

THE NEW TERRORISM DEBATE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN GOALS
OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

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ABSTRACT

THE NEW TERRORISM DEBATE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN GOALS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

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In this thesis, the question whether the concept of terrorism has been subject to revolutionary changes with respect to its aims, lethality and organization structure was tried to be answered by conceptualizing terrorism as a political form of violence and examining the changes and developments that occurred throughout the history of terrorism. This thesis examines the emergence of a new concept of terrorism under three chapters. In this sense, firstly, this thesis examines various definitions of terrorism in order to select a definition that conceptualizes terrorism as a political form of violence. Secondly, in this thesis, changes and developments in the history of terrorism were analyzed through the examination of a number of selected terrorist groups that had different manifestations and motivations. Lastly, the new terrorism debate, which argues that terrorism has been subject to revolutionary and previously unseen changes with respect to its aims, lethality and organizational structure after 1990s was analyzed thoroughly with the inclusion of opposing ideas. In this respect, the question whether radical Islamist terrorist groups that increased their global and local activities after 1990s had apocalyptic, unclear goals was tried to be answered via an analysis of the activities of radical Islamist terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and its Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusra with regards to their struggle in order to establish a zone of territorial political control in Syria.

Key Words: Terrorism, International Terrorism, New Terrorism Debate, Radical Islamist Terrorism

ÖZ

YENİ TERÖRİZM TARTIŞMASI: TERÖR ÖRGÜTLERİNİN AMAÇLARINDA DEĞİŞİM VE DEVAMLILIK

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tezde, terörizmin 1990’lardan itibaren amaçsal olarak yeni ve devrimsel nitelikler kazanıp kazanmadığı sorusu; terörizmin siyasal bir şiddet biçimi olarak kavramsallaştırılması ve tarihsel süreç boyunca geçirdiği değişimlerin ele alınması doğrultusunda cevaplanmıştır. Bu tez, terörizmin 1990’lardan itibaren amaçsal, organizasyonel ve öldürücülük gibi faktörler bakımından yeni ve daha önce görülmemiş devrimsel özellikler taşıyıp taşımadığı sorusunu üç ana başlık altında incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda ilk olarak literatürdeki mevcut terörizm tanımları incelenmiş ve terörizm siyasal bir şiddet biçimi olarak ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci olarak, terörizmin tarihsel süreç boyunca geçirdiği değişim ve dönüşüm, farklı dini, etnik ve ideolojik terör grupları ele alınarak incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Son olarak, terörizmin 1990’lardan itibaren devrimsel ve daha önce görülmemiş nitelikler kazandığını öngören yeni terörizm kavramı, terörizmin değişen amaçları, artan ölümcüllüğü ve devrimsel olarak değişen organizasyonel yapısı bağlamında, eleştirel görüşler de ele alınarak incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, 1990’lardan itibaren faaliyetlerini artıran İslamcı terör örgütlerinin dini, kıyametçi ve uzlaşamaz amaçları olup olmadığı sorusu, radikal İslamcı El-Kaide terör örgütü ve onun Suriye’de 2011’den beri faaliyet göstermekte olan El-Nusra Cephesi isimli kolunun Suriye’de sağlamaya çalıştığı bölgesel kontrol incelenerek cevaplandırılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, Uluslararası Terörizm, Yeni Terörizm Tartışması, Radikal İslamcı Terörizm

This thesis is dedicated to all those who lost their lives as a result of terrorism.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FLN	Front de Libération Nationale – National Liberation Front
ALN	Armée de Libération nationale – National Liberation Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PFLP	The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
IRA	Irish Republican Army
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – Basque Country and Freedom
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion – Red Army Faction
SA	Sturmabteilung - Storm Detachment
SS	Schutzstaffel – Defence Corps
SD	Sicherheitsdienst - Security Service
CHEKA	Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya – Emergency Committee
NKVD	Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del - People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê – Kurdistan Workers’ Party
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
GI	Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya – The Islamic Group
MUKUB	Maktab Khadamāt al-Mujāhidīn al-'Arab – Bureau of Services for Arab Mujahedin
AAS	Ahrar ash-Sham - Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant
AQI	Al-Qaeda in Iraq
JN	Jabhat al-Nusra
IS	The Islamic State

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Subject in Question

Terrorism, as one of the most important and also one of the most controversial terms in history, continues to pose both global and domestic threats. However, the concept of terrorism is yet to be clearly defined in an academic and legal sense. Although there is not a common agreement on what terrorism actually is, there are plenty of counter-terrorism campaigns undergoing in different parts of the world which aim to counter terrorist threats globally and domestically. In this sense, terrorism studies and efforts to reach to an objective, clear and comprehensive definition of terrorism becomes more important by the time. Otherwise, efforts to counter terrorism are likely to create more and more political problems as we have been witnessing especially since the beginning of the 20th century.

An important reason for terrorism to become such a problematic concept is that the causes of it are often debated. Motivations for terrorism varied throughout history, although the most common reasons for use of terrorism are listed as ethno-nationalism, religious motivations and ideological motivations. Causes that spark terrorism such as poverty, oppressive governments, revolutionary ideas, suppression of ethnic identities and etc. are often being involved in discussions regarding the definition of terrorism. Inclusion of such causal elements of terrorism complicates the issue of creating a short, clear and comprehensive definition. In addition to this, domestic laws of different countries around the world define terrorism according to their own legal and criminal terms, which represents a problem with respect to combating terrorism in a global sense.

Terrorism's transformation, or evolution throughout the history has also been subject to debate. The question whether there is a change or a continuity in terrorism has been discussed by authors such as Bruce Hoffman, who claimed that "new adversaries with new motivations and new rationales have appeared in recent years to challenge some of the most basic assumptions about terrorists and terrorism."¹ Indeed, documentation of the history of terrorism, when examined, indicates that terrorism appears to have been subject to several changes with respect to its tactics and methods. Factors such as the rise of nationalism, anarchism alongside with fall of empires influenced terrorism and terrorist tactics. In addition, technological advances, especially in regard to arms and communications technologies, contributed greatly to an advance to the next level of terrorism tactics.

The discussion regarding the changes in terrorism has evolved into a significant debate after the 1990s, especially after the appearance of terrorist groups with radical Islamic agendas. Following deadly attacks committed by radical Islamic terrorist groups, a discussion regarding the emergence of a completely new form of terrorism that was different from the terrorism of the Cold War and the previous era with respect to its aims, lethality and organizational form.² Ideas that argued for the emergence of a "new terrorism" became even more significant after al-Qaeda's attack against the World Trade Center towers in New York in 2001. Religiously motivated terrorism was separated from the old "secular" types of terrorism and thus it was to be countered with different methods and tactics. Therefore the most distinctive feature of new terrorism is that it was claimed to be motivated religiously.³ However, the concept of new terrorism also had

¹ Bruce Hoffman, "Change and Continuity in Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24, (2001): 417.

² Peter R. Neumann, "Introduction" in *Old & New Terrorism*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 1-3.

³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 82.

critical reception. Critics of new terrorism claimed that developments in terrorism after 1990s were not adequate to label it as a fundamental change in terrorism.⁴

In light of these, this thesis asks the question whether the radical Islamic terrorist groups that emerged after 1990s had apocalyptic, unnegotiable goals due to their religious motivation. In this study, the question regarding changes occurring in aims of terrorist groups will be answered through a study of the definition of terrorism, an evaluation of terrorism's historical transformation and an analysis of the aims of al-Qaeda and its Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in Syria as a case study. This thesis argues that the goals of terrorist groups that are considered as "new" are not purely religious and apocalyptic unlike the concept of new terrorism suggests. Instead, it is concluded that terrorism is a political form of violence and thus the changes that occurred in the forms, methods and tactics of terrorism throughout the history are the results of political and technological developments. In addition, from a contemporary point of view, localization of Jihadist groups in Syria, with respect to their aims, especially the case of JN, indicates that although religiously motivated terrorist groups appear to be aiming for unnegotiable goals such as establishment of a global Islamic caliphate, their primary aim on the ground is to create local zones of territorial and political control. Such zones appear to be located within areas of Muslim populations instead of parts of the territories that belong to countries that are within Western civilization. However, this thesis does not argue that al-Qaeda and its branches seek purely political goals, and that their agenda is not religious. Instead, it is argued in this thesis that Jihadist groups with wider global aims appear to have changed their tactics in order to secure the establishment of local power bases around areas of turmoil in Muslim populated parts of the world, which is familiar to the behaviors of terrorist groups that are labeled as "old" and "secular" by

⁴ See for example, Martha Crenshaw, "The Debate Over "New" vs. "Old" Terrorism, *Center for International Security and Cooperation*, (2007), 1-34, Isabelle Duyvestein, "How New is the New Terrorism?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, (2004), 439-454, Anthony Field, "The 'new terrorism': Revolution or evolution?" *Political Studies Review* 7, no.2 (2009), 195-207, Doron Zimmermann, "Terrorism Transformed: The "New Terrorism," Impact Scalability, and the Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no.4 (2001): 158-163.

proponents of the concept of new terrorism. In other words, in this thesis, it is argued that the “new” terrorists are not very different from the “old” terrorists with regard to their goals as it was observed that groups with radical Islamic, Jihadist motivations, too, seek to establish local political control over a certain part of the world via alliances or conflicts with other Jihadist groups. In this sense, it is concluded in this thesis that the goals of “localized” Jihadist groups that appeared especially after the popular uprisings in the Middle East during 2011-2015 period carry similarities with terrorist groups that existed before the emergence of the “new” terrorism concept.

1.2. Methodology

In terms of the analysis of the new terrorism debate, this thesis firstly aims to adopt a specific definition of terrorism in order to discuss changing forms of terrorism throughout history. To do so, a number of attempts to define terrorism will be compared and discussed with respect to academic efforts to define terrorism. After adopting one of the specific definitions of terrorism, terrorism’s various manifestations throughout the history will be analyzed in the second chapter of this thesis. Different manifestations of terrorism that emerged in history will be analyzed by using the definition of terrorism adopted in the first chapter of this thesis. Examples of terrorism types with different motivations will be analyzed by the help of the selected terrorism definition in order to determine goals of terrorist acts conducted by different terrorist groups. By doing so, this thesis will try to emphasize on political nature of terrorism. Afterwards, the new terrorism debate will be discussed and analyzed including the critical reception regarding emergence of the concept of new terrorism.

This thesis will mainly rely on secondary sources consisting of a selection of books and journal articles regarding the definition and historical development of terrorism and the concept of new terrorism debate. In addition to the books and articles on the subject, online sources will also be used. Online sources mainly consist of news websites and

online dictionary services. For the use of primary sources, a summary of published interviews, as well as letters and fatwas issued by various terrorist leaders will be cited.

1.3. Outline of the Thesis

This thesis consists of four main chapters. After the introduction chapter, in the second chapter, the thesis will focus on the definitions of terrorism. First section of the second chapter will discuss terrorism and its basic connotations. In the next section, elements that are used in defining terrorism will be discussed as well as attempts to define terrorism in academic literature. Comparison of a selection of terrorism definitions crafted by several different scholars will be analyzed and a certain definition of terrorism will be chosen in order to be adopted by this thesis. In the third section of the second chapter, attempts to define terrorism in international law will be discussed with several examples from the UN resolutions and conventions on terrorism as well as examples of terrorism's definition in the EU legislation. Afterwards, in the fourth section of the second chapter, causes of terrorism will be discussed and analyzed.

Third chapter of this thesis will present a brief information on history of terrorism. This chapter aims to provide insight on different manifestations of terrorism throughout the history via describing and analyzing a selection of cases. First section of the third chapter will focus on examples of terrorism in ancient times. Sicarii of the Palestine, the Assassins of Hassan Sabbah and Reign of Terror following the French Revolution will be analyzed by utilizing the definition of terrorism adopted by this thesis. In order to better understand the concept of terrorism, the concept of state terrorism will also be included in the analysis. Second section of this chapter will analyze the emergence of anarchist terrorism during late 19th century while the third section will focus on the excessive amount of state terrorism conducted by the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during 1930 – 1945 period. The fourth section of chapter three will discuss the post-colonial terrorism via examples of Zionist terrorism by Irgun and Lehi in Palestine

and the nationalist terrorism employed by FLN during Algerian resistance against France. In the fifth section, examples of ethno-nationalist and ideological terrorism will be analyzed with the examples of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – Basque Country and Freedom) in Spain and RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion – Red Army Faction) in West Germany. Sixth section of the third chapter will describe and analyze the emergence of radical Islamic, Jihadist forms of terrorism. In addition, this section will also analyze the emergence of the al-Qaeda following the end of the Afghan-Soviet War.

In the final chapter of the thesis, the concept of new terrorism and the debate over the concept of new terrorism will be analyzed. In this sense, the first section of the fourth chapter will focus on the origins of the idea of new terrorism. Second section, together with its subsections, will analyze the concept of new terrorism under three of its main characteristics that are listed namely as aims, lethality and organizational structure of the new terrorism. The idea that JN in Syria, as a branch of al-Qaeda, could represent an example to political behaviors of Jihadist terrorists that aim to control a limited territory will be discussed under the subsection that analyzes the changing goals of the new terrorists. This subsection aims to discuss the idea that although being labeled as religious fanatics with apocalyptical aims, the “new” terrorists show similarities with the “old” terrorists in terms of their aims especially when examining the actions of JN in Syria as a branch of Jihadist group al-Qaeda. Third section of the fourth chapter will mention the critical response against the idea of the new terrorism. This section will emphasize the view that the idea of new terrorism, apart from representing the changes in terrorism, serves political purposes rather than academic discussions.

CHAPTER II

TERRORISM AS A FORM OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

2.1. Terrorism and Its Connotations as a Form of Political Violence

Terrorism demonstrates to be one of the most challenging concepts in the area of social sciences especially in terms of reaching an international consensus on its definition. Terrorism, as Randall D. Law argues, is “as old as human civilization and as new as this morning’s headlines”.⁵ However, current attempts to define the concept of terrorism are relatively new. Especially throughout the 20th century, there have been many attempts to define terrorism based on a number of criteria. These criteria however, have actually been the main source of controversies and disputes among different academics, journalists, politicians or other groups of people who are interested in terrorism studies or engaged in political issues. The differences between elements included in order to define terrorism, such as “identity of the victim”, could be discussed as an example of how terrorism’s definition is directly affected by selection of elements that are to be included in a definition. Alex P. Schmid, in his article on definition of terrorism, includes the “civilian element” in his definition in a way that the victim’s civilian identity represents a criterion in describing whether a violent act is an act of terrorism.⁶ However, targets of terrorist groups may not always be civilians, as there are many examples of terrorist groups targeting military and law enforcement personnel.

Motives of terrorist groups, on the other hand, represent another disputed point. As stated in the famous phrase “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”, acts of

⁵ Randall D. Law, *Terrorism: A History*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 1.

⁶ Alex P. Schmid, "Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 2 (2010): 204.

violence in order to obtain freedom from a political entity can be labeled as terrorism as the violent group targets a state in order to achieve political freedom as we see in cases of ethnic terrorism. However, from the opposing perspective, although these groups pursue political aims such as achieving freedom, their acts are labeled as unlawful, violent terrorism. On the other hand, some of the opposing political groups or terrorist organizations continuously accuse states of being the real terrorists, terrorizing populations of the countries that they physically or economically damaged. Randall Law states that;

The problem is that scholars, policy analysts, and laypeople alike tend to use the word terrorism in mutually exclusive ways. On one hand, we use it normatively, as a moral judgment against violence that is inherently wrong. On the other hand, we imagine we are using it analytically, as an objective descriptor. Our understanding of terrorism is rooted in an emotional reaction and moral revulsion.⁷

Further examples of conflicting criterion for the definition of terrorism will be examined in following sections where a selection of criteria will be defined in order to apply them to the debate regarding the existence of new terrorism and the aims of the new terrorists.

From a simple, dictionary perspective, terrorism is often described as “systematic use of violence and intimidation” to achieve political or some other goals.⁸ Similar to this, The Oxford Learner’s Dictionary defines terrorism as “the use of violent action in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to act”.⁹ Merriam Webster Online Dictionary defines terrorism as “the use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area

⁷ Law, 2.

⁸ *Collins Cobuild English Dictionary* s.v. “Terrorism,” accessed June 1, 2015, <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/terrorism>

⁹ *Oxford Learner’s Dictionary* s.v. “Terrorism,” accessed June 1, 2015, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/terrorism>

as a way of trying to achieve a political goal”.¹⁰ Basic definitions of terrorism, in sum, imply that it is a type of violence in order to create a feeling of terror and scare among a target population in order to achieve political or other gains. As seen above, basic definitions are way too vague and do not actually offer a clear idea of who is actually a terrorist. As for the meaning of the word “terror”, the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary concludes that “terror” indicates a “very great fear” and “the threat of violence, or violent acts, especially when it is used for political agendas.”¹¹ At first glance, most of the dictionary definitions stated above focus on the attacks against civilians when describing a terrorist attack. Meanwhile, Bruce Hoffman argues that;

Virtually, any especially abhorrent act of violence perceived as directed against society-whether it involves the activities of antigovernment dissidents or governments themselves, organized-crime syndicates, common criminals, rioting mobs, people engaged in militant protest, individual psychotics, or lone extortionists-is often labeled “terrorism.”¹²

Use of the word “terrorism” is often perceived negatively, especially after the World War II. Up until then, especially among the Russian anarchists of 19th century, the word “terrorist” was being used in a positive manner to point out their tactics and aims. David Rapoport argues that “the [Russian] rebels described themselves as terrorists, not guerillas, tracing their lineage to the French Revolution”¹³. The word terrorism has been used in a positive manner by Russian anarchists due to its origins in the era known as the “Reign of Terror” after the French Revolution. As Hoffman argues, “the word terrorism

¹⁰ Merriam Webster Dictionary Online s.v. “Terrorism,” accessed June 1, 2015. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism>

¹¹ Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. 1989. Oxford University Press quoted in Ufuk Sözübir, *Conceptualizing the Definition of Terrorism in Light of the Developments in the Fields of Academics, History and Legislation* (Master’s thesis, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2005), 8.

¹² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 1.

¹³ David C. Rapoport, *The Four Waves of Terrorism*, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, *Attacking Terrorism* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 51.

had a decidedly positive connotation [during the French Revolution] in contrast to its contemporary usage”.¹⁴ In his book, Bruce Hoffman states that the meaning of terrorism has been subject to several changes between late 19th century and today. He argues that terrorism had gained different connotations depending on the context and political environment in which it had occurred.¹⁵ Indeed, terrorism is a concept that is subject to different perceptions especially in accordance with the political and cultural atmosphere of the period.

The changing, dynamic nature of terrorism is one of the reasons why there is still no commonly agreed definition of terrorism. Impact of improvements in industrialization, communication, media and propaganda have enabled masses to challenge existing political structures in the world. This has resulted in revolutions, anti-colonial movements and national self-determination struggles. Parallel to these changes, terrorism has become more dynamic and efficient as the world become smaller. Walter Laqueur argues that;

Seen in historical perspective, the various manifestations of terrorism, however different their aims and the political context, had a common origin: they were connected with the rise of democracy and nationalism.¹⁶

Laqueur claims that terrorism is a concept that develops parallel to the rise of democracy of nationalism. Although Laqueur’s argument is partly valid, terrorism’s manifestations date back to much earlier times in history. As stated above, terrorism has a very old connection with the human beings that it was a tool since the ancient times. Forms and volumes of terrorist groups and attacks may have been different, but it can be argued

¹⁴ Hoffman, 3.

¹⁵ Ibid, 9-19.

¹⁶ Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 11.

that terrorism actually dates back to ancient world.¹⁷ In addition, Chaliand and Blin also argue that exploitation of terror predates the modern democratic state.¹⁸ However, Laqueur's argument is useful in understanding the increase of terrorist activity and efficiency especially after the late 19th century. Definitional debates and different connotations of the word "terrorism" also coincide with the increase in terrorist activities after the 19th century. Basically, it can be argued that terrorism is a universal concept that has gained importance parallel to the developments in the history of mankind. Rather sudden increase in terrorist activities after 19th century can also be explained with the concepts such as globalization and modernization.

Consequently, it can be understood that basic definition of terrorism is often associated with the "use of force in order to achieve political or other goals". However, of course, a more complex definition of terrorism include many more elements than just "use of force" and "political goals". Also, different groups from different parts of the world perceive and define terrorism differently from each other depending on their agendas and interests by calling the same groups as "guerillas", "freedom fighters", "liberation movements", "anti-colonial movements" and etc. Differences regarding the definition of terrorism, especially in international law and academia, result in different counter-terrorism policies and politicization of the issue. Martha Crenshaw, an important scholar in terrorism studies, argues that the term is often used in a careless or pejorative way for rhetorical reasons.¹⁹ Indeed, rhetorical use of the term "terrorism" currently represents one of the major causes of wars and instability in different places around the world. Anthony Richards argues that;

¹⁷ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz. *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*, (New York: Plagave & MacMillan, 2005), 19.

¹⁸ Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, ed., *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*, (California: University of California, 2007), 8.

¹⁹ Martha Crenshaw, *Explaining Terrorism, Causes, Processes and Consequences*, (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011), 206.

The failure to craft an agreed-on definition of terrorism has left a vacuum for actors, whether they be state or non-state, to define terrorism in ways that serve their own perceived political and strategic interests, and, in the case of state responses, remits of “counter-terrorism” are often determined accordingly.²⁰

To support this argument, United States’ “Global War on Terrorism”, for example, has been subject to many debates around the world with its implications on the Middle East and South Asia. Moreover, failure to reach an agreement on a commonly agreed definition of terrorism also prevents formulation of international agreements against terrorism.²¹

In the following section, elements used to define terrorism will be reviewed alongside various definitions of terrorism in academic literature in order to determine a definition of terrorism that will be used in this thesis.

2.2. The Definitions of Terrorism in the Academic Literature

In academic literature there are a large number of definitions of terrorism. These definitions, however, vary among different scholars due to the complex nature of terrorism. Terrorist groups around the world have different aims, tactics and structures to achieve their goals. Therefore, their targets and attacking practices often differ from each other. Thus, different academic definitions of terrorism occur depending on the criterion to be used in defining terrorism. Political differences and state policies, of course, influence attempts to define terrorism. In some cases, some definitions of terrorism may include a number of states to be labeled as “terrorists” depending on their definition criteria. In addition to this, James M. Lutz and Brenda Lutz, argue that

²⁰ Anthony Richards, “Conceptualizing Terrorism”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37, no. 3 (2014): 214.

²¹ Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter?”, *Police Practice and Research* 3, no. 4 (2002): 300.

“international accepted definitions are difficult to achieve because some countries have attempted to make sure that national liberation movements are not include in the category”.²² Moreover, Bruce Hoffman argues that “different departments or agencies of even the same government will themselves often have very different definitions”.²³ It is obvious that there are a few objective elements that can help define terrorism and these elements, which will be analyzed in this thesis alongside with definitions formulated by them, appear to be the only way out in reaching a clear definition of terrorism that’ll serve governments and international system to combat terrorism in a healthier way.

An important problematic point in the definition of terrorism is being considered as the “normative” nature of the discussion. Verena Erlenbusch argues that;

Reliance on everyday speech introduces a moral judgment of terrorism as wrong or evil into academic discourse. This judgment then becomes one of terrorism’s essential characteristics and is built into a definition whose ostensible purpose is to serve as the basis of philosophical moral assessment.²⁴

Erlenbusch’s work criticizes that the definition of terrorism is largely based on objectionable terms suggested by daily speech which prevent us from creating an objective, clear definition. In addition, Adrian Guelke also opposes the normative side of terrorism’s definitions by criticizing Alex P. Schmid’s definition over the use of term “violence”. Indeed, violence is a critical term in terrorism studies as the identity of the perpetrators of violence is essential to describe whether it is a case of legitimate use of force or a terrorist attack. Guelke states that “characterization of an action as violent also usually entails disapproval and implies that it is illegitimate”.²⁵ Guelke concludes that

²² James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz. *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*, 6-7.

²³ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 30

²⁴ Verena Erlenbusch, “How (Not) to Study Terrorism”, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17, no.4 (2014), 472.

²⁵ Adrian Guelke, *The New Age of Terrorism and the International Political System*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009), 20.

the “violence” is related to illegitimacy while “force” represents legitimacy. Thus, Guelke argues, “any definition of the concept that employs the term ‘violence’, also carries that normative presumption with it”.²⁶ Both Guelke and Erlenbusch’s ideas are essential towards understanding why some parts of the society define terrorism as completely different from other ones and why, in fact, some people consider terrorists as “freedom fighters”. Normative approach towards terrorism affects definitional struggle in terms of creating and defining enemies and tagging opposition or liberation movements as terrorists. This trend has gone even further in some countries where any type of dissidents, including journalists, have been labeled as terrorists and have been judged under terror laws.

Another problem faced when defining terrorism is that it has often been confused or equated with “insurgency” and “guerilla warfare”.²⁷ Similarities in tactics used by insurgents, guerillas and terrorists create confusion whether which one is a terrorist group or act. Hoffman discusses that guerillas are larger in numbers and operate as a military unit while insurgents share the same characteristics but rather transcend hit-and-run tactics.²⁸ Hoffman differentiates terrorists from insurgents and guerilla groups by stating that;

Terrorists, however, do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in combat, are constrained both numerically and logistically from undertaking concerted mass political mobilization efforts, and exercise no direct control or governance over a populace at either the local or national level.²⁹

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 35.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

Ariel Merari argues that the major difference between terrorists and guerilla groups is that terrorists do not aim to establish physical control over a certain territory.³⁰ In terms of territorial control, Hoffman, Chaliand and Blin have a common point that terrorist groups do not struggle for control of a certain territory. A challenge to this idea, however, is the terrorists groups that claim control over certain territories in the world such as Syria, Libya and Iraq. After the civil wars and uprisings in the Arab dominated parts of the Middle East alongside with North Africa, it has been witnessed that many terrorist organizations such as Jabhat Al-Nusra, the Islamic State, Ahrar ash-Sham have claimed control over different parts of Iraq, Syria and Libya. Whether or not all terrorists pursue territorial control over a certain territory will represent the focal point of the thesis and the question will be answered while examining the differences between the “new” and “old” terrorists in the following chapters. In general, however, guerilla groups and insurgents differ from terrorists due to reasons specified above and also the fact that these groups often target military and law enforcement personnel of the target state instead of deliberately targeting civilians.

2.2.1 Definitional Elements of Terrorism

In their book *“Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature”* (1988) Alex P Schmid and Albert J. Jongman provide a very useful list of elements that are used in defining terrorism. Also, Schmid and Jongman provide percentages on how often each element is used on the selected list of 109 different terrorism definitions they examine. In their work, three most frequently used elements in describing terrorism are as follows: Violence, force (83.5), political (65) and fear, terror emphasized (51). From this perspective, it can be understood that terrorism is widely accepted as a form of political violence as “violence” and “political

³⁰ Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency” in *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*, ed. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, 12-51, (California: University of California, 2007), 24.

nature” are the first two elements that are used most frequently. However, there are other elements as well that are worthy of attention. Psychological effects and anticipated reactions, for example, are used in 41.5 percent of the 109 definitions examined by Schmid and Longman.³¹ This data could be useful to understand the Brian Jenkins’ argument that “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead”.³²

Table 1.1 Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism³³

Element	Frequency
1. Violence, Force	83,5
2. Political	65
3. Fear, terror emphasized	51
4. Threat	47
5. (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions)	41.5
6. Victim – target differentiation	37.5
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5
9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
11. Publicity aspect	21.5
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character;	21
13. Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
14. Intimidation	17
15. Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5
16. Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14
17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5
18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
19. Clandestine, covert nature	9

³¹ Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman. et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 5-6.

³² Brian Michael Jenkins, “New Modes of Conflict”, *Rand Corporation* quoted in Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25, (2002): 306.

³³ Schmid and Longman, 5-6.

20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7
21. Criminal	6
22. Demands made on third parties	4

2.2.2 Attempts to Create a Scholarly Definition of Terrorism

James Lutz and Brenda Lutz combine works of scholars such as Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge in order to formulate a working definition of terrorism that is based on six major components such as “political nature”, “the violence or threat of violence”, “a target audience beyond immediate victims”, “an identifiable organization”, “targets and perpetrators of the violence” and “[terrorists’] aim to improve power situation”.³⁴ Their definition based on these six criteria are as follows;

Terrorism involves political aims and motives. It is violent or threatens violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victim of the violence. The violence is conducted by an identifiable organization. The violence involves a non-state actor or actors as either the perpetrator, the victim of the violence or both. Finally, the acts of violence are designed to create power in situations in which power previously had been lacking (i.e. the violence attempts to enhance the power base of the organization undertaking the actions).³⁵

The most important feature of this definition is that it does not include the specific term “civilian” unlike some other definitions. Boaz Ganor, for example, provides a one line definition claiming that “terrorism is the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians in order to achieve political ends”.³⁶ Exclusion of the term “civilian” removes some of the confusion on type of the victims and helps us understand the fact that the

³⁴ James M. Lutz and Brenda Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 9-13.

³⁵ James and Brenda Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 9.

³⁶ Boaz Ganor, “The Relationship Between International and Localized Terrorism”, *The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs* 4, no. 26 (2005), accessed June 4, 2015, <http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-26.htm>

primary aim of a terrorist group is to send a message to a group of people via targeting selected or random victims of terror. Similar to Ganor, Danilo Zolo also focuses on the civilian identity of the terror victims and comes up with his definition that states “[terrorism is the] indiscriminate use of violence against a civil population with the aim of spreading panic and pressurizing a government or an international political authority”.³⁷ It is also significant that these definitions emphasize the fact that terrorism is chosen by the weaker groups in a society in order to create or enhance their power. The type of this power could be argued as military, economic or sociological. Whatever the type of power terrorists seek to increase, it will be used to gain political leverage.

Bruce Hoffman, after using five elements to filter out his definition, concludes that;

Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.³⁸

Hoffman’s definition is similar to that of Lutz’s in terms of its criterion. Only major difference, however, is that Hoffman’s definition lacks the “identifiable organization” mentioned by Lutz. Hoffman does not argue that there must be an identifiable organization, a type of structure within the perpetrators to call them terrorists.

Schmid and Jongman’s definition is more complex compared to Lutz and Hoffman;

³⁷ Danilo Zolo, *Victors' Justice: From Nuremberg to Baghdad*, trans. M. W. Weir (New York and London: Verso, 2009), 126 quoted in Verena Erlenbusch, “How (Not) to Study Terrorism”, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17, no.4 (2014), 471.

³⁸ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 41.

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.³⁹

Firstly, apart from political reasons, Schmid and Jongman's definition includes "idiosyncratic" and "criminal" reasons as well. This, however, may create a confusion with mafia groups and criminal networks. For example, if a drug cartel decides to plant bombs in a rival cartel's neighborhood to send a message, would that still be accounted as terrorism? This question stems from the usage of the term "criminal". On the other hand, Schmid and Jongman do not refer to "an identifiable organization" in their definition either. Moreover, it also does not contain elements of "power" in it.

Carsten Bockstette's definition, which emphasizes on the type of victims that terrorists choose is as follows;

Terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). Such acts are meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organization. The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to reach short- and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states.⁴⁰

³⁹ Schmid and Jongman, 28.

⁴⁰ Carsten Bockstette, "Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques", *George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies* 20, (2008): 8.

Bockstette's definition has three significant differences. Firstly, it designates "noncombatants" as targets of terrorism. Secondly it defines terrorist groups as "illicit" and "clandestine". Finally, it argues that purpose of terrorism is to attract media attention to increase publicity and reach short and medium term political goals and / or desired long term end states. Bockstette's argument regarding the aims of terrorists is rather confusing since it says that terrorists either follow short and midterm political goals and / or desired states. It seems that this argument fits in the idea that all terrorist groups eventually pursue territorial control over a certain piece of land regardless of their motivations or driving ideologies. However, Bockstette's definition still lacks clarity that other's relatively maintain.

Neil J. Smelser's definition, on the other hand, is based on a selection of criteria that includes terms such as the violence or threat of violence being; "intended", "irregular", "in secret".⁴¹ Moreover, instead of word "fear", Smelser uses "anxiety" in a somewhat similar way compared to Schmid. Smelser defines terrorism as;

Intended, irregular acts of violence or disruption (or the threat of them) carried out in secret with the effect of generating anxiety in a group, and with the further aim, via that effect, of exciting political response or political change.⁴²

Smelser's definition could be considered as a shorter and more precise mix of the definitions made by Schmid and Lutz. Similar to Schmid, Smelser also stresses the fact that terrorism is carried out in order to "generate anxiety" and that the groups carrying out terrorist activities are "clandestine" or "secret". In terms of aims, Smelser seems to agree with other scholars on the idea that terrorists seek to create political change by targeting subjects of that particular political body. However, unlike Lutz, Smelser's definition does not touch upon the issue of victims. His definition does not clearly specify whether victims of terrorist attacks are the actual targets or they are targeting "a

⁴¹ Neil J. Smelser, *The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), PDF e-book, 242.243.

⁴² Smelser, 242.

wider audience” as Lutz argues. In terms of the terms chosen, Smelser explains that he uses the word “intended” to specify that terrorist attacks are conducted by human agents with a specific intention therefore they must not be mistaken with disasters or accidents.⁴³ This could be understood especially when thinking of incidents where explosions or accidents caused by natural disasters or other human-related failures cause panic and fear due to being mistaken with terrorism.

Adding to these, he also uses term “irregular” instead of the word “random” and explains this by stating that “terrorist actions frequently display patterns in the selection of targets according to their importance, accessibility, and symbolic significance. “Irregular” seems an essential feature, because the notion of terrorist-induced anxiety involves both threat and the uncertainty of occurrence.”⁴⁴ Smelser’s emphasis on using word “irregular” instead of “random” is essential in describing patterns of terrorism as it explains why and how societies are kept aware of a terrorist threat most of the time although there may be long periods of time between attacks occurring. His use of the word “irregular”, thus, serves two purposes. Firstly, it prevents the possible confusion created by the word “random” since both targets or timing of each attack can indeed be random. Secondly, the word “irregular” explains why terror and anxiety in a society created by a terrorist attack still exists although after a significant amount of time after the attack.

As seen above, there are a number of controversial terms and elements that are used by different scholars in order to create a definition of terrorism. Apart from the definitions examined so far, the definition of terrorism that will be used in this thesis in order to discuss and challenge the concept of “new terrorism” will be the one that has been put forward by Anthony Richards. In his article “*Conceptualizing Terrorism*”, Richards focuses on two main elements of terrorism in order to create a short, precise definition that also avoids controversial elements. Firstly, Anthony Richards focuses on the

⁴³ Ibid, 243.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

primary aim of the terrorists and claims that terrorists primarily aim to generate wide psychological impact.⁴⁵ Secondly, Richards' definition emphasizes on the political nature of the terrorism in order to differentiate concept from other criminal activities, and most importantly, from the freedom fighters. According to Richards, "a comprehensive (and more honest) definition of terrorism needs to incorporate the possibility of terrorism that one might sympathize with or even endorse as well as 'bad terrorism' an international approaches to the phenomenon arguably should reflect this".⁴⁶ In light of these, Richards' definition of terrorism is as follows;

Terrorism is the use of violence or threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive.⁴⁷

Following a comparison of definitions of terrorism that come out as primary ones, a definition with an emphasis on political nature of terrorism will be adopted in this thesis in order to examine the existence of "new terrorism" and argue that terrorism has not been subject to a completely fundamental change, especially in terms of the aims of terrorists. Therefore, it can be argued that both the old and the new terrorists have pursued political gains and territorial control over a certain part of the world as their primary aim. In order to achieve these goals, both the new and the old terrorists have targeted victims selectively or randomly in order to generate a psychological effect that will reach beyond the chosen victims.

⁴⁵ Richards, 230.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 229.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 230.

2.3. Attempts to Define Terrorism in International Law

An important and yet to be solved problem in international relations is the definition of terrorism in accordance with the principles of international law. According to a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime paper explaining frequently asked questions regarding countering terrorism and international law, “there is no international crime of ‘terrorism’ in the sense of a *delicta juris gentium* and terrorism as such is neither a war crime nor a crime against humanity. One reason for this is the fact that there is, as yet, no general international agreement on a definition of terrorism.”⁴⁸ Indeed, attempts to formulate an internationally agreed definition of terrorism have failed so far.

Due to difficulties that lie ahead of reaching an internationally agreed definition of terrorism, an approach that bypasses a direct, comprehensive definition of terrorism has been applied. According to this “inductive” approach, “international law specifically addressing terrorism exists within the general framework of international law including international criminal law, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and refugee law”.⁴⁹ In terms of this approach, “international legal scholars do not attempt to define terrorism as a general concept. Instead, they have tried to define (and proscribe) specific events such as plane hijacking, taking of hostages, bombings and so on.”⁵⁰

This approach, however, has resulted in the formulation of different conventions on prevention of terrorism with respect to different aspects of the phenomenon. Moreover, this approach also inevitably neglects the intent of the terrorist activities and rather focuses on the impacts of terrorist acts. Contrary to the inductive approach, however, the

⁴⁸ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Frequently Asked Questions on International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism*, (New York: United Nations, 2009), 41.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁵⁰ Ufuk Sözübir, “Conceptualizing the Definition of Terrorism in Light of the Developments in the Fields of Academics, History and Legislation” (M. A. thesis, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2005), 22.

efforts to utilize a comprehensive, all-inclusive approach has taken place at 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.⁵¹ The definition of terrorism made in article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is as follows;

Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.⁵²

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which has been adopted in 28 September 2001, condemns the September 11 attacks and enforces member states to take measures and combat terrorism.⁵³ However, UNSC Resolution 1373 does not contain a clear cut definition of terrorism. The resolution rather sets out the principles by which member states shall combat terrorism. The UNSC resolution 1566, which has been adopted in 2004, puts forward a definition of terrorism that is to be prevented by the member states.

Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 54/109, "International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism," December 9, 1999, <http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm>

⁵³ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1373, September 28, 2001, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement>

ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.⁵⁴

It can be understood that UNSC resolution 1566 includes a definition of terrorism that includes the “intent” of the terrorists alongside their tactics and methods. Also, this resolution does not single out the civilians as prime or sole targets of terrorist attacks. The European Union’s definition of terrorism is also rather comprehensive. Article 1 of the *Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism* (2002) states that;

Offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.⁵⁵

EU Council Framework Decision defines terrorism as a political violence that aims to intimidate a population or unduly compel a government or an international organization. Similar to UN resolutions, EU Council Framework Decision also emphasizes the political nature, therefore intent, of the terrorism. The most important achievement in this framework decision is that it enabled EU countries to agree upon a definition of terrorism.

International organizations, in general, appear to have followed two different paths to define terrorism in order to prevent it. First, “inductive” approach enables states to reach a “textual agreement” on the acts of terrorism by singling out criminal acts that are conducted by terrorist groups.⁵⁶ On the other hand, a single and comprehensive definition of terrorism has the risk of labeling individual or other irrelevant acts of crime

⁵⁴ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1566, October 8, 2004, <http://www.unrol.org/files/n0454282.pdf>

⁵⁵ EU Council Framework Decision, 2002/475/JHA (combating terrorism), June 13, 2002.

⁵⁶ Sözübir, 23.

as terrorism since the definitions offered have a wider range.⁵⁷ Also, another problem in reaching an international consensus over definition of terrorism is the motivational causes behind a terrorist attack. Political motivations, as examined in various academic definitions of terrorism, constitute the largest element in differing criminal acts from terrorism. Moreover, touching upon the identity of terrorists, Eva Herschinger argues that another reason for the problem of reaching an internationally agreed definition of terrorism in UN debates is that;

The concept of what counts as a terrorist offence is highly dependent on national interests and a universally accepted definition is thus considered to delimit sovereign power since it entails giving up the right to define terrorism according to one's own rationale.⁵⁸

Therefore, a comprehensive definition of terrorism created by an international organization which has binding rules over member states may create controversy over deciding which specific criminal acts actually possess the political motivation or intent. Filtering out criminal acts from acts of terrorism by using the element of “intent” stands out as a primary method, however, in an international sense, it appears to represent the most difficult challenge.

Reaching a commonly agreed definition of terrorism in international law still represents a difficult task both in theory and in practice. Instead, international organizations such as the UN, find different ways to combat terrorism as a crime. There are fourteen UN Conventions on terrorism that are open to ratification of member states. When examining the timeline and content of each specific convention, it is understood that the UN chose the path of combating terrorist acts individually via these fourteen

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Eva Herschinger, “A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN Debates on a Definition of International Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no.2 (2013), 185.

conventions on different terrorist acts such as hijacking of planes, protection of nuclear materials, protection of maritime navigation, bombings and financing of terrorism.⁵⁹

It is concluded that the international organizations rather seek to prevent and combat terrorism by considering different terrorist acts and methods as different international crimes instead of formulating a comprehensive definition that would encompass terrorism as a whole. Main reason behind this is that different states have different national interests that from time to time clash with others'. Thus, self-determination and national liberation movements that are supported by different states are being perceived as terrorist actions from the perspective of the subject states. Syrian government, for example, have long identified the rebel movements in the country that emerged after 2011 as "terrorists" meanwhile other states, have defined the events in Syria as "uprisings" or "rebellions".⁶⁰ Although there are various opinions on whether terrorism can or cannot be defined internationally, Herschinger provides the idea of evaluating terrorism as a tactic rather than its motives in order to solve the definitional problem in international sense. She claims that "thinking of terrorism as a tactic does not aim to circumscribe a particular content to terrorism but to consider terrorism as a practice among others to foster specific political ends."⁶¹ Indeed, by doing so, terrorism may be evaluated free of its intent, which constitutes the controversial part in definitional debates. Thus, different political agendas of states may matter less in terms of deciding what a terrorist act is. To support her argument, Herschinger says that;

Considering terrorism as a tactic should not be misunderstood as re-essentializing terrorism. On the contrary, this understanding of terrorism can offer some avenues on how to deal with terrorism when defining it does not come to a close.⁶²

⁵⁹ Herschinger, 184.

⁶⁰ "Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: Facing down rebellion," BBC News, accessed June 9, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/10338256>

⁶¹ Herschinger, 186.

⁶² Ibid.,

Herschinger's argument, however, can be challenged with the concept of state terrorism. Terrorist tactics employed by a state, for example, may result in the punishment of that particular state as terrorist although motives and intent might be different. Thus, consideration of terrorism as a tactic may also face strong opposition from a group of states that belong to the UN or another international body that attempts to prevent and punish terrorism based upon a certain definition.

Terrorism will exist throughout future generations and states will eventually have to come up with an agreed definition. Political agendas and differences might seem to be blocking the way towards an agreed definition, however, it is also observed that in today's world, terrorism still represents one of the major security concerns both in global and domestic sense. In this sense, it is sensible to say that current efforts to define and combat terrorism in international law are not void, yet the quest for a definition still has a future ahead.

2.4. Causes of Terrorism

One of the important reasons that result in difficulties for creating an objective, clear definition of terrorism is the causal explanation. Basically, the causes of terrorism are, as well as its definitions, also subjective and debated. Causes of terrorism, in this sense, must be determined well in each specific terrorism case in order to reach a neutral definition. As political nature of terrorism is widely accepted by many academics, it would be sensible to argue that causes of terrorism are also political. However, the way terrorism originates in different parts of the world still differ from each other due to different factors contributing to emergence and acceleration of terrorism. As James and Brenda Lutz argue, "groups with political grievances among a society choose terrorism as a method of struggle because of their limited resources."⁶³ Balance of power between

⁶³ James Lutz and Brenda Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 16.

dissident groups and the ruling authority they are against is the main factor that determines the way of struggle. Insurgency or guerilla warfare, in this sense, require more organization, propaganda and resources compared to terrorism. Therefore, before arguing contributing elements to terrorism such as economics, globalization, modernization, wars and civil wars, it is important to underline that the main reason for the use of terrorism is political and the reason for resorting to terrorist tactics is often the limited nature of resources and capacity allowed to a specific dissident group. All of these reasons, however, does not suggest that politically discriminated groups automatically choose terrorism as a method. Martha Crenshaw argues that “not all those who are discriminated against turn to terrorism, nor does terrorism always reflect objective social or economic deprivation.”⁶⁴

Major factors that contribute to emergence of terrorism as a form of political violence could be listed as poverty, economic globalization, modernization, religion, ethnic separatism, wars and civil wars.⁶⁵ Poverty and economic inequality, for example, has long been debated as one of the most important causes of terrorism. However, research indicates that there is not enough evidence to support that poverty and economic inequality can represent a root cause for terrorism.⁶⁶ It can be argued, however, that economic problems in a society may cause deprivation of a certain group and then accelerate their radicalization. In short, economic grievances have often served terrorist groups as an accelerator and a tool for propaganda. For this reason, terrorists often chose neighborhoods with high levels of poverty in order to select new recruits. Perhaps the relation between terrorism and poverty could be better explained by the relation between poverty and radicalization. Lack of economic resources and unequal distribution of wealth have caused sparking of radical groups and ideologies in many countries. Though

⁶⁴ Martha Crenshaw, “Causes of Terrorism,” *Comparative Politics* 13, no.4 (1981), 383.

⁶⁵ James Lutz and Brenda Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 17-20.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

terrorism has not emerged in most of these countries. However, it can be argued that poverty aids people to radicalize faster.

On the other hand, economic globalization has also been one of the major factors fueling terrorism especially in a global sense. Stanley Hoffmann argued that;

The specialization and integration of firms make it possible to increase aggregate wealth, but the logic of pure capitalism does not favor social justice. Economic globalization has thus become a formidable cause of inequality among and within states, and the concern for global competitiveness limits the aptitude of states and other actors to address this problem.⁶⁷

End of the Cold War and rapid spread of globalization in global political economy has changed and perhaps damaged economies of some developing and/or underdeveloped countries. It is not a coincidence that terrorism, especially in a global sense, has emerged in areas that have started to lose their political and economic significance after the end of the Cold War.⁶⁸ In addition to these, outsourcing and other methods brought in by multinational companies have increased the gap between rich and poor in underdeveloped parts of the world. In this regard, it can be argued that peoples of the countries that are negatively affected by the results of economic globalization may have felt similar to those that were under colonial rule a hundred years ago. Therefore, as Hoffmann argued, economic globalization has contributed in inequality among and within states which fueled political grievances and terrorism in different parts of the world.

Globalization has accelerated the process of modernization as well as economic interdependency. It is argued that modernization has been perceived as a threat to local cultures and traditions, causing grievances among local societies in countries around the

⁶⁷ Stanley Hoffmann, "Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no.1 (2002), 108 quoted in James Lutz and Brenda Lutz, *Global Terrorism*.

⁶⁸ Guelke, *The New Age of Terrorism*, 146.

world.⁶⁹ Anti – Western political movements around the world may represent an example to people who feel threatened by the economic and cultural norms that are brought in by globalization and modernization. Especially, religiously sensitive areas of the world may demonstrate harsher examples of how modernization fueled terrorism. Many of the radical Islamic terrorist groups in the Middle East, for example, focus on banning any cultural element that is associated with the West. Influx of Western traditions and cultural items have apparently created a sense of invasion among more conservative countries in the world. In addition to radical Islamists, radical leftist groups often target symbols of modernization that are brought in by Western culture and media. In this sense, it can be argued that modernization has become an element for terrorist groups that they can turn into a universal enemy.⁷⁰ Emergence of economic globalization and modernization is also important with respect to better understanding the “new terrorism debate” as extremists of the new terrorism often associated with targeting the Western way of life with the aim of establishing Islamic rule all around the world.⁷¹

Ethnic grievances and struggles within a specific region or a country can be considered as one of the most frequent causes of terrorism. As the name suggests, ethnic grievances and discrimination of certain groups by ruling authorities often result in formulation of terrorist groups in different countries. Spread of nationalism, self-determination movements and post-colonial struggles, combined with Cold War politics of global powers, resulted in an increase in terrorism during the 20th century. Examples of IRA, ETA and PKK in Ireland, Spain and Turkey could be specified respectively. Terrorism, as stated above, has been selected as a method of political violence by these groups mainly because of the capacities of their “enemies”. IRA, for example, did not have the means and capacity to fight on the same level with British government. Neither had they had the capacity to carry out a long term insurgency in North and South Ireland.

⁶⁹ James Lutz and Brenda Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 19.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 90.

Role of religion in terrorism will be discussed in detail in the following chapters of this thesis, however, from a causal point of view, it can be argued that in order to understand the relation between terrorism and religion, one must first look into the relationship between religion and politics since terrorism is defined as a form of political violence in this thesis. Religion and terrorism have been associated with each other more frequently in recent years especially by the proponents of the concept of “new terrorism”. Bruce Hoffman argues that “the religious imperative is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.”⁷² However, as this thesis will also discuss, religion still cannot be listed as primary characteristic of terrorism especially in a modern sense. First of all, religion, due to its nature, stands out as a great “tool” that could be utilized in order to mobilize more people to join the cause. Palestinian Hamas, which has been recognized as a religiously motivated terrorist group by many scholars, primarily targets liberation of Palestine instead of spreading an Islamic rule around the world. Indeed, Hamas impose Islamic values and practices in areas it controls, however, the root cause for the movement still stands out as national liberation. Al-Qaeda, has been the main example for the concept of religiously motivated terrorism especially 9/11, however, causes for al-Qaeda to emerge are deeply related with economic globalization, modernization, global high politics and many other political events including fall of the Soviet Union.

Lastly, wars and civil wars around the world are also considered as important factors that cause and breed terrorism. Indeed, especially after the Arab Spring and mass uprisings around the Middle East in 2011, we have observed that many terrorist groups have emerged within countries that are drifted towards turmoil. In this regard, failed or

⁷² Ibid., 82.

weak states can also be included as a cause of terrorism as they provide shelter and training ground for terrorists in many cases.⁷³

2.5 Conclusion

Terrorism's definitional problems both on academic and legal grounds still pose an obstacle with regards to counter-terrorism efforts in global and domestic sense. Definitions that are based on controversial, equivocal elements such as "targeting of civilians" or "organizational structure" constitute difficulties ahead of reaching to a commonly agreed definition. In order to avoid such obstacles and reach to a clear, short and precise definition, political nature of terrorism must be emphasized. A working definition of terrorism must not ignore the fact that it is a political form of violence and also avoid elements that could possibly cause the definition to become a limited one. In regards to international law, apart from political differences among states, problems occurred in reaching an internationally agreed, legal definition of terrorism also stem from definitional attempts that are mostly limited and cover only several aspects of terrorism such as "kidnapping of individuals", "hijacking of planes" and other types of criminal activities. As a result, defining terrorism becomes an even more difficult task both for policy makers and academics. Thus, a universal definition must be as precise as possible, with its main emphasis being the political nature of terrorism.

Causes of terrorism are also important to understand why and how terrorism emerges in different parts of the world. Throughout the history, terrorism appears to have emerged due to different types of problems. However, when examined, it could be concluded that fundamental cause of terrorism has always been political. Even religiously motivated radical terrorist groups were formed as results of political grievances. However, this

⁷³ Alex P. Schmid, "Prevention of Terrorism: Towards a Multi-Pronged Approach" in *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* ed. Tore Borgo (London: Routledge, 2005), 232 quoted in James Lutz and Brenda Lutz, *Global Terrorism*.

does not mean that religion's relationship with political grievances and use of terrorism must be completely disregarded. Instead, role of religion, poverty, ethnic conflict, globalization, civil wars and other factors that led to creation of terrorist groups must be examined together with a precise and comprehensive definition of terrorism. By doing so, relationship between root causes and motives of terrorism can be differentiated.

In this sense, Anthony Richards' definition of terrorism will be adopted in this thesis. Main reason for this, as stated in previous sections, Richards' definition is considered as short, precise and relatively comprehensive compared to other definitions that were analyzed in this chapter. Richards' definition will be employed in analyzing different waves of terrorism throughout the history. Motives and methods of terrorist groups will be examined by employing his definition and thus a comparison will be made between different terrorist groups that emerged in different periods of time. This type of comparison will be made in order to discuss the idea that terrorism, in each of the cases, is essentially a political form of violence although methods and structures of terrorist groups may be different from each other. In addition, this comparison is deemed as necessary in order to understand how and why the concept of "new terrorism" sprung after the end of the Cold War period. The definition made by Richards, thus, will be applied to both "old" and "new" forms of terrorist movements in order to discuss whether terrorism has been subject to a revolution or not after the 1990s.

CHAPTER III

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM

As a form of political violence, terrorism is mostly considered as a phenomenon that occurred more frequently parallel to the developments in the 20th century. However, due to its political nature, terrorism has been present in history of mankind since ancient era as an important type of conflict. In this chapter, a brief history of terrorism will be provided in order to give an idea about how and why terrorism has emerged around the world. In addition, this chapter aims to provide an insight regarding history and evolution of terrorism in terms of understanding the roots of the debate over the existence of new terrorism. It is considered as crucial that a brief information on history of terrorism is necessary in order to understand fundamental aspects of the new terrorism debate. In this regard, this chapter will try to analyze selected examples of terrorist movements and groups from different periods of history in order to evaluate change and continuity in methods, aims and organization of terrorist groups.

3.1 Examples of Terrorism in Ancient Era

When examined, it could be understood that human beings have resorted to the use of violence for political aims since the ancient times. Terrorist movements throughout the history have changed and evolved in terms of their types, methods and motivations, but it is for a fact that weaker groups existed in all kinds of civilizations around the world and those weaker groups have developed their own methods in order to target stronger rulers to achieve their objectives. Jewish zealots in Palestine has formed groups that are called “Sicarii” in order to attack citizens of Roman Empire in Palestine meanwhile a group that belonged to “Ismaili” sect in Persia have spread their campaign of

assassination of prefects, governors and caliphs.⁷⁴ There are also others examples to this form of terrorism that is based around the power gap between the weak and strong groups within empires and states.

Unsurprisingly, the use of fear by “stronger” groups has also been a familiar phenomenon throughout the history. State terror has been used within different empires and states throughout the history in order to impose specific policies and suppress public opinion. Events taken place in France during 1793 – 1794 period represent important examples of this fact. Walter Laqueur states that “many more people have been killed throughout history and more havoc has been wrought, as the result of crimes committed by governments than by terrorism from below”⁷⁵ Indeed, crimes committed in Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Communist China represents an important example to Laqueur’s idea that “terrorism from above” have actually resulted in more deaths compared to “terrorism from below”. However, an important factor here is that state terrorism is, too, a controversial concept since it does not have a commonly agreed, legal or academic definition. Therefore, in order to analyze state terrorism, one must first recognize the state’s sovereignty in making laws and enforcing them upon its constituents. Therefore, not every action of a state can be defined as state terrorism especially if such an action is within the limits of both international and state’s domestic laws.

In addition to the Laqueur’s idea that manifestation of terrorism has connections with rise of nationalism and democracy, it could be argued that manifestations of terrorism have a direct connection with a great majority of political developments throughout the history of mankind. Considering the fact that politics has a wide spectrum regarding its content, it could be sensible not to limit manifestations of terrorism to rise of democracy and nationalism. As this chapter will try to describe, terrorism has emerged long before

⁷⁴ Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism*, 8-9.

⁷⁵ Laqueur, 6.

rise of concepts such as democracy and nationalism. Thus, as time went forward and politics have continued to change, terrorism had also reemerged around different parts of the world with different facets. Political struggles within and among empires, governments and non-governmental groups usually do not occur overnight. Therefore, causes of terrorism around the world, although different from each other, emerge within long periods of time.

3.1.1 Jewish Zealots and Sicarii (Dagger Men) of Palestine in the Roman Empire

After the beginning of the Common Era, Jewish population in Palestine have ignited the emergence of terrorism as we know it today. Also known as “Sicarii”, a group within Jewish Zealots were assassinating public figures and Roman soldiers in Palestine. The word Sicarii means “men carrying daggers (sica)”. This was due to the fact that Sicarii usually consisted of men in cloaks, carrying small daggers in order to be used when attacking Roman soldiers and government officials.⁷⁶ Sicarii are known to have emerged around 50 CE.⁷⁷ According to Josephus, a Jewish general of the time that later defected to Roman Empire, Sicarii have adhered to the doctrine of “no masters above god” and their goal was the liberation of Judea and their people from Roman Empire.⁷⁸

The striking aspect of Sicarii activity in Judea was that this group was targeting both the Romans and the Jews that were allegedly collaborating with Romans. Also, Sicarii men were targeting Sadducees who were the dominant Jewish sect in Palestine that had the political control over the citizens. Sadducees can also be described as a Roman satellite as their authority over Palestine was limited. In this sense, Sicarii assassinations in

⁷⁶ Laqueur, 7.

⁷⁷ Randall D. Law, *Terrorism: A History*, 27.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

public and in broad daylight represented true examples of terror in Ancient Era.⁷⁹ Randall Law argues that Sicarii ultimately aimed to provoke a crackdown conducted by Sadducees on Jewish population that would eventually trigger a popular uprising.⁸⁰

Indeed, an uprising in 66 CE in Palestine had occurred with contribution of Sicarii terrorism. However, Sicarii then lost control of the uprising to Zealots, a different Jewish group, and then withdrew to the mount of Masada since the leader of the Sicarii were unable to control such an uprising due to their violence and savagery.⁸¹ Sicarii have resorted to criminal acts in order to sustain their lives in Masada which caused a public alienation contrary to their early image which represented a symbol for religious and political resistance to Rome. Randall Law argues that Sicarii's criminal activities and targeting of property belonging to public population after losing control of the revolt in 66 CE is common to most terrorist groups;

This episode, like the entire Roman-Jewish War that the Sicarii helped to foment, demonstrates well a timeless trait of terrorists: their willingness to see the civilians they claim to represent as ultimately expendable, necessary sacrifices to the greater cause.⁸²

Sicarii are important for the history of terrorism for two reasons. First of all, they were a group that were attacking and threatening a population for political purpose which was the liberation of Judea. Yet, their target audience were consisted of selected individuals. In this regard, actions of Sicarii can be defined as acts of terrorism according to the definition of terrorism that this thesis adopts. In terms of power balance, Sicarii were weaker compared to both the Sadducees and the Roman Empire. Therefore, for two reasons, Sicarii employed terrorist tactics: Firstly, to gain support among Jewish

⁷⁹ Laqueur, 7-8.

⁸⁰ Law, 28.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

population and provoke a crackdown that would hopefully result in a revolt. Secondly, to intimidate their target audience. Thus, it can be argued that actions of Sicarii fit into terrorism with respect to its definitional aspects such as motivations, tactics and aims.

Finally, and most importantly, the reason that makes Sicarii an important example to terrorism studies is that they used religion in order to justify their aims and recruit new members. As stated above, their difference from other Jewish groups such as Zealots was that they adhered to a different and more radical religious doctrine. David C. Rapoport defined Sicarii as having messianic doctrines simultaneously suggested the object of terror and permitted methods necessary to achieve it.”⁸³ However, eventually, it has been understood that Sicarii aimed to provoke a political revolt rather than a mass religious transformation in Palestine. Because targeting of their “subject” population for survival after losing control of the revolt in 66 CE contradicts with the nature of sacred religious goals. Sicarii are a good example in order to understand the intertwined nature of politics and religion in the ideologies of a terrorist group. In this sense, Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin argue that “in general, exclusively political terrorist organizations are rare in history, as are religious pressure groups with no political ambitions”⁸⁴ Understanding the position of religion and politics in Sicarii agenda is crucial to understand how and why religion and terrorism had been used in different parts of the world. Role of religion in terrorism still represents an important issue in both academic studies and world politics. Moreover, role of religious extremism represents an important pillar of the argument regarding existence of new terrorism.

Consequently, existence of Sicarii in Roman Palestine between 60 CE and 73 CE is an extremely significant historical fact that proves terrorism has always been a political

⁸³ David C. Rapoport. “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions”, *The American Political Science Review* 78, no.3 (1984), 669.

⁸⁴ Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, “Zealots and Assassins” in *the History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*, ed. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, 55-78, (California: University of California, 2007), 24.

form of violence that is mostly, but not limited to, employed by weaker groups that seek political aims. Inclusion of religion to Sicarii propaganda is also significant since it explains why religion can become an advanced “weapon” against target audience. By using religion, Sicarii have both legitimized its cause and also intimidated possible other forces in Jewish community that could have been rivals to the Sicarii.⁸⁵ It is also important to note that Sicarii have targeted Romans in broad daylight with daggers. This is to signify the fact that their courage to confront enemy directly have also increased their popularity among Jewish population.⁸⁶ In addition, Sicarii propaganda also become successful in terms of showing the “weakness” of Romans via assassinations committed in public areas.

3.1.2 Hasan Sabbah and the Assassins of the Ismaili Sect

After the split among the Muslims following the death of Prophet Mohammad, Shite and Sunni sects engaged in various forms of conflicts against each other. Among these conflicts, acts of terrorism had also taken place. After the fall of Fatimid dynasty in Egypt, a group consisting of members of Ismaili sect, an offshoot of broader Shiite sect, had emerged in Persia around 1090.⁸⁷ This group, led by Hasan Sabbah, aimed to support Nizar, a candidate for the Fatimid throne and the Shiite Imamate. After this, the Assassins have also become known as the “Nizaris”⁸⁸ Assassins have targeted both the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt and the Seljuk and Abbasid rulers in Persia and Syria. Their aim was to spread fear among both the citizens and rulers of the targeted dynasties by assassinating important figures in government. Similar to Sicarii, Assassins had also preferred to strike their victims in public at times, in order to increase amount of terror

⁸⁵ Chaliand and Blin, 57.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 58.

⁸⁷ Law, 40.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 40-41.

generated. Among their targets, a prominent figure in Seljuk Empire, was Nizam al-Mulk. Nizam al-Mulk was the grand vizier of the Seljuk Empire, therefore his assassination had demonstrated the capabilities of the Assassins and created a deep psychological impact among constituents of the Seljuk Empire as Nizam al-Mulk was considered one of the most important statesman of the time.

According to various sources, Hasan Sabbah, the leader of the Assassins, had lived in a castle called Alamut located in South Caspian region. It is understood that Sabbah and the Ismaili sect have employed missionaries to gain public support in order to expand their zone of influence.⁸⁹ When met with resistance, Sabbah did not step back from using terror in order to persuade nobles to hand over their territory.⁹⁰ Sabbah's strategy of using terrorism in order to destabilize Seljuk Empire appears to have worked out well up until a point where the size of his sect and capacity of his followers were inadequate to remove Seljuk rule. Assassination of Nizam al-Mulk, who had been a prominent figure in countering Sabbah's attacks towards the empire, had been a lethal strike against Seljuk Empire. However, eventually, these types of attacks were proved inadequate to bring down the Seljuk Empire. Walter Laqueur argues that;

Seen in historical perspective, the terrorist struggle of the Assassins was a fruitless attempt by a relatively small religious sect to defend its religious autonomy (and way of life) against the Seljuks who wanted to suppress them. But the means they used were certainly effective for a while, and the legends about the Old Man from the Mountain deeply impressed contemporaries and subsequent generations.⁹¹

The Assassins are significant in terms of modern terrorism as they represent a weak, relatively distinct group that aims to bring down a giant empire to its knees. To strike a

⁸⁹ Chaliand and Blin, 65.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Laqueur, 9-10.

political entity from a point of extreme weakness, as it is the case with the Assassins, had become unsuccessful and only managed to harass such entities while failing to respond their military power.⁹²

Regarding the balance of power between Sabbah's Assassins and its enemies, Chaliand and Blin argue that the case of Assassins is not fundamentally different from al-Qaeda today, claiming that both Hasan Sabbah and Osama Bin Laden had similar means against similar enemies.⁹³ The most important aspect of the Assassins and their terrorist attacks is the stark contrast between the fear and terror they generated and their actual success.⁹⁴ Finally, as Bruce Hoffman argues, an important and additional motivation for the Assassins was that they were to be ascended to heaven immediately after losing their lives for the cause.⁹⁵ Considering the information regarding Sabbah's fortress called Alamut where the Assassins were served drugs called "hashis" in order to enhance their spiritual transformation, it is sensible to argue that the Assassins show similarities with modern era terrorists in terms of sacrificing their lives for the cause and use of drugs while carrying out their attacks.

3.1.3 Events in France after the Establishment of the First French Republic (1793 – 1794)

The events taken place in France following the French Revolution in 1789 are significant in terms of terrorism studies as it was the when word "terrorism" started to have been popularized.⁹⁶ Secondly, the Regime of Terror in France during 1793 – 1794

⁹² Chaliand and Blin, 68.

⁹³ Ibid., 69.

⁹⁴ Law, 45.

⁹⁵ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 84.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 3.

represents the use of state terror unlike other examples of terrorism where the terrorist acts are conducted by groups that are weaker against the ruling regimes. Following the revolution, terror has been used by different political groups competing for power in France such as the Girondins and the Montagnards.⁹⁷ After that, the state itself had begun to use terror against its own citizens in order to prevent counter-revolutionary movements from seizing back the power from revolutionaries. Thousands of people were murdered by state and citizens became terrorized as the new regime has labeled any type of opposition as “enemies of the people”.

An important leader of the Revolution, Maximilian Robespierre, believed that a virtuous government was ideal for peace time but he also defended that the virtue must become united with terrorism during revolutionary times in order for democracy to eventually triumph.⁹⁸ Interestingly, Robespierre himself was sentenced to death by his own supporters with the accusation of “terrorism” instead of “terror” since his supporters accepted “terror” as a form of governing.⁹⁹ It is understood that the feeling of terror generated in France during that era was so strong that even Robespierre’s own supporters had to overthrow him fearing that they could have been the next victim of state terror. Events that took place in France during this era are very similar to that of Soviet Union during Stalin’s great purge except that nobody could dare to overthrow Stalin.

In terms of its characteristics, Bruce Hoffman argues that the use of terrorism by state during Reign of Terror, was systematic, deliberate and organized.¹⁰⁰ In this sense, it could be argued that state terror employed by revolutionaries in France during 1793 – 1794 period fits in the definition of terrorism since it was conducted by political purposes and the target audience of the revolutionaries was well beyond the thousands

⁹⁷ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*, 39-40.

⁹⁸ Hoffman, 3-4.

⁹⁹ Sözübir, 49.

¹⁰⁰ Hoffman, 4.

that were murdered or sentenced to death by the state bodies. Terrorism, at that time, was applied from top to bottom in order to impose a certain way of life and a political system in France.

3.2 Rise of Anarchism and Terror in 19th Century

The 19th century represents an important period of time when terrorism, as we know of today, had its first manifestations throughout Europe. The 19th century has been a cornerstone in the history of humanity as well since the idea of nationalism led to creation of nation-states around Europe. Economically, 19th century was very significant since the Industrial Revolution had taken place and new universal ideologies such as Marxism and Socialism had begun to surface.¹⁰¹ Terrorism in 19th century is essential in terms of its unique manifestation which is also known as “propaganda by the deed”. The concept of “propaganda by the deed” had been put forward by Carlo Pisacane, an Italian republican who claimed that “ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are free”¹⁰² Groups of people that were influenced by the nationalism or Marxism were main subscribers of the idea of “propaganda by the deed” as it was being perceived as a didactic form of violence.¹⁰³

Anarchists and nationalists of the 19th century mainly argued that the change in a society and a government could only be created by actions instead of spreading ideas as it was thought as the essential way of mobilizing masses against their governments. Violence, was the main type of “deed” that was meant by the proponents of the idea. Anarchists in Europe and especially in Russia were the most important examples of groups conducting

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰² George Woodcock, ed., *The Anarchist Reader*, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), 43-44 quoted in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 5.

¹⁰³ Hoffman, 5-6.

terrorist acts against their ruling regimes in order to practice the idea of “propaganda by the deed”. However, Continental Europe was not the only place where anarchist or nationalist terror was taking place. Ottoman Empire, for example, was a target of Armenian terrorism which aimed to assassinate public figures and bureaucrats. Some of these bureaucrats, such as the governor of Van province, were Ottomans from Armenian descent. This is a significant example of how terrorist groups select their targets. Ireland and United States, meanwhile, had also suffered from use of terrorism and assassinations.

3.2.1 Narodnaya Volya and Emergence of Russian Anarchists

Narodnaya Volya, which meant “People’s Will” in Russian, was the name of the anarchist terrorist group in Russia that had conducted the most significant terrorist act in late 19th century. The group was influenced by the revolutionary ideas of the Russian anarchists and Marxists as well as ideas of Nihilism put forward by Sergei Nachaev and Michael Bakunin. Main purpose of Narodnaya Volya was to spark a revolutionary movement among peasants and villagers in Russia by assassinating prominent, important figures within Russian administration. On the other hand, the group had other members who argued that the power itself must be seized by Narodnaya Volya members instead of sparking peasant revolution.¹⁰⁴

It is argued that Narodnaya Volya could be considered as one of the first clandestine terrorist groups that had an organization and division of labor before conducting terrorist attacks.¹⁰⁵ After several debates within the group itself, it was decided that Narodnaya Volya must target the Russian Tsar himself instead of provincial government officials. Prior to 1881, the group had 8 attempts to kill the Russian Tsar Alexander II, however, all of them failed. Finally, on March 1, 1881, Russian Tsar Alexander II was killed by

¹⁰⁴ Law, 82-83.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Narodnaya Volya members in a bomb attack.¹⁰⁶ The assassin died during the attack while 5 other members of the group were caught and hung by Russian security forces following the assassination.¹⁰⁷ An important fact regarding assassination of Alexander II was that the perpetrators of the attack used a small-scale bomb in order to prevent collateral damage to bystanders. Their focus was the Alexander II as they wanted to avoid killing innocent people. This indicates that Narodnaya Volya did not resort to indiscriminate target selection before conducting an attack.¹⁰⁸ A major reason for this is that the group wanted to attract public attention in order to spark a revolution from within the Russian society. Thus, they did not want to antagonize the driving force of the possible revolutionary movement they aspired at the beginning.

The striking aspect of Tsar Alexander II's assassination was that it did not result in any sort of revolutionary attempt. Russian government had cracked down on the group, arresting many of the organization's members. "Propaganda by the deed" concept had been combined with terrorism in practice; however, the result was not as intended. The most important reason to this could be considered as the fact that ideas of Narodnaya Volya were not being shared by a large group of people in Russian Tsardom. The group basically lacked one of the most important elements of terrorism which was the public support.

Consequently, terrorist attacks by Narodnaya Volya have demonstrated the practical results of the concept of "propaganda by the deed". Although successful in organization and division of labor, Narodnaya Volya had failed to attract public support. Another important fact regarding the group's failure was that it had targeted the enemy himself. Apart from many examples of terrorism, in this case, Narodnaya Volya did not target a selected group of people. Instead, they have targeted the head of government himself. This might be considered as another reason why their assassination of Alexander II has

¹⁰⁶ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*, 54.

¹⁰⁷ Law, 84.

¹⁰⁸ Hoffman, 6.

failed to spark a revolution. However, their acts influenced other groups that later became important figures taken action during the period prior to the Russian Revolution. The Socialist Revolutionary Party, for example, applied Narodnaya Volya's tactics of assassinations and even managed to kill the cousin of Russian Tsar during 1900s.

Terrorist groups and assassinations increased and started to become common with the start of the 20th century especially in Europe. United States also faced assassinations as the President William McKinley was assassinated by a Hungarian anarchist in 1901.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, in June 1914, a Serbian nationalist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, which led to the start of the World War I.

3.3 State Terrorism in Nazi Germany and Soviet Union (1930 – 1945)

After the end of the First World War, two important changes took place among the great powers of the First World War. Firstly, a communist revolution in Russia had changed the country radically, resulting in a communist regime that was to rule the country until 1991. Secondly, in Germany, Adolf Hitler started to rise onto power, whose "National Socialist German Worker's Party" eventually transformed the country to a giant military power that would shake the Europe for 6 years after igniting the fire for the start of the Second World War.

Developments in these two countries especially during 1930s are essential to understand specifics of state terrorism. Leaders of both regimes, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, used similar tactics to destroy their political opponents and terrorize their own populations in order to eliminate any opposition movement and also mobilize them for a possible upcoming war. They have targeted different parts of society and ruling elite in their own countries; however, both regimes employed terrorist tactics and used state power to reach their aims.

¹⁰⁹ Hoffman, 7.

3.3.1 Nazi Germany

Adolf Hitler and his fascist movement in Germany had resorted to terrorist tactics both before and after becoming the ruling power in Germany. Nazis in Germany adopted terrorist tactics soon after forming up their paramilitary groups known as the SA (*Sturmabteilung* – Storm Division) or the “Brown Shirts”. Nazi paramilitary groups, before coming to power in Germany, mainly targeted their communist opponents and Jews in order to fuel the chaos among the German society.¹¹⁰ The SA had become involved in bloody street battles against their political opponents which resulted in deaths most of the time. The main idea behind SA violence was that it aimed to discourage communists from taking over the streets and increase their political presence. On the other hand, SA’s involvement in street battles against communists enhanced the idea that the Nazi party was the only power that could stabilize the country and preserve rights of right-wing groups.¹¹¹ By provoking chaos, SA aimed at consolidating their public support and then crushing the opposition in Germany.

The most important reason that led to the chaotic atmosphere in Germany was, of course, the results of the World War I. Germany had become massively destabilized in terms of politics and economy following the Treaty of Versailles. Following the negative effects of the 1929 Global Economic Crisis, radical political groups emerged in Germany. Nazis took advantage of this situation and combined their views with the widespread enmity against communism during 1930s. Similar events took place in Italy as well. Communism and radical left were targeted by right wing extremist groups who aimed to consolidate their supporters. By doing these, German fascists aimed to create an image that would demonstrate that only the SA and the Nazi party could become the ruling power in Germany thanks to their capacity.

¹¹⁰ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, 71.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 71-72.

After Hitler's coming to power, state terrorism continued in Germany with even greater impact on society. Gestapo (*Geheime Staatspolizei* - Secret State Police), SD (*Sicherheitsdienst* - Security Service) and the SS (*Schutzstaffel* - Defense Corps) have become new instruments of the German state terrorism. German Gestapo and SD units have successfully terrorized German society by using their own police force, court trials and other judiciary bodies. Basically, Gestapo could accuse any selected individual of any selected crime. As a result, Gestapo and SD created a system of informants among the society that informed police forces of German Jews, Communists, Romans and other political and religious groups that Nazis aimed to crush. In November 1938, "a state sponsored pogrom" carried out by SA, the police and civilian mobs against Jews and their property which is also known as the "Kristallnacht" (Night of the Broken Glass).¹¹² This incident signified impacts of Nazi state terror in Germany since it represents the beginning of a systematic murder campaign against Jews and communists that would later evolve into the "Holocaust".

Considering events that took place in Germany during 1930-1945 period, it could be understood that the Nazi Party in Germany had used terrorism for two different purposes. Firstly, they had provoked street battles against their political opponents in order to attract public support and increase their physical and political strength. This tactic had been applied during a period where Nazis represented a relatively marginal part of the society. They were one of the small right wing factions among many others. Thus, they had resorted to terrorism in order to gain leverage against stronger groups. In this sense, Nazi behavior before coming to power in 1933, especially use of street terror, fits in well with the relationship between use of terrorism and the power balance between perpetrators and victims of terrorism. Secondly, after seizing control of government institutions, Nazis had used terrorism in terms of "top to bottom" approach. After they becoming the stronger side, they started to terrorize German population and convert some parts of the population into informants that spied on each other. By doing so, Nazis aimed to destroy any sort of opposition and keep society under control at all

¹¹² Law, 175.

times. In this sense, Nazi state terror shows similarities with that of Jacobins during the Reign of Terror in France.

3.3.2 Soviet Union and the Era of Great Terror

Russian Revolution resulted in terrifying examples of state terrorism. Bolsheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) resorted to the use of terrorism both before and after the Russian Revolution. One of the most important leaders of the Russian Revolution, Vladimir I. Lenin, had supported the use of terrorism in a certain way. Although he opposed SRs and Bolsheviks for choosing terrorism is the only method, it was known that he believed in the use of terror in order to enhance power.¹¹³ Lenin's main difference from other revolutionaries in terms of usage of terrorist tactics was that he believed terrorism must have had a clear purpose and timing, otherwise it would not be logical to resort to it.

After coming to power, Lenin and the Bolsheviks set up their own police force called "Cheka" (*Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya* – Emergency Committee).¹¹⁴ Similar to Gestapo, Cheka served to political purposes and acted as an element of counter-revolutionary force in Soviet Union. Cheka arrested and executed thousands of people after the revolution and during the Russian Civil War. Lenin and Bolsheviks believed that their power could only be preserved by total destruction of the opponents of the revolution which happened to be the majority of the Russian population. It has been subject to discussion how Bolsheviks managed to seize power in Russia despite their marginal size as a political force. It is understood that Lenin was aware of the situation and therefore he wanted to employ terror and whatever other means available to prevent possible removal of Bolsheviks from power. Indeed, Cheka and Red Terror after the revolution helped Bolsheviks to survive and remain in power.

¹¹³ Chaliand and Blin, 197-198.

¹¹⁴ Law, 161.

After Lenin's death, Joseph Stalin had become the leader of the Soviet Union. During Joseph Stalin's rule, state terror peaked in Soviet Union, causing deaths of millions of people in different areas of the Soviet Union. As Chaliand and Blin describe, "Stalin took the state apparatus established by Lenin –party dictatorship- and transform it into the instrument of power of just one man."¹¹⁵ Under Stalin's rule, Cheka was converted into another similar police force called NKVD (*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del* - People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). By using NKVD and organizing Show Trials, Stalin ordered for imprisonment and murder of millions of people living under Soviet rule. With consecutive purges conducted by Stalin, thousands of politicians, generals, administrative officials and party members were removed from power, ensuring Stalin's rule over the Soviet Union. Stalin also terrorized other parts of the Soviet Union such as Ukraine. He ordered for the starvation of millions of Ukrainians due to their rejection of Collectivization policies. Chaliand and Blin argue that, "of all totalitarian regimes, that of the Soviet Union was, between 1929 and 1953, the most perfect embodiment of state terrorism."¹¹⁶ Indeed, Stalin's use of state terrorism has ensured his power until his death in 1953. Stalin's crimes against his own population were so damaging that his legacy was later denounced by the next Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev during 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

Consequently, both Lenin and Stalin resorted to state terrorism in Soviet Union although their aims were different. Lenin favored systematic terror for enhancement of Communist Party's power in USSR while Stalin employed state terrorism to ensure his very own political power. For this, he even organized Show Trials where prominent figures who were once allies with Stalin trialed and sentenced to death.

Considering examples of Germany and the Soviet Union, it is understood that nature of terrorism, although applied by states, does not show signs of similarity. Actors who resort to terrorism, therefore, must not become the first element of a definition of

¹¹⁵ Chaliand and Blin, 205-206.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 207.

terrorism. The idea that “state is the only legitimate power with the authority of using force” does not reflect the true nature of a state. As defined in previous chapter, terrorism is a form of political violence. Perpetrators of terrorist violence may change, however, the nature of terrorism, which aims to use violence or threat of violence in order to generate a psychological impact beyond immediate victims for a political motive, remains the same. State terrorism represents an important example in this sense especially with respect to the new terrorism debate as it demonstrates the fact that the identity or form of perpetrator does not influence the true nature of terrorism.

3.4 Post-Colonial Terrorism after the World War II

The end of the World War II marks an important era in history as the world was subject to significant political changes that were more radical than that of World War I. As a result, British Empire and France got significantly weaker while Germany and Japan were devastated and torn by the defeat. Outcomes of the war led to post-colonial struggles initiated by the locals of formerly colonial states. Both Jews and Arabs resorted to terrorism in Israel before and after the World War II in order to force colonial British rule out of Palestine whereas Algerians rose up against French rule in Algeria. In this part, use of terrorism during post-colonial era of struggle will be described with the examples of “Irgun and Lehi” in Palestine and FLN (Front de Libération Nationale – National Liberation Front) in Algeria.

3.4.1 Irgun and Lehi (Stern Gang)

Jewish groups in Palestine started to form up their own paramilitary groups against the British mandate in Palestine. Jewish struggle started under the umbrella of the group called Haganah (Defense), which would later constitute the base for the Israeli Defence Forces. Although it was the British who let Jewish migrants to settle in Palestine, Jewish

groups were not content with the migration quotas alongside with problems that had occurred with Arabs. Therefore, Jewish population in Palestine had formed up Haganah to challenge and evict British from their mandate during 1920-1948 period. Irgun and Lehi (also known as the Stern Gang) were paramilitary Jewish Groups that were offshoots of the larger Haganah group.

Irgun, after splitting from Haganah in 1931, aimed to target Arab population in Palestine in order to protect and secure Jewish lands in Palestine. Irgun also targeted British officials but main difference between Irgun and Lehi in Palestine was that members of Lehi were more radical towards attacking British targets. Irgun are mostly known with two major terror attacks. First was the bombing of the King David Hotel in Palestine in 1946 where several British Mandate offices were located. Secondly, Irgun group had been involved in Deir Yassin Massacre in 1948 where 600 Arabs were massacred in the village of Deir Yassin. Like other Jewish paramilitary groups, Irgun also had the motivation of protecting Jews from Arabs and British rule on their route towards independence. Both Irgun and Lehi were influenced by the Zionist ideology. Ian S. Lustick argues that;

The psychological target of Zionist violence was often the Jews. Jewish fights with or retaliation against Arab villages or Bedouin tribes were motivated not only by considerations of self-defense but by the desire to set inspiring examples of physical prowess and heroism to Palestinian Jews and to prove to Diaspora Jews the validity of an important dimension of Zionist ideology.¹¹⁷

Indeed, Zionism was the driving ideological force behind Jewish terrorism. Jewish nationalism, unlike other examples, is a combination of religious and ethnic motives at the same time. Therefore, apart from the idea of nationalism and self-determination, Jews in Palestine had also been influenced by the idea of Zionism. Similar to Irgun, Lehi was an offshoot paramilitary group as well. Lehi was split from Irgun in order to form a group that would focus on British forces and force them to evacuate Palestine. In terms

¹¹⁷ Ian. S. Lustick, "Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict" in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw, 514-553, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 522.

of tactics and targets, it could be argued that Lehi appeared to have been more of a guerilla group although a prominent member of Lehi, Yitzhak Shamir had publicly endorsed terrorism.¹¹⁸

In his memoirs, Menachem Begin, the former head of Haganah and also 6th Prime Minister of Israel, had written that “the goal [of Jewish paramilitary groups] was not the military defeat of the United Kingdom, but its ability to govern Palestine effectively”.¹¹⁹ Begin’s words successfully put forward the aim of Irgun terrorism. His description of Jewish strategy against British rule, in a definitional sense, accords with the very nature of terrorism. Jews had chosen to erode British patience in Palestine instead of directly confronting them in a military sense which would possibly result in destruction of the Jewish paramilitary group. Also, such confrontation would antagonize rest of the world against the Jewish cause in Palestine. Haganah, Irgun and Lehi had perfectly exploited Britain’s weaker status during the World War II and employed terrorist tactics in order to force Britain to make concessions.

3.4.2 FLN and Terrorism during Algerian War of Independence

During the Algerian War of Independence between 1954 and 1962, FLN (Front de Libération Nationale – National Liberation Front), became the main political and military power among the Algerian population which would organize and conduct Algerian policies against the French Government. During the war, terrorism was used by elements within FLN and other factions of the Algerian resistance. The FLN had a military wing called as ALN (Armée de Libération nationale – National Liberation

¹¹⁸ Law, 182.

¹¹⁹ Bruce Hoffman, *The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine 1939-1947*, (Bar Ilan University Press, 1983) 50, quoted in Randall D. Law, “Terrorism: A History”. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 182.

Army) which had conducted guerilla type attacks against French troops in Algeria. This group had become the basis of the Algerian army following the war of independence.

Contrary to the example of Jewish and Arab struggle against colonial British rule in Palestine, Algeria had around one million European French settlers residing in the country on a permanent basis.¹²⁰ Thus, struggle in Algiers between the French Authority and FLN had eventually turned into a larger conflict than that of Jews against British forces in Palestine. Another significant point regarding use of terrorism in Algeria is that the FLN's guerilla warfare against French forces in rural areas of Algeria had failed to attract attention from the international community and the Muslim world. Upon failure of guerilla attacks against French army units, FLN opted to employ terrorism against French population residing in the capital of Algeria.¹²¹ By targeting cafes, avenues and the Algiers Airport, FLN aimed to force French citizens to evacuate Algeria and withdraw public support towards French rule in Algeria. Terrorist attacks of FLN in Algiers are known as the "Battle of Algiers" where the use of terrorism by Algerian resistance resulted in deaths of 49 French citizens. FLN's attacks against French citizens, however, were not limited to Algeria. They carried out attacks in Paris as well. FLN leader Ramdane Abane defended the use of terrorism by stating that "one corpse in a [civilian] jacket is always worth more than twenty in a uniform".¹²² Therefore, by resorting to terrorism, FLN succeeded in three major areas. Firstly, they managed to draw the attention of the international community which they previously failed to achieve by conducting guerilla warfare against French army units. Secondly, they have succeeded in sparking a public opinion that is against the French rule and struggle in Algeria which would later cause a government change in France. The use of terrorism by FLN in Algiers contained a definitional element of terrorism. FLN targeted an audience

¹²⁰ Law, 200.

¹²¹ Ibid., 202-203.

¹²² Alistair Horne, *A Savage War Of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, (New York: New York Review Book Classics, 2006), 132 quoted in Randall D. Law, "Terrorism: A History". (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 202.

in France instead of their French targets in Algiers. By bombing cafes and civilian areas in Algiers, FLN succeeded in creating a public opinion within French territory that is against the French rule in Algeria. Finally, Battle of Algiers resulted in a massive French counter-terrorism campaign against FLN members which contained torture and killings. By provoking a harsh counter-terrorism campaign against themselves, FLN gained even greater public support from its own population. Overreaction and the indiscriminate use of force by French authority sparked public anger and dissidence among Algerians. Guerilla warfare in the beginning of Algerian resistance, similarly, failed to draw this amount of domestic support.

Eventually, FLN's resistance turned into a war of independence that would eventually result in France's withdrawal from Algeria and recognition of it as a sovereign independent state. FLN's struggle against French in Algeria influenced other nationalist and anti-colonial struggles around the world as well such as the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization). However, use of terrorism in wars of independence must be examined carefully as it does not legitimize the concept. A war of independence or a struggle against a colonial power may represent a certain amount of legitimacy; however, use of terrorism during these struggles should not legitimize terrorism itself. This applies to civil wars as well. With respect to new terrorism debate, FLN's struggle can be a good example in order to explain why sometimes terrorists choose to directly attack the target audience as well as its selected victims. Al-Qaeda's attack against the United States in September 11, 2001, from this perspective, can be considered as an attempt to generate international publicity and propaganda instead of destroying the United States' ability to govern itself and the world politics.

3.5 Ethnic and Ideological Terrorism during the Cold War Period

Following the decolonization and wars of independence in different parts of the world against former imperial powers such as Britain and France, concept of terrorism had centered itself around ideological and ethnic struggles during the Cold War Period. Cold

War period and in general the 20th century is the most significant period of time with respect to terrorism since it represented a time period where globalization and transnationalism made great leaps forward compared to previous centuries. Two great wars and emergence of the Cold War resulted in serious technological advances in communications and arms technology following the industrial revolution. For this reason, internationalization of terrorism coincides with the peak of the Cold War. Bombs have become easier to produce and customize without the necessity of scientific expertise whereas travelling abroad via using airplanes have become more common, thus representing an important target for terrorists to attack. Plane hijackings by PLO and German leftist terror groups accelerated the process of internationalization of terrorism.

Another important reason for terrorism to increase its presence as a form of political violence was the fact that the world became bipolar during the Cold War. United States and USSR have sought to support terrorist groups in a clandestine manner against each other's allies. Many of the nationalist and ideological terrorist groups are known to have been receivers of Soviet support. Terrorism of this era has been generally labeled as the "old terrorism" by the proponents of the "new terrorism" concept. In this regard, it is essential to examine ethnic and ideological terrorist groups of the Cold War era in order to decide whether the change in form of terrorism after the Cold War is enough to defend the emergence of a new form of terrorism.

In this sense, ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – Basque Country and Freedom) in Spain will be analyzed as an example of ethnic and separatist terrorism. ETA's organization, aims and methods will be examined in order to understand how ethnic terrorism is shaped around the idea of self-determination. With regards to ideological terrorism, RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion – Red Army Faction) in West Germany will be discussed. RAF's terrorist acts will be examined in accordance with the idea of radical leftist terrorism and internationalization of terrorism via radical leftist ideologies.

3.5.1 ETA and Emergence of Ethnic Terrorism in Spain

ETA in Spain emerged during 1950s as a terrorist group that adopted Basque nationalism. ETA's main idea was to establish an independent Basque state in Spain. Another reason for ETA to emerge was the fascist dictator of Spain, Franco, who had heavily suppressed Basque separatism at the time. As seen in other examples of ethnic and nationalist terrorism, ETA's aims were pretty much the same with those of IRA, PLO and FLN in terms of generating a public support or even a revolt against government via anticipated government repression following terrorist attacks.¹²³ Although ETA's earlier attacks towards government officials and police forces in Basque areas failed to draw desired amount of attention, the group later on got popularized after several trials where people of Basque origin were tried with death penalties. ETA's popular support mainly originated from its anti-authoritarian actions against Franco's dictatorship. Similar to almost all of the other ethnic nationalist terrorist groups of the time such as PLO, ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê – Kurdistan Workers' Party), IRA (Irish Republican Army) and FLN, ETA was also Marxist oriented. The Marxist stance and terrorism employed against Franco's rule had generated a popularity of ETA in Spain. Therefore, in the case of ETA, it could be argued that the group had gained most of its credibility and popularity for ideological reasons rather than its terrorist acts against the government. Indeed, none of ETA's terrorist attacks, kidnappings or bombings caused a public uprising against the Spanish government. Instead, the idea of solidarity among Marxist, radical leftist terrorist groups helped enhance ETA's role as the defender of the oppressed people of the Basque region in Spain. ETA's assassination of Franco's Prime Minister Carrero Blanco in 1968 also contributed to this image which drew support from

¹²³ Law, 249.

both within and outside the country.¹²⁴ In terms of internationalization, ETA pursued a policy of accusing Spanish state of torture and harassment towards their members.¹²⁵

However, when Franco's dictatorship was replaced by constitutional democracy, ETA's popularity decreased massively. As a result of this, in the long run, ETA's terrorist attacks generated popular backlash instead of support. When Spain granted Basque region the political autonomy that they sought, ETA's decline accelerated. ETA's terrorism started to target civilians after its loss of popularity, which made situation even worse as ETA's own Basque population had started to protest the group's attacks. ETA eventually declined after early 2000s especially after the emergence of radical Islamists terrorism. In a structural sense, IRA had a top to bottom hierarchy like other ethno-nationalist terrorist groups of the time being. It had a leadership at the top while "commando" units undertook terrorist attacks on the ground.¹²⁶ Although Marxism and radical left represented an important portion of ETA's credibility, ETA was a communal terrorist group that sought ethnic separatism in Spain with a nationalist motivation. ETA's Marxist stance, in this sense, was a useful element in increasing positive image of the group for two purposes. First, ETA's anti-authoritarian image contributed generating public support from within the Spanish population. Secondly, ETA's ideological stance had contributed to the internationalization of its cause just like the examples of PLO and IRA. Soviet policies regarding ethnic and nationalist struggles around the world had created an atmosphere of solidarity among different ethno-nationalist terrorist groups despite the fact that each group sought its own nationalist interests in different countries.

¹²⁴ Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism*, 195.

¹²⁵ Rogelio Alonso and Florencio Dominguez Iribarren, "The IRA and ETA: The International Connections of Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism in Europe" in *Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalization*, ed. Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova, 3-18, (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2009), 12-13.

¹²⁶ Law, 249-250.

3.5.2 International Radical Leftist Terrorism: The Case of Red Army Faction (RAF)

During 1960-1980 period, ideological terrorism had its peak in Europe. After nearly 30 years, revolutionary leftist-or even anarchist up to an extent- ideas begun to resurrect under banners of several different terrorist groups. Unsurprisingly, the rise of ideological terrorist movements coincides with the increase in the popularity of leftist ideas around the world. Students from middle class families with revolutionary ideas and political dissatisfaction constituted a basis for such terrorist groups and gangs.¹²⁷ The most significant fact about ideological terrorists was that they were not oppressed by an immediate enemy unlike ethno-nationalist or anti-colonial groups. Therefore, motivations of people that joined ideological terrorist groups appears to be cyclical as James and Brenda Lutz argue “unlike religion and ethnicity, ideological affiliation involves a much more conscious choice for the followers of the set of political beliefs.”¹²⁸ Members of leftist terrorist groups, especially in Europe, consisted of people that had consciously decided to support revolutionary movements around the world and seek a class struggle among their own societies.

Emergence of RAF in Germany, in this sense, is deeply connected with the political atmosphere in Germany during 1970s. Also known as the “Baader-Meinhof Gang” the RAF was formed in 1968 during the height of student protests in Germany.¹²⁹ Group had been founded by criminal Andreas Baader and radical journalist Ulrike Meinhof. RAF participated in street battles and protests at its earlier period. After gaining publicity, group started to target wealthy German cafes, stores and banks. In this sense, it could be argued that it looked like more of a criminal gang rather than a terrorist organization. Indeed, it cannot be argued that RAF was an effective terrorist organization overall. To

¹²⁷ Law, 254-255.

¹²⁸ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 129.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

achieve their terrorist goals, Andreas Baader and his followers had joined PLO training camps in Jordan with the purpose of obtaining knowledge regarding the use of bombs and weapons.¹³⁰ As a result, in 1972, RAF started to target the US military presence in West Germany and killed 2 soldiers in an attack to a US Army base in West Germany.

RAF's bank robberies and targeting of wealthy areas of West Germany drew significant popular support in the beginning. In return, new sympathizers have started to join the group and contributed replacement of imprisoned members of the RAF. Although ringleaders of the group such as Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof and Carl Raspe was arrested, RAF continued to strike West Germany with terror thanks to its new members. Autumn of 1977, in this sense, is very significant as the group's ringleaders began hunger strikes whereas RAF kidnapped an important official from Daimler Benz Company who also happened to be a former Nazi called Hans Martin Schleyer. Meanwhile, PLO hijacked a Lufthansa aircraft in order to support RAF's cause, demanding all RAF prisoners to be freed by West German government. Eventually, West German Special Forces secured the plane in Mogadishu later on while RAF members in prison committed suicide.¹³¹

Striking aspect regarding RAF's emergence and use of terrorism is that it didn't diminish completely although it suffered significant losses in personnel and capacity throughout the 1970 – 1990 period. Although their terrorist attacks did not result in mass casualties, the group's ideology continued to survive, attracting new recruits. Moreover, PLO's hijacking of Lufthansa airplane in order to support RAF cause demonstrates an important evidence of the connection between leftist, Marxist ideologies and international terrorism. There are other similar examples of such relationships like the RAF – PFLP (Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine) relationship. Unlike PLO, PFLP aimed at more radical actions against the West in order to defend rights of Palestinians and PFLP in general was known to be a Palestinian group with more radical Marxist

¹³⁰ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 139-140.

¹³¹ Law, 268-269.

views compared to PLO. In this sense, it is understandable that they sought close relationships with RAF and other radical leftist terrorist groups around Europe as well as ethno-nationalist terrorists such as IRA and ETA.

In terms of aims, radical leftist terrorism was different in nature compared to ethnic and/or nationalist terrorism. It is considered that the difference is due to two reasons. Firstly, members of such ideological terrorist groups were influenced by high ideals instead of immediate dangers such as a colonial rule or an oppressive government. They sought to create a class struggle that would contribute to rights of all of the oppressed people around the world. Secondly, RAF members found more opportunities than their ethno-nationalist counterparts in terms of publicity and propaganda since they resided in countries that had relatively better means of communication and press freedom. Although their actions were little in damage compared to that of FLN, for example, they've managed to draw significant amount of attention. Instead of bombing cafes and trying to kill hundreds of people, RAF targeted sources of wealth and robbed banks and stores. Their structure appears to be similar to other terrorist groups of the time although the hierarchy was relatively loose. Their methods were also similar to terrorists of the day, as they conducted bank robberies, assassinations, kidnappings and plane hijackings with limited amount of casualties.

3.6 Emergence of Radical Islamist Terrorism

The emergence of radical Islamism dates back to teachings of Islamic scholars of medieval era and 18th century such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn ‘ Abd al-Wahhab during first half of the 20th century. As a form of political ideology, radical Islamism became a significantly important phenomenon especially in Egypt during the 20th century. Egyptian radical Islamists such as Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Al-Banna- founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (also known as Ikhwan) in Egypt- argued that salvation of Islamic world depended on the practice of pure Islam in Muslim lands with

a complete rejection of Western civilization. Even so, Sayyid Qutb's writings proposed that violence could be used as necessary means to restore Islamic rule in Muslim lands where local rulers were corrupted by Western values.¹³² Figures like Qutb defended the idea that Islamic values must constitute the core of government under which Muslim population could be ruled. Thus, their views contained a strong enmity against the Western civilization and its supporters. Radical Islamists such as Qutb perceived the rulers of their own countries as "apostates" since they have not applied the rule of Sharia in governing their states. Therefore, governments of countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey also became targets of radical Islamism.

Randall Law argues that Sayyid Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood's understanding of Islam had found audience during 1960s and 1970s due to several reasons.¹³³ Among these, three factors are significant. First, Gamal Abdel Nasser's policies that aimed to modernize Egypt failed and resulted in several defeats to Israeli army which ultimately caused a great frustration among already poor population of Egypt.¹³⁴ Secondly, Law argues, Islamic clerics and scholars' forced retreat into a more conservative and passive approach by governments that sought modernization had fueled the rise of Qutb's ideas regarding resurrection of Islam.¹³⁵ Third factor, according to Law, is the discovery of Oil resources in the Muslim dominated areas of the world, namely the Middle East.¹³⁶ Unequal distribution of wealth generated by oil revenues resulted in a grievance among Muslim masses which eventually led to their radicalization.

¹³² Philippe Migaux, "The Roots of Radical Islamism" in *the History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*, ed. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, 255-314, (California: University of California, 2007), 283.

¹³³ Law, 286.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 286-287.

Militant Islamism, in this sense, emerged as a combination of violence and radical Islamism in order to restore the Islamic Caliphate in the world. Militant Islamists, embracing the idea of Jihad, had aimed to fight against both their apostate governments and the Western civilization in order to establish a global Islamic rule governed with Sharia.¹³⁷ Twofold objective of Jihadist movements, therefore, aimed to remove local governments as a first step towards restoration of the Islamic Caliphate. Violent acts of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt against the military rule, such as the failed assassination attempt against Gamal Abdel Nasser, represent an example of how Muslim Brotherhood attacked the regime in order to get rid of it.¹³⁸ Muslim Brotherhood did not only operate in Egypt. Groups With same purposes, offshoots of Muslim Brotherhood organized a number of both failed and successful attacks against governments of Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Two important developments in the second half of the 20th century occurred with regards to the emergence of radical Islamist terrorism. First important incident was the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 by a member of Egyptian terrorist group Organization for Islamic Liberation¹³⁹. Egyptian jihadist groups such as al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GI), Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Jihad, which were founded by former Muslim Brotherhood members, began carrying out terrorist attacks against Egyptian government during 1970s due to their repression of Islamist groups in the country. However, Anwar Sadat's assassination was largely due to the Camp David Peace Accord that had been signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979.¹⁴⁰ Egyptian Islamists targeted Anwar Sadat in person as a punishment of his collaboration with Israel. Secondly, Iranian Revolution in 1979 represented an important era of victory for

¹³⁷ Migaux, 283.

¹³⁸ "Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood". BBC News. Accessed June 28, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12313405>

¹³⁹ Migaux, 288.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 289.

political Islam. Although the revolution took place in a Shiite country, Sunni radical Islamists such as Ayman al-Zawahiri (current al-Qaeda leader) believed that it was a victory of Islamist movements and that the type of revolution occurred in Iran could as well occur in other Muslim countries with the support of radical Islamist groups.¹⁴¹ Another important outcome of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 was the hostage crisis occurred in Tehran during the revolution. Majority of the hostages taken during storming of the US Embassy in Tehran by students and protesters were held for 444 days while only 11 of them have been released immediately. This incident became a symbol of the anti-American views combined with Khomeini's labeling of the US as the great "Satan"¹⁴²

Radical, Jihadist understanding of Islam put forward by Qutb evolved into militant, violent Jihadism following distribution of a book in Egypt written by Abd al-Salam Faraj.¹⁴³ In his book *Absent Obligation*, Faraj supported the idea that Jihad was indeed the sixth pillar of Islam and then "elevated the duty of armed revolt, offensive in nature, against an infidel political leadership to the level of a standing religious obligation."¹⁴⁴ Unlike Qutb, Faraj's views were more radical and violent with respect to concept of Jihad as a way of salvation for Muslims. His work basically argued that a violent Jihad is the only way towards establishing an Islamic Caliphate that would rule the world.¹⁴⁵ Faraj also founded the violent Jihadist group "al-Jihad" which was involved in assassination of Anwar Sadat.¹⁴⁶ Another significant Egyptian Jihadist group was the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GI). Led by Omer Abdel Rahman (also known as the "Blind Sheikh"), GI started as a student organization as its leader was an important figure in

¹⁴¹ Law, 288-289.

¹⁴² Ibid., 289.

¹⁴³ Migaux, 286.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, (California: University of California Press, 2005), 107.

¹⁴⁶ Migaux, 287.

prominent Egyptian University “Al Azhar”.¹⁴⁷ The GI had a large network of smaller groups which undertook public protests against Sadat regime in Egypt especially after the signing of the Camp David Peace Accord. Omer Abdel Rahman, is thought to have released the fatwa that authorized execution of Anwar Sadat.¹⁴⁸ After Sadat’s assassination and Hosni Mobarak’s coming to power, Egyptian government cracked down on many of the Jihadist groups in the country. As a result, members of these groups fled to neighboring regions while GI had stayed intact. Philippe Migaux argues that the GI stayed intact in Egypt due to organization’s size.¹⁴⁹ Consequently, GI had also been suppressed by the Egyptian government by early 1990s. Meanwhile, Omer Abdel Rahman went to Afghanistan and United States during late 1980s and early 1990s.¹⁵⁰ While in Afghanistan, Abdel Rahman is thought to have cooperated with Abdallah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden who managed logistical and financial support that would reach to Afghan mujahedin. The rise of Jihadist groups in Egypt also contributed to the rise of Jihadist groups in Afghanistan following the end of the Afghan – Soviet War. Many of the Egyptian Jihadists went to Afghanistan in order to fight against Soviet Union. Before his assassination, Anwar Sadat also intended to support Afghan Jihad by sending Egyptian Jihadists to Afghanistan, however, he failed.¹⁵¹ The most important aspect of the rise of Jihadist violence in Egypt is that it constituted the ground for a revolutionary movement within Islam that sought revenge from “apostate” rulers of their countries. Also, it can be observed that up until Bin Laden’s announcing of US troops in Saudi Arabia as enemies of Islam, these revolutionary Jihadist groups mainly targeted their own governing regimes. Anti-American aspect of violent Jihadism, apparently, emerged after the Gulf War.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 288.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 290.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 291.

¹⁵⁰ Law, 302.

¹⁵¹ Migaux, 289.

Terrorism with radical Islamist imperatives occurred before these events as well; however, religion was a side element in most of such attacks. Palestinian resistance, in this sense, represents an important example. Although there are examples of religious motivations in some of the terrorist attacks against Israel during Israeli – Palestinian conflict, the main motive behind these attacks were largely sourced from nationalism rather than radical Islamism.¹⁵² In addition, these attacks were a part of a local struggle in a specific part of the Islamic world contrary to radical Jihadists who seek for a global Islamic Caliphate. Despite these facts, resistance in Palestine had been taken over eventually by HAMAS, a radical Islamist political party with an armed wing against the Israeli army. HAMAS' founders, including Ahmed Yassin, were offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and they shared similar ideas with the followers of Qutb with respect to interpretation of Islam.¹⁵³

In the following section, rise of al-Qaeda, the most prominent Jihadist global terrorist network, will be briefly described. Al-Qaeda's emergence lies at heart of the new terrorism debate as the group's tactics, aims and organizational network are considered as new and unique compared to characteristics of previously seen terrorist groups. In addition to academic debate among scholars, policymakers and security circles in countries that are combating Jihadist terrorism alongside the US also claim that the al-Qaeda and its structure are completely new unlike terrorist groups of the Cold War Era. Therefore, according to policymakers and security officials, counter-terrorism measures against them should have been in accordance with the changes that have caused al-Qaeda to emerge as a unique global terrorist organization.

¹⁵² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 82.

¹⁵³ Law, 308-309.

3.6.1 Afghan Soviet War and the Emergence of Al-Qaeda

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had a significant outcome that would surface in the following decade. In order to contain Soviet invasion, the United States, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia collaborated to organize the Afghan resistance which consisted of radical Islamist volunteers arriving from different parts of the Middle East. The United States had supplied militants in Afghanistan with arms while Saudi Arabia participated in providing manpower and funds to be used by the resistance. Pakistan provided a logistical corridor for the militants arriving from the Gulf, Maghreb and Palestine. Flow of foreign fighters into Afghanistan continued for 10 years where they were subject to religious and military trainings in camps.¹⁵⁴ Osama Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi, was among the fighters who joined the Jihad in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁵ After almost a decade, Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan upon heavy losses. Jihadi groups accomplished their objectives with regards to defeating the USSR. However, after Soviet withdrawal, these groups were split into two different parts. First group returned to their homes in order to serve for local radical Islamist movements. Second group chose to stay in Afghanistan in order to help train younger Jihadists that would later on join radical Islamic armed resistance movements in Chechnya, Bosnia, Algeria and Kashmir.¹⁵⁶

Among these fighters, the largest group decided to stay intact for long term future plans. The group's majority was from Arab descent who were also known as "Arab Afghans". Abdullah Azzam, a Jordanian jihadist who led this group and managed Saudi financial aid together with Osama Bin Laden during the Afghan – Soviet war, created a group to gather Arab Afghans under the banner "MUKUB" (Maktab Khadamāt al-Mujāhidīn al-

¹⁵⁴ "Anti Soviet Mujahdeen". Global Security.org. Accessed June 30, 2015. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mujahideen.htm>

¹⁵⁵ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*, 137.

¹⁵⁶ Migaux, 296-297.

'Arab – Bureau of Services for Arab Mujahedin).¹⁵⁷ Abdullah Azzam was a prominent cleric as well as an influential Jihadist. It is argued that al-Qaeda was born out of the rivalry between Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam. A theory suggests that the two had different ideas regarding the future of their group following the war.¹⁵⁸ The same theory argues that it could be Osama Bin Laden that organized Abdullah Azzam's assassination in order to take control of the group that was to be known as al-Qaeda later on.

From a wider perspective, it is understood that a power struggle occurred between leaders of the MUKUB group following the end of the war. After Azzam's death, Bin Laden took over the command of the group with the purpose of serving the Islamist cause. For this reason, he traveled to Saudi Arabia prior to the Gulf War. It was known that Osama Bin Laden was against the US presence in Saudi territory and viewed it as a sin. Therefore, he offered the Saudi King protection of Saudi Arabia by his own group instead of US army. Bin Laden was denied by the Saudi Arabia. This incident, although part of a greater story, is considered as an important cornerstone of events that shaped al-Qaeda's ideas and selection of the US as a direct target. Furthermore, Philippe Migaux argues that;

Bin Laden viewed [the US presence in Saudi Arabia] as an unbearable humiliation for all Muslims-the land of the Prophet defiled by infidels. To him, the American presence represented a twofold act of aggression: the occupation of Saudi Arabia by infidel soldiers was also evidence of America's desire to plunder the country's wealth under the pretext of protecting it. The United States, having thus humiliated all Muslims, became their principal enemy, inasmuch as it was deemed responsible for the Saudi authorities' corruption and apostasy.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 293.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 297.

¹⁵⁹ Migaux, 318.

Bin Laden's targeting of America also originates from the victory that was gained against the Soviet Union. The victory against the Soviet Union reflected the powerful nature of the Jihadist militants in Afghanistan including Bin Laden, who thought that the Soviets were an infidel nation that sought to exploit and plunder Afghanistan as well as diminish Islam in the region.¹⁶⁰ Following his deportation from Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden was exiled to Sudan where he enjoyed government support in return of funding and construction work for Sudanese government.¹⁶¹ During his time in Sudan, Bin Laden was involved in funding of several different terrorist attacks against the US targets at home and abroad. Bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 by Ramzi Yousef represents an example to this fact as well as the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1995 where 19 US servicemen have lost their lives.¹⁶² None of these attacks were claimed by al-Qaeda back then.¹⁶³ It is understood that Bin Laden's policy during 1990s was centered on supporting different terror cells and networks that had ties with him and his group.

After leaving Sudan, Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in order to find shelter and broker good relations with Taliban, the radical Islamist Pashtun group that seized power in the country during early 1990s. Although Taliban didn't have a global agenda, they supported Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda council in Afghanistan in return of funding and training activities for Taliban and other Mujahedin remnants from the Soviet War who now fought in other battlegrounds around the world.¹⁶⁴ After his arrival to Afghanistan, Bin Laden issued his declaration of war against the United States in 1996. Moreover, he continued to criticize Saudi government for letting American troops into the country,

¹⁶⁰ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*, 137.

¹⁶¹ "Brief History of al-Qaeda". Bill Meyer's Journal. Accessed June 30, 2015. <http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07272007/alqaeda.html>

¹⁶² "Brief History of al-Qaeda". Bill Meyer's Journal.

¹⁶³ Migaux, 322-323.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 320-321.

calling Saudi Royal Family as “heretics”.¹⁶⁵ Al-Qaeda’s settling in Afghanistan set out the basis for their training, recruitment and funding activities for future operations. After settling in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda started conducting and claiming its operations such as the bombing attacks against US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 where 224 people died. Instead of funding and secretly supporting splinter groups against the US, al-Qaeda started to target the enemy by itself by the year 1998.¹⁶⁶ US government retaliated by bombing Afghanistan and Sudan with Cruise missiles, resulting in the destruction of a number of al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Following the US Embassy attacks, al-Qaeda had organized a bombed attack against US Ship Cole stationed in Yemeni port of Aden. Militants detonated a boat loaded with explosives next to USS Cole, resulting in death of 17 American sailors.¹⁶⁷ These two attacks represent major al-Qaeda operations against the US prior to 9/11. 1996 – 2001 period is thus significant in terms of al-Qaeda’s history as the group had started to openly target US and claim responsibility within these 5 years. Previous incidents like World Trade Center bombing in 1993, Khobar Towers attack in 1995 are, by some viewers, considered as early signs of al-Qaeda terror; however, al-Qaeda had never involved directly in these attacks. Bin Laden never went further than just praising the attackers.

In September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda had launched the biggest terrorist attack in the history of mankind. 2 passenger airliners en route to Los Angeles had hit the World Trade Center towers in New York while a third had crashed on the Pentagon. The fourth aircraft had crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Attacks were the result of a suicide attack mission planned and conducted by 19 al-Qaeda militants, some of whom took flight courses to hijack a plane and fly it towards the target areas. As a result 2996 people died including the attackers. The 9/11 had been recorded as the most lethal terrorist attack ever taken place as it resulted in death of nearly 3000 people with a

¹⁶⁵ Law, 305.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 307-308.

¹⁶⁷ “The USS Cole Bombing”. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Accessed June 30, 2015. <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/uss-cole>

single attack.¹⁶⁸ The attack had dealt a major psychological blow to the United States. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda's propaganda had its climax with several different video tapes of Bin Laden and other commanders who vowed for continuation of attacks against the US. 9/11 was the most important event of the 21st century due to two reasons. First of all, the most powerful state on earth, the US, had been hit by a group of al-Qaeda members who have hijacked 4 passenger planes. Up until that day, this was an unthinkable scenario. However, al-Qaeda's attacks on 9/11 had demonstrated that terrorists had the power to convert passenger planes into missiles that could hit the US soil without getting intercepted by defense structures. It demonstrated how globalization enabled terrorists to strike most powerful states with an operation budget less than half a million dollars.¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, 9/11 had shown that terrorism, unlike its previous examples, is a weapon that is deadlier than it was thought until that day. Role of media was significant as well since the world had witnessed that the "CNN Effect" of 1990s had now found its Middle Eastern counterpart "Al-Jazeera". Al Jazeera become popular after 9/11 since messages from al-Qaeda leaders had been broadcasted on the TV channel globally.¹⁷⁰ Al-Qaeda's attack had a twofold objective. First it had aimed at spreading its message of Jihad against the greater enemy, the US. In this sense, it could be argued that al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks had become significantly successful in spreading its message across the world via striking US with terror. On the other hand, al-Qaeda, similar to previous terrorist organizations, sought to provoke US by this attack in order to start a military operation and/or invasion against a Muslim country. This strategy aimed at creating a large scale public uprising and Jihad against the United States, starting from the country that US chose to attack following the 9/11. In this sense, al-Qaeda's strategy of

¹⁶⁸ "9/11 F.A.Q.". 9/11 Memorial. Accessed June 30, 2015. <http://www.911memorial.org/faq-about-911>

¹⁶⁹ Shan Carter and Amanda Cox, "One 9/11 Tally: \$3.3 Trillion". The New York Times. Accessed June 22, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html?_r=0

¹⁷⁰ Neumann, *Old & New Terrorism*, 143-149.

provoking US to intervene in the Middle East and South Asia appears similar to the strategy of “action, repression, action” employed by Ethno-nationalist terrorists.

In the decade following 9/11, US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Both invasions brought about massive repercussions. US army got bogged down in both countries. The United States’ “Global War on Terrorism” resulted in two wars, one of which did not end still. US policies in both home and abroad have been under strong criticism since 9/11, especially after the increase in casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2010. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda continued to carry out its attacks via a global network of terrorist cells. During 2001-2008 period, al-Qaeda carried out bomb attacks in Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Pakistan, Britain and some other countries.¹⁷¹ These bombings have targeted Western interests in above mentioned countries as well as Synagogues and foreigners especially in Muslim countries. Al-Qaeda kept its resiliency until 2011 although number of attacks declined. In May 2, 2011, US captured and killed Osama Bin Laden who was apparently hiding in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda came to an important junction as many people hoped that Bin Laden’s death would lead to the abolishment of the group. However, instead, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in command, took charge of the group after 2011.¹⁷² As Peter Bergen argued, al-Qaeda chose to carry out its activities in a regional level. Group basically sought to make the most of the opportunities arose in countries that were in turmoil due to the Arab Spring. However, al-Qaeda’s choice of selecting countries in turmoil as a ground for recruitment and operations is not a new policy as the group had its roots established in Afghanistan during 1990s as well as Yemen, where a strong government authority had been missing for decades.

In terms of aims and goals, al-Qaeda’s charter, translated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) states that the group aims “the victory of the mighty religion of Allah, the

¹⁷¹ “A History of Terror: al-Qaeda 1988-2008”. Guardian. Accessed July 1, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida>

¹⁷² “Ayman al-Zawahiri to head al-Qaida following Bin Laden's death” Guardian. Accessed July 1, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/16/ayman-al-zawahiri-al-qaida>

establishment of an Islamic Regime and the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate, God willing.”¹⁷³ However, its terrorist attacks do not serve to this purpose. Instead, by trying to attack the “far enemy”, al-Qaeda appears to seek more publicity and support from the Muslim world. Until Arab Spring, there is little to no example regarding to an effort by al-Qaeda to establish its Caliphate in a specific part of the world. In this sense, it could be argued that al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks, in the first place, aims to generate popular support and create more recruits. Another argument regarding al-Qaeda’s aims could be that the group may have planned its attacks in order to provoke a US retaliation, which eventually occurred after 9/11. Furthermore, it could be argued that al-Qaeda, in this sense, failed to generate a mass popular movement that sought to overthrow Western hegemony in the Middle East and form up an Islamic caliphate. This is a very familiar story of failure when compared to the ethno-nationalist and/or ideological terrorists of the Cold War era. Although al-Qaeda had developed unique characteristics in terms of its methods, organization and financing, it had failed to move to the next level of terrorism.

3.7 Conclusion

Consequently, it has been observed that terrorism, throughout the history, has been subject to a continuous transformation. Ethnic, ideological and religious forms of terrorism continued to emerge in different parts of the world. Means of terrorism, in accordance with technological developments such as invention of dynamite and improvements in communications technology, evolved and provided terrorists better capability against their targets.¹⁷⁴ Aims of terrorist movements, however, appears to have not become a subject of radical change. In this sense, it could be argued that all of

¹⁷³ “Al-Qaeda Charter” The Black Vault. Accessed July 1, 2015. <http://www.theblackvault.com/documents/capturediraq/charter.pdf>

¹⁷⁴ Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism*, 92.

the terrorist groups that were examined in this chapter, had political aims that fit in the definition of terrorism that was adopted by this thesis. In some examples, such as the Sicarii and Assassins, observation was that religion, as well as political aims, appeared as the driving force behind terrorist acts. However, when examined thoroughly, it is understood that both Sicarii and Assassins had primarily political aims. Sicarii sought independence from the Roman Empire while the Assassins aimed at overtaking the leadership of Shiite Imamate as well as weakening Seljuk Dynasty.

It is observed that ethnic terrorism also had political goals which were political independence, national self-determination and political autonomy within a country. In this sense, as seen in ETA and FLN case, ethnic terrorism aimed at provoking a mass revolt and gaining public support from its own constituents in order to struggle against the ruling authority. In FLN case, terrorism succeeded to draw public support and provoke French crackdown after the group started to target French civilians living in Algiers instead of French army units in rural areas of Algeria. Eventually, FLN managed to convert its struggle into a war of independence, which would not take place without public support it gathered. In the case of ETA, the group's use of terrorism eventually brought political autonomy to peoples of Basque region in Spain; however, the group could not manage a public revolt against Spanish government. Instead, it had gained support from Spaniards who were against the dictatorship. In this sense, it could be argued that when ETA's political objectives were successfully accomplished, the group's popularity started to decline. Therefore, it could be argued that groups that sought ethnic and/or nationalistic goals employed terrorism in different parts of the world. Means of ethnic terrorists were also subject to change, however, their aims remained political.

Radical Islamic terrorism, despite its religious inspiration, also appeared as a result of political grievances in the Muslim countries. In this regard, radical Islamic movements, at their early stage, aimed at overthrowing governments of their own states whom they perceived as apostates. Iranian Revolution in 1979, which is one of the most significant political events of the 20th century, politically influenced and fueled such Islamic

movements that sought for a change in their governments. Ideas of global Jihad still circulated; however, groups of the time sought regional and local political changes. Al-Qaeda and “global Jihad against the United States”, also aimed at political change. According to Saif al-Adel, al-Qaeda’s Egyptian operations commander, the group aimed at “establishing the vanguard of a rebirth of the Islamic nation”.¹⁷⁵ Although it appears that al-Qaeda’s goal appears as purely religious duty, in fact, it could also be considered as a transformed, globalized version of the political aims sought by Jihadist groups in Egypt and the Middle East. In the following chapter, different ideas regarding emergence of global Jihad against the West will be discussed with respect to economic globalization.

To conclude, it could be argued that terrorism had been subject to several important changes with respect to its tactics, recruiting methods and internationalization. David C. Rapoport, for example, considered transformation of terrorism as waves of terrorism that occurred throughout the history. According to Rapoport, religiously inspired terrorism represents the fourth wave of terrorism.¹⁷⁶ In this sense, it could be sensible to argue that there has been a continuity in terrorism via evolution of its methods and tactics. This type of evolution occurred mainly due to political and technological changes in history of mankind. However, the aims of terrorism appear to have remained political despite religious inspiration in several examples. In light of these, it is considered that in order to discuss whether terrorism has been subject to a fundamental, revolutionary change, the examination of the aims of terrorist groups from different periods of times represents an important task.

¹⁷⁵ Assaf Moghadam, *the Globalization of Martyrdom: Al-Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks*, (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 71.

¹⁷⁶ See for example: David C. Rapoport, *The Four Waves of Terrorism*, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, *Attacking Terrorism* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46-73.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW TERRORISM DEBATE

4.1 Emergence of the Concept of the New Terrorism

One of the results of the end of the Cold War and the Afghan Soviet War between 1979 and 1989 was the emergence of radical Islamist groups that sought to carry out acts of terrorism against the Western countries, whom they thought as the enemy of the Muslim population. In a fatwa released in 1998, Osama Bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, declared in the name of “the World Islamic Front” that;

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah."¹⁷⁷

More importantly, this fatwa was also signed by leaders of other radical Islamists groups who operate in different parts of the world such as Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Jihad in Egypt at the time. The fatwa signified that Bin Laden and his radical Islamic affiliates, who led other radical Islamist terrorist groups, started a new wave of terrorism that would target the US citizens and military forces around the world. Also, in the fatwa, it was stated that the actions to be taken by Muslims against the enemies of Islam were “God’s

¹⁷⁷ “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” Federation of American Scientists, accessed July 6, 2015. <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>

orders”.¹⁷⁸ Prior to al-Qaeda’s targeting of US as the main adversary of radical Islamist groups, several terrorism experts in US came up with the argument of a “new” form of terrorism emerging in the world due to differences observed in the methods, aims and organizational structure of the newly emerging radical Islamic terrorist groups. Walter Laqueur, an American historian and political commentator, argued in 1996 that a new form of terrorism was on the rise and therefore a new vocabulary was needed in order to define this newly emerging form of terrorism.¹⁷⁹ Laqueur argued that the newly emerging, religiously motivated terrorist groups had posed a new threat against global security. Laqueur described these groups as “apocalyptic”, arguing that such groups aimed giving history a push by creating universal wars.¹⁸⁰ Similarly, Bruce Hoffman, one of the proponents of the new terrorism concept, argued that “the more traditional and familiar types of ethnic/nationalist and separatist as well as ideological groups have been joined by a variety of organizations with less comprehensible nationalist or ideological motivations”.¹⁸¹

Another aspect of the concept of “new terrorism” was, as Bruce Hoffman argued, that such kind of terrorist groups were much more lethal and indiscriminate with respect to their terrorist attacks.¹⁸² In order to claim that new terrorism was more lethal compared to the old, Hoffman argued that from 1990s on, the number of terrorist attacks had decreased although the number of casualties following these attacks had increased. Prior

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no.5 (1996), accessed July 7, 2015, <http://www.li.suu.edu/Library/Circulation/Stathis/posc2200msPostmoderTerrorismSpr04.pdf>

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al., MR-989-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 9.

¹⁸² Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects*, 11-12.

to Hoffman, however, Brian Jenkins had estimated during 1985 that a rise in the number of casualties as a result of terrorist attacks was on the horizon.¹⁸³

Several terrorist attacks that took place during the first half of 1990s contributed to the idea of the emergence of a “new” form of terrorism. Failed attempt to bomb the World Trade Center in 1993 by Ramzi Youssef was one of the terrorist plots that made scholars think of a newly emerging, indiscriminate form of terrorism that aimed at maximum casualty rather than publicity.¹⁸⁴ In addition to this, Aum Shinrikyo’s, sarin gas attack in Tokyo subway in 1995 had also raised concerns about the capabilities of new terrorism. Aum Shinrikyo was known as a Japanese religious extremist terrorist group which was based around a doomsday cult. Another important terrorist attack during 1990s took place in US soil. In 1995, Timothy McVeigh, an American right wing extremist, set off a truck bomb in Oklahoma City which killed 168 people.¹⁸⁵ Oklahoma City bombing, prior to 9/11 attacks, was recorded as the deadliest ever attack that took place in the US.¹⁸⁶ These incidents, together with attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, contributed to the emergence of an idea of a “new” form of terrorism. Another argument regarding the characteristics of the new terrorism was that the new terrorists aimed at obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that could even lead to a “nuclear Armageddon”.¹⁸⁷ In addition, it was argued that new terrorists aimed at creating a global terrorist network that would cooperate against their targets in a global sense unlike previous terrorist groups that rather operated on a local level. In this regard, Thomas R. Mockaitis argued that, “illicit organizations no longer confine their activities

¹⁸³ Brian M. Jenkins, “The Future Course of International Terrorism,” *RAND Corporation*, 1985, 3.

¹⁸⁴ Peter R. Neumann, *Old & New Terrorism*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 2-3.

¹⁸⁵ Neumann, *Old & New Terrorism*, 3.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

to one geographic area that they seek to influence or control”.¹⁸⁸ Many of the major terrorist attacks that were conducted by radical Islamists were not officially claimed by any terrorist group during 1990s. The US Embassy bombings in 1998 and Khobar Tower attacks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 represent important examples. Osama Bin Laden was known to be financing these attacks; however, his blurring stance behind such attacks had created the image of a loosely organized flat network of terrorist groups that were aiming at conducting terrorist attacks in a global scale.

4.2 Defining Characteristics of New Terrorism

The concept of new terrorism was based on four important pillars. Firstly, new terrorists were described as fundamentally different from their previous ethno-nationalist and ideological counterparts due to their apocalyptic worldview that was fueled by their religious extremism. Secondly, proponents of new terrorism concept argued that new terrorists were much more deadly and indiscriminate with respect to their attacks unlike previous terrorist groups. Bruce Hoffman explained the increasing lethality of new terrorism with statistical data gathered by RAND Corporation that proved lethality of terrorist attacks had increased despite the fact that the number of terrorist attacks were relatively lower.¹⁸⁹ Thirdly, it was argued that new terrorists sought to organize a flat, loose network instead of vertical hierarchical structure of “old” terrorists. According to this argument, new terrorists had a decentralized network structure that allowed local cells autonomy over their actions.¹⁹⁰ Finally, it was argued that another reason for the

¹⁸⁸ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *The New Terrorism: Myths and Reality*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 43.

¹⁸⁹ The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism Figure, quoted in Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al., MR-989-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 11.

¹⁹⁰ John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al., MR-989-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 51.

concept of new terrorism to emerge was the advance made in information and arms technologies, combined with the effects of globalization that became increasingly dominant after the end of the Cold War.¹⁹¹ In addition to ideas regarding the spread of globalization and the increasing transnationality of terrorism, proponents of the new terrorism idea noted that terrorists now had better opportunities with regards to access to WMDs. Matthew Morgan argued that “the collapse of the Soviet Union and the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state users is the primary factor that has significantly increased the danger of nuclear terrorism.”¹⁹² Advances made in communication technologies also represented an important opportunity for terrorist groups. In terms of globalization, it was argued that liberal democratic values and economic globalization had a negative effect on the image of West with respect to developing countries and the third world. Michael Mousseau noted that;

As a result of globalization, these [liberal democratic] values and beliefs are increasingly clashing in the mixed market–clientalist economies of the developing world, triggering intense antimarket resentment directed primarily against the epitome of market civilization: the United States.¹⁹³

Indeed, the effects of globalization, especially with respect to culture and tradition, played an important part in spurring of radical Islamist terrorism. Fathali Moghaddam argued that, “for Muslim fundamentalists, the threat posed by globalization is terrifying and immediate, and they feel they must defend their traditional heritage against this gigantic global force.”¹⁹⁴ In this sense, technological advances, together with grievances

¹⁹¹ Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25, (2002), 307.

¹⁹² Matthew Morgan, “The Origins of New Terrorism,” *Parameters*, (Spring 2004), 39.

¹⁹³ Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,” *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03), 6.

¹⁹⁴ Fathali M. Moghaddam, *How Globalization Spurs Terrorism: The Lopsided Benefits of One World and Why That Fuels Violence*, (Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Security International, 2008), 6.

stemming from globalization's economic and cultural effects also contributed to a new form of terrorism.

4.2.1 Religious Motivation and Apocalyptic World View

The most important aspect of the new terrorism concept is the idea that “new” terrorism is religiously motivated, amorphous and is seeking to destroy current political system in the world. Proponents of new terrorism defended the idea that new terrorists were different from the “old”, “secular” terrorist groups as they were religiously motivated and thus their demands were apocalyptic and unnegotiable.¹⁹⁵ Walter Laqueur described new terrorists as groups who aimed at liquidation of all satanic forces and destruction of all life on earth as punishment to mankind's crimes.¹⁹⁶ In his article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1996, current Secretary of Defense of the USA, Ashton B. Carter described “new” terrorists as catastrophic groups with aims to obtain WMDs.¹⁹⁷ Bruce Hoffman argued that religious imperative for terrorism was the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity observed in 1990s.¹⁹⁸ According to a research conducted by Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, only two out of sixty-four international terrorist organizations in 1980 could be classified as religious. This figure rose sharply to twenty-five out of fifty-eight by 1995.¹⁹⁹ Although terrorism with religious motivations was not a new concept in terrorism, it was argued that religion was now the

¹⁹⁵ Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate Over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism, *Center for International Security and Cooperation*, (2007), 8-9.

¹⁹⁶ Walter Laqueur, *New Terrorism: Fanaticism and Arms of Mass Destruction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 81.

¹⁹⁷ Ashton B. Carter, John Deutch & Philip Zelikow, “Catastrophic Terrorism”, *Foreign Affairs* 77, No. 6, (1999), 81.

¹⁹⁸ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 82.

¹⁹⁹ Nadine Gurr & Benjamin Cole, *The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 28-29 quoted in Alexander Spencer, “Questioning the Concept of New Terrorism,” *Peace Conflict & Development*, no.8 (January 2006), 9.

most powerful imperative to terrorism. In this sense, different from the past, religion was considered as the aim of terrorism rather than a tool for legitimization and justification of terrorist acts.²⁰⁰

This view reflected the idea that new terrorists were consisting of radical Islamists who aimed to bring down the existing world system in order to replace it with a global Islamic caliphate. Thus, it is claimed that political and/or economical grievances play a secondary role compared to religious inspiration. In 2001, Michael Ignatieff from the Guardian newspaper called “new” terrorists as nihilists and argued that;

The nihilism of their means - the indifference to human costs - takes their actions not only out of the realm of politics, but even out of the realm of war itself. The apocalyptic nature of their goals makes it absurd to believe they are making political demands at all. They are seeking the violent transformation of an irremediably sinful and unjust world. Terror does not express a politics, but a metaphysics, a desire to give ultimate meaning to time and history through ever-escalating acts of violence which culminate in a final battle between good and evil. People serving such exalted goals are not interested in mere politics.²⁰¹

Also, due to their religious zeal, new terrorists were considered to be unnegotiable unlike secular terrorist groups. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon argued that;

The terrorists allied with Mr. Bin Laden do not want a place at the table; they want to shatter the table. They are not constrained by secular political concerns. Their objective is not to influence, but to kill, and in large numbers -- hence their declared interest in acquiring chemical and even nuclear weapons.²⁰²

²⁰⁰ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 419, quoted in Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate Over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism, *Center for International Security and Cooperation*, (2007), 8-9.

²⁰¹ Michael Ignatieff, “It’s War-But It Does not have to be Dirty,” *Guardian*, 1 October 2001, quoted in Isabelle Duyvestein, “How New is the New Terrorism?,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, (2004), 446.

²⁰² Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon. “The New Face of Terrorism”. *The New York Times*. Accessed July 7, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/04/opinion/the-new-face-of-terrorism.html>

In this regard, proponents of new terrorism concept argued that old terrorist groups were mostly secular. For instance, Bruce Hoffman differentiates “old” terrorist groups as secular and starkly different in terms of their perception of themselves and their violent acts.²⁰³ In addition, Bruce Hoffman claims that;

Whereas secular terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or as means to foment the creation of a new system, religious terrorists see themselves as not components of a system worth preserving but as “outsiders” seeking fundamental changes in the existing system.²⁰⁴

This argument also provided a basis for the idea that new terrorists’ religious nature, combined with their aims toward removing the existing world system, enabled them to carry out large scale terrorist attacks where mass casualties were aimed to be inflicted. Hoffman also stated that religiously motivated terrorists, since they alienated themselves to the existing system by calling themselves as “outsiders”, tend to contemplate far more destructive terrorist attacks compared to secular terrorists as their perception of “enemy” consisted of anyone who wasn’t a member of their group or particular religious sect.²⁰⁵

On the other hand, some scholars such as Peter R. Neumann argued that “it is true that Bin Laden’s appeal in some parts of Muslim world is not based on deep religious conviction but stems, to a large extent, from political grievances he articulates.”²⁰⁶ By this statement, Neumann agrees to some extent with the idea that although new terrorists are largely religiously motivated, their cause stems from political and/or economic problems that exist in their own particular geographies. However, Neumann still argues that “al-Qaeda’s source of activism, purpose and justification are undoubtedly

²⁰³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 89.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Peter R. Neumann, *Old & New Terrorism*, 42.

religious.”²⁰⁷ Neumann’s main argument here is that al-Qaeda’s reasons for resorting to terrorism might be stemming from political grievances, but the group’s solution to these political problems is an unattainable idea that aims to create a global Islamic caliphate which is to be ruled under Sharia law.

The idea that new terrorists were religiously motivated and had apocalyptic world view has been challenged by a number of scholars. Martha Crenshaw, a prominent critic of the new terrorism debate, argued that al-Qaeda, as a religiously motivated group, had clear and specific purposes such as forcing US military personnel to withdraw from Saudi Arabia.²⁰⁸ By this, Crenshaw questioned the idea that new terrorism lacked specific, sometimes limited, goals unlike previous terrorist organizations. In addition Crenshaw argued that not all members of groups such as al-Qaeda were religious fanatics.²⁰⁹ Instead, she argued that members of such groups were coming from middle classes of their societies with adequate amount of educational background.²¹⁰ Crenshaw also argued that new terrorists, similar to old terrorist groups, acted in accordance with a group psychology instead of individual, apocalyptic agendas.²¹¹

Isabelle Duyvestein examined al-Qaeda’s aims in two parts as short and long term goals. In the short term, she argued that groups like al-Qaeda aimed at provocation, publicity and hurting the enemy whereas same type of groups, in the long term aimed for highly unattainable objectives.²¹² Furthermore, Duyvestein argues that al-Qaeda’s long term aims, like that of Red Army Faction in Germany, represented objectives that seemed

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 43.

²⁰⁸ Martha Crenshaw, *Debate Over “Old” vs. “New” Terrorism*, 14.

²⁰⁹ Crenshaw, 16.

²¹⁰ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 96.

²¹¹ Crenshaw, 15-16.

²¹² Isabelle Duyvestein, “How New is the New Terrorism?,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, (2004), 446.

impossible to be achieved. Therefore, she argued that aiming for unattainable, unrealistic objectives were not unique to “new” terrorists.²¹³ This is an approach that did not deny the core idea of new terrorists having apocalyptic goals. Rather, this idea pointed out that such kinds of motivations were observed before the emergence of al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic, Jihadist terrorist groups. With respect to religious motivation of new terrorist, Anthony Field argued that “in many cases, terrorist groups have translated broad religious principles into concrete political objectives, most often the ambition to gain political control over a specific territory.”²¹⁴ Field’s approach emphasized on the similarities between old and supposedly new terrorist groups with respect to their fusion of religion and politics.

Perhaps one of the most accurate criticisms regarding the new terrorism concept is the one that was made by Stephen Holmes. Holmes noted that “Bin Laden’s public statements stress secular rationales for the 9/11 attacks and that historical circumstances rather than religion led al-Qaeda target the United States”.²¹⁵ Holmes’ argument can be considered as having similarities to the idea that al-Qaeda is a group that is a result of historical failures of previous Jihadist movements and policies of the West combined with effects of globalization. Likewise, Olivier Roy argues that “it is common to find among Islamic radicals a mix of Koranic injunctions and pseudo-Marxist explanations.”²¹⁶ Moreover, as British philosopher John Gray argues, “many supporters

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Anthony Field, “The ‘new terrorism’: Revolution or evolution?” *Political Studies Review* 7, no.2 (2009), 201.

²¹⁵ Stephen Holmes, “Al-Qaeda, September 11, 2001,” in Diego Gambetta, ed., *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 134-135 quoted in Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate Over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism, *Center for International Security and Cooperation*, (2007), 16.

²¹⁶ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 46.

of al-Qaeda should be more accurately described as “Islam-Leninists” than “Islam-Fascists”.²¹⁷

Consequently, main discussions regarding the goals of “new” terrorists revolve around the ideas that such kind of terrorist groups are religiously motivated and thus seek for a fundamental change in the political system instead of limited, local solutions that were sought by secular, traditional terrorist groups. Since these groups were described as having “apocalyptic” aims, it was also argued that members of these groups were motivated by “rage, aggression, sadism, paranoia as well as fanaticism”.²¹⁸ On the other hand, ideas regarding the goals of new terrorism have been challenged by a number of scholars on the grounds that religious motivation was not a new phenomenon and that such terrorist groups were not apocalyptic with respect to their objectives as their grievances were arguably political. In the following section, idea that religiously motivated new terrorism is apocalyptic and seeks to topple the existing system will be analyzed within the context of Syrian Civil War and emergence of Jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra (JN).

4.2.1.1. Aims of Al-Qaeda and JN in Syria: Local Emirate or Global Caliphate?

Although al-Qaeda set out its major goal as the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, developments in Syria after 2011 indicated that the group appears to have opted to create a local emirate in Syria that would establish political and territorial control over a limited amount of territory within Syria with the support of other opposition groups

²¹⁷ John Gray, “The Atheist Delusion” *The Guardian*, 15 March 2008 quoted in Peter R. Neumann, *Old & New Terrorism*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 43.

²¹⁸ Walter Laqueur, *New Terrorism: Fanaticism and Arms of Mass Destruction*, 281 quoted in Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate Over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism, *Center for International Security and Cooperation*, (2007), 15.

fighting against the regime forces in Syria.²¹⁹ Jabhat al-Nusra emerged in Syria during 2011 as a branch of al-Qaeda that was formed out of the group's branch in Iraq called "al-Qaeda in Iraq".²²⁰ The group received ideological, logistical and manpower aid from the al-Qaeda in Iraq during its formation phase.²²¹ During that time, al-Qaeda in Iraq, which would later become Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who is now the leader of JN's main rival in Syria, the Islamic State (IS).²²² JN's main aim during the Syrian Civil War was to defeat Bashar al-Assad regime together with other opposition forces in order to establish an Islamic state projected in al-Qaeda's charter. A significant event during JN's emergence was its split from al-Qaeda in Iraq, which would later evolve into the Islamic State. During 2013, Baghdadi released a statement where he declared merger of al-Qaeda in Iraq (also known as the Islamic State in Iraq – ISI) with JN.²²³ Meanwhile, JN leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani held back the declaration regarding announcement of JN's affiliation with al-Qaeda.²²⁴ After Baghdadi's declaration regarding the merger of the AQI and JN in Syria, JN leader Julani made a statement where he declared that there is no possibility of such a merger between JN and al-Qaeda in Iraq. In addition, Julani stated that he held back his declaration of affiliation of JN to al-Qaeda due to the efforts to understand a Sharia policy that is appropriate for al-Sham (Syria) reality.²²⁵ Although al-Qaeda leader

²¹⁹ "Mapping Militant Organizations" Stanford University. Accessed July 9, 2015. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493#note22>

²²⁰ Seth G. Jones, "Syria's Growing Jihad," *Survival* 55, no.4 (August/September 2013), 55.

²²¹ Valeria Szybala, "Al-Qaeda Shows its True Colors in Syria," *Institute for Study of War*, (August 2013), 1. Accessed July 9, 2015.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISWSyriaUpdate-AlQaeda-TrueColors-Syria.pdf>

²²² Stephen Negus: "Call for Sunni state in Iraq". Financial Times. 15 October 2006. Accessed July 9, 2015. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e239159e-5c6a-11db-9e7e-0000779e2340.html>

²²³ Szybala, 2.

²²⁴ Ibid., 2-3.

²²⁵ Ibid.

Ayman al-Zawahiri declared in June 2013 that both JN and ISI were to operate separately in Syria under the umbrella of al-Qaeda, JN and ISI eventually split in February 2014.²²⁶ Since 2014, clashes occurred between JN and the IS led by Baghdadi. Frequency of clashes between two Jihadist groups from same descent tend to increase as more groups pledge alliance to IS.²²⁷ Meanwhile, United States listed both the IS and JN as foreign terrorist organizations in 2004 and 2014 respectively.²²⁸

Considering developments occurred among two major groups in Syrian Civil War, it could be argued that aims of these groups carry similarities with old terrorists with respect to the new terrorism debate. Firstly, although both groups seem to be aiming to reach same type of goals that include the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, their activities in Syria indicate that they are seeking rather limited objectives. In this regard, JN's declaration regarding the local nature of the state to be established within Syria, along the precondition that this state would be established upon a consensus reached with other opposition group can be considered as a limited goal. In this sense, JN's main objective in Syria with regards to establishing a local Islamic state carries similarities with aims of "old" ethno-nationalist terrorist groups such as ETA, who sought to establish independent states within borders of a country or within a limited area that included borders from multiple countries. ETA, fought the Spanish government to create an independent state that would emerge within borders of both Spain and France as the group claimed that indigenous Basque population were spread into both countries.²²⁹

²²⁶ Basma Atassi, "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger," Al Jazeera, June, 9, 2013. Accessed July 9, 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html>

²²⁷ See for example: "Senior Al-Qaeda figure killed by ISIS". The Daily Star Lebanon. Accessed July 9, 2015. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Feb-24/248278-senior-al-qaeda-figure-killed-by-isis.ashx>

²²⁸ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations". U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. Accessed July 9, 2015. <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>

²²⁹ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 111-112.

Another argument could be that groups such as al Qaeda and the IS, although having connections with Jihadist affiliates from other parts of the world, aim at establishing local Jihadist rules first rather than trying to attempt at a global Jihadist uprising that would target the West and the US primarily. For example Al-Shabaab in Somalia, a Jihadist group that is claimed to have pledged alliance to al-Qaeda in 2012, is described in US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as “coming from disparate clans, and susceptible to clan politics, internal divisions, and shifting alliances.”²³⁰ NCTC report also indicates that “most of [Al-Shabaab] fighters are predominantly interested in the nationalistic battle against the SFG and not supportive of global jihad.”²³¹ In this sense, it could be argued that bonds between different Jihadist groups that are affiliated show similarities with that of ethno-nationalist and ideological terrorist groups with Marxist-influenced common ideologies that existed during the Cold War. PLO and RAF, although having different aims, had collaborated under the umbrella of revolutionary Marxist ideas. However, PLO was a movement of nationalist struggle that aimed the liberation of Palestine while RAF had rather unattainable ideological goals such as a revolutionary upheaval and collapse of the West German government.²³² In this sense, Jihadist world view can be seen as the common ideology between different groups that eventually aim at the control of a local territory. With respect to this, it could be argued that the idea of establishing the global Islamic caliphate stands as a far aim that currently serves as a rhetorical and motivational tool. Establishment of power bases by JN and other similar Islamist militants in different parts of the world, thus, enhances the idea of a global Islamic caliphate by providing local territorial control over selected parts of the world. In short, local political gains of Jihadist groups, especially in areas of civil wars and turmoil, serves to the purpose of enhancing the “far aim” which is the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. This could be true. Jihadists that are battling on the areas

²³⁰ U.S. National Counterterrorism Center. Accessed July 9, 2015. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Law, 269.

of turmoil may still aim at establishing a global caliphate, however, current status of radical Islamist groups that are fighting for rather limited territorial control indicates that global caliphate serves as a “far aim” that is to be reached in a distant period of time. However, current realities on the ground do not rule out the fact that Jihadists, however limited and local their current goals are, are also motivated by the idea of a global Islamic rule.

Another example that indicates rather limited goals of JN, thus al-Qaeda in Syria, could be JN leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani’s statements during an interview with Al-Jazeera TV in 2015. In his interview, Julani stated that “Nusra Front doesn’t have any plans or directives to target the West. We received clear orders not to use Syria as a launching pad to attack the US or Europe in order not to sabotage the true mission against the regime.”²³³ An idea derived from this interview could be that JN clearly demonstrated clearly the aims for both itself and the al-Qaeda. In addition, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s orders to JN leadership clearly instructs that any terrorist activity against the West must have been stopped.²³⁴ Julani’s statements and Zawahiri’s orders regarding not targeting the West might seem temporary decisions that were taken in accordance with the situation in the battlefields of Syria. However, in the long run, it could be considered that al-Qaeda may still avoid targeting the West as it would want to preserve its territory, avoiding a possible Western intervention.

On the other hand, clash between the IS and al-Qaeda over the leadership of global Jihadi movement itself could represent a feature of old terrorism. Although both al-Qaeda and IS descend from the same ideology, recent conflict between the two Jihadist groups indicate that there is an ongoing political and territorial struggle between these groups. In this regard, an example of a somewhat similar political struggle can be found

²³³ “Nusra leader: Our mission is to defeat Syrian regime”. Al-Jazeera. 28 May 2015. Accessed July 9, 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/nusra-front-golani-assad-syria-hezbollah-isil-150528044857528.html>

²³⁴ Charles Lister. “An Internal Struggle: Al Qaeda’s Syrian Affiliate Is Grappling With Its Identity”. The World Post. 31 May 2015. Accessed July 9, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-lister/an-internal-struggle-al-q_b_7479730.html

in Palestine during 1980s and 1990s between Fatah and Hamas. Although context of Hamas and Fatah rivalry is starkly different, the political struggle to take over the leadership of Palestinian resistance shows similarities with that of IS and al-Qaeda with respect to political rivalry via conflict and propaganda.

Consequently, the localization of Jihadist groups, especially al-Qaeda, may represent a challenging idea against the argument of new terrorism which claims that the new terrorists are aiming at a global Islamic caliphate and that their goals, therefore apocalyptic. It is true that most of the Jihadist groups including the IS and al-Qaeda still aim at a global Islamic rule, however, realities on the ground suggest that this goal is rather rhetorical. Main reason that drives Jihadist groups forward appears to be political and territorial control over a certain proportion of land instead of direct targeting of the West and creation of an apocalyptic atmosphere via use of WMDs. However, this does not mean to argue that Jihadist groups do not seek to obtain WMDs anymore. Neither such groups gave up on targeting the West. Instead, it could be argued that Jihadist groups, especially al-Qaeda, focused on rather regional and/or local aims. Clashes or temporary alliances among Jihadist groups that control limited amount of territories in civil war zones also suggest that a political and logistical relationship instead of a shared Jihadist ideology between such groups appears to be dominant. A difference between the new terrorism idea and the actual aims of today's Jihadist terrorist groups may be the fact that Jihadist groups may no longer reach the US or its allies, initially identified as targets, therefore their activities would concentrate on the parts of the Muslim world where they have been able to establish their bases or hideouts.²³⁵ In this sense, it could be argued that Jihadist groups' inclusion into local conflicts in Muslim populated regions may have occurred due to two reasons. Firstly, failure to generate a global Jihadist upheaval may have triggered such decision. Referring to al-Qaeda's earlier objectives, Peter Holmes argued that

²³⁵ M. Saeed Khalid. "As Global Jihad Goes Local". The News International. July 09, 2014. Accessed July 9, 2015. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-260685-As-global-jihad-goes-local>

Because the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia could not be overthrown by force, al-Qaeda turned to the far enemy. What hit the United States on 11 September was not religion therefore. Instead, the 9/11 terrorists represented the *pooled insurgencies* of the Arab Middle East.²³⁶

Indeed, recent developments in zones of civil wars in Muslim populated countries suggest that Jihadist movements may have turned against the “near” enemy again as they did during the early period of Jihadist violence in 1970 – 1990 period. Secondly, it can be argued that Jihadist groups saw civil wars and instability in Muslim lands as an opportunity and thus preferred taking the battle into such territories as a struggle that confronted the West directly failed beforehand. The flow of foreign fighters to Jihadist groups from Western countries such as France, Belgium, Britain and etc. may also be an evidence to this fact.²³⁷ Potential members flowing from Europe could represent the idea that the global Jihad could not have been achieved as an objective in Europe and the West. Thus, the struggle would be continued on a local basis with contribution of radicals residing in the West. In this sense, contrary to the aims of terrorist groups specified in accordance with the concept of new terrorism, it could be argued that instead of having apocalyptic aims such as destroying the existing international system along with the Western Civilization, Jihadist groups, such as JN in Syria, maintain largely political goals that aim at control of territory in specific parts of the different countries that suffered from turmoil. In addition to this, although Jihadist ideology proposes a universal Jihad that aims at a global Islamic caliphate, it is observed that currently there are major conflicts emerged among relatively stronger Jihadist groups which would prevent such a unification among these groups. These conflicts appear to have roots within power relations and territorial disputes instead of ideological differences as observed in the case of al-Qaeda – IS split. Therefore, it could be argued

²³⁶ Holmes, 168, quoted in Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate Over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism”, 17.

²³⁷ “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria”. The Washington Post. Accessed, July 9, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html

that Jihadist groups also tend to compete among themselves for political and territorial control, similar to terrorist groups of the “old” terrorism era. In this regard, goals of Jihadist groups, especially recently, seem to be more rational and local instead of being apocalyptic and millenarian.

To conclude, this section concludes that al-Qaeda and its Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusra, appear to be aiming at primarily local and political goals especially with regards to the ongoing struggle in Syria. JN’s statements regarding establishment of a local Islamic state in Syria, with the condition that such a state would be founded upon a consensus reached with other opposition groups in the country suggests that the organization chooses to act rationally in Syria, avoiding an understanding of “total war” against other opposition groups. Moreover, JN leader Julani’s statements broadcasted in Al-Jazeera TV are also essential to understand that the al-Qaeda affiliate JN chose to pursue rather limited and rational goals such as establishing and then protecting a local power base in Syria. Julani’s statements regarding taking orders from al-Qaeda that instructed JN to not hit the United States of America as long as they do not interfere with al-Qaeda’s struggle in Syria is a firm example of a strategy change in al-Qaeda. Adding to these, as the US National Counterterrorism Center’s study suggests, motivations of other groups that previously pledged alliance to al-Qaeda such as al-Shaabab, indicate that al-Qaeda, as a radical Islamic terrorist organization, appears to be strengthening its global image via power bases established by its affiliates. However, as US NCTC report suggests, power bases established by groups such as al-Shaabab were founded upon local, political interests of such groups. As a result, it could be concluded that al-Qaeda’s image of a transnational radical Islamic terrorist organization apparently stems from the gains made by affiliate groups that rather pursue their own political and local interests as described by the US NCTC report on al-Shaabab. Lastly, the intricate relationships between several different jihadist groups in Syria indicates that local power struggles represent priorities among the aims of radical Islamist groups that appear in areas of turmoil. The competition between the JN and the Islamic State in Syria represents an example of such a competition. Moreover, this competition, later on, led to a larger competition between al-Qaeda and the IS, which has heavily political characteristics. Although both the IS

and al-Qaeda appear to be aiming at same type of goals, especially in a religious sense, the struggle between them appears to be political, especially when examining the fact that many groups in Syria, including the JN had lost a number of their members to IS due to defections.²³⁸

4.2.2 Indiscriminate Use of Violence and Increasing Lethality of Terrorist Attacks

Another important feature of the concept of “new terrorism” is considered as the lethality of terrorist attacks. Bruce Hoffman, one of the leading scholars with respect to the new terrorism debate, argued that new terrorism was far more lethal and indiscriminate compared to old, secular terrorism.²³⁹ Using the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, Hoffman concluded that within 1991 – 1996 period, 1996 was the year with most casualties as a result of terrorist attacks although number of terrorist attacks was the lowest during that year.²⁴⁰ Bruce Hoffman explained the increased lethality of terrorism via several reasons. Firstly, he claimed that terrorists thought that media attention was beginning to decline, therefore they chose to kill more people in order to regain attention and media coverage.²⁴¹ Secondly, Hoffman claimed that terrorists became more adept at killing as their weapons got smaller, more effective

²³⁸ See for example: Gianluca Mezzofiore, “Syria Isis News: 40 al-Qaida Nusra Fighters Defect to Islamic State with Enslaved Woman Given to Leader”. The International Business Times. October 21, 2014. Accessed August 4, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syria-isis-news-40-al-qaida-nusra-fighters-defect-islamic-state-enslaved-woman-given-leader-1471122>, Richard Spencer, “Leading Syrian rebels defect, dealing blow to fight against al-Qaeda”. The Telegraph. December 5, 2013. Accessed August 4, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10498477/Leading-Syrian-rebels-defect-dealing-blow-to-fight-against-al-Qaeda.html>

²³⁹ Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects*, 10-13.

²⁴⁰ Hoffman, 11-12.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

and sophisticated.²⁴² Thirdly, Hoffman argued that increased lethality of terrorism during 1990s had a connection with religious nature of terrorists. Suicide attacks, for instance, fall in the category of religiously motivated, therefore more lethal types of attacks.

Another argument regarding lethality of new terrorism, was that new terrorists were not concerned by public support. Bruce Hoffman argued in 1993 that religious terrorists considered themselves as in a state of “total war”, therefore they did execute terrorist attacks only for themselves.²⁴³ Parallel to Hoffman, Audrey Cronin argued that new terrorists did “dehumanize” their victims, which increased lethality of their attacks.²⁴⁴ Simon and Benjamin, on the other hand, argued religiously terrorism was in pursuit of mass casualty attacks.²⁴⁵ Similarly, Walter Laqueur argued that new terrorism became increasingly indiscriminate and no longer cared about propaganda.²⁴⁶ In light of these, it could be understood that scholars arguing for an increase in lethality of terrorist attacks agreed upon two reasons that caused an increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks. Firstly, in connection with the argument regarding the goals of new terrorists, it was claimed that religious motivation and apocalyptic aims played an important part in making terrorist groups more deadly after 1990s. Secondly, since these groups were motivated religiously, and were in a state of cosmic war with their enemies, target selection or killing for publicity was no longer the aim for the attacks.²⁴⁷ Instead, new

²⁴² Ibid., 14.

²⁴³ Bruce Hoffman, “Holy Terror: Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative” *RAND Corporation*, (1985), 3.

²⁴⁴ Audrey K. Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003), 41.

²⁴⁵ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 18 quoted in Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate Over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism, Center for International Security and Cooperation, (2007), 18.

²⁴⁶ Walter Laqueur, *No End to War*, (New York: Continuum, 2003), 9.

²⁴⁷ Mark Jurgensmeyer, “Understanding New Terrorism”, *Current History*, 99.636 (April 2000), 162.

terrorists opted to kill as much as they can in order to deal the enemy the maximum damage.

Critics of the new terrorism debate also argued against the idea of increased lethality in terrorism. Martha Crenshaw argued that the number of terrorist attacks and casualties due to those attacks could not be accepted as a completely “new” development as she thought that attacks conducted by groups with different motivations and objectives also resulted in mass casualties.²⁴⁸ While admitting that the 9/11 was the deadliest attack in history of terrorism, Crenshaw argues that “old” terrorists also conducted terrorist attacks indiscriminately.²⁴⁹ To support her argument, she provides examples of indiscriminate terrorist attacks that were conducted by terrorist groups with starkly different motivations such as the FLN’s Algiers bombings, Japanese Red Army’s Tel Aviv Airport bombing which killed 24 people, as well as Irgun’s bombing of King David Hotel in 1946 which resulted in deaths of 91 people.²⁵⁰ In addition to this, Alexander Spencer argued that;

Examples of ‘old terrorists’ causing many fatalities include the simultaneous truck bombings of US and French barracks in Lebanon in 1983, which killed a total of 367 people, the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, which took the life of 270, and the bombing of an Air India flight in 1985 by Sikh terrorists with 329 fatalities.²⁵¹

With respect to terror attacks prior to 9/11 that aimed at mass casualties, Cody Brown argue that terrorist acts such as Timothy McVeigh’s bomb attack in Oklahoma City or the Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack must be considered as “anomalies” rather than a new form of terrorism as she explains that mass casualty attacks (including suicide attacks)

²⁴⁸ Crenshaw, “*Debate Over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism*”, 20.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 20-21.

²⁵¹ Alexander Spencer, *Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism’*, 15.

do not represent a “new trend” in terrorism.²⁵² In addition to arguments regarding past existence of indiscriminate terrorism, Alexander Spencer claims that the increase in lethality of terrorist attacks might have occurred due to advances made in technology.²⁵³ Also, Spencer argues that terrorists also improved and transformed their selected methods of attack due to governments’ increasing efforts on countering the types of existing terrorist attacks prior to 1990s such as kidnaping, hijacking of airplanes, assassination of public figures alongside sabotages.²⁵⁴ In terms of use of the WMDs, Isabelle Duyvestein argues that Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack, alongside the spread of mails containing anthrax in US were made out of national sources and that there were no other examples of such attacks that include usage of WMDs by terrorists.²⁵⁵ Duyvestein argues that terrorists may seek to obtain and use WMDs, however, these two cases do not form a trend in terrorism with respect to use of WMDs by terrorist groups.²⁵⁶

In terms of target selection, Duyvestein challenges the suggested indiscriminate nature of terrorism by stating that the World Trade Center (which had been targeted twice by radical Islamists), had a symbolic value with respect to its symbolization of capitalist values.²⁵⁷ She also argues that targeting of selected individuals remain important with respect to terrorism, as she claims that one of the aims of the terrorists of 9/11 was the targeting of American President in the White House²⁵⁸. With respect to new terrorists’ behavior of “not claiming responsibility” for their attacks was challenged by Alexander

²⁵² Cody Brown, “The New Terrorism Debate,” *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 3&4 (Fall&Winter 2007), 40.

²⁵³ Spencer, 16-17.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 17.

²⁵⁵ Isabelle Duyvestein, *How New is the New Terrorism?*, 448.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

Spencer. Quoting Thomas Copeland, Spencer argued that “[the new terrorists] do not need to make public statements taking credit for an attack because their constituency is already aware of the actors and their cause”.²⁵⁹ Another example to this could be the July 2005 letter written by al-Qaeda’s second in charge, Ayman al-Zawahiri, which was sent to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was responsible of al-Qaeda in Iraq during the time being. Martha Crenshaw argued that Zawahiri, in his letter, strongly urged Zarqawi regarding the targeting of Shiite mosques and that Shiite popular support was necessary for al-Qaeda.²⁶⁰

Consequently, it is understood that the increase in number of fatalities as results of terrorist attacks following the start of 1990s could be explained with several different factors that are put forward by both proponents and critics of new terrorism concept. First of all, religious nature of the new terrorism and understanding of a cosmic war between terrorists and their targets may have seriously contributed to the increase in number of fatalities in terrorist attacks. On the other hand, there are many other examples of mass casualty terrorism, where similar numbers of people lost their lives as result of terrorist attacks conducted by terrorist groups that had different aims and motivations.²⁶¹ However, al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks represent an exception as it is the deadliest terrorist attack in the history of terrorism with nearly 3000 deaths. Considering that the new terrorism concept emerged in early 1990s, it is understood that critics of new terrorism concept consider 9/11 as an exception and argue that the recent increase in fatality of terrorist attacks is rather a result of technological developments and opportunities that arose with the emergence of globalization.

²⁵⁹ Thomas Copeland, “Is the New Terrorism Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for

Terrorism”, *Journal of Conflict Studies* 21, No. 2, (2001), 101 quoted in Alexander Spencer, “Questioning the Concept of New Terrorism,” *Peace Conflict & Development*, no.8 (January 2006), 17.

²⁶⁰ Crenshaw, 23.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 21-22.

4.2.3 Change in the Organizational Structure of Terrorist Groups

One of the most important characteristics of new terrorism is considered as the unique structure of terrorist groups that are unlike previous terrorist groups with respect to their flat, network type structures. In this regard, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon argue that “Jihadist” groups maintain a network type, loose hierarchy among themselves in order to have better operational capacity.²⁶² In addition, Simon and Benjamin note that;

Members of bin Laden’s al Qa’ida operate self-sufficiently to a degree, although it is known that they communicate with the leadership in Afghanistan and with each other, combining elements of a ‘hub and spoke’ structure (where nodes communicate with the centre) with a ‘wheel’ structure (where nodes in the network communicate with each other without reference to the centre).²⁶³

In addition to Simon and Benjamin, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini argue that “the information revolution is favoring and strengthening network forms of organization, often giving them an advantage over hierarchical forms.”²⁶⁴ Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini also coin the term “netwar” which they described as;

An emerging mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, involving measures of short traditional war, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.²⁶⁵

Another, striking aspect of network type of organization of new terrorists was mainly pointed out as the fact that network structures enabled smaller groups or “cells” a certain

²⁶² Steven Simon & Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism”, *Survival* 42, No. 1, (2000), 69.

²⁶³ Simon & Benjamin, 70.

²⁶⁴ John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al., MR-989-AF (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999), 45.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

amount of local autonomy over their operations. In this regard, Peter Neumann claims that cell system “preserves the group’s hierarchy, except for making it less visible to outsiders and the foot soldiers at its bottom”.²⁶⁶ It is argued that this type of organization system is almost leaderless with little to no hierarchy.²⁶⁷ Neumann also argued that “in most networks, there exists a nominal leadership that provides inspiration, justification and guidance, and is in some way connected to the wider movement.”²⁶⁸ Neumann’s description here reflects some aspects of al-Qaeda’s organization as what he meant by nominal leadership was the role of al-Qaeda high command during Bin Laden’s leadership. Arguably, same sort of leadership mechanism still applies.

With respect to al-Qaeda’s organization and recruitment methods, Audrey Cronin argued that the group almost never “tapped” random individuals for membership or recruitment. Instead, she claims that al-Qaeda taps social bonds within Muslims in order to recruit more people for their operations.²⁶⁹ The significance of new terrorists’ “network” type of structure is perhaps sourced out of the difficulties in tracing back the terrorists. Cronin describes this situation by stating that “some operatives have been connected to al-Qaeda and its agenda in an indirect or informal way, having neither gone to al-Qaeda camps nor had much formal training.”²⁷⁰ It could be argued that this type of a structure is formed out of social, economic and cultural problems that lie in the heart of the problems of Muslim population in the world. In this regard, Fawaz A. Gerges argues that “there exists a deep structural crisis in socioeconomic and political-institutional terms that generates and produces this alarming gut reaction in Muslim countries.”²⁷¹ Gerges

²⁶⁶ Neumann, 18.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Neumann, 20.

²⁶⁹ Audrey K. Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 172.

²⁷⁰ Cronin, 172-173.

²⁷¹ Fawaz A. Gerges *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 245.

describes the critical factors as to why people join or support al-Qaeda as “gut reactions”. Therefore, it is sensible to summarize that proponents of new terrorism argued for the emergence of a new, network type of structure in terrorist groups, especially among religiously motivated terrorists, which is mainly due to developments in information technologies, as well as the effect of the religious cause that pushed people to membership to cells that operate within the terrorist groups.

On the other hand, critics of new terrorism concept opposed to describing network type structure as a new trend in terrorism. Similar to criticism of other aspects of new terrorism, historical examples of similar type of structures among past terror organizations were proposed as evidence by critics of new terrorism concept. Alexander Spencer argued that structure of PLO under Fatah’s leadership represented an example of network type of organization where Fatah was the dominant faction while PLO represented an umbrella organization.²⁷² Meanwhile, Martha Crenshaw argued that al-Qaeda’s network type structure is unique and does not apply to other religiously motivated terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas or Egyptian Islamic Jihad.²⁷³ Similar to Crenshaw and Spencer, Tucker also noted that past terrorist organizations had similar features to new terrorists with respect to organizational structures as he concluded that the RAF in West Germany was “not hierarchical at all”.²⁷⁴ Tucker also added that “the RAF spawned second and third generations haphazardly and remained more a collection of terrorists sharing a common purpose than a hierarchical organization.”²⁷⁵ In his article, Renate Mayntz argued that there exists a false dichotomy between “the “old” hierarchical and the “new” network-like organizational form,

²⁷² Spencer, 23.

²⁷³ Crenshaw, 27.

²⁷⁴ David Tucker, “What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, (2001), 3.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

furnishing scholars with a more differentiated set of analytical categories.”²⁷⁶

Furthermore, Mayntz also argued that;

Ideologically based identification, latent relations, and effective control through generally formulated organizational goals constitute a particular mode of governance, found especially in the “new” transnational terrorism, but present as well in national terrorist organizations.²⁷⁷

Consequently, it is understood that the effects of globalization, improvements in communication technologies and religious inspirations seem to have created a new structural organization type among terrorist groups. Although proponents of new terrorism idea describe this as a new trend in terrorism, critics of new terrorism debate, by referring to past terrorist organizations such as PLO, Russian Anarchists or the RAF, argue that such type of organizational structure cannot be considered as a completely new trend in terrorism studies. In this regard, before deciding whether there is a new, network type of structure among terrorist groups, it is important to stress the fact that al-Qaeda is more of a movement that contains anti-global sentiments that particularly targeted the United States. In this sense, as stated in previous sections, Olivier Roy and John Gray’s description of radical Jihadists as groups who maintain pseudo-Marxist explanations represent an important element as to why al-Qaeda has a network of supporters and “members” that operate relatively autonomously compared to that of old terrorists. In this regard, the social, economic and cultural reasons that paved the way for emergence of radical Islamist movements must be centered in efforts to understand and discuss network type structure of the new terrorism. Therefore, it is arguable that al-Qaeda and its affiliates benefited both from technological advances and the global nature of their cause that arose from anti-global sentiments with respect to creating an almost “leaderless” terrorist organization that had the potential to operate almost anywhere in the world.

²⁷⁶ Renate Mayntz, “Organizational Forms of Terrorism – Hierarchy, Network, or a Type sui generis?”, *MPIfG Discussion Papers*, (2004), 14.

²⁷⁷ Mayntz, 15.

4.3 Criticism of the New Terrorism Concept With Respect to its Policy Implications

Critics of new terrorism argued that the concept of new terrorism paved way for fundamental political changes in international system such as the emergence of Global War on Terrorism which resulted in creation of an identity of enemy for the constituents of the countries that are combating the new form of terrorism.²⁷⁸ Münevver Cebeci argued that new terrorism concept contributed to “deconstruction of classical conception of war and reconstruction of the enemy”.²⁷⁹ Cody Brown suggested that “the new terrorism creates little room for there to be political solutions to conflicts that involve terrorism.”²⁸⁰ Brown argued that “the reasons for this are of course the theory’s confirmation that the terrorists are not concerned with matters of the political or structural.”²⁸¹ Similarly, Anthony Field noted that;

The concept of ‘new terrorism’ has gained wide currency in recent years because it has suited governments and political leaders for the purposes of political communication and the legitimatization of counter-terrorism policies. It has often been used instrumentally to justify the severity of the terrorist threat to a skeptical audience.²⁸²

Furthermore, Alexander Spencer mentioned that “many of the policies can be directly attributed to some of the supposed features of ‘new terrorism’.”²⁸³ To support this argument, Spencer claimed that “the invasion of Iraq, which was considered to have

²⁷⁸ Crenshaw, 28.

²⁷⁹ Münevver Cebeci, “Defining the “New Terrorism”: Reconstruction of the Enemy in the Global Risk Society,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 8, no.32 (Winter 2012), 45.

²⁸⁰ Brown, 42.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Anthony Field, “The ‘new terrorism’: Revolution or evolution?” *Political Studies Review* 7, no.2 (2009), 205.

²⁸³ Spencer, 26.

WMDs, can be interpreted as a counter-terrorism measure aimed at preventing ‘new terrorists’ from obtaining and using WMDs.”²⁸⁴

Overall, it is understood that critical approach towards the concept of new terrorism is mainly focused on its policy implications. It was argued that categorizing terrorism after 1990s as a completely “new” phenomenon could have paved the way for the strategies that led to the United States’ policy of “Global War on Terrorism”, which has been criticized ever since it was implemented due to its controversial results in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is feared that perception of terrorism of today as a completely “new” phenomenon would eventually enable politicians to take harsher measures against terrorism, especially in the Middle East, which would prevent possible negotiations for establishment of peace. Furthermore Crenshaw argues that “defining groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations with whom the United States cannot negotiate saves policy makers from having to cope with the troublesome problem of how to deal successfully with hostile but democratically-elected nonstate actors.”²⁸⁵ This argument leads to the idea that defining new terrorists in a completely new framework also contributed to the continuation of existing political problems that occurred in the Middle East at the beginning of the 20th century. According to critics of new terrorism, especially considering Crenshaw’s perspective on policy implications of new terrorism, it is understood that new terrorism is served as a policy tool in order to maintain the status quo.

4.4 Conclusion

The new terrorism concept is still appealing to an extent, as radical Islamist terrorism continues to gain ground in the Middle East and to expand towards Africa and South Asia. In this respect, it is important to discuss and understand how proponents of new

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Crenshaw, 29-30.

terrorism concept argue that a change in terrorism occurred after 1990s. The question regarding whether there is a change or a continuity in terrorism is an important one so as to countering terrorism. In this sense, this chapter analyzed the concept of new terrorism through the study of its three main characteristics. In addition, the idea of new terrorism being apocalyptic and unnegotiable due to religiously motivated fanaticism was challenged with the example of al-Qaeda's Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. It was argued that al-Qaeda, which was the most important group that was described as a unique example of new terrorism, had rather limited political goals that aimed at political control of a limited territory in a certain part of the world instead of pursuing destruction of the existing international system. Main argument here was that groups like al-Qaeda pursued local, limited territorial gains in different parts of the world, which was similar to the objectives pursued by "old" terrorists. It was also argued that Al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups' discourse about the destruction of the Western civilization was rather rhetorical and that such discourse served as a propaganda element. In addition, new terrorism concept was also analyzed with respect to the ideas that new terrorists were uniquely organized via using a network type of model and that the new terrorism was rather indiscriminate and far more lethal compared to old terrorism. Criticism against characteristics of new terrorism, which led to the "new terrorism debate", were also described in this chapter in order to better understand the academic debate on the subject. Critics of the new terrorism concept mainly argued that historical examples of past terrorism cases do not indicate to a fundamental change in terrorism. A comparison of cases of terrorism from the past with the terrorism cases that appeared after 1990s were made by the critics of new terrorism concept in order to prove that proposed characteristics of new terrorism are not fundamentally new, as there were examples of similar terrorist groups in the past with respect to being indiscriminate, religiously motivated and having a flat, network type organizational structure. Lastly, a critical response to the political implications of the concept of new terrorism was mentioned, in order to analyze the idea that the new terrorism was providing a ground for harsher counter-terrorism measures by reconstructing the image of enemy. Apart from the academic debate regarding its characteristics, new terrorism concept was mainly

criticized due to being an obstacle for solving political problems that led to terrorism especially in the Middle East.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the concept of terrorism was examined as a political form of violence. It was concluded that terrorism, throughout the history, has been subject to a continuous transformation with regards to its tactics, organizational structures, recruitment methods and etc. However, the political nature of terrorism remained the same regardless of a terrorist group's motivation. This is to say that throughout the history, there appeared a number of terrorist groups with different types of motivations such as religion, ideology, ethnicity and nationalism. However, a common point between such terrorist groups with different motivations has been the fact that their aims were ultimately political and that these groups, whether limited or global, sought a change in the existing political structure in a local or global level. Thus, however different and amorphous they appear with respect to their aims, common point among Jihadist terrorist organizations and "old" and "secular" terrorist organizations with different ethnic or ideological motivations is that they've aimed at political gains and control of territory and power in certain parts of the world. From this perspective, the concept of "new terrorism" that emerged with the beginning of 1990s which argued for a fundamental change in terrorism with respect to its aims, target selection and organizational structure was analyzed in this thesis. In this thesis, it is concluded that terrorism, as a form of political violence, has been employed as a tactic of the weak against the powerful in order to achieve political objectives. Therefore, in this thesis, terrorism was considered as a form of conflict that is characterized by the power balance between the actors that struggle for political power. Thus, in some cases, it was analyzed that stronger groups, such as governments, also employed terrorist tactics in order to protect a political status quo and suppress opposing views. Therefore, it is concluded that religiously motivated terrorist groups, however apocalyptic their agenda may seem, also pursue political goals via employing terrorist tactics.

In this sense, the concept of new terrorism was analyzed in this thesis especially with respect to its emphasis on revolutionary changes that occurred in aims of terrorist groups, especially the radical Islamist terrorist organizations that appeared after 1990s. The idea that radical Islamic terrorist movements, unlike secular, nationalist and / or ideological terrorist groups of the Cold War era, were aiming at a “total war” against the West and thus their aims were unclear, apocalyptic and unnegotiable was tried to be challenged in this thesis via the example of al-Qaeda and its Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusra. In this regard it is understood that contrary to the argument regarding new, religiously motivated terrorism had apocalyptic and unnegotiable goals, the emergence of Jabhat al-Nusra as al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch indicates that radical Islamist terrorism, similar to terrorism before 1990s, aims at local, territorial and political control over a certain territory. Similarly, local and global competition between various different Jihadist groups also suggest that these groups had primarily political goals that aimed at seizing control of a certain, specific territory although they are religiously motivated. However, this does not mean that radical Islamist terrorism is purely political. In this sense, it was shown that although new terrorism concept argues that new, religiously motivated terrorists sought destruction of the international system and thus were unnegotiable, actions of radical Islamist terrorist groups in the Middle East especially after 2011 indicate that these groups, similar to terrorist groups that existed before 1990s, had primarily political goals that contain local territorial interests.

This thesis concluded that the idea that terrorism is a political form of violence, thus, terrorism’s aims will continue to remain political although religion, ethnicity, nationalism and ideological beliefs emerge as different sources of motivations. The concept of new terrorism, in this sense, is the result of changes in methods, tactics and capacity of terrorist movements although these changes are not considered as adequate in order to be able to speak of a fundamentally new form of terrorism as critics of new terrorism concept argued. In addition, this thesis argued that targeting of the West by radical Islamic terrorist organizations did not actually represent radical Islamist terrorism’s actual goals. Instead, it is claimed that radical Islamist terrorism, similar to the “old”, “secular” forms of terrorism, had more concrete aims on the ground such as

establishment of local states within Sunni populated territories with a lack of authority. In this regard, Jabhat al-Nusra's formulation and activities in Syria as a radical Islamist terrorist group operating under the umbrella of al-Qaeda provides an important evidence as to how and why radical Islamist terrorist organizations tend to localize their targets in the Middle East after the start of the Arab Uprisings in 2011.

Consequently, this thesis aims to contribute to the terrorism studies from the perspective of new terrorism debate. Definition of terrorism as a political form of violence, alongside determining whether or not terrorism became a subject of revolutionary changes after 1990s are of paramount importance with regards to analyzing and better implementing counter-terrorism strategies that would effectively decrease terrorism's lethality if not successfully bring an end to it.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY

YENİ TERÖRİZM TARTIŞMASI: TERÖR ÖRGÜTLERİNİN AMAÇLARINDA DEĞİŞİM VE DEVAMLILIK

Bu tezde, terörizmin 1990’lardan itibaren amaçsal olarak yeni ve devrimsel nitelikler kazanıp kazanmadığı sorusu, terörizmin siyasal bir şiddet biçimi olarak kavramsallaştırılması ve tarihsel süreç boyunca geçirdiği değişimlerin ele alınması doğrultusunda incelenmiştir. Bu tez, terörizmin 1990’lardan itibaren amaçsal, organizasyonel ve öldürücü gibi faktörler bakımından yeni ve daha önce görülmemiş devrimsel özellikler taşıyıp taşımadığı sorusunu üç ana başlık altında incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda ilk olarak literatürdeki mevcut terörizm tanımları incelenmiş ve terörizm siyasal bir şiddet biçimi olarak ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. İkincil olarak, terörizmin tarihsel süreç boyunca geçirdiği değişim ve dönüşüm, farklı dini, etnik ve ideolojik terör grupları ele alınarak incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Son olarak, terörizmin 1990’lardan itibaren devrimsel ve daha önce görülmemiş nitelikler kazandığını öngören yeni terörizm kavramı, terörizmin değişen amaçları, artan ölümcüllüğü ve devrimsel olarak değişen organizasyonel yapısı bağlamında, eleştirel görüşler de ele alınarak, incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, 1990’lardan itibaren faaliyetlerini artıran İslamcı terör örgütlerinin dini, kıyametçi ve uzlaşamaz amaçları olup olmadığı sorusu, radikal İslamcı El-Kaide terör örgütü ve onun Suriye’de 2011’den beri faaliyet göstermekte olan El-Nusra Cephesi isimli kolunun Suriye’de sağlamaya çalıştığı bölgesel kontrol incelenerek cevaplandırılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Terörizmin tarihsel süreç boyunca geçirdiği değişim ve dönüşümler çeşitli akademik tartışmalara gerekçe oluşturmakla birlikte, kimi yazarlar terörizmin belirli dönemlerde

belirli evrimleşme süreçlerine tabi olduğunu belirtirken, kimi akademisyenler ise bu değişimlerin devrimsel nitelik taşıdığı belli başlı tarihsel dönemlere vurgu yapmaktadırlar. Bu bağlamda yeni terörizm tartışmasının eksenini, terörizmde bir devamlılık mı yoksa değişim mi olduğu tartışmasına temas etmektedir.

Bu tezde, terörizmin özellikle 1990’lardan sonra radikal İslamcı terörist grupların etkinliğini artırmasıyla birlikte devrimsel nitelikler taşıyacak şekilde belli başlı değişimler geçirip geçirmediği sorusu cevaplandırılmıştır. Bu bağlamda öncelikle terörizmin tanımı konusundaki mevcut çalışmalar ve tartışmalar incelenmiş, terörün sebepleri, uluslararası hukuktaki yeri ve akademik anlamda terörün tanımına yönelik çalışmalar analiz edilmiştir. Bu tezde kullanılması planlanan terörizm tanımının seçilmesinden önce farklı terör tanımlarının bir kıyaslaması yapılmış ve terörizmin akademik olarak tanımlanmasında en sık kullanılan elementlerin bir listesine yer verilmiştir. Hem bu listeden hareketle, hem de Bruce Hoffman, Alex P. Schmid, James M. Lutz, Brenda J. Lutz, Boaz Ganor, Carsten Bockstette, Neil J. Smelser gibi akademisyenlerin terör tanımlarının incelenmesinin akabinde, mevcut terörizm tanımlarının içerdiği belirli bazı kavramların, terör olgusunun evrensel olarak kabul edilebilecek bir tanıma kavuşması açısından problemler doğurabileceği tespit edilmiştir. Bazı terör tanımları “sivillerin hedef alınması” koşulunu öne sürerken, diğer terör tanımları bir saldırının terör eylemi özelliği taşıması için mutlaka “bir organizasyonel hiyerarşiye sahip” ve “gizlilik içinde faaliyet yürüten” gruplar tarafından gerçekleştirilmiş olması gibi koşullar öne sürmüştür. Alex P. Schmid ve Albert J. Jongman’ın 109 terör tanımını inceleyerek oluşturduğu, terör tanımlarında en sık kullanılan elementlerin listelendiği tablo incelendiğinde, terörün tanımında en çok kullanılan kavramların sırasıyla “Şiddet”, “Siyasal”, “Korku” ve “Tehdit” olduğu görülmüştür. Bu bağlamda, terörün siyasal bir şiddet biçimi olduğunu vurgulayan ve diğer tartışmalı kavramlardan arındırılmış, sade bir terör tanımı teşkil etmesi bakımından bu tezde Anthony Richards’ın terörizm tanımı esas alınmıştır. Anthony Richards’ın tanımına göre terörizm “siyasal bir amaçla, saldırı için seçilen yakın hedefler veya kitlelerin ötesindeki daha geniş kitlelerde psikolojik bir etki oluşturmak amacıyla şiddet uygulanması veya şiddet tehdidinde bulunulması” eylemidir. Richards’ın tanımı,

terörizmi siyasal amaçlar güden ve hedef seçtiği kitlenin ötesinde, daha geniş bir toplulukta belirli bir psikoloji etki yaratmayı amaçlayan bir tür şiddet biçimi olarak tanımlamaktadır.

Terörizm, uluslararası hukuk bağlamında da üzerinde uzlaşmış herhangi bir tanıma sahip değildir. Terörizm kavramı, halihazırda fazlasıyla politik nitelikler taşıdığı için, devletler arasında gerek BM gerekse diğer uluslararası örgütler seviyesinde evrensel ve uluslararası hukuka uygun bir tanım yapılamamaktadır. Bunun ana sebebi, devletler arasında çeşitli alanlarda sürmekte olan siyasal rekabetin terörizmin tanımına engel oluşturmasıdır. Terörizm olarak tanımlanan bazı silahlı mücadeleler, başka birtakım ülkelerde “özgürlük” veya “bağımsızlık” mücadeleleri olarak kabul edilmekte, hatta yer yer destek görmektedir. Bu anlamda evrensel bir terör tanımı yapılması, bazı ülkeleri teröre destek veren ülkeler konumuna getirme riski taşıdığı için, Birleşmiş Milletler nezdinde mümkün olmamaktadır. Eva Herschinger, bu sorunu aşmak için terörizmin uluslararası hukukta bir taktik olarak tanımlanmasını, bu şekilde kavramın siyasal boyutundan bir nebze de olsa arındırılarak uluslararası hukukta bir suç biçimi olarak konumlandırılmasını önermektedir. Fakat terörizm, özellikle 20. Yüzyıldan itibaren olumsuz intiba uyandıran bir kavram olduğu için, bu siyasal niteliklerinden arındırılması mümkün görünmemektedir.

Terörizmin akademik ve hukuksal anlamda ortak bir tanıma kavuşturulamamasının altında yatan en büyük sebeplerden biri de, terörizmin ortaya çıkış sebeplerinin çeşitliliği ve bu sebeplerin terörizmin tarafları açısından farklı algılanmasıdır. Bu bakımdan terörizmin dünyanın çeşitli bölgelerinde ortaya çıkış sebepleri, kavramın nasıl geliştiğine ilişkin bilgi edinmek açısından önem arz etmektedir. Ayrıca, terörizmin siyasal hedefler güttüğü ve bu hedefler için farklı sorun bölgelerinde farklı sosyal ve kültürel problemlerden istifade ettiği olgusu da, terörizmin dünya üzerinde tezahür ettiği vakaların sebepleri incelenerek anlaşılabilir. Bu bağlamda James M. Lutz ve Brenda J. Lutz, toplum içerisinde siyasal talep ve şikayetleri olan grupların, yeterli güç kapasitesinde olmadıkları için bu sorunları müzakere edilebilir noktaya getirmek üzere terörü bir yöntem olarak kullandığını belirtmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında terörizm,

zayıfın güçlüye karşı dengeyi sağlamak için kullandığı asimetrik bir mücadele biçimi olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Fakat bu her durumda geçerli değildir. Örneğin devletlerin kendi vatandaşlarına veya diğer ülkelerin vatandaşlarına karşı uyguladığı siyasal şiddet de, Richards'ın tanımına da uygun olarak, terörizm olarak kabul edilebilir. Bu bağlamda terörizmin siyasal bir şiddet biçimi olarak değerlendirilmesinin önemi bir kez daha ortaya çıkmaktadır. Siyasal amaçlarla belirli kitlelere karşı şiddet uygulanması veya bu kitlelerin şiddetle tehdit edilmesi, sadece güçsüz aktörlerin güçlü aktörlere karşı uyguladığı bir yöntem değildir. Aynı şekilde devletlerin de terörist yöntemlere başvurarak meşruiyetlerini koruma ve güç temerküzlerini sağlamaya teşebbüs ettikleri görülmüştür.

Terörizm antik zamanlardan beri dünyada çeşitli şekillerde, çeşitli coğrafyalarda ortaya çıkmakta olan, fakat nihai kertede siyasal problemlerden kaynaklanan bir şiddet biçimidir. Terörün oluşumunda belirgin pay sahibi olan kavramlar ise genellikle yoksulluk, ekonomik küreselleşme, modernizasyon, din, etnik ayrımcılık, savaşlar ve iç savaşlar olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Martha Crenshaw'a göre, ekonomik küreselleşme ve yoksulluk terörizmin ortaya çıkışında önemli faktörler arz etseler de, terörün ana sebeplerini oluşturmamaktadırlar. Bu bağlamda yoksulluk ve ekonomik küreselleşme gibi faktörlerin, aslında siyasal temelleri olan belli bazı toplumsal problemlerin ortaya çıkışında hızlandırıcı rol oynadığı söylenebilir. Stanley Hoffmann'a göre ekonomik küreselleşme, devletler arasında ve içerisinde ekonomik eşitsizliği artırmış ve bu sayede politik problemlerin ortaya çıkışını hızlandırmıştır.

Küreselleşmenin Soğuk Savaş'ın bitiminden sonra hızını artırması ve modernite olgusunun dünyaya yayılması, kültürel ve dini açıdan dünyanın belirli bölgelerinde reaksiyoner yaklaşımlarla karşılaşmıştır. James Lutz'a göre devletler ve toplumlar arasındaki bağların ve kültürel etkileşimin yayılması, belirli kitlelerin kendilerini, dini inançlarını ve kültürlerini başka kültürlerin baskısı altında hissetmeleri duygusuna neden olmuştur. Buna göre küreselleşme ve serbest piyasa ekonomisi gibi Batı'da yaygın olan olguların Soğuk Savaş'ın bitiminden sonra Asya ve Orta Doğu'ya hızla yayılması, Müslümanlar ve diğer toplumlarda kültürel bir Haçlı Seferi algısı yaratmıştır. Bu tip

küreselleşme ve kapitalizm karşıtı tepkiler, radikal İslamcı terör gruplarının yanı sıra, Soğuk Savaş döneminde de varlığını sürdüren ideolojik, sol ve / veya marksist görüşlü terör gruplarında da yaygındır. Bu anlamda Olivier Roy, John Gray gibi akademisyenlerin de bahsettiği gibi, anti kapitalist, aşırı solcu terör grupları ile radikal İslamcı terör grupları bir noktada aynı düşmana karşı benzer tepkiler göstermektedirler.

Etnik ayrımcılık, azınlık hakları ve bağımsızlık mücadeleleri, terörizmin en yaygın ve halen etkisini sürdürmekte olan sebeplerinden bazılarıdır. İrlanda'da İRA, Türkiye'de PKK, İspanya'da ETA, Sri Lanka'da Tamil Kaplanları ve Filistin'de Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü, önde gelen etnik terör örnekleri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Etnik terörizmin temel sebebi, belirli bölgelerde yaşayan ve çoğunukla azınlık konumunda bulunan etnik grupların özerklik, bağımsızlık gibi taleplerini içeren siyasal amaçlardır. Bu anlamda terörün siyasal bir şiddet biçimi olarak ortaya çıktığı en belirgin tür, etnik/milliyetçi terörizmdir.

Dini referanslı terörizm; terörizmin tanımlanması, yeni ve eski terörizm gibi kavramların karşılaştırılması açısından en önemli örneği teşkil eden terörizm biçimidir. Yeni terörizm kavramını ortaya atan Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur, Steven Simon, Daniel Benjamin, Brian Jenkins gibi akademisyenler, İslami referanslı terör örgütlerini, daha önce tarihte görülen ideolojik, etnik, anarşik terör gruplarından kesin bir çizgiyle ayırmaktadırlar. Bu tezde ise din, terörizmin siyasal bir şiddet biçimi olarak ortaya çıkışında motivasyonel olarak kullanılan bir etken olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda Hamas'ın Filistin'deki bağımsızlık mücadelesinde FKÖ'ye karşı dini referansla ön plana çıkması bu fikre bir örnek olarak sunulmaktadır. İleriki bölümlerde de inceleneceği gibi, bu tezin ana fikrini dini motivasyonlu terör örgütlerinin, diğer terör örgütlerine benzer şekilde aslında sınırları belli olan siyasi amaçlar gütmesi fikri oluşturmaktadır.

Terörizmin ortaya çıkış biçimlerinden bir diğeri ise, savaş ve iç savaş bölgelerindeki otorite eksikliğidir. Terör örgütlerinin, istikrardan yoksun savaş ve iç savaş bölgelerini mücadele alanları olarak seçmelerinin en temel sebebi, bu bölgelerdeki güvenlik ve istihbarat zaafiyetleridir. Aynı zamanda başka devletlerin savaşlar ve iç savaşlara çeşitli

yollarla müdahil olmaları, bu bölgelerde oluşan terör gruplarının silahlanması, organize olması ve yeni üye bulmalarının önünü açmaktadır. Bu bağlamda 2011’de başlayan Arap ayaklanmalarının olduğu Libya, Mısır, Suriye gibi bölgelerde radikal İslamcı terör gruplarının oluşması, iç savaş ve savaş ortamlarının terörizme zemin hazırlamasına örnek teşkil etmektedir.

Sonuç olarak terörizm halen üzerinde akademik ve hukuksal anlamda mutabakata varılamayan, tartışmalı bir kavram teşkil etmektedir. Bu kavramın tartışmalı olmasının temel sebebi, kavramın özellikle 20. Yüzyıldan itibaren kötüleyici ve illegal bir şiddet biçimi olarak nitelendirilmesidir. Bunun yanı sıra, terörizm siyasal amaçlar içerdiği için, bu siyasal amaçların tartışılması da terörizmin kendisinin meşruiyetini tartışma zeminine açmaktadır. Bir silahlı grup dünyanın bir bölgesinde terörist olarak algılanıp yargılanırken, diğer bölgelerde özgürlük savaşçıları olarak kabul edilmektedir. Aradaki bu ayrım ise, konuya farklı siyasi çıkar perspektiflerinden bakan grupların yaklaşımlarından kaynaklanmaktadır.

Aynı şekilde uluslararası hukuk kapsamında da terörizmin BM ve diğer uluslararası örgütler nezdinde ortak olarak kabul edilmiş bir tanımı bulunmamaktadır. Bunun yerine BM, terörizmin çeşitli suçlar için kullandığı taktiklerini, 14 farklı konvansiyon kapsamında tanımlamıştır. Bahsi geçen suç konularına ilişkin konvansiyonlar, teröristlerin hedef ve muhtemel hedeflerine karşı yürüttüğü saldırı tiplerini baz almaktadır.

Terörizmin tanımının tartışmalı bir konu hale gelmesinin bir diğer sebebi de, kavramın sebeplerinin dünyanın farklı bölgelerinde, farklı motivasyonel faktörler altında aranmasıdır. Yoksulluk, küreselleşme, din, etnik kimlik, iç savaş ve savaş gibi farklı faktörler, aslında siyasal amaçlar için şiddet kullanan grupların amaçsal olarak birbirinden farklı olduğu algısına sebep olmakta, bu algı da sonuç itibarıyla farklı terör vakalarının farklı olark değerlendirilmesine yol açmaktadır. Yeni terörizm kavramının amaçsal olarak incelenmesi, ve yeni ve eski terörizmin birbirinden ayırt edilmesi maksadıyla bu tezde Anthony Richards’ın terörizm tanımı esas alınmıştır. Buna göre “terörizm siyasal bir amaçla, saldırı için seçilen yakın hedefler veya kitlelerin ötesindeki

daha geniş kitlelerde psikolojik bir etki oluşturmak amacıyla şiddet uygulanması veya şiddet tehdidinde bulunulması eylemidir.”

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde, antik çağlardan günümüze kadar geçen dönemde meydana çıkmış, birbirinden farklı motivasyonlara sahip belirli terör örgütlerinin kısa incelemeleri yer almaktadır. Burada yapılan incelemelerin amacı, tarihin farklı periyodlarında, farklı motivasyonlarla ortaya çıkan farklı terör gruplarının, Richards’ın tanımına göre temelde nihai olraak siyasal ve sınırlı olan amaçlar taşıyıp taşımadığı incelenmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, bu örgütlerin incelenmesi üzerinden, terörizm amaçları, yöntemleri ve organizasyonel yapısında tarih boyunca bir değişiklik mi yoksa devamlılık mı olduğu sorusu yanıtlandırılmıştır.

Terörizm, insanlık tarihinde etkisini 20. Yüzyıldan sonra artırdığı düşünülen bir siyasal şiddet biçimi olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Fakat Walter Laqueur’un da belirttiği gibi, terörizm aslında insanlık tarihi ile paralel şekilde var olan bir şiddet türüdür. Ulus devlet, uluslararası hukuk ve uluslararası sistem gibi yapıların henüz oluşmadığı antik ve orta çağlarda da terörizm varlığını sürdürmüştür. 20. Yüzyılda terörizmin daha yoğun tezahürünün sebebi, demokratik sistemlerin yaygınlaşması ve bu sistemlerin terörizme karşı faşist ve otoriter sistemlere göre daha fazla alan bırakması olarak düşünülmektedir.

Roma İmparatorluğu döneminde Filistin topraklarında ortaya çıkan Yahudi radikaller, antik dönem terörizmine önemli bir örnek teşkil etmektedirler. Yahudilerin Roma İmparatorluğu’nu Filistin topraklarından çıkarmak için uyguladığı suikast tipi saldırılar, antik çağlarda da terörizmin kullanıldığına işaret etmektedir. Yahudi aşırı dinci suikastçiler, gün ortasında ve kalabalık yerlerde Romalı askerleri hançerleyerek, halka ve Romalı askerlere siyasi mesajlarını iletme yöntemini seçmişlerdir. Bu tarz saldırıların bir diğer amacı ise, Roma İmparatorluğu’nu Yahudilere karşı aşırı tepki vermeye sevk ederek Yahudi toplumunda Roma karşıtı bir ayaklanma çıkarma hedefidir. Nihayetinde Yahudi aşırı dinci gruplar bu suikastler sonucu bir isyan çıkarmayı başarsalar da, bu isyanın kontrolünü ellerine geçiremedikleri ve kitleyi yönlendiremedikleri için izole olmak zorunda kalmışlar ve kendi halklarına saldırmaya başlamışlardır. Tanımsal açıdan bakıldığında, Yahudi aşırı dincileri, hedef gözetmektedirler. İmparatorluk askerlerinin

halka açık yerlerde hançerlenerek öldürülmesi, saldırıların belirli bir hedefe karşı belirli bir maksat taşıdığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca bu grup, üyelerini seçerken dini kriterler uygulamakta ve aşırı dinci bir örgüt yaklaşımı gütmektedir. Bu açıdan Filistin ve Roma İmparatorluğu örneği, dini referansın aslında siyasi bir hedef için seçilen terörizm yönteminde kullanılmasına da örnek teşkil etmektedir. Aşırı dinci ayrılıkçı Yahudilerin Roma İmparatorluğu'nu Filistin'den çıkarma hedefi, terörizm açısından son derece siyasi ve sınırları belirlenmiş bir hareket tarzıdır.

Tarih boyunca terörizm var olduğu gibi, devlet terörizmi de çeşitli şekillerde tezahür etmiştir. Burada devlet terörizmini tanımlarken, devletin kendi yasalarına göre uyguladığı yargılama ve infazları ayrı tutmak gerekmektedir. Bir eylemin devlet terörizmi olarak kabul edilmesi için, söz konusu devletin kendi yasalarını ve uluslararası yasaları da çiğneyerek belirli başlı siyasi şiddet biçimlerini uygulamaya koyması gerekmektedir. Bu bakımdan Fransız Devrimi sonrası 1793 – 1794 döneminde yaşananlar ile Nazi Almanyası ve Sovyetler Birliği'nde 1930 – 1945 arasında yaşanan olaylar devlet terörizmine örnek teşkil ettikleri için incelenmiştir. Adı geçen ülke ve zaman aralıklarında yaşanan olayların devlet terörüne örnek olarak incelenmesi, bu olayların Anthony Richards'ın tanımına göre terör eylemi teşkil edip etmediğinin kontrolünden sonra yapılmıştır.

Fransız devrimi sonrası 1793 – 1794 döneminde Jakobenler olarak bilinen devrimci yapı, devrim karşıtlarını belirlemek ve sindirmek için Fransa'da çok kanlı ve adaletsiz yargılamalara hatta infazlara girişmiştir. Korku ve panik unsuru, devletin yasallaştırdığı şiddeti adaletsiz ve ölçsüz olarak belirli bir siyasi görüşün yayılmasını engellemek amacıyla kullanması yüzünden Fransa'ya hakim olmuş ve halkı baskı altına almıştır. Bruce Hoffman'a göre bu dönemde Fransa'da Robespierre ve destekçileri tarafından uygulanan şiddet, yargısız infaz ve tehdit kampanyası son derece organize ve sistematik idi. Bu açıdan incelendiğinde, Fransa'da Robespierre ve destekçilerinin gerçekleştirdiği, şiddet ve baskıya dayanan politikalar ve infazlar, devletin siyasi bir amaç için kendi halkına şiddet uygulaması ve/veya şiddetle tehdit etmesi kapsamına girdiği için devlet terörü olarak nitelendirilebilir.

Aynı şekilde Nazi Almanyası'nda ve Sovyetler Birliği'nde 1930 – 1945 dönemi yaşanan olaylar da devlet terörizmine örnek teşkil etmektedir. Yahudilerin, solcular ve çingelerin Almanya'da muhalifler ile birlikte hedef alınarak önce tasviye edilip sonra infaz edilmeleri, devletin ideolojisini baskın kılmak için yaptığı terörizm faaliyetlerine örnekler sunmaktadır. Benzer şekilde Stalin'in Sovyetler Birliği'nin belirli halklarını kolektivizasyona geçişe zorlamak için aç bırakması ve katletmesi de devletin belirli bir görüşü dayatmak için terörü ve korkutmayı yöntem olarak belirlemesinin bir başka örneğidir.

Terörizm, 19. Yüzyılda özellikle de Rusya'da anarşist gruplar tarafından kullanılmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra Balkanlar ve Orta Doğu'da da bağımsızlık mücadeleleri vermekte olan milliyetçi gruplar, terörizmi karşılarındaki imparatorlukları köşeye sıkıştırmak amacıyla kullanmışlardır. Rus Çarı 2. Alexander'ın Narodnaya Volya adlı terör örgütü tarafından öldürülmesi, bu dönemde ortaya çıkan ve genellikle suikastlerle isimlerini duyurmaya çalışan terör örgütlerinin faaliyetlerini yansıtmaktadır.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ise, sömürge bölgelerindeki halkların mücadeleleri ilk kıvımcımlarını vermiştir. Burada sömürgeci, emperyal güçlere karşı verilen bağımsızlık mücadelelerinde terörizmin de bir yöntem olarak seçildiği gözlemlenmiştir. Cezayir'in bağımsızlığı için Fransız sömürge yönetimine karşı terörist eylemlere girişen FLN hareketi, bağımsızlık mücadelelerinde terörizme başvuran gruplara dair popüler örneklerden biridir. Filistin'deki İngiliz yönetimine karşı teröre başvuran ve İngiliz kuvvetlerini Filistin'den çıkarmayı hedefleyen Irgun ve Stern Gang gibi Yahudi terör örgütleri de yine aynı şekilde bağımsızlık mücadelelerinde uygulanan terörizme örnek teşkil etmesi bakımından incelenmiştir.

2. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde ise etnik, ayrılıkçı ve ideolojik terörizm örnekleri sık rastlanır hale gelmiştir. İspanya'da ETA, Türkiye'de PKK, İrlanda'da IRA ve Filistin'de FKÖ, bağımsızlık mücadelelerine girişmiş ve sol, marksist görüşler altında ortak noktalar bularak birbirleri ile çeşitli zaman ve biçimlerde işbirliğine gitmişlerdir. Bu işbirliğinin en belirgin örneği, FKÖ ve IRA arasındaki lojistik ve medyatik ilişkidir. Etnik ve bağımsızlıkçı terör örgütlerine ek olarak, Almanya ve İtalya'da eylemleri ile ses

getiren ideolojik tabanlı aşırı solcu terör grupları da dönemin Avrupa'sı için tehdit oluşturmuştur. Bunlardan en belirginini, Almanya'da kurulan Kızıl Ordu Tugayları (Red Army Faction) isimli örgüttür. Bu örgüt genellikle gangster tipi eylemlere yönelse de, Alman devlet otoriteleri ve iş adamlarını hedef almıştır. Soğuk Savaş dönemi etnik ve ideolojik terör örgütlerinin ön plana çıkması bir tesadüf değildir. ABD ve SSCB arasında süren ideolojik rekabet, bu ülkelerin dolaylı yoldan karşı kutuplardaki ülkelerde meydana çıkan bağımsızlık mücadelelerini desteklemesinin önünü açmıştır. Bağımsızlık mücadelesi veren milliyetçi terör örgütlerinin, sol ve marksist dünya görüşü üzerinde ortak noktada buluşabilmeleri, SSCB'nin Soğuk Savaş döneminde bu tip terör örgütlerle ne tarz bağlantılar kurduğu noktasında ipuçları vermektedir.

Soğuk Savaş'ın sonlarına yaklaşıldığında ise, özellikle de 1979 İran Devrimi'nin etkisi ile, radikal İslamcı silahlı grupların ortaya çıktığı görülmektedir. Özellikle Mısır, bu tür radikal İslamcı örgütlerin köklerini kazandığı bir İslam ülkesi olarak 1970'ler itibariyle öne çıkmaktadır. Mısır'da 1920'li yıllarda Hasan el-Benna tarafından kurulan ve ideolojik altyapısı 20. Yüzyılın ortalarında Seyyid Kutub gibi figürlerle güçlendirilen İslamcı Müslüman Kardeşler örgütü, radikal İslamcı anlayışın siyasal arenaya taşınmasında öncü rol oynamıştır. Buna ek olarak Mısır'da 1970'lerin sonlarına doğru etkilerini artıran Cemaat-i İslami gibi gruplar, Mısır devletine karşı silahlı eylemlere girişmişler ve nihayetinde 1981 yılında Mısır Devlet Başkanı Enver Sedat'a suikast düzenlemişlerdir. Bu suikastın temel amacı, Enver Sedat'ı İsrail ile imzaladığı 1979 Camp David Barış Anlaşması konusunda cezalandırmak idi. Bu anlamda radikal İslamcı terör örgütlerinin ilk eylemlerinin Batı'dan ziyade kendi ülkelerinde Batı ile işbirliği yaptıklarını düşündükleri Müslüman yöneticiler ve devlet güçlerine yönelik tasarlanması önemli bir nokta teşkil etmektedir. Bu anlamda dikkate alınması gereken önemli bir nokta, radikal İslamcı terörizmin Batı ve ABD'yi hedef almasının, Afgan – Sovyet Savaşı'nın sonu ve Soğuk Savaş'ın bitimi ile kesişmesidir.

El Kaide terör örgütü de Afgan – Sovyet Savaşı sonrası Afganistan'dan Suudi Arabistan'a dönmeyi hedefleyen savaşçı “mücahid”lerin Usame Bin Ladin önderliğinde Afganistan ve Sudan'da kamplara yerleşmesinden sonra doğmuştur. Bu örgütün,

Sovyetlere karşı birlikte mücadele verdiđi Taliban'dan farkı, direkt olarak ABD ve Batı'yı Müslüman dünyasındaki sorunların birincil kaynağı olarak hedef almasıdır. Bin Ladin ve ona bağılı El Kaide militanları, 1990'lar boyunca ABD'yi hedef alan çeşitli saldırılar düzenlemiştir. Bu saldırılardan 1 tanesi ABD topraklarında gerçekleşip başarısız olurken, diğerleri Kenya, Tanzanya, Suudi Arabistan ve Yemen gibi ülkelerdeki ABD üsleri içeren bölgelerde gerçekleşmiştir. El Kaide'nin en etkili ve en fazla ölüme sebep olan saldırısı ise, 2001 yılında New York'ta gerçekleşmiştir. 11 Eylül 2001 tarihinde El Kaide tarafından kaçırılan uçaklarla gerçekleştirilen saldırılarda 3000'e yakın insan hayatını kaybetmiştir. 11 Eylül 2001 saldırıları, yeni terörizm tartışmasının ağırlık merkezine birkaç farklı açıdan oturmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, terörizmin kısa tarihçesi incelendiğinde bütün terör örgütlerinin ortak noktasının siyasal bir amaç hedeflemek olduđu görölmektedir. Terör örgütleri ideolojik, etnik veya dini referanslarla ortaya çıksalar da, hedefleri belirli bir bölgede siyasal ve saha kontrolü sağlamak olmuştur. Bu anlamda terör örgütlerinin devletler ile yer yer işbirliğine gitmesi de onların hedeflerinin siyasal olduđu konusunda bir başka örnek oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölümde incelenen çeşitli farklı terör örgütleri, tezin ikinci bölümünde seçilen terörizm tanımına göre tekrar incelenmiş ve hepsinin bu tanıma göre terörist örgüt olarak kabul edilebileceğı ve bu kabulün oluşmasında en etkili faktörün terör örgütlerinin siyasal amaçlar taşıdığı görüşüne varılmıştır.

Tezin dördüncü bölümünde, yeni terörizm kavramı ve bu kavrama ilişkin eleştirel yaklaşım ile birlikte şekillenen yeni terörizm tartışması incelenmiştir. Yeni terörizm tartışması, öncelikle dünyada 1990'lardan itibaren yeni, daha acımasız ve hedefleri tam olarak belirlenmemiş, bir çeşit total savaş öngören bir terörizm akımı olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur, Steven Simon, Daniel Benjamin ve Brian Jenkins, terörizmin 1990'ların başından itibaren yeni bir biçim aldığını ve devrimsel değişikliklere maruz kaldığını belirtmektedirler. Burada yeni terörizm kavramından kast edilen, 1970'lerde faaliyetlerini artıran, 1980'lerin sonunda da Afgan cihadına katılan ve sonrasında da kendi örgütlerini kuran radikal İslamcı gruplardır. Bu bağlamda El Kaide,

geliştirdiği eylem biçimi ve organizasyonel yapısı nedeniyle yeni terörizm tartışmasında önemli bir örnek teşkil etmektedir.

Yeni terörizm kavramının savunucuları, terörizmdeki yenilikleri üç ana başlık altında açıklamaktadır. Buna göre birincil olarak yeni teröristler, eski teröristlere kıyasla daha belirsiz, uzlaşamaz ve ulaşılamaz hedefler taşımaktadır. Walter Laqueur'e göre El Kaide ve türevi radikal İslamcı gruplar, Soğuk Savaş dönemi "seküler" terör örgütlerine kıyasla uzlaşamaz bir statüdeledir. Buna göre bu tip terör örgütleri, mevcut sistem içinde kendi sorunlarına çözüm aramaktan ziyade, sistemi toptan yok etme eğilimindedirler. El Kaide'nin Batı'yı hedef alması ve onların yaşam biçimlerini tehdit etmesi de bu şekilde algılanmaktadır. İkinci olarak, yeni terörizm kavramının savunucuları, terörizmin 1990'lardan sonra radikal İslamcı gruplar vasıtasıyla daha ölümcül bir hale geldiğini iddia etmektedirler. Bruce Hoffman ve RAND Corporation isimli düşünce kuruluşunun araştırmalarına göre, 1990'larda radikal İslamcı El Kaide ve türevi gruplar tarafından yapılan saldırıların miktarında azalma, fakat bu saldırıların sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan ölüm ve yaralanma oranlarında artışlar saptanmıştır. Bu noktadan hareketle Bruce Hoffman, yeni teröristlerin insan hayatına daha az değer verdikleri ve eylemlerini planlarken maksimum kayıp verdirme prensibine uygun hareket ettiklerini belirtmektedir. Yeni terörizm konseptine göre eski teröristler, yeni teröristlerden farklı olarak, hedef gözetmekte ve daha sembolik, limitli hedeflere saldırılar düzenlemekte idi. Fakat yeni teröristler düşman olarak gördükleri kesimlerle aralarındaki savaşı dini bir varoluş mücadelesi olarak algıladıkları için, karşı tarafa maksimum kayıp verdirme onlar için birincil amaç haline gelmiştir. Bu anlamda yeni terörizm kavramının savunucuları, bu tip radikal İslamcı terör gruplarının hedef ayırt etmeden, maksimum kaybı yaratarak propaganda yapma ve amaçlarına ulaşma yoluna başvurduklarını iddia etmektedirler. Yeni terörizm kavramının üçüncü önemli ayağı ise, yeni teröristlerin organizasyonel yapılarıdır. Kavramın savunucularına göre eski terör örgütleri dikey, belirgin bir örgütsel yapı ve hiyerarşiye sahipken, yeni terörizmde örgütlerin dikey değil yatay ve hücrelere dayalı bir hiyerarşik yapıya sahip olduğunu belirtmektedirler. Buna göre El Kaide ve benzeri örgütlerin en belirgin organizasyonel özelliği, bu tip örgütlerde hücre yapısının olması ve bu hücrelerin görece özerk hareket

edebilmeleridir. Örgütün dikey bir hiyerarşiye sahip olmaması, suçluların takibi ve örgütün çözülmesi gibi süreçleri daha da zor hale getirmektedir.

Yeni terörizme eleştirel bakış ise, Martha Crenshaw, Isabelle Duyvestein, Alexander Spencer, David Tucker gibi akademisyenler tarafından sağlanmaktadır. Bu anlamda yeni terörizm kavramı, kavramın yeni olarak ortaya attığı değişikliklerin aslında yeni olmadığı ve önceki terör örgütlerinde de görüldüğü temeline oturmaktadır. Dini referanslı terörizmin El Kaide veya Aum Shinrikyo'ya özgü olmadığı, tarihin başka bölümlerinde de bu tarz terörizm örneklerine rastlandığı iddia edilmektedir. Buna ek olarak yatay örgüt yapısı ve ölümcüllüğün artması gibi özelliklerin de yeni olarak kabul edilen İslamcı terör örgütlerine özgü olmadığı konusu, detaylı araştırma ve örneklerle ortaya konmuştur. Bu anlamda yeni terörizme eşştirel yaklaşım, kavramın “yeni” olma özelliğini sorgulamaktadır.

Bu tezde, yeni terörizm tartışması terörizmin amaçlarında köklü değişiklikler olduğu iddiası üzerinden eleştirilmektedir. Bu maksatla El Kaide terör örgütünün 2011'deki Arap Ayaklanmaları sonrası Suriye'de oluşturduğu El Nusra Cephesi isimli kolu, ve bu kolun Suriye'de açıkladığı hedefleri ve diğer radikal İslamcı gruplarla olan mücadelesi, yeni teröristlerin amaçlarının kıyametçi, belirsiz ve uzlaşmaz olduğu fikrinin bu anlamda geçersiz olduğunun ispatına yönelik incelenmiştir. El Kaide ve El Kaide çatısı altında Suriye'de faaliyet göstermekte olan El Nusra Cephesi isimli radikal İslamcı terör örgütü, Suriye'de yerel bir İslami Emirlik kurmayı hedeflediğini ve bu hedefini gerçekleştirirken Suriye'de rejim karşıtı diğer gruplarla uzlaşma noktası arayacağını belirtmiştir. Buna ek olarak El Nusra cephesi, Irak El Kaidesi'nden ayrılarak kurulan ve İslam Devleti olarak adlandırılan bir başka radikal İslamcı terör örgütü ile Suriye topraklarında alan hakimiyeti mücadelesine girişmiştir. Bu anlamda radikal İslamcı bir terör örgütü olan El Nusra Cephesi'nin, hedeflerini son derece açık bir biçimde Suriye'de kurulması planlanan bir yerel emirlik ile sınırlandırması, eski terör örgütlerin olarak kabul edilen örgütlerin sınırlı amaçları ile benzerlik göstermektedir. Afgan – Sovyet Savaşı ve Arap Ayaklanmaları arasında geçen dönemde radikal İslamcı örgütlerin hareket sahası bulamaması, onları Batı'ya karşı direkt saldırılara geçmeye

yönlendirmiştir. İslamcı terör örgütleri Batı'yı halen hedef almaktadırlar, fakat bu durum İslamcı teröristlerin küresel bir İslam devleti kurmak hedefinde olduklarını doğrulamamaktadır. Bunun yerine, Suriye ve Libya gibi savaş bölgelerinde meydana gelen olayların da işaret ettiği gibi, radikal İslamcı terörizmin daha ziyade Müslümanların yaşadığı bölgelerde, özellikle de otorite boşlukları oluştuğunda belirli ve kısıtlı hedeflerle ortaya çıktıkları ve bu bölgelerdeki otorite boşluğundan faydalanarak Müslüman ülkelerde radikal İslamcı anlayışları benimseyen İslami emirlikleri kurmak istedikleri ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu açıdan incelendiğinde, Walter Laqueur ve Bruce Hoffman gibi akademisyenlerin iddia ettiğinin aksine, yeni olarak kabul edilen terör örgütlerinin de, belirli ve sınırlı siyasal hedefleri olduğu, Suriye'deki El Nusra Cephesi örneğinin incelenmesi vasıtasıyla ortaya çıkmaktadır. El Kaide her ne kadar küresel hedefler taşıdığını iddia etse de, sahada meydana gelen olaylar ve izlenen politikalar, örgütün küresel cihad hedefinin daha ziyade retorik ve propaganda amaçlı olduğunu düşündürmektedir.

Sonuç olarak terörizm dünya üzerinde siyasal maksatlar taşıyan bir şiddet yöntemi olarak varlığını sürdürmektedir. Dünya üzerinde siyasal problem var olduğu sürece terörizm de bir şiddet yöntemi olarak kullanılmaya devam edecektir. Terörist örgütlerin farklı söylem ve motivasyonlar taşımaları, bu örgütlerin siyasal hedefler açısından birbirleri ile benzer özelliklere sahip oldukları gerçeğini değiştirmemektedir. İslamcı terör örgütlerinin de bu açıdan diğer terör örgütlerinden ayrılmaması ve onlar gibi incelenmesi gerekmektedir. Olivier Roy'un da belirttiği gibi, El Kaide ve türevi örgütler, Müslüman topraklarda kapitalizm ve onun getirdiği siyasal ve ekonomik problemlere karşı ortaya çıkan ve İslami kültürden etkilenen bir tepki biçimidir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, El Kaide'nin siyasal ajandasının diğer terör örgütlerinden pek de farklı olmadığı ve bu dünyada gelişmekte olan siyasi olaylara bağlı olduğu anlaşılmaktadır.

APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Özbudak
Adı : Volkan Deniz
Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : THE NEW TERRORISM DEBATE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN GOALS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☒ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☒
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: