.2.1. Restriction to Press Freedom

Freedom of press had long been a source of controversy between the state and the reformist opposition. The first student uprising in the Islamic Republic began on 7 June 1999 as a result of closure of a reformist newspaper, *Salam* by the Special Court for the Clergy. *Salam* was the first reformist newspaper published in Iran by a group of clergy attached to the *Ruhaniyun* Association and the owner of the newspaper was Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Musavi-Khoeinia. The court decision was taken upon the publication of a government memorandum about plans to suppress publications that were favoring political reform. Musavi-Khoeinia was banned from journalism for three years and editor-in-chief Abbas Abdi was detained.³⁶ Students gathered to protest *Salam*'s closure in Tehran and other cities. On July 9, 1999 (18 Tir), security forces and members of Ansar-i Hezbollah attacked Tehran University dormitory in order to break the protests. According to the information Maloney provided, fifteen hundred students were arrested, several were injured, and killed.³⁷ The mass protests were the first manifestation of the split in the streets between the state and society after the revolution.

³⁶ "Assault on Independent Press in Iran Intensifies", 28 July 1999, available at <http://iranian.com/News/1999/July/press4.html>, accessed on 25 August 2015. Closure of *Salam* was not the unique case. The restrictions on press continued with detention of editor of another reformist daily, *Sobh-e Emrooz* (Today's Morning), on 20 July 1999 on the charge of publishing an article that insulted Islam by the Tehran public prosecutor.

³⁷ Susan Maloney, "Fifteen Years after the 18th of Tir: The Legacy of Student Protests that Shook Iran", 10 July 2014, available at <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/07/09-iran-student-protest-anniversary-rouhani>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

With the 1999 student protests, Iranian reformists encountered problem of 'plainclothesmen' (*lebas-shakhsiha*), vigilantes of *Ansar-e Hezbollah* group, and their unlawful intervention in protests. The encounter of reformists and *Ansar-e Hezbollah* vigilantes had started earlier in 1996 when they began to disrupt Abdolkarim Soroush's classes and conferences, which they continued to chase after him until 2000. However, in 1999 protests, they joined the Law Enforcement Forces (*Niru-ye Entezami*) and attacked students with clubs, chains, and riot gear. On 12 July, the students protested the dormitory attack. They burnt tires, destroyed bus-stops and busses, chanted slogans blaming the Supreme Leader Khameneh'i for crimes committed by *Ansar* against the protestors. That day, the security forces and members of *Ansar-e Hezbollah* who appeared on motorcycles rounded up and attacked protestors. Due to spread of protests to other cities, government shut down Iran's cellular phone network and prevented communication of protestors. This incident was also the first major blow to reformist government of Khatami.

The brutal suppression of the protests and involvement of vigilante elements were regarded as a manifestation that the religious institutions of the Islamic Republic was powerful than the elected president, and that the president was not capable of intervening in favor of the protestors.³⁸ The closure of reformist newspapers by state authorities has become very common and ordinary since 1999, which has been regarded violation of basic constitutional right of freedom of press and publication by the Green Movement.

6.2.2. Pressure in University

During the first term of Ahmadinejad's presidency, *Basij* (Mobilization) forces assumed an active role in suppression of the opposition besides the plainclothesmen.

³⁸ Val Moghadam, "The Student Protests and the Social Movement for Reform in Iran: Sociological Reflections" in *Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis*, Vol. 15, No.2, November 1999; Michael Rubin, *Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran*, Policy Paper No. 56, (USA: The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 2001).

The *Basij* network and forces became primary means for putting pressure on the university student and professors, and for restricting freedom of speech and thought in the university. The *Basij* network also provided ideological mobilization of the Islamic Republic in the society and means for state cooptation under the presidency of Ahmadinejad.

Basij was formed during the 1979 Revolution for revolutionary mobilization by volunteer people. Although they fought besides armed forces during Iran-Iraq war, the *Basij*'s main function is to ensure political control and suppress dissidents. Golkar states that "the *Basij* had four main roles in controlling the Iranian society: (1) engaging in local defence, (2) conducting surveillance, (3) policing society, and (4) suppressing dissidents."³⁹ They operate under the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps command. Golkar further states that the *Basij* is organized into cluster-like networks under provincial and regional commands, into units and resistance groups. Morality policing, cultural propaganda, intelligence gathering, rescue and relief, security and defense are the major responsibilities of *Basij* units and resistance groups.⁴⁰ Thus, as argued by Afshon Ostovar, "*Basij* is an ideological organization ... whose raison d'être is to instill an ideological worldview in its members and promote those perspectives among the Iranian public."⁴¹ Despite the ideologically like-minded people supportive of the Islamic Republic mostly joins *Basij*, the organization can be regarded as one of the most influential means for state cooptation in Iranian society. Thorough joining *Basij*, volunteers gain access to various opportunities and privileges. Special quotas in university entrance, financial

³⁹ Saeid Golkar, "Organization of the Oppressed or Organization for Oppressing: Analyzing the Role of the *Basij* Militia of Iran" in *Politics, Religion and Ideology*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2012, p. 457.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 459. Ahmadinejad, who was himself a former *Basij* member, had began to use *Basij* network for intelligence gathering when he was serving as mayor of Tehran between 2001-2005. Golkar states that he "asked *Basijis* to act as secret agents and report to him about the Tehran district mayors and their activities." Sobh-e Sadegh, Tehran, 131 (15 December 2003), p. 1 referred in Saeid Golkar, "Organization of the Oppressed or Organization for Oppressing", p. 464.

⁴¹ Afshon Ostovar, "*Iran's Basij: Membership in a Militant Islamic Organization*" in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 67, No.3, Summer 2013, p. 359.

loans, subsidized government housing, subsidized food and household items, discounts in business are some benefits special to *Basij* members. Also, by being part of an influential wide social network the volunteers gain privileges.⁴²

The Student *Basij*, which was established after Khomeini's death in 1989, was created with the aims of recruitment of students for *Basij* organization and ideologization of university youth. *Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat* (Office of Strengthening Unity), the dominant organization within the university, objected the creation of Student *Basij* bureau within the university because it was not an independent organization but a government institution. In 1997, the university students and *Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat* actively supported Khatami's election.

Following Khatami's victory, Supreme Leader Khameneh'i urged involvement Student *Basij* in political activities in the university. They participated in the suppression of 1999 student riots in cooperation with *Ansar-e Hezbollah* vigilantes. Student *Basij's* opposition against Khatami increasingly continued until the end of his presidency. With the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005, the Student *Basij's* activities entered a new phase and they started to support Ahmadinejad government. The organization's ideological commitment became radicalized and they began to advocate for a second cultural revolution at the universities. Accordingly, Student *Basij* embarked on purging universities from dissidents and oppositional students as well as academics. Golkar argues that in the years 2008 – 2009, Student *Basij* was no longer a student organization but a self-declared paramilitary organization.⁴³ Student *Basij's* cooperation with *Herasat* (Security) offices in the universities, which were occupied by a representative from Ministry of Intelligence, was effective in the suppression of 2009 Green Movement protests.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 353 – 354.

⁴³ See Saeid Golkar, "The Reign of Hardline Students in Iranian Universities" in *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2010, p. 26.

Under Ahmadinejad's presidency, the enrollment within the ranks of Student *Basij* increased tremendously. This was partly due to financial support given to the organization by the government for network enlargement. However, the elements of state cooptation were also at work for increasing participation. During Ahmadinejad's presidency, enrollment in Student *Basij* bestowed the members with opportunities for graduate education and employment. It provided access to the state power structure, enabled social and political mobility for otherwise disadvantaged students.⁴⁴

Initiation of the Second Cultural Revolution by Ahmadinejad government was another manifestation of authoritarianism of the government. Second Cultural Revolution aimed at re-Islamization of the universities by purging un-Islamic elements.⁴⁵ Many secular and liberal professors were forced to resign to an early retirement, many left Iran to Europe and the U.S. because of the heightened pressure to leave the university. For instance, the well-known professors of Law and Political Science Department of Tehran University, Hossein Seifzadeh and Sadeq Zibakalam were subjected to forced-retirement, and Hossein Bashiriyeh had to leave Iran for the U.S.

After 2005 presidential elections, a phenomenon of starred-student (*daneshju-ye setarehdar*) was created by intelligence and security institutions and began to dominate education in Iran. Referred as "systematic discrimination and exclusion of students from higher education" by the report of International Campaign For Human

⁴⁴ See Saeid Golkar, "The Reign of Hardline Students."

⁴⁵ The second Cultural Revolution was a reference to the Cultural Revolution declared by the Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution. The High Council of the Cultural Revolution was created by a decree of Khomeini on 12 June 1980. The duty of the council was to revise all educational system to purge Western influences and establish an Islamic education system. All schools, including foreign schools, and universities were closed for three years, all the textbooks examined and revised in accordance with Islamic content, Iranian history was re-written in a way to glorify the Islamic past. Specifically for the purification in the universities the council declared University's Holy War (Jehade Daneshgahi) against leftist, Westernist, and corruptive influences. See Homa Omid, *Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State*, (Great Britain: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 157 – 167.

Rights in Iran, starting was based on the political beliefs of the students and their activities to exercise freedom of expression. In the case of Baha'i students, starring was applied based on religious beliefs. *Herasat* offices of the Ministry of Intelligence kept record of blacklisted students by putting a star near their names in their files and transcripts. The Ministry of Science, Technology and Research was the executive body for the prevention of starred student from higher education.

The starred students were those who passed the academic exam but prevented from education on the basis of number of stars they had. A one star student could continue education on the condition of written guarantee for not to continue political activity. Two starred students were those who could continue education after giving written guarantees but also accept that it was a temporary privilege and could be suspended any time if they involve in political activity. Three starred students were those whose credentials were totally rejected regardless of their academic success.

During 2006, the starred students case was made public. *Etemad-e Melli* newspaper, which was published by Mahdi Karroubi's *Etemad-e Melli* (National Trust) Party, brought the issue to its pages. The starred students organized several protests in front of Ministry of Science buildings and publicized the letters of refusal they got from the student selection committee of the ministry. A group of students even went to the parliament and met parliament members to get support to end discrimination. Due to increased complaints, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Research announced on March 1, 2007 that there would no longer be a problem of star markings or any other markings for the applicants, which might show a conditional selection. However, after 2007, the government adopted the policy of 'invisible stars', indicating that the selection committee reviewed the student applications but did not put star on transcripts so to mark them. According to *Etemad-e Melli* newspaper, the Selection Committee of Ministry of Science barred at least 50 students from

education in the 2007 entrance exams.⁴⁶ According to report of International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, 217 students were barred from education between 2005 and November 2010.⁴⁷ Within the framework of Green Movement, the policy of starring and barring from education was again a violation of the Constitutional rights of the Iranian people by the authoritarian government.

6.2.3. Pressure on Women's Movement

Those who suffered from unconstitutional arrangements of Ahmadinejad's government were not only students but also women. Iranian women were bestowed political rights in 1963 with Mohammad Reza Shah's White Revolution. In 1967, the Pahlavi state enforced 'Family Protection Law' and legalized equal rights between men and women. After the revolution in 1979, Family Protection Law was amended in accordance with *shari'a* and women were forced to wear *hejab* in public places. Parks, beaches, busses and other public places became gender-segregated. Although women protested these arrangements and refused to obey, the revolutionary repression and turmoil failed them to attain nation-wide organized support for their cause. Under the reformist government of Khatami, however, legal and social discrimination against women began to be voiced. The major development in this regard was the publication of the first feminist weekly of Iran, *Zan* (Woman), in July 1998. Published by Faezeh Hashimi Rafsanjani, it offered a platform for women to express their problems and the discrimination they faced. Upon publication of a Norouz message of Farah Pahlavi, the wife of dethroned Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the court took decision to close *Zan* in April 1999 on the charges of supporting feminism and criticizing *hejab*.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ "This Year Again Starred Students Were Given Invisible Stars," 26 May 2007, *Etemad-e Melli*, quoted in "Iran Punishing Stars: Systematic Discrimination and Exclusion in Iranian Higher Education," *International Campaign For Human Rights in Iran*, December 2010, p. 47.

⁴⁷ For further information see "Iran Punishing Stars."

⁴⁸ Ziba Mir-Hosseini, *Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran*, (USA: Princeton University Press, 1999).

The One Million Signatures Campaign initiated in 2006 became the first nation-wide organized campaign to defend women's rights and to end gender discrimination. The campaign was the result of series of conferences organized by the Iranian feminists after Shirin Ebadi, the Human Rights Lawyer, was awarded with Nobel Peace Prize in 2003. On June 12, 2005, a demonstration against gender discrimination was occurred in front of Tehran University. One year after, on June 12, 2006, nearly six hundred defenders of gender equality, men and women, gathered a larger demonstration in Haft-e Tir Square in Tehran. That day a pamphlet on 'The Effects of Laws on Women's Lives' was distributed in Tehran. The security forces attacked this peaceful demonstration and many of the demonstrators were arrested. After this event, on August 27, 2006, fifty-four activists launched One Million Signatures Campaign with the aim of dismantling discriminatory laws against women.⁴⁹

The method that the campaigning organizers had chosen was to put pressure on legislators by collecting one million signatures for the petition to change discriminatory laws. Avoiding any hierarchical structure of organization and arguing that there was no one way to reach the same goal, the campaign called for the participants to campaign in accordance with local conditions of each place on the basis of the basic principles stated in 'The Effects of Laws on Women' pamphlet.⁵⁰ The campaign spread all over Iran and campaigners gathered and worked in twenty cities.

However, Ahmadinejad government initiated a systematic crackdown on the campaign in 2007. The website of the campaign was blocked in February 2007, campaigners were arrested while they were collecting signatures in April; meetings and conferences of the campaign were prevented; publication of news about the campaign was banned. As a result of the crackdown the campaign could not reach

⁴⁹ "About "One Million Signatures Demanding Change to Discriminatory Laws"," available at <http://iranianfeministschool.info/english/spip.php?article8>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

⁵⁰ "The Effects of Law on Women's Lives", available at <http://iranianfeministschool.info/english/spip.php?article9>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

the target of one million signatures. Tahmasebi argued that some minor changes in family law were made during this period but they were more a response to realities of society rather than an achievement of the campaign. She stated that the authorities that accepted these changes were no longer in a position to not responding the needs of the society.⁵¹

The campaigners of one million signatures supported Musavi and Karrubi in 2009 elections and joined Green Movement protests. Many of the campaigners were arrested and some are still in prison serving their jail terms, but the defenders of legal equality between men and women continue to publish their stories in ‘we-change’ website.⁵²

6.2.4. Pressure on Intellectuals

In the face of protests and campaigns that were critical of the government policies, Ahmadinejad government propagated discourse of resistance against ‘soft war’ of the West. The color revolutions that succeeded to change governments in the former Soviet Union republics and in the Balkans aggrandized conspiracy outlook of the Iranian state. The government targeted intellectuals, who work in cooperation with foreign institutions, had links with foreign intellectuals and universities, and had dual citizenship. Ramin Jahanbegloo, Haleh Esfendiari and Kian Tajbakhsh were three

⁵¹ The changes were made in inheritance law, women were allowed to receive equal compensation with men from insurance companies in cases of accidents, and women were allowed to change her nationality to their children with the change in nationality law. However, according to Tahmasebi, the biggest change that the campaign achieved was creation of a discourse on women rights in the public and at the government level. Susan Tahmasebi, “The One Million Signatures Campaign: An Effort Born on the Streets,” available at <http://amnestymena.org/en/Magazine/Issue20/TheOneMillionSignatureCampaigninIran.aspx?media=print>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

⁵² Available at <http://we-change.org/site/english/>, accessed on 25 August 2015. For Ahmadinejad government’s discriminatory policies against women and women’s politicization also see Fatemeh Sadeghi, “*The Green Movement: A Struggle Against Patriarchy?*” in Negin Nabavi (ed.), *Iran: From Theocracy to the Green Movement*, (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 123 – 136.

scholars arrested and forced to make false confession as proofs of the anti-Islamic Republic conspiracies of Western states and institutions.

Ramin Jahanbegloo, the well-known Canadian-Iranian philosopher who received education in Harvard and Sorbonne universities, worked on political philosophy and non-violence, and authored many books on Western philosophy and modernity. He was detained on April 27, 2006 at the airport on his way to Brussels for a conference. The proposal he had submitted to German Marshall Fund on a project to compare Iranian and Eastern European intellectuals and the role of European intellectuals in the demise of communism and formation of civil society was the cause of his detention. Although the authorities did not make any explanation for his arrest, unanimous resources told that he was arrested on the charge of espionage and threat to national security.⁵³ Mohsen Kadivar, a well-known reformist cleric and philosopher, stated upon Jahanbegloo's arrest: "In a country fighting for respect of law and freedom of press for more than a hundred years, still we have a well-known figure who's arrested without a proper court order or open trial, and they don't even announce that he's been arrested. This is the height of insecurity and lawlessness."⁵⁴ Jahanbegloo's arrest provoked international reaction and on May 19, 2006 more than four hundred prominent international figures, philosophers, scholars, human rights activists issued an open letter demanding his immediate release.⁵⁵ Jahanbegloo was released on bail on August 30, 2006 after four months of confinement. In the interview he gave to ISNA one day after his release, Jahanbegloo said: "I never wanted to do a work against national interest or against Iranian nation. When I was in

⁵³ Payvand News Iran, "Iran Confirms Arrest of Top Scholar Ramin Jahanbegloo," 4 May 2006, available at <http://www.payvand.com/news/06/may/1036.html>, accessed on 25 August.

⁵⁴ BBC Tehran, "Iranian Autohor Arrested in Tehran" 3 May 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4970120.stm, accessed on 25 August 2015.

⁵⁵ Mansour Bonakdarian and Danny Postel, "Open Letter to the President of Iran," 13 July 2006, available at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/jul/13/open-letter-to-the-president-of-iran/>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

prison I felt that I was influenced by American institutions, a flow that I never wanted to be in.”⁵⁶

Haleh Esfendiari, an Iranian-American academic and Director of the Middle East Program at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, was arrested on May 8, 2007. Actually she was under pressure since December 30, 2006, the day she was attacked by three men when she was on the way to airport after visiting her ailing mother. Her bag and passport were taken in the incident. She barred from travelling outside Iran and the Ministry of Intelligence authorities began interrogating her, mainly on her activities in Woodrow Wilson Center. She was forced to make false confession for her participation in anti-government activities. She was arrested upon her refusal to make confession.⁵⁷

On May 11, 2007, another Iranian-American dual citizen, Kian Tajbakhsh, an urban planner who was supposed to joined faculty of urban planning at Columbia University, and a consultant for George Soros’ Open Society Institute, was arrested at his home in Tehran. He was accused with espionage and involvement in plans to topple Iranian government. His travel outside Iran has still been banned.

Esfendiari, Tajbakhsh and Jahanbegloo forced to make public confessions on the Iranian state television on July 18, 2007. The program was titled ‘In the Name of Democracy...’ (*Beh nam-e demokrasi*). The main theme of the forced confessions was plans and actions conducted ‘in the name of democracy’ by American government and institutions, which were to undermine Iranian government by organizing another ‘Velvet revolution’ in Iran.⁵⁸ The ‘soft war’ discourse of the state

⁵⁶ “Jahanbegloo: Esham-e Jasousi be man...,” available at, <http://isna.ir/fa/news/8506-05273/>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

⁵⁷ BBC News, “Iran Accuses US-Iranian Scholar,” 22 May 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6679779.stm, accessed on 25 August 2015.

⁵⁸ Ettela’at, “Beh Nam-e Demokrasi: Matne Kamil-e Eterafat-e Ejbari-ye Hale Esfandiari, Yahya Kian Tajbakhsh va Ramin Jahanbegloo,” 7 July 2006, available at <http://www.ettelaat.net/07-juli/news.asp?id=22678>, accessed on 25 August 2015; BBC Persian, “Bernameh-ye Beh Nam-e

was strengthened with the Green Movement protests in 2009. The government crackdown was justified as an act to prevent a Green revolution, which was, according to Khameneh'i, staged by enemies of the Islamic Republic.⁵⁹

6.2.5. Economic Mismanagement

Green Movement was also critical of the economic policy of the Ahmadinejad government. Elimination of government mismanagement, growing gap between economic classes and poverty were demands of the protestor from the authorities.

The 2005 election campaign of Ahmadinejad was built on the discourse of economic justice and effective redistribution of resources. Privatization, subsidy reforms, monetary policy and banking were the three main areas that Ahmadinejad government's populist policy's effects were visible. Privatization had long been a debated issue in Iran since the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989. Ahmadinejad continued with privatization scheme after revising the privatization law; a revision to ensure distribution of forty percent of the shares of the privatized firms to low-income households at discounted prices, which he called as "justice shares (*saham-e adalat*)."⁶⁰ The low-income population that the justice shares were distributed included veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, families of the martyrs, and families that received income support from government welfare agencies. The remaining forty percent of shares were sold on the stock market, but the buyers were semi-state agencies and foundations (*bonyads*), and investors who had close ties to security or government officials.⁶⁰ The privatization program became an instrument

Demokrasi: Daryaft-e Mardomi, Tahlil-e Hokumat," 21 July 2007, available at http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2007/07/070721_mv-az-tv-confessions.shtml, accessed on 25 August 2015.

⁵⁹ "Supreme Leader: Countering Enemy's Soft War, Main Priority," 25 November 2009, available at http://english.khamenei.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1209&Itemid=2, accessed on 25 August 2015.

⁶⁰ Nader Habibi, "The Economic Legacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad," *Middle East Brief*, No. 74, June 2013.

of cooptation by the government through justice shares to facilitate the continuation of political support in society. In addition, it created new patrimonial networks and strengthened corporatism.⁶¹

Subsidy reform was the most radical economic policy of Ahmadinejad's government. Since 1979 revolution energy products such as gasoline, natural gas, and diesel fuel were largely subsidized besides staple foods. The subsidies on energy products created a problem of waste and overconsumption over the years. However, Iran was importing about forty percent of its fuel due to lack of refining capacity. When the international sanctions began to be imposed because of the nuclear stalemate, Iran's dependence on foreign markets rendered the economy more vulnerable. Thus, the subsidy reform bill that Ahmadinejad presented to the parliament in December 2008 was approved in January 2010.⁶² At the time of 2009 presidential elections, this bill had still been debated in the parliament and its radical content as well as indeterminate implications of its application was a source of unrest among Iranian people.

The third concern of Ahmadinejad's economic policy was monetary policy and banking. He used state-owned commercial banks as instruments to implement government projects, by ordering them to divert their resources to government's preferred geographic areas and activities at low interest rates and increasing the

⁶¹ See Kevan Harris, "The Rise of the Subcontractor State: Politics of the Pseudo-Privatization in the Islamic Republic of Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 45, 2013, pp. 45 – 70.

⁶² The bill envisioned the removal of price subsidies, a rise in prices of imported gasoline and other refined oil products, and cash subsidies to low-income households to contain the burden of price rise. However, due to difficulties faced by the Statistical Center of Iran to determine the household incomes and the political concerns about the possible social unrest because of denial of cash subsidies to middle and upper middle classes, the monthly cash payments were eventually offered to all citizens. In addition, business sector was offered loans and financial supports. These cash payments were amounted to fifty percent of the income that the government earned from price rise, and the loans were amounted to thirty percent of that income. Finally, the plan started to be implemented on 19 December 2010. However, it not alone did not eliminate the fiscal burden since the earnings were redistributed to households and businesses, but resulted in inflation with the rise of prices of many other goods and services as the people began to spend the cash money. Kevan Harris, "The Politics of Subsidy Reform in Iran," *Middle East Report*, No. 254, Spring 2010, pp. 36 – 39; Nader Habibi, "The Economic Legacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad," *Middle East Brief*, No. 74, June 2013, pp. 3 – 4.

amount of loans received by government agencies from the commercial banks. Thus, the government debt was no more due to the Central Bank but to state-owned commercial banks. Ahmadinejad also initiated non-bank financial institutions to increase the government's control over economy. These institutions were mostly affiliated with *bonyads* (charity foundations), Islamic Revolutionary Guards and *Basij*, and they operated to the detriment of state-owned commercial banks due to government support.⁶³

On the whole, the most favored institution of Ahmadinejad's economic policy was the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Former members of the IRGC were appointed to important government posts and occupied managerial levels of economic enterprises.⁶⁴ The IRGC-related firms were the beneficiaries of the privatization scheme and they also received preferential loans from the state-controlled commercial banks. The IRGC-related construction and engineering company, *Khatam-al Anbiya* (Seal of the Prophets), became the largest economic enterprise. After the imposition of sanctions, the IRGC-affiliated companies carried out their activities abroad to sustain economy and engaged in activities such as establishing front companies in other countries to enable the flow of imports and exports.⁶⁵

⁶³ Nader Habibi, "The Economic Legacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad."

⁶⁴ Bayram Sinkaya, *Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations*, (Great Britain: Routledge, 2016), pp. 165-197; Ali Alfoneh, "The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics," *The Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2008, available at <http://www.meforum.org/1979/the-revolutionary-guards-role-in-iranian-politics>, accessed on 25 August 2015.

⁶⁵ Jahangir Amouzegar, "Ahmadinejad's Legacy," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XX, No.4, Winter 2013, p. 130. On the role of *Khatam-al Anbia* to bypass sanctions see Masoud Behnoud, "Hadaf-e Tahrir-e Amrika: Ghararghah-e Sazendagiye Khatam-al Anbiya-ye Sepah (The Target of American Sanctions: Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters)" *BBC Persian*, available at http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2007/10/071026_ka-mb-us-iran-sanction-khatam.shtml, accessed on 25 August 2015.

The consequences of Ahmadinejad's economic policy were a matter of debate. In winter 2013, at the end of the second term of Ahmadinejad's presidency, an Iranian economist Jahangir Amuzegar wrote:

With the exception of Ahmadinejad himself and his small circle of friends and admirers, there is no analyst inside or outside of Iran who does not believe that the Iranian economy was grossly mismanaged, if not permanently damaged, during his administration. The extent and dimensions of this mismanagement, however, are hard to assess due to the official data that is deliberately withheld, camouflaged, doctored, falsified, or contradicted by the agencies involved.⁶⁶

Nader Habibi also mentioned the fact that essential data had not been provided by the government agencies. He noted that Ahmadinejad's government was criticized by the members of the parliament and economic experts for delaying the release of economic data and inaccuracy in statistics.⁶⁷ However, it was certain that the low-income group and the revolutionary guards were benefited from his economic policies. Ahmadinejad's attention to low-income households and low-income regions of the country facilitated state cooptation and continuation of political support among the people benefited from these policies.

Although the government did relatively well in the economy in the first three years of presidency due to high oil prices, the effects of sanctions began to be severely felt in 2008 when the economy was weak. The government blamed sanctions as justification for economic hardship. Salehi-Isfahani argued that this was not accurate picture and the main cause of worsening economy was rooted inside, mainly the banking crisis resulted by lowering interest rates for the redistributive populist economic policy of the government.⁶⁸ He further stated that dissatisfaction with

⁶⁶ Jahangir Amuzegar, "Ahmadinejad's Legacy," p. 126.

⁶⁷ Nader Habibi, "The Economic Legacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad," p. 8. Also for general information on Iran's economic policy, stakeholders and sectors by 2009 see Shayerah Ilias, "Iran's Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues", Congressional Research Service, 15 June 2009.

⁶⁸ Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Iran Sanctions: Who Really Wins," *Brookings*, 30 September 2009.

economic stagnation and rising poverty were not the reasons for the emergence of Green Movement. Rather, it was the growth of the middle class that reduced the size of lower income class in the last ten years since 1999. This change, he argued, was the primary impact of economy on the rise of the movement.⁶⁹ In the same vein, Fariba Adelhah argued that explanations based on economic factors were not adequate to explain the character of the Green Movement since because the movement could not be reduced to a question of economic grievances. In her view, other factors such as “the distinction between the city and the countryside, or between disadvantaged regions and those benefiting from oil wealth ... are important.”⁷⁰ Leaving the character and composition of the Green Movement aside, it was a popular manifestation of demands to end economic grievances, by elimination of mismanagement, corruption, and favoritism.

6.3. Coordination of the Green Movement

The Green Movement’s coordination began with the announcement of the candidacy of Mahdi Karroubi on October 12, 2008 for the tenth presidential elections of 2009. The movement’s mobilization intensified with Mir Hossein Musavi’s declaration of candidacy on March 10, 2009. Former president Khatami, who had earlier declared his intention to run for elections, withdrew his declaration in support of Musavi. Khatami’s decision intensified the feeling of unity among reformists and added positively to the coordination and mobilization of the movement.⁷¹

The parties that declared support to reformist candidates were mainly Association of Combatant Clerics, The Organization of the Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution,

⁶⁹ Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “Iran Sanctions.”

⁷⁰ Fariba Adelhah, “Political Economy of the Green Movement: Contestation and Political Mobilization in Iran” in Negin Nabavi (ed.), *Iran: From Theocracy to the Green Movement*, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 33.

⁷¹ Tehran Times, “Khatami Officially Drops Out of the Race,” 18 March 2009, available at http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=191252, accessed on 26 August 2015.

Servants of Reconstruction Party, Participation Front, Freedom Movement of Iran, and National Trust Party. Despite having divergent views on certain policies, these parties fall under the 'reformist' headline of the Iranian political sphere. The ideological endurance of the conservative current of the Islamic Revolution, effective state cooptation through social and economical benefits and the existence of vested interests in the continuation of the system without reform led to solidified non-reformist (Principalists/*Usulgarayan*) and reformist (*Eslahtalaban*) camps in current Iranian politics. Thus, the Green Movement was mainly supported by reformist parties, who have been demanding change in the Islamic Republic's system to the direction of legality since mid-1990s, meaning proper implication of the constitution, formation of civil society in which individual, political and social freedoms could flourish, and a foreign policy based on dialogue and moderation.⁷² However, the constituency of these parties was not restricted to any social class; i.e. the Green Movement got support of diverse social classes.

6.3.1. Association of Combatant Clerics (*Majme'eh-ye Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez*)

The Association of the Combatant Clergy (*Majme'eh-ye Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez*) was established in April 1988 as a result of a split within the revolutionary clerics organization, *Ruhaniyat*. A group of clerics from *Ruhaniyat*, namely Mehdi Karrubi, Mohammad Musavi-Khoeiniha, Mahmud Doai, Mohammad Tavassoli, Mohammad Khatami, Mohammad Jamarani, Ayatollah Hassan Sane'i and Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, had controversy on the nomination of candidates for the third Majles elections with the other clerics in *Ruhaniyat*, and they announced the establishment of *Ruhaniyat* just before the third Majles elections. The reason they declared for their split from the *Ruhaniyat* was that due to their differences of opinion with other respected clergymen of the organization they decided to form another organization to serve the Imam and the people better. Khomeini gave his blessings to the new

⁷² Saeed Barzin, "Factionalism in Iran," *The World Today*, 51:10, October 1995, p. 202; Kamal Akbari, "Naqsh-e Ahzab dar Siyasat pas az Enqelab-e Islami (The Role of Parties in Politics after Islamic Revolution)," *'Ulum-e Siyasi (Political Sciences)*, No. 47, Autumn 2009.

organization. He went further and tried to present this split as an indicative of pluralism in the Islamic society rather than being a power struggle or a conflict.⁷³

The differences of opinion between *Ruhaniyat* and *Ruhaniyun* were on economic and foreign policies of the Islamic Republic. While *Ruhaniyat* was in favor of private property and market economy in accordance with Islamic ordinances, *Ruhaniyun* argued the necessity of state intervention in the economy to support the poor. On foreign policy, *Ruhaniyun* had more radical views including the export of revolution.

Ruhaniyun decided to cease its activities in 1992 when Guardians Council wanted to review the credentials of the association's clerics for the Council of Experts election, and dismissed *Ruhaniyun*'s candidates in fourth Majles election. *Ruhaniyun*'s reason for temporary halt of its activities was that the clergy became fond of acquiring power rather than serving for the Islamic Republic and the revolution; thus, their withdrawal from politics might end the power race and create more suitable conditions for the realization of goals of Islamic Revolution. However, in the words of Khomeini, this did not come through,⁷⁴ and *Ruhaniyun* decided to resume its political activity just before the 1997 presidential elections with the permission of Ayatollah Khameneh'i on October 19, 1996. *Ruhaniyun* had asked for the candidacy of Mir Hossein Musavi on 17 October. Musavi refused the offer and *Ruhaniyun* turned to Mohammad Khatami at the end of October. *Ruhaniyun* became the main supporter of Khatami in 1997 elections where he was elected with unprecedented popular endorsement until that day.⁷⁵

⁷³ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran (History of Political Parties in Iran)*, (Shiraz: Entesharat-e Novid-e Shiraz, 1380 (2001/2002)), pp. 301 – 302.

⁷⁴ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran*, p. 302.

⁷⁵ *Ruhaniyun* was subjected to *de facto* attempts of exclusion from politics. Khameneh'i had been a member of *Ruhaniyat* and his election for *Rahbariyat* after death of Khomeini gave the clerics of *Ruhaniyat* advantaged position in government bodies. Thus, *Ruhaniyun*'s candidates were rejected in 1992 parliamentary elections and later in 1996 parliamentary elections. The presidency of Khatami was a victory for *Ruhaniyun*. The association participated 2nd Khordad Front with all supporters of Khomeini and the *Ruhaniyun* clerics gained access to government positions. For instance, Mehdi Karrubi became the Speaker of Parliament in Khatami's cabinet. *Ruhaniyun*'s hold on power lasted

Khatami's election campaign also declared change in the initial ideology of the *Ruhaniyun* from radicalism to freedom, civil society, rule of law, promotion of Islamic democracy. With Khatami's election, reformist political faction gained a firm ground in Islamic Republic's political history, whose legacy has given rise to the Green Movement in 2009. Just as *Ruhaniyun* had been a major player in reformist faction in 1997, the association became a major supporter of Mir Hossein Musavi and the Green Movement of hope in June 12, 2009 presidential elections.

6.3.2. The Organization of the Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution (*Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Enqelab-e Islami-ye Iran*)

The Organization of the Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution was founded in 1979 with the unification of seven armed groups that had been involved in secret and underground activities against the Shah before the 1979 Revolution.⁷⁶ These groups were composed of non-clerical individuals who were followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. Upon Khomeini's return to Iran on February 1, 1979, these groups were in charge of his protection.⁷⁷

The common ground of the seven groups at the time of unification was their belief in the leadership of Khomeini and the *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of jurisconsult). Their obedience to Khomeini would become the glue between these groups that unified them. The *Mujahedin* proposed remedies for the post-revolutionary problems such as: (1) Preparation of a referendum for the approval of the constitution and

short and in 2004 parliamentary elections its candidates were disqualified together with many other candidates from 2nd Khordad Front. Karrubi, who lost presidency to Ahmadinejad in 2005 presidential elections, became the most vocal critique of the elections. In an open letter he wrote to Ayatollah Khameneh'i, he complained about the involvement of the military and paramilitary forces in the elections and declared them unfair. "Assembly of Combatant Clerics," *Iran Data Portal*, available at <http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/parties/mrm/>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

⁷⁶ These organizations were Mansurun, Ommat-e Vahede, Gorouh-e Tojidi Saf, Muhedin, Badr, Salah, Falagh. These organizations were also the foundational base of IRGC.

⁷⁷ "Organization of the Mujahedeen of the Islamic Revolution of Iran", *Iran Data Portal*, available at <http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/parties/mojahedin/>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

immediate arrangement of parliamentary and presidential elections; (2) preparation of plans to the benefit of *mostazafin* (downtrodden); (3) control of all armed groups by the revolutionary leadership; (4) ceasing diplomatic relations with the U.S. until the expulsion of the Shah and anti-revolutionary elements, and annulment of all imperialist agreements with foreign powers such as the U.S.; (5) appointment to all important positions people from followers of Imam's line. Actually, many of the members were also active in the Revolutionary Committees and the founders of *Mujahedin* were also involved in the foundation of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. *Mujahedin* actively involved in the struggle against Bani-Sadr government and dominated the first parliament in 1980 election as part of a coalition of followers of Imam's line.⁷⁸

However, a month after the establishment of the *Mujahedin*, controversies began to appear among the members on certain issues. According to Mohsen Armin, a member of the *Mujahedin* and director of the organization's newspaper, *Asr-e Ma*, The first controversy appeared one month after the establishment over the issue of publishing a statement on the occasion of Workers' Day. A group of members regarded any concern on Workers' Day as an association with communist ideas. The second controversy occurred one month after on publishing a statement for the commemoration of 'Ali Shari'ati. While a group of members regarded Shari'ati as a heretic, others regarded him as a reformer among intellectuals who had important role in the formation of the 1979 Revolution.⁷⁹ Although the *Mujahedin* was one of the most active groups that struggled against liberal government and Bani-Sadr during the initial years of the Islamic Republic, the divergent views among members led to creation of three factions: (1) rightest faction of Ahmad Tavakkoli, (2) leftist faction of Behzad Nabavi, (3) centrist faction of Morteza Alviri. Due to the fact that the advisor to the organization appointed by Khomeini, Ayatollah Hossein Rasti-

⁷⁸ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran*, pp. 257 – 259.

⁷⁹ *Asr-e Ma*, No. 104, 95, 93 quoted in Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran*, pp. 254 – 255.

Kashani, was a rightist in his political views, the leftist members had disagreements with him with regard to political matters. When the controversies among these groups reached to utmost point, the two rightist and leftist factions resigned in 1982 and left the organization to the remaining Alviri faction. The Organization of the Mujahedeen of the Islamic Revolution continued its activities until 1986 when it declared dissolution.⁸⁰

The leftist faction of Behzad Nabavi resumed political activity on October 2, 1991 with a slight change in name, The Organization of Mujahedeen of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Nabavi group, who had resigned from the first *Mujahedin*, introduced their political stance as leftists who were the followers of Imam's line, and holders of radical tendency and faith in principles and values of the Islamic Revolution. In the leftist ideology of *Mujahedin*, defending constitution and lawfulness in the administration of the country was one of the most important aims of the organization. The organization argued that all the political parties and groups should operate freely on the condition that they observe the constitution. In economy, opposition to trade capitalism in Iran was the organization's main policy. They were against both to accumulation of wealth in the hands of a group and transformation of state into the largest employer. Thus, according to Nozari, *Mujahedin* differentiated itself both from socialist and capitalist economy models.⁸¹ However, they were in favor of a strong state. According to their analysis of social underdevelopment of Iranian society, they concluded that only a strong state that would devise development programs and intervene in society could overcome the problem of underdevelopment. In foreign policy, the *Mujahedin* tried to prevent the U.S. influence in the region.

According to Nozari, *Mujahedin* had the most real party-like structure among all other parties in the Islamic Republic. The organization of the party was composed of

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 255 – 257.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

the Congress that held once every year, the Central Committee, the Arbitration Council, the Political Council, and the Executive Board. The party had branches all over the country, organized seminars for the education of party members, public meetings to answer any questions, and published bi-weekly newspaper, *Asr-e Ma*. It was more unified in ideology than the first *Mujahedin* and closed to new membership to sustain the coherence and quality of leadership. The party accepted new members for the first time before the 1999 municipal elections.⁸²

The *Mujahedin*'s ideology became closer to the reformists by the end of 1990s. Although constitutionalism had been one of the pillars of the *Mujahedin*, they began to put more emphasis on the equal weight for the republican and Islamic aspects of the regime. They began to prioritize political rights, reformist Islamism, and normalizing external relations including the U.S.-Iran relations. In economy, their views shifted from statism to justice-centered developmentalism. The organization joined the reformists in 2 Khordad (May 23, 1999) elections in support of Khatami. During Khatami's presidency, the members of the *Mujahedin* served in high-level positions. In the sixth parliament (2000-2004), two members of the *Mujahedin*, its leader Behzad Nabavi and spokesman Mohsen Armin, served as deputy speakers of the parliament. However, the conservative backlash on reformists in 2002 also influenced *Mujahedin* and a prominent member of the organization, history professor Hashem Aghajari, was sentenced to death on the charge of apostasy. The authorities brought him to trial because he had mentioned Islamic Protestantism in one his lectures. His sentence eventually reduced to five years in prison. As a continuation of the backlash, the Guardians Council disqualified *Mujahedin*'s candidates for the seventh parliamentary elections (2004-2008). In reaction to disqualification, the organization boycotted the elections. In 2005 presidential election, the party declared support for the reformist candidate, Mostafa Mo'een. Ahmadinejad's victory in the elections left *Mujahedin* out of the government structure.⁸³

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 268 – 269.

⁸³ "Organization of the Mujahedeen of the Islamic Revolution of Iran", *Iran Data Portal*, available at <http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/parties/mojahedin/>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

Mujahedin supported Mir Hossein Musavi in the 2009 presidential election. Although Khatami was their first candidate, they gave support to Musavi when Khatami decided not to run for. *Mujahedin* was one of the severely influenced parties from the post-election government crackdown on the opposition of Green Movement. Many of its leaders were arrested, including Behzad Nabavi, Feizollah Arabsorkhi, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Parviz Qadiani, and Javad Emam. The *Mujahedin* has been dissolved by court order by after 2009 elections.⁸⁴

6.3.3. Servants of Reconstruction Party (*Hezb-e Kargozaran-e Sazandegi*)

The Party of the Servants of the Construction of Iran (*Kargozaran*) was formed before the elections for the fifth parliament (1996-2000) through a declaration signed by sixteen ministers, deputies of the president, and head of the Central Bank of Iran on January 17, 1996.⁸⁵ These technocrats united to declare their support to President Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose economic policies had been under attack by the conservative groups, especially *Ruhaniyat*. Their foundational statement declared “support for Hashemi support for the course of reconstruction; support for Hashemi is support for expansion of social justice and public welfare; support for Hashemi is support for Imam’s way and following *velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih* (absolute guardianship of jurisconsult), support for Hashemi is elimination of destitution from

⁸⁴ BBC News, “Iranian Court Bans Two Leading Opposition Parties,” 27 September 2010, available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11421538>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

⁸⁵ Names and affiliations of the sixteen people were: Esmail Shushtari, Minister of Justice; Ataollah Mohajarani, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (1997-2000); Mohsen Noorbakhsh, Head of the Central Bank of Iran (1981-2003); Mohammad Hashemi, advisor to president; Mohammad ‘Ali Najafi, Minister of Education; Morteza Mohammad Khan, Minister of Finance; Isa Kalantari, Minister of Agriculture; Akbar Torkan, Minister of Roads and Transportation; Seyyed Mohammad Gherzi, Minister of Posts, Telegraph and Telephone; Bijan Zanganeh; Gholamhossein Karbaschi, Mayor of Tehran (1989-1997); Reza Amrollahi; Gholamreza Furuzash, Ministry of Reconstruction War; Mostafa Hashi Taba, Director of Organization of Physical Education; Gholamreza Shafe’i, Minister of Cooperatives; Mohammad Reza Ne’matzadeh, Minister of Industry and Mines. Mohammad Atrian-Far, the editor of Hamshahri newspaper and Faezeh Hashemi, member in the fifth parliament (2000-2004) and daughter of Hashemi Rafsanjani were also among the influential members of the party.

various parts of the country; support for Hashemi is support for globalization of the revolution and following the practical principles of the revolution.”⁸⁶ The slogans of the *Kargozaran* were Islamic honor, continuation of reconstruction, and construction of Iran.⁸⁷

Kargozaran was against state intervention in economy, politics and culture. Economically they were in favor of free market economy and privatization. They had a more liberal stance than *Ruhaniyat* in cultural affairs, and they supported social freedoms. However, their liberalist attitude was more related to economic liberalism rather than cultural liberalism. In foreign policy, colonialism and imperialism did not have a place in the party’s rhetoric. Instead, some of the members were in favor of negotiation with the U.S. The party’s press organ was the newspaper published by Tehran municipality, *Hamshahri*, during the mayorship of party’s general-secretary Gholamhossein Karbaschi.⁸⁸

The establishment of the new party was objected to the criticisms of *Ruhaniyat* on the grounds that the formation of the *Kargozaran* was a blow to the unity of *Ruhaniyat*, and that the group was monopolizing the phrase “servants of reconstruction” as if they were the only people with this aim. However, Ayatollah Khameneh’i approved the formation of the party and the members participated in the fifth Majles elections. They had a victory against the candidates of *Ruhaniyat* and formed the dominant group in the fifth parliament. In the 1997 presidential elections *Kargozaran* joined the coalition of reformists and supported Khatami. With his victory, *Kargozaran* members preserved their access to the government. They also won seats in 2000 parliamentary elections. However, like other supporters of reformist camp, *Kargozaran* also suffered from conservative backlash in 2002. For

⁸⁶ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran*, p. 278.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 276 – 277.

⁸⁸ Mehdi Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*, (USA: Syracuse University Press, 2002), pp. 130-134.

instance Tehran mayor Karbaschi summoned in an embezzlement case and sentenced to three years in prison. The Guardians Council disqualified their candidates in 2004 parliamentary elections. In 2005 presidential elections, *Kargozaran* supported Hashemi Rafsanjani, who lost the race to Ahmadinejad in the second round of the elections.

By 2005 *Kargozaran* was active for almost a decade. During this period the party persevered the rightest stance on economy, promoted development through privatization, free market, and foreign investment. Despite criticism to the party, they continued pragmatic relations with *Ruhaniyat* and other conservative clergy. However, after 1997 the party became closer to the reformist camp and entered into coalition with *Ruhaniyun*. The change of *Ruhaniyun*'s stance from radicalism to moderation also enabled this coalition. The two divergent currents of early 1990s found a common ground in privatization, normalization of relations with the outside world, promotion of social justice, and development of civil society.

Kargozaran supported Mir Hossein Musavi in 2009 presidential elections along the lines of the party's agenda. Actually Musavi's political inclination was more centrist rather than leftist. The secretary-general of *Kargozaran*, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, was the only party member who declared his endorsement for Mahdi Karroubi, the leftist candidate of reformists.

Kargozaran, although survived from the fate of dissolution, suffered from the government suppression during the Green Movement protests. Three influential members of the party, Mohammad Atrianfar, Hedayat Aghae, and Jahanbakhsh Khanjani, were arrested in the protests.

6.3.4. Islamic Iran Participation Front (*Jebhe-ye Mosharakat-e Islami-ye Iran*)

The Islamic Iran Participation Front was the party of reformists that was born out of the election success of Khatami in 1997. Although Khatami was listed as the

candidate of *Ruhaniyun*, the younger non-clerical personalities among the leftist faction, who were among the “Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line” (*Daneshjuyan-e Mosalman-e Peyrovan-e Khatt-e Emam*), also supported Khatami due to his new and reformist ideas. Initially they were gathered around Strategic Studies Center and Salam newspaper, both of which were directed by Musavi Khoeiniha, and began to work for the election of Khatami to presidency. After Khatami became president, this group of 110 people decided to organize the movement under a party roof and to pursue reformist goals not only as an ideological front but also as a unified political organization. They declared the party’s formation on December 5, 1998. The party started its activities on its getting permission from the Interior Ministry on February 20, 1999. Since then, *Mosharakat* has been the largest reformist party of Iran. Mohammad Reza Khatami, younger brother of Mohammad Khatami, who served as deputy speaker of the parliament in 2000-2005, was the Secretary-General of the party until 2005. The other important personalities of the *Mosharakat* are Secretary-General Mohsen Mirdamadi who served as member of the sixth parliament, Saeed Hajjarian, chief theorist and strategist of the “reform movement” and served as an advisor to Khatami, Abdollah Ramazanzadeh who served as the spokesperson of Khatami’s cabinet, and Mostafa Tajzadeh who served as the deputy of the Ministry of Interior.

Mosharakat party presented new concepts to the discourse of Iranian politics. For instance, the slogan of Khatami’s election campaign, “Iran for all Iranians (*Iran baraye hameh-ye Iranian*)” became the slogan of all reformists. The slogan of *Sobh-e Emrooz* newspaper published by Saeed Hajjarian, “to know is the right of people (*danestan haqq-e mardom est*)”, was also endorsed by the reformists. The party’s aim was to provide participation of all Iranians to the political and social affairs of the Iran. The philosophy of Islamic reformism that flourished in the classes of Abdolkarim Soroush in the beginning of 1990s was the central ideological orientation of this group. The influence of ideas of Soroush changed the group’s political orientation from radicalism and anti-imperialism to political and social liberalization, normalization of foreign policy, and market economy. The party

presented itself as the opposition to the current state of Iran, especially increasing state control in the social affairs. They even criticized their occupation of the U.S. Embassy in 1978 and affirmed that they were no longer living in the past but today. Khatami's election slogan, "freedom in expression, reason in speech, and law in action" became the guidelines of activity for the party. Khatami's presidential victory was the first chance for the reformists to access the executive and implement reformist political agenda.⁸⁹

Under Khatami's government *Mosharakat* Party became active in politics. Especially with the holding of municipal elections in February 1999, which was constitutionally stated but had not been held until Khatami's presidency, *Mosharakat* Party members gained majority of seats in municipal councils. In the elections for the sixth Majles in February 18, 2000, *Mosharakat* mobilized with the slogan "Iran for all Iranians, spirituality, justice and freedom." The party gained a landslide victory and managed to get around 150 seats out of 290 in the parliament. *Mosharakat's* being the majority group in the parliament enabled many reform bills regarding the press, satellite usage, and foreign investment to be enacted. However, some of the bills could not be executed by the president due to the Guardians Council's rejection. Especially in the second term of Khatami's presidency, the bills regarding the empowerment of the president and reform of the election law created crisis between the parliament and the Guardians Council in September 2002 that lasted until March 2004 when Khatami eventually had to withdraw the bill.

In 2001 presidential elections *Mosharakat* was the main supporter of Khatami and his victory for the second term of presidency enabled the party to continue its access to the government for another four years. However, *Mosharakat* lost its power in the municipal councils with their defeat in 2003 municipal elections. This was the beginning of reformists' decline. In 2004 parliamentary elections the Guardians

⁸⁹ Mohammad 'Ali Zandi, "Jebhe-ye Mosharakat-e Iran-e Eslami," available at <http://www.pajooh.com/fa/index.php?Page=definition&UID=43083>, accessed on 28 August 2015.

Council did not accept the candidacy of many party members and the party boycotted the elections. In the 2005 presidential elections, *Mosharakat* supported the reformist candidate Mostafa Mo'en, the former Minister of Higher Education, in the first round and Hashemi Rafsanjani in the second round. With the election Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, *Mosharakat* lost its power in the executive.

Mosharakat (Participation) newspaper was the official publication of the party until it was closed in April 2000 crackdown on the reformist press alongside with other newspaper such as *Sobh-e Emrooz*, *Aftab-e Emrooz*, *Bahar*, *Jame'eh*, *Tus*. After then, *Norouz* newspaper became the publication organ of the party. Reforms in the election law, the press law, the party law, and preparation of law for definition of the political crime continued to be the major political aims of the party programme.

Mosharakat supported Mir Hossein Musavi in 2009 presidential elections and became a major supporter of the Green Movement after elections. Twenty-five members of the party, including Secretary-General Mohsen Mirdamadi, Vice Secretary-General Abdullah Ramazanzadeh, Central Committee member Mostafa Tajzadeh, political advisor to the secretary-general Azar Mansuri, and Saeed Hajjarian were arrested in the post-election crackdown by the government. Many members of the Central Committee resigned after arrests and trials that rendered the party inactive. In September 2010 *Mosharakat* was banned from public activity by a court order.⁹⁰

6.3.5. The Freedom Movement of Iran (*Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran*)

The Freedom Movement of Iran was formed on May 3, 1961 by 25 founder members under the leadership of Engineer Mehdi Bazargan. Dr. Yadollah Sahabi, Ayatollah

⁹⁰ Mohammad 'Ali Zandi, "Jebhe-ye Mosharakat-e Iran-e Eslami," available at <http://www.pajooh.com/fa/index.php?Page=definition&UID=43083>, accessed on 28 August 2015; "Islamic Iran Participation Front", Iran Data Portal, available at <http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/parties/mosharekat/>, accessed on 28 August 2015.

Mahmud Taleqani were also among the founders of the party. Coming from the tradition of National Front, the main idea of the movement was “the Shah must reign, not rule.” The movement aimed to strengthen constitutionality by restricting the Shah’s power. Bazargan identified the group’s identity as such: “Firstly, we are Muslims, we regard religion and politics are not separate. Secondly, we are Iranians, however our love of Iran and our nationalism is not dependent to race. Thirdly, we are Mosaddeqists, we regard Mosaddeq as pride of Iran and the East.”⁹¹

After the 1963 uprising, the group’s leaders were arrested and were kept in prison for many years. Due to the severe repression inside the country after 1963, the movement could not continue its activities inside Iran but members of the movement outside Iran pursued the goals of Freedom Movement mainly in the U.S. and France. In the U.S., members of former National Resistance Movement and Organization of Students of National Front who left for the U.S. and France to continue higher education formed the Freedom Movement of Iran Abroad. While Ebrahim Yazdi, Mostafa Chamran, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, Mohammad Nahshab and Abbas Amir Entezam were active in the U.S, Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr and ‘Ali Shari‘ati were active in France. After the 1979 Revolution, the members of the Freedom Movement Abroad came back to Iran, formed interim government and were appointed to important government positions. Ebrahim Yazdi served as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in Bazargan government. Mostafa Chamran became the Defense Minister in the interim government. Sadeq Qotbzadeh served as a member of Revolutionary Council, spokesperson of Khomeini and became the director of state radio and television (*Seda-o-Sima*) on 11 February. He also served as minister of foreign affairs for a short period of time. At the time of occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Iran he worked for the resolution of the crisis in the negotiations with Hamilton Jordan in Paris. He became candidate for the first presidential elections of the Islamic Republic in January 1980, and lost to Bani-Sadr. Abbas Amir Entezam

⁹¹ Dr. Ezzatollah Nozari, *Tarikh-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran*, p. 107 – 109.

became the speaker of government and deputy prime minister of Bazargan after the revolution.⁹²

Bazargan and Yazdi proposed the formation of Revolutionary Council to Khomeini and council was formed in November 1979. On February 4, 1979 Bazargan, the Secretary-General of the Freedom Movement, was appointed by Khomeini as the Prime Minister of the interim government of Iran. Although there were controversies within the revolutionary forces and liberals on bestowing the clergy with special rights in the constitution and the existence of parallel revolutionary organizations besides the government, the breakaway incident was the occupation of the U.S. Embassy by the Students of Followers of Imam's Line.

Bazargan government's foreign policy, which was based on negative equilibrium and non-alignment, envisaged continuation of relations with all states except Israel and South Africa. Although they demanded the U.S. not to accept the Shah to the country and give back to revolutionaries, there was no intention to cut relations with the U.S. However, the U.S. continued to support the Shah and did not respond the government's demands. The lack of attention on the part of the U.S. to Iranian demands activated students. They occupied the U.S. Embassy on November 4, 1979, and took the employees hostage. This incident brought the end of Bazargan government that resigned on 9 November. According to Nozari, although the occupation of the U.S. Embassy made the opposition of Iranian people against the U.S. intervention in Iran heard globally, it did not reach the desired end to get back Shah from the U.S. On the contrary, it resulted in freezing of Iranian assets in the U.S and cutting off bilateral relations.⁹³

Despite the fall of Bazargan government, the Freedom Movement did fairly well in the first parliamentary elections in 1980 and constituted the opposition against the

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 115 – 120.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 127 – 128.

Party of Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the members of the party were disqualified from all subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections until it the Interior Ministry banned the party by the approval of Khomeini. The Freedom Movement opposed the continuation of war with Iraq after 1982 when the territories invaded by Iraqi army were regained. The movement also did not give up its opposition to conservative clerical system and continued to foster liberal ideas generated from Islamic modernist thought. On the economic issues, however, their opposition to state interventionism was more in line with conservative understanding. Although the party was declared illegal, the government tolerated its existence and party members continued to be active in politics. At the end of 1980s, however, many members of the party were under arrest due to their criticisms against the state. In 2000 conservative backlash on reformists, the Freedom Movement was also pressured that it could no longer organize any activity.⁹⁴

Ebrahim Yazdi became the Secretary-General of the Freedom Movement in 1995 after Bazargan had passed away. In 1997 presidential elections, Ebrahim Yazdi applied to run but disqualified by the Guardians Council. However, Khatami's reformist presidency liberated political space and the members of Freedom Movement participated to the reformists. Since then, Freedom Movement supported reformist candidates in presidential and parliamentary elections. After 2005, Ahmadinejad government prevented the party from holding gatherings.

In 2009 presidential elections the Freedom Movement called the people for participation to the elections. The party propagated participation as a chance to change the entire administration of Iran. The Freedom Movement argued in its statement that in the first four years of Ahmadinejad's presidency there occurred a wide distance among the initial principles of the revolution, freedom, independence, republic and Islam, and people were severely restricted. The 2009 elections,

⁹⁴ "The Freedom Movement of Iran," available at <http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/parties/nehzateazadi/>, accessed on 29 August 2015.

according to the party, was a chance to correct all the wrongdoings of the past four years.⁹⁵ The Freedom Movement objected to the results of the 2009 election on the basis of the reports of the Committee for Protecting Votes.⁹⁶ With the rise of the Green Movement after 2009 elections, the members of the Freedom Movement were subjected to arrests, including Ebrahim Yazdi and Gholamabbas Tavassoli, many members of *melli-mazhabi* group, and members of Freedom Movement's youth group.

6.3.6. National Trust Party (*Hezb-e Etemad-e Melli*)

The National Trust Party was formed by Mehdi Karrubi after his defeat in the ninth presidential elections in 2005 and his resignation from the post of Secretary-General of the Society of Combatant Clerics (*Ruhaniyun*), which he was among the founders of the association in 1988. Karrubi objected the election results and claimed that they were rigged. He wrote an open letter to the Supreme Leader Khameneh'i and argued that Mojtaba Khameneh'i, the son of Ayatollah Khameneh'i, and several IRGC commanders intervened in the elections on behalf of Ahmadinejad. The Guardian Council rejected Karrubi's objection and Khameneh'i responded him that his action would result in national crisis. Karrubi, who was a senior advisor to Khameneh'i and a member of Expediency Council, then, resigned from all his governmental posts in protest, and formed the National Trust Party as well as the National Trust newspaper. His newspaper was the most critical reformist newspaper of Ahmadinejad government and his policies until 2009 elections.

The National Trust party claimed to take a different path from the coalition of reformists. Although Karrubi declared himself as reformist, he criticized Mohammad

⁹⁵ The Freedom Movement of Iran, "Entekhabat Forsati Barayi Taghyir dar Modiriyat-e Kalan-e Kashvar (Elections Chance for Change the whole Administration of the Country)," available at http://www.mizankhabar.net/asnad/bayanieh/88/88_b_2104.htm, accessed on 30 August 2015.

⁹⁶ The Freedom Movement of Iran, "E'teraz be Natija-ye E'lam Shode-ye Entekhabat-e Riyasat-e Jomhuri," available at http://www.mizankhabar.net/asnad/bayanieh/88/88_b_2107.htm, accessed on 30 August 2015.

Khatami for not standing against the conservative opposition and let them to destruct reformist ideals. The goals of the party that stated in its statute were “to accelerate the stable national development, expansion of justice and freedom in the order of Islamic Republic, and promotion of public welfare.”⁹⁷ National Trust Party supported the continuation of uranium enrichment program but also endorsed establishing relations with the U.S. The Party was also very critical of Ahmadinejad’s arguments against Israel, although they also criticized Israel’s policies towards Palestinians. Moreover, Karrubi openly argued the need for change in the constitution for the elimination of Guardians Council veto power. Increasing the rights of provincial councils, annulment of state monopolies, nationalizing the oil profits and sharing them with people were also among his 2009 campaign programme.⁹⁸

Mehdi Karrubi ran in the reformist camp in 2009 elections as the candidate of the National Trust Party. Although he could not get support from other reformist parties, many prominent reformist figured supported him and worked for his campaign. Gholamhossein Karbaschi was his campaign manager. Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Abbas Abdi, Hossein Marashi, Eshagh Jahangiri, Mohammad Ali Najafi, Ataollah Moajerani, Jamileh Kadivar, Abdolkarim Soroush, Emad Baghi were among the supporters of Karrubi in 2009 elections.⁹⁹

Karrubi got the least votes in 2009 elections. Together with Musavi, they objected the results. Upon the rejection of their objections they declared the new government of Ahmadinejad as illegitimate. They organized anti-government protests and became the leaders of Green Movement. The National Trust party was dissolved and

⁹⁷ “Esasnameh-ye Hezb-e Etemad-e Melli (Statute of National Trust Party)”, available at <http://www.bashgah.net/fa/category/show/57345#>, accessed on 30 August 2015.

⁹⁸ “National Trust Party,” available at <http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/parties/etemademelli/>, accessed on 30 August 2015.

⁹⁹ Muhammad Sahimi, “The Sheikh of Reform: Mehdi Karroubi,” available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/10/the-sheikh-of-the-reforms-mehdi-karroubi.html>, accessed on 30 August 2015.

National Trust newspaper was closed in the post-election turmoil. Karrubi has been under house arrest since 14 February 2010.

Coordination of major reformist parties was important for the formation of Green Movement. The parties mentioned here were the larger political organizations both in terms of popular constituency and organizational development, and their ability to influence state power. However, Green Movement was not a hierarchical organization like an organized party. Also it was not an unorganized collection of people. The Green Movement was an organized civil movement that relied on principles and social networks. In the words of Musavi, every Iranian who adheres Green principles was a movement.¹⁰⁰ The most important of the principles were adherence to Islamic Republic's constitution, end of arbitrary use of state power, freedom of expression. These principles were the axis of coordination for the political parties and all other social groups who were mobilized by carrying the symbol of 'Green' within the non-violent resistance movement. The principles of the Green Movement, according to Fariba Adelhah, "enabled disparate special-interest groups to unite in a national movement, thereby creating a whole which is greater than the sum of its parts ... [and] evolved into something more than a monopoly of Tehran-based elites."¹⁰¹ In the next section of the chapter, the mobilization of these diverse groups into a national opposition movement will be dwelled on.

6.4. Mobilization of the Green Movement

Mobilization of the Green Movement occurred through two phases. The first phase was the mobilization before the elections to support Mir Hossein Musavi. In this phase diverse groups and political forces came together and formed the nucleus of

¹⁰⁰ "The Green Movement Charter" in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 342.

¹⁰¹ Fariba Adelhah, "Political Economy of the Green Movement", p.18.

Green Movement. The election program and messages of Musavi were the demands of the Green movement from government and they mobilized to reach an influence on the state power through Musavi's presidency. The importance of the first phase of the mobilization was the creation of networks and links between the people around a common cause that gave the impression of unity and solidarity. The second phase was the mass protests of the election results that soon turned into protests against the authoritarian state. The Green supporters of Musavi poured to the streets to protest the election results that they believed to be rigged by the government and continued their mobilization for a year and half until the two leaders, Musavi and Karrubi, were taken into house arrest by the government.

6.4.1. Mobilization for Elections

The mobilization of the Green Movement started first by people's gathering around Mir Hossein Musavi to support his presidential candidacy. There were two reformists candidates running for the elections; Mir Hossein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi. Both politicians were active in politics since the revolution. Mir Hossein Musavi, an architect in profession, served as prime minister between the years 1982 – 1989 and was advisor to Rafsanjani and Khatami governments. At the time of 2009 elections, he was the head of Iranian Academy of Art and member of Expediency Council. Mehdi Karrubi, student of Khomeini and Montazeri in the 1960s, was among the revolutionary clergy and a member of *Ruhaniyun*, served as representative of Tehran in the parliament, speaker of the third (1989-1992) and sixth Majles (2000-2004), senior advisor to the Supreme Leader, and member of the Expediency Council. At the time of 2009 elections, he was the leader of his own party, *Etemad-e Melli*, and was publishing a daily newspaper with the same name. Musavi and Karrubi ran against the latest president Ahmadinejad and a former IRGC Commander, Mohsen Rezai.

Until Musavi declared his candidacy, reformists were largely mobilizing around former President Khatami. He had explained his decision to run for 2009 elections on

February 8, 2009. However, Khatami withdrew from elections in support of Musavi three days after Musavi announced his candidacy on 13 March. From that date on until the elections on 12 June, the Green Movement continued its mobilization to support Musavi. Islamic Iran Participation Front, The Organization of Mujahedeen of Islamic Revolution of Iran, Organization of Combatant Clerics, Party of Servants of Reconstruction of Iran, and Islamic Iran Participation Front were the major parties that supported Musavi. Many other smaller parties, artists, a small group from the Principalist faction, reformist clerics of Qom seminary, workers' associations, and most importantly Grand Ayatollah Montazeri also declared their support for Musavi's presidency. Besides, members of the parties that were officially not permitted but their activities were tolerated under the Islamic Republic, namely *Jebhe-ye Melli* (National Front), *Melli-Mazhabi* (National-Religious), and *Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran* (Iranian Freedom Movement) gave support to Musavi. The other reformist candidate, Karrubi was mainly supported by his *Etemad-e Melli* party and Office of Strengthening Unity (*Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat*). Prominent personalities among reformists, such as former Tehran mayor Karbaschi, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Abbas Abdi also declared their support to Karrubi.¹⁰²

Musavi's campaign was built on the slogan "Developed Iran by law, justice and freedom."¹⁰³ After declaration of candidacy, Musavi founded *Kalemeh-ye Sabz* (Green word) newspaper on May 3, 2009, and started publication on 17 May. The newspaper was closed by court order two days after the elections without any explanation. Musavi's election campaign was based on the need to strengthen the republican tenet of the Islamic Republic while preserving the strength of the Islamic tenet. He criticized the lack of experts and technocratic approach to economic problems and the adventurous foreign policy. He promised increasing employment opportunities, restructuring the oil sector, increasing the energy export capacity and

¹⁰² Ali M. Ansari, *Crisis of Authority: Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections*, (Great Britain: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2010), pp. 32 – 33.

¹⁰³ "She'ar-e Entekhabati-ye Mir Hossein 'Elam Shod (The Campaign Slogan of Mir Hossein Announced)" available at <http://fararu.com/fa/news/22794/>, accessed on 27 August 2015.

creating new job opportunities in this sector. Stating economy as his priority, Musavi promised to end corruption by reviving the Plan and Budget Organization, whose independent status had been abolished by Ahmadinejad, and also activating other decision-making bodies. He also promised a transparent administration on country's economy and improvement of working conditions, which, he claimed, would eventually end corruption.¹⁰⁴ According to Musavi, the foreign policy of Ahmadinejad government was not based on principles but imaginary slogans that humiliate the country and endanger national security. In the issue of relations with the U.S., Musavi stated that it was not a taboo, and that Iran could establish relations if the U.S. step back and engage in dialogue based on justice and equality. In social issues he promoted respect for social freedoms and taking necessary steps in this direction.¹⁰⁵

People enthusiastically supported Musavi in a mood of a festivity in the streets, in the election meetings and at Musavi's public speeches. On the occasion of 2 Khordad (23 May, the date that the first reformist president Khatami was elected), while Musavi was making his speech in Isfahan, a large crowd was gathered in Azadi stadium in Tehran where they showed their enthusiasm for change while Khatami was making his speech in support of Musavi and reformism. The campaigners adopted the color 'green,' which was symbolizing the Family of the Prophet (*ahl-e bayt*), as the color of hope. One of the most magnificent demonstration of election mobilization was the chain of people all wearing green color from the beginning to the end of the longest street of Tehran, Vali Asr Street. On 8 June, just four days before election, people showed their solidarity with the chain they formed from Rah-

¹⁰⁴ "Mashruh-e Barnameh-ye Eghtesadi-ye Mir Hossein Musavi 'Elam Shod (Comprehensive Economic Programme of Mir Hossein Musavi Announced)" available at <http://www.mehrnews.com/news/884149/>, accessed on 27 August 2015.

¹⁰⁵ Kambiz Basetvat, "How do Political Forces are Positioning Themselves as the Islamic Republic's Presidential Election Gets Closer?", available at http://www.iranpolitics.org/english_articles.html, accessed on 19 August 2015.

e Ahen Square at the south end of Vali Asr to Tajrish Square at the north end of Vali Asr.

The pre-election debate between Musavi and Ahmadinejad on state television on 3 June added to the enthusiasm of people in the streets to support Musavi. He not only gained respect with his decisive but calm stance, he also channeled the discourse of Imam's line to his side through emphasizing his role in Iranian politics as the prime minister of Khomeini. In this debate, Musavi gave voice to the complaints of students due to discriminatory policies, loss of dignity because of foreign policy, inefficient economic policy and mismanagement, and Islamic Iranian human identity. In the case of discrimination of students, Ahmadinejad did not take responsibility of starved students and blamed the education policy of the Khatami government, which was an argument far from credibility. In the same vein, he portrayed the softer rhetoric of Obama government towards Iran as a success of his harsh stance in foreign policy, which was an argument clearly in contradiction with the imposition the sanctions by the Western powers due to nuclear issue.¹⁰⁶ According to Milani, "a large and powerful coalition of forces, ranging from Ayatollahs Montazeri and Rafsanjani to moderate secular forces, members of the middle class, women's group, trade unions, student organizations, technocrats and leaders of Iran's badly beleaguered private sector was formed around the issue of ridding the country of Ahmadinejad" by covering the cities with Green color.¹⁰⁷

The large and lively demonstrations not only in Tehran but also in many cities of Iran to support Musavi highly increased the hope for winning the first round of elections. However, with the announcement of the election results, the hope of the Green supporters turned into despair. The unexpected difference between the number of votes for Ahmadinejad and Musavi struck the people. The allegations of

¹⁰⁶ Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5gGxwDPTTk> , accessed on 26 August 2015.

¹⁰⁷ Abbas Milani, "Iran: A Coup in Three Steps", available at <http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/15/iran-elections-khamenei-mousavi-ahmadinejad-opinions-contributors-milani.html>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

government's rigging the votes were in the air and people came out to the streets again to show their reaction.

6.4.2. Mobilization for Street Protests After Elections

The mobilization for street protests began with the declaration of election results by the Interior Minister Sadeq Mahsuli on the morning of 13 June. Accordingly, Ahmadinejad got 62.63 percent of the votes, Musavi got 33.75 percent and Karrubi got 0.85 percent.¹⁰⁸ Musavi and Karrubi objected to the election results. Indeed, they had serious concerns about a likely election fraud and established the Committee for Protection of Votes a few days before the elections. When the results were announced, Musavi and Karrubi objected the results and demanded the renewal of elections. On 13 June, Karrubi declared "he will not be silent over this amateur fixing and engineering of the vote count."¹⁰⁹ Musavi, in his statement on 13 June stated:

I personally strongly protest the many obvious irregularities on the day of the election, and I am warning I will not submit to this dangerous stage-setting. The result of such performance by some irresponsible officials will jeopardize the pillars of the Islamic Republic and will establish falsehood and tyranny. ... I am suggesting officials stop this trend immediately before it is too late and return to the land of law and preserve people's votes.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ The results of the 10th presidential election announced by Sadeq Mahsuli: The final results show that total of 39,165,191 votes have been cast. Mahmud Ahmadinejad gained 24,027,516 votes, which is 62.63 per cent of the votes; Mohsen Reza'i-Mirqa'ed had 678,240 votes, which is 1.73 per cent of the votes; Mehdi Karrubi won 333,635 votes, which is 0.85 per cent of votes; and Mir Hoseyin Musavi Khamene had 13,216,411 votes which is 33.75 per cent of the total votes. "Therefore, considering the total number of votes cast which is 39,165,191, out of the total number of eligible voters which is 46, 200,000, we have had 85 per cent turn out in this election and this is an unprecedented record and an epic story." "Iran announces final poll results, Ahmadinejad wins," *Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1*, Tehran, 13 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring). *Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1*, Tehran, 13 Jun 2009, (BBC Monitoring)

¹⁰⁹ "Iran's Karrubi calls poll results "amateur fixing" and "engineered"," *Sahamnews*, 13 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹¹⁰ "Iranian presidential candidate Musavi protests election results", *Roshangari*, 13 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring)

Ruhaniyun also declared on 13 June that there had been extensive election rigging and called for annulment of the election. The statement of the *Ruhaniyun* said “in order to defend the Islamic republican nature of the system and to restore the public trust and to safeguard the trend of national reconciliation with the ballot boxes, an appropriate measure that can be taken is to annul the election and to hold a fresh election in a fairer and more logical atmosphere.”¹¹¹

These statements set the stage for the mobilization of the Green Movement in protest for election results. According to Dabashi, by 15 June, “the assumption of the election having being rigged is now a “social fact.” It is no longer relevant whether or not the election was rigged. Millions of Iranians believed it was, and they are putting their lives on the line to announce and assert it.”¹¹²

While IRGC and *Basij* were rejecting accusation of involvement in the election, the Head of Guardians Council, Ahmad Jannati, asked Musavi and Karrubi on 15 June to submit their complaints for inspection by the Council. Meanwhile, Intelligence Minister Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, stating that the unrest-creating people would be arrested, warned the families not to let their children go out to the streets.¹¹³ Although the constitutional bodies were ready to examine the results according to the constitution, the paramilitary security forces had already been in the street. According to *Aftab* news, some plain cloth people carrying cold weapons detained the journalists of the *Etemad-e Melli* newspaper during the protests on 13 June in Haft-e Tir Square in order to cut their communication with the protestors.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ “Iran cleric body calls for election results to be annulled – website”, *Aftab News*, 13 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring)

¹¹² Hamid Dabashi (edited with and introduction by Navid Nikzadfar), *The Green Movement in Iran*, p. 24.

¹¹³ “Iran Intelligence Minister says unrest creating individuals arrested”, *Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1*, Tehran, 15 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring)

¹¹⁴ “Iran reformist journalists detained”, *Aftab News*, 13 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

Supreme Leader Khameneh'i had already congratulated Ahmadinejad for his reelection on the next day of election.¹¹⁵ In addition, before Guardians Council finalized examination of election irregularities upon the official request of the candidates, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameneh'i, while suggesting the investigation of the irregularities through legal channels, actually endorsed the election results by saying that "22 Khordad was an epic election and it was registered in history, although some enemies in the world tried to undermine this definite victory and lower it to a dubious and doubtful victory."¹¹⁶ In the same speech, he also labeled the street presence as a wrong thing to do and it would not put pressure on the system. He warned the protestors that the consequences of continuing street protests would lie with them.

Following the announcement of election results, thousands of people joined civil protests in Tehran and in many other cities. They were peaceful protests came out of the reaction of the first shock of election results. The protestors were asking from the authorities of the Islamic Republic a credible answer to the question: "Where is my vote?" The answer of the Guardians Council was that there had not been any major irregularity and elections would not be annulled.¹¹⁷ The Green protestors expressed their reaction to the humiliation of being ignored by the authorities by writing in the banners that "*Ma bishomariim* (We are many)." As an answer to president Ahmadinejad's words on 14 June describing the protestors as "dust and pebbles," the large crowd of protestors carried the banner "*Hamaseh-ye khas o khashak* (Epic of dust and pebbles)." Mir Hossein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi, however, did not give up resistance. They, together with Khatami and Mir Hossein's wife Zahra

¹¹⁵ "Iranian Leader Congratulates Nation on Ahmadinejad's Reelection," *Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 13 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring)

¹¹⁶ "Supreme Leader Khamenei's Friday Address on the Presidential Elections," 19 June 2009, available at <http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/supreme-leader-khameneis-friday-address.html>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

¹¹⁷ "Iran's Guardians Council Rules Out Vote Nullification," *Press TV*, 22 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

Rahnavard, attended protests, spoke to the people, directed the demonstrations, and insistently called for annulment of elections.

The protests continued for one week despite Ministry of Interior's declaration on 15 June that all the rallies and gatherings were illegal. Not being able to get permission from the authorities, Musavi and Karrubi organized a silent rally on 15 June that they also participated alongside Khatami to calm down people, who were estimated to be around one million. They had issued statements for not to attend since they could not take permission, but due to government's restrictions on communication like disabling Facebook, the leaders could not deliver messages effectively and decided to join to the rally to control the crowd and to provide a channel of information.¹¹⁸ According to Abrahamian, it was the largest rally in Tehran since the Islamic Revolution. Also, that day witnessed large rallies in many other cities that day. Abrahamian stated that the massive crack down by the government came after these huge rallies that had shaken the government.¹¹⁹

On 18 June, Musavi hold another peaceful rally in Tehran's Imam Khomeini Square. The Law Enforcement Forces and plainclothesmen, who had begun intervention to protests from the first day, intensified their grip on the protestors. Vigilante forces attacked student dormitories of Tehran University. On 18 June, foreign news agencies like BBC and CNN were filtered and BBC representative was ousted from Iran to prevent foreign media coverage, which was regarded as a tool for enemy against Iranian Islamic democracy by the government. At least 22 deaths, thousands of injuries, and many arrests were reported in the first week of demonstrations.¹²⁰ According to the report of International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, several

¹¹⁸ "Iran Reformist Candidates Take Part in Protest Rally," *Qalam News*, 15 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring)

¹¹⁹ Ervand Abrahamian, "I Am Not A Speck of Dirt, I Am A Retired Teacher" in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, pp. 67 – 68.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

prominent reformist political and intellectual figures, such as Saeed Hajjarian, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Bahzad Nabavi, Abdolfattah Soltani, Abdollah Ramazanzadeh, Mostafa Tajzadeh, members of Freedom Movement of Iran, members of Iranian Islamic Participation Front, members of Office of Strengthening Unity Alumni group were arrested by 16 June. The report concluded that there had clearly been a systematic detention of civil society members.¹²¹

For 20 June, another rally was organized under the slogan “from revolution to freedom,” which was also carrying a reference for the venue that would start from Enqelab (Revolution) Square and end in Azadi (Freedom) Square. By 19 June, however, government officials were giving the signal of a backlash. Tehran governor stated that there was no legal permission for the rally and there were warnings from the police.¹²² But the protestors, disappointed by the lack of attention to their demands from the state authorities, gathered once again. However, government violence reached its peak on June 20, 2009. Police attacked the Green protestors with tear gas, batons, and water cannons. It was also the day Neda Aghasoltan was killed by a sniper gun while standing at the edge of the protest. The moments after she was shot was filmed by a cell phone and circulated around the world. She became the hero of the Green Movement, symbolizing state violence against a non-violent resistance movement. The eight days of massive protests stopped as a result of coercive control by the state, which was followed by mass detentions of intellectuals, journalists, artists, lawyers, human rights activists, reformist politicians as well as students.

Despite state coercion, Musavi made it clear that Green Movement could not be suppressed by violence. On the same day of the brutal intervention, he wrote a letter

¹²¹ “Mass Arrests and Detentions Signal Increasing Repression,” *International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran*, 17 June 2009, available at <http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2009/06/increasingrepression/>, accessed on 27 August 2015.

¹²² “No Permission Granted to Iran’s Reformist Groups to Hold Rally,” *Press Tv*, 19 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

to the Guardians Council stating a number of election irregularities that he determined and asked for investigation. The next day, on 21 June, he issued a statement for the Green Movement, which called for non-confrontation with the security forces, but also draw the guidelines for the non-violent protest of the Green Movement. He stated what the Green Movement was confronted with were “lies and cheating” as a consequence of unlawful behavior. But the Green Movement was not confronting *basijis*, revolutionary guards, armed forces, and law-enforcement forces for these are brothers, protectors of revolution, borders, and citizens. It was the lies that the Green Movement was confronting, which would be corrected by “genuine principles of the Islamic Revolution.” The genuine principles of the revolution, according to Musavi, could be reached by relying upon the path of Imam; therefore, protecting the compatibility of Islam and republicanism.¹²³

The Green Movement faced with state violence but it did not lead to its dissolution. On the contrary, as indicated by Musavi in his 7th statement, the movement would not give up.¹²⁴ However, The Green Movement after election protests changed its strategy. Musavi, in his Statement No.11 where he drew the Green Path of Hope, mentioned this change as such: “It has become a crucial necessity to take a social approach (instead of only a political approach) to solving the current conflict. And this requires us to utilize the social capacities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”¹²⁵ Musavi advised the Green Movement members to continue in the path of hope by spreading the social networks. Since the Green Movement was composed of small and diverse groups of people, Musavi asked them to organize gatherings frequently in their vicinity and form social cores that would engage any civil activity, religious, cultural, social, political, scientific etc., and to strengthen the solidarity among the like-minded people.

¹²³ “Musavi’s Fifth Statement to Iranian People,” 21 June 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹²⁴ Mir Hossein Musavi’s statements are published in a compilation by Daryoush Mohammad Pour, *Nurturing the Seed of Hope: A Green Strategy for Liberation*, (UK: H&S Media, 2012).

¹²⁵ “Musavi’s 11th Statement: The Green Path of Hope,” 5 September 2009, available at <http://khordaad88.com/?p=409>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

The Green Movement, however, did not disappear from the streets. Indeed, within the framework of Green Path of Hope, the largest social group of the Greens could be gathered in the streets. The movement, thus, gathered on the special days for the Islamic Republic and Iranian nation to make their voices carrying their messages heard besides the official rallies of the government. By this way, the Greens embrace the same ideals of the Islamic Republic that were also embraced by the non-reformists, but with a different interpretation. The alternative slogans heard in these rallies could be read republican alternatives of the Islamic Republic to its Islamic interpretations. The Greens in opposition challenged the Islamist paradigm that was dominant due to its possession of state power.

The first occasion that the Greens rallied after 21 June was the Qods (Jerusalem) Day on 18 September (27 Shahrivar). It was the day that Iranians under Islamic Republic expressed their solidarity with the *oppressed* people of Palestine and Lebanon, and also all Muslims who were subjected to Western imperialism and domination. Typically, Israel was condemned on this day; from a moral perspective because of its misconduct with regard to Palestinians, and from revolutionary perspective because it has been the agent of imperialism in the Muslim lands. On the 2009 Qods Day, the Green Movement displayed its criticism to anti-holocaust argument of the Ahmadinejad government by shouting not “Death to Israel,” but “Death to Russia;” since Russia had been the first foreign government that recognized the 2009 election results. The nationalist slogan of “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I will give my life for Iran” was also shouted in same occasion.

The second occasion when Green Movement mobilized in the street was the Anniversary of the U.S Embassy takeover on 4 November (13 Aban). The day was symbolizing the anti-imperialist character of the Islamic Revolution. By the occupation of the U.S. Embassy, the Students of Followers of Imam’s Line achieved the second aim of the Islamic Revolution after the Shah left Iran, that was the ousting of imperialist powers from Iran and ending the foreign influence in Iran’s affairs. Thus, the day was marked by the remembrance of the three pillars of the Islamic

Revolution; independence, freedom, and Islamic Republic. These pillars were built on the policy ‘neither East, nor West’ since relations with both Eastern and Western powers would create dependencies and eventually destroy Iran’s national dignity. Usually, the participators of rallies on 4 November cry the slogans ‘Death to America’ and ‘neither East, nor West, Islamic Republic.’ The Green protestors used this occasion to protest the aggressive foreign policy of the Ahmadinejad government by shouting ‘Death to no one.’ Implying that they were anti-imperialist just like Islamic Republic but the implication of their anti-imperialism was different than that of the Islamic Republic, the Greens shouted ‘neither East, nor West, National Green State.’ Milani noted that “A green Iran doesn’t need nuclear weapons” was also heard by some people.¹²⁶ Since the government was trying to prevent mobilization of Greens but they could not order people not to join a nationally recognized official rally, the security forces did not let Musavi out of his house on the day. However, Karrubi joined the Green Movement protestors on 4 November.¹²⁷

The third occasion that Green Movement used the official celebrations as a venue for protest was the National Student Day on 7 December (16 Azar). This day was to commemorate the deaths of three students of Tehran University in the protests against the U.S. Vice President Nixon’s visit to Iran in 1953. In Pahlavi Iran, this day was commemorated every year as symbol of the Shah’s brutality against his own people. It was the day that the opposition and students condemned the Shah because of his brutality, his alliance with an imperialist power, the U.S., and his actually being vested the throne through a U.S. and British instigated coup against Iran’s national government, Mosaddeq. Islamic Republic proclaimed the occasion National Student Day after the revolution to commemorate the students’ sacrifices in the struggle against the Shah’s authoritarian rule and the U.S. imperialism in Iran. On 7 December, the Green protestors faced with another crackdown by the police, *basij*,

¹²⁶ Abbas Milani, “The Green Movement”, p. 42.

¹²⁷ Matthew Weaver & Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “New Protests in Iran,” *The Guardian*, 4 November 2009, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2009/nov/04/iran-student-day-protests>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

and revolutionary guards in the streets. From the leadership, only Zahra Rahnavard was seen among the protestors. According to the reports of the observers, the police used tear gas and clubs against the protestors. Plainclothesmen were seen filming the students to intimidate and identify them after the protest. Faced with violence, the protestors shouted “Don't be afraid, we are all in this together were” for greater mobilization. Reporters also observed that there were no more “Where is my vote?” slogans in the streets. Instead, protestors started to target the Islamic regime, and more specifically Ayatollah Khameneh'i himself. The shouts “Down with dictator” and “Down with Khameneh'i” were reported to be heard.¹²⁸ The brutal suppression of protests was not confined only to Tehran but also to Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad where the security forces clashed with the protestors. In addition, cries of ‘Allah-u Akbar’ were shouted on the streets everywhere. Actually, this was a renewed practice of Islamic Revolution. During the protests against the Shah and in the face of very harsh armed repression against the protestors, people were showing their resistance against the Shah by crying ‘Allahu Akbar’ from their rooftops or gardens in the darkness of the night. The Green Movement renewed this tradition when the peaceful protests became the scene of violent suppression by the security forces. The Greens called for the supporters to shout ‘Allahu Akbar’ every night from rooftops at exactly 10 pm, to demonstrate resistance against the government and solidarity among the people. This renewed protest was mobilized with the slogan “Green Cry: God is great; you are the media (Faryad-e Sabz: Allahu Akbar, Resaneh shomaiid).”

After the 7 December protests, Musavi issued a statement where he stated that the reason of people's reaction was because they were being looked down with arrogance and their greatness was being denied. He also warned the authorities that the “Student Movements are signs of realities greater than themselves. ... If officials had paid more attention to their role (the role of students) as a sign of [what is to

¹²⁸ “Student Day Protests Live Blog – December 7 (16 Azar),” available at <http://www.irannewsnow.com/2009/12/iran-students-day-protests-december7-16azar/>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

come] tomorrow, we would not have been in such a crisis.”¹²⁹ Former president and prominent supporter of reformists Hashemi Rafsanjani also broke his long silence and said at a meeting in Mashhad: “Doubts about the election should be resolved, political prisoners should be released, the families of the victims of the post-election violence should be comforted and the restrictions on media and criticizing the government and the current situation should be lifted.”¹³⁰ He also criticized violence against people and emphasized the necessity of free media for people to have an opportunity to debate and not to take protests to the streets.

Just a few weeks after the Student Day, the Green Movement once again mobilized on 19 December for the funeral of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. Montazeri was a very important figure for the 1979 Revolution. He laid the foundations of *velayat-e faqih* theory, was once heir of Khomeini who was dismissed in 1988, became a vocal critic of the politics of Islamic Republic after Khomeini’s death and was not permitted to leave his house for so many years. He was the most senior clerical supporter of reformists. After the 12 June election, he issued a number of statements in support of the Green Movement. His July 2009 fatwa was a “theory of automatic annulment of a political system if and when its leaders lose trust of the people.”¹³¹ In an interview on August 31, 2009, Montazeri stated “Islamic intellectuals claim that Islam and democracy are fully compatible. But one can clearly say that the Iranian regime has shown that democracy and *velayet-e faqih* are not compatible. Republicanism and *velayat-e faqih* are not compatible. These are the contradictions that have come to light in practice. ... Some Islamic propagandists say

¹²⁹ Iran's Opposition Leader Musavi Issues Statement on "Student Day", 7 December 2009, available at <http://www.payvand.com/news/09/dec/1065.html>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

¹³⁰ Rafsanjani: *Basij* and Revolutionary Guards Should Not Have Stood Against the People”, 6 December 2009, available at <http://www.payvand.com/news/09/dec/1061.html>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

¹³¹ The text of Montazeri’s fatwa which was the most challenging for the Islamic Republic system was available at Ahmad Sadri and Mahmoud Sadri, “Delegitimizing the Islamic Republic of Iran With a Fatwa: The Significance of Ayatollah Montazeri’s Post-Election Legal Ruling of July 2009” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 151 – 164.

that *velayat-e faqih* equals to Islam and so a failure of the letter means a failure of Islam. Today, the greatest opponents of religious despotism are also against concept of *velayat-e faqih*.¹³² Green movement mobilized for the funeral of their ideological and spiritual leader in Qom. The funeral was coincided with the second day of Moharram, the mourning month for the third Shi'i Imam, Hossein, who was killed by Umayyad Caliph Yazid. Large crowds shouted "Ya Hossein, Mir Hossein;" *i.e.* the name of Shi'i Imam Hossein, the name of Hossein 'Ali Montazeri, and the name of Mir Hossein Musavi. Montazeri's funeral became the greatest demonstration in support of a 'dissident cleric,' in support of republicanism, and against usurpation of power by any authority in the Islamic Republic's history.¹³³

The Green Movement's mobilization in the Shi'i mourning month Muharram revived another tradition of anti-Shah protests before the Islamic Revolution. The movement declared the month as Green Muharram. On the Ashura, the tenth day of Muharram, which corresponded to December 7, 2009, "tens of thousands of people" gathered in the streets to demonstrate in opposition to Ahmadinejad government.¹³⁴ The Greens targeted the Supreme Leader in their slogans such as "down with the dictator," "O Imam Hossein, uproot oppression," and "this month is the month of blood, Seyyed 'Ali will fall." Protestors organized using mobile phones and text messages, and informed others about the happenings in their place. Videos captured by mobile phones were minutely shared in YouTube. Security forces tried to prevent people gathering together by using tear gas, batons and warning shots, and controlled the streets from helicopters. Protestors set fire the streets in downtown Tehran, and similar reports of protests came from Qom, Isfahan, Kashan, Shiraz, Najafabad

¹³² Rooz Online, "The Key Features of the Green Movement: An Interview With Dissident Cleric Mohsen Kadivar," Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p.116.

¹³³ Robert Tait, "Funeral of Iranian Cleric Montazeri Turns into a Political Protest," *The Guardian*, 21 December 2009, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/21/iran-funeral-ayatollah-montazeri-protest>, accessed on 26 August 2015.

¹³⁴ "Tens of Thousands of People Chanting Slogans in Tehran", *Rahesabz (JARAS)*, 27 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

(birthplace of Montazeri) and Mashhad.¹³⁵ There were reports that late-Ayatollah Montazeri's home was surrounded by plainclothesmen, preventing communication from Montazeri's office with the protestors.¹³⁶ The Ashura of 2009 witnessed the harshest clashes between the security forces and the Green protestors. According to the official account confirmed by Tehran's Public Prosecutor seven people were killed in the clashes in Tehran.¹³⁷ Mir Hossein Musavi's nephew was also reported to be shot to death but his body was not found.

The Ashura incidents were condemned by both reformist and pro-Khameneh'i circles. For the state, the events were acts of "sedition (*fetna*)" carried out by the "green Umayyad sect" against the true lovers of Imam Hossein in an effort to divert the course of the revolutionary political system and its people.¹³⁸ The Green protestors, according to the state, were mobilized in the streets and at mourning ceremonies by "a limited number of conspirators in a pre-planned programme guided by foreign media" to disrupt the public order, which was restored by the police.¹³⁹ Grand Ayatollahs who support Khameneh'i, such as Naser Makarem-Shirazi, Ja'far Sobhani, and Hossein Nuri-Hamedani, also issued separate statements condemning the Ashura protests, and asked officials to maintain unity in the society by resolving disputes reasonably and peacefully.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ "Iran protestors using mobiles, text messaging, YouTube", *Rahesabz (JARAS)*, 27 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹³⁶ "Plainclothes men surround Montazeri home", *Rahesabz-Jaras*, 29 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹³⁷ "Prosecutor comments on 27-December deaths in Tehran", *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 29 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹³⁸ "Iran: Daily says Ashura "taboo-breaking" spelt end of "green sedition movement",", *Javan*, 28 December 2009, p. 2, (BBC Monitoring).

¹³⁹ "Police statement confirms five people killed in Tehran "unrest",", *Islamic Republic News Agency, Tehran*, 27 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹⁴⁰ "Pro-Khamene'i Ayatollahs condemn protests as "desecration of Ashura",", *Mehr News Agency*, 29 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

The reformists, however, condemned the government aggression against the peaceful protests of the Greens. Islamic Iran Participation Front's statement portrayed the incidents as "violent attacks against "defenceless and innocent people on Ashura [27 December]." The statement continued: "In continuation of its civil resistance movement the Green Movement intended to once again express its peaceful and civil objection which was responded by attack from police, security forces, and plainclothes agents against defenceless people in central streets of Tehran... leaving a number of people martyred and injured during the month of Muharram and the Ashura Day"¹⁴¹ The statement put the responsibility of the incidents on the government who did not hear people's objection and did not ask a solution for the crisis from the nation's wise men to reach conciliation. The Participation Front, affirming that the Green Movement was peaceful, law-abiding and non-violent, called on people to keep their calm and self-restraint to offset conspiracies.

To fight against 'sedition,' the government arrested many reformist leaders, including the leader of the Freedom Movement of Iran and the Secretary-General of Human Rights Center Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, who had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the interim government of Mehdi Bazargan.¹⁴² With the Leader of *Mujahedeen*, Behzad Nabavi, who had already been arrested, the leaders of two reformist parties were now under government control alongside many party members. To increase pressure on Green Movement leaders after Ashura, the authorities arrested brother of Zahra Rahnavard, Shapur Kazemi, who had reportedly not been involved in any political activity.¹⁴³ Mehdi Karrubi was put under strict control by the guards in his house.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ "Iran reformist movement condemns police violence on 27 December", *Nowruz*, 29 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹⁴² "Opposition figure arrested in Iran", *Rahesabz (JARAS)*, 28 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹⁴³ "Brother-in-law of Iran opposition leader arrested", *Rahesabz*, 29 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

¹⁴⁴ "Iran reformist leader under house arrest", *Rahesabz*, 29 December 2009, (BBC Monitoring).

According to Michael Fischer, the Ashura protests demonstrated that the Green Movement “has effectively mobilized Karbala paradigm ... against the government, although the government has not given up its own claims to that narrative.”¹⁴⁵ However, the government’s paradigm was more powerful and effective since it was armed with the state’s coercive power. Thus, the Ashura of 2009 became the last instance of street mobilization occasion for the Green Movement. The leaders of the non-violent civil movement continued their efforts of resistance by spreading Green ideas, criticizing government, and proposing solutions for the crisis of the Islamic Republic that was resulted from the wide split between the state and the people, and widened it more due to lack of conciliation. Musavi’s Statement No.17 was a case in point. Issued after Ashura incidents on January 1, 2010, Musavi had chosen the title “killing us will only make us stronger.” In this statement, he affirmed that the “calls for the execution, murder or imprisonment of myself, Karoubi and the like, will not resolve our problems. ... We cannot solve these problems until the existence of a severe crisis is not recognized within the country.”¹⁴⁶ In this statement, Musavi asserted the identity of the Green Movement for the first time, which was necessary in the face of accusations of the government that the Green Movement was treacherous, tool of foreign powers, or aimed to destroy the religion and Islamic order (*nezam*), all of which was contained in the label ‘*fetnagar*’ (seditionist). Accordingly, Musavi stated:

I feel a burden of necessity to emphasize the Islamic and national identity of the green movement, its opposition to foreign rule, and its loyalty to our constitution. We are the followers of Imam Hossein. ... We believe in a compassionate reading of Islam that views people as if they are all equally religious [in worshipping one God, may it be Christian, Jewish or Muslim] or as companions in creation – a reading that promotes the innate dignity of humanity and does not tolerate for criminals to be fed differently than their victims outside the prison, or to be tortured during imprisonment. ... I am

¹⁴⁵ Michael M. J. Fischer, “The Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran,” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 362.

¹⁴⁶ “Musavi’s 17th Statement: Killing Us Will Only Make Us Stronger,” 1 January 2010, available at <http://khordaad88.com/?p=925>, accessed on 29 August 2015.

strongly committed to the independence of this country. ... We strongly oppose the current levels of corruption upheld by incorrect policies and incompetence. We stress that if institutions like the Revolutionary Guards participate in financial matters like the stock market, they cannot be defenders of the country, or of its national resources. ... The green movement is against lying and views it as a harmful disease for this nation. ... We are neither American nor British. ... We are very familiar with the mechanism of power on the international stage, where every country acts based on its own national interests. We despise those who do not respect their own nation's religious beliefs and traditions.¹⁴⁷

Musavi ended his statement with his proposal to solve the crisis. He proposed five demands and elaborated on how the fulfillment of them would lead to solution. Briefly, the five points are: 1. The government should ensure that it is directly accountable to the nation, the parliament and the judiciary branch. 2. Propose transparent and credible regulation of the election process to guarantee that the nation has free and fair elections, without trickery and interference. 3. Free and exonerate all political prisoners. 4. Among the essential elements that can contribute to a solution are freedom of the press and media, along with the releases of confiscated newspaper licenses. 5. Abiding by article 27 of the constitution to recognize the people's right to form legal congregations and to establish political groups and parties.

With the 17th Statement of Musavi, the Green Movement entered a new period, which can be named as 'constitutive resistance.' Following the Statement of Musavi, five leading religious intellectuals, all who had left Iran due to political pressure, issued a manifesto stating the goals of the Green Movement. Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush, Dr. Mohsen Kadivar, Akbar Ganji, Ataollah Mohajerani, and Abdolali Bazargan issued nine points for solution of the crisis, which also contained the five points of Musavi's statement.¹⁴⁸ According to Soroush, they decided to take action

¹⁴⁷ "Musavi's 17th Statement: Killing Us Will Only Make Us Stronger," 1 January 2010, available at <http://khordaad88.com/?p=925>, accessed on 29 August 2015.

¹⁴⁸ Muhammad Sahimi, "An Opposition Manifesto Emerges: Statement By Five Religious Intellectuals," Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, pp. 168 – 172.

because the Green Movement needed better definition of its goals and objective at that stage. He explained the rationale behind the manifesto as such: “I’ve said for years that the Revolution was theory-less. It was a revolt against the Shah – a negative rather than a positive theory. I insisted that if there is going to be another movement, it has to have a theory. People should know what they want, not just what they don’t want.”¹⁴⁹

The document that accomplished the constitutive resistance to take shape was the Green Movement Charter that was written by Mir Hossein Musavi on the basis of all previous documents and views. The charter was published exactly one year after the first organized street protest of the Green Movement, on June 15, 2010. Musavi introduced the formation of the movement through the stages it had passed in that one year after the election and said that the new document had been prepared “for better cooperation and communication between the members of the Green Movement and to fortify the common identity of the movement itself.”¹⁵⁰ The Charter was composed of the following sections: Roots and goals; fundamental strategies; Green identity: the Iranian-Islamic treasure tove (with a subsection titled ‘the right to popular sovereignty’); values of the Green Movement (with subsections titled ‘respect for human dignity and opposing violence’ and ‘justice, freedom and equality’); moral conduct and respect for personal and social creativity; abiding by the law and negotiating.

When Arab uprisings started in Tunis on December 18, 2010 and then in Egypt on 25 January, the fervor of anti-government protests in the region alarmed the Iranian government more than ever. Government not only rushed to declare the anti-government uprisings in the Arab states as an Islamic awakening aspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution, but also struck a final blow to its opposition inside.

¹⁴⁹ Robin Wright, “The Goals of Iran’s Green Movement: An Interview with Abdolkarim Soroush,” Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 194.

¹⁵⁰ “The Green Movement Charter” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 335.

Musavi and Kerrubi had called for a silent rally in Tehran on February 14, 2011, to show solidarity with their Egyptian fellows in Tahrir Square protesting against Hosni Mubarak. On the same day, Mir Hossein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi were put under house arrest together with their wives, Zahra Rahnavard and Fatemeh Karrubi for an unlimited period. Thus, the Iranian government cut every means of communication between the Greens and the two leaders. The Green Movement, however, continue its activities under the Green Council formed in July 2011, which aimed to coordinate the mobilization both inside and outside Iran in the absence of the movement's leaders.¹⁵¹

6.5. Conclusion

The Green Movement has been the last moment in modern Iranian history when opposition nationalism reasserted itself in the body of a social movement mobilized against foreign interventionism and domestic authoritarianism. The discourse of the Green Movement was shaped by its two major demands from the state: giving priority to the interests of the Iranian people over the claim of Islamic unity, and putting an end to arbitrary government by implementation of constitutional rights of the people and freedom of expression in the public sphere. Emerged out of reformist politics of late-1990s that aimed to strengthen the republicanism of the state system vis-à-vis the expense of Islamism, the Green Movement called for opening in the system, which went through the most restricted phase in the post-Khomeini Iran under Ahmedinejad's presidency. The Green Movement also called for the redefinition of national interest along republican lines in foreign policy. They opposed not only the aggressive foreign policy rhetoric of Ahmadinejad's presidency and argued for moderate relations with the world, but also Islamic Republic's involvement in Palestine and Lebanon to the detriment of Iranian sources. The 2009

¹⁵¹ "New Green Movement Manifesto," 12 July 2011, available at <http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/jul/12/new-green-movement-manifesto>, accessed on 29 August 2015; The website of Coordination Council for the Green Path of Hope is available at <http://shora.org/en/>, accessed on 29 August 2015.

allegedly rigged election results, however, sealed the “Revolutionary Guards electoral coup to end the Republic and inaugurate clerical monarchy.”¹⁵² Thus, all social and political forces, which saw the benefit of the nation in the republican virtues of the system and were against despotic political behavior, came together and mobilized the Green Movement in the streets under the leadership of Musavi, Karrubi, Khatami and Rahnavard. The millions of people’s demand for the annulment of election results and organization of new elections did not meet positively by the state authorities. Instead, Green Movement supporters were declared to be agents of foreign enemies who wanted to design a velvet coup in Iran, destructive forces that wanted to demise Islam and Islamic Republic, and seditionists. The security forces attacked the peaceful protestors, where hundreds were died and injured in the clashes. The government arrested all the reformist politicians and political activists, human rights activists, artists, reformist journalists, Internet bloggers. The Green Movement was unsuccessful to bring a change in the government or to have any influence in state power in the subsequent four years until the presidency of Hassan Ruhani in 2013. However, the reformist and republican ideals of the movement have pervaded the Iranian political consciousness.

The rise of the Green Movement led the observers to reconsider the question that was asked by Foucault thirty years earlier with regard to the 1979 Revolution and that has still been relevant and still captures the Iranian imagery; *i.e.* what are the Iranians dreaming about? Prior to 1979 Revolution, Foucault wrote on the basis of his observations in Iran that the opposition introduced a political spirituality in the form of a movement that wanted to disengage itself from both external domination and internal politics. He wrote that it was not a revolution in the literal sense of the term but an insurrection of men with bare hands and “perhaps the first great insurrection against global systems, the form of revolt that is the most modern and the most

¹⁵² Said Amir Arjomand, *After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors*, (USA: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 165.

insane.”¹⁵³ To the question of “what do you want?”, Foucault writes, “I did not hear even once the word “revolution,” but four or five times, someone would answer, “An Islamic government.””¹⁵⁴ Iranians wanted Islamic government whose definitions were imprecise. However, Foucault notes, when Iranians speak of Islamic government; “when under the threats of bullets, they transform it into a slogan of the streets ... they have other things on their minds than these formulas from everywhere and nowhere.”¹⁵⁵ It was a reality that was very near to Iranians since they themselves were its active agents.

Thirty years later, when the Green Movement appeared in the streets of Iran, they also knew what they did not want in asserting their subjectivity, which, according to Ali Alizadeh, was “constituted by political intuition, creativity and recollection of the 1979 revolution.”¹⁵⁶ “The aesthetics of politics”, writes Michael Fischer, “play upon the instruments provided by the technical infrastructure of civil society and public spheres.”¹⁵⁷ It was transforming the “masque of singular vox populi ... into the harmonics of multiplicities, of *ma bishomariim* (We are many) and *resaneh shomaiid* (You are the media), of subjectivities etched into new information flows.”¹⁵⁸ What the Green Movement wanted, however, was “nothing less than the absolute implementation of the constitution ... and the fulfillment of its promises of

¹⁵³ Michel Foucault, “The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt,” (First published in *Corriere della sera*, November 26, 1978) translated in Janet Afary, Kevin B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and Seductions of Islamism*, (USA: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 222.

¹⁵⁴ Michel Foucault, “What are Iranians Dreaming About?” (First published in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, October 12 – 16, 1978, translated in Janet Afary, Kevin B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, p. 205.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

¹⁵⁶ Ali Alizadeh, “Why Are the Iranians Dreaming Again?” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p.6.

¹⁵⁷ Michael M. J. Fischer, “The Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran,” p. 368.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

independence, freedom, and justice.”¹⁵⁹ According to Mohsen Kadivar, it has become “a national campaign against the deviations of the Islamic Republic, a campaign led by some who were among the regime’s insiders in the first generations of the revolution” and turned into “the first open confrontation by the middle-class citizens, a wide range of youth, students, women, journalists, and educated people against the restrictive policies of the Islamic Republic.”¹⁶⁰

Hossein Bashiriyeh explains Kadivar’s notion of ‘national campaign’ in terms of a “grave crisis of elite cohesion and unity, which has not been solved by arbitration as in the previous episodes but has been met with violence and repression.”¹⁶¹ “However, he adds, the issue of disunity has not led to a crisis of coercion and domination [since] there are no apparent rifts within the armed forces, no rival military force, and the ruling elites will to power and repression seems to be intact.”¹⁶² According to Bashiriyeh, such a mobilization like Green Movement under authoritarian regimes cannot be explained by ordinary factors such as economic problems, government incapacity, and general mass discontent of political repression. Rather, it is the subjective channeling of these objective conditions that gave rise to Green Movement. In the case of the Green Movement, the gap resulted from the rising expectations before the election and the violent repression after the election, and the widening divisions within the ruling elite and the popular awareness with regard to this division¹⁶³ created the subjective channels for the popular discontent aroused from objective conditions.

¹⁵⁹ Mohsen Kadivar, *The Green Call: Narrative of the Iranian Green Movement*, Preface available at <http://en.kadivar.com/2014/11/07/the-green-call/>, accessed on 1 September 2015.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Danny Postel “Counter-Revolution and Revolt in Iran: An Interview with Iranian Political Scientist Hossein Bashiriyeh” in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), *The People Reloaded*, p. 85.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 85 – 86.

¹⁶³ According to Bashiriyeh, the fact that the reformist candidates were approved by the Guardians Council to run for presidency and the reformists’ affirmation of their allegiance to the constitution and the theocratic system, and the divisions within the power bloc that resulted in support of some traditional conservatives to the reformists were the visible signs to the public with reagrd to disunity

The Islamic Republic suppressed the subjectivity of the Green Movement with force and coercion in the subsequent four years. However, the ruling elites opted for opening the channels for the amelioration of the objective conditions and moved towards a partial reconciliation by allowing the candidacy of Hassan Ruhani in 2013 presidential elections who ran as the candidate of reformists and whose one of the yet-unfulfilled promises was to free all political prisoners including the leaders of the Green Movement from house arrest. The ruling elites of the Islamic Republic not only endorsed the presidential victory of Ruhani, but also supported him in full capacity of their power to pursue negotiations with the Western countries including the United States and to reach a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue. Within this framework, Ruhani's presidency has been functional until today as a mechanism of cooptation of the reformist anti-authoritarian tide against the clerical power holders. Its ultimate effectiveness, however, will be tested in the upcoming parliamentary elections and in the next presidential elections.

among the ruling elite. Also, reluctance of some conservatives inside and outside the parliament to support the candidacy of Ahmadinejad added to the public perception of divisions within the ruling elite. See Danny Postel "Counter-Revolution and Revolt in Iran", pp. 87 – 90.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation was an attempt to understand the impact of nationalism in current Iranian politics. Departing from the observation regarding rise of nationalist appeal in the discourse of the Green Movement in 2009, the dissertation tried to make sense of mass appeal to nationalist ideology under the theocratic system of Islamic Republic. Adopting a critical stance to the *prima facie* paradox of secular connotation of nationalism and religious ideology of the state that disposed itself against nationalism and secularism in particular and any Western ideology in general, the dissertation firstly tried to understand the appeal to nationalist ideology by a political opposition movement that declared allegiance to the religious revolutionary ideals of 1979. After engaging with a historical-sociological enquiry of modern Iranian history, the dissertation refrained from taking the Islamic Republic's political system and ideology as the ground for analysis. Assuming the discursive continuity of nationalism since the beginning of Iranian modernization, the dissertation tried to find out possible linkages between political modernization and mass appeal to nationalist ideology. Thus, the ground for analysis became the Iranian society in the face of modernization whose dynamics throughout the modern Iranian past led to abolishment of two monarchies and establishment of current Islamic Republic. Secondly, the dissertation searched for the linkages between state power and the exercise of popular sovereignty by the people located in a more general context of state-society relationship. Thirdly, the dissertation searched the impact of external factor; that is, the influence of foreign powers in the country's affairs. Foreign influence was identified as the vital catalyzing factor in channeling the masses to the nationalist ideology whose ultimate aim was to secure independence of nation.

The historical-sociological enquiry of the subject throughout the dissertation revealed that there are two traits of nationalism in modern Iran. One is the

hegemonic state nationalism, which determines the institutional, cultural and ideological organization of the modernizing state; the other is the political nationalism of the opposition mass movements, which emerges in the face of foreign intervention in state affairs and restrictions on the exercise of popular sovereignty by the centralizing authoritarian state. This dissertation focused on the second trait of political nationalism since it was a genuine movement by the people raised out of discontent to inflict a positive change towards national and popular sovereignty.

Nationalist movements claim to speak for the whole nation contrary to state nationalisms that speak for a certain state ideology. Thus, for a mass movement of political nationalism to be effectively coordinated and mobilized, it adopts the language of nationalist ideology that is independent from any other political ideology. In fact, nationalist opposition movements become successful to influence state power when the nationalist ideology provides a roof for diverse political and social groups with diverse interests. On the contrary, the effective cooptation of the people by the state through material gains or the use of coercive power by the state over the society through military and security apparatus decline the chances of a nationalist opposition movement to become a significant force. Thus, political nationalism as an opposition mass movement arises when state's cooptation and coercion is not strong enough to appease the discontent among the society. This dissertation identified four such moments in modern Iranian history and explained the interactions between state, society, and foreign powers in four chapters.

Among the four moments of opposition nationalism, the first one emerged in the traditional Qajar state that experienced the first encounters with modernization. The second and third moments, however, occurred after the replacement of traditional Qajar authority with the modern Iranian nation state under Pahlavi monarchy. The last moment, again, occurred in a different polity that replaced monarchy, which was the Islamic Republic. Opposition nationalism, which rises in different political systems, state ideologies and international conditions, engages with the state and the foreign powers in different contexts. If we take the state as structure and society as

agent, the relationship is not one-dimensional. On the contrary, they both influence and transform each other. Thus, while the nationalist movements in different contexts have the power to transform the state, their nature, ideological composition, and the remedies for the solution of nation's problems are influenced by the state's behavior. However, the four moments of nationalist opposition in modern Iran embodies the common desire to end foreign intervention in the country, and to assert popular sovereignty vis-à-vis the authoritarianism of the state, which have been common conditions of all three different Iranian polities existed in the period of analysis in this dissertation.

Before the first emergence of nationalist opposition, which was the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 11, the traditional Qajar authority was destabilized by the military defeats in wars with imperial powers and subsequent territorial losses, and by the economic penetration of the imperial powers in the form of concessions that eventually put the entire economic resources and management in the hands of foreigners. To counter these negative impacts of modernity, the Qajar state initiated reforms in military, administrative and judicial system of the traditional state. However, these reforms further disrupted social interests and weakened the popular support to the monarchy. The widening gap between state and society as a result of changes in traditional governmental structure by the modernizing reforms and the perception of weakness of the state in the face of foreign intruders, nationalist opposition movement, mainly by traditional groups of merchants and clergy and the modern intellectuals, was coordinated and mobilized to establish a just rule through adoption of a constitution and formation of a parliament. Albeit clashes mounting to civil wars occurred between the protestors and coercive forces, Iranian nation succeeded to have a constitutional monarchy and a parliament by 1911.

The Qajar authority became impotent by the military coup d'état of Reza Khan, who would soon proclaim the establishment of Pahlavi monarchy in 1925 with the ambition to form modern Iranian nation state. He implemented institutional and economic reforms for centralization, and established channels for dissemination of

state-sponsored national ideology all over the country. However, the modernization by Reza Pahlavi brought out a one-man rule in the country, with his extreme intolerance to any kind of opposition. The end of his reign, however, was brought by foreign powers, when the Allied states that invaded Iran during the Second World War forced him out of throne in 1941 and replaced with his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. With the end of the brutal suppressive policies of Reza Shah, and the liberal environment during the occupation created by the political non-interference of Allied powers in society, provided political groups and parties to assume activity. Although Mohammad Reza Shah tried to turn back to the authoritarian model of his father in government, the state was not effective to curb political opposition due to its economic weakness after the occupation and lack of available coercive apparatus. However, the lack of means did not refrain him to restrict the political space through unfair elections where the state decided who to win. Thus, National Front was formed in 1949 to enforce popular demand for free elections and assumed the leadership of nationalist opposition in Iran until the coup d'état against the Mosaddeq government in 1953. Iranian nation state had just overcome a foreign invasion at the time of the formation of the National Front, but the country's most precious resource, oil, was still under the British control despite years-long negotiations and conundrums between the two governments. Thus, the National Front movement identified the nationalization of oil industry as the ultimate necessary goal to gain full national independence. The two aims of defending constitutional politics to secure nation's rights and nationalizing oil industry to secure true independence vis-à-vis foreign domination determined the nationalist discourse of opposition until 1953.

Mosaddeq, the symbol of liberalism and democracy for Iranians, was toppled by a foreign-instigated coup organized by British MI6 and American CIA agents. What is more, Mohammad Reza Shah regained his throne as a result of this coup with the help of the U.S. and British governments. This has become one of the bitterest political memories in Iranian national psyche. It deepened the xenophobic political culture and facilitated fiercely anti-imperialist opposition politics over the years until

the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Due to 1953 coup, Mohammad Reza Shah severely lost his legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Thus, he resorted two means to regain his power: alliance with the U.S., thereby obtaining military and economic aid, and establishment of coercive state apparatus. In 1963, he put forth a very ambitious reform programme for modernization, which he actually called this scheme of profound change as revolution. The White Revolution was designed to facilitate economic and social modernization. The reforms provided better living conditions for peasants through land-distribution and equitable pay for workers though share of industrial profits. For the improvement of living conditions and welfare of Iranian citizens, the Shah established literacy corps, health corps, and reconstruction and development corps. He reformed the electoral law and enabled women to elect and to be elected. These reforms served well for state cooptation for almost fifteen years. However, Reza Shah's modernization and reform policies were seriously flowed in the eyes of the political opposition since because he adopted the reform program in the absence of parliament that he dissolved by order and that he did not get consent of traditional classes such as the clergy, the bazaar merchants, and even the secular politicians of the National Front. The ever-mounting coercive measures against the political opposition that even became an international issue with the interference of human rights organizations in the last years of Pahlavi monarchy after 1975 increased the popular dissent against the government. Mohammad Reza Shah opted for implementing modernization together with coercion as the strategy of the survival of his monarchy. However, by 1977, the reemergence of armed guerilla activity, international pressures for Iranian political liberalization, the worsening economy due to decrease in oil revenues proved that the Shah could not continue with his old method of survival. Thus, he began to propagate liberalization. From 1977 until 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah on the one hand implemented policies for liberalization, on the other hand continued coercive suppression, which even, for a brief period, led to creation of military government and declaration of nation-wide martial law. The nationalist ideology coordinated interests of diverse groups and enabled their mobilization in the streets in the last two years of Pahlavi monarchy. The discourse of nationalist mobilization was imbued with anti-Americanism and

anti-Pahlavism. The commonly uttered slogan, 'independence, freedom, Islamic Republic' symbolized the nationalist aspirations of the masses in the streets. It was actually meant independence from foreign powers, freedom of political participation, and Islamic Republic as the ideal government that would facilitate these two. The leadership of the nationalist opposition was assumed by the senior clerics, their students in the seminary, lay-religious intellectuals mostly from the ranks from the Freedom Movement of Iran. However, socialists, communists, Marxist guerilla groups, liberals, university and high school students, workers, in short people espousing to various political ideologies who were tired of state repression and coercion joined the nationalist opposition movement that eventually brought down the monarchy by the triumph of revolution in February 1979.

With the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, modern Iran's experience with another new polity has begun. Islamic Republic is based on a theocratic system where the political supremacy of the clergy has been acknowledged by the new constitution adopted in October 1979. Where the exclusive sovereignty and right to legislate has been vested in God, the new constitution adopted *shari'a* as the law of the country. However, the new system legitimized itself as being approved by the vote of the people who realized the revolution against the Pahlavi monarchy. Thus, Islamic Republic's constitution vested in people the political rights to elect the president, parliament, local councils, Council of Experts who would choose the Supreme Leader to the office of *Velayat-e Faqih* at the top of the political system. On the whole, the political system of Islamic Republic is a hybrid of Islamic institutions and republican institutions. However, the national culture has been Islamicized by eradicating every idea and institution which is Western in origin, and monarchical in implementation. Thus, the secular romantic nationalism of Pahlavi state that entertained symbols of pre-Islamic Iranian past by reviving the ancient traditions, customs and religion has given its place to the transnational Islamic definition of nationalism. The Islamic Republic's ideology, especially evident in the first Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini's declarations, attacked nationalism as a Western ideology used by the imperialist powers to divide the Muslim peoples.

Instead of nationalism, the Islamic Republic has propagated patriotism (*hubb-ul vatan*), which has been acceptable since every individual loves his/her country, as a middle way to Islamic identification with other Muslim societies while preserving Iranian Muslim identity at the same time. Although curbed by the war with Iraq and evolved into a more territorial nationalism, this transnational identification of nation paved the way for the Islamic Republic to declare the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance against Israel as the primary Iranian national interest. The new state supplied the Palestinian and Lebanese organization with arms and manpower, and channeled important sums of oil revenues to these organizations. In the cultural domain, Islamic Republic embarked on a new national culture–formation project based on Islamic interpretation of social values. The university jihad Islamicized the education curriculums, mandatory *hejab* and restriction on men-women public relationship ‘mosquefied’¹ the public space, the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution directed the Islamification of universities and controlled the convenience of publications and media to Islamic principles, Headquarters of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice issued guidelines for the Islamic cultural policy to be enforced by provincial authorities. The restrictive cultural policies put a serious burden for liberals and seculars, and the middle-class people in general. However, the main friction between the Islamic Republic and the people in the political sphere has started in the beginning of 1990s, when the Guardian Council started to exercise its supervisory authority (*nezarat-e estesvabi*) to decide for the eligibility of the candidates for elections to the detriment of radical leftist revolutionaries, who would unite under the reformist umbrella after 1997 presidential elections. All these features of the Islamic Republican state paved the way for the coordination and mobilization of the last nationalist opposition movement in modern Iran, the Green Movement, in 2009. Like the previous three nationalist opposition movements, the Green Movement has declared itself to be against foreign interventionism, and political and cultural authoritarianism. Showing allegiance to the ideals of

¹ The concept of ‘mosquefication’ was used by Prof. Dr. Hamid Dabashi in his class on Iranian Cinema, Literature and Politics at Columbia University, New York.

revolution; *i.e.* independence, freedom, Islamic Republic, the Green Movement introduced a new interpretation of these ideals. To the Greens, independence meant not only resisting against imperialism but also considering the interests and values of Iranian nation above all other interests and values, including the transnational identification of national foreign policy interests. The second ideal, freedom, meant full implementation of the constitutional rights of the people, facilitating free political space, freedom of expression and publication, respect for human rights. Thus, the nationalist opposition of the Green Movement asserted, only by preserving independence and freedom in these lines the people could reach the true ideal of the Islamic Revolution.

Based on the analysis of the four nationalist opposition movements in modern Iran, this dissertation argued that there is a discursive continuity of the opposition nationalism in Iran, which is dependent on the continuity of foreign economic and political intervention, and the continuity of authoritarianism at the expense of the constitutional rights of the nation. The analysis reveals that the discursive continuity of opposition nationalism is not dependent on the ideology of the state since it appeared in traditional state, reappeared twice in secular modernizing nation state, and appeared again in Islamic-republican nation state. Therefore, despite the ruptures in state authority, hence, in the discourse of hegemonic state nationalism, the rival trait of nationalism at the societal level emerges in discursive continuity of the opposition nationalism.

Within the framework of this dissertation, the nationalist opposition movement is ontologically situated in the ambivalent space between acceptance and rejection towards modernization. The ambivalence stems from the implicit assumption of the argument of this dissertation. Accordingly, the argument implicitly assumes that there will not be any opposition nationalism phenomena if the political systems facilitate and secure the exercise of free political participation. This implicit assumption, however, imply in praxis the establishment of Western style liberal parliamentary democracy. For the non-Western societies it means imitation of

Western practice of political development. However, opposition nationalism's anti-foreign character makes it hostile to the Western model that it wants to imitate, to curb the authoritarian politics and open a wider space for popular sovereignty. It is this ambivalent space that the opposition nationalism in modern Iran has been situated. Thus, this dissertation cannot explicitly assume that the success of nationalist opposition movements to gain state power will lead to the formation of Western-style liberal democracy.

From a critical perspective it can be argued that the emergence of mass opposition movements in Iran can be explained by ideas other than nationalism or can be grounded more firmly on structural causes of state-society or intra-society relationships. Thus, the framework of 'opposition nationalism' may not be the only explanation to the research question. One plausible alternative explanation is to identify the mass movements with certain ideologies, which stems from the fact that the ideology of the leadership of these nationalist movements usually determines the discourse of nationalist ideology. For example, the liberal ideology of Mosaddeq has still been praised as the only example of civic nationalism and the only brief period of democracy in Iranian history; thus leading the researchers to identify National Front Movement as a liberal movement. The 1979 Revolution, however, imbued with Islamist terminology due to the leadership of the clergy and lay intellectuals aspiring to modernist Islamist ideology; thus often being referred as an Islamist movement. We do not know if the Mosaddeq's government would continue with liberal and democratic politics if he would gain control of state power or would resort to discriminatory policies as he exhibited briefly during his premiership to defend constitutionalism in the face of opposition. However, 1979 Revolution succeeded to gain state power and the revolutionaries established the Islamic state that the leadership of the nationalist opposition desired. The Islamic Republic Islamicized the political space through adoption of *Shari'a* in the legal system and through the constitutionally established clerical institutions with power over the exercise of popular sovereignty. Many Iranians who supported the revolution were disillusioned by state terror over opposition, Islamization of political space and

‘mosquefication’ of public space, and by the forced migration of those who did not accept the social rules of the new polity. Therefore, the nationalist opposition movement of 1979 Revolution ceased to represent the revolutionary masses in post-revolutionary state and did not speak for the whole nation; instead, it deliberately implemented discrimination in the name of protecting the revolution. To give another example, the rise of Green Movement as a political opposition movement can be grounded in the controversy between two understandings of the ideal Islamic Republic since the beginning of the revolution; one giving supremacy to religion and the other giving supremacy to popular sovereignty. However, this explanation is bound with political intrigues, checks and balances, and institutional rivalries and nationalism cannot be a determinant factor for this explanation. All these realities aside, what was important for the analysis in this dissertation was the coordination and mobilization functions of the nationalist ideology through which masses could channel nationalist demands into an opposition movement. Thus, this dissertation portrayed the four significant political mass movements in modern Iran as nationalist opposition movements.

In conclusion, the concept of ‘opposition nationalism’, which was derived by the single-case study that examined political nationalism and the nationalist mass opposition movement in modern Iran, has a strong explanatory power for the discursive continuity of nationalism at the societal level. For the future study, the explanatory power of ‘opposition nationalism’ framework can be tested in studies of nationalist mass movements in other single cases. It can also be used as a tool for comparison between the Iranian case and political nationalisms in other non-Western states that has experienced different political and social dynamics.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışma İran’da 2009 yılında ortaya çıkan siyasi muhalefet hareketinin milliyetçi ideolojiyi benimseyen bir söylem kullandığına dair gözlemden esinlenmektedir. İran’daki son kitlesel muhalefet hareketi olan Yeşil Hareket, İran devletinin politikasını eleştirmiş, bu politikanın İran devletinin milli çıkarlarını ve İran milletinin anayasa ile belirlenmiş olan haklarını korumadığını iddia etmiştir. Yeşil Hareket’in söylemindeki milliyetçi vurgu, ilk bakışta İran muhalefeti için milliyetçi ideolojinin devletin İslami ideolojisinden daha önemli olduğu açıklamasını ortaya çıkarmıştır. Ancak Yeşil Hareket’in milliyetçi ideolojiyi benimsemesi İran siyasetine dair iki önemli soruyu doğurmuştur. İlki, milliyetçiliği İslam birliğini bölmeye yönelik Batı kaynaklı bir ideoloji olarak reddeden teokratik devlet yapısının düzenlediği siyasi alanda doğan bir sosyal hareketin milliyetçi ideolojiyi benimsemesinin nasıl açıklanabileceği sorusudur. İkincisi ise, seküler milliyetçi ideoloji arzusunda olmayan, aksine İslam Devrimi’nin ideallerinin takipçisi olduğunu iddia eden bir siyasi muhalefet hareketinin neden milliyetçi ideolojiyi benimsediği ve bu hareketin milliyetçiliği nasıl anladığı sorusudur.

Tarihsel düzeyde yapılan araştırma Yeşil Hareket’in modern İran tarihinde devlet ideolojisine karşı milliyetçi ideolojiyi benimseyerek ortaya çıkan ilk veya tek toplumsal muhalefet hareketi olmadığını ortaya koymuştur. Aksine, milliyetçilik İran modernleşmesinin başlangıcından bu yana devlet otoritesine meydan okumuş olan üç diğer toplumsal muhalefet hareketinin de itici gücü olmuştur. Tarihsel-sosyolojik analize dayanan bu çalışma, modern İran’da devlet otoritesine ciddi bir tehdit olarak ortaya çıkmış toplumsal düzeydeki dört siyasi milliyetçilik hareketini incelemektedir.

Bu çalışma modernist yaklaşımı benimsemekte ve milliyetçilik düşüncesinin Batı kökenli olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Batı-dışı toplumlarda milliyetçiliğin benimsenmesini modernleşme ile birlikte başlayan değişikliklerle ilişkilendirmektedir. Batı-dışı dünyada siyasi milliyetçilik incelendiğinde Batı-dışı milliyetçi siyasi hareketlerin yabancı egemenliğine ve keyfi devlet siyasetine karşı direniş hareketleri olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Yabancı egemenliğine direniş emperyalizm veya kolonyalizm şeklinde tezahür eden Batı etkisine karşı bir tepkidir. Batı etkisi, Batı egemenliğinden bağımsızlık kazanmak, bağımsız bir ulus devlet yaratmak, ve modern ilerleme için toplumun siyasi seferberliğini sağlamak amaçlarına sahip milliyetçi direnişi ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Keyfi devlet siyasetine direniş ise halk egemenliği, anayasacılık (meşrutiyet), ve parlamenter demokrasi talepleriyle ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu modern düşünceler milliyetçi direniş tarafından keyfi devlet otoritesini koşula bağlamak ve böylece modern ve bağımsız ulus devlete ulaşmak için zorunlu kabul edilmektedir. Ancak Batı-dışı dünyadaki milliyetçi direniş hareketleri genellikle halk egemenliğini sınırlayan güçlü ulus devlet yapılarıyla sonuçlanmaktadır.

Batı-dışı milliyetçiliğe dair çizilen bu çerçeve modern İran'daki durum için de açıklayıcı bir çerçevedir. İran'da siyasi milliyetçilik ilk defa geleneksel Kacar otoritesi altında ortaya çıkmıştır. Ülkedeki İngiliz ve Rus hakimiyetine ve keyfi devlet siyasetine karşı mobilize olan siyasi milliyetçi hareket, anayasal monarşi düzeninin kurulmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır. İran ulus devleti ise Kacar otoritesinin yıkılarak yerine Pehlevi devletinin kurulması ile ortaya çıkmıştır. Pehlevi devleti ülkenin toprak bütünlüğü tesis etmiş ve idari merkezileşmeyi sağlamışsa da tek-adam yönetimi altında güçlü bir devlet yapısı kurmuştur. Rıza Pehlevi ve daha sonra oğlu Muhammed Rıza Pehlevi olmak üzere iki şahın yönetimi altında varlığını sürdürmüş olan Pehlevi devleti İran'ın idari ve ekonomik modernleşmesini benimsediği seküler milliyetçi ideoloji ile gerçekleştirmiştir. Ancak Pehlevi monarşisinin siyasi alan üzerinde uyguladığı güçlü devlet kontrolü siyasi özgürlükleri kısıtlamış ve siyasi modernleşmenin önünü kesmiştir. 1979 yılında Pehlevi monarşisini ortadan kaldıran ve yerine İslam Cumhuriyeti'ni kuran İran Devrimi de güçlü bir devlet yapısını

ortaya çıkarmıştır. Dinsel milliyetçi bir ideoloji benimseyen İslam Cumhuriyeti, devlet sistemin teokratik unsurlarının toplum karşısında üstün konumda tutulması ile halk egemenliği hakkının kullanılmasını kısıtlamıştır. Dolayısıyla Batı-dışı milliyetçilik çerçevesi içinde yapılan siyasi milliyetçilik analizi devlet otoritesinin farklı siyasi yapılara kayması temeline oturmaktadır. Bu yaklaşım, ulus devlet yapısına karşı ortaya çıkan muhalif milliyetçi sosyal hareketleri açıklamadığı gibi İran siyasi milliyetçilik tarihini devlet otoritesinin değişmesi ile meydana gelen kırılma noktaları ile dönemselleştirmekte ve açıklamaktadır. Kırılma noktası okuması siyasi milliyetçiliğin devlet düzeyinde analiz edilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu okumaya göre siyasi milliyetçilik, devlet otoritesindeki dönüştürücü değişikliklerin ve otoritenin esas aldığı farklı milli kimlik tanımlamalarının arkasındaki itici güç haline gelmektedir. Ancak bu çalışma, siyasi milliyetçiliğin aynı zamanda toplumsal düzeyde muhalefet hareketlerinin de itici gücü olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Devlet düzeyinde yapılan kırılma noktası analizinin aksine toplumsal düzeyde siyasi milliyetçiliğin sürekliliğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bunun için şu soruları sormaktadır: Neden ve nasıl milliyetçilik siyasi muhalefet için kapsayıcı bir ideoloji haline gelmiştir? Dört milliyetçi muhalefet hareketini doğuran yapısal durumlar nelerdir? Hangi faktörler bu hareketlerin toplumsal hareket olarak koordinasyonunu ve mobilizasyonunu sağlamıştır?

Çalışmada toplumsal düzeyde kitlesel muhalefet hareketleri şeklinde cereyan eden siyasi milliyetçiliğin sürekliliğini tanımlamak için ‘muhalefet milliyetçiliği’ çerçevesi geliştirilmiştir. Muhalefet milliyetçiliği devlet gücünü ele geçirmeyi ve kullanmayı amaçlayan siyasal kitle hareketidir. Milliyetçi ideoloji ile koordine ve mobilize olan kitlesel muhalefet hareketi devlet otoritesine meydan okur ve devlete karşı ciddi bir tehdit oluşturur. Farklı siyasi ideolojileri ile ayrışan grupların belirli anlarda bir araya gelmesi ve milliyetçi muhalefeti oluşturması ile ortaya çıkan bu hareketlerde milliyetçi ideoloji bu ayrışan gruplar için kapsayıcı bir ideoloji işlevini görmektedir. Milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi ulusun çıkarlarını iç ve dış tehditlere karşı koruma amacındadır. Dış tehdit, ülkenin siyasi ve ekonomik işleri üzerindeki yabancı

etkisidir. İç tehdit ise güçlü devlet yapısının güttüğü otoriteci siyaset ile halk egemenliğinin kısıtlanması ve halkın anayasal haklarının sınırlandırılması durumudur. Dolayısıyla çalışmada, yabancı müdahaleciliği ve devlet otoriteciliği İran'da belirli anlarda muhalefet milliyetçiliğinin ortaya çıkmasını sağlayan yapısal koşullar olarak tanımlanmaktadır.

Özetle, milliyetçi toplumsal muhalefet hareketinin beş özelliği vardır. İlki, devlet otoritesini ele geçirmeye ve kullanmaya dair siyasi motivasyondur. İkinci olarak, milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi belirli bir ideoloji ile ilişkilendirilemez. Bunun nedeni, bu hareketin farklı siyasi ideolojileri ve çıkarları ile ayrışan grupların ortak milliyetçi amaç etrafında birleşmesi ile ortaya çıkmasıdır. Her ne kadar hareketin liderliğinin ideolojik eğilimi hareketin devlet otoritesinden taleplerinde ağırlığını hissettirse de, kitlelerin liderlik etrafında toplanmasının nedeni liderliğin ideolojisi değil dış müdahaleye müsamaha gösteren fakat topluma karşı otoriteci olan devlet gücünü sona erdirmek hedefindeki ortak milliyetçi ideolojidir. Üçüncü özellik, modernleşme karşısında kabullenici ve reddedici tepkiler arasındaki müphemlik milliyetçi muhalefet hareketinde de gözlemlenmektedir. Milliyetçi muhalefet hareketinin temelinde gelenek değil modernleşme yatmaktadır. Ancak modernleşmenin Batı-dışı toplumlarda yarattığı müphemlik nedeniyle hareket modernleşme sürecinde yeniden tanımlanmış olan geleneksel unsurları bünyesinde barındırabilir. Dördüncü olarak, milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi bir kitle hareketi olduğundan çok zaman kitlelerin sokakta mobilize olmaları ile ortaya çıkmaktadır. Hareket, sokak dışında da mümkün olan mobilizasyon imkanlarını kullanır. Son olarak, milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi amaçladığı gibi devlet gücünü ele geçirdiğinde muhalefet hareketi olma özelliğini yitirir. Milliyetçi muhalefeti harekete geçiren güç devlet siyasetinde milletin çıkarlarına ters olduğu düşüncesiyle değişiklik yaratma arzusudur. Bu anlamda devlet gücünü ve örgütlenme yapısını değiştirmeyi amaçlayan devrimci bir harekettir. Ancak milliyetçi muhalefet bir defa bu güce ulaştığında, yarattığı değişikliği korumak için uğraşan statükocu bir güce dönüşür. Bundan sonra artık konumu gereği devlet gücüne muhalif olan ikincil bir milliyetçiliğin temsilcisi olmaktan çıkmış, hegemon ve birincil devlet milliyetçiliğine dönüşmüştür. Ancak

hegemon devlet gücü, milliyetçi muhalefetin önceki otoriteye karşı başarısıyla ele geçmiş dahi olsa, yabancı güçlerle işbirliği yapması halinde ülkede artan dış etki ve siyasi modernleşmeyi gerçekleştirilmeyen güçlü devlet yapısını koruması durumlarında gelecekte başka milliyetçi muhalefet hareketleriyle karşılaşmaya mahkum olacaktır.

Muhalefet milliyetçiliği çerçevesi aynı zamanda uluslararası ortam tarafından belirlenen imkanlar ve engeller ile devletin katılım sağlamadaki etkililiği ve devletin baskıcı gücü faktörlerini de göz önüne alan bir analizdir. Bu faktörler milliyetçi muhalefet hareketinin koordinasyonu ve mobilizasyonunun neden belirli bir anda imkanı hale geldiği ve hareketin başka herhangi bir anda ortaya çıkmadığını belirlemek için önemlidir. Ayrıca, bu faktörler neden bazı grupların milliyetçi muhalefete katılırken bazılarının katılmadığını, neden bazı grupların harekete ilk başta katılıp sonra ayrıldığını veya tam tersi şekilde neden önce katılmayarak sonradan harekete destek verdiğini anlamak için de önemlidir. Böylece bütün toplumsal grupların topyekûn dahil olmadığı milliyetçi muhalefet hareketini tanımlayan sınırların nasıl bulanık hale geldiği de bu faktörler çerçevesinde anlaşılabilir.

Uluslararası ortamın yarattığı imkanlar ve engeller İran'da muhalefet milliyetçiliğinin ortaya çıkışında ve farklı grupların muhalefet hareketine destek vermesi veya vermemesi durumlarında önemli rol oynamıştır. Örneğin 1949-1953 Milli Cephe Hareketi'nde ABD'nin dünya siyasetinde İran açısından tarafsız bir büyük güç olarak yükselmiş olması milliyetçi muhalefetin İran için tarihsel olarak 'şer güçleri' olan İngiltere ve Rusya'ya karşı mücadelesinde bu iki devleti dengeleyen bir unsur olmuştur. Milliyetçiler, Amerikan askeri danışmanlarını, mali yardımını, ve hatta petrol krizi esnasında İngiltere ile görüşmeler kesildiğinde Amerika'nın arabuluculuğunu kabul ederek İngiliz ve Rus etkisini üçüncü bir büyük güç yardımıyla dengeleme siyaseti izlemişlerdir. Her ne kadar Amerika'nın dünyadaki büyük güçlerden biri konumuna yükselişi Milli Cephe'nin başarısı için fırsat yaratmışsa da Rusya'nın Amerika'ya karşı duran ikinci büyük güç oluşu

milliyetçi mobilizasyon için engel oluşturmuştur. Bunun nedeni örgütlenme ve toplumsal destek anlamında İran'daki en güçlü partilerden biri olan komünist Tudeh partisinin İran'ın Sovyet yanlısı bir siyaset izlemesi gerektiğini savunması ve bu nedenle Milli Cephe Hareketine katılmamasıdır. Sovyet Rusya'nın kuruluşundan itibaren İran'daki Sovyet çıkarlarını korumaya çalışmış olan Tudeh partisi, ideolojik olarak Milli Cephe ile anti-empyralist düşünceyi paylaşırsa da Milli Cephe'nin Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşıt duruşunu kabul etmemiştir. Aksine, Milli Cephe'nin milliyetçiliğini inkar etmiş ve Cephe'yi Amerikan ajanı olmakla suçlamıştır. Bu da Soğuk Savaş'ın getirdiği ideolojik kutuplaşmanın İran siyasetine bir yansımasıdır. Geniş bir mobilizasyon kapasitene sahip olan Tudeh partisinin destek vermemesi Milli Cephe hareketini zayıflatmıştır ve bu, milliyetçi hareketin devlet gücünü ele geçirmekteki başarısızlığının nedenlerinden biri olarak gösterilmektedir. Daha sonra 1978-1979 İran Devrimi Hareketi'nde Amerika'nın monarşik yönetimlerde insan haklarını güçlendirmek ve demokratikleşmeyi sağlamak yönündeki politikası milliyetçi muhalefet için bir fırsat olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Carter Başkanlığı'ndaki ABD yönetiminin küresel insan haklarını teşvik siyaseti 1978'de devrimden hemen önce Muhammed Rıza Şah'ın siyasi muhalefet üzerindeki baskıyı gevşetmesinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Şah, halihazırda muhalefet ve ekonomik krizler nedeniyle sarsılmaya başlayan iktidarını ABD'nin desteğini de yitirerek tehlikeye atmak istememiştir. Aynı zamanda, ABD ile Sovyet Rusya arasında yaşanan yakınlaşma, milliyetçi muhalefet tarafından bir fırsat olarak görülmüştür. Muhalefet, bu yakınlaşmayı İran'ın Soğuk Savaş koşullarında Rusya'ya karşı bariyer olması durumunun ABD için önemsizleşeceği ve ABD'nin Şah'a olan desteğinin azalacağı şeklinde yorumlamıştır. Her ne kadar ABD, devrim süreci boyunca Şah'a olan desteğini geri çekmemiş olsa da, uluslararası siyasetten kaynaklanan bu iki faktör, 1978'de milliyetçi muhalefetin mobilizasyonunu güçlendiren bir etki yaratmıştır. 2009'daki Yeşil Hareket'te ise küresel iletişim araçlarının yaygınlığı küreselleşmenin hareketin mobilizasyonu için sağladığı bir fırsat olarak göze çarpmaktadır. Özellikle sokak protestolarının organizasyonunda muhalefet Facebook ve Twitter gibi küresel iletişim araçlarından faydalanmış ve yine bu gibi araçlarla sadece İran'a değil bütün dünyaya ülkedeki durumla ilgili bilgi yaymışlardır. Ancak

özellikle eski Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri'nde yönetimleri deviren kadife devrimler dalgası İslam Cumhuriyeti yönetimini de muhtemel bir dış-kaynaklı darbeye karşı alarma geçirmiştir. Yeşil Hareket için uluslararası siyasetten kaynaklı bir engele dönüşen bu durum devlet yönetimini Yeşil Hareket'in demokrasi yönündeki taleplerini bir devrim tehlikesi olarak algılamaya sevk etmiş ve devletin baskıcı gücünü Yeşil Hareket karşısında yoğun şekilde kullanarak hareketi şiddet yoluyla bastırmasına yol açmıştır.

Muhalefet milliyetçiliğinin koordinasyonu ve mobilizasyonunu etkileyen ikinci faktör olan devlete katılım, devlet-toplum ilişkilerinin bir işlevidir. Otoriter devletlerde siyasi alan sınırlı ve devlet ile toplum arasındaki mesafe geniş olduğundan devlet şiddet uygulama gücünü muhafaza ettiği sürece muhalefet mobilize olmakta zorlanır. Batı-dışı dünyadaki modern otoriter devletler baskıcı güçlerini koruyabilmek için dış askeri ve ekonomik yardıma ihtiyaç duyarlar. Aynı zamanda giderek şehirleşen nüfusun devlete katılımının sağlanması için içeride kaynakların dağıtımını yapmaları gerekir. İran örneğinde ise devletin katılım sağlama kapasitesi aynı zamanda petrol gelirlerinin etkili kullanımına bağlıdır. Petrol gelirlerini kullanarak devlet sosyal refah programları uygulayabilir, halk için eğitim ve sağlık hizmetleri sağlayabilir, temel ihtiyaçlar ile enerji ürünlerini halka sunabilir. Ayrıca devlet, eğitilmiş insanların bürokrasiye dahil olmasını sağlayarak da devlete katılımı artırma yoluna gider. Böylece, muhalefet milliyetçiliği bu katılım yöntemlerinin iyi kullanılmadığı ve nüfusun büyük kesiminin devlete katılımının sağlanmasında başarısız olduğu anlarda ortaya çıkar.

Modernleşmekte olan otoriter devlette devletin katılımı sağlamadaki başarısızlığı iki dinamikten kaynaklanır. Birincisi hızlı modernleşme reformlarının toplumun geleneksel kesimlerinde yarattığı rahatsızlıktır. İran örneğinde, büyük toprak sahipleri, din adamları ve pazar tüccarları devlet eliyle gerçekleşen modernleşme planı sosyal güçlerini ve mali çıkarlarını zedelememiş olsa devlete destek vermeye devam edecek olan sosyal gruplardı. 1920ler'de ve 1930lar'da Rıza Şah'ın uyguladığı seküler reformlar din adamlarının eğitim ve yargı alanlarında sahip

oldukları gücü yok etti. Muhammed Rıza Şah'ın ortaya koyduğu ekonomik modernleşme planı ise pazar tüccarlarının yabancı sermaye karşısındaki rekabet gücünü azaltarak kritik anlarda devlete karşı muhalefete katılmalarına neden oldu. Büyük toprak sahipleri Pehlevi devleti için en sadık geleneksel grup olmalarına ve devlet gücünün önemli bir temelini oluşturmalarına rağmen özellikle 1963 yılında uygulanan toprak reformundan duydukları rahatsızlık devlete olan desteklerinin azalmasına yol açtı. Ancak yine de bu gruplar kendi içlerinde yekpare şekilde muhalefete katılmış değillerdir. İran'daki dört muhalefet milliyetçiliği hareketinde de bu sosyal grupların bazı üyeleri milliyetçi muhalefet ile ittifak yaparken bazılarının devlet gücü tarafından katılımları sağlanmaya devam etmiştir.

Otoriter devletin katılımı sağlamakta başarısız olmasına yol açan ikinci faktör ise devletin siyasi alanda uyguladığı baskıcı kontrolün boyutudur. Siyasi farkındalığı olan grupların siyasi alana katılımını kontrol etmek ve herhangi bir muhalefetin oluşmasını engellemek için alınan otoriter önlemler devlet ile toplumu birbirinden uzaklaştırmakta ve toplumda baskıdan kurtulmak yönünde isteğin belirmesine neden olmaktadır. Milliyetçi ideoloji baskı altındaki toplumun devlet-karşıtı hislerini kitlesel bir hareketin koordinasyonuna doğru yönlendirmektedir. Böylece, devletin baskıcı gücünün çeşitli nedenlerle zayıfladığı bir anda baskı altındaki siyasi gruplar muhalefet milliyetçiliği ile devlete karşı mobilize olurlar. İran örneğinde bu dinamik Anayasa Devrimi Hareketi'nde, Milli Cephe Hareketi'nde, İran Devrimi Hareketi'nde, ve Yeşil Hareketi'n mobilizasyonunda sürecinde cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi öncesindeki dönemde muhalefet milliyetçiliğinin etkin şekilde mobilize olmasını sağlamıştır.

Anlaşıyor ki sosyal ve siyasi gruplar uluslararası fırsatlar ve engeller ile devletin katılımı sağlamaktaki etkinliği çerçevesinde milliyetçi muhalefet ile işbirliği içinde hareket etmeyi veya etmemeyi seçerler. Bu noktada dikkate alınması gereken bir diğer husus da uluslararası bağlam ile devletin katılımı sağlama kapasitesinin yakından ilişkili olduğudur. Batı-dışı otoriter devletin gücünü sürdürmesi için içeride kendine bağlı gruplardan aldığı desteğe olan ihtiyacının yanında gelişmiş Batılı

lkelerin askeri teknoloji ve ekonomik yardımlar konusunda desteđine de ihtiyaçı vardır. İki dinamik arasındaki iliŐki devletin muhalefet milliyetçiliđinin ortaya çıkışını engellemek için uluslararası fırsat ile yüksek katılım kapasitesinin bileşimine ihtiyaçı olduğunu göstermektedir. Milliyetçi muhalefet için mevcut olan uluslararası fırsat ile devletin zayıf katılım kapasitesi ise muhalefet milliyetçiliđinin ortaya çıkışı ile sonuçlanabilmektedir. Yine aynı dinamikler, milliyetçi muhalefet hareketine katılmayan grupların davranışını da açıklamaktadır.

Őimdiye kadar ortaya konan dŐünsel çerçeve içerisinde bu çalışma modern İnan siyasetinin dönŐtürc gc olarak siyasal milliyetçilik dŐncesini anlamak amacındadır. Bunu yaparken analiz düzeyi devlet deđil toplumdur. Modern İnan'daki siyasal toplumsal muhalefet hareketlerinin söylemlerinde, amaçlarında ve mobilizasyonlarında milliyetçi ideolojinin roln ortaya koyma çabasındaki çalışma, devlet otoritesine ciddi bir tehdit oluşturmuŐ drt milliyetçi muhalefet hareketini incelemektedir. Muhalefet milliyetçiliđi tanımlaması modern İnan siyasetinin dođurduđu bu drt toplumsal hareketin milliyetçi söylemindeki sürekliliđin ortak bir çerçevede kavramsallaŐtırılmasına yardım etmiştir. Bu çerçeve temelinde çalışmada İnan modernleşmesinin başlangıcından bu yana devlet otoritesi ç farklı siyasal yapıya kaymasına rađmen drt milliyetçi muhalefet hareketinin yabancı etkisi ve toplum karşısında gçl devletin varlıđı olarak süreklilik gösteren yapısal koŐullar nedeniyle emperyalizm karşıtlıđı ve otoritecilik karşıtlıđı söylemlerini süreklilik içerisinde sergilemeye devam ettiđini iddia edilmektedir.

Çalışmada her biri ayrı bir blm halinde incelenen drt milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi Anayasa Hareketi (1906-11), Milli Cephe Hareketi (1949-53), İnan Devrimi Hareketi (1978-79) ve YeŐil Hareket (2009)'tir. Anayasa Hareketi modern İnan'da ortaya çıkan ilk siyasal milliyetçi muhalefet hareketidir. Modernleşme ile ilk yüzleşmeyi yaşamıŐ siyasal otorite olan geleneksel yapıdaki Kacar devletine karşı örgtlenmiştir. Dolayısıyla modern İnan'ın ilk milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi ulus devlet olmayan bir siyasal otoriteye karşı ortaya çıkmıştır. Muhalefet milliyetçiliđinin ortaya çıkışından önce geleneksel Kacar otoritesi emperyalist gçlere karşı girdiđi

savaşlarda uğradığı askeri yenilgiler ve toprak kayıpları ile sarsılmaya başlamıştı. Devletin emperyalist güçlere verdiği ekonomik imtiyazlar ile İran’da yabancıların ekonomik nüfuzu güçlenmiş ve ülkenin neredeyse bütün ekonomik kaynaklarının idaresi yabancıların eline geçmişti. Emperyalist güçlerle birlikte gelen modernitenin maddi koşullarda yarattığı bu olumsuz etkiyle baş edebilmek için geleneksel yapıdaki Kacar devleti askeri, idari ve yargı alanlarında reformlar uygulamaya başladı. Abbas Mirza, Emir Kebir ve Sipahsalar Kacar devletinde modernleşme reformlarını başlatmış ve devletin merkezileşmesi yönünde ilk uygulamaları yürürlüğe koymuş devlet adamlarıydı. Ancak bu reformlar toplumsal çıkarları karışıklığa sevk etmiş ve halkın monarşiye olan desteğinin azalmasına yol açmıştır. Modernleşme reformları ile geleneksel yönetim tarzında yapılan değişiklikler ve yabancı müdahaleciler karşısında devletin zayıflığına dair algı milliyetçi muhalefet hareketinin doğmasında rol oynayan en önemli iki etken olmuştur. Bu bağlamda ortaya çıkan milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi, geleneksel sosyal gruplar olan tüccarlar ve din adamları ile modern bir sosyal grup olarak İran toplumunda yer edinmeye başlamış olan aydınların çıkarlarını koordine ederek mobilize olmaları sayesinde devlet otoritesine karşı ciddi bir tehdide dönüşmüştür. Milliyetçi muhalefet hareketinin iki amacı İngiltere ve Rusya’nın İran’daki emperyalist varlıklarına son vermek ve anayasanın kabulü ve parlamentonun kurulması ile halkın söz sahibi olduğu adil bir yönetimi tesis etmektir. Milliyetçi muhalefet anayasacılık düşüncesi etrafında toplanmıştı; çünkü anayasa, İran’ın bağımsızlığını sağlamanın tek yolu olarak görülmekteydi.

Milliyetçi ideoloji 1900 başlarında toplumda güçlenmeye başlamıştı. 1906’ya geldiğinde yaklaşık on yıldır hükümdar olan Muzaffer ed-Din Şah’ın göreceli liberal iktidarı milliyetçi fikirlerin kitlesel mobilizasyona dönüşmesinde önemli rol oynayacak olan yarı-gizli derneklerin faaliyetlerinin artmasına imkan vermiştir. Tüccar, din adamı, ve aydın gruplarının bir araya gelmesi için platform teşkil eden bu dernekler, çıkardıkları gazeteler ve dağıttıkları el ilanları ile milliyetçi fikirleri toplumun daha geniş kesimlerine yaymaya çalışmışlardır. Anayasa Devrimi Hareketi’nde milliyetçi mobilizasyonu sağlayan bir diğer yöntem ise eski bir İran

geleneği olan genellikle cami veya türbe gibi devlet gücünün müdahale edemeyeceği güvenli bir yere sığınma (*bast*) yöntemidir. 1905 yılından başlayarak 1906 boyunca muhalif gruplar tarafından üç büyük sığınma gerçekleşmiştir. Sokak protestolarının da düzenlendiği bu dönemde olaylara şahit olmuş İranlı tarihçiler tarafından halkın her kesiminin anayasa talebine katıldığı yazılmaktadır. Hareket, 9 Ağustos 1906'da Muzaffer ed-Din Şah'ın anayasal yönetimi ve meclis kurulmasını kabul etmesiyle amacına ulaşmıştır. Ancak hem anayasacı güçler arasında, özellikle din adamları arasında, çıkan görüş ayrılıkları hem de güç kavgasına giren Şah'ın Rus yardımına da başvurarak Meclis'i kapatması ile şiddetlenen çatışmalar 1911 yılına kadar sürmüştür. Ancak bu yıldan sonra Meclis düzenli olarak çalışmaya başlayabilmiştir. Sonuç olarak Anayasa Devrimi Hareketi devlet otoritesini değiştirmemiştir; ancak keyfi yönetim şeklini koşula bağlayan anayasal monarşi düzenini kurmuştur. Bu şekilde halk egemenliğinin güçlenmesi ile Kacar devletinin emperyalist güçler karşısındaki zayıflığının bertaraf edileceği düşünülmüştür.

Modern İran tarihinin ikinci siyasal milliyetçi muhalefet hareketi 1949-1953 yılları arasında devlet otoritesine ciddi bir tehdit oluşturmuş olan Milli Cephe Hareketi'dir. Anayasa Devrimi Hareketi'nden 1949'a kadar geçen zamanda Rıza Han askeri darbe ile Kacar otoritesini ele geçirmiş ve 1925 yılında kendisini ilk Pehlevi Şahı ilan ederek Pehlevi monarşisini kurmuştu. Pehlevi devletini Kacar devletinden ayıran çok büyük fark, Pehlevi devletinin İran'ın ilk ulus devleti olmasıdır. Rıza Şah, isyancı kabileleri kontrolü altına alarak, emperyalist devletlere verilen ekonomik imtiyazları kaldırıp bu devletlerle ikili anlaşmalar imzalayarak İran'ın toprak bütünlüğünü ve bağımsızlığını sağlamıştır. Devletin merkezileşmesini sağlamak için pek çok idari, ekonomik ve kurumsal reformlar gerçekleştirmiş, sanayi ve ulaşım alanında kalkınma hamlelerine girişmiştir. İdeolojisi seküler milliyetçilik olan Rıza Şah'ın ulus devleti, İran'ın kültürel modernleşmesi için de eğitim, spor, modern kıyafetlerin giyilmesi gibi konulara önem vermiş, devletin milliyetçi ideolojisinin topluma yayılması için gerekli kanalları kurmuştur. Ancak herhangi bir muhalif fikre veya gruba karşı son derece hoşgörüsüz olan Rıza Pehlevi'nin modern İran devleti siyasi alanı kısıtlayarak toplum karşısında güçlü bir devlet yapısına dönüşmüştür. İkinci

Dünya Savaşı sırasında ittifak devletlerinin İran'ı işgal etmeleri ile birlikte Rıza Pehlevi 1941 yılında tahttan ayrılmış ve yerine oğlu Muhammed Rıza geçmişti. Böylece Rıza Şah'ın acımasız baskıcı siyaseti sona ermiş ve işgal süresince işgalci devletlerin iç siyasi işlere müdahale etmemelerinden kaynaklanan göreceli liberalleşmiş sosyal ortam, siyasi partilerin yeniden faaliyetlere geçmeleri ile canlı bir siyasi alan yaratmıştı. Muhammed Rıza Şah ise hem işgalden dolayı devletin ekonomik olarak zayıflamış olmasından hem de henüz muhalefete karşı kullanmak üzere baskıcı güce sahip olmadığından ülkede oluşmaya başlamış olan muhalefeti engelleyememişti. Ancak 1949'a gelindiğinde Muhammed Rıza hem artık ordu üzerinde hakimiyet kurmaya başlamıştı hem de seçimlere yaptığı müdahaleler ile parlamenter siyaseti kontrol etmeye ve sınırlamaya çalışmaktaydı. Özellikle 1949 yılı Şubat ayında Muhammed Rıza Şah'ın Tahran Üniversitesi'ne ziyareti sırasında düzenlenen başarısız suikast girişimi Şah'ın muhalefeti bastırması için gerekli mazereti yaratmıştı. Bu olaydan sonra sıkıyönetim ilan edilmiş, muhalif gazeteler kapatılmış ve suikast girişimini düzenleyenlerden birinin komünist olduğu gerekçesiyle Tudeh partisi yasadışı ilan edilmişti. Bu ortamda 1949 yılında oluşan Milli Cephe'nin ilk amacı adil seçimlere dair halkın talebini ve ülkede baskı altına alınan basın ve ifade özgürlüğünü savunmaktı.

Milli Cephe parti yapısında değil değişik partilerin ve grupların bir araya gelmesiyle oluşan gevşek bir koalisyon yapısındaydı. Liderliğine Dr. Muhammed Musaddık'ın seçildiği Milli Cephe, İran'daki kolonyel hakimiyete ve istibdat devletine karşı mücadeleyi Cephe'nin iki amacı olarak belirlemiştir. İstibdat devleti yönetimi Şah'ın siyasi özgürlükleri kısıtlayıcı ve anayasal konumunu belirleyen "Şah saltanat eder, yönetmez" prensibini Meclis karşısında kendi yetkilerini artırmak yoluyla çiğneyen yönetim şekliyle kendini göstermektedir. Milli Cephe'ye göre halk egemenliğini ve özgürlükleri garanti altına alan Anayasanın tam şekilde uygulanması ile despotizm sona erecektir. Kolonyel hakimiyet ise İran topraklarını daha yeni terk etmiş olan büyük güçlerden biri olan İngiltere'nin İran'ın petrol endüstrisinin sahibi olmasıyla süregiden durumdur. Milli Cephe'ye göre tam ulusal bağımsızlığın kazanılması için petrol endüstrisinin millileştirilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu iki amaç etrafında 1949

yılında sosyalist, pan-İranist ve dinsel partiler ve gruplar Milli Cephe çatısı altında bir araya geldiler ve milliyetçi ideolojinin koordinasyon işlevi etkin olmaya başladı. Muhalif milliyetçiliğin mobilizasyonu ise Milli Cephe üyelerinin seçimler sonucunda milletvekili seçilerek resmi olarak 1950 yılı Şubat ayında açılan Meclis'e girmeleri ile Meclis çatısı altında sağlandı. Üyeler, Meclis'te küçük bir grup olmalarına rağmen Şah'ın parlamentoyu kapatma yetkisi elde etmek için talep ettiği anayasa değişikliği karşısında etkin şekilde muhalefet ettiler. Daha sonra, Haziran 1950'de eski Meclis döneminde İngiliz Petrol Şirketi ile imzalanmış ancak henüz onaylanmamış olan Ek Anlaşma metninin onaydan önce tüm yönleriyle incelenerek Meclis üyelerinin ve kamuoyunun anlaşmanın kapsamına dair aydınlatılması amacıyla kurulan Petrol Komisyonu, Milli Cephe üyelerinin milliyetçi mobilizasyonu sürdürdüğü platform haline geldi. Komisyonun on sekiz üyesinden beşi Milli Cephe grubundandı ve komisyon başkanlığına Dr. Musaddık seçilmişti. Razmara hükümetiyle Milli Cephe arasındaki çetin tartışmalar ve güç mücadelesi, Komisyon'un hükümet taraftarı üyelerinin de milliyetçi amaca ortak olmaları ile Aralık 1950'de Ek Anlaşmanın onaylanmayarak petrol endüstrisinin millileştirilmesine dair yasa tasarısının Meclis'e sunulmasıyla sonuçlandı. Meclis görüşmeleri sürerken hükümetin baskıcı güçleri Milli Cephe'nin fikirlerini halka yayan gazetelere baskın düzenlendi ve gazetecileri tutukladı. Bu durum, sokakta da gazetecilere destek veren ve basın özgürlüğü talep eden Milli Cephe taraftarları ile hükümet güçlerini karşı karşıya getirdi. Sokakta hükümet karşıtı protestolar Meclis'te ise Başbakan Razmara'nın petrol millileştirilmesine karşı mücadelesi sürerken İslam Fedailerini adlı köktenci bir örgüt tarafından Razmara'ya düzenlenen suikast, petrol endüstrisinin millileştirilmesi yasasının 8 Mayıs 1951'de kabul edilmesine giden yolu açtı. Şah'ın ve Senato'nun onayıyla yürürlüğe giren kanun, 1951 yılı Mayıs ayında Musaddık'ın başbakanlığa seçilmesiyle yürütme gücünü ele geçiren Milli Cephe tarafından uygulanmaya başlandı. İran'da özgürlük ve demokrasinin sembolü haline gelmiş olan Başbakan Musaddık'ın 1953 yılında İngiliz ve Amerikan ajanlarının ülke içindeki Musaddık karşıtlarıyla işbirliği yaparak düzenledikleri darbe ile iktidardan düşürülmesi İran ulusal bilincinde hala kapanmayan bir yara açmıştır. Muhammed Rıza Şah'ın ise darbe sayesinde tahtını

milliyetçi muhalefetten kurtarmış olması İran siyasi kültüründe yabancı düşmanlığını derinleştirmiştir. 1979 İran Devrimi'ne kadar geçen sürede emperyalizm karşıtı muhalefet siyasetinin ülkede derin şekilde yer etmesine neden olmuştur.

1978-1979 İran Devrimi Hareketi, modern İran tarihinin üçüncü siyasal milliyetçi muhalefet hareketidir. 1953 darbesinden sonra Muhammed Rıza Şah halkın gözünde meşruiyetini ciddi şekilde kaybetmişti. Şah gücünü geri kazanmak için iki yola başvurdu. Birincisi Soğuk Savaş'ın iki büyük gücünden bir olan ABD ile ittifak kurarak alacağı askeri ve ekonomik yardımlar ile iktidarını güçlendirmektir. İkincisi ise baskıcı devlet aygıtını kurarak toplumu kontrol etmektir. Nitekim 1957 yılında Amerikan CIA ajanları ve daha sonra da İsrail'in MOSSAD ajanlarından aldığı destekle kurduğu SAVAK teşkilatı, her ne kadar modern bir istihbarat teşkilatı olması ve iç ve dış tehditlerle mücadele etmesi amaçlarıyla kurulmuş olsa da sahip olduğu yetkiler ile kısa sürede devletin toplum üzerinde baskı kuran bir aygıtı haline dönüşmüştü. 1959 yılında ABD hükümetiyle varılan savunma anlaşması da ABD-İran ittifakını güçlendirmiş ve İran'ın alacağı askeri ve ekonomik yardımların garantisini sağlamıştı.

Güçlü ve modern ulus devletinin ancak toplumsal ve ekonomik reformlarla ayakta kalacağına inanan Şah 1963 yılında İran'ın devlet eliyle modernleşmesinin en hırslı adımlarından biri olan Ak Devrim prensiplerini ilan etti. 'Şah-millet devrimi' veya 'kansız devrim' gibi isimlerle halka sunduğu Ak Devrim çerçevesinde Şah, toprak reformu ile çiftçilerin yaşam koşullarının iyileştirilmesini, işçilerin sanayi karlarından pay alarak daha adil ücrete kavuşmalarını, ormanların millileştirilmesini ve bu projelerin uygulanması için eğitim, sağlık ve yeniden yapılanma ve kalkınma birliklerinin kurulmasını öngörmüştü. Seçim yasasında değişiklik yapılarak kadınlara seçme ve seçilme hakkının verilmesi de Ak Devrim'in reformları arasındaydı. Bu reformlar, her ne kadar Şah'ın 1953 darbesinden sonraki iktidarında baskı altına alınan muhalefet tarafından ciddi eleştirilere maruz kalmışsa da İran'ın özellikle petrol gelirleri ile artan zenginliği sayesinde etkili şekilde uygulanarak 1978'e kadar toplumun geniş kesimlerinin devlete katılımını imkanı hale getirmişti. Muhalefet ise

Rıza Şah'ın otoriter yönetimi, Ak Devrimi ilan ettiği sırada Meclis'i kapatmış ve dolayısıyla halkın temsilcilerine danışmamış olması, reformlardan olumsuz yönde etkilenen pazar tüccarları ile din adamlarının ve seküler Milli Cephe'nin dahi görüşüne başvurmamış olması gibi nedenlerle reformlara karşı çıkmaya devam etti.

Şah, iktidarı boyunca bir taraftan ABD ile yakın işbirliğini sürdürürken diğer taraftan içeride siyasi alanı kontrol etmeye devam etti. Bağımsız partilerin kurulmasına izin vermeyen Şah, ülkede parti siyasetinin varlığını kendi kurduğunu ve işlevsel olmadığına karar verdiğinde dağıttığı devlet partileri eliyle sağlamaya çalıştı. 1957 ve 1958 yıllarında kurduğunu Milliyetçiler Partisi ve Halk Partisi, çoğunluk ve muhalefet partileri olarak bir süre siyasi grupların devlete katılımı sağladı. 1964'te ise Milliyetçi Parti'yi kapatıp yerine reform idealine uygun şekilde Yeni İran partisini kurdu. Bu iki parti siyaseti Şah'ın 1975 yılında bütün halkın devlete katılımını sağlamak düşüncesiyle kurduğunu ve 1979'a kadar tek parti olan Diriliş Partisi'ne kadar sürdü. 1963 ayaklanmasını şiddet yoluyla bastırılmış olan Şah, muhalefet liderlerini yurt dışına sürgüne göndererek veya hapse atarak ve SAVAK teşkilatını halkın arasında en etkin şekilde kullanıp muhtemel bir muhalefetin oluşmasına izin vermeyerek devlet reformlarını uygulamaya devam etti. Şah, iktidarını sürdürmek için modernleşme ve baskıyı birlikte uygulama yolunu seçmişti.

Ancak 1977'ye gelindiğinde ülkede silahlı gerilla faaliyetlerinin yeniden başlaması, İran siyasetinin liberalleşmesi ve demokratikleşmesi yönündeki uluslararası baskı, petrol fiyatlarının düşmesi nedeniyle yaşanan ekonomik kriz ve devletin katılımı sağlamakta zorlanmaya başlaması Şah'ın artık eski iktidar metodunu uygulamaya devam edemeyeceğini göstermekteydi. Carter yönetiminin insan hakları programının da etkisiyle Şah, liberalleşme düşüncesini yaymaya ve siyasi muhalefet üzerindeki baskıyı göreceli olarak azaltmaya başladı. Ancak liberalleşme yoluyla muhalefeti kontrol altına alamayan Şah, 1977-79 arasında bir taraftan liberalleşme yönünde adımlar atarken diğer taraftan baskıcı sindirme yönetimine devam etti. Öyle ki bu, artan protestolar karşısında kısa bir süre askeri hükümeti işbaşına getirmeye ve ülke çapında sıkıyönetim ilan etmeye kadar vardı. Nitekim 1977'den itibaren milliyetçi

ideoloji komünist, Musaddıkçı ve dinsel parti ve grupların Şah'ın otoriteciliğine ve ülkedeki Amerikan etkisine karşı koordinasyonunu sağlamış ve 1978'e gelindiğinde sokak protestoları bütün ülkeye yayılmıştı. İşçilerin grevleri de protestolara eklenince ülkede üretim durma noktasına gelmiş, zaten ekonomik kriz yaşan hükümet üretimi duran petrol endüstrisinden sağladığı gelirden de önemli ölçüde mahrum kalmıştı. İran dışında da özellikle Yurt Dışındaki İran Özgürlük Hareketi çatısı altında bir araya gelen muhalif öğrenciler Şah karşıtı protestolara destek vermekteydi.

Kıdemli din adamları ile onların medresedeki öğrencileri ve çoğu İran Özgürlük Hareketi saflarında yer alan din adamı olmayan dindar aydınlar 1978-1979 muhalif milliyetçi hareketinin itici gücü oldular. 1978'in sonlarına doğru sosyalist ve komünist partiler, Marksist gerilla grupları, liberaller, üniversite ve lise öğrencileri ve işçiler de milliyetçi muhalefete katılmışlardı. Ancak 1978-1979 muhalif milliyetçi hareketinin lideri 1964 yılından bu yana Şah'a ve Şah'ın Amerika ve İsrail ile işbirliğine karşı muhalefeti nedeniyle sürgünde olan Ayetullah Humeyni oldu. Humeyni'nin özellikle ulema, halk arasındaki dini gruplar, ve din adamı olmayan dindar entelektüeller arasındaki hem söylemsel hem de eylemsel gücü ve Şah yönetimiyle hiçbir şekilde uzlaşmaya yanaşmayan katı tavrı onu hareketin liderliğine yükseltmişti.

Milliyetçi muhalefet, dini motifleri siyasal simgeler haline dönüştürdü. Özellikle şehit cenazelerinde ve Muharrem ayındaki anma günlerinde mobilize olan büyük kitleler Şah'ı üçüncü Şii İmam'ı Hz. Hüseyin'i katleden Yezid'le, Şah iktidarını da baskıcı Emevi iktidarıyla özdeşleştirmişti. Sokak protestolarında en sık duyulan ve daha sonra devrimin idealleri olarak anılmaya devam eden 'bağımsızlık, özgürlük, İslam Cumhuriyeti' sloganı sokaktaki her ideolojiden ve siyasi gruptan kitleler için milliyetçi amaçları simgeleyen bir slogan olmuştu. Bağımsızlık dış güçlerin İran'daki etkisinin sona erdirilmesi, özgürlük otoriter yönetimin sona erdirilerek toplumun siyasi katılımının sağlanacağı yönetimin kurulması, İslam Cumhuriyeti ise bu iki hedefe ulaşmayı sağlayacak ideal hükümet şekliydi.

Başvurduğu bütün yöntemlerin muhalefeti yatıştırmaya yetmediği gibi protestoların daha da yaygınlaşmasına neden olduğunu gören Şah, 12 Ocak 1979'da yönetimi Bahtiyar hükümetine ve saltanatı Naiplik Konseyine bırakarak İran'dan ayrıldı. 1 Şubat'ta Humeyni'nin sürgünden devrim lideri olarak İran'a dönmesi ve 11 Şubat'ta Bahtiyar hükümetinin istifa etmesiyle muhalif milliyetçi hareket İran Devrimi'ni zafere ulaştırmış oldu.

Milliyetçi muhalefetin iki amacından biri olan Şah iktidarının sona ermesi gerçekleşmişti; ancak diğer amaç olan ülkedeki Amerikan etkisinin sona erdirilmesi 4 Kasım 1979'da kendilerini İmam'ın Çizgisinin Takipçileri olarak adlandırma bir grup öğrencinin ABD Büyükelçiliği'ni işgal edip çalışanları esir almasıyla gerçekleşti. Şah İran'ı terk ettikten sonra Amerika'ya kabul edilmişti. Devrimciler, Şah'ın İran'a iadesini istemişti; ancak Amerika olumlu yanıt vermemişti. Buna karşı öğrenciler de ABD elçiliğini işgal yoluna gitmişlerdi. Büyükelçilik işgali sadece ülkede ABD'nin siyasi ve askeri varlığını sona erdirmekle kalmadı; İslam Cumhuriyeti devleti ile ABD arasında onarılması zor bir düşmanlık yarattı.

Modern İran'da ortaya çıkan dördüncü ve son muhalif milliyetçi hareket Yeşil Hareket'tir. İran Devrimi ile Pehlevi monarşisi yıkılmış ve yerine hem halk egemenliğine dayanan hem de teokratik bir yapılanmaya sahip olan İslam Cumhuriyeti devleti kurulmuştu. 1979 Ekiminde kabul edilen yeni anayasa ile din adamları siyasi olarak sistemde üstün bir konuma yerleştirilmişti. Ancak İran muhalif milliyetçiliğinin anayasacılık fikrinin yansıması İslam Cumhuriyeti'nde de etkili olmuştu. 1979 Devriminde halkın rolü de göz önüne alınarak İslam Cumhuriyeti halk egemenliği prensibini kabul etmiş ve cumhurbaşkanı, meclis üyeleri, yerel konseyler, ve Uzmanlar Konseyi gibi siyasi kurumlardaki temsilcileri seçme hakkını tanımıştı. Dolayısıyla yeni devlet sistemi teokratik ve cumhuriyetçi unsurların birlikteliğinden oluşan ikili bir yapıya büründü.

Yeni siyasi sistemde her ne kadar meşruiyetin din ve halk olmak üzere iki ayağı olduğu kabul edilse de iktidarı seküler milliyetçi Pehlevi devletinden ele geçirmiş

olan devlet milli kültürü sekülerizmden arındırmayı amaçladı. İslam Cumhuriyeti, Batı ile ilişkilendirilen her türlü düşünceyi ve kurumu reddetme ve Pehlevi monarşisi tarafından belirlenmiş olan milli kültür normlarını ve kurumlarını İslamileştirme çabasına girdi. İran'ın İslam öncesi geçmişini, geleneklerini ve dinlerini yücelten seküler ve romantik Pehlevi milliyetçiliğinin yerini İslam sonrası İran kültürünün ve geleneklerinin yüceltildiği ve milli varlığını İslam toplumlarının bütünlüğü içerisinde konumlandıran ulus-ötesi İslami bir milliyetçilik anlayışına bıraktı. İslam Cumhuriyeti, özellikle Humeyni'nin konuşmalarından anlaşıldığı gibi, milliyetçilik düşüncesinin ırk ve soya dayalı Batılı bir ideoloji olduğunu ve İslam toplumlarını bölmek için emperyalist güçler tarafından kullanıldığını savundu. Her bireyin ülkesini sevdiğini ve bunun milliyetçilik anlamına gelmediğini iddia eden İslam Cumhuriyeti, milliyetçilik yerine vatanseverlik düşüncesini yayarak Müslüman İran kimliğini koruyarak aynı zamanda diğer Müslüman toplumlardan da kendini ayırmayacak bir orta yol benimsedi. Her ne kadar İran-Irak Savaşı bu düşünceye zarar vererek teritoryal milliyetçilik fikrinin güçlenmesine yol açmışsa da İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin İran milletini ulus-ötesi kavramlarla tanımlaması İsrail'e karşı Filistin ve Lübnan halkının direnişini İran'ın öncelikli milli çıkarı olarak ilan etmesinin yolunu açmıştır.

Kültürel alanda ise İslam Cumhuriyeti sosyal değerlerin İslami yorumuna dayanan yeni bir ulusal kültür yaratma projesine girişti. Her ne kadar yeni kültürel politikalar liberaller, seküler gruplar ve genel olarak toplumun orta sınıfı üzerinde sınırlayıcı olmuş ve ciddi bir baskı yaratmışsa da siyasi alanda İslam Cumhuriyeti yönetimi ile halk arasındaki temel anlaşmazlık 1990lar'ın başında kendini ciddi şekilde göstermiştir. Humeyni'nin 1989'da vefatından sonra Koruyucular Konseyi seçimlere katılacak adayların salahiyyetine karar verme yetkisini radikal solcu grupların aleyhine olacak şekilde kullanmaya başladı. Bu gruplar 1997 cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinden sonra reformculuk şemsiyesi altında toplandı. Böylece 2000 yılına gelindiğinde reformcular ve ilkeçiler İran siyasetinin iki büyük ideolojik çatı grubu olarak siyasi alanda yer aldı. İlkeçilerin sistemin kurumlarındaki ağırlığı ve pek çok seçimde Koruyucular Konseyi tarafından reformcuların katılımının engellenmesi her

ne kadar devrimi yapan ve yeni sistemi kuranlar arasında önemli bir yerleri olsa da reformcu grupların ülkenin muhalefeti haline geldiğinin işaretiydi. İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin siyasi katılımı çeşitli şekillerde sınırlayan otoriter siyaseti, reformcuların bu durumu değiştirmek ve anayasal halk egemenliğini güçlü şekilde tesis etmeye yönelik muhalefetini güçlendirmekteydi.

2009 yılında Yeşil Hareket İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin bu yapısından ve siyasi geçmişinden kaynaklı bir ortamdan doğdu. Farklı reformcu partilerin ve sosyal grupların koordinasyonu ile ortaya çıkan Yeşil Hareket, kendinden önceki üç muhalif milliyetçi hareket gibi yabancı müdahalesine ve siyasi otoritecilğe karşı bir hareket olduğunu ilan etti. Ancak diğer üç muhalefet hareketinden farklı olarak dış müdahaleci gücü tanımlarken yapısal bir durum olan Batı emperyalizmini değil İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin Filistin ve Lübnan halklarının mücadelesini merkeze alan ulusal çıkar tanımlamasını hedef aldı. Bu farkın temel nedeni diğer üç muhalif milliyetçilik hareketinde dış müdahalenin kaynağı olan emperyalist devletin aynı zamanda İran'daki otoriter devletin işbirliği ilişkisi içerisinde olduğu devlet olmasıdır. Bu nedenle muhalif milliyetçi hareket hem içeride toplum karşısında güçlü devlet yapısını hedef alırken hem de bu yapının dışarıda işbirliği yaptığı emperyalist gücün devlet üzerindeki etkisini hedef almıştır. Bu da millete yönelik iki tehdidin muhalif milliyetçi söylemde bir araya gelmesini sağlamıştır. Yeşil Hareket'in ortaya çıktığı siyasi koşullarda ise İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin işbirliği ilişkisi içerisinde bulunduğu bir emperyalist güç yoktur. Aksine, İslam Cumhuriyeti için emperyalizme karşı mücadele temel saiktir. İran içerisinde ve baskı altındaki Müslüman toplumlarda emperyalizme karşı mücadele etmek amacıyla Filistin ve Lübnan mücadeleleriyle işbirliği içine girmiştir. Böylece, Yeşil Hareket'in milliyetçi söylemi devletin işbirliği yaptığı dış faktörler olan Filistin ve Lübnan mücadelelerini hedef almaktadır. Her ne kadar Yeşil Hareket'in İslami duyarlılığı İslam toplumlarında emperyalizmin etkisini göz ardı etmemesi sonucunu doğurmuşsa da İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin ulusal çıkar tanımından farklı bir nüansla yeni bir tanım ortaya koymasına da fırsat vermiştir. Bu nedenle, Yeşil Hareket'in muhalif milliyetçi söylemi devletin ulusal çıkar tanımına karşı muhalefetini yükseltmiş ve İran

milletinin çıkarlarının İslam ümmetinin çıkarlarından öncelikli olduğunu savunmuştur.

Yeşil Hareket, İslam Devrimi'nin değerlerini, yani 'bağımsızlık, özgürlük, İslam Cumhuriyeti' ideallerini benimsediğini ilan etmiştir. Ancak otoriter devlet tarafından bu ideallerin halk egemenliğini baskı altına alacak şekilde yorumlandığını ve devrimin aslına dönüldüğünde bu ideallerin yeniden yorumlanması gerektiğini savunmuştur. Yeşil Hareket'e göre bağımsızlık sadece emperyalizme karşı mücadele değil aynı zamanda İran milletinin çıkarlarını ve değerlerini bütün diğer çıkarların ve değerlerin üzerinde tutmakla sağlanabilir. Özgürlük ise halkın anayasal haklarının tam olarak uygulanması, serbest siyasi alanın yaratılması, ifade ve basın özgürlüğünün tesis edilmesi ve insan haklarının korunmasıyla mümkündür. Yeşil Hareket, ancak bağımsızlık ve özgürlük bu şekilde sağlandığı zaman gerçek İslam Cumhuriyeti ideallerine kavuşmanın mümkün olacağını savunmuştur.

Farklı reformcu partilerin koordinasyonu ile bir araya gelen Yeşil Hareket'in ilk amacı 2009 cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinde Mir Hüseyin Musevi'nin adaylığını desteklemek ve seçilmesini sağlamaktı. Ancak seçim sonuçları büyük bir oy farkıyla Ahmedinecad'ın kazandığını ilan etti. Reformcuların seçim denetleme grupları tarafından da tasdiklenen seçimlerde hile yapıldığı iddiaları da reformcuların seçimin iptali ve yeniden düzenlenmesi talebini doğurdu. Bu talebe olumlu yanıt vermeyen devlet otoriteleri, Ahmedinecad'ın zaferini kutladı. Bu gelişmeler karşısında devlet tarafından yok sayılmış olduğunu düşünen Yeşil Hareket destekçileri seçim sonuçlarını protesto için sokağa çıkmaya başladılar. Seçim sonuçlarının ilanından sonra sekiz gün boyunca devlet yasağına rağmen sokağa dökülen protestocular devletin şiddetli baskısı karşısında sürekli protestolara son verdiler. Bundan sonra ise İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin ilan ettiği önemli milli günlerdeki kutlama ve anmalarda sokağa çıkmaya ve resmi toplantı için orada bulunan kalabalıkların yanında Yeşil Hareket'in alternatif sloganları ile seslerini duyurmaya çalıştılar. Ancak 2009 Aralık ayındaki Aşura protestoları sırasında yaşanan ölümler ve kayıplar ve silahlı güçler ile sivil giyimli çetelerin protestocular üzerindeki şiddetli baskısı Yeşil Hareket'in

sokaktaki mücadelesini sona erdirdi. Hareket, felsefesini yazılı hale getirerek ideallerini İran toplumunda yaymak üzere yapıcı bir direniş içine girdi. Ancak İslam Cumhuriyeti yönetimi tarafından devleti yıkmak isteyen yabancı ajanların oyununa alet olan fitneciler olarak ilan edilmiş ve İran'a yönelik en büyük iç tehdit olarak gösterilmişlerdi. 2010 yılının Şubat ayında hareketin liderleri Mir Hüseyin Musevi ve Mehdi Kerrubi'nin eşleriyle birlikte ev hapsine alınmaları ile liderlik ile hareket arasındaki bütün bağlantı kesildi.

Baskıcı devlet gücü tarafından kontrol altına alınan ve sessizleştirilen Yeşil Hareket'in belki en önemli kazanımı reformist eylemliliğin İran toplumunda yayılmasını sağlamaktır. Devlet her ne kadar reformist hareketin öznelliğini baskılamayı başarmışsa da bu öznenliğin tanımlanmasına ve ifade edilmesine neden olan nesnel koşulların iyileştirilmesi gerekliliğini fark etmiştir. 2013 seçimlerinde reformcu aday Hasan Ruhani'nin adaylığına ve cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesine izin verilmesi toplumun reform talebi karşısında devletin toplumla kısmi uzlaşması olarak yorumlanabilir.

Sonuç olarak, çalışma modern İran tarihi boyunca süreklilik gösteren yapısal koşullar olan güçlü otoriter devlet ve dış müdahaleye karşı farklı siyasi grupların milliyetçi ideoloji ile koordine ve mobilize olarak ortaya çıkan ve devlet otoritesine karşı ciddi bir tehdit oluşturan dört toplumsal muhalefet hareketini 'muhalefet milliyetçiliği' çerçevesi yardımıyla incelemiştir. Yapısal koşullardaki sürekliliğin muhalefet milliyetçiliğinin söyleminde emperyalizm karşıtlığı ve otoritecilik karşıtlığı olarak süreklilik içerisinde kendini sergilemeye devam ettiği gösterilmiştir. Batı-dışı siyasal milliyetçiliğin toplumdaki yansımaları İran örneğinde inceleyen bu çalışmanın İran'da milliyetçilik düşüncesini ele alan literatüre iki şekilde katkısı olmuştur. Birincisi, mevcut literatür İran'da milliyetçilik düşüncesini devlet düzeyinde incelemekte ve devlet otoritesindeki değişimle birlikte yeniden şekillenen resmi milliyetçi ideolojiye odaklanmaktadır. Bu literatürde toplum düzeyinde milliyetçiliğin etkisi kültürel milliyetçilik boyutuyla veya devletin resmi milliyetçi ideolojisinin toplumdaki yansımaları boyutuyla çalışılmaktadır. Bu çalışma ise

siyasal milliyetçiliğin toplumsal düzeyde siyasete olan etkisine odaklanmaktadır. Toplumla devletle ilişki içerisinde ancak devletten ayrı bir siyasal bir aktör olarak değerlendirilen bu çalışma toplumsal muhalefet hareketlerinde milliyetçi ideolojinin siyasi hedefler doğrultusunda birleştirici ve harekete geçirici bir rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Çalışmanın ikincisi katkısı ise toplumsal düzeyde siyasal milliyetçiliğin etkisini anlamak için geliştirdiği ‘muhalefet milliyetçiliği’ çerçevesidir. Çalışmada İran örneği için açıklayıcı gücü ortaya konan bu çerçeveye başka Batı-dışı siyasal milliyetçilik örneklerinde de açıklayıcı bir çerçeve olarak başvurulabilir. Muhalefet milliyetçiliği çerçevesinin farklı toplumsal ve siyasal dinamiklere sahip diğer Batı-dışı toplumlardaki siyasal milliyetçilik ile İran örneği arasında yapılacak karşılaştırmalı çalışmalar için de açıklayıcı olabileceği düşünülmektedir.

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
Ph.D.	METU International Relations	2015
MS	METU International Relations	2006
BS	METU International Relations	2003
High School	Çanakkale Milli Piyango Anadolu Lisesi	1998

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2004 - Present	METU Department of International Relations	Research Assistant
2011- Present	ORSAM (Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, Ankara)	Part-Time Researcher
2012 - 2013	Columbia University (MESAAS) Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies	Visiting Researcher
2010 - 2011	Tehran University, Iran	Ph.D Exchange Researcher
2006 January	Palestine Legislative Council Election	TR Short-Term Observer
2005 November	Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections	OSCE Short-Term Observer

RESEARCH GRANTS

Erasmus Mundus EU - Lot 8 scholarship, *PhD exchange*, Research scholarship in Iran, Tehran University, 2010 – 2011.

BAP–08–11–DPT.2011K121010 ÖYP Ph.D Dissertation Research, Tehran, Iran (2012) and New York, USA (2012-2013).

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Fluent Persian, Intermediate French, Elementary German.

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Middle Eastern politics and society, Iranian politics and society, Iranian foreign policy, social movements, nationalism, religion, gender.

PUBLICATIONS

1. “Ruhani Hükümetinin İran Dış Politikasında Yarattığı Değişimin İç Siyasetteki Yansımaları” (Change in Foreign Policy of Iran Under Rouhani Government and Its Reflections in Domestic Politics), *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 6, No. 61, March-April 2014.
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Adı : Pınar

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