TOWARDS THE SPECTACLE: ON THE ROLE OF IMAGERY IN ARCHITECTURAL REPRESENTATION

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EMRAH YERĞİN

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submitted by EMRAH YERĞİN in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Architecture in Architecture Department, Middle East Technical University by,

Prof. Dr. Gülbin Dural Ünver
Dean, Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Prof. Dr. Tomris Elvan Altan
Head of Department, Architecture

Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın
Supervisor, Architecture Dept., METU

Examinining Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Celal Abdi Güzer
Architecture Dept., METU

Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın
Architecture Dept., METU

Prof. Dr. Ayşen Savaş
Architecture Dept., METU

Prof. Dr. Nejdet Jale Erzen
Interior Architecture & Environmental Design Dept.,
Izmir University

Asst. Prof. Dr. Bülent Batuman
Urban Design & Landscape Architecture Dept.,
Bilkent University

Date: September 9, 2015
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Emrah Yergin

Signature:
This study enquires into the pejorative stance of image in representations of architecture. It is a critical literary look on the relations between architecture and modes of representation on the path of subject, through possible implementations via different media. It also inhales the exposition of architectural representation and space construction in the visual scene. This study has claims primarily on space, which is a common phenomenon in architecture and cinema. It has a direct question reads as follows: Can cinematographic image be regarded as an objective tool in the narration or documentation of architecture? Historically, the transformative potential of representational tools is an influence on architecture. Along its development, cinematic and photographic tools, which were the basic instruments to document at the early stages, became tools of re-production of reality. Themes of social subject, image, and space will form the thesis.

Keywords: cinematic space, representation, politics and space, image
ÖZ

GÖSTERİ’YE DAİR: MİMARLIK TEMSİLİNDE GÖRÜNTÜNÜN ROLÜ ÜZERİNE

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in beloved memories of Zehra Deniz Şengel & Alice the whale
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt that inhales the exposition of representation and space construction in the visual scene, particularly through cinema and photography. It is an inquiry that has claims primarily on space, which is a common phenomenon in both domains. It has a direct question reads as follows: Can cinematographic image be interpreted (or be used) as an objective tool in the narration or documentation of architecture? Although the inquiry of the thesis maintains sets out from the differing architectural representations from textual to visual, it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

While space is a common denominator along all the theoretical and practical acts particularly in fine arts (Beaux Arts) domain, it does not provide one exact definition. From Michel Foucault's interpretation of Las Meninas in terms of representation and spatial organization of every figure subjected in the painting, to his examination of space in the context of power relations, he points several possible frameworks and definitions. Henri Lefebvre has his own understanding of space, relying on its social triggers, positing that space is the very fabric of social relations and existence, and so on. This study, therefore, does not possess a fixed approach with a particular definition of space.

The concern actually has its origins in several different examinations of space among different disciplines—architecture, literature, visual studies, social studies and so on. Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu notes that the word (space) is taken in hand to some extent
for particular reasons, which, in the end, there occurred an arisen use of the word in a state of vocabular infertility. This, he points, ended up with a distorted definition of space in the context of both mass and artisan production based architectural practice, noting the obscurity of modernity as well. Following the same path, instead accepting a precise definition of space, this study will be open to abstract notions of space (i.e. Foucault, Deleuze, and so on) in order to have a better understanding of concurrent different definitions of the word, albeit in the domain of architecture and cinema. However, to set a solid framework in order to locate particular concerns over the interrelativity of both disciplines, this study sets apart from some basic presuppositions.

First, at hand, this thesis structures upon the definition of space being a social production, with direct references to scholars like Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey—it is of critical importance to address the Marxist critique of dialectical relationship between society and space as well. Second, representation, which is a key theme for this study, is considered as a historical construct. Whether it is intently or intuitive, the manners conducted on looking, seeing, concentrating and acting have a profound historical character. Therefore, it is the claim of this study that, with the inspiring thoughts of Jonathan Crary, specific aesthetic practices form and establish basic inquiries of the same field—in this case, it is cinema, or more precisely; representation of architecture in cinema. Third, incepting from the abstract notions of space, this study welcomes a wider conception of space, which, as some would not suggest, includes the architectural space. Architectural space, here, is not the entity, or specific solid-void relationship that some architect precisely built or designed, on the contrary, it inhales any environment that human created with the very intrinsic custom of habiting.

In the theoretical framework mentioned above, the study will allusively explore interrelation between architecture and cinema around common concepts like frame,

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2 The study directly refers to and nourishes intensely from the works of Jonathan Crary, John Berger and Roland Barthes in this respect.
3 The study will address works of Henri Lefebvre in this context.
montage, image, space, representation, movement, and so on. In addition to such indirect relationship, study frankly looks for the political premises that both disciplines acquire, by which to say, their utilization as apparatuses by the social institutions. Considering both accessibility and technical development in modern times, any kind of representational device has the primacy as the manipulative apparatus. Camera as one of the primary devices of representational media, documents the designated mechanisms and life sequences. In a Foucauldian perspective, an eye, which documents or assumed to see without being seen helps to constitute the basic notion of modern society’s discipline devices. Therefore the political essence of the general conception set above will be the primary prosperity. It is the claim of the thesis that, with the consciousness of the social subject that is conceived with the political momentum, image opens spaces for arguments upon conventional compromise over its manipulative or deleterious effects.

This study has its claims on space as aforementioned, yet on the field of vision; a research on image is the primary intent therefore. In this context, study interrogates into the very differences on the representational practices, the very knowledge and framework, which, may not be architectural in content in the first place. However, a plethora of study and literature is of existence about articulating the relationship between architecture and vision, optics and space. What outcomes of those studies vary in were basically the practices of looking diverse in cultural perspective.\(^4\)

Nevertheless, perspectives on the relationship between architecture and moving image, or image more precisely, differ in the historical context as well. Early twentieth century practitioneers and theorists celebrated the engagement of new, changing technology with practices; Walter Benjamin’s modern cultural critique upon relations of production, an insight that exemplified with film and architecture,\(^5\) or the thought of more of a direct relation between the two as in Sergei Eisenstein’s

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work from 1938, can be counted as two seminal insights upon the relationship and engagement of new technologies to artisanal practices. Later on, not denouncing the affirmative manner, however as a counterargument Susan Sontag reprimanded the role of image in her historical work, Fredric Jameson denoted photography for not presenting the experience of the buildings acutely, rather concentrating on only being an image, and Claire Zimmermann condemned the optical manipulation in documentation of architecture, and so on. What this study does is practically engaging those perspectives with on a wider spatial context, pursuing the investigation on the subject level.

On the account of the subject, there are two paths that the study follows for limiting the discussion in the architectural framework. One of which, as it is clued, is Crary’s approach of vision and modernity, in which he analysed the historical situation of the subject in the model of camera obscura and on. The intriguing fascination about subject in Crary’s argument was locating the camera obscura model in more of a knowledge-based framework, than a visual-based one. His extensively Foucault-informed appreciation of the subject in that particular model heralds the potential of the subject for developing an epistemology about its environment; thus, camera shall transcends itself just as an optical device, attributing itself to an epistemological instrument as well. The intent hereby is not to argue about the epistemological background of architecture, especially when it is engaged with diverse disciplines that had been done over and over again. However, if the epistemological inaccuracy is considered when a concept or notion in a particular field emigrates to the other, digging into the stances of arguments that have been carried around subject is of

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potent on architecture and its capabilities through engagements with other disciplines at best.

In addition to Crary’s intense Foucauldian context, tracing Foucault is also useful in content though. Aret Karademir utilizes his work in three periods: archaeological in the 60s; which is grounded on bold discourse analysis, genealogical in the 70s; which is grounded on power analysis that is conducted by non-discursive devices such as buildings, etc. and ethical in the 80s. In the last period, he continues his scrutiny not on the indirect, remote devices of power, but on the subject, on the self. His motivation exemplifying each analysis on spatial and architectural metaphors did not refer to the direct relation and content of architecture with technology or ability as such (techne). Instead, analyses made it clear that the constructive discourses on the subject, be it either governmental or not, is materialized and acted via space. The research that turns back to/around a wholesome analysis of the subject is a hint for construing the stance of subject on the interrelationship between architecture and visuality, space and its representation. Whatever the context may have been in each of his works, Foucault declared that his concern was mainly about experience. It is important to note that he frames experience in a context in which “experience is understood as the correlation

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12 Aret Karademir. “Foucault ve Cinsellik Deney(im)i Kurgusu”, paper presented at Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu Sempozyumu IV, April 3, 2015. Karademir especially notes that the word “expérience” in French translates into English both as “experiment” and “experience”, as the title in Turkish suggests.

13 It is important to emphasize that he, in the last period, conducts his analysis on sexuality, as a matter of self-technologies; how one can construct its own identity obeying which routines and norms, eventually how one did experience such identity. But, what is intriguing in the case of Foucault is his analysis profoundly shapes around “experience”. Although his concerns have paradigm shifts in the course of his work, he always thinks on experience, especially subjective experience. Yet, his subjective construction refers to an experience, which outcasts the experience construct that the discursive acts created around some subject, and focuses on a process, which the subject constructs itself repeatedly. It may be speculated that his undifferentiated and cautious approach towards power and knowledge differed from an expanded scale of discursive content towards governmental one. However, subject is central to his interrogations in all cases; either indirectly (in 60s and 70s with knowledge and institutions) or directly (in 80s with the self). For an extensive research on Foucault and his works please see Paul Rainbow (ed.). The Foucault Reader, Pantheon Books: New York, 1984; Michel Foucault. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon et al., Pantheon Books: New York, 1980.

between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture.”

If experience is considered, Foucault’s critique of power discourse and inquiry of subject in the context of self-technologies is of importance for an interrogation of modernity. In addition to inquiry of the subject in modernity, space and architecture occupy a vast domain in historical import, as stated above, due to the instrumentalization in the power scale. Yet, on both extents, Benjamin conceived a compelling approach that centres subject and space in his analysis of modernity. He claimed that the modern city, in all aspects was the perfect locus to analyse modernity with all integers. His writings on the city of Paris are constituent of his particular approach to modernity, let alone his observations on cities that he compiled, which hold a significant role in fashioning his critical approach. Though, he developed a new methodology in analysing modernity, which evolves around image that he utilizes to create a new historical index.

Nevertheless, his conception of image profoundly grounds on individual experience; wandering, or with more of a direct, exact and philosophical meaning of the word, strolling in the cityscape, in order to observe the entire consequences of modernism in the urban scale, locating his cultural theory right in the midst of his critical approach. Thought-images are centre to his critique, a new conception of image, in which he dispatches “full of moving physiognomical details about the urban topographies of cities” as Beatrice Hanssen noted. He crafted his philosophical approach as a critic-flâneur around a paradigm of space, in which he denounced the modern understanding of space, which is based on “alienation as a collective state of no longer being at home.” Thus, he enquired in this particular space-informed paradigm into a possible habitat, which is evidently urban topography, around new historical subjects such as flâneurs and political crowds.

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As every keen intellect working on Benjamin would suggest, his appreciation of image erudite differs from the concept of image, which either grounds on mental image that prioritize faculties of mind, or the history of material images. The latter two are the pivotal discussions for those engaged with pictorial representation. However, Benjamin holds a position that has the primacy for the literal sense of the word image. Sigrid Weigel defines his way of thinking as “thinking-in-images” in which images are constellation of resemblances that succeeds form-content relationship.\(^{19}\) Obviously, this particular definition of image is not of primary matter for the intent of this study. Yet, Benjamin’s implementation of and the indirect discussion loci that he created on his line of thought, and most importantly, the historical index he sets on this path and location of subject in this particular index are useful premises for the investigation. Benjamin’s seminal work, *The Arcades Project* will be main source in the course of investigation on this account. Apart from tracing the key concepts in his theory, particularly his method in compiling the writings that comprise his unfinished work, which is montage, is of importance for the study. In the course of the discussion, the study will revisit *The Arcades Project* on occasions and the arguments of Benjamin will pop-up to reinforce the premises of the study.

The inquiry will be conducted on three thought-bubbles. One of the bubbles is concerned about, as one would expect, the concept of image. At first, the study will revisit the concept in order to articulate the conception image. Yet, in the framework of the study dictated, image will be elaborated historically and, due to the cluster of the study, phenomenologically. Image will not be expanded on the epistemological level in the architectural domain, but on its objectivity or its manipulative effect as stated above. Still, the very possibility and probability of image will be argued via the concern of space; how can image be dictated? What is the subject’s position in this process?

The second of the three argues about the historical subjects, with respect to Crary and Benjamin. The arguments about the acts of the observer and the flaneur will

dwell on preceding discussion about image. The conditions and situations that affected those historical subjects will be investigated in order to articulate the subject’s position in possible image constructions. When the technological advance is of matter in the optical devices, how the historicity of the subject in mentioned cluster affected is one of the main arguments that the study will attempt to articulate. On this account, the inquiry will elaborate for the forthcoming discussions: What’s the position of the subject in the optical devices? Is subject is an actor in image-making process, or in creating spectacles?

The third will investigate alternative space definitions in an architectural and urban manner. The contemporary relationship between moving image and space science, image and the building (or what is related to architecture) will be discussed with respect to discussions of preceding chapters. It is of matter to articulate the role and the potentials of representational practices conveyed via optical devices in architectural practice in this plane. The discussion will construe on spatial practices and its representation through a selected example.

Among key concepts, those three thought-bubbles will coalesce through sub-concepts as well. A key theme for the study, as stated above, representation will be elaborated around the major concept image. After the introduction chapter, the following chapter will expand on image as a conception. In the meantime, since the major concern is about space and its depiction/representation, such elaboration will be convoluted with space. Since Crary’s treatment of optic devices as an epistemological instrument, which clearly traces back to Foucault and his knowledge (savoir) concept, the interrogation will be initiated with Foucault’s examination of space in the study, it is used in a wider conception. Thus, in which domain it is employed, the term does not imply any other meaning. The differing uses of the concept—as architectural image, photographic image and cinematographic image—will refer to only its domain and mode of production. Therefore, it is the pivotal departure of the study that, reductionist or, more unerring, limiting attitude of representation of any kind, makes its possible to return to the basic condition of a term (as in space and image) to construct, if vulgarly said, an epistemological re-conception. The approach, comprehensibly and obviously, inhales a Foucauldian instrumentalization. The epistemological re-conception will make one to reconsider all the economical, social, political, cultural stances and orders. Michel Foucault. The Order of Things, Routledge: London, 2002 (first published in 1966). Also, please see Ulus Baker. Siyasal Alanin Oluşumu Üzerine Bir Deneme, Paragraf Yayınları: Ankara, 2005.
Las Meninas in which he inspects representation (classical) and its relation to subject via space depicted. Also, the study will consider architectural production as a process, which has a profound effect on the end product. However, this attitude does not refer to presumably rigid or uncompromising process that is “the medium is the message” as a Marshall McLuhan prophecy, but an attitude that prioritises the praxis as well as the process in form-content relationship through which “form must ultimately express some profound inner logic in its content” as Jameson puts it. Suffice it to say, the claim of the chapter dwells on the idea that process itself is of importance as the end product on behalves.

On an epistemological ground as such, Chapter two will argue representation as a process in architecture, by which to express that the process is of importance as the end product in the architectural process. Image, with the developing technology, became an important tool of architectural production in the contemporary scene. After locating the representational act in such framework, study will reconceptualise image with a historical insight in reference to William JT Mitchell, where he retrieves knowledge, or knowledges in this particular conception. In addition to Mitchell, since the process of representation is of primary content, study will address the stance of optical devices in creating images around the concept of apparatus. Vilém Flusser’s irresistible phenomenological approach upon image therefore is of significant for this part. Initiating a reconceptualization of image in order to appeal image as a tool for constructive criticism in architectural production is one of the main goals of this chapter.

Amidst concepts apparatus and image, the interrogation will locate dialectical image of Benjamin as a sub-concept. Benjamin does not denounce the technological devices, as they are forms of commodity, rather he celebrates the technological advances in analysing modernity with new forms of media such as radio, newspapers

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and film. Instead of rejecting, he sees them as a potential for a new way of communication if shall they be freed from relations of production. He looks for “a new supra-individual form of communication” in them, as once Bernd Witte noted. Also, his methodology makes new interpretations of conditions possible, which he achieves by compiling different temporalities in a new historical index. What is compelling about dialectical image is, Benjamin does not see it as a product, neither social nor ideological. Rather, he writes, “dialectical images as models are not social products but objective constellations in which the social condition represents itself.” As mentioned above, the tripartite plane of the study refers to a constellation as well, and dialectical image is a useful concept for those three bubbles to coalesce in order to examine the subject’s stance through a social condition, which is one of the main arguments that the study maintains. In order to carry the investigation on the subject level, study uses dialectical image for bringing together the three thought-bubbles as objective constellations, in order to achieve a temporal relativity and make it possible to elaborate the historical subjects in Chapter three.

In elaborating the matter on subject levels, first, the study will construct the subject in a political context with reference to Crary’s intense Foucauldian utilization of subject as observer. Therefore, apparatus again will be used as a concept to elaborate the subject matter in Chapter three. Yet, elaboration will not proceed along the phenomenological path as preceding chapter handles, but along a political one. The intention here is to explore optical devices with not representations they suggest, but merely dwelling on the knowledge they suggest with their implications, as devices that power utilizes to be operational directly on body (of the individual). In addition, mass culture will be another key to explore political inspection. In a political context, the doubtful stance of the subject in creative process of any art form is the main concern to be articulated. In a creative (and in a sense, obviously productive)

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25 Jay. The Dialectical Imagination, p. 207.
process, if there is a formal and visual pleasure, say, there is consumption and contemplation as Benjamin encouraged to develop a dialectic between cultural consumption and production in his time. Second, the study will inspect subject further on Benjamin’s flaneur and Dziga Vertov’s kinok. Dwelling yet on the political context driven in the previous section, the political body is kinok in cinematography of Vertov, and flaneur as collective body in philosophy of Benjamin. The section will discuss both subjects around the concepts of kino-eye and flanerie by two of which Benjamin and Vertov utilized their insights upon modern city. Conceived by the political momentum, Vertov proposes an exemplary approach upon the subject in the form of a cinematographer, and Benjamin suggests experiencing modern urban topography as a mobile consumer, indicating that the cityscape is the core of articulating the relations of production in which all the subjects hold a position for the collective body. While suggesting those compelling premises, two authors have the primacy for image, which is a form that is beyond representation, a form that inhales both its material existence and its visual condition.

The third bubble to coalesce will be elaborated around the concept of mass media in order to articulate the relationship between architecture and optic media. The study will express its claims via a documentary as a case study in this chapter. Indeed, the discussions that the previous chapters held will reinforce the approach of this part, but the investigation will be conducted through the optic media convoluted with space discussion. As expected, the discussion concerning space will frame the questions in a certain context where the study intents to uncover its delineating parameters with optic devices.

Within the given framework of the thesis, apart from architecture’s engagement with the filmic medium, which is the forerunner of diverse media among avant-garde in the early twentieth century, spatial experience that is portrayed via arts have always been ambiguous. Therefore, as a first step the study takes the guidance of Esra

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Akcan’s inquiry of Benjamin’s traces in Manfredo Tafuri’s critical readings of architecture and urban physical structure in order to unravel a “theory of the architectural avant-garde.” While unravelling Tafuri’s postulations around the concepts of end of history, metropolitan condition, and end of architecture as auratic object, she suggests that the theory for an architectural avant-garde embedded in Tafuri’s writings translates into architecture as “the end of architecture in the sense of its total dissolution into the urban structure of the metropolis.” Tafuri argues history as crisis and defines the historian both as an active and critical contributor in this process. For him, history of architecture and historiography is an operational discipline and a site of political resistance. Hence, Tafuri encourages reading architecture via meta-languages such as image or text, where he posits that in the age of capitalism due to relations of production that the architect is into, architecture cannot be conducted on reliable, fine grounds. In a similar fashion with Benjamin, he proposes a historical-critique, which “step by step”, destroys “the linearity of that history and its autonomy: there will remain only traces, fluctuating signs, unhealed rifts.” Following Akcan’s line of thought, the condition of the individual, the social subject (in this case the architect), is of important for that reason. The urban physical structure in which the whole fanfare is acted through, therefore is the very site that scenes “the total dissolution of Architecture into something other than itself, of aura into mass, of form into process, of author into producer, of architect into organiser” as Akcan meticulously unearths. Architect as a subject in the urban scene, loses its dignity, its state of existence through its practice in the given architectural space and relations of production. Therefore, in the last part, as a concept, the study will focus on the term heterotopia, which is coined by Foucault, in order to look for differentiable spaces in the urban setting. In addition, the study will discuss the term also on Lefebvre’s viewpoint. In using the word space, Lefebvre opposes Foucault’s position regarding the status of the space and the status of the subject does not refer to a conception that is epistemologically acquired, by which he accuses Foucault’s

30 Ibid., p. 135.
definition for remaining insufficient. He defines heterotopia as an act rather than space.

In order to track the implications on visual scene, the study will analyse Peter Watkins’ documentary on Paris Commune, *La Commune (de Paris, 1871)* from 2000 as an example. As everyone would suggest, architecture engages with cameratic practices on a bold level. There stands a heavy literature on this particular relationship. By this heavy literature articulated, the study will analyse *La Commune* with respect to the historical subjects that the study articulated in preceding chapter. The study will regard the space, 1) as a form by which film benefits from space as a tactile entity in architectonic terms, in the guidance of already investigated common principles and concepts, all of which refer to different conditions in various cases, and 2) as a construct that is built up by several discourses and narratives.
CHAPTER 2

ACT ONE: ON IMAGE AND SPACE

“The painter is standing a little back from his canvas.” One of the seminal books in the 20th century by the prominent French philosopher begins with this agonizingly calm but hauntingly moving sentence. The interrogation is about Diego Velázquez’s *Las Meninas*, which is one of the most influential artworks about pictorial representation together with Vermeer’s *Art of Painting* and Courbet’s *Studio*. Foucault examines the painting by constructing reciprocity along different modes of representation, a reciprocity that concerns about the painting and the spectators, which is constructed between the classical representation and the representation of the painting itself. Then he recalls the conflicting reciprocity between an absent-viewer and the world in view, by which he argues, there has to be a subject-viewer essential to classical representation.

However, Svetlana Alpers explores the inconsistent interpretations about *Las Meninas* along art historians in the framework of representation, which fundamentally differs from one another thoroughly on several accounts like style. She responds post-positively:

For the reciprocity between the absent viewer and the world in view is produced not by the *absence* of a conscious human subject, as Foucault argues, but rather by Velázquez’s ambition to embrace two conflicting modes of representation, each of which constitutes the relationship between the viewer and the painting of the world differently. It is the tension between these two—as between the

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33 Foucault. *The Order of Things*, p. 3.
opposing poles of two magnets that one might attempt to bring together with one’s hands—that informs this picture.  

“The problem is endemic to the field” she asserts, while she wanders in the art history domain, in investigating representation “to suggest ways in which pictorial representation, an aesthetic order, engages also a social one” in order to draw the attention to the condition of the viewer (in Alpers’ case the viewer then becomes the observer due to the social context) which is affected by the social context that pictorial representation created, whereas she also heralds the continuing tradition started in the eighteenth century, traces of visual representational device replacement by one another; Vermeer’s View of Delft compared to nature in camera obscura, and Sterling—Maxwell notes Velázquez’s Las Meninas anticipated Daguerre. Representation covers a striking place along artistic discussions, as well as the architectural ones. Nevertheless, as Jale Nejdet Erzen notes, the questioning and probing movements of art incepted by Modernism, ruled out one of the primary and essential constituent of art, which is representation, especially in the second half of the 20th century, with the political and economic inputs. In this context, the stance of the subject either as spectator or producer remains significant therefore.

What this chapter will focus on is to look for the possible sites and intriguing premises that the subject may introduce in representational status of architecture. Moreover, the changing technology, also provided different techniques, diverse aesthetic orders in varied forms despite demolishing of representation, whereas the

34 Svetlana Alpers. “Interpretation Without Representation, or, the Viewing of Las Meninas”, Representations, No. 1, February 1983, p. 36. The emphasis is original.
35 Ibid. p. 34.
36 Ibid. p. 40.
37 Ibid. p. 31. Alpers’ approach on the subject is rather optimistic. However, what is glancing is the stance of the social subject in the—so to say—representational process when the historic development is considered. The sign of such accumulation is worth to be notified, but when the emerging social condition of a representation is considered, as Alpers points out, it indicates further consequences with the introduction of technology: “This will kill that” (Victor Hugo). For more about representational device replacement both in medium and space and its ground-breaking consequences, please see Beatriz Colomina. Privacy and Publicity: Modern Architecture as Mass Media, The MIT Press: Massachusetts, London. 1994, pp. 201-230; Michel Foucault. The Order of Things, pp. 136-177; Gilles Deleuze. Foucault, trans. by Sean Hand, U of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1988 (first published in 1986), pp. 23-44.
38 Jale Nejdet Erzen. “Çevre Sanatı”, Betonart, No. 19, Summer 2008, pp. 60-65. Jale Erzen sets her framework in reference to the artistic works of 1960’s, which were bold in political context; especially those are conducted on nature and environment with an interdisciplinary manner.
space it is put through and derivative forms of (so called) spaces—not physical but
definitive, still designated—dictated by an art form remain particularly promising
and distinctive. When Foucault talks about history and documentation of it, he points
to a new conception of history, which no longer documents and logs in the form of
text, papers, scripts, words or records. In his words;

In fact, these [exotic plants and animals] had already claimed men’s
interest for a long while. What had changed was the space in which it
was possible to see them and from which it was possible to describe
them. To the Renaissance, the strangeness of animals was a spectacle:
it was featured in fairs, in tournaments, in fictitious or real combats, in
reconstructions of legends in which the bestiary displayed its ageless
fables. The natural history room and the garden, as created in the
Classical period, replace the circular procession of the ‘show’ with the
arrangement of things in a ‘table’. What came surreptitiously into
being between the age of the theatre and that of the catalogue was not
the desire for knowledge, but a new way of connecting things both to
the eye and to discourse. A new way of making history. 39

He indicates a new and pure tabulation of things, juxtaposition of creations, things,
et cetera in a new space, which liberates them from the already established lingual
system. By this new classification method, in a Foucauldian perspective, these things
were to be presented as objective, as natural, as themselves. The transformation of
medium from which they are described and space in which they are seen—namely
the museum in the case of Foucault—sets its own legitimacy as an institution up to
modern times. 40 Later on these media—libraries, catalogues, indexes—will turn into
different representational devices with the changing of new technologies as
photography, newspapers, cinema, etc.

39 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 143. The emphasis is by me.
40 Foucault attests to his claims through a reasonable amount of spatial metaphors, especially in The
Order of Things. He states that in the eighteenth century, the reflection of governmental devices upon
architecture has a notable stance; “architecture has not become political since, it was political ever
since” he remarks, yet the codes of architecture firstly documented in written form by the
governmental apparatuses in the eighteenth century. He explains it as follows; “What is striking in the
epistemological mutations and transformations of the seventeenth century is to see how the
spatialization of knowledge was one of the factors in the constitution of this knowledge as a science.”
Michel Foucault. “Space, Knowledge, and Power”, in The Foucault Reader, p. 254. He states that
such spatialization then continued on the techniques as well; via books, magazines, etc., which are
“spatial techniques, not metaphors.” Ibid. Such spatialization via the governmental apparatus is of
matter for architecture as well.
In terms of architecture, and not only its representation *per se*—the act of realization of architecture through its renown presentation techniques like line, drawing, and as a compact tool of those sub-representative instruments, the orthographic set—but its representative condition via different media creates new domains in habitus. The claims of this study concerned, on the account of architectural representation, it is not by definition only but architectural representation extends beyond just holding a place for particular information about some architectural manifestation. Put it less mildly and ambiguous, the representative tool that is used in the architectural production process tells more about the condition and the potential of architecture, be it a line, drawing or a visual technology—an image.  

Beyond being several structural or elemental qualities, the representative tools refer to a rendering to make the invisible visible when the production process in concerned. As Şebnem Yalınay noted, representation hold a dilemma in terms of architectural representation. Regarding the tools it is conducted through, they “both introduce and represent”, therefore, through such an intermediary phase, any elemental quality of a representation should not subordinate the other (the end product, such as a building or edifice), in Yalınay’s words, “each is indeed the other”.  

Similarly, Diana Agrest points to such dilemma. She argues about the dichotomies and ambiguities of representation maintains and introduces a distinction to be made between presenting and representing, in order to draw the attention to mode of presentation becoming the part of the production, by which the representative tool would not be just a spatial representation, but a functioning and effective medium for

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41 The study takes architectural representation into consideration as a process, which affects the end product, holding the primacy of tools it is conducted. In a Deleuzian way, if the architectural production is an ‘event’, the architectural representation tools are the primary elements that makes this particular event an ‘extension’, thus, this is the point where architecture expands to the other fields. Therefore it not only defines it, but informs it as well. Gilles Deleuze. “What is an Event?” in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, The Athlone Press: London, 1993, pp. 76-82; Anthony Vidler. “Architecture’s Expanded Field” in *Architecture Between Spectacle and Use*, edited by Anthony Vidler, Yale University Press: New Haven, 2008, pp. 143-154.


the architecture yet to be produced.\textsuperscript{44} Agrest states that the contradiction, or putting it boldly, the dialectic between presentation and representation is an outcome of the disassociation of abstract thought from the actual construction process. Such a distinction will introduce the mode of representation, which will announce the technique of design or representation is important as the building itself. Hence, following the same paradigm, when it is implemented to cinema, as a Modernist medium, the representative tool, primarily image, opens encouraging spaces for architectural representation discussions.

The relation between architecture and cinema is obviously not a recent phenomenon. There stands a vast literature on that particular commonality. However, the representational stance of architecture and the transformational capacity of representation heralds new schemas to study in that specific habitus and an extensive area to work on in the domain of architecture. While representation, accordingly image holds a solid position in the architectural historiography, one should better revisit the concept of image along with its historical development in order to locate the concerns architecture over cinema, or cinema over architecture more delicately, regarding the fact that the intended inquiry posits itself in a blurry intersection of each discipline concerns about.

The seminal works \textit{Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology} by Mitchell\textsuperscript{45} and \textit{Towards a Philosophy of Photography} by Flusser\textsuperscript{46} will form the approach of this part, as both works reveal unfamiliar perspectives in the conception of image; the relationship between ideology and image in the modern cultural critique in the former, and the introduction of technology, more of a technical manner, in formation of image and its effect on the epistemological context in the latter. What is inspiring about Mitchell’s approach is his discussion of image in the historical timeline with


discourses on image generally with its possible and apparent relations with other discourses and disciplines like art, literature, language etc. and superimposing that construction of image onto historical development of the social subject itself, by which he interrogates for the conception of image in social, political and cultural context.

As the word space, the word image also refers to several different meanings in distinct domains it is employed. One may hesitate to say that it is distorted in meaning like the word space; however, the ambiguity comes from the word itself. It refers to tangible entities as it refers to intangible entities as well. Mitchell states that one has to do a recursive thinking in any interrogation about image, for “the very idea about an “idea” itself is bound to the notion of imagery.”\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, Flusser identifies the image as a surface, a significant surface, which can be recognized “at a single glance yet [this] remains superficial.”\textsuperscript{48} One of the approaches seems rather epistemological, and the other semiotic but profoundly phenomenological, they both refer to several different meanings of the word.\textsuperscript{49}

What Flusser stresses on in his approach of which he constructs a new methodology concerning about photography with a bold postulation and keen interest how photography and image making should be reconsidered in the light of new technological premises and changes. He sets his framework fundamentally on new arguments; therefore he refuses to construct his approach in a historical timeline about photography or image, positing himself from a new perspective, which is critically phenomenological, rather than referring to past discussions about imagery. He uses the word ‘superficial’ to emphasize the nature of imagery in such a framework that can be regarded as anthropocentric, constructing the significance of image on human’s gaze.\textsuperscript{50} He states that if one wants “to deepen the significance to

\textsuperscript{47} Mitchell. \textit{Iconology}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{48} Flusser. \textit{Towards a Philosophy of Photography}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{49} The study does not emphasize any of the explanations. For several different meanings of the word please go online for http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91618?skey=PfEVuz&result=1#eid (accessed on October 13, 2014).

\textsuperscript{50} Mitchell. \textit{Iconology}, p. 13. As the existence of several different explanations of imagery, those differing approaches refer to different conceptions. For example, a conception focuses on image being “window on the world” referring to the times of Renaissance, holding the primacy of sensation in the
reconstruct abstracted dimensions”51 for such spaces of interpretation, one needs to let his gaze stroll and roam over the surface of the image. On the course, he emphasizes paths that the gaze follows, one is the structure of the image, and the other is the observer’s intention.

While Flusser focuses on the primacy of the observer and nature of the image—as it were, Mitchell looks for cultural codes in the transcendental stance of the image in the modern cultural critique. The recognition of image is no more than an enigma for the modern criticism, and it is way beyond the understanding that it is the perfect, transparent media that reality can be understood through. He writes,

The commonplace of modern studies of images, in fact, is that they must be understood as a kind of language; instead of providing a transparent window on the world, images are now regarded as the sort of sign that presents a deceptive appearance of naturalness and transparence concealing an opaque, distorting, arbitrary mechanism of representation, a process of ideological mystification.52

Such an understanding looks for an inquiry of image in the modern scene in the case of image making or the process of this phenomenon with regards to its operative integers. In order to identify integers accurately—be it political, social or cultural—the position and stance of social subject in this particular historiography is an important figure for interrogation regarding the fact that image is not just a sign for several constructions, but a character and history that participates in the process in a manner that quests for possible conceptions of representation, albeit changing technologies demolished the classical paradigm of it.53

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53 Ibid., p. 9 and 37-38; Jale N Erzen. “Çevre Sanatı”. It is important to stress that this study does not emphasize only image and its—so to say—false perceptions in the process of several constructions,
On this account, regarding the technological advances on the optical devices since *camera obscura*, Flusser urges to dig for the image producing process, which he defines it as ‘technical image’ that is produced by apparatuses. He states that for apparatuses and their status one needs to investigate the status of the apparatuses along with the very etymology of the word. In accordance to him, the very phenomenological status of an apparatus refers to culture, since it is produced out of the natural world. He constitutes a framework that distinguishes the natural science from the cultural one on the account of the observer who actually owns a particular intention in producing such cultural goods. So that, the apparatus become a tool in the hands of an observer, “whose intention is to produce photographs.” Following the same context with Mitchell, Flusser asserts:

Tools in the usual sense tear objects from the natural world in order to bring them to the place (produce them) where the human being is. In this process they change the form of these objects: They imprint a new, intentional form onto them. They ‘inform’ them: The object acquires an unnatural, improbable form; it becomes cultural.

In reference to Flusser, the apparatus used in producing images created not only their form with replicas, but a derivative knowledge as well. Furthermore, it created a culture in the light of questions not “why?” only, “what for” too. Those questions especially architecture. It refers to a condition that image making in the modern scene should be regarded as a paradigm by which one has to enquire into the knowledge that particular process produces. As Mitchell states: “It is important to guard against misunderstanding here. I am not arguing for some facile relativism that abandons ‘standards of truth’ or the possibility of valid knowledge. I am arguing for a hard, rigorous, relativism that regards knowledge as a social product, a matter of dialogue between different versions of the world, including different languages, ideologies, and modes of representations.” William JT Mitchell. *Iconology*, p. 38.


Ibid., p. 23.

Ibid., p. 22. Flusser asks these questions in a phenomenological framework, obviously. However, noting the cultural stance that Flusser points to, the modern cultural criticism provides a wide area on this subject. Despite Mitchell approaches the modern cultural criticism cautiously, since it somehow conceals few points—especially ontological ones, upon which the institutionalized discourses make use of the notion imagery—and limits the scale of discussion of image, he also mentions about “an arbitrary mechanism of representation” which actually is a consequence of disconnection between the object and its image (representation). As Agrest points to, disconnection in that manner is also tangible in architectural discussions. On this account, the representative relation, whom the human body constructs between the representation and the object in the vast domain of discussion on image, rules out the social subject from the process in the discussion about an arbitrary mechanism and structural relationships. In social and cultural domains, that particular structural relationship generally referred as a hidden structure, which is one of the main premises that Karl Marx addresses in his works, and it is quested on the account of social and cultural shifts by many names along with Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, Jean Baudrillard, Guy Debord and Walter Benjamin. Walter Benjamin digs
address the intention of the social subject (the photographer, the cinematographer, etc.) in reference to Mitchell, and the optical tools in a phenomenological manner in accordance to Flusser. For the reason that, as Mitchell paraphrases Ernst H. Gombrich, “there is no vision without purpose, innocent eye is blind”, locating the social subject right in the midst of such a framework provides a potential critique for Modernism and historical status of the social subject within Modernism in general sense, and a locus for the architectural representation through which the status of an observer (as the social subject) and its participation in implementation of any architectural deed regarding that the documentation of such act is conducted via optical devices (cinema, photography, etc.); as once Crary noted, “a history of vision (if such is even possible) depends on far more than an account of shifts in representational practices”.

2.1 Dialectical Image

In order to enquire into a framework to locate image accurately and to clarify the stance of imagery in its neighbouring discourses and disciplines that imagery has a contribution to, the cultural domain as Flusser points to remains significant. As a further matter, the stance of the social subject in the process of image since the nineteenth century as explored by Crary should be deployed within the cultural field as well, if one to examine the image and spectacle relationship via architectural scene.


58 Crary. Techniques of the Observer, p. 5. In this sense, it is important to point out the method that Crary uses, which the study will also follow, inhales a bold Foucauldian instrumentalization in the manner of being “genealogical”: “I don't believe the problem can be solved by historicizing the subject as posited by the phenomenologists, fabricating a subject that evolves through the course of history. One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.” Michel Foucault. Power/Knowledge, p. 117.
In order to base the claims on solid theoretical ground in a valid framework, one shall carry on the concept of dialectical image of Benjamin. His seminal book *The Arcades Project* has critical points about the methodology of Benjamin and it is more accurate to analyse his works about art production in several forms, like photography and film. One should note, Benjamin’s concern about art and both its mode and ways of production actually lies in Frankfurt School’s general approach upon aesthetics. Martin Jay argues about two main strains of aesthetic criticism endowed by the Institute as; 1) a bold socialist realism that is shaped around a strong political partisanship, therefore holding a primacy of the creator/producer and 2) an approach which prioritizes the value of art by its “inherent social significance” than the intention of the creator/producer. The first one, which is employed by the hostility to artistic Modernism of any kind, was engaged with mostly Leninist theory, whereas the latter retained Engels thrift. The evident hostility upon artistic Modernism grounded on, as Jay indicates, “their alleged formalism and subjectivity.” The Institute’s position regarding the intellect considered in a social vacuum consequently tackled culture “as a human endeavour and material existence as a lesser aspect of man’s condition.” Still, Max Horkheimer of the Institute, informs Jay, argued about artistic phenomenon as an individual creativity, which resulted as considering the artistic subject as social as well as an individual. Thus, every artistic act resulted as a work of art intuitively inhere objective social tendencies. Jay writes,

> Although the spontaneity of subjective creativity was a necessary element in genuine art, it could realize itself only through objectification. And objectivity inevitably meant working with materials already filtered through existing social matrix. Thus in turn meant the necessity of at least some reification.

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59 Walter Benjamin proposes his “dialectical image” on the accounts of means and relations of production. I shall stress that the interrogation that I proceed on, be it visual or culture in general, will have connotations in this manner. The exploration that Crary does on the observer through nineteenth century is not solely in a political context obviously, however, Crary indicates several political connotations inevitably, since he traces the technological advances on the optical devices as well, and refers to works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault and Walter Benjamin. In this regard, the concept of “dialectical image” is a convenient tool for setting a prominent historical index for image conception, noting that the general approach still remains genealogical.


Actually, one should also note, Eugene Lunn makes one of the pivotal departures along the theoretical debates upon Marxism as he explores around a political—aesthetic encounter. Similarly, George Lichtheim states that “[w]est Germany today, unlike its Eastern neighbour beyond the wall, provides a meeting place of Marxism and Modernism. Some such encounter had already begun in the later years of counter-revolution and war, might have set the tone for the intellectual élite in the country as a whole.”64 The exposition of such encounter has merits discussing on in the case of Modernism and the intrinsic dynamic potency of Marxist critique. If one hears Terry Eagleton’s words on conventional approaches on representation and aesthetics, it would be more delicate to locate Modernism:

Modernism stresses the material character of art forms themselves, in contrast to the Marxist Platonism which would see art as a mere “copy” or immaterial reflection of a world elsewhere. It deploys multiple, ironic, contradictory perspectives, dismantles the consolatory “unities” of bourgeois individualism, exploits the “shock effects” of montage and fantasy to disrupt routine social consciousness, denies the artefact any metaphysical absolutism by its sceptical self-reflectiveness, and reveals a bold trust in technological experiment.65

Pursuing the same path, Eagleton concludes as; “[On the contrary,] the complex of experimental twentieth-century aesthetics we label “modernism” would seem a far more suitable medium for revolutionary politics.”66 It is the junction where makes the two understandings meet: the primacy of materiality triggered the two major thought streams, where any Modernist art practice (as an eminent Modernist medium, film for example) was an appropriate site for laying a critique upon society, and the condition of subject was another intriguing stance for this particular critique. With the critique based on material character and subject’s role, Modernism does not only engage with political insight per se, but also is the only site where one can determine what is related to architecture or not paradoxically. In addition, the political position that Benjamin maintains distinguishes him from more orthodox

66 Ibid.
critiques by “refusing to reduce cultural phenomenon to an ideological reflex of class interests” as Jay notes.

Image for Benjamin as stated before, in reference to Weigel, is not a word but an entity and tangible tool for constituting his claims. Weigel defines his approach as “thinking in images”. His description of image as a constellation of resemblances beyond form-content relationship points Weigel, is one of the main differences that distinguishes Benjaminian understanding of image from mental and material images which are the basic conceptions for concern about representation. Still, Benjamin sees image as writing rather than representations. She writes,

Benjamin’s manner of writing and manner of thinking cannot be seen as separate, that his thinking-in-images constitutes his specific and characteristic way of theorizing, of philosophizing, and of writing, and that his writings cannot be seen in terms of a dualistic opposition of form and content.

One should realize that, in accordance to Mitchell’s categorization of image definitions, Benjamin’s approach could be noted as seeing “the literal sense of the word image as a resolutely non- even anti-pictorial notion.” Image as in Mitchell’s account, is a fundamental principle that Foucault once defined as “the order of things”.

“The image is the general notion,” says Mitchell, “ramified in various specific similitudes that holds the world together with “figures of knowledge”.” In historical development of image, Mitchell distinguishes that pictorial representation and function of representation subjugated the conceptualization of image especially after the inauguration of perspectival concerns in the Renaissance. In this respect, Mitchell notes that the notion of image is therefore a phenomenon whose appropriate discourses are philosophy and theology, the two words of which Benjamin conjoins together in order to fashion his critical approach.

As Weigel asserts, The Arcades Project is a consistent work of Benjamin both in form and content by which book is constructed via the method of montage of

67 Jay. The Dialectical Imagination, p. 178.
69 Ibid., p. 50.
70 Mitchell. Iconology, p. 31.
72 Mitchell. Iconology, p. 11.
different passages. It is comprised of several convolutes, one of which is the prominent about his conception of image. The Convolute N is one of the key passages to the methodology of Benjamin and his conception of dialectical image. He constructs a new thinking of history, which actually liberates the timeline from the chronological understanding of history, pointing a historical index in which one cannot talk about a continuous set of events through modernity. He constructs his critical approach in his analysis as,

It may be considered as one of the methodological objectives of this work to demonstrate a historical materialism which has annihilated within itself the idea of progress. Just here, historical materialism has every reason to distinguish itself sharply from bourgeois habits of thought. Its founding concept is not progress but actualization. ([N2,2])

Although ambiguous by definition and theory, dialectical image has been a site of investigation for many prominent authors and thinkers. However, considering the scope and the intent of this study, dialectical image provides a solid framework to wander into the inquiry of conception of image in reference to Mitchell and Flusser. What is striking about dialectical image is, on one hand, with the words of Max Pensky, “unlike concepts, the claim to immediacy inherent in the graphic image contains the potential to interrupt, hence to counteract modes of perception and cognition that have become second nature.” Furthermore and more significantly, in terms of temporality, it presents a multi-temporality in which the appropriation of such artistic acts or representative deeds in architectural and urban historiography provides a critical window. The celebrated passage from The Convolute N reads as,

It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on the past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the

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relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly emergent. – Only dialectical images are genuine images (that is, not archaic). [“Awakening”, N2a, 3]76

If there is a construction via images elaborated through several knowledges as Mitchell and Flusser suggest, for Benjamin and his analysis of historical index, that particular construction leads the very conventional understanding of history in which, where Pensky outlines, past and present is related with each other in one way, past being a narrative construction for the present, which thereby comprehends it. However, in Benjamin’s case, Pensky expresses that “past and present are constantly locked in a complex interplay”, an interplay which coincides on historical timeline that is not a realm for the image to come together to form a constellation. Benjamin constructs a temporal state that is not a matter of a continuous past and present, but a reciprocal “what-has-been” and “now”, by which he expands the meaning but more importantly he also expands the operative area of the, say, social relationship or societal norms; in order to “cultivate a capacity for recognizing such moments.”77

Nevertheless, what is glancing in Benjamin’s approach is again the location and condition of the subject in the “actualization”78 process. Pensky writes,

Theory, for Benjamin, in general always requires the stability of a (theorizing) subject and the imposition of subjective intention on the structure of historical time; the invariable effect of even the best-intentioned theory is a certain pacification of history and hence the loss of the capacity for recognizing sites where past and present lose their familiar contours.79

“If Benjamin understands the image as a constellation,” writes Weigel, “then image here describes a heterogeneous, or heteromorphous, relation of resemblances.”80 By this particular definition and abovementioned approaches, image for Benjamin is a tangible tool which “wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation”81 that experience, history and reality becomes recognizable and visible in it. He regards the city as an assemblage in different layers, an

76 Benjamin. The Arcades Project, p. 462.
77 Ibid., p. 181.
78 Benjamin. The Arcades Project, p. 460.
80 Weigel. Body-and Image-Space, p. 47.
81 Benjamin. The Arcades Project, p. 462.
organism in a multiple temporal state, all of which has become concrete in Parisian Arcades that he meticulously articulates;\(^82\) every temporal state that is inherent in urban is visualized by an image. If one to pick his lines; an image that “distinguishes images from the “essences” of phenomenology” by a “historical index”, and “[e]very present day is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each “now” is the now of a particular recognizability”\(^83\) [N3, 1]. In this respect, Benjamin actualizes a theological tradition along the philosophical one in the historical development of image, which maintains a twofold approach in accordance to Weigel: “as images in relation to which his thoughts and theoretical reflections unfold, and also as images whose representations are translated into figures of thought”.\(^84\) Yet, while defining such moments, he points to the social condition, “objective crystallizations of the historical process”\(^85\) as Jay noted.

On the other hand, dialectical image as a text or concept be contemplated differently “due to its extremely ambiguous status as a text”\(^86\) as Susan Buck-Morss contends. Among prominent authors about Benjamin, Pensky locates dialectical image in cultural criticism domain, regarding its indecisive, indeterminate condition. In accordance to him, Benjamin regards dialectical image both as the “quintessence of method” and the “historical object, which “generates from detritus material memory, rather than merely preserves as a mode of the transmission of dominant cultural traditions.”\(^87\) Such that, he condemns the concept for retaining the graphic character of cultural artefacts, which cannot be used in an analysis that inhales a critique of historical economic production. However, Benjamin states that “dialectical images as models are not social products but objective constellations in which the social condition represents itself”, \(^88\) by which he constructs a temporal state that occurs in a flash that knowledge is also treated in. The constellation that he

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\(^{83}\) Benjamin. The Arcades Project, pp. 462-463.

\(^{84}\) Weigel. Body-and Image-Space, p. 48.

\(^{85}\) Jay. The Dialectical Imagination, p. 207.


\(^{87}\) Max Pensky. “Geheimmittel: Advertising and Dialectical Images In Benjamin’s Arcades Project”, in Walter Benjamin and The Arcades Project, p. 114. The emphases are original.

\(^{88}\) Benjamin. The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, pp. 499-500.
achieves by “no periods of decline”\textsuperscript{89} [N1, 6] is legible via “knowledge[s] comes only in lighting flashes”\textsuperscript{90} [N1, 1] as well. Thus, dialectical image as a concept, refers to a cluster in which cultural and social conditions finds its representations, “which is constituted by discontinuity as a fundamental practice of historiography”\textsuperscript{91} as Weigel asserts.

In the actualization process, although Benjamin looks for the removal of the subjective element from the construction of images, still the objectivity of dialectical image and the role of a theorizing subject (for Benjamin) are not articulated in reference to Pensky. Benjamin analyses the condition of modernity in which the subject holds a paradoxical, an indecisive position;

\begin{quote}
Ambiguity is the appearance of dialectic in images, the law of dialectics at a standstill. This standstill is utopia and the dialectical image, therefore, dream image. Such an image is afforded by the commodity per se: as fetish. Such an image is presented by the arcades, which are house no less than street. Such an image is the prostitute—seller and sold in one.\textsuperscript{92}
\end{quote}

The condition of the subject, as everyone would suggest, has always been a conflict in imagery. Yet, its construction in a given period is of importance as well. Regarding the non-linear historical approach of Benjamin in which he forms constellations by what-has-been and now coming together in a flash, Foucault’s regard of history mentioned in the introduction chapter coincide with Benjamin on the account of the subject. As stated before, Foucault’s ethical period that analyses the experience on the technologies of the self by the problematization or sexual conduct in antiquity in order to construct the subject of knowledge, and possible forms of subjectivity, if vulgarly said.\textsuperscript{93} Weigel asserts that his project on the technologies of the self grounded on ancient history, regarding his concern based on the relationship between sign and subject originated in modern thought, is also a “constellation in which the male constitutes himself as subject both of sexual and of

\textsuperscript{89} Benjamin. \textit{The Arcades Project}, p. 458.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 456.
\textsuperscript{91} Weigel. \textit{Body-and Image-Space}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{92} Benjamin. “Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century <Exposé of 1935>”, p. 10.
discursive practices.”\footnote{Weigel. \textit{Body-and Image-Space}, p. 31.} Benjamin on the other hand, references texts from nineteenth and twentieth century, yet, he focuses on the subject as well; in his account, considering the author as a “true subject of \textit{modernité}”\footnote{Walter Benjamin. \textit{Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism}, translated by Harry Zohn, Verso: London, 1997, p. 74.} among other subjects like prostitutes, and flâneurs. In this respect, among the institutional and governmental discourses that constitutes the subject, it is useful “to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself \textit{qua} subject”\footnote{Foucault. \textit{The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure}, p. 6. The emphasis is original.} as once Foucault noted.
Figure 2.1 Las Meninas, Diego Velázquez, 1656. Retrieved from wikipedia.org.
2.2 Physical Space & Virtual Space

On the account of representation, albeit its status changes via technology but more importantly by the position and theorization of social subject as mentioned above, it still needs a defined Cartesian planar surface; a space whether physical or virtual to be implemented on. When it comes to the representative status of an architectural practice, it becomes more eminent. Yet, if one explores the approaches to space in representative arts, it is obvious that the differing concepts about space are based on solely a raw symbolism. Nevertheless, the glancing point on this matter is, through the succession of one representative act to the other, the space is shaped and defined in accordance to the subjective eye that the space is looked to/through.

Three-dimensional space is the fibre of architecture; its representation in two-dimensional form accompanied by the medium of time in virtual motion is the fabric of the film. Although the two disciplines are continuously and flawlessly in a state of reciprocal feedback since the beginning of twentieth century, especially engaged with the avant-garde, treatment of space in each medium by their professionals differs, as an expected routine. Along the historically articulated cross-medium relationship by the prominent thinkers as stated before, the relationship between the two terminologically challenged the boundaries of the words that are particularly related to disciplines. “Space, time and architecture”\textsuperscript{97} for example, coined by Sigfried Giedion, is evidently one of the texts among others that regards architecture in a newly defined framework, which concerns about not only form but connotes the spatial experiment, subject’s spatial experience as well.

If Modernism in architecture is considered, especially in the beginning of the twentieth century, architectural agenda was busy with pure geometrical forms, white walls, and designated attributes named under International Style. These attributes, considering fundamentally the form, were somehow canonized as how a Modern architecture should be regarded, around common keywords that Modernism also concerns about in art; transparency, space-time articulation, interpenetration,

interlocking, superimposition, and so on, which present similar implications, yet, are tools providing a vast field for critical approaches on behalves. Transparency for example, in reference to Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky, is one of the tools to distinguish the Modernist reflex as form, regarding that the tool precisely refers to not only a geometrical attitude, but also a definition that explores the space without a defined metrical syntax. In accordance to them, transparency distinguishes between essence and appearance, content and form that, as Rowe tries to locate the exact essence of geometry in Modernism in the sense of so called Modernist canons, premises, or keywords like transparency. Although produced and designed in Modernist era, the building itself may be Modernist in form, however, especially in spatial organization, it may serve as a common, conventional building from the 16th century. Therefore, Modernism in architecture prioritizes the subject’s spatial experience rather than the building’s geometrical attributes.

During the course of movements replacing one another in the realms of art, if the Modernist historiography is considered, the succeeding movements from Symbolism in the late nineteenth century to Cubism in the early twentieth century—which is omnipotent in architectural agenda as well, especially European based Modern architecture, distinguishes itself especially on the subject level. This was particularly obvious on the scene of painting, grounding itself on revolutionary formal changes. Cubism profoundly offers juxtaposition and superimposition of different angles and moments in space and time, demolishing the custom of a stationary observer with a fixed featureless objective order of seeing. In implementation of such aesthetic order, especially in painting, the cubists altered space depiction; as Lunn asserts “it is significant that colo[u]rs usually used by the cubists for architectural, not poetic or emotive purposes.” Nevertheless, the camera’s ability to document the spatial experience of the subject, as well as the spatial quality of the building precisely still is of question.

On photographic representation of architecture, especially on the account of Mies van der Rohe's architectural pieces, Zimmerman argues that “[t]he factual information they [black-and-white photographs] provide about architectural attributes is inadequate, misleading, and distorted, and better reasons for their existence can be adduced than the provision of accurate information about the physical characteristics of a given place and space.”¹⁰¹ In terms of architectural representation, the images depict the beginning decades of the Modernist Movement in architecture are the most faithful documentations consulted both for comprehension of the Movement's dynamics and, considering the latter stage, history writing and theorizing the basics of Modernist Movement in architecture. Thus, the photographic medium apart from early narrative accounts and texts of Modernism, as Sarah Williams Goldhagen states, “helped to artificially produce coherence in the message.”¹⁰² However, these photographs concealed some of the distinguishing attributes of Modernist architectural examples that Zimmerman also takes into consideration.

On photographic documentation Zimmerman, referencing German critic Willi Warstat, states “the camera records proportional relationships in two dimensions, height and width, with relative reliability. In the third dimension, however, in its record of depth, the photographic negative deceives.”¹⁰³ In terms of architectural representation, she argues about the transformation of this representative device introduces and creation of a new architectural experience rather than the particularly subjected or documented architectural scene actually provides. The alteration Zimmerman mentions, describes a different spatial construction; manipulation in this manner creates a new reality, instead of a representing one. On the other hand, André Bazin, states that, of the representational acts in arts, the supremacy of photography to painting is in its very objectivity (objectivité). Thus, he connotes, the lenses that replaces the human eye and emerges as the eye of the photography, be named as

“objectif”. Disregarding any social counterpart an image embodies, the process of an image production counts in a certain degree of subjectivity through selection, framing or personalisation. On one hand, on a deeper level, although consumer market made one to go for video or still-photography cameras in which all the aesthetic choices automated that are black-boxed to the user, which clearly inhales social and aesthetic norms, still it is the social subject who takes the image. On the other hand, despite obvious subjective aspects as such, if one to connote Benjamin, the aura of machine still holds on to the mechanical and electronic process of image production. Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright argue that all images generated by cameras, whether they are photographically achieved, cinematographically achieved, or electronically achieved, embed the still photography heritage culturally in regard to positivism that the camera was counted as scientific apparatus. The juxtaposition or more unerring, superimposition of the subjective and objective aspects in this particular process, they conclude, “is a central tension in camera-generated images”.

In an agenda as such in the early twentieth century, in order to achieve multi-perspectival order, as an eminent medium, film was a site of practice in creating such aesthetic order as well. However, on the account of cinema and film production, Annette Kuhn wares about this kind of subjectivity introduces ideological analyses and social condition surveys as an inherent issue to the case, especially in space construction discussions. “Practices of looking are intimately tied to ideology” note Sturken and Cartwright, drawing attention to “diverse and often conflicting ideologies” in visual culture arena, while locating the individual right next to social structures through which several ideologies are conducted. Although space constructions—be it virtual, planar or physical—pursue the discussions on the raw symbolism in cinema, it provides a site for ideological analysis, which is constructive for interrogation the condition of social subject. Vidler argues,

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The body, in its anatomical corporeality, together with all its prosthetic accoutrements, still obstructs total virtuality; architectural space, in its role as a stimulator of mental introjection (memory) and physical and psychical projection (event), still retains its primal power to capture the body; filmic media, as simulated movement in movement, and simulated space in two dimensions, still operates as an analytical instrument akin to that of the surgeon’s scalpel or psychoanalyst’s couch, to discover and display all the lapses of memory and consciousness.109

Vidler points the filmic medium for the spatial experimentation of architecture; however, he argues that the medium is not only the best choice for depiction of the movement in space and space in movement, “it also unpacked the modern subject’s spatial unconscious and its layers of (repressed) memories.”110 In accordance to him, optic devices used in such process and particular representational acts conducted in representory spaces like screen for film, or two-dimensional tabular images of photography helped the subject to gain a political insight that he treats with what he/she sees. He writes,

Drawing on all of the yet-untapped resources and devices inherited from the modernist avant-gardes, while using more and more sophisticated digital technology, yesterday’s simulated virtual environments are transformed into today’s real virtual environments, or rather, into environments constructed in the world of four-dimensional sensory perception out of virtual materials that project multivalent and other environments en abîme.111

Considering space, the case in Las Meninas as painting is the same considering optical tools that ranges from camera obscura to modern day cameras; even it is superficial in context, in performance arts that requires some specific set designs like theatre, the perceptive space is shaped with regards to perspectival concerns. So, one should not regard interdisciplinary experiments “not as failed total utopias, nor as lost disciplinary practices”, as Vidler encourages, “but rather as elaborate conversations between private subjects in a newly constituted public realm.”112

Space eventually is a physical entity, the tools that the architect utilizes may differ in

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110 Ibid., ix.
111 Ibid., x.
112 Ibid., xii.
the course of history, but eventually what architect concerns about is physical space, not an entity that is augmented in reality with the technological devices. Similarly, the frame in which the space is depicted looks for the physically tangible spaces either it is designed just for scenery. Regarding the substantiality of photograph, or a more preceding example like stereoscope, the planar stance of image is similar to classical set design, which as Crary argues, combines planar surfaces and perspectival actual space into a non-existent, imaginary scene. However, what Crary distinguishes is that the “theatrical space is still perspectival in that the movement of actors on a stage generally rationalizes the relation between points.” Therefore, the status of social subject is implicit to the case; however, respective consequences of such relation to the representational practices are worth for exploration in order to distinguish representative power of architecture.

CHAPTER 3

ACT TWO: ON HISTORICAL SUBJECT

All is grounded on a simple optical principle. If a light traces through a hole to a darkened enclosure, it will generate an inverted image of what is on the exterior scene. As an incipient form, the camera obscura is always the inaugural model for the modern-day photographic cameras, if one to commence a history of film or photography. The inception of inverted image, but particularly the process of such formation holds the core argument for the pejorative stance of image and its engagement with diverse disciplines in theoretical debates. With the implied characterization of different eras, vision and space have always been the primary operative fields of modernity. This chapter will focus on the visual cluster as a predecessor to spatial one, which the study intents to explore in the forthcoming chapter.

If one shall have a quick glance in Jay’s works, he attends to the issue of vision and visuality accompanied by questions about aesthetics in *The Dialectical Imagination*, one of which is a concise historical work about Benjamin and his contemporaries that this study also enjoys its assets and convenience. In his later works, he deals with the matters about vision and visuality in a sustained and steady manner; where he compounds the intellectual history with vision that one might call “history of visual culture or a cultural history of vision”. It is apparent that vision cannot be approached in a way that it was only a faculty of some natural outcomes, disregarded

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from historical and cultural fields. The visitation of such faculty accompanied by visual technologies, manifests itself way too intense in everyday experience on a minor scale, as well as historical manifestations of different ways and practices of seeing and looking on a major scale, which one can define as Jay calls it, borrowing the term from Christian Metz, “scopic regimes”.\textsuperscript{116} While he links the two, the intellectual history with vision, he refers to the antagonism to totality concept, which “was often accompanied by scepticism about the possibility of a totalizing gaze, a God’s eye view, of the whole.”\textsuperscript{117} In accordance to him, the questions that concerns about philosophy and social theory are in close relation with the manner of entitling vision in the first place. The very knowledge produced on a social theory is incepted by hegemony of vision, or the critique upon any social condition is credited to a visual order, be it representation or social groupings.

As an emergent field in the last two decades, visual culture entails multiple perspectives. On one hand, it encompasses examining and establishing aesthetic values and power relations within culture with a manner that centres vision and visual concern. On the other, respectively, it provides “an entire range of analyses and interpretations of the audio, the spatial, and of the psychic dynamics of the spectatorship”\textsuperscript{118} as Irit Rogoff puts it. Hence, the way one looks to a particular image or representation inhales much more complexity due to the hegemony of image in the contemporary age. Rogoff suggests that visual culture; due to its framework and the way it handles the issues, provides a “free play of signifier” by which “to understand meaning in relation to images, sounds or spaces not necessarily perceived to operate in a direct, casual, or epistemic relation to either their context or to one another”\textsuperscript{119} contrary to what a cultural formation normally does. “The complexity of representation lies [then] in its embeddedness in cultural forms”\textsuperscript{120} says Richard Dyer, pointing various different ways of social construction via images.


\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 25.

However, he contends that such construction is related to the society’s self-examination, the very social grouping that it creates itself. Therefore, he points to a social condition, which representation not only refers to through image, but also affects it with diverse cultural norms, if necessary re-construct it through other modes such as relations of production and its relation to reality. “Representation is the organisation of the perception of these into comprehensibility”\textsuperscript{121} as Dyer puts it. In addition, concerning about multiple perspectives in visual culture, it is a field that interrogates how visual studies and chains of reasoning about vision constrained to a particular narration, which generally obliged to pursue a linear timeline that one might normally consider stagist. Visual culture has the ability to offer multi-temporality in which realism, modernism or post-modernism intermingles together, not in an orderly succession, but through a multi-temporal perspective. Therefore, the visual turn, as Jay calls it, heralds a multi-temporal heterogeneity in which proclaims “the simultaneous, superimposed spatio-temporalities which characterise the contemporary social text”\textsuperscript{122} as Ella Shohat and Robert Stam suggests.

Space as the arena in which representation depicted in the field of vision, is always differentiated in reference to Dyer. Due to cultural norms constituted via imagery, it is equipped with unrecognized obstacles, which makes one not to see what is out there and what one expects to see. It is always differentiated in the sense that, as Rogoff states, “it is always sexual or racial; it is always constituted out of circulating capital; and it is always subject to the invisible boundary lines that determine inclusions and exclusions.”\textsuperscript{123} The visual realm, therefore, with the provided multi-temporal perspective and free play of the signifier as stated above, opens way to differing epistemic constructions. The way of looking that was blessed by the scientific tools can be analysed through power relations; who is allowed to look, or with what intent that is sanctioned under which particular discourses one looks, and how the visual realm transforms it. Jonathan L. Beller suggests the term “cinematic mode of production” which cinema, or any other contemporary visual realm are

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Rogoff. “Studying Visual Culture”, p. 32.
regarded as “deterritorialized factories in which spectators work, that is, in which they perform value-productive labo[u]r.”¹²⁴ He asserts that such transformative act of the visual realm creates its own vocabulary like “virtual reality” and “visuality”. If the mode and relations of production is considered, “the transformation of the visual from a zone of unalienated creative practice to one of alienated labo[u]r” he says, “is the result of capital accumulation, the historical agglomeration of the exploited labo[u]r.”¹²⁵ One not only faces the image on the screen, but challenges and enquires into the logistics of the image, or image-driven event also. In the age of the visual, the ones who maintain themselves as images in a capital labour, dramatically labours the image as it happens. Therefore, it is important to note that the field itself is vacated of any political dynamics or models of subjectivity. As Rogoff claims, “it is a neutral field in which some innocent eye is deployed by an unsituated viewer.”¹²⁶

Although the representational artefacts are the main apparatuses that a discussion about vision is conducted through, and devices from camera obscura to modern day cameras are the eminent and ruling tools of a historical interrogation, one should note that it is important to emphasize the historical problems about vision are not dependent on the accuracy of representational artefacts; therefore a historical examination of such is irrelevant. As some would suggest, visual studies entails far more than what is intended, if the historical and cultural outcomes is considered. It necessitates looking for far beyond the conventional approaches of art history that once Foucault achieved with his interpretation of Las Meninas, and further than what Mitchell coined as rhetoric of images.

Having its range extended to cover entire exposition of optical experience, all alternative forms of visual practice, Jay informs that visual culture somehow blesses anything with democratic inclusivity and urges one to become “empowered to pronounce” words like “spectacle, gaze, surveillance and scopic regimes”.¹²⁷ He asserts in such culture of vision, the terminology refreshes itself due to the entailing

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¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 63.
features; once named as “filmic fact” he examples, “subsumed under cinematic fact, which includes the entire ideological apparatus surrounding it.” To him, culture makes it possible to include everything that an object is involved in; therefore, there is no need for a distinction between the visual object and context, since there is no need to demarcate the object of inquiry in the given discipline any longer. Anything visualized can be the object of scholarly inquiry including all exposition of visual environment and all demonstration of visual experience. Insofar, as long as the technological advances assist or encourage the image production increasingly in an uncontrolled manner into everyday experience, one should enquire into the very politics of their existence, rather than treating them only as a sign of representation or a depiction. Similarly, Crary encourages disregarding the contemporary media products and mass-cultural objects as a field of inquiry; instead, as “a persistent temptation”, he suggests, “to maintain the fiction of a continuous historical space in which all images assumed to have some primary visual values” freeing the images from signification and pointing the viewer, the detached observer.

3.1 Subject I: The Observer

Modernism’s operative fields vary, and yet, vision and space are among the eminent ones. Begun with the Renaissance, there is a clear distinction in the representational forms now and then, thanks to the technological advances like challenging printing techniques contested with the invention of printing, and among technology, obviously, the scientific revolution on gone. On the course, the implications of these particular ancestries, so called, are what one shall utilize to determine the hegemonic visual model of modernity. Jay defines this impetus with “Renaissance notions of perspective in the visual arts and Cartesian ideas of subjective rationality in philosophy” which influenced architecture and architectural representational forms obviously, beginning with Alberti. The three-dimensional space can be rendered on a two-dimensional canvas with Alberti’s codes and rules. The new concepts of space is constituted as uniformity with a celebrating attitude towards

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128 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
130 Jay “Scopic Regimes of Modernity”, p. 4.
geometry then to be canonized in the twentieth century art. He quotes from Richard Rorty as he argues about how this model became the reigning visual model of modernity: “in the Cartesian model the intellect inspects entities modelled on retinal images…. In Descartes’ conception—the one that become the basis for ‘modern’ epistemology—it is representations which are in ‘mind’.” However, recognizing the geometrical syntax in the representations depicted in the form of—generally hidden—grids, as a characteristic of 1900’s art, the condition of the viewing eye contemplated.

The celebrated geometrical attitude regards as if one is looking through a hole, with one eye. Such an approach proclaims of a fixated viewer, what a scientific model naturally provides; the eye thus disembodied. Jay nicely identifies this as “a visual take that [is] eternalized”, prioritising Gaze rather Glance, attributing the vision to Godly view. Such an abstract model not only offers a visual model that the relationship between the viewer and the artwork scatters, the gap in-between augments, but also provides the viewing subject to locate itself to a notional point, constructing a condition for an objective viewing: a visual model in which the subject isolates itself, a participant who “fails to recognize its corporeality, its intersubjectivity”, its embedment. This articulation, Jay contends, urged many intellects for examining the totality concept, which covers a striking place in inspecting power relations on the historical import. The notional point, which the viewer stands on, opens up a vast area for scopic regimes with particular discourses, and the main operative area of these were the human body.

The visual models constituted accordingly to the technological advance in every step of a historical timeline dealing with the optical devices have their ability to identify

132 Ibid., p. 7.
133 Ibid., p. 24.
and narrate a social condition themselves. However, these models intuit a human body, an observer whose condition relates to the world by these optic devices, or as the fibre of the optic culture, by images. By the virtue of the scientific revolution especially in the nineteenth century, if the laws of optics are considered, the intent or the concern has a paradigm shift from the geometrical transmission of light and the mechanical process provided by the apparatus to the physical treatment of the human sight, as Crary well demonstrated. He asserts that the physiological construction of the subject in the field of vision is a moment that refers to a time “when the visible escapes from the timeless order of the camera obscura and becomes lodged in another apparatus, within the unstable physiology and temporality of the human body.”

He writes,

On the one hand are those who pose an account of ever-increasing progress toward verisimilitude in representation, in which Renaissance perspective and photography are part of the same quest for a fully objective equivalent of “natural vision”. On the other are those who see, for example, the camera obscura and cinema as bound up in a single enduring apparatus of power, elaborated over several centuries, that continues to define and regulate the status of an observer.

If one has a glance in the history of vision, although the fulfilment and conduct of vision vary in forms, the introduction of photography and cinema in the nineteenth century and their heavily dissemination in the early twentieth is a succession of cameratic enterprises from camera obscura to photographic camera, through which an ideological and technological development achieved. The purpose of using camera obscura evolved in the course of its historical development, however, the significant change it made through was the use of camera obscura as an artistic device in order to create scientifically true images, and its use as a popular entertainment device, which obviously introduces the spectatorship (Fig. 3.1). The categorisation of camera obscura’s technological development through centuries, such as the incorporation of lens in the sixteenth century, makes one to identify and discern the progressive and continuous shift in utilisation of camera obscura as a device from scientific experimentation and observation to artistic production and

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popular entertainment. In this particular succession of cameratic enterprises one to another, the condition of the subject and possibilities of an observer cannot be regarded as a consequence of the technological development, which obviously is the realm of a multifaceted reality: such as the scientific fact of optics dealing with the light, or the use of devices as apparatuses to make use of the ideological construct.

![Four major types of optical camera obscura](image)

**Figure 3.1** Four major types of optical camera obscura. Included in Wolfgang Lefèvre. *Inside the Camera Obscura*, Planck Institute, 2007.

The use of camera as a photographic and cinematographic apparatus, it is alleged, introduces a completely different realm due to the induction of chemicals first, and the digital process latter. However, since the underlying main principle remains the same, the relationship between the subject and the device is dependent to each other, a relationship in which subject and optical enterprise affects the visionary concept, no matter how the framework and this particular relationship is established. One can rigorously claim that the evolution of the camera towards the photographic and cinematic apparatuses rules out the subject being part of the process due to the mechanical embodiment, yet, vision is a field that entails beyond the basic principles of optic physics. “Vision and its effects,” Crary argues, “are always inseparable from the possibilities of an observing subject who is both the historical product and
the site of certain practices, techniques, institutions, and procedures of subjectification”.

Instead of focusing on the celebrated technological advances that cameratic enterprise is subjected to, or on material character, or on experimentation based on empirical manifestations in which Modernism takes quite most of its part in the history of vision, one can claim that Modernism actually relied on the subject with a detached viewpoint, as Crary encourages. Although Modernism’s operative medium is especially the avant-garde, the avant-garde relied on already defined codes of vision in order to distinguish itself from the conventional approaches and identify a challenging role. It is so that because the media that the avant-garde utilises at most are photography and film, which become powerful especially in the early twentieth century through dissemination. Therefore, in order to detach Modernism from traditional notions of vision, the revolutionary codes modernist vision relied on the subject, on the looking and seeing practices of an observer. It is a bodily structure that does not have its existence through a continually systemic and shifting field of experience. It is a reality embedded within diverse “network of discursive, social, technological, and institutional relations”, as the same case as of vision whose historicity materialised on the subject and become visible through it.

Becoming a requisite site of interrogation, the evolution of optic devices from camera obscura to photographic camera conceives a field of vision whose status among diverse representational agent herald different models of subjectivity, the hegemony of an unanticipated subject-intrusion, one may call. Therefore, the model incepted in which the camera obscura conceived with a subject, lost its generic model in the course of the evolution of optical devices. Thanks to the mechanisation process, and with the help of technology, cameratic enterprise is black-boxed in which the subject decorporealised both from vision and image-making process. Crary notes “the collapse of the camera obscura as a model that conceived on the subject”, where you look for the possibilities for the condition of an observer, is part of a process of modernization in which even camera as an element “define a

139 Crary, *Techniques of the Observer*, p. 5. Emphasis is original.
140 Ibid., p. 6.
“free”, private, and individualized subject”. The consequence of a black-boxed cameratic enterprise, with the excess development of technology as well, is the use of optical devices as the forms of mass entertainment, forming the origins of mass culture. The visual experience, from then on, coincide as new forms of communication, production, consumption, and rationalisation, all of which demanded a new form of subject as well, a subject that is endowed with and prioritise the consumer act. The evolution of the visual experience as such heralds potential connotations both for the subject and the art forms.

Benjamin, in his renowned article from 1936, argues that with the technological developments, the cult and unattainable values of traditional art, which he identifies as “aura”, prevail upon decay under the impact of new cultural technologies. To him, cinema particularly is the finest medium for dispelling the auratic historical function of an artwork. By virtue of technology and mechanisation process, the art freed from the ritual and secular cult of the beauty. With the decay of a spell, the art has the potential in the emancipation of the masses as an instrument. Therefore, “the historical trajectory of art passed from religion to politics”, as Lunn delicately puts it. However, such decay also recalls the consumerism for the individual. As the subject, together with the social advance of the masses and the invention of media like film and photography, which depends on dissemination to the masses, one can easily reach to the artworks that are not independent, unique, and rapidly produced. An idea of mass culture in the good of the masses, as once Benjamin had, disregards the relations of production and endows the subject with diverse perspectives. Considering the status of the subject in the production process of an artwork, ascribing it to a collective self-emancipation agent, coincide with heavy consumerism. Benjamin has the origins of mass culture in The Arcades Project, by which he analyses the arcades of Paris in modernity. He designates the primacy of depersonalisation, and of disregarding any subjective content with the decay of aura and mechanisation process, and looks for new forms of bodily structures. A body, or a collective body which eliminates the anti-political cult of art and disdain for the

142 Ibid., p. 137.
144 Lunn. Marxism and Modernism, p. 152.
masses. While Crary sees the site of such bodily structure in the field of knowledge, Benjamin sees it on a more tangible field, the urban topography. He draws it not only on the architecture of nineteenth century Paris, but on the writings of city planners by which fashions his approach. Architecture is the constructions “play the role of bodily processes”—around which artistic architectures gather” [K1a, 7].

3.2 Subject II: The Flaneur and Kinok

As aforementioned, it is often alleged, Modernism to be embedded with politics. For some, every act concerns about and is conducted in the realms of Modernism, is inherently politic. The belief, as one would expect, grounds on the premise that Modernism stresses the material character, be it an art form or something else. Modernism’s engagement with the technology deploys it with multiple and diverse perspectives, endowed with a continuous scepticism, which, in the end reveals a bold trust in technological experimentation. On the web of experimental aesthetic attempts in the beginning of twentieth century, which clearly influenced architecture, Modernism may have seemed the most proper and satisfactory medium for revolutionary politics. On a different vantage point, apart from a perspective that inquires and has the primacy of material and technology, the politics of Modernism can be found in the modern subject as well. An intriguing social subject on whom Benjamin’s philosophy upon urban topography grounds on, named after flaneur, is firstly introduced by Charles Baudelaire in the second half of nineteenth century. Then Benjamin reconstructed it in the early twentieth century. It refers to an urban figure, which strolls within and around the urban topography or metropolis in order to understand and analyse the premises and outcomes of Modernity as empirical and tangible facts. Benjamin describes the flaneur as,

That anamnestic intoxication in which the flaneur goes about the city not only feeds on the sensory data taking shape before his eyes but often possesses itself of abstract knowledge—indeed, of dead facts—as something experienced and lived through. [M1, 5]

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146 Ibid., p. 417.
This particular critical act reconstructs the sphere of the metropolis both in textual and visual mediums. What Benjamin does while reading the Parisian Arcades is to collect the factual images of urban experience. For Benjamin, the capitalist origins of modernity can be achieved by analysing the Parisian Arcades, and the individual has to potential for producing knowledge for social reality by passive observation. In addition, any change occurring in the morphology of the cityscape and in the mode of production identifies the role of the flaneur as an urban subject. The flaneur as a figure embodies several historical forms; be it a prostitute, a passer-by, the industrial worker, or an architect. The flaneur “saturates modern existence”, and “provides philosophical insight into the nature of modern subjectivity”,147 as Buck-Morss puts it. Therefore, flaneur is a critical, active producer; wandering through the cityscape as a flaneur is the very act to reproduce the urban topography and space, and flanerie is an ideological attempt to reprivatize the urban, public, and social space.

Flaneur as a body, which provides a modern subjectivity, finds itself in other forms as well, as Benjamin predicted. Actually, one should note, the politically embedded subject in Modernity is the basic tool to investigate society. Ulus Baker proposes that social sciences are in the search for social subjects as stereotypes, such as lumpen-proletariat of Marx, and flaneur of Benjamin.148 Like these political bodies, the Soviet filmmaker Dziga Vertov constructs his vision on kinok, another politically conceived social subject. Vertov advocated documenting the life sequences as it is via kinoks, namely men with cameras. However, Vertov makes a twist regarding the subject and its relation to the camera,

We therefore take as the point of departure the use of the camera as a kino-eye, more perfect than the human eye, for the exploration of the chaos of visual phenomena that fills space. The kino-eye lives and moves in time and space; it gathers and records impressions in a manner wholly different from that of the human eye. The position of our bodies while observing or our perception of a certain number of features of a visual phenomenon in a given instant are by no means

obligatory limitations for the camera which, since it is perfected, perceives more and better.\textsuperscript{149}

He achieves a temporal state in which one to catch what a human eye cannot. Like flaneur, \textit{kinok} is the politically constructed, conceived subject of Vertov (Fig. 3.2-3).

![Figure 3.2 Sequential stills from \textit{Man with the Movie Camera}, 1929 (Personal archive).]

Figure 3.2 Sequential stills from \textit{Man with the Movie Camera}, 1929 (Personal archive).

However, such an approach denounces the credibility of camera as a documenting device, as once Beatriz Colomina contended.\textsuperscript{150} The mechanical eye is achieved by superimposition of a human eye on the reflected image of the lens. An approach which also describes the analogous model of camera obscura is altered by Vertov by which he achieves using the camera lens as a mirror, not placing himself behind the camera to use it as an eye in a way that realistic epistemology does. The


\textsuperscript{150} Colomina. \textit{Privacy and Publicity}, pp. 77-78.
manipulation of these two realities produces a notion that means the following: instead of representing the real, it constitutes a new reality. In addition, in cinema, images are comprised of infinite sub-images that have no effect all alone. The frame scenes an absolute space, the time in it is frozen. Yet, framing is to put the scene in a context, in terms of architecture, in an experience. Thus, the image or the representation is not an entity that is “seen” no more, it turns into a legible and readent entity, as Baker states. Therefore, the camera is the very device that not simply renders the life sequences, but it manifests totally different structural formation of the subject (Fig. 3.4).

One can claim that while Benjamin counts on the intent look of the flaneur as a collective body, Vertov praises the machine by which he redefines the very model of camera obscura by transforming the human eye into a machinic-human-eye, or cine-eye as he calls it. One can also claim that Vertov sees the social subject as a body equipped with the technological assemblages through which transforms the society, since “all machines are social before being technical” as Gilles Deleuze rigorously asserts. With machine-like subjects he maintains a position, which stands for the

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constitution of body as politically constructed collective-physiognomic-entities in order to achieve the truth, document it, and disseminate it via medium.

![Figure 3.5 Sequential stills from Man with a Movie Camera, 1929 (Personal archive).](image1)

It is possible to say that both writers, on one hand, insist on creating multi-perspectival standpoints in analysing the modernity and its concrete, physical outcomes, on the other, both strive to reach the objectivity, or truth if vulgarly said, or “life as it is”\(^\text{153}\) in Vertov’s account with the optical devices, forcing its potential to the furthest extend. One should note experiencing the urban topography or architectures in such manner, the social subject, as a conscious collective body embodying an aesthetic impetus, can make use of the technological devices on both ends: to achieve an objective equal of natural vision in representation, and as apparatuses of power and devices of surveillance. Such a critical point will also enables one to reproduce the urban or architectural imagery unlike the conventional representational techniques.

![Figure 3.6 Sequential stills from Man with a Movie Camera, 1929 (Personal archive).](image2)

CHAPTER 4

REPRISE: A RELATIONSHIP CONVOLUTED WITH SPACE

As a pre-eminent Modernist medium, film is the medium of time, movement and sequence with its phantasmic images, and unified integrity over time through the rhythmic association of elemental lines, forms and colours in motion.\(^{154}\) Considering its structural constitution, cinema depicts these narrated fictions or realities in specially designed spaces or both in the cityscape itself and urban environments. Therefore cinema, with intention or not, as a cultural medium, reflects “a fascinating rendering between representation, ideological construction and the cityscape” as Güven Arif Sargin puts it.\(^{155}\)

Since the late nineteenth century, film has provided a laboratory for the definition of modernism in theory and technique. In reference to Anthony Vidler, as the modernist art par excellence, “it has also served as a point of departure for the redefinition of the other arts, a paradigm by which the different practices of theatre, photography, literature, and painting might be distinguished from each other”. Of all the arts, he continues, “however, it is architecture that has had the most privileged and difficult relationship to film.”\(^{156}\) An efficient tool for experiments of space and researches of spatial conduct, film has been commended for its damaging influence for denigrating the architectural image. However, the intricate relationship between cinema and


architecture deserve a close look-up in terms of theory through Modern historiography, as Vidler encourages. Building on the discussions held in previous chapters, in the domain of politics and aesthetics, therefore, one can claim that out of the intersection of the two disciplines—cinema and architecture, in reference to Vidler, a theoretical apparatus can be developed that at once holds architecture “as the fundamental site of film practice, the indispensable real and ideal matrix of the filmic imaginary and at the same time, positing film as the modernist art of space par excellence—a vision of the fusion of space and time.”

Hence, it is possible to clarify the role of imagery, which is widely criticized over its manipulative effect with the flexible theoretical framework. It is the question whether can it be a constructive, encouraging tool in the appropriation of space. Dwelling on the dichotomy between modern understanding of urban space and Lefebvrian distinction between the place and process of habiting, “the successive revolutionary movements in Paris from 1789 through 1830 and 1848 to the Commune of 1871”, as David Harvey exemplifies, constitute significant exemplary about urban-based class struggles.

4.1 Space & Ideology

While the early texts of Marxism and Marxist critique itself constituted its approach on art roughly, pioneers like Benjamin would take the step further concerning on the impact of technical change upon forms of imagination and art. However, if one hears out Lunn about the very basic idea of Marxist critique upon base and superstructure relationship stemming from the relations of production:

But, once again, neither Marx nor Engels had pursued this very far [concerning about the impact of technical change on art like Benjamin

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157 Ibid., p. 46.
159 The text reads as: “the relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness”. Karl Marx. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, edited by Maurice Dobb, translated by S. W. Ryazanskaya, Progress Publishers: Moscow, 1977. p. 20.
Neither gave much attention—understandably, given the cultural climate of their time—to changes in the technical production of artistic media themselves, i.e., the impact on aesthetic reception of new means of communication since the printing press, such as photography (then, of course, in its initial stages). The far greater visibility of these changes in the twentieth century (film, radio, television, etc.) was to aid in the emancipation of Marxist cultural theory from simply being a critique of ideology.  

Ideology, though it covers seemingly negative role in the critique of relations of production in the early texts of Marxism, with the technical development along the apparatuses that superstructure uses, it then needed further exploration. Considering the conceptualization of media with its possible institutions and devices in regard to its historical development, the process and development of such devices and the institutions differ in the historic perspective. Recalling Eagleton's representation discussion that he condemned the conventional construct, which brings about the symbolic interpretation in the Modernist domain, which is constituted in particular forms, John Thompson writes,

> With the development of a range of media institutions, the processes of production, storage and circulation have been transformed in certain ways. These processes have been caught up in a series of institutional developments, which are the characteristics of modern era. By virtue of these developments, symbolic forms have been produced and reproduced on an ever-expanding scale; they have been turned into commodities; they have become accessible to individuals who were widely dispersed in space and time.

Therefore, the significance of the base-superstructure model is still on the cusp in the analysis of relations of production in the capitalist mode of production, however, one should note that with the appropriation (not in a pejorative sense of the meaning) of the theory by critics like Walter Benjamin, Louis Althousser, Theodor Adorno, and so on, should the Marxist critique and the base-superstructure model be elaborated further, as Raymond Williams once noted;

> Most people who have wanted to make the ordinary proposition more reasonable have concentrated on refining the notion of superstructure. But I would say that each term of the proposition has to be revalued in

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a particular direction. We have to revalue determination towards the setting of limits and the exertion of pressure, and away from a predicted, prefigured and controlled element. We have to revalue “superstructure” towards a related range of cultural practices, and away from a reflected, reproduced or specifically dependent content. And, crucially, we have to revalue “the base” away from the notion of a fixed economic and technological abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men in real social and economic relationships, containing fundamental contradictions and variations and therefore always in a state of dynamic process.  

In terms of relations of production in the capitalistic mode of production, medium finds itself as an agent of superstructure, which constitutes the social production in an either dialectical or reciprocal relation with the base, which executes the material production. Since, as Benjamin argues, “the transformation of superstructure which takes place far more slowly than of the substructure”, the superstructure conveys its ideology through its agents. However, ideology, which is ambiguous by definition, does not control the whole situation by itself. Mike Cormack argues:

[I]deology is not simply a distorted reflection of the economic structure but has a certain amount of independence, allowing the possibilities of ideology being changed by other elements in the superstructure, and of ideology itself being a cause of economic change. Rather than a superstructure resting on a base, economic structures and ideological structures should be seen as intertwined frameworks of social action.

Therefore, in reference to Horkheimer and Adorno, who identified the late capitalism as culture industry, “that is the media, mass culture and the various other techniques of the commodification of the mind” as Jameson puts it, media is not a device that the ideology is conveyed through, and it is the ideology itself. On the other hand, in order to track such an effect, one should introduce Lefebvrian ideology into the scene in order to understand how the social agent—the state or any governmental institution devises space. In his critique of analytic thought Lefebvre opposes rationality that resulted from a misguided application of organizational process that coincides as concealment of particularities with a direct reflex of commodification.

Hence, Lefebvre insists on revealing the irrationalities that are also subject to process together with the rationalities as well,

The notion of blind field is neither a literary image nor a metaphor, in spite of the paradox of combining a subjective term “blind” and an objective term “field” (which, moreover, is always thought of as being illuminated).\textsuperscript{166}

In his argument, Lefebvre presents a potential for possible constructions: blind field may be re-interpreted on and on again with the constraints or contradictions that the urban resides, with new beginning points, eliminating the possibility or the effort of superimposing basic contradictions which are inherent to the case, juxtaposing\textsuperscript{167} them rather. Against the misleading act of emphasizing the class conflict dwelling solely on base-superstructure model by whom Lunn and Williams criticized, there appears a challenging proposition that all the accumulated knowledge upon urbanization and space science in general, be there the contradiction between rural and city centre, which actually constructed upon the separation of human being and nature.\textsuperscript{168} As once Foucault noted,

by way of retracing [this] history of space very roughly, that in the Middle Ages there was a hierarchic ensemble of places: sacred places and profane places; protected places and open, exposed places; urban places and rural places (all these concern the real life of men).\textsuperscript{170}

Yet, the subject’s stance is still a game changer in a political framework. At this point, emphasizing the role of the social agent and its apparatuses, Sargın states that “[r]ather than separating man [human being] and nature as two distinct entities the


\textsuperscript{167} According to Oxford English Dictionary \textit{juxtapose} means to place (two or more things) side by side, or close to one another, or (one thing) by the side of another. Retrieved from; http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/102288?redirectedFrom=juxtapose\#eid (accessed on January 24, 2015).

\textsuperscript{168} The general approach here dwells on the conception of political space in a different context by Ulus Baker. Baker identifies the unexperimented acts on contemporary socio-political agenda in which he grounds his refutations profoundly on space, as “blind spot”’s (kör nokta), and encourages the social subject to begin reconceptualization of individual space within the same framework from different initial points repeatedly. Ulus Baker. \textit{Siyasal Alanın Oluşumu Üzerine Bir Deneme}, p. 3. In order not to disregard the Spiniest standpoint, please also see Ulus Baker. \textit{Aşındırma Denemeleri}, Birikim Yayınları: Istanbul, 2000.

\textsuperscript{169} Lefebvre. \textit{The Urban Revolution}, pp. 103-114.

contemporary rhetoric reintegrates these two sides as it appeals to pure dialectics of social and environmental transformation.”¹⁷¹ Employing subject as an active integer in defining spaces, and acts concern about space is a challenging premise in order to see how space is devised, redefined, and even transformed. Moreover, through the representation of this particular phenomenon, one can see how space is (re)constructed. Hence, the term heterotopia, which is coined by Foucault himself come to the scene in the conception of space, which “takes for us the form of relations among sites”¹⁷² as he puts it. Space is defined not only by absolute geometrical forms but through relations of social subject also.

Lefebvre introduced extensively the definitive role of the social subject about space as a phenomenon in 1970s. The period is pretty glancing in terms of urban based struggles as in the successive movements from 1789 to 1871, since his early ideas about critique of everyday life have a major influence on May 1968. The architectural agenda for the time being was political as well; lectures on the political implications of Le Corbusier’s Maison Dom-ino by Peter Eisenman, the failed political agenda of modernism by Colin Rowe, Vidler was focusing on geometries of Cité de Refuge, as Steven Harris narrates.¹⁷³ What Harris points out that the structuralism’s hegemony resulted in architecture’s setback from its social commitments and political initiatives, and defamiliarisation of direct experience from architectural discourse.¹⁷⁴ However, in order to engage architecture with lived experience and society, Lefebvre’s insightful ideas on everyday life are a potential for Harris as he writes,

The consideration of everyday life as a critical political construct represents an attempt to suggest an architecture resistant to this commodification/consumption paradigm, a paradigm that has come to dominate contemporary architectural practice.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Foucault. “Of Other Spaces”, p. 23.
¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 2.
¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 3.
Engaged extensively with lived experience and political struggle, especially promoting the individual/social subject’s act, that line of thought inspired activist groups such as Situationists. The consumption paradigm finds its traces in everyday life, obviously. However, everyday life is intrinsically political. If one to hear Peter Halley; “there are two versions of the everyday today, through the two seem contradictory.” One of them is rather democratic to him, refers to a culture with a modernist preference, an aesthetic experience, which inhales the democratization of architectural units like kitchen, living room etc. The other, on the other hand, is a signifier for the identity of the powerful class.

On these accounts, Lefebvre’s ideas on everyday life are crucial in cultural and architectural debates; critique of modern planning methods and architectural functionalism, also engagement of the individual with the architectural practice generates a new approach not only to architectural practice itself, but the representative status of architecture as well. Mary McLeod states that his dialectical approach to everyday life and his refusal of any static categorization may seem elusive, however, it is the very contradiction that nature intrinsically has. She writes,

While it is the object of philosophy, it is inherently nonphilosophical; while conveying an image of stability and immutability, it is transitory and uncertain; … while controlled by technocratic rationalism and capitalism, it stands out of them. Everyday life embodies at once the most dire experiences of oppression and the strongest potentialities for transformation.  

Lefebvre presented several failed political agenda that comes with Modernism for urbanization, urban and suburban homogenization along with the examples that emerged on the urban peripheries, repetitious and seemingly functionalist office blocks, which actually was a global phenomenon by the 60s and 70s. However, everyday life still is a productive site regardless its bold political agenda, as being a potential site for individual’s ability to exploit circumstances and generate self-ruling action spheres, by Michel de Certau’s words, “network of an antidiscipline” in

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terms of architecture, in order to engage “the consciousness of the act of making architecture.”179

4.1.1 Defining Differentiable Spaces: Heterotopias

Within the modernity however, if an individual were to create its very own architecture through a gained consciousness, it is the subject matter of a social ordering per se. Space and spatial theory has become one of the primary loci for the social theory after the second half of the 80s as aforementioned. If one to take a glance in the modern historiography upon space, it is no surprise that the major acts employed within modernity has shaped around and precisely devised through space, as Kevin Hetherington insights that one has to analyse modernity “not as a social order, as has tended to be the sociological convention, but as a social and indeed spatial ordering.”180

Despite Foucault uses intense spatial metaphors and institutions—as representations of power that accounts for erected physical spaces, in order to speak of his claims in rigor, he regards space much of a context that counts for an ability of the mind, if vulgarly said. He construes space discussion on several fields, for instance he argues “knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he [the subject] deals in his discourse”. 181 What is distinguishing in Foucault’s approach is; it is not the appropriation of the word space in several milieus in an epistemological sense, but representations of such discourses in several forms of spatializations. However, Lefebvre accuses Foucault’s use of word space for, though it precisely points the institutional characteristics, it does not stand for any physical, more accurately, lived space. He writes,

Foucault never explains what space it is that he is referring to, nor how it bridges the gap between the theoretical (epistemological) realm and the practical one, between mental and social, between the space

180 Hetherington. The Badlands of Modernity, ix.
181 Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 201.
of the philosophers and the space of people who deal with material things. Lefebvre insists that, regarding Foucault’s position, an opposition of the status of the space and the status of the subject does not refer to a conception that is epistemologically acquired; thus the spatial metaphor or “spatial sphere”, as Lefebvre defines it, remains insufficient. In defining the relationship between society and space, one of the premises about space, which the study also structures upon, is that it is socially produced, and it is a condition of social production. The space is something that evolves and develops spontaneously and in an unconstrained manner. Jane Randell points that some have argued the space also as an entity that is materially and culturally produced. “As material culture”, she says, “space is not innate and inert, measured geometrically, but an integral and changing part of daily life”. Such an approach, by which architecture is considered to be a cultural artefact, critiques the status of architecture and the role of the architect, regarding built environment as a whole, “rather than one-off pieces”, and redefines the users of buildings, among their designers and builders, “as producers of space”. McLeod also takes this issue on account and argues about its reflections on the architectural domain with its concrete and tangible consequences. On the contemporary architectural scene, the ambiguity arisen from the interpretations and representations of Foucault’s space definition is the essence for most of the architectural critics and practitioners, which entirely evolves around the term heterotopia.

Although McLeod devices her argument on being “other”, it still refers to the political insight and premise of Foucault’s line of thought; stating that being other is a conquest against the status quo. One to recall Eagleton’s comment on Modernism; the embedded political agenda and the tendency towards materiality, McLeod condemns the discourse of contemporary appropriation of heterotopia in the

183 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
architectural scene, which all denote disruptions of architectural form and inversions. She writes,

[W]hile such architecture forsakes the modern movement’s political agenda, including the transformation of productive process and institutional boundaries, it now gains political power simply through cultural sign, or, more precise, through revealing the disintegration of that sign. Newness and “otherness”—traditional claims of the avant-garde—are largely an issue of formal strategy.\(^\text{187}\)

On the other hand, Demetri Porphyrios holds a significant role among architectural thinkers who translated concept of heterotopia into architectural discourse. In reference to Porphyrios “heterotopia is a category of design methodology”.\(^\text{188}\) He elaborates his claims on Aalto’s works, his organization of architectural space, his disjointed volumes and his peculiar amalgamations and arrangements of materials. Such a “sensibility” says Henry Urbach, “does not, as we might expect, lead towards a critical architecture, but to the rule-governed repetition of spatial types.”\(^\text{189}\)

Regarding the cultural paradigm as McLeod points to, what one should distinguish is heterotopia entirely connotes the social context whichever domain it is employed in as Hetherington puts it accurately; “there is a tendency to conflate the social construction of space with its social production, a tendency that sometimes confuses cultural representation with social action.”\(^\text{190}\) He particularly refers to Rob Shields’ analysis on place myths and the politics of placing the margin. Shields asserts that place myths are the products of social practices and social spatializations all of which are constituted around a discourse about space and a bold cultural formation that entails and grains “on-going social construction of the spatial at the level of the social imaginary (collective mythologies, presuppositions)”\(^\text{191}\). On these accounts, the very site that heterotopia applies into and finds the traces of its political premises that Foucault counts on, therefore, is space (in the general sense) rather than form in the architectural context.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., p. 5.
\(^{190}\) Hetherington. The Badlands of Modernity, p. 25.
Hetherington, in his analysis of modernity, comes up with different definitions about heterotopia among which the two glance. One of them defines heterotopia as “sites that are defined by their absolute perfection, surrounded by spaces that are not so clearly defined as such”\textsuperscript{192} in reference to Foucault, and the other defines it as “sites that are marginalized within the dominant social spatializations”\textsuperscript{193} in reference to Lefebvre. In accordance to Hetherington, Foucault refers to places as heterotopia in the issues that propose ordering. That ordering is given significance because of the fact that the juxtaposition is not positing things side by side, or locating them together; which are subject matter to places of Otherness. However, juxtaposition as such does not manifest itself through resemblance, but through similitude.\textsuperscript{194} Foucault takes the primacy of the process of the ordering, which constitutes heterotopia. The process or the definitive stance of being Other is formed through relationality; so that, considering the process, all the Other is designated analogously. To this extent, as these spaces eventually influence other social engagements, they present new options for arrangement of spaces.\textsuperscript{195} This kind of ordering actually comes into being with juxtapositions to form heterogeneity, and the spaces they are dictated in are more of decentralized (and because of the process, analogous\textsuperscript{196}) spaces as James Harkness writes,

\begin{quote}
Resemblance, says Foucault, ‘presumes a primary reference that prescribes and classes’ copies on the basis of the rigor of the mimetic relation to itself. Resemblance serves and is dominated by representation. With similitude, on the other hand, the reference ‘anchor’ is gone. Things are cast adrift, more or less like one another without any of them being able to claim the privileged status or ‘model’ for the rest. Hierarchy gives way to a series of exclusively lateral relations.\textsuperscript{197}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, Hetherington also summarizes that Benjamin Genocchio objects Foucault’s treatment to heterotopia as a site stating that the attempt to define “being other” or Otherness in a counter-site contradicts the premise itself. What Genocchio

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{192} Hetherington. \textit{The Badlands of Modernity}, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{196} Lefebvre. \textit{The Production of Space}, p. 366.
\end{footnotes}
grounds his claims on the idea that locating heterotopia as a site in this manner is the elimination of its state of being different and defining it like any other space. Genocchio’s position seems closer to idea of Lefebvre as Lefebvre defines it not as a counter-site as such. Lefebvre insists that the idea of a heterotopia will be conducted by an act, with an active participation of the social agent; “heterotopia as an idea of space, rather than an actual place”\(^{198}\) of what Genocchio proposes. Genocchio writes,

> In any attempt to mobilize the category of an outside or absolutely differentiated space, it follows logically that the simple naming or theoretical recognition of that difference always to some degree flattens or precludes, by definition, the very possibility of its arrival as such.\(^{199}\)

In his analogy, Lefebvre opposes Foucault's conception of heterotopia, of other spaces stating that the analogous spaces that happens to be is the part of homogeneous space, part of the urban: “[w]ithin urban space, elsewhere is everywhere and nowhere. It has been this way ever since there have been cities, and ever since, alongside objects and actions, there have been situations, especially those involving people (individuals and groups) associated with divinity, power, or the imaginary.”\(^{200}\) Dwelling on the Foucauldian perspective over utopias where are the sites defined as not being a real place, “sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of Society”,\(^ {201}\) Harvey asserts that “spatial form controls temporality, an imagined geography controls the possibility of social change and history”\(^{202}\) and argues about the existence of authority and restrictive forms of governance;

> What Foucault regards as ‘a panoptican effect’ through the creation of spatial systems of surveillance and control (polis = police) is also incorporated into Utopian schemes. This dialectic between imaginative free play and authority and control throws up serious problems. The rejection, in recent times, of utopianism rests in part on an acute awareness of its inner connection to authoritarianism and totalitarianism (More’s Utopia can easily be read this way). But rejection of utopianism on such grounds has also had the unfortunate

\(^{198}\) Ibid., p. 47.
\(^{200}\) Lefebvre. The Urban Revolution, p. 38.
effect of curbing the free play of the imagination in the search for alternatives. Confronting this relationship between spatial play and authoritarianism must, therefore, lie at the heart of any regenerative politics that attempts to resurrect Utopian ideals.\textsuperscript{203} Lefebvre proposes the differential space notion as a remedy to the rupture between the urban and its precedents, which includes the particularities that are experienced through homogeneous spaces, with the primacy of the urban practice. The Deleuzian approach in Lefebvre's argument—polycentrality of the urban and the proposition of a repeating urban practice, is projected for precluding the reuse of signifying units detached from their initial context. Nevertheless, in the domain of Modern historiography, the conception of Foucauldian heterotopia might lead us to explore some other relations. Foucault argues,

One could describe, via the cluster of relations that allows them to be defined, the sites of temporary relaxation—cafes, cinemas, beaches. Likewise one could describe, via its network of relations, the closed or semi-closed sites of rest—the house, the bedroom, the bed, et cetera. But among all these sites, I am interested in certain ones that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect. These spaces, as it were, which are linked with all the others, which however contradict all the other sites, are of two main types [utopias and heterotopias].\textsuperscript{204}

However, the panoptic schema, a Foucauldian interpretation of power ramification, systematization of behavioural segregation, is of an absolute power and has its own jurisdiction upon the space, every bit of space actually. Though Lefebvre tries to locate his heterotopic spaces between those jurisdictory spaces/places, where in the end, this particular space will be jurisdicted; as once Hetherington noted Lefebvre’s spaces of representation “are also counter-hegemonic spaces of freedom”,\textsuperscript{205} which introduces alternative modes of ordering. Hence, Foucault envisages his heterotopias spatially where the direct act of state do not stretch or reach, but Lefebvre seems to tolerate the act of state where it transgresses its jurisdiction to the very heterotopic spaces, compromising with the state as he sees the classical antagonism between the

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., p. 163.
\textsuperscript{204} Foucault. “Of Other Spaces”, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{205} Hetherington. The Badlands of Modernity, p. 24.
state and the individual at the urban scene as an opportunity in order to understand the spatiality of modernity. Noting Lefebvrian definition of heterotopia not as a site, but an act profoundly based on practice, one can enquire into for other differential spaces in other media, be it physical or virtual but precisely presumed or determined, in order to have a better understanding of not only differing definitions but representations of space also, and implementations on it.

4.2 A Case: The Commune

The workers of Paris, joined by mutinous National Guardsmen, seized the city and set about re-organising society in their own interests based on workers’ councils. The Paris Commune is often said to be the first example of working people [as other] taking power. It is a highly significant event, even though it is ignored in the French history curriculum. On 18 March 1871, the Commune was established. After free elections held, a council made up mostly of Jacobins and Republicans (though there were a few people from other factions like anarchists and socialists) elected. The council declared that Paris was an independent commune and that France should be a confederation of communes. Inside the Commune, all elected council members were instantly recallable, and had equal status to other commune members. Contemporary anarchists were excited by these developments. The fact that the majority of Paris had organised itself without support from the state and was urging the rest of the world to do the same was pretty exciting. The Paris Commune led by example in showing that a new society, organised from the bottom up, was possible. The reforms initiated by the Commune like turning workplaces into co-operatives put anarchist theory into practice. By the end of May, 43 workplaces had become co-operatives and the Louvre Museum was a munitions factory run by a workers’ council.206

As a heterotopic act, the study will subject The Commune of 1871 in Paris as a case. The study will elaborate the documentary of Peter Watkins La Commune from 2000. It is a visual documentation that spreads over 345 minutes and takes place in designated Paris streets. The director creates Paris streets of the time rather than using the real ones. If one considers the build-up of the narrative about the commune, that is it is an urban struggle to achieve an alternate ordering, an alternate

power ramification in its historical context, among many subsidiary reasons; the study examines the representation of such an act on behalf of the build-up conducted in previous chapters.

Colomina in her argument of visuality of space, associates representation of architecture with the idea of mask, which is basically constituted on the fact that the face looks towards “outside” is different from the face looks towards “inside”. Parallel to the Foucault’s mirror metaphor, although one should not ignore the controversial status of photography, in the realization any heterotopia or an architectural praxis, the dichotomy between Lefebvrian understanding of space, which is constructed upon experiential manners and space in the conventional sense might give clues about other possible constructions through imagery. Colomina draws the attention to the transformative role of mass media in architecture as she writes,

Modern urban space, as opposed to traditional ‘place’, cannot be understood in experiential terms. The ‘exterior’ is not only image, but a picture, a photographic image. If, for Saussure, writing is the photograph of speech, and for Loos, the interior is that which cannot be photographed, for Sitte, ‘modern’ urban space is the photograph of ‘place’. The ‘outside’ is a photographic image.  

For her, the modern urban landscape is an ambient form, which is constructed as photographic images in the first place; image itself is a space, which the architect cautiously and meticulously constructs before the building. She identifies modern urban space therefore as non-experiential, however, the moving image suspends such a negation. As articulated in Chapter 2, with the introduction optical apparatuses, Flusser distinguishes the representational visuality of the earlier account, say, as in the case of paintings and sculptures, from the technical visuality of the latter achieved by the earlier models of modern day cameras. With the dissolution of aura thanks to the mechanical production, the image then on, is perceived differently. Images in the earlier account can be only scanned, watched, looked at, and gazed at inquisitively. The technical image, on the contrary, is an entity that is readable.

Hence, objectivity is irrelevant to consider for the technical image produced by apparatuses. The reading of the representation that the image depicts varies therefore. In addition, the progress of image escalates as it passes into the cinema in the form of moving image. Building on that, the space depicted via moving images can be read through several perspectives. On this account, in the next part the study will read the *La Commune* through space upon two claims: space as form, and space as construct. The reading will be with regard to the subjects that have been articulated in previous chapter as observer and *kinok*, around common concepts in architecture and cinema.

4.2.1 Space as Form

As stated before occasionally, it is easy to track the relationship between architecture and cinema due to the common concepts both disciplines acquire. Space is the basic term, however, the production process in both disciplines proclaims the common concepts yet again. Sequences, and events that are made out of sequences, as phenomena rooted in culture, for example, are the basic tools for architecture and cinema. Spatial sequences affect the way architectural and urban spaces are perceived. Both as a producer and consumer on both acts, the manner of perception refers to a subjective and empirical counter-perspective in both disciplines. Therefore, in order to achieve particular perceptions in films, cinema uses architecture as a tool in order to form a foreground, or background in which the scene is depicted. Similarly, movement and passages are other common concepts. Obviously, in cinema, as everyone would suggest, movement is the fundamental component that gives way building up to the whole; movement mediates the act in a manner. One point to distinguish is the cinematic movement refers to a path that is intangible, achieved by the spectator, whereas the path of architectural movement is more tangible one. In architectural movement, one simultaneously uses its visual sense in a particularly designed space, unlike the cinematic movement. For the audience it is just an imaginary line. While movement is used in cinema in order to represent the space somehow, in architecture, it is used to achieve to the very tectonics of three-dimensional space in experiential terms. As mentioned in the
previous chapters, framing is a common concept in both disciplines yet again. Architecture as an ensemble, and the cinema as an eminent medium to depict such ensemble evolve around the idea of framing, framing of space. Not only it provides multi perspectival situations, but structures all the content that is depicted, or chosen. Frame actually holds the very essence in spatial arts.

In *La Commune*, Paris is depicted via set designs; the director chooses not to use the designed landscape, or accumulated topography. It is a cross-genre production, can be classified as both fiction and documentary. The cast is introduced role by role at the beginning of the film, together with the general mise-en-scene, the alike-design streets of Paris. Film does not have a linear montage. In the light of historical references that took place in 1871, the mise-en-scene, in defining the urban praxis of Paris Commune acutely represent the heterotopic idea. In this sense, through this particular visual production, the reading counts space and space experience as a custom of habiting. Thus architecture is not a concrete, absolute entity that some architect designed, nor some particular solid void relationship. It is regarded as a depiction of urban experience in this regard. If one to articulate the concepts stated above; for the *kinok*, the cinematographer, every historically depicted episode that makes the whole is achieved with a single, continuous shot in the film. The whole spatial experience is achieved in this regard, creating an urban architectural sequence. In the case of the observer, the concepts are achieved in the same manner; however, the observer reads the space along a visually created path. Therefore, it separates itself from the main plot.
Figure 4.1 Time of the upheaval (*Kinok eye*). Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.2 Time of the upheaval (*Kinok eye*). Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.3 Time of the upheaval (*Kinok eye*). Still from the film (Personal archive).
Figure 4.4 Mise-en-scene (Observer eye). Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.5 Mise-en-scene (Observer eye). Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.6 Mise-en-scene (Observer eye). Still from the film (Personal archive).
4.2.2 Space as Construct

Though the techniques of representing space do not differ, space depiction may refer to some other construction in films. Cinema utilizes architecture in order to intensify and enrich its narrative with its foreground. It may be used for simple visualisations as foreground and background. In such cases, architecture stands for not the eligibility that the success or efficiency of the depiction, rather used as a symbol. Most of the filmmakers do not possess the intent as an architect does when dealing with the space representations. Architecture as a discipline has the primacy for the three-dimensional space, whereas cinema, since it is a two-dimensional depiction, does not concern about it, which makes architecture to use as symbols. However, this does not prevent architecture or the architectural intent becoming a basic element of the films. In both cases, whether it is used as form or symbol, space is treated as a basic element of the film, which conveys the message and helps the visualisation of the narration. Therefore, regarding the moving image in its basic form, and if its relation to architecture is regarded in its basic aspects and basic concepts like sequence, movement, and framing, filmmakers and cinema uses or interprets the space as symbols.

On these accounts, being Other is constructed both on cinematographic elements and architectural elements. By the elements that depict the space, and other elements again common in both forms of art, like editing, lighting, La Commune creates its own space, its own streets of Paris, spaces of the past, spaces of the present, spaces of surveillance, spaces of signs and metaphors. Constructing the Other on spaces and its surroundings, naturally, refers to the social and physical ordering in itself. In cinema, generally, such orderings depicted via spaces, therefore, it leads to utopias or dystopias. However, the city itself may depict such orderings, avoiding the sharp and surrealistic interventions to the space. The representations of space and urban setting in La Commune display a responsive conduct. The film treats space in order to depict the essence of the film, together with the other tools for symbols than architecture or urban setting, like the narrative as foremost. It basically uses a vast open space as the set, which is partitioned into three: a main space as the symbol of
the squares and clash arenas of Paris, and two subsidiary spaces as the symbol of streets and indoors.

In the case of the subjects with regard to the previous chapter, using spaces as symbols does not have a glancing difference. However, digging into the articulations of space depictions gives clues about the utilisation of architecture in narrative structures. In the point of view of the cinematographer/kinok and the observer, the important part is to distinguish the configuration of the syntax dealing with the space, and the configuration of tools that are utilized in depiction of this particular narration. It is a matter of reproduction, compilation, and particularly codification of a spatial narrative data by the very producer of that particular representation, namely the cinematographer. The Paris Commune in 1871 is a historical fact, however, the construct that cinematographer utilise to turn the historical narrative/information to a narration is actually a matter of, not only the historical context that the cinematographer is into, but the vocabular ability and fertility of the subject as kinok also. Being a politically constructed subject and having the primacy of a representational apparatus, the historical narrative obviously is used in order to describe the Other with its particular political choices and impetus, therefore, the very codes of such depiction with its apparatuses is the point that one needs to question. In such cases, as it is in case in La Commune, the essential object is the space, and the set or the spatial construct that the depiction is conducted through is the principal and dominant ingredient. In La Commune, the general conception about the space is the conception that the urban or architectural space has the memory, and the constituents in this particular memory with its all signifiers and signifieds are attached to, comes into being, and are depicted through space. All the political and social reminiscent of the Commune is reconstructed via a space-time paradigm during the film. In this course, not only the historical narrative, but the architectural and urban data/code/syntax and information, incessantly reconstructs itself both by the cinematographer and the observer. The historical narrative upon the urban and architectural experience documented via an optical device, or photographic camera so called, reveals the dichotomies and the basic qualities related to space, and gives an opportunity to the subject to interpret it.
Figure 4.7 Spaces and signifiers as symbols. Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.8 Spaces and signifiers as symbols. Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.9 Spaces and signifiers as symbols. Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.10 Induction of media as an active constituent. Still from the film (Personal archive).
Figure 4.11 Signifiers as symbols. Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.12 Signifiers as symbols. Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.13 Cast participation as an active constituent. Still from the film (Personal archive).

Figure 4.14 Spaces and signifiers as symbols. Still from the film (Personal archive).
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

“Modernism has not created “religious orders”, but a political party.”

Antonio Gramsci,
Selections from The Prison Notebooks, p. 332.

This study on the general look is a critical literary approach for the investigation on the role of imagery in representations of architecture. Its main objective is to articulate how the optical devices been utilized throughout the history regarding the fact of transformative potential of representational tools and technology is an influence in the architectural, or in a wider framework, spatial domain. Of all the representational tools, this study focuses on photography and cinema as devices of framing, documenting and representing. The historical import of photography and cinema upon architectural history, especially in the beginning of the twentieth century holds a significant place. In a manner, say, the very codes of the disciplines coalesce if the relationship with the subject figure is examined. Architecture, as the two neighbouring disciplines, encloses the subject figure in a bound compound, be it a device, or a building as the work of architecture. Shaping up around common concepts, with the inception of technological development, especially cinema with its fibre of moving image, helped architecture to express its capacity more easier and in a significant number of ways. However, due to its production phases, image gains a controversial status with the technological experiment covering a vast space. The progress incepted from the camera obscura as the incipient form of modern day cameras, posited the optical experience in a disseminated people compass, yet, the
constructive capacity of imagery remains hindered. In the light of the concepts that deals both architecture and optics, like framing, movement, time, and so on, architecture’s engagement with the optical devices on a representational foreground, maintains its constructive capacity on utmost possible level. In order to achieve and unravel such constructive capacity, the study focuses on the subject figure as a common entity since the inauguration of optics with its environment in the model of camera obscura.

In the first level, though it was not articulated elaborately in the study, the technological improvements and advances surpasses the pejorative stance of the imagery, especially in the representations of spatial acts and in architectural representation. The main motivation behind this premise is the evolution of camera obscura into modern day cameras. The introduction of chemicals and film rolls, then its evolution into digital technology varies the ways of perception, and eliminates the deficiency of lenses and its ability to represent. Obviously architecture has its own language, however, the ability to express itself via other disciplines and platforms due to its operative and function areas, is not sufficient. In order to reach its constructive capacity that entails a vast domain in the everyday import, architecture’s engagement with diverse disciplines is reasonable. Building up on such point, throughout Chapter 2, in the first aspect, the study composes a structural and two-fold scheme on the idea dealing with architectural representation. The structural scheme problematizes the representation as a historical construct, whereby the practices of depiction relies not only on the ways of looking and seeing, also the ability that the technology endows. The representation itself is a process and whether it is a painting or a photograph, in any case it, even the classical representation, structures upon its positioning of the subject. In the Classical representation, and later on in the model of camera obscura, as the study have discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3, the man as the subject is incapable of placing himself. No matter how it is of existence in the representation process mastering the apparatus as device, and prevailing upon the objectivity of the device. The first aspect of the two-fold scheme is, on the other hand, building up on the ontological figure of images (though the ontology of the image is an unfamiliar thing to say,
André Bazin asserts that there is). The image, to what extent it is conceptualised, equips the image with a particular discourse. This became more apparent with the inspection of the second aspect of the two-fold scheme: the phenomenological figure of the images. Images in the earlier account can be only scanned, watched, looked at, gazed at inquisitively, as it is the case in the Classical representation. The technical image, on the contrary, is an entity that is readable. The reading of the representation that the image depicts varies therefore. A dispute over objectivity, in this regard, is irrelevant to consider for the technical image produced by apparatuses. Yet again, it is the subject itself, and the construction of the subject on a greyer discourse area that concerns about the accurateness of an image to discuss. In addition, the transfer of image into the cinema, whereby escalates its usage both in the form of moving image, and in the technical sense, makes an elaboration of the subject a requisite matter.

In the second level, the means of optical forms regarding the subject’s position and construction, inherently and selectively fostered specific regimes of communication and enactment. As stated before, starting with the camera obscura to the modern day cameras, the succession intrinsically refer to a culture of vision. In the development of such culture, every model relies upon a subject. A distinctive body in camera obscura, and a set of bodies in modern day cameras, isolated and disembodied from the device, which occasionally housed under an architectural frame/structure. Apart from the critical literary on looking of the study, the practical part is based on analyses of various common concepts in cinema as a scopic regime and architecture. At first, space regarded as form, by which it is intended to analyse the lexicon word of the meaning around the very basic and common concepts regarding both disciplines. Second, the space regarded as a construct, as symbols driven by representation. Both of the aspects conducted in the light of the politically constructed subjects of observer (with reference to Crary) and kinok (with reference to Benjamin and Vertov).

Employing architecture as an optical device while associating technology and technique with high art in modernity, and embedding the shift from the individual to
collective experience in high art opens an argumentative domain concerning about architecture and its representation along with its relation to image if the concerns of this study considered. It is important to note that bonding with technique and technological transformations seems utterly reasonable if the conduct of architecture is considered. The consequence of such satisfactory relationship may repulse architecture in a sense that it may not be eligible in embodying and re-presenting ideas that are not so relevant to the art of the building or architecture whatsoever. Yet, engaging with technique and material on a higher degree made architect to charge architecture with aesthetic sensibilities at best so that architecture fused with a valorised image technology. The efforts to analyse subjective experience fashioned with the mechanical reproduction transcended into some other level with the digital reproduction techniques. In the contemporary architecture scene and modern culture images may have become a spectacle with wide ranging echoes, but theme of architecture yet remained in the same operative domain. Engaged with such aesthetic sensibilities associated to the machine inevitably made subject (in this case, the architect) consciously or unconsciously see image beyond a by-product of machine/technique, by which architecture ascribed to symbolic and iconographic realms especially when it is employed in diverse disciplines, needless to say have become dependent to spectacle in an overwhelming presence of image. In this regard, one can claim that if a crisis to be unravelled concerning architecture, it would not be the unilateral and barren Style issue, but a wide-ranging one, which centres developmental process of capitalism, which in every level of its phenomenal evolution, architecture utilised images, and therefore spectacle, on a excessive amount in its expression *per se*.

Acknowledging such an impetus, this study grounded its claims upon space being a social production. Space not only is formed around physical and material laws, but manifests itself spontaneously through humane activities as well. Building on that, architecture is both the subject and the object of this particular social production, and the social subject of any categorisation that is conceived with the architectural intent locates itself both as producer and user in the architectural domain. If space is an

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entity that can be defined through such social relationships, the approaches upon architecture and architectural production process will not ground on the analyses of intangible critical readings, but on tangible critical points building itself up on the humane activities. Critical readings guided by texts, which obviously is an intense Tafurian influence, will take the issue one step further with the introduction of the social subject as an active and determinant influence. Heterotopias as the tangible spaces can be founded on this account, both as spaces where eliminates the institutional constructs and presents opportunities for different spatial discourses and as spaces originated from humanitarian acts. In this context, architectural space created in such regard inhales any environment with the inherent custom of habiting.

The condition of architect is a matter as the social subject among the others in order to track several different architectural readings. The sites designated by the relationships expel the architect in regard to relations and means of production. In such conditions, architect as producer will contemplate the architecture a non-auratic object, and the-work-of-architecture, which is the fibre of urban space, a composition created with spatial concerns, will dissolve into the urban structure. By this procedure architectural form evolves into a process, aura into mass, and in some cases, unintentionally, the architect into an organiser. Architecture, with such dialectical approach, is and becomes the site of political resistance, along being the dominant operative domain. One can read architecture and architect—both being its subject and object, fitted into the relations of production through other concepts like texts, or images. All the more, devising and reading architecture through transcendent notions like text and image helps one to distinguish the condition of architect, or locate the architect accurately in the relations of production by analysing the whole network of relations that may or may not hindered crucial points while dealing with the principal aspects of the discipline which is creating and providing the sustainability of spaces by science for (in)habiting. In spite of all the discourses governed by institutional and academic regimes, space thus be constructed on several accounts, which obviously and intentionally tackles the singular readings of architecture.
Tackling the singular readings of architecture through subjects by images, historically, brings about the question of spectatorship into presence. From the incipient form of modern day cameras, image is constructed over locating the subject and regulating its condition to the architectural frame in the earlier stages, to the black-boxed enterprises in the latter. Subject in this process, therefore, needs to define its presence and relationship both to the apparatus and its outcome as image. Whether it is intently or intuitive, the manners conducted on looking, seeing, concentrating and acting have a profound historical character. The social subject is obliged to redefine, or reconstruct itself on each occasion as an active constituent; social subject as a cinematographer, social subject as an observer, social subject as an actor/actress if it is the case of representation through film. Bearing in mind the fact that specific aesthetic practices form and establish basic inquiries of the same field, in the case study of this particular thesis, La Commune, is a compiler of images in which one cannot distinguish itself sagaciously, therefore, it presents various possible readings on several accounts. Experience of subject on each role offers different architectural sequences. These different readings on each subject level assemble a constructive integrity with the concept of dialectical image in order to suggest a social condition. Dialectical image coalesces different experience layers and presents subjective episodes, and these episodes define themselves through the space itself; they narrate themselves via architectural spaces. In this respect, dialectical image generates possibilities for different readings. Each subject regards the architectural space in a separate and distinct manner; whether it is a prostitute, a flaneur, a salesman, a photographer, or an architect. It is therefore possible to tackle the means and relations of production that devises itself dominantly through the spatial conducts and forces homogeneous experiences through the cityscape. In this manner, it is also inevitable to oppose identical readings of architecture. Architectural space therefore portrays potentials for different readings through subjects.

This study highlights how modernity encompasses an idea of vision, which becomes more autonomous on every level, taking part in greyer discourses capitalising upon sight with particular subjectifications. A subject takes shape in the architectural
discourse with respect to the visual discourse in cinema and in cinema with respect to architecture. Throughout the history of vision, there are not accurate, natural-like achieved, objective images, but historically, politically constructed subjects and their looking practices. The result is identification of architecture as an organiser of bodily structures and encounters, and the spatial environment surrounds it has the potency of producing and reproduction of different representational modes. Architecture and cinema, as having the immense legacy of optical tools of representation, have corporeal activities that incessantly inspire and provoke each other. One is obliged to investigate the similar and dissimilar variables, continuities and discontinuities in the treatment of space in cinema and architecture. If the experience is considered, yet another common theme in between, cinema has the possibility to put an entity in a context rather than its own physical features. Narrative that feature film is obliged to, recalls constructed regimes and space organisations. The narrative constituted on particular spatial knowledge/syntax/data, be it mythical or historical, in order to spatially experiment or use the architectural landscape as it is, manipulates and transforms the architectural frames of knowledge. In such cases, architecture needs to distinguish itself from the relation that the representation and narrative maintains (as it is achieved in *La Commune*) both architecturally and cinematographically.

A further point that the study inspires is the representations of architecture rely on the corporeal experiences, bodily structures, if one to dignify the representational power of architecture. The phony status of image, so called, is something doomed to cease; experience, collective memory, and psychological influence of architectures and architectural landscapes yield the opportunity to change the way image and space are perceived whimsically. The transformation of architectural landscapes into cinematic spaces, as it were, does not provide significant manipulation in the architectural sense. The experience conducted in an architectural space, can be experienced in a designated cinematic space. An intriguing critical discourse upon cinematic spaces is therefore possible. The fictitious, narrative knowledge and technique of a space strives for partly factual and realistic, partly fictive constructions through screenplays. Narrative (screenplay) constructed upon spaces
with particular connotations not only arrays initiatives that entail several reproductions of spaces or architectural landscapes as a proclaimer of visionary, but also encourages the social subject to create flexible narrations using the actual space itself. Though narratives attached to a particular architectural landscape will enable the social subject to derive the architectural knowledge, inspiring it to create possible variations of space, which has its own politically consolidated cultural value. On these accounts, if the architectural landscape is considered, a remark on the manipulation of cinematographic image is in any way a matter of argument.

The study encourages, at the furthest point, dialectically, articulating the stance of the subject in the architectural culture. Acknowledging images are the main constituent of spectacle on an expanded yield at contemporary times, architecture cannot be independent of such spectacle, whether it is a contribution to, or an icon of. Apart from analysing the spectacle of any kind, or the society of spectacle, so called, with its entire political, social, physiological and psychological extents, it is important to regard that a corporeal looking and seeing reigns the essence of a spectacle. In order to articulate the specific architectural knowledge through representational devices as highlighted above, the subject must be included in the production process. In documenting, or photographing any architectural space or product, the subject using the camera may choose to frame the space without its quality of being a collective space of modern landscape. Unravelling the architectural knowledge/syntax/data through a concern of subjective inclusivity, at modern times, or more directly, in the age of late capitalism, coincides as not identification of architecture through spectacle through which several transcendent conditions of architecture is reconstructed, but rather, in the same context, motivating to redefine such transcendent situations with a claim that representations of architecture in cinema, the social subject, and spectacle themselves bear an active role in production of images. Therefore, whether it is a society of spectacle or a society of surveillance, architectural frame, whether in the representational form or in the form of a work-of-architecture, is a binding feature as an enclosure.

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Thinking architecture as a device of power-related institution, and a functional contributor for human institutions as well as a reification of a collective transgression, architecture dignifies the culture that produces it and reaffirms the hegemony of culture, helping to secure its continuity. In this context, the culture that architecture produced, hereby will based on power relations. Culture demands a thorough legibility in all aspects, yet, it is created by the methods of production by which power relations owns and maintains its presence. The cinematic representation of architecture should be considered in the context of both architectural production and in the domain of political economy. The culture that produces architecture also creates the architectural representational modes. On the account of the culture that produces them, even they are created in different times, modes, models, and contexts, it is related to socio-economic model of the society it establishes to maintain its presence and legitimacy as well as methods of architectural production. Hence, media and mass culture, the culture industry as it is called, construct the architectural representation. Therefore the mass media should be regarded as a discourse and the architectural representation created in this particular culture should demolish and disfigure the culture and reassign what left of it as residue and remnant.

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La Commune (de Paris, 1871), 2000

Directed by: Peter Watkins
Written by: Agathe Bluysen, Peter Watkins
Cinematography: Odd-Geir Sæther
Edited by: Agathe Bluysen, Patrick Watkins, Peter Watkins
Production Companies: 13 Productions, Le Sept-Arte, Le Musée d’Orsay
Runtime: 345 min (5 hr 45 min), 220 min (3 hr 40 min) (theatrical version)
Color: Black and White
Negative Format: 16 mm
Release Dates: May 2000 (Germany), July 2003 (USA), November 2007 (France)
Genre: Drama
Country: France
Language: French

Synopsis:
On March 18, Adolphe Thiers makes an attempt to seize the cannon of the National Guard, and is foiled by the women of Montmartre. The women appeal to the government soldiers, many of who refuse to fire on the people of Paris and reverse their muskets in a gesture of solidarity. Within a few hours Paris is in a state of insurrection, and the Mairies (town halls) of most districts within the capital are in the hands of the rebellious National Guard. A Central Committee of the National Guard occupies the abandoned Hôtel de Ville (the principal town hall governing Paris) and announces preparations for new municipal elections. On March 26, the left wing gain enough votes to establish a socialist-oriented “Commune”—which will last until May 28. On March 28, the Commune installs itself at the Hôtel de Ville, and for the next two months does its best to run the administration of Paris.

Production:
*La Commune (de Paris, 1871)* has been noted for its very large cast. It is mainly non-professional; including many immigrants from North Africa Members did much of their own research for the project. Watkins once said of the film, “The Paris Commune has always been severely marginalized by the French education system, despite - or perhaps because - it is a key event in the history of the European working class, and when we first met, most of the cast admitted that they knew little or nothing about the subject. It was very important that the people become directly involved in our research on the Paris Commune, thereby gaining an experiential process in analysing those aspects of the current French system which are failing in their responsibility to provide citizens with a truly democratic and participatory process.”

Filming:
*La Commune (de Paris, 1871)* was shot in just 13 days in an abandoned factory on the outskirts of Paris. Like many of Watkins' later films, it is quite lengthy—a long cut runs 5 hours and 45 minutes, though the more common version is 3 and a half hours long. The long version is available on DVD. The making of *La Commune (de Paris, 1871)* was documented in the 2001 National Film Board of Canada film *The Universal Clock: The Resistance of Peter Watkins*, directed by Geoff Bowie.

Critical Reception:
*La Commune (de Paris, 1871)* received general acclaim from film critics. J. Hoberman of *Sight & Sound* magazine wrote, “Watkins restages history in its own ruins, uses the media as a frame, and even so, manages to imbue his narrative with amazing presence. No less than the event it chronicles, La Commune is a triumph of spontaneous action.” Jonathan Rosenbaum called it Watkins’ “latest magnum opus.” Dave Kehr, writing for *The New York Times*, called it “essential viewing for anyone interested in taking an exploratory step outside the Hollywood norms.”

**Man with a Movie Camera, 1929**

Directed by: Dziga Vertov
Written by: Dziga Vertov
Cinematography: Mikhail Kaufmann
Edited by: Elizaveta Svilova
Production Company: VUKFU
Runtime: 68 min (1 hr 8 min)
Negative Format: 35 mm
Country: Soviet Union (CCCP)

I want to welcome you again on behalf of Prof. Güven Arif Sargin, and express how thankful I am for your references all, in the utmost possible ardent manner. In order not to take much of your time, I will map out the general approach of mine and will have my reading of the film while it reels at the back. But, at the beginning I would like to delineate the intellectual backup that this particular work has gone through, since I advocate the primacy of the process somehow in the thesis as well. First, I should point my efforts in engaging these two disciplines date back to my undergraduate studies, through which I have extensively researched, experimented, and if possible, contemplated. Most of these contemplations were in the form of collages of video fragments, supported with the architectural and urban images that I have collected or produced myself. However, those work that I have conducted were completely a reflection of how a city or urban landscape is perceived with an intense architectural outlook. Along these inquiries I have been into, the questions started to pop-up on this particular, reciprocal relationship between the disciplines. Those questions were spanning on a major outlook I might add, like the inquiry about the political and social spatial construction via photography and film. However, these inquiries and ponderings were intuited with an assumption that space is one form of an entity: the intellectual response or treatment of space of an architect and of a cinematographer is the same construct. With this backpack I started my graduate education, continuing on the same academic inquiries and concerns. During the course of my graduate education, I tried to take relevant courses and produce materials that will help to understand and unravel the relationship in between,
regardless of the numerous efforts that covers the same domain. I wrote a paper that concerns about the architectural representation through a comparison of the International Style catalogue of 1932 and a documentary, My Architect from 2003, in the course instructed by Prof. Ayşen Savaş; another two were the political background of space construction via photography and cinema, in the guidance of Walter Benjamin, Dziga Vertov, and Ulus Baker, whom I revisited for this thesis as well, along the one that argues about the imagery condition of a praxis in the guidance of Henri Lefebvre and other contemporaries in the courses instructed by Prof. Sargin; and one other that searches for possible architectural representation differences between the textual representation and the visual one, in the course instructed by Prof. Ali Cengizkan. However, what changed my mind was the course I first audited then attended in Bilkent University, instructed by Dr. Ersan Ocak, GRA517 coded “Image, Time, and Motion”. It occurred to me that the intuition I had for the treatment of space was not that accurate, and therefore I could not retrieve a critical knowledge upon the relationship in between. Therefore, I started to enquire into a literary look towards the spatial discourse, the least of which I can get some critical points unlike the unilateral technological aspects of film and photography, and its repercussions in the architectural scene and so on. Through this process, I decided to focus on one question in order to avoid the drifting aparts, which aims a common discussion in the architectural domain. The question reads as follows: Can cinematographic image be regarded as an objective tool? I have extended my inquiry in this manner, and in the end, I had a mapping of my inquiry as a play of bubbles, as it were; all of which, separately has its own domain and its accumulating knowledge, but is in relation with and borrowing its knowledge to other disciplines at the same time (B. 1).
First, I compose a structural and two-fold scheme on the idea dealing with the image. The structural scheme problematizes the representation as a historical construct, in which the practices of depiction relies not only on the ways of looking and seeing, also the ability that the technology endows. I pursue the matter on Foucault’s interpretation of *Las Meninas*. To him, representation needs an outer, fixed eye, and in *Las Meninas*, the subject is incapable of replacing itself. Svetlana Alpers on the other hand, reveals that this refers to a social condition. The first aspect of the two-fold scheme is, the ontological figure of images. I read the whole in the guidance of WJT Mitchell’s writings. The image, to what extent it is conceptualised, equips the image with a particular discourse. This became more apparent with the inspection of the second aspect of the two-fold scheme: the phenomenological figure of the images. Images in the earlier account can be only scanned, watched, looked at, and gazed at inquisitively, as it is in *Las Meninas*. The technical image achieved by the apparatuses, on the contrary, is an entity that is readable. The reading of the representation that the image depicts varies therefore. Though I focus on treatment of
space in both extends, I somehow coalesce the levels of my study through the notion of experience following Foucault first, then Benjamin, utilising his dialectical image to construct a “social condition”, which in accordance to him, what dialectical image is for. Second, I track the historical subjects with bold and heavy readings of Jonathan Crary and his biblical work *Techniques of the Observer*, along with Benjamin’s flaneur and Dziga Vertov’s *kinok*. I reconsider Vertov’s appreciation of *kinoks* with reference to Benjamin’s flaneur, which as a collective embodies the modern subjectivity. The social subject, therefore, is a body equipped with the technological assemblages, through which transforms the society. I practically read the film *La Commune*, which narrates one of the earliest urban struggles in the history that happened in Paris through these historical subjects, as observer in the form of spectator, and as *kinok* as the cinematographer.

At first, I regard space as form, in its lexicon meaning around the very basic and common concepts regarding both disciplines. For example, in terms of movement, the cinematographer depicts every episode that makes the whole with a single, continuous shot, in the eye-level through the film. The whole spatial experience is achieved in this regard, creating an urban architectural sequence. In the case of the observer, the concepts are achieved in the same manner; however, the observer reads the space along a visually created path. Therefore, it distinguishes itself from the main plot. Second, I regard space as a construct, as symbols driven by representation. The film treats space in order to depict the essence of the film, together with the other tools for symbols than architecture or urban setting, like the narrative as foremost. It basically uses a vast open space as the set, which is partitioned into three: a main space as the symbol of the squares and clash arenas of Paris, and two subsidiary spaces as the symbol of streets and indoors. In this context, the fictitious, narrative knowledge of a space strives for partly factual and realistic, partly fictive constructions through screenplays. Narrative (screenplay) constructed upon spaces with particular connotations not only arrays initiatives that entail several reproductions of spaces, but also encourages the social subject to create flexible narrations using the actual space itself.
What I schemed out was to show the representations of architecture rely on the corporeal experiences and bodily structures. The image technologies are useful tools on this path, and thanks to its advances, the limitations of a camera lens documenting a space is no more is of matter. The transformation of architectural landscapes into cinematic spaces, as it were, does not provide significant manipulation in the architectural sense. The experience conducted in an architectural space, can be experienced in a designated cinematic space. An intriguing critical discourse upon cinematic spaces is therefore possible. On the other hand, unravelling the architectural knowledge through a concern of subjective inclusivity, coincides as not identification of architecture through spectacle in which several transcendent conditions of architecture is reconstructed, but rather, in the same context, motivating to redefine such transcendent situations with a claim that representations of architecture in cinema, the social subject, and spectacle themselves bear an active role in production of images. Devising and reading architecture through transcendent notions like text and image helps one to distinguish the condition of architect by analysing the whole network of relations that may or may not hindered crucial points while dealing with the principal aspects of the discipline. In spite of all the discourses governed by institutional and academic regimes, space thus be constructed on several accounts, which obviously and intentionally tackles the singular readings of architecture. Architectural space, therefore, provides potentials for different readings through social (and historical) subjects; be it an observer, or a cinematographer, or an architect. In such cases, architecture needs to distinguish itself from the relation that the representation and the narrative maintains, both architecturally and cinematographically, in order not to cave architecture in other domains, contradicting its own autonomy and refuting its status as a mode of knowledge and experience.

That’s all I am going to say about this work, and together with your reviews, if you have any questions, I would be happy to receive them.
TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN
Soyadı: Yergin
Adı: Emrah
Bölümü: Mimarlık

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): Towards the Spectacle: On The Role of Imagery in Architectural Representation

TEZİN TÜRÜ: Yüksek Lisans

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.

2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın.

3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun.

Yazarın imzası: Tarih: