

NATIONALISM AND THE 'INTER-NATIONAL': A CRITICAL SURVEY OF
INTERNALIST THINKING WITHIN THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to critically survey the role of the “international” in theories of nationalism. It will be argued that even though a great majority of theories of nationalism have emphasized the causality between international factors and social dynamics, these two domains still remain as analytically distinct categories within their theoretical frameworks. This in turn serves the reproduction of the internalist thinking which prevails within social sciences, through the dichotomization of internal (sociological) and external (international) spheres, and renders it problematic both for the self-proclaimed interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies, and for overcoming methodological nationalism which is predominant especially within the discipline of International Relations.

Keywords: internalism, theories of nationalism, methodological nationalism, internal/external divide, international

ÖZ

MİLLİYETÇİLİK VE ‘ULUSLAR-ARASI’: MİLLİYETÇİLİK KURAMLARI İÇERİSİNDEKİ İÇSELÇİ DÜŞÜNCE ÜZERİNE ELEŞTİREL BİR ARAŞTIRMA

Özeniş, Çağdaş

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Bu tez milliyetçilik kuramları içerisindeki “uluslararası” rolünü eleştirel bir şekilde araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Her ne kadar milliyetçilik kuramlarının büyük bir çoğunluğu uluslararası faktörler ve toplumsal dinamikler arasındaki nedenselliğe vurgu yapıyor olsa da, bu iki alanın kuramsal çerçeveleri içerisinde hala ayrı çözümsel kategoriler olarak kaldığı iddia edilecektir. Bu da, sosyal bilimlerde hüküm süren içselci düşüncenin, iç (sosyolojik) ve dış (uluslararası) alanların ikiliği üzerinden yeniden üretilmesine hizmet etmekte ve hem disiplinler arası bir alan olma iddiasındaki milliyetçilik çalışmaları için, hem de özellikle Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinine hâkim olan yöntemsel milliyetçiliğin aşılması bakımından sorun teşkil etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: içselcilik, milliyetçilik kuramları, yöntemsel milliyetçilik, iç/dış ayrımı, uluslararası

To My Wife and Daughter

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. 1918-1945: EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM THEORY AS AN ACADEMIC FIELD OF STUDY	8
3. 1945-1989: THE INTER-PARADIGM DEBATE	19
3.1 Primordialism: The Laymen’s View of Nations and Nationalism.....	19
3.2 Modernism and the Historical Novelty of the “Nation”	27
3.2.1 Weberian Approaches to Modernity of the Nation	28
3.2.2 Marxist Approaches to the Modernity of the Nation.....	40
3.3 Ethnosymbolism: An Intermediate Position built on Myths and Symbols	53
4. POST-STRUCTURAL APPROACHES: NATIONALISM AS A DISCOURSE.....	66
4.1. Michael Billig and Banal Nationalism	67
4.2. Craig Calhoun and Nationalism as a Discourse	73
4.3. Nira Yuval-Davis: Feminist Approaches to Nationalism Studies.....	76
4.4 Partha Chatterjee and post-colonial theory.....	79
4.5 The “international” within the Post-Structural Approaches.....	84

5. CONCLUSION	87
REFERENCES.....	95
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY.....	102
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	111

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to critically survey the role of the “international” in theories of nationalism. It will be argued that even though a great majority of theories of nationalism have emphasized the causality between international factors and social dynamics, these two domains still remain as analytically distinct categories within their theoretical frameworks. This in turn serves the reproduction of the internalist thinking which prevails within social sciences, through the dichotomization of internal (sociological) and external (international) spheres, and renders it problematic both for the self-proclaimed interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies, and for overcoming the methodological nationalism which is predominant especially within the discipline of International Relations.

Theoretical discussions on nationalism have been fuelled following the end of Cold War. Most associated this tendency with the catastrophic consequences of the proliferation of ethnic and nationalist conflicts in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.¹ Others claimed that this proliferation is in fact a “selection bias”, and needs to be taken with a pinch of salt.² Since they argue, there has actually been a sustained decline in the total number of armed ethnic conflicts since the early 1990s, but our “ethnic bias in framing” is leading us to “overestimate the incidence of ethnic violence by unjustifiably seeing ethnicity at work everywhere”. Thus they said, “we

¹ See for instance, Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, London: Sage, 2001, and Graham Day and Andrew Thompson. *Theorizing Nationalism*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

² Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: a Critical Introduction*. 2nd edition, Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 2

are no longer blind to ethnicity, but we may be blinded by it”.³ One way or another, as Delanty and Kumar points out, nationalism which “once thought by many intellectuals of both Left and Right to be a declining or dying force, has seemingly returned with renewed vigour in recent decades”.⁴

This vigour, of course, also had some major repercussions on the discipline of International Relations. Scholars within this field, started to recognize more and more, that their discipline, which supposed to explain the relations among nations, had actually put no effort to theoretically elucidate what a nation is, or what nationalism implies for their subject domain. James Mayall, for instance, noted sadly in 1994, that “in the vast literature on nationalism, so few books are written by students of IR, and conversely why, in the IR literature, nationalism receives only scant attention”.⁵

Year after year, new studies were conducted by scholars, which problematize this tendency, what has come to be known as, “methodological nationalism”.⁶ Scholars repeatedly criticize this ill-conceived understanding of mainstream IR theories, which takes “nation-states” as given, or as the natural social and political form of the modern world.⁷ For almost all of these scholars though, this prevalence of methodological nationalism, was essentially indicating the existence of a much bigger problem; “the sharp distinction between politics inside and relations outside the territorial borders of existing sovereign states”.⁸

³ Roger Brubaker and David D. Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24, 1998, p. 428

⁴ Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar. (eds) *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, London: Sage, 2006, p. 1.

⁵ James Mayall, “Nationalism in the Study of International Relations”, in A. J. R. Groom and M. Light, eds, *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*, London: Pinter, 1994, p. 182.

⁶ Andreas Wimmer and Nina G. Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-state Building, Migration and the Social Sciences”, *Global Networks*, Vol. 2, no. 4, 2002, p. 301-334.

⁷ Martin Griffiths and Sullivan, Michael. “Nationalism and International Relations Theory”, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 43, no. 1, 1997, p. 53.

⁸ Rob Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 3.

They mostly held positivist epistemology responsible for this external/internal divide, as it draws rigid disciplinary boundaries between different branches of social sciences. Accordingly, they offered inter-disciplinary approaches for studying certain concepts, such as state, society, nationalism etc., which they believed fall in between the cracks of these disciplinary boundaries.⁹ What is interesting to note though, by the recognition of this poverty of positivist epistemology, which dismantles social reality through disciplinary boundaries, the “reification” of the international through the separation of domestic and international domains, can no longer be attributed to the Realist scholars solely. Now the discipline of sociology too, comes to be seen equally responsible from this internal (sociological) / external (international) divide as well.

“A major problem across the social sciences”, writes Rosenberg, which is “increasingly recognised in recent years, has been the predominance of ‘internalism’: the explanation of social phenomena by reference to the inner characteristics alone of a given society or type of society.”¹⁰ According to Rosenberg, internalist thinking is an upbringing of classical social theory which essentially conceptualizes society as a “singular, unitary and self-contained” entity.¹¹ This understanding he believes, has led scholars to neglect the theoretical significance of inter-societal relations and “thereby deprived the social sciences of a proper understanding of the international dimension of their subject”.¹²

Correspondingly, Rosenberg explains, the discipline of International Relations, which supposed to fill this gap, has itself been significantly shaped as an extension of it. “The neglect of the international in other disciplines”, he points out;

⁹ For one of the first studies on the impact of state/society relations on the “international”; see Faruk Yalvaç “Sociology of the State and the Sociology of International Relations” in M. Banks and M. Shaw. (eds) *State and Society in International Relations*, London: Palgrave MacMillan/ Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 93-114.

¹⁰ Justin Rosenberg, “The “Philosophical Premises” of Uneven and Combined Development”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 39, no. 3, 2013, p. 1.

¹¹ Justin Rosenberg. “Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky: Anarchy in the Mirror of Uneven and Combined Development”, *International Politics*, Vol. 50, no. 2, 2013, p. 188.

¹² Justin Rosenberg, *The “Philosophical Premises”*, p. 2.

has promoted a realist self-definition of IR in explicit contrast to Sociology, with the implication that its subject matter, lying beyond the reach of social theoretical categories, is somehow “supra-sociological” in nature.¹³

This in turn created an analytical separation of domestic and international politics, and endorsed a “state-centric” and “ahistorical” conception of the international domain, in which the behaviours of the actors are assumed to be structurally determined by an ever-present anarchy. So, in a way IR mirrored “Sociology’s tendency to reductionism with its own, equal and opposite, tendency towards the reification of ‘the international’”.¹⁴

Dufour believes, the same line of thought very much applies to nationalism studies as well. “Theories of International Relations have often shied away from apprehending the historicity of modern nationalism”, he writes, “inversely, theories of nationalism have not spent much time theorizing the ‘international’ beyond realism and its nationalist horizon”.¹⁵ This is why Dufour states,

The analysis of the relationships among social relations, international orders and nationalism has fallen in the cracks between the field of IR and the field of comparative nationalism.¹⁶

Now, Dufour has a point when he says, mainstream theories of IR has been in the business of studying nation-states, rather than nationalism. Even though historical approaches in IR have emphasized the novel character of nationalism¹⁷, “few have attempted to capture the social conditions of possibility of nationalism”, as Dufour

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁵ Frederick G. Dufour, “Social-property Regimes and the Uneven and Combined Development of Nationalist Practices”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 13 no. 4, 2007, p. 584.

¹⁶ Dufour, *Social-property Regimes*, 2007, p. 583.

¹⁷ See for instance; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; John A. Hall, (eds) *The State of the Nation; Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

asserts.¹⁸ Yet, a more controversial claim comes from Dufour, following this previous statement, this time with regards to the sociology of nationalism. Scholars of nationalism Dufour maintains, “has been in the business of studying endogenous, rather than internationally or geopolitically mediated processes”, this he believes led them to downplay, what Teschke calls, “the constitutive role of the international in historical development”.¹⁹

So does this come to mean a lack of an “international” dimension within nationalism studies, in the above mentioned “constitutive” sense? Such a critique would not only be a harsh but also an unfounded one. As this thesis will argue, it is actually possible to trace an “international” dimension within every theory of nationalism. Since nationalism, as a modern political ideology, is built on the premise that nations are limited and sovereign entities, scholars of nationalism were obliged to mention, the impact of what remains outside its borders, on the construction of what remains within. This meant that every theory of nationalism necessarily required a theory of the “international”, which they whether explicitly put forth or implicitly assume. It is true that some of these indeed tend to downplay the above mentioned constitutive role of the international, some even overlooked it all together, but most actually managed to capture it, in some way or another. What they failed to do instead, is that they have never challenged internalism, which is a by-product of the internal/external divide. Even though a great majority of them combined international and domestic forces while explaining how certain nationalisms emerged, these two domains still remained in their studies as analytically distinct.²⁰

This thesis aims to present a general survey of the nationalism theories, through which it will examine how different approaches have integrated the “international” dimension into their theoretical frameworks, and to what extent. Following largely on

¹⁸ Dufour, *Social-Property Regimes*, 2007, p. 584.

¹⁹ Benno Teschke quoted in *ibid.*, p. 584.

²⁰ Martin Hall, “International relations and historical sociology: Taking stock of convergence”, *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 6, no. 1, 1999, p. 108.

the conventional periodization within the field²¹, the investigation will start by analyzing the theories which emerged during the years in between 1918 and 1945, since for a great majority of scholars this period refers to the first appearance of nationalism theory as a field of academic inquiry. In this chapter, I will analyze the views of Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes and E.H. Carr respectively, since these historians are considered to be the vanguards of the nationalism theory.

In the second chapter, I will continue with the 1945-1989 period, in which the theoretical debate on nationalism became heated and more diversified. I will begin this part by reflecting on the views of Primordialist scholars who treated nations and nationalism, as naturally given human constants. Here, the cultural primordialism of Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, the socio-biological approach of Van den Berghe and the perennialist views of Adrian Hastings will be scrutinized respectively.

Afterwards I will carry on with the modernist view, which rejected the self-evident primordialism of the previous scholars, and explained that nationalism is actually a correlate or an offshoot of modernity. In line with the role they attach to the international dimension in their analysis, I will categorize these scholars under two main headings, the ones who followed the Weberian tradition in their theoretical approaches, and those with Marxist credentials. Scholars like John Breuilly, Paul R. Brass, Ernest Gellner, and Miroslav Hroch will be examined under the first category, which is labelled Weberian, because of the methodology and concepts these scholars use in explaining nationalism.

After inspecting the role of the international domain within these Weberian approaches, then I will continue with exploring the impact of the same dimension within the works of scholars with Marxist credentials. Even though all four scholars scrutinized under this category are self-described Marxists, it would be wrong to suggest that these form a homogenous category with regards to their theoretical positions. This is why, I will regroup these under two categories within themselves. First I will examine the Neo-Marxists position, which is mostly associated with Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter, and then, I will carry on with Eric Hobsbawm and

²¹ For such periodization, see Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*.

Benedict Anderson, two other prominent figures who associated themselves with the Marxist tradition. However, even though these scholars are self-proclaimed Marxists, their theoretical approach to modernity resembles some fundamental aspects of the Weberian scholars which were mentioned above. In this regard, it can be argued that these scholars actually adopts a position which tries to reconcile the modernist view of Gellner with the historical materialist predispositions of their own, this is why I will label their position, as *reconciliatory*.

In the final section of this chapter, I will put the ethno-symbolist view under scrutiny, which can be regarded as an intermediate position between primordialism and modernism. Here the works of, John Armstrong and Anthony Smith will be examined respectively. Then, I will present how Smith's conceptualization of the international have transformed over the years.

The fourth and last chapter will analyse the post-structural approaches to nationalism, which emerged after 1990s. For many, this signified "a new wave of theorizing", some even labelled it as the "post-classical" period in the theoretical debate on nationalism. Here, I will start my appraisal by examining Michael Billig and his notion of "banal nationalism", and then continue with Craig Calhoun for whom nationalism is essentially a discursive phenomenon. Nira Yuval-Davis and her feminist approach to nationalism will be considered in the third section, while Partha Chatterjee and his post-colonial theory will be examined in the fourth part. Finally I will finish with a general overview of the "international" within these new approaches.

CHAPTER II

1918-1945: EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM THEORY AS AN ACADEMIC FIELD OF STUDY

For a great majority of scholars within the field, nationalism has become a subject of academic inquiry, only very recently, in the opening decades of the twentieth century, “amidst the detritus of the First World War”.²² To stress the significance of this striking reality, some even developed narratives, which would otherwise seem absurd. Hobsbawm, for instance, adopts the point of view of an intergalactic historian, who visits our planet after a nuclear apocalypse, only to make the point that his reading list on nationalism “would contain very little that was written in the classic period of nineteenth century liberalism”.²³ In this sense, a widely held notion among the scholars of nationalism is that; “unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers”, or in Anderson’s words, it has got “no Hobbes, Tocquevilles, Marxes or Webers”.²⁴

Of course, this does not mean that nationalism itself was altogether absent in the studies of the classical thinkers. As Özkırmılı points out, nationalism as an ideology and a political doctrine, “has been very much in evidence since at least the end of the eighteenth century”, even though “interest in nationalism throughout much of this period was more ethical and political than analytical”.²⁵ Even for Anthony Smith, who

²² Özkırmılı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p.31.

²³ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 1.

²⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed., London: Verso, 1991, p. 5.

²⁵ Özkırmılı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 9.

defines classical modernism as the paradigm of nationalism, with its early forerunners being thinkers like; Michelet, Lord Acton, Rousseau, Herder and Mill, the pre-1914 sociological and social psychological traditions only provides a framework for the study of nationalism, since “much of its historical content was provided by the labours of sociologically inclined historians from the 1920s”.²⁶ Right after Smith identifies; Marxist tradition, Freudian crowd psychology, Weber’s writings on nations and Durkheimian emphasis on community, as the four major streams of influence contributing to the intellectual foundations of nationalism, he maintains that none of the scholars however, “were endeavoured to present a theory or model of nations and nationalism per se”, or “attempted to fashion a general theory applicable to all cases”.²⁷

In this regard, 1920s are generally considered to be a milestone in nationalism theory. It is widely believed that only after the pioneering works of historians like Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes, Louis Synder and E. H. Carr, nationalism theory has emerged as a field of academic inquiry, since these names were the first to treat nationalism, “as something to be explained, not merely defended or criticized”.²⁸ Relying on to this common narrative, I will start my survey by examining the work of these scholars, in order to demonstrate how the interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies has emerged. As it is the method that will be followed throughout this study, first the views of these historians will be put under scrutiny, and their contribution to the theory of nationalism will be briefly analysed, and then, it will be continued with a critical evaluation of how they conceptualize the international in their analysis.

As stated above these historians are considered to be the vanguards of nationalism theory since by problematizing how nationalism has been regarded as common place “in the modes of thought and action of the civilized populations of the contemporary world”, they raised the initial critique to the understanding which takes nationalism for

²⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p.16.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁸ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 2010 p. 31.

granted.²⁹ The American historian and diplomat Carlton Hayes, for instance, is one among the first to stress the historical novelty of nationalism. He states that;

We can be sure that prior to the eighteenth century A.D. it was not the general rule for civilized nationalities to strive zealously and successfully for political unity and independence, whereas it has been the general rule in the last century and a half. Universal mass-nationalism of this kind, at any rate, has no counterpart in earlier eras; it is peculiar to modern times.³⁰

In his book *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, Hayes aims to find out the main factors that have given such a “vogue” to nationalism, which he defines as the “paramount devotion of human beings to fairly large nationalities and the conscious founding of a political nation on linguistic and cultural nationality”.³¹ According to Hayes, human beings have displayed loyalty to different collective units all throughout the history, be this their tribes, clans, cities, provinces, manors, guilds or polyglot empires. Nationalism, in this regard, is just another expression of human sociality for him which is neither more natural nor more dormant than tribalism or imperialism.³² What makes nationalism such a major force in the eighteenth century though, Hayes explained, is the growth of a belief in the national state as the medium through which human progress and civilization is best achieved. In this regard, Hayes formulizes a chronological and evolutionary typology of nationalism, and defines five different forms in which modern nationalism has manifested itself.³³

The first one is the humanitarian nationalism which is the earliest and the only kind of formal nationalism. This includes the first doctrines of nationalism that were based on natural law and believed to be inevitable for human progress. The second one is the Jacobin nationalism. Hayes says that Jean Jacques Rousseau was one of the advocates of humanitarian nationalism but he promoted democratic nationalism which later

²⁹ Carlton J. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1931, p. 292.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.293.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.6.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 289.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

became “Jacobin”.³⁴ This form of nationalism in the name of promoting the ideas of French Revolution is developed by the revolutionary leaders. Since Jacobin’s idealism directed them into a continuous war, they became more and more nationalists. Hayes claims that this form of nationalism, established the basis of the extreme nationalisms of Italy and Germany in the inter-war years.³⁵ The third one is the traditional nationalism. Contrary to the Jacobin nationalism which views reason and revolution as the basis of nationalism, this form of nationalism takes history and tradition as a reference.³⁶ In other words, traditional nationalism, is aristocratic and evolutionary. Edmund Burke, Vicomte de Bonald and Friedrich von Schlegel are among the most well-known exponents of this line of thinking.

In the middle of Jacobin and traditional nationalism lies the fourth form; the liberal nationalism.³⁷ Originated in England, liberal nationalism views nationality as the proper basis for state and government, and regard it as the suitable medium through which people can exercise their individual liberty against the despotic and aristocratic rule. For Liberal nationalist, this may only be succeeded with the formation of different political units for each nationality.³⁸ The constitutional government, in this sense, governed by the people unified under a common national identity, is viewed as the main tool to destroy the aristocratic rule. According to Hayes, Jeremy Bentham is the leading proponent of this view. The last form of nationalism, in Hayes’ typology is integral nationalism, which he defines as intolerant and warlike. It is this extreme form of nationalism which presents national interest as a supreme value that is above humanity. Therefore it rejects humanitarians’ and liberals’ internationalist perception of nationality and claims that the ultimate aim of nationalism should be the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.42.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.159-163.

maximization of national power. In this regard, integral nationalism is inherently exclusionist.³⁹

As the above summarized typology reveals, Hayes' theory of nationalism is chronological and evolutionary. Accordingly, democratic nationalism is believed to evolve into Jacobinism; while aristocratic nationalism transforms into traditional nationalism through time. Eventually, Jacobin and traditional nationalisms gave rise to the evolutions of liberal and integral nationalisms respectively. However, as Özkırmılı points out, "this account of the evolution of the ideology of nationalism is not descriptive or value-free", since Hayes' favoring of liberal nationalism is explicit.⁴⁰ Moreover, even though Hayes treats nationalism as historically novel, and criticize attempts to take it for granted, the scope of this critique was limited to nationalism only and never extended to include the concept of nation, or national identity. As Lawrence explains, this inevitably limited the analytical value of Hayes' formulation, since he tended to presuppose the central component of his main object of analysis, the "nation", rather than explaining it.⁴¹

In this sense, a much more persuasive study conducted in this era, is Hans Kohn's 1944 classic *The Idea of Nationalism*. In this book, Kohn claimed that the emergence of modern states is a prerequisite for nationalism, since a common political form is necessary in order to integrate such masses of people into a collective entity.⁴² Thus, Kohn argues, nationalism was "unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state in the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century".⁴³ According to Kohn, nationalism is "first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 170, 311, 320.

⁴⁰ Özkırmılı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 2010, p. 34.

⁴¹ Paul Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory*, Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005, p. 87.

⁴² Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958, p. 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

the French Revolution has been more and more common to mankind”.⁴⁴ In that regard, Kohn believes it was the French revolution that idealized the nation state as the ideal form of political organization and nationality as the ultimate source of cultural energy and economic well-being.⁴⁵ Within this perspective Kohn makes a spatial and moralistic categorization of nationalism, and distinguishes between two types of nationalisms in terms of their origins and main characteristics: Western nationalism and the others.

Kohn associates Western nationalism with individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism as he thinks it is the product of Enlightenment thinking. In this regard, for Kohn, the rise of nationalism in the Western world, was a political occurrence.⁴⁶ While the other later nationalism, which emerged in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia have a different characteristic, since they appeared at a more backward stage of socio-political development. This type of nationalism, Kohn argues, “found its first expressions in the cultural field” and “held together, not by the will of its members nor by any obligations of contract, but by traditional ties of kinship and status”.⁴⁷ Relying on, and reacting to influences from without, this new nationalism Kohn writes; was

not rooted in a political and social reality, lacked self-assurance; its inferiority complex was often compensated by overemphasis and overconfidence, their own nationalism appearing to nationalists in Germany, Russia, or India as something infinitely deeper than the nationalism of the West.⁴⁸

According to Özkırımlı, this binary distinction that Kohn developed, has “proved to be the longest-living, and probably the most influential typology in the field of nationalism studies”.⁴⁹ Needless to say, however, Kohn’s typology is also very

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10-11.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13-14.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 329-331.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

⁴⁹ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 2010, p. 37.

problematic. Before anything else, it was essentially Eurocentric, as it presented an obvious example of orientalist thinking.⁵⁰ Moreover, as Calhoun points out, such a distinction also implies that, it is actually possible to talk about a purely political or rational form of nationalism, in which the sense of belonging is established entirely on internalizing an “idea”.⁵¹ Such a notion, Calhoun believes, is not only analytically flawed, but also politically precarious, since “it encourages self-declared civic nationalists [...] to be too complacent, seeing central evils of the modern world produced at a safe distance, by ethnic nationalists from whom they are surely different”.⁵²

Another historian who worked extensively on nationalism during this period is E. H. Carr. Unlike Kohn and Hayes, Carr was more concerned with outlining the various stages of European nationalism, rather than attaching any ethical value to it. According to Carr;

The nation is not a “natural” or “biological” group – in the sense for example, of the family. It has no “natural” rights in the sense that the individual can be said to have natural rights. The nation is not a definable and clearly recognizable entity; nor is it universal. It is confined to certain periods of history and to certain parts of the world.⁵³

So, in this regard, the modern nation constitutes a “historical group” for Carr, which “has its place and function in a wider society, and its claims cannot be denied or ignored”.⁵⁴ However, he adds; modern nations can in no circumstance be absolute, since they are “governed by the historical conditions of time and place; and they have to be considered at the present moment primarily in relation to the needs both of

⁵⁰ For a detailed study of orientalism; see Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, London: Penguin, 2003.

⁵¹ Craig Calhoun, “Introduction to the Transaction Edition”, in Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005, p. xiii.

⁵² *Ibid*, p. xiii.

⁵³ Edward H. Carr, *Nationalism and After*, London: Macmillan, 1945, p. 39.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 39.

security and of economic well-being”.⁵⁵ What has to be challenged and rejected in this sense, Carr asserts, “is the claim of nationalism to make the nation the sole rightful sovereign repository of political power and the ultimate constituent unit of world organization”.⁵⁶

In Carr’s view, “the modern history of international relations divides into three partly overlapping periods, marked by widely differing views of the nation as a political entity”.⁵⁷ The first period starts with the “gradual dissolution of the medieval unity of empire and church, and the establishment of the national state and the national church”.⁵⁸ The most fundamental characteristic of this period is “the identification of the nation with the person of the sovereign”.⁵⁹ In this context, the international relations “were relations between kings and princes, and matrimonial alliances were a regular instrument of diplomacy”.⁶⁰ Equally characteristic were the national economic policies of the period, to which the name “mercantilism” was afterwards given. As Carr explains, “the aim of mercantilism, both in its domestic and in its external policies, was not to promote the welfare of the community and its members, but to augment the power of the state, of which the sovereign was the embodiment”.⁶¹ French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars marks the end of this period.⁶²

The second period, according to Carr, “was essentially the product of the French Revolution and, though its foundations were heavily undermined from 1870 onwards, lasted on till the catastrophe of 1914, with the Versailles settlement as its belated

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 39.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 39.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 1.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p.2.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 5.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 1-2.

epilogue”.⁶³ Carr considers this period as “the most orderly and enviable” period of modern international relations.⁶⁴ According to Carr, the success of this period was heavily depended on “delicately balancing the forces of ‘nationalism’ and ‘internationalism’”; since the established international order was powerful enough to allow “a striking extension and intensification of national feeling without disruption on any wide scale of regular and peaceful international relations”.⁶⁵ The international society of this period had relied on the progressive economic expansion, which was built on the theory of *laissez-faire*.⁶⁶

Finally comes the third period, which brings yet another change in the character of the nation. The two essential symptoms of this period, according to Carr, is “the catastrophic growth of nationalism” and “the bankruptcy of internationalism”.⁶⁷ Even though it is possible to trace the origins of this period in the years after 1870, for Carr, it reached to its “full overt development only after 1914”, especially between 1914 and 1939.⁶⁸ A necessary corollary of this period is the “re-establishment of national political authority over the economic system”, which in turn led to the socialization of the nation, and eventually to two world wars.⁶⁹ Carr also presents a more detailed study of this third period in a separate study.⁷⁰

As the above summary illustrates, all three scholars reflect some common tendencies, which actually gives us valuable information for sketching the general understanding, predominating the field of social sciences during this era. First of all, they all were emphasizing the historical novelty of modern nationalism and problematizing the

⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 6.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 6.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 11.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 17.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 18.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 27.

⁷⁰ See. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, An Introduction to The Study of International Relations*, New York, Palgrave, 2001.

understanding which takes it for granted. Yet, as stated above, the scope of this critique was limited to nationalism only and never extended to include the concept of nation, or national identity. These notions continued to be taken for granted, even by the very scholars who studied nationalism. Secondly, they all tended to distinguish between rival understandings of nationalism, which in turn led to come up with their own typologies for differentiating different forms of nationalism which is prevalent in different historical epochs or geographical locations. As we will see in the following chapter some of these even shape the ideal-type construction of succeeding scholars. Yet, such dichotomizations, say for instance between “Western-Eastern” or “liberal-integral” nationalisms, said very little about the interaction between the categories themselves. Instead they served more to the consolidation of the “internalist” thinking, or, more precisely, to the notion that social phenomena, in this case “nationalism”, can only be explained by reference to the inner characteristics alone of a given society or type of society.

Of course, the international was always present within their theoretical considerations, whether overtly, as in Carr, or tacitly as in others. Yet, expectedly, the existence of this medium was taken for granted as well, just like the “nation” or national identity itself. None of these scholars grant any theoretical significance to the existence of such dimension. Instead they largely focused on explaining the changing historical forms and dynamics of geopolitical behaviour, as if these were naturally given, or inevitable. Now, it would be not only absurd, but also anachronistic to blame these scholars for their realist essentializing of the international, especially considering that E.H. Carr himself is considered to be one of the founding fathers of the realist school of International Relations. However, the moralistic tone in their approaches demonstrates, how the first great debate in IR, which supposedly takes place between realists and idealists, has shaped their own understanding of the international.⁷¹ Consider Carr, for instance, who says he has once believed in the possibility of an

⁷¹ The disciplinary history of International Relations is mostly articulated by a series of “great debates.” For more on this issue, see Ken Booth, Michael Cox, Timothy Dunne. *‘The eighty years’ crisis: international relations 1919-1999*, Cambridge University Press, 1998; Steven M. Smith, “The self-images of a discipline: A genealogy of international relations theory”, in Ken Booth and Steven M. Smith, eds, *International Relations theory today*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.

international community, yet this “exclusive solution is no longer acceptable”, given that it would be an impossible task to create such a community “out of units so fantastically disparate”.⁷²

To conclude, it will not be wrong to suggest that nationalism theory was born into an academic environment where “international” simply implied war and anarchy. That is not surprising considering the fact that, what generated their motivation for studying nationalism, is the impact of two great wars that the world has experienced. Correspondingly however, the positivist epistemology which was extremely prominent within social sciences at that time, has also led them to draw clear cut boundaries, between domestic and international spheres. As they believed, like most of their contemporaries, that these two domains were analytically separate categories. As we will see in the following chapters, this tendency continued to be salient in the field of nationalism studies in the following years.

⁷² Carr, *Nationalism*, p. 42.

CHAPTER III

1945-1989: THE INTER-PARADIGM DEBATE

The process of decolonization, together with new discussions in social sciences, initiated the most intensive and productive epoch of research on nationalism in between the years 1945 and 1989. As Özkırımlı points out, the earlier studies of this period – roughly those produced in the 1950s and 1960s – “were produced under the sway of modernization theories, then ascendant within American social sciences”.⁷³ Yet, later on, especially after 1970s, the theoretical debate on nationalism reached to its apex. Three distinct schools of thought were especially important to consider during this era. As it will be explained below none of these schools form a monolithic category, yet they were all classified according to some basic assumptions they hold with regards to nations and nationalism. This chapter aims to study the role of the international within these theoretical approaches. These three schools: primordialism, modernism and ethnosymbolism will be examined respectively in the following three sections. Each section will first briefly summarize mainlines of the corresponding approach, than it will reflect on the central arguments of the particular scholars within each category, and finally the role and the scope of the “international” dimension within these arguments will be explored.

3.1 Primordialism: The Laymen’s View of Nations and Nationalism

Primordialist view treats nations and national identities, as naturally given human constants that have existed since antiquity. “Primordialism” has long been seen as a pejorative term among the scholars of nationalism. Brubaker for instance, asserted back in 1996, that “no serious scholar today holds the view that is routinely attributed

⁷³ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p.39

to primordialist”.⁷⁴ Similarly, Hobsbawm stated that, “no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed political nationalist”.⁷⁵ This is why, for the vast majority of scholars in the field, primordialism clearly implies “the laymen’s view of nations and nationalism”.⁷⁶ Since, even though it is not very popular among the academic circles, a great majority of people still holds this view, as it continues to shape the curriculum of history classes in primary and secondary education.

The two most prominent adherents of this view, are Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz. Especially Shils is considered to be the eponym of this view, since he is the first to use the term primordial in his famous 1957 article; “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties”.⁷⁷ In this short but influential essay, Shils states that modern society, is no “Gesellschaft” as Tönnies claims it to be.⁷⁸ He believes, defining Western societies as expediential, atomized, rationalistic and individualistic, implies that these are “soulless, egotistical, loveless [and] faithless” entities, “which is utterly impersonal and lacking any integrative forces other than interest or coercion”.⁷⁹ Instead he argues; every society, including the modern one,

[...] is held together by an infinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense which is low in many, high in some, and moderate in most persons.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ Roger Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996, p. 15.

⁷⁵ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, p. 12.

⁷⁶ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p.49.

⁷⁷ Edward Shils, “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties”, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 8, no. 2, 1957, p. 130–145.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 131-132.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 131.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 131.

Shils points out that these “primordial ties”, are by no means functional or instrumental but they rise from “significant relational” qualities, which could be rightfully “attributed to the tie of blood”.⁸¹

This, however, should by no means get interpreted as he attributes certain amount of sacredness to this tie, as some critics have claimed him to do.⁸² According to Shils, these attachments are significant, simply because they represents a psycho-cultural necessity for individuals. After all, he writes, “[m]an is much more concerned with what is near at hand, with what is present and concrete than with what is remote and abstract”.⁸³ Geertz too shares this point of view. In “The Interpretation of Cultures”, which is formed from a collection of his previous essays, he writes that;

One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import *attributed to* the tie itself.⁸⁴

In that sense, Geertz too defines primordial ties as attachments which derives from what is culturally given, or more precisely, what is “assumed” to be culturally given.⁸⁵ Kinship of course is the primary one among these givens, yet primordial ties are goes beyond simple kin connections. “The givennes that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices”, these are all factors which contributes to the formation of primordial attachments.⁸⁶ “These congruities of blood,

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁸² See for instance, J. D. Eller and R. M. Coughlan. “The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 16, no. 2, 1993, p.183–201.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 130

⁸⁴ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, 2nd ed., London: Fontana, 1993, p. 259

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 259

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 259

speech, custom, and so on”, Geertz asserts, “are seen to have an ineffable and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves”.⁸⁷

Today, Shils and Geertz are regarded as “cultural primordialists”, or simply as culturalists.⁸⁸ This is to distinguish them from other scholars, who also believes in the immemorial character of the nation, yet refrain from calling themselves primordialists, since they do not share the same philosophical premises with Shils and Geertz. One such name is Pierre Van den Berghe, who is best known in the field, for his “sociobiological theory of nationalism”.⁸⁹ Without rejecting the socially constructed and evolutionary character of ethnic, racial or national groups, Berghe’s theory suggests that “there is indeed an objective, external basis to the existence of such groups”.⁹⁰ “In simplest terms”, Van den Berghe writes, “the sociobiological view of these groups is that they are fundamentally defined by common descent and maintained by endogamy”.⁹¹ Ethnicity, thus for Van den Berghe, “is simply kinship writ large”.⁹²

According to Van den Berghe “kin selection”, or mating with relatives, is a powerful determinant in human sociality since, like all animals, humans too can only “be expected to behave cooperatively, and thereby enhance each other’s fitness to the extent that they are genetically related”.⁹³ Therefore, he claims, “ethnic and race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection”.⁹⁴

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 259

⁸⁸ See for instance, Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 160; Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 55.

⁸⁹ Pierre Van den Berghe, “Sociobiological Theory of Nationalism”, in A. S. Leoussi, eds, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001, p. 273–279.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 274.

⁹³ Pierre Van den Berghe, “Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 1, no. 4, 1978, p. 402.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 403.

Of course these super extended families might sometimes become more perceptual, yet this is not important, since they are often real enough “to become the basis of these powerful sentiments we call nationalism, tribalism, racism, and ethnocentrism”.⁹⁵ Van den Berghe believes, sociologists are unable to see this basic reality, since their anthropocentrism avoids them to think evolutionary.⁹⁶ He believes, underlying this tendency, is their “trained sociological incapacity to accept the fundamental canons of scientific theory construction: reductionism, individualism, materialism and parsimony”.⁹⁷

The final group of scholars which also falls under the category of primordialism, goes by the name of “perennialist”, a term which is coined by Smith in order to distinguish these from other naturalist approaches.⁹⁸ As Özkırmılı states, even though “perennialists do not treat the nation as a fact of nature”; they still take it “as a constant and fundamental feature of human life throughout recorded history”.⁹⁹ The most prominent figure of this school is Adrian Hastings. Hastings believes, we can define nationalism in two different ways as a political theory and as a practice.¹⁰⁰

As a political theory that each “nation” should have its own “state” it derives from the 19th century. However, that general principle motivates few nationalists. In practice, nationalism is strong only in particularistic terms, deriving from the belief that one’s own ethnic or national tradition is especially valuable and needs to be defended at almost any cost through creation or extension of its own nation-state.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

⁹⁶ Pierre Van den Berghe, “Why Most Sociologists Don’t (and Won’t) Think Evolutionarily”, *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 5, no. 2, 1990, p. 174.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁹⁸ Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 159.

⁹⁹ Özkırmılı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 58.

¹⁰⁰ Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 3.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3-4.

If nationalism manages to become this central to 19th century Western political thinking in the former theoretical sense, Hastings claim, this is only because “it existed as a powerful reality in some places long before that”.¹⁰²

This general overview of the primordialist scholars, will continue with the way in which the “international” is integrated to the above mentioned theories. It will not be wrong to suggest that the role which “international” play in this line of analysis varies between little to none. Even, the word “international” randomly appears in the works of the above mentioned scholars. Of course, this does not mean that, they had overlooked the role of the “international” space all together. Yet, what it signified for them never went beyond the “reified” version of the realist scholars. International for these scholars simply meant war, destruction and invasion.

Take Van den Berghe for instance, for whom the international simply refers to interethnic or inter-kin relationships. Apart from “kin-selection”, which is the basis of ethnic and nationalist sentiment, he identifies two other mechanisms which he uses to explain human sociality. These are; reciprocity and coercion. “Reciprocity”, Van den Berghe defines “is cooperation for mutual benefit, and expectation of return, and it can operate between kin or between non-kin”, while “coercion”, “is the use of force for one sided benefit that is, for purposes of intra-specific parasitism or predation”.¹⁰³ According to Van den Berghe, “while intra-group relations are primarily dictated by kin selection, real or putative, intergroup relations are typically antagonistic”.¹⁰⁴ This is why he explains, even though different ethnic groups might sometimes enter into symbiotic and reciprocal relationships, this does not usually last long, since there exists

an open competition for, and conflict over scarce resources, and not infrequently establishments of multi-ethnic states dominated by one ethnic group at the expense of others. Coercion then becomes the basis of interethnic (or inter-racial) relations.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁰³ Van den Berghe, *Race and Ethnicity*, p. 403.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

As you can see, the inter-ethnic space within Van den Berghe's analysis very much complies with the structural realist conception. International represents a hostile environment, where an ever-present anarchy reigns.

Hastings too, hold a similar view. In his nominal work, *The Construction of Nationhood Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Hastings examined the formation of numerous nation-states, varying from Biblical Israel, to English nation-state, which he believes existed since tenth century and constituted the prototype of the modern nation states.¹⁰⁶ His analyses were not limited to Western European national identities, but also included, southern Slavic ones, and even the African nations of medieval times. Yet, even the historical and geographical context heavily varied in the cases he put under scrutiny, the role of the international in his explanations remained constant. Nationalism he states;

arises chiefly where and when a particular ethnicity or nation feels itself threatened in regard to its own proper character, extent or importance, either by external attack or by the state system of which it has hitherto formed part; but nationalism can also be stoked up to fuel the expansionist imperialism of a powerful nation-state, though this is still likely to be done under the guise of an imagined threat or grievance.¹⁰⁷

So the role of the international in the formation of national identities, according to Hastings is twofold. It either serves as an external threat which solidifies nationalist attachments, or as an expansionist intention which comes naturally with power. In this sense the international that Hastings put forth is perfectly congruent with that of structural realism which attempts to "abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities".¹⁰⁸

The same line of thinking is also evident in culturalist approaches. Geertz for instance, while explaining the fusion between mystical-phenomenological world view and

¹⁰⁶ Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood*, p. 5.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ Kenneth N Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979, p. 99.

etiquette-centered ethos through the example of Javanese shadow-puppet play 'wajang', writes that

the dalang's absolute control over the puppets is said to parallel God's control over men; or the alteration of polite speeches and violent wars is said to parallel modern international relationships, where so long as diplomats continue talking, peace prevails, but when talks break down, war follows.¹⁰⁹

Geertz refers to this "precarious" nature of the modern international system several times in his book.¹¹⁰ Each time taking it as a given or natural attribute of this dimension.

To sum up, primordialist theory interprets nationalism as just another form of collective identity, which has existed in every human society, since the dawn of history. Primordial affinities, in that sense are integrative forces which holds the society together. So much so that, once this social entity come into existence it is most likely to persist. Of course, as Shils states,

It might be destroyed by modern warfare, or the exhaustion of its resources, the lack of initiative of its inventors and enterprisers might so hurt its competitive position in the economic world that it would be doomed to the pressure of a standard of living below what its members aspire to. Aside from these, it is in no danger of internal disintegration.¹¹¹

In that sense, the role of the international within this approach, does not exceed to illustrate the contrast between in-group/out-group affiliations. What it pose is an existentialist threat, or occasionally, an opportunity for expansionism. The external/internal divide has central theoretical implications in this respect. Indeed, the primordialist theory is implicitly built upon it.

¹⁰⁹Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, p. 259.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 221, 265, 281, 308.

¹¹¹ Shils, *Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties*, p. 131.

3.2 Modernism and the Historical Novelty of the “Nation”

As explained in the previous sections, the concept of nation have long been treated as a human constant, though in the late twentieth century, there emerged grounds for doubting the naturalness of this concept. Social scientist started to question the universality of the widely accepted definitions of the “nation”, and challenged some basic premises regarding the concept. By rejecting the self-evident primordialism of their predecessors, these claimed that nationalism is actually "a correlate, an offshoot, of modernity and modern civilization".¹¹² According to these scholars, since the majority of the national identities emerged in the past 200 years, their emergence in many cases coincided with the development of capitalism and the modern state. Therefore, the emergence of nationalism has to be understood, in relation to;

industrialization, bureaucratization, centralization of authority, as well as the growth of literacy, secularization and democratization in short, a complex of possibly related developments, which is commonly called modernization.¹¹³

There are two common attributes, which were especially apparent in all these approaches. First, the emergence of nationalism was put forward as a consequence of the structural processes that were brought by the modernization. Second, in relation to this structuralist understanding, the particular, modern form of the nation-state is represented as a functional prerequisite of the large scale industrial society. In this sense, the age of industrialism was bound to be an age of nationalism, since as Gellner explained, the modern industrial society "can only function with a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable population" and the nation-state is the only agency capable of providing such a work force, through its support for a mass, public, compulsory and standardized education system.¹¹⁴ In short, the modernist perspective held the belief that "nations exists not only as functions of a particular kind of territorial state [...] but also in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic

¹¹² Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p. 11.

¹¹³ Liah Greenfeld, “The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France”, *Research in Political Sociology*, Vol. 5, 1991, p. 334.

¹¹⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, p. 46.

development".¹¹⁵ In this sense, they were both spontaneously generated by and instrumental for the development of modern industrial society.

It is possible to come across with several categorizations of modernist scholars within the nationalism studies literature. Özkırmılı, for instance, divide modernist theories into three categories in terms of the key factors they identify; those that emphasize economic transformations, those that focus on political transformations, and those that stress the role of social/cultural transformations.¹¹⁶ Smith, on the other hand, follows a different typology, and distinguishes between six different groups, those who associate nationalism with the culture of industrialism, those that highlight the relationship between capitalism and nationalism, those that do the same for state and nation, those who see it as a form of political messianism and those who regard it as invention and imagination.¹¹⁷ Since the main aim of this study is to survey the role of the international within these theories, here, the modernist scholars of nationalism will be briefly analysed under two main headings, to be exact, the approaches that followed the Weberian tradition and the ones who followed the Marxist tradition in their formulation of the modernity of the nation.

3.2.1 Weberian Approaches to Modernity of the Nation

A variant of the modernist approaches to nationalism can be labeled as “Weberian” regarding their methodology and the concepts they use to explain nationalism. This variant, one can suggest, analyzes nationalism mostly in an instrumentalist and functionalist perspective. They focus on the modern bureaucratic state, growing role of elites, power struggles between different elite groups, etc. One prominent figure which falls under this category is John Breuilly. Breuilly’s work is considered as one of the key texts on nationalism because his massive historical survey differentiates him

¹¹⁵ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, p. 10.

¹¹⁶ For Özkırmılı’s categorization, see Özkırmılı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 72.

¹¹⁷ For Smith’s categorization see, Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*.

from earlier studies. His approach aims to combine historical perspectives with theoretical analysis.

Breuilly proposes to perceive nationalism as a form of politics, so his conceptualization also differs from other works in the field. He is skeptical of “grand theories” since they present a general argument and remove the examples they are using from their historical context. Therefore, he states;

general framework of analysis is only acceptable if it permits an effective analysis of particular cases. This requires two things. First, it is necessary to develop a typology of nationalisms, since nationalisms are too varied to be explained by a single method of investigation. Thus, any study should begin by identifying various types of nationalism which can be considered separately. Second, each type should be investigated by the method of comparative history.¹¹⁸

He describes his arguments main aspects as state-oriented and modernist. For him, nationalism refers to “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments”, thus he explains, nationalist argument is based on three assertions:

1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
3. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.¹¹⁹

For him, the crucial point for nationalism studies is that nationalism is about politics and politics is about power which, “in the modern world, is principally about control of the state.” Therefore, the main task of nationalism studies should be;

to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power. We need to understand why nationalism has played a major role in the pursuit of those objectives.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2nd ed., 1993, p. 1-2.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

First step to take in this regard, is to consider nationalism as a form of politics and to formulate an analytical framework accordingly. Then comes the next step, which is relating nationalism to the process of modernization. Here, modernization refers to the process that involves a significant change in the “generic division of labour”. The most important stage of this change is the transition from a “corporate” to “functional” division of labour.¹²¹ Breuilly argues that the modern state originally developed in the liberal form, since public powers were handed over to specialized state institutions and many private powers were left under the control of non-political institutions. Therefore, distinction between public and private or state and civil society became much more obvious. Under these circumstances, the central question was “how to establish the state–society connection”, or in other words, “how to reconcile the public interests of citizens and the private interests of selfish individuals”.¹²²

The political answer based on the idea of citizenship was the first form of the answer provided to this question. The nation as the body of citizens created the perception that the only things mattered was the political rights of the citizens and their cultural identities. The second answer, which is the cultural one, stressed the collective character of society. It addressed two basic problems of political elites, these are; intellectual problem of how to legitimize state action and political problem of how to secure the support of the masses.¹²³ However, the “modern” necessitated to establish political languages and movements in order to appeal a wide range of groups, and that complicated the matters further. At this point nationalism got on the stage, with its “sleight-of-hand ideology” which brings the two solutions together, namely “the nation as a body of citizens” and as a “cultural collectivity”.¹²⁴

Another scholar who embraced a similar approach is Paul R. Brass. The most significant argument and emphasis of Brass’ work is the instrumental nature of

¹²¹ John Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism”, in G. Balakrishnan, eds, *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, 1996, p. 163-164.

¹²² John Breuilly, “Nationalism and the State”, in R. Michener, eds, *Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism in Liberal Democratic Societies*, Minnesota: Professors World Peace Academy, 1993, p.23.

¹²³ Breuilly, *Approaches to Nationalism*, p. 165.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

ethnicity and nationality. Accordingly, ethnicity and nationality are redefined and reconstructed in changing conditions and in order to satisfy the needs of political elites who are trying to generate mass support for gaining wealth, power and prestige. “[T]he study of ethnicity and nationality is in large part the study of politically induced cultural change”, Brass writes;

More precisely, it is the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups.¹²⁵

There are three basic assumptions in Brass’ approach. Firstly, he argues that the rise of ethnic identities and their transformation into nationalism is not inevitable; specific conditions are required for the politicization of cultural identities. Secondly, cultural differences are not the source of ethnic conflicts; rather broader political and economic environment which shapes the competition between elite groups is the main factor promoting it. Finally, the definition of the relevant ethnic groups and their persistence are influenced by this competition.¹²⁶

In pre-modern societies, says Brass, process of ethnic transformation has not yet begun or in post-industrial societies the boundaries separating ethnic categories are not obvious. These boundaries become visible in the process of ethnic transformation. Since, he explains,

cultural markers are selected and used as a basis for differentiating the group from other groups, as a focus for enhancing the internal solidarity of the group, as a claim for a particular social status, and, if the ethnic group becomes politicized, as justification for a demand for either group rights in an existing political system or for recognition as a separate nation.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Paul R. Brass, “Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia”, in D. Taylor and M. Yapp, eds, *Political Identity in South Asia*, London: Curzon Press, 1979, p. 40-41.

¹²⁶ Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi and Newbury Park: Sage, 1991, p. 13-14.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Ethnic differences and elite competition in a given population is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the process of ethnic transformation to occur. The sufficient conditions according to Brass are:

the existence of the means to communicate the selected symbols of identity to other social classes within the ethnic group, the existence of a socially mobilized population to whom the symbols may be communicated, and the absence of intense class cleavage or other difficulties in communication between elites and other social groups and classes.¹²⁸

Lastly, Brass discusses the factors that determine the success of a nationalist movement. For Brass, three factors are especially significant in this respect: “the existence of and the strategies pursued by nationalist political organizations, the nature of government response to ethnic group demands, and the general political context”.¹²⁹

Another scholar of nationalism who falls under this category, is Ernest Gellner. Gellner is probably the most reputed scholar of nationalism and his work is considered to be the most important attempt to explain nationalism. Gellner’s theory can be better understood within the context of a longstanding sociological tradition whose origins go back to Durkheim and Weber. The cardinal feature of this tradition is a distinction between “traditional” and “modern” societies. Following in the footsteps of the founding fathers of sociology, Gellner posits three stages in human history: the hunter-gatherer, the agroliterate and the industrial.¹³⁰

Gellner argues that nationalism, as a primarily political principle, “holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”.¹³¹ Moreover, it has “become a sociological necessity only in the modern world”, thus the task of a theory of nationalism “is to explain how and why did this happen”.¹³² He explains the absence of nations and nationalisms in pre-modern eras by analyzing the relationship between “power” and “culture”. In hunter-gatherer stage, there are no states, hence there is no

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹³⁰ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 129-130.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

room for national culture. Agro-literate societies have complex systems of statuses. However, the rulers did not have the purpose of imposing cultural homogeneity since they were benefiting from diversity. As Özkırımlı points out, “the overall conclusion for Gellner is straightforward: since there is no cultural homogenization in agro-literate societies, there can be no nations”.¹³³ Thus, shared culture is not essential to the preservation of social order in agro-literate societies since status, that is an individual’s place in the system of social roles, is ascriptive.¹³⁴ Conversely, culture plays a more active role in industrial societies. The industrial society is a highly specialized society, however, the gap between different specialisms is not huge as it was in the former stage. This argument leads to Gellner’s emphasis on “generic training”:

A modern society is, in this respect, like a modern army, only more so. It provides a very prolonged and fairly thorough training for all its recruits, insisting on certain shared qualifications: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and social skills [...] The assumption is that anyone who has completed the generic training common to the entire population can be re-trained for most other jobs without too much difficulty.¹³⁵

In the former, agro-literate stage, status and ranks were the main aspects of individuals in a society. On the contrary, in the industrial societies, which are characterized by high levels of social mobility, education becomes the most significant element an individual is assessed.

the employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals [...] now hinges on their *education* [...] A man’s education is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers identity on him. Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture.¹³⁶

Since this kind of education, and the infrastructure it needs, are huge and very expensive, only the central state is capable of sustaining the educational system. In an

¹³³ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 100.

¹³⁴ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 18.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27-8.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

environment that various states compete for overlapping catchment areas, a culture has to acquire a protector state, in order to protect itself against another one.¹³⁷

In short, nationalism is a product of industrial social organization. As Gellner points out;

Nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population [...] It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind.¹³⁸

In high social mobility conditions, “the culture in which one has been *taught* to communicate becomes the core of one’s identity.”¹³⁹

Last scholar which will be examined in this section is the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch. Hroch was the first scholar who attempted the social-historical analysis of nationalist movements in a systematic comparative framework. He also showed the relations between nation forming processes and aspects social transformation, especially those associated with the spread of capitalism in his works. “The most important argument of my academic work, and where I disagree with the majority of contemporary research”, writes Hroch;

is the belief that we cannot study the process of nation-formation as a mere by-product of nebulous ‘nationalism’. We have to understand it as a part of a social and cultural transformation and a component of the modernization of European societies, even though this modernization did not occur synchronically and had important regional specificities.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Ernest Gellner, “The Coming of Nationalism and its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class”, in G. Balakrishnan, eds, *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, 1996, p. 110.

¹³⁸ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 57.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹⁴⁰ Miroslav Hroch, *Comparative Studies in Modern European History: Nation, Nationalism, Social Change*, Aldershot: Ashgate. 2007, p. X.

Thus, for Hroch, on the one hand it is necessary to accept the objective existence of a large social group (which can comprise a nation), however, on the other hand, “one must be aware of the exploitation of this fact in the pursuit of power.”¹⁴¹

Hroch scrutinizes the history of Europe and concludes that programs of the classic national movement include three groups of demands:

1. The development or improvement of a national culture based on the local language which had to be used in education, administration and economic life.
2. The creation of a complete social structure, including their “own” educated elites and entrepreneurial classes.
3. The achievement of equal civil rights and of some degree of political self-administration.¹⁴²

There are variations on the timing and priority of these demands, however, the track of a national movement would not be completed until all of these demands are fulfilled.

Hroch also offers an explanation for the structural phases of a national movement from its beginning to its successful completion. During the first period, Phase A, activists mostly strive to reveal the linguistic, historical and cultural attributes of their ethnic group. In the second period, Phase B, new group of activists aim to create a nation, so they intend to gain the mass support of their ethnic group. Lastly, in the third period, Phase C, the national consciousness became the concern of the majority of the population and a mass movement was formed.¹⁴³

Hroch argues that this periodization helps researchers to make meaningful comparisons between national movements. He concludes that the most important criterion “is the relationship between the transition to Phase B and then to Phase C on the one hand, and the transition to a constitutional society on the other”.¹⁴⁴ According to Hroch, combination of these two series of changes provides a useful tool to compare

¹⁴¹ Hroch cited in Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 115.

¹⁴² Miroslav Hroch, “National Self-Determination from a Historical Perspective”, in S. Periwal, eds, *Notions of Nationalism*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995, p. 66-67.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁴⁴ Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe”, *New Left Review*, Vol. 198, p. 7-8.

different national movements and he applies this to the national movements that occurred in Europe. Nevertheless, he prefaces that they are based on generalizations and they do not enable us to understand the origins and outcomes of various national movements.

As one can see what united the above mentioned scholars was their unilinear conception of the historical development of nationalism. Nationalism in this sense is an inevitable consequence of the transition from agrarian, or pre-industrial societies to modern or industrial societies. Moreover, this transition also believed to take place in several phases which necessarily follows one another, in other words, a path-dependent trajectory. Comparative models and ideal-type constructions provides the main methodological framework in this line of thinking, and analysis are conducted within the framework of state-society relations, where the former is assumed to have certain autonomy from the latter. Its capacity to instrumentalize nationalism for integrating large sections of the populations to its self-promoted culture, in turn determines its chances for survival in the last instance.

That autonomy granted to the state in its domestic affairs, is also evident in its relations with other states or external populations they interact with. Now this is not to say that these scholars put any weight to inter-state relations while explaining how nationalism emerged within the already developed industrial states of the Western Europe, or how it spread over the populations in distant geographies. In that regard, the inter-state analysis are purely assumed within realist terms, military power being the main determinant. Yet, there exist of course, in these scholars' analysis, an international space which is theoretically subtle yet still analytically significant for studying the development of nationalism.

Within the conceptualization of this international space, the notion of sovereignty plays a critical role. Nationalism after all is defined as a political doctrine, built on the assertion that, "the nation must be as independent as possible [which] requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty".¹⁴⁵ At this point, once again the modern bureaucratic state comes into the focus, and forms the main frame of reference for

¹⁴⁵ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, p.2.

analyzing the relations among nations. This is why for instance, Breuilly's typology is built on two aspects; first one concerning the relationship between the movement and the state to which it either opposes or control; and second one concerning the goals of the nationalist movement, whether it is separation from the present state or to reform it via nationalism, or unification with another one.¹⁴⁶ This notion of sovereignty is also internally linked with the notion of "legitimacy", which Breuilly defines as another function of nationalism. Here too, we encounter the elusive yet present role of the "international" which takes the form of public opinion of powerful external agents and foreign states.¹⁴⁷

The definition of national interest in this category of analysis constitutes yet another aspect within which the role of the "international" space is discreetly implied. Brass for instance, defined such interest, as a selection of various aspects of collective culture to create symbols to mobilize the group in its competition with rivalling groups.¹⁴⁸ In this regard the boundaries that separate in/group out/group affiliations forms an important aspect of Brass' analysis, which he believes are built upon "objective cultural criteria".¹⁴⁹ Though it should be noted that these objective criteria are by no means fixed, but liable to change and alteration. Cultural markers, as stated above, are continuously negotiated between different elite and non-elite groups, and they only transform into clearer and sharper boundaries only in the process of ethnic transformation.

The existence of "international" space in this sense, also plays its part in competition for local control. For Brass, such competition may take four different form; those between local land controllers and alien authorities, between competing religious

¹⁴⁶ Breuilly, *Approaches to Nationalism*, p. 166.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁴⁸ Brass, *Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity*, p. 41.

¹⁴⁹ Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, p. 19.

elites, between local religious elites and collaborationist native aristocracies, and between native religious elites and alien aristocracies.¹⁵⁰

Moreover, it is also possible to trace an existence of inter-ethnic space within Brass' analysis.

The mass base for nationalism may be created when widespread intra-class competition occurs brought about by the movement of large numbers of people from either a previously overwhelmingly rural group or from a disadvantaged group into economic sectors occupied predominantly by other ethnic groups.¹⁵¹

Brass states, in order to make the point that the mass base of nationalism is sustained by inter-ethnic competition for scarce economic opportunities. However, even though this “sectorally-based competition” for controlling state apparatus is crucial for constituting the mass base of nationalist movements, the success of it still depends on political factors in the last instance. As Brass states, for a nationalist movement to be successful, it must have a dominant political organization in representing the interests of the ethnic group against its rivals.¹⁵² Here too, Brass indirectly refers to the theoretical significance of an underlying “international” space. Since a crucial aspect of the general political context for nations to emerge is the availability of alternative political arenas, Brass contends that elite strategies to reorganize old political arenas or the construction of new ones for satisfying ethnic demands, are mostly successful when external powers are not willing to intervene to this process.¹⁵³

So, as you can see, even if it is possible to track the presence of an “international” or inter-ethnic space between the lines of Breuilly's and Brass' analysis, it plays an extremely subtle role, which is almost invisible theoretically. Gellner's approach in this regard, provides a more concrete conceptualization of the “international”

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 63.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 65.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, p. 13-14.

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 60-61.

dimension. Gellner openly states that there is indeed a link between nationalism and the process of colonialism, imperialism and de-colonization. According to Gellner;

The emergence of industrial society in Western Europe had as its consequence the virtual conquest of the entire world by European powers, and sometimes by European settler populations. In effect, the whole of Africa, America, Oceania, and very large parts of Asia came under European domination; and the parts of Asia which escaped this fate were often under strong indirect influence.¹⁵⁴

However, Gellner adds this was rather an uncommon global quest. Since normally the political empire is an award of military strength and executed by societies which are strongly dedicated to warfare. This was not the case though in the above mentioned European conquest of the world. Since, it was accomplished not by a “militaristic machine”, but by nations which were “increasingly oriented towards industry and trade”.¹⁵⁵ It was not a planned conquest in that regard, neither it was a fruit of military orientation, but rather it was simply an upbringing of economic and technological superiority.

As this views of Gellner illustrates, even though he makes an explicit attempt to accommodate the international dimension to his theory of nationalism, it still plays a tributary role in the effectualness of the overall argument, since it does not bear any weight on the socio-historical development of particular nationalisms, but rather subordinated to them. Colonialism or imperialism, in that regard is demonstrated as a natural consequence of the sociological development of progressive Western states, yet their role in this development is largely overlooked. In this regard the economic and technological superiority of the Western states, which apparently subsists without any international foundation, is explained solely by referring to the inner sociological characteristics alone.

Thus, it is possible to suggest that the internalist thinking within this collection of studies, stems from the belief that nationalism, is a modern form of social organization,

¹⁵⁴ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 42.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

“based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state”.¹⁵⁶ Since these scholars hold a Weberian understanding of the state, the domestic and international spheres naturally assumed to be as isolated from and external to each other, where an external influence can only exert an impact on internal dynamics, after being filtered through the state apparatus, or vice versa.

3.2.2 Marxist Approaches to the Modernity of the Nation

The tremendous international transformations taking place in the late 1960s and 1970s had re-directed the interest of the Marxist intellectuals on the subject of nationalism. Those independence movements that adapted a nationalist stance in the colonies, the ethnic revivals in Europe and North America, and the triangular warfare between the so-called socialist states of China, Vietnam and Cambodia... All these led nationalism to return with an improved vitality into the theoretical discussions of Marxist scholars. Even though all four scholars that will be analysed under this heading are self-described Marxists, it would be wrong to suggest that these form a homogenous category with regards to their theoretical positions. In this sense, these scholars can be regrouped under two categories within themselves; the neo-Marxists position adopted by Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter, and the conciliatory position which is evident in the approaches of Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson.

I will start my overview with the neo-Marxist position, which as Özkırımlı explains, “believed that traditional Marxism was ill-prepared to cope with the challenges posed by nationalism” which were given a new urgency following the above stated developments.¹⁵⁷ After briefly summarizing these scholars’ theoretical insights on nationalism, it will continue with how they conceptualized the role of the international within their analysis. The first, and the most reputed scholar to be examined under this category is Scottish political theorist Tom Nairn. Nairn, in a series of articles published

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁵⁷ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 73.

in *New Left Review*¹⁵⁸ and his book *The Break-up of Britain*¹⁵⁹ argues that no theoretical study on nationalism, including those by the Marxists, was able to properly explain the term's content and fully grasp its political implications. The theory of nationalism in this sense, "represents Marxism's great historical failure", for Nairn. As he writes;

It may have had others as well, and some of these have been more debated: Marxism's shortcomings over imperialism, the state, the falling rate of profit and the immiseration of the masses are certainly old battlefields. Yet none of these is as important, as fundamental, as the problem of nationalism, either in theory or in political practice.¹⁶⁰

This failure however is not peculiar to Marxist theory for Nairn, as he believes other traditions in western thought have not done any better. "Idealism, German historicism, liberalism, social Darwinism and modern sociology have foundered as badly as Marxism here", he states.¹⁶¹ In this respect, Nairn criticizes the previous Marxist literature on this failure yet he does not blame them. After all, no other tradition was able to provide a theory of nationalism at that period. For him, this was simply because the time was not yet ripe for it. However, he believes, Marxist ontological and epistemological formulations provide viable analytical tools to postulate a materialist understanding of nationalism, and it's about time for such an attempt. Though, Nairn states that his aim is not to provide a theory as such, but to present "the scantiest outline" of how this might be done.¹⁶²

According to Nairn, contrary to what existing theories suggests, nationalism should not be explained by referring to the internal dynamics of individual societies alone, but rather sought in the general processes of historical development following the end of the eighteenth century. For that, the world history in its totality should be taken as the

¹⁵⁸ See for instance; Tom Nairn, "Scotland and Europe", *New Left Review*, Vol. 83, 1974, pp. 92–125 and "The Modern Janus", *New Left Review*, Vol. 94, 1975, pp. 3-27.

¹⁵⁹ Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1981.

¹⁶⁰ Nairn, *The Modern Janus*, p. 3.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁶² Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, p. 329.

explanatory framework. Nationalism, in this sense, Nairn asserts, is “determined by certain features of the world political economy, in the era between the French and Industrial Reolutions and the present day”.¹⁶³ However, this does by no means imply that the emergence and spread of nationalism is a contingent consequence of industrialization or modernity. Instead, Nairn points out, it is a symptom of uneven historical development which is brought by the capitalist mode of production.¹⁶⁴

As Nairn explains, the theories of modernization, which is a concomitant of the Western Enlightenment thought, maintained for a very long time that the human civilization would develop evenly and progressively. This idea of “even development” was based on the understanding that, even though Western European powers have initiated the process of capitalist development, “this advance could be straightforwardly followed, and the institutions responsible for it copied – hence the periphery, the world’s countryside, would catch up with the leaders in due time”.¹⁶⁵ However, Nairn suggests, history proved this view wrong.

The influence of the early capitalist countries was experienced not in the form of imitation but rather in the form of domination and invasion. This was in a way unavoidable considering the huge gap in the level of development between the core and the periphery. After all, as Nairn states, “the new developmental forces were not in the hands of a beneficent, disinterested elite concerned with Humanity’s advance”.¹⁶⁶ The people living in the backward countries were soon realized that, “progress in the abstract meant domination in the concrete, by powers which they could not help apprehending as foreign or alien”.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

Nevertheless, their expectations for material progress were not disenchanted. Since the ideological discourse of progress had already been internalized by the masses, “the peripheric elites had no option but to try and satisfy these demands by taking things into their own hands”.¹⁶⁸ Nairn believes this signified the starting point of nationalism. Since the elites had to convince the masses that challenging the concrete form presumed by progress, is the first step to progress itself. On the one hand, they strived to obtain the institutions of the European powers which necessarily meant imitating these early developers, yet on the other hand they had to do this while opposing the direct intervention of very same states. What this meant for Nairn, is “the conscious formation of a militant, inter-class community rendered strongly (if mythically) aware of its own separate identity *vis-à-vis* the outside forces of domination”.¹⁶⁹

The whole point of the dilemma Nairn points out, is that this mobilization had to done in terms of what was already there, yet “there was nothing there”, other than people with its speech, folklore, skin colour and so on. Under such circumstances, Nairn writes “the new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation card had to be written in a language they understood”.¹⁷⁰ So, for Nairn, the rapid spread of capitalism to other regions resulted in the emergence of nationalism. However, the story did not end there. Nairn claims that nationalism once emerged in the peripheral countries, dialectically spelled to the West, since once the nation-state become a compelling norm, or in Nairn’s words, the “new climate of world politics”, the core countries had no option but to fell under its spell.¹⁷¹

As one can see, the influence of the “dependency school” and “world-systems theory” on Nairn’s approach is evident. Another scholar who based his analysis on these assumptions is Michael Hechter. Similar to Nairn, in his theoretical formulation of nationalism Hechter, reproduces the premises of the Dependency School through

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

concentration on exchange relations rather than production relations as Orthodox Marxists would do. Hechter built his theory of nationalism on the concept of “internal colonialism”, a term which was originally employed by Russian populists, and later adopted by Gramsci and Lenin to emphasize the unequal exchange relations that takes place between the territories of a given state.¹⁷²

According to Hechter, the spatially uneven wave of modernization over state territory results in the formation of advanced and less advanced groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage, Hechter explains; there occurs a crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. Within this context;

The superordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system. It attempts to regulate the allocation of social roles such that those roles commonly defined as having high prestige are reserved for its members. Conversely, individuals from the less advanced group are denied access to these roles.¹⁷³

Moreover, this stratification system, which for Hechter resembles a cultural division of labor, contributes to the development of distinct ethnic identities within each group. As Hechter asserts;

Actors come to categorize themselves and others according to the range of roles each may be expected to play. They are aided in this categorization by the presence of visible signs, or cultural markers, which are seen to characterize both groups. At this stage, acculturation does not occur because it is not in the interests of institutions within the core.¹⁷⁴

Therefore, according to this model, economic inequalities combined with cultural differences results in a “cultural division of labor”. If the cultural division of labor is supported by intra-group communication than the disadvantaged group will claim the

¹⁷² Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999, p. xiv.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

separateness of their nation.¹⁷⁵ Since Hechter used this model in his analysis of assimilation and ethnic conflict in America he claimed that this situation will result in the dissolution of the unity of nation. However, Hechter claims that the situation is not much different in the overseas colonies. The economies of colonies are organized in the way that it complements the core's development. This ends up with the dependency of Third World on the international markets. The dependence is reinforced through political and military measures and discrimination on the base culture turn out to be daily routines.¹⁷⁶

Hechter, later published an article where he amended his conceptualization of cultural division of labor.¹⁷⁷ He says that cultural division of labor does not necessarily associate with economic deprivation. According to his reformed formulation, both the distribution of certain ethnic groups in the occupational structure unequally and specialization of certain groups in certain sectors are the dimensions of cultural division of labor. Hechter, aims to underline that the social status and economic interests of the people working in the same sector turn out to be a common denominator which indeed results in a cultural division of labor.¹⁷⁸

As one can see the “international” dimension occupies a central position within the context of neo-Marxist theorizing. Capitalist development in this line of analysis, is considered as a global process and national developments as closely interconnected with (if not determined by) it. Yet, as Yalvaç explains, “this insight has usually been confined to the analysis of the relation between the developed and underdeveloped countries, concerning itself with the causes and effects of development and

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁷⁶ Özkırıklı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 81.

¹⁷⁷ Michael Hechter, “Internal Colonialism Revisited”, in E. A. Tiryakian and R. Rogowski (eds), *New Nationalisms of the Developed West*, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985, p. 17–26.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

underdevelopment".¹⁷⁹ So these scholars while concerned themselves with the role of the world economy in formation of national consciousness, ignored the impact of the state-system on it altogether. Their approach to nationalism, in this regard, carries the determinist tones of Wallerstein's world system perspective in general, which Yalvaç describes as "relegating the political dynamics of the world system to a secondary position with respect to the world market competition".¹⁸⁰ Moreover, while overstating the influence of world economy on the emergence of periphery nationalisms, both of these scholars share a common flaw in ignoring domestic social structures and their implications on nationalism. So much so that, Nairn for instance, "inverts the actual sequence of events by placing the origins of nationalism within the less developed countries".¹⁸¹

Nairn and Hechter are not the only modernist scholars with Marxist credentials. Two other prominent figures who associated themselves with the Marxist tradition, are Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson. However, even though these scholars are self-proclaimed Marxists, their theoretical approach to modernity resembles some fundamental aspects of the Weberian scholars which were described above. In this regard, it can be said that these scholars actually adopts a position which tries to reconcile the modernist view of Gellner with the historical materialist predispositions of their own.

According to Hobsbawm, for instance, both nations and nationalism are products of "social engineering", which is built upon the foundations of "invented traditions". Hobsbawm describes "invented traditions" as

a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past

¹⁷⁹ Faruk Yalvaç, "Sociology of the State and the Sociology of International Relations" in M. Banks and M. Shaw, eds, *State and Society in International Relations*, London: Palgrave MacMillan/ Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 106.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁸¹ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 120.

In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.¹⁸²

Hobsbawm argues that nations are the most prevalent ones among such invented traditions. Regardless of their historical novelty, Hobsbawm points out, they manage to create a factitious continuity with the past and “use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion”.¹⁸³

Hobsbawm in this regard, differentiates between two processes of invention. The first one is the adaptation of old traditions and institutions to new situations. This type of invention is relevant for all societies even for the so-called traditional ones. The second one is the deliberate invention of “new” traditions for novel purposes, in order to maintain the order and cohesion following periods of rapid social change, for instance, in the wake of industrialization, which caused a strong fragmentation and disintegration within the traditional society.¹⁸⁴

For Hobsbawm, the period between 1870 and 1914, can be regarded as the apex of invented traditions. He suggests that with the emergence of mass politics and the intrusion of the previously neglected segments of the population into the political arena, the ruling elites found themselves in an extremely difficult position, in which they were obliged to invent traditions for maintaining the loyalty and cooperation of their subjects.¹⁸⁵ Hobsbawm identifies three major factors which characterizes this period; the development of primary education, the invention of public ceremonies, and the mass production of public monuments.¹⁸⁶ These processes Hobsbawm argues led nationalism to “became a substitute for social cohesion through a national church, a

¹⁸² Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 1.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 264-265.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 270-271.

royal family or other cohesive traditions, or collective group self-presentations, a new secular religion”.¹⁸⁷

In this regard, Hobsbawm’s theoretical formulation resembles crucial aspects of Gellner’s understanding. In his later work, Hobsbawm acknowledges Gellner’s definition of nationalism all together. However, he adds to this principle that the political duties of citizens to the polity which encompasses and represents their nation, “overrides all other public obligations, and in extreme cases (such as wars) all other obligations of whatever kind”.¹⁸⁸ For Hobsbawm, this is what distinguishes modern nationalism, from earlier forms of collective identifications, which in turn implies that modern nationalism belongs to a specific, and historically recent period, since “it is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state”.¹⁸⁹ In short, Hobsbawm concludes, for analytical purposes nationalism comes before nations, or in other words “nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way around”.¹⁹⁰

The nationalism phenomenon, for Hobsbawm, “is situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation”.¹⁹¹ In that regard, he believes that it is also a dual phenomena, constructed primarily from above, yet impossible to comprehend without being examined also from below, “that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people”.¹⁹² This is the point where he criticizes Gellner’s account for sacrificing the later (analysis from below), for the sake of the former. What is exceedingly difficult to unveil for Hobsbawm, is that view from below, which does not take nation as the way it is understood by governments and spokespeople of nationalist movements, but as it is

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

¹⁸⁸ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, p. 9.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

experienced by ordinary people who are the objects of such projections. Luckily, he says, social historians now know, how to inspect the history of ideas, opinions and feelings at the “sub-literary level”, “so that we are today less likely to confuse, as historians once habitually did, editorials in select newspapers with public opinion”.¹⁹³

Benedict Anderson, who is also largely influenced and reflected on Gellner’s views, adopts a similar reconciliatory approach in his classic book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, which was published in 1983. As he himself notes, “the book attempted to combine a kind of historical materialism with what later on came to be called discourse analysis. Marxist modernism married to post-modernism avant la letter”.¹⁹⁴ Yet, as Neil Davidson points out, “it is the postmodern aspects of the work which have proved the most influential, all too often at the expense of Anderson’s Marxism”.¹⁹⁵

Anderson takes Nairn’s criticism against Marxist literature as his starting point, and widens the scope of this critique

It would be more exact to say that nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory and, precisely for that reason, has been largely elided, rather than confronted. How else to explain Marx’s failure to explicate the crucial adjective in his memorable formulation of 1848: “The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie”? How else to account for the use, for over a century, of the concept national bourgeoisie without any serious attempt to justify theoretically the relevance of the adjective? Why this segmentation of the bourgeoisie - a world-class is insofar as it is defined in terms of the relations of production - theoretically significant?¹⁹⁶

In this sense, Anderson aims to deliver what Marxism fails to attain, and offers a tentative suggestion for a more satisfactory theory of nationalism. He believes that a

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁹⁴ Anderson quoted in Neil Davidson, “Reimagined communities - A review of Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*”, *International Socialism*, Issue 117, available in http://isj.org.uk/reimagined-communities/#117davidson_2

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 2006, p.3.

persuasive definition of nationalism should not limit itself to the cultural or political factors. Anderson traces the roots of nationalism and ideas of “nation-ness” back to the end of the eighteenth century. The leitmotif of Anderson’s approach is that nationalism is a cultural artifact - not a self-conscious political ideology - that came out of a “crossing” of different contingent historical forces. The venture he undertakes is to show why and how these particular artifacts have aroused such deep attachments.¹⁹⁷

For Anderson, nations are imagined communities. They are imagined in the sense that the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion; and they are communities in the sense that regardless of the actual inequalities, the nation is perceived as a horizontal comradeship.¹⁹⁸ Unlike Gellner, Anderson choose to label nations as “imagined” instead of “invented” notions, since he believes, the former gives the meaning of falsity to the term and dismantles its material base. “Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences”, Anderson writes;

that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’. In this way he implies that ‘true’ communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations. In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.¹⁹⁹

Anderson, in this regard, claims that nationalism should not be seen as a self-conscious production of political ideologies. Instead it should be understood in relation to the cultural systems that preceded it, and out of which nationalism came into being. According to him, three overlapping historical conditions - the decline of a coherent religious community, the decline of dynasties, and the emergence of homogenous time

¹⁹⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 4.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6-7.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6 .

- created the conditions which enabled the emergence of imagined communities within Europe.²⁰⁰

The first change was in the decline of the “unselfconscious coherence” of religious community. That is, with the global explorations, religions has come to be seen as plural and territorialized in a way that lay the foundation of nationalist imagination.²⁰¹

A second change was in the power and status of dynasties. The rise of regicide and revolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries started to dissolve the assumed legitimacy of monarchic rule along with its models of governmental organization.²⁰²

A Third one was changing conceptions of time. The change in the conception of time led to the replacement of the idea of simultaneity in Christian conception of time with the idea of homogenous empty time marked by temporal coincidence and measured by clock and calendar.²⁰³

Though the most crucial variable in the emergence of nationalism is what Anderson calls, the “print capitalism”:

The slow, uneven decline of these interlinked certainties, first in Western Europe, later elsewhere, under the impact of economic change, “discoveries” (social and scientific), and the development of increasingly rapid communications, drove a harsh wedge between cosmology and history. No surprise then that the search was on, so to speak, for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together. Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways.²⁰⁴

Now, it must be stated that the “international” space occupies an immense place within the theories of Hobsbawm and Anderson. Especially within their empirical analysis. Yet, it will be more appropriate to focus on their theoretical considerations, to see how

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 12-31.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12-19.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 19-22.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 22-31.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

the “international” is conceptualized in their approaches to modernity. Hobsbawm, for instance, explains that the modern equation of nation=state=people, inevitably linked the nation to territory, since “structure and definitions of states were now essentially territorial”. However, he states, “it also implied a multiplicity of nation-states so constituted, and this was indeed a necessary consequence of popular self-determination”.²⁰⁵ Anderson, also underlines the same point, “nation is imagined as limited”, he states “because even the largest of them, [...] has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”.²⁰⁶ So, the international actually is directly included to the conceptualization of the nation, within Anderson and Hobsbawm’s works.

Moreover, Hobsbawm believes that the theoretical discourse on nationalism, has impressed its character most decisively on the European nineteenth century;

especially on the period when the ‘principle of nationality’ changed its map in the most dramatic way, namely the period from 1830 to 1880 [...] during the fifty years when the European balance of power was transformed by the emergence of two great powers based on the national principle (Germany and Italy) and the effective partition of third on the same grounds (Austria-Hungary).²⁰⁷

In addition to this, Hobsbawm points out, “the nineteenth century world economy was international rather than cosmopolitan”. What this implies for Hobsbawm is that

during lengthy period from the eighteenth century to the years following World War II, there seemed to be little space and scope in the global economy for those genuinely extra-territorial, transnational or interstitial units.²⁰⁸

Anderson too, had emphasized the role of 19th century liberalism on the emergence of national consciousness. Considering the character of the newly emerged nationalisms between 1820 and 1920, which for Anderson, had “changed the face of the old world”,

²⁰⁵ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, p. 9.

²⁰⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

²⁰⁷ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, p. 23.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 25.

the impact of the French Revolution were of central ideological and political importance, since it provided a visible model for these new nations through which all were able to work from.²⁰⁹ Moreover, he also discusses how imperialism, and its related policies, for instance Russification or Anglicization, has triggered the emergence of official nationalisms.²¹⁰

So, these scholars not only implicated the international in their conceptualization of nationalism, but also attached to it a constitutive role. Moreover, they also effectively demonstrate how this international space interacts with domestic social mechanisms. Especially Hobsbawm, through combining what he calls the “view from above” with the “view from below”, took a significant step in this regard. Yet, even in their line of analysis, the international and sociological domains remained analytically distinct.

As they concentrated on understanding the subjective/ideational elements of nationalism; such as ideas, opinion and sentiments of ordinary people, this led them to establish an external relationship between the domestic sociological sphere where these elements are constructed, and the “international” domain where these ideas are transferred or carried through material mechanisms, such as capitalist development and industrialization. Once again, just like in the neo-Marxist scholars, the internalist understanding got reproduced from the opposite direction, where the international structurally determined the domestic, as it is assumed to be autonomous from the latter, or supra-sociological in essence.

3.3 Ethnosymbolism: An Intermediate Position built on Myths and Symbols

Ethnosymbolism can be defined as an intermediate position between primordialism and modernism.²¹¹ It mostly emerged as a response to the structural claims of the modernist view, which suggests that “there is a radical break between pre-modern units

²⁰⁹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 83-103.

²¹¹ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p. 17.

and sentiments and modern nations and nationalism”, yet, it is equally critical towards perennialists’ claims that nationalist sentiments are “simply larger, updated version of pre-modern ties and sentiments”.²¹² Rather than explaining nationalism as a material and objective reality, ethno-symbolist approach focuses more on the symbolic elements and subjective dimensions in the process of the formation of nationalisms. Of crucial importance for this line of analysis, are the role of myths, symbols, communication codes, memories, values and traditions in the formation, perseverance and transformation of ethnicity and nationalism.²¹³ According to ethnosymbolists, it would be impossible to fully comprehend the origins and formation of contemporary nations without taking their ethnic origins into account, or as Hutchinson explains it, without “contextualizing them within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity”.²¹⁴ For this they recurrently emphasize the need for *la long duree analysis*, which implies tracing the development and persistence of collective cultural identities over long periods of time.²¹⁵

Put simply, ethnosymbolist view of nationalism, argues that nationalism has its specificity and achievement due its capacity to absorb and reproduce the ideational factors that have great importance in the *longue durée* construction of ethnic identities. Thus nationalism is not something constructed out of vacuum as modernists claim, but on the contrary, as Smith explains

[...] it emerges out of the complex social and ethnic formations of earlier epochs, and the different kinds of ethnies, which modern forces transform, but never obliterate. The modern era in this respect resembles a palimpsest on which are recorded experiences and identities of different epochs and a variety of ethnic formations, the earlier influencing and being modified by the later, to

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²¹³ Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 14. See also Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism A Cultural Approach*, New York: Routledge, 2009, Section 2: “Basic Themes of ethno-symbolism”, pp. 23-41.

²¹⁴ John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*, London: Fontana, 1994, p. 7.

²¹⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.10.

produce the composite type of collective cultural unit which we call ‘the nation’.²¹⁶

This characteristics enables nationalism both to maintain the continuity of some social relations in order to gain legitimacy and at the same time change the society to achieve a suitable environment for modernism. As a result, modernism although having significant clashes with earlier formations gains the support of masses and already established institutions.

As Özkırmılı notes Ethnosymbolists form a more homogeneous category compared to other two views; “[g]uided by a common reverence for the past, they lay stress on similar processes in their explanations of nations and nationalism”.²¹⁷ Even though there exists numerous scholars who are associated with this view, two names are especially important.²¹⁸ These are John Armstrong, the first scholar who points out to the importance of *la long duree* analysis and *myth-symbol complexes* for the study of nationalism, and Anthony Smith the most prominent figure, and the founding father of ethno-symbolist theory. So before we continue with the role of the international within this approach, it would be more appropriate to elaborate some of the views asserted by these two scholars.

According to Armstrong, “the key to the significance of phenomena of ethnic identification is persistence rather than genesis of particular patterns”.²¹⁹ For this reason, he proposes to implement the *long duree* perspective of Annales school of French historiography into the study of ethnic identities, since he believes, the durability of ethnic attachments can only be examined through an “extended temporal perspective”, which studies ethnic groups in a time dimension spanning over many

²¹⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1995, p. 59.

²¹⁷ Özkırmılı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 143.

²¹⁸ For other ethnosymbolist scholars see for instance; Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby (eds), *Nationalism and ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations*, Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press, 2007.

²¹⁹ John A Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, p. 4.

centuries.²²⁰ Following the social interaction model of the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth, Armstrong stresses the “the fundamental but shifting significance of boundaries for human identity”, and asserts that,

the focus of investigation must shift from internal group characteristics to symbolic boundary mechanisms that differentiate these groups, without overlooking the fact that the mechanisms in question exist in the minds of the subjects rather than as lines on a map or norms in a rule book.²²¹

In this sense, what the term “boundary” implies for Armstrong, is a far more encompassing concept than the conventional definition, which is “based on the occupation of particular, exclusive territories”.²²² It refers to the “uncanny experience of confronting others”, since “groups tend to define themselves not by reference to their own characteristics but by exclusion, that is, by comparison to ‘strangers’”²²³

So ethnic boundaries, according to Armstrong, “fundamentally reflect group attitudes rather than geographical division”, since he states “myth, symbol, communication, and a cluster of associated attitudinal factors are usually more persistent than purely material factors”.²²⁴ According to Armstrong there are several factors which ensures this persistency of myth/symbol complexes. First one among these, and maybe the most general factor, is the distinction between two fundamentally different ways of life, namely “the nomad” and “the sedentary”. Armstrong starts his analyses with this distinction, since he believes,

the myths and symbols they embody – expressed notably in nostalgia – crucially divide nearly all subsequent identities into two groups based on incompatible principles. The territorial principle and its peculiar nostalgia ultimately became the predominant form in Europe, while the genealogical or

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6-7.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

pseudo-genealogical principle has continued to prevail in most of the Middle East.²²⁵

The second factor is religion, which “pursues and deepens the analysis of nomadic and sedentary ways that have so profoundly affected the civilizations founded on the two great universal religions”, Islam and Christianity.²²⁶ The third factor is the role of the city, since it “constitutes the first exploration of the impact of a quintessential political structure”.²²⁷ As Armstrong points out,

Exploration of the effect of towns upon identification requires examination of a very broad range of symbolic and attitudinal data, from the impact of architectonic features on consciousness to the unifying or centrifugal effects of different legal codes.²²⁸

The fourth factor is the role of the imperial policies. Here, Armstrong asserts; “the central question becomes how could the intense consciousness of loyalty and identity established through face-to-face contact in the city-state be transferred to the larger agglomerations of cities and countryside known as empires?”²²⁹ The final factor is, “the close relationship of religious organization to linguistic adherence”, here Armstrong “introduces the significance of language for identity in the pre-nationalist era”.²³⁰

Even though Armstrong is the first to introduce the myth-symbol complexes to the study of nationalism, it was Anthony Smith who developed these to construct an elaborated theory of Ethnosymbolism. According to Smith, although Armstrong “has made a pioneering and monumental contribution” in employing “symbolic” analysis, his approach was more phenomenological and “instrumentalist” in this regard, “since

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

it follows the model of social interaction laid out by Barth”.²³¹ Thus, he states, “it is not entirely clear in Armstrong’s and several other scholars’ work as to whether and how far they would make a distinction between ethnic community and nation, and ethnic identity and nationalism”.²³²

What should be done instead, Smith states, is “to distinguish between these two sets of concepts, while charting their empirical connections”.²³³ What this implies, Smith explains;

[is] grounding our understanding of modern nationalism on an historical base involving considerable time-spans, to see how far its themes and forms were pre-figured in earlier periods and how far a connection with earlier ethnic ties and sentiments can be established.²³⁴

Adopting such a perspective, Smith argues, will enable us to realize that;

not only did many nations and nationalism spring up on the basis of pre-existing ethnic and their ethnocentrism, but that in order to forge a nation today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute serious impediment to “nation-building”.²³⁵

According to Smith, most modernists, due to their theoretical standpoint, “content to describe a subset of the general category of nation”, namely the modern Western nation, “as if it stands for the whole”. This is the point where he believes “a descriptive historical term becomes entangled with a general analytic category”.²³⁶ In this sense, Smith points out, the first step to be taken, “is to define the concept of nation in ideal-

²³¹ Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 14.

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²³⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, p. 18.

typical terms, and thereby recognize the persistent nature of the analytic category as a transhistorical ideal type”.²³⁷

In line with this purpose, he starts his analysis by introducing the concept of ethnic community or, what he simply refers as, the “ethnie”. According to Smith, what lies in the “core of ethnicity”, is the “quartet of myths, memories, values or symbols”, which can be also summarized as the “myth-symbol” complex.²³⁸ These, Smith believes, create the “characteristic forms or styles and genres of certain historical configurations of populations”.²³⁹ Moreover, these historical forms of human community are often in flux, “even where their names, symbols, and boundaries persist”, because they are products of “certain social and symbolic processes”, which depends on human action and subjective interpretation.²⁴⁰ “All of this suggests that the ethnie is anything but primordial”, Smith writes. “As the subjective significance of each of these attributes waxes and wanes for the members of a community, so does the cohesion and self-awareness of that community’s membership”.²⁴¹

So how does an ethnie form in the first place? For Smith, the historical record suggests that there are two main patterns of ethnie formation. These are coalescence; “coming together of separate units through processes of amalgamation of separate units or absorption of one unit by another” and division; “through fission or what Horowitz calls “proliferation”, when a part of the ethnic community leaves it to form a new group”.²⁴² According to Smith, ethnies, “once formed, tend to be exceptionally durable under “normal” vicissitudes and to persist over many generations, even centuries”.²⁴³ Of course, this does not mean that, it is a historically frozen entity which is immune to

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²³⁸ Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 15.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁴⁰ Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations*, p. 33.

²⁴¹ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, London: Penguin, 1991, p. 23.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁴³ Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 1986, p. 16.

change. There are certain traumatic events which may cause deep changes on the cultural contents of such identity, such as “war and conquest, exile and enslavement, the influx of immigrants and religious conversion”.²⁴⁴

For Smith, however, most ethnies are durable even against these radical changes in demographic composition. He gives the examples of Persian and Armenian ethnic identities to rest his case. According Smith these examples suggest that “a combination of often adverse external factors and a rich inner or “ethnohistory” may help to crystallize and perpetuate ethnic identities”.²⁴⁵ This is because there exists certain mechanism for ethnic self-renewal such as; religious reforms, cultural borrowings, popular participation and myths of ethnic election. These along with “location, autonomy, polyglot and trading skills, helps to ensure the survival of certain ethnic communities across the centuries despite many changes in their social composition and cultural contents”.²⁴⁶

Smith, then, examines the main patterns in the formation of such identities, in order to find out the general causes and mechanisms which led to the formation of nations, on the basis of these.²⁴⁷ For this, he distinguishes between two types of ethnic community. First one among these, is the “lateral” ethnie, which is usually socially confined to the upper strata of aristocrats and higher clergy, even though it might sometimes include bureaucrats, high military officials and the richer merchants.²⁴⁸ It is termed lateral because even though it lacks social depth, it is also “geographically spread out to form often close links with the upper echelons of neighbouring lateral *ethnies*”. As a result, Smith explains, “its borders were typically ragged [...] and its often marked sense of common ethnicity was bound up with its *esprit de corps* as a high stratum and ruling

²⁴⁴ Smith, *National Identity*, p. 25.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

class”.²⁴⁹ The second, “vertical” (demotic) type, on the other hand represents a more compact and popular form of ethnies, since it is inclined to be culturally diffused to other social strata and classes. In vertical ethnies, social divisions are not reinforced by cultural differences, instead an idiosyncratic historical culture unites different classes around common heritage and tradition, “especially when the latter were under threat from outside”. Thus, Smith explains, the ethnic attachment is usually more powerful and exclusive.²⁵⁰

According to Smith, this distinction between lateral and vertical ethnies, offers us two different types of ethnic cores, “around which nations could be constructed” and provides us two main trajectories for the formation of national identities.²⁵¹ The first one is the “lateral” route which mostly operated through the “bureaucratic incorporation” of the middle strata and outlying regions into the dominant culture of the lateral ethnies. “The primary agency of such incorporation”, Smith writes, “was the new bureaucratic state”.²⁵² This is the route that most Western European ethnic states had taken, like England, France, Spain and Sweden. The relatively early development of these nations overlapped with consecutive revolutions in the spheres of administration, economy and culture.

In fact, Smith argues, in these cases, the state has actually “created” the nation, through “its activities of taxation, conscription and administration”, which “endowed the population within its jurisdiction with a sense of their corporate identity and civic loyalty”.²⁵³ The second route, which Smith associates with vertical ethnies, is “vernacular mobilization”. Unlike the former route, here, the bureaucratic state only indirectly influenced the process of nation formation. This is mostly because, Smith explains, “vertical ethnies were usually subject communities”, where “the bond that

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 55.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

cemented the membership [...] was an exclusive and all-pervasive one”.²⁵⁴ Instead, the chief mechanism here, was “organized religion and its sacred scriptures, liturgy, rituals and clergy”.²⁵⁵ This is the route for instance, that Byzantine Greeks, early Orthodox Russians, Monophysite Copts and Gregorian Armenians had taken.

This brings us to Smith’s monumental distinction between territorial (civic) and ethnic nationalisms. Building on Kohn’s distinction between Western and Eastern nationalisms, Smith constructs a provisional typology of his own, by “taking into account the overall situation in which particular communities and movements find themselves both before and after independence”.²⁵⁶ Accordingly, Smith defines territorial nationalisms as movements which are based on a civic and territorial conception of the nation, these seek to integrate often disparate ethnic populations into a new political community. Ethnic nationalisms, on the other hand, are movements whose concept of the nation is basically ethnic and genealogical, these Smith writes

seek to expand by including ethnic “kinsmen” outside the present boundaries of the ‘ethno-nation’ and the lands they inhabit or by forming a much larger “ethno-national” state through the union of culturally and ethnically similar ethno-national states.²⁵⁷

In this regard, Smith names territorial nationalisms as “integration nationalisms”, while he defines ethnic nationalisms as irredentist and “pan” nationalisms. Smith admits that this is not an exhaustive typology, yet he says such a basic typology will still allow us to compare different nationalisms within each category, while placing them into a broader context.

Now, since we have sketched the philosophical premises of the ethno-symbolist theory, we might continue with the role of the “international” within this line of analysis. Analysing how Smith’s conceptualization of the international have transformed over the years will be a good way to proceed in this regard. It can be said

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 82-83.

that, Smith, when he first formulated the ethno-symbolist theory, had a more essentialist understanding of the international. In this sense, even though his theory of nationalism represented an intermediate position between perennialist and modernist approaches, his ontological assumptions with regards to the international resembled more the former than the latter.

After all, what he was essentially critical about, is the belief in the contingency of nationalism, which modernist scholars associate with strictly modern developments like; capitalism, industrialization or secular utilitarianism. Since he wanted to emphasize the role of the cultural elements and pre-existing ethnic identities on the development of national identities, the international entered the equation only when it has any theoretical implications for the persistence or transformation of these. In this regard, the causal effect of the international, was limited to the overall significance of territorial location, which Smith writes,

depends in the last instance on the economic and political regional networks of communities and states in which the particular ethnies is inserted, and the changing patterns of warfare and military and political fortunes of the members of the inter-state system in that area.²⁵⁸

Systemic factors, in this regard, were only utilized in order to separate the “preconditions” of autonomist nationalisms from “triggering factors”, and largely embodied geopolitical and economic pressures.²⁵⁹ International community, which implied the aggregate of these regional state systems, evaluated as an impediment to the secessionist claims of particular ethnicities, since breaking out of the existing state system and gaining recognition was deemed impossible by Smith, within the ongoing Cold War environment.

Later on though, Smith started to gradually expand the scope of the international domain within his analysis, of course, in relation to the international political developments occurring at the respective time. In *National Identity*, for instance, his book which was published in 1991, the impact of the rising ethnic conflicts are evident

²⁵⁸ Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 94.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

on Smith's analysis, since he believes "many of the most bitter and protracted 'international' conflicts derive from competing claims and conceptions of national identity."²⁶⁰ In this sense, it will not be wrong to suggest that Smith's longing for a genuine international community, becomes the central concern that have shaped the argument and plan of his book.

One important point Smith raises in this regard, is how state and nation have come to the fore in their misconceived unity, and recognised as the main constituent of the "equally misnamed 'international' community".²⁶¹ However, even though Smith openly distinguishes between "international" and inter-state relations in his book, the international space within his analysis continue to resemble the traits of the latter.²⁶² International in that regard, remained as a dimension where different nationalism strive for recognition and compete with others within a certain hierarchy.²⁶³ "To [the] cultural and psychological reasons for the pervasive and ubiquitous nature of national identity must be added equally powerful economic and geo-political grounds", Smith writes "whose combined effect is to intensify existing ethnic and national differences and globalize their impact".²⁶⁴ So the "international" dimension, what has once been of secondary importance, now became a fairly more significant component, yet still remained as an additional factor, whose role is limited to initiating and consolidating national identities.

Even though Smith started to discuss the impact of cosmopolitanism and globalization on national identity in this book, his interest on these issues developed extensively in the following years, especially after 1995, the year in which he published *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*.²⁶⁵ Yet, even here, he withdraws himself from engaging

²⁶⁰ Smith, *National Identity*, p. viii.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

²⁶⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1995.

with the wider debates about globalization, which has emerged as a hot topic at that time. “I believe that the key to an understanding of nations and nationalism as general phenomena of the modern world”, he asserted, “lies more with the persisting frameworks and legacies of historical cultures and ethnic ties than with the consequences of global interdependence”.²⁶⁶ Even though he tries to defend his initial position, in the face of new theoretical and empirical challenges, the role of the international space within his analysis inevitably transformed to have a more transactional character, where old ethnic identities are now consolidated, not by mere geopolitical or economic pressures, but through interacting with each other.

One thing with regards to Smith’s conceptualization of the “international” remained intact though, throughout these years. Since he identifies himself with the tradition of historical sociology, he mostly draw his assumptions regarding the international space, from the works of Charles Tilly.²⁶⁷ “Not only does ‘war make the state (and the state makes war)’, as Tilly declared”, Smith writes but it also “fashions ethnic communities not only from the contestants but even from third parties across whose territories such wars are often conducted”.²⁶⁸ This is why his understanding of the international suffers equally from the internalism which Tilly is mostly criticized for. The internal/external divide, is not only evident in Smith’s analysis, but also characterizes it, since the relationship between the “international” domain and the domestic cultural domain, is manifestly constructed as external to each other.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, preface

²⁶⁷ See for instance, Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 94, 130-132; *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 76, 80, 83

²⁶⁸ Smith, *National Identity*, p. 27.

CHAPTER IV

POST-STRUCTURAL APPROACHES: NATIONALISM AS A DISCOURSE

As discussed in the previous chapter, the theoretical debate on nationalism during the Cold War period (1945-1989) has mostly evolved around question like, “when is the nation?”, or “whether it is a modern concept or a historical reconstruction?”. Following early 1990s, a dissatisfaction with regards to these “classical debates” became increasingly noticeable within the nationalism literature. Correspondingly, there has been a considerable growth in the number of studies which adopted a critical stance towards, what has now become, the “mainstream theories” of nationalism. New schools of thought, which emerged in various disciplines of social sciences; such as feminism, post-colonialism and post-structuralism, introduced new perspectives and enriched the theoretical discussions within the field.

In the wake of, what many calls the “post-modern turn” in social sciences, these scholars turned their backs on “grand narratives” and “ideal-types” which, they assume, were designed to explain nationalism as a “general” phenomena. Instead, they shifted the focus of discussion to an epistemological level, by concentrating more on particular nationalist practices and specific representations, and presented a new array of methods to the study nationalism such as; critical discourse analysis, conversation analysis, and rhetorical theory.²⁶⁹ By questioning the extent to which our conceptual frameworks and analytical vocabularies are themselves shaped by the discourse of nationalism, they sought to transcend the classical debates, and attempted to shed light on the previously overlooked aspects of nationalism, such as “the gendered and

²⁶⁹ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 169-170.

sexualized character of nationalist projects” or “the dilemmas of ‘nation-building’ in post-colonial societies”.²⁷⁰

For many, this signified the dawn of a new era in the study of nationalism; or “a new wave of theorizing”, “which is qualitatively different from the whole body of work hitherto produced”.²⁷¹ So much so that, scholars started to talk about a “post-classical” period in the theoretical debate on nationalism.²⁷² This chapter aims to examine the role of the international within these “new” approaches to nationalism. First I will briefly sketch out some central arguments and core assumptions put forth by different scholars within this constellation of studies, and then move on to how they integrate the international dimension to their theoretical analysis.

4.1. Michael Billig and Banal Nationalism

The reproduction of nations and nationalism is first brought into question, by French Marxist Scholar Etienne Balibar, who defined nation as a social formation or;

a construction whose unity remains problematic, a configuration of antagonistic social classes that is not entirely autonomous, only becoming *relatively* specific in its opposition to others and via the power struggles, the conflicting interest groups and ideologies which are developed over the *longue durée* by this very antagonism.²⁷³

In this regard, Balibar pointed out the central question which should be examined with regards to these social formations, is not how these emerged, but instead how they got

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

²⁷² See for instance, Graham Day and Andrew Thompson, *Theorizing Nationalism*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 and Lawrence, Paul. *Nationalism: History and Theory*, Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005.

²⁷³ Étienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology”, *New Left Review*, XIII (3), 1990, p. 334.

reproduced through time, or “the conditions under which they can maintain this conflictual unity which creates their autonomy over long historical periods”.²⁷⁴

Building on Balibar’s work, Michael Billig was the first to specify these conditions, and to provide a systematic analysis of the reproduction of nationalism in his prominent work *Banal Nationalism*.²⁷⁵ Billig’s approach was built upon the critique of popular and academic writing, which associates nationalism with “those who struggle to create new states or with extreme right-wing politics”.²⁷⁶ Such an understanding, Billig believes tends to illustrate nationalism as the property of “others”, or the peripheral states which are still struggling to accomplish their nation-building processes, but not “ours”, the already established Western nations. Billig rejects this notion, and argue that nationalism continue to exist in United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and so on. “Daily, they are reproduced as nations and their citizenry as nationals”.²⁷⁷ However, this reproduction became so mundane and so continual that it can no longer consciously registered by the individuals. This is why Billig introduces the term “banal nationalism”, “to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced”.²⁷⁸

Thus, “[t]he metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion”, Billig asserts, but “it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building”.²⁷⁹ In this respect, the symbols of nationhood “which might once have been consciously displayed, do not disappear from sight”, according to Billig, when a nation acquires a political roof, and becomes a nation-state, but instead these “become absorbed into the environment of the established homeland”.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 334-335

²⁷⁵ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 171.

²⁷⁶ Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage, 1995, p. 5.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

Since the symbols of modern nation-state is not limited to flags only. Coins and banknotes, for instance, also typically bear national emblems on them, “which remain unnoticed in daily financial transactions”, yet successfully transforms the background space into “national” space.²⁸¹

“It is easy to think that the problems of nationalism come down to issues of identity”, Billig asserts, this is why “so much about nationalism seems, at first sight, to be explained by identity”, so much so that, “identity” has become the “watchword” of our times, as John Shotter has written.²⁸² Though for Billig, this watchword frequently explains less than it appears to, since national identity is not a thing in itself; that is developed in social vacuums.²⁸³ Billig, herein, points at Serge Moscovici, and argues that “the so-called inner psychological states of individuals depend upon culturally shared depictions, or representations of the social world”. So, in order to speak of a national identity according to Billig, the holder of that identity must first know what that identity implies. Since, he explains

a person cannot claim to have patriotic feeling for their nation, unless they have assumptions about what a nation is and, indeed, what patriotism is: unless, to use Moscovici’s terminology, they have social representations of ‘nation’, ‘patriotism’ and much else beside.²⁸⁴

Billig, then, continues by investigating the sources of information which shapes the general themes of nationalist consciousness and its habits of thinking.

He starts with the linguistic and historiographical roots, which use the same basic categories for their “homeland” and their “people”, all throughout the world. “This is the part of universal code of nationality”, Billig writes, “the particular nation is affirmed within a general code, which always stipulates that a particular people and

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

particular homeland are to be imagined as special, and, thereby, not so special”.²⁸⁵ Since; “a national community can only be imagined, by also imagining communities of foreigners”, or simply put, “there can be no us without a them”.²⁸⁶ It is exactly at this stage, Billig believes, the stereotyped judgements about foreigners kick in, in order to make “us” feel unique, by means of distinguishing “them” from “us”. “We often assume ‘ourselves’ as the standard, or the unmarked normality, against which ‘their’ deviations appear notable”, Billig explains.²⁸⁷ Contributing to this tendency is the association of this unique culture to a particular territory, through which a bounded geographical space which exclude foreigners becomes “our” homeland.

Such an understanding of course inevitably contains “a mixture of the particular and the universal”, since “if ‘our’ nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a nation amongst other nations”, each tied to a particular homeland.²⁸⁸ Therefore, Billig notes, “the consciousness of national identity normally assumes an international context, which itself needs to be imagined every bit as much as does the national community”.²⁸⁹ In this regard, the “international” space actually forms an integral part of Billig’s theoretical understanding.

According to Billig, three sorts of actors are especially important in due process. First one among these is the politicians. For Billig, politicians play an important role in the daily reproduction of nationalism, not because they are influential actors, but because they are familiar figures. “Their faces regularly appear in the papers and on the television screens”, he writes, and “the media treat political speeches as newsworthy, giving space to the words of presidents and prime ministers”.²⁹⁰ In a way, they are like celebrities, since by “rhetorically presenting themselves as standing in the eye of the

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 78-79.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

nation”, they “evoke the whole nation as their audience”.²⁹¹ In such a context, their words and the way they are saying these becomes of utmost importance.

Even though they all often play the “patriotic card”, their role in the reproduction of national consciousness is not limited to this. Their real rhetorical power comes from their claim to speak on behalf of the nation. As Billig points out, “the deixis of homeland” in their speeches, “invokes the national ‘we’ and places ‘us’ within ‘our’ homeland.”²⁹² Moreover, “[w]hen the homeland-making phrases are used with regularity, ‘we’ are unmindfully reminded who ‘we’ are and where ‘we’ are”.²⁹³ Through this Billig asserts; “we are identified without even being mentioned”. In this way, national identity becomes a routine way of talking and listening; it becomes a form of life, “which habitually closes the front door, and seals the borders”.²⁹⁴

Of course, politicians are not the only actors who play a role in the daily reproduction of nationalism. Daily news also play their part, in what Billig calls, flagging nationalism. By adopting the rhetorical forms and above mentioned deixis’ of politicians, daily newspapers also manage to “evoke a national ‘we’, which includes the ‘we’ of reader and writer, as well as the ‘we’ of the universal audience”.²⁹⁵ Moreover, “the deixis of homeland making” put forth by the newspapers, is not limited with this. Billig believes, “there is a further element built into the organization of many newspapers, especially the broadsheets”.²⁹⁶ By separating foreign from domestic news, and by reserving different pages for each, Billig explains, these newspapers “flags the home of the newspaper and of the assumed, addressed readers”.²⁹⁷ In this regard, “home” indicates much more than just the content of the particular page, since

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

we, “the regular readers”, without any conscious awareness, “find our way around the familiar territory of the newspaper”.²⁹⁸ As we do so, Billig points out, we find ourselves “habitually at home in a textual structure, which uses the homeland’s national boundaries, dividing the world into ‘homeland’ and ‘foreign’”.²⁹⁹

Yet, the most persuasive thesis of Billig’s study is on the role of social scientists in reproducing nationalism. According to Billig, many social scientists, especially sociologists and social psychologists, have tended to ignore what he calls “banal nationalism”.³⁰⁰ By using the term “nationalism” in a rather limited way, Billig argues, “such theorists have often projected nationalism onto others and naturalized ‘our’ nationalism out of existence”.³⁰¹ This tendency becomes visible within two lines of theorizing, which Billig believes, often coexists in the analysis of social scientists. First one among these, is the “projecting theories of nationalism”. According to Billig;

These approaches tend to define nationalism in a restricted way, as an extreme/surplus phenomenon. Nationalism is equated with the outlook of nationalist movements and, when there are no such movements, nationalism is not seen to be an issue [...] [Such] theories tend to take this world of nations for granted as the ‘natural’ environment, in which the dramas of nationalism periodically erupt. Since the nationalism which routinely reproduces the world of nations is theoretically ignored, and nationalism is seen as a condition of ‘others’, then such theories can be seen as rhetorical projections. Nationalism as a condition is projected on to ‘others’; ‘ours’ is overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied.³⁰²

Besides these, Billig defines a second line of theoretical thinking which he calls the “naturalizing theories of nationalism”. These Billig states;

[...] tend to depict contemporary loyalties to nation-states as instances of something which is psychologically general, or endemic to the human condition. Thus such loyalties might be theoretically transmuted into “needs

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

for identity”, “attachments to society” or “primordial ties”, which are theoretically posited to be universal psychological states, and not peculiar to the age of nation-states. As such, ‘banal nationalism’ not only ceases to be nationalism, but it ceases to be a problem for investigation. Indeed, the lack of such identities (the lack of patriotism in established nations) can be seen as the problem for concern. In this way, such theories make existing conditions of consciousness appear natural, taking for granted the world of nations.³⁰³

4.2. Craig Calhoun and Nationalism as a Discourse

Another scholar who studies nationalism as a discursive phenomenon is Craig Calhoun. According to Calhoun, nationalism is, “among other things what Michel Foucault called a ‘discursive formation’, a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness”, accordingly it is also problematic enough to keep creating more issues and questions, pushing us into further talk, and engendering debates over how to think about it.³⁰⁴ In this context Calhoun believes,

Recognition as a nation clearly requires social solidarity - some level of integration among the members of the ostensible nation, and collective identity - the recognition of the whole by its members, and a sense of individual self that includes membership in the whole.³⁰⁵

Yet, as Calhoun points out, such collective solidarity is present in almost all sorts of human groupings, “from families to employees of business corporations to imperial armies”.³⁰⁶ So, what distinguish these from a nation, or more precisely, “what additional characteristics should ideally also be present for us to call a population with social solidarity and collective identity a nation?”³⁰⁷

For Calhoun, this is the point at which the discursive formation of nationalism intrudes. As a particular way of interpreting such solidarity, nationalism plays a key role in

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³⁰⁴ Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism Concepts in Social Thought*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997, p. 3.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

reproducing national self-consciousness, and in internalizing nationalist claims which are put forth by others. In this regard, Calhoun lists ten distinguishing features of the rhetoric of nation, though he adds that none of these “is precisely definitive and each may be present in greater or lesser degree in any nation”, but rather, what is crucial, “is the pattern formed by having a preponderance of them”.³⁰⁸ These features are;

1. Boundaries, of territory, population, or both.
2. Indivisibility - the notion that the nation is an integral unit.
3. Sovereignty, or at least the aspiration to sovereignty, and thus formal equality with other nations, usually as an autonomous and putative self-sufficient state.
4. An “ascending” notion of legitimacy - i.e. the idea that government is just only when supported by popular will or at least when it serves the interests of “the people” or “the nation”.
5. Popular participation in collective affairs - a population mobilized on the basis of national membership (whether for war or civic activities).
6. Direct membership, in which each individual is understood to be immediately a part of the nation and in that respect categorically equivalent to other members.
7. Culture, including some combination of language, shared beliefs and values, habitual practices.
8. Temporal depth - a notion of the nation as such existing through time, including past and future generations, and having a history.
9. Common descent or racial characteristics.
10. Special historical or even sacred relations to a certain territory.³⁰⁹

Once again, note that these are only features of the rhetoric of the nation, in other words, “claims that are commonly made in describing a nation”.³¹⁰ This, by no means implies that nations can be defined effectively by any of these empirical measures. Instead, as Calhoun explains, nations are largely constructed by these claims themselves, “by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity, to mobilize people for collective projects, and to evaluate people and practices”.³¹¹

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4-5.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

The critical point to grasp here, according to Calhoun, is that nationhood “cannot be defined objectively prior to political processes, on either cultural or social structural grounds”, this is because they are themselves in part made by nationalism.³¹² In other words, nations can only exist “within the context of nationalism”, since nation is “a particular way of thinking about what it means to be a people”.³¹³ This means that nationalism is inherently a modern categorical identity. The term “nation” might have existed before the modern era, yet “it meant only people linked by place of birth and culture”, and “it signalled nothing about the relationship of such identity to larger or smaller groupings; neither did it carry any clear political connotations”.³¹⁴ As Calhoun explains long standing cultural patterns might have contributed to the formation of national identities, however, “the meaning and form of these cultural patterns has been transformed in the modern era”.³¹⁵ Therefore, even if these cultural patterns are important for understanding the formation of modern nations, they are not sufficient enough to fully explain them, since “state formation was the single most important factor in changing the form and significance of [these] cultural variations”.³¹⁶ In this sense, Calhoun believes, nationalism cannot be reduced to a simple claim of ethnic similarity. Instead it should be understood as “a claim that certain similarities should count as the definition of political community”.³¹⁷ For this reason nationalism requires clear-cut boundaries which premodern ethnicities lack. In short, what really matters for the constitution of nations, is the discourse of nationalism, and it was only by the end of the eighteenth century, that such “discursive formation was fully in play”.³¹⁸

One last important point that Calhoun refers to, is the ineffectiveness of “master variables” in explaining nationalism; be this industrialization, enduring ethnic

³¹² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10

³¹⁷ Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream*, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 69

³¹⁸ Calhoun, *Nationalism Concepts*, p. 9

identities, or state building.³¹⁹ According to Calhoun, even though “[a]ll these factors and others have contributed to the creation of nationalist movements and the currency of nationalist discourse. None of them explains them entirely”.³²⁰ Indeed, to treat any of these contributing factors as a “master variable”, will be a reductionistic approach, since even though “these factors explain various contents of nationalism or processes associated with nationalism [...] they do not explain the form of the nation or nationalist discourse itself”.³²¹ This is mostly because they address “heterogeneous objects of analysis”. However, Calhoun states “at the level of practical activity, there are many diverse nationalisms; the idea of nation is integral to many different aspects of how we understand the world”.³²² This means that it is impossible to formulate a general theory of nationalism. To conclude in Calhoun’s words; “what is general is the discourse of nationalism, it does not completely explain any specific such activity or event, but it helps to constitute each through cultural framing”.³²³

4.3. Nira Yuval-Davis: Feminist Approaches to Nationalism Studies

In the mid-1980s, a group of feminist scholars started to criticize mainstream nationalism theories for their gender blindness. These scholars, including Cynthia Enloe, Sylvia Walby and Nira Yuval-Davis, perceived nationalism as a gendered discourse which can only be captured with a theory of gender power. The existing nationalism literature, for these scholars, ignores the integration of women and men into national projects in various ways.

However, this body of literature has engaged but little with the differential integration of women and men into the national project. Most texts on nationalism do not take gender as a significant issue.³²⁴

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³²³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³²⁴ Sylvia Walby, “Woman and Nation”, in G. Balakrishnan, eds, *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, 1996, p. 235.

Therefore, these scholars tried to formulate a feminist theory of nationalism that will critically relate nationalist institutions with social structures, including ethnic, racial and class power, through reflecting the genderism in male theories and women's role in national formation.

This part will mainly focus on one of the most prominent feminist scholar, Nira Yuval Davis, since her studies mainly concentrated on the genderism in nationalism studies. Yuval Davis, says the main aim of the feminist theory in nationalism is to show how state constructs men and women differently since this is the proper way to reveal how the state constituted the state subject in a gendered way.³²⁵ She claims through this way the relation between the women participation in national processes and state can be put forth. Within this perspectives she defines five ways through which women participate in national processes.

The first way is the participation as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities.³²⁶ This is related to the women's role in the re-production of the population. Yuval-Davis associates three discourses with this nationalist policies of population control which target generally the role of women in the society. She defines the first one as the "people as power" discourse. Within this discourse the growth of population is perceived as an advantage for the nation.³²⁷ President Erdoğan's insist on at least three children may be put in this category. The second discourse labeled as Eugenicist by Yuval-Davis is the one concerned with the quality of population rather than the size.³²⁸ As Özkırımlı points out "this has given rise to various policies aimed at limiting the physical numbers of members of 'undesirable' groups."³²⁹ The third

³²⁵ Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis. "Introduction", in N. Yuval-Davis, and F. Anthias, eds, *Woman-Nation-State*, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 6.

³²⁶ Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, London: Sage, 1997, p. 22.

³²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 29-31.

³²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 31-32.

³²⁹ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p.177

discourse is the well-known Malthusian discourse which associates the well-being of the nation with preventing the population increase.³³⁰

According to Yuval-Davis, the second way through which women participate in national processes is their role as the reproducers of ethnic/national groups. While the first way mentioned above concentrates on the control of women's fertility, this one underlines the proper behaviour of women. As she underlines, nationalism creates a boundary between "us" vs "them". These borders are drawn through taking cultural codes, style of dress, language etc. as a reference. Yuval-Davis claims that a feminist theory of nationalism may explore the role of gender and especially women in the reproduction of these ethnic and national references.³³¹

Third, women participate in national process in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as the transmitters of its culture. In this category, Yuval-Davis stresses the role of women as cultural carriers who have a key role as the main socializers of small children. Therefore, women perceived to have a mission of transferring the ethnic symbols, traditions and social values to the new members of the nation.³³²

The fourth way is the participation of women as the signifiers of ethnic and national differences. While the third way concentrates on the role of women as the transmitter of the culture, this way emphasizes their role as the symbolizers of the culture. Yuval-Davis underlines how women are portrayed as the bearers of the collectivity's honour. She asserts that the nation is viewed as a loved woman therefore, certain characteristics are attributed to the proper woman in the nationalist narrative.³³³

Lastly, women get involved in the national processes as the participants in national, economic, political and military struggles.³³⁴ Yuval-Davis concentrates on the sexual

³³⁰ Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, p.124-125

³³¹ *Ibid.*, p.23

³³² Anthias and Yuval-Davis, *Introduction*, p. 9.

³³³ Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, p. 15.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

division of society during the peace time and shows how this is changed in a war time. She says that the nature of sexual relation changes in the warfare and women incorporated into the army which results in a new pattern of sexual relation. However, she maintains that in the new division of sexual relations the power relation between men and women is not erased.³³⁵

This analysis of the women's role in national process directs Yuval-Davis attention to the dimensions of nationalist projects. She claims that nationalism has a genealogical dimension that is constructed around the race; a cultural dimension that is constructed around language, religion, etc.; and a civic dimension that is constructed around the state sovereignty and territoriality.³³⁶

In short, since the mid-1980's, according to Yuval-Davis the nation and nationalism studies have ignored feminist literature. However, this is a mutual neglect as feminists also ignored the role of nations and nationalism in the construction of gender roles. According to the feminist writers, the masculinist universalism has diffused to the nationalism studies too. Therefore, their mission should be exploring the sexual division of labor in the nationalist projects and examining the dual position of women as subjects and objects in these projects.³³⁷

4.4 Partha Chatterjee and the Post-Colonial Theory

As one of foremost members of Subaltern Studies Group, Partha Chatterjee develops a critique of European oriented discussions of nationalism and makes a significant contribution to the discourse of nationalism from a post-colonial standpoint. His seminal work, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative*

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.21.

³³⁷ Nira Yuval-Davis, "Nationalism, Feminism and Gender Relations", in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson, eds, *Understanding Nationalism*, Cambridge: Polity, 2001, p. 137.

*Discourse?*³³⁸, makes an important theoretical contribution to nationalism studies in general and to colonial nationalism in particular.

As his book's title implies, Chatterjee's main problem with those discussions having made on European model rests on the idea that these discussions are invariably shaped according to contours delineated by given historical models on the basis of European experiences. Therefore, he comes to argue that these discussions had failed to recognize the peculiarities of the nationalist thought in non-western world. In this regard, by making a distinction between "western" and "non-western" nationalism, he argues, bourgeois-rationalist perspectives, whether it is liberal or conservative, pose a dichotomy between a normal and a special type of nationalism. In this sense, the normal is perceived to be the classical, which shares the same material and intellectual premises that of the European Enlightenment: industry, the idea of progress, and modern democracy. These material and intellectual factors form a historical unity and gives the bourgeois-rationalism its paradigmatic form in which nationalism goes hand-in-hand with reason, liberty and progress. The special type, on the contrary, emerges under different historical circumstances and thus deviate from the normal, classical type. In these discussions, nationalist thought in non-European world does not hold a discursive autonomy, but rather seem to be as derivative of discussion for western world.³³⁹

In such a framework, Chatterjee criticizes the bourgeois-rationalist perspective for not allowing a discursive autonomy for the non-western world. In this regard, although the theoretical intervention of Benedict Anderson in the 1980s through the conceptualization of "imagined communities" brings the question of ideological constitution of the nation as a central problem in study of nationalism, he could not be considered quite successful in breaking with the bourgeois-rationalist tradition. Against Anderson's concept of "imagined communities", Chatterjee poses a

³³⁸ Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, London: Zed Books, 1986.

³³⁹ Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, London: Zed Books, 1986, p. 3.

countering question and asks, “whose imagined communities?”³⁴⁰ In this regard, he further argues that

If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain “modular” forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the post-colonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain forever colonised.³⁴¹

From this departure point, Chatterjee criticizes such interpretations and proposes that “the most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an identity but rather on a difference with the ‘modular’ forms of the national society propagated by the modern West. How can we ignore this without reducing the experience of anticolonial nationalism to a caricature of itself?”³⁴²

Chatterjee considers nationalist thought as providing the ideological unity of post-colonial state, which he argues, gives the nationalist thought in post-colonial world its paradigmatic form. In this regard, according to him, the nationalist thought in non-western world should be linked to the peculiarities of nation-building process. Yet he does not take such an ideological unity through the development of a nationalist thought as granted, but rather he is in an effort to scrutinize the historical constitutions of this unity. In this regard, he identifies three stages in the history of Indian nationalism. Each of these three key moments, has a specific form of combination of power relations. With a view to making his three-staged analytical framework sustainable, he also utilizes the Gramscian conceptualization of “passive revolution” as the general form of the transition from colonial to post-colonial national states in

³⁴⁰ See Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, Chapter one.

³⁴¹ Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, p.5; see also Chatterjee, Partha. “The Nation in Heterogeneous Time”, in Özkırımlı, Umut, eds, *Nationalism and its Futures*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 33–58.

³⁴² Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, p. 5.

the twentieth century. In this way, he tries to show that the various stages of movement in the realm of ideas which accompany the historical process of this passive revolution are also an aspect of the historical evolution of nationalist thought in colonial countries.³⁴³

The three moments of nationalist thought in non-Western world, for Chatterjee, are necessary ideological moments on the way to attain its paradigmatic form. He considers the encounter of a nationalist consciousness with the framework of knowledge created by post-Enlightenment rationalist thought as *the moment of departure*. This is also accompanied by an awareness and acceptance of an essential cultural difference between East and West within the national bourgeoisie. It is such a distinction in turn opens the way for a belief that while the attributes of modern European culture make it more culturally convenient for power and progress, the lack of such attributes in the traditional culture of Eastern counterpart make those Eastern countries doom to poverty and subjection. Without denying such cultural difference and its consequences, nationalist movements in the East claim that those features of backwardness emanating from traditional culture should not be considered as an irrevocable character, but rather it can be transformed through adopting all those modern features of European culture by the nation acting collectively.³⁴⁴ This last point introduces another aspect of Chatterjee's interpretation of non-Western nationalism. That is the division between the material and spiritual domains of social institutions and practices.

The material is the domain of the 'outside', of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an 'inner' domain bearing the 'essential' marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills

³⁴³ Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*, p. 50.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50-51.

in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one's spiritual culture.³⁴⁵

That is to say that the convenient modernity for non-European nations lies in combining the superior material qualities of Western cultures with the spiritual greatness of the East.³⁴⁶ In such a nexus, Chatterjee argues that it is the spiritual domain that constitutes the sovereign territory of nationalism and thus draw a line to the colonial power to interfere with it. Through this way, Chatterjee argues, nationalism creates its imagined community.³⁴⁷ This latter ideal, he further argues, however, requires an elitist program since the desired synthesis could only be brought into being by refined intellect. Due to the “steeped in centuries of superstition and irrational folk religion”, it is not possible to expect from popular consciousness to adopt such a venture. At this point, the Gramscian conceptualization of passive revolution come to Chatterjee's analytical framework and he argues that the transformation could only be attained through a passive revolution, which poses a solution to the central political-ideological dilemma of capitalist transformation in a colonial country.³⁴⁸ Because the objective is to establish a politically independent nation state, he argues that

The means involve the creation of a series of alliances, within the organizational structure of a national movement, between the bourgeoisie and other dominant classes and the mobilization, [...] of mass support from the subordinate classes.³⁴⁹

This process, for Chatterjee, amounts to a reorganization of the political power. Therefore, for him, the purpose of such a political venture does not involve a break up with or transformation in a radical way from the institutional structures of “rational” authority established under colonial period. Moreover, it does not also involve a complete struggle against all pre-capitalist classes rather, he maintains, it seeks to

³⁴⁵ Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, p. 6.

³⁴⁶ Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*, p. 51.

³⁴⁷ Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, p. 6, 120-121.

³⁴⁸ Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*, p. 51.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

“limit their former power seek” and “to bring them round to a position of subsidiary allies within a reformed state structure.”³⁵⁰ All these are achieved in the next moment, *the moment of maneuver*, a crucial stage with many contradictory possibilities. He argues that “it consists in the historical consolidation of the “national” by decrying the “modern”, the preparation for capitalist production through an ideology of anti-capitalism.

Finally, in *the moment of arrival*, the nationalist thought attains its fullest development. Hereafter, it turns out to be “a discourse of order, of the rational organization of power. “Here the discourse is not only conducted in a single, consistent, unambiguous voice, it also succeeds in glossing over all earlier contradictions, divergences and differences incorporating within the body of a unified discourse every aspect and stage in the history of its formation”.³⁵¹ It is in this moment that the nationalist thought seeks to attain its paradigmatic form through realizing the ideological unity of itself in the unified life of the state. In short, “Nationalist discourse at its moment of arrival is passive revolution uttering its own life-history.”³⁵²

4.5 The “international” within the Post-Structural Approaches

Unlike most of the previous theories that we examined in the previous sections, “international” dimension plays a critical and theoretically founded role within the post-structural approaches to nationalism. They did not only examined different nationalisms in relation to each other, but also point out to the discursive interaction between those. Nationalism, as these scholars argue, has always been a social construct, which necessary involved an “other”, since there can be no “us” without a “them”. This implies, as Billig pointed out, “the consciousness of national identity

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

normally assumes an international context, which itself needs to be imagined every bit as much as does the national community”.³⁵³

However, does this not mean they manage to overcome the internalist thinking which has always been dominant within the theories of nationalism? I believe before answering that question, it would be more appropriate to consider what Rosenberg says regarding the contributions of the same line of thinking, but only this time, for the field of International Relations. “Critiques of realism”, Rosenberg writes, “have tended to operate by applying to international questions forms of thought developed elsewhere in the social sciences: liberalism, Marxism, feminism, constructivism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, and so on”.³⁵⁴ Rosenberg, admits that the field of IR has been incredibly augmented by the theoretical contributions that these scholars have to offer. Considering the limits of the neo-realist theory, and its ahistorical and supra-sociological conceptualization of the international, these implementations have undeniably enhanced the sociological extent of the IR theory, since they introduced new dimensions, such as class, gender, identity and discourse, to its analysis. “At the same time however”, Rosenberg argues,

such is the continuing hold of internalist thinking over the social sciences in general that these imported resources never bring with them the conceptual tools for formulating the significance of the international itself.³⁵⁵

Of course, it will be absurd to inscribe these words of Rosenberg to the works of nationalism scholars. After all, how can one expect a nationalism scholar to come up with a sociological theory of the international, which overcomes the internal/external divide, while no scholar of International Relations have ever been able to do so?

Yet, Rosenberg’s words still illuminate an important point with regards to these new approaches: that they are necessarily internalist, since they have a trained sociological understanding which deems the international, as lying beyond the reach of social

³⁵³ Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 83.

³⁵⁴ Justin Rosenberg, “The “Philosophical Premises” of Uneven and Combined Development”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 39, no. 3, 2013, p. 2.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

theoretical categories. By degrading the theoretical significance of the international to the level of interaction between nationalisms, they actually restraint the depth of their analysis to the level of the empirical, which cause them to overlook the impact of underlying mechanism and unobservable yet materially embedded social structures. Consequently, as Yalvaç explains, “the international system is then defined in terms of interactions, contacts, exchanges among principle actors and the structure of the system is understood to be the observable regularities in these interactions and contacts”.³⁵⁶

Consequently, such a treatment leads them to ignore the role of the international as a totality. Thus, the “international” space in this line of analysis, remains partial and fragmentary. Even if the “other” signifies different nationalisms, it never encompasses all of them as a single entity. In other words, while they try to avoid the immediate problem of methodological nationalism, this time they fall into the trap of methodological individualism. Since they grant no theoretical significance to the multiplicity of societies itself.

This is why for instance, Smith can criticize these approaches, for not making any attempt to uncover the mechanisms by which nations and nationalism were formed and spread. After all, Smith, who himself largely theorize nationalism by referring to cultural elements of individual societies, can make a valid point, stating that these approaches “illuminate a corner of the broader canvas only to leave the rest of it in untraversed darkness”.³⁵⁷ This mostly stems from the anti-foundationalism of post-structural approaches. By turning their backs to grand narratives and general theories, they are actually giving up on understanding and explaining nationalism holistically, as an intrinsically international phenomenon.

³⁵⁶ Faruk Yalvaç, “Sociology of the State and the Sociology of International Relations” in M. Banks and M. Shaw, eds, *State and Society in International Relations*, London: Palgrave MacMillan/ Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 95. See also, Faruk Yalvaç, “Critical Realism, International Relations Theory and Marxism”, in Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (eds), *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, 2010, pp. 167-186

³⁵⁷ Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 1998, p. 219

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to survey the role of the “international” dimension within nationalism theories, by examining how and to what extent, nationalism scholars have incorporated this dimension into their conceptual frameworks. As the overview illustrated, it is possible to trace an “international” dimension within every theory of nationalism. Given the fact that nationalism is a phenomena which distinguishes between different groups of people, it would have been impossible to theorize it without giving any reference to the “international” dimension. This meant that every theory of nationalism necessarily required a theory of the “international”, be this overly emphasized or tacitly presumed.

Following largely on the conventional periodization within the field, I have started my investigation by evaluating the theories which emerged during the years in between 1918 and 1945. In this part, the role of the international within the theories put forth by Kohn, Carr and Hayes has been examined since the work of these scholars are considered to be pioneering for the field of nationalism studies. After briefly summarizing the views of these scholars on nationalism, I have come to the conclusion that, as a reflection of the prevalent understanding within social sciences during this era, “international” simply implied war and destruction for these scholars. Even though they all emphasized the historical newness of nationalism as a political ideology and criticized the understanding which takes it for granted, it was only the concept of nationalism which they problematized, but not the concept of nation or national identity. These concepts were continued to be taken for granted along with the international dimension itself. The moralistic tenor which was evident in the typologies they have constructed, contained the overtones of what is known as the first great debate within the field of IR, and the international is assumed under realist pretenses

in that regard. Moreover, corresponding to the positivist epistemology that was prominent within social sciences at that time, they draw clear cut boundaries in between domestic and international spheres, which they hold to be analytically separate categories.

Then, in the second chapter, I have continued with the theories of nationalism which emerged during the Cold War Period of 1945-1989, in which the theoretical debate on nationalism became heated and more diversified. This chapter is divided into three sections, in which the nationalism theories of three most acknowledged schools of thought has examined respectively. The first section was devoted to Primordialist scholars, who treated nations and nationalism, as naturally given human constants. After a general overview of the primordialist scholars, I have examined how they integrated the international dimension to their theories, only to find out that the role which this dimension play in this line of analysis is little to none. What international signified for primordialist never went beyond the “reified” understanding of the realist school of International Relations, where anarchy, warfare and coercion become the norms in inter-ethnic or interracial relationships.

Afterwards I carried on with the modernist view, which rejected the self-evident primordialism of the previous scholars, and explained that nationalism is actually a correlate or an offshoot of modernity. In line with the role they attach to the “international” dimension in their analysis, I categorized these scholars under two main headings, the ones who followed the Weberian tradition in their theoretical approaches, and those with Marxist credentials. The first category is labelled Weberian, because of the methodology and concepts that these scholars used in explaining nationalism. After analyzing their theories, which mostly viewed nationalism through an instrumentalist and functionalist perspective, I have argued that what characterized these studies is their unilinear conception of the historical development of nationalism, which in this sense perceived as an inevitable consequence of the transition from agrarian/traditional societies to modern/industrial ones. State, in this line of studies, is believed to have certain autonomy from social relations, both in its domestic and “international” affairs, and viewed as a container of deeply internalized, education-dependent elite cultures, which in turn conceptually

isolated the “international” from sociological dimension. In this regard, the role of the former in the development of the latter is largely overlooked, as external forces are regarded to have influence on the internal dynamics, only after being filtered through the state apparatus.

Then I have continued with exploring the impact of the same dimension within the works of Marxist scholars. Even though all four scholars scrutinized under this category are self-described Marxists, it would be wrong to suggest that these form a homogenous category with regards to their theoretical positions. This is why, I regrouped these under two categories within themselves. First I examined the Neo-Marxists position, which is mostly associated with Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter. Influenced by the views of the dependency school, these scholars sought the roots of nationalism, not in the internal dynamics of individual societies, but in the general historical processes of the capitalist development.

Here, I have argued that even though the “international” space occupies a central position within the works of these scholars, this insight has usually been confined to the analysis of the relationship between the developed and underdeveloped countries, concerning itself with the causes and effects of development and underdevelopment. So these scholars while concerned themselves with the role of the world economy in formation of national consciousness, ignored the impact of the state-system on it altogether. Their approach to nationalism, in this regard, carries the determinist tones of Wallerstein’s world system perspective in general, and subordinates the political dynamics of the world system to the world market competition. Moreover, while overstating the influence of world economy on the emergence of periphery nationalisms, I have argued, both of these scholars share a common flaw in ignoring domestic social structures and their implications on nationalism. This in turn led them to reproduce the internal/external divide, but from an opposite direction. As they believed the international structurally and inescapably determines the domestic social relations, and in this regard independent of them, this led them to conceptualize it as a supra-sociological dimension.

Afterwards, I have continued with the reconciliatory position of Anderson and Hobsbawm. I called this position reconciliatory, since these scholars have attempted

to reconcile the modernist view of Gellner with the historical materialist predispositions of their own. Following a brief summary of their views, I have argued that these scholars' work have presented the most comprehensive attempt to overcome the internal/external divide which is an inherent characteristic of all nationalism theories. Especially Hobsbawm, through combining what he calls, the view of nationalism from below with the view from above, managed to demonstrate significant connections between the role of the "international" space and its domestic implications for national identity construction. Yet, I have claimed, these scholars too could not escape from falling into the traps of the internalist thought. Since, just like the neo-Marxist scholars which were examined previously, they have taken the international factors as the main determinants of the national identity construction. Meanwhile, as they concentrated on understanding the subjective/ideational elements of nationalism; such as ideas, opinion and sentiments of ordinary people, this led them to establish an external relationship between the domestic sociological sphere, and the "international" domain, since they mostly associated the latter with material factors, such as capitalist development and industrialization.

Lastly in this chapter, I have reflected on the views of ethnosymbolist scholars, who propose a middle ground in between the previously examined modernist and primordialist approaches. Here, I sought to examine the role of the "international" within this line of thinking, by analyzing the transformation of Smith's conceptualization of the international through time. As the analysis has revealed, Smith held a more essentialist understanding of the international when he first formulated the ethnosymbolist theory. Yet, he have gradually expanded the scope of this domain within his analysis later on, in relation to the international political developments of the respective periods. The "international" dimension in this regard, which has once been of secondary importance, became a fairly more significant component, following Smith's involvement within the discussions regarding globalization and cosmopolitanism, yet it still remained as an additional factor, whose role is limited to initiating and consolidating national identities in the form of external pressures.

In the final chapter of the study, I had put the post-structural approaches under scrutiny, which emerged following early 1990s, in the wake of what many calls the post-modern turn in social sciences. As explained above, the scholars under this category, attempted to transcend the classical debates of the previous periods through shifting their analysis to a more discursive level. They have introduced new perspectives, such as feminism and post-colonialism to the study of nationalism, and enriched the theoretical discussion within the field. As the survey has demonstrated, the “international” dimension plays a critical and theoretically founded role within this line of studies. These scholars did not only examine different nationalisms within relation to each other, but also point out to the discursive interaction between those. They basically contended that nationalism has always been a social construct, which necessarily involved the “other”, since it would be impossible to define an “us”, without referring to a “them”. Yet, I have argued, by degrading the theoretical significance of the international to the level of interaction, they have overlooked the role of it as a totality. In that regard, they neglected the impact of underlying mechanisms and unobservable yet materially embedded social structures, which exists independently of our consciousness of it. In that regard, they reproduced the internalist thinking, maybe not in the form of an internal/external divide, but in their tendency to explain nationalism as a phenomenon which is in the last instance, a product of domestic sociological (even personal psychological) factors.

So, it is not only the international dimension which is present in all theories of nationalism but also a form of internalist thinking. But why is this relevant for the field of IR, or for social sciences in general?

Yael Tamir was complaining back in 1993, about the indifference of the mainstream academic circles towards nationalism. “When I embarked on this project, nationalism seemed almost an anachronistic topic”, Tamir wrote to the preface of his book ‘Liberal Nationalism’.³⁵⁸ Not much has changed since then. Today, as an IR scholar working on nationalism, I provoke a very similar reaction to what Tamir once got in Oxford after he utterly reported that he was writing a thesis on nationalism. “How interesting!”

³⁵⁸ Tamir quoted in, Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 3.

people reply, a phrase which Tamir translates to Oxfordese as “How weird!”³⁵⁹ This implicit triviality of nationalism is still very evident among the academic circles, especially within the mainstream IR studies.

As stated above, methodological nationalism; or the assumption that nation-state is the natural social and political form of the modern world, is mostly a symptom of the internalist thinking which is prevalent all over social sciences. So, no matter how much one problematizes this understanding, it will continue to persist as long as the latter does. The field of nationalism, actually offers a great opportunity for overcoming this tendency, as its subject’s domain lies in between (or encompasses both), the disciplines of International Relations and Sociology.

Moreover, the scholars of nationalism proclaim themselves to be inter-disciplinary. Yet, as long as they keep reproducing this internal / external divide, such claims has no merit. Maybe, what they should do instead, is to work on formulating transdisciplinary conceptual tools, which will surmount this internalist thinking once and for all. If I may be so bold, I would like to conclude with two observations and two suggestions, which I think might be useful for such purpose.

Firstly, as this survey indicates, in the course of time, nationalism theory got sucked more and more into an ideational realm. What has started as an “invented” or “imagined” concept, than became a modern social reproduction which is constructed upon previous ethnic identities, and finally, turned into an altogether cognitive phenomenon following the end of the cold-war, as it is started to get examined as a discursive and inter-subjective dimension. So much so that, scholars started to claim that, nationalism itself is actually a particular form of discourse, a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world. As a result of this epistemological shift, scholars became more and more dissatisfied with the notion that nationalism can be explained holistically. They became dissidents of ‘grand narratives’ which attempts to explain nationalism as a general (singular) phenomenon, and grow tired of meta-theoretical debates which they believe, has become unnecessarily polarized around certain issues.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3

Secondly, even though the emphasis on the international aspect of nationalism has increased in due course, so did the predominance of the “internalist” thinking within the field, which assumes that nationalism can only be explained by reference to the inner characteristics alone of a given society or type of society. Modernists, which has analysed nationalism as historically emergent phenomenon, were stressing the role of international markets and global capitalism on the development of national identities. Then, came the ethno-symbolist critique, which completely left this dimension aside, by saying that once crystallized, collective cultural identities are remarkably durable to normal fluctuations of history; such as migrations and invasions. After 1990s, the new post-structuralist wave reintegrated the international aspect to the theory of nationalism. However, this time not as a systemic dimension, but rather as a medium of interaction. They stated that development of each nationalism should be examined through analysing its interaction with other nationalisms, and how it positions itself towards these. Yet, they also embraced the notion that each nationalism should be understood within its own historical and social context.

I believe that there is a strict causal correlation between these two tendencies. The more we turn our back to the materialistic explanations of this phenomena, the more we downplay the role of the inter-societal dimension on the development of it. Since attempts to explain the historical development of nationalism will inevitably lead to either, methodological individualism or to a form of particularism, where specific nationalisms cannot be understood within a general theoretical framework, or without pointing to certain “peculiarities” that appears to distinguish the national character of the society under scrutiny.

In this regard my suggestions can be summarized as follows. First, refocusing on the material aspects of nationalism phenomena can be a good starting point to overcome this internalist understanding, since, as the above study reveals, only the Marxist modernist scholars seem to capture the “constitutive role of the international” in their analysis, and that is mostly because they apprehended the international in materialistic terms. Of course, this does not mean that, we should leave the discursive dimension of nationalism aside. This dimension is equally important and the contribution of post-structural scholars in this sense have utmost value. Yet, this discursive dimension of

nationalism have to be contextualized on more concrete, structural attributes inherent to it, just like modernist scholar have done, but without downplaying the role of the former to a function of the latter. Secondly, shifting the attention of the theoretical discussion from epistemology to ontology, might be offer us a solution in this regard, since the external/internal divide is an ontological dichotomization, and can be transcended only through another ontological formulation.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez milliyetçilik kuramları içerisindeki ‘uluslararası’nın’ rolünü eleştirel bir şekilde araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Her ne kadar milliyetçilik kuramlarının büyük bir çoğunluğu uluslararası faktörler ve toplumsal dinamikler arasındaki nedenselliğe vurgu yapıyor olsa da, bu iki alanın kuramsal çerçeveleri içerisinde hala ayrı çözümsel kategoriler olarak kaldığı iddia edilecektir. Bu da, sosyal bilimler içerisinde hüküm süren içselci düşüncenin, iç (sosyolojik) ve dış (uluslararası) alanların ikiliği üzerinden yeniden üretilmesine hizmet etmekte ve hem disiplinler arası bir alan olma iddiasındaki milliyetçilik çalışmaları için, hem de özellikle Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinine hâkim olan yöntemsel milliyetçiliğin aşılması bakımından sorun teşkil etmektedir.

Milliyetçilik olgusu, özellikle Soğuk Savaş’ın bitiminin ardından, sosyal bilimler genelinde artan bir şekilde ağırlığını hissettirmeye başlamıştır. Bu durum, özellikle Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) Disiplini içerisinde faaliyet gösteren akademisyenler arasında, ulus-devlet kavramını verili olarak kabul eden ana-akım kuramlara karşı eleştirel bir bakış açısının gelişmesine sebebiyet vermiştir. Uluslar arasındaki ilişkileri inceleme iddiasında olan bu disiplinin, gerek ‘ulus’ kavramını, gerekse bu kavrama içkin olan milliyetçilik olgusunu, kuramsal olarak incelemek adına hiçbir gayret göstermemiş olması, bu eleştirel bakış açısının merkezini oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda temel olarak sorunsallaştırılan, ontolojik bir ikilem içerisinde sunulan, iç (ulusal) ve dış (uluslararası) siyasetin, birbirlerinden ayrılması gerektiği algısıdır.

Uİ'nin sosyolojik kategoriler ile erişilemeyecek kendine özgü bir alanı olması gerektiği inancı büyük ölçüde disiplinin doğduğu yıllarda yaygın olarak kabul gören pozitivist bilim felsefesinin bir mirasıdır. Sosyal gerçekliği parçalara ayıran pozitivist epistemolojinin akademik disiplinler arasında çizdiği keskin sınırlar, bu dönemde

egemen olan Realist paradigmanın sosyal bilimler ile arasına mesafe koymasına neden olmuştur.

Bu bakımdan pek çok düşünürü göre, 'içsellikğin üstünlüğü' ya da 'yöntemsel milliyetçilik' gibi farklı isimlerle de sorunsallaştırılan bu toplumsal-uluslararası ayırımından, ana-akım Uİ kuramları kadar, geleneksel sosyoloji kuramı da sorumludur. Öyle ki, sosyoloji disiplinin, toplumsal görüngünün yalnızca incelenen toplumun kendine özgü ve içsel özellikleri ile açıklanabileceği yönündeki yaygınca kabul gören önermesi, toplumlararası etkileşimlerin kuramsallaştırılmasını da problemli hale getirmiş ve sosyal bilimleri inceledikleri konunun uluslararası boyutlarını anlamaktan mahrum bırakmıştır. Fakat ilginçtir ki, bu eksikliği gidermek üzere oluşan Uİ disiplini de, bu anlayışın bir uzantısı olarak, kuramsal kategorilerini Sosyoloji kuramı ile özdeşleştirdiği toplumsal ilişkilerden soyutlamış, 'sosyoloji-üstü' olarak tanımlanabilecek yapısal-gerçekçi bir kavramsal çerçeve benimsemiş ve kendi yarattığı bu 'iç/dış' sorunsalı etrafında da bizatihi şekillenmiştir.

Böylesi bir anlayışın gözlemlenebileceği bir diğer alan ise milliyetçilik çalışmalarıdır. Ana-akım Uİ kuramcılarının milliyetçilik olgusuna karşı gösterdikleri bu ihmalkâr tutuma benzer bir şekilde, milliyetçilik çalışmaları alanında faaliyet gösteren akademisyenler de, uluslar-arası, ya da milletler-arası alanı kuramsallaştırmak adına kayda değer bir çaba göstermemişlerdir. Pek çok düşünürü göre, bunun sebebi, milliyetçilik olgusunun genel olarak endojen, yani içten kaynaklı etmenler çerçevesinde incelenmesi, ve jeopolitik ve uluslararası etmenlerin bu anlamda kuramsal çerçeve içerisine dâhil edilmemesidir. Mesela Dufour'a göre milliyetçilik kuramları, işte tam da bu yüzden, ulus olgusunun tarihsel gelişimini incelerken, uluslararası alanın belirleyici rolünü göz ardı etmişlerdir. Peki, gerçekten de durum bu mudur?

Bu tez milliyetçilik kuramları içerisindeki 'uluslararası' alanın rolünü ve kapsamını inceleyen eleştirel bir araştırma yapmayı hedeflemektedir. Tezin temel savlarından biri, 'uluslararası' alanın, hemen her milliyetçilik kuramı içerisinde kaçınılmaz olarak bir yer teşkil ettiğidir. Milliyetçilik olgusu, modern bir siyasi ideoloji olarak, ulusların belirli sınırlar içerisinde geliştiği ve bu sınırların dışında da başka ulusların var olduğu, önermeleri üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Bu sebeple, bu olguyu inceleyen hiç bir

akademisyen herhangi bir uluslararası kavramsallaştırması yapmaksızın, milliyetçiliği kuramsallaştıramaz. Bu kavramsallaştırma, ister alenen ortaya konsun ister örtülü kabul edilsin, her milliyetçilik kuramında mevcuttur. Burada asıl sorunsallaştırılması gereken, ‘uluslararası’ alanın kuramsal çerçeve içerisine nasıl entegre edildiğidir.

Yapılan inceleme sonunda görülecektir ki, her ne kadar, milliyetçilik kuramı üzerine çalışan düşünürlerin birçoğu, bu olguyu açıklarken, jeopolitik davranışlar ile toplumsal dinamikler arasındaki nedenselliği açıklamaya çalışsalar da, hiçbir zaman uluslararası alanın sınırlarını ve yapısını açıkça kuramsallaştırmamışlardır. Bu da, sadece 'uluslararası' ve 'iç politika' ikiliğinin yeniden üretilmesine hizmet etmiş ve bu iki alanın etkileşim halinde olmalarına karşın, hala analitik olarak ayrı kategorilere işaret etmesine sebebiyet vermiştir.

Milliyetçilik kuramı üzerine çalışan pek çok akademisyen için, millet ve milliyetçilik kavramlarının, ancak I. Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından, kuramsal olarak incelenmeye başlanmıştır. Bugün milliyetçilik çalışmaları olarak da bilinen disiplinler-arası alanda genel olarak benimsenen dönemselleştirme, 1918 öncesi dönemi, milliyetçilik kuramı açısından tabiri caizse bir karanlık dönem olarak değerlendirme eğilimindedir. Her ne kadar millet olgusunun ve milliyetçilik ideolojisinin köklerinin Alman Romantizmine ve Aydınlanma geleneğine dayandığı kabul edilse de, 18. ve 19. yüzyıllarda milliyetçilik olgusuna olan ilginin daha çok politik ve etik olgusu; ve bu dönem de konuyu tartışan Marxist ya da Liberal düşünürlerin hiç birisinin ortaya somut bir milliyetçilik kuramı koyma gayretinde olmadıkları vurgulanmaktadır.

Bahsi geçen bu geleneksel dönemselleştirmeye göre milliyetçilik kuramı ile ilgili tartışmalar genel olarak üç ayrı dönem altında incelenmektedir. Bunlardan ilki, Hans Kohn, Carleton Hayes, ve E. H. Carr gibi tarihçilerin öncülük ettiği çalışmalarla milliyetçilik kavramının ilk kez kuramsal bir incelenmeye tabi tutulduğu 1918-1945 arası dönemdir. Bunu kuramsal tartışmaların giderek hararetlendiği ve çeşitlendiği 1945-1989 arası dönem takip eder. Bu dönem, milliyetçilik çalışmalarının ‘klasik dönemi’ olarak tanımlanmakta ve genellikle primordializm, modernizm ve etnosembolizm başlıkları altında toplanan üç ana görüş etrafında incelenmektedir. 1989'dan günümüze uzanan süreç ise, pek çokları için, işte bu klasik tartışmaların

aşıldığı ve post-modern ve post-pozitivist yeni bir kuramsal anlayışın hüküm sürmeye başladığı, niteliksel olarak farklı, yeni bir döneme işaret eder.

Bu dönemselleştirmeyi takiben, araştırmaya 1918-1945 arasında ortaya çıkan milliyetçilik kuramları ile başlanılmış ve çalışmanın ilk kısmında yukarıda da adı geçen Kohn, Carr ve Hayes gibi tarihçilerin ileri sürdüğü kuramlar ve bunlar içerisindeki uluslararası alanın boyutları incelenmiştir. İnceleme sonunda bahsi geçen kuramlarda, dönemin ruhuna uygun düşecek bir şekilde, uluslar-arası alanın büyük ölçüde savaş ve yıkımla eşdeğer tutulduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Her ne kadar, bu düşünürler, milliyetçiliği verili olarak kabul eden yaygın düşünceyi sorunsallaşırsalar da, bu eleştirinin kapsamı sadece milliyetçilik ideolojisi ile sınırlı tutulmuş ve hiçbir zaman ‘ulus’ ya da ‘ulusal kimlik’ gibi kavramları da içine alacak şekilde genişletilmemiştir. Bu kavramlarla beraber uluslararası alanda verili olarak kabul edilmeye devam etmiş ve genellikle Realist düşüncenin ortaya koyduğu sınırlar içerisinde kavramsallaştırılmıştır. Dahası, aynı dönem içerisinde sosyal bilimlerin hemen her alanında etkili olan pozitivist epistemolojinin de bir getirisi olarak, ‘ulusal’ ve ‘uluslar-arası’ alanlar çözümsel olarak birbirlerinden katı sınırlar ile ayrılmış, bu anlamda içselci düşünce milliyetçilik çalışmalarının ilk ortaya çıktığı yıllardan itibaren, alan üstündeki kuramsal ağırlığını hissettirmeye başlamıştır.

1945-1989 arası dönemde ortaya çıkan milliyetçilik kuramlarının analiz edildiği çalışmanın ikinci bölümde, bu döneme damga vuran üç genel yaklaşım, yani primordialism, modernizm ve ethnosembolizm, sırasıyla üç ayrı ara başlık altında incelemeye tabi tutulmuştur.

Bu görüşlerden ilkinin oluşturan primordialism, ulusları doğal ve ebedi kavramlar olarak ele alır. Buna göre, ulusal kimlik toplumsal yaşantının kaçınılmaz bir getirisidir ve kültürel olarak verili kabul edilmelidir. Bu bölümde, sırasıyla Edward Shils ve Clifford Geertz gibi kültürel primordialistler, Van den Berghe’nin sosyo-biyolojik yaklaşımı ve Hastings’in ortaya koyduğu perennialist (daimci) yaklaşım incelenmiştir. Bu genel değerlendirmenin ardından, bu düşünce biçimi içerisinde uluslararası alanın oynadığı rol incelenmiş ve bu rolün oldukça sınırlı olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Buna göre, bahsi geçen düşünürler için, uluslararası hiçbir zaman Realist düşüncenin ortaya

koyduğu 'şeyleştirilmiş' biçiminin ötesine geçememiş, anarşi, savaş ve zorlama etnisiteler ya da ırklar arası ilişkiler için birer norm olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Bu bölümün, ikinci kısmında, primordialist görüşe karşı bir tepki olarak ortaya çıkan ve 'ulus-devleti', endüstrileşme, kapitalizm, şehirleşme, laiklik ve bürokratikleşme gibi son iki yüzyılda meydana gelen yapısal gelişmeler ile açıklayan modernist görüş ele alınmıştır. Bu kategori altında incelenen düşünürler, uluslararası kavramını ele alış biçimleri çerçevesinde, iki ana başlık altında incelenmiştir. Bunlardan ilki, John Breuilly, Paul R. Brass, Ernest Gellner ve Miroslav Hroch gibi düşünürleri de kapsayan Weberyen görüştür. Bu kategorinin Weberyen olarak adlandırılmasındaki temel sebep, bahsi geçen düşünürlerin kullandığı yöntem ve kavramlardır. Öyle ki, bu düşünürler milliyetçiliği çoğunlukla araçsal ve işlevselci bir perspektiften ele almış, ve bu kavramın ortaya çıkışını ve gelişimini tekdoğrusal (unilinear) bir tarih anlayışı çerçevesinde incelemiştir. Bu anlamda, milliyetçiliğin ortaya çıkışı geleneksel tarım toplumundan, endüstriyel modern topluma geçişin kaçınılmaz bir sonucu olarak görülmüştür. Modern-bürokratik devlet, bahsi geçen düşünürlerin kuramsal analizlerinde merkezi bir öneme sahiptir. Bu biçimiyle devlet, gerek yerel gerekse uluslararası ilişkilerinde, toplumsal ilişkilerden bağımsız, otonom bir varlık görünümündedir ve de eğitim odaklı üst / elit kültürleri dış etmenlerin etkisinden koruyan bir kurum olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu da uluslararası ve sosyolojik alanların birbirlerinden kavramsal olarak yalıtılmasına ve iç/dış ikiliğinin yeniden üretilmesine sebebiyet vermiştir.

Milleti ve milliyetçiliği modern olgular olarak ele alan ikinci bir görüş ise Marksist geleneği takip eden düşünürler tarafından ortaya konulmuştur. Ancak; her ne kadar bu kategori altında incelen dört düşünürde kendisini Marksist olarak addetse de, bunların kuramsal pozisyonları itibariyle homojen bir kategori oluşturduğunu söylemek yanlış olacaktır. Bu yüzden Marksist düşünürler de kendi aralarında iki alt gruba ayrılmış, ve ilk önce, Tom Nairn ve Michael Hechter ile özdeşirilen neo-Marksist pozisyon mercek altına alınmıştır. Bağımlılık okulunun önermeleri üzerine kurulu olan bu görüş, milliyetçiliğin köklerinin incelenen toplumun iç dinamiklerinde değil, kapitalist gelişimin genel tarihsel süreçleri içerisinde aranması gerektiğini iddia etmektedir. Öyle ki, bu düşünürlere göre milliyetçilik kapitalizmin eşitsiz gelişimin bir sonucudur,

ve gelişimini tamamlamış “merkez” ülkeler ile az gelişmiş “çevre” ülkeler, arasında gelişen ve sömürü üzerine kurulu bir ticaret ilişkisinin diyalektik bir sonucudur.

Her ne kadar uluslararası alan bu düşünürlerin kuramsal çerçeveleri içerisinde merkezi bir öneme sahip olsa da, bu kavrayış genellikle gelişmiş ve az gelişmiş ülkeler arasındaki ilişkiler ile sınırlı tutulmuş ve temel olarak dünya ekonomisinin ulusal bilincin gelişmesindeki rolü üzerine yoğunlaşmıştır. Bu bakımdan, denilebilir ki, bu düşünürlerin analizlerinde uluslararası, Wallerstein’in dünya sistemi perspektifine de içkin olan determinist yaklaşımın nüanslarını taşımaktadır. Öyle ki, dünya sisteminin siyasi dinamikleri, küresel pazar ekonomisinin rekabetçi güçleri karşısında ikinci plana atılmış, dünya ekonomisinin çevre milliyetçilikler üzerine etkisi abartılarak, yerel toplumsal yapıların bu anlamdaki önemi göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu da, iç / dış ayrımının karşı istikametten üretilmesine sebebiyet vermiştir: uluslararası alan, yerel dinamikleri yapısal ve kaçınılmaz olarak belirleyen ve bu bakımdan bunlardan bağımsız, sosyoloji üstü bir karaktere bürünmüştür.

Milliyetçilik olgusuna modernist perspektiften yaklaşan bir diğer Marksist görüş, Benedict Anderson ve Eric Hobsbawm’in ortaya koyduğu ve bu tez içerisinde *uzlaşmacı* pozisyon olarak adlandırılan bakış açısıdır. Bu düşünürlerin uzlaşmacı olarak kategorize edilmesindeki temel sebep, yukarıda bahsi geçen Ernest Gellner’in ortaya koyduğu milliyetçilik anlayışı ile kendi sahip oldukları Marksist eğilimleri uzlaştırmak için gösterdikleri çabadır. Tezde de iddia edildiği gibi, bu iki düşünürün analizleri, milliyetçilik kuramlarının genelinde hakim olan içselci düşüncenin aşılması açısından en önemli girişimi oluşturmaktadır. Bu yazarların çalışmalarında uluslararası, milliyetçilik olgusunun kavramsallaştırılması aşamasında kuramsal çerçeve içerisine doğrudan dâhil edilmiş, dahası, bu olgunun ortaya çıkması ve gelişmesi açısından yapıcı (konstitütif) bir rol üstlenmiştir. Ayrıca bahsi geçen çalışmalar, uluslararası alan ile toplumsal yapılar (hatta psikolojik etmenler) arasında etkileşimsel bir nedensellik inşa ederek, bu iki alan arasındaki ilişkiselliğin farklı boyutlarını da gözler önüne sermiştir. Bu bakımdan, özellikle Hobsbawm’in yukarıdan aşağı açıklamalar ile aşağıdan yukarı açıklamalar arasında kurduğu ilişki, milliyetçilik olgusunun çok katmanlı bir kavram olarak incelenmesi bakımından en önemli adımlardan birini (belki de en önemlisini) oluşturmaktadır.

Ancak, bu yazarların çalışmalarında bile uluslararası ve toplumsal alanlar arasında yapılan analitik bir ayırmadan söz etmek mümkündür. Bunun nedeni, her iki düşünürün de temel kaygısının, milliyetçilik olgusunun sübjektif/düşünsel yönlerini açıklamak olmasıdır. Öyle ki, bu yazarlar için asıl önemli olan, milliyetçiliğin nasıl ve neden ortaya çıktığını anlamaktan ziyade, nasıl sıradan insanların fikirleri ve duyguları üzerinde böylesi güçlü bir etki yaratabildiğini açıklamaktır. Bu da onları, böylesi öznel ve düşünsel etmenleri özdeşleştirdikleri toplumsal ilişkiler ile onlar için daha çok kapitalizm, jeopolitik faktörler ve endüstrileşme gibi materyal gerçeklere işaret eden uluslararası alan arasında, dışsal bir ilişki kurmaya itmiştir. Bu da, tıpkı yukarıda anlatılan neo-Marxist pozisyonda olduğu gibi, içselciliğin karşı istikametten üretilmesi sonucunu doğurmuş, yani uluslararası alan, yerel dinamikleri yapısal ve kaçınılmaz olarak belirleyen, ve bu bakımdan bunlardan bağımsız, sosyoloji üstü bir karaktere bürünmüştür.

Bu bölümün son kısmında, primordialist ve modernist görüşlere kıyasla, bir ara mevzi olarak değerlendirilebilecek etnosembolist yaklaşım incelenmiştir. Bu görüş, milliyetçiliği materyal ve objektif bir gerçeklik olarak incelemek yerine, bu olgunun oluşumunda rol oynayan sembolik ve sübjektif etmenler üzerine yoğunlaşır. Ethnosembolistlere göre, modern ulusların nasıl oluştuğunu bunların etnik kökenlerini hesaba katmaksızın anlamak imkânsızdır, çünkü hiçbir ulus modernistlerin iddia ettiği gibi, boşluktan inşa edilemez. Ulusal kimlikler birbirileri ile ilişkili etnik, kültürel, ekonomik ve siyasi pek çok unsurdan oluşan karmaşık yapılardır. İşte bu yüzden, bu görüş için, mitler, semboller, iletişim kodları, hatıralar, değerler ve gelenekler, etnik toplulukların (ya da etnilerin) ve daha sonra da ulusların oluşumu, korunması ve dönüşümü açısından kritik bir öneme sahiptir. Kısaca mit-sembol kompleksi olarak adlandırılan bu öğelerin, en radikal demografik değişimlerde dahi, kolektif kimliklerin korunmasını ve yeniden üretilmesini sağladığı ve ulusal kimliğin ancak bu bağlamda incelendiği zaman tam olarak anlaşılabilceğini iddia ederler.

Bu kısımda öncelikle John Armstrong ve Anthony Smith'in ortaya koyduğu temel önermeler sunulmuş, daha sonra da bu yaklaşım içerisinde uluslararası alanın oynadığı rol, bu görüşün kurucu babası olarak kabul edilen Smith'in analizlerinde, bu alana atfedilen anlamın nasıl dönüştüğü üzerinden incelenmiştir. Bu inceleme sonucunda,

uluslararası alanın, Smith'in ethnosembolist kuramı ilk kez formüle ettiği yıllarda, kuramsal çerçeve içerisinde daha sınırlı bir alan kapladığı, ancak takip eden yıllarda, dünyada meydana gelen siyasi gelişmelerinde etkisiyle kapsamını arttırdığı iddia edilmiştir. Fakat bu anlamda değişmeyen önemli bir faktör, kendisini tarihsel sosyoloji geleneği içerisinde tanımlayan Smith'in, uluslararası ile ilgili varsayımlarının çoğunlukla aynı geleneğin ilk kuşağını oluşturan bir diğer isim olan Charles Tilly önermeleri etrafında şekillendiğidir. Bu durum Smith'in analizlerinde uluslararası ve toplumsal alan arasında dışsal bir ilişki kurmasına sebebiyet vermiş, ve kuramsal çerçevenin açıkça iç/dış ikiliği üzerine inşa edilmesi sonucunu doğurmuştur.

Dördüncü bölümünde özellikle 1990'ları takip eden yıllarda ortaya çıkan ve önceki dönemin klasik tartışmalarını aşma gayretinde olan post-yapısalcı yaklaşımlar ele alınmıştır. Bu bölümde incelenen düşünürlerin ortak özelliği kendilerinden önceki kuramcıların aksine, milliyetçiliği ideal-tipler üzerinden genel olarak kuramsallaştırmaya çalışan üst anlatılara sırtlarını dönerek, kuramsal analizlerinin odağını daha epistemolojik bir düzeye çekmeleridir. Bu bölümde önce Michael Bilig'in 'banal milliyetçiliği' incelenmiş, daha sonra milliyetçiliği bir söylem olarak ele alan Craig Calhoun'un görüşleri değerlendirilmiş, üçüncü olarak Nira Yuval-Davis'in feminist milliyetçilik kuramı mercek altına alınmış ve son olarak da Partha Chatterjee ve sömürgecilik sonrası yaklaşım analiz edilmiştir.

Bu incelemelerin sonucunda, bahsi geçen düşünürlerin farklı milliyetçilikleri birbirleri ile ilişkilendirmekle kalmadığı, aynı zamanda bunlar arasındaki söylemsel etkileşimlerinde kuramsal çerçevelerine dahil ederek, doğrudan sosyolojik temeller üstüne oturtulmuş bir uluslararası alan tanımladıkları iddia edilmiştir. Bu bakımından post-yapısalcı kuramlar önceki tüm milliyetçilik kuramlarından niteliksel olarak farklılaşırlar. Ancak; tezde de iddia edildiği gibi, bu düşünürler uluslararası sadece etkileşimsel bir boyuta indirgeyerek, bu alanın bir bütün olarak oynadığı rolü göz ardı etmişlerdir.

Bu anlamda uluslararası alan etkileşimler, temaslar ve aktörler arası ilişkiler üzerinden tanımlanmış ve sistemin yapısı gözlenebilir süreklilikler seviyesine indirgenmiştir. Bunun bir sonucu olarak da, görünmeyen ama sistemik etkilere sahip materyal yapılar ve mekanizmalar dikkate alınmamışlardır. Kısacası bu yaklaşımlar içerisinde

uluslararası alan parçalı ve bölünmüş bir karaktere sahiptir, çünkü 'öteki' hiçbir zaman bütünü kapsayamaz. Bu da, post-yapısalcı düşünürlerin yöntemsel milliyetçiliği aşalım derken yöntemsel bireycilik tuzağına düşmelerine neden olmuştur. Bu da içselci düşüncenin farklı bir şekilde de olsa yeniden üretilmesi anlamını taşımaktadır.

Tezin son kısmında, araştırmanın bulguları anlatılmıştır. Buna göre, milliyetçilik çalışmaları alanının tarihsel gelişimi incelendiğinde iki temel eğilimden söz etmek mümkündür. Bunlardan ilki, milliyetçilik kuramının yıllar geçtikçe daha düşünsel bir boyuta çekildiğidir. Önceleri hayal edilmiş ya da icat edilmiş olarak tanımlanan millet olgusu, daha sonra önceki etnik kimlikler üzerinden yeniden üretilen bir toplumsal inşa olarak değerlendirilmiş ve en nihayetinde de tamamen bilişsel bir alana çekilerek söylemsel bir biçim almıştır. İkinci eğilim ise, her ne kadar bu süre zarfında uluslararası verile önem artsa da, aynı şekilde içselci düşüncenin milliyetçilik kuramları üzerindeki etkinliği de perçinlenmiştir.

Bunu takiben bu iki eğilim arasında nedensel bir ilişki kurulmuş, milliyetçiliğin materyal boyutlarına verilen önem azaldıkça uluslararası alanın bu olgunun oluşumu üzerindeki etkisinin de kuramsal olarak önemsizleştiği iddia edilmiştir. Son olarak ise milliyetçilik kuramları içerisindeki içselci düşüncenin aşılması bakımından yararlı olabileceği düşünülen iki öneri sunulmuştur. Bunlardan ilki, kuramsal odağın tekrar milliyetçilik olgusunun materyal yönlerine çekilmesi gerektiğidir. Yukarıda da anlatıldığı gibi uluslararası milliyetçilik olgusu üzerindeki yapıcı (konstitütif) etkisini en iyi Marksist modernist düşünürler yakalayabilmişlerdir. Bunun temel sebebi ise uluslararası materyal olgular üzerinden tanımlamalarıdır. Elbette bu düşünsel boyutun bir kenara bırakılması gerektiği anlamına gelmemektedir. Bu boyut aynı derece de önemlidir, ve bu bakımdan post-yapısalcı düşünürlerin katkıları yadsınamaz. Ancak, uluslararası bu söylemsel boyutu, tıpkı modernist düşünürlerin yaptığı gibi daha somut ve yapısal bir bağlam üzerine oturtulmalı; ancak bu yapılırken modernist düşünürlerin kuramlarında görünen indirgemecilik tuzağına düşülmemelidir. Bu bağlamda ortaya konan ikinci öneri ise, 1990 sonrası dönemde epistemolojik alana kayan milliyetçilik kuramlarının, artık ontolojik bir seviyeye çekilmesi gerektiğidir. Bu iddianın dayanağı, iç/dış ikiliğinin temelde ontolojik bir ayırım olduğu ve ancak yeni bir ontolojik formülasyon ile aşılabileceğidir.

B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : ÖZENİŞ

Adı : ÇAĞDAŞ

Bölümü : ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER

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