DE FACTO PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN TURKEY UNDER ERDOĞAN’S LEADERSHIP

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ABSTRACT

DE FACTO PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN TURKEY UNDER ERDOĞAN’S LEADERSHIP

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The aim of this thesis is to focus on the concept of de facto executive presidentialization, implying that regimes are becoming more presidential in actual practices without changing their constitutional and formal characteristics, in Turkey. While doing so, this thesis sheds lights into the prime ministry and presidency periods of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The main argument is that the Turkish system has been de facto presidentialized at the executive level in both periods. However, there have been little or no meaningful evidence in order to argue for a presidentialization within the broader system.

Keywords: Presidentialization, Institutional Stretch, Personalization of Politics, Turkish Type Presidential System Proposal
ÖZ

ERDOĞAN’IN LİDERLİĞİ ALTINDA TÜRKİYE’DE FİİLİ BAŞKANLAŞMA

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Eylül 2015, 235 sayfa

Bu çalışmanın amacı Türkiye’de, anayasal ve formel karakteristikleri değişmeden, rejimlerin gittikçe başkanlık sisteminin işlevsel mantığını yansıttığını ileri sürdüğü ilerlemeleri sürdürmektedir. Bu yapılarla, Türkiye’de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın başbakanlık ve cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemlerine ışık tutmaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel iddiası, her iki dönem açısından sistemde yürütme düzeyinde füllü bir başkanlaştırma varlığını gözlemlemememebilir olduğudur. Ancak, sistemin tamamı hakkında füllü bir başkanlaştırma varlığını gösterecek kanıtlar bulmak oldukça zordur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Başkanlaştırma, Kurumsal Genişleme, Siyasetin Kişiselleşmesi, Türk Tipi Başkanlık Sistemi Önerisi
To my wife...
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BİMER</td>
<td>Prime Ministry Communications Centre (Başbakanlık İletişim Merkezi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican Peoples’ Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CİMER</td>
<td>Presidency Communications Centre (Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Merkezi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFLs</td>
<td>Decrees Having the Force of Law (Kanun Hükmünde/Gçünde Karaname)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>Group of 7 (major advanced economies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of 20 (major advanced economies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETA</td>
<td>Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Turkish Commercial Code (Türk Ticaret Kanunu)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGNA</td>
<td>Turkish Grand National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRT</td>
<td>Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td>Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İsadamları Derneği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YSK</td>
<td>Supreme Electoral Council/Board (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu)</td>
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The attempts at bringing the office of the presidency to bear to understand the developments on the office of the prime ministry has been a debated issue among scholars of comparative politics. Within this perspective, dealing with the questions looking for the areas of convergence and/or divergence such as - Are there important developments at the global level affecting both the offices of presidency and prime ministry and leading them toward a parallel track? Do their institutional differences and broader political logics prevent the incumbents of a presidential and a prime ministerial office to respond to the developments in a manner seems similar? Do certain historical and political contexts force prime ministers and presidents to follow certain policies? - has been an object of study (Hart 1991).

Although the questions noted at the beginning could be extended, among many, they certainly have a common problem: is it possible to compare the office of prime ministry and presidency, or in the words of Hargrove (2001: 50), “is it acceptable to compare the apples and oranges of different institutions?”

These questions and attempts at caring for them are not new. Especially since the 1990s, scholars have employed the concept of presidentialization in order to account for the developments in parliamentary systems, especially relevant for the British case. The term presidentialization has to be understood as an “analogy” and directs attentions to a “de facto” situation. Its message is not that “there is no difference between parliamentary and presidential systems now”. It does not argue that there is a shift in the legal-formal context from parliamentarism to presidentialism, but rather directs attention to the informal changes.
Contemporary world is characterized by the increasing importance of international politics. The common problems nations face, such as terrorism, fight against global warming, migration problems, economic integration, financialization, international competitiveness and so on, are elaborated, to a great extent, at the international level where the national governments and their head of executives are conducting negotiations with others. In addition, the developments in the media technology and the increasing complexity of the political processes created a stronger tendency for both media and political leaders’ to become natural allies. The media concentrating on leaders’ personal traits and personality attracted the audiences, as though they are celebrities, and leaders’ effective control on the media helped them fostering their cults and popularities. One of the most crucial effects of this alliance is the (increasing) significance of leaders’ influence over the voters during election times.

In other words, the structural and contingent factors are considered as the reason for “the emergence of new political practices” that leads systems, i.e. parliamentary system, to acquire “untypical characteristics” (Zaznaev, 2008: 27). The new practices and/or characteristics have crucial effects on changing “the operational rules” of the form of government. Just to give an example of it, in a parliamentary system when the “elements characteristics of purely presidential system become intensified without adopting it”, it is possible to talk about a “silent structural change” (Ibid: 30) aimed at gradually strengthen the emerging presidential characteristics of the system.

Thus, the changes, primarily found in political practices, are viewed in the “working mode/actual working” (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny 2011) of parliamentarism that increasingly resembling the logic of presidentialism.

The working mode of presidentialism should be put down, as Poguntke and Webb (2005); Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny (2011) had done, into “the superior power resources of the executive leaders (as they are not responsible to parliament, as they have direct legitimacy thanks to popular elections and as they have to rest on the logic of “one-person executive” which gives them the power to organize executive without significant interference from other actors and institutions), increasing
autonomy of the party and executive leadership from each other (the direct result of the separation of powers found in the presidential systems), and the personalization of the electoral process. As “these features are inherent to presidential systems”, if “similar developments should be seen in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems”, then “a de facto presidentialization occurs” (Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny, 2011: 6). The presidentialization as conceptualized here should also be applied to presidential systems. It may be more “presidentialized” as these features are enhanced, however needless to note, the base-line to expect these things develop from is higher when compared to parliamentary systems. In a similar vein, a parliamentary system may also be “partified” if the features of governing through parties rather than passing it and the collegial character of the system become dominant. The systems, according to Poguntke and Webb (2005), depending on the interactions among political actors and/or institutions, on the changes in the structural and contingent factors, may move from one side (presidentialized) to the other (partified).

There are important variations among the usage of the term “presidentialization” (which I will be dealing with in the following Chapter at some depth). It may be the “presidentialization of parliamentary elections” (Mughan 2000, Pryce 1997), “presidentialization of parliamentary systems”, “presidentialization of prime ministers” and presidentialization of politics” (Poguntke and Webb 2005). However, certain common points in these emphases should be delineated:

First and foremost, the presidentialization points out a centralization and/or concentration of power around a single organ, i.e. a prime minister in parliamentary systems. It reveals that in this process of centralization, the powers previously exercised by other bodies, i.e. the council of ministers, are shifting toward a single office. Within this framework, Mancini (2011: 60-61) argues that the presidentialized political actor should be termed as a “figure, or better a role, that is requested by contemporary needs”, especially in order to simplify the decision-making processes.
The demands of mass media at this point are of critical importance. The media’s inclination to and interest in political actors in order to identify political developments before the audiences is paving the way for political leaders to fulfil the function/role of anchorage in this complex processes which seem to be beyond the grasp of ordinary people who do not have necessary information and knowledge on what is going on. However, it is not a one-way relationship. At the same time, the leaders are relying on media due to its power of projecting their cults/popularities.

The presidentialization has to be analysed as a process. To start with, the suffix “-zation”\(^1\) clearly warns us what we are dealing with is a “process”. In other words, we are experiencing and/or facing a “process of change” which has not completed yet. If applied to our case, the main idea behind the term presidentialization is that we are facing a process of change towards what the term “presidential” implies. Thus it has to be noted at the very beginning, what presidentialization argues is not that “something became presidential”, on the contrary it directs attention to a movement which is on the way going to that end. For example, the emphasis on the processual character of presidentialization of parliamentary systems gives the message that the features of the parliamentary system, to a certain extent, remain.

Having said that it is a process of realization, it should also be noted that there are certain factors affecting this process of change. These factors, whether structural and/or contingent, are in a dynamic relationship. For example, a particular leader may accelerate the process but another one may slow it down (Mancini 2011). Thus, presidentialization is a process but “it is not a smooth process” but a “lengthy one”. Within this understanding, a differentiation can be made between the “contingent presidentialization” and “structural presidentialization” (Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny, 2011: 18-20). The contingent presidentialization implies the chief executive’s domination of political executives through the impact of the support they

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\(^1\) See Mancini, 2011: 48 for what the suffix of –zation implies if it is applied to the terms such leader, president and personal.
can draw from their parliamentary parties standing in the parliament, their personalities, their popularity within the electoral processes and unpredictable events. On the contrary, the structural presidentialization is interested in underlying long-term developments, such as reorganization of the government, strengthening the institutional resources available to the chief executive which enhance the chief executive’s potential for strong leadership. It may be that contingent factors may not enable an incumbent to fully realize his/her potential. However, if one has to speak about “enduring presidentialization”, the structural factors have to be at work.

Additionally, although it may be supported by an introduction of certain constitutional clauses that strengthen the power and/or autonomy of a chief executive, presidentialization is first and foremost a “behavioural claim”. What is considered by behavioural at this point is meant “in the absence of a constitutional change”. Thus, presidentialization is related with the changes at the political behaviour, practice and processes rather than with constitutional features. On one level, it is to say a prime minister is becoming, in terms of the behavioural patterns, like a president. Just to give a concrete example from Pryce (1997: 4-5) “the prime minister has become a president in the eyes of the people but remains a prime minister according to the constitution”. The presidential and parliamentary systems are institutionally different. It is thought that the behaviour of a certain chief executive is determined and, thus, has to be analysed “through the institutional form that makes it appropriate” (Dowding, 2012: 2). The presidentialization thesis argues that chief executives do not merely accumulate extra powers through their behaviour but they also enhance their institutional resources in a way to make them possible (Webb and Poguntke, 2012: 6).

Last but not least, presidentialization is an “empirical thesis”. It should be observed, operationalized and thus associated with particular political figures. To exemplify it, the premierships of Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröeder and Silvio Berlusconi (Mancini 2011, Zaznaev 2008) had been exclusively studied as
empirical cases by researchers. The presidentialization fits on the supposed shift from “formal-legalism” to “modernist-empiricism” that has been viewed in the study of executives for some time (Rhodes 2006). Although, these terms (parliamentary and presidential) seem to be, first and foremost, “qualitative concepts”, dealing with various cases with the same type of executive demonstrates that they have different qualitative parameters, in some of them presidents are strong whereas moderate or insignificant in others (Zaznaev, 2008: 28).

In order to summarize what had been said up until now, it should be concluded that, as Venturino observed “presidentialization, shortly said, is the growth of the power of the head of executive”\(^2\) over other power centres, personally and/or institutionally. Although it may be supported by a constitutional clause injecting some features of presidential system in isolation with others into the parliamentary one, it is generally seen in the political practices and processes.

The major problematic of this dissertation is to explore the concept(s) of presidentialization and/or presidential allusions with particular reference to the Premiership (2003-2014) and Presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2014-now) in the Turkish case. While doing so, this dissertation will be in use of the presidentialization in order to account for the “transformation of the political executives in a parliamentary system” of Turkey. To use a more concrete terminology proposed by Poguntke and Webb, I will be paying my attention toward the “executive face” of the presidentialization, rather than the “party” and “electoral” faces. The executive face mainly searches for the changing intra-executive power relations in advantageous to the head of the government. Although the executive could be separated into political and bureaucratic\(^3\) (Peters 2011), I will focus on the

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\(^3\) The politicization of civil service and bureaucracy through a harsh control from the top over the appointments has long been argued to be an integral element of the presidentialization debate within the British case. Especially noteworthy example was Thatcher, according to many in this vein. Her,
political executives. While doing so, the main accent will be on the “core executive”, mainly composed of the prime minister, cabinet members and the President of the Republic of Turkey. The broader configuration of the executive is out of the analysis.

Within this framework, the main research question is that “whether one can argue for an (increasing) de facto executive presidentialization with the premiership and presidency of Erdoğan in Turkey or was it already at high before the period analyzed”. If it is meaningful to claim, then, “what would be the indicators of this somewhat de facto executive presidentialization”? Turkey has generally been classified under parliamentary regime since 1876, with the exception of the 1921 constitution which was a special one implied under the war of independence. There are also scholars who identify the Turkish regime more in line with the semi-presidential one since the 1982 constitution which gave more powers to the president and especially since the 2007 constitutional change which asserted that the next president would be elected by direct vote. The hitherto studies on the Turkish case have paid great amount of attention to the comparison of the Turkish case with the presidential one (especially the U.S. model) and the advantages/disadvantages of such a change (Kuzu 2011; Güney 2007); the import of the semi-presidential regime to the Turkish case and its possible consequences (Kamalak 2007) and the factors leading some political figures such as Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to underline the need for a presidential regime (Gönenç 2011). For many authors, the dominant political culture in Turkey, the party discipline, the institutional experiences within the parliamentary system for more than 100 years are important factors highlighted in order to remain within the merits of parliamentary system (Akçalı 2007; Üskül 2007).

The reason behind the preference of employing presidentialization/presidential allusion is to account for the arguments’ claiming that for some time Turkey has a

alleged, concern over the appointments in the way of asking “is s/he one of us?” is considered a strong sign of the politicization of bureaucracy (see Jones, 1991: 130, Ware, 1987: 360).
“de facto presidential” regime. It is believed by many that without a constitutional change specifying the system as presidential, the functioning of the executive in Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership has reflected the working mode of presidentialism or has reflected some identifiable features evident in presidential systems.

One of the latest expressions of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan perfectly captures the subject topic of this dissertation. In August 2015, the first directly elected president of the Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan argued that the importance and influences of the August 2014 direct election of the President in Turkey has not been captured well. According to him:

There is a president with de facto power in the country, not a symbolic one. The president should conduct his duties for the nation directly, but within his authority. Whether one accepts it or not, Turkey’s administrative system has changed. Now, what should be done is to update this de facto situation in the legal framework of the constitution (Hürriyet Daily News 2015g).

The declaration of Erdoğan was considered as an attempt at a “civilian coup” by the opposition and as totally in contradiction to the existing constitution of the 1982. On the other hand, Erdoğan and his supporters have long been arguing that the 2007 amendments which paved the way for a popular election of the president in 2014 together with the personality and power resources of Erdoğan, the systemic update is necessary because the de facto powers of the president do not match with the constitutional realities. In other words, the arguments try to shed light into the fact that “Erdoğan is the de facto president” in a parliamentarian system.

This is not the first time Erdoğan is called as the de facto president of Turkey. During his prime ministry (between 2003 and 2014), there have been considerable observations/arguments indicating that in time Erdoğan has become the de facto president (İnsel 2012, Tezkan 2012a). These arguments reveal that the decision-making process has been centralized at the office of Erdoğan, Erdoğan has become synonymous with the party he has been presiding and the politics has been
personalized as considering the personality of Erdoğan the anchor of stability and/or the only source of success and/or failure.

It is believed that exploration of the concept of presidentialization paying due regard to the executive face in the Turkish case is valuable and aims to contribute to the literature in the following points: First of all, such an attempt should contribute into the contemporary discussions on the Turkish political system and on the allegedly visible de facto presidential regime under Erdoğan’s effects. Secondly, the hitherto studies on the presidentialization and presidential analogy have focused on analysing the issue within the framework of advanced democracies. An analysis in the context of Turkey should contribute to the debate in indicating the implications of excessive power concentration around a political leader in terms of the quality of democracy, authoritarianism etc. Additionally, as an original contribution to the presidentialization literature, which mainly deals with the power and position of a prime minister in parliamentary systems, this dissertation in the Chapter V will argue that a president, popularly elected, in a parliamentarian system should also be dealt with through the presidentialization framework. Erdoğan’s presidency, the case at hand considering the Turkish case, seems to be very instructive in order to indicate that contingent factors may be of critical importance in contrast to the structural ones (such as the institutional structures supporting the incumbent) in analysing the executives. This is because Erdoğan was able to carry presidentialization debate with himself while moving from the office of the prime ministry to the presidency. It may be seen strange to analyse a president in a parliamentary system within the presidentialization debate. However, it is a must according to me.

As far as the research design/methodology is considered, this dissertation is mainly an ideographic case study, in an attempt to delineate the particular issues and features in a developing country such as Turkey. The presidentialization thesis is certainly an empirical framework. For this reason, I will be in an attempt to operationalize the indicators of presidentialization, in line with hitherto literature and due regard to the
Turkish context. The research will be supported by document analysis and analysis of discourse, especially the discourse of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) in the form of the then-PM and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speeches.

After this brief introduction, Chapter II is mainly allocated to the aim of clarifying the historical evolution of the concept of presidentialization. Although presidentialization thesis has been facing its third decade, at the start it was exclusively a British phenomenon and attributed specifically for British prime ministers (Helms 2013). At the very early stages, presidentialization had been mainly studied as “presidentialization of electoral politics” trying to gather attention toward the increasing importance of political leaders, which is argued in theory as less important in the British parliamentary system, in the electoral process (Pryce 1997, Mughan 2000).

In time, I will be paying greater attention to the works of Michael Foley, that contributed to the debate especially directing attentions on the development new leadership strategies affecting both the PMs and presidents, Anthony Mughan and Poguntke and Webb. My main claim will be that Poguntke and Webb contributed to the debate in freeing the concept from its British origins. Their analytical frameworks, providing different “faces of presidentialization”, clarifying the “factors leading to” it and their “set of indicators” not solely rested on the British experience, used to operationalize the term opened up the debate to comparative study.

Chapter III has three aims: first is to go through the Turkish constitutional frameworks paying due regard to the type of executives they stipulated, in order to come to terms whether one could argue for a presidentialization supported constitutionally. Although the 1982 constitution and the 2007 amendments have certainly injected certain elements that would be considered as presidentializing the system, however they are exclusively related to the power and position of the office
of the presidency rather than the PM. Thus, if presidentialization is mainly devoted to the changing power and positions of the prime ministers, then a process of presidentialization in the Turkish case is not supported by constitutional clauses. Additionally, I will be in an attempt at dealing with the structural and contingent factors, at some depth, leading to presidentialization in the Turkish case paying due regard to the pre-AKP and AKP periods respectively. While doing so, as an important factor, finally the leadership of Erdoğan will be explored paying due regard to the context within which he and his party was emerged.

The analysis of the premiership period of Erdoğan through the lenses of (executive) presidentialization thesis underpins Chapter IV. With the help of the hitherto studies on the issue of presidentialization, a set of indicators, seem to be meaningful in order to be seen as manifestations of presidentialization, are proposed and analysed. It will be argued that Erdoğan’s premiership period can be considered as a de facto executive presidentialization of the Turkish system. However, considering the presidentialization of the politics and/or the presidentialization within the broader system, there is little or no meaningful evidence to support the issue at hand.

Chapter V seems to be an exception within presidentialization literature; however, to me, it is a must within the peculiarity of the Turkish case. It is the study on the Erdoğan’s presidency in terms of presidentialization literature. As noted above, presidentialization first and foremost cares the position of prime ministers. However, in Turkish parliamentary system the popularly elected president in 2014 led many people argue for a de facto presidential system and indicating the gap between the position of the president Erdoğan and constitutional realities. Erdoğan while moving from prime ministry to the presidency tried hard to bring his personal and institutional power resources together with him. He attempted at stretching the office of the presidency into political system, which is argued to be unprecedented in the history of Turkey, through the reorganization of the office institutionally, financially, symbolically and politically.
Chapter VI is tackling with the AKP’s and/or Erdoğan’s 2012 proposal for a presidential system. The conclusion reached at the end is that it was an attempt at updating the de facto and/or current position of the then-PM Erdoğan into a constitutional framework in the minds that he would be the first president of the constitutionally presidential system. The analysis is hoped to be seen as a proof of presidentialization of the system during Erdoğan’s premiership. In Chapter VII, main findings of the study will be summarized.

This dissertation, in short, will aim to operationalize the concept of (executive) presidentialization with particular emphasis laid on the periods of Erdoğan’s premiership and presidency. Thus, an investigation of the notion of presidentialization - its historical origins, different understandings, diverse levels of analyses and position vis-à-vis other frameworks – seems to be a primary task at this point, and the following chapter is hoped to meet these concerns.
CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The most accepted distinction made among types of executive are ideal type constructs based on the relationship between the executives and legislatives. According to this criterion, there are three main types: presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. The categorizations are made either on the idea that cases grouped under the same category share a set of definitional (necessary or sufficient) properties or similarly classified cases are sharing a large number of non-necessary attributes.

2.1 Types of Executive
As far as the presidential system is under scrutiny (the US case as the paradigmatic example of it), the main characteristics of it should be noted as follows: First of all, the head of government and the head of state are united in the same office (Siaroff, 2005: 142). The president is elected for a fixed term (in the U.S. case it is four years). This fixed term is secured unless s/he commits an unconstitutional act (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1991: 58). This is widely considered as the main factor of the rigidity of the system. Secondly, one of the most important features is that there is a clear separation of powers among three branches of government (Charlton, 1986: 16-7). The executive power is given to the President; the legislative competences are given to the Congress and judicial power left to the Supreme Court (considering the US case). This separation of power gives the chance to both the executive and legislative to be directly elected by the people. Consequently, they have no responsibility to each other. Within the framework of the principle of the separation of powers, the US legislative, executive and judicial organs donated with checks and balance mechanisms in the relations among themselves (Akçalı, 2007: 77). To name
some of these mechanisms, the legislative may reject the appointments of the president. On the other hand, the executive can veto laws that are passed by the Congress and appoint federal judges (Ibid: 78). In the presidential system, there is a non-elected cabinet responsible to the president (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1991: 58). The executive power belongs to one person who does not share it, thus making the presidency a “winner-take-all” position (Siaroff, 2005: 142).

With regard to the main characteristics of the parliamentary system (the British case is considered as the home of parliamentary system), it has to be noted firstly, in the parliamentary system; there is the collegial/collective executive (Blondel, 1990: 263). This means that the head of the state is separate from the head of the government and the role of the head of the state is mainly symbolic (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1991: 53). Additionally, the relation between the prime minister and the cabinet should be understood as the prime minister is “first among equals” (primus inter pares) in this collegial executive understanding. Secondly, the executive is responsible to the assembly because the executive is directly drawn from the assembly. The “vote of no confidence” given by the Parliament may bring down the government and this compels the president to invite the leader of the main opposition party to form a government (Ibid: 53). Conversely, the legislative can be dissolved by the executive. Thirdly, in the parliamentary system since the executive is drawn from the parliament, it’s fair to argue that there is no clear separation of powers (Charlton, 1986: 16-7). Those who are making the laws and those who are implementing it are the same people. Fourthly and very related to the above characteristics, the head of government is not chosen directly by the voters (Siaroff, 2005: 145). According to some, this characteristic seems to be less democratic compared to the directly elected president in the presidential system.

France (from the fifth Republic onwards) is the main example of the semi-presidential type of executive. This is a mixed system combining core elements of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The dual executive character of this system
means that there are both president and prime minister in the system. As cited in Cheibub et al. (2013: 3), Elgie defines semi-presidential system as a system in which “a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament”. In this system the president has considerable power such as appointing the prime minister, controlling army, right to dissolve the parliament and negotiate treaties. However, it is expected that the president should be at a distance from daily politics (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1991: 62).

One of the most important features and potential complication of this system is the “cohabitation”. This means that the president and prime minister from different parts of political spectrum can work together (Ibid: 63). The observation of Poguntke and Webb is worth quoting:

Its actual working mode is directly dependent upon presence or absence of party political congruence between the President and the Parliamentary majority. In periods of unified government, semi-Presidential regimes resemble an extreme form of Parliamentarism in times of divided government; however, semi-Presidential regimes revert to a unique mix of Parliamentary and Presidential elements of government (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 4).

To sum up, the specific implementation of semi-presidential system depends not on the formal features but instead on the power relations between the prime minister and president.

Within this understanding, “scholars rely on an assumption that the presidential-parliamentary distinction classifies constitutions that are reasonably homogenous (Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg, 2013: 1-2). In this reasoning, whether one knows, just to give an example, that Turkey has a parliamentarian constitution, s/he can be, to a great extent, able to grasp the position and powers of the Turkish prime minister. He has to be “first among equals” considering his relations with the Cabinet, he has to share powers with his colleagues in the government, he and his government are responsible to the parliament, and he has to gain steady support of his party in the
parliament because it is the party who makes him the chief executive, and so on. Returning back to our example, these are directly derived from the broader logic of the fact that Turkish type of executive is parliamentary constitutionally. But, what if the system, in its actual functioning, does not resemble the properties and attributes, whether necessary or sufficient?

A group of people considers that the study of the executive institution has to be anchored in the political logic of the larger system. In this consideration, the system is thought as a package system. The ideal American model of executive is thought as the “mixed system of government”. Presidents work within a formal constitutional system of separated institutions sharing power and a president leads by building political coalitions. Although there are times to experience strong presidents, such as the Imperial Presidency arguments during the Cold War, the enduring theme has been the weakness of the presidency. The office is depended on the persuasion skills of the president. On the contrary, the ideal British model is identified with strong centralized leadership thanks to disciplined party and parliamentary majority within highly collegial institutions. The institutional features of the British government offer opportunities for prime ministerial dominance. At the period of popular prime ministers, not restrained by the Cabinet and parliament move in a system in which the checks and balances are removed. This group does not deny that the ideal systems may face common political trends. However, what they reject is these trends do not necessarily mean common institutional responses. In other words, convergence and divergence at some points may go hand in hand. Fair to note, they believe in that the political logic of the each system permits variations within the prevailing system (such as weak and strong PMs and Presidents). However, they direct attentions towards being cautious in claiming the emergence of a new political logic and a new executive politics (Hargrove 2001).

In contrast to previous institutionalist school, many people claim that comparisons, crosscutting ideal classical typology and a reformulation are perfectly acceptable.
They argue that these classical types are constructed as ideal types and they are not strictly separated from each other in the real world, thus there may be transitions among them. In this vein, over the last twenty years, there have been attempts at rethinking, at reformulating, at searching for variations among these types. In these attempts (see Table 2.1), the issue of heterogeneity among types (Cheibub et al. 2013), parallel developments affecting all the types (implying a parallel development rather than a convergence) (Foley 1993 and 2000), arguments for the same working mode operating in all types (Poguntke and Webb 2005) seem to be the main lines. Presidential analogy and/or presidentialization are clearly such an attempt.

**Table 2.1 The attempts at reformulating, rethinking and searching for variations among the classical threefold types of executive approach**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variations among presidential regimes</td>
<td>Shugart and Carey 1992;</td>
<td>Presidents wield a wider range of powers than generally assumed. Some have full control of the hiring and firing of the cabinet whereas other do not; some have significant law-making powers and others do not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto players approach</td>
<td>Tsebelis 2002</td>
<td>The overall argument is that most of the differences between regimes discussed in the traditional literature can be studied as differences in the number, ideological distances and cohesion of the corresponding veto players as well as the identity, preferences, and institutional powers of agenda setters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity among classical categories</td>
<td>Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg 2013</td>
<td>When and where the constitution is written is more important in analysing the powers of an executive than whether the country has a presidential or parliamentary regime.</td>
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</tbody>
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4 This table is prepared by the author; however the inspiration behind it certainly belongs to Cheibub et al. 2013.
Table 2.1 (continued)

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<tr>
<td>(Analysis of the British executive – a parliamentary regime – in an engaging manner with the developments of the American presidency)</td>
<td>Contemporary conditions affecting modern democracies may lead both the offices of presidency and prime ministry to be moving along parallel lines of developments. Although these developments may not produce a convergence, nevertheless allow us to search for a comparable identity.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Presidentialization of Politics</th>
<th>Poguntke and Webb 2005</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(mainly the diversity within Parliamentary systems)</td>
<td>The modern/advanced democracies have come to operate under the ideal working conditions of the presidential regime. However, this does not mean that all regimes can be named presidential.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.2 The Concept of Presidentialization

*At the very broader level*, conventionally, the concept of presidential is the opposite of the parliamentary. The “parliamentary politics” is considered as party politics, which is, as the assumption goes, characterized with less significant individualistic elements. Within the framework of such kind of an understanding, “parliamentary elections” are mainly considered as contests between parties representing social cleavages. In this formulation, the personalities of leaders are thought as electorally irrelevant. Thus, presidentialization, at the broader level, implies the increasing importance of the leaders’ personality in parliamentary systems. As far as what presidentialization refers *constitutionally/legally* is considered, it should be claimed that presidentialization is meant to “adopt one or more formal constitutional features of presidentialism” (Zaznaev, 2008: 30). However, a new regime would not meet all the criteria of presidentialism. As quoted by Zaznaev, Webb argues that “where a parliamentary democracy adopts one of the necessary elements of presidentialism in isolation, it does not become a presidential regime as such, but it does introduce presidential features” (Ibid). Within this framework, one can talk about two different types of presidentialization: legal/constitutional (de jure) and factual (de facto) or in
Krouwel’s terms “constitutional presidentialization” and “political presidentialization”\(^5\). Politically, the presidentialization generally evoke, among others, the “concentration of power around a political leader” (e.g. prime minister in parliamentary system), “centralization of decision-making” (at the office of the PM), “a new kind of leadership” which is distanced and detached from the party and/or government, “personalization of elections” and “pluralization of advice” ready to political leaders. According to Helms (2005a: 253) “the lowest common denominator of the different conceptions of presidentialism” is “a gradual transformation of key features of political process in parliamentary regimes into political manifestations considered being typical of the political process under presidential government”.

Historically, the presidential analogy/presidentialization was originated in the British context which necessitates me to deal with the issue at hand at some length\(^6\).

2.2.1 The British Context

It is fair to argue that the historical seeds of the (contemporary) presidentialization debate could be found within the “Cabinet versus Prime Ministerial government”\(^7\)

\(^5\) With respect to Romanian politics, Krouwel conceptualized political presidentialization as to imply “ruling by decree by the president” (2003: 14).

\(^6\) This does not mean that I consider it meaningful to compare Turkish and British executive systems. To me, it is a must because historically the idea of the presidentialization of parliamentary democracies originated from the British case.

\(^7\) For a system to be described as prime ministerial, Buckley (2006: 167) noted the following eight key features that need to be present. The Prime Minister:

- Dominates the policy-making process.
- Takes responsibility for all key policy decisions.
- Will dominate the Cabinet.
- Will determine the outcome of the process of collective responsibility.
- Will claim a separate source of authority from party and electorate and not rely exclusively on Parliament.
- Will act as the principal spokesperson for the government and will be treated as the ultimate interpreter of government policy.
- Will clear all key decisions made by cabinet ministers.
- Will make good use of prerogative powers that allow him or her to act as head of state. This is especially relevant to foreign policy, defence and security which tend to be personal powers of the Prime Minister and subject to few controls.
discussions in the 1960s in Britain. Walter Bagehot in *The English Constitution* (1865) argued that the secret of the British political system was the Cabinet, rather than the parliament, that dominated the government. He argued that the Cabinet was the “buckle which fastens” (as an institution that keep the whole political system together) and the “hypen” (joining legislature to the executive) (cited in Holmes, 2008: 408). In Cabinet government, the prime minister (just a member of the Cabinet, with more authority than each of the other members) works together with Cabinet Ministers in governing the country. The prime minister just being a chair of a committee must contend with the Ministers and needs steady support of them (Hargrove 2009, Holmes 2008). The Cabinet government model stresses that the executive is collegial executive. The collective cabinet responsibility contends that the Cabinet as a whole resigns in the event of a vote of no confidence.

John P. Mackintosh and Richard H. S. Crossman were two important proponents of the prime ministerial government thesis in the 1960s. The transformation of Cabinet government into a prime ministerial one was considered as a result of three important developments experienced in the 20th century, all of them increased the powers of the prime ministers: the growth of the civil service, the growth of the modern, disciplined, mass political parties and the prime ministerial domination of government publicity machine. Crossman, referring to Bagehot’s terms, argued that “the hypen which joins, the buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part, becomes one single man” (cited in Hart, 1991: 210).

In line with the masterful study of John Hart (1991: 209-213), I think there are at least two important conclusions that could be drawn from this specific debate. First of all, neither Mackintosh nor Crossman\(^8\) (although they both considered and compared the two systems) came to a conclusion that this form of prime ministerial

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\(^8\) There are important variations between the authors. For example, Crossman could be considered more eager to relegate Cabinet to a more subordinate position compared to Mackintosh. For a detailed analysis of their ideas, see Hart 1991.
government the same as presidential government. They both rejected it due to the possibility of “a prime minister can be unseated by his/her colleagues or by his/her party”. The debate, certainly, had taken place within the cabinet system. In Mackintosh ideas the locus of power had shifted to the prime minister whereas according to Crossman now a single man used a collective body to serve himself/herself. However, neither of them claimed that there had emerged a new system similar to a presidential one. As John Hart (1991: 211) concluded “there is nothing in their writings to justify the substitution of presidential to prime ministerial government”.\footnote{One of the most important exceptions was Humphry Berkeley. Following the footsteps of Mackintosh-Crossman prime ministerial thesis, he argued that “we are now operating in a presidential system”. While he was making this similarity, he aimed at curbing the powers of the prime minister and providing necessary safeguards against it (Hart, 1991: 211).}

Comparisons between the British prime minister and American president emerged as an unintended by-product of Mackintosh-Crossman thesis. Secondly, it is highly instructive that the prime ministerial power debate in Britain, in the words of Rhodes and Dunleavy, had been “an almost inactive field” over the 1970s and 1980s\footnote{If there had been any important contribution to the debate in the 1980s, it came from a different context, from Australia rather than Britain, by Patrick Weller’s study of First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Westminster Systems (Hart, 1991: 225).}. This is also relevant in terms of presidential analogy in order to account for British premiers. I believe that it is an important indicator of the fact that the president/prime ministers comparisons has an essentially empirical character.

According to George Jones, one of the most known academic opponents of the prime ministerial government thesis, it was the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s method and/or style that paved the way for the writings of Mackintosh and Crossman in the 1960s.

Putting aside the relevance or irrelevance of these theses, the office of prime minister is thought to be affected by the character and style of people sitting there. The absence of a highly effective/extraordinary prime minister until Margaret Thatcher could be the reason of the silence of the field. On the other hand, this observation warns us to be careful in claiming durable changes while dealing with increasing
powers of the prime ministers. The following most important contributions (one is British Presidency argument and the other is electoral presidentialization) in this literature were going to come at the end of Margaret Thatcher premiership.

At the very early stages, presidentialization had been mainly studied as “presidentialization of electoral politics” trying to gather attentions toward the increasing importance of political leaders, which is argued in theory as less important in the British parliamentary system, in the electoral process (Pryce 1997, Mughan 2000). Nevertheless, there were exceptions, like the work of Jones (1991, 117-131) who dealt with the Thatcher era, which tries to tackle with the “developments said to contributing the presidentializing the system”: the aloofness of the premier from parliament; the devaluation of Cabinet; direct appeal to public; politicization of the civil service and building up of the prime minister’s own staff. Jones’s work seems to be one of the first studies putting together the so-called indicators/developments taken as evidences of presidentialization.

The following part will highlight key points of the contributions of Michael Foley within the British context.

2.2.1.1 The Rise of the British Presidency
After a certain period of stagnation in prime ministerial and presidential government discussions in Britain, the end of Margaret Thatcher premiership (1979-1990 in office) was coincided with important publications. At the one side of the debate, George Jones located himself as a fervent opponent of presidency school. This position acknowledged that one had to be cautious in arguing that the changes to prime ministerial power were permanent. There are practical restrictions and forces at work that will prevent any prime minister from establishing a complete

\[11\] In addition to George Jones, one could add Peter Hennessy and Martin Burch, as did by Buckley (2006: 174, 175).
dominance. The office of the prime minister, they believed, is flexible and will be shaped by individual premiers. Jones provided a set of requirements\textsuperscript{12} for a system to be called presidential and after an inquiry he came out with a conclusion arguing that Britain was clearly not a presidential system. Instead, Jones used the analogy of “elastic band” in defining the cabinet system “which can be stretched either toward strength or weakness under the influence of the prime minister” (cited in Hargrove, 2001: 64). A prime minister may stretch the powers of the office well beyond which would usually be considered “normal”. There is a limit and there will be tensions to force the band to return to an unstretched state. In short, this position highlighted that a prime minister maybe in a powerful position only their colleagues allow them to be (cited in Buckley, 2006: 175). At the other side of the debate, one can find Michael Foley and his ideas on the “British Presidency”. It should be claimed that Foley’s studies are interested in an “old chestnut” of a debate whether the British politics has become (more) presidential or not since the 1960s (Clarke, 1994: 327).

Foley published \textit{The Rise of British Presidency} in 1993 and \textit{The British Presidency} in 2000. The original analysis in 1993 was dominated by Thatcher’s leadership whereas the updated and more detailed publication in 2000 focused on the Blair’s period. Foley analysed some of the discernible features and developments of the US presidency and tried to employ these into the British context. He was interested in and in search of parallel developments affecting these different political systems. Foley was talking about the “presidential allusion” and an “analogy” that “alerts us to the possibility of general trends in the underlying properties of political leadership and to the existence of new resources and strategies of leadership that may well signify deep and comparable changes in two, ostensibly different, political systems”\textsuperscript{13}. In his words, the “presidential analogy” and/or “de facto presidentialism”

\textsuperscript{12}These are cited in Hargrove (2001: 64) as the following: the prime minister makes the important policy decisions; the cabinet has come to be an entourage of advisers but does not act as a group; the prime minister has a department/staff loyal only to him; the prime minister has a direct relation to the voters; and the term of the office of prime minister does not depend on a legislature.

\textsuperscript{13}Cited in Judge, 1994: 115
should be used to account for changes considering the position and authority of a prime minister because the customary depiction of a prime minister who is first among equals in the Cabinet has continued to evolve due to contemporary conditions (Foley, 2008b: 54).

Foley provided what his understanding of the US presidency was: a presidency “operating in a strict separation of powers system, a fixed term of office and electoral/political independence from the legislature”. If one apply these characteristics to the British case, it is obvious that Britain is not a presidency. What would be the reasons, then, that led him to argue for a rise of the British presidency. In fact he listed nineteen (19) reasons\(^\text{14}\) however four of them necessitate special attention (for an instructive summary of the important terms, see the table 2.2 The most important concepts of Michael Foley on the British Presidency).

The term “spatial leadership” refers to “the way in which political authority is protected and cultivated by the creation of a sense of distance and detachment from government”\(^\text{15}\). Foley thought that this was the way Thatcher and Blair applied in terms of their leadership. The spatial leadership contains in itself being outsider in the party, the existence of an unconventional policy agenda and populist appeal. Rhodes (2006: 328) noted the key methods for a spatial leadership: “going public” or trying to build support by appealing to the public and “getting personal” or using media to build personal relationship with the public.

\(^{14}\) Judge, 1994: 115.

\(^{15}\) Cited in Rhodes, 2006: 328.
Table 2.2 The most important concepts of Michael Foley on the British Presidency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Spatial Leadership</strong></td>
<td>This term refers to the attempts made by American Presidents to distance themselves politically from the presidency when it is expedient to do so. Foley uses Major’s Citizen’s Charter as a good example of the way in which this idea has been adopted in the UK. By publicly criticising bureaucratic elements of government, Major gave the impression that he was on the side of the ordinary citizen, battling against oppressive bureaucracy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Cult of the outsider</strong></td>
<td>This is the distance claimed by either President or Prime Minister from the political establishment. Nixon, Carter, Reagan and Clinton in the United States, and every British Prime Minister since Callaghan have claimed to be outsiders and therefore not to have the vested interest of the government insider. Thatcher was particularly adept at this in the way she courted the rank and file of her party and dealt in populist politics that circumvented party élites and Whitehall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. The personal factor</strong></td>
<td>In both the United States and Britain an integrated image of a party and its programme is now being routed through its leader. In this way, differences between parties tend to become personalised. It is assumed that the personal qualities of the Prime Minister and other leaders are central to public evaluations of political leadership and performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Command and control premiership</strong></td>
<td>The term implies a special prime ministerial attention and interference in departments in order to check whether they are pursuing the office of prime minister’s priorities. The need for a prime minister (especially relevant for Tony Blair) to become personally involved in issues has led to the impression that where no intervention is planned or threatened, no prime ministerial interest exists. The wisdom should be summarized as “things only happen when Mr. Blair takes personal charge”. The command and control premiership is considered as special governing style by Foley and in establishing it, the role of special advisers of the prime minister (challenging hierarchies, processes and conventions) is of greater importance. Such a style creates an impression of a “private” and “ingrown regime”.</td>
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</table>
Table 2.2 (continued)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>5. Public leadership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Especially relevant for the last 30 years in the American presidency, public leadership phenomenon refers to a requirement of contemporary leaders to create a direct relation with the concerns of the public. This aims at diversifying leader’s political base and bargaining resources. In fact, this should be considered “as a process of disintermediation” in which the leader attempts to marginalize or even displace the claims of other agencies/actors to speak on behalf of the wider public and national interest. The public leadership and/or presidency is ensured or caused by “leader stretch” in which party leader become progressively differentiated from their organizational bases in terms of media attention, public recognition and political identity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Buckley, 2006: 178 and the author

Michael Foley has insisted to hold his position in the following years. He went on to analyse the case of Tony Blair premiership through the presidential analogy in terms of leadership consolidation, prime ministerial critique and leadership decline in his 2004 and 2008 articles. The following passage is very instructive for a summary indicating his main claim:

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16 The following explanation of Foley is worth to be quoted at length: “the prime minister has pursued an uninhibited process of claiming a contractual relationship between himself and his administration on the one side and the interests of British people on the other. In doing so, he has conspicuously established himself at the centre of government responsibility and accountability”. Foley quoted Blair at this point: “that is my covenant with the British people. Judge me upon it. The buck stops here”. (Foley, 2004: 293).

17 The first three terms have been taken from Buckley’s study. The explanations for the “concepts of command and control premiership” and “public leadership” are composed by the author through summarizing what Foley (2004 and 2008b) has written on the issue at hand. For a detailed analysis of command and control premiership, see Foley (2004: 297 and 2008b: 59-61) and for public leadership, see Foley (2004: 293-294 and 2008b: 55-56).

18 The title of the 2004 article in which he considered the usage and critical intent of presidential allusion was “Presidential attribution as an agency of prime ministerial critique in a parliamentary democracy: the case of Tony Blair”. To name but few, he showed that the presidential attribution is and should be used to express personal hostility to a leader, to gather attention to excessive powers of the prime minister, to criticize the governing style of the leader and his/her close team, to prime minister’s increasing attention to foreign policy and his/her specific policy agenda in that area etc.
The assertion is that the changes do not constitute a set of extensions to the traditional schema, or a settled order of growth. Instead, they are claimed to represent a qualitative shift in form and substance – namely that a profusion of political developments have transcended the formal infrastructure of Britain’s political system to the point where the usage of the presidential analogy has become so compelling as to indicate the emergence of de facto British presidency (Foley, 2004: 54).

He, once more, needed to highlight that, “despite numerous attempts by others to claim otherwise”, what he has been arguing “is not an emergence of a British version of the US presidency, but an authentically British Presidency evolved out of the British political structure and in response to British political conditions and traditions” (Foley, 2012: 7).

Although a full-fledged analysis (of the contributions and/or critiques\textsuperscript{19}) of Foley is impossible, it is necessary to note some of them. First of all, the British presidency (as a model of British government\textsuperscript{20}) seems to be gathering the attentions toward “the gap between public expectations and cumbersome character of the Cabinet government”. The prime ministers have appeared to fill this gap by creating a personal political persona. The prime ministers are now considered as “a national figure in his own right against which his or her government is judged by the public” (Hargrove, 2009: 23-25). Foley, for sure, has attempted to account for this contemporary development. Secondly, there is no doubt that Foley’s insights on the leadership in general and on spatial leadership in particular are “reasoned and

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\textsuperscript{19} One of the most important and indeed powerful critiques directed to Foley was that “he never said what a British presidency is” (Judge 1994). Although he listed the reasons that gave rise to a British presidency, he was more successful in terms of indicating what a British presidency is not: it is not a British version of the US presidency.

\textsuperscript{20} Hargrove (2009: 23-25) considers the British presidency, together with Cabinet government and Core Executive models, as 3 models of British government.
illuminating” (Judge, 1994: 116, Rhodes 2006, Helms 2005a\textsuperscript{21}, Buckley 2006\textsuperscript{22}). However, Rhodes (2006: 328) argues that “indeed Foley’s argument seem to be more about changing role of parties and party leadership than about prime ministers and cabinets”. Thirdly, although Foley has noted that Britain saw exceptionally powerful leaders in the past, he attributed their pre-eminence to special conditions (such as wartime). According to him, on the contrary, Thatcher\textsuperscript{23} and Blair were the dominant leaders during unexceptional times (2004: 296). I argue that it is questionable whether it is possible to label the contexts of both Thatcher and Blair as unexceptional. On the contrary, I side with Hargrove (2001: 65-67) in that their specific contexts, the end of predominant Keynesian paradigm for Thatcher period and the rising moments of Third Way arguments for Blair, have played into their hands in claiming to fill the ideological vacuum experienced at the time and in claiming and/or implementing policy mandates far exceeded their popular supports. Finally, as Heffernan (2012: 1) summarized, the Blair premiership which was considered as presidential was followed by Brown’s premiership which was labelled as unpresidentialized. This could be a sign for presidentialization falling further from favour. This is an important critique against Foley. However, Foley holds his position that presidentialization is valid for both leadership expansion and decline. It should also account for decline because the appearance of the following three problems is inevitable: getting hard to maintain the momentum of public contact; the leader by time will be assimilated within the process of government and such leadership will provide opportunity for opposition (Foley, 2008b: 57-58). A dominant prime minister should stretch the office to a degree that his followers certainly will try to benefit from it. It is a structural development for Foley.

\textsuperscript{21} Helms (2005a) argues that Foley’s studies are the most sophisticated ones in the presidentialization literature in terms of considering electoral and decision-making arenas.

\textsuperscript{22} “If the modern prime minister is indeed separate from his/her cabinet, it does not imply a dominance of cabinet, or a simple shift in balance of power. This is a brand-new style of leadership” (Buckley, 2006: 179).

\textsuperscript{23} Foley attributed the dominance of Thatcher, especially, to her personality and her individual agenda for reform in government.
The following quotation is very critical:

It is commonly claimed that a prime minister with a presidential style or orientation will always be forced in the end to return to ‘normality’ with what is often stated to be a revival of politics. It is further asserted that such a transition constitutes a restoration of the structural integrity of the parliamentary-cabinet system and, with it, an inevitable dissolution of leadership presumption and prerogative. Both these reflexive responses are open to dispute. The presidential dimension in the British system should not be seen either as a euphemism for the suspension of politics, or as a deviant condition that is necessarily unsustainable (Foley, 2008b: 65).

Although this observation seems to be related with the British case, this is certainly the most important question that every scholar within the presidentialization debate has to face and account for. Thus, Foley should be appreciated even if only this observation.

2.2.1.2 Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections

Anthony Mughan’s study of *Media and Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections* (2000) is one of the most sophisticated studies in the presidentialization literature. To account for the dominance of political figures/leaders such as Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Bob Hawke in Australia in the 1980s, which seemed to be a puzzle in parliamentary democracies, was the main motivation behind the study. As the author rightly argued, he waited for some time since the 1980s to observe whether the presidential elements in parliamentary elections are “transient” or “represented a durable change”. This study, although had implicit wider implications, mainly dealt with “the role of leaders in shaping the conduct and outcome of parliamentary election campaigns” (2000: 1). It’s impossible to do justice to the every important arguments of Mughan. However, the following part will be in an attempt to provide how Mughan developed his concept of presidentialization at some depth.

At the broader level, Mughan started to compare the “conventional” understanding of the concept of parliamentary in opposition to the concept of presidential. In this vein,
according to him, the “parliamentary politics” is considered as party politics, which is devoid of individualistic elements. Within the framework of such kind of an understanding, “parliamentary elections” are contests between parties representing social cleavages. In this formulation, the personalities of leaders are thought as electorally irrelevant. Mughan, by referring to the Kirchheimer’s insights on the emergence of “catch-all” parties and “ideological depolarization” that had started to be observed in the large western European political parties, highlighted that these developments had paved the way for the transformation of the character of parliamentary politics and for greater autonomy to leaders in defining the party policy over a wide range of issues (2000: 1-2). In his words, “thus there emerged a tendency to personalize politics” contrary to collective character of parliamentary politics.

As far as the concept of presidential is considered, Mughan (2000: 6-7) noted three important characteristics, provided by Lijphart, that are thought to be key differences from the parliamentary type of executive: a) it is a one-person executive in contrast to collective executive, b) presidential heads of governments are directly elected whereas in parliamentary executives they are selected by the legislature, and c) except special circumstances, a president cannot be forced to resign. In short, he stressed that presidential institutional arrangements encourage individualism and parliamentary government is first and foremost government by party. Considering these conventional understandings of both concepts, he argued that:

The term “presidentialization” therefore implies movement over time away from collective to personalized government, movements away from a pattern of governmental electoral politics dominated by the political party towards one where the party leader becomes a more autonomous political force” (Mughan, 2000: 7)

This is, in other words, a convergence on the individualist American model. In fact, this convergence can take several forms: Mughan (2000: 8-10) identifies three forms: a) *constitutional presidentialization* which occurs with a constitutional clause specifically empowering the party leader heading the government. The highly used
mechanisms to reach to a constitutional presidentialization are a new constitution-making or amendment. The highly cited examples are the Federal Republic of Germany just after the Second World War and the 1996 Israeli constitutional revision which allowed for the direct election of the prime minister; b) de facto presidential transformation of parliamentary systems of government and/or evolutionary change in the absence of constitutional change means the changing relationship between the prime ministers and other political actors in the advantage of the former without a constitutional change. In this form of presidentialization, leaders seem to be less inclined to observe constitutional proprieties and more willing to institutionalize alternative sources of advice. Considering the relations between the cabinet and prime minister; this was the essence of a well-known debate in Britain which had asserted that the cabinet government had given way to prime-ministerial government.; and finally c) transient presidentialization which occurs at a time of crisis. In this form, the need for rapid, effective and efficient decision-making may increase the power and autonomy of prime ministers similar to that of president in presidential regimes. Mughan (2000: 9) argues that when the crisis passed, the toleration shown to a ‘heroic leader’ would be withdrawn. Such form of presidentialization was the characteristic pattern applied in the Third and Fourth French Republics.

Having provided the concept of presidentialization and its types, he noted his own understanding which sees:

Presidentialization as a personalization of electoral politics that on the one hand occurs within the parameters of an unchanging parliamentary constitution and on the other persists over time, albeit that the actual impact of the party leaders on mass political behaviour and election outcomes can vary in magnitude from one contest to the next”. He argues that if a parliamentary election is held to be presidential, leaders do influence behaviour (Mughan, 2000: 9).

His differentiation between presidentialism and presidentialization worth to be noted: presidentialism refers to a leader’s independent electoral impact in a single election,
whereas presidentialization implies that this impact has persisted and has become stronger over a number of elections (2000: 10).

If an overview is needed, there is no doubt that Mughan’s presidentialization is certainly directed at electoral presidentialization. However, this specific debate opened up the way towards the differentiation of the types of presidentialization such as constitutional, evolutionary, transient and electoral. Helms (2005a: 254) argued that constitutional changes, evolutionary changes and transient political circumstances leading to presidentialization, in fact, can be grouped under two headings: manifestations based on constitutional change (the first category in Mughan) and manifestations relating to the behaviour of political actors (the second and third categories in Mughan’s scheme). He concluded that Mughan’s insights forced us to keep the dimensions of change apart analytically and Mughan’s specific understanding of presidentialization contributed to the debate in clearing the definitional confusion.

In addition to Mughan’s contribution to the types of presidentialization, I believe that his accent of the “persistence” of the leader effect over a number of elections (which is the difference of presidentialization from the presidentialism in his ideas) thought as the main criteria in his electoral presidentialization, is very critical. This observation, albeit confined to electoral arena in Mughan’s study, is very much related with the wider debate whether this presidentialized effects are to be considered transient, based on contingent factors, or indicating a durable change due to structural changes. Thinking together with the remarks of whether such changes will in the end be “forced to return to normality” in the discussion of the overview of Foley, I believe the most important legacy of the British context to the ongoing presidentialization thesis.
2.2.2 The Presidentialization of Politics

One of the key characteristics of the contemporary debate is that there are attempts to rescue the discussions from the “constitutional formalities and apparent reliance on short-run idiosyncrasies of individual leaders” and by this way tries to examine the developments experienced by modern democracies in order to frame these sufficiently similar phenomena under a generalized conception (Foley, 2008a). One of such an attempt came from Poguntke and Webb in 2005 with the publication of The Presidentialization of Politics. In Budge’s (2006) words, their clear distinction between the “process and regime” and in Persson’s (2008: 433) words their attempt to “let democratic systems vary on a scale running between partified and presidentialized government instead of treating them as separate” is very welcome (see Figure 2.1: Partified and presidentialized governments).

Figure 2.1 Partified and presidentialized governments
Source: Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 6
Poguntke and Webb (2005) argue that “internationalization of politics, the growth of state, increasing importance of media and the declining importance of traditional social cleavages shaping electoral preferences” give way to a world-wide process which they called “the presidentialization of politics”. In their words, “regardless of formal constitutional characteristics/regime types; regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual practices without changing their formal structures” (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 1).

It is necessary to highlight that what is proposed by presidentialization does not “simply mean that there is no difference between parliamentary and presidential regimes” (Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny, 2011: 2). By the term presidentialization, it should be understood that “rather than referring to a shift in the formal-legal context from parliamentarism to presidentialism, the informal changes in the working mode of political systems are the main interest, whereby they increasingly come to operate according to a logic resembling that of presidentialism” (Ibid, 2011: 4-5). Thus, in this formulation, the presidential regimes (especially the US case) are portrayed as ideal-types. Poguntke and Webb (2005: 5) have noted this “functional logic of the presidential system” as following:

1. Leadership power resources: The logic of presidentialism provides the head of government with superior executive power resources.
2. Leadership autonomy: The head of executive is well protected against the pressures from his own party.
3. Personalization of the electoral process: This follows directly from the natural focus on the highest elective office and implies that all aspects of the electoral process are decisively moulded by personalities of the leading candidates.

Having provided the main tenets of the types of executive; Poguntke and Webb (2005) called presidentialization as to imply that regardless of the formal/constitutional characteristics, the working mode of systems has gradually come closer to presidential one. This trend of *de facto presidentialization of politics*
is more visible in its three faces affected by factors other than formal constitutional structures: the executive face, the party face and the electoral face (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 5). The executive face implies both a shift in intra-executive power to the benefit of the head of government (be it prime minister or president) and growing degrees of autonomy of leaders from their parties (Ibid: 9). The presidential-style domination of executives should be explained by relying on “short-term contingent factors” (size and cohesion of parliamentary support; the current standing with the electorate; personalities; unpredictable impact of events). Although this “contingent presidentialization” (Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny, 2011: 19) should not be underestimated; the changes associated with an enduring character may lead to the “structural presidentialization” (reorganization of government to increase the strategic coordination resources of the leader; reduced opportunities of collective decision-making; increase in the bilateral decision-making to the exclusion of the Cabinet; to promote non-party technocrats and politicians) which seems to be prioritized. The party face is meant an increasing power of leaders within their parties. The leaders seek to by-pass party activists, factional leaders and circles of power within their parties and to communicate directly with voters implying that the leader rather than the party competes for a popular mandate. The electoral face concerns the growing emphasis on leadership appeals in election campaigning, the increasing focus of the media coverage of politics on leaders and the growing significance of leader effects in voting behaviour (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 10). As the party leadership rests less on the dominant coalition within the party, the power and autonomy of the leader is dependent on electoral success which seems to be a “precarious power base”: presidentialized party leaders in this sense are less likely to survive electoral defeats than their precursors, who were safely entrenched in their parties (Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny, 2011: 9). To conclude, leaders are stronger in victory, but weaker in defeat.
2.2.2.1 Factors Leading to Presidentialization of Politics

As far as the factors leading to presidentialization of politics are concerned; changes attributable to “structural factors” imply permanent character whereas “contingent factors” mean they can be reversible, short-term in nature and dependent on the actors’ personalities and aims (see Figure 2.2: the causal flows in presidentialization of politics). The following part will be in an attempt to shed lights to these factors at some length.

Figure 2.2 The causal flows in presidentialization of politics
Source: Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 16

What is called “the internationalization of politics” by the authors implies that the important global issues cannot be handled domestically any more. This internationalization is argued to increase the autonomy and/or power of the head of executives due to the trends seen at the international level. The fight against terror, establishment of effective migration policies, battle against environment, global
financial issues, European integration process and so on are touched upon at the intergovernmental organizations at the global level. These co-operations are decided at the international negotiations that have been particularly important in shifting the power to the hands of the head of governments or some key-advisers (the executive presidentialization) because the international politics is seen a domain of leaders rather than parties (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 350). Within this internationalization debate, the “Europeanization” arguments reserve a certain amount of place. The Europeanization is meant to one of the most important consequences of Europe’s impact on national political system is that “national parliaments will lose influence over national executives as European integration proceeds” (Back at al., 2009: 227).

Additionally, the economic and political integration have paved the way for the increasing power of prime ministers / presidents who have become key participants in the important political bargains in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. On the effects of Europeanization on the executive autonomy; the following points are worth noting: First of all, the Europeanization is believed to increase the “autonomy of executives from domestic political and social pressures” (Back et al., 2009: 229) indirectly. The transfer of domestic issues to supranational/international levels plays into the hands of national executives in avoiding blames, however, on the other hand, it increases the vulnerability of the country at hand due to the global trends. Secondly, the governance methods applied in the EU (such as the Open Method of Coordination) create increasing information asymmetries in executive-legislative relations. Lastly, the coordinative and bureaucratic challenges of the European Union may give rise to a kind of technocratic cabinet governments.

As far as the “growth of state”, one of the factors leading to presidentialization, is considered; it’s plausible to argue for twin processes of “institutional differentiation” (increasing the organizational types through which government works) and “institutional pluralisation” (increasing numbers of the same type of organization) (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 14). The responses of the state to these processes, which are considered very relevant to the phenomenon of presidentialization, are put
forward as “the centralization of the power in order to coordinate this institutional fragments” and “what is called sectorized policy-making - bilateral contacts between specific ministers and the head of the executive” which is undermining the collective cabinet responsibility (Ibid: 14). However, a careful analysis of the strategies/processes indicates that the policies conducted within this framework, also, may go hand in hand with what is called “the restructuring of the state”, which should be claimed to provide small and efficient states. Nevertheless, this seemingly paradox between the centralization of power and the restructuring the state seems to give way for a strategic coordination directed by the state (Ibid: 14). This need for an increasing coordination, through making many institutions dependent on the office of the prime ministry, on specific ministry and on specific actors could be evaluated in terms of their function aimed at centralizing the political processes.

The increasing “importance of media” is also highlighted in these debates. It’s believed that the media has started to focus more and more on the personality of political leaders rather than their programmes in order to reduce the complexity of political issues. Additionally, it is argued that the media is also instrumentalized by political leaders through reliance more on symbolism rather than substance. As the media’s focus on individual leaders increase; the public is provided with the chance to judge the leaders “as persons”. In this sense, the “symbolic closeness” to masses is considered a necessary condition for the emergence and electoral success of a leader (Garzia, 2011: 2). Besides, one of the observations on the relationship between media and leader is that the former has the “lowering effect” on the latter. Garzia (2011: 5), quoting Meyrowitz, notes the following on the lowering effect of media:

through television we see “too much” of our politicians; as “the camera minimizes the distance between the audience and performer...it lowers politicians to the level of their audience”...thus stripping them of the aura of greatness that characterizes any ideal conception of a political leader. From here, the paradox of candidates for the presidential nomination competing to look as unpresidential as possible, and of presidential (or prime ministerial) candidates chosen on the basis of their communicational, expressive, and relational capacities (emphasis in original).
Through this lowering effect of media and its successful use by some leaders; audiences view some politicians as expert in “public communication” and develop close ties “emotionally”. In this sense, some leaders are produced with the help of their parties to imply that they are both special but they are also ordinary. This is what is called “celebrity politicians” by John Street (quoted in Nash, 2010: 199). To a certain extent, Bill Clinton, Silvio Berlusconi, Tony Blair (and this dissertation considers Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in this sense) should be provided as paradigmatic examples.

The last factor tries to direct attention to the “declining importance of traditional social cleavages shaping electoral preferences”. The weakening social anchorage of a party entails the increasing pluralisation of its social base which implies the loss of social group ideology and coherent and integrated programmatic packages. This pluralisation of social base put the leader of the party at the very centre. The aim of maintaining the support of diverse groups and responding to the grass-roots demands of the party has to be skilfully managed.

2.2.2.2 Indicators of Presidentialization

To name a full list of empirical indicators is not easy which should be applicable to a wide range of cases. However, it is believed that certain empirical indicators should be highlighted as Poguntke and Webb did (2005: 19-20).

In dealing with the increasing leadership power within the executive; the following points should be searched for;

- A trend towards more personal polling in which the prime ministerial office regularly monitor personal popularity of leaders and voter policy preferences
- A growing tendency of chief executives to appoint non-party technocrats

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24 For a more detailed discussion on the indicators of presidentialization, see Chapter IV.

25 In addition to these indicators, it is argued that “the use of plebiscitary techniques by the head of the government” is an important sign of presidentialization (Helms, 2005b: 431).
• A growing tendency to have more cabinet reshuffles while the prime minister remains in office

• A growing tendency to consider the chief executives as the most important anchor of stability? (I believe in that such a tendency is especially critical for the Turkish case after the deteriorating relationship with the external powers such as International Institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) affecting the course of internal developments).

As far as increasing leadership power within the party is concerned, indicators of both structural and contingent changes may include;

• Changes which give party leader more formal powers.

• The capacity of leaders to forge programmes autonomously of their parties.

• Becoming leading candidates although not being the most senior party politicians.

In terms of electoral process;

• The extent to which the media coverage has increasingly concentrated on leaders

• A change in leader effects on voting behaviour

I argue that a fair and balanced evaluation on the Poguntke and Webb’s version of presidentialization should note (at least) the following contributions and shortcomings: First and foremost, it is certainly an attempt to try to save the concept from constitutional/formal legalism of the well-known tripartite types of executives. By the way of proposing a new classification between partifed and presidentialized governments, they certainly contribute to the attempts of reformulating types of executives. As important as the previous contribution, their presidentialization thesis has freed up the concept from its British origins and/or its preoccupation with the British context. Their presidentialization gives way to cross country comparisons.²⁶

²⁶ In fact, in their 2005 book, country experts have evaluated Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, France, Finland, Portugal, Israel, and the US (among others) within the framework
Thirdly, they attempt to locate the issue into the long-term trends and by this way they try to pay due regard to personal, institutional and sociological factors. Their stress on the processual character of presidentialization has to be taken into consideration. Needless to note, they analytically provide the structural and contingent causes of presidentialization, manifest different types of presidentialization and list the indicators in order to operationalize the issue at hand. In contrast to these highly invaluable contributions, I agree with Foley (2008a) that it is not clear what the term presidentialization reflects, supports and promotes in terms of the kind of the politics in their version of presidentialization. In these arguments, whether the politics imply representation and/or agency, political symbolism, legitimacy, power relations or anti-politics is not clear. Although the political symbolism has been increasingly emphasized due to the growth of media’s effect (Garzia 2011), to a great extent, the analysis on the term of politics, both in their studies and in the literature, seems to be secondary. It has to be dealt with great caution and I will deal with this critique at some depth in the following part in which I will sketch out my general position on the presidentialization.

2.3 Overview of the Conceptual Framework

The presidentialization thesis, in its all versions, is not without important criticism (see Table 2.3 for the summary of the main ideas of proponents and opponents although it is not exhaustive). However, I consider noting some of them important at this point. Considering the Foley’s British Presidency arguments, observers stress the following counter arguments to Foley’s claims: the fall of Thatcher in 1990 by largely the work of her Cabinet (persuading her to leave the party leadership) and the turning of the public opinion polls against her; Blair’s pre- and post-Iraqi war popularity rates, his own confession noting that on so many important decisions his most influential cabinet colleague Brown had stopped him and his own declaration that he was going to leave the leadership of the Labour Party due to increasing

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proposed by Poguntke and Webb in the introduction. Additionally, one of the latest articles (Kefford 2013) has analysed the Australian case through presidentialization of politics approach.
pressures coming from his colleagues. (Holmes, 2008: 423-4; Heffernan 2012: 1). These examples for many indicated that a PM in a parliamentary regime never becomes a president because at one level his/her position is depended on how much his/her colleagues allow him/her to dominate. Admittedly, Foley’s insistence on the rise of an authentic British presidency rather than a presidential regime and his argument for the relevance of presidential analogy in leadership decline (it is clear in his 2008 article) seems to be nuanced observations, however this debate goes on.

Regarding Mughan’s electoral presidentialization arguments, the increasing leader effect in terms of electoral campaigns, leadership appeal of the media in election times and leaders’ effect on the election outcomes have been argued for many years. However, especially, as far as electoral outcomes are considered, the data measuring leaders’ effects autonomously in election outcomes hardly exists. And, by some the existing data justifies the opposite (Karvonen 2010). It is also admitted by Poguntke and Webb that the presidentialization in their electoral face is the least justified one, empirically.
Table 2.3 The summary of the ideas of the proponents and opponents of the presidentialization thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidentialization thesis</th>
<th>Main Author</th>
<th>Main arguments</th>
<th>Opponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early voices</td>
<td>Crossman, Mackintosh</td>
<td>Never used the concept of presidentialization, they considered the issue within the PM-Cabinet debate.</td>
<td>Institutional and/or Constitutional differences always matter: Changes will never lead for a presidential regime if the process does not matched with a constitutional change or a new constitution (because the executive is still responsible to the assembly). It is totally wrong to label the developments as presidentialization. Rather, what we have been observing is exactly the “prime ministeralisation” of prime ministers. Although one may argue that the power and power resources of prime ministers have increased over the years, prime ministers are always more powerful than presidents: If supported by a parliamentary majority and a disciplined party, a prime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentic British Presidency</td>
<td>Michael Foley</td>
<td>Relying on the developments in the modern leadership and observing related changes in both the US and Britain, Foley came to argue that rather than a British version of presidential regime we now have a British presidency. He thinks that modern developments represents somehow qualitative changes that do not allow us any more to debate the issue within the PM-Cabinet relations.</td>
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</tr>
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27 The term is used by Keith Dowding (2012) in terms of accounting for the British prime ministers. In a similar fashion but less critical on the presidentialization ideas, Richard Heffernan (2012) argues that due to the personalisation of politics, changes in the institutional power resources (being the head of government, a PM is involved in government policy; having the administrative and political means to access knowledge, a PM should extend his/her reach across government; being able to shape and influence other actors; and being able to frame and lead policy agenda of government) and party politics, prime ministers are generally “preeminent” within their government. If this pre-eminence is combined with the personal power resources (such as being electorally popular, considered as a high standing within the party, having a reputation for being a leader/extraordinary prime minister) of the prime minister, she/he will be “predominant”.

43
Table 2.3 (continued)

| Electoral presidentialization | Anthony Mughan | Through an empirical analysis of British parliamentary elections and party campaigns over a certain period, rather than a single election, stated that leaders’ effects are increasingly visible in parliamentary elections | minister is powerful than a president.

The power of a president in presidential regime, especially the US one is considered is a myth rather than a reality: there have been powerful and undeniable presidents, however it is not possible unless the office of presidency is thought to be filled by a very exceptional and/or historical leader.

If there is any sign of presidentialization in a parliamentary regime at all, it is more about the style of a particular leader and it is of a more informal/behavioural kind: the presidentialized behaviours and styles of a prime minister will not matched with the substance of politics because there are structural and institutional barriers before it.

| Presidentialization of politics | Poguntke and Webb | Due to both structural and contingent factors, regimes come to reflect the same mode of functioning in terms of executives, party politics and electoral processes. Both a parliamentary regime can move between partified and presidentialized versions of it and a presidential regime between presidentialized and partified versions of it. They opened up the concept to international comparisons and freed up its heavy emphasis on the British context. |

2.3.1 Presidentialization and Other Approaches

As Anthony Mughan rightly argues that the “presidentialization” has been and is “part and parcel of a number of important debates in the study of politics”. Thus, it is a phenomenon of broader interest. Although the focus of this dissertation will be on the “presidentialization in terms of executives and/or governments with respect to decision-making arena”, it is nevertheless necessary to deal with the implications of
the presidentialization thesis within the broader debates at some length. It is impossible to do justice to every framework within the limit and scope of this dissertation. The following part will be in an attempt to deal with issue at hand through providing the main arguments of presidentialization in relation to broader debates such as personalization and party decline and institutionalization.

As far as the study of executives is considered, one can locate the presidentialization debate into the shift from legal/formal towards the empirical approaches. As argued by Rhodes, the presidentialization thesis, albeit its different conceptualizations and understandings, at the general level fits into the modernist/empiricist/behavioural approaches. These approaches basically subscribe to the claim that modern executives can be compared, measured at some points. The preoccupation of the presidentialization thesis with operationalizing the concept, as far as Poguntke and Webb is considered paying due regard to its different faces, has been a fundamental task for the scholars. Their search for indicators should be evaluated within the broader framework of empiricist approaches. Additionally, as it was clear especially considering the British case, certain political leaders and their behavioural styles in office led and has continuing to lead the scholars of executives to account for their period empirically as far as it is possible. Within this framework, the presidentialization thesis is both in a mutually affecting relationship and in a contest with other well-known approaches. Just to use the terminology of Helms (2005a: 17-22) among many, presidentialization falls into the category of an “interactionist approach” which try to pay due regard both to personal and systemic variables. The “leader-centred” approaches which mainly concentrate on the performance and impact of individual leaders, gives the priority to agency/actor whereas the institutional and structural approaches see the supremacy in institutional environment within which leaders operate and in structural conditions (such as the current stage of capitalism), respectively. The interactionist approach, to a certain extent, admits that

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28 According to Rhodes (2006: 324-327), the shift has manifested itself through moving from the formal-legalism of the Westminster model towards the modernist/empiricist and rational choice institutionalism approaches.
leader operate within an environment but argues that this environment is something more than institutional parameters and leaders cannot be considered as the hostages of the system. The attempt of Poguntke and Webb to provide the structural and contingent factors leading to presidentialization should be considered as a sign of accounting for both to personal and underlying systemic factors.

It can be argued that “No presidentialization theory” yet exists. However, it is plausible to speak about some theoretical elements in terms of hypothesis (such as the three faces of presidentialization – executive, party and electoral). Although they should not be seen identical; it is believed by this dissertation that as far as a theoretical framework, the “presidentialization thesis” seems to be in a close relationship with some other widely-known approaches such as “personalization of politics”, “the decline of party government” and what should be called as “institutionalization of party”. The following part of this chapter will be in an attempt to provide the main tenets of the above mentioned approaches as to locate the presidentialization thesis at the very fluid intersection of these broader frameworks. Considering the scope and aim of this dissertation, it is impossible to do justice to every debate in these frameworks. The emphasized points are consciously chosen as to provide what seems to be common with presidentialization thesis. At the end of this part, the common points of all these approaches will be provided.

2.3.1.1 Personalization of Politics
The technological innovations in the media and organizational change put the leaders at the centre in modern democracies. This is especially relevant in terms of political communication. As far as the media effect is considered; it is argued that “the televised debate during national election campaigns” (especially in the 1990s) have directed attentions to the personalities of the leaders. Additionally, the transformation of the parties into catch-all parties signalled the declining role of ideology and put accent to the personalities of party leaders which has started to be more appealing to voters (Garzia, 2011: 3).
The personalization of politics could be seen as part of a more widespread processes such as “individualization of social life” which led people tend to perceive themselves and others as individuals rather than representative of collectivities: “macro-institutional” such as electoral laws and “micro-behavioural” perspectives that try to deal with distrust in representative institutions (Garzia, 2011: 2).

Within this framework; one of the key questions is “under which conditions, the leaders’ personalities can be especially significant”? The rationale behind such a question is that there are factors affecting the role of leaders in individual voting behaviours. One of the factors is “the presence or absence of a dominant climate opinion” (Garzia, 2011: 9). The US 2004 election was held under the post 9/11 opinion climate which favoured the candidate who is believed to have higher leadership strength. The other factor should be identified as “the presence of a systemic crisis” within the political system. This presence of systemic crisis is believed to give way to the emergence charismatic leaders. The highly cited example is Silvio Berlusconi who appeared in the 1990s transition experienced in Italy (Ibid: 9). The following observation from Italy, but which can also be relevant to other cases, is worth quoting:

Why have leaders especially acquired so much importance? First, it should be kept in mind that when most of the old parties disappeared or had to change their name and outlook to survive, voters lost the reference points with which they used to orient themselves in the complex political world. At that point, party and coalition leaders appeared as an anchor, a shortcut to making voting decisions without being obliged to fully understand the ongoing and somehow obscure process of the transformation of the party system (Campus, 2010: 224).

Needless to note, the personalization debate has to deal with the relationship between the leader and the citizens. A latest contribution, in this sense, came from a co-authored book by Blondel and Thiébault et al. Although, they prefer the term

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29 Blondel and co-authors argue that their framework is different from that of Poguntke and Webb. In their sense, the concept of presidentialization is an institutional argument which neglects the psychological dimension provided by personalised leadership (Ibid: 34).
“personalized leadership”\textsuperscript{30}, they argue that there are mainly three types of relationships between the leaders and citizens: “discourses”; “direct contacts” which can take several forms such as clientelism, patronage and media dominance, and “reaction of citizens” which emphasis the notoriety, charisma and popularity of candidates (Blondel et al., 2010: 33).

Among these relationships, the discourse needs special attention. The discourses of personalized leaders contain their vision of the kind of society, political party or the political system in which ideology is also embedded consciously or not. These discourses can be divided into three subtypes (Ibid: 34-38):

1. The discourse of preservation which should be called as conservative discourse.
2. The discourse of change: Such kind of a discourse is discourse of those people whom are called as “transformers” by the authors (in the sense that, they strongly change the basis on which the society or the political system is organized). Transforming personalized leaders can be further divided into two categories: a) Saviours (who were able to solve a major problem facing the political system when in government; they strengthened a political system that was collapsing or had collapsed) examples are Churchill, De Gaulle, Adaneur, b) Revolutionary Transformers (who wish to alter the whole basis on which their society is organized) such as Mao Zadung, Lenin and Castro.
3. Out of these types; the intermediate discourse is mainly the discourse of “policy-makers”. The policy-makers can also be divided into two: technocrats/managers (Chirac should be provided as an example) and innovators (Thatcher, Blair, Berlusconi, Mitterand, Koizumi, and Thaksin). These discourses are about “economic/social interests”, “values”, and more

\textsuperscript{30} The personalized leadership is primarily about mobilization of psychological resources and has three elements: 1) leaders must have undisputed and personal rule in the party, 2) if win elections, the leader cannot be primus inter pares and 3) leaders must be able to control who speaks for the party in media (Blondel and Thiébault et al., 2010: 32-33).
recently “technocratic discourse” gained ground with leaders wishing to demonstrate that they are able to manage efficiently the polity.

Considering the hypothesis “is personalised leadership more relevant in pre-existing or new parties”; it should be stated that leaders creating new parties has benefited from advantages that leaders of old parties seem not to have: a) who create new parties have to determine what the policy of the party is to be and b) the link between older parties and their supporters may well be regarded as being in orbit (based on habit or tradition) (Blondel et al., 2010: 71).

2.3.1.2 The Decline of Party Government

It must be stated at the very beginning, a full-fledged analysis of the changes witnessed by the parties, such as the changes in the organization of parties, party systems, are important debates which are beyond the aim and scope of this study. However, some critical points which share certain amount of common points with the presidentialization debate will be noted in the following part.

As noted by Mughan (2000: 2), Otto Kircheimer in 1966 has underlined the waning of class-mass parties and drawn attention to the newly emerging parties which were transforming the parliamentary politics. This new “catch-all” parties have following characteristics: a) reduction in ideological baggage, b) strengthening top leader groups, c) declining role of party members, d) de-emphasizing its relationship with a specific social class in favour of recruiting voters from population at large, e) access to a variety of interest groups. Such organizational changes coupled with ideological de-polarization (Mughan, 2000: 2) or convergence of parties (Mair, 2009: 212) has enabled the role of individual leaders who are now less closely tied to party organization and ideology. This growing importance of leaders seemed functional in order to attract volatile electorates beyond their traditional class base. This transformation of parties and increasing importance of media in political communication has led scholars to conceptualize new party types, such as “electoral-
professional party” (Panebianco 1988) and “cartel party” (Katz and Mair 1995) in addition to catch-all parties. What is common in these conceptualizations is the increasing power of the party leaders (Kriesi, 2009: 154). The increasing power of leaders and the growing tendency of media to privilege the ordinary citizens have given way to a relationship between electorates and government that is unmediated by parties (Ibid: 155). The party leaders are, now, believed to mobilize masses without the party machine, in the sense that they try to get a “personal mandate from the electorate (Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny, 2011: 14), which led Mair to call the situation as “partyless democracy” or in the words of Mény and Surel “de-parliamentarism” (Ibid: 155).

All these developments, according to Mair, also led to decline of “party government thesis” which is at broader level should be called as “government by the party in the collective sense”\(^{31}\) (Webb at al. 2011: 36). Synthesizing important scholars working on the notion of party government, Mair (2009: 225) has noted the following conditions necessary for party government in the following way:

1. A party (parties) wins control of the executive as a result of competitive elections
2. Political leaders are recruited by and through parties
3. Parties offer voters clear policy alternatives
4. Public policy is determined by the party (parties) in the executive
5. The executive held accountable through parties

As a result of long-term shifts in the character of elections, parties and party-systems, “these conditions are becoming marked more by their absence than by their presence”. Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny (2011), also, came to somewhat the same conclusions as far as party government notion is considered. They argue that growing candidate-centred electoral process, the leaders’ reliance less on dominant coalition

\(^{31}\) In this formulation, collectivity implies the involvement of the actors of the various party strata such as parliamentarians, extra-parliamentary officers and activists.
within the party represent a shift away from party government thesis. However, they also underlined that their only claim is that the leader effect have tended to become more so over time which does not claim that party considerations are less significant than leader effect (2011: 25).

On the other hand, considering the “parties-matter thesis”, scholars have underlined two important propositions: a) social constituencies of parties have different preferences which feed the process of policy formation and b) policy orientations of parties clearly reflect the preferences of their social base (cited in Mair, 2009: 219). On these propositions, many people (Mair 2009, Kriesi 2009, Webb et al. 2011) agree that it is beyond dispute that they are less observed in contemporary democracies. They come to conclusion that despite the relevance of the view which asserts “leader factor is, by and large, a function of the party factor”, the tendency is working to the advantages of party leaders.

2.3.1.3 Institutionalization of Parties
Within this framework, the parties are considered as “organizations” in its entirety responding political, economic and social changes in its environment. As far as “adaptation” of parties is the main interest in this framework, some of them are provided as adapting to and others failing to do so to the changes in the system. Kumbaracıbaşı (2009)32, heavily influenced by the concept of institutionalization used by Panebianco (1988), gives us two important terms in dealing with the institutionalization of a party at hand: the degree of its “autonomy vis-a-vis its environment and the degree of its “systemness”. The concept of autonomy implies the degree of the independence of the party from its environment. The primary way to do so is to gain room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis the main external veto actors. However, the internal levels of membership involvement and responsiveness to grassroots demands are important aspects of systemness (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 3).

32 Kumbaracıbaşı’ s study mainly deals with the first governing period (2002-2007) of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) case through the lenses of institutionalization framework adopted from Panebianco’s views by the author.
Contrary to Panebianco, Kumbaracıbaşı argues that “the degree of autonomy and the degree of systemness may well not go in parallel to each other”. The following passage is worth to be quoting:

if the party works toward a higher systemness and wants to maintain its internal unity, this would involve a strengthening intra-party participation, leading to more opportunities for the different factions to articulate their preferences, less leadership centralization, and better communication between the grassroots and leadership... It would also reduce the party’s attractiveness to moderate voters, who have helped to give the party a certain amount of political autonomy.

In other words, the party should face a “strategic dilemma” which necessitates a trade-off between the two dimensions: “if the leadership increases systemness, it runs the risk of losing autonomy and vice versa. Therefore, the leadership is believed to attempt to optimize the level of institutionalization rather than seeking to maximize institutionalization in both dimensions” (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 3). In short, according to the perspective which considers the parties as organizations, the aim of coordinating both the autonomy and systemness put party leaders at the centre of analysis.

To conclude this part, it is clear that all the approaches, “personalised leadership”, “decline of party government”, “institutionalization of parties” and “presidentialization”, share a certain point: leader effect is on the increase in detriment of the parties. However, the disagreement is based on which criteria to substantiate this argument. Personalised leadership and personalization of politics have in common accent put on the “psychological dimension” which they believe non-existent in Poguntke and Webb. What is called as “institutionalization of parties” framework by this dissertation is considered parties as only organizations, leaving, to a certain extent, social constituency arguments aside. All these approaches have emphasized the role of media in political communication, changes in the electoral process in order to enlarge the support base of parties that put the party leader (whether mediated or not by their parties) to the centre of analysis.
2.4 Concluding Remarks

I argue that the framework of “presidentialization of politics” needs clarification, in order to escape the fate of “just being a buzzword” due to the conceptual confusion reserved in itself. The following part will be an attempt to such an end.

First of all; as noted in the previous pages, the main weakness in Poguntke and Webb’s presidentialization is what the term presidentialization reflects, supports and promotes in terms of the kind of the politics in their version of presidentialization is not clear. I argue that the presidentialization thesis is above all dealing with the term of power. To provide an example, the observations of this dissertation on the concept of “power” (implicitly) conceptualized in the presidentialization debate seem to be instructive. Following on the footsteps of Therborn (1976), I claim that the concept of power is generally considered in terms of “power over” in the presidentialization-inspired studies. The analyses are generally focused on the leader over the party; leader over the cabinet; leader over the voter and (party) leader over external veto players. This kind of analysis, to a great extent, neglects other (“power to” and what should be called as “power from”) approaches applied in sociological theories. Thus, what factors used for a legitimization of accumulation of power of a political leader and an analysis of how society/the structures stemmed from it give way to a concentration of power at some hands, seem to be secondary, if it exists in the presidentialization debate. The lack of such a full-fledged understanding of power, in my view, puts presidentialization thesis in a deadlock in facing the question of “presidentialization in which society” and “presidentialization to do what”? This should be seen in their inadequate accounts for the context within which

33 Therborn in his ground-breaking article notes three main approaches to the concept of power in sociology. The first one is “Subjectivist approach” which is mainly interested in the analysis of “power over”. The power over approach looks for the holders of power in society and mainly is interested in the distribution of it. This approach reflected the well-known debate between the elitists and pluralists. The second one, what is called as “Economic approach” in which the primary emphasis is on “power to”. This approach is mainly locked in the analysis of “power to do what”, understanding power as a capacity to get things done, thus searching for accumulation of power. The classical example of this approach is Talcott Parsons’ well-known structural functionalism. Both, the power over and power to, approaches have shortcomings in providing explanations of the broader society, its historical evolution and its class positions.
presidentialization started to emerge. To a great extent, I believe in that the highly analysed Thatcher example is not a coincidence because the mood of the early 1980s was the attack towards welfare states and the main aim was to restructure state in line with neoliberal and/or New Right premises. I will be facing these questions in the Turkish case within the framework of the restructuring state debate in the neoliberal era.

The second point that should I want to highlight in this conceptual confusion is that whether the presidentialization should be considered a new wine in an old bottle or not. One of the suspicions over the term draws attentions to former conceptualizations of increasing power of prime ministers. In other words, is the presidentialization thesis a reflection of the older debate of the "prime ministerial government"? Helms (2005b) argues that both the presidentialization and prime ministerial government theses implied an effective increase in the role and power of the Prime Ministers. However, according to author, the presidentialization thesis seemed to be broader (Ibid: 430-1). At this point, another problem arises as far as the indicators of presidentialization are considered. To provide an example, it is claimed by some authors that the cabinet turnover rate (an important indicator reflecting the increasing power and autonomy of the Prime Minister) in the Clinton cabinet (presidential system) was smaller than in the cabinets of Blair and Schroeder (parliamentary system). This observation, at least, directs our attention to one of the problem of the presidentialization debate: this notion can "overlook the fact that some parliamentary executives (e.g. British parliamentary executive, especially in the Thatcher and Blair periods) is more powerful than its US presidential counterpart" (Heffernan 2005a). Thanks to the possibility of a single-party government in the parliamentary systems, some Prime Ministers should be in a better position than their counterparts in the presidential systems.

Considering the "newness" of the concept; Ian Budge (2006: 8) tries to bring the issue of increasing media effect, as far as election campaigns are considered, under
The author clearly argues that the development of the mass press around 1990s had similar effects which led elections campaigns dominated by a single authority such as Bismarck’s election campaigns. In addition, the presidentialization thesis should be viewed as “returning to Schumpeter”. Poguntke and Webb (2005: 354) noted that despite the common points such as the centrality of leaders; two approaches differ in their accent on the “political role of citizens” and “reassertion of democratic legitimacy in modern democracies”. They clearly reject the fit between the democratic elitist model of Schumpeter and their presidentialization thesis.

Another important intervention into this debate should be made in dealing with the dangers of periodization. Although, in their book, Poguntke and Webb acknowledges that their thesis and the factors leading to presidentialization revealed the characteristics after the 1960s, the authors neglected the critical question that does the presidentialization thesis mean that the political leaders before the 1960s had never had a chance to increase their autonomy and power within the system to a level capable enough to be called as presidents? It is an important problematique indicating the shortcomings of presidentialization thesis in terms of periodization. In order to deal with such a problem the criteria has to be clearly detailed as to represent a clear break with the features of previous periods. In short, this dissertation subscribes to the critiques highlighting the works of Poguntke and Webb as “a-historical” (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 21). The solution in order not to be trapped into an “a-historical analysis”, the features of and changes from (if there is) the previous periods should be detailed qualitatively and quantitatively (if it’s possible). Additionally, if the term presidentialization has to be defined as a “trend” towards increasing power of executives, leaders and media (in short), it is necessary to take the longitudinal implications of the concept seriously. The research question of this

34 In one of the issue of Foreign Affairs; Bismarck’s way of dealing with his political rivals through suppression and his authoritarian style led Michael Bernhard (2011) to argue that modern leaders share many common attitudes (such as Putin, Chavez and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) with him. This type of regimes should be called as “competitive authoritarianism”, according to author.
dissertation, “whether there is an increase in the presidentialization of politics in Turkey or it was already at a high level at the outset of the period” reflects such a rationale.

Last but not least, an important point in discussion is whether the American case (as a presidential system example) is a model that other examples can be compared to (Blondel et al.) or just a construct as claimed by Poguntke and Webb (2005). Such an intervention is vital in directing attentions to the evolution of the system in the US case. Reviewing an important amount of literature on the US cases, Blondel et al. (2010: 47) argue that the nature and characteristics of the presidential systems would be more “mythical than real”. They largely disagree with the arguments claiming that American presidents are all-powerful, especially considering the president vis-a-vis the departments and cabinets, since the second half of the twentieth century. In their recent study, Webb et al. (2011: 47) totally disagree with the view blaming them for considering the US case as a theoretical example. They noted, once more, the concept of presidentialization was not derived from the US case per se, rather was constructed as an ideal type as to provide the inherent mechanisms of the presidential system. Additionally, it seems that the application of the concept by Poguntke and Webb was due to highlight a broader phenomenon, affecting not only parliamentary systems but also other democratic systems. If the concept of presidentialization is to be used with specific reference to the US (which was not the case considering the work of Poguntke and Webb), the warnings of Blondel et al. have to be taken into consideration. A proper analysis necessitates reviewing the changes and/or evolutions experienced by the case which is used as a reference point.

Having provided the conceptual framework, in lieu of conclusion I shall argue presidentialization has to be understood and analysed as a “process”. By this way, it is aimed to locate the debate into its historical context. It is beyond dispute that a clear-cut criteria to label some periods as “presidentialized” or “non-presidentialized” in parliamentary systems has not been yet developed. An historical
analysis necessitates noting the changes (functional or occasional) from the previous periods if it exists. At this point, two important methods seem crucial. First of all, borrowing the method from the dialectical thinking; “the qualitative and quantitative changes”\textsuperscript{35} feeds us with certain amounts of instruments in order to argue whether “quantitatively increases signs of presidentialization pave the way for a qualitatively presidentialization of politics” or not. This compels us to provide the history of modern Turkey in terms of executives as to deal with the period under scrutiny. Secondly; the developments of the period in which we try to analyse would be “processual realities” which connotes that they are not fully realized but we are facing the period of realizing. Within such a rationale; the following chapters of this dissertation will be in an attempt to shed lights into the Turkish and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) cases, respectively. To relate these debates with the AKP case without an analysis of Turkish executives in its historical evolution would be incomplete.

\textsuperscript{35} For a detailed analysis of the dialectical method in general and qualitative/quantitative changes in particular, see Ollman (2003).
CHAPTER III

THE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL AND CONTINGENT FACTORS LEADING TO EXECUTIVE PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN THE TURKISH CASE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ERDOĞAN'S LEADERSHIP

As far as the Turkish case is considered, one of the pillars in the debate over Turkish type of executives historically is whether Turkey had experienced a presidential system in its history or not. Although the Turkish type of executive has been mainly considered parliamentary since its foundation according to the mainstream literature, there were scholars who argued that in practice “we had seen de facto presidential systems” (İyimaya 2013, Sabah 2005). The period of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal\(^{36}\) had been considered as examples of the system “working as a de facto presidential system”. Among them, Mim Kemal Öke argued that:

In Atatürk’s period, in order to embed the revolution and reforms there was the need for an authoritarian regime…More or less, it was like a de facto presidential system. It was a presidential regime due to the peculiar conditions of both Atatürk and Turkey. Afterwards, the İnönü period was also like a de facto presidential regime. Despite the constitutional parliamentarian regime, there was a presidential regime (Sabah 2005).

Öke claimed that a de facto presidential regime was also the case in the Menderes period, especially relevant for his second term in office. The ideas claiming that Turkey had seen de facto presidential systems, tacitly, directed attention to the “peculiar conditions” of those periods. In this reasoning, those times were the times of “transformation” or “new restructurings” such as nation-building, democratization and integrating with the world. These transformative periods have necessitated

\(^{36}\) Öke notes that those who demand the presidential system fiercely, considering Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel, mainly wanted to get rid of the opposition when they were ruling the country (Sabah 2005).
popular and charismatic leaders, concentrating power in their hands, who sometimes acted in contravention to the constitutional system thanks to their personal traits.

Within this perspective, the aim of this Chapter is to come to terms whether we had seen an application of a presidential system in the Turkish history, either de jure and de facto. This necessitates both to deal with the Turkish constitutional structure and actual practices of executives from an historical perspective. As argued by Mughan, the presidentialization should be distinguished between constitutional and behavioural - Helms (2005a) combined the “evolutionary” and “transient presidentialization” provided by Mughan under the category of “behavioural” - types. I will follow such differentiation which seems to be clearer analytically. I will sketch out first the main implications of the constitutions and/or constitutional amendments in terms of Turkish executives from an historical perspective. Secondly, due to time and space limits, I will be dealing with the Motherland Party (ANAP) case at some depth concerning whether the “behavioural/evolutionary/transient presidentialization” in which the increasing power and autonomy of a prime minister vis-à-vis other political actors should be observed or not. Finally, the factors that are thought to be leading to presidentialization will be sketched out paying due regard to the Turkish case with regard to Erdoğan. Within this perspective, the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as one of the most important contingent factors, is going to be analysed at some depth.

3.1 Constitutional Presidentialization?: The Turkish Case

Turkey has been generally classified under Parliamentary regimes since 1876, with the exception of the 1921 constitution which was a special one implied under the war of independence. The 1924 constitution declared the Grand National Assembly as the supreme organ of the state and gave the legislative and executive powers to it. The

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37 The particular position and power of the presidency as laid down by Turkish constitutions, the details of the 2007 constitutional amendments and the 2014 presidential elections are not touched upon at this point. I will be dealing with the history of Turkish presidency, 2007 amendments and post-2014 process in the Chapter V which is allocated to the Erdoğan’s presidency in particular.
1961 constitution which could be identified as “pure parliamentarism” (Uluşahin, 2011) reflected a distrust of politicians by creating somehow effective checks and balances (provided judicial review in order to check the constitutionality of executives’ acts, strengthened administrative courts, created a second chamber of legislative assembly, granted substantial authority to universities, etc.). The constitution was criticized by the governing parties, especially by the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – AP) at that time, on the basis of it created an “ungovernable political system” by giving excessive powers to bureaucratic and judicial agencies. Thus, they demanded stronger executive in order to be able to “govern” (Özbudun, 2000: 53-56). The 1971 and 1973 constitutional amendments together with curtailing certain civil liberties introduced by the 1961 constitution and increasing the institutional autonomy of the military, strengthened the executive, particularly by allowing the Parliament to grant it law-making powers (decree powers) (Ibid: 56-57).

As far as the 1982 constitution is considered, it created a strong presidency which the makers of the constitutions assumed would long be controlled by the military. The president was given substantive powers which could not be in line with the idea of a symbolic presidency of parliamentary regimes. According to Özbudun (2000: 59-60), increasing powers of the president led to different interpretations considering the systems of government. Some perceived it as presidential or semi-presidential system. According to another view, the logic of the 1982 constitution dictated parliamentarism though the president was more powerful. A third view argued that the constitution provided two alternative models: “if the system functioned normally, it would be closer to parliamentary regime in which the prime minister would dominate; if the party system failed to avoid or resolve crises, than the substitute power of the president would grow and the system would become closer to presidentialism (Ibid: 59). As a more consistent view, the 1982 constitution provided a “modified/weakened parliamentarism” that implies that if the premiers are more powerful vis-à-vis the president, the balance of power is shifting towards the prime minister”. 

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Finally the 2007 constitutional amendment which was accepted through a national referendum stated that the president would be elected by popular vote. The idea of a popularly elected president was a reaction to a political crisis (known as “367 decision” in Turkey) to the election of the president by the Parliament. Thus, it is difficult to accept it as a well-designed constitutional engineering scheme (Uran, 2010: 2). Today, it seems that the 2007 amendment was divorced from the conjuncture within which it was emerged and it has become the main reason for those advocating a transition to a presidential or semi-presidential regime (İnsel, 2013: 9-10). This is especially the idea of the AKP leaders and in fact the 2012 AKP proposal which is known as “Turkish type presidential regime” in Turkey was an “aim to adapt the de facto situation created by 2007 amendment, taking Erdoğan factor into consideration” (Ibid: 10). The 2014 presidential election campaigns were conducted in a highly controversial environment, affected by the Gezi Park Protests and the alleged corruption scandals related to AKP MPs and ministers. The AKP’s candidate then the PM Erdoğan has conducted a campaign mainly on creating a New Turkey which should be possible together with a constitutionally presidential system. He maintained that if he was elected, he would not be a traditional president, directed the attention toward the popular mandate behind the president.

Thus, considering this brief overview, a conclusion can be derived that, if the constitutional presidentialization in Mughan’s terms (2000) is identifying a particular constitutional clause “empowering the head of the government”, it seems hard to consider the Turkish case as a perfect example of the constitutional presidentialization. On the other hand, since the 1982 Turkish constitution and/or constitutional amendment, especially the one in 2007, presidents, rather than the prime ministers, have been given important powers although being unaccountable. This seems to be puzzle for a researcher to come to a conclusion whether the Turkish system has presidentialized constitutionally or not. The solution could be to argue that “the constitutional presidentialization can be identified considering the power and autonomy of the president” rather than the prime minister in the Turkish case.
However, the problem is that considering the period since the 1982 constitution, when there were powerful prime ministers, the presidents of the Republic largely played a ceremonial role. Thus, it seems that the personality of a particular leader and the position s/he holds, whether prime ministry or the presidency, can have an impact on the actual working of the Turkish executives. This leads us to consider the “behavioural” presidentialization with a special emphasis in the Turkish case to grasp whether the system has presidentialized.

3.2 Behavioural Presidentialization?: The Motherland Party and The Justice and Development Party Cases

It should be argued that the 1982 constitution had a three-fold aim: providing the supremacy of the executive, providing the possibility of forming strong governments (e.g. the %10 election threshold) and providing governmental stability (İnsel, 2013: 12-13). Since the 1980s, Turkey has experienced two “(single) party governments”: the ANAP and AKP. To a certain extent, it should be claimed that the ANAP and AKP governments had fulfilled the political system (even if as a spirit) envisaged by the 1982 constitution. The following part will deal with these cases.

The goal behind the analysis of the ANAP and leadership of Turgut Özal within the presidentialization framework was the fact that during Özal’s premiership, his undisputable authority within the executive, party and his popularity within the electorates, led him to concentrate all the powers in his hands while governing. He appeared to be just the example of a new kind of leader aiming to transform the society. His governing period was called as the “one man system” (Tek Adam Sistemi) (Türk, 2014: 154). Among many, the concentration of power around Özal, his political practices not in line with the parliamentarian customs of Turkey and his image of being an outsider within the broader political system led many scholars to label his period as acting like a “de facto presidential system”. Even, Özal himself, argued that:

The critical developments in Turkey had been fulfilled in the periods of Atatürk, Democratic Party, Justice Party and (single) party government of
ANAP...Because in those periods, the system was ‘a sort of presidential system’  

Thus, ANAP and Özal experiences seem to be reasonable cases to deal with within this perspective.

3.2.1 The Motherland Party (ANAP)

The military regime that ruled Turkey between 1980 and 1983 outlawed all the existing parties and permitted new ones to be established just prior to the 1983 elections. Out of three parties competed in the election, the Motherland Party (ANAP) led by Turgut Özal won the elections with 45.2 percent of the votes and an absolute majority of Assembly seats (52.9 percent). This was to the surprise of many due to implicit support of the military regime to another party competed in the election. In the 1987 election, ANAP again won with a lower percentage of votes (36.3) but an increased majority of seats (64.9) as a result of changes it had introduced into the electoral system. According to Özbudun (2000: 94), the most striking feature of party politics in the 1980s was the predominance of the ANAP, which gave eight years of uninterrupted single-party government. This was not only due to its three consecutive election victories (two general elections of 1983 and 1987 and a local election in 1984) but also to the new ideas (such as a new concept of government ³⁹) it brought to Turkish politics (Ayata, 1993: 33).

It was argued by many that the ANAP had succeeded in bringing all the political tendencies (nationalism, liberalism, social democracy and conservatism) of the 1970s together. It was like a “weird coalition” (Zürcher, 2004: 412), “a melting pot”


³⁹ Ergüder notes that there was a very concerted effort to emphasize service delivery to the citizen; a well-conducted campaign to show the relations between taxes paid and services delivered. At the municipal level, the energetic ANAP mayors were very responsive to the demands and problems of citizens. Ergüder argues that “its emphasis on economic rationality, service delivery and decreasing bureaucracy, urban problems coupled with a careful avoidance of ideological issues and partisan conflict appeared to have opened up a place for the party at the centre-right of Turkish politics” (Ergüder, 1988: 571).
(Ergüder, 1988: 572) and/or “a supermarket” (Ahmad 2008). In short, it seemed that the party was divided due to a lack of coherent ideology which put its leader at a pivotal position.

Turgut Özal was an engineer. His move from bureaucratic and managerial positions into a political career was impressive. He acted as the undersecretary to Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel up until the 1980 military coup. A year before the coup, Özal was put by Demirel in charge of the stabilisation plan which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) insisted. He was one of the most important actors in economic reforms of those days, known as 24 January decisions, which was aimed at liberalizing Turkish economy. After the coup, he retained his services, as a Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey (Anderson 2008).

Turgut Özal was known, among others, as “a reformist leader, a technician, man of nation and a man of service” (Türk, 2014: 124). He had tried hard to give the image of “being outsider” in the system. His emphasis on “not being a man of protocol”, his harsh “criticisms directed to the bureaucracy” that was considered as the embodiment of the political establishment, his attitudes “breaking the political practices/customs” and his continuous accent to construct the political process as “a war on behalf of the nation against the power groups, sometimes those resisting to the new, sometimes the opposition and sometimes the media/press,” could be seen as attempts giving the message to the public that he was not representing the vested interests of the broader system (Türk, 2014: 126-135; Acar, 2008).

Considering the governing style of Turgut Özal, as Ahmad argues (2008: 225), there had been nobody in the Turkish history that could use the advantages of being in government like Özal before him. It should be argued that his governance style is composed of two phenomena: a) based on Cabinet Decrees, b) the proliferation of extra-budgetary funds. Özal’s preference for ruling by decrees (bypassing parliamentary procedures and constraints) was kind of a practice associated with
Latin American style presidential systems (characterized by the absence of checks and balances providing enormous powers for the key individual in charge) (Öniş, 2004: 114). This style was convenient to undertake decisions rapidly and overcome powerful interest groups. It has been reported that the number of decrees in his premiership period (1983-1989) was 161 - 70 of them signed by himself in only one year, the year of 1984 – compared to the 34 decrees of pre-1980 period and 91 of the military regime period of 1980-1983 (Türk, 2014: 131). Additionally, one of the most important developments of the period was “the fund system” created to strengthen the executive. This extra budgetary fund was ¼ of the budget in 1984 and was ½ in 1986. There were 134 funds noted by researchers and in 1986, the parliament authorized the Prime Minister (Ahmad, 2008: 225-6).

An analysis without dealing with the aims of Turkey in the 1980s to liberalize her and to integrate with the world would be incomplete. The ANAP and Turgut Özal came to power at the turn of the 1980s. In Anderson’s words (2008) the 1980s were “the hours of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, Özal was a local equivalent in neoliberal resolve”. The ANAP and Özal were the carriers of such an ambition, were seen as the initiator of liberal reforms, voice of anti-bureaucratic attitudes, and supporter of growth-oriented (export-led) system. Additionally, there were reforms aimed at attempting to restructure the state in line with neoliberal premises. Just to provide an example, in the ANAP period, we had seen the restructuring of the ministries which aimed at changing the balance of power within state institutions by strengthening those institutions closer to international markets.

40 Türk (2014: 131) cited that in 1984 Özal had signed 157 government bill (kanun tasarısı), 70 decrees having the force of law and 1395 enactment (kararnname).

41 For some time, it has been argued that the balance of power within the state institutions is shifting towards the Treasury, Central Banks and prime ministry in the neoliberal restructuring period. Within this perspective, in Turkey the functions of the Ministry of Finance regarding the treasury and international economic and trade relations, were transferred to Undersecretary of Treasury and Foreign Trade dependent on the office of the Prime Minister in 1983. This undersecretary in 1991 by transferring some competences of the State Planning Organization into itself grew more and in 1993 was divided into two undersecretaries as Treasury and Foreign Trade (cited in Bedirhanoğlu, 2009:53-54).
On the other hand, the party was also seen as a caring actor in terms of injecting optimism not only to business sector but also to wider public through mass housing projects which should be called popular capitalism, similar to Thatcher style (Öniş, 2004: 119). Within this perspective, Özal had always prioritized his and his party’s “newness”. In fact, his strong passion in order to be called as the “transformative of the Turkish society” (Acar, 2008: 197) led him to argue for the necessity of a powerful leader. Considering Özal, according to Öniş (2004: 118) an effective leadership was required in order to successfully move to a neo-liberal model of development: 1) in order to get the support of transnational community and international financial order through a commitment to reform process, 2) in order to generate trust of both domestic and external capital, 3) to sustain the reform process by incorporating broad strata of population.

As far as his power and autonomy within the ANAP is considered, Özal had the absolute authority. He was the undisputed leader and the party was known “Turgut Özal’s fun club” (Ahmad, 2008: 227). The party was mainly composed of “new politicians who knows how to make money by their education in the US and who are globalized young people”. These people in Turkey were called as “Özal’s princes”. Özal always appeared to give the message to the party members that their political career was strictly depended on his attitudes (Acar, 2008: 194). The strategy he followed within the party as a leader was interpreted as “no matter they all are adversaries to each other but let them all be my kins”\(^{42}\) (Türk, 2014: 127) which seemed to be beneficial for him in preventing the distortion of the balance of power in a way detrimental to him within the party. His electoral popularity at those days seemed to be the main factor behind the concentration of power around Özal’s hand within the party. As Özal won, the others also won.

Özal was also aware of the importance of public leadership. He gave paramount importance to the image and the visual character of the politics. He was always

\(^{42}\) In Turkish, “Herkes birbiriyile hasım olsun ama hepsi birden benimle hasım olsun”.
careful giving the image of being “one of ordinary citizens”. His addresses to the nation through the speeches of “Through the achievements” (İcraatın İçinden) broadcasting by the TV helped him to identify himself with the services in the eyes of the broader public. He was the visible face of the government and he personally was seen as the short-cut to political processes for the nation.

Thus, it is fair to argue that there are many reasons to argue for an increasing power and autonomy of leadership considering the ANAP case. First of all, a single-party government in a political system characterized by the absence of checks and balances provided the Prime Minister with enormous power resources, reflected in the increasing preference for ruling by decrees and using extra-budgetary funds. Secondly, due to the demise of traditional party system in the early 1980s which is considered to give way to the appearance of (new) party and leader(s) as an anchor when the old parties disappeared (Campus 2010), the ANAP was considered as representing the “new” which was competing with the “old” (Ahmad, 2008: 230). Considering the discourse of the party, the “instability” brought by the coalitions in the 1970s; portraying ex-political leaders responsible for the terrorism which was the official reason for military to intervene, were characteristics of the old system. In other words, the ANAP had no antecedents, and definitely no roots that extended into the past struggles of Turkish politics (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 45). Thirdly, as some scholars of Turkish politics argues, the ANAP and Turgut Özal heavily relied on the “new understanding of politics” brought in their period. This new understanding of politics should be termed as “servicing to the nation” rather than engaging in ideological discussions on the regime. In other words, “Özal has provided the wisdom in which the policies (followed in order to solve problems) had overcome the politics (attempts at seizing and sustaining power)” (Heper, 2008: 253-4). He believed in that the main function of government is to generate appropriate policies rather than engaging in politics which implies endless discussions on the regime (Ibid). Fourthly, to use another jargon, the institutionalization dilemma the party faced in those years put the leader at the centre of observations. The search for
“optimizing institutionalization in both systemness and autonomy” (Panebianco 1988 and Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 3) was skilfully managed by Turgut Özal. Although the party managed to change its founding leader in 1989 (Turgut Özal became the President in 1989) and stood in power until 1991, it could not succeed in its adaptation to the changing circumstances or in routinizing the charisma of Özal (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 58).

In 1989, Turgut Özal managed his move to the presidency despite the ANAP’s declining electoral popularity. During his term at the office of the presidency, he attempted at ruling country from there with a pliant prime minister whom was handpicked by Özal, himself. However, in time Özal lost his authority over the ANAP, was sidelined by then-prime ministers and in 1993 he died.

3.2.2 The Case of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)

As far as the context is concerned, the 1990s were popularly conceptualized as “the lost years” in Turkey. To use a more substantiate terminology, “the crisis of parliamentary politics” (Ataay 2002) seems to be the dominant idea in identifying the 1990s Turkish politics. At the start of the 2000s, the expectation of Turkey was to find a socially and politically stable regime that could pull out the country of short-lived coalition governments, economic crises and the Kurdish problem. In addition, the 1990s had witnessed the development of Turkish nationalism, political Islamic movements and identity-politics. However, the closure of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 1998 and the capture of Abdullah Öcalan produced the produced the possibility of filing the excesses of radical Islam and Kurdish movement. In order to exit the orbits of radical movements and to get rid of de-stabilising effects of economic crises, the expectations of those voicing the system as “ungoverning democracy” 44 (yönetemeyen demokrasi) had focused on a possible political

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43 For a more detailed analysis of Özal’s presidency, see the Chapter V.

44 The wisdom of ungoverning democracy and a possible solution to it is explained in the following quotation: Coalition governments cannot have discipline, rapidness and cohesion which are necessary
movement and a leader as an anchor of stability. The AKP emerged within this context with the promise of a “governing democracy” (Açıkel, 2013: 15-16), an actor that would not deepen political crises, which would represent both the secular and conservative capital, which would not focus only on Islamic geography in its foreign policy, which would democratize the system and would do reforms in line with the EU.

There is no doubt that the AKP has been the most important development in the 2000s in Turkish political history. Although founded short before the 2002 elections, it succeeded in the elections and has become the governing party since 2002. The AKP broke away from the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi - FP) which was banned by the Constitutional Court. The party members tried hard to demonstrate that the party was not a direct descendant of any of the older parties (Özbudun, 2006: 546). However, as far as the electoral base of the party was considered, it included the peasantry, underclass of urban-dwellers and above all, the party’s dynamic core was the newly enriched Anatolian entrepreneurs, who were modern in their approach to profitable business but very conservative in attachment to religious beliefs and customs (Anderson 2007). According to Özbudun (2006: 546) analyses of the voter base of the party indicated that the AKP appeared to have successfully rebuilt the Özal’s ANAP coalition, bringing together centre-right voters, conservatives, liberals and moderate nationalists. Socially and politically, it is fair to argue that this is a heterogeneous coalition. The leader of the party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been viewed as the most important factor in keeping together the disparate elements in the AKP.

For this highly eclectic electoral base, an “ideological cement” - in the terms of Anderson - was needed. The AKP found the magical formula around the idea of

in ‘crisis management’...Due to the image of Turkey “unable to govern itself”, the economic program is not advancing with required rapidness, the confidence cannot be given to both domestic and foreign markets, the investments are not increasing...If Turkey does not pass to a political system in which a government with a vote around 40% emanates, these crises of “ungovernable democracy” will continue (quoted in Ataay, 2002: 201).
entry into the European Union (EU). Every part of the society found something in the idea of the EU. As Anderson (2008) summarized, the EU was meant the better paid jobs for the mass of the population; the integration into the deeper capitalist markets and more stable macro-economic environment for big business; for liberal intelligentsia it was the safeguard against any military intervention and anchor for the democratization; and for the military it was the realization of the reaching contemporary civilization, a long-standing aim of Turkey.

Above all, for the AKP the EU was the provider of the international legitimacy which increased the autonomy of the party in the eyes of the state elites. Additionally, the European integration bid has been instrumentalized by the party. Some authors even argued that “the AKP has been transforming the fundamental parameters of both the Turkish and Islamic politics by way of ‘Europeanization’ and ‘internationalization’ of domestic issues” (Duran, 2010: 334). The EU accession process is considered as a “national transition project” which means that without the EU bid or EU anchor, the reforms would not have been conducted. In fact, Erdoğan attributed special importance to his party’s EU bid in terms of doing necessary reform in domestic politics:

As an objection one can affirm that we should do these reforms without the EU membership. However, it is easy to say but hard to do. We have to be realistic. This must not be forgotten that the necessary transition which was originated from the structural and governmental systemic crisis is very hard to be carried out by the internal dynamics of Turkey.\(^{45}\)

Additionally, many authors attributed the greatest importance behind the popularity of the party to the economic recovery the AKP provided. The larger part of the society credited the AKP with building strong economy, lowering high interest rates, providing fiscal discipline and taking important steps to improve healthcare, public transportation and infrastructure (Paul, 2014: 1, Anderson 2007, Türk 2014). The AKP, thanks to the international boom, adopted neoliberal policies in terms of free

market with a social face of “philanthropic” attitudes. In Anderson’s terms, the fiscal discipline became the buzzword and privatization was the grail together with the 6% budget surplus, real interest rates around 15% and lowering inflation to single digits, business confidence was restored, foreign investment poured and growth rebounded. The poor were able to find employment in the informal sector, significantly as a causal worker in the construction industry.

With regard to the balance of power within the AKP, it should be claimed, as Cornell (2014: 2) did, that in the first years of the party a “more collegial” approach was the case. Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül (the foreign minister of those days) together with Bülent Arınç and Abdullatif Şener have been crucial and played influential roles in providing a balance of power within the party. The first sign of Erdoğan’s ability to impose his will on the party was seen in the aftermath of the problem of “inviting American troops across Turkey to attack Iraq in March 2003”. During the parliamentary votes, when Erdoğan was still outside the parliament due to his previous ban and Abdullah Gül acting as the premier, one third of the AKP deputies rebelled and the bill was defeated. Two months later, Erdoğan entered the parliament and took charge. After he became the premier, Erdoğan succeeded in providing sending Turkish troops to take part in the occupation of Iraq through a vote in the parliament. Although, it was too late, Erdoğan’s leadership and ability to impose his will on the party was acknowledged (Anderson 2008). He sidelined Gül who was elected as the president in 2007 and removed him from day-to-day politics. As far as Arınç was considered, the problem between Arınç and Erdoğan surfaced when Arınç threatened Erdoğan to run himself for the presidency unless the AKP nominated a religious candidate, forcing Erdoğan handle Gül’s nomination. In the second term of the AKP, Arınç was not reelected as the speaker of the parliament and failed to get a cabinet post (Cornell, 2014: 2).

Keyman (2010: 316) termed this strategy as “philanthropic neoliberalism” trying to gather attention to the party’s presentation of itself as a caring actor. This strategy differs, according to the author, from the free market fundamentalism. Through providing free coal, free food, free primary textbooks for the poor and disadvantaged groups, the AKP enhanced the feeling of aid and caring in the larger part of the society.
3.3 The Analysis of the Structural Factors Leading to Presidentialization through the Leadership of Erdoğan

In this part, the structural factors, especially the international politics and the media, leading to presidentialization will be scrutinised as they should be sources of leadership empowerment and/or restraint in the Turkish case with particular reference to the leadership of Erdoğan.

3.3.1 The Leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Two thousand and twenty three, we are hundred years old
Our target is again Great Turkey
We are in the race to be a global power
The New Turkey is our Red apple
Our leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Who draws his strength always from Allah
Two thousand and seventy one, we are thousand years old.
We are making bid for being a superpower
We provide peace at home, peace in the world
The New Turkey is our Red apple
Our leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Who draws his strength always from the nation
Atilla, Oğuzhan, Gazi Alparslan
Osman Gazi, Fatih, Yavuz, Süleyman
Also deserving of heaven Abdülhamid Han
It is Gazi Atatürk who founded the state
Nation’s man Tayyip Erdoğan
Who draws his strength always from his peoples
This new century will be the century of Turks
We will spread out the name of Allah
Without leaving from the path of prophet
We will build the New Turkey
Our leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Who draws his strength always from the nation
Establisher of the democracy is Martyr Menderes
My Turgut Özal modernized us/made us step into a new age,
He is the last link of the golden chain
Turkish people is loyal to you Erdoğan
Our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Who draws his strength always from his Lover

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47 The more detailed analysis of the Erdoğan premiership period (2003-2014) and presidency period (2014 onwards) will be the main themes of the following Chapters.
One nation, one flag, one motherland belongs to us
One State Turkey belongs to our nation
For brotherhood, independence, equality
Our target is New Great Turkey
Our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Who draws his power always from Allah.⁴⁸

As highlighted in the previous Chapter, there are structural and contingent factors affecting the power and autonomy of political leaders. Among the contingent ones, the personality and leadership of particular political actors are thought to be leading to the centralization of the decision-making process within the executive advantageous to the chief executive. Recalling the arguments of Foley, in fact it is meaningful to talk about new leadership styles seen in the parliamentary systems, mirroring the latest developments in the presidential systems.

Considering the Turkish case, it should be claimed that democracy in Turkey is still to be “leader democracy” (Heper and Sayari, 2008: 8). The leader’s worldview, strategy, personality and aims can influence the quality of the democracy in the positive and/or negative. Not as an alternative of but trying to contribute to above mentioned framework, I will be in an attempt to locate my analysis on the leadership of Erdoğan into the presidentialization thesis. Although I will be in use of the arguments of other frameworks, the main emphasis will be placed on the struggle to integrate the leadership of Erdoğan with the presidentialization frameworks’s set of concepts. To me, the “spatial leadership”, the “cult of the outsider” and the” system performance” seem to be the most suitable ones. In fact, the vastly highlighted factors behind the popularity of Erdoğan, such as the aura of victimization and conceptualization of politics as “politics-as-service” (hizmet siyaseti), have so much in common with these concepts. Finally, let me clear myself that this part should not

⁴⁸ “The New Turkey anthem”, which is composed and written by Hasan Celal Güzel, former Turkish politician who is widely known for his support for a presidential system in the country, was played by The Mehter (Ottoman military band) band of Ankara Municipality during the inauguration ceremony of the New Turkey Strategic Research Centre (Hürriyet Daily News 2015e). The translation from Turkish to English is mine. For the original Turkish version of the anthem, see Hürriyet 2015h.
be seen as a study on the autobiography of Erdoğan. Although these studies are of importance (Heper and Tokta 2003, Lashnits 2005), I will be selective in Erdoğan’s career, as far as the certain development is thought to be influential over his leadership, is going to be mentioned.

At the expense of recalling myself, the spatial leadership identifies the perceived distance of the chief executive from the office s/he is sitting on (be it presidency and/or prime ministry) whereas the cult of the outsider is again the distance claimed by the actor from the political establishment. These analytical concepts are proposed to be functional in analysing the contemporary political leaders’ popularity within the system they are operating. Claiming a distance from the government and political establishment by an actor seem to be very critical in giving the message to public that “s/he does not have vested interests of the government and establishment”. In other words, they talk to the public as if they are the outsider while in office. The media and opinion leaders are of critical importance for the party and its leader to create such a personality. This is especially critical for a reformist and/or transformative leader in order to build public support for his/her unconventional policy agenda. Thus for the ruling party and its leader, this is a claim that while they are in governing position, they are the outsider of the system or the anti-systemic movement using the tools of the system.

As far as the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is considered, there is no doubt that he has been the most influential political figure since 2002. Just to give an example from the Economist (2014), he “certainly knows how to win elections”. Between 2002 and 2014, his party, the AKP, and he had scored nine victories, three general elections in 2002, 2007 and 2011; three local elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014, two referenda of 2007 and 2010 and finally the presidentialization election of 2014. Erdoğan’s leadership in the Turkish context are generally compared and contrasted with the previous highly influential right wing leaders in the Turkish history, such as Adnan Menderes, Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal (Türk 2014,
Laçiner 2015b). In these studies, one can certainly trace continuity in the discourses of these leaders, especially considering their attitudes toward the national will, understanding of democracy, their populist appeals and their conceptualization of politics as servicing to the nation. However, what is strikingly different in Erdoğan’s case\(^{49}\) is his rise to the apex of the power from the below. Erdoğan had been present at every level of politics. He led the youth division of the National Salvation Party’s (Milli Selamet Partisi) Beyoğlu District in Istanbul. In 1984, he became the head of the Welfare Party’s (Refah Partisi – RP) Beyoğlu District Branch. The next year, he was entrusted with the administration of the RP’s Provincial Party Organization in İstanbul. In 1986, Erdogan was elected to the central executive committee of the RP. In the 1989 local elections, Erdogan was the RP’s candidate for the Beyoğlu mayoralty. In the 1994 local elections, the RP nominated him as their candidate for Istanbul metropolitan mayor. Although he competed against several nationally prominent candidates from other parties, he nevertheless won the mayoralty. He served in this last post until 1998. That year, he received a prison sentence. In the 2001, he founded the AKP and served as prime minister of Turkey between 2003 and 2014. Finally, in 2014 he became the first popularly elected president of the country. In this sense, he should be termed as “professional politician”:

What distinguishes Erdoğan from his predecessors is that unlike Menderes, Demirel or Özal, his route to power has not been through bureaucratic preferment from above, but grass-roots organization from below. For the first time, Turkey is ruled by a professional politician, in the full sense of the term (Anderson 2008).

How such an admirable popularity could be endured by Erdoğan is a case in point. In the following parts, I will be in an attempt to put down his enduring popularity into several reasons, with the help of presidentialization thesis.

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\(^{49}\) According to Türk (2014: 317-8), Erdoğan’s experience as a mayor of Istanbul has brought him close to Demirel and Özal who were famous for their careers as an engineer. From a different perspective, Laçiner (2015b) argued that Erdoğan is the last generation of right wing leaders in Turkey who had not proved himself, compared to previous leaders, in terms of his skills, intellectual capacity and remaining aloof from the corruption charges.
According to many (Türk 2014, Anderson 2008, Dağ 2008, Hale and Özbudun 2010), the election of Erdoğan as the mayor of İstanbul, the biggest metropolitan of Turkey, was one of the most critical developments in his political career. At the broader level, it could be argued that his experience as the mayor of İstanbul had contributed to his understanding of politics-as-service and to his transformation into a pragmatist politics. Erdoğan had learnt a lot from the grassroot organizations of the previous experiences of his party membership, especially thanks to the policies of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the “national outlook” (Milli Görüş), based on local religious network powered by modern communication systems (Anderson 2008). This was especially functional in big cities such as İstanbul. Erdoğan became very popular as being the mayor of İstanbul by delivering services, and charitable networks to communities, such as sanitation, transportation, free meals and coals to poor, that had never known such attention before.

His experience shaped Erdoğan’s understanding of politics. It has been argued that Erdoğan realized that “public-service provision trumped ideology” (Dağ, 2008: 28). This understanding, known as politics-as-service is characterized by its pragmatism. According to Türk (2014: 213-226), the political sphere is constructed as the “construction site” (şantiye alanı) in this understanding. The power of the politics-as-service is coming from its “visibility” and “simplicity” which is impossible for the electorates not to notice in their daily lives. The politics is all about concrete “projects”. Thus, the km of the roads, sewer repair, trash collection, the inflation rate in numbers, the reserves of the Central Bank, the increase in the number of hospitals and schools and macroeconomic statistics are always shared with the public. This is also considered as the criteria of success for the leaders.

Erdoğan certainly fits into this understanding. He many times stressed that his understanding of politics is servicing to the nation. In fact, both Türk (2014: 217) and Yavuz (2010) argued that politics-as-service was the main goal of Erdoğan in his
premiership to spread his municipal experiences into the national scale. In the words of Yavuz:

Erdoğan, as a political actor, has been aware of the fact that political consolidation and success are materialized at the local level. The politics at the local level is not dealt with great ideas and free ideologies; instead, the services provided for the rehabilitation of daily lives and corruptions of previous governments are given priority while governing at the local level. He, in his experience in İstanbul, realized that the main source of legitimacy is the servicing to the main needs of the people and bringing social services to many. This awareness made him the most pragmatic and the less ideological leader in the Turkish history. What is at issue is the implementation of locally-based politics at the national level (Yavuz, 2010: 26).

The politics-as-service has still formed the essence of Erdoğan’s understanding of politics. For me, the parallel between the politics-as-service and the “system performance” is striking. The concept of system performance, employed by Whitefield (2005) in order to search for the popularity of Vladimir Putin within the context of Russia, identifies the perceived improving economic and political performance and the institutional responsiveness in the eyes of the public. Whitefield argued that (2005: 142), the popularity of and the support to a leader is based on “the perceived improved economic and political performance” and “people become less likely to see the democratic system in practice as a basis for their judgment about candidates because institutional performance and responsiveness has improved and normalized”. Such an observation also seems to be making sense in the case of Erdoğan. As argued by Türk, the politics-as-service is instrumentalized by the leaders as the most important criteria in order to judge the performance of the system and the leader. Erdoğan has certainly derived a certain amount of his legitimacy thanks to the services he has provided both as mayor of İstanbul and chief executive of the country.

Erdoğan, as a leader, has been very talented at portraying himself “always the victim”. By this way, he could be able to claim a distance between himself and the political establishment. In the words of Cornell (2014: 2), this “aura of victimization” enabled Erdoğan to emerge as a leader in the eyes of the Turkish underrepresented
groups (especially the conservatives) that “similarly styled themselves as having been victimized by the political establishment” for a very long period. At the very early days, the victimization and being outsider within the political system has a certain ground. He had been convicted to prison in 1998 for having incited religious hatred due to a poem he had read and his public speeches. He was not eligible for membership of parliament in the 2002 elections. Although, his party was the victorious, he had waited until 2003 to get the premiership thanks to a constitutional amendment which opened up Erdoğans’s membership of parliament in a bye-election. Erdoğan has tried hard to sustain the discourse of the victim. Every development and event has been viewed as betrayal or attack on his power according to him. However, the traitors change almost every day. One day it could be the Constitutional Court which labelled as “unpatriotic” by Erdoğan (after the court removed the ban on twitter), another day the “traitor” was the chief of the Central Bank for keeping interest rates relatively high and even the protesters and those sympathetic to them are called as serving the global interest rate lobby whom working at the expense of Erdoğan and his party’s advantages (Sezgin 2014).

However, the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 17/25 December corruption probe seem to damage his image of spatial leadership and being an outsider in a non-reversible way. Although he and his close aides tried hard to insist that these are directed against his government and to call them as an attempt of coup, trying to topple his government. What is important for this dissertation was this time Erdoğan was less successful, or even not reluctant, to distance himself from the accusations. Instead, despite the moderate attitudes of president Gül and other influential figures within the AKP, Erdoğan has shouldered the responsibility and had set the 2014 March local elections as the referendum over these accusations. This is the reason why he considered the victory of the 2014 local election as a credit to his “personal mandate” rather than the AKP and its’ candidates (Cornell 2014).
As far as the Turkish case is considered, Erdoğan is not the first to claim that “the system allows one to be in government but not allow being able to rule”. This idea of “in government but not powerful” (hükümet ama muktedir değil) has been an essential component of the previously mentioned Turkish debate on ungoverning democracy. Every government established since the 1961 constitution claimed that they shared their executive powers with bureaucratic, judicial and military officers. This was the main reason behind the demand for strong governments which to a certain extent constituted the main philosophy of the 1971 and 1973 amendments and the 1982 constitution (Özbudun 2000). In the discourse of Erdoğan, the bureaucratic oligarchy and the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer together with the opposition parties in the parliament did not let his government to govern in the very early days. In time, the discourse chose the military tutelage, judicial tutelage, foreign powers and the parallel structure within the state (implying the Gülen movement) as the political establishment that tried to topple his government.

Erdoğan’s cult of being outsider, as being a hero fighting always with the ‘enemies’ within the system, has been fuelled by the media. The media in the service of a political leader (and/or a prime minister) is not a new entry into the Turkish politics with Erdoğan’s leadership. Previous decades witnessed many examples of media members holding in high esteem to the political leaders. However, the level the leaders-media symbiosis has come under the leadership of Erdoğan is unprecedented.

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51 Criticizing the president, Erdoğan noted that in their government the ratio of return from the presidency was 29% which was between 2 and 4% in the previous governments. See May 06, 2003 AKP Parliamentary Party Group Meeting, http://www.akparti.org.tr/grupkon.asp

52 This time Erdoğan criticized the parliament directing attentions to the difficulties his party facing in legislating despite their 364 members of parliament. See June 10, 2003 AKP Parliamentary Party Group Meeting, http://www.akparti.org.tr/grupkon.asp.

3.3.1.1 Structural Factors and Erdoğan: The International Politics

The growing importance and participation of prime ministers in “foreign affairs” led scholars to compare them with presidents in presidential systems. The idea comes from the widely acknowledged belief arguing that “presidents arguably have more support for foreign than domestic politics” (Dowding, 2012: 13). This is because the presidents are “relatively” more autonomous in setting their agenda in foreign affairs due to their greater resources and information. Poguntke and Webb (2005) argue that the internationalization of politics plays into the hands of political leaders at the national level. This internationalization is argued to increase the autonomy and/or power of the head of executives due to the trends seen at the international level. The fight against terror, establishment of effective migration policies, battle against environment, financial issues and so on are touched upon at the intergovernmental organizations at the global level. These co-operations are decided at the international negotiations that have been particularly important in shifting the power to the hands of the head of governments or some key-advisers (the executive presidentialization) because the international politics is seen a domain of leaders rather than parties (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 350). The chief executive’s concentration on foreign affairs may enhance their image of being the leader of the nation and may unite people to him/her as the “national champion” (Jones, 1991: 116). The leaders are more identifiable in the times of success and/or esteem, as a single leader representing the nation, at the international level.

Erdoğan’s premiership certainly supports the above hypotheses. To start with, when he was not the premier but the leader of the AKP, he was met as if he was the chief executive of Turkey in his international visits. In addition, the strong accent of the party and Erdoğan on the “proactive foreign policy” and the “inseparability of international and domestic affairs” seem to be in line with this trend. Erdoğan has always argued that the increasing reputation and power at the international arena rests on the stability in domestic politics. In addition, as a pragmatist, he wanted to
turn his international legitimacy as a leader into a bargaining chip in domestic politics. The EU accession process had been his perfect lifesaver.

The EU accession process strengthened Erdoğan’s hands and increased his party’s autonomy against the veto players within the broader politics. The EU bid of Turkey has always been a national dream and viewed as the realization of the founder of the Republic, Atatürk’s aim to reach the contemporary civilization. Thus it is a non-debatable issue. The EU-related reforms gave more room for Erdoğan to manoeuvre in declining the importance of Turkish military due to the necessary reforms demanded in order to provide “civilian control over military”. The EU process is also instructive in terms of governmental crisis Turkey had faced in the 1990s. It has been widely believed that coalition governments of the 1990s could not realize necessary reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria, thus a need for a strong government, with a comfortable majority in the parliament, is vital to legislate rapidly. The best expression of this view can be found in Kuzu’s words;

If the election threshold falls and ten (10) parties are represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, then a coalition government among four parties is indispensable. Through this government; it is impossible to do your homework and access to the EU (quoted in Güney, 2007: 352).

Last but not least, the attempts in order to attract foreign direct investment to the country seem to be a special factor in the Turkish case, a developing country. The international visits of the PM Erdoğan are said to be targeting to “attract investments to the country”54. About the critics directed against the government that “they are always on the international travel”, the party, once again, claimed that the foreign policy and the domestic developments would not be thought separately. In the words of Erdoğan “the normalization in the internal arena walks parallel to the foreign policy of the government”. The 21st century “necessitates to share everything with the world” in order to attract foreign investment to your country and turn it out as

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54 April 29, 2008 Group meeting.
production. Even, the policies followed by the party (fiscal discipline, increasing Foreign Direct Investments flowing to the country, privatizations, building trust and stability in Turkish economy) are legitimized by the ideas of the international institutions. Relying on the ideas of the IMF’s president who called the years 2003-2004 of Turkey as “the most important success of the century” and Turkish Director of the World Bank – Andrew Vorkink – who noted that “we see that the trust of foreign investors on Turkish economy is greater than their Turkish counterparts. This is very interesting”, Erdoğan reiterated that Turkey is a country of stability and trust from now on.

The party’s discourse on the inseparability of domestic and international affairs has aimed at providing legitimacy at the global level which is viewed as a *sine qua non* for dealing with domestic issues. Relatedly, the party clearly argues that “their increasing power in the international arena is the reflection of the domestic stability and developments”. Erdoğan considers the skill of a leader as an important factor in the increasing reputation and power of Turkey at the international level. While criticizing the opposition leader, he implied that a powerful leader is needed at international platforms:

> Deniz Baykal, who could not defend himself in an organization in which he is the Vice President, how can he defend Turkey in international platforms in where the hardest negotiations are conducted?

However, nothing was more effective than his image of “the Conqueror of Davos”. International affairs would give opportunities to strengthen the cult of leader. Erdoğan’s cult as a powerful leader at the international arena has certainly been affected in a positive way in the eyes of Muslims all around the world, due to his

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55 February 23, 2005 Group meeting.

56 May 03, 2005 Group meeting.

57 May 03, 2005 Group meeting.

58 July 01, 2008 Group meeting.
defence of the Palestinian people in a panel discussion on Gaza at Davos 2009 meetings. In a row with Israeli PM Shimon Peres, Erdoğan said to Peres; “Mr. Peres, you are older than me...Your voice comes out in a very loud tone. And the loudness of your voice has to do with a guilty conscience. My voice, however, will not come out in the same tone...When it comes to killing; you know well how to kill”. Finally accusing the moderator of not allowing him to speak, Erdoğan storms off the stage, saying “And so Davos is over for me from now on”\(^{59}\). Erdoğan had been met by his supporters, chanting as “we are proud of you,” saying as “Erdoğan had woken up a giant that has been sleeping for a hundred years”\(^{60}\) and holding banners titled as “the new leader of the world”\(^{61}\) at his return to Turkey.

Today, Erdoğan seems to lose his international reputation as a democrat, reformer and reliable partner of the West. His reactions to international critics are generally labelling them as “toppling his government”. Now, he tries hard to give the image of a hero fighting against international media for the sake of Turkish people. An Erdoğan, a world leader, trying to reform Turkey together with the international support behind him has gone, and an Erdoğan defined his foreign policies as “precious loneliness” (değerli yalnızlık) has come.

3.3.1.2 The Media and Erdoğan

In the contemporary world, the impact of (mass/news) media on politics and leadership of a political leader is a highly touched upon phenomenon. The media is considered as a “genuine political actor” that could act either as a “functional equivalent of an opposition party” or “a powerful catalysts of a gradual concentration of power in the hands of a political leader and a chief executive” (Helms, 2008: 26-


In the contemporary politics in which political processes are characterized by their complexities, media (capable of creating the feelings of intimacy, effectiveness, authenticity and responsibility) seems to be one of the best natural allies of political leaders to project charisma (Best and Higley, 2009: 337; Helms 2012). The media’s increasing inclination to the coverage of and to direct attentions toward the leaders may have an impact on the audiences’ perception of the leader. To give an example of such a possible perception, Helms (2012: 658), inspired by Foley, argued that “just as leaders are increasingly seen as not just representing but being their parties, prime ministers may be perceived as not just heading but being government”62.

As far as Erdoğan’s case is considered within this framework, it will not be an exaggeration to argue that the media has constituted an essential pillar in his route to the power. After assuming the premiership in 2003, Erdoğan dealt with “sizeable restructuring of Turkish media”. Firstly, following an inquiry, the media holdings of Uzan family, including a TV and newspaper, were seized and eventually sold to businessmen sympathetic to Erdoğan (Daglier, 2014: 148). It was followed by the seizure of the second largest media company, ATV and SABAH, by the state. This famous TV and newspaper, first earned by Ciner Group and then by Çalık Holding. Çalık Holding bought ATV-Sabah for 1.1 billion dollar, with 750 million credits from state-owned banks (Türk, 2014: 397; Daglier, 2014: 171). In fact the sole bidder was Çalık Holding and Erdoğan’s son-in-law was the general manager of the holding. In 2009, the largest media group in Turkey, Doğan Holding, was fined $3.7 billion for tax fraud and in 2013 the media assets of Çukurova Holding were seized by the state and sold to pro-government media networks without public auction (Daglier, 2014: 171).

In Turkey, almost every major newspaper and TV channel is owned by a conglomerate. These conglomerates are operating in various sectors, such as mining,
energy, construction and they use their media companies to promote government interest in return for contracts. In the words of Daglier (2014: 171) “the mass media is not a lucrative business in Turkey, but fostering Erdoğan propaganda is a necessary sacrifice to get government contracts”.

Another noteworthy example was the coverage of the Erdoğan’s presidential campaign in 2014, especially by the official network, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). As noted by Kalaycıoğlu (2015: 161, 162 and 175), on July 3, 2014 TRT-Türk allotted 30 minutes to Erdoğan while his opponents had no airtime and on July 4, 2014 Erdoğan got 80 minutes of air time and the other two candidates, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu received 1 and Selahattin Demirtaş again had none.

Today, it is argued that all media in Turkey are owned by 10 major conglomerates and two-thirds of it is in the hands of entities sympathetic to the AKP and Erdoğan (Tremblay 2015). As noted before, government’s ability to control the mass media has always been present in the Turkish context. However, the stage of the symbiosis between the media and leader has come is unbelievable when one faces the declaration of Ethem Sancak, who owns the Star Daily and Kanal 24 and recently acquired the dailies of Akşam and Güneş together with SKY 360 TV through state-run seizures; in a TV interview:

While working on his campaign to get him elected prime minister, from my hometown Siirt, I met him. I saw his honesty and courage. I saw his opposition to oppression, his ability to protect the victim. The more I saw him, I feel in love [with him]. To be honest, during my days as a leftist, I could not understand the love between Mevlana [Jelaluddin Rumi, the poet] and [his companion and spiritual guide] Shams al-Tabrizi. As I got to know Erdogan, I realized that such a kind of divine love between two men is possible. When I [first] declared my love to him, I was already among the top 20 on the Forbes’ list. I did not need to wait for any favours by holding on to Erdoğan’s coattails (Tremblay 2015).

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63 See this blog that is created by Mert Yıldız, [http://econoscale.com/2014/02/15/erdogans-rise-to-power-through-the-media/](http://econoscale.com/2014/02/15/erdogans-rise-to-power-through-the-media/)
The media should be functional in fostering the cult of a leader; however, if it is exaggerated it may be counterproductive. Thus, leader-media symbiosis should also be a liability rather than an asset if it is not properly controlled.

In time, with the increasing pressure of Erdoğan’s charisma and personalization of power on the AKP, the party has turned out to be “Erdoğan’s lovers/fun club”. “The glorification, prophetization (according to a party boss, he is the second prophet of Islam) and even deitisation/deification (one of the local party deputy argued that Erdoğan embodied all qualities of God) have become almost common practice among local AKP leaders and members of the parliament (many of them declared that they are ready to die for Erdoğan and become martyrs in defence of him)” (Sezgin 2014). In short, the AKP has become an organic extension of its leader (Türk, 2014: 260-1).

In addition to his changing relationship with the party, since 2011 and especially since 2013, Erdoğan’s political career seems to be culminated in his claim that “he embodies the national will in himself” in the words of Cornell (2014: 4). He has come to understand every electoral victory “a mandate given to him to rule the country as he saw fit” (Ibid). However, Erdoğan may be the “mirror image of average Turkish electorates” (Bekdil, 2015: 3) but his arbitrary rule alienates the other electorates whom do not consider him as their mirror image.

3.4 Concluding Remarks
The 1982 constitution, with its philosophy to create a strong executive and governments, had paved the way for the ANAP and AKP governments. The ANAP and Özal’s legacy, within the framework of this dissertation, is that whether the changes brought by Özal’s style and leadership had represented a kind of qualitative shift - the usage of the presidential analogy has become so compelling as to indicate the emergence of de facto presidency - in terms of Turkish executives. Özal’s declining popularity and authority, at the end his loneliness at presidential office,
warns us to care that an executive de facto presidentialization phenomenon could be transient and/or behavioural rather than a necessarily sustainable process. It is context bounded, depended on other actors and institutions’ willingness and personal factors. The ANAP’s declining electoral successes; the resistance within the ANAP toward Özal and Özal’s sudden death seem to be crucial factors detrimental to the enduring presidentialization of Turkish executive in this case.

Almost a decade later, Turkey had seen a “stable and strong” government, once more, under the AKP and Erdoğan’s leadership. As it was the case for ANAP and Özal, AKP and Erdoğan were seen new and emerged within the context of crisis that is tremendously in need of transformative politics. Erdoğan, as an outsider within the broader system, highly popular due to his mayorship background and having the aura of victim appeared as the new leader of Turkey. The EU accession bid, the supportive context of the international politics and his cult fostered by media have made him an extraordinary power holder who could not be labelled as an ordinary prime minister in a Turkish type parliamentary system created by the 1982 constitution.

The particular analysis of Erdoğan’s leadership during his premiership, trying to do justice to the indicators of presidentialization, will set the ground for the following Chapter.
CHAPTER IV

INDICATORS OF THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENTIALIZATION UNDER THE AKP EXPERIENCE: ERDOĞAN’S PREMIERSHIP

After trying to deal with the concept of presidentialization in the Chapter II and analysing the causes (both structural and contingent) leading to executive presidentialization with particular reference to the AKP case in Turkey, the present Chapter will be in an attempt to note the indicators of executive presidentialization in the AKP period, especially up until 2014 the Presidential Election. The rationale behind such a limitation is that in 2014 the leader of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has moved to the office of the presidency (cumhurbaşkanlığı) in the Turkish (somehow) parliamentarian system. Since, the presidentialization/presidential analogy are, to a certain extent, about the changing position and power of the prime ministers in parliamentarian regimes, this Chapter limits its analyses to the period of Erdoğan’s premiership. However, it should be noted that, the presidentialization debate within the Turkish political system, according to many people, is going on because since Erdoğan’s presidency, it has started to be manifested itself at the office of the president. The manifestations of presidentialization at the office of presidency under Erdoğan’s effect will be the issue at hand in the following Chapter.

As Mughan (2000: 6) argued the presidentialization is “a much-remarked upon but little investigated” concept of parliamentary politics. The problem of how to investigate the signs of presidentialization in particular and the executive leadership in general has been an important issue for the authors working within these approaches. It seems what Rhodes (2006: 324-7) offers in the study of executives seem to be a consensus among many: The presidentialization debate fits into the
broader trends related to the study of executives which should be considered as the shift from formal/legalism towards the modernist/empirism in the Political Science. An indivisible argument of presidentialization debate, originated from the British case, is the importance of the extraordinary prime ministerial characters such as Harold Macmillan, Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. This is a strong sign for many that the office of the prime minister is to be affected by the character and the style of the people sitting there. The place of a prime minister within the politics has usually been conducted through the “prism of the incumbent” (Heffernan, 2005b: 615). Thus, the study of executives and presidentialization has certainly an empirical character.

At the expense of recalling previous arguments of this dissertation, the methodology of this part is as follows: The concept of presidentialization can be studied at different levels or paying due regard to its different faces, in Poguntke and Webb’s analytical distinction such as electoral, party and executive. However while studying the concept, one has to distinguish between whether the alleged presidential elements in the system are the product of a constitutional change or more relating to behavioural character, in other words in the absence of a constitutional change. Due to the practical and empirical reasons\(^\text{64}\) to a great extent, such as the lack of longitudinal data considering the impact of individual leaders on the outcome of parliamentary elections\(^\text{65}\) in Turkey and the secrecy of parliamentary party meetings to a certain extent, I am left with the analysis of the executive level and/or “face” in Poguntke and Webb’s terminology. However, I intend to compensate this limitation through locating the so-called executive presidentialization within the wider political process as suggested by Helms (2005a and 2005b). The aim to add such a wider

\(^{64}\) As Heffernan and even Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny noted presidentialization arguments on the electoral arena have been strongly challenged by a well-known study of King. At the end, many people argue that these arguments are the least empirically proven one within the three faces of presidentialization (Heffernan 2005b: 608 and Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny, 2011: 8).

\(^{65}\) A report provided by KONDA (2014: 36, 46) just after the 30 March Local Elections concluded that the trust in the leader is the main factor among the AKP voters and the trust in the leader is coming just after the services provided by the party and economic stability as the most important factors in voting among AKP voters.
political process is two-fold: First, it is a must if a scholar wants to argue for a presidentialization of politics, as Poguntke and Webb did. The executive face and/or the core executive arena is one of the levels of wider political system and an alleged manifestations of presidentialization is not enough for an argument considering the “politics”. Secondly, by incorporating the wider political process – harbouring executive-legislative relations, public leadership and the relations with veto players (Helms 2005a) - the remedies of excluding other dimensions are fulfilled.

As far as the causes of the so-called presidentialization is considered, it seems that the behaviouralist perspective (in this terminology it identifies the absence of constitutional change) is the only candidate because of the very little formal constitutional change in the Turkish parliamentary system (see Chapter III) may appear as the best candidate that would justify presidentialization of an incumbent prime minister. In short, the following parts will be in an attempt to point out the presidentialization at the executive level in details in particular and presidentialization within the wider political process in general from the behaviouralist perspective.

While doing so, researchers face the greatest challenge of how to operationalize such an elusive concept as presidentialization paying due regard to its dimensions. The aim of providing meaningful indicators as the manifestations of presidentialization is sparked by this challenge. Although the literature on the concept does not have a list of exhaustive indicators in order to label a certain prime minister and political process whether presidentialized and/or un-presidentialized, there has been important attempt to that end. Since this Chapter is devoted to “executive face of presidentialization” to a great extent, in the following parts I will elaborate on the proposed indicators on that dimension that are thought to be meaningful at that level.

Since the distinction among the three faces of presidentialization is analytical, they could impact on each other. Poguntke and Webb notes that the presidentialization of the electoral face would justify the dominant role a PM plays in the executive face (2005: 17).
4.1 Indicators of Presidentialization at the Executive Level

As the presidentialization thesis originated from the debate severely focused on the British case, the indicators, for years, used to provide a sense of change through empirical observation paying due regard to British experience (especially on the basis of the reality observed during the Thatcher and Blair periods that are thought to be presidentialized). The hitherto studies on the British executives within these frameworks highlighted the alleged changes considering the increasing impact of leaders on the election outcomes (Mughan 2000), the prime minister’s increasing involvement in international affairs (Dowding 2012), the decreasing involvement of a prime minister in parliamentary business (Helms 2005a) and the concentration of control at the office of the prime minister – known as Downing Street No.10 (Bevir and Rhodes 2006).

One of the first clear and concise attempts in laying down the indicators for presidentialization has come from Poguntke and Webb. They approach the potential indicators for executive presidentialization within the logic of addressing, mainly, the following issues: a) whether a chief executive is constrained or not by their colleagues and party, b) increasing institutional, procedural and resourceful changes playing into the hands of the chief executive and c) non-constitutional factors increasing the power resources of the prime minister in a parliamentary system (2005: 18). To that end, they reformulated the indicators used for the British case and considered the “growing tendency to have cabinet reshuffles”, “increasing trend for more personal polling” and “growing inclination to invoke a personalised mandate by the prime minister” as additions.

In addition to these “indicators” (see Table 4.1 for a full list of indicators suggested by different authors), Van Biezen and Hopkin (2005: 116) considers the length of tenure of PMs which help them personalize the office and Fiers and Krouwel (2005: 67) notes that the degree of Tony Blair’s involvement in parliamentary business was the all time low.
136) view the periods of governmental incumbency as an important indicator. These ideas stemmed mainly from the fixed term logic of the presidential systems. Helms (2005b: 433) has an objection to the indicator of “a significant increase in the turnover rate of cabinet ministers”. Considering the analogy of Cabinet turnover rates and compared it with the US case, he notes that there was a “smaller cabinet turnover rate in the Clinton period than in the Cabinets of Blair and Schröeder”.

**Table 4.1 Indicators thought to be meaningful for a manifestation of presidentialization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators derived from the British Case&lt;sup&gt;68&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Poguntke and Webb’s list of indicators in order to free the concept from the British origins&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>International debate&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Suggestions of other authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A significant increase in the impact of individual leaders on the outcome of parliamentary elections</td>
<td>The increasing trend towards more personal polling over the PM’s popularity and voter policy preferences</td>
<td>A significant increase in the turnover rate of cabinet ministers</td>
<td>Periods of governmental incumbency (Fiers and Krouwel, 2005: 136) and/or length of tenure of PMs, personalization of the PM’s office (Van Biezen and Hopkin, 2005: 116).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The increasing involvement of PMs in international summity</td>
<td>Growing tendency to appoint non-party technocrats.</td>
<td>An inclination of the majority parliamentary party group(s) to behave, and present themselves, as actors being largely independent from the executive</td>
<td>The establishment of expert commissions (Lütjen and Walter 2000)&lt;sup&gt;71&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>68</sup> Cited in Helms 2005b: 431-2.

<sup>69</sup> Quoted from Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 19

<sup>70</sup> Cited in Helms 2005b: 431-2.

<sup>71</sup> Cited in Helms 2005a: 281.
Table 4.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A decreasing involvement of PMs in the management of parliamentary business (i.e. making speeches, voting)</th>
<th>Growing tendency to have more cabinet reshuffles</th>
<th>The use ‘plebiscitary’ techniques of leadership by the head of government, including the use of such devices as intra-party ballots on crucial political and policy issues.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The growing importance of extra-parliamentary media strategies of governments and PMs in particular</td>
<td>Increasingly centralized coordination and control of policy making by the PM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The concentration of resources of control and advice at the “centre”, the PM’s office</td>
<td>An increasing inclination to provide integrated communication strategies controlled by the PM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The transfer of policy initiatives from individual departments to the office of PM or even advisers</td>
<td>An increasing tendency to invoke a personalized mandate by the PMs based on their electoral appeal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A notable detachment of the PM from the government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A growing detachment of the government from the judiciary</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The broader rationale behind the list of Poguntke and Webb was to open up the concept to international comparisons. To a certain extent, this is why the list they set up is “bound to be too general to apply in every respect to individual cases” (Webb and Poguntke, 2012: 2). Moving on their footsteps and having noted the suggested indicators by the authors, I will attempt to analyse those indicators tailored to the Turkish case\(^{72}\). While doing so, essential indicators such as the increasing interest

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\(^{72}\) In the words of Poguntke and Webb (2005: 18) one should pay particular attention to find functionally equivalent indicators with respect to the case at hand instead of using identical ones.
and tendency in employing the polling on policy preferences into the governing process; the changing relations between the prime minister and Cabinet members; increasing visibility, salience and importance of special advisers to the prime minister are chosen from the international debate. The passage to follow which seems to grasp the internal logic of all these indicators is worth quoting:

Policy packages are constructed and presented by leaders and coteries of close advisers according to what incoming polling and focus group data indicate is most saleable. Leaders stage announcements of the packages for the media, who in turn portray the leader as the key agent of change. Parties thus become ‘leader parties’ whose role is restricted to anointing leaders and financing campaigns in the expectation of receiving spoils if their leader wins…Leaders now bring parties to power rather than the other way around (emphasis in original, Best and Higley, 2009: 336-7).

As an original conceptualization, I add the indicator of “the prime minister as an anchor” the list inspired by the Turkish case. It should be claimed that the chosen indicators in this dissertation are not exhaustive. However, they lie at the heart of the concept and they are thought to be manifesting themselves evidently. This is why I leave aside others, although in the following pages one should find some underdeveloped analyses on the issue of (increasing tendency in) ruling by decrees.

As far as the indicators in order to care the manifestations of presidentialization within the wider political process are considered, I follow the structure developed by Helms (2005a and 2005b). At this level, the relations between the executive and legislative, the nature of the public leadership and the role of veto players and counter-majoritarian institutions (Helms 2005a) should be considered to provide a reasonable ground.

### 4.2 The Analysis on the Indicators as a Basis for the Manifestation of Executive Presidentialization in Turkey: Erdoğan’s Premiership

Considering the recent interpretations of the changing features of Erdoğan’s leadership, of the workings of Turkish executive and/or of the decision-making process in the core executive arena that concentrate on the manifestations of
presidentialization/de facto presidency, common sense ideas in the Turkish case comprises a great deal of points from the political culture of Turkey\textsuperscript{73} to the social construction of powerful leaders. Nevertheless, one can group these ideas into three broader observations: The first group of those politicians, columnists, scholars of Turkish politics and foreign observers who think that Turkey under Erdoğan’s rule has been working de facto presidential for some time, argue that the “policy-making” generally and “decision-making” particularly within the executive has been centralized under the office of the prime ministry and in the personality of Erdoğan\textsuperscript{74}. They highlight that Erdoğan determines everything including all appointments, be it administrative and political (even some goes further that he somehow appointed Abdullah Gül to the Presidency in 2007) and who is going to appear on the TV. Additionally, the observations gathering the attentions to the issue of “the absence of checks and balances” argue that there is nothing left within the broader system to stop him as a political actor\textsuperscript{75}. One of Erdoğan’s ex-advisers, Cüneyd Zapsu, considers a possible (constitutionally) presidential system in order to counterbalance his unparalleled power with the hope of strengthening the Parliament. Last but not least, now Erdoğan is thought to be the only source of stability and/or change\textsuperscript{76} who can project the future of the country’s economic and political issues.

Having noted these observations arguing that the Turkish system has been working de facto presidential for some time, more specific indicators, in line with the British and international debate, are needed in order to fit the issue at hand into a framework. The part to follow is allocated to that end.

\textsuperscript{73} Even one of the journalists, Sevilay Yükselir, working in a media group known as close to Erdoğan, claims in a TV debate that the presidential elements have been present in the genes of Turkish people (Sabah 2014). In a similar mind, Bir (2012) argues that as of 2012 Turkey had already a presidential system because the prototype of leadership preferred by the Turkish people and practiced by the Turkish leaders is the powerful man emerging inside the nation who controls everything.

\textsuperscript{74} Birand 2010, Reuters 2014, Aydintaşbaş 2011.

\textsuperscript{75} Financial Times 2012, Vatan 2011.

\textsuperscript{76} Yıldırım 2010.
4.2.1 Public Opinion Polls and Voter Policy Preferences

The importance of carrying out polls, surveys and voter policy preferences in governing and decision-making seems to be in line with the broader argument claiming that we are living in an era of “permanent campaign”. Helms (2005b: 432) notes that the idea of the permanent campaign is that since the 1980s electoral campaigning and the performances of the chief executives have been perceived as part of the wider governing process. Although what is called as “campaigning to govern” by Helms emerged first in the US\(^{77}\), it is hard now to deny that campaigning in the parliamentary systems have become longer and have demanded more time and energy of the executive leaders\(^{78}\).

The permanent campaign arguments note that leaders and their organizations are forced to market their credentials to as wide a constituency as possible and the citizens are increasingly conditioned to expect leaders to dominate media coverage, to shape agendas and to define the issues of the day. In other words, “subordinating the governing responsibilities to the drive to maintain public support”, leaders are needed to remain within the currents of popular public opinion (Foley 2011). In this state of permanent campaigning, one of the most important abilities of leaders is to “merge his/her identity and/or policy into the shifting currents of public opinion” and to try “to disable opponents through the deployment of common-sense postures” derived from the polls and surveys (Foley, 2004: 304). Merging identity with the broader public’s preferences is also playing into the hands of the leader to claim a personal contract of policy premises to the electorates. In the media, to a great extent, such policies are viewed as a “leader-centred contract of policies” (Foley, 2008b: 56).

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77 According to Helms (2005b: 432), the US origins of permanent campagin arguments could be viewed as a justification for considering it as an element of presidentialization for parliamentary systems.

78 On the other hand, Pippa Norris, especially considering the British case, argues that experts in polling and political marketing are still not integral to the process of government (cited in Helms, 2005a: 250).
Paul Brooker (2010: 114-5) argued that relying on public opinions at the time of a controversial policy proposals could bring a “bargaining cheap” to a prime minister in his/her relations with the ministers in order to veto their policy preferences and/or ease their fears by pointing to public opinions favouring the innovation. In this context, a prime minister could achieve “an above party leadership of public opinion” in which he/she might well succeed in selling the public a pioneering proposal. In addition, the regular search for the personal popularity of the leader seems to be vital for the organization and other actors in order to consider whether their leader is an asset or a liability.

It is argued that searching for public opinions and carrying out surveys in order to measure voters’ sensitivities and preferences has started in the 1970s in Turkey⁷⁹. Aksiyon (2002) highlighted that the professional public opinions surveys, especially before the general elections, has started in the 1980s. The PIAR Company’s research was very close to 1983 election results. Such an appropriate prediction has increased the confidence of research companies. As far as politicians are considered, Turgut Özal is known as the first politician who started the tradition of having carrying out surveys/polls and questionnaires. For Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it has been argued that, since the very early days of his political career, he has been paying tremendous attention to the opinion polls and voter policy preferences. Before his candidacy for Beyoğlu Mayorship and Istanbul Mayorship he had many firms carry out polls and questionnaires for himself (Türk, 2014: 424). It is noted that before the first poll conducted for him, he declared that “We need information. I demand research and surveys. The politics could not be done blindfolded⁸⁰. His determination on the necessity of surveys and polls goes on in the following years. Before the 2007 Presidential candidacy discussions, he declared that the announcement of the AKP’s

⁷⁹ According to Tanju Tosun, the first research made by Prof. Dr. Nermin Abadan Unat in Ankara was published in Turkish daily newspaper Hürriyet. It was followed by a research conducted by İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin in order to compare the 1973 and 1977 general elections (Aksiyon 2007).

⁸⁰ “Bilgiye ihtiyacımız var. Araştırma ve anketler yapılmasını istiyorum. Gözü kapalı siyaset mi olur?”
candidacy was going to be after many polls and surveys: “Polls/surveys are our style” (Aksiyon 2007).

According to a report published by Aksiyon 2007, the AKP, since its foundation, has been working with mainly three (3) firms for surveys and polls: DENGE, ANAR and POLLMARK. DENGE research company has conducted surveys on “local problems, general political issues, political agenda” for the party. It is argued that the company, between 2002 and 2007, had interviewed with hundreds of thousands of people. ANAR, which was founded by Beşir Atalay, who later became deputy prime minister and minister, has been conducting monthly surveys composed of two hundred and fifty questions for the party on “the perception of leader, economic situation, employment, the operations of government, voter policy preferences”. The company officials informed that the results are directly submitted to Erdoğan. In addition, the company had conducted eight surveys with twenty thousands respondents on the agenda topics, on the performance of mayors and general political issues with seventy thousands respondents and twice a year with eight thousands of respondents on the issues intended for rural areas. POLLMARK is famous for its questionnaire for the party organization, mayors, parliamentarians and members of central decision making and administrative committee before the announcement of the AKP’s 2007 presidential candidate.

The party before and after every significant policy proposal, in order to measure the expectations and satisfactions, has made research companies carry out polls and surveys (Kartoğlu 2014). This method of before and after polls has been implemented, just to give some examples, in the Kurdish problem, democratization

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81 “Anketler bizim üslubumuz”.

82 Beşir Atalay, ex-deputy prime minister and ex-minister of interior, declared that they had completed the first party programme, in the days of the foundation of the AKP in 2001, on the basis of comprehensive polls and surveys (cited in Kartoğlu 2012).

83 In addition to these research companies, Metrosfer (2014) noted that the AKP has been also working with ANDY-AR, METROPOL, GENAR and KONSENSUS.
reforms, reforms in education (Kartoğlu 2012). Mustafa Kartoğlu, a Turkish columnist, noted that the AKP has received more than 20 researches on the agenda topics yearly, wide surveys before and after every election, before very important political decisions (such as Kurdish initiative and reform in education system). As a total, the AKP has been able to receive the policy preferences more than 400,000 Turkish citizens yearly, from different socio-economic sectors (Kartoğlu 2012).

The examples of how these results of surveys are used by the leader and party are very illustrative. Altaylı (2014) referring to the general director of MAK company noted that the PM Erdoğan, before announcing his candidacy for the presidency in 2014, had relied on many polls indicating the fact that the turnout in the elections would be very low (which was viewed to the advantage of Erdoğan). Baransu (2013) noticed one of the most important causes of discarding the Gülen community was their low levels of vote potential in the polls the AKP received. Last but not least, Yayman (2013) considered the results of public opinions party had received were very influential in the steps taken at Kurdish issue. The fact that Erdoğan, it is argued, has been considered “the only man who can handle the issue” in these researches motivated the party.

There is no doubt that Erdoğan cares the polls and surveys. He considers the results “as they are referenda”, a “democratic method” and “guide” for politics (Kartoğlu 2012, Aksiyon 2007). He is known as the leader who relied most on these polls in the Turkish political history and who made research companies famous. One of the officials from the research company POLLMARK called him as the “father of questionnaires” (Aksiyon 2007).

Relying on surveys and polls as a governing and decision making method carries two significant problems. First, such polls and surveys are prone to manipulation by the owners whom ordered them. The results could be distorted to give the image of being powerful, to give the perception of support from the public in order to ease
opponents and political actors. The fact that many researchers, officials and owners of the companies are also advisers to politicians creates serious doubt on the reliability of the research.\textsuperscript{84} Secondly, the idea of leaders move in concert with political trends and public opinions seems to be in contrast to the “transformative leadership”\textsuperscript{85}, ability of leaders to shape and change public preferences as well as the course of history (Helms, 2005a: 260). The following passage is very instructive:

On the negative side, this kind of high exposure leadership can be said to generate a state of permanent campaigning in which governing responsibilities are subordinated to the drive to maintain public support and to the need for leaders to remain within the parameters of current popular opinion. Far from offering a leading sense of direction, this kind of political leadership is arguably too political – shaped, presented and projected as it is by a continual process of market testing and message engineering dominated by teams of political advisors, media consultants, market strategists, focus group and public relation experts (Foley 2011).

Relying on polls and voter policy preferences before political decisions, it has been argued, has transformed political leaders “the CEO of a client-driven firm”. The announcements of policy packages, together with an unparalleled marketing technic provided by experts, give the image of “a CEO is sharing their products with the public”. The AKP period and Erdoğan’s leadership style, although not limited to such style, are not an exception to this trend. The announcement of the 2013 Democracy Package by the PM Erdoğan was an excellent case in line with this marketing (Üstündağ 2013).

\textsuperscript{84} Hasan Basri Uslu from DENGЕ Company has been working with Erdoğan since his very early political career. Additionally, the AKP MP, between 2002 and 2007, Zeynep Karahan Uslu worked as an adviser to DENGЕ. The GENAR Company was founded by the AKP’s Esenler Mayor Tevfik Göksu. The AKP’s member of central decision making and administrative committee, Edibe Sözen, has been in the administration of the company. The relations of the AKP with POLLMARK company detoriated in 2012 due to a survey made by POLLMARK indicating the votes of the party very low (Metrosfer 2014). From the Turkish political history, a case needs special attention. Tansu Çiller, ex-Prime Minister of Turkey, had brought the SONAR research company to the court due to a poll made by the company (Aksiyon 2002).

\textsuperscript{85} J. McGregor Burns have analysed the dichotomy between “transforming and transactional leadership” to give a theoretical basis to leadership studies. The transactional leaders are devoid of “any global perspective as to how society should be ultimately”. On the contrary, the transforming leaders, arisen out of revolutionary situations, have a certain vision of the society (cited in Blondel 1987: 20-21).
4.2.2 Prime Minister – Cabinet Relations

The traditional view on the parliamentary executive underlines the collective/collegial character of the power. The power in this type of executives is thought to be located in the Cabinet. The members of the Cabinet (Ministers) are equal. The prime minister is regarded as first among equals and in theory has no more power than any other member of the Cabinet. Traditionally, the Cabinet has the role considering the aspects of “formal policy approval, policy coordination, resolving disputes, forum for debate, party management, and symbol of collective government”[86].

However, over a long period and accelerating in recent years, the Cabinet government has lost its importance. In its formal sense, the collective cabinet government goes back to a period before the development of disciplined political parties. However, at the time, such an ideal seems to be outdated. In the absence of disciplined political parties, a minister’s threat of resignation could threaten the life of government. Thus, all the members of the Cabinet had to be kept on board. As parties get unified and disciplined, the threat of resignation diminished[87].

In short the need for reorganization of the government to increase strategic coordination resources of the leader; reduced opportunities of collective decision making; increase in the bilateral decision making to the exclusion of the Cabinet and to promote non-party technocrats and politicians seem to be prioritizing the prime minister in the balance of the intra-executive power. Mughan (200: 134) directs attentions to two related reasons to argue that prime ministers have become more like presidents in their relations with the Cabinet members: a) their enhanced electoral


[87] Ibid (20.01.2015).
role and their consequent greater autonomy in the appointment and dismissal of Cabinet ministers.

As far as the Turkish case is considered, the following indicators should be considered as the evidences of the shift of intra executive power to the benefit of the head of government. First of all, as observed by a Turkish columnist – Mehmet Tezkan, over a certain period the most heard words of the Turkish politics have been “with the instruction of our prime minister” (başbakanımızın talimatı ile). He noted those Turkish ministers, mayors and other important political actors while explaining their activities (not only on important projects but also on less significant issues) had declared to the public through the media that they are doing these projects/activities with the instruction of the Prime Minister Erdoğan. He has listed the declarations of the Minister for EU Affairs, Development, Energy, Food, Agriculture and Livestock, Foreign Affairs, İstanbul mayor among others. Tezkan highlighted that the words of “with the instruction of our prime minister” is particularly stressed and persistently declared. The aim is giving a message to the wider public that Prime Minister Erdoğan has personally interested in every issue (whether significant or not). This is aimed at restoring public trust in government. The “reconfiguration of the government projected through the prism of the presidential persona” (Foley, 2008b: 56) of Erdoğan are functional in fusing the government and policy implementation under the leader. Tezkan concluded that “This is not a discourse developed spontaneously. It has a political aim for the future designs of Turkey. At the end, these political actors are creating an image that the Prime Minister Erdoğan is governing Turkey single-handed” (Tezkan 2012b).

In addition, the office of the prime ministry has grown to an unprecedented degree in the Turkish history. Just to give a latest development, it has been reported that 402 new personnel allocated to the different units within the office, especially to the

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88 Mughan also highlights the decreasing importance of the “ideological arithmetic” arguments, the need to balance ideological tendencies or factions so that the Cabinet is a microcosm of the larger parliamentary party, in the PM’s choice of Cabinet personnel (2000: 135).
Sectoral Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (Sektörel İzleme ve Değerlendirme Birimi) which was formed in 2011 with the aim of advising to prime minister. These personnel will act like adviser in the authority areas of some Ministries. This development has been reported in the Turkish media as establishing “parallel ministries” depended on the Prime Minister Erdoğan. This Unit will be acting as advisors and will provide special reports to the prime minister on “economy, agriculture, energy, social policy, security, justice, education, culture, science and technology, transport and international relations”. It is reported that the Minister of Science, Industry and Technology, Fikri Işık, evaluated the formation of such a unit within the increasing prime minister office’s need for coordination: “In order to coordinate better, the flow of data from ministries to the prime minister’s office is necessary” (Milliyet 2014).

The AKP government, in 2011 through a “decree” just before the general elections, restructured the ministries. This regulation has decreased the number of ministries and has redefined their functions. In addressing the media, Prime Minister Erdoğan highlighted the need for coordination among the institutions, for rapid decision-making process and for the prevention of the multi-headed executive. According to him, the excessive numbers of ministries before 2002 had locked the state; especially he gave the examples considering the problems in privatization projects. While the office of the prime ministry is considered as “the office of coordination”, Erdoğan’s words should be identified as a clue in arguing that this coordination is viewed as increasing the importance of the prime minister:

In a government composed of 3 (three) parties, the new ministries formed in order to please every party...The existence of so many ministries, formed in order to provide political balance, have complicated the harmony and coordination among the institutions...What is important? Rather than Ministries, the services must be performed...I always declare. As a Ministry, this brother (the Prime Minister, the author’s note) is enough to you. We will give all the services to you89.

89 See Hürriyet 2011
To conclude, the marginalization of Cabinet members and prime ministerial predominance displacing Cabinet ministers into obscurity (Foley: 2004, 293) has made the prime minister the defining value of the party and/or government as this process supported by Cabinet members. Now, the projection of personal leadership of a particular leader seems to be an encoded change at the system which alters the classical depiction of the Prime minister as first among equals and turns his/her office as the centre of strategic coordination and political management (Ibid: 296).

4.2.3 Special Advisers to Prime Minister

In the formation and application of local and national policies, it seems that some special smart men and/or questionable surveys are more esteemed than common mind and public’s demands and expectations. It is visible that in governing the advices, the direction and effectiveness of a small bureaucratic and oligarchic group are chosen (Hürriyet 2013b).

These are the words of the ex-Minister of Interior, İdris Naim Şahin, in his declaration of resignation. The increasing number and importance of special advisors to Prime Minister is certainly considered as an indicator of presidentialization in a parliamentary system. Considering the Turkish case, although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since his very early political career has been working with special advisers and/or experts (Türk 2014), the last years has witnessed a hot debate over his special advisers. Their increasing number and effectiveness have been understood as a reflection of the centralization of Turkish government around the office of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Before going into details, it seems functional to note the rationale behind the increasing importance of special advisers to prime minister, especially in the Turkish context. First of all, such a small inner circle around a powerful leader acts as a “shadow government/cabinet” in governing the country. This plays into the hands of the leader in controlling the acts of Ministries and Cabinet members. Although official cabinet members are those breasting the issues for the government that draw criticism, Erdoğan’s advisors work in the shadow in the policies of government.
Secondly, advisors seem to be functional in bypassing the established rules and/or hierarchies in bureaucracy while governing. This small team are administering through “point persons” (undersecretaries, deputy undersecretaries and deputy ministers). These advisors are thought to be countervailing forces against the civil service. Additionally, because of their personal loyalty the prime minister enjoys an unimpeded control over executive. Rather than the issue of Cabinet members who have to take the concerns of their constituencies into account, advisors’ allegiance only lie with the prime minister. Last but not least, advisers are very functional in fostering a personal cult. One of the highly used mechanisms for that is to keep repeating a narrative used by the prime minister in a public speech over and over in order to amplify the message (Bozkurt 2013).

Erdoğan’s special advisers are participating in party’s Central Executive Committee (Merkez Yürütme Kurulu) (Habertürk 2007), they are addressing the press and media on behalf of the government (Ertan 2013), some of them are known as the writer of the prime minister’s speeches, they are acting as the columnists in the media groups closer to the government. Just to give two significant examples for the importance and visibility of Erdoğan’s advisors; the current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was acting as his chief Foreign Policy advisor and the current Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan had been known as his chief political advisor.

Hargrove (2009: 14) while noting the characteristics of the dominant executives directs the attention towards the private advisers to presidentialized prime ministers. He claims those advisers’ “responsive competence crowds out their neutral competence”. The Turkish case is not an exception. The observers of Turkish government have serious doubts whether Erdoğan’s special advisers can freely express their views. One of them, Barkey (2013) called these advisers as “yes-men” arguing that they only reinforce what Erdoğan has already decided to do. They have a reason behind such an act. It was Erdoğan who offered them these positions and ultimately it will be him to decide whether keep them or fire them (Bozkurt 2013).
Even it will be Erdoğan who will help them in climbing the ladders in their future political career.

Juxtaposing the lack of neutral advices to a culture of submission to the leader could pave the way for an adviser to claim very absurd views and conspiracy theories. As an example, one of the advisers to Erdoğan claimed that powerful groups, both inside and outside, were trying to kill Erdoğan with telepathic attacks (Today’s Zaman 2013). In addition, the warnings of one of the AKP’s deputy to an advisor of current Prime Minister Davutoğlu is also very instructive considering the philosophy of the office of advising: “Being an adviser is an official representative post. For that reason, it is not an office of criticizing the party and government in front of public. An adviser shares his/her views with the owner of that post and does not contradict with the policies of party and government. In spite of the owner of the post, declaring his/her truths with the competence deriving from that post is very problematic” (Cumhuriyet 2014).

4.2.4 The Prime Minister’s Personality as an Anchor

What is meant by anchor? At the general level, the concept of anchor identifies a fixed point, especially materials or tools used to affix something at that point. Specifically, it is used to delineate to hold a ship and a boat to a fixed point. The anchor prevents moving what had been anchored or it prevents going off the rails. It is generally used as an image of a sound harbour. In political terms, anchor is used for both institutions and personalities. In the Turkish case, for a long time but at a decreasing pace in the last years, the IMF and EU have been considered as Turkey’s external anchors in the way of reformation in order to secure macroeconomic stability and to accelerate the democratization.

As far as a person is considered as anchor, he/she is mainly viewed as the source of transformation and/or the only

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90 This issue at the time is beyond the aim of this dissertation. However, one can consult Öniş 2008, Öniş and Bakır 2007, Tocci 2009 for the importance of the EU and IMF anchors in the history of Turkey.
guarantee for stability and even the only person who can set the identifiable criteria and target for the people.

The extraordinary prime ministers supported by a disciplined party and clear parliamentary majority combined with their personalities can be considered as an anchor for stability and/or as the only source for change. In a similar fashion what have been documented particularly to Tony Blair’s leadership in Britain by Foley (2008b), I shall argue that in Turkey, at the social level, “things only happen when Erdoğan takes personal charge” ⁹¹. Such an idea seems to have two-edged interpretations of the issue. On the one side, people who are considering his personality as the only source of stability ⁹² views the issue from his leadership expansion and prime ministerial centralization. On the other side, such a call for a prime minister takes personal charge on a specific issue (whether it is vital or not) provide and even predetermine the form and substance of the critiques. In other words, they try to push the leader to interfere. Otherwise, it means that although he has the capacity and political resources, he does not involve in ⁹³.

Considering the anchorage debate, the analysis without dealing with the social construction of leadership and/or social power projection ⁹⁴ would be incomplete. An

⁹¹ One of the highly interesting examples was the Erdoğan’s interference into the issue whether the Turkish Super League Champion in 2012 Galatasaray could get its cup at the home of its main competitor, Fenerbahçe. Due to the security issues, the Turkish Football Federation offered to give the cup at another place. However, it is reported that Galatasaray rejected that offer and contacted with PM Erdoğan. After Erdoğan’s instructions to the officials, Galatasaray players were able to lift the cup at the home of Fenerbahçe (Hürriyat 2012a).

⁹² One of the best reflections of this observation (even limited to economic issues) comes from Yıldırım (2010) which is worth to be quoted at length: “The International Monetary Fund has ceased to be the anchor. The effect of business world has decreased tremendously...There is no anymore the EU anchor...Erdoğan is the sole anchor”.

⁹³ One of the highly known Kurdish politician in Turkey, Leyla Zana’s words considering the Kurdish issue, one of the chronic problems of the Turkish nation historically, for Erdoğan seems very instructive: I trust that Erdoğan resolve this issue (Hürriyat 2012b).

⁹⁴ A Kurdish politician, after the death of his son, in a phone call indicating the increasing terror activities in the country told Erdoğan that “every country has a “dear and/or saint” who changes the
inseparable part of leadership is the relationship between the leader and the followers. As discussed in the Chapter II under the headline of personalization, Garzia (2011) noted two very key conditions when the leaders’ personalities can be very significant: a) the absence/presence of a dominant political climate and b) the presence of a systemic crisis. In addition to these conditions, leaders’ personalities in the contemporary world seem to be seen as a response to the growing complexity of political issues and attendant uncertainties”. The following passage is worth to be quoted:

Voters rely on leaders in this complexity and uncertainty as their guides and innovators who are more capable of responding to unforeseen dilemmas. On the other hand, leaders who grapple with ‘issues whose complexities lie beyond the grasp of mass publics’ offer broad visions that they try to articulate (Best and Higley, 2009: 337).

As Barkey (2013) observes, for Erdoğan no issue\(^{95}\) (including public art, who wins what contract, where buildings go and even what commercials can be aired) is “too unimportant to gather his attention”. Erdoğan’s reply summed up his interest in this broad range of issues as “I am the country’s prime minister. Every issue is my concern”\(^{96}\). Such an “incessant need to interfere with everything in Turkey”, according to one of the Turkish academicians, Füsun Üstel, symbolizes at the level of social perception that Erdoğan is both Prime Minister, President and even the Mayor of İstanbul (BBC 2014). In a similar mind, Türk (2014: 318) calls Erdoğan as “the national Mayor of Turkey” due to his fervent interference into the Municipalities’ activities. On the side of Erdoğan, it would be claimed that such societal leadership projection led him to think, as Gareth Jenkins observed\(^{97}\):

\(^{95}\) Cornell (2014) noted the issues of raising a pious generation, urging women to have at least three children, planning to outlaw abortion and commenting on the historical television shows as examples of his inclination of “having a personal mandate to rule Turkey as he saw fit”.

\(^{96}\) Cited in Cornell 2014.

\(^{97}\) Cited in Cornell 2014.
Erdoğan appears to regard himself as the embodiment of the national will – with the result that his tastes, prejudices and opinions become those of the nation, regardless of whether or not the nation is aware of the fact.

In addition to these indicators, one can consider the tendency to rule by *decrees having the force of law* (DFLs) as an indicator of executive presidentialization in the AKP period. Although the authorization of the Council of Ministers to issue “decrees having the force of law” is hardly new in Turkey, the decrees issued in the AKP period represented the limits such a tendency could go.

As far as the Turkish case is considered, it should be noted that the authorization of the Council of Ministers to issue decrees having the force of law was present in the 1876 Constitution. However, to a great extent, the arbitrary use of such power by politicians led constitution-makers not to add such a clause in the 1921, 1924 and 1961 constitutions. The 1971 constitutional amendment brought the decrees back to Turkish legal structure. The reason behind bringing back the decrees was that the parliamentary regime’s law-making procedures were lengthy, due to the increasing economic and social needs of the modern states, the rapid legislation was of critical importance. Finally the article 91 of the 1982 constitution notes that:

> The Grand National Assembly of Turkey may empower the Council of Ministers to issue decrees having the force of law. However, with the exception of martial law and states of emergency, the fundamental rights, individual rights and duties included in the first and second chapters and the political rights and duties listed in the fourth chapter of the second part of the Constitution, shall not be regulated by decrees having the force of law.

The authorization to issue decrees have been used heavily by the governments since the 1971 and fluctuating after the 1982 depended on the governments. To give an example, the number of decrees issued between 1971 and 1982 was only 34,

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98 See Ardıç (2001: 30).

99 The Constitutional Court was granted the right to examine the constitutionality of decrees having the force of law, in respect of both substance and form, by the article 148 of the 1982 constitution.
compared to that of 166 in the period of 1982-1985\textsuperscript{100}. However, it is clear that the Turgut Özal period was the most important in terms of the decrees before the AKP\textsuperscript{101}. As stated above, the decrees are thought to be instruments to legislate rapidly. However, they are affecting the balance of power between the executive and the legislative to the advantage of the former. Many people consider the decrees as the tendency to rule “bypassing the legislative processes”. This is perceived as undemocratic due to the lack of parliamentary debate before legislation on critical issues.

The post-1980 decrees had utilized by the governments in regulating the areas of finance and insurance, public employment, restructuring the ministries and more significantly in providing a legal framework for privatization. Regarding the AKP period, the decrees having force of the law issued in 2011 sparked a hot debate in Turkey. Just two months before the coming elections\textsuperscript{102}, the TGNA empowered the AKP Council of Ministers on April 06, 2011 to issue DFLs for the coming six (6) months. AKP, in these 6 months following the authorization, issues thirty five (35) DFLs in order to “restructure Ministries”, to regulate “public administration”, to “introduce vice-ministries in to administrative structures” and to regulate hierarchically the “Independent regulatory agencies”. Although the opposition party brought these DFLs to the constitutional court, the court rejected the appeal on October 27, 2011. As discussed in the previous parts of this chapter, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan’s press release considering the DFLs seems very instructive in terms of the presidentialization thesis. Erdoğan defended the restructuring of Ministries in order to regulate their areas of authority within the logic of “preventing multi-headed” executive. Due to the ministerial pluralization and fragmentation,

\textsuperscript{100} See Ataklı 2011.

\textsuperscript{101} See Ardıç 2001 for the details of the decrees issued at the Motherland Party under the Özal’s premiership (1983-1991).

\textsuperscript{102} According to many, the timing of the decrees had an important message sent to the Turkish people. Just two months before, empowering the Council of Ministers for the coming 6 months was the message that the AKP was going to win the elections. Thus, for this reason, decrees also comprised the post-election period (see TMMOB 2011, Ataklı 2011).
especially dealing with the important privatization projects, Erdoğan noted that pre-AKP governments led the government into a chaos (Hürriyet 2011). What the AKP government prioritized, in the words of Erdoğan, was the “coordination”.

4.3 Concluding Remarks

Having analysed the indicators manifesting the presidentialization under the Erdoğan’s Premiership period, it should be concluded that one can argue for a presidentialization at the executive level in Turkish parliamentary system. The presidentialization in the core executive does not necessarily mean the presidentialization of the wider system, i.e. the presidentialization of politics and/or presidentialization of the parliamentary system. In other words, the centralization and personalization of the power at the office of the prime minister in contrast to other actors, such as cabinet members, civil servants, veto players, in the core executive is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of the systemic presidentialization.

Although the developments in the core executive and/or executive face have taken a presidential turn under the AKP period, in order to argue for a “presidentialization in the wider political process”, there are very little evidences supporting the thesis. The understanding of the parliamentary party and the parliament by the AKP and Erdoğan seems to be a proof of the non-existence of the presidentialization within the broader political process.

As far as the executive-legislative relations are considered, according to the logic of the presidential system, the independent mandate of the chief executive reflects the autonomy of the leaders from their parties. The leader-party relations are the direct result of the separation of power principle found in presidential systems. The leader, thanks to his/her capacity to attract the electorate can bypass the wishes of the party. At the same time, the party in the legislature may feel more independent from the leader. Because the leaders are not sitting on the dominant coalition in the party, their leadership are precarious despite powerful at the times of elections.
With regard to executive-legislative relations, presidentialization implies the growing autonomy of both the chief executive from the party and the legislative party from the leader. The critical views on the issue of presidentialization highlight the major difference between the president and a prime minister in dealing with their parties. Dowding (2012: 12) argues that presidents in order to legislate have to bargain. Focusing on the US case, presidents is said to “be forced by circumstance to govern through ad hoc coalitions in Congress or by using their public appeal to force their will upon the legislators”. On the other hand, Dowding giving the example of Obama’s health care reform process, which originally was very different from the final state, argues that governing through bargaining may be seen as a failure with respect to a PM. The PMs are to be controlling the legislative agenda. Thus, an analogy is not correct. A presidentialization in this sense could be seen if the chief executive’s power to control the parliament diminishes.

Relying on the Turkish case under the AKP period, it seems that it is hard to argue for an increasing gap between the government and its supporting party in the parliament. Even one may found counter-evidences on this account. One of the indicators of such evidence is the “proportion of the bills initiated by the opposition” as proposed by Helms (2013). As it is argued by one of the fervent supporters of presidential system for Turkey, the AKP MPs Burhan Kuzu, the 98% of the bills in the parliament are initiated by the government. According to him, the remaining 2% is very symbolic:

The right to legislate is, in appearance, in the parliament. However, the parliament is non-existent in the process before the legislation. It is not powerful in its negotiations. It is unaware of the background. 98% of laws are coming from the government. The remaining 2%, in fact needed by the government but due to the public opinion pressures, they are coming from member of parliaments indirectly. In reality, 100% of them are coming from the government. What do the members of the parliament do? They look to their parliamentary party group’s deputy chairman. It is a mob mentality. If the deputy chairman raises his hand, then, deputies also raise their hands.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{103} Cited in Hakan 2015.
Rather than observing a detachment of the parliament from the executive, Erdoğan considers the negotiation process over the legislation in the parliament as an impediment to his government. Considering the educational reform attempts of AKP, known as “4+4+4”, he argues that:

One of the deputies has talked for 12 hours on the “4+4+4” in the commission. Who? A deputy from the CHP. If he is asked ‘what is education’, he is unaware. He is proud of this. Hey! You will not prevent us. You will not prevent us.

Even, Erdoğan ordered that:

Today is Thursday. This commission will work. Tomorrow, Friday. It will work again. If it is needed, the commission will again work on Saturday and Sunday. At the end, this legislation will pass through the parliament. (Al Jazeera Türk 2012).

As it is evident, it is impossible to talk about autonomy of the parliament from the leader. Even Erdoğan considers himself as capable of mandating member of parliaments to work for the holiday.
CHAPTER V

ERDOĞAN’S PRESIDENCY: THE CASE OF INSTITUTIONAL STRETCH AND PRESIDENTIALIZATION

In line with the 2007 constitutional amendment which stated that the next President of the Republic would be elected by popular vote, Prime Minister Erdoğan became the first directly elected President of Turkey in August 2014 Presidential Elections. Although the office of presidency has symbolic powers in a parliamentary regime, the Prime Minister Erdoğan and officials from the AKP government argued that the direct election for the office would provide the incumbent with greater political power and direct legitimacy. This legitimacy, combined with the personality of Erdoğan, was considered to be significant in order to move the office to the heart of executive power in Turkish political system.

According to the Turkish 1982 constitution, the President has important powers nominally but nowadays the incumbents of the office are reluctant to use them. Although the constitution shares the executive power between the Council of Ministers and the President, the Turkish political system clearly identifies that the power mainly lies at the office of the prime ministry. Erdoğan and his supporters directed attention to the constitutional powers of the President and highlighted that Erdoğan would use all the powers granted to him. This had opened up a debate whether the practice of president’s rights would force the system to transform.

It is no secret that Erdoğan has been demanding a somewhat presidential system especially since 2011. During Presidential campaigns, he stated that “if elected, I will be a sweating, running president”. At the time of writing this dissertation (as of August 2015), the 12-month performance of President Erdoğan seems to be a case in
point that could be analysed within the framework of presidentialization thesis. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to study the performance of Erdoğan’s presidency, starting on August 2014 up until now. To a great extent, such an endeavour is a matter of studying leadership, at this time, the leadership of Erdoğan at the office of the Presidency of the Turkish Republic.

Relying on the state of art on the study of a political actor, as done by Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter (2013: 2), I will be in a struggle to pay due regard to the following points in dealing with Erdoğan’s leadership as a President:

a) Exploring the institutional and contextual power chances of Erdoğan at the office of Presidency
b) The relationship between Erdoğan and other political actors (such as the party he came from) as a critical sources of both leadership empowerment and restraint and,

c) The social construction of Erdoğan’s performance as a leadership success and/or failure.

Analysing these points in the study of leadership, in fact, reveals that leadership is not “just a matter of personality” but also it is always “conditional” and “co-dependent” (Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter, 2013: 3). It should be argued that it is co-dependent because it depends on a particular historical moment, political culture and institutional conditions (such as the time of an institutional change) and it is conditional as far as it needs the support of colleagues and, may be the most important, the followers.

It is my claim in this part of the dissertation that Erdoğan’s presidency is an attempt at “institutional stretching” by him and his close aides to make the office of the presidency a more potent platform in imposing its incumbents ambitions. It should be claimed that the direct election of the president for the first time in 2014 and his
relations with his ex-party has provided a certain ground for him to push the office to the lynchpin of the Turkish politics.

After this brief introduction, the plan of this Chapter is as follows: first of all, I will briefly sketch out the position of the office of the presidency in Turkish politics. In doing so, the special emphasis will be given to the 1982 constitution, 2007 amendment and 2014 presidential election. Following this historical analysis, I will try to outline the conceptual framework I intend to utilise in shaping my arguments. As the conceptual framework, I will be locating the analyses of Erdoğan’s presidency within the presidentialization-induced institutional stretch arguments. And, finally, I will note some of the meaningful manifestations of presidentialization through proposing some indicators in Erdoğan’s term of presidency. At the end, I will try to show that Erdoğan has certainly attempted at stretching the office of presidency in a very short time period. However, for the future of the office, coming back to the points noted at the very beginning, his aims of stretching is and will be always conditional and co-dependent.

5.1 The Office of the Turkish Presidency

5.1.1 The History of the Turkish Presidency:\textsuperscript{104}:

5.1.1.1 The 1924 Constitution:\textsuperscript{105}

According to the 1924 constitution, the parliament was established as the centre of the power. Article 5 of the constitution noted that “the legislative and executive functions are vested and centred in the Grand National Assembly”. In addition, Article 7 highlighted that “the assembly exercises the executive power through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a cabinet

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{104} In Chapter III, Turkish constitutions were dealt with at some depth through the lenses of constitutional presidentialization. For that reason, in order not to repeat myself once more, this part is exclusively allocated to the position of the office of the presidency in Turkish constitutions.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{105} The English version of the 1924 constitution can be consulted at Edward Mead Earle (1925).
chosen by him”. The same article gave the assembly the right to withdraw power from the government at any time. However, neither the president nor the government could dissolve the parliament according to the 1924 constitution. Under the Executive Power section, the 1924 constitution noted the election of the president by the assembly for a period equivalent to that of the parliamentary term (Article 31), accepted the responsibility of the president to the Grand National Assembly only in case of high treason (Article 41) and highlighted that the “responsibility for all decrees promulgated by the president, according to the Article 39, devolves upon the head of the Cabinet and the responsible ministers whose signatures are affixed to the decrees”. In terms of the formation of the government (Article 44) and the “collective responsibility” of the government, the 1924 constitution was in line with the parliamentarian principles.

It should be claimed that according to the 1924 constitution, on paper, the presidency was intended to be a more “ceremonial position” (BPC, 2015: 9) in line with the wisdom of seeing the president as the head of the state rather than the government. Still, president had important rights, though the original draft of the constitution conferred on the President greater powers than he enjoyed under the constitution as finally adopted (Earle, 1925: 87), such as the right to veto the bills passed by the Assembly.

Although the details are out of this dissertation’s aims, the position of the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a president under the 1924 constitution, taken his “magnetic prestige” combined with being his leadership of the Popular Party and the constitutional prerogatives into consideration, could be seen as a powerful factor in the determination of the public policies (Earle, 1925, 87-88; Erdoğan, 2003: 55-70). The BPC (2014: 9) concludes that the steering of the country, to a certain extent, from the presidency through the force of personality by Mustafa Kemal “left a significant imprint on Turkish politics”. That is, the personality matters. As far as the relation between president Atatürk and prime minister İnönü is considered, Erdoğan
(2003: 69-70) noted that there was a tension among the two as far as Atatürk’s direct interference into the government policies has put PM İnönü into obscurity, or even “in a position of half-retirement”. Eventually, PM İnönü resigned in 1937.

After Turkey had passed to multi-party democracy in 1946, the constitutional framework of the 1924 was still in force. During the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) period (1950-1960), the relations between president Celal Bayar and prime minister Adnan Menderes should be termed as “the first to adhere to the constitutional structure that put the prime minister ahead of the president” (BPC, 2014: 10). Although Bayar was an influential figure, Menderes was leading the politics.

5.1.1.2 The 1961 Constitution

There is no doubt that the 1961 constitution foresaw a parliamentarian type of executive. As far as the position of the president is considered, the office was representing the “less powerful and symbolic” wing of the executive that was composed of Council of Ministers and the president. The right to govern, in essence, was given to the Council of Ministers emerging from the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Article 95 of the constitution noted that the president “shall be elected for a term of seven years from among those members of the TGNA”. Significantly, the president would no longer be allowed to stand for re-election and he would be required to dissociate himself from his party. Among the authorities of the president, the president “shall preside over the Council of Ministers when he deems it necessary” (Article 97). The president shall designate the prime minister and appoint the Ministers nominated by the prime minister (Article 102). As line with the parliamentarian principles, the president “shall not be accountable for his actions connected to his duties” unless the impeachment for high treason and the

responsibility of the decrees emanating from the president is for the prime minister and the relevant ministers (Article 98, 99).

All these provisions highlighted that the designers of the 1961 constitution took steps to “ensure the prime minister as a primary political actor in the Turkish politics” (BPC, 2014: 10). In practice, as intended by the writers of the constitution, the prime ministers were more powerful under the 1961 constitution. Not the presidents Cemal Gürsel (1960-1966), Cevdet Sunay (1966-1973) and Fahri Korüttürk (1973-1980) but the prime ministers İsmet İnönü, Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel were the dominant and leading figures in the Turkish politics.

5.1.1.3 The 1982 Constitution

According to the 1982 constitution, the executive is again composed of president and the council of ministers. Taking the articles 109, 110, 111, 112 into the consideration, the council of ministers seems to be the essential component. In fact, Article 112 reveals that “the prime minister, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, shall ensure co-operation among the ministers, and supervise the implementation of the government’s general policy”.

With regard to the position of the president, the powers of the office had been tremendously increased by the 1982 constitution. Article 104 of the constitution listed president’s powers for each branch of the government107. Among the powers related to legislation are the right to promulgate laws, the ability to return laws to the parliament to be reconsidered, the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court for an annulment of laws, the submit to referendum legislation regarding amendments to the constitution and to call new elections for the parliament. As far as executive powers are considered, the president appoints the prime minister and can preside over the council of ministers when he/she deems it necessary. The president has

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107 The detailed list of president’s powers related to legislative, executive and judiciary should be consulted at the website of the Presidency of the Turkish Republic. [http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/presidency/power/](http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/presidency/power/)
significant control over the military, as being the Commander-in-Chief, he/she appoints the chief of general staff and can preside over the National Security Council. Additionally, president can proclaim martial law or state of emergency and has the right to appoint members and the Chairman of the State Supervisory Council, members of the Higher Education Council and the rectors of universities. President’s powers related to the judiciary are “to appoint the members of the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of the members of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, the members of the Military High Court of Appeals, the members of the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors”.

Article 105 deals with the accountability and non-accountability of the president and noted that “All Presidential decrees except those which the President is empowered to enact by him/herself without the signatures of the Prime Minister and the minister concerned, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and other laws, shall be signed by the Prime Minister, and the ministers concerned. The Prime Minister and the ministers shall be accountable for these decrees. No appeal shall be made to any legal authority, including the Constitutional Court, against the decisions and orders signed by the President on his/her own initiative”. A president may only be “impeached by high treason on the proposal of at least one-third of the total number of members of the parliament and by the decision of at least three-quarters of the total number of members”.

According to the 1982 constitution, the prime minister was the dominant force in the politics and the presidency was to remain secondary. However, the significant increase in the powers of the president created some degree of ambiguity in relations between the president and the prime minister. Considering the powers/status of the president according to the 1982 constitution, “although it was not an office popularly/directly elected”, it should be argued that “a president may be significantly
active over the general policy” (Erdoğan, 2003: 208) if “the parliament and the prime minister are willing to go along with” (BPC, 2014: 12). It should be argued that the writers of the 1982 constitution designed the presidency “as a tutelary institution and as a realm of protecting the collective interests of the nation from partisan politicians” (Kalycioğlu, 2015: 158).

Although Kenan Evren, while in office, did not use presidential powers to the fullest extent, civilian presidents following Evren attempted to govern the country from the presidency. Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel were the cases in point. Turgut Özal, the then prime minister, succeeded Kenan Evren as the president in 1989. Özal considering his declining and damaged reputation as a PM and being fearful for his party’s electoral prospects in the next elections manufactured his ascent to the presidency (BPC, 2014: 12). He ensured one of his followers, Yıldırım Akbulut, was elected as the prime minister. Özal thought that he would work in harmony with Akbulut and he could steer the country from the presidency. However, he was unable to fully control the government and used every opportunity to criticize it. Even within his party, Mesut Yılmaz, had unseated Akbulut as the leader of the party and declared his intention to bring the presidency in line with the constitution (Ibid: 12). After ANAP lost the government to a Demirel-led coalition, then PM Demirel successfully marginalized Özal as a president. After the death of Özal, Süleyman Demirel was elected as a president by the TGNA in 1993. He also attempted to govern the state and his ex-party from the presidency; however he could not achieve his aims. It is worth noting that Demirel in his term in the presidency saw unstable coalition governments. Such a context created a political vacuum in the system and Demirel filled this vacuum especially pursuing a personal foreign policy agenda (Ibid: 13). In fact, in 1997 it was argued that he could manage masterfully the military’s threat to the DYP-RP government.
5.1.2 The 2007 Constitutional Amendment

As Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s presidency (2000-2007) ended in May 2007, the ruling party, the AKP, wanted to elect a candidate from its deputies. The foreign minister of the AKP government and one of the leading figures in the AKP, Abdullah Gül, was nominated as party’s candidate to the presidency. Gül’s perceived lack of secular identifications in the eyes of state elites, AKP’s reluctance to get the support of the opposition party (Republican Peoples Party – CHP) in the parliament, the military’s messages sent out to the AKP which stated that the next president would “commit himself to the fundamental values of the republic, including secularism, not only in words but also in substance” (Uran, 2010: 3), and the legal discussions, known as “367 decision”, arguing that “the constitution and the rules of procedure of parliament, was argued, necessitate that unless two-thirds majority of deputies were present in the first round of balloting, the necessary quorum for the elections would not be met and election process could not start” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2015: 159) led the AKP call an early election and initiated a legislative bill to amend Article 101 of the 1982 constitution which mainly regulated the selection process of the president. In time, to cut the whole history into short, the AKP managed to put the bill into a referendum in October 2007, was victorious in early elections of July 2007 and was able to elect its candidate, Abdullah Gül, as the president in August 2007. Since Abdullah Gül had already been elected for a non-renewable seven-year term, with the support of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) on 28 August, hence it was not until 2014 that the first popular presidential election took place.

108 The most surprising attempt from the military was the declaration published on 27 April 2007 in the official website of the office of the Chief of General Staff. It stated that “it should not be forgotten that the Turkish armed forces are a side in this debate and are a devoted defender of secularism…The Turkish armed forces will display their position and attitudes when it becomes necessary. No one should doubt that…” (cited in Uran, 2010: 3). This declaration was known as “e-memorandum” by the public and academicians.

109 As Kalaycıoğlu (2015: 159) summarized the arguments put forward by the former Republican prosecutor Sabih Kanadoğlu in 2007 presidential elections were first brought into the public and political debate by a former politician, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1989 in the discussions over Turgut Özal’s election in the parliament as a president.

110 For details of the whole process, see Kalaycıoğlu 2015, Köker 2013, Gönenç 2014, Uran 2010, İnsel 2013.
The referendum on the constitutional amendment was held on October 21, 2007 and almost 69% of the voters voted in favour of popular election of the president. The 2007 amendments stipulated that;

- The next president would be elected by popular vote rather than by the parliament,
- The term of office for the president has decreased from seven to five years and allows the incumbent to stand for re-election for a second term,
- The parliament’s term of office was reduced to four from five years
- The quorum of the assembly for both sessions and elections was decided as 184 rather than 367.

The introduction of the popular election of the president into the system has triggered an academic debate whether the Turkish already flawed, by the 1982 constitution, parliamentarian system had transformed or not. Before going into the details of this debate, it seems worth noting the theoretical insights on the direct election of a president in a parliamentarian system.

As far as the theoretical accumulation on the “direct election of the president” in a parliamentarian system is considered, the common wisdom highlights that it would be a danger in terms of the inclination of the president to interfere into the executive matters and consider himself/herself as the essential part of the government (Tavits 2009). As Tavits (2009: 11-12) summarized the highly cited view of Lijphart on the issue, the popular mandate behind the president would lead him to “encroach upon or take over the leadership of the government”. This is because the elected president considers that his/her direct election provide him/her with a democratically legitimate justification to be “more active”. The following passage is very instructive in terms of summarizing the common view’s position:

Direct elections inevitably lead to more activism and conflict between branches of the state because presidents feel that their constitutional powers do not correspond to their direct popular mandate (Tavits, 2009: 12).
Secondly, using the terms of the approach known as “the principal-agent theory” put forward by Samuels and Shugart, due to the changing principals of the agents, at this time the electorates rather than the legislators, the directly elected presidents may feel no need to please other actors in the political system, as in the indirect election that they need to get the support of the legislators. This wisdom could culminate in the behavioural differences between the directly elected and indirectly elected presidents.

However, the enhanced legitimacy behind the presidents due to the popular mandates “does not automatically lead to increasing activism and power” (Tavits, 2009: 15). The increasing presidential activism and power is dependent on the partisan forces and institutional structures within the environment they operate. In practice, the directly elected Irish, Austrian and Icelandic presidents have no executive role, to a certain extent, in their political systems. The political opposition and the strength of other institutions may become constraints for the directly elected presidents’ willingness to be more active. Thus as Tavits (2009: 15-16) concluded, it is not the direct or indirect election that may provide presidents with more legitimacy and resources to be more active but the environment within which they are operating shape their chances of increasing power.

I support the arguments (Uran 2010, Köker 2014, Gönenç 2013) claiming that the 2007 amendments were a reaction of the AKP government to a political/constitutional crisis rather than a well-designed “constitutional engineering scheme” (Uran, 2010: 2-3). The changes brought into the system by the 2007 amendments were new additions to the already deviant parliamentarian system of Turkey since the 1982 constitution. However, the constitutional, legal and

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111 The presidential activism should be divided into two as Tavits (2009: 30) did as formal and informal. The formal activism comprises “approving/vetoing legislations, engaging in policy discussions with executive or foreign leaders and, interfering with cabinet-building” whereas, the informal activism is composed of “making statements, setting policy agenda and, public opinion and international impression”.
institutional structures were not adapted to the emerging situation. In time, the 2007 amendments has divorced from the context within which it was emerged and has seen as a reason to pass through a presidential system, especially by Erdoğan and his supporters in the party and the academia (Uran, 2010: 2; Însel, 2013: 9). The coming years’ “Turkish type presidential system” debate and “the 2012 AKP Proposal” should be considered as the attempts at adapting the system, taking Erdoğan factor into consideration, to the de facto situation created with the 2007 amendments (Ibid: 10).

5.1.3 The 2014 Presidential Election

In the 2014 presidential election, AKP’s candidate Erdoğan had run against Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the joint candidate of both the CHP and MHP, and Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Considering the aim of this dissertation, the main emphasis will be put on the campaign of Erdoğan113.

As far as Erdoğan’s campaign is considered, although it had coincided with an environment deeply affected by the “revelations of December 2013, which the opposition interpreted as evidence of political corruption among the AKP elite”, while the AKP government and president Erdoğan “portrayed them as an attempted coup” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2015: 164). Interpreting the results of the March 2014 local elections that the most of the Turkish electorates accepted the AKP’s description as the truth, Erdoğan had concentrated his campaign mainly around his previous successes during his premiership, his leadership in providing a macro-economic stability. However, above all in the campaign Erdoğan promised to create a “New Turkey” in his possible presidency (Kalaycıoğlu, 2015: 164; Köker 2014, BPC

112 For the details of both the debate and the proposal, see Chapter VI.

113 For further information on personalities and commitments of both İhsanoğlu and Demirtaş during the 2014 Presidential elections, see Kalaycıoğlu, 2015: 162-164 and for Erdoğan’s campaign, see Kalaycıoğlu 2015 and Köker 2014.
2014). In this New Turkey, Erdoğan argued that the office of the presidency would be supreme, the president would not be neutral in the sense that he would be sided with the nation, and the president would be active in designing and executing policies together with the PM and council of ministers.\footnote{According to Kalaycıoğlu (2015: 164-165) all these commitments are in contravention of Article 103 of the constitution and are not in line with Article 109 which stipulated that the right to execute policy is given to prime minister and the council of ministers.}

The concept/vision or even the commitment\footnote{Mahçupyan in his articles (2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f) deals with the concept of New Turkey as a target, as a dream and as a commitment and tried to provide the philosophical foundations to this idea of New Turkey paying due regard to the possible New Turkey’s society, politics and citizen and bureaucracy typology. For a critic of Mahçupyan’s ideas, see Laçiner 2015a.} of the New Turkey seems to be a “total and transformative political vision” (BPC, 2014: 16) Erdoğan and his supporters have been arguing with his presidency.\footnote{Interestingly enough, in time the New Turkey anthem has been composed, the New Turkey journal has been published, the volunteers of New Turkey has emerged and internet sites have been made ready.} It should not be seen as only an electoral slogan. Erdoğan and his supporters have loaded an “encompassing vision” to the concept,\footnote{Laçiner (2015a) claimed that this New Turkey discourse should be considered as an “empty signifier” – signifier having no signified -, hinting that it is part of an hegemonic project, open to be filled by a signified in accordance with dominant discourse. In other words, it is impossible to comprehend the New Turkey concept concretely as it is open to be filled.} representing the founding principles of the coming decade of Turkey, in terms of society, politics and citizenship, with the presidential mission of Erdoğan (Mahçupyan 2015a). Seen from this perspective, the New Turkey discourse is argued to be a hegemonic project, thus necessitate me to deal with this vision at some depth.

First of all, although much has been said on it, it seems that nobody is able to reveal the contents of this New Turkey except the highly used argument indicating that it will be built under Erdoğan’s “constitutive presidency” (Kurucu cumhurbaşkanlığı) (Laçiner 2015a, Mahçupyan 2015a, Miş and Aslan 2014). Despite important publications coming from those intellectuals and research companies close the AKP,
their analyses do not allow us to comprehend the concept concretely (Laçiner 2015a). At the very broader level, the early ideas on the New Turkey were highly influenced by the 2007 constitutional amendments. It goes like this:

With the popular election of the president, the state and the nation “will be merged”. It will be possible to call the president as the “president of the nation”. As it was the case before the 2007 amendments, a political figure determined as the final outcome of the negotiations among political parties within the parliament, the coming president will be “the nation’s authentic/real representative” due to the popular mandate behind him/her. Finally, as in the discourse of the AKP, the “last castle of the tutelary powers”, the office of the presidency, will be held down by the people and it will be in the reach of ordinary Turkish people.¹¹⁸

As Erdoğan’s candidacy for the presidential office became clear, his ambitions, bringing a presidential system, and personality has been added to the previous reasoning. This time, it has been argued that the president has already important powers in the 1982 constitution. Adding the increasing legitimacy coming from the popular mandate behind him to these already important powers, he will use all his powers to the greatest extent ad the system will be forced to transform to bring the presidency to the centre of executive politics. Thus, the mission of the popularly elected president should be a “constitutive mission” which will create new customs, procedures and institutions in an irreversible way. The old Turkey has died, and the new Turkey will be built under a new president according to this argumentation. Erdoğan’s ambitions and aims perfectly fit into this reasoning. In fact, the vision pamphlet Erdoğan used in the presidential elections was titled as “on the way to New Turkey”.

As Erdoğan came out of victorious from the presidential elections, his first message he sent was “without a doubt, the New Turkey … has won today”.

¹¹⁸ These ideas are my own integration from the highly stressed points voiced in AKP’s introduction ceremony of its candidate, Erdoğan, for the presidency. One can also find these arguments in AKP 2014a, AKP 2014b and Hakan 2014.
5.2. Erdoğan at the Office of the Turkish Presidency

5.2.1 The Concept of Institutional Stretch
It will not be wrong to claim that the idea of institutional stretch falls into the broader category of an interactionist approach in analysing a political actor or a leader. The interactionist approach in this framework argues that the actor to study is both an actor dependent on the environment in which s/he operates and, at the same time, s/he can have an impact on the support structure that he sits on, i.e. institutional power resources (Bennister 2007). Although dependent on the environment (formal institutional structure, other political actors etc.), an incumbent of an office would force the institution in a way that it has the potential to deliver greater power (Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter 2013).

At the very broader level, the institutional stretch identifies that “new structures, processes and practices becoming embedded in the political system by the incumbent” (Bennister, 2007: 327). In other words, institutional stretch is a phenomenon of the times of “change” in which a perceived transition has affected the institutions to restructure to meet the emerging exogenous demands. Although we know that political leaders have certain amount of power as a result of the position they hold, their capacity to exert power should be shaped by the context and situation. Certain contexts and situation could “open up space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways” (Kefford, 2014: 2). Generally, an institutional stretch indicates that “the influence and authority of an incumbent is beyond the systemic”, i.e. beyond the formal structures, traditions and customs (Bennister, 2007: 328).

The idea of institutional stretch has close ties with two important phenomena: centralization and personalization. In this framework, personalization refers to the personal power resources of the incumbent and centralization indicates the increasing institutional resources of the incumbent toward a greater power or resource
augmentation around the office in order to be able to better coordinate the policies. The personal leadership can provide the actor with greater power resources than the formal structure he/she sits on. As in the idea of Foley “the old moorings of institutionalization have been stretched in response to the new context of personalized public leadership” (cited in Bennister, 2007: 328).

Heffernan (2005b: 616-617) notes “reputation, political success, public popularity and the high standing in the party” are the most important resources of personalization and/or personal power and “agenda-setting through the leadership of the cabinet, strengthening the office and agenda-setting through news media management” for the centralization. However, it should be highlighted that these institutional and personal resources are not transient. They are always context bounded and dependent on other actors and institutions. In Heffernan’s terms, it should be admitted that “actors who are ‘resource rich’ are provided with access to the resources of other actors and institutions that are ‘resource poor’”, they are not totally independent on other actors and institutions to achieve their goals (2005b: 608-610). As a conclusion we should neither privilege the agents and downplay the effects of the structure nor privilege the structure and downplay the effects of agents on them.

After this brief theoretical remarks, the following part should be seen the analysis of the case at hand, Erdoğan’s presidency, through the lenses of above-mentioned framework.

5.2.2 Erdoğan’s Presidency

Erdoğan’s first attitude which was considered by many as clearly being in contravention of the constitution and as paralyzing the constitutional definition of president’s impartiality (Köker 2014, Kalaycıoğlu 2015), following the presidential election, was his participation in the AKP’s 27 August 2014 congress where the new leader of the party and the prime minister was elected (Yazıcı, 2015: 106-7).
Although the 1982 Constitution’s Article 101/3 stipulates – “If the President-elect is a member of a party, his/her relationship with his party shall be severed and his/her membership of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall cease” – Erdoğan interpreted the clause as if all his previous titles were intact until he takes the presidential oath on August 28 rather than the official declaration of his victory by the Supreme Electoral Council/Board (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu – YSK) of Turkey in the Official Gazette on August 15 (Köker, 2014: 3, Kalaycıoğlu, 2015: 172).

In addition, Erdoğan after assuming the presidency had behaved as if he was still the leader of the AKP. His demand for a total of 400 MPs, tacitly indicating the electorates to vote for the AKP, in order to be able to pass through a presidential system, which was later decreased to 335, an amount enough to bring the issue into referendum, his critics directed against opposition parties before the 7 June 2015 elections and his mass opening ceremonies (toplu açılış törenleri) in which he scheduled them before the elections as if they were campaign rallies were seen by many as if Erdoğan was still acting the leader of the AKP and violating the constitutional clause which stipulated the principle of the impartiality of the president (Yazıcı 2015, Kalaycıoğlu 2015).

As far as the relations between President Erdoğan and other political actors are considered, it seems that his relations with the handpicked Prime Minister Davutoğlu are of critical importance in terms of his aims of bringing the office of presidency into the centre of the Turkish politics. Since he assumed the office in August 2014

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119 Hürriyet Daily News 2015c.

120 Hürriyet Daily News 2015d.

121 An interesting study of Michael Sercan Daventry, published in Turkish dailies, after comparing and contrasting the meetings held by prime minister Davutoğlu and ceremonies of president Erdoğan, has come to a conclusion that the organization of rallies and ceremonies seems like both leaders shared the country for these meetings before the elections. If you put Davutoğlu’s 46 campaign rallies and Erdoğan’s 19 ceremonies into the Turkish map, only the 6 meetings and ceremonies overlapped. See Cumhuriyet 2015b. The original source should be consulted at Daventry’s web site, [http://www.jamesinturkey.com/campaigns-in-concert](http://www.jamesinturkey.com/campaigns-in-concert) (20.08.2015).
until now, on many controversial issues Prime Minister Davutoğlu has been forced to retreat by president Erdoğan. Out of them, the suspension of the anti-corruption transparency law, the Supreme Court elections for the ex-Ministers accused by corruption, the abandonment of the candidacy of the National Intelligence Agency’s chief Hakan Fidan as an MP from the lists of the governing party in the coming elections, the president’s negative views on the Kurdish peace process, the reluctance of Prime Minister Davutoğlu on the issue of switching to a presidential system despite Erdoğan’s fierce support for it and the post-7 June elections debate on the establishment of a coalition government with other political parties has indicated Erdoğan’s aims of exerting tutelage on the Davutoğlu’s government even, to a great extent, exceeding the limits of the constitution (Küçükşahin 2015). These issues reveal that the system is controlled by a “partisan president” who is controlling both the government and the governing party from the Presidential Palace (Çakır 2015). According to Çakır (2015), this is a de facto presidential regime if not de jure.

The “most significant” and “unprecedented” rift between president Erdoğan and the AKP government emerged over the handling of the peace process on March 2015 (Guardian 2015a, Yazıcı, 2015: 106). President Erdoğan declared that he was considering the meeting between the government and pro-Kurdish deputies to announce a call for disarmament was “inappropriate” and said that he was unaware of the issue. He severely criticized government through the media. The Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç had gently reminded the president his constitutional powers: “His (Erdoğan’s) statements like ‘I did not like that’ or ‘I am not happy about that’ are emotional and are his views. The peace process is being carried out by the government and the government is responsible for this question” (Guardian 2015a). Facing such a reaction from the Deputy Prime Minister, Erdoğan went on to argue that “What does it mean that I make politics? Can a president remain outside the politics? Does not a president have something to say on politics? They (critics) are looking for a wall flower suitable for them. I am not a wall flower as a president” (Cihan News Agency 2015a). Such a row, for the first time, indicated uneasiness
present in the government over the interference of the president into the politics. However Erdoğan insisted on his rights to be an active president and argued that since the 10th of August 2014 with the popular election of the president, an era in the Turkish politics has been de facto over. The following passage is worth to be quoted at length:

The parliamentarian system, being started from 1876, 1924 or even 1946 by some people, has been taken to the waiting room irreversibly by the nation on the 10th of August. How long will this waiting take or until when? It will last either till providing a constitutional framework to the present practices or till substituting a new system instead of the current one. The decision on this issue will be given at the 7th of June 2015 general elections (Sabah 2015).

In addition to President’s relations with the members of the core executive, considering the wider system Turkey has witnessed president Erdoğan’s quarrel with the chief of Central Bank. Erdoğan attacked the Central Bank for treachery for having kept interest rates relatively high. He publicly labelled the chief of the central bank as “traitor” for not decreasing the interest rates. Erdoğan’s quarrel with the central bank authorities had been followed by public for a certain period of time. During the debate, the value of American dollar against the Turkish lira increased just after every time Erdoğan attacked on the Central Bank. This is named as “Erdoğan trade” by the Turkish media (Yıldız 2015). It is argued that president Erdoğan has become “unpredictable” and “source of problems and instability” once seen as the anchor of stability (Dombey 2015a, Yalçiner 2015).

Although the Turkish corporate elite “knows too well the risk of antagonising the government” (Dombey 2015b), the row between the Turkish Industry and

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122 The translation from Turkish to English is mine.

123 For the details of the debate and the views of the parties to the dispute, see Yıldız 2015, Diken 2015.

124 Dombey highlights that there is no need to remind the Turkish businessmen “the initial $2.5bn tax fine levied on Doğan Media Group in 2009 after Erdoğan was angered by their newspaper’s coverage of a corruption scandal”. Additionally, Dombey argues that “memories are still fresh of how Erdoğan reversed a huge amount of warship construction deal with Koç Holding, the country’s biggest group, after denouncing it for sheltering anti-government protesters”.
Business Association (TÜSİAD) and the president on the issue of “the addressee of the association” is very instructive in terms of Erdoğan’s attempts to move his office at the centre of the broader politics. On December 29, 2014 in an interview with a newspaper, TÜSİAD’s outgoing chairman Haluk Dinçer had said that “TÜSİAD’s addressee is not the president but the prime minister related to our field” (Hürriyet Daily News 2014). Both president Erdoğan (naturally) and prime minister Davutoğlu (interestingly) reacted to TÜSİAD’s chairman’s words saying that they would not attend TÜSİAD’s meetings anymore, adding that the association would need to find an addressee to attend its meetings (Hürriyet Daily News 2014). Dinçer reiterated his earlier words: “it is not meaningful to discuss this addressee issue so much. The president is the head of the state, representing the Turkish Republic. The addressee of the TÜSİAD is, of course, the government, because it offers its policy proposals to the government and criticizes it if necessary” (Hürriyet Daily News 2015b). It seems that “the addressee issue” is closely related with the TÜSİAD’s opposition to the plans for switching to a presidential system. On the issue of the ongoing presidential system debate in those days, TÜSİAD clearly opted for a parliamentarian system which is considered more appropriate to the Turkish culture and history by the association and worried about the ideas on the Turkish style presidential system aims of Erdoğan and his supporters.

The attitudes and activeness of the president Erdoğan in the post-July 2015 elections seems to be very instructive in terms of providing vital clues about the impact of context and political actors on the office of the Turkish presidency. As noted before, Erdoğan set the 7 July 2015 elections as a referendum for his demands of switching to a presidential system. The results of the election, which put an end to 13-year uninterrupted rule of the AKP, his ex-party, did not please him. Although the AKP had secured 258 MPs out of 550, that amount was far below to realize Erdoğan’s aims. The results met with statements arguing that “Erdoğan was the biggest looser”
(Today’s Zaman 2015). Even Davutoğlu admitted that the results could be understood as “No to Erdoğan’s dream of a presidential system constitutionally”\textsuperscript{125}.

The results forced political parties to form a coalition. Erdoğan, throughout his political career, had made no secret that he has not been in favour of coalitions. This time, he reiterated his well-known ideas. However, he charged the leader of the biggest party, AKP’s Davutoğlu, with a mandate to form a coalition within 45-days as it was stipulated in the 1982 constitution. The MHP had made clear that it would not be together with pro-Kurdish HDP in a coalition under any circumstances. This had changed all the possible coalition scenarios without the participation of the AKP. Because without the support of both the MHP and HDP, the main opposition party, CHP, could not be able to reach to 276, the amount necessary to get a vote of confidence in the parliament.

The AKP and CHP had negotiated for 39 days but at the end, a coalition was not possible. On the eve of the last meeting between the leaders of both party, Erdoğan while addressing the mukhtars, said that “the principles of the parties in coalition talks need to match”, implying that they do not. “Unless the principles of both sides match, forging a coalition would come to mean committing suicide”, which was interpreted as a message to Davutoğlu. The CHP still accused Erdoğan for interfering into the coalition talks in order to block the efforts and criticized him of not charging Kılıçdaroğlu with the mandate to form a coalition for the last three days as of 20 August, which due to the political customs the former president had given in the Turkish history. Erdoğan implied that he would not give the mandate, considering that there was no possibility for him to come with a coalition.

Almost 45 days after the elections, political actors in the system could not find a way to handle the coalition issue, due to many reasons. Although the post July 2015

context was convenient for those critical of the activeness of the president Erdoğan since his popular election in August 2014, they could not come together. Today it seems highly likely that the Turkey is going to a snap election, again highly likely, for the first time in its history through the president’s call for an early election due to the time allotted in the constitution for coalition talks expires. This should also be considered that Erdoğan’s presidency has the potential in many ways to be the “Presidency of the initials”.

5.2.3 Indicators of Presidentialization

5.2.3.1 Changing Organizational Structure of the Presidency

Just four months after Erdoğan became the president; he restructured the organization of the presidency through a confidential decree which was not published in the Official Gazette. With this restructuring, the number of presidencies at the president office has increased up to thirteen (13) from four (4). Previously, there were only four presidencies (administrative and financial affairs, corporate communication, information technologies and human resources) in line with the traditions. The presidencies of Domestic Security (responsible for fighting against the “parallel structure” – a term used by Erdoğan to refer to Gülen movement, Foreign Affairs, Economy, Defense, Energy, Social Affairs, Communication Center and Investment Monitoring Unit have been added to the already existing presidencies. In broader terms, these new presidencies have been designed to develop policies, reports and strategies in their areas, to take role in coordination among state organs and to consult the government. In Erdoğan’s words, they are aimed at “building a better harmony between the government and presidency” (Hürriyet Daily News 2015a).

126 According to a report published by Today’s Zaman (2014), the Investment Monitoring Unit will be responsible for monitoring investment. In line with the changing structure at the Presidency, the final approval for investments will be given by the Presidency not by the PM, as it used to be. With this change, the President is making the final decision. It is noted in the Turkish press that former transportation Minister, Binali Yıldırım, now the chief advisor to president, will be heading the presidency at the palace.
This restructuring of the presidency is also visible with regard to the number of personnel working for the office. The number of personnel working for the presidency has quadrupled in the period of Erdoğan compared to his predecessor Abdullah Gül. In fact, in Gül’s period there were 718 personnel working within the presidency, which was very high as compared to the ex-presidents. The secretary general of the current presidency, Fatih Kasırga while speaking the Turkish Grand National Assembly in December 2014 during the budgetary talks reported that they were going to increase the number up to 941 which means an increase of 30 per cent. It was rumoured that, in fact, on March 2015 the number of personnel working for the presidency has increased to 2,700\textsuperscript{127} thanks to the new presidencies added at Erdoğan’s period.

The increasing budget available to the president has been also considered as the steps taken by Erdoğan to keep a tight grip on the Turkish politics. The 2015 presidential budget was argued to quadruple\textsuperscript{128} the total amount of 7-year Gül presidency (2007-2014). A critical amount of the budget available to Erdoğan was composed of the “discretionary fund” which was traditionally in the use of prime ministers.

The changing organizational structure of the Presidency is entirely alien to the Turkish parliamentary system. Almost all of the newly formed units within the presidency correspond to ministerial offices and their area of jurisdiction. Such a step taken by the President has been interpreted as the first step taken towards a presidential cabinet and a de facto presidential system by the opposition (Today’s Zaman 2014). The newly formed thirteen (13) presidencies are called as “a 13

\textsuperscript{127} According to Erdem Gül, a report published by Cumhuriyet (2015a), the number of 2700 was calculated relying on the public bank established within the presidential palace. In March, 2700 people has got their salaries from this public bank which was specifically established for the Presidency.

\textsuperscript{128} According to Turkish Daily Newspaper, Meydan (2015) ex president Gül had spent 700 million Turkish liras between 2007 and 2014. Only for 2015, the budget available to Erdoğan is 2 billion and 697 million Turkish liras. Out of this 2,697 billion, 2,3 billion was the discretionary fund making available to the president, for the first time in Turkey.
member President’s Shadow Cabinet” and “the team monitoring the government” (Hürriyet 2014).

In addition to the newly added directorate-generals, the Presidency Communications Centre (Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Merkezi – CİMER) was founded in parallel to the Prime Ministry Communications Centre (Başbakanlık İletişim Merkezi – BİMER) in order to collect the denunciations and complaints coming from public institutions, whether central and rural. For this purpose, every public institution is asked to charge one of its members for the task of providing necessary communication with the Presidency, with an instruction sent to Ministries by the presidency. The reason is put forward as “rapid and qualified direction the demands coming from the presidency”. The centre will operate as a unit of public relations and the ministries will be coordinated to the centre. The centre was viewed as “Erdoğan has been preparing the infrastructure of the presidential system” and considered as an “attempt at controlling all public institutions from the presidency”. This centre seems to be detrimental to the BİMER and prime ministry’s authority (Zaman 2015a).

Last but not least, it is argued that Erdoğan has been in the way of establishing a TV Channel which will be broadcasting 24 hours Erdoğan’s meetings, programs and official levees/receptions. The expenses of the channel will be met from presidency’s discretionary fund and the budget of the TRT. It is rumoured that it will be ready before the coming general elections (Zaman 2015b).

Thus, the institutional and financial support structures under Erdoğan at the presidency has enhanced tremendously. As it is clear considering the newly established presidencies, the number of personnel and the amount of the budget allocated to the president, the office of the presidency has been stretched by Erdoğan to provide him deliver greater power and authority.
5.2.3.2 Chairing the Council of Ministers

In line with his previous statements that he will not be a “protocol president”, President Erdoğan’s chairing the Cabinet meeting on 19 January 2015 was seen as an attempt to expand the powers of the office and transform Turkey’s political system” (Peker 2015). Although Article 104 of the current constitution grants the President to chair Council of Ministers meeting when deemed necessary, it is reported that since the 1945 only five (5) presidents had chaired the Cabinet seventeen (17) times129. Erdoğan’s predecessors convened the Cabinet meetings at exceptional times such as the first Gulf War, the aftermath of terrorist attacks, the response of government to economic turmoil (Peker 2015).

The assembling of Cabinet by Erdoğan has gathered great attention by the domestic and international media. It is seen as compatible with Erdoğan’s desire to transform the system towards a presidential one and considered consistent with his desire to have a stronger presidency. According to Atilla Yeşilada, Erdoğan considers that “the constitutional framework for the power he has accumulated is so weak that his influence over the party and the government can only continue through direct means, such as today’s meeting” (cited in Peker 2015). This however comes at the cost of weakening the Prime Minister’s authority. Just before the meeting, Binali Yıldırım announced that President Erdoğan would convene the Cabinet every two months, with the first one scheduled for the 5th of January. The PM Davutoğlu denied such a meeting and added that it had to be decided by the Prime Minister and the President and no other person should be involved in the process. From this statement, it was clear that the prime minister was not previously aware of such a meeting plan. The final words came from Erdoğan and he declared that he had the power to chair Cabinet and he will chair it on 19th January (Hürriyet Daily News 2015a, Özsoy 2015).

129 Since the 1960, ex-presidents Cemal Gürsel, Fahri Korutürk, Kenan Evren, Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel convened the council of ministers. We saw no meeting in the periods of Cevdet Sunay, Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Abdullah Gül (Birgün 2015).
Interestingly enough, at the heyday of the discussions on the Erdoğan’s chairing the Cabinet, the TGNA Research Centre has prepared an annotation on the “President’s chairing the council of ministers” in order to deliver to the member of the parliament. In this pamphlet, it is noted that although this is a constitutional power granted to the president, the use of it seems to be contrary to the spirit of the parliamentary system. The critical point in this case is the unaccountability of the president. The constitution foresaw that the presidents, due to their unaccountability, are expected not to interfere in the deeds necessitates accountability. The pamphlet has noted the ideas of many well-known Turkish constitutional scholars. These academics directed attentions to the conclusion that “such an inclination would reflect the spirit of a de facto presidential system or a semi-presidential one” if the PM is deferent to such an act (Birgün 2015).

Since August 2014, Erdoğan has chaired the Council of Ministers four (4) times until now. Taking the historical indicators into the consideration, Erdoğan would be the record holder if he continues to practice chairing council of ministers.

5.2.3.3 The Presidential Palace (Aksaray)

According to many domestic and international observers of the Turkish politics, there is nothing better represent the power of Erdoğan at the presidency than the newly created Presidential Palace, known as “Aksaray” (White Palace) in the Turkish media. The cost of constructing it, its number of rooms, its legal status and even its monthly utility/electric bills has been debated since the beginning of Erdoğan’s term at the presidency.

The new presidential palace has been thought very crucial due to its symbolism in terms of Turkish politics that Erdoğan has been trying very hard to transform since his presidential candidacy. First of all, Aksaray is thought as the symbol of

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130 The pamphlet highlighted that although the constitutional court had no order on the matter at hand, its ideas “in the doctrine the role of the president should not go beyond the warning and advice” in another issue should be considered as its position.
“underscoring the break with Turkey’s past”. It is, in the minds of Erdoğan, the symbol of the “New Turkey” that he declared just assuming the presidency on 2014 August: “we are closing the doors on one era, and we are now taking our first step to a new phase” (BPC, 2014: 16). Considering the palace as the symbol of breaking the links with Turkey’s past, the following passage from Erdoğan is very instructive:

Turkey is no longer the old Turkey. The New Turkey should reveal itself. The office of the presidency, in the new building, was formed very differently. To that project, this humble person (himself, the author) has contributed a lot. We have to give the message that Ankara is a Seljuk capital. We paid great attention to this. Inside the building, we cared the Ottoman motives a lot. We reflected the impressions of the modern world. The building was designed as a smart building...These are the necessities of being a great state.\textsuperscript{131}

The palace is also very critical in terms of moving the seat of the presidency from the Çankaya Palace, the residence of all the past Turkish presidents since the foundation of the republic by Atatürk. Secondly, the palace seems to be a testament to the regime Erdoğan demands (Gürsel 2014) and/or the president Erdoğan aspires to be\textsuperscript{132} (BPC, 2014: 16). The debate on Aksaray and Erdoğan’s demands for a switch to an executive presidency appear hand in hand. As noted in the previous pages, the organizational restructuring at the presidential office has indicated that Erdoğan will not be a traditional/symbolic president in Turkish politics. Finally, the palace seems to represent Erdoğan’s perception on his unchallenged personal power. It is made public that the palace was originally intended for the prime minister. In 2011 at the time of starting to build the complex, the name of the project was the “Prime ministry Service Building” (Başbakanlık Hizmet Binası). As of 2014, after the election of Erdoğan as president, the complex has become the Presidential Palace. If Erdoğan could not get elected at the 2014 presidential election, the building was going to be available to the prime minister as it was intended and the new president

\textsuperscript{131} Cited in Gürsel 2014. The translation from Turkish to English is mine.

\textsuperscript{132} Jonny Hogg from Reuters (2015) directs attentions towards the symbolic importance of one of the pose of Erdoğan at the new presidential palace with a “presidential guard dressed in costumes from different eras of Turkie history”. With this exposure which was reminding ex-Turkic sultans, it was aimed at providing legitimacy for an executive presidency Erdoğan has been demanding by referring to Turkish history.
was going to reside at Çankaya Palace in line with the customs. This is a strong sign that Erdoğan has planned the palace for himself (Gürsel 2014). Additionally, the legal status of the palace has still been debated. It is situated on protected parklands first owned by Atatürk and later donated to the state. As sited in an environmentally protected zone, the Turkish highest court has ordered that the construction should be suspended. However, Erdoğan replied the orders of the courts as “Let them tear it down if they can. They ordered suspension, yet they cannot stop this building. I’ll be opening it; I’ll be moving in and using it” (BPC, 2014: 16, Gürsel 2014).

All in all, according to Erdoğan such great buildings are necessary for great and powerful nations. These are the symbol of national esteem abroad and power. In fact, the Aksaray seems to represent the amount of power Erdoğan has accumulated on behalf of nation or as “the president of Turkish people”. The growing power of Erdoğan, is argued to, represent the level Turkey’s power has risen. The equation is simple: Erdoğan’s power is nation’s power.

5.3 Concluding Remarks
As far as the historical analysis on the office of the presidency is taken into consideration, the following conclusion should be derived. First of all, starting with the 1924 constitution and the case of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, it should be claimed that the personality of the presidents matter in analysing the powers of the office within the system. The charismatic and popular presidents could be more active despite the constitutions’ intentions to design the office more symbolic and less powerful. In these terms, Erdoğan was not the first who tried to steer the country from the presidency. Secondly, the 1982 constitution gave the presidents more room to manoeuvre to govern from the presidency thanks to the powers vested the office by the constitutions. However it is not unconditional. This could be the case if the prime minister, parliament and other political actors are willing to get along well with him. Last but not least, both Özal and Demirel attempted at steering the country from the presidential office however they both faced “the implosion of their parties
after they assumed the title of president” (BPC, 2014: 13). Planning to govern the country together with a “pliant/deferential” prime minister did not work as both influential political figures foresaw. That would be the reason why both political figures fervently supported a presidential system for Turkey when they were alive.

All the indicators noted down in the analysis of the Erdoğan’s Presidency are thought as the appearance of a de facto presidential regime, albeit this time, manifested itself at the Office of the President in the Turkish political system. Although, presidentialization is considered, to a great extent, to account for the changing power and autonomy of prime ministers, the President of a somehow parliamentary regime or an incumbent such as Erdoğan, within limits, is a case in point.

Such a development – the manifestation of presidentialization at the office of the Turkish presidency under Erdoğan’s effect - should be interpreted, regarding our conceptual framework as follows:

I argue that, it is an important reflection of the idea that presidentialization is a “process”. The Turkish case, whether based it since 1982 Constitution, the 2007 constitutional amendment, Erdoğan’s Premiership or his Presidency, is a certain case in study to analyse the manifestations of the concept of presidentialization and the ongoing process. The structural and/or contingent factors are thought to be leading the system towards the presidential direction, as a dynamic if not an automatic process.

It should be considered as an important example of the supremacy of “contingent factors” in contrast to structural ones in the process of presidentialization. Although, the structural changes are at work, the personality of Erdoğan together with the popular election has moved the centre towards the office of President comparing it with the Office of Prime Minister under Davutoğlu. While Erdoğan was prime minister, the prime ministry was the house of the presidentialization. However, to a
certain extent Erdoğan managed to carry his power resources, be it personal and/or institutional, to the presidency. Thus, it seems that rather than the office brings the incumbent to the fore but the vice versa.

All these developments support the idea that power of a specific office should be depended on “events”. The 2007 constitutional amendment, which was a reaction of the AKP government to the judiciary and political opposition, is now divorced from the context within which it was aroused but is considered as the most important factor in order to move towards a presidential system and in order to define the system with these realities.

The legal-formal constitutionalism, although provides us important clues in analysing the presidentialization process in the Turkish case, seems to lose out to behavioural/informal practices in the study of executives. As a very important factor, Mr. Erdoğan can set new rules, new procedures and customs which are seen as undermining the already present legal, formal and behavioural practices.

To conclude, under Erdoğan’s effects, the office of the presidency has started to be transformed institutionally (the newly added directorate generals), symbolically (the new presidential palace) and electorally (thanks to the 2007 constitutional amendment that foresaw the next president would be elected by popular vote). However, almost one-year presidency of Erdoğan has also indicated that his attempts to stretch the office of presidency towards the centre of the executive politics are not a smooth process. As it was stated at the beginning of this chapter, it will always be dependent on the context. Just after the 2015 general elections, it is an open issue how the office of the presidency will adjust to the new situation after the elections. The demands of the opposition parties to “bound the president within the limits of the constitution”, to “move the presidential palace to the ex-residence of Çankaya rather than the Aksaray” are seen as their sine quo non in order to form a coalition with the AKP.
President Erdoğan may be “well-resourced” institutionally and personally to stretch the office of the presidency towards the “centre of the centre of” executive politics, however, considering the context after the 2015 elections which opened up the possibility of a coalition after 13-year of uninterrupted party government of the AKP, may not free him to further stretch the office of the president in order to interfere into the executive matters. All in all, an actor at an office has to be studied paying due regard to the context and it should be admitted that he/she will always be dependent on others.
CHAPTER VI

THE AKP/ERDOĞAN PROPOSAL FOR A PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM IN TURKEY: THE TURKISH TYPE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM DEBATE AND PRESIDENTIALIZATION

The discussions on the need for a presidential system are not a new entry into Turkish politics. The presidential system has been debated since the 1980s from time to time. Turkish ex-Presidents Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel expressed the need for such a system although grounding their arguments on different bases. However, both political figures could not turn their ideas into a concrete political project and were not able to mobilize their supporters at large.

The issue reappeared under the AKP government period. Although up until the publication of the 2023 Political Vision pamphlet, neither AKP nor Erdoğan had taken an interest in the political systemic change albeit expressed some opinions on the functionality of presidential system for Turkey. Just after the 2011 electoral victory, late at night while addressing the supporters of the party from the balcony of the AKP headquarter, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan asked one of party members (Burhan Kuzu known as the fervent supporter of the presidential system in his career) to study on a possible presidential system. In November 2012, the party offered a constitutional draft to the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission in which the type of executive was written through the prism of somewhat ambiguous presidential system. Later, this proposal started to be known as the “Turkish type presidential system”.

It is no secret that Mr. Erdoğan has long been calling for switching to a presidential system. After the deadlock in the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission due to
the AKP’s presidential system proposal, the party organized conferences (in the form of public lecture given by party members and academics) in many cities of Turkey under the heading of “Turkey is talking the presidential system”. Erdoğan has accelerated his insistence on a presidential system after he walked to the office of the Presidency. He organized “presidential dinners” with academics and think thank affiliates in order to discuss a possible systemic change. He convened many local governors in the Presidential Palace weekly in which he delivered very important speeches. One of the most touched upon topic in these speeches has been the need for presidential system. In the opening ceremonies around Turkey, he used every opportunity to express his desire for a presidential system. In short, Erdoğan has been trying hard to shape the perception of the public in favour of a presidential system, to increase the awareness of Turkish people and to mobilize supporters at the grass-root organizations.

With regard to the AKP and Turkish case, it is interesting that the AKP’s 13-year uninterrupted rule has been considered by many people from international organizations to party’s members as “miracles” in terms of macroeconomic stability and economic growth; as “a silent revolution” being able to make democratic reforms in their first years paving the way for EU-candidacy and as “a centre of attraction” for the Foreign Direct Investment the party attracted to Turkey due to the political and economic stability it provided. In addition, the leader of the party, Mr Erdoğan, it is argued, is called as the greatest leader after Atatürk the Turkish political history has seen and he was considered the guarantee of Turkey’s success. The AKP and Erdoğan have succeeded within a parliamentarian system, no matter how far it is a pure parliamentarian system at the time being. Under these circumstances, why the AKP and Erdoğan have pushing severely for a presidential system remains to be told. This broad question will be the main issue I will be trying to handle from an historical perspective.
The structure of this part is as follows: First of all, I will sketch out the discussions on a presidential regime before the AKP period in the Turkish political history. Secondly, the AKP proposal, the Turkish type presidential system will be analysed paying due regard to the following issues of “the implications of the accent on the Turkish type”, “the ideas for supporting it”, “the bases and reasons of such a need”. Thirdly, I will note the main critiques directed against the party and Erdoğan.

6.1 The History of Presidential System Discussions in Turkey

The transition to a presidential or a semi-presidential system was first discussed in the early 1980 in Tercüman Daily Newspaper and Yeni Forum Magazine in Turkey (Yazıcı, 2011: 159). In both, the idea was debated within the project of a possible new constitution. Just after the 1980 coup d’état, the Advisory Council of the Constitutive Assembly asked academics, universities and civil society organizations to propose their views on the formation of the new constitution. Overwhelming majority of proposals argued that presidential/semi-presidential systems were not convenient to Turkish practices and they pointed out the danger of both systems possibility to turn out to be a dictatorship in Turkey (Yazıcı, 2011: 160).

Turgut Özal was the first politician who fervently supported a presidential system in the Turkish politics (Yazıcı 2011, Üskül 2007, Gönenç 2005). Özal was claiming to preserve the powers of the President laid down by the 1982 constitution but to introduce the direct election of the President at the same time the election of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Kalaycıoğlu (2012: 46-47) noted that Özal’s proposal came at a time when he considered that his party started to lose its votes and sympathy within the electorate however his personal popularity was going on. The supporters of Özal proposal argued that the direct election of the President who had a strong political popularity (Turgut Özal in their minds) would be a solution to unstable coalition governments and would provide a “governing democracy”. Özal thought that the coalition governments were not able to leap forward. Turkey, according to Özal’s mind, had to transit to a presidential system if she wanted to be
one of the most developed 10 or 15 economics in the world (Gönenç, 2005: 2). However, the debate Özal started could not give way to a proposal for a constitutional amendment in line with a presidential system.

Following Turgut Özal, the ex-president Süleyman Demirel in 1997 voiced a need for a presidential system, mainly approaching the issue from the lenses of instable coalitions. It is argued that Demirel expressed his views as “I have been sitting in the Presidential Palace for four years and three months. Within this period, I have ratified six governments. This has made the system, inevitably, questionable” (Miş 2015). According to Yazıcı (2011: 162) one of the most important reasons behind his idea was the “anti-secular” politics followed by the Welfare-True Path Parties coalition which startled the Turkish Armed Forces and broader public concerns. Demirel’s proposals, also, did not gather too much support and faded away.

Having noted the ideas of two ex-politicians and presidents, some common characteristics of the views the supporters of presidential systems highlighted in Turkey should be noted. First of all, proponents argued that presidential system was going to be a receipt for governmental instability Turkey had long suffered. Interestingly enough, these ideas had been voiced more by politicians who were the members of governing parties (Güney, 2007: 349-350). Secondly, although in discursive terms, there was the need to a “transformation project” for Turkey, a developing country located within a highly important and instable geography, to become a great power in its vicinity. To that end, she had to transit to a presidential system which would provide strong and effective governments able to effectively, rapidly and unproblematically legislate (Gönenç 2005: 1). Another highly complained issue was the “resistance of high level bureaucracy”, especially to the neoliberal stability policies (Güney 2007, Kalaycıoğlu 2005, Oder 2005). Özal tried to overcome this resistance through young and educated bureaucrats known as “ÖZal’s princes”. If a presidential system was present, the leaders could work with his team and in a harmony, the country could make the necessary reforms in order to
adapt to the neoliberal premises. The presidential system was also considered necessary in order to fulfil Turkey’s long ambition of European Union accession. The conduct of EU affairs demanded a strong government, with a comfortable majority that could legislate rapidly in order make the necessary reforms. This idea was best represented in the following argument:

If the election threshold falls and ten (10) parties are represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, then a coalition government among four parties is indispensable. Through this government; it is impossible to do your homework and access to the EU (quoted in Güney, 2007: 352).

The most identifiable characteristic of the debate on presidential system was the lack of clarity. The debates, to a great extent, were directed by politicians. There are many people who considered the debates “subjectively”, arguing that debates revolved around the need of some ex-Presidents to stay in politics by being a president in a presidential system (Üskül, 2007: 19). The lack of “theoretical bases” of the ideas blurred the proposals (Güney, 2007: 353) and gave the image of complaining from the controlling mechanisms of the system rather than the type of executive.

6.2 The Debate in the AKP/Erdoğan Period

6.2.1 The Period between 2002 and 2012

The AKP came to power in 2002 within a parliamentary system which is now severely criticized by Erdoğan. The AKP has given 13-year uninterrupted governmental stability and to a certain extent Turkey has not faced any systemic problem despite the highly stressed first years’ the tension between the Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Sezer by the party. In terms of macroeconomic indicators, Turkey under the AKP rule has been considered as a miracle. All in all, it is very hard to argue for a necessary systemic change due to a problem of instability, political deadlock or an economic crisis.

One can argue that up until 2012, neither the AKP nor Erdoğan had attempted to bring forward the presidential system discussion to the top of the political agenda.
Although there were expressions, largely as expressions of intention, we had not seen any clear cut project to that end. There were some voices within the party calling to “update the system in line with the 2007 amendment”. Otherwise, they warned, the situation after the 2014 presidential election by popular vote could be a problem.

As far as the party manifestos of 2002, 2007 and 2011 are considered we see no reference to a need for a presidential system. The 2002 manifesto discussed the “restructuring of the administrative system”. However, it only dealt with the office of the prime ministry. The office of the prime ministry was argued to be restructured in the 2002 manifesto in order to facilitate the coordination role of the prime ministry with respect to the principles of parliamentarian system. Within this framework, the institutions attached to the prime ministry were going to be transferred to the relevant line ministries (icracı bakanlıklar), thus, the office of the prime minister will be removed from the servicing ministries (AKP, 2015a: 57).

In their 2007 election manifesto, the AKP, without any doubt, considered the idea of a new constitution within the parliamentarian system, even aimed at redefining the position and power of the office of the presidency:

The new constitution to be prepared has to be short and clear; the relations among the legislative, executive and judiciary have to be clearly and intelligibly designated with respect to parliamentarian system; within this framework the position and power of the President has to be redefined (AKP, 2015b: 21-22).

“The issue of the redefinition of the position and the power of the President” was also the main principle in the draft constitution the AKP demanded from some well-known constitutional scholars. A member of the Constitutional draft committee, Ergun Özbudun, noted that they clearly considered curbing the powers of the president in line with the AKP demands in their studies for a new constitution.

The 2011 election manifesto (AKP, 2015c) had still no reference to the need for a presidential system. However, interestingly enough, this time under the title of the
new constitution, very broad and general ideas were noted, and no argument was seen to redefine the position of the president.

The first clear reference to presidential system came with the “2023 Political Vision” the AKP prepared in the last months of the 2012 before its 4th Congress. In this pamphlet, under the political system title, it was argued that Turkey had been debating and looking for a proper type of executive for 200 years (AKP, 2012: 15). The Turkish political history has generally been portrayed by “unstable, weak and ineffective coalition governments” and the times of stable and strong governments (the Menderes years, the Özal era and the AKP era) were considered as the years of growth and development because of the stability they brought. However, such a “transitory phenomenon of political stability” should be transformed into an institutional one according to the party (Ibid: 16).

The AKP argued that the referendum that foresaw the direct election of the president in 2014 made the change in the political system necessary (AKP, 2012: 16). Thus, the “structural problem”, in the party’s view, needs a structural remedy. “Therefore, either a presidential, semi-presidential or party-affiliated presidency choice should be selected and implemented” (Ibid: 16).

6.2.2 The 2012 Turkish Type Presidential System Proposal
Since the publication of the 2023 political vision pamphlet, the debate on the presidential system for Turkish political system has accelerated. The clearest attempt came at the end of 2012 when the party proposed its constitutional draft to the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission. After the 2011 general elections, upon the proposal of the ruling AKP government, the political parties having parliamentary groups formed an ad hoc Commission in the parliament for making a new constitution. The Constitutional Reconciliation Commission started working on a new constitution on 19 October 2011 and by the end of 2012 they agreed on 60 articles. The AKP’s proposed draft constitution which was written from a
presidential system perspective paved the way for serious critics from the opposition political parties that were favouring parliamentary system. The AKP left the commission on November 2013 and the commission was dissolved on the December 2013\textsuperscript{133}.

The AKP proposal was shocking for many. It was argued that the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission started working on a new constitution within the framework of a parliamentarian system and the AKP also adopted the parliamentarian sensitivities of other parties represented in the committee (Üskül, 2013: 530). The opponents were criticizing the AKP proposal on the basis of designing a system for Erdoğan. They considered the imposition of the AKP as unacceptable (Bal, 2013: 92-3).

As far as the AKP proposal\textsuperscript{134} is considered, the executive authority seems to be bestowed upon the office of the presidency. The term of office for president is set for five (5) years and one can only be elected for two terms, no need for it to be consecutive. The president is both the head of the state (represent the unity of Turkish nation and Turkish republic, oversee the implementation of the constitution, proper and harmonious functioning of state organs) and the chief executive (responsible for domestic and international politics).

Additionally, the president has legislative and non-legislative powers. As Özsoy-Boyunsuz (2014a: 3) noted, the legislative powers of the president range widely from vetoing legislative acts to submitting them to a referendum. The president’s veto can be overridden by the three fifth of the parliament which seems to be a high percentage. The “presidential decrees” should be noted as one of the most important

\textsuperscript{133} For a detailed analysis of the process of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission and the AKP proposal, see Özsoy-Boyunsuz, 2014a: 1.

\textsuperscript{134} The full text of the 2012 AKP proposal should be consulted at, https://erdalguven.wordpress.com/2013/04/01/ak-partinin-baskanlik-sistemi-teklifi-tam-metin/
legislative powers of the president. The president is given the power to issue presidential decrees to implement his/her general policy choices where there is no legislative act over presidential decrees in case of a conflict. Additionally, the president can submit legislative acts to referendum only once a year seeking public approval to nullify it. The president is also given the power to bring cases before the constitutional court for constitutional review of parliamentary rules of procedures and legislative acts both in form and substance.

With regard to the non-legislative powers of the president, the president has unlimited authority to select and dismiss ministers. The parliament does not have any authority on this selection and dismissal process. The ministers have parliamentary immunity. According to many, this is surprising because the ministers cannot be members of the parliament. The presidential and legislative elections are to be held at the same day and for five years. Both the president and the Turkish National Grand Assembly have the power to renew the elections. Thus, the president has the power to dissolve the parliament. Once parliamentary election is renewed, the presidential election is to be renewed as well. Finally, the president has very important appointment powers. Without any reservation or approval by another body, the president may appoint all the public executives; university rectors; half of the members of the Higher Education Council, Constitutional Court, Administrative Court of the Appeal, Higher Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors; and the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation.

The impeachment mechanism is also designed. The parliament needs a two third majority to open a criminal investigation regarding the personal or position related crimes. Once an investigation completed, three fourth of the parliament are required to decide on sending the president to the Supreme Court to be tried.

135 The proposal included a conflict clause giving priority to legislative acts over presidential decrees. According to Özsoy-Boyunsuz (2014a: 3), even so this is a dramatic separation from the Turkish administrative law because in the current constitution executive decrees have secondary power. They can only regulate areas where legislations set out main principles.
6.2.2.1 Critiques Directed against the 2012 Proposal

At the most general level, the critics has raised concerns over the lack of checks and balances, the disregarded principle of separation of powers and the creation of very strong presidency (some may prefer to use the term of hyper and/or super presidency) with a limited judicial control. In particular, the major differences between the AKP proposal and the US case (highly accepted paradigmatic example of a presidential system) constitute the main pillar of critics directed against the Turkish type presidential system proposal (see Table 6.1). Thus, it is very much argued that what the AKP proposed is not a presidential system per se\textsuperscript{136}.

In a presidential system based on clear separation of powers principle, neither the president nor the legislative body (Congress in the US case) dissolve the other. The right to dissolve given to the president in the AKP proposal seems to be strong deviation from the essence of a presidential system design, at least from the US one\textsuperscript{137}. Secondly, the decree power of the president in the AKP proposal is different from the well-known “executive orders” applied in the US case. The US president, within the framework of the constitutional clause (article II, Section 3: “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” may issue orders with the intent of directing the US executive’s duties and defining the meanings of (Özbudun 2012). Ruling by decrees is a method heavily applied in some Latin American presidential systems and called as “decretismo”. Özbudun highlights that almost all scholars working on presidential systems admit that ruling by decrees corrupts the system and carries more potential of a conflict between the legislative and executive. Finally, the appointment powers of the US president depends on the approval of the Senate (Article II, Section 2: He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and

\textsuperscript{136}Özbudun (2012) claims that the proposal should not be considered within a semi-presidential system since the AKP did not foresee any clause considering the government’s responsibility to the parliament through a vote of confidence.

\textsuperscript{137}Ergun Özbudun (2012) directed attentions towards the existence of such a clause in some Latin American countries such as Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay and according to the 1989 constitution Chile.
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments). There is no any provision envisioned in the AKP proposal.

In addition to these clear differences, the US presidential system is working within a federal structure. An important amount of powers have been left to “States” in the US system. This is totally alien to the Turkish politics. The centralization of power in an office (i.e. the office of the presidency) or in a person should be the case in a unitary system such as the Turkish Republic.

Table 6.1 The differences between the AKP’s 2012 Turkish type presidential system proposal and the U.S. presidential system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The independence of the legislative body (Congress in the US case) from the executive (manifested itself at the office of the President)</th>
<th>The US Presidential system</th>
<th>The AKP Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The presidential and legislative elections are held at different dates</td>
<td>a. The presidential and parliamentary elections have to be held on the same day.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The differentiation of the term of office of the president (4 years), house of representatives (2 years) and senate (6 years and renew one third at two years intervals)</td>
<td>b. The term of office for both the President and the parliament is the same and set as five years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The party system is designed in order to increase the independence of legislative from the executive (i.e.</td>
<td>c. Highly disciplined political parties lacking intra-party democracy may lead to party domination on both the executive and legislative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The independence of the legislative body (Congress in the US case) from the executive (manifested itself at the office of the President)</th>
<th>undisciplined and less ideological parties; due to the electoral system, the Congress members are responsible to their electorates and electoral arena rather than the party)</th>
<th>d. Due to the political culture of Turkey (highly polarized society lacking the culture of reconciliation together with the highly disciplined and ideological parties) the possibility of deadlock may very high if the president and the majority in the parliament are from different political traditions (Ataay, 2013: 276).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The right of dismissal</td>
<td>Neither the president nor the congress may dissolve the other.</td>
<td>Totally counter to the essence of separation of powers, President may dissolve the parliament and the parliament may dismiss the president. The only reservation ids that if parliamentary election is renewed, the presidential election is to be renewed as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The issue of “decrees”</td>
<td>Executive orders</td>
<td>Presidential decrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The legislative organ</td>
<td>Bi-cameral</td>
<td>Uni-cameral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The administrative structure</td>
<td>Federal system</td>
<td>Unitary system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.2.2.2 Responses to Critiques

The arguments developed by the supporters of the Turkish type presidential system proposal against the critiques in particular and the necessity of presidential system in general concentrate on the following points: the rationality behind designing the system as proposed in the 2012 Turkish Type Presidential System was to prevent the emergence of a “poor president”. It seems that the most important factor behind the peculiar design of the proposal is the position of the US presidents in the US.
presidential system. Considering the latest US president Barrack Obama, Kuzu concludes the position of presidents in the US presidential system in his description as “Poor Obama” (Zavalli Obama): “My prime minister is three times more powerful than Obama. Obama is quite poor” (Hürriyet 2013a). An important figure within the party, Bekir Bozdağ also shares the views identifying “Obama as poor”: Because he (Obama) has no effect on the parliament. But Atatürk, İnönü and Menderes had controlled both the executive and legislative. They were full presidential systems. They all were more powerful than the current US president” (Ntvmsnbc 2013).

These arguments can be considered as a powerful indicator of the difference of the proposal from the US presidential system. The mentality of the US system (in short, working under the broader principles of separation of powers and checks & balances), is argued, paves the way for “poor presidents”. Thus, the proposal is designed not to make “the Turkish president poor”. The US presidents, according to this view, is characterized as powerless regarding the strict separation of powers principle and the checks and balances applied in the US. This was the main issue that has to be taken in minds. Secondly, the system was designed as the president may legislate its preferences unproblematically.

Having noted these main arguments, in order to better understand the internal logic of the AKP proposal, dealing with the ideas of Burhan Kuzu, Ahmet İyimaya and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in some details should be more beneficial. Burhan Kuzu, Turkey’s most recognized supporters of presidential system for years, has argued that the most convenient system to the socio-cultural structure of Turkey is presidential system138 (2013: 42). Kuzu regarded the “lack of powerful executives” as the major factor behind the instability Turkey had faced up until the AKP government. In fact, he argued that all the 1971 and 1973 constitutional amendments and 1982 constitution tried to empower the executive as a philosophy (2013: 27). With regard

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138 Interestingly enough, while arguing that the history of Turkish people has been more convenient to a presidential system, Kuzu claimed that the Americans were inspired by the Ottoman Empire in founding their presidential system.
to the AKP’s 2012 proposal, Kuzu expressed that “the conflict between the president and the congress” in the US system had always in their minds while writing down the proposal (2013: 45). He considered the Obama’s Health Care Reform as an important case indicating the difficulties presidents face in their relations with the Congress. Thus, according to Kuzu the president’s right to dissolve the parliament and the existence of presidential decrees were foreseen as a “precautionary measures”.

Kuzu admitted that these measures are not in compliance with the logic of presidential system:

In essence, these precautionary measures are contrary to presidential system. However, they are foreseen due to the possibility of a crisis. These measures are also debated in the US and open to discussion (Kuzu, 2013: 45).

The owner of the wording of “Turkish type” considering the 2012 proposal, Ahmet İyimaya locates the internal logic of the AKP proposal into a different reasoning. İyimaya while defending the 2012 proposal argued that “the debate over a type of executive” has to take certain amount of “observations”, in his words, affecting the working of executives (İyimaya, 2013: 53-57). İyimaya noted the “the spoiling effects of tutelary regimes on the performance of executives”, “the intellectual reflex against presidential system”, “the lack of societal interest on the presidential system in Turkey”, “Erdoğan’s calls for a systemic change for a long time”, “the existence of a strong but a questionable perception on the parliamentarian character of the Turkish system” and “the 2007 constitutional amendment which paved the way for a popularly elected presidency” as the sine qua non observations while debating over the proper system in the Turkish case. However, as the most important observation, İyimaya argues that the Turkish political history has seen the “reality of dual-constitutions and de facto presidential regimes”. What İyimaya implied by dual-constitutions is “simultaneously operating two constitutional order” up until the recent past: One is a “written constitution” which is not implemented in hard days, the other is a “de facto” one, implemented in times of crisis. İyimaya took the reality
of 1920-1950 as an example of de facto presidential era despite the existence of the 1921 and 1924 constitutions.

As a reply to the critics directed towards the 2012 proposal, İyimaya alleged that “our proposal is a reviewed and rationalized form\(^\text{139}\) of the US presidential system while taking its’ practices into the consideration”. The introduction of the decree right of president was “exceptional and limited” and the right to dissolve the parliament was to “prevent the political gridlock” seen in the US system. İyimaya was aware that these measures “were peculiar and first of its kind” in terms of presidential systems. Thus, the critics, directed attentions towards the “unique” and “unprecedented” character of the 2012 proposal, were regarded as “intellectual disease”. Turkey, İyimaya claimed, is capable of providing an authentic model (İyimaya, 2013: 58-62).

Finally, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the most fervent supporter of a presidential system for Turkey and the presidential candidate in many minds if a presidential system in Turkey is to be enforced, express his views almost on a daily basis. Nevertheless, I find it functional to group his thoughts on three different levels, socio-cultural reasons, economic reasons and political reasons, which seem to be analytically coherent.

At the most general level, Erdoğan approaches the issue within “state of transformation” at the domestic and global level. If such a transformation occurs, coming first and foremost with a presidential system peculiar to Turkey’s needs, this will be convenient to the Turkish history, culture and socio-economic characteristics; will make Turkey one of the most advanced economies in the world through her new

\(^{139}\)Defending the AKP proposal on the basis of “the rationalization of the US presidential system” is not special to only Ahmet İyimaya. Atar (2013: 550) noted that the AKP developed its presidential system proposal taking the advices put forward by political scientists in order to rationalize the US system into account. Atar argued that his claim could be seen in the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission’s minutes (tutanak). He even claimed that the AKP authorities were aware of a report advising an effective presidency for the revision of the US presidential system by the Committee on the Constitutional System supported by the Brookings Institute in 1987.
development project as a conclusion of a possible presidential system and politically will provide an executive without obstacles. These broad ideas, analytically, should be grouped into three different levels: socio-cultural, economic and political. The following part is a case in study paying due regards to these levels. With regard to socio-cultural arguments, Erdoğan argues that the presidential system is in the genes of Turkish people: “The presidential system together with a leadership system is in the Turkish history, genes of the Turkish people and the tradition” (Yeni Şafak 2015). In his reasoning, Turkey is a remainder of the Ottoman Empire and has been characterized by the strong state tradition. The presidential system he is demanding has to reflect eternal characteristics of the Turkish history: a strong state tradition, a need for powerful leadership in order to remobilize glorious history of Turkish people.

As far as locating the need for a presidential regime into the economic imperatives, the supporters of the Turkish type presidential system approach the issue through linking the economic performance to presidential system. In Erdoğan’s words, “Where is the most advanced country in the world? In the US. What about economy? The world’s most advanced economy is in the US. They have a presidential system there” (Yılmaz 2015 b). Additionally, Erdoğan considers the “Group of Twenty” (G-20), 20 major economies of the world, members having a presidential system as a strong sign of the link between the economic performance and the type of executive” (Hürriyet 2015a). At the end, Erdoğan claimed that “the country could have achieved more if a presidential system had been adopted” (Daily Sabah 2015a).

A critical observation in locating the presidential system into economic imperatives is the arguments of “a new development project” that would support Turkey within the global system which is in the process of transformation. The changing global parameters necessitate Turkey to make fundamental changes in order to appear strong in the global system. It is not possible with “Old Turkey” which is characterized, at first, by a parliamentary system (Hürriyet 2015a). The
transformation needs a “New Turkey” which would be appeared on the basis of a presidential system Erdoğan has demanded.

The economic reasons of a presidential system proposal, as it is argued by Erdoğan and his supporters, sit on the broader argument that:

The global system is going through fundamental changes and it is very hard for Turkey, with its existing mechanisms, to turn this global change into an opportunity... Being able to make rapid decisions in democratic systems and implement them is only possible with presidential systems. I have experienced it in my 12-year period of prime ministry... Today an important amount of G7 and G20 members have presidential or semi-presidential systems... These are the most advanced countries (Hürriyet 2015a).

A Turkish columnist, Cemil Ertem later became one of the chief advisers of the President Erdoğan, has published five important opinion pieces in his newspaper, Akşam. In these opinion papers, Ertem tried to construct Erdoğan’s call for a presidential system into a new economic paradigm. The titles of these pieces were “Presidential system is an historical opportunity for the oppressed”, at the global level, “the interest rate debate, among the President Erdoğan and the Central Bank of Turkey whether the interest rates in Turkey should be decreased, is a debate of political system”, Presidentialism is a clearance of colonialism” and what Erdoğan is proposing with a presidential system for Turkey is also “proposing a New Deal for all developing countries”. Admittedly, these are highly interesting and ambitious arguments. As the overlap of Erdoğan’s discourse and the ideas of Ertem are striking, I consider dealing with Ertem’s opinions in some depth helpful in order to indicate how the Turkish type presidential system is being substantiated economically and globally.

Ertem starts his analyses by arguing that the global system founded just after the Second World War is swinging (2015a). The monetary policy founded on the US dollar is on the process of collapse. The examples of Greece with Chipras and Spain with PODemos movement are considered as the resistance against the austerity policies demanded European power holders. Russia’s and some other countries’
intentions to construct their own IMF, development banks, credit rating agencies appears to be a new global political reality according to Ertem. These attempts are representing an historical opportunity for developing countries “to put an end to colonial mentality and their institutions”. This is a strong sign of the demands for global economic change. The developing countries has to be able to develop their own institutions and replace the old one, i.e. bureaucratic oligarchies which are considered as the internal allies of the global colonial mentality, with these newly created ones. These newly created institutions have to be peculiar to the country, not to be emulated or copied from the Western traditions. Turkey, under the direction of Erdoğan is laying a claim to this transformation. This is the economic foundation of presidential system and Turkish type presidential system (Ertem 2015b).

High interest rates are also portrayed as the reason for increasing unemployment and decreasing rate of investments. Turkey’s Central Bank, within the context of Western economic crisis, has not been reading the global realities correctly for Ertem. Thus, “this is not a debate of high or low interest rates…This is a debate of turning Western crisis into an opportunity and creating a unique development and growth model” (2015c).

Together with the economic propositions, Erdoğan’s call for a unique Turkish type presidential system is a “new deal” for all developing countries (Ertem 2015e). It is aimed at resisting against global finance oligarchy, turning the Western crisis into an opportunity, a new paradigm for development and growth, creating new institutions having peculiar mentalities etc. Thus, Turkish type presidential system is thought to “create a global attractiveness”, to be emulated by other developing countries.

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140 Ertem considers the expression made by Rawkins from the Fitch “our concern is the possibility of the transformation of the political system in Turkey into a presidential system” as an important indicator of the potential Turkey should perform globally with a presidential system. According to Ertem “global finance oligarchy does not want Turkey switching to presidential system” (2015d).
Politically, first and foremost, it is argued that the direct election of the President in 2014 has transformed the parliamentarian system. Within these arguments, the necessity of a systemic change has come to a point of no return. The popularly elected president together with a prime minister, who is traditionally the lynchpin of the executive power, creates a “multi-headedness”. In order to prevent multi-headedness, Erdoğan has claimed that Turkey needs a centralized political system. This centralization would both “strengthen the national will” and “reflect economic development”. The following two quotations are very instructive in terms of what Erdoğan means by “multi-headedness”:

One has to be able to use the powers invested in you by the national will in the best possible way. But at the moment, I am not able to do that. At the moment, you have to ask permission of three different people for each decision, for each appointment…The judiciary puts obstacles in the way. One cannot run a country like that. For me, this is the biggest flaw of a parliamentary system (Guardian 2015b).

The biggest advantage … would be in abolishing policy making through multiple channels…Swift decision-making would reflect in rapid implementation…Almost all developed countries have a presidential system. It’s obvious it works for them. If it’s good for them, why should we insist on keeping the shackles that bind us (Daily Sabah 2015a).

According to Yılmaz (2015a), Erdoğan’s arguments on the multi-headedness together with the “authentic Turkish style presidential system” demands of his supporters means “no need for a counter power” such as the judiciary or a parliament\(^\text{141}\). These powers that would balance the president and the executive have been characterized by “obstacles and shackles”. Erdoğan considers the parliamentary system “inoperable”. He defended his ideas on the necessity of a presidential system together with an authentic model (manifested itself in the Turkish style debate) on the basis of his experiences. In his words, “the issue is not an ordinary theoretical problem. It is the issue of integrating the theory with the practice and implementation. I have has a shy at” (Hürriyiet 2015a). Thus, it is argued that “his 13-

\(^{141}\) Erdoğan exemplified the “debate in the Turkish parliament over the Internal Security Law” as a deadlock. According to him, the opposition parties used every mechanism to delay the legislation of the bill and this prevents the Turkey’s leap (Star 2015).
year experience guided his recommendation for adopting a presidential system” (Duran 2015).

Last but not least, in one of his speeches in which he was addressing Turkish businessmen, Erdoğan made an analogy between governing the state and administering a company. He tried to substantiate his call for a presidential system due to his desire that Turkey to be administered like a company. These are exactly the words of Erdoğan in this regard:

I have talked about a new constitution and the presidential system and I will speak about these once again. Insisting on this [current] system is an injustice being performed against our nation. The New Turkey will develop with you, civil society organizations and businessmen. What I ask from you is to speak about New Turkey and the presidential system at any opportunity you get. Turkey should also be administered like an incorporated company. If not, there are shackles tied to your ankles and you cannot walk further (Cihan News Agency 2015b).

In the same speech, Erdoğan gives the following example which seems to be what he considered as “the shackles tied to one’s ankles”:

There is a negotiation process on the Internal Security Law at the parliament. The weeks have passed and almost the months started to be revolved. Still, the law is not passing from the parliament. The majority is in the ruling party…Then, how are they preventing it? Because the system is defective.

Reading the analogy of an incorporated company together with the new Turkish Commercial Code142 led Tezkan to argue that what Erdoğan demands is “a single-headed system in which the executive board will be consisted of only him”. Tezkan concludes that what Erdoğan has been calling, in short, is “Let Turkey be an incorporated company, let me be the single executive board” (Tezkan 2015b)

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142 One of the significant changes, introduced by the New Turkish Commercial Code Article 338, concerns the minimum number of founders. The NEW TCC states that “one or more” shareholder founders are required for incorporation of a joint stock. As is known, acceding to the current code, joint stock companies are established with minimum five shareholders. The single shareholder or single member partner is allowed to exercise all the authorisations granted to the General Assembly, and can take all types of decisions.
6.3 The Broader Rationality of the AKP Proposal

6.3.1 The Term “Turkish Type”: What Does It Imply?

The AKP proposal was not in parallel with some other well-known presidential systems, whether presidential or semi-presidential, such as the US and the French ones. It is this difference that seems to be the main reason to give the name “Turkish type” and/or “a la turca” to the proposal by the party members, especially very active on the issue of a necessity of presidential system for Turkey.\(^{143}\)

It should be argued that what the term Turkish type implies can be grouped at least into three meanings. First of all, it means that the system in minds should be “peculiar to Turkey”. According to this idea, the country should not import or copy any system that has been applied around the world. The idea behind the choice of calling it Turkish type has been supported by the party as “there are many different presidential system(s) all around the world”. Erdoğan noted that:

It is being said: ‘A Turkish-type presidential system is not possible.’ I am saying it loud and clear: It is possible, pure and simple. Why wouldn’t it be?... In America, there is a different presidential system; when you go just to its south, in Mexico, there is a different presidential system. When you go to Cuba, it is different; Argentina is different; Brazil is different; Russia is different; France has a semi-presidential system (Hürriyet Daily News 2015f).

In addition, the party and Erdoğan consider the peculiar culture and tradition of Turkish history as an important reason for “not simply copying existing practices. The system should be in accordance with the Turkish history, culture, tradition and society”. Again, in the words of Erdoğan; “I do not say ‘in any case, be it so the US system’. Let us work as such ‘be/make it Turkish system’. Let’s pick up the

\(^{143}\) It is noted by some observers, the founding father of the term “Turkish type” was Ahmet İyimaya, an AKP MP and the member of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission (See Köker 2015: 11). İyimaya responded a question considering the name of the proposal in the following way: “This proposal, in exactly the same way with the term rationalization of parliamentarian system, is the rationalized and reviewed form of the problems (in terms of deadlocks) seen in presidential systems all around the world. Turkey does not have to look always for exemplary; she has the capacity of being an example in terms of Constitutional literature and types of executives. The system we proposed, in this way, is peculiar, original and moves from the nature of our problems” (IHA 2013).
beneficial aspects of very different systems to us, let’s sort out the non-applicable aspects due to the differences in cultural and social structure” (Hürriyet 2012c). This peculiarity should also be considered while designing the system’s problems. The system should pay due regard both to “universal merits” and “local values”. Turkey has peculiar problems and the system would be designed in order to tackle them.

Secondly, calling the system as Turkish type reflects the self-trust of the party to its intellectual capacity. Within this framework, the supporters generally directed attentions towards the historical emergence of the first presidential system, i.e. the US presidential system. Burhan Kuzu, one of the leading figures in these arguments, has claimed that the presidential system unlike the parliamentary one is the product of human rationality as a response to how to govern better:

Parliamentary system came into existence and developed within the English own history, all its properties formed according to English traditions, it emerged in practice and it is named afterwards. The presidential system is a system coined by human ration. It can be concluded that parliamentary system, carrying the properties of the English history, should succeed in a country to a certain extent however, the presidential system, because it is the product of human reason, every wise people of that country come together, without making concessions from the general conditions of the system, and form a presidential system carrying local/peculiar characteristics (Kuzu, 2013: 41).

Last but not least, the Turkish type presidential system is seen as a necessary step in order to reach to a new societal restructuring comprising of political, cultural and economic dimensions:

To begin with, it is sine qua non to express that the debate on the presidential system in these days is not only and exclusively consist of presidential system discussions. The presidential system discussion is only a part of a broader and comprehensive debate. Turkey is in a process of total change and the discussions are focused on social, political, economic and cultural dimensions…Truly, Turkey is a process of total change and it is natural to debate on the type of its executive (Fedayi, 2013: 679).

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144 Ali Aslan from SETA argues that while designing a Turkish type presidential system the local political problems of Turkey, the appointment of the members of the judiciary, local administrations and the authorization of abrogation has to be taken into consideration. It is must, according to Aslan, to balance these needs with the universal merits in the possible presidential system (Daily Sabah 2015b).
While noting general characteristics of presidential systems, Can (2013: 175) notes that “presidential system has emerged historically. It was born out of the necessities in times of new beginnings…It is high time to ask new questions for new beginnings in Turkey, searching for a new constitution and constitutional order”.

As far as the implications of the Turkish type within a presidential system is considered, the arguments and ideas, to a certain extent, seem to be totally in opposition to the theoretical considerations on the types of executives. It should be argued that there is a consensus among the scholars on the issue of “the types of executives are package deals”. The specified form arranges many elements in addition to the organization of executives and the power of the chief executive. There are a number of features, whether less or more important, hang the system together within a broader rationality:

When nations choose a presidential or parliamentary form, they are choosing a whole system whose various properties arise endogenously - whether they like it or not - out of the political dynamics that their adopted form sets in motion...Presidential and parliamentary systems come with their own baggage (cited in Cheibub et al., 2013: 5).

It seems that the AKP proposal either rejects the broader rationality of systems or creates a new rationality within which the Turkish type presidential system constitutes a certain part. I argue, in the following parts, the AKP opts for the second alternative. The Turkish type presidential system (which brings a totally different system regarding the existing practices), according to the AKP, is designed for extraordinary times within which the New Turkey, with the guiding of a constitutive/transformative leader, will emerge. This is a new beginning and this is peculiar.

6.4 Overview of the AKP/Erdoğan Proposal

Erdoğan has made it no secret that he demands a presidential system despite the fact that there is no full-fledged design of the proposed model. The AKP’s 2012 Turkish type presidential system proposal and Erdoğan’s statements, almost heard every day
on the issue, seem to be the basis of this somewhat unclear presidential system calls. Erdoğan has fervent supporters within this perspective among the party, academics, and media outlets. However, it is very hard to speak a consensus at large, even within the party.

As far as the party is considered, there are important criticisms directed to and negative views expressed on the progress of the debate. Erdoğan’s predecessor as a President, ex-PM and one of the founders of the AKP, Abdullah Gül made it public that he has certain concerns about the Turkish type presidential system. Gül, speaking on the Erdoğan’s demands for a Turkish type presidential system, urged to be cautious and directed the attention towards the issue of checks and balances: “if we have a presidential system like the US in which the separation of powers are written down clearly like the ones in advanced democracies and countries in which the rule of law is universally practiced, then we cannot call such a system undemocratic” (Hürriyet 2015b). The Turkish media evaluated Gül’s remarks as addressing directly his old comrade President Erdoğan who is striving to put in place.

A well-known AKP MP and Vice-PM of the government, Bülent Arınç expressed his concern on the issues of Turkish type presidential system debate and the method of establishing it. Arınç thinks that those who are categorically objecting to a presidential system in Turkey protest against the possibility of Erdoğan’s presidency rather than the essence of presidential systems. The personalization of the debate over the presidential system is not healthier according to Arınç. However, he argues that “there cannot be a presidential system without an infrastructure, without a tuning of institutions and without establishing a system of checks and balances”. He said the following on this point: “some say that we should look at the presidential systems in Mexico, Argentina or Paraguay, and that we should get important parts of the system from those countries and form a system according to our mentality. This would not be correct” (BBC Türkçe 2015). He considers this method, suggested by Erdoğan to pick up elements from different systems and leave aside some of them due to the
cultural differences, as “montaged style” (montaj usulü) and strongly rejects it (Hürriyet 2015c). Arınç is speaking of a contradiction in the debates. By contradiction, he means the lack of tuning of the system after the 2014 presidential election. In his views, the selection method of the president could have been harmonized by the powers of the president laid down in the constitution. However, he defended that the AKP bears no responsibility for this contradiction.

The current Prime Minister who was handpicked by Erdoğan himself, Davutoğlu seems to be at a very critical position on this regard. If a presidential system is to be established, it would mean the end of his office as a PM. Although he made public that the AKP will make the switch to a presidential system as one of the pillars of its election manifesto, he has been keeping a low profile on the necessity of a presidential system for Turkey. Just before the launch of the AKP’s 2015 election manifesto, he clarified that he was going to write the presidential system part in the manifesto by personally himself. Erdoğan told the newspapers that he read the parts written by Davutoğlu before the launch of it.

The part on the presidential system in the AKP’s 2015 election manifesto was considered as a sign of “the PM Davutoğlu’s reluctance” in this regard (Tezkan 2015a). The text was three-page long and located part as a sub-heading rather than a full-fledged design within the title of a New Constitution. The AKP thought that the 2007 Constitutional amendment made new arrangements in order to allocate the authority and duty between the PM and President in the political system necessary (AKP 2015d: 35). If the necessary changes are not fulfilled, a crisis between the PM and president will be of greater possibility, if the incumbents of both offices are coming from different political traditions. The presidential system is thought to be a mechanism overcoming that possible crisis (Ibid: 36).
In the manifesto, there were very broad references to a system envisaged rather than a design of it. The framework of the system will be, as it is noted in the declaration (Ibid: 37), as the following: “A new system in which;

The elections would provide stability
Both the executive and legislative, on their own, would be efficient
The democratic mechanisms of checks and balances are foreseen
The decision-making processes are accelerated and
All kinds of tutelage are prevented”.

Although the manifesto considered presidential system necessary and declared an intention to switch to such a system if the parliamentary arithmetic permits; the words of such backing up were considered as “Prime Minister’s unwilling support” to Erdoğan by the Turkish media and Turkish scholars as the indicator of the “confusion” within the AKP over the design of it¹⁴⁵ (Deutsche Welle 2015).

As far as the academic community is considered, Turkish leading law and political science scholars released a declaration against the Turkish type presidential system. They consider the 2012 AKP proposal and the debate “carried out under the guidance of Erdoğan” in the last days as “idiosyncratic”. The declaration voices strong objection to the efforts put forward in order to construct a system personally identifiable to President Erdoğan and states that these are alien to universal democratic methods and is out of constitution (Hürriyet 2015d).

The president of the constitutional court, Zühtü Arslan, at a ceremony marking the 53rd anniversary of the constitutional court urged political leaders to protect the

¹⁴⁵ According to Deutsche Welle (2015), Ergun Özbudun evaluated the manifesto and Davutoğlu’s remarks while presenting it as “the continuation of the confusion” within the party. Özbudun said “he always used general expressions. Nothing is clear. What does it mean the executive is open to constitutional control? There seems to be confusion at all”. In the same report, İbrahim Kartoğlu considered Davutoğlu’s support as “unwillingness”: the confusion and uncertainty in the minds appeared clearly. Beyond that, one can clearly notice the clash between Erdoğan and Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu, without giving any details, reluctantly talks about it”.
principle of separation of powers….The most striking words of Arslan were “one of the most important obstacles before the new constitution would be the demands of ‘constitutionalizing’ the thoughts and proposals despite all and everything”. In his speech, he advised political leaders to revise their maximalist position in the way of new constitution. The words of Arslan were regarded as an indirect reference to the efforts to renew the constitution in order to adopt a presidential system to grant Erdoğan more authority (Doğan News Agency 2015, Hürriyet 2015e).

In addition to the views of political actors, when one deals with the broader Turkish public, it seems that the presidential system, compared to the parliamentary one, is less known by the Turkish people (Bilgesam 2013). This conclusion was also shared by the ruling party. The AKP, Erdoğan and the theoreticians of the 2012 proposal have also been arguing that the presidential system is not well-known by the Turkish people. In other words, the supporters of the presidential system admit that despite its relatively long history, the discussions on the presidential system in Turkey are not widely known by the public. In the words of İyimaya, contrary to intellectual accumulation, the societal “interest in and demand for” presidential system is very low. According to him, a “powerful wave of societal information” is needed (İyimaya, 2013: 55). Thus, the creation of a perception in favour of presidential system has been one of the targets of the supporters. In line with the advices of İyimaya, Erdoğan has been aiming at creating a positive perception at the societal level towards the presidential system. However, just one week before the June 2015 general elections he admitted that the presidential system debate could not become the priority among the electorates\textsuperscript{146}. Being aware of the fact that they are open to

\textsuperscript{146} In the same speech, Erdoğan expressed that it was he who predominantly talked about the system change. In this statement, it was not clear whether Erdoğan implied the lack of support within the AKP or among the electorates. Nevertheless, he made it public that he was not happy with the state of the debate. In his words, “on the eve of the coming elections, the presidential system could have been at the top of the agenda” (Hürriyet 2015f). Just one day after Erdoğan, another important political figure of the ruling AKP, Ali Babacan noted that the presidential system discussions in the global markets were not purchased in the way Erdoğan has been demanding. The expectations of the markets from the current debate in Turkey were mainly about the possibility of increasing authoritarianism, the lack of controlling mechanisms and separation of powers (Hürriyet 2015g).
manipulation, the recent public surveys, testing the social support, indicate that although Erdoğan has increased the support of their electorates favouring presidential system, the public at large is still negative on the issue. Among the recently conducted surveys, a great amount of them conclude that “Turkish people are against the presidential system”.

All in all, the lack of societal support and demand; the absence of a consensus among political figures within the AKP and serious criticisms of the opposition and academics should be considered that the need, to use the jargon of Ahmet İyimaya, for a presidential system (at least the way Erdoğan demands it) has not become a norm in the debate Erdoğan and his close entourage has been pushing severely. Thus, reading all these views together give the image that the Turkish type presidential system is “Erdoğan-based” and “Erdoğan’s Project”.

6.5 Concluding Remarks
Turkey has been debating to adopt a presidential system since the 1980s from time to time. The early voices within these debates have regarded a presidential system as a cure to the problems Turkish politics experienced. The principle of the fixed-term office for an executive under a presidential system was thought to be curbing the instability problem of coalition governments. In addition to instability arguments, presidential system was seen as a step to leap forward in the global economy. The powerful presidents, working with their officers rather than the reluctant bureaucracy, could have made necessary reforms in order to integrate with the world market. Interestingly enough the demands for a presidential system had come from ex-PMs and ex-presidents. The debates up until the AKP period have been mainly directed by politicians coming from Prime ministry towards the office of the president. Thus, the discussions have always a character of “subjectivity”.

147 One can consult the surveys of Çarkoğlu and Aytaç done with the support of the Open Society Foundation, Koç University and Ohio State University, Gezici Research, GENAR research, A&G surveys. The common denominator of these surveys is that they note that Turkish public is against the system change and/or Turkish electorates remain aloof from presidential system. Only the ORC Company has concluded that “%70 of Turkish people support the presidential system”.

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As far as the debate over the necessity of a presidential system in the Turkish political history is considered, I argue that the debate in the AKP period and under the direction of Erdoğan seems to be a rupture rather than a continuity regarding the issue from an historical perspective. Unlike the previous calls of Turgut Özal in the 1980s and Süleyman Demirel in the 1990s for a presidential system, the AKP and Erdoğan have turned their ideas on the presidential system, for the first time, into a concrete political project. The party proposed a draft constitution to the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission in 2012. Although the proposal was contrary to the well-known cases of presidential system on many points, the AKP, albeit the lack of a consensus within itself, and Erdoğan have supported its rationality directing attentions to the peculiarity of Turkish case. The AKP has made the idea of transition to a presidential system one of the cornerstones of its 2015 election manifesto, although there were only general remarks rather than a full-fledged design of the system. In addition, we have been witnessing a shift in the reasons put forward for calling a presidential system in the AKP period. One can note continuity, at a decreasing pace, considering “the need for rapid and unproblematically legislating governments”, “complaints of the bureaucracy or bureaucratic oligarchy”, “the need for a governmental stability in order to lessen the EU accession related legislation process” and the “convenience of the presidential system to the social structure and political tradition of Turkey” in the AKP’s and Erdoğan’s arguments. In the AKP period, the accent has been put on the need for a “New Turkey” or a “New Social Contract”. In order to accomplish such great projects, the presidential system that is argued to be providing effectiveness in the government, has been considered necessary. The AKP and Erdoğan aim at adopting a presidential system but this is not exclusively limited to a change in the type of executive. Thus, it should be claimed “what we are now debating in Turkey under the direction of Erdoğan is not a debate exclusively on a presidential system”. Presidential system seems to be a part or a pillar of a broader project.
Another important conclusion that can be derived from this debate is that all the attempts of the AKP and Erdoğan should be considered as aiming to adapt the constitutional structure to the reality of Erdoğan and 2007 amendments or to constitutionalize the de facto functioning of the Turkish executive (İnce 2013, Miş 2015, Mert 2015). These arguments whether explicitly or implicitly accept the ideas, which are very much relevant to this dissertation, that the Turkish parliamentarian system has been presidentialized under the AKP and Erdoğan rule for some time. Thus, the design of and support for the Turkish Type Presidential System seems to be what Erdoğan and AKP have de facto been doing for many years. What is at stake is to enframe the practice and de facto situation with a “constitutional correction”. In my view, this is the biggest and strongest proof of this dissertation’s argument that the Turkish system has been presidentialized executively for some time.

The arguments put forward by the proposal designers and voiced by Erdoğan are hardly convincing, empirically unproven or even, in the words of Özbudun, “distorting the reality”. As far as the economic reasons voiced by Erdoğan are considered, the hitherto studies had no proof to what Erdoğan has been arguing: “Advanced economies are run by presidential systems”. Erdoğan insisted on the claim that “great amount of G-20 members have presidential systems”. However, these arguments are contrary to scholarly findings. In one of the latest studies dealing with the relation between the type of executives and the success/performance of those countries, Kaptı and Gültekin assert that in the indexes that are widely

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148 İnce (2013: 109) argues that “A prime minister, as powerful as now, why he demanded a presidential system that would limit his powers? In fact, what is proposed now is to legitimize our current freak system through institutionalizing it”.

149 Miş (2015) considered that with the 2007 constitutional amendment and 2014 presidential election, the parliamentarian system has been expired. Thus he argues that “accordingly, with the difference of previous presidential system discussions, it is clear that it is a must to provide constitutional and institutional framework to the political system that has been de facto applied”.

150 Kaptı and Gültekin has relied on 15 international indexes measuring human development, welfare, social development, social capital, rule of law country vulnerability etc.
accepted at the international arena, the countries having parliamentarian systems are the most successful ones. In this study, it is reported that among the G-20 members 8 countries are run by parliamentarian system where as only 5 countries are run by presidential system (Kaptı and Gültekin, 2015: 6).

With respect to political arguments, first of all it seems hardly convincing that presidential systems are without the mentality of coalitions. Just to give an example, in the US case presidents have to seek for coalitions in order to put their stamps over the policies. They have to persuade certain amount of Congress members in order to legislate. This could only be possible by making alliances with the members of the rival party. If a president is Democrat, he has to get the support of Republicans and vice versa. This is the biggest factor why a presidential candidate generally state that “he/she is able to make alliances with the rivals” during the campaigns.

Erdoğan and AKP believe that the presidential system will accelerate the process of legislation. In the current system, according to them the opposition parties in the parliament and the judiciary slow down the government or even prevent them. The arguments seem hardly convincing as far as the methods of “decrees having force of law” and “the method of omnibus bill” (torba yasa) is taken into the consideration. These mechanisms could bypass the parliament and in a while could change a large number of laws.

The direct election of the president is put forward as the most important factor in the debate. However, one can argue that the direct election of the president does not necessarily lead to presidential system. There are many examples from the European countries where the president is directly elected by the people but the system works in a parliamentarian form. These are called as “parliamentarian systems with a president” (Özsoy-Boyunsuz 2014b). The systems of Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia are considered as the examples of the directly elected president within a parliamentary system.
Finally, the AKP and Erdoğan proposals and arguments on the need for a presidential system seem not to be an end in itself. In other words, the presidential system ideas should be considered as part of a broader project, called as New Turkey by the party. The party’s 2015 election manifesto notes that “we have to keep looking for a system that is convenient to our vision of New Turkey in this perspective…Our New Turkey vision is in need of efficient and dynamic administrative system. Within this framework, we believe in that presidential system is favourable” (AKP 2015x: 36-7). This broader project is presented as a new restructuring under the direction of the charismatic leadership of Erdoğan. Even, some considers his presidential mission as “Constitutive Presidential Mission” for the future of Turkey. The new beginning of the New Turkey which necessitates a transformation in itself, made the presidential system inevitable according to the proponents. The presidential system is thought to be one of the pillars, a sine qua non, of a greater project.

All in all, it should be concluded that what has been debated under the heading of presidential system in Turkey since 2012 is a case of “transformative leadership”. In other words, as Mert (2015) argues this reflects a specific kind of an understanding of politics: “A leader charged with an historical mission”. This transformative leadership understanding is also highlighted by Erdoğan in one of his latest speeches:

> It is inevitable for every system that could not develop itself to the changing social, political and historical circumstances, to experience a crisis. In other words, the systems not updating are obliged to face such a crisis. Besides that, every crisis, in fact, paves the way for a restructuring and a reform…Almost everybody in Turkey talks about the necessity of structural change. The political system directs the structural change. Thus, if a political system determines the structural change, then, the change has to start with the political system. We consider the presidential system as a radical step, essential reform in the change of political system.  

For sure, the system changes are painful. Not only the institutions but also the societies go through a serious trauma. For that reason, the great changes can only be accomplished by powerful leaders having great popular support behind

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151 The translation is mine. See the video, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrWqZzJdJgE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrWqZzJdJgE).
them. These leaders through the confidence they provide in the society, in the process of system change, lessen the effects of traumas\textsuperscript{152}.

Erdoğan argues that this leadership will forever bring an end to political instability; accomplish the necessary restructuring that Turkey has been striving for; imbed the bureaucratic resistance into history; make Turkish economy as one of the 10 most advanced economies in the world; remobilize Turkish history, cultural structure and traditions. A Turkish type presidential system is thought to be the first step taken in this way.

\textsuperscript{152} The translation is mine. See the video, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrWqZzJdJgE}.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

It is believed by many that the offices of the presidency and prime ministry are strikingly different with their own political logics. However, contemporary changes seen at the international and national levels affect both offices. Among them centralization of power at the executives and in the hands of the chief executives, thanks to the structural and contingent factors, led scholars to search for variations and similarities between the offices of presidency and prime ministry. This dissertation analyses a particular type of change within the nature of the distribution of power between prime ministry and other core executive actors within a parliamentary system. To put it more clearly, this study tries to scrutinize the specific situation in which increasing level of power and autonomy of prime ministry in an analogous way to a (ideal type) president seen in (ideal type) presidential regime with particular reference to the Turkish case.

There is no need to remind that states are governed by means of either presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential systems, but the point is that degrees of authorization possessed by various offices of political regimes are diversified among various cases thought to be classified under the same heading. This situation contaminates the purity of these governmental systems and especially since the 1990s, particularly on the basis of British case; we see various analyses working on changing character of parliamentary systems where power and autonomy of prime ministry turns to be superior to a greater extent in comparison with the theoretical remarks.
As a theoretical construct, the concept of presidentialization constitutes one of the most analytical products of these scrutinies studying transformative procedure in parliamentarian systems through the lenses of the study of presidents in presidential systems as a reference point. First of all, it must be noted that presidentialization is processual by nature. It is a dynamic process through which the level of power and autonomy of office of prime ministry is affected by various factors. More blatantly speaking, rising power of executive (principally executive leaders) allows them to be accountable directly to the voters, not the parliament. In consequence, electoral process turns out to be personalized and other political institutions except the executive are excluded from the policy-making mechanisms.

Under the light of diverse examples, it is seen that another defining characteristic of presidentialization is related with its de facto feature. No matter whether structural or contingent factors are at work, presidentialization, first and foremost, takes place within deeply political occurrences involved with changes in level of power and autonomy of various offices instead of constitutional transformations, though sometimes they could also be supportive. In other words, de facto presidentialization takes place on the basis of dynamic relations among different political actors and institutions and as a result, there may be times of particular figures speeding up and/or slowing down this lengthy process of presidentialization in a parliamentary system. Having de facto character implies that presidentialization does not refer to a total transformation of parliamentary system into a presidential one, rather in each and every stage of the process, some parliamentary features persist.

The presidentialization refers to centralization and/or concentration of power in the hands of a single position (mostly the chief executive) at the expense of other political actors or institutions in parliamentary systems. Additionally, process of presidentialization has a mainly unsmooth character which can be identified as lengthy and difficult procedure. It has “ups and downs” and generally unpredictable routes especially in terms of contingent factors that are at work.
Another significantly defining trait of presidentialization is its behavioural formation. Parallel to the fact that procedures of presidentialization are de facto by nature, the processes in question, principally, take place without (any significant) change in the level of constitution. Instead, the procedures at stake happen in terms of political actions and practices of actors and institutions. Therefore, presidentialization process is a highly empirical object of inquiry. To put it more clearly, it can be argued that presidentialization is closely associated with specific political actors. This is the main reason, in our case, behind shedding light into Erdoğan’s practices and attitudes, seem to be in contravention to the actual working mechanisms of the parliamentary system.

Having put the main tenets of presidentialization concept, let me repeat the main research question of the dissertation is that “whether one can argue for an (increasing) de facto executive presidentialization with the premiership and presidency of Erdoğan in Turkey or was it already at high before the period analyzed”. As mentioned in the research question, this study basically concentrated on the process of presidentialization taking place in the (core) executive, more specifically offices of executive leadership, cabinet and the president. It is claimed that although there is no related constitutional change regarding the transformation of existing political system from parliamentarism into presidentialism, especially during Erdoğan’s both premiership and presidency periods, one can witness presidential functioning of the executive which is materialized in the form of Erdoğan’s leadership.

Turning to conclude the analysis of the Turkish case in terms of presidentialization, I claim that this case constitutes a particular type of presidentialization, namely executive presidentialization. In this sense, electoral and party-based aspects of the presidentialization process are not included by this study due to various limitations which have mentioned in the Chapter 4. In this sense, what is highlighted throughout this dissertation is the fact that presidentialization process in the Turkish case is more
visible in its executive face. The procedure of presidentialization at stake occurs in the level of executive leadership which is materialized by Erdoğan as a political figure marking the last decade of Turkish political life. In other terms, as noted above, such type of presidentialization is crystallized in Turkish political system. More clearly speaking, under the circumstances of presidentialization process in the Turkish case - where power and autonomy is concentrated and centralized in the hands of Erdoğan - it is hard to talk about presidentialization of the whole political system by aid of much broader process containing various political actors and institutions. At that regard, considering the negotiation process over the legislation in the parliament as a waste of time, Erdoğan has aimed at bypassing questioning potential of the parliament (or basically opposition) on behalf of the government. Under these circumstances, it is considerably difficult to accept the existence of autonomy of both parliament and legislation at all.

As mentioned above, presidentialization takes place in “de facto level” and that is why Erdoğan’s leadership, especially in the period of his presidency can be thought as de facto presidential regime even though it could correspond to constitutional change, as of the 2007 amendments and 2014 presidential elections. This situation can be observed as a manifestation of presidentialization process within the Office of the President in the political system of Republic of Turkey. This kind of manifestation allows me to embrace four main elucidations: firstly, concerning the thirteen years of AKP rule and initiatives made by Erdoğan during this era significantly reflects the processual feature of the presidentialization; secondly, the determining role played by the specific characteristics of Erdoğan’s personality and his electoral achievements on the basis of these personal characteristics demonstrates the primacy of the contingent factors instead of structural factors for the Turkish case. This is because Erdoğan, as an actor, managed to carry his personal, institutional and electoral power resources in his move from the office of the prime ministry toward the presidency; thirdly, under the circumstances of occurrences taking place during the AKP rule, it can be asserted that increasing power of any
office – whether premiership or presidency – heavily relies upon the distinct events, as the 2007 constitutional amendments which were largely a political reaction rather than a constitutional engineering directed specifically toward certain aims, that have happened during this time period; lastly, even though legal-formal constitutionalism yields some significant signs of process of presidentialization (especially since 1971) for the Turkish case, behavioural and informal practices of political figures constituting the executive turns out to be decisive when Erdoğan leadership is taken into consideration within the analysis of rising power and autonomy of the executive in last thirteen years. Thus, if these behavioural and informal changes do not match the constitutional framework the presidentialization process may be vulnerable due to the contingent factors. The ANAP and Özal case seems to be a case to deal with within this reasoning.

In addition to those behavioural and informal facets of de facto presidential regime initiated by Erdoğan’s leadership, throughout this period presidential office experienced institutional, symbolic and electoral transformations. To put it more bluntly, quite a large number of new directorate generals have been attached to the presidency and this has changed the offices institutional power resources drastically. Furthermore, some important constructions, particularly the new presidential palace, have transformed the presidential office in symbolic manner in the eyes of ordinary people. Also, by means of 2007 constitutional amendment opening the way of election of the president by popular vote, presidency has been electorally transformed and especially this situation has fueled the discussions of the existence of de facto presidential regime in the Turkish case.

Despite the fact that some parallels can be figured out between attitudes and initiatives held by both Erdoğan and Özal in terms of increasing power and autonomy of the executive at the expense of other political actors and institutions, on the basis of historical approach it can be noted that the AKP period under Erdoğan’s leadership constitute a rupture within the debate on presidential system concerning
the Turkish case. The point is that for the first time presidential system ideas has turned out to be a real political project by aid of actions and practices of AKP led by Erdoğan. Concerning the following arguments calling for the necessity of the presidential system Erdoğan leadership has repeated the discourse of its predecessors: “the need for rapid and unproblematic legislation”, “complaints of the bureaucracy or bureaucratic oligarchy”, “the need for a governmental stability in order to lessen the European Union accession related legislation process” and the “convenience of the presidential system to the social structure and political tradition of Turkey”. However, the 2012 AKP/Erdoğan proposal for a presidential system, widely known as “Turkish type presidential system” seems to be an attempt at providing constitutional framework to the actual practices of the system under Erdoğan’s leadership. I believe that such an observation should be counted as one of the most important proofs of the arguments that the systems has presidentialized during Erdoğan’s premiership.

In addition to these hardly new arguments longing for presidential system, Erdoğan and other AKP officials have come to put into words a considerably new argument of the necessity of establishment of “New Turkey” or “New Social Contract”. In order to achieve such a grand political project, formation of the presidential system is supposed to be one of the most important preconditions. By doing so, the need for a presidential system is attached to a totally new and much deeper meaning in debates on Turkish political system. Hence the presidential system is said to be turned from ultimate goal out to an indispensable part of a far broader political project reflecting the self-perception of power accumulated by specific actor(s).

Having briefly put some conclusions of this dissertation, let me elaborate on key contributions that this study may make. Firstly, this analysis of presidentialization with particular reference to Turkish case can help us to comprehend concrete causes and effects of practices of Erdoğan’s leadership more deeply. In this regard, this study aimed at shedding some light to the daily debates on changing policy-making
mechanisms which directly influence casual and actual aspects of Turkish political system.

Secondly, this dissertation purports to be an example of exposition of the literature of conceptualization of presidentialization to the developing countries’ political systems. In doing so, the study tries to go beyond hitherto presidentialization analyses sticking to advanced democracies. Dealing with the more dynamic and incalculable parameters of the Turkish case, through underlining the contingent factors, this study opens the way of possibility of new scrutinies (which cannot be included by this dissertation) trying to figure out the critical inter-relationship between process of presidentialization and increasing authoritarianism, populism, and conservatism, which makes democracy in those developing countries to be more turbulent and fragile.

Thirdly, analyzing the practices of Erdoğan’s leadership in terms of its determination for concentration of power in the hands of the executive, this dissertation aims at contributing the literature of presidentialization by means of focusing on the changing role of the president in the parliamentary systems. In this sense, a particular attention is paid to the popular election of the president. By doing so, various factors employed by Erdoğan’s both premiership and presidency are investigated through operationalizing the theoretical indicators provided by the literature of presidentialization conception.

Lastly, by scrutinizing the Turkish case under Erdoğan’s leadership with particular emphasis laid on the presidentialization notion this study stresses the importance of contingent factors catalyzing the presidentialization process. Although it is accepted that structural factors are also effective with respect to rise of presidentialization in the Turkish case, significantly triggering factors initiating and consolidating the procedures of presidentialization under Erdoğan’s leadership are contingent ones such as (charismatic) personality of the leader, electoral success of the leader with
the help of his/her popularity and domination of the executive leadership strengthened by a great deal of support provided by the parliamentary parties, which is motivated by nothing but the logic of “one-person executive”.

The post-July 2015 context seems to be very instructive for the last warning that this dissertation subscribes. The power and autonomy of a particular leader is always context-bounded and actor-depended. It is open to observe whether other political actors and institutions and particular events and/or developments will go on to let Erdoğan to dominate the executive politics in the future.
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Parlamenter sistemlerdeki başbakanların iktidarını ve sistem içerisindeki konumlarını anlamada başkanlık sistemlerindeki başkanlara bakmak karşılaştırmalı siyaset konusunda çalışmalar yapan araştırmacılar arasında tartışmalı bir konu olarak bir konu olagelmiştir. Bu çerçevede, küresel düzeyde ortaya çıkan kimi gelişmelerin her iki makama aynı yönde hareket etmeye zorlayıp zorlamadığı, her iki sistemdeki kurumsal farklılıkların ve sistemlerin daha kapsamlı siyasal mantıklarının başkanlık ve başbakanlık koltuğunda oturanların ortaya çıkan gelişmelerle benzer tepkiler vermelerini engelleyip engellemememiş ve belirli tarihsel ve siyasal bağlamların başkanları ve başbakanları benzer siyasal izlemeye zorlayıp zorlamadığı gibi sorular, her iki makam arasında bir yakınsaklık ve/veya ıraksaklıktan bahsedip bahsedilemeyeceği konusunu önemli araştırma nesnelerinden biri haline gelmiştir (Hart 1991). Kısaca ifade etmek gerekirse, başbakanlık ve başkanlık makamlarını karşılaştırmanın mümkün ve/veya anlamlı olup olmadığı karşılaştırmalı siyaset konusunda çalışmalar yapan araştırmacıların ilgisini çekmektedir.

Başkanlık ve başbakanlık makamlarının karşılaştırılması ve bu çerçevede belirli bir yakınsaklık iddia edilebileceğini düşünceyi pek de yeni değildir. Özellikle, kimi araştırmacılar 1990’lardan itibaren ve büyük ölçüde İngiltere örneği için geçerli olacak şekilde parlamenter sistemlerdeki değişimleri ve gelişmeleri ifade edebilmek için Başkanlaşma kavramını kullanmaktadır. Başkanlaşma kavramı bir analoji olarak düşünülmeekte ve dikkatleri parlamenter sistemlerdeki fiili duruma çekmeye çalışmaktadır. Başkanlaşma kavramının temeldeki mesajı “artık başkanlık ve parlamenter sistemler arasında bir fark kalmadığı” değildir. Formel bağlamda parlamenter sistemden başkanlık sistemine bir geçişten ziyade, parlamenter
sistemdeki enformel değişimlere vurgu yapmak için başkalanışma kavramı önerilmektedir.


Ortaya çıkan yeni siyasal pratikler ve özellikler sistemlerin işleyiş kuralları üzerinde ciddi etkilerde bulunmaktadırım. Örnek vermek gerekirse, parlamentar sistemde başkanlık sisteminin ait olduğu düşünülen bir çok özellik, başkanlık sisteminine formel olarak geçirilmeden, enformel olarak siyasal pratiklerde sıkıla görülmeye ve/veya uygulanmaya başlandığında, parlamentar sistem açısından bir nevi “sessiz bir yapışal devrimden” bahsetmek mümkündür (Zaznaev, 2008: 30). Öncelikli olarak siyasal pratiklerde görülen değişimlerin, parlamentar sistemin işleyiş tarzının artan oranda başkanlık sisteminin mantığını yansıttığı anlamına geldiği ileri sürülmektedir.

Başkanlaşma kavramı “parlamenter seçimlerin başkanlaşması”, “parlamenter sistemlerin başkanlaşması”, “başbakanların başkanlaşması” ve “siyasetin başkanlaşması” gibi farklı bağlamlarda kullanılmaktadır. Başkanlaşma kavramının kullanımları arasında önemli farklılıklar olmakla birlikte, kullanımların ortak kimi noktalara dikkat çektiği görülmektedir:


Son olarak önemli noktalardan bir tanesi de, başkanlaşma’nın “ampirik/görgül” bir iddia olduğunu. Gözlemlenebilir ve belirli liderler ile özdeşleştirilebilir. Bu bağlamda, Thatcher, Blair, Schröeder ve Berlusconi gibi liderler araştırmacılar tarafından başkanlaşma’nnın ampirik/görgül örnekleri olarak analiz edilmiştir.

Bu tezin en temel sorunsalı, Türkiye örneği bağlamında Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın başbakanlık ve cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemlerini başkanlaşma kavramına yoğunlaşarak analiz etmektedir. Bu yapılara çalışılırken, başkanlaşma kavramı Türkiye’nin parlamenter sistemindeki yürütmenin dönüşümünü ifade etmek üzere kullanılacaktır. Poguntke ve Webb tarafından önerildiği şekilde, daha somut bir ifade ile ben bu
çalışmada başkanlaşmanın “yürütme yüzüne” yoğunlaşacak ve “parti ve seçim süreçleri” yüzlerini analizlerinin dışında tutacağım. Parti toplantılarının ve parti içerisindeki konuşmaların gizliliği ile liderlerin partilerin aldığı toplam oy içerisindeki kişisel oylarını ölçen uzun vadeli (longitudinal) araştırmaların Türkiye bağlamında bulunmayışı beni bu tercihe zorlamıştır. Ancak yine de, bu çalışmada başkanlaşmayı daha büyük sistem açısından da tartışmaya çalışarak bu eksikliği kapatmayı planlıyorum.

Bu çerçevede, bu tezin temel araştırma sorusu “Erdoğan’ın başbakanlık ve cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemlerinde (artan derecede) fiili bir başkanlaşmadan söz etmek mümkün müdür yahut bu dönemlerden önce de fiili başkanlaşma Türkiye’nin parlamenter sisteminde gözlemlenebilir bir olgu mudur?”. Eğer bu soruya olumlu cevap vermek mümkün ise, “artmakta olan fiili başkanlaşmanın göstergeleri neler olabilir?”. Başkanlaşma kavramının tercih edilmesinin altında yatan en temel neden, kimilerince Türkiye’nin belirli bir süredir fiili olarak başkanlaşmış bir sisteme sahip olduğu görüşüdür. Başkanlık sistemine geçildiğini gösteren bir anayasa değişiklik olmadan, Erdoğan’ın liderliği altında Türkiye’deki sistemin işleyiş tarzının başkanlık sistemlerinin işleyiş tarzının yansıttığına inanılmaktadır. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın son açıklamalarından bir tanesi, bu tezin temeldeki araştırma sorularını ve kavramlarını somutlaştırma açısından oldukça önemlidir. Erdoğan 2014 yılında ilk defa halkın onayladığı Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminin öneminin pek fazla algılanmadığını belirttiği açıklamasını devamında aşağıdaki görüşleri ileri sürmüştür:

Artık ülkeye sembolik değil, fiili gücü olan bir cumhurbaşkanı var. Cumhurbaşkanı elbette yetkiler çerçevesinde, ama doğrudan millete karşı sorumlu olarak görevini yürütmek durumundadır. İster kabul edilsin, ister edilmesin Türkiye’nin yönetim sistemi bu anlamda değişmiştir. Şimdi
yapılması gereken, bu fiili durumun hukuki çerçevesinin anayasal olarak kesinleştirilmesi döşememizdir\(^{153}\).

Başkanlaşma kavramı açısından Türkiye örneğinin ve Erdoğan’ın liderliğinin incelenmesinin, Türkiye’nin siyasal ve hükümet sistemi üzerindeki güncel tartışmalara katılma sağlayacağı düşünülmektedir. Başkanlaşma bugüne kadar özellikle Avrupa demokrasileri bağlamında kullanılmış ve Türkiye gibi gelişme altındaki, bir başka ifade ile demokrasisi pek gelişmemiş bir örnekte incelenmemiştir. Başkanlaşma bu açıdan çalisılması güçler ayrırlığı ilkesinin pek de işlememiş bir siyasal sistemde iktidarın merkezleşmesinin ve kişiselleşmesinin demokrasi üzerinde yaratacağı sıkıntılara da göstermesi sebebiyle de önemlidir.


Hükûmet sistemleri konusunda genellikle kabul gören üçlü tipoloji, sistemleri başkanlık, parlament ve yarı-başkanlık sistemleri olarak sınıflanmıştır. Bu tasnife göre, yürütme organı üzerinde yapılacak inceleme anlamsız olup, 218


Poguntke ve Webb’in 2005 yılında yayımladıkları Siyasetin Başbakanlaşması başlıklı çalışma başkanlaşma kavramını İngiliz kökeninden ve aşırı vurgusundan kurtarmış, kavramı karşılaştırmalı çalışmalarla açılmış ve kavramın değişik ülke örnekleri...

Poguntke ve Webb başkanlaşmaya yol açan yapısal ve olumsal faktörleri de incelemişlerdir. Yapısal faktörler olarak siyasetin uluslararasılaşması, devletin büyümesi, kitle iletişiminin değişen yılı ve seçmen davranışlarının açıklanda sınıf gibi toplumsal bölümün azalan etkisini ele almış; olumsal faktörler olarak ise siyasal ve tarihsel bağlam ile liderlerin kişiliğini saymışlardır. Tüm bu faktörler dinamik bir ilişki içerisinde başkanlaşmayı etkilemektedir.

Başkanlaşma kavramı önemli bir takım eleştirilere de tabii tutulmuştur. Thatcher’ın 1990 yılında kendi kabinesi tarafından parti liderliğini terkетmeye zorlanması, Blair’in ise Irak savaşı öncesi ve sonrası popülerlik oranlarındaki değişim ile önemli bir çok konuda bakanlar tarafından durdurulduğunu ilerleyen yıllarda itiraf etmesi başkanlaşma olgasının tutarlı ve anlamlı olmadığını düşündürmektedir. Bu noktada

Türkiye örneğine bakılacak olursa, 1876 yılından itibaren Türkiye’de parlamentor geleneğin önemli bir yer tuttuğu ileri sürülebilir. 1982 anayasası yürütme organının yetkilerini artırmış, cumhurbaşkanına parlamentor gelenekle bağdaşmayan önemli yetkiler vermiş ancak temelde sorumsuzluğunu esas aldığından ve başbakan ile ilgili bakanları sorumlu tutuşturulan, parlamentor sistemin mantığını yansıtmaya devam etmiştir. 2007 değişikliği Türkiye’deki sisteme halk tarafından seçilecek cumhurbaşkanlığını eklemiş, ancak diğer bir çok konuyu bu oldukça önemli görünen

Başkanlaşma yol açan faktörler Türkiye örneği bağlamında incelendiğinde Erdoğan’ın liderliği ve 2007 anayasada değişikliği en önemli olumsal; siyasetin uluslararasılaşması, AKP’nin aktif dış politika vurgusu, devletin yeniden yapılandırılması ve medya bağlamında yaşanan gelişmeler ise en önemli yapısal faktörler olarak görülmektedir. Erdoğan siyasetçi olarak kendisini sürekli sistemin mağduru olarak konumlandirma konusunda oldukça başarılı olmuştur. Böylelikle, seçimlere müessess nizamın çıkarlarından olabildiğince ayrıldığı ve adeta sistem içerisinde “iktidar ama muktedir değil” imaını verme konusunda elini kuvvetlendirmiştir. Parti içerisinde, siyasi yasağı sona erip başbakanlık koltuğuna oturduğu ilk günde bu yana sürekli ichtidarını sürdürmüştür. Zaman içerisinde partideki önemli bir çok aktörü ya dışsallaştırmış ya da edilgenleştirmiştir. Öyle ki gelinen son noktada, AKP’nin bir nevi “Erdoğan sevenler derneği” haline dönüştüğü bile ileri sürülebilir.

Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olma süreci iktidarının ilk yıllarında ve aktif dış politika vurgusu ise son yıllarda kadar liderliğinin uluslararası meşruiyet ile desteklenmesi

futbol federasyonu yetkilileri aslında yapmaları gereken görevlerde bile bu görevi “Erdoğan’ın talimatı ile” yaptıklarını özellikle vurgular olmuşlardır.


Başbakanın kişiliğinin siyasi istikrar için “yegâne çipa” olduğu algısı Türkiye’de az rastlanır bir düşünce değildir. Destekleyenler olsun, muhalifler olsun Türkiye’de Erdoğan istemezse herhangi bir konuda adına adımlar atmayaçağı ve/veya bazı kalıcı hale gelmiş sorunları “ancak Erdoğan’ın çözceği”ni iddia etmişlerdir. Erdoğan’ın kişiliğinin AB ve İMF gibi çipaların azalan öneminde ülkenin istikrar içinde kalmasının tek güvencesi olduğu ileri sürülmüştür. Kürt sorunu gibi konularda ortaya atılan “açılım süreci”nin Erdoğan’ın bu konudaki kararlılığı olmasa yaşanmayacağı, iktisadi kalkınma ve ülkenin yabancı sermaye çekme açısından güvenilir bir liman olduğu alışı bir noktada Erdoğan’ın kişiliğinde vücut bulmuştur. Erdoğan partisinin ve hükümetinin siyasalarını topluma sunarken, adeta toplumla arasında varolduğunu düşünüren bir kişisel sözleşme gereği bu adımların atıldığı vurgulamıştır. Türkiye siyaseti bir anlamda Erdoğan özelinde kişisel esmiştir.

Tüm bu göstergeler birarada düşünülürse Erdoğan’ın başbakanlığı döneminde yürütme açısından fiili başkanlaşma göstergelerinde şüphesiz bir artışın söz etmek mümkündür. Öte yandan, yürütme ileyasama arasındaki ilişki göz önüne alınca, partinin liderinden artan derecede özerklik kazanması konusunda ise bir kanıt öne
sürebilmek imkânsız görünmektedir. Hatta yasama organındaki yasa tasarlarının 98%’inin hükümetten geldiği ve başbakanın belirli yasa tasarlarının yasalaşması için parlamentelere tarih koyması göz önüne alınırsa, başkanlaşma karşıtı kanıtlar gözlemlemek mümkündür. Kısacası, Erdoğan’ın başbakanlığı döneminde yürütme düzeyinde bir başkanlaşma olduğu söylenebilir ise, sistemin geneli ve daha büyük siyasal süreçler açısından bir başkanlaşmadan söz etmek mümkün değildir.


Erdoğan cumhurbaşkanlığı makamına oturunca cumhurbaşkanlığını kurumsal bir yeniden yaplamaya ve bunun sonucunda ise “kurumsal bir genişleme”ye (institutional stretch) tabii tutmuştur. Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamını örgütsel olarak yeniden yapılandırmış (özellikle cumhurbaşkanlığı içerisinde bulunan başkanlık sayısını dörtten on üçe çıkarmış ve onları bakanlıkların yetkili olduğu alanlarda kendisine rapor ve danışmanlık hizmeti vermekle sorumlu kılmış), cumhurbaşkanlığının bütçesini artırmış, örtülü ödenek kullanımı cumhurbaşkanlarına açılmış ve cumhurbaşkanlığı personeli sayısı tarihsel süreçten bir kopuş olduğunu göstermek için, cumhurbaşkanlığını Çankaya Köşk’ünden medyada “Aksaray” olarak bilinen Beştepe Cumhurbaşkanlığı Külliyesine taşımıştır. Böylelikle, Yeni Türkiye iddiasını desteklemek için geçmişle olan bağı kesmek ve sistem içerisindeki değişmesi gereklen pozisyonunu ifade etmek amaçlarını göstermiştir. Sistem içerisindeki aktörler ile olan ilişkisini de geleneksel cumhurbaşkanlarından olabildiğince ayırmış, 2015 genel seçim sürecinde isim vermeden AKP için oy istemiş, hemen her gün çok önemli siyasal konularda görüş bildirmiş ve açıklama yapmış ve 2015 seçim sürecinde neredeyse kampanya yürütüyör gibi toplu açılış törenleri düzenlenmiştir. Kendisine yöntemli anayasal yetkilerini aşmakta olduğu eleştirilere ise, kendisinin halk tarafından seçilen ilk cumhurbaşkanı olduğu, toplum ile devletin kendi cumhurbaşkanlığı döneminde birleştiği, her fırsatta milletten yetki aldığı için doğal olarak onlarla buluşması gerektiği, sistemin artık fiilen dönüştüğü ve bu dönüşümün anayasal değişim ile hukuki olarak netleştirilmesi gerektiğini şeklinde cevap vermiştir.

Türkiye siyasi tarihinde başkanlık sistemine geçme tartışmaları Erdoğan ve AKP ile başlamamıştır. 1980’li yıllarda beri özellikle Turgut Özal ve Süleyman Demirel gibi bir takım liderler başkanlık sistemi yönde görüşler beyan etmişlerdir. Bu isteklerini

Erdoğan ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin 2012 yılında Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu’na sunduğu kamuoyunda “Türk tipi başkanlık sistemi” önerisi olarak bilinen öneri, bu tez bağlamında Erdoğan’ın başbakanlık döneminin fiili başkanlık gibi işlediğini bir kanıt olarak düşünülebilir. Türk tipi başkanlık sistemi önerisinin tıtzir bir incelemesi yapıldığında, önerinin başkanlık sistemlerinin temel mantığı ile, özellikle en iyi şekilde işletildiği düşünülen Amerikan tarzı başkanlık sistemi ile, pek bir alaksının olmadığı görülecektir. Hatta bu gözlem öneride önemli payları olduğu düşünülen AKP’lı vekiller tarafından bile ifade edilmiştir. Erdoğan ve/veya AKP önerisinin Erdoğan’ın varlığını göz önüne alarak kurulması planlanan başkanlık sisteminde başkana çok üstün yürütme yetkileri vermeyi planladığı ve başkanlık sistemlerinde görülen güçler ayrıılığı ilkesi ve kontrol denge mekanizmalarını ise
birer istikrarsızlık ve atalet unsuru gibi algılandığı için pek de yer vermediği açıklık. Türk tipi başkanlık sistemi önerisi, Erdoğan ve başlıca destekçileri açısından, sadece bir başkanlık sistemi tartışması da değildir. Planlanan sistem değişikliği ile Yeni Türkiye kurulacaktır. Kurulacak olan Yeni Türkiye’de Erdoğan’ın “kurucu misyonu” toplumu, siyaseti ve sistemi topyekun dönüştürecektir. Kıscaya ifade etmek gereksizse, önerinin destekçileri açısından başkanlık sistemi sadece istikrar ve iktisadi kalkınma için değil, Yeni Türkiye için de gerekliydi. Erdoğan’ın başkanlığı döneminde başlamış olmakla birlikte, cumhurbaşkanlığı makamına geçmesi ile birlikte hızlanan bir süreç olarak Yeni Türkiye’nin kurulması yeni teamüllerin oluşmasını, yeni işleyiş ve hedeflerin belirlenmesini ve yeni bir sistemın mevcudiyetini gerektirmektedir. Alışılmış bir tarzda cumhurbaşkanlığı görevini yerine getirmesi de bu bağlamda düşünülmeliidir.

Bu çalışmada fiili başkanlaşma kavramı çerçevesinde Türkiye örneğinde Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın başkanlık ve cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemleri incelenmiş, özellikle başkanlaşmanın yürütme düzeyi açısından belirli göstergelerine dayanarak Türkiye’dede sistem başkanlaşma yaşamıp yaşamadığı sorusuna cevap aramıştır. Başkanlaşma kavramının tanımları, tarihsel evrimi ve göstergeleri ortaya konup, özellikle yürütme açısından başkanlaşma sürecine yoğunlaşmıştır. Tüm analizler ışığında, bu çalışmaların ulaştığı başlıca sonuçlar şunlardır:

İlk ve öncelikle vurgulanması gereken nokta, Türkiye ve Erdoğan örneklerini başkanlaşma kavramı penceresinden incelemek, Türkiye’de bir süredir devam edegelen sistemin fiili olarak başkanlaştığı iddialarına bir çerçeve çizmesi açısından önemli bir katkı sağlaması amaçlanmıştır. Erdoğan’ın, bizzat kendisinin, “sistemin fiili olarak değiştiğini” iddia etmesi bile bu çalışmanın gerekliliğini göstermesi açısından yeterli bir neden olarak alınabilir.


APPENDIX B

CIRRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION
Surname, Name: Uslu, Hasan Faruk
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 11 March 1982, Konya
Marital Status: Married
Phone: +90 312 210 30 22
email: ufaruk@metu.edu.tr

EDUCATION

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<td>DOKUZ EYLÜL UN., IR</td>
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WORK EXPERIENCE

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FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Elementary French

PAPERS PUBLISHED IN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

PRESENTATIONS


APPENDIX C

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü  
X
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü  
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü  
Enformatik Enstitüsü  
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü  

YAZARIN

Soyadı : USLU
Adı : HASAN FARUK
Bölümü : SIYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : DE FACTO PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN TURKEY UNDER ERDOĞAN’S LEADERSHIP

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans  
Doktora  X

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak göstermek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin indeksler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

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