TURKEY’S APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:
THE CASES OF BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

ŞÜKRÜ ÇILDIR

JUNE 2015
TURKEY’S APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE CASES OF BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ŞÜKRÜ ÇILDIR

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JUNE 2015
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı (METU,IR)

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev (METU,IR)

Prof. Dr. Ramazan Gözen (Marmara Uni.,IR)
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Şükrü Çıldır

Signature :
ABSTRACT

TURKEY’S APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE CASES OF BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

Çıldır, Şükrü
M. Sc., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev

June 2015, 140 pages

This thesis examines Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo that took place in the post-Cold War period. Concerning Turkey’s foreign policy and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, this study makes a substantial contribution to the existing literature. The way Turkey formulated and implemented its approach to humanitarian intervention is analyzed through qualitative techniques. This thesis asserts that three factors had an impact on the formation of Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention, namely 1) the historical background of the crises, 2) the reactions of international community, and 3) Turkey’s own conditions, initiatives, and experiences in dealing with the crises of Bosnia and Kosovo. Additionally, this study argues that Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention was shaped within the framework of Turkey’s advocacy of implementing humanitarian intervention in the international arena, and its contribution to international military coalitions with its own troops by eschewing unilateral military action. As a result, it was concluded that Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo was an outcome of the mixture of both its altruistic and strategic motives.

Key Words: Turkey, Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Intervention, Bosnia, Kosovo
ÖZ

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI SÜREÇTE TÜRKİYE’NİN İNSAN İ MÜDAHALE YAKLAŞIMI: BOSNA VE KOSOVA ÖRNEKLERİ

Çıldır, Şükrü
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev

Haziran 2015, 140 sayfa


Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Dış Politika, İnsani Müdahale, Bosna, Kosova
To My Family
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev for his guidance, advice, and encouragement over the course of writing this thesis. I am also thankful to Prof. Dr. Îhsan Dağı for honoring me as gracefully accepting to be a member of the examining committee. Additionally, it should be sincerely noted that thanks to the master courses of these distinguished professors, ‘British School of International Relations’ and ‘Human Rights Politics in the European Union’, I had a chance of getting a robust theoretical background about the issues of humanitarian intervention and human rights in world politics.

I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Ramazan Gözen for enduring support, continuous encouragement, and sparing his valuable time in reading and commenting on earlier drafts of my thesis. I am extremely grateful to his constructive comments and criticisms that enriched my thesis with new perspectives. Prof. Dr. Ramazan Gözen has been a source of inspiration, and supported my academic and professional life since my undergraduate years.

I would also like to record my special thanks to my colleague Eyüp Ersoy, a PhD candidate at Bilkent University, for his helping and sincere friendship in every stage of the thesis. I am indebted to him for sharing his expertise and profound knowledge that made a unique contribution to my thesis. He was also quite meticulous in proofreading some important sections of the thesis.

I am also grateful to the invaluable suggestions of Prof. Dr. Yücel Acer with whom I had the privilege of working at Yıldırım Beyazıt University as his assistant. Although he was so busy in his administrative duties, he was always ready to lend me a helping hand whenever I needed, especially in some parts of this study concerning international law.
A special mention is due to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şaban Kardaş for encouraging me to write a thesis on Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention. I benefited from his invaluable researches on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention during the process of writing this thesis.

My special thanks are also for the academic staff of the Department of International Relations at METU and Yıldırım Beyazıt University for their guidance and support for improving my intellectual capacity.

I am extremely thankful to my friends Hidayet Kıslalı and Samuel Tran for their reading and editing some parts of my thesis. In addition to Hidayet and Samuel, I would like to thank to my friends Okan Erciyas, Mehmet Can Palancı, and Metin Yücekaya for their endless motivations, good mood, and encouragement during my Master study.

My greatest debt is owed to my family, who encouraged me to study for a Master’s degree with unfailing patience and endless love. My mother Nazmiye Çıldır and my father Ömer Çıldır deserve a high praise for supporting me to get a good education throughout my academic career. I am deeply grateful, last but not least, to my wife Kevser for her great patience, tolerance, and unconditional support over the course of completing this study. This work is a result of the family peace, love, and trust. I have always felt their faith in me.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLAGIARISM</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖZ</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EVOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Definition of Humanitarian Intervention</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Normative Debate of Humanitarian Intervention</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 State Sovereignty and International Society Approach</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Conflicts between Human Rights and State Sovereignty</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3 Assessment of Humanitarian Intervention in this Context</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4 Opposition to Humanitarian Intervention</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Legal Debate of Humanitarian Intervention</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1 Principle of State Sovereignty and Non-use of force</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 Authorization of the United Nations</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3 Responsibility to Protect</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3.1 Background of the Concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3.2 The Content of ‘Responsibility to Protect’</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. TURKEY’S APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
   IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA ....................................................... 40
   3.1 Historical Background of the Bosnian Crisis ..................... 40
   3.2 International Responses to the Bosnian Crisis .................. 42
   3.3 Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Bosnian Crisis ........... 44
     3.3.1 Diplomatic Initiatives of Turkey ................................. 48
     3.3.2 Turkey’s Domestic Politics and the Bosnian Crisis ......... 56
     3.3.3 Turkey’s Role in the Implementation of Humanitarian
           Intervention ................................................................. 61
   3.4 Assessment of Turkey’s Approach to Humanitarian Intervention for
       Bosnia ............................................................................. 67
4. TURKEY’S APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
   IN THE CASE OF KOSOVO ...................................................... 74
   4.1 Historical Background of the Kosovo Crisis ...................... 74
   4.2 International Responses to the Kosovo Crisis .................... 77
   4.3 Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Kosovo Crisis ............. 80
     4.3.1 Diplomatic Initiatives of Turkey ................................. 82
     4.3.2 Turkey’s Domestic Politics and the Kosovo Crisis ......... 91
     4.3.3 Turkey’s Role in the Implementation of Humanitarian
           Intervention ................................................................. 96
   4.4 Assessment of Turkey’s Approach to Humanitarian Intervention for
       Kosovo ................................................................. 102
5. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 106
REFERENCES ........................................................................ 115
APPENDICES
A. TURKISH SUMMARY ........................................................... 128
B. TEZ FOTOKÖPİSİ İZİN FORMU .................................................. 140
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Leftist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTP</td>
<td>Democratic Society Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UN | United Nations
UDHR | Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNMIK | United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSC | United Nations Security Council
UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force
USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
R2P | Responsibility to Protect
RP | Welfare Party
UK | United Kingdom
USA | United States of America
SEECP | Southeast European Cooperation Process
SHP | Social Democratic People’s Party
SFOR | Stabilization Force
TGNA | Turkish Grand National Assembly
US | United States
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The debate on humanitarian intervention goes back to the seventeenth century when nation states began to emerge in international politics. The emergence of nation–states paved the way for reciprocal recognition of state boundaries. To arrange the relations of states with each other in the modern era, it was a necessity to regulate some rules and norms that sanctified the respect of sovereignty and non-interference into domestic affairs of other states. In this way, international order would be maintained and sustained.

On the other hand, particularly by the end of the Second World War, there appeared a considerable interest in the promotion and protection of human rights in international relations. It can be seen in the UN Charter which covers the human rights and fundamental freedoms as one of its purpose, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by UN General Assembly in 1948, and which indicates the fundamental human rights to be protected universally, and in many other regional and international arrangements about human rights following the Second World War.

In that sense, it should be noted that the concept of humanitarian intervention is not only related with some peculiar rights of states such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference into their domestic affairs, but also has the aspect which prioritizes to safeguard individual human rights. Therefore, the debates on humanitarian interventions have been generally made on the dilemma about whether international order should be maintained at any cost by respecting and preserving the rights of states, or whether fundamental human rights should be promoted and protected against any aggression.
Due to the fact that humanitarian intervention seems to be a kind of military intervention against a state or a region in which no state control exists or people faced brutal killing, the decisions of states in implementing a humanitarian intervention could be affected by both strategic and humanitarian motives. As undertaking a military intervention burdens political, economic, and social costs on the shoulders of intervening powers, it needs a high capacity and capability in terms of political, economic and social elements of power. Even though a humanitarian intervention is legitimized on moral and ethical grounds, states have different approaches on this issue because of their concerns about its probable costs and risks to their national interests.

By virtue of the restricted nature of the Cold War period, humanitarian intervention was not high on the agenda of international society. However, with the disintegration process of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent humanitarian crises as a consequence of power vacuum in different parts of the world, the concept of humanitarian intervention became one of the most debated subjects of international relations. Although there existed some concerns on undermining international order, international community took many decisions to implement humanitarian intervention against the gross, systematic, and large-scale violations of human rights in several countries such as Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and so on.

It is worth studying how Turkey approached to the concept and operations of humanitarian intervention especially during the post-Cold War period. In order to make it clear and more comprehensible, this study examines two cases of humanitarian intervention: Bosnia and Kosovo. Both cases are of special importance in Turkey’s foreign policy because Turkey has historical and cultural linkages with them. In addition to this social aspect, the Balkans is located on the routes of Europe with which Turkey has a deep and a century-long political, economic and security relationship. Therefore, any crisis that broke out in the region could have some repercussion over Turkey’s political, economic and social interests.

The primary reason to study this subject is to fulfill the existing gap in the literature of Turkish Foreign Policy about humanitarian intervention. In a period
in which humanitarian intervention was one of the heated debates of international relations, analyzing Turkey’s approach to this subject can contribute to filling this gap in the literature. Additionally, examining two cases like Bosnia and Kosovo is the product of a deliberate choice among other case studies such as Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor. First, the military interventions towards Bosnia and Kosovo were generally regarded within the concept of humanitarian intervention. Second, Bosnia and Kosovo are located in a region with which Turkey has both cultural-historical linkages and political-economic interests which are sensitive matters in Turkish Foreign Policy to ensure the protection of Turkey’s security and its national interests. Third, even though Turkey contributed to some other international military coalitions like in Somalia with its own troops, any of them did not attract much attention in its domestic public opinion contrary to what happened in Bosnia and Kosovo. The reason can be seen in the existence of a sense of common identity among Turkish people and Muslim population in the Balkans. Notwithstanding the high impact of ethnic-nationalist motives over the regional politics at that time, Turkish people and decision-makers displayed a special importance to put an end to the Serbian aggression against Bosnians and Kosovars much more than any other cases.

Of course, there are other cases that highly concerned Turkey during the period of Arab Spring like Libya and Syria. Upon rising tensions in the Libyan Civil War in March 2011, a multi-state coalition led by French-British-US military forces launched a military strike towards Kaddafi forces. However, for Syria there has not been so far any humanitarian intervention undertaken by international community in spite of the fact that humanitarian conditions are getting worse. Therefore, these two cases kept beyond the scope of this thesis. One of the reasons behind excluding these cases is that this study concentrated on interventions undertaken during the 1990s. The cases of Libya, Syria and maybe Iraq following the increasing of brutal activities of ISIS by 2014, can be a good subject of the future studies focusing on the process of Arab Spring. Secondly, Libya and Syria are two cases that represent an unfinished process in terms of humanitarian interventions. Even though international community carried out a humanitarian intervention in Libya against Kaddafi regime in 2011, international
community is expected once again to undertake another military intervention for establishing a state order because the first one caused the collapse of state mechanism, and the emergence of anarchic order. For Syria, there has not been any humanitarian intervention against the Syrian regimes yet.

This thesis is mainly studied through qualitative techniques. Due to the fact that Turkey’s position on humanitarian intervention is examined by evaluating the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, the case study method constitutes the main component of this thesis. Because of the insufficient amount of literature on this subject, the arguments set forth in this study is underpinned by means of the content analysis which covers speeches of statesmen, press statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, records of the parliament. Additionally, it is enriched with the information in newspapers, and the articles and analysis of some prominent experts on Turkish Foreign Policy.

In order to understand Turkey’s humanitarian intervention approach in the post-Cold War period, it can be useful to draw a general framework of Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Encountering diverse political, economic and social challenges in domestic politics during the 1990s, Turkey faced some difficulties in its foreign policy as well because of some outstanding systemic changes in international relations at the end of the Cold War period.

The end of the Cold War generated many changes and challenges in international politics. Even though it was welcomed by many actors that western liberal democracy and capitalist economic system would bring about peace, stability and prosperity for all, international actors had to deal with diverse problems that emerged as a consequence of the collapse of a super power, ensuing power vacuum and resurgent micro-ethnic nationalism. At the same time stable and predictable international order during the Cold War was replaced by unstable and unpredictable one which caused political, social, economic and military crisis in the world. From this point of view, this new period can be regarded as a new world ‘disorder’ rather than an ‘order’.¹

¹ Ramazan Gözen, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Turbulence of the Post Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints,” in Idris Bal, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era (Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), p. 32.
While Turkey stood in “the back waters of international politics during most of the Cold War period” as a pro-western country, it had to come to “the forefront of the world politics” in order to deal with the major challenges, and benefit from the emerging opportunities at the end of the Cold War.² Adopting itself to the new conditions of the post-Cold War period, Turkey began to pursue a more assertive and active foreign policy in contrast to the previous reactive one. While it was a positive development for Turkey that the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union removed a security threat from Turkey’s vicinity, it created a conducive condition for having intensified bilateral relations with newly-emerging independent countries with which Turkey has had cultural, historical, and ethnic linkages. It was initially assumed that, being a secular, democratic, and capitalist country, Turkey would be a leading one in transforming these newly-emerging countries in Central Asia, Caucasia and Balkans into the western style economic and political state system.

However, Turkey faced political instabilities during the 1990s. In Turkey, ten different governments came to power and twelve foreign ministers were changed between 1990 and 1999.³ This political instability constituted an important obstacle for determining long term foreign policy targets in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, revitalizing power of Russia in a short period of time in the ex-Soviet regions and blowing up of ethnic/nationalist conflicts in the vicinity of Turkey can be accounted as other two challenges for Turkey’s foreign policy during this period. Therefore, it seemed so hard for Turkey to play a leading role in addressing the problems that unfolded in its nearby region.

In spite of these challenges and risks emerging as a result of international systemic changes, Turkey made efforts to convert the risks into opportunities that would contribute to increase in its regional and international influence. Having a limited social, political and economic power, Turkey aimed to attain this objective by ensuring a peaceful and secure environment. Having a liberal economy since the early 1980s and realizing the subsequent openings to abroad to meet the needs


³ For the list of Turkish Foreign Ministers, see “Dışişleri Bakanlığı Listesi,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_disisleri-bakanlari-listesi.tr.mfa.
of domestic markets, Turkey needed a secure and stable regional order. Achieving this objective would also contribute to enhancing its domestic order. In this sense, it had to refrain from unexpected events that would undermine Turkey’s stability, security and progressive developments such as facing a massive immigration, a grave conditions in which Turkey would have to undertake a unilateral military intervention or similar ethno-religious/nationalist conflicts that would give damage to its territorial integrity and political unity. For these reasons, Turkey attached a great importance to address the intractable problems and conflicts in its vicinity through peaceful means. When it failed to solve these problems in peaceful ways, Turkey did not hesitate to advocate and support military options in cooperation with global actors, particularly with its NATO allies, but it didn’t tend to indulge into a unilateral military adventure.

Within this general explanation of Turkey’s position on the regional and international crisis erupted in the Post-Cold War era, the purpose of this thesis is to explain and understand Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention during this period. To this end, first, it propounds the conceptual and historical framework of humanitarian intervention. Second, it sets forth the comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s policies towards two specific cases of humanitarian interventions, Bosnia and Kosovo. Third, it examines the general assessment of Turkey’s approach to the issue of humanitarian intervention which international community was preoccupied with during the Post-Cold War era within the theoretical and practical framework evaluated in the previous sections.

This study argues that Turkey’s humanitarian intervention approach during the Post-Cold War period was formed within the framework of contributing to an international military coalition with its own troops by refraining from any unilateral military action, and advocating to implement a humanitarian intervention against the concerning states, located in a region which is of a special importance for Turkey’s own security and interests, and where there are gross, systematic and large-scale violations of human rights. Turkey formed its approach with the support/encouragement of international community and the consent/pressure of domestic public opinion by making some revisions to its traditional status-quo oriented foreign policy.
To support this argument and scrutinize the factors that have an influence over Turkey’s humanitarian approach in the 1990s, following the Introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical dimension of humanitarian intervention within the historical and conceptual perspective. This theoretical dimension is composed of normative and legal debates of the concept of humanitarian intervention. Such a theoretical section is necessary in understanding of what humanitarian intervention is, and how the moral/ethical values and international law have considerable impact over the attitudes of states. Its normative debate examines three specific conceptions such as state sovereignty, international community and human rights, which are comprehensively discussed in the literature, and then provides a general assessment of humanitarian intervention based on these three conceptions. In so doing, it reveals the supporting arguments and objections in the issue of humanitarian intervention. Then it moves to the legal dimension of the issue. Due to the fact that Turkey’s adherence to international law traditionally constitutes an important element of its foreign policy, this study questions the legality of humanitarian intervention and introduces its different interpretations in the literature. In the meantime, it touches upon the role of the UN in undertaking a humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which appeared as a codification effort of the concept of humanitarian intervention.

Chapter 3 focuses on the case of Bosnia. In this section, what attitude Turkey displayed on the issue of humanitarian intervention for Bosnia is analyzed. The main argument put forward here is that Turkey’s attitude is shaped under the impacts of historical background of the Bosnian crisis, international reactions, and Turkey’s own conditions, initiatives and experiences in addressing the problem. To this end, first, the historical background of the crisis is briefly noted. Second, it indicates the responses of international community to the Bosnian crisis. Third, it analyzes Turkey’s foreign policy towards the crisis by considering its diplomatic initiatives and the discussions in its domestic politics about the crisis. In the light of these three points, it evaluates Turkey’s humanitarian intervention approach in the case of Bosnia.

Chapter 4 demonstrates Turkey’s position on the crisis of Kosovo within the framework of humanitarian intervention. It also argues that Turkey’s
humanitarian intervention approach in Kosovo is shaped under the influence of historical background of the crisis, international responses, and Turkey’s own conditions, experiences and initiatives in dealing with the crisis. As in the case of Bosnia, this section briefly presents historical background of the Kosovo crisis. Then, it moves to examine the reactions of international community to this problem. After that, it analyzes Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Kosovo crisis within the framework of its diplomatic initiatives, and the arguments put forward in its domestic politics for the Kosovo issue. At the end, bearing in mind the points remarked above, Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention in the case of Kosovo is assessed.

The Conclusion encapsulates the main points and findings reached and examined throughout this study. To give a brief summary of humanitarian intervention issue, it touches upon the functions of human rights on the course of international relations, and how the matters of human rights set the stage for humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War period. Accordingly, it briefly mentions the main characteristics of Turkish foreign policy in this new period, and how and why Turkey adopted pro-interventionist attitudes in Bosnia and Kosovo. At the end, it covers some important points to be paid attention for future cases of humanitarian intervention.
CHAPTER 2

EVOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To explain and understand Turkey’s approach to humanitarian interventions, this chapter presents a brief analysis of the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. In contrast to other studies that give a detailed description of what humanitarian intervention is, it is preferred to analyze the concept of humanitarian intervention within the framework of the widely discussed conceptions: ‘state sovereignty’, ‘international society’ and ‘human rights’. The reason to use this method is that for a long time Turkish foreign policy has been shaped in the light of the principles of sovereignty, and non-intervention to the domestic jurisdiction of other states.\(^4\)

The literature on the concept of humanitarian intervention has been particularly accumulated in order to find an answer to the question of what to do when individuals are subjected to the brutal killings as a result of the pressure of their state or a civil war. As the concept of humanitarian intervention consists of uniting two main words, ‘humanitarian’ and ‘intervention’, it turns the spotlight on the debate on the main principles of international relations such as ‘sovereignty’, ‘non-intervention’, ‘international society’ and ‘human rights’. For this reason, the concept concerns diverse principles and values derived from the needs of modern international relations as well as ethics and morality. This fact renders the concept more complicated and controversial, and makes it hard for

\(^4\) For more details about the guiding principles of Turkish Foreign Policy see: Ramazan Gözen, İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe: Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık, 2009), pp. 46-50; Baskin Oran, “Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice,” in Baskin Oran, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents, trans. Mustafa Aksın (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), pp. 18-23.
experts and decision makers to study on humanitarian intervention and develop strategies regarding it.

As the concept is widely used by a large spectrum of different disciplines such as international relations, international law, security studies, philosophy and so on concerning the humanity, states, sovereignty, military issue, there emerged so many definitions of the concept at these diverse disciplines. In spite of the difficulties to define exactly what humanitarian intervention is, it is possible to determine some common points of this contested concept by reviewing the several definitions:

2.1 Definition of Humanitarian Intervention

In literature, the concept of humanitarian intervention is defined on the basis of its motives, means, legality or legitimacy. The humanitarian dimension of the concept is used to refer halting or averting the undesirable status or conditions of human-beings. Notwithstanding the definition of ‘intervention’ is regarded as the most debatable issue in the literature, the noun ‘intervention’ largely refers to a forcible action into the domestic affairs of another state. It is possible to justify a forcible action such as military operation against a sovereign state in the moral and ethical grounds, but there emerge so many controversies on the legality and legitimacy of such kind of trans-boundary actions due to the lack of legal framework in the current international system without the authorization of the United Nations (UN). As undertaking an intervention on humanitarian grounds is largely depend on the political calculations of the members of the UN, particularly the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council\(^5\), it is an unrealistic view to argue that the UN would uphold the decisions for all incidents entailing a humanitarian intervention.

With the objective of shedding light on the further parts of the thesis, the conception of humanitarian intervention can be defined by overlooking its diverse descriptions as following:

---

\(^5\) The United Nations Security Council is hereafter written shortly as the Security Council or abbreviated as the UNSC.
A coercive action, involving the use or threat of military force, undertaken by a state, a group of states or an international organization into the domestic jurisdiction of a target state without its permission in order to avert or halt massive and grave violations of human rights other than its own nationals with or without UN authorization.⁶

Considering this comprehensive description, some underlying points can be remarked. First of all, it can be noted that humanitarian intervention is a sort of coercive action covering the use or threat of military force. This coercive action implemented by a foreign military force concerns internal affairs of target states. Such actions were generally regarded as an infringement of sovereignty right of states in question by some critics who oppose to humanitarian intervention. Although this concept seems to be an aggression against domestic jurisdiction of states, its main objective is to stop gross, systematic and large-scale violations of human rights irrespective of the consent of target states. For the avoidance of suspicions directed against the altruistic motives of interventionists, humanitarian intervention should be in principle undertaken for individuals who are not their citizens, or nationals. Additionally, in terms of international law, such kind of intervention should be conducted with the UN authorization. However, considering international conjecture, it seems that states endeavor to sustain mostly their national interests through their international relations. Therefore, they do not portray same willingness to carry out a humanitarian intervention in all relevant cases. That’s why, there exist some cases of humanitarian intervention without the UN authorization due to the different attitudes of permanent members of the UN Security Council in this issue.

2.2 Normative Debate of Humanitarian Intervention

As the objective of this thesis is to study Turkey’s humanitarian intervention approach, it is necessary to examine some notions such as sovereignty, international society, and human rights, which are closely related with the concept of humanitarian intervention. Their meanings, their transformation within the process of history, and how humanitarian interventions are legitimized with some arguments that concern these three notions should be revealed to understand a state’s approach to this concept. In addition to that, there exist some objections raised against humanitarian intervention. Evaluating all these arguments both supporting and opposing this concept can present some ideas in analyzing the position of a state in this issue.

To this end, this section examines the normative elements of humanitarian intervention issue by touching upon the questions of what the state sovereignty is, what constitutes international society and where human rights stand on the debates between the sovereign state and international society. It also covers some challenging arguments against the humanitarian intervention.

2.2.1 State Sovereignty and International Society Approach

The notions of ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘international society’ are the two subjects of the discipline of international relations which are largely discussed among scholars. In general, while the ‘state sovereignty’ can be regarded as a right and privilege for states, ‘international society’ can be viewed in some extent as a community of sovereign states in anarchic international system.

‘State sovereignty’ is one of the most widely used concepts of the disciplines of international relations. In both realist and idealist point of views in international relations the notion of ‘sovereign state’ is taken as a point of departure in their analysis. While realist approach views sovereign state as a given fact and individual unit, idealists regard it as a member of the community of sovereign states.7

Taking a sovereign state as a given unit in modern international relations relies largely on the questions of their ‘reason d’être’. The existence of a sovereign

state can be ontologically explained by human desire to satisfy the needs of an order and stability in a communal life. Particularly, in Hobbesian point of view, a sovereign state is a product of mutual contract of individuals who avoid the backlashes of anarchy, basically described as a war of all against all.

Undoubtedly, the concept of ‘sovereignty’ seems to be an indispensable component of statehood. Notwithstanding a great deal of importance ascribed to sovereignty, in literature there is no any definition that precisely describes what sovereignty is. Before moving on the definitions of sovereignty, it can be useful to mention the historical background of the state sovereignty in order to understand its meaning.

The roots of state sovereignty, emerged in modern era as a main principle of international relations, go back to the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 which dealt with the question of whom would determine which religion would be superior in a particular territory. At the same time, the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 displayed a common ground for decision makers of participating states to recognize their counterparts as a final authority in their territories. This treaty, on this ground, contributed to the territorial consciousness which constitutes the modern idea of international relations through the principle of non-interference and the territorial sovereignty.

In literature, there exist many definitions that put forward the different aspects of sovereignty. Enabulele examines it in the context of supremacy and absolute power over a territory. “States are the absolute regulators of events, properties and persons therein”. Clunan defines it as “exclusive authority over a particular territory”. Philpott describes it as “the supreme legitimate authority

---

9 Aidan Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction, p. 45.
within a given territory”. According to Hinsley, sovereignty seems to be as an idea which is ‘an absolute and final authority in a political community’. Under the light of these definitions, some common points of the meaning of sovereignty can be discerned. Firstly, ‘Supremacy’ highlights the non-existence of a higher authority other than the sovereign. Secondly, ‘Territoriality’ emphasizes that a state apparatus operates within defined boundaries. Thirdly, ‘legitimacy’ is the recognition of a state by its citizens and international community as a sovereign power over its territory. In that sense, state sovereignty seems to be a means of linking territoriality and power in pursuit of dispelling instabilities and disorders within a state. No matter what forms of sovereignty such as democracy, monarchy or oligarchy are conducted by sovereign powers, what is important is that a sustainable order would be maintained through the exercise of sovereignty.

Besides its diverse definitions, it can be noted that the notion of sovereignty has two dimensions like ‘external sovereignty’ and ‘internal sovereignty’. Internal sovereignty refers to be a legitimate exclusive authority over a territory and population. Each sovereign state has a right to exclusively regulate its own social, political and economic life. The term of external sovereignty means to become an independent unit from the outside authorities. It enables a state to protect itself from a possible outside interference into its own domestic realm. In this sense, sovereignty imposes on states such some obligations and responsibilities for refraining from interfering into the domestic jurisdiction of others as well as providing some rights and privileges for states.

Emerging sovereignty as an important component of modern international relations ensures a convenient international structure where a sovereign state could sustain its interests without damaging others.\(^\text{18}\)

Considering these definitions and descriptions, it can be argued that undertaking a humanitarian intervention against a state seems to be contradicted with its sovereignty right. However, those who are supporters of humanitarian intervention point out the alternative point of views about the scope and content of sovereignty. It seems that there exist a delicate balance between the concepts of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. Therefore, in order to understand this balance and demonstrate alternative explanations about the scope and content of sovereignty, it should be applied to the propositions of Constructivism, one of the main theories of International Relations. According to this theory, sovereignty can be regarded as not being a fixed and static conception. The historicity of sovereignty displays the fact that “what counts and/or functions as sovereign is not the same in all times and places”.\(^\text{19}\) As Westphalian state system necessitates an absolute and exclusive authority over a particular territory and people, the constructivist understanding indicates the fact that the conception of sovereignty has been exposed to some certain degree of transformation under the changing conditions of time and places since the seventeenth century.\(^\text{20}\)

In the same vein, sovereignty is not a physical object which can be sensed by touching, smelling or hearing. The existence of sovereignty relies on a common understanding shared by the members of international society\(^\text{21}\).


\(^{19}\) Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, p.11.

\(^{20}\) Ibid, p. 13. For instance, the revolutions of 1820 were regarded as international problems by Concert of Europe. However, the revolutions of 1910 in Europe were evaluated by USA as domestic issues of states. Additionally, interdependency and globalization undermined to some extent the classical understanding of sovereignty, which will be addressed in further pages.

\(^{21}\) Charles Manning explains the existence of sovereignty by drawing the analogy of Santa Clause (Father Christmas), a mythical character in Christianity who brings gifts to the homes of good children before the night of Christmas. It is argued that this figure is assumed real as a result of a general belief of people. In the same way, the existence of sovereignty relies on the shared belief of people or members of international society. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 22.
Therefore, it can be argued that the idea of sovereignty exists as a product of a general assumption of the members of international society and reciprocal recognitions of states. All of these propositions get its roots from the constructivist theory developed by Alexander Wendt.

Furthermore, constructivist theory sees social realities such as states, international organizations and institutions as being socially constructed. This perspective challenges the positivist understanding of international relations in which static material assumptions and motives are to be primary concern in the search of a state policy and international relations. In contrast to the positivist determinism on physical facts and independent variables, constructivism draws the attention to the social dimensions of realities such as cultures, languages and common understanding which have power to some extent to reshape the social realities. In this vein, social realities such as states, international institutions and so on are not to be regarded as a given fact. Rather they are created through the interactions of international actors and their inter-subjective understandings and expectations. So, the state and its institutions like sovereignty are exposed to a transformation under the conditions of time and space. While the neorealist and neoliberal theories regard the notion of ‘state sovereignty’ as a static reality and objective institution, constructivism sees it as a dynamic concept which evolves in line with the needs of conjecture without losing its significance in international relations.

As well as sovereignty, the notion of ‘international society’ can also be analyzed in the light of constructivist understanding. Particularly it should be stated that international society is generally known as being consisted of sovereign and legally equal states. As states have emerged to meet the needs of peaceful co-existence among people, international society can also be a structure established by its members, particularly sovereign states, in order to ensure peace,

security and stability among them. There are many diverse concepts used for defining international society, such as international community, international system or system of states. No matter what concept is used for defining international society, it should not be ignored that international society is a social reality that sovereign states as being the main actors of international relations emerge in the forms of an international structure regulating their actions.\(^\text{23}\)

However, this structure cannot be regarded as an overarching authority to which member states submit their power, rather it seemed to be an anarchic one in which member states are free in their actions. The anarchic character of the society has not hindered to emerge a high level order in the society even though the possibility of war, violence, threat and fear among states remain.\(^\text{24}\) Notwithstanding the growing number of studies on international society have taken place in literature, Hedley Bull and Charles Manning are two prominent scholars who have a great influence on others.

Noting the difference between international system and international society, Bull precisely displays the existence of international order. He argues that ‘sufficient conduct among states and sufficient impacts on one another’s decision create a system of states’. If they are conscious of common interests and common values, they set a society in which they are bound by some rules and norms in their relations.\(^\text{25}\) It is not the main concern of the thesis to debate on the differences between these two concepts, but the essence of the point is that there exists an international order, no matter which descriptions such as ‘society’ or ‘system’ is used.

From the constructivist point of view, some scholars emphasize the impacts of rules and interactions among states on the emergence of international society. Even though some of them personified states as key actors of

---


international society\textsuperscript{26}, some regard states not as an agent, but as a structure for which the representatives act on behalf of their states. In this sense, state leaders or diplomats are not free to act without considering the internationally recognized rules, norms and values such as sovereignty and international law. By taking an analogy of a game, Charles Manning likens a diplomatic process to a game that has particular rules and the respect to those rules. So, like all other games diplomacy covers a certain set of rules and norms which have to be obeyed by authorities.\textsuperscript{27} This analogy supports the fact that international society is not a physical but a social fact covering some rules and norms be respected by its members. Therefore, its scope and content can be changed to meet the needs of time and space.

\subsection*{2.2.2 Conflicts between Human Rights and State Sovereignty}

State sovereignty and human rights seems to be two contradicted concepts of modern international relations. As the idea of state sovereignty is taken as an essential component of the contemporary international relations, human rights issue is gradually considered as a subject of international relations particularly since the end of the Second World War. It is largely debated among scholars that the principle of state sovereignty encountered some challenges by internationally recognized human rights.

Jack Donnelly argues that the peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the Universal Declarations of Human rights in 1948 are two corner points of modern international relations which display the conflict between the rights of states and individuals. While the peace of Westphalia brought states to have absolute sovereignty over their territory regardless of their records on human rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights problematized the issue of human rights an international subject that is to be assessed beyond the state boundaries.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26} Peter Wilson, “Manning's Quasi-Masterpiece: The Nature of International Society Revisited,” \textit{The Round Table} Vol. 93, No. 377 (October 2004), pp. 755-769.

\textsuperscript{27} Nicholas Wheeler, \textit{Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society}, p. 22.

However, some realist arguments do not consider human rights as an important component of international relations as much as the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. From this point of view, sovereign states conduct their relations with others without considering their records of human rights. They have to respect the sovereignty rights of others, which is derived from non-intervention principle. This argument takes the issue of human rights within the domain of internal affairs of sovereign states.

In contrast to the realist perspective, liberal one emphasizes the roles of intergovernmental organizations to uphold human rights in world politics. In this sense, the United Nations is the first international organization in history which recognizes universal human rights. The catastrophic results of the Second World (1939-1945) led states to establish new international mechanisms by which international peace and security would be maintained. For this aim, fifty-one states came together in 1945 to establish the UN in order to maintain international peace and security, and ensure cordial relations among states as well as upholding human rights, better living standards and social life for people. Putting emphasis on humanitarian discourse, the Charter of United Nations can be differentiated by comparing its predecessor the Covenant of the League of Nations. Having 196 member states, the United Nations has been playing an important role for promoting and protecting human rights through international treaties, conventions or declarations produced by its organs and committees since its establishment. In addition to the UN, there emerged so many diverse inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) at regional and international levels such as the Council of Europe (CoE), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),

---


30 The United Nations is abbreviated as the UN. Hereafter, this shortly written form will be used.


33 David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations*, p. 4.
Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU) and so on to encourage the respect for human rights in world politics.\(^{34}\)

The existence of international organizations and their arrangements constitute some restrictions on the acts of sovereign states, even though their implementations depend on the consent of territorial states. In this context it is possible to claim that the issue of human rights is internationalized by setting supranational mechanisms influencing on sovereign states to prefer a policy that would not infringe the universal human rights.\(^{35}\)

Additionally accelerated globalization process particularly since the end of Second World War contributed to the internationalization of human rights, and produced some challenges to the sovereign power of a state. Proliferations of science and technology particularly in the communication sector occurred mostly since 1980s created a conducive condition for increasing public awareness of the violations of the universal human rights. These innovations particularly in social media and communication technology served to be a public pressure on decision making process of states and a driving force for prompt actions against humanitarian crisis.\(^{36}\)

From this perspective it is widely argued among scholars whether state sovereignty lost its traditional power due to the emergence of humanitarianism in world politics. While some scholars argue that the state sovereignty is eroded, undermined or weakened against international human rights\(^{37}\), some point out that


\(^{36}\) Former Secretary of State James Baker III (1995) wrote: “In Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Chechnya, among others, the real-time coverage of conflict by the electronic media has served to create a powerful new imperative for a prompt action that was not present in less frenetic [times].” Eytan Gilboa, “The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations,” Political Communication, Vol.22, No.1 (January-March 2005), p. 28.

\(^{37}\) In this sense, Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, the sixth Secretary General of the United Nations, noted that it is essential to respect state sovereignty and integrity, but “the exclusive and absolute
reshaping state sovereignty in accordance with the standards of human rights is completely compatible with the principle of sovereignty emerged in the peace of Westphalia. For both of these arguments, it appears that the internationalization of human rights has some influence over the transformation of state sovereignty in line with humanitarianism, but it does not eradicate the state control over its territory. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the function of international human rights to restrict the freedom of brutal actions of sovereign states.

2.2.3 Assessment of Humanitarian Intervention in this Context

It is largely debated in literature that realizing humanitarian intervention as a policy instrument in international relations challenges the traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention into a state’s internal affairs to which a great value was attributed in modern international system. Yet, although it is possible to justify all these arguments on humanitarian intervention from various theoretical perspectives, this thesis takes the conception of sovereignty as well as international society and human rights as a social reality which can be evolved and transformed in response to the needs of contemporary circumstances. So, constructivist point of view provides an alternative perspective for the policies of humanitarian intervention and the changing approaches to the concept because I argue that the notion of humanitarian intervention relies on the changes of the content and scope of sovereignty, international society and human rights concepts. However, it does not mean to underestimate the main rules and norms of international relations developed for centuries, particularly embedded in the UN Charter.


It is possible to take same conclusion from the statement of Javier Perez de Cuellar on humanitarian intervention. Javier Perez de Cuellar said that “an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents”. From this statement it is possible to understand that international actions against the violation of human rights in large scale can prevail over the basic principles of international law such as the non-intervention and state sovereignty.

As discussed in detail in previous sections above, the concept of human rights began to be assessed beyond the boundaries of sovereign states since the end of the Second World War. Even though it was a hard mission to act against the large scale humanitarian crisis during the Cold War period due to the constrains of bipolar international system, the codification of human rights through various international organizations including the UN facilitate increasing awareness of humanitarianism on domestic and international public opinion, and forced the decision-makers to do something against large-scale humanitarian crisis emerged largely in the post-Cold War period.

Hence, the internationalization of human rights led to redefine the concept of sovereignty generally known as an ‘authority’ over a territory and people, but now it must also cover a responsibility for people. In other means, while sovereignty as authority largely refers to a control over a territory and people residing in it, sovereignty as responsibility means that a sovereign state should at least respect a minimal standard of human rights.\textsuperscript{39} Otherwise, a sovereign state having gross and systematic violations of human rights would lose its right of sovereignty.

This perspective on sovereignty led to some transformation of the concept of international society. Increasing opportunities for cooperation among states and rising expectations on the respect of human rights contributed to the emergence of solidarism in international society. Following the Cold War period, international conjecture was surprisingly convenient for states “to establish common rules and norms and recognize their common interests in maintaining these arrangements” which are the main conditions of the emergence of ‘the solidarist international society’.\textsuperscript{40} In this sense, the solidarist view on international society rather than pluralist one prioritizing the maintenance of international order rather than


\subsection*{2.2.4 Opposition to Humanitarian Intervention}
As the humanitarian intervention is widely supported and legitimized by diverse approaches, it is also largely criticized from different perspectives. The main reason of these criticisms and objections to the concept of humanitarian intervention is the insufficiency of the international norms which illustrate how, when and where an intervention for the humanitarian purposes will be conducted.\footnote{For more details, see, Timothy W. Crawford and Alan J. Kuperman, \textit{Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion, and Civil War}, (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).}

Even though there are different interpretations of international legal documents, the legal objections to humanitarian intervention emerge generally on the basis of the Charter of United Nations. In principle, the charter limits the use of force only for self-defense\footnote{UN Charter, Article 2(4).} and collective security under the authorization of United Nations Security Council.\footnote{UN Charter, Article 24,39, and 42.} In this sense, using military force to relieve humanitarian crisis seems to contradict the UN Charter.

Besides legal objections to the idea of humanitarian intervention, it is also criticized by the pluralist perspective. From the pluralist understanding of international relations, international order set up by diverse states having different understanding of ethics, morality and justice can only be preserved by adhering to the rules of international society. Sharing some rules and norms particularly sanctifying state sovereignty and independence against external intervention appears to be the major tools of international society to maintain international peace and security. Acting against the common values of international society
jeopardizes the very existing international order “based on mutual toleration of difference”.

In this sense, Robert Jackson draws the attention to the importance of maintaining international order in order to uphold human rights in the world. To subvert the existing international order with the hope of protecting human rights have risks of increasing the number of wars among states, particularly great powers. Hence, it would be so hard to safeguard the human rights when a conflict emerges in a region. On the other hand, international norms and rules generate a common basis of coordination among states through which they can know or guess how their counterparts behave in a certain matter. Abusing those rules and norms for particular humanitarian purposes would undermine the existing trust among states. This can trigger a conflict between states or societies, and finally reach to a level that thousands of people will lose their lives.

Furthermore, it is stressed by Mohammad Ayoob that preserving domestic order of states is prerequisite for the preservation of international order as well as upholding human rights because there is no other authority or institution rather than a state apparatus to be able “to provide domestic order to the societies”. To establish a well-functioning domestic order it is essential to respect the sovereignty rights of individual states. He says that “by eroding the legal basis of sovereign authority, humanitarian intervention … may be opening the floodgates for domestic disorder”. Failing to comply with the obligations under international law such as the respect to the sovereignty right of states can pave the way for a disorder within states and eventually in international order. This instability and disorder would foster a further humanitarian crisis.

On the other hand, conducting a military intervention for humanitarian purposes is harshly criticized by realist perspective. From this point of view, the

---


main purpose of pursuing a foreign policy for states is to further their national interest and increase the wealth of their public. The primary responsibility of a state is not to serve the benefits for foreigners, but to fulfill the needs of its nationals and ensure their wealth higher. From Hobbesian point of view, decision makers of democracies are authorized to do so. Due to the fact that the use of military force needs much more political and economic power, the burden of a military operation for any reason would be on the shoulders of the nationals of interventionist states. That’s why humanitarian interventions might be undesirable for the nationals of intervening states.

Notwithstanding humanitarian intervention appears to be a remedy for halting large-scale humanitarian crisis, it sometimes causes problems as well as alleviating them. T.W Crawford and A. J. Kuperman underline the fact that using military force for saving lives of subordinate groups in a particular state feeds the expectations of other opposition groups in different parts of the world to be saved from their authoritarian governments. Increasing number of humanitarian interventions would be regarded by these opposition groups as incentives to revolt against their own state instead of endeavoring peaceful means for settling disputes or being cautious about the armed conflict.

Besides having insufficient capabilities to fulfill all these expectations, international community led by major powers like USA, France, the UK, Russia, China and so on is not able to undertake military interventions for whole humanitarian crises. This creates a selectivity problem for the future cases of military ones, which is another point of criticisms on humanitarian intervention. It subsequently leads to the criticisms of “double standards” and fosters the doubts on the altruistic commitment of humanitarian actions.

---


On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that humanitarian interventions are generally implemented as a product of the mixture of states’ diverse motives. One of such motives, the pursuit of ‘national interest’ can play an important role for states in taking a decision on such kind of military actions like humanitarian interventions. In addition to that domestic and international public opinion pressured over states to do something for halting humanitarian crises.\textsuperscript{53} From this point of view, interventionist powers are either harshly criticized due to the emerging doubts on whether they have a hidden agenda to use humanitarian language for legitimizing their military actions to reach their strategic targets, or in case of non-intervention they are denounced due to their unwillingness on not acting to save innocent people from mass killing.

Additionally, it is intrinsic feature of international system that the member states of the system have material power in unequal quantity. Unequally distributed power among states may have big powers to dominate weak ones and abuse the equal rights of states underlined in international rules and norms. In this sense, Benedict Kingsbury argues that with maintaining international values such as sovereignty and non-intervention, it might be possible to alleviate the tensions arising from the existing inequality of powers among states. In other words, common international principles such as sovereignty and non-interference into the domestic issues of other states “provide a shield for weak states” against unwarranted external interventions.\textsuperscript{54}

Mohammad Ayoob also draws the attention to this argument as well. He points out that the sovereignty right of states constrains “the interventionist instinct” of major powers. It is noted that common international norms of states have a limiting power over the behaviors of the strong states particularly towards their weak counterparts.\textsuperscript{55} It can be also argued that with the existence of the common international values the existing disparities among states cannot cause a serious conflict in international relations. Southern states consisted of mostly

\textsuperscript{53} Mohammad Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” p. 86.


\textsuperscript{55} Mohammad Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” p. 83.
weak ones that are experiencing a state-making process and have small economic, military and technological capabilities are generally inclined to preserve order within states and justice among other counterparts. Northern states, on the other hand, mainly strong ones which passed the state-making process for a long time ago, and have higher political, economic, military and technological power than southern ones prefer to accommodate justice within states and maintain an order among them. Therefore, it can be argued that while northern states generally support the conduct of humanitarian intervention as a means of sustaining justice within a sovereign state, southern states consider it as a challenge to the existing order of a target state.

### 2.3 Legal Debate of Humanitarian Intervention

Another dimension of the concept of humanitarian intervention is its legality according to international law. As it is expressed in the description of the concept of humanitarian intervention at the beginning of this chapter, it generally renders the use of force against other states necessary to halt grave violations of human rights. So, the provisions of international law regulating the conditions of the use of force are to be mentioned for shedding light on the discussions about the legality of humanitarian intervention. In that sense, this part of the thesis will give general information about the legality of humanitarian intervention by considering the provisions of the UN Charter and other relevant conventions on state sovereignty and the use of force as well as their diverse interpretations in the literature. Then, it will try to explain the conception of Responsibility to Protect, put forward as an attempt for the codification of humanitarian intervention.

#### 2.3.1 Principle of State Sovereignty and Non-use of force

As the current international system is governed on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations, it can be easily said that the fundamental international convention arranging the use of force in international relations is the UN Charter. According to the Charter, international disputes have to be resolved by peaceful means. It is obviously stated in the Article 2(3), “All Members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”

It is also forbidden to interfere into the domestic affairs of other states as mentioned in the Article 2(7) that

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene into the matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Furthermore, the non-use of force in international relations is determined as a paramount principle in the Charter. It is directly indicated in the Article 2(4) that

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

There exist two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force. One of them is self-defense indicated in the Article 51 of the Charter, the other one is coercive measures undertaken by the UNSC under the Chapter VII against the threats or breaches of international peace and security, and aggression.

Besides these rules about the conditions of the use of force, the Charter covers the purpose of “…promoting and encouraging respect of human rights and for fundamental freedoms…” as well as maintaining international peace and security. Even though the Charter lacks the detailed descriptions of which rights are to be regarded as human rights, protecting human rights is counted as one of the main purposes of the UN at Article 1(3).

In this line, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 with 8 abstaining and no dissenting vote. This declaration complemented the UN Charter by presenting the guiding principles of rights that individuals exercise, and inspired to create a number of treaties, conventions, declarations and provisions not only in regional and international

57 UN Charter Article1(3)

organizations but also in domestic law of states. Therefore, this declaration can be considered as the foundation and universal recognition of international human rights law.\(^59\) Besides creating UDHR, the UN adopted “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” and “the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in 1966 in order to further the rights of UDHR and ensure the binding force on ratifying states.

As well as the progress on international human rights law briefly mentioned above particularly through the UN, there emerged some critical declarations enshrining state sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force. The UN adopted ‘the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty’\(^60\) in 1965 which bans the external interventions for any reason into the domestic jurisdiction of states, and in 1970 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’\(^61\) which points out the cooperation among states and the prohibition on the use of force together with sustaining the respect of human rights, but does not present any road map on how to ensure human rights when mass atrocities occur.\(^62\)

Although these declarations were adopted in almost the same time period, they generate dichotomy on whether to prefer respecting human rights or state sovereignty when atrocity crimes emerge within a state. While international human rights law put obligations on states to uphold and fulfill human rights, declarations about state sovereignty and the use of force make them binding not to

---


interfere into the domestic jurisdiction of states and to use peaceful means in their international relations. Therefore, there emerge some ambiguities and diverse arguments on whether the conduct of humanitarian intervention is legal or illegal for international law.

As some scholars assume that humanitarian intervention appears to contradict the paramount principles of international law, particularly in terms of the UN Charter, and so should be regarded as illegal, others claim its legality. These two different approaches are divided into two camps and conceptualized in literature as classicists/legal positivists/restrictionists versus legal realists/counter-restrictionists. As during the Cold War period, restrictionist understanding of international law related to humanitarian intervention was more popular among states, but in the post-Cold War era the legality of humanitarian intervention has been largely supported in line with arguments of counter-restrictionists.

Under the light of these diverse arguments on the legality of the issue, it is not clear whether humanitarian intervention is legal or illegal in terms of international law. As Ian Hurd argues about the legality of humanitarian intervention, it depends on “one’s understanding of how international law constructed, changed and represented”.63 Due to the fact that the conduct of humanitarian intervention includes the use of military force against another state, it seems to contradict the main elements of international law such as the prohibition on the use of force, non-interference into the internal affairs of other states, the respect for sovereignty and equality of states.

The main contestation about the legality of humanitarian intervention for international law is how to interpret the provisions of international law, particularly the UN Charter64, when the large scale humanitarian crisis is taken place in a state. Legal positivists such as Ian Brownlie argue that the meaning of the Charter is not unclear, and it compels states to settle their interstate disputes through peaceful means (as in Article 2(3)), not to use force in their international


64 International law consists of treaties and international custom described as repeated practices of states over time. One of the most important treaties is the UN Charter due to its power on regulating when and how to apply the use of force, and maintaining international peace and security.
relations (as in Article 2(4)), and to respect the domestic jurisdiction of another states (as in Article 2(7)). The contracting parties have a moral duty to obey the rules of an agreement.\textsuperscript{65} This plain language of the Charter prioritizes the principles of the rule of law and ‘pacta sunt servanda’ over any other ends.

On the other hand, legal realists or counter-restrictionists argue that one of the purposes of the UN Charter is to protect human rights in international level. Therefore, it can be argued that the conduct of a military intervention against gross, systematic and large-scale violations of human rights is not contrary to the UN Charter. In contrast to legal positivists, they claim that the Article 2(4) does not prohibit all uses of force. This prohibition is restricted only to direct intervention against territorial integrity and political independence of target states. So the conduct of a humanitarian intervention does not fall within the scope of this prohibition.\textsuperscript{66} In that sense, undertaking a military action against a state in order to halt mass atrocities and mitigate grave humanitarian crisis does not mean to threat against territorial integrity and political independence of states in question.\textsuperscript{67}

In contrast to that argument, the legal positivists underline the fact that a number of military interventions having been so far carried out for humanitarian purposes have been resulted in either regime changes of targeted states or weakening state control over its territory. Furthermore, they argue that the UN Charter lacks the provisions concerning specific violations of human rights to be sanctioned through the use of military force.\textsuperscript{68}

2.3.2 Authorization of the United Nations

In addition to the controversies on legality of this issue, the question of who authorizes the conduct of humanitarian intervention constitutes another dimension of the debate. Given the UN Charter, it seems that two organs of the

\textsuperscript{65} J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” pp. 36-37.


\textsuperscript{68} Eric Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War, p. 63.
UN, the General Assembly and Security Council, have the authorization power for taking the decision for a humanitarian intervention.

Having the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, the UN Security Council (the UNSC) deserves the right of deciding on which matters would be “a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and what measures would be taken to guard international peace and security. In this context, whether a massive humanitarian crisis within a state jurisdiction constitutes a threat to international peace and security is debatable on the legality issue of humanitarian intervention.

While the concept of international security had been merely understood as addressing territorial aggression of states against each other in the wake of the establishment of UN state system and particularly Cold War period, it has been interpreted broadly by the UNSC since the end of the Cold War by covering some security risks emanating mainly inside states such as civil war, intrastate conflict and humanitarian crisis. Therefore, it can be noted that there seems to be a transformation in the meaning of international security due to the assessment regarding humanitarian crisis within the scope of international peace and security.

Should the UNSC be unable or unwilling to take actions to maintain international peace and security, the General Assembly considers the matter and makes appropriate recommendations to ensure international peace and security. Besides its decisions are not binding, it needs two-thirds majority of votes to take action, which is very difficult to achieve without the supports of major international powers. Even if it reaches to enough votes for the decision in the

---

69 UN Charter, Article 24
70 UN Charter, Article 39
73 UN Charter, Article 10, 11
Assembly, it seems to be impossible to implement such kind of military actions without the logistical supports of major international powers. Furthermore, the UNSC may give security roles and responsibilities to some regional organizations or agencies under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In this sense it can be assumed that regional organizations and agencies can be regarded as responsible on addressing the problems of international peace and security with the condition of an authorization given by the UNSC.\textsuperscript{75}

Notwithstanding there exist all these mechanisms to embark upon a humanitarian intervention, in many intervention cases either they failed to take actions due to the veto powers of the permanent members of the UNSC, or intervening states bypassed them by acting individually. While unauthorized military interventions are mainly criticized as ‘illegal’, interveners justify their actions with ‘legitimacy’ by using a different interpretation of rules.

Because of the existing ambiguity on the legality of humanitarian interventions and the criticisms about unauthorized military actions, all relevant actors either engaging in a military actions for humanitarian purposes or the target of such kind of military actions use diverse arguments about the same rules of international law in order to legitimize their actions or criticisms. Therefore, there emerged a need of agreement that would address these controversies on humanitarian intervention by reaching a consensus to reconcile protections of human rights and state sovereignty.

\textbf{2.3.3 Responsibility to Protect}

This idea was illustrated as a remedy for dealing with the problems arose from the conducts of humanitarian intervention. International community has encountered a number of military interventions for humanitarian ends particularly since the end of the Cold War. Along with the existing ambiguities about the issue in international law, increasing number of the cases of humanitarian intervention enabled international community to take initiatives on creating a legal framework for the conduct of humanitarian intervention on behalf of the United Nations.

However, these initiatives and attempts for the codification of humanitarian intervention did not bring any significant contribution to the ambiguities when, where, and how to undertake these interventions even though the Responsibility to Protect was in principle accepted as a norm in the UN.

2.3.3.1 Background of the Concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’

Following the breakup of Cold War states system, international community had to encounter an increasing number of security risks to international peace, derived mainly from civil war or domestic violence perpetrated by the governments against their citizens on large scale. The changing scope of international security\(^{76}\), the increasing numbers of massive killings of civilian populations in conflict areas, and rising global awareness through improving satellite technology made it necessary for international community to halt this humanitarian crisis as soon as possible and to find comprehensive solutions to the new challenges to the international peace and security without endangering international order set on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. The idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the product of such endeavors that international community has to reach an agreement on the issue of humanitarian intervention.

Notwithstanding all these developments on the humanitarian intervention particularly since 1990, the responses of international community to halt humanitarian crisis are not successful for all relevant cases. As it failed to protect civilian populations from mass killing in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan, it became possible to save lives in some cases like Kosovo only through military operations conducted by a group of states without UN authorization, which fostered the fear of declining importance of UN state system.\(^{77}\)

---

\(^{76}\) During the cold war period international security is premised on the non-existence of interstate war, but with the end of the Cold War international community began to view as a threat to international security civil wars, internal conflicts mainly resulted in humanitarian catastrophe.

\(^{77}\) Dorota Gierycz, “From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” *Criminal Justice Ethics*, Vol. 29, No.2 (August 2010), p. 112.
In these circumstances, the Secretary General Kofi Annan posed the well-known question at UN Millennium Summit:

... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to Rwanda, to Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity? 

Following the initiatives at the UN, an independent panel, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), was established with the experts from diverse disciplines and countries in September 2000 and produced a report detailing the description of the concept of R2P in December 2001. In 2005 this concept of R2P was endorsed by the UN General Assembly with great majority of member states. Adopting Resolution 1674, the UNSC reaffirmed the concept through its reference to the provisions of 138 and 139 in 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.

2.3.3.2 The Content of ‘Responsibility to Protect’

The concept of R2P, as issued in the report of ICISS in 2001, put a responsibility on the host state and the international community for protecting individuals who suffer from an ethnic cleansing or large scale and systemic loss of life. With this idea, the debate moved from “the legal right or obligation to intervene to the idea of responsibility to protect the victims of a humanitarian crisis”. The responsibility is primarily on the shoulders of the host state. If it fails to meet this responsibility, it falls on that of international society. According to the concept of R2P, the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild are

---


79 Dorota Gierycz, “From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” p. 112.


81 Eve Massingham,“Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Advance the Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?,” pp. 809-810.

82 Dorota Gierycz, “From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” p. 112.
accounted as three specific responsibilities of international community to avert or halt a humanitarian crisis.83

Furthermore, the R2P concept in the report of 2001 provided some criteria for the international response to these crises. First of all, ‘ethnic-cleansing’ and ‘large scale loss of life’ are regarded as two just causes for conducting a military intervention. Secondly, the decision on a military intervention would be authorized by the right authority. The ICISS report assumes the Security Council, the General Assembly, and regional organizations as three right authorities even though the Security Council has priority over other two mechanisms. Thirdly, military option should be a last resort after all peaceful means are used. Fourthly, the purpose of military intervention is to end or alleviate human suffering. This is called as ‘the right intention’. Fifthly, military operations should be conducted proportionally. The last one is that a military intervention is to be taken when “a reasonable chance of success” would be achieved.84

Notwithstanding the detailed descriptions of all these criteria in ICISS Report of 2001, the provisions of 2005 World Summit Outcome Document are not enough for resolving the challenge of halting probable humanitarian crisis in the future. Although the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document determines four crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity for application of R2P, and underlines the UN responsibility of using both peaceful and coercive measures to address these crisis, international community did not exactly resolve the question of what to do when the UNSC failed to act for halting humanitarian crisis or how to address the unauthorized interventions. While the 2001 ICISS Report covers some measures that would constrain particularly permanent members of the UNSC not to avoid responsibility to react when massive killings would occur in anywhere in the

84 Ibid., pp. 807-808.
world\textsuperscript{86}, in 2005 they displayed their unwillingness to agree with the proposals that would limit their freedom of action for humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, while 2001 Report had some proposals for restricting the use of veto power by the permanent members of the UNSC, they seemed to be unacceptable by these major powers and ruled out in the 2005 document.\textsuperscript{87} The Outcome Document, therefore, is so poor to remove the ambiguities on the implementation of R2P.\textsuperscript{88} From this point of view, it can be argued that, as the words of Michael Byers, the outcome document “watered down” the very elements of the concept of the R2P to an extent that in practice it would not precisely deal with the future large-scale humanitarian crisis.\textsuperscript{89}

In this chapter, the normative and legal dimensions of the concept of humanitarian intervention are broadly analyzed. As this concept consists of two words like ‘humanitarian’ and ‘intervention’, it is important to evaluate how human rights have an impact on the contemporary international relations, and how the concept of sovereignty has undergone a substantial transformation over time for taking a better comprehension about this concept and Turkey’s approach to it. In addition to that, it is generally touched upon the reality that the establishment of the United Nations and the international efforts of promoting and protecting human rights played an important role on constituting an international community that is sensitive for human rights as well as preserving international peace and security. Hence, these developments and arguments concerning the concept of humanitarian intervention constitute a theoretical background for implementing humanitarian intervention in related cases by some states or international organizations. In contrast, there exist some objections to humanitarian

\textsuperscript{86} Two of the rejected proposals are “the criteria governing recourse to force” and “restricting the use of the veto power”, see, Alex J. Bellamy, “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit,” \textit{Ethics & International Affairs} (Wiley-Blackwell), Vol. 20, No. 2 (2006), p. 167.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., pp. 167-169.

\textsuperscript{88} Dorota Gierycz, “From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” p. 114.

intervention on the basis of normative arguments as well by asserting such
concerns that increasing number of military interventions against states with
humanitarian consideration could set the stage for more problems, undermine the
current international order, raise the possibility of wars among states, and so more
humanitarian crises we would encounter. When this concept is examined in terms
of legal dimension, it is possible to see both supporters and opponents who
question the legality of humanitarian intervention from different perspectives by
evaluating the same documents of international law. Thus, there exist different
interpretations of the provisions of international law particularly concerning the
use of force, sovereignty and human rights.

When several cases of humanitarian intervention especially in the post-
Cold War period were examined, it can be seen that interventionist states have
endeavored to legitimize their military actions through different arguments
generally mentioned in this chapter. In the same way, it can be claimed that
Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention in the cases of Bosnia and
Kosovo was shaped as a result of interpreting these conceptions like the principles
of sovereignty, non-intervention into the domestic affairs of other states, the
respect to international law to which a great importance was attributed in
traditional Turkish foreign policy within the framework of above-mentioned
arguments. Turkey followed a pro-interventionist policy towards the gross,
systemic and large-scale violations of human rights in Bosnia. It will be possible
to explain and understand this pro-interventionist attitude of Turkey that was
rarely seen in its foreign policy by analyzing historical background of the crisis,
the reactions of international community, and Turkey’s own situation, actions and
experiences in handling this Bosnian crisis. However, in the case of Kosovo,
Turkey pursued prudent policy on carrying out a humanitarian intervention. In
order to explain and understand why Turkey was cautious about lending its
support to a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, it is necessary to examine
historical background of the Kosovo issue, international reactions to this problem,
and Turkey’s own condition, attempts, and impression that it get in addressing the
problem. In doing so, it will be tried to evaluate how Turkey took a position on
humanitarian intervention in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo in the post-Cold War period.
CHAPTER 3

TURKEY’S APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA

In order to explain and understand Turkey’s approach to the humanitarian intervention for Bosnia, it should be briefly mentioned about the historical background of the Bosnian crisis. To have accurate information about the background of the crisis can help to understand why Turkey advocated a humanitarian intervention for Bosnia. Furthermore, another important factor to be mentioned in shaping Turkish foreign policy is the attitudes of international community during the crisis because it is a reality that Turkey does not have enough power to implement a unilateral military intervention abroad. It renders it necessary for Turkey to take the support of international community in such matters. Then, this section analyzes Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Bosnian crisis in the light of its diplomatic initiatives and the discussions in its domestic politics. Finally, it assesses how Turkey took a stand on the humanitarian intervention for Bosnia.

3.1 Historical Background of the Bosnian Crisis

Following the death of Tito, the former president of Yugoslavia\(^9\) who took office between 1943 and 1980, Yugoslavia encountered severe economic,

\(^9\) There exist diverse official names used for Yugoslavia during history. I preferred to use the shortly written form ‘Yugoslavia’ instead of these long official names noted below. Hereafter, this shortly written form will be used.

1918-1929: ‘The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovans’.
1929-1944: ‘the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’.
1944- 1946: Democratic Federal Yugoslavia.

40
political and social crisis. In the absence of a charismatic leader like Tito in the federal administration, federated states enjoyed a large autonomy and pursued independent policies in 1980s in accordance with the constitutional amendments of 1974. Additionally, the country had to deal with a deteriorating economy with high inflation, serious unemployment, huge foreign debt and food shortages.\footnote{David Andersan, “The Collapse of Yugoslavia: Background and Summary,” Parliamentary Research Service, No.14 (1995-96), p. 8; Selver Buldanlioglu, The Dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the Emergence of a New Interventionism (M.S. diss., METU, 2003), pp. 10-31.}

In this circumstance, a Serbian nationalist leader, Slobodan Milosevic was appointed as the chief of the Serbian Communist Party and then took the presidency of Yugoslavia in 1989. Unlike Tito, he conducted the nationalist policies based on Serbian dominance over other parts of the country through which the autonomy of Kosovo was revoked in March 1989. Rising power of Serbs in the administration of the country precipitated the emergence of other nationalist movements against Serbian dominance, which thereafter brought the country into the dissolution process. As a reaction to the expanding powers of Serbs in Belgrade, new nationalist leaders were elected in the elections of federated states in 1990.\footnote{Andersan, “The Collapse of Yugoslavia,” p. 9.}

In this circumstance, it is not surprising to see that the flourishing nationalism in a country like Yugoslavia that consists of diverse ethno-religious groups triggers the secessionist movements. It is obvious that dissolution of a country like Yugoslavia in which there is no clear-cut boundaries among ethno-religious groups could induce a civil war among different nations, creeds, races and religious groups. Following the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991, Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and its affiliated Serbian paramilitary forces launched attacks to these two former federated states. This paved the way for a protracted crisis in the Balkans, engulfing later Bosnia and Kosovo as well.

1946-1963: Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia

“The History of Yugoslavia”, \url{http://www.kosovo.net/serhist2.html}
The recognition of independences of Croatia and Slovenia by international community, particularly the West, forced Bosnia-Herzegovina\(^{93}\) to choose either the independence that would have led to be subject to a possible Serbian aggression or remaining in Yugoslavia under Serbian dominance. If Bosnian leadership decided on declaring their independence, it was inevitable that they would face a Serbian aggression like their Croatian counterparts, because Serbs constituted about one third of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991.\(^{94}\) Eventually, the war in Bosnia broke out in early April 1992 and continued until mid-December 1995. This war led to one of the greatest atrocities, as over 100,000 people were killed\(^{95}\), around 40,000 women were raped\(^{96}\), and 2.2 million people were displaced.\(^{97}\)

### 3.2 International Responses to the Bosnian Crisis

When the conflict began, influential international actors like some European countries, the United Nations, and the United States engaged in some efforts to stop the fighting in Yugoslavia. At the initial phases of the conflict, the international community expected that diplomatic initiatives and negotiations would yield promising results in reliving the ongoing conflict in Yugoslavia. However, as time passed, the international community was not able to bring an end to the war through peaceful means. As a result, coercive military measures were now on the agenda of the international community.

\(^{93}\) Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the six federated states of Yugoslavia. I generally used ‘Bosnia’ instead of the official name of ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’.

\(^{94}\) With a considerable homogeneous ethnic population in which only 2 percent of its population was Serbs, Slovenia overcame Serbian aggression much easier than Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where Serbs constituted 11% and 31% of populations respectively. One third of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 equals 1.3 million Serbs. This independence would be perceived by such a big amount of populations that they were pushed out of Yugoslavia against their will. See, Andersan, “The Collapse of Yugoslavia,” p. 12.

\(^{95}\) “Bosnia war dead figure announced”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228152.stm


\(^{97}\) “Jolie highlights the continuing suffering of the displaced in Bosnia,” *UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency*, http://www.unhcr.org/4bb422512.html
Earlier recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence by the European Community became a turning point in the dissolution process of Yugoslavia. In coming days, other regional and international actors followed the same path by recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina as separate and independent political nations. This made the dissolution of Yugoslavia an irreversible reality.

However, Serbian side, keeping the power of central government in Yugoslavia at that time, opposed to the independences of these former federated states. Since it failed to prevent this process, it encouraged Bosnian Serbs to establish their own republic in Bosnia on 27 March 1992. One month later, on 27 April, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Considering the developments in Yugoslavia and the reaction of the international community towards them, it appeared that a new state of affairs emerged within the boundaries of former Yugoslavia.

International actors therefore concentrated their efforts on resolving the crisis given this new reality. Their primary objective was to put an end to the ongoing conflict between the warring parties. For this purpose, international community conducted some attempts under the UN auspices. The Security Council (UNSC), for instance, adopted Resolution 713 in September 1991, which banned the transfers of weapons to all belligerent parties in Yugoslavia. Additionally, to set the stage for political negotiations between the conflicting parties, several UN representatives proposed deploying a UN peacekeeping mission. As a result, the UNSC adopted Resolutions 743 and 749 to establish and deploy the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for Yugoslavia in 1992. The UN also led several more initiatives for humanitarian assistance.98

Due to the initial expectation of that diplomatic solutions would end the conflict, the international community disregarded and delayed coercive actions demanded by some countries like Turkey until 1995. From 1991 to 1995, several conferences were organized, and many peace plans were prepared in order to solve the protracted crisis in Yugoslavia. From mid-1993 onward, the UN and

later NATO began to use a threatening discourse for coercive measures as a response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis. However, the failures of these peaceful initiatives and warnings to curb the Serbian aggression caused the deaths of thousands of people and the displacement of millions. In the end, led by NATO under the leadership of USA, the international community undertook a military intervention against Serbian targets to restore peace in the region.

3.3 Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Bosnian Crisis

Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the most important regions in the Balkans due to its multi-ethnic and multi-religious state structure. A possible crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina could have some reflections over Yugoslavia on a state level, the Balkans on a regional level, and Europe on an international level. It might spark another World War, just as the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the Archduke of Austria-Hungarian Empire, by a Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip started the First World War. Any fighting in the Balkans that would have global implications was not favorable for Turkey that has had limited material capabilities, but considerable historical and cultural ties with the region.

Additionally, Turkey attaches great importance to the Balkans because of its long term interests in Europe. First, the Balkans sit on Turkey’s route to Western Europe with which Turkey has had strategic relationships in the politics, economics, security, and culture links. Turkey has had a considerable amount of foreign trade with Western European countries since its founding in 1923. Second, due to the existence of Turkish and Muslim minorities in the Balkans as a cultural and historical legacy, Turkey has to assume some responsibility for ensuring their safety. Any threat to their very existence in the heart of Europe might pave the way for the exclusion of Turkey from the European Community.


100 Kamuran Inan, a politician and Turkish diplomat, stated that the War in Yugoslavia would engulf some regional countries such as Albenia and Macedonia. If the conflict could not be prevented, it would lead to a Third Balkan War. Didem Ekinci, “The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkish Parliamentary Debates,” Uluslararası İlişkiler, Vol. 6, No. 22 (Summer 2009), p. 45.

Third, the two to four million kin and friends of Bosnians in Turkey— in other words, those who largely migrated from the Balkans in the late 19th and 20th centuries— would exert some pressure on the then governments to do more for helping Bosnians in their fight with Serbian side.  

Fourth, if a crisis occurs in the Balkans, Turkey would face a huge influx of refugees, which would burden the nation’s economy. For these reasons, maintaining regional stability and security constituted Turkey’s primary foreign policy objective in the region.

Initially, Turkey adopted a status-quo oriented foreign policy. Given friendly relations with Yugoslavia and the possible risks to Turkey’s national interest if Yugoslavia dissolved, Turkey stressed diplomatic solutions and negotiations between the conflicting parties while keeping its cordial relations with the Serbian authority. However, changing political circumstances in Yugoslavia and the rise of human sufferings particularly in Bosnia forced Turkey to change its previous stance. In order to stop Serbian aggression in Bosnia and help to restore the regional order, Turkey adopted a pro-interventionist foreign policy towards Yugoslavia.

Prior to the crisis induced by Serbian nationalism and separatist policies of Slovenia and Croatia, Turkey had friendly political and economic relations with Yugoslavia. Before the eruption of the war, Turkish and Yugoslavian businessmen and entrepreneurs with support of the political officials of two countries arranged a number of meetings to boost bilateral economic relations. In addition, since a stable Yugoslavian ally that would not pose any risk to Turkey’s Balkan policy, Turkey attached great importance to keep political relations with Yugoslavia. In that way, Turkey prudently acted towards the initiatives that not only undermined the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, but also

---

102 Ibid.


104 One year earlier of the war, the 8th Meeting of the Turkish-Yugoslavian Economic Cooperation Joint Commission was held with the participation of State Minister Cemil Çiçek. Following that, the former president of Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) put forward the plan that two countries could initiate joint investment projects. In October 1990, the Second Turkish- Yugoslavian Business Conference was held and made a memorandum of understanding. See, Didem Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era: Diplomatic, Political, Economic and Military Relation (PhD. diss., Bilkent University, 2009), p. 89.
created uncertainties about relations with the new unstable independent states. Therefore, in the early phases of the crisis, Turkey consistently supported peaceful means to resolve the existing disputes through dialogue and diplomacy. Given the benefits of continuation of regional status quo and the existing balance of power, Turkey supported maintaining territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

With the disintegration in Yugoslavia imminent, both officials from the federal government and representatives of the federated states paid visits to Turkey with the objective of gaining Turkey’s support for their own roadmaps about Yugoslavia. In April 1991, Milosevic came to Ankara with the hope of gaining Turkey’s blessing. During the meeting, Özal emphasized Turkey’s support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Three months later, the leaders of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina demanded Turkey to recognize their independences. On the other hand, following the visits from Yugoslavia, the official visits from Turkey were also held in order to find a comprehensive solution to this newly emerged problem. Turkey, with its strong belief in dealing with the crisis without the use of force, played a mediating role between the disputing parties.

Though Turkey initially pursued a more cautious and status-quo oriented foreign policy towards Yugoslavia, it later revised this policy to fall in line with the changing policies of major international actors, and respond to increasing Serbian aggression towards non-Serbian ethnic groups.

In contrast to Turkish diplomatic initiatives undertaken to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Yugoslavia, Germany recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in late 1991, one month before the European Community

---

105 Mustafa TürkeĢ, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security,” p.204.


(EC) recognized them on 15 January 1992. With this recognition of the independences of these former Yugoslav federated republics by European major powers and Bulgaria as well\(^{109}\), Turkey like other European countries regarded the dissolution as an irreversible reality that Turkey could not remain its outside. As a result, Turkey indiscriminately and simultaneously recognized the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia on 6 February 1992.\(^ {110}\)

After Bosniaks approved of the independence in the referendum\(^ {111}\) held on 29 February 1992, the EC decided to recognize the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April 1992. However, since they boycotted the referendum for independence, Bosnian Serbs unilaterally founded their own republic in Bosnia on 27 March 1992. One month later, on 27 April, Serbia and Montenegro established the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Considering the developments in Yugoslavia and the reactions of international community, it was a new state of affairs for Turkey to determine its own foreign policy towards the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Notwithstanding the support of the international community for Yugoslavia’s dissolution, Serbian side intensified its aggression against Bosnian Muslims\(^ {112}\) and Croatians. Bosnia-Herzegovina was concerned with the adverse effects of the Yugoslavian collapse much more than any other republics, particularly since 31% of its populations were Serbs. Although Serbs and Croats had enough military power to defend themselves, Bosnians were vulnerable to an attack because of their insufficient military strength. Thus, widespread aggression against Bosnian Muslims began in early April 1992.\(^ {113}\)

As the crisis threatened regional peace and security, and the existence of Turkey’s historical legacy in the Balkans, Turkey revised its initial foreign policy and pursued a more assertive and pro-interventionist stance. From the beginning,

\(^{109}\) Aftermath of the recognitions of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states by European Community, Bulgaria recognized the independences of Slovenia and Croatia as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. İlhan Uzgel, “Balkanlarla İlişkiler,” p. 491.

\(^{110}\) Ibid.

\(^{111}\) Bosniaks preferred for independence with a clear majority of 64% in favor, but Bosnian Serbs boycotted this referendum.

\(^{112}\) In literature, Bosniaks are also widely used instead of Bosnian Muslims, simply Bosnians.

Turkey prioritized the Bosnian war in its Balkan foreign policy agenda. During the first half of the 1990s, the Balkans was perceived like Bosnia and others in the minds of many Turkish officials and ordinary citizens.\textsuperscript{114}

In this new period, it can be pointed out that Turkey’s priorities in the Bosnian war were to put an end to the ongoing massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to prevent the war from spreading to other regional countries like Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia Sandjak and Vojvodina.\textsuperscript{115} To succeed, Turkey relied on multilateralism and legality in its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{116} Although some expected from Turkey to undertake a unilateral military intervention in the Bosnian war, the country attached great importance to acting in tandem with the international community, particularly with its western allies.

3.3.1 Diplomatic Initiatives of Turkey

When war intensified in early April 1992, Turkey launched intensive diplomatic initiatives in its both bilateral relations with other states and multilateral ones in the framework of some prominent international organizations such as the UN, the OIC, the CSCE, and NATO.

On 16-22 April 1992, a Turkish delegation paid a visit to Belgrade and Sarajevo to meet political officials of conflicting parties including Foreign Minister of Serbia and the heads of the observing missions of the EC and the CSCE. While there, Turkey saw the deteriorating conditions on the ground and directly conveyed its concerns about what was happening in the region.\textsuperscript{117} Representative of Turkey in this visit, Ambassador Ömer Ersun clearly stated that the fighting in Yugoslavia was precipitated by Serbian nationalism that began

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Şule Kut, “Turkish Policy toward the Balkans,” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, eds., \textit{Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy} (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), pp. 74-91, p. 82.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Duygu Bozoğlu Sezer, “Implications For Turkey’s Relations with Western Europe,” in Mathias Jopp, ed., “The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe’s Foreign Relations,” Chaillot Papers, No.17 (October 1994), p.45.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Mustafa Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security,” p. 203.
\end{itemize}
with the Milosevic administration’s rise in 1987. Thus, the key to put an end to this bloody fighting in this country was with Serbian leadership, the main party responsible for the ongoing crisis in the region. Ambassador Ersun also drew the international attention to the risk that this war in Bosnia-Herzegovina could spread to Kosovo, and might trigger a mass migration of people. If that happened, Turkey could not remain indifferent to the suffering of Bosnian people. The Turkish ambassador also warned the Serbian leadership that they would face international isolation if they did not bring an end to the ongoing brutality against Bosnian Croats and Muslims.

Thanks to this week-long visit, Turkey determined that the current fighting was not a civil war but a war waged by Bosnian Serbs, backed by the Belgrade administration, against Croats and Bosniaks. In this sense, Turkey tried to convince the international community to deter aggression by taking all necessary measures including military actions to bring peace to the region. In this manner, Turkey focused on bringing Bosnian suffering to the attention of the international community.

On 5 May 1992, Turkey asked the UN to safeguard the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the chair of the committee of ministers, then Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin pointed out the importance of protecting the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey, furthermore, had close contact with the leaders of Western and Islamic countries to exchange views about resolutions, and take concrete steps to stop violence in Bosnia. On 30 April 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina joined the CSCE as a result of Turkey’s diplomatic efforts. On 10 June 1992, the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE demanded that the UN would take necessary measures to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This included military intervention.

In addition to European institutions, Turkey regarded the Organization of the Islamic Conference (the OIC) as an important mechanism for Islamic countries to act together on the Bosnian issue. This joint action by majority

Muslim nations would lead the international community to take more decisive measures. In this regard, having the rotational presidency of the OIC, Turkey called on an extra-ordinary meeting among foreign ministers in Istanbul. During the meeting on 17-18 June 1992, foreign ministers from fifteen OIC member states demanded for taking all necessary measures, including military intervention against Serbia, within the framework of the UN. This meeting revealed Muslim sentiments about the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{120}

Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina also worked together at some international summits. One such meeting was the CSCE Helsinki Summit held on 9-10 July 1992. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin and Bosnian President Izetbegovic took the same flight to Helsinki. Even though the Summit’s final document did not properly cover the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it became an important meeting in which the crisis has been comprehensively discussed.\textsuperscript{121} In this summit, the Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel undertook bilateral meetings with some leaders of participant states to express Turkey’s concerns. In his meeting with US President George Bush, Demirel described the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a problem between Serbia and the world, not a problem between Turkey and Serbia or between the USA and Serbia. In this regard, he expressed a need for UN or NATO intervention as in the case of the Gulf War (1990-1991) to stop bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{122} The Council of Foreign Ministers of NATO ultimately decided to establish a NATO fleet in the Adriatic Sea to monitor sanctions against Serbia and humanitarian aid to Bosnia Herzegovina. Turkey contributed a frigate to this operation.\textsuperscript{123}

At the same time, Turkey presented a “Plan of Action for Bosnia” that covered both diplomatic and military measures to the permanent representatives of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The proposal had two parts. The first


\textsuperscript{121} Şule Kut, “Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina,” p.302.


included disarming Serbian militants, monitoring Serbian prisons by the UN officials, preventing Serbia from supporting Serbian militants, and bringing the responsible officials before international courts. The second part of the plan stipulated a limited military intervention through air bombardment, which targeted some areas controlled by Serbian militia in case diplomatic overtures failed to stop ongoing aggression.¹²⁴

Besides its own efforts before some international organizations of which it is a member to find a lasting solution for the Bosnian problem, Turkey was also invited to some initiatives of the EC of which it has not been member yet. One of such diplomatic initiatives was the London Conference held on 26-28 August 1992. The EC, at the request of the Security Council, organized this conference to find a comprehensive solution to the Bosnian crisis by setting the stage for reaching an agreement among the representatives of former Yugoslavia, the EC and other relevant parties. While it did not bring out a final compromise for reaching a lasting solution, it was a positive development of this conference that the EC and other international organizations began to concentrate on efforts that would relieve the ongoing suffering of Bosnia rather than only that of Croatia. In that sense, the conference was an important step not only for bringing the Bosnian case to the higher agenda of international community, but also for perceiving the crisis an international problem that must be addressed through a broader consensus among international actors.¹²⁵ Turkey’s invitation to the London Conference was an important development with respect to regarding Turkey’s constructive role as an indispensable factor in dealing with the problem in the Europe.

As a consequence of all these diplomatic efforts and escalating suffering of Bosnian people, on 9 October 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 781, which prohibited all military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina except those undertaken within the framework of the UN, and for humanitarian aid. With this resolution, UNPROFOR assumed the role of enforcing the ban. The UN also


¹²⁵ Şule Kut, “Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina,” p. 305.
requested that states give technical support to UNPROFOR on this mission.\textsuperscript{126} This resolution adopted by the UN was in line with Turkey's long-standing diplomatic initiatives.

Due to the failure of the international community to implement a no-fly zone and to achieve to avert the bloodshed in Bosnia, Turkey embarked on other regional initiatives. Turkey organized a Balkan Conference in Istanbul on 25 November 1992. Participants included the foreign ministers of Balkan states with the exception of Yugoslavia and Greece. Having objectives of discussing the military intervention and the probability of spreading war to other regional countries, Turkey undertook this regional initiative as a response to the ineffectiveness current solutions.\textsuperscript{127} However, many of the participating states were unwilling to use military force, even as they supported the continuation of diplomatic efforts.

To prevent the escalation of conflict, the UN Security Council (UNSC) had issued an arms embargo against Yugoslavia through Resolution 713 on 25 September 1991. Instead of mitigating the ever intensifying conflicts in Yugoslavia, the policy left Bosnian Muslims vulnerable to further attacks because Serbia had enough military power and were able to support the Bosnian Serbs in this fighting. As the diplomatic initiatives that Turkey made in diverse international platforms, mentioned above in detail, did not bring about satisfying results concerning military action to deter Serbian aggression, Turkey began to lobby members of the OIC and the UNSC to lift the arms embargo against Bosniaks.\textsuperscript{128}

At a meeting of the OIC in Karachi in April 1993, Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin argued the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina prevented Bosnian people from defending themselves against massacre. He called for terminating the arms embargo and expressed this mission as a moral responsibility


\textsuperscript{128} Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, \textit{Turkey, Germany and the Wars in Yugoslavia: A Search for Reconstruction of State Identities}, p. 190.
of the world. At the end of the Summit, members unanimously adopted a joint proposal that underlined the necessity of lifting the arms embargo, called on the UNSC to take necessary measures, including military intervention, encouraged members of OIC to terminate economic relations with Serbia and Montenegro, and demanded the international community to prevent the arms transfer to Yugoslavia.129

Moreover, until the end of the conflict in late 1995, President Demirel130 gave efforts on lifting the unfair arms embargo by sending letters to the members of the Security Council in late July 1993. He also attempted to convince the US to take a leadership role in December 1993. Despite some reports about Turkey’s violation of the embargo, the country took cautious and careful steps to lift the restrictions by itself.131

Since peaceful means failed to deter Serbian aggression against Bosnia, a strong expectation emerged that the next step would be military intervention against Serbian targets. Turkey and Bosnia thus presented a proposal to the UN General Assembly that advocated international military intervention if Serbian brutality could not be stopped. On December 18, 1992, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/121, which denounced Serbian inhumane actions, emphasized the rights of Bosnian people to defend themselves, and demanded the Security Council to decide on military intervention if Serbian aggression did not stop by 15 January 1993. This resolution was the closest one to Turkey’s position until that time.132

Taking part in a probable military action against Serbian brutality, Turkish parliament passed a motion that would allow the government to send troops abroad, especially for Bosnia and Somalia. Then, Turkey concentrated its efforts to convince international community, particularly its western allies and some

129 “Türkiye Çatışmaların Ortasında”, Milliyet, 28 April 1993
130 Following the unexpected death of President Turgut Özal on 17 April 1993, Turkish Parliament elected Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel as the new president.
131 Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, Turkey, Germany and the Wars in Yugoslavia: A Search for Reconstruction of State Identities, pp. 191-192.
regional countries with which it had cordial relations during that period, to implement such a military operation against Serbian side.

With this objective, the then head of state Turgut Özal made some diplomatic attempts particularly in his official visits to the USA and some regional countries. When Özal held a visit to the USA on early days of February 1993, as a response to a question asked about Turkey’s demands from the USA he expressed the necessity of a military operation with ground troops and if necessary an air attack. Also, he underlined the importance of the UN to be more decisiveness on this issue, and preparing the ground for establishing a no-fly zone.133 Although the USA had not yet been engaged with the crisis at the time of this visit, newly elected US president Bill Clinton presented to the President Özal a general framework on the new US policy towards Bosnia, to some extent, satisfying the demands of Turkey.134 As far as reflected the details of this policy to public opinion, Özal came back to Turkey with the hope that the USA would pursue an active and determined foreign policy against Serbian aggression. Even though there did not exist any proof of conducting a military action in a short period of time, Özal believed that the USA could have taken a further step towards a military action after the failures of diplomatic solutions.135

In addition that, Özal went for a Balkan tour to put out the feelers of some regional countries, such as Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia with which Turkey had good relations, on a possible military operation towards Bosnia. Although Bulgaria and Turkey had a similar approach on dissolution of the Bosnian problem, they fell apart on how to solve this problem. In contrast to Turkey, Bulgaria insisted on peaceful remedies and objected to a probable military intervention towards Yugoslavia, especially undertaken by regional countries in spite of the fact that it criticized and even condemned the Serbian atrocities.136 However, Albania and Macedonia displayed their support on a

133 Özal’ın ABD ziyareti, Milliyet, 02.03.1993; “Özal’a protestolu karşılaştırmaları,” Milliyet, 02.03.1993.
military intervention because they concerned the extension of the crisis towards their borders it was not prevented as soon as possible.  

As a result of all these initiatives both Turkey and other influential actors of international system, the UNSC adopted the Resolution 816, on 31 March 1993, for implementing the no-fly-zone decision taken before in October 1992. Upon this decision Turkey contributed with its air forces to the operations of NATO for implementing no-fly-zone over Bosnia. In coming years, Turkey welcomed and contributed to international military measures adopted by both the UN and NATO.

It should be also stated that reaching an agreement between Bosnian Muslims and Croats was an important factor on that Western powers pursued more assertive and active foreign policies towards this problem. Bosnian Muslims and Croats ended their conflicts with each other, and signed a ceasefire agreement on the 18th of March, 1994. This was followed by the establishment of Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina between two communities with the encouragement of Germany, Turkey and the USA. Influence of Turkey and Germany over Bosniaks and Croats, respectively, and the pressure of a super power like USA brought two conflicting parties on the table. The resolution of the conflict between Croats and Muslims drew the international attention over the Serbian side and exerted pressure on Bosnian Serbs to join this peace process. On the contrary, they heightened their aggression against Bosniaks and Croats. As a result of all these failed peace initiatives, Bosnian Serbs faced a comprehensive military operation of NATO in 1995 in which Turkish fighter jets actively participate.

Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives demonstrate what extent an active role Turkey assumed in the resolution of the crisis. Although addressing the problem through peaceful ways were prioritized, increasing number of civilian killings and

---

the failure in taking deterrent measures against this carnage led Turkey to become more engaged into this problem. After the loss of hope in preventing the ongoing atrocities against civilians through peaceful means, Turkey brought up the military option in its diplomatic initiatives. At the same time, Turkey’s these policies and initiatives were intensely discussed in its domestic politics. Then President Turgut Özal and opponent parties conveyed their objections and criticisms towards the policies that the government followed during the crisis. As the public pressure was one of the important factors in shaping Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention in the case of Bosnia, it is necessary to touch upon the attitudes and statements of the then opposition parties and the President Özal to Turkey’s policies towards the Bosnian issue.

3.3.2 Turkey’s Domestic Politics and the Bosnian Crisis

According to Turkey’s 1982 Constitution, the government bears the responsibility of determining and shaping foreign policy. In that sense, the criticisms and remarks of the president and the opposition parties can be considered as the political pressures to some extent over the government. That’s why, Turkish governments have prudently conducted their foreign policy over the years, particularly during extraordinary times of war, by establishing a healthy balance between domestic and international pressure. In contrast, opposition parties could harshly criticize the government about its cautious and careful foreign policy.

From this point of view, during the crisis of Bosnia, it can be easily argued that the political parties in power refrained from exercising unilateral coercive action against Serbian cruelty. Rather, they preferred to work together with major international actors. On the other hand, some opposition parties accused the government of withholding support for the Bosnian people and neglecting their suffering by not pursuing an active policy. These debates occurred during Parliamentary sessions held on the Bosnian issue.

One opposition party that harshly criticized the government policy was the Welfare Party (RP), which advocated unilateral military force in Serbia. Because the party considered fighting in the region as a war between Muslims and
Christians, it called the government to give logistical support to Bosnian Muslims and unilaterally violate the arms embargo. Early on the conflict, RP member Mustafa Bağ, stated that Turkey must actively support its Bosnian brothers. He regarded it as a human, Islamic, and historical responsibility. He argued that, just as Indian Muslims financially supported Turkey in its Independence War of 1919-1922, Turkey ought to take serious measures and to act in the spirit of the 13th century Ottoman Sultans, Osman Gazi and Sultan Murat. Similarly, Necmettin Erbakan, the chairman of the RP, considered the conflict in Bosnia as a war conducted by Zionists and Christians to wipe out the Muslim population from the region. Thus, Turkey must closely cooperate with Islamic countries rather than attempt to convince Western powers to address the situation.

Another criticism of the government came from the Motherland Party (ANAP), which did not consider the Bosnian war as one between Islam and Christianity. Vehbi Dinçerler, the group’s speaker, described the war as an atrocity rather than as a conflict among religions. He referred to a letter written by a Christian bishop about Serbian aggression against innocent Bosnian people, and urged the international community to take action. In addition, he advised the government to concentrate its efforts on a multilateral approach. For him, Turkey should not waste its time persuading the CSCE or the UN for deploying UNPROFOR; instead, it should focus on military action that would be carried out within the framework of the UNSC or NATO.

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), by contrast, viewed the Bosnian war as an attack against Bosnian Muslims by those who have Crusader mindsets. The chairman of the party, Alparslan Türkеş declared that Turkish and Muslim peoples were not alone in Bosnia. God and the Turkish nation would safeguard them. According to Türkеş, if the massacre against Bosniaks did not stop, Turkish volunteers would go and fight against cruel Serbs in Bosnia.

---

142 MHP replaced the Nationalist Work Party in January 1993.
late 1994, Türkeş shifted from his previous radical stance toward support of an international political solution.\textsuperscript{144}

The Leader of the Democratic Leftist Party (DSP), Bülent Ecevit pointed out Turkey’s lack of a definite Balkan policy, even though Turkey itself was a Balkan country. While he opposed unilateral action, he supported Turkey’s multilateral attempts to deal with the conflict. Furthermore, he argued that Turkey should send weapons to the Bosnian people to defend themselves because international community would not oppose to such kind of policy in the then international conjecture. In his view, the country had significant interests in Bosnia because of the millions of Bosniaks that resided in Turkey. Turkey had to lead diplomatic efforts on Bosnia.\textsuperscript{145}

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) approached the matter from a different perspective. During a visit to Sarajova amidst the intensifying war in late 1992, chairman Deniz Baykal emphasized the peaceful coexistence between different religions and races for almost 500 years in the Ottoman era. He also proposed defending the Bosniaks and intervening with the international community to establish peace and security in the region.\textsuperscript{146}

Turgut Özal, the head of state until April 1993, was also critical of the Turkish government over Bosnian policy. He believed that Turkey had to pursue a more active and assertive foreign policy, given the country’s historical and moral responsibility. In his view, the US was the only power to lead international interventions in Yugoslavia. Accordingly, Turkey had to convince this powerful ally to lead a military operation. When he held an official visit to the US in January 1993, he proposed sending Turkish ground forces to Bosnia if the US provided an air operation. On the other hand, he described the US attitude toward

\textsuperscript{144} Birgül Demırtaş Coşkun, \textit{Turkey, Germany and the Wars in Yugoslavia: A Search for Reconstruction of State Identities}, p.208.


Bosnia as a double standard. Though similar conditions existed in Iraq and Bosnia, the USA took military action in one situation and not the other.  

During the period of Özal presidency, as many other domestic issues, there emerged some tensions in determining Turkey’s policy towards the resolution of Bosnian problem between Presidency and Government. From time to time, the leaders of two ruling parties Süleyman Demirel and Erdal İnönü gave some such statements that the government had a responsibility in shaping and implementing foreign policy, Turkish President could not put Turkey into a binding engagement without the consent of the government. Otherwise, his commitments made in these official visits would not mean anything for Turkey. In addition to these discursive criticisms conveyed to Özal, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin did not attend to the official visits of President Özal to USA and some Balkan countries in 1993. This was interpreted as an existence of a conflict between government and presidency. Acts of the ruling parties with domestic political calculations in such an issue like Bosnian problem was criticized by many experts due to fact that it had a potential to endanger Turkey’s interest and image abroad.  

Besides political discussions on Bosnia, public reaction against Serbian cruelty and indifference of international community to some extent had an impact over Turkey’s policy because ruling parties must take into account the reactions of public in order to keep the public support behind them. In a circumstance in which public outrage blew up against the massacre of Bosnian people with whom Turkish people felt close bond, Turkish decision-makers could not have had a risk of losing public support as a result of contradicting with its public opinion. Many protests against Serbian cruelty were organized in different parts of Turkey, thousands of criticizing letters were sent to then Secretary General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali who did not able to stop the ongoing fighting in Bosnia, thousands of people joined into signature campaigns organized for doing

something to end the massacre against Bosnians, and so on. All these show the sensitivity of Turkish people on the atrocity of Bosnian people.

These pressures coming in diverse forms from domestic public opinion had a considerable impact over Turkish decision makers. However, they had to take into account Turkey’s capabilities and international reactions on addressing the problem. Therefore, they had to adopt a prudent foreign policy that balanced both the expectation of domestic public opinion and the matters of Turkey’s capabilities and international reactions towards the Bosnian issue. This prudency was seemed in the statements of the government members. Between April 1992 and March 1996 four coalition governments mainly formed by the True Path Party (DYP) and Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP) governed Turkey. During the Parliament’s extraordinary session on Bosnia in August 1992, Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin gave a speech about Turkey’s response to the Bosnian crisis. He not only criticized opposition parties for their irresponsible charges against the government, but he also stated that Turkey did what was necessary to deal with the problem. He drew the attention of the parliaments to the fact that reaching a lasting peace in the region was only possible with the cooperation of international actors. As a result, Turkey had given efforts to solve this problem in international consensus by playing an active role to bring the issue into the agenda of international organizations.

When the general attitudes of ruling and opposition parties are assessed, it appears that all of them had a consensus on which Turkey should pursue an active policy and engage into this problem in reaching a lasting solution. However, they had different views on what extent Turkey should pursue an active policy, and engage into the problem. Opposition parties demanded more active policy and a leading role that Turkey should follow, and that Turkey should resolve the problem by acting together with international community. While RP and MHP made a remark on which Turkey was to take a unilateral military action if it was

---


151 SHP united with CHP in their joint congress on 18 February 1995.

necessary, other opposition parties generally expressed that an international military intervention in which Turkey actively participated was to be implemented. The then ruling parties, however, stated that they tried to do its best for convincing international community to carry out a military action against Serbs, and for Turkey undertaking a unilateral military action seemed impossible. Instead, they argued that handling this issue legally in international level was more useful for Turkey.

3.3.3 Turkey’s Role in the Implementation of Humanitarian Intervention

Turkey played an important role in the implementation of humanitarian intervention to Bosnia. To participate in an international military coalition, Turkey had to establish a legal basis in line with Article 92 of its constitution. The UNSC decision to intervene with military force in Somalia encouraged the Turkish government to seek authority from Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) to send troops abroad. In December 1992, Parliament gave the government authority to deploy armed forces abroad in order to implement the prospective decisions of the UNSC that would undertake military interventions in Bosnia and Somalia.\(^{153}\)

Up to that point, the most concrete step the UNSC took was Resolution 816, which authorized a no-fly zone on 31 March 1993.\(^{154}\) NATO assumed the role of implementing this resolution and called on Turkey to contribute to its mission. Upon the request from NATO, Turkey provided 18 war planes to NATO’s “Operation Deny Flight” which enforced a no-fly-zone decision over Bosnia-Herzegovina’s airspace. Despite the lateness of the operation, Turkey regarded it as better late than never.\(^{155}\) The implementation of such a critical decision that was expected to deter and restrain Serbian side and Turkey’s active participation in that international action were perceived by both domestic and international public opinion as a success of Ankara.

Regional rivals like Greece and Bulgaria were concerned with Turkey’s participation in the no-fly zone and declared to prevent Turkish air forces from


\(^{154}\) “Sırp Uçaklarını Düştürmeye Izin”, Milliyet, 02.04.1993.

\(^{155}\) Şule Kut, “Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina,” p. 311.
using their airspace to reach Bosnia.\textsuperscript{156} While Greece seemed to be supporting Serbian side in the Bosnian clash due to such reasons like religious affinity and some political interests, particularly in preventing the possible expansion of Turkey’s influence over the region, Bulgaria did not take a tough position as much as that of Greece. It can be easily said that there were just different perspectives rather conflicting attitudes between Turkey and Bulgaria in the way of resolution of the Bosnian issue.

Bulgaria, one of Turkey’s neighboring countries en route to Europe, objected to any military intervention in the Balkans even though it harshly criticized the Serbian aggression in Bosnia, and demanded to do something to halt such a humanitarian crisis in the region. Because of probable risks over its own security and stability, Bulgaria was worried about a prospective military intervention in the region with which Bulgaria had a boundary with Yugoslavia. Additionally, Bulgaria was concerned with possible dangers of eroding the regional balance of power. Therefore, Bulgaria was unwilling to support or take part into such a military intervention in the region.\textsuperscript{157}

In that sense, it was not surprise to see that Turkey could not take support of Bulgaria in its participation into a military operation against Serbian side. For Turkey, Bulgaria as well as Greece was of a geo-strategic importance in sending Turkish troops to Bosnia because it was located in the nexus of Turkey and Bosnia. Additionally, Turkish jets needed Bulgarian airspace to reach Bosnia. However, Bulgaria rejected Turkey’s demands concerning with the military intervention.\textsuperscript{158}

Another neighboring country, Greece pursued a pro-Serbian policy during the crisis. For Greece, a military intervention undertaken in favor of the Muslim populations in the region could have paved the way for Turkey’s rising influence over the Muslim populations. Such a development would not be easily conceded.

\textsuperscript{156}“Türk Jetleri Bosna’ya,” Milliyet, 17.04.1993.
\textsuperscript{158}Ibid. When Turkey's then president, Turgut Özal, held a visit to Bulgaria within the framework of his Balkan tour in February 1993, he asked the support of Bulgaria if Turkey needed the use of Bulgarian territory in dispatching Turkey’s troops to Bosnia. Due to the above mentioned reasons, Bulgaria rejected such demands of Turkey.
by Greece. It had a great concern that if Turkey had been a leading actor in a military intervention in Bosnia, this would have made the expansion of its influence in the Balkans unavoidable. It can be also stated that such discourses like ‘Turkish World from Adriatic to China’ mostly used by Turkish decision makers particularly after the end of the Cold War contributed to the increase of anti-Turkey campaign in the region, especially among Orthodox Christians. Several states in the region including Greece occasionally claimed that Turkey gave efforts of creating ‘a Muslim Crescent’ by giving efforts of bringing all Muslims together in the region. In this regard, Greece generally harshly criticized Turkey’s initiatives to persuade international community to implement a military intervention in Bosnia.159

Furthermore, like Greece, Yugoslavia and Russia accused Turkey of trying to achieve its imperial ambitions by demanding a military solution to the Bosnian issue. Yugoslavia considered Turkey’s attempts as interference into its own domestic affairs.160 However, some other regional countries like Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia supported Turkey’s Bosnia policy that would deter Serbian aggression, and ensure peace and security in the region.161

This regional divergence on Turkey’s policy and its participation to an international military coalition caused some concerns in international level as well. In this regard, it was a striking point that the UN opposed to the participation of Turkey’s ground forces in the UNPROFOR mission until March 1994. Although the UN put forward such some plausible reasons that its impartiality would be undermined with the participation of regional powers into its military mission, and so some complications and security risks would emerge, the mission still needed approximately 10,000 additional soldiers. Since participating states were unwilling to assign more troops for Bosnia mission, the UN changed its

previous policy and invited Turkey to participate. In response, Turkey sent nearly 1,500 troops and a submarine that enforced the embargo on Yugoslavia.

Nonetheless, the military measure did little to deter Serbian side those during 1993. As a result, with the beginning of 1994, the international community hinted on the signs of pursuing more assertive and decisive policy against the Serbian aggression. On February 28, 1994, four Serbian jets violating the no-fly zone decision of the UN were shot down by the NATO forces. In addition, when Serbian forces attacked Gorazde- one of the six UN-designated safe areas, NATO bombed Serbian targets on 10 April 1994. Turkish decision makers welcomed NATO’s response and supported these military operations. During the 1994, NATO continued its military campaign in different scale against Serbian targets.

The summer of 1995 was a turning point for the war. Bosnian Serbs had intensified its aggression and captured two UN-designated safe areas in Bosnia-Srebrenica and Zepa, and they massacred around 7,000 people there. In turn, Western military officials held a meeting in London to discuss the issue on 20-21 July 1995. They gave an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs with the demands of not attacking Gorazde, the most vulnerable of the remaining safe areas in Bosnia.

The fall of Srebrenica, one of the six safe areas proclaimed by the UN, and the following deaths of thousands of innocent people pushed Turkish politicians to discuss better ways to safeguard the security of the Bosnian people. In that sense, lifting the arms embargo put by the UN with the Security Council Resolution 713 in September 1991 on the former Yugoslavia appeared as a remedy to ensure the self-defense of Bosnian people. Vehbi Dinçerler, then president of the Research Commission of TGNA, pointed out the fact that Russia had a decision of lifting its arms embargo to Yugoslavia. He, therefore, stated that

---

162 Sami Kohen, “Bosna’ya asker göndermek iyı ama…”, Milliyet, 09.03.1994.
164 “NATO 4 Sırp Uçağını düştü,” Milliyet, 01.03.1994.
Turkey should have taken a decision for lifting this embargo for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Particularly, Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, accused the UN of massacring those in Srebrenica because Bosnian people trusted the UN to protect Bosnia, and so handed over their weapons to UN soldiers.

Similarly, in Turkish domestic public opinion, there were intense pressures and expectations on doing something to protect Bosnian people from Serbian aggression. Some Turkish opposition parties criticized the UN for not fulfilling its responsibility of protecting Bosnian people. Abdullah Gül, vice-president of the Wealth Party (RP), emphasized the main responsibility of Boutros Ghali, the Secretary General of the UN, in preventing bloodshed in Bosnia. Therefore, he stated that welcoming B. Ghali in his visit to Turkey would hurt the public conscience. In the same way, some members of the government accused the UN of not protecting the Bosnian people.

In August, the ultimatum about Gorazde was extended to the remaining safe areas including Sarajevo. Bosnian Serbs dismissed the warnings of the UN and NATO. They shelled Sarajevo several times, killing tens of lives and wounding a hundred others. In retaliation, NATO executed a month-long air operation against Serbian targets. Turkey heavily supported and welcomed these military strikes of NATO even though it regarded these military attacks as belated actions. Tansu Çiller, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, stated that Turkey was ready to contribute to any such a military operation. She also said that Turkey provided 1500 soldiers, 10 fighter jets, and one frigate to the international coalition force for Bosnia and actively participated into this military intervention as well as the USA, France and some other countries. However, it was not

surprise to see that some countries like Russia, Greece, and Yugoslavia condemned this NATO operation against Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{171}

Thanks to these comprehensive military attacks, diplomatic initiatives gained new impetus for reaching a lasting solution. Izetbegovic and US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrook visited Ankara, and demanded Turkey contribute to the final settlement. Holbrooke wanted Turkey to use its influence over Bosnian Muslims to maintain peace talks.\textsuperscript{172} He also asked that Turkey participate in any peace operation to Bosnia. Turkish President Süleyman Demirel welcomed these overtures, assessing the diplomatic initiatives as a great chance for all concerning parties. While he was pleased with the military strike of NATO for which Turkey had called for a long time, he stated that Belgrade should not miss this opportunity for a solution.\textsuperscript{173}

As a result of these military campaigns and diplomatic pressures, the conflicting parties agreed to a cease-fire at the end of September in 1995 and then reached a peace agreement, known as the Dayton Accords on 14 December 1995. Thus a violent conflict having engulfed the Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, causing the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and the displacement of millions of people, was stopped. Following the Dayton Peace Agreement, to guarantee the end of conflicts between belligerent parties NATO-led the Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed in December 1995 for one-year period. As part of IFOR, 60,000 peacekeepers were provided by NATO. Turkey participated in this mission in brigade level. One year later, in December 1996, IFOR was replaced by SFOR (Stabilization Force), and Turkish forces began to operate under SFOR. In line with the improving situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a reduction was made in the size of SFOR personnel, and so Turkey gradually downsized its brigade to battalion level. In December 2004, European Union assumed this stabilization role in the name of EUFOR Althea Operation. Turkey


\textsuperscript{172} Sami Kohen, “Türkiye’nin Bosna İçinde Yeni Rolü,” Milliyet, 05.09.1995.

contributed this EU Force with “with a total number of 243 personnel comprised of one maneuver company and five Liaison/Observation Teams”.174

3.4 Assessment of Turkey’s Approach to Humanitarian Intervention for Bosnia

In the case of Bosnia, Turkey’s foreign policy shifted from status-quo oriented to revisionist one in accordance with the conjectural changes during the crisis. In the start of the crisis, Turkey regarded Yugoslavia as the sovereign authority over the Bosnian territory. This followed Turkey’s traditional foreign policy stance, which respected the sovereign right of states and territorial integrity. Therefore, to preserve its friendly relations with Yugoslavia, Turkey dealt with the problems through peaceful ways without undermining the regional status quo and territorial integrity of regional states.

In spite of Turkey’s sensitivity on preserving territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the international community, led by some influential European actors, adopted a different foreign policy stance toward Yugoslavia. Further deterioration of the situation and increasing death toll in various regions of Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia, pushed the international community to take drastic actions. This included recognizing the independence of the former federated states of Yugoslavia, which made its dissolution inevitable. These reactions of the international community and the rising humanitarian crisis both caused Turkey to move from its previously prudent foreign policy to a pro-interventionist one. Moreover, Turkish policy-makers were also under pressure by public opinion to pursue an active foreign policy through which Turkey was expected to expand its influence from the Balkans to Central Asia in the post-Cold War era. Together, these factors pushed Turkey to engage in the situation and safeguard the lives of Bosnian Muslims against Serbian aggression. Thus, Turkey adopted a policy

---

recognizing other federated states of Yugoslavia as independent and sovereign countries.

In the initial phases of the crisis, Turkey displayed a prudent stance towards the policies that would strain the relations with Yugoslavia and erode its territorial integrity. Among the reasons behind this cautious stance, it can be pointed out that the probable changing the balance of power in the region and emerging an uncertainty that would lead to further problems in the region. From this point of view, as pluralist understanding argued, undermining sovereignty or political independence of a state could constitute a threat to regional or international peace and security. Such a problem could be followed by some conflicts or even wars in regional and international levels. Therefore, Turkey’s initial prudent foreign policy that prioritized the dialogue and diplomacy in addressing the problem by keeping its good relations with the Serbian authority could be considered on the basis of the concerns that the pluralist understanding setting forward against implementing military operations towards a sovereign state.

However, upon reaching the crisis to the level of gross, systematic and large-scale violations of human rights because of the Serbian brutality, Turkey and its international counterparts took some measures such as recognizing the independences of former federated states and imposing embargoes on Serbian governance that were supposed to deter Serbian side from its cruel activities. Taking these steps by international community including Turkey indicates the fact that a matter of human rights are not regarded as a local problem, but an international one. Turkey as well as some other concerning states preferred to deteriorate its relations with Yugoslavia rather than to keep its good relations in pursuit of safeguarding its political and economic gains with a country like Yugoslavia that had not directly constituted a threat to Turkey’s security and interests in the region until that time. It was an important development in terms of promoting and protecting human rights in international level that international community acted against the brutal activities of Serbian authority in spite of some material costs to them.
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that there exist some diverse instruments such as diplomatic pressures or a military intervention in acting against the massive killings of innocent people. While states in general posed some diplomatic pressures over other states due to this sort of brutal activities, they could not demonstrate similar willingness on stopping or averting the violations of human rights in conducting a military intervention. Due to the much higher political and economic costs of a military intervention than diplomatic pressures\textsuperscript{175}, states do not always decide on a military intervention for the humanitarian crisis all around the world. Although this can be assessed as a double-standard, this seems to be a reality of current international relations.

As examined in detail in the theoretical part, state sovereignty was a social reality that its people and other states considered a sovereign entity as a legitimate authority over a territory. This recognition of sovereignty and its impact on international relations were determined in international law. In line with these rules and norms, states decide on whether to recognize or not the sovereignty of a state over a territory and people. After recognizing sovereignty for a state, it seems impossible to withdraw its recognition according to international law.\textsuperscript{176} In this sense, it is the interesting point that Turkey and other Western allies recognized the independences of former federated states of Yugoslavia as a sovereign authority over their territory and people. While it means that new states emerged in the Balkans, it seem to be also that international community revised and even undermined the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. Such a decision was upheld by international community in a circumstance in which there was no any change on the binding rules of international law concerning state sovereignty, particularly in the UN Charter. The only change was in the perceptions and attitudes of decision makers to recognize new entities as sovereign authorities. In the case of Bosnia and other federated states, state sovereignty concerning Yugoslavia were reinterpreted and revised in line with the changes in the conditions of the conflict.

\textsuperscript{175} Conducting a military operation against a state or a region may need billions of dollars or cause the loss of thousands of soldiers’ lives.

particularly in humanitarian matters, and the perceptions of decision makers of other states.

In other words, upon rising numbers of civilian killings, the matter came to the point of whether the escalation of humanitarian crisis due to the brutal suppression of a sovereign state would undermine its sovereignty right. As it was examined in theoretical part, state sovereignty means not only an authority over a territory and people but also a responsibility to its people. In that sense, it was questioned by international community whether Yugoslavia, a sovereign federal state under the control of Serbian decision-makers, that conducted gross, systematic and large-scale violations of human rights in Bosnia and some other federated states would lose its right of sovereignty. Considering these facts and the theoretical knowledge examined extensively in the previous chapter, it can be argued that the rising humanitarian crisis had a great impact over the decision of international community to recognize the sovereignty for all former federated states of Yugoslavia.

In this regard, Turkey recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a separate political entity. This provided a legal instrument for Turkey to help a sovereign country, Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addressing its problems. Furthermore, increasing attacks by the Yugoslav army and Serbian paramilitary groups against Bosnian civilians were considered by international community, including Turkey, as a threat to international peace and security.

From this point of view, there was some repercussion of Turkey’s demands for multilateral military operation against Serbian government over Western capitals even though its practice was delayed until 1995. Thanks to the rising international pressure, the UNSC adopted several decisions as a response to Serbian aggression. The situation on the ground demanded humanitarian intervention, so Turkey attempted to convince influential international actors to stop the massive killings of the Bosnian people with military force.

The emergence of a humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and the necessity of a military intervention to stop the aggression against Bosnian Muslims became one of the most important subjects in Turkish foreign policy. Everyone supported military force against Serbian aggression, though many discussed whether Turkey
should have undertaken a unilateral military intervention in Bosnia. Although some opposition parties like the Welfare Party (RP) and the National Movement Party (MHP) vigorously advocated Turkey’s unilateral military intervention towards Bosnia, others opposed such actions and argued for an international response.

Having the right of determining and shaping foreign policy in Turkey, the ruling coalition, consisted of True Path Party (DYP) and Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP), followed a more cautious and multilateral foreign policy towards the Bosnian crisis. It can be argued that this prudent policy was to be pursued by these two ruling parties due to their position of responsibility as a government. Even though the government faced considerable pressures from some political circles and public opinion to be more aggressive, it refrained from a unilateral adventure that would make the crisis worse and bring about additional political, economic, and security costs for Turkey.

Multilateralism in Turkish foreign policy helped preventing an escalation of the crisis to the point where Turkey needed to unilaterally intervene. Various reasons can be cited behind this policy. First, the country’s policy on the use of force in Bosnia was affected by Turkey’s experience in Cyprus. In 1974, Turkey—without regard for the reaction of the international community—decided to intervene in Cyprus according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Even though Turkey asserted that this action was conducted according to international law, the country encountered a serious isolation, and received much criticism from the international community. In Bosnian case, Turkey would risk its standing in the international community even much more than that in the case of Cyrus if it intervened without any authorization by the UNSC or consideration of the international response. Therefore, Turkish policymakers more cautiously and prudently responded to the clamor for unilateral intervention from the Turkish and Bosnian public.\(^\text{177}\)

Second, Turkey’s military capabilities were not sufficient for a unilateral use of force towards the Bosnian issue. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina was far from

\(^{177}\) Kemal Kiriçi, “The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour,” p. 246.
Turkey, Turkish war-planes had the capacity of staying almost five minutes in Bosnia without returning to Turkey for more fuel. Turkey did not have any tanker aircraft until 1995, so it needed support from neighboring countries like Bulgaria and Greece to reach the area or superpowers like the US that have enough capability to lead such a military operation. Bosnia-Herzegovina is also not a neighbor country of Turkey to send its troops overnight. Therefore, unilateral military intervention seemed impossible and unfeasible.\footnote{Seyfi Taşhan, \textit{Turkish Daily News}, 29 July 1992; Haluk Geray, “Müdahale Olanaksız,” \textit{Cumhuriyet}, 13 December 1992.}

Third, Turkey has dual images in the Balkans because of the historical legacy of Ottoman Empire. Some regional countries and publics perceived any Turkish initiative as an attempt at neo-Ottomanism. It was another reason of why Turkish decision-makers avoided the suspicion of having a hidden agenda.\footnote{Mustafa Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security,” p. 204.} That’s why Turkey officially regarded the issue as a violation of human rights like genocide and ethnic cleansing than as a conflict between Muslims and Christians. Otherwise, Turkey’s unilateral use of force could have led other regional countries to support Serbia, which could have triggered a regional war.\footnote{Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, \textit{Turkey, Germany and the Wars in Yugoslavia: A Search for Reconstruction of State Identities}, p. 199.}

Fourth, Turkey seemed to be not ready to pay likely material and human costs of a unilateral military operation in Bosnia. It was estimated that Turkey would have had to spend annually $800 million to 1 billion for this mission and lose or injure at least 3000 soldiers. It was doubtful whether Turkish public opinion would have accepted those economic and humanitarian costs.\footnote{Ibid., p. 200.}

For these reasons, Turkey refrained from unilateral military action in Bosnia and acted in a multilateral, realist, and responsible manner with respect of international law. To maintain a secure and stable regional order, Turkey endeavored to draw the attention of international community to the crisis through its various initiatives before influential international organizations. By means of international pressure, it aimed to deter the Serbian aggression and mitigate the
suffering of Bosnian Muslims. By preserving peace and security in the region, Turkey would not only consolidate its political, economic, and security interests but also to meet the expectations of public opinion to safeguard its historical legacy and responsibility in the region.

Turkey’s willingness to undertake a humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia revealed the extent to which Turkey would uphold the main principles of international law like the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries. Because of its fear of pressure from Western allies and its political, economic, and especially military shortcomings on implementing such kind of military actions, Turkey relied on multilateralism both its diplomatic initiatives and the demands for military intervention. This enabled Turkey to pursue its foreign policy in a legal and legitimate way.

Additionally, Turkey’s high engagement with the Bosnian crisis and its support for a humanitarian intervention also resulted from the close social and cultural ties that Turks and Bosnian Muslims had. Both communities shared similar identities and a common historical heritage. That explained why Turkish people pressured their government to act for stopping Serbian aggression and why Turkish decision-makers ultimately decided to support Bosnians with all efforts including military measures. As the constructivist theory asserts, the social dimensions of Turkish foreign policy like cultural ties, mutual discourse of the representatives of two countries and common understanding had an impact on shaping pro-interventionist foreign policy towards Bosnia.

Given the situation, Turkey supported a humanitarian intervention in Bosnia to restore peace and security in the region, and safeguard the lives of Bosnian people. These diverse strategic and humanitarian motives led Turkey to pursue a pro-interventionist policy against Yugoslavia.
CHAPTER 4

TURKEY’S APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE CASE OF KOSOVO

This section examines how Turkey approached to the humanitarian intervention carried out by NATO for Kosovo. As Turkey’s policy towards the crisis was affected by the historical developments of the crisis in Kosovo and the attitudes of international community, particularly Turkey’s Western allies, this part begins with brief information about the historical background of the Kosovo crisis. Then it moves to explain how international community reacted to the crisis, and what steps were taken to handle this problem. In contrast to the case of Bosnia, while Turkey’s western allies displayed much more decisiveness on conducting a humanitarian intervention for Kosovo, Turkey was unwilling to advocate such an intervention until that NATO had a decision to undertake a military intervention. Therefore, it gains importance to explain why international community, particularly western countries, advocated a humanitarian intervention for Kosovo. After analyzing the attitudes of international community, it will be evaluated how Turkey pursued a foreign policy towards the crisis in the light of its diplomatic initiatives and the discussions held in its domestic politics. Finally, Turkey’s own approach to the humanitarian intervention for Kosovo will be assessed.

4.1 Historical Background of the Kosovo Crisis

Constituting a great majority of its population by Albanians, Kosovo was an integral part of Yugoslavia until the Second World War. With the establishment of Communist Yugoslavia, Kosovo exercised a certain degree of autonomy within Serbia. The constitutional amendments of 1974 turned the
governmental system of Yugoslavia into a loose federal system\(^{182}\) and in doing so Kosovo gained “an economic, administrative and cultural autonomy through the establishment of a provincial bank, supreme court, independent administration, free expression of national language and affirmative action for employment in public services”.\(^{183}\) As it was still a part of Serbia in legal and technical terms, Kosovo was in practical terms granted a similar status that other constituent republics had enjoyed before.

In the aftermath of the unfavorable developments in political, economic, and social lives of the country after the death of Tito, generally cited as the strong leader of Yugoslavia, the situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate. Organized massive movements of the Kosovar Albanians in 1981 to demand a republican status for Kosovo as other six ones exercised were brutally crushed by the security forces of the federal state. During the 1980s Kosovar Albanians were in varying degrees exposed to the severe violations of human rights by the federal security forces under the control of nationalist Serbs. With the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy by Serbian leadership in 1989, the ongoing problem reached a new stage of the crisis. As well as a large abuse of human rights, Albanian Kosovars faced rigid discriminatory policies such as massive dismissals from educational, mass media, health care and administrative sectors.\(^{184}\)

Against such kind of heavy pressures of Serbian leadership, they pursued a non-violent resistance to avoid ruthless attacks of the central government in Belgrade and internationalize the Kosovo issue. As a response to the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy and accompanying ruthless practices of Serbian authority, they established a parallel state system through certain set of some institutions such as an elected parliament, and a government led by Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK). Due to both this passive resistance of Kosovars and ongoing fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovo

\[^{182}\] Some experts described this system as a semi-confederal system. See, Corneliu Bjola, *Legitimising the Use of Force in International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics of Intervention* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 91.

\[^{183}\] Ibid.

\[^{184}\] Ibid. p. 93.
problem continued to be an ethnic conflict rather than an armed one until mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{185}

The failures of this passive resistance of Albanians to take international support for reaching their own self-determination, and the exclusion of the problem in Dayton Accords prepared a fertile ground in strengthening of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in coming years. In that sense, it was perceived by Kosovar Albanians within Dayton process that “the international community only understood the language of armed conflict”.\textsuperscript{186} After the settlement of the Bosnian dispute, KLA conducted a series of armed attacks against Serbian security forces and government officials. Serbian harsh response to these attacks led to the intensification of the conflict to the extent that it reminded the human tragedy that had occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina a few years ago.

As of February and March 1998 when Serbian authority decided to halt KLA activities, the first signs of the coming humanitarian disaster in Kosovo appeared. Killing around 80 people who were mostly women, children and elderly people in Drenica in March 1998 became a turning point in the escalation of the crisis. This indiscriminate attack paved the way for mobilizing a great public support for KLA in Kosovo. Acting as a guerilla organization, KLA succeeded on retreating Serbian security forces from some part of Kosovo. However, it should be noted that KLA did not have enough military capacity to completely defeat the well-trained and technologically superior Serbian security forces. Therefore, Serbian security forces used their attacks as a pretext of their brutal offences in Kosovo in guise of combatting terrorism. As a result of these Serbian brutalities, around 2000 Kosovar Albanians lost their lives, many school, houses, and shopping centers were destructed and approximately 400,000 Albanians became homeless between March and October 1998.\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{185} Selver Buldanhoğlu, \textit{The Dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new Interventionism} (M.S. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2003), p. 66.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
With the failures of peaceful and democratic resistance against Serbian pressure over Kosovo, it became inevitable for Kosovar Albanians to shift their support from moderate movements to radical ones. Throughout the process of militarization of the issue, as KLA gained ground and increased its popularity in general public opinion of Kosovo, brutality of Serbian forces intensified. As a result of the failures of diplomatic initiatives to halt ongoing Serbian aggression against Kosovars, Serbia faced a military strike conducted by NATO during 77 days in 1999.

4.2 International Responses to the Kosovo Crisis

With the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, international community seemed to be much more engaging in finding a solution to the conflict that blew up at the heart of Europe. Having experienced a humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia-Herzegovina a few years ago, Western countries as well as Russia instigated several diplomatic initiatives in either bilateral level or multilateral one within the framework of some influential international organizations like the UN, OSCE and also the Contact Group\(^{188}\) in order to prevent the escalation of the problem to the whole region and facing a similar humanitarian disaster having occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Upon the incident in Drenica, the countries of the Contact Group discussed the issue and condemned the Serbian brutal action on 9 March 1998. They called the Serbian authority to withdraw its forces from the province, and to cooperate with international community to deal with the crisis. They also promised to put arms embargo to the conflicting parties and freeze all Serbian funds.\(^{189}\) Following the condemnation of the Contact Group, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1160 on 31 March 1998. The Resolution not only affirmed the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, but also expressed support for establishing “a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration” for

\(^{188}\) The Contact Group is an informal grouping of influential countries including the US, Russia, France, the UK, Germany and Italy. This group came together to find a comprehensive solution to the war and crisis in the Balkans in early 1990s.

\(^{189}\) Corneliu Bjola, *Legitimising the Use of Force in International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics of Intervention*, p. 94.
Kosovo. In addition to that, Serbian authority was warned with “the consideration of additional measures” in case of the failures of peaceful attempts for reaching a solution.\footnote{UNSC Resolution 1160, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1160%281998%29.}

It was the main concern for international community whether the Serbian leadership would heed its warnings through a number of diplomatic initiatives. In May 1998, NATO foreign ministers discussed the possible options for relieving the severe situation in Kosovo. The high ranking officials from the US and Russia gave efforts to convince Serbian administration to put an end to its aggression, and let international observes and humanitarian organizations access to Kosovo. Notwithstanding all diplomatic attempts to address the problem in peaceful ways, Serbian attacks intensified in the summer of 1998. The UN adopted the Resolution 1199 that hinted on a possible military intervention by assessing the situation of Kosovo as a “threat to peace and security in the region”. On the other hand, NATO made some decisions on preparation for an air strike if Serbian side did not comply with the Resolution 1199.\footnote{Corneliu Bjola, Legitimising the Use of Force in International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics of Intervention, p. 94-95.} Increasing pressures of international community and their assertive stance against Serbian aggression got Serbian administration to step back to the negotiation table, and so brought about some agreements between Serbian authorities and US, OSCE and NATO for the solution.

In the light of these agreements and diplomatic pressures it can be argued that the Kosovo issue was not regarded by international community as a domestic problem that only Belgrade had right to settle the issue, but an international problem that international community would not remain indifferent to the plights of the Kosovar Albanians. As the high engagement of international community to the problem helped to bring Serbian side to the negotiation table, it also contributed to the continuation of the conflict by encouraging KLA to exploit the ongoing problem.

Kosovar Albanians were not satisfied with a cease-fire, and aimed at reaching an independent state with the help of NATO thorough its military strike
against Serbian targets. Increasing attacks of KLA paved the way for the harsh retaliation of the Serbian side. This was followed by the deployment of a huge number of Serbian forces in Kosovo. As a result, the peace initiatives and agreement undertaken in the year of 1998 were undermined by the continuation of the violence.

With the beginning of 1999, the violence in Kosovo dramatically increased, which reminded international public opinion of the early stages of the carnage in Bosnia-Herzegovina in between 1992 and 1995. As a consequence of belated military intervention of international community Bosnian people had faced a humanitarian crisis in which thousands of people lost their lives and the millions were displaced. Although the death toll at the beginning of the crisis relatively low in Kosovo, there was an expectation that without international action a similar humanitarian tragedy would occur again in Kosovo. In addition to that, the credibility of Western powers, particularly NATO, began to be questioned on deterring aggressors from resorting an act of violence. Threatening the use of force, and subsequently not undertaking any action by Western powers prompted Milosevic to exert excessive pressures over Kosovar Albanians.

When 45 Albanians were killed by Serbian forces in Racak on 15 January 1999, it necessitated a robust action to be conducted by international community to put an end to the ongoing conflict. As a last attempt to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, the Contact Group and conflicting parties came together in Rambouillet Conference held in February and March of 1999 in order to discuss “the political status of Kosovo, the situation of human rights in the province and the creation of a more robust implementation mechanism”. At the end of the conference, Serbian side refused to sign the agreement proffered by the Contact Group while the Albanian Kosovars signed it with some reservations. The way of

192 Selver Buldanlıoğlu, The Dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new Interventionism, pp. 69-70.
194 Corneliu Bjola, Legitimising the Use of Force in International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics of Intervention, p. 95.
bringing two conflicting sides together to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Kosovo was described by the chief US negotiator Holbrook as “a very legitimate attempt to bring the parties together to force them to agree”. The failure of reaching an agreement in Rambouillet and subsequently increasing tension in Kosovo replaced the diplomatic solution with military measures on 24 March 1999. NATO launched a comprehensive air bombardment that continued during 77 days. Thanks to these military attacks, it became possible to terminate the crisis in Kosovo.

4.3 Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Kosovo Crisis

When the crisis in Kosovo emerged in the early months of 1998, Turkey followed a prudent and cautious foreign policy towards the Kosovo issue. As in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey was in favor of addressing the problem through peaceful ways and avoided the escalation of the problem to the level that regional peace and security would be threatened. For Turkey it was a plausible way of preserving the stability and security in the region that regional status quo must be protected with respect to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of regional states. At the same way rising ethno-religious tensions in the Balkans has a great potential in posing some risks to Turkey’s security and its social, political and economic interests in the Balkans. Turkey, therefore, attached a big importance to maintaining regional peace, security and stability.

There exist several reasons behind of Turkey’s initial cautious policies in the Kosovo issue. First of all, it can be noted that Turkey’s status quo oriented foreign policy in Kosovo problem is a continuation of its traditional patterns of foreign policy. Since the establishment of the republic, Turkey has given an importance to preserve existing boundaries among states, and refrained from following irredentist policies towards the adjacent countries with which Turkey has ethnic or religious affiliations. This principle was also relevant for the Yugoslavia, particularly for Serbia.

---

Secondly, unlike the federated status of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo was an autonomous province of Yugoslavia even though in practice it exercised some rights like an independent country in the pre-1989 period. Although its autonomous status was lifted by Yugoslav federal government, there was a general tendency among many international actors that Kosovo issue was to be regarded within the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia. From this point of view, it would be a risky attempt for Turkey to give support to an independence gained by a community having some differences from the majority of the country’s population because Turkey has dealt with Kurdish nationalist insurgency, known as PKK terrorism, for several decades at that time. Therefore, the success of Kosovar Albanians to own a separate country could set a negative precedent for Kurdish population in Turkey.196

Thirdly, with the end of Cold War, many communities in former Communist region with which Turkey has historical and cultural linkages demanded independence from their federal states. This process promoted the emergence of a misconception in regional public opinion about whether Turkey would consolidate its power in the region. It was possible to see such kind of suspicions even for Turkey’s positive contributions to resolving the problem such as its diplomatic initiatives between conflicting parties. Several regional countries worried about Turkey’s rising influence over the Muslim-Turkic populations.197 This delicate image of Turkey in the region generally pushed Turkey not to engage unilaterally into the regional developments. Considering the existence of a Turkish minority in Kosovo, Turkey’s policies towards mostly Albanian populated region became much more fragile.

Fourthly, having had limited economic and political capabilities to lead a regional order, Turkey was aware of the fact that it would not able to encounter the probable security threats emanating from regional conflicts by itself. It, therefore, determined its position in Kosovo problem by considering the approaches of the global actors, particularly the US, and acted in cooperation with

them. On the other hand, they regarded Turkey as a regional country that has had a considerable influence over the developments of the region. That’s why, the demands and proposals put forward by Turkey should be taken into account in attaining a lasting solution to the conflict.

Fiftly, unlike for Bosniaks, Kosovar Albanians turned their face not just to Turkey, but demanded the helps of other regional countries like Albania with which they have an ethnic linkage and global one like the US. While Bosniaks saw Turkey as a protector against Serbian attacks, Kosovar Albanians did not ascribe a special importance to Turkey as much as Bosniaks did during their crises. Additionally, at that time, Turks in Kosovo were under the pressure of Albanian Kosovars in preserving their own national identities. As Albanians displayed some attitudes that denied Turkish national identities, Turks living in Kosovo complained of ‘dual pressures’ and even assimilation exposed by both Albanians and Serbs.¹⁹⁸

For these reasons, Turkey had to exercise more cautious foreign policy in Kosovo issue than that was pursued in the case of Bosnia. Having limited capability to encounter security threats that targeted to the people remaining in Yugoslavia, regarded as a historical legacy of Ottoman period, Turkey was in favor of forestalling the emerging crisis in Kosovo as soon as possible before its intensification to undesirable level. For Turkey, it seemed to be the best way to safeguard the rights of Muslim population in the Balkans through maintaining peace, security and stability in the region. In that sense, preserving regional status quo and ensuring the respect of territorial integrity of states came to the forefront into Turkish foreign policy agenda.

4.3.1 Diplomatic Initiatives of Turkey

Unlike its highly sensitive foreign policy attitudes throughout the crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, Turkey pursued a moderate and

cautious foreign policy during this crisis in Kosovo occurred between 1998 and 1999 with the impacts of above mentioned reasons. Although Turkey was seen as one of the several destinations where conflicting parties demanded the support for their own political agendas, the influence of Turkey over the solution of Kosovo issue remained limited when it was compared with in the case of Bosnia. The USA and its some influential European allies like the UK, France and Germany played a leading role in coming to the military solution of the crisis. Taking lessons from the prior humanitarian tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they adopted more assertive and interventionist foreign policy towards the Kosovo issue. As being a regional actor that emphasized the inviolability of territorial integrity of states and the need of safeguarding the lives of people in Kosovo, Turkey initially avoided itself from interventionist actions that would undermine territorial unity of Yugoslavia until the failure of diplomatic initiatives to put an end to the ongoing human suffering.

Such prudent and cautious foreign policies of Turkey can be easily recognized in its attitudes, responses and approaches to the demands of Kosovar Albanians. When the leader of Kosovar Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova held a visit to Turkey at the early stages of the crisis on 11 February 1998 and searched for the recognition of their newly-emerged republic, Turkey refused this demand, but promised to give political support to Kosovar Albanians. When another Albanian leader, Bukovic, repeated their demand for the recognition, Turkish officials drew the attention of the public opinion to the legal status of Kosovo as an autonomous region of Serbia.199

With the emergence of the first signs of the conflict in early months of 1998, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem visited Belgrade to discuss this problem and presented a three staged plan to the Serbian authority for overcoming this crisis. This plan covered putting an end to the ongoing bloodshed, implementing the education agreement signed in 1996 with Kosovar Albanians, and giving back of the previous autonomous status of Kosovo. In addition to this plan, Cem stated that Turkey recognized Kosovo as an integral part of

Yugoslavia, and so was in favor of reaching a solution with respect to territorial unity of Yugoslavia.\(^{200}\)

In this visit, Cem at the same time conveyed Turkey’s concerns on the escalation of the crisis to the level that would threat regional peace and security. In order to prevent the occurrence of such kind of danger, Turkey advised the Serbian side to put an end the splitting bloods of civilian population in Kosovo. He also underlined the fact that Turkey did not have any intention of interfering into the domestic issues of Yugoslavia and was ready to contribute to the solution of the crisis.\(^{201}\)

In addition to its bilateral diplomatic relations with conflicting parties, Turkey also attached a great importance to act together with regional countries. Being a homegrown initiative in the region, Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) emerged as one of such mechanisms that Turkey and other regional countries would deliberate on the crucial developments of the region and demonstrate a common stance for a resolution. In this respect, having the chairmanship of SEECP in the period of 1998-1999, Turkey organized a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul in June 1998, of which its top agenda was on Kosovo. In his opening remark, Foreign Minister Cem emphasized that all forms of violence, terrorism and the use of force should be immediately stopped, and conflicting parties launched the negotiations as soon as possible for reaching a lasting solution to the crisis. Although Yugoslavia gave efforts to prevent the negotiations related with Kosovo in this conference by using an excuse of being a domestic issue, other regional countries including Greece criticized this attitude of Yugoslavia by considering the issue as a regional problem. The common opinion among these regional actors was that the Kosovo issue should have been addressed before it turned to be a crisis like that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{202}\)

Another regional forum to discuss what should be done for dealing with the Kosovo crisis was the second Balkan Summit held in Antalya in April 1998.

\(^{200}\) Barçın Yinanç, “Kosova Krizinde Üçlü Türk Planı,” Milliyet, 09.03.1998.
\(^{201}\) “Çankaya’da Kosovo zirvesi,” Milliyet, 07.03.1998.
\(^{202}\) Taki Berberakis ve Aslı Çağır, “Kosovo Kurtulsun,” Milliyet, 09.06.1998.
In this summit, three presidents from Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania came together and discussed the proposals about the solution of the Kosovo question as well as other regional problems. Three regional countries stated that Kosovo issue should be addressed within the framework of resolutions of the UN and OSCE in peaceful ways. In addition to that, Organization for the Islamic Conference (OIC) did not remain indifferent to the crisis. In its Summit in March 1998, OIC condemned the brutal actions of Serbian forces and called for international community to take all necessary measures for the resolutions.

In international level, the members of Contact Group played a leading role on achieving a solution for this issue. When the first hints of the conflict began to emerge during the early months of 1998, the Contact Group held a number of meetings to discuss the Kosovo issue. Although they generally, except Russia, used a tough langue to deter Serbia from its disproportionate use of force, they prioritized the peaceful ways for the resolution. In contrast to the Bosnian issue, they displayed a more decisive posture for putting an end to the killing of civilians by Serbian forces. Before imposing some sanctions to Serbian side, the Group gave some time to conflicting parties to end the clash and begin the dialogue for the peaceful solution. The meetings of Contact Group held in London and Bonn in March of 1998 can be regarded in this context. Disregarding the warnings of regional and international actors, and so the rise of tensions in the region forced the group to impose some sanctions on the aggressor, the Serbian side, in its meeting of Rome on 29 April 1998. As well as adopting a resolution by the UN for arms embargo to all sides in the beginning of April, additional sanctions increased the pressures on Serbia, and led to the discussions on military measures against Serbian aggressions.

International responses to the ongoing Kosovo problem were important for Turkey to shape its own policy towards Kosovo. As Turkey is a member of diverse international organizations like NATO, UN and OSCE that had an influence on the regional developments, the reactions of its western allies towards

---

204 Barçın Yinanç, “ĠKO Kosovo sorununda zorlandı,” Milliyet, 18.03.1998.
Kosovo problem had an impact over the Turkish foreign policy at that time. Although Turkey did not use a harsh rhetoric as much as its western allies did against Yugoslavia for its brutal attack in Kosovo, there existed a considerable conformity between their approaches to the crisis in Kosovo. Like Turkish officials, western high ranking officials emphasized the necessity of the peaceful remedies for dealing with the problem, and maintaining the territorial unity of Yugoslavia. In this regard, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in the meeting of Contact Group in Bonn underlined the need of reestablishing an autonomous status of Kosovo, not an independency. US Secretary of State Mandeleine Albright stated that they really wanted to ensure a political dialogue for the solution by referring to the decisions of Contact Group that supported the resolution of the crisis within the boundaries of Serbia. 206

Rising of the conflicts in the region led Turkey’s western allies to use a more assertive and threatening language against Belgrade. 207 As some additional sanctions were imposed to the Serbian side by the Contact Group, it was generally seen that military options began to be pronounced in international arena by reminding the humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia that came about as a result of belated actions of international community. Beginning of the new attacks by Serbian forces to some Albanian villages in Kosovo on the early days of June in 1998 led the Western politicians to give a harsh statement against Serbia. US president Bill Clinton emphasized that “we won’t allow a second Bosnian tragedy”. 208 UK Prime Minister and defense Minister of Holland also stated the needs of a military operation within the framework of NATO against Serbian military target due to their ethnic-cleansing in Kosovo. 209 In this circumstance, Turkey gathered a meeting where seven Balkan countries participated in Istanbul. In his opening remarks Ismail Cem said that “all forms of violence and the terrorism should be immediately ended”. The common desire of the participants was that the problem should be addressed before it transformed into one like

208 Yasemin Çongar, “ABD’nin Kosova Atağı,” Milliyet, 01.06.1998.
Bosnia. However, this meeting didn’t bring about a concrete road map on how to resolve the crisis.

As a result of ineffectiveness of the regional initiatives in finding a solution to the crisis, international initiatives gained more importance. In international level, while western countries led by the USA was in favor of military measures that would deter or stop the aggression of Serbian side, Russia, China and many other countries opposed to any military solution for the crisis. This divergence in international level led the searches on alternative mechanisms like NATO rather than the UN to find a solution to the crisis. This problematized the legality of a probable military action towards Yugoslavia without the permission of the UNSC. It was also seen even in the statement of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan saying that “a UN decision would be necessary for a military intervention by NATO”.

Believing in the importance of reliving the crisis as soon as possible, Turkey was initially not pleased with the discussions on a military action of which legality was questionable, and that would set a negative precedent for the general principles of international relations like preserving the territorial unity of states and the respect to their sovereignty. It was not to be regarded that Kosovo was of a special interest in international level that had reflections in international relations more than the previous crisis in Bosnia. Referring to the consequences of Bosnian tragedy, western leaders did not hesitate to express their intention on acting even militarily to prevent a second humanitarian catastrophe at the heart of Europe. This decisiveness of its Western alliances led Turkey to stand on the side of NATO after all of its diplomatic initiatives towards a peaceful solution to the crisis.

When NATO decided on a military exercise in June 1998 against the Serbian aggression, Turkey also joined into this exercise as being a member of the alliance. When the probability of a military operation against Serbian targets increased in the summer of 1998, Turkey did not hesitate to support the military

210 “Kosova Kurtulsun,” Milliyet, 09.06.1998.
measures of which it was not previously in favor. In this direction, President Süleyman Demirel sent a letter to the members of the Contact Group, stating that Turkey was ready to participate in all kinds of measures including a multi-national peace force. He also drew the attention of a risk of reemergence of the same violence experienced a few years ago in Bosnia-Herzegovina if international community did not take efficient and decisive measures. He called for his counterparts to maintain peace and security in the region.\(^\text{213}\) By considering these expressions in the letter, it can be argued that Turkey changed its previous hesitant foreign policy to a more assertive one in Kosovo issue, converging its policy with its western allies.

Increased the probability of a military operation against Serbia raised the subject of how Turkey would participate in a possible international military coalition. Passing a parliamentary motion on 8 October 1998, Turkey decided on taking part in a multi-national military force that would be established within the framework of NATO. Turkey decided on providing several aircrafts and military personnel to NATO. Even though concerning the fact that a military operation towards Kosovo would be much more questionable than that of Bosnia according to international law, Turkey declared their position on the side of western alliance over the solution of Kosovo issue.\(^\text{214}\)

Rising of assertive stance of Western countries including Turkey on taking a military action did not end the diplomatic initiatives that would dissuade Serbian authority from a violent attack to Kosovar Albanians. With the hope of persuading Serbian authorities to end its aggression in Kosovo, Turkey convened another meeting of Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) in Antalya on 12 October 1998. Bringing together regional countries around the same table, this meeting was of a special importance for regional countries to convey their criticisms, and thus posed a regional pressure upon Serbian authority. In his speech, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz warned the Serbian side on which this diplomatic initiative could be a last chance for Serbian side, emphasizing Kosovo issue was a threat to the regional peace, and reached to an unacceptable


level. He also added that “all participating states see the use of military forces as a last and undesired option for reaching a solution to the crisis”. This diplomatic initiative demonstrated Turkey’s sensitivity on addressing the problem through peaceful ways rather than undertaking a military action against the Serbian side.

The pressures over Serbian side in both regional and international level made it step back from its irreconcilable attitudes and promised to meet the demands of international community. However, with the early days of 1999, the conflicts in Kosovo restarted and Serbian authority did not fulfill its promises. The Racak incident in which 45 Kosovars were killed by Serbian security forces pushed again international community to take coercive measures. This was followed many other massacres conducted by Serbian forces. These brutal actions of Serbian side exhausted the patience of international community. The Contact Group called on all conflicting sides to launch negotiations for a settlement in Rambouillet Palace in Paris. At the same time, NATO Secretary General was authorized by NATO Council to conduct an air strike against Serbian targets on 30 January 1999. However, there appeared a disagreement between Russia and the rest of the western countries over the use of military force. While Russia maintained its tough stance against undertaking a military intervention in Yugoslavia as regarding the issue within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state, NATO members were in favor of a military intervention in order to stop the brutal regime of Yugoslavia from a second massacre at the heart of Europe like the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina a few years ago.

In this circumstance, Turkey gave effort to act together with its western allies even though a possible military action without the UNSC authorization would be illegal in respect of international law. After the failures of its diplomatic initiatives in regional and bilateral levels as well as all other initiatives in international level, Turkey stood on the side of its Western allies and offered to contribute to the NATO military forces. When NATO launched a comprehensive air bombardment against Serbian target, Turkey declared its support to this air campaign. Convening a couple of days later following the NATO operation against Yugoslavia, National Security Council of Turkey stated Turkey’s

readiness to do all missions in this crisis. Prime Minister Ecevit also said that Turkey would contribute to even a land operation carried out by NATO.\textsuperscript{216}

Regarding these statements, it can be argued that Turkey ultimately adopted a foreign policy in compatible with that of its Western allies, considering the use of force as a remedy to establish a lasting peace in the region. This ultimate policy of Turkey was determined after its unsuccessful attempts for peaceful initiatives to convince Serbian leadership to stop the civilian killing in Kosovo. Reaching the stage of a military solution, for Turkey, the Kosovo issue was no longer to be regarded as a domestic issue of Serbia or addressed by maintaining the territorial unity of Serbia.

In addition to that, it can be noted that following the use of force to stop Serbian atrocities, particularly western countries changed their previous policy that demanded Serbia to reestablish the autonomous status of Kosovo within the boundaries of Serbia. They began to argue the impossibility of living together of Serbs and Kosovars within the same state. This argument was the first sign of a revision in the political targets determined before conducting the air campaign against Serbian military units. Expressing such a statement in international level had some reflections over Turkish foreign policy.\textsuperscript{217} Bülent Ecevit, the Prime Minister of Turkey gave a similar message about the independence of Kosovo. “This problem is not addressed only by a ceasefire. Keeping Kosovar Albanians within the governance of Serbia seems to me impossible” said Ecevit.\textsuperscript{218} Even at this point, Turkey did not demonstrate any objections to the policies of western countries that would undermine the territorial unity of a sovereign country. This shows that as long as its western allies support such a policy Turkey can recognize a changing political boundary of a sovereign state responsible of a humanitarian tragedy within its boundary.

Turkey strove very hard to find a solution to the Kosovo problem through diplomatic ways with its bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives taken in

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{216} “MGK’dan “Teslim ol” Çağrısı,” Milliyet, 27.03.1999; “Kosova’ya Türk Komandolar,” Milliyet, 26.03.1999.
\textsuperscript{218} “Demirel sıcak bölgeye gidiyor,” Milliyet, 07.04.1999.
\end{flushright}
both regional and international level. Unlike its policies in the Bosnian case, it seems that Turkey was more cautious in advocating and supporting a military intervention towards Yugoslavia. The reasons behind this prudent foreign policy were broadly discussed. Nevertheless, decisive attitudes of its Western allies enabled Turkey to change this policy, and begin to support a military campaign against Yugoslavia. It can be argued that the impressions that Turkey had in its diplomatic initiatives largely mentioned above had an impact over its changing foreign policy towards the Kosovo issue. However, it is a well-known fact that domestic politics of a state has a considerable impact over its foreign policy. The following section, therefore, will examine how the Kosovo crisis had reflections over the Turkish domestic politics, and which criticisms the opposition parties made about the foreign policies pursued by the then government in the Kosovo issue.

4.3.2 Turkey’s Domestic Politics and the Kosovo Crisis

The fact that Turkey’s political parties, particularly represented in TGNA, have a certain degree of influence over the decision-making process of Turkish Foreign Policy renders it necessary to analyze the approaches, attitudes and discourses of these political parties in explaining and understanding of Turkey’s approach to the Kosovo issue. Although determining foreign policy falls into the responsibility of Turkish ruling part(y)ies, it must be taken into account of the criticisms or supports of opposition parties in this regard.

Turkey’s both ruling and opposition parties were generally in favor of active foreign policy of Turkey in addressing the Kosovo crisis. Besides relying on cultural and historical elements in justifying their arguments on foreign policy issues, they consider the probable risks and threats that would be the detriment of Turkey’s own security. In that respect, there existed a common perspective among all political parties in the Parliament on putting an end to the ongoing conflicts as soon as possible, acting together with western countries and the fact that Serbian side was the aggressor and Kosovars were innocent. In spite of these common views about the crisis, there existed some divergence between the ruling and
opposition parties over to what extent Turkey should engage with the crisis, and minimize its relations with Serbian side.

Over the years 1998 and 1999 when Kosovo crisis unfolded, three coalition governments came to the power. In this circumstance where political instabilities continued, for many opposition parties there was a high chance of becoming a ruling one in coming elections. Therefore, their political statements concerning Kosovo issue seemed to be shaped in a reasonable balance between the efforts of criticizing the then governments with the objective of raising their popularities among general public opinion and the responsibility of becoming a ruling party in coming elections. It is possible to see this political dilemma in their discourses, statements and parliamentary speeches. In that respect, the approaches of Turkey’s political parties to the Kosovo issue can be useful to understand how Turkey took a stand for a military intervention to Kosovo.

It can be noted that there were no significant differences in the proposals of the political parties on Turkey’s policy over Kosovo. While the opposition parties put forward the government’s inadequate attempts to relieve the ongoing crisis in Kosovo, the ruling coalition parties generally stated Turkey made its all efforts to find a solution to the crisis. Regarding Kosovo as a historical and cultural legacy of Turkey from an identity perspective, opposition parties argued that Turkey must play a leading role in addressing the problem. However, none of them urged Turkey to intervene unilaterally into the crisis. Both ruling and opposition parties agreed on the policy that Turkey could act together with western countries.

The approaches of political parties in the Parliament on this issue can be perceived through their group speeches. When considering these speeches made in the parliamentary sessions gathered to discuss the Kosovo issue in three separate times during 1998, it appears that there were no considerable differences among the parties’ arguments on this issue. According to CHP, Kosovo issue should not have been regarded by Turkey as a domestic problem of Serbia. Like all other countries, Turkey should have condemned the brutality of Serbia. For CHP, in order to prevent Serbia from attaining its objective of establishing Grand Serbia, Turkey should have decisively brought the issue before the influential
international organizations such as NATO, OSCE, and the UN. As referring to its historical legacy CHP contended that Turkey had much more responsibility for helping Kosovars than any other regional country.\(^{219}\)

In the same way, Welfare Party (RP), known as an Islamist party of Turkey, criticized the government of its hesitant attitude towards Kosovo. For reaching a lasting solution to the Kosovo crisis, Turkey should play a leading role and undertook diplomatic initiatives in diverse international organizations. In its perspective, what Serbs did in Kosovo was similar to what Israel did in Palestine and what India did in Kashmir. Although it was questionable in terms of international law, RP assumed Kosovo as one of eight federated states of former Yugoslavia. Regarding the attacks of Serbian forces as genocide, military option should always be on the table, but such option should be undertaken within the framework of NATO, OSCE or UN.\(^{220}\)

Like all other opposition parties, True Path Party (DYP) argued that Kosovo problem was not purely a territorial one, but an identity and faith problem by referring to the Turkey’s historical and cultural legacy. Therefore, as a responsible country in helping Kosovars, Turkey should give an effort to draw the attention of international community to the issue. Due to the ongoing ethnic-cleansing, it was not to be a shield for Yugoslavia to assert the inviolability of the territorial unity of a country. Turkey should be bounded with such international law and principles as much as other international countries were bounded. So, in such cases where a genocide or ethnic-cleansing occurred, Turkey should review its policy of respecting some essential rules and regulations of international law such as sovereignty right and territorial integrity and unity of states by acting in cooperation with other Western allies.\(^{221}\)


In spite of being a member of the then coalition government between 1997 and 1999, Democratic Society Party (DTP) harshly criticized the government’s Kosovo policy. Like other opposition parties it highlighted the historical duty of Turkey to help Kosovar Albanians. Criticizing Turkey to pursue a hesitant foreign policy, Turkey should play a leading role in addressing the issue. For DTP, the main responsibility of all atrocities in Kosovo was Milosevic, and it was a political problem. In that respect, Turkey should make all its efforts to take part in an international military coalition against Yugoslavia.222

Besides putting forward the similar arguments that referred to the cultural-historical and real-politic reasons, ruling coalition parties generally gave efforts to justify which policies Turkey followed in addressing the issue in response to the criticisms directed by opposition parties. In the parliamentary sessions, the group speaker of the Motherland Party (ANAP) generally gave information about which initiatives the government launch before international organizations. Paying attention to the assertive attitudes of Western allies in terms of military action, ANAP seemed to be in favor of pursuing a policy that Turkey should take a position against Yugoslavia.223

Using same cultural-historical reasons, the representatives of Democratic Leftist Party (DSP) also highlighted all diplomatic efforts undertaken by Turkey in addressing the issue. In their statements, it was emphasized that putting an end to the ongoing conflicts immediately was an important phase to reach a lasting solution of the crisis. Therefore, DSP believed the importance of dialogue and agreement between conflicting parties to reach a lasting solution to the crisis. In addition to that, with the responsibility of governing the state as a ruling party, DSP had to use more rational statements and remarks than any other parties, which was reflected in their policies towards Kosovo. In initial phases of the


issue, the high ranking members of the DSP occasionally pointed out the importance of preserving and respecting sovereignty right of Serbia, and so the fact that Kosovo was an autonomous region of Serbia, not a federated republic. That’s why, in contrast to the assertive and emotional statements conveyed both by opposition parties and particularly by western decision-makers, DSP in early phases of the crisis adopted a policy that regarded Kosovo as a domestic problem of Serbia, and a solution should be reached within the boundaries of Serbia. In this respect, its group speakers talked about Turkey’s diplomatic initiative and tried to justify Turkey’s moderate foreign policy between conflicting parties in Kosovo.\footnote{For the speech of Ahmet Pirıştina, see, \textit{TBMM Tutanak Dergisi}, 64. Birleşim, 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 10.03.1998, pp. 234-237; \textit{TBMM Tutanak Dergisi}, 4. Birleşim, 20. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı, Cilt 63, 08.10.1998, p. 375-378.}

As in the case of Bosnia, the members of TGNA made intense discussions on the policies of Turkey during the Kosovo crisis. Opposition parties demanded more active foreign policy from the then government for preventing the ongoing cruelty committed by the Serbian authority in Kosovo. In contrast to the case of Bosnia, none of them stated Turkey’s unilateral military action in Kosovo even though they considered that Turkey should have followed an active foreign policy in this crisis as its cultural and historical responsibility. They generally gave such statements that Turkey should have provided some contributions to the resolution of the crisis by acting together with its Western allies. Then Turkish government which preferred a cautious foreign policy due to the probable risks and threat to Turkish national interests argued that Turkey fulfilled its historical and cultural responsibility by taking all necessary diplomatic initiatives. However, upon the increasing possibility of a military intervention to Yugoslavia, the government began to pursue pro-interventionist policies in this issue. The next section evaluates how Turkey took role in the implementation of a military action with humanitarian consideration.
4.3.3 Turkey’s Role in the Implementation of Humanitarian Intervention

In the case of Kosovo, Turkey’s role in the military campaign carried out by NATO remained limited because NATO and its leading states like the USA played much more critical roles than Turkey.

As many other military operations carried out abroad, Turkey’s participation into such an operation necessitates the permission of TGNA. In that sense, the legality of sending Turkish troops to Kosovo can be evaluated in two Parliamentary motions taken on 8 December 1992 (Resolution 205) and on 8 October 1998 (Resolution 596). On the basis of these motions, the elements of Turkish Armed Forces joined into the military actions towards Kosovo. Upon the air strikes launched by NATO on 24 March 1999, Turkey contributed 10 F-16 fighter jets to NATO forces, and they carried out over 2000 hours flight. In forthcoming months, NATO demanded additional aircrafts, and Turkey sent 8 more F-16 fighter jets and 3 tanker aircrafts for the operations of NATO in Kosovo.225

Furthermore, rising intensity of airstrikes led NATO to demand the use of military bases in Turkey. Turkey permitted NATO to use the airbases in Balıkesir and Bandırma for fighter jets, and the airbase in Çorlu for NATO tanker aircrafts with the decision of Turkish cabinet on 27th of April, 1999. Upon this development, the US personnel and aircrafts began to come to these cities by the 3rd of June, 1999. However, as a result of reaching an agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia, there was no need of the use of Turkish airbases in the bombardment of Serbian targets by NATO.226

In addition to its contribution to NATO in its air operations against Yugoslavia, Turkey took participation into the activities of NATO to monitor the implementation of arms embargo and economic sanctions that were undertaken within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1160. In this regard, Turkey sent a frigate to Adriatic Sea and a fleet of F-16 Fighter jets for this monitoring mission.227

225 Fuat Aksu, “Kosova Krizinde Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası,” p. 70.
Although Turkey initially presented a distant stance on the resolution of the crisis through military intervention, rising international and domestic pressures as a result of reaching an unacceptable level of Serbian attacks towards Kosovars led Turkey to change its prudent policy against coercive actions, and began to support of international military intervention to Yugoslavia. Two main reasons can be noted on the behind of this change in Turkey’s policy. One of them is related with international reaction, the other one concerns the reactions of Turkish public opinion. International coalition led by the USA demonstrated a decisive attitude for implementing a military intervention following some failed diplomatic initiatives undertaken by many leading states, including Russia and the USA. In order not to see a second Bosnia in which there occurred a humanitarian tragedy because of belatedly undertaken a military operation, international community took a stand on implementing an early intervention to stop Serbian aggression in Kosovo. On the other hand, it should be stated that Turkish people attributed a great importance to Kosovo as many other Balkan states having predominantly Muslim population in terms of cultural, historical and religious linkages. Increasing violence and repressive actions of Yugoslav government against Kosovar Albanians which are one of the several remnants of Ottomans as a Muslim population in the region had Turkish people more sensitive in the matter of conducting a military intervention. Therefore, it can be asserted that these reasons played an important role in changing Turkey’s policy in favor of supporting and contributed to international military intervention.

As in the case of Bosnia, Turkey’s participation into the international military coalition against Yugoslavia for Kosovo concerned some regional countries while some others displayed their support to Turkey in this mission. One of such countries was Greece, a neighbor of Turkey. In contrast to the policies in the case of Bosnia, making great changes in its foreign policies with the new prime minister, Kostas Simitis, who came to power in 1996, Greece sought to pursue its foreign policies in consistent with the USA and the EU in the case of

Kosovo. Even though the majority of its population had sympathy with its fellow Orthodox Serbs, Greek decision makers avoided of following pro-Serb policy in the crisis. Greece prioritized to become a reliable actor of the West, which gave importance on peace, stability, and security of the region. This country, in that sense, did not obviously support western countries in this intervention, but did not display its opposition to their military action either.\textsuperscript{229} However, when Turkey demanded the use of Greece territory and airspace to send its troops to Kosovo within the framework of NATO, Greece raised its objections to this Turkey’s demand. Even though Turkey planned to dispatch its military forces to Kosovo with the objective of contributing to NATO, Greece closed its border against Turkey’s military passage.\textsuperscript{230}

At this point, Bulgaria appeared as an alternative route for reaching Turkish troops to Kosovo. Having been a staunch ally of Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era, Bulgaria made radical changes in politics, economy and foreign policy to prepare itself to post-communist period together with the new Prime Minister Ivan Kostov who came to power in 1997. In this new period, Bulgaria gave a lot importance on pursing pro-western and pro-NATO policies. As in the case of Bosnia, intense discussions took place in Bulgarian public opinion on whether they support Serbian government in their fighting with Kosovars because they had some sympathy with Serbs like Greek population due to the fact that majority of Bulgarian population are Orthodox Christians. In addition to that, sharing a border with Yugoslavia might have created some security risks for Bulgaria in a possible military operation against Yugoslavia. Therefore, Bulgarian people were unwilling to give consent to their government to support NATO in this military operation while its decision makers attributed a great importance on cooperating with Western states in military and security areas. These conflicting views between Bulgarian people and their state were intensified by some errant NATO missiles landing on Bulgarian territory, and economic recession as a result of rising conflicts in Yugoslavia and the imposed

\textsuperscript{229} Ibid., p. 167.

sanctions to this neighboring country. Prime Minister Kostov, however, appeased the tough opposition of Bulgarian people against the military operation to Yugoslavia thanks to the security guarantees provided by NATO. So, Bulgaria took cooperation with NATO in its military operation against Yugoslavia. Due to this pro-Western foreign policy of Bulgaria, Turkey asked the Bulgarian government to permit Turkish troops to go to Kosovo for contributing to NATO ground troops. After passing a decision from the Bulgarian parliament, Turkey began to send a battalion to Kosovo through Bulgarian territory.

The approaches of other countries to Turkey’s contribution to the intervention of NATO in Kosovo can be evaluated within the general framework of their reactions to the military operation of NATO. In contrast to the case of Bosnia, Turkey did not play a leading role in taking a decision to implement a military intervention, but just only contributed to NATO forces with 987 personnel and 21 aircrafts. Moreover, Kosovar Albanians had much more expectations from the USA and EU than Turkey in dealing with the crisis. Due to this fact many countries except Greece and Bulgaria did not demonstrate a serious reaction to Turkey in its participation into NATO forces in Kosovo. One of such countries that made a great objection to the intervention of NATO without the decision of Security Council was Russia. Although Russia did its best to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, international coalition led by the US under the umbrella of NATO implemented an intervention against Yugoslavia. Such a way of intervention led Russia to be isolated and felt humiliated. So it did not hesitate to display its objections by harshly criticizing NATO. However, Russia did not do any retaliation against illegal intervention of NATO beyond using discursive reactions.


233 Selma Sulejmanovic, Russia and the Kosovo Conflict:1998-2008 (M.S. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2008), pp. 36-59.
At the time of war in Kosovo, Russia needed the economic supports of Western countries for realizing some reforms in its domestic affairs during the post-communist period. Additionally, if Russia had taken a counter-offensive step against NATO’s intervention, it might have been completely outside of the crisis management process, and faced much more isolations by the western countries. Russia, therefore, aimed to influence the decision-making process in finding a solution to the Kosovo problem through keeping its relation with Western powers. Such a policy and its active participation in settlement of this dispute could also have raised the international prestige of Russia. Hence, Russia not only criticized the military intervention of NATO in terms of international law, but also did not indulge into a unilateral offensive reaction, and maintained its relations with Western countries. Even though it was not an actor who actively joined into the air strikes of NATO towards Yugoslavia, it sought to be an influential actor in the post-intervention period by contributing to KFOR with its own troops.\(^{234}\)

Serbian decision-makers regarded the intervention of NATO as interference into its domestic affairs. They especially asserted that signing Appendix B of Rambouillet Accords\(^{235}\), a peace agreement that was purposed by Western states during Rambouillet Conference organized for getting Serb and Albanian representatives to sign up, would eradicate their sovereignty right over Kosovo with the deployment of NATO forces. The rejection of Serbian side to sign up this agreement ended the negotiation between Serbs and Albanians.\(^{236}\) The failure of this attempt in reaching a solution enabled NATO led by the USA to launch air strikes against Yugoslavia on 24\(^{th}\) of March, 1999. Turkey participated in these air strikes with some of 18 F-16 jets and 3 tanker aircrafts that were assigned to NATO in its bombing campaign for Kosovo.\(^{237}\) After 78-day comprehensive air campaign to devastate Serbian military infrastructure, NATO and Yugoslavia signed a Military Technical Agreement on 8 June. With this agreement, Yugoslavia began to withdraw its security forces from Kosovo.\(^{238}\)

\(^{234}\) Ibid.

\(^{235}\) The original name of this agreement is Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo.


\(^{237}\) The code of this NATO operation is Operation Allied Force.
UNSC adopted the Resolution 1244 that authorized the deployment of international civil and security presences in Kosovo, and the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).\(^{238}\)

Following the end of the conflict with the Military Technical Agreement and the UNSC Resolution 1244, international community concentrated on how to ensure peace and security in Kosovo. In that sense, it was planned that international peacekeeping force composed of around 50,000 personnel from NATO members and non-members like Russia would be deployed in Kosovo. The first elements of this international security force, known as Kosovo Force (KFOR), began to deploy in Kosovo on 12 June 1999. Thanks to the deployment of KFOR, it was aimed to “deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serbian forces”, “establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order”, “demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army”, “support the international humanitarian effort”, and “coordinate with, and support, the international civil presence”.\(^ {239}\)

Upon passing the Resolution 1244 from the UNSC, while NATO prepared to send its troops to Kosovo, Russian troops consisted of 200 soldiers stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina arrived to Kosovo in the morning of 12 June before the coming of NATO forces, and captured the Slatina Airport in Priština. By 20\(^{th}\) of June, 1999, Serbian security forces were completely withdrawn from Kosovo.

Turkey, one of the 39 states participated in KFOR, initially contributed to this force with a battalion, consisted of 987 personnel. However, the deployment of this Turkish troop was delayed for around 2-3 weeks due to the disagreement on the passage problem between NATO and Bulgaria. This problem caused a harsh criticism in Turkish domestic public opinion to both Turkish decision makers and international community. Stationing of Russian and Greek troops in Kosovo before Turkish one created some considerable disappointment among Turkish people. They showed an intense reaction to the non-existence of Turkish troops in an international coalition in Kosovo which was under the control of

\(^{238}\) “Kosovo Air Campaign”, NATO official website http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm.

Ottoman Turks for a long time as around 450-year period from 1455 to 1912. “Turkey was not to be isolated in determining the future of Kosovo. Turkey was not to be set aside in rebuilding of Kosovo.” said the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. After Bulgaria consented on the dispatches of Turkish forces to Kosovo, Turkey completed to deploy its troops assigned to KFOR in Kosovo. The decision of stationing Turkish troops in such places where Turkish minority predominantly live like Mamusha, Dragash, and Prizren was welcomed by Turkish public opinion both in Turkey and Kosovo.

With the improvement of the situation in Kosovo in forthcoming years, NATO made some reduction in the number of peacekeeping forces. By early 2002, KFOR troop levels were decreased to 39,000, then to 17,500 by the end of 2003. KFOR, today, perform its mission by approximately 5,500 personnel from 31 countries in Kosovo. As in parallel with the reduction of the numbers of KFOR forces, Turkey also reduced the number of its soldiers, and currently continues its mission in KFOR with almost 350 military personnel.

4.4 Assessment of Turkey’s Approach to Humanitarian Intervention for Kosovo

In the case of Kosovo, Turkey displayed a different posture on the humanitarian intervention than that in the case of Bosnia. Although Turkey eventually contributed to the military operations of NATO against Yugoslavia, Turkey for a long time did not seem to support such proposals like conducting a military intervention against Yugoslavia. Turkey’s such policy was affected by the fact that the nature of the crisis in Kosovo was different than that in Bosnia.

First of all, it can be noted that Kosovo was a province of Serbia, which exercised some economic, administrative and cultural autonomy, but it was later

---

revoked by then Serbian administration. Although this oppressive act of Serbian administration was highly criticized by many states including Turkey, there had been no concrete step to recognize Kosovo as a separate and independent political unit in international community until the NATO operation undertaken against Serbia. Therefore, Turkey’s advocacy of a military intervention against a country whose sovereignty and territorial integrity was recognized and respected by international community would be contrary to its traditional foreign policy which respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states. On the other hand, for Turkey, supporting a province in its gaining of independence would set a negative example for the Kurdish separatist movement with which Turkey has been struggling for almost three decades. For this reason, Turkey insistently supported the diplomatic solution of the Kosovo conflict through peaceful means.

Secondly, Kosovars did not hold high expectation from Turkey to stop the ongoing conflict in Kosovo. Unlike in Bosnia, Turkey was not seen as a protector of Kosovars from Serbian aggression, but regarded as a regional country which had some influence over the developments in the region. Although Turkey has cultural and historical linkages with Albanians, in this case nationalism was a driving force in shaping their international policies. Considering the discussions on Kosovo in TGNA, in contrast to the Bosnian case, no political party advocated Turkey’s unilateral military intervention to Kosovo. Instead, many of them pointed out multilateral diplomacy and coercive measures. It can be argued that Turkish foreign policy in the case of Kosovo was relatively kept away from social pressures unlike those experienced during the case of Bosnia.

Thirdly, without any resolution of the UNSC, the legality of Kosovo intervention would be questionable in terms of international law. Considering the attitudes of Russia and China towards a military intervention to Kosovo, it seemed very hard to pass a resolution from the UNSC. Introducing a military intervention without the decision of the UNSC would be a violation of international law, and could trigger similar operations in different parts of the world, which would undermine the existing order in international relations. In that sense, it can be claimed that Turkey adopted a legal-realist interpretation of international law until NATO air strike started.
In the light of these reasons, Turkey concentrated its efforts on resolving the problem through diplomatic initiatives and attached a great importance to maintaining peace, stability and security in the region. With this objective, Turkey played a mediator role between the conflicting parties. In addition to that, Turkey conducted several diplomatic initiatives in both regional and international levels for finding a solution to the crisis. However, while in the case of Bosnia Turkey had played a leading role in diplomatic initiatives to undertake a military strike against Yugoslavia, in the case of Kosovo Turkey’s western allies played such a role. What Turkey aimed with its diplomatic initiatives for Kosovo was to prevent the escalation of the conflict to the level that would render it necessary to undertake an illegal military intervention by western countries.

Upon the failures of diplomatic initiatives to put an end Serbian aggression against Kosovars, NATO took a decision to introduce a military intervention against Yugoslavia. After that decision, Turkey changed its opposing attitude against a military intervention, and contributed to NATO military forces with its troops. Turkey took this decision after seeing that a humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia became inevitable. Having some political, economic, and social problems within its domestic politics, Turkey previously had adopted a pluralist stance on a humanitarian intervention to Kosovo because the legality of probable intervention was questionable in terms of international law, and it might have posed some risks for the existing international order and its national interests. However, following the failures of peaceful means in stopping the conflict in Kosovo and decisive attitude of its Western allies on humanitarian intervention for Kosovo, Turkey preferred to act together with its Western allies and took part in the NATO military operation.

The different natures of the crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo enabled Turkey to demonstrate different postures in each case in terms of humanitarian intervention. While Turkey seemed to be more assertive and willing in supporting a humanitarian intervention in the case of Bosnia, it was more cautious and unwillingness in supporting such kind of military intervention against Yugoslavia. It can be argued that one of the reasons behind this changing attitude of Turkey is that international community also displayed different policies on implementing a
military intervention against Serbian aggression. As international community initially seemed to be unwilling to carry out a military strike in the case of Bosnia, it acted with more decisiveness on undertaking a humanitarian intervention. Thus, Turkey came to the forefront as one of the most aspirant country on humanitarian intervention for Bosnia. In addition to that, there were a certain degree of differences in the reactions of Turkey’s domestic public opinion to these two cases. The reality that the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was not much horrible than that in Bosnia can be regarded as a factor behind these different attitudes of Turkish domestic public opinion. These differences can be easily recognized in the statements of political parties that represented the various segments of the population and their world views in TGNA. The members of these political parties gave more emotional statements, and even some of them set forth Turkey’s unilateral military intervention for Bosnia. However, in the case of Kosovo, none of them urged the then government to take a unilateral military action, but they expressed the critical roles of international community in undertaking a humanitarian intervention. For them, Turkey should have acted together with international community, and contributed to an international military force in dealing with the Kosovo issue.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention in the light of the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s was analyzed with this study. To get a comprehensive examination of this subject, it began with the general knowledge that touches upon the questions of what is the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’, and how it is assessed from the normative and legal viewpoints. This theoretical framework is important for explaining and understanding of how the concept of humanitarian intervention has an impact over the course of international relations in the post-Cold War era, and how this concept affects foreign policies of states. After this theoretical background, how Turkey demonstrated a posture of humanitarian intervention in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s was analyzed by indicating the similarities and differences of Turkey’s approaches and their reasons.

It is a fact that the concept of humanitarian intervention appeared to be one of the most important subjects of international relations with the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, international community encountered a number of international military interventions by humanitarian considerations. It can be argued that the rising impacts of these notions like ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’, and ‘the rule of law’ on the course of international relations more than ever played an important role over the emergence of such a situation in world politics.

In addition to that, some remarkable developments relating to the promotion and protection of human rights occurred by the end of the Cold War. The first summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), Helsinki Summit, prioritized to ensure the European security in its Final Act. However, the Charter of Paris adopted in the second summit of CSCE in 1990 largely concentrated on human rights. According to this Charter, states are expected not only to respect to human rights, but also prepare a fertile ground for enhancing the rights of national minorities or different identities. It is a remarkable point that the promotion and protection of human rights began to be regarded beyond the national sovereignty of states, and became an international matter.

The post-Cold War period is regarded as a beginning of a new era in terms of human rights. Increasing number of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and inter-governmental organizations (IGO) began to play an active role on the promotion and protection of human rights, and had considerable impacts over the policy preferences of decision-makers. In that sense, human rights as well as democracy and the rule of law have led to question the legitimacy of governments or regimes, and to be seen as a precondition for ensuring international peace and security. Thus, grave violations of human rights in a state began to be perceived as international matters that other states or international organizations claimed a responsibility to address.

In addition to these promising developments in terms of human rights, power vacuum and resurgent micro-ethnic nationalisms that broke out as a consequence of the disintegration of Soviet Union triggered some security crises like serious instabilities, devastating conflicts, and wars within or between states. The occurrence of gross, systematic and large-scale violations of human rights during these crises made the problems more complicated, and rendered it necessary for international community to handle these humanitarian problems in

---

244 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the 1994 Budapest Summit
international level. To deal with these problems, international community were expected for taking all necessary measures ranging from economic embargo and diplomatic pressures to military interventions. Hence, the matter comes to the point that perpetrations of gross, systematic, and large-scale violations of human rights were regarded as an international security issue that the states committing such kind of crimes would not have an exclusive right to deal with, and so used as a reason for a military intervention. For some opponents, these sorts of military actions were undertaken as a pretext by interventionist powers in order to consolidate their interests.

In terms of international law, there exist great discussions on the legality of implementing a humanitarian intervention. The UN Charter covers the principles of the resolutions of international disputes by peaceful ways in the Article 2(3), the ban on the use of force in the Article 2(4), and the non-interference into domestic affairs of states in the Article 2(7). As a matter of fact, many humanitarian interventions are in general realized through military operations as a consequence of the deterioration of humanitarian situations on the ground after the failures of the peaceful means having exercised a period of time. For some, the UN Charter prohibited the use of force only in the case of a direct intervention towards territorial integrity or political independence of concerning states. Therefore, they argues that conducting a military intervention with humanitarian consideration against a state committing a gross, systemic and large-scale violations of human rights is beyond the scope of this prohibition in the Article 2(4). Furthermore, the legality and legitimacy of such a military intervention undertaken without the decision of the UNSC are also noted among controversial issues. Additionally, the lack of codification of humanitarian intervention is regarded another point that makes the legality of humanitarian intervention debatable. In this regard, it seems that states put forward various arguments related to these different interpretations of the same international rules in order to legitimize their actions and positions in a case of humanitarian intervention. In my opinion, the arguments of states about the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention can be varied in accordance with their national interests.
These discussions about humanitarian intervention and the developments in international relations in the post-Cold War period had a great impact over the determination of Turkish foreign policy in dealing with the humanitarian crises, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo. As many other states, Turkey also followed its foreign policies to reach its goals and ideals determined in the form of ‘national interests’. These policies and its instruments were changed in accordance with Turkey’s own national capacity and the conditions of international system. Therefore, Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention, particularly in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, can be assessed within this framework.

Considering Turkish Foreign Policy until the end of the Cold War, it appears that Turkey attributed a great importance to maintain the existing regional and international status-quo. It generally refrained from some adventurous attempts that would threat regional and international security. In that sense, adopting the principle of ‘Peace at home and peace in the World’, Turkey for a long time acted with the idea that world peace could be maintained if every state respects to sovereignty right of other states, and refrains from revisionist policies that aim to change the regional balances or existing frontiers among states. As Turkey demonstrated a robust and decisive reaction towards any foreign attempt regarding its own domestic issues, it apparently had no willingness to intervene in matters beyond its boundaries. For Turkey, such a policy seemed to be a necessity due to its limited power and constraining nature of international political order particularly during the Cold War.

The remarkable changes in the structure of international order and accompanying instabilities by the end of the Cold War enabled Turkey to revise its previous status-quo oriented foreign policy in accordance with the reactions of international community, especially its western allies such as the USA, the UK and France. It does not mean that Turkey completely deviated from its traditional foreign policy path having concentrated on the preservation of peace and security by maintaining the existing international status-quo. Especially in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, Turkey supported an implementation of humanitarian intervention, that can be perceived as a revisionist policy, with the objective of
halting Serbian aggression against Bosnians and Kosovars, and restoring the undermined regional order that would imperil its national interests in the Balkans.

Turkey could not have remained indifferent to any crisis in the Balkans due to the several reasons. One of them is that the Balkans is located in region which is of special importance for Turkey because of its geostrategic importance. This region provides a linkage route to Western Europe with which Turkey has had intense political, economic and military relations for over a century. Furthermore, during the 1990s, Turkey and Greece competed for increasing their own influence over the Balkans. In spite of all warnings and criticisms by the Western governments, Greece adopted a pro-Serbian policy during the Bosnian crisis with the support of Russia. Turkey, in contrast to that, supported Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia against the pressures of Greece, and sought to act with the USA and some other Western powers.

In addition to its geostrategic importance for Turkey, the second reason is that the Balkans housed the millions of Muslim or Turkish people regarded by Turkey as remnants of Ottomans. Committing atrocities against these populations by Serbian forces rendered it necessary for Turkey to play an active role through diplomatic initiatives or a military intervention because Turkey felt a responsibility for saving the lives of these people. Turkey’s domestic public opinion also exerted considerable pressure on its government to do something for preventing Serbian cruelty against Muslim population.

The third reason is an assertion over the diminishing of Turkey’s strategic significance for the West by the end of the Cold War. The emergence of new republics following the dissolution of Soviet Union provided some new buffer zones for the West in the Eastern Europe against a possible security threat from Russia as a successor of the USSR. That’s why, there appeared such a prediction that Turkey had lost its strategic importance. However, breaking out a variety of crises by the collapse of the Cold War international system led the West to develop a consensus over Turkey’s crucial importance in the reestablishment of a regional stability and order because of its geopolitical position, and its cultural

248 “Muslims in Europe: Country guide,” BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm
and historical links with the newly independent countries in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia. It was hoped that Turkey would become a model for these states with its democratic, secular and constitutional state system, capitalist economic structure, and its Muslim-majority demography. Hence, western style state system would have been expanded to these former Soviet territories through Turkey. This encouraged Turkey to follow an active foreign policy and endeavored to do its best to provide its contribution to address the conflicts.

The fourth reason is that the rising of political Islam and nationalism in Turkey’s domestic politics. Especially the refusal of Turkey’s application for full membership by the EU in 1989 caused a disappointment among Turkish people, and discussions on whether Turkey should have sought alternatives to the EU. When the new Turkic/Muslim republics in Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Balkans gained their independences at the end of the Cold War, it was expected that Turkey would easily enhanced its political, economic, and social relations with the newly independent states with which it has ethnic, religious, and cultural ties. Moreover, rising of political Islam in Turkey since the 1980s evoked an emotional sentiment towards Muslim communities resided in former Ottoman territories beyond Turkey’s boundaries. These developments fed the process of constructing a new identity based on nationalism and Islamism rather than westernism. This new identity, thus, had some impacts over Turkey’s humanitarian intervention approach in Bosnia and Kosovo.

For these reasons, Turkey eventually both supported and contributed to implement a humanitarian intervention for Bosnia and Kosovo by actively participating into international coalition. In both cases, Turkey initially prioritized to handle the problems through peaceful means. Upon the failures of peaceful remedies for the resolution and the rising of violence against civilians, Turkey called for undertaking a humanitarian intervention. Turkey, however, displayed some remarkably different approaches between Bosnia and Kosovo in the


250 Zeynep Ergolu, *Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era* (M.S. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2005), pp. 13-17.
implementation of humanitarian intervention. This thesis argued that these different approaches emerged as a consequence of some differences on the historical background of the crises, the reactions of international community, and Turkey’s own situations, initiatives and experiences during the period of these two crises.

The historical background of the Bosnian crisis showed some important differences compared with that of Kosovo. Bosnia was one of the six federated states of Yugoslavia. Due to the oppressive policies of Milosevic administration across the country, four federated states except Serbia and Montenegro declared their independences, and so faced brutal activities of then Yugoslav government. Some Serbian paramilitary groups in these former federated states backed by Yugoslav National Army raised their attacks to these newly independent countries even though their independences were mostly recognized by international community. Particularly in Bosnia, these attacks evolved into a humanitarian tragedy.

Turkey, as many other Western states, recognized the independences of former federated states of Yugoslavia. Then, it concentrated its efforts on preserving the territorial integrity and political independences of these newly independent republics. In this circumstance, Turkey took various diplomatic initiatives in both regional and international level to prevent and halt Serbian aggressions against the territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia. After Turkey lost its hopes of stopping Serbian attacks through peaceful ways in relatively short period of time, it insisted on a military solution in its diplomatic initiatives. However, it did not demonstrate a similar willingness and insistence on a military intervention for the Kosovo issue. The main reason behind such a different attitude is that Turkey saw a military intervention for Bosnia as being more convenient to its national interests as well as humanitarian motives. Therefore, it can be easily claimed that Turkey supported a humanitarian intervention for Bosnia because of both humanitarian reasons and maintaining its national interests in the region.

Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo was an autonomous region of Serbia. Due to the revoking their some important autonomous rights, given in the constitutional
amendments in 1974, by Milosevic administration in 1989, Kosovars initially protested these unfair policies, and later it also demanded to gain independence like other federated states. Then, increasing pressures of Serbia on Kosovo and counter offences of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) exacerbated the crisis even more.

In the case of Kosovo, some western states like the USA, France and the UK appeared to be more willing than any other states including Turkey to undertake a humanitarian intervention for Kosovo. In contrast to its policies in Bosnia, Turkey opposed to the resolution of the crisis through military means until it saw the strong signs of military intervention that would be carried out by its western allies. There were several reasons behind such a policy. Turkey greatly concerned the pressures of Albanians over Turkish minority in Kosovo, and a probability that Kosovo issue might have set a precedent for its Kurdish problem. In addition to that, unlike the case of Bosnia, the victims in Kosovo did not consider Turkey as a savior from Serbian aggression, and so turned their face to the Western major powers like the USA. Therefore, Turkey insisted on peaceful resolution of the Kosovo issue. In this respect, it tried to contribute to find an ultimate solution for the crisis through its diplomatic initiatives in regional and international levels. As a result of the rise of humanitarian crisis and the insistence on military intervention by its western allies, Turkey changed its previous policy, and declared its support to a military intervention that would be undertaken by NATO.

However, in both of the cases, Turkey avoided any unilateral military action that would have drawn harsh criticisms of its western allies. Especially in Bosnia, although Turkey demanded a military intervention much more than any other western state, it did not indulge into a military action regardless of the reactions of international community. It was aware that such a military option requires a huge military, economic, and political capacity. During the 1990s, Turkey, however, encountered many political, economic and social problems, which constituted a big obstacle for implementing this kind of cross-border military operation. In terms of military capacity, it seemed to be a serious problem that Turkish Armed Forces did not have any refueling tanker aircraft that would
have its fighter jets to fly long distance until 1995. Besides having a limited power for undertaking a unilateral use of force, Turkey’s experience in its military intervention to Cyprus in 1974 also had a great impact over its policy of reaching a multilateral solution. Even though Turkey had conducted a military intervention by using its rights arising from international law, it faced harsh reactions and criticisms from its western allies. It had to encounter serious economic and political costs for a long time. This experience taught Turkish decision makers of the dangers of unilateral military interventions that can alienate Turkey from the international community. Turkey, hence, gave efforts on acting together with international community, particularly its western allies, and sought to deal with the problems on the basis of international legitimacy in both crises in Bosnia and Kosovo.

In conclusion, Turkey’s humanitarian intervention approach in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo was shaped according to the historical backgrounds of these crises, international reactions, and Turkey’s own situation, initiatives, and experiences in handling these two crises. It can be easily claimed that the policies and approaches of its Western allies like the USA had considerable impact over the formation of Turkey’s humanitarian intervention approach because of some important reasons comprehensively examined in the previous chapters. It can be also noted that Turkey determined its approach, and tried to legitimate its changing attitudes in Bosnia and Kosovo by using the arguments about the normative and legal discussions over humanitarian intervention, indicated in theoretical framework of this study.
REFERENCES

BOOKS, BOOK CHAPTERS, ARTICLES


Ayşegül Kocaman, Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Interventions (MA diss, Bilkent University, 2008).


Baskın Oran, “Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice,” in Baskın Oran, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents, trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010).


Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, Turkey, Germany and the Wars in Yugoslavia: A Search for Reconstruction of State Identities (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2006).


Ramazan Gözen, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Turbulence of the Post Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints,” in İdris Bal, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era (Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004).


Selma Sulejmanovic, Russia and the Kosovo Conflict:1998-2008 (M.S. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2008), p. 36-59.

Selver Buldanlioğlu, The Dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new Interventionism, (M.S. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2003).


Timothy Crawford and Alan Kuperman, Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion, and Civil War, (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).


Zeynep Eroğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era (M.S. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2005).

JOURNALS, INTERNET SOURCES


“Amerikasız Müdahale Olmaz,” Sabah, 11 January 1993

122

“Blair: Sorun Kuvvetle Çözülür,” Milliyet 09.06.1998


“Bush’tan Demirel’e övgü,” Milliyet, 10.07.1992

“Çankaya’da Kosovo zirvesi,” Milliyet, 07.03.1998

“Clinton randevusuna tepki,” Milliyet, 03.02.1993

“Demirel sıcak bölgeye gidiyor,” Milliyet, 07.04.1999


“Kanlı Saldırı sürer,” Milliyet, 27.04.1992

“Kara Harekâtını bize bırakın”, Milliyet, 30 January 1993,

“Kosova Antalya’ya taşındı,” Milliyet, 13.10.1998

“Kosova Kurtulsun,” Milliyet, 09.06.1998

“Kosova’ya Türk Komandolar,” Milliyet, 26.03.1999


“MGK’dan “Teslim ol” Çağrısı,” Milliyet, 27.03.1999


“NATO 4 Sırp Uçağını düşürdü”, Milliyet, 01.03.1994


“NATO Yine vurdu,” Milliyet, 10.04.1994

“Özal’a protestolu alkışlı karşılama,” Milliyet, 02.03.1993


“Sırbistan’a yeni yaptırımlar,” Milliyet, 30.04.1998

“Sırp Uçaklarını Düşürmeye İzin,” Milliyet, 02.04.1993

“Sırlara bir ay süre,” Milliyet, 26.03.1998

“Sırlarda Özal Polemiği,” Milliyet, 25.03.1993

“Taksim’den Vahşete Lanet,” Milliyet, 14.02.1993


“Türk Jetleri Bosna’ya,” Milliyet, 17.04.1993


“Türkiye Çalışmaların Ortasında,” Milliyet, 28 April 1993

“Türkiye’den Müdahale,” Milliyet, 04.10.1998


“Sırplara NATO Balyozu,” Milliyet, 31.08.1995

Ankara’dan diplomatik atak,” Milliyet, 14.04.1992

Barçın Yinanç, “İKO Kosovo sorununda zorlandı,” Milliyet, 18.03.1998

Barçın Yinanç, “Kosova Krizinde Üçlü Türk Planı,” Milliyet, 09.03.1998


Derya Sazak, “Gali’ye Mektuplar,” Milliyet, 03.02.1993

Doğan Heper, “Türkiye Kosova’nın Neresinde,” Milliyet, 17.06.1999


Fikret Bila, “Özal Bizi Bağlamaz,” Milliyet, 02.02.1993


NATO official website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm


Sami Kohen, “Bosna’ya asker göndermek iyi ama…,” Milliyet, 09.03.1994

Sami Kohen, “Bulgarlara güven ve güvence,” Milliyet, 17.03.1993

Sami Kohen, “Makedonya’ya tam destek,” Milliyet, 19.03.1993


Sema Emiroğlu, “NATO’ya BM Köşteği,” Milliyet, 30.06.1998


Taha Akyol, “Kosova’da Bayrak,” Milliyet, 17.06.1999


Taki Berberakis and Aslı Çığır, “Ortak Bildiride Çözüme Yer Yok,” Milliyet, 10.06.1998

Taki Berberakis ve Aslı Çığır, “Kosovo Kurtulsun,” Milliyet, 09.06.1998
The official website of Turkish Armed Forces,
http://www.tsk.tr/20_ingilizce_tsktr/5_international_relations/contribution-of-the-turkish-armed-forces-to-peace-support-operations.html


The official website of Council of Europe,
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en

The official website of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
http://www.osce.org/who

The official website of Organizations of American States,

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

The UNSC Resolution 1160

Turan Yavuz, “ABD’nin Bosna Planı Özalda”, Milliyet, 10.03.1993

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), “Turkey,”


Yasemin Çongar, “ABD’nin Kosova Atağı,” Milliyet, 01.06.1998

Yasemin Çongar, “Rambouillet öldü, Yaşasın Rambouillet,” Milliyet, 10.04.1999

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY


Bu noktada insani müdahale kavramının hem devletlerin egemenliği, toprak bütünlüğü ve içlerine karşıılmazlık gibi bazı prensipleri yakından ilgilendiren hem de bireylerin temel hak ve özgürlüklerinin korunmasını önceleren bir yönünün bulunduğuna dikkat çekmek gerekir. Bu yüzden insani müdahale meselesi üzerine yapılan tartışmalar genellikle devletlerin egemenliğine saygı gösterilerek uluslararası düzenin ne pahasına olursa olsun korunması mı gerektiği, yoksa insanların temel hak ve özgürlüklerinin her türlü saldırıya karşı korunması ve geliştirilmesinin mi gerektiği ikilemi üzerinde cereyan etmiştir.

Yapılan tüm bu tartışmalar uluslararası normların, değerlerin ve prensiplerin yeniden yorumlanmasını ve zamanın ihtiyaçlarına göre yeniden anlamlanmasını gerektiği kesinlikle yönetildiği gibi yanıtlanmıştır. Çünkü uluslararası normlar, değerler ve prensipler uluslararası toplumun kendisinden bağımsız değildir. Uluslararası toplumu oluşturan ve en önemli aktörü konumunda bulunan devletlerin söylemeleri ve eylemlerine göre bu normlara, değerleri ve prensiplere yüklenen anıtlar
farklılaşabilir, çünkü bunlar birer sosyal gerçeklktir. Her sosyal gerçeklik gibi uluslararası normlar, değerler ve prensipler de uluslararası toplumu oluşturan aktörlerin ortak anlayışları, ihtiyaçları ve beklentilerine göre şekillenir. Bu yüzden sosyal gerçeklikler statik değil dinamiktir, değişime ve düşünümeye açıktır.

Dolayısıyla ulus-devletlerin ortaya çıkma başladığı 17. yüzyıldan günümüze kadar gelen süreçte egemenlik ve içleriğe karsılmama gibi prensiplerin kapsamının ve içeriklerinin belli oranda değişip dönüşüğünü iddia etmek yanlış olmaz. Özellikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından insan haklarının uluslararasılaşmaya başlanması devletlerin egemenlik ve içleriğe karşılmazlık haklarına ciddi sınırlamalarına neden olmuştur. Bu yeni dönemde insan hakları meselesi devletlerin mısır yetki alanının dışında değerlendirilmeye başlanmıştır. Özellikle Soğuk Savaşı sonrası süreçte patlak veren krizlerde görüldüğü gibi insan hakları sorunları devletlerin içleriğe mesele olmaktan çıkıp uluslararası mesele olarak ele alınmaya başlanmıştır.


Gerek siyasi gerekse hukuki açıdan tartışlan bu farklı argümanlar devletlerin insanlı müdahale yaklaşımlarının oluşması ve bu yaklaşımları mesrulaştırma çabalarında da görülebilir. Devletler aynı uluslararası hukuk kuralları üzerinde yürütülen bu farklı yorumları öne koyan politikalarını ve insanlı müdahale yaklaşımlarını mesrulaştırmaya çalışabilme hakkıldır.


Insanlı müdahale konusunda uluslararası alanda yaşanan bu gelişmeler Türkiye’yi de etkilemiş ve dış politikasını belli oranda dönüşüme uğratmıştır. Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca maceracı politikalardan uzak durmaya ve bölgesel
Türkiye'nin dış politika tarzındaki bu değişim uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmelerin önemli bir payı vardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan çatışma ve istikrarsızlık ortamında müdahaleci bir tavır sergilemiştir. Türkiye'nin dış politika tarzındaki bu değişim uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmelerin önemli bir payı vardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan çatışma ve istikrarsızlık ortamında müdahaleci bir tavır sergilemiştir. Türkiye' nin dış politika tarzındaki bu değişim uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmelerin önemli bir payı vardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan çatışma ve istikrarsızlık ortamında müdahaleci bir tavır sergilemiştir. Türkiye' nin dış politika tarzındaki bu değişim uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmelerin önemli bir payı vardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan çatışma ve istikrarsızlık ortamında müdahaleci bir tavır sergilemiştir. Türkiye' nin dış politika tarzındaki bu değişim uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmelerin önemli bir payı vardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan çatışma ve istikrarsızlık ortamında müdahaleci bir tavır sergilemiştir. Türkiye' nin dış politika tarzındaki bu değişim uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmelerin önemli bir payı vardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan çatışma ve istikrarsızlık ortamında müdahaleci bir tavır sergilemiştir. Türkiye' nin dış politika tarzındaki bu değişim uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmelerin önemli bir payı vardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan çatışma ve istikrarsızlık ortamında müdahaleci bir tavır sergilemiştir. Türkiye' nin dış politika tarzındaki bu değişim uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmelerin önemli bir payı vardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan çatışma ve istikrarsızlık ortamında müdahaleci bir tavır sergilemiştir. Türkiye' nin dış politika tarzındaki bu改变においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確実性の状況下で対応する積極的な姿勢を示し、その国際的な立場や外交スタイルでのこの変化が国際的な変化の中においても重要な役割を果たしています。トルコは、冷戦後の時期に発生した対立と不確か
bilincinde görülebilir. Etnik-milliyetçi güdülerin bölge siyasetinde önemli etkilerinin olduğu bir ortamda, Türk insanı ve karar alıcılar farklı etnik gruba mensup olmalarına rağmen Boşnak ve Kosovalılara karşı yürütülen Sırp zulmünün durdurulması için diğer krizlere göre daha fazla çaba sarf ettikleri görülmüştür.


Ikinci bölüm insani müdahale kavramı ve bunun üzerine yürütülen normatif ve uluslararası hukuk tartışmaları kapsamaktadır. İkinci bölüm genel bir olaya bakıldığında veya bu tür müdahalelerin desteklenmesinde söz konusu tartışmalardan genellikle yararlanıldığı için Türkiye’nin bu meseleye yaklaşımının şekillenmesinde de bu tartışmaların etkili olduğu düşünülmüştür. Bu çalışma bahsi geçen tartışmaları egemenlik, uluslararası toplum, insan hakları ve uluslararası hukuk kavramları bağlamında değerlendirilmiştir. Bu kavramlar hem insani müdahale doktrinini hem de Türkiye’nin dış politikasını yakından ilgilendirdiği için, ikinci bölüm bu kavramların içeriği, tarihsel süreçte nasıl dönüştüme uğradığı ve insani müdahalenin nasıl meşrulaştırıldığı gibi hususları değerlendirilmeye çalışmıştır. Ayrıca çalışma insani müdahaleye karşı çıkanların argümanlarına da değinmiş, insani müdahalenin nicin yapılmaması gerektirir bir eylem olduğu ve mevcut uluslararası düzenleme ne gibi zararlar verebileceği de tartışılmıştır.

Dördüncü bölüm ise Kosova örneği bağlamında Türkiye’nin insani müdahale yaklaşımasını incelemektedir. Bosna örneğinde olduğu gibi bu bölümde de Türkiye’nin Kosova krizindeki insani müdahale yaklaşımanın krizin tarihi arka planı, uluslararası toplumun tepkileri ve Türkiye’nin kendi şartları, girişimleri ve edindiği izlenimlerin etkisi altında şekillendiği iddia edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda Kosova krizinin nasıl ortaya çıktığı ve ne şekilde geliştiği hakkında kısa bir tarihsel arka plan sunulmuş ve uluslararası toplum Kosova krizine yönelik tepkileri incelenmiştir. Ardından Türkiye’nin bu krize karşı yürüttüğü dış politika gerçekleştirmiş olduğu diplomatik girişimler ve iç siyasetinde yapılan tartışmalar çerçevesinde analiz edilmiştir. En sonunda da Türkiye’nin Kosova krizi özelinde nasıl bir insani müdahale yaklaşıımı benimsediğinin değerlendirilmesi yapılmıştır.


Kosova ile karşılaştırıldığında Bosna krizinin tarihi arka planı biraz farklıdır. Bosna Yugoslavya’nın altı federe devletinden birisiydi. Miloseviç


Bununla birlikte ABD, Fransa ve İngiltere gibi Batılı ülkeler Kosova için askeri müdahale yapılması hususunda Türkiye’nin de içinde bulunduğu diğer ülkelerde göre daha fazla istekli görünmüştürlerdir. Bosna’daki müdahaleci tutumunun aksine Türkiye, müdahaleye yönelik güçlü işaretleri görece kadar


Ayrıca, Türkiye’nin 1974 yılında icra ettiği Kıbrıs Barış Harekât’ından elde ettiği tecrübelerin de kendisinin Bosna ve Kosova krizlerinde çok taraflı çözüm politikasından yana tavr almasında büyük etkisi olduğu söylenebilir. Türkiye uluslararası hukuktan doğan haklarını kullanarak Kıbrıs
müdahalesini gerçekleştirmesine rağmen, Batılı müttefiklerin ciddi tepkilerine ve eleştirilerine maruz kalmaktan kurtulamamış, uzun yıllar bu müdahalenin siyasi ve ekonomik bedellerini ödemek zorunda kalmıştır. Bu tecrübe Türkiye’yi uluslararası toplumdan soyutlayacak tek tarafı bir askeri müdahalenin muhtemel tehlikelerini Türk karar alıcılarla öğretmiştir. Böylece Türkiye, Bosna ve Kosova krizleri sürecinde uluslararası toplumla özellikle de Batılı müttefikleri ile birlikte hareket etmeye önem vermiş ve sorunları uluslararası meşruiyet zemininde çözmeye çalışmıştır.

Sonuç olarak Türkiye’nin insanlı müdahale yaklaşıımı, krizlerin tarihsel arka planı, uluslararası tepkiler ve Türkiye’nin kendi özel şartları, girişimleri ve sorunların çözümü sürecinde edindiği tecrübelerin etkisi ile şekillenmiştir. Önceki bölümlerde detaylı olarak yapılan analizler ışığında ABD gibi bazı Batılı müttefiklerin yaklaşımları ve politikaları Türkiye’nin insanlı müdahale yaklaşımanın şekillenmesinde önemli ölçüde etkisi olmuştur. Ayrıca Türkiye teorik kısımda tartışılan normatif ve hukuki argümanlardan yararlanarak Bosna ve Kosova krizlerinde=yürüttüğü politikaları meşrulaşturmaya çalışmıştır.
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN
Soyadı : ÇİLDİR
Adı : ŞÜKRÜ
Bölümü : ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : TURKEY’S APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE CASES OF BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: