

M. TILTAK

EMOTIONS AND THEIR MANIPULATION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS:
CASES OF RWANDA AND BOSNIA

MURAT TILTAK

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EMOTIONS AND THEIR MANIPULATION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS:
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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members (first name belongs to the chairperson of the jury and the second name belongs to supervisor)

Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç	(METU, IR)	<hr/>
Prof. Dr. H. Simten Coşar	(HU, DRTS)	<hr/>
Assoc. Dr. Birgül Demirtaş	(TOBB ETÜ, IR)	<hr/>

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Name, Last name : Murat TILTAK

Signature :

ABSTRACT

EMOTIONS AND THEIR MANIPULATION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS: CASES OF RWANDA AND BOSNIA

Tiltak, Murat

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This thesis analyses the motivations and the role of emotions that lead societies to ethnic fragmentation which eventually end up with massive hatred and identity based conflict. Constitution of social identity, description of identity along with ethnicity, power of emotions in constructing an extreme consciousness of ethnicity, perception of “us” and “the others” are discussed in order to understand the dynamics that create identity based fanaticism among ordinary civilians. Thesis also focuses on analyzing the role of emotions along with manipulatory efforts of political entrepreneurs by investigating historical cases of ethnic fragmentation. Lastly, thesis finalizes with investigating the role of identity and emotions in International Relations Theories to analyze social movements in international system.

Keywords: Emotions, Identity, Manipulation, Ethnification, Conflict

ÖZ

DUYGULAR VE DUYGULARIN ETNİK ÇATIŞMALARDA MANİPÜLASYONU: RUANDA VE BOSNA VAKALARI

Tıltak, Murat

Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez toplumları etnik temelli ayrışmaya sürükleyen ve sonunda kitlesel nefret ve çatışmalara neden olan motivasyonları ve duyguların burdaki rolünü analiz etmektedir. Kimlik temelli fanatizmin siviller arasında yayılmasını anlamak için “Toplumsal kimliğin oluşması, kimliğin etnik temelde tanımlanması, uç noktada etnik bilincin inşasında soyut olguların gücü, ‘biz’ ve ‘onlar’ ayrışmasının algılanması” gibi konuları tartışmaktadır. Bu tez ayrıca tarihsel süreçte gerçekleşmiş etnik ayrışma vakalarını inceleyerek siyasi aktörlerin manipülasyona yönelik çabalarında kimlik ve sosyal duyguların rolünü anlamaya odaklanmaktadır. Son olarak, bu tez uluslararası sistemde toplumsal hareketlerin analiz edilmesi açısından kimlik ve duyguların Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplini içindeki yerini sorgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik, Duygular, Manipülasyon, Ethnikleştirme, Çatışma

To the innocents who were and are being killed for the most vicious purposes...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

JNA	Jugoslavska Narodna Armija
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PARMEHUTU	Party of Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLMC	Radio Television Libre de Mille Collines (Free Radio Television of Mille Collines)
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	UN Mission of Assistance to Rwanda
UNAR	Rwandan National Union
USA	United States of America
MNRD	Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Development (National Revolutionary Movement for Development)
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes the role of emotions and motivations which lead societies to fragmentation and violence in the basis of ethnicity. In order to understand the dynamics which create extreme feelings such as hatred and fear among societies, the thesis also focuses on the constitution of social identity, description of identity in the basis of ethnicity, power of emotions in shaping an extreme consciousness of ethnicity and perception of “us” and “the others”. Thesis also analyzes the role of emotions along with manipulatory efforts of political entrepreneurs by investigating historical cases of ethnic fragmentation. Lastly, this thesis concludes with discussing the role of identity and emotions in international relations discipline in order to analyze social movements in international system.

Life starts like an empty bottle, or a deserted field where there is nothing but nihilism that waits to be filled. It continues according to where you were born and how you are treated. In time that nihilism is filled with, knowledge, emotions; the personal perceptions of love, hatred, disgust, envy and self-consciousness. One can become a hero to some people while being seen as a coward or a traitor to some others. All of these are possible with the emotional nature of human being and the never ending ties of individuals with others. As the individual is totally covered with the myths about societies, past experiences, ancient biases and hatreds; there is no way but a sense of belonging emerges. This sense might be the key to a solidarist and cooperative way of life in a society -with the accumulation of individuals with the same like feelings- where there is a strong balance and peace among the residents. But on the other hand, the sense of belonging can also cause terrible incidents depending on the description of “the others”; just like it is done with the concept of “us”. Consequently, extremely strong ties in a society should not always be attended

by a positive meaning because of its contribution to the prosperity in a society; as extreme ties can easily turn to strong senses such as fear or rage against the others.

Before the technological revolution, especially on the communication technology, it was possible to explain fear or hatred against another society as a fear of unknown that strong biases in a society against one other could at least be seen a little reasonable. However, as years have passed, international societies have started to live in a more transparent world; not the whole but fortunately, most of them could have the chance to learn more about the others with the high technology devices; but unfortunately even though the fog of unknown was significantly disappeared, and even the national identities were damaged with the new emerging global identities; the manipulative effects of old hatreds among societies did not lose their velocity. In any international news channel you can face the scenes from religious or ethnic radical protesters in a conflict with the police in Europe, a bomb explosion between religious groups, wounded civilians on a stretcher covered with blood in Middle East, or never ending suppression and attacks of paramilitary groups against tribal villages in Africa. If we ever consider the conflict between groups as a reality of the human nature, as long as we do not separate the human kind with the other species, there is always a reasonable answer to it; however looking at the ever increasing level of violence from the broad examples that lies in the history, there is always a few questions raised in any logical mind that; *“How can one exercise such a violent treatment to another?”* or *“How can such brutality be possible?”*, *“Can there be any legitimate answer to such a violence?”*, *“How can people be manipulated”*, *“Even if there are manipulative efforts of rational political elites, why do ordinary people respond to such manipulations by even participating in massacres for their ethnic identity?”*. In the International Relations Discipline looking at the interaction between conflicting groups in a society; there are always coherent answers such as a competition between different groups in the extent of scarce resources as there is an unavoidable correlation between ethnic conflict among groups and unfair distribution of resources or scarcity in a heterogenic society. However materialist explanations of such incidents are clearly and naturally reductive that there is no possibility to make a deeper explanation without integrating the complicated psychological structure of

the individual and its on-going manipulation. In this study it is argued that, as long as “Why” is used along with “How”; the international relations discipline could go beyond the seen facts behind the ethnic violence that as the main purpose of this thesis is also to find out “*How can a sense of belonging, an ethnic or religious self-consciousness, a state of awareness turn ordinary people into ragefull “patriots” using sadistic ways and legitimizing themselves without a piece of regret?*” Are facts like social identity and ethnical consciousness enough to explain commitment of such crimes without hesitation or they are only the instruments for manipulators? Looking at the historical events in Rwanda, Bosnia or considering the Second World War, we may not find a proper answer to understand the logic behind such a cruelty; however we can find some commonalities among any precarious situation leading to the cleansing of a group by another from any geographical area that the use of propaganda and administrative devices as an instrument of discrimination and mobilization should be counted as a top commonality and appear as a key term for ethnic and identical research studies.

There is a tremendous link between the caliber of mobility and dimension of social action and the way how political power is used by political and social elites, especially when it comes to charismatic leaders. Looking at the common tendency of ethnic or religious groups on following the political leaders in the historical cases of ethnic conflicts would lead us to the construction instruments of the sub-structure of societies that lies under the rage, hatred, fanaticism or self-exaltation over “the others”. Therefore we may find an answer to the role of political elites on the social mobilization and execution of discriminative actions by the public. There is a natural possibility in the attention of negative meanings to others within any individual mind. However it would be wise to find out how these hidden feelings that belong to distinct individuals are gathered together and directed into a single purpose and the role of political elites in it.

Shortly, this thesis aims to find out how motivating factors leading to ethnic conflict is forged, by whom and why it is done. In this sense, the thesis starts with investigating the construction of social identity in order to see what determines the

components of it and why do individuals adopt a social identity. Ethnic conflict can directly be connected with the group identity as fragmentation is related with the construction of “us” and “the others”. Therefore, the construction of social identity should be investigated to find out the origins of ethnic conflict.

Afterwards, the thesis goes on with the evolution of social identity to ethnic identity in order to find out how social identity gains ethnic meanings. Also, it investigates the role of emotions in transformation of social identity to ethnic identity since construction of ethnic identity needs to be examined in order to understand why and how it offers an appropriate ground for polarization and whether it makes it suitable for the manipulation of emotions. In this sense, the thesis may find out the reasons why groups are mobilized and discriminated in terms of identity and the role of emotions in it. Then, it goes on with different theoretical approaches on the reasons of ethnic violence in order to gain different perspectives towards how social groups are fragmented and why this fragmentation can lead to conflict. Lastly, the thesis examines historical cases of ethnic conflict in order to combine theory and practices. In this sense, the thesis investigates Rwandan and Bosnian cases in order to distinguish the role of culture, geography, time period or history and the role of emotions and manipulation in ethnic conflict in different societies with different political structures. Through investigating these cases it also focuses on the role of political actors in manipulation of emotions. The thesis also tries to discuss the methods of manipulation and purposes of political actors in manipulation. In sum, this thesis aims to find out “*What drives civilians to mobilize and exterminate other civilians in identity based incidents.*”

2. CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL IDENTITY

Social identity stands as an important starting point for understanding how societies are fragmented. As social identity is related with adoption of an upper identity with upper characteristics by the individuals compared with individual identity; it contains the description of national identity as well. It also includes the description of “us” and “the others”. In this sense, it is expected to have a close relationship with fragmentation. It is also important to analyze how social identity gains ethnic meanings and the role of emotions in it in order to understand the main element of ethnic conflict, the ethnic fragmentation. Therefore, in this chapter the thesis examines the construction of social identity, the role of emotions in developing national identity and its evolution to gain ethnic meanings. So that, it can be found out how social identity turns into a source of manipulation in ethnic fragmentation and ethnic conflict.

2.1. Emotions, Social Identity and the Development of National Identity

Looking at the incidents about conflicts between different religious or ethnic groups; without any doubt it can be seen a leverage of matters related with social identity. No matter where the mass killings happen and what determines the motivations of groups, sentiments appear as an important element which should not be underestimated by the researchers who try to understand the motivations of mass killings in civil wars. Sentiments reside in gripes which might lead to terrorism or war, creation of prejudices, proliferation of hatred, killing of masses in the search for vengeance or the definition of friends and foes, targets and threats to be eradicated. As the sentiments arise from the perceptions towards the world and contribute to the definition of “us” and “others”; it can be seen as a key point of development of social identity. Therefore, they should be taken more seriously for the international relations discipline in order to understand the origins of modern threats against states

such as global terrorism or separatist movements which definitely create disorder within a state or the international system itself. However, in the discipline, there is a tendency to exclude sentiments, perceptions or emotions from calculations as they are seen to be too nominative, too ambiguous and too fluid to be included in investigations. Reason, rational calculation and cognition are seen to be sufficient for understanding the motivations of social and individual actions while forgetting how the emotions affect the construction of social identity, how they are used as an instrument by rational actors for the search of personal interests or how the emotions appear as the main subject of collective action. Emotions are the basis of human motivation, incentive to social action, self-identification. They appear in the social bonds which make groups, nations and even the whole society.¹ Consequently, sentiments should be considered as one of the starting points of political actions which should be added to the variables of subjects about international relations.

Hegel thought of men – in the generic sense – as different from animals, in that he was willing to die for a cause higher than life. Hegel should have added: man is also willing to kill for a cause higher than life. This, I think, is truer of modern man and woman than it is true of humanity in general... Just put millions in the wrong uniform: citizens and patriots will celebrate their death as the end of enemies.

Mahmood Mamdani

Therefore, in this part the relation among sentiments, social identity and collective action will be examined to understand another matter for the motivations of mass killing in ethnic conflicts. In this sense, Mamdani's analysis on Hegelian thought of men asserts a good point in understanding the motivations of mass killing:

The national identity building process can be traced back to the midst of seventeenth century as the rapid urbanization caused by revolutions on production resulted in new forms of communities living together in big cities who search for new identities because of the new coming problems such as poverty and unemployment. However the significance of the national identity increased in the second half of twentieth century as conflicts between national states left its place to the fight among ethnic or

¹ Ronald Grigor Suny, "Why We Hate You: The Passions of National Identity and Ethn Violence", *Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series*, (2004), p. 5.

religious groups with the post-colonial era. Looking at the studies about national identity building after the second half of the twentieth century; we can see the common points of a single unitary identity, lack of plurality of self-description and a long history related with a particular territory. Preceding and exclusive claims based on language, race or culture were justified with territorial possession and took its place in the transnational discourse of the nation. For a political legitimization of a particular nation; a combination of culture and history enriched with the myths of ancestors used for attending positive meanings for one's belonging to a certain society. In the social sciences, constitution of a nation was required in order to pursue democratic politics since a clearly defined and emotionally bounded society is more suitable to be presented. As the nationalism was seen to be a subject for the decolonization process after the Second World War; there is no doubt that conversion of tribes into lucid nations was both a natural process of modernization and also a project constituted by rational western policy-makers for the desire of new international market economic system.

Unlike the particular rational actors with the ability to separate emotions and reason; for the masses, the national identity has even a greater meaning than other kinds of definitions about identity as the pleasure gained by feeling to belong somewhere with a unique background. In this sense it can be considered that there are no ethnic or religious groups with a dull history neither they can be explained by shallow calculations of rationality. Yael Tamir's "Enigma of Nationalism" stands as a good point for understanding why national identity has a huge effect on motivating individuals more than any other political force where he starts with an astonishing myth Babel which is about the birth of nations. According to the myth, in the very early eras of human history humanity was a constitution of one kind who spoke the same language. In time with pride, these humans started to challenge their abilities and stood together to make a tower, the well-known Tower of Babel, in order to reach the heaven. But this impertinence of humans cost them with the retribution of god as they were scattered around the earth with a division of nations.² According to

² Yael Tamir, "The Enigma of Nationalism", *World Politics*, Vol. 47. No. 3., (April 1995), p. 418.

this myth the birth of nations is also the birth of diversity and diversity which ironically justifies a unity in division of nations through same methods. It can be seen that when a subject is related with national identity, not even needed to be related with a particular one, myths stirring perceptions and emotions come to play. According to Yael Tamir, no affiliation can be matched with memberships in society which helps the individual to feel as belonging to a community in the particular time and place he or she lives; instead, it is like finding a place in an uninterrupted chain of being.³ Nationhood depends on the superiority of society both among the members of today and across the generations which makes it more complicated as long as it still stands as a simple and casual feeling. Though it is a creation of sum of individual actions over-time; it transcends even the whole society in a particular time.

Benedict Anderson's definition of nations as imagined societies also presents a good point for understanding what drives the motivation of standing united without rationality. Anderson considers nation an imagined community which is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. He goes on by explaining "imagined" as the members of even the smallest communities do not see, hear or even know about their fellow-members; they still go on considering each other as members of a unity. There appears an image of a communion in the minds of each.⁴ Therefore the creation of a national identity is related with post facto construction of reality. The flavour of the national identity is so powerful that people willingly accept earlier generations with a fully positive meaning even though they do not have any connection. When it comes to "imagined"; Anderson goes on as even the leading nations have fixed boundaries beyond other nations; they are imagined as limited. None of them imagine themselves as adjacent with other nations that unlike the radical religious people think that one they all the human race will gather around their religious view; most fanatic nationalist do not think about a day all the planet

³ *Ibid.* p. 425.

⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition, (London, 1991), p. 6.

will join their nation in a way.⁵ Therefore we can understand that both religious and ethnical identities contain the sense of exclusion. However; while the religious identity includes a desire for containing the humanity as a whole; there are no sign of inclusiveness for the ethnic identity as “bloodlines” play an active role in the constitution of national identity. Even though it is an imagined reality, even this imagined community is united through the conventions and common stories; the kinship plays an active role in the definition of others and us. For the national identity; the kinship was not earned in a particular time as it happened for religious identities. Throughout the history human beings have been formed or happened to exist in a way as a member of an ethnic community. Geographical facts, conventions, cultures created during the historical process are not the causes of ethnic identity but they are just the effects of it. Emotions make it possible for the masses to focus on mythic realities that stir the hearts of people and help them feel special which also offers a suitable sense of national identity for rational and opportunist actors’ insemination. On the other hand, there is a circular affection between emotions and myths, as emotions are thoroughly affected by myths that heighten ethnic consciousness.

In a point of view, national identity can be seen to be objective and simplified; that carries an extreme effectiveness. Consequently, it may not be considered as a matter of artificial reality; rather it is closer to objectivity. It is inevitable and necessary in the structure what the world has to be. There is a tendency to see the nationality as natural and normal in somehow. Therefore having a nationality has become one of the few most basic attributes of every human being like having given birth or having parents. As the entire land surface is essentially divided into nation-states, assigning an ordinary meaning to national identity has long been a reality.⁶ Even though nation-states and nationalities are not the one and only way for setting borders between the physical and social world, they are still a part of the reality and need to be included in the definitions whether they are a part of artificial human

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 50.

⁶ Martyn Barrett, *The Development of National Identity in Childhood and Adolescence*, University of Surrey Inaugural Lecture, (March, 2000), p. 2.

constructions or not. For the International Relations Discipline has suffered enough from excluding immeasurable facts from the study; emotions, myths and construction of identity, which are varied accordingly with conditions and change of perspectives of different groups, should also be conducted within this research. The national identity works most properly when people who feel as fellow members act without the awareness that their actions shift according to conditions. Instead, they feel like they have made it all in a natural order.⁷ In this state of irrationality; calculation is stifled while the emotions are instigated. According to Stuart Kaufman, nationalism plays a role similar with religions. For the nationalists, nation is a god to whom the fellow members construct temples -namely monuments for martyrs of national wars, national heroes, leaders or legends-attend sacred relics –flags, folkloric signs- create a theology transferred across the generations –myths, legends, cultural tales- in order to get a kind of immortality for standing as a component of a community which is considered to be eternal.⁸ Ross also argues that psycho-cultural narratives, such as mythic tales, often bear discriminative elements. Having an unrealistic and exaggerated phrasing, these narratives are generally derived from historical experiences; mostly grievances or heroisms. Since these tales have strong emotional power, they can cause and escalate ethnic conflict.⁹ In a well-balanced circulation, reconstruction of identity is provided through symbols, tales, and conventions. In the meantime the cause and effect is jumbled while the source of reality is forgotten in time with the blurring affect. Therefore the rational reasoning of nations' existence is lost and one's identity is simply attended to sanctity or a process of natural order. Reason and effect, memories and experiences are the cornerstones of the identity which are also the starting point of people's motivations and choices.¹⁰ People may act rationally according to their allegiances; however those allegiances are directly

⁷ Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: the Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*, Cornell University Press, (2001), p. 25

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Marc Howard Ross, *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, (May 2007, Cambridge), p. 37.

¹⁰ *op. cit.*, Sunny, p. 8.

related with their identity which owes its existence to an irrational construction process. Therefore the rationality derived from the national identity may not lead to a healthy solution as sentiments may block the angle of sight. In order to create a common sense national identities are congested with emotions which are constructed in time with mythmaking, teaching and their reproduction. For stirring the hearts of people; extreme feelings such as betrayal, hatred or heroism are often used as the ordinary progress of each nation's history. For example, Armenians continuously mention about the betrayal of either the outsiders or traitors within. With the reproduction of tales, the minds of new generations have been constantly filled with wars, disasters, times of starving to death, massacres and the well-known assertion of genocide.¹¹ Not surprisingly all these tales ends with enormous sacrifices and heroic perseverances which led them through the brink of extinction. Therefore the emotions such as hatred and pride had successfully served for the creation of a common sense on the development of a common national identity. Still, feelings are used as a powerful instrument of the Armenian diaspora in the search of political goals in many countries. Symbolism and mythmaking do not only construct a national identity; but also draw a new direction for the nation through insemination of common desires. The example of Kazakhstan asserts even a better point that even though the people did not have a common identity before the twentieth century, which decreases the common sense of historical awareness; nation makers had been able to construct a national identity based on an ancient, continuous and primordial history.¹² Without a doubt emotions have been the best friend of nation builders. Touching the apprehensions of folkloric alienation under the rule of USSR, efforts on uniting the nation under the banner of a common national pride and a new ideology for the place of socialism, which lost all its credit in the eyes of the public opinion, have been just a few examples of nation building process through stirring the sentiments in Kazakhstan. While emotions can be rambling, like anger or hatred, as the direction of them may not be certain; they can also be purposive like the emotion

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹² *Ibid.*

behind vengeance. Emotions like desires and beliefs are deliberate. They are related to some existing facts and differ from instinctive feelings such as agony, somnolence, disgust and dizziness.¹³ Sentiments are naturally related with certain actions whose existence affect or have affected the bearer of feelings. For example; guilt constructs an action tendency to remake, admit or to penalize self. Infamy gives the inclination to hide from others and even feel suicidal. Envy creates an action tendency to make the envied object to disappear from sight. Anger constructs a tendency to make the source of the anger pay. Lastly, the biggest sentiment, hatred creates an action tendency which gives the bearer a desire for wiping the source out of the earth.¹⁴ Therefore, the action tendency of emotions presents an opportunity to unite, mobilize and motivate for nation builders. Channeling all the idle sentiments which are born by the masses into a certain purpose allows the political actors to reach rational objectives; while giving the joy of unity to the people. From such a process; there happen social movements based on common desires which hold the possibility to turn into extreme movements in time.

Sentiments naturally have the specialty to show a variety depending on races, genders, groups and classes. Though the emotions exist either within or without the society; most of the sentiments are shaped by the groups of which individuals feel themselves as a member. As channeling emotions into a certain purpose ends up with the reconstruction of social consciousness; social consciousness also affects the direction of individual emotions. Consequently, in order to have a “common sense” in the society; there is needed “social norms”¹⁵; which are provided through the unity of senses. There is no possibility for all the cultures to conceptualize or exercise the same sentiments. When an emotion happen to be counted within “the conceptual catalogue of a culture”¹⁶; it becomes one of the ingredients that constitute the cement

¹³ Jan Elster, *Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction and Human Behavior*, MA MIT Press, (Cambridge, 2000), p. 35.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 38.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

which keep the society together while it might also gain the possibility to become a tool for discriminative desires for the future.

In some given circumstances people perceive and react in some certain ways which are triggered by the socially constructed emotions. Therefore the importance of historical and socio-cultural investigation on understanding the origins of ethnic wars increase for the International Relations Discipline. Sociologist Anne Kane's article on the Irish War between 1879 and 1882 offers a good example on the mobilization through appealing the senses of masses. Briefly explaining the situation; the general of the tenant farmers of post-Famine Ireland were enjoying an overall prosperity; however an economic downturn in 1870's revealed the inner problems of Irish land system. Not surprisingly, the source of the movement was fed by the smallest and the poorest tenancies which did not have the chance to harvest in 1878 and 1879.¹⁷ Those who put forward the idea for organizing tenant farmer objections and protest within a social movement were also coming from the most nationalist leaders; such as Michael Davitt, who read the then land system problem not only as a short-circuit in the economic system but also a national cause which happened to exist after years of British hegemony and exploitation over the Irish. Local leaders shared the idea that the Irish tenants needed to be mobilized against the British for the sake of the cause. Therefore, the local leaders from both nationalist and agrarian causes assembled and organized the first minor meetings which increasingly mobilized the tenants in a short time. By the end of 1880, the land movement had been supported by both the tenant farmers, nationalists and also the majority of the church. There had been resistance movements such as demonstrations at the sites of eviction; however the most prominent and figurative lunges of the land movement were the massive land meetings which took place every week and could even reach to ten times on any weekend.¹⁸ Those meetings were ritualistic in both their ceremonial form and content. Symbols had often been used for construction. Participants were

¹⁷ Anne Kane, "Finding Emotion in Social Movement Processes: Irish Land Movement Metaphors and Narratives", *Passionate Politics*, University of Chicago Press, (2001), p. 255.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p256

mostly the middle and low class farmers, labourers, merchants and professionals whose main reason for attending such meetings was actually their economic concerns. However with the power of speech, these concerns turned to be concerns over national cause. On the speakers' side; there were local leaders including tenant farmers, central Land League organizers, clergy and a couple of national leaders who expressed emotionally charged speeches elaborated with Irish history and myths.¹⁹ The substructure of the speeches which were given by the land lords, mostly the underlined parts, were about humiliation, hatred, sorrow, anger or disgust to or by the opponents; and solidarity, revenge, righteousness, perseverance and prevalence for the land and people.²⁰ Especially during the first year of the movement, the essential descriptions of degradation, humiliation and grief were expressed together. Taking one of the speeches of one of the leaders of the movement, priest father P. J. O' Brien's speech, in the meeting took place on November 2 1979 would grant us a good example of insemination of thoughts in masses' minds during undesirable eras:

It is with a soul overwhelmed by grief and humiliation that I am here. We are assembled today to try to have off the country a burden more oppressive than the mountains which crushed the giants of old; the intolerable incubus of an iniquitous land code. It is to lift up our voices in a loud wail of wretchedness to call in tones of piercing sadness upon those who are responsible for the lives of our people... Until Ireland has wrung her autonomy from the fears of England... never until self-government becomes an accomplished fact... will those melancholy meetings fade away into mere memories of her mournful doom under the Saxon's yoke."²¹

Clearly seen from the speech of father O'Brien, it is given place to mischief and humiliation of the British rule and the desired retribution of the Irish people with this movement. Elements of Irish myth such as the old giants are mentioned for the unity of tenants, laborers and professionals under a national cause instead of a denominational movement. The past experiences towards the British lords are referred with "intolerable incubus" with the aim of detracting the British lords, British land system and the British government. The land system and the British rulers were seen equal to all the reasons of Irish poverty and therefore people from

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.257.

various life conditions who had assembled for protesting the economic problems had been mobilized through appealing their national sentiments. Therefore, the substructure of all these meetings and the speeches given by the Irish movement leaders are good examples for mobilization through socially constructed emotions. While the movement broke out with economic concerns; it was converted into a national cause by the hands of a group of elites. Tumultuous terms cause the masses to easily go under the influence of emotions. As this kind of situations break the sense of rationality; sentiments become an instrument for insemination and mobilization. Therefore the processes after dramatic events need to be read and analyzed very carefully in order to understand what drives the motivations on killing.

Nationalism is a fact which is constituted with the unity of social emotion in a society. It represents the love towards one's or a group's love to its nation. While it creates a harmony and offers intimacy with the bondage it creates; it brings the possibility of skepticism and prejudice against the other societies. Therefore, except for the other types of love from a subject to something; the love for nation is suitable to be abused and turned into hatred against others. Benedict Anderson expresses this irony by saying that nations inspire love; and profoundly self-sacrificing love however insisting on the near-pathological character of nationalism, one might reach the roots in fear and hatred of "others" and its affinities with racism.²² The nation is a fact of imagination, and once it is imagined it is modelled, adapted and transformed which make it suitable for misuse. The borders of nationality are not certain thus it is available to turn into some sort of a weapon for radical movements that might make ordinary people feel ready to die for their nation. Ernst Moritz Arndt (26 December 1769-29 January 1860), one of the early German nationalists, defines the German nation as a community which is bound together by love. "From the North Sea to the Carpathians, from the Baltic to the Alps, from the *Vistula* to the *Schelde*, one belief, one love, one spirit and one passion must again bring together the whole German Volk in brotherly union."²³ Looking at his words, we can find the roots of the

²² Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

²³ Suny, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

constitution of national identity in love and passion where the rationality can easily lose its ground. According to Arndt, the love for fatherland is like a highest form of a religion, a passion that is even superior to one's love for his/her mother, father and children.²⁴ Groups bound together by rational terms might also have exclusive attributes; however in such groups, all kinds of exclusive actions are linked to a certain logic where both the included and the excluded know about the borders of the community. However if the emotions are the case, the level and the type of exclusive actions are varied according to group's perspective on their nation. Therefore there is an uncertainty in the behaviors of members against the "others." This uncertainty and the direction of behaviours is a matter of experiences throughout the history. Historical transformation is the main determinant that construct social emotions, as Gustave Le Bon's words underline it:

Changes in emotions, rather than in thought or social life were the key to historical transformations. Emotions and reason are always operated at cross purposes.²⁵

-Gustave Le Bon-

2.2. Conclusion

As the purpose of this thesis is to find out the reasons behind ethnic conflicts and the role of emotions in fragmentation; it started by examining the construction of social identity and its evolution to ethnicity. In this sense, it investigated the ideas of various scholars about how the social identity is constructed. Therefore, in this chapter it was mainly focused on whether the social identity is historical or artificial, the role of emotions in the constitution of social identity, its attachment with ethnicity and the construction of "us" and the "others". According to many scholars searching for the origins of social identity, it has various artificial aspects within. However, it is more of a historical and natural process as it is described as a matter of

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Suny, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

survival instinct. Each individual is born to a family which is shaped by a greater structure which we may call the society. As human kind is strongly attached both with emotions and sociality, adoption of social identity is rather natural than artificial. There is a circular construction of social identity as the individual is influenced by the outer structure while the outer structure is also influenced by the members that constitute it. Experiences, during the historical process determine the way individuals perceive themselves, and the others. In this sense a division is constructed between “us” and “the others”. However, the proportion of emotionality gains weight in the evolution of social identity to an ethnic identity. Unlike social identity, ethnic identity bears sacred and mythical meanings which make it more subjective than the social identity. Ethnic identity can be described with the accumulation of precarious times experienced in the past. In such times, human kind shows a tendency to attend sacred meanings to their existence in order to overcome the situation. Objectivity is replaced with a subjective and mythical perception towards social identity which results in the construction of ethnic identity. It is not surprising that all societies with ethnic consciousness have a mythology, and all these mythologies bear elements of anxiety, fear and sanctity to overcome hopeless situations. In this sense, it can be realized that there are no happy tales for ethnic identities. Thus, social identity evolves to ethnicity in the point where extreme emotions like fear, hatred or anxiety rise. With a simple but true saying, ethnic identity is created by emotions and gain strength with emotions such as anxiety. Therefore, it can also be seen that the greatest difference between social identity and ethnic identity is the emotional aspects of ethnicity. From a general perspective, social identity is constituted as a consequence of historical experiences and individual needs. It is an accumulation of individual behaviours and manners reacting to such experiences. On the other hand, social identity gains ethnicity as it is attached with sanctity in times of depression. Thus there is a direct relation between the ethnic identity and emotions. We may go a bit further by saying that there is a positive correlation between extreme emotions and ethnic consciousness.

As a conclusion, in this chapter it was aimed at the foundations of social identity and how social identity is attached with ethnicity in order to understand the role of

ethnicity in fragmentation of societies into ethnic camps, participation of civilians in ethnic conflicts and their adoption of brutal ways. Thus, the thesis may go on with investigating theories concerning ethnic conflicts in order to analyze different perspectives towards the subject and also to contribute to our study by combining historical cases with theoretical explanations.

3. THEORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

In the second half of the twentieth century, wars between nation states had started to leave their place to global terrorism in the international level and ethnic wars in the domestic level. As the death toll from ethnic wars increased, the attention of international society turned into such incidents and the facts that caused them happen. With the claims towards genocide (the most extreme and systematic form of ethnic cleansing) could have the chance to get more attention from the international society; more variables such as modernity, elites, propaganda, exploitation, mobilization and manipulation were included in subjects which accordingly caused scholars to develop some consistent approaches to understand the origins of ethnic wars. Therefore, examining theories which have been developed to understand the reasons of ethnic conflicts would be invaluable to understand the motivating factors on mass killing. Keeping the latest researches and writings about the ethnic conflicts in mind; we can divide the approaches into those underline rationality and those underline emotional structure of human. Underlining rationality or emotions; it has been developed a number of competing approaches in order to understand the processes leading ethnic wars in their own way. Primordialist approach, political entrepreneurs approach, competition over resources theories and institutional approaches have been a few major competing ethnic conflict theories. Primordialist approach helps explain the role of emotions and the conflict potential of ethnicity. Political entrepreneurs approach, competition over resources theories and institutional approaches explain how the interaction of institutional and political factors with ethnic emotions lead to ethnification, ethnic intolerance, competition and finally conflict.²⁶ Since the role of human motivation in ethnic wars and the number of variables make the subject more fluid and complicated; linking the incidents in a few reasons and depending on a single theory would definitely be limited. Therefore, rationality should also be considered according to this logic in the case of ethnic

²⁶ Bojana Blegojevic, "Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework", *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, Vol. 3, No. 1, (2009, New York), p. 3.

wars. Rational choice approaches are undeniably functional to understand individual behaviour in given situations. However they are not enough to explain social behaviour in the cases of intense circumstances. Approaches based on rationality are successful in understanding the rational reasons behind political elites' manipulative actions. However, they are not enough to explain the power of collective identities, especially subjects like ethnicity, nationality and nation. Despite all the rational reasons we can imagine; there is still some questions to ask; why do individual human beings commit acts, sometimes brutal and humiliating acts, against other individual human beings of a different ethnic category?²⁷ How can people be ready to kill or be killed for their collective identities, their social connections? Even if there is a certain manipulation, why do ordinary people respond to the elite manipulation, how can ethnicity be enough to mobilize?²⁸ Even in the most rational case; absence of sentiments into the explanation can prevent you from reaching a proper point. We need to underline that "how" is not only related with what happened in the past. "How" is interested in how it happened just like unforgettable memories. Extreme emotions are derived from extreme experiences. Killing is unquestionably horrible, but how it is done makes it unforgettable.

As a conclusion, ethnic conflict theories will be conducted in this chapter. Despite the number of different theoretical approaches, there will be no effort on justifying one or other but trying to equally benefit from each in order to contribute understanding the motivating factors on mass killing.

2.1. A General View on Ethnic Conflict Theories

Examining the conditions that brought societies into the brink of ethnic conflict; it can be found some common factors like a major structural crisis, increasing tension

²⁷ Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*, Cambridge University Press, (September, 2002), p. 2.

²⁸ Suny, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

on the competition over national resources, occurrence of incidents which brings back the memories of old hatreds, institutional factors which escalates inter-group intolerance, manipulation of historical memories by the political elite by the awakening of hate and fear against “others”.²⁹ There is no doubt a higher possibility for ethnic conflict in ethnically heterogenic societies. In case of a dramatic change in the conjuncture like a military coup, a major natural disaster, state institutions may lose their functionality, there might be a huge gap in the authority and there might be a radical economic and political transition. These create instability and uncertainty about the political, social and economic future of groups in a country. Therefore a collective fear for the future arouses within groups.³⁰ Consequently, the most general explanations about the ethnic conflict are generally related with inter-group differences, ancient hatreds and centuries old disputes which are totally factual but not enough when it comes to the reasons which bring back such sentiments. There are needed dramatic events which cause a fear for safety. Such incidents might create a chance for a burst of emotions between national residents. Therefore the political elites find an opportunity to mobilize communities with the use of sentiments to promote fear, hatred and resentment between groups in order to fulfill their political goals. This results in an inter-ethnic competition over resources and rights and reconstruction of social categories of “us” and “others”. Consequently, ethnification and ethnic intolerance rise, where social, psychological and political importance of one’s own ethnic identity increase, with a high tendency of a transition into physical violence among ethnic groups.

3.1. Primordialist Approach

According to primordialist approach there is a tendency to bear ancient hatreds among ethnic and cultural groups. People obtain some particular differences at birth

²⁹ Blegojevic, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁰ David Lake & Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict”, *International Security*, Vol. 21. No.2, (1996), p. 41.

or in the family. Ethnic loyalty arises from deep, possibly hereditary, feeling close to people like oneself and a tendency to fear strangers or stay cautious from people who are “different”³¹. Ethnicity plays a motivator role in people’s directions which can end up with group altruism. The instinct to define and discriminate “us” and “others” goes back to our ancestors, even to our animal prototypes. Thus primordialism plays a vital role on the formation of individual identity through a process of collective definition.³² For the primordialist approach, leaning to xenophobic actions and prejudices are some natural habits of human beings³³ and in case of a loss in the ability of one’s self control; groups instinctively hold onto their ethnic or ethnical identifications or what stirs their heart about their self-descriptions. Such primitive descriptions include a priori meaning that they are natural units which derive their cohesion from some inherent biological, cultural or racial traits that has the possibility to become instruments for social differentiation.³⁴ However the primordialist theoreticians gives importance to distinguish that not the ethnicity but the emotions, which make people develop a strong bondage with their ethnic identity, are stamped on our genes.³⁵ In case of a tumultuous situation, social emotions lead groups to perform their actions. Rothschild (1931-2000) claims that in a situation of rapid change, people perform a variety of actions from sticking to their identity, rediscovering it or even totally re-constituting a new ethnicity assuming that it is eternal, essential and primordial. For Rothschild, there are some reasons attached with survivality such as; the need for personal identification, emotional security and communal anchorage.³⁶ Whether the differentiation comes with a conditional nausea;

³¹ Suny, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

³² Ashley Tellis & Thomas S. Szayna & James A. Winnefeld, *Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model*, Rand Arroyo Center, (November 01, 2000), p. 18.

³³ Beverly Crawford & Ronnie Lipschutz, *The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict”: Politics, Economics and “Cultural” Violence*, GAIA Research Series, (Berkeley, January 1998), p. 10.

³⁴ Tellis, Szyna, Winnefeld, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁵ Henry E. Hale, “Explaining Ethnicity”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (May, 2004), 460.

³⁶ Blegojevic, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

identification of ethnicity in a primordialist way gains power in deviant times. Massive perception of threat mobilizes groups. Most of the primordialist theoreticians connect ethnic violence with these social differentiations between ethnic groups. Quarrel and clashes arise from incompatible preferences which are generally main reasons for violence. Fearon makes his primordial ethnic conflict analysis through the use of term “mistrust”. According to him, mistrust and animosity among ethnic groups escalates the disharmony which is one of the essential reinforcers of ethnic violence.³⁷ Though sentiments such as mistrust and animosity have a tendency to be triggered by the political actors or interest groups; Fearon adds these basic senses to the primordialist approach as they are already transferred by the genes but need to be ignited by an external factor. In order to conceptualize the ethnic conflict subject; Fearon also tries to implement his primordialist approach on the process of ethnic conflict in former communist countries. In his examination; people under the communist rule had hated and battled each other for centuries before the domination of Soviet Union and other communist states. During the communist rule, this hatred between different ethnic groups did not diminish but was suppressed by the autocratic rule of governments. Therefore, during these years “the pot was boiled over”, in his words, and consequently; beginning with the powerful autocracies started losing their power, conflicts immediately emerged.³⁸ Though Fearon uses terms which are also open to be used by constructivist and institutional ethnic conflict theoreticians, he strongly contributes the subject and manages to stay consistent as these sentiments may be counted as main elements which constitute human behaviour along the generations.

Philip Yang (1981-...) also contributes the subject by adding three elements to primordialist ethnic conflict explanations. Firstly, ethnicity is an ascribed identity or an assigned status which is gained by hereditary transfer from ancestors. Taking Chinese identity as an example; physical and cultural characteristics of a Chinese is

³⁷ Tatiana Rizova, “A Case of Contested Sovereignty: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1991-2002”, *Review of European Studies*, Vol. 3. No. 2., Center of Sciend and Education, (December, 2011), p. 75.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

inherited to new generations since, as Yang describes, ethnicity is an extremely intense bondage to one's ancestral bloodline.³⁹ This extreme bondage is without a doubt is the main reason for the loss of prudence and logic during tensions among ethnic groups. Therefore it contributes the purpose of manipulative actions. Secondly, according to Yang; primordial approach defines ethnicity as static. As a significant natural consequence of ascribed identity, ethnic boundaries marking the insiders and the outsiders of an ethnic group are fixed or immutable. Having born as a Chinese means that there is no chance to shift to another group.⁴⁰ Lastly, for Yang, the fact that determines one's ethnicity is his/her common ancestry. In other words, people belong to an ethnic group because of the fact that all the members of that group share common biological and conventional heritages.⁴¹ Therefore the members of a group do not think about a cause-and affect relation about their membership to their groups. The sense of belonging is not gained by choice which brings the possibility to harm the sense of logic. In a state of lack of logic, there is a strong possibility for all kinds of fanaticism. Primordialist approach underlines the importance of facts like lineage and cultural ties on the constitution of ethnic identity. For the primordialist, these primordial bonds ignite the sentiments of love, hatred, envy or disgust. Primordialist approach emphasizes the importance of emotions in cases of ethnic conflict or conditions suitable for it. While ethnic emotions appear to be primordial; they are socially and politically constructed which are fed by bringing back long-forgotten injustices and cruelties. History is used to support speculations towards cultural, ethnic and religious identities and eventually reconstruct the ethnic identity in a concentrated purpose.⁴² In order to create a common sense, national identity is reconstructed through the use of instruments such as teaching and iteration of conventions. Consequently, putting negative emotions in

³⁹ Philip Q. Yang, *Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches*, State University of New York Press, (2000), p. 42.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Blegojevic, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

the place of elements which constitute ethnic identity, especially when directed to a particular group, reproduces ethnification and discrimination within a society.

For the primordialist approach, ethnicity is so deeply rooted in minds that the way how the society exercise their lives, how the culture is shaped are totally influenced with its power; which is why the ethnic identities have the potential on determining the direction to either hatred or respect. Primordialism's positioning in not changing according to economic and political conditions differentiates the approach from instrumentalism's fluidity.⁴³ Constitution of a linkage between the past and the present that dignifies one's membership to a collective identity is required in order to search for the roots of ethnic conflict within primordial reasons. This linkage enlightens an eternal period filled with accumulation of memories that makes a fixed and inherited individual and collective self-description with the use of kinship.⁴⁴ For the primordialists, kinship and memory are seen to be the main reasons for the wills on conservation and storatoin of past emotions, holding negative attributions within, and evaluation of present and future according to them. As the collective identity and kinship is related with past experiences and memories, bad memories of old hatreds can be considered as a connection point between ethnic radicalism and conflicts derived from ethnic identity.

Most of the primordialist theoreticians assert that along with socio-political reasons, inheritance needs to be given more attention in order to understand the human motivation leading to ethnification. Therefore, sociobiological perspective gains power in the search for the roots of ethnic violence. The sociobiological perspective represented by Pierre Van den Berghe (1933-...), who began to use the term "ethny" as early as the 1970's, emphasizes the importance of a sociobiological fact, a kinship, in order to explain ethnicity. According to Van den Berghe ethnic identity is a derivation of kinship. Ethnic and racial sentiments are seen to be as an extension of

⁴³ Amanda Kearney, "Ethnicity in Wounded Spaces: Instrumentalism and the Making of Africa in Brazil", *NSN: An Ethnic Studies Journal*, (2012), UC Berkeley, p. 44.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

kinship ties.⁴⁵ Ethnic identity is constituted and continued around common ancestral bondage of group members.⁴⁶ Therefore, keeping this explanation in mind, we can reach a conclusion that ethnicity will never perish since kinship always exists. Another variant view that sociobiological perspective contains is the culturalist perspective. For the culturalist perspective, the common culture is the main fact that determines borders of ethnic group membership which also feeds the exclusionary estimations. Elements that establish a common culture such as common language and common religion defines the origin and tenacity of ethnic identity even in the absence of common ancestors.⁴⁷ Therefore, not only the biological matters which create an opportunity for the justification of illogical superiority of an ethnic group but also the conventions that are developed in time may also contribute to the differentiation process.

At this point, it may be a brief look at symbolist political theory since it makes a productive contribution by inspecting the role of primitive tales and myths which constitute the basis of conventions. However, it needs to be underlined that symbolist approach on ethnic conflict constitutes a bridging point between instrumentalist and primordialist approaches as it contains both the creation of myths from primordial elements and use of these myths as instruments of political goals. Thus, it references subjective primordial facts and their role in rational political purposes; and accept both primordial facts and rationality in terms of ethnic conflict. In this sense, the approach needs to be considered under the topics of both primordialism and instrumentalism.

Symbolist political theory, adopts a socio-psychological view which focuses on the intangible facts that create the group boundaries and appear as the basis motivation behind ethnification and ethnic violence. Symbolist theoreticians emphasize that all

⁴⁵ Daniele Conversi, "Mapping The Field: Theories of Nationalism and the Ethnosymbolic Approach", *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations*, Edinburgh University Press, (Edinburgh, 2006), p.16.

⁴⁶ Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

sorts of ethnic violence, even genocide, have a strong connection with “differentiating” group myths which create and justify hostility, mistrust, and symbolic politics of xenophobic mobilization.⁴⁸ These hostility creating myths stir sentiments by elaborating emotional symbols which make a suitable ground for rational wills along with differentiating politics of political actors. However, the symbolists do not accept that ethnicity is an instrument which is constructed by the elites in order to motivate the masses. They do not reject that ethnicity is used as a hegemonic instrument however they consider it as a natural fact not a matter of human creation. According to symbolist theoreticians, shared culture and the elucidation of group history creates bondage between group members and constitutes a distinction between other groups. Therefore irrationality and deep emotions can be abused by the rational purposes of individuals.⁴⁹ This is why the symbolists claim that myths should be taken more seriously in the analysis of ethnic violence. In conflictual situations, political elites can stay rational in order to turn the situation into an opportunity. While masses tend to act according to motivations derived by emotions such as fear or hatred instead of rational calculations; they might get under the control of political entrepreneurs who show the ability to behave rational and contemplate analytical. Stuart Kaufman (1939-...), one of the leading symbolist theoreticians, asserts three conditions necessary for ethnic violence. First of all, symbols and myths justifying hostility against an ethnic group gain popularity. Then an opportunity arises to politically mobilize masses against a group. Lastly, fear becomes the main element of ethnification.⁵⁰ While the second condition, rise of an opportunity to mobilize masses, reflects an institutional explanation of ethnic violence, ethnic fears and symbols supports the primordialist explanations towards the subject. According to Kaufman, the emotional factors rather than rationality are the main motivators that drive groups to violence. Therefore, we can understand that according to the symbolist approach, the origins of group action in the ethnic

⁴⁸ Stuart Kaufman, “Symbolist Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence”, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 4, MIT Press, p. 46.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁵⁰ Kaufman, *Modern hatreds*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

violence need to be searched within psychological factors⁵¹ since the ethnic violence itself is totally out of rationality as long as the masses, not individuals are taken as the main subject.

Though primordialists advocate the explanations of ethnic conflict by underlining the essential elements of group identity, fixed codes transferred with genes from ancestors; some of the primordialist theoreticians also claim that there is an inescapable change in the group boundaries. For instance, Isaacs (1910-1986), who clearly adopts the primordialist view, also underlines that ethnic identities change in time, whereas group cultures are not fixed, ethnic history suffers from lack of meeting the requirements of present. He also expresses that the content of group hostility is more a variable than being constant.⁵² However these theoreticians constitute only a minor percentage of primordialists since most of them focus on the intensity of group identifications, facts that differentiate groups and sentiments which increase the gap between them; such as hatred, disgust or desire for vengeance. Therefore, taking sentiments and ancestral legacy as a main principle on explaining the ethnic conflict drives the primordialist theoreticians shift to irrationality. For example Walker Connor (1926-...) mention about the non-rational but still reasonable nature of ethnic and national bond. For Connor, there is a sense of kinship among the group members. This kinship does not mean a matter of historical tie between group members. However it creates a “feeling of consanguinity”⁵³ which arises a willingness to make sacrifices. Edward Shils (1910-1995) also contributes the term by adding that “a state of intense and common solidarity”, which does not have to mean biological heritage, carries the possibility of demanding individual sacrifice for the group. According to Shils, ethnic and national ties of people are connected to matters without which people cannot live; consequently it makes it primordial. He goes on by explaining these vital matters by traditionality, the

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵² Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press, (Los Angeles, 1985), p. 74.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

persistence of past into the present; and collective self-consciousness, referents which generates boundaries.⁵⁴ Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) contributes Shils' efforts on emphasizing non-hereditary matters by highlighting the group perceptions about their groups. According to Geertz not the history based on common blood and absolute cultural bonds but the group perceptions for the primordality of group actually influence behaviours.⁵⁵ For Geertz even a bondage to a mechanical group can create fanaticism as long as it is perceived as primordial by the group members. Not the factual situation itself but the perception of it has the power to procure a sense of awareness and a sense of belonging which create a comparison of others and bring the possibility of manipulation, mobilization and ethnic discrimination.

Some primordialist ethnic conflict theoreticians make their analysis with a comparison of situations connected with distribution of economic and political resources. For them, ethnic groups are located in heterogenic societies where there is a possibility of competition among ethnic components. Whether the relations inside ethnic groups are personal or impersonal in nature, social relations between ethnic groups are consistently impersonal and they are created through market structures or the political process.⁵⁶ For each of the ethnic groups in a certain society, these institutions are the key factor of distribution of wealth and power; thus create both winners and losers. Therefore both the winners and the losers assemble together in the same group as ethnic groups rise or fall as a whole, making ethnic violence a strong possibility. Even if a certain ethnic group does not include the needed portion of objectively disadvantaged individuals, inter-group conflict can still occur with the definition process of group identity, adoption of myths about the defiance of the group that cause to channel the resentments of the individuals towards other groups rather than neutralizing them within itself.⁵⁷ According to these primordialist theoreticians, conflicts can occur even within an ethnic group as a result of economic

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

⁵⁶ Tellis, Szyna, Winnefeld, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

competition. However, primordialist approach, based on the definition of ethnic groups with forms of organic solidarity derived from natural ties of biology, culture or race, underlines that such a competition within an ethnic group would not be that substantial or result in large-scale violence as long as it is not directed at one's ethnic associates. A large scaled ethnic based violence directed to a certain ethnic group which is proliferated with the loss of sanity can only be possible within a competitive society which is accepted to have tribally constituted through the biological inheritance.

Without a doubt primordial approach is significantly successful on explaining the essential reasons that bring ancient hatreds and tendencies on conflict based on the biological nature of humanity; however, it suffers from assigning too much meaning to fixed and essential facts about human nature on its explanations.⁵⁸ Since the approach assumes that culturally defined groups are naturally exclusionist and directed by limited conventional values which block the universality; identical elements such as language, ethnicity, traditions and religion have a strong tendency of creating conflict among different ethnic groups. For primordialist approach, only the parochial norms attributed to cultural groups are enough to lead them to extremism and subsequently the violence.⁵⁹ Cultural differences do not always cause extremism and conflict among cultural groups. For example, Muslims and Christians in Bulgaria enjoy different cultural conventions and see themselves culturally different from each other. However though there had been clashes between the Muslims and Christians in the last period of the Cold War; now people of Bulgaria are able to live in peace⁶⁰. The possibility of conflict in a hetero-ethnic society is without a doubt higher than societies exercising unitary conventions; but ethnic differences lead to clashes only when they are politically charged. Also the cultural identity becomes a matter of separatist movements if it turns out to be a reason for the way of distribution of economic resources, rights and protection.

⁵⁸ Crawford & Lipschutz, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Crawford bends on the deficiencies from which primordialist approach suffers. According to Crawford, primordial approaches are not sufficient to explain the importance of state institutions on igniting, soothing or escalating the ethnic conflict through structural incentives which emphasize or depreciate cultural identity with its institutional instruments. These instruments are found hidden within the citizenship laws, rules of accountability, participation or distribution which have the ability to build a political structuration that might appease or empower the possibility of ethnic or religious political conflict.⁶¹ Crawford gives the example of Malaysia where the cultural identities are politically relevant however they are directed to create a peaceful political competition among the groups with the institutional structuration of state and economy. England also asserts a good example where universal membership in the political community combined with supportive liberal institutions do not let the politicization of ethnic matters and the structure of party politics are set to wedge the position needed by the political actors to benefit from ethnification.⁶² Just the opposite can also be seen by looking at the examples of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Darfur where state institutions and media were used for ethnification. Glancing over such examples, we can clearly understand that state's institutional structuration can be put on the center of ethnic politics. No matter how the institutional structuration of the state is constituted, culturally and ethnically polarized societies are much easier to get mobilized as accumulated hatred and collective memories of harassment gives the population a strong tendency to respond the political actors' efforts to encourage them for political action or even violence. Rajat Ganguly also believes in the probability of ethnic conflict in hetero-ethnic societies; however he specifically underlines the role of rapid change, a state of nausea or a chaotic situation in the ethnic conflict. According to Ganguly, in case of an uncertainty or a state of chaos, the long forgotten hatreds and extreme consciousness towards ethnic identification can be instrumentalised for ethnification for the sake of political goals. Exaggerating the power of sense of belonging,

⁶¹ Crawford & Lipschutz, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁶² *Ibid.*

attending too much meaning to biological facts or considering the historical hostilities as the only reasons for the polarization is insufficient.⁶³ More importantly, seeing historical and current realities of ethnic groups as a result of pre-determined or primordial factors might give way to exclusivist and homogeneous nations and strengthens the justification efforts on deportation or even ethnic cleansing since ethnic violence is shown to be inevitable in multi-ethnic societies. Therefore, a proper understanding of the causes of ethnic polarization and mobilization is more likely to be done through moving beyond picking up reasons out of primitive stimulations. Also, believing in progress instead of eternity and perpetuity help us understand one's reality as constructed which at least strengthens the logic and choice in the definition of one's identity. Indeed a tenacious bondage results in a loss of reasoning which creates an illogical bilateral tension. However, moving away from primordialist explanations may also help develop more elaborated ways to cope with ethnic conflict.

Primordialist theoreticians believe that possibility of ethnic violence between two ethnic groups is inevitable as there are unchanging, essential characteristics within those groups. Specifically, ethnic violence breaks out of perpetual antipathies and resentments the ethnic groups adopt. However, constructivist theoreticians consider the claims towards unchanging, essential characteristics exceedingly exaggerated and taking the easy way out to explain such a complicated issue.⁶⁴ According to critics, even though there is hostility between two ethnic groups, it does not have to have an eternal reason. Moreover, taking primordialist view as the main explanation of ethnic conflicts creates desperation for the resolving of the possibility of ethnic conflicts since nothing can be done to prevent ethnic conflict in such unavoidable and fixed conditions. Conducting ethnic hatred as something which is attached with ethnic groups and seen to be fixed makes the problem totally simplified

⁶³ Blegojevic, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁶⁴ James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity", *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4, (Autumn, 2000), p. 849.

and decrease the possibility of making broader solutions.⁶⁵ Such a simplification, blocks the way to examine the variables causing mass-killing by activating the long-forgotten hostilities. Reducing the subject solely to primordialist approach also results in a degree of ignorance and prejudice against the societies, which had already suffered from ethnic conflict, by empowering the claims like only the primitive civilizations bear the facts that lead ethnic violence.

As a conclusion, the primordialist approach offers a credible explanation for some of the reasons of ethnic animosities which play the key roles on the preparation of suitable conditions for ethnic hostility. However it suffers from insufficient and inconsistent evaluations that miss the origins of ethnic violence. It is not enough to explain why ethnic memberships or identities of individuals and groups change. Moreover, it cannot fully explain why new ethnic identities, such as Asian American, emerge from various groups which are biologically and culturally distinct; and why ethnic identities fade and vanish. More importantly, it totally passes over the political interests strictly aligned with misdirection of masses using ethnicity as an instrument of separation.⁶⁶ These are shortly the main points that primordialist approach is not enough to explain ethnic conflict as a whole. Having suffered from the fixations of primordialist approach; perception on seeking the sources of ethnic identity and differences in the historical process, explaining identity as an accumulation of human action and choices rather than attributing natural and sacred meanings to ethnicity have turned the attention of discipline into more flexible and rational explanations. Therefore, the study can go on with the perspectives that political relevance of cultural identity is socially constructed which the thesis can find by proceeding to instrumentalist approach.

⁶⁵ Blegojevic, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁶⁶ Yang, *Op.Cit.*, p. 43.

3.2. Instrumentalist Approach

The instrumentalist approach simply considers ethnicity as a strategic tool, an instrument, for gaining power and resources. The reason for calling the approach as “instrumentalism” is that the approach tries especially to underline how the ethnic symbols are used as a means of individual interests.⁶⁷ According to instrumentalist analysis, people tend to impact on their ethnic identities as long as ethnicity provides significant gains to them. Consequently, the approach asserts that existence and adoption of ethnicity is not for its sanctity but its convenience. For the instrumentalist approach, not only the political elites but every single individual should be taken as a matter of subject; as ethnification can be used by anyone as long as it brings remarkable utilities. However, when it comes to ethnic conflict; relations between political elites and ethnic groups, and political interests of political actors are explicably given more attention by the approach. Elites seeking to maximize their interests are capable of using the ethnic features of a group to gain concrete benefits. Political leaders without enough reformist skills, or wills but abilities to appeal masses tend to consolidate their political power through addressing and provoking emotional, generally national or religious, sentiments where the realization of reformist demands are no longer even demanded by the followers. Violence can be instrumentalised and used to achieve certain material benefits which include political and economic power such as the control of a certain group. Political actors can put the ethnic politics in the center of their political agenda in order to increase their material or non-material ambitions through benefiting from polarization of the society. With the help of governmental institutions political elites can mobilize groups towards a direction. Therefore, instrumentalism finds it logical to inspect the policy efforts of political elites in cases of ethnic tensions which makes the approach an important analytical framework as it tries to shed light on the existence of a crucial connection between the elite and the “grassroots level of politics”⁶⁸ that

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁶⁸ Rizova, *Op.Cit.*, p. 75.

brings the efforts on large scaled calculations towards loss and gains. For the instrumentalist approach, costs and benefits related with ethnic group membership determines the level of group bondage. When an ethnic choice appears, the costs and benefits play a vital role in defining the options which totally shows the ethnic identity as a matter of rational goals. However, instrumentalist theoreticians underlines that not all ethnic choices are rational and materialistic.⁶⁹ Many people “pridefully” bear their ethnic identities not for material reasons such as political and economic gains but for emotional reasons that mostly contain the need for social attachment. Nevertheless, use of identity in favour of political purposes can make it a perfect subject in the motivator factors of mass killing.

According to Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, who are two of the leading theoreticians of instrumentalism, ethnicity is not a reflection of affective emotions; but it works as if an interest group, a useful means of political mobilization for fulfilling political and economic goals.⁷⁰ Ethnic and national bondage does not have to be a result of sanctified or eternal organic ties but it seems to be a constitution of mechanical ties, like a class membership. Despite most of the instrumentalist theoreticians accept both the facts that ethnic identity has some primordial ties and it is also instrumentalised for interests, some radical instrumentalists do not even recognize the term “nation” by claiming that it does not reflect the reality. For the radical instrumentalists the ethnic identity has nothing to do with primordialism and it has always been edited by the political elites in purpose of manipulating society. In other extreme forms, acquisition and maintenance of ethnic membership and identity is totally explained with the desire of holding a comparative advantage.⁷¹ The salience with ethnic identity shifts time to time as the benefits also show no consistency. These extreme positions based on a never ending renovation of ethnicity for individual interests cause an attribution of a constructivist meaning on the instrumentalist approach. For the radical instrumentalists, there is a great gap

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

between political and economic elites and people that they are constantly manipulated by the elites. Along with the idea, Paul Gagnon claims that ethnic conflicts are provoked by political and economic elites in order to create a domestic sphere where the only politically relevant entity is ethnicity. Elites create a rhetoric based on framing of ideas, expression of values and judgements and exposing political arguments. They try to influence the course of competition among groups in the political arena, which can result in a system of political representation based mainly on ethnic and religious identity instead of values, interests and ideologies. For example, Gagnon inspects the mobilization of Serbs against all other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia and reaches a point that political elites in Yugoslavia had an absolute part in the whole process. For Gagnon, Serbian elites continuously victimized Serbs which created a massive feeling of damnification and caused the justification of inhumanity against Albanian minority. Ethnic matters were instrumentalised such as framing the NLA (Macedonian National Liberation Army) rebel as terrorists in order to demonize Albanian society. Therefore the Serbian elites could have the chance to consolidate their power while avoiding the circumstances of Serb violence ended up with genocide.⁷² Suitable to Gagnon's ideas; Eric Hobsbawm considers political and economic elites as ambitious "social engineers"⁷³ who have the capability to motivate and mobilize masses through attracting their parochial emotions. He also adds the term "invention of tradition"⁷⁴ in order to reflect how the power of elites and political actors persist through the ages with the emphasis of symbolic agendas. Nations are not fixed, pre-determined, eternal, natural facts that they are derived from discursive and political practices for long-term gains. Leaders with universally notorious reputations such as Hitler, Milosevic and Saddam Hussein are known to have used immoral, dishonest and cruel practices to create massive disinformation towards ethnic entities to stimulate them to inhumane actions escalating until genocide by creating an atmosphere as if harsh measures were needed to be taken for

⁷² Rizova, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁷³ Conversi, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

survival. Though this does not have to mean that they instantly invented ethnic symbols and myths for the mobilization of people, there still stands a tremendous reality that ethnic emotions are used for a very simple purpose; achievement and maintenance of power.⁷⁵ On this point, Anthony Smith tries to pull attention to the balance between construction of ethnic identity and use of it as a matter of manipulation. He questions how far myths, conventions and other elements of distinctive ethnic identity can be invented. According to Smith, without a doubt ethnicity is used as a tool for manipulation and abuse. However, he underlines that considering ethnicity as a constructed matter to be used as an instrument of insemination is away from logic. For political achievement, political and economic elites use existing myths and conventions instead of creating them. Against the reductive claims that all the key activists in mobilized groups are in the pursuit of personal interests; Smith also asserts that some might be only after the maintenance of their cultural heritage.⁷⁶ After all, ethnification is a clear result of conscious actions derived from political elites' political purposes. Considering the elitist claims about common goods and common interests, they should only be named as "alleged" common interests. Orlando Patterson contributes the subject by claiming that the strength, scope, viability and bases of ethnic identity are determined by the general class interests of individuals and they are used for their achievement.⁷⁷ Some of the moderate instrumentalists also explain ethnicity through the relation of advantages from ethnicity and bondage to it. For example, Daniel Bell claims that the perception over ethnicity is getting more attractive as it has the ability to combine advantages of ethnicity with affective ties. Also Cohen asserts that cultural homogeneity of people help them become organized as an interest group which also increases ethnic cohesion.⁷⁸ From this point we can understand that; whether the ethnicity is primordial, eternal and historical or not, the reason for mobilization always bears

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid*

⁷⁷ Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p. 47.

people's unity around a common interest. There is a complicated situation with the cause and affect relation with ethnicity that ethnic bondage is not a cause itself but just a reinforcer for unity over interests. Ethnic conflicts and even massive cleansings are performed under the title of patriotism or other titles used for one's love for his/her nationality; but when you dig up; you may find strong material reasons. Fanaticism may even be used as a cloak to cover the insanity based on so called rational purposes namely taking control of a territory or management of resources. Not going too far; from Bell, Cohen and Patterson, we can understand that interests are the only determinants for one's intimacy level with his/her ethnicity. As the advantages gained by the ethnicity are not permanent, ethnic bondage also shows a provisional association. Along with the relation between the gains from ethnic identity and bondage to it; some instrumentalists assert that people have multiple identities. This does not mean that people identify themselves with a variety of identities at the same time, as if they are mentally ill; but the instrumentalists aim to emphasize that identical descriptions of people may have a shift depending on the change in conditions; which is like a multiple dimensionality in identity.⁷⁹ Examining the point, rationality and calculations which are highlighted by the instrumentalist perspective seem to be capable of removing all kinds of emotion motivated behaviours which generally stands as the main triggers of ethnic differentiation and violence. John and Jean Comaroff use the term "looseness" in order to categorize the quality of ethnicity by defining them as an organizational category or mechanism of affiliation for human groups in a more instrumentalist way. They define ethnicity as a "labile repertoire of signs by means of which relations are constructed and communicated; through which a collective consciousness of cultural likeness is rendered sensible; reference to which shared sentiment is made substantial"⁸⁰ In the constitution of ethnic identity, the importance of relations and communication through the cultural signs is beyond questioning. However collective consciousness among people is seen to be sensible as the general

⁷⁹ Henry E. Hale, "Explaining Ethnicity", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (May, 2004), 480.

⁸⁰ Amanda Kearney, "Ethnicity in Wounded Spaces: Instrumentalism and Making of Africa in Brazil", *NSN: An Ethnic Studies Journal*, (2012, Berkeley), p. 46.

of the group is aware of the fact that constitution of the group identity was a result of historical goal congruence which makes ethnicity a loose organization structure while defeating its distinctive power. While the use of term looseness strengthens the rationality in adopting social identity, it stands insufficient in explaining the motivation of mass killing. Even the most prominent instrumentalist theoreticians may need to set a balance in the rationality and affiliation to ethnic identity. Therefore, we should not ignore that even if the instrumentalist approach does not totally focus on the elite actions, the political and economic elites definitely invade most of its research field. Consequently, instrumentalization of identity, shifts in identical descriptions which are ignited by changes in conditions are not totally valid for groups as a whole and especially for masses.

Instrumentalist approach indubitably takes its roots from principles based on preferences which are made through rational calculations. While instrumentalist theoreticians make their assertions and evaluations according to this matter of fact; Amanda Kearney gives more importance to how a calculative relation can be constituted with a fairly complicated fact such as the adoption of ethnic identity. Therefore, in order to emphasize the power of experiences in developing rational choices, which is the main case for instrumental adoption of the ethnic identity, Amanda Kearney attaches memory to instrumentalism. For Kearney, if instrumentalist approach is to explain embracement to ethnic identity as a result of rational calculations, it has to evaluate adoption of ethnic identity as a process based on relation between memory and ethnicity which leads the individual to more accurate preferences benefiting from experiences. For this perspective, memories result as conscious and purposeful choices directed by “the remembered” and “the forgotten”. In order to explain the subject through an instrumentalist process; subjective and contested loyalty to the ethnic identity is only possible with the memory which attributes ethnicity a plasticity, a conditionality instead of sanctity. What is remembered and what is forgotten are directly related with the calculation of costs and benefits of material and emotional wellbeing.⁸¹ Kearney’s contribution to the instrumentalist approach needs attention as it offers a cause-affect relation to the

⁸¹ Amanda Kearney, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

theory by emphasizing the development of logic through experiences. In doing so she also contributes some of the instrumentalist claims which see ethnic groups as interest groups whose members actually came together for material reasons. More importantly, attaching memory with rationality stands as a reciprocity with the primordial analysis which also assigns an important role to memories in the development of ethnic identity and the discriminatory movements derived from it. While primordial thinkers see memories as one of the main reasons for bringing back ancient hatreds and prepare a suitable condition for the loss of rationality, Kearney's analysis makes a counter explanation by showing memory as a source of rationality instead of sensuality. However, when it comes to explain ethnic conflict, it is clear that the analysis creates some contradictions to the mainstream instrumentalist approaches which underline the role of rational elites' mobilization of emotional masses. In any way it offers an alternative view to primordial perspective on memories.

Making all its analysis with the terms of rationality, calculation and choice; "Rational Choice Theory" can be seen to be the leading theory based on rational explanations. Therefore, participating in the argument towards the motivating factors behind ethnic violence, rational choice theory could carve out a strong place for itself in the borders of instrumentalist approach. In general, rational choice theory advocates that people perform their actions in order to achieve and maintain an ever promoting socio-economic position through trying to minimize the potential costs and maximize the potential benefits from their decisions. Applying the theory to ethnic orientation, rational choice theory claims that ethnic allegiance is based on the rational calculations over ethnic association. Ethnicity is just an option and one's adoption of an ethnic identity over another or breaking contact with an ethnic group depends on the potential gains from such an interaction.⁸² Consequently, affiliation with an ethnic identity does not only depend on what the identity offers but also personal priorities of the individual. In case of an unexpected change in the conditions, already constituted rational bounds positively affect the mobilization of the group under the flag of a religion or ethnicity in order to achieve political and economic

⁸² Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

power over another group. The size of the prize determines how further the group goes. Exaggeratedly mechanical but consistent within, rational choice theory shows that ethnic conflicts do not break out of group motivations derived from strong emotions but by a union of individuals with alike attitudes who came together in time and have the tendency to show similar ration.

As a conclusion, instrumentalist approach asserts a variety of explanations to the subject of the motivating factors behind ethnic violence. Unlike primordial approach's efforts on seeking reasons behind primitive and highly emotional structure of human beings; the approach tries to combine sentiments of masses with the rational calculations for achievement of position, power and resources. Except for the radical instrumentalists who try to explain every element of ethnic violence with rational wills of individuals; most of the instrumentalists accept the important role of emotions and hereditary attributions of people. However, they try to show and emphasize how these sentiments are instrumentalised by the profit maximizing elites in precarious times.

3.3. Constructivist Perspective on Ethnic Fragmentation

Besides the two frontier approaches on the construction of ethnic identity and ethnic conflict, a brief view of constructivist approach on the subject need to be taken into account as it has been a source of inspiration for this thesis. Also, the constructivist approach need to be understood for it tries to explain how ethnic identity is created and how societies are fragmented. Furthermore, constructivism is valuable to understand the role of manipulation in ethnic conflict since the approach focuses on how the reality is constructed by the actors in the system and the bilateral affection between the system and the actors in it.

Constructivist approach considers ethnic fragmentation and ethnic violence as a creation of substantial historical processes. Ethnic identity is a matter of accumulation which is created and obtained through social and cultural affections

along the history. The role of language, history, symbols and culture is the key factor that determines both social cohesion and also ethnic rivalry.⁸³ Unlike primordial and instrumentalist theories, constructivist approach asserts that ethnic bond is not ensured through mutual interests or primordial links; but it is constructed and regenerated along with key historical processes and experiences such as the distribution of official identity cards.⁸⁴ It claims that components which constitute ethnic identity are not natural, inevitable or stable as ethnic identity is not about genes but the experiences and key developments that create common perceptions.⁸⁵ The reproduction of ethnic identity is maintained through historical processes; however it may not be considered as fully historical, since ethnic identities obtain massive social recognition. In time, individuals perceive ethnic identities as a matter of natural fact and totally attach their individual identity with the group identity they belong to.⁸⁶ Furthermore constructivist approach focuses more on external elements instead of primordial feelings or rational calculations when it comes to ethnic fragmentation and mobilization. Constructivists assert that the societies are historically constructed; through which comes the fragmentation and the description of “us” and “the others”. Therefore, historically constructed cleavages can be instrumentalised for manipulation by political entrepreneurs. Constructivists focus on the historical construction and the maintenance of ethnic identities by political elites for political and social control.⁸⁷ For constructivist theory, the factors that heighten or lessen the ethnic mobilization are constructed by external elements. Some general historical processes which seem to be a consequence of natural course of history may

⁸³ Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds*, *op. cit.* p. 26.

⁸⁴ Donald P. Green & Rachel L. Seher, “What Role Does Prejudice Play in Ethnic Conflict?”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol 6. Yale University Press, (2003), p. 521.

⁸⁵ John Ferejohn, “Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England”, *The Conomic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action*, Harper Collines Publishing, (New York, 1991), p. 285.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Dodeye Uduak Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theoreis of Ethnic Conflict”, *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinart Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, MCSER Publishing, (Rome, 2015), p. 149.

even be constructed for political ends.⁸⁸ In this sense, constructivist approach is mostly related with how ethnic identity is constructed, and in cases of ethnic conflict, it is related with the manipulation process since it focuses on the creation of reality by the actors in the system. Therefore, the approach is expected to focus on the propaganda efforts of political elites in ethnic conflicts, construction of hatred and fragmentation within the society by political instruments such as media and political discourse and the creation of prejudices among societies along the historical process.

Shortly, the constructivist approach focuses on two points in the subject of ethnic identity and ethnic conflict. Firstly, the approach tries to explain the construction process of ethnic identity, which according to them is done through historical affection. It is not natural but in time it is fully attached with individual identity. Secondly, the approach focuses on the process that led to ethnic conflict. It tries to explain how reality is constructed and the societies are fragmented through manipulation of political entrepreneurs. Explaining the subject from two basic points with simple but clear and concrete explanations, the constructivist approach tries to stir up a critical perspective within the international relations theory. As the intention of this thesis is to find out the intangible factors that motivate societies to participate in ethnic conflicts, constructivist theory underlines valuable points both in the construction process of ethnic identity and manipulation in ethnic conflict.

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, the thesis focused on theoretical approaches on ethnic fragmentation and ethnic conflict in order to investigate different perspectives on the subject and extend the dimensions of this study. It focused mainly on the two primary approaches, the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches, on the subject. Afterwards the thesis briefly investigated the constructivist theory since

⁸⁸ Donald&Rachel, *op. cit.*, p. 521.

constructivism has been one of the starting points of this study. Each perspective offered different explanations towards ethnic fragmentation and ethnic conflict. Despite the clear divergences between the theories, each approach could offer comprehensive and consistent explanations within the borders of their logic.

The primordialist theory analyzed ethnic conflicts with primitive feelings and instincts which should be considered as indisputable characteristics of every individual. According to primordialist theory, the instinct to adopt an ethnic identity, its sanctification and tendency of fragmentation are primordial characteristics of every individual which are transferred by genes from ancestors. In this sense, ethnic conflicts are inevitable as ethnic fragmentation is a biological reality which cannot be overcome. One way or another, every individual shows a strong tendency on polarization and fragmentation and ethnic fragmentation comes at the top of this tendency since ethnic identity is one of the top initiators of primordial sentiments.

On the other hand, instrumentalist approach underlines the role of rational calculations in ethnic fragmentation and ethnic conflict. According to instrumentalist theory, either the adoption of a social identity, its fragmentation or processes that end up with ethnic conflict include elements of rational calculation. In this sense, both ethnic fragmentation and ethnic conflict are derivations from rational purposes of individuals. Besides the primordialism, instrumentalists focus on the instrumentalization of ethnic identity by political entrepreneurs in which the approach pays attention on manipulation. It does not fully reject the role of emotions in the adoption of ethnic identity; however it asserts that there are strong links between rational ends and ethnic fragmentation. From the political entrepreneurs to let alone civilians, ethnicity can be seen as an instrument for rational calculations; like an individual's consideration ethnic conflicts as an opportunity to share less resources or a political leader's consideration ethnic conflict as an instrument to mobilize masses in accordance with his/her will on consolidating political power. In this sense, ethnic identities or their fragmentations stand as suitable instruments for rational individuals.

Lastly, the constructivist theory investigates ethnic fragmentation and ethnic conflict in the basis of constructed realities. According to constructivist theory, every single step of ethnic conflict, from the construction of ethnic identity to ethnic violence, elements that divide societies are constructed both by the system and its components. There is a bilateral affection between the system and its actors and ethnic identity also took its share from this affection. For constructivist theory, ethnic identities are constructed along the history through groundbreaking experiences which eventually ended up with the definition of “us” and “the others”. Like the instrumentalist approach, constructivism also focuses on the instrumentalization of ethnic identity in cases of ethnic fragmentation and ethnic conflict. However, constructivist theory focuses more on the political entrepreneurs in the basis of instrumentalization of ethnicity for manipulation. For the constructivist theory, the factors that increase or decrease the mobilization of societies are constructed by external factors. In this sense, the constructivist theory is important as it offers a critical perspective about the reality itself; for the truth may have been shaped and imposed by the victors.

As a conclusion, investigation of theoretical views on the issue of ethnic conflict is necessary and beneficial as it deepens the study while creating a theoretical basis before analyzing historical cases of ethnic conflict; so that the thesis can combine reality with theoretical perspectives.

4. HISTORICAL CASES OF MOBILIZATION AND MANIPULATION

Theoretical approaches has absolute importance in studying complicated issues that combine tangible and intangible facts such as; construction of social identity or social fragmentation. However, without combining the theory with reality, it may not be possible to find out concrete answers to intangible questions. Also, there is no doubt that history offers a comprehensive source for questions seeking the origins of processual facts. Therefore, in this chapter two important and well-known cases of ethnic conflict will be analyzed in order to find out the origins of ethnic fragmentation, ethnic conflict and the role of emotions and manipulation in such incidents. In this sense, the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia are chosen since they happened at almost the same time, on different geographies and among societies with different conventions and histories. Thus, the thesis may benefit from similarities and differences in each case to find the main reasons for ethnic conflict in each case.

4.1. The Case of Rwanda

In 1994, humanity faced one of the greatest and most rapidly spread massacres of human history. Despite having decades of historical background; only in three months about 500.000 to 1.2 million people were brutally killed during the uprisings following the assassination of nationalist Hutu leader and the head of the government Juvenal Habyarimana, who was returning from Arusha Records, a demarche for the appeasement of militia movements of Rwandan Patriotic Front. Though the villains of Habyarimana is still not clear, whether he was killed by Hutu radicals objecting any kind of softening towards the Tutsi or Tutsi militia under the flag of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), without a doubt; it was used by the Hutu radicals as a source of triggering point for terrorizing and appealing the Hutu to wipe out every single Tutsi and “Tutsi lovers”; from politicians to modest farmers. The massacre can

clearly be counted as an exact initiative to genocide as the killings were against a certain group, though most of the villains were agitated civilians, the movement was systematically organized and simply subsidized by governmental organs. But the facts that make the case *unfortunately* a perfect research field for the motivational sources of mass killing is that; people could “brutally” be killed, raped or disabled by their years of neighbours and radio broadcasts adopting an incredible discourse which even help people describe the best and the most painful ways of killing; explicitly called for a rampage against Tutsi “*inyenzi*” (cockroach). The lack of armed weapons caused even more perilous endings. Farm animals belonged to Tutsi were either be stolen or killed. Even stray dogs were killed for they belonged to the Tutsi... All these examples that show the level of violence directed by **ordinary people against other ordinary people** are not possible to be overlooked. Moreover, the case presents a valuable research field to understand the conversion process of tribal groups in a society by gaining both concrete and sacred meanings by the hands of colonial powers. Therefore the thesis can analyze how either the myths and the history of a society or their simple physical differences can be used to create separatist motivations which may assert a connection between colonial background, instability and ethnic based civil wars. Also the case is suitable for understanding the role of political entrepreneurs in social separatism for consolidating their power by exercising conspiracy theory based policies which are for appealing emotions. Consequently, the Rwandan case presents a great source for understanding the motivational factors behind ethnically based killings as it contains social, psychological, economic and historical factors which are definitely useful to integrate practices with theories based on ethnic discrimination and civil wars.

4.1.1. Historical Process of Ethnic Division in Rwanda

Though ethnic separatism and violence in Rwanda made a peak in 1994 with the support of Hutu controlled government; the facts that affected the incidents find their roots even in the beginning of the twentieth century when the country was meeting

the colonial rule for the first time in its history. However, a brief investigation of pre-colonial era is also needed to observe the change in time.

Division in social identity in Rwanda had been forming even in the pre-colonial era. However, this division was mainly based on social and economic connections instead of ethnic or religious senses. It was related with productive forms, mainly based on the opposition between cattle culture and agricultural economies. In this pre-colonial social division, each form of production was particularly related with a tribal group which was like; Tutsi with cattle, Hutu with agriculture and Twa with hunting and gathering. Shortly, which production form one were capable of handling was determining not only their status in the society but their title as well.⁸⁹ Therefore, it needs to be taken in mind while studying the pre-colonial era of the country.

4.1.2. Pre-Colonial Rwanda

According to the historians studying the region; the first inhabitants in the region called Rwanda today existed in about 2000 B.C. They were hunter gatherers and forest dwellers whose origins trace back to the ancestors of Twa, who currently constitute only a 1% portion of the country. Along with hunting and gathering, they were also skilled on pottery and basketwork which points out that Twa were living as a resident society.⁹⁰ Around 1000 A.D., a massive migration of farmers called Hutu, started to displace Twa from their centuries of lands and settled mostly on the soils with richest minerals. These migrations took their part in the Rwandan history as the “Bantu Expansion”, which was the first time for a remarkable demographic shift in the region. Even though the Hutu displaced the original land-owners Twa, from their lands; both tribes could live together. As the Hutu were already experienced agriculturists, they developed village industries, organized under clan chiefs and

⁸⁹ David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, (2001), p. 268.

⁹⁰ Tor Sellström & Lennart Wohlgemuth, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, The Nordic Africa Institute, (Uppsala Sweden), p. 21.

constituted more of a hierarchical and organized society. They also created a semi mutual and semi exploitive relation with the Twa as they traded with the exchange of skins and meat for minerals like salt and iron.⁹¹ This historical process which ended up with a more complex and hierarchical society naturally constitutes one part of social division in the country.

When it comes to the beginning of Tutsi activity in the region; it is a bit blurring since not only the first time of their existence in the region but also their origin are still controversial for anthropology scholars. It is believed that the Tutsi have entered in the region from the North East, in around fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. For some scholars in the colonial era, there are connections between the Tutsi and the Maasi, the Oromo of Ethiopia; which means that the Tutsi are the descendent of the biblical Ham and even the ancient Egyptians.⁹² These claims of colonial scholars may sound simple but they might constitute important parts of ethnic separatism in the country. (For a brief discussion see pp. 51-52) Finding Hamitic theory as “racist”, post-colonial theoreticians point out that there is no evidence of a track from Ethiopia or of the language Tutsi spoke before migrating into the region. Post-colonial scholars also suggest that there is not enough evidence to support the idea that the Tutsi came from the North.⁹³ These kinds of strong controversies in anthropological claims between colonial and post-colonial scholars towards the origins of the then ruling elite, Tutsi, may provide us a good point for the construction of ethnic identities, especially for the favour of a particular group, by the hands of colonial powers.

Claims towards the pre-colonial social differentiation, which was primarily based on the economic bounds and patron-client relations, are invaluable for evaluation of the separation process of a group of people who speak the same language, adopted almost the same culture but have particular physical differences. Whether the Tutsi

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Aime Sangara, *Understanding the Present Conflict in Rwanda: A Look At Some Factors which Contributed to the Outbreak of the Genocide*, Oxford University Refugee Studies Centre, (1994), p. 3.

⁹³ *Ibid.* P. 4.

immigration into the region was progressive or sudden; over time, the Tutsi existence in Rwanda went on with conquests and peaceful assimilation towards Hutu; as two groups developed relations with the exchange of cattle products and agricultural products. The Tutsi possession of cattle and knowledge of warfare provided a distinctive dominance over Hutu in the long term. Therefore, they gained a more affective share in the rule by establishing a direct military rule and administration which brought the control of production through restricting the access of Twa and Hutu to land, cattle and labour.⁹⁴ Especially, Nyiginya, the first Tutsi dynasty to achieve a whole dominance in the region, stands as a symbol for the scholars who try to explain the Rwandese conflict as a reflection of past tribal relations. Along centuries, social division had been based totally on economic ties and patron-client relations, which even has a term in Rwandese culture as *ubuhake*, as the Hutu gained the use of Tutsi cattle by offering labour and military service.⁹⁵ Though the system seems to be one of those ordinary post-modern era feudal systems which can be found in the history of every single country; a considerable amount of scholars seek the roots of the hatred among Rwandese people into *ubuhake* system. According to *ubuhake*, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were simply categorized as; Tutsi were mostly administrators, cattle-herders and soldiers; Hutu were mainly farmers; and the least numbered entity, Twa, were often mistreated and marginalized by the others which caused Hutu and Tutsi to constitute the body of the society. Until the middle of 19th century, despite the dominance of Nyiginya, a clan system with 19 clans and all of which consisted of both Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were the basis of social categorization which had nothing to do with ethnicity.⁹⁶ Clans consisted of all three entities and no ethnic consciousness also give a clue for the connection between the colonial existence and appearance of ethnic categorization.

Though the *ubuhake* was the most salient and prevalent social system in the era; there were also less common social systems as well. Before the middle of eighteenth

⁹⁴ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁹⁵ Anastase Shyaka, "The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies," The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, (2005), p. 7.

⁹⁶ Selstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

century, the patron client structure in the east of Rwanda was only one of three political organizations settled in the region. In the northern and north-western parts, people lived in small-scale political organizations with rather small populated agricultural societies. For these groups, identity was a combination of “*umuryongo*”-lineage- and “*ishanja*” -sub-clan- units. Dominant clans had the control of land and allowed others to reside on these lands creating a client relationship similar to *ubuhake*.⁹⁷ In the west, ritual politics was the basis of social categorization; since ritual claims to the productivity of the land and the wealth of population were the main organizing factors. Though only 4 from 20 ritualistic entities could gain autonomy, this rather primordial political organization could exist even after the colonial era. Namely: Bukunzi and Busoozo in the southwest; and Kingogo and Bushiru in the northwest. However, what is important about these ritually organized political structures was their enormous social mobility even though they were consisted either of Twa, Hutu and Tutsi. Scholars roughly explain this mobility with commune practices of trapping, gathering and hunting and lack of single central power.⁹⁸ Though the political structures varied according to areas; it still should be kept in mind that the main and the general system which led a social categorization remained as Nyiginya led *ubuhake* system.

Just before the arrival of colonial powers, the structure of Rwandan society took its last form of post-colonial era. At the end of the 19th century, Rwanda took expansionist policies to neighbouring soils under the rule of King Rwabugiri from Nyiginya Dynasty. Expansionist on the outside, Rwabugiri also ruled by force as he tried to suppress dominant lineages. In order to consolidate his power in the central administration, he made the appointments of important positions on his own rather than sharing power with Tutsi families who had gathered noteworthy power with long years of Nyiginya dynasty. Rwabugiri was important for the transformation and centralization of both Rwandan governmental system and social structure as he exercised considerable regulations about state the administration, centralized royal

⁹⁷ Newbury, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

power and fragmented aristocrats in order to divide their power.⁹⁹ He broke through conventional exercises and increased the power of monarch. As he extended the central policies to the peripheral areas of the kingdom; he helped generalize the social structure in the country.¹⁰⁰ His ambition on gathering all power on his own and breaking the aristocratic power for the favour of monarch gave the last form of Rwanda just before the arrival of colonial powers. But the greatest formation during his reign was the institutionalization of *ubuhake* system. While it started to lose its conventional meaning and centralized by the monarch; it also gained rather a modern and more hierarchical formation. Thus the system remained as the main institution which categorized the social structure and reinforced as a tool for colonial efforts on social division until the end of colonial era. In other words, the *ubuhake* system was transformed by the colonial administration and used as a tool for social classification of the society. The system that kept pre-colonial Rwandese people together -as it was based on reciprocal relations of loyalty and exchange of goods and services- turned to be one of the triggering reasons for all the conflicts in the post-colonial era. The *ubuhake* was regulating an accommodation, a status, reputation between social members in a hierarchical system. The patron was mostly Tutsi but the clients were generally a Hutu or Twa. Just like the conventional era; an individual could be both a patron and a client as a Tutsi patron of a Hutu could be a client of another Tutsi; or a Hutu client could be a patron of another Hutu or Twa. Therefore the only person without a patron was *Mwami* (the king) himself. Until the twentieth century, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were used as tribal terms instead of ethnic meanings.¹⁰¹ However, the problem with the centralization of the system was that unlike the conventional era; hierarchical lines between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa became more pronounced and institutionalized for the favour of Belgian economic exploitation. Because the colonial administration needed an organized, classified and divided labour force to fulfil their exploitative objectives. Fortunately, the *ubuhake* system constituted a

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

¹⁰⁰ Sellström, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁰¹ Helen M. Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife: Reflecting on the Genocide in Rwanda", *Ethnicities*, Vol. 1, No. 25, (London, 2001), p. 27.

great model for them. They only designed and institutionalized the *ubuhake*; while elaborating the system with ethnic terms. Consequently, economic based social classes became available to be reflected as ethnic arguments in the following years starting with the colonial rule. A broader examination of how *ubuhake* system was transformed by the colonial powers will be made in the Colonial Rwanda Section.

Pre-colonial Rwanda needs attention from those who seek the origins of ethnic based conflicts during the twentieth century. Under the light of all the studies about the Rwandan society it can be realized that there had not been any vindication for a distinct ethnic separation among entities before the arrival of Europeans. As the Rwandese kingdom was expanding to the neighbouring regions; not only the Tutsi who occupied the most skilled military positions but also Hutu and Twa fought together against neighbouring kingdoms. They did it in a sense of unity; as *Banyarwanda*, the people of Rwanda. Keeping in mind that extraordinary times may bring extraordinary unity; it would not be wrong to say that the solidarity among the members of Rwandese society was still observably stronger in the post-colonial era. However it was totally out of ethnic sense. Therefore, the changes the society experienced in the historical process and the evolution of social structure between the pre and post-colonial eras are the key features that created a strong sense of ethnic identity among the entities of the society. As a conclusion, comparison of post and pre-colonial eras of Rwanda clearly reveals the change in senses of people about their identities. Therefore, the thesis can go on by inspecting the developments during the colonial rule in order to understand how ethnic consciousness took place of the conventional, non-racial, class-based identities of Rwandese people.

4.1.3. Colonial Rule in Rwanda

Rwanda experienced the rule of two different colonial powers namely; Germany from 1899 to 1917 and Belgium from 1917 to 1961 (including ten years of trusteeship between 1951 and 1961.) During the rather short period the Germans

administered the country, there were only five civil missions of Germany in Rwanda since the German administration could not give enough attention to Rwanda because of the chaotic period which led Europe to the World War I.¹⁰² With the lack of colonial missions; German colonial administration executed a policy of “indirect rule” which was based on the continuity of existing mwami rule and his cooperation with German administration. The occupation of the country came with protectorate treaties between the mwami and the German Government. During the German administration, rebellions against German existence broke out and they were harshly suppressed by the mwami himself. As a result several hundred thousands of rebels were killed. This was the first time Rwandese natives faced a massive massacre. By the end of the World War I, as Germany was defeated; Belgium took Rwanda from Germany as a compensation of German campaign into Belgian soil in Africa during the war. After the war, Rwanda and Burundi formed a single administrative body under the mandate system of the United Nations. Belgium was also given the status of “trust country” for Rwanda by the League of Nations. At first, Belgium also pursued the German legacy of “indirect rule”; however their influence in the governmental structures went on step by step. Before, the Belgian colonization, the level of tolerance between the groups were so high that; they were talking the same language, sharing same religious and cultural conventions, they were intermarried and more importantly, they had neither a consciousness nor an inch of idea about their ethnic identity. They even did not have a word representing the meaning of ethnicity in their language.¹⁰³ However it all changed as the Belgian colonial rule in the country executed policies that caused direct fragmentation, alteration and manipulation of indigenous social and political texture of the country. Colonial powers described Rwandan entities as racially, culturally and historically different and totally unrelated. As the Belgian administration needed the indirect rule strategy to work appropriately, they needed an hierarchical society and an upper group that was going to rule the country in the name of colonists. Thus, they aimed at ruling the

¹⁰² Sellström, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁰³ Julia Hecht, “Memory, Myth-Making, and Their Implications For Ethnic Genocide”, *World Outlook: An Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs*, No. 35, (Spring, 2008), p. 16.

country via Tutsi administrators, excluding the Hutu elites from administrative positions and using the *ubuhake* system which was based on patron-client relations for consolidating place of the Tutsi on the top of the hierarchy.

In the 1920's, breaking the conventional balance of power; they executed policies for increasing the efficiency of central Tutsi government. They transformed social structure by institutionalizing the conventional social system, *ubuhake*. In order to suppress potential uprisings, the Belgian administration divided, classified and organized the Rwandese society under the title of *ubuhake*. They used ethnic terms, illogical anthropologic theories and nepotism of a specific group to create a deeper division. Besides the social construction, the hours at work increased, the products that people were to grow were regulated, new tax policies were executed. As the society was divided into ethnic sections; the Belgians earned a sundered, silent and also an organized labor force for their economic purposes.¹⁰⁴ As a result of missionary movement pursued by the Christian Church, namely Patres Albi, which was founded in the ends of the 1800's; religious workers cooperated with colonial powers and all kinds of labour positions were filled and organized by them; from food procurement and renovation of roads to transportation of administrators. The church could reach such a power that in 1931, King Musinga was replaced with his son Mutara III because of his lack of cooperation with colonial administration. Mutara III was baptised in 1946 and devoted Rwanda to Catholicism, which made Rwanda as a leading model of a catholic state in Africa continent.¹⁰⁵ During 40 years of colonial administration, conventional social and political structures and their consequences were fragmented and deformed by the colonial hands. The conventional Rwandese social system based on patron-client relations was rather flexible and reciprocal. However the Belgian administration stiffened the system with mutual commitments.¹⁰⁶ Relations among people lost their voluntarily basis; that the clients were no longer able to shift to another patron if they were not

¹⁰⁴ Philip Quarless van Ufford, "Rwanda-Belgium, Division and Reconciliation", *Short Historical Study As Representation of the Belgium-Rwanda Reconciliation Conference*, (7-14 July, 2009), p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Sellström, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

satisfied with their current one. Belgian colonialism also executed a system called cash-crop economy which abolished the traditional mutual-gain relations based on barter and gift. Forced and planned labour activities and strengthened socio-economic divisions between Hutu and Tutsi took the place of conventional labour service in exchange of cattle and soil. Social positions and tasks belonged to each group were reformed and sharpened. Therefore, political discrimination between Tutsi and Hutu became clarified excluding the Hutu from nearly the whole governmental positions. Tutsi efficiency became so apparent that they were even equated with the colonialism rather than the Europeans.¹⁰⁷ Physical change in social and political structure was obvious; however, for the sentiments that brought fragmentation, there were more than simple, short-term administrative regulations...

Without a doubt, colonial administration brought observable physical changes in Rwandese social and political system. However, the facts that brought a rapid ethnic consciousness and a massive fragmentation among people are beyond physical regulations in the system. The colonial administration executed policies through its scholars by theories and mythologies introduced into the society. The society was categorized into ethnic groups with the descriptions based on physical attributes and wealth. The then colonial Europeans were, in a manner of speaking, so adventurous and they were so solicitous to categorize, to explain anything with grand theories, to link science with myths. They also had a great enthusiasm for perfection. From their reports, studies, experiments and efforts to explore, it can clearly be seen their will on finding or creating "the perfect". In this sense, they considered colonialism as creating the perfection civilization. According to the 19th century European perspective, imperialism was serving the perfection of human race by wiping the inferior races out from the world. It was but a biological necessity since the extinction of lower races was inevitable according to the law of nature which essential for the future of the world.¹⁰⁸ Worse, this perspective was shared,

¹⁰⁷ Hintjens, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹⁰⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, "Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa", *Identity, Culture and Politics*, Vol. 3 No. 2, (December, 2002), p. 3.

internalized, normalized and strongly advocated by the scholars of almost every natural and social science field.

When colonial explorers arrived at the great lakes region in the end of the 19th century; they recognized that neither the image nor the social structure they received from local people was matching with the then illustration of Africans in Europe. They also found nothing resembling the other organized structures of many East African societies.¹⁰⁹ They were slobbery about their exploration of unique noble pastoralists with tall and athletic physical characteristics which they equated only with European physical structure. The height of the Rwandese monarch was distinguishing them from the whole society. As the Europeans were obsessed with the physical greatness; most of the anthropologists of the time were defining small structure as a racial inferiority; thus, Hutu and Twa were categorized lower than the Tutsi in the evolutionary ladder.¹¹⁰ As the Europeans could not associate these praiseworthy physical characteristics to “African negroes”, they steered on finding the Tutsi origin outside of Africa. According to the early white explorers, the East African pastoralists were physically too impressive to be African that they had to be the descendants of a Hamitic race which had ruled over a “Bantu” African majority. Therefore the Tutsi might be originated in Ethiopia or Egypt.¹¹¹ It is a bit surprising but despite being the “White men”; it seems they simply did not understand the way the evolution ladder works. Some early Belgian explorers even speculated about some far distant origins for the Tutsi. They elaborated their theories with fantasy lands and even related the Tutsi origin with places like the last continent of Atlantis or the Garden of Eden.¹¹² Either way we should admit that some early explorers had insane imagination.

¹⁰⁹ Anastase Shyaka, *The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies*, The National Unity and Reconciliation Council, p. 11.

¹¹⁰ Hintjens, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Paul Magnarella, “Explaining Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide”, *Human Rights & Human Welfare*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (Winter, 2002), p. 26.

Besides the interesting physical standards of the country, the colonists also wanted to analyze the extra-ordinary political centralization, marked social hierarchy and Rwandese mixed economy based on mutual evaluation of agricultural and administrative skills of different entities for a united production. Thus, the Europeans linked all these complicated political, social and economic relations to presumed ethnic attributes. Consequently, they made an analysis where power, race and culture were all entangled. For them, the Tutsi were related to power, pastoralism and distinctive physical characteristics, tall thin and often light-skinned. On the other hand, the Hutu were described with rather a rough build and associated with all kinds of labor activity. Lastly, the Twa, having marginalized by the others, lived in the borders of the society and associated with hunting and pottery, and the ascriptions towards their physique by the Europeans were; a short and stocky build, round heads and broad noses.¹¹³ The Belgian colonists described the Hutu as ignorant and vile creatures who were slaves by nature as they had no ambition. They were also featured as an indication of inferiority of “the Negroes”. A colonial report which dates back to 1925, stands as a good example of Belgian scorn against the Hutu and the Twa. In the report the Hutu were described as “generally short and thick-set with a big head, a jovial expression, a wide nose, and enormous lips.” while describing the Twa as “the most primitive group of the society who are small, chunky, muscular, and very hairy especially on the chest, with a monkey-like flat and huge nose that is similar to the apes.” The report also mentioned about the Tutsi residents of the region. However, there was an enormous difference between the description of the Tutsi and the other two “inferior” groups as the report considered the Tutsi as “more evolved” in both intelligence and appearance. A part from colonial minister’s speech in 1925 also forms a good example of discrimination in Rwanda:

The Mututsi of good race has nothing of the Negro, apart from his color. He is very tall, 1.8 m at least, at least 1.9 m or more. He is very thin, a characteristic which tends to be even more noticeable as he gets older. His features are very fine: highbrow, thin nose and fine lips framing beautiful shining teeth. Batutsi women are usually lighter skinned than their husbands, very slender and pretty in their youth, although they tend to thicken with age...Gifted with ‘vicious’ intelligence, the Tutsi

¹¹³ Newbury, *op. cit.*, p.258.

displays a refinement of feelings which is rare among primitive people. He is a natural born leader, capable of extreme self-control and calculated goodwill¹¹⁴

These ever-increasing researches, reports and discourses emphasized the difference among people and created a deep down jealousy which spoiled the social tissue and historical balance within the society ending up with hatred and never ending conflicts throughout the generations.



Source: Photo taken by Amnesty International Video: “The Forgotten Cries”, 1997.

Figure 1: The supremacy of the Tutsi were justified and internalized among the society

In time the intensity of the analysis gained other forms and they all united in the “**Hamitic Theory**” which is seen by the scholars interested in the subject to be the leading intangible part of ethnification of Rwandese society. The Hamitic Theory was the basic ideological perspective of the Europeans towards the people in Africa. It was developed in time and highly influenced by the biblical myth of the origin of man, which defines the place of the black men among human kind. Naturally, the theory deserves a broad review as this thesis intends to find out constructivist sides of ethnic conflicts.

At the end of the 19th century, the European scientists were in a stage of “madness” for classifying human races in a hierarchical manner. Not only classifying human kinds as white or black, they were also trying to classify white and black within. Adopting the Hamitic theory, they were trying to describe the distinction among

¹¹⁴ Aimable Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Realism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide* (2003, Lanham University), p. 47.

African people by deciding whether they were “Genuine Negroes”, “Less Negroes” or “Caucasoid whites”.¹¹⁵ Combined with the archaeological studies in the era which were claiming that the ancient Hamitic ancestors of Egyptians, could have immigrated into the Great Lakes Region; the colonists wanted to use Hamitic myth to justify that the descendants of Tutsi and Hutu could not be from the same origin. Explaining the myth; *an ancient god named Noah had two sons namely; Ham and Canaan. One night, Noah gets drunk and falls into sleep naked. Canaan sees their father naked and drunk lying in the public but do nothing to prevent their father’s self-exposure. Noah wakes up and sees Canaan had done nothing to cover his shame. Therefore he curses him with the words: "Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants he shall be to his brothers."* Cursed by their father, Canaan and all his line were going to be the servants of Ham and Ham’s descendants. According to the Hamitic theory, this was the beginning of the black race who was going to be cursed till eternity; and stay as servants and slaves for others races, namely; to their other brothers. Since the colonists strongly believed that the Tutsi were from a non-African descent, they equated only the Hutu and Twa with Canaan which supported the idea that the Tutsi were born-leaders. In spite of being totally out of science, it was satisfactory enough to be adopted by the scholars serving to meet the intentions of white explorers on categorizing and dividing the society. Adoption of the Hamitic myth was also easy for the colonists since a similar myth including Noah, the father of black race, existed in both the fundamental Christian and Orthodox Jewish belief. The myth was also suitable for the colonists to infuse into such a tribal society with ancient conventions and beliefs.¹¹⁶ With a few adaptations and elaborations, the myth was ready to serve.

While the Belgian colonial explorers were so busy with myths; the British explorer John Speke presented a thesis with a rather tangible shape through explaining the Hamities with physical features and mental capacity. According to Speke, with their


¹¹⁵ Edith Sanders, “The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Function in Time Perspective”, *Journal of African History*, Vol. 10, No. 4, (1969) p. 523.

¹¹⁶ S. R. Shaerer, *The Hamitic Hypothesis: Racial Christianity in the Service of the Business and Political Elites*, <http://www.antipasministries.com/html/file0000094.htm>

remarkable physical and mental features, the Hamities were born leaders just like their European cousins. Their only similarity with the Negroes was their skin color as they got tanned in time. The Tutsi must have been the descendants of the Hamitites for Speke. They were Europeans who somehow had got black skin. This racist and illogical theory was expressed and internalized in various ways in order to associate the Tutsi with Europeans. While it increased the cooperation between the Tutsi and colonists, it also changed the way Tutsi and Hutu considered each other. Either way, it worked as another instrument for the colonial divide and rule strategy.¹¹⁷ Under the title of scientific researches, the colonists recorded and broadcasted the process of physical classification of the society. Size of the nose, color of the eyes, shape of the skull were all the features that determined if a Rwandese was a Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. It did not stay with only physical humiliation as the Hutu were also excluded from public service and education. Since the colonists attached the Tutsi with the title of “born leaders”; they put only Tutsis into governmental positions. Being excluded from administration; Hutu and Twa were not even given an opportunity for self-improvement since they were not allowed to get neither higher education nor land ownership.¹¹⁸ Having been insulted in various ways; the Hutu were now being isolated from the society as well since their right to be educated was even taken from them. Consequently, the alienation among the social groups of Rwandan society gained momentum.

¹¹⁷ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹¹⁸ S. R. Shaerer, *op. cit.*



Source: Photo taken by Amnesty International Video: "Forgotten Crisis", 1997.

Figure 2: The shape of the nose and skull, the color of the eyes could be determinants of which group some one belonged to.

In 1920's Belgian policies on consolidating the Tutsi supremacy went on with more practical policies. Hutu chiefs and subchiefs were replaced with the Tutsi. Until 1930's Tutsification of the society resulted in monopoly of social and political power in the hands of the Tutsi chiefs. As the triple hierarchical structure of the chiefs (army chief, cattle chief and land chief) were abolished, all the power was united in the Tutsi mwami which incited ethnic fragmentation even on the high layers of the society. Furthermore, these institutional practices made a peak with the introduction of the identity cards in 1933.¹¹⁹ According to some historians, the Belgian officials were having so much difficulties on distinguishing Hutu from Tutsi; so they invented a method that any man with more than 10 cattles were going to be counted as Tutsi and the rest were going to be counted as Twa or Hutu according to their professions. This clearly shows the perspective of colonists that wealth could also be considered as an indication of ethnic characteristics. In time, identity cards were introduced to the society to make it easier for the officials to distinguish people according to their race. With the identity card, ethnicity of the future generations was determined in a patrilineal logic; thus, every individual was counted as having their father's ethnicity

¹¹⁹ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

regardless of what their mothers' ethnicity is.¹²⁰ Each identity card had different characteristics such as different color and signs on them. Therefore, the officials were going to understand the race of every individual even by looking at the cover of an identity card.¹²¹ However, they were not aware of the fact that this implementation was going to make it easier for the Hutu militia to detect and kill the Tutsi which absolutely increased the number of people caught and killed.

The principle of "indirect colonization" and "divide and rule strategy" relied on revealing the potential of competent and favorable natives. However, myths and theories were not enough to internalize the division among the society that the colonial administration needed institutions to consolidate Tutsi supremacy. Using public institutions and education Rwandan society was hierarchically classified and organized with the institutionalization of racial and mythical terms. The Tutsi, with the title of born leaders naturally became the native officers of the colonists. Considered to be the natural inferiors, Hutus and Twa were generating the main body of the labor force; and all these thoughts were infused into young generations starting from elementary schools. According to Shyaka, the indirect colonial rule was acting like a company director who was trying to add new employees for his\her company branch, thus he\she had no option but to choose biologically the best.¹²² Consequently, they used every governmental institution as an instrument for justifying the supremacy of the Tutsi. Therefore, not only the administration; but church, education, and military were also organized around the so called superiority of the Tutsi. European religious and racial beliefs towards the order of nature were highly imposed to the society. The idea that the roots of the Hutu and the Tutsi were totally from different kins was tried to be justified and inseminated within the society. Colonial institutions based on racial theories advocating the supremacy of the Tutsi consolidated the power of Tutsi monarch.¹²³ Combining this power with the

¹²⁰ Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹²¹ Hintjens, p. 253.

¹²² Shyaka, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹²³ Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

Catholicism also increased the Belgian rule in an indirect manner; however corruption of local conventions were directly equated with the Tutsi.

Before the Belgian rule, during the pre-colonial era, Rwandan society was ruled by land lords who were generally from the Tutsi. As the social relations based on clientalistic relations were providing economic prosperity and security for most of the Hutu; they would scarcely rebel against their lords. However, by the 1950's; the system of exploitative reciprocity gained a less reciprocal form as the Hutu were exposed to some harsh implementations such as *ubuhake* (forced labor). Therefore, rebellions against the Tutsi rule became more widespread.¹²⁴ Hutu masses organized under political groups and raised their voice with political demands. These demands of the rebels were mostly framed in ethnic terms. Namely "the Bahutu Manifesto" of the rebels, which was aiming to influence the UN trusteeship mission on the country and drafted by nine Hutu intellectuals, demanded both democratization and liberation for the Hutu and it was a reflection of Hutu desire to abolish the Tutsi supremacy once and for all. Also in the manifesto, the Hutu tried to take the advantage of the colonial thesis which advocated the fact that the Tutsi were not originally from Rwanda. Consequently, the Hutu alleged that they had to be the true owners of the administration as they are the true Rwandese people whose origins were traced back within the region by the colonial theoreticians themselves.¹²⁵ The proud, noble and aristocratic image of the Tutsi was tried to be transformed into lazy, parasitic and cruel invading outsiders. All the myths and theories that were generated to impose and consolidate the supremacy of the Tutsi were reversed and used against the Tutsi. By using such theories and myths; the Tutsi were tried to be sent back to Ethiopia, to the lands in theory, they came from.¹²⁶ Such developments were followed by the formation process of political parties in the country. Consequently, the process was influenced by the ethnic fragmentation of the society; thus the formation of the

¹²⁴ Hintjens, p. 253.

¹²⁵ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

¹²⁶ Hintjens, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

political parties was mainly based on improving the conditions for the favor of an ethnic group. Parties like Parmehutu (Party of Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu) and APROSOMA (Association for promoting the Welfare of the Masses) were vindicating the rights of the Hutu while parties such as UNAR (Rwandan National Union) and RADER (Rwandan Democratic Reassembly) were established only for the good of the Tutsi.¹²⁷ However, it should be underlined that the political parties were not only important for indicating how the political civil movements were driven by ethnic fragmentation but the parties were also dangerously suitable for social mobilization of groups under ethnic ideals.

The Hutu uprising of 1959 was indicated as the “Hutu Revolution” turned Rwanda into a Hutu Nation while advocating a program of justice: Justice for Hutu and a reckoning for Tutsi. Besides all their other meanings, they also attended a political identity for Hutu and Tutsi; that Hutu as native and Tutsi as alien.¹²⁸ During the revolution, in 1959, Parmehutu led movements caused bloody conflicts which ended up with the overthrow of the King Kigri V. These conflicts resulted in death of thousands of Tutsi and also forced about 130.000 Tutsi to immigrate in neighboring countries such as Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (Then it was Zaire) and Uganda. All that is left from the Tutsi -cattles, farms, houses- were, in the full sense of the word, “snatched” by the Hutu.¹²⁹ The refugee problem went on with increasing numbers. According to UNHCR mission report which was going to be published in 1964, about 200.000 refugees; mostly the Tutsi, had fled to neighboring countries¹³⁰ which was going to provide the main human source for Rwanda Patriotic Front (Tutsi Militia against Hutu administration).

When it came to late 1950’s, the colonial support for the Tutsi had lost its velocity. Belgian administration suddenly turned their attention to the problems of Hutu

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Mamdani, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹²⁹ Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹³⁰ Aime B. Sangara, *Understanding The Present Conflict in Rwanda: A Look at Some Key Factors Which Contributed to the Outbreak of the Genocide*, (1994), p. 11.

peasant majority. The church, once one of the main instruments for Tutsi supremacy, showed a radical change as the high official Monsingor Andre Perraudin stated various times that social discrimination against the Hutu could not be accepted any more.¹³¹ This instability was going to result in a change from 1961 to 1962, as the Belgian trusteeship was going to manage the replacement of half of all Tutsi chiefs with the Hutu chiefs. Belgians and Hutu elite were now seemed to be the new allies against the Tutsi supremacy. However, according to historians relevant to the region, it was obvious from 1950 that the Belgian colonizers could no longer resist the increasing demands of the Tutsi elite for independence.¹³² For the colonial administration, reviving the racial problems and inciting the Hutu movement against the invading Tutsi was the best option to suppress the increasing Tutsi ideals. Within that context of instrumentalization of politicized ethnicity by the colonial power, the 1959 rebellion that lasted for weeks and resulted in the death of thousands of Tutsi. The Belgian government sent troops to the country benefiting from such an opportunity.¹³³ However, instead of suppressing the revolution and the massacres related to it, they adopted a de-facto pro-Hutu policy, constituted a temporary army led administration and appointed 300 Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs to the positions of Tutsi chiefs who had been deposed, killed or fled from Rwanda during the first stages of the uprising. Moreover, they established an indigenous territorial guard based on the proportion of each side. Thus, an army with %85 Hutu was going to be an official Hutu militia against the Tutsi.¹³⁴ During the rebellion the Belgian administration left too much space to the Hutu giving them the opportunity to burn houses and forbidding the mwami to make counter-strike. Though they had created the fragmentation on their own; now they seemed to be supporting the righteous cause of the humiliated and excluded Hutu folk. Consequently, they neither supported the Hutu rebellions nor countered the bloody uprisings. By the end of the

¹³¹ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹³² Hintjens, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

¹³³ Shyaka, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹³⁴ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

rebellion, the demographic structure of the country had experienced a noticeable change.

Despite the United Nations' instigations on reinstating the order reconciliation of mwami and imprisoned Tutsi politicians and keeping Rwanda and Burundi together, Belgians allowed the nationalist Parmehutu leader Gregoire Kayibanda to constitute a temporary government. Besides, conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi escalated against the Tutsi as they were mainly the ones who were murdered, tortured and banished.¹³⁵ In 25 September 1961 a national election held place under the supervision of United Nations which resulted in the shift of political domination from Tutsi to Hutu. It was literally a crushing victory for the Hutu-led political parties. PARMEHUTU (Party of Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu) gained %78 of the votes which equated 35 seats of 44. On the other hand, Tutsi-led UNAR (Rwandan National Union) got only %17 of the votes which meant only seven seats in the parliament. Consequently, on 26 October 1961, Gregoire Kayibanda who had been one of the authors of the Hutu Manifesto was elected as Rwanda's new president. After such a demographic change, election of such a Hutu nationalist political actor as the president was not surprising at all. Soon after his election, in September 1961, a referendum took place to decide the new form of the country.¹³⁶ As a result of the Hutu political elite became so distinctive, %80 of the votes were in favor of an independent republic of Rwanda.¹³⁷ Therefore on 1 July 1962, Rwanda and Burundi finally gained the form of two separate independent and sovereign states which also brought an end to the colonial administration.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹³⁶ Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹³⁷ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

4.1.4. Post-Colonial Rwanda

Many scholars accept that revolutionary transition of Rwanda from Tutsi-dominated monarchy to the Hutu-led republic constitutes a crucial period for understanding the ethnic fragmentation in the country. From the beginning, dual-nationalism was the main determinant for both political and social actions. Theoretical examination of this ever increasing dual-nationalism after the independence offers two competing hypotheses. The primordialist approach asserts that the ongoing dual nationalism was fed by ancient and essential differences between the two communities each of which tried to control the region along the history. On the other hand instrumentalist approach strongly advocates that the division, between the groups were rather artificial and created during different eras to serve different purposes of different political actors.¹³⁸ Therefore, starting with the Kayibanda regime, elites of independent republic also pursued the same legacy and covered their political failures by touching ethnic emotions.

Independence of Rwanda came neither with peaceful negotiation nor bilateral reconciliation. Uprisings broke out in 1959 called “the Hutu Revolution” led the country to independence. However, crises in the country went on with the increasing Hutu nationalism as the country had turned into a Hutu led Republic from a Tutsi led semi-colonial Kingdom. The period of Rwandan Republic ruled by Hutu nationalists was interrupted with three major crises (1963, 1972-73, 1990-94) which in the end resulted in a genocide of thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutus. In a circular relation, radical policies triggered crises as the crises fed national radicalism. Eventually, the Belgians totally departed from the administration and left the country on its own after giving both sides ethnic consciousness which in time ended up with hatred and social fragmentation. Related with all the cronyism shown to the Tutsi elite, the colonial policies incited the Hutu nationalism. Before the colonial era, Rwandan society had no consciousness of themselves as ethnic entities since the

¹³⁸ John F. Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism”, *After independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States*, The University of Michigan Press, (2006), p. 75.

society was structured on the basis of a conventional, collaborative system.¹³⁹ Along with the process, both the Tutsi and the Hutu nationalism took its final form; the future was going to bring more conflict and crises. Worse, each crisis was resulting in increasing level of massacres; thus, the end was crystal clear even from the beginning of the independence. The PARMEHUTU leader Gregoire Kayibanda's words in 1957 clearly reveal the growing fragmentation in the society:

The Hutu and Tutsi are two nations in a single state... Two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of different planets.¹⁴⁰

Gregoire Kayibanda, PARMEHUTU leader and the First President of Independent Rwanda

In a clear manner, the Kayibanda government was an incarnation of Hutu nationalism and provided its legitimacy totally through enhancing and strengthening Hutu population. During the early 1960's, Kayibanda formed a separatist Hutu nationalist autocracy. Since the beginning of the independence, the government did nothing to prevent Tutsi murders which encouraged both the Hutu militia and Hutu citizens while speeding up the Tutsi mobilization under Rwandan Patriotic Front. In conformity with old policies, Kayibanda also embarked on a definition of Hutu and Tutsi. Both groups were defined as two different nations and two different races. While the Hutu were considered to be the main native entity namely "the owners of the country", the Tutsi were shown to be the aliens in Rwanda. Therefore, the Tutsi were treated as aliens in the country of Hutus and their definition shift from race to ethnies making them a political minority from resident aliens. In time, the categorization exceeded the borders of Rwanda including the Tutsi in other countries. In this context, the Tutsi in Rwanda were seen to be as the political minority with minority rights. However, the Tutsi in neighbouring countries were seen to be external entities, which means that they were denationalized as perpetual

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁴⁰ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

aliens that the doors were totally closed for them.¹⁴¹ Therefore, these behaviours of new Hutu led government caused the exiled Tutsi to gather under the banner of Rwandan Patriotic Front and adopt guerrilla strategies against Rwanda in order to take back what they lost. Consequently, after the constitution of Hutu led administration in the country, thousands of Tutsi had been killed and an estimated 130.000 Tutsi had immigrated into neighboring countries. Massive groups of immigrants generated social and economic problems in these countries. More importantly, they supplied new members for Tutsi militia movement under the flag of Rwandan Patriotic Front. Years following the independence, Hutu refugees from especially the Tutsi dominated Burundi began launching attacks into Hutu led Rwanda. However, after every attack, the Hutu came with more brutal retributions against local Tutsi. Therefore, fled Tutsi patriots jeopardized every single Tutsi by each operation they performed into Rwanda. Hutu government was also using each of these attacks to justify slaughtering Tutsi residents in Rwanda. Likewise, the Hutu government used an unsuccessful Tutsi operation into Rwanda as a reason for counter-attack. From December 1963 to January 1964, only in one and a half month, about 10.000 Tutsi residents were killed and all the remaining Tutsi politicians who had not yet fled to other countries were executed.¹⁴²

Following the perseverance of the Hutu nationalism and Hutu nationalists rose to power in the independent Rwanda, the politics started to turn into competition among regional elites of the Hutu. Kayibanda's primary electorate in Gitarama had opponents both with high-ranked actors from Butare in the south and leaders from Ruhengeri in the north. The main reason for such an opposition was mainly about Kayibanda's failure to enact prompt economic development and his failure on executing policies to meet the passion, ambition and excitement of the Hutu who now had the power at their hands. His domination was not justified because of the lack of any large and noticeable development which became more visible with the recession of the Hutu nationalism. Thus, the Kayibanda government was exposed to harsh criticism of Hutu elites for staying insufficient to catch the expanding horizon

¹⁴¹ Mamdani, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁴² Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

of the population.¹⁴³ As the Kayibanda regime started to show an unequal treatment among the Hutu itself, it served as an instrument to protect and empower Kayibanda and his core supporting “Gitarama” elites from the elites of others regions, especially Butare. Therefore the regime also failed to cover the interests of the Hutu peasantry and even the middle class.¹⁴⁴ In 1970’s, the expressions of the politicians and military officials from the Kayibanda government formed a tactical manner around ethnic discourses in order to cover the economic problems of the government and the criticism directed by the Hutu elite of the north. Influenced by the fragmenting discourses of politicians and military officials, population reacted clinging on violence. Mainly in ethnic senses, it spread to schools, business and administrative institutions in Rwanda which triggered bloody events of 1972 in Burundi. As the exiled Tutsi constituted the majority in Burundi, this time the Hutu were the victims. However, the governing Hutu elite of the northern Rwanda did not show the expected reaction against the incidents. Therefore, the Hutu population in Rwanda started to show their reaction by attacking not only the Tutsi but also the rich Hutu elite who did not meet the expectations of Hutu nationalists. Getting the support of the northern politicians who were afraid of being physically eliminated, the National Defense Minister Major Juvenal Habyarimana decided to make a military intervention. As the northern Hutu were historically dominant in the military; he could perform a successful and peaceful coup, overthrow Kayibanda and declare himself as the new president of Rwanda. In a planned, preemptive strike manner, he wanted to suppress the potential Hutu opposition by eliminating former president Kayibanda and most of his high ranking supporters via his security forces. After a trial proceeded with high level secrecy, overthrown president Kayibanda and his seven closest political partners were sentenced to death in June 1974. Many politicians from former government were also sentenced to long-terms of imprisonment.¹⁴⁵ Habyarimana’s relatives and influential regional supporters were given all high level positions both in the government and security forces. His closer

¹⁴³ Clark, *op.cit.*, p. 90.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 87.

¹⁴⁵ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

relatives, such as his wife filled the highest positions in the army, like Presidential Guard.¹⁴⁶

Beginning from his coup to the late 1980's, Habyarimana ruled the country without any serious challenge. Unlike Kayibanda, Habyarimana was really successful on developing his own ideology. He could also conduct a definite economic progress and maintain political stability. After creating his own political party in 1973, namely the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement-MNRD* he also emplaced it within the constitution as the only legal party. Political movements and activities were treated with harsh methods as the regime gained a quasi-totalitarian form. Not only the control over people extended, but the control over the peasants could reach such limits that they were forced to give free labor service.¹⁴⁷ However, many scholars assert that besides the autocratic rule Habyarimana adopted, he also tried to blunt the tension between the Hutu and the Tutsi until 1980's. Either way imbalanced staff within the public service continued as the regime equated democracy with the rule in the name of majority. Along the years of Habyarimana rule, there had been neither a Tutsi mayor nor a governor. There was only one Tutsi officer in the whole army. Out of 75 members, only two members of the parliament were Tutsi and only one Tutsi minister out of 30 ministers in the cabinet.¹⁴⁸ Most importantly Habyarimana maintained the identity card policy which emphasized each citizen's ethnicity and he also executed a quota policy which restricted the amount of Tutsi officials in schools, government agencies or business to 9 percent. Therefore, we can see that blunting ethnic tension between the Tutsi and the Hutu was a bit about suppressing Tutsi in all fields. However, we should note that despite all the totalitarian implementations, the success on economic and political progress enabled the substantial funding of the international aid community in the country. Even after experiencing so much restriction on their freedoms, great majority of the Hutu supported the regime. Moreover, most of the Tutsi showed absolute tolerance to the

¹⁴⁶ Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁴⁷ Gerard Prunier, *The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide*, ColumbiaUniversity Press, (New York, 1995) p. 56.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 75.

regime's pre-1990 period.¹⁴⁹ Either way, the Tutsi were exposed to less radicalism as the Hutu could gain a full control in the country.

By the late 1980, Habyarimana's Rwanda had returned into an exact party dictatorship. Number of separatist regulations increased; such as prohibition of army members from marrying Tutsi women. Also the separatist ethnic card and ethnic quota systems preserved by the regime. The number of refugees excluded from Rwanda could reach up to 1,5 million people and Habyarimana still insisted on refusing their return claiming that Rwanda was already too crowded with too little land, food and opportunities. However the surrounding countries that were hosting the Rwandan refugees were sharing the same conditions as well. Either way, the stability and mutual co-existence could be preserved as the regime were not interfering the Tutsi in private sector. Being excluded from the public service, the Tutsi were at least left space to do business until this fragile balance evaporated and the stability in the country ended with the Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion led by the Tutsi refugees in Uganda and Burundi in the beginning of 1990.

In 1989, the uncertain plans of opposing Tutsi leaders gained a new form with the Hutu political reform movement in Rwanda. Feared from the political competition among the regional Hutu elites, a number of Hutu political opponents of Habyarimana left Rwanda and joined the growing opposing movement in Burundi and Uganda.¹⁵⁰ By 1990, about a million Tutsis and contrarian Hutu had been exiled in the neighbouring countries. Some of them including the current President Paul Kagame initiated a freedom movement named as the Rwandan Patriotic Front in order to give an end to the Habyarimana regime and Hutu government and provide a safe return for the exiled Rwandese.¹⁵¹ United in a single purpose; to return home, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under the command of Major General Fred Rwigyema and Major Paul Kagame was willing to influence the Rwandan

¹⁴⁹ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* P. 95.

¹⁵¹ Maria van Haperen, "The Rwandan Genocide, 1994", under *The Holocaust and Other Genocides*, Amsterdam University Press, NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, p. 102.

government with an invasion.¹⁵² On October 1 1990, the RPF launched an unsuccessful attack on the Habyarimana regime which resulted in the death of RPF commander Rwigyema. During the first attack, Major Kégame was under military training in the United States of America. However he returned to take the command as soon as he was informed about Rwigyema's death. Considering the support of USA to the commanders of RPF, French government gave a full assistance to Habyarimana in order to prevent any American influence in the country.¹⁵³ Therefore, following the months after the invasion, with the assistance of France, Habyarimana could increase the size of the army from 5 thousand to 35 thousand soldiers. According to a classified CIA report dated back to January 1993, there were massive purchases of guns, hand grenades and machetes by the government,¹⁵⁴ which clearly meant a surreptitious preparation for war. At the same time, the government controlled radio began broadcasting false reports about ruthlessness of RPF in order to inculcate fear and hatred into the Hutu population. The government also organized massacres against the Tutsi with the hands of local Hutu officials which resulted in the death of thousands of people until 1993. Just like the other conflicts between the sides, thousands of people were displaced, many killed, arrested and tortured.¹⁵⁵ In order to provide security, the government executed a comprehensive arrest campaign against the Tutsi. Besides the ones displaced and killed, about 30,000 people were arrested during the campaign.¹⁵⁶ Habyarimana and his companions did not miss the opportunity to use the RPF attacks for his advantage. He utilized from symbolist politics in order to construct and enhance a long-standing hostility against Tutsi. All Tutsi were shown to be the potential allies and members of Rwandan Patriotic Front. The whole Tutsi were transferred into enemies of Rwandan state and its ethnic majority and any moderate or opposing politician

¹⁵² Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁵³ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹⁵⁴ Hapere, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁵⁶ Africa Watch, "Rwanda: Talking Peace and Waging War, Human Rights Since The October 1990 Invasion", *A Human Rights Short Report*, Vol. 4, February 7, 1992, p 4.

against this transformation was also a part of this plot against the country.¹⁵⁷ The RPF was shown to be the Tutsi invaders who were going to steal their rare resources from the Hutu just like their ancestors did centuries ago after they immigrated into the region. Having been challenged by regional Hutu political elites, Habyarimana also wanted to use the Tutsi invasion to earn the support of his opponents. In order to wriggle out of political criticisms, Habyarimana tried to make everyone believe the Tutsi were the only reason for all the problems of Rwanda. Feeding ethnic tensions among the society, Habyarimana government aimed both at strengthening Hutu loyalty to the government and frightening the Tutsi to keep them away from political opposition.¹⁵⁸ Besides radicalizing the Tutsi, such efforts converted many Tutsi's ideologies from Banyarwandan (kind of Rwandese Patriotism) to Tutsi nationalism.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, in a circular relation which can even create a term as hatred dilemma, fanaticism consumed remaining low numbered prudent and modest Rwandese from both sides. Meanwhile, hate propaganda against the Tutsi proliferated with the use of media. Especially the famous *Radio Television Libre de Mille Collines* (RTLMC), owned privately by Hutu radicals Ferdinand Nahimana and Joseph Serugendu, was the primary tool for deepening the separation. Besides their nationanism, Nahimana and Serugendu's political and economic interests from the regime were their main motivation.¹⁶⁰ Besides the radio, pro-government magazines were successfully used for stimulation. Through such instruments, Habyarimana answered by instigating the antagonism towards the Tutsi by using the invasion as a means to justify another ethnic purification movement. With a publication named "Hutu Ten Commandments" Habyarimana's anti-Tutsi propaganda was formulized in an anti-Tutsi magazine named *Kangura* in December 1990. The document began with a prologue dispraising and cursing the Tutsi as; "Tutsi are blood and power thirsty and they want to impose their hegemony in the Rwanda with cannon and

¹⁵⁷ Hintjens, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

¹⁵⁸ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ Moise Jean, "The Rwandan Genocide: The True Motivations for Mass Killings", *Emory Endeavors Journal*, Vol. 1: Truthiness, (2007), p. 9.

sword. They are dishonest in business they seek only the supremacy of their ethnic group”¹⁶¹ Therefore, giving the list of Ten Commandments will make it easier to understand the foundations of hate propaganda against Tutsi leading the way to 1994 incidents.

The Ten Commandments as published in Kangura magazine No. 6 in December 1990:

1. Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, works for the good of Tutsi ethnic cause. Therefore any Hutu who acquires *a Tutsi wife, acquires a Tutsi concubine, acquires a Tutsi secretary* is a traitor.
2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more conscientious as women, as wives and as mothers. Aren't they lovely, excellent secretaries and more honest!
3. Hutu women be vigilant and make sure that your husbands, brothers and sons see reason.
4. All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is ethnic superiority. We have learned this by knowledge from experience. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:
 - Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi,
 - Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise,
 - Borrows money from or loans money to a Tutsi
 - Grants favors to Tutsis (import licenses, bank loans, land for construction, public markets...)
5. Strategic positions such as politics, administration, economics, the military and security must be restricted to the Hutu.

¹⁶¹ Victoria M. Esses & Richard A. Vernon, *Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbors Kill*, Blackwell Publishing, (2008), p. 138.

6. A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, scholars, teachers)
7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively Hutu. The War of October 1990 has taught us that. No soldier may marry a Tutsi woman.
8. Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi.
9. Hutu, wherever they be, must stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly search for friends and allies to the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu brothers. Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda. Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy: THE TUTSI.
10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu Ideology must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word wherever he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and teaching this ideology is a traitor.¹⁶²

¹⁶² NOTE: From the web site: <http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/kanguralist.html> you can find all the propaganda articles published in Kangura and hate broadcasts made in Radio Milles Collines between 1990-1994.)

5. VOICI LES 10 COMMANDEMENTS.

1. Tout Muhutu doit savoir que Umututsikazi où qu'elle soit, travaille à la solde de son ethnité tutsi. Par conséquent, est traître tout Muhutu :
 - qui épouse une mututsikazi ;
 - qui fait d'une Umututsikazi sa concubine ;
 - qui fait d'une Umututsikazi sa secrétaire ou sa protégée.
 2. Tout Muhutu doit savoir que nos filles Bahutukazi sont plus dignes et plus consciencieuses dans leur rôle de femme, d'épouse et de mère de famille. Ne sont-elles pas jolies, bonnes secrétaires et plus honnêtes !
 3. Bahutukazi, soyez vigilantes et ramenez vos maris, vos frères et vos fils à la raison.
 4. Tout Muhutu doit savoir que tout Mututsi est malhonnête dans les affaires. Il ne vise que la suprématie de son ethnité.
- « RIZABARA UWARIRAYE »
- Par conséquent, est traître tout

Muhutu :

- qui fait alliance avec les Batutsi dans ses affaires ;
 - qui investit son argent ou l'argent de l'Etat dans une entreprise d'un Mututsi ;
 - qui prête ou emprunte de l'argent à un Mututsi ;
 - qui accorde aux Batutsi des faveurs dans les affaires (l'octroi des licences d'importation, des prêts bancaires, des parcelles de construction, des marchés publics...)
5. Les postes stratégiques tant politiques, administratifs, économiques, militaires et de sécurité doivent être confiés aux Bahutu.
 6. Le secteur de l'Enseignement (élèves, étudiants, enseignants) doit être majoritairement Hutu.
 7. Les Forces Armées Rwandaises doivent être exclusivement Hutu. L'expérience de la guerre d'octobre 1990 nous l'enseigne. Aucun militaire ne doit épouser une Mututsikazi.
 8. Les Bahutu doivent cesser d'avoir pitié des Batutsi.

9. — Les Bahutu, où qu'ils soient, doivent être unis, solidaires et préoccupés du sort de leurs frères Bahutu.
 - Les Bahutu de l'intérieur et de l'extérieur du Rwanda doivent rechercher constamment des amis et des alliés pour la Cause Hutu, à commencer par leurs frères bantous.
 - Ils doivent constamment contrecarrer la propagande tutsi.
 - Les Bahutu doivent être fermes et vigilants contre leur ennemi commun tutsi.
10. La Révolution Sociale de 1959, le Référendum de 1961, et l'idéologie Hutu, doivent être enseignés à tout Muhutu et à tous les niveaux. Tout Muhutu doit diffuser largement la présente idéologie. Est traître tout Muhutu qui persécute son frère Muhutu pour avoir lu, diffusé et enseigné cette idéologie.

Source: Kangura, No:6, 1990, p. 8.

Figure 3: Original Text of “Hutu Ten Commandments” from Kangura’s December 1990 dated publication

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Figure 4: A caricature published in Kangura saying: “General Dallaire and his army have fallen into the trap of Tutsi femme fatales.”

Seen from the commandments, the Hutu regime constituted its propaganda around the cunning of every single Tutsi. Additionally, it was emphasized several times that a Hutu should neither sympathize nor trust any of them. Also the number of commandments based on the Hutu and the Tutsi women constitutes another broad research subject. Even the definition of patriotism and treachery were made through a Hutu man’s relation with women. Defined as pure evils, the

Tutsi women were shown to be one of the main reasons for the defeat against RPF in October 1990.¹⁶³ Sexual parts formed one of the main pillars of black propaganda against the Tutsi. The first three out of 10 commandments were implying that the Tutsi were using their women to seduce and control the Hutu elite. They were the Hamitic eves of Bantu garden of Eden who were going to enslave the whole Tutsi elite using their desires. Therefore, the main duty of a Hutu woman was to free their husbands from the Tutsi women's snares.¹⁶⁴

Just before the genocide, there were three different groups competing for the power in Rwanda. Firstly, there were moderate Hutus who led by the Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana (Who was going to be one of the first ones to be killed) and supported by UNAMIR. There were also Hutu extremists who were supported by the governmental army *Interhamwe*, extremist militia and the media such as *Radio Televiosion de Milles Colines* and *Kangura* and lastly there were Rwandan Patriotic Front.¹⁶⁵ The process was also an exact example of psycho-political maneuvers of Hutu elite, a great example for social construction of "the enemy", "the traitor" and "what to do against them". It offers a constant field for studying securitization and a satisfactory source for constructivists. There were psycho-political initiatives towards the political opponent. Demonizing and dehumanizing the Tutsi, the Hutu elite tried to cover their political failures and transformed their opponent into non-human and dangerous beings who were going to evaluate any chance to undermine the Hutu existence. The Hutu had no way but to kill every single Tutsi in order to survive and this logic was justified and infused into the whole society.¹⁶⁶ Caricatures, news, commandments published in newspapers and magazines and radio broadcasts cursing the Tutsi normalized in a short time. In December 1990, "Hutu Power" newspaper declared Tutsi as "the common enemy". Another article named as "17 Rules of the Tutsi were published in *Kangura* which were presenting "the facts about the Tutsi

¹⁶³ Photo taken by the web site: Women's Medica center, "Women Under Siege", <http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/rwanda>, [Accessed: 07.06.2015].

¹⁶⁴ Hintjens, 265.

¹⁶⁵ Haperen, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

¹⁶⁶ Shyaka, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

plot” against all of Rwanda. Kangura claimed that the rules were constituted in Uganda and were like an action plan for the Tutsi in Rwanda which formed a series of orders and suggestions such as;

- Identifying and detecting the whole Hutu living nearby,
- Waiting for RPF and fighting to the death,
- When the time came killing the whole Hutu children.

Starting from the academics the Rwandan intelligentsia was also highly influenced by the governmental propaganda. As the universities were under the suppression of the government, not much space had been left for any critical perspective. A Leading Hutu Power politician and academician Leon Mugesera’s hate speech made in 1992 indicates how once colonial politics for consolidating the Tutsi supremacy was in an exclusive manner against the Tutsi. According to Mugesera, all Tutsi had to be sent to Ethiopia from where they belatedly came to Rwanda. Through the Niyaborongo River, they have to be sent back home. With such an unfortunate coincidence, in the end of the 1994 genocide, thousands of their dead bodies were floating on the Niyabongo River.¹⁶⁷ In another speech on 22 November 1992 he was crying out that "The Real Men would never let themselves be invaded by Inyenziz (Cockroaches)!":

They shoot us from behind and you shoot us from in front by sending us this rabble to bring us food supplies”. I had no answer to give them, and they went on. “What we want, they said, is that from ourselves, we can elect incumbents, advisors, cell leaders, a mayor; we can know he is with us here in the camp, he protects us, he gets us food supplies”. You will understand that what I was told by these men and women who fled in such circumstances as you hear about from time to time, on all sides, was that they also wanted elections: the whole country wants elections so that they will be led by good people as was always the case. Believe me, what we should all do, that is what we should do, we should call for elections. So in order to conclude, I would remind you of all the important things. I have just spoken to you about: the most essential is that we should not allow ourselves to be invaded, least the very persons who are collapsing take away some of you. **Do not be afraid; know that anyone whose neck you do not cut is the one who will cut your neck.** Let me tell you, these people should begin leaving while there is still time and go and live with their people, or even go to the “Inyenzis”, instead of living among us and keeping their guns, so that when we are asleep they can shoot us. Let them pack

¹⁶⁷ Hintjens, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

their bags, let them get going, so that no one will return here to talk and no one will bring scraps claiming to be flags!!¹⁶⁸

Léon Mugesera 22 November 1992

Without a doubt, during the war against RPF hate speeches, agitating publications and broadcasts escalated the hatred against the Tutsi and removed any ideas for making peace. Moreover these publications were like a preparation process for 1994 events since such radios and magazines were going to carry on “inspiring” the Hutu during the genocide.

With the end of war between Rwandan army and Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1993, directed by the international community Habyarimana government participated in a series of negotiations with the Rwandan Patriotic Front named as “the Arusha Accords” despite their years of fascist implementations and escalating the division between the sides. The growing Hutu Power movement showed an exact opposition to the Accords. However, under heavy international pressure, the Habyarimana government signed a number of agreements with the RPF which inferred as sharing of governmental power with the Tutsi, return of the Tutsi refugees to Rwanda, forming of an integrated Rwandan Army in which the RPF was going to constitute %40 of the integrated military forces and %50 of its officer positions. Signing such agreements was like signing his own death sentence for Habyarimana as most of the Hutu elite, including the Northern Hutu who formed Habyarimana’s main supporters, were going to lose their superior positions in both military and government. The following days of the agreement, Radio Mille Collines, the pro-Hutu station which was going to be the main source of propaganda, started non-stop broadcasts cursing the Accords, the Tutsi and the Hutu who betrayed “the cause” by signing it.¹⁶⁹

On 6 April 1994, while Habyarimana and his companions including Ntaryamira the President of Burundi were returning from one of the sessions of Arusha Accords in Dar-es Salam. Just above the Kigali Airport descending to land, two missiles were

¹⁶⁸ From Mugesera’s “Reasons For Judgement”, 08.09.2003, Toronto:
<http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/mugesera.pdf> (Access: 14.04.2015)

¹⁶⁹ Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

fired on the plane. The first one hit the wing and the other hit the tail. Only in seconds the plane got fire and with a tremendous explosion it crashed onto the President's Palace which was nearby the Kigali Airport. None could survive the crash.¹⁷⁰ It is still unclear who was responsible from the attack but general of the observers believe that the Hutu extremists from his own military were the ones who assassinated Habyarimana. This was the latest event that triggered the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Following the hours after the attack Hutu militiamen who were organized under *Interhamwe* had already blocked the roads in Kigali as they were ordered a radio announcement of Radio Milles Collines. From the radio, the names and addresses of Tutsi and Hutu who were considered to be priority targets. Also *Interhamwe* was informed during the whole process as the escaping directions of the Tutsi were continuously broadcasted. The Presidential Guard started their murders in Ramera a region near the airport. Target Lists were made by the presidential guard for the first wave of attacks. On the 6th and 7th days of April 1994, identity cards of people were checked to detect the passers if they were a Tutsi, an opposing party member, a human rights activist. Besides the Tutsi civilians, combined forces of the Hutu extremists (*Interhamwe* and Presidential Guard) also killed some of the moderate Hutu politicians as well.¹⁷¹ In this regard, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and her husband, who were lynched by the angry mob in his house, became one of the first victims. Ten Belgian soldiers who were on duty for peacekeeping and guarding the prime minister were disarmed and executed by the Presidential Guard. Therefore, Belgium withdrew all of its peace keeping forces from the country. Also the President of the Constitutional Court Joseph Kavaruganda, priests working in the Christian Aid Centre, business men, civil movement activist Charles Shamukiga, Minister of Agriculture Frederic Nzamurambaho and his assistant Theoneste Gafaranga, journalist Andre Kamyewa were some of the first

¹⁷⁰ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

¹⁷¹ Alison Desforbes, "Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide in Rwanda", *Human Rights Watch*, (March, 1999), p. 10.

victims of the genocide alongside the Tutsi civilians.¹⁷² In the first week of the genocide, the incidents had passed to the rural areas of the country. Starting from the cities then going on with rural areas indicates that there was a top down planned violence, from governors to mayors and sub governors; then to the regional administrators. From each local administrator and elites, the plan was passed to the local folk, the murderers in action. Mostly, school and hospital administrators, local officials or business people were the leading elements of the massacre plans. Using their authority over people, they proved success in stimulating ordinary folk to killing. According to a UN report on 11 April 1994, an estimated 20.000 people had been killed in Kigali only in five days.¹⁷³ The number of victims killed only in the capital city was more than enough to emphasize the size of the incidents. Besides the number of civilian victims, the number of civilians involved in the events and the state of mind they had during the killings reveals the power of manipulation in ethnic wars. Following the confessions of a Hutu who participated in the massacre presents the change in their feelings. Though they admit that those they mercilessly killed were once their neighbours, their friends they once toasted glasses in a bar, the need for killing invaded their minds:

At first we were too fired up to think. Later it had become too much of a habit. In the state we were in it meant nothing to us that we were chopping off all our neighbours' heads. It had become a matter of course. By then they were no longer our good neighbours from way back who used to pass us the bottle at the pub, because they were no longer allowed to go there. They had become people who had to be cleared away, so to speak. They were no longer what they had been, and neither were we. We didn't feel bothered by them or by the past, because we didn't feel bothered by anything... Some men started on the hunt in good spirits and finished in good spirits. And other men were never keen at all and killed because they were obliged to. A man can get used to killing if he constantly kills. He can even become a wild beast and not pay any attention to it. Some men started to threaten each other when there were no more Tutsi to use their machetes on. You could see from their faces that they felt the need to kill.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² Philip Gourevitch, Human Rights Watch, "The Rwandan Genocide: How It was Prepared", (April 2006), p. 11.

¹⁷³ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

¹⁷⁴ Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak*, Picador USA, (April, 2006), p. 58-60.

The conflict in Rwanda was an exact form of identity based conflict where one group was convinced that they were threatened by “the enemy”, the other group, of being both politically and physically annihilated. Collective narcissisms confronted each other. Belonging to an ethnic group, a territory, a language, a religion and a culture became explicitly distinguished. Taking its source from historical experiences, moral construction was made.¹⁷⁵ Although, the tension and conflicts between the groups already existed before the genocide in 1994, massacres had never reached to a society-wide genocide where the ordinary Hutu folk were convinced by the Hutu elite to make them participate in the genocide through carefully planned campaign of hatred, myth and manipulation.¹⁷⁶ State politics focused on stirring the emotions of Hutu population. There was a clear fact that in the beginning of the incidents after April 6, the Hutu hostility towards their friends, neighbours and relatives was pretty tenuous. Such hatred and fear was manipulated and constructed through broadly planned massacres.¹⁷⁷ As mentioned before, radio broadcasts and newspaper publications were instrumentalised successfully for black propaganda by the Hutu elite in order to create cold-blooded killers out of ordinary people. In the cartoons, Tutsi men and women were pictured as wild beasts, snakes, cannibals, rapists and sources of any kind of barbarism. Mythical images of Christianity and Rwandese traditions were used to internalize Hutu innocence against the cunning of the Tutsi. From the beginning of the incidents even the National Guard and *Interhamwe* were directed by radio broadcasts. Announcements accusing the RPF and UN soldiers of the assassination of Habyarimana were agitating both the Hutu civilians and army for vengeance. The radio broadcasts were especially focused on the unemployed and antisocial runagates of thugs in the militia. All the broadcasts had simple logic equating everything about Tutsiness and Arusha Accords with bad and anything about Hutuness with good. More tragically, the names of the targets, especially belonged to political opponents, places of Tutsi villages, possible safe houses for Tutsi who could escaped the Hutu attacks were continuously broadcasted. Hutu folk

¹⁷⁵ Shyaka, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁷⁶ Hecht, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁷⁷ Hintjens, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

were motivated by such hateful broadcasts like; “We have not yet revenged Habyarimana!”, “The graves are not fully filled by the cockroaches! Who is going to do the necessary job to fill them?”, “Kill the cockroach and earn their cows” and “You might have missed some in the places you checked so far. Why not checking once more?”¹⁷⁸ The role of the media in escalating the level of violence to the genocide was extremely affective in Rwanda case. Along with warning and reminding, the radio broadcasts were even teaching painful methods of killing. Besides, the Hutu extremists used any opportunity for proliferating disinformation and they benefited from any kind of source to create and enhance their propaganda. One repeatedly broadcasted report based on a story of a Hutu woman who was exposed to RPF violence had been taken word to word by a Polish Partizan war story belonged to the Second World War. According to the report a young Tutsi woman dressed in white wakes up in a grave with her whole family slaughtered by the RPF. She manages to escape the grave, however seen by the soldiers who were still gathered around the grave. The soldiers catch her again but instead of killing, ask her to cook for them. Having no other chance she starts to cook for the murderers of her family. Then one day, she finds an opportunity to escape and lives to tell the story.¹⁷⁹ It seems like Hutu officials who were responsible for propaganda had been into a close investigation of any kind of wartime propaganda which led them to a war time tale from totally a different time line and a different place.

Economic problems and unemployment was another leading factor for the genocide. There were only a few alternatives for farming and the main employment source for the people was government. In the late 1980s, 7000 people could be employed to the central government while the local governments could employ 43000 people.¹⁸⁰ With the quota system, only nine percent of the positions could be filled by the Tutsi which was equal to 4500 governmental positions. This huge ratio of unemployment was causing great psychological problems among the young members of the society

¹⁷⁸ Arto Kantonen, *Rwanda Crisis and Genocide in Case Law of Rwanda Tribunal*, University of Helsinki, (April, 2006), p. 5.

¹⁷⁹ Hintjens, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

¹⁸⁰ Magnarella, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

since the country had no social security program besides the lack of employment opportunities. Consequently, living on the margins of survival, many unemployed young Hutu were hopelessly applying for *Interhamwe* recruitment where they were exposed to radicalism and brain washing. The main groups that were responsible for the massacres, *Interhamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* were generally recruited by the poor and hopeless Hutu who hoped to benefit economically from the genocide. They were influenced by the Hutu extremists by sayings like “kill the Tutsi and eat their cows.”¹⁸¹ It was both a practical and symbolic saying as historically, cattle ownership was one of the main determinants of status and race in Rwanda. It was also practical as poor Hutu did not have much option. Idea of pillage was the main component which was used by the extremists to influence the poor.¹⁸² Thus, along with blood thirsty extremists, ordinary civilians were either inspired or forced to kill the Tutsi. Those who resisted participating in the killing and any sympathizers of Tutsi were considered worse and were declared to be betrayers. Soon, it came to such a point that neighbours were killing neighbours. Indeed the state organized the massacres but they were performed mostly by machete holding ordinary civilians. People were more likely to be killed by their neighbours, colleagues, employees bosses, teachers, students, doctors or even by their husbands.¹⁸³ Moreover, staying neutral was impossible. The story of a Gitarama prison reveals the cruelty directed to those who did not show the will to join the massacre;

The leader of our cell was our leader. He said to me; “so you there, you are the one keeping that person whom we could not find? They also choose a person who would kill me. The leader then said to me, “I told you that you would kill this person by all means.” They told me that there was no other way except dying with that person. They brought the person who would kill me. Then they told me, “kill that person first and then they will kill you too.” Then nothing happened. They snatched a club from one person and handed it to me than I killed that one... Whenever I slept, I

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁸³ Mamdani, *op. cit.* p. 12.

would see the person I killed. I saw him in front of my face. Later, they put me in prison. I was imprisoned on August 12, 1994.¹⁸⁴

Besides the hatred, sense of belonging, or fear from the Tutsi, the group pressure during the massacre also affected the number of villains. It was an exact form of psychological battle which persuaded people to kill either by force or will. Either way, losing all your mercy for people who were once your neighbours, friends or colleagues and mobilization of crowds to a merciless stance is what manipulation is capable of. The Tutsi survivor Valentine Iribagiza's words are enough to express the consequences of such a merciless stance:

When Habyarimana's aeroplane was shot down on 6 April 1994, we were all at home. We saw many people running in all directions. When the perpetrators started burning people's houses, we ran to the parish church. On Friday 15 April, the Interahamwe surrounded it. Mayor Gacumbitsi was with the soldiers. He told them, "Take your tools and get to work. You hit snakes on the head to kill them." They started killing... I lay among the corpses and tried to hold my breath. They would throw rocks or pick up kids and throw them in the air. They threw a stone at me and I screamed for mercy, but one of our neighbours, Pascal, said, "I recognise that brat. Isn't she from Bikoramuki's family? All the rest of her family is dead, so what's so tough about her that we can't manage her?" He kicked me and spat on the ground saying that he wouldn't splash my blood onto him. Then he cut my head with a machete. I don't know what happened after that.¹⁸⁵

Geography of the country also made the situation worse for the Tutsi. Plain geography of the country left almost no place to hide for the victims. Especially in rural regions, since the Tutsi villages were gathered in some particular places, the militia arrived even before the villagers gathered to run away. In the rural, there were also needed no identity card checks since the identities of groups were obvious which made killings even faster. In the cities it was more complicated. Every street was blocked by the militia, each passer were checked. Having a Tutsi identity card, having lost an identity card or behaving that way were simply the reasons for death. Some people were killed for acting suspicious and some, despite having a Hutu

¹⁸⁴ Susan Cook, *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*, Transaction Publishers, (New Brunswick, 2006), p. 165.

¹⁸⁵ Hapere, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

identity card, were even killed as they looked like Tutsi.¹⁸⁶ Taking a life mercilessly, torturing unarmed people became more than ordinary. In 20 days, an estimated 20.000 people had been killed and about 250.000 people had immigrated in the other countries as refugees. According to the report of UN Security Council on 30 April 1994, besides the great number of people who had been killed; more than 1.3 million people had left their homes.¹⁸⁷ It has to be underlined that only in 20 days an amount of people who could completely fill up a football stadium had been killed with hateful methods and in the name of patriotism. In the rural, people knew each other, they lived together for decades.

For weeks, those who could survive the attack, who lost their families, looked for any shelter in bushes or swamps. During the day, they stood still hiding behind trees and banana leaves. In the night they were safe and coming from the places they were hiding and counting the dead. Besides the fear of a painful death, torture or rape, they suffered from the lack of food and water. Many died of exhaustion and starvation. In the city, it was easier and less painful to kill for the well-equipped and organized troops. However, in the rural, the ordinary folk had neither combat experience nor skill or modern equipment. They attacked with machetes, sickles, and wooden clubs with nails. Therefore the massacre in the rural adopted more conventional ways bringing more violence and blood.¹⁸⁸

Response of the international community was explicitly controversial. French military support to Habyarimana government before the genocide, withdrawal of peacekeeping troops from the country, late action of UN Security Council during the massacre, ambiguous behaviour of the United Nations Court of Justice in declaring the incidents as genocide caused extensive criticism both against UN and central powers of international community. Passive stance of the leading powers and the 5 permanent members of the Security Council since the RPF invasion and especially during the 1994 tremendously encouraged the criminal acts and the level of violence

¹⁸⁶ Kantonen, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁸⁷ Selström, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹⁸⁸ Hapere, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

in the region. In the day light, before the eyes of all the witnesses, including UN Mission in the country, the Hutu radicals and *Interhamwe* were stopping cars with roadblocks, checking for identity cards and killing the ones with Tutsi cards on the spot. Yet the Security Council preferred using ethnic cleansing instead of genocide. Besides their passive stance towards raising violence, they were not that conscientious for keeping refugee camps in order. Thus, the imprecise administration of Kivu and Ngara refugee camps of Rwanda, tolerating the violent militias who were controlling the camps extended the sphere of violence.¹⁸⁹ In this content, Stjepan Mestovic presents a stunning criticism against the western perspective towards conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia. According to Mestovic, during the massacres in Rwanda, insufficient and one sided reports of European journalists who could easily be deceived covered the level of violence in the region and abstained the international public opinion to learn about the real situation in the country. Moreover, the European perspective towards the third countries and their people internalized and normalized the level of violence by showing it as natural for such societies. Perceiving the incidents as “ordinary” regional facts, international society did not show the needed attention to suppress the massacres which also encouraged the Hutu in holding the power at all costs.¹⁹⁰ Thinking about the current developments in Africa and Middle-East we can see the point in Mestovic’s thoughts. Every day it is seen horrible images from ISIS or Boko Haram massacres in the name of holiness, yet the international community has taken no concrete measures.

During the Rwandan genocide, either because of ignorance or not, only Belgium and France took action and sent paratroopers to Kigali. Actually, they “had to” take action as a consequence of their historical responsibility in the region. In June 1994, during the preparations of the United Nations Peace Corps, the French government executed the Operation Turquoise with 2500 French soldiers in order to protect the civilians. In the South-West Rwanda they established a safe-zone. As for the United

¹⁸⁹ Hintjens, *op. cit.* P. 50.

¹⁹⁰ Stjepan G. Mestrovic, *Genocide after Emotion: The Post-Emotional Balkan War*, Routledge, (London, 1996), p. 25.

Nations peace forces, UN Mission of Assistance to Rwanda (UNAMIR) had already settled in the country with 2500 soldiers in order to protect peace following the sign of controversial Arusha Accords. UNAMIR's objectives was supporting the process of governmental transition as projected, peacekeeping, disarmament, informing the Headquarters, providing and maintaining ceasefire, organizing humanitarian aid and leading refugees in the refugee camps. However, UNAMIR could not fulfill its objectives due to lack of information and communication problems as there were 2548 soldiers from 26 different nationalities who were commanded by a Canadian General, Romeo Dallaire. After the beginning of massacre following Habyarimana's assassination, UNAMIR could not do much to stop the genocide either as no permission was given by the UN Headquarters. On 17 May 1994, decision was taken to send 5.500 more UNAMIR peace troops to the country following the approval of the Security Council resolution No. 918. Meanwhile, RPF launched a counter attack and by the 22nd of May, they had taken control of the Kigali Airport, *Kanombe* barracks, and stretched their control over the northern and eastern regions of Rwanda.¹⁹¹ Therefore the government had to leave the capital and moved to Gitarama. Despite the RPF advance through the country, massacres continued in the regions of the country which were controlled by the *Interhamwe* and militia. On 13th of June, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front Forces could advance to Gitarama and take the city. Therefore the radical Hutu government had to flee once more. Such developments impelled France to execute Operation Turquoise for humanitarian action. Though the operation was launched to save the surviving Rwandan civilians, it only caused many Rwandan Army members to flee into exile in the neighbouring countries.¹⁹² On July 4, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front Forces could have a full control in both Kigali and Gitarama suppressing all the remaining Rwandan Army resistance. On July 19, 1994, Rwandan Patriotic Front seniors constituted a new government in the capital Kigali in which the RPF Leader Paul Kagame became the Vice President and Minister of Defense. For the time being, afraid of a possible retribution, thousands of Hutu were in a great exodus into any country or refugee

¹⁹¹ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

camps while thousands of Tutsi exiles were returning from Burundi Uganda and Tanzania to capture abandoned lands and houses by the Hutu. According to records an estimated two million Hutu left Rwanda after July 1994. The first steps of the new government was trying to bring justice for the victims of the genocide, and executing security policies to prevent any danger which might cause by the ex-militia and Rwandan Army members. Therefore, led by the new government of Kigali, RPF Army soon executed operations into specific areas of the country. Thousands of Hutu civilians were going to be killed as pre-emptive measure including an estimated five thousand Hutu refugees in Kibeho camp in April 1995. In May 1997, during the war with Democratic Republic of the Congo, tens of thousands of immigrating refugees and big amount of accompanying *Interhamwe* militia men were specifically going to be tracked down and killed by the RPF.¹⁹³ Conditions of jails where the liables for Genocide kept were another story. Stuffed in warehouses and cages, too many died that some scholars considered it another subject for genocide.¹⁹⁴ On November 8, 1994, the Security Council decided to establish courts for judging the suspects of the genocide according to international law. As an effort to symbolise and emphasize where it all began, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was settled in the building where the Arusha Accords took place. Trials took place in many cities such as Gacaca or Kigali. More than 100.00 Hutu, those who could not find the chance to flee to Zaire (DRC) were imprisoned. During some 12.000 Gacaca trials, more than a million cases were dealt with.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Haperen, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

¹⁹⁴ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

¹⁹⁵ Haperen, *op. cit.*, p. 113.



Source: Photo taken from *The Holocaust and Other Genocides*, Amsterdam University Press, NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, p. 114.

Figure 5: A Trial in Gacaca, The Genocidaries (3 on the Desk) are Questioned (1994)

Rwandan genocide was a swift and violent incident which took its source from centuries but on the other hand made a peak in only a hundred days. Only in a hundred days, almost three quarters of the whole Tutsi population in Rwanda were killed. The number of victims was estimated between 507.00 to 1.2 million by numerous official authorities such as Rwandan Government or experts took part in International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.¹⁹⁶ But the killing did not stop even after the end of tribunal process as Kigame's RPF executed vengeful campaigns against the Hutu in both Rwanda and Congo. Thousands killed, some were imprisoned and kept in worse conditions than death. About two million had to leave Rwanda. Today there is no conflict between the sides. Despite the Tutsi dominance in the government, there are no injustice implementations or regulations towards other groups. However, the society still lives group by group in different places as there is

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

still a long way until such painful memories to be erased. Reconciliation is not the problem but the memories remain as the Rwandan genocide survivor Emmaneul Mugenzira expresses:

There are still people with such bestial hearts; people who killed. You can tell they would do it again. Reconciliation is not the problem. The problem is that those who killed, ate our cattle and took our things, run away from us. I don't know how we can forgive when there hasn't been any communication between us. There are lots of people like that who look at you and wish you were dead.¹⁹⁷

Emmanuel Mugenzira, survivor Rwandan genocide

4.1.5. Conclusion

The case of Rwanda is, unfortunately, a perfect source for understanding the motivations behind ethnic conflicts. In order to explain the inner reasons of the conflict in the country, it was examined several aspects such as; history, socio-economic structure, conventions, changing political stances and crossing interests of elites. Each aspect provides invaluable facts to see the reasons behind the Rwandan genocide since understanding such a problematic and complicated subject needs a thorough and versatile examination. Starting from the pre-colonial history of the country, the change in the social structure, division process of the society and construction of ethnic consciousness was investigated. Along with it, the thesis examined the socio-economic structure of the country to find out how limited resources affect social relations, how economic conditions can be attached with survival of a specific group and how economic problems are instrumentalised by the political elites in order to mobilize ethnic groups.

I should say that along with a number of theories towards ethnic separation, my interest in the critical and constructivist international relations theories was at the top of the reasons that made me have a desire for inspecting ethnic conflicts and understanding the reasons which fragment people through ethnic terms. Thus, I

¹⁹⁷ From *Testimony Africa*, (June, 2004), <http://seansheridan.com/2011/03/the-story-behind-the-cover-of-testimony-africa/> (Access: 24.04.2015)

should admit that history of Rwanda is like a justification of constructivist theory as the Rwandan society has experienced a rapid and unnatural change with the hands of outer entities. Before the colonial rule in the country, there were neither ethnic groups nor ethnic consciousness. The only structure that separated the country was a semi-hierarchical, semi-cooperative economic system which was based on the exchange of labour service with meat and crop; a feudal alike system with less hierarchical and exploitative but more conventional bonds. Furthermore, such a separation was not generating any kind of hatred or tension among people since it was considered a conventional and natural order by the whole society. Inspecting each historical era of Rwanda it could be seen that there was a clear connection between the arrival of colonial powers and constitution of ethnic consciousness, corruption of conventional cash-crop system and exalting of a specific group while justifying the inferiority of the other in the name of divide and rule strategy. Especially, regulations and implementations of the colonial rulers since the beginning of the 19th century, which divided the society and inseminated ethnic consciousness among people should be given utmost attention. During this timeline, the colonial administration chose the Tutsi as their proxy administrators, made so called scientific analysis over the Rwandese, divided them into superior and inferior entities and published identity cards which divided the society in ethnic terms with a clear cut manner. Researches towards the groups were recorded and published. Ethnic classification based on simple physical foundations were proliferated and internalized among the society. Fabricated myths were used by the administrators to support the colonial thesis tracing the origins of the Hutu and the Tutsi in disparate geographies. Division and inequality among the society generated such a crystal clear point which blocked any chance of normalization even after the independence of the country.

Besides the theories towards ethnification, emotions were also another starting point of this thesis. After the foundation of the republic, the administration shifted to the majority Hutu. Benefiting from the colonial legacy, political groups and leaders adopted securitization as the main instrument. Instead of efforts towards erasing the facts that separate the society, political entrepreneurs inseminated fear and hatred in

order to reinforce their chair in the office. Proliferation of fear and hatred among people helped Hutu leaders to execute discriminative regulations in order to create more space and resources for their political components and supporters. Erstwhile constructed extreme emotions were instrumentalised for ethnic polarization and the mobilization of masses.

As a conclusion, not only during the 1994 events, millions of ethnic killings were committed in Rwanda along the years of unjust and polarizing politics pursued both by the colonial rulers and political leaders after the independence. Combined with the lack of resources and worsening economic conditions; tenuous differences, crafted stories, victimization and ever-generated conspiracy theories turned people against each-other while serving only to radical political leaders and political entrepreneurs benefiting from extra-ordinary measures which come with ethnic tensions. Simplicity of reasons, but the gravity of losses reveal the power of stimulating emotions and steering crowds.

4.2. The Case of Bosnia

While the Rwandese people were facing one of the most rapid and brutal massacres of human history, all the attention of international community were canalized into the turmoil following the collapse of Soviet Union. Besides the uncertainty and chaos in the international level, the collapse of Soviet Union also resurrected regional antagonism in several regions once again. In this sense, Yugoslavia was at the top of the countries which influenced by the cold war's end. Following the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, political turmoil and competition in Yugoslavia, once the symbol of peaceful coexistence of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural groups, were going to lead the country to another phase as old Yugoslavian states seceded from the federation. Considering Rwanda and Bosnia cases together; at the same time period but on totally different places of the world, political polarization and identity based conflict tore apart two totally different countries with

different histories and different cultures. Despite distinct cultures, social structures, histories, geographies and life conditions, it can be clearly observed that in each case impulses, causes and affects had major similarities. Thus, inspecting the case of Bosnia and comparing its variables with the case of Rwanda presents good points to understand the motivations behind ethnic conflicts. Therefore, in this chapter, the reasons led Bosnia to ethnic conflict will be inspected through analysing history, socio-economic conditions and struggle for power among political actors. In doing so, it is aimed to find out what brought back the old grievances among such groups lived in harmony for decades.

4.2.1. Brief History of Yugoslavia

The background of Balkan Peninsula is very important to recognize the instable history of the region and the reasons lessened the sensitivity of local people to violence. Communities constituted Yugoslavia (Croat, Slovene, Macedon, Serbian and Bosnian) were all familiar with conflicts, wars and violence for centuries as the region was like a cross-roads between the East and the West. Despite the close relation among the origins of Balkan entities, their identity was affected by ever changing hegemons over the region. Starting with Roman-Catholic and Orthodox divisions, the region had also been divided among Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian influence since 14th century with the Ottoman Empire conquered most parts of the region including Macedonia, Serbia, parts of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina while Austro-Hungarian Empire controlled Croatia and Slovenia,¹⁹⁸ who were going to be the first countries to secede from Yugoslavia. Besides conflicts between imperial powers, local people also suffered from blood feuds, vendettas and banditry as results of lack of authority. Consequently, the region became “the geography of violence” making roughness the only way for survival. However, this

¹⁹⁸ Ton Zwaan, “Crisis and Genocide in Yugoslavia, 1985-1995”, under *The Holocaust and Other Genocides*, Amsterdam University Press, NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, p. 125.

conflictual atmosphere in the region was not going to gain a national meaning until the late 19th century.

The name of Yugoslavia itself referred to a single ethnic entity as it literally means “land of the southern Slavs”.¹⁹⁹ However, Yugoslavia was a country which combined multiple cultures, religions and ethnicities. The entities constituted Yugoslavia are considered to have settled into the Balkan Peninsula during 6th, 7th and 8th centuries, each were fragmented into different religious and cultural camps along the centuries of power struggle of Kingdoms over the region.²⁰⁰ In this sense, Croat and Slovenian entities in the western Balkans were influenced by the Roman Catholicism while the Serbs and Macedonians in the East were affected by the Byzantium Orthodoxy. Eventually, the tribes such as Bosniaks in the south-east Balkans, took their share from this change, and adopted Islam during the centuries of Ottoman rule. This ever increasing fragmentation in Balkan Peninsula even constituted a terminological word as “Balkanization” which means “Dividing a region into antagonist sections”. Also, such fragmentation was going to constitute the basis of polarization and civil wars within Balkan provinces during the First and the Second World Wars.

In similar cases, generally the parties bear ancient hatreds. They are deeply divided with sharp differences which were gained throughout the history. However, in Yugoslavia, at least considering the animosity between the Croats and Serbs; things were a bit different. Before the foundation of first Yugoslav state in 1918, there were no fatal rivalry among Serbs, Slovenes Muslims or Croats and before the World War II there were still not a grand level of hatred, no major and violent crisis between ethnic groups.²⁰¹ However, the process beginning with the twentieth century formed a rather critical feature for ethnic disintegration in the country.

¹⁹⁹ David Anderson, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia: Background and Summary*, Parliamentary Research Service of Australia, Research Paper No. 14 (1995-1996), p. 2.

²⁰⁰ 6th Appendix in Dutch Government Report on Massacre at Srebrenica, *The Background of the Yugoslav Crisis: A Review of the Literature*, Nederlands Institute for War Documentation, p. 10.

²⁰¹ Josip Zupanov, “A Breakdown of the Civil Order: The Balkan Bloodbath,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (1996), p. 406.

Apart from the form of regime, the idea of establishing a Yugoslav State had already been in the agenda of both Croatian and Serbians as they were highly influenced by the nationalist movements since the middle 19th century and were conscious of their Slavic identity. Such purpose of a Slavic state was not going to be actualized until the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918.²⁰² The new kingdom had lots of administrative problems. The rulers of the new state were not that familiarized with parliamentary democracy which caused problems on solving inter-group issues which mostly broke out of resource sharing. Thus, in 1929, taking advantage of political disorder, King Alexander abolished the parliament and gathered the whole power in himself. In order to procure and maintain stability, he restricted social liberties, executed regulations limiting free speech, collective movement and political publications. He also had a strong antagonism against communism.²⁰³ In order to soften ethnic meanings and increase the Slavic emphasis over the society he changed the name of the state as Yugoslavia, redesigned governmental structure and regulated the borders of each province with a traditional manner in order to lessen nationalist desires. Despite abolishing parliamentary democracy and taking power to the monarch, he still could earn the respect and support from society and soon was called to be the unifier.²⁰⁴ However, it was soon to be broken with the assassination of King Alexander in October 1934.²⁰⁵ His death was shocking for either his supporters or opponents that both side feared that his death would result in the collapse of the country. He also had not appointed a successor or neither had he an heir. Consequently local elites resort to reconstituting the abolished local parliaments. However the new Yugoslavia turned to be a kind of Greater Serbia since it was founded around a centralist constitution where the main regulations were made by a Serb majority government in Belgrade. Thus, such unequal governance caused the heightening of Croat nationalism and led Croats to a

²⁰² *Ibid.* p. 3.

²⁰³ Retrieved from The Creation and Collapse of Yugoslavia,
http://www.grsd.org/Global%20Text/CS_CH06_04_p674-701.pdf, p. 679, Access: 02.06.2015.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

desire for an independent Croat state which was going to have a direct effect on the collapse of Yugoslavia both in 1941 and after the fall of communism.²⁰⁶ The movement turned into a major political opposition against the central government which had no tolerance for political opposition. Therefore, opposing movement was tried to be suppressed with violence. Harsh attitude of the government resulted in rural insurrections, terrorist attacks and failed assassination attempts against politicians.²⁰⁷ While the opposing movement went on with uprisings against Belgrade, the central government had to make regulations to reform the role of Croats in the administration. Following the regulations, an agreement organizing boundaries was signed between Croat and Serbian parties which gave most of Herzegovina and south eastern Bosnia to Croatians while assigning the rest of the region to Serbs. Moslem population in the region kept themselves away from the power struggle between the Croats and Serbs for they neither had the will nor power to participate in such a competition. In this tremulous atmosphere, the region faced the Second World War which deepened the radicalism and ethnic consciousness among entities.

4.2.2. The Second World War in Yugoslavia

Despite the conflictual history of the region, twentieth century brought the social fragmentation new dimensions. Remembering Zupanov's words; "There had been too little conflictual situations between Croats and Serbians before the twentieth century. With the foundation of Yugoslav state in 1918 administrative problems caused minor conflicts between the groups. However, the hatred between Croats and Serbs had strong links with the incidents in the Second World War."²⁰⁸ Therefore,

²⁰⁶ Zupanov, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²⁰⁷ Zwaan, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

²⁰⁸ Zupanov, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

the incidents experienced in the Second World War should be taken into account in order to understand the origins of ethnic conflict during the resolution of Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia was invaded by Nazi Germany on April 6, 1941. As a consequence of German blitzkrieg, Yugoslavian army faced a major defeat only in ten days. Such a rapid failure in the battlefield unveiled the divergence in Yugoslavia thus, Croat radicals considered the invasion as an opportunity to gain full control of the country. On April 10, 1941, under the extreme right-wing organization Ustasha, Croatian radicals declared independence for Independent State of Croatia, which had full-support of Nazis as a consequence of religious bonds with Germans. They were granted with the full scale control of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁰⁹ Supported by the Nazi movement, Croatian Nazis were also enthused by racial and religious senses and targeted Jews and gypsies for racial motives while targeting Orthodox Serbs for religious motives.²¹⁰ A minor group of Muslims also cooperated with Ustasha which caused Serbian Chetnik to murder thousands of Muslims in return.²¹¹ Before the war, there were an estimated two million Serbs living within the Croatian lands. The Ustasha movement considered all these thousands of people a menace for their national coherence. Speech of Croatian minister of education indicates the Croat nationalist perspective against Serbs which also reveals the level of antagonism at the time; *“one third of the Serbs we shall kill, another we shall deport and the last we shall force to embrace the Roman Catholic religion and thus meld them into Croats”*²¹². In this sense, it is easy to see the role of identity in the disintegration. In this case, it was religion combined with ethnicity. This radical movement became an official policy and spoken out by several officials such as the governor of Bosnia Viktor Gutich. According to Gutich, starting from each city, the whole Croatia

²⁰⁹ Blagojevic, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

²¹⁰ David Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²¹¹ Blagojevic, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²¹² Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Council on Foreign Relations, (Summer, 1993), p. 116.

needed to be purified from Serbs.²¹³ Similarly, Anta Pavelic, the leader of Ustasha, considered their campaign as a chance for purification of Croatian race and ethnic cleansing as a rightful merit. Besides all the antagonist policies Ustasha pursued, they also adopted detention camps just like the Nazi Germany. Thus, Jasenovac detention camp appeared to be a symbol for Croatian cruelty during the Second World War and years later it was going to be used by Serb radicals to justify and enhance Serb nationalism and sharpen ethnic division. It was going to be one of the top figures of Serbian victimization.

As a result of Ustasha brutality, almost 325.000 Serbs were killed 60.000 of which were at Camp Jasenovac. This number of deaths meant to be one sixth of total Serb population within Croatian territory. Countless variety of crimes was committed which were limitless in bestial creativity. As an example in August 1941, in a small Bosnian town of Sanski Most, two thousand Serb residents were killed with three days of torture. In many villages, they were surrounded, piled into Churches and burnt.²¹⁴ Similar with other cases regarding ethnic massacres, rumors and myth-making appeared to be a good way of mobilization and increasing the ranks of the cause. Thus, such cruelty brought resisting forces a rapid recruitment.

The first resisting group was Chetnik movement which was formed by Serbian rebellions who were close to the view that Yugoslavia was the Greater Serbia. Chetnik movement was actually a reincarnation of the Serbian guerrilla movement against Ottoman Empire towards the end of 18th century and it was organised around a similar structure.²¹⁵ Though their struggle against fascist Ustasha could be seen to be a just cause, the movement was no less nationalist than Ustasha that their only motive was to save Serbia from Ustasha cruelty and then to create a greater Serbia. While Chetnik movement was based on the superiority of another ethnic entity in Yugoslavia, the third resisting movement, the Partisans, was based on communist ideology which helped it to be supported by multiple constituents of the country.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

²¹⁵ David Anderson, p .3.

Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Partisan movement, could gain respect and blessing of majority Yugoslavian people.²¹⁶ Among them there were names such as Franjo Tudjman who was going to be the President of Croatia after the Cold War. Partisan ranks increased rapidly with moderate Yugoslavians from all provinces. Despite historical rivalries and antagonist memories of the past, Croat, Slovene and Muslim people fought side by side against the common enemy. Creation of such a supra-ethnic solidarity was going to constitute the basis of united Yugoslavia after the World War II.

Taking advantage of the rugged geography of the country, Chetnik and Partisan forces could resist with guerrilla tactics against both Ustasha and Nazi invaders. However, as soon as the Nazi forces could be drawn back from the country, each side soon fell out with each other in order to take the full control of Yugoslavia. Eventually, Russian army arrived at the country in September 1944 and a provisional government was constituted to which Tito was assigned the prime minister. However the remains of Ustasha could not be fully stopped until May 1945. After the surrender of remaining Ustasha, the British immediately gave all their Croat prisoners to the newly founded government. Many Ustasha tried to get lost fleeing into the mountains of Yugoslavia. 45.000 of them were tracked down and killed at sight. Mostly the remaining prisoners were forced to exodus through the country and none were given either food or water. Those who lost all their strength to move on were shot without hesitation. An estimated 100.000 Croats were killed as a result of Partisan vengeance.²¹⁷ Like any other ethnic conflict, fear brought fear and hatred brought hatred. Each incident resulted in deeper separation which was preparing a suitable ground for the black propaganda of future nationalist leaders. Atrocities occurred during the Second World War were highly penetrated into the hearts of Balkan people that even after a half century of Yugoslav rule in the basis of an upper identity, many people in Balkans were still sharing the remains of horror and distrust from past experiences. In a concrete expression, one-tenth of Serb population had been killed by Nazi collaborators which was retributed with the death of 100.000

²¹⁶ David Anderson, p .4.

²¹⁷ Andrew Bell-Fialkof, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

Croats in return after the Ustasha was defeated and Partisans took control.²¹⁸ Such brutality was not easy to be forgotten and was going to be a key factor for manipulation through victimization, which was the main instrument of the Serbian elite.

4.2.3 Post-War Yugoslavia

With the war ended and Yugoslavia freed from German occupation, already remaining struggle between Chetnik and Partizan movements heightened. However it did not take long for Tito's Partizan to gain the full control in the country as Tito was also elected the new President. After finding himself in the office, Tito pursued high measures to assemble people around commune values. He tried to end the conflict and competition among ethnic groups by uniting state, capital and labour. Still enabling autonomy for each group, the new Yugoslavia was established around six federal republics and two autonomous regions. Moreover, borders of each state were redrawn in order to redress the balance among ethnic groups. Yugoslav government did not abolish national identities or prevent political participation in ethnic terms. Instead, they superimposed the Yugoslav state and Yugoslav identity over all the elements that constituted Yugoslavia. Besides, they never let cultural differences determine the route of political economy. Fair redistribution of resources was given utmost importance. Only positive discrimination was pursued to maintain balance and prosperity.²¹⁹ In this sense, Muslim entity in the country was officially given the title of nationality in 1971. Tito wanted to give an end to Croat and Serbian claims within Muslim territory. He also believed that creating Bosnia-Herzegovina as a

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ Randy Hodson, Dusko Sekulic, Garth Massey, "National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 99, Issue 6, (May, 1994), p. 1538.

republic would be beneficial as a buffer zone between Croats and Serbs.²²⁰ In 1974, Yugoslav constitution was redesigned. Bosnia Herzegovina was accepted as a republic with a Muslim nation. It was displeased by Croats and Serbs as the province included also Croat and Serb minorities. However, such policy was required for constituting balance since each major group except for Muslims had their own federal structure to be represented. As another attempt to maintain balance in the country, he focused on diminishing the Croat and Serb influence through developing Macedonia. Indeed the Yugoslav government provided and maintained equality and balance in the country and also prevented possible ethnic polarization and violence, the country still had a long way to achieve full integration.²²¹ In order to construct a common identity, modernize the educational system and support regional integration, government had no chance but to rule the country with strict rules, suppress political opponents and also ensure authority with a well-organized intelligence agency inspired by Soviet notion of secret service. Therefore, unity was not yet to be internalized as the prior efforts were on creating an upper identity.²²² Construction of the upper identity would be more beneficial and long standing if it was realized through normalizing each ethnic identity; however it should be admitted that it would never be easy to achieve just after major animosities experienced in the region.

In 1974, another regulation was going to affect the faith of country. The term “Collective Presidency” was added to the constitution in order to prepare the country to collective governance in Post-Tito period. According to Collective Presidency, leaders of 6 federate states and 2 autonomous regions and an individual leader for Yugoslav party were going to rule the country together where Presidency was going to pass into the other leader every year. Without a doubt, the purpose in such regulation was for the sake of ensuring collectivity and balance among the political leaders of Yugoslavia after his death. However, it was going to be used by Milosevic to dominate the whole country and use its all capabilities for the sake of Serbia.

²²⁰ Steven Majstorovic, “Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation? Memory and Politics in the former Yugoslavia”, *World Affairs*, Vol. 159, No. 4, (1997), p. 176.

²²¹ Zwaan, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

²²² *Ibid*, p. 125.

Either way the purpose was just and modernizing which could be an ideal model for federations as long as it was not abused.

Yugoslav regime was aware of the fact that modernization had to be supported with rational and well-organized governmental institutions. Only then it was possible to ensure sustainable development which was the key to maintain peace and prosperity and avoid political polarization around identities. Tito was fully conscious that multicultural structure of the country could be the biggest menace against the unity of the country. Accordingly, his main objective had always been to secure and maintain balance among groups, and continuously generate uniting values to isolate nationalist senses. In his reign, people generally lived in peace and away from ethnic antagonism. Constructing an upper national identity was the top priority of the country since its foundation. The country was established and ruled on the basis of brotherhood and unity. Yugoslav ethnic identity was constructed on two core principles that; all Yugoslavs, not only the South Yugoslavs, historically share same memories which is consisted of struggle for freedom and independence and they all united around the values of self-managed socialism which totally reflected, for them, the independent spirit of Slavs.²²³ Despite the hatred and seriously divisive experiences of the recent past, a new Yugoslav identity could be constructed weakening any kind of ethnic and religious sentiments which model soon considered to be the symbol of multicultural peace and tolerance. In order to strengthen social integrity, policies towards a comprehensive and modernist education system, mobility among provinces and development in communication and economics were executed. With an equal and modern education system, Yugoslav administration aimed at raising generations free from identity based antagonisms. Also in the educational system they adopted the principles of “self-managed socialism” and brotherhood and unity” in order to soften differences among ethnic entities and put forward common senses. Yugoslav identity was inseminated with governmental

²²³ Brian Jenkins & Sypros Sofos, *Nation & Identity in Contemporary Europe*, Routledge, (New York, 1996), p. 258.

instruments.²²⁴ Trying to develop a national economic system based on the equal integration of each province, Yugoslav administration was determined to avoid appearance of regional economic gap as they knew that economic disintegration is generally a triggering element for social polarization in a country. Redistribution of resources by transferring resources from wealthier regions to the poorer was the main success of the country which protected economic balance among federations. These kinds of policies formed the fundamentals which enabled decades of social cohesion in Yugoslavia.

Initiatives of Yugoslav rule in order to create a common identity, a balanced economic system favouring regional equality and a comprehensive educational system suppressing ethnic differences could hold Yugoslav society together for absolutely a long time. From politics to science and art to the family, this unity could be observed from all the components of the country. For example, the ethnically mixed marriage rate is certainly a good indicator to understand this harmony that between 1945 and 1991, 800.000 ethnically mixed marriages had been documented in the country. In 1990, thirteen percent of all marriages in the country were ethnically mixed²²⁵ which stands as an important information about how animosities could be overcome and a united social structure could be created. However, this structure was to be deconstructed as the policies appeared to be vulnerable to nationalist manipulation and could not be internalized among society despite planned efforts of the government. Especially, identity policies were so attached with the Partizan movement and Tito that Yugoslav people came to a position which they could not perceive Yugoslavia without Tito and Partisans. The system itself was equated with Tito. Thus, describing the system with the ruler himself, governmental instruments such as education system could not prepare Yugoslav society for post-Tito Yugoslavia.²²⁶ Moreover, Yugoslav administration could not constitute a system

²²⁴ Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill Irvine, Carol Lilly, *State Society Relations in Yugoslavia: 1945-1992*, Macmillan, (London, 1997), p. 81.

²²⁵ Vesna P. Zimonjic, "Mixed Marriages on the Rise Again", *Other News: Information that Markets Eliminate*, (2006), Access: 17.08.2015.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

which was based on normalizing distinct identities; since they had no chance but to suppress every single identity for a quick reproduction of an upper Yugoslav identity. They overcame social division through uniting around a single identity. The society was multicultural on the outside but on the inside, each group was still alienated from each other's identity as they were not familiarized with each culture which constitutes Yugoslavia. Thus, social differences could neither be internalized nor normalized by the society. This common alienation and lack of knowledge was going to be instrumentalised for those who benefit from disinformation, myth-making and black propaganda.

Tito's death in May 1980 fomented a political unrest and the uniting power of communist regime experienced a substantial weakening. Yugoslav identity was a harvest of rambling efforts of Yugoslav regime. Besides, they never needed to develop social institutions regulating and normalizing social relations in the basis of ethnic terms.²²⁷ Weakening the central power, Tito's death resulted in a quick transition into a multiparty democracy which ended up with political polarization around ethnic camps. In the forthcoming years, ethnicity alone could settle on the center of political and social fragmentation.²²⁸ Ethnicity was instrumentalised by every political elite in each Yugoslav society. It was an easy and a fast way to mobilize large groups in favour of personal political goals. Ethnicity became the main indicator of difference among groups and main determiner of how someone defined himself/herself. Besides, ethnicity was not only perceived as a differentiating feature. It was also perceived as an exclusionist attribute which strengthened social polarization. The rise of nationalism in the federate states also brought a comprehensive skepticism towards Tito's legacy. Croats considered him a tyrant who used Yugoslav communism as a tool to forcefully keep Yugoslav societies together without their consent. The Serbian perspective towards him was not brilliant aswell. According to Serbs, Tito believed that Yugoslavia could not be a strong country with a united Serbia within. Therefore he divided Serbia into three provinces such as

²²⁷ Charles A. Kupchan, *Nationalism and Nationalities in the new Eueope*, Cornell University Press, (London, 1995), p. 105.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo whose unity was considered a historical right by the Serbian people.²²⁹ Though Tito's memory was going to be the first thing to hold on to with the escalation of ethnic tension in the end of 1980s, these nationalist thoughts towards him affected the change in atmosphere and social disintegration in the country after his death.

4.2.4. From Harmony to Genocide

Tito's death coincided with global economic crisis broke out in late 70's namely the global oil crisis. Moreover, the amount of assistance given to the country by both the Eastern and Western blocs decreased Yugoslavia had lost its importance after the end of the cold war. Therefore, country's debt had reached to an amount of 20 billion Dollars by the end of 70's.²³⁰ Such a fast decline in economic values inevitably increased social opposition and strengthened demands towards radical changes in the system. Political groups in the country faced a sharp cleavage as the society was divided into both ethnic and political camps as reformists and conservatives. Serbian reformists were carrying the banner of the reformist side as they had the most radical and most liberal party in the country. Serbian party demanded more autonomy in the local level, liberalization of private initiatives, secret ballot, open public counting and multi-party system.²³¹ The mobilization of reformist front and their demands for radical changes in several aspects consequently mobilized the conservatives. Especially at the local level, nationalist leaders successfully enhanced orthodox-Marxism and turned it into a national ideological movement. Similar to reformists, Serbia also had the most vigorous nationalist movement among the Federates.²³² In

²²⁹ 6th Appendix, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

²³⁰ Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia", *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 3, The MIT Press, (Winter, 1994-1994), p. 145.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

²³² *Ibid.*

this atmosphere, the first ethnic based tensions showed up in Kosovo. The Albanians constituted almost eighty percent of Kosovo population and they wanted to secede from Serbia as an independent Federate State. The major Albanian nationalists in the region considered Serbs and Montenegrins responsible for the subjugation of Kosovo to Serb officials in Belgrade. A massive Albanian autonomy movement protested their “unfair” situation. Conflicts between nationalist groups partially broke out. In the spring of 1981, the movement was violently suppressed by the police and the federal army commanded by the Serbian leadership. In order to gain political sympathy, Serbian political elites adopted the discourse that local Serbs had been exposed to massacres by the Albanian nationalists. Serbian Orthodox Church emphasized that the situation in Kosovo was a reflection of a just Serbian struggle in order to defend themselves and their identity from the historical “enemies” since the 1389 Kosovo War.²³³ Serbian black propaganda scribbled Albanians as immoral savages who were having too many children in order to outnumber other populations. They were also showed to have an aspiration of killing every Montenegrin and Serbian villagers in order to take over their lands and women.²³⁴ Milosevic’s political campaign was mainly focused on agitating myths and symbols and polarizing the society by addressing most sacred emotions. In an irredentist manner, he deliberately provoked Serbs’ historical ties with soils within Kosovo territory. Regions with high proportions of Serb populations like Eastern Slovenia and Krajina were shown to be irreplaceable for their dream of “Great Serbia”.²³⁵ Hatred and fear generated reciprocal distrust. Actually the discourse of victimization was going to be the main element of agitating emotions of Serbian people, and it was going to last until the end of Bosnian war in an increasing and circular relationship as victimization increased hatred and hatred eased victimization. Serbian nationalist elites wanted to insemminate the feeling over the whole Serbian folk that they had been denigrated and tyrannized

²³³ Birgül Demirtaş, *Srebrenitsa Aynasında Balkanlar’ın Bugünü ve Yarını*, Aljazeera Turk: <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/srebrenitsa-aynasinda-balkanlarin-bugunu-ve-yarini>, Access: 15.08.2015.

²³⁴ Zwaan, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²³⁵ Bokovoy, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

throughout the history and now it was a purified right to defend themselves at all costs with all means.²³⁶ Rising nationalism and turmoil confirmed through victimization led each group to consider other groups as potential enemies. Remembering old atrocities, fearing from a violent death narrowed down logic and morality. Vamık D. Volkan's term "Chosen Trauma"²³⁷ _which was also used as "chosen past" by Birgül Demirtaş in order to explain the use of chosen parts of history in manipulation in Yugoslav wars_ can be considered an exact term to explain the manipulation of old hatreds as manipulation is ensured through a planned manner by continuously emphasizing carefully "chosen" memories which stand as symbols of old "cruelties".²³⁸ Consequently, growing national feelings increased the popularity of nationalist leaders; among them Slobodan Milosevic was assigned to be the chef of Serbian Communist Party in 1986.²³⁹ Thus, his first policy was emphasizing on ethnic concerns and underlining the problems of Serbian nation. He especially focused on the problems of Serbian population in Kosovo.

Having recognized how crucial the media is for getting political support, he targeted the staff of every single magazine whose editors were changed with conservative editors sharing common interests with Milosevic. Benefiting from the support of magazines such as *Politika*, he conducted a large-scale campaign against Albanians in order to agitate the situation in Kosovo.²⁴⁰ Milosevic adopted victimizing discourses as a political instrument. The Serbian Communist Party used the conflict in Kosovo as a tool to gain full support of Serbian nationalists. Publishing stimulatory magazines, giving provocative speeches and addressing a Stalinist way of democratic centralism, he could take over the full power over the party organization. He was also very successful at earning the support and the respect of

²³⁶ Demirtaş, *op. cit.*

²³⁷ Vamık D. Volkan, "Large Group Identity: 'Us and Them' Polarizations in the International Arena", *Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society*, Vol. 14, (1999), p. 10.

²³⁸ Demirtaş, *op. cit.*

²³⁹ David Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

²⁴⁰ Gagnon, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

Serb intellectuals and academicians. In 1986, a group of Serb intelligentsia from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Belgrade constituted a memorandum which consisted of radical nationalist expressions. According to the memorandum; the Serbs in Kosova had been oppressed and departed since the seventieth Century. Also, during Tito's administration, Serbian people had always been exposed to double standards. They also claimed that they sent more troops than any other group during the Second World War but gained less than the others. Moreover, Serbs with minority status in other federate states always felt insecure. Therefore, problems of Serbians needed to be the main issue of central administration as it required an immediate and permanent resolution. In the end of the memorandum they also mentioned that the unity of Serbian people under a single Serbian state would be the only absolute way to provide a permanent security for Serbians.²⁴¹ Consequently, such a perspective was endangering the Yugoslavism from the core. Apart from a minority people, majority of each state's population was sharing similar nationalist ideas. However, the victimization of Serbian people bringing back centuries of old hatreds was a rather radical effort considering other Yugoslav states. Having a historically more active political culture, Serbian side was the first to articulate it. A part from the memorandum presents a good view for victimization and manipulation of Serb people by Serbian nationalism of 1980s;

The attitude taken by those in power and the authorities in Kosovo towards the violence directed at the Serbian people is particularly significant. The hushing up or glossing over these crimes, the practice of suppressing the whole truth, and dilatory tactics in enquiries and prosecution all encourage large and small acts of terror, and at the same time a false, "sanctified" picture of conditions in Kosovo is created. Moreover, there is a persistent tendency to find a political excuse for the violence perpetrated against Serbs in the alleged existence of hatred on both sides, intolerance, and vindictiveness, while of late more and more is being heard of the imaginary activities of an "external" enemy from outside the Province, viz., Serbian nationalism emanating from "Belgrade". Serbia's economic subordination cannot be fully understood without mention of its politically inferior status, from which all other relationships flowed. As far as the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was concerned, the economic hegemony of the Serbian nation between the two world wars was beyond dispute, regardless of the fact that Serbia's rate of industrialization was lower than the Yugoslav average. This ideological platform gave rise to opinions and behaviour which were to have a crucial influence on subsequent political events and inter-communal relations. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and

²⁴¹ Zwaan, *op. cit.*, p. 126-127.

Arts once again expresses its willingness to do everything it can, to the best of its abilities, to assist efforts to deal with these crucial tasks and the historical duties incumbent upon our generation.²⁴²

Serbian Memorandum was a successful maneuver to justify the Serbian cause. Until the time the memorandum was published, the Serbian Academy was known to be a fair and fully scientific institution which contained objective scientists. Therefore, it was shocking to hear such a critical report from such an objective institution.²⁴³ Consequently, the backwash of the memorandum was more comprehensive than it was expected which turned the report into a key figure for Serbian mobilization. The memorandum influenced vast majority of Serbians from all socio-economic classes. Slobodan Milosevic knew that emphasis on nationality was the key to consolidate his power in the party. Therefore, he renovated and shaped his political discourse around the memorandum. He could eliminate his political opponents, including other nationalist leaders, and quicken the unity in the basis of Serbian nationality.²⁴⁴ He could resort to any means to consolidate his power. Black mailing and slandering within the party organization, using broadcasts, radio and television for political manipulation, staging organized scenes in the public were few of his tricks. He also knew how to design his discourse. He was very successful at addressing most fragile sentiments. He knew which sentiment to appeal according to the type of crowd he was speaking with. However, he had not been a man of speech before 1987 and he might have stayed that way if he had not been sent by the Kosovo Province to mediate a minor dispute in Kosovo. In this sense the Polje Speech can be considered a breaking point for his career as a nationalist leader since his words “Noone should dare to beat you again!” is still remembered. Adam LeBor brilliantly draws a picture of the very moment in his book “Milosevic: A Biography”:

Slobodan Milosevic, the communist leader who up until that time had not been very outspoken in the nationalist debate, travelled to Kosovo Polje, to the historic grounds

²⁴² Taken from *The Holocaust and the Other Genocides*, Amsterdam University Press, p. 127.

²⁴³ Gail Harmon, “War in Former Yugoslavia: Ethnic Conflict or Power Politics?”, A Senior Honors Thesis, Boston College University, (April, 1997), p. 133.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

of the Battle of Kosovo. Here he addressed the Serbian crowds in an orchestrated demonstration: "Comrades, Comrades!" Then someone in the audience shouted at him "The Albanians got in among us. We were beaten up. Please! They are beating us up! Milosevic then spoke ominous words that would prove to be a turning point in his career as a Serbian leader: "Noone should dare to beat you again!" Later he told the audience: "This is your land, your fields, your gardens, your memories are here. Surely you will not leave your land because it is difficult here and you are oppressed... You should stay here because of your ancestor sand because of your descendants. Otherwise you would disgrace your ancestors and disappoint your descendants. I do not propose, comrades, that in staying you should suffer and tolerate a situation in which you are not satisfied. On the contrary you should change it."²⁴⁵

In the speech Milosevic refers both to the ancestors and descendants of the Serbian people which constitutes an emotional burden for them. Besides, he covertly asserts to change the situation without mentioning about the means. In the following era, his adoption of nationalist discourse resulted in an increasing support from Serbian population. Consequently, Milosevic was going to be elected as the president of Serbia in 1989. His nationalist propaganda increasingly continued. He knew that he could determine the collective leadership status and consequently dominate whole Yugoslavia through influencing other federal parties. Therefore, Serbian Party leadership focused on influencing political elements in other federal states in order to pull attention to the problems of Kosovo Serbs. In each city of Serbia and in other provinces, Serbian party gathered thousands of people to protest the situation in Kosovo. The movement was so successful that in a short time, Montenegro and Vojvodina party leaderships were overthrown and politicians sympathized with Serbian movement took their places. Also the Kosovo party leadership who was literally selected by the Serbian administration itself was forced to submit the repeal of Kosovo's autonomy and inclusion of Kosovo to Serbia.²⁴⁶ By 1989 Milosevic could have controlled four out of 8 votes in the federal government which were Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo. He only needed to eliminate

²⁴⁵ Adam LeBor, *Milosevic: A Biography*, Yale University Press, (2002), p. 82.

²⁴⁶ Gagnon, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

Macedonian leadership in order to gain full control in the central administration.²⁴⁷ Separatist campaigns were simultaneously conducted against Croats and Slovenes as well. Similar to the campaign against Kosovo, Milosevic benefited from media for manipulation. Even before the Croat elections held place in 1990, Serbian media had already started black propaganda against Croatia. After the elections, Serbian media especially focused on the victorious Croatian Democratic Party and claimed that they were planning to massacre whole Serbian residents in Croatia.²⁴⁸ In an effort to equate the new Croat administration with Ustasa regime, scenes from mass graves filled with thousands of bones from the Second World War were continuously published and broadcasted.²⁴⁹ Serbian propaganda was especially gathered around Ustasa fascism in which Ustasa collaboration with Nazi invaders was emphasized many times. Myth making also invaded a major place within Milosevic's nationalist campaign. He benefited from dramatic events that took place in the Serbian History by attaching them sacred meanings with an exaggerated expression. As Horowitz says, "History can be a weapon and tradition can fuel ethnic conflict. But a current conflict cannot generally be explained as a revived form of an earlier conflict."²⁵⁰ Thus, history alone is not enough for the emergence of ethnic conflict. Manipulation stirs up historical sentiments. In this sense, historical events such as the legendary Serb leader Dusan's death or the First Kosovo Battle against the Ottomans and Serbian noble land lords' and Prince Lazar's honourable sacrifices fighting large armies of the enemy were instrumentalised through myth making.²⁵¹ Symbolist politics, instrumentalization of mythical memories were used for victimization; and manipulation of emotions. In this sense, Serbian nationalism especially settled its propaganda on such symbolic days. The Serbian myths and legends were incited and shown to be the memories of yesterday. For example, following the day of Lazar's

²⁴⁷ Harmon, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

²⁴⁸ Gangnon, *op. cit.*, p.. 155.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

²⁵⁰ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press, (London, 1985), p. 99.

²⁵¹ Aleksander Pavkovich, *Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*, Palgrave Macmillan: Second Edition, (July, 2000), p. 8.

Feast, a day to memorize Prince Lazar's heroic death in the Battle of Kosovo; in June 1989, *Politika* gave a headline that "the Serbian people has glorified and still glorifies their heroes and recognize their traitors"²⁵² which was an attempt to use old atrocities of Serbs in order to stir up fear and hatred since it was indicated that the Serbian nation "still" glorifies its heroes and recognizes the traitors of "today". Benefiting from myths created by historical events, Serb nationalism equated Ottomans and all their remnants as the ultimate enemy. In this case, "the remnants" were Bosniaks as they were considered to be all that is left from Ottoman rule. The historical day of Lazar was symbolized through myth-making in various times by various political actors such as Milosevic, *Politika* or the Serbian Orthodox Church, in order to link past with today and the past enemies with today's opponents. In this sense Lazar's death was symbolized and equated with the never ending suffering of Serbs throughout the history, which still remains as an example of successful victimization campaign pursued by Serb radicals during the Kosovo and Bosnian wars.

As a matter of cause and effect to Serbian national movement, nationalism was radicalized in other Yugoslav states as well. Croat nationalism got its share from this wave of radicalization. Led by Franjo Tudjman, Croat nationalist movement was gathered around Nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica*) in 1989. Croat Party pursued similar policies with Serbia. Ethnic nationalism was no longer restrained, people were mobilized around national propaganda and social problems were agitated within ethnic terminology. Symbols related with a Greater Croatia constituted the basis of Croat propaganda. Just like Serbian Autonomy Memorandum, they pictured every Serbian with a savage nature who generates the biggest threat for Croatian people.²⁵³ Exclusive side of ethnicity was instrumentalised by Croat nationalist leaders as well. Towards the end of 1988 to the months just before the 1990 elections, every ethnic group in Yugoslav society

²⁵² Florian Bieber, "Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo Myth from 600th Anniversary to the Present", *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Routledge, (2011), p. 102.

²⁵³ Zwaan, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

was polarized by different political entrepreneurs. In the Croatian side, after a process similar to Serbia, fuelling the polarization of society, *Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* won the elections in May 1990 making Tudjman the new president of Croatia. His arrival at the office removed the whole communist influence in the country and Croat political agenda was fully structured in nationalist terms. One of Tudjman's first activities after coming into the office was demoting the Serbian population from the Croat constitution which was about 600.000 people and twelve percent of the population.²⁵⁴ Country's belongingness to Croat people was often emphasized and adopted in the discourses of Croat politicians. Serbian officials were removed from public institutions.²⁵⁵ Such developments created a major uncertainty and incited anger and fear among Serbian people in Croatia which was going to be instrumentalised by Milosevic. Moreover, visibly against the Serbian movement, Croatia and Slovenia developed closer relations during the secession process of Yugoslavia, which constituted a simple form of beneficial partnership. Having a rather homogenous society (Only 2 per cent Serbs) Slovenia was not vastly influenced by the nationalist movements in Yugoslavia. As each side had no claims within each other's territories, it was not a hard decision to act together against Serb fanaticism.²⁵⁶ Therefore, on 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia simultaneously declared their independence. It did not take even a day for Serb dominated Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija-JNA*) to launch an attack against Slovenia. At the same time Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia started a rebellion against Croat forces. Fight in Slovenia did not take long that Slovenian forces had already been ready for any possible attacks into their territory. On 7 July 1991, conflict ended with Brioni Agreement. However, the size of the conflict in Croatia was going to be much worse as the resident Serbs of Croatia, who constituted 11 per cent of the country, were the leading actors of the assault. From July to December,

²⁵⁴ Harmon, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁶ Adnerson, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

about 10.000 people from each side were killed.²⁵⁷ During the first 3 months of the conflict, the level of violence was not at a high level since mostly the battles between the parties occurred as long-ranged border combats. However, it was heightened with the Spring of 1991 since paramilitary forces from Serbia joined Serb paramilitary groups in Croatia. In the Krajina region of Croatia the rebel Serbs declared themselves as autonomous which was immediately recognized by Serbia. Krajina administration lasted for 4 years and during that time not only the Croats but also moderate Serbs with liberal demands were exposed to harsh treatment.²⁵⁸

On 2 May 1991, a group of Croat police in Borovo Selo were brutally murdered by a group of Serb paramilitary forces. Throats were cut, noses were sliced and eyes were gouged...²⁵⁹ The massacre in Borovo Selo was just an example of countless atrocities happened in Yugoslavia's disintegration process however it became a symbol for Croats later in the war and triggered the mobilization of civilians under voluntary militia forces. After that time, civilians from each side came to the forefront in the battle. With the growing violence; fear and anger spread among common folk which eventually led them to group up in order to stay alive. The more the fight became intense, the higher the numbers of fighters in the battle increased. Even the Croats living in other countries of Europe returned their homelands to join the voluntary ranks. In parallel with the increasing number of victims not only the number of fighters enlarged but the sides became more radical. Level of violence in Croatia was also a turning point for the structure of Yugoslav army that it was transformed into a purified Serbian army and lost its multinational formation. From then on all the capabilities of Yugoslav army was going to be at full control of Serbs. While the Conflict in Croatia was in full swing, the federal government collapsed in late 1991 which was going to end up with the unity of Serbia and Montenegro in April 1992.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁵⁸ Stathis N. Kalyvas & Nicholas Sambanis, "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violence Dynamics", *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, DC: World Bank, Vol. 2, (Washington, 2005), p. 191.

²⁵⁹ Harmon, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

In August 1991, under the command of Milosevic, Yugoslav Army laid a siege to Vukovar. The city could resist for three months. When it fell 90 per cent of the buildings in the city had been destroyed. After taking the city, the Serbian forces immediately spread into the city, searched for hiding and wounded civilians. Then they dragged the ones they found to open fields, murdered and dumped their bodies into mass graves. Those who were killed were mostly the wounded Croats found in Vukovar hospital.²⁶⁰ Destroying a whole city, killing wounded and unarmed civilians incapable of defending themselves and committing all these crimes in cold blood had nothing to do with legal and just struggle of a nation. Instead, it represents how affective and dangerous is to mobilize people in the basis of hatred and fear. In September 1991, in the sixth month of Siege of Dubrovnik, the General Council of United Nations decided 14.000 soldiers of peacekeeping forces to settle in the region and also to an economic embargo against Montenegro and Serbia. Besides, the General Secretary gave permission to the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, to conduct a peace agreement between Yugoslav administration and Croatia meanwhile the peacekeeping force was going to be deployed into the country.²⁶¹ Simultaneously, there was a growing opposition against Milosevic regime among Serbian political groups since the ongoing war and the embargo had broken the economic condition in the country. Massive strikes conducted by vast majority of workers against Milosevic and pro-reformist demands started to shake his hegemony. Milosevic fell back upon the military against the protesters. However, the military refused to move against the protesters. Therefore, he could no longer resist both external and internal pressure and accepted to withdraw from Croatia and conceded the deployment of UN Forces into Krajina.²⁶² Soon, UN Peacekeeping Forces were settled between the Yugoslav Army, Serb militia and Croat Forces. In January 1992, having been forced by the German administration, European Community recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Thus, with the Yugoslav Army and Serb militia was departed

²⁶⁰ Elizabeth Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style*, Brookings Institutional Press, (Washington, 2006), p. 16.

²⁶¹ Stathis, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

²⁶² Gagnon, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

from the Croat territory, secession process of Croatia from Yugoslavia was finally completed. However, disintegration process of Yugoslavia was not going to be ended with the independence of two countries.

After Croatia and Slovenia's independence were recognized by the European Community and USA as well, Bosniak community in the country also demanded independence. Actually, Bosniak population did not have any other option since after Croatia and Slovenia's secession from the federation, staying within Yugoslavia would mean living under the dominance of Serbia.²⁶³ Between the 28th of February and the 1st of March 1992, a referendum took place in Bosnia Herzegovina where 3.15 million out of 4.35 million of Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted (%64 of the votes). The proportion of "for votes" is enough to reveal the intention of Bosnians for independence as it was %99,7.²⁶⁴ As soon as the results of the referendum were announced, Serbs set up roadblocks around major cities in order to cut their connection from Bosnian cities with Serbian majority. In April 1992, Bosnia was internationally recognized as an independent state from Yugoslavia. As expected, response of the Federal Government was prompt and violent. Despite the referendum was recognized by the international community they did not hesitate to attack Bosnia. However, the army did not encounter with international pressure aswell. An Economic blockade was implemented in the places out of the control of Serbian militia in Bosnia.

Having failed in Kosovo and Croatia, the Muslims were now shown to be the main enemy of Serbian people. Islamic population of Bosnia was portrayed to be seeking ways to found a fundamental Islamic State, impose Islam and exterminate resident Serbians if seen necessary to create a purified Islamic Society in Bosnia.²⁶⁵ Absolutely the same process was being actualized by the Serbian nationalist movement for the third time. Yet it could still gain support from masses. Serbian

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ Commission on Security and Cooperation Report, *The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia Herzegovina: February 29-March 1, 1992*, p. 19.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

residents in Bosnia were armed and organized. Serb guerrilla forces launched attacks into regions where the referendum for independence passed. At the end of May 1992, UN Security Council executed an economic and military embargo against the whole Yugoslavia. However it made it easier for Serbian forces as they were benefiting from all capabilities of Yugoslav Army. On the other hand Bosniaks and Croats had to resist with light weapons. In the following months, Serbian guerrilla forces committed countless crimes against Muslims and Croats in order to daunt opposing forces. In the end of July 1992, Serbian guerrilla had already controlled seventy per cent of Bosnia territory.²⁶⁶ With growing humanitarian crisis in the summer of 1992, UN executed a no-fly zone over the country and enacted the deployment of UN Peacekeepers into the country. In October 1992, UN forces were deployed into Bosnia. However, UN Peacekeeping forces were so hesitant to interfere in the combat and they were not even sure about retaliating in case of a direct attack to UN Forces. Therefore the Serbian blockade and massacres in Bosnian cities continued. It took until May 1993 for UN to declare Sarajevo and five other Muslim enclaves as “safe areas” under UN protection.²⁶⁷ Yet, it still did not stop Serbian advance into Sarajevo, one of the safe zones under the protection of UN.

In the summer of 1993, after the siege of Sarajevo, NATO announced its availability to execute air operations into Sarajevo in order to protect UN missions. The declaration delayed Serbian assaults for a short time but the violence restarted with the beginning of 1994. In February, 68 civilians were killed with a bomb attack at Sarajevo. NATO reacted by giving an ultimatum that if Serb forces were not pulled back to UN determined areas, the retribution was going to be with massive air strikes onto Sarajevo. As the Serbian forces did not retreat from the capital Sarajevo, NATO planes bombed Bosnian Serb units for the first time in April 1994. Situation in Sarajevo could be stabilized but this time violence heightened in Bihac between Krajina supported Bosnian Serb militia and Bosnian forces. NATO launched air strikes into the Serbian ruled Krajina region in Croatia in order to cut external support to Serb militia in Bosnia. After a successful operation all the targeted critical

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

²⁶⁷ Stathis, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

points could be eliminated which eventually cut all the support of Serb militia in Bosnia. Milosevic was forced to withdraw and participate in ceasefire negotiations. In December 1994, the sides agreed on a four month ceasefire with mediation of US president Jimmy Carter.²⁶⁸ The ceasefire resulted in the benefit of Serbian forces as they could reinforce their ranks. As soon as the ceasefire expired, Serbian forces launched another assault on Sarajevo.

In the Spring 1995, experienced the most brutal massacre in Europe since the Second World War. Under the protection of 400 men Dutch peacekeeping force unarmed civilians in Srebrenica were massacred by the Serbian Militia under the command of Radco Mladic. No single bullet was or could be shot to the Serbian units by the peacekeeping forces. During the attack on Srebrenica, peacekeeping forces showed neither physical resistance nor willingness to stop Serbian movement which encouraged the Serb forces to occupy the whole area. In 5 days 8372 Bosnian Muslims from every gender and every age were killed in most brutal ways. Women were raped before the eyes of their families, refugees and Dutch soldiers who were supposed to protect them. People were forced to kill members of their own families. Some committed suicides to evade such brutal and long lasting tortures. It is incredible to even imagine the level of violence committed to unarmed refugees in the name of ethnic and religious differences. According to the testimonies of survivors, young boys were forced to rape their little sisters, pregnant women were killed, their stomach were cut and their unborn babies were thrown into the ground and beaten to death, mothers were forced to drink their children's blood.²⁶⁹ Besides killing; torture and rape was permitted and even ordered to demoralize the enemy and considered as some kind of a reward for soldiers and a powerful deterrent against the enemy to force them abandon the lands they live. Rape and torture was seen to be the newest and the most horrible weapon of ethnic cleansing.²⁷⁰ The level of violence and hatred directed to the civilians reveal the power of manipulation and agitation of

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

²⁶⁹ From the testimonies of survivors Writ of Summons: District Court, the Hague, Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten, (2007), p. 101-111.

²⁷⁰ Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

emotions by political leaders. Directing masses, manipulating emotions, inseminating fear and hatred to mobilize people for political goals have been more dangerous than any weapon since nothing can get worse than human cruelty. This was what happened in the disintegration process of Yugoslavia. Continuously emphasizing the crimes committed by Croats in the Second World War or describing Bosnian Muslims as Slavs converted into Islam, sharp biases were spread among people. Ancient hatreds, primordial feelings, competition over resources, interests of political entrepreneurs, ignorance of international society affected each other, generated a deadly combination and constituted a suitable ground for radicalism.

With the indignation caused by the Srebrenica genocide, NATO forces launched its most extensive military campaign since the beginning of the war in order to soothe international community. With month-long air strikes of the NATO aircrafts and Croat Force's advance into Krajina with a 10.000 men army, Serbian troops were forced to retreat from Bosnia after three years. By November 1995, Serbian forces had abandoned the country leaving thousands of death and mutilated as well as generations of people with damaged psychologies. In late 1995, the war legally ended as each party signed *Dayton Agreement* under the pressure from USA and international community.²⁷¹ According to a UN report about the casualties of Bosnia war, by the late 1994 there had been around 200.000 people killed, 50.000 tortured in almost 800 detention camps. According to another report taken for the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia there had been about 150.000 people killed during the disintegration process of Yugoslavia and almost 100.000 of it belonged to the victims of Bosnia.²⁷² Though it has been 20 years after the Bosnian war; fear, anxiety and sorrow still remains which have inflicted into the Balkan Peninsula. Memories are still so fresh which causes a danger for possible rise in nationalism. It has always been up to the leaders to ensure and maintain peace among people. Now, the peace still depends on the leaders who have the power to cover old hatreds with peaceful policies and dialogue. However, we should not ignore that after such atrocities penetrated into every individual's mind, peace still stands on thin ice.

²⁷¹ Zwaan, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

²⁷² *Ibid.*

4.2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter the thesis aimed at understanding the reasons led Yugoslav people to fragmentation and bilateral brutalism during the disintegration process of Yugoslavia. Specifically, Bosnian War and Srebrenica genocide was investigated as the level of crimes reached their highest level in the full presence of international community. Also the victims and the hunters were once the residents of same neighborhoods. Therefore, the chapter was started with the historical background of entities that constitute Yugoslavia. Then, searched for the ancestral origins of each entity in order to understand what caused different ethnic and religious consciousness among them. Thus, it was reached the perspective that people in the region from distinct ethnic and religious identities were coming from same descendants but gained ethnic and religious identity as a consequence of various breaking points throughout the history. However, the main reason for fragmentation tendency among entities in the region was its geographical position. Balkan Peninsula is settled on a position between the military expedition roads of both western and the eastern kingdoms. Therefore, in every historical era, great empires that had the will to increase their sphere of influence had to control Balkan Peninsula. Consequently, Balkan residents were frequently exposed to assimilation of shifting powers which presents the reasons that divided Balkan society into distinct groups. However, the process leading to the World War II and crimes committed during the Nazi invasion can be counted as a turning point for the division between entities constituted Yugoslavia. Besides collaborating with the Nazis, one of the cruellest political powers of human history, Croat Ustasa's methods to deter other groups also left decades of fear and distrust which were hidden until the collapse of Berlin Wall. In this sense comes the question "how" instead of "why" since not only killing but adopting brutal ways is as important as it reveals an answer to the question how ordinary civilians can turn into cold-blooded killers. Memories of past conflicts may inflict fear and mistrust within societies. This can give an answer to why societies divide into different camps and participate in ethnic conflicts. However, the memories of the brutalities in such cases are the main source of manipulators to stir

up extreme emotions. This can give an answer to the question how the civilians can reach a state of hatred to kill other civilians with most brutal ways. Because what happened in the past may be forgotten or lose its affection in minds. However, how it happened is the key point which is instrumentalised by political leaders in order to bring back old emotions since committing a crime is one thing, but how it is committed is another.

After briefly investigating the historical background of Yugoslavia the thesis aimed at understanding the process that ended up with an ethnic conflict. The case of Bosnia without a doubt carries lots of similarities with the case of Rwanda. Despite, major differences in each culture and geography; similarities in each case were the main motivation of this thesis for investigating them. Similar to Rwanda, also in the Bosnian case historical process of development of ethnic identity in each group plays a major role in fragmentation. Also in each case there were needed rapid decrease in life standards and a triggering event that creates a suitable ground for fragmentation. In the Bosnia case, it can be considered that the process from Tito's death to the end of Cold War as the era of rapid decrease in life conditions. As Tito was the main constituent that ensured social cohesion among the members of Yugoslav society, his death generated a massive confusion about how and by whom the post-Tito Yugoslavia was going to be administrated. Besides the uncertainty of its internal affairs, Yugoslavia was also suffering from the global economic crisis of 80's. In such an atmosphere, every federate state was thoroughly considering secession. Thus, it did not take long for the nationalist leaders to gain power in party leaderships of each state. But the thing was, with the collective leadership regulation, Serbian nationalist leader Milosevic reached the chance to be the president of Yugoslavia. Though he still was the president of whole Yugoslavia, he did not hesitate to show his will to use his position for the favour of Serbia. Along with growing intentions for secession, nationalist leaders did not have difficulties in polarizing ethnic groups for political mobilization. Like every other cases in ethnic conflicts, the triggering point in the case of Bosnia can be counted as tension reached to violence in Kosovo between Serb minority and Kosovo residents. In the time, Milosevic was not the president yet and used the situation in Kosovo in favour of his

nationalist political campaign. In the blink of an eye, major protests were organized to emphasize the conditions of Serbian minorities in each federate state. It was a turning point for the Yugoslav disintegration processes that Serbian population as a whole was mobilized in radical terms that most of the Serbian population could be influenced by nationalist campaign of Milosevic and supported his policies to move other entities from Serbian territory. Therefore, even before the Serbian party leadership, militia groups had already been gathered in every federate state. Support for nationalism and social mobilization were in such levels that; hours after every referendum in Yugoslav states, militia forces of minority Serbs in each had already set up roadblocks and isolated the ways to regions with higher Serbian population. Indeed Serbian nationalism was fed by fear; thus, they were mostly claiming to take defensive measures in the beginning. However, after Milosevic's presidency, both Yugoslav army and Serb militia posed an advancing manner.

Without a doubt, Bosnian case has many differences from the case of Rwanda in terms of the construction of identities. The case of Rwanda presents a perfect example for the construction of ethnic consciousness among a group of people who lived absolutely free from identities or ethnic consciousness for centuries. Thus, it was clear to see the process how Rwandese people were divided into groups along with colonial implementations. On the other hand, ethnic consciousness of Balkan people did not emerge in artificial ways as it took centuries of assimilation of each group to gain different ethnic and religious identities. However, under the roof of Yugoslavia, they could live together with harmony on the basis of brotherhood and unity where they adopted an upper identity. In this sense, the rapid abolition of this harmony and upper identity assert certain points to see the process of how national emotions are incited, people are radicalized and fragmented; and masses are manipulated and mobilized on the basis of ethnic sentiments. Consequently, the case of Bosnia constitutes a comprehensive source for rapid fragmentation, instrumentalization of national emotions and escalation of tension. It also presents detailed information about political entrepreneurs' use of instruments such as radio, newspaper or magazines for mythmaking and black propaganda. Therefore, the

Bosnian case is also suitable for explaining ethnic conflict in terms of Instrumentalist Approaches towards ethnic conflict.

As a conclusion, in this chapter the thesis managed to compare two different cases for ethnic fragmentation and genocide to find out the common elements that lead different societies to genocide. Therefore, it could be seen how worsening conditions turn societies vulnerable for manipulation, how past memories are used to reincarnate old hatreds, the role of emotions in manipulation and mobilization and the chain-like connection of all these elements that lead societies to a certain disaster. Worst of all, it was seen that it is only a matter of political will to bring back buried memories in case of a turmoil that heighten social intolerance.

5. CONCLUSION

This thesis started research with the construction of social identity and the emotional structure of human being as a basis of this study. As the primary purpose and the main question of this thesis is to find out how ordinary civilians show will to involve in brutal massacres against other ordinary civilians and can emotions be the main actor to create blood thirsty masses, it was needed to understand the role of emotions in the construction of identity. The thesis also analyzed the relation of emotions with social bonds, social differentiation and the construction of “us”, and “them”. Therefore, it could be understood that an individual cannot be considered free from their feelings. Emotions are the key that derive individual actions. Society is an accumulation of individuals where there is bilateral affection between the individual and the society. Consequently, the society should also be considered along with emotions and social movement is a derivation of common feelings. Vice versa the common sentiments are the reason for the constitution of society. Individuals create society and each individual is created by it. In the end of the chapter the thesis found out that ethnic identity is a complex mixture of sentiments, especially the most dramatic emotions, perception, consciousness, myths and moral codes all of which are intangible motivator devices. Therefore, individual and social action can neither be explained with reason nor emotions only; and in cases of extreme situations emotions can be the main motivator of social actions.

After the first chapter, the thesis continued with two competing fronts of ethnic conflict theories in order to understand systematic explanations towards the occurrence of ethnic fragmentation. The theories of ethnic conflict may be considered as a bridge between the construction of social identity and the cases examined in the chapter 3 since theories in the second chapter explain ethnic conflicts through starting from the construction of social identity to realization of ethnic conflicts. Also with different theoretical perspectives the thesis could define different explanations towards ethnicity and conflicts derived from it.

Shortly remembering the theories of ethnic conflict in few sentences; primordialist approach attributes ethnic consciousness to human nature. Human is a social being and he/she obtains some particular differences at birth from their ancestors. The instinct to define us and the others is explained through human nature. This differentiating sense is so powerful that it triggers altruism and survival of group in case of a threat from outside. This protectionist instinct is the key to ethnic conflict. On the other hand according to instrumentalist approach, human kind does not have a characteristic from born which make them differentiate and obtain a sense of belonging. Social identity is something learnt. Human is a social being and each individual is in need of a group to live with. Unlike primordialism, according to instrumentalist approach, people gain social identity through experiences and there is a correlation between the rise of ethnic consciousness and the amount of gain from ethnic identity. Instrumentalist approach asserts that in cases of ethnic conflicts, the level of ethnic fanaticism increases since the amount of gain from ethnic affiliation is at its highest level which is “the survival”. Instrumentalist approach also advocates that ethnic conflict breaks out as ethnic identity is instrumentalised by political entrepreneurs. They inculcate fear and hatred among the members of a society in cases of tumultuous times. People are manipulated until their ethnic identity stands as the only thing they hold on to. Thus, ethnic fragmentation is instrumentalised for political goals and genocide is the ultimate point it can reach.

After examining the two grand views towards ethnic conflict, the thesis examined two specific cases which are the Case of Rwanda and the Case of Bosnia. The purpose in choosing these two cases was that they took place at the same time in different geographies and committed by people from totally different cultures and histories. Despite all of these unquestionable differences, motivations of killers, causes and effects were almost the same. At the same time but in different places, from same reasons and with same ways ordinary people were massacred by other ordinary people. Speaking in methodological terms; ethnic conflict and massacre are dependent variables of this thesis, while time period, society, culture and geography were the independent variables. The thesis tried to figure out whether the geography, culture, society, history or the time period affected social motivations in ethnic

conflicts. Though, each case had their own dynamics; neither the geography nor the conventions affected the result. In each case emotions, ethnic consciousness, manipulation of nationalist political entrepreneurs, competition over resources were the main commonalities. Therefore the thesis could reach a conclusion by comparing and analyzing the common points in each case one by one.

First of all, emotions should never ever be excluded when explaining the term ethnic conflict. Especially in tumultuous periods, emotions can reach beyond any kind of rational thought. They are also very affective in designating social action as individual reason can be covered by mass anxiety. Every individual has a tendency to easily adopt social perception which blunts individual reasoning capability. At some point, social perception had been penetrated so much into the individual mind that the individual considers it as free will. This is how a society which is totally vulnerable to any kind of manipulation is created. Especially, extreme emotions like fear, hatred, and disgust should be considered as the key to social mobilization for massive sentiments have always been the main generator of social consciousness. When social consciousness is attached with ethnic identity, then nationalism is also radicalized. Therefore, any other group can be seen as a menace and the reason for all the problems of their nation. In the hands of political manipulators, societies may eventually consider exterminating other groups as the only way to survive. In each case the thesis has examined that both the Hutu and the Serbians were manipulated through their emotions. They were convinced that there were no other ways but to exterminate other group to survive. Ultimate emotions like fear and hatred were so powerfully agitated that they did not stop with eradicating the others but also wanted to do it in “most extreme ways”. That is why, analyzing the power of emotions is a must to understand what can turn ordinary civilians against others and make them adopt the most brutal ways in their actions.

Secondly, political entrepreneurs and their manipulatory efforts should be added to the analysis. So far in the thesis, it was emphasized the role of emotions in ethnic fragmentation and ethnic violence. However, one thing is certain that without manipulation, emotions alone cannot lead people to fanaticism and eventually ethnic

violence. In each case it is seen that political entrepreneurs like party leaders or businessmen seek political and economic benefits in the fragmentation of people and radicalizing them. In each case, masses were mobilized towards a desired direction by political elites. Emotions were agitated and extreme sentiments were inseminated also by political entrepreneurs. With the use of mass communication devices people were polarized. News slandering other groups and myths enhancing fragmentation were publicly published in order to proliferate negative perceptions against other groups. In each case the broadcasts and publications, “*Politika*” in Serbia and Kangura and “Radio Milles Collines” in Rwanda, emphasized old atrocities so often to keep fear and hatred warm enough. In each case any kind of hegemonic device was used to manipulate masses into a desired direction. Fabricated stories collected from historical events, were broadcasted in order to spread anger and fear among people. Photos of victims from old crimes were explicitly published by warmongering magazines and newspapers. Moderate views were silenced with censorship, blackmail or by force; all other options for resolution were covered in black and the only way to survive was shown to be holding onto one’s ethnic group and annihilating all the enemies in an anarchic society. Political leaders also adopted radical discourses in order to mobilize people around their ethnic identity. They used polarizing and radicalizing discourses to cover social and economic problems. Therefore, a nationalist society would sacrifice to the end and never demand for more in such an “extra-ordinary time”. Shortly, manipulation of political entrepreneurs has to be seen as another aspect of ethnic mobilization, radicalization and normalization of ethnic brutality. Taking its power from social emotions, manipulation should be considered as a completeive for social emotions in cases of ethnic fragmentation. By the combination of extreme emotions like fear and anger with manipulation, there exists an offensive national consciousness.

Thirdly, dramatically worsening conditions, decreasing life standards and competition over resources are doubtless common points of each case. Both in Rwanda and Bosnia, society experienced a rapid economic crisis which triggered social tension and intolerance. In each case, nepotism and political favouritism in governmental cadres harmed social cohesion and consequently enhanced

polarization. In the limited resources, those who achieved political power broke the rules of fair distribution of resources in order not to lose maintenance of their own political supporters. With decreasing morality and growing tension, social fragmentation increased as every group started to seek salvation in radical solutions. In each case, a final tumultuous period increased tension and polarization which resulted in a triggering event that led ethnic violence.

Lastly, the claims of the thesis can systematically be described in a diagram to present the causes and effects that lead to ethnic fragmentation and violence in an order. As the emotional structure of human kind is the basis of this thesis, emotions can be placed on the foundation of as well. Throughout the historical process, various facts such as; assimilation of shifting rulers in the case of Bosnia or social construction by colonial hands in the case of Rwanda, attribute different identities to societies which generally bear ethnic meanings. Therefore, societies eventually adopt ethnic consciousness. In case of a turmoil which decreases life standards and morality, ethnic identity tends to be radicalized by the manipulation of political entrepreneurs. Thus, social polarization and national radicalism rise as societies start to hold onto their ethnic identity. Manipulation of sentiments is used to mobilize masses and a triggering event is enough to lead these mobilized groups to violence. The level of violence proliferate fear and hatred in a short time which spread massive distrust among the groups. After a point, brutality is normalized and committed systematically against the whole members of the other group. However, the diagram does not finalize with ethnic violence and genocide as the committed atrocities generate a rich source of hatred and fear for possible manipulation of future leaders...




Figure 6: Diagramized Summary of Fragmentation and Genocide

Consequently, the purpose of this thesis was to understand the cognitive reasons that lead societies to incredible levels of violence. Also by understanding how and why societies are fragmented and butcher each other for ethnic reasons, the thesis underlines that the emotions has to be counted as a regardless research field for international relations discipline. Either in individual or social level of analysis, emotions has to be included in the discipline. As state is not the only actor and social movements constitute a considerable element of international system, emotions should be valued as equal with “reason” in analysis. It is still controversial whether individual action is derived from international system or the system is created by the accumulation of individual actions. However, one thing is certain that without humanly motivations that influence individual action, analysis will be deficient. As the human kind can never be examined free from their feelings; emotions should never be underestimated by the International Relations Discipline.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Çatışma, mücadele ve şiddet insanlık tarihinin başlangıcından beri ayrılmaz bir parçası olmuştur. Tarihî süreçte düşünsel olarak değişim gösteren insanoğlu bireye, topluma ve sisteme dair dönüşümleri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu süreçte değişmeyen temel olgulardan biri çatışmanın kendisi iken çatışma nedenleri bambaşka boyutlar kazanmıştır. Bilinen insanlık tarihinin en başlarında tamamiyle içgüdüsel ve maddesel motivasyonlarla açıklanan çatışma olgusu insanın kendisine ve çevresine atfettiği anlamlar, değişen akıl ve duygusal yapısı ile büyük dönüşüm göstermiştir. Zamanla din ve etnisite gibi doğrudan duygularla ilişkilendirilebilecek soyut kavramlar iç güdü ve materyalizmin önünde yer alarak çatışmanın temel nedenini oluşturacak noktaya gelmiştir. Bu noktada çatışmanın varlığı ile bireyin kendine ve içinde var olduğu topluma atfettiği anlamlar arasındaki etkileşim devam etmiş ve çatışmanın varlığında toplumsal kimlik algısının önemini ortaya koymaya başlamıştır. En başlarda bireyler ve ilkel gruplar arasında var olan çatışma kavramı zamanla yerini merkezi feodal yapılar ve devletler arası çatışmalara bırakmış, toplumsal kimlik algısının oluşumu ve tarihsel dönüşümü ile doğrudan dini veya etnik motivasyonlarla toplumlar arası değil toplum içi ayrışma ve çatışmalara ulaşmıştır. Bu çalışma da toplumsal kimlik algısına dayanan dini ve etnik temelli çatışmaların kaynağına ulaşabilmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu açıdan sosyal kimlik algısının oluşma süreci, toplumsal kimliğin etnik kimlik olgusuna dönüşümü, etnik çatışmalarda toplumların ayrıştırılması ve bu ayrışma sürecinde duyguların manipüle edilmesi gibi olgular araştırılmıştır. Bu açıdan araştırmaya farklı boyutlar kazandırması açısından etnik kimliğin oluşması ve etnik ayrışmaya yönelik farklı teorik bakış açılarına incelenmiş daha sonra da Ruanda ve Bosna'da yaşanan, soykırıma varan etnik çatışmalar incelenerek teori ve gerçeklik birleştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Çalışmanın en temel sorusu olarak da "Aynı toplum içinde yaşayan

sivillerin nasıl olup da etnik temelde kutuplaştıkları ve birbirlerini son derece vahşi yöntemlerle katledecek noktaya gelecek bir nefrete sahip olabildikleri” sorunsalı belirlenmiştir.

Etnik çatışmalarda toplumların ayrışması doğrudan kimlik algılarıyla bağlantılı olduğu için öncelikle toplumsal kimlik olgusunun ortaya çıkışı araştırılmıştır. Farklı görüşlerin toplumsal kimlik algısının oluşmasına yönelik görüşleri incelenerek bu olgunun var oluş temeline inilmeye çalışılmıştır. Toplumsal kimlik olgusu en temel anlamda bireyin hem içgüdüleri, hem duyguları hem de rasyonel düşünme yetisiyle ilgili bir kavramdır. Birey var oluşundan itibaren en temel gayesi olan hayatta kalma amacını gerçekleştirebilmek için hem manevi hem de fiziksel olarak diğer bireylerin varlığına ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Bu anlamda bireyin sosyal olma arayışı hem iç güdüsel hem de ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda tercih edeceği rasyonel bir olgudur. Öncelikle aile kavramı ile ortaya çıkan bu sosyal yapı daha sonra bu yapıların birleşimiyle oluşan ve tarihsel bir olgu olarak karşımıza çıkan toplum olgusunu ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu anlamda bireyin önce bir ailenin varlığına ihtiyaç duyduğu daha sonra da bir toplum içerisinde olmayı arzuladığı ve bunu aynı zamanda rasyonel olarak seçtiği savı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu da toplumsal kimliği oluşturan temel süreci ortaya koymaktadır. Ancak toplumsal kimliğin etnik temelli bir kimlik algısına dönüşümü daha karmaşık etkenlerin bir araya gelmesi ile gerçekleşmektedir. Etnik kimliğin ortaya çıkışında içgüdüler ve rasyonalite varlığını korumaya devam etmekte bununla beraber deneyimler ve bunlara bağlı değişen duygular ağırlık kazanmaktadır. Etnik kimlik algısı toplumların yaşadıkları olumsuz, dönüm noktası niteliği taşıyan unuyulmaz olaylar ve bu olaylardan yana meydana gelen duygusal dönüşüm ile tarihsel süreçler sonucu meydana gelmiştir. Zira bu dönemlerde toplumlar kendilerini tanımladıkları, varlıklarını açıkladıkları olguları doğa üstü etkenler ve kutsallıkla bütünleştirmeye dair büyük bir ihtiyaç içerisinde kendisini bulmuşlardır. Bu olumsuz dönemlerde oluşan kitlesel endişenin üstesinden gelebilmek için toplumsal kimliklerine atfettikleri mitler ve kutsal olgular vasıtasıyla içerisinde bulundukları travmatik durumla baş etmeye çalışmışlardır. Bu anlamda etnik kimlik tarihsel süreç içerisinde gerçekleşen olumsuz kırılma anlarında meydana gelen toplumsal reflekslerin bir ürünüdür. Bir açıdan bakıldığında etnik bilinci üst

seviyelerde olan toplumlarda etnik kimliğe dair var olan sembollerin uç noktadaki duygulara hitap ettiği ve aynı şekilde etnik kimliğe dair hikayelerin büyük acılar ve kahramanlıkları içinde barındırması tesadüfî değildir. Etnik kimlik olgusu genel anlamda toplumsal kimlik olgusunun oluşumuna kıyasla daha irasyonel kesinlikle duygular ile doğrudan ilişki içerisindedir. Bu nedenle toplumsal ayrışma süreçlerinde duyguların manipölasyonu açısından etnik kimlik olgusu dört dörtlük bir kaynak arz etmektedir. Dolayısıyla etnik kimlik temelinde ayrışma ele alındığında duygular ve bu duyguların ne şekilde yönlendirildiği mutlaka hesaba katılmalıdır.

Etnik çatışmalarda etnik kimlik temelinde ayrışmanın ne şekilde gerçekleştiği de araştırma sorumuza ulaşmamız açısından büyük önem arz etmektedir. Bu açıdan araştırmaya farklı boyutlar kazandırmak, teorilerle gerçekliği birleştirebilmek ve incelenecek olan iki tarihsel vakaya öncelikle düşünsel bir temel oluşturabilmek için etnik ayrışma ve çatışmaların oluşumuna yönelik teorik bakış açılarının incelenmesinin elzem olduğu düşünülmüştür. Bu doğrultuda etnik ayrışmaya yönelik iki temel cepheyi oluşturan ilkselci (primordialist) teori ve araççı (instrumentalist) teori incelenmiş; son olarak bu çalışmanın ve çalışmaya dair sorunsalın oluşturulmasında temel esin kaynaklarından biri olan inşacı (constructivist) teori üzerinden de etnik ayrışma konusu açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır.

İlkselci teori açıklamaya çalıştığı olgulara dair insanoğlunun nesilden nesile aktardığı ve insandan ayrı tutulamayacak duygu ve içgüdülere odaklanır. Etnik kimlikle ilgili olarak bireylerin varoluştan sahip oldukları iç güdü ve hislerin kendilerini kutsiyete ve doğa üstü olgulara dair bir kimlikle açıklamaya yönelttiğini belirtmektedir. İnsanlar varoluştan kendilerini üst bir kavramla açıklama istek ve arzusuna sahiptir. Kimlik temelli ayrışma da aynı şekilde yine nesilden nesile aktarılan genlerin meydana getirdiği iç güdülerin bir sonucudur. İnsanlar ne olursa olsun ayrışmaya dair güçlü bir eğilim gösterirler. Etnik temele dair kimlik algısı da bu anlamda ayrışmayı daha uç noktalarda ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu nedenle ilkselci yaklaşım açısından bakıldığında etnik ayrışma bir anlamda önlenemez, doğal bir geçeklikten ibarettir. Er ya da geç “biz” ve “onlar” kavramları etnik temelde oluşturulacak bu da çatışmaları kaçınılmaz olarak beraberinde getirecektir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında etnik

ayrışmada duyguların rölünün araştırılması hususunda ilkselci yaklaşım araştırmaya önemli katkılar sağlamaktadır.

Araççı teori ise etnik ayrışma konusunu tamamiyle farklı açılardan ele almaktadır. Araççı yaklaşım bireylerin içgüdü ve duygularından etkilenecek hareket ettiklerini tamamiyle reddetmese de seçim ve davranışlarında rasyonel hesaplamalara daha fazla önem verdiklerini belirtmektedir. Yaklaşım göre bireylerin toplumsal kimlik algılarını oluşturan da buna etnik anlamlar yüklemelerini sağlayan da edindikleri deneyimlerden yola çıkarak ortaya koydukları fayda analizleridir. Zira yaklaşıma göre bireylerin etnik kimlikleri ile olan bağlarını güçlendiren ve zayıflatan da bu bağdan elde ettikleri faydadır. Bu doğrultuda etnik ayrışmanın gerçekleşip gerçekleşmemesi ve etnik çatışma ile karşı grubun ortadan kaldırılması hususları da yine elde edilecek faydaya göre oluşup oluşmayacaktır. Araççı yaklaşım etnik çatışma konusunu aynı zamanda siyasi aktörler temelinde de ele almaktadır. Yaklaşım göre etnik çatışmalarda toplumların ayrışmasında en önemli rolü bundan siyasi çıkarlar elde edecek siyasi aktörler oynamaktadır. Zira araççı yaklaşıma göre etnik ayrışma çoğu vakada siyasi aktörler tarafından araçsallaştırılmakta ve bu araçta da manipölasyon temel yöntem olarak kullanılmaktadır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında araççı yaklaşım bu çalışmanın temel amaçlarından olan manipölasyonun etnik çatışmalardaki yerinin araştırılması noktasında araştırmaya önemli katkılarda bulunmaktadır.

Genel olarak duyguların, algıların, kimlik olgusu gibi soyut kavramların uluslararası ilişkiler disiplindeki önemine vurgu yapan inşacı yaklaşım etnik çatışmalara dair de inşa edilmiş gerçeklik üzerinden açıklamalarda bulunmanktedir. İnşacı yaklaşıma göre toplumsal kimlik de etnik kimlik de tarihsel süreç içerisinde edinilen deneyimler ile oluşturulmuştur ve bireylerin algılarından meydana gelmektedir. Bir bakıma inşacı yaklaşıma göre gerçeklik bireylerinden algılarından ibaret olan ve dış etmenler tarafından inşa edilmiş bir olgudur. Etnik kimlik bireylerin yapıyı, yapının da bireyleri etkilemesi sonucu döngüsel bir süreç ile inşa edilmiş ve sürekli olarak yeniden üretilmiştir. Bu süreç içerisinde de içselleştirilerek inşa edilmiş olduğuna dair farkındalık ortadan kalkmış; doğal bir olgu olarak algılanmıştır. Etnik ayrışma

ve etnik çatışma konusunda da inşa edilmiş gerçeklik açısından açıklamalarda bulunan inşacı yaklaşım etnik ayrışmanın da etnik çatışmanın da siyasi aktörler tarafından manipüle edilen birer inşa süreci olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu açıdan araççı yaklaşım ile büyük bir benzerliğe sahiptir. Ancak araççı yaklaşımdan farklı olarak inşacı yaklaşım toplumların etnik kimlik algılarını ve bu kimlikleri ile aralarındaki bağı rasyonalite üzerinden açıklamaz. İnşacı yaklaşıma göre etnik kimlik tarihsel süreç içerisinde yapı ile yapıyı oluşturan parçalar arası süre gelen etkileşimin bir ürünüdür ve bu etkileşimde tarihin her döneminde dış etkenlerin etkisi ve yönlendirmesi söz konusu olmuştur. Bu açılardan bakıldığında inşacı yaklaşım gerçekliğe dair sorgulayıcı bir bakış açısı oluşturmaktadır. Algılanan gerçekliğin temelini araştırmak adına önemli bir role sahip olduğu için etnik kimliğin oluşumu, etnik ayrışma ve çatışmaya nedensüreçleri incelemek ve anlamak açısından bu çalışmaya önemli katkılarda bulunmaktadır.

Etnik ayrışma ve çatışmaya yönelik teorik yaklaşımları inceledikten sonra etnik çatışmalara yönelik iki farklı olay karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmiştir. Bu olaylarda etnik kimliğin oluşması, etnik ayrışma ve etnik çatışma unsurlarının ne şekilde gerçekleştiği konuları araştırılarak, farklı süreçlerde duygular ve duyguların manipülasyonunun etnik çatışmalardaki rolünün ne olduğu bulunmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu amaçla hemen hemen aynı dönemlerde, farklı tarih ve kültüre sahip toplumlar arasında gerçekleşmiş olan Ruanda ve Bosna vakaları ele alınmıştır. Böylece karşılaştırmalı olarak etnik çatışmalarda duygu ve manipülasyonun yanı sıra zaman, yer, kültür, tarih gibi olguların bir etkisinin olup olmadığı da araştırılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Ruanda vakasında öncelikle Ruanda'yı oluşturan etnik yapıların kökenleri araştırılmış, bu amaçla Ruanda tarihi sömürge öncesi dönem, sömürge dönemi ve sömürge sonrası dönem olmak üzere üç dönemde incelenmiştir. Sömürge öncesi dönemde Ruanda'yı oluşturan etnik yapıların varlığının bölgede hangi dönemlerde ilk kez görüldüğü ve gruplar arası etkileşimin ne seviyede olduğu araştırılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda gruplar arası herhangi bir etnik bilinç ve ayrışma olup olmadığı bulunmaya çalışılmış; sömürge öncesi dönemde Ruanda toplumunu oluşturan yapılar

arasında herhangi bir etnik bilinç veya herhangi bir üst kimliğe dayalı bir ayrım olmadığı bulgularına rastlanmıştır. Sömürge öncesi dönemde Ruanda'daki toplumsal ilişkilerin temelini “ubuhake” adı verilen kültürel bir üretim formu oluşturmaktadır. Bu yapı feodal yapıya benzer bir nitelik taşımakta ancak feodalizmden farklı olarak hiyerarşik gruplar arası sömürüye değil işbirliği ve görev dağılımına dayanmaktadır. Sömürge öncesi Ruanda toplumunu oluşturan en temel yapı bu organik yapı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Toplumun avcı, toplayıcı ve savaşçı olarak gruplara ayrıldığı ve bundan başka bir toplumsal ayrışma algısının olmadığı bu yapı sömürge döneminde yönetim tarafından Ruanda toplumunun ayrıştırılması amacıyla en temel araç olarak kullanılmıştır. Önce Almanların daha sonra da Belçikalıların benimsediği ve toplumu yöneten sınıf ve işçi sınıfı olarak ayrıştıran sisteme ihracat ürünü (cash-crop) sistemi adı verilmiştir. Ancak bu sistemi araştırma konumuz açısından önemli kılan ayrışmanın etnik temelli ve sömürge yönetiminin kontrolü ve manipülasyonu doğrultusunda gerçekleşmiş olmasıdır. Toplum yöneten ve hizmet eden gruplara ayrıştırılmış, yöneten grup tamamiyle sömürge yönetimiyle işbirliği içerisinde hareket etmiş üstelik bu ayrışma kurumsal olarak etnik anlamlar kazandırılarak içselleştirilmiştir. Toplumun tamamına yayılacak şekilde yöneten sınıfın Tutsi olduğu, bu grubun kökenleri Afrika olamayacak kadar üst özelliklere sahip olduğu, yönetilen sınıf olarak benimsetilen Hutular ile kıyaslandığında evrim merdiveninde kesin olarak çok daha üst sıralarda olduğu benimsetilmiş, içselleştirilmiştir. Bu içselleştirme çeşitli yayın ve sözde bilimsel çalışmaların yayımı gibi yönetsel araçlarla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Tutsi ve Hutu arasındaki fark kökensel olduğu kadar fiziksel ve zihinsel olarak da yine hegemonik araçlar vasıtasıyla benimsetilmeye çalışılmıştır. Toplum hızlı bir kategorizasyon hareketi ile keskin bir şekilde ayrıştırılmış ve ayrı etnik bilinçlere sahip olmaları sağlanmıştır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında Ruanda konusu etnik kimliğin inşası açısından çok net bir örnek ortaya koymaktadır. Zira tarihsel olarak etnik bilinç ve etnik temelli bir ayrışmayla hiç bir ilişkisi olmamış bir toplum çok kısa bir süre içerisinde dış etkenler vasıtasıyla etnik bilince sahip olup ayrılmıştır. Bunda tarih ve biyoloji gibi sosyal ve beşeri bilimlerin sömürge yönetimince araçsallaştırılması; bunların da kültürel mit ve sembollerle desteklenerek haklılaştırılması önemli rol oynamıştır. Bunlara ek olarak devlet

yönetiminde, eğitimde ve üretimde uygulanan kota uygulamaları ve ayrımcı düzenlemeler kurumsal olarak da bu ayrışmayı pekiştirmiştir. Son olarak sömürge yönetimi tarafından uygulanmaya başlanan ve Ruanda vatandaşı olsalar da etnik kimliğe göre ayrı olarak dağıtılan kimlik kartları Ruanda vakasında etnik kimlik inşasının adeta bir sembolü olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Zira kimlik kartları aynı zamanda Ruanda soykırımı sırasında “biz” ve “onlar” tespitiinin gerçekleştirilmesinde ve katliamın boyutlarının artmasında doğrudan rol oynamıştır.

Sömürü sonrası dönem de Ruanda’nın değişen yapısını anlamak için önemlidir. Ülke hayata geçirilen ve içselleştirilen ayrıştırıcı *Politikalar* nedeniyle yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısında iyiden iyiye milliyetçiliğin yükselmesine sahne olmuştur. Bu açıdan Hutu milliyetçiliği güçlü bir hareket olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. 1959 yılında gerçekleşen ve tarihe “Hutu Devrimi” olarak yazılan olay ile Ruanda bağımsızlığına kavuşmuştur. Ancak hareketin temelinde artan Hutu milliyetçiliğinin olması ülkenin bağımsızlığının temelinde bir Ruanda halk hareketinden çok belirli bir gruba ait milliyetçi bir hareket olmasına neden olmuştur. Bu da bağımsızlığını kazanan ülkenin Hutu milliyetçisi liderlerce yönetilmesine neden olmuştur. Ülkenin ilk devlet başkanı olan Gergoire Kayibanda da sonrasında darbe ile başa geçen Juvenal Habyarimana da *Politikalarını* doğrudan Hutu haklarının iyileştirilmesi ve Hutuların toplum içerisinde güçlendirilmesi üzerine kurmuş, bunu da sömürge döneminde yaşadıkları baskıları sık sık vurgulayarak haklılaştırmışlardır. Sömürü sonrası dönemde milliyetçi *Politika* ve söylemler tüm siyasi liderler tarafından benimsenmiş, milliyetçi duygulara hitap edilerek toplumun asıl ihtiyacı olan reform hareketlerinin talep edilmesinin önüne geçilmiştir. Ancak bu güvenlikleştirme *Politikaları* ülke içindeki milliyetçi kutuplaşmayı git gide artırmıştır. Bunun yanında Tutsilere karşı uygulanan kota uygulamaları ve baskıcı *Politikalar* Tutsilerin çevre ülkelere göç etmesine yol açmış, sayıları bir buçuk milyonu bulan sığınmacı sorunu diğer ülke yönetimlerini de zor durumda bırakmıştır. Bu durum Tutsi milliyetçiliğinin radikal boyutlara ulaşmasına ve çevre ülkelere göç etmek durumunda kalan sığınmacıların “Ruanda Yurtsever Cephesi” altında birleşmesine neden olmuştur. Zamanla silahlı mücadeleyi benimseyen Ruanda Yurtsever Cephesi ile Ruanda kuvvetleri arasında git gide artan çatışmalar karşılıklı milliyetçiliğin iyiden iyiye artmasına ve Hutu

yönetiminin baskı *Politikalarını* haklılaştırmasına yol açmıştır. 1990 Ekim Ruanda Yurtsever Cephesi tarafından geniş çaplı bir saldırı başlatılmış üç yıl süren çatışmada binlerce kişi hayatını kaybetmiş ve etnik ayrışma en uç seviyelere ulaşmıştır. Bu süreç içerisinde Hutu yönetimi tarafından benimsenen araçsal *Politikalar* ile her türlü yönetsel aygıt kullanılarak Tutsi nefreti en üst seviyelere çıkarılmıştır. Kangura ve Radio Television des Milles Collines gibi yayın organlarınca yapılan yayınlar ile nefret söylemi, Hutuların varlığını devam ettirebilmesi için Tutsilerin yok edilmesi gibi uç düşünceler toplumun tüm kesimlerinde içselleştirilmiştir. 1993 yılında artan çatışma seviyesi ve sivil ölüm oranı ülkede yaşananlara yönelik uluslararası bir tepki doğurmuş ve Ruanda Yurtsever Cephesi ile Habyarimana arasında Arusha Görüşmeleri adıyla bilinen müzakerelerin başlamasını sağlamıştır. Ancak 6 Nisan 1994 günü Dar-es Salam’da gerçekleştirilen müzakerelerden dönen Habyarimana’nın uçağının başkent Kigali üzerinde düşürülmesi Ruanda soykırımına giden yolda bir kırılma noktası olmuştur. Uçağın kimler tarafından düşürüldüğü ise hala bilinmemektedir. Olaydan saatler sonra Radio Television des Milles Collines tarafından Hutu liderinin oyuna getirilip öldürülmesine ve Tutsilerin gerçek niyetinin Hutu varlığını yok etmek olduğuna dair sert söylemlerin yanı sıra; Tutsi ve ılımlı Hutu siyasilerin isimlerinin olduğu hedef listeleri yayınlanmaya başlamıştır. Aynı zamanda Hutu milisleri ve Ruanda Ulusal Ordusu tarafından Başkent Kigali’deki tüm yollar kapatılmıştır. Kimlik kontrolü yapılarak Hutu olmayan herkes görüldüğü yerde öldürülmüş, kırsalda ise Tutsi köyleri basılıp yok edilmiştir. Süreçle ilgili en önemli detay toplumun her kesiminin katliamlara katılabilecek kadar duyguların manipüle edilebilmiş olmasıdır. Yayın organlarında hiç durmadan yapılan propaganda yayınlarının yanı sıra yerel liderler de toplumun her kesiminde nefret ve mağduriyet hissi yaratmak için tarihten, sembollerden ve yalan haberlerden yararlanmışlardır. Bu açıdan Ruanda vakası toplumun ayrıştırılıp nefret ve endişe duygularının uç noktalara getirilecek kadar manipülasyonu ve oluşturulmuş gerçekliğin toplumsal mobilizasyondaki etkisini anlamak açısından önemli katkılar sağlamaktadır. Zira çalışmamız doğrultusunda görgü şahitleri ve katliamlara katılmış kişilerce verilen söylemlerin incelenmesinde de manipülasyonun ne kadar büyük bir silah olduğu gözler önüne serilmiştir. Ruanda soykırımının ilk 5 günü içerisinde

20.000 sivilin bir araya getirilmiş diğer siviller tarafından öldürülmesi ve bunu yaparken de aşırı yöntemlerin benimsenmesi toplumlar arasında oluşturulan nefret ve endişe gibi duyguların hangi boyutlara ulaşabileceğinin altını çizmektedir.

Ruanda vakasını inceledikten sonra elde edilen bulguların karşılaştırılması, etnik kimliğin oluşması ve etnik çatışmaya giden süreçte ayrışmaya neden olan olguların karşılaştırmalı bir bakış açısıyla belirlenebilmesi açısından Bosna vakası incelenmiştir. Etnik kimliğin oluşmasındaki tarihsel süreci anlamak adına Bosna vakası da Yugoslavya öncesi dönem Yugoslavya ve soğuk savaş sonrası dönemlere ayrıştırılarak incelenmiş daha sonra Bosna savaşına giden süreç üzerinde durulmuştur.

Bosna vakasına bakıldığında etnik kimlik algısının oluşmasında farklılıklar olduğu gözlenmiştir. Balkan toplumlarının kimlikleri tarih boyunca Balkanlarda yaşanan iktidar değişimleriyle bağlantılı şekilde oluşmuştur. Dolayısıyla Ruanda olayının aksine bölge toplumları arası etnik bilinç tarihsel olarak meydana gelmiştir. Etnik kimliğin yanı sıra Ortodoks, Katolik ve Müslüman kimlik algıları da bölgede etkisini hissettirmiştir. Tarihsel olarak bölgeye egemen olmak isteyen güçler arası mücadele bölgenin tarihsel anlamda çatışmalara aşına bir hal almasına neden olmuştur. Ancak bölge yerlileri arası mücadele yirminci yüzyıla kadar etnik boyutlara ulaşmamıştır.

On dokuzuncu yüzyıla gelindiğinde son bir asırdır etkisini artırarak hissettiren milliyetçilik akımı Balkan toplumlarını da etkisine almış, Slav kimliği bu toplumlar arasında ön plana çıkmaya başlamıştır. Zira bu amaç güney Slavları anlamına gelen Yugoslav krallığının kurulması ile yirminci yüzyılın ilk yarısında gerçekleştirilebilmiştir. Hırvat, Sloven, Sırp ve Boşnaklardan oluşan krallık bir anlamda bölge toplumlarının bağımsızlık özlemlerini kaşılaması açısından uyumu sağlasa da zamanla gruplar arasında etnik temelli olmasa da yönetsel ayrışmalar yaşanmaya başlamıştır. Ancak ayrışmalar 1934 yılında Kral Alexander'ın suikaste kurban gitmesine kadar çatışmaya dönüşmemiştir. Kralın ölümü sonrası ülkenin büyük bir Sırp Krallığı'na döndüğünü iddia eden Hırvat milliyetçiliği yönetime karşı şiddet eylemlerine başvursa da aynı şekilde bastırılmış, Hırvat milliyetçi hareketi Hırvatistan yönetimine bırakılan topraklar ile yatıştırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Ancak çok

geçmeden İkinci Dünya Savaşı ile meydana gelecek Nazi istilası ülkedeki etnik ayrışma açısından bir dönüm noktası olacaktır.

Yugoslavya 6 Nisan 1941 tarihinde Nazi güçleri tarafından sadece on gün içerisinde işgal edilmiş, bu büyük yenilgi Yugoslavya içerisinde radikal grupların etki alanını güçlendirmiştir. Bu doğrultuda Almanlar ile dini bağları olan Hırvat milliyetçiliği işgali ülke üzerinde tam kontrol sağlamak adına bir imkan olarka görmüştür. Ustaşa adı altında birleşen Hırvat radikalleri Nazi hareketi işbirliğinde ülkedeki diğer unsurlara karşı katliamlara girişmiştir. Bu katliamlarda en büyük hedef ülke kontrolü açısından en büyük rakip olarak görülen Sırp olmuştur. Katliam süresince çatışmalarda ve toplama kamplarında 325.000 Sırp katledilmiştir. Bu durum Soğuk savaş sonrası Sırp milliyetçiliğinin tutunacağı en temel kaynaklardan biri olacaktır. İşgal, aynı zamanda Osmanlı'ya karşı on sekizinci yüzyılda mücadele etmiş Sırp milliyetçisi Çetniklerin de güç kazanmasını sağlamıştır. Bu iki milliyetçi guruba alternatif oluşturan ve temelini sosyalizmden alan Partizanlar ise işgal süresince ülke içi milliyetçi gruplara ve Nazi güçlerine karşı verdikleri başarılı mücadeleyle savaş sonrası kurulacak yeni Yugoslavya'nın birleştirici yapısının oluşmasında temel rolü oynamıştır. Zira İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası kurulan devletin ilk başkanı olarak Partizan lideri Josip Broz Tito seçilmiştir.

Tito ülkenin en büyük sorunu olarak gördüğü çok kimlikli yapıyı bür üst Yugoslav kimliği içinde eriterek ve bunu da Yugoslavya'nın kurucu unsuru olarak belirttiği “birlik ve kardeşlik” unsurları çevresinde gerçekleştirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu doğrultuda eğitim, ekonomi ve siyaset alanında kurumsal araçlarla bu üst kimliğin benimsenmesini sağlamaya çalışmıştır. Zira ülkenin toplumsal yapısının etnik temelde değil belirli ideolojik değerler temelinde oluşturulması federal devletler için örnek bir model haline gelmesini sağlamıştır. Aynı zamanda ülkenin doğu ve batı blokları arası “bağılantısızlık” *Politikası* yürütmesi ile elde ettiği iktisadi kazanımlar da ülkeyi oluşturan fedratif devletler ve etnik gruplar arası üst bir kimlik çevresinde uyumlu bir birliktelik sağlamıştır. Ancak 1980 yılında Tito'nun hayatını kaybetmesi ile ülke büyük bir çalkantı dönemi içerisine girmiştir. Üstelik ülkenin soğuk savaş açısından önemini git ide kaybetmesi ve yaşanan uluslararası ekonomik kriz de ülke

içindeki huzursuzluğun artmasına neden olmuştur. Bu duruma federatif devletler arasında Tito sonrası yönetim eşitliğini sağlamak adına oluşturulmuş olan “kollektif liderlik” uygulamasının getirdiği belirsizlik de eklenince ayrışma yanlısı düşünceler ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Federatif devletlerde meydana gelen ayrılıkçı hareketler güvenlik güçleri tarafından şiddetle bastırılmış, bu durum milliyetçilik ve milliyetçi liderlerin hızlıca yükselmesini sağlamıştır. Zira Ruanda ile kıysalandığında Yugoslavya’nın ayrışması’ndan Srebrenitza Soykırımı’na giden süreçte liderlerin rolünün çok daha ön planda olduğu göze çarpmaktadır. Ruanda ile benzer şekilde ayrılma yanlısı düşünceler etkisini gösterir göstermez Sırp *Politika* gazetesi gibi milliyetçi yayın organları radikal liderlerin manipülasyonuna katkı sağlar nitelikte yayınlar yapmaya başlamışlardır. Aynı zamanda Sırp Bilim ve Sanat Akademisi gibi saygı duyan akademik çevrelerin yayınları ile de milliyetçi görüşler içselleştirilmiş, mağduriyet duygusu uyandırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu süreçte en etkin lider olan Miloseviç, dağılma sürecinden Bosna Savaşı’na uzanan sürede verdiği milliyetçi söylemlerle etnik çatışmalarda toplumların mobilizasyonu ve duyguların manipülasyonu ile ilgili çok önemli bir örnek oluşturmaktadır. Bunun yanında Bosna vakası gerçekliğin inşa edilmesi açısından “seçilmiş geçmiş” olayların planlı bir şekilde vurgulanması ve toplum içerisinde korku, endişe ve mağduriyet duygusunun uyandırılması açısından özel bir yere sahiptir. Zira ayrışma sürecinde Miloseviç’in konuşmalarında ve radikal yayın organlarının yayınlarında geçmişe dair endişeler araçsallaştırılmış ve tarihe gömülmüş nefretler tekrar canlandırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Ruanda olayında olduğu gibi Bosna katliamında da sivillerin mobilize edilmiş sivillerce katledilmesindeki en büyük etken de inşa edilen korku, endişe ve mağduriyet hissinden kaynaklanan hayatta kalabilmek için her yolun mübah olduğu düşüncesi ve bunun normleştirilmesidir.

Kısacası her iki vakada da toplumların ayrışması ve sivillerin duygularının manipüle edilerek mobilize edilmesi bunlara giden süreçte de belirli kırılma noktalarının siyasi liderler tarafından araçsallaştırıldığı göze çarpmaktadır. Coğrafi ve kültürel olarak birbirinden tamamen farklı iki ülkede aynı yıllar içerisinde yaşanan etnik çatışmalarda da ayrışmaya giden süreçte uygulanan yöntemlerden çatışma sürecinde katliamlara katılan sivillerin psikolojisine kadar inanılmaz bir benzerlik olduğu

ortaya konulmuştur. Bu açılardan etnik çatışmalara yönelik bulgularımızı şu şekilde toparlayabiliriz:

- Siyasi aktörler ve manipölasyon etnik çatışmaların analizinde olmazsa olmaz unsurlardır.
- Etnik çatışma süreçlerinde mutlaka bir kırılma noktası vardır. Bu kırılma noktası milliyetçi liderlerin söylemlerini haklılaştırmaları ve toplum içerisinde nefret ve korku gibi duyguların canlandırılması açısından şarttır.
- Seçilmiş geçmiş, semboller ve mitler gerçekliğin inşa edilmesi ve duyguların manipölasyonu için en önemli unsurlardır. Radyo, televizyon ve gazete gibi yayın organları da manipölasyonun en temel araçlarıdır.
- Uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini gerçekliği sorgularken rasyonal neden sonuç ilişkilerinin yanı sıra duygu ve algılar gibi soyut kavramları da araştırma konusuna dahil etmelidir. Saf materyalist ve rasyonalist bakış açıları gerçekliğin algılanmasında yanıltıcı olabilmektedir.

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