

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL WILL DISCOURSE OF ERDOĞAN:
FROM ‘NATION-AS-ONE’ TO ‘NATION AS US’**

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis has produced for analyzing the national will discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the chairman of JDP and Prime Minister of Turkish Republic between the years of 2002-2014. National will concept is thought to be one of the constitutive components of Erdoğan’s discourse and it is observed that this concept is overused by Erdoğan. Whilst working on this subject, the French thinker Claude Lefort’s theory, he theory of ‘empty space of power’ has utilized. According to this theory, power which had been rest in the absolute monarch before the modern era, has taken from him with the ideal of popular sovereignty and left to the people as abstract masses. In other words the place of power is emptied in 20th century systems and power becomes the power of nobody. Lefort asserts that this emptied space of power is convenient to be filled by a party or a person who is capable of constituting a discourse through which he identified himself with nation or people . It is asserted in this thesis that, in Turkish case, the discourse indicating by Lefort, is the national will discourse of Erdoğan. For grounding this assertion, firstly the political history has written with taking the concepts of power,

popular sovereignty, nation and national will as base, then the Turkish episode of the concept has put with considering center right political tradition until the occurrence of JDP, and finally all the speeches of Erdoğan from its 11 years power term has subjected to the discourse analysis through the notion of national will.

Key Words: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, National Will, Power, Claude Lefort, Popular Sovereignty

ÖZ

ERDOĞAN'IN MİLLİ İRADE SÖYLEMİNİN ANALİZİ: TEK OLARAK MİLETTEN BİZ OLARAK MİLLETE

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Bu tez AKP Genel Başkanı ve 2002-2014 yılları arası Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakan'ı olan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Milli irade söylemini analiz etmek amacıyla yazılmıştır. Milli irade kavramının Erdoğan'ın söyleminin kurucu unsurlarından biri olduğu düşünülmüş ve kavramın Erdoğan tarafından fazla kullanıldığı gözlemlenmiştir. Bu konuyu çalışırken, Fransız Düşünür Cladue Lefort'un 'iktidarın boş alanı' teorisinden yararlanılmıştır. Bu teoriye göre modern öncesi dönemde mutlak bir kralda bulunan iktidar, halkın egemenliği ideali ile kraldan alınmış ve soyut bir kitle olarak halka verilmiştir. Başka bir deyişle 20. yüzyıldaki sistemlerde iktidarın alanı boşaltılmış ve hiç kimsenin iktidarı haline gelmiştir. Lefort boşalan bu iktidar alanının kendini milletle özdeşleştirecek bir söylem kurmaya muktedir olan bir parti ya da kişi tarafından doldurulmaya elverişli olduğunu belirtir. Bu tezde Lefort'un işaret ettiği söylemin Türkiye bağlamında Erdoğan'ın milli irade söylemi olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu iddiayı temellendirmek için önce siyaset tarihi iktidar, halkın egemenliği, millet ve milli irade kavramları temel alınarak yazılmış, sonra kavramın Türkiye serüveni, AKP'nin oluşumuna kadarki merkez sağ siyaset geleneğini göz önünde bulundurarak koyulmuş

ve son olarak Erdoğan'ın 11 yıllık iktidar dönemindeki bütün konuşmalarının, söylem analizi milli irade kavramı üzerinden yapılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Milli İrade, İktidar, Claude Lefort, Halkın Egemenliği

Dedicated to those, who have been killed in the squares and streets while I was
studying on this work.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DLP	Democratic Left Party
DP	Democratic Party
EU	European Union
FP	Virtue Party
HSYK	High Council of Judges and Prosecutors
JDP	Justice and Development Party
MP	Motherland Party
MUSİAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
PDP	Peace and Democracy Party
RPP	Republican Peoples Party
SP	Felicity Party
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assambly
TEKEL	Tabaco Products, Salt and Alcohol Companies General Management
TİP	Turkey Worker's Party
TOKİ	Housing Development Administration
TTP	True Part Party
TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Today, one of the most frequently used concepts in Turkey is the concept of ‘national will’. Within almost all the speeches, especially speeches of the ruling party, it is possible to see the usage of the ‘national will’ concept. From opening speech of airport construction to the opening speech of barrage, from speech in the women’s branch congress to speech of vocational and technical education courses certificate ceremony¹, the concept of national will, somehow comes to the fore. This frequent usage of the concept both tells something about the Justice and Development Party-JDP- power and Turkish political tradition and also about the place of the terms as ‘nation’, ‘people’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘power’ and ‘will of nation’, within the 21th century political systems. In other words, for understanding and revealing this frequent usage of the national will concept in the JDP, and thus in the discourse of Erdoğan, it should be looked closer to the theoretical and historical place of national will term and to the rise of the term in Turkish political tradition. This thesis has been produced for realizing these aims. Starting from these aims, one of the much-debated concepts of Turkey will tried to be analyzed through the discourse of Erdoğan.

This concept, surely, has not been developed by Erdoğan himself. It neither firstly used by him in Turkish Republic. He, rather, makes use of the implications that are inherent in the concept. Therefore, these implications have to be determined, together with trying to answer the question of why these implications are still useful in the 20th and 21th century’s political world. In this direction, national will concept in the

¹ These discourse have found during the scan of unpublished speeches of Erdoğan which taken from TBMM: Opening of Airport Construction 14.09.2013 Adıyaman, Opening of DSI Kayackı Barrage 30.10.2005, Ankara Women Branch Congress 2005, Certificate Ceremont of Technical Training Course 02.02.2009 İstanbul

discourse of Erdoğan has been chosen as the main subject of this thesis. In order to analyze this subject systematically and to constitute the argument of the thesis, the 20th century French thinker, Claude Lefort's ideas will be pursued. It is thought that Lefort's approach to modern democracies will be helpful in understanding what the national will concept serves for today.

Lefort indicates the difference of 20th century's political system from its earlier counterparts. He sees the necessity of the reexamination of liberal democratic ideals and the concepts of 18th and 19th century for comprehending the political and social experiences in 20th century. Indeed, his main aim is to decipher the rising totalitarianism in his time. Since these regimes are born out of modern democracies, Lefort thinks that principles and notions of modern democracies have to be scrutinized. What he faces when doing these analyses is the notion of 'sovereignty of people'. This notion, according to him, constitutes one of the major problems about the current regimes. He concretely aims to say that, modern democracies create an illusion of being ruled by the people. These people, who have thought to be taken the place of early kings or clergy, are an abstraction or at least, they represent a 'shifting mass'. Introducing this abstract, shifting masses as the power holders means emptying the place of power in modern democracies. Lefort calls this situation the *empty space of democracy*. What he sees in these democracies is the purely social society without a body; it means neither people nor the nation represents substantial entities.² If that is the case, what national will, as the will of abstract nation, could mean in contemporary political systems? The answer of this question requires completing Lefort's proposition.

It might be asserted that, this emptiness is inherent in democracy as a whole. From democracies of city states to the democracies of the contemporary societies, terms like

² Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 18.

nation, people and *state* have always been an abstraction and never represent substantial entities. However, democracies before the 20th century and in any other political systems, the substance has been provided with the division between those who hold power and those who are subjected to them. People have always natural determination which is once linked to the body of the prince or the essence of nobility. Or, as in the case of Ancient Polis, there are small numbers of citizens knowing each other and everyone is accurately seeing the power holders. In 20th century democracies, on the other hand, people experience a fundamental indeterminacy.³ This situation has deepened with the ‘universal suffrage’. After the establishment of universal suffrage, people are assumed to manifest their will through voting. But it is not the expression of ideas or revealing of collective decision but just revealing the statistics. Indeed, what Lefort asserts is that; the emptiness which is inherent in 20th century democracy causes a new type of despotism which can easily be masked with the ‘popular sovereignty’ notion. In other words, popular sovereignty understanding and mainly the popular suffrage try to convince people that everything is made with their decisions. And they are told to be the power holders. This is the point where illusion begins and where despotism becomes invisible. In reality, it is not the people who are in power, but power becomes the power of nobody. This situation has two sides. On the one hand, it reflects the technical system of democracy where political parties compete for this place of power, on the other hand, it underlines the importance of ‘discourse’, through which the politician is able to claim identification with people and owing to this, they start to occupy the empty space of power. Indeed, in the contemporary democratic systems, the ones who are sufficient to claim that they are representing the people, by coming from the people, and being part of the people (*the people-as-one*), are more powerful to occupy the empty space of power. Lefort thinks that if the image of people is actualized by a successful demagog or a political

³ Ibid:19

party, if it claims to identify with it and appropriate power under the cover of this identification then the empty place can be filled by this organ or actor⁴. It is asserted in this thesis that this ability in Turkish case is peculiar to center-right parties and leaders, but it is Erdoğan who accurately does this occupying with the discourse of national will. In other words, the concept of national will in the discourse of Erdoğan is asserted to be used for occupying the locus of democracy and power which is emptied with transition to popular sovereignty ideal. In point of fact, this thesis marks the national will discourse of Erdoğan as the filler of this empty space. Substantiality, it is provided through the various usage of his discourse.

The argument of this thesis, as a result, is based on the Lefort's idea, and asserts that; the current usage of *national will* concept by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of the party in the power wherefrom 11 years, constitutes its unique abstraction about the nation . 'National will', as one of the most used concepts by Erdoğan, constitutes the main mechanism through which legitimacy of Erdoğan's power is gathered. This concept is used for implying the differences from other parties which are in relation with the state tradition in Turkey, it implies the authenticity of their party-JDP- and to assimilate it into values of nation abstraction, it is used against all kinds of oppositions and finally for positioning their claims above law. It is going to be asserted in this thesis that the usage of *national will* in Erdoğan's speeches serves the *invisible despotism* in the Lefort's theory and constitutes the most important part of the 'new symbolic constitution of the social.'⁵ This constitution uses the concept of national will for defining the nation and outsiders of it, and it establishes the limits of this nation and puts the absolute representatives of that national will who are also part of it. This constitution of the social with the help of the discourse of national will brings

⁴ Claude Lefort, *Political Forms of Modern Society*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1986) 279-280.

⁵ Ibid:18.

tangibility to the abstraction of nation and becomes convenient to fulfill the empty space of democracy.

Checking the validity of this argument requires the meticulous looking to three domains. What is needed to be known first is the theoretical rising of the national will term and more prominently, the place it is embedded in the political history of power. For that purpose, the second chapter of the thesis puts the brief history of political power which also places the national will concept to the center. In this regard, the place of power before and after the invention of national will term is going to be stated. It is done with the categorization that has been inspired from the Lefort's assertion about the place of power. In this direction, the position of power until the occurrence of popular sovereignty understanding and the concept of national will are going to be classified in this chapter under the subtitle of *power-as-one*. This heading includes medieval acceptance that regards power as belonging to the omnipotent monarchs and their divine right to rule. This acceptance constitutes the category of *power-as-one*. Second heading explains the power position that comes with the criticism of the absolute divine right of kings in modern era. This term, where power is aimed to be taken from king and given to the people, is categorized under the heading of *power-as-many*. In the third heading, the radical version of this understanding is going to be stated. This understanding, which insists upon the people's right to rule themselves regards society as a monist homogenous body and constitutes the general will conceptualization and it is stated under the heading of *people- as-one*. Under this subtitle, Rousseau's General Will theory will be stated. Finally, in the fourth heading, occupation of position of power by shifting mass will be stated. Here, with the changing social and political conjuncture in the recent political history and with the critics of the national will and popular sovereignty understandings, the assertion of empty space of democracy is going to be explained under the heading of *power-as-nobody*. With this classification, the emptied space of

power is aimed to be revealed. In addition, the concept of national will and its basis is tried to be put forth. It might be said to be the rereading of democracy through the concepts of power, popular sovereignty and national will.

After this theoretical introduction, which provides the context of national will understanding and its current position in the political history, in the third chapter of this thesis, national will's position in Turkey is aimed to be stated. This chapter organized for providing background for the Justice and Development Party and the discourse of its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In this respect, what national will and popular sovereignty means for Turkish political tradition, when it begins to be used, when its implications experience breaks and who are the top users of the term in the Political History of Turkey are tried to be put forth.

The history of national will concept in Turkey is stated from Republican term, with a brief introduction to the development of the popular sovereignty understanding from early republican term onward. This can be considered as the unique version of transition towards 'power-as-one' to 'power-as-many'. In this process of establishing and shaping 'national will' in Turkish Political tradition, 'transition to the Multi-party system' is given a primary importance. It is generally accepted that the establishment of Republic and abolishment of sultanate is considered as the first important event on the national will conceptualization in Turkey and the transition to the multi-party system can be said to be the most determinant one. After the transition to multi-party period, one category of elites is added to the state elites who are asserted to be the representatives of nation and national will against the state elites and state tradition.⁶ This category of elites that is called political elites is belonged to the center-right tradition in Turkish democracy. In other words, this cleavage that has been occurred

⁶ Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman, 'Duble Faced State: Political Patronage and Consolidaiton of Democracy in Turkey' in *The Politics of Modern Turkey*, eds. Çarkoğlu-Hale, (Oxon-New York: Routledge 2008) 4.327.

with the multi-party system creates the center right tradition in Turkey.⁷ Arguing whether the JDP is center right or not, is not the main concern of this thesis. Although, the notion of national will in the JDP and JDP's regard toward nation can be pursued through the center-right tradition, this tradition's approach toward 'national will' is provided as the basis of the JDP. In the third chapter, after giving a background about the early republican period and transition to multi party term with its internal and external causes, in the first subtitle, the victory of the multi-party term and precursor of the center right tradition, the Democratic Party (DP) are going to be mentioned. The tradition about the national will concept that has begun with DP is asserted to be resumed in succeeding representatives of the center-right. Therefore, after the DP, in the second subtitle Justice Party (JP), which is established as the continuation of DP and its national will understanding, are going to be analyzed. Then in the third subtitle, center-right situation after 1980 coup has been mentioned. With special emphasis to Özal and mentioning the post-Özal term with Çiller and Yılmaz, center-rights' attitude toward national will after the 1980 has put under the subtitle of 'Center Right After 1980 Coup: Emergence of Motherland Party(MP) and True Path Party(TPP) as successors of DP'. The term comes after the post 1980 and is commentated in the forth subtitle. Here, the process of 28 February is stated as one of the preparatives of the emergence of JDP. The military intervention toward the Islamist movement and closure of the Islamist party after 28 February is thought to be effective on the rising of JDP as center party rather than the continuation of radical Islamist claims. Therefore, the discourse of JDP and Erdoğan thought to be owed much to this process. As a closure of this chapter, coalitions and failures after the 28 February process will be stated and thus the historical process of Turkish republic is going to be studied until the emergence of JDP.

⁷ There are some scholars who started center right tradition after the establishment of center left, such as Özman and Coşar (2013), However the relevant opinion accepts DP as center right. It can be seen in Tanıl Bora, Yüksel Taşkın, Nuray Mert, Hüseyin Çavuşoğlu etc.

What is aimed to be provided with these two chapters is groundwork for the national will discourse of Erdoğan. The origin of the term national will and the place it positions in the 20th century democracies are going to be stated. In the theoretical framework of the thesis, Lefort's theory on the 20th century democracies and his thoughts about the power position is going to be used. Then, the condition of Turkish democracy and the national will concept that inherited from this history is tried to be analyzed. Here, the transition of power first from Sultanate to republican elites, under the name of popular sovereignty, and then from republican elites to political elites -in other words the center right parties- will be explained. The center-right line is pursued until the emergence of JDP. Following this historical and theoretical background, in the fourth chapter, discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 13 years chairmen of JDP is tried to be analyzed. To this end, in the first subtitle, the conditions that have brought JDP and basic characteristics of the party are going to be touched upon. Supports and reactions the party has faced during its power will be mentioned. Second subtitle aims to decipher the national will discourse of Erdoğan. What is aimed to be found out can be summarized as follows: Erdoğan firstly identifies himself and JDP with the 'national will' and then he tries to occupy the empty space of democracy with the term of 'national will' as the will of JDP and its sympathizers. The discourse of national will, from beginning to end, serves this purpose with passing several phases. What is achieved at the end is thought to be the implicit assertion of '*people as us*', and '*power as us*'.

These headings are inferred from 11 years speeches of Erdoğan. From January 2003 to August 2014 (until the presidency of Erdoğan) all speeches of Erdoğan about all subjects have been scrutinized with implying the method of 'discourse analysis'. The method of discourse usually refers to a research approach in which language material such as talk or written texts is examined as an evidence of phenomena beyond the

individual person.⁸ Discourse search of this method involves the analysis of language data as evidence of social phenomena, theorizing language as communication, practice or selective construction drive from accrued social meaning.⁹ With also taking the recommendation of Fairclough into consideration, hidden connections and causes are aimed to be revealed through discourse analysis.¹⁰

In a preliminary stage of the discourse analysis of this thesis, dates of the subject of this and the speeches of Erdoğan have been collected. These speeches can be reached in three parts: The speeches from 2003 to 2009 have been taken from the library of JDP as an electronic copy, which are lined up categorically as speeches in the country, speeches in special days, and the international speeches. The speeches from 2009 to 2013 have been taken from Turkish National assembly as the monthly press of Erdoğan's speech¹¹. And the speeches from 2014 have been found from the website of JDP¹² which puts Erdoğan's speech on a daily basis. Indeed, not even one speech of Erdoğan is skipped out and all his speeches from 2003 to 2014 will be analyzed in detail. In accordance with the subject and objective of this thesis, these speeches have been scanned in order to reach the usage of national will. In other words, the discourse that is analyzed here is the Erdoğan's discourse of national will. In addition to the national will concept, all the mentioning of nation, people, democracy, ballot box, election, tutelage and society have been studied for finding out the general regard towards the national will concept. After collecting and scanning the speeches, the notion of national will in these speeches have tried to be categorized in terms of their implications. The common usage of national will and the points that separate one

⁸ Stephanie Taylor, *What is Discourse Analysis*, (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 2.

⁹ *Ibid*: 27

¹⁰ Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 8-9.

¹¹ These are the only available in the TBMM, unpublished raw data, (Ankara: Büyükharf Press)

¹² <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/kategori/genel-baskandan>

usage from another have taken into consideration while making this categorization. What are emerged as a result of this effort are the five headings, which are, to some extent, feed each other but to other extent exclude the implications of others. These headings are organized as the subtitles of the second heading of the fourth chapter and put as such; national will as authentic representation, national will as the result of elections, national will against the military tutelage, national will against separation of powers and national will against all kind of oppositions. These categories are designed to indicate a thematic path and they also reveal the chronological phases of the discourse. In this thesis together with detecting the breaks, changes, transitions within and among these categories, it is aimed to reveal the real meaning and function of the ‘national will’ term in the discourse of Erdoğan. What is tried to be achieved is answering how national will concept changes and in what ways it occupies the ‘empty place of power’. In other words, it is aimed to pursue the road which goes from ‘power as nobody’ to ‘power as us’.

CHAPTER II

SOVEREIGNTY FROM GOD TO THE PEOPLE: GENERAL/NATIONAL WILL¹³

This chapter of the thesis concentrates on lightening the meaning of the term of ‘national will’. The place where ‘national will’ embedded in the history and the theory is tried to be put forth. In order to achieve this aim, what precedes the understanding of national will and what comes after it will be mentioned.

It is accepted that, the concept of national will essentially expresses the understanding of popular sovereignty. In other words, sovereignty, and therefore power also, is thought to be taken from the God given authority of the body of king, and given to the people, the *people-as-one*. However, as Lefort, inspired from Tocqueville, indicates; power, with these theories, has been set free from arbitrariness of personal rule, a monarch for instance, and it appears to be belonged to no one, except for the people in abstract.¹⁴ The power in here is thought to be belonged to nobody. And ‘when the popular sovereignty, is assumed to manifest itself that the social interdependence breaks down and becomes a mere statistics. The number replaces the substance’¹⁵ This proposition is accepted as the basis of this thesis, and the term of *national will* is scrutinized in accordance with this theory. Indeed, it is asserted that the concept of

¹³ The subject of inquiry of this work is the concept of ‘*national will*’ and particular usage of this concept. It should firstly be noted that, while the usage of concept as ‘*national*’ will has prevalent in the theoretical domain, the founder theorist, J.J. Rousseau, named this theory as ‘*Genaral*’ will. Certainly these usages has shown differences in terms of the users, however since Rousseau use the ‘*genaral will*’ for the people in a given territory, for the people who would generate a whole, and since this whole corresponds to the nations of nation states in the contemporary world, these two usages would be mentioned interchangeable in this work.

¹⁴ Claud Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, Cambridge1988), 15.

¹⁵ Ibid19

national will with underlying the idea of sovereignty of people has been used in 20th century for filling the discharged place of power.

Accordingly, the place of power before it is emptied has aimed to be stated. Power positions from pre modern political systems to the 21st century are tried to be analyzed. This historical line supervenes on the Greek Helen and Roman political systems and their power positions. Within these times and these political systems, especially in Ancient Greece, we can observe the essence of the popular sovereignty ideal and people's right to rule can be seen. In these states, citizens reach significance with attendance to the public life and they rule themselves.¹⁶ However, as Cartledge mentions, power is the prior matter in ancient city states but ancient political theory is based on the sharing and the rule rather than the sovereignty and power.¹⁷ After this period, in the Roman Republicanism and Constitutionalism, power is aimed to be dispersed among institutions.¹⁸

At the end of Roman Empire, mainly after Christianity, power has accepted to be hold by Kings with deific authority, in other words *power* had begun to be *seen as one*. These understandings have begun to be challenged first by scholasticism then by contract theories and finally by Renaissance and Reformation during the 15th century to 18th century. It can be stated that this challenge is started the Enlightenment, with the occurrence of liberal understanding and individualism in addition to the development of capitalism. These developments have brought the understanding of *power as many*, which urges upon the separation of power, checks and balances system and challenges the divine right of kings. During the same century, this 'many',

¹⁶ Ellen Wood, *Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political Thought from Antiquity to Middle Ages*, (New York: Verso Press, 2008), 17.

¹⁷ Paul Cartledge, 'Greek Political Thought: the Historical Context' in *Greek and Roman Political Thought*, eds. Rowe and Schoffield, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 20.

¹⁸ See Philip Pettit, *Republicanism : A Theory of Freedom and Government*, (Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press), 1997.

as power holders, has been aggrandized with being part of political community or nation, and the theory of *general will* has been developed. This theory indicates *people as one*, - people as sovereign and people as power holders. This approach certainly has brought out its critics who mainly insist upon the plurality of societies and reject the understanding of homogeneity. After that, with the institutionalization of liberal apprehensions and with the 20th century's totalitarian experiences, another approach towards modern societies and power has been generated: *power as nobody*.

This thesis follows this path in order to understand both the meaning of the national will concept and its function in the political and social system in 20th century. In the first instance, the understanding of *power as one* will be mentioned with considering pre-modern times. Secondly, *power as many* will be stated with mentioning contract theories, renaissance reformation, capitalism and liberal thoughts. Thirdly, Rousseau's term 'general will' will be stated as the monist view of democracy and the understanding of *people as one*. Finally, the criticism of previous headings and the 'empty space of democracy'¹⁹ will be presented with the title of *power as nobody*.

2.1. POWER AS ONE: PRE-MODERN TERM OF DEMOCRACY

The proposition of 'power as one' basically indicates the 'God Power' which is the determinant characteristic of the medieval age and its feudal societies. Surely, this understanding has its own history and it has been a result of serious historical developments which can be said to be started with the imperial Rome. Two thinkers of the transition term from Republican Rome to Imperial Roma, Seneca and Epicletos, initiates the idea of deific authority of kings, and the idea of people as 'homo credits' - believers.²⁰ This understanding together with the consolidation and domination of Emperors firstly brings forth the ideas related to divine rights of kings as far as they

¹⁹ See Lefort 1986,279 and Lefort 1988,17

²⁰ Zafer Yılmaz, 'Helen Güneşi Batıyor Roma Güneşi Doğuyor' in Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler eds.Ağaoğulları, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları) & David Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Politiy Press 2006) 29.

are compatible with the perpetual law and the will of God. During and after a bit of these debates, contributions of scholastic movement of thought, theory of two swords, ideas of Augustinus and Thomas have affected the god power understanding. The heading contains this understanding which is named as power- as-one in this thesis.

2.1.1. Power as One

It can be said that, first ideas related to power, indeed ideas related to how to keep power under control and how to distribute it, have been seen in the Greek and Hellenic times. They might be considered as a useful starting point for the coming theories on this issue. On the other hand, the events in the Republican term of the Rome, which comes after the Hellenic term, prepare the position of power as power as one.

Civil wars, late in the republican Roma, have caused the emergence of Roman Empire. Here, the role of Senate which is remained from the Republican period has been protected but the domination of Emperors has apparently increased. In this regard, ideas related to deific authority and the number of people as believers has been raised. In addition, the rise of Christianity ‘shifted the source of authority and wisdom from the citizens to other earthy representatives. The Hellenic view of man as formed to live in a city was replaced by a preoccupation with how humans could live in communion with God.’²¹ These developments firstly bring forth the ideas related to divine rights of kings as far as they are compatible with the perpetual law and the will of God. And, in the imperial Rome, the main matter becomes the destiny and universality of the Rome and togetherness of them with the destiny of the world.²²

It might be said that it is St. Aquinas who puts or at least explains the philosophical basis of that term. He writes the most authoritative statement of the superiority of the

²¹ David Held, *Models of Democracy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press 2006),29.

²² Zafer Yılmaz, Helen Güneşi Batıyor Roma Güneşi Doğuyor’ in *Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler*, eds. Ağaoğulları, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2014) 190.

ecclesiastical power over secular.²³ With the views of Augustinus and his skepticism, everything loses its autonomy before God. From that point on, whole human kind is thought to be part of the union which is established by God, and the state has an important place in this union.²⁴ Power clearly seen as belongs to God. ‘This does not harm, according to Augustinus, the patriotism but reinforces it by making of it religious duty.’²⁵ This view mentions that, ‘since the state has no authority in the interpretation of religious doctrine, the Church can stand in judgment over rulers’.²⁶ Indeed, who constructs the philosophical basis of the term is the Augustinus. He first insists upon the State Of God and later thinkers establish their theories for supporting or criticizing those views.

These developments have gone hand in hand with the collapse of Roman Empire and the beginning of the medieval ages. What is witnessed in these terms, is economically feudality, politically the absence of central power and the arising of local powers and culturally the institutionalization of the Christianity.²⁷ With the collapse of the West Rome, political thinking has changed its perspective within the frame of Christianity. Thanks to these parameters, The Roman Church search ways for establishing its worldly authority in addition to its divine authority. It means that the Church desires to abolish the distinction between worldly power and the divine power and want to unite two swords in one hand, in the hand of Pope.²⁸ According to this doctrine which is mainly emphasized by Salisbury of John, God has two swords symbolizing worldly

²³ David Held, *Models of Democracy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press 2006),30.

²⁴ Ayhan Yalçinkaya, ‘İlahi Siyaset’ in *Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler*, eds. Ağaoğulları, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2014) 219.

²⁵ Ernest L.Fortin, ‘St.Augustin’ in *History of Political Philosophy*, eds. Strauss & Cropsey, Chicago: Rand McNally Company, 1972) 175.

²⁶ David Held, *Models of Democracy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press 2006),31.

²⁷ Ayhan Yalçinkaya, ‘İlahi Siyaset’ in *Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler*, eds. Ağaoğulları, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2014) 219.

²⁸ Ibid:248

and divine power. In other words, the source of both earthly and divine power is the God and the God has given both two swords to the Church. The church then gives the worldly swords to the order of the princes.²⁹ Therefore as John states, the king who do not obey the rules of Church become illegal and turns to be Tyrant. In this situation it would be legitimate to execution of the King.³⁰ Aquinas has challenged these views. Reading of Aristotle has given him a vision that separates the state and church with insisting the importance of man's nature. Aquinas than resume his idea with searching a balance between divine and secular and with rereading the Aristotle, and this paves the way for the natural law doctrine of liberal thinking.³¹ He concentrates more on secular and spiritual jurisdiction and has generated the idea which indicates state's submission to authority of Church.

2.1.2. Transition from the 'Power as one' to 'Power as many'

However Aquinas has not generated a theory which is adequate to chance of vision about the owner of the power. Main radical effort towards the matter of ecclesiastic and secular power came with the Marsilius of Padua and with the doctrine of scholasticism. 'The foundations of scholasticism have been first led with the rediscovery of the Aristotle's philosophical works which are alien to prevailing Augustinian conceptions of Christian political life.'³² The fundamental political commitment of the scholastic theorist is an ideal of political independence and republican self-government.³³ Their aim is to separate the divine and earthly powers and they underline the superiority of the earthly secular one. Important representatives

²⁹ Ibid:251

³⁰ Ibid:150-151

³¹ Zafer Yılmaz, 'Helen Güneşi Batıyor Roma Güneşi Doğuyor' in Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler eds. Ağaoğulları, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2014),218-254 and David Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Politiy Press 2006), 30-31.

³² Quentin Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought:Renaissance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998)49-50

³³ Ibid:53

of this doctrine have been stated as Marsilius and Bartolus by Quentin Skinner³⁴. This understanding might be placed as the most important effort for taking lowering power from God to ground. Here, the first examples of the sovereignty of people against the sovereignty of god, church and monarch have begun to appear.

An important critic towards god given kingship has come from Marsilius of Padua. In his *Defence of Pacis*, he accepts the need for coercive authority in order to maintain peace but he lies heavy on the people-demos on the legitimacy of the system. He states that the 'people's will is the key test of the proper interpretation of the ends to which the community is oriented and the only basis on which coercive power may be legitimately deployed'.³⁵ The characteristics of his Defender of Peace reacts the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Therefore, he is the exception of his time or it might be said that he is the precursor of the road. 'One can say that he takes the side of the people when the people are understood contradiction to the clergy and to nothing else.'³⁶ This will cause the radical turn in the understanding of power in the common generations.

The theory of popular sovereignty developed by Marsilius and Bartolus is designed to play a major role in shaping the most radical version of early modern constitutionalism. Already they are prepared to argue that sovereignty lies with the people that they only delegate and never alienate it and thus no legitimate ruler can

³⁴ Quentin Skinner Foundations of Modern Political Thought:Renaissance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998)40-53.

³⁵ David Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Politiy Press 2006),37.

³⁶ Leo Strauss, Marsilus of Padua' in History of Political Philosophy, eds. Strauss and Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally Company 1972)259.

ever enjoy a higher status than that of an official appointed by, and capable of being dismissed by his own subjects.³⁷

These doctrines pave way for the understating of independence of earthly power and take power from god and bring it to the earth. Then, this power is going to be comment to the people as sovereigns. These ideas has pursued by the Renaissance and Reformation which bring out ideas on human, society and religion. ‘The renaissance helps to revive the rational this-worldly, secular scientific spirit that has lain dormant through many centuries of medieval encasement.’³⁸ These developments cause the arising of the idea of man for displacing God and man becomes the center of the universe.³⁹

One of the most important centers of renaissance is Florence where Machiavelli has lived and has written on human and politics in the light of these developments. He might be classified as a bridge between the understanding of *power as one* and the understanding of *power as many*. He has taken a step towards a more secular understanding of power. Unlike the classical political thought before him he perceives politics as solely the complement of actions and states that politics has to be investigated the present current situation.⁴⁰ According to him power should rest in the prince who could and sometimes should be wise and crafty.⁴¹ His aim is to establish order and stability and thus according to him power should be reside in this kind of prince. With this argument he means to emphasize the ‘raison d’états’ which puts contingency of the state above anything else.

³⁷ Quentin Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought v.1. Renaissance, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1998),65.

³⁸ William Ebenstein, Introduction to Political Philosophy, (London: Kennikat Press, 1972), 101.

³⁹ Ibid:102

⁴⁰ Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, ‘Prensin İktidarından Devlete’ in Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler, eds. Ağaoğulları eds. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2014),324.

⁴¹ See Machiavelli, The Prince

This kind of strong and omnipotent power, declared in the writings of Machiavelli begins to be appeared by 15th and 16th century Europe. Together with scholastic effects, this brings the Reformation and the Renaissance and the conception of a sovereign state. Moreover, the matter of relation between empire and freedom has been sprung. This matter finds its answers with passing through the feudality of medieval age, debates of earthly and divine authority in 11th and 12th centuries and the Renaissance and the Reformation in 15th and 16th centuries. After these experiences in Europe, new ideas on legitimate authority regarding the natural rights and freedom of human have been matured and have brought new perspectives to legitimate authority and power.

2.2. POWER AS MANY: MODERN TERM OF DEMOCRACY AND ARISING OF INDIVIDUALITY AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

Power, or the legitimate authority, has been the matter of inquiry of the thinkers since the Antiquity. However the most radical stance, except the polis experience, can be said to reveal during the modern period. Significant events that have triggered these radical developments range from economy to society, politics to philosophy and positive science to new religious doctrines. Whatever the basis is, the result has been revolutionary. This modern term witnesses the arising of sovereignty of state and then, sovereignty of people. In this part, these developments will be stated.

After the period Machiavelli has lived, from 15th century to 18th century, the small and weak political units as Florence of Machiavelli incrementally absorbed by stronger political structures. These events give rise to establishment of two types of government in Europe; absolutist and constitutional monarchies. This development, together with peasant rebellions, and also the influence of renaissance culture and protestant reformation and religious strikes, forms a basis of new ideas about the form of the state and the government. The teachings of Calvin and Luther, ecclesiastics critics of the Catholic church initiate reformation and assert the idea of a person as individual who is able to make decision on his life. In addition, the idea of birthright and the precept of natural rights pave the way for liberalism. These are the signals of modern democratic thought.

It is stated that Machiavelli has aimed to separate the politics and religion. This aim has been checked by the protestant reformation which can be mentioned as one of the constrictive elements of the political thought of the modern period. It reveals the philosophical and political protestation towards the Church and the Papacy. This also, inevitably has affected the king's attitude towards Church. On the one hand, 'an important phenomenon of this period has been the rise in the feeling of a national unity in several countries.'⁴² On the other hand there has been a contest between the head of these nations as kings or monarch and the Church or the Papacy. As a result of this contestation and with the help of the Protestant Reformation, 'the king becomes the champion of the sovereignty and the independence of the new state [is] compelled to assert equal authoritative power which [can] be derived only from God.'⁴³ Here the power becomes to be belonged to the monarch and the subjects of the monarch become more distinct. Gettel explains this transition with its causes as follows:

If the king ruled by divine right and was responsible to God alone, he becomes independent of his subjects as he was of the pope or of other sovereigns. Unquestioned obedience could be demanded and revolution becomes a sin against god and as a political offence. The medieval mind coercive of universal church state with ultimate power in the spiritual head, by the sixteenth century emphasis shifted from World Empire to territorial state and from ecclesiastical to civil predominance⁴⁴

Along with these developments, state has begun to be put as the single supreme authority and this has brought its own emphasis of sovereignty. Jean Bodin, can be considered as one of the first thinkers who systematically explains this new conception of sovereignty. He mentions sovereignty in terms of state citizen relations, and sees sovereign power as the essential characteristic of the state and gives this

⁴² Gerald Runkle, A History of Western Political Theory, (New York Ronald Press Co. 1968) 159.

⁴³ Raymond.G.Gettel, History of political Thought, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1953)153.

⁴⁴ Ibid:154.

power to the king.⁴⁵ Contract theories and theorists, after Bodin, have the aim of explaining the legitimacy criteria's of the rising order. Thomas Hobbes, in the first place, emphasizes the malicious nature of the human and mentions the necessity of a powerful single authority, an absolute sovereign, to maintain security and peace. However, this sovereign is the representative of the people, it is established by the authority conferred by the people and the obedience to that sovereign is the result of consent which manifests itself in the contract. In *Leviathan* (1651) Hobbes states; 'A multitude of men, are made *One Person*, when they are by one man or one *Person Represented*.'⁴⁶ Through the sovereign, the plurality of voices and interests can become one will and to speak of a sovereign state assumes such a unity.⁴⁷ John Locke (1632-1704) who is accepted as the first philosopher who gathers consistently themes of political liberalism as an doctrine,⁴⁸ the rejects the need of an absolute sovereign to state the order, instead, he thinks that state should be limited with defense of the life liberty and property of individuals who enjoy natural rights.

These contract theories and theoreticians use concepts that provide basis for the coming theories. The Concepts of Natural Rights and the State of Nature, which are determinant in liberal understanding, bring philosophers to the idea of *social contract*. Although the meanings of the conceptualizations differ in terms of contract theoreticians, they generally imply the similar point. According to this theory, the state of nature is a situation that is no superior authority which can impose sanction on individuals. It might be a stateless society for some thinkers or might typify the limitless and arbitrary power. The natural law, on the other hand, corresponds to the universal moral laws of human beings that are based on wisdom. This law includes

⁴⁵ Ibid:183.

⁴⁶ Hobbes from: David Held, *Models of Democracy*, (Cambridg: Politiy Press 2006),61.

⁴⁷ David Held, *Models of Democracy*, (Cambridg: Politiy Press 2006),61

⁴⁸ Filiz Zabcı, Spinoza ve Locke:Siyasal Özgürleşmeden Bireysel Özgürlüğe, in *Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler* eds. Ağaoğulları, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2014)476.

normative rules which are valid for all people in all places and all times. To behave in accordance with natural laws means to behave in accordance with wisdom.⁴⁹ All contract theories- Hobbes, Locke and later Rousseau- base their theories on their conceptualizations on state of nature and they generate the contract by the reason of (possible) corruption in state of nature and to avoid the possible civil wars in the absence of common authority. This theory emphasizes the need for an authority for the reasons that diversify in terms of the contract theoreticians but what is common is the several faulty in the state of nature, or, for Rousseau, the conditions that occur because of the living state of nature. Rousseau's approach will be detailed below and it has to be stated that it differs from the other two theoreticians' approaches.

What have to be mentioned further are the effects of individualism which have been mainly derived from Locke's theory. He constructs his theory on human freedom and recommends a limited government for protecting this freedom. His emphases can be summarized in the motto that state freedom for life liberty and property. He brings the idea which states all governments should be limited and exist only by the consent of governed.⁵⁰ To establish such an order, he postulates the notion of popular sovereignty, majority rule and division of powers within the state, constitutional system and the representative system of parliamentary government.⁵¹ The 'popular' of popular sovereignty above, implies not only the collective rights of people but also the active personal agreement of individuals on giving their rights to the authority with keeping their right to rebel in themselves. Fundamentally, the concept of liberalism not only insists upon the question of who holds the political power it also insists more upon the limited political power. Nonetheless, liberal emphasis of the limiting political power brings several principles to realize this ideal. Some of these principles

⁴⁹ Ibid:485-486

⁵⁰ Robert A. Goldwin, 'John Locke' in in History of Political Philosophy, eds. Strauss & Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally Company, 1972),451.

⁵¹ Held,62-65.

are the constitutionalism, the separation of powers and the rule of law. Moreover, the principle of 'majority rule' has begun to be seen dangerous for the liberties of individual and has been criticized by some subsequent liberals.

However, the doctrines that are propounded from the contract theorist, such as the state of nature, natural law and people as individuals prepare the political theory of contract and on one level; they bring new perspectives to the understanding of state. In this state, people have rights come from their humanity and they are handled as their own, as an individual. And this seems to bring some new perspectives on limited power.

This matter of limited power or limiting power starts to appear as an important issue after the consolidation of monarch's power as a single authority. Whether they are the bases their legitimacy of pope or god, they pretend to be in the assertion being the only power holder. One of the suggestions related to limited power come from the French philosopher, Montesquieu. Like other liberal thinkers, he also thinks on the matter of liberty and concludes that in the law abiding moderate regimes liberty will certainly be better protected. Montesquieu details and popularizes the ideal of the separation of powers which has risen from the Locke's theory, and has been adopted by modern democracies. The main aim of this principle is to prevent holding of power by one. In his book 'The Spirit of Laws', Montesquieu proposes the usage of power by the separate organs of the legislative executive and the judiciary. Owing to this separation these bodies will check and balance each other and in that way, the abuse of the power will be ceased.⁵² On the other hand, Montesquieu's separation of powers not only refers the functional differentiation of governmental bodies but also considers the division between the social forces; monarch aristocracy and people as bourgeoisie in this time and context. Especially, the power of legislation has to be used in the

⁵² See Montesquieu, B. 1977 *The Spirit of Laws*, Cambridge University Press Cambridge

conciliation of aristocracy and bourgeoisie. It resembles the republican constitutionalism or in general the fear of accumulation of power in one section of society and the concern of this time is not to preserve stability but to prevent the rights of individuals.

In the eighteenth century, the purpose of this doctrine was to strength the popular element of government at the expense of the king. In the nineteenth century Montesquieu's formula was used by conservatives to keep the power of the monarch intact against demands for full democratic and popular government.⁵³ Montesquieu, above all, is one of the representatives of the enlightenment philosophy. His aim is to enlighten the people. This ideal and understating also affects the philosopher of the 'General will'. As a basis of the general will theory, the idea of enlightenment should be mentioned.

The period that also includes the Montesquieu, has named as enlightenment and also it has significant effects on the understating of sovereignty and power. The allegory of enlightenment implies the emancipation from old ideational structures and dogmas and carries people to light of the reality.⁵⁴ Surely there are significant political reflections of this understating. Philosophers of enlightenment, adopt the principle of 'political determinism' which states that political authority is responsible for the freedom or virtue of the people. This authority in their time is thought to be violating the rights and freedoms of people and led them to rethink about traditional elements of the political authority. These efforts are turned to be the rejection of 'divine right of kings' and also necessitates taking God out of the political domain and finding a new source of legitimacy for power. This new source of legitimacy has not put as individual, at least at the beginning, but the concept of people has been rediscovered.

⁵³ Ebenstein,147.

⁵⁴ Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, 'Aydınlanma: Düşünceler Yumağı' in Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler, eds. Ağaoğulları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014),517-518.

The concept of public/people has begun to be used by the philosophers of enlightenment, who absolutely put the explicit or implicit consent of people at the basis of the political legitimacy and use the notion of *sovereignty of people*. The idea of supremacy of people above other settled institutions, brings forth the new democracy understanding which implies that the whole society and politics arise from the one integrated collectivity; the people, and politics has to be designed for the sake of realizing their collective will . These ideas give way to Rousseau who not only drives state from people but also consubstantiates them together.

2.3. PEOPLE AS ONE: GENERAL WILL AS RADICAL UNDERSTANDING OF POWER AND SOVEREIGNTY

The concept of *General Will* as an ideal and as a whole theory has been developed by Jean Jack Rousseau during time of the Enlightenment and the phase that witnesses the appearance of bourgeois society. To some extent, he seems to be effected by his contemporaries; the philosophers of enlightenment, from another angle, he formulates his theories with the aim of criticizing what is constituted by the enlightenment, indeed, the rise of bourgeois society and its political provision. This concept is highly related to the idea of sovereignty of people, but in this theory, the characteristics of that people and their common attitudes become prominent.

The general will concept of Rousseau differs from the ideas that have been generated on the legitimate authority thus far, and to a great extent, it differs from the understanding of national will which is the research subject of this work. Rousseau's theory, therefore, is going to be used as the inspirer of the term of *national will* or at least as a compulsive theoretical source or starting point.

The concept of *general will* is mainly known by J.J. Rousseau. However, the concept has also been used by Malebranche (1715), Montesquieu (1755) and Diderot (1784)

before him.⁵⁵ While Malebranche uses this term as the divine will in a theological sense, Montesquieu uses the term in its political meaning. Diderot, on the other hand, attributes the *general will* to whole humanity and states that it based on law and is the standard of wisdom. In his article on *Natural Law*, he points out that ‘Private wills are suspected, they may be either good or bad. But the general will is always good. It has never beguiled and will never mislead.’⁵⁶

J.J. Rousseau uses this concept in a secular way as Montesquieu and he seems to be affected from Diderot’s distinction between particular and general will. He has used the term in the first instance, in his article called ‘Morale et Politique’ or with its name when it is pressed, *Discours sur L’economie Politique* which is written for the ‘Encyclopedie’⁵⁷. However Rousseau’s main implementations on *general will* arise in his *Social Contract* in 1762. In this work, ‘Rousseau calls the guiding principle of sovereign body, established by the social contract, general will’⁵⁸. For comprehending the implications of the general will fully, we have to analyze the Rousseau’s general theory.

Rousseau mainly writes about the problematic of the political society. The question about the best government has led him to ask about the qualifications of a government that can generate the best community/people. So the purpose of achieving the sources of this good society and politics of Rousseau first puts the allegory of state of nature as Locke and Hobbes before him, but this time the state of nature has mentioned as the irrevocable paradise. The phases that humanity experiences through the socialization cause deterioration in this paradise and people incrementally leave this state of nature.

⁵⁵ Orhan Özgüç, J.J.Rousseau’da Genel İrade Kavramı in <http://www.flisdergisi.com/sayi14/1-25>.

⁵⁶ Denis Diderot, *Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992), 19-20.

⁵⁷ Eynyclopedia is the work edited by Diderot and D’Alembert which means the Systematic Dictionary of Sciences, Arts and Crafts.

⁵⁸ Philip Gourevitch, introduction to the Rousseau Social Contract and Later Writings, eds. Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xx.

Rousseau categories those phases in four stages. However, together with passing through several stages these paradise is dissolved and with the economic inequalities, hierarchies, private property, and division of people as rich and poor, the state of war has occurred as in Hobbes' state of nature. But this time, conditions of war is the result of the socialization of people not from the nature itself. This state of war is irreversible and certainly makes people to make a contract for protecting themselves from each other.⁵⁹ This contract firstly has been made in accordance with the interests of the property owners and riches and reveals, what Rousseau calls the moral and political inequality. The poor becomes the slave before the political power of the wealthy. This is the phase where inequality gains a political dimension with the fact that, law takes the place of direct violence. Here social slave man takes the place of natural free man.⁶⁰ As a result these deteriorations of the state of nature and occurrence of bourgeois society of inequalities strengthen the need for a real contract. Rousseau then begins to state the favorable social contract.

In social contract, Rousseau aims to designate the legal condition of living of society.⁶¹ This legal condition for him is the contract through which all members voluntarily give their right themselves entirely to the whole community: since each governs himself entirely, the condition is equal for all, and since the condition is equal for all, no one has any interest in making it burdensome to the rest.⁶² Main intention of the people, who agree on social contract, for Rousseau, is to establish an order where

⁵⁹ See Rousseau, *A Discourse Upon the Origin and the Foundation of the Inequality among Mankind*, Part 2, Section1

⁶⁰ Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, 'Jean Jack Rousseau: Halk Kendini Yaratıyor' in *Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler*, eds Ağaoğulları eds, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 579.

⁶¹ Rousseau's conceptualization of general will has not implied the whole human being instead he refers to the peoples/communities who would generate a whole. To that extend Rousseau did not use the term general in the cosmopolitan meaning but political society in the primary place.

⁶² Jean Jack Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Later Writings*, eds. Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004), 50.

they can maintain their freedom and to avoid struggles. And the only way to realize this intention is submitting to the '*general will*'. With doing this they will continue to govern themselves. According to him, social contract can be reduced to the following terms: 'Each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole'⁶³ With the contract, the moral and collective body arises as a public entity with its own will. Moreover, with this, the enlightenment ideal of sovereignty of the people will be realized however in its own communitarian and equalitarian way. Rousseau explains the conditions for practicing such a status in a very detailed way. Firstly 'everyone who wants to be part of the society participates the contract and this is realized with the unanimity. It is in this respect, a product of individual wills however it is not the sum of individual wills. It has its own personality and will- the general will-. Secondly, social contract can also be extinguished through the will of people. But it would not be realized according to him since contract has been made for everyone, and for the sake of common good. Thirdly, one can individually harm the contract with perusing their personal interests in that situation they will lose their citizenship and become an enemy.'⁶⁴ The sovereign, on the other hand, acts in order to the general will therefore it is not possible for sovereign to harm the contract. This contract will continue by the tacit consent of succeeding generations.'⁶⁵ The aim of the social contract according to Rousseau is to create social free man who perceives himself as an inseparable part of the society, thus he is properly a citizen.'⁶⁶ A society that is composed of these citizens quintessentially is rigged with a specific goal: common good. And for properly realizing this goal of common good, it needs an

⁶³ Ibid:50.

⁶⁴ Ağaoğulları, 582.

⁶⁵ Herbert Tingsten, The Problem of Democracy , (New York: Bedminster Press 1965), 51.

⁶⁶ Ağaoğulları, 583.

idiocratic will; the general will.⁶⁷ As seen from here, social contract is strictly tied to the concept of general will. Through this contract, state has been established and the only legitimate subject to direct the forces of this state is the *general will*. In social contract Rousseau states that;

So long as several man united consider themselves as a single body, they have but a single will, which is concerned with their common preservation and the general welfare. Then all of the springs of the State are vigorous and simple, its maxims are clear and perspicuous, it has no confused, contradictory interests, the common good is everywhere, fully evident and requires only good sense to be perceived.⁶⁸

Just as the contract, general will also results from individuals but it exceeds these individuals and their sum. As stated above, it is the will of common good and its aim is the interest of collectivity. It is indeed mainly related to the concept of citizenry which's content is stated above, it is the will of the citizens or the public, as opposed to the will of an individual or particular wills. While the person has the personal will, the will of citizen is bounded with the will of whole. Then when it comes the people as collectivity of citizens, their total will should become the general will.

The important point related to the matter of majority and minority begins here. According to Rousseau, the general will locates itself in the voting of its members as citizens. In other words, 'members of society can be said to represent society when they vote'⁶⁹. Although Rousseau rejects the idea of general will as the sum of particular wills and defends the unanimity in voting, he finds the votes of majority sufficient. However, this point should not cause any misunderstandings. Rousseau accepts the vote of majority but before this acceptance he puts his provisions for working of this system: 'firstly people have to be rigged with proper and adequate information. Secondly, individuals have to vote as a citizen and without impressing by

⁶⁷ Ibid:583

⁶⁸ Rousseau, 121.

⁶⁹ Herbert Tingsten, *The Problem of Democracy*, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1965), 51.

private interests. Therefore associations, parties organizations which lead people to private interest should not be exist.’⁷⁰ As long as these conditions are being realized, the unanimity can be reached or the majority of votes will be on the same direction of the common good. This proposition implies that ‘minority forthwith joins the majority: it simply acknowledges its former error.’⁷¹ In the case of deception of people and contras of common good, not only the majority vote but even the unanimity will not be sufficient to be considered as general will. In the true state of Rousseau, general will belongs to people with full of consciousness of being part of the citizens community and aiming the common good. This society should be the one whose members form an indissoluble entity and do not possess any other will, and this leads to the community of man and the general welfare. It should also be composed of ‘members who are not only be equal but will be alike in all respects that any one at all can be considered to represent the general will’⁷² Related to this idea, and in this situation, to want something against the general will be abnormality and Rousseau suggests that forcing people to act in accordance with general will force them to be free.

According to Bertram we have at least two apparently contradictory conceptions of ‘general will’: the general will as decision and the general will as a transcendent standard or principle.⁷³ The former meaning implies the consensus of citizens on the common good which would also be good for each member one by one. It is indeed the common interest of the members of particular political community and would be survived within the properly constituted sovereign assembly, in which people are determining where common good lies. As Bertram states, ‘Where the democratic

⁷⁰ Ağaoğulları:585

⁷¹ Tingsten,52.

⁷² Ibid,52.

⁷³ Christopher Bertram, Routledge philosophy guidebook to Rousseau and The social contract, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 98

mechanism functions properly then the state is governed according to general will, but where the process misfires and common good is not pursued, this does not realized'⁷⁴In this respect, general will comes as a result of citizen's decisions with regarding to common interest. It is indeed the collective decision of people. The latter meaning, on the other hand, implies that general will is a superior guide which expresses values and laws that are defining common good and justice. It is the sole source of justice and it sublimates the souls and emotions of people. Rousseau sees it as an infallible and a pedestal condition. As he states in the Social Contract, that, general will cannot be transferred -While power can be transferred, general will cannot- General will by its nature tends to equality-While particular will, by its nature, tends to partiality- Only a general will can form a law- If the will is not general but particular, it can only form a decree but cannot form a law.-⁷⁵ In fact, on the basis of social and political theory of Rousseau, there is general will which is composed of will of all society but is not the articulation of particular wills. It has a more supreme and abstruse meaning. It comprises the request and the advantage of all society. Indeed, as opposed by Levine, this society is not supra-individual entity or a whole community borne by a community constituted by individuals, virtually, wills, as Rousseau understands them, are not distinguished by their bearers but by their objects or more precisely, the interests towards which they aim, *General Will* aims general interest.⁷⁶Rousseau asserts that general will is always upright and always tends to be a public utility. However, this does not mean that people's deliberations are always equally upright. People might be caused to be mistaken even they cannot be corrupted. This occurs when will of all, that is to say articulation of particular wills, obstruct the emergence of general will by forming fractions and give rise to the votes of

⁷⁴ Ibid,98.

⁷⁵ Rousseau, 57-58-59

⁷⁶ Andrew Levine, *The General Will- Rousseau, Marx, Communism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),19.

associations instead of voters. The worse scenario for Rousseau is the growth of one of these associations and surpassing the others. In that case, the result is no longer a sum of small differences but it will be one single difference, than there will no longer be a general will and opinion that prevailing nothing but a private opinion. In this situation, the only way to express general will is to increase the number of these associations and prevent inequality, but of course the most preferable situation is having no partial society in the state and every citizen states only his opinion.⁷⁷

From the argument above, it is understood that general will is not the sum of particular wills of citizens, but what makes general will general is not the majority of votes but the common good and collective efficacy. In other words, these two meanings, per se, are not contradicting at all. Rousseau aims to indicate that; general will would always right, independent of whether its agents, citizens/people, misidentify what concludes their good. If they misinformed or reasoned badly they may want contrary to their best interests. They may not achieve the infallible general will. What people want and what they will might not be always the same. In the situation where people are misidentified, they have to be helped in accordance with the common good and general will. Rousseau states this as one of the most important points of his contract theory and general will understanding as follows:

By itself people always wills but by itself it does not always see it. The general will is always upright but the judgment it guides it is not always enlightened. It must be made to see objects as they are sometimes as they should appear to it shown the good path which it is seeking, secured against seduction by particular wills, bring together places and times within its purview, weigh the appeal of present perceptible the advantages against the danger of remote and hidden evils.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Rousseau 2004:59-60

⁷⁸ Ibid:68

That is to say, general will is not reached by simply assembling the maximal demands of individuals but rather it is reached through a rational consideration of how those interests may be furthered and how common good can be ensured. What can be inferred from all that is that, the general will in Rousseau's terms both indicates an ideal and executable principle. In Rousseau's terms, both the process of forming sovereign authority and the aim of this process named as general will. And it, in its essence, serves the ideal of people governed by the will of them.

All in all, the concept of general will indicates certain distinct points even if it is found contradictory by some. General will is the will of collective body that arises with the contract. This body is called sovereign by Rousseau and it is considered as the subject in itself and the general will is the will of this subject. The most important point about the general can be its object. This object is common good or in other words, it is the general interest. The general will here is the collective decision of people on the common good. The things that are contrary to common good cannot be considered as the product of general will even they are decided by the collective body. According to Rousseau people, as a whole, never aim to do such things against their common interests anyway.

The general will constitutes a basis of sovereignty in society. It arises from the whole society and it reflects the common preservation and general welfare. What makes it general is not the plurality of votes but the principle of common good. Social contract and state in consequence of it are based upon the general will. Sovereignty exists only when laws are made by the people and in accordance with the common interest of them, pursuant to the general will. By general will, people govern themselves and it is the only way that can liberate them. These ideals are thought to be applicable to small scaled societies in terms of population and territory. 'He hopes to defend the idea of assembly politics where the people can readily meet together and where each citizen

can know the rest.’⁷⁹ Moreover it should be a society where people are contented with the amount of property they need. He desires to bring forth a moral and ethical equality. Because it is in any case a desire of society without disagreements and it is open to totalitarian applications.

Beyond the totalitarian interpretations, Rousseau’s theory puts the principle which is included in contemporary constitutions. This principle declares that ‘sovereignty belongs to the nation’. This motto surely cannot be handled as the summary of the general will theory but, it might be argued if it constitutes the core of general will theory. Henceforth, other approaches to the sovereignty and power will be stated which might also be read as the critics of the sovereignty of people or the concept of general/national will.

2.4. POWER AS NOBODY: EMPTY SPACE OF TWENTIEETH CENTURY DEMOCRACY

2.4.1. Power in Twentieth Century Democracies

Taking the sovereign rights and power from God and bringing them to the people has constituted a very important step in the formation of contemporary democracies. During these ages, liberal concerns incrementally have become institutionalized surely with the great contribution of the French and American revolutions.

The enlightenment ideal of sovereignty of people and its concise form in the Rousseau’s theory impacts on the American and French revolutions. However with revolutions, this understanding of popular sovereignty has experienced transitions with the effect of individualism of liberal thinking and the rise of bourgeoisie. Effects and –problematic- combination of the two generate the contemporary democracies. Indeed, liberal individualistic ideas and ideals in addition to the notion of *sovereignty of people*, has given rise to American and French revolutions. In company with these

⁷⁹ Held,44.

revolutions, ideas of eighteenth century have been put on paper in concise form for the first time and prepare ground for the doctrines of the nineteenth century: for conservatism, liberalism and socialism.⁸⁰ After these revolutions a new kind of government had been established. These governments might be said to be the precursor of what is called *liberal democracy* today. What is institutionalized in that time has been the representative system, doctrine of state of law, separation of powers and constitutionalism.

The French Revolution has been affected by the enlightenment philosophers and mainly by Rousseau. The constitution which is written after the revolution, establishes the representative system of democracy. Intellectual background of American Revolution, on the other hand, is based on two important writings: Common Sense of Thomas Paine and The Federalists of the James Madison. However, what frames the constitution of America is 'The Federalist' published by Madison and Hamilton. Madison has been affected from Hobbes Locke and Montesquieu on rights of individuals and balance of powers but he puts the president in the place of Montesquieu's constitutional monarch. According to O'kane, the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu do not constitute a theory of democracy while Madison's does. He is distinctive because he has made the discovery about the importance of diversity which also undermines the monistic approaches to society and politics. He criticizes the idea of non-dissenting consensus and recommends the republic instead of direct democracy.⁸¹ His writings are more likely to explain emerging democracies. Madison remarks the possible problems of these new systems. He takes attention to the fact which threatens liberty that may come from the fractions and majority. Madison on the first instance puts the serious contradiction against the *civic virtue* understanding

⁸⁰ Tingsten,3.

⁸¹ Rosemary H.T. O'Kane, , Paths to Democracy: Revolution and Totalitarianism, (New York: Routledge Press, 2004), 48-49.

of the general will idea. According to him, civic virtue can only be a mask of the people's self-interest. Unequal distribution of property has always caused the fraction in society and task of politics is to overcome the possible conflicts of these fractions. According to him, the most important problem of government and society is the violence of fractions. He recommends the representative principles in extending republic covering a large territory and containing large population, since, according to him, diversity creates political fragmentation and this will prevent an excessive accumulation of power. If a fraction is not large enough to form a majority, the relief for Madison is supplied by the republican principle which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.⁸² However, when a fraction forms a majority against the public good, the danger is bigger for him. To prevent such a situation; 'Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression'⁸³ It is seen that effectiveness of people indeed the majority aimed to be limited. Actually, Madison proposes two solutions for protecting the rights of minority from a possible danger of majority: 'the one which he rejects, is the creation of general will, the other which he advocates, is by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens.'⁸⁴ It is apparently a stance against the comprehension of people-as-one.

A century later, J.S. Mill (1806-1873) in England, puts the defense of the democratic system with recommending remedies for its ills. In this phase of the democracy debate, the matter becomes the problems that may be generated from the representative system and specifically possible intervention of this system to the rights

⁸² James Madison, *Federalist Papers*, eds. Goldman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 51.

⁸³ *Ibid*:52

⁸⁴ O'kane, 49-50.

of individuals. During the growing industrial nation and in the newly formed social classes of 19th century, Mills emphasizes free development of the individuality and sees democratic politics as the prime mechanism of moral self-development of individual. To ensure these aims, according to Mill, representative government- with the system of proportional representation and proportional voting- is essential on condition that it is limited. To that extent he warns us against what he names as 'despotic use of power'. When considered from this point of view, the importance and the necessity of representative government and the dangers related to it, Mill criticizes the monist approaches of national will, general will or will of the people understanding in democracy, which, for him, cause the misunderstanding of uniformity of representatives and the represented. He states;

It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised, and the "self-government" spoken of, is not the government of each by him, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this, as against any other abuse of power.⁸⁵

In this quotation Mill states his apprehension about the representative system and the self-government ideal. He also points out the problem of these systems related to limiting the power of majority groups over the individual. He names this possibility as '*Tyranny of Majority*' -borrowed from de Tocqueville- and says that protection against tyranny of magistrate will not be sufficient, in addition to the precautions against them, the precaution against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; and against the prevent the formation, of any

⁸⁵ John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* Publishing of (Penslyvania: Penslyvania State University, 1998), 6.

individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.⁸⁶

The thinker who puts forward the concept of *tyranny of majority* first however is not Mill but Alexis de Tocqueville in his *Democracy in America*. The main basis of his great works, *Democracy in America* and *L'Ancienne Regime et la Revolution en France*, is the distinction between liberty and democracy. To understand what has happened both in France and in American Revolutions and their consequences he approves to use democracy in the classical sense as simply the rule of the majority.⁸⁷ While to some extent, he seems to be agreed on to this system, but he is also critical about the rule of the majority: 'I regard as impious and detestable this maxim that in matters of government the majority of a people has the right to do anything, and yet I consider that the will of the majority is the origin of all powers.'⁸⁸

According to Tocqueville just as an individual and a minority, a majority will have a potential of misusing the unlimited power. Therefore, this power has to be limited by some countervailing forces. The voting of individuals will not always mean that they are in the rule. Instead it might create the atmosphere where the will of majority oppresses the views and the wills of the minority.

So what is a majority taken as a whole, if not an individual who has opinions and, most often, interests contrary to another individual called the minority. Now, if you admit that an individual vested with omnipotence can abuse it against his adversaries, why would you not admit the same thing for the majority? Have men, by gathering together, changed character? By becoming stronger, have they become more patient in the face of obstacles? As for me, I cannot believe it; and

⁸⁶ Mill, 7.

⁸⁷ Bernard Crick, *Democracy A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 62.

⁸⁸ Alexis deTocqueville, *Democracy in America*, eds. Nola eds, (Indiana: Liberty Fund, Inc, 2009), v1.410.

the power to do everything that I refuse to any one of my fellows, I will never grant to several.⁸⁹

With this annotation, Tocqueville's critics on power vested directly to the majority by the representative system can be seen. Regular elections, also, cannot prevent such a tyranny instead; they are able to mask it. This is the real danger to individualism. As Nolan stated;

Tyranny of the majority, the tyranny of the electoral voice described in the first Democracy, is already the triumph of individualism, that is to say the triumph of man without individuality and personality. The moment of election forces the abandonment of what is specific and particular to the individual and forces him for a moment to become a unit, or, if you want, an abstraction (one man one voice). In this way, the new form of despotism is entirely compatible with election. Men emerge from servitude to elect their tyrants and return there immediately after.⁹⁰

The quotation below shows through the idea of tyranny of majority and the signals of the possible despotic character of the representative democracies that have begun to be seen by thinkers. This idea is also developed by several other scholars with enhancing it. The danger of the tyranny of the majority, asserted for instance, is not only the threat for the individual liberty by the way of legal and political tyranny of majority but may also, for the critics, mental and social tyranny of majority. These threats might be the massification of culture and morals, a risk of demagoguery and the mask of oppressive rule. According to Tocqueville and other critics, cultural denigration merges with an informal exercise of the tyranny of the majority wherein by a kind of thought control, people with refined sensitivities will be ignored or socially ostracized.⁹¹ For countervailing those undesirable outcomes of rule of the many, or people in Tocqueville's term, some precautions are needed such as pluralization of the society with independent associations, decentralization of aspects

⁸⁹ Ibid:411

⁹⁰ Eduardo Nolla, 'Editors Introduction' in *Democracy in America*, eds Nola, (Indiana: Liberty Fund, Inc, 2009)v.1. cxxvii.

⁹¹ Frank Cunningham, *Theories of Democracy*, (Toronto: Routledge Press 2001), 17.

of government and liberal values that protect individual before state. Moreover democracy has to be functioned with laws, in other words, the rule of law is thought to be a remedy for the tyranny of majority.

By the 20th century, when we look at Tocqueville's apprehensions, Claude Lefort, aims to explain how democracy is susceptible to demagoguery. As Tocqueville notes, the majority in democracy is like a monarch or a ruling aristocracy. The difference is that, whereas the latter are, or are comprised of, actual identifiable people, the majority is a shifting mass that is taken to represent the people as a whole. But the people are even more of an abstraction than the majority.⁹² Lefort calls it as the 'empty place of democracy'⁹³ and suggests that the notion of the people is contactless and unstable. It is without content because it is not supposed to be coextensive with any specific individuals not even the majority at any one time. Thereby, elected politicians in a democracy typically announce that the people speak when electing them.⁹⁴ This situation gives elected politicians a chance for saying that they embody the popular will. And thanks to this, authoritarian and oppressive policies can be justified by the notion of 'will of the people'. In the next part, Lefort's ideas on this subject will briefly be handled.

2.4.2. Claude Lefort: Empty Space of Democracy and Power-as-Nobody

Insofar, the locus of power from antiquity to modern democracies and societies has tried to be stated. This power has been given to people, in its limited but real sense, during the city states-polis of the ancient times. After these experiences, history of politics has not allowed the realization of that kind of the sovereignty of people. Until the 20th century, locus of the power has been filled by a deific king, then by absolute

⁹² Ibid:19

⁹³ Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 16-17.

⁹⁴ Cunningham, 20.

monarch, and finally asserted to be filled by the people as sovereign and with their will. By the 20th century, however, the abstractedness of this sovereignty has begun to be seen by thinkers and the empty place of power has been signaled.

One of the most explanatory theories in 20th century society and democracy has been developed by French philosopher Claude Lefort. He draws attention to the change in the sphere of power in modern systems. As stated above, in modern representative democracies, power cannot be said to be held by the people, at least in its concrete sense. Power, likewise, has already been taken from the God and monarch. If so, where does power reside in modern democracies? Lefort, who has been inspired from Tocqueville, answers this question as such; ‘power, which had been set free from the arbitrariness of personal rule and appears to belong to no one except to the people in the abstract.’⁹⁵

Lefort finds this answer while asking other questions about the democratic system of the time. By means of bearing witness of the rise of totalitarianism both in communist and fascist variant, he looked for answers to the question of ‘how democracies turned to be the totalitarian systems’, and he reexamined the democracy in his time. According to him, the reason behind the ‘is political mutation; from a mutation of symbolic order, and the change in the status of power is its clearest expression’⁹⁶. Lefort thinks that democracy signals a mutation of the symbolic order with the new position of power.⁹⁷ For a better explanation for this mutation he mentions the old power positions.

The singularity of democracy only becomes fully apparent if we recall the nature of the monarchical system of the Ancient Regime... Within the framework of monarchy, gave the prince sovereign power within the boundaries of a territory

⁹⁵Lefort,15

⁹⁶ Lefort ,13.

⁹⁷ Ibid,16.

and made him both secular agency and representative of god first separation of state and civil society occurred...Power was embedded in the prince and it therefore gave society a body.⁹⁸

On the other hand, in democracies Lefort sees the power as empty place which's exercise is subjected to procedures, and it cannot be occupied and represented. What is visible is the only the mechanism of exercising power and the one who holds political authority.⁹⁹ It becomes symbolic and certainly it does not mean that it is held by people as sovereigns. Lefort asserts that the figure of power disappears in its materiality and substantiality and the democratic society institutes a society without body.¹⁰⁰ The doctrine of sovereignty of nation/popular sovereignty and especially the belief of realizing this doctrine with elections makes things worse according to Lefort. He states as follows:

It is a very moment when popular sovereignty is assumed to manifest itself when the people is assumed to actualize itself by expressing its will, that social interdependence break down and that the citizen is abstracted from all the networks in which his social life develops and become a mere statistics. Number replaces substance.¹⁰¹

Lefort thinks that, in these democracies, 'the legitimacy of power is based on the people, but image of popular sovereignty is linked to the image of an empty place, impossible to occupy, such that those who exercise public can never claim to appropriate it'¹⁰². Therefore, it is neither meaningful to talk about popular sovereignty nor 'will of these people' and 'nation'. The reason of this fact is that; the users of this power also do not and cannot reflect the sovereignty of people. In this sense, according to Lefort, democracy discharges the place of power and makes it the power

⁹⁸ Ibid: 16-17

⁹⁹ Ibid,17.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid,18.

¹⁰¹ Ibid,19.

¹⁰² Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986)279.

of nobody. In this situation, power holders are seen as mere individuals who are seen as forming a faction at the service of private interest. This catted up the civil society.¹⁰³

It is clear that Lefort indicates the emptiness of the locus of power and underlines that popular sovereignty can only be a mask of this emptiness because of the abstraction of the concepts of 'popular' or 'nation'. So how does he attach this proposition with the totalitarianism? He makes this association with the 'discourse' which can fill this empty space and shapes the abstract masses. Since 'neither the state nor the nation represents substantial entities, their representativeness in itself depend upon a political discourse and always bound up with ideological debate',¹⁰⁴In a way Lefort suggests that this system permits totalitarianism mainly because of the empty space of the representative democratic systems of the day. This emptiness is able to be filled by the power which makes no reference to anything beyond the social and makes a division between inside and outside of social¹⁰⁵ therefore the limits of this social can easily be determined by the discourse of politicians. In this point, Lefort puts the role of the party or the leader who takes the system to totalitarian direction. If with this situation of emptiness, the image of the people is actualized, if a party claims to identify with it and to appropriate power under the cover of this identification, all the uncertainty and distinctions in modern democracies would be resolved for the sake of totalitarian understanding.¹⁰⁶

As a matter of fact, Lefort sees the road between democracy and totalitarianism. He first states that power becomes an empty place in democracy and implies nobody, as far as the party, a leader or a class asserts that it is capable of concentration power in

¹⁰³ Claud Lefort , *The Political Forms of Modern Society*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 279

¹⁰⁴ Claud Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, Cambridge1988),18.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*:17

¹⁰⁶ Claud Lefort , *The Political Forms of Modern Society*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 280.

itself. In that situation, Lefort thinks that power ceased to designate and empty place.¹⁰⁷ Here, the signs of division between the state and the society and signs of social division are abolished. The ultimate criterion of law and knowledge which cannot be reached by the power has been disappeared.¹⁰⁸ Power and society identifies and the image of people-as-one appears. The people-as-one should be represented by a great other; the power-as-one.¹⁰⁹ It is seen that the empty space in the 20th century democracy open to be filled by the old traditional power patterns. However, the time and society have changed and the results have also been different.

What is also striking in this theory that the indication of Lefort on the notion of enemy in these systems. Through refilling the place of power, a new body is aimed to be created with an abstract entity. For strengthening this metaphor of the body, the metaphor of the other is necessary: these are the enemies and the alien elements. The ‘Other’ is the representative of the forces that has driven from the old society-before them. In fact, as Lefort states, ‘constitution of people as one requires the incessant production of enemies. Against these elements, the leader appears as the one who merged with people, (the party in communist variant) and at the same time occupy the position of master heir, who sees and names everything, or that of the organizer, the activist the mobiliser of the mass.¹¹⁰ It is a prevalent agent of the process of identification between power and people, and of the process of homogenization of the social field.¹¹¹ ‘The political agent is dissolved in an “us” that speaks, hears, and reads reality through him, thus identifying himself with party, the body of people and at the

¹⁰⁷ Ibid:285

¹⁰⁸ Ibid:286

¹⁰⁹ Ibid:287

¹¹⁰ Ibid:288

¹¹¹ Ibid:289

same time representing himself through the same identification as the head of that body',¹¹²

In essence, Lefort underlines the importance of analyzing the disentangling sphere of power for being able to comprehend modern democracies and their open door to the totalitarian usages. By doing this analysis, he seeks to find and show the shaky condition of the ideal of 'popular sovereignty' with emphasizing the understanding of power as nobody. We can find some characteristics of this shaky condition as follows:

Power appears as an empty place and those who exercise it mere mortals who occupy it only temporarily or who could install themselves in it only by force or cunning. There is no law that can be fixed, whose articles cannot be contested, and whose foundations are not susceptible of being called into question. There is no representation of center and of the contours of society: unity cannot efface social division. Democracy inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable society, uncontrollable society in which the people said to be sovereign, of course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent.¹¹³

What is faced in the 20th century democracies is the empty space of power but together with the threat of filling this space with the totalitarian or authoritarian purposes, or at least purposes which are against the spirit of the popular sovereignty ideal. Lefort states that it does not always mean this unavoidable emptiness leads societies to oppression but, it encloses the possibility of turning to a tyranny when an individual such as populist demagogue or an autocratic political party occupies the space by claiming to embody and speak for the people-as-one.¹¹⁴

The purpose of pursuing this line that ends with the Lefort's theory of 'empty space of power' is in the first instance, placing the national will concept in the political history with its predicators and subsequents. Indeed, the national will predate the empty space

¹¹² Ibid:301

¹¹³ Ibid:3003-304

¹¹⁴ Cunningham,184-185

and understandings of ‘power as nobody’. It is the ideal that has been thought to fill the locus of power which is taken from monarch and the God given authorities. On the second instance, it is thought that, inspired by Lefort, this empty space is also open to be filled not directly by the notion of ‘national will’ but with the discourse of it or other similar monistic usages in modern democracies. The term ‘national will’ as ‘people-as-one’ seems to be ended but it is certain that 20th century democracies has witnessed the new version of this concept for the aim of filling the empty space that is rested from the kings body.

Actually, Lefort indicates that this emptiness of power is inherent in democracies a whole. From their invention, the term ‘nation’, ‘people’ and the ‘state’ have always been abstractions and never present substantial entities. This paradox has deepened within the institution of suffrage as stated before. The important matter in 20th century democracies, is that its inclusion of attempts to concretize this abstraction with the discourse, and with the ideology. The legitimacy of the truth and the reality has determined by the one who got the chance of affecting this empty space.

In short, the concept of national has arisen in 18th century mainly related with the notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ or ‘sovereignty of people’. After the 16th century, new ideas on society and legitimate authority have arisen together with the effects of the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation. These developments reveal the need for explaining legitimate authority in the basis that is different from God and God based divine right of kings, ‘For limiting the power of monarch, the concept of natural law and the contract between monarch and people have referred. The emphasis on the separation on power and mainly the separate legislative body has begun to be seen essential. The feudal understanding which ties citizenship to nobility had denied.’¹¹⁵

Associated with the criticism of these ideas which attributes right to govern to God, to

¹¹⁵ Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, ‘Aydınlanma: Düşünceler Yumağı’ in Batıda Siyasal Düşünceler, eds.Ağaoğulları, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 537.

the force or to heredity, the new space for democracy has been formed. This space is tried to be filled by the 'sovereign state' established by social contract, sometimes in its absolute sense as in Hobbes and sometimes, individual centered and small as in Locke but nevertheless, it put the idea of Sovereignty of people in the place of the legitimate authority which will find its clearest and more radical expression in Rousseau's version and enlightenment ideas.

The will of nation, in substance, has been thought as the substitute of the monarch's or prince's sovereignty who are thought to be taken their power from god. Hereafter, the source of 'right to rule' can only be legitimized by attributing it to the people, indeed attributed the ones that are to be ruled. However, this understanding brings some questions: Who should be considered as people, in which kind of society and in which extent of society? Rousseau, of course, has his own answers for these questions, but coming generations and systems which prefer to use his idea of general will and common good do not always take use of those answers and try to apply national will idea without considering the scale and complexity in the society.

Surely, the developments in contract theories and sovereignty of people mean turning to democratic ideals after the monarchies in Europe between 15th to 18th centuries. Albeit, the place of democracy is not the city state this time but it is the emerging nation state with its large population. As Held notes, the ancient democracies of city states are alien to the modern distinction, which have begun to emerge with Machiavelli and Hobbes, between state and society, specialized officials and citizens the people and government.¹¹⁶ In these modern societies, where direct democracy is impossible because of two reasons: first, the scale and the second is already composed class differences between aristocracy and people (equality in the ancient democracies cannot be found in this societies), for this reason, the idea of the representative

¹¹⁶ Held, 14

democracy has been developed. In the representative democracies, people are thought to be represented by elected politicians in the parliament. The people, who are represented, are aggrandized with the feature of citizenship. Although, at the beginning of the Enlightenment era, citizenship is limited with the criterion of property, even not the nobility¹¹⁷, in time, the concept of nation has enlarged and expanded to include masses of people. And as the concept of nation becomes more comprehensive, parliament becomes supreme but sovereignty of nation, in its real sense, diminishes and extra-parliamentary politics pushed out of legitimacy.¹¹⁸ Hereafter, politics will be taken place in the parliament and the way of one's execution of his will starts to be reduced to regular voting. In this condition, the matters of thinkers turn to be the limiting of the power of elected and preventing the threats that may be generated from the rule of majority. From 17th century to 20th century, thinkers have contributed to democracy theory and have indicated the possibility of tyranny of majority and recommended remedies for preventing this possibility.¹¹⁹ They have criticized the idea of national will and common good. From Mill to Tocqueville, Schumpeter to Dahl, Lefort to Madison, the threats of majority have been emphasized and the harms and misuse of the common good and national will understandings have been stated. Especially, after the pluralist views on society and politics, homogeneity understanding of 'national will' ideal has been questioned and objected.

To comprehend the rise and meaning of the 'national will' both in the history and in the contemporary world, theories of Claude Lefort can be seen as explanatory. His

¹¹⁷ Ağaoğulları, 538

¹¹⁸ Ellen Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 205-206

¹¹⁹ Oktay Uygun, 'Demokrasinin Çoğunlukçu ve Çoğulcu Modelleri İki Bin Beş Yüzyıllık bir Tartışmanın Analizi' in *Kamu Hukukçuları Platformu Çoğunlukçu Demokrasi Çoğulcu Demokrasi İkilemi ve İnsan Hakları Toplantısı*, Ankara, TBB Yayınları, 2010), 22-77.

analysis on ‘empty space of democracy’, ‘change in the statue of power’, ‘popular sovereignty’, and ‘power as nobody’, have been used for constituting a map through which the location of the notion of national will are determined and better analyzed. His analysis and conceptualizations on the modern society are used as the directive of the theory part. The change in the statue of power in political history of the west has tried to be pursued. Then, it is accepted that, although 20th century brings the new kind of society and politics which are alien to previous terms, and references from popular sovereignty or national/general will has not ceased but gain a new phase. They have begun to be used by politicians in their discourses for filing the locus of the power. This kind of discourse has mainly peculiar to the center right leaders and parties in Turkey. In the next part, attitudes of these parties towards the national will term tried to be analyzed. It is put, for providing a historical and discursive base for the main object of the research: the discourse of the Erdoğan.

CHAPTER III

ON THE NOTION OF “NATIONAL WILL” AND THE TURKISH CENTER RIGHT

Experiences in the world and especially in the political history of the west have witnessed the invention and transition of the concept of ‘national will’ and the ideal of ‘popular sovereignty’. The Turkish Ottoman history has not pursued the identical line with its European counterparts. It has neither experienced limiting efforts of monarchies nor witnessed the Renaissance and Reformation that emphasized the people as individuals and break the understanding of homo-credence. As a result, while inspiring from its theoretical basis, the genuine national will understanding has been developed.

Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, ideas related to limiting the power of Sultanate were begun to be seen. This can be handled as the aim of transition towards power-as-one to power-as-many. However, these aims mainly resulted from the efforts of the state elites for the sake of survival of the Ottoman state.¹²⁰ During and after the establishment of Turkish Republic, on the other hand, new kind of national will approach has occurred. This new political system of Turkey was established on the doctrine that emphasized the popular sovereignty notion. Indeed, the basic principle of this new regime was the doctrine of ‘Sovereignty, without any condition and reservation, belonged to the nation’. It is thought that with the establishment of assembly, the will of nation becomes sovereign. The Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished after the war. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal recommended a Republic which consisted of elected President, a prime Minister who was appointed by President and a system of cabinet. In this new system -in the republic period- however, the tradition

¹²⁰ See, Dood 1994, Heper 1994, Heper 1987, Karpat 1959, Sunar-Sayarai 2004, İnalçık 1995, Mardin 1973

of centralization, which was intrinsic in the Ottoman State, was not changed. But with the secularization and modernization, it gained a new phase. As argued by some scholars ‘The Turkish elite has launched a large scale modernization movement that would burn the bridges with the former Ottoman socio-political order’¹²¹ This would help politicians to prepare their national will conceptualization which was based mainly on the idea of alienation of people from state. Some important reforms were made like new European codes of law were introduced in the place of Islamic Holy law, the dervish convents were closed down by the official clergy: ulema were deprived of power and the influence of Arabic script was changed to the Roman the language reformed to make it more Turkish, the national history was rewritten¹²² and cultural reforms from clothing to music were applied. However, these reforms were also thought to have adverse effects on public because, they broke the critical ideological bond between state and its subjects. It suppressed the faith of public with the laicist policies. Hale and Özbudun states that;

The penetration of cultural revolution was not complete. Among the ruling elite- the state bureaucrats army officers and urban professionals of the new republic- attachment to Kemalism became an article of faith. However among the rural masses, traditional values some of them pre-Islamic and Muslim remained as powerful counter attachments to Kemalist nationalist modernism.¹²³

More importantly, while the ideal of sovereignty of nation is put at the center of this new state order, it is thought that nation has not known yet where their real interest rest, therefore they had to be guided and ruled by the well-informed elite.¹²⁴ This type

¹²¹ Nazif Mandacı, ‘Turkey’s Unfinish Transition to Democracy’ in *Democratic Consolidaiton in Turkey*, eds. Müge Aknur, (Florida: Universal Publishers Boca Raton, 2012), 63.

¹²² Clement Henry Dodd, *The Crises of Turkish Democracy*, (Beverley, North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1983)

¹²³ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (London: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2010), xviii

¹²⁴ Tanel Demirel, *Türkiye’nin Uzun On Yılı Demokrat Parti İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs Darbesi*, (İstanbul; İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011) 33.

of thinking resembles the Rousseau's ideas about people's attitudes towards general will. He states that people might not know the general will, or their real interest, so in that situation he recommends them to be led by the ones who know the general will. He states that people want common-good but not always able to see it. So, under these circumstances they need guidance. People, one by one has to be forced to conform to general will and people have to be taught what they should want. Only in such a case, wisdom and will would merge owing to lightening of people.¹²⁵ This is exactly what Republican elite want and put into practice. People, according to them, have to be enlightened first and then their will would become acceptable. Until that time, republican elite would be responsible to decide what is good and what is bad for the people. It was formalized as 'For people, despite people'. In 1930s, the paradox this formula embodies, aimed to be exceeded with the concepts like 'national will' and 'national sovereignty'. By considering the usage of the national will term, Köker asserts, it can be said that Kemalist national state understanding is based on Rousseau's bases.¹²⁶ This kind of national will understanding differs considerably from the one that would generate with transition to multi-party system.

Until the transition to multi-party system, 'national will' has been used as one of the republican ideals that underline the sovereignty of the people instead of sovereignty of the sultanate. This notion, indeed, indicates the main parameter of the newly established regime. This has been used as in Rousseau, and refers to the common good for the collectivity. This is the basic underlying principle of the republic which, on the one hand bases itself to the people while on the other hand had not convinced their maturity. When these people begin to reflect their preferences with establishment of other parties, the contradiction between people as immature majority and state

¹²⁵ Rousseau, 68-69

¹²⁶ Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 149

elites as secular, knowledgeable Westernist elites would become the main problematic of the system.

It can be said that the contradiction stated below constitutes one of the main parameters of the democracy in Turkey. In addition to this parameter, there have been other determinants on the Turkish democracy and its consolidation. Military coups, political party closures, effects of World War and finally effects of globalization can be stated as some of them. Certainly, all these developments shape the democracy and national will understanding in Turkish politics but the main determination can be said to occur with the transition to multi-party system in 1946 and victory of Democratic Party (DP) in 1950 elections. Transition to multi-party system has given a new meaning and discourse to the concept of national will with the questions such as who can represent this sovereignty of nation, who are closer to nation, or who are included in the nation. This discourse is appropriated by the leaders and parties who are defining themselves at the center, but mainly the center right, and to that extent claiming to be comprehensive and close to the people. Representing nation has been defined by these center right parties as representing the masses or large populations against the state centered policies and state elites. In the words of Rustow; '1950 election was thus Turkey's first step toward overcoming its most deeply entrenched social political division that between the urban bureaucracy and the population at large.'¹²⁷ From that point on 'the traditionally strong state quickly found its adversaries among the new political elite. The latter presented themselves as the proponents of the national will against the state's will and as the protectors of the masses against the state elite.'¹²⁸ As seen from here, national will concept has been used by political elites- mostly from

¹²⁷ Dankwart A. Rustow , 'Turkish Democracy in Historical Perspective' in *Politics in Third Turkish Republic*, eds. Heper & Evin, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 7.

¹²⁸ Fuat Keyman and Metin Heper, 'Double Faced State Political Patronage and Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey' in *The politics of Modern Turkey*, Çarkoğlu and Hale eds, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 327.

center right parties- in order to underline the settled duality between state and people. This kind of usage forms an important part of the discourse of center-right parties; on the other hand it serves to the success of these parties.

Furthermore, the rising of center-right in Turkey corresponds to the ‘democratization’ of Republic at least in the sense of elections; therefore interrelations with people become one of the most critical issues of the political parties and governments. It might be said that, the most important achievement of center-right has been its spectacular success on these relations. Almost all of the center-right parties’ signified characteristics serve their persuasive discourse on people. Some of these characteristics are contrary to military bureaucratic tutelage, liberal economic policies, modernization, economic development discourse, municipality discourse, nationalist conservatism, fetishism of state (to some aspects), struggle against communism, and most importantly, preservation and representation of large masses which means authentic representation, and that means dominance of national will. Center right combines the promises of making the cultural values of nation dominant with the promise of political and economic rising.¹²⁹ Making the nation and its values dominant would not be realized with the hands of a group of educated elites but with hands of (votes and preferences of) nation itself.

The national will concept has also been put by the center-right as the only source of legitimacy. And this attitude; indeed emphasizing the criteria of national sovereignty and national will as the unrivalled legitimacy standards, primarily specifies the superiority of political preferences of public majority, appears in the general elections, over other political principles. With emphasizing this superiority, center right side against the single party history and republic elitism. The stress on nationality feature of ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘national will’ symbolizes the most apparent step that is

¹²⁹ Yüksel Taşkın, *Milliyetçi Muhafazakar Entelijansiya* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2013), 88.

taken for this aim.¹³⁰ This emphasis on national will can be used for perceiving the understanding of democracy and representation of center right. The understanding of national will of center-right, indeed, degrades ‘homogenous’ nation to the representable object of politics. This object for them is the silent conservative mass that is full of national consciousness. As Taşkın states, ‘Main separation has been constructed as the silent conservative Muslim nation, against exceedingly powerful proponent Westernist elite minority.’¹³¹ As seen here, an authentic kind of elites and people duality have been put forward. Elites, in this context, imply the bureaucratic and military elite which are also embedded in the Ottoman tradition, and people imply the people as nation, who should be represented by center right parties. Virtually, all center-right parties and leaders construct their discourse of ‘nation’ in accordance with their political, ideological needs, interests of their party and with the existing conjecture. Almost all of the center-right leaders use the nation and national will concepts in order to respond these needs. Therefore, the usage of the nation and the component that intimates can be changed from leader to leader and even within the discourse of one leader in progress of time. Finding that eclectic diversity on the discourse of Erdoğan will be the main problematic of this thesis. For a better comprehension of Erdoğan’s discourse, center right tradition will be stated concisely.

3.1. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND ARISING CENTER RIGHT IN TURKEY

DP emerged as the major opposition party in 1946. The aim of DP members was firstly to replace the bureaucratic state which was identified with republicans, with a democratic one. This, according to them, would help to solve country’s economic and social problems. They reached the favor of masses and could get 61 seats in 1946

¹³⁰ Tanıl Bora and Nergis Canefe, *Türkiye’de Populist Milliyetçilik in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce*, Milliyetçilik2009), v.4.644.

¹³¹ Taşkın, 88.

General Elections and won overwhelmingly in 1950.¹³² This event caused the rising of main cleavage in Turkish politics. From that time on, a center party against the Republican Party has arisen with its objections to harsh secularist Westernalist statist policies of the RPP who stays in the boundaries of Republic's legal politics and the existing system.

This party was able to get response from the people, or more precisely, majority of the voters. Masses had several reasons in supporting DP. The middle class were seeking to refashion the repressive bureaucratic tutelary state in ways which would provide greater opportunities for those industrial and commercial talents. For the proletariats and peasants, laic attitudes and implementations were irritant. Wealthier land owners and growing bourgeoisie on the other hand were united in fear of the incipient socialism they perceived in some parts of the People's Party. The land owners in particular, sensed the threat of land reform. They all -but especially commercial middle class the urban poor and the more modern sections of the rural population-¹³³ supported the DP which, according to them, would better represent their interests both culturally and economically.

The main separation line however was the cultural resistance against the republican reforms. Proclamation of the Republic was radical and the Westernalist modernizing cultural reforms that succeeded it, inevitably generated reaction from the people. The main event that experienced from the transition to multi-party term was the surfacing of the reactions toward these big changes in short time.¹³⁴ DP established its politics on the mobilization of this reaction.¹³⁵ Dating from its establishment, DP had tried to embody all the sections that were uncomfortable with Republican People's Party-RPP,

¹³² Sarıbay, 121.

¹³³ Dodd,8.

¹³⁴ Nuray Mert, Merkez Sağ'ın Kısa Tarihi, (İstanbul: Selis Kitaplar,2007:40)

¹³⁵ Ibid,40.

under the slogan of making national will dominant.¹³⁶ It considered itself as the aside of nation and its will against the bureaucratic and culturally alienated RPP. As stated by Demirel, The power of DP meant the limitation of arbitrary attitude of military and civil bureaucracy. And the ordinary citizen was thinking that she/he could apply to DP against unfair practices of RPP bureaucracy and bureaucrats.¹³⁷ The force of DP populism, as Sunar asserted, was directed against the state society division which the bureaucratic reforms deepened with their militant secularism and imposed etatism.¹³⁸

To that respect DP, could be said to represent and defend its ‘nation’. But they were not position themselves as the tutelary of nation; instead DP meant to be the nation itself. And since DP was the nation itself, any intervention or constraint toward it would be the intervention to the will of nation.

As stated above, this assertion of being the nation itself and representing their will were accepted and supported by the people. The famous slogan of the DP; ‘Enough is enough, the nation has the word’ reveals best their aim and it seems that it works. In that respect it can be said that ‘DP tempted to represent the masses who seem have not right to speak.’¹³⁹ This mass therefore, has to be re-defined in accordance with the aims of DP. DP defined people, as the people who want to live their religion¹⁴⁰. This, according to Bora, is the ‘national willist’¹⁴¹ populist discourse which has not

¹³⁶ Tanel Demirel, Türkiye’nin Uzun On Yılı Demokrat Parti İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs Darbesi (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011), 52.

¹³⁷ Tanel Demirel, ‘Demokrat Parti’ in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Liberalizm (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2013), 498.

¹³⁸ İlkay Sunar, State Society and Democracy in Turkey, (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Press, 2004), 125.

¹³⁹ Tanel Demirel, ‘Demokrat Parti’ in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce , Liberalizm (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2013), 495.

¹⁴⁰ Tanıl Bora, ‘Adnan Menderes’ in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce, Liberalizm (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları 2013), 498.

¹⁴¹ ‘Milli İradeci’ in Turkish

attributed a character to the people beyond being a voter and deprived of specific definition of the people.¹⁴² Their character as voters absolutely occupies the basic place, however these voters, or majority of them or more precisely voters of DP has mainly defined more than a voter but with their religious and cultural aspects. They were thought and rendered to be conservative, indigenous; authentic; indeed, they were the man in the street. DP chose this mass as a mass of its own, and with the policies especially which were related to religion, such as turning Ezan again in Arabic version, and brought some freedom toward religious practices which were important for this mass. ‘DP successfully identified itself as the liberalizer of the religion.’¹⁴³ For example, the discourses of Menderes like ‘Turkey is a Muslim society, it will remain so and all the requirements of Islam will be maintained’¹⁴⁴ could take support of the masses and their votes.

The votes of these masses have always been one of the most important things for DP and these votes become equally important for its successor center parties. In fact, since the power of Menderes and DP, national will has always marked the majority of voters, who are culturally and religiously different from RPP and whose voice has not been taken into consideration by single party regime. National will in that context has been used as the concise definition of democracy. ‘Democracy is, according to DP members, unquestionable supremacy of the national will that is manifested in the elections. One of the propaganda brochures states that, ‘Now that as you can vote whoever you want, this is the democracy’¹⁴⁵ One of his speeches, Menderes states that ‘if there is no controversy on the elections from elections of chief to election of deputy and election of president and opinion of public are in agreement on this, it

¹⁴² Bora, 498.

¹⁴³ Sarıbay, 123.

¹⁴⁴ Menderes from :Bora,405.

¹⁴⁵ Tanel Demirel, Türkiye’nin Uzun On Yılı Demokrat Parti İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs Darbesi, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011),151. from ‘Demokrat Partinin 3. Zaferi’,10.

should be accepted that the most important stage on democracy has been passed'.¹⁴⁶ In his another speech, Menderes again indicates the ballot box with saying that 'if they are right and we are wrong, nation will determine the result with their votes'.¹⁴⁷ Menderes thinks that in the democracies which he defines as the plurality system, the power of representing national will that is gained by the feature of plurality, connotes so to say a general warrant of attorney.¹⁴⁸

In this system of plurality is indicated by Menderes, supremacy of national will de facto means the supremacy of the party which has the majority in the parliament. The nation uses it to govern its majority through the parliament. All the other state organs take their authority from parliament and the majority of parliament should be able to do everything. According to Bayar, one of the founders of the DP; 'the principle of 'majority is inerrable' which is one of the basic principles of the democratic regimes. The ones, who oppose the decisions of parliament, are opposing the will of majority in substance and therefore they are receding the democratic spirit and pursuing the dominance of minority.'¹⁴⁹

Apparently, the leaders of DP asserted that any movement that attended to limit parliamentary majority would come to mean limiting the will of nation.¹⁵⁰ Menderes took a step further and declared that opposition's function of supervision had to be done by opposition but could be fulfilled by the parliamentary will, which meant the will of majority in practice.¹⁵¹ Similarly, according to Menderes, juridical bodies as

¹⁴⁶ Adnan Menders, 1957:432 Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları Demeçleri Makaleleri, From Bahadır Türk Muktedir (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2014), 34.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid:34

¹⁴⁸ Bora,502

¹⁴⁹ Demirel,152

¹⁵⁰ Demirel,T. 'Demokrat Parti' in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce, Liberalizm, (İstnabul: İletişim Yayınları 2013),502.

¹⁵¹ Ibid,504.

well cannot and should not take precedence over national will and cannot control it. 'All powers are represented by parliament. Just as power of executive is given by government, the juridical power is given by judiciary. Giving priority to judiciary means taking the power of judiciary from the nation.'¹⁵² DP shortly emphasizes the parliament as the representative of the will of nation regarding executive and judiciary powers as the agent of parliament.¹⁵³ In the discourse of Menderes, general will and plurality of parliament represent the national benefit. The title of nationality¹⁵⁴ enriches this absolute political authority with a holly transcendental burden.

All in all, coming as a democratic reaction towards the single party regime and secularist Westernalist reforms, DP has been able to gather support of the simple citizen who is consecrated as the nation. DP defines this nation as conservative and nationalist and defines this notion according to its politics. Democracy is also defined in this direction. Democracy is thought to be the majority rule against oppressive and bureaucratic minority rule. It is, in the words of Heper, also results from the weak linkages between political parties and social groups which cause legitimacy crises in Turkey.¹⁵⁵ These crises are aimed to be exceeded by center-right parties and their political elites. *National will* would be the savior term which claims to represent the demands of the masses with passing over the linkage to needs of the masses. There is no need to link since political elites have already been in the claim of being nation itself. This situation eases the usage of national will concept for explaining how they handle people or nation outside of the state and the political elite. The concept has been firstly used by DP for these purposes. Beyond doubt, a wide clientalist network,

¹⁵² Ibid:34

¹⁵³ Tanel Demirel, Türkiye'nin Uzun On Yılı Demokrat Parti İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs Darbesi (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları,2011),152-153.

¹⁵⁴ 'Millilik' in Turkish

¹⁵⁵ Metin Heper, The Strong State as A Problem for the Consolidaiton of democracy eds.Heper &. Landau, (States of America and Canada: I.B. Tauris St Martin's Press, 1992), 159.

fed by distributive policies, a diffuse populist appeal a conciliatory attitude towards religious demands and a relative liberalization of economy also bound peripheral groups loosely to the DP.¹⁵⁶ These groups seem to reject oppressiveness of RPP on many domains. However, the oppressiveness seems to change hands when it comes to the second half of the DP government. Sarıbay indicates two reasons for arising anti-democratic attitudes of DP. The first one is the conception of state that the DP has shared with RPP and the second one is the lack of political culture conducive to a democratic government.¹⁵⁷ Whatever the reason is, the oppressive policies of DP towards all kind of oppositions especially after the 1957,¹⁵⁸ have brought first military coup of Turkish Republic in 1960.

3.2. THE 1960 MILITARY COUP AND THE JUSTICE PARTY (JP)

Rising authoritarian attitudes of DP prepared the conditions for the military intervention toward the government. According to Eroğul, first Military intervention in 27 May 1960 inevitably brought about by the DP's attempt at dictatorship¹⁵⁹, and military legitimized its initiative by saying that they aimed to prevent fight between fractions. The leader of DP, Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers were convicted and hanged for violating the constitution. Same year a council of professors was established and begun to write a new constitution. Main purpose of this new constitution was to balance the power of Assembly with the other institutions such as Constitutional Court, and the second chamber in Assembly and National Security Council. As stated by Sunar and Sayarı:

¹⁵⁶ İlkey Sunar and Sabri Sayrı, 'Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects' in *State Society and Democracy in Turkey*, (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Publication 2004), 75.

¹⁵⁷ Sarıbay, 127

¹⁵⁸ See; Tanel Demirel, *Türkiye'nin Uzun On Yılı Demokrat Parti İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs Darbesi* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011), 286-301.

¹⁵⁹ Cem Eroğul, 'Establishment of Multiparty Rule 1945-71' in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, eds. Schick and Tonak, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 118.

The 61 constitution reflects the new balance of power. In the face of popular support mobilized by counter elite, the bureaucratic-intelligentsia and the authors of constitution were on the defensive against centralization of power and concentration of function. As a consequence power was dispersed institutions carefully differentiated, and bureaucratic checks and controls were established against the power of the parties.¹⁶⁰

Before the Military relinquished power, they had forced two major parties into shotgun coalition. However, advancing popularity of Justice Party, which came up as the one who looked for justice for the DP, led to outright victory of it in the 1965 general election. It increased its majority in 1969.¹⁶¹

The interruption of democracy underlines the damnification discourse of political elites against new (old for Ottoman –Turkish political history but new for the multi-party system) elite group; the military. Although it is generally accepted that these attempts of military are not for the sake of establishing fully authoritarian regimes but aimed to effect a ‘reequilibration of democracy’¹⁶² this acceptance cannot prevent the usage of national will discourse for emphasizing democracy against the military rule and its representatives. This intervention, to that extent, generates the new usage of the national will which directly attacks the military interruption and the military rule after it.

In this direction Justice Party-JP came into power with criticizing the military and declaring that it was the continuation of DP. For this reason its first conceptualization of democracy and national will implied the objection of all kinds of tutelage. According to Süleyman Demirel,-the second leader of the JP after Ragıp Gümüşpala ‘no matter how it is defined, it cannot be asserted that democracy is a system other

¹⁶⁰ İlkey Sunar and Sabri Sayarı, ‘Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects’ in *State Society and Democracy in Turkey*, (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Publication 2004), 76.

¹⁶¹ Dodd,10

¹⁶² Ergun Özbudun, *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1988), 30.

than self-government of nation.’¹⁶³ ‘If it is not nation who has the final word, if nation’s decisions are not the decisions which have to be implemented compulsorily, it cannot be said that nation is governing itself, nation is the master of its own destiny and there is a republic and nation in the country.’¹⁶⁴ Especially, after the 27 May 1961 and 12 September 1980 military coups, Demirel has established a rhetoric which glorifies national will as the essence of democracy for the sake of institutionalizing parliament and elections as the only legitimate source of power.¹⁶⁵ Demirel emphasizes the nation’s maturity of deciding and defines his mission as the cause of making the despised national will a superior force. In a similar vein, Demirel propounds that the effort of keeping parliament open and functioning is the basic principle and the proof of the support of national will.¹⁶⁶

On the other hand, as in the DP, JP also underlines the cultural divide between the elites and the people. The leader of JP after 1964 has been Süleyman Demirel, who has come from a rural background, and many of the party members are the men who are rural based and who succeed in their own rights.¹⁶⁷ These features of the politicians of JP were different from the characteristics of DP politicians who could gather votes from rural non-elite people while rising out of elite RPP and being urbanite. In this respect, JP had more chance to express being the nation itself. Demirel himself fused this perception with continually repeating his provinciality with stating that he was a commoner. When he was elected as the chairman of JP, he stated that ‘We are the people who came from the nation, who are suffering from the

¹⁶³ Tanel Demirel, *Adalet Partisi İdeoloji ve Politika*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2013), 221.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*:221

¹⁶⁵ Tanıl Bora, ‘Süleyman Demirel’ in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce, Liberalizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2013), 558.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*,561.

¹⁶⁷ Eric Jean Zürher, *Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 363.

problems of nation'.¹⁶⁸ According to Bora, Demirel's discourse reflects the national populism which aggrandizes people with the qualification of being part of the nation.¹⁶⁹ In addition, JP has resumed conservative and nationalist policies remnant from DP, against the state elites and their westernist policies. However, this does never mean the turning away to the west. Demirel rather separates material and moral forms of the modernization and supports the material front. Morally and culturally, however, JP pursues the road of DP with giving importance to religion and traditions and makes use of its advantages on the elections. According to Tanel Demirel¹⁷⁰ JP can be considered as conservative since it cares for the importance of authority and hierarchical social order which are the characteristics of conservatism. Moreover, he adds that, JP purports to be the defender of national moral values, customs and traditions. However for Tanel Demirel, it does not indicate a refined conservatism but more than this, it is the way of showing that they pay respect to religious values and this is related with the vote potential of this attitude. On the other side, JP has features that are convenient to conservative thinking and behavior. The party states that it puts emphasis on tradition, and advocates an organic state and society understanding together with nationalism understanding which projects identity of nation and state.¹⁷¹ Nevertheless, as DP before it and MLP and JDP after it, JP always desire comprehensive chances both in political and social domain in the frame of development and making national will dominant. This can be considered as the eclectic way of conservatism in Turkish 'center' right.

This kind of moderate conservatism and moderate modernism eased the JP's aim of comprehending the large masses sometimes with different interests. It would bring

¹⁶⁸ Tanıl Bora, 'Süleyman Demirel' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce, Liberalizm*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2013), 552.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid:553

¹⁷⁰ Tanel Demirel, *Adalet Partisi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2013), 342-343-344-345.

¹⁷¹ Ibid: 343

them a large number of votes. And just like other center right leaders before and after him Süleyman Demirel declared that he represented all groups and classes. ‘Demirel often repeated that the JP was a mass party which represented the interest of all classes-city dwellers and villagers, workers and employers’¹⁷². This assertion eases the nationality of the party in terms of its comprehensiveness. This means that they are not the part of any ideology but part of the nation and this discourse has been used by later center right parties.

The relations with bureaucracy were also maintained similar with DP. ‘JP was anathema to many bureaucratic circles not because of anything it had done but because of what it was a party based on political will only’¹⁷³. After the 1965 elections when JP formed single party government, this cleavage was deepened. Especially after the mid-1960s the weakening and the disruption of ascriptive ties, fast increasing urbanization and growth of shanty towns, the rapid socioeconomic change and the high level of social mobilization –all these developments greatly magnified the impact of parties.¹⁷⁴ And parties took advantage of these developments. Especially JP, heir of DP, resumed clientalist allies that had been commence with DP but while working to take electoral success JP tried to balance this aim with the exigency of state elite, bureaucracy and military.

By the 1970, there were parties relatively autonomous from bureaucracy that were able to establish informal linkages with professional interest associations, more liberal constitutions and the power balancing institutions. On the other hand, fractions on both right and left were taken advantage of this liberal atmosphere. With the words of Dodd; they benefited from the freedoms of liberal democratic regime in order to

¹⁷² Avner Levi, ‘The Justice Party’ in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, (States of America and Canada: I.B. Tauris St Martin's Press, 1988), 140

¹⁷³ Ibid:144

¹⁷⁴ Sunar and Sayrı, 77.

exploit the scarcely avoidable dislocations inherent in a developing economy.¹⁷⁵ Political division occurred and radicalized in those years. Augmenting conflicts and violence in universities and outside, brought the 1971 military intervention which's main aim was to prevent anarchy. Two trends characterized the party politics of the 1970s, namely increasing party fragmentation and a sharpening of ideological confrontation and polarization.¹⁷⁶ During that period, the government had been changed five times. After the 1973, there was no party having won the overall majority. Coalition governments marked this term. Political, ideological conflicts between fractions resumed and economic situation deteriorated. TİP (Worker Party of Turkey) was closed for the reason that it declared its support of democratic demand of Kurdish people. Similarly Milli Nizam Partisi of Necmettin Erbakan was closed. Attitudes of National Salvation Party which begun its activities in 1972 as follower of MNP, moreover, gave rise to thought of threat to Atatürk's secularizing reforms. Those developments caused the military intervention in 12 September 1980.

Until the second military coup, the perception of national will in the center-right tradition seemed to be resumed with JP. The notion of national will was conceptualized in accordance with the majoritarian democracy and its principles. This notion was emphasized against the military intervention and for underlying the importance of parliamentary politics. It was also used for mentioning the national and commoner character of party leader. In this way, the divide between states elites and people was aimed to be resumed. It could be said to create a cyclical situation: the notion of national will was mentioned for gathering votes, and to receive the majority of votes and that eased the usage of national will concept in turn. After the 1980 military coup, this notion would find a new place for itself in the newly establishing order.

¹⁷⁵ Dodd,11

¹⁷⁶ Sunar and Sayrı,81

3.3. CENTER RIGHT AFTER 1980 COUP: EMERGENCE OF MOTHERLAND PARTY (MP) AND TRUE PATH PARTY (TPP) AS SUCCESSORS OF DP

The intervention in 1980 was aimed to bring political stability to the country and the government took precautions related to that aim. With the 82 constitution, progressions that had been gained with 1960 constitution were reversed. Power embodied in the executive and the potencies of president and national security council were increased. Moreover, the freedom of press, freedom of syndicate (general strikes, political aimed strikes and solidarity strikes) were banned. Basic rights and liberties were bind to conditions like national security, national interest and public order and health. General Kenan Evren became president, and a new law for political parties was announced. After military intervention in 1980, pre-1980 politicians were precluded from politics for ten years and only three parties were allowed to participate on elections and were supported by military leaders. From that atmosphere, Motherland Party-MP- with Özal, which seemed like democratic, could win that election with having gained more than 45% of the votes.¹⁷⁷ MP became partner with the True Path Party-TPP- at the center right. These parties included the politicians from right parties of 1970s, Nationalist Movement Party-NMP, National Salvation Party-MSP and JP.

This new party under the leadership of Özal was pretended to contain four tendencies in Turkish politics: conservatism, nationalism, economic liberalism and social democracy.¹⁷⁸ To that respect, Özal seemed to generate new cleavages in the Turkish politics different from the center right and RPP tradition. In the words of Ergüder: we cautiously concluded that perhaps a new modern cleavage in terms of left and right

¹⁷⁷ Zürcher, 407.

¹⁷⁸ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, 'The Motherland Party' in *Political Parties in Turkey*, eds. Rubin & Heper, (London Frank Cass Press 2002), 45.

was emerging eclipsing to a great extent the former cultural cleavages'¹⁷⁹. In this new structure, citizens defined as the Muslim Turkish people respecting to their traditions while supporting at the same time, modernization. In other words, Özal both uttered the economic growth and protecting traditional values. As Kalaycıoğlu mentions;

MP's image was influenced by Özal's soft-spoken cool arguments of an engineer politician who calculates and then carries out projects which promoted liberal economic rationality for rapid change through export led growth in a globalizing world...He seems to argue for a traditional society, a social structure that will still be dependent upon moral religious (Sunni) values of past while simultaneously proposing dramatic changes to economy and prosperity of the country .¹⁸⁰

Actually, these implications had already been found in the previous center discourses, the new things in there were the neoliberal historical and political conjuncture in addition to the assertion of representing four political tendencies. This definition of politics found its response from the voters. Since November 1983, MP was able to continue its statue as major party of the right despite declining national percentages of support.¹⁸¹ These moderate policies seemed to be effective on the people. However, this moderation was also containing old Islamic tones. Özal had been contested a seat on the İzmir NSP list- A radical Islamist Party- but became unsuccessful in 1977. Moreover, he was the member of one of the most prominent religious sects Naqshbandi, and was a 'leader of conservative religious bureaucrat group during his career bureaucracy between 1967 and 1971'.¹⁸² Islamic sects gave him an opportunity to establish a dialog between religious masses; on the other hand he was pursuing

¹⁷⁹ Üstün Ergüder, 'The Motherland Party 1983-1989' in *Political Parties in Turkey*, eds. Heper& Landou, (London: I.B.Tauris Press, 1988), 153.

¹⁸⁰ Kalaycıoğlu 2002:46).

¹⁸¹ Ergüder,154

¹⁸² Tanıl Bora, 'Turgut Özal' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce,Liberalizm*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013),593.

modernizing policies that attracts the laic fraction.¹⁸³ After his victory in 1983, he could be said to abide by these nationalist conservative motifs as the legitimacy and popularity refuge.¹⁸⁴ It can further be said that, Özal at least made Islam and its practices apparent and pushed it to the public sphere. He stood behind the policies of 1980 coup, which insisted upon the role of Islam as the combating ideological extremism of left and right.¹⁸⁵ This understanding was coincided with the idea of Turkish Islam synthesis that was supported by both NSP and NMP. With this perspective, Islamic divinity Students High Schools were rearranged and gained right to get into university and religion and moral lessons became obligatory for all schools and students with their totally Sunni contents. Thus, Radical Islam was gaining ground in those years. Those developments revealed the Islamism and laicism debate between the people and it deteriorated in 1990s.

As a matter of fact, in the MP and in Özal's discourse, there was an approach that comprised all attitudes except the radical ones, at the same time; they supported religion and religious formations. Interestingly enough, those were done together with the market modernism and new right hegemony. Those were the most prominent characteristics of that term. In that period, the concept of national will had not been widely used. Instead, synergy of the nation and their representation had been mentioned in different ways. One of these ways was the religion and tradition, the other was the feeding the hope of prosperity in the simple citizens. According to Ergüder, the success of MP in 1983 appeared to be associated with the commitment of bringing better living conditions and socio economic development. MP indeed could cast an image of a being a product of the society rather than a concoction from above.

¹⁸³ Feride Acar, 'Turgut Özal' in *Türkiye'de Liderler ve Demokrasi*, eds. Heper, Sayarı, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2008), 188.

¹⁸⁴ Bora, T. 2013: 593

¹⁸⁵ Metin Heper, 'Trials and Tribulations of Democracy in Third Turkish Republic' in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds. Heper & Evin, (San Francisco: Westview press 1994), 233.

It was closer to a center right party- an image that the DP and JP molded since 1950- that got the things done and was responsive to policy demands of the masses¹⁸⁶ As seen from here what was done from DP to MP was establishing the perception of we came out of your bosom and we were working for you and for your interests only. The emphasis of the national will, in that context, had been preferred by previous center right parties for underlying their authenticity. When it came to MP however, cultural cleavage was aimed to be exceeded with comprehensive discourses instead of dualist separations like we as nation and others as bureaucratic elite or military.

When the relation with military and reaction towards it was concerned, Turgut Özal, as well, who came to rule after military coup, never showed overtly opposition to the military. His reaction was gravitated towards bureaucracy and ‘power groups’. According to opponents, Özal collaborated with the military regime and profited by the political bans of 12 September coup. On the other hand, more rightist comments regarded Özal as the figure of demilitarization. Both sides can be said has a right. Because Özal had never left using the concepts of demilitarization and democracy together and he implied that military was insufficient in many domains such as economy. In addition, according to Özal, freeness, that was prerequisite of development, and centralized military discipline were incompatible with freeness.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, Özal abstained from sharpening his views on demilitarization, as long as 12 September regime resumed. And more importantly, he had never made the legitimacy of 12 September a matter of debate, not even implicitly.¹⁸⁸ In this sense, Özal did not go beyond the pro-tutelage mentality which ranked democratic rights and liberties in terms of maturity and readiness of society. ¹⁸⁹ As seen from there, Özal’s

¹⁸⁶ Ergüder,163

¹⁸⁷ Bora,T. 2013:590 ‘Turgut Özal’ in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce v.7 Liberalizm İletişim Yayınları İstanbul

¹⁸⁸ Ibid:590

¹⁸⁹ Ibid: 590

attitude toward tutelage reflected his pragmatism. Apart from that, the concept of national will was not taken up a space in the discourse of Özal neither related to the de-militarisation. He did not contradict the tradition of DP and JP on the issue of democracy and national will, but he did not need to underline these concepts. His shining concept and matter was development and he correlated all other issues on this concept. Finally, during his presidency, the usage of the concept of 'power groups' might had given hints about his conceptualization of the national will. Especially, the times when Motherland Party had begun to weaken, he continuously stressed the power groups. He states that: 'There are many power groups in our country. We have struggled many of them, we have succeed but not totally yet'.¹⁹⁰ We had arisen because we did not want some old power groups have a voice over nation .¹⁹¹ He did not see MLP as the continuation of DP or JP but stated that he was threatened by some power groups with implying that he could experience the DP's fate.¹⁹² Beyond all these, his main starting point was a working man, man of municipality or developmentalist leader, more than the man of his nation or representative of national will.

What Özal brings fort related to nation will and continuation with center right tradition can be summarized as such; he has maintained the image of man of the people, has resumed the assurance of protecting conservative life style, has given people economic hope with economic liberalism, he has fought with the bureaucracy and power groups and their statist policies but without underlying the national will concept. However he did not use the military or elite opposition as much as his processors. But this did not mean that Özal did not resemble previous center right leaders. Like them, he was separating from RPP tradition but this time, he was

¹⁹⁰ Özal from Türk, 147

¹⁹¹ Özal Form Türk, 147-148

¹⁹² Türk,153

separated from them with his technocratic vision. As Göle states; Previous modernizing elites of the Republic, had seen the secularization of Turkish politics and transmission to western values was the main condition however, the technocratic elites of the 1980s defined their goal less in terms of educating the people than of synthesizing Islamic values and pragmatic rationality.¹⁹³ Özal might be said to be the most explicit representative of these technocratic elites. He seemed to resume center right tradition with the new conjecture of 1980s.

In the 1987 the ban in the pre-1980, politicians were lifted despite the counter efforts of Özal. This event has coincided with the inflationary pressure created by MP's 'patronage and populist oriented economy policies'.¹⁹⁴ Election results were affected from these developments and 1987 general elections brought the new table. There was first the return of right wing nationalism and religious right even they did not able to take seat in the parliament. Secondly, 'center right for the first time divided into two parties with the MP under the leadership of Özal and True Path Party under the leadership of Demirel, gathering 20 and 19 percent of votes respectively.'¹⁹⁵ In 1989, the General Evren's term of presidency ended and Özal became president. The leadership position in MP was taken over by Mesut Yılmaz. 'Yılmaz aimed to move the party towards the center with a view to neutralize the effects of both the defections by conservatives from the party ranks and encroachments by the nationalist NMP and the Islamist Welfare Party which had replaced the pre-1980 NSP.'¹⁹⁶ In general elections in 1991, coalition government formed with the center right TPP and Social

¹⁹³ Nilüfer Göle, 'Toward an Autonomisation of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey' in *Politics in Third Turkish Republic*, eds. Heper&Evin, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 213.

¹⁹⁴ Canan Aslan, 'Democratic Consolidation and Institutional Challenges for Political Parties and the Party System in Turkey' in *Democratic Consolidation in Turkey*, eds. Müge Aknur, (Florida: Universal Publishers Boca Raton, 2012), 151.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, 153.

¹⁹⁶ Mandacı, 92.

Democratic Populist Party (SHP) while Islamist Welfare Party had increased its vote in a considerable amount. After the death of Özal in 1993, Demirel became the president and left his position in TTP to Tansu Çiller who became the first female prime minister of Turkey. After her election, Çiller adopted a political discourse which attached importance to conservative populism, economic liberalism like Özal and cooperation with military for armed struggle in the Kurdish issue.¹⁹⁷ The Kurdish matter caused the intimacy between Çiller and Military Forces more than any other center-right leader. Expect that taking position against the military, Çiller indulged the military quite oppositely. In that respect, it could not be possible for Çiller to use the national will discourse against the military like the center right leaders before her. However, after 1997 when she became to be part of opposition, she used a new concept on democratization which consists of three theses. First one was the national will and the supremacy of the assembly. Second one was the democratization program which objects the Jacobin official ideology and third one was the political reform.¹⁹⁸ From that point on the usage of national will concept and inclination to previous center discourse could be seen.

That period had also witnessed the increasing political challenges from Radical Islam in addition to Kurdish Movement fraction.¹⁹⁹ These challenges had been seen from 1980s onward and had been gaining ground in Turkish social and political life. During the 1980s-1990s as a result of more pluralistic atmosphere that had begun in Özal's years with increasing prosperity, the Islamists became more integrated into the system through an expansion of educational opportunities economic activity and party politics.²⁰⁰ This development became the factor that strengthened the Welfare Party-

¹⁹⁷ Ümit Cizre, 'Tansu Çiller' in Türkiye'de Liderler ve Demokrasi, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2008), 231.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 244.

¹⁹⁹ Mandacı, 94

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 95

WP. This strength brought the victory in the 1994, local elections and the general elections in 1995. Çiller, on the other hand asserted that the TTP was the only party that could stop Islamist threats. However, after three months coalition with center left party Çiller became the coalition partner with the Necmettin Erbakan and formed a coalition with WP under the premiership of Erbakan in 1996. Anti-secular attitudes of this government brought its end with the indirect military intervention in 28th February 1997.

3.4. THE 28TH FEBRUARY MILITARY INTERVENTION

From 1984, increasing effect of Islam had being emphasized in Kemalist and Socialist press. From those years, many members of the old sub classes had been educated and gained opportunity to propound their own social and cultural designs. These were represented by politicized Islam instead of left politics as many other countries in Asia and Africa.²⁰¹ At the end of 1980s, problem of laicism arose with the headscarf issue. Islamist students protested the prohibition of using headscarf in the public institutions and especially universities. This gave rise to polarization between laics and Islamists at the beginnings of 1990s. As noted above, in 1994 local elections Islamist RP gained many municipalities especially in the metropole regions with taking six of fifteen big cities.²⁰² In 1995 Islamic RP increased its votes and become the biggest party with gaining 21% of votes and it was able to form a coalition government with center-right True Path Party. Not surprisingly, that achievement of the Islamist party and its heading the government in addition to conspiracy towards well-known Atatürkist intellectuals, headscarf debates in the universities, discourses and policies against laic life style etcetera, they all contributed to process which had taken the country to the ‘28 February Process’.

²⁰¹ Zürcher,416.

²⁰² Ibid:425

These processes led the fall of the Erbakan government and after that, RP closed down in 1998 by the constitutional court on account of its anti-secular activities and its leading members were banned from political activities for a period of five years. The 28 February 1997 process also involved the ‘introduction of a number of restrictions on religious education and activities of Islamist leaning business firms’.²⁰³ However, these restrictions did not cause the Islamist Party to give the struggle. Instead it caused a transformative effect on the Islamist movement. RP substituted by Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP-) and most of the RP cadres joined this party and still that part painted a more moderate picture. Islamist groups realized that radical Islam would find no place in the political arena any longer. Many of the Islamist chose to be modernist rather than clinging to past.²⁰⁴ However this inclination of modernization could not prevent FP to be closed by the Constitutional Court because of its anti-secular actions in 2001. Before its closure, the conflict had been started between the party members and came to its fore at the FP congress in 2000.²⁰⁵ Abdullah Gül, the candidate of the modernists challenged Recai Kutan the incumbent leader and candidate of the traditionalists, for Party leadership and Gül lost the race.²⁰⁶ After the closure, effects of this conflict became a concrete divergence. While traditionalists join the SP (Felicity Party), the innovationists set up the ‘Movement of Virtuous’,²⁰⁷ which then formed the core cadre of the JDP.²⁰⁸

After the intervention in 28 February 1997, a coalition government was established under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz. It was composed of MP and two social

²⁰³ Hale and Özbudun,4-5.

²⁰⁴ Zeynep İçener, ‘The Justice And Development Party’s Conception of ‘Conservative Democracy’ Invention of Reinterpretation’ in Turkish Studies (London: Routledge Press 2009), 596.

²⁰⁵ Hale and Özbudun,5

²⁰⁶ Ibid:5

²⁰⁷ ‘Erdemliler Hareketi’ in Turkish

²⁰⁸ İçener,597

democratic left parties together with the external support of RPP. This government ended up with the corruption accusation in 1999 and gave place to DLP, NMP and MP coalition. With the economic crises in 2000 and 2001 and the speculation on the health of Bülent Ecevit, one of the coalition leaders and prime minister led the process to snap election in 3 November 2002. In that election, the parties which were found in 2001, together with the separated members of FP, gained the majority of votes while coalition parties of the early 2002 got out of the parliament. From that point, the reign of the Justice and Development Party-JDP begun.

Until the formation and victory of JDP, the history of Turkish republic, especially after the transition to multi party regime, witnessed a specific kind of general will conceptualization. The transition to multi party regime generated the separation between state elites and political elites. While state elites were seen in the side of statist, westernalist and reformist policies, the political elites were thought to be in the side of ‘people’ or ‘nation’ who were alien to the top down reforms of republic. These political elites, after the transition to multi party, constituted the line which could be classified as ‘center right’. These center-right parties resumed the construct separation between state and nation and they politically benefited from it. During the establishment and the deepening of that separation between center-right and statist secularist tradition and their representatives, Turkish democratic history had witnessed the events that were supportive of center-right thesis. On the one hand, military interventions and party closures happened, on the other hand prohibitions on public appearance of religious practices such as legality of religious sects or the usage of hand scarf in public domain were experienced. However, main factors behind the support of center parties were not only those prohibitive executions but the discourse of center right which could turn those democratic problems to the object of political discourse under the heading of victimization. While doing this, the main concept that all the center parties used, was the concept of national will.

From DP to JDP all center right parties- with the exception of Özal's MP in discursive level- made use of the national will concept. They implied with this concept that they were came from the bosom of nation, they were representing the values and life styles of nation, they were the result of nation's will and the elections were the proof of that fact. The parliament therefore was accepted as the main mechanism for hearing the voice of the nation even not the only one. They reshaped the concept in terms of their demands and continually had underlined their nationality. This inevitably served the abstract construction of the nation and at the same time, abstract consumption of others of it. Limits of both these categories remained uncertain and blurred. This fact allowed politicians to assert that they were comprehensive. Since, nation was defined in an abstract way comprehensiveness of it could be shaped by the discourse of leaders. With all these discrepancies and abstractness, the term of national will concept in Turkey seems convenient to fill the empty space of power in modern democracies. However it would be R.T. Erdoğan who managed to make this filling with incremental concretization of the national will abstraction.

In the next part, Erdoğan's usages of the national will concept will tried to be analyzed. Historical developments, especially the main separation line in the history of Turkish Republic and in the experiments in center-right politics has been stated in this chapter for preparing the ground for Erdoğan's discourse. In the next part, genuine term of JDP and Erdoğan will be analyzed which is, in a sense, different from all its predicators, even it attributes to this tradition.

CHAPTER IV

‘NATIONAL WILL’ IN THE DISCOURSE OF ERDOĞAN

In the Turkey of 2000s , after the 80 years Republic experience and with the important effects of center right political tradition, a genuine national will discourse has been developed. This discourse, which is seen in a JDP, biggest political party of the country, is asserted to be both the successor of previous center right discourses on national will and have also new character. This new and overused notion of national will is thought to be understood through the discourse of the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of 11 years ruling party. In this direction, the object of this thesis has been put as comprehending the term ‘national will’ in the discourse of Erdoğan. Indeed, the points which are intended to be highlighted are the cleavages in his usage, and changes in the content of the national will term in his discourse. In what ways the concept used and how this usage become compatible with the Lefort’s theory on modern democracies, is tried to be stated with considering the fact that this discourse owes much to the center-right tradition and ever-evolving inheritance of republican history. With doing this, one of the most used concepts of Erdoğan during his 11 year power term, has tried to be enlightened. For these purposes, in this chapter, firstly the cadre and the movement which Erdoğan has been included are going to be mentioned. The conditions that has brought JDP, components and collaborators of it will be stated. Then, the national will concept in the discourse of Erdoğan is going to be given with the classifications that have been supplied with the research of 11 years data.

4.1. THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY-JDP

JDP is a political party that had been ruling Turkey since 3 November 2002. Naturally, it was the result of Turkish history of democracy. The question of whether it is the follower of the center-right tradition in Turkish politics is not the matter of this work. However, for handling JDP’s attitude related to the concept of national will,

attitudes of past center- rights' positions had stated in the third chapter. Here, before analysing the national will discourse of the chairman of the party, concise explanation of the JDP is going to be stated.

JDP was founded in 2001 by members of virtuous movement that was left from Felicity Party, and won three general election victories in 2002, 2007 and 2011, having won 34.3%, 46.6% and 49.8% respectively. Having almost won the two-thirds majority of the 550 parliamentary seats in 2002, the party won 341 seats in 2007 and 327 in 2011. The party currently has formed a third-term majority government since 18 November 2002. The party also maintained its electoral success in municipal elections in the years 2004, 2009 and 2014. It included the names from National Outlook movement, Motherland Party and Justice Party and True-Path Party. First, government of JDP was formed by Abdullllah Gül by the reason of the chairman of the party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's political ban. After the ban had been removed with a constitutional amendment Erdoğan was able to be elected as deputy and get into the parliament with election renewal in Siirt.

By the help of a brief overview of Turkish political history, we can discover that JDP is the outcome of the conjuncture triggered by 28 February process which divided the national outlook movement and made AKP to enter Turkish Politics. Innovationists have steamed from that process with gaining experiences about the limits of a party and political movement would face in Turkish politics. As stated by Öniş about the post 28 February process;

It became increasingly clear that a party that failed to respect the principles of secularism would have no chance of sustained and effective participation in the Turkish political system given its constitutional boundaries. Hence, this learning process was extremely important in pushing Islamist in Turkey toward a moderate, centrist direction. There was a learning process in the sense that hard line Islamist politics would appeal only to a small segment of the Turkish population.

Moderation was therefore a key toward the construction of a mass party of broad electoral support.²⁰⁹

Basically, both the separation of FP cadres and the closure they experienced, gave innovators a chance for trying another way. This way included the focusing of broad based interclass alliance instead of aiming to represent only the Islamist periphery. This new alliances would, and had to include the rural population, artisans' small trades in the cities, urban slum dwellers, rapidly rising Islamic bourgeoisie, liberals who were discontented with secularism statism and tutelage, moderate middle class in addition to older Islamists who are damaged from the secular policies of the republic. Fortunately, for JDP, existing political parties started to be unable to represent the demands and expectations of the segments that are stated above. They experienced a loss of prestige and became unable to carry the burden of politics and transformation.²¹⁰ JDP benefited from the failure of those parties and transferred votes from them. Analyses of the voter base of JDP demonstrated that the Party was not a direct descendant of any of the older parties; nor do the Party leaders claim such a lineage. Survey Researches showed that JDP seemed to have received substantial support from the former voters of the two center-right parties (MP and TPP) and those of the ultra- nationalist NMP in addition to more than half of the former Islamist FP voters.²¹¹ It might be said that the erosion of center in Turkish politics made room for JDP. Undoubtedly, the voters' disappointment with the performance (rather than policy position) of the existing political parties helped JDP to win the election of 2002. However, as Kumbaracıbaşı states, 'if the Party wishes to become more independent of the whims of protest voters, it needs to find occupy and defend a

²⁰⁹ Öniş 'The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party' in *Emergence of a New Turkey Democracy and AK Party* The (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2006), 211-212.

²¹⁰ İhsan Uzel, 'AKP Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü' in *AKP Kitabı* (İstanbul:Phonix, 2010), 11.

²¹¹ Hale and Özbudun, 37.

sufficiently large niche in the voter market. This niche needs to be defined in a way that links credibly to the JDP's origins as a moderate Islamic party.²¹²

Certainly, the process of 28 February and the inefficacy of the existing parties were just the two of the reasons behind the rapid increase of the JDP. There were some other parameters -some of them were linked to the former ones-that need to be mentioned. First and foremost, insufficiency of the existing parties was mainly linked to the economic conditions which would turn to be an advantage for JDP. In a word, JDP took over an economy that was eluded from making a plan for getting over economic crisis and finding funds for it²¹³ and this situation, according to Boratav, was the most convenient position for government change over.²¹⁴ In addition, first five year of the power of JDP, there had been revival of capital movements from metropolis to periphery in the world economy between 2002 and 2007. For Boratav, this was the most convenient condition for coming into power in the country which existed on the periphery of imperialist system.²¹⁵ Secondly The economic situation in the world and also the moderate preferences on the ideological and identity level served the demands of the West about the Turkish policy. These demands and the support that came after them constituted the international parameter behind the success of JDP. According to Laçiner, JDP corresponded to the West's demands- which had been shocked with El Kaide terror in 11 September 2001- was in search of a moderate Islam atmosphere in the Middle East. Due to this historical conjuncture, the west accredited JDP more than any other Islamist labelled parties and this reliance

²¹² Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı, *Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP : Dilemmas of Institutionalisation and Leadership Strategy*, (New York: Routledge press 2009), 156.

²¹³ Ömer Laçiner, 'AKP'nin Zor Yılları' in *Birikim Journal* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2013), v.294:3

²¹⁴ Korkut Boratav, 'AKP'li Yıllarda Türkiye Ekonomisi' in *AKP Kitabı* eds.Uzgel& Duru, (İstanbul: Phonix, 2010), 464.

²¹⁵ *Ibid*,463-464.

gave rise to the process of affiliating EU with the great impulsion of USA.²¹⁶ Thirdly this moderation and democratization wave which carries from the impulse of west or experience of 28 February process, provides an important support for JDP; support of the liberals and big capitalists from TÜSİAD. In addition, there is a developing group which support JDP and benefit from its government: the new Islamic bourgeoisie. When JDP starts out to be a neoliberal, globalist and reconciled with policies of new world order, it starts to create its organic bourgeoisie. And it makes small and medium Islamic capitalists organized under the associations like TUSKON and MUSİAD, as the supportive base.²¹⁷ Yavuz defines this bourgeoisie as the prime agent of transformation of Islamic movement:

One needs to explain how and why the party has adopted a more liberal line. The transformation of the Islamic movement in the form of shifting from oppositional to propositional is an outcome of underlying changes in Turkish society, especially changes in the new business class and new intellectuals. The prime agent of this transformation is the new emerging bourgeoisie rooted in Anatolia which evolved as a result of Prime Minister Turgut Özal's neo-liberal economic revolution.²¹⁸

Despite these alliances with capitalist, JDP can aspire the votes of the poor masses, who are mainly defined themselves in reference with Islam and tradition, and certainly gets what it wants. Herein, the role of identity, ideology and the assertion of authentic representation cannot be underestimated.

In terms of ideology, JDP decided to hold relatively moderate line again. The official ideology of JDP has been announced as the 'Conservative Democracy'. With this new term, JDP has separated itself from the Islamist ideology and *national outlook* perspective. They rather prefer conservatism for some internal and external reasons.

²¹⁶ Laçiner,4.

²¹⁷ Mustafa Sönmez, '2000ler Türkiye'sinde AKP Hakim Sınıflar ve İç çelişkileri' in in AKP Kitabı, (İstanbul: Phonix, 2010),179.

²¹⁸ Hakan Yavuz, The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and Ak Party, (Utah: The University of Utah Press, 2006), 2.

Firstly, internal dynamics of Turkish politics do not lead Islamic parties, which are conflicting with state norms, to survive. Parties who were introduced themselves Islamic and followed the line of national outlook world view, has been closed and banned by the constitutional court. In this respect, resting within the legal politics of secular Turkish Republic necessitates moderating the Islamic identity politics with more inclusionary discourse. This would also serve to attain votes of center parties in addition to votes of RPP tradition. According to JDP ideologues, this term would subserve the normalization of politics in Turkey and state –society relation. On the other hand, as stated before this kind of moderate Islam politics correspond to the demands of USA and Europe on the Muslim states. This new ideology is apparently useful on many aspects, but what does it mean clearly? Yalçın Akdoğan, one of the most important ideologues of JDP, provides the official version of the concept and summarizes its parameters as such:

According to conservative democrats, the field of politics should be firmly grounded in the culture of reconciliation. They favor a limited and defined form of political power. Conservative democracy considers political legitimacy to be based on popular sovereignty and the rule of law; political leaders achieve legitimacy by accepting the will of the nation. The state should be functioning small but dynamic and effective and it should never insist on specific preferences for its citizens or retreat to dogmatic and ideological stances. Conservative democracy rejects radicalism and social engineering and supports gradual and progressive transformation of society.²¹⁹

Conservative part of this ideology implies the importance given to traditional values and family while democratic part implies the importance given to freedom about religious and any other identities and life styles in addition to parameters stated above. This does not make, however, JDP a Muslim Democrat according to JDP cadres. As Erdoğan clearly states; ‘We are not Muslim Democrats, we are conservative

²¹⁹ Yalçın Akdoğan ‘The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity’ in Ak Party and Conservative Democracy’ in The Emergence of New Turkey: Islam Democracy and the Ak Party, eds. Yavuz , (Utah: University of Utah Press,2006), 50-51.

democrats. Our notion of conservative democracy is to attach ourselves to the custom and the tradition and the values of our society which is based on family. This is a democratic issue, not a religious one.²²⁰ Similarly, JDP's program called 'Development and Democracy Program' strongly emphasized democracy, human rights and the rule of law.²²¹ This identity is thought to be more unproblematic for substituting in the place of national outlook identity. According to Hale and Özbudun, this ideology and identity, which include limited government, the rule of law, centrality of the individual, free market economy, strong civil society, universal human rights, the importance of dialog, imply more liberal than conservative ideology, and this synthesis of liberal and conservative values, perhaps with a somewhat heavier emphasis on Islamic values, has also seen in other center right parties of Turkey.²²² Abandoning Islamism and establishing a conservative democrat ideology as previous center right parties, with giving it a name this time, helps JDP to gain legitimacy inside the country, and receiving support with escaping scepticism in the international arena.²²³ Moreover, this ideological preference brings the party a moderate voter. Kumbaracıbaşı states that 'the JDP leadership was able to combine Islamism, conservatism and traditionalism with moderate pragmatic and even liberal policies in some areas.'²²⁴ Surely, these combinations of ideologies ease attaching voters from several ideologies and backgrounds. However, maybe the more important achievement of this cadre is to establish the perception of representing periphery with the term conservative rather than democrat. According to survey that is led by Hakan Yavuz, majority of people in Turkey identify themselves as conservative but this

²²⁰ Erdoğan 2004 from Nur Bilge Criss, 'Dismantleing Turkey: The will of People' in Islamisation of Turkey Under the AKP Rule, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 44.

²²¹ Hale and Özbudun, 21.

²²² Ibid, 24-25.

²²³ İçener, 603.

²²⁴ Kumbaracıbaşı, 185.

conservatism implies the moderate conservatism rather than an extreme conservatism. When we ask the question of who are the most conservative amongst political and social groups in Turkey, we will find out the voters of JDP at the first stage.²²⁵ It is certainly not surprising that, in a country where majority of people regards themselves as conservative, the ideology of conservative democracy makes a splash.

All in all, as stated above, JDP, with its conditions of emergence and the support it takes from different strata of society, it can become the mass party of Turkey. On the one hand, it gains the support of liberals, religious facts, rising Islamic investors, Western countries in addition to some Arabic and Middle Eastern countries and it aims to adopt neoliberal policies, on the other hand, party presents itself as the representative of the periphery and the alienated people especially the Islamist and conservatives but generally the people who are the victim of the secular statist policies and military-bureaucratic tutelary of Republic. In other words, JDP intends to be the continuation of DP-JP-MP tradition in the matter of being political elite representing the national will against the state's will.

These moderate comprehensive tones in the party and the support it takes from wide range of fractions do not mean that JDP has not experienced objections. In its 13 years government term, JDP has faced set of compelling events in addition to the support it takes. These objections, which would be mentioned briefly on the following paragraph, are thought to be highly effective on the discourse of national will and the change in its discourse. They would be stated in a concise way in the following paragraph.

One of the effective objections came before 2007 presidency elections. Secularist opponents named these meetings as the 'Republic Meeting'. In 2008 it was asserted

²²⁵ http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/OSI-Conservatism-Sunus-Yorumlar1.28465456.pdf

that those meetings were organized for leading up to military intervention and an operation, called 'Ergenekon', was started against the ones who were thought to be responsible of that attempt, including the civil society members and some generals.

A year after eliminating this opposition, in 2008, the party faced a closure trial. Turkey's chief prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, asked the Constitutional Court of Turkey to close down the party on charges of violating the separation of religion and state in Turkey. The closure request failed by only one vote, as only the 6 of the 11 judges ruled in favour, with 7 required; however, 10 out of 11 judges agreed that the Justice and Development Party became "a center for anti-secular activities", leading to a loss of 50% of the state funding for the party.²²⁶

Besides, state and secularism centred oppositions, social and economic based objections begun to rise. Most effective proletariat reaction towards economy and labour policies of JDP government came in 2009 with TEKEL Labour Resistance. The resistance revealed the handicaps of the privatization policies. After the privatization of TEKEL, 8247 labour was repealed, and government proposed an unsecured staff position called 4-C. This protest, which opposed to the Article 4-C and wanted the repeal of it, became the biggest mass strike action after 1980. Similar protests, related to the right of workers, have been experienced during the government after this massive protest but TEKEL insurance can be said to be a country-wide movement that has created a great influence. Erdoğan and the government members declared those protest as illegal and ideological.²²⁷ Opposition against this new law draft about unsecure staff position and full time law started to grow and embodied fire-fighters, pharmacies and doctors. The government who was worrying about the

²²⁶ <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-323934-ak-party-to-ask-for-retrial-by-constitutional-court.html>

²²⁷ <http://haber.sol.org.tr/yazarlar/merdan-yanardag/tekel-direnisi-ve-genel-dayanisma-grevi-basarili-mi-23713>

growing tension withdrew the problematic law draft.²²⁸ And, in a sense, we can talk about an acquisition after that movement.

Another formidable situation was faced in June 2013 because of the protest of extra-judicial settlement decision about Gezi Parkland in Taksim. The protests were sparked by the outrage at the violent eviction of a sit-in at the park for protesting the plan. Subsequently, supporting protests and strikes took place across Turkey protesting a wide range of concerns, at the core of the protests there were issues of freedom of the press, of expression, assembly, and the government's encroachment on Turkey's secularism. During the protests, police's disproportionate use of force ended with the death of some protestors including a child.²²⁹ Workplaces, vehicles and public properties were damaged. These movements triggered the parkland forums where people came together and talked about the city and other political social issues. The government members and Erdoğan on the other hand, organized meetings called 'respect to national will' and also counter reactions towards protests. Beyond its own importance in social and political history of Turkey, Gezi Park Protests have very significant effects on the discourse of national will. That is to say, these protests and the following developments have constituted a cleavage in the discourse of national will. This cleavage is going to be mentioned when analysing Erdoğan's discourse.

Final reaction toward JDP government during the premiership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arouse in 17-25 December 2013. Those were the operations against corruption claimed about some ministers and sons of them. In that process, several recordings were come out and four ministers were obliged to resign. That process brought up the problem of national security and bugging activities in addition to the assertions of corruption including the name of Tayyip Erdoğan's son Bilal Erdoğan. Those operations were accepted as the operations of the religious sect of Fethullah

²²⁸ <http://www.gazetevatan.com/tekeli-iscilerinin-direnisi-sonuc-verdi-282758-ekonomi/>

²²⁹ <http://yasarkenyazilantarih.com/historyrecordedlive/#p=20>

Gülen. The sect of Fethullah Gülen which were old allies with JDP, started to have problems with JDP government mainly for the reason of the private teaching institutions²³⁰ and it was declared as a parallel structuring to the state and the counter operations was made against this sect. The related court did not process an indictment about the case files of corruption. But the effect of the conflict between groups and reaction of public resumed.

All these reactions have significant influences over the discourse of national will. It is seen that while the parameters that are stated as the bearer of JDP to the power have played a constative role of JDP power and to that extent, the general discourse of it and the parameters that are revealed through the reactions have a transformative role in the national will discourse of JDP and Erdoğan. For being able to state analytically the constitution and transformation of the national will discourse of Erdoğan, conditions that have brought JDP to the power and objections that JDP faced during its power have been analysed in this part of the thesis. After this part, it would be asserted that the usage of the national will term has undergone a change during the 11 years power term of Erdoğan. And for revealing the meaning and changes on the notion of national will, Erdoğan's discourse would be analysed. What is expected to be found is the new version of the old tradition both in historical and theoretical sense.

4.2. NATIONAL WILL DISCOURSE OF RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN: 'POWER AS NOBODY' TO 'POWER AND PEOPLE AS US'

It has been stated that, the concept of nation will mainly related to the popular sovereignty understanding of 18th century. From its beginning, the term national will has always been an abstraction and has never represented the wills of substantial entities. It can only be realized as the will of majority, or, the power as many. In addition, if the concept is scrutinized with Rousseau's conceptualization, it implies the common good, common interest, common utility of collectivity of people who have

²³⁰ 'Dershane' in Turkish

more or less similar characteristics and incomes even they are not homogenous. Because of these two reasons, which are stated briefly, this ideal has been criticized by 20th century theorists. It is said that, for the 20th century systems, it is not meaningful to talk about homogenous society with identical interests, instead, there are thought to be groups with different expectations. In this regard, it is considered that democracies after 20th century cannot be considered as societies which reflect the terms of common good and civic virtue. Even these societies have been still stayed under the roof of nation states; the possibility of talking about common national good has been diminishing sometimes, just because of the conflicts which are based on differences within the nation state. Therefore, former monist understandings of democracy which take use of the concept national will give its place to the pluralist views of democracy.

However this does not mean that the discourse of the concept of national will is ceased or the monistic approach to society in practice ends. Even in contemporary systems, theoretical explanatories of the term diminish, but its discourse and the ideology it contains, are still operative. Actually, the matter in here is not the real existence of the homogenous people and their homogenous interests or wills, but, the matter is that the abilities of politicians to create and feed this idea or abstraction of national will in accordance with prosperity of them and the system in which they compete in. As Wood states, the abstraction of nation might be capable of serving as an 'ideological device to deny or discuss the more immediate experiences of individuals or disaggregate and delegitimize, or at least to depoliticize, the solidarities that stand between the levels of individual and nation, such as those forged in the workplace, the local community, or in a common class experience.'²³¹ This

²³¹ Ellen Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2000), 211.

abstraction is applied differently by different countries having different political and social experiences.

As far as the situation in Turkey has been concerned; it is seen that this ability- the ability to create and feed the abstraction of nation- is pertain to the center-right parties and leaders. This is the result of the historical distinctive parameters such as republican elitism and secularism, reiterated military interventions, and the clientalist vote potential of the term owing to its ability to identification of politicians with the people as nation. Although, the ideal of ‘sovereignty belongs to nation’ and Rousseauian way of liberating people have been used by the republic and its ideologues, who gives the meaning and the current usage of the term have been the center-right leaders and governments. In their discourse, the term national will is encountered as abstraction as Wood states, or it fills the Lefort’s empty space of democracy. Among the thinkers who have signalled the harms or at least the misuse of the integrative national will understanding in the modern societies with parliamentary systems, Lefort’s approach might be said to be the most explanatory on the current usage of the concept in Turkey. He marks the current democracies with the invisible despotism²³² and assimilates democracies in 20th century to totalitarianism.

Modern totalitarianism arises from a political mutation, from a mutation of symbolic order, and the change in the status of power is its clearest expression. What in fact happens is that a party arises, claiming to be by its very nature different from traditional parties, to represent the aspirations of whole people and to possess a legitimacy which places it above the law. It takes power by destroying all opposition; the new power is accountable to no one and is beyond all legal control.²³³

As stated in the first chapter, the argument of this thesis is based on the Lefort’s idea about modern totalitarianism and it asserts that; the current usage of *national will*

²³² Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, (Cambridge: Polity Press 1988), 10.

²³³ Ibid:13

concept by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, corresponds to the illusion of *aspiration of whole people* in Lefort's proposition, and creates its unique abstraction about the people or nation in this usage. It is the main mechanism which Erdoğan attributes his legitimacy, it is one of the most used concepts by him and it has experienced several diffractions during the 11 year power of JDP. It is used for implying the difference from other parties which are in relation with the state tradition in Turkey, implies the authenticity of their party and assimilate into values of nation abstraction, it is used against the all kind of opposition and finally for positioning their claims above law. It is going to be asserted in this thesis that, the term of *national will* in Erdoğan's discourse serves the *invisible despotism* of Lefort and constitutes the most important part of the 'new symbolic constitution of the social.'²³⁴ This constitution uses the concept of national will for defining the nation and outsiders of it, establishes the limits of this nation and puts the absolute representatives of that national will who are also the part of it. This constitution of the social with the help of the discourse of national will brings tangibility to the abstraction of nation. The elected who are elected in majoritarian ways, serves this tangibility.

Therefore, it is going to be analysed in what contexts this tangibility diffractions occur and in what ways the concept of national will is used in the discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Starting from this point, what this concept is served for, why it is considered as an abstraction or how this abstraction become concrete, its absence of the constant mass and the increase in its exclusion, its relation with totalitarianism and to what extent the usage of this concept exceeds the former center-right parties would tried to be pursued.

For that purpose, indeed, for achieving the intent and the aim of the national will, the discourse of Erdoğan will be analysed in five headings. After the advertent scanning

²³⁴ Ibid:18

of all speeches of Erdoğan in his 11 year power term, these headings are constituted. These headings are classified in the way, which is thought to reveal the intrinsic points about the notion of national will. They have a thematic order and also indicate a historical process. Last headings, indeed, contain the speeches which have been encountered in the last term of the power of the JDP. In the first instance, and as the most encountered way of usage, will be stated under the heading of '*national will as authentic representation*'. It mainly implies that ruling group or person is legitimate to the extent that it is representing nation as of being the nation itself. It is part of the nation, coming from the bosom of nation and living in accordance with the culture and settled habits of the nation. In this context, national will concept also has anti-elitist and anti-secular emphasises which are thought to be prevalent in republican bureaucracy. Second heading explains the way of reaching this represented nation. It is the usage of '*national will as election results*'. It is asserted that national will appears only through elections and therefore majority of votes in the elections give us an idea about what the nation will is. According to this discourse, national will can only be concretised or reveal itself in the elections. It is seen as a way of hearing the voice of nation or seeing its will. This understanding brings the view of superiority of elected over other institutions and directs us to the third heading. Third and one of the most used ways of national will is the *national will against military tutelage*. This usage is mainly related to the legitimacy of the elected over the appointed. It is surely can be read as the response of four military interventions in the Turkish Republic history which have been faced by center right tradition and the fourth of them has been directly experienced by the movement from which JDP came from. Its main implication is the belief that the only legitimate authority in the country is the elected officials and more specifically the ones who are able to form majority in the parliament. Any other kind of structures should be under the command of the government. In this direction, the third usage of national will has been used with direct opposition to the military tutelage and with reference to the past. Fourth

heading also shares the similar tone with anti-tutelary mentality but this time it is aimed to surpass other institutions. It is the usage of '*national will against separation of powers*.' It implies that, national will, as government composed of elected officials, is the only authority on the society and all other powers such as judiciary have to be in accord with the legislative but more than legislative; the government. Finally, in the fifth heading, national will usage begins to be more divided and it is used against all kinds of oppositions. This part is named as '*national will against all kind of oppositions*'. As time passes national will starts to be used against all kind of oppositions in every respect from proletariat and syndicate revolts to environmentalist actions, from student protests to demands of the congregations. National will usage in its final sense becomes the will of the supporters of the governing party and any one or any group who criticizes it has been considered as out of the national will. In this way, the monist and in a sense collectivist concept of national will has been used in order to underline and deepen the dualism in the society. Actually, the purpose of creating this dualism with the concept of national will can be observed from the beginnings. It implies the authentic representer versus elites, elected versus appointed, majority from ballot box versus minority voters, government versus other powers as judiciary and legislation, and finally our party versus its criticals, indeed we and others. It would be asserted that the 'we', which is re-constructed with national will concept and becomes the 'we' as JDP sympathisers, is used for filling the place of power which is emptied by the monarch. Naturally, theoretical baggage of the term which contains general will, common good and sovereignty of people, eases the current usage and the aim of the term. These concepts provide content for abstract and shifting sphere for nation and national will. Therefore, analysis of the discourses on national will has been made with considering the theoretical perspective.

4.2.1. National Will As Authentic Representation: ‘I am the Nation’

I hold then that Sovereignty, since it is nothing but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the Sovereign, within is nothing but a collective being, can only be represented by itself : the power can will be transferred, but not the will. Jean Jack Rousseau.²³⁵

4.2.1.1. National will as ‘I am the Nation’

JDP, whether the result of rising Islamic bourgeoisie, or the project of west, whether the , or the failure of existing parties and economic crises, gained the election of 2002 under the leadership of Erdoğan and has governed Turkey alone 13 years long (from 2002 and 2015). During his power ‘JDP has positioned itself as the representative and even the embodiment of the segments of the society which are economically politically and culturally excluded. These segments that are told to be represented by JDP, comprise everyone except, the little minority who acquired the state and the ones who utilize the material and the moral rent that come from them. And this scope has been predicated as nation in the discourse of JDP.’²³⁶ Surely, this identification with nation did not begin with JDP. It is one of the determinant characteristics of center-right in Turkey. The right and rightist parties, but mainly the center right are pretended to represent values, faiths and life styles of large masses. Indeed one of their characteristics is the assertion of *authentic representation* and indigenouness.²³⁷ ‘Starting with DP, main subject which is objected has not been authoritarian politics of RPP but its alienation from society. As far as power switches to real representatives of society end would be gained. It was the meaning of democracy. Nuray Mert names this assertion as the assertion of authentic representation.’²³⁸ Mert adds the importance

²³⁵ Rousseau,57.

²³⁶ Menderes Çınar, ‘Kendi Ezberini Bozamayan Parti’ in Birikim Journal (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları 2012), v.283: 31.

²³⁷ Mert,101.

²³⁸ Ibid:101

of rightist leaders' backgrounds which have to be convenient to their base. Because, in Turkey, the discourse of the right has constituted its representation in relation to identification. This type of 'identification assumes homogenous society and the real representatives of it.'²³⁹ This also can be stated as the ability of right which is in communication with large masses.

From the beginning, in other words, since DP democracy has been defined as the *representation of national will*. This understanding does not only define democracy as the authentic representation of homogenous society but also underlines the absolute loyalty toward state when this representation occurs.²⁴⁰ In this context, the notion of national will in Erdoğan's discourse, which is used for underlying the authenticity of him and the party against the elites -who are thought to be economically and politically privileged and culturally corrupted- is analysed under the category of "national will as authentic representation".

JDP, and mainly Erdoğan who is the voice of it, continually repeats and regenerates the perception of being the nation itself against the culturally corrupted, secular and elitist republican elite and their political representatives and supporters. The discourse of *national will* in JDP is used for proving or at least for underlying this authenticity. As far as the discourses of Erdoğan considered, it is seen that these kinds of implications and explanations occupy the biggest place in the general discourse when compared to other categories. Erdoğan mainly places this identification with the nation around some concepts like; rose out of the nation, coming from it, and being part of it. This approach has been seen in the speeches of Erdoğan from 2003 to the end of his premiership.

²³⁹ *ibid*:101

²⁴⁰ *ibid*:53

He continually indicates the party's authenticity with stating that, JDP has been constituted by the nation (symbolically and substantially). Nation has launched as the formant or as raw material of the Party.

Today is a day of joy which connects Turkey's deep roots to its honourable future. Indeed, JDP is only, but the only party which is based on our nation and takes its power from Turkish nation and it is moulded by our nation. For this reason, our efforts come to fruition; the abundance of our success belongs to our country and our nation.²⁴¹

According to this understanding, JDP has come out of the nation and always underlines the importance of the nation. It is not the result of fortuitous events but it is result of the national will. JDP cadre, according to this discourse has been formed through answering the needs of the people which cannot be answered by republican tradition and previous parties.

JDP is neither a production of temporary winds or a periodic orientation nor a production of chance, on the contrary, it is the ultimate address of will of nation that has waited for many years within the roots of conscience of nations and JDP is the embodiment of searches and hopes of the nation. We entered into politics to realize our nation's demands, aspirations and their ideals. Our only guarantor is our nation. The starting point of JDP, that has mobilized Turkey's accumulation, common sense and collective conscience, is directly the nation and will of nation.²⁴²

JDP is said to be convenient with the life style, the way of thinking and the interpretation of the nation. It is stated to represent the common points of the nation. And for being able to understand the JDP, one should look into the nation. Erdoğan states that: 'Those who want to analyse us should study our nation's way of life

²⁴¹ Erdoğan, J DP 1. Grand Ordinary Congress, 12.10.2003 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁴² Erdoğan, The Meeting of the Organization of Women's Branch of İstanbul 17.02.2007 Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

first.²⁴³ According to Erdoğan, JDP represents the common points of the nation and he states that ‘They are the party of the common people’²⁴⁴. They, as the cadre of JDP, are said to be thought in the same direction with nation. And they take the steps in accordance with the nations desires:

We melted our own destiny and fate of our nation in the same pot; we see the same dreams with our own people... The major thing in our policy is being aligned with our people, to walk in parallel lines with nation and following the same historic route with them and the same line of fate.²⁴⁵

He also sees the nation as the background of the success of JDP. ‘Behind our success there is the pray of nation and there is nation itself.’²⁴⁶ This authenticity is the basis of the party’s success. Erdoğan continually states that they have the same feelings with the nation and this is the secret of their success.²⁴⁷ Here, it is aimed to be stated that we- cadre of JDP- are preferred by the people and gain the power because we are part of them. In relation to this, it is asserted that, in as much as they come from the nation itself, they can understand the nation best and they can be sensitive to their expectations and feelings. He expresses this assertion with saying that: ‘we came here as a delegate of yours and sharing same feeling and cares with our nation. Our destiny is same with people whose from Malatya, Sivas, Erzurum, Yozgat and Kütahya. We came today by the will of our nation.’²⁴⁸

JDP asserts that with the government of the party, that has come from the nation, is convenient with its real demands, the tense politics based on the tension between

²⁴³ Erdoğan, JDP 1. Grand Ordinary Congress, 12.10.2003 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Erdoğan, Kızılcahamam Meeting 27.09. 2004 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁴⁶ Erdoğan, Kızılcahamam Meeting 20.01.2007(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁴⁷ Erdoğan, Group Meeting, 24 05 2005 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁴⁸ Erdoğan, Malatyalılar Night 11. 03. 2007 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

elites and nation would be exceeded and Turkish politics would be normalized with their power. He names this base generally as the nation, however; this base is also named as the social center of Turkey. The social center of Turkey, to that extent, represents the nation and its will. Erdoğan indicates this idea in his speech in 2003 as follows:

The mission of our party is moving the demands and values of “social center” to the center of politics and hence to resolve the problems that engendered due to the distance formed between state and society. Over years, many projects have been produced by political elites to take steps to resolve this malfunction. What those elites could not do was accomplished by our unique nation through organizing “Anatolia Movement”. JDP was born from the demands of the nation; it brought together the periphery and the center of society.²⁴⁹

With the speech in the first ordinary congress of JDP, Erdoğan clearly puts the duality between elites and the nation and bounds the base of his power to the nation with underlying that they are the part of the nation. This nation also forms the social center. What is indented to be stated by the ‘we are not going to dispersed to edges’, is that; JDP would pursue the moderate center path as opposed to his former Islamist tradition. This moderate attitude -or discourse only- eases the desire of representing the nation in general or representing the social center as mentioned by Erdoğan. It implies the moderate center right which concretises itself with the JDP. Moreover, according to this discourse, nation, whatever its content is, gives JDP and Erdoğan an authorization for representing itself and realizing this representation in accordance with the values of nation, with its culture, its origin and its authenticity.

JDP, in other words, is asserted to be representing the social center in Turkey. This social center is defines the people who are economically disadvantaged, who have moderate ideological attitude, and who are positioned opposing to the former political center who are alienated from the society (as moderate people). This representation,

²⁴⁹ Eroğan, JDP 1st Ordinary Congress 12 October 2003, Same implication seen in 2. Grand Congress 11.11.2006(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

moreover, is thought to be the only way for Turkey to reach its deserved prosperity. It would prosper because as it is termed by Erdoğan it ‘talks to same language with the nation.’²⁵⁰ This belief or perception is emphasized in several speeches of Erdoğan. Behind the prosperity of JDP, there is the power of authentic representation.

JDP is the result of our nation’s true values and genuine reconciliation. JDP is the expression of our nation’s sensitivity and considering anything else cannot be possible. Because, this is the only way which we can reach a contemporary vision that is feeding from our self-values. Our beloved nation is moving confidently into the future with our government and with its own power²⁵¹

The assertion of “talking the same language with nation” is based on three main points. One of them is the Islamist attitudes which have created inequalities and victimisations during the republican history, in both JDP and in conservatist sections. (This victimization has blown up with the events about the use of head scarf in the public domains, and especially in universities and with the matter of religious schools related to the entrance of university). The second one implies the lower level, modest and rural life style within the members of JDP and people. The third one is the creation of this discourse by the identification themselves with public. For this identification they use the dialects of some regions and some folk poems in the same manner with the former center-right parties. It also serves for the comprehensiveness of the Party. In other words, Erdoğan states the similarity between the Party and the public with implying three things: ‘we have also experienced victimization related to religion, we are also coming from a rural background and low income strata, and we do not hesitate to talk within your mouth.’²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Erdoğan, Second Establishment Anniversary of JDP 14.08.2003(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁵¹ Erdoğan, Antalya Meeting 15.05.2003 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁵² Erdoğan, JDP’s 4th Anniversary Celebration 14.08.2005 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters) and similar example was seen in(AK Parti Belediye Başkan Adaylarının Toplu Tanıtım Töreni ve Kampanya Açılışı) 07.02.2009 / ANKARA)(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

Since JDP is thought to be gathered its power from the core values of the nation and since it is the nation itself, the will of nation would inevitably mean the will of JDP and vice-versa. JDP is claimed to be brought this core, the will of nation and this novelty in Turkish politics which is thought to be useful for social peace. While it regards and acts through this ideal, all the people are thought to be in the same mind. ‘Those who cannot encounter until yesterday, those being deaf to the voice of each other as if they live in different galaxies, today start to think together. That’s the stuff! JDP with its conservative democratic identity and its reconciled politics with our nation, the will of nation is transferred to politics.’²⁵³

This approach also enlarges the extent of JDP. It represents the whole people who are able to think rights of society and the good of society above all. Here, the comprehensiveness that may feed the national will theory has been put. All the members of nation have said to be in the same direction with JDP. This discourse splendidly corresponds to the definitions of totalitarianism of Lefort. It is said that this party is not just composed of the party members or the explicit supporters but everyone who shares the same idea. There cannot be a better concept than the nation, referring to everyone who gets together in the moderate idea. As stated by Erdoğan: ‘Our politics has been spread to a large area that is based on the nation which cannot fit into this roof. Do not forget that JDP is nothing but the nation itself. Do not think that JDP is not just composed of people who have the lapel pin of our party’²⁵⁴

In this direction, homogenization of the ‘right’ has been settled incrementally. It, to some extent, resembles the core meaning of the general will with its being always upright and reflects the good of all. Here, the good is determined by the party which

²⁵³Erdoğan, JDP’S 4TH Anniversary Celebration 14.08.2005 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁵⁴Erdoğan JDP Antalya Consultative Meeting Opening Speech 24.06.2006 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

purports the representing the will of nation. Therefore, ‘since nation does not represent substantial entity, its representation depends upon a political discourse and is bound up with ideological debate.’²⁵⁵ In other words, Erdoğan’s usage of the nation as the party’s base and core and as opposed to the other system parties especially the secular republican elites, gives him a chance to establish his ideological perspective as the ‘perspective of nation’ and gives him a divine and privileged character. Since he represents the nation as being part of it, as being authentic extension of it, his words and politics also reflect the will of nation or the common good. He and his cadre are the projections of Turkey as a whole. This can also be seen in these words: The strength and the will of Turkish nation are represented here.²⁵⁶ JDP is the name of the nation’s will. We are the hope of this country, its power and its will.’²⁵⁷

To that extent, opposing the JDP means to oppose the nation because of this representation and the embodiment relation. And because JDP represents the normalization of Turkey with the real representation of nation, opposing the party means to oppose normalization and it is considered as in contrast to the interest of nation. Similarly, decisions or ideas of JDP are thought to accurately reflect the ideas of nation. The discourse of ‘we are nation, our will is the will of nation, eases this perception. Moreover, the backgrounds and victimization experiences of the party members and Erdoğan serve for this discourse. This category of nation also includes all economic classes. Any of them cannot be considered out of JDP. It comprises all the strata. It is not surprising; because of the fact that the term of nation is the abstraction and its inclusion degree can be increased or decreased according to the conjuncture. ‘Firstly, this nation deeply believes that whatever made during this

²⁵⁵ Claud Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, (Cambridge: Polity Press 1988), 18.

²⁵⁶ Erdoğan, Group Discussion 14.11.2006 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁵⁷ Erdoğan, The dinner with AK Party İzmir Organization 18.12.2005 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters) and the similar implication in JDP Meeting in 06.09.2010 in ŞANLIURFA (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

government period were done for this nation. Because, once again I say, we are artisan, we are farmers, we are workers, and we are civil servants'.²⁵⁸ Surely JDP's declared ideology as conservative democracy eases the inclusive discourse of it. It is thought to be representing the values of whole society indeed all strata of society. It serves the possibility for politicians of JDP to identify themselves with people on the discourse of this conservatism, regardless of their classes. It is absolutely a comprehensive point and it eases the establishment of a duality between secular elites. In other words, while JDP constitutes itself as being the nation with the help of conservatism and the majority of votes -this would be stated below-, at the same time it otherise the former elites of republic, who, in time, would be include everyone opposing JDP.

4.2.1.2. National will against the Secular Elite and Elitism

In addition to JDP's assertion of being the nation itself, the discourse of national will also serves the definition of this nation through indicating the 'other' of that nation. The main distinction between JDP and the others has been put by JDP through the discourse of the nation and the national will. JDP has been stated as the nation and the others have been declared as state elites and political elites who pursue the ideology of state elites. Those elite groups are asserted to damage the genuine/authentic sons of the country with the policies that are alienated from culture and tradition of this country. Absolutely, the perception of some republican reforms and mainly the laicism has been the matter of debate between these –nominal- groups. The distinction is constituted mainly through this secularism and conservatism debate. However, the 'real laicism' as they called, has never been rejected. The distrust of republican elites - more concretely the state elites as explained above- to the people has been continually underlined and become one of the most important elements of the construction of the

²⁵⁸ Erdoğan, 2006-2007 Opening Speech of Budget Discussions, (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

nation and its will. Erdoğan summarizes the opinion of the side which he terms as nation as such:

They said in Turkey “politics are made by handful elites, people could not determine the direction of politics and the will of nation is insignificant.” Our nation was underestimated, and they were subjected to humiliation by those elites who lived in their ivory towers. They said, those come from suburbs, the lower classes, suburban, rural migrants and doorman cannot govern this country. ...Certainly, Tayyip Erdoğan was not the main issue. From my point of view, all these mean was this; what they want to say is that those who came from Altındağ, Keçiören, Kızılcahamam, Sincan, Etimesgut and Yenimahalle cannot govern this country, because those people could not handle the government, these are what those elites think. Those who begrudge democracy from our people were said “you are not actor of politics in Turkey” right to our people’s face.²⁵⁹

Erdoğan here assimilates himself with the despised people. He firstly puts the separation between elites and the nation. He sometimes uses the term nation and the term people interchangeably however the intent of them is almost fixed. This category implies the lower classes, rural immigrants, inhibitors of the suburbs, and to that context it is asserted to include the members of the movement of JDP and Erdoğan himself. He does not detach himself from these excluded groups and claims to represent them against the mistakes of the state elites and their political extensions. In this context, in the target, there is the emphasis of injustice or the victimization that has been experienced by Erdoğan; there is also nation and the suffering of the nation as a whole. They are suffering because they are the part of the nation. This identification between these groups, aims to gather their supports with the reason of knowing their suffering and being one of them. His victimization is related to republican policies toward Islamism and conservatism; therefore, he constitutes the *nation* on this point and on this line of distinction. Just as nationalism degrades nation, which is thought to be homogenous, to a representable object of politics, conservatism

²⁵⁹ Erdoğan, JDP Women’s Branch Second Congress 06.04.2008 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

also turns nation to the object of a dignification such as quiet conservative mass or the substantive element. One of the ways of this dignification is the assertion of identification with this nation as outsiders, and the other way codifies conservatives as the organic representatives of this nation.²⁶⁰ Elites are, on the other hand, continually criticized on account of the fact that they underestimate and humiliate this nation. What has to be done politically, according to Erdoğan, is not to impose policies to nation but rather attribute policies to the nation, or the will of nation. ‘We are not those who impose their understanding of politics to people. We represent a line which deduces right politics from the nation itself. Hence, we are neither distinguished from our nation nor our thoughts are separated from their way of thinking’.²⁶¹

Erdoğan uses the term *national will* in his discourse under this heading- indeed when he aims to say that he belongs to that nation and he is the authentic representative of it- he uses it in the same meaning with the term *nation*. In other words, in these speeches related to authentic representation, nation tacitly implies the will of nation, and the national will implies the nation itself. In this annotation, Erdoğan clearly states that he uses the term national will as people and in continuance, uses nation in the same meaning.

I wish they (the opponents of JDP) walked together with our nation, I wish they paid attention to the demands of our nation, I wish they had given up politics of tribalism and factionalism, I know it is difficult yet I wish, only once they broke their routine and accepted the will of our nation, I mean abandoning to insult and deriding our nation. I wish they had internalized democracy and accepting competitive ground of politics, I demand this political maturity from them.²⁶²

It is seen from here that, ‘nation’ is used for the place of people who are despised by republican elites and this means the despising of the will of nation. The equalisation of

²⁶⁰ Yüksel Taşkın, *Milliyetçi Muhafazakarlık Çözülürken Merkez Sağ’da Miras Kavgası ve AKP’nin İmkanları* in *AKP Yeni Merkez Sağ mı*, eds. Kurt, (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları 2009), 161.

²⁶¹ Erdoğan JDP Second Congress of Women Branch 06.04.2008 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁶² Erdoğan, Kızılcahamam/Ankara 31.05.2008 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

nation, national will and people can be revealed from that speech. In the general discourse, it is also known that this equation also includes the JDP. What is reached at the end, is the equalisation of nation with national will, with people and finally with JDP. All this equation is actually constituted for emphasizing the belief that JDP is the nation. Then, the democracy is also defined in terms of this equation.

This equation, however mainly has been put forward for the sake of creating a dualism. On the other side of the equating JDP with nation and national will, via the discourse of coming from their bosom and feeling the same way with the nation, is the otherising and criticizing opponents as being elitist and alienated from nation. After a while this discourse causes the accusation of elitism toward all kind of objection toward JDP. From that point on, national will abstraction is constituted through the critics in the secular elite and from their alienation.

Those people accuse our nation as rude and illiterate, those people claim that election is not everything, democracy is not everything, and they even say that will of nation is nothing. Those people do not see the fact that their vote is equal with my shepherd's brother, farmers' one and the vote of man's from Çankırı. They disdain our nation. They look down on our nation. They humiliate our people.²⁶³ ... Those people are so alienated from our country, they misinterpret the favour of our nation to our party and they seek our nation's favour on coal, rice and paste.²⁶⁴

These criticisms have been associated with the historical attitudes of mentioned elite groups and their way of thinking. They are considered to be uncomfortable with the achievements of the nation and they aim is considered as harming these achievements and the concise form of these achievements: JDP. According to tis implication, while JDP continually aggrandizes values related to nation, the secular elite continually insult these values and people. These elites include the columnists, the academicians

²⁶³ Erdoğan, JDP Çankırı Providence Meeting 25.03.2009/Çankırı (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁶⁴ The Opening Ceremony of İBB Taksim- Şişhane and 4. Levent-Maslak Subway Line and Atatürk Automobile Industrial Complex 30.01.2009/ İstanbul (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

and the bureaucrats. And the main criticizing idioms come from the columnists.²⁶⁵ This feeds the national will discourse as a part of the opposition between the nation versus its insulters.

You are a stranger in your homeland, you are a pariah in your motherland... this is exactly what they ascribe to our people... They do not respect to our nation's choices. They do not respect to the discretion of our nation. They do not esteem the demands, desires and expectations of the nation. They have seen themselves as owners of this country, not the nation. They have taken decisions in the name of the nation but against the nation. While they are saying "sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation", they are also accusing the nation of being "purblind" and rude....²⁶⁶.

Erdoğan surely does not skip over these appeals and uses them in the construction of their nationality. These critics are implicitly for the JDP voters therefore they can be considered as proofs of the views of elites. However JDP does not deny these critics but announces itself as a part of this insulted nation. This is one of the important ways of identification.

Those people who have exploited our country's benefits for decades speak with authority to our people from there. Those people have looked down to our nation from their glasshouse. These are the elites, elites. They do not know anything about poverty. They are unaware of village without a path, a field without water. They do not know the sufferings of our nation. They do not trust even the will of nation, they do not believe in democracy. We gave the game away! Here we put an end to this elite sultanate. Here with your authorization we have stopped them. From now on, the word is yours (nation), from now on, you will take decision, and from now on, the authority and the seal are in your hands.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ Most known columns are the two; which includes the idioms that characterise the supporters of JDP as 'man scratching his potbelly', and bin headed man.

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/6449176.asp>

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/7074842.asp>

²⁶⁶ Erdoğan, JDP Skaraya Providence Meeting 14.08.2010 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁶⁷ Erdoğan, JDP Kayseri Providence Meeting 21.08.2010 Kayseri(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

Erdoğan states that the elites humiliate him and since he is the part of the nation, they humiliate the nation, at the same time. In the same direction when Erdoğan prospers notwithstanding these elitist interpretations and applications, the nation becomes to prosper. Those sentences below indicate this approach of Erdoğan;

They are supposed to humiliate us. They also today look the same way to us as yesterday, yesterday they call us drum heads and the man who scratch his belly, and today they say we are brainless and stupid. In their newspaper, they write “he could not manage even a village” about me, but today thanks to God, the nation has taken power in his hands, and nation has done what he has to do.²⁶⁸

In these discourse JDP’s and Erdoğan’s identification with nation is revealed again. And what is as explicit as this, is the fact that, this identification has been constructed through positioning elites against the nation. It is stated in this quotation that the distinction between the nation and the elites has its own history. The continual process of insulting nation has asserted to be ceased with the power of JDP. Because it is considered that, this insulted nation, who are put as JDP members, have taken the power from the elites. Therefore, this cadre is aware of what is the meaning of being insulted. These two assertions, the assertion of authentic representation and the assertion of positioning against elites, indeed fuse each other. Erdoğan is opposed to the elites because he is the part of the nation not the part of the elites and he is also part of the nation because he positions himself against the elites.

Ahh! My brothers in Kayseri; we know what is to be a second-class citizen. We know what is being humiliated, falling into contempt. We know those people’s bad treatments who suppose that they are the owners of this country. This mind-set for decades has told us that “you cannot produce anything”, “we will govern you”. Then, we tell them” we are the nation, we are the owners of this country, we are the sons of this country, and we are the lovers of this country.” The third of November is the date of nation’s coming of the power²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸ Erdoğan, JDP Sakarya Province Meeting 05.06.2011(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁶⁹ Erdoğan, JDP Kayseri Providence Meeting 29.05.201/ Kayseri (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

This criticism towards elites and the identification with nation always goes hands in hand with the distinction between religiosity and conservatism in the context of Turkey. The nation has always been marked with religion while elites representing the secular side are even considered as the enemies of religion. Surely, laic reforms of Republic have fed the perception related to elites and the religious vocational high school graduation of Erdoğan and most of his cadres feed the religiosity of the JDP.

Those parts, of course now cannot understand our concept of “pious generation”. Because they do not know our sufferings, they do not hear our painful voices. They have never seen what bureaucrats, media, intellectuals, and the wealthy elites have done to us, and they do not want to see. From now on, those elites do not take this offence but, we have in this country. We are the owners of this country and we are the sons of this country.²⁷⁰

Here the segment of the society which is told to be persecuted by elites is equalized with the nation. Thus, the will of these people, including the JDP cadre, inevitably should be the will of the nation. Another point that is worth mentioning is the emphasis of ‘sons of this country’. This phrase implies the authenticity and includes the assertion of real owners of the county. This usage also serves for the legitimacy of JDP power.

We can observe similar discourses related mainly to the secularist characteristics of elites during the presidency elections in 2007. Related to the matter of selection the president, which caused the problems, this dualism between elites and people, was reawakened. The process witnessed the debates of laicism and headscarf. During this elections in 2007 the candidate of JDP was protested by the parliamentarians from opposition parties because they saw him as a threat to the republican principles which should be exactly represented by the chair of presidency. And therefore, constitutional requirement of two thirds of majority-367 votes- could not be reached by candidate of

²⁷⁰ Erdoğan, The 3rd Ordinary Congress of JDP’s Youth Branch 29.04.2012 Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

JDP in the first two rounds. That process together with the opposition meetings from laicist people gave JDP a new level for countering the secular state elite and emphasis the being the nation of themselves. This discourse has continued to be used as long it is thought to be needed. Before many elections including the referendum in 2010, this debate about presidency elections has been reminded.

We put an end to reign of those elites. We stopped them thanks to your authorization that you gave us. We have said a last word, it is the nation. Now power is in the hand of the nation. Now nation will decide, now nation has an authority. What did they say? They told you that “you cannot choose president.” They use the strangeness of 367 as an excuse. Remember what was happened. They threatened our deputies in parliament. They watched our deputies in their private rooms. They put pressure on their choice. They published reports in midnights. Well, then we told them let’s go to the election! Nation will decide on this issue. What did nation decide? The nation said JDP in a strong voice, he said democracy and national will, and he said justice, justice...

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The quotation is one of the clearest annotations from the speeches of Erdoğan revealed after the protests of the Republic Reception in 2010. Here, RPP members protest the reception because they see JDP’s background and policies inconvenient to the republican ideals. This situation is crystalized and materialized with the issue of headscarf. Erdoğan, here, claims that the criticisms toward their government and his presidency reflect the criticisms and the disposal of the people and the nation. It can be inferred from the identification his power with the nation.

In the previous day, they boycotted the Republic Reception that arranged for the honour of the 87th Anniversary of the founding of the Republic. For years, people of this country had not been let in this reception, they were kept out from there, and they were excluded. This nation had not been let into the Ankara’s distinct Ulus (it means nation in Turkish) due to their appearance and dress. Then young girls were turned

²⁷¹ Erdoğan, JDP Kayseri Providence Meeting 21.08.2010 Kayseri(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

back from the door of universities because they had modest dress according to their belief. Now look, this repressive mind-set, this oppressive mind-set did not participate the reception because our people came to the reception. They are troubled with the nation. They are uncomfortable with the smell of the nation's sweet blood. They do not want to share the same feelings with us.²⁷²²⁷³

During the election campaigns for precedency, Erdoğan finally insisted upon his national and authentic character against other candidates and demanded vote from this direction. He defined his possible victory in precedency as the consolidation of nation with the republic. Here, he underlines his discourse that implies that I am the nation itself.

Are you ready to vote the candidate of nation, Aydın? Who is this candidate? Who is this candidate? Mashallah, barekallah.²⁷⁴In this election, you should leave political parties aside; you will choose either the candidates of elites of old Turkey or new candidates of the nation, I expect you to vote to a new candidate.²⁷⁵

It is clear that Erdoğan identifies himself and the movement of JDP as the nation itself. Therefore, the success of the JDP means the success of nation, critics toward JDP means critics toward nation, decision and will of JDP, means will of nation. This is supported by the moderate Islamic life style, middle class attitudes, accepting rural and cultural values as the basis of the life and otherising the secular elite. They pretend to be in harmony with nation, this fact in turn, is thought to make them successful in the elections.

²⁷² Erdoğan, Public Opening Ceremony of DSİ, Şanlıurfa 31.10.2010 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁷³ These implications on victimization of masses and aggrandising them with the honour of being part of nation and popularising the conservatism and conservative religious masses can be read on the conservative populist context. This context is not positioned the focus of this work.

²⁷⁴ Erdoğan, Augustus, 06. 014-6:51 Aydın: akp.org

²⁷⁵ Erdoğan, The speech at High Speed Train Eskişehir July 25 2014 akp.org.tr./genel-baskandan/

Inasmuch as JDP is the nation itself, the elections' results should be compatible with the will of JDP. Since 2015, it has been realized in that way. Actually it has never been stated directly that the term national will is just related to election results, but the use of notion causes the term national will to rise. However, the election results ease this perception both in JDP and people. Mainly these two emphasizes; the emphasis of authentic representation and the emphasis of election can be considered in different categories. More precisely, they are the reasonable followers of each other, not the interchangeable usages. From that point national will is used for underlying the authenticity of JDP and Erdoğan. The debate of whether they are really same as nation or the success of nation as Taşkın states, cannot be explained by their discourse of being one of us, but their ability to create those images and persuade people to it.²⁷⁶ However the discourse is free from ambiguity, whatever the aim is, it is said that we are the nation and therefore, only we can represent it accurately.

4.2.2. National will as the Result of Election

Nothing makes the paradox of democracy more palpable than the institution of universal suffrage. It is at the very moment when popular sovereignty is assumed to manifest itself, when the people is assumed to actualize itself by expressing its will, social interdependence breaks down and the citizen is abstracted from all the networks in which his social life develops and becomes a mere statistic. Calude Lefort²⁷⁷

Elections also have critical importance in the discourse of national will. Because this will of nation is thought to be manifested in the elections. The concept of democracy is also bound to this fact and this definition works when the democracy is the revealing of national will through the elections.

²⁷⁶ T  ksel Taşkın, Milliyetçi Muhafazakar Entelijensiya, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları2013), 80-83.

²⁷⁷ Lefort, 18-19.

This authentic representation relation between nation and the ones coming out of them, their genuine representer in other words, arises from the ballot boxes. National will in this context is used as the result of ballot boxes. Nation, in other words, expresses itself through votes. The concise form of this usage explicitly states that what nation wills and can be understood from their voting preferences. And what they prefer can be seen in the votes of majority. This is the majoritarian democracy where the will of majority is given a priority. Many or majority rules this system but this time with the representation principle and through their authentic representatives. Indeed, the collective decision making of the majority is beside the mark. In this type of democracy, ‘many’ vote and their authentic representer decides. We can remember even Rousseau cannot get out of this problem and recommends the majoritarian principle in voting.²⁷⁸ However, we should bear in mind that, what Rousseau foresees is the small society of common good. On the other hand, as Lefort indicates voting does not always mean that people are ruling. Instead as Schumpeter Dalh and their contemporaries mention that it means voters decide only who is going to rule.²⁷⁹

In the case of Turkey, electoral system was established after the Republic. In 1946, the first general election with multi party was done. However as Demirel stated, democratic regime did not eliminate the distinction between rulers and the ruled.²⁸⁰ After the power of DP and then its successor center right parties, this distinction is concealed with the national will term. With the help of national will, the ruler and the ruled are considered to be the same and this relation that occur with elections is seen as the realization of the national will. Erdoğan has not generated but resume this perception. Because of the untermimated threat of the military intervention and anti-secular background of the party member, Erdoğan needs this emphasizing and has

²⁷⁸ Rousseau, 102-109

²⁷⁹ See Joseph A.Schumpeter, ‘Capitalism Socialism and Democracy’ (USA: Routledge Press 1996)and Robert Dahl, ‘A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2006)

²⁸⁰ Demirel,T. 2011:11 Türkiye’nin Uzun 10 yılı, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul

done so. Ballot box according to him is the honour²⁸¹ of the nation.²⁸² Erdoğan states that; ‘Nation declares his will and choice through elections, through elections, he chooses government’.²⁸³

What is revealed in the elections according to Erdoğan’s discourse is the will of nation. He states that ‘the result of the election of November 3rd is that, people thought that in Turkey things were not going well but the conscience of them would not tolerate it anymore, and they showed it with their political power.’²⁸⁴ Since the elections reveal the will of nation, parliament majority as a result of elections can be the major representative of national will. Erdoğan uses this understanding with referring also the Republic’s ideal of ‘sovereignty belongs to the nation’.

Great Leader Atatürk’s sentence “Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation” is the clearest evidence that the heart of our democracy is Turkey’s Grand National Assembly. The will of the nation is embodied under this roof. The people who are under this roof represent the common will of the nation and the conscience of the nation.²⁸⁵

However, at the beginning of his power, Erdoğan defines democracy as more than elections. He states that democracy requires free social discussions and excludes insistent decisions from above. In this context, according to Erdoğan ‘Conservative Democracy’ ideology and universal democracy ideal is compatible.

What we mean by democracy is not a scheme that people go to the polls at regular times. Democracy is a political regime that determined on the basis of civilized and ongoing public debates, but not the regime which public benefits are determined by the impositions from non-democratic centres. It means that

²⁸¹ ‘Namus’ in Turkish

²⁸² Erdoğan, Municipality meeting 18.09.2013 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁸³ Erdoğan, JDP Parliamentary Group Meeting 10.02.2009/ Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁸⁴ Erdoğan, Antalya Province Meeting 15.05.2003 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁸⁵ Erdoğan, The Symposium of the National Sovereignty and Politics 19.04.2004 Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters

democracy is a system based on free discussions that excludes predetermined, constant and standing solutions. In this sense, Conservative Democrat politics does not see any contradictions between the values of this country and universal democratic values.²⁸⁶

Democracy, according to this speech in 2004 is not just the election. ‘What is ideal, in his words, ‘is not the mechanical democracy which is degraded to the specific institutions but an organic democracy which spreads the administrative, social and political domains.’²⁸⁷ However, it is not the only democracy defining of Erdoğan he also states: Democracy is another name for development and justice (reminding also the party’s name) because democracy is the reflection of people’s will to the government.²⁸⁸ Democracy in this usage means the reflection of national will to the government. He states that, they, as JDP movement, see the elections as a way of reaching the national will. We see elections as the manifestation of national will, not the means of fighting’.²⁸⁹ And this national will here manifested in the form of JDP. The national will is said to be resigned to the JDP: While national will prefer the JDP and its candidates, it made a comparison...²⁹⁰ This discourse includes also the implication that JDP is the party that is confirmed by the nation, and its victory is the result nation’s decision. This perception can be seen from introduction of this sentence: “When we as JDP come to power with nation’s decision...”²⁹¹ What is certain in here is that the elections are the decisions of nation and nation decides the JDP.

²⁸⁶Erdoğan Kızılcahamam Meeting 27.09.2004 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁸⁷ Erdoğan, JDP International Conservatism and Democracy Symposium 10.01.2004 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁸⁸ Erdoğan, DİYARBAKIR TOKİ Ceremony 12.08.2005 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁸⁹ Erdoğan, İstanbul Province Meeting, 20.03.2004 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁹⁰Erdoğan, The opening speech of Kızılcahamam Meeting in 01.04.2005 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁹¹ Erdoğan, 1. Youth Congress, 10.04.2005(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

It is both stated that the elections alone would not enough to democracy, and democracy is the reflection of will of people to government, and national will appear in the elections. While democracy cannot be reduced to elections, elections are seen as not only but most important component of it. And while national will cannot be reduced to the results of elections, these results are seen most concise and precise reflections of national will in addition being the most legitimate and thereof most important one. In democracies, the will of nation is manifested in the ballot boxes and we are pretty close to the ballot boxes.²⁹²In this annotation, Erdoğan marks the ballot box as the place where national will appears, but this time includes the wills of all the citizens in this national will. This does not always indicate what is mentioned. At the end, the majority says the last words. And the hidden point here is that the underlying belief of majority indicates the common good, or in the words of Erdoğan common wisdom. In the context of Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia, Erdoğan indicates some of his views on democracy as follows;

We have never believed that democracy will lead to a chaos. We have never believed democracy will emerged form radicalism. The free, fair and democratic election certainly is not a thing to be afraid of. Because, nation's common sense, conscience collective does not do wrong. It does not tend to the incorrect. If there is any problem, the solution place will be the ballot boxes, and nation.²⁹³

Here common wisdom is thought to be generated from the elections. If so, vote of majority in this electoral system, inevitably becomes the representative of common wisdom. This is not as comprehensive as in the 2 May 2007 speech. In other words, comprehensive franchise does not mean a comprehensive democracy. This is what majoritarian democracy is. National will as the will of majority appears here.

²⁹² Erdoğan, Group Discussions, 02.05.2007(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

²⁹³ Erdoğan, JDP Group Meeting in Parliament 01.02.2011 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarters)

Erdoğan states this importance of elections on the determination of national will during the election campaigns of presidency: ‘Please go the ballot box because this election is the one, national will would be manifested in its purest way’²⁹⁴ through which elections have begun to be seen more important than other component of democracies and it is concretized with the term of national will. This also encountered in the 2013 dated speech: ‘In March, we will make history that there is no power above the will of the nation. We will declare on March that in Turkey the will of nation purely and simply seal the fate of this country not those elites, not newspapers, not capitalist, and not the streets.’²⁹⁵

What is the common point of these annotations is not only their content but also their dates. The former speech belongs to 2014, last years of Erdoğan premiership and latter is from 2013. Therefore, it can be argued that, other important point that is worth of looking is the fact that the increase of democracy usage and associating it with elections during the pre-election times and usage of this version have increased chronologically in the JDP government. First version of national will usage, in the first terms of JDP government begun to be disappear in time. It is saying that national will manifests itself not only in elections but every day and every moment. It is not the passive mass. It is understood from that this mass is active and consciously prefers the JDP. This perception is used against the elites and non-elected forces such as military to indicate the active and conscious role of ‘*nation*’. As years have passed, or in the changing contexts, this understanding of democracy in JDP and Erdoğan has eroded or as far as critics on their election success rise, their return to the electoral and majoritarian democracy has been revealed in their speech. Erdoğan states that in 2006 as follows: ‘There is no place in Turkish political life for those people who suppose that nation is nothing but a manipulable mass. The will of the nation does not manifest

²⁹⁴ The TV Program named ‘Candidates are Speaking’ Ankara in 06.08.2014 akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

²⁹⁵ Erdoğan, County Mayor Meeting 18.09.2013 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

itself from election to election but it manifests itself every day, and every moment',²⁹⁶ but when it comes to 2010 he utters the following sentences: Elections and referendums are the most important indicators for revealing the will of the nation. This is everyone's responsibility to accurately understand the message that came from people by these indicators and everyone should accurately understand what those people want.²⁹⁷

Erdoğan ratifies the nature of majoritarian democracy through the national will concept. He states that he cannot understand why his emphasis on national will becomes a problem. He rejects the majority's domination on minority discursively but at the same time indicates the threats of reverse situation in Turkey. 'So, we will together oppose the domination of majority over minority. We will always stand against that. However, we will also oppose the domination of minority over majority as happened one decades in Turkey in the name of democracy, we will always stand together against this opposition.'²⁹⁸ He accepts the importance of rules and laws for governing but underlines that their power of JDP is based on majority above anything else. This majority, according to him, gives legitimacy of the decisions of JDP because it bases the will of nation. In his several speeches until the end of 2000s Erdoğan mentions the importance of elections and votes of majority while also touching upon other democratic institutions: 'Of course, participatory democracy cannot be reduced to a numerical majority, but the numerical majority is not as insignificant as they think, because there is the will of nation behind the numerical majority, it is the nation that sends the numerical majority to the parliamentary.'²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ Erdoğan, The Opening Speech of JDP Consultation Meeting /Antalya 24.06.2006(Unpublished Raw Data From Head Quarter)

²⁹⁷ The Statement that made after the result of the Referendum about Constitutional Amendment 12.09.2010 İstanbul(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁹⁸ Erdoğan, General Assembly of TOBB 01.08.2013(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

²⁹⁹ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 29.04.2003(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

This majority according to Erdoğan should not be underestimated, because it indicates the nation and the national will. He states that: ‘Underestimating the majority of Assembly that is representing the will of nation will not serve the stability in the country.’³⁰⁰

At the beginning of their power, the party has been mentioning about pluralist democratic approaches prevalently. However even in those terms, importance of majority of votes has been underlined. The most important way of underlying the elections and their results has always been legitimizing with the national will concept.

Our democratic majority in the assembly is based on the will of nation. Insulting this parliament means insulting the nation. Nobody should narrow the limits of politics with creating rough pluralism debates. We know and we believe that pluralism is the main principle of the democracy. But the logic of the pluralistic democracy is based on the principle of the majority, otherwise minority will be the domination of minority over the majority, I have just told before, this invites the authoritarianism. We are a country that refuse authoritarianism and accept democracy. Therefore, none should attempt to underestimate JDP’s power that is given by the majority of people and none should attempt to present this power something unimportant.³⁰¹

Erdoğan indicates clearly that the democratic system is based on pluralist ideals but it works with the majoritarian principle. And he wants everyone to respect their parliamentary majority. He also states that they do not base their politics to their majority although they have the right to do it.

Those people still have difficulty digesting our majority in parliamentary that is shaped according to the will of the nation. Although we have chance to change the Constitution, we declared that we do not make politics on the strength of this majority. However, certain people presume to think that as if we have no right to use our legitimate power.³⁰²

³⁰⁰ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 01.01 2004(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Erdoğan, Group Meeting 29.04.2003 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

Majority, according to this understanding is not only source of legitimacy but it is thought to be stem from nation, acting in accordance with it, and it is explicitly legitimate. Erdoğan indicates this with saying: majority consists of the nation. In the framework of the basic principles set out in our Constitution, our right to use the power that comes from the majority rests on the idea of making our nation's life better.³⁰³

After the midst of their rulership, and after their increasing success in elections, Erdoğan begins to overemphasise the ballot boxes and elections as the primary indicator of democracy. And he begins to criticise the ones who reject the democracy and election identification, and remind their requisites of democracies-at least liberal constitutional democracies. In his speech which resembles the 22 July 2007 elections in which JDP gain the majority of votes, Erdoğan puts his understanding on democracy and national will relation with criticising the opposition leader of party as follows:

Soon as Baykal opened his mouth, he said “democracy is not just an election”. I want to ask him: if democracy is not election and applying to the national will, then what is democracy? This kind of understanding that based on the humiliation of people, ignoring the result of election will not survive at all?³⁰⁴

As far as the date of 2014 comes, indeed mainly from 2010, the definition of democracy has been encountered only with the concepts of ballot box and election. Erdoğan also states that he is not accepting the other implications on democracy. He states that they learn from politics literature that democracy is a ballot box, and adds that ‘we learned both from out studentship and in practice that democracy is the reflection of nation’s will on the ballot box’³⁰⁵ Other definitions, according to him are

³⁰³ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 01.07.2004 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³⁰⁴ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 10.02.2009 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁰⁵ Erdoğan, Rize Collective Opening Ceremony 24.08.2013 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

peculiar to elites and old traditions in Turkish republic. The current idea that ‘democracy is not just an election’ has been imposed before by West in Turkey. Erdoğan conveys this idea and he says that now there are some people who want to impose it again, but we say that general elections are the sine qua non in the path of democracy, election is the national will itself.’³⁰⁶

In response to the critics that say ‘democracy is not the elections alone’, Erdoğan and JDP hold more on the concept of national will for legitimizing the electoral majoritarian democracy which give them a great chance of ruling. Using national will in place of democracy serves to legitimize decisions in JDP who takes the right of making decision with the majority votes in election. This majority has to be sacrificed anyway. The national will concept is very useful for that purpose. It is thought that JDP has come to power with national will, in reality and in technical sense and the majority has allowed this position therefore majority is seen to be sacrificed by the name of national will.

The general usage of the term national will implies that national will comes from the majority vote. This inference can be made through the Erdoğan’s continual indications of the ballot boxes related to critics toward JDP and Erdoğan construes it as a way of answering critics and dissenting attitudes of the opposition. Elections in this meaning are the place where pleasantness and displeasure of the nation are being determined. It is the field where critics should have to put forth and it is the most important place of accountability in fact. In the 2013-2014 during the matter of corruption and illegality, this understanding of foregrounding the nation will more than any other mechanism would be seen in its most clearest way. By the way of these aims the ‘national will’ and ‘election’ relation battologized within the relation with democracy. Election is considered as the judging place before the nation: The sentences such as ‘Thanks God,

³⁰⁶ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 20.08.2013, (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

in the result of every election our nation has believed our fairness, and so we have won all elections' or 'JDP has won the last four elections. In all these elections, our nation shows their agreement with our politics'.³⁰⁷ In other words, nation answers the critics and opposition parties and groups. Therefore it is seen as the most even -not only for now- legitimate way of opposition.

The elections have been made four times... Four times we went to presence of the nation.. And four times our people said JDP...When the time comes we will again go to the polls. The nation will decide. The nation will make a selection. The nation is the ultimate decision maker. Come on! Put your trust in the will of nation, respect the decision of the nation and obey opinion of the nation...³⁰⁸

Political accounting is also thought to be realised only in the elections. In other words, elections are seen as the court of the nation. As stated by Erdoğan in his speech at 2008; 'We maintain the policies in a legal scope, and we are ready to give account for what we politically do to our nation. The place of that is democratic mechanisms and election.'³⁰⁹ Anyone who wants to criticise or overthrow the government has to wait the election results, where according to Erdoğan nation decides the right and wrong with their votes. It is the way of nation to put forth their wills and their distrust. This understanding validated and legitimised with giving nation, an abstract category, a superior power. This nation in turn becomes to be the electors of JDP as a result.

There is no will above the will of nation, there is no power above the power of the people and there is no other decision maker aside from Turkish Grand National Assembly. Do you have a problem with JDP? Show your face, and tell us your problems, your formulas and schedule and your goals. Then, wait for the decision of the people. People will make decision through election and they will choose who they find believable. This is the bright side of democracy... this is the bright

³⁰⁷ Erdoğ, The Meeting JDP's Provincial Headmen in Ankara 09.01.2008, and The Meeting with JDP's Deputies 20.05.2009 İstanbul (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁰⁸ Erdoğan, JDP Trabzon Province Meeting 05.07.2009(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁰⁹ Erdoğan, JDP 2nd Ordinary Congress of Women Branch 25.05.2008/Ankara(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

side of republic...This is the bright side of the elections. Apart from that way, everything is undemocratic and illegal.³¹⁰

In a sense, this quotation means that waiting the election results is the only legitimate way for opposing the policies and Erdoğan criticises other ways except from elections. After the main revolts against his government, Erdoğan increases his emphasis on the ballot boxes through aggrandising it with the national will term, who do not wait for elections are considered to ignore the national will according to Erdoğan.

Everyone will deal all their matters in the election. With molotov bombs and stones nobody will reach democracy, it is a coup d'etat. Ballot box is the only address of democracy. This nation with his deep foresight will evaluate both opposition parties and the ruling party. Those who do not accept the results of election must not forget that the period of usurping the will of nation through terror, weapon and hitting the streets is finished.³¹¹

Erdoğan also indicates the ballot boxes as the place of judging the wrong policies of republic and earlier governments. Since as stated, it is the only way to hear the nation's will.

From now on, if God permits head scarf women will begin to serve in a public sector. Pay attention to those who feel uncomfortable with it. You are the ones who will ask them to account for it. In where? In the ballot box. Because it is democracy. It is the beauty of democracy. Ballot box is yours, it is people's, because the will of nation manifests itself in ballot boxes and everyone gives consent to results.³¹²

All kind of political and social discomforts have to wait for the voting time. Then, this presupposition has been named, it is nothing but sort of democracy. The equation which is put above has encountered again with enhancing: national will as will of anti-elitists can reveal through elections which indicates the real sense of democracy. Here the national will is considered as the outcome of elections and since JDP gain the

³¹⁰ Erdoğan, JDP Provincial Congress in İstanbul 27.06.2009(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³¹¹ Erdoğan, Ankara Province Meeting 25.10. 2013(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³¹² Erdoğan, Adana Rally 06.10.2013(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

majority from these elections, this gives the whole legitimacy to JDP. This nation actually, after all, becomes the nation of Erdoğan.

Until here, it has been seen that national will arises through elections and it is the most important indicator of democracy. This leads to the majoritarian understanding of democracy. The majority of votes are thought to be respected since they reflect the will of nation. It is seen that this emphasis has comprehensive tones at the beginning but this comprehensiveness changes after the elections and winning majority replaced in the term of national will with the all citizens. At the end of 2000s, the definitions of democracy and elections have begun to change. And we have such definitions that can summarise the national will as elections results:

The election is the most important tool of democracy. Democracy will be renewed through elections and it will be strengthened. Because, through elections both the ruling party and the opposition parties will be re-evaluated and will be tested. Nation, thanks to elections, declares its decision and choices. Election process means for the ruling party measuring themselves in the mirror of the nation and giving account to the nation.³¹³ ...Why there is an election? It gives you an authority, and it will measure you. You will get your deserts in the ballot box; you will learn your lesson. This is the democracy, that's the ballot box. If you ignore the ballot box then it will be an oppressive regime, a dictatorship, and it will be totalitarianism. If you respect to the election, you have to respect people. If you ignore the election then you have ignored people.³¹⁴

This annotation clearly summarizes the outlook on elections. As stated before it is the way of revealing national will, the way of judging the parties by voters and a way for parties to see themselves from the point of nation. From the first usage of national as authentic representation to the usage as elections results, what we have about the nation, is silent conservative lower class mass against the secular Westernalist elite, who say its word in most strict way with the election and because they constitute the

³¹³ Erdoğan, Group Meeting in 10.02.2009(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³¹⁴ Erdoğan, Parliamentary Speech 23.04.2014(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

majority of society reasonably-(they are mass they constitute the majority), majority in the election results is thought to be the will of the nation.

4.2.3. National Will Against Military Tutelage

In addition to these construction points of the national will, there is another constructing point which is also highly associated with the former construction. Under the emphasis of elections, mentioned above, there is advocacy of civil politics against the military or bureaucratic tutelage. This usage can be said to be the most relevant and most important usage together with the usage as authentic representation. Actually, the secular elites which have been put against the authentic nation also include the military and bureaucratic elite and vice versa. However, the point in this usage is not cultural, but directly opposed to the intervention of the military. Indeed in this context, it is totally political. The mentality that subordinates the sections, that are thought to be detached to republican reforms, is concretized in the mentality of military. This mentality provides itself a role of enlightening people for the sake of people and using force in line with this purpose is considered necessary and legitimate. Virtually, what is rejected by rightist and Islamist parties is not the military as institution. They rather see military as the Prophet's house and voluntarily give a supreme position to it. Its reflections can also be seen in the sanctification of conquests and the martyr grade that they gave to the soldiers died during the military service. In the word view of Right parties in Turkey, power of state is always based on the military power, therefore weakening military as an institution has been never aimed. The problem related to the army is originated from the mentality that sees itself as the tutelar, the guardian and teacher and shepherd of the society.³¹⁵ This understanding of military did not remain unfulfilled but experienced Turkey a three military intervention. Military intervenes when it is thought that state is under threat of terrorism or reactions. This begins with the virtual ending of one-party rule in 1950,

³¹⁵ Ahmet İnel, 'Güvenin Tesisinden Öz Güven Patlamasına' in Birikim Journal (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları 2012), v.282.17-18

when the identity between party-state-government was ceased. From that point on, state and government distinction has begun to appear. In this new process, as Öztan states, particularly state; bureaucracy, judiciary and military tended to indicate that was stronger than the elected.³¹⁶ This aim was concretised with the coup in 27 May 1960. This coup was resumed and the final one in 28 February 1997 caused the division in the national outlook movement and became one of the creators of JDP movement. Processors of JDP movement and even Erdoğan himself experienced the military coup. They experienced the overthrow of the elected governments. This historical memory and military threat toward elected government who were incompatible with republican state tradition, forced JDP to generate actions and discourses against this testator understanding. The discourse of national will in this regard, constitute not against the military as an institution but its testator character in Turkey. JDP for that purpose, rectify the cadre in military who are thought to be menacing toward their government. The stressed discourse of the notion of national will also accompanies this process. Erdoğan, for that purpose, continually underlines that the nation who prefers them, is well matured and able to decide in accordance with their and countries' interests. Therefore at the center of politics there should be the will of the nation. 'Our people are aware of what is right and wrong. Turkey always gets in trouble from those people who "love this country more than anyone" and those people who "want to protect the benefits of the nation more than anyone"'.³¹⁷ Anyone who thinks that nation is unable to decide and anyone who aims to apply tutelary ways is mistaken according to Erdoğan's discourse.

This nation, despite the interruptions it experienced historically, they have embraced, internalized and digested democracy, and they have realized that their

³¹⁶ Güven Gürkan Öztan, 'Türk Sağında Devlet Fetişizmine Dair' in Türk Sağ: Mitler Fetişler Düşman İmgeleri, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2014) 435.

³¹⁷ Erdoğan, TUSİAD High Advisory Council Meeting 24.12.2004 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

problems can only be solved through democratic ways. Now, the elitist attitudes should be left aside when we speak on the community and its problems and we must leave off the doubts about democratic processes. Nobody produces any political tutelage scenarios any more. Because this society has democratic maturity and matureness; it does not need any guardians or protectors.³¹⁸

According to Erdoğan, military's attitude toward elected parties reflects the arrogant approach toward the nation. None should look himself up to this country and its people. As it was before, the nation will determine the center of the politics. The center of politics is the values of the people and their demands.³¹⁹

In that context, the ones who see nation as inadequate for deciding the right representatives need to generate a definition for democracy which is not based on election. Erdoğan criticises those attitudes while giving his true democracy definition continually. After objecting the state elite's way of defining democracy, Erdoğan puts his definitions about the civil society and military. In 2005, Erdoğan explains his views on tutelage and civil politics and rejects the simple adverseness between military and civil society. Civil society according to him is more than demilitarization but it has to imply mainly the designating character of the society in the politics. This quotation from 2005 clearly indicates his views on civil society and demilitarisation.

...Contrary to popular opinion, the concept of "civil" is not the opposition of "military". "Civil" is a concept associated with "civilization"... Civil society corresponds to a cultural and historical category. In the concept of civility, there is an intense emphasis of "law". In this sense, there is a close link between democracy and civil. Demilitarization in the context of Turkey has been perceived as elected people must be more decisive rather than the appointed ones. The basis of this perception lays some historical weakness of our democracy. Demilitarization, even if it is perceived in that way, does not refer only to increase

³¹⁸ Erdoğan, Group Meeting Speech 02.11.2004(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³¹⁹ Erdoğan, Group Speech 18.05.2005(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

the power of the elected ones but also aims to increase the power of all the society's decisive role in politics³²⁰

Erdoğan rejects the simple distinction between civility and military politics. He, instead, constructs his distinction on the duality between state and nation. Although he says that this duality has been established before him, he uses this distinction with saying that: ‘for the aim of abolishing it.’ What he actually does however, placing himself together with nation against the old state of mentality. Here, he generates a duality or resumes the existing one. According to him, there is a difference between state and nation but with their government, this duality is exceeded. When they become the ruler of state, nation and state has come together. ‘All decisions in a democracy are the exclusive property of the nation. That's why the will of nation is so important. As state belongs to the nation, the state is the nation itself.’³²¹ ‘Now, the state and nation are looking at the same horizon.’³²²

Erdoğan states the importance of the effectiveness of society or nation in the politics, and then he indicates that the decisions of society are voiced by the elected. In his speech in 2007 Erdoğan emphasized the importance of democracy which according to him can only be prospered with getting rid of all kind of tutelage over elected. ‘Those who wish to undermine the relations between will of the nation and democracy feed from the discredits of politics and irresoluteness of politics. What we call “the

³²⁰ Erdoğan, 20th Anniversary of Birlik Foundation and the Meeting on the Democratization and Demilitarization 28.05.2005(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³²¹ Erdoğan, The presentation of the candidates of major, before election 28.12.2008/Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³²² Erdoğan The Meeting with Providence headmen 13.09.2006(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

reputation of politics” is setting all the pieces in place in democratic system and so it runs like clockwork.’³²³

JDP in that point claims to finish this relation of tutelage between the elected and the non-political forces through basing itself to the will of nation. The will of nation is the antidote of tutelage in the discourse of Erdoğan: ‘Thank God, that politics of guardianship, and that separatist factional politics which separates society from the state has been eliminated by the hands of the nation, our country has gained a strong political will. It is the JDP.’³²⁴ This purging was not limited with the turnovers in the parliamentary. According to Erdoğan, changings in the bureaucracy cadres are also needed. He thinks that these cadres with their old tutelary mentality harm the country and prevent its development. He thinks that the nation also indicates their demand of changing in the elections and if this demand would not be satisfied, this would be disrespect to nation. This is what national will require or what nation actually wills.

Our people were liquidated by those responsible politicians in 3 November election. So what will be in charge of some bureaucrats those who were committing error with those politicians. They have not given an account of their mistake and they are still protecting their rights. They will continue to resist the change. If it will not be said to those people “enough is enough”, if it will not be asked to account for their responsibility and their authority, why then we are doing an election? Are we going to an election just because for changing people in parliament in 4 or 5 years? It is disrespectful to the people, this is irresponsibility towards our people. It is mocking the democracy and the concept of will of the nation.³²⁵

Erdoğan puts his determination about the anti-tutelary movement at the beginning of the power of JDP. In the same year, in 2003, he repeated this determination with

³²³ Erdoğan JDP Kızılcahamam 11. Consultation Meeting 24.11.2007(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³²⁴ Erdoğan JDP Kızılcahamam Consultation Meeting Closing Remarks 25.11.2007(Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³²⁵ Erdoğan, Group Speech, 29.04.2003 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

saying that: JDP intends to actualize the system of representation that reflects the will of the nation, and aims to build an understanding of politics from the bottom to the up , and to implement a hierarchy between those who are selected on who were appointed.³²⁶

Erdoğan puts the term national will against all kinds of tutelary approach from any kind of nonelected bodies. Therefore those bodies should be bounded to the government, who are thought to be representatives of the voters, the nation. The only way to realise the supremacy of national will is seen as the supremacy of elected over other bodies. The ideology of state should also be decided by the nation not by the state elites. In the first term of their power, he seems to be establish a precept and it reflects his discourses.

...Any political attempt that wishes to go beyond the power of the parliament and the will of the nation would be unacceptable. JDP is tightly coupled with these principles and JDP government is the performer of these politics, in this sense JDP do not want any power struggle between the country's institutions, rather it desires them to produce a synergy that reconcile state with the society.³²⁷...There are certain people in this country; they see their own volition above the will of the nation. Those people who interpret loving this country in their own exclusivity, they are more self-justified than anyone in this country; they have a kind of mentality that they cannot digest listening the will of the nation. Those people thanks to God are becoming obsolete and they are marginalized.³²⁸

In the last annotation, the contradiction between national will and status quo supporters has been stated clearly. It is understood from other speeches that these mentioned groups who support status quo are thought to be the military and bureaucratic elites. In the 'address to the nation',³²⁹ Erdoğan indicates the ballot box as the manifestation area of national will against any other kind of interventions. Who

³²⁶ Erdoğan, Group Speech 01.10.2003 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³²⁷ Erdoğan, Group Speech 01.07.2004 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³²⁸ Erdoğan, Group Speech 28.07.2005 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³²⁹ 'Ulusa Sesleniş' in Turkish

come with the elections has to go with it. After the online controversion of General Staff declared in April 2007 with the anti-secularist concerns, this emphasis of national will against the military tutelage increased. Erdoğan implies in the following month of the e-memorandum -online controversion- that the decision of nation is more important than the decision of General Staff: ‘In democracies, governments come to power by elections and they also go with elections. Nation will decide who will govern themselves. For that reason, democracy means to trust people. It means to respect the reason and the will of the people.’³³⁰

When we look from this perspective, the clear enemy of the national will is the military and elitist judiciary that which aims to overthrow JDP through military intervention or over-closure case. On the other hand, JDP positions itself as the defender of national will against these enemies of national will and democracy. While doing this, Erdoğan successively reminds the early coups in Turkey and underlines the success of JDP to terminate these attempts. These kinds of discourses were used especially before elections for underlying the change that is brought with JDP. Before the presidential referendum in 2010, for instance, these points had been reminded as such:

On March 12, they interfered in democracy once more. On September 12, they interrupted democracy again. On February 28 and on April 27 once again they downplayed the national will. These were nightmares of the political life in Turkey. They put the tutelage on politics. They took the state on center not the people. They said “the people for the state, not the state for the people”. They wish to be the master over the people instead of being servant to them... Our democracy has taken great pains from this tutelary mentality. The national will has taken great pain from the pro-coup mindset.^{331 332}

³³⁰ Erdoğan, Adress to the Nation, May 2007 (Unpublished Raw Data From JDP Head Quarter)

³³¹ Erdoğan, AK Party İstanbul Providence Rally 05.09.2010 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³³² Similar reminding has seen in;

AK Parti Province Meeting 04.06.2011/ iZMiR(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

These objections against the tutelage have been constituted through the national will term. And all interventions from military accepted as the interventions toward the national will. This understanding can be seen clearly in the coming words of Erdoğan where he indicates military coups one by one and announces them with their harms to national will.

On May 27 they wanted to draw a direction against the national will; they brought the country to the brink of abyss. In 12 September they treated the national will like dirt. They made serious wounds on the country. On 28 February they interfered to the national will once again. They made political engineering. They condemned the country to poverty, oppression and cruelty. We, in no way, would allow those kinds of interventions to the politics and democracy by the political engineers; we would not be a mere spectator to that.³³³

A special emphasis has been made for the 28 February coup which is accepted as a direct attack toward the cadre from which JDP arises. This has been resumed with the last experience of military intervention by online ways in 2007.

On February 28 different methods were used, and it was done in a different style; but in the end, just as the previous ones the national will and nothing but the nation was in the target. We, the victims of the February 28, stand proudly here today, we're here. And you are the victims of the February 28 too, still here and you are standing with great pride. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey as the one of the victims of the February 28 is still here today and it represents the national will with honour and glory.³³⁴

The frequency of the reminding earlier attacks on democracy and national will, increased after an example of this positioning experienced in 2007. In this date before the election of president Gül, The Chief of General Staff transmitted an explanation via internet which indicated the anti-laic movement in country and reminded its

AK Parti Province Meeting 10.08.2010 / TRABZON(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

AK Parti Province Meeting 22.08.2010 / SAMSUN(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³³³ Erdoğan, JDP Youth Festival 22.05.2011 Gebze/Kocaeli (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³³⁴ Erdoğan, JDP Parliamentary Group Meeting 28.02.2012/Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

position as a saver of laicism in the country. This explanation was named as a memorandum by several columnists and intellectuals.³³⁵ A response to this attempt of the General Staff's explanations based on national will comes from Erdoğan and JDP. Here, the discourse of national will against tutelage, is seen again. In the answer to the memorandum, the explanation of General Staff has been evaluated as anti-democratic.

The speech, given by government spokesman Cemil Çiçek, accepted as the basic manifesto against the e-momerandum. It is accepted as national will defence against the military tutelage. After a briefing was made by the military via its website, JDP charged its government spokesman for reading a text that declared the priority of elected as the representatives of nation over the military forces. According to Erdoğan, this declaration of JDP, is the turning point on the civil politics and military relations in Turkey. He states the importance of this speech as such:

Remember April 27-28 events. There was a declaration made by soldiers... The next day we told our Government Spokesman, our friend Cemil Bey, "you had read this text. Our government spokesman read this text the following day. It was the breaking point. If it were not done, today we had been living in a very different Turkey. There we said to the nation "People, you sent us here and through this announcement we protect your will. This is because the legitimacy of the government in this state comes from the democratic parliamentary system. This state is governed by this legitimate government. We took this step in this determination. These soldiers are our soldiers and these policemen are our policemen. They have neither power nor the authority to change the government.

³³⁶

This development gives JDP a great opportunity to consolidate its victimization before the nonelected forces and especially the military. After the early elections in 2007, the

³³⁵ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6420961.asp?gid=180>

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/6426009.asp?yazarid=3&gid=61>

<http://www.stargazete.com/index.asp?haberID=119068>

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=220011>

³³⁶ Erdoğan, Presidential Election Special Program 05.08. 2014 www.akparty.or./genel-baskandan/

‘national will’ preferred again the JDP. With this support, JDP deactivates the tutelary powers with successive juridical operations and as a result of this decisive attitude, the social sections which supports JDP has enlarged.³³⁷ This movement has continued with the Ergenekon operations, and Turkish armed forces has made computable with government. However this was not enough to cease the discourse against tutelage. After the end of threat, ‘national will against military tutelage’ discourse has continued to be used. The coups are successively reminded to voters for underlying the place where JDP stays. But together with defeating of the threat, these events were reminded with the great self-confidence and with a glorified way. JDP has been seen as the winner of the struggle between the nation and tutelary and has gained the victory on the behalf of nation. Erdoğan said that nothing going to be same before us. The aim of this struggle against the tutelage and the victory has been named as the ‘advanced democracy’. JDP’s attempts against the tutelage, declared as a step towards the advanced democracy. JDP in a sense constitutes its democracy through the anti-tutelage and through the majority in elections. The notion of national will has been used for both two parts.

Including September 12 in 2010 Referendum for Constitutional Amendment we actualized lots of reforms with courage. We removed state of emergency and bans in our country; we strengthened national will against political tutelage. Our main goals in the third period are placing all the rules and institutions of democracy and ensuring the transition from imperfect democracy to perfect democracy in our country.³³⁸

In the same years, Erdoğan underlines the superiority of government which is declared to be formed by the national will. And since parliamentary and government are the reflection of national will, they should be protected against all kind of attacks, including which come from the military. And it is asserted by Erdoğan that this aim of

³³⁷ Insel,17

³³⁸ Erdoğan, Reading the. 61. Government Program in TBMM General Assembly 08.07.2011(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

protection of national will, civil politics in this context, has been reached in the JDP term.

The JDP is a party believed to be whole heartedly that it places the national will and the choices of the national over everything and believes democracy with body and soul. In a democracy, governments are established by the nation and they are also dismissed by them. There is no will, authority and power over the Turkish Grand National Assembly formed with the nation's will and choice, and it cannot. Against any initiative intended to ignore the will of nation will find our nation and their representatives.³³⁹

In the last sentences of this part of speech, the relation between national will construction and anti-tutelage understanding can be observed. Erdoğan asserts that, anyone who aims to harm national will, or civil politics made through the parliament would be stopped by the nation itself and its representatives. In the former sentences, he marks JDP as the protector of the nation will. Therefore what is revealed at the end is the national will as the parliamentary politics against any type of tutelage and this will is identified with the JDP. It is the JDP who never accepts the tutelage over nation and over themselves. ‘We do not accept any guardianship over politics, Turkish Grand National Assembly and over the will of the nation and we will never accept it, we cannot.’^{340/341}

In these speeches, there is clear a construction between national will and tutelage and clear identification between national will and JDP. JDP has been placed in this context as both the victim of the tutelage and the defeater of it. For underlying the former part,

³³⁹ Erdoğan, AK Party Parliamentary Group Meeting 16.06.2009/ ANKARA(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁴⁰ Erdoğan, AK Party Provincial Congress 19.07.2009/ ANKARA(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁴¹ Simiar emphasises in;

AK Parti Genişletilmiş İl Başkanları toplantısı 14.08.2009/Ankara

AK Parti Genişletilmiş İl Başkanları Toplantısı 11.11.2008 / Ankara

AK Parti TBMM Grup Toplantısı 05.10.2010 Ankara

Erdoğan continually references previous coups and the victimisation of previous leaders. For emphasising the other one, he states their victory especially after 2007.

National will have gained significance during that period and it has gained context. During the JDP government, national will has gained power. During that time struggle of all kinds were made on the guardianship system, and all kinds of fighting were done against the gangs which were against the national will... At the time when uniformed and tutelage with epaulet has finished, we do not let bureaucratic tutelage haunt to politics. Our fathers were grown in the shadows of the May 27, and we were grown in the shadows of the September 12. But today we do not allow darkening February 28 and their actors' mindset our life. We will sit back and watch those mindset to darken the future of our children.³⁴²

These interventions towards politics are announced as a direct intervention toward the nation itself since their preferences are ignored. Therefore, these coups were made directly against the nation. The nation and JDP identification has encountered also under this subtitle. The emphasis of the victory against the tutelage has been mentioned especially before the elections and used as a way of gathering votes. Before all the elections, the discourse of national will has come to the fore, and it has used related to all determined categories including 'national will against tutelage'.

This tone of national will as anti-tutelage becomes one of the constitutive parts of the JDP. However whether it is worked in the elections or not, in reality, as long as JDP takes the power continuously, alarmist capacity of militarist tutelary has been reduced. And since JDP links its democrat identity to the anti-tutelage, the limits of its democracy understanding are being revealed. Çınar, in here, sees two roads in this situation, either JDP would degrade democracy for its cadres to come to power, or it would keep the threat of tutelage alive in the discursive level.³⁴³ However JDP adds a

³⁴² Erdoğan, Group Meeting 28.02.2012(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁴³ Menderes Çınar, AKP'nin Ustalık Döneminde Siyaset in Birikim Journal (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları 2012)v276: 22

third way of using of this concept; for otherising the opposition, and for positioning itself above any kind of legal restrictive powers. As explained below, the notion of national will have also takes part in the constitution of JDP's new way.

4.2.4. National Will Against Separation of Powers

The instant the people is legitimately assembled as a sovereignty body, all jurisdiction of government ceases, the executive power is suspended and the person of the last citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the first magistrate because where the represented is there no longer a representative. Jean Jack Rousseau.³⁴⁴

Objecting the tutelage is not restricted only with the opposing to military. It also includes all kind of non-elected bodies especially the judiciary. Since judiciary is the part of the old alliance of the republican tradition of tutelary and put a signature to many of the closure cases by the virtue of regarding them as a threat toward the republic, politicians from the periphery parties have always been distant to it. This distance in time has turned to be a critical view on the state of law and the separation of powers. It is not surprising that the right political tradition which aims to hold all power in their hands is critical toward the separation of powers and the state of law. The best way to indicate this aim implicitly is to underline continually the supremacy of legislation which is thought to be represented by nation. Any other power should be depended on the parliament or the government that comes from them. This attitude has been also seen in the former center right-parties and has been defended with the notion of national will. It has been increasingly continuing in the JDP era. This is because, during its power more than 10 years, JDP has the chance of changing these institutions in accordance with its aims. According to the report of the opposition party, RPP, in the term of Erdoğan, the ideal of separation of powers has seen as the impediment of the executive. Moreover, both judiciary and legislative is aimed to be

³⁴⁴ Rousseau,112.

tied to the executive under the leadership of Erdoğan. According to this report, legislative is working as a ministry of legislation that is bounded to Erdoğan. When it comes to the judiciary with the constitutional amendment in 2010 Constitutional court and HSYK³⁴⁵ they have been reconstituted in order to allow the controls of the government.³⁴⁶ All these regulations have been criticized surely and the discourse of national will again steps in as a legitimizer. An example of this discourse has been revealed before the referendum about the alteration of the constitution. Here, Erdoğan mentions the need of change in the constitution of juridical bodies and to transform them from the law of superiors to supremacy of law.

They are making fuss of argument that JDP envelops the Supreme Court. They make fuss of politicization of Jurisdiction Power... They have problems rather than that... They will lose their privileges, so they create these kinds of claims... Jurisdiction power will no longer be the backyard of “someone”, because of that they are afraid ... In Jurisdiction power there will be no longer any caste system, they are afraid of it. This Constitutional Amendment is not the project of JDP. This is a national project.³⁴⁷

In the same year, Erdoğan criticised the members of judiciary with underlying superiority of the elected body. Judiciary according to this should be respectful to the national will which concretise mainly in the executive branch.

The resignation happened in the HSYK clearly shows once again the September 12 Constitution Amendment was a right decision and the change of the structure of SCJP was also a right decision. Claiming politicized Judiciary Power is completely an unfounded and an unjustified claim and everyone knows very well the political positions of those people. They do not want to accept the power of the national will.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁵ Abbreviation of ‘High Council of Judges and Prosecutors’

³⁴⁶ <http://www.chp.org.tr/Public/1/Folder//akp-otorite-web.pdf>

³⁴⁷ Erdoğan, JDP Antalya Providence Rally 07.08.2010 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁴⁸ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 12.10.2010(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

In this quotation again the national will has been put the counter place of the existing judiciary and wanted to be turned into a judiciary of nation. In addition, Erdoğan continually underlines the superiority of executive and to some extent; legislative over the judiciary. He criticises their tutelary attitudes and puts again the duality between national will against the powers beside the executive and majority in the legislative. He openly criticizes the tutelary attitude of judiciary with using the national will concept in the coming annotation:

Where do you get this audacity to ignore and humiliate the people? Are you parents or the guardian of the nation? The nation is mistaken, Parliament is mistaken, and legislative is mistaken but only you are right, oh yeah? Or do you want to be the boss of the nation? Republic is declared so that any mindset that wishes to establish a guardianship over the nation and any arbitrariness that wishes to govern the people according to their desires and finally establishing any pressure over the national will cannot come to the power.³⁴⁹

Erdoğan also states that the all powers have to be respectful toward the decisions of Nation. Closure cases are criticized through the national will discourse.

You like it or not, you accept or not.... But in a democracy people have the last word, and on September 12 the people said the last word. We, as politicians, as the ones chosen by the people have to follow the nation's decisions, it is valid also for the executive power and juridical power who decide on behalf of the people have to follow and respect to the nation's decision.³⁵⁰

Even, Erdoğan respects discursively to the separation of powers, he underlines the supremacy of national will and practically the majority of elected. All powers according to him have to be convenient to the national will which are materialised in the legislation but mainly in the executive. As Çınar stated; Erdoğan's general approach to the relations between powers insists that executive who is directly authorized by the executive should have the final words on all matters, all institutions

³⁴⁹ Erdoğan, Parliamentarians for Global Action32. Governorship Forum 26.10.2010/Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁵⁰ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 12.10.2010 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

and people have to act and administer with supporting the government, or at least without fettering it.³⁵¹ This causes the majoritarian regard toward separation of powers. It is, to some extent, lead the hierarchy of powers which is legitimized by national will discourse.

In a democracy, the boundaries and the authorities of executive power, legislative power and judicial power are clear. All kinds of cross-border initiative are misusing of authority, it is the violation of the national will. All kinds of power which does not come from the national will and against the people are illegitimate power according to constitution. And we do not allow illegitimacy in this country.³⁵²

Similar statements can be seen in the speech which is made two years later. Here, Erdoğan again puts the national will against the judiciary power and the separation between the ones who are elected by the nation and the appointees. In such a situation, the words of elected are seen as the reflection of nation's will and should be accepted as superior.

We came here by national will. But you do not, you were appointed to here. On the one side, those who were appointed, and on the other side, there are people who were elected by the people. If in this country sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation, then of course there must be right of the representatives of the nation to say something. Besides all this, when you declare your decision, you say "we took this decision "on behalf of the nation". But, how this decision would be a "behalf of the nation", I do not understand.³⁵³

Erdoğan wants to guarantee the supremacy of legislation of the majority in it and in this direction, demands judiciary to be accountable to the legislative as the executive is. Erdoğan does not think that it would harm the independency of judiciary. He wants

³⁵¹ Menderes Çınar, Vesayetçi Demokrasiden Milli Demokrasiye in Birikim Journal (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları 2013)v.288:24-27

³⁵² Erdoğan, JDP Youth Branch 3th Ordinary Congress 19.02.2012/İstanbul (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁵³ Erdoğan, Dolmabahçe Palace Meeting 04.01.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

judiciary to be bounded and accountable to the elected but what he means by elected as stated before is the majority in the parliament and the government.

The Judiciary decides on behalf of the nation, for the benefits of the nation, not against of the benefits of the nation, it cannot... While you defend the “independent judiciary, you pass the judiciary power in to the hands of the ambitions of the certain organization, then the judiciary power cannot be independent. We do not accept it. We do not allow Judiciary power to intervene on legislative and executive powers. This, above all, disregards the national will completely. We are always ready to give account to the people, as an executive power. Is there any place where the Judiciary power gives an account? None. For this reason, there should be certain ways for Judiciary power to give account to the people, too.³⁵⁴

These sentences of Erdoğan clearly specify his views on separation of Powers. These emphasises are important because here Erdoğan explicitly defends the hierarchy of Powers through basing this ambition to the supremacy of national will. The term national will here is used as a standard of the divine legitimacy. According to the demands in these speeches, with the name of nation will JDP, under the leadership of Erdoğan should gain an uninspectable authority. It is inspectable only to the voters. This demand has been also revealed during the presidency debates in 2013 and 2014.

³⁵⁴ January 14, 2014 Ankara

4.2.5. National Will Against All Kind of Opposition

It is understandable that the constitution of people-as-one requires the incessant production of enemies. It is not necessary to convert, at the level of phantasy, real adversaries of the regime or real opponents into the figures of evil other, it is also necessary to invert them. Claude Lefort.³⁵⁵

This discourse of Erdoğan puts the national will above everything legal and illegal in the country. It becomes the standard of legitimacy and exceeds the existing laws and traditions. This actually fulfils the Rousseau's supremacy of general will however this national will directly indicates the government this time. In this respect, any kind of opposition toward the government and its policies has been considered as an opposition to national will and it is illegitimated by the discourse of Erdoğan. As stated above, the only legitimate way of opposing to this understanding is voting. Therefore, from republic protests³⁵⁶ to Gezi insurgency, from Tekel Insurgency to 'corruption operations', from student actions to worker protests, everything against the government and its policies specifically have been accused to be the enemy of national will. In this direction, people in groups begin to be exerted from the nation. While in some speeches at the beginning of JDP government, Erdoğan defines the nation in a comprehensive way, as the oppositions increase against the government, he begins to exclude the opponents from the nation. He begins to position them as the enemy of the national will. The only expression of national will becomes the JDP and its government who come into power by the votes of majority. Protesting this majority is not seen illegitimate but this protest can be realized only through voting. If other groups have some demands from the government or related to the democratic changes, they have to report those demands to the government and wait a solution from the government as the representative of the nation. This also reminds the general will

³⁵⁵ Claud Lefort , Political Forms of Modern Society, (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1986) 298

³⁵⁶ 'Cumhuriyet Yürüyüşleri' in Turkish

ideal with its corrupted version. Rousseau intends to say through applying the notion of general will that, common good can be sprung only through the general will, which is not the articulation of particular wills. The notion of national will in JDP's discourse seems to establish this kind of ruling with the assertion of representing the national will. However it is clear that JDP and its movement is one of the fractions in the society not the nation as a whole, even though it asserts that being the basis of society. And what Rousseau recommends in this situation is increasing the number of groups for reaching the common good instead of the particular interest.³⁵⁷ The government of JDP rejects the existence of sections. The legitimacy of the groups that side with change and reform such as Alevis, Leftists, Kurds, and Armenians are bounded to their intimacy with JDP's politics and discourses.³⁵⁸ Indeed, JDP and Erdoğan want to represent all ideas and identities under the single party, and only through this way their existence is allowed. All of the legitimacy criteria behind those politics, not surprisingly, are the JDP's assertion of representing national will. Because of the fact that they represent the national will as a whole, other deviations have to be in parallel lines with them. In this direction, national will was begun to be used against firstly the elites and military tutelage, but day by, it has become to be positioned against all kind of oppositions from class proletariat demands to the demands of transparency. All of the opposing groups incrementally have taken out of the definition of nation.

Some critical breaking points that have broad participation in the history of JDP have been chosen to explain this exclusion of the opposition through the discourse of national will. One of the influential oppositions came from the TEKEL workers who were protesting their dismissal in the framework of privatisation policy of the

³⁵⁷ Rousseau, 59-60

³⁵⁸ Ruşen Temiz, 'Türkiye'de Değişimi tartışmak ve AKP' in Birikim Journal, (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları 2011), v.266:28-30

government and the proposal of government known as 4c rule which laid the groundwork of the precarity. It had begun in the late 2009 and resumed until mid-2010 with its effects. During the protest, participation had been increased and workers both in TEKEL and some other sectors attended the strike. When these protests have been asked to Erdoğan, he answers through applying the notion of national will.

Look, do not take it as a challenge but it was not the TEKEL workers who put us into power. Our nation put us into power. They are also individuals of the nation and I have respect to them but this respect is bounded to the legality. These incidents we faced now are not legal but decided to tolerate them for the sake of democracy.³⁵⁹

Here, Erdoğan puts the nation against the opposing workers. He takes this group out of the nation and even says that they are also part of it. It is seen that they are accepted as nation to the extent that they stay within the limits determined by laws, but mainly by the Erdoğan and his 'good faith'.

Another extensive attempt can be seen as the Gezi Insurgency which begins with the opposition towards lumbering of trees and grow up because of the harsh response of police toward little group of environmentalist activists. This uprising had come after some eristic decisions of the government related to urbanising, historical events, Alevites and any other else. Therefore, with the involvement of these reactions about other policies, this insurgency spread around the country. Against these protests Erdoğan certainly use the national will discourse, and regard these protests as 'an attempt to coup'. During the Gezi protests, JDP organizes counter meetings to these protests with the name of meeting of 'respect to national will'. Here, Erdoğan declares that their aim in these meetings is to 'challenge those people who have some plans on our country, and to defend democracy against the new attempts of coups like May 27, February 28.'³⁶⁰

Here, it is seen that Erdoğan equalizes protests with the previous coups and puts nation against these protests. The objections toward the government are thought to be objections towards the national will and therefore nation should manifest itself and its

³⁵⁹ <http://www.izlevideo.net/erdogan-bizi-tekel-iscisi-iktidar-yapmadi-28439.html>

³⁶⁰ Erdoğan, JDP Enlarged Province Presidents Meeting Ankara 14.06.2013 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

wills. In this direction, meetings called ‘respect to national will’ have been organized. This organization and the name given to it obviously reveal the intent of the discourse of national will. What is tried to be said by the national will here is that the ones who oppose to the government and Erdoğan cannot be considered in the national will. Erdoğan feeds this perception by underlying the nation in their speeches toward the Gezi protesters. Nation, according to these speeches, is the ones who are waiting with patience in their homes and showing a great morality. He calls these meetings at the same time the meeting of democracy, what is meant in here that a meeting in the heading of Erdoğan is related to nation and democracy while other protests are non-democratic. He states that: ‘This weekend we execute two great democracy meeting. We will fill the areas to hear the voice of the silent masses.’³⁶¹ After that, its name turned to be the respect for national will. This will has been revealed according to this in the elections and unless they say that do not want this government in the elections, government would not take step backward.

Those who do not approve anything going on in this country, those who have some problems with the politics must deal with them in a democratic way, and the place of it is an election, a ballot box. It is not possible to solve problems with guns in mountains, or in the streets in anti-democratic ways, or terrorize cities to demand rights, it is against democracy.³⁶² ... It is our nation who gives us power; it is the nation who will decide our future, nobody else can make any imposition to us.³⁶³

According to this, the concise form of the nation can be seen in the “respect for national will” meetings. Erdoğan states that the voice of national will can be heard from these meetings.

If anyone wishes to hear the voice of democracy, law, and the will of nation should listen to Ankara. If anyone wishes to hear the voice of the silent mass

³⁶¹ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 11.06.2013 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁶² Erdoğan, Tobb General Assembly 01.08.2013(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁶³ Erdoğan, The Meeting with Town Majors 13.06.2013/Ankara(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

should hear from here, Ankara. Are we as one man, Ankara? Are we together, Ankara? Are we brother, Ankara? Do you protect the national will, Ankara? Do you protect the democracy? Thanks God, this nation supports its prime minister. This nation supports its government.³⁶⁴

He does not want to see the purpose of the protests and evaluate them as just the opposing toward the elected government and him. He reduces all the anger toward government and policies to the oppositions to the national will. Even he impeaches the protesters as being the thief of national will. He declares meetings of JDP as legal and protest marches toward the government as illegal and states that: ‘Today we, as all the Turkey, are together against the thieves of national will’.³⁶⁵ According to Erdoğan, the matter is not the environmental issue, for example in the Gezi Insurgence, but the matter is overthrowing the government. He accepts this kind of attempts as actions against the nation and its will. This point surely is related to his conceptualisation of national will as seen in the former titles. While national will is defined previously as authentic representation of the majority of voters against the elites and military tutelage, and thought to be represented mainly by majority in the assembly, any opposition toward that majority and their policies can be reduced to the attempts toward national will. As stated by Erdoğan during the Gezi Protests; ‘The matter is neither a three nor the environment. The matter is democracy; the matter is national will and nation. A real matter is Turkey...’³⁶⁶ As a result of this matter, Erdoğan declares that they, all of the nation, will be patient and take their revenge through the election. ‘We will maintain our moderation. Eight months later, when the result comes in front of us, we will call those vandals, barbarian, those who defend and protect

³⁶⁴ Erdoğan, Respect for National will’Meeting 15.06.2013 / Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁶⁵ Erdoğan, Respect for National will’Meeting 16.06.2013 / İstanbul (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁶⁶ Erdoğan, Respect for National will’Meeting 16.06.2013 / İstanbul (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

them and the enemy of the national will to account for what they did in the ballot box.³⁶⁷

In the quotation above, while Erdoğan states that we are going to be patient as a nation, he expresses his attitude through putting himself in the place of nation or in other words, concretise nation with the identity of JDP. It is similar with the idea that it is the nation who forms the government, not the TEKEL insurgent. This understanding is repeated here, the nation who gives the power to JDP and Erdoğan does not consist of the protesters all around the country. It is seen that the scope of national will has been narrowed from one protest to another. These protester groups are otherised and accused of being cheated by the foreign forces. They are erred and should be shown the true way. The real nation however is aware of what is happening and is waiting for elections to raise their voices. Here, the dualism has been constituted as the enemies of national will against the nation itself. Erdoğan reminded rallies that were arranged after the Gezi Park events, and he said hundreds of thousands in Ankara, and close to a half a million citizens attended the rally of İstanbul. ‘Because there were a serious attack against the national will. This attack annoyed the people, because this was an attempt to rape the national will. Then, of course the people gave them a strong response.’³⁶⁸

Erdoğan denies the legitimacy of protests and has told that these protests are undemocratic. He does not give reason about the way they are protesting or the legality of protests but directly states the fact that they target the policies of government. Indeed, these are illegitimate because there is no election and ballot box during the process.

³⁶⁷ Erdoğan, ‘Respect for National will’ Meeting 21.06.2013 / Kayseri (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁶⁸ Erdoğan, ‘Toward the Local Election’ Show 13.03.2014

I am very clear in saying we will not allow terrorism to ruin the city. We do not thank people who disturbed peace in streets, neighbourhoods and cities and we will not. Whoever has any receivables and payables they will get in elections. In Turkey, the term is completely closed the street to clear the debts. The period of usurp the will of the nation in the streets is closed.³⁶⁹

It is indicated that these protests include violence and therefore they are undemocratic but their discourse cover the real objection towards the elections. In some speeches of Erdoğan, he does not hesitate to use irrelevant examples about the violence in the context of Gezi Insurgency. He begins his sentences with saying the Gezi Insurgency and shows it as an infidelity to the fraternity of people and after a bit he gives the example of burned bus in 2009 to create the perception of there is connection between the two.

All the protests, wherever they come from and whatever their purpose, are regarded to be hostility toward the nation. They are, in other words, consciously regarded in the same pool. In the meeting against the Gezi Protests, national will has continually been used against the protesting groups including several leftist organisations, republican organisations, Kurd and Alevi groups but Erdoğan homogenises those groups just like homogenising the nation will side. This homogenisation begins with the discourse of 'hostility toward national will and elected government' but then, Erdoğan accuses them of being elitists and he states in the meetings that these protesters are insulting the people. They are now homogenous group of elitists in the eyes of Erdoğan or it can be said that this perception is tried to be established through the magic of national will term. Here, old versions of national will usage is used for maintaining the perception of being the victimized group and the poles are clarified again just as it has done at the beginning: the representatives of the silent victimized masses versus rich elite group against democracy and lower class people.

³⁶⁹ Erdoğan, Meeting with Borough Mayor 13.06.2013 / Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

They could not handle the results of the polls. They cannot accept democracy. They cannot accept both nation and nation will...Do you know what they say? "We are the people well educated." they say ... "We're artists." they say. "We are writer, we are financier, and we are the privilege." They say. We know everything, we understand everything, "they say. "Our vote cannot have the equal effect with the vote of the shepherd in Kayseri" they say. Those people, who labelled themselves as public, unfortunately call this fabulous combination as "drum head", "the man scratching his belly" and "people who sell their vote for flour and coal". For decades they have been doing this. For decades, drank the whiskey against the strait, they lived in pleasure in Çankaya, they insulted everyone else, they insult.³⁷⁰

The major opposition begins with the process of the conflict between one of the greatest religious sects in Turkey and the government of Erdoğan in a sense, which reveals itself in the debate of courses. In the peak of the conflict and after the showdown of government and this religious sect, which named them a 'service movement', the recording about the corruption of JDP government and the son of the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been served to the internet. This recording includes dialogues from council of ministers and it is about the national security, and it creates reactions from opposition parties and people toward government. Erdoğan again has the national will term in his discourse while rejecting these assertions about corruption and criticising this attempt of defamation of government. These attempts, according to him, are the attempts of the coup under the mask of corruption and they are eroded before the national will.³⁷¹ He uses the term for whitewashing the government's corruptions and for answering the claims. He says for example that; 'Remember, the parallel infidelity gangs has attempted a coup in 17 and 25 December and attacked the law, democracy and mainly the national will.'³⁷² Do you know what the target of these attacks is? The national will. Target of these attacks is the nation...³⁷³ These words

³⁷⁰Erdoğan, Respect For the National Will Meting 21.06.2013 / Kayseri(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁷¹Erdoğan, Group Meeting 10.06.2014(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁷² Erdoğan, İzmir Province Meeting 02.08.2014(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁷³ Erdoğan,Sakarya Province Meeting 27.12.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

summarizes Erdoğan's views on the oppositions related to corruption scandal and the notion of national will in his discourse. This also reveals the old versions of national will which identify nation directly to the JDP government. According to this approach, the struggle against these claims and mainly the parallel structuring in the terminology of JDP, is not only Erdoğan's or his party's struggle but it is Turkey's struggle and it is related to the national security issues. The target of the parallel structure is considered as an attack toward the Republic of Turkey and directly to the national will.³⁷⁴ In its concise form, in the words of Erdoğan, December 17 is a conspiracy plot to usurp the will of the nation.³⁷⁵ More specifically;

Who tried to usurp the national will in December 17, cannot scent out corruption. Who turned a blind eye to the theft of the national will, applauded this theft and these robberies on May 27, March 12, February 28, cannot come to us and traduce. RPP applauded and supported the usurpation of the national will on May 27, since that day to today it has been address of stealing, whisp, corruption and theft. I say it here once again to the losers lobby who assigned slander us corruption: "If you want to see corruption, please go and look in the mirror". Who assigning slander us corruption, bribe, actually are in attempt and bustle within the cover of a big robbery, burglary of national will...³⁷⁶

In this version of national will discourse, it is interestingly seen that, this time other representatives of religious people and silent mass are being otherised for acquitting the party's base. It is said that they cannot be accepted as the representatives of silent mass, they just engage in deception. Therefore religion, conservatism education in the way of service movement/parallel structuring is dismissed from the real national version represented by JDP. They are positioned by Erdoğan against the nation and national will. They are the ones who want to embower the national will, the ones who

³⁷⁴ Erdoğan, TOBB Speech 07.08.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁷⁵ Erdoğn, Group Meeting 25.02.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁷⁶ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 28.01.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

set a trap against nation's government and they will take the necessary answer from our nation.³⁷⁷

About these events, Erdoğan makes a comparison between the corruption and the way it is revealed by the Service Movement³⁷⁸ and states that the biggest robbery is the robbery of national will. According to Erdoğan, any ways towards changing the government other than the elections, is the robbery of national will and service movement has done this. According to Erdoğan the biggest corruption is the theft of the national will and this is the aim of parallel structuring. In his own words: 'They aim to steal the national will'.³⁷⁹

After 17-25 December events, Erdoğan has begun to categorise all oppositions toward the government in the same heading. These are the enemies of national will like at the beginning but this time it begins to include more people and groups. All the oppositions have been put in the same place by Erdoğan. After the otherising of the opposition, Erdoğan aims to reinforce the perception of the JDP cadre's identicalness with nation itself. He states that a threat toward us is a threat toward national will and therefore a threat toward all the assembly.

If the capital considers itself beyond the Parliament will, it is also a threat to the national will. If media considers itself beyond the Parliament will, it is also a threat to national will. Some gangs, some dark organizations, mafia structures are directly a threat to the national will. The one who must stand against these threats are not only the powerful party's authorities, they are also all of the authorities, and political

³⁷⁷ Erdoğan, Karaman Collective Opening Ceremony 26.04.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁷⁸ 'Hizmet Hareketi' in Turkish

³⁷⁹ Erdoğan, Ağrı Meeting 10.03.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

parties. All of the attacks against the will of nation target not only the powerful party, but also the entire Parliament.³⁸⁰

Against all kind of public demonstrations, Erdoğan also puts the national will. Any group who come together to protest any policies of government is considered against the national will. He mentions this implication related to the protest of Kurd groups in October 6-7 about the war in the North Syria.

If a political party does not attempt and attitude against terror, if it does not put distance between terror and itself and cannot condemn the terror clearly, it means it is denying the national will, most importantly, it denies itself. If a political party clearly supports the street actions which contain violence, if it appeals to it, even its own deputies throw stones to the police, it means that the party does not give importance to the Parliament's and nation's will, respectability of politics. If some capital circles, some media institutions target the Parliament through ugly alliances, if powerful party and opposition party do not give mutual reaction to these attacks, it means that national will is being hurt.³⁸¹

He includes all the opposition in the same pot who stand against nation and national will for him. According to Erdoğan, all of these groups are leaded by one evil. And they act altogether against the national will, which, as continually stated, is not other than JDP itself. For instance, the Gezi Insurgence and the corruption events are evaluated together. Their organizers are said to be the same people or same forces.³⁸² JDP declares that they struggle with all of these opposing groups from media to parallel structuring, from some capital groups to some small parties:

An alliance of enormity just before the president elections. They are aligned in the same line, they come together like rosary. Who is in that alliance? There is RPP. On its tail, there is NMP. There are large and small parties which cannot take even %1 vote and cannot see the nation's favour. There is once again Pennsylvania gang in this alliance. There are some capital groups, media groups in this alliance.

³⁸⁰ Erdoğan, Fatsa Meeting 21.12.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁸¹ Erdoğan, Budget Talks Parliament 10.12.2013 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁸² Erdoğan, Group Meeting 18.02.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

JDP walks with nation, it walks in alliance with the nation. Against whom?
Against this enormity alliance.³⁸³

The concise statement of this approach also manifests itself in these words of Erdoğan;

Gezi events and December 17th strike attempt is the attempt of engineers. The same dark faces take place at the backstage of each event. Sometimes roles, bit players or scenarios are changed but each of these events target Turkey; national will. Now, you see what's happening. The rooted structure is moving together with the ones who beat our head geared sisters. They are trying to make operation together.³⁸⁴

This positioning of nation and national will has not been limited with the major opposition events like TEKEL and Gezi Insurgency or Corruption operations but it comprises all kind of oppositions from everywhere. One of the institutions Erdoğan criticised via national will has been the media institutions. 'They can write what they want to write, they can slander, and they can lie. Media did not brought us here, nation did nation. You did. And the one which will take the charge is not media. It's nation.'³⁸⁵

Here, there are effects from anti-elite version of national will however the direct aim is not the secular elite this time but the media intuitions as a whole. There is an emphasis of ballot box put fort this time for the sake of otherising any other kind of independent formations. Indeed, national will here does not just indicate the election or authentic representation but it is used for excluding independent media from the content of national will. Therefore, there is one way for national will to be revealed, it occurs by the representation of members of parliament who have majority of votes. Similar usage is seen against the wikileaks documents. In 29 November 2010, a

³⁸³ Erdoğan, Sakarya Province Meeting 16.07.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁸⁴ Erdoğan, Opening of Haliç Metro Bridge 15.02.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

journalistic organisation published significant diplomatic documents of USA including the document about Turkey. The questions of the opposition party on these documents have been answered by Erdoğan again with the help of the notion of national will as follows:

He (leader of opposition party) wants a paper from me which does not exist. Main opposition party must understand it and accept it. There is no power beyond the national will. Politics is being done with nation. Politics is being done for nation. Politics cannot be done by foreign diplomat's slanders, accusing, and deliriums.³⁸⁶

Erdoğan answers the critics against his assessment on the sculpture in Kars toward which he had said freak and got reactions with national again. He represents the tastes of nation therefore he has thought to be said everything toward the artwork which is not convenient to the nation's tastes. The critics about his rebuke are answered with the terms as nation and authentic representation as stated below:

Now, I, when I said freak for that sculpture in Kars, I address the king's nakedness at the same time. A person who has eyes, who can see through their eyes can distinguish the aesthetic one and the ugly one, the freak. There is no need to come up from a noble family, to grow up in glass palaces. These are, be careful my friends, not just insulting only nation's political preferences but its tastes, values, sense of aesthetics.³⁸⁷

It is seen that any kind of opposition toward any kind of government policy or the comment of Erdoğan has been taken as an opposition toward national will. Certainly, this attitude is bounded to the first category of national will discourse of Erdoğan. These oppositions, indeed, are compensated with the idea that we are representing the nation and all our policies represent the will of nation. This situation reveals the cyclical situation between the nation will categories in this thesis. For instance, while

³⁸⁶ Erdoğan, Collective Opening Ceremony Sivas 05.12.2010 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁸⁷ Erdoğan, JDP Enlarged Province Presidents Meeting 14.01.2011 /Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

criticising the Kurdish party in the parliament, the division between the party of the nation and the others has been put again. The difference between them as Erdoğan states, while the route of JDP has been decided by the nation, the route of other parties are decided by gangs.³⁸⁸ The critics toward the Roboski Massacre, through which 34 Kurdish smugglers have been killed with the warplanes of the Turkish military, is answered again with the notion of national will. It is said that JDP is the representative of national will therefore it cannot be boycotted whatever the reason is. ‘Not accepting the %50 voted party’s power, or saying that this party has no legitimacy is disrespect to the national will, it is not accepting the democracy. Beyond, it is unconsciousness. To introduce the Uludere incident as state terror or as state murders its citizens is inability.’³⁸⁹

Against the opposition toward new discontinuous education system that paves the way for attending religious schools and leaving school in early ages, the term national will again is switched on. These oppositions have also answered with the national will concept as follows:

How people who brings continuous education and support for it have pity this country today they are moving in the same manner as opposed to progressive education. You know all this; an arrangement that comes with violence, we eliminate with democracy. We are correcting an application comes with artillery and tank, moving tanks in Sincan, with will of the nation, with parliament.³⁹⁰

The quotation implies that they make new regulations in the direction of the nation’s demands. It is handled as a way of resisting to the secular attitude that has come from the republic. He states that ‘For the first time in our republic history, the National Education System has been shaped with the people’s will, according to the demands

³⁸⁸ Erdoğan, JDP Province Meeting 17.05.2011 | Yozgat (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁸⁹ Erdoğan, JDP Group Meeting 10.01.2012/ Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁹⁰ Erdoğan, 15th Anniversary Competition Authority 15.03.2012 / Ankara (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

and desires of the people.’³⁹¹ Similarly, in his another speech Erdoğan stated; ‘by the law we made on Friday the last track of February 28 has also been deleted On Friday, the national will is manifested most strongly. With progressive education status quo lost national will and democracy has won.’³⁹²

In this speech, there is the emphasis of the identification of them as nation and others as protesters of new education regulation. This identification and otherising are still aimed to be constituted through the anti-elitist implications. According to this attitude with the new regulation about the education system (which permits the transferring religious schools in early ages) nation wins. As underlined by Erdoğan: ‘On 30 March, the mentality of junta lost, the national will won.’³⁹³

This kind of national will discourse has been also seen against the opposition parties other than RPP. Any kind of non-parliamentary opposition (opposition groups or parties) accused by being the enemy of national will. Against the Kurdish groups in the parliament, the term national will has been used. The parliament is indicated as the legitimate way of politics and they accuse Kurds about their non-parliamentary political actions. In the words of Erdoğan; ‘People who do not show any respect to law, democracy and national will, show their respect to PDP (Peace and Democracy Party) which sees terror as a method.’³⁹⁴ One of the speeches of Erdoğan against these actions explicitly equates majority, nation, JDP and democracy. While Erdoğan is rejecting the criticisms of Kurdish political party he puts this equation clearly:

³⁹¹ Erdoğın, Meeting of JDP deputies 30.03.2012 / Ankara(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁹² Erdoğan, JDP Parliamentary Group Meeting 03.04.2012 / Ankara(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁹³ Erdoğın, 4th Ordinary Congress provincial chairman of the JDP 07.04.2012 / Konya(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁹⁴ Erdoğan, Extended Meeting of the JDP Provincial President 12.2012 / Ankara(Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

"We do not recognize you" says the chairman of PDP. For God's sake, it doesn't matter whether you recognise us or not. The nation knows us. The nation...Our nation's prays, their appreciation, their benediction are highly enough for us. (...) To say that we do not recognise the government which is selected by 50 per cent of the votes, saying that the government is not legitimate, amounts to not accepting democracy, showing disrespect to national will and beyond them amounts even to loss of consciousness.³⁹⁵

In the resolution process again, while JDP and Erdoğan have been representing the national will, other side of the peace, the Kurd movement with politicians, civil society organisations and guerrilla are positioned outside the national will. JDP as the representer of national will can dispense justice to demanding groups as the father in the family. The relation between equals has been never wanted and generated.

The term national will has also applied when international policies of government are protested. Against the Reyhanlı bomb attack from Syria, it is asserted that the national will has been targeted. This event also handled with the national will term as follows:

In Reyhanlı, how vicious attack traitor citizens of Turkey, unfortunately in Taksim events have been using our own citizens themselves. I'm repeating. This game is corrupted. This trap is turned upside down. This scenario is discarded before reaching its destination. Praise, nation claim its government, democracy, economy and national will in the strongest way.³⁹⁶

In May 2014, the mine disaster was experienced with the 301 loss of life. After this event the debates on subcontractor and unsecured working, the relation between capital and government was put in to question again. And as a response related to these critics from opposition parties to media, from foreign media to syndicates and student groups, Erdoğan once more uses the national will. He also puts the dualism of the elite versus the nation against this opposition. These words present the usage of national will in its anti-elite sense for responding any kind of opposition. Indeed old points of separation aimed to be kept alive since it is useful for responding

³⁹⁵ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 10.01.2012 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

³⁹⁶ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 06.18.2013 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

oppositions. As a response of critics related to Soma incidence, Erdoğan criticises the opposition through the notion of national will. 'These 'drum head' they said, 'man scratching his belly, "they said to my brothers entered the mines. 'They do not know anything" they said, but they realized they did not know anything.'³⁹⁷

They do not even care about miners, workers, our martyrs there, and their families. There are slanderers think that how we can get a political result here, we get an ideological rent. We have no fear of our review; we do not worry about the demonstrations within the law and freedom of expression. If our democracy, the national will, the economy and our future being targeted under the name of criticism, protest, demonstration right we also do not allow it. I believe that you also do not allow it.³⁹⁸

In the same vein, nation is used against the critics related to twitter in Turkey. Some journalists insist that this ban infamizes Turkey. And the ban has been defended also with asserting that it is preventing the national will from attacks. 'With this new regulation of internet, we are not only securing our children and our youth but also protecting our democracy, politics and national will from threats and chantages.'³⁹⁹

As a result, it is asserted by Erdoğan that all the preclusions they faced from the beginning are because of their togetherness with the nation and national will. They are tried to be stopped by the enemies of national will. The numbers of these enemies are increasing day by day including the opposition parties, media institutions, and foreign forces and so on.

JDP's primary mission is to realize the will of the nation towards change and democratization. Difficulties that we lived to this day are always difficulties to undermine this mission. This is the reason of our success in five elections and two referendums. So walking in the nation's route to work to fulfil the people's desires, it is to strive to maintain the highest will of the nation. This challenging problems

³⁹⁷ Erdoğan, Cologne, 24.05.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁹⁸ Erdoğan, 70th Financial General Assembly TOBB's Speech 22.05.2015 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

³⁹⁹ Erdoğan, Speech in Konya 20.02.2014 www.akp.org.tr/genel-baskandan/

exposed in our journey are related with the magnitude of this mission which change the status quo.⁴⁰⁰

When it is came to the end, it is seen that the notion of national will in Erdoğan's discourse becomes more and more exclusive and excludes everyone who does not think in the same direction with Erdoğan and who sees mistakes in the policies of JDP. At the beginning of the power of JDP, first three categories: 'national will as authentic representation', 'national will as the result of election' and 'national will against the military tutelage', are more prevalent. Those were the categories that were inherited from previous center-right tradition. They have focused mainly on the representation of nation as being one of them. They assert to do this representation against the alienated and secularist state elites. This representation is thought to be their legitimate right both because they are already the nation itself and because this is registered by the elections. They have brought this 'right of representation of nation' from the elections. Therefore, majority in the elections become the determinant of national will. It is seen that, the implication of national will thus far, has spread to the whole power term of the JDP. Together with the implication of national will against military tutelage, these three usages constitute the basis of the national will discourse of Erdoğan. These usages have not ceased whatever the content and agenda is. The way of their continuity is provided with their transformation in accordance with the context. What is aimed to say here is that, national will emphasis in Erdoğan's discourse mainly implies the first three categories, indeed it is constructed as authentic representation which arises from election and against elite groups and military tutelage. However, as time passes, the effectiveness of 'others' in the first there national will category, has begun to be decrease. In other words, the closure cases, military's aim to intervention and elitist attitudes have begun to be less effective on the JDP. But this does not cause a decrease in the national will usage of Erdoğan. This time, from making use of the implication of first three categories, new versions of the

⁴⁰⁰ Erdoğan, Group Meeting 10.01.2012 (Unpublished Raw Data From TBMM)

national will usage occurred. These new versions begins to otherise all opposing powers, from technical and democratic opposition of judiciary to popular uprising, with accusing them as the enemies of national will. They are continually assimilated to the earlier elite categories and excluded from the authentic nation. National will becomes the will of JDP sympathisers and can be represented just by the JDP.

This kind of national will usage loses its comprehensiveness as in General Will theory. The common good understanding begins to be determined only by the JDP. What is good by nation, it is implied, can be seen by JDP alone. And whatever stands against the JDP, a rule, a tradition, a group of people and so on, is thought to be stand against the national will. In this way, social division is denied. It is just two groups; the nation and its enemies as beguiled. This situation reminds the Lefort's words on possible situation of modern democracies. The party arises to represent aspirations of whole people, and takes power by destroying all opposition, an opposition is affirmed between people-as-one and 'Other', knowledge becomes property of power, and power itself claims to be the organ of discourse and it embodies in a group or single individual.⁴⁰¹ It might not be true to assert that the situation put by Lefort for explaining the rise of totalitarianism is identical with the situation of Turkey's 13 years. However, the similarities are unignorable. Lefort aims to state the possibility of filling the empty space of democracy with discourse of totalitarian parties or people. In this thesis, it is asserted that this empty space is filled with similar discursive features of totalitarian regimes. The discourse of national will, which at the end begins to imply the JDP only, fills this empty space. These five categories of national will in this chapter allow the pursuit of these developments which make national will discourse as the concretisation with the JDP and therefore, tuning the situation of 'power as nobody' to 'people and power as us'

⁴⁰¹ Claud Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 13 and Claud Lefort, *Political Forms of Modern Society*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1986), 24

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, one of the most encountered concepts in Turkish politics, the concept of ‘national will’ has been aimed to be analyzed through the discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This thesis had questioned what can be the reason of the over-usage of this 18th century term, in the 21st century Turkey. This inquiry has led this thesis to search the theoretical background of the term in addition to the historical background of the term national will in Turkey. It is thought that, only in the light of these two backgrounds, the discourse of Erdoğan can be accurately comprehended. In this direction, political history of the west, from pre-modern political systems to 21st century, has been re-examined from this point of view. And authentic experiences of the national will understanding in Turkish democracy tradition has been aimed to be revealed both for seeing the origin of national will in Turkey and for positioning the Justice and Development Party in the Turkish democratic history. These two parts of the thesis firstly reveals the fact that, the concept of national will neither the invention of Erdoğan, nor firstly used by him in Turkish political history. If that is the case, what makes his usage unique and worth to be worked on? In the point of answering this question, this thesis, has used the Lefort’s theory on modern democracies, which asserts that;

In modern democracies, the locus of power becomes an empty place, it cannot be occupied and cannot be represented. Only the mechanism of exercise of power are visible. Power now remains the agency by virtue of which society apprehends itself in its unity and relate to itself in time and space. This agency, marks a division between inside and outside of the social. In this society neither the state nor the nation represents substantial entities. Their representation is itself in its

dependence upon a political discourse and upon sociological and historical elaboration, always bound up with ideological debate.⁴⁰²

Here, inspired from these ideas of Lefort, it has asserted that; what makes discourse of Erdoğan unique is its ability to constitute his discourse which fills the empty space of democracy and concretizes the abstract notion of national will with himself and his party. The political discourse, which Lefort indicates above, corresponds the Erdoğan's discourse of national will. For proving this argument, firstly the political and theoretical history of the democracy and national will has read in accordance with the Lefor's theory of power. Then history of national will and national will discourse in Turkey has been put for providing background of the JDP. Finally Erdoğan's national will discourse has stated with the genuine categorization of this thesis.

The theory of this thesis, as stated above, has based on the Lefor's argument about modern democracies and the power position in these democracies. Lefort asserts that locus of power become an empty place in the modern democracies. Therefore locus of power until the occurrence of modern democracies has being stated together with rising and establishing of popular sovereignty and national will understandings. The subtitles which explain the process until the 20th century democracies, indeed until the empty space of power and democracy, has categorized as such; power-as-one, power-as-many, people-as-one and finally power-as nobody. This process until the disappearance of substantial sovereign body, reveals the political developments which prepare the national will understanding and its establishment in western political world.

The national will understanding had come to the political agenda together with the popular sovereignty ideal, and to that extend, on the purpose of overthrowing the divine right of kings or clergy, indeed their 'power' as one. After the absolute

⁴⁰² Claud Lefort, *Democrac and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 17-18.

monarchies and the idea of supremacy of the divine ruling right of the King and Church, which has handled under the category of power-as-one, new radical ideas had putted forward. These ideas were rejecting the religious and monarchical absolute authority and asserting the maturity of people. These ideas that came with scholasticism, contract theoreticians, renaissance, reform, liberalism and finally with enlightenment, has brought up the popular sovereignty ideal which aims to give power to the 'many'. This ideal, than, has put at the basis of modern political systems. Rousseau, with his general will theory, has taken this understanding a step further and demanded the a system in which there is sovereign body of people who are thinking on the same direction of common good. Rousseau has declared them as the only source of legitimacy. This was the understanding of people-as-one.

After the 18th century, however, the world, and especially the west, has experienced some important changes in social and political domain. These changes brought new ideas about legitimate authority, legitimate power and the sources of legitimate power. Indeed the political world of the west, which witnessed big revolutions, -as in France and America-, and then totalitarian and authoritarian experiences -as in Continental Europe and Soviet Russia-, was now considerably different from previous terms. The idea that lies behind the popular sovereignty, the idea of homogenous society or the society that established through the contract or through collective decision, became unable to explain 18th 19th and mainly 20th century societies. Instead what is faced is the society, which can be explained with 'plurality' or, in Lefort's terminology, 'indeterminacy'. As a result the ideal of popular sovereignty which finds its radical expression in General Will theory of Rousseau, is ceased to be sovereignty of the agreed mass and becomes the technical device that is implying the parliamentarism and representative democracy. This newly occurred system bases its legitimacy to the will of nation and this will of nation, which is thought to be reveal in the elections, gives the elected a supreme authority. These developments, however, has begun to be

seen dangerous by thinkers of the term. They propose precautions for a possible threat of tyranny of majority. Thinkers like J.S.Mill, Madison, Tocqueville recommend institutional remedies related to the limiting the power of elected. According to Mill, for instance 'a popular government was a thing only a dreamed about or read of as having existed at some distant period of past.'⁴⁰³ And he recommends the combination of democracy with liberalism for protecting the rights of individuals from the decisions of majority. Tocqueville also indicates the fact that, 'voting of individuals would not always mean that they are in the rule, and states that majority, vested with omnipotence, can abuse it.'⁴⁰⁴ Madison again, proposes institutional arrangements as in the Republican system. As a result of these intellectual efforts together with historical developments, precautions like checks and balances between powers and constitutionalism has established in time.

These percussions, on the other hand, have not changed the problematic and the abstract nature of popular sovereignty ideal and national will understanding. Schumpeter, for instance, remarks barrage of information within the people as obstruct to the realization of popular sovereignty.⁴⁰⁵ Pluralist and neo-pluralists as Dahl⁴⁰⁶, reject the implications of comprehensiveness and homogeneity in the popular sovereignty understanding. Finally as a comment on democracy and popular sovereignty in 20th century democracies, Lefort indicates that power in the modern democracies lose its body and become an empty place which is open to totalitarian fillings. In other words, he states that it is not the people or their will that have the power, rather, in modern democracies power becomes the power of nobody indeed

⁴⁰³ Mill, 6

⁴⁰⁴ Tocqueville, 411.

⁴⁰⁵ Joseph. A. Schumpeter *Oxon Capitalism Socialism and Democracy* (USA: Routledge Press 1996), 253-254.

⁴⁰⁶ See; Robert Dahl, 'A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2006)

becomes empty space. The popular suffrage, according to him, makes paradox of democracy more palpable.⁴⁰⁷ People, in these systems are persuaded that they are ruling themselves through electing their representatives however this situation rather gives rise to the possibility of the rule of a successful demagog or party which claimed to be part of the people. In modern democracies, Lefort asserts, power actually is an empty place which cannot be occupied and represented. But, for the very reason, it is open to totalitarian filings. This filling according to Lefort, have mainly done by the discourse of politicians which are able to persuade people to the ideal of people-as-one. It can be said that, this line from monarchies to 20th century modern democracies, commentates the story of popular sovereignty and national will in a sense. And it is asserted that in the current empty space of democracy, the role of national will discourse, can be argued, to create an image of common will of nation, which, might be said to be never been exist.

The experience of Turkey, has taken over the national will term from its western contemporaries in almost the same eras. At the beginning of 20th century, Turkey establishes its transition from Empire to Republic through this notion of popular sovereignty and gave at least formal importance to the national will understanding. However the notion of national will gain its original meaning in the Turkish political history, with transition to multi-party system and rising of (Democratic Party) DP as the representatives of nation, against the secularist state elites. This relation of representation between political elites and nation resumed with the coming parties which are mainly considered as center right parties. Former usage of the national will by republican elites has the ‘forced liberalizing’ tones and is put against the Sultanate and Caliphate. On the other hand, together with the discourse of political elites, or the representatives of center right, national will concept has begun to be implied objection of secularist westernalist republican elites and begun to assert the identification with

⁴⁰⁷ Lefort,18

nation itself. This kind of usage constitutes the main category of national will discourse in Turkish democracy. This discourse is accepted as the constitutive component of center right tradition which is still prevalent today.

In this respect, national will term helps to crystalize the distinction between state elites -and their political extensions- and center right parties, which came to mean political elite, and representatives of nation. These center right parties as form DP, have used national will concept for identifying themselves with nation and asserting the authentic representation of them, for excluding elite and secular tradition, for aggrandizing ballot box and elections and for delegitimizing the military tutelages and party closures. Insomuch that, national will term has begun to be seen as the ideal that pertains to the center right parties.

For indicating this discourse until the emergence of JDP and Erdoğan, the line that begins with DP has pursued and JP, MP and coalitions after MP has stated. It is seen that the discourse of national will which is used today, can be asserted to be based on this historical developments mainly after the emergence of DP. This emergence brought out the center right tradition which have the claim of representing nation. And the term nation has defined in accordance with this claim, as large masses with religious and traditional identities who are excluded from the social and political opportunities of state. This definition of nation has experienced changes from one leader to another in accordance with the conjecture but secure its main implications that are inherited from the DP and succeeding center right tradition.

The object of this thesis can be summarized as analyzing the discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which pursued this intrinsic center right tradition about national will understanding and has taken it, a step further. With his discourse, which is categorized under five heading in this thesis, Erdoğan firstly aims to fuse the intrinsic separation between elites and nation. With positioning JDP and Erdoğan as part of the nation and

defender of the authentic demands of that nation, this discourse implies the ‘authentic representation’. In addition Erdoğan aims to state its legitimacy against the military coups and any other kind of intervention with the notion of national will. It is asserted that decisions of nation, has to be superior to the decisions of any other institutions. In that context, national will has used against the military tutelage. Certainly, events that were experienced by earlier center right parties and Islamist movements, such as party closures, and military interventions have significant effect on the national will discourse of Erdoğan. Nation, according to this discourse, is thought to have maturity and can chose the best for themselves. And this nation, Erdoğan’s discourse asserted, has chosen JDP. Their decision is thought to be seen from the result of elections. Therefore this discourse put national will also as the result of elections. If this is the case, it can be said that national will in Erdoğan’s discourse more or less implies the majoritarian democracy understanding which has also seen in the earlier center right tradition. While in the first years of his power he underlines the importance of pluralism in democracies, in his last speeches, might be said 2011 onward, he begins to emphasize more on the importance of election results. These election results which are thought to reveal national will, are accepted to give the whole legitimacy of Erdoğan and JDP. As far as they have taken the votes of nation, they should be able to decide everything from education to art, architecture to urban planning. All these decisions and matters somehow are bound to the national will by Erdoğan. For underlying the priority of his decisions he continually applies the national will term. All the knowledge belongs to him since he is the representative of national will.

However the discourse of national will in Erdoğan has not limited with these three versions. Furthermore it is implied with the concept of national will that, the domains of both legislative judiciary and executive has to be work in accordance with national will which mainly concretized with executive branch, with JDP itself. In a similar vein, all the oppositions toward JDP and toward the attitudes of Erdoğan, about all the

maters, have been accepted against the national will. In other words, since national will has identified with JDP, any critics toward JDP have been introduced as the critics toward will of nation. This association is mainly constructed with turning backs to the first categories of national will discourse. Indeed it is asserted that anyone who criticizes the JDP or Erdoğan himself is part of a secular elite or acting like them. In other words critics, toward JDP, are identifying with elitism, tutelage mentality, and anti-democratic attitude. In its final sense, the equalization between national will, majority, JDP and democracy has occurred. In this direction the national will discourse which is used as continuation of abstract distinction between nation and elites, begins to imply the JDP alone. It is inferred from the discourse analysis of the Erdoğan that, these discourses begin to exclude all groups other than the JDP and its supporters. It begun to be used against any kind of oppositions from syndicate revolt to Gezi insurgence, from critics toward artificial or cultural policies of JDP to critics on some mine accident, from matters of education to assertion of corruption. It means that Erdoğan aims to legitimize everything related to his party and government with the national will concept. Since national will becomes the JDP, the policies of JDP become the policies what nation desires. And who criticize these policies are thought to be enemies of national will and thus excluded from this concept. Therefore the discourse of Erdoğan seems to exceed the discourse of 'authentic representation versus elite' or 'periphery against the center'. For example, one of the conservative fraction of society, the mass of 'Hizmet movement' can be excluded from national will concept when they are thought to oppose JDP. And in this way, Erdoğan puts himself and JDP as the only representative of national will and declare with his discourse that they are the nation itself. Through this embodiment, this discourse fills the empty space of power. What is taken from sultanate, the power indeed, can be said to concretized with the national will discourse of Erdoğan. It is the new way and unique power assertion of Erdoğan in 21th century Turkey; 'power as us because we are the nation'.

It is seen that these implications that are inherited in Erdoğan's discourse of national will, firstly differ from the General will understanding of Rousseau which is based on common good and which is reached through both collective consideration and natural law. Instead what is encountered in national will of Erdoğan is the shield, which's shape is changed in accordance with the conceptual need. For instance, national will in the discourse of Erdoğan can imply both the ballot box and anti-elitism. Secondly, this usage, rejects the social division and substitutes it with the division between nation and enemies. As in the theory of Lefort, 'internal division is denied and yet at the same time an opposition is affirmed between the people-as-one and 'Other' which is regarded as the enemy of people. The people-as-one, forms a social body which is held together and sustained by power-as-one.' (Lefort 1986:24) Erdoğan and JDP reach the legitimacy of ruling as power-as-one thanks to the discourse of national will which implies the people-as-one against its enemies from elites to military, judiciary to TEKEL insurgents. What is reached at the end is the JDP alone, as the nation. This is the power position of Turkey under the JDP rule. A party as Lefort asserts, has arisen claiming to be different from traditional parties, *as different from RPP and state elites*, represent aspiration of whole people, *as authentic representation*, to possess legitimacy which placed above law, *as against separation of powers*, takes power by destroying all opposition, *as against all oppositions toward JP*. This suitability of Lefort's this ideas with the national will notion in the discourse of Erdoğan, indicates the answer of the question that has been asked at the beginning. The concept of national will has been overused by Erdoğan because the empty space of power in current democracies is filled by the Erdoğan's national will discourse in Turkey. The revealing situation, in terms of JDP and Erdoğan, is the Power-as-us and People-as us.

As last words it can firstly be said that, the concept of national will itself is already problematic, because it is based on an abstract collectivity as nation and abstract

concept of common good. Moreover in the pluralist and technical nature of contemporary social and political systems the meaning of popular sovereignty is diminishing as explained in the theory part. This leads us the validity of Lefort's theory on 'empty space of democracy'. Secondly it is seen that the concept of national will is not the invention of Erdoğan. But Erdoğan is the one, who has got use of the ambiguity that is inherited in this concept. Thirdly, it is detected that Erdoğan's usage of national will resembles the early center right approach to the concept. He develops his usage from the point where previous center rights leave of. However the usage of national will for implying directly the identification of nation, party(JDP in Erdoğan case) and democracy has not seen in the previous center right discourses. Erdoğan, substantialize the abstract concept of national will with himself and his party. Through the end of his power, he has done this substantiation with providing the duality of we as nation and others as enemies of nation. Through this substantiation of national will with the Erdoğan and his supporters, new power position has generated as such; the people-as-us and power-as-us. It is, indeed the inherent meaning of national will in Erdoğan's discourse and give the clues of the place of national will term in contemporary Turkish democracy.

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APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez, günümüz Türkiye siyasetinde en çok kullanılan kavramlardan biri olan ‘*milli irade*’ kavramını Tayyip Erdoğan’ın söylemi üzerinden incelemek amacıyla yazılmıştır. Kavramın Erdoğan’ın söyleminin kurucu unsurlarından biri olduğu düşüncesi, ve 11 yıllık iktidar döneminde gözle görülür şekilde fazla kullanılması bu konunun tez konusu olarak seçilmesinin nedenidir. Erdoğan’ın söylemi içinde ‘*milli irade*’ ifadesinin konudan ve bağlamdan bağımsız olarak hemen her konuşmada kullanıldığı, ya da her konunun bir şekilde *milli irade* ile ilişkilendirildiği gözlemlenmiştir. *Milli irade* kavramı, örneğin, bir baraj ya da havalimanı yapımı açılışına kullanılabildiği gibi kavrama bir kadın kolları kongresinde ya da bir mesleki eğitim kursunun sertifika töreninde de rastlanabilmektedir. Bu fazla ve bağlamından kopuk kullanımın hem Türkiye siyaseti ve özellikle Türkiye’de merkez sağ geleneği, hem 11 yıllık AKP iktidarının millete ve *milli irade*ye bakışı hem de millet, *milli irade* demokrasi ve halk egemenliği gibi kavramların 21. yüzyıl sistemlerindeki yeri ile ilgili bir şey söylediği düşünülmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, tezin konusu olarak belirlenen ‘Erdoğan’ın *milli irade* söylemi’ üzerine çalışmak, hem *milli irade* kavramının siyaset tarihindeki yeri ve anlamına, hem de kavramın Türkiye’deki yükselişine bakmayı gerektirmektedir. Bu tez, bu gereklilikleri göz önünde bulundurarak son yıllarda Türkiye siyasetin en popüler kavramlarından biri olan *milli irade* kavramını Erdoğan’ın söylemi üzerinden analiz etmeye çalışmıştır.

Bu doğrultuda tezin ikinci bölümü, *milli irade* kavramının siyaset tarihinde ortaya çıkışını onu hazırlayan sebepleri ve çağdaş sistemlerdeki yerini anlamak üzere, *milli irade* ve bununla bağlantılı olarak ‘halkın egemenliği’ kavramlarını merkeze alan teorik bir bölüm olarak düzenlenmiştir. Takip eden bölüm, *milli irade* kavramının

Türkiye Siyaset tarihinde ortaya çıkışı ve kullanımını açıklayacak şekilde yazılmıştır. Bu bölümde hem kavramın yerli kullanımı ortaya konmak istenmiş hem de AKP'ye kadar gelen merkez sağ siyaset çizgisi kısaca anlatılmıştır. Böylece AKP ve onun söylemine zemin hazırlayan tarihsel gelişme ve söylemler tezin kapsamını aşmayacak şekilde belirtilmiştir. Bu iki bölüm sonucunda ilk olarak ortaya çıkan, milli irade kavramının ve kullanımının ne AKP'ye ne de Erdoğan'ın söylemine özgü olmadığıdır. Milli irade kavramı, tarihi 18. Yüzyıla kadar geri giden köklü bir düşünce ve siyaset geleneğinin parçasıdır ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşundan itibaren de çeşitli şekil ve yoğunluklarda kullanılmıştır. Öyleyse Erdoğan'ın milli irade söylemini bu tarihi gelişimden ayıran ve çalışılmaya değer kılan nedir? Bu tez iki temel önerme üzerinden Erdoğan'ın söylemini çalışmanın anlamlı olduğunu ileri sürer. İlk olarak Erdoğan'ın milli irade söyleminin, takipçisi olduğu siyasi geleneği, içerik ve kullanım sıklığı olarak aştığı, yeni bir içerik kazandığı düşünülmektedir. İkinci ve esas olarak bu tezde Erdoğan'ın milli irade kullanımının Fransız düşünür Claude Lefort'un 20. Yüzyıl demokrasileri için öne sürdüğü 'iktidarın boş alanı' teorisindeki 'boş alan'ı dolduracak şekilde kurulduğu ve kullanıldığı iddia edilmektedir. Tezin argümanını ve bulgularını özetlemeden önce bu önermeleri biraz daha ayrıntılandırmak gerekecek.

Yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi bu tezin teori bölümü milli irade ve halkın egemenliği kavramlarını açıklamaya dönük olarak hazırlanmıştır ve Lefort'un modern demokrasiler ile ilgili iddiasını temel almıştır. Lefort, kısaca modern demokrasilerin halkın egemenliği kavramı yoluyla, insanların kendileri tarafından yönetildiği illüzyonunu yaratıldığını iddia eder. Bu, ona göre illüzyondur çünkü kendini yönettiği iddia edilen halk bir soyutlamadır ya da en azından değişken bir kitledir/çokluktur. Modern demokrasilerde, halkın egemenli ideali ile iktidar, mutlak hükümdardan ya da kiliseden alınmış sınırları belirlenemeyen, bu gün ve yarın bakıldığında bile aynı kitleyi imlemeyebilecek soyut bir halk ya da millet kavramına bırakılmıştır. Yani başka bir ifadeyle, iktidarın alanı boşaltılmıştır. Önceden iktidarı elinde tutanlar(kral,

sultan ve benzeri) ve iktidara tabi olanlar(teba serf ve benzeri) olarak somutluk kazanan siyasal ve toplumsal yapı artık tamamen bir belirlenimsizlik halindedir. Bu sistemde iktidar artık ‘hiç kimsenin iktidarı’dır. Sitemleri totalitarizme götüren ise boşalan bu iktidar alanının totaliter eğilimleri olan bir parti ya da iyi bir demagog tarafından doldurulmasıdır. Lefort bu boş alanın söylem ile doldurulmaya oldukça müsait olduğunu söyler. Özellikle kendini kitleyle özdeşleştiren bir söylem kurabilen kişi ya da partilerin Lefort’a göre bu alanı doldurması daha kolaydır. Her kim bir halk imajını canlandırabilir kendini bu halkın bir parçası olarak gösterebilir onunla özdeş olduğu fikrini yerleştirebilir ve bu özdeşlik örtüsü altında iktidarı ele geçirirse bu kişi ya da parti iktidarın boş alanını doldurmada daha başarılı olacaktır. Bu tez, Türkiye’de iktidar alanının bu yolla doldurma yeteneğinin merkez sağ siyaset geleneğine ait olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Ama bu iktidar alanını milli irade söylemini kullanarak kendisi ve partisi ile sabitlemeyi başaran Recep Tayyip Erdoğan olmuştur.

Bu iddiaya sistematik bir biçimde varabilmek için teori bölümü, siyaset tarihini iktidar demokrasi, halkın egemenliği ve milli irade kavramları üzerinden okumuş, bu tarih çizgisini iktidarın boş alanına varıncaya kadar takip etmiştir. Bunun için ilk alt başlık olarak ‘*bir-olarak-iktidar*’ kullanılmış ve iktidarın modern öncesi konumu açıklanmıştır. Bu konumda iktidar mutlak yetkiye sahip bir Hükümdar’a aittir. Eski Yunan ve Helen uygarlıklarının iktidara sahip olan vatandaş fikri, Roma İmparatorluğu döneminde özellikle de Hristiyanlığın ortaya çıkışından sonra yerini ‘inananlar olarak insanlar’ anlayışına bırakmış ve kralın tanrısal bir otoriteye sahip olduğu fikri gelişmeye başlamıştır. Bu dönemde özellikle Hristiyan düşünürler ve din adamları ilahi otoritenin dünyevi otoriteye üstün olduğunu görüşünü savunmuşlardır. Bu dönemde tanrı-devlet anlayışı gelişmiştir ve toplumlar bu anlayışla yönetilmiştir. Dönemin teorik temeli Aziz Aquinas, Aziz Agustinus ve Salisburyli John’un iki kılıç kuramından takip edilebilmektedir. 11 ve 12. Yüzyıl bu tartışmalarla geride kalmış, 13. ve 14. Yüzyıl, iktidarın, mutlak ilahi yetki sahibi olan krala ait olduğu siyasi

sitekler altında yařanmıřtır. 13 yzyılın sonu ve 14 yzyılın bařında Padualı Marsilius'un radikal katkılarıyla dnyevi iktidara giden dřnsel yol aılmıř daha sonra bu yol Machiavelli'nin arasal siyaset yorumu ve 15. 16. yzyıllarda ortaya ıkan reform ve Rnesans akımlarıyla daha sekler bir iktidar anlayıřının ortaya ıkmasına zemin hazırlamıřtır. Bu geliřmelerin katkısıyla 16. yzyıl ve 18. yzyıl arasında kralın mutlak ve ilahi iktidara sahip olası anlayıřını reddeden yeni grřler oraya atılmaya bařlamıřtır. Tezde '*bir ok –olarak- iktidar*' bařlıęı altında ele alınan bu grřler temel olarak iktidarın tanrıdan ve tanrısal kraldan alınıp halk oęunluęuna verilmesi gerektięi zerinde durur. Yani halkın egemenlięi fikri oluřmaya bařlar. 16. ve 18. Yzyılı iine alan bu dneme skolastik dřncenin, szleřme teorisi ve teorisyenlerinin Rnesans ve reform hareketlerinin, liberalizmin ve son olarak da aydınlanmanın byk dřnsel katkısı olmuřtur. Bu grřlere gre kralın iktidarı sınırlandırılmalı, ynetim halkın taleplerine aık hale gelmelidir. Kralın gcnn sınırlandırılması ve demetlenmesi baęlamında Fransız dřnr Montesque'nun kuvvetler ayrılıęı fikri, szleřme teorisyenlerinin devleti oluřturanın halkın kendi arasında yaptıęı bir szleřme olduęu iddiası ve zellikle John Lock'un ve klasik liberal ęretinin yařam hrriyet ve mlkiyet hakkını korumak iin sınırlanmıř bir iktidar gerektięi dřncesi bu dnemin dřnsel geliřmelerinin bařında gelir. Bu dnemde savunulan 'halkın egemenlięi' fikrinin daha radikal bir biimi, yine bir szleřme teorisyeni olan Rousseau'dan gelmiřtir. 'Genel irade' teorisiiyle milli irade kavramı iin de temel referanslardan biri olarak kabul edilebilecek Rousseau, '*tek- olarak-halk*' bařlıęı altında incelenmiřtir. Rousseau halkı, doęası itibariyle ortak yarara ynelmiř birbiriyle aynı arzu ve ıkarlara sahip, eřit ve grece homojen bir kitle olarak grr. Bir szleřme erevesinde bir araya gelmiř bu kitlenin kendine has ortak bir iradesi vardır, Rousseau bu iradeye genel irade ismini verir. Bu genel irade tek tek bireylerin iradeleri toplamı olmadıęı gibi bireylerden baęımsız onların stnde de deęildir. Aslında doęaları gereęi kiřilere ikin olan genel iradeye ve ona ynelme haline, tek tek bireylerin talepleri toplanarak deęil, en iyiye nasıl varılacağı ile ilgili

müzakereler yoluyla ulaşılır. Rousseau genel iradeyi esasen taşıyıcısına göre değil iradenin yöneldiği şeye göre tanımlar. Genel irade, ortak iyiye ve genel yarara yönelen iradedir. İyi işleyen bir toplum mutlaka genel irade doğrultusunda yönetilmelidir. Bu toplumda egemen varlık toplumu oluşturan yurttaşların bütünüdür ve bu yurttaşların çıkarına aykırı bir çıkarı yoktur ve olamaz. Kısaca Rousseau bu kuramıyla halkın mutlak egemen olduğu ama bu egemenliğin ancak ortak yarara bağlı ve genel istemlerin özel istemlere üstün görüldüğü bir sistemde mümkün olacağını belirtir. Genel irade ona göre her zaman doğrudur ve yanılmaz ancak bu halkın kararlarının her zaman doğru olacağı anlamına gelmez. Doğası itibariyle tüm insanlar kendi iyiliğini ister ama kimi zaman bu iyiliğin nerede olduğunu bilemeyen insanlar bulunabilir. Bu insanlar genel irade doğrultusunda eğitilmeli başka bir deyişle zorla özgürleştirilmelidir. Zaten yeterince aydınlanmış bir halk söz konusuysa (ki genel iradenin oraya çıkması için olması gereken budur) böyle ayrımlar da olmayacaktır. Rousseau'nun genel irade doğrultusunda yönetileceğini öngördüğü toplum küçük ölçekli olmalı, insanlar başta ekonomik alanda olmak üzere pek çok alanda eşit ya da en azından eşite yakın olmalıdır. Bu anlamda Rousseau'nun görece homojen bir toplumun iradesi olarak genel iradeden söz ettiğini söylemek mümkündür. Bu iradenin hem üstün bir standarda hem de aydınlanmış ve vatandaşlık bilincine sahip insanların ortak kararına karşılık geldiği söylenebilir.

Ancak ne Rousseau'nun 'tek-olarak-halk' şeklinde kategorize edilen bu fikirleri ne de çok olarak iktidar başlığı altında ele alınan görüşeler 18. Yüzyıl sonrası toplumlarını açıklamaya yetmemektedir. Yani bir sözleşme ya da kolektif bir karar etrafında oluşmuş görece homojen bir toplumdaki bahsetme ihtimali azalmıştır. Özellikle 19. 20. Yüzyıl toplumlarında karşı karşıya olunan durum homojenlikten ziyade çoğulluk ya da Lefort'un deyişiyle belirlenimsizliktir. Bu toplumlarda halk egemenliği idealindeki 'egemenlik' artık ortaklaşmış bir kitlenin egemenliğini işaret etmemektedir. Halkın egemenliği artık yeni demokratik sistemlerin teknik bir

ayrıntısına işaret eder: seçimlere. Kısaca halkın egemenliği parlamentarizm ve temsili demokrasi sistemini anlatır hale gelmiştir. Bu sistemler formel olarak meşruiyetleri halkın -ya da milletin- iradesine dayandıran sistemlerdir ve milletin iradesinin en temelde seçim yoluyla tecelli ettiği kabul edilir. Böyle bir yaklaşım seçimin galiplerine, milletin iradesine dayandıkları düşünüldüğü için, üstün bir otorite vermektedir. Elbette bu gelişmeler dönemin düşünürleri tarafından tehlikeli görülmüş ve halkın egemenliğine dayanan ama çoğunluğun tiranlığına varmayacak bir sisteme ulaşmak için öneriler getirilmiştir. James Madison, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill bu konuda önemli görüşler ileri süren düşünürlerdendir. Örneğin Mill'e göre halkın egemenliği yalnızca hayal edilebilecek bir şeydir ya da çok uzak bir geçmişte var olmuştur. Bu nedenle Mill demokrasi ve liberalizm beraber işlediği ve böylece bireylerin haklarının çoğunluk karşısında korunduğu bir sistem önerir. Tocqueville de benzer şekilde insanların oy vermelerinin, onların yönetimde olduğu anlamına gelmeyebileceğini söyler. Ona göre sınırsız olarak yetkilendirilmiş bir çoğunluk, aynen sınırsız olarak yetkilendirilmiş bir kral gibi bu yetkiyi kötüye kullanabilecektir. Madison da benzer bir tehdidi bertaraf etmek için kurumsal düzenlemeler önerir. Bu düşünürlerin önerileri ve tarihin gelişimi sonucu kuvvetler arası kontrol ve denge sistemi ve anayasacılık gibi çoğunluğun iktidarını sınırlayacak önlemler geliştirilmiştir. Ancak bu önlemler halkın egemenliği ve milli irade anlayışlarının sorunlu doğasını değiştirmeye yetmemiştir. Bu görüşler ve seçime dayalı temsili demokrasiler daha sonraki düşünürler tarafından da eleştirilmiştir. Örneğin bu tezde teorisi temel alınmış Fransız düşünür Claude Lefort, 20. Yüzyılın totalitarizm deneyimlerini de göz önünde bulundurarak modern demokrasilerde iktidarın bedenini kaybettiğini, boş bir alan haline geldiğini ve bu boş alanın totaliter eğilimlerle doldurulmaya müsait olduğunu iddia eder. Halkın egemenliği kavramı ve özellikle evrensel oy hakkı ilkesini ise bu sistemin maskeleri olarak görür. Ona göre bu sistemlerde halk, oy vermek yoluyla yönetimde söz sahibi olduğuna, iktidarın sahibi olduğuna inandırılır. Oysa aslında iktidar artık hiç kimsenin iktidarı değildir, o bir boş

alan haline gelmiştir. Bu alan ne halk ya da millet gibi değişken bir kitle tarafından işgal edilebilir ne de temsil edilebilir. Tehlikeli olan bir mutlak iktidar sahibinden boşalan bu alanın bir parti ya da iyi bir demagog olan bir lider tarafından doldurulması olacaktır. Lefort’a göre modern demokratik sistemlerde, halkla (ya da milletle) özdeş olduğunu halktan geldiğini yani tek-olarak-halk algısını içerecek bir söylem, bu boş alanı doldurmaya muktedir olacaktır. Bu tezde bu alanın Erdoğan’ın söylemi tarafından doldurulduğu iddia edilmiştir. Bu iddiayı temellendirmek için iktidar alanının nasıl boşaldığı ve daha önceden ne ile doldurulduğu ikinci bölümde anlatılmıştır. Buraya kadar mutlak monarşilerden başlayıp, halkın egemenliği ve milli irade ideallerini açıklayan ve 20. demokrasilerine kadar uzanan tarihi bir çizgi takip edilmiştir. Bundan sonra gelen bölüm ise milli irade kavramının Türkiye’deki yenine değinmiş ve AKP’ye kadar gelen tarihsel politik çerçeveyi çizmeyi amaçlamıştır.

Batı Dünyasının tarihsel deneyimleri milli irade ve halkın egemenliği kavramlarının ortaya çıkışına ve yerleşmesine tanıklık etmiştir. Türk Osmanlı siyaset geleneği ise batılı muadilleriyle aynı tarihsel çizgiyi izlememiştir. Osmanlı siyasi tarihinde padişahı halk karşısında sınırlama çabaları çok görülmediği gibi, Rönesans ve reform deneyimleri de bu coğrafyaya yabancıdır. Bu nedenle Türkiye coğrafyasında görece özgün bir milli irade anlayışı gelişmiştir. Türkiye, halkın egemenliği ve milli irade gibi kavramlarla Osmanlı imparatorluğunun dağılmaya başladı dönemde karşılaşmaya başlamıştır. 20. yüzyılın başlarında İmparatorluktan cumhuriyete geçişte, halkın egemenliği anlayışı temel alınmıştır ve yeni rejimin kuruluşunda milli irade kavramına en azından resmi bir önem verilmiştir. Cumhuriyetin kuruluşuyla birlikte iktidar sultandan alınıp halka verilmek istenmiştir. Bu dönem aydınlanma idealinin etkisiyle cumhuriyet elitleri, aydınlanmış bir halkın demokratik usullerle kendini yöneteceği bir sistem yerleştirmeye çalışmışlardır. Bu sistemin şiarı ‘egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız milletindir’ ilkesi olmuştur.

Buna karşın milli irade söylemi bu günkü ve genel anlamını 1950 yılında çok partili hayata geçilmesiyle kazanır. Çok partili hayata geçişle birlikte aydınlanmacı batıcı ve seküler cumhuriyet elitinin karşısına yeni bir elit grubu çıkmıştır. Siyasal/politik elit olarak adlandırılabilen bu grup, devlet elitine ve devlet geleneğine karşı milleti ve milletin iradesini temsil ettiğini iddia etmektedir. 1950li yıllardan AKP ve Erdoğan’a uzanan milli irade söyleminin nüveleri bu ‘devlet elitine karşı otantik temsil’ iddiasında bulunabilmektedir. CHP’den ayrılarak vekillerle kurulan DP kültürel geleneksel ve dini değerleri muhafaza ederek ekonomik bir kalkınma getireceğini vaat eder ve girdiği ilk seçimde çoğunluğun oyunu alarak iktidar olur. Bu bir merkez sağ partinin CHP’ye karşı kazandığı ilk zaferdir. Kuruluşundan itibaren DP CHP’den rahatsız olan tüm kesimleri kapsamayı hedefler ve bunun için milli iradeyi hakim kılma söylemini kullanır. ‘Yeter söz milletin’ sloganını kullanan DP, hem milletin bir parçası olduğunu iddia eder hem de onun haklarını ve taleplerini yönetime yansıtmayı vaat eder. DP ve Genel Başkanı Menderes, bu doğrultuda milleti temel olarak dinini yaşamak isteyen inşalar olarak tanımlar ve bu insanları dindar seçmenlere indirger. Milleti, muhafazakâr, yerli, sokaktaki adama ve seçmenlerin çoğunluğu olarak gören DP kendini de dinin özgürleştiricisi ve milletin temsilcisi olarak kodlar. Bu minvalde, demokrasi de seçimlerde ortaya çıkan milli iradenin diğer kurum ve kişilere üstünlüğü olarak tanımlanır. Menderese göre milli iradenin üstünlüğü bir anlamda mecliste çoğunluğa sahip olan partinin üstünlüğüdür ve bunu çoğunluğu sınırlamaya yönelik girişimlerin milli iradeyi sınırlayacağı iddia edilir.

Demokrat partinin darbeyle iktidardan edilmesinin ardından yaşanan askeri yönetim sonrası Ragıp Gümüşpala liderliğinde Adalet Partisi kurulur. Darbenin ardından idam edilen ve tutuklanan DP’li vekillere adalet aramak üzere yola çıkan Adalet Partisi, darbeden bir yıl sonra yapılan seçimlerden birinci parti olarak çıkar. 1964 yılında Gümüşpala’nın vefatının ardından liderliğe Süleyman Demirel seçilir ve merkez sağ çizginin en önemli figürlerinden biri haline gelir. Darbe sonrası iktidara gelen merkez

sağ bir parti olarak AP'nin milli irade söylemi askeri vesayete karşı şekillenir. Böylece merkez sağın milli irade söylemine önemli bir parametre dahil olmuş olur: askeri vesayete karşı milli irade. Bu kullanımın dışında AP ve Demirel de seküler elite karşı otantik temsil olarak milli irade söylemine sıkça başvurur. Üstelik artık taşra kökenli ve görece daha halktan sayılabilecek bir parti lideri ile bu söylemin ikna ediciliği artmıştır. Bu özelliğini de sıklıkla vurgulayan Demirel 'biz milletin sinesinden çıktık' 'biz milletiz' gibi kullanımlarla otantikliğinin altını çizer. Merkez bir partinin sınırlarını aşmayacak ölçüde milliyetçi ve muhafazakar öğeler içeren AP söylemi demokrasiyi de selefi DP gibi bu doğrultuda tanımlar. Demirel'e göre demokrasi milletin kendini idaresinden başka bir şey değildir. Millet bunu kendi içinden gelen hakiki temsilcilerini seçmek yoluyla gerçekleştirir ve parlamentoyu açık tutmak milli iradeciliğin temelidir.

1970 ve 1980 yılları arasında artan politik kutuplaşma ve 1971de bir askeri müdahale daha getirmiştir. Bu dönemde İslamcı iddialarla ortaya çıkan Milli nizam partisi de kapatılmıştır. 197—1980 yılları arası artan siyasi kutuplaşa ve gerilim neticesinde 1980 yılında asker yeniden siyasete müdahale etmiştir. Darbeden sonra 1980 öncesi politikalara 10 yıllık siyaset yasağı getirilmiş ve bunun sonucunda 1983de yapılan seçimlerle Türkiye'nin 3. Büyük merkez sağ partisi ANAP, Turgut Özal liderliğinde siyaset sahnesine çıkmıştır. Bu parti Türkiye'deki dört siyasi eğilimi kucakladığını iddia eder. Buna ek olarak İslamcı siyasetleri de destekler. Parti lideri Özal önemli bir cemaatin üyesidir ve bu ona dindar kitlelerle de iletişim kanalını açmıştır. Bu dönemde imama hatip okulları ve din dersleri ile ilgili alanına muhafazakar mesafe bundan 20 yıl sonra başarıya ulaşan AKP ve onun tabanının için de ipuçları vermektedir. Özal de milleti geleneklerine bağlı muhafazakar insanlar olarak tanımlar ama bu inşaların modernizmi ve özellikle ekonomik gelişmeyi arzuladıklarının altını çizer. Ancak özel bu insanların iradesi için milli irade söylemini kullanmaz. Eski merkez sağ partilerin söylemlerini büyük ölçüde sürdürülür. Milletin içinden gelmek ve tüm

amacın ona hizmet olması, söylemin önemli parçalarındandır. Askeri vesayete karşı ise pragmatik bir tutum sergiler. Fakat aslında onun söylemi milletin adamı olmaktan ziyade hizmet adamı olmayı önceleyen bir söylemdir. 1987 yılında darbe öncesindeki siyasi partilerin yasağı kalkar ve böylece merkez sağ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinde ilk defa ikiye bölünür. Demirel Doğru Yol Partisi ile meclise tekrar girmiştir. 1980 darbesini gerçekleştiren General Kenan Evrenin cumhurbaşkanlığı süresinin 1989 yılında dolmasıyla Özal Cumhurbaşkanı olur ve 1993 yılında onun ölümüyle Demirel Cumhurbaşkanlığına gelir. Doğru Yol partisinin başına Demirel'in ardından gelen Tansu Çiller eski merkez sağ söylemlere benzer bir söylem kullanır. Muhafazakar popülizm ve ekonomik liberalizm konusunda eski merkez geleneği takip eden Çiller çatışmaları artan Kürt meselesi nedeniyle asker ile iş birliği yaptığı için askere karşı bir söylem geliştirmez. 1997'den sonra muhalefete düştüğünde ise yeni bir demokratikleşme konsepti kullanmaya başlayan Çiller, milli irade ve meclisin üstünlüğü resmi ideolojiye karşı demokratik bir program ve siyasal reform önerir. Özal'ın ardından ANAP'ın liderliğine gelen Mesul Yılmaz'ın da Özal'ın söylem çizgisini takip ettiği söylenebilir.

1990 sonrası dönem aynı zamanda İslamcı Refah Partisi'nin de yükselişe geçtiği bir dönem olmuştur. Özal döneminde oluşan çoğulcu atmosfer sayesinde İslamcı hareket sisteme daha iyi entegre olmuş ve eğitim ve üniversitedeki baş örtüsü yasağı meseleleri üzerinden varlığını göstermeye başlamıştır. 1994 yerel seçimlerinde pek çok belediye başkanlığı alan RP 1995'deki genel seçimlerde de en büyük parti olmayı başarır ve DYP ile koalisyon hükümeti kurar. Bu başarının ardından parti tabanı ve yetkililerinin laiklik karşıtı tutumları 28 şubat askeri darbesinin zeminini oluşturur. Post modern darbe olarak adlandırılan ve askerin yönetime doğrudan el koymadığı ancak yönlendirici olduğu bu sürecin İslami hareket üzerinde dönüştürücü bir etki yaratır. Kapanan RP yerine daha ılımlı bir imaj çizen Fazilet Partisi kurulur. Ancak bu ılımlı görüntü de FP'nin Anayasa Mahkemesi tarafından 2001 yılında

kapatılmasına engel olamaz. Parti kapanmadan önce üyeleri arasındaki fikir ayrılıkları da artmıştır. Kapanmadan sonra gelenekçi kanat eski lider Recai Kutan başkanlığında Sadet Partisini kurarken, kendilerine ‘erdemliler hareketi’ adını veren yenilikçiler 2001 yılında AKP’yi kurar. 28 Şubattan 1997den 1999 yılına kadar ve 1999 yılında 2002 yılına kadar ülkeyi koalisyon hükümetleri yönetir ve 2001 yılındaki krizin ardından erken seçime gidilir. Bu seçimlerin galibi seçimlerden birinci parti olarak çıkan ve tek başına iktidara gelen AKP olmuştur.

Görüldüğü gibi, cumhuriyetin ilanından 2000li yılların başlarına kadar milli irade söylemi Türk siyaset tarihin ve özellikle de merkez sağ geleneğin en önemli söylemlerinden biri olagelmıştır. Cumhuriyet, ‘bir’in iktidarından yani sultanın saltanatından ‘bir çok-olarak-iktidar’a geçişini milli irade kavramını kullanarak gerçekleştirmiş ve kavramın ilk kullanımını oluşturmuştur. Ancak kavramın daha ziyade Rousseaucu olan bu kullanımı, bu günkü milli irade söylemi ile ilgili bir şey söylememektedir. Bu günkü kullanım Türkiye’de çok partili hayata geçilmesi ve devlet elitinin karşına milleti temsil etme iddiasında olan siyasal elitin çıkışıyla şekillenir. DP’nin iktidara gelmesiyle ilk örnekleri ortaya çıkan milli irade söylemi öncelikle seküler devlet elitine ve devletçi politikalara karşı milletin iradesini temsil etme bağlamında kullanılır. Bu temsile yetkin olanlar olarak, seküler elitin aksine milletin bir parçası olan ve milletin içinden geldiği iddia edilen DP’liler işaret edilir. Milletin iradesini seçimler vasıtasıyla ortaya koyduğu düşünülür ve milli irade söylemi kullanılarak seçimler ve çoğunlukçu demokrasi yüceltilir. Demokrasi tanımı da milli iradenin seçimler yoluyla yönetime yansıması olarak belirlenir. Milli irade kavramının bu kullanımı AP’de de görülür. Yukarıdaki imalara ek olarak AP darbe sonrası oluşan bir siyasal parti olduğu için milli irade söylemi her türlü vesayete karşı milletin meclise yansıyan iradesi olarak da kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Özal ve ANAP ile devam eden merkez sağ çizgi de doğrudan milli irade söylemini kullanmamakla birlikte millet ve demokrasi ile ilgili benzer anlayışlar Özal’da da görüşmüştür.

Arkasından gelen koalisyon hükümetlerinde yer alan merkez partilerin de milli irade ile ilgili aşağı yuları aynı söylemi götürdüklerini söylemek mümkündür. Dolayısıyla Türkiye Merkez Sağ geleneğinde milli irade söylemi, temelde, milletin devlete, siyasal elitin devlet elitine üstünlüğünü vurgular. İkinci olarak milli irade söylemi ile seçimler, milli iradenin tecelli ettiğı mekanizma olması sebebiyle, yüceltilir ve demokrasinin en önemli ve bazen tek ayağı olarak seçimlerin görülür. Bununla bağlantılı olarak askeri ve bürokratik vesayete karşı meclisin ve hükümetin yani meclis çoğunluğuna sahip partinin üstünlüğü yine milli irade söylemine dayanarak vurgulanır. Hükümetin yasama ve yargı gibi kuvvetlere karşı üstün olduğu fikri de zaman zaman (DP ve AP'DE) milli irade söylemi yardımıyla işlenmiştir ancak tüm merkez sağ partilerde rastlana bir söylem değildir. Bu tezde AKP'nin milli irade söyleminin DP ile başlayan bu merkez sağ çizginin devamı olarak okunmuştur. Bunun için DP'den başlayıp AKP'ye kadar gelen tarihsel süreç ve bu süreçteki milli irade kullanımları tezin üçüncü bölümünde özetlenmiştir.

Tezin ana bölümü olan dördüncü bölümde Erdoğan'ın milli irade söylemi, milli irade kavramının siyaset teorisindeki ve Türkiye siyasetindeki yeri temel alınarak analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda Erdoğan'ın iktidar dönemi boyunca yaptığı konuşmalar tek tek incelenmiş ve beş başlık halinde kategorize edilmiştir.

Bu başlıklar otantik temsi olarak milli irade, sandıktan çıkan sonuç olarak milli irade, askeri vesayete karşı milli irade, kuvvetler ayrılığını karşı milli irade ve en son her türlü muhalefete karşı milli irade olarak belirlenmiştir. Başlıklar tematik bir ayırım içermekte ve aynı zamanda tarihsel bir sıra izlemektedir. Örneğin son iki başlık Erdoğan iktidarın son dönemlerinde daha sık görülmektedir. Yer yer örtüşen noktaları olmakla birlikte, başlıkları birbirinden ayıran noktaların daha fazla olduğu düşünülmüştür. Beş başlık halinde kategorize edilen bu söyleminin ilk alt başlığında Erdoğan geçmişten gelen millet ve elitler ikiliğini derinleştirmiştir. Kendini milletin bir parçası ve ilerleyen zamanlarda milletin kendisi olarak tanımlamıştır. Bu söyleme

göre milleti temsil etme hakkı ve kudreti olan yine milletin içinden çıkmış AKP olacaktır. AKP ile temsil edilen bu millet, Erdoğan'ın söylemine göre, devlet eliti ve bu elitin politikaları altında ezilmiştir. Ne zaman ki millet tercihini iradesini seçimler yoluyla ortaya koymaya başlamış o zaman milletin meclisi milletin eline geçmiştir. İkinci alt başlıkta Erdoğan'ın milli iradenin tecelli ettiği yer olarak seçimleri ve çoğunlukçu demokrasiyi yücelttiği görülür. Her ne kadar iktidarının başlarında demokrasinin çoğulcu olması gerektiğini söylese de ilerleyen dönemlerde demokrasiyi sandığa eşitleyen bir anlayış hakim olmaya başlar. Bu anlayışı meşrulaştıracak söylem yine milli irade söylemi olmuştur. Yani seçimler ve meclisteki çoğunluk ve bu çoğunluğun kurduğu hükümet milletin iradesini yansıtır başka bir deyişle milletin iradesi dediğimiz şey seçimle ortaya çıkan parlamento çoğunluğundan başka bir şey değildir. Üçüncü alt başlıkta milli irade kavramının doğrudan askeri müdahalelere karşı kullanıldığı söylemler ele alınmıştır. Askerin siyasete müdahalesinin meşru görülmemesi fikri yine milli irade kavramı kullanılarak pekiştirilmiştir. Bu kullanımda geçmişten gelen bizzat AKP üyelerin tecrübe ettiği darbeler ve parti kapatmaların etkisi olduğu söylenebilir. Dördüncü alt başlık kuvvetler ayrılığına karşı milli irade söylemin kullanılmasını ele almıştır. Burada Erdoğan özellikle yasama gücüne karşı milli irade kavramını kullanmış ve böylece yürütmenin milli iradenin özü olduğu iddiasıyla diğer kuvvetlere üstün olması gerektiğini savunmuştur. Son alt başlık milli iradenin her türlü muhalefete karşı kullanılmasını içerir. Gezi ayaklanmasından Somadaki maden faciası karşısında hükümete gelen eleştirilere, TEKELE direnişinden her türlü sendikal muhalefete, hükümetin sanat politikalarının eleştirilmesinden yolsuzluk operasyonların kadar her türlü muhalif tepki milli iradeye gösterilen tepki olarak kabul edilir. Örneğin Gezi direnişine cevaben 'milli iradeye saygı mitingi' adıyla bir sıra miting gerçekleştirilmiştir. Önemli bir nokta da Erdoğan'ın bu son başlıktaki milli irade söylemini kurarken ilk üç alt başlığa gönderme yapıyor olmasıdır. Erdoğan örneğin hükümetin sanat politikalarına muhalefet edenleri milli iradeye saygı göstermemekle ve elitist olmakla suçlar. Bu doğrultuda Erdoğan Kedisi

ve partisinin politikaları ile ilgili her şeyi milli irade söylemi yoluyla meşrulaştırır. AKP milletin içinden gelmek, seçimlerde çoğunluğun oylarını almak, vesayete ve elitizme karşı savaşmak suretiyle milletin yegane temsilcisi olmaya hak kazanmıştır. Bu her seçimde tescillenmektedir. AKP milli irade söylemi yoluyla milletin kedisi olarak işaretlenir. Dolayısıyla AKP'nin iradesi milli irade, AKP'nin eleştirisi de milli iradeye saygısızlık olacaktır. Bu yolla AKP'ye karşı olan ya da onu eleştiren kesimler tedricen milletin tanımının dışına çıkarılır. Bu söylem düzeyindeki dışlama öyle bir noktaya varır ki İslami bir cemaatin vaktiyle AKP seçmeni olan kitlesi de AKP'yi eleştirmesi halinde milli irade söyleminin dışına çıkarılmaktan kurtulamaz. Dolayısıyla Erdoğan'daki milli irade söylemi eski merkez sağ partilerde görülen otantik temsil olarak milli irade, elitlere karşı milletin iradesi olarak milli irade söylemini aşmıştır. Milli irade zaten merkez sağ gelenekte hiçbir zaman teorik anlamında tüm halkın iradesi ya da Rousseau'daki gelen irade olarak kullanılmamıştır. Ama Milli irade artık ezilen muhafazakar halk kitlelerinin iradesi olarak milli irade de değildir. Erdoğan'ın aslında soyut olan milli irade kavramını kendisi ve AKP ile somutlaştırmış ve bu somutlaştırmayla iktidarın boş alanını doldurulmaya çalışılmıştır.

Bu tezin argümanı iktidarın sultandan boşalan alanının Erdoğan'ın milli irade söylemi ile doldurulmaya çalışıldığıdır. Lefort'un belirttiği gibi, diğer geleneksel partilerden farklı olduğunu iddia eden bir parti orya çıkmış, *CHP'den ve devlet elitiden farklı olarak AKP'nin ortaya çıkması*, tüm insanların arzularını temsil ettiğini iddia etmiş, *otantik temsil iddiası*, hukukun ötesinde bir meşruiyeti olduğunu iddia etmiş, *kuvvetler ayrılığına karşı milli irade savunusu* ve iktidarını tüm muhalefeti etkisizleştirerek elde etmek/tutmak istemiştir, *her türlü muhalefete karşı milli irade vurgusu*. Ortaya çıkan sonuç, çoğunluk olarak iktidar değil, biz- olarak-iktidar ve biz-olarak-millet anlayışıdır.

