

FRAMING GEZİ MOVEMENT IN ANKARA

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **FRAMING GEZİ MOVEMENT IN ANKARA**

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The most rapid, unexpected and broad participation example of the social movements in Turkey emerged in İstanbul during 2013 June. The events expanded all over Turkey in a short period of time with the participation of 2.5 million people and imprinted in the memories with togetherness of different clusters of the society, casualties, injuries and a big material loss. The question of “what is Gezi?” will be a contentious issue for the next decades. This thesis examines Gezi movement as a “new social movement” which refers to a discrete set of social actions by their actors, tools, incidences, demands and discourses. Carrying the traces of post-industrial society, the major characteristics of these movements are revealed by their eclectic, multi identitical, rapidly transformative, network-based, non-materialistic targeted structure. One of the most intensive locations of Gezi has been Ankara, the capital of Turkey. Although Ankara has a significant potential emerging from its quality and population, it is also known with its conformist civil servant city profile. Therefore, it is suprising that, Ankara became one of the centers of the violent conflicts and local originalities despite its pacified social movement profile. This thesis tries to answer the question of “can perception of repression create new social movement?” by evaluating Gezi from a framing perspective in the case of Ankara. The major method of in-depth interviews is supported by several interpretative methods such as word frequency analysis in order to scrutinize and understand various aspects of Gezi which is one of the most influential social movements of Turkish history.

**Keywords:** Gezi movement, new social movements, power, framing, Ankara

## ÖZ

### ANKARA’DA GEZİ HAREKETİNİ ÇERÇEVELEMEK

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

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Türkiye’de toplumsal hareketlerin en hızlı, en beklenmeyen, en geniş katılımlı örneği Haziran 2013’te İstanbul’da ortaya çıktı. Türkiye’nin her tarafına yayılan ve resmi verilere göre 2,5 milyon kişinin katıldığı olaylar, toplumun farklı katmanlarının bir arada hareket etmesi, can kayıpları, geniş ölçekli yaralanmalar ve büyük maddi zararlar hafızalarda yer etti. Gezi’nin “ne olduğu” sorunsalı gelecek on yıllar boyunca Türkiye’de cevap aranan sorulardan biri olacak. Bu tez, Gezi’yi; aktörleri, mücadele araçları, ortaya çıkış şekilleri, talepleri ve söylemleri ile önceki dönemlerden farklı bir sosyal hareket dalgasını ifade eden “yeni sosyal hareketler” bağlamında değerlendiriyor. Post endüstriyel toplumun izlerini taşıyan yeni sosyal hareketlerin en önemli özellikleri; eklektik, çok kimlikli, hızlı dönüşebilen, ağlar aracılığıyla yayılan ve materyal olmayan değerleri ön plana alan nitelikte olmaları olarak özetlenebilir. Gezi hareketinin en yoğun yaşandığı yerlerden biri Türkiye’nin başkenti Ankara oldu. Nüfus ve nitelik bakımından büyük bir potansiyeli barındıran ancak genelde toplumsal hareketler konusunda İstanbul’a kıyasla pasif bir profil çizen Ankara, bu defa şiddetli çatışmaların ve farklı semtlerde özgün katılımların merkezi oldu. Bu tez, Gezi’yi Ankara örneğinde değerlendirirken “baskı algısı yeni toplumsal hareket yaratır mı?” sorusuna çerçeve perspektifini de katarak cevap arıyor. Çalışma, Türkiye tarihindeki etkili sosyal hareketlerden biri olan Gezi’yi derinlemesine analiz etmek için temel yöntem olarak derinlemesine mülakat tekniği benimsenmiş, kelime frekansı analizleri gibi niteliksel yöntemlerle desteklenmiştir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Gezi hareketi, yeni sosyal hareketler, güç, çerçeveleme, Ankara

*To my deceased father, my mother and brother...*

*To Esra, my family in future...*



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AI</b>	:	Amnesty International
<b>AKA-DER</b>	:	Anatolian Culture and Research Association
<b>AKM</b>	:	Atatürk Cultural Center
<b>AKP</b>	:	Justice and Development Party – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
<b>AK Party</b>	:	Justice and Development Party – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
<b>ANAP</b>	:	Motherland Party – Anavatan Partisi
<b>AOÇ</b>	:	Atatürk Forest Farm
<b>AP</b>	:	Adalet Partisi
<b>ATM</b>	:	Automatic Teller Machine
<b>ATO</b>	:	Ankara Chamber of Commerce
<b>AVM</b>	:	Shopping Mall
<b>BBC</b>	:	British Broadcasting Company
<b>BDP</b>	:	Peace and Democracy Party
<b>BHH</b>	:	Birleşik Haziran Hareketi
<b>CBD</b>	:	Central Business District
<b>CCTV</b>	:	Closed Circuit Television
<b>CEO</b>	:	Chief Executive Officer
<b>CGT</b>	:	General Confederation of Labor [France]
<b>CHP</b>	:	Republican People’s Party – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
<b>CNN</b>	:	Cable News Network [US/INT]
<b>CNN Türk</b>	:	Cable News Network Turk [Turkey]

<b>CSO</b>	:	Civil Society Organization
<b>DDY</b>	:	State Railways
<b>DHA</b>	:	Doğan News Agency
<b>DEHAP</b>	:	Demokratik Halk Partisi
<b>DİSK</b>	:	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey
<b>DP</b>	:	Democrat Party – Demokrat Parti
<b>DYP</b>	:	True Path Party - Doğru Yol Partisi
<b>EMEP</b>	:	The Party of Labor – Emeğin Partisi / Emek Partisi
<b>EGM</b>	:	General Directorate of Security
<b>EGO</b>	:	Electricity Gas Bus [Department of Ankara Municipality]
<b>EU</b>	:	European Union
<b>FO</b>	:	Worker’s Force [France]
<b>FP</b>	:	Virtue Party - Fazilet Partisi
<b>FTTA</b>	:	The Free Trade Area of the Americas
<b>GDP</b>	:	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GMK</b>	:	Gazi Mustafa Kemal
<b>GP</b>	:	Genç Party
<b>GTA</b>	:	Grand Theft Auto
<b>HAS Party</b>	:	Party of People’s Voice – Has Parti
<b>HDP</b>	:	People’s Democracy Party
<b>HES</b>	:	Hydroelectric Power Plant
<b>HRW</b>	:	Human Rights Watch

<b>ICT</b>	:	Information Communication Technology
<b>ICOMOS</b>	:	International Council on Monuments and Sites
<b>ID</b>	:	Identification
<b>IMF</b>	:	International Monetary Fund
<b>ISIL/ISIS</b>	:	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant/Syria
<b>İHH</b>	:	Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
<b>İTP</b>	:	İttihat ve Terakki Partisi
<b>İTC</b>	:	İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti
<b>JDP</b>	:	Justice and Development Party – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
<b>KESK</b>	:	Confederation of Public Workers' Unions
<b>LGBT</b>	:	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transexual
<b>MC</b>	:	Milliyetçi Cephe – Nationalist Front
<b>MÇP</b>	:	Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi
<b>METU</b>	:	Middle East Technical University
<b>MHP</b>	:	Nationalist Action Party
<b>MNP</b>	:	Milli Nizam Partisi
<b>MOBESE</b>	:	Mobile Electronic System Integration
<b>MSP</b>	:	Milli Selamet Partisi
<b>NSM</b>	:	New Social Movement
<b>MÜSİAD</b>	:	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association
<b>NYC</b>	:	New York City
<b>OSTİM</b>	:	Middle East Industrial and Commercial Center

<b>PCF</b>	:	French Communist Party
<b>PKK</b>	:	Kurdistan Workers' Party – Kürdistan İşçi Partisi
<b>POMA</b>	:	Police Events Intervention Vehicle
<b>POS</b>	:	Political Opportunity Structure
<b>PS</b>	:	Socialist Party [France]
<b>PR</b>	:	Public relations
<b>RM</b>	:	Resource Mobilization
<b>RP</b>	:	Welfare Party-Refah Partisi
<b>SCF</b>	:	Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası
<b>SDP</b>	:	Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi
<b>SHP</b>	:	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti
<b>SMO</b>	:	Social Movement Organization
<b>SPD</b>	:	Social Democratic Party of Germany
<b>TCF</b>	:	Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası
<b>TDHB</b>	:	Turkish Dentists' Union
<b>TEM</b>	:	Fight Against Terror [Department of Police]
<b>TGB</b>	:	Turkey Youth Union
<b>TİB</b>	:	The Presidency of Telecommunication
<b>TİP</b>	:	Türkiye İşçi Partisi
<b>THY</b>	:	Turkish Airlines
<b>TKP</b>	:	Turkish Communist Party
<b>TMMOB</b>	:	Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects

<b>TOKİ</b>	:	Housing Development Administration
<b>TOMA</b>	:	Social Events Intervention Vehicle
<b>TTB</b>	:	Turkish Medical Association
<b>TUSKON</b>	:	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
<b>TÜSİAD</b>	:	Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
<b>TV</b>	:	Television
<b>ÖDP</b>	:	Freedom and Solidarity Party
<b>UN</b>	:	United Nations
<b>UNESCO</b>	:	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>US</b>	:	United States
<b>USA</b>	:	The United States of America
<b>WB</b>	:	World Bank
<b>WFA</b>	:	Word Frequency Analysis
<b>WTO</b>	:	World Trade Organization
<b>WWI</b>	:	First World War
<b>WWII</b>	:	Second World War
<b>YÖK</b>	:	Higher Education Council
<b>YKM</b>	:	Yeni Karamürsel [a Store]
<b>YTH</b>	:	Yeni Toplumsal Hareket(ler)
<b>ZMO</b>	:	Chamber of Agricultural Engineers



## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Gezi Park in Terms of New Social Movements**

When the history of Turkey has been analyzed, Gezi protests can be considered as significant milestone. They are the biggest social movements after the military coup of 1980 and they included many unique sides associating with the global realities. The effect of Gezi has been perceived not only in Turkey but also in the world.

In the end of May 2013, Gezi Park protests started as a social action against an urban renewal project in the central square of Taksim in İstanbul, the mightiest metropolitan city in Turkey. From the very start, main reason for the events was the removal of the trees from Gezi Park and harsh police intervention against the protestors. In a short while, the protest actions spread all over the country and movement became a cause celebre which was one of the most important social events in Turkey.

The actions started rapidly and contingently. There is no such an example of social mobilization in the Turkish history (Beriş, 2013). According to formal statistics of Ministry of Interior, two and a half million people participated in the actions. The movement was very extraordinary in the sense that environmental interventions such as removal of trees in the account of urban renewal and police brutality in social actions were not novel issues in Turkey. In many aspects, the movement had new social movement characteristics. This study examines these characteristics and tries to categorize them in relation with the other social movement theories.

#### **1.2 Concepts, History and Theoretical Overview**

##### **1.2.1 Concepts**

The social movement is a collective endeavor to achieve a common target while protecting a common interest (Giddens, 2000: 540–541). It may include conflicting or reformist tendencies. Actually, social movements are cultural and social reproduction mechanisms. Protest events are any kind of public actions of demonstrative,

confrontative or violent actions (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, Giugni, 1992). The quality of political actors and the social is reinterpreted in every case (Foss and Larkin, 1986:143). Social movements can be reformist or revolutionist. The reality gaps between society and demands of individuals can reveal tensions which come with uprising, protest or agitations (Geschwender, 1967).

There seem more effort to identify social movement than “protest”. Protest refers to a behavior. Demonstrations against war or changes in labor law can be classified as protest. However, people are generally disagree with categorizing terrorist acts or group of students’ complaints on a course syllabus as protest. In the other words the concept is ambiguous. In social movements literature, the protest is identified as a joint action of individuals that does not take place regularly whose aim is achieving a goal by putting pressure on third parties. Joint or collective first thought as the coordinated actions of several individuals. However, collective action can be spontaneous as well. Thus, collective or joint action can be understood as action of several individuals regardless of whether there is a coordination or not. Protest refers to actions those try to change something by influencing decisions of a target. In other words, the focus is on the individuals who cannot achieve their goals by themselves. Protests may be legal or illegal, more or less organized (Opp, 2009).

One of the mainly used words for Gezi has been resistance. Actually, resistance movements, rather than advocating change, seek to hold it back and keep the status quo (Simons, 2015). Thus, it is fair to mention that Gezi started as a resistance. Resistance is a general concept, it may include civil resistance or armed resistance. It is done against a legally established government, or power. Bourdieu also mentions about an “effective” resistance. For him, the actors may contribute to the reproduction of certain social relations that are disadvantageous for them. Thus, the effective resistance means targeting dispositions responsible for the reproduction of these specific power relations. This provides new insights into the issue of personal transformation that is linked to the emergence of the new social movements. The power relations can be dismantled by the alternative practices. In other words, it is possible to escape symbolic violence by introducing the alternative ways of seeing, feeling and understanding (Bourdieu, 2000).



### **1.2.1 History**

Since 1850s, social movements were predominantly economy based. Both 1917 Soviet Revolution and 1953 East Berlin rebellion against communist regime, which aim to protest working conditions, were the examples of such demands. Considering the last century, in some cases labor class showed itself in the revolutions while in other cases it had been repressed. However, all these social movements showed typical characteristics at that time (Carroll, 1992). Arrighi (1989) et al. consider 1968 as an anti-systemic movement. For him, there have been only two revolutions: One in 1848 and the second one is 1968.

While mentioning about new social movements (NSMs), the 68 Movement is one of the most referred events. Actually, 1968 Movement changed the soul of movements. The demonstrations which burst out in France had expanded to many different regions of the world and characteristics of the events varied by region. In Prague, they were about demands of more democracy while in USA they were more like anti-war and anti-racist movements, probably due to the effect of Vietnam War.

68 Movement initiated in Nanterre University in Paris with the ban of a play called “The Paravans” which was performed by the university students. After a small scale conflict between students and the university authorities, the administration closed the university. Following this, on 3 May (1967) the students of University of Sorbonne decided to protest the closure decision. Police responded to the strikes in Sorbonne and invaded the university. New students participated into actions to stop custodies and as the support expanded police brutality got wilder. Finally police took control after arresting hundreds of students. On 6 May, some student unions called for general resistance to protest police invasion of Sorbonne. Nearly 20.000 people participated in the actions and police responded with strong tear gas and took hundreds of people into custodies. On the same day, a huge crowd consisting of high school students and workers congregated in students. The demands of protesters listed as withdrawal of police forces and accusations against students, and reopening of universities. However, negotiations between protestors and authorities did not end as intended. On 10 May, a greater mass gathered in Left Bank. Barricades were built and conflicts lasted until

the morning. Certain radios broadcasted events minute by minute. Government's harsh intervention brought on sympathy for the protestors. French Communist Party (PCF) supported students without a strong desire. Leftist-anarchist trade unions like General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and Worker's Force (FO) called for 1-day general strike. Moreover, Prime Minister declared that Sorbonne would be opened and students would be released. However, this was not enough to stop the students. Sorbonne was occupied by students and workers started to occupy factories. As of May 16, approximately 50 factories (including important industries such as Sud Aviation and Renault) have been occupied and more than 200.000 workers joined strikes. In one week this figure reached to 10 million which was one third of all workers in France. Although a huge number of workers participated the strikes, trade unions did not pioneered these strikes. Large mass of people were shouting as "De Gaulle, resign!" on streets but de Gaulle followed another way: He gathered military support in case of emergency, repealed National Assembly and called for an election on 23 June. Subsequently, workers gradually started to return to work. Government banned some leftist organizations and mentioned about state of emergency as an option on the table. National Students Union called off street actions. Strikes and occupations were repressed by police in some factories. Police took back Sorbonne on 16 June. De Gaulle won the elections in June and the crises ended (Çimen, 2007). About one year later, some protests emerged against Vietnamese War and for gender freedom. The ban of men's entrance to women dorm was a triggered unrest in Nanterre University. Protests, which were supported by labor unions, spread to the whole country. Banners and walls were filled with various slogans: "Banning is banned, agenda is madness, light wages heavy tanks, radio is lying" (Güleç, 2013).

68 Movement were generally called as a social uprising as well as resistance and it was not only a French movement but also gathered certain attention from all over the world. In the US, Argentina, Mexico and Germany there were parallel actions generally organized by students. However, the actions in Germany and the US have not been supported by workers. On the other hand, there were certain ideals under the motivations of the 68 Movement: Rise against central power, demand for better life standards, fight for more individual freedom, ask for gender equality, anger against

widespread pacifism. Some participants of 68 Movement took roles in politics of their countries like Bill Clinton and Joschka Fisher after long years. According to certain philosophers, the actions were the greatest revolutionary movement in the century due to the fact that it included a large mass consisting of different ethnical identities, ages, and classes instead of labor class or minorities (Çimen, 2007). 68 Movement became a starting point for the new social movement discussions. However, some researchers argue that NSMs lost their ideals and motivations by 1990s since they became institutionalized in time.

The alter-globalization movement was a clear example of NSM. The alter-globalization movement targeted structural social change not reform. The movement became visible by the demonstrations in Seattle in 1999. Heavily armed police, tear gas, masked protestors were the images of the WTO protests. Moreover, in the cities around the world people marched for the release of activists imprisoned in Seattle. In the US the “protestor violence” shadowed the event. After Seattle, a debate took place among activists about the legitimacy of property crime and diversity of tactics (Çetin and Çopuroğlu, 2010).

At this point, occupy movement can be considered as another example of NSM. The strategy of occupy movement is based on the occupation of an urban space which is close to power and using it to elaborate how to resist against power (Kanbak and Önver, 2013). There are many writers who argue that the social inequality which increased during last 30 years in the US had a certain effect on the emergence of the Occupy movement which was simply the occupation of the American Stock Exchange “The Wall Street”. Most of the analysis of the Occupy Movement, references the famous graphic of the Saez and Piketty that shows the income share of richest 10 percent in a “U” form (Özatalay, 2014).

The Occupy Movement in the US, were targeting the richest 1%. The major slogan was “We are 99%”. There was an opinion against the richest part of the society: “where these people got this wealth without proper contribution to system?”, This enrichment has seen as an injustice action. For Grusky et al. (2013), American society was not against inequality but they expect a balance between income and contribution (ibid).

In developed capitalist countries, the classical industrial labor class perished due to the fact that factories have strongly falled away or disappeared. Sustainability of urban life, which requires the expansion of service sector, is provided by disorganized, sub-contracted, low wage worker class that works only part time. This class does not hope for the future and Harvey calls this class as “precariat” instead of proletariat (Harvey, 2013). Several social scientist argued that the participants of Occupy Movement were coming from the *precariat*. Thus, these participants were not only angry with “unfair riches” but also with “unfair labor” that is organized by labor unions. Indeed, labor unions were not that effective in the Occupy Movement (Özatalay, 2014).

### **1.2.2 Theoretical Overview**

In the beginning, analysis of social movements was based on the description of characteristics of “systemic anomalies”. Hence, social movement analysis was considered in terms of conflict studies. However in 1950s, new approaches had been developed in order to analyze the social movements in a systematic way. Thanks to the “deedy” period of 1960s, the social mobilization theory was developed in the US in 1970s. Then, the political opportunity (POS) and political process approaches emerged as critics to the social mobilization theories. In general, these approaches ask the question of “how the social movements emerge?”. The institutional relations behind and systemic components revealing collective actions are examined. The resource mobilization (RM) theory focuses on the effectiveness of sources such as social capital, money, time and motivating power those boost the social movements (Jasper, 2002:67). In the resource mobilization theory, the social movements are important elements of the systems and they must be promoted for the healthy functioning of the system. However, the political opportunity and political process approaches (generally abbreviated as POS) which have emerged as critics, focuses on the position of political actors, democratic capabilities of the states, struggles and coalitions between the power elites. In other words, changes in opportunities and limitations affect the transformation of social movements (Tarrow, 2006:24-25). Just like the POS model, RM handles actors as exclusively strategic and rational. Movements, it assumes, put resources to the service of already defined movement

goals. RM approach handles identity and everyday life instrumentally: these do not constitute the primary focus of movement activity, but their deployment may become tools for inciting people (Morris 1984; Zald 1996).

In this manner, we testify a rapid development in social movements in 20th century. In 1940s, the study of social movements was in a descriptive level and relatively lack of theory (Strauss 1947: 352) and in 1960s, the social changes received relatively little emphasis in social sciences (Killian, 1964: 426). By 1970s, the issue of collective action started to become one of the most vigorous areas in social sciences. At the end of the 1980s, there was an explosion in the writings on social movements and collective action (Morris and Herring, 1987: 138, Rucht, 1991). Today, the social movements and protest actions have become the permanent components of Western democracies (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).

Until 1960s, traditionally, social movements had focused mainly on issues of labor and nations: since the 1970s and 1980s, “new social movements” have emerged instead centered on concerns such as women’s liberation, environmental protection etc. Attempts to explain developments in the forms of conflict in the 1960s had encountered a number of problems. Day by day, big mass of women entered the labor life and the possibilities of social stratification increased. Many of the actors engaged in those conflicts (youth, women, new professional groups) were only partially related to the class conflicts. The existence of working class in post-industrial society has been criticized (ibid).

Tilly (1997) argues that a social movement consists of repeated interactions among challengers, relevant publics, and various third parties such as rival challengers, counter-demonstrators, incidental victims, and police. With the growth of democratic regimes after 1980, social movements became much more common. Social movements are partly causes, partly effects, and almost invariably concomitants of democratic freedoms to speak, assemble, associate, and complain (Tilly, 1997). Another original effort to link structural analysis and social movement analysis has been inspired by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Researchers engaged in the analysis of cultural habits (or the cultural predispositions produced by processes of

socialization) as well as their structural determinants. Going beyond economic interests, some scholars explained indeed social movement activism as following needs and desires that derive from values and norms that are typical of specific cultures (or fields). In this sense, action is not rational, but reasonable (Bourdieu, 1980; Eckstein, 2001; Sommier, 2003).

Although POS and RM models have tackled questions of culture, the scholars associated with these approaches have most of the time neglected how culture, everyday life, identity-formation, and habits might not only be resources, instruments, and aspects of society that are transformed as a result of mobilization, but the very focus of movement activity (Tuğal, 2009). A frequent response to such criticisms has been identity-oriented movements and explanations. Also, counter arguments exist. For instance, Tarrow (1989) argues that “Movements that privilege identity ignore opportunities”. According to Tarrow (2006), the social movement is based on the collective action of the groups which have claim-making actions. The contentious politics refers to the relation of actors and it has been developed as replacement of relations of institutions to relations of individuals. Indeed, the role of the actor gained dominance for the old structuralists like Tilly. The structural and cultural analyses have come closer in recent time (McAdam et al., 2001: 134-136).

According to Wiewiorka (2005), the sociology of social movements is recent. Particularly after 1960s, the “new social movements” (NSMs) approaches became evident. NSM is an umbrella concept for the eclectic movements including woman, peace, gender and ecology movement. NSMs refer to movements which do not have a traditional hierarchy, a strict institution, stable memberships, strong ideals, pioneering classes, or ideological linkages. Mostly these movements have specific agendas, result oriented as well as flexible structures and voluntary participants (Olofsson, 1988; Buechler, 1995). Thus the NSMs have post structural characteristics. The NSM analysis is based on personal motivations, cultural coding, daily relations and their reflections rather than the structure of institutions. In these analyses, the individual and action is dominant to structure. In other words, these are in general, identity movements. Generally, the purpose of the actions are not abolishing the government but pushing it to change the politics in some areas, on some particular issues (Scott,

1995:133-134; Savran, 1987). The new social movement theories have diversity. It is not easy to mention about one single new social movement theory but the new social movement theories.

### **1.3 What makes Gezi Park Protests Distinct?**

As it is seen, the field of social movements has almost a-70-years history and especially in the last fifty years, this field had certain transformations by the help of new and raising concepts, such as identity. But, what is the place of Gezi Protest in this conceptualization?

Gezi Protests started in the summer of 2013 as an environmentalist resistance in a small part of İstanbul, Turkey with a small group of protestors. However they have expanded to all over the country in a few days with a great mass participation. Gezi created a great mass mobilization, new solidarity and resistance forms, new concepts as well as a new culture that has not known before. For some people Gezi was “hope” while for some others it was a “dangerous uprising” against legitimate government. However, several writers argue that nobody has been thought such a mass supported action could be done before 30 May 2013. Even in the critical years identified by continuous conflicts of 1990s, memorized by the state and Kurdish struggle particularly in Southeastern Anatolia, the number of participants and number of protests have been low. According to General Directorate of Security (EGM) statistics, the annual average number of the street protests was 1700 in 1990s. It was 916 in 1994 and 2269 in 2000. The average participant number has been lower than 500 in those years. In 2005, the number of protests reaches 8000. Uysal (2013a), argues that it is because of the increase in accession to street and relative conditions of peace. However, such actions were not affective in political decisions. In these terms, Gezi was a very unique and extraordinary process in Turkey. The actions drew attention in Turkey as well as in the world and the event will have probable effects in the future of Turkish political and social life.

A significant part of the youth had experienced their first contact with the street movement and resistance actions. Now these people have an idea of “violence”, “state”, “resistance” and “legitimacy”. They know that people can invade the streets,

the power is not absolute and it can be shocked easily (Soysal, 2013). Where the power exists, resistance exists and Gezi was a clear example of this. Furthermore, there is no strict forms of resistance and there is no strict forms of power as well.

Gezi was offering a new political organization model: It was against subject oriented political structures, head oriented hierarchies, authoritarian figures of representative democracies. It was not offering a leader or hierarchies. It was not requesting representation but presentation. According to Kodalak (2013), the problem was structural. He claims that who had the power of governance used the tools as they wanted.

After a long time, central hegemony lost their power since people used slogans such as “tear gas hooray!”, “tear gas makes us high”, the fear threshold was abolished. The 21st century is providing new hopes with new organizations and new tools. That was a youth based uprising against neo liberalism and “adult ideology”. This is in search of reality and against any kinds of authority relations including a scale of family to state (Ergüden, 2013).

“Everything started with staking a claim on protecting our trees”. It was against the destruction of a public space by the state with the ignorance of the public demands. The action for protecting trees became Gezi Park resistance due to imbalanced intervention of police. Due to the brutal aggression of police on the peaceful activists, the mass of people was mobilized. After all those arrogant speeches of Erdoğan the level of protests increased (Çitak, 2013).

Gezi has been handled by different perspectives and it seems that the question of identification of Gezi will survive in the future. This thesis contributes to these disputes by handling Gezi through new social movements (NSM) perspective, particularly identity.

#### **1.4 Research Problematic and Research Question**

The research problematic of this study is about identifying the roots, process and consequences of Gezi in the case of Ankara. The roots of Gezi can be detected through a bunch of theories. Naturally, most of social movement theories may have an



explanatory role on Gezi. However, a detailed view shows that new theories provide a better basis to understand Gezi. Resource mobilization and political opportunity structure/political process, which are new aspects in social movements particularly in the US, are auxiliary theories in this analysis. On the other hand, this study considers Gezi as an identity movement at final. Therefore, European rooted new social movement theories, specially Touraine and Melucci's cultural and symbolic understanding of the identity movements, have been used as the primary explanatory approach.

The resource question of this study is formulated as "can perception of repression create a NSM?" since this new social movement has been considered as result of repressive push on the identity. Indeed, this is not homogenous but composite identity. It is hard to mention about one single identity but it has been able to create a collective action. Principally, this question does not only answer the question of sources under Gezi incident but also it explores the nature and consequences of the action.

The thesis is based on the claim of "consideration of repression" rather than merely "repression". Because, the repression does not have to be inciter for a civic action. Nevertheless, the repression becomes a valuable factor when it is "considered" as repressive. The repression may have factual basis, which have been mentioned in this thesis, but the more important part of the story is peoples' perspective on it. The consideration of repression may change rapidly by frames or it may need a symbolic incident to get embodied.

Long time analysis showed that there is no transcendent (meta) reason under the social movements like in Gezi. Many actions have strong similarities but may follow different destinies. The movements are the results of some trends as well as a unique combination of particular conditions. In that perspective, this thesis tries to find similarities as well as differences between these movements and same patterns as well as specificities are tried to be observed as a consequence of similar causes in terms of new social movements.

## **1.5 Overview of Study**

After the identification of basic concepts such as social movements as well as major pathways to these movements, first of all, this study tries to provide a theoretical perspective by referring to traditional theories of social movements from a long standing perspective. In this part, early and modern contributions to theory have been examined. The second part of this chapter handles the new declinations in the social movement theories. The reflections in the US as well as in Europe will be mentioned. In this part, an extensive priority will be given to new social movements as the main concern of the thesis. The question of “why new social movements are new?” will be answered on the basis of a postmodernism debate. The construction of new social movements, the concept of identity and collective identity formation will be examined. One last question of the chapter will be on place of repressive power in the debate of identity. At the end, some comparative tables will be drawn to overview the theories from an analytical point of view.

Next part covers the Gezi incident as a case study. In this part, the background of the events will be primary concern. What constituted the sources of Gezi? Considering the claim of “new social movements” the question will be the reflection of “new” in the last decade of Turkey. Naturally, the political and economic aspects under social movements and under the “new” reflections in Turkey will be the major components of debates. A brief history of the events will be provided from a framing perspective.

In the next chapter, Gezi protests in the Ankara case, will be analyzed by the help of theories. A model will be constructed to analyze events in a methodological way and main statement referring to repressive power and identity will be supported. Furthermore, in this part a detailed examination of Ankara-Gezi protests will be done including different aspects supporting the main theoretical argument. In the part of auxiliary debates, some further perspectives will be provided as the known issues on the debates of NSMs.

Final chapter provides a summary through a quest on thesis statement and it asks questions for the future aspects and potential research areas.

### **1.6 Methodology: Which theories? Which unit? Which methods?**

This study elaborates almost all social movement theories considering their probable explanatory power on social movements. However, at the end it adopts the new aspects in social movements as referred by political opportunity structure (POS), resource mobilization (RM), framing and specifically new social movements (NSM). These theories have proper basis to understand Gezi since they provide new perspectives for the movements after 1960s and 70s. This study follows the traces in the new aspects and finds European rooted NSM as the most powerful theory particularly. Focusing on NSM has naturally brought the thesis on the quest of identity. Therefore, relation between emergences of identity movements and the repression constructs the resource question. This thesis gives a priority to “actor” on the structure meaning, the actor’s movement is understood in a structured way. In other words, actor may act in structures, within an interactive relation with these structures. However these structures cannot be considered as a fixed, instead they emerge, abolish and reemerge continuously.

Understanding Gezi from an identity perspective directs us to participants, their perception, in general their experiences in Gezi. Thus, the unit of analysis of this research is 40 people from Ankara who have participated in Gezi protests actively in June 2013, the time when street actions started, raised and ended. In-depth interview technique has been adopted to mine data in detail since the experiences have been thought as the major frames in Gezi. There exist several studies in new social movements field but combining power debates with identity and constructing a relational model including different aspects of theories are new contributions to the field.

By the way, it must be underlined that most of the social movement theories referred in this study can neither be considered in an asymmetry nor hierarchy with the others. Most of the time, it is more realistic to accept the overlappings among these theories. A detailed analysis on these theories shows that some concepts have been borrowed from others or they have been interpreted in a different form. Sometimes, the abstraction level and unit of analysis change. However, all these theories have

explanatory power for the certain parts of the social movement. Besides, it must be emphasized that new aspects have more concrete power in these explanations.

The methods of this study include documentation, content analysis, participant observations and in-depth interviews. Not only academic writings but also daily newspapers, popular culture books, humor magazines have been examined in the study. A framing analysis has been adopted for three newspapers for one month (June 2014) including the period of street events. The events have been observed and certain contacts had been built during the process. Finally an in-depth interview process has been adopted with 40 people who had participated in the events in Ankara. By this process, their evaluation of Gezi process has been collected and the question of “how the perception of repression can reveal a new social movement” will be answered.

In-depth interview contained non-structured section (III) of “concepts” based on the people’s understading of Gezi-related concepts. One of the powerful methods of qualitative research is content analysis. The assumption under this method is that the most often mentioned words reflect the greatest concerns. While this may be true in some cases, there are several counterpoints to consider when using simple word frequency counts to make inferences about matters of importance (Stemler, 2001). In this study, word frequency analysis has been used as a unique tool and 40 concepts related to Gezi have been asked to participants. Several word clouds were drawn referencing important points of the theory<sup>1</sup>. The positive aspect is that word frequency analysis provides people an open space without any structured question. However, due to the deficiencies of the method, the questions sometimes can be directive or problematic. Thus, also question specific analysis has been adopted, some questions have been omitted, merged or consolidated after the field study. In some answers, the concepts have been grouped and whole answers have been taken into consideration to derive connotations.

One of the unique sides of this study is inclusion of a framing analysis in the case study chapter. This analysis is not only significant in terms of providing the background chronology of Gezi from the three major perspectives but also in terms of its

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<sup>1</sup> In the word clouds, the bigger the word is, the more the frequency of the concept is.

contribution on explaining the roles of frames in Gezi. By this study, the news of three different newspapers with distinct perspectives as “leftist”, “conservative”, “mainstream-liberal” has been analyzed through one month. At the end of this work, certain linkages have been built with the interview participants and frames. By this way, a relation has been observed between the image creation of participants as well as the media frames during Gezi process. At this point a deficiency became quite visible about the design of the whole study. It would be beneficial to include a social media analysis instead of a daily newspaper analysis since social media (particularly Twitter which boomed in Turkey while most of the messages are sent and received from the social media during Gezi). However, it was extremely hard to predict that the participants of interviews were active parts of an “over network society”.

New social movement approaches (particularly Touraine and Melucci’s tradition) try to examine the events as processes rather than making analysis on structures. Actor and process are dominant to structure. In this vein, this thesis prioritizes identity as a cultural asset, thus understanding process and dynamics of the movement become an important target. However, while adopting this attempt a structural model has been used to see the whole picture of the events. This abstract model has been constructed to simplify the basic dynamics of the Gezi movement. The model shall not be considered as a static one which is fixed, valid and functional for any social movements.

### **1.7 Case of Ankara**

This thesis tries to answer this question in the case of Ankara since the work specifically deals with the experiences in Ankara which have been shadowed by İstanbul in social movements in the history<sup>2</sup>. Even though Ankara is the capital of Turkey, İstanbul is at least three times bigger compared to Ankara. Even though Ankara is known by the antique ages as a small town, it is fair to argue that the city

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<sup>2</sup> As the largest metropolitan city, İstanbul’s oppression on all cases is a known issue in Turkey. Considering the specific Gezi Event, an extensive literature have been reviewed for this study and it can be argued that more than 90% of all Gezi texts refer to events in İstanbul, particularly the events near Taksim. However, as the capital of Turkey, Ankara has been a substantial place for social events where has been the second greatest metropolis with 5 million people living by 2013 statistics.

has been “a project” of Turkish Republic which was founded in 1923. Considering the long history of İstanbul, Ankara has an “artificial” character. Naturally these realities affected the city. Ankara has never been a touristic center and it has never included a mass cosmopolitan population compared to İstanbul. Indeed, Ankara became an important space during Gezi events and it deserves to be examined by several researches. As the capital of Turkey, Ankara is the second greatest metropolis with more than five million population. With 22 universities, Ankara has the largest university student population and for a long time it has been considered as “secure” city<sup>3</sup>. Despite the high student potential, as the city of “public officers” Ankara has been seen as a “passive” city in terms of social protests compared to İstanbul. On the other hand, as the center of the politics, the activism in Ankara has a particular meaning. Since all the public institutions take place in the major centers of Ankara, the protests are always under regular surveillance and open for police intervention. Moreover, Ankara has been identified as a particular arena during Gezi events with its dense participation to the protests, heterogeneity of districts as well as harsh police intervention. During Gezi protests the city lived many cases for the first time, several Ankara districts participated in the events and they have hosted many originalities. Thus, the unit of analysis in the study comes from Ankara. The social movements will be examined in referring to mainstream theories with a specific priority on new social movements (NSMs). Finally, the significantly argued topics of social movements such as class basis, violence and urban aspects will be examined while analyzing Gezi events in general and Ankara case in particular.

### **1.8 Limitations, Concerns and Reflexivity**

As Laçiner (2013) argues that Gezi was an important event in the history of Turkey not less than the rule of AK Party, there existed several studies about Gezi Park but most of them have the limits of quantitative research techniques. Moreover, most of these studies have been designed in the short periods and they have been conducted in the movement spaces before a certain “cooling” period. Thus, the sensitive motivations may have a certain weight in these researches. This thesis has been prepared after two

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.ensonhaber.com/ogrencilerin-en-cok-tercih-ettigi-sehirler-2013-07-29.html>

years of Gezi while most of the field study has been conducted after 8-14 months of Gezi. This period provides a good interval to reconsider the question of “what is Gezi”. However, it should be emphasized that this study exhibits the appearance “two years after Gezi”. Obviously, there is not one “Gezi” but several “Gezis” which will be written and rewritten in time.

Another aspect is about the sources those used in the study. After the events, many quantitative researches have been published by private companies and academic institutions. Nevertheless, some of these works had deficiencies in terms of methodology, theory, conceptualization and construction (Yavuz, 2014). In addition, an ethical and scientific critic is needed after a certain time which is enough to make analysis has passed, say nowadays. Gezi gained huge popularity in different aspects, such as publishing sector and academia, in a short while. First, the reflection of Gezi in the publications became rapid. Before the end of August 2013, more than one hundred books were on the shelves in the central bookstores of Turkey. While the resistance was ongoing, the picture books including slogans and street writings have been published. Incoming days, some books have been published under the category of “diary of resistant”. These were more literal studies but still trying to enter “Gezi” from front door. Gezi has been an ongoing process and it should be analyzed slowly. Gezi sections in the bookstores were quite eclectic by the end of summer 2013. Thousands of essays have been written and some documentaries have been composed. By 2014, after the relative decrease of the popularity in Gezi, the sections in bookstores were removed one by one.

According to Göker (2014a; 2014b), these contradictions showed themselves in academia as well. Many leftist and conservative writers tried to reconstruct Gezi to serve their political realities. Besides, many of them have not ignored to refer well-known sociologists slightly in their analysis. Bourdieu (2010) uses some words to identify these issues: “People argue that something is real because it is reality of them. A simple but valid rule for society. “Hence, before referring to a study, a certain question must be raised: “what is the reason behind these claims? Does the writer have reasons other than academic motivations to write these?” Bourdieu considers sociology as a martial art which aims to expose repression techniques. That is why this

study includes a framing analysis on three newspapers with different backgrounds and that is why all the “urgent” concepts such as “Y-Generation” used and writings have been examined in a critical-skeptical way. The combination of several quantitative studies can lead valuable ideas about the process although no strong argument has been built upon these studies. Therefore, our skeptical position will be preserved in all parts of this thesis. Since this is intrinsically a qualitative research, no representativeness has been sought between the sample and the universe. The content analysis is crucial for this study since the message cannot be considered outside the medium and it covers three newspapers representing leftist, liberal as well as conservative voices.

One of the most important issues about the study is reflexivity which is actually a confession about the main environment of time and space. Obviously there are limitations as well as reflexive aspects in this study. Honestly, the researcher does not believe in a value-free science and certain effects of all frames, personal paradigms along with experiences reflected in the all parts of the study. Without a shadow of a doubt, the researcher respects to the globally accepted scientific rules and tries to stay as objective as it used to be. Nevertheless, the effects of habitus on the researcher are non-negligible. In this respect, providing a clear framework about the limitations of the study and putting the awareness of the reflexivity are the most fair measures to be taken. This issue will be elaborated in the field study section in specific to interviews adopted in the case of Ankara.

If the study had been designed under today’s conditions, it would probably include a more detailed framing analysis with a primary weight. This analysis would be based on the mapping of social media messages, as well as locating the “nodes” in the social media networks those have primary roles in the dissemination of the social media messages in Turkish media. The nodes are significant since social media in Turkey forms a more hierarchical structure compared to western examples. Today, a social media analysis based on frequencies of social media messages is quite possible considering some particular costs such as downloading data from the certain databases. However, detailed content analysis on the messages means a huge workload which



mostly exceeds the limits of academic works<sup>4</sup>. Some studies have been done for the social network side of the Gezi which provided mostly descriptive statistics. It seems that more detailed analysis on Twitter can be adopted which are not possible for Facebook due to technical limitations of that service.

The interviews have been started just after 8 months of Gezi (after the dawn of movement at the end of June 2013) and lasted about six months. Thus, after one year and two months of active Gezi periods, the interviews had been completed and summarized.

During the writing process, the ethical rules have been followed strictly. All the interviewees have been guaranteed that their contributions would be used only for scientific purposes and anonymous synthesizes. They have been informed that any question that is thought as “irritating” or “improper” could be left unanswered. Tape records have only been taken under the interviewees’ open permission, kept encrypted and terminated right after the completion of the study. No indicative registration has been done referring to the identities of the participants or third persons. Moreover, the participants were informed not to provide personal data and/or reference in their narratives. The faces in the photos taken from the protests have been blurred in order to keep anonymity. In all cases, the researcher accepts the responsibility of ethical concerns including a strict confidentiality those emerge directly or indirectly due to conduction of this field study.

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<sup>4</sup> One of the biggest questions of today’s social media analysis is summarization of the content based data. This process needs the categorization of message contents which is done by two contradictory methods: In the first method, a computerized software based on dictionary libraries are used (such as Google Translate) to make categories from message contents. This provides a very limited and mostly contradictory results since the artificial intelligence is far away from the understanding of “real meaning” of a message. Considering that the messages on Gezi were in Turkish and many of them included irony and humor, this option cannot provide an acceptable result. The second method is employing real human for the categorization of contents. But this method is very costly and time consuming. Moreover, it is known that real human analysis is not always ensuring the clear categorization due to the “limits of humankind” such as subjectivity and embarrassment during work.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1. Traditional Approaches**

##### **2.1.1 Contribution of Marx, Lenin and Gramsci**

The earliest theorists of social movements, Marx and Engels did not ask the question of what makes individuals engage in a collective action. Or, rather they thought the problem as an outcome of society's structural development rather than one of individual choice. They saw a collective action in social structure but underrated the resources, cultural dimensions and importance of politics. Marx answers the question of how individuals involved in collective action in historically determined terms: people will engage in collective action when their social class comes into fully developed contradictions. In this model, the resources were class consciousness and trade unions. According to Marx, workers movement needs the cooperation of a significant proportion of its members and failure in doing, a revolution, as the history dictated, has been explained by the concept of "false consciousness". The theory was unsatisfactory since no one could say whose consciousness was false and whose was real. Overall, Marx thought that the problem will resolve in itself by the capitalism's contradictions but we know that as capitalism developed, it found certain mechanisms integrating worker into capitalist democracy. Through nationalism and protectionism workers often allied with capitalists. Marx had not stated a clear-cut concept of leadership or working class culture and he seriously underspecified the political conditions which provide opportunities for revolutionary mobilization (Tarrow, 1998b).

A solution for the problem of collective action of worker class has been found by Lenin. His preoccupation was building a leadership mechanism for the movement. Learning from the western European experience workers was only act on behalf of narrow "trade union interests". He proposed an elite of professional revolutionaries and this "vanguard" would act as the guardian of workers' real interests. When it succeeded in 1917 in Russia it first substituted party interests for worker class and then

leader interests with party by the Stalinism. This theory of vanguard was a response of historical situation in Russia in where there was a repressive state with a backward society, a working class unable to produce a revolution on its own (ibid).

When the 1917 Revolution failed to spread to the West, Marxists, like Gramsci, realized that at least in Western conditions, organization would not be sufficient to raise a revolution. Under that conditions, it would be necessary to develop worker's own consciousness. Hence, workers movement had to have a collective intellectual and prime task was to create a working class culture. Gramsci had strong belief on the power of culture and consequently the cultural hegemony of the bourgeois should be stopped. The battle should be fought within the fortifications of capitalist society. And workers' party had to learn to deal with the cultural institutions like church. However, in the example of Italian Communist Party after World War II (WWII), Gramsci's solution led a new dilemma: Long term dialogue between workers and bourgeois had a potential to transform workers' party rather than visa-versa (ibid).

All these theorists emphasized a different element of collective action. According to Marx, there was a mobilization potential, Lenin created movement organizations (what would later be called as "resource mobilization" by American scholars) and Gramsci focused on the need to build consensus around party's goals (what has come to be called as "framing" and "collective identity" formation). But none of them specified the political conditions what we call as political opportunities and constrains. The emergence of this perspective and more specific theories took some time to come in view (ibid).

### **2.1.2 Relative Deprivation Theory**

Indeed, the concept of relative deprivation was not new. In the 19th century, Tocqueville and Marx used the concept in their respective analyses of the French Revolution and the problems associated with the rise of capitalism and personal property. Nevertheless, the modern relative deprivation theory had raised attention after WWII. Actually, sociologist Samuel Stouffer developed the theory while conducting research for the US Army during WWII. Stouffer reported that WWII soldiers measured their personal success by standards based on experience in the

military units in which they serve. According to relative deprivation theory, social movements emerge from collective feelings of relative deprivation. The central idea of relative deprivation theory suggests that individuals or groups feel deprived when their current circumstances are negatively compared to the situation of others. When applying relative deprivation theory to social movements, sociologists look to see what structural conditions exist within the society to foster feelings of relative deprivation and lead to the creation of specific social movements (Morrison, 1971). In this respect, social satisfaction is the opposite of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation theory focuses on feelings and actions. Moreover, relative deprivation theory distinguishes between egoistic deprivation and fraternal deprivation. Egoistic deprivation refers to a single individual's feeling of comparative deprivation. Fraternal deprivation, also called group deprivation, refers to the discontent arising from the status of the entire group as compared to a referent group. Fraternal deprivation may strengthen a group's collective identity (Singer, 1992). Relative deprivation theory has been primarily used for the explanation of Labor and Civil Rights Movements in the United States (1950s-60s). As Morrison argued, the relative deprivation theory was criticized very seriously:

Scholars have questioned the link between relative deprivation and social movements. Much of the evidence linking social movements to feelings of relative deprivation is indirect. While absolute deprivation clearly leads to feelings of discontent and ultimately efforts to effect social change, feelings of relative deprivation may or may not definitively lead to the creation of social movements and collective identity (Morrison, 1971).

Also, while constructing the resource mobilization theory McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that a number of studies have shown little or no support for expected relationships between objective or subjective deprivation and the outbreak of movement phenomena and willingness to participate in collective action (Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Mueller, 1972; Bowen et al., 1968; Crawford and Naditch, 1970).

### **2.1.3 Collective Behavior Theory**

The collective behavior theory emerged in the period marked by the raising of fascism in Europe. The social scientists tried to look for the collective deviances that bring people to action. Even in 1920s, Sigmund Freud asserted that people can behave irrationally in crowds differing to their individual behavior. The acting crowd is

spontaneous and momentary; it lacks organization, leadership, identity and we-consciousness while it has a common objective and goal. For the first time, with the collective behavior theory, the social movement has been thought as the meaningful acts and that makes collective behavior theory valuable. However, it is fair to argue that the main stance of the theory to collective action is negative since it considers collective action as irrational and pathological. It can be stated that, resource mobilization theory in 1970s emerged as a reaction to this theory. Yet, it has also been criticized to assumption of rational behavior (Martin, 2015). As it is seen, in early interpretations, the actions have been categorized under deviations. However, collective behavior theory had long time followers. Türkdoğan (2013) can be an example of this understanding from Turkey. He firstly argues that such actions are the products of the society where technology is advanced. It is due to the fact that, techno societies lost the balance between “tools” and “targets”. He borrows the concept of anomie from Durkheim and considers the actions as a consequence of prevention on social solidarity rules. Secondly, Türkdoğan refers to the fondness of madness as a motivating factor in the state of chaos or revolution. Thus, social physiology became powerful science to explain such agents. Turner and Killian (1957) argue that collective action is an action of a group or society to boost or prevent a change in an institution. According to Türkdoğan (2013), collective action efforts are serving against the change of society. Regarding this point of view, it can be argued that he embraces the idea that social movements are static, indeed.

#### **2.1.4 Rational Preferences & Rational Choice Theory**

Rational choice based theorizing has a long tradition in sociology. Max Weber argued the importance of basing sociological explanations on clearly articulated ideas about rational action (Weber, 1922). In fact, Weber’s approach has been influenced much by the economic theory. Most sociological rational-choice theories assume that actors are rational. The rational choice theory was outlined by Olson in 1965. It is based on the neoclassical economics which tries to explain human action in terms of individual choices and preferences. People seek to maximize their utilities and lower their costs (Hedström & Stern, 2008). In this model, unless the group is very small individuals in the group would not act to achieve collective interests rather they only act to maximize

their own benefits. However, the problem of free riding can always preclude the social action like in the example of labor unions: If a worker can benefit from the positive inputs of a labor union without being a member why s/he wants to pay membership fees? (Martin, 2015). Naturally, this approach has also been one of the most criticized approach in sociology. While some scholars argue that rational choice theory is based on calculation of costs and benefits some others oppose (Opp, 2009). Also it is obvious that the theory assumes that the individual is asocial.

## **2.2 New Theories: Resource Mobilization, Political Opportunity Structure, Framing and New Social Movements**

### **2.2.1 Resource Mobilization Theory**

Resource mobilization (RM) theory has been developed in 1960s as a response to collective behavior theory because in the 1960s, social science studies of collective action experienced a paradigm shift. By RM, theorists largely abandoned the social-psychological approach. These social-psychological theories all tended to focus on identifying factors that attract individuals to social movements (e.g. personality traits, grievances, disillusionment, and ideology) (Flynn, 2009).

Since 1970s, the resource mobilization theory refers to the effects of resources on the emergence of a social movement. The resource mobilization theory was a welcome addition and substitution. Sociologists like Tilly, McCarthy and Zald (1977) pointed out that there was always strain in a society and that mobilization required both resources and rational orientation to action. The actor in movements was not under the effect of emotions or ideologies but rather the action should be understood in terms of logic of costs, benefits as well as opportunities of the action. The resource mobilization theory emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the resources that must be mobilized for social action as well as the dependence of movements to external sources for success (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

McCarthy formulates the resource mobilization by these ideas:

Social movements may or may not be based upon the grievances of the presumed beneficiaries. Conscience constituents, individual and organizational, may

provide major sources of support. And in some cases supporters-those who provide money, facilities, and even labor-may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

As it is formulated, the RM theory gives a high priority to power imbalances and conflicts of interest. These power imbalances and conflicts of interest are sufficient to generate grievances that lead to the mobilization of social movements. Centralized and formally structured social movements more effectively mobilize resources and achieve goals of change than decentralized and informal social movements. The success of social movements is heavily influenced by group strategy and the political climate. According to resource mobilization theory, participation in social movements is a rational behavior, based on an individual's conclusions about the costs and benefits of participation, rather than one born of a psychological predisposition to marginality and discontent (Klandermans, 1984). Furthermore, powerless or resource-poor SMOs require outside support and funding to succeed. Basically, for RM, the major factor in the formation of social movements is the availability of resources, not personal grievance.

Resources used to mobilize social movements may be intangible or tangible. Intangible resources, also referred to as human assets or resources, that can mobilize social movements include the specialized resources of organizational or legal abilities, the diverse skills of supporters, legitimacy, loyalty, social relationships, networks, personal connections, authority, moral commitments, and solidarity (Fuchs, 2006). Tangible resources used to mobilize social movements include money, facilities, and means of communication. Institutions, which may influence the mobilization of resources for social movements, include private foundations, social welfare organizations, colleges and universities, the mass media, government agencies, and business and industry (Flynn, 2009).

In a wide identification, some writers argue that police violence can be considered as a source as well. It has been seen that the state oppression became a significant source under the actions against Apartheid regime in Africa. Similarly since anti-globalization movement, particularly Seattle-1999, the police violence is a globally well-known source. Imbalanced intervention including freeing of attack dogs and using real bullets caused casualties in Goteborg, Copenhagen and Geneva in 2001 and 2002 (Uysal, 2013b). The events in Greece, France and the US from 2008 to 2014 were distinct examples of such police violence and their boosting effect on the events.

Resource mobilization theory is an essential contribution to sociology of social movements though it has also been criticized due to the assumption of the rational understanding of the agent. Besides, this theory have been considered as a theory which is mainly valid under specific conditions, say in the US. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that this theory stands quite structuralist.

### **2.2.2 Political Opportunity Structure**

Political opportunity structure (POS) argues that contention is closely related to opportunities and limitedly to constrain. In contrast to resource mobilization theorists, POS theorists emphasize the mobilization of resources external to the group. POS is a useful approach to understand the sudden wave of political contention developed in a so centralized and police-controlled regime, after years of suppression and tightly controlled participation. Tocqueville wrote, because people act on opportunities, the most risky moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to restore the regime. Tocqueville applies this understanding to French Old Regime and same understanding can be adopted for the collapse of Soviet Union. Gorbachev convinced that his country could not survive without reforming itself. However his desire for liberalization (*glasnost*) opened new possibilities for legitimate organizations and he lost the power altogether (Fish, 1995).

In POS, there are three broad sets of properties in a political system which directly affect the social action: 1. Formal institutional structure, 2. Informal procedures and prevailing strategies with regard to challengers. 3. Configuration of power related with the confrontation of challengers. The first two provide general setting for the mobilization of collective action. The configuration of power refers to strategies of “authorities” or the “members of the system”. The strategies define whether the collective action will be facilitated or repressed, whether there is a chance for reform or success. This is related with the positive or negative orientation of government (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, Giugni, 1992).

The calculation of authorities affects the collective action but such calculation is powerful partially since the general setting restricts the country specific mix. Country specific mix of settings also determine the options for challengers (ibid).



The state is at the center of the political process paradigm, which was developed mainly by Charles Tilly (1978), Doug McAdam (1982), and Sidney Tarrow (1998b). A distinction is often made between the weak states and strong states. Weak states are open in terms of input and they lack of capacity in terms of imposing themselves. Conversely, strong states are closed for the inputs and they have a high capacity to impose themselves. The internal structure of the state institutions (the degree of internal coherence or fragmentation) determines the overall strength or weakness of the state. In the sample of Kriesi, Switzerland was the weakest while France was strongest. The informal procedures and prevailing strategies with respect to the challengers can be ex-clusive (repressive, confrontative, polarizing) or integrative (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative). This issue is very dependent on the country tradition. French and German legacy are typically ex-clusive. Integrative strategies are typical for small, consensual democracies. Federalism can have weakening effect in this equation. The combination of an exclusive state with a dominant strategy reveals a full exclusion. Combination of weak state and inclusive dominant strategy reveals full procedural integration. Repression is comparatively weak and challengers' access to system is facilitated in this model. In formalistic inclusion, the challenger can count on informal facilitation of access. But s/he tends to meet strong repression. Germany is an example of this issue. In the case of informal co-optation, challenger have do not have strong formal access, but they can count on informal facilitation (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, Giugni, 1992). Switzerland emerges with the highest level of mass mobilization. Membership of social movement organizations (SMOs) is an important indicator. The ecology movement has the strongest organizational infrastructure. In Germany and Switzerland, mobilization is much more decentralized. French pattern is most centralized, least formally organized and most radical. This political opportunity structure approach has been criticized because of its strong structural background. However, the positions and structure of the actors don't have to be considered as so fixed.

Political opportunity has some dimensions. Nonetheless, these are not necessarily formal or permanent (Gamson and Meyer, 1996).

First dimension is “increasing access”. Rational people do not often attack well-fortified opponents, gaining partial access to participation provides such intensives. Elections are examples of this participation. However, in democratic systems elections are routine events and usually dominated by institutional parties. According to Eisenger, relationship between protest and political opportunity is curvilinear. Neither full access nor its absence produce the greatest degree of protest.

The second dimension of POS is shifting alignments. It means the instability of political alignments. In pluralist systems, this is mostly measured by electoral stability. Especially when the power is based on new coalitions the changes fortunes of government can create uncertainty among supporters. The unique example of this issue has been seen in the American civil right movement (Valelly, 1993). In anti-democratic regimes, political instability encourages contention easily. This is what have been observed in the rebel of peasants in the collapse of Mussolini’s fascist regime during the Second World War (Bevilacqua, 1980; Tarrow, 1967).

The third dimension is divided elites. As it is quite obvious, conflicts among the elites encourage outbreaks of contention. Such conflicts not only incites the populations but also they encourage portions of the elite to seize the role of “tribunes of the people”. Particularly after Gorbachev warned the Communist states of the Europe that the Red Army would no longer intervene to defend them, groups started to organize and these regimes started to collapse one by one. Similarly in Spain and Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s, divisions between soft-liners and hard-liners provided openings for oppositions groups to exploit (Bermeo, 1997; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).

The fourth dimension is influential allies. Challengers are encouraged to take collective action when they have allies who can act as a friend in court, as guarantors against repression. Thanks to Yeltsin’s open support to independent activities, challengers gained both confidence and models for the action. William Gamson’s book on contention in the US shows historical evidence for a correlation between the influential allies and the success of the action in democratic systems. In the fifty-three conflict group studies he studied, the presence or absence of political allies was closely related to the success of these groups. Similarly, one reason for the long standing of

“sliding May” in Italy was the presence of the Socialist Party in the government which styled itself as a defender those outside (Tarrow, 1989). In democratic systems, the political parties can have these functions. In European, new left parties like Greens are more hospitable to life-space movements (Kriesi et al. 1995). In non-democratic systems, different actors can fit this gap. For instance, in Central America peasant movements profited from religious workers, union organizers, revolutionary guarillas, political party activists (Brockert, 1991:258). In 1970s, Catholic Church in Poland helped the resistance and protected the activists (Osa, 1995).

The fifth dimension is repression and facilitation. In Charles Tilly’s definition (1978), “repression is any action by another group which arises the contender’s cost of collective action. Thus, facilitation is “an action that lowers group’s cost of collective action”. In theory, the authoritarian governments repress the actions while the representative ones facilitate them. On the other hand, there are aspects of repressive states that encourage some forms of contention while some of representatives try to sting out. These aspects are arrayed in different systems and change over time. For instance, splits among elites and political realignments work together.

These five aspects of political opportunity are specified as changes in opportunity but there are also more stable aspects of opportunity-constraints. One set of factors revolves around concept of “state strength”. The other one deals with states’ prevailing strategies towards challengers and the third one relates to the problem of repression and social control.

Due to the invitation to criticism and participation, decentralize systems frequently “process” the most challenging elements out of the popular politics like in the example of riot movements in the US during 1960s. Different degrees of state centralization revealed a major difference between French and American student movements of 1960s. The first exploded only in early 1968, diffused rapidly and soon moved rapidly to political arena. The second produced a much longer, more decentralized series of protests and diffused in the various rivulets of new left (Tarrow, 1989). This was clearly observed in the collapse of the iron curtain as well. The less Stalinized Poland produced the earliest movement with the support of Solidarity strikes whereas

Czechoslovakia, which was subjected to brutal Stalinist control after 1968, was one of the last to rebel. Tarrow relates this difference directly to the strength of state socialism in two countries.

On the other hand, in authoritarian states while the repression crushes the actions in most conditions, the centralization of power offer a sort of advantage –a unified field and centralized target to attack- once the system is weakened. The bug of these systems writes Bunce (1991) is the “great deal in common” that they have.

Prevailing strategy is about an absorbing strategy towards the demands of challengers. In the Gamson (1990) approach, it can be inclusive or exclusive. Kriesi et al. (1992) argue that these strategies varying systematically in different countries. From this point of view, France has been considered as exclusive while Sweden followed an inclusive strategy.

Considering repression and social control, the repression can either depress collective action or raise the costs of organizing and mobilizing opinion (Tilly, 1978). Though suppression is more brutal and frightening there is evidence that increasing costs of organization and mobilization is more effective strategy in long run. Like in the McCarthy era, increasing the cost of membership in the Communist Party was more effective than the ban of strikes and demonstrations. However, raising the costs do not always work: Challengers can discover new ways of contention like in the nonviolent civil resistance of Gandhi or such kind of suppression may give them more public sympathy. Also, there are limits for suppression say the capacity of jails. In addition, the regimes that successfully use the repression sometimes can produce a radicalization of collective action and more effective organization of opponents, more militant ones take the center stage. As we know the repressive atmosphere of czarist Russia contributed the radicalization of social democracy (Bonnell, 1983). While authoritarian states systematically repress contention, the absence of regular channels for expressing opinion turns even moderate dissenters into opponents of the regime.

## **2.3.4 Framing and New Social Movements Theories**

### **2.3.4.1 Road to New**

New social movement theories provide the main tool for the analysis of this thesis. The concept of the identity constitutes the basic of “new”. Thus, a query for the source of “new” is needed at this point.

By the 1950s and 1960s, several changes started to emerge in the world not only in the field of one particular area such as social movements but also many fields in a society. These changes have also been handled in the discussions of modernism and postmodernism. This thesis does not include a massive discussion of modernism and postmodernism but it refers to debate whenever it is needed since the factors those feed the modernism-postmodernism debates can also be seen as the factors under the creation of “new”.

Indeed, it is quite hard to set clear routes for the changes that created the “new” since they are closely related to each other. Nevertheless, we can build some patterns to identify the main paths of the change. It should be kept in mind that these paths have always connections, intersections and overlaps.

#### **2.3.4.1.1 Paths of Change**

First changes are related to more economic transformations. This category includes the changes in production model (including Fordism to post-Fordism trends) and emergence of new forms of work.

One significant aspect of the “new” is about the great transformation in the production model. Actually, the world history can be divided to three periods according to accumulation models. The first one was agricultural revolution which lasted for thousands of years. The second one was industrial revolution which lasted approximately 300 years. The last one was the revolution of information which lasted about 50 years (Toffler, 1992).

The first set of civilizations were the products of agricultural revolution. They majorly worked on land. The second wave meant Newton physics, steam engines and rise of

natural sciences. This new model needed a new organizational structure which used to be the nation state. The state have been composed of new social classes as proletariat and bourgeois which allowed the new accumulation model based on industry. Fordist heavy industry was the superior model of the time since the road to richness was passing to factories. In fact, what has been done by Henry Ford was the spatialization of time by the assembly line. Some philosophers pay great attention to Taylor, who was the theoretician of such great rationalization process of production. All the sub units of the society, such as the family, have been oriented according to realization of efficiency of that economic model. The soul of the era was completely structural that the whole nation state set itself by its structures such as institutions like schools, prisons or hospitals. Everything in the society have been rationalized for more efficiency like the parts of working machine. Any deviation from the “standard” had to be ready to face punishment in this society machine. We title the maturity period of this time as the “modern era”. However, the post-1968 generation gradually lost belief in the potential of working class as the historic agent and begin to look other social movements to take forward the “progressive project”. The class focus gradually receded with issues of culture around gender, sexuality and race gaining in priority. Fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 the end of “radical project” (McLaughlin, 2012).

Some of the transformations were not the results of economy but they were in a reciprocal relation with the economy. For instance, enterprise needed free thinking which boosted the demand of rights and secularism. In modern time, this let to the raise of concepts such as individual rights, secularism and nationalism. Quest for social order, progress and stability emerged. As a reflection of this economic model, there were mass production and the idea of Keynesian mass consumption to support it. The modern society was a mass society which actually operated as a Fordist factory: A child was born in the nuclear family, s/he has been educated in the school and have been a ready “product” to be a part of society.

The third revolution opened the information era. The starting point of this final revolution can be regarded as 1955-1956 period when the service sector started to dominate industry in the US. In this era, the significant part of the production started to be carried out of factory. The service sector became dominant and new flexible

forms of employment such as office, home-based, internet based, tele-working emerged. The worker of modern era had rarely asked the question of “why?” What has been expected to him/her was to gear the rhythm of line of production (Toffler, 1992). The worker of this “postmodern era” had worked more mentally, s/he has to interrogate, take risks and adapt himself/herself to more changing economic conditions. S/he has to be more skilled, open for new flexible forms of contracting. Naturally, no mass rules exist anymore. There are new ethical rules, new units and new cultures of this postmodern era. The turnover rate expanded rapidly, deskilling and reskilling possibilities increased (Harvey, 2003). The organization model transformed from hierarchies to networks. Harvey (2003) considers this identity as a product of time-space compression. This time also went hand in hand with great developments in the technology. As Melucci (1994) argues the microelectronic revolution has not only transformed the size of computers but also brought a great increase in the speed at which information can be processed and enormous amount of data can be stored. Internet based systems and communication possibilities became indispensable tools for new organizational models. That information society started to create a reflexive, artificial, constructed character of social life. Today a great mass of data is created and waiting for the processing of the people. The result is the search for the identity. Rediscovery of organized religion and unified identities are reflections of this period (Melucci, 1994).

The other output of this information society is globalization or planetarization of the system. The circulation of the information ties the world system together and raises new transitional problems. Old national questions are losing their validity and geographical localization is gaining a new meaning (ibid).

Second changes are more related to ideology. This category includes the debates of new left, fall of labor unions, Vietnamese War in US, Thatcher regime, new countries and post imperial colonization age.

Both 1968 movements and decline of Soviet Block was a turning point for the left. The Soviet failure was not only problematic due to its abstractions but also could not realize individual freedoms. The concepts such as *perestroika* and *glasnost* revealed

an inner critique for the soviet type socialism and the left. The classical social movements were based on a vertical organizations in which participant have to obey certain rules to take place (Sunal, 2005). Moreover, central states became responsible for the economic crises due to their disharmony of post-Fordist economic conditions. As a consequence, neo liberal agenda raised. This lead to a decline in welfare state regimes in European as well as powerful conservative tradition in the continent. End of economic determinism and the change in the industrial relations affected all society quite strongly. On the other hand, this era became the time of monopolies. The organic composition of capital has not been decreased but it expanded rapidly in the rising industries of third world countries. Year by year, developing countries such as China, India, South Korea and Malaysia integrated the world market with huge growth rates. Naturally, this contributed to decrease of absolute poverty rates in the world. However, in a Marxian perspective, the exploitation is still a real phenomenon under the conditions of labor earning less than \$1-a-day. On the other hand, middle classes gradually expanded. Due to cheap labor expansion in the Far East, in the West and in the other parts of the world more and more people access to goods and services easier than before. This is also related to the rise of consumption society.

The consumption model reflects the soul of new era which is based on private demand rather than mass consumption. The postmodern society is basically a consumption society which is created by augmentation of goods, services and material entities. Today there are entities near the people rather than other people in a society. The claim of “consumption society” is actually a western middle class thesis. Thus, the emergence of this class must be understood by consumption rather than production. This class is a significant class due to its role on determination of power by its quantity and quality. Thus modern writers try to deal with this class while searching for a transformation in the society (Marcuse, 1991).

What creates a consumption society is actually the “gadgets”. The commodities transformed into gadgets which are in fact the entities without useful functions most of the time (Baudrillard, 2008). We live in an era of “limitless credits”. In contrast to traditional consumption theories, the consumption does not had to be a derivative of the nominal income. According to Modigliani (1966), the consumption can lean on



expected income. It is obvious that mortgage based long terms opportunities and credit card type modern banking facilities provides middle classes to spend the “income of future”.

On the other hand, consumption society thesis is also a postmodern thesis. In postmodern understanding, the meaning emerges in mind, language or text but not in nature or outer world. Hence, postmodern philosophers consider a concept within a differentiation of signifier and signified. No binding relation exists between signifier and signified (Sarup, 2004). In contrast, all concepts include a hidden positivism in modernist understanding and they can be identified in an absolute way. However, in postmodern approach the signifiers those we have to use in communication gain their meaning in context. This identification process is a part of interaction. Context and interaction are not objective realities but they are quite manipulative which can be affected by all kind of historicity.

For the hundreds of years durable goods, constructs and vehicles had been lived longer than people. Today, we are witnessing their creation and termination. In postmodern era, there is a clear transformation in commodities. According to Baudrillard (2008), the major reason under this transformation of commodities is the semiotic aspect of them. Indeed, none of these commodities have a fixed meaning. The commodity has two aspects: Commodity itself and a halo that function as a signifier of it. What creates a consumption society is the halo around the commodities. The halo claims that these commodities are something more than their promise, they are quite adequate and you can be part of a new society by purchasing them. The signifiers can provide any meaning to a commodity and they can code the consumption with happiness, pleasure or prestige. The decoding process is done in historically constructed context libraries. A hegemonic power can impose its library to show the commodities in a different form. In this respect, the signified is actually trivial and suppressed. As McLuhan (1964) argued medium is the message which means that the representation of an incident is dominant to reality (Thompson, 1995). The consumption is a daily habit and daily life is actually a decoding/interpretation system produced by signifiers. The condition of consumer is not about illiteracy but false consciousness, it is balance in sterile autism and pleasurable. It needs new narratives, vanity, extravagance and

consumed violence (Baudrillard, 2008). The phenomenon of consumption can be understood by the stubs of society. “Tell me what you waste and I will tell you who you are”. The consumption society needs to waste commodities to survive which refers to creative destruction of Lefebvre (1992). The long time usage of the objects reveals their slow termination while, rapid termination (short life cycle) of objects, creates higher amount of surplus. The appreciated thing in TV magazines is exaggerated expenditure habits of celebrities. According to Veblen (2005) the value of greatness have been coded with victimizations (as a termination of valuable entities) for long centuries and now it is the termination of commodities. Actually the modern human being is a real consumer. This not because of that the consumption is an innate aspect of mankind but it is due to a bunch of reasons: His/her consumption is remunerated, used as a reward or punishment and manipulated by communication channels.

Finally, our understanding of society has transformed in powerful manner. The analysis on modern society used to be quite structural. Indeed, all structuralist philosophers pay attention to structure. Every “component” has an importance in the structural analysis. Nevertheless, the identification of structure diversifies for modern approaches and postmodern approaches. For modern era or modernism, the structure refers to the organizations in the society. These organizations can include different categories. Family, trade union, political party, governmental body, company, NGO can be instances of organizations. Besides, they do not have to be physical, they can be invisible. These kinds of organizations may have sub categories as well. Finally, all of them are the systems of abstractions and a unit gain it’s meaning within these organizations. Organizations provide generalizations and efficient operation in the social system. Hence, the organization is social structure which explains the social relations in the modernism.

In contrast, postmodern definition of structure refers to a completely different phenomenon. The structuralism starts with the analysis of language. Thus, the structure actually refers to construction of language. Language, a system of signs, is an important phenomenon since it dominates every channels of knowledge and signs and representations are the elements of this structure. In this understanding of language, there is a difference between the things and their representations. This is the distinction

between signifier and signified which was stated by Saussure. The signifiers do not have a meaning by themselves. For instance, “table” is a signifier of a real thing. And there is no natural connection between this concept and the fact. Actually, the language is adopted in the mind. According to Saussure, language is a system and it has rules in itself. The structural categories can also be considered as the things in the mind. However, the modernist understanding tries to seek for connections between signifier and signified. Because, according to Levi Strauss, human mind works in this way, it just categorizes the knowledge within binary oppositions (Sarup, 2004). Thus, it has a tendency to build connections between the concepts and things. This is a natural result of empirical-objective approach of modernity. That is why there exist a fascism at the one extreme side of modernism. At this point, we see the transition in the modern to postmodern structuralism. This is basically, a transition from social structure to linguistic structure. And, this structure may expand to semiotics. By this way, it lies on every kind of relations. That is why the frames constitutes an important place in every analysis.

Both in modern and postmodern structuralism, the individual has a secondary possession. The structuralism in postmodernism criticizes the modernist structure and its’ individual. This individual is logical individual that has full power to do everything. This is the humanitarian aspect of modernism and it is one of the strongest critical point for postmodern structuralism. The social relations cannot be explained by the facts but the signs. By using signs, we construct a completely different structure. Because, every act of individual is defined in the linguistic structure and so there is no space for free will in this system (ibid).

Like the structuralists, the post structuralists also focus on the structure. These structures refer to categories in mind as well. However, the post structural philosophers are not contented to bring up the binary oppositions of a structure. They deconstruct it since deconstruction is a unique element of the process. Indeed, without deconstruction we cannot reach the reality. Deconstruction is essential for the termination of hegemony and power. According to Derrida, also the language, which dominates everything, can be deconstructed (Harvey, 2003). If we deconstruct language, we will reach text. And we should consider that the text is constructed by the writer. Thus, we

have to seek for the determiners of the writer. These determiners can be language or institutions. When s/he gets rid of these effects, s/he will be free. Therefore, individual has potential to be free. And the major source of this process is deconstruction. It is the way of marginalization of structures. For instance, before deconstructing the social organizations and language, we cannot see notion of nationalism that dominates everything.

For post structuralism, a component gains a meaning in the structure. Similarly, the actor gains a meaning in the network. For instance, if there is no cold, there cannot be a hot. The matter acts and it is not independent from the human. Besides, the interaction does not have to be only between people. Thus, the meaning and reality will change due to our interaction with these structures (Chown, 2009).

The post structural method is a “collage”. As Foucault states, we can just make the archeology of knowledge to bring it into the daylight (Harvey, 2003). We can mine and dispose it without an order. However, deconstruction must not be seen as a step-by-step method of reaching the “reality”. Actually, it is new way of approaching to the dominated text: Realization of binary oppositions and describing them. Therefore, it is a decentered, anti-essentialist, open ended, unlimited process (Sarup, 2004). There cannot be a manual guide of “building a parasitic system on another system”. The purpose of the parasites is terminating the system and producing tiny components. This is a way of the realization of individual richness.

All these categories are abstract and transitional. There is a clear relation between post-Fordist production and fall of labor unions, as well as fragmented identity formation and network society. Thus, the categorization is only made for a clear and basic understanding of the change and sources of “new”.

#### **2.3.4.1.2 Effects on Identity Formation**

The other aspect of explanations on society is the change of identity. Actually, the concept of identity which has started to be popular after 1960s has experienced a great transformation in the postmodern time. Today identity refers to a dynamic concept people may have multiple, fragmented or hybrid identities at the same time. By the

individualization of mass society self-realization started to be more important for people. Today, the ideologies left their place to identities.

Generally it is thought that identity includes all preferences of a person. The identity is a continuous process with a continuous fragmentation and transformation (Martin and Nakayama 2007; Hall, 1996; Shi, 2005). Each and every individual constructs his/her identity within an interaction of social structures. At the same time, identity is also formed by the identification of signifiers. Since there are multi-layer identities, it is really hard to achieve a unified identity concept. However in sociology, identity is a constructed as a changing concept. Mead (2008) argues that ego has two parts as “I” and “me”. “I” is the innate side of the ego while me refers to outer and socially constructed side. For Mead’s symbolic interactionism, the identity is formed in this symbolic interaction process. The language has a central role in this process. Identity is considered as a social creature a structure formed by social structure (groups etc.), meaning and context but also it forms them. According to post structuralism, identity refers to attributed meanings on our behaviors and skills.

Today, there are several components which constitute an identity. Some of them are more stable ones while others are contingent. One of them is the change in production model which is going to a flexible one and second one is more about technology. However, actually all of them are quite related with each other. Consumption is one of these components. There are identity packages which emerge due to consumption. Today identity may emerge, change and disappear rapidly. Goethe argues: “Who knows where is he going, he even hardly knows his origin” (Sennett, 2008). This is the brief contradiction of modern human. The consumer of modern society is swinging alone. While production is unifying, consumption is separating people, it is boosting individualism and destructing solidarity. Can automobile owners resist against tax? Or can people create a social objection against TV? A person can only live alone by consuming (Baudrillard, 2008).


According to Toffler (1992) there are many conditions in the channel compared to past and it reveals a temporariness in the value system. According to Simmel (1976) the stimulus reveals a tedium and contradiction. The major reaction or defend mechanism

against this condition is exclusion, denial, denegation, simplification and nostalgia creation. The creation and recreation of fashion as the new signifier systems can be instances of that soul (Simmel, 2011). Many times this condition can be interpreted as a form of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is not an illness anymore in a *Prozac Society*<sup>5</sup> but an ordinary balancing mechanism for modern individuals. Consumption culture, new organizational patterns at work, technologic communication, non-stop broadcast of mass media becomes the sources of this fragmented character (Castells, 2008). Sennett (2008) considers the phenomenon as the corrosion of character. Naturally, the new human has multiple identities. These identities have no hierarchy or stability. They are more open for manipulation of frames since all generations had to deal with more daily variables. Today the worker is not just worker, at the same time s/he is an explorer of shopping mall, owner of automobile, coffee consumer and internet user. The identity of an internet user is being fragmented under certain suppression of online processes. For instance, the news are published in a very eclectic way in a web page of a newspaper. The user has different identities in social media (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram) or in a gazette page, or in social games. In a fragmented identity, even the signals of very harsh realities can be emitted partially. Such a fragmented identity is quite open for emotional effects, symbolic actions, rapid images, leader characters. All these give signifier a great role in the social processes. In some cases, like in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty Four*, a condition of aphasia emerges and the "yes" becomes "no" or vice versa. According to Baudrillard (2008), this is a limited responsible society and such a society cannot have its own perspective for itself, it can only have alienation. There is nation state at the top of structures of modernism. The nation state arises on the singularization. This is one major identity movement which is sometimes supported by secondary identities like religion. The other ethnic identities are not welcomed and they are assimilated. Such that, in the theory of Parsons' structural functionalism, the assimilation is an essential condition for integration (Nohl, 2009), this identity often seeks for secure ports to keep out of modernist homogenization and to feed its originality. The nostalgia is one of the tools for this process. Modern people

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<sup>5</sup> "Prozac society" is a concept to stress the dysfunction of Prozac, the bestselling antidepressant taken by 40 million people worldwide.

try to create nostalgia occasionally however it is actually related to a reconstruction or simulation but not a relational reality (Nalbantoğlu, 2010a).



**Figure 1: Old and New Identity Structure**

**Created by author.**

This diagram summarizes the fragmented structure of today's identity. Compared to the old formation, new identity is quite fragmented, composed of smaller components since several parallel identities exist. Some of these identities are not always dominant but transitional. That is why diagram is not fixed and it can only provide a general idea about the old & new identity formation. The important thing is that due to fragmented identity structure of today's societies, the "signals" (or messages) received by old-bigger identities are getting senseless. To put in a different way, the messages which have been understood by bigger-stable identities such as "worker" cannot be decoded by new identity as before. A signal or message means "an information package which gains meaning in the mind of a person". Naturally, it is directly related with the images which have been constructed within the language by the effects of frames. Today, there are more signals compared to before since a communication revolution took place which showed its effects particularly after 90s and 2000s. The boom in communication possibilities not only increased the mass of the stream in channel but also diversified

the types of communication models. In other words, today there exists more resources (signals) to affect a person but these signals should address different components of the identity for a successful detection since the identity is quite instable, fragmented and transitional today.

In contemporary social thought, there has been not only a shift about identity understanding but also a great transformation. Our identities today are not given. Whereas, in previous societies identity was largely fixed according to social class or status, today by contrast we are able to choose our identity reflexively from various competing aspects of our lives (Giddens, 1990). As it has seen in the Figure 1, the old identity structure was more unified which is ready to receive many signals from life to create meanings while the new one is quite fragmented that different signals are needed to construct meanings.

Identity is something about our as well as others identification about ourselves. Nevertheless, neither our perception nor the view of others do not take place in a vacuum, rather it is shaped by social, cultural and political influences. For example, until industrial revolution nobody would identify himself/herself as working class and although homosexuality existed, the construction of this phenomemon is a recent development. A sense of identity has often been linked to a sense of injustice. In other words, the collective awareness of group comes from the sense of injustice. Women, black people, homosexuals and working class formed groups in recognition that they were not treated on an equal basis within society (McLaughlin, 2012).

#### **2.3.4.1.3 Urban Aspects of New**

Urban based class struggles have a long history. In the 18-19th century, these movements emerged as revolutionary actions. 1789, 1830, 1848 and 1871 (Paris Commune) were the examples of these movements. In 20th century, Soviet of Petrograd, 1927 and 1967 Shangai Commune, 1919 Seattle Strike, role of Barcelona in Spanish Civil War, 1969 Cordoba uprising, 1960s urban uprisings in the US, 1968s urban movements in Paris, Chicago, Mexico, Bangkok... are the examples of such movements. In the late history, 1999 Seattle anti-globalization movement, Quebec movement, Tahrir, Madison (Wisconsin), Madrid and Syntagma protests, Oaxaca,



Cochabamba (2000, 2007-Support for Morales), El Alto (2003, 2005) revolutionary movements, Occupy Wall Street (2011) and finally Buenos Aires (2001-2002), Santiago (2006, 2011) protests were important political actions. On the other hand, even though it has been underestimated by the media, thousands of people protested the incoming Iraq war in Roma, Paris, Athens, Barcelona, Berlin, New York Melbourne and Ankara in 2003 February (Çetin and Çopuroğlu, 2010). All these showed that indeed the urban has been political. Some urban centers are more available for such protests. For instance, it is easier to build barricades in Paris streets than in London and Los Angeles. Thus, the political power always seek to regulate urban structure to control political groups. The boulevards of Haussmann were a clear example in Paris. After the uprisings, the city centers in the US were redesigned and the highways built a physical burden between the rich estates and poor districts. The city and the space is an important scene for social movement and uprising. The selection of action area and positioning are as important as the site and positions in a military operation. The other significant point is the success of movement in harming the economic activities in a city.

In the last 20-30 years, though rises and declines were unstable many mass protests have emerged. According to Harvey (2013) this does not mean the termination of traditional leftist organizational models. However, today these movements are “more messy, swimming in an ocean without political consistency”.

A modernist representation of space includes a singularity. According to Lefebvre, the commodification of space needs the homogenous fragmentation and atomization. In this model, differences are excluded like it has been done in the colonization process of 1850s to 1914 (Harvey, 2003). An absolute categorization on spatial relations referred to a secret fascism. In deed, recreation of space is affected but neither it can be controlled or determined since it is a social phenomenon. Therefore, it is important to represent relational space rather than pure geographical space (Tekeli, 2010).

Space is another important concept to identify the urban aspect of the issue. According to Soja, the space is neither a given entity nor *tabula rasa*. Space is always a culturally constructed entity. It is a component of a cultural network, it is always converted like

all cultural components. For Soja (1996), spatiality means socially constructed aspect of space. It is created through teleological labor. In this area, the socialization reveals transformation. According to Soja, there are three forms of space as perceived, conceived and lived. The first one includes a relatively identifiable concept. It is physically and socially constructed. Cognitive space is created in mind. It is a system constructed by symbols and signifiers. It is a reflection of power and ideology in a society. The thirdspace is a composite space, which includes physical aspects, signifiers, social constructions, practices and experiences. The Thirdspace is real, imagined and more (Arentsen, Stam, Thuijs, 2000). Similarly, Lefebvre (1992) identifies the space on three folds. The first one, spatial practices construct the perceived space. It refers to the daily practices. The second one is representations of space. It refers to a conceived space including language and other signifiers. The third one is representational spaces which can be understood as lived space which makes imagination possible. Indeed representational spaces can make people passive but Lefebvre (1992) calls for an uprising against the representation of the language, signifiers and space.

The city is a space which is constituted by the people from different classes who come together to produce a common life. As stated by Harvey (1990), in the process of reproduction, the capital passes into the urbanization process. By this process, the capitalists have hegemony on urban spaces. This hegemony is not only on political power but also on all population (lifestyle, labor, culture, values...). Such a hegemony cannot be accepted by all parts of the population. Thus, the city and the urban processes become a space for class struggles.

The public space is generally built by the public forces and it has been important for the capitalist development. But, public space does not always create a common space. What creates common spaces like Syntagma (Greece), Tahrir (Egypt) or Plaza de Catalunya (Spain) is gathering of people to represent their demands and political ideas. The street have been a space for social movements, revolutions as well as bloody repressions. Neoliberal politics constrict the public area by lowering public expenditures and social groups seek for new cure to support this area. Hence, the common space must be considered as a social relation which is open for all kinds of

effects. In other words, the commonization means an action in common space. This action is a relation between common space and a social group which is collective and out of capitalist relations. Before the cars, the streets were common spaces. After the cars, this space has been erased. The municipalities built new public spaces for common usage and sometimes this process articulated with the capital: City parks always rise the prices of near estates like in the High Line in New York. This leads to the exclusion of some social groups from the usage of these spaces. Besides, in some cases high security residences provides a total isolation between several different parts of the society. The major way of expropriation to common spaces is the rent coming from real estate. There exist several cases under the title of gentrification, street life is being replaced by cars, multicultural actors and relations disappear. According to Hardt and Negri (2011), the whole metropolis can be thought as a common space which is produced by collective labor. Who produce such a common space, have right to use it commonly and this is the basis of urban right. Major struggles emerge between two groups of people who see the public space as common property or private property. Several corruptions in urban politics is about the transfer of public investments to the private privileges under the title of investment to common.

Actually, urbanization is a way of absorption of capital and labor surplus. While investigating on residential construction, Robert Gottlieb found fluctuations which were softened after the Second World War due to the systematic Keynesian policies. After 1970s, the Keynesian interventions lost momentum and risk of new fluctuations reemerged. In the US, the repression of absorption of capital accumulation were rising in 1990s. President Clinton mentioned about National Homeownership Strategy and he forced the major financial companies like Freddie Mac to lower credit providing criteria. Arbitrary credits have been provided and controls have been by-passed. At the same time, the executives of such companies had big fortunes and they have seen as pioneering figures of such “charity-like” urban movement. With the low interest policy of Central Bank, all these boomed the home sales. However, this demand is not always satisfied by a sufficient supply. Purchases and sales of current house stock obviates the new constructions. This leads to rise in prices and speculation. In the 2005, scale of mortgage market reached to 625 billion Dolar by the speculative capital follow in

the US. On the other hand, Marx argued that if the value created by the production is not sufficient, the cycle become unsustainable. In the US, many people not being able to provide proper collateral purchased houses by the expectations of sale profits coming from rises in the prices. When the prices started to fall, dead loans appeared. In 2011, the real loss in house prices was about 20%. New residential production was lower than the level in 1940s. While unemployment in production sector was below 10%, it was about 20% in construction. All these have a strong potential for urban crises which is the basic nature of capitalist accumulation (Mshana, 2009).

As Harvey argued, the casino capitalism found a proper space in cities:

As the economy shifted from providing goods and services to investing in the more profitable 'casino capitalism' (Strange, 1986), with the embrace of neoliberalism in the 1980s, most incomes stagnated while the incomes and wealth of the elites, especially the financial elite, not only skyrocketed, but with this wealth the elites changed the rules and regulations of banking, investment, economic activity, and the tax codes to further increase their wealth (Harvey, 2005).

In this model, the elites who are able to change the rules, can easily create rents from cities at the expense of uneven capitalist development. While the mortgage system was growing away from just a "housing model" several famous credit monitoring organizations were providing positive reports on this profitable system.

The globalization of the last decades has transformed many social and economic structures, among them the hierarchy of the cities. Today's new urban hierarchy indicates a sharp difference with the structure of Fordist era. The uneven urbanization trends of "global cities" differ from the cities less integrated to global cities. These cities are linked to intensifying transitional links and follow those lead to new forms of inequality as well as new forms of social action. This is an economic functional hiararchization (Kratke, 1995)

Castells (1973) and Cecarelli (1982) argue that urban movements of the 1990s are no longer like those of the 1970s and early 80s. Today, there is a broader social mobilization and unity in the opposition of urban renewal, more demand for improved collective consumption and there is a greater challenge to established parties and local governments' monopoly to process political interests. Today, urban movements are

more heterogeneous and diverse, there is no clear dominant type amongst them and the struggles differ from the struggles in small and medium-sized towns. The movements are quite fragmented and contradictory in the urban level (Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler and Mayer, 2000).

Reviewing the urban governance, there are three trends: The competitive forms of urban development, the erosion of the traditional welfare rights and shift of urban political system from government to governance. Today the global cities try to upgrade themselves for international investors, labor-market flexibility and mega projects (ibid).

The local political actors try to promote their cities as the centers of more labor-market flexibility in order to counter the crises of Fordism and place of international competition (Amin, 1994). The higher the position of a city within the global competitive structure, of the new economy, the more important advanced services in the central business district. The city centers are being turned into luxury citadels and this reveals uneven patterns in very close neighborhoods (Keil and Ronneberger, 1994). These trends are not only visible in Europe but also in many developing countries such as Argentina. Auyero (2007) argues that during 1990s, the Peronist Party shifted its urban organization to clientelist networks. The mutually reinforcing processes of state-retrenchment, hyper unemployment and mass immiseration increased the influence of local brokers and party bosses who provide access to state resources. Neoliberalism revived in clientelism (Rock, 2005). Similarly, as Friedmann (2002) argues, daily experiences and culture created in the space have no meaning for power and capital: Today, human relations became rent and citizen became client.

All these reveal new oppositional movements both in cities and at their peripheries. They have either built on existent (latent) networks or organizations or have sprung up anew, and they range from defensive and pragmatic efforts to save existing quality of life or privileges. They can be sometimes progressive, environmentally conscious and inclusive but other times selfish, or even anti-immigrant, militant and racist. These often are middle-class, quality of life movements. The social justice movements of 1970s have been replaced by particularistic interests. One important part of the urban

movements has stood on the movements against urban growth policies and gentrification. The urban growth and gentrification are directly triggered by instruments of big city politics. Festivals such as Olympics or international garden shows, attractive mega events depend on the packaging and sale of urban space (Hausserman and Siebel, 1993; Scholz, 1997). The movements attack the side effects or lack of democratic participation of these enterprises. Most of the time such reconstructions contributes the urban sprawl by concentrating the investments in particular places while neglecting to others (Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler and Mayer, 2000).

Another trigger to the structural change in urban social movements profile is the trend of eroding welfare state. It has some elements such as dualization of labor markets, raise of informal jobs which produces a new marginality, new poverty concentration in specific areas and new forms of social exclusion (Dangschat, 1995; Huster, 1997). Since 1990s, it has been observed that some cities even adopted revanchist policies such as regulating to prohibit people sitting or lying on sidewalks in business districts (Egan, 1993). In order to drive beggars or homeless people these groups are being constructed as the “dangerous classes” or “enemies of the state” (Ruddick, 1994). Social policies have been abandoned in favor of punitive and repressive treatments. In reaction to these trends, new poor people’s movement have sprung up sometimes by the support of advocacy organizations, also anti-fascist initiatives. The primary resources of these groups are their body and time thus these resistance tactics tend to be episodic or spontaneous local nature or disruptive. Their disruptive tactics can block the normal city government and legitimacy of local policies of exclusion. For instance Paris defended their right to the city campaign around the slogan of “the right to housing” by a series of protests in 1994 (Pechu, 1996).

On the other hand, the opening of the non-governmental stakeholders and implementation of alternative social services, cultural projects, housing and economic development has been a new force shaping the trajectories of urban movements since 1980s (Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler and Mayer, 2000).

Sassen’s global cities model offers a valuable reading in order to understand the dynamics of cities as the basis of social actions. Contrary to the Wallerstein (1991),

she adopts a more Foucauldian perspective including “contingency and openness of the process of restructuring. She views global cities and high-tech districts as “partially denationalized strategic territorializations with considerable regulatory autonomy through ascendance of private governance regimes. In Sassen’s understanding, the global digital economy requires massive concentrations of physical resources through being turned into liquid and mobile and hypermobile forms. However, the necessary digitations are dependent on identities outside the digital space (Sassen, 2006).

Today, urban rent constitutes a very significant part of the economies. Mortgage based market generates 40% of all GDP in developed economies while it is about 10% in developing countries. World Bank states that a model based on the people who own their home reveals a more stable socio economic ground. However, since 1973, hundreds of financial crises have emerged and most of them were related to the real estate sectors and urban development. After 2001, it has been widely accepted by the economists that something was seriously wrong in US real estate sector. The crises in 2007-2009 was effectively felt in the US, Spain and Ireland while Germany, France, Netherlands and Poland had no serious problems.

#### **2.3.4.2 Framing Perspective**

As a natural continuation of the debates on power of signifiers, the framing perspective gained importance. Most scholars agree that meanings are constructed. What is the relationship between symbol formation and contention? Also we often hear the term “identity politics” which means the contention is fought in the name of collective identities. Few people possess single, unified identities while most people juggle and combine, categorical and political, embedded and disjoined identities (Tilly, 1997). This is a problem of cultural study of social movements. If the struggle between opponents had been merely cognitive and symbolic, then a social movement could be understood as a symbolic message center, either recycling inherited meanings. In that case, we could read the interaction between movements and authorities as a kind of literary text (Glenn, 1997 and Kertzer, 1988: 175). Furthermore, it is important to establish a discourse in order to provide the meaning for future mobilizations. Klandermans (1984) argues that the transformation of social issues into collective

action frames does not occur by itself. It is a process in which social actors, media and members of society jointly interpret, define and redefine states of affairs.

A frame, in Snow and Benford's (1992) words is an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions.

One of the mode of discourse in contentious politics is built around William Gamson's (1992) injustice frame. McAdam (1982) shares this idea and argues that "before collective action can get underway, people must collectively define their situations as unjust". However, according to Gamson, it is insufficient if individuals privately adopt a different interpretation of what is happening. For collective adoption of injustice frame, it must be shared by potential challengers in a public way (Gamson, 1992). The other mode is emotionality frame. Some emotions like love, loyalty, reverence are clearly more mobilizing than others such as despair, resignation and shame. Some of them like anger are more vitalizing and more triggering for the mobilization of resistance whereas others like resignation or depression are devitalizing during the phase of demobilization. Since the religion is a reliable source of emotion, it is a recurring source of social movement framing. Religion provides ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities (Smith, 1996). The same is valid for nationalism: it can possess a much greater emotional potential in the lack of mechanical metaphors of class dialects. To conclude, symbols are taken selectively by movement leaders from a cultural reservoir and combined with action-oriented beliefs. The media had a great significance in establishing these frames. The role of radio in terms of information diffusion should not be ignored for instance during the May 1968 events. During the cold war BBC and Radio Free Europe played an important role in spreading information to Eastern Europe. The effect of radio was still visible in the case of Otpor resistance against authoritarian government in Serbia. However, it was television with its unique capacity to encapsulate complex situations in the compressed images that brought about a revolution in movement tactics. During the 1960s, civil rights movement became the television's first recurring news story largely due to its visual elements. The student movement was the second major testing ground of television. According to Kielbowicz and Scherer (1986), media attention can serve to cultivate a



collective awareness, laying the groundwork for social movement. The third wave was the popularization of political religion in the 1970s and 1980s mass media. In places as diverse as the US and Iran, religious figures became adept at using the media to diffuse their political messages. In Iran Ayatollah Khomeini used these resources for their anti-Western critique while Christian fundamentalists broadcasted their messages in many aspects. The most dramatic role of media was global: the staging of a massive demonstration by Chinese students in Tiananmen Square in protest against Communist Party corruption and authoritarianism (Esherick and Wassestrom, 1990). Several examples took place. For instance, Gamson (1996) studied the coverage of two nuclear accidents in the American press in the 1950s and 1980s, he found that there had been a radical change in how reporters treated the issue.

This story highlights a major problem for social movements: the media are far from neutral bystanders in the framing of movement events. While the media may not work for ruling class they certainly do not work for social movements. In a capitalist society, the media can stay in business only if they report on what the readers or viewers are interested in, or what the editors think they will be interested in. How movements are reflected by the media is affected by the structure of the media industry. As Kielbowicz and Scherer (1986) state, movements are affected by the media's preference for dramatic, visible events and by the reliance of journalists' professional values and orientations.

To conclude, both existing cultural frames and role of media constrain movement formation. The symbols of collective action take hold through two main process: over the long run, they enter people's consciousness through consensus formation and mobilization and in the short term they impress people through transformations wrought by collective action itself (Jonhston, and Noakes, 2005).

Framing can be a purposive action or not (Tarrow, 1998a). Framing processes are active, ongoing and continuously evolving (Snow and Oliver, 1995) and anybody or organization can fully control this process.

Frames occasionally develop in the streets as protestors mobilize especially in nondemocratic nations where there is little free space for movements to construct

alternative interpretations of events. For instance, Oberscall (1997) argues that “the people themselves framed the issues in mass demonstrations in East Germany” during 1989. It is observed that framing processes are generally less conscious at the beginning of the movement, become more strategic as the battle is waged (McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, 1996). Many collective action frames are product of social movement entrepreneurs making practical decisions in response to styles, forms and normative codes of target audience (Kubal, 1998).

### **2.3.4.3 New Social Movements**

#### **2.3.4.3.1 Background and Main Characteristics**

In the early times of modernity, the social movements have been explained as the movements which emerge due to the class conflicts and seek for altering political power. However, by the transformations in the process of industrial to post-industrial society, the explanations started to change. Wieviorka (2005) argues that at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s the working-class movement was near its end as a social movement. Daniel Bell created the term “post-industrial society” as early as the end of the 1960s; the image he suggested was very different from that of Alain Touraine. Bell, using his own definition of the term, saw therein a form of extension of industrial society much more than a new type of society, which was Touraine’s view (Bell, 1974; Touraine, 1971). According to Touraine, the NSMs are “new” because they distinguish themselves from the target of altering political systems, they try to transform civil relations, they are based on individuals rather than classical leaderships and they use more cultural platforms (Touraine, 1995; Erbaş and Coşkun, 2007). At the start of the new millennium, the wave of mobilizations for globalization from below (identified as the global justice movement) have the potential for a global, generalized challenge, combining themes of class movements with themes typical of new social movements, like ecology or gender equality (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).

Kreise et al. (1992) categorize the NSMs as ecology movement (including anti-nuclear energy branch), peace movement, solidarity movement (encompassing various branches mobilizing for humanitarian aid, refugee rights, human rights, political

regimes in third world), the autonomous movement (including squatters movement), women's movement, gay movement, citizens' rights movement (mobilizing for democratic participation against repression).

New social movements are affected by "new political consciousness, a new economic ideology, new waves of transformations in international platforms, crises of the bureaucratic state, new organizations and their new strategies" (Şanlı, 2003: 16; Şentürk, 2006: 41). Thus, it can be argued that new social movements are transformed following different aspects of globalization process. All the emergence of network society, decline in welfare state, work force of post-Fordism, new conservatism trends supported the emergence of new social movements.

Basically, new social movements have some particular diversifications from the classical social movements. New social movements are not dependent on political basis and they do not have to contain a class or economic basis. The members are heterogeneous, identity oriented and educated (Şentürk, 2006: 41).

For long decades, the resource mobilization theory was the dominant perspective in social movement theories. Social constructivism was another alternative which emphasizes the role of framing activities and social processes. New social movement theory is another alternative to these approaches. The theory is rooted in Continental Europe and it has two distinct versions as political and cultural. This approach is a consequence of inadequacy of classical Marxism in the analysis of collective action. The inadequacy of Marxism was based on the economic reductionism (politic action is derived from economic logic of capitalist production) and inevitable class relations (rooted in production processes). Other social identities were secondary for the collective action. In contrast, new social movement theories have looked at other drivers of action and other sources of identity such as ethnicity, gender and sexuality. On the other hand, new social movement theories are not a reaction to the classical Marxism and even some of them offer an update for Marxism. The new social movement theories have some typical characteristics: Firstly, symbolic action in civil society and cultural sphere are important themes of new social movement theories. Secondly, maximizing influence and power were replaced by promotion of autonomy

and self-determination. Thirdly, post material values have a priority. Fourthly, fragile process of constructing collective identities and group interests are important (instead of structurally determined interests). Fifthly, socially constructed nature of problems is important (instead of group's structural location). Finally, new social movement theories emphasize the role of submerged, latent social networks (Buechler, 1995).

Castells, Touraine, Melucci and Habermas are four major theorists of new social movement theories who are the representatives of different intellectual traditions. Castells focuses on the capitalist dynamics of transformation of urban space and role of urban social movements in this process. Urban issues have become crucial due to the growing importance of collective consumption and the necessity of the state to intervene to promote the non-profitable public goods. City is a social product of conflicting social interest and values. Socially dominant interests try to define urban space according to the goals of capitalist commodification and bureaucratic domination while grassroots social movements define popular interests and maintain cultural identity. Class relations are significant alongside other identities such as nationality, gender, ethnicity and citizenship. Urban protests typically develop around three themes: collective consumption provided by the state, cultural identity that is linked to the territoriality, and more autonomous, decentralized decision making. Alain Touraine (2007) argues that after the passing of the meta-social guarantees of social order, more people become the part of social action. The capacity of social actors to construct a system of knowledge and technical tools (historicity) has been increased. This led to the self-production of the society and this self-production became a defining hallmark of postindustrial society. The control of historicity is an intent for struggling classes. The postindustrial society has two major social classes: consumer-clients (popular classes) and managers-technocrats (dominant classes). The principal field of the conflict is culture and the central contest is based on the control of society's growing capacity of self-management. Touraine locates new social movements between two logics: A system that tries to maximize production, money, power, information and one which tries to defend and expand their individuality. According to Touraine (2007), in post-industrial society, there is no single class that represents social order. Different oppositional social movements are united simply by their

oppositional attitude. For him, contemporary social movements are the evidences of displacement of protests from economic to cultural realm accompanied by the privatization of social problems (ibid).

The problem for Habermas (1975) is that in modern society, the system intrudes into lifeworld in the form of colonization resulting in the media of money and power. Such intervention not only regulates economic and political transactions but also identity formation, normative regulation and other forms of symbolic reproduction associated with the lifeworld. Welfare state can be considered as colonization form that monetarizes and bureaucratizes the lifeworld relationships. As stated by Habermas, new social movements are between system and lifeworld which means that they have purely defensive characters. They can defend the lifeworld against the colonizing intrusion of the system and sustain the role of consensus rooted in communicative rationality. For Habermas, the conflicts on material production are rare while the conflicts on cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization are getting common. The new movements bring a new political perception concerned with political life, projects of self-realization, and goals of participation and identity formation. The movements include the issues related with ecology and peace which have not been the central struggles before (Habermas, 1975). Melucci (1988) claims that the postmodern world brings new forms of social control, conformity pressures and information processing to which social movements respond. The conflict involves symbolic codes, identity claims, and personal or expressive claims that come from everyday life. These conflicts are far removed from political sphere but also they have extensive structural effects. The most prominent systemic effect of new social movements is to render visible the modern form of power behind the rationality of administrative processes and to show socially constructed world of alternative arrangements. According to Melucci (1988), the role of identity is essential in modern collective action. This means people's propensity to participate in collective action is linked to their capacity to define an identity at the first place. Melucci steers attention away from organization by stressing that much collective action is nested in networks of submerged groups organized on temporary basis.

The concept of new social movement started to be popular in the end of 1980s since the electoral results showed considerable raise in new “nontraditional” parties in Germany, Austria, Italy and France. Both in Europe and North America, movements have arisen those went beyond the explanatory capacities of older theoretical perspectives. Peace movements, student movements, anti-nuclear energy protests, minority nationalism, gay rights, women’s rights, animal rights, alternative medicine, fundamentalist religious movements, new age and ecology movements gathered certain attention from sociologists, historians and political scientists. It was significant for the sociologists that these movements cannot be understood within the European or American traditions of analysis.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, sociological studies of social movements have been dominated by theories of ideology and later by the theories of organization and rationality. In Europe and the US, sociologists focused on the systems of ideas those reveal the movements. This was an understanding of issue in the economic, class basis or at least some set of discrete interests such as social status that characterizes something in social structure. The movement has been considered as a response to sense of injustice or an ideology in this model. The major problem for many sociologists were understanding the process of movement formation by analysis of the social structure. The focus was on specific groups that occupied specific places in the social structure with special interests and demands. 19<sup>th</sup> century labor movement and political parties of labor were fitting this model very well. Then organizational aspects such as Weber’s bureaucratic organizations and charismatic leadership have been handled. In more recent years, guided by conceptions of rational choice, sociologists have gone well beyond the Weberian insights by focusing on the organizational capacities to mobilize a collective action.

All these approaches have certain deficits in explaining the social movements, which is quite understandable. In due course, the concept of new social movements that is a real double-edged sword, started to gain certain attention. One side of the concept tries to explain the morphological changes in the society that rises these movements. The change of class based conflict in Europe since the industrial revolution (Melucci, 1989) was an important focus point. On the otherside, there is an obvious tendency to

“ontologize” the social movements. The concept refers to an approach rather than a theory, it is not a set of general propositions that have been verified empirically but just an attempt to identify certain common characteristics in social movements (Melucci, 1989; Larana and Gusfield, 1994). The bundle of NSMs were difficult to conceptualize with ideology of the past and rationally organized interest group.

A good starting place can be the specification of the fundamental characteristics of NSMs.

First, NSMs do not bear a relation to structural roles of the participants. The social base of the NSM transcends the class structure. The background of participants find their most frequent structural roots in rather different social statutes such as youth, gender, sexual orientation or professions that do not correspond with structural with explanations (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). This preference is especially striking in Greens movement, anti-nuclear movement (Europe) as well as ecological movement, animal rights movement and children’s rights movement (the US).

Second, the ideological characteristics of NSMs constitutes a sharp contrast to the working class movement and to the Marxist conception of ideology as the unifying element for collective action. Especially in Europe as well as in the US movements were characteristically perceived in accordance with overarching ideologies: conservative-liberal, right-left, capitalist-socialist. The NSMs are more difficult to characterize in terms of bourgeois or proletarian. They exhibit a pluralism of ideas and values, they have pragmatic orientations and search for institutional reforms (Offe, 1985; Larana, Johnston, Gusfield, 1994). According to Larana, Johnston and Gusfield (1994) these movements imply a “democratization dynamic” of everyday life and expansion of civil versus political dimensions of society.

Third, NSMs often involve the emergence of new or formerly weak dimensions of identity. The mobilizing factors tend to focus on cultural and symbolic issues that are linked with issues of identity rather than economic grievances (Melucci, 1989). They are associated with a set of beliefs, symbols, values and meanings related to sentiments of belonging to a differentiated social group with new socially constructed attributions about the meaning of everyday life. Catalan and Basque movement (Spain), Asian and

Hispanic movements (the US), ethnic movements in former USSR, Palestinian nationalism and even women's movement and gay rights movement are all examples of new identities emerging in the modern world.

Fourth, the relation between the individual and the collective is blurred. Many contemporary movements are "acted out" in individual actions rather than among mobilized groups. The "hippie" movement is the most striking example. Also, gay rights and women's movements can be other examples. The movement becomes the focus for individual's definition for himself or herself. The action emerges as complex mix of collective and individual confirmations of identity. Student movements in 1960s were the earliest examples of this aspect of the collective action.

Fifth, NSMs often involve personal and intimate aspects of human life. Movements focusing on gay rights, abortion, alternative medicine or anti-smoking. These movements extend into areas of daily life: what we eat, what we wear, what we enjoy, how we make love.

Sixth, another common feature of NSMs is the use of radical mobilization tactics of disruption and resistance from those practiced by working-class movement. NSMs employ new mobilization patterns characterized by non-violence and civil disobedience like the tactics adopted by Gandhi (Larana, 1979; McAdam, 1988; Morris, 1984; Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988)

Seventh, the NSMs are often related to the credibility crises of the conventional channels for participations in Western democracies. This is especially true considering the conditions of the traditional mass parties. NSMs tend to have considerable autonomy and even disdain against parties. All these bring new alternative forms for participation (Whalen and Flacks 1989; Melucci, 1989).

Finally, in contrast to cadre-led and centralized bureaucracies of traditional parties NSM organizations tend to be segmented, diffuse and decentralized. Collective forms of debate and decision making emerges and these limit the linkages with regional-national organizations. This is a sharp distinction with the centralized-Leninist model.



NSMs includes many different movements: Peace movement, student movements, lesbian-gay rights movements, women and animal rights movements, alternative movements, radical religious movements, environmentalist movements, new age movements (Larana, Johnston, Gusfield, 1994). Ethnical movements in Spain, US and Russia can be considered as new social movements.

There are several debates about the new social movement theories: Are these movements really new? Are they defensive or reactive response to the larger social forces? Are they more culturally oriented rather than political or are they apolitical? What is the social basis of these movements? Can this basis be identified as a social class?

According to Karl Werner Brand the new social movements have a cyclical pattern in response to the cultural crises and critiques of modernization. Nevertheless, similar periods of culture critique prompted similar movements around 1840 and 1900 in Britain, Germany and the US. Thus, these critiques see the new social movements romantic, cultural, idealistic rather than new. For Dalton and Kuechler, the NSMs have a humanistic tradition and their new aspects include their post-materialistic value base, their search for pragmatic solutions, their global awareness and their resistance to spiritual solutions (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). For Offe (1996), the newness of these movements lies under their post-ideological, post-historical nature as well as their lack of positive alternative and specific target in the form of privileged classes. They deny the accommodation to existing power and resist standard forms of co-optation. For Eder, the new social movements were inherently modern because only in modernity can their cultural orientation be formulated. However, these movements provide an alternative cultural model and moral order. On the other hand, the term “new” refers to a breakdown from the Marxist looking to the “old” labor movements as the primary agent of the history. The new movements involve students, women, ethical, racial, sexual minorities and they involve peace, ecology, justice themes. Since these are important historical predecessors for over a century, it is fair to mention about a continuation rather than a breakdown (Buechler, 1999).

According to Habermas new social movements are defensive against the system. However, different claims exist as well. Pursuant to Rucht the movements may be reactive, proactive or ambivalent. For Rucht, modernization produces conflicts around democratization, self-determination and individualization has a progressive character. At the same time, modernization in the system may provoke a more defensive kind of protests against side effects of technological, economic and political changes in the modernity (ibid).

According to Hirsch (1990), new social movements must be understood as a part of the Fordist crises. Fordism was a response to the capitalist crises which emerged in the Keynesian economy and welfare state expansion. On the other hand, this model created extended surveillance and control, commodification and bureaucratization of social life thus new social movements were responses to these developments. These movements try to overcome alienation and regulation and seek for the recovery in the civil society. As a consequence, these movements transcend the known dichotomies of left-right or progressive-conservative. Mooers and Sears are pessimistic about these movements they indeed accept capitalist social relations and they can be seen as new reformism at the end. Same movement and same agenda may provide progress or reaction according to their socio-historical space. How resistance movements become liberation movements? For Richard Flacks the basis of this question is the democratic consciousness. The consciousness narrows the gap between the “daily life” and “making history” (ibid). Some writers, such as Krips (2012), think that NSMs as a new post-liberal form of democratic-emancipatory political agency.

Another debate on the features of NSMs is whether these movements are cultural or political. This is a dangerous dichotomy since all the movements have cultural and political aspects. Being political is directly related with their transformative potential. Political movements are at least partially seeks for influencing or changing state power. Pursuant to Brandt, these movements are meta-political. In 1960s the movements had some strong political aspects although in 1970s and 1980s most of them were more culture oriented in which identity politics became more predominant. The notion of “personal is political” was deformed. The excessive attention emerged for the personal life instead of political action aimed at institutionalized power (Boggs,

1986; Epstein, 1990). According to Kaufmann, the anti-politics feature of identity leads to apolitical introspection. Kaufmann claims that these movements promote the values of marketplace. According to Melucci, apolitical nature of these movements must be regarded as strength rather than a weakness. He adopts a cultural reading but he does not disregard the transformative role of these movements on the existing social relations. This is because these relations have come to be defined more and more in the cultural language of symbolic representation. If power congeals in such media messages and administrative rationality, the basic challenge comes from the cultural movements. The movements make the power visible and play a more important role than the conventional political movements (Buechler, 1995). Wieviorka (2005) argues that “new social movements” may put social demands in the forefront. In students movement, denounced their difficult living conditions, their “poverty” as an economic dimension. Nevertheless these actors are much more culturally than socially oriented.

On the other hand, Reiter (2011) mentions about the problems of adoption of NSM concept for the non-European countries such as Brazil: *The concept of “new social movements,” characterized by a focus on identity, cannot readily be transferred to a Latin American context. Because Latin America never experienced the postmaterialist turn that led some to call certain European social movements “new.”*

Melucci argues that today the conflicts move from the economic-industrial system to cultural sphere, they focus on personal identity, the time and space of life, and motivation as well as codes of daily behavior (Melucci, 1994).

There is no line between the categories of NSMs and urban movements. In contrast, they constitute a composite category and a NSM can emerge in the form of an urban movement. Considering the new globalization trends on urban, this is a natural result.

Dominant issues of new social movements consist in the concern with a territory, space of action, or life world such as body, health, sexuality, city and neighborhood. These issues have a common value and most prominent among these values are autonomy and identity (with their organizational correlates such as decentralization, self-government, and self-help) and opposition to manipulation, control, dependence, bureaucratization, regulation, etc. The actors’ identification of themselves do not rely

on the establishment of political codes (left /right / liberal-conservative etc.) nor socioeconomic codes (working class/ poor/ rural) (Offe, 2008).

#### **2.3.4.3.2 Base of NSMs: Identity and Collective Identity**

Some theories tried to explain social movement by complains, resources and outer opportunities while some others tried to stress the rational decisions, inner values and positions of actors (Meyer, Whittier and Robnett, 2002). Moreover, some theories considered actors irrational or purely rational. Also, RM and POS theories recognize the actor as a rational agent and they neglected the construction of identity. However, identity provides important clues to explain the motives under the interests of actor (Lee, 2008). Identity is an instrument for self-representation and collective identity functions as a tool to represent people when they feel they are vulnerable alone (Kılıç, 2002). This concept of identity is related to the postmodern identity approach which is quite plural and interactive. It does not have to be rational, but it can be quite fragmented. This identity is under the certain bombardment of modern tools particularly the power nodes and it is in search of a balance due to the cultural necessities.

There is a dialectic relationship between identity and social movement. The movement may emerge by reason of identity demand but identity may affect the movement as well. After the participation of actor, identity can be reformed thus collective identity is both a premises and a product (Corrigal and Brown, 2008). There are three dimensions of identity. Individual identity, which have been constructed socially. It is related to biology, genetics as well as social interaction. Collective identity is related to group norms. Public identity is related to role of media and institutions such as state (Yaylacı, 2011).

Identity, particularly the collective identity lies under the NSMs since it's a composite form of actor and society. Both Touraine and Melucci consider NSMs as directly identity movements. This is in harmony with the acto-culture based understanding of social movements. According to Melucci (1985), collective identity is a shared belief. For him, the motive behind the NSMs is related to culture and symbolic issues (Larana, Johnston, Gusfield, 1994). Collective identity can be created by cognitive praxis as

well as framing processes (Boström, 2004). According to Taylor and Whittier (1992), identity is being created by the interaction with the “other”. Similarly collective identity is constructed through the rivals of the movement.

In fact, the concept of collective identity is not unique to social movement studies. Since Marx, Weber and Durkheim the concept has been used in many fields but the functionality of this concept in the social movement studies has been discovered later. Polletta and Jasper (2001) locate collective identity within the individual, defining it as “an individual’s cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution”. Another influential formulation is that of Taylor and Whittier (1992) who define collective identity as “the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences and solidarity”. Alberto Melucci brings the concept to the new social movements. Influenced by the work of Alain Touraine (1981) and Pizzorno (1978), among others, Melucci developed arguably the most systematic, comprehensive and influential theory of collective identity in social movements. Melucci was writing in a European context where class-based movements were declining and new social movements (e.g. environmental, peace, autonomous, feminist) that did not depend on member’s shared class position were emerging.

As Hunt and Benford (2004) argue, “In a sense, collective identity replaced class consciousness as a significant factor that accounts for mobilization and individual attachments to new social movements”. Melucci’s (1995) point of departure was that: “The empirical unity of a social movement should be considered as a result rather than a starting point”. Melucci therefore rejected the idea that collective identity was given. He tried to bridge the gap between individual beliefs and meanings and collective action by exploring the dynamic process through which actors negotiate, understand and construct their action through shared repeated interaction.

Social constructivism has emerged as another critic to the traditional social movement theories. And collective identity implies a constructivist view of collective action. It has some epistemological consequences. It affects the research practices (Melucci, 1995). The rise of interest in collective identity is parallel with the decline in interest

in Hegelian/Marxist conceptions of social change. For Castells, the resistance identities generated by actors who are repressed, stigmatized or devalued by structure of domination in a given society (Chesters & Welsh, 2006). The actors produce collective action because they are able to define themselves and their relationship with the environment. The definition that actor's construction is not linear but produced by interaction, negotiation and the opposition of different orientations. Collective identity is constructed by an action system that a network of active relationships between the actors. Finally, collective identity refers to an emotional investment (Melucci, 1995).

Collective identity enables social actors to act as unified and delimited subjects and to be in control of their own actions. The collective identity has ability of collective actor to recognize the effects of its actions and to attribute these effects to it. Thus, collective identity presupposes a self-reflective ability of social actors. Second, it requires causality and belonging (ibid).

The social movements develop collective identity in a circular relationship with a system of opportunities and constrains. Collective actors are able to identify themselves when they learn to distinguish between themselves and environment. Actor and system reciprocally constitute themselves and a movement only becomes self-aware through a relation with its external environment. The unity of the collective action rests on the ability of a movement to locate itself within a system of relations. Collective identity is a learning process that leads to the formation of and maintenance of a unified empirical actor. By the time, the collective actor develops a capacity to resolve the problems set by the environment. Collective identity ensures the continuity and permanence of the movement over time. Collective identity is a concept, an analytical tool but not a real existence, a thing. We are talking about a lens that helps us to see the reality (ibid).

According to NSM theorists, the transformation in the concept of collective identity has been emerged due to transformation in social structure. As Poletta and Jaspers (2001) argued several NSM philosophers identified the new by referring the different aspects of postmodernism. It is called as "post-industrialism" for Touraine (1981), "information society" for Melucci (1996), and "network society" for Castells (1997).

It is extremely important to understand how people identify themselves while they are participating in an action. How their identities transform to a collective identity (Lee, 2008). According to Hunt et al. (1994), complaints and frames can be sources for collective identity. The representation of collective identity can be done through cultural images such as names, symbols, styles, rituals, outfits etc. Nevertheless none of these images represents the collective culture by themselves alone (Polletta and Jasper, 2001).

Collective identity as a process involves cognitive definitions about ends, means and the field of action; this process is given voice through a common language, and enacted through a set of rituals, practices, and cultural artefacts. This cognitive framework is not necessarily unified or coherent but is shaped through interaction and comprises different and even contradictory definitions. This point is important because it means that actors do not necessarily have to be in complete agreement on ideologies, beliefs, interests or goals in order to come together and generate collective action, an assertion that counters more structural understandings of what brings and keeps movement actors together. Conflict provides the basis for the consolidation of group identity and for solidarity, rather than shared interests (Melucci, 1995)

Collective identity is seen as a prerequisite of a collective action but it is often not clear what the identity signifies. Also, in European social psychology, social identity is an important concept as well. Indeed, collective identity is a collective belief whereas social identity is an individual belief. Social identity is about someone's awareness of belonging to a specific group or category.

Acting collectively, requires some collective identity or consciousness. Pursuant to Melucci (1996), collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals. He conceives collective identity as a process that creates a unified empirical actor.

Taylor and Whittier (1992) define collective identity as "the shared definition of a group that derives from members' common interests and solidarity". Like Melucci, they see collective identity as a movement characteristic that is constructed, activated and sustained through interaction in social movement communities. Hence, in order to understand collective identity, one must examine the interaction, especially the social and political struggle that politicizes identity.

Factors such as similarity in personal characteristics and common fate affect the generation of collective identity. And once formed, group maintain collective identity over time by socializing newcomers (Levine and Moreland, 1991).

In order to become a binding element of a political protest, collective identity must be politicalized. In real, it is politically neutral most of the time. However, collectively defined grievances that produce a “we” feeling and causal attributions that donate a “they” who is responsible for these grievances lies under conflicts (Gamson 1992, Taylor and Whittier, 1992). If the out group is an authority which is perceived by the in-group to be unjust, encounter with such and authority will rapidly politicize collective identity (Gamson, Fireman and Rytina, 1982; Hirsch, 1990). The collective identity becomes a concept that defines itself in opposition against political authorities. This is true particularly when authorities appear to be unresponsive to the group’s claims or respond in a repressive way.

#### **2.3.4.3.3 Identity vs Class**

According to some philosophers, class no longer plays a role in the discourses of advanced modern societies. It has become popular to perform studies beyond and against discourse of class. This is mainly due to the fall of communist regimes. Class is a tool to understand modern society, particularly the industrial society. Due to the fall of industrial society we can look for the new concepts & new tools. To what extent the new social movements are indicators of new antagonisms in society? To what extent does collective action reproduce the traditional class conflict and to what extent does collective action contributes the new forms of class conflict? Does class determines collective action or does collective action has a role on class? The latter effect is less visible. We will work on the first effect. If we show that the first effect does not exist it does not mean that class have no role. Maybe, there is a need of a redefinition of class (Eder, 1995).

According to Eder, new social movements, seen from the creative side of collective action, create meanings that no longer relate to traditional class conflict. The creative activity in NSM, is an interaction of action and culture. There are different ways of relating movements with class. First effect can be explained that the class specific



social positions explain the specific strength and durability of the practices. Thus, the first effect of the class is to serve as a “political opportunity structure” for collective action. The second effect implies that the class no longer determines the collective action and class can never be reduced to class-specific ideology. Collective action gains a creative aspect and culture works a mediating variable between collective action and class (ibid).

Some people claim that such analysis of NSMs means a denial to class analysis. However, it will be fair to consider the issue as the reinterpretation of “class” rather than a denial. Actually, NSM analysis provides a wider area for the class based social movement analysis. On the other hand, the American and European approaches have entered a same way to eliminate their deficiencies (Kriesi et al., 1992).

Scholars of new movements agreed that conflict among the industrial classes is of decreasing relevance, and similarly that representation of movements as largely homogeneous subjects is no longer feasible. Nevertheless, there were differences of emphasis in relation to the possibility of identifying the new central conflict which would characterize the model of the emerging society, defined at times as “postindustrial,” “post-Fordist,” “technocratic,” or “programmed.” According to Touraine, in the industrial society, the ruling class and the popular class oppose each other, and in the programmed society, the new social classes will replace capitalists and the working class and they become the central actors of the conflict (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).

Melucci described contemporary societies as highly differentiated systems, which make individual autonomous center of action. In his view, new social movements try to reclaim individuals’ right to define their identities and to determine their private and affective lives against the comprehensive manipulation of the system. Unlike the workers’ movement, new social movements do not limit themselves to seeking material gain, new actors do not so much ask for an increase in state intervention, to guarantee security and well-being, but especially resist the expansion of political-administrative intervention in daily life and defend personal autonomy. On the other hand, the approach to new social movements has been transformed over time (ibid).

Briefly, class became much less important when determining the base. New social movements are defined by the dynamics of race, ethnicity, culture, gender, or age. The group identities undergirding collective action have shifted from class to status, race, gender, ethnicity, or nationality. There is a shift from group based interests to value based interests as a consequence of that in the advanced form capitalism there emerge different forms of deprivation and domination which affects different segments of the society (Steinmetz, 1981). On the other hand, one other strategy is to suggest a class base for these movements. According to Offe, the social base of new social movements is threefold: the new middle classes, elements of old middle classes and decommodified groups outside the labor market. The new middle class is a modern and class-aware group. The other ones draw open pre-modern & particularistic ideologies. Thus, the politics of NSMs depend on the dominancy of these groups. For Eder (1995), the NSMs are not class movements in traditional terms. All collective actors are socially constructed rather than structurally determined. Thus, Bourdieu's concept of habitus is a useful guide to understand the social construction of class actors and collective action. Since this class has an intermediate position between upper and lower social classes, it blends bourgeois individualism and plebeian particularism. Kriesi identifies antagonisms within the new middle class between technocrats with organizational assets and specialists with professional identities. Maybe these movements represent a major form of social activism whose social base is sometimes best defined in something other than class terms, whether that be gender, ethnicity, race, sexuality, or age. Hence, we have to look in detail to these identities and how they affect the NSM participations. Maybe some movements can be characterized by the values and goals rather than their social base. Social movements have shifted their focus from race, class and more political issues toward the cultural ground (Buechler, 1995)

On the other hand, we are witnessing the impressive development of communication technologies, the creation of world media system, the breakdown of historical political cleavages, the impact of cultural differences on national societies and at the world scale (ibid).

Do these social movements produce practices and meanings those create new cleavages in modern societies? Eder's answer to this question is as follows: these new social movements are forms of middle class radicalism and middle class protests. This model has two features: First, the new social movements carry identity projects. The second is that NSMs are concerned with issues that are non-negotiable within institutional frameworks (Eder, 1995).

Another important attempt to relate social-structural change to mass collective action has come from Manuel Castells by addressing the importance of consumption processes for class relations, by moving the focus of class analysis from capitalist relations within the workplace to social relations in the urban community (Castells, 1983). Compared with Marxists, new social movement theorists had two specific advantages: they once again placed actors at the center of the stage; and they captured the innovative characteristics of movements which no longer defined themselves principally in relation to the system of production (Maheu, 1995).

Traditionally, the class has been used to identify two different normative intentions. The first meaning was nearly synonymous with exploitation. Classes were related to each other in terms of power that created a mode of power. There has never been a systematic place for middle class in this model. There was not strong emphasis to formulas such as *petit bourgeois*, small property owners etc. Only one systematic concern had been shaped around a negative phenomenon: The role of middle classes on the rise of capitalism. The term of middle classes gained attention in 1970s as a result of their role on the new social movements. According to Eder, the term middle class make sense within the context of labor class and capitalist class. Specific reaction and movements cannot be considered as a class. However, the situation changed with the rise of new middle classes. This situation is explained by the loss of working class culture due to two trends: rise of a universal mass culture and emergence of cultural differences in individualized societies. There is no consensus on whether the new middle class is dominant or being dominated. For some, they are the new proletarians while they are new dominant classes for others. Nevertheless, the new middle class has attracted attention not because of its location but because of its specific culture. Culture is important because of its creative effect upon class (Eder, 1995).

Dimensions of the protest culture in mobilized middle class people contains shared interests, shared norms and shared values. Historically, the proletariat shares the frame of injustice. Norms are related with the notion of being “white” or “blue” collar. Issue of shared values has been the object of “social psychology of class”. It gives us information about people’s construction of reality about stratification. Every mobilization creates its own culture. Classes do matter in the study of social movements not only as causes of mobilization but also as the effects of mobilization. Social movements also create class relations. Class is not a social fact but a social construction. Social opportunity structure refers to occupational differentiation, educational differentiation, income differentiation, lifestyle differentiation (ibid).

Is searching for a class in a contemporary protest futile? According to Pakulsky it is. He argues that new social movements have a social base that cross cuts class lines. A second argument implies that the new social movements are value-laden movements which do not link directly with socio-structural characteristics related to social inequality. However, Bourdieu (1980) claims the contrary. He uses the “petit bourgeois habitus” to refer the link between the middle classes and new social movements in advanced modern societies. There emerges new type of class antagonisms centered on issues beyond exploitation and injustice. In 1960s and 1970s a change in the culture of middle class groups, characterized by “new middle class culture” which affected economic, political, cultural even religious life, took place. Specific culture is created in the mobilization process. The new social movements reshaped the institutional system of the modern societies. They introduced additional political cleavages. They are drawing new social boundaries. To what extent new social movements built new social boundaries? According to Touraine, the new social movements are no longer identified by natural forces but social forces. The traditional working class has been tied to natural forces (forces of production). Defining modernity as denaturalization of social reality, industrial society appears as a semi-modern society. The new social movements, on the other hand, distance themselves from the naturalism underlying the world of the labor movement and the working class. The problem of identity is a central concern for the middle classes. Middle classes live with a traditional notion of good life with consensual social relations. Good life is

class-specific lifestyle that led by good people. Religious groups are based upon such goodness and these religious notions have survived neither in lower nor in upper classes. It became a middle class phenomenon. Today, the middle classes are obsessed with personal aggrandizement, autonomy and competition. Consensual social relations refer to people interact as equals and as free people. Communication is a central feature of middle class lifestyle. Consequently, the idea of social opportunity structure can be completed by cultural opportunity structure. New social movements contain more than specific socio-structural and historical-cultural characteristics. The NSMs concerned with the realization of an “identitarian” existence. The NSMs are not traditional class movements however, they can be seen as manifestation of new type of class relationships (ibid).

Indeed, Marx’s revolutionary class consciousness is similar with the concept of collective identity. In both, there exists several common concepts such as common values, interests, targets, responsibility and solidarity (Hunt and Benford, 2004). Like Marxist paradigm, consciousness and solidarity have had a central role in Durkheim. Weber argues that Marx neglected the other sources of collective behavior while giving the priority to production. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), collective identity is the social construction of reality.

Today collective identity replaced the role of class consciousness in the process of social mobilization. The lack of revolutionary class and anti-democratic socialist experiences revived the popularity of non-class based movements in 1960s (Hunt and Benford, 2004). According to Klapp (1969), the quest for collective identity is reaction against the lack of interaction in a modern society. Since the transformations on political and economic demands in 1960s, equality has no major motivating role on social movements. In contrast, individuals demand for the acceptance of their new identities and lifestyles (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). The creation of NSMs relies on quest of collective identity. The movements are being accelerated by complaints and symbolic issues (Johnston, Larana and Gusfield, 1994). The collective identities are generated around the cultural and symbolic themes. These are sub cultured those criticizes the hegemony (Melucci, 1980).

#### **2.3.4.3.4 Power, Authority and Repressiveness**

The sociology of social movements currently lacks a conceptual framework to understand collective attempts to construct and reconstruct definitions of power. Benford and Hunt (1995), explained the role of power by a dramaturgy example. This example includes four techniques: Scripting, staging, performing and interpreting. Scripting refers to development of a scenario. It outlines the expected behavior. Scripts are built upon frames that provide a collective definition of situation. Scripting is a social process. Social movement scripts are about power relations. Staging refers to appropriating, managing, directing materials, audiences and performing regions. Social movement dramas require audiences. Performing involves demonstration and enactment of power. It is based on the struggle between protagonists and antagonists. By taking action, movement participants experience a transformation of self. The collective reconstruction of meaning is done through interpreting. Real and ideal power arrangements are done by taking the audiences' consideration in the account.

Sennett (2014) argues that authority is a basic need. Several works such as *Odysseia*, *King Lear* and *Buddenbrooks* tell the stories on weakening and deterioration of authority. According to Sennett, the fear is the primary component of authority and in all units of society fear of authority exist due to its intervention to freedoms. Besides, the need of authority increases the fear. The other components are trust, capacity to discipline and power of judgment (Sennett, 2014).

According to Marx, people do not think about political power they think about the things those infused by sovereign. However, Gramsci considered this approach problematic and he reformulated these ideas since he believed that the capitalist conditions were quite contradictory and welcoming for critics (ibid).

In Weber's approach, there are three perceptual categories of authority. First one is the traditional authority which comes through an institutionalized belief. The religious prohibitions refer to this kind of authority. The prohibitions such as alcohol<sup>6</sup> does not

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<sup>6</sup> Mostly referred as "ban" or "prohibition" among the participants as well as in media, the issue about alcohol sales was a limitation on the hours of sale. By the law no: 6487 dated 24.05.2013, it is clearly stated that the alcohol cannot be sold between the hours of 22.00-10.00. This limitation does not include the restaurants but retail sales such as markets or tabacs. This regulation made the alcohol consumption difficult particularly in public areas.

related to its badness but emergence of the ban for certain period of time. The second category of authority is rational-legal authority. This is based on the rules and behaviors of leaders who act according to rules. There exists a justification for this kind authority and it is similar for everyone. Each and everyone has right to be candidate to rule in this model. The final category of authority is charismatic authority. It is based on a devotion of society to a leader's divine power, the order that has been created by him/her. The authority of prophets can be considered as the part of this category. According to Weber, individuals' perceptions on the authority was a matter of the utmost importance (ibid).

Weber thinks similar to Kant. For him, people think via categories which is quite important for the matter of authority as people try to reach an abstract balance from the complex and contradictory conditions of power. However, in his understanding these the categories do not exclude each other. He matches the authority with legitimacy. In this approach, people do not obey the one considered illegitimate. The authority exists when people have will to obey. If there is pressure on people for obedience, people do not believe in the legitimacy of the power. In line with this thinking, Mosca argues that political formula meets with a necessity in people. This necessity is being governed in moral basis. However, contrasting approaches exist. For instance, Freud seeks for adults' primitive images of power and legitimacy those coming from their childhood. People tend to feel comfortable provided by a powerful image. Freud considers these devotion and submission phenomena as revisiting the childhood. The authoritarian figures always benefit from this tendency of people. Freud's fear of peoples' childish authoritarian image creation became an inspiration point for the representatives of Frankfurt School. Several writers including Adorno, Horkheimer, Fromm, Benjamin and Marcuse tried to combine these ideas with a critical approach of Marxism. The famous work of "The Authoritarian Personality" asks the question of "which physiological factors let the survival of the childhood authoritarian images in the adulthood?" The subsidiary questions of this work are "how do people's minds work?" and "what motivates people to adopt their childhood images for long periods?" This work, which has been criticized very harshly due to its methodological problems, claims that the labor class has more tendency for authority

than the middle classes and provided many useful insights while revisiting Weber: People's will to obey authority is not only related to things those provided by the power but also their needs of belief. "What do people demand from authority" becomes an important question (ibid).

By the way, Sennett (2014) stresses another important aspect of power. As stated by him, there is an attractiveness at people those we had not believed that legitimate before. This is not a modern phenomenon. Dante's works are full of people who pursue the Satan despite their love of God. The modern interpretation is that the legal powers in modern institutions have a very illegitimate image for people who have to obey these powers. For Weber, being obedient to power that we consider illegitimate is contradictory though for Freud it is quite possible. The person can deny the authority but also s/he can feel dependent on it.

On the other hand, the power debates are natural outcomes of the post structural thoughts. In terms of power, this thesis adopts a Foucauldian perspective. In all societies, all spaces and times power relations appear. It is highly probable that long time power nodes have a strong tendency to build their contextual systems, own hierarchies and norms. They abrogate the "center" and they try to impose their specific norms as "normal" then, they try to discipline the others as "deviant". Sometimes this process may emerge by more intentional dynamics (Foucault, 2014).

The role of power was elaborated in Orwell's essay "Shooting of an Elephant" in 1920s. In his essay, Orwell tells a story about an elephant that attacked people in a bazaar. At the end of the story, elephant went to rural area and became totally harmless. Even though it is totally needless, Orwell had to shoot elephant as a police officer since 2000 people in the colony was watching him to prove his authority. Basically, power always needs such "theatres" although they are mostly irrational. Domination needs its signifiers. It can be visible through stress on hierarchies, vanity, extravagance or a "theatre". A tyrant has to rule like a God. This is completely related to the claim of legitimacy in power (Scott, 2014). A powerless appearance is a precursor of loss of control in a society. Consequently, a useful suggestion for dictators is pushing repression until the end.



Foucault states that freedom is a consequence of a specific power or information network rather than a real phenomenon (Kitchin and Valentine, 1988). He claims that people who are in a specific context cannot be free.

Some traditional approaches conceive power as something used by an actor (Dahl, 1957). However in general, power has been considered as a relational phenomenon. In the relational approach, there are at least two actors while one actor makes another act in a certain way. Coercion and persuasion are accepted as two main methods in power relations. Realist and neo realist approaches prioritize coercion (hard power) over persuasion (soft power). Both assume power as a characteristic form of domination. In this hierarchical relationship, the actor with material or social capital directs another's practices in accord with its rationally determined self-interests. Sometimes, power appears as repression. Repression means the limitation of freedom of choice of an actor by another's exercise of power over it.

According to Foucault, power is not a "stuff" to be possessed by an actor, but it exists when it is exercised (Foucault, 1982). However, for Foucault, power gains meaning in time and space, in other words, context. There is no ahistorical power. It is a social phenomenon that is produced and reproduced in subjectivities. While individual subjectivities are reconstructed through processes of normalization, this results in reproduction of power. The normalization means the framing of "deviant" individuals in a society to act as "normal". Thus, there is no difference between a society and its institutions such as a prison or clinic in general. Power extends into all social spheres of life and there is nothing immune to the effects of power, daily actions and words reproduce power (Foucault, 1977). Power is a dynamic concept that changes and is changed through practice and this feature of power is of the utmost importance to understand the dynamism of power in social movements and how this power transforms individuals' own conception of themselves. Power emerges when individuals act in accordance with the certain norms (such as norms of citizenship, gender, class, mode and race). In other words, power (re)emerges socially, when people act in order to "normalize" themselves. The individuals are generally depicted as "docile bodies" whose "disorderly irrational, irresponsible thoughts and desires are self-capped and self-controlled, yielding the disciplined self. We become our own

jailors and perpetuate disciplinary practices through our own actions”. As Foucault claims, resistance is a natural dimension of power: “Where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1990). He states that, “power is exercised only over free subjects” or power exists by enabling free individuals to act in a certain way (Foucault, 1982). Also, the identities that we use is already constructed and determined by the political power. By the practice we consider them as our natural habitus. Indeed, there are sanctions ready for a deviant. If people question “normal” s/he must be ready to be labelled.

In traditional approaches, power is something intentional that actors use on others to make them act according to former’s interests. Thus, actors rationally determine their interests. Although Foucault does not reject that actors sometimes intentionally inflict power on others through micro-political practices (such as building prisons, guarding state borders), power mostly emerges when it makes individuals act in their daily activities in accordance with the norms of power, indeed (ibid). Probably the Tahrir Square meetings in Egypt provide an important example for this understanding.

When Egyptians started to gather in the Tahrir Square in January [2013], they carried their individual identities along with their negative preconceptions about other protestors. At the beginning, these negative preconceptions prevented individuals from fully exercising power-with. What connected them, but not united them, was their resistance to power-over of authoritarian regimes. They had to cooperate with others. However, during the protests, while they were targeted by the police, the trust relationship started to improve. Individuals not knowing each other and holding different identities stood up together against the security forces. Although it is normatively undesirable for Foucauldian power approach, the body politic in Tahrir showed that power can result from a collective identity which is not necessarily dominating and hegemonic. This collective identity can be pluralistic, open to differences and inclusive (Bilgiç, 2013).

Foucault proposes extraordinary ways to understand a society. In order to understand “normal” the “madness” should be investigated. Working on “illegal” may provide us the “legal”. Similarly, understanding resistance forms gives clues about power relations. He expresses that, power categorizes people, by transforming individuals to subjects (Foucault, 2014). According to Foucault, the power categorizes people, by transforming individuals to subjects (Foucault, 2014). On the other hand, according to Foucault, the power does not have to repressive or negative, instead it can be

productive. Power must be considered as a network passes through the whole society. Thus, the power does not take root from a single source and it does operate in a hierarchic way instead it is dispersed. The power can never be thought under control of a specific “center”, it functions in a network. There can be some focus points or nodes for the power such as the power of state or sovereign class and additional attention should be paid to these micro devices of power. Foucault entitles these devices as the “micro physics” of the power (Foucault, 1977).

Similarly, according to Gramsci, the concept of hegemony does not only refer to sovereign class but also acts of progressive social powers. The hegemony is based on consent rather than repression. However, one other type of hegemony can be based on repression rather than consensus. Habermas, one of the second generation member of Frankfurt School, a concept gain meaning in the society by the process of communicative action. Thus, the public space which is the network of civil society has significant role for the dissemination of acts of power by knowledge and frames (Brown, 2009).

Heinz Klegler argues that democracy raises on majority and dialogue. Today, in parliamentary systems nobody thinks that power act as a rational way due to the fact that it is supported by majority (Canetti, 2014). There exists a long period between the elections. In this period, voters look for images for their representation.

Hanna Arendt explains the components of totalitarianism. First component of totalitarianism is their claim of universality. Their claims are absolute realities which cannot be limited by time and space. The second component is instability. The absolute realities change by time. Today’s white becomes tomorrow’s black. Today’s hero becomes tomorrow’s betrayer. Therefore these regimes periodically adopt cleaning campaigns. Thirdly, totalitarian regimes construct a total sovereignty on society. It can be voluntary or repressive. Civil disobedience cannot be seen in totalitarian regimes. In the countries between democratic and totalitarian there is a possibility of civil disobedience. In democratic regimes, civil disobedience has a regulatory function on the system whereas in totalitarianism it cannot function in a constructive way (Coşar, 2013).

The configuration of power sets more specific limits to the strategies available to the authorities with regard to given challengers. The supporters of NSMs typically belong to electoral potential of left. Thus, configuration of power in left is more important. What is the combination of social democrats-communists in the action? If left is divided, there is relatively less space for NSMs. In contrast, where the left is strongly bonded and class conflict has been pacified in time, there is more space for NSMs. Social democrats can be expected to be much more likely to support these new challengers. We regard the social democrats to profit if they are in the opposition since the challengers may weaken the government. The configuration of power is strongly dependent on the left's participation in government and dividedness. It is also related to how the new forces (such as a green party) constitute themselves as new actors in the party system. If the social democrats govern alone, then they make more concessions than in case they depend on a partner. In France, when the renewed party gained success it became less accessible for the NSM forces. When PS came to power it abandoned the anti-nuclear energy campaign. From 1970s to 82 SPD that had been in coalition in Germany followed a full exclusion strategy. Generally repressive legacy and coalition circumstances lead the position. During 70s, SPD was subject to strong pressure of union movements to stick the traditional goals instead of NSM goals. The greater openness can be attributed to federalist structure of country, party's youth organization, challenge of Green Party after 1979. After the break down of coalition in 1989 party followed a more facilitative strategy. The crucial element of the social movement is its overt challenge to the authorities; it is the series of the actions constituted in interaction with the authorities that defines a social action in Tilly's terms. The most relevant level of POS is national one. The NSMs are evolving by the international politics. Change in international POS affects national POS (breakdown of communist states) Nation state is in a decline but it must not be exaggerated (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, Giugni, 1992).

In his study, Boudreau (2002) makes a comparison of state repression and social movements in the sample of three dictatorial countries of time as Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines. He makes a summary of regime repression strategies and social response and he builds patterns. In each, patterned interactions between state

repression and social mobilization shaped the identities. In each case, state repression shaped alliance potentials between regime defectors, reform-minded elites and mass society. In all the cases, movement success or failure depended on both movement's capacity and state's resilience. This is also related with the histories of state repression of the countries.

In an authority relation, there exist parties. At least one party has the right and responsibility to regulate some aspects of the action of the others. Somebody is acting in the authority role as an agent of a larger authority system. Gamson, Fireman and Rytina (1982) argue that one of the bases of the social mobilization is people's thoughts on the injustice of the authority. In other words, encounters with the unjust authority is a potential career to a sustained challenge to an authority system.

According to Gamson, Fireman and Rytina (1982), there are several points among encounters. Individual vs. collective, continuing vs. discrete, organized vs. disorganized challengers are critical points for the encounters.

Examining some specific cases on labor from a social-psychological perspective, Gamson, Fireman and Rytina (1982) designate five categories as the milestones of rebellious action against authority. At first level, the participant acts in compliance with the authority. They may ask questions to authority to clarify procedures. The second level is evasion. In this level, participants do not confront to the authorities but they do not perform in desired manner. Third level is dissent. In this level the participants, publicly express objection to the way which authorities are acting. Next level, resistance means the refuse to do what the authority asks them to do. The final level is struggle to stop the authority system from perpetrating the injustice. This analysis does not tell a total story about the social action dynamic but this way of understanding may provide some clues for the understanding of the action. A social action or protest does not merely depend on the social processes but also individual motives. Furthermore, there is no clear line between social and individual and there is no reason to assume these levels indicates a dialectic relation. As it has been argued in the identity and collective identity analysis, the "identity" and collective identity are relational products. They are created, deconstructed and recreated continuously. It is


obvious that, the rise of information society which can be basically reflected by the rise of communication in all levels of the life affected this relational creation very directly.

By the approach of Gamson, Fireman and Rytina (1982) we understand the importance of perception on authorities' injustice in way of rebellious action.

The "repressiveness" does not have to be a real fact. What makes it a significant milestone in the way of rebellious action is its perception among the people. The societies may live in extreme authoritarian conditions those even don't reveal a repressive consideration. It is obvious that the perception is a subjective phenomenon and it is totally dependent on the condition of time and space. At this point the frames have a particular role. They are the signifier those create our meanings. Framing is a process of symbol formation, mostly done by unconsciously. That is why in the emergence of social actions the symbolic actions have a particular multiplier effect.

#### **2.3.4.5 Repressiveness and Identity**

As we mentioned earlier, the new social movements are cultural things. Identity lies under the new social movements. This includes both individual identity as well as social identity. Today, both individual and social identity is constructed through relational processes. Postindustrial employment forms, ideological breaks, technological improvements, network based social communication systems as well as over rationalization efforts of the agents such as state contributed the creation of this identity. Thus, this identity became a fragmented, pluralist, sometimes resistant, sometimes obedient or irrational, interactive, network and technology based identity. Besides, this identity was under a massive bombardment of signifiers. Through the framing processes, all of the meaning those belonged to this identity has reformed continuously. Moreover, this identity is urban. It is experiencing the urban trends, uneven capitalist development, flows those seen in every parts of city. Finally, the repression on this identity prepares the conditions of a resistance. Through the collective identity that can be visible by the social interaction in protests, the main form of a social movement is being characterized.



**Figure 2: Creation of Identity as the basis of NSM and Creation of a New Social Movement by the repression**

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**Table 1: An Overview of Old and New Trends**

	<b>Traditional</b>	<b>New</b>
<b>Actor</b>	citizen, individual, worker	white collar, student, corroded character
<b>Space</b>	nation, urban, rural	urban space, thirdspace, cyberspace
<b>Organization</b>	labor union, party, assoc.	association, internet, short cooperation, no organization

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## CHAPTER 3

### CASE STUDY

#### 3.1 Gezi Protests in Turkey

Gezi events started in İstanbul and in the beginning they were quite limited in one of the centers of İstanbul, Taksim Square. After the expansion of events to the other cities, Ankara became one of the major centers of the protests. Kuğulu Park/Tunalı Hilmi Street/Bestekar Street, Kızılay/Güvenpark<sup>7</sup> and engaged streets grew into places of protests. Besides, people gathered and corteges were organized in districts like Dikmen, Batıkent and Tuzluca. Harsh police interventions and conflicts came up in the areas like Kızılay (central square-CBD) since these places were not “permitted”<sup>8</sup> demonstration areas. Besides, most of the action places were close to governmental buildings, particularly National Assembly and Prime Ministry.

At least for a certain period of time, the events continued in a form of open street festival in İstanbul, particularly in Taksim due to the removal of the police forces. In contrast, the events had a long lasting tension in Ankara. The population in the events was scarce and less cosmopolitan compared to İstanbul. However, considering major social events such as May Day in the last decades<sup>9</sup>, the participation was in quite high levels in Ankara and that the protestors could occupy Kızılay Square<sup>10</sup>. Also the event

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<sup>7</sup> Güvenpark is the central park in Kızılay, the city center of Ankara, Turkey.

<sup>8</sup> According to Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (Article:34) Everyone has the right to hold unarmed and peaceful meetings and demonstration marches without prior permission. However, the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches shall be restricted by law on the grounds of national security, public order, prevention of commission of crime, protection of public health and public morals or the rights and freedoms of others. Besides, the Constitution declares that the formalities, conditions, and procedures to be applied in the exercise of the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches shall be prescribed by law. In practice, these widely identified regulations reveals a “permission” process in the social actions.  
[http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution\\_en.pdf](http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> The major center of the social events in Turkey is İstanbul. The protests in Ankara stay in the shadow of İstanbul in general. The cosmopolitan soul, high population and composition of different labor sectors provide a better dynamism to İstanbul. Especially in last decades, meetings such as May Day celebrations could gather only a few thousands of people which have taken place in limited-controlled spaces such as Sıhhiye and Tandoğan Square instead Kızılay.

<sup>10</sup> There is no permanent restriction for social events in Kızılay Square where is the center of Ankara. However, by the governorship the meetings have been prohibited before the important events like May Day. In such cases, the



gained strong micro supports from the districts. People organized “night walks” in the central places of districts and some people joined the protests from their homes by playing woks and pots. Besides, after the fall of first impact many residences participated in the park forums in Ankara. Since İstanbul was the center of the movement the studies and writings on the actions in Ankara are extremely rare.

## **3.2 Understanding Background of Gezi**

### **3.2.1 Brief History Social Movements in Turkey**

The Ottoman Empire subsisted until the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923. The last two centuries of the Empire included the decline and dissolution period. During this period, the Empire was defeated in several battles, lost huge land, social and economic systems collapsed. These developments as well as the effects of French Revolution and Industrial Revolution in Europe affected the Empire in many aspects<sup>11</sup>. On the other hand, devastated aspect of the Empire led some Ottoman Sultans to take measures to stop the rot. Some reformations have been made mostly inspired (and pushed) by the West. That is why the history of social movements in Turkey goes back to modernization period of Ottoman Empire. Especially last 150 years of the Empire had been passed by the strong modernization efforts those opened a new space for the social movements.

Sultan Selim III was the first reformist sultan ascended in 1789. His inspiration was not French revolution but French monarchy so first effect of the French bureaucracy was seen in his era. His reforms called as Nizam-i Cedit and had not positive reflections on people. By the contrary, financial burden created by the reformations was covered by taxes and that created dissatisfaction among people. In 1791, the janissaries have rebelled in the leadership of Kabakçı Mustafa against the new modern army. Many members of the new army have been murdered and Sultan Selim had to

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governorship points “legal” meeting areas where are Sıhhiye and Tandoğan in general. Some small groups tries to enter Kızılay in such days and small scale conflicts emerge. For long decades, Kızılay have not been used for legal meetings and the small scale efforts of occupation have failed steadily.

<sup>11</sup> However, it is fair to argue that the direct effects of the French revolution had only seen on the minorities (as liberty and nationalism), particularly merchants who have ties with Europe.

leave his position. Shaykh al-Islam gave a fatwa that claimed the reforms were traversal to Islamic rules.

Mahmut II was the second reformist Sultan who tried many changes in bureaucratic and military system after a certain preparation period. His primary aim was empowering central state by the modernization of army which was similar with the ideals of Selim III. During reformist sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839), the janissaries rebelled several times. In these uprisings, Artillery Barracks in Taksim have been used as a base. In some cases Orthodox Patrick has been blamed by supporting the rebels and plunders emerged against these minorities. In 1826 janissaries rebelled for the last time, Mahmut II called people for a total war and he repressed janissaries with loyal soldiers and abolished the guild. After the abolishment of the guild, the Ottoman bureaucracy, that had resisted against reforms for long decades, lost their power and Mahmut II could actualized many reforms. Mahmut II adopted more “secure” Prussian officers instead of French, English or Russian ones in new army called “Mansure” which became a beginning for almost 100 years of German effect on Ottoman. The second part of the Sultan Mahmut’s reforms was constituted by education which was aimed to create human resources to implement and maintain reforms. Sultan Mahmut’s reforms drew a frame for the next 80 years of the Ottoman modernization history. Sultan Adülmecit who ascended in 1839 opened the era of reforms from 1839 to 1876.

In 1839, Tanzimat “reorganization” Edict provided security of life and property for all people, it tried to adopt modern rules of compulsory military service and fair taxation. Obviously, none of these reforms raised by the demands of people. Even the Christian communities who benefited from the reforms had no mass support since they were more affected by the autonomous aspects. After 1839, the characteristics of the events have changed. The events between minorities, student rebellions, and attempts of changing emperors were accelerated. Most of the time, the reformations received a certain reaction since the pioneers of reforms were considered as the servers of Christian community by Muslims. However, the struggles have been lasted between power elites rather than government and large mass of population since Ottoman Empire was a sui-generis empire that a clear distinction between ruling class (Askeri) and people (Reaya) existed. Even Sened-i İttifak document, titled as “Ottoman Magna

Carta” in some resources was regulating the responsibilities between Sultan and the landed proprietors (Ayan). This issue started to change by the last decades of the Empire in a limited scale. In 1876, the first constitution and first elections were done and time of constitutional monarchy started. However, elections could receive no serious attention by people and the parliament which has been considered as a critical thread for his power was closed by Abdülhamit II until 1908. At the same time, an intellectual fraction has started to emerge as a consequence of modernization. By the end of 19th century, these intellectual groups had reached a certain maturity. Composed of different ideals such as nationalism, socialism or Islamism they were investigating the ways of recovery for the country. One of these thought moments, the movement of İttihat ve Terakki<sup>12</sup>, rooted by French positivism had adopted the idea of nationalism. When Abdulhamit II lost his power, the movement became dominant in the politics as well as on the modern military of the final stage of the Empire. Even though Ottomanism was the official ideology of İTC, the nationalism, derived from French thought, was considered as the real ideology of İTC supporters. By the announcement of second constitutional monarchy in 1908, İttihat ve Terakki movement reached a direct power as a political party. Until 1908, İTP has been the defender of democratic demands however, it adopted an authoritarian discourse after the establishment of hegemony on the Ottoman politics. For instance, 1908 provided a very fruitful space for freedoms. In this atmosphere many social movements including strikes of workers emerged. Such movements were repressed by İTP (Zürcher, 2015). 1908 was the first protest without strong hierarchies. İTP was organized in Thessaloniki and Manastır but not in İstanbul. In Turkey, since Second Constitutional Monarchy period (II. Meşrutiyet) the center of the social movements became İstanbul. Kürkçügil (2013) argues that after more than 30 years, nobody remember what was constitutional monarchy. Thus, not only Abdülhamit but also İT confused about people celebrating the constitution in İstanbul. “It should be something like an undefined sense of freedom”. One year later 31 March Incident emerged. It was a conservative reaction against constitutional system. In 13 April 1909, Hareket

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<sup>12</sup> First started as an association: İTC, then evolved into a political party: İTP

Ordusu<sup>13</sup> came to İstanbul, regained control from the rebels and changed emperor one more time. Many people have been executed and Sultan Abdülhamit II has been replaced by Mehmet Reşad V. In 1919, a meeting was organized against the occupation in İstanbul. It was not autonomous but gained a large mass support (Sakaoğlu, 2013).

After a short while, İTP prepared the basis of Ottoman participation in the WWI. The WWI ended by the defeat and a total surrender & partial occupation of the Empire. However, in the ashes of Empire, a War of Liberation, a leader called Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and Turkish Republic raised. The period of Turkish War of Independence has been passed by local uprisings in all over the country. Both nationalistic as well as religious tendencies have played an important role in these uprisings. Until his death in 1923, Turkey was governed by Atatürk's Party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi<sup>14</sup> (formerly Halk Fırkası) under the charismatic leadership of Atatürk. Coming from the nationalist tradition of İTC, Atatürk adopted a European type top-down modernization process for the country. In a few years, several reforms have been done such as adoption of Latin alphabet, the law on unification of education, abolition of the caliphate, closure of small Islamic monasteries. All these revealed a certain transformation in the society but also received several reactions as well. In 1925, Şeyh Said Uprising emerged in the Kurdish provinces. The leadership of Şeyh Said uprising were following the ideas of “free Kurdistan” while the mass support were more religious oriented who demands the return of caliphate and Sheri law. This uprising was suppressed very hardly, the press was taken under certain control by a specific law. The vanguards of the uprising were condemned, some of the Kurds were relocated and a “denial process” started for the Kurdish identity (Zürcher, 2015).

From 1923 to 1930 two legal efforts of establishment of oppositional parties were failed. Because the accumulation in the years of war, shock of rapid transformation

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<sup>13</sup> Stands for “Army of Action”, Hareket Ordusu was a modern army in Ottoman Empire which was a follower of nationalistic ideas of İTC formulated as “Order and Progress”.

<sup>14</sup> Republican Peoples Party (CHP) is the mainstream social democratic party with a 25% support in Turkish politics today. Being the republic's founder party, CHP stayed in power until the 1950s. After 1950s, it left place to central-conservative traditions and it could take place in government for short periods. CHP is still being criticized to be representative of status-quo. It is assumed that a traditional CHP supporter has concerns on laicism and nationalism which are coming from the 6 principles of the part symbolized as “Six Arrows”.

(including religious concerns), as well as heavy economic conditions (global effects of world economic crises in 1929 and capital accumulation model in national level) were making the opposition a center of attraction. That is why two political parties established in legal rules, Progressive Republican Party (TCF) and Free Republican Party (SCF) had created a great attention in the mass of people. In 1930, arrival of Ali Fethi who was the leader of Liberal Republican Party (LRP) caused gathering of great mass of people. People showed their anger against republican government by elevating opposing leader. (Kürkçügil, 2013). In a short while these parties have been considered as an open thread to the system and they have been blamed as being traitors (Zürcher, 2015).

Both uprisings against regime and the mass attention to oppositional parties can be considered as the first forms of social movements in the early republican time. The regime was quite authoritarian during 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, world economic crises and raising fascism in European was affecting the Turkey's atmosphere clearly. İsmet İnönü, the latter leader of CHP, could make Turkey stay out of WWII. However, neither CHP nor the regime has never received great mass support even in 1950s. In contrast, by the time CHP gained certain reaction due to several reasons. The class based organizations had been prohibited until 1945. The rural people were under heavy taxation. Besides, religious-conservative concerns were under clear attack of rapid modernization. All these were aggravated by the heavy measures of WWII. During these years, some autonomous actions took place. The incident of raid to Tan Printing was an example. Tan Printing was the center for a leftist newspaper called Tan. In 1945, after the USSR's declaration on the status of Çanakkale and İstanbul Bosphorus the political tension raised and a meeting was organized against "communism" the group including nationalist-conservative youth attacked Tan Printing and some other places (Kürkçügil, 2013).

In 1946, the multi-party democracy period started in Turkey for the third time by the establishment of Demokrat Parti (DP). DP was established by a group coming from the inside of CHP. For the third time, the accumulated reaction gathered in the new oppositional party. Due to this mass attention as well as CHP-designed-election system, based on the idea of "winner takes all", DP won the 408 chair while CHP has

only 69 and DP came to power in 1950. It was a turning point in Turkish history (Zürcher, 2015). Started by a relatively composite staff, DP became the “owner of the state” in a short while. Leader Adnan Menderes and DP thought that the people had authorized them in every fields thus everything done by DP would be legitimate. Despite the expanding mass support to DP, Menderes had never trusted CHP and started oppressive practices. The right of strike for labor which was one of the commitment of DP before elections was forgotten and oppressive policies on labor went on. The economic revival upturned in the middle of 1950s. Censorship on press and confiscation of CHP’s properties were done after a few years of electoral success. Liberal-intellectual support began to decline in a short while and general atmosphere of the country was under tension. The second electoral victory made Adnan Menderes to believe that, his authoritarian tendencies were supported. On 6 September 1955, by the trigger of a provocative news people attacked to minorities in İstanbul. More than 5000 properties vandalized and plundered (Ertuğrul, 2008). The incidents on 6-7 September 1955<sup>15</sup> have been represented as the results of some national emotions but there were organized dynamics under this case. Also, the tense atmosphere in society was providing a proper basis for such an “explosion”. Moreover, DP took steps backward from the Republican ideals which created a reaction among the secular mass of people as well as among power elite. By the end of 1950s the events spread to metropolitan cities, to the universities and DP government ended up by the first military coup in 1960 (Kürkçügil, 2013).

A relatively democratic constitution was prepared and political parties could return to democratic life in a short while. In 1961 the meeting for the legalization of labor rights was an autonomous meeting with 100.000 people despite some support of İstanbul Labor Union organizations. By 1965, Justice Party (AP) who was the ancestor of DP came to the power with a great success. In a short while, the oppressions on leftist policies and reactive events particularly among students, had started. At the same time, the labor class reached a certain maturity and had a possibility to be represented in

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<sup>15</sup> In 1955, another incident took place in İstanbul. A nationalist group who gathered claiming a raid against Atatürk’s House in Thessaloniki attacked to religious minorities (Hellenic, Armenian, Jewish) in İstanbul. Thousands of shops, houses and sanctuaries were damaged. No clear data exist about the human injuries losses.

the parliament by Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP). The leftist movements had a clear anti-imperialist discourse at that time. World conjecture, dispute between communism versus capitalism, anti-Americanism as well as 68 Movement have been effective on these movements. In those years, the ideological bases of movements became lucid. Nationalist Action Party (MHP), who is the major representative of Turkish nationalism today, was founded in 1968 and became an active part of the street opposition. In the other words, the conflicts between right and left constituted the main basis of the opposition. In the same years, distinctly first Islamic Party called Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP) was founded by Erbakan. By the time, this opposition became violent and the conflicts went out of control. 15-16 June labor incidents in 1970 were important incidents supported by labor unions such as DİSK. 100.000 people participated, 4 people died and government declared state of siege. These conflicts were ended by a limited military coup in 1971 (Zürcher, 2015).

This coup was differentiating from 1960 since the position of Armed Forces was more right oriented. Because of that the coup was majorly against the “communism threat”, the leftist movement in Turkey which had certain damage during post-1971 period. Demand of Army elites was “laicism with a powerful government”. MNP and TİP were closed. Liberal aspects of the constitution were eliminated. However, Ecevit’s CHP became the first party in 1973 elections. In 1974, Ecevit gained power by the positive domestic wind of military operation on Cyprus. However, the government could not be established by CHP. Despite 41.4% majority of CHP, the government was established by MHP-MSP-AP which was titled as nationalist front “MC”. Soviet supported communism had been considered as a primary concern at that time, and the conflicts were based on left and right. Moreover, great labor movements as well as first indicators of Kurdish separatist movement had been observed. During the 1970s, when the new social movement debates emerged in the world, Turkey was experiencing the classical mass social movements powerfully. It was actually early for the NSMs, as identity movements, until 1980s (Sunal, 2005). From 1970 to 1980 almost no stable government had been established and the street conflicts raised day by day. Besides by oppressive and partisan approaches, MC built the ways to new military coup. A CHP government which was established after MC could not solve

structural problems. 36<sup>16</sup> people were murdered and hundreds of people injured in İstanbul during the 1977 May Day celebrations in Taksim Square. The murders have not been found. In same year, Bülent Ecevit the former leader of CHP could gather a big mass in same place and on 6 September 1980, Erbakan could gather about 100.000 people in Konya (Kürkçügil, 2013). During these years, traditional conflicts such as Alevi-Sunni had gained political aspects as communist-nationalist. By 1979, Kahramanmaraş incident took place, 111 people died and more than 1000 people were injured (Ertuğrul, 2008). After this incident, 13 cities had been governed by martial law and murders were becoming daily realities including the murder of famous persons such as Kemal Türkler (a labor union leader) and Abdi İpekçi (journalist) (Karpat, 2014).

In 1980, Turkey faced the military coup for the third time. This strong intervention not only repressed all political fractions but also redesigned the socio-economical structure of Turkey. Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces was elected as the President and he could have the power on politics since 1987. All labor union organizations and non-governmental organizations were closed and labor movement was repressed. By this way, a backdrop was created for the liberalization. On the other hand, “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” became the dominant perspective of post military coup era. In 1983, Motherland Party (ANAP) came to power with a new charismatic leader Turgut Özal. ANAP received a strong support and became the operator of neo liberalism. During this period, Turkey evolved to an open economy experiencing both the pros and cons of the new system (Zürcher, 2015).

The primary social movement in Turkey after 1980s became the Kurdish movement. As Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK) was established in 1978 as a neo-Marxist movement, one part of the Kurdish movement adopted the armed struggle illegally and especially in 1990s conflicts in Southeastern Anatolia became the central issue of the politics. By the end of 1980s, old political leaders who have been banned in 1980s military coup gained the right of doing politics and several parties coming from the tradition of AP (re-founded as DYP), MHP (re-founded as MÇP), CHP (re-founded as SHP, then CHP

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<sup>16</sup> In some resources, it is 41.



as well as DSP) and MSP(re-founded as RP) were established. Also, by the end of 1980s ANAP had to face with 8 years neo liberal politics. In 30 November 1990, 70.000<sup>17</sup> Zonguldak coal miners came to capital Ankara by walking 112km after the fail of collective bargains. It has been noted as the final great labor movement in Turkey. From 1989 to 1992 labor unions went to strikes and actions titled as “Spring Actions”. Nearly 1.5 million worker participated in these actions which were mostly due to Özal’s low wage policy (Ertuğrul, 2008).

The concept of NSM entered in politics by the end of 1980s, when the effects of 1980s military coup started to decline. Sunal (2005) identifies this period as a time when the consumption society patterns started to emerge, the idealist approaches replaced by career stories, and everything started to become temporary. Bora (1990) mentions the condition of social movements by 1990 and he confirms the emergence of new social movements in Turkey particularly in the examples of feminist and green ecology movement. According to Sunal (2005), NSM actors were old classical movement actors of 1970s and the pressure on these movements brought people quest for alternative resistance forms in NSMs.

By the beginning of the 1990s, ANAP lost power and the era of coalitions started. 90s have been identified by the political and economic instability due to chronic hyperinflation, economic crises, PKK conflicts and short run coalition governments. During this period, SHP and DSP (centralist parties coming from leftist traditions) became the part of coalitions for two times once in 1992 as the minor stakeholder and the other in 1999 as the major stakeholder. During these years, the state monopoly on television broadcasting was used as the main tool for the propaganda of government policies. 1990s were also the years those political Islam became a means of debate. In 1990 two professors, who were members of SHP, were murdered by Islamists. In 1992, 37 people including artists and intellectuals were killed in Sivas during the traditional Alevi celebrations. In 1993, Uğur Mumcu, one of the most famous journalist of the time, who has written on the connections between Iran-Saudi Arabia as well as Turkish Islamic groups was murdered by bomb (Zürcher, 2015). Thousands of people

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<sup>17</sup> In different resources, it goes up to 150.000.

participated in meetings against these murders but none of these incidents have resolved. Also, legal side of the political Islam had gained certain success during 1990s: In 1994 local elections, it became visible that RP won 15 metropolitan municipalities in Turkey including Ankara (Mayor: Melih Gökçek) and İstanbul (Mayor: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan). In the same year, Turkey experienced an economic crisis which contributed the success of Islamic tradition in 1995 general elections. RP became the primary party by taking 21% of the votes in 1995 and established a coalition. However, on those years, political Islam has considered as primary concern by the Army besides Kurdish movement. In 1997, a limited coup was made by Armed Forces, RP was closed by court decision, and Fazilet Partisi (FP) established. In 1999, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, was caught in Nigeria which made DSP primary party in the elections by feeding its popularity. The coalition was powerful since it was supported by both left (DSP) and right (MHP) parties though it was ended up with an early election in 2002. November 2002 elections became a great smack-down for DSP, MHP, ANAP as well as other traditional parties DYP and FP. The electors considered these parties awkward in Marmara Earthquake in 1999 and responsible for the greatest economic crises in 2001. People gave big attention to early founded AK Party (AKP) and its charismatic leader Erdoğan. AK Party was coming from distinctly FP's tradition but it was a modernized form of tradition which abrogated anti-western discourse with younger and dynamic faces.

Considering the political history of period since modernization time of Ottoman era, there exists a pattern in social movements in Turkey. In this pattern, a political actor captures central authority. Most of the time, the incoming power comes to power under abnormal conditions such as economic crises or war and it has a claim of "change" or being "new" which attracts people. Most of the time, the electoral system and oppositional powers generate proper conditions for such a success. For the early periods of the power it represents a comparatively inclusive and open perspective. However, after the total control on the state apparatus, power abrogates the central-inclusive strategies and tries to impose its purely own ideology and agenda. In some cases, this hegemony emerges as the direct intervention to people's life. In all these cases, reactions emerge against central power and governments follow authoritarian

standing-repressive policies to defend their positions rather than building a consensus<sup>18</sup>. Blaming the opposition on the “heaviest” offences such as being terrorist, collaborator, traitor, reactionary is a known tradition which prepares the legitimate basis for the all kind of oppressions. Sometimes the tension expands to people and political leaders easily behave without common sense. In most of these cases, probably as a consequence of abnormal conditions, charismatic leaders considered as “savers”, who have the power to mobilize large mass of people. In most cases, Armed Forces stay as a “balancing” power and intervene to movements as well as politics at a certain time. However, the political position of the army determines the soul of post-coup era<sup>19</sup>. Considering this history, it is unrealistic to examine social movements without the effects of political historicity and roles of charismatic leaders.

In that respect, considering its macro reasons Gezi was a typical example of social movements in Turkey. Its primary target was the central position of the government in brief. However, if we take into account the micro reasons as well as nature of the movement, NSM theories as well as framing provide us better explanatory perspectives.

### **3.2.2 A Decade of AK Party Power in Turkey**

As the ruling Party, AK Party’s role has been central in Gezi. There has been several aspects those made this role important. In last decade, AKP<sup>20</sup> played a crucial role in the transformation of Turkey. This transformation contained both social and economic aspects.

AKP was born after 20 years of military coup in 1980. By the end of 1990, the effect of coup as well as military was surviving. The coalition of an Islamic party (Welfare

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<sup>18</sup> Naturally there exist efforts for building consensus but in general, consensus is considered as tool to divide opposition rather than finding a middle way.

<sup>19</sup> Even though it exceeds the limits of this study, the roots of this conflicting political atmosphere can be investigated in the rapidness of Turkish modernization process.

<sup>20</sup> AKP or AK Party stands for Justice and Development Party. While the supporters prefer “AK Party” as the proper abbreviation the opposing groups use AKP mostly. “AK” means white and refers to party tradition with a special stress on “pureness”, while AKP is used to stress problematic sides. It seems that even this abbreviation has been thought as a signifier however in the theoretical part of this thesis no distinction between AKP and AK Party has been made and both these abbreviations considered as neutral. However, in the declarations of interviewees, distinction between AKP and AK Party has a meaning.

Party-Refah Partisi) was abolished by a limited military coup<sup>21</sup> in 1997. These years were characterized liberalism, instable coalitions and economic crises (particularly in 1994, 2000 and 2001). During these years the welfare state as well as labor rights and class based politics had a certain decline (Yalman, 2014).

When AKP was established, it used to be a quite composite party that included old politicians (with a certain conservative weight) who have been marginalized in their ex-party, Fazilet Party<sup>22</sup> (FP). Besides, İstanbul Mayor of RP/FP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had been sentenced to 10 months imprisonment due to a poem that he sang in 1997 Siirt meeting. After 4 months imprisonment, he was released and became one of the founders, as well as symbolic leader of AKP. However, he had to wait till 2003 to enter the parliament and became the legal leader of movement just after the removal of ban on doing politics by a special law.

Meanwhile, AKP was founded in 2001, got 34% of votes and came to power alone in November 2002 elections. There were several reasons under this success: First of all, the ex-government, one of the most powerful coalition governments of Turkish history called as Milliyetçi Ana Sol<sup>23</sup> was considered as responsible for the greatest economic crisis in Turkish history. Secondly, the early struggle and marginalization of AKP founders contributed this image at that time. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, receiving 25% of votes in 1994 local elections, has already been an active and popular politician in İstanbul municipality. Also it is understandable that imprisonment of this enthusiastic speaker created the basis for the symbolic leadership of party<sup>24</sup>. Thirdly, the antidemocratic election law provided a great contribution to this result. Due to 10% election threshold, about 45% of national will could not be represented in parliament.

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<sup>21</sup> 28 February military coup, called as post-modern coup, was a military memorandum that forced the Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign. By 27 February incident, the coalition of Welfare Party and Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) ended and a military supported government was established.

<sup>22</sup> After 27 February military memorandum, RP was closed and the leader Necmettin Erbakan banned from politics for 5 years. FP was founded in 1998 under the leadership of Recai Kutan which took over RP's heritage.

<sup>23</sup> 58th government of Turkey was established by a party from social democratic tradition, a nationalist and a liberal one.

<sup>24</sup> One of the clear example of effect of "local" in Turkish political history. The municipalities are open paths for political leaderships, those people learn the tricks of governance and play powerful roles compared to deputies.

Parties with 9% (DYP), 8% (MHP), 7% (GP), 6% (DEHAP), 5% (ANAP) and many others around 1% could not have any chair in the parliament. The election law, a heritage of 1980s military coup, has always been subject to criticism when the parties are in opposition although none of the ruling parties acted to change it. In contrast, it has been seen as a tool to avoid Kurdish representation in parliament and then means to support the argument of stability.

The first AKP government period was a “learning process” for the Islamic tradition since it was the first central governing experience for most of the members of the AK Party. In this period, AKP built a dialogue with different segments of the society, including intellectuals. At that time, AKP launched many infrastructural projects, say motorways for the economic restoration.

AKP was strongly dependent on EU membership target as well as structural reforms in economy. Moreover, by the help of the world economic conjuncture, a recovery process in the Turkish economy started. According to Sönmez (2010), the first ruling period of AKP was identified by the biggest short term capital inflow which made Turkey more integrated to the global economy. Meanwhile, thanks to the expansion of the Far East productions in Turkish market, prices started to shrink and different segments of the society found ways to consume more. In a short while, majority of middle class families had the opportunity to afford electronics such as mobile phones and notebook computers. DSL based broadband internet became widespread which boosted internet based economy and social media culture<sup>25</sup>. Several economic analyses consider the 2002-2007 period as the “golden years” of Turkish economy (Sönmez, 2014). However, the general economic approach of AKP was quite liberal which can be instanced by several examples such as privatizations as well as social security and general health insurance law. Those years also led to the expansion of existing middle classes and emergence of new middle class segments in Turkey. In the 2000s, shopping malls became the “new life centers” of raising middle class.

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<sup>25</sup> There exist a gap between higher and lower socio-economic groups in terms of computer and internet usage statistics, it was lightened by the expansion of broadband internet in 2000s. However, by 2013, the year of Gezi there was still a clear gap: 92% of university graduates were internet users while it was 61% among secondary education graduates and 19% in primary school (TÜİK, 2013).

Nevertheless, the empowerment of government has not been considered positive among all power elites. In 2007, before the presidential elections, The Presidency of General Staff (Turkish Armed Forces) published an announcement on the official web site which was framing an “ideal president”. For most of the writers, this has been understood as a new “post-modern military coup” or “electronic memorandum” against elected government. In the same year, AKP made a bid for the election of Abdullah Gül as the president who was one of the popular figures and founders of the party. However, the presidential elections which was held in the National Assembly at that time was cancelled by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, Republican rallies<sup>26</sup> have been organized by the nationalist forces including opposition, artists and intellectuals. AKP had to launch early elections and in the same year it acceded by 46% support. This election showed that AKP was able to change its “dangerous image” on laicism among society and it provided hope for economic stability. After the success of 2007 elections, Abdullah Gül could be elected as the president. However in 2008, AKP faced a closure case with the claim of “being the center for anti-secular activities”. In the same year the Supreme Court accepted that AKP was the “center against the laicism” but the closure request failed by one vote. All these attempts have been considered as attacks against democracy among the West and many intellectuals. Nevertheless, a counter argument was claiming the “neighborhood pressure” which meant the AKP’s redesign attempts of daily life according to Islamic rules (Yalman, 2014).

The closure case was the final attempt of modern power elites to “stop” AK Party. In the second governing period (2008-2011), AKP gained skills to govern and it gained self-confident to struggle against other power elites. By a series of lawsuits called “Ergenekon” and “Balyoz” power groups have been discharged from the critical positions in army and bureaucracy. Even though all these processes have been operated by law forces, AKP did not hesitate to evince support to the actions.

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<sup>26</sup> A set of meetings organized in 2007 to show dissatisfaction about the possible election of a president from the AK Party tradition. Number of participants varies by different sources from three hundred to 1.5 million people.

In 2011 general elections, AKP received 49% of votes and came to power for the third time. That year also indicated to some shifts in Turkish foreign policy. At that time, the primary discourse was “zero problem with the neighbours” which has been reflected as a peaceful policy. After Mavi Marmara<sup>27</sup> incident in 2010, Turkey adopted a harsh discourse against Israel and replaced mediating position. Same year, “Arab Spring” started in Northern Africa and affected all dictatorial regimes day by day. After the fall of long lasting Libyan leader, AKP started to take active role in foreign policy, particularly in Middle East. When the uprisings started in Syria, AKP tried to affect Syrian Government to take measures for political reformations. However, by the time hope for reformation has been lost and Turkey started to provide open support to Syrian opposition. There are three different approaches for the AK Party’s foreign policy, the strong one implies that it was an interventionist and populist policy (Demirtaş, 2014). Indeed, in contrast to AKP’s expectations, Syrian regime had not been collapsed easily and Turkey became one of the most affected parts of the war. According to formal statistics, about 2 million refugees came to Turkey and this raised many socio economic issues<sup>28</sup>.

During ruling period of 2002-2013, AKP’s economy policies have been settled on purely neo liberal ideas. In this period, Turkey executed ambitious privatization policies and privatization reached to a historical level that was not realized before in the republican history. Flexible employment policies opened new paths for entrepreneurs while increasing labor exploitation. Sub-contracting became the major type of employment that disrupted labor unionization. From 1980s to 2008 the share of employment in agriculture has decreased from %55 to %23 while the services increased from 30% to %55. By 2009, it is assumed that 50% of this employment were in informal sector. In this period, labor unions that have already been under the attack

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<sup>27</sup> Mavi Marmara Incident (or Gaza flotilla raid) was a military operation by Israel against six civilian ships of the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" on 31 May 2010 in international waters in the Mediterranean Sea. Nine Turkish activists in Mavi Marmara Ship were killed in the raid. The flotilla, organized by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İHH), was carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials, with the intention of breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip.

<sup>28</sup> ORSAM, (2015). Suriyeli Mültecilerin Türkiye’ye Ekonomik Etkileri, Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, Rapor No: 196

of neo-liberalism for more than 20 years had a certain decline (Çoşar and Özdemir, 2014).

On the other hand, urban rent has been considered as the primary source of surplus in ruling of AKP. Construction sector has been boosted by the hands of TOKİ, with the great authorization, feeding nearly 50 different sub sectors. As mentioned above, AKP came to power after the biggest economic crises in Turkey and urban rent has been considered as the most effective way to overcome crises. That, in the declaration of 2011 elections, AKP was proud of gifting Turkey the concept of “urban renewal” (Adanalı, 2015). In almost all cities, urban renewal projects started and residences have been constructed for all segments of society. Substantially big scale infrastructural projects titled as “mega projects” such as Marmaray<sup>29</sup>, Ankara-İstanbul High Speed Train, Third Airport in İstanbul and Third Bosphorus Bridge have been launched. All these enterprises started to change the face of Turkey physically and socially. Obviously, AKP could create new bourgeois that got richer due to handling of such projects. Öztürk (2014) frames this process as the raise of Islamic big bourgeois that the richest members of Islamic bourgeois organizations such as MÜSİAD<sup>30</sup> and TUSKON<sup>31</sup> were literally boosted. Besides, pursuant to Akyol (2009) especially in the last decades a clear agreement between Islam and conservatism emerged. He refers to “Islamic Calvinism” while describing a “Protestant Ethic” to explain the desires of Muslim people in the way of becoming more prosperous. Reciprocal relation between AKP and Islamic Calvinism that both of them supported the other in several ways took place. On the other hand, negative effects of neo liberal development had not been received great attention. The reaction against occupational accidents such as in Zonguldak mines or Tuzla shipyards stayed local. AKP provided several provisions to absorb these effects. For instance, Ankara Municipality became a prototypical example of conservative urban governance. Nearly 400.000 families have been supported by municipal aid since 2005. These provisions included a wide scale from fuel support to houses to food (Evren, 2009). The rediscovery of solidarity and culture

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<sup>29</sup> Underground railway system passing under the İstanbul Bosphorus which was opened in 2014.

<sup>30</sup> Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association

<sup>31</sup> Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists



of foundation by the help of faith based organizations as well as government policies became a tool to absorb these negative aspects of the neo liberal transformation. In general speaking, under the condition of global economic crises, AKP's economy policies have been considered as a success story and middle classes represented a pleased perspective with their increasing support to government. Besides, in this period AKP's conservatism has lived a good alliance process with the neo liberalism which can be summarized as religious based freedom-welfare and market oriented liberalism (Yeğenoğlu and Coşar, 2014). Continuous exploitation, ecocide and urban damage have based on authoritarian neoliberalism has become subordinate issues for the large mass of people.

By the third AKP government, a process of "solution" was launched by Erdoğan in 2012 and conflicts between Turkish Army and Kurds entered a detente period. The solution process has been criticized due to negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of PKK. Also, according to some intellectuals this was a populist, superficial and reluctant reflection of AKP's policies since the identity consideration of AKP was on Islamic-conservative basis (Şentürk, 2014). However the process has been welcomed in society due to long awaited peaceful conditions. On the other hand, during this period harsh neo liberal politics of AK Party started to go hand in hand with a symbolic conservative language. As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan argued that was the "period of mastership". It can be interpreted as that AKP considered itself as the single political power in Turkey which is able to do anything it desires. AKP became the "real owner" of the state, it became more powerful and central. Ultimately, AKP was a conservative party with a religious background and third period of its ruling was the time of representation of old conservative desires. At that time the personal image of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan started to be central in government and the Party started to be overidentified with him. In May 2011, by a decree law AKP granted prime minister and his cabinet the power to pass laws without submitting them to parliamentary vote for six months. By this law, the government gained abilities to do several changes including the establishment of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization which has seen as the leaving of environment at the mercy of urban developers (İğsız, 2014). By the way, the electoral system was still working in the account of termination of small

parties since it only supports the parties those can pass the 10% electoral threshold. Thus, these small movements could not find appropriate space to make their visibilities as well as acquiring treasury support. The representatives of Kurdish movement in National Assembly have been in an agreeable process with government due to solution process. Besides, neither CHP nor MHP could not built an effective and efficient opposition<sup>32</sup>. In terms of AK Party, what caused governments' repressive implementation of power was a matter of time and space.

In 2013, alcohol sales have been prohibited between the hours 10.00 AM to 06.00 PM by a law suggested by AKP. Moreover in his various speeches, Erdoğan identified abortions and cesarean as murder. Several times he had mentioned about his demand on having at least three babies. Such sexuality based discourses became one of the central components of power especially considering the control on public space. Even some TV serials have been designed under the reflection of this discourse. In 2010 Erdoğan argued that he does not believe in gender equality and nearly 1 year before Gezi he mentioned that the famous feminist slogan “my body, my decision” was not acceptable for religion (Karaca, 2015)<sup>33</sup>. In the same year “conservative democrat”<sup>34</sup> identity reached an authoritarian conservative point which tries to impose itself rather than seeking consensus. At the same time, some symbolic spaces of the cities became urban renewal areas and government started to give its colors to these zones. Probably the most symbolic urban space affected by this stream was going to be Taksim Square.

### **3.2.3 Taksim before Gezi**

Taksim is located at the top of Galata, an old part of Byzantine, at the end of Beyoğlu. There used to be monasteries in the place of Atatürk Cultural Center (center of Taksim). There were palaces, masjids, fountains, and baths from the Ottoman period.

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<sup>32</sup> One of the clear example of the inefficiency of opposition was the acceptance of Bütünşehir Law. Even though it was known that it reveal mortal consequences in local elections, CHP and MHP could not take a powerful position against the law in 2012. In 2014 local elections, some important cities, particularly Ankara and Antalya were taken by AKP by the direct effect of related law.

<sup>33</sup> In 2013, after Gezi he mentioned about the houses those shared by man and woman and he argued that such a case must be taken into consideration by security forces.

<sup>34</sup> Title that was used by the AKP members to identify their politic line for long years.

After 16th century, such part of the Galata got the name of Beyoğlu and the residence expanded around a street called Cadde-i Kebir<sup>35</sup>. Contrary to popular belief, there were dens Muslim neighborhoods in the area. In 1730, Ottomon Sultan Mahmud the First built a water supply depot in the area and the water was served to the close districts such as Tophane and Kasımpaşa<sup>36</sup>. The end of Cadde-i Kebir was an open recreational area which included coffeehouses. It is clearly seen in the gravures that there were also small forests and moors. Until the big fire in 1870, most of the structures were wooden. Today's Taksim and Beyoğlu was constructed mostly by the Sixth Department<sup>37</sup> of İstanbul Municipality (Göncü, 2013).

In 1806 a barracks (Topçu Kışlası) was constructed for the guild of artillery by Sultan Selim the Third.<sup>38</sup> In duecourse, the barracks was damaged and restored several times. The first important incident in the history of barracks was uprising of Kabakçı Mustafa. After the uprising, the barracks was renewed by Mahmut II, a reformist Sultan. The second significant historical event emerged in 1909 in the last days of repressive reign of Abdulhamid II. The religious oriented-sultan supported uprising was repressed by the western oriented “Hareket Ordusu-Army of Action” and militias coming from Balkans. The barracks, the center of uprising, was damaged and has never been restored again. During the invasion in the First World War, the barracks was used by French soldiers and a stadium was built inside it. In republican time, the structure was used as a stadium and sport center until the end of 1930s<sup>39</sup>. However, since WWI, the structure has been dysfunctional for a decade. The New Republic viewed Taksim Square as a prestige project. The square was expanded, entertainment centers were

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<sup>35</sup> “Big Street”.

<sup>36</sup> The name of Taksim emerged as the meaning of “sharing” or “serving”.

<sup>37</sup> One of the first modern municipality departments in the history of İstanbul as well as Turkey.

<sup>38</sup> Barracks was an interesting example of late Ottoman time with a semi oriental style. However, it was not a representative example of Ottoman Architecture.

<sup>39</sup> The courtyard of barracks was used for several activities such as weight lifting, athleticism, boxing, motorbike racing, hockey, baseball, horseback riding, cycling and even national sport matches.

developed close to the area and it became one of the centers of İstanbul (Schleifer, 2013).

Comparing today, Taksim was a small square in republican time. In 1928, a monument was constructed representing the Turkish War of Liberty (Kurtuluş Savaşı) and Atatürk's Revolution. The monument and desolate barracks represented an incompatible view in that time. Henri Prost<sup>40</sup> who prepared the construction plans after 1936 offered a park for the area. The prospected name was İnönü Gezi Park<sup>41</sup>. Barracks was demolished in 1939 and the first form of the park emerged in 1940 with wide terraces and stairs. A modern municipality club was added in 1940s. The area became a major center of republican activities. In 1950s, the planning was done by Aron Angel<sup>42</sup>, who was the first planning expert in İstanbul and coming from the école of Prost. He worked with Prost and worked on Gezi Park officially named as “No:2 Park”. The planned park was including a very huge area from Taksim to Dolmabahçe including Maçka Park. However the project could survive only a few years. The first “invasion” started with Hilton Hotel. After the ratification of Hotel plan by governor and mayor Angel resigned. In 1967, Beyoğlu Marriage Office was built. In 1968 a touristic hotel was built in the place of municipality club. Several hotels were started to be constructed. While all the powers were reflecting their political consideration in the area, there emerged a demand for a representative mosque from the conservative groups after 1970s. After this time, a long-running cultural and political battle over the fate of the square started (ibid). Same years, the area was an important center for the rising working class as well<sup>43</sup>. On the other hand, due to the growing enormous rent, the economic interests were expanded besides political interests (Göncü, 2013).

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<sup>40</sup> Prost was invited by Atatürk in 1936 and he was charged to prepare a master plan for İstanbul.

<sup>41</sup> İsmet İnönü was the primary comrade and political follower of Atatürk.

<sup>42</sup> Angel was the son of a dentist of Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz. He was the architect of several projects such as Lütfü Kırdar Conventional and Exhibitional Center, Bağdat Street (Kadıköy), master plans of Bursa and Yalova cities in Turkey.

<sup>43</sup> May Day of 1977-1978 in Taksim Square were significant milestones in Turkish political history.

## New Taksim: The Pedestrianization Project

The barracks reemerged as a matter after 2000s. The basic idea was representing the Ottoman image in the area again (ibid). But what was the reason that the government have to bring this architecturally insignificant building back to life?

Öncü (2007) explains the correlation between Neo-Ottoman inclinations and the Neo-liberalization of large metropolises, like Istanbul, that present their “cultural heritage” as a marketable commodity. However, Öncü also notes that it’s not just about marketing, but also about forming a political identity for the city:

Many of the ancient monuments and heritage sites that symbolize the unique attractions of Istanbul in transnational markets refer back to layers of contested memories, dislocations and serial destructions that have been a part of nation-making. The designation of particular sites in the material fabric of the city (and not others) as ‘historical treasures’ has been accompanied by intense political debate, calling forth competing interpretations of different epochs in the city’s history. More broadly, the mobilizations of Istanbul’s imperial legacy to articulate future aspirations for a ‘global’ future have challenged modernist imagination of the Republican past (Ekmekçi, 2013).

In August 2007, İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality announced that it completed the planning of “Taksim Square Pedestrianization and Traffic Circulation Project”. The idea was removing the major vehicular traffic from the center of the square by using tunnels. The project has not been actualized (Çakmak, S. İşigüzel, Ş., Alan, Ü., Güntan, A., Tan, G., 2013).

On 1st of June, 2011 Prime Minister Erdoğan announced Taksim Pedestrianization Project in the “Target: 2023”<sup>44</sup> programme projects of Justice and Development Party, before the general elections in June, 2011. The project included two new things: Removal of all the vehicle traffic to the underground, replacement of the old artillery barracks on the Gezi Park. This project was done as a PR work at that time and no opinions of İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality have been taken (ibid).

On 16 September, 2011, the land use plans of 1/5000 and 1/10000 which permit the adoption of pedestrianization project were accepted at the municipal council. The barracks project was accepted by the votes of AK Party members. On 30 October 2012,

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<sup>44</sup> The promotional projects of AK Party were presented under the “Turkey is Ready Target:2023” programme.

the tunnel constructions of the project were started. On 11 September, 2012, İstanbul 2<sup>nd</sup> Cultural Assets Protection Council denied the barracks project due to the lack of sufficient information and documents for the project. On 24 January 2013, Minister of Culture and Tourism who was against the barracks project was discharged from his duty. On 4 February 2013, Erdoğan announced that they were about to reconstruct the barracks he said “the council had denied the project and we will deny the denial”. He also provided information on the function of barracks: “Some parts can be museum and the center is green area. Some parts are shopping malls as the continuation of İstiklal Avenue while the other parts can be hotel and residence.” On 27 February, 2013 Ministry of Culture Protection High Council denied the decision of İstanbul 2<sup>nd</sup> Cultural Assets Protection Council. The high council did not provide any justification. On 7 May, 2013 İstanbul 6th Administrative Court decided suspension of execution of construction of barracks (ibid).

On 27 May 2013, Monday, some construction vehicles of Kalyon İnşaat<sup>45</sup> started to demolish the walls of Gezi Park just a few minutes before midnight. The destruction was announced by social media at that time. Some people came to the park (ibid).

From 2009 to 2012, Taksim Square has been opened to May Day celebrations and labor class could use the symbolic space for demonstrations. Besides, in 2009 by the desire of government, May Day became an official holiday in the title of Labor and Solidarity day.

### **3.3 Emergence and Progress Chronology of Gezi**

The Gezi Park protests started in the 27<sup>th</sup> of May 2013 evening as a small scale action against the Taksim Pedestrianization (renewal) Project. According to several sources, the participants consisted of almost 50 people at that moment. A municipality construction vehicle was working on the green areas of Gezi Park and the activist

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<sup>45</sup>A private construction company who undertook the Taksim Pedestrianization Project.

group stopped the vehicle, then they claimed that such intervention had no legal basis. After that, the group started to wait as guards against the incoming interventions.<sup>46</sup>

For four days, the actions were considered as an “ordinary security issue” for local authorities as well as political parties and media. The renewal process of Beyoğlu (Pera) and historic Fatih districts in İstanbul was not new. Sulukule<sup>47</sup> Urban Renewal Project, destruction of Emek Cinema, the closing of İnci Patisserie had already received a certain reaction in the recent time<sup>48</sup>. Thus, such a reaction in Gezi Park was not extraordinary. Thus, not only the conservative ones but also the leftist media channels have not paid much attention to the actions in the Park.

The activists built up tents and they started to stay in the park. In the morning of 29<sup>th</sup> of May, the municipal police forces intervened to the park and the tents of activists were put on fire. This led to a breakdown since the visuals of intervention were shared

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<sup>46</sup> SETA, 2013, Birgün, Hürriyet, Yeni Şafak Daily Newspapers

<sup>47</sup> Sulukule is located near the lowest part of the İstanbul historic city walls. During the republican time, the district has been known with its gypsy population and entertainment culture as well as squatter settlement. Some known artists in Turkey rooted from Sulukule. In 2005, an urban renewal project was launched and all settlement of the district reconstructed by TOKİ. The residents have been replaced to city skirts and reactions of some CSOs were ignored during the process. UNESCO ICOMOS confirmed the case as a basic gentrification process which was destructing culture. The Council of State (Danıştay) cancelled the project in 2015, after 9 years of destruction. By 2015, new Sulukule houses are ten times expensive than the old ones which indicates a boom in the rent and they are mostly rented by Syrian refugees.  
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr>, 10.04.2015

<sup>48</sup> Emek Cinema and İnci Patisserie were located in a historic building in İstiklal Street in İstanbul. The building was known as Serkldoryan which was built by the wealthy son of an Armenian banker between 1880 and 1892. It has been the greatest building in the street by its size and elegant decoration. There was a club (Cercle d'Orient) which accepts only “powerful” members as well as an ice skate salon (Salon de Paten) at that time. After the bankruptcy of the builder, the building was purchased by another Armenian broker by 1919. In 1924, a roof was built on the skate saloon and the place started to be used as a cinema with a capacity of 875 people. However, in 1942 due to an ad-hoc tax taken from the minorities called property tax “Varlık Vergisi”, the Armenian man had to sale building to İstanbul Municipality. In 1944 a Patisserie called “İnci” was opened and became one of the famous patisseries in İstanbul. In 1957 the building was handed over to Emekli Sandığı, one of the public social security institution of the time. The cinema saloon was restored by Emekli Sandığı and rented to private businessmen to operate as a cinema. In 1976, the whole building was registered as a cultural property which made renewal almost impossible. Thus, a renewal project based on a 25-year contract with Kamer Construction Company was adopted and cancelled in 1992. Until 2009, the cinema was open and functional but far from competitive power. By the time, the construction company passed into hands of a new owner and Beyoğlu Urban Renewal Project has been adopted in 2006. In 2009, a sudden construction has been launched in the building which led closing of İnci Patisserie (December, 2012) and destruction of Emek Cinema (May, 2013). Both these cases revealed public a limited reaction but not changed the destiny of the building. By 2015, the construction still goes on and the company declares that the building will be used as a passage, the cinema will be replaced in a different floor with same capacity and decoration. İnci Patisserie was moved to another building in the same district.  
Tiyek, S. (2013). Emek Sineması ve Serkldoryan Binasının Öyküsü, Celsius Kütüphanesi Aklımdaki ve Gönlümdekiler <http://celsiuskutuphanesi.blogspot.com.tr/2013/04/emek-sinemas-ve-serkldoryan-binasnn.html>

in social media and a rapid interest started to rise among politics. Sırrı Süreyya Önder, a deputy of BDP<sup>49</sup>, came to the park and he stopped the working of construction vehicles. Again, some deputies from CHP<sup>50</sup>, the main opposing party, came to the park. İstanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş declared that the works were conducted under the pedestrianization project and no decision had been taken for the construction of a shopping mall. However, the mass in the area started to raise day by day. After 29<sup>th</sup> of May, there emerged conflicts between activists and police forces. In the evening of 31<sup>st</sup> of May the police forces pushed away the activist from the square to Tarlabası, Gümüşsuyu and Harbiye by using tear gas and TOMAs<sup>51</sup>. Same day, actions started in İzmir and Ankara. Less than one thousand people gathered in Kuğulu Park, Ankara in the 31<sup>th</sup> May, Friday night and the actions started to transform a general protest movement against the government.

On 1<sup>st</sup> of June, the first symbolic name of Gezi, Ethem Sarısülük, was seriously wounded in Güvenpark in Ankara by a shot into his head from a close distance. He lost his life after 13 days<sup>52</sup> (Göncü, 2013).

After 1<sup>st</sup> of June the actions started to gain political aspects. The Prime Minister declared that AK Party<sup>53</sup> represents 76 million people and the protests are ideological as well as political. However, by the push of President Abdullah Gül, the police forces resigned from the area and the activists started to use the space as they wish. Several barricades were constructed, police cars, TV channels' satellite vehicles and buses were burnt and a particular free space has been created in the center of İstanbul. New forms of action started to emerge such as turning lights on and making voices by using

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<sup>49</sup> Peace and Democracy Party - The major Kurdish political party in Turkey.

<sup>50</sup> Republican People's Party - Mainstream opposing political party coming from a republican-secular-nationalist-leftist origin.

<sup>51</sup> A special vehicle of police forces with the ability of spraying water. "Social Events Intervention Vehicle" - named by police.

<sup>52</sup> Ethem Sarısülük was born in 1987. He had one child and was a worker. His moment of death was recorded. The police officer argued that he shot him due to a stone hit his hand. The officer was released by the court pending a trial because of "justifiable self-defense".

<sup>53</sup> Justice and Development Party, the ruling party in Turkey since 2002.



wok and pots. In some districts of Ankara, such as Dikmen and Batıkent, people launched night walks.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> of June, CHP, the major opposing party called for a meeting in Kadıköy (a district far from the event zone) because of the events. Then it cancelled the meeting and called people to Gezi Park-Taksim Square. Same day, a car drove into the activists in Ataşehir, İstanbul. Second symbolic name of Gezi, Mehmet Ayvalıtaş, was lost his life by the car hit <sup>54</sup>(Göncü, 2013).

On 3<sup>rd</sup> of June, the Prime Minister declared “I do not have to get permission from a few *çapulcu*<sup>55</sup>, we will construct a mosque on Taksim Square as well”. “*Çapulcu*” became a higher identity for the protesters after that time. “Chapulling” entered terminology of social action. It provided a collective identity basis for the participants of protests coming from different segments. Same day, the third symbolic name, Abdullah Cömert, lost his life in Antakya in the supporting meetings<sup>56</sup>(Göncü, 2013).

The Prime Minister was abroad from 3<sup>rd</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> of June. Chief Prime Minister Bülent Arınç gathered with a group from Taksim Solidarity Platform<sup>57</sup> and he received their demands<sup>58</sup> as the first direct dialog between activists and government. A police officer died in Adana by falling down of a bridge while in pursuit of the protestors<sup>59</sup> (Göncü, 2013).

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<sup>54</sup> Mehmet Ayvalıtaş was born in 1992. His cousin Seyit Kartal was also seriously wounded in the same event. The governorship declared that it was a traffic accident. However, Turkish Medical Association declared that the car did not stopped in spite of calls.

<sup>55</sup> Identified as the person who upraises against order. This title is used by the AKP politicians in a pejorative manner to label resistance. Also, “chapuller” means rebel or riot which has become a global concept after Gezi.

<sup>56</sup> Abdullah Cömert was born in 1991. Some broken parts were spotted in his head after the autopsy. His cause of death is unknown.

<sup>57</sup> An umbrella organization constructed to protect Gezi Park and Taksim Square.

<sup>58</sup> Demands of Activists:

-Gezi Park must stay as a park.

-Governors of İstanbul, Hatay and Ankara must be removed.

-Using of tear gas must be prohibited.

-The people under arrest must be freed and a guarantee must be provided.

-Prohibitions on the movements in the major squares such as Taksim and Kızılay must be abolished.

<sup>59</sup> Mustafa Sarı was born in 1986. Prime Minister condoled his wife and Minister of Internal Affairs participated in his funeral ceremony.

On 7<sup>th</sup> of June Prime Minister returned from Northern Africa visit and a big mass of people welcomed him in the airport. He argued that the street actions were the organizations against AK Party, the protesters had no real ecological agenda and the government can only be changed by the elections. In the same meeting, he launched a meeting campaigns titled as “respect to national will” as well.

On 9<sup>th</sup> of June, Prime Minister had two meetings in Adana and Mersin.

On 10<sup>th</sup> of June in the morning, the police forces intervened to Taksim square, the square was cleared, and all the posters on the AKM<sup>60</sup> were removed. However, police did not enter into the Gezi Park.

On 12<sup>th</sup> of June, the Prime Minister gathered with a group from activists. After the 5 hours long meeting, Hüseyin Çelik, the speaker of AK Party, declared that the party respects the jurisdiction of courts and a referendum can be conducted for the Park.

On 14<sup>th</sup> of June, İstanbul Governor Hüseyin Avni Mutlu gathered with 150 activists and he showed that the dialog channels are open.

On 15<sup>th</sup> of June, Prime Minister had a meeting in Sincan, Ankara. In the same day, police forces intervened into the area and Park was cleared.

During 31<sup>st</sup> May to 15<sup>th</sup> June, the protests were in top stage. They gathered different people from different segments. After the clearance of Gezi Park in 15<sup>th</sup> of June the actions started to deflate. After the loose of major symbol of the action, the movements tried to have new forms as small scale districts forums were launched. At the same time, a rapid greenification process was launched in Gezi Park: 100 trees, 5000 roses and 200.000 other flowers were planted by the AK Party municipality.

On 16<sup>th</sup> of June, the Prime Minister had a meeting in Kazlıçeşme, İstanbul. In the same day, Berkin Elvan, a 14-year-old child was shot by his head with a tear gas capsule of

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<sup>60</sup> Ataturk Cultural Center (AKM) is a symbolic building in the center of Taksim which has served as a conventional center for long decades. This building was abandoned and it was about to be demolished for the construction of an opera building in Baroque architecture in recent years.

police<sup>61</sup>. On 22<sup>nd</sup> of June, he had a meeting in Samsun and on 23<sup>rd</sup> of June, in Erzurum. In these meetings he used references to the success of the government and the “unfair operations” in the past. He built the messages on showing that AK Party was still popular among the large mass of people and cannot be destroyed as easy as the opposition thinks.

According to Ministry of Interior data of 23<sup>rd</sup> of June, 2.5 million people participated in the meetings. 8 people died in the events including 1 policeman. 4900 people were arrested. About 4000 people and 600 police were injured. 140 million TL was lost (SETA, 2013). The events emerged in 77 provinces excluding 4 of them<sup>62</sup>. In the first 17 days of Gezi, 8 dogs, 63 cats, 1028 birds died due to tear gas<sup>63</sup>.

On 8<sup>th</sup> of July, Taksim Gezi Park was reopened. Same day, 35 members of Taksim Solidarity Platform and some members of Çarşı<sup>64</sup> were arrested. All of them were realized after 3 days. Some people were arrested in Eskişehir and İzmir.

On 10<sup>th</sup> of July, Ali İsmail Kormaz, a 19-year-old university student was died in Eskişehir after he was beaten shopkeepers during his support to Gezi.

On the other hand, some public officers were investigated. The municipal police who burned the tents were laid off from the job. One police officer were arrested for the killing of Ethem Sarısülük in Ankara but he was realized by the court on account of

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<sup>61</sup> Berkin Elvan has stayed in the hospital for 269 days and on 16 March 2015 he died. Continues disputes have been done on his participation in Gezi. While his family claimed that he was there to buy bread Erdoğan claimed that he was a member of terrorist organizations.  
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28634518.asp>

<sup>62</sup> According to Ministry of Interior, in Şırnak, Bingöl, Bitlis and Muş no Gezi protests have been done. Inofficial sources claims that only one city have not participated in Gezi which was Bayburt.

<sup>63</sup> Hayvan Hakları İnisyatifi (2013) In Yalçınkaya, C. (2014). *Dirençizgiroman, Gezi Direnişinden Çizgiler*, Esen Kitap, İstanbul

<sup>64</sup> A popular supporter group of Beşiktaş, one of the major football teams in Turkey, who is known with their protest standing in social issues. Çarşı was founded in 1982 by a few people who were about 16-18 years old without a legal entity. In the post military coup era in Turkey, the stadiums were one of the few spaces representation in the stagnant society. The name of Çarşı, comes from a bazaar in Beşiktaş which is quite identified by the district. It is the most known supporter group of Turkey which represents an anarchic standing in the socio political events such as assassinations, anti-nuclear campaign, Philistine issue as well as LGBT identity (Dikici, 2009). Çarşı who have supported leftist actions such as May Day, and anti-government actions such as republican meetings became a motor component of Gezi in a short while.

self-defense. 4 policemen were seized because of the killing of Ali İsmail Korkmaz in Eskişehir (SETA, 2013).

According to information reports to the government, the activities would reemerge in September and October. However, no strong movement reemerged. The political slogans were prohibited in sport matches. The ban was flouted in some matches but the actions were not as strong as before. The biggest event was the protests against the construction of motorway in METU in September and Ahmet Atakan died in the protests in Hatay while supporting the METU movement.

### **3.4 Reflections in Ankara**

In Ankara the action started on 31<sup>st</sup> of May after the strong police intervention in Taksim. Some tents have been constructed in Kuğulu Park but all of them were removed except a symbolic one. The first evening was like a festival with 500-1000 people in Kuğulu Park and close areas. The crowd was heterogeneous. There were a few stands of small political groups and book sellers. After the sunset, some walks started in Kennedy, Bestekar and Tunus. By the decrease in the number of the people, police intervention were about to start and there were close conflicts with the police forces.

Kızılay Square-Güvenpark was the other major center of actions in Ankara. Kızılay, which is actually a cross road rather than a square, was occupied by the activists. On 1 June Saturday, about 3000 people gathered in city center Kızılay/Güvenpark in midday. Kızılay had not been a permitted legal place for any public meetings for long years thus people's gathering in Kızılay was an extraordinary issue for Ankara. Police intervened people strongly and dispersed mass by tear gas and pressured water. The struggles continued in different places of Kızılay: In front of YKM, Yüksel Caddesi, Ziya Gökalp Caddesi and GMK Boulevard. 15 people were taken into custody and police helicopters were used to monitor this first wave of action. A CHP deputy, many civilians and shopkeepers were affected by tear gas and reacted against police. On 1st of June, OSTİM worker Ethem Sarısülük was shot by his head and he died after 12 days. After the spread of news of events in Kızılay, a greater mass stream started to Kızılay. About 16.00 o'clock, people started to gather again and police took back some

of the barriers from the center and built a new line in front of Prime Ministry.<sup>65</sup> Yüksel and Ziya Gökalp barriers were passed by the people. From three different canals, protestors entered Kızılay. Groups were composed of major opposing party (CHP), socialist-communists (TKP, EMEP, SDP), civil society organizations such as Halkevleri, as well as nationalists parties (MHP) and groups<sup>66</sup>. Medical Chamber of Ankara declared that 414 people were injured (including brain traumas, cerebral hemorrhages, skull cracks, tear gas capsule burns, eye loss, basin breaks and smashes) while 15 of them were seriously wounded and one had cerebral death in the events only in 1<sup>st</sup> of June<sup>67</sup>. Same press release refers 30 injured policemen who have been taken to Medicana Hospital same day.

On 2 June Sunday, people again gathered in Kızılay/Güvenpark about 14.00 o'clock. Groups was carrying CHP, ÖDP, TKP, as well as Syrian and Cuban flags. These groups expanded and closed Kızılay traffic in Atatürk Boulevard. Police started to hold position in front of Prime Ministry-Ministries-Akay-National Assembly. Several groups were building barricades face to face to this police line. In the front line, young protestors were in close contact with police, throwing stones and throwing back gas capsules, trying to go further. These lines were under strong gas attack and a small fire started in Bakanlıklar Tüpegeidi. In the central cross of Kızılay, there were people rather than outrageous activists who were shouting slogans, carrying banners and flags, hitting to the bars to produce sound. This mass was composed of ordinary people coming from different ages and groups, they were calm and generally peaceful. Sometimes, police was throwing gas capsules from Prime Ministry side as well as via helicopters to this center. Besides, sometimes several people were going to front lines to support and returning to have breathe. According to news, there were also Ülkücü<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Radikal, 1 June 2013

<sup>66</sup> According to some participants of 1 June protests in Kızılay nationalist group of "Gökbörü" was in Kızılay.

<sup>67</sup> A detailed information injuries & hospitals was included in the press release of Medical Chamber of Ankara, 2 June 2013 <http://ato.org.tr/bilgi/basin-aciklamalari/detay/296>

<sup>68</sup> Ülkücü refers to members of the youth organization of Nationalist Action Party which is the mainstream Nationalist-Turkist Party in Turkey.

groups with blue Bozkurt<sup>69</sup> and Turkmen flags, shouting “eye to eye, revenge” slogans in these people who were admired by people in center. Due to the lack of police, further support has been obtained by near cities and 30.000 police concentrated in the center of Ankara by the evening. A strong police intervention started about sunset through the all direction of city center by pressured water and tear gas. Many people have hidden in closed areas such as AVMs and police used tear gas in these places.<sup>70</sup> Mülkiyeliler Birliği (also used as an infirmary), Kızılay AVM (also used as an infirmary), Leman Cafe and Nazım Kültürevi were raided by riot police. About 500 people including protestors, volunteer doctors, injured and ordinary people were taken into custody and delivered to EGM (General Directorate of Security) with the municipal buses. There were several injuries including brain traumas, eye loses and skull damages<sup>71</sup>. Same day, during the meetings in Kızılay a car suddenly entered the square, two women were injured.

On 3 June, actions continued in Ankara. People started to gather in Kızılay by using social media facilities. In the begging the group was about 200 people mostly 16-17 years old students. After strong police intervention, new streams started to Kızılay and mass got greater in few hours. CHP deputy Emine Ülker Tarhan contacted with police and officers built the red lines for the Prime Ministry. The protestors closed several streets and burnt municipal buses. Akreps<sup>72</sup> were used for throwing tear gas and intervention. Many people were injured by gas capsules, a Çankaya Municipality worker lost his eye. 50 *Ülkücü* came and had a small meeting in Kızılay to support police shouting “hands touching police must be broken!”. A group started to walk from METU to AK Party center near Çukurambar. Struggles emerged in Çukurambar with

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<sup>69</sup> Bozkurt means “Greywolf” it is a widely used symbol of Turkist-nationalist tradition.

<sup>70</sup> Radikal, 2 June 2013

<sup>71</sup> Hürriyet, 3 June 2013

<sup>72</sup> A light armored vehicle for the police intervention.

police and some protestors attacked Star TV and Kanal 24<sup>73</sup> building in Balgat. By the night, 620 people had already been under custody (including the days before).<sup>74</sup>

On 4 June, Confederation of Public Workers' Unions (KESK) called for a general strike. Protestors as well as policemen sat in Güvenpark together and even had chats. By the evening the mass expanded and they started to throw stones and bottles to the police. Police intervened with tear gas and pressured water. 65 more people were taken into custody<sup>75</sup>. In other districts of Ankara, actions continued and police has taken under custodies.

On 5 June, other labor unions and trade associations such as Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK), Turkish Medical Association (TTB), Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) joined KESK's call for general strike. These organizations were representing about 850.000 people in Turkey and groups coming from these occupational organizations gathered in Kızılay. According to Hürriyet there were about 50.000 people in Kızılay center which was the biggest event in Kızılay<sup>76</sup>. Call of general strike was also supported by TÜM-BEL-SEN which is one of the labor unions in Ankara Municipality. Ankara Mayor Melih Gökçek declared that all participants of this action would be fired of their public jobs<sup>77</sup>. Then, he released a notice which provided amnesty to the people declared regrets until the end of that night. The actions were peaceful during the day but by the evening close conflicts started between the protestors and police. KESK and DİSK officers wanted to stay until the morning but police intervened by claiming incoming information on actions of TGB and Halkevleri. 9 people were taken into custody<sup>78</sup>. Same day, a group

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<sup>73</sup> TV channels have been targeted since they have been considered as the supporters of the government.

<sup>74</sup> Vatan, 4 June 2013 <http://www.gazetevatan.com/ankara-nin-gazina-bak--543403-gundem/>

<sup>75</sup> Hürriyet, 5 June 2013

<sup>76</sup> Hürriyet, 6 June 2013 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/23437835.asp>

<sup>77</sup> Akşam, 5 June 2013 <http://www.aksam.com.tr:80/guncel/ankara-gezi-parki-eylemlerinde-son-durum/haber-212970>

<sup>78</sup> Akşam, 5 June 2013 <http://www.aksam.com.tr:80/guncel/ankara-gezi-parki-eylemlerinde-son-durum/haber-212970>

was gathered in Kuğulu/Tunalı by building barricades. Police intervened strongly with tear gas and pressured water.

On 6 June, the events including struggles and police interventions continued locally. By 7 June, people who are attacking to protestors emerged in different cities including Ankara. On 8 June, Ankara Mayor Melih Gökçek declared that they had prepared a glorious welcome for Prime Minister Erdoğan and he launched a campaign via twitter. The actions continued in Kuğulu/Tunalı, Kennedy, Kızılay and several districts. On 9 June a big meeting was organized in İstanbul with a great participation. By 11 June morning riot police entered Taksim Square and the area was cleaned from groups while Gezi Park has been stayed occupied. Incoming days, Prime Minister Erdoğan had several meetings with representatives of Gezi groups and he declared that “message was received, don’t go further” with a soft tone. On 14 June, Taksim Solidarity as the main component of resistance decided clear area and stay with one symbolic tent and cleared the flags other than Taksim Solidarity until 16.00 o’clock, 15 June. On 15 June Erdoğan had meeting in Sincan Ankara titled as “respect to national will” and he said “Taksim square must be cleared otherwise our police knows how to do it”<sup>79</sup>. Same day at 17.30 police started to call for clearance in Gezi Park and by 20.50 intervened to Park. A small group was in conflict with police using stones, molotov cocktails and firecrackers. Police easily controlled Park and about 1000 workers cleaned it until the morning<sup>80</sup>.

By the loss of Park on June 15, the actions spread to districts in different places of İstanbul and Ankara. On 16 June, the funeral of Ethem Sarısülük, who died in Güvenpark, 1 June, wanted to be taken to Kızılay/Güvenpark from Batıkent Cemevi. The traffic was closed by police and conflicts started in different districts. Nearly 15.000 people gathered in Kızılay about midday, police intervened strongly by tear gas and pressured water. Conflicts continued in Kızılay, Demirtepe, GMK, Ziya Gökalp, Selanik, Mithatpaşa, Kurtuluş. By the evening a greater mass gathered in

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<sup>79</sup> Radikal, 15 June 2013

<sup>80</sup> Milliyet, 16 June 2013



Kızılay again and police strongly intervened. Several protests emerged in Dikmen, Ayrancı, Balgat Yüzüncüyıl, Bahçelievler, Batıkent, Keçiören, Mamak, Esat and Gaziosmanpaşa<sup>81</sup>, many people were injured and taken into custody. On 20 June, police intervened to people in Kuğulupark. On 22 June police had a strong intervention in Kuğulu and Dikmen<sup>82</sup>. In Dikmen about 01.30 people built barricades and police had a strong intervention by squeezing water to houses and even to a mosque. Especially Dikmen intervention revealed a strong reaction from residents<sup>83</sup>. On 23 June, until the morning struggles and police interventions continued in various districts of Ankara. On 24 June, by the distribution of news on release of police who shot Ethem Sarısülük several protests have been done. Police did not intervene to actions in Dikmen<sup>84</sup>. The mass of people were supporting to meetings generally in weekends and police forces were entering the space when they felt there exist a controllable crowd. Thus, the police interventions were so sudden in Ankara. When the square was under the control of police the small groups were trying to find ways to infiltrate the area and sometimes they were broadcasting to internet via mobile phones and online streaming systems. News from Ankara has been steadily diminished by the ends of June. On 10 September, Ahmet Atakan was shot and died in Antakya while he was protesting the events in Middle East Technical University, Ankara<sup>85</sup>.

Government reacted as a typical strong central state but it tried to find new ways in the process. Such processes could not go beyond the new forms of repression and limitations: The harsh discourse followed by conspiracy theories. The tear gas stock for two years have been depleted. Police forces and vehicles have been supported by

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<sup>81</sup> <http://www.gazetecileronline.com/newsdetails/10327-/GazetecilerOnline/ankara39da-halk-sokaklara-dokuldu-kizilay39da-sert>

<sup>82</sup> <http://www.ankarahaber.com/haber/Ankara-Dikmen-de-Gezi-Park%C4%B1-mudahalesi-son-dakika/138497>

<sup>83</sup> USTREAM became a popular internet service which enabled amateur live stream broadcasting via mobile phones with a parallel online chat function.

<sup>84</sup> <http://www.cnnturk.com>

<sup>85</sup> The September 2013 events in METU emerged due to the construction of a motorway project passing through Middle East Technical University campus. Even though, METU has not been against the construction, a night rush and sudden cutting of trees created a reaction among some students.  
<http://www.metu.edu.tr/tr/orta-dogu-teknik-universitesi-rektorlugunun-anadolu-bulvarinin-devami-olan-yol-hakkinda-aciklamasi>

the reinforcements from long distance cities like Diyarbakır. AK Party municipalities like İstanbul and Ankara provided logistic support voluntarily to the police. In some places MOBESE (security) cams have been turned off by police. Some doctors, advocates and even Turkish flag sellers have been taken into custody. A censorship and auto censorship trend have been started, NTV Tarih which has been a history magazine was closed by its owner due to it's final number on Gezi. Actually, the condition of media was not new. Making news on the resistance of people in urban renewal issues have been banned several times. In one particular case about urban renewal in Ayazma district people raid to Doğan News Agency (DHA). An authorized person openly declared that there has been a censorship for the broadcasting against urban renewal (Uşaklıgil, 2014). Thus, some of the media channels openly supported government while some of them learnt a lesson from previous cases. For instance, seven newspapers<sup>86</sup> broadcasted news via totally same title: "We die for your democratic demands." Some people were taken into custody due to their sharing on social media. After the events, AK Party launched some suits against Gezi participants. A research has been conducted on Gezi and a social media force has been built, by 2014. Moreover using masks cloaking the personal identity has been banned.

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<sup>86</sup> Habertürk, Yeni Şafak, Star, Sabah, Türkiye, Zaman and Bugün. Zaman and Bugün changed their discourse by the end of 2013 after a struggle between power elites of their owners and the government.




Figure 3: Chronology of Ankara Events (presented in green)  
Created by author based on data taken from chronologies and newspaper screening<sup>87</sup>

### 3.5 A Framing for the Chronology of Gezi

Framing was used by Bateson as a physiological concept. The concept has also been elaborated by the sociologist Erving Goffman in Frame Analysis. According to Goffman, the frames are basic structures which determine our consideration of reality. As the subjective identifications, these structures are not realized cognitively but they are adopted unconsciously<sup>87</sup>. Entman dealt with the concept in media studies. On the other hand, framing was also discussed in the political communication theories. According to Bateson, framing means direction of the perception of reality by taking in account some specific messages while eliminating the others (Bateson, 1972; Entman, 1993). Thus, especially in media studies the issue is completely related with the source of knowledge or medium. In sociology, physiology and politics framing has been elaborated under the issues of perception, opinion building, and conviction. In communication, the framing has two dimensions: content and effect. Media frames refer to content and individual frames refer to effect. The individual frames are the representations of public discourse in individual mind. This representation is determined by the cultural and mental structures of a person. Media frames are representation manners which give a message to make audience consider the issue in a specific way. The concepts, symbols, styles are the parts of the content. In the context of social movements, collective action frames not only focus and punctuate on “reality” they also serve as modes of attribution and articulation (Hunt et al., 2004)

The representation and perception of social movements constitute a certain weight in the framing analysis.

Due to the frames, the knowledge can have a shape in the mind. The frames are constructed by the keywords, images-photos, metaphors, symbols, titles etc. Some thoughts become a reference point while the others become invisible. In some cases, the termination of certain ideas is not a major purpose but popularization of news reveals such results. According to Entman some signifiers are more significant in comparison with the others and they are about selectiveness. The difference between identification of an issue with a variable of “die” or “not saving lives” reveals different

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<sup>87</sup> Thomas König, [www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/publications/frameanalysis/index.html](http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/publications/frameanalysis/index.html)

results. Thus, framing is not about the distortion of reality but about its representation. Gamson used Entman's ideas when interpreting framing activities in the US in the cold war era: The news have been prepared within certain frames to build a consideration supporting the government policies. In those frames, the communist riots were represented as the causes of destabilization and several problems. Such frames included the images and symbols those refer to communists' atheism as an ethical failure and they represented the supporting of government policies as the reasonable way (Gamson, 1992). The adoption of frames is completely related with the culture. Actually, the culture is already an existing frame. Another study on the US media handles the framing issue in the representation of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study claims that the news focused on the question of "who started conflict" and made the real reason invisible (Sexton, 2001). The traces of framing can be found by comparison of news about same issues. Especially, propaganda publications during conflicts and/or wars provide clear frame samples. According to Nelson the framing is built by recalling old information instead of creating a new one (Nelson et al., 1997).

Framing argues that all the factors affecting the participation have passed by an interpretation process. Thus, the presentation and imagination of the concepts are important. Press, TVs, social media and friend groups can easily create new representations of the same concepts. Frames can persuade people to consider the existence of a problem or not.

Social constructivism states that framing activities and social processes were also important in NSMs. This study includes a specific part which is about a specific framing analysis on three different newspapers. This part not only summarizes the events from three distinct perspectives but also shows how the certain frames can be effective on the images of people. The specific analysis of the news had been done in the other part of this thesis. The questions on indirect perceptions showed that the people have strongly adopted the frames used by liberal as well as leftist media.

Like Habermas has been argued the new social movements were in defensive character and they try to keep the lifeworld from against colonizing intrusion of system. Besides, the actions were less about material production but more about cultural production,

social integration and socialization. Considering the participants, it can be argued that their primary concern was cultural rather than material. Most of them focused on the issues about intervention to daily life. Most people have concern about material issues such as urban rent but the dominant perspective is on culture. Ecology and peace oriented demands were included which were important characteristics for Habermas in NSMs. Most people accept that the movement started as an ecologic action.

According to Marcuse and Gramsci, the language and the symbols have been used as the means of domination, repression and lying for long time. For the construction of alternative, another language is needed which is against conformism. The Negro language, people language or slangs can be examples of this alternative language. These are the languages of the “oppressed”. Marcuse argues that the language is a means of political struggles and as a consequence, the ruling classes try to construct and impose their own languages (Çobanoğlu, 2014). The ruling party in Turkey has constructed this language before Gezi but it has been crystalized in the speeches of Prime Minister during the actions. For instance, democracy was not only a concept expressed by the protestors but also it was a widely used word of Tayyip Erdoğan. However, the meaning was directly referring to general elections in the discourse of power (ibid).

As we seen in the framing analysis, Gezi event has been included in media often. Not only in left but also in conservative and main stream media have showed the events in their platforms. However, the dispute on media is about the density and the context of the news. On the other hand, main stream media channels have been organized as holdings in Turkey. While we can see Gezi news in newspapers and internet websites, no special attention have been paid in TV channels which is the most popular way of reaching to people. Prime time news have mentioned about Gezi but none of the main stream TV channels had a live broadcast from İstanbul and Ankara while the major places were under occupation. The media who broadcast an airport press release of Prime Minister live have not condescended the events in the same way. In contrast, they were quite frivolous in the example of CNN Turk. In Gezi the role of broadcasting have performed by small channels like Ulusal and Halk TV. CNN International who had live broadcasted from Taksim criticized by government and as a counter reaction,

AA<sup>88</sup> was charged to broadcast social events-protests in the places like the US. It should be accepted that whether it is CNN International or CNN Turk the capitalist media can only be relatively free. Aydın Doğan, who is the most powerful media boss in Turkey, has enterprises in nearly one hundred sectors. Due to his position, it should be unrealistic to expect him to do something irritating for government.

The effect of Gezi process as well as the counter effect of social media became quite clear at the time of movement. By 29 May 2013 there were 1.8 million active twitter members in Turkey. Within 10 days it boosted and reached 10 million by 10 June. By 29 May, 7 million Twitter messages have been shared related to Gezi. This number reached to 15 million by 30 May, after the violent police intervention and it reached to 18 million by 1 June. Until 20 June, Gezi related twitter messages reached to 23.9 million and 16.3 million were coming from Turkey. Also, it must be argued that facebook is a more widespread social network in Turkey. There are nearly 30 million facebook users in Turkey which consist 38.5% of Turkey population. With this number, Turkey is the 4th largest member force of the facebook which is quite near the internet accession ratios (44.4% by 2013). It can be argued that facebook has been used actively during the actions. However, there is no formal statistics reflecting the numbers on facebook. Especially the concerns on the freedom of media affected people to look for alternative communication tools such as twitter and facebook. Moreover, internet blogs, web sites, e-mail groups as well as video and transmission softwares became other components of this alternative channel (Yüksek, 2015). One other important thing is that in Turkey, the twitter statistics in Turkey represents a more hierarchical form compared to European samples. Which means “affective” people such as celebrities and journalists have a powerful effect on the dissemination of the messages in Turkey. Besides, same analysis shows that most of the tweets were coming from coastal areas of Turkey. Irak (2015) argues that despite the reality of facebook, the dissemination of activity via twitter can be explained by quality rather than quantity that is to say, high social capital of the members.

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<sup>88</sup>Turkish official news agency.

One purpose of the study is analyzing the representation of Gezi movement in Turkish media. For this purpose, three daily newspapers had been chosen. Known as a long standing-liberal newspaper of a big entrepreneur group, Hürriyet is the part of mainstream media in Turkey with a 350.000 daily circulation. Birgün is gathering a leftist approach with about 25.000 daily circulation while Yeni Şafak is considered as a conservative one with 115.000 daily circulation<sup>89</sup>. Briefly, these three newspapers have different ideological perspectives which is clearly seen during the Gezi movements. The framing study period had been limited by 1 month including the day before the actions, two active weeks of Gezi occupation and the time the actions lost their effect.


Only the direct news have been included in the study. The essays of columnists have been excluded. Comparison between the frequencies of newspapers cannot reveal a valuable result since Hürriyet can always have a big frequency due to its resources. However, a comparison in the frequency trends in newspapers may provide an opinion.

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<sup>89</sup> <http://www.gazeteciler.com/gazete-tirajlari.html>



**Table 2: Frequency Trends in Newspapers (Numbers indicate the count of news)**



None of the newspapers could see the actions at the beginning seriously. Birgün had 2 news on Emek Sineması on 27th of May.

The elasticity rate of Hürriyet was high. When the actions raised, the news on Hürriyet boomed. When the movement lost power, the number of news lowered rapidly. In contrast, after the power loses in the movement, Birgün kept the interest on actions. After 15 and 24th of June, the gap between Yeni Şafak-Hürriyet and Birgün raised.

### **3.5.1 In favor of / against / neutral?**

In this part, the news have been categorized under the titles of “in favor of Gezi”, “against Gezi” and “neutral”. It is not always easy to build a clear distinction between these categories thus only directly massive news have been categorized as “in the favor” or “against”.


In favor of Gezi: Includes the news which directly affirms Gezi, open calls for actions, strong critics against government-state officers and police, as well as any positive arguments by people taken without quotations.

Against Gezi: Includes the news directly against Gezi, praises of government/police actions as well as negative arguments by people taken without quotations.


Neutral: Includes direct news free from opinions such as description of actions as well as arguments by people in quotations.

Besides, some news with exclamation marks made news positive or negative according to meaning.

**Table 3: Position of News 1 (Numbers indicate the count of news)**



**Table 4: Position of News 2 (Ratios indicate the count of news)**



Birgün had only 1 news against Gezi in the beginning. Yeni Şafak had 3 news in the favor of Gezi however all these news were from the first days of Gezi, after the crystallization of the sides, Yeni Şafak has never written in the favor of Gezi. According to the numbers, all three newspapers have done mostly the neutral news. However in Yeni Şafak and Birgün positive-negative news were in front pages and neutral news were under their shadows.

**Table 5: Examples of in favor of/against/neutral news<sup>90</sup>**

	In favor of Gezi	Neutral	Against Gezi
Birgün	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Taksim under the occupation of fascism</li> <li>• Results of police terror</li> <li>• Police attacks in Kızılay</li> <li>• Sights from resistance against dictator</li> <li>• Both fascism and resistance exist</li> <li>• Erdoğan incites the violence</li> <li>• Police terror takes life</li> <li>• Powerful fell down the donkey</li> <li>• JDP rehearsed massacre</li> <li>• The scary love of İstanbul governor</li> <li>• Gezi threat against university</li> <li>• Dictator attacks, people resist</li> <li>• Fascist who holds the flag</li> <li>• In Taksim at 15.00!</li> <li>• Erdoğan's police on duty!</li> <li>• Dangerous slogans!</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “We are at Taksim until our demands are met”</li> <li>• Solidarity message from European youth</li> <li>• People of Gezi are in Gezi Park</li> <li>• Erdoğan provide a period for Gezi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arınç critical with the attack</li> </ul>
Hürriyet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incredible actions from THY air hostesses.</li> <li>• Brother, do not press the Gezi trees</li> <li>• TOMA pressed the person like this</li> <li>• Resistance guide for uprising</li> <li>• The best moment of action</li> <li>• Tarkan is in resistance</li> <li>• Science of protection against tear gas</li> <li>• Celebs supports the Gezi movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reference to Gezi Park in Word Game TV Show</li> <li>• The declarations from Taksim Platform</li> <li>• Referendum for the Park</li> <li>• Events in front of Prime Minister's office</li> <li>• Hearth of Sarısülük stopped</li> <li>• Active moments in Cumhuriyet Square</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This is the minute of firing against police</li> <li>• Does Çarşı resign from the actions?</li> <li>• Who will pay for the damages in Gezi?</li> <li>• The claim of provocation in Gezi</li> </ul>

<sup>90</sup> The original versions and dates of the screening news can be found in the Appendix 28.

**Table 5 (continued)**

Yeni Şafak	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tear gas against mission in Gezi Park</li> <li>• The activists distributed bagels for miraj.</li> <li>• From governor to Gezi: “I would love to be with you”</li> <li>• Reaction against police by the Taksim shopkeepers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gezi declaration from President Gül</li> <li>• Our democracy is in a test</li> <li>• Activists passed the bridge by walking</li> <li>• Taksim was opened for pedestrian traffic</li> <li>• Kılıçdaroğlu: Gezi Park is the park of freedom now</li> <li>• Erdoğan: Police has written a destiny</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Death provocation from the celebrities</li> <li>• They realized they are the artists</li> <li>• The greatest lie</li> <li>• They drank beer in the mosque</li> <li>• Activist are targeting foreign investors</li> <li>• Sound bomb provocation in Gezi</li> <li>• Social media is about to lie</li> <li>• Harsh message to interest lobby</li> <li>• People in ambush</li> <li>• “Organized works” in media agencies</li> <li>• Armed provocateur in Sultangazi</li> <li>• TARGET:A Turkey without Erdoğan</li> <li>• Alcohol fight in Gezi</li> <li>• Vandals in capital</li> <li>• The police is in pursuit of this woman</li> <li>• Provocateurs punched press</li> <li>• Code name: İstanbul uprising</li> <li>• So called doctors are “thief”</li> <li>• “Kulturkampf” in Gezi</li> </ul>
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**Table 6: Monthly Word Frequency Count<sup>91</sup>**

27.05.2013-27.06.2014 Monthly Word Frequency Count - News Titles					
Birgün		Hürriyet		Yeni Şafak	
Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency
resistance	42	gezi	91	gezi	44
gezi	41	park	48	park	24
police	40	Erdoğan	21	Erdoğan	24
park	32	Taksim	15	Taksim	17
on-going	27	police	15	explanation	9
people	24	explanation	14	police	9
Erdoğan	20	intervention	13	activists	8
		Prime			
Taksim	20	Minister	12	twitter	7
				standing	
Ethem	20	action	11	man	5
				CHP	
AKP	16	Ankara	11	supporter	5
custody	16	celebrities	7	harsh	4
against	12	gas	7	trees	4
gas	16	support	7	gas	4
Turkey	10	tear	7	Turkey	4
				Prime	
tear	10	protest	6	Minister	4
governor	10	standing man	5	target	3
reaction	10	injured	4	German	3
continuation	9	governor	4	reaction	3
				interest	
crime	8	pressured	4	lobby	3
attacked	8	free	4	government	3
world	8	partisan	4	tear	3
attack	8	ethem	4	stranger	3
free	8	USA	4	uprising	3
on resist	8	end	3	tree	3
message	8	important	3	lie	3
Kuğulu	6	Mutlu	3	white	3
place	6	meeting	3	support	3
killer	6	person	3	barracks	3
destroying	6	against	3	artillery	3
				we don't	
operation	6	Günay	3	want	3
again	6	custody	3	said	3
Prime					
Minister	6	stopped	3		
chapuller	6	beating	3		
before	6	Çarşı	3		
from now on	6	call	3		
resisting	6	called	3		
		CHP			
cancel	6	supporter	3		
social	6				
uprising	6				
action	6				
media	6				
end	6				

**Table 7: Content Analysis of the News (Numbers indicate the count of news)**

29 May 2013 - Content Analysis					
Birgün		Hürriyet		Yeni Şafak	
Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency
gezi	29	gezi	56	Erdoğan	6
park	15	park	24	gezi	4
Önder	12	Taksim	21	tree	2
Taksim	10	police	11	Taksim	2
guard	7	Kışanak	10	park	2
tree	7	İstanbul	10	tree	1
İstanbul	6	chp	9	barracks	1
against	6				

5 June 2013 - Content Analysis					
Birgün		Hürriyet		Yeni Şafak	
Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency
police	57	gezi	27	gezi	21
gezi	30	park	16	Taksim	16
park	20	Taksim	13	park	12
gas	17	Ankara	12	İzmir	9
Taksim	15	Kızılay	10	June	9
haziran	8	Davutoğlu	9	marginal	9
		municipality	9	police	9
		support	9	pastry ring	8
		foreign affairs	9	events	7
				democratic	6

<sup>91</sup> Common words and grammatical references (example: conjunctions) have been excluded, some words have been merged. Word counter tool:  
<http://www.textfixer.com/tools/online-word-counter.php>

12 June 2013 - Content Analysis					
Birgün		Hürriyet		Yeni Şafak	
Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency
police	27	gezi	52	Erdoğan	31
gezi	18	said	41	gezi	26
Taksim	15	Prime Minister	28	Prime Minister	18
park	10	park	25	park	13
İstanbul	9	referandum	14	Turkey	13
morning	8	police	13	said	13
against	8	Ankara	12	Gül	12
continuation	8	came	12	minister	12
said <sup>92</sup>	8	foreign affairs	11	custody	12
place	7	we	11	party	11
				police	11
				Bağış	11

19 June 2013 - Content Analysis					
Birgün		Hürriyet		Yeni Şafak	
Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency
gezi	29	standing man	15	Turkey	19
police	27	gezi	7	standing man	16
custody	17	park	5	gezi	16
university	17	action	5	Turk	13
continuation	15	suspicious	4	Turkey	12
İstanbul	14			İstanbul	12
				Prime Minister	11
				Erdoğan	10
				tweet	10
				USA	10
				interest lobby	10

<sup>92</sup> “Said” indicates that the gazette preferred to use a statement from the speech of person such as prime minister.



26 June 2013 - Content Analysis					
Birgün		Hürriyet		Yeni Şafak	
Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency	Primary Keywords	Frequency
police	44	said	14	people	7
gezi	28	Turk	7	Turk	7
custody	15	USA	8	Kırca	5
Prime Minister	13	protest	5	Menderes	4
		government	5	condition	3
		foreign	4	Erdoğan	3
		gezi	4		

This framing study will be analysed briefly under the theoretical analysis chapter.

### 3.6 Field Study

#### 3.6.1 Method and Questionnaire

This qualitative research has been conducted with 40 people in Ankara metropolitan area who have been between 15-75 years old and participated in the first wave of Gezi actions between May and June 2013 in Ankara. The participants have been contacted by the multiple key persons and snow ball technique. People have been reached through a reference to increase validity and no representativeness have been sought. A questionnaire with mostly open ended questions have been used with in-depth interview techniques. The interviews have been lasted for 1-1.5 hours. 15 of them have been sound recorded<sup>93</sup>. During the interviews, notes have been taken on the computer. At the end, these notes were consolidated. Sound records have not been decoded and did not included in the analysis.

<sup>93</sup> 1 person who has lost his/her eye in the events accepted interviews then cancelled.

This study majorly focuses on the street protestors. A very limited part has been left for the home protestors. This target has been realized as 1 person who only supported actions from balcony.

The students and academic personnel could not exceed 60% of the whole participants. It has been realized around 50%. Actively METU affiliated people could not exceed 20% which has been realized as 10%.

Also, this study pays attention to ideas of teenagers. However, at least 25% of the participants could be from people older than 30 years. This has been realized as 35%.

The only quota that could not be reached has been gender. A balanced containment has been targeted while only one third of the participants were women.

This study has a questionnaire which includes four major parts:

The first part is about socio-economic profile questions. This part tries to answer the question of “Who have been participated?” This part is consisted of structured and semi-structured questions.

The second part is about direct experiences of participants and it answers the questions of “Why?”, “Where?”, “How?”. This part is consisted of several partially structured questions.

Third part is for the reaching of indirect perceptions: Connotations of some concepts are being received in words, sentences or explanations. This part is completely unstructured.

Finally, there are a few structured questions which are being asked to acquire general understanding on Ankara, Turkey and the world.

### **3.6.2 Trajectories of Studying Gezi in Ankara**

This field study has been conducted in Ankara. As already been argued, Ankara is a massive metropolis in Turkey. There exist many unique aspects which make Ankara a good place for data mining: Dealing with the reality of “white collar city of bureaucracy” as well as “student dynamism” are two of these aspects. Active role of

Ankara in Gezi as well as harsh police intervention and extraordinary occupation of city center, establishment of district forums are other aspects those make the city as an attractive place to study. But also, there are critical sides. For instance, Ankara is the city of central politics and heterogeneities. Even though it is seen homogenous compared to general of Turkey, the political preferences and social composition clearly changes in districts. Thus, dealing with people from different district affects the quality of study very considerably.

The second critical issue about this field work is about the political sensitivity. By its nature, Gezi has always been a political issue. In some parts of this study the timidity has been observed in participants. Those times additional measures have been taken to achieve a clear understanding. Most participants have been achieved by the personal references and certain guarantees have been provided to participants in terms of confidentiality. Despite these, in some cases interviews were cancelled, some questions were omitted, sound records were stopped and in one case a participant did not attend programmed study claiming the possible political results. Most of the interviews have been done in the evening hours in the neutral places such as cafes and parks. Both the advantages and disadvantages have been observed. The researcher tried to neutralize outer and personal effects but it is obvious that conducting and writing is a reflexive process. Like in the emergence of Gezi, many factors including emotions, signifiers and frames can affect the field study. In other words, there cannot be a study of Gezi which tells all the meta-narrative, but several Gezi studies unique to different space and time.

### 3.6.3 Description of Data

#### 3.6.3.1 General Profile

**Table 8: General Profile of the Participants**

No	What is your age?	What is your gender?	What is your current job?	What is your final graduate?
1	33	Male	Public Officer	Phd-Ongoing
2	19	Male	Unemployed	High School
3	32	Male	Academician	Phd-Ongoing

**Table 8 (continued)**

4	32	Male	Banker	Graduate
5	32	Male	Shopkeeper	Graduate
6	34	Female	Academician	Phd-Ongoing
7	28	Female	Insurer	High Graduate
8	24	Male	Student	Graduate
9	24	Male	Student	Graduate
10	30	Female	Banker	Graduate
11	52	Male	Agricultural Engineer-retired	High Graduate
12	45	Male	Sergeant-retired Agricultural	Graduate
13	53	Male	Engineer-retired	Graduate
14	17	Male	Student	High School-Ongoing
15	17	Male	Student	High School-Ongoing
16	17	Female	Student	High School-Ongoing
17	17	Female	Student	High School-Ongoing
18	17	Male	Student	High School-Ongoing
19	18	Male	Student	High School-Ongoing
20	17	Female	Student	High School-Ongoing
21	20	Male	Student	High School-Ongoing
22	18	Male	Student	High School-Ongoing
23	25	Male	Editor	Graduate
24	17	Male	Student	High School
25	26	Female	Student	Graduate
26	28	Male	Public Officer	High Graduate-Ongoing
27	28	Female	Unemployed	High Graduate
28	35	Male	Unemployed	Graduate
29	20	Male	Private Security	Graduate
30	21	Male	Accountant	Graduate
31	21	Male	Building Sentry	Primary
32	19	Male-LGBT-Homosexual Student	Graduate-Ongoing	
33	23	Female-LGBT Teacher	Graduate	
34	31	Male	Shopkeeper	Graduate
35	25	Female	Food Engineer-Sales Assistant	Graduate
36	34	Male	Personal affairs and cafe management	Graduate
37	31	Female	Public Officer	Graduate
38	26	Male	Student	Graduate
39	30	Female	Teacher	Graduate
40	20	Female	Student	Graduate-Ongoing

**Table 9: General Profile of the Participants (cont.)<sup>94</sup>**

No	Where is your residence district in Ankara?	How much is your average household income?	How you define your economic class?
1	Altındağ-Aydınlıkevler	3700	upper-middle class
2	Etimesgut-Eryaman	2000	upper-middle class
3	Çankaya-Yüzüncü Yıl	2300	middle class
4	Altındağ-Aydınlıkevler	3300	middle class
5	Çankaya-Sokullu	7500	middle class
6	Etimesgut-Eryaman	2100	poor, I don't have even [social] security.
7	Çankaya-Maltepe	5500	middle class
8	Sincan-Fatih	700	middle class
9	Sincan-Fatih	800	lower class
10	Sincan-Fatih	2000	middle class
11	Etimesgut-Eryaman	4000	highest 10%
12	Yenimahalle-Merkez	4500	middle class
13	Yenimahalle-Merkez	5000	middle class
14	Etimesgut-Eryaman	2500	petit bourgeois, not starving hot eating much
15	Etimesgut-Eryaman	5000	middle degree
16	Etimesgut-Center	Missing	middle class
17	Etimesgut-Center	Missing	middle class
18	Etimesgut-Center	Missing	middle class
19	Etimesgut-Eryaman	4000	upper-middle class
20	Etimesgut-Eryaman	4300	middle-petit bourgeois
21	Etimesgut-Eryaman	4000	second class
22	Etimesgut-Eryaman	3500	direct middle class-poor
23	Çankaya-Ayrancı	1750	lower-middle class
24	Çankaya-Ayrancı	6000	middle class
25	Çankaya-Ayrancı	6000	middle class
26	Çankaya-Dikmen	6500	middle class-labor class
27	Çankaya-Kurtuluş	1000	lowest class
28	Yenimahalle-Batıkent	9000	upper-middle class
29	Altındağ-Karapürçek	2500	lowest class
30	Mamak-Tuzluçayır	5500	lower class, we have outcome as we have income
31	Altındağ-Doğantepe	1500	lowest class
32	Çankaya-Dikmen	3000	middle class sometimes lower class
33	Çankaya-Anıttepe	2500	middle class

**Table 9 (continued)**

34	Keçiören-Subayevleri	15000	upper-middle class
35	Çankaya-Öveçler	6000	middle class
36	Mamak-Natoyolu	3750	middle class
37	Çankaya-Emek	3500	middle class
38	Çankaya-Dikmen	3500	middle class
39	Yenimahalle-Çayyolu	3000	lower class
40	Çankaya-Kırkkonaklar	4000	middle class

The questionnaire has been applied to 40 people. The ages of the participants were changing from 17 to 54. 26 of them were under 30. The balancing of genders is 13 to 27. 2 people also declared their LGBT identity while mentioning their genders. One of them added homosexuality as well.

The people were coming from very different occupations. As one motor of the Gezi movement were students, high school and university students composed a certain part of the participants. The people who had a job have been working as white collar workers who also constitute a certain part of the distribution in this study. Despite several contacts have been constructed, no interview could be done with a blue collar worker which is considered as a deficiency of the study.

As it has been observed in the quantitative surveys adopted by research companies in İstanbul, Gezi participants were coming from an “educated” part of population. In Ankara case, a same case is emergent that only 1 person was primary school graduate despite his age.

All people in the study were living in Ankara metropolitan borders and all of them were living in municipal counties. Eryaman, Batıkent, Çankaya (particularly Dikmen) and Tuzluçayır were the major centers those took place in the study. Eryaman should

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<sup>94</sup> “Economic class” refers to own identifications of the participants.

be separated to different districts as Eryaman 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Güzelkent and Devlet Mahallesi.

The people were coming from middle income families with incomes varying from 700 to 15000 Turkish Liras<sup>95</sup> (monthly) per family.

Most of the participants are coming from urban origin, particularly, Ankara. People have been lived in the cities since their childhood. However there are people who came from rural areas as well<sup>96</sup>.

### **3.6.3.2 Internet Usage & Social Media**

As it is seen in the table, this is an “over online” network society. In the sample, there is no person without “internet connection”. Most of the people use internet very intensely. Most of them has internet in their mobile phones and most of them use it “all time” when they are “awake”. When the participants asked about their usage of internet typical answers received: “all times, except work time”, “all times when I am awake”, “every day”, “every day regularly”, “every day continuously”, “every minute”, “every moment”. There are even people who consider internet as the source of their life. Very few people mention about low internet usage rates as “half an hour a day” or “morning and nights”.

Young people use internet more. Most of the people have social media accounts. Facebook is in the first order which is used by 33 people of 40 while twitter is in pursuit with 23 people-accounts. Besides, while Facebook users were long time account holders, twitters users are comparatively new. Some people (6) started to use twitter actively after Gezi. Few people mentioned about Instagram<sup>97</sup> and Netlog.

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<sup>95</sup> Nearly 280 to 6000 US Dollars by 2015 prices.

<sup>96</sup> A detailed table for origin city and living period in metropolis have been provided in Appendix 3.

<sup>97</sup> A detailed table provided in the Appendix 7 including the internet usage with the composition of social media accounts and membership periods.

The social media is an important issue in the emergence of social movements. Thigo (2012) mentions about use of information and communication technologies (ICT) by civil societies agencies in Kenya:

Listen to the south, speaking in all its grandeur, re-finding its voice through new technologies . . . Listen to the voices of innovation that speak of a new song, woven from the experiences of communities at the grassroots, speaking in their own language, naming their alternatives, ushering in an era of a collective narrative that speaks of a great violence of development . . . Listen to the vision of the poor for they are the true poverty experts. (Thigo, 2012)

Indeed, ICT brought many to different geographies. Probably the role of ICT was more significant in the societies which are implementing democratic rules lately compared to west. It is obvious that Gezi was product of network society. Temiz (2013) argued that the trees were just reflections of a spatial crises which is coming from the invasion on the public spaces. In Gezi, despite main stream media, a local action dispersed to other places. This showed that local is not “local” as it has been before. In Ankara case, most of the people know about the events from the social media (majorly Twitter and Facebook). Some of them argued about internet news websites. Nearly a quarter mentioned about TV channels while most of them added it was Halk TV. Ulusal Kanal, Oda TV, Hayat TV, Onedio, T24, Sözcü, Radikal and Hürriyet were other broadcasting channels those were mentioned. Besides, few of them argued that they just heard the sounds on the street and went out<sup>98</sup>.

Nearly all the people monitored the events via social media. Many of them mentioned that they don’t have trust to mainstream media. Some people said that the mainstream media was not so censored at the beginning. On the other hand, some writers argued that the social media became a communication monopoly in the Gezi process (Arıcı, 2013). Also, as Temiz (2013) argued many people realized by internet that a similar type of pressure has been experienced by many others from different places of the country.

During Gezi, social media created rapid as well as contradictory situations. For instance, a “lynch” campaign was launched against a famous actor, Mehmet Ali

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<sup>98</sup> Exclusive responses for monitoring of events have been provided in Appendix 13.



Alabora, due to his activity in Twitter. However, while his famous tweets were retweeted 40.000 times, another figure gathered a greater attention during 30-31 May with 200.000 retweets. This figure was Okan Bayulgen. Gülhan thinks “he lived his own 68 movement in the starting of Gezi and quitted rapidly by an organic celebrity responsibility with aware of political game in Turkey” (Gülhan, 2014). This particular case shows the importance of symbolic incidents as well as their framing processes in the emergence of a social movement.

There are contradictory opinions on the issue of social media. In his essay titled “why we believe Twitter lies?” Tunçdemir (2013) tried to support his claim which was based on that social media was an arena of lying and people have a strong tendency to believe in them. He supported his ideas by several scientific research which have been done in different fields including sociology and he stated that the educated people were more closed for new ideas since they have sophisticated knowledge those building barriers compared to illiterate ones (Tunçdemir, 2013). His claims were totally in a harmony with Erdoğan’s, and Yeni Şafak’s. However, the participants thinks in an opposite way and when they asked about media mostly used words are “lie”, “penguin”<sup>99</sup> and “government”. Some statements those used to describe media are as follows: “channels bought by government”, “government supporter”, “wing of government”, “toy of system”, “art of lying” “partisan”, “must be silenced”, “3 monkeys”, “liar monopolies”, “bloodsucker”. Rare interpretations are neutral: “conscious, freedom” and “confused duck”. On the other hand, the consultant of President Abdullah Gül, Ahmet Sever argued that it was impossible to get the news from Turkish media and even President Gül was watching BBC and CNN International and he was quite confused about this situation (Sever, 2015).

### **3.6.3.3 Political Preferences**

Most of the people voted/would vote for Republican Peoples Party (CHP) in the elections. Less of them are supporters of small socialist-communist parties. One people argued that he is a leftist-nationalist and a supporter of MHP who voted for CHP

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<sup>99</sup> Penguin became a famous figure in Gezi ironizing the condition of media since CNN Turk, one of the most reliable TV news channels in Turkey, preferred to broadcast a documentary on penguins instead representing the Gezi incident and police intervention.

because of a right wing candidate in last local elections. Some of participants are below 18 without a qualification to participate in the elections. Only one person declared that Gezi event had an effect on his/her voting preference. Most of the people consider AK Party as the party they never vote for. Few of them declares MHP as the party they never vote for. As in the last local elections slogan, CHP became a real “uniting power of Turkey” for these participants that depending on different reasons a great floating mass met on CHP. However most were unhappy and claimed several reasons for this “unwilling” support<sup>100</sup>. This state confirms the conceptualization of “atypical CHP voters” of SETA. According to work of SETA (2013), most of the CHP voters in the protestors were “atypical” supporters of CHP<sup>101</sup>.

Most people voted for CHP declared that they never vote for AK Party/AKP. This group constitutes nearly one fifth of the participants. Besides, there is a clear unification against right wing parties: [I don’t vote for...] “AKP-MHP-SP-BBP, in any case I never vote for them”, “Any right wing party”. Few people showed anti-systemic tendencies: “AK Party. I will not vote for any party in the future. I don’t believe in democracy. In last elections they have cheated” “Central and rightist parties: AKP-CHP-MHP-DP. The elections works for the continuation of power, an illusion”, “I am against voting system”. MHP sympathizers mentioned about their discomfort on leftist candidates like Murat Karayalçın or Kurdish parties. In contrast, leftist party supporters mentioned about their concerns on right wing parties, particularly MHP<sup>102</sup>.

#### **3.6.3.4 Organized & Disorganized?**

There exist highly fragmented form of organizational membership. Considering their relatively higher socio-economical background, surprisingly the organizational level is low among the participants. 14 people don’t have any organizational contact. 10 people are CHP, Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) and Turkish Communist Party

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<sup>100</sup> Voting preferences have been provided in the Appendix 8.

<sup>101</sup> According to work of SETA, the “atypical” CHP voters are different than traditional CHP voters. SETA identifies them as the “young people have been grown up in the CHP supporter families”. However, they have built different, relatively liberal political identities but still voting for CHP.

<sup>102</sup> A cross-tabulation of voted party and the party which can never be voted provided in same Appendix.

(TKP) members. Despite existence of many workers, only 3 person are labor union members. Some of them mentioned about obligatory organizations such as Chamber of Agricultural Engineers (ZMO) or Ankara Chamber of Commerce (ATO). Besides, some university clubs and small NGOs have been mentioned. More importantly, most people do not have a strong trust to these organizations except TKP members. 13 people declared that they could trust such organizations while the others ordered several reasons not to trust. Generally, these organizations are found as dysfunctional, bureaucratic and passive. Besides, a highly different opinions exist on the activism of such organizations in Gezi.

### **3.6.3.5 Activism before Gezi**


In contrast to major quantitative analysis such as in SETA (2013) and KONDA (2014) on Gezi (particularly in sample of İstanbul), people were familiar with activism before Gezi in this study. But, the participation of events were quite different: Two main blocks are standing on republican rallies and May days. Some people participated in both however most people have not participated into such events very often<sup>103</sup>.

### **3.6.3.6 Participation Place**

People generally participated into the events in several areas in Ankara. Kızılay/Güvenpark, Kuğulu/Tunalı/Bestekar were the most popular places. Also many people argued that they have participated into the events in the small districts rather than centers. Dikmen, Tuzluçayır, Batıkent, Eryaman were major districts of the participation. Besides few people mentioned about Çayyolu, Sıhhiye, Hüseyingazi, Öveçler, Keçiören, Akay and Aydınlikevler.

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<sup>103</sup>Activism levels before Gezi have been provided in the Appendix 10.



**Figure 4: A Diagram Showing the Gezi Actions in the Central Ankara (Not including the actions in districts, Tunah-Kuğulu)**

Created by author based on observations.

**Table 10: In Where People Participated in Actions**

Q.In where have you participated in the actions?
At home
Batıkent
Eryaman 3, Optimum, Göksu
Eryaman, Batıkent
Kızılay
Kızılay, Batıkent
Kızılay, Batıkent, Eryaman
Kızılay, Çayyolu
Kızılay, Kuğulu
Kızılay, Kuğulu, Eryaman
Kızılay, Kuğulu, Kurtuluş
Kızılay, Kuğulu, Öveçler, Dikmen Street-near Polisevi
Kızılay, Kurtuluş
Kızılay, Sıhhiye, Tunalı, Tuzluçayır, Hüseyingazi
Kızılay, Tunalı, Kırkkonaklar-Birlik
Kızılay, Tuzluçayır
Kızılay, Tuzluçayır, Kuğulu, Elvankent, Batıkent
Kızılay, Kuğulu, Tunus, Dikmen
Kızılay/Akay/Meşrutiyet
Kızılay/Eryaman
Kızılay/Güvenpark, Kenedi, Sıhhiye, Eryaman
Kızılay/Güvenpark, Kuğulu, Dikmen, Yüzüncü Yıl
Kızılay/Güvenpark, Sıhhiye, Eryaman, Tuzluçayır, Batıkent
Kızılay/Güvenpark/İzmir Caddesi, Kuğulu, Sıhhiye, Eryaman
Kızılay/Meşrutiyet
Kızılay/Sakarya, Kuğulu, Kenedi, Dikmen
Kuğulu, Eryaman, Cebeci, Kızılay/Güvenpark
Kuğulu, Kızılay
Kuğulu/Kenedi, Batıkent
Kuğulu/Tunalı, Kızılay
Kuğulu/Tunalı, Kızılay, Yüzüncü Yıl
School
Tunalı, Kızılay
Tunalı, Kızılay, Aydınlikevler
Tunalı/Tunus, Subayevleri-Keçiören/İstanbul
Tuzluçayır
Tuzluçayır, Batıkent, Dikmen

### 3.6.4 Spontaneous Experience

Obviously Gezi was an important experience in the life of people. Many aspects were unique in Gezi. For instance, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) mention about “liminal experience” while talking about mobilization. A liminal experience may emerge in the state of intense mobilization. It is a transcendental sense towards to better. Several people in Gezi mentioned about such a unique spontaneous experience. This experience can be affected by many structural and contingent variables. Both in the raid of Bastille Prison and the events in Tiananmen such unique experience has been mentioned (Gülhan, 2014).

**Table 11: Examples of Liminal Experiences<sup>104</sup>**

Liminal Experiences
...I returned home but I could not sleep. About 2.00 AM, I heard sounds from outside and I saw people in their pajamas. It was about 3000 people I believe, maybe 5000. I joined them and we started to walk to national assembly from Eskişehir Yolu.....
...We turned on Halk TV and watched events. My 15 year old daughter said that she wanted to go meetings in Kızılay tomorrow. I looked from window, we heard slogans. We went out and we caught crowd. It was about 70 people in 4. Etap and became 150 in 3. Etap.

The liminal experience have been mentioned in several times in Ankara case as well as in İstanbul. A participant in İstanbul argues that s/he woke up by wok-pan sounds in the night of 31 May-1 June and articulated with the people (Oskay, 2014).

Gezi provided a great activist politicization for mass of people. Even though many people had already political identities some of them participated in the protests for the first time in their life. There are examples of injuries as well as being into custody for the first time in a social action: “We went EGM near Ankamall. One friend was kicked in Kızılay and they freed him. We waited in EGM two hours in the buses in the garden of EGM. Haluk Koç came and said they would free us soon. But they took us to gym

<sup>104</sup> More examples can be found in the Appendix 16: Exclusive Answers About People’s Experiences in Gezi

in same campus. They tried to make a queue and take our photos, some of people reacted and they gave up. Gym was full about 800 people I think. A flag seller in Kızılay was in gym as well. We haven't given our IDs or telephones. We stayed on mattress but not many people could sleep. No water or food provided". "We found ourselves in Kızılay AVM. I asked for water and seller asked for money I attacked him. There were injured people. We have hidden in closed auto park. About 22.00 police came..."

The violence is a significant part of social movement debates. In theory, violence is not the typical component of NSMs. However, some movements such alter-globalization movement (particularly Seattle-1999) was a clear example of NSM while considering the issue of violence. Police brutality, usage of tear gas, occupy actions, wearing masks and gas masks were the ordinary images from the actions. The violence element has been discussed in many aspects and even a guide was prepared for 2000 IMF-WB protests to exclude violence, weapons, alcohol, drugs and destruction of properties among to participants.

Considering many social events including fall of Berlin Wall, massacre of Ruanda, events China-Tiananmen Square, Tilly retains that the most widespread collective violence have been seen in low capacity democracies such as Somalia and the lowest level of violence have been seen in high capacity<sup>105</sup> democracies like Deutschland. The others (like China and Jamaica) vary between these poles. On the other hand, high capacity regimes (like China and Deutschland) provide more space for their "brutal experts". The most of the collective violence includes a liminal activation. When these limits have been passed people can react violence by violence. However, all societies and all individuals have different limits. (Tilly, 2009).

So, what is the place of violence in Gezi? Actually, the violence was also an important aspect of Gezi movement. Both the police violence as well as violence in protestors were criticized. There have been several arguments criticizing police violence, but also

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<sup>105</sup> In Tilly's text, it has been understood that "the capacity" refers to level of institutionalization in a society.

approving the participant violence in some cases. The violence was an identifying aspect of Gezi especially in the case of Ankara.

The police brutality, especially in the beginning of the actions became a source of motivation to participate in the actions. More than half of the people argued that they participated into the actions due to the (municipal) police intervention in İstanbul. According to Temiz (2013), Police never drew a line for the usage of tear gas, it has not only used in gatherings but sometimes used it in public areas, private properties as well as in hospitals.

The participants in Ankara case think that a certain police violence existed in both İstanbul and Ankara. However, most of the people particularly the participants from Dikmen, Tuzluçayır and Kızılay think that police intervention were stronger in Ankara when compared to İstanbul. There are some participants who directly imposed police violence. Some people argued that they were injured by plastic bullets and one mentioned about a bouncing gas shell. One claimed that the police was throwing gas without searching a clear shot and some people claimed that tear gas was thrown from helicopter “I have been shot by plastic bullet and tear gas capsule but not so serious. Police got me but people were taken me.” “A civil [police] shouted to police and they got us. They punched me in stairs and kicked after I dropped. Somebody got me to ambulance. Ambulance said dealing in hospital needed. Police said ‘Do it now whatever you can, I have to take him into custody...’ ”

Most people “tasted” tear gas first time in their life. People generally consider it painful and effective. There is no such thing about getting used to it but some people mentioned that they withdraw from the fronts after the strong tear gas intervention and reposition after their recovery. Some people argued that they had breathing problems due to tear gas. Few people were injured due to plastic bullets. One still have a small wound because of it. One person was injured by tear gas capsule but there was no big wound since it was a bouncing capsule. Some people were under arrest and they had another stories. “Some people were in frontline in a close conflict with police forces near the prime ministry. Police was throwing gases and they were throwing back but sometimes police was throwing gas to other parts crowd where the peaceful people



exist”. “I got sick. Now I have an asthma report. My family is genetically vulnerable for asthma. Doctor said that it should be triggered by tear gas. I has been exposed strong tear gas in Kuğulu. We entered a pastry and they behaved positive”. “I have been shot by plastic bullet and tear gas capsule but not so serious” , “I saw that a car hit to people. I heard sounds of guns from Güvenpark. And one of my friends was shot by her back with gas capsule. We have been stacked in Sakarya finally we could ran away”. “I was shot by a bouncing gas capsule from my shoulder. I went to health center but it was not so serious. I can ran away so fast so none can take me into custody” , “My wife and I have been exposed strong tear gas. One of my relatives was taken into custody” , “I was out of breathe due to the tear gas”. “My psychology has been affected much. I was unable to sleep when I returned home”. “TOMA squeezed water on me”.<sup>106</sup> In Ankara, the decorative pools of Ankara municipality which divides the streets for a continuous car traffic have been used by the protestors to neutralize tear gas bombs successfully.

In this process, TOMA became the part of daily life. “In 1990s, when I saw armed police panzers in the center of Ankara I would feel excited, now there are TOMAs everywhere, everyday”. In Gezi process, TOMA have been used effectively by the police and it has been personificated. When people asked about this vehicle, people provided different answers: water, monster, giant, violence and POMA.

POMA was another concept which have been created in the Gezi process. It was emerged after the capture of an engineering vehicle by Çarşı supports. The supporters named it as POMA and drive it to the police zone in Beşiktaş, İstanbul. A participant of Gezi in İstanbul declared that it was psychologically success since POMA have been captured by police easily after it passed the barricade. In any case, both using of pools and TOMA can be good examples of creativity as well as a deconstruction of the system in Gezi.

When people asked about the concept of police they mostly used concepts such as “fascist”, “sentry/watchmen” , “state” “robot”.

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<sup>106</sup> Additional experiences have been provided in Appendix 16 : Exclusive Answers About People’s Experiences in Gezi and Appendix 17 Direct Results of Events.

**Table 12: Perceptions about Police and Riot Police**

Police	Riot Police
cane of power	[swear]
fascist	a type without identity
full of revenge and furious	bad
government's police. I am scared when I see	bully
I hate most	fascism
if you are fine with order they are hero, if not they are terrorists	fascist
nerd	gas
riot police is not human, brainwashed	hired killer of power
sentry of fascism	illiterate youth
sentry of government	like robot, hatred
slave	mean
some of them are robot some of them	murder
tool of Gülen	police
some of them helpful, some of them	polices
fascist	revenge
tear gas	robocop
tear gas and baton	robotics with limited action ability
instrument	Tayyip Erdoğan
unconscious robot	satan, darkness
useless, trigger, right hand, we must not be a police state	savage dogs of police
violence	scare while we need to trust
war	state based terror organization
we asked police why they were not with us and they did not have any to say	tear gas
	they are like dolls, with muscles and empty
	uneducated police
	useless
	violence
	violence, massacre
	welcome to hell
	what a pity!

When they are asked about riot police the perception becomes more negative: “violence”, “murder”, “fascism” and “gas”.

According to Uysal (2013a) one source of the police brutality is police’s anxiety of losing control on the street. This increases by the raising of participant numbers and self-confidence of participants. When the anxiety raises, undisciplined acts of police raises. In this perspective, the humor boosts the anxiety of police and also increases the probability of violence. Whatever the law says the physiology of the police is a

determining factor in the events. It has been observed that police withdraw the space when participants are intense and attacks when it is distinct. The educational books for police identify the social events as a “war of nerves” and they say “who keep calm be the winner.” In Gezi, police could not stay calm and lost control easily. After building of legitimacy and providing mass support for a movement, the spatial control was almost impossible for police.

The other aspect of violence is the violence of protestors in the actions. There is a certain violence in İstanbul as well as in Ankara particularly against police forces as well as properties. Generally the public properties were vandalized and in some cases the private properties were vandalized as well. Ankara municipality published a leaflet after the actions as well as it prepared an exhibition including the vandalized public busses. In the case of Ankara the violence among protestors are accepted. While the violence against police is thought as a legitimate resistance, the destruction of public properties were thought as a mistake. Some participants argued that they stopped people who tried to vandalize properties while less of them think the people with violent actions were civil polices or provocateurs. Some participants argue that there were not much violence by the protestors and some of them said that they could not stop the attackers because they had fear. “A person near me attacked the bus stop advertisements. I thought it was wrong but I cannot stop him because I had fear and I don’t want to receive reaction by a person who is in same side with me”. “I saw people were swearing against Prime Minister strongly, I never confirmed such a habit. It was completely sexist and those people who were like football supporters probably voted for him before.” “We reached to Kızılay and we entered to a café. We thought it was safe but police started to throw tear gas. We climbed to terrace and some of my friends started to throw bricks from terrace to the police. I really got confused...” Such arguments confirms the existence of a violence oriented lumpen mass in the actions. Several unique experiences can be found in the attached part of “Exclusive Answers About People’s Experiences in Gezi”.

### 3.6.5 Entitling Gezi from the Perspective of Participants

People identify Gezi under several titles. “Resistance” or “Gezi Resistance” are the most common entitlements to identify Gezi. Secondly, most of the people consider the events as an “uprising”. Awakening, explosion, inception, revival are similar words which puts the same “accumulation” aspects of the event.

**Table 13: Extraordinary Words to Title Gezi**

Q.How do you title the events started in Ankara after the events in İstanbul in June 2013?
A French Revolution for Ankara people, revival, enlightenment
A milestone, no name
A movement of “that is enough”, uprising
A question mark
A war to make nationalism and republic stand
An anti-systemic movement
Dissatisfaction of people from the government
Explosion, not an occupy movement in Ankara. In occupy, people stand with their tents.
Final drop in the bottle
Freedom movement, a scream
Rage
Resistance of June or Gezi Park events. Things have not started in İstanbul actually. All started with the Prime Minister's visit to METU.
Uprising, an effort to explain ourselves.
Uprising, resistance and just a sound at the beginning, then obstinacy.

## CHAPTER 4

### UNDERSTANDING GEZİ THROUGH THEORIES

#### 4.1 Early Efforts

The causes of Gezi Park events can be explained by combining several theories. Even though they are not considered as functional, the early social movement theories may have some challenging sides approaching to Gezi. Besides, an effort of elaborating the ideas of these theories may provide clues on how the new theories have a better perspective.

As one of the early theories, relative deprivation theory argues that the mass protests may emerge due to the deprivation of certain materials and rights. According to Uysal, Gezi was not fitting to this model since the participants are generally from middle or higher-middle classes. The case in Ankara confirms Uysal. The people are from middle and higher-middle classes and they do not have strong class references and concepts like “poverty”.

Another perspective could be obtained from the collective behavior theory. The early stage of social movement studies focused on the control of society. Le Bon, Spencer, Le Play, Quatelet, Lombroso and partially Pareto considered uprising and protest as a matter of criminality and race. They focused on the “scientific” struggle strategies of states (Gülhan, 2014). Before the modern identification of social movements, Le Bon tried to use “crowd psychology” as a key concept. French sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1960) claimed that civilizations are always created by a small intellectual aristocracy that imposes rationality and discipline upon the potentially destructive masses. Le Bon’s views are still widespread among news reporters, police chiefs, legislators, commentators as well as the public at large. “It is always masses that bring out the civilizations’ downfall”. According to Le Bon, the crowds make people more sensitive and irrational (Uysal, 2013a). It is hard to understand crowd psychology by the interviews however there are some clues: Some people joined the actions because there was a certain mass of people on the streets however the pulling factor was not the

crowds but their friends in general: “I majorly participated to observe. I had common points with the participants”. “My friends were on streets and I wanted to be with them”.

On the other hand, the government handled the street actions as an issue of conflict. Interestingly, this is very similar with the early consideration to the social movement in the literature which has been jailed in conflict studies. Thus according to government and supporting media channels, the action was something extraordinary, a systemic anomaly. Most of government supporter writers argued that Gezi was a movement which people tried to abolish government that they could not do it by elections. However, there were indeed few participants with anti-systemic ideal & motives in Gezi: “I expected to enter prime ministry. We could not”. When it has been asked to the people, a certain part of them argue that Gezi movement could not reach its aim since the government stands still. Thus, for a certain part, abolishment of the government was an aim or at least a desire. On the other hand, some philosophers tried to explain the phenomena by the concept of mass society like it has been used to explain the emergence of 20th century fascism. According to this approach, such actions can be seen in the people who have weak social ties. No strong basis has been found to support this claim among Ankara participants. In contrast, people have strong ties such as positive role of their families, or love to their country. However, the group was a total internet society. It is still clear that Le Bon’s theory may have some clues but it stays quite primitive to explain Gezi.

On the other hand, as a lecturer in Police Academy, Koca (2015) had a chance to contact with riot police and he has conducted one of the unique works for Gezi. In his work, he interprets Gezi from the perspective of police. During his interviews, it has been argued that polices consider Gezi participants as spoiled and many slogans humiliating for themselves. Especially, the slogan of “police sell the bagels and live with your honor” is understood as the natural dishonored image. One of the most interesting point of this study is that Koca claims that Le Bon’s books are most borrowed books in Police Academy library which indicates the police’s understanding of social action as a form of “deviance”, “anomaly” or “crowd psychology” which is quite primitive considering social movement theories for now. However, using early

theories may provide significant contributions for the alternative studies such as a study including police.

#### **4.2 Towards New Theories**


Four major theoretical approaches exist in the new theories: Political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, framing and new social movements.

According to the political opportunity structure, there are three broad sets of properties in a political system which directly affect the social action: Formal institutional structure, informal procedures and prevailing strategies, configuration of power of challengers. In Gezi process, all these components of political opportunity structure affected the movement. The formal institutional structure provided some basis for the action. The opposing political parties had lost their representative power and they could not reflect the anger of mass in “elected ways”. Most of the participants except the members of small parties argued that the opposing forces could not generate an effective structure: “I voted for CHP-not because I like it. If MHP receive 40% I would vote for it”. The election system which has 10% threshold since 1980 motivates people to vote for big parties or boycott which create a deadlock as well as an anger for systemic parties. The major opposing forces, particularly the main opposing political party, CHP, has been criticized because ineffective opposition. MHP openly declared that it had no support for such a street movement. These positions motivated some people to participate in Gezi in order to express themselves. Most of the participants who have generally voted for CHP said that they do not have trust to this party. “CHP cannot generate a good opposition, thus they do not have place in the movement.” “It was the movement of people not the republican people”.

Besides “a relative peace process” before Gezi were contributed the emergence of such movement while repressing nationalist hysteria but also it prevented participation of big mass of Kurdish people into the Gezi since the main stream Kurdish movement (BDP, at the time) did not support the movement directly. However, there were also Kurdish people on streets without an organized support and the launch of the resistance was motivated by the standing of a famous Kurdish politician, Sırrı Süreyya Önder. The movement included several nationalist tendencies which cannot walk with

Kurdish movement together. On the one hand, mainstream-institutional Kurdish absence motivated the nationalists to participate in the action. However, the possible participation of organized Kurdish movement could take the movement to an advanced level: “If Kurds had supported movement, I believe that the Prime Minister’s office would be occupied”. Moreover, it can be said that people in Ankara case were pleased to participate in the actions with Kurds since they consider Kurds as oppressed in general and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, a deputy from Kurdish oriented party as a pioneer of the movement.

In the Figure 5, there exist word frequency analysis for the concepts of “Kurds” and “Sırrı Süreyya Önder”. In the third part of the questionnaire, several concepts have been provided to interviewees and their opinions-connotations were received openly. The answers have been transformed into texts and word bubbles have been produced. In these analysis, bigger words indicate that people used that word more frequently. In the case of Figure 5, the people who asked the concept of “Kurds” has used the concepts of “Gezi” and “oppressed” frequently. Similarly, Sırrı Süreyya Önder has been considered as a pioneer in Gezi process for some while he was “opportunists” according to a certain part of people at the same time.



**Figure 5: WFA for “Kurds” and “Sırrı Süreyya Önder”**



On the other hand, the political opportunity structure can also be analyzed according to positions of power elites. Some capitalists were in direct relationships with the government. For instance Kalyon İnşaat were responsible of some constructions in Gezi Park whose close interactions with the government is known. Several holdings and media companies were supporting the government in a similar way. However, even these organizations were not fully aware of what was happening in Gezi. They built their positions according to declarations of Prime Minister. Especially, after the first speeches of Erdoğan, the sides had to choose their standing points. TÜSİAD<sup>107</sup>, as the admiral ship of Turkish bourgeois declared that the capitalist were with the political stability. TV channels and press organs were reflected the actions extremely limited and they have been strongly criticized. However, during the police intervention in İstanbul, many people found shelter in the Divan Hotel of Koç Holding<sup>108</sup> in Taksim. This case was interpreted as bourgeois support to Gezi movement. The government claimed that it was a clear support which cannot be accepted legitimate by them. However, the participants had diversifying ideas about the position of bourgeois in the movement, particularly Divan Hotel-Koç Holding and Ali Koç as one of the CEOs of the holding. “Supported Gezi, paid a price but their support does not last long”. “They skim of this country but it was an important standing, I admired”. “Consciously he saved people and stood against government”. “He was like the Germans who saved Judaists [in World War II]” Some participants said that Ali Koç’s and Divan Hotel’s aptitude were just “good”. Some of them considered it as confusing. “I don’t believe their motivation was humanity, they don’t do same now”. “They did a humane job but finally he is an entrepreneur. It should not be forgotten that he is a TOMA producer”. “It was a tiny support, is it really important? He is a source of exploitation”, “He must not be identified as a revolutionary. But he was brave”. Most people are aware of Koç

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<sup>107</sup> Stands for Turkish Industry and Business Association, TÜSİAD is the greatest non-governmental entrepreneur organization gathering biggest companies in Turkey. As an effective association TÜSİAD has been in the center of politics. Since the AK Party government thought TÜSİAD one of the supporters of the military coup against a conservative government in 1997, it always had a hesitant relationship with TÜSİAD.

<sup>108</sup> Belongs to Koç family, Koç Holding is the greatest holding in Turkish private sector.  
<http://www.fortuneturkey.com/fortune500-2013>



and upside down as being used by the AK Party supporters to explain the nature of Gezi events. According to Türk (2013), the conspiracy theories have emerged due to traumas and this time Gezi was the trauma of AK Party. The ratio under conspiracy denies the role of actors in the events and assumes that an invisible power controls them remotely. Conspiracy works for the practical struggling against such a trauma. Besides, due to conspiracy, the crises can be an opportunity to stress the success of the agent: “all these were an organization of foreign powers who wanted to stop Turkey’s growth”. In this approach, all the “enemies” is considered in alliance such as all “marginal” groups, CHP, foreign powers and old bourgeois. The death of old political figures who are from right wing politics such as Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal have been seen as the part of this conspiracy and the defensive discourse of “Yedirmeyeceğiz”<sup>110</sup> must be understood under this manner. However, many people believes in that provocation existed in Gezi. On the other hand, it is clearly seen that the pressure of President Abdullah Gül’s on removal of police barricade on 1 June, provided the activists a space for occupation of Park which can be considered in the political opportunity structure. After end of Abdullah Gül’s presidency, a book was written by one of his consultants. In this book Sever (2015) clearly argues that Gül wanted to remove barriers in Gezi. Istanbul Governor supported his position but Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan was resistant. After Gül’s conviction on Erdoğan the barricades were removed. Moreover he also instructed to remove police from the connected streets of Taksim. However, considering the political opportunity structure, Erdoğan’s clear support to police forces<sup>111</sup> had a rational basis since the authoritarian governments are well aware of that when protestors know that no police forces can defend government they can be abolished easily like in the collapse of iron curtain. All the east European regimes collapsed in 1990s without shooting a bullet since the people saw that the USSR would not provide them military support anymore.

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<sup>110</sup> Can be interpreted as “we will not give him away” which has been used by notables who considered the protest a coup against prime minister.

<sup>111</sup> On 23 June 2013, after the clearance of Gezi Park, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that he gave the order to police directly by himself.  
[http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/polise\\_emri\\_ben\\_verdim-1138828](http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/polise_emri_ben_verdim-1138828)



on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays, after 19.00 in weekdays were top periods for the participation. Time was a very important resource that the harsh police intervention emerged in Friday morning that let people to react same day after working hours. Similarly, the police got Taksim again by a morning attack when less people were in the square<sup>112</sup>. The people from Ankara case could participate in the events as the time could give them possibilities. It was generally on first Friday, Saturday, Sunday and weekdays night in the districts. Also the actions were in the time of open days of schools. Besides, spring provided a good basis for street actions.


On the other hand, the resources also refers to direct logistic supports. Some political parties including the main opposing party CHP supported to the actions, limitedly. The participation of a big legitimate party in the actions could motivate people to participate. Some people who have taken into custody mentioned about visit of CHP deputies such as Aylin Nazlıaka, Kamer Genç, Sezgin Tanrıku in EGM. Other deputy Levent Gök participated in protests in Kızılay as well. However, contradictory claims exist about this issue. The participants in Ankara are mostly CHP supporters but nearly none of them trusts CHP and nearly none of them think that CHP provided logistic support to the movement: “I can say the youth movement of CHP were in the actions in Kızılay but I don’t think CHP had a strong institutional support indeed.” On the other hand, several people argued that small leftist parties such as ÖDP and TKP had supported the movement. However it can be argued that none of the political parties provided an organized-institutional support.

The usage of social media as well as mobile phones and other internet facilities were a good example of resource mobilization. Several social movement theorists such as Castells, Norris, Meikle, Pickerill have examined the social and political ramifications of information communication technology (ICT) regarding its impact on the nature of communication, social relations and the political process (Carty & Onyett, 2006). In sample of Gezi, almost all people are long time social media users, particularly

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<sup>112</sup> “Morning operations” of police forces are a known strategy which is based on the raid in the most vulnerable period. This strategy and counter strategy can be thought as clear example of resource mobilization.

Facebook. Besides, most of them had no trust to main stream media. During the process, social media facilities have been used on a regular basis.



**Figure 8: WFA for “Media”**

Most people had knew about the events via social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook. At the beginning, TVs were appropriate tools as well: “At the beginning there was not much censor at TV. Then [I used] social media.” , “I saw the death of Ethem Sarisülük on TV, actually on Kanal D. But after that, the events became a taboo [for TV]”. Internet facilities mobile Technologies had a strong influence on the monitoring of events as well as sharing. A very particular form of social media was seen in the events in Ankara: “I could not participate the actions in Kızılay in weekdays however I monitored the events from USTREAM<sup>113</sup>. A particular group near Kurtuluş was trying to enter Kızılay from different channels and they were broadcasting their actions live via their mobile phones”. The amateur broadcasting was open for public via USTREAM channels that people could text chat on the live events as well. Besides, even an open radio transmission software called Zello have been used for solidarity<sup>114</sup>.

<sup>113</sup> An internet web site like Youtube which gives people to live broadcast via their phones and chat.

<sup>114</sup> Transmission records in Gezi are still available in Youtube by 2015.

Internet, mobile phones and social media provided a strong basis for the monitoring and sharing of the events however it also constituted the weakest points: Twitter and Facebook was used by police to spot the participants and people were accused due to their posts about Gezi. A participant from Ankara who was taken into custody argued that they disabled their facebook accounts after the remarks of their friends. S/he never opened it again. The power of social media was also realized by the government as well. During Gezi, the government tried to limit the effect of social media by several operations and after one year such efforts had stronger basis as regulations in law<sup>115</sup>.

As a part of explanations through RM theory, secondly, the government supporters often stated that certain institutions provided infrastructural support to Gezi by supplying basic needs such as food, water and health equipment. There are several news about vehicles carrying such materials to Taksim. In İstanbul, Gezi movement collected some other clear supports: Divan Hotel which is a luxury hotel in the center of Taksim belonged to one of the biggest bourgeois in Turkey opened its doors as an infirmary. Besides, there are several claims about small scale logistic supports to the Taksim Square. Some argued that bottles of waters were delivered while some others mention about caring of small hotels in İstanbul. However, in Ankara nobody mentioned about any organized logistic support. However, especially in residential areas of Dikmen and Tuzluçayır participants could easily find a shelter to defend themselves: “Once I entered shop while running away from getting into custody. Shopkeeper said that nobody can take one from his shop” (Dikmen). A person had brought his scrap car and supported barricade” (Dikmen). There were cafe umbrellas and even sofas, iron doors in barricade (Tuzluçayır). It is hard to mention about an institutional logistic support to actions in Ankara. But it can be argued that in Dikmen and Tuzluçayır some extraordinary support models have been discovered the participants felt themselves comfortable to find a shelter in case of a police attack<sup>116</sup>.

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<sup>115</sup> According to regulations in omnibus bill (updating law no: 5651) which have been accepted in March 2015, accession to any internet web site can be prevented by the direct order of Prime Minister or ministers within 4 hours. As implementing agency, TİB (Presidency of Telecommunication) notifies the court within 24 hours after the measure. By the same law, all internet service providers had to keep users web site entrance records for 2 years.

<sup>116</sup> Exclusive Answers about People’s Experiences in Gezi has been provided in the Appendix 25: Indirect Perceptions on Concepts (Word Frequency Analysis).

“There were many people with Talcid<sup>117</sup> based liquids to spray protestors’ eyes against tear gas”. Some people argued that some shopkeepers tried to save them but in general the shops were not friendly<sup>118</sup>. Several people in sample argued that they would never go to Kızılay Shopping Mall, MADO and Starbucks due to their attitude in Gezi. MADO is the greatest target people mentioned in Ankara. “I have never gone to MADO again”. “I only go to Kızılay AVM for my toilette. There was a person injured in there and nothing has been done. The mall delivered everyone to police”. “I stopped watching TV. For instance, I used to watch Arka Sokaklar<sup>119</sup> in my childhood which represents police so nice. This is not the reality. I decreased my consumption. I stopped to trust human. Even the people who help to others in Gezi actually seek for appreciation by the others.”, “Some cafes in Tunalı gave the CCTV records to police. We deciphered them in social media.”

In Ankara case, it can be argued that several individual resources were important during the process however there was no strong financial basis as a resource and the participants had not a specific material resource other than their own financing.

### Framing

Revisiting the framing theory, we can mention that people has adopted a leftist frames those we can see the match in participant’s jargons and Birgün Newspaper.

Resistance is the mostly used word in the description of the news for Birgün. Thus, the events have been constructed as a resistance. This concept has never been used in the news of Hürriyet and Yeni Şafak. Hürriyet takes the issue as an “event” and uses “Gezi” to refer participants. Yeni Şafak prefers to impersonate event like Birgün but uses word of “activists” instead of “resistance”. In both Hürriyet and Yeni Şafak “Erdoğan” took place in the third order. It seems that these newspapers tried to

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<sup>117</sup> As medications for stomach disorders, Talcid and Rennie were used to soften tear gas effects due to their anti-acid affects.

<sup>118</sup> There exists a basis for the original supports to district actions in Dikmen and Tuzlucaıyır. Dikmen includes an Alevi population who are building a certain opposition. Besides, there exist a local resistance (solidarity platform) against urban renewal for long decades in Dikmen. In Tuzlucaıyır, Kurdish as well as Alevi identity must be considered as a strong basis for the social movements.

<sup>119</sup> A famous serial adventure movie in Turkey which presents the police forces in a sympathetic way.



represent events as a traffic between participants and Erdoğan. Birgün used the name of “AKP” often while Yeni Şafak mentions about CHP’s support to actions. Hürriyet does not use the names of such parties often however, it tries to present popular sides of the Gezi by using symbols like “TOMA” or participation of celebrities in the events. Birgün uses the names of people such as Ethem Sarısülük who died in Gezi. Hürriyet mentions about deaths without mentioning the names. Yeni Şafak does not mention about deaths primarily. In all three newspapers the police is in the center of the events and Taksim is the central zone for the news. Birgün mentions about the events in Ankara while the others ignore. Birgün persistently refers the continuation of the events by using “continuation, on-going, on-resist”. Yeni Şafak refers to provocations by using “interest lobby” and “lie” (about social media). Birgün uses some negative concepts often: “crime”, “attack”, “killer”, “destroy”. Hürriyet uses the words such as “intervention” and “protest”. There exists a similarity between participants’ identification of the events and Birgün’s jargons. Thus, even though they are not regular readers of the leftist newspapers such as Birgün, they have adopted such frames during Gezi. Only few participants of Gezi represented themselves as activists like in the identification of Yeni Şafak.

**Table 14: Newspapers’ Framing of the Gezi Shared by the Participants**

Birgün	Hürriyet	Yeni Şafak
Resistance	Resistance	Vandals (used as “vandalism”, in a more neutral form by participants)
Fascism	TOMA	
Police terror	Tear gas	
Dictator		
Attack		
[Names of people who died in Gezi]		

Like in the NSMs, contingent reasons played an important role in the participation of Gezi. This is completely related to the framing of the action. “Because I saw that the

police attacked to people in tents in İstanbul”. “After exam, I saw police attack in Kızılay. People were there from different fractions. I saw Turkish, Palestinian and Cuban flags, we joined because we wondered. My friends were more active than me. I have been confused.”, “I believe in such struggling methods. Not for green actually. I was watching TV on Friday about 03.00 o'clock [Friday after midnight]. My wife came and said about the events in İstanbul. We turned on Halk TV and watched events. My 15 year old daughter said that she wanted to go to meetings in Kızılay tomorrow. I looked from window, we heard slogans. We went out and we caught the crowd. It was about 70 people in 4. Etap and became 150 in 3. Etap”. “I don't want to leave alone the people thinking similar to me”. “I participated because of the harsh intervention on TV.”, “I saw the oppression in İstanbul from TVs. But when we see the action in Kızılay we wanted to join. We were not organized”. “I turned on TV and I saw police was squeezing water and people were dropping on the street. I went to Kızılay the day after”. “I was in social media and while the people were sitting and reading in İstanbul police attacked I was shocked. I could not believe, how police attacked an innocent person? I went to Kuğulu, people started to come. I am actually a person with right & conservative tendencies...” MCAdam and Snow argue that a significance have been rarely paid to contingent features. However, some turning points exist in the structural change identified by political and cultural creativity (Della Porta & Diani, 2009).

Also in Gezi, there emerged an “injustice frame”. The mainstream news agencies who were quite disinterested with the social actions had a certain attention to the events. The components of this frame were firstly perception of injustice actions of the authority. A pure visible, violent action became quite visible. Some images have been represented in an esthetical form such as Lady in Red<sup>120</sup> who has been “face of Gezi” in the Hürriyet, the most affective newspaper in Turkey<sup>121</sup>. In Gezi, all slogan writers,

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<sup>120</sup> A woman who has been exposed strong tear gas from a close distance in the first days of Gezi. She rapidly became a popular image of Gezi with an innocent standing.

<sup>121</sup> Some social cases in Turkish society constitutes a proper basis for the conceptualization of “injustice frame”. For instance on 11 February 2015, a 20 year old university student, Özgecan Aslan, was murdered as she resisted a rape attempt on a minibus in Mersin. Her burnt body was discovered on 13 February. The murder sparked protests across the country on the following days. Thousands of protesters took to the streets in several provinces, with some criticizing the government for its “insufficient response” and alleged normalization of the rape of non-conservative women. The protests were described as the first mass movement for Turkish women. Actually, in last

their photographers, tweeters and retweeters are frame producers. The social actors tried to construct their own knowledge system (historicity). Especially humor component of Gezi was a good example for this. By the humor, Gezi participants built their own knowledge system. Similarly, the ruling (dominant) class tried to build its own historicity by defining the concepts again. Conspiracy, coup, *çapulcu*, interest lobby were the examples of these concepts. Interestingly, *çapulcu* was adopted by the participants however the participants consider the other concepts unrealistic and unfair.

### **4.3 New Social Movements Theory and Gezi**

#### **4.3.1 A Clash between Identity and Repressive Power in Urban and Cyberspace**

##### **4.3.1.1 Incoming New Trends**

The new social movement theory forms the major basis of this thesis. Gezi can be explained referencing NSMs in many ways. NSM is a concept to identify eclectic movements including woman, peace, gender and ecology movement.

Ecology movement and gender movement are two clear examples of these movements. Gezi started as an environmentalist movement. It showed that the environmentalist critic is legitimate in many levels of the society. Thus, one output can be considered as opening of spaces to the discussion of ecology. Pursuant to Kodalak, we saw cosmetic naturism at the end of the Gezi: when the authority realized that it cannot destroy the park, it started to add new trees to park and build a package. He thinks about an alternative ecology approach which breaks the transformation of significant public spaces to sterile shopping malls that target middle and upper middle classes. For him, the concern was the corruption of environment in the beginning, after the expansion of movement it was still about environment and then it was about

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7 years, in each year more than 100 women was killed by violence. The number was 226 in 2013, 286 in 2014 and 165 until the half of 2015. However, only the case of Özgecan Aslan gathered a particular extraordinary attention. The query on this issue takes us some critical points. First, there exist a clear “injustice” since Özgecan was just a passenger. Her student identity and innocent image contributed the construction of such a frame. Besides, dangerous image of killer as well as cruel form of murder created the injustice frame. Naturally, these components does not tell the story about the accumulation as a source of social protests but they provides important clues for the time of emergence of the protest.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31476978>

<http://www.kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net/kategori/veriler>

environment as well. But he takes into account natural, social, economic, mental and ethical aspects of the environment (Kodalak, 2013). Most of the participants accepted that Gezi started as a small scale ecology movement. “Yeah, in the begging it was actually about trees, nothing more.” “All states are killers in my opinion. But the current government had very strong ecological massacres since 2010. Think about HESs. AKP is a party that never leave even 1000 square meters space”.

#### **4.3.1.2 Identity**

NSMs refer to movements which do not have a traditional hierarchy, a strict institution, stable memberships, strong ideals, pioneering classes, or ideological linkages. However eventually NSMs are culturally oriented movements. Composite, fragmented as well as pluralist identities act in the center of these movements. Thus, the model of this thesis is constructed on three components: One is identity, the second is repression and final one is collective identity that emerge due to the interaction. This process takes place in an urban space under the effect of political opportunities, resource mobilization techniques and framing processes. The effect of last three parts have been underlined in above discussions and this part elaborates the clash between identity, repression and emergence of collective identity in the case of Ankara.

Pursuant to Bourdieu (1980) such an action comes from cultural habitus. Indeed, when we look into the profile of the participants there is a certain habitus which affect their activism. Most of the participants are coming from urban families and most of them was born in urban areas. Generally they are from middle class families with relatively higher education. Most of them were social democrat CHP supporters/national-leftists and socialists. Besides few of them were Alevis. In sum, most people had a certain habitus for the participation into such action. However, most of this people have not been a part of an organized movement and nearly half of them have not been in such reactive protests before.

The term “new” refers to a breakdown from the Marxist looking to the “old” labor movements and Gezi, particularly the Ankara case, was not primarily based on the labor classes. The new movements involve students, women, ethical, racial, sexual minorities and they feature peace, ecology, justice themes. The participants in Ankara

were coming from very different identities with very distinct requests. The people were young, educated, sensitive about laicism and modern. Most of them do not have any connection with a party or political organization. Thus, they were apolitical for the “old politics” but they were revolutionary for the future politics. Ecologists, Marxists, feminists, anarchists, LGBT activists, and animal right defenders were minorities in this “resistance event” but they were the accelerating forces (Çelebi, 2013).

In Gezi, people identified themselves in quite different, eclectic forms. Nevertheless, it is clear that nobody identifies themselves as in traditional form in Turkey: “Turkish and Muslim”. People who are nationalist declared themselves as Turkish. In general, multiple identities exist but it can be argued that the participants are coming from a secular mass with different concerns about world. The macro concepts such as “worker” or “labor” do not have strong places in this identification. On the contrary, daily leisure have a particular place: “anxious”, “reader”, “hard working”, “vegan”, “woman-feminist”, “Beşiktaş/Fenerbahçe supporter”. Being leftist and/or socialist are other strong identities. Being student is important as well. Being “human” and “world citizen” are other chief identities which refers to the humanitarian sides in Gezi<sup>122</sup>. Some people declared that they were Kurdish while some of them emphasized their Alevi identities. However, it should be noted that some Kurds and Alevis avoided to state their identities openly.

A comparatively conservative reality emerges in the question of “What makes their life meaningful?” Most of the people stated that the thing making their life meaningful was their families and secondly, “love/lover” comes the role of the moral things such as political movement or activism is in the third order which are actually low. Surprisingly, a number of participants stated that there is no such thing that make their life meaningful<sup>123</sup>. The participants support several sport teams. And this is a sort of family tradition. However, several people had sympathy for the Beşiktaş and Çarşı due to their social role and activism in Gezi. People do several activities in their spare

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<sup>122</sup> Self-identification of the participants table have been provided in the Appendix 3.

<sup>123</sup> Answers for “what make their life meaningful?” question have been provided in the Appendix 4.

tame and reading is the predominant one among these activities.<sup>124</sup> Reading is followed by meeting with friends as the second most popular spare time activity.

Some writers tried to explain the events with the concept of middle class. Not only the general Gezi analysis but also case of Ankara in this study indicated that the people in Gezi Park were generally from middle classes that both their income and perception locate them in middle classes. Bourdieu uses the term “petit bourgeois habitus” to refer a link between the middle classes and new social movements in advance modern societies. According to Touraine (1971), new social movements are no longer identified by natural forces but social forces. The traditional working class has been tied to natural forces (forces of production). However, it is hard to talk about a conscious middle class position. Does sharing a middle class position with others generate a distinct preference? Indeed, the study illustrates that this question is not meaningful at all. Gezi was a specific reaction and such movements cannot be attributed to the class consciousness.

Thanks to Gezi, people with different world-view met each other: Çarşı knew Lambda, Anti-capitalist Muslims knew feminists. People loved that they were not powerless and they can change something (Çitak, 2013). Also, a degree of convergence among opposite groups, such as Kurdish people with nationalists, has emerged. Even the icons of MHP have been seen within socialists. Zizek asks: “Greece and Turkey seem different but what if each Turkey generates and contains its own Greece, its own islands of misery?” (Zizek, 2013).

Even though most of the participants can be categorized under the titles of leftist/social democrats/socialists they had no strict ideological linkages: “Well I am a leftist but I don’t think this movement was a leftist one, there were religious people as well.” “There were nationalists in the beginning”. “I saw a few women wearing turban”, “There were anti-capitalist Muslims in Istanbul who I adore as much as a socialist”, “I participated in *yeryüzü sofraları*<sup>125</sup> in Güvenpark, Ankara”.

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<sup>124</sup> Sports team preferences and causes, spare time activities have been provided in the Appendix 5 and 6.

<sup>125</sup> Dinners for Islamic iftaar settled on the streets openly for all people.

The movement was quite eclectic in terms of participant agents. It had references from ecology movement, autonomous movement and women movement as well as nationalist and religious movements: “I am a socialist-ecologist.” “I am here because I am feminist and I am against repression on women body”, “We came because they are destructing just for rent.” Like a typical preference, the participants were heterogeneous, identity oriented and educated.

One of the most original side of this movement has been constructed by the active involvement of a clear Muslim group who have identified themselves as Anti-capitalist Muslims. This support was so significant as well as unique in a social movement experience in Turkey. Besides, this group has been found sincere among other participants and gained a good reputation.

Neither the foundation date nor the institutional status of the group was clear but they were coming from an Islamic referenced political party which was set by the discourse of social justice<sup>126</sup>. After a short life and abrogation of political party, this group maintained its struggle under the title of “Anti-capitalist Muslims”. Their first sensational action was their partaking into 2012 May Day actions which was in Taksim Square, İstanbul. They were using some left oriented slogans and banners combined with Islamic references such as “side by side against Pharaoh” which has been used by socialists as “side by side against fascism” in its’ classical form. Similarly, they rearranged “Work, Bread and Freedom” motto as “God, Bread and Freedom”.<sup>127</sup> They were considering newly rising conservative bourgeois as an “ablution for capitalism” and their protest position and their leader İhsan Eliaçık have been popularized by media. They have never claimed such an identity but leftist people had a tendency to consider them as leftist Muslims or socialist Muslims. They have a clear position against government and they announced their support to METU students in the events which emerged during the visit of Prime Minister, December 2012<sup>128</sup>. However, the

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<sup>126</sup> Party of People’s Voice “HAS Party” was founded in 2010 including some Islamic oriented politicians as well as some socialists. In 2011 elections it received 0.77% of votes and by 2012 it has been abolished by joining to AK Party.

<sup>127</sup> <http://www.antikapitalistmuslumanlar.org/>

<sup>128</sup> <http://www.adilmedya.com/antikapitalist-muslumanlardan-odtululere-destek-h34293.haber>

real amount of supporters of this group never exceeded a thousand people and they have stayed just as big as many other marginal leftist movements. Anti-capitalist Muslims, as some called them, became a distinct part of Gezi and by 2014, their activism is on-going and they are still launching *yeryüzü sofraları* events and referring to egalitarian and humanitarian sides of Islam.

Traditionally, there is no strong support for the social movement activism and conflicts among Sunni Muslims in Turkey (Özdemir, 2014). This is a known reality that nationalist conservatists blame the religious youth for their pacifism during the street actions before military coup of 1980 (Yanardağ, 2002). However in Gezi, undoubtedly Muslim group coming from Sunni tradition joined the ranks of majorly leftist groups. They were extremely popular in İstanbul<sup>129</sup> but also some people argued that they were in Ankara demonstrations as well. Thus, their image in the Gezi supporters constitutes an important effect. Most of the participants used positive words such as “respect” and “sympathy” about them and they found their participation “valuable”. However, there are also fewer people who find this movement dangerous and identified their existence as a matter of scale: “Think about ISIL<sup>130</sup>. Like Anti-capitalist Muslims, they are not only Anti-capitalist but also Muslim. Thus, I think there is no problem if only they stay in minor numbers”.

Secondly, another “marginal” group reached a popularity and legitimacy during the one month of Gezi. In honor walk of 30<sup>th</sup> June, 100.000 people participated both Gezi and LGBT boosted others (Pearce, 2014). Members of this identity argue many positive things about the action: “we could tell something to some people and make them think about it [talking about being vegan]”. “People could contact with LGBT in İstanbul which was not possible in Ankara”. LGBT was another component of these symbolic images as well.

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<sup>129</sup> Some people argued that one of their members has been injured in Gezi events during the police attack on the park.

<sup>130</sup> ISIL or ISIS stands for Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (or Syria) which is an Islamic guerrilla group who announced Islamic Caliphate in 2014 during the civil war in Iraq and Syria. The organization adopts Salafi ideology with a strict Sharia law and it has been considered as terrorist by West. In a short while, the organization became the most effective Islamic group in the war zone and seized a big area including important cities such as Raqqa (Syria) and Mosul (Iraq).



There were also some clear identities. Alevi identity is one of them since all the resistant participants who died in Gezi were from Alevi families. Indeed, Alevi identity has felt a great repression for a long period of time. In some cases like Maraş Incident (1987) and Sivas Incident (1993), this repression became drastically visible. Due to long term and short term effects, Alevi identity is one of the most leftist and oppositional tradition in Turkey. In this tradition, there are different forms of social activism and opposition. Moreover, Alevi identity constructs one of the biggest group who are unhappy with the Sunni policies of AKP government. Thus, Gezi provided space for Alevis to represent themselves. In some districts of Ankara such as Tuzluçayır, Alevi identity provided a support basis, space as well as shelter for the action. However, it is an unsubstantial attempt to identify Gezi as an Alevi movement. No actual struggle emerged among Alevi and Sunni groups in Gezi. Besides, in the case of Ankara, Alevi identity has not seen as a prioritized identity among the participants. Even some participants with probable Alevi identities have not mentioned their Alevi identities. This can be due to the standing of Alevi identity as just a background identity or it can be a result of possible reflexivity problems. But in any cases Gezi cannot be considered as an Alevi action.

Identification of participations in the unique categories were always problematic since it is a collective action rather than a group action. Pearce argued that Erdoğan had a categorization of conflicts between seculars and religious people. However, several resources show that most of the participants had no powerful ideological backgrounds or ideas. Therefore, they were using football marches or daily created slogans (Pearce, 2014). Similarly, some writers in *Yeni Şafak* tried to reduce movement to militarist-laic reaction against AKP (Berman, 2013). Berman argues that like the former ruling groups in Turkey, AK Party had no tolerance for the life style out of its own norms. This time, the opposition was different compared to traditional forms. The opposition was much related with the daily life, the human body was an important agent as an oppositional space and opposition had creative language. Among the government supporters, “soft” writers and “soft” politicians lost their power and they became marginalized. In the case of Ankara, it is impossible to mention a religious versus secular polarization. Secularism was an imperative aspect among participants but

repressive policies instead being against religious were declared as the major reason of Gezi events.

All the people in Gezi who lost their lives were Alevi though it is not an Alevi movement at all. As it is seen in Ankara case many different even struggling identities including Kurds, Kemalists, socialists, environmentalists even some nationalists participated in the movement. The losses of Alevis is related to level of repression on Alevi identity, their protest tradition as well as their stand on front lines as a consequence of this identity.

The second widespread identity in Gezi was secular-Kemalist. Like in the Alevi example this identity has felt in repression as well. Nevertheless, this is a relatively new issue since this identity has always been in a peaceful relation with the state. At this node, claim of a participant provides a clarification for the issue: “Until Gezi, secular-Kemalist identity was in a certain decline in last decades. The explosion of Gezi was just the time of that Kemalists realized the reality of lose”. Indeed, Gezi was the product of composite and fragmented identities rather than single identities like Alevi or Kemalist.

According to Eder (1995), the NSMs were inherently modern and the case of Ankara confirms this preference: People can be considered as a part of modern society with highly modernist demands such as living in a better green city, particularly like İzmir, with more cultural freedom and less oppression. According to Kanbak and Önver (2013), Gezi was a new movement. A bunch of reasons make Gezi new: It showed that the urban and people can be in solidarity.

Della Porta and Diani (2006) argued that unlike the workers’ movement, new social movements do not limit themselves to seeking material gain, new actors do not so much ask for an increase in state intervention, to guarantee security and well-being, but especially resist the expansion of political-administrative intervention in daily life and defend personal autonomy.

Melucci (1980) stresses the apolitical nature of these movements and he also regarded this aspect of the movements as a strength. In Ankara case, most of the participants

have no institutional-political linkages. More than half of the respondents have no trust to such organizations. Nearly half of them identify themselves without political references while more than half of them consider that the major aim should be the abolishment of government which make the movement quite political.

#### **4.3.1.3 Repression**

NSMs are not based on the material opportunities but on demands for alternative life styles as well as perceived pressure on lifestyles. Most people from Ankara case argued that the major causes of Gezi was the government intervention to the daily life. This is the node that repression shows effects on the identity. This is again a clear cultural concern about lifestyle which generally excludes the material basis. Different identities constituted important motives for Gezi participants and the strongest motivation for Gezi was the perception of repressive policies on people's individual freedoms: The repressive policies of government constitutes an important reason. Thus, it can be argued that central position of the government motivated the participants in Gezi. Many people argued that they participated in Gezi protests owing to the hate speeches of Prime Minister. Some of them mentioned Ankara Mayor as well. The ideological differences and central position of Prime Minister became the major motivation for the movement. "Honestly, I am clearly and openly dissatisfied with current government. I am annoyed because of the conservative-oppressive policies of government. Gezi was just a spark". "There is an authoritarian government. There is a domination against civil society by state". "Government's repressive policies and I just liked the people's resistance". "I have a reaction against *cemaat*<sup>131</sup> and government. It was an opportunity, a hope to stand against injustice". "I wanted to show my reaction against state authority"<sup>132</sup>. "I thought intervention to lifestyle contains me. I think individual

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<sup>131</sup> Refers to Gülen Community. The Gülen movement is a religious based social movement led by Turkish Islamic scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen. The movement has no official name but it is usually referred to as Hizmet ("the Service") by its followers or as Cemaat ("the Community") by the broader public in Turkey. For long years, Cemmat was in a strong alliance with government. The members of the community has taken place in the effective positions in Turkish bureaucracy. However, by the end of 2013 a struggle emerged within the power elites of cemaat and government.

<sup>132</sup> A table provided in Appendix 11 showing why people participated in Gezi with a categorization of reasons.

freedoms have been limited by the government”. “Both for ecology as well as just standing against Ottomanization. Even Ministry of Family and Social Policies said that homosexuality is an illness. Gezi is important for homosexuals since the Park is a place to find customers “There is an idiom as *Çarka çıkmak*<sup>133</sup>”. So the place is important for LGBT”. “Not only ecological reasons, pushing of conservatism and decline of secular education”, “The issue is not trees. Trees are final drop in the battle. The real problem is intervention of AKP government. Intervention to our sleeping room, our right of education, 4+4+4 [educational reform], unprogressive structure in schools”. “I am keen on my freedom. I believe in respect in society. There was an accumulation I was there as a reaction”. “I felt I could not breathe. I was fed up with everything. We had things to say but nobody was hearing us. Gezi emerged as an explosion”. Also, when people asked about “ban of alcohol”, “intervention to private life”, “abortion and cesarean” which have been the popular issues about lifestyle discussion in Turkey most of them declared their concerns<sup>134</sup>. Such answers show the motivations triggered by the central position of government.

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<sup>133</sup> *Çarka çıkmak* refers to usage of Gezi Park as a working space for transsexual identities.

<sup>134</sup> Opinions on “ban of alcohol”, “intervention to private life”, “abortion and cesarean” have been provided in the Appendix 25: Indirect Perceptions on Concepts (Word Frequency Analysis)



Figure 9: WFA for Pressure Consideration

As Butler (2014) argues that Erdoğan in some ways represents a neo-Ottoman imaginary that has become strangely compatible with privatizing public goods, lands, parks, historic buildings and services. As the sociologist Ayşe Öncü argues that under Erdoğan, cultural heritage itself becomes a marketable commodity (Butler, 2014). Also Iğsız argues that Erdoğan showed himself as the unique authority to go by announcing “if the environmentalist youth have complaints, they should address these directly to him, their Prime Minister (Iğsız, 2014). Thus, he was locating himself in a unique central position those all the problems can only address to him. Çelebi (2013) thinks that the movement was a consequence of an accumulation. And this accumulation emerged due to a bunch of reasons: an education policy based on growing up conservative youth, repression of the any kind opposition by the courts with special privileges, squelching of universities by YÖK, aggressive foreign policy, despotic moralism, a body policy determining the rules of maternity, dressing, alcohol usage, sardonic discourse against art and artisans, destruction of urban public spaces in the account of a wild property regime, destruction of history and green by systems such as nuclear power, basically exclusion of ideas and lifestyles. As a consequence, the accumulation was ready to explode with a great oppressiveness. Gezi was an explosion of freedom with a wick of life. This wick meet with the fire by the aggression of capital based authority on green and tear gas supported intervention of police. The people have been oppressed in their life and they had to invent a new life (Çelebi, 2013). According to Tanyıldız, 1st of June was a starting point. For him, AK Party was making the life of people irresistible systematically for last 10 years. The people who were not the part of Sunni Islam were labeled as “nonbeliever” and “immoral”. Transsexuals and women experienced same pressure and finally when people saw that the trees were cutting down, they also realized that their life was cut down at the same time (Tanyıldız, 2013).

According to Insel (2013), the mode of Erdoğan was an important factor for the expansion of the movements. His declarations on “having three babies”, “prohibiting the alcohol”, “building religious generation” have created an accumulation as the basis of explosion. The “old owners” of the regime had been removed from the political

arena by the suits like Ergenekon & Balyoz and that created a more competent power for AK Party (SETA, 2013).

The political reflexes of being a ruling party in Turkey, conservative tradition of Erdoğan's movement and his personal tendencies created an authoritarian leader image at final. Pursuant to İnel (2013), the authoritarianism has not been only a reference of Erdoğan but the major property of Turkish politics. İnel identifies two types authoritarianism: First one is in a defensive character which tries to prevent social change while the second one is interventionist. It does something more by trying to impose its own norms to the society. This type has an idea of new society and it wants to design a new society by destroying the former one. As stated by İnel, from republican time to AKP, Turkish politics were swinging between these two manners, especially with the emergence of strong leader figures the second type gained power. Finally, at the end of 10 years, AKP has been settled in the second form of authoritarianism. The authoritarianism was not new but by the hands of Erdoğan it could have a visible body. What have been done by Erdoğan had already been done by Melih Gökçek<sup>135</sup> for two decades. This character was including all the extremities of Turkish right with an aggressive discourse and revanchist style. Therefore, what Erdoğan meant for Turkey in Gezi, was similar that Gökçek meant for Ankara. Most people argued that Erdoğan followed a polarizing way and they considered him as the biggest problem in Turkey while most of them considered current Ankara Mayor as the biggest problem in Ankara. Nearly none of the people referred to problems such as transportation or ecology in Ankara while one summarized the reason: "Yes, Ankara has many problems such as transportation but all of them can be reduced to personality of this mayor". Such contingent factors coming from the strong position of government had certain effects on Gezi: "I saw the oppression in İstanbul from TVs". "Police violence, oppressive approach of government", "Erdoğan's behaviour which is far from consensus "Gezi Park was started to be destroyed and police attacked people". Besides, media can also support the polarization. Several media channels have been

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<sup>135</sup> Melih Gökçek is Mayor of Ankara, the capital of Turkey. He has been elected since 1994. He is from liberal-conservative tradition and he always been in the center of politics using a polarizing language. His aggressive style is considered as the source of his political energy for several writers (Başsoy, 2012).

governed by TMSF and the Prime Minister can decide who can manage those media channels. These channels easily followed a way to create a “one man” portrait for Tayyip Erdoğan as well (Uşaklıgil, 2014). Ekmekçi (2013) states that most problematically for the Turkish people, the reconstruction is coming about simply because Prime Minister Erdoğan would like it to. Erdoğan, a product of his neo-liberal and neo-Ottoman beliefs, has always had a vested interest in the development and appearance of İstanbul.


When people asked to say their opinions on the concept of government they used “pressure”, “murder”, “resign”, “fascism”, “authority” and “thief”. Most of these concepts refer to central position of government<sup>136</sup>. Moreover, when they are asked the democracy concept, most of the people used the phrases such as “there is no”, “I don’t believe” and “lie” which clearly implies that majority of the people participated this study lost their belief to democracy.<sup>137</sup> Similarly, most people referred to concept of “murder” when they were asked about “state”. These opinions do not provide the reasons behind participation in Gezi but they provide clues about the dominant perception of government.

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<sup>136</sup> The opinions on the concept of “government” have been provided in the Appendix 25: Indirect Perceptions on Concepts (Word Frequency Analysis).

<sup>137</sup> The opinions on the concept of “democracy” have been provided in the Appendix 25: Indirect Perceptions on Concepts (Word Frequency Analysis).





**Figure 10: Most Important Problem in Turkey**

No strong consensus exists but issues related to political power and its implications indicate a gravity<sup>138</sup>.

According to Arıcı (2013), it was so natural to see dissatisfied people after a 10-year-old one party government. And Gezi was a channel which represented the dissatisfaction.

From a Foucauldian perspective, there is a clear relation between rationalization and extremities of political power. Bureaucracy and concentration camps are clear examples of this rationalization. Even some Frankfurt School members criticized the rationalisms in modernism coming from Enlightenment (Foucault, 2014). From this perspective, on the one hand it can be argued that AK Party government has been modernized and rationalized since 2002. Rationalization boosted the motor reflexes of Party but it terminated the excitement and soul that is hungry for success. On the other hand, AK Party brought its' conservative authority to the center of politics. It moved away from the central ideologies and became the defender of certain identities.

<sup>138</sup> Numbers indicate number of answers instead number of respondents.

Moreover, Foucauldian power perspective provides many visions to understand dynamics and relations in Gezi. During Gezi, the participants have been labeled as “marginal” or “Çapulcu”. The government had a classic agenda of normalization. It tried to give strict lines to keep actions limited. As Foucault (2014) argues, there is police power which comes from practice. The slogan of “drop your baton” actually attacks to this practice. It was inevitable that Çarşı had to create certain hierarchies that is why it was against itself at final. For active days Gezi could create a solidarity since no strong hierarchies have been constructed. However, when the action moved into parks, the hierarchies started to dominate the people which decreased the aura of the action.

Also, it is fair to argue that the long standing conflicts and military coups supports to tendency of obedience to authority. Before Gezi, Turkey experienced military coups those emerged once a decade. Also the Kurdish issue which leaded a conflict space since 1980s always contributed the quest for rule and stability. Ignoring the anti-democratic conditions of post-military coup period, the pro-coup constitution could gather a 92% support in 1982. Some academics like Işıklı (2002) also stresses the individual sources of social obedience such as the binding military service in Turkey. It can be argued that Gezi was semi free of military coup period as well as conflicts such as 1990s considering the high rate young people.

Like in the NSMs, some people refers to crises of bureaucratic state. People have been asked to the representations of state. And many of them mentioned about its negative aspects. “Killer/murder”, “power” and “oppression” were the most used concepts for the state referring to a bureaucratic crisis. None of the participants used a reference like “welfare state”, “protection” or “consensus”. Marginalization discourse was emerged in both government and protestors. Many people believe that the government marginalized them by the interventions in daily life but also they marginalized the government as well: “Is this my state? No, never.”

Also, sometimes Gezi is considered as a civil disobedience action. Civil disobedience is an illegal action which can emerge in relatively democratic conditions. It can emerge after the depletion of all legal ways due to serious injustice practices of power. It seeks


for justice while excluding violence since it is considered as a means of consensus rather than a representation of conflict. The civil disobedience activist is not against the basic norms of the constitutional order. In contrast s/he sends a message to society because of the violation of these basic rules and rights. Thus, civil disobedience is not legal but legitimate. Civil disobedience is an open and visible action, the participants (or individual) take the responsibility of the political (sometimes legal) consequences of the action. It is an accountable and organized action while excluding illegal organization. In other words, it is a “to the target” action with a certain causality to the injustice. Hanna Arendt argues that civil disobedience is intrinsic to the US since the country has been created on a horizontal consensus (Coşar, 2013).

On the other hand, the power of challengers became one of the reason which boosted as well as ended up the movement. The harsh police/municipal police intervention motivated the movement in the beginning. Some small-marginalized groups constituted resistance lines against police forces but police always had the power to clear occupation. When the police forces thought that they are strong enough for intervention they attacked and take the control. Protestors followed several creative ways to resist but strong police brutality became the determiner at final. Some writers claim that after marginal groups took power on the protests the mass support disappeared. Police could intervene these groups easily. “After police intervention, many people were abducted, many of them were injured. We all feared”. In these terms, Turkey can be thought as a strong state which always had a great capacity to impose itself.

#### **4.3.1.4 Collective Identity**

As Melucci argued, the identity has an important role in NSMs. But, have the Gezi movement had a capacity to define a collective identity? It had. The first part of the collective identity has been constructed by the perception of injustice. As mentioned in above discussions, the central long run repression as well as its contingent forms create this injustice perception. This perception was also supported by the injustice frame.

If all the participants of this study would be gather under one collective identity it would be “being against Melih Gökçek”. After his more than 20 year metropolitan municipality mayor experience, he is known by his typical rightist identity, with his disputed speeches. After Gezi events, he prepared a banner to thank Turkish police “for their efforts in Gezi” and before 2014 local elections, he has a helicopter flown with a banner including a slogan called “We won’t give Ankara to Gezi supporters.” His open attack on identities (such as asking people their ethnic roots or sexual orientation), suggestions such as “a victim should kill her rapist instead abortion” and harsh methods while dealing with the critiques (such as launching lawsuits) as well as his way of urban governance (a very personalized neo liberal style) caused the materialization of people’s hate on him. One important source of protestors’ violence and vandalism against public goods can be understood in this manner. “Indeed, there are two types of people in Ankara. One type votes for Gökçek while the others swear against him.”




**Figure 11: Most Important Problem in Ankara**

Finally, the collective identity was constructed by the marginalization of participants in the name of “Çapulcu”. In a short while, Çapulcu became a collective identity which most of the participants had proud of it.

It is clear that the participants had a strong collective identity that is based on being against the government. Nearly all of the people consider Prime Minister and the mayor of Ankara as the center of the problems and most of them consider Gezi as a cause of repressive policies of government. This collective identity built a solidarity which could have titles such as “Çapulcu”. As Temiz (2013) argued, the government tried to marginalize the movement by the creation of the concepts of “marginal”, “Çapulcu” and “%50” in pejorative manner. These were the examples of this labialization discourse.

Another aspect of NSMs is the fragile process of constructing collective identities and group interests (instead of structurally determined interests). In Gezi, people could adopt a collective identity called “Çapulcu-Chapuller”. When they are asked what is “chapuller” they mostly answered as “me”. In İstanbul, the maintenance of Taksim commune could have a result for creation of such identity by preparing mails or operation of health services or open library; but there has not emerged such an institutionalization in Ankara.



**Figure 12: WFA for Chapuller as a Collective Identity**

Ultimately, Gezi was the movement of collective identities. Some people argued about cosmopolitan characteristics: “There was a different soul, it was a supra-party movement”. “I was there just as a citizen, nothing else.” When people asked about minorities like Alevis, Kurds or LGBT most of them used inclusive arguments despite they are in opposite positions. The traditional prejudices have disappeared for a certain time. For the first time, some Turks questioned the violence and Kurdish issue together.

According to Çelebi, there existed some organs which made Gezi Park a collective living body: infirmary, library, and necessity table, garden. A new communal anarchy experience: A stateless model without authority. The structure of solidarity cannot be described but it was a transformative think that was opening the space. The experience was opening space in space while the square measure was fixed. It was deconstructing the place and capital based hierarchies. A stateless experience winked. [A Gezi Slogan says: Revolution winked.] There was no space for hedonist and consumed body in there. It was the place of creative body. The freedom lives in the community, in solidarity (Çelebi, 2013).

The major handicap of collective identity was seen after the police seizure of Gezi Park. After the fall of Gezi Park in İstanbul, the resistance had followed a way as spreading the actions to the district forums. Most people in this study participated in the forums at least once. They were considered as a creative and invincible way of resistance in the beginning but most of the people argued that they were unsuccessful since there emerged several fights in the forums. Actually, the action were extremely eclectic and it was not so easy to reach a consensus in an issue referring to social action or district problems. Thus, forums collapsed rapidly. People who saw the fights in forums stopped participation. People who have not participated into forums considered forums positive while the actual participants of forums thinks those as a big “mistake”. “In the beginning, the forums were not bad, but after that, nobody could find a base for agreement, fights started and public support decreased”. “I don’t believe that the forums were a good decision, we were different as participants and we realized it in forums”. On the other hand, in spite of end of resistance and unsuccessful attempt of

forums people still think that Gezi was an important action, it had a certain affect in their life and they are proud of being a part of the action. Nearly half of the people think that the action was successful: “Yes, of course, it was successful, finally we saved the park.” While the other half thinks opposite: “No, after a year the government is still in power, how can we say we are successful, we just lost”.<sup>139</sup> In Batıkent, a particular consequence of forum experience emerged: the district assemblies (*semt meclisleri*) have been set and they sent candidates for local elections. Some of them were elected<sup>140</sup>. However, by these forums a “radical democracy” experience could not emerge as argued by Habermas since these platform became the area of struggle rather than consensus<sup>141</sup>. On the other hand, Gezi contributed to the creation of a new organization called Birleşik Haziran Hareketi (BHH)<sup>142</sup> or HAZİRAN. This organization has been composed by the support of participants of district forums, academicians-intellectuals, socialist parties such as ÖDP and TKP as well as few of CHP deputies. The biggest action of the organization was a boycott activity in education in account of defending secular and scientific education in January 2015. During the process, many participants have been taken into custody due to the slogans against Tayyip Erdoğan<sup>143</sup>. As a movement coming from the soul of Gezi, BHH was an important attempt for the institutionalization of district forums. Moreover it could gather different political groups from socialists to social democrats. However, in contrast to Gezi, BHH could never reach mass of people and stayed as a small scale intellectual platform.

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<sup>139</sup> Answers on the participation of district forums have been provided in Appendix 22.

<sup>140</sup> The leftist composition must be considered while thinking about this success. Batıkent is a district where mainly set by the cooperatives of labor unions and in where such protest tradition have been maintained for long decades.

<sup>141</sup> In his theory of communicative action, Habermas considers a language which make people interact with each other, public space provides an arena for such an interaction and a consensus is reached at the end for the legitimate decisions. Communicative action is individual action designed to promote common understanding in a group and according to him the pathologies can be understood as forms of manifestation of systematically distorted communication (Habermas, 1984-1991). Thus, lack of such space as well as such language have a certain affect on both causes and effects of Gezi.

<sup>142</sup> Can be interpreted as “United Movement for June”.

<sup>143</sup> Laik ve Bilimsel Eğitim için Ayaktayız Sol Portal, 11 Ocak 2015

#### **4.3.1.5 From Traditional Class to NSM Identities**

As Wieviorka (2005) claims, unlike the working-class movement, whose social adversary was relatively clear and identifiable with real leading and dominant actors, the “new social movements” have only inchoate and unstable representations of their adversary. Probably Gezi is different than NSMs in this aspect since it had clear adversaries. One nexus of debates on what is new about the movements is the class basis of the movements.

Since 1950s, Dahrendorf, Poulantzas, Miliband, Wright and finally Bourdieu provided many aspects to this discussion of class. Besides, Harvey adopted theory of space to develop this concept. The income or occupation based low-middle-high class categorization cannot be a necessity. In contrast, the class can be conceptualized through capitalist relations considering power, state, politics and space. Class can only be conceptualized in its historical realization. Thus it cannot be static. According to Kurtuluş, the “high educated plaza workers” as well as “low skilled sub contracted workers” were sharing similar problems and their togetherness in Gezi had a natural soul. Similarly the both “good children” of Kadıköy and “bad boys” of Okmeydanı were class relatives. However, in this togetherness, there were components who do not have real class ties like TGB who were quite “brave” but “exclusionist” against Kurds. Also, Kurds who were intensely participated in district actions have not supported Gezi due to Açıılım process. Potential common sharing of urban class between Kurds and Turks could not reveal solidarity in Gezi. A left cannot be so powerful when it is solely bases on to class. Like in the sights of Gramsci, the media worked as a factory during Gezi. Researches has been done in days and many sociological, geographical, architectural analysis, interpretations have been done. The middle class has been inflated as a “magic” concept (Kurtuluş, 2014).

Class debate is also related to Fordism. Referring to Hirsch, new social movements could be understood as the part of the crises of Fordism. The Fordist model created extended surveillance and control, commodification and bureaucratization of social life thus new social movements were responses to these developments. In Turkey, a Fordist economy can be an exaggerated discourse but the state behaves as a typical



Fordist actor. Several respondents argued about commodification of daily life and repression of controls on them. On the other hand these movements transcend the known dichotomies of left-right or progressive-conservative. Mooers and Sears were pessimistic about these movements and they indeed accept capitalist social relations which made them to be considered as new reformism at the end. From the Ankara case, Gezi cannot be seen anti systemic-anti capitalist. It is more reformist, looking for a better social life but romantic frame of revolution was a part of arguments in some participants.

Tilly (2009) has been dealt with the collective action by analyzing the perspective of different philosophers. From the perspective of Tilly, the weakness of Marxian paradigm on political action was about the effect of rationality. For Durkheim, the focus point of collective action was anomy. The rise of organic solidarity reveals a social action either in the form of anomy or in restoration. Thus the continuity of social order has been the primary motor of collective action. In J.S. Mill, the collective action has been considered as a fear from the mobilization of social classes and it has been explained by micro economic concepts such as individual preferences. The quest for social order has been observed in Mill as well (Gülhan, 2014).

Tilly have two major models as policy area and mobilization model to explain the dynamics of collective action. In the first model, there exist a government, an opposing unit and a policy area for the government. This policy area of a government is constructed by economic-social-cultural tendencies of government and it determines the limits of its actions. Different social groups can enter this policy area or can stay outside or can stay in this area partially depending on their habitus. As it is seen, this is a very government oriented and static model but it has still has an explanation power. On the other side, the mobilization model is a multi-dimensional model. It has five variables of interests, organization, mobilization, collective action and opportunity. According to Tilly, real people do not participate in the collective action. The ordinary behaviors of people reveal collective action in this interactive model. The experiences of individual participants do not mean much in the action. Both these two abstract models have weak points which are also accepted by Tilly; but there are several aspects in these models which can explain Gezi. Considering the policy model, a certain mass

of people could reach the possibility to have influence on policy for the first time. The seizure of this policy was about power on urban space which have not been seen since May Day in 1977, Taksim. Considering the mobilization model, the transformation of urban space contributes to interests of some social classes while it damages to expectation of some other classes who is poorer in terms of materials but younger and more rich in terms of culture (Gülhan, 2014).

Most of the participants declared that they were from “middle class”. A small number of people consider themselves as high class while a few of them declare themselves as “higher-middle”. Few of them used different concepts such as “proletariat”, “petit bourgeois”, “poor”, “lowest class” or “second class”. One intriguing aspects was that there are people considering themselves “middle class” while earning minimal wage and also in the higher layers, higher class consciousness increases<sup>144</sup>.

As we seen, when they are asked, most of the participants easily identify themselves as “middle class”. However, their objective positions show that they have concerns and problems coming from capitalist relations. When they are asked urban issues or power issues, their positions become clearer (Kurtuluş, 2014). It is still impossible to mention about a collective identity in this inflated concept.

Boycott activities can be considered as an example of “middle class opportunism”: Most of the people started to boycott the shops in Ankara after they saw their support to police. However some argued that it does not continued much: “in the beginning I never went shopping but after a few months I started”<sup>145</sup>.

Pursuant to Uysal, the labeling of the movement as a white collar new middle class movement is also something boosted by media. However, the spatiality of the actions can refer significant disparities. Participants from İstanbul-Gazi Mahallesi and İzmir Narlıdere were not main actors in central spaces but they constructed another unique resistance in their districts (Uysal, 2013b). Case of Ankara-Tuzlucaırobtviously supports this claim.

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<sup>144</sup> A cross tabulation table have been provided in the Appendix 2.

<sup>145</sup> A detailed table has been provided for the boycott activities in the Appendix 20.

Even though the participants come from white collars and students who generally consider themselves as middle classes, it is hard to claim that there has been a particular class pioneering the movement. In contrast, both labor and bourgeois were in action. Besides, in the study, participants generally have not put the workers in a particular position in the movement: “Yes, labor is the greatest worth... but I don’t think the workers were the motor in Gezi”. On the other hand, there are a bunch of discussions on the “new middle class” role on Gezi. Even though workers are considered as oppressed & exploited and labor is considered as greatest value, the concept was not central in Gezi. Writers like Keyder argue that Gezi was mostly a product of new middle classes who are mainly composed of white collar workers, college educated professionals with global linkages. This class has been saying that it had qualifications and it has a right to live better. Nobody has the right to dictate a certain lifestyle (Keyder, 2014). Considering Ankara case, references for such an analysis can be founded. For instance, like the primary concern of new middle class, most of the participants had no problem with a working modern capitalism, they were just against a patrimonial capitalism. However it is still difficult to attach the movement to just “new middle classes”. There was a certain weight of white collar officers and students but particularly Alevis were strong components. Really small part of participants have class consciousness or something about class belonging. Only few of them participated into the actions for the reasons related with their class positions. “I was there because I am against capitalism” Also none of the participants titled the action as “Haziran Direnişi<sup>146</sup>” while this title was used by a mass who consider the actions related to anti-capitalist movement rather than an ecology oriented movement. Also, there existsSome outstanding scholars use this concept to stress class aspects of Gezi. Korkut Boratav as one of the pioneers of this group argues that the “middle class” is an ambiguous term rather than a real concept. He accepts the absence of labor class organizations in the movement but also he criticizes the efforts to exclusion of labor class from the movement. When we look in detail to his claims, we see that the the socially excluded people, residents of suburbs, white collar workers without university

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<sup>146</sup> Means “Resistance of June”, it is mostly used by people who consider Gezi as a class oriented action rather than an identity or ecology movement.

degrees are considered near the blue collar workers in Gezi. He thinks that team supporters, laic, leftist, progressive, democrat groups are the parts of traditional labor class. Furthermore, according to him, the university students can be considered as the potential members as well. He asserts Ethem Sarısülük, the industry worker who was killed in June, as a clear example of labor class participation (Boratav, 2015). Thus, it is fair to argue that Boratav's tradition has a "wide understanding" of labor class. However, this thesis considers the movement as an identity movement which is based on paying attention to people's self-identification rather than their objective positions. Also, there exist some writers who argue that Gezi was a reaction of "white Turks"<sup>147</sup> who lost their privileges about 10 years. Indeed, Gezi has been supported by "such elites". However, it is also hard to mention the basis of Gezi has been constituted by these elites<sup>148</sup>.

#### **4.3.3 Urban Aspects of Gezi**

The urban perspective is an important constructive component of NSMs since these are urban movements in general. Gezi can be thought as an urban movement as well. Because it is directly related with the capitalist production in urban space. Most of the urban areas are considered as the sources of commodification by the capitalist forces. In contrast, the grassroots movements try to keep cultural identity. Gezi was a typical example of this. First of all, the movement took root against a shopping mall project under urban renewal: "The Gezi Park was started to be destroyed and police attacked people".

According to Lefebvre (1992) the "life" in the city is being erased by the development of capitalism. Day by day, urban space becomes just a place which is really unclear as

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<sup>147</sup> "White Turks" is a term used in Turkey for the urban Republican elite. White Turks are in an imaginary contrast to the so-called Black Turks, a name for the more Islamic among Anatolian Turks. The two terms are related to the emergence of a middle class since the end of the 20th Century, and is an expression of elite consciousness and also a contempt for a section of the population which is perceived as backward. Civilizing efforts were part of the imagination of all Turkish elites since the Tanzimat reforms. The chief editor of *Hurriyet*, Ertuğrul Özkök, considers himself part of the White Turks and describes this group as follows: "They live mainly in coastal regions, are sensitive when it comes to secularism, they drink alcohol, have a high purchasing power, a western lifestyle and the women do not wear headscarves". The Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan described himself as a Black Turk. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White\\_Turks\\_and\\_Black\\_Turks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Turks_and_Black_Turks)

<sup>148</sup> Class and middle class issue will be elaborated in the next parts.

a city. Several critics have been done claiming the *Kasabali*<sup>149</sup> identity of cities in Turkey. The claims on Ankara support these ideas as well. Ankara is place where have not been adopted as a place to live. Harvey who is inspired by the concept of right to city stated the urban space as the place of revolutionary struggle (Alpman, 2013). For Rancière, “the police” represents the status quo. The police order defines what is visible, what is noise and what is voice? Referring to the activities of the state and the ordering of social relations, police is “both a principle of distribution and an apparatus of administration, which relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space” (Uitermark & Nicholls, 2014). These writers argue that the NSMs have been in a certain decline in 1980s and 1990s. For them, the movements lost power in order to politicize and the cities had become incubators for policing strategies as governments developed new governmental rationalities, technologies, and institutional methods of control.

Also, “right to the city” has been conceptualized by Lefebvre as a defense point for the city dwellers. Because, the capitalist system defines the urban space a commodity which is valued by its exchange value except use value (Lefebvre, 2000). In other words, the capitalist class defines urban renewal and it recreates the exploitation by the spatial transformation. By this process, the propertyless class loses their right to state its opinion on city. A contradiction emerges between city dwellers and the people who commodifies the city. Lefebvre suggest to organize and seize city. According to him, the urban space is the arena of class struggles. He considers the right to city as a natural expansion of human rights. The capital just wants more accumulation and the basic way is to renovate valuable places who are used by propertyless people. This is a typical process and thus, social crisis and resistance are unavoidable. Considering the Marxist analysis of primitive accumulation, the basic rationality under the capitalist accumulation has not been changed much. It is just a seizing process done by conscious action for financing purposes. The agents and the target of this seizure can be changed but real process stays same. In some countries, we experienced this process while

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<sup>149</sup> Means the people from small town.

transferring the accumulation from agriculture to industry and now we the urban space hosts this process (Alpman, 2013).

It can be argued that Gezi is a typical example of urban movements. Considering the emergence of the protests in İstanbul and statements of Ankara participants, metropolis of Turkey provide a great basis for the emergence of urban movements. Especially a central green park such as Gezi is a natural arena for symbolic struggle. Therefore, it can be argued that the urban aspect is a powerful side of Gezi. However, it is also important to mention that urban based demands have not gathered a mass civic action for long years and the primary motive for Gezi has still been the consideration of repression rather than the motives based on urban dynamics.

Making İstanbul a financial center, creation of a center of attraction, constructing a “secure port” are very typical reflections of global city discourse. Gezi Park was one of the green area with only 0.038 km<sup>2</sup> space (less than the scale of Vatican City) and it became the target to be a “shopping mall” the global temples of the globalization. However, this neo-liberal attack tells only one side of the story. In the sample of Turkey, conservatism has been governing the metropolitan cities since 1994. And by the third time of the AK Party government the symbolic reconstruction of the urban space gained a particular importance. Thus, it was not only important that a shopping mall is offered to be built on the Park but also the architecture of mall was in the form of barracks symbolizing the old “Ottoman dream” against modernization. In the sample of Gezi and Turkey, such symbolic reconstruction of urban space has been a more powerful motive in the way of urban intervention.

According to Ergun (2014), Gezi was a movement to defend “public”. The global cities, being the financial centers of the system, are the motors of capitalism. As a consequence of change in the mode of production, the blue collars go to edges of cities while the center is controlled by white collar workers. Most public areas become open arena for the capital follows. There is no limit for the ambition of capital in the cities and many areas can easily be targets for the creative destruction. Sometimes creative destruction targets an old school to build a hotel, sometimes a public forest became a shopping mall and sometimes a squatter settlement changes to renovated apartments.

The urban spaces becomes ordinary commodities and capitalism uses the urban as a strategy to struggle against systemic crisis (İnal, Sancar, Gezgın, 2015). For long years, this phenomenon expressed by governors in Turkey as well. The famous sentence of “We overcame [economic] crises due to TOKİ<sup>150</sup>” has been used several times. Besides, since 1980s, the major claim of the İstanbul governors has been to make İstanbul a financial center in the globe. All metropolis in Turkey like Ankara and İzmir have become the center of giant urban renewal/gentrification projects. In general, the urban renewal projects are the processes which have been done by the force of local government without any democratic participation. Former residents of the renovated places are being driven through long distances and/or they face with payments of long term mortgages for an apartment. TOKİ has been criticized in many terms but probably the strongest critics came for the consideration of space as a “physical product” rather than a social reality (Ergun, 2014). The “urban renewal” process have been seen in many places of İstanbul like in Sulukule, a 1000 years old Gypsy district in İstanbul. This approach has been described as “Destroy and make an Ottoman imitation” by Sevgi Ortaç (Uşaklıgil, 2014).

By the time, there emerged winners and losers of the process. The winners of these processes have been the wealthier social classes. Some urban renewal processes have not been received great reactions when the small interests emerged for the relatively wealthier householders. Nevertheless a large mass of the people have become the sufferers and this revealed a reaction (Ergun, 2014).

In Turkey, the state intervenes the market to produce public goods. Especially in last decade TOKİ was used as a very powerful tool to produce houses for middle classes. However, in the process TOKİ had a certain transformation and its one of the primary function became providing spaces to the construction firms. By this way, middle class as well as luxury houses have been produced. The global as well as national climate for credits were well enough and TOKİ became a nexus of all kinds of housing system. The people have been asked about the concepts about urban issues. Most of the people thought TOKİ equal to rent and secondly people thinks about government. When they

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<sup>150</sup> Stands for Housing Development Administration, TOKİ is responsible of production of housing. By all types of projects, it became one of the overpowered institution of state in last 10 years.

are asked about “rent” people mostly mention about “money”, “capitalism”, “construction”, “TOKİ” and “AKP”.

**Table 15: Opinions on TOKİ**

TOKİ
beyond the ugly concrete mass Corruption corruption by the state digressed from its aim, it should not profit neither TRT. Exploitation expoliting rent source of system under the title of urban renewal flora of state foot of government good houses but no solution for shelter, rent government's corporation who built schools and Imam Hatips Grave in everywhere it used to be public housing but now back of government it was a need of Turkey but now it only creates rent as an important tool of ruling long, unformed buildings made a certain part rich by creating rent and destructing urban many people could buy home due to it massacre of space and green modern prisons not so positive, I would look more positively if it was in hands of another government organization that thread your life. Something can happen in your home which is not possible outside. pocket of Erdoğan Rent rent, always rent, richness, relation among state and capital rent, useless scandal, offer stone stack the poor quality houses of government tricking, making money by playing on hopes useless, supporter of government, concrete will collapse on their head



**Table 16: Opinions on Urban Renewal**

Urban renewal
a rent door opening by destruction of local values
a sort of invasion
Ali Ağaoğlu, destruction
betrayal to nature
cover of rent
Critical, but today it is rent.
Destruction
deconstructs all quarters
Failure
I don't see big problem when I think Gecekondu. But it means rent in Turkey
It must be done but we haven't seen
It must be done, the settlement is really bad
if it is done by experts it is ok but it is rent now
Interest
it has not been understood and it has not been done
it has pros and cons, rent, opportunism
it is a need but it is used against people for rent
it is necessary but in Turkey it is rental renovation
it must be done in a different way
lie, concrete
Massacre
Money
most clear site of free market
necessary but it is also depends on your aim
necessary in Turkey but the dwellers cannot be harmed
obligatory migration, they did in Mamak and people did it with a revanchist agenda, their purpose is to make people don't know each other
oppression of poor people, Gazi
Rent
rent, poverty since it is not the decision of poor
Robbery
sometimes it is a need
TOKİ
Totally rent by pushing people.
wish of upper classes to return city center

Participants are more optimistic about concept of urban renewal since some of them consider it necessary but people generally think under this circumstances the urban renewal is nothing other than rent.

In places where the rent oriented urban renewal projects exist, the participation in the events has a bigger urban movement side. Particularly in Dikmen, people are aware of what is going on in Dikmen Valley and they have a particular reaction against Gezi. The power has a discourse but the alternative discourse can be created in free spaces. Thus, the power has a great fear from such social spaces. Taksim has always been the potential space for such a new narrative, a secret scenario. In Ankara, the city has lost its all social squares within the time. The political meetings have been pushed to Sıhhiye and Tandoğan, which are less important crossroads compared to central Kızılay.

However, the number of people who directly relates the Gezi movement with urban issues is relatively low and it should be argued that urban issues play an indirect role for the motivations under Gezi. Considering the participants, there are less people who supported Gezi due to reasons related to transformation of urban space although it is clear that most participants have specific concerns on urban issues particularly urban renewal. Especially, in the issue of Ankara, the urban issues have become an important factor of “accumulation” against government and its micro presentation in Ankara (ibid).

In İstanbul, there was a spatial segregation between the groups from different fractions. The core group was staying in tents in Gezi Park. Other political fractions were using the Taksim square. Even though there were signs of political groups they were so few and no major group was dominating the area. While the major routes to square were barricaded, there was a festival atmosphere in Taksim (SETA, 2013). In Ankara, most of the people participated in the actions of groupings, walking, protesting with slogans. A certain part of them carried banners. Few of them conflicted with the police forces, and none of them vandalized any properties. People who only participated into actions in a specific part of the city generally don't have ideas about the actions in the other parts. Thus, the actions were isolated for these people. Thus people do not have much

information about these actions. Dikmen and Tuzluçayır are exceptions. However, people who could have a chance to participate into actions in different districts have interesting ideas about them. For instance, one states that he participated demonstrations in Kızılay but there were also a really distinct atmosphere in Tuzluçayır. Because he thought that in Kızılay “they were resisting” while in Tuzluçayır “all were resisting”. People have powerful perception about the actions in Dikmen and Tuzluçayır. Dikmen has been considered as more family oriented while Tuzluçayır was the major center of action. People argue that participants in Batıkent were more “Atatürkçü” while the major motivation in Tuzluçayır were built by Alevis. Some respondents argued that Alevis were also strong in Dikmen. Yüzüncü Yıl was pioneered by METU students and Cebeci-Kurtuluş were under support of Cebeci Campus students and people coming from Mamak-Tuzluçayır.

Places like Aydınlıkevler and Eryaman were more family oriented in where people participated in the action with their families those led “isolated” actions without much conflicts. Tuzluçayır residents provided logistic support to protestors and people foundshelter in this district effortlessly<sup>151</sup>.

For more than half of the people the center of the actions was Kızılay. The reasons can be summarized as the symbolic value of Kızılay, nexus of transportation, intensity of participation, harshness of intervention. Many people argued that Kenedi/Tunalı Streets can also be centers and also few people mentioned about other places<sup>152</sup>.

On the other hand, the cosmopolitan atmosphere of İstanbul led the emergence of such movement since a stronger urban rent raised in the many places of Ankara: “I don’t think such a movement could begin in Ankara. There is a more serious attack on all urban values in here, just look at the Atatürk Orman Çiftliği. It is times bigger than Taksim Gezi Park but no big action emerged”.

MacCannell mentions about a sight sacralization. Some spaces become sacralized and they gain symbolic meanings. According to him, this process emerge in five steps.

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<sup>151</sup> The ideas of participants about the other districts in Ankara have been provided in Appendix 14.

<sup>152</sup> The ideas of participants about the “center of the events” in Ankara have been provided in Appendix 15.

These stages are naming, framing and elevation, enshrinement, mechanical reproduction, and social reproduction. And Pearce argues that a sacralization was in practice in the issue of Taksim Square. AKP's landscape projects were also generating other sides of this process (Pearce, 2014). Same sacralization process emerged for Güvenpark as it was the place that Ethem Sarısülük was shot. On the other hand, another sacralization is adopted for the "trees". As Bora (2013) argues, actually defending of trees means defending of life. Being with tree instead of stone or bronze means a sacralization. As it was seen in the frequency analysis, the concept "tree" is mostly coded by "life". Thus, the intervention on public places was not only about cutting trees but also about destruction of public life. Similarly, as ruling party refers creating of life does not only a problem of tree planting statistics. Bora considers the events as a struggle to keep the public spaces in a city (ibid). However, none of the participants mentioned about the symbolic value of Taksim or Gezi Park in Ankara case.

As it has been mentioned in the debates of NSMs, there exist a distinction between public space, common space and commonization of space. In this respect, Taksim Square was a common space before Gezi. Kızılay Square was a "so called" public space since it has been used by the cars rather than people. Any representation of demands have been strictly prohibited in Kızılay for long decades. By Gezi, both these spaces reached the commonization which means an action in common spaces. The commonization can be considered as a significant issue for Taksim while it is a revolution for Kızılay. On the other hand, Kızılay has never become an appropriate space for civic actions. Since Ankara has been designed in 1927 by Hermann Jansen, Kızılay has been a cross point of several axes in the city. This symbolic space in Yenışehir has gained importance since republican time but it has never been a real square for people's gatherings. Raising rent transformed parks to buildings (Kızılay AVM) and bus stops (Güvenpark) but this central space has not been considered as more than a cross road<sup>153</sup>. Since it is the major line between the arteries, occupation on

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<sup>153</sup> One clear example of this approach have been seen in 2004. Municipality wanted to remove all pedestrian traffic in Kızılay by directing people to underground (metro) connections. Finally, the regulation cancelled but during the referendum people voted in the favor of this regulation by 92%.

Kızılay cannot be legitimate easily. Furthermore, Kızılay was extremely closed to governmental buildings and that makes the space as a natural target for police.

Most of the people in Turkey could not have a chance to get healthy information about the actions in İstanbul except two channels, being media and particularly social media. Most of them had no clear ideas about İstanbul. Some of the people strongly argue that events Ankara was harsher and more “successful” compared to İstanbul. Like in İstanbul police threw tear gas bombs from helicopters both in İstanbul Ankara. “Yes I saw, o bomb was coming from air, it shouldn’t be shoot from surface since it hit at the top of GAMA building which is at the center”. Some of them refer to cosmopolitan nature of resistance in İstanbul.

On the other hand, in spite of the fact that there had been a de facto commune in Taksim-İstanbul, it is known by very limited person in Ankara. Besides, some people argued that more people participated in Gezi in Ankara compared to İstanbul.

A known widespread argument was that Ankara was beaten while İstanbul having a “festival”. This is true in some sort for Taksim Square and Gezi Park area. Nevertheless it is fair to argue that there existed different Gezi actions for İstanbul rather than one in Gezi Park or central square. Taksim experienced a semi-autonomous atmosphere about two weeks which revealed such cultural activities but there were actions and harsh conflicts in different places such as Beşiktaş-Dolmabahçe. In contrast, there were not big conflicts in residential areas in Ankara except Tuzluçayır and Dikmen (after a while), police forces used all their reinforcements to keep central areas close to government buildings such as Kızılay and Tunalı<sup>154</sup>.

In terms of urban issues, participants were asked their ideal city imagination. Some people answered the question by mentioning cities like İzmir, Eskişehir, NYC or METU campus. Some of them stated that they wanted to live in a “socialist” city (as Ovacık or Tuzluçayır). Some mentioned a city with cultural life, a modern lifewhere people can gather in social spaces/squares and enjoy the good governance-democratic

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<sup>154</sup> A comparison by the participants between İstanbul & Ankara has been provided in the Appendix 19.

participation. However, beyond these, the most stressed word has been “green”. Nature has not been considered as a major problem for Turkey and world, but in the city scale it is the most wanted preference in Ankara<sup>155</sup>.

#### **4.3.2 Typical NSM Preferences of Gezi**

There were also several preferences those typically exist in new social movements. These are mostly related to the power structure of new social movement as well as dynamics of collective identity creation and urban aspect.

For instance, Gezi movement had no traditional hierarchies. The mass was not under the rule of strong organizations. Participants of this study were from different organizations and/or disorganized. Most of them were not a member of any organization including labor unions and political parties. In contrast, several times it is argued that Gezi does not belong to these organizations: “I believe that the mass organizations have been depleted”. “I don't have hope for them. “I don't think they are functional”. The disorganized form was new side of social movements in Turkey but also naturally, this form was also a basis the easier repression of movement: “We were disorganized. People were not professionals”. None of the participants argued that the movement had a leader. When they were asked those have been memorized for Gezi, very diversifying answers including abstract figures emerged. There is no consensus on a single image or figure. As distinct figure of Ankara, the participants mostly remember Ethem Sarısülük who was shot by his head on 1 June in Güvenpark, Kızılay. Lady in red, standing man, Ali İsmail Kormaz, Berkin Elvan<sup>156</sup>, Sırrı Sürreyya Önder, Çarşı and Gezi martyr were other major figures in Gezi events in memories<sup>157</sup>. Arslan thinks that the most efficient action in the protest were standing man. Probably the most distinct issue was timing. “In a boxing match, while the fighter of the state (police) was attacking against his rival, the weaker one recoils aesthetically and the attacker’s punch go to waste” (Arslan, 2013).

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<sup>155</sup> The ideal city of the participants have been provided in Appendix 24.

<sup>156</sup> After 269 days of he was shot in Gezi process, Berkin Elvan died in 11 March 2014. By that time the field study of this these was under progress and this is one of the reasons that he was one of the most referred figures.

<sup>157</sup> A word frequency analysis and exclusive answers for the figures those have been remembered from Gezi have been provided in Appendix 21.

Some writers like Evren (2013) argued that Gezi was the first “bottom up” movement in Turkey. There was no leader as it has been reflected by Erdoğan’s speech clearly: “I cannot find a person to address, who is responsible here?” New social movement theories emphasize the role of submerged, latent social networks. Most of the people were in the movements as a part of submerged networks: Police asks to Çarşı supporters: “Who gave you the mission to protect here?” and people respond “Everybody gives to other”. In reality, nobody knows who did since this is like an internet network model. Obviously there are some nexus points but it is impossible to mention an invisible responsible. Pichardo (1997) argues that NSMs attempt to replicate in their own structures the type of representative government they desire. They organize themselves in a fluid non-rigid style that avoids the dangers of oligarchic organization. In this network model, not only public interests but also individual interests found a place. That is why both hedonist figures as well as public response have been seen. Before June 2013, the social actions had a certain, bureaucratic and controlled form. However, all the cliché of socialist left on May 1 and all the cliché of state performed on May 19 have been destroyed in May 31. The search for extreme (long speeches, military orders, biggest banners, highest people towers in stadiums...) has been replaced drastically.

Like in İstanbul, no hegemony has been constituted by specific groups in the center of Ankara. The space was more likely a marketplace in where different groups tried to show they were in the actions. There were flags, banners, slogans of different groups but no institutional dominance existed on space. On the contrary, the supporting media often stressed the dominancy of group like CHP and TGB. Some participants argued that the nationalists were strong in Ankara. Nevertheless, icons like Turkish flag do not always provide strong clues about the identity of the participants. In most of actions in different countries, the national flags have been seen since people can use them to stress the national and legitimate characteristics of the actions. Similarly, in many actions the effect of supporter teams can be observed in the world. Thirdly, minority groups are seen in actions (Cantek, 2013).

On the other hand, several people have a global perspective and potential to build ties due to their education. Surprisingly, very few of them had linkages with İstanbul and

only few of them could have been in İstanbul during Gezi. New middle class approaches can have meaningful sides however it is compulsory to put such a new middle class framework particularly in Ankara. Besides, joining the protests based on cultural demands instead of economic. Nobody has been directly stressed on the economic preferences of government while nearly all of them referred to cultural aspects like the intervention of daily life.

No clear long standing ideal exists in the participations. Some of the participants think that the target was saving the trees. Really few of them felt themselves close to a revolution. However in general they had a specific agenda which was about stopping the repressive tendencies of government. There was no long run macro perspective or ideals. The movement just began with a specific agenda based on keeping Gezi Park. Then it has been transformed to a general protest against the government. Many people desired end of government but very few people were in direct conflicts with police and nobody knew what they could do when they pass the police barricade. Hence, it will be difficult to say there was a purpose of abolishing government in general. As Nas (2013) argued Gezi had a potential of affecting government rather than abolishing it: “I think they got the message. We proved that here is not bear garden”. “It has not achieved its aim. The government had to see that they are exploiting the nature but they cannot”. Like in the NSMs, this movement had a particular aim rather than changing system.

In addition, all the participants were volunteers. None of them had participated in the meetings by pushing of an organization. On the other hand, the individual motivations played a central role in the participation: “I was there because it was a vivid community”. “I liked the meetings, all my friends were in there”.

On the other hand, in all levels Gezi has been articulated with the globalization like typical NSMs. It articulated in many forms and the globalization process dialectically transformed the movement: Most of the people were regular internet users (most of them use internet almost all time) and all of them have at least one active social media account for about 5 years. Most of the people knew the actions from internet particularly social media, primarily facebook and secondly twitter. Social media as a



specific side of globalization became the primary motor of new organization. Majority of the people monitored the actions from internet including social media sharing and internet news channels of formal newspapers like Hürriyet. Besides, people used many forms of such technologies. In Istanbul a quadcopter<sup>158</sup> was used to take videos from the square. Some people claim that it was also used to see police movements. Such technologies were not widespread but they can be reached by ordinary people. Finally it was shot down during low flight and the pilot was taken into custody. Many people including the participants of this study shot photos and videos to share their live actions during the movement. A particular group in Ankara broadcasted live actions, escapes, occupations from a streaming web site. However, these new tools of NSMs could be used against the movements as well. People have been found easily and they are accused of sharing illegal things. USTREAM and Zello<sup>159</sup> could be used by police forces to track the activities and participants. Civil police forces used mobile phones instead of radio transmitters to hide their identities.

In NSMs, there are typical preferences. For instance, influence and power were replaced by promotion of autonomy and self-determination. Indeed, the participant mass in Ankara was generally against a certain concentration of power in government and people generally in search of more autonomy. In contrast, there were figures from government supporters with an eternal fidelity to the Prime Minister.

Like in the NSMs, Gezi emerged very unexpectedly. Nearly nobody could expect that such limited movement at the end of the 2013 May could affect all the country (Saltık, 2013). However, like in the NSMs, Gezi also started to lose weight rapidly. Harsh police intervention make some people fear. Violence became a thing that harmed legitimacy. Images are important for such movements. Naturally, after loss of Gezi Park, the symbolic basis of Gezi disappeared. District forums became the source of struggle rather than solidarity platforms since they showed the quite heterogeneous & eclectic face of Gezi. Clear political differentiations became visible. Government held a strong position with “respect to national will” meetings. Educational semester ended,

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<sup>158</sup> Is a remote control helicopter occupied with a video camera to take photos or videos.

<sup>159</sup> A radio transmitter software for smartphones which have been used in Gezi among the protestors for live communication.

people's support decreased, limits of creative methods have been reached and shopkeeper's tolerance depleted. Finally, Gezi ended rapidly.

Most of the people think that they are proud of the events now. Most of them say "If there emerge one action again I will certainly participate." One person mentioned that the actions supported and boosted by the community and they became the elements of such game. Nearly half of the people think that the actions reached their targets while others think that no success exist at the final. Some people consider the saving of Gezi Park as a success while the others refers to continuity of the government. Furthermore, few people considers the actions as a success since it was the first togetherness among very different groups<sup>160</sup>.

According to Nas, Gezi process was incredible, referring to Bourdieu, even though the government supported media represented the events as black and white everyone was located in their "habitus" during the Gezi events. Thus, it was indeed a subjective process that make people criticize their cultural and class positions (Nas, 2013).

In NSMs, post material values have priority. In Gezi, it can be clearly seen that post material demands were widespread in banners, slogans and graffiti. The most popular slogan was "Everywhere Taksim, everywhere resistance!" which refers nothing other than the resistance. People stated that they also used the slogans which are only about post-material values. Another image of such slogans was the reaction against government, particularly against Prime Minister. Gezi also changed a long time discourse in Turkey which is based on the "corrosion of laicism". Actually, there were people who participated in Gezi due to anxieties on secularism but the major discourse was more creative and libertarian especially among young people.

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<sup>160</sup> Answers on current thought about Gezi have been provided in Appendix 18.

## CHAPTER 5

### AUXILIARY DEBATES

There are some auxiliary issues to be mentioned. These issues are indirectly related to this thesis main construction but they are widespread elaborated debates about Gezi. Also, such issues are important in terms of new social movements discourse. One purpose of elaborating these issues are opening new pathways for future studies in this area.

#### 5.1 Violence in a NSM?

Not only by police forces but also by protestors violence became the part of daily life in Gezi process. Taksim was under occupation. In Ankara, most of the public properties (bus stops, traffic barriers, metro signs, advertisement panels, buses and municipality boxes) were damaged and vandalized. Some people tried to stop the vandalism while the others supported them. Some of these properties have not been repaired by the municipality for a certain time to label Gezi as a form of vandalism. After the protests, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality built an exhibition area in the auto park of municipality for damaged properties. Moreover the municipal prepared an internet web site<sup>161</sup> and published a booklet titled as “Olmamalıydı!”<sup>162</sup> presenting the vandalism of public properties in Ankara<sup>163</sup>. Based on government statistics, 291 private shops, 271 private cars, 116 police cars and 41 ambulance were damaged seriously and the financial loss reached 140 million liras (Beriş, 2013).

Some writers like Laçiner (2013) argued that Gezi protestors built a distance between violence and themselves while some others claimed that Gezi was generally peaceful.

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<sup>161</sup> <http://ankarageziolaylari.com> (including the digital version of Gezi booklet of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality)

<sup>162</sup> Named as “It should not have happenedhappen!” the booklet was pressed in 500.000 and sent to the addresses for free. Some part of the books can be found in the annexes.

<sup>163</sup> Some pages of “Olmamalıydı!” brochure which has 115 pages in real can be seen in Appendix 27. Same brochure has been published in a web site which has been on-line since the events. This brochure not only includes photos from Ankara but also İstanbul and it assesses the events by putting “what was wrong” step by step. <http://ankarageziolaylari.com/>

When asked to the participants in Ankara, a certain part of people denied the existence of violence. However, most of the people accepted the reality of violence after they saw the brochure of “Olmamalıydı!”. Most people mentioned that they were against such things those infested the soul of Gezi: “yes there was vandalism in Gezi which harmed our legitimacy”. “I cannot stop, I got afraid.” “vandalism and violence exist in Gezi but it cannot be accepted. However, there was police violence as well. They are fed by opposition”. “These activities provided a legitimate basis for government.”

**Figure 13: WFA for “Vandalism”**

**Table 17: Opinions on the Existence of Vandalism**

Vandalism
does not exist in Gezi
does not exist in Gezi, it was only for self defense
have not done by activist, done by civil police, even it has done by activists, it is not a crime
I saw a group those left stones on places. They provide a legitimate basis for government.
If it has been existed, it was fair
it exist but rare
it exists in Gezi but it cannot be accepted. However, There was police violence as well. They are fed by opposition
it is injustice
it is like sadism, police did it (violence?)
it is normal
it should not be done. But it had not been done in İstanbul
Lie
no there was not in Gezi. It is normal to see it in such a movement, it is nature of resistance.
no there was not in Gezi. The state of municipal goods were a consequence of our anger, they were already our properties
no, can we compare the destructed things with human life? Can all these match with the value of Ethem?
no, it is done just for defense
people died can we think about ten buses
reality in Gezi.
there are people in political groups, it is not always vandalism, normal
there was no vandalism, those bus stops were destroyed by police. some of them were self defense.
There was not plunder. Is it vandalism to fire Gökçek's fruit juice vehicle?
they were not Gezi activists, some people came with motorbikes and they plundered buses
yes ther was in Gezi. It was traitors and it was crime that must be punished
yes there is group including drug users in Gezi.
yes there was and some of them done by people us and we supported arguments of Gökçek. I don't consider correct but it is understandable.
yes there was vandalism in Gezi which harmed legitimacy of Gezi. I cannot stop, I got afraid.
Yes there was. I never approve, Gezi started by protecting nature, why we need vandalism?
yes, but it is normal
yes, but it is right
yes, there was and it was unfair but it can be understood
yes, there was but it was normal
yes, there was in Gezi but it was a need
yes, there was in Gezi, but lets don't call it as vandalism but damaging environment.
yes, there was vandalism in Gezi but it was right and legitimate, some polices should die like the killer of Ethem
Yes, there was. I saw by my eyes. Youth coming from places like Çiğir tried to burn everything in streets, ways have been closed, billboards were destroyed. It was clear and we left.
yes, there was. It was a normal consequence of herd mentality

Pursuant to Bora (2013), it was ironic to blame Gezi protestors with their vandalism against public property since the public space has already been under an invasion. On the other hand, part of the people accept violence reality in Gezi and but considered such actions normal. “No, it is done just for defense” “They attacked people, so breaking public phones or fruit juice vehicles is nothing”. “People died... can we think about ten buses?”. “Yes, but it is normal”, “I don't consider it acceptable but it is totally understandable”.

Some people believe that vandalism was a practice of police and/or other marginal groups as a provocation. “Yes, there is group including drug users in Gezi”. “Have not done by activists, done by civil police, even it has done by activists, it is not a crime” “They were not Gezi activists, some people came with motorbikes and they plundered buses”. “Yes, there was. I saw for myself. Youth coming from places like Çiğir<sup>164</sup> tried to burn everything in streets, ways have been closed, and billboards were destroyed. It was clear and we left.”

Few people consider violence as totally legitimate since it was in the limits of uprising. “Yes, there was in Gezi, but let's don't call it vandalism but damaging environment, it is not rational but it should be more”. “It is normal to see it in such a big social movement, it is the nature of resistance”.

According to Nas (2013), state of exception became normal and taking photos with the vandalized properties was a clear example of the normalization of violence. One interesting point is that several people think vandalism as violence. Secondly, it is seen that the “violence” became more normal and legitimate both for such events and for the society as a whole.

As stated by Max Weber, the identifier of modern state is its' claim of performing legitimate physical violence in a particular geography. Thus, the state is an institutional reflection of social violence. It is a Hobbesian approach which claims that people give the power of violence to state by a contract. As a consequence, the state is the basis of violence naturally and it is a monopoly of violence. According to Özcan and Çeğin, in

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<sup>164</sup> A district in Ankara close to city center where is identified by its aggressive Gypsy population.

Gezi the one who rationalized its' violence won the game. Like Nietzsche says, violence is the real motor of life. Its legitimacy is not based on its nature but it is acceptance by large mass of people (Çeğin and Özcan, 2014).

The violence in Gezi was typical state violence which have been performed during many other social actions. The first police violence provided a legitimacy for Gezi but also Taksim Square was occupied by the legitimacy with an invisible support of people to violence. Many participants argued that they participated Gezi when they saw violence on TV. Incoming days, the occupation of Gezi Park was a civil disobedience. This passive form provided an extra legitimacy for Gezi. The action combined all this passive resistance with creative methods and popularized it among Turkey. The guitarist man, lady in red, book reader were the images of this passive resistance. There was similar success under the resistance of Gandhi. As a British officer argued, passive resistance cannot be repressed by violence when it is supported by large mass of people. However in Gezi, after a while several groups emerged with violent tendencies. Not only such actions boosted Gezi with a romantic soul but also they provided strong arguments for government and they contributed the loss of mass support. Vandalism and the argument of "marginal groups" have been used widely. Walter Benjamin argues that the violence has a constructive character and when this character disappears the related institution collapse. When people think that the legitimacy of using violence depleted, the square has been lost rapidly (ibid).

The violent actions were not considered as good for the future of the movement and they provided a legitimate basis for the police intervention. However, it has been perceived by some protestors as acceptable in some cases. Also, it has been observed that sometimes concept of "vandalism" has been perceived as "violence against police".

## **5.2 Humor, Romanticism and "Y-Generation"**

Gezi has always been identified with a raise of humor which is mostly represented by the symbolic actors, images, actions and slogans on the walls. In Gezi, the atmosphere was entertaining that some participants openly argued that they were there since all the people were there and they were entertaining. It was especially valid for the district

walks, Kuğulu-Tunalı actions. People saw themselves as a part of movement. Moreover, it is fair to argue that violence could create such a romantic soul in some cases: Posing, taking *selfies* in the burned public buses could only be a fantasy in the Hollywood movies before Gezi.

Gezi also lifted the lid on the accumulated sub consciousness of Turkey: “About ten years old girls were singing marches every nights”. “Some football team supporters, whom I believe previous supporters of the government, were swearing against Prime Minister and they seem getting a contingent pleasure by doing it”. Nas (2013) reinforces these ideas by referring to sexist swearing and militarism in the mass participants. The slogans included “we are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal” which have been used by some of the participants of this study as well.

Humor also increased the anger of the government. Sometimes, the humor was going hand in hand with swear. However, usage of patriarchal slogans while criticizing the patriarchal character of government has been criticized much as well (Özkul, 2013). According to Yıldırım Türker the uprising in Gezi was a “revolution of laugh” at first. “It was a movement without leader and authority. The victory lies under the confusion of the state” (Türker, 2013)

About the youth sub culture, Solmaz (2013) claims that what American youth have lived in 1950s is now being lived by this youth. For long decades, the youth in Turkey has been considered quite sterile but now another sub culture revealed and became visible. As stated by Kurtaran, the new generation was not political because they just don’t find anything interesting in politics. But as Özkul argues, they showed that they can be political when their life is under certain supression.

On June 17, a man called Erdem Gündüz performed a new sort of action. He was just standing silently in front of AKM and looking to banner of Atatürk. This protest, which is technically legal, was called “dilemma action”. The tools of dilemma actions, like a piano, are not strategic in real and their power comes from this preference. When several protestors started to perform similar action, police started to get under arrest. Custodies had no legal basis and so it contributed the loss of legitimacy for the government in Gezi protests (Pearce, 2014).



After Gezi, the artistic action became more widespread. Such expressions provided a boost for the action by their dilemma action characteristics. Castells argues that the state has the violence monopoly but construction of images in the people's minds is a more powerful tool. Culture transforms people in long whiles (ibid).

Lady in red was a strong image of Gezi. It was in the first days, a lady in red outfits was exposed to tear gas in very close range. It gathered a certain sympathy in social media since it was characterizing an absurd way of violence towards an innocent woman. Through the final stages, the mothers who came to park reconstructed same image. Mask of Guy Fawkes was another example of this image which has been used in Ankara as well. This symbolic tool popularized by movie of V for Vendetta<sup>165</sup> and used in protests in Tahrir Square as well as Occupy Wall Street actions. Wearing masks was banned after in street actions performed by Kurds in 2014 (ibid).

According to Altun, several philosophers including Nurettin Topçu, Frantz Fanon, Alie Şeriati, Albert Camus considered uprising as a natural action of being human. It is not related with modern rational action but with romantic theology. In Turkey, there are both examples of this romantic uprising culture in socialist as well as Islamic tradition (Altun, 2013). Probably, this romanticism found a body in the standing alliance of anti-capitalist Muslims and socialists in the process of Gezi. This cult has been fed by popular culture icons like vendetta masks or roman costumes<sup>166</sup>. These people have a tendency to see themselves as natural resistants and others as all-time obedient. Maybe the term "Y-Generation" has some basis in this issue. On the other hand one anarchist ideal about civil disorder says "the best governance is the least governing". Some philosopher even goes beyond and say "the best governance is not to be governed". For these people, due to rational purposes, governance has already been opportunist by its nature. However, sometimes people do not behave as opportunist as the system demands (Thoreau, 2007). These arguments assume a hidden

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<sup>165</sup> V for Vendetta is a German-American anti-systemic movie by 2005 telling a story about a one-man resistance to popular uprising in an authoritarian dystopia. The major character image inspired many anti systemic movements and the mask of the movie star became popular among the activist all over the World.

<sup>166</sup> A man used Byzantine legionary/legioner costume during the METU way resistance which shows that sometimes uprising can only be done for itself.

and natural anarchism intrinsic to people. It should be argued that the little occupy period of self-autonomy and open solidarity in public space could create romanticism which is fed by such an anarchic soul.

On the other hand, nobody has been expected such an action from Turkish youth who is considered “apolitical”. However, actors in Ankara case are not apolitical, instead they are familiar with protests. But, these protests belonged to very different types. Some of them were supporters of leftist actions while many of them participated in republic day meetings. Also, the frequency of participation should be considered; most people mentioned only May Day and republican meetings that are indeed exceptional gatherings during a year time.

In Gezi protests, fairly unique techniques have been created: Talcid men, tent builders, colorful demonstrations, standing men, reacting against tear gas capsules, quadraicopter records, USTREAM broadcasts, usage of construction vehicles, rediscovery of social media, protesting mainstream media. Like in the formulation of Simmel's Metropolis and Mental Life, even İstanbul experienced the differences and innovations with recklessness (Kodalak, 2013).

Reflections have been seen in humor, in social media, in graduation ceremonies and in whole country as well as in globe. The events became the major source of the humor which is still alive after more than one year. Most of the famous humor magazines published special editions for Gezi. Global media channels such as CNN and organizations such as EU and Amnesty International (2013) were interested in events and published several reports or releases (Ergenç, 2014).

Cantek (2013) argues that not only “Soldiers of Mustafa Kemal” but also “Soldiers of Mustafa Keser, Soldiers of Yıldız Tilbe”<sup>167</sup> as well of anti-militarists were in Gezi. According to him, unlike the 80s generation, the 90s-generation (or Y-generation) had not an injured relation with politics. They don’t care about the inner contradictions of left and being side by side has more meaning than being against fascism. They felt in

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<sup>167</sup> Soldiers of Mustafa Kemal refers to groups who follow the ideas of Ataturk, the founder of Turkey. It is used in slogans popularly by some nationalist groups. In contrast, Soldiers of Mustafa Keser and Yıldız Tilbe are reformulations of the slogan in an ironic and humorous way.

proud and even some of them reflected their gratefulness in their banners. “Everything was a cloud then life began”. Obviously, “The life” is the most popular metaphor in Gezi. The libertarian slogans have been deformed by hedonist discourses like in occupy movement: “One way revolution-amen”, “One way chocolate”, “the cure is Drogba”<sup>168</sup>, “Gekas on duty”<sup>169</sup>, “The revolution will not be broadcasted on TV”, these slogans have focused on two actors specifically: Firstly, Tayyip Erdoğan and secondly the police. Erdoğan’s long run provocative discourse has been responded in a counter way: “you banned alcohol and people have come around”, “This is the mood of Ayran” , “Would you like to have 3 children like us?”, “We could not have shower send us a TOMA”, “Tear gas makes us high”, “You attacked a generation who beat police in GTA”<sup>170</sup>. Wieviorka (2005) argues that the actors in “new social movements” are characterized by a high degree of cultural awareness; they have no qualms about challenging the cultural orientations of the societies in which they live. They confront authority in all its forms. Similarly, Gezi people have not hesitated to make fun of every images. Alan (2013) states that the 80s generation encounter bureaucratic obstacles, or say the state, in parks. “It was forbidden to step on grass in parks and we were struggling against the park wardens”. Several people argued that in Gezi, they have found their old friends. “We were friends in facebook but have not contacted until Gezi”. We saw that we were on same pavement again during Gezi, we walked together and defend each other

Until Gezi, twitter activism has been derogated. Gezi rebuilt the signifiers of the concepts. Even a concept called “resist” became popular and it is started to be used in everywhere: “resist iPhone charger”, “resist Mirzabeyoğlu”<sup>171</sup> (Evren, 2013).

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<sup>168</sup> This slogan refers to a famous football player Didier Drogba who is seen as a cure for the dire situation of Galatasaray, one of the most popular football teams of Turkey.

<sup>169</sup> Another slogan taken from the football. A greek player Teofanis Gekas is called on duty.

<sup>170</sup> Stands for Grant Theft Auto, GTA is a world-wide bestselling video game which is based on committing offence and driving through city.

<sup>171</sup> Mirzabeyoğlu is an Islamic figure who was sentenced to life imprisonment in Turkey.

### 5.3 Arab Spring and Gezi

Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across the Middle East in early 2011. The term “Arab Spring” was popularized by the Western media in those times, when the successful uprising in Tunisia against former leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali emboldened similar anti-government protests in most Arab countries.<sup>172</sup> Since Ben Ali’s presidency coming after a bloodless coup in 1987, he was subsequently reelected with enormous majorities, each time exceeding 90% of the vote; the final re-election was on 25 October 2009 (Yannick, 2009). The events in Tunisia all of a sudden gained momentum in a very unexpected way. In 17 December 2010, a 26-year-old street seller whose stand was taken since he denied bribing and burnt himself in front of a government building. His name was Muhammed Buazizi and his protest was recorded by his cousin and published in social media. In a very short time, hundreds of people came to the same place to protest. The center of the events were comparatively poor and small town with 40.000 people in the south of capital. In a few days, several new symbolic suicides emerged and protests started to spread different cities. By January 2011, police killed 147 people to stop events. After the end of French support who have been his ally since 1987, Ben Ali had to escape to Saudi Arabia. Protestors were demanding free elections and swearing to corrupted politicians, financial speculators, brutal police as well as media. They have not been satisfied by the remnants of regime and they built up tents in the center of capital. The walls were filled by slogans and long standing forums were established for discussions. Even the possible positive role of Islam on corruption have been discussed (Since the Islamic influence was strong in Tunisia, the Islamists were generating one of the powerful groups among protestors but that was not an Islamic movement, in contrast secularism and Islamism could survive without great conflicts). Besides, national icons (such as flag and anthem) were used often. The composition of the participants were mostly consisted of young people including workers (also supported by labor unions), unemployed people, in particular educated unemployed people who were an identification of imbalance between

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<sup>172</sup> <http://middleeast.about.com/od/humanrightsdemocracy/a/Definition-Of-The-Arab-Spring.htm>

education and equal opportunities. Organized opposing parties could not be a strong part of the movement, the leaderships of the movement have been created and recreated in different spaces. The TV channels have become primitive tools of government propaganda. And Al Jazeera has become the major TV channel monitored by people which was using the information coming from ordinary people via social media and spreading them to general public. On the other hand, especially amongst educated young people, internet-mobile phone usage was the highest in Tunisia among all near countries (Castells, 2012).

At this point, Castells mentions a hybrid public space which was emerged due to connection of free usage of internet (majorly facebook, twitter and youtube) and occupation of urban space. According to him, the uprising was a successful as well as an original example for Arab societies since it was denying leaders, boosted by a long standing cyber activism culture and supported by a widespread internet usage. This was a precursor of a new network society in Arab world (ibid).<sup>173</sup>

As it has been seen many similarities exist between Tunisia events and Gezi. While there were many same reasons to motivate such an action before, Gezi started by a revanchist shopping mall project in İstanbul. In this respect, it was also similar to the launch of Arab Spring. Like in the example of social media and mobile phone usage, many aspects were coming from the soul of new social movements. As stated by Castells a similar hybrid public space has been constructed by free usage of internet and occupation of public space during Gezi. In Turkey, call for sharing of free wireless have been made and it succeeded. Both in Tunisia and Turkey the government tried to stop these channels by banning twitter and youtube several times.

The effect of internet have been seen in the actions in 6 April Movement which started in Egypt after the events in Tunisia. Even though only 5% of Egypt population had facebook accounts, this limited number of users achieved to constitute a qualitative result. The main philosophy of this groups was demanding change without violence. In addition, like in the NSMs, the group was consisting of young people who declared

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<sup>173</sup> After the collapse of former regime, Gannuşi was elected by free elections. He symbolizes a reformist Islamism which does not exclude modernism and his actual reference is considered as Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (Castells, 2012).

that they were not close to any political party. The facebook group which have been set in 23 March, reached from 300 to 3000 members in one night, to 40.000 in one week and to 70.000 in two weeks. (Telci, 2011) On the other hand, according to Hafez (2013) the movement is a representation of how social movements in Egypt developed to link political demands with grassroots socio-economic demands, mainly by the workers: *Until recently, it has been opposition parties, unions who carried the banner of activism against injustices. At that time, political life in Egypt and the global south in general was about left and right, east and west, capitalism and socialism. But this black-and-white setup offered further challenges... ...the tools were diverse and creative, reflecting a departure from the old conventional ways, which the oppressive state had devised many counter-tools to suppress.* As stated by Işık (2013) the events in Turkey were not an Arab spring but the tools (particularly Internet-social media) were same.

The particular example of Tunisia could not be repeated in other Arab countries. Day by day, the long standing dictatorial regimes have collapsed though in general new governments followed authoritarian ways or countries went into extreme chaos. When Gezi participants were asked about Arab spring, people predominantly refer to hopeless story in Libya, Egypt and Syria. In these places, the movements were not always secular and modernist, sometimes they were revanchist rather than pluralist. Kürkçügil argues that the Arab spring was more like social actions in 1800s in which people demanded removal of old feudal structures and created the basis of today's nation states (Kürkçügil, 2013).

**Table 18: Opinions on Arab Spring**

Arab Spring
American game
an artificial transformation process for the redesign of middle east
anti-authoritarian action, results does not match with the aims
consumed hopes
does not have real basis, it is about external supports. People have not such a demand.
execution in Egypt, change of power
foreign policy
game of imperialism. Yes Kaddafi was a dictator but he could use Libya's resources better for Libya.
hopeless middle eastern people
I am critical about Gezi because of Arab spring. It can start good but then goes like Arab spring
imperialist fascism
is it really spring? It is exaggerated.
it did not bring us summer
it exceed the limits
it is an inception but not a consequence
it is like Gezi by the results: Could not terminate dominant power but made it more powerful
it never ended with spring, maybe it is a winter
Lie
Massacre
middle eastern societies are not mature enough to demand democracy
need to be worried
new dictators rise
no idea
parallel to Gezi, many people reacts agains something in the world but maybe sources comes from Islam, being silent can be related to Islam
Persepolis
Rabia, nonsense, violence
Reza
richness of dishonored people, spending money without control
social media
Syria, Egypt
Tricky
we live Arab spring in Turkey at the moment, it is like a winter now.
we see the conditions of countries

## 5.4 Movement of 68, Occupy and Gezi

More than half a century after 68, Gezi emerged in Turkey. There has been a bunch of similarities as well as some differences between 68 and Gezi in macro as well as micro form. Considering the similarities, the driver of Gezi was white collars and students like in 68 but it was obvious that Gezi gathered a certain attention from very different segments of the society. Secondly, ideals were almost the same: rise against central power, more individual freedom, equality in gender as well as all other identities. Besides, demand for defending the ideas of secularism was an original ideal in Turkey. It is directly related with the lifestyle but also a part of *Atatürkçü*<sup>174</sup> ideology. Thirdly, both countries had strong central governments as well as charismatic political figures as de Gaulle and Tayyip Erdoğan who had certain successes in political life over the last decades. On the other hand, there were many micro similarities: The events started by a micro scale issue and advanced rapidly by the harsh intervention of police. The government followed a brutal way and this provided a very sympathetic and legitimate basis for the protest. At the end, de Gaulle found the elections as a way out and he succeeded. Tayyip Erdoğan did not call for an early election but he searched for support from his party basis also he mentioned that the arena for such demands could only be elections. He succeeded in the first elections less than one year after Gezi. There are even contingent similarities in the some parts of the actions: There were conflicts in barricades with stones and extreme tear gas attacks. After a certain point, both National Union of Students as well as Taksim Solidarity called to stop street actions. It was spring, a proper time for actions: Police entered Sorbonne on 16 May 1968 and Turkish police took back Gezi Park on 15 June 2013. 68 created its own sub-culture with slogans and humor which was repeated in Gezi. Some characters transformed to well-known political figures in the world and same thing can be expected in future social democratic-leftist-socialist tradition in Turkey.

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<sup>174</sup> Atatürkçülük (English: Atatürkism), also known as or the Six Arrows is the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey which is mainly based on Turkish nationalism and statism. Kemalism, as it was implemented by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was defined by sweeping political, social, cultural and religious reforms designed to separate the new Turkish state from its Ottoman predecessor and embrace a Westernized way of living, including the establishment of democracy, civil and political equality for women, secularism, state support of the sciences and free education, many of which were first introduced to Turkey during Atatürk's presidency in his reforms. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kemalism>



While 68 was going in parallel with the actions in some countries Turkey was experiencing a rebellion atmosphere close to Arabic countries with uprisings. On the other hand, there were some differences as well. In contrast to 68, Gezi could not found a strong worker support. Call of strikes could not succeed and Gezi never became a worker oriented movement. The strongest mass support has been constituted by Alevi people in Gezi. There were natural changes: Radio was replaced by social media-mobile phones and new age tools were used in Gezi. However, the soul in the slogans were slogans were quite same that people write “liar!” on the vandalized NTV broadcasting car in Taksim.

68 developed a very strong reaction against gender discrimination and so it provided a good basis for gender movements. Similarly in Gezi “marginal” groups like Anti-capitalist Muslims, LGBT and vegan movement could find a basis to identify themselves. Several people who don’t have much idea about LGBT say “Yes, they supported Gezi”. Furthermore, some writers argued that participation of women made Gezi more peaceful. Most of the time the system was not the main target but both supports of 68 and Gezi were uneasy with the political and social results of neo liberal/neo conservative governance (Güleç, 2013).

According to Gülhan (2014), even though there are many similarities between 68 Movement and Gezi, it would be problematic to consider Gezi as a new 68. Because, 68 Movement has not only meant a certain wave of social movements but also a new break down in many areas including history, sociology, politics and culture. Thus, the consideration of Gezi as a new 68 has still time to be analyzed by its results.

In brief, there were differences as well as similarities between 68 and Gezi. Considering the similarities, calling Gezi as “a new 68” cannot be an exaggerated titling. As Güleç argued, it was not a revolution but an uprising, specifically against the government but also against many points in the system.

Another comparison is made between Gezi and occupy movement. Like in the Occupy Movement, Gezi was also emerged as the occupation of a certain place. Only one person from participants referred to occupy movement but s/he thought Gezi was not

occupy in Ankara: “This is an explosion, not an occupy movement in Ankara. In occupy, people stand with their tents”.

In Gezi Movement, *Çapulcu Pazarları* (Chapuller’s Bazaar) emerged which was based on the barter of second hand dresses. It was tried to be done in the forum parks, especially in wealthier parts of İstanbul, but has not been able to generate a powerful influence and institutionalization. The second movement was Güç Birliği which emerged as a platform after the collection of a fund to advertise in New York Times as “What is happening in Turkey?”. This synergic organization was a sui-generis one which connects white collar professionals and that is why the major nexus of connection was LinkedIn and slogan was “expert managing, consulting democracy”. Like in the sample of America, probably these people thought that despite their high skills they were not in the positions they deserve in their jobs (Özatalay, 2014). To conclude, there exists some similarities with Occupy Movement and Gezi but Gezi cannot be considered as an “occupy” since it had not a material basis demanding more justice for the lower strata of the society.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

Turkey encountered a new form of social movement embodied in Gezi events in May, 2013. Gezi movement is simply unprecedented and cannot be easily identified. While some considered the movement as a conjectural public order problem, others thought it as a milestone in the history. This thesis aims to analyze Gezi movement through a model. Probably this thesis can be summarized by an incident which includes the major paths of the model constructed for Gezi.

Two years before Gezi, an exhibition was organized in a place which is quite close to Taksim by the European Capital of Culture Agency called “Hayal-et Yapılar”. The English translation of the title does not represent the playful nature of the word “Hayal-et” which cleverly goes back and forth between *hayalet* (ghost) and *hayal et* (imagine!). It was a visually stunning exhibition about urban memories with 12 examples of İstanbul’s long-lost buildings with an air of “if they still existed, what would they look like today?” Among other architectural utopias, artillery barracks were represented as urban spaces beaming with life. Such illustration had re-imagined functions of military barracks with cafes, shops, luxury residences, sport facilities, museums and concert halls. It was nostalgic and utopian but also consumerist and gentrified, mostly a rethinking of this building complex as contributing to the commercial everyday life (Harmanşah, 2014).

Subsequently, it is learnt that, Prime Minister Erdoğan had seen the exhibition and appropriated the imagined visual scenario about the Taksim barracks from Hayal-et Yapılar as if it was a real architectural project and used it in many presentations in June 2011 to promote AK Party’s plans called “Türkiye Hazır, Hedef 2023” (Turkey is Ready, Target is 2023). The irony of situation intimates the relationship between utopias and reality in the long term history of the cities. (ibid)

This ironic incident represents several aspects in the major body of the thesis. Probably one of the most important aspects is how a framing process, such as an “utopist

illustration”, can be affective on the reconstruction of urban space. When the decisions become centralized, such sensitive inciters gain strong importance. In the case of Gezi, the power has not only been centralized, but also personalized in the mood of Prime Minister Erdoğan. Such an utopia was a typical reconsideration of urban space articulated with capitalist trends. Rapid, authoritarian and up-to-down gentrification became visible in the cafe umbrellas of such illustration. Even though the root of Taksim Pedestrianization project was not new, the adoption and integration of images into the Target 2023 propaganda gives clues about the contingent soul of today’s world as well as new social movements.

The project, which has become visible after an ironic incident, was though as a prestige project for AK Party. Ironically it revealed massive protests and became the starting point of a decline in AK Party. Today, some participants think that Gezi events have not produced “an actual result”. Also, it can be argued that the aura of Gezi faded away after two years and people remember Gezi as a nostalgic event. However, it is also obvious that Gezi protests was a powerful standing against the central power. Some writers such as Yalman (2014) thinks that Gezi was the end of social engineering of the government. Majority of the participants thinks that Gezi could not reach the target but it will certainly have influences in social, economic and political life (Pearce, 2014). For the first time after Gezi, the government lost its unified standing and self-confidence and tried to use more repressive ways. It adopted a harsh discourse which considers all the opponents as a part of conspiracies. This approach contributed the fragmentation in Turkish society.

In a broad sense, three components lie under the emergence of Gezi. These components are interrelated. The first component is an identity which have experienced a long run transformation process. This is a rejuvenating new identity which lived an open economy, raising technological opportunities, consumerism trends, decline in welfare provisions, uneven urban transitions and fall of sharp ideologies. Due to endless information follows, this identity lived in a relational urban space as well as a cyberspace. This identity had to become more global more liberal and more plural as well as more fragmented due to strong interaction in its nature.

The second component of this model is power. In the case of Gezi, this power has been exercised by a political party and its conservative reflections in the society. AK Party, as the 10-decade-ruling party has been one of the agents contributing to the creation of this new identity. However, by the elections in 2011 AK Party felt itself quite powerful to act as it wants to be and it started to depart from central-conservative democracy by making long term projections that aims to design the future of Turkey. At the same time, the oppositional elites such as military has lost their playmaker roles. AK Party's symbolic plans for 2023 and 2071 were reflections of this long run power perception. This process also indicated an articulation of AK Party and its charismatic leader Erdoğan. In this process, rule of AK Party has been embodied at him so all the policies have been formed around his understanding of life. By this self-confidence, AK Party started to regulate all aspects of life and that can easily be seen in the speeches of Erdoğan who forms sentences that is against personal freedoms. For some identities, such as seculars, this accumulation was not new but for most people it was a product of last 3-4 years.

At final stage, this concentration of power became visible in a neo-liberal, revanchist urban renewal project called Taksim Pedestrianization Project. The small resistance to save Gezi Park trees was repressed harshly and this created a great explosion against power. In this explosion stage, symbolic activities as well as images and their representation played a significant role. That showed the importance of framing while constructing a movement. Due to these interactions a collective identity has been created as the third component. Political opportunities those based on mostly divergences in governmental power as well as peace process with the Kurdish society had positive effects on the movement. Resources such as high social capital and limited support of surrounding agents have contributed the continuity of the movement. Gezi declined after the loss of symbolic space in Taksim and ended rapidly as it started. During this relatively short period, Turkey experienced a new social movement for the first time in its history.

Gezi was an important experience in many aspects. It was important as a style of opposition. Solmaz (2013) argues that excluding Kurds and Muslims (as political movements) when more than 3 people comes together they succeed to fall behind even

power of one in terms of quality. The opposing parties have forgotten to manage, and they lost the power of providing excitement and motivation to the mass. The classical organizations such as DİSK could not even manage a powerful standing. That is why these organizations were unreliable for most of the participants. Gezi created something other than all these.

Moreover, Gezi showed that there is a social change in Turkey. Emergence, continuation, mass support, preferences of participants, proliferation dynamics were the reasons those made Gezi unique and new (Kanbak and Önver, 2013). The distinct side of Gezi not lied on quantity but on quality. The participants were from a qualitative group including young, educated, “middle class”, “golden collars”. Significantly big part of this group experienced such a social action for the first time in their lives. The events were quite productive and it transformed itself into new conditions creatively for a long while. Gezi also had a unique place in the history of Ankara. City dwellers have not been experienced such an action process before, like the symbolic center in İstanbul-Taksim, Kızılay had been occupied by the protestors decades after. On the other hand while AK Party got certain attention as a “defender of democracy” by struggling against old state ideology, Gezi was a democratic entity with its struggle against central power on nature. After a while, democratic arguments in Gezi were started to be shadowed by typical power issues like in fights in forums.

Prime minister was so confused about the actions since he is not familiar with such kind of opposition. The only opposition should be in style of what have been done by the oppositional party, thus his reductionism on the movement included an intimate approach as well. Probably the weak points of the event is the main reason behind its power. The marginalization of disorganized mass was not easy. As Elias Canetti (2014) mentions, the mass is an agent who wants to get bigger without any organizer out of itself. In this vein, Gezi seems like an anti-organization (Kurtuluş, 2013). Indeed, Gezi had many “deconstructive” sides. Building barricades by using construction bars (which were actually prepared for a revanchist urban renewal), using pools to deactivate tear gas bombs, playing guitar against polices, standing in the center of Taksim were these deconstructive examples which made systemic reactions ineffective. The protestors were not proactive but reactive. They were in the space not

to demand but to object. This was a mass with anger but without a thesis, a target. However, the major motivation of the movement was the imagination of a Turkey without the conservative rule of Erdoğan. Both, these were connecting elements of different parts of society.

Apparently, Gezi is a product of long time accumulation. Until Gezi, most of the channels were blocked by the government which prevented the representation of the people. The opposing parties were dysfunctional and far from proper representation and reaction. People were feeling their individual choices and identities were suppressed strongly. This was a long time accumulation but also boosted embodied in the image of Tayyip Erdoğan. The imbalanced attack to an environmentalist action in Gezi Park was the final straw which created a breaking point. The natural legitimacy of the action, symbolic images such as burning tents and using tear gas on defenseless people motivated people to act. The emergence as well as survival of the actions have been realized by several different factors. The political opportunities which have given due to contradictions between political actors provided a basis for the movement. There were pulling motives such as vividness of Le Bon's crowds those pulled people to the events. Some resources such as proper time, network communication possibilities and social capital fed the expansion of the protestors. However it can be argued that, identity was the strongest aspect of the Gezi participants that made them protestors. Obviously, they carried different identities from nationalist to communist, besides, they even had eclectic and fragmented identities. However, the primary driver of Gezi was the repression on the identities. This repression has not only occurred due to direct attacks like police force or Erdoğan's speeches but also by a discourse which had been constructed by certain frames. This fragmented identity not only showed the togetherness of differences but also it provided clues about the decline of the movement by its flaneur character.

In Gezi, a certain part of the society showed indignation at the several government policies. Such policies have been varied from policies on family to urban, from foreign policy to education. This anger have been crystallized on one character (Tayyip Erdoğan) and on one space (Gezi Park). The movement in Ankara could not find a single space but in several spaces however Kızılay have been occupied as the place

with a symbolic value. Kızılay/Güvenpark, Kuğulu/Tunalı/Bestekar were popular areas while Eryaman, Batıkent, Dikmen, Tuzlucaıyır revealed originalities. It can be argued that after Gezi, Kızılay and Güvenpark had a new symbolic value as well.

In the case of Ankara, the participants were coming from a young and educated group. They have identified themselves as middle class mostly. All people in the study were living in Ankara metropolitan borders and almost all were coming from urban families. Ankara case indicates to an “over online” network society that all participant have internet in many parts of their life. Facebook is the major social platform that is used in the case of Ankara, reflecting the general condition in Turkey. Consequently, the people monitored the events via internet and online facilities have constituted the major tool of organization in the case of Ankara. The group is under the strong bombardment of the frames constructed by media and there exist certain overlapping between their understanding of concepts and the concepts coming from framing analysis. This was an unorganized group without strong membership and trust to CSO type organizations. However, most were familiar with activism before Gezi. Most of the participants voted for CHP, the mainstream social democratic party in Turkey. However, most of these voters were atypical supporter (relatively liberal political identities) instead traditional supporters. These atypical voters would become the target group of HDP in the general elections of 2015 in Turkey. In sum, most people had a certain habitus for the participation into such action. The people in Gezi Park were generally from middle classes that both their income and perception locate them in middle classes. Bourdieu uses the term “petit bourgeois habitus” to refer a link between the middle classes and new social movements in advance modern societies. The movement have been titled as “resistance” and “uprising” mostly. The liminal experience was also a distinct aspect of the Gezi which cannot be explained by the methods of this study. The violence was an identifying aspect of Gezi especially in the case of Ankara. More than half of the people argued that they participated into the actions due to the (municipal) police intervention in İstanbul. Some people argued that they have been imposed to police violence. However, Gezi also showed that there has been a hidden acceptance of the violence among participants in the case of Ankara.



In the case of Ankara, Gezi was the product of a new identity which was under certain accumulation of a repression process. This case confirms the Melucci's identity based understanding of the new social movements. Most people from Ankara case argued that the major causes of Gezi was the government intervention to the daily life. This is a clear cultural concern about lifestyle which generally excludes the material basis. Different identities constituted important motives for Gezi participants and the strongest motivation for Gezi was the perception of repressive policies on people's individual freedoms. Briefly, the repressive policies of government constituted the major basis of Gezi but also in the case of Ankara, the movement easily found a higher identity as being against Melih Gökçek. Violence against public properties has been crystallized in his implementation of municipality. That is why the violence has been considered partially legitimate case of Ankara among participants. As Foucault argued, power exists when it is exercised and in the case of Gezi it gained meaning in the space and time. Oppression was an authoritarian way of domination which created its discourse of deviance. From a Foucauldian perspective, Gezi supporters were labelled and marginalized by government. This was a typical example of creation of "deviant" however it provided a collective identity under the title of "Çapulcu". The government had chosen the way of police aggression like in the example of Orwell's "Killing of an Elephant" story which took the issue to a massive movement.

Most of the people argued that Gezi changed their perspective. Most of them said they have hope again. One said that s/he realized that s/he was not only person with the feeling of repression. However, there are also people who argues that Gezi did not changed much in their life<sup>175</sup>. "For the first time, I am proud of being born in these lands".

It seems that the protests will affect the political life in Turkey. The Gezi movement was the biggest and most effective movement of post military coup era in Turkey. It has already saved the park and paused the discussion on presidential system. CHP and BDP have been in a discussion of determining candidates from Gezi actors in elections. An analysis on movement has already been prepared in AK Party which includes many

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<sup>175</sup> "Gezi effect on the people's life" has been provided in Appendix 23.

different aspects of movement. In some districts such as Batıkent-Ankara district forums could prepare candidates for local elections. It is strongly probable that the movement will have medium term and long term effects in the political life in Turkey. Some people argued that new political movements can emerge while some others like Kongar and Küçükkaya (2013) thought Gezi was a milestone but emergence of new political parties were not realistic.

On the other hand, there is a marginalization between Gezi protestors and the government supporters. According to Nas (2013) Gezi could not construct an argumentation appealing to basis of AK Party. Many methods in Gezi, such as building a commune based solidarity, can never receive a certain attention by the masses. The Gezi participants are proud of Gezi while government considers the movement as a coup. There are two polars with zero tolerance for others who had to live together. Considering this, it might be argued that according to some people Gezi not only showed the existence of an alternative but also resulted in gathering of some people near the charismatic leadership of Erdoğan as well. Excluding some exceptional voices, the government and supporters considered the movement as a big conspiracy. Gezi has been seen as a betrayal against success and it should be punished harshly. Therefore, all the government policies targeted to repression of the movement in any condition. The research on Gezi (done by the Party) did not taken serious in AK Party and extraordinary voices have been silenced. At final stage, Gezi also revealed a certain marginalization process. Both sides of society break off the other since one side believed that 8 people were murdered in Gezi while other part thought that there was an unfair uprising (even coup) against legitimate government. As a consequence of these polices, polarization continues to rise by 2015. And, nobody can expect how and where a rapid reaction will emerge.

Returning to major research question of this thesis, “can perception of repression create a new social movement?”, the protest of Gezi in the case of Ankara constitutes a good example to support this claim. Gezi showed that Turkish society has transforming identity demands. Of course, all these transformations have a bunch of reasons but at final stage, the repressive concentration of power lead the emergence of such a movement.

Concluding, nobody clearly know that if the slaves rebelled due to maturity of extreme conditions or the leadership of talent Spartacus in the history. Actually, there is no single answer for the question of “why these events emerged in that time or why all people pour into the streets at that moment?” On the contrary, there exists a bunch of reasons (Kürkçügil, 2013). Indeed, what happened in Gezi was similar to what Kürkçügil claims particularly in the first hours of 1 June 2013, people mentioned the “sounds coming from streets”. Like in the chaotic conditions of social life it was impossible chase up this liminal phenomenon.

At final, this thesis tries to build an abstract model and provide some answers according to this model. Future technologies, such as more efficient social media analysis may have a chance to attain better understandings. Probably the major deficiency of this study can be the focus of unit of analysis. Other studies focusing on different actors of Gezi are needed. The mothers who sent their children to Gezi, government supporters of the time, the police on duty, nationalist and conservative participants as well as an extended framing study including the social media analysis will be the virgin zones of Gezi studies in the future.

#### Epilogue: Chronology of Major Political Events in Turkey after Gezi Movement

By the end of June 2013, Gezi lost the power of street resistance and motivating aura. Some forums have been lasted in the parks of districts in a limited scale. By September 2013, some claims emerged about the revival of resistance that the government took strict measures before the beginning of the new semester. However no major protests took place except a limited student resistance in METU against an autobahn project of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality passing through the university campus. The protests in METU were supported by some local actions from different cities. Ahmet Atakan, a protestor was killed in Hatay during one of these protests and he became one of the symbolic figures of Gezi. These protests can be accepted as a heritage of Gezi.

At the end of 2013, two big operations have been launched against four ministers of the government. The reason for the operations was justified by claims on corruption files. At the end, four ministers had to resign. The government considered the operations as an attempt of coup and tried to take counter measures to prevent the

actions. Turkey faced a new struggle between the power elites in Turkish bureaucracy. Several tape records have been broadcasted to support these ideas, social media services and well-known internet sites, such as Youtube, have been prohibited by the government.

On 30 March 2014, Turkey had local elections. AK Party got 46% of the votes which indicates a slight (4%) loss of its support while the opposing parties stayed at the same vote levels compared to general elections in 2011. The most debated issue of the elections was the election of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. In that election the candidate of CHP, Mansur Yavaş got 43.8% while Melih Gökçek from AKP got 44.8%. Due to the interruption in the counting system and irrational shifts on number follows, electoral corruption claims became the main topic of conversations. However the objections have not changed the result and Melih Gökçek was reelected as Municipal Mayor for the fourth time

On 13 May 2014, 301 miners died in Soma during a mining accident. The neoliberal policies of government have been criticized by some parts of the society and some protests have been organized in major cities such as Ankara. However, the reaction stayed limited.

In June 2014, Mosul, the second major city of Iraq, was seized by ISIS. 49 people working in Turkish Consulate were taken as hostages.

On 10 August 2014, Turkey voted for the President for the first time in the history of republic. Tayyip Erdoğan got the majority of the votes, 51.8%, and he was elected in the first tour of the elections. However, even these rates were far from an absolute power considering the expectations. The candidate of CHP-MHP received 38.5% which was below the support of nominal total of these two parties. The real surprise of the presidential elections was Selahattin Demirtaş, the candidate of Kurdish tradition. With 9.8% of the votes he proved his popularity as a leader and showed that the potential of Kurdish Party was close to 10% electoral threshold. In the same month, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former Foreign Minister of AKP government, became the Prime Minister and leader of AK Party.

In October, as a consequence of the ISIS siege on Kobane, a symbolic Kurdish city in Syria, urban protests launched in major Kurdish cities by the call of Selahattin Demirtaş, the young leader of HDP. Armed forces came in the streets after a long time and 50 people died on the 6-7 October. In the same month 18 miners died in mine accident in Karaman.

On 29 November, in the 91<sup>st</sup> Anniversary of the Turkish Republic, The Presidential Palace, which has been constructed on Atatürk's Forest Farm and named as "Ak Saray" came into service. The cost of the building was declared as 1 billion \$ by President Erdoğan and room number was over 1150. The palace became a long standing question of debate by its cost, location, purpose, hugeness as well as legal status.

By 2015, pre-electoral period started for the general elections in June. The distinct side of the election was that HDP, the party coming from the Kurdish tradition, decided to participate in the elections as a party instead of independent deputy candidates. It was a risky political decision considering the 10% electoral threshold. Thus, the "gamble" was between winning 45 more chairs or losing all 35 chairs in the parliament for HDP. In the need of 3-4% more votes, the leader of HDP, Demirtaş, adopted an anti-Erdoğan discourse which was directly calling for the support of Gezi youth. AKP formed the political campaign on the commitment of a presidential system which would be based on the powerful governance of Erdoğan. During the election campaigns, President Erdoğan has organized several meetings and asked for 400 chairs in the parliament which meant a covert support for AKP.

On 7 June 2015, general elections was held and HDP entered the parliament with 13.5% of the votes doubling its support compared to last general elections. As a result, AK Party lost its majority in the parliament and one party government period ended. However, the composition of the parliament was quite eclectic those could not permit a coalition between opposing forces. Due to histo-incompatibility between partners, neither opposing block (CHP-MHP-HDP) nor CHP-AKP could form a coalition. A temporary electoral government was set and a renewal for general elections on 1<sup>st</sup> October 2015 was decided. Mustafa Sarısülük, brother of Ethem Sarısülük, who was

killed in Ankara protests during Gezi became the deputy candidate from HDP in Ankara.

On 20 July 2015, a group composed of socialist youth carrying humanitarian aid to Kobane was bombed by ISIS in Suruç, a rural district located in southeastern part of Turkey, near the Syrian border 34 people died while more than 100 injured. After two days, 2 special operation police officers were killed in the city. PKK took the responsibility for the attack and declared that the attack was done as a retaliation to Suruç. President Erdoğan and AK Party Speaker Beşir Atalay declared that peace process was paused. Military operations were launched against PKK targets and PKK launched counter attacks against military and police targets. By September 2015 circa 120 soldier and polices were killed while official numbers declares the loss of PKK around 1000. On 8 September 2015 public protests were organized against terrorism but in several cities HDP offices were attacked and vandalized.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE

*(adopted in Turkish)*

Gezi Parkı Questionnaire and Guiding Questions (April 2014)

I

What is your age?

What is your gender?

What is your occupation?

What is your current job?

How long have you been employed?

What is your final graduate?

Where is your residence district in Ankara?

How much is your average household income?

How you define your economic class?

How long have you lived in metropolis?

Where is your origin city?

Do you like your job?

Please tell me 3 things those construct your identity.

Please tell me the most significant thing that make your life meaningful.

Which team do you support? Is there a reason under your team support?

What do you do in your spare time?

How often do you use internet?

Do you have social media accounts?

Who have you voted for in last elections?

Is there a political party that you never vote for?

Are you member of any political party or organization?

Do you trust these organizations?

Have these organizations active in Gezi events?

Have you participated in meetings or protests before Gezi?

## II

How do you title the events started in Ankara after the events in İstanbul in June 2013?

Why did you participate in the actions?

What is the reason behind the actions?

How have you known about the events, how have you monitored?

In where, have you participated in the events?

What do you think about the events in other districts in Ankara?

Have you gone these places?

Where was the center of the events in Ankara?

What have you done in the events?

Had the events have results those affected you?

What do you think about actions now?

What do you think about actions in Ankara when compared to İstanbul?

Have you participated in the district forums? What do you think?

Have you participated in any boycott activities?

Are there figures or people those you remember from Gezi?

Have Gezi process changed your life perspective?

## III

Gezi

Tree

Chapuller

Riot police

Government

Democracy

Çarşı

TOMA (Social events intervention vehicle)

Media

Ban

Tear Gas

Ethem Sarısülük

Mehmet Ali Alabora

Sırrı Süreyya Önder

Ali Koç and Divan hotel

LGBT

Worker

Labor

State

Kurds

Alevis

Kemalism

Anti-capitalist Muslims

Shopping mall

Urban renewal

Resistance of June

Nationalism

Kalyon İnşaat

TOKİ (Housing Development Administration)

Barracks

Provocation

Intervention to private life

Police

Vandalism

Rent

Conspiracy

Abortion and cesarean

Ban of alcohol

Arab spring

METU autobahn

AOÇ (Ataturk's Farm in Ankara)

IV

What is the most important problem in the world?

What is the most important problem in Turkey?

What is the most important problem of Ankara?

What kind of city would you like to live?

## APPENDIX 2 CROSS TABULATION OF INCOME LEVEL&CLASS PERCEPTION

Income Level & Economic Class Perception	
<b>700</b>	
	middle class
<b>800</b>	
	lower class
<b>1000</b>	
	lowest class
<b>1500</b>	
	lowest class
<b>1750</b>	
	lower-middle class
<b>2000</b>	
	middle class
	upper-middle class
<b>2100</b>	
	poor, most people say middle class because they like it. But I don't have even [social] security.
<b>2300</b>	
	middle class
<b>2500</b>	
	lowest class
	middle class
	petit bourgeois, not starving, not eating much
<b>3000</b>	
	lower class
	middle class sometimes lower class
<b>3300</b>	
	middle class
<b>3500</b>	
	direct middle class-poor
	middle class
<b>3700</b>	
	upper-middle class
<b>3750</b>	
	middle class
<b>4000</b>	
	highest 10%
	middle class
	second class
	upper-middle class
<b>4300</b>	

	middle-petit bourgeois
<b>4500</b>	
	middle class
<b>5000</b>	
	middle class
	middle degree
<b>5500</b>	
	lower class, we have outcome as we have income
	middle class
<b>6000</b>	
	middle class
<b>6500</b>	
	middle class-labor class
<b>7500</b>	
	middle class
<b>9000</b>	
	upper-middle class
<b>15000</b>	
	upper-middle class



### APPENDIX 3 ORIGIN CITY & LIVING PERIOD IN METROPOLIS

Where is your origin city?	How long have you lived in metropolis?
Amasya	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ankara	Always
Ardahan	Always
Artvin	Always
Çorum	Always
Erzurum	Always
Eskişehir	Always
İğdır	Always
İstanbul	Always
Kayseri	Always
Kayseri	Always
Konya	Always
Lüleburgaz	17 years
Nevşehir	Always
Niğde	18 years
Niğde	Always
Rural	33 years
Rural	Missing
Samsun	Always
Tekirdağ	Always
Trabzon	Always
Trakia	10 years
Tunceli	Always
Urban	Always
Urban	Always
Urban	Always
Urban	Always
Yozgat	12 years

### APPENDIX 3 SELF IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTICIPANTS

#### Please tell me 3 things those construct your identity

"Ankaragüçlü", lively, wretch, silent  
activist, humanist, woman, leftist, child  
Alevi, homosexual, anarchist, vegetarian  
anarcho-communist, egalitarian, libertarian  
artist, student, impatient  
calm, revolutionist, fatalist  
communist, high-school student, Beşiktaş supporter, anxious, neither I trust state nor myself  
culturally Alevi, Kurdish, socialist  
day dreamer, cheerful, sensitive  
freedom lover, revolutionary, sports lover  
hardworking, sportsman, action man  
hesitant, impatient, book lover  
honest, stable, disciplined, I don't believe in classification, creation is important for me.  
human, hardworking craftsman, sportsman  
human, leftist  
human, lover, leftist  
human, socialist, agricultural engineer  
hyperactive, anarchist soul, I like living  
laic, leftist, scientist  
leftist, Alevi  
leftist, Beşiktaş supporter, drum player  
libertarian, communist  
public officer, hedonist  
reader, observer, anxious  
socialist, Beşiktaş supporter, student  
socialist, feminist, ecologist  
socialist, Fenerbahçe supporter, positive  
student, member of family  
translator, reader, world citizen  
Turkish citizen, conservative  
Turkish, Fenerbahçe supporter, student  
Turkish, idealist, Atatürkçü (all ideals of him)  
Turkish, patriot  
Turkmen, communist  
vegan for last 2 years, animal libertarian, anti authoritarian  
vegan, woman, feminist  
we are Kurds but I don't consider myself as Kurd. Leftist, word citizen  
woman, libertarian  
world citizen, atheist, animal lover  
world citizen, vegan, LGBT individual

## APPENDIX 4 THING THAT MAKES PARTICIPANTS' LIFE MEANINGFUL

Please tell me the most significant thing that make your life meaningful	
<p>activism</p> <p>books</p> <p>class struggle</p> <p>commodification of animals and its affect to my life</p> <p>family</p> <p>family, change</p> <p>family, ideals</p> <p>family, my lover and my diploma</p> <p>human love</p> <p>Ideals</p> <p>loneliness, I don't like people</p> <p>love</p> <p>love, friendship</p> <p>mother, father, sister</p> <p>my boy</p> <p>my family</p> <p>my family, Gezi process</p> <p>my family, I believe in God and it makes me stand.</p> <p>my family, my work, my friends</p> <p>my lover</p> <p>my lover, my party and family</p> <p>my wife and children, opposition</p> <p>nature</p> <p>nature love</p> <p>nature, plants, animals</p> <p>reading, thinking, family, travel</p> <p>self-realization</p> <p>self-realization, art, discussions</p> <p>sightseeing</p> <p>some people</p> <p>sport</p> <p>sport, music, politics</p> <p>start of my political life</p> <p>struggle</p> <p>to be successful</p> <p>visiting cultural places</p> <p>working books, good people, a meaningful social struggle, being happy</p>	

## APPENDIX 5 CROSS TABULATION OF TEAMS & SUPPORTING REASONS

Football team & reasons behind being supporter
<b>Ankaragücü</b>
my uncles and brothers
<b>Beşiktaş</b>
a legitimate club when compared to Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray. It has high social responsibilities.
colors
comes from family
Çarşı and Gezi
due to my grandfather and Çarşı
receiving a uniform when I was child and Çarşı buses
supporter groups and Gezi
the team of people and justice
<b>Eskişehirspor</b>
against bourgeois teams
my lover
<b>Fenerbahçe</b>
comes from family
comes from father
it comes from birth
Missing
my family
(missing)
<b>Galatasaray</b>
comes from father
comes from my family
comes from my grandfather
effect of my relatives
from childhood
from radio
Since all my family supports Fenerbahçe
so called GS supporter
<b>Gençlerbirliği</b>
Karakızıl and Alkalar Groups
my friends
Since it is the club of my city
(missing)
<b>None</b>
Being a supporter is nonsense for me
NA

## APPENDIX 6 SPARE TIME ACTIVITIES

### What do you do in your spare time?

Beşiktaş matches, PS3, reading, music  
biology, botanic, zoology  
books, computer games  
botanic garden, I look after to dogs, reading  
bridge club, reading, internet sharing  
computer, my friends  
cooking, reading  
cooking, reading, watching, friends  
friends  
friends, book, film  
friends, eating, discovering city, critics on actual life  
girlfriend and family  
girlfriend course  
go out, Kızılay and Tuzluca for actions  
handwork, reading  
internet  
music, art, reading  
music, reading, translation  
music, research, politics  
nature activities, fishing, camping  
nature walk, hunting: pork, fish, partridge  
organ, serials  
photographing, cooking, feeding animals  
Photographing, horse riding, reading, playing flute  
reading, arts, my cat  
reading, computer games, music and basketball  
reading, friends, family, music, creative activities  
reading, knitting, walking, friends  
reading, watching films, chat with friends  
research  
sleeping, random research  
sport  
sport, fitness, swimming  
sport, folklore with my family  
theatre player  
travel in future, I try to develop myself  
travel, theatre  
TV, reading, cinema  
walking  
watching movies, puzzle making, travelling, walking

## APPENDIX 7 INTERNET & SOCIAL MEDIA HABITS

How often do you use internet?	Do you have social media accounts?
18 hours when I don't sleep	facebook-5 years
3 hours at the night	facebook-6 years, twitter-3 years
3 hours daily	facebook-5 years
6 hours daily	twitter-2 years twitted after Gezi
all times	facebook-2 years, twitter-2 years after Hopa social events
all times	facebook-7 years, twitter 1 year
all times	facebook-7 years, twitter-7 years, netlog and instagram
all times	facebook-8 years, twitter-not active
all times	none
all times	twitter-since Gezi
all times, except work time	facebook-5 years-I use rarely
all times, very intensely	I hate
always	facebook-3 years, twitter
always	facebook-4 years, twitter 4 years
always	facebook-5,twitter 1 year (after Gezi)
always	facebook-6 years
lways but for research	facebook-5 years, twitter-6 months, instagram 1 month
always in my life	facebook-8 years, twitter-8 years
always, at work, out of work.	facebook-1,5 years
always, when I am awake	facebook-4 years, twitter 1 year, instagram 1 year and linked in
always, when I am awake	facebook-5 years, twitter 1,5 years
always, when I am awake	facebook-5 years, twitter 4 years
always, when I am awake	facebook-6 years, instagram 1 year
always, when I don't do sport	facebook-7 years, twitter, instagram
at least 6 hours	facebook-6 years
every day	facebook-7 years others are not active
every day I open to see what is happening in the world	twitter-2 years, instagram few months
every day, continuously	facebook-7 years, twitter-4 years, I am addicted.
every day, once in two hours	facebook-5 years, twitter after Gezi
every day, probably every hour	facebook-6 years, twitter-inactive
every day, regularly	facebook-8 years
every day, when I am awake	facebook-7 years, twitter 1 month
every minute	facebook-6 years, twitter 1 month
every moment	facebook-5,5 years, twitter 2 years

half an hour daily	facebook-4 years
morning and nights also for work	facebook-8 years, twitter-2 years, tumblr not so active
only for watching films	twitter-2 years
source of my life after Gezi	facebook-4 years, twitter-3 years, instagram 3 years
when I am at home	facebook-5 years, twitter 5 years
Missing	facebook-5 years

## APPENDIX 8 VOTING BEHAVIOR AND OTHER POLITICAL REFERENCES

	Q. Who have you voted for in last elections?
CHP	15
NA, would vote for TKP	5
HDP	4
NA	3
CHP for Mansur Yavaş	2
Missing	1
ÖDP	1
CHP-not because I like it. If MHP receive 40% I would vote for it	1
CHP,MHP, I am a leftist MHP supporter	1
Did not voted for the rightist candidate of CHP.	1
NA, I have been an observer	1
Boycott, CHP, ÖDP	1
CHP,MHP	1
HDP, CHP	1
CHP-HDP-I did not want actually	1
CHP, MHP,BBP	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>



## CROSS TABULATION OF VOTED PARTY AND THE PARTY WHICH CAN NEVER BE VOTED

Political party preferences & Is there a political party that you never vote for?
<b>Boycott, CHP, ÖDP</b>
MHP
<b>CHP</b>
AK Party
AK Party. I will not vote for any party in the future. I don't believe in democracy. In last elections they have cheated.
AKP
AKP-MHP-SP-BBP, in any case I never vote for them.
all kinds of nationalists, Turkist, Islamic.
any rightist parties.
Erdoğan and similar people, MHP.
Islamic tradition
Missing
Sharia parties and fascists
<b>CHP, MHP,BBP</b>
Party of Kurds
<b>CHP,MHP</b>
Never Karayalçın.
<b>Did not voted for the rightist candidate of CHP.</b>
AKP and Melih Gökçek
Central and rightist parties: AKP-CHP-MHP-DP. The elections works for the continuation of power, an illusion.
I don't vote for most of them.
<b>CHP for Mansur Yavaş</b>
AK Party
Sometimes I can vote for AKP to teach people lesson. Never vote for SP and MHP even they support homosexual marriage

## APPENDIX 9 TRUST TO ORGANIZATIONS

### Do you trust these organizations?

I like the works of chamber but at service the money is important.

It is relative but In Turkey they are useless.

No.

No, never

No, they don't have culture of self-critics, they are closed for change.

No. I believe the mass organizations have been depleted.

No. I don't have hope for them.

No. I don't think they are functional.

No. I search for them individually. But, even it meets with my concerns. I don't be member.

No. I will leave Eğitim Sen soon. They just ask for help for their bureaucracy.

No. The leader of CHP is OK but his surroundings are not.

No. The real purpose of the managers are individual interest.

No. They are not useful anymore.

No. They don't have tangible benefits. .

Not much.

They are not active, I haven't seen a benefit.

Yes.

Yes for Party no for labor union. The union is with boss at final. Good of the bad.

Yes-I trust collective movements, I trust TMMOB.

## ACTIVITY CONSIDERATION OF ORGANIZATIONS IN GEZİ

### Have these organizations been active in Gezi events?

CHP did something, the others could not do.

DİSK was some active. Solidarity platforms were effective and marginal left created problem. Marginal groups made me worried. But Gezi was cosmopolitan

Greens, Sol Gelecek and Halkevleri were active.

I haven't participated in organization. ÖDP was passive, labor union was totally irrelevant.

I saw the support of TKP in Gezi process. They protected people.

Insufficient, insincere, coward. TKP and FKF were active. CHP and MHP were inactive. BDP is out of politics.

KAOS GL was not active. We wanted rainbow flag and they haven't given. They are with Kurds and Kurds were passive not to shadow peace process. LGBT is an identity, not a community.

KESK, TKP, ÖDP, Halkevleri were active

No.

No idea.

No, Gezi was not under control of parties of labor unions. They could not understand protestors and they tried to find roles for themselves. Only I saw the flags...

No, Greenpeace stayed in itself.

No-they should not be active, it is incompatible with soul of Gezi. Gezi was a process over political parties

Opportunism, and provoking people. Nobody have been provoked.

ÖDP was active, tried to be pioneer, KESK demanded party bus but it did not affect general mass since they were independent, TMMOB was active.

Some of them were active to show-off and supporting them for election purposes. Kaldıraç, BDP, CHP, EMEP, SYKP had flags and even I saw MHP flag in the beginning. I don't trust socialist associations in animal liberties. They are so orthodox and they come only to show-off.

Some of them were active like the supporter team Çarşı.

Some socialists in CHP were leaded in Batıkent.

TGB was in front. They tried something but it was insufficient.

TGB were active, some labor unions were active but I am not sure about their aim.

The call for general strike failed. Turk-İş made a call KESK and DISK did not. I think they are passive.

They totally failed except few of them: TMMOB and Taksim Solidarity

They were passive in general, no contribution to activism

TKP identifies myself with their thought and ideology. But they are not dominant in Gezi

Worker's unions, TGB and ADD were active

Yes

Yes, all oppositional parties, Dev-Lis were active

Yes, especially TMMOB

Yes, participated and organized actions in Gezi.

Yes, they made their politics public.

Yes, they were far from provocateurs. They built a trust.

Yes, vegan organizations and animal lovers participated, people say it is not about 3-5 tree but they started.

Yes. Especially Eğitim Sen 5th Branch. But they try to educate mass. They don't have toleration. On 5 June, I went with them and square was empty. My excitement went. They try to incite people to use their slogans. Organized left is here but disorganized not.

Yes. Not in the conflicts but especially in social media. SoL newspaper were active.

Leftist organizations ESP, SDP, Halkevleri, ÖDP, nationalists were active

## APPENDIX 10 CIVIC ACTION PARTICIPATION BEFORE GEZİ

### Have you participated in meetings or protests before Gezi?

No

No, but after Gezi, I will go out for injustice.

Yes, 1 March meeting against war in university.

Yes, 1 May, 6 May, 19 May

Yes, even in 28 February I struggled for turban. Sağlık Sen-DİSK, maydays. 29 Eki I could not believe my eyes that people were beaten.

Yes, Hopa, 4+4+4, women rights

Yes, laborer woman days

Yes, many times.

Yes, May day, meetings against power

Yes, May days

Yes, May days, 6 May, memorial for Nazım.

Yes, mayday, legitimate public officer meetings

Yes, since high school. My family is Kemalist. I participated in funerals of Uğur Mumcu and I met with left in university.

Yes, youth movement before 1980s, Uğur Mumcu...

Yes, once mayday, 3 times republican meetings

Yes, May day and republican meetings.

Yes, 19 May and 23 April, republican meetings.

Yes, republican meetings.

Yes, May day and republican meetings

Yes, Çerkes Foundation meetings with my family

Yes, May day and 19 may with my family

Yes, meeting for martyrs, May day and 19 May

Yes, May day

Yes, 29 October, 4+4+4, world woman day

Yes, May day and labor union actions

Yes, May day, feminist meetings, homosexual meetings

Yes, Hrant Dink meeting, Roboski and May day

Yes, for animal rights, fur and circus protests

Yes, started with Uğur mumcu in 1994, May day, 10 October

Yes, Maydays

Yes, honor walks, anti homophobic walks, May days, anarchists

Yes, may days, 1 September world peace day

Yes, republican meetings

Yes, I participated TMMOB's occupational actions. I used to be dissenter but I have been politicized after Gezi

Yes, May day, actions of public officers

Yes, republican meetings but I was not so willing

Yes, republican meetings, some actions against capitalism and imperialism

Yes, in the theft of university exam questions, we walked from Kızılay-Meşrutiyet to AK Party, republican meetings

## APPENDIX 11 WHY PEOPLE PARTICIPATED IN GEZİ?

(categorized in two tables)

### I. Reasons related to repressive policies of the government

#### Q. Why did you participate in the actions?

AKP's fascism

All the states are murderers in my opinion. But the current government had very strong ecological massacres since 2010. Think about HES. AKP is a party that never leave even 1000 square meters space.

Both for ecology as well as just a standing against Ottomanization. Even Ministry of Family and Social Policies said that homosexuality is an illness. Gezi is important for homosexuals since the Park is a place to find customers. "Çarka çıkmak". So the place is important for LGBT.

Government's repressive policies and I just liked the people's resistance. I heard sounds while I was sleeping I awakened went out and participated.

Honestly, I am clearly and openly dissatisfied with current government. I am annoyed because of the conservative-oppressive policies of government. Gezi was just a spark. I am also an ecologist and it is related with my feminist identity. I am keen on my freedom. I believe in respect in society. There was an accumulation I was there as a reaction.

I felt I could not breathe. I was fed up with everything. We had things to say but nobody was hearing us. Gezi emerged as an explosion.

I have a reaction against Cemaat and government. It was an opportunity, a hope to stand against injustice.

I thought intervention to lifestyle contains me. I think individual freedoms have been limited by the government.

I turned on TV and I saw police was squeezing water and people were dropping on the street. I went to Kızılay the day after.

I wanted to make people hear me, I want to free many things accumulated in me.

I wanted to show my reaction against state authority. Ecological destruction and intervention to justice system have effect. Expansion of religious references.

I was there because I was against the government. The green was not so important at the beginning. After that, the people who killed in Gezi and stigmatization for these people disturbed me.

Not only ecological reasons, pushing of conservatism and decline of secular education, I saw the first police intervention in Gezi Park and I went out on 31 May Friday

The issue is not trees. Trees are final drop in the bottle. The real problem is intervention of AKP government. Intervention to our sleeping room, our right of education, 4+4+4, unprogressive structure in schools. We had boycott in school and investigations started. We pay fees and they are not used correctly.

There is an authoritarian government. There is a domination against civil society by state. Rape of nature, attack to the people is not new. Before Gezi, it was only

known in some parts of Turkey. There has been a struggle between state and people but not in the practice.  
They cut those trees but the country goes back that we must stop.  
To change the current order  
To defend my rights

## II. Reasons related to contingent issues

### Q. Why did you participate in the actions?

Because I saw that the police attacked people in tents in İstanbul  
Because, my country is important for me. I am a nationalist person and I believe that love of the country was damaged.  
I already participate small meetings in Yüksel Street. That Saturday I was at AÖF exams. After exam, I saw police attack in Kızılay. People from different fractions were there. I saw Turkish, Palestinian, Cuban people and we joined because we wondered. My friends were more active than me. I have been confused.  
I am already leftist, we saw that people were uprising. Trees were important but reaction was also important.  
I am keen on my freedom. I believe in respect in society. There was an accumulation I was there as a reaction.  
I believe in such struggling methods. Not for green actually. I was watching TV on Friday about 03.00 o'clock [Friday after midnight]. My wife came and said about the events in İstanbul. We turned on Halk TV and watched events. My 15 year old daughter said that she wanted to go meetings in Kızılay tomorrow. I looked from window, we heard slogans. We went out and we caught crowd. It was about 70 people in 4. Etap and became 150 in 3. Etap.  
I don't want to leave alone the people thinking similar to me.  
I majorly participated to observe. I had common points with the participants.  
I participated because of the harsh intervention on TV.  
I saw the efforts of people to identify themselves.  
I saw the oppression in İstanbul from TVs. But when we see the action in Kızılay we wanted to join. We were not organized.  
I turned on TV and I saw police was squeezing water and people were dropping on the street. I went to Kızılay the day after.  
I was in social media and while the people were sitting and reading in İstanbul police attacked I was shocked. I could not believe, how police attacked an innocent person? I went Kuğulu, people started to come. I am actually a person with right & conservative tendencies. I am nationalist, I accept capitalism and liberalism. But people were on fire, they were in "happy days-left days" mood. I could not understand why all happened, actually there is no resistance culture in Turkey. Everybody is satisfied with the grants of elected people.  
I was there due to Atatürk's Bursa speech. I was there for Turkey's as well as my future.  
It would be nonsense not to participate, I am already an activist.

My friends were on streets and I wanted to be with them.  
Police violence, oppressive approach of government  
Erdoğan's behavior, his behavior which is out of consensus.  
The Gezi park was started to be destroyed and police attacked people.  
The people was supporting actions via internet. I wanted to go out but my father did not permit. I just play pan from balcony to build a rhythm.  
The resistance of Sırrı Süreyya provided me hope as a socialist person. After the burning of tents we started turn on/turn off lights in Batıkent. It rapidly spread and car horns started, we went out. We were 10 people from our site. We reached to metro station and people were coming. Coming day, my children were in actions in Kızılay.  
They cut those trees but the country goes back that we must stop.

## APPENDIX 12 REASONS UNDER PARTICIPATION

### Q.What is the reason behind the actions?

accumulation of injustice

accumulation of long years. The people had never an idea of revolution or destruction.

accumulation, inequalities, our democracy has been interrupted several times. Even Atatürk, who I like much interrupted our democracy. We have still long years for rise of democracy. But people realized that they must stand and say "no".

AKP, especially it's humiliation of people who does not support it. But I believe that the events lasted long due to the realization of socialist conscious. Because, the socialist power resisted. Same action had existed in republican meetins but they had not lasted long.

An accumulated anger in people and limitations on people's freedom.

At first, it was about trees but then government became target.

At the beginning, it was about trees but after police intervention everything became political.

Being against AKP for most of the people. Young people are suffocated and they don't consider a bright future for themselves.

dictatorship of AKP

Emergence of AKP's secret agenda

Energy accumulation in people. Intervention to individual life. The leakage of state authority into the individual life.

Explosion created by harsh intervention of system to the innocent actions against Gezi park destruction in İstanbul.

fascism of AKP

Governing style. This is a monarchy where 50% of people is ignored. Oppression and bans. Actions against constitution.

Government's attitude to people. It never took people serious. Attack to people's values and violation of law.

Government's capitalist order, imperialist idea and exploitation system.

Governments' rage and impatience. They say "take your mother and go" to a farmer, they say "sit down, let your son stay employed"

I am not sure, maybe we are part of a conspiracy. Many things happened by excitement from the beginning. In Çayyolu, the reason was toally lifestyle. There is naive mass with higher class preferences in there. Most people think here AKP exploits religion and it is against republican values. I think Gezi is against Erdoğan mostly. People showed their revenge against him.

In general, one part likes to government while the other does not. Our government wants marginal things.

Intervention to life styles which cannot be accepted in such a society.

Maybe it started with trees but actually people wanted to vomit the accumulation in themselves. accumulation coming from oppression.



Not only about the trees the overflow of people due to oppressive policies of government.

Open state attack on ecology

Oppression of a legitimate demand and Erdoğan's speeches.

Oppression of government of freedom. No other way was possible to represent people's will.

Oppression of people even intervention to Rakı. I saw many people without political identities. Political resistance goes to TEKEKEL resistance in Ankara.

Othering, imposition, disrespect against women, promotion of patriarchy, disrespect to individuals, insulting Atatürk who is liked by people [alcoholic].

People said "one minute". "you cannot enter my bedroom". It was not ideological.

People wanted to free their fire, they wanted to feel they had done their responsibilities.

Reaction against government.

Tayyip Erdoğan, wrong behaviour of AKP, intervention to free will of people, not the trees. Even though there is no limitation on meeting it was banned. Injustice intervention of police. We see that democracy was destroyed.

Starting is against concrete destruction but after that it was against government. State terror, authoritarian, strict standing of government. Emergence of state terror in other cities which was already in Kurdistan. Events are against attack on nature for rent. Everybody saw the results of HES, AVMS, autobahnss and urban renewal. People realized that their life space were getting smaller.

The optimum explosion point has been reached. There is a device that intervenes everything from your Rakı to abortion. People are not stupid. People know about economy, everybody knows how much they earn. Also there was a legitimacy in Gezi. They attacked to tents... Spermary of child has been exploded. But, gathering point is secularism. Don't intervene our life! We will not give you anatolia.

The people always had fear up to now. The people got full psychologically.

The reaction of new generation who are not so accustomed to the oppressions. The reason was not trees.... Several things cannot be accepted: "alcohol, Reyhanlı, Emek Cinema...", intervention to natural rights of people, quest for freedom.

Violent oppression of government, obstinacy of government

We came to this stage step by step, it was an accumulation many things supported all these. There was a big fire in May day. Taksim had red alert. People also like attraction, the permitted actions do not receive such an interest. KESK had protests nobody come.

We were under pressure, direct intervention to private life. It disturbed a certain mass of people.

## APPENDIX 13 EXCLUSIVE RESPONSES ON THE MONITORING OF EVENTS

### Q.How have you known about the events, how have you monitored?

At the beginning there was not much TV censor. Then social media.

facebook-31 May Kuğulu call

I heard in Taxi - 31 May

I was in there, TV (Halk TV, some Ulusal Kanal)

Internet, I saw the death of Ethem Sarısülük on TV, actually at Kanal D. But after that, the events became a taboo.

Internet, TV (Halk TV), twitter (without submitting), newspaper (Sözcü and Hürriyet)

my family lives in İstanbul, I heard from them there was an extremely strong police intervention

and injuries, internet.

My friends, the trees were being cut in İstanbul but I did not believe the expansion of events.

One of my friends telephoned me from İstanbul in 28 May. S/he said “hakkını helal et”, they are killing us here.

Twitter of my wife

twitter-31 May police violence

Twitter-activated due to Gezi

We saw the burn of tents in İstanbul via TV. And then streets.

## APPENDIX 14 ACTIONS IN OTHER PLACES

### Q.What do you think about the events in the other districts of Ankara?

At the beginning everything is good, but after that provocateurs affected. For instance an elderly guy was shouting: “target the windows of buildings”. We were right but after the organizations joined we lost our legitimacy.

Dikmen actions were more Atatürkçü, there were also MHP supports, Kurds had to stay silent in Dikmen. In Yüzüncü Yıl, it was the ego wars of METU youth. Desire to be leader: One calls for something and 10-15 people pursuits him. Desire to glorify someone. I think a person who earn 3000TL monthly, does not support actions like in Yüzüncü Yıl.

Dikmen was strong, but it was family oriented. I participated 3 times in first week.

Dikmen was unbelievable. Dikmen that I know were more conservative. Even people were on streets with their children, families. Actually Dikmen is a lower middle class place. All these were confusing to me. There were endless corteges and people were supporting turning off light events. Also the summer affected these in a positive way. Such things are not so possible under rain or snow.

Dikmen, Eskişehir Yolu, Batıkent were active. I saw MHP supporters despite Bahçeli.

Due to the Alevi population the police violence was high in Tuzlucaıyr and also there was police violence in Batıkent.

Especially, the districts like Tuzlucaıyr are under certain oppression. These are political people who have a reaction against oppression. After Makromarket there is Dörtıol, about 1000 people were there. Kızılay was under siege. But even there were participants with their babies, I think people had a great reaction. Gezi was a resistance without leader but it created disappointment as well. No pioneer, no unity.

Events happened at everywhere and all people tried to do something.

I am worried that I could not participate in Kızılay. There was no tear gas in Eryaman and Batıkent. But a person in Kızılay died that the actions in other districts supports Kızılay, when I heard it I felt better and I have not gone.

I have once visited Tuzlucaıyr and once Hüseyingazi. We built convoy by cars in Hüseyingazi.

I haven't gone to Kuğulu-Kenedi and I think it was my responsibility.

I know some shops had not sold water to Gezi walkers in Eryaman. I saw litter bins have burnt in Tuzlucaıyr.

I know there were TOMAs in Kenedi. The actions were strong in Dikmen and Kuğulu.

I think nationalists, anti AKP people were in actions in Batıkent. İP and grey wolves of MHP tried to lead but they have not been accepted.

I was in mosque in Çayyolu. The imam has spoken in mosque, I liked it much he argued that our main target is not deviation, but making good things for our

country. He said let God help Gezi participants and nationalists who love their country. He asked as to create new clever brains.

I went to Yüzüncü Yıl. They are mostly METU students and they have a problematic mentality: Let's make a fire and let police come here. I don't support this.

In Kurtuluş, police attacked us.

In Tuzluçayır everyone opens their door and they did. Dikmen was good as well. But the local people could hide in their home but people from outside could not find place to shelter. Some of my friends were taken into custody. Even the most apolitical places, Çiğdem and Hıdırlıktepe had a response. They built barricades and burned fires. Even Ankaragücü supports had done something for Gezi. This was a total reaction. It was being Atatürkçü in Tunalı, being Alevi in Tuzluçayır. I even know public officers and soldiers

It was powerful in Tuzluçayır. They continuously tried to come to Kızılay Kuğulu was more colorful. Many apolitical, anarchist, organized people were in there. There was a stronger solidarity in Kuğulu group. Also there was a group who was in search of entertainment. We also looked Yüzüncü Yıl and Çiğdem. Yüzüncü Yıl bazaar are most of METU students and they were prepared well. They had batons and masks but no intervention has been done that night.

Maybe there was 1000 people in Batıkent.

There was serious cases in Dikmen but I don't have much idea.

There were more conflicts in Tuzluçayır the people were ready for resistance.

There were very hard interventions. People were sharing their wi-fi internets and providing blood and advocates. A serious solidarity had been built. In Batıkent there was no serious violence. I think police power was concentrated in city center. There was no riot police, no TOMA. We even laughed since we could not receive any gas. This was urban police not riot police.

Tuzluçayır was so incredible, but other places is walking.

Tuzluçayır, Dikmen, Batıkent were effective. I liked Tuzluçayır actions. (saw from Halk TV)

Yüzüncü Yıl had a powerful activism but it is about students, otherwise Yüzüncü Yıl is not a democrat place. In Dikmen, Batıkent and Tuzluçayır, Alevi population is high. My mother said that people had walked from Dikmen to Kızılay in the time of Madımak.

## APPENDIX 15 EXCLUSIVE ANSWERS ON CENTER IN ANKARA

### Where was the center of the events in Ankara?

If it is about emergence of revolution, the center is Tuzluçayır. But symbolic value belongs to Güvenpark since Ethem was shot in there.

Kızılay and then Kenedi

Kızılay certainly.

Kızılay, Batıkent, Dikmen, İncirli

Kızılay, Bestekar

Kızılay, Kenedi, Tuzluçayır

Kızılay, Kuğulu

Kızılay, then Tuzluçayır

Kızılay, Tunalı, after that Batıkent and Dikmen. In Dikmen there was not conflicts but people were taken into custody.

Kızılay/Güvenpark/Meşrutiyet, Tunalı (first week), Tuzluçayır, Dikmen

Kızılay/Kuğulu

Kuğulu/Kenedi - Violence in Kızılay demoralized people in there. I don't believe the fear threshold has been passed over in Kızılay

## APPENDIX 16 EXCLUSIVE ANSWERS ABOUT EXPERIENCES IN GEZİ

### Q.What have you done in the events?

It was time of AÖF exams. On 31 May, I was with my friends we saw the events in Taksim on TV and went to Kuğulu. There was police intervention at the night. I entered exam on Saturday, after that I was in Kızılay. I only watched the events and Kızılay was full. We were in Kızılay from 14.00 to midnight. We stayed in Demirtepe at my friend's home. We saw marginal groups struggling with police. On Sunday, I rejoined after exam. We were near CHP. We were near Burger King, the sun was setting and a car rushed into crowd. We were about to leave and police started intervention. Everywhere was full of sound bombs and tear gas. We ran away and entered Kızılay AVM. It was a mistake. We could not run to Sıhhiye. Inside AVM was like a infirmary. They wanted to push us, we wanted to run away to Demirtepe from auto park. However, while we were there riot police threw intense tear gas and we had to return. About 1,5-2 hours we stayed in Kızılay AVM, a place like boiler room. We were with 3 people that I don't know. Somebody opened door and we have hidden. Finally riot police came, they made fun of us and punched my nape. My friend received a kick. They took us to buses, continued to make fun of us. It was about 100 people and 10-15 police. We went EGM near Anka mall. One friend was kicked in Kızılay and they freed him. We waited in EGM two hours in the buses in the garden of EGM. Haluk Koç came and said they would free us soon. But they took us to gym in the same campus. They tried to make a queue and take our photos, some of people reacted and they gave up. Gym was full about 800 people I think. A flag seller in Kızılay was in gym as well. We haven't given our IDs or telephones. We stayed on mattress but not many people could sleep. No water or food provided. Next day about 9.00 a.m. we prepared for legal medicine, they got our phones, IDs and they have taken our photos. We went to DDY hospital with EGO buses accompanied by riot police. It was afternoon, still without food. My parents came and distributed bagels to bus. In legal medicine, they examined for any hurt. In the morning girls and boys were separated, I lost my sister. They took us to jail. I was at theft and my sister was in TEM. The rooms were for 4 people. They have taken our shoe strings, we have given food there. I was under custody about 45 hours. CHP deputies Aylin Nazlıaka and Levent Gök came. My father found an advocate, he has spoken with me. They have taken us with the claim of "resistance against police". Advocate recommended me to say I was there to eat from Burger King. I haven't done any resistance against police indeed. They got our fingerprints, we went to legal medicine again. After we returned they asked us to sign a document. We went legal medicine for the third time next day. They have taken our photos again, signed a document for deliverance of our belongings, we were out.

**Q.What have you done in the events?**

When I went to Kızılay my friends were waiting. I was in Kızılay AVM at 10.00 and they did not permit people to go out [due to tear gas]. About 12.00 I escaped from front door but due to intensive tear gas I fell to ground in 2 minutes. Somebody got me and I could find my friends. We have dispersed by police intervention. The major aim of police was to stop gathering of people, and secondly protecting the prime ministry. I saw MHP supporters second day. I did not clapp but there were people who clapped them. After that violence scared people and they disappeared. Police is very irritating they should sell bagels and live with their honor.

**Q.What have you done in the events?**

We were at TBMM cross on Friday there was Çarşı and TGB but not so crowded. Some people threw stone and bottle to police, we ran away. Other day we were at Kızılay. We were in Sakarya and whole Kızılay was under invasion. Slogans, halay. Police was throwing gas but not to all people. On Sunday, all patience diminished. About 20.00, the intervention started with sound bombs, gases and plastic bullets. We found ourselves in Kızılay AVM. I asked for water and seller asked for money I attacked him. There were injured people. We have hidden in closed auto park. About 22.00 police came. A civil shouted to police and they got us. They punched me in stairs and kicked I dropped. Somebody got me to ambulance. Ambulance said dealing in hospital needed. Police said “Do it now whatever you can, I have to take him into custody” But that police left a female one came and she said them to leave me. Two riot police took me and they got me to İzmir Street, they left me there. My family came and took me, I visited my friends in EGM. After that I went to Kuğulu and stayed at back two times.

**Q.What have you done in the events?**

I walked, shouted slogans, carried Turkish flag. On Friday we were near YKM. Womn were blowing whistle. Other weekdays the actions were violent, we ran away from police and entered Kızılay AVM, they kicked us out. I saw police was holding people with Akreps in Demirtepe. In Tunalı, Çankaya Municipality was constructing pavements with small stones [speculations exist on this issue] Çankaya Municipal building provided health support and they hid us. I also participated in Kırkkonaklar, every night walks were organized. A man launched firecracker from balcony. I saw around 500 people with whistles and posters of Atatürk. There was no police in our district.

#### Q.What have you done in the events?

Dikmen built a rapid reaction. We went out in Dikmen that night. Groups coming from Keklik and İlker were walking through the Polisevi. Some people were out, in front of their homes. First days, there was no intervention in Dikmen. After that, due to lack of police people thought they could go to Kızılay easily. Stream from Dikmen started to change balances in Kızılay. Then, police decided to stop people at Dikmen. After 20 days, first TOMAs and Akreps entered Dikmen with a group of police. While many elderly people were on street, police had attacked. We returned to Ziraat Bank cross, as the center. The atmosphere was so bad. There were houses smoked by tear gases. Many houses have been targeted by police capsules. The type of action changed. Families with children disappeared and a more aggressive group stayed to struggle. I tasted Jenix that night. I throw stone against TOMA and it watered me. All my skin was burnt. Two times I had shower, did not worked. When my arm touches my body it was burning. I could not sleep that night but next day it decreased and disappeared. I haven't see such an aggressive intervention. Sometimes, different groups came from out of Dikmen. Police cars were suddenly coming and taking people intocustody. I saw groups with firecrackers and firebrands. A man had brought his scrap car and supported barricade. A red Renault Toros was taken with tow truck that I have seen in barricade at night. An old woman shouted at me and gave her door number in case of emergency. I saw an original reverse table built by construction irons specifically for barricade. Some people were taking injured people to the ambulances. The son of previous headman came with his machete near Polisevi and people reacted him. Once I entered them and thinking about custody. Shopkeeper said "nobody can take one from my shop". I saw a person in car after midnight he was civil police and escaped from us. I saw a person with ATV which costs about 30.000TL but he was still in the action carrying injuries. Kızılay was more in struggle compared to Kuğulu. However, Kızılay is not an appropriate place to gather. People had to run. It is easier to control Kızılay. In Tunalı, people built barricades those TOMAs cannot enter. We heard that riot police is coming from the stairs near TÜBİTAK and group started to go there. We started to throw stone and bottles. They could not ran away and we beat them there. We pushed them by seizing some of their equipment. After that they started to throw extreme tear gas. I also saw a Grand Chereokee, off road car, in Tunalı. He hit one of the barricades with burning bins and drive through us. People started to stone it and broke its glasses. Finally, we escaped from Tunus by convincing a Taxi driver. Some shopkeepers saved us. I entered to a shop thinking for custody and he said "nobody can take anyone from my shop". I learnt "pirated action" concept. One night before action, we entered to a pharmacy in Hoşdere for Rennie and mask. The shop was so elite that I felt ashamed. I said Rennie, he asked me if it was for action and he took me a special section back including different medicines. He advised me some of them: "Here are creams for burns. Also people are buying this one we really don't know why they use it".



**Q.What have you done in the events?**

I was at METU in the morning of 31 May. I was looking to newspapers from internet and I saw that police attacked to the tents. Then I started to receive calls for a protest action in facebook. We got organized spontaneously and went to Tunus. Some people said there is a press release in front of AKP building in Kocatepe. We went there, there was police protection but it was not so strong, people in there were organized left fractions. Then, we passed to Kuğulu. When we reached motorized traffic in Tunalı stopped. Crowd was so intense about 20.00 p.m. It was like a festival in that night. I have never had fun before in a meeting. But also we were a little doubtful since information were coming on the actions of police in Atatürk Boulevard. When we saw police we started to walk through Akay and we saw police barricade in Akay. We reached to Kızılay and we entered to a café. We thought it was safe but police started to throw tear gas. We climbed to terrace and some of my friends started to throw bricks from terrace to the police. I got really confused. We stayed in there about an hour then I went out. I saw police attacked a man and some of my friends attacked to the police. I returned home but I could not sleep. About 2.00 a.m., I heard sounds from outside and I saw people in their pyjamas. It was about 3000 people I believe, maybe 5000. I joined them and we started to walk to national assembly from Eskişehir Yolu. I returned after a while but I know that they had been stopped in front of DSİ, near Kızılay. An anonymous mass realized police violence that night for the first time. I think those people have always considered themselves as “reasonable citizens” until that time and they never thought about facing such violence. This was the first state of being conscious, first stage of realizing this state is not theirs anymore. This is a new conservative state.

**Q.What have you done in the events?**

I just stand. Tunalı was more elite, generally filled by CHP supporters. But, there was an angry mass of people in Kızılay. First day, 31 May, we arranged to go to Kuğulu with my friends. It was like a festival, I expected an aggressive area but it was not. So different than İstanbul. After that, Ankara became more violent. Ankara dwellers even made this issue festival. It should not been. But in Kızılay angry people were much. I don't know the meetings much but I haven't seen such an angry crowd. Average age was low and there was a clear unbalanced violence. Both sides were making war at all costs. Children whom I think lycee students were so active and they were trying to throw back capsules back. I admired them. In contrast, older people were calmer. They were staying back.

#### Q.What have you done in the events?

We were in Güvenpark, our major target was to stop traffic. It was 11.00 o'clock, we gathered and stopped traffic with 2000-3000 people. There were no political parties, people started to come and of course police too. We hit bars with stones to create attention. Our target could be National Assembly. But police started to push by throwing tear gas rarely. We used masks and schnorkels. I bought special gloves to throwback gas capsules. I have asthma and my friends took good care of me when I was affected by gas. It was a distinct type of solidarity. I came at 11.00 o'clock but the first actions began to start at 15.00. People were gathering group by group. Labor unions tried to initiate actions but could not succeed. Kuğulu was more nationalist. Ulusal-Halk TV were showing them. I threw stone to police and people reacted me in Tunalı. I am anti militarist. I did not go for laicism, I was in there for freedom. But people were flag fascists in there. After all these, I decided to continue my struggle in Tuzluçayır. People in Tuzluçayır are generally Alevis, social democrats, revolutionary, poorer. I think the basis of Gezi was in Tuzluçayır in Ankara. About 17-18 people were gathered in Tuzluçayır and major crosses were closed. There were even sofas in barricade. Firecrackers, molotov cocktails were used. Akder, Çorumder, Sivasder were with us. It is interesting CHP and İP was not in there. People voted for CHP but do leftist politics in Tuzluçayır.

#### Q.What have you done in the events?

I was in Kızılay on 1 June. People seemed conscious to me. We met with friends and built barricades. I wore gloves and threw bombs back since I am a handball player. I memorized my anarchist feelings. I felt trust in there. Intervention was harsh and defense was strong. In Tuzluçayır, there is police station near a mosque construction. We built barricades in front of police station. Two Akreps were attacking. There were cafe umbrellas and even sofas, iron doors in barricade. I built a toothbrush holder and pencil box via tear gas capsules. I was shouting as "talcid". I found a bulwark and struggled. One of my friend used sling. I searched things to build barricade, by the time I became professional in building barricades.

#### Q.What have you done in the events?

We were at Kızılay with my friends. It was about 21.00 and the sun was about to set. We had shouted and I said to leave since I had a workday on Monday [next day]. Suddenly a big mass started to come through us. We started to run to Kızılay AVM. They took one of our friends into custody. The inside was infirmary. We ran to lodge. We tried to go outside. We could not. We have hidden in lodge. We were 5 people, we entered a small place, tried to call Ankara Barosu. Baro advised us to go outside and accept custody in company with advocates. We had not fear from custody but we feared from being beaten. I lost connection with my friends. We stayed back of a wall without breathing. Then a man, probably a

civil police, noticed us with his torch. He said "be silent" but after a few minutes 3-4 riot police came and got us. He said "come here pisi pisi, look who is here?" Police checked our IDs and when he found mask in my bag he got happy. He took us by our arm. He did not beat us but hold so strong. I said "I don't escape, no need to press" and he said "You cannot anyway." A woman police searched my body and said "why you are here? It will be in your record. They got us to bus. It was so crowded. I called to my friends and asked for advocate. All people were discontented but also some girls were bantering with polices. The bus travel took a long time, we stayed in buses for long time in the garden of EGM. They got us to gym. I found one of my friends. Everybody was smoking it was cloudy. Some people were sleeping. Probably 100 polices were in gym. I slept a little and people recommended us to close our facebook-twitter accounts. I did. People were thinking about events&tortures in 80s. I denied to give any declaration without my advocate (my workmates advised). Polices wanted us to make a queue for photos, some people resisted and they gave up. Then we have been separated as men and women. We went for declaration. I entered room. 5-6 female police was on desk taking declarations. I sat one of them, she said "put everything on desk" (so pejorative). They got my ID and phone. She put a document on desk and said "sign this now". I said I was waiting for my advocate and she said "she will say same things, do it". An advocate saw my resistance and came. Document was saying "I have been participated actions in ... place in the date of..." something like that... I added "I did not damage any public property, I am not member of any organization, I did not resist police". That woman was angry with me. The process finished and we returned back to gym. We went 45 mins in a bus and went to legal medicine with other 100 girls. We made us wait consciously. A police said "we are waiting for 4 days". In legal medicine doctor asked: "Have you received any pulse?" that is all. Kamer Genç visited. We again returned to gym, profile was composed of students. I saw a mom-daughter, they had taken while walking in Kolej due to red kerchief. A policeman said "you are here for an extra time". A girl lost her calmness she was saying "we will stay here". A girl with turban had been said "what are you doing with these atheists, shame on your headscarf". Also a girl had been forced to staywith handcuff which hurt much. Advocates came and took our declaration, we went to legal medicine again, got our IDs and went out. I could not go to work (a private bank) one day but it did not became a problem.

[After nearly half a year, this participant mentioned that she had gone to a public hospital for an ordinary reason and doctor said to her "you have been in legal medicine before" loud enough to be heard by the other patients around.]

## APPENDIX 17 DIRECT RESULTS OF THE EVENTS

### Q.Had the events have results those affected you?

Basically, Jenix.

I broke up with some of my relatives. They are volunteered slaves and they still defend Erdoğan.

I cried much. I still cry. If we look at the events as a whole, there were many things to cry. There was youth who thought that they can change regime rapidly. Young people took the risk of death, there was extreme polarization and there was a group who used this polarization for its own account.

I don't believe only 3-5 people died. Every day I saw injured people and I worked as an infirmary. They did not permit our right of gathering, our basic right. I saw the swans in Kuğulu park died because of the tear gas. Çankaya municipality saved some of them.

I got sick. Now I have asthma. My family is genetically vulnerable to asthma. Doctor said that it should be triggered by tear gas. I had been exposed to strong tear gas in Kuğulu. We entered a pastry and they behaved positively towards us.

I had been shot by plastic bullet and tear gas capsule but not so serious. Police got me but people were taken me.

I had been shot by plastic bullet but it was not a serious injury.

I had been taken into custody.

I had not participated in street actions but I lost my sleep due to twitter on those days.

I met with TKP.

I saw that people were hit by a car.. I heard sounds of guns from Güvenpark. And one of my friends was shot by her back with gas capsule. We had been stacked in Sakarya finally we could ran away.

I think they made me more conscious.

I was out of breathe due to the tear gas.

I was shot by a bouncing gas capsule from my shoulder. I went to health center but it was not so serious. I can ran away so fast so none can take me into custody.

I was working as a volunteer teacher, I saw the purple traces on the arms of my students. TOMA squeezed water on me.

Just excitement and fear.

My psychology had been affected much. I was unable to sleep when I returned home.

My uncle got my cousin from police station and my mom said to me "Do never go to Kızılay!" My family said that I was easily take fire and they wanted me to stay calm.

My wife and I have been exposed to strong tear gas. One of my relatives was taken into custody.

## APPENDIX 18 CURRENT IDEAS ON GEZİ

### Q.What do you think about the actions now?

Some people thinks that rights of workers comes first. We realized that is not true. It was a breaking point.

A total victory.

Actions were so special and they achieved its objective. Topçu Barracks have not been built.

Ankara supported İstanbul quite distinctly. It was a clear a-class based support. Construction of shopping mall cancelled but government and Melih Gökçek are still on duty. But, even people on the streets who were exposed to violence had fun.

Gezi has not achieved it's aim. In contrast, it is like “nothing happened”. Actions rised and ended rapidly. We saved the park but the real aim was government's collapse or a disintegration at least.

Gezi was a necessity. But it should not go on long. The aim was to say “we are here” then, people thought everything is possible with the action which could not create productive results. Support of people depleted. Shopkeepers started to loose revenues. The space became the arena of marginals who don't have much legitimacy.

I am pleased but Gezi has not reached its aim. There is still SOMA. But Gezi Park was saved.

I am worried that deviances existed. I looked for Atatürk youth, I could not see. The target was to show that system cannot be changed easily but government continued in similar way. Turks forget easily. Nobody cares about Gezi now.

I built a prejudice against police after Gezi. The action have not reached its aim. Government is still powerful. Besides, Gezi revealed more polarization. Polarization serves Erdoğan in good stead.

I don't believe that everything is terminated. But the popularity of Gezi, easy and perfunctory written Gezi books disturbed me. It was a shame for social sciences and there were really less sincere researches.

I don't believe that we reached the objective. The objective was to abolish government. But, I am going to say “you should have seen those days” to my grandson.

I don't think actions reached its objective. I thought the end would be the resignation of government. It had not happened. And they became more cruel. Now, people do not support anything. The problem is not fear anymore, people have no hope but I still have. The best thing was creative writings on the walls. For instance, “servants of God, let's defense.” “Legs to shoulder against fascism” etc.

I don't think it was an uprising, someone provoked us. There was an initiation in social media. Many of my friends participated and I believe some of them had hormonal basis. Maybe Cemaat provoked the events at the beginning. Maybe Cemaat ordered police to be strong. We also have to think about the psychology

of police. They just take orders and they work in absolutely horrible conditions. Gezi groups always made fun of police. Where is empathy? We also have to think about group psychology and group dynamics.

I think they got the message. We proved that here is not bear garden.

I would go again. I think government has not taken the message.

I would participate again but I don't believe the actions reached what they aim to, they still ignore us.

If it is possible, I would do the same again. I don't scare to be taken into custody.

Our aim was to show that power is nothing, we did.

It could be better but the self confidence of government died out. We saw their face. But we were disorganized. People were not professionals. Now I ask myself when I pass those places.

It has not achieved its aim. The government has to be aware that they are exploiting the nature but it still does not. But, ecological response as well as different identities had manifested themselves. Humor was so original which affected world and global actions.

It has not achieved it's aim. The government took no step backward.

It is a means of showing your ego. Human being is an egoistic entity, so selfish.

Socialism does not solve these contradictions. It is just romantic.

It is nothing to gathering against government. In normal circumstances these resisters cannot stay side by side but it was resistance while laughing side by side. I felt honored with Gezi. But also I was scared, I was at the front last year, now I am at the back, I say don't go. I am scared. But we make them scared, too. It is just a beginning.

It never reached its aim. We have not even come closer. Experience was excellent but we could not succeed.

It reached its goal. It created a breaking point.

It reached its goal. It destroyed the self confidence of government.

It was an important mass standing an honorable one. We showed that Turks are not stagnant people. A certain part of this society do not accept everything. The most educated, clever part of Turkey joined this action. It gave us self confidence but it is asleep now. However, we felt the need of a leader and pioneer. It had not affected parties much, energy was wasted.

It was a unique uprising, it did not need so clear targets. It was a certain milestone. In the places where leftist people are scarce, actions cannot last long. District assemblies were set up in Batıkent and they presented their candidate in local elections. It destroyed leftist organizations but I saw lycee movement in Ankara and I am confused. Everybody has a Gezi memory now, next generation will have this fire. Organizations must renew themselves.

Not, reached to the objective, should last longer.

Revival

The actions could not reach their objective. A reaction emerged but not sufficient.

The actions were just a reaction without a tangible objective. People just wanted to present their demands and the world media broadcasted all these. But there were outputs which had not been targeted actually. The new generation became politized and the soul of solidarity has been planted. A huge mass saw the strong face of state. People started to criticize massacres in Kurdistan.

The objective were to save trees. Trees were saved. However, if the trees be under attack again, such reaction may not emerge. We rised a great awareness on trees. Everywhere in Turkey people gave response on cutting down trees. Probably not only about Turkey, the government lost prestige globally. All over the world the real dictator is exposed. .

The people wanted to say “that is enough” and they said.

The resistance in Ankara was more long lasting and more violent.

The squares are not places of political parties. They were just there for promoting themselves. If they would really support, things could change. At least we realized that we have the soul and people can say “stop”.

They have not reached the major objective. But after Gezi I had hope for civil movement. The participants were very honorable they did not damage anywhere. But there can be a monetary support. There was polarization before but now Turkey divided into two concrete pieces.

Yes, we saw that people are ready for reaction but they have not supported Yatağan workers. I felt disappointed.

## APPENDIX 19 İSTANBUL AND ANKARA COMPARISON

### Q.What do you think about actions in Ankara when compared to İstanbul?

Actions in İstanbul and İzmir were more effective compared to Ankara.

Actions launched in İstanbul. More people participated in there. Gazi Mahallesi, Okmeydanı and Çarşı contributed much. Resistance was better, of course.

Actions were more violent in Ankara. In İstanbul, it was violent for 1-2 days then it was festival. It was bloody in Ankara, steps for a civil war.

Ankara does not have an internal capacity to build such a movement, İstanbul has. Can we compare AOÇ and Gezi Park? More trees destroyed in AOÇ.

Ankara is a stepchild. We have been beaten and they enjoyed the piano concert.

Ankara is the big brother of İstanbul in Gezi. Yeah, Gezi was in Taksim but we owned better.

Ankara was violent and İstanbul was colorful: concerts, library, chain of mothers, creative actions...

Actions in Ankara were more intense. I think Ankara witnesses a bigger event, it was more radical, harsher.

Ankara was more united. I was in İstanbul in August there was nothing. A couple who met in Gezi married and they wanted to celebrate at Taksim. Even this demand was denied!

At the beginning, İstanbul was better but then, Ankara was stronger.

I also participated in İstanbul, several times I stoned police, once I attacked with a wooden bar. I have been shot but not so serious.

I saw İstanbul, it was more organized, people are more experienced but all these are can be attributed to the fact that İstanbul is more populous..

I think, there are several "Gezi"s in İstanbul. Taksim, Gazi, Okmeydanı were different. Alevi districts are distinct and there are similarities between Ankara and İstanbul in this manner.

I was in İstanbul in August and I realized that police set a powerful system that nobody could gather easily. How they could unite in Gezi time I could not understand, it is times better than in Ankara. People could contact with LGBT in İstanbul which was not possible in Ankara. All active supporters of LGBT do not exceed 150-200 people in Ankara.

I was in İstanbul with business purposes. I heard the events and went to the Park. There were "içen, sıçan". It was worse in İstanbul like a hippy event. The people who had families don't stay in the park.

In Ankara, Eskişehir and Hatay the interventions were stronger. I know many many friends injured but most of them were not serious.

İstanbul was more cosmopolitan. Actions in Ankara were more violent.

İstanbul had a full-fledged action. I even supported Çarşı as an Ankaragücü supporter.

İstanbul was more conscious compared to Ankara. Ankara is like an inexperienced newcomer.



İstanbul is a bigger city with more young people. It is normal to see a greater action there. People can return back to their homes after 11.00 o'clock.

İstanbul was greater but Ankara and other places were not bad.

İstanbul was more crowded.

İstanbul was more effective, more overbold.

My father was in İstanbul and told the whole story. I believe actions were more effective in Ankara.

My sister lives in İstanbul and she was in depression at Gezi time. It had been more violent in İstanbul that she cried on phone several times.

No idea.

Taksim was more effective. İstanbul is the city of labor, more cosmopolitan so it is normal.

The events were about to finish in İstanbul, when they saw fire of Ankara they hanged again.

There is no real difference. Polices are the same, activists are the same, even dynamics are the same.

There was a vegan stall in İstanbul. But we could not do the same here. But we could tell something to some people and make them think about it.

These were similar actions. İstanbul had a greater soul and more successful in terms of continuation.

They were listening piano in İstanbul and we are about to die in Ankara. I want the storm of Gezi Park's butterfly created by wings in Ankara.

They were similar I think. Both are metropolitans attracted people from different parts of the society.

They were totally different. Maybe İstanbul was crowded but Ankara was so active.

## APPENDIX 20 PARTICIPATION IN BOYCOTT ACTIVITIES

### Q. Have you participated in any boycott activities?

I actually do not support such activities but Halk TV was invisible hero in the process.

I boycotted GİMSA with my family.

I boycotted MADO, Penguin TVs, Kızılkayalar in Taksim and Burger King who said "go out" to us. But I restarted to go Burger King nowadays.

I boycotted MADO and Starbucks, we also shouted "Boo!" when we were front.

I cancelled my Garanti Bank card. I never go to MADO. I have not gone Starbucks for a while then restarted.

I don't go to Starbucks. Also I know that Boyner supported Gezi.

I don't have TV, I am always in boycott. I don't go MADO, I don't like to use credit cards. I realized that I had lived with boycott before Gezi.

I had already been in boycott due to my diet.

I had not gone these places before Gezi. But boycotting media is important for me.

I have never gone to MADO again.

I haven't gone to MADO again.

I never go to MC Donald's and MADO.

I only go to Kızılay AVM to use toilette. There was a man injured in there and nothing has been done. The mall turned everyone over police.

I protested some banks.

I stopped watching TV. For instance, I used to watch Arka Sokaklar in my childhood which represents police so nice. This is not the reality. I decreased my consumption. I stopped to trust humanity. Even the people who helped others in Gezi actually sought for appreciation by the others.

During the events, I never went to AVM but after a while I restarted. But I never go to MADO.

Individual boycott does not mean much but people saw tht media is liar.

No, but I try to keep in mind.

No.

No. But I think the consumption patterns must be changed. A second hand bazaar was established in Kuğulu which was so positive. I don't believe such boycott activities are so realistic in metropol.

No. I don't believe in such kinds of protests.

No. Nobody has a right to judge people who does not support boycotts.

Nobody has to open his workplace to people. It is nonsense to boycott MADO.

Some cafes in Tunalı gave the CCTV records to police. We deciphered them in social media.

We don't go to MADO.

We went Starbucks in İstanbul and I felt very regretful.

Yes. Some spaces. El Paso, Rixos and MADO.



Gezi martries, TKP

Guitarist man, “Ankara'nın Bağları” in an occupied Ankara bus. A man with snorkel and writings on the wall.”Orama TOMA burama TO”

I don't remember.

I haven't seen such thing in real but I dream about bloody faces in Sakarya.

Lady in red, naked man who walked through the police in İstiklal.

Lady in red. People who died in Gezi and who lost their eyes.

Lobna Allami, lady in red, people gathering garbage in park, poor animals and the helpful doctors. Gülsin Onay open performance, gas mask, ballet shows.

marginals, a photo showing two elderly people with a young

Martries of Gezi: Ethem, Ali İsmail, Medeni, Ahmet, Berkin, Abdo, Mehmet...

Police violence, mothers

Mehmet Ali Alabora, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Halit Ergenç and Necati Şaşmaz as a bad example. Besides, Metin Feyzioğlu.

Mehmet Ayvalıtaş, Davulcu Vedat

Murdered people, Sırrı Süreyya, BDP group, Selahattin Demirtaş, I think Kurds changed their image. But the nationalists were irritated by the Kurds. I think they have mistaken. I don't believe Kurds were out of this movement. Maybe they are not so effective at the beginning.

Our friends lost their lives in Gezi, Ethem Sarısülük, penguin.

Riot police, İdris Naim Şahin

Erdoğan and Gül as a hippy photo.

Sırrı Süreyya Önder, pianist man, standing man.

Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Mehmet Ali Alabora, lycee students, Lobna

Syrian girl who got a shot and became paralyzed. Ethem Sarısülük, young deaths and making all these issues under carpet.

## APPENDIX 22 PARTICIPATION IN DISTRICT FORUMS

### Q. Have you participated in the district forums? What do you think??

Forums were good to find a leader for the future of this movement.

Have not participated but it was a true style of acting. Everybody could say their ideas. But discussions were nonsense. Maybe one of the reasons under the deflation of events were these forums.

I attended Anıtpark and Seğmenler Forum. It pacified resistance but maybe prevented lose of more lives.

I became a speaker in a forum. I called to boycott for the unprogressive firms like GİMSA.

I participated in 5 forums including Ethem Sarısülük forum [Çaldıran] forum. In Çayyolu it was comparatively useful but I saw that people were being separated clearly. It is funny but police is a combining factor, when police goes the people disperse. Forums were valuable but there is a problem of authority. I participated in Kuğulu. There was documentary broadcast but I did not like the taste. They have not lasted longer. Forums have not provided much for people.

I participated in Seğmenler. It was useful for the organization of people.

I think forums were a correct way but never alternatives to Gezi on streets.

Different opinions could find platform in forums. I met with people from different political views. We criticized violence, tear gas and district problems such as the construction of new train station on the sugar factory area. There were small problems that TGB and İP tried to dominate forum.

In Kuğulu and Dikmen-Ahmet Arif I participated. They were useful since these were first experiences for us. They are a need for the local control on central authority. The current problems even ideals for a different world have been elaborated.

It think they were creative. But forum appeals to a very strict mass.

Intellectuals, university students... So they were limited.

It was like women TV programs. Regular thesis for June... that is all, nothing new.

No idea

Not attended, no idea.

Not attended.

Not attended. As I monitored via internet, it was valuable to criticize urban problems in such forums.

Not attended. Forums did not make any sense. I don't believe in violence but now I am sure that democracy does not mean much. What is election? It does not create any result. They wanted to construct a palace on AOÇ and they are doing despite decision of court. I feel troubled about all my actions. Everything can be problem today. I cannot express myself. My friend applied for abortion and they called her husband saying "do you know your wife is pregnant?". This is just absolute monarchy.

Not attended. I know there were in Anıttepe, Beşiktaş. But I think they were not so effective. I already monitor such events, If I don't know they cannot be effective.

Not attended. The major reason was fire and they dispersed easily.

Partially, a forum was broadcasted live by İP. The discussions were very low quality and harmed the actions.

Participated in Mamak and Tunalı. The forums were a must. But they could not succeed. Because after a short while people try to find supporters, that is all. All forums were criticizing irrelevant things and no result get mature.

The tasks in case of intervention have been distributed in forums.

We had one in Ethem Sarısülük Park. I have spoken for animals. We were few people but it was so intense and effective.

We had one in Kartaltepe Park. Ali Asker participated, we watched cinemas. But forums have not created a result. Parties could not understand this issue and they tried to form the forums to rediscover their discourse. All parties learnt their lessons, all of them failed in Gezi.

Yes, Eryaman and Kuğulu. It was necessary at the beginning but then everybody considered themselves "a God". Objectives were lost, there was a person who harmed forums.

Yes, I think future is at these forums. Because the park forums transformed to assemblies in Batıkent. Forums could create some initiatives for the issues of street animals, cellular stations, high voltage lines.

Yes, in Eryaman 3-4 "Gezi crossing". We discussed problems, deflation in walks and Eryaman resistance facebook page. I think forums were a big failure. We started to fight with our brothers and people returned home. Solidarity diminished.

Yes, it was a correct action but I am not sure about productivity.

Yes, it was a useful experience but lost the aim via discussions.

Yes, once. I was against forums. It needs intellect.

Yes, several times. I liked them since there was a soul of commun.

## APPENDIX 23 GEZİ EFFECT ON PEOPLE'S LIFE

### Q. Have Gezi process changed your life?

"Susma sustukça sıra sana gelecek" we realized this slogan. Especially for last 5 years we were silent and dominated us. Gezi showed that we could be a power as well. I have hope since I saw their fear.

At least we make people hear our sound. It was the first time I experienced such a thing. We were silent and resigned our destiny before Gezi. Now we have resistance, I had believed I were alone but I am not.

At Soma, I met with a Riot Police commissar. He said that we don't understand them. He argued that they have worked under very strong conditions. nonsense. I think about the death people. We are here but they are lost. I realized that if you should rise your volume up, you must do it. Otherwise, it can be late. Not everything is about ideology but many things are about life.

Don't be hopeless for anything. Hope will come when you don't expect.

Everybody realized that what is a defense of rights. We realized that this country is ours. We learnt to object.

First time in my life I said "something can happen in this country"

First, I had a hope but then, it became a disappointment. I have not liked police before Gezi without any reason. But now, it has a strong basis. We are people of different worlds. There is really a mass who stay in their home hardly. Especially the first three days could reveal an uprising.

Gezi took me to fringe, to activism.

I became a more positive person. I got extremely worried about human loses. I believe I experienced a psychological trauma. I realized that the things I thought individual were the problems of many other people like me. My self-confidence raised. It was important to see white collars' resistance.

I can never think that I could tell about veganism in the middle of Kızılay. A brother had become vegetarian and this is a big victory.

I don't believe there was a meta ideal in Gezi. Someone wants to bring CHP instead of AKP. Socialist organizations work for their account. There are sexist slogans "O.Ç.". I used to feel close to Kemalism before Gezi. But now I think their ideology is empty. No need for ties. Human is not good, I am homosexual since I am 7. Everyone harms nature. We have a problem with nature.

I finished to be a "so called leftist" I look at the life more political. I became organized after Gezi and started to read political books.

I had hope about Turkey.

I had not had hope for new generation. Now I have hope. We saw young people whose left punch are up and singing national anthem.

I had said "bizden adam olmaz" before Gezi. Now I am extremely politicized. I feel positive for civil society movement.

I have hope again for Turkey

I learnt to stand against my family. I resigned being a sheep.

I realized that under unexpected circumstances a great mass of people can be gathered and do something. It can be dangerous too. But this also creates herd mentality.

I saw that we need to do something

I started to build a connection with my country, with my people. First time in my life, I felt this connection.

I started to derogue polices.

It is nice to see physical activities from the youth only knows playing computer at house but I don't expect anything from this generation. I think the events were governed like 9/11. separations-dichotomies emerged like "they-us". Now there are two groups in Turkey which makes me scared. People can be easily judged and send into the jail.

It was a real breaking point. Before Gezi, there have been politicians, after Gezi I realized that we have power to abolish a government without a disarmed people movement. It was exclusive in Turkish history.

Just hope.

Left lived so dark times. It is important to see people do not care for commodity for even two hours in a metropol like İstanbul.

My hope for change raised. At final, it was a great mass participation in many cities.

No, I already trust youth since I see 15-16 year old children at the grave of Deniz Gezmiş. Who can stop these children at university?

No.

Not much.

Not much. It only made my ideas more powerful.

Not much. We realized that the people can be organized and come to streets easily however the current order cannot be changed easily.

Now, I have a respect for young people. I had believed that they were apolitical but they are not.

Obviously, Gezi politicized many people.

The youth were on streets and people have not supported them as it is used to be.

We were consent with our destiny before Gezi. After Gezi, we started to organize rapidly. We collected 2000 signs in school and prices in canteen lowered. For Berkin, we had a memorial in school and finally police came. They have threatened us by legal transaction. They claimed that we fought with nationalists (Ülkücü) but even the nationalists were in Berkin's memorial.



## APPENDIX 24 AN IDEAL CITY FOR THE PARTICIPANTS

### What kind of city would you like to live?

a city in peace with environment, human oriented, with culture, art and aesthetics  
a city like NYC. A green city without traffic and concrete  
a city like Tuzluçayır  
a city not in Turkey maybe in the US, Russia or Germany  
a city that I can do everything by bicycle, a city without concrete, with green and recycling  
a city that I can use my democratic right and a city that my demands are being considered, I city that I feel a belonging. I can only stay in Eymir. But Münhe was opened for rent.  
a city that nobody is hunger, a city with equality  
a city that the political decisions are taken by the dwellers, a city with an intense social life, a smaller one  
a city with an effective municipality  
a city with big squares, AOÇ, green railways  
a city with railways, music makers, squares  
a city without bans and free children  
a hopeful city like İzmir that we don't lose  
a livable city with squares, streets closed to traffic  
a metropol like NYC  
a more green, more natural, planned city with buildings shorter  
a planned city with order. A grid system city like NYC. A city with big squares.  
a socialist city  
an Ankara, a more green, without oppression, an Ankara like İzmir  
city of enlightened people  
green, with esthetical architecture, a city with more cultural and artistic features with museums and libraries and people who knows their value  
I don't think I want to live in city, a place in a peace with nature like the forests of Bolu, a place like a village.  
I don't want to live in city with apartments, I would like to live in jungle with my lover. Some people do it in Artvin-Alakır, I admire.  
I don't want to live in city, I would prefer a more pastoral place.  
I need bus at 23.00 o'clock. A city does not impose me to drink only certain places.  
I would like to live somewhere like Eskişehir. A city who is governed by her lover not her rapist.  
I would prefer rural  
like a socialist city  
like Eskişehir  
like in Ovacık. Socialist municipality. Free transportation and water  
like İstanbul

like İzmir

more green, in city form of an university campus like METU







more green, modern but side by side nature like village.



more green, peaceful, a place where people respect to others “Allah sonumuzu hayretsin”





With a better social life, bigger parks, less population, theatre, sport, concert facilities







a city that I am not being attacked in the night, a place that the governors do not slaughter the nature, a city who asks dwellers when they want to do something, a city with 24 hours transportation and emergency help when I feel ill. Once I went to hospital after I borrowed some money.

**APPENDIX 25 INDIRECT PERCEPTIONS ON CONCEPTS**  
**(WORD FREQUENCY ANALYSIS)**

	
Gezi	Tree
	
Chapuller	Riot police ( <i>Çevik kuvvet</i> )
	
Government	Democracy







<p>againstTOMA</p>  <p>against everything resistance football group Çarşı hooliganism</p>	<p>POMA water</p>  <p>POMA water vehicle monster violence people war</p>
<p>Çarşı</p>	<p>TOMA (Social events intervention vehicle)</p>

 <p>Word cloud for Media: The most prominent words are 'lie', 'government', 'penguin', 'monkeys', 'supporter', 'production', 'slimy', 'CNNTurk', 'dirtiness', 'objective', 'silenced', 'thankless', 'confused', 'way', 'monopol', 'tong', 'toy', 'channels', 'leech', 'art', 'liar', 'NTV', 'tool', 'just', 'lying', 'news', 'finished', 'duties', 'conscious', 'bloodsucker', 'wing', 'partisan', 'duck', 'bought', 'system'.</p>	 <p>Word cloud for Ban: The most prominent words are 'government', 'AKParty', 'freedom', 'Turkey', 'ban', 'like', 'limitation', 'ordinary', 'authoritarianism', 'break', 'twitter', 'rules', 'less', 'against', 'reality', 'system', 'order', 'believe', 'defense', 'activism', 'relative', 'scare', 'years', 'condition', 'past', 'created', 'intervention', 'opposition', 'live', 'what', 'is', 'banayol', 'pressure', 'devekusu', 'useless', 'cruelty', 'TayyipErdoğan', 'dictatorship', 'stop', 'things', 'coup', 'self', 'useful', 'unacceptable', 'abortion', 'authority', 'dominance', 'kabere', 'human', 'anything'.</p>
Media	Ban
 <p>Word cloud for Tear Gas: The most prominent words are 'people', 'pain', 'gas', 'police', 'tear', 'lemon', 'weakness', 'never', 'mortal', 'lost', 'sometimes', 'cough', 'human', 'striking', 'qualm', 'RAID', 'sinus', 'smiling', 'shows', 'cover', 'vegan', 'disrespect', 'like', 'bad', 'food', 'harmed', 'ever', 'banned', 'eyes', 'opens', 'illiteracy', 'female', 'fun', 'worse', 'see', 'need', 'brain', 'beautiful', 'used', 'Gezi', 'effective', 'now', 'toy', 'opener', 'started', 'male', 'breathe', 'mask', 'tool', 'life', 'inhumane', 'afraid', 'skin', 'high', 'many', 'makes', 'some', 'against', 'health', 'violence', 'painful', 'entertaining', 'chemical'.</p>	 <p>Word cloud for Ethem Sarısülük: The most prominent words are 'victim', 'pain', 'resistance', 'laborer', 'ruined', 'place', 'about', 'birth', 'funeral', 'wretch', 'satan', 'killed', 'innocent', 'worker', 'father', 'said', 'explosion', 'name', 'point', 'material', 'comrade', 'death', 'tea', 'participated', 'unlucky', 'one', 'brother', 'drinking', 'nothing', 'felt', 'June', 'Gezi', 'police', 'pioneer', 'revolution', 'generation', 'poor', 'massacre', 'symbol', 'martyr', 'new', 'heartache', 'Ankara', 'Güvenpark'.</p>
Tear Gas	Ethem Sarısülük

	
Sırrı Süreyya Önder	Mehmet Ali Alabora
	
Ali Koç and Divan hotel	LGBT
	
Worker	Labor





 <p>Word cloud for Urban renewal. Key words include: oppression, pushing, revanchist, massacre, Ağaoğlu, settlement, agenda, poor, harmed, market, think, poverty, done, rent, destruction, cover, need, interest, sort, all, city, depends, Gazi, aim, free, rental, bad, pros, way, other, really, today, upper, Ali, different, most, TOKİ, door, each, since, clear, invasion, nature, site, seen, Mamak, center, quarters, renovation, Gecekondu, cons, robbery, Turkey, sometimes, failure, betrayal, purpose, migration, against, values, dwellers, concrete, problem, obligatory, necessary, opportunism.</p>	 <p>Word cloud for Resistance of June. Key words include: Fortunately, season, action, continuation, Unforgettable, easier, memorize, Park, opposition, excitement, life, resistance, youth, good, raised, revival, big, June, identical, people, root, added, stream, go, use, situation, nothing, September, correct, happened, death, sign, streets, end, stay, weather, freedom, scream, started, since, hope, Gezi, uprising, milestone, ecological, name, revolution, some, civic, legend, explosion, biggest.</p>
Urban renewal	Resistance of June
 <p>Word cloud for Nationalism. Key words include: fastening, politics, republican, stopping, people, unnecessary, Halkçılık, idology, pest, it, nonsense, old, sometimes, wing, country, generally, one, Kurds, let, central, yes, together, instead, using, religion, done, right, belongs, Atatürk, critical, live, system, fashioned, closest, past, left, incidents, bin, now, like, comes, neutral, everyone, about, still, oriented, nationalist, Kurdish, societies, militarism, JP, monophony, today, damages, freedom, racism, difference, ulusalculuk, needed, adopt, complicated, nationalisms, useless, against, Atatürkçülük, drawback, fascism, anti-imperialism, connects, missing.</p>	 <p>Word cloud for Kalyon İnşaat. Key words include: rent, capital, money, Emec, corporation, puppet, game, Çetin, Erdoğan, era, branch, AKP's, eater, pioneer, tong, pocket, slave, back, figure, interest, fed, one, extraordinary, builder, burgler, holding, supporter, government.</p>
Nationalism	Kalyon İnşaat
 <p>Word cloud for TOKİ (Housing Administration). Key words include: Something, urban, rent, shelter, space, certain, home, among, useless, always, another, ruling, concrete, organization, rich, foot, capital, corporation, Turkey, creates, positive, pocket, governments, title, people, poor, buy, used, everywhere, supporter, mass, only, built, good, possible, imam, flora, made, solution, back, life, look, need, tricking, now, neither, creating, many, Hatips, housing, prisons, stack, due, long, ugly, quality, buildings, aim, outside, profit, TRT, public, grave, happen, hopes, part, renovation, playing, scandal, source, schools, collapse, more, exploiting, tool, thread, state, stone, head, making, positively, uniformed, exploitation, relation, offer, richness, houses, under, massacre, corruption, beyond, money, important, digressed, hands, destructing, modern, government.</p>	 <p>Word cloud for Barracks. Key words include: soldier, military, constructed, remember, discipline, like, disappearance, peaceful, again, legitimacy, soldiers, place, wish, good, secure, service, erase, make, just, center, project, death, GeziPark, never, militarism, metro, both, look, person, deaths, rent, saw, prison, grave, money, symbol, living, useless, Taksim, sides, unit, central, want, militaryservice, built, Akköprü, comfortable, image, civilization, cold, cannoneersbarracks.</p>
TOKİ (Housing Administration)	Barracks







## APPENDIX 26 PHOTOS FROM CENTER OF ANKARA

(1– 2 June, 2013)



**Atatürk Avenue – to the Prime Ministry**



**Kızılay Cross-Square – to the Sıhhiye/Ziya Gökalp direction**





**Destroyed barriers in center**



**Kızılay Cross- Square – to the Güvenpark – Prime Ministry direction**



**Burning barricade constructed by the protestors near Güvenpark**



**Front line small scale harsh resistance in barricade, plundered oranges.**





**Kızılay, from top of Burger King in Kızılay AVM.**



**Open area for fast food on the top of Burger King – Kızılay AVM.**




**Front line resistance, by evening.**



**Kızılay Cross- Square by evening.**

## APPENDIX 27 “OLMAMALIYDI!” BROCHURE



First page and example page.



# APPENDIX 28 ORIGINAL VERSIONS OF NEWS IN SCREENING

	In favor of Gezi	Neutral	Against Gezi
Birgün	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Taksim Faşizmin İşgali Altında</i> (31 May)</li> <li>• <i>Polis Terörünün Bilançosu</i> (31 May)</li> <li>• <i>Polis Kızılay'da Saldırdı</i> (1 June)</li> <li>• <i>Diktatöre Direniş Manzaraları</i> (2 June)</li> <li>• <i>Faşizm de var Direniş de</i> (2 June)</li> <li>• <i>Şiddeti Erdoğan Kışkırtıyor</i> (5 June)</li> <li>• <i>Polis Terörü Bir Can Aldı</i> (5 June)</li> <li>• <i>Eşekten düşen mukteditir</i> (8 June)</li> <li>• <i>AKP Katliam Provası Yaptı</i> (13 June)</li> <li>• <i>İstanbul Valisi'nin Korkunç Sevgisi</i> (13 June)</li> <li>• <i>Üniversiteye Gezi tehdidi</i> (16 June)</li> <li>• <i>Diktatör Saldırıyor, Halk Direniyor</i> (17 June)</li> <li>• <i>Faşistin Bayrak Tutarı</i> (23 June)</li> <li>• <i>15.00'da Taksim Meydanı'na!</i> (1 July)</li> <li>• <i>Erdoğan'ın Polisi Görev Başında!</i> (7 June)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>"Taleplerimiz Karşılanana Kadar Taksimdeyiz"</i> (8 June)</li> <li>• <i>Avrupalı</i></li> <li>• <i>Gençlerden Dayanışma Mesajı</i> (9 June)</li> <li>• <i>Gerze Halkı Gezi Parkı'nda</i> (10 June)</li> <li>• <i>Erdoğan Gezi için Süre Verdi</i> (13 June)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Arınç'tan Saldırı Eleştirisi Geldi</i> (2 June)</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Tehlikeli Sloganlar!</i> (8 June)</li> </ul>		
Hürriyet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>THY Hosteslerinden Müthiş Eylem</i> (5 June)</li> <li>• <i>Gezi Fidanlarını Ezmesen be Birader!</i> (6 June)</li> <li>• <i>TOMA Genci Böyle Ezdi</i> (1 June)</li> <li>• <i>İsyân için Direniş Rehberi</i> (6 June)</li> <li>• <i>Eylemin En Güzel Anı</i> (4 June)</li> <li>• <i>Tarkan Direnişte</i> (6 June)</li> <li>• <i>Biber Gazından Korunmanın Bilimi</i> (2 June)</li> <li>• <i>Ünlüler Gezi Parkı için Taksim'de</i> (30 June)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Kelime Oyununda Geziye Gönderme</i> (3 June)</li> <li>• <i>Taksim Platformu Açıklama Yaptı</i> (5 June)</li> <li>• <i>Gezi Parkı için Referandum</i> (12 June)</li> <li>• <i>Başbakanlık Ofisinin Önünde Olaylar</i> (1 June)</li> <li>• <i>Sarısülük'ün Kalbi Durdu</i> (14 June)</li> <li>• <i>Cumhuriyet Meydanında Hareketli Dakikalar</i> (12 June)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>İşte Polise Ateş Açılma Anı</i> (25 June)</li> <li>• <i>Çarşı Eylemlerden Çekiliyor mu?</i> (10 June)</li> <li>• <i>Gezi Parkı eylemlerinin zararını kim karşılayacak?</i> (6 June)</li> <li>• <i>Gezi'de Provokasyon İddiası</i> (31 June)</li> </ul>
Yeni Şafak	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Gezi Parkındaki Nöbete Biber Gazı</i> (30 June)</li> <li>• <i>Aktivistler Taksim'de Kandil Simidi Dağıttı</i> (5 June)</li> <li>• <i>Vali'den Gezi'ye: "Aranızda Olmak İsterdim"</i> (9 June)</li> <li>• <i>Taksim Esnafından Polise Sert Tepki</i> (31 June)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Gül'den Gezi Açıklaması</i> (1 June)</li> <li>• <i>Demokrasimiz Test Ediliyor</i> (12 June)</li> <li>• <i>Eylemciler Köprüyü Yürüyerek Geçti</i> (16 June)</li> <li>• <i>Taksim Yaya Trafiğine Açıldı</i> (17 June)</li> <li>• <i>Kılıçdaroğlu: Gezi Parkı Artık Özgürlük Parkıdır</i> (14 June)</li> <li>• <i>Erdoğan: Polis Kahramanlık</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Ünlülerden Ölüm Provokasyonu</i> (1 June)</li> <li>• <i>Sanatçı Olduklarını Hatırladılar</i> (3 June)</li> <li>• <i>Yalanın En Büyüğü!</i> (3 June)</li> <li>• <i>Sığındıkları Camide İçki İçtiler</i> (3 June)</li> <li>• <i>Eylemciler Yabancı Yatırımcıyı Hedefledi</i> (6 June)</li> <li>• <i>Gezi Eylemine Ses Bombalı</i></li> </ul>

		<p><i>Destanı Yazdı (16 June)</i></p>	<p><i>Provokasyon (5 June)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Taksim Gezi Parkı olaylarında provokatörler boş durmadı ve sosyal medyada yalan üstüne yalan haber yayınlandı (21 June).</i></li> <li>• <i>Faiz Lobisine Sert Mesaj (7 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>Pusudakiler (7 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>Reklam Ajanslarında Organize İşler (8 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>Sultangazi'de Silahlı Provakatör (8 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>HEDEF: Erdoğansız Türkiye (9 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>Gezi Parkı'nda alkol kavgası: 1 yaralı (10 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>Başkent'te yağmacılar görüntülendi (11 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>Emniyet Bu Kadının Peşinde (14 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>Provokatörler Muhabir Tokatladı (15 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>“Kod Adı: İstanbul İsyanı” için ne dediler? (16 June)</i></li> <li>• <i>Sözde Doktorlar “Hırsız” Çıktı (16 June)</i></li> </ul>
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## APPENDIX 29 EXPLANATIONS IN CHRONOLOGY

**Sırrı Süreyya Önder:** Deputy of BDP. The person who stand in front of construction vehicle on 28 May, 2013. His action became one of the symbols of Gezi.

**Lobna Allami:** An Arabic young women who was shot by a tear gas capsule in Taksim, critically wounded by head, stayed in a coma for 24 days.

**Kuğulu:** Titled as “The Park with Swans”, a very small park in Ankara close to city center famous of its pools and swans.

**Kızılay:** Ankara city center known by the old “Kızılay” (Turkish Red Crescent Society) building.

**KESK:** Stands for “Confederation of Public Workers' Unions”, a leftist oriented labor union for public workers.

**Kazlıçeşme:** One of the “legal” public meeting space in İstanbul, which is used by the AK Party.

**Ethem Sarısülük:** Ankara OSTİM industry worker who was shot by police on 1 June and died after 12 days.

**Kenedi:** One of the major streets in Çankaya district close to Kuğulu Park and Tunalı Hilmi Street that actions took place.

**Dikmen:** One of the major districts in Ankara close to city center. Dikmen is known by its long standing urban renewal resistance as well as partially Alevi population.

**Wok Actions:** The actions of people based on generating sounds by hitting pans and woks to support Gezi. In many districts people played pan & woks from balconies during specific periods in the evenings.

## **APPENDIX 30 CURRICULUM VITAE**

### **PERSONAL INFORMATION**

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2011-2015 EU Affairs Expert, Financial Cooperation Directorate, Ministry for EU Affairs

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2005-2006 Student Assistant, Information Technologies Department of METU Library, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

## APPENDIX 31 TURKISH SUMMARY

### Giriş

Haziran 2013'te Türkiye, daha önce tarihinde görmediği sosyal protesto eylemlerine sahne oldu. İstanbul'un merkezlerinden biri olan Taksim Meydanı'ndaki Gezi Parkı'nın bir meydan düzenleme projesi kapsamında alışveriş merkezine dönüştürülmesi ile başlayan, Türkiye'nin 81 ilinin 80'inde resmi verilere göre 2,5 milyon kişinin katıldığı ve Haziran boyunca devam eden Gezi eylemlerinde, biri polis 8 kişi yaşamını yitirdi. 4900 kişinin tutuklandığı olaylarda 600 polis ve 4000 sivil yaralandı (SETA, 2013). Olayların ilk 17 gününde biber gazından 8 köpek, 63 kedi, 1028 kuş öldü. Resmi kaynaklara göre maddi zararın 140 milyon TL'ye ulaştığı ifade ediliyor.

Türkiye tarihinin bu kendine özgü hareketi neden ve nasıl başladı? Nasıl kitleselleşti ve nasıl bitti? Gezi'yi bir "yeni toplumsal hareket" olarak niteleyen bu tez, tüm bu sorulara Ankara örneğinde ışık tutma amacı taşıyor. Gezi eylemleri katılımcılarıyla yapılan derinlemesine mülakatlar, gazete taramaları ve katılımcı gözlem tekniği ile elde edilen veriler ışığında "baskı algısı yeni sosyal hareket yaratır mı?" sorusuna cevap veriliyor.

Söz konusu toplumsal hareketler olduğunda daima İstanbul'un gölgesinde kalan Ankara, bu defa gerek şiddetin derecesi gerekse yaratıcı eylemcilik açısından zaman zaman İstanbul'dan daha fazla ses getiren olaylara sahne oldu. Öğrenci kenti olmanın dinamizmi ve memur kenti olmanın "konformizmi" ile yıllar sonra işgal edilen Kızılay Meydanı, sert polis müdahalesi ve semtlerin özgünlüğü Ankara'yı Gezi içinde incelemeye değer kılıyor.

Gezi; ortaya çıkışı, gelişimi, kısa ve uzun vadeli sonuçları ile Türkiye'nin geleceğine yön verecek potansiyel taşıyor. Bu sebepten, Türk toplumsal tarihinin kilometre taşlarından biri olan Gezi olayları her yönüyle detaylı ve defaatle araştırılmayı, yeniden yorumlanmayı hak ediyor.

## **Tarihsel Arkaplan**

Toplumsal hareket, ortak bir çıkarı korurken ortak bir amacı gerçekleştirmek üzere ortaya konan kolektif çabadır (Giddens, 2000). Toplumsal hareketlerin içindeki protesto eylemleri barışçıl, şiddet yanlısı devrimci veya reformist olabilir. Protesto, daha özel bir kavram olup eylemler aracılığı ile bir üçüncü tarafın kararlarını etkilemeyi ifade eder. Buna karşın, direniş ise statükoyu korumaya vurgu yapan bir kavramdır (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, Giugni, 1992).

1850'lerden beri toplumsal hareketler daha ziyade ekonomik temelli hareketleri kapsamaktaydı. Yüz yıllık süreç, genelde işçi sınıfı hareketleriyle ve bunların çeşitli şekillerde bastırılmasıyla geçti. Fakat bu durum 1968'de yaşanan kırılmayla değişime uğradı. "68 Hareketleri" denen hareketler Fransa'da başlasa da farklı ülke ve coğrafyalarda çok değişik biçimler aldı. Örneğin Prag'da daha fazla demokrasi talebi ön plana çıkarken, ABD'de savaş karşıtlığı ve ırkçılık karşıtlığı ana ekseninde yer aldı. Bu hareketler; Arjantin, Meksika, Almanya gibi değişik ülkelerde de karşılık buldu ve 68 yılı sonrasında da etkisini sürdürdü. Tek bir 68 Hareketinden bahsedilemese de bu hareketlerde ön plana çıkan birtakım ortak unsurlar söz konusuydu: merkezi otoritenin reddedilmesi, kişisel özgürlüklerin artırılması, cinsiyet eşitliği, daha yüksek yaşam standartları talebi gibi. Bu hareketleri bir direniş ve isyan olarak niteleyenler olduğu gibi farklı kimliklerin, sınıfların, yaş grupları ve azınlıkların yer aldığı "20.yy'ın devrimi" nitelemesini yapanlar da olmuştur (Çimen, 2007). 68 hareketi, "yeni toplumsal hareket" tartışmalarının başlamasını sağlamıştır. Bazı araştırmacılar ise 68 Hareketinin zaman içinde kurumsallaşmasıyla 90'larda etkisini yitirmeye başladığını dile getirdiler. 90'larda ise, yeni toplumsal hareket altında tartışılan hareketlerin içinde küreselleşme karşıtı hareketler ve *occupy* hareketi başı çekmektedir.

## **Genel Çerçeve**

İlk dönem sosyal hareketler yaklaşımları, bu hareketleri birer "sistemsal anomali" olarak görmekteydi. Bu sebepten sosyal hareket çalışmaları yazında daha ziyade çatışma çalışmaları içinde kendine yer buldu. 1950'lerde bu teoriler daha sistematik hale gelmeye başladı. 1960'ların, sosyal hareketler bakımından aktif dönemi ise takip eden yıllarda yeni yeni yaklaşımların ortaya çıkmasını beraberinde getirdi. 1970'lerde



ABD’de kaynak hareketliliği teorisi geliştirildi. Aynı dönemde, politik fırsatlar ve politik süreç yaklaşımları ise bu teoriye rakip teoriler olarak ortaya çıktı. Tüm bu yaklaşımlar temelde “sosyal hareketler nasıl ortaya çıkar?” sorusuna cevap aradılar ve temelde sosyal hareketlerin altındaki yapısal bileşenleri sorguladılar. Gerek politik fırsat gerek kaynak hareketliliği yaklaşımlarında hareketlerin arka planındaki aktörlerin stratejik ve rasyonel olarak hareket ettiği varsayıldı. Bu yaklaşımlar yer yer bahsetseler de; kültür, gündelik hayat, kimlik oluşumu gibi kavramların üzerinde yeterince durmadılar. Oysa zaman içerisinde kimlik eksenli açıklamalar da toplumsal hareketler konusunda anlamlı olmaya başlayacaktı. Tilly çizgisindeki eski yapısalcılar bile hareketlerde “aktörün” daha fazla ön plana çıkmaya başladığını ve hatta yapısal ve kültürel yaklaşımların birbirine yakınsamaya başladığını iddia ediyorlardı (McAdam et al., 2001).

1960’lardaki gelişmelerden sonra diğer yaklaşımların yanında temelde Avrupa merkezli yeni toplumsal hareket (YTH) yaklaşımları da görünür hale gelmeye başladı. Yeni toplumsal hareket; kadın, cinsiyet, barış, çevreci hareket gibi hareketleri kapsayan şemsiye bir kavramdır. Bu hareketlerin ortak özellikleri düşünüldüğünde temel eksenlerinin kimlik olduğu görülür. Zaten YTH teorisyenleri de açıklamalarının önemli bir bölümünü “bir kolektif kimliğin nasıl oluştuğu” sorusuna ayırırlar. YTH’lerin geleneksel bir hiyerarşileri, çok belirli bir yapıları, güçlü idealleri, öncü sınıfları, ideolojik bağlantıları yoktur. Birçoğunun belirli bir ajandası, sonuç odaklı amaçları, esnek yapıları ve gönüllü bazda katılımcı kitleleri vardır (Olofsson, 1988; Buechler, 1995). Özetle, bu hareketlerin doğası ve bunların değerlendirilme tarzının post-yapısalcı karakterde olduklarını söylemek doğru olur. Bu yaklaşımların analizlerinde birey ve hareket yapıya üstündür. Bunun yanında, belirtmek gerekir ki bir tek YTH teorisinden ziyade konuyu farklı yönleriyle ağırlıklandıran bir dizi teori ve yaklaşımdan bahsetmek mümkündür. Örneğin Castells, yeni sosyal hareketleri açıklarken mekanın dönüşümü üzerinde dururken, Melucci post modern kimlik oluşumuna ağırlık verir. Ayrıntıları ilerleyen bölümlerde açıklanacak olan bu yaklaşımlar birbirlerini dışlamazlar, aksine birbirilerini dinamik bir ilişki içinde besledikleri söylenebilir.

## **Gezi'nin Yeri**

2013'ün Haziran'ı boyunca devam eden Gezi Olayları (kısaca Gezi olarak da bahsedilmektedir) dünya ve Türkiye'de sosyal hareketler bağlamında ciddi bir öneme haizdir. Bir çevreci direniş hareketi olarak başlayan olaylar kısa sürede Türkiye'nin her yerine sıçramış ve çok büyük bir kitlesel olay haline dönüşmüştür. Türkiye'de 1990'larda ve 2000'lerde sayıca fazla olan sosyal olayların ortalama katılımcı sayısı 500'ün altında iken Gezi'ye 2,5 milyon kişi katılmıştır. Gezi, siyasal olarak tartışmalı bir konu olup; kimileri için bir "umut" kimileri için ise "tehlikeli bir kalkışma"dır. Olayların üzerinden iki sene geçmiş olmasına karşın farklı değerlendirme çalışmaları sürmekte ve bir süre daha süreceğe benzemektedir. Ancak sosyolojik açıdan bakıldığında Gezi, YTH'lerde bulunan birçok özelliği bünyesinde barındırmakta, bu bakımdan bir YTH olarak değerlendirilme potansiyeli taşımakta, bu da değerli bir çalışma alanı sağlamaktadır. Gezi, "devlet", "şiddet", "güç", "meşruiyet" gibi bazı kavramların belirli bir kitle tarafından ilk kez sorgulandığı deneyim olması açısından da önemlidir (Soysal, 2013). Bu tez, bu türden tartışmaları bilimsel bir çerçeveye taşımayı amaçlamaktadır. .

## **Araştırma Sorusu**

Bu çalışmanın temel problematiği, Gezi'nin sebepleri, sürecini ve sonuçlarını Ankara örneğinde ortaya koymaktır. Birçok sosyal hareket teorisi Gezi'yi açıklamakta belirli bir güce sahip olabilir. Ancak politik fırsatlar ve kaynak hareketliliği gibi yeni nesil teoriler bir açıklama kurgulama konusunda daha güçlü yönlere sahiptir. Bunun yanında Gezi temelde bir kimlik hareketi olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu sebepten Avrupa merkezli YTH teorileri, özelde de Melucci ve Touraine'in kültürel ve sembolik kimlik yaklaşımları birincil teoriler olarak benimsenmektedir. Bu tezin temel araştırma sorusu "baskı algısı yeni toplumsal hareket yaratır mı?" şeklindedir. Zira bu yeni sosyal hareketin, kimlik üzerindeki baskı algısının bir sonucu olduğu düşünülmektedir. Tezin baskı yerine baskı algısı üzerinde yoğunlaşmasının sebebi ise "çerçevelerin" bir sosyal hareket oluşumundaki etkisini göz önünde bulundurmasıdır.

## **Metod**

Kimlik üzerindeki vurgu bizleri bu araştırma konusunda katılımcılara yöneltmektedir. Araştırmanın temel metodu, Ankara’da 2013 Haziran ayında Gezi Parkı eylemlerine katılan 40 kişi ile yapılan derinlemesine mülakatlardır. Kitlenin; cinsiyet, yerleşim yeri, yaş, çalışma durumu gibi kriterler açısından dengeli olmasına özen gösterilmiş, bu denge büyük oranda sağlanmıştır. Bunun yanında katılımcı gözlem ve çerçeveleme analizi çerçevesinde gazete içerik analizleri çalışmanın zenginleştirilmesine katkı sağlamıştır. Sağ/muhafazkar-sol ve liberal olmak üzere üç ayrı çizgiden gelen gazetelerin yayınları elektronik ortamda taranmış ve haberlerin Haziran 2013 boyunca nasıl çerçvelendiği ortaya konmuştur. İçerik analizi çalışması, Gezi’nin kronolojik yönünü farklı yaklaşımlarla vermesi açısından da önemlidir. Katılımcı deneyimleri, çerçeve analizi ve olayın arka planı ışığında çalışmanın temel sorusuna cevap verilmiş bunun yanında YTH teorileri ve Gezi kapsamında sıklıkla tartışılan şiddet ve 68 hareketi gibi belli tartışmalar yapılmıştır.

## **Ankara Örneği**

Çalışmanın Ankara örneğinde kurgulanmasının ciddi bir önemi vardır. Öncelikle Ankara, Gezi Parkı eylemlerine aktif olarak katılım göstermiş ve eylemlerin şiddetli olarak yaşandığı Gezi’nin bir gününde yüzlerce gözaltının yaşandığı bir şehir olmuştur. Bunun yanında Ankara, Türkiye’nin başkenti olarak büyük bir nüfusu barındırmaktadır. 22 üniversite ile en kalabalık öğrenci şehri olan Ankara eylemler açısından da ciddi bir potansiyel alandır. Ayrıca Ankara toplumsal hareketler konusunda daima İstanbul’un gölgesinde kalmış ve “memur konformizmi”ne sahip olmakla eleştirilmiştir. Gezi’de bu potansiyel ortaya çıkmış ve kimilerine göre şaşırtıcı biçimde “Ankara kendini aşmıştır”. Bunlara ek olarak Ankara, bir metropol olarak çok farklı eylemlere ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Ankara’nın değişik mahallelerinin farklılaşan özellikleri bu tür sosyal hareketlerdeki duruşunu doğrudan etkilemektedir. Diğer taraftan Ankara; hükümet, devlet kurumları ve bürokrasinin merkezi olarak, şiddete ve sert müdahalelere açık, hırçın bir eylemliliğin de şehridir. Bu gibi özellikler Ankara’yı toplumsal hareketler için önemli bir araştırma alanı yapmaktadır.

2013 yazından sonra özgün Gezi deneyimine ilişkin birçok çalışma yapılmıştır. Bilhassa büyük araştırma firmalarınca anket şeklinde kurgulanan önemli araştırmalar mevcuttur. Ancak bu çalışmaların birçoğu kantitatif tekniklerin eksiklerini içermektedir. Sonrasında hazırlanan kronolojiler ve birkaç ayda reyolları süsleyen kitaplar da çoğunlukla Gezi'ye “ön kapıdan girme” yolunu seçmişlerdir. Konuya ilişkin daha etraflı, soğukkanlı ve bilimsel çalışmaların ortaya çıkması ise zaman almıştır. Bu çalışma da, Gezi literatürüne bu yönde bir katkı sağlamayı hedeflemektedir. Ancak unutulmamalıdır ki, bu çalışma Gezi'den “2 yıl sonra” tamamlanan bir Gezi çalışmasıdır. Bu durumun avantajlarını ve dezavantajlarını kaçınılmaz olarak içerir. Tez sahibi bilimsel kriterlere bağlı olsa da mübrem olarak kendi *habitusunun* etkisi altında olduğunu kabul etmeyi borç bilir.

### **Teorik Çerçeve**

Erken zamanda sosyal hareket meselesine öyle ya da böyle yakınsayan konuları tartışanlar, bireylerin kolektif bir harekette nasıl bulunduklarından ziyade toplumun yapısal olarak bu hareketlere nasıl zemin hazırladığı konusuna kafa yormuşlardır. Zaten kullandıkları kavramlar da “toplumsal hareket” altında formüle edilmemiştir. Marx, işçi sınıfının belirli bir olgunlaşmanın ardından harekete geçeceğini iddia etmiş ancak tarihsel örnekler işçi sınıfının her zaman böyle bir yol izlemediğini ve kapitalistlerin işçi sınıfını kendi safına çekmede başarılı olabildiğini göstermiştir. Marksist teorinin toplumsal hareketler açısından eksik bir diğer kısmı da sınıf kültürü ve liderlik gibi kavramların üzerinde durmamasıdır. Sınıf liderliği meselesi Lenin tarafından yeniden ele alınmış, Gramsci ise hegemonya kavramı çerçevesinde meseleye kültürü entegre etmiştir (Tarrow, 1998b). Yine de tüm bu çabalardan sonra bile, erken zamanda sosyal hareket konusu “politik fırsat” gibi daha sistematize açıklayıcılığı olan kavramlardan uzaktır.

Toplumsal hareketler konusunu yakından ilgilendiren bir diğer ilk çabalardan biri Görelî Yoksunluk Teorisidir. Bu teori esasen II. Dünya Savaşı esnasında geliştirilmiş olup, ABD ordusundaki askerlerin kendi kişisel başarılarını ölçerken görelî pozisyonlarını referans alarak değerlendirmesi şeklindeki tespit üzerine kuruludur. Bu teoriye göre sosyal hareket, kolektif görelî yoksunluk hissinden doğar. Buna göre

gruplar ya da bireyler toplumun diğer üyelerine göre pozisyonlarını değerlendirir ve göreceli bir yoksunluk hissedersen hareket etmeye geçerler. Teori, toplumsal hareket konusuna sistematik bir açıklama getirirse de pratik örnekler her zaman göreceli yoksunluk hali ile sosyal hareket arasında bir bağlantı olduğu iddiasını desteklememektedir (Morrison, 1971).

Toplumsal hareketler konusunda bir diğer dikkat çeken teori ise kolektif davranış teorisidir. Bu tezin ortaya çıkışı da Avrupa’da faşizmin yükseldiği döneme rastlar. Çok geniş kitlelerin faşizmin etkisi altına girmesinde etkili olan şartları sorgulamak tezinin oluşmasına katkı sağlamıştır. İlk defa bu teori ile kolektif hareket bilinçli bir çerçevede anlamlandırılmıştır. Ancak bu teoriye göre toplumsal hareket “negatif bir sapma” durumudur, hatta irrasyonel ve patolojiktir (Martin, 2015). Tezinin Le Bon gibi savunucularının yanı sıra Türkiye’den de Türkdoğan gibi izleyenleri vardır. Bir diğer ilginç örnek ise Polis Akademisi bilim insanlarından Erkan Koca’nın (2015) Le Bon’un eserlerinin Türkiye’de akademi kütüphanesinde en çok ödünç alınan kitaplar arasında yer aldığı tespitini yapmasıdır. Bu durum, Türkiye’de toplumsal hareket katılımcıları ile “müdahalecileri” arasındaki yaklaşım asimetrisinin teorik temelleri açısından da ipuçları verir.

Toplumsal hareketler konusunda bir diğer yaklaşım ise iktisat teorisinden etkilenen rasyonel tercihler ya da rasyonel seçim yaklaşımıdır. Olson tarafından 1965’te geliştirilen bu teori de sosyal hareketlere katılımı aşırı bilişsel-rasyonel bir tercih olarak niteler ve bireylerin çıkarları uğrunda bu hareketlerde yer aldığını iddia eder. Bu tezinin de sendikal hareketler gibi bazı toplumsal hareketleri açıklamada değerli katkıları vardır (Martin, 2015). Ancak, neo-klasik yaklaşımın etkisini yansıtan bu teori “bedavacılık” paradoksu gibi bir dizi bilindik sosyal durumu açıklamakta oldukça yetersizdir.

1960’lardaki sosyal hareketlerden sonra geliştirilen teorilerin başında ise ABD merkezli kaynak hareketliliği ve politik fırsat yapısı teorileri gelir. Zira 1960’lardan sonra sosyal hareket yaklaşımlarında bir paradigma değişikliği olmuş, olayları psikolojik faktörlerle açıklama yaklaşımı yerini daha farklı yaklaşımlara bırakmıştır. McCarthy ve Zald’ın (1977) formüle ettiği kaynak hareketliliği yaklaşımına göre bir

toplumda sosyal hareketi motive edecek durum zaten vardır. Sorun, bu hareketi sağlayacak kaynakların uygun şekilde mobilize edilmesi meselesidir. Bu başarıldığı takdirde hareket oluşur. Buradaki “kaynak” geniş bir havuzu ifade eder. Parasal fon gibi materyal olabileceği gibi zaman veya beşeri sermayeyi de kapsayabilir ya da kimi kaynak hareketliliği yaklaşımlarında bir sistemdeki aktörlerin konumları veya polis şiddetinin de bir kaynak olarak nitelendirildiği görülmüştür. Sosyal hareketi kontrol eden yapı ne kadar merkezi ve kurumsal ise kaynaklar o kadar etkin mobilize olacaktır. Görüldüğü üzere bu teori son derece yapısalcı ve rasyonalist bir yaklaşımın ürünüdür.

1960’lardan sonra ortaya çıkan ve önem kazanan bir diğer teori de politik fırsat yapısıdır. Politik fırsat yapısı daha ziyade toplumsal hareketin ajanı olan gruba dışsal olan kaynaklarla ilgilidir. Bu yaklaşımda toplumsal hareket politik fırsatların varlığı ve kullanımı ile ilgilidir. Seçim sistemleri, politik ittifaklar, iktidarın gücü, politik kaos durumları gibi değişkenler bu fırsatları belirler ve hareketin oluşmasını sağlar. Bu teori bilhassa aşırı merkezi ya da antidemokratik sistemleri hızlı bir şekilde mobilize ettiği sosyal hareketleri açıklamada başarılı olmuştur. Örneğin Doğu Bloğunun hızlı bir şekilde çöküşündeki süreç açıklanırken bu teoriye sıklıkla referans verilir (Fish, 1995). Ancak yine bu teorinin de oldukça yapısalcı ve rasyonalist olduğu eleştirisini yapmak mümkündür.

### **Yeni Sosyal Hareketlere Giden Yol**

Görüldüğü üzere toplumsal hareket olgusunu açıklamaya çalışan bir dizi teorik yaklaşım vardır. YTH yaklaşımı ise bu tezin ana aracıdır. Bu sebepten daha kapsamlı biçimde sorgulanacaktır. Peki, YTH denilen şey nasıl ortaya çıkmıştır? “Yeni” nedir? Ya da, soruyu daha net sormak gerekirse yeni toplumsal hareketleri gerçekten “yeni” yapan şeyin temeli nedir?

1950 ve 1960’larda dünyada çeşitli toplumsal dönüşümler ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Bu değişimler belli alanlarla değil birçok alanla çapraz olarak ilintilidir ve genelde literatürde modernizmden postmodernizme tartışmalar içinde kendilerine yer bulurlar. Bu tez doğrudan bir modernizm-postmodernizm tartışması içermemekle birlikte konuya gerektiğince referans verecektir; zira yeni toplumsal hareketi “yeni” kılan şey, bu tartışmanın da bir parçasıdır.

Söz konusu deęişimin güzergahlarından bir tanesi, üretim modelinde dönüşümlerdir. Buna göre, dünya tarihi, ekonomik birikim modellerine göre üç aşamaya ayrılabilir. Bunlardan birincisi, binlerce yıl süren tarım devrimidir. Buna göre, ilk uygarlıklar tarım devriminin ürünüydüler, yerleşik hayata geçtiler ve büyük oranda toprak üzerinde çalıştılar. İkinci aşama ise endüstriyel devrimdi. Bu devrim ise 1700’lerin ortalarında başlayıp yaklaşık 300 yıl sürdü. Buhar makinesinin öncülük ettiği bu dönem, Newton fizięi ve doğa bilimlerinin yükseliş i ile özdeşleşti. Bu dönemin toplumsal örgütlenme sistemi ulus devletlerdi. Zenginlięin kaynaęı endüstri, toplumun başat sınıfları ise burjuvazi ve proletaryaydı (Toffler, 1992). Henry Ford, bu dönemde Taylorizmi özel bir forma sokarak “zamanı mekansallaştırdı” ve Fordist montaj hattını kurdu. Fordizm sayesinde ürünler eskisinden etkin, ucuz ve standart-kitlesel olarak üretilebilir hale geldi. Bu da temelde bir kitle toplumu oluşmasının önünü açtı. Okullar, hastaneler, hapishaneler gibi kitle kurumları oluştu, devlet bu kurumlar temelinde rasyonalize edildi. Bu kitleselden sapanlar ise “zamana uygun” cezalara çarptırıldılar (McLaughlin, 2012). Bu dönemin olgunlaştığı çaęa modern çaę demek yerindedir ancak “modernite” tartışmasının her zaman için ucu açık bir tartışma olduğunu da kabul etmek gerekir. Bu dönemde sekülerleşme, bireysel hakların artması, çekirdek aileyi öne çıkaran Keynesyen refah modeli gibi bazı gelişmeler üretim modelinin her zaman sonucu olmamak birlikte onunla genelde doğrudan bir uyum içerisindedir. Neticede bu dönemde toplumun kendisi de bir girdiyi tek yönlü işleyerek çıktıya dönüştüren Fordist fabrika gibi işlemekteydi. Çekirdek ailede doğan bir çocuk, devlet okulunda okuyor ve sonra ideal olarak fabrikada çalışıyordu (Toffler, 1992).

Üretim modelinde üçüncü devrim ise bilgi çaęını açmıştır. Bu dönemin başlangıcı kabaca 20. yüzyılın ikinci yarısıdır. Daha net bir tarihten bahsetmek gerekirse ABD’de hizmetler sektörünün ekonomideki ağırlıęının sanayiye aştığı 1955-56 yılları bir çıpa olarak alınabilir. Bu dönemde üretimin ağırlıęı fabrika dışına taşmıştır. Yeni-esnek istihdam (uzaktan çalışma, geçici çalışma gibi) biçimleri ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Modern dönemin emek gücü nadiren “neden” sorusunu sorarken bu yeni oluşmaya başlayan çalışan ise sıklıkla çalışma sistemine müdahale etmek zorunda kalan, inisiyatif alan, emeęi hızla deęer kazanan ve deęer yitirebilen, kendini yenilemek zorunda olan bir çalışandır. 1947 yılında keşfedilen ve günümüz bilgisayarlarının

temeli olan bipolar transistör isimli devre elemanı da ilginç bir şekilde 1955 yılında vakum tüplerinin yerini almıştır. 1950 ile 1960'ların arasındaki beş yılda günümüz bilgisayarının temelini atmaya imkan veren devrime ön ayak olan transistörler bunların birleşimi ile oluşan entegreler ve ilk mikroişlemci üretilmiştir.

Yani bu dönem teknolojiyle de el ele giden bir süreç olup Melucci'ye (1994) göre, sadece bilgisayarların boyutunu düşürmemiş bir taraftan da saklanabilen ve akan veri miktarını yüzlerce kat artırmıştır. Bu dönemde organizasyonel model de hiyerarşilerden ağlara doğru düşünmeye başlamıştır (Harvey, 2003). İnternet bazlı sistemler ve yeni iletişim imkanları yeni toplumsal organizasyon modellerinin temelini atmış ve bilgi toplumu yeni bir sosyal hayatın temelini atmıştır. Bu hayatta sürekli akan bir yığın veri bireyin işlemesi için beklemektedir ve bu da kimlik arayışlarını beraberinde getirmektedir. Diğer taraftan aynı etkiler tüm dünyanın birbiriyle etkileşimini kolaylaştırmış bu da yeni ulus ötesi problemlerin ortaya çıkışını hazırlamıştır.

1960'lardan ve 1970'lerden sonra ise dönüşümün bir diğer güzergahı ise ideolojiktir. Yeni solun tartışılmaya başlanması, sendikaların güç kaybetmesi, ABD'de Vietnam savaşının yarattığı toplumsal etkiler, İngiltere'de Thatcher'in liberal rejimi ve Sovyetlerin önce topallaması sonra da çöküşü gibi etmenler, ideolojik bir takım paradigma değişikliklerini beraberinde getirdi. Refah devletinin düşüşü, liberalizmin yükselişi gibi değişimlerin şüphesiz ekonomik değişimlerle doğrudan ilgisi vardı. Diğer taraftan Çin, Hindistan gibi ülkelerin 1980 ve 1990'larda kapitalizme entegre olması, emek yoğun sektörlerin bu ülkelere kaymasına, fiyatların düşmesine ve kitle tüketim mallarında fiyatların düşmesi sonucunu verdi. Bu sayede önceki dönemde erişilemez olan birçok ürün Batı'da ve Türkiye gibi gelişmekte olan ülkelere erişilebilir hale geldi ve bu da keskin sınıf farklılıklarını azaltıp orta sınıfın genişlemesine, hatta bazı ülkelere bir tüketim toplumundan bahsedilir hale gelmesine önayak oldu.

Bu tüketim modeli de yeni bir aşamaya işaret eder, zira bu dönemde kitle tüketiminin yerini bireysel bazda çeşitlenebilen özel tüketim almıştır. Bugün ürünler çokça üretiliyor ve isteğe göre farklılaştırılabilir. Bu dönem toplumunun kimliğinin



tanımlayıcı özelliklerinden biri tüketimdir. Hatta bu durumun geleneksel sınıfın yerini aldığı söylemek mümkündür. Üstelik Marcuse (1991) gibi kimi bilim insanlarına göre bu toplumda önemli olan sınıf da budur zira bu sınıf gücü etkileme yetisine sahip olan sınıftır. Bu tüketim çağı sınırsız krediler ve *gadget*lar çağıdır. Yine tüketim denilen şey aslında metaların kendisinden ziyade onların çevrisindeki hale ile tanımlanan bir durumdur. Bir şeyin tüketilmesi için onun gerçekten ihtiyaç olması gerekmez. İnsanların reklam gibi mesajlarla buna inandırılması yeterlidir. Bu çağ, post modernite tartışması içinde kendine sıklıkla yer bulan bir “gösterenler” çağıdır. Moda gibi kavramlar bu kültüre hitap eder. Öyle ki Baudrillard’a göre “bireyler eskiden evladiyelik ürünler almakla gurur duyardı, bugün ise ürünlerin kısa sürede elimize geçişlerine ve yok oluşlarına tanık oluyoruz”. Lefebvre’nin (1992) belirttiği gibi tüketim toplumu kendini yaşatmak için ürünlerin sürekli olarak kendini harcamalarını gerektiren bir “yaratıcı yıkama” ihtiyacı duyuyor.

Son dönüşüm güzergahı olarak, toplumsal algımızın değiştiğinden bahsedebiliriz. Modern toplum analizleri oldukça yapısalcıydı. Zira toplumun daima bir yapı şeklinde kurgulanarak etkin olacağı düşünülmüştü. Bu yüzden tüm geleneksel düşünürler yapıya önem verdi. Modern toplum; aile, sendika, parti gibi toplumsal yapılar üzerinden kurgulandı ve her bir organın uygun işlemesi toplumun da “iyi” işleyişinin temeli olarak görüldü.

Oysa post-modern düşüncede yapı, bu anlayışın ötesinde bir şeye tekabül eder. Yapı temelde “dil”dir. Post-yapısalcı düşünürler bu yapıyı “sökme” (çözmeyi ve dağıtmayı içeren şekilde çift anlamlı) denerler ve bu süreçte de dildeki kavramlar gösteren-gösterilen ayrımına tabi tutulur. Gösteren ve gösterilen arasında zorunlu bir birliktelik olmamasına rağmen modern düşünce böyle varmış gibi davranır. Zira bu, Levi Strauss’un da belirttiği gibi insan zihnini düşünce yapısına da uygundur (Sarup, 2004). Bu yüzden ki modernizmin bir ucunda faşizmin yer alması tesadüf değildir. Övgüler düzülen modern birey post-yapısalcı yaklaşımda o kadar da rasyonel görülemez. Belki de olguları açıklamada olguların kendilerinden ziyade onların gösterenlerinden hareket etmek daha doğrudur. Bu yaklaşımda bir bileşen yapının içinde anlam kazanır. Bir aktör, bir ağın içerisinde anlam kazanır, her şey ilişkisiyle veya zıttıyla bir anlam üretir. Örneğin “sıcak” yokken “soğuk” demenin bir anlamı

yoktur. Post yapısalcı metot ise sadece bir kolajdır, yapısöküm de gerçek anlamda bir yöntem değil, zaten var olan bir “şeydir”.

Son olarak, dönüşümün ana hatlarının hiçbirinin ayrı kategoriler olmadığını ve bunların hepsinin birbirinin etkileşimli sonucu olduğunu ifade etmek doğru olur.

Tüm bu dönüşüm, kimlik oluşumunu da etkilemiştir. Bu tez açısından önemli olan kısım ise işte bu etkidir. Aslına kimliğin de bir kavram olarak 1960’lardan sonra popülerleştiği söylenebilir. Bugün kimlikten kasıt post-modern zamanın kimliğidir. Bu kimlik sürekli dönüşen, değişen dinamik bir kavramı ifade eder. Bugün ideolojiler yerini kimliğe bırakmıştır.

Peki kimlik nedir? Genel bir bakış açısıyla düşünersek, kimlik bireyin tüm özelliklerini ifade eder. Tüm bireyler kimliklerini sosyal yapılarla etkileşim içinde kurarlar. Günümüz kimlikleri “verili” değildir. Bizler artık kimliklerin birçoğunu gündelik yaşamdan seçiyoruz (Giddens, 1990). Aynı zamanda kimlik “gösterenlerin” etkisiyle kurulur. Üretim modelindeki değişim, ideolojilerin uğradığı değişim, tüketim toplumunun ortaya çıkması gibi değişimler hep kimlik oluşumunu etkilemiştir. Örneğin üretim birleştirici iken tüketim ayrıştırıcıdır. Günümüz kimliği de öylece boşlukta salınan bir bireye denk gelir. Castells’e (2008) göre yeni üretim modeli (esnek işler vs.), teknolojik iletişim (internet vs.), bitmeyen veri bombardımanı parçalanmış karakterlere sebep olur. Sennett (2008) bu durumu “karakter aşınması” olarak formüle etmiştir. Doğal olarak günümüz insanı çapraz ve bölünmüş kimliklere sahiptir. Bu kimlikler arasında bir hiyerarşi veya durağan bir ilişki olması da gerekmez. Bugünün çalışanın baskın kimliği yalnızca çalışan olmak değildir, o aynı zamanda bir tüketici aynı zamanda internet kullanıcısıdır ve bir internet kullanıcısı da aynı anda birden fazla sosyal ağın parçası olup paralel kimlikleri kullanabilir. Bu bir şizofreni durumu gibi görünebilir ancak, aslında modern insanın kendini dünyaya adapte etme biçimidir. Böyle bir kimlik yapılanmasında toplumdaki bireye gelen açık-net sinyaller bile algılanmayabilir. Zira gösterenler, yani mesajın kendisinden ziyade sunuluşu ciddi bir önem kazanır. Böyle kimliği parçalanmış bir bireyin sıklıkla “güvenli limanlar arayışına çıkması”, yeni inançlar bulmaya çalışması, nostaljiler yaratması anlaşılabilir bir durumdur (Nalbantoğlu, 2010b).

Diğer taraftan “yeni” şeklinde ifade ettiğimiz gerçekliğin kentsel bir boyutu da vardır. Kentin politik bir kimliği olduğu gerçektir. Endüstri Devriminden, hatta Fransız Devriminden beri sosyal hareketlerin mekanı kenttir. İşçi sınıfı ihtilallerinden 2000’lerdeki *occupy* hareketlerine kadar bu durum değişmemiştir. Kent sosyo-ekonomik olarak öncüdür, zamanını yansıtır ötesi için ipuçları verir çünkü kalabalık, değişken ve dinamiktir. Kent deyince mekan akla gelir. Kentsel mekanın toplumsal hareketler açısından bir kullanırlılığı vardır ki, siyasi iktidar da bu yüzden kentsel mekan düzenlemesini daima kendine dert edinmiştir. Soja’nın Lefebvre tarafından da paylaşılan mekan yaklaşımına göre algılanan, tasarlanan ve yaşanan olmak üzere üç ayrı mekan vardır. Algılanan mekan, görece tanımlanabilir bir kavramdır. Bu mekan, fiziksel ve sosyal olarak oluşturulmuştur. Tasarlanan mekan ise, semboller ve gösterenle zihinde yaratılır. Gücün ve ideolojinin kaçınılmaz olarak yansımasıdır. Yaşanan mekan ise tüm bunların bileşimi, aynı zamanda deneyim ve pratiklerin mekanıdır. Lefebvre bu mekanı sunum mekanları olarak tanımlar. Bu mekan yaratıcılığa, baskıya ve gösterenlere karşı harekete imkan verir (Lefebvre, 1992).

Günümüzde kent artık emek ve sermayeyi emmenin bir aracı olarak görülmektedir. 1970’lerden itibaren terkedilen Keynesyen politikalar, 1980’lerle birlikte liberal hale gelmiş ve kent, büyük elitlerin spekülasyon biçiminde rant yaratma alanına dönüşmüştür. Aynı politikalar sayesinde bugün kent daha fazla kentsel yoksulu barındıran, daha gözetimci bir yer halini almıştır. ABD, İspanya, İrlanda gibi gelişmiş kapitalist ülkeler bile 80’lerde fütursuzca temelini attığı bu politikaların bedelini yakın zamanda patlayan ve bir domino etkisi ile tüm ekonomik sistemi etkileyen emlak balonlarıyla ödemiştir. Lakin kentlerde Harvey’nin deyimiyle eşitsiz kapitalist gelişmenin temel mantığı çok da değişmiş ve terkedilmiş değildir. Bu gelişmelere bağlı olarak kentsel sosyal hareketler de artık 1970’lerin hareketleri değildir. Bugün kentlerde eskisinden daha fazla kentsel dönüşüm karşıtlığı, daha fazla kolektif tüketim talebi, politik kent yönetim tekellerine karşı daha güçlü bir duruş vardır. Bunun yanında kentsel alanda hareketler daha çeşitli ve bir o kadar da parçalıdır (Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler and Mayer, 2000).

## **Çerçeveleme Yaklaşımı**

Çerçeveleme konusu, “gösterenlerin gücü” tartışmasının doğal bir uzantısıdır. Çerçeve, Snow ve Benford’a (1992) göre bir yorumlama şemasıdır. Bu şemanın içinde bazı semboller alınır bazıları ise dışlanır. Medyada bir ölüm olayının “can kaybı” ya da “katliam” adı altında yani çok farklı iki şekilde sunumu buna örnektir. Peki sembol yaratımı ile toplumsal hareketin temelinde olan çatışma arasında bir bağlantı var mıdır? Bu sorunun cevabı da pozitifdir. “Adaletsizlik” çerçevesi ya da “duygusallık” çerçevesi bir kolektif hareket oluşumunu doğrudan etkiler. Tüm bu çerçeveler medyanın (ana akım medyadan sosyal medyaya kadar) sosyal hareketler içinde ne kadar etkin bir güce sahip olabileceğini ortaya koyar. Örneğin 68 olaylarında radyonun rolü tartışılmazdı. 90’lara gelindiğinde ise Berlin Duvarı’nın yıkılışı TV’den naklen yayımlanıyordu. Aynı yıllarda Sırbistan’da Otpor Örgütü’nün başını çektiği ayaklanmalarda radyo halen etkin bir rol oynuyordu. Medya, İran’daki rejim sahipleri ya da Hristiyan köktenciler gibi otoriter kesimlerce de yoğunlukla kullanıldı (Esherick and Wassestrom, 1990). Günümüzün medyası ise yalnız kitle medyası değil aynı zamanda internet devrimi ile gelen sosyal medyadır.

## **Günümüzde Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler**

Touraine’e göre YTH’ler yeniydi, zira kendilerini politik düzeni değiştirme amacıyla olan hareketlerden ayırıyorlardı. Bunun yanında sivil alanı düzenliyor ve klasik liderlik yapılarına uymuyorlardı (Touraine, 1995). Bu hareketlerin post Fordist trendlerden, yeni liberal-muhafazakar hareketlerden etkilendiği belliydi. Diğer taraftan, sembolik hareket ve kültürel alan bu hareketlerin eğildiği önemli noktalardı. Gücün yerini otonomi ve self-determinasyon almıştı, post materyal değerler ve bir itici güç olarak kolektif kimlik önemli özelliklerdi. Ayrıca bu hareketlerin örgütlenmesinde sosyal ağlar ön plandaydı (Buechler, 1995). Castells, Touraine, Melucci ve Habermas YTH teorilerinin dört önemli düşünürüdür. Castells, bu hareketleri açıklarken kentsel mekanın dönüşümüne dikkat çeker. Kent, kapitalist metalaşma ve bürokratik baskıya karşı kolektif tüketim talebinin, toplumsal çıkarın savunulduğu alandır. Touraine, çatışan sınıflar tarafından dil denilen sisteminin baskı altına alınması üzerinde durur. Ancak Touraine’e göre post-endüstriyel toplumda sistemi baskılayan tek bir sınıf

yoktur. Farklı sınıflar çıkarlarına göre bir araya gelebilir. Habermas’a göre de YTH’lerde, sistem yaşam alanlarına doğrudan müdahale eder. Bu yüzden YTH’ler defansif karakterdedir. Çatışma, materyal üretimden ziyade kültürel-sosyal alandadır. Melucci ise modern kolektif harekette kimliğin önemi üzerinde durur. Modern harekete katılım, kimlik tanımlama kapasitesi ile ilgilidir.

### **YTH’lerin Temeli: Kimlik ve Kolektif Kimlik**

Kimlik, bir toplumsal hareketin ajanı olan aktör konusunda önemli ipuçları verir (Lee, 2008). Kimlik bir kendini sunma yoludur ve kolektif kimlik de, bireysel olarak çaresiz olunan durumlarda toplumsal bir kendini gösterme aracıdır (Kılıç, 2002). Burada postmodern bir kimlikten bahsediyoruz. Bu kimliğin rasyonel olması gerekmiyor ama oldukça parçalı olması olası görünüyor. Bu kimlik modern araçların ve gücün baskısı altında olup kültürel gereksinimlerinden ötürü de sürekli bir arayış halindedir.

Kimlik, sosyolojide yeni bir kavram olmasa da onu YTH’ye kazandıran Melucci olmuştur. Hatta ona göre kimlik, YTH’de sınıfların yerini almaya başlamıştır. Ancak kimlik yine Melucci’ye göre verili değil, dinamiktir. Kimlik ve toplumsal hareket arasında diyalektik bir ilişki vardır. Kimlik hareketi etkileyebilir ama hareket de kimliği değiştirir. Taylor’a (1994) göre de kimlik, “öteki” ile etkileşim içinde, kolektif kimlik de hareketin rakipleri ile etkileşimi içinde kurulur. Toplumsal hareketin altında yatan kolektif kimlik, aktör ve toplumun kompozit bir formudur. Touraine ve Melucci, YTH’leri doğrudan kimlik hareketleri olarak görürler. Bu, aktör-kültür temelli sosyal hareket algısı ile uyumlu bir durumdur. Melucci’ye (1985) göre kolektif kimlik, paylaşılan bir inançtır ve YTH’lerin altında kültürel-sembolik konular yatar. Kolektif kimlik de bir “şey”den ziyade bir analiz aracıdır. Hunt (1994) , çerçevelerin kolektif kimlik oluşumuna etkisine vurgu yapar.

### **Güç, Otorite ve Baskı**

Günümüzde sosyal hareketler sosyolojisi güç konusunda bir kavramsal çerçeve oluşturmaktan uzaktır. Sennett (2014), gücü bir ihtiyaç olarak tanımlar. Aynı zamanda toplumun tüm birimlerinde otoriteye karşı, özgürlüklere müdahale açısından bir korku vardır. Weber’e göre de önemli olan bireylerin otorite konusundaki algısıdır.

İnsanların itaat eğilimi varsa otorite anlamlıdır ve insanlar meşru görmedikleri otoriteye itaat etmezler. Freud da çocukluktan gelen ilkel güç figürlerinin otorite algısını nasıl etkilediğini ortaya koyar. Ona göre güçlü bir figür insanları “olumlu” hissettirir. Bu yaklaşım Frankfurt Okulu’nu da etkilemiştir. Bu yaklaşımları Marksizmle sentezleyen Okul, işçi sınıfının neden orta sınıflardan daha fazla otoriteye biat eğiliminde olduğu sorusuna cevap aramıştır (Sennett, 2014).

Diğer taraftan otorite tartışması, post-yapısalcı tartışmaların doğal bir ürünüdür. Bu açıdan tez, Foucault çizgisinde bir yaklaşıma sahiptir. Foucault’ya göre tüm toplumlarda, tüm zaman mekanlarda güç ilişkileri vardır ve bu ilişkilere karşı bağımsızlığı olan bir toplum düşünülemez. Güç sürekli yeniden üretilir, yani dinamik ve insanlar kendi hareketleri ile gücü içselleştirirler. Uzun süreli güç odakları, kendi kavramsal çerçevelerini, hiyerarşilerini ve normlarını inşa ederler ve topluma dayatırlar. Bunların toplumsal “merkez” olduğunu dile getirir ve bu merkezden sapanları da “sapkın” olarak yaftalarlar (Foucault, 2014). Güce ilişkin diğer bir husus da gücün sıklıkla kendini ispat edecek gösterilere, “tiyatrolara”, çoğu zaman irrasyonel bile olsa ihtiyaç duymasıdır. Orwell’in Bir Fili Vurmak eserindeki gibi bir şekilde otoriteye karşı gelen cezalandırılmalıdır, aksi takdirde güç, inanılrlığını kaybeder (Scott, 2014).

Geleneksel yaklaşımlar gücü, “bir aktör tarafından uygulanan bir şey” olarak nitelese de günümüzde güç kavramının ilişkisel bir anlam taşıdığı kabul gören bir gerçektir. İlişkisel yaklaşımda da en az iki aktör vardır. Güç zorlayıcı veya ikna edici şekilde olabilir. Bazen güç baskı şeklinde de ortaya çıkabilir. Baskı, gücün özgürlükleri kısıtlamada kullanılması durumudur. Foucault’ya (1980) göre güç, bazen tam da öyle olsa da, her zaman niyetli biçimde ortaya çıkmaz; bazen gündelik hayattaki güç formları ile girilen iletişim gücü bizzat oluşturur. Ocak 2013’te Mısır’ın Tahrir Meydanı’nda başlayan olaylar, bireysel kimliklerin polis ve güven ilişkisi sayesinde nasıl kolektif kimliğe dönüştüğünü ve bunun da gücü nasıl inşa ettiğinin açık bir örneğidir. .

Gücün özel bir formu-uygulaması olan baskı ile YTH’lerin bağlantısı bir arada düşünüldüğünde şu söylenebilir: YTH’ler kültürel olgulardır. Bunların temelinde

kimlik vardır. Bu hem bireysel hem de sosyal bir kimliktir. Güç gibi kimlik de ilişkisel biçimde oluşur. Bu kimliğin oluşumuna, post endüstriyel istihdam biçimleri, ideolojik kırılmalar, devletin aşırı rasyonalize edici baskıları, teknolojik gelişmeler, ağ toplumu olgusu gibi birçok değişken etki etmiştir. Günümüz kimliği parçalı, çoğulcu bazen sığınmak için güç arayan-itaatkar ya da bazen irrasyonel-isyankar, interaktif-ağ ve teknoloji temelli, kentsel bir kimliktir. Bunun yanında, çerçeveleme süreçleri ile gösterenlerin de güçlü bir bombardımanı altındadır. Böyle bir kimlik üzerindeki baskı, direnişin de temelini inşa eder ve bu direniş kolektif kimlik ile ilişkisel ve görünür bir hale gelir.

### **Örnek Olay İncelemesi: Gezi**

Gezi olayları 2013 yılı Mayıs ayının sonunda ilk kez Türkiye'nin en büyük kenti olan İstanbul'da başladı ve sonra başta Ankara olmak üzere birçok ile hızla yayıldı. Ankara'da Tunalı Hilmi/Bestekar Sokak, Kuğulu Park, Kızılay/Güvenpark gibi birçok yer olayların merkezi oldu. Ayrıca Dikmen, Tuzluçayır, Batıkent gibi birçok semt de yer yer barikat ve işgaller yer yer çatışmalar, yer yer de kortejler halinde sakin katılımlarla Gezi'ye destek verdi. Özellikle Kızılay gibi belli merkezler düşünüldüğünde Ankara'da olaylar şiddetli bir şekilde gerçekleşti. Şehir merkezinde belli noktalarda ciddi polis müdahaleleri oldu. Mitingler için izin verilen bir alan olmayan ve kamu binalarına da yakın olan Kızılay Meydanı göstericiler tarafından işgal edildi ve uzun süren çatışmalara sahne oldu.

### **Gezi'nin Arkaplanı**

Gezi'nin arka planını anlamak için Türkiye'nin bilhassa son dönem politik atmosferini değerlendirmek gerekiyor. Zira iktidar partisi olarak AK Parti'nin ve dönemin başbakanı olan partinin lideri Erdoğan'ın Gezi'deki rolü oldukça merkeziydi.

Laiklik karşıtlığı temelli gerekçelerle daha önce birkaç kez kapatılmış olan “İslamcı” partiler geleneğinden gelen AK Parti, Türkiye'deki 1980'deki yapılan “son doğrudan askeri darbe”den 20 yıl sonra doğdu. Ekonomik olarak liberalleşme çabalarını ve sancılarını yaşayan Türkiye'de 2001'deki “tarihin en büyük ekonomik krizi” olarak adlandırılan krizin ve seçim sisteminin de etkisiyle AK Parti 2002 yılında tek başına

iktidar oldu. AK Parti'nin ilk iktidar dönemi, muhafazakar ağırlıkla ama görece kompozit bir kadro ve toplumun farklı bölütleriyle diyalog içinde geçti. Bu dönemde AK Parti, AB hedefine de sıkı sıkıya bağlı bir profil çizdi. Bu dönem ekonomik olarak gerek kriz sonrası sürecin gerek de dış dünyanın etkisiyle hızlı bir büyümemenin yaşandığı, Uzakdoğu ürünleri sayesinde alım gücünün arttığı, geniş bant internetin ülkede yayıldığı ve internet ekonomisinin oluşmaya başladığı da bir dönem olmuştur. Ancak AK Parti'nin yükselişi tüm güç elitlerince kabul görmemiş ve Parti 2008'de bir "e-muhtıra" bir de kapatma davası ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Sonuçsuz kalan bu girişimler, AK Partinin girdiği ikinci seçimde daha güçlü bir destekle iktidar olmasını getirmiş, bu dönemde AK Parti kendisine karşı organize olan güç elitlerini marjinalize etmeyi ve tasfiye etmeyi başarmıştır. AK Parti'nin 2011'de %49 oyla üçüncü kez iktidara geldiği dönem ise tam gücüyle iktidar olduğu, merkezileştiği bir döneme tekabül eder. Bu dönemde "komşularla sıfır sorun" olarak tabir edilen politika terkedilmiş, Suriye'de başlayan iç savaşta taraf olma yolu seçilmiş ve halihazırda resmi rakamlarla 2 milyon civarında mülteci Türkiye'ye akmıştır. Bu dönemde Parti büyük oranda karizmatik lideri Erdoğan ile de iç içe geçmiştir. Aynı dönemde Erdoğan'ın muhafazakar söylemleri artmış, içki satışının kısıtlanması, üç çocuğa sahip olma, kızlı erkekli kalınan evlere müdahale edilmesi gibi argümanlar gündeme getirilmeye başlanmıştır. Dönemin en temel özelliği ise Türkiye'nin bilhassa Güneydoğusunda 1990'lara damgasını vuran ve 2000'lerde yer yer devam eden çatışmalı ortamı bitiren-askıya alan "çözüm sürecinin" AK Parti liderliğinde başlatılmış olmasıdır. Aynı dönem yıllarca palazlanan İslami burjuvazi ve muhafazakar orta sınıfın da belli bir olgunlaşmaya eriştiği dönemdir. AK Parti'nin hiçbir dönem değişmeyen özelliğini ise ekonomide tutarlı bir neo-liberal yaklaşım oluşturur. Her dönem kayıtdışı istihdam artmış, özelleştirmeler devam etmiş, kentsel rant ekonomik kalkınmanın temel motoru haline gelmiştir. Gezi Parkı ise 2013 yılında gerek bu muhafazakar-merkeziyetçi söylemin, gerek kentsel rantın artırılması yaklaşımının vücut bulduğu, mekansallaştığı yer olmuştur.

### **Gezi Olayları**

Gezi olayları 27 Mayıs 2013'te başladı. Bu tarihte İstanbul'da Taksim Meydanı'nın ortasında kalan Gezi Parkı adındaki küçük bir ağaçlık park alanında (0.038 km<sup>2</sup>)



taşeron inşaat firması merdivenleri sökerek parkın bir kısmına girmeye başladı. Parka müdahale 50 kişiyi geçmeyen bir aktivist grup tarafından protesto edildi ancak İstanbul’da bu tür gelişmeler olağan olduğundan olay “sıradan bir güvenlik olayı” ötesinde fazlaca ciddiye alınmadı. Az sayıdaki aktivist parka çadır kurmuştu ve bu çadırlar 29 Mayıs sabahı zabıta güçlerinin müdahalesi ile yakıldı ve eylemciler parktan uzaklaştırıldılar. Olayın aynı gün içinde medyaya yansımaları üzerine öncelikle dönemin BDP milletvekili Sırrı Süreyya Önder daha sonra bazı CHP milletvekilleri olay yerine geldi, parkta halktan da birikim olması üzerine güvenlik kuvvetleriyle yer yer çatışmalar baş gösterdi. 31 Mayıs Cuma günü polis parktaki göstericilere yaptığı sert müdahale ile göstericileri çevre semtlere sürdü. Tüm bu olaylar sosyal medyada dönemin çok bilindik kareleri ile paylaşıldı. Aynı gün olaylar başta İzmir ve Ankara gibi olmak üzere diğer şehirlere sıçradı. 31 Ağustos akşamı Ankara Tunalı Hilmi Caddesi-Kuğulupark yaklaşık bin kişi toplandı ve cadde trafiğe kapatıldı. Bu tarihten sonra hareketler temel olarak bir hükümeti protesto eylemine dönüşmeye başladı ve dönemim başbakanı Erdoğan’ın geri adım atmaması söylemleri ile protestolar her geçen gün daha büyük bir ivme kazandı. 1 Haziran’da İstanbul’da çatışmalar devam etti, dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül’ün de etkisiyle polis güçleri Taksim’den çekildi, aktivistler Taksim ve Gezi Parkı’na girerek yerleştiler ve yaklaşık iki hafta sürecek “Taksim komünü”nün temelini attılar. Taksim çevresine çıkan yollar kapatılarak barikatlar kuruldu, Taksim’de birçok otobüs, polis aracı ve canlı yayın aracı yakılarak eyleme dahil edildi. Gezi Parkı; içine kurulan çadırlar ve revir, kütüphane, ücretsiz bakkal gibi birimlerle yaşayan bir alan haline geldi. Bu alan iki hafta boyunca bir festival alanını andırırken çatışmalar daha ziyade Beşiktaş gibi polisin hattını terketmeyerek koruma görevi yaptığı yerlerde cereyan etti. Ankara’da ise olayların merkezi Kızılay Meydanı ve Güvenpark’tı. Bu alanın TBMM, Başbakanlık ve Bakanlıklar gibi kamu binalarına yakınlığı, toplumsal eylemler için izin verilmeyen bir alan olması ve esasen araç trafiğinden arı bir toplanma meydanı ihtiva etmemesi sebebiyle polis bu alanı korumak için sert müdahalelerde bulundu. Ancak Kızılay tüm engellemelere karşın çok uzun zaman sonra eylemcilerin eline geçti ve polis alana kısıtlı müdahale ile temelde Başbakanlık hattını korumakla yetindi. Bilhassa 1-2 Haziran’da çıkan sert çatışmalarda ölüm, yaralanma ve büyük çaplı gözaltılar oldu. Ankara’da bir diğer şiddetli çatışma alanı ise Tunalı-Bestekar Sokak’tı.

Ankara'nın Eryaman-Batıkent gibi şehir merkezine uzak birçok semtinde bilhassa akşam yürüyüşleri düzenlendi ve Dikmen gibi muhalif kesimin yoğun olduğu yerlerde yer yer polisle çatışmalar oldu. Çayyolu gibi, daha yüksek gelir grubu semtleri ise görece daha steril, naif protestolara sahne oldu. Hemen hemen birçok ilçede evlerden tencere-tava çalarak, ışık yakıp söndürerek eylemlere destek verildiği görüldü. Tuzluca gibi Alevi-Kürt nüfusun yoğun yaşadığı bazı semtlerde ise polisle şiddetli çatışmalar-sokakları trafiğe kapatma eylemleri gözlemlendi. Ankara'da olayların temel çizgisi; akşam toplanmaları, yürüyüşler-hükümet karşıtı sloganlar, polisle yer yer çatışmalar ve polisin kontrol altına alabileceğine inandığı anda kalabalığa müdahalesi şeklinde gelişti. Ankara'da merkezi hareketlilik İstanbul'da Gezi Parkının eylemcilerin elinde olduğu sürece devam etti. Sembolik bir önemi olan parkın 15 Haziran'da polisler tarafından geri alınmasından sonra ülke çapında eylemler forumlara yayıldı. Ankara'da da eylemler bir süre semtlerde devam etti. Ancak kurulan forumlar önemli çıktılar üretse de dinamik bir sosyal hareket devamlılığı sağlamadı. Haziran sonuna doğru Ankara için önemli bir dinamizm kaynağı olan öğrencilerin de azalması ile hareketler etkisini yitirdi.

### **Katılımcı Deneyimleri**

Bu tezin saha çalışması kısmını, Haziran 2013'te Ankara'da Gezi Parkı eylemlerine katılmış 40 kişiyle yapılan derinlemesine mülakatlar oluşturmaktadır. Bu mülakatlarda, en temel olarak Gezi'ye neden ve nasıl katılım sağlandığı sorusuna cevap aranmıştır.

Ankara örneğinde katılımcı kitlenin profili; genç-erkek ağırlıklı, eğitilmiş, orta gelir grubunda yer alan ve kendini orta sınıf olarak tanımlayan, kent kökenli olarak nitelenebilir. Kitlenin bir diğer önemli özelliği çok yüksek düzeyde internet (çoğunlukla “her an” *online* olmak üzere) ve sosyal medya (özellikle Facebook) kullanıcısı olması, olayları da büyük oranda bu mecradan izlemiş olmasıdır. Kitlenin büyük kısmı CHP seçmenidir ancak, bu seçmenler “atipik CHP'li” profiline uymaktadır. Yani, CHP'li ailelerde yetişen, genel olarak CHP'ye oy vermiş/verme eğiliminde olan ama CHP ile arasında geleneksel-tarihsel bağ kurmayan, daha liberal, dönüşüme açık değerlere sahip olan gençlerdir. Kitle genel itibarıyla örgütsüzdür ve

demokratik kitle organizasyonlarında deneyime sahip değildir. İstanbul için yapılan kantitatif anket çalışmalarının aksine bu çalışmada Ankara katılımcılarının Gezi’den önce kısıtlı da olsa genel bir eylemliliği olduğu da görülmüştür. Ankara’da Kızılay/Güvenpark, Kuğulu/Tunalı/Bestekar bölgeleri ise eylemlere en çok katılım sağlanan yerler olmuştur.

Gezi katılımcılarının Ankara örneğinde önemli bir “sınır deneyimi” yaşadığı gözlemlenmiştir. Bilhassa 31 Mayıs’ı 1 Haziran’a bağlayan gece insanların gece 03.00 sularında “dışarıdan gelen sesler” sebebiyle çıktığı ve olaylara müdahil olduğuna dair bir dizi hikaye dinlenmiş ancak muhtemelen sosyal medya kaynaklı olan bu olayların çıkış noktasına ilişkin bir iz bulunamamıştır. Ankara örneğinde birçok kişi hayatında ilk kez şiddet yaşamış, birçok kişi hafif düzeylerde yaralanmış, gazdan etkilenmiş, bazıları gözaltına alınmış ve eylem kavramına bakışları değişikliğe uğramıştır. Ankara örneğinde Gezi, en çok “direniş” olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Bu tanıma “Gezi Direnişi” ve “ayaklanma” kavramları izler.

### **Gezi’yi Teorilerle Açıklamak**

Bu tezin temelini YTH teorileri oluşturmaktadır. Bu teoriler; cinsiyet, barış, çevre, kadın gibi eklektik hareketleri açıklayan şemsiye teorilerdir. Gezi’nin başlangıcı bir çevre hareketini anımsatır. Ankara örneğinde birçok katılımcı Gezi’nin bir çevre hareketi olarak başladığını düşünmektedir. YTH’lerin diğer ayırt edici özellikleri ise, sağlam kurumsallıkları, güçlü hiyerarşileri, üst idealleri, öncü sınıfları ve ideolojik bağlantıları olmamasıdır. Bunun akabinde YTH’ler temelde kültür hareketleridir ve özellikle Touraine ve Melucci bu hareketleri kimlik hareketleri olarak görür. Ancak bu tekil ve güçlü bir kimlik değildir. Ankara örneğinde de Gezi’de katılımcılarının tam da beklendiği üzere güçlü bir kimlik tanımlamaları yoktur. İşçi-emekçi gibi kimliklerin yerini “heyecanlı, Beşiktaşlı, okuyucu, kaygılı, vegan” gibi son derece gündelik özellikleri öne çıkaran kimlik tanımlamaları almıştır. Ankara’da eylemlerin Kızılay’a taşındığı ilk gün olan 1 Haziran’da milliyetçi örgütlerden Anti-Kapitalist Müslümanlara, LGBT’den sosyalist ve ulusalcılara karşı birçok fraksiyonun, birlikte olmasa da yan yana durabildiği gözlemlenmiştir. Ankara örneğinde katılımcılar arasında Kürt ve Alevi kimliğine sahip kişiler olsa da bu kimlikleri belirgin bir biçimde

öne çıkarmadıkları da bir diğer gerçektir. Diğer taraftan Ankara örneğinde hareket lidersizdir. Hareketten akılda kalan kişiler temelde Gezi’de yaşamayı yitirenler olup Ankara’lı olması sebebiyle Ethem Sarısülük ve mülakat günlerinde yaşamını yitirmesine bağlı olarak Berkin Elvan isimlerinin öne çıktığı düşünülmektedir.

Gezi’yi temelde bir YTH yapan asıl unsur şu şekilde bir modele oturtulmuştur: Türkiye’de Gezi’nin ajanı olan çoğulcu bir kimlik oluşmuştur. Bu kimlik, eğitimli, kentli ve kendini orta sınıf olarak tanımlayan, ağırlıklı olarak modernist-seküler ve internet gibi kanallarla bir araya gelen, teknoloji ile barışık bir kimliktir. Bu kimliğin üzerindeki uzun süreli baskı Gezi’deki birikimi yaratan unsur olmuştur. Baskıdan ne anlaşıldığı sorusu katılımcılar tarafından temelde “hayatlarına müdahale” olarak nitelendirilmiştir. “İktidarın otoriterliği, gündelik hayata-yaşam tarzlarına müdahale, nefes alamamak, eğitim politikaları, kentsel mekana müdahaleler” sıklıkla dile getirilen argümanlardır. Bu baskı belli bir birikim noktasına Gezi’den önce zaten ulaşmıştır ve sonunda bu baskı İstanbul’da Gezi Parkı’nda mekansallaşarak Başbakan Erdoğan’da cisimleşmiştir. Erdoğan’ın Gezi’nin ilk dönemlerindeki konuşmaları, politik fırsatlar (Kürtlerle barış süreci ya da AK Parti içindeki-çizgisindeki görüş ayrılıkları gibi) ve kaynak hareketliliği (yüksek beşeri sermayeli katılımcılar gibi) yaklaşımları, bu hareketin oluşumunu etkileyen belli perspektifler-katkılar sunmaktadır. Bununla birlikte Gezi daha ziyade böyle bir kimlik baskılama-bunun çerçeveleme süreçleri ile algılanması, bunun sonunda oluşan bir direniş, direniş sürecinde gelişen kolektif kimlik ve bunun harekete yön vermesi ile oluşan bir süreçtir. Bilhassa Ankara örneğinde bu baskı algısının cisimleştiği, muhtemelen Tayyip Erdoğan’dan daha etkili bir figür 20 yıla aşkın süredir Ankara Belediye Başkanı olan Melih Gökçek’tir. Katılımcılarca ortak kabul gören ve benimsenen “Çapulcu” kavramının yanı sıra, şayet Ankara örneğinde katılımcıları tek bir kolektif kimliğe indirgeyebilecek olsaydık “Melih Gökçek” karşıtlığını net bir şekilde ortaya koyabilirdik. Bu durum Ankara örneğinde belli ölçülerde belediyeye ait kamu mallarına verilen zararı ve şiddetin üstü kapalı olarak meşru görülmesini de açıklamaktadır.

Gezi’nin ortaya çıkmasında ve devamında çerçeveleme süreçleri çok önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Zira hareketin oluşumu, meşrulaşması, bir adalet çerçevesinin ortaya

çıkması ve hareketin dönüşümü ile gücünü yitirmesi başını medyanın çektiği birçok aktörün oluşturduğu semboller üzerinden gitmiştir. Yaratıcı biçimde bu semboller oluşukça Gezi beslenmiş, şiddet gibi “kışelere” bulaşıldıkça hareket güç kaybetmiştir. Ankara’da hareketi ateşleyen diğler unsurlar ise kentsel rantın yarattığı algı ve iktidar konusundaki seküler kaygılardır.

### **Yan Tartışmalar**

Gezi’nin ortaya çıktığı dönemde oldukça süslü bir yazın oluştu. Gezi her şeyle karşılaştırıldı ve çok fazla bağlantılı konuda yazılıp çizildi. Bu tartışmalar tezin ana eksenini oluşturmamakla birlikte ana iddianın çevresinde şekillenen, onu zenginleştiren tartışmalara kısaca değinmekte yarar vardır.

Bir YTH’de şiddetin yeri bu tartışmalardan biridir. YTH’ler karakteristik olarak şiddet içermeseler de her zaman ve mekanın özgün örnekleri vardır. Gezi Ankara örneğinde gerek polis açısından gerekse eylemciler açısından şiddet dolu bir eylemdir. Katılımcılar örneğinde polis tarafından birçok biber gazı kullanma, coplanma, yaralanma, hakarete maruz kalma gibi şiddet içeren örnekler olmakla birlikte, katılımcılar arasında polise ve kamu mallarına saldırma, ya da saldırıları meşru görme, kabul etme eğilimi ön plana çıkmaktadır. Özetle, Gezi’de şiddetin karşılıklı olarak meşru görüldüğü kabul edilmelidir.

Bir diğler önemli unsur Gezi’de patlayan mizahtır. Gezi özgürlükçü sloganları yarı ciddi, hedonist gençlik ateşi ile bir araya getirmiştir. Gezi böylece kendi özgürlükçü dilini yani alternatif kavram sistemini de yaratmış, yer yer kendisi ile de dalga geçmiştir (Çelebi, 2013). Mizahı ve örneğin cep telefonu ile eylemlerden canlı yayın yapmak gibi sayısız yaratıcı yöntemin her birini Gezi’yi besleyen birer çerçeve olarak görmek mümkündür.

Gezi, ortaya çıktığı zaman periyodunda sıklıkla Arap Baharı ile de mukayese edilmiştir. Bilhassa hareketin ortaya çıkmasındaki sembolik olaylar, katı merkeziyetçi devlet yapılanmaları, internet ve sosyal medyanın kullanım şekli Gezi’nin bu olaylarla sıklıkla kıyaslanmasını sağlamıştır. Ancak Arap Baharı daha ziyade Avrupa’da 1800’lerdeki feodal yapılara karşı direnişleri anımsatmaktadır (Kürkçügil, 2013). Bu

hareketler Gezi gibi seküler ve modernistten ziyade çoğunlukla rövanşisttir ve hareketlerin çoğu yerini ülkelerde dönüşümden ziyade yeni kaoslara bırakmıştır. Gezi ise daha Batılı örneklerle yakınsayan, bu kadar büyük değişiklikleri getirmeyen bir “yeni toplumsal hareket”ti.

Gezi’yi 68 Hareketlerine benzetenler arasında ise daha belirgin ayrımlar vardır. Gezi’yi Türkiye’nin 68’i olarak kurgulayan yaklaşımlar hareketin çoğulculuğuna, farklı kimliklerine, başlangıcına vurgu yaparken, aksini iddia edenler 68’in aksine sınıfsal destekten yoksunluğu ve 68 gibi bir “değerler sistemi” inşa etmekten uzak olduğu tezlerini savunmaktadır.

## **Sonuç**

Türkiye, Mayıs 2013 sonunda tarihinde hiç örneği olmayan bir sosyal hareket dalgasıyla karşı karşıya kaldı. Gezi olayları olarak nitelenen ve Haziran ayı boyunca etkisini hissettiren olaylar kimilerine göre Türkiye tarihinde önemli bir dönüm noktası oldu.

Gezi, Ankara katılımcıları örneğinde sıklıkla dile getirildiği şekliyle doğrudan bir sonuç yaratmasa da önemli dolaylı etkileri oldu. Belki de en önemli sonucu Türkiye tarihinde eşi görülmemiş derecede ani, tabandan, eklektik bir hareketin vücut bulmasının bizzat kendisidir. Gezi bu tür yönleriyle tipik bir yeni toplumsal hareket görüntüsü çizmekteydi. Görünürde bu çizgiye oturan Gezi, oluşturulan bir sosyal hareket modeli çerçevesinde Ankara örneğinde analiz edildi.

Söz konusu modele göre Gezi’nin temeli uzun süreli bir politik birikimin neticesinde oluştu. Zaten Türkiye’nin Osmanlı’dan miras aldığı ve son 150 yılını kapsayan modernleşme döneminin daima merkezin bir politik güç tarafından ele geçirilmesi ve muhalefetin dışlanması şeklinde tekerrür ettiği bir gerçektir. Dolayısıyla makro olarak bakıldığında Gezi, bu tipik sancılı sürecin yeni bir tezahüründen başka bir şey değildi. Hükümetin 11 yıl sonunda iktidara tam olarak hakim olmasının da etkisiyle güttüğü merkeziyetçi politikalar, yaşam tarzları, gündelik hayatın kontrolü, yasaklar, laiklik gibi konulardaki toplumsal kaygı içerikli algılar Gezi’yi hazırlayan ve mülakatlarda

sıklıkla dile getirilen birikim faktörleriydi. Ancak Gezi'nin mikro özgünlükleri, asıl incelenmeye değer kısmıydı. Gezi'nin İstanbul'da patladığı ve geliştiği süreç ise büyük oranda çerçeveleme süreçlerinin etkisinde gelişti. Kentsel mekanın rantta açılması, sürekli olarak tepki toplayan bir süreç olmakla birlikte patlamanın Gezi Parkı ile başlaması, sembolik birtakım faktörlerin, politik fırsat yapılarının, kaynak hareketliliği imkanlarının etkisinde gerçekleşmiştir. Gezi'de harekete geçen; görece genç, örgütsüz, kendisini orta sınıf olarak tanımlayan ve bu tür alışkanlıklar gösteren, internetten örgütlenen, lidersiz, hiyerarşisiz bir kitledir. Bu kitle içine İslamcısından ulusalcısına, sosyalistinden, LGBT'lisine ve hatta apolitiğine kadar çok değişik siyasal fraksiyonları alan eklektik bir kitledir. Ancak bu eklektik kitle Gezi'de çeşitli mekanizmalar sayesinde, en temelde de Türkiye ve Ankara örneğinde bireylerde cisimleşen otorite karşıtlığı üzerinden bir kolektif kimlik üreterek bir arada durmayı başardı.

Gezi, post-modern olarak nitelenen dünyadaki her “yeni” gibi, hızlı başladı ve hızlı bitti. Ancak yarattıkları ile uzun süre Türkiye tarihinde değerlendirilmesi gerekli bir tarihi dönem olarak kalacak.

Bu tez, her daim İstanbul'un gölgesinde kalmış Ankara örneğine eğilerek Gezi'ye YTH perspektifinde, katılımcılar tarafından bir bakış sunuyor. Gezi'den yaklaşık iki yıl sonra tamamlanan bu tez, şüphesiz yazarın kendi *habitusunun* sınırlılıklarını ve etkilerini de taşıyor. Bu gerçekten hareketle, ileride Gezi üzerinden yapılacak sosyal medya analizleri, yeni çerçeveleme imkanları, Gezi'de hükümet destekçileri, muhafazakar kitlelere ya da polislerin olay algısına eğilen çalışmalar, eksikleri gidererek sosyal hareketler literatürüne önemli katkılar sağlayacaktır.

## APPENDIX 32 TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Aksular  
Adı : Arda Deniz  
Bölümü: Sosyoloji

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) : Framing Gezi Movement in Ankara

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☒

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☒

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**