

D. AMETBEK

LOCATING TURKEY
IN KAZAKHSTAN'S EURASIAN IDENTITY

DINMUKHAMMED AMETBEK

JULY 2015

METU
2015

LOCATING TURKEY
IN KAZAKHSTAN'S ERASIAN IDENTITY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DINMUKHAMMED AMETBEK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JULY 2015

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (METU, IR)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Güner Özkan
(Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi, IR)

Assoc. Prof. Hasan Ali Karasar
(Atılım Üniversitesi, IR)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı (METU, PSPA)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu (METU, IR)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Dinmukhammed Ametbek

Signature :

ABSTRACT

LOCATING TURKEY IN KAZAKHSTAN'S EURASIAN IDENTITY

Ametbek, Dinmukhammed

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

July 2015, 315 pages

In this dissertation I analyzed Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey in the post-independence period. In my examination, I applied Constructivist as well as the image theory of International Relations. In Constructivist understanding, it is the identity of the state, which determines its perception. Based on this conception, the main argument of the study is that the basic determinant of the Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is Kazakhstan's national identity. Due to the demographic and geopolitical conditions of the country, Nazarbayev identified Kazakhstan as a Eurasian state. Since then, Eurasianism became a state ideology of Kazakhstan's pluralism and multilateralism at the core of which Kazakh-Russian or Turkic-Slavic nucleus is located. This nucleus at the domestic level pulls and consolidates all ethnic and religious groups in the country. At the international level it does not gravitate towards Russia or Turkey but is a center, which pulls both Moscow and Ankara. In this way, Eurasianism became the philosophical basis for the Kazakh multi-vector foreign policy. In this equation Turkey, the leader of the Turkic world represents one side of the Eurasian nucleus of Kazakhstan. In other words, Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is directly related to the Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan. In the eventual analysis I used the image theory of international relations in order to measure the

Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. According to the image theory there are four levels of analysis: decision maker, elite, general public, and international levels. Based on the analysis, I argue that Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is evolving from a negative 'alien image' and 'image of other' to a positive 'friend image' and 'brother image'.

Keywords: *Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey, image of Turkey, Kazakhstan's Eurasianism, Kazakh-Turkish relations*

ÖZ

KAZAKİSTAN'IN AVRASYA KİMLİĞİNE TÜRKİYE'NİN KONUMLANDIRILMASI

Ametbek, Dinmukhammed

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

Temmuz 2015, 315 sayfa

Bu tez Türkiye'nin Kazakistan'daki algısını analiz ediyor. Bunu yaparken ben Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi'nin İnşacı yaklaşımını ve Uluslararası İlişkilerin İmaj Teorisi'ni kullandım. İnşacı anlayışa göre, algıyı belirleyen devlet kimliğidir. Bu anlayışa dayanarak, çalışmanın temel argümanı, Türkiye'nin Kazakistan'daki algısının temel belirleyicisi Kazakistan'ın milli kimliğidir. Ülkenin demografik ve jeopolitik koşullarından dolayı, Nazarbayev Kazakistan'ı Avrasya devleti olarak tanımladı. O zamandan beri, merkezinde Kazak-Rus veya Türk-Slav tandem çekirdeği bulunan Avrasyacılık, Kazakistan'ın çoğulculuk ve çok taraflılığını savunan devlet ideolojisi haline geldi. Bu çekirdek iç politikada ülkedeki tüm etnik ve dini grupları etrafına çeker ve birleştirir. Uluslararası ilişkilerde ise bu çekirdek Rusya veya Türkiye'ye doğru çekilmez, tersine Moskova ve Ankara'yı kendine çeken bir merkez haline gelir. Bu şekilde, Avrasyacılık çok vektörlü Kazak dış politikasının felsefi temelini oluşturur. Bu düşünceler çerçevesinde, Türk dünyasının lideri olan Türkiye, Kazakistan'ın Avrasya çekirdeğinin bir tarafını temsil eder. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin Kazakistan'daki algısı Kazakistan'ın Avrasya kimliği ile doğrudan ilgilidir. Pratik açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye'nin Kazakistan'daki algısını ölçmek için algıyı karar verici, elit, genel halk ve uluslararası çevre olarak dört

seviyede analiz eden Uluslararası İlişkilerin İmaj Teorisi'ni uyguladım. Bu seviyeleri incelerken çalışmanın temel argümanı, Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısının olumsuz 'yabancı imaj' ve "öteki' imaj'dan olumlu 'dost imaj' ve 'kardeş imaj'a doğru gelişmekte olduğudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısı, Türkiye'nin imajı, Kazakistan'ın Avrasyacılığı, Kazak-Türk ilişkileri*

Ađam Ğaniy Ämetbekke

Abim Gani Ametbek'e

To my brother Gani Ametbek

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A Kazakh proverb says: ‘Knowledge is like digging a well with a needle’ (*Bilim iynemen qudıq qazğanday*). I would not have begun to dig my well and follow an academic career, if there was not encouragement of my supervisor Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı. He supported me not only in the process of writing the dissertation but also throughout my all stay in Turkey. If one day I become a professor in my life, it is thanks to Hüseyin Hoca’s inspiration and vision that I should make a presentation on ‘Turkish foreign policy: viewed from Kazakhstan’ in 2023, during the hundred anniversary celebration of the Republic of Turkey. I also wish to express my deepest gratitude to Assist. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Güner Özkan for their guidance and advice throughout the research. I also thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar for their constructive criticism of the study. It was a great honour for me to defend the dissertation in front of such distinguished scholars in Eurasian studies. Eventually, I think I have to thank my wife Nurzhanat Ametbek for her support and patience in all these years.

It would be difficult for me to conduct the research if there was not financial support of several Turkish state institutions. First of all, I have to thank the National Ministry of Education of Turkey which supported me within the program ‘Great Student Project’ (*Büyük Öğrenci Projesi*). I would like to express my special thanks to Birol Dok, the coordinator of the program and to Songül Çakmak, the civil servant of Ankara branch of the ministry. In addition, I thank TÜBİTAK (the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) for its support between the years of 2009 and 2013. At last but not least, I thank Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities of Prime Ministry of Republic of Turkey, (*T.C Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı*) and Türkiye Scholarships.

TRANSLITERATION

Kazakh Alphabet	Transliteration	Pronunciation Notes
А а	A a	(as in <i>father</i>)
Ә ә	Ä ä	(as in <i>cat</i>)
Б б	B b	
В в	V v	
Г г	G g	
Ғ ғ	Ğ ğ	(as in the guttural French r: <i>raison</i>)
Д д	D d	
Е е	E e	(slightly palatalized: <i>ye</i>)
Ё ё	Yo	
Ж ж	J j	(as in <i>John</i>)
З з	Z z	
И и	İy iy	(schwa + ee as a back diphthong)
	Iy iy	(schwa + ee as a front diphthong)
Й й	Y y	(consonant, as in <i>yes</i> , or in Turkish <i>bay</i>)
К к	K k	(velar or soft k)
Қ қ	Q q	(back-velar or hard k)
Л л	L l	
М м	M m	
Н н	N n	

Ң ң	ñ	(ng, as in <i>going</i>)
О о	О о	(with a glide in initial position: wo)
Ө ө	Ö ö	(as in German <i>schön</i> but with a glide: wö)
П п	P p	
Р р	R r	
С с	S s	
Т т	T t	
У у	Uw uw	(as in Turkish <i>su</i> or <i>tuğ</i>)
	Üw üw	(as in Turkish <i>serüven</i>)
	W w	(consonant, as in <i>wet</i>)
У у	U u	(very low, rounded back vowel)
У у	Ü ü	(as in German <i>für</i> but closer to ö)
Ф ф	F f	
Х х	H h	(as in German <i>ich</i>)
Һ һ	H h	
Ц ц	Ts ts	
Ч ч	Ç ç	
Ш ш	Ş ş	
Щ щ	Ş ş	
ъ		(Russian hard sign)
Ы ы	I ı	(schwa, as in Turkish <i>hanım</i>)
І і	İ i	(Shorter than English i)
ь		(Russian soft sign)
Э э	E e	(unpalatalized short e in foreign words)
Ю ю	Yu yu	
Я я	Ya ya	

In this dissertation, for transliterating Kazakh words I utilized Bruce G. Privratsky's transliteration system which he used in his book *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory*¹ with slight modification of mine. For transliteration of Russian words, I benefited from US Library of Congress Transliteration System.

¹ Bruce G. Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory*, Curzon, Great Britain, 2001, p. xix.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
TRANSLITERATION	x
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xiii
LIST OF TABLES	xvii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. PERCEPTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES	16
2.1 Introduction.....	16
2.2 Perception and International Relations Theories	18
2.3 Perception and Constructivism	21
2.4 Image Theory of International Relations	23
2.4.1 Decision Maker Level	26
2.4.2 Elite Level.....	26

2.4.3 General Public Level	27
2.4.4 International Level	28
2.5 Methodology	31
2.6 Conclusion	32
3. KAZAKHSTAN'S EURASIAN IDENTITY	33
3.1 Introduction	33
3.2 The Emergence of Ethnic Kazakh Identity	33
3.3 Eurasian Feature of Kazakhstan's National Identity	44
3.3.1 Domestic Factors	46
3.3.2 International Factors	65
3.4 Kazakhstan's Eurasianism	86
3.5 Conclusion	95
4. NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV'S PERCEPTION OF TURKEY	99
4.1 Introduction	99
4.2 Presidential Term of Turgut Özal	103
4.3 Presidential Term of Süleyman Demirel	115
4.4 Presidential Term of Ahmet Necdet Sezer	121
4.5 Presidential Term of Abdullah Gül	132
4.6 Conclusion	145
5. KAZAKH ELITE'S PERCEPTION OF TURKEY	148
5.1 Introduction	148
5.1.1 Emergence of Kazakh Intelligentsia	149

5.2 Kazakh Elite after the Independence	153
5.3 The Eurasian Identity of the New Kazakh Elite	155
5.4 The Kazakh Elite’s Perception of Turkey.....	158
5.4.1 Bureaucratic Elite	160
5.4.2 Intellectual Elite.....	175
5.5 Kazakh Elite’s Perception of Turkish Foreign Policy	182
5.5.1 Turkey’s Relations with Eurasia.....	183
5.5.2 Turkey’s Relations with the West	199
5.5.3 Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East	204
5.6 Conclusion	210
6. KAZAKH PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF TURKEY	213
6.1 Introduction.....	213
6.2 Eurasian Identity of Kazakhstan or Kazakh-language Media vs. Russian-language Media.....	214
6.3 Kazakh Diaspora in Turkey	220
6.4 Cooperation in the Field of Education	222
6.5 Tourism of Turkey	232
6.6 Public Polls	234
6.7 Conclusion	238
7. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND KAZAKHSTAN’S PERCEPTION OF TURKEY	242
7.1 Introduction.....	242
7.2 Eurasian Environment of Kazakhstan.....	243

7.3 Kazakhstan-Turkey Interaction.....	251
7.4 Conclusion	259
8. CONCLUSION.....	261
BIBLIOGRAPHY	275
APPENDICES.....	295
A: LIST OF INTERVIEWED KAZAKH EXPERTS	295
B: CURRICULUM VITAE.....	296
C: TURKISH SUMMARY.....	297
D: THESIS COPY PERMISSION FORM	315

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Dynamics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.....	249
---	-----

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the Soviet Union did not mean only the disappearance of a super power from international arena but also meant the emergence of 15 new states of international politics. In many of these new states nation and state building was an urgent priority after independence. Among the former Soviet states, Kazakhstan was one of the most fragile states due to its geopolitical location, namely its neighborhood with Russia, the presence of large ethnic Russian minority as well as the dominant place of Soviet culture and Russian language in the country. The ethnic Kazakhs, a Turkic-speaking group in the country, who consider Kazakhstan as their fatherland, possess weak positions in terms of culture, language, education, and even demography. In nation building process in Kazakhstan, Kazakh² leadership had to take into account these realities. In this case, nation building and identity construction process in Kazakhstan cannot be analyzed separately from its foreign policy and especially its relations with Russia and Turkey with whom Kazakhstan share common culture and language. While Kazakhstan's interactions with these

² In this dissertation the definition 'Kazakh' means adjective which is related to Kazakhstan. Until recently, the term Kazakhstani was used as an adjective to define something related to Kazakhstan, but in official Kazakh media now the term 'Kazakh' replaced the term 'Kazakhstani'. For example, Kazakh minister of foreign affairs.

states contribute to the consolidation of Kazakhstani people, on the other hand Kazakh foreign policy itself toward these states is presented as the reflection of the interests of certain segments of country's population.

In this dissertation I will examine Kazakhstan's national identity and what role Turkey plays with respect to this identity. The research question of the study is to analyze the construction of Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity and find out how this identity is reflected in Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey and vice-versa. It is important to note here that the legacy of Turkic civilization and the subsequent Russian-Soviet culture had deep impacts on the country's self-identification. It means that Turkey which is the main power in the Turkic world and the country which was established with strong references to Turkic civilization, has direct implications on the construction of modern Kazakhstan's national identity.

Kazakhstan is situated between Slavic and Turkic worlds. The country's population is composed of Slavic (mainly Russians) and Turkic (mainly Kazakhs) people. Therefore, both at the international level and as well as the domestic one, Kazakhstan is under influence of these two civilizational-cultural zones. Accordingly, Kazakhstan's national identity is shaped by these two neighboring civilizations and Slavic and Turkic components of its own population. In international relations, Slavic people of the country see Russia as the natural ally of Kazakhstan and consider that Kazakhstan is a part of the Slavic world. While the Turkic people of the country see Turkey as the natural ally and consider that Kazakhstan is a part of the Turkic world. What is more acute for Kazakhstan's survival is that the convergence of the country with Russia is viewed by Turkic people as a threat to their existence, while the convergence of the country with Turkic world is viewed by Slavic people as a threat to their vital interests. In other words, Slavic component of the population is pulled towards Russia, while Turkic one is pulled towards Turkey. In the worst-case scenario this can lead to the partition of the country to the Slavic North and Turkic South. Taking into account this dichotomy of the county, Kazakhstan's founding President Nursultan Nazarbayev defined Kazakhstan as a Eurasian state and introduced his own vision of Eurasianism.³

³ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Strategiya Nezavisimosti* (Strategy of Independence), Atamura, Almaty, p. 40.

As it is known the School of Eurasianism was established by the Russian emigrants in Europe who tried to solve the identity crisis of Russia in 1920s. The Eurasian thought's main argument is that for Russia to survive as a great power it must recognize that the space where Russia was built is the place of interaction and co-existence of Slavic and Turkic people.⁴ The Eurasianists were against Slavophil and Pan-Slavists who give prominence to Slavic culture at the expense of the Turkic culture. In this way these scholars tried to revise Russian History Thesis, which demonized Genghis Khan and the period of the domination of the Turkic people. They re-evaluated the period of Turkic domination positively and claimed that that period played an important role in establishing Russian statehood.

Nazarbayev, by introducing his own version of Eurasianism, utilized many aspects of Russian Eurasianist thinkers of the early twentieth century who can be classified as the Classical Eurasianists. Nazarbayev was well aware that ethnic Kazakh nationalism in Kazakhstan can lead to the fragmentation of the state; just as in the Russian case, Pan-Slavism or ethnic Russian nationalism can lead to the disintegration of Russia. In addition, Kazakh leadership could not ignore the Tsarist Russian and the Soviet period of country's history. Therefore, Nazarbayev's Eurasianism emphasized the Slavic-Turkic or Kazakh-Russian co-existence. Furthermore Kazakhstan was presented as a place where more than hundred ethnic and religious groups live in peace and harmony. Nazarbayev's Eurasianism became the ideological and academic basis of country's pluralism and multiculturalism. In this sense, Nazarbayev's Eurasianism is another name of the inclusive, civic nationalism of Kazakhstan.

In order to highlight the implications of this Eurasian identity for Kazakhstan's foreign policy, it is useful to remind geopolitical situation in early 1990s. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR, the post-Soviet space became a geopolitical and geo-cultural battleground between different powers. In Eastern Europe, European-Western values were ready to replace the Russian-Soviet ones. But in the post-Soviet Muslim republics, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Arab countries

⁴ Lev Gumilyov, *Ritmy Evrazii: Epokhi i Tsivilizatsii* (Rhythms of Eurasia: Ages and Civilizations), AST, Moskva, p. 23.

were struggling for influence. Although the Islamic fundamentalism of Arab countries was gaining ground in the region, the main geopolitical and geo-cultural struggle occurred between Russia and Turkey due to the ethnic and cultural similarities between the latter and the new Turkic states.

This geopolitical struggle between Moscow and Ankara formed a challenge for Kazakhstan, which was located between the Slavic world and the Turkic one. In this context, Nazarbayev's Eurasianism that underlined Slavic-Turkic co-existence in domestic politics, constituted the main basis for building cooperation with both Russia and Turkey at the same time. Therefore, in Nazarbayev's understanding, Moscow and Ankara are not opposing poles but centers with whom Kazakhstan must build durable relations. While in the domestic politics Eurasianism became the basis to build poly-ethnic Kazakhstani identity, in foreign policy Eurasianism became the basis for pursuing a multi-vector policy which means that Kazakhstan's convergence to a certain country or region does not mean its divergence from the others.⁵

Within the framework of the multi-vector foreign policy, Astana develops equal and balanced relations in four directions. In the northern direction Kazakhstan develops strong relations with the CIS countries and especially with Russia. In the eastern direction, Kazakhstan constructs beneficial relations with Asian countries and especially partnership relations with neighboring China. In the western direction, Kazakhstan builds beneficial relations with EU and the USA. In the southern direction Kazakhstan restores its traditional relations, which were cut during the Cold War, with Muslim countries where Turkey is no doubt a significant country.⁶

Among these foreign policy directions due to the Eurasian identity of country, Astana tries to develop good relations both with Moscow and Ankara. Astana's relations with these two capitals, which are considered not only as capitals of Russia and Turkey respectively but also considered as those of the Slavic and Turkic worlds

⁵ A. N. Nysanbayev & V. Y. Dunayev (eds.), *Evrziiskaya Doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva* (Eurasian Doctrine of Nursultan Nazarbayev), Almaty, 2010.

⁶ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Strategiya Nezavisemosti* (Strategy of Independence), Atamura, Almaty, p. 40. Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, *Vneshnyaya Politika Kazahstana v Usloviyah Globalizatsiyi* (Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy under the conditions of Globalisation), Almaty: AO Sak, 2000.

respectively, have deep implications in the domestic politics of the country. Based on this reality, Kazakh government prioritizes its relations with both Moscow and Ankara.

To position this Moscow-Ankara axis on Kazakhstan's Eurasianism, Kazakh scholars utilize the classical Eurasianists' emphasis on the Russian-Turkic synthesis and define Kazakhstan as the center of Eurasia where all ethnic and religious groups of the region, but first of all Slavic and Turkic people (explicitly Russians and Kazakhs), live in peaceful co-existence. According to Kazakh Eurasianist scholars, generally when we say Eurasia, where East meets West, Europe meets Asia, and Islam meets Christianity, three countries stand out. They are Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkey "which must jointly constitute a new trans-Eurasian axis. However, according to this logic, Kazakhstan gets pride of place because it is at the center of the center, a meeting place for the two other states."⁷ As the country, which is situated at the center of Eurasia or in the very intersection of Slavic and Turkic worlds, its interaction with Russia is viewed as an extension of its Slavic identity and its interaction with Turkey is considered as the reflection of its Turkic identity. Thus, Kazakhstan's interaction with Russia strengthens the Slavic component of its Eurasian identity, while its interaction with Turkey contributes to the strengthening of the Turkic component. In the final analysis, Turkic and Slavic extremes meet on common ground of the Eurasianism.

From this point of view, Turkey and Turkish foreign policy's activism in the region takes special importance for Kazakhstan. Turkey is evaluated not only as a strategic asset to balance against Russia but also in domestic politics it is considered as an instrument to balance the domination of the Russian culture and language.

In this context, Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is important. The location of Turkey in Kazakhstan's domestic politics means Turkey's image in Kazakhstan. The phenomena of perception, misperception and image began to be studied in international relations academically since 1950s. The writings of scholars such as

⁷ Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008, p. 183.

Kenneth Boulding,⁸ Robert Jervis⁹ and Glenn Fisher¹⁰ underlined the vital importance of the phenomena. Although the problem of perception and image is a subject, which is studied by most schools of the mainstream International Relations Theories,¹¹ the phenomenon is theoretically well analyzed by the Constructivist School. According to Constructivism, there are close relations between identity and perception and they reciprocally construct each other.¹² In other words, identity shapes perception and perception shapes behavior in turn.

In our case, Kazakhstan's identity necessitates interaction with Turkey, and on the other hand Kazakh-Turkish interaction affects Kazakhstan's identity. In other words, Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey can be well explained by Kazakhstan's national identity. Nevertheless, to utilize the assumptions of the Constructivists does not mean that I exclude the premises of the other approaches for example, power balance policy assumption of Realism. Besides the mainstream schools of International Relations Theories, the research is built on the image theory of international relations. The image theory is applied to measure a certain country's attitude to another country. So I apply this theory to analyze Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. According to this theory, there are four levels of analysis. These are decision makers, elite, domestic politics, and international environment. So I analyze Kazakhstan's view in these four levels.

While examining Turkey's image, the methodology I applied is a research and data collection through the analysis of library sources including books, academic journals,

⁸ Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969, p. 10. K. E. Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 1959), p. 120.

⁹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p.13. Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1970, p. 8.

¹⁰ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Second Edition, Intercultural Press, USA, 1997, p. 23.

¹¹ The notion of Soft Power can be considered within frame of image and perception.

¹² Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 397.

and newspaper archives. I tried to cover how Kazakh elite, politicians, academics and general public view Turkey and Turkish foreign policy. For that purpose all available Internet resources composed of online journals and books, websites of newspapers, state departments and ministries, embassies, research centers were considered as well.

At the decision making level the books, speeches, statements of the Kazakhstan's first president Nursultan Nazarbayev are analyzed. In fact he is the main architect of Kazakhstan's national identity and Kazakh foreign policy. We can say that Kazakhstan is constructed on his views and ideas. Therefore, to understand modern Kazakhstan and its foreign policy, one should understand Nazarbayev. Especially his books written in 1990s give hints about what kind of state he is building and in what direction Kazakhstan will develop.

His book *In the Stream of History* examines the identity and culture of the new republic. Nazarbayev understands that in the country where the population is heterogeneous and there are different cultural orientations, it is difficult to define the national identity. In *Kazakhstan 2030 Strategy*, Nazarbayev tries to find answers to questions 'Who are we?', 'Where are we?', and 'What is our mission?' Nazarbayev's success as the first president of Kazakhstan is his achievement in preventing the conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups living in the country. This success shows that Nazarbayev correctly analyzed the cultural orientations and identities of the community. Having analyzed Kazakhstan as part of the Western, East Asian, Russian and Turco-Islamic civilizations, he notes that certain groups in the country want to see Kazakhstan to be incorporated into a particular civilization at the expense of others. He defines Kazakhstan as a *Eurasian* country who has its own history and its own future. He concludes that "in its civilization orientation we will not put the issue as 'either this or that'; our model will not be same with others. It will combine achievements of all civilizations." To paraphrase it, he means that Kazakhstan is not periphery of these civilizations; but a center of Eurasia with its unique place in the world history.¹³

¹³ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Strategiya Nezavisemosti* (Strategy of Independence), Atamura, Almaty, p. 41.

Concerning the image of Turkey, in his book *On the Threshold of 21st Century*, Nursultan Nazarbayev writes about his first experiences in relations with foreign countries. In that book he mentions about his personal relations with the Turkish presidents Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel and the general trend of Kazakh-Turkish relations.¹⁴ It is apparent that Nazarbayev has positive view on Turkey. He seems to understand the value of Turkey for Kazakh foreign policy and more importantly for the Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan. In another book *In the Stream of History* under the chapter “Kazakh lands are the parts of the Great Turkic Civilization” having examined the relations among Turkic people, Nazarbayev lists one by one what should be done to advance the Turkic civilization in the world.¹⁵ Based on these findings I can argue that Nazarbayev’s foreign policy toward Turkey and Turkic World is not based on day to day decisions and as responses to international conjuncture but based on a grand strategy which aims to strengthen Kazakhstan’s national identity, its place in international arena and its independence from Russia by taking into account the Eurasian identity of the country. So viewed from Kazakhstan, according to Nazarbayev’s vision of Turkey and Turkic world, it is not Turkey but Kazakhstan who is rigorously interested in the discourse of Turkic integration and the Turkic world.

At the elite level, Kazakh bureaucratic and academic elite, who represent the official view, tries to underpin Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism. In this sense, three institutions should be mentioned. National Academy of Science, Eurasian National University named after Lev Gumilyov, and International Turkic Academy established in 2010. These institutions try to position Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism on a more academic ground. Eurasianism is generally understood as integration with the Slavic world and convergence with the Turkic world at the same time. The book *Eurasian Doctrine of Nursultan Nazarbayev* which was edited by Nysanbayev and Dunayev examines Kazakhstan’s place in the integration of post-Soviet countries. On the contrary, two books *Eurasian Idea of N.Nazarbayev and Turkic Space* and *Kazakhstan and Turkic World* published by the Turkic Academy analyze Kazakhstan’s place in the

¹⁴ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Yüzyllar Kavşağında*, Ankara, 2012.

¹⁵ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Almaty: Atamura, 2003.

integration of Turkic world. Another book *Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey: through the Pages of Eurasian Ideas of the 19th and the 21st Centuries* by Sergei Seliverstov, who was professor at the Eurasian National University and currently works in the Administration of President Nazarbayev, describes Kazakhstan as the center of Eurasia and the locomotive of Eurasian studies.¹⁶ In a similar line, another book *East and West Call for Globalization: Civilization Dialogue and Kazakhstan's Middle Eastern Policy* by Bagdad Amreyev, who is a scholar and diplomat, posits Kazakhstan at the point of intersection of Islam and Christianity.¹⁷ The latter book by Amreyev displays the strong relation between the discourse of multi-ethnic and multi-religious identity in domestic politics and the Congress of World and Traditional Religions initiated by Astana.

The common idea in all these books is that Kazakhstan is a Eurasian country where different ethnic and religious groups live in harmony. This feature of the country paves the way to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy. Kazakhstan's Eurasianism makes it possible to harmonize different directions of the foreign policy. This point is clearly underlined by Kazakhstan's foreign minister Tokayev in the early 1990s. The minister drew parallels between domestic politics and foreign policy. He argued that Kazakhstan which represents itself as multi-ethnic and multi-religious country should develop a multi-vector foreign policy.¹⁸

Turkey's place in Kazakh foreign policy is analyzed within the frame of this multi-vector policy. Tokayev's works on Kazakh diplomacy gives detailed information on Turkish foreign policy.¹⁹ A memoir of vice-minister of foreign affairs Salim

¹⁶ Sergei V. Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya: po strnitsam evraziiskikh idei XIX-XXI vekov*, Baspalar uyi, Almaty 2009.

¹⁷ Bagdad Amreyev, *Doğu ve Batı Küreselleşme Çağrısı: Medeniyetler Diyalogu ve Kazakistan'ın Orta Doğu Politikası*, Hayat Yayın Evi, İstanbul, 2011.

¹⁸ Kasymzhomart Tokayev, 'Turtsiya – Strategicheskiy Partner Kazakhstana', in *Kazakhstan-Turtsiya: 5 let druzhby i sotrudnichestva*, Bilig, Ankara, 1996, p. 8.

¹⁹ K.K. Tokaev, *Pod Styagom Nezavisemosti* (Under the Flag of Independence), Almaty, Bilim 1997. Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, *Vneshnyaya Politika Kazahstana v Usloviyah Globalizatsiyi* (Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy under the conditions of Globalisation), Almaty: AO Sak, 2000. Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, *Svet i Ten'* (Light and Shade), Astana, 2007.

Kurmangojin, who during the Soviet Union from 1973 to 1978 worked as the Consul of the USSR in Istanbul, reflects the Soviet view on Turkey.²⁰ In addition books published by the Embassy of Kazakhstan to Turkey: *Kazakhstan-Turkey 5 Years*, *Kazakhstan and Turkey Relations and Turkic World*, and *Kazakhstan and Turkey: 20 Years of Cooperation and Friendship* give detailed information on the cooperation between Kazakhstan and Turkey. All this literature generally reflects official view of Kazakhstan on Turkey. Although in official language there is no term as the ‘brother’ country, Nazarbayev and other high-ranking Kazakh statesmen use this term regarding Turkey. But generally in Kazakh official perception Turkey has a strong image of ‘friend and partner’.

Concerning concretely on Turkish foreign policy there are some studies conducted by young Kazakh scholars. Dulat Sagnayev’s study *Eurasian Policy of Turkish Republic in the Context of National Interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, attempts to analyze the Eurasian dimension of Turkish foreign policy. The author notes that Turkish elite bases their Eurasian policy on ethno-cultural and religious-ideological aspects. He draws attention to the similarities between Kazakhstan and Turkey, both of whom possess multiple identities, in foreign policy principles. It is interesting to note that for the author Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Russia together with other countries of the CIS within the framework of bilateral and multilateral cooperation can contribute to the development of Eurasian integration. He positions Kazakhstan between Turkey and Russia and suggests that Kazakhstan can mediate between these two.²¹ Nazgul Abiyeva in her study *Central Asia in the Foreign Policy of Turkey (from 1992 till present)* notes that from Kazakhstan’s perspective the aim of Kazakh diplomacy is to accelerate the potential of cooperation with Turkey both at the bilateral level and within the scope of international organizations. She first discusses Turkish foreign policy in the directions of Europe, Trans-Atlantic, Middle East, and Russia, and then concentrates on Central Asia. She concludes that the regional policy

²⁰ S.A. Kurmanguzhin, *45 Let na Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhbe*, Jibek Joly, Almaty, 2003.

²¹ Dulat Elemesovich Sagnayev, *Evraziiskaya Politika Turetskoy Respubliki v Kontekste Natsyonal’nykh Interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata politicheskikh nauk, Kazakhskii Natsyonalnyi Pedagogicheskii Universitet imeni Abaya, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2008.

of Turkey toward Central Asia is one of the priorities of its foreign policy.²² Aigerim Shilibekova in her study *Kazakhstan and Turkey in the Context of Emerging Security System of Central Asia*, having emphasized that the only state in the region which has potential to become a locomotive fostering regional cooperation is Kazakhstan, describes Turkey as a security provider in Eurasia and argues that its involvement in Central Asia is based upon more realistic and pragmatic policies.²³ Both in Abiyesova and Shilibekova's study Turkey and Russia are evaluated as equal subjects of international politics. Zarema Aznabakiyeva in her study *The Question of Accession of Turkey into European Union*²⁴ and Materials of the International Research Conference, *Interrelations of Turkey and Central Asia in the Context of Enlarging Europe*²⁵ underlines that Turkey is situated between Europe and Central Asia. The main idea is that Turkey's membership in EU will positively affect Central Asia's development.

These academic studies stand close to official point of view; therefore they do not analyze multi-vector Kazakh foreign policy critically. However there is another group of intellectual elite who support integration solely with the Turkic World at the expense of integration with Russia. Tursin Jurtbay, Aydos Sarım, Askar Qumıran, and Naziya Joyamergen can be listed as the Kazakh thinkers and public figures who argue that integration with Russia is against the Kazakh national interests and thus they support integration within Turkic world. Although their number is small; in this

²² Nazgul' Shakimashripovna Abiesova, *Tsentral'naya Aziya vo Vneshney Politike Turtsii (s 1992 g. – po nyneshnii den')*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Kazakhski Natsyonalnyi Pedagogocheskii Universitet im.Abaya, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006.

²³ Aigerim Shilibekova, *Kazakhstan and Turkey in the Context of Emerging Security System of Central Asia*, unpublished PhD dissertation, the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, 2009.

²⁴ Zarema Myrghyiasovna Aznabakiyeva, *Vopros Vstupleniya Turtsii v Evropeyskii Soyuz*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Kazakhski Natsyonalnyi Universitet im.al-Farabi, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006.

²⁵ M.H. Abuseitova (ed.), *Interrelations of Turkey and Central Asia in the Context of Enlarging Europe*, Materials of the International Research Conference, Daik-Press, Almaty 2006.

dissertation I argue that the discourse of Turkic world in Kazakhstan is becoming more and more popular. Their perception of Turkey is totally different than that of the mainstream views.

Here, at the elite level it can be said that Kazakh elite's view on Turkey is related to the Soviet legacy. This legacy creates special relations with Russia, the center of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Due to the composition, Kazakh elite can be classified as those who favor Russian world and those who favor Turkic world. Therefore, to understand Kazakh elite's view on Turkey, their view on Russia should be elaborated. Kazakh elite's view on Turkey is determined by their view on Russia. In parallel with the main argument of the dissertation, the Eurasian identity of the country shapes the elite's perception of Turkey.

At the public opinion level, Kazakhstan is divided into two broad lines as the Turkic and Slavic ones. The main constructor of the image about a particular country is the mass media in Kazakhstan. Kazakh-language media and Russian-language media speak in different tones. While in Kazakh media euphoria, romanticism and kinship are popular, in Russian language media rationalism prevails. Russian-speaking population of the country is under the influence of the information from the Russian Federation and in some cases, Russian-speaking media serves as the media of Russia not Kazakhstan. Kazakh-language media is relatively independent from Russia. Therefore Kazakh language media tries to construct an independent image of Turkey. It underlines that Turkey is a brother country, while Russian language media emphasizes on a 'friendly Turkey'.

I analyze the relevant public polls in this dissertation as well in order to understand the rising interest of the population towards Turkey. Although the official policy of the country is tilting towards integration with Russia; Kazakh public thinks differently as Moscow's aggressive policy in its near abroad creates concerns. This situation has contributed to Kazakh population's perception of Turkey in a positive manner. Kazakh-speaking media discusses Turkey independently from Russia. In some cases there are contradicting views in Kazakh and Russian language media. Especially, Ukrainian crisis revealed this different perception acutely. While in the Kazakh-language media Turkey's image as 'brother', 'kin', and 'relative' is often

underlined; in Russian language media there is less emphasis on these images. Based on this division different perceptions of Turkey are supported by researches²⁶ and public polls.²⁷ In this way Eurasian identity of the country has its reflection in the Kazakh media and general public opinion.

At the international level, as it was already mentioned, Moscow's attitude in the region determines Kazakhstan's policy towards Turkey. Kazakhstan, which has the longest land border in the world with Russia, has no luxury to play power politics and draw zigzags in its foreign policy. Kazakhstan has to pursue clear, sincere and predictable policy towards Russia. So Kazakh leadership had to work out a foreign policy strategy which prevents the aggressive attitude of Russia and at the same time preserving Kazakhstan's independence. In this context as we have discussed above, Nazarbayev's Eurasianism presented as a multi-vector foreign policy. Comparing with neo-Eurasianism of Russia which is anti-Western and imperialistic, Kazakhstan's Eurasianism emphasizes cooperation with all regions including the West while respecting the sovereignties of all other states. In this context, while there is a special emphasis on cooperation with Russia, in the final analysis it became only one component of Nazarbayev's Eurasianism. In his vision there is a place for China, Turkey and the West. It can be summarized that the term 'Eurasia' has two meanings: geographical and geo-cultural. In its geographical definition, Eurasia is a continent which covers both Europe and Asia as it was taught in Soviet schools and is still being taught today. In the geo-cultural sense, Eurasia is a space where Slavic and Turkic people co-exist. In a narrow understanding Nazarbayev's Eurasianism means integration of Slavic and Turkic realms with Russia and Turkey, and in a broader sense it means cooperation with the East and the West, with Europe and

²⁶ Anar Somuncuoğlu, 'Bağımsızlık Sonrası Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti'nde "Türkiye ve "Türk" Algısının Geçirdiği Değişim' in *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies*, Cilt: 2, Sayı: 3, 2007, USAK. Guldariga Nogayeva, *Kazakistan'da Türkiye ve Türk İmaji*, Yüksek Lisans tezi AÜ, 2007.

²⁷ Zhanat Mominkulov, 'Kazakistan'da Türkiye ve Türk algısı', Avrasya Ekonomik İlişkiler Derneği adına Gümüşhane Uluslararası Toplantısı için özel Mayıs 2012 tarihinde Al-Farabi Kazak Ulusal Üniversitesinde yapılan sosyolojik araştırma. Dr. Salih Akyürek, 'Kazakistan'da Türkiye ve Türk algısı', BilgeSAM Rapor No: 44, Ankara <http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-91-2014040836rapor44.pdf> Accessed on 15.04.2013.

Asia. In this perception Turkey fits to both understandings. Due to this unique place of Turkey, international environment push Astana towards Ankara.

The analysis of Turkey's image at these four levels supports the main argument of the dissertation which underlines that the Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan determines its perception of and attitude towards Turkey. In all of these four levels, it is observed that Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is shifting from a negative one, which was established by Soviet ideology, to a positive one. In this sense, the originality of the study is that it shows the evolution of Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey where the image of 'other' returned to image of 'brother'.

This dissertation is composed of two main parts. In the first part, Kazakhstan's identity is examined and in the second part Turkey's image viewed through the angle of this identity is analyzed. If the study was based solely on the statements of current Kazakh decision makers, the thesis would be valuable only in examining the period which passed under the rule of the current decision makers. In the case of change in the leadership of the country, the views of the previous leaders would be obsolete. However, the study is based on the identity of Kazakhstan in which the views on Turkish foreign policy are rooted. To examine the identity of Kazakhstan means to grasp the cognitive environments on which views, perceptions, prejudices, stereotypes are based. So what makes the present study original is that it gives clues on the tendencies and cultural orientations of the Kazakh population. It is important to understand self firstly in order to analyze how self perceives the other.

In line with this, the dissertation structurally is composed of two parts. The first part is composed of two chapters. After introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study. Here I discuss the phenomenon of perception in International Relations Theories. I conclude the Chapter with the assumptions of constructivist approach which say that identity determines the perception. From this perspective in Chapter 3, I examine the evolution of the Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev's version of Eurasianism. Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey which is based on this Eurasian identity of the country is discussed in the second part of the study. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 the views of Nazarbayev, Kazakh elite and Kazakh public on Turkey are discussed. Chapter 7

analyzes how international environment influences Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. The last part, Chapter 8 concludes the study.

PART 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND KAZAKHSTAN'S EURASIAN IDENTITY

CHAPTER 2

PERCEPTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

2.1 Introduction

Social sciences are different than Natural Sciences. In natural sciences there is common understanding of things. When a scientist writes H₂O, other scientists all over the world understand it as there is consensus on symbols. In contrast, in social sciences there is no such consensus on the naming of the things. In the era of positivism, social scientists tried to use the rules of natural sciences in social sciences. But by the time it was realized that due to different cultural environments things were perceived in different ways by different people.

So long as *physical* objects are concerned, we agree, but if we turn from physical objects to *social* facts then our story becomes pertinent and very realistic—in symbolic terms. For what to members of the one ethnic group looks like “aggression,” to members of another group looks like “defense” or “revolt;” what to the one group looks like “liberation,” to the other group looks like “enslavement;” what to the one group looks like “re-education,” to the other group looks like “persecution;” what to the one group looks like “dictatorship;” to the other group

looks like “true democracy;” what to the one group looks like a “hero,” to another group looks like a “criminal”—the list could be continued to *infinitum*.²⁸

This is because a human being, as in anecdote of Hoca Nasreddin, who was asked the center of the world answered that it is under his feet, evaluates the outside world from the place where he or she stands. In academic language it is called as ego-centric or ethnocentric view which means that outside world is perceived through cultural and cognitive prism of the perceiver. Generally people tend to think that other people perceive the object in the same way as he or she perceives.

Here we explore that every person has different mindset. According to Fisher, mindsets are to larger issues what words are to the specifics—a means of simplifying the environment and bringing to each new experience or event a pre-established frame of reference for understanding it. Further he argues that the human mind becomes a cognitive system, that is, a framework of mental constructs of the external world and of beliefs, images, assumptions, habits of reasoning, and so forth, by which continuing barrage of stimuli a person receives can be sorted out and given meaning. In simple words, mind’s duty is to give meaning to and interpret things around us on the basis of the information it possesses. Even more, Fisher claims that beliefs and stereotypes can be useful in this regard.²⁹

Human being’s mindset is shaped firstly by parents, elder brother and sisters, friends and environment. As summarized by Fisher

One’s cognitive system is molded by society and culture, by education and socialization process, social experience, information and knowledge transmitted from other people, and, in specific situations, by suggestion and a sense of group sanction or censure. Through social experience, habit of perceiving and reasoning become, in large degree, those of the groups to which we as individuals belong. Such commonality provides the shared outlooks that make social life possible.³⁰

²⁸ Gustav Ichheiser, ‘Misunderstandings in international relations’, *American Sociological Review*, June 1, 1951, p. 311.

²⁹ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Second Edition, Intercultural Press, USA, 1997, p. 23.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

In fact what makes a group of people a society is their shared outlook. A person's perception of external world is framed by this shared outlook of the society. In words of Fisher, the way a person perceives other people, interprets what they are doing and why, and chooses how to respond to them is locked in by socio-cultural circumstances. This phenomenon eventually extends to the way one society perceives another.³¹

The general name of shared outlook, shared values, shared history is culture of people. It is culture which molds cognitive system of people and shapes national identities. Fisher having noted that people view international issues and events through a cultural lens, define this lens as a more fundamental aspect of thinking and perceiving, the basic resource programming from which mindsets are, in part drawn and with which they tend to be consistent.³²

In conclusion due to the different cultural and environmental backgrounds of people social realities can be perceived differently. It means that every community because of its historical development can possess different values which shape their perceptions. Therefore in social sciences the problem of perception became an important issue. In international Relations the problem is twice important as perception, more correctly misperception, can lead to war which is the main subject of the discipline of International Relations.

2.2 Perception and International Relations Theories

Realist school of International Relations Theories as the main representative of positivist thinking firstly was not interested in perception of self by others. In realist understanding the real world is perceived in the same way by all actors. Their main concept of power was analyzed as something which is taken for granted. Realists argue that all actors behave according to the distribution of power. However, later it was realized that there is inconsistency between real power and perceived power. No

³¹ Ibid., p. 27.

³² Ibid., p. 42.

matter how much powerful one state is, if this power is not perceived by others as much powerful as it is, then it does not mean anything.

Thus new concept of 'soft power' emerged. Joseph Nye explains notion of soft power as the ability to shape others' wishes. Soft power rests "on the attractiveness of one's own culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic."³³

All states try to transfer their real power, in Nye's terminology hard power, into soft power. In our context soft power means the perception of self by other. Later it was understood that perception of power can be more important than power itself. It is because the perception of power of self makes self control the minds of others. Eventually it became clear that it is perception which leads to miscalculations in international relations. That is why states are concerned with their image and perception in other states. For any state it is important to know what people of other states think about them. As Morgenthau expressed it "For the struggle for power on international scene is today not only a struggle for military supremacy and political domination, but in a specific sense a struggle for the minds of men."³⁴ To sum up, in realist understanding all works related with improvement of image, prestige, and reputation of the state whether it is propaganda, image making or perception management are considered to be a part of foreign policy which aims to achieve power. And power in words of Morgenthau means control over minds and actions of men.³⁵

In Liberalism in contrast to Realism, there is no term as 'to control minds of men' but instead there can be a term 'enlighten minds of men' due to their belief in progress in the spirit of Enlightenment. In this sense, Liberals take into account

³³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p. 7.

³⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, USA, 1973, p. 148.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

influence of many factors including the human factor in decision process. As it put by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, “Calculations of interest or utility—gains and losses—can also be affected by misunderstandings or misperceptions on the part of decision makers as a result of incomplete information, bias, stress, or uncertainty about cause and effect relations related to policy options under consideration.”³⁶ To overcome the misperception which can lead to war, Liberals propose two remedies. One is democratization of society and second is global governance. The first remedy aims to build peace from down to up that is from unit to system, while the second one aims to do so from up to down, from system to unit. According to the first way which is democratic peace theory, democracies tend not to go to war with each other.³⁷ The second way was based on the understanding of collective security which unfortunately did not work during the League of Nations. Nevertheless, it became one of the foundations of United Nations Organization.

As we see Liberalism is much more focused on the overcoming of misperceptions. However, it should be noted that assumptions of Liberalism especially democratic peace theory constructed a world where authoritarian regimes are perceived as enemies. In the words of Robert Kagan, the world is divided in the line of democratic regimes and authoritarian solidarity.³⁸ In conclusion it can be said that Liberalism contributed to the study of perceptions by recognizing that International Relations are composed not only by nation-states by non-state, transnational actors, non-governmental organizations, interest groups and individuals.

English School in comparison with Realism and Liberalism stands one step closer to phenomenon of perception by introducing sociological aspect of international relations. The term international society means that states compose a society and act

³⁶ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, ‘Liberalism: Interdependence and Global Governance’ in *International Relations Theories*, Fourth Edition, Longman Pearson, p.119.

³⁷ Micheal W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, 80, 4 (1986), p. 1156.

³⁸ Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2008, p. 54.

according to rules of society.³⁹ According this societal-international focus of English School, states like individuals in society affect each other in different ways. In other words social relations among states shape their attitudes towards each other. In this sense, although English School is positioned between Hobbesian Realism and Kantian Liberalism, it has more common with Constructivism. It is because both English School and Constructivism make emphasis on social dimension of International Relations.

2.3 Perception and Constructivism

In Constructivist approach of International Relations Theory, as the name Constructivism hints, since very beginning it was argued that the world is socially constructed. In Constructivist understanding there is real world and world in our mind. As Alexander Wendt emphasizes “A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward object, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them.”⁴⁰

Due to the differences in cultural and social environment the same reality can be perceived in different ways by different people. In International Relations the understanding of one common world and different worlds were expressed by Francis Fukuyama’s work *End of History* and Samuel Huntington’s work *Clash of Civilizations*. While Fukuyama made emphasis on one world heading for liberal democracy,⁴¹ Huntington underlined different worlds with different values based on their historical civilizations.⁴² According to Constructivists it is culture, history, civilization which shapes the views of the actors in international relations. In the

³⁹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, Macmillan, London, p. 261.

⁴⁰ Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 397.

⁴¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1992.

⁴² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

words of Wendt, identity is the basis of interests. From this perspective, positivist approaches as Realism and Liberalism conceive identities of actors in international relations as homogeneous, because they tend to act in similar way. In other words, their perception of outside world is framed by power and economic interest. While Constructivists argue that identities of actors are heterogeneous because the cultures and international environment which constitute their identities are different.

In Constructivist school there are several approaches to the problem of construction of identity. Systemic Constructivists like Wendt argue that interaction between subjects shape the identity of self, while unit-level Constructivists argue that domestic politics are more important than the system. In this dissertation I apply the third Constructivist approach that is holistic which gives equal importance to both international system and domestic politics. Nevertheless, there is consensus among Constructivists that the view about other and perception of other is closely related to the identity of the self. Therefore, in order to understand other's view on the self, the identity of the other should be analyzed.

The self can feel sympathy toward other and present itself as friend of the other. But this feeling of sympathy and friendship does not mean much if the same feelings are not shared by the other. The famous saying of Mevlana Jelaleddin Rumi 'No matter how much knowledgeable you are, you are only as much knowledgeable as your partner understands you' indicates that your knowledge is measured by the level of perception of the partner. In the same way, status of a state in international relations is determined not in the way it presents itself to other, but by the view of other states about it.

The change in the identity of the self leads to the change in view about other. Therefore it is important to analyze the identity of perceiving part. As it is expressed by Wendt, the Cold War was over because the United States and the Soviet Union decided that they are no longer enemies.⁴³ In terminology of image theory which is discussed below it means that reciprocal image of enemy was changed into image of friend.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 397.

In the final analysis we can conclude that identity is basis of perception. This is the main argument on which the study is built. Nonetheless, it should be noted here that although Constructivism discusses identity, perception and image conceptually, it lacks the methodology to measure the self's perception of other. To fill this gap, I apply Image Theory of International Relations Theory whose main subject is image and perception.

2.4 Image Theory of International Relations

In order to examine the origins and consequences of the images that nation-states hold of each other, Theory of International Images emerged. Shortly, Image Theory is a theory of strategic decision making that identifies the primary judgments guiding international images, or stereotypes, and the selection of international policies. Image theorists suggest that ideas about other actors in world affairs are organized into group schemas, or images, with well-defined cognitive elements. These images are organized in a systematic way, comprised of cognitions and beliefs regarding the target nation's motives, leadership, and primary characteristics.⁴⁴ Images, perceptions or stereotypes are significant in international relations as they "serve to justify a nation's desired reaction or treatment toward another nation."⁴⁵

It is useful to note here that the terms image and perception can be used interchangeably as I have been doing in this study. But to be concrete, perception is wider than image. Image can be defined as the product of perception. In this sense, while concept of perception covers both the perceiving process and its result, image solely means the outcome of this process. Therefore, Image Theory is focused on outcome of perception.

Fisher underlines the importance of images in the following way:

It is fundamental that people, including those on one's own side of an issue, do not ordinarily react to an event or issue on the basis of the facts as might be empirically

⁴⁴ Michele G. Alexander, Shana Levin, P. J. Henry, 'Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Feb., 2005), p. 22.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

determined but on the basis of their images of the fact, on what they think or believe to have happened or to have been at stake. Thus, international relations evolve around interplay of images.⁴⁶

This 'interplay of images' can explain relations among states. As Boulding put it in similar way, "It is always the image, not the truth that immediately determines behavior. We act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it 'is'."⁴⁷ Robert Jervis argues that the image of a state can be a major factor in determining whether and how easily the state can reach its goal. He argues that a desired image can often be of greater use than a significant increment of military and economic power.⁴⁸ In this sense, the purpose of diplomacy of any state is to construct desired image. And public diplomacy is image making within the target community.

By analyzing the image of state A in state B, it is possible to predict the behavior of state B towards state A. The main proposition of the Image theory is that "behavior depends on the image."⁴⁹ According to Image theory images can be enemy image, ally image, dependent image, imperialist image, barbarian image and so on, and responds can be accordingly. For example, if a conquering state succeeds to change its 'imperialist image' in the conquered realm to 'spreader of civilization image', then it does not need military force to exploit the colony any more. It means that conquering minds and hearts is more profitable than conquering lands and people. That is why every nation who is aspired to have respectable place in the world works for their image in foreign countries. In words of Jervis, the image of a state is a major factor in determining other state's policies toward it and states therefore have good

⁴⁶ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Second Edition, Intercultural Press, USA, 1997, p. 4.

⁴⁷ K. E. Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 1959), p. 120.

⁴⁸ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1970, p. 6.

⁴⁹ Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969, p. 6.

reason to try to project desired images.⁵⁰ British Council, Goethe Institute, Confucius Institute, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, CNN, BBC, student exchange programs, scholarships serve to improve the images of the respective countries.

During the Cold War the work of these kinds of institutions were called propaganda or psychological warfare. Today their works are called as image making or perception management. With the development of technologies, Internet and Social Media, nations who control these means are more successful in creation of their positive images than those who are not able to develop their own technologies.

The central question of Image Theory is ‘what determines the image?’ Boulding argues that there is message and image. When message hits the image it can remain unaffected, it can change in some regular and well-defined way that might be described as simple addition, or it can change revolutionarily.⁵¹ Message first of all means statements of decision makers, relations between leaders and elites of two countries, people to people relations. In some cases, a state’s relations with the third part can give different messages to perceiving part. In sum, message covers all activities of a state which can affect its image in perceiving country. Diplomacy, public diplomacy, people to people relations are important tools in making positive and desired image. Especially with the development of Internet networks, which can by-pass official sources of information, people to people relations gain greater importance. While until recently the stands of decision makers were important, now in the age of globalization the opinions of masses are becoming more and more important. Robert Jervis count decision-makers, bureaucracy, domestic politics, and international environment as levels of analysis of perception.⁵²

⁵⁰ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1970, p. 8.

⁵¹ Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969, p. 10.

⁵² Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p.13.

2.4.1 Decision Maker Level

Decision makers and their mindsets, orientations, characters were considered and are still the main determinant in international affairs. Since ancient times scholars put the emphasis mainly on the leaders and rulers. In ancient Greek philosophy Thucydides, Chinese philosophers like Confucius and Sunzi, Muslim scholars as Yusuf Has Hacid and Nizamul Mulk, and Machiavelli gave advises on how to act for rulers. In this way they agree that it is ruler who is responsible for their city-states, empires, and states.

In modern times, the main assumption of Classical Realism was that decision-makers are determinants of foreign policy. From this perspective, to understand one state's view on other state, characteristics of the decision-maker should be analyzed. Realists claim that all problems in international politics derive from evilness of human nature.⁵³ The notion of evilness and greediness of human nature is most probably takes its root from Christianity.⁵⁴ It is so or not, the views, thoughts, mindsets of decision makers are of vital importance to understand the perception of outside world and foreign policy based on that perception. Waltz claims that without understanding a man's nature, there can be no theory of politics.⁵⁵ By reasoning in the same way, we can say that without understanding the nature and mindset of decision maker, it is difficult to analyze that state's view on other states. Especially in the countries whose national identities are under construction the views of decision makers become twice important.

2.4.2 Elite Level

On the other hand, it was seen in the history that despite the change of ruler or decision-maker the state continued to pursue the same foreign policy. It reveals that certain groups, certain establishments which are called deep state or inner state

⁵³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, USA, 1973, p. 71.

⁵⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 21.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

compel decision-maker to act in this or that manner. These kinds of establishments are subjects of conspiracy theories. Anyway, we can assume that certain business, military, academic and media groups are interested in preserving the certain relations which determine the perception about a foreign country. These groups can be defined as elite of nation. Whether different groups of elite on power or not, they all have profound impact on decision making process. To analyze groupings in elite, their identities, perception of a certain country is much more important than doing so with decision maker in predicting the upcoming developments in the country. It is because they are the main force behind the decision maker.

Elite of any nation can be divided into political or bureaucratic elite, business or economic elite, and intellectual and cultural elite. The relation between political elite and economic one is like a relation between power and wealth. In many developing countries politics is considered as the path to wealth. On the other hand to be conducted in politics one needs to be wealthy. Because of this situation, in many developing countries, business elite are attached to political elite. The same can be said about academic elite. But with democratization and liberalization of the country new groups of business and academic elite emerge which can challenge the official perception. Especially academic elite which is the main force in shaping public's opinion can express their views and ideas on certain issues independently. Therefore, in examining a certain state's image in another country the structure and orientations of elite should be taken into consideration.

2.4.3 General Public Level

However, any kind of bureaucracy and elite cannot build their policy by ignoring the sentiments of common citizen. This link between general population and ruling elite is weak in authoritarian regimes and strong in democratic ones. Democracy and election force ruling elite to take into account the opinions of the ruled. In this way, religion, civilization, and cultural orientation of the general population become one of the determinants of the perception. Waltz's statement that "the internal organization of states is the key to understand war and peace"⁵⁶ can be applied in our

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 81.

case and be understood as the domestic politics of states is key to understand their view on others states.

Fisher by indicating that the importance of public mindsets in international relations has increased much faster than our analytical attention to them, notes that greater public involvement changes the way the international process work. He underlines that decision makers and negotiators are constrained by the moods and viewpoints of their interested publics.⁵⁷ In terms of public pressure, Boulding first describes decision makers and ruling elite as powerful, and the mass as ordinary, then makes an emphasis that:

The tacit support of the mass, however, is of vital importance to the powerful. The powerful are always under some obligation to represent the mass, even under dictatorial regimes. In democratic societies the aggregate influence of the images of ordinary people is very great; the image of powerful cannot diverge too greatly from the image of the mass without the powerful losing power. On the other hand, the powerful also have some ability to manipulate the images of the mass toward those of the powerful.⁵⁸

In this regard, media is one of the important tools in manipulating public opinion. “Media, rather than being simply the conveyor of information about international events, has with increasing frequency become part of them.”⁵⁹ However, the idea that mass media shapes public opinion is one-sided consideration. In fact, media itself is shaped by the public opinion. In this sense to some extent media can be seen as the indicator of the public opinion. From this perspective, media can be analyzed to measure perception of public of a certain issue. To sum up, public opinion is important component of perception construction process.

2.4.4 International Level

The last level of analysis is international environment. Many scholars considered this level as the main determinant of international politics. Kenneth Waltz describes man,

⁵⁷ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, p. 12.

⁵⁸ K. E. Boulding, ‘National Images and International Systems’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 1959), p. 122.

⁵⁹ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, p. 11.

state, and international system as first, second and third images.⁶⁰ Having analyzed first, second, and third images, he ends up with Structural Realism where he gives priority to third image in expense of first and second images.⁶¹ From this perspective, international structure or system compel states act in this or that manner. This theory was workable under the constraints of the Cold War, where bipolar world was the main determinant of international politics. The end of the Cold War signaled the emergence of the new system. In this emerging system, ideational values as culture, religion, kinship, civilization which were suppressed by the containments of the bipolar system expected to become determinant factors. In this regard, Samuel Huntington's thesis of Clash of Civilizations can be defined as a Constructivist reading of the emerging system. He warns and almost predicts that the countries which are situated in the fault lines of different civilizations, like Ukraine, are faced with danger of partition. These fault line considerations are applicable to Kazakhstan as well due to its geopolitical and geo-cultural location. It means that Huntingtonian system of civilizations plays significant role in shaping a state's perception of the other. To sum up, Huntingtonian system says the perception and view of a state about the other state are derived from cultural and civilization identity of that state. If the other shares the similar culture, civilization, religion, language with the self within realm of certain civilization, then the state tends to have positive image of that other.

Concerning state-to-state relations in the system and its affect on perception, Wendtian Constructivism says that the perception and view of a state about the other state emerge in the process of interaction among states and as a result of calculations of the reactions of other states in the system. According to this approach, actors do not have a self prior to interaction with other; how they view the meaning and requirements of this survival therefore depends on the processes by which

⁶⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the state, and war; a theoretical analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

⁶¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1979.

conceptions of self evolve.⁶² Actors acquire their understanding of not only other but self during the interaction.

“Conception of self and interest tend to ‘mirror’ the practices of significant others over time. This principle of identity-formation is captured by symbolic interactionist notion of the ‘looking-glass self,’ which asserts that the self is a reflection of an actor’s socialization.”⁶³ So generally if state A has enemy image of state B, then this triggers the emergence of enemy image of the state A in state B. In other words, actors constitute each other’s image and identity. Boulding notes that the shared experience of danger creates the national spirit. He underlines that nations are creations of their enemies, for instance, France is creation of Germany, and Germany of France.⁶⁴ Wendt supports this idea by stating that this process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a “social act” and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings. Further he argues that interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others. If repeated long enough, these “reciprocal typifications” will create relatively stable concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interaction.⁶⁵

Even after the creation of these ‘stable concepts of self and other’, states are always eager to monitor to measure their image in other states. To learn what other states think about your state has important if not crucial implications on bilateral relations. For example, Wikileaks documents which uncovered the real thoughts of leaders about others made damages to relations of many countries. Recent scandals about secret listening of US intelligent services to German Chancellor and German intelligent services to Turkish decision makers show that even allies are eager to learn the real opinions of their friends. In the final analysis, in international level,

⁶² Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, p. 402.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 404.

⁶⁴ Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969, p. 114.

⁶⁵ Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, p. 405.

state-to-state relation in the system and system itself are determinant factors in shaping a state's perception of other.

2.5 Methodology

Scholars of Image Theory try to work out a system which can measure the perception of a state about other one. Boulding after indicating that the problem of the measurement of hostility (or friendship) is a very interesting one, proposes two avenues:

A historical approach. Over a period of years two nations have been at war, threatening war, allied, bound by treaty, and so on. Each relation would be given an arbitrary number, and each year assigned a number accordingly: the average of the years' numbers would be the index. This would always yield a symmetrical matrix—that is, the measure of I's relation to J would be the same as J's relation to I, or $a(IJ)=a(JI)$.

An approach by means of content analysis of public communications (official messages, newspaper editorials, public speeches, cartoons, etc.). This seems likely to be most immediately useful and fruitful, as it would give current information and would also yield very valuable dynamic information about the changes in the matrix, which may be much more important than the absolute figures.⁶⁶

In this study when I measure Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey I apply the second type of measurement. It means that the dissertation is based on research and data collection through the analysis of library sources including books, academic journals, and newspaper archives and then classified according to the levels of analysis which are decision-makers, bureaucracy and elite, public opinion, and international environment. So I will apply holistic approach which covers both domestic and international determinants of perception.

Indeed scholars accept that “the international and domestic societies in which states are imbedded shape their identities in powerful ways.”⁶⁷ According to Huntington, “Values, culture, and institutions pervasively influence how states define their interests. The interests of states are also shaped not only by their domestic and

⁶⁶ K. E. Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 1959), p. 125.

⁶⁷ Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security' in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, p. 23.

institutions but by international norms and institutions.”⁶⁸ Taking into account these considerations, it is better to examine both domestic and international factors which shape identity and then its perception of other.

2.6 Conclusion

As we have discussed in this chapter to understand a state’s perception of other has profound importance in bilateral relations. This fact is recognized by all schools of International Relations Theories. Nevertheless, it is Constructivism which is more suitable to deal with perceptions. Constructivists’ emphasis on relation between identity and perception is quite useful to apply in this study. In order to measure Kazakhstan’s perception of Turkey I apply Image Theory of International Relations which examines the phenomenon on four levels of analysis. These are decision maker, elite, general public, and international environment. It means that these levels constitute Kazakhstan’s perception of Turkey. Ironically, Fisher concerning these determinants of perception having noted that it is the general practice in making psychological estimates in international affairs to start with individual decision makers at the center of attention and then pursue the analysis of their decisions in terms of external contributing factors—the influence of advisers, the inner workings of institutions, the thinking of pertinent elites, public opinion, and political processes, underlines that culture tends to be considered last, as having only a broad or diffuse impact on ways of perceiving and reasoning, or, more frequently, it is left out altogether.⁶⁹ However, it is culture together with identity which constitute the basis of perception. Therefore, in the following chapter firstly I discuss culture and identity of Kazakhstan as the main determinant of perception, and only then in the second part of study I focus on levels of analysis of perception.

⁶⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996, p. 34.

⁶⁹ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, p. 35.

CHAPTER 3

KAZAKHSTAN'S EURASIAN IDENTITY

3.1 Introduction

In order to understand Kazakhstan's view on Turkey first of all Kazakhstan's identity should be analyzed. To recall from the previous chapter, perception of 'other' is closely related to the self i.e. identity of perceiving part. In other words, to understand what Turkey means for Kazakhstan, we should examine what Kazakhstan means, and what Kazakhstan's national identity is. For that purpose, firstly we examine the emergence of the ethnic Kazakh identity and its evolution in the history where it acquired Eurasian feature. Secondly we will analyze domestic and international factors affecting the modern identity of Kazakhstan.

3.2 The Emergence of Ethnic Kazakh Identity

According to the curriculum of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan beginning from Middle School, school children are taught a subject called 'History of Kazakhstan'. In the national examinations to enter university this subject is one of the four subjects from which children are responsible. At universities in the first year's curriculum, the subject 'History of Kazakhstan' is a must course. This subject in fact is the continuation of the understanding of history of the Soviet era. In that sense, 'History of Kazakhstan' is not the history of Kazakh people. Rather it is a territorial based history which means it covers historical events

taken place in the territory of modern Kazakhstan. For example Gaznevids and Timurids are not covered by this history. There is still a debate on how to call this subject. Some people propose to call it as national history, some people as homeland history, some as state history. Nevertheless, since independence there is a tendency to evaluate ‘the History of Kazakhstan’ as the history of ethnic Kazakh people, and to construct lineage between states of the past as Saka, Xiongnu, Gokturks, Qipchaqs, Golden Horde, and Kazakh khanate. The main evidence is that the history of tribes which constituted ethnic Kazakh people can be traced to the ancient Hun Saka period. More precisely, the names of ancient tribes are still preserved among ethnic Kazakhs and are still considered to be one of the main features of self-identification.

As the other Turkic people which emerged in the 15-17 centuries in Central Asia, the ethnic basis of Kazakh people was composed of different tribes. They are Saka, Uysun, Kangli, Hun, Gokturk, Turgesh, Karluk, Oghuz, Kimek, and Qipchaq of ancient times, and Nayman, Argun, Kerey, Qonirat, Jalayir, and Dulat in recent times.⁷⁰

Modern Kazakhs still identify themselves with these tribe names. For example, when Kazakhs meet each other for the first time, they ask ‘Ne elsiñ?’ which means ‘What is your tribe?’ It means that although Kazakhs are united by upper identity Kazakh, the tribal identification is still strong. Uzbeks with whom Kazakhs share many common tribes, almost forget their tribal affiliations, while Kazakhs still consider their tribal identity as one of their main features which separate them from other nations.

The emergence of ethnic entity under the name Kazakh is closely related with Genghis era. According to the History of Kazakhstan, Genghis khan divided his empire among his four sons. The biggest territory of modern Kazakhstan was part of Golden Horde, a possession of Juchi, eldest son of Genghis khan. When the Golden Horde was disintegrating in the fifteenth century several khanates emerged. All khans were descendants of Juchi. One of those khanates was Kazakh khanate established by Kerey and Janibek. The term Kazak which means someone who

⁷⁰ *Isroriya Kazakhskoy SSR s Drevneyshikh Vremen do Nashikh Dney*, v.I., Almaty, 1977, p.17. Quoted in *Kazakistan ve Kazaklar, Eski Devirden Günümüze*, Kazakistan İlimler Akademisi, Çev. Abdulvahab Kara, Selenga, İstanbul 2007, p.189

disobeys and loves his freedom, later on became the name of the Khanate, and name of the people of this khanate. In Old Turkic civilization there was an understanding of becoming a ‘Kazak’.

Kazak is someone who had a problem with the rulers or with someone who held power and ran away to the mountains or to the desert. Mete, Atilla, Seljuk, Genghis, and Timur were firstly Kazaks for their freedom against their rulers. Kazak is not the name of a tribe (el) like Kirgiz. Every tribe could have Kazaks.⁷¹

In other words, at first Kazakh was not ethnic name, but it was political term which united tribes who rebelled against the rulers. As it is indicated by Kumekov, according to Muslim sources, there was an institute of ‘qazaqlıq’ among the Turkic people. “The word ‘Kazak’ was used as a whole for the designation of different kind of *vol’nitsa* (freemen, outlaws). People became ‘Kazak’ in that time irrespective of their ethnic or state obstacles.”⁷² Although it is clear that the name ‘Kazakh’ was given to the people from outside, it is not certain since when the people began to call themselves as Kazakhs.

In the sixteenth century Kazakh khanate became the most prosperous state in the steppes between the rising Russian power and Central Asian Uzbek Khanates. Another factor which affected the Kazakh identity was aggressive policies of Jungaria a nomadic state in the east of Kazakhstan. The matter is that Jungaria attacked Kazakh Khanate in order to spread Buddhism. So the war between two khanates Kazakh acquired strong Muslim identity. In other words, Jungaria as ‘the other’ of Kazakh Khanate in religious, linguistic terms strengthened the consolidation of Kazakh people and their Kazakh identity. From sixteenth to eighteenth centuries the further consolidation of Kazakh people and emergence of ethnic Kazakh identity took place. When it came to nineteenth century Kazakh tribes who occupied almost four thousand kilometers from East to West, from East Turkistan to the Caspian Sea spoke one language and shared the same culture. The fact that Kazakh language has no regional dialect supports the idea that Kazakhs

⁷¹ Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi*, Kültür Bakanlığı, Ziya Gökalp Yayınları, İstanbul 1976, p.23.

⁷² B. Kumekov, ‘About the term ‘Kazak’’, in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998, p. 60.

formed a homogeneous culture. In terms of race, scholars in the complex investigation on anthropometry, anthroposophy, tooth system, skin design of palms and fingers, blood group factors and other physiologic characteristics of Kazakhs, consider that Kazakhs represent the Turanoid race with Mongoloid-Europoid features.⁷³

In terms of economic and social structure the main feature of Kazakh people which separated them from other Turkic people settled in Volga-Ural rivers basin like Tatars and Bashkir, and from Central Asian Turkic people settled in Amu Darya-Syr Darya rivers basin like Uzbeks was their nomadic style of life. Kazakhs along with Kirgiz and Mongols can be considered as the last nomads of Eurasia. Kazakhs as nomads preserved the state traditions of the Golden Horde which were in fact the state traditions of Huns and Gokturks. There is no doubt that in the cities the culture of sedentary peoples like Persians and Chinese were predominant. While the nomadic tribes left the steppe and migrated to the Middle East and Inner China, they were absorbed by the cultures and state traditions of Arab-Persian civilizations and Chinese-Buddhist civilizations. While Kazakhs preserved Turkic nomadic titles as *khan* and *khatun*, nomads migrated to the Middle East adopted titles like *Shah*, *Padishah*, and *Vezir*, and those in China adopted title *Huangdi* (Emperor).

The main feature of the Turkic and nomadic culture is tolerance against foreign cultures and religions. This characteristic feature which was preserved by Kazakh people is the basis of the formation of tolerant a country after independence in 1991. As Nazarbayev rightly points

Turks always were tolerant towards the religion of conquered people. Even three-hundred-years rule of nomadic people over Russia stands out with religious tolerance. Our ancestors and brother Turkic people were never characterized by religious aggressiveness and always respected spiritual freedom of other peoples.⁷⁴

From the perspective of Turkic civilization, Kazakh lands can be considered as the origin and cradle of that civilization. According to Kazakhs' '*şejire*' or pedigree

⁷³ O. Ismagulov, 'Ethnogenesis of Kazak people', in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998, p. 51.

⁷⁴ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Amaty: Atamura, 2003, p. 178.

tradition which can be considered as the collective memory of Kazakhs, they are sitting in the father's home. They inherited the father's home (*qara şańıraq – baba ocağı*), as the youngest son, when elder brothers left the home, some to Europe, some, to China, and some to Anatolia. Well-known saying '*Türkmen tör ağam, Özbek öz ağam*' which means 'Turkmen is my chief brother, Uzbek is my own brother' displays this understanding. This collective memory is reflected in Mağjan Jumabayev's poem 'Türkistan'.

Turanda türük oynagan uqsap otqa,

Türükten basqa ot bolıp jan tuwıp pa?

Köp türük enşi alısıp tarasqanda,

Qazaqta qara şańıraq qalğan joq pa!

(Turk played in Turan lika a fire,

Who else, except Turk, was born like fire?

When many Turks left their homeland,

Kazakh inherited the father's hearth!)

In terms of religion, both Volga-Ural rivers basin and Amu Darya-Syr Darya rivers basin were cradles of Islamic civilization while steppes lay between them. As it was put by Mustafina, "Along with the Islamic ideas and standards the Kazakhs, just as other nations, preserve a broad range of notions and rites dating back to the local pre-Islamic traditions, and in common place conscience are perceived as Moslem."⁷⁵ From this perspective, though Kazakhs called themselves as Muslims, their Islam was a moderate one as compared with the Islam of other people in the region. Even more, Şoqan Walihanov claimed that when Kazakhs converted into Islam, only names, words changed but the idea remained as previous one. *Ongon* became *ärvah*, *köktäñri* became Allah, spirit of earth became *shaytan*, but the idea remained shaman.⁷⁶ Kazakh religion is only called Islam, but the content remained the Old

⁷⁵ R. Mustafina, 'Role of Islam in Kazakhstan', in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998, p. 93.

⁷⁶ Chokan Valikhanov, 'Sledy shamnstva u kirgizov', in *Sobranie sochineniy*, 4 tom, Qazaq Sovet Ğılım Entsiklopediyası, Almaty, 1985, p. 49.

Turkic belief system. Maybe that is why Tatar scholar Rafael Bezertinov described Kazakh khanates as the last castle of Tangriism.⁷⁷ A more proper definition of Kazakh religion can be that Kazakh Islam is synthesis of Islam and Old Turkic beliefs. Walihanov says that there is double-headed religion in the steppes.⁷⁸ According to Zikirya Jandarbek, what made Kazakhs different from other Muslims was Yassawiya order (*tariqa*) of Islam they practiced. He argues that this order made Old Turkic traditions to be consistent with Islam.⁷⁹ In other words, Kazakh religion is better to be called as Turkic Islam.

Ahmet Yassawi, the first Sufi of Turkic people, deserves special attention when the subject is Turkic Islam. As it is underlined by Nazarbayev “One of the greatest people of the Kazakh steppes Ahmet Yassawi brought Islam to Turkic people. In line with his teachings Kazakhs have been forming their own national consciousness.”⁸⁰ Even today for Kazakhs to visit Turkistan, the city where the tomb of Yassawi is situated, is considered as a small pilgrimage to Mecca. Concerning the name of the city, Bruce G. Prirvatsky has an interesting suggestion. Having noted that the original name of the city Yası came to be called Turkistan in the fifteenth century when the nomads of the Golden Horde, those are the ancestors of modern Kazakhs and Uzbeks, began to migrate to the region from north to south, Prirvatsky argues that “A possible reason for the name-change was that “Turk” had come to mean “nomad,” i.e. Kazakh, in contrast to the sedentary Uzbeks who had begun to identify themselves with the Persian culture of Central Asia.” He concludes that the concept

⁷⁷ Rafael Bezertinov, ‘Perspektivy tyurkskoy ideologii’ in *II International Congress of Turkologists Modern Turkology: Theory, Practice, and Perspectives*, II Volume, Ahmet Yassawi Universiteti, Türkistan, 2006, p. 426.

⁷⁸ Chokan Valikhanov, ‘O musul’manstve ve stepi’, in *Sobranie sochineniy*, 4 tom, Qazaq Sovet Ğılım Entsiklopediyası, Almatı, 1985, p. 71.

⁷⁹ Zikiriya Jandarbek, *Yassawi Jolı jane Qazaq Qoğamı*, El-şejire, Almatı, 2006, p. 35.

⁸⁰ Nursultan Nazarbayev, ‘Iz vistupleniya na II vsemirnom kurultae kazakhov v Turkestane 23 oktyabrya 2002 goda’, *Strategiya nezavisemosti*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 276.

of Turkistan, the land of the Turks derives from the wild Turko-nomadic reputation of the steppe, in contrast to the civilized Turko-Persian world to the south.⁸¹

Defined in this way, Kazakhs can be considered as the heirs of Turkic civilization. Kazakhs followed the Yasawiya order which made it possible for Turkic traditions to co-exist under Islamic civilization. Nazarbayev describes Ahmet Yassawi as the origin of the formation of the Kazakh Khanate and Kazakh national originality.⁸² Zikirya Jandarbek explains this statement in detail by claiming that the name Kazakh means someone who rebelled against the foreign cultural and ideological influences and preserved its own identity. According to him the reason why Kerey and Janibek, the founders of Kazakh khanate, rebelled against Abulkhayir, the head of the nomadic Uzbek Khanate, was the fact that Abulkhayir abandoned the Yasawiya order and accepted Naqshibandiya which represented more Persian culture than the Turkic one.⁸³ Ultimately, both Nazarbayev and Jandarbek emphasize that the Yasawiya order was the basis of the Kazakh khanate and Kazakh identity.

In terms of language, Kazakh language belongs to the Kıpçak-Nogay subdivision of the Kıpçak group of the Turkic group of the Altai family.⁸⁴ Here again, in contrast with Tatar and Uzbek languages, Kazakh language is comparatively pure Turkic language from Arabic and Persian influences. As it was indicated almost a thousand years ago by Mahmud Qashqari, “The purest and the most correct language is the language of those who know only one language, does not neighbor with Persians, and does not travel to foreign countries. And the language of those who communicate with bilingual city-dwellers is a spoiled one.”⁸⁵ What is more interesting is that Qashqari says that “The language of people who sit along the rivers

⁸¹ Bruce G. Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory*, Curzon, Great Britain, 2001, p. 47.

⁸² Nursultan Nazarbayev, *V potoke istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 272.

⁸³ Zikirya Jandarbek, *Yassawi Jolu jane Qazaq Qoğamu*, El-şejire, Almaty, 2006, p. 227.

⁸⁴ O. Ismagulov, ‘Ethnogenesis of Kazak people’, in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998, p. 44.

⁸⁵ Mahmud Kaşgarlı, *Divanü Lugat-it-Türk*, 3. Baskı, Çeviren Besim Atalay, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1992, p.29.

Ertis, Ile, Edil, and Yamar is correct Turkish.”⁸⁶ This is what Kazakhstan is today. Literally Kazakhs describe their land as that between Ertis and Edil.

When Russians seized Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556, Kazakh khanate became the neighbor of Russia. From the Russian perspective, Kazakh khanate became the main obstacle in its further advance to Central Asia and India. The first agreement between the Russian Empire and Kazakh khanate on military assistance was signed in 1731. This date symbolized the beginning of the colonization of Kazakh lands. Meanwhile, in 1755 Qing China occupied East Turkistan by ending the Jungarian Khanate. Thus Kazakh khanate became the last nomadic state between Russia and China. The last great leader of Kazakhs Abilay khan tried to balance between Russia and China. The balance shifted toward Russia and it was impossible to resist modern armies of the western power. In 1847 when last khan Kenesary died in the battlefield, it was certain that Kazakh khanate was abolished. In 1865 when the Russian army seized Tashkent, Kazakh lands became the part of the Russian Empire. Kazakhs, though lost their political independence, in cultural terms continued their traditional nomadic style of life. However, with the colonization of Kazakh lands Russians began to migrate and settle in Kazakh lands. This occupation forced Kazakhs to give up their nomadic style of life. Nevertheless, only a few Kazakhs settled down.

It can be argued that with the colonization of Kazakh lands and inclusion of the Kazakhs into the Russian Empire, the evolution of Kazakh identity faced new problems and entered a new phase. Kazakhs found themselves between two worlds, western and eastern. Nazarbayev describes that period in the following way:

Kazakh national worldview was very different from the surrounding European one (which was represented by the Russian culture during that time) and eastern one (of Turkic Muslim – Central Asian khanates). The surrounding nomadic world already ceased its existence. Only Kazakhs remained as the last huge continent of the nomadic civilization in the steppes of Eurasia.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 30.

⁸⁷ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *V potoke istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 281.

Kazakhs remained in between modernity and tradition. Their traditional way of life and worldview was not relevant anymore. But the abandonment of this tradition would have caused the loss of identity and existence as Kazakhs. This dilemma was resolved with the emergence of new national elite, which replaced the traditional elite of *hoja* and *töre*.⁸⁸ With the expansion of Russian towns in the northern borders of Kazakh lands, wealthy families began to send their children to Russian schools. On the other hand many Kazakhs studied in schools opened by modernists, *jaditçi*, the followers of Ismail Gasprinski. In the final analysis it was graduates of these modern schools who revived the Kazakh identity by attempting to resolve the dilemma between the West and the East. As in other places, intelligentsia played a crucial role in reinterpretation of identity of Kazakh people.

In the early 1900s, the Kazak intelligentsia reinterpreted Kazak national identity, which had traditionally been defined by its nomadic culture and heritage. Russian colonization of Central Asia during the nineteenth century had seriously eroded Kazak economic and social structures and threatened the existence of the Kazak nation. In response to this threat, the Kazak intelligentsia – whose members regarded themselves as the protectors of Kazak culture, language and history and were an important part of a self-proclaimed modernist movement – began to imagine a larger polity, the Kazak ‘nation’, and distinguish and celebrate what they identified as national characteristics.⁸⁹

In 1905 when Revolution broke out in Russia, hundreds of educated Kazakhs were ready to support liberals and democrats. Kazakhs actively participated in the first Russian Parliament, Duma. Before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Kazakh intelligentsia declared their autonomy under the name Alash which lived until 1920 when it was abolished by the Red Army. In fact Kazakh intelligentsia united around the idea of Alash formed a core of the first Kazakh Autonomous Republic in 1925 and ultimately Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936. After this, the Kazakh Republic became one of the 15 republics of the Soviet Union.

Two events before the World War II had disastrous implications for Kazakh people. One is forceful collectivization and sedentarization of Kazakh nomads which was realized in 1929 and 1932. The policy led to mass starvation and death of hundred

⁸⁸ About *Hoja* and *Töre* see Chapter 6.

⁸⁹ Steven Sabol, *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p. 151.

thousands of Kazakhs. Comparing figures from the 1926 and 1939 censuses, Naum Jasny has estimated that more than 1,5 millions Kazakhs died during the 1930s and nearly 80 percent of the herd was destroyed between 1928 and 1932.⁹⁰ Olcott says that the actual losses were probably even greater. Recently published archival data shows that the number of Kazakh households declined from 1,233,000 in 1929 to 565,000 households in 1936, and the famine-related deaths were still being reported.⁹¹ Concerning the catastrophic disaster Nazarbayev notes that:

The interruption of the traditional economic order which was realized not by the natural evolutionary change of the ethnos, but as the result of imposed aims of alien cultural and economic systems, led not only to the destruction of the social structure but coercive break of national consciousness.⁹²

The second event was the purges and prosecution of the Kazakh intelligentsia. In 1937-38 this generation of Kazakh elite was exterminated by the Soviets. Olcott describes this policy as the “the Great Terror” where not only the person with any trace of a “nationalist”, but a whole generation of Kazakh writers including Kazakh communists, who had made the creation of a Kazakh-Soviet culture their life’s work, were killed.⁹³ The extermination of Kazakh intelligentsia turned Kazakhs into slaves ready to die for their masters. Kazakh identity almost disappeared. Chingiz Aytmatov’s term ‘Mankurt’ was introduced to describe desperate condition of Kazakh people who forgot not only their history, traditions but also their mother language.⁹⁴

After the World War II, under the circumstances of the Cold War, Kazakh lands became the main area for the Soviet nuclear bomb tests. “Between 1949 and 1989 tests took place there at the rate of one in every three weeks. In those four decades

⁹⁰ Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1941, p. 323. Quoted in Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs, Second Edition*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 185.

⁹¹ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs, Second Edition*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 185.

⁹² N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Atamura, Amaty, 2003, p. 187.

⁹³ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs, Second Edition*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 196.

⁹⁴ Chinghiz Aitmatov, *The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years*, Indiana University Press, 1988.

there were 752 nuclear explosions in Kazakhstan – 114 of them in the atmosphere or at ground level with no protection for the domestic population.”⁹⁵ In addition, there was a biochemical polygon in the island in the Aral Sea which tested weapons of mass destruction. All these nuclear bomb tests and ecological catastrophic condition of Aral, which turned from a Sea to a Lake, had disastrous affect on Kazakh peoples’ health and survival. Despite all these tragedies it is impossible to disagree with the conclusion of Privratsky.

The strength of Kazak ethnic identity over period of 500 years is suggested by Kazak attacks on Uzbek cities in the 16th century, their resistance to Jungar incursions in the 17th and 18th, uprisings against Khoqandian and Russian rule in the 19th, anti-conscription riots against the Tsar in 1916, the Alash Orda government of 1917-1920, and a series of revolts against Stalin’s collectivization program.⁹⁶

Interestingly, despite all repression against Kazakh nationalism and banning of the names of Alash intelligentsia, the more Kazakhs became educated, the more they became aware of Kazakh identity. Although the Soviet education system trained loyal citizens to the regime, under the circumstances of stability, Kazakhs began to recover and rediscover their history and culture. As it is noted by Aitken, Kazakhs are tough, stoical people well schooled in surviving the climatic extremes of the steppes and the political extremism of colonial occupiers. Despite many efforts to obliterate them, Kazakhstan’s language, poetry, music and national character were well preserved in times of suffering.⁹⁷

In 1986 Kazakh youth naively believing in the democratic rhetoric of Gorbachev gathered in the central square of Almaty to protest decision of the Central Government to replace the first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Dinmuhammed Konayev with Genadi Kolbin. The protest which was the first one within the Soviet Union were brutally suppressed, but gave impetus for the revival of Kazakh identity. This reveals that Kazakhs, despite all tragedies in their history, did

⁹⁵ Jonathan Aitken, *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes after 20 Years of Independence*, Continuum, London, 2012, p. 4.

⁹⁶ Bruce G. Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory*, Curzon, Great Britain, 2001, p. 8.

⁹⁷ Jonathan Aitken, *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes after 20 Years of Independence*, Continuum, London, 2012, p. 5.

not lose their collective memory. As it was written in the first version of national anthem of Kazakhstan

Jaralğan namıstan qaharman halıqız,

Azattıq jolında jalındap janıppız.

Tağdırdıñ tezinen, tozaqtıñ özinen

Aman saw, aman saw qalupız.

(A valiant people who were created from honor,

On freedom's way we have burst into flame.

From the anvil of fate and the fire of hell

We have been saved, and all is well.)⁹⁸

After these discussions on the evolution of the ethnic Kazakh identity we move to Kazakhstan's national identity where ethnic Kazakh identity is considered as the basis of nation on the one hand, and sometimes as one of the components which formed Kazakhstani nation. This second point is important in our discussion as in that context ethnic Kazakh identity together with Russian identity constitutes upper Kazakhstani identity which is in fact Eurasian identity.

3.3 Eurasian Feature of Kazakhstan's National Identity

There are domestic and international factors which shape Kazakhstan's national identity. These factors began to be effective when the USSR entered to the phase of disintegration. During that phase, Kazakhstan was the last republic of the Union to declare its independence. As one author put it, Kazakhstan had become more reliant on the Soviet Union than any other republic, and feared the independence that so many others craved.⁹⁹ Olcott describes this situation as "reluctantly accepting independence".¹⁰⁰ This action is explained with the fact that Kazakhstan differed

⁹⁸ Translation is by Bruce G. Privratsky with small changes of mine.

⁹⁹ Jim Corrigan, *Kazakhstan*, Mason Crest Publisher, Philadelphia, 2005, p. 47.

¹⁰⁰ Martha Brill Olcott, *Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C., 2002, p. 24.

from other republics in several important features. Large ethnic Russian population in Kazakhstan and the long border with Russia were determinant factors in Kazakhstan state identity. Kazakhstan both in economic and cultural terms was the most dependent republic to the center. The disintegration of the Union would first of all hit Kazakhstan and might even lead to the collapse of the republic.

In terms of the identification of the new state, Shirin Akiner argues that the situation is further complicated by the fact that Kazakh society has undergone two major transformations over the past century and a half. First is under the Tsarist regime, the Europeanization/Russification of a large proportion of the Kazakh aristocracy, as well as far-reaching administrative and economic changes; and second is under the Soviet regime, the total destruction of the nomadic way of life and the co-opting of the intellectual elite into the new system.¹⁰¹ In other words, the colonization of Kazakhstan broke the evolutionary development of the Kazakh identity. Further Akiner underlines that “Today, the Kazakhs are confronted not only with a multitude of practical problems that are directly connected with the sudden and unexpected acquisition of independence, but also with the need to knit together the disparate, fractured parts of their history.”¹⁰²

Because of these features, it was not an easy task for Kazakh leadership to declare the independence of the country. It would not be an exaggeration to state that Kazakhstan was in identity crisis both domestically and internationally. Nazarbayev analyzes the condition in this way:

We should realize that the internal fragmentation, on the one hand and the external cultural influence, on the other, contribute to the fact that the cultural integrity of Kazakh nation is far away from the ideal. Unless we stay active we will be pulled into pieces by the history in action due to the fact that the different ‘cultural islands’ within Kazakh nation will objectively drift toward the different centers of attraction.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Shirin Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p.1.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na poroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 12.

Therefore, during the nation building process, Kazakh leaders had to take both internal and external determinants into account.

3.3.1 Domestic Factors

Kazakhstan due to its geographical proximity to Russia and demographic composition was part of the Union which internalized the Soviet identity. Although it is academically not correct to identify the Soviet culture with the Russian one, the fact is that Kazakhstan culturally and demographically was considered as the extension of inner Russia rather than an autonomous unit of the Union. Kazakhs who gave their ethno name to the country were in minority status by the early 1990s. Even many of these Kazakhs were alien to their own cultural identity. So it would be difficult after independence to consolidate the Kazakhstani nation around an ethnic Kazakh identity.

Therefore, the primary concern for the founding leaders of Kazakhstan was to define Kazakhstan's national identity. The leadership clearly understood that it was impossible to build nation-state on the basis of Kazakh ethnicity and culture. As it was discussed by Sartayeva, while most of the older states were formed on the basis of so called 'cultural hegemony' of ethnos-dominants, the state-forming ethnos did not exist in Kazakhstan at the moment it gained its independence. Even if it existed, it was not recognized as such by the majority of representatives of other ethnic groups.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, Kazakhs were both demographically and economically weak in the country. According to the data of 1989 population census, Kazakhstan's population is composed of ethnic Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Uyghur, and Tatars who are Muslim Turkic people, as well as ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians who are Christian Slavic people. Kazakhstan's population in 1989 was 16,200,000 where Slavic people constituted 44% (ethnic Russians 37,8% of total population), and Turkic people composed about 45% (ethnic Kazakhs 39,7% of total population). Other ethnic groups like Germans, Koreans, Armenians, Kurds, and Greeks

¹⁰⁴ Raushan Sartayeva, 'Problemy sotsiokulturnoy konsolidatsii i formirovanie novoy identichnosti v Kazakhstane' in *Tawelsiz Qazaqstannın halıqaralıq bedelinin ösüwi jane jahandanuwdın qawip-qaterleri, Halıqaralıq ğilimi-praktikalıq konferentsiyanın materialdarı*, Filosofiya jane politologiya İnstitutı QR BGM ĞK, Almatı, 2011, p. 228.

constituted about 10% of the total population.¹⁰⁵ While all Europeans were qualified workers and lived in industrial centers and cities, most of the Kazakhs were peasants and lived in rural areas. The self-identification with the state was different among Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs. Olcott analyzed the situation in the following way:

The biggest problem that Kazakhstan's government faces in state building is that the republic's two largest ethnic communities, the Russo-Slavs and the Kazakhs, view the birth of the republic in totally antithetical ways. To the Kazakhs, the creation of Kazakhstan is the fulfillment of a dream that they had not even dared entertain, whereas Kazakhstan's Slavic population generally views as a cruel twist of fate. The tension between these two worldviews might under certain circumstances be sufficient to destroy the new state.¹⁰⁶

According to Seydulla Sadıqov the independence of Kazakhstan is a culmination of the evolutionary development of Kazakh nation.¹⁰⁷ But Pyotr Svoik argues that the Soviet policy towards nationalities could not transform Kazakh people and when the USSR collapsed Kazakh were living according to traditional tribal relations.¹⁰⁸

Another factor which determined Kazakhstan's identity was the fact that the most of the Kazakh bureaucrats and decision-makers were alien to the values of ethnic Kazakh people. Most of them could speak very poor Kazakh and some, none at all. I return to the Kazakh elite in Chapter 6. It is sufficient to note here that the majority of Kazakh elite are the continuation of the Soviet era bureaucrats who internalized the dominant Soviet culture.

Ultimately, the founding leaders came across with a dilemma where they could ignore neither ethnic Kazakhs who were from historical perspective the real owners of the country but possessed weak demographic, economic and cultural shares; nor

¹⁰⁵ Qazaqstan Respublikasının Statistika jöindegı Agenttigi (Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan), (2000) *Qazaqstan Respublikası Halqının Ulttıq Quramı: Qazaqstan Respublikasındağı 1999 jılğı Halıq Sanağının Qoritındısı*. (National Composition of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Conclusion of the Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1999) Almaty.

¹⁰⁶ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Second Edition, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 289.

¹⁰⁷ Seydulla Sadıq, *Qazaq publitsistikası: Ulttıq biregeylik maseleleri*, Nurlı Älem, Almaty, 2013.

¹⁰⁸ Pyotr Svoik, 'Natsional'nyi vopros v Kazakhstane: vzglyad "russkoyazychnogo," *Tsentral'naya Aziya i Kavkaz* 1998.

Europeans in general and Russians in particular who migrated to the country as the consequences of Russian imperial and Soviet politics but possessed strong positions in demographic, economic and cultural arenas.

This dilemma was reflected in the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic of 25 October 1990, the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on ‘State Independence of Republic of Kazakhstan’ of 16 December 1991, and consequently in Constitutions of the country after independence. As the Declaration on State Sovereignty of KazSSR stated:

High Council of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic expressing the will of the people of Kazakhstan; attempting to create honorable and equal life conditions for all citizens of the Republic; considering the primary task as consolidation of and strengthening friendship of peoples living in the Republic; recognizing General Declaration of Human Rights and Nation’s right on self determination; realizing the responsibility for the destiny of Kazakh nation; expressing the determination to build democratic state with rule of law; declare state sovereignty of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and adopt this Declaration.¹⁰⁹

In this preamble two points are important in resolving the dilemma. The phrases “the people of Kazakhstan”, “all citizens of the Republic” assure Russians and other ethnic groups against discrimination; the phrase “peoples living in the Republic” accepts the diversity in the country. However, the word ‘peoples’ in plural not ‘people’ in singular became a source of many debates. I will discuss the issue in detail later on. The phrase ‘Kazakh nation’ assures the Kazakhs that they would have a special place in the country. The second point of the Declaration which is about measures on preserving, defending and strengthening the nation-state emphasizes that “Revival and development of distinctive culture, traditions, language, and strengthening the national dignity of Kazakh nation and other nationalities living in Kazakhstan, are one of the important tasks of KazSSR statehood.”¹¹⁰ According to the Declaration, “Citizens of the Republic are guaranteed with all rights and freedoms accepted by the Constitution despite their national (ethnic) and party

¹⁰⁹ ‘Deklaratsiya o Gosudarstvennom Suverenitete KazSSR’ (Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR) <http://www.mfa.kz/index.php/ru/vneshnyaya-politika/khronika-nezavisimogo-kazakhstana/12-material-orys/650-deklaratsiya-o-gosudarstvennom-suverenitete-kazssr> Ccessed on 4.03.2012

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

membership, origins, social and economic status, religion, profession, place of residence.”¹¹¹ Point 11 states:

Representatives of nations and ethnic groups, living in Kazakh SSR outside of their nation-states and autonomous units; or people who have no territory in the Union, are guaranteed with legal equality and equal opportunities in all spheres of civil life. Kazakh SSR is concerned with the satisfaction of national culture, spiritual and language necessities of Kazakhs living outside the Republic.¹¹²

All these provisions were repeated in the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan under ‘State Independence of Republic of Kazakhstan’ with one exception. Leading elite witnessed bloody ethnic clashes in the Caucasus and in other parts of the Union, and tried to avoid nationalistic rhetoric. The first task was to get rid of the emphasis on Kazakh nation-state. So the name of the country which was Kazakh (Soviet Socialist) Republic was renamed as the Republic of Kazakhstan. As a consequence, the people of the country are named not as Kazakh people but as Kazakhstani people.

The terms Kazakh and Kazakhstani have been debated before and after independence. According to Rustem Kadyrzhanov, the confrontation of these terms started in the Soviet period. During that period the term ‘Kazakh’ gained ethnic meaning, while the term ‘Kazakhstani’ was used as a term which consolidates all ethnic groups, and became important as geographical, political and ideological term.¹¹³ During the Soviet Union term Kazakhstan was generally perceived by public as a term which mainly referred to locality. But after independence it gained first of all political meaning as the name of country or even of nation.

After independence Kazakh nationalists proposed to use term ‘Kazakh’ not only to ethnic Kazakh but also to all the population. This proposal was criticized by Russians and other non-local nationalists. The ideological background of this debate stemmed from ethnic nationalism which is dominant in Kazakhstan. The proposals of Kazakh and Russian elites who wanted to end the debate on the basis of civic

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Rustem Kazdyrzhanov, ‘Kazaks and Kazakstanis’ ORSAM Rapor No: 75 ORSAM Avrasya Stratejileri Rapor No: 13, Ekim 2011, p18. http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/201258_13raportum.pdf Accessed on 25.08.2012

nationalism were accepted neither within the elite themselves nor among the masses.¹¹⁴

People who identify with Kazakhness and Kazakhstaniness both claimed discrimination led by their opponents. While Kazakhs argue that they are considered as second class citizens in their own country, non-Kazakhs argue that they are not wanted anymore and were forced to leave the country.

While these debates continued, the ruling elite has attempted to develop a discourse or ideology which aims to hold confronting sides under control and provide stability in the country. For that purpose, as it was seen in the mentioned Declaration on State Sovereignty of KazSSR and the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 'State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan', the state ideology tries to satisfy both sides. The Constitution of Kazakhstan starts with sentences such as "We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historic fate, creating a state on the indigenous Kazakh land..."¹¹⁵ Here, while the word 'people of Kazakhstan' aims to satisfy and erase the concerns of non-Kazakhs who are preferred to be called as 'people of Kazakhstan' rather than 'Kazakh people'; the word "the indigenous Kazakh land" aims to satisfy Kazakh nationalists who demand a special place for Kazakhs.

Nursultan Nazarbayev in his book *In the Stream of History*, which was first published in 1996, clearly stated that "We are building a multi-ethnic state with equal rights and opportunities for all. In this role, the President of the country as a guarantor of the Constitution, is responsible for all people of Kazakhstan, for 130 nationalities and ethnic groups."¹¹⁶ This statement means that Kazakhstan is not a nation-state based on the identity of a dominant group. Rather it is a nation-state where all ethnic and religious groups preserve their identity. In other words,

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p18.

¹¹⁵ *The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan.* (2007) <http://en.government.kz/docs/konstitutzia.htm> Accessed on 30.08.2012.

¹¹⁶ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 7.

Kazakhstan is not based on ethnic nationalism but on civic nationalism. Nazarbayev points out that “The fundamental challenges of the present time is the necessity of building pluralistic in principles, dialogical in content, multi-language in functioning, multi-religious cultural model of state which is adapted to market economy and values coming from abroad.”¹¹⁷ Marat Tazhin in a similar way defines Kazakhstan as multinational country where representatives of more than one hundred nationalities live. He underlines:

We do not strive for the formation of a certain Kazak nation which would mean the assimilation of multiple nations. Our policy is directed to the formation of the political, civic unity of Kazakhstanis. In other words, the people of Kazakhstan are considered as community of citizens of different nationalities, and not as the new ethnic community.¹¹⁸

Nazarbayev declares that the ambitious times of ‘planning of nations’ is gone.¹¹⁹ It is generally expected that the official ideology has monopoly to define criteria of being considered to be included or excluded from nation. By this statement, Nazarbayev says that the role of the state in defining the identity of nation is gone. Further, he states the crucial change occurred in the principles of cultural issues. Firstly, it means the refusal of imposition of one unified ideology. This is a constitutionally defined principle. Nazarbayev argued that this is first time in the century when our state is refusing any form of pressure on cultural processes.¹²⁰ Here, the state refuses to assimilate people, imposing Kazakh language and culture, educating people by totalitarian means, as it was and continue to be the case in many nation-states. Nazarbayev understands the necessity of a nationwide idea to consolidate the nation. As it is put by Olcott, Nazarbayev had on one hand to make Kazakhstan seem to be more overtly the homeland of the Kazakhs, with increased visibility for Kazakh

¹¹⁷ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 66.

¹¹⁸ M. Tazhin, ‘Sovereign Kazakhstan’, in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998, p. 194.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹²⁰ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 66.

culture, language and history, without on the one hand alienating the republic's large Russian and European population.¹²¹

Regarding the national identity of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev defines two levels. First level is related to the formation of people of Kazakhstan as a civic and political community. He underlines that there is a difference between the approach to form an ethnic community and a civic one. He believes that it is early to speak about so called Kazakhstani nation. At the moment the priority is to solve the task of the first level which is the state building, now a formal entity of citizens that should be transformed into the community with common values. The difference of the idea of nation-state from a totalitarian state ideology is that it is not imposed from top to bottom, but grown up from real development of the community.¹²² Pyotr Svoik, a Kazakh politician, in his article 'National question in Kazakhstan: the view of 'a Russian-speaking person' notes that there is no nation in Kazakhstan as there is no morality and ideology which unites people and the state.¹²³ Nazarbayev understands that only the political values can unite the people of Kazakhstan.¹²⁴ In this regard, the well-known phrases 'Kazakhstan is our common house' and 'Kazakhstan is the country of 130 ethnic and religious groups' can be read from this perspective.

The second level, according to Nazarbayev, is related to the national identity of Kazakhs.¹²⁵ He underlines that Kazakhstan is no doubt an organic integrity. Kazakh ethnos is autochthonic ethnos. This is the territory of its ethnic genesis and its historical existence. Hundred-year struggle of Kazakhs to recreate their statehood in their autochthonic territory is organic part of state building process.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs, Second Edition*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 259.

¹²² N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 181.

¹²³ Pyotr Svoik, 'Natsional'nyi vopros v Kazakhstane: vzglyad "russkoyazychnogo," *Tsentral'naya Aziya i Kavkaz* 1998.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

This is what Sally N. Cummings defines as “the dual legitimation process of simultaneously promoting internationalism and an ethnic Kazakh revival.”¹²⁷ However, there is no duality in Nazarbayev’s considerations. He states “While solving the national identity of Kazakh nation, the other level of identity that is political and civic identity of the people of Kazakhstan must not be neglected. These are different levels of identity and it must be clearly stated. There is no contradiction in this point.”¹²⁸

Thus, Kazakhstan’s identity since the very beginning was built on compromise and “consensus”¹²⁹ mainly between Kazakhs and other ethnic groups. To express it in a different way, Kazakhstan as a country was built on the balance between Kazakhs and other Russian-speaking ethnic groups. The state’s and President’s duty is to keep this balance. Nysanbayev and Kadyrzhanov say that the position of the state in promoting the mutual understanding between the ethnic Kazakh elite and the Russian-speaking elite is of great importance.¹³⁰ When Nazarbayev states that the President of the country, as a guarantor of the Constitution, is responsible for the people of Kazakhstan, including 130 nationalities and ethnic groups,¹³¹ he says that the president and state is responsible to keep that balance. As noted by Olcott, “Given the precariousness of Kazakhstan’s present situation, it is a testament to the skills of President Nursultan Nazarbayev that the republic has remained stable.”¹³² Concerning the state’s responsibility, Nazarbayev states that “For the stable development of Kazakhstan, that in near foreseeable future will remain, no doubt, multi-ethnic community, there must be legal guarantees from the state, which creates

¹²⁷ Sally N. Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2005, p. 90.

¹²⁸ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 211.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

¹³⁰ A. Nysanbayev and R. Kadyrzhanov, ‘Natsyonal’naya idey: grazhdanskaya ili etnicheskaya?’ *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 24 December 2006.

¹³¹ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 7.

¹³² Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Second Edition, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 294.

conditions for development of national-cultural lives of different ethnic groups living in the country.”¹³³

In practice, this balance was threatened by language politics of the government and with ambiguity in the 7th point of the Constitution about official language. According to the 7th point of the Constitution, adopted in 1995, “the state language is Kazakh.”¹³⁴ This sentence satisfied Kazakhs, however other ethnic groups would feel suppressed and discriminated if this point was realized. In addition, Kazakhstan has no qualified bureaucrats educated in the Kazakh language. Besides, approximately 60% of the population couldn’t speak in Kazakh. Under these conditions founding leaders solved this situation by adding the following to the constitution: “official language is Russian.”¹³⁵

The balance between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs seemed to be established. In fact, the functioning language on an official level continued to be Russian. Kazakh nationalists felt deceived by the ideology. However, the reality was that Kazakh language during the Soviet period did not develop in many spheres such as science, statecraft, economy. Literature was the strongest area where Kazakh language developed. In practical terms, for leaders it was much more convenient to speak in Russian, rather than in Kazakh. Nevertheless, they tried to speak in Kazakh while visiting southern regions largely populated by Kazakhs.

With the change in demographic situation, increasing number of Kazakhs the balance is shifting in favor of Kazakhs. After the end of the Cold War and Kazakhstan’s declaration of independence, many Russians and Germans migrated to their motherlands. The population, which was about 17 million according to 1989 population census, dropped to 14 million in 1999 population census. In these circumstances, the general volume of ethnic Kazakhs increased.¹³⁶

¹³³ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 131.

¹³⁴ The 7th point of 1995 Constitution

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Qazaqstan Respublikasının Statistika jöinidegi Agenttigi (Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan), (2000) *Qazaqstan Respublikası Halqının Ulttıq Quramı: Qazaqstan Respublikasındağı*

Another factor affecting Kazakhs' increase besides natural birthrate is the migration of ethnic Kazakhs from neighboring countries to Kazakhstan. In the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 'State Independence of Republic of Kazakhstan' of 16 December 1991 it is indicated that

The Republic of Kazakhstan creates conditions for repatriation to its territory of individuals who were forced to leave the territory of the Republic during the periods of mass repressions, coercive collectivization, as result of other anti-humanist political actions, as well as their descendants, also for Kazakhs who are living in the territories of the former (Soviet) union's republics.¹³⁷

As it is indicated by Işık Kuşçu, in contrast to other countries in the region, Kazakhstan was not only restricted by rhetoric on inviting Kazakhs living abroad to homeland. Since 1992 actively supported since 1992 the repatriation of Kazakh Diasporas. Within 20 years after the launching the repatriation policy, approximately 700,000 ethnic Kazakhs migrated to Kazakhstan from different countries such as Turkey, China, and Mongolia.¹³⁸ According to the 1999 population census the ethnic Kazakhs' number was 8 million which consisted 53,5% of the total population. In 2009 population census Kazakhs' number increased to 10 million which is 63,1% of total population.¹³⁹ Young generation of Kazakhs moved to big cities under the pressure of new economic conditions. Moving of the capital from Almaty located in the South, to Astana in the North, led Kazakh youth to move to Northern industrial centers where Kazakhs were in minority. Nazarbayev as response to critiques about 'Kazakhization' of the country stated "Why is the demographic domination of Kazakhs on their mother land a concern, while the domination of French in France, Russian in Russia, and Germans in Germany is perceived as a normal issue?"¹⁴⁰

1999 jilgi Haliq Sanağının Qoritındısı. (National Composition of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Conclusion of the Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1999) Almaty.

¹³⁷ 7th point of the Constitutional Law of Republic of Kazakhstan on 'State Independence of Republic of Kazakhstan'

¹³⁸ Işık Kuşçu, 'Ulus İnşası Sürecinde Kazakistan'da Etnik Geri Dönüş Göçü Siyaseti ve Etkileri', in Turgut Demirtepe (ed.), *Orta Asya'da Siyaset ve Toplum: Demokrasi, Etnisite ve Kimlik*, USAK, Ankara 2012, p.176.

¹³⁹ «Kazakhstan Respublikasının 2009 jilgi Ulttiq haliq sanaginın qoritındıları» Taldamalı Esep, Kazakhstan Respublikası Statistika Agenttigi, p.20.

¹⁴⁰ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 188.

Although Kazakhs' position strengthened in terms of demography, the ruling elite continued to be alien to Kazakh values especially to Kazakh language. These ruling elite who controlled the main resources of the country and possessed key positions in the government played a crucial role in determination of Kazakhstan's national identity. They were interested in preserving Kazakhstan's identity as a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious one. In order to institutionalize this ideology, the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan was established in 1995. In this assembly, all ethnic and religious groups were represented.

The name of the Assembly which uses the word 'peoples' in plural form was under harsh attack from the Kazakh nationalists. The argument was that there is only one people in the country. In fact the tradition to use people in plural was formed in the Soviet time. There were peoples of the Union. As a result of the critiques, the name was replaced with 'the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan', where word 'people' is used in singular.

The task of the Assembly is to consolidate Kazakhstan's people. On the first session of the Assembly Nazarbayev underlined the importance of peace and stability in the country. He drew the attention of the delegates from different ethnic groups living in the country to bloody ethnic clashes in the post-Soviet space such as Karabakh, Tajikistan, Transdnestr, Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Chechnya. He stated: "Unfortunately, we are living in a fragile and unstable world. Based on this simple truth, we must not allow the emergence of conflicts in our country. Otherwise, any help from the outside cannot help. Therefore, we ourselves have to work out the mechanisms of overcoming similar contradictions."¹⁴¹ According to Nazarbayev there are three approaches to the solution of the national question. First is to suppress other ethnic groups. Second is ignoring the national question and hope that it will be solved by itself. Third is searching for common points, and broadening the zones of mutual understanding and trust among people. Nazarbayev pronounced that "Our

¹⁴¹ N. Nazarbayev, 'Strany i narody vernutsya na put' integratsii' in A.N. Nysanbayev, V.Y. Dunayev (eds.), *Evrasiiskaya Doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva*, Almaty, 2010, p.36

main line must be based on the development of all ethnic groups through search of compromises and strengthening of uniting beginnings.”¹⁴²

Although the Assembly includes all ethnic and religious groups in the country, I argue that by the ethnic groups mainly Kazakhs and Russians are understood. The official ideology prefers not to make stress on these two groups, but prefers to develop a discourse which prioritizes all ethnic and religious groups. This way implies Kazakhs and Russians are equal to others. In this way confrontation between two major groups would be resolved. As Olcott put it, Kazakhstan is increasingly going to look like two nations contained within a single border. Nazarbayev hoped to merge these two communities by developing and inculcating a multinational state ideology.¹⁴³

Interestingly, in his first address to the assembly, Nazarbayev recalls how all these people together fought for their freedom and independence during World War II, and how together they explored the cosmos (space).¹⁴⁴ From a theoretical approach it is good example of how common identity can be built on common memory. Indeed all people of Kazakhstan were united with one destiny and a common memory of the past. In this respect Kazak government’s assessment of the Soviet past is totally different from other post-Soviet republics. Central Asian countries perceive the Soviet Union as an empire which exploited the region. In Georgia and Azerbaijan the Soviet Union has strong enemy image. In Baltic countries the Soviet Union is described as an invader and occupant. Ukraine accuses the Soviet Union of genocide, so called Holodomor, against Ukrainians. Although the number of casualties and victims of the Kazakh people, who suffered under the Soviet regime, is much more than any of these republics; the Kazakh leadership preferred to reconcile with the past and build Kazakhstan’s identity and its relations with the former Soviet countries on the positive memory and the experience of the Soviet period. One such

¹⁴² Ibid., p.41.

¹⁴³ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Second Edition, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 296.

¹⁴⁴ N.Nazarbayev, ‘Strany i narody vernutsya na put’ integratsii’, p.40.

experience is the friendship of peoples on which the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan is based. According to Cummings' research, in facing up to a past of simultaneous repression, collectivization, sedentarization and modernization, the ethnic Kazakh elite typically evaluate the Soviet political order as beneficial to their country, and often rationalized the past by presenting a balance sheet of pluses and minuses: 'there was a lot of good and some bad.' The scholar notes that overwhelmingly, both (generally older) Kazakhs and Russians alike regretted the passing of the system which, they often felt, might have been saved if reform had come earlier and been better managed.¹⁴⁵ Today in Kazakhstan, holidays which became a tradition during the Soviet time are still recognized as the official holidays. The New Year's Day, 8th of March International Women's Day, 1st of May Labors' Day, 9th May Victory Day are widely celebrated by all people. Even some celebrate the February 23rd the Day of Formation of the Red Army though not officially.

The role of the Assembly was strengthened by amendments to the Constitution in 2007. According to these amendments 9 seats in the Majilis, the lower chamber of Kazakhstan's Parliament, are occupied by members of the Assembly. In other words, 9 Parliament members is to be elected not by general elections, but will be transferred from the Assembly. In this way, the Assembly was institutionalized and became a part of the official organs. The same package of amendments ended the ambiguity in the Constitution about the state language and official language. The 7th point of the Constitution was changed with the following statement: "state language is Kazakh language. Russian language is used on the level of state language."¹⁴⁶ Thus it seems that the balance between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs is restored.

3.3.1.1 Kazakhstan and Kazakh Statehood

The definition of Kazakhstan's national identity as multi-ethnic and multi-religious does not restrict leaders from building Kazakhstan's statehood on the legacy of Kazakh statehood which includes all empires and khanates formed in the territory of modern Kazakhstan. As it was discussed above, according to Nazarbayev the

¹⁴⁵ Sally N. Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2005, p. 91.

¹⁴⁶ 7 point of the Constitution

reconstruction of Kazakh national identity is related to the second level of the identity of Kazakhstan.¹⁴⁷ As Olcott claims “While continuing to embrace the rhetoric of ethnic tolerance that stresses the multinational nature of the state, the government now actively pursues policies that strengthen the Kazakhs’ claim to cultural, political, and economic hegemony.”¹⁴⁸

In his address to the Assembly of the World Kazakhs (*Düniye Jüzi Qazaqtar Qurultayı*), Nazarbayev stated that “Now Kazakh people are the basic constructors of the state, and are responsible for its fate.”¹⁴⁹ In this definition, Kazakhs are the hosts in the common house of Kazakhstan. But at the same time being a host does not give right to discriminate others in the house. On the contrary Nazarbayev says that as the hosts, Kazakhs are responsible for order, stability and inter-ethnic understanding. Sartayeva elaborates Nazarbayev’s statement in the following way:

No matter that Kazakhstan’s new identity is constructed as ‘Kazakh nation’ or ‘Kazakhstani nation’; it should include the great responsibility of Kazakhs for the success of every Kazakhstani citizen despite their ethnic and religious identities. But this process necessitates a part of ethnic and social self-consciousness of every ethnic group. Kazakhs should understand that many representatives of other ethnic groups have right to consider themselves as indigenous residents of the country. And the representatives of other ethnic groups should understand and take into account the fact that Kazakhs have no other historical homeland.¹⁵⁰

This concept of homeland of Kazakhs is underpinned by the idea of statehood continuity of Kazakhstan. As it is discussed by Kumekov, the history of Kazak statehood properly is connected with the Kazakh khanate, which was formed in the fifteenth century. Meanwhile, Kazak khanate itself is a product of a long historical development going back with its roots to the line of successive state connection to

¹⁴⁷ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 185.

¹⁴⁸ Martha Brill Olcott, *Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C., 2002, p. 52.

¹⁴⁹ Nursultan Nazarbayev, ‘Iz vystubleniya na II kurultae kazakhov v Turkestane 23 iktyabrya 2002’ in *Strategiya nezavisemosti*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p.276.

¹⁵⁰ Raushan Sartayeva, ‘Problemy sotsiokulturnoy konsolidatsii i formirovanie novoy identichnosti v Kazakhstane’, p. 232.

the epoch of ancient times.¹⁵¹ Generally Kazakhs consider themselves as the heirs of all states formed in the present territory of Kazakhstan, from Scythians to Khazar Empire, from Karahanids to Harzemshahs.

Nursultan Nazarbayev delivered his speech at the fifth anniversary of Kazakhstan's independence under the title of 'Historical Stages of Our Statehood', where he clearly underlined that Kazakhstan was one of the heirs of Great Turkic Kaganate.¹⁵² In the above mentioned Nazarbayev's book *In the Stream of History* where he defines Kazakhstan's identity, Nazarbayev devoted one chapter under the title 'Kazakh steppe is a part of Great Turkic El' to Turkic civilization. The founding leader of Kazakhstan writes with honor and admiration that "Our ancestors during two thousand years played a considerable role in the development of states in the space from Far East to West Europe, from Siberia to Hindustan."¹⁵³

The next reference to Kazakhstan's statehood is the Golden Horde formed by Batu khan the second son of Juchi and grandson of Genghis khan. Though Genghis khan's invasion of Central Asia assessed in different ways by some scholars in Kazakhstan, it is a fact that the period of Genghis khan Era created a suitable condition for the consolidation of Kazakh people. It is fact that all khans of Kazakh Khanate were descendants of Genghis khan. Moreover, after mid 14th century the throne of the Golden Horde was occupied by the descendants of Orda-Ejen the first son of Juchi who were ruling White Horde (*Ak Orda*), the right wing of the Golden Horde.¹⁵⁴ If we take into account that khans of Kazakh people were descendants of Orda-Ejen i.e. White Horde (*Ak Orda*), it is quite symbolic that the residence of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan is called *Ak Orda*. Indeed Kazakhstan as an independent country is the only heir of the Golden Horde.

¹⁵¹ B. Kumekov, Problem of the Kazak statehood, in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998, p. 62.

¹⁵² N.A. Nazarbayev, *Strategiya Nezavisemosti*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 201.

¹⁵³ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 81.

¹⁵⁴ Kayrat Begalin, *Khany Zolotoy Ordy*, Aruna, Almaty, 2011, p.154.

The third reference to Kazakhstan's statehood is Kazakh Khanate formed during the disintegration period of the Golden Horde. Kazakh khanate emerged as a result of rebellion of Kerey and Janibek, descendants of Orda-Ejen, against Abulhayir whose origin was from Shibani the fourth son of Juchi. Kerey and Janibek claimed that Abulhayir as a descendant of Shibani has no right to reign the realm of Ak Orda which was Khanate of descendants of Orda-Ejen family.¹⁵⁵ As an act of disobedience Kerey and Janibek with tribes who supported them migrated to South to the rivers of Shu and Talas. Thus they founded the Kazakh Khanate.

Under the period of Kazakh Khanate the consolidation of the Kazakh people took place. The Kazakh Khanate lived between 1456-1848 years and united most of the nomadic Turkic tribes living in vast area between Caspian Sea and Himalaya mountains. Consequently, the Kazakh khanate thus Kazakh people is a confederation of different tribes united by the upper identity of Kazakh. It is believed that all Kazakhs are relatives and have blood relations with each other except *Töre* and *Hoja* tribes who were Mongols and Arabs and were assimilated by the Kazakh culture.

This tribal structure is still relevant among modern Kazakhs. Accordingly, every Kazakh knows his or her tree of genealogy (pedigree) by heart. In this form, Kazakh people have an exclusive identity which means one cannot become Kazakh if he or she is not born as Kazakh. In other words, any ethnic Russian or Korean who lives in Kazakhstan cannot become a Kazakh even if he wants to. As two Russian writers put it "Russian cannot be Kazakh, because he is not relevant to a tribe-clan structure, he has no tree of genealogy. As Kazakhs are bound by relative bonds of tribe-clan relations, Russians are excluded from this structure and cannot be included into Kazakh circle."¹⁵⁶ The authors suggest that "for Kazakhs to become an imperial nation they must eliminate the tribal structure of themselves."¹⁵⁷ From this point of

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 253.

¹⁵⁶ Vsevolod Lukashev & Stanislav Epifantsev, 'Mojet li Russkiy Kazahstanets Staty Kazahom?', 1.07. 2009, <https://zonakz.net/articles/25408> Accessed on 10.09.2012

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

view official ideology's stress on Kazakhstani nation rather than Kazak nation is understandable.

3.3.1.2 Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan

In 2009 the debates on Kazakhstan's national identity become once more heated with the presentations of a new document called 'Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan'. While the main emphasis of the doctrine was on the creation of the Kazakhstani nation, as reference were given USA and Brazil, where all ethnic groups live under one uniting identity, this doctrine disappointed Kazakh nationalists. They perceived it as the loss of Kazakhness. Kazakh nationalists argue that within 20 years Kazakh language still did not reach the level of state language. Under this circumstance, the creation of Kazakhstani nation would mean the suppression of Kazakh language by the Russian one which is spoken both in official level and among the people. They were right because the de facto official language and lingua franca among the ethnic groups was Russian not Kazakh.

As a result of long discussions among the different groups, the final version of the Doctrine which was officially presented on 29 April 2010 at the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan can be considered as a compromise between Kazakh nationalists and civic nationalists. The Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan is based on above discussed Declaration on 'State Sovereignty of KazSSR', the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 'State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan', and the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Doctrine is composed of four parts: General Provisions, I 'One Country—One Destiny', II 'Different Origins—Equal Opportunities', III 'Development of National Spirit', and Concluding Provisions.

General Provisions state: "The Republic of Kazakhstan is the only legal and historical heir of the centuries-long statehood of Kazakh people and natural continuation of its political and state formation."¹⁵⁸ This sentence is very important to satisfy the expectation of Kazakh people, because till that time there was no

¹⁵⁸ Doktrina Natsional'nogo edinstva Kazakhstana, <http://www.inform.kz/rus/article/2263364>
Retrieved in 23.05.2012

reference to Kazakh statehood in the official and legal level. In the above mentioned preamble of the Constitution, the reference was given only to Kazakh land. Keeping in mind the effort of the state ideology to create new Kazakhstani nation like Americans, the reference only to the indigenous ancient Kazakh land, was not perceived positively by Kazakh nationalists. It is because in the case of America, the state was built on American identity by exterminating the indigenous Indians. The reference to indigenous Indian land does not change the fact that the Indians' identity was excluded from state and national identity. From this point of view, the recognition of centuries-long Kazakh statehood as basis of the Republic of Kazakhstan was a turning point. The Doctrine recognizes that "Kazakh people passed through hard tests, they not only survived but established their own state, gained independence."¹⁵⁹

Another emphasis of the doctrine is on the fact that Kazakhstan is a national state or a nation-state. In western literature nation and state is equal to each other. But in Kazakhstan, national generally means which belongs to Kazakh nation. In addition, in words of leaders Kazakhstan is sometimes identified as multi-national instead of multi-ethnic. Doctrine introduces new term 'ethnos' (ethnicities) instead of contested terms such as peoples in plural and nationalities. The main stress of the Doctrine is on the term of Nation with capital N. The authors of the Doctrine intentionally avoid the term Kazakhstani nation.

The Doctrine indicates that in the Declaration on 'State Sovereignty of KazSSR' and the Constitutional Law on 'State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan' there were two principles that determined basis of sovereignty and further consolidation of nation: first is right of Kazakh people to self-determination which created the condition to establish the state of Kazakhstan; second is equal opportunities for all citizens of the country.¹⁶⁰ In fact these principles equally emphasize both ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. The doctrine preserves the balance between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

The Doctrine is constructed on the idea of the national unity. The first principle on which national unity is based, presented under part one ‘One Country—One Destiny’. This is the recognition of the commonness of destiny of each citizen and the Motherland, the Republic of Kazakhstan. “The national unity is based on high level relatedness despite one’s ethnic origin, to Kazakhstan and to its future.”¹⁶¹ New Kazakhstan is not a country with a multi-ethnic and multi-religious identity but it is a country with the identity of one Nation. “Under new historical circumstances, Kazakh people who gave its honorable name to the country have new historical mission; that is to be consolidating center of unity of Nation.”¹⁶²

The second principle on which national unity is based presented under part two ‘Different Origins—Equal Opportunities’. It is equality of opportunities for all citizens despite their ethnic and other origins, religions, and social statuses. In the list of measures to provide equality there is a point which indicates that it is legally prohibited to form political organizations based on the ethnicity and religions.

The third principle of national unity is strengthening and development of Spirit of Nation. “Spiritual basis is power which unites Nation into one. ...To raise our National Spirit the priorities must be spirit of traditions and patriotism, spirit of renewal, competitiveness and victory.”¹⁶³ In this respect, the development of state language is included into priorities list. At the same time the state cares about the satisfaction of spiritual-cultural and language necessities of all ethnicities living in the country.

“Modernization and competitiveness built on traditions is the basis of progress for our national spirit in 21st century”. The stress on tradition is very important for Kazakhs, as it says that while building new country, we will not lose our traditional identity, i.e. Kazakhness. In this sense, Nazarbayev’s thoughts are relevant. “We are confronted with a dilemma: we will explore modern reality and build new

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

Kazakhstan, or we will go to non-existence. We chose former one, but our building of new must be based on rich historical experience. Dreaming honorable future let's remember honorable past.”¹⁶⁴

To sum up, Kazakhstan's national identity is built on two components: Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs. Both groups are concerned not to be assimilated by the other. These two groups are as two poles that must be balanced by the state. Before I move to the discussion of the international factors influencing the Kazakhstan's identity, it is reasonable to make reference to Rustem Kadyrzhanov who describes above mentioned two poles as Turkic and Russian.

Turkic and Russian identities of Kazakhstan can be considered as the poles of specters of orientation which characterizes the national identity of Kazakhstan. These specters reflect the diversity of identities of different social groups composing Kazakhstan's community. ...It is proper to say that the certain part of their identities is related to Turkic orientation and the other part is to Russian orientation.¹⁶⁵

Turkic and Russian identities are related to geographical and geo-cultural environments and historical experience of Kazakhstan. It makes sense from this point to move to international factors shaping Kazakhstan's identity. The demographic division of the country is deepened by the civilizations of neighboring countries. As it is put by Olcott, Kazakhstan is trapped by geopolitics as well as demography.¹⁶⁶ While in domestic level it is demography of Kazakhstan which is the main determinant of its national identity, in international level it is geopolitical and geo-cultural environment that tremendously affects its identity.

3.3.2 International Factors

Kazakhstan is situated between different civilizations. Northern and Eastern borders of the country are considered to be the borders of Islamic civilizations. Islam meets with the Orthodox Christianity on the North and with Confucianism on the East. Ethnically speaking, the northern border of the country is that between Slavic world

¹⁶⁴ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 76.

¹⁶⁵ Kadyrzhanov Rustem, “Vybor alfavita–vybor identichnosti”, *Kazakh almanaghy*, № 4, 2009, p.66.

¹⁶⁶ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Second Edition, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 294.

and Turkic world. Interestingly, in linguistic terms, Kazakhstan's Southern and Eastern borders are considered to be the borders of the realm of the Russian language. In geographical terms, Western border of Kazakhstan which is the Caspian Sea is considered to be the border of Asia. It is difficult to position Kazakhstan in certain geographical, ethnic, linguistic, religious and civilization frame in the world.

In Nazarbayev's analysis, due to its multi-ethnic composition, in Kazakhstan there are several intersecting 'cultural plates' of global and regional religious complexes: first of all Islamic, Christian, and elements of almost all world religions; basic ethnical: Kazakh and Russian; and meta-ethnic complexes: Turkic and Slavic.¹⁶⁷ To paraphrase this statement, Kazakhstan's population who are mainly Muslim Kazakhs and Christian Russians consider themselves as parts of an Islamic-Turkic world and parts of Christian Slavic world respectively. These religious and cultural circles intersect in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan both demographically and geo-culturally is situated between these two worlds. To refer once again to Nazarbayev, "Kazakhstan is situated in the intersection of two huge 'archipelagos': Eurasian cultural space and traditional historic-cultural unity of Central Asian people developing on the new basis."¹⁶⁸

Based on this analysis, in international environment Kazakhstan's identity is pulled towards and shaped by these two directions that are Turkic-Islamic and Slavic-Christian worlds. Kazakh leadership has no luxury to ignore one of these directions. This dilemma was revealed just during the period of disintegration of the Soviet Union.

On 8 December 1991 the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus without informing the leaders of the other Republics formally denounced the USSR and created the Commonwealth of Independent States. Nazarbayev recalls that one of the main problems under discussion was the formation of the Slavic federation.¹⁶⁹ After this,

¹⁶⁷ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 138.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.141.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p 94.

on 13 December the leaders of Central Asian Republics gathered in Ashkhabad, capital of Turkmenistan. The leader of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov proposed the project of the formation of the Confederation of Central Asian countries as response to the decision of Slavic leaders.¹⁷⁰ In this way the post-Soviet integration seemed to be concentrated on North among the Slavic-Christian countries and on South among the Turkic-Muslim countries. Nazarbayev writes that “We were on the threshold of the establishment of two unions: Slavic one and Turkic one plus Tajikistan.”¹⁷¹

Though Kazakhstan was perceived as Turkic country, its Turkic identity was disputable due to the majority of the Slavic population in the country and sovietized and russified mindset of Kazakhs. In addition, there is a 7000 km border with Russia which cannot be ignored by any leader of Kazakhstan. Therefore, it was not convenient for Kazakhstan to be incorporated in this or that grouping. It is because Kazakhstan was neither purely Slavic, nor pure Turkic. Kazakhstan’s leadership tried their best to prevent this split in the Slavic-Turkic line.

The split of the Soviet Union in the axes of Muslim Turks and Christian Slavs was prevented by the initiative of Nazarbayev, when he invited all post-Soviet countries’ leaders to Almaty on 21 December to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States on the new basis. He convinced Eltsin to accept Central Asian countries as the founding members of the organization.¹⁷² Thus, Nazarbayev prevented the split and polarization in religious cultural lines from which firstly and mostly would be affected Kazakhstan due to its location between these opposing two poles.

From the position of ethnic Kazakh people, Central Asian countries stand closer because of ethnic, linguistic and religious commonness. However, for other people of Kazakhstan who can be called as Slavs, or non-Kazakhs and especially Russians feel themselves closer to Russia. In the final analysis, in international terms Kazakhstan’s

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 94.

¹⁷² Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na poroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p 95.

identity was shaped by Turkic world and Central Asia on the one hand, and by a Slavic World and Russia on the other. In addition, the rise of Asia and the dominant place of the USA and the European Union affected Kazakhstan's state identity as well. Nazarbayev seems to resolve this dilemma in *Strategy 2030 of Kazakhstan* while discussing models of development.

Some people say that Kazakhstan is, though not considerable nevertheless, part of Europe and historically we have been heading toward the Western civilization. Others say that we are Asian country in large extent, so we should follow the experience of 'tigers' Japan and Korea. The third group says that we are deeply entered into Russian mindset and principles of collectivism, so our choice must overlap with the choice of Russia. The fourth group argues that we have mainly Muslim population so we should follow the neo-Turkish model. Although it sounds paradoxical, they are all right and wrong at the same time. We are Eurasian country who has its own history and its own future. Therefore, our model will not be the same with others. It will combine achievements of different civilizations. We will not put questions as 'either this or that'. We will be eclectic and will use 'both this and that' by applying the best achievements of all civilizations proved their effectiveness.¹⁷³

Due to its geopolitical and geo-cultural location Kazakhstan's state identity is influenced by all surrounding great and regional powers. In cultural terms it is especially affected by Slavic and Turkic worlds due to the demographic composition of Kazakhstan. The Slavic world is generally named as the Commonwealth of Independent Countries. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a 'Department of the CIS' coordinating mainly Slavic countries and also there is a 'Department of Central Asia, South Caucasus and Turkey' which as region covers the Turkic world. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that in the year of 2012 Astana was declared by TURKSOY (The International Organization of Turkic Culture) as Cultural Capital of Turkic World exactly the same year in which Astana was declared to be the cultural capital of the CIS countries.

3.3.2.1 Turkic World

During the Soviet time Kazakhstan was not included in Central Asia. "From its beginning in 1917, the Soviet state never included Kazakhstan in Muslim Central Asia, preferring to give it a non-Asian identity by linking it closely to Russia and

¹⁷³ N.Nazarbayev, *Strategiya Nezavisemosti*, p. 41.

Siberia.”¹⁷⁴ According to Soviet terminology today’s Central Asia was called as Kazakhstan and Middle Asia (*Kazakhstan i Srednyaya Aziya*). During the Tsarist Russian imperial period, the most territory of today’s Kazakhstan was separated from Turkistan province of the empire. In this way, Kazakhstan was separated from the Turkic people in its South and considered to be a buffer zone between the Slavic world and the Turkic world.

Just after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in the summit of Central Asian leaders Nazarbayev proposed to include Kazakhstan within the concept of Central Asia. It was the first step for Kazakhstan to identify itself as Central Asian which was closer to the terms of Turkic and Muslim. The Turkicness became a component of the Kazakhstan’s identity. Shirin Akiner lists Islam, Turkicness, and nomad legacy as defining factors of Kazakh identity which have particular prominence.¹⁷⁵ As we have mentioned above in the book *In the Stream of History* Nazarbayev describes Kazakh lands as part of Great Turkic El, which is Turkic statehood or civilization. The concept of ‘*Mangi El*’ which means eternal state was developed by Turks. It is meaningful that in 2011 during the 20th anniversary of Independence in Astana the statue of ‘*Mangi El*’ was revealed. Even in 2014 Nazarbayev proposed to make the concept of *Mangi El* as national idea.¹⁷⁶

Thus, Kazakhstan defines itself as the heir of Turkic legacy. As Nazarbayev expressed it “It is not a coincidence that the cult of wolf became the symbol of all Turks, and the sky blue color became organically the color of Kazakhstan’s national flag.”¹⁷⁷ Meanwhile, this sky blue color with the proposal of Kazakhstan after

¹⁷⁴ Han-Woo Choi, ‘Geo-Cultural Identity of the Western Turkestan’, *International Journal of Central Asian Studies*, Volume 8 (2003), p. 2.

¹⁷⁵ Shirin Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p. 64.

¹⁷⁶ ‘Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbayev to the nation. January 17, 2014’ http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_215751_kazakhstan-respublikasynyn-prezidenti-n-a-nazarbaevtyyn-kazakistan-khalkyna-zholdauy-2014-zhylhy-17-kantar Accessed on 4.03.2015

¹⁷⁷ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 82.

Bishkek Summit of Turkish speaking leaders in 2012 became the color of the flag of Turkic Council which is intended to unite all Turkic countries.¹⁷⁸

Nazarbayev writes with admiration about Turkic civilization. He says that today the role of Nomadic Empires became the subject of systemic analysis. He underlines that it happened not just by itself but as a result of Kazakhstan's independence and those of culturally close peoples of Central Asia.¹⁷⁹ Nazarbayev is very optimistic about the future of Turkic countries.

Anyone, who even superficially knows the history of Turks, cannot come to pessimistic conclusions about the further historical destiny of this cultural-historical and linguistic community. Having created unprecedented empire fourteenth centuries ago, having passed through the colonial slavery, having stood against weights of totalitarian regime, today Turkic world came across with the qualitatively new historical perspective, i.e. to fill with real content centuries long dream of peoples about independence and building of their own state.¹⁸⁰

Of course, Nazarbayev is aware of the natural contradictions which emerge in the nation-state building process, but he underlines that it is necessary to see more major problems as well, solving of which exactly will help to realize the tasks of strengthening the sovereignty.¹⁸¹ To open this statement, during the nation building process, the Turkic countries try to monopolize common Turkic historical persons and traditions. For example, Kazakhs say that Farabi was Kazakh, while Uzbeks claim that he was Uzbek. In recent debate, both Kazakhs and Kirgiz argue that dance '*Qara Jorga*' belongs to them. Another dispute which is more acute than cultural values is over certain territories. Nazarbayev's idea is that when Turkic states stand close to each other more properly motivated not by local national interest but from the perspective of regional integration, it will strengthen at the same time their independence. Nazarbayev's prediction is that "Despite the turbulent processes of national identification, the world wide law is tendency toward emergence of huge

¹⁷⁸ Türk Konseyi'nin bayrağı Bişkek'te kabul edildi. <http://turkkon.org/icerik.php?no=159> Accessed on 2.02.2015

¹⁷⁹ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 72.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p.111.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

civilization complexes formed as a result of economic, cultural, information processes and possessed own vision of historical process.”¹⁸²

Nazarbayev calls to realize common cultural-historical destiny of Turks. But he underlines that he does not mean breaking away and isolation from other cultural poles. “Turkic world was always a linking bridge between peoples and cultures. Exactly this Turkic world will become the bridge which will enrich cultures of the peoples of the following civilizations: West; Arabic-Iranian world; Russia; China.”¹⁸³ It is obvious that by ‘other cultural poles’ he means Russia first.

Nazarbayev has quite interesting thoughts about the unity of Turkic world. It should be kept in mind that for a president, whose country is dependent on Russia which discourse of Turkic unity is directed against it, making such statements is quite a bold action.

If the idea of unity of Turkic world is analyzed from the position of the present historical moment, it seems that the integrative and mobilization potential of the idea of unity is very small. But if it is viewed from broader time scope, then the history proves that every Turkic group is the organic part of Turkic cultural world. With the time passed, it is certain that cultural geo-landscape will change because of the increase of economic and political role of Central Asian states. Turkic people acting as a single entity can affect the geopolitics of the region not as a passive object but as an equal subject.¹⁸⁴

To sum up Nazarbayev’s statements, Kazakhstan acts not only as a representative of Turkic world but moreover it acts as a nation who is responsible for the future of the Turkic civilization. Dutch scholar Armand Sag notices that Kazakhstan has embraced its own Turkic heritage, even though other countries (like Turkey) have been somewhat hesitant in order to maintain the myth of their own Turkic heritage. He claims that Kazakhstan can rightly be portrayed as one of the cradles of the Turkic

¹⁸² Ibid., p.112.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V potoke istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 114.

civilization. It is proper to agree with his conclusion which states that Kazakhstan is slowly reuniting with this part of their ancient history.¹⁸⁵

In *Kazakhstan's Strategy 2030*, adopted in 1997 according to which Kazakhstan by year 2030 should become the Asian Leopard as Asian tigers, threats and priorities are discussed. In that main document Nazarbayev writes “the Kazakhstani leopard will be united in his struggles, victories and failures with his brothers, Uzbek, Kirgiz and other Central Asian leopards, who were feed and brought up by one mother, and will be proud of their developments and achievements.”¹⁸⁶ It means that Kazakhstan perceive Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as close brother nations.

Generally every nation has its symbol or totem which define its identity. For example, Russia is identified by bear, China by dragon or panda, Britain by lion. Traditionally Turks are symbolized by ‘kök börü’ divine wolf. However, for Kazakhstan to identify itself with the wolf would mean too much emphasis on pan-Turkist ideology. So Nazarbayev preferred the symbol of snow leopard which is politically neutral. But the phrase ‘Turkic brothers as Uzbek and Kirgiz fed by one mother’ means that the subject is not she leopard but she wolf, mythic mother of all Turkic people. Even if we accept that Nazarbayev preferred snow leopard to grey wolf, it doesn’t contradict with the Turkic traditions as the snow leopard was the totem or symbol of Huns, the ancestors of Turks. It is so or not, Nazarbayev underlines Kazakhstan’s commons origin with Central Asian states.

In Nazarbayev’s view, regional countries are united not only by common past but with the very issue of survival in international arena. In the address to the People of Kazakhstan in 1999 he put it as follow:

In the threshold of a new century, the question of political aspirations of Central Asian states is not important as the question of strategy of common survival in the

¹⁸⁵ Armand Sag, ‘Kazakhstan in the World: the Turkic Heritage and the World around It’, in *Turkic World Almanac*, Turkic Academy, Almaty, 2013, p. 263.

¹⁸⁶ N. Nazarbayev, *Strategiya Nezavisemosti*, p.23.

world which is full of hidden threats and opportunities. Trust and convergence of Central Asian people is demand of our common security.¹⁸⁷

In the 2004 Address to the Nation Nazarbayev, after counting Russia, USA, and China as priorities, added “the priority which is not less important than these is Central Asian countries. We have to work more actively with neighbors on convergence of economies and respectively of countries and peoples. We also motivated with the understanding of importance of providing the stability in the Southern borders of Kazakhstan.¹⁸⁸

In the Address to Nation in 2005, Nazarbayev under title ‘Regional Issues’ called Central Asian countries to regional economic integration:

Until the end of 15th century, Central Asia was a major player in the global economy. Our region bridged the East and the West. The population of the region was not divided into countries and nations. The decline of the Silk Road turned Central Asia into backwaters of progress. For the first time in over five centuries, our independence is making it possible to restore the economic importance of our region. We are developing our transit infrastructure and emerging as a global major supplier of commodities, including oil, gas, iron ore and agricultural products. The network of new oil and gas pipelines and modern highways and railways can already be seen along the ancient Silk Road.¹⁸⁹

After analyzing the economic tendencies in the world he concludes “We can clearly see the causes behind the success by Asian tigers and the European Union. On the other hand, we have observed the international confrontation and conflicts among nations that emerged from colonial rule after the Second World War. The global economy demands larger markets.” Nazarbayev reminds that:

¹⁸⁷ QR Prezidentiniñ Qazaqstan Halqına Joldawı ‘Stabil'nost' i Bezopasnost’, Strany v Novom Stoletii’ 16.09.1999 http://www.akorda.kz/kz/page/kazakstan-respublikasynyn-prezidenti-n-a-nazarbaevtyin-kazakstan-khalkyna-zholdauy-20199-zhylhy-kyrkuiek_1342857844 Accessed on 5.05.2013

¹⁸⁸ Poslaniya Narodu Kazakhstana, ‘K Konkurentosposobnomu Kazakhstanu, Konkurentosposobnoy Ekonomike, Konkurentosposobnoy Natsii’ 14.03.2004 http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstan-19-mart-2004-g_1342416361 Accessed on 30.04.2013

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

Today, we are again witnessing superpower rivalry for economic dominance in our region. We have to address correctly this new global and geo-economics challenge. We have a choice between being the supplier of raw materials to the global markets and wait patiently for the emergence of the next imperial master or to pursue genuine economic integration of the Central Asian region. I choose the latter.¹⁹⁰

In Nazarbayev's understanding, further regional integration will lead to stability, regional progress, and economic, military and political independence. This is the only way for the region to earn respect in the world. This is the only way to achieve security, and to fight effectively against terrorism and extremism. Regional integration will advance the interests of all the common folk that live in Central Asia. He proposes to create 'a Union of Central Asian States'. The Treaty of eternal friendship between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan can serve as a solid foundation for such union.¹⁹¹

By comparing Central Asia with Europe he claims "In the region, we share economic interest, cultural heritage, language, religion, and environmental challenges, and face common external threats. The founding fathers of the European Union could only wish they had so much in common. We should direct our efforts towards a closer economic integration, a common market and a single currency." The reference to the common history is also interesting, "I see integration as the only way to become worthy of our common great ancestors who always envisioned us together. The Tsarist Empire and Stalin's ethnic policy abhorred this unity; they broke our region into administrative territories. Their policy was that of 'divide and rule'. The day has come for us to embark on a new and indispensable path that the next generations of equal peoples in the region will follow after us."¹⁹²

Nazarbayev does indeed supports regional integration: "It is important to keep a steady pace of regional integration. We have to develop comprehensive relations with neighboring countries in Central Asia with whom we share common culture and

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Addresses of the President of Kazakhstan, "Kazakhstan on the Road to Accelerated Economic, Social and Political Modernization." 16.02.2005 http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_address-of-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayev-to-the-people-of-kazakhstan-february-18-2005_1343986671 Accessed on 30.04.2013

history. Our interaction in trade and economic and cultural and humanitarian areas offers promising prospects.”¹⁹³ In the 2007 Address to the Nation named ‘New Kazakhstan in New World’ Nazarbayev continued his stress on regional integrations. He underlined the active role of Kazakhstan in providing regional stability, development of economic integration of Central Asian countries, and formation of dynamic market in the zone of Caspian and Black Seas.¹⁹⁴

To summarize, this is how Turkic world in general and Central Asia in particular are seen from Kazakhstan’s point of view. Kazakhstan strongly identifies itself with Turkic civilization. Astana not only defines itself as part of Turkic world and heir of Turkic civilization but consider itself as the center of Turkic world and the cradle of Turkic civilization. Based on this view, Kazakhstan develops foreign policy in this direction. Kazakhstan is trying to take initiatives in a Turkic world. Now I will discuss how the Turkic world is shaping Kazakhstan’s national identity.

Kazakhstan has borders with three Central Asian Turkic republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirgizstan. For the former two, it was not difficult to build a nation-state on the basis of ethnicity because of the homogeneous population. So, in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the emphasis was on Turkmenness and Uzbekness. Even in the Kirgiz case, despite the heterogeneous population, the official name of the country was adopted as the Kirgiz Republic. This condition in the Southern neighbors of Kazakhstan especially that in Uzbekistan became the source of admiration for Kazakh nationalists who want to see Kazakhstan as nation-state with emphasis on Kazakhness. Kazakh-language mass media in Kazakhstan, when illustrate the bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, used to use ‘Kazakh-Uzbek relations’ instead of officially accepted ‘Kazakhstani-Uzbek’ relations. It is because in Uzbekistan it is widespread to use ‘Uzbek’ as an adjective,

¹⁹³ Addresses of the President of Kazakhstan, ‘Kazakhstan’s strategy of joining the world’s 50 most competitive countries, Kazakhstan is on the threshold of a major breakthrough in its development’ 01.03.2006 http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_address-of-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayev-to-the-people-of-kazakhstan-march-1-2006_1343986805 Accessed on 30.04.2013

¹⁹⁴ Poslaniya Narodu Kazakhstana, Novyy Kazakhstan V Novom Mire 28.02.2007 http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana-28-fevralya-2007-g_1343986887 Accessed on 30.04.2013

as in the examples of Uzbek officials and Uzbek foreign policy. As a reaction to this usage, Kazakhs use Kazakh as an adjective of Kazakhstan but not Kazakhstani.

From perspective of the origins, Uzbeks are the closest people to Kazakhs in the region. There is a Kazakh proverb which says ‘*Özbek öz ağam*’ which means ‘Uzbek is my own brother’. Both Kazakhs and Uzbeks see their origins coming from the Nomadic Uzbek tribes. However during Uzbeks migration to Maverennahr, today’s Uzbekistan’s territory, due to the environment Uzbeks left their nomadic style of life and became settled people. In this way, they adopted many traditions of Persian people who were called as Sarts among Turks. So from approach of life style, nomadic Kirgiz people became closer in identity to Kazakhs. There is another proverb reflecting this approach ‘*Qazaq Qırğız bir tuwğan, Özbek Sarttı kim tuwğan*’ which means Kazakh and Kirgiz are born from one mother, and who gave birth to Uzbek Sart. In the second sentence of proverb, Uzbek is identified with Sart i.e. Persian. Interestingly, Kazakhs separate Uzbek from Sart by saying above mentioned proverb “Uzbek is my own brother” and then add “Sart is for me stranger”: ‘*Özbek öz ağam, Sart sadağam*’.

Generally, identity is built on otherness. In order to understand who you are, first you should learn who you are not. From this approach, the last nomadic tribes settled before forced collectivization of the Soviet time were Uzbeks. Therefore, Uzbeks became the other of nomads as all Turkmens, Kazakhs and Kirgiz were nomads. They accused Uzbeks of being mercantilists, and of forgetting nobility and generosity of nomads. And Uzbeks in their turn accused others of being uncivilized and brutal. The advices written in Seljukname exactly reflect this understanding: “I warn you, do not live in cities and settle down, because people who stay in cities forget their geneology (*el, shejere*), they lose their nobility and dignity. Nobility and dignity is only in the nomadic style of life and in Turkmenness.”¹⁹⁵

From a religious and a civilization approach, Turkmens and Uzbeks traditionally are devoted Muslims, while Kazakhs and Kirgiz are moderate ones. Until the recent years Kazakh and Kirgiz worldviews and beliefs were a mixture of Islamic and Old

¹⁹⁵ Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi*, Kültür Bakanlığı, Ziya Gökalp Yayınları, İstanbul 1976, p.25.

Turkic civilizations. This situation was reflected in the national flags of the Central Asian Turkic countries. While Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan chose the sun which is the symbol of Tangriism, the system of beliefs in pre-Islamic ancient Turkic civilization, and put it in their flags; Uzbeks and Turkmens preferred to use crescent the symbol of Islam to identify themselves.

Present Uzbekistan's territory which was called as *Maverennahr* in the terminology of Islamic scholars was one of the cradles of Islamic civilization. Many great thinkers and scholars in hadith, sayings of Prophet, Islamic law, medicine, and philosophy were educated here. Despite general decline of Islamic civilization and Soviet struggle against religion many lodges of Islamic learning survived. And as a consequence Uzbeks were devoted Muslims as compared to Kazakhs. From this Uzbek point of view, Kazakhs who forgot not only religion Islam but even mother language as *mangurt* in terms of Chinghiz Aitmatov.¹⁹⁶ Uzbeks have a proverb which says that 'In order to become a Russian, first you should become a Kazakh.'

To sum up, the nationalistic stand and religious identity of Southern neighbors especially of Uzbekistan strengthened Kazakhness and religiosity of Kazakhs thus contributing to the Turkic component of Kazakhstan's identity. No doubt that interaction of Kazakh officials with their counterparts on all levels in other Turkic countries including Turkey and Azerbaijan, contributes to the awakening awareness of Turkic origins. Officials visiting Turkey generally try to speak in Kazakh in order not to disappoint the Turkish community who perceive Kazakh as their brothers with the same ethnic and linguistic origins. For example, in Nazarbayev's official visit to Turkey in October 2012, he tried not to disappoint the Turkish community by speaking in Russian. In that visit Nazarbayev was addressed as '*Aksakal* or Head of Turkic world'. For *Aksakal* of the Turkic world it would be improper to speak in Russian. In the press conference, one question was put in Russian. The matter is that according to the Kazakhstan's Law on Civil Service, a statesman, who is applied by citizen in Russian, must respond in Russian.¹⁹⁷ However, President Nazarbayev

¹⁹⁶ Chinghiz Aitmatov, *The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years*, Indiana University Press, 1988.

¹⁹⁷ For instance in August 2011 during Kazakhstan's minister of foreign affairs' visit to Turkey, when he was asked question in Russian, he answered in Russian by noting that the question was put in

without any hesitation started to respond to the question, asked in Russian, in Kazakh. This small example shows how interaction can change attitude of Kazakhstan's officials. In the final analysis, Turkic world which lays in Kazakhstan's south shape the national identity of Kazakhstan. Ultimately, Kazakhstan is part of Turkic world. We observe the rise of Turkic identity of Kazakhstan.

3.3.2.2 Slavic World and Russia

Many scholars write that Russia formed a distinct civilization.¹⁹⁸ "Russian civilization was a product of its indigenous roots in Kievan Rus and Muscovy, substantial Byzantine impact, and prolonged Mongol rule."¹⁹⁹ The main features of this civilization are Russian language, Cyrilic alphabet, Orthodox Christianity. Fernand Braudel describes Russia, the Muscovy of early days, which became the USSR and then the CIS as 'the other Europe'. "The other Europe developed too late, almost as late as America, but on the continent of Europe itself and therefore cemented to the West."²⁰⁰ Although this Russian civilization can be considered as the extension of Western civilization, there are certain differences. The Russian Empire as the heir of Byzantine, i.e. East Roman Empire was the other for the West Roman Empire, just as Orthodox Christianity was the other for Catholic Christianity. The Russian Communism was the challenge for the Western European democracy. Although this alternative to Western democracy disappeared after the disintegration of the Eastern bloc, it had impact for certain extent in the subconscious of the people

Russian. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-kazakistan-disisleri-bakani-yercan-kazikhanov-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisinin-metni.tr.mfa> Accessed on 30.04.2013

¹⁹⁸ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D.C. Semervell, Oxford University Press, New York and London, Thirteenth Edition 1956. Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, translated by Richard Mayne, Penguin Books, London, 1995.

¹⁹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Shuster, 1996, p. 140.

²⁰⁰ Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, translated by Richard Mayne, Penguin Books, London, 1995, p. 526.

educated during the Soviet time. As one scholar put it, “Communism passed from the scene, but powerful challengers to democracy have not.”²⁰¹

Russia’s interaction with the nomadic people of the steppes in its history constitutes the bond between modern Russia and Kazakhstan. Russia is the heir of Muscovite Rus’, while Kazakhstan is the heir of the Golden Horde. Beginning from the mid-sixteenth century when the domination passed from Turkic people to Slavic people, Kazakh lands gradually became part of the Russian Empire.

Kazakhstan as was mentioned above during the Tsarist Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was not considered as the part of the Muslim Turkic Central Asia. Rather it was considered as the extension of the inner Russia. Since 1731 Russia began to colonize Kazakh lands. The resistance of the Kazakh khans continued for a century and more. Because of this resistance, Russia decided to build trans-Caspian railroads from Batumi to Samarkand bypassing Kazakh lands.

The Slavic or the Russian identity of Kazakhstan was formed through the colonization and the assimilation policies. Shirin Akiner in her study on Kazakh identity titled ‘Cultural Change: beginning of Europeanization/Russification’ defines four channels through which the process took place. The first channel was state-sponsored education which was intended chiefly to serve the needs of the local Russian military and civilian communities, but also admitted Kazakhs. The second channel of Russian cultural influence was through manners, dress, furnishing and popular entertainment. The third source of Russian influence, socially and geographically more limited in outreach, but of profound importance in the development of a European-style cultural environment, was the lively intellectual life of the urban-based immigrant communities. “These included doctors, teachers, engineers and other permanently resident professionals, visiting scholars, and thousands of political exiles, not only from Russia, but from other parts of the empire as well (among them Ukrainians and a large contingent of Poles), who represented all the main trends in revolutionary thought from 1820s onwards.” The fourth way in

²⁰¹ Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2008, p. 54.

which Russian culture played definitive role in the transformation of Kazakh society was through its function as recorder, classifier and interpreter of the nomad legacy.²⁰²

Mekemtas Mirzahmetov contends that “The main purpose of the domestic and foreign policy of the Romanov dynasty for centuries was to Russify and Christianize the conquered people.”²⁰³ By Russification it is understood to exterminate the local languages and cultures of the conquered people and turn them into Russian people with Russian language and culture; and by Christianization it is understood to exterminate the local religions and beliefs of the conquered people and turn them into Orthodox Christians. Mirzahmetov argues that to reach that purpose the most reliable and the most effective method was to settle Russian peasants among non-Russian people and to increase the number of Russians year by year as it was possible.²⁰⁴ In 1861 the serf system was abolished in Russia and peasants who gained their freedom began to migrate to Kazakh lands in search of good life. As it is expressed by Mirzahmetov, this migration of Russian peasants was encouraged by the government as a tool of colonization and assimilation of Kazakh lands and Kazakh people.²⁰⁵ According to the study of George J. Demko, “The wave of Russian migrants which swept into Kazakhstan between 1916 profoundly altered its geography.”

During the course of twenty years, the population increased by 2,000,000, or more than half, and in some of the northern uyezds, it more than doubled. Significantly, the number of Russians more than tripled as a result of in-migration and high rates of natural increase, where the native population increased only slightly (14 percent) and in some areas actually decreased. In 1897 Russians made up only 14 percent of the population, but 35 percent by 1916.²⁰⁶

²⁰² Shirin Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p. 26-27.

²⁰³ Mekemtas Mirzahmetov, *Kazaklar Nasıl Ruslaştırılmaya Çalışıldı*, Aktaranlar Bağlan Özer ve Tümen Somuncuoğlu, ÇAVSAM, Çankırı, 2012, p. 11.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

²⁰⁶ George J. Demko, *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896-1916*, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1969, p. 196.

The famine and death of thousands of Kazakhs in 1930s further increased the Russian share in the population in Kazakhstan. Ultimately, due to the Russian peasants and their economic activity Kazakh lands became more integrated to inner Russia. That is what makes Kazakhstan different from other Central Asian countries.

The Russification policy which began during the Tsarist Russian period continued during the Soviet Union as well. Nazarbayev having noted that there was regime similarities between two periods of the Kazakh history says that “the change of the social system strengthened the existing trends, the process led to the destruction national culture and national system as a whole in the scales of totalitarian multiplication.”²⁰⁷ Shirin Akiner defines the Sovietization of Kazakhstan as ‘building the new’ and ‘destroying the old.’ In ‘building the new’ the specific strategy that was of crucial significance for the transformation of Kazakh society was the campaign form mass literacy and education. In ‘destroying the old’ Soviets destroyed Kazakh national elite; the traditional nomadic way of life which led to destruction of traditional culture and worldview; and Islam.²⁰⁸

During Stalin’s period, Kazakh lands became open jail camps for different peoples of the Union who were found as ‘the threat’ and ‘enemy’ to the Soviet regime and were exiled to Kazakh steppes. Especially during the World War II, many nationalities of Caucasus and northern Black Sea who were suspected to assist Germans were deported. They were Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, Turks, Dagestanis, Armenians, Kurds, and of course Volga Germans who were living there since the eighteenth century. As *lingua franca* among them was Russian, they contributed to the Russian identity of Kazakhstan. The republic turned into a model of Soviet internationalist country.

In 1960s during Khrushchev era, when the campaign was launched to cultivate vast virgin lands, thousands of youth from Russia migrated into Kazakhstan. This further accelerated the sovietization of the republic. In 1970s there was a plan to unite the

²⁰⁷ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Atamura, Amaty, 2003, p. 16.

²⁰⁸ Shirin Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p. 40-44.

five oblast, administrative divisions, of Kazakh Soviet Republic into Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. The precedent was the first territorial organization of the soviet government in early 1920s. “Indeed, dominance of Russians in the population of northern Kazakhstan, as well as its economic similarity with Western Siberia, prompted the Soviet Government to incorporate parts of the region into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in 1923.”²⁰⁹ That incorporation included Orenburg, the first Capital of Soviet Kazakhstan. The famous song of Şәмşi Qaldayaqov ‘*Meniñ Elim*’ (My Country) became popular at that time as a reaction to that decision of Brezhnev. The greatest achievement of Dinmuhammed Kunayev, the First Secretary of Kazakh Communist Party was that he convinced Brezhnev not to partition the territory of Kazakhstan.²¹⁰

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian population, culture, language, and mindset of Kazakhs which constituted the organic link between Russia and Kazakhstan continued to exist. Although Nazarbayev is clear in his evaluation of the Tsarist Russian and the Soviet period as “the military, economic, cultural colonization of the Kazakh lands,”²¹¹ he does not deny the positive impacts of the Russian rule. Kazakh President clearly indicates that he finds Russian culture as a great one and as contributing much to the Kazakh culture.²¹² In another place he points “Kazakh’s learning of Russian culture no doubt is positive phenomenon which affected the informational and intellectual vision of the whole nation.”²¹³ American scholar Alexandra George having said that Russia’s assimilation of the Kazakh

²⁰⁹ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 204.

²¹⁰ In 1986 during the Almaty uprising of Kazakh youth ‘Jeltoqsan’ (December) which was the first demonstration in the USSR against central government, when they protested Moscow’s decision which replaced Dinmuhammed Kunayev by Genadi Kolbin from Russia, Kazakh youth sang this song ‘Meniñ Elim’ (My Country). After Independence this song became the national anthem of Kazakhstan. In London Olympic Games 2012 Kazakh sportsmen gained 7 golden medals and occupied first ten in the first week of the Games. Turkish journalist Ertuğrul Özkök wrote in his article that he mostly liked Kazakh anthem. ‘Olimpiyatlarda en çok Kazakistan Milli marşını sevdim.’ 9.08.2012 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/21186713.asp> Accessed on 10.09.2012

²¹¹ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 17.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

steppe took place in the nineteenth century, notes that “This encounter between a Slavic European civilization and the nomads would transform the steppe bringing the Central Asian people into the modern Western world: Kazakhs would absorb European culture through the Russian prism.”²¹⁴

Today it is apparent that Kazakhstan shares with Russia many common values. According to Nazarbayev Kazakhstan and Russia are very similar. As he put in 2004, “Russia is very important country for Kazakhstan. We are in the same geopolitical circumstances, face the same problems. We possess similar views on many processes in the world, they must be realized. The achieved high level of economic integration and trust must be continued.”²¹⁵ In other words, the integration between Kazakhstan and Russia is based on the similarities in their identities. Jonathan Aitken also underlines “deeper roots” of Kazakh-Russian relations:

To a considerable extent the two countries share a common language, culture and history. The Soviet heritage, brutally imposed though it was for much of the twentieth century, also brought great benefits to Kazakhstan. Many of the country’s best schools, technical colleges, scientific institutes and cultural activities owe their quality to standards set in Moscow. Most important of all, twenty-three per cent of Kazakhstan’s populations are ethnic Russians. Some of them have lived in the country for three or four generations and have risen to prominent positions. For example the governor of the Central Bank, Grigory Mrchenko, comes from a Russian family who has been in Kazakhstan for 108 years.²¹⁶

Based on this analysis, it is not disputable that Kazakhstan is within orbit of Russian culture. There are thousands of Russian newspapers and journals both coming from Russia and printing in Kazakhstan. In addition, there are dozens of Russian TV channels. Besides all these, the most important link between Kazakhstan and Russia is Russian language and the Cyrillic alphabet adapted to Kazakh language.

²¹⁴ Alexandra George, *Journey into Kazakhstan: the True Face of the Nazarbayev Regime*, University Press of America, New York, 2001, p. 6.

²¹⁵ Poslaniya Narodu Kazakhstana, ‘K Konkurentosposobnomu Kazakhstanu, Konkurentosposobnoy Ekonomike, Konkurentosposobnoy Natsii’ 14.03.2004 http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstan-19-mart-2004-g_1342416361 Accessed on 30.04.2013

²¹⁶ George J. Demko, *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896-1916*, p. 146.

One of the main indicators which identify the civilization is the alphabet of the nation. It is known from the history, Turks created a distinct civilization with its own culture, belief system, and especially with their own alphabet. Then with the Islamization of Turks they entered into the orbit of Islamic civilization. The main indicator was the adoption of Arabic alphabet. In the twentieth century Turks of the Soviet Union adopted Cyrillic alphabet which displayed that they became the part of the Russian civilization. In the same way, Turkey's adoption of Latin alphabet was an indicator of its self-identification as part of the Western Civilization.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan who were less dependent on Russia adopted Latin alphabet thus distancing from the Russian civilization. Kazakh and Kirgiz languages remained in Cyrillic alphabet, thus remained in the realm of the Russian civilization. However, almost since 1989 among intelligentsia in Kazakhstan it has been debated whether to stay in Cyrillic alphabet or to introduce Latin alphabet. In official level in 2006 President Nazarbayev in his address to Assembly of People of Kazakhstan stated that Kazakhstan is preparing to adopt Latin alphabet and there is special commission working on that issue. The present ambassador of Kazakhstan to Turkey Janseyit Tuymebayev was head of that commission. In 2010 December when Tuymebayev gave lecture to students I asked about the results of works of that commission. Tuymebayev answered that "the commission prepared all necessary precondition such as technical basis, linguistic reformations. However, leadership of Kazakhstan is waiting for suitable time for adoption of Latin alphabet as it is political issue". Though Mr. Ambassador refrained from saying that there is Russian factor in replacing alphabet, it is quite understandable that abandoning of Kirilitsa by Kazakhstan will mean the loss of Russian position in Kazakhstan in cultural sphere. If we refer to Kazakh scholar Rustem Kadyrzhanov's article 'Choice of Alphabet is Choice of Identity' then it became clear that when Kazakhstan adopts Latin alphabet, it will exit from Russian cultural sphere and enter Turkic cultural sphere. Kadyrzhanov argues that replace of alphabet has "decisive significance in determination of national identity of Kazakhstan."²¹⁷ On 14th of December of 2012

²¹⁷ Rustem Kadyrzhanov, 'Vybor alfavita – vybor identichnosti' *Qazaq almanađı*, № 4, 2009, p.62

President Nazarbayev in his Address to Nation of Kazakhstan under title ‘Strategy of Kazakhstan 2050’ stated that “From 2025 we need to modernize our language to use Latin fonts and a Latin alphabet.”²¹⁸ It seems that Kazakhstan will continue to stay within Russian cultural orbit in near future.

Ultimately, Kazakhstan is strongly attached to the Russian civilization. Many Kazakhs in Kazakhstan except those in the very south of the country find more common values with Russians rather than with Uzbeks. Even after 25 years of independence, inability to speak in Kazakh language is normal, while inability to speak in Russian is perceived as abnormal thing in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh government understands that it should promote Kazakh language, but at the same time, many Kazakh people realize that knowing Russian language is advantage for them. Pavel Astrushevich, deputy chairman of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, having noted that Kazakhs evaluate Russian language positively and that Kazakh great poet Abay assessed the impact of the Russian language highly, said that he could not agree with the assessment of one Estonian delegate at a recent OSCE meeting who called Russian the ‘language of colonizers.’ “No, for Kazakhstan it was a source of knowledge,” he said.²¹⁹

Nazarbayev also evaluates the bilingualism of Kazakhs positively. “Our fathers and grand fathers having learnt Russian language, which is one of the richest and the most difficult languages of the world, created the rare example of bilingualism of not only elite and even not the millions of people, but of the whole people.”²²⁰ These statements mean that Kazakh government does not pursue a policy of distancing from Russian culture and language. Kazakh-Russian bilingualism is filled by English language education beginning from primary school thus became trilingualism. The

²¹⁸ Address By The President Of The Republic of Kazakhstan, Leader of The Nation, N.A.Nazarbayev, ‘Strategy “Kazakhstan-2050” New political course of the established state’ 14.12.2012 http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-leader-of-the-nation-n-nazarbayev-%E2%80%9Cstrategy-kazakhstan-2050%E2%80%9D-new-political-course-of-the-established-state%E2%80%9D_1357813742 Accessed on 25.04.2013

²¹⁹ Alexandra George, *Journey into Kazakhstan: the True Face of the Nazarbayev Regime*, University Press of America, New York, 2001, p. 131.

²²⁰ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, Amaty: Atamura, 2003, p. 63.

success of trilingualism is not certain. But it is certain that Kazakhstan has no intention to leave the orbit of Russian civilization.

In the final analysis, Russia is the main factor in shaping Kazakhstan's national identity. Moreover, this trend is supported by integration projects in Eurasian space. Although the general perception of Eurasian Union is negative among Kazakh nationalists and Kazakh population, however, some Kazakh scholars such as Darhan Hidirali and Burkitbay Ayagan say that there is no need to fear from Russian language and culture.²²¹ It is expected that with the change in demography, Russian cultural influence will decrease. Indeed, the Russian population is decreasing not only in Kazakhstan but in the all autonomous regions of the Russian federation. Instead of fearing Russian cultural influence, Kazakhstan strengthens Turkic component of its identity and even more, Kazakhstan supports the Turkic people of the Russian Federation to revive their identities without drawing attention of the Russian chauvinist circles. What Institute of State History and International Turkic Academy situated in Astana are doing are exactly those kinds of works which is strengthening academic and cultural ties between Kazakhstan and Turkic people of Russian Federation.

3.4 Kazakhstan's Eurasianism

According to Nazarbayev, "the very conditions of emergence of Kazakh ethnos has historical roots in centuries long Turkic-Slavic cultural interactions. During the Russian Empire and Soviet Union this interaction continued."²²² If we analyze last thousand years of history of interaction between these two groups, the first five hundred years could be described by Turkic domination and control of Slavic people and last five hundred years by Slavic domination and control of Turkic people. Nazarbayev argues that the history of interaction between meta-ethnic groups of Turks and Slavs must be considered not only in projection of past but of future as

²²¹ Interviews of the author with Darhan Hidirali, and Burkitbay Ayagan. February 2012.

²²² Nursultan Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 139.

well.²²³ In other words, Slavic and Turkic worlds that shaped Kazakhstan's identity in the past will continue affecting the state identity of Kazakhstan in the future.

This space of interaction is called Eurasia. In fact, the term Eurasia and the concept of Eurasianism was introduced by Russian scholars at the beginning of the 20th century who tried to solve the identity crisis of the Russian Empire that defined itself as a European country but rejected by the Europeans as such and perceived as 'the other'. Eurasianists described Russia as a distinct civilization. This civilization is called Eurasian civilization. The contribution of Eurasianists was to positively evaluate the Turkic domination and Turkic legacy in Russia. The Eurasian thought's main argument is that for Russia to survive as a great power it must recognize that the space where Russia was built is the place of interaction and co-existence of Slavic and Turkic people.²²⁴ The Eurasianists were against Slavophil and Pan-Slavists who give prominence to Slavic culture in expense of Turkic culture. In this way these scholars tried to revise Russian History Thesis which demonized Genghis Khan and the period of the domination of the Turkic people. They re-evaluated the period of Turkic domination positively and claimed that that period played important role in establishment of Russian statehood.

During the Soviet time concept of Eurasianism was developed by scholar Lev Gumilyov who studied history of Turks. He described Eurasia as a common space of Turkic and Slavic peoples. This formulation was utilized by President Nazarbayev but this time to solve identity crisis of Kazakhstan which was hanged between Europe and Asia, between Slavic and Turkic worlds, between Christianity and Islam. In this conception of Eurasia, Turks and Slavs conceived as equal subjects of history, so it warned against Russian chauvinist stands.

Nazarbayev by introducing his own version of Eurasianism utilized many aspects of Russian Eurasianist thinkers of early twentieth century who can be classified as the Classical Eurasianists. Nazarbayev was well aware that ethnic Kazakh nationalism in

²²³ Ibid., p.140.

²²⁴ Lev Gumilyov, *Ritmy Evrazii: Epokhi i Tsivilizatsii* (Rhythms of Eurasia: Ages and Civilizations), AST, Moskva, p. 23.

Kazakhstan can lead to the fragmentation of the state as in the Russian case Pan-Slavism or ethnic Russian nationalism can lead to the disintegration of Russia. In addition, Kazakh leadership could not ignore Tsarist Russian and Soviet period of the country's history. Therefore, Nazarbayev's Eurasianism emphasized Slavic-Turkic or Kazakh-Russian co-existence. Further, Kazakhstan was presented as a place where more than hundred ethnic and religious groups live in peace and harmony. Nazarbayev's Eurasianism became ideological and academic rationale of the country's pluralism and multiculturalism. In this sense, Nazarbayev's Eurasianism is another name of the inclusive, civic nationalism of Kazakhstan. While in the domestic politics Eurasianism became the basis to build multi-ethnic Kazakhstani identity, in foreign policy Eurasianism became the basis for pursuing multi-vector policy which means that Kazakhstan's convergence to a certain country or region does not mean its divergence from other ones.²²⁵

The presentation of the Eurasian policy of Kazakhstan was realized by Nazarbayev in early 1994 during his visit to Russia. At that time many post-Soviet Republics were in euphoria of independence, and when Russian leaders were busy with incorporation into and recognition by West. Predominated by Atlanticist worldview, Moscow considered the Central Asian countries as a burden to its economy. Nazarbayev in his lecture in the Moscow State University proposed to create a Eurasian Union of States. He emphasized commonalities such as high level of integrated economies, similar social and political structures, and mindset of peoples, multi-national composition of many republics, and common historical traditions in the CIS countries that can lead to further integration.²²⁶

This bold step by Nazarbayev was perceived with great enthusiasm and supported by the Russian academia. Later, Kazakh president elaborated his version of Eurasianism in several books and annual speeches in Eurasian National University. Nazarbayev was Eurasianist both as an initiator of the debate on Eurasianism in academic sense

²²⁵ A.N. Nysanbayev, V. Y. Dunayev (eds.), *Evrziiskaya Doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva* (Eurasian Doctrine of Nursultan Nazarbayev), Almaty, 2010.

²²⁶ N. Nazarbayev, 'O formirovaniy Evraziiskogo soyuza gosudarstv' in A.N. Nysanbayev, V.Y. Dunayev (eds.), *Evrziiskaya Doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva*, Almaty 2010, p. 40.

and a practitioner in political sense. As it was mentioned by Golam Mostafa, the Russian views and perceptions of Eurasianism developed, suggested and propagated mainly by radical nationalists who seem to be very active, dominant and organized academically and intellectually but not evolve as a state policy or ideology.²²⁷ Kazakh President by the presentation of his own version of Eurasianism ended the monopoly of Russian intellectuals over the legacy of the Classical Eurasianism.

In this regard it is useful to compare the difference between Eurasianism of Nazarbayev and that of Russian intellectuals, especially of Aleksandr Dugin. As it is underlined by Luca Anceschi, Nazarbayev's controversial association with A. G. Dugin raises more questions regarding the establishment of the president's Eurasianist credentials, given the patent incompatibility between Dugin's hard-line neo-Eurasianism and the fundamental thrust of Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism.²²⁸ First of this incompatibility should be properly examined, as not to understand them leads to a misunderstanding that the Kazakh president supports the Russian imperial Eurasianism. Anceschi defines three intersecting considerations between the neo-Eurasianism of Dugin and Nazarbayev. First, Dugin's neo-imperial inclination was distinctively incongruent with the anti-imperial disposition held by Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism since its onset. Further, Dugin's neo-Eurasianism adopted a thoroughly anti-Western outlook, which was never shared by the version of neo-Eurasianism developed in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Finally, the two forms of neo-Eurasianism assessed in conflicting ways the contribution that the post-Soviet state was capable of making to the establishment of an Eurasianist community. The preservation of post-Soviet sovereignty, on the one hand, remained a constant influence for the theoretical evolution of Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism. The consolidation of artificial and ephemeral forms of statehood, on the other, was regarded by Dugin as the main outcome of state formation in the post-Soviet region including Kazakhstan.²²⁹

²²⁷ Golam Mustafa, 'The Concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian Policy and Its Implications', *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4 (2013), p.169.

²²⁸ Luca Anceschi, 'Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy: neo-Eurasianist rhetoric in post-Soviet Kazakhstan', *Nationalities Paper: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 19 Aug 2014, p. 742.

²²⁹ Ibid.

In a similar way, Sergey Biryukov underlines seven basic features of Eurasian concept of Nazarbayev: first, realist character, absence of ‘the ideology primacy’; second, the tendency to connect firmly the idea of ‘Eurasian integration’ in the post-Soviet space with the purpose and objectives of modernization; third, focus on the priority of interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a sovereign independent state; fourth, realistic reflection of the current state of ‘the post-Soviet space’ and main trends of its development; fifth, review of the prospects of Eurasian integration in the context of a multi-directional strategy adopted by the Kazakh government; sixth, the tendency to close cooperation of economic and political integration, and finally, consulting not only Kazakh and Russian interests within the ‘integration project’, but the interests of Central Asian states as well.²³⁰

Aneschi argues that Dugin’s appreciation of Nazarbayev’s Eurasianist credentials underwent a parabolic evolution, although Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism had maintained an immovable anti-imperial thrust since its original formulation.²³¹ Dugin wrote a book *Eurasian Mission of Nursultan Nazarbayev* where he reconsiders the Eurasian integration as the union of Slavic-Turkic one generally and Kazakh-Russian one particularly. As we have discussed above, the large majority of Kazakhs are bilingual and stand in equal distance both to Russia and Turkic world. Kazakh president represents this feature. Dugin describes Nazarbayev as a Kazakh who revived the culture of his people and restored Kazakh statehood and independence, and at the same time as a Russian who internalized Russian culture, Russian science, and Russian and Soviet labor ethics.²³²

However, it is wrong to reduce Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism to the reintegration solely with Russia. As the main locomotives in Eurasia idea he counts the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Conference on

²³⁰ Sergey V. Biryukov, ‘Eurasian Doctrine of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev: ‘Thinking space’’, 24.01.2013, <http://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/eurasian-doctrine-kazakh-president-nursultan-nazarbayev-thinking-space#.VUoWLY7tHw> Accessed on 6.05.2015

²³¹ Luca Aneschi, ‘Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy: neo-Eurasianist rhetoric in post-Soviet Kazakhstan’, p.743.

²³² Akeksand Dugin, *Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Avrasya Misyonu*, Çeviren Lazzat Urakova ve Mehriban Gençkal, Yeni Avrasya Yayınlar, Anlara, 2006, p. XI.

Interaction and Measures of Confidence Building in Asia. It is important to note that all three were formed with the initiative of the Kazakh president.²³³ In practical terms, as it is expressed by Mostafa, Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy is designed to serve multiple goals and purposes: externally to improve relations with Russia and other regional countries based on Eurasian solidarity, balancing relations with Asia and Europe by playing the role of a 'bridge between Asia and Europe' and claiming as a bastion of peace, stability and neutrality, and domestically to create a successful multi-ethnic, multi-national peaceful and harmonious nation with stability and harmony.²³⁴ The last point is important as it contributes to resolve identity crisis of country.

As we have seen above, Kazakhstan both domestically and internationally is located between and pulled towards the Turkic world and the Slavic world. Generally, Turkic states as Khazar Empire, Qipchaqs, Mongol Empire, the Golden Horde, and the Ottoman Empire are perceived by Slavic people as enemies, while Slavic states as Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union are perceived by Turkic people as enemies. In this conception Slavs and Turks are considered as opposing poles. For example as Graham Fuller expressed in relation to Russian-Turkish interaction "Yet the reality is that Turkey's historical and ethnic relations with the Muslim (largely Turkic) peoples of the former Russian and Soviet empires can never totally disappear as a potential concern to Moscow. It is almost as if Moscow and Ankara represent alternate poles of influence upon these peoples."²³⁵

From Kazakhstan's point of view, three countries stand out as 'the strategic center of Eurasia', where East meets West, Europe meets Asia, and Islam meets Christianity. They are Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkey "which must jointly constitute a new trans-Eurasian axis. However, according to this logic, Kazakhstan gets pride of its place

²³³ Nursultan Nazarbayev, 'Proekt Evraziiskogo Soyuz: problem i perspektivy integratsii', in A.N. Nysanbayev, V.Y. Dunayev (eds.), *Evrasiiskaya doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva*, Institut filosofii i politologii KN MON RK, Almaty, 2010, p.26.

²³⁴ Golam Mustafa, 'The Concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian Policy and Its Implications', p. 165.

²³⁵ Graham E.Fuller, *The New Turksih Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 2008, p.129.

because it is at the center of the center, a meeting place for the two other states.”²³⁶ So Kazakhstan’s Eurasianism is a conception which defines Slavic and Turkic worlds, and Russia and Turkey not as opposing poles, but as poles which complete each other.

When the identities of Turkey and Russia are analyzed, one can notice many similarities between identities of two countries. Both countries are situated in Eurasia. Both countries are described by Samuel Huntington as ‘torn countries’ which means the Russian and Turkish elites identify their countries as European in this way rejecting their Asian identities.²³⁷ So the torn or rejected part of Russian and Turkish identities is Eurasia, or properly Asia. Kazakhstan’s Eurasianism invites both Russia and Turkey to recognize their Eurasian dimension. While this recognition of roots is realized, Turkey and Russia can meet in Eurasian identity. From the Kazakhstan’s perspective, “It is noticeable that ideas of Eurasianism are relevant for Turkish Republic, a country which as Kazakhstan organically combines European and Eastern tendencies.”²³⁸ Ultimately, Turkey, Russia and Kazakhstan are bound by the common space of Eurasia.

Then, if we define the term ‘Eurasia’ as a space of interaction of Turkic and Slavic people, then ‘Eurasianism’ can be defined as the art of peaceful coexistence of these two poles. Here Russia as power center represents Slavic pole while Turkey, as the only Turkic country which succeeded to defend its independence and continued Turkic statehood tradition, represents Turkic pole. In this configuration, for Kazakhstan which is situated in the intersection of Slavic and Turkic worlds and as a country whose population is composed of Slavic and Turkic people, Russian-Turkish relations gain special importance. From this perspective of concept of Eurasia, from

²³⁶ Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008, p. 183.

²³⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

²³⁸ Quoted in S.V. Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya: po strnitsam evraziiskikh idei XIX-XXI vekov*, Baspalar üyi, Almatı, 2009, p. 8.

Kazakhstan's point of view, the equation of Eurasia will be complete only if Turkey enters the Eurasian integration formed by Kazakhstan and Russia.

Sergei Seliverstov who currently works in the administration of the President Nazarbayev by quoting Halil Akinci's words "Turkey and Russia are the strongest partners in the Eurasian region. Turkey is ready to cooperate with Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey considers Russia as a partner and does not compete with it" notes that the era of the closed official Turkish nationalism and radical political pan-Turkism are left in the past. He says that considering Russia as a partner not as an antagonist competitor in the Eurasian region corrects the previous understanding of Turkish thinkers of ideal Turan. "Irreconcilable pan-Turkic opposition 'Turan-Russia' in the conception of Eurasia positively resolved. In Eurasian space of 21st century there are place for both Turkey and Russia, and both for Slavic and Turkic worlds."²³⁹ Further Seliverstov points out that new understanding about Turkey gradually is spreading among Russian intellectuals. He refers to Russian philosopher A.V. Ivanov who concludes that in new century Turkey could play important constructive role in establishment of new form of unions within inside of continental space of Old World, in other word, in fulfilling the mission of one of the mediator-conjuncture in whole geopolitical space of Eurasian continent. In this case, new Russia and new Turkey could together step on 21st century as pivotal integration forces of Old World and demonstrate model of Eurasian cooperation on principally new basis and priorities.²⁴⁰

Kazakhstan's Eurasianism is represented as an idea where Turkic people and Slavic people can find common language. Kazakhstan as a country and Kazakhs as people can play the role of mediator between these two groups. Representing itself as a Eurasian country Kazakhstan aims, on the one hand, to contribute to convergence of these two civilizations, on the other hand, this identity let Kazakhstan resolve its ambiguous place in international arena.

²³⁹ S.V.Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya: po strnitsam evraziiskikh idei XIX-XXI vekov*, Baspalar üyi, Almatı, 2009, p.204.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

From the perspective of domestic politics of Kazakhstan, Eurasian integration proposed by Nazarbayev aims to provide security of Kazakhstan by emphasizing common Eurasian values between Kazakhs and Russians of Kazakhstan and those between Russia and Kazakhstan. This relation between Eurasianism and security is well analyzed by Aida Abzahparova. She argues that constructing the Eurasian Kazakhstani state could not have been achieved without constructing a particular representation of Russia, positing a particular relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia and writing the identity of the Kazakhstani state such that the potential threats of national extremism, factionalism and separatism were never made possible. “That is, they were made unintelligible, marginal and illegitimate – it would have been unimaginable given the dominant official discourse to pursue extremist or separatist policies that would in turn have constituted a very different kind of relationship with Russia to that which exists, for instance hostile. The relationship would have been militarized, Russia would have been a foe and there would have been no possibility of peaceful co-existence of ethnic Kazakhs with ethnic Russians on Kazakhstani territory.”²⁴¹ As Aleksandr Dugin noticed, Kazakhstan’s success is hidden in the Eurasian integration. “The convergence of Kazakhstan with Russia is guarantor of peaceful and positive resolution of the political situation in Kazakhstan which is though not so much complex but slowly intensifying.”²⁴² In more precise way, “Russian population in Kazakhstan as an important power, which has potential in other cases to instabilize, plays significant role in convergence between Kazakhstan and Russia.”²⁴³

In this way Kazakhstan’s Eurasian idea provides Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity and facilitates its cooperation with Russia. Although Kazakh nationalist intellectuals accuse Nazarbayev of selling the national interests by integrating with Russia, this should be conceived as misunderstanding. Eurasianism serves both domestic and

²⁴¹ Aida Abzahparova, ‘(Re)imagining Eurasianism: (Geo)political and (geo)cultural practices of Kazakhstan in the preservation of its security’, Paper prepared for British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, 27-29 April, 2011, Manchester, UK.

²⁴² Aleksandr Dugin, *Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Avrasya Misyonu*, Çeviren Lazzat Urakova ve Mehriban Gençkal, Yeni Avrasya Yayınlar, Anlara, 2006, p. 26.

²⁴³ Ibid., p.27.

international interests of the country. As it is indicated by Alexandra George, “By enunciating this Eurasian ideology Nazarbayev wanted to move away from Kazakhstan’s role as ‘Younger Brother’ of the Russians. On the contrary, Nazarbayev turned the tables: he intended the Kazakhs to become the ‘Elder Brother’ around which all the 132 nationalities living in Kazakhstan would unite.”²⁴⁴

Although the Eurasian Doctrine of Kazakhstan looks like a pro-Russian ideology, in fact it opens way to revive and restore Turkic identity of Kazakhstan thus serving the interests of Kazakh nationalism. The explicit example is Eurasian National University which is represented as the locomotive of Eurasian studies of Kazakhstan. The university is identified with Turkic civilization. There is a copy of Orhun inscriptions at the university. There is a museum of history of Turkic alphabets. Generally Kazakhstan’s active policy in Turkic world is essential result of Eurasian idea of Kazakhstan. It is not coincidence that the first book published from Turkic Academy in Astana was *Eurasian Idea of Nazarbayev and Turkic World*. In the final analysis, Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism suits real situation of Kazakhstan and serve to solve identity crisis of the country. This idea not only provides Kazakhstan’s survival but enables it to develop Turkic identity.

3.5 Conclusion

The main argument of the chapter is that Kazakhstan’s national identity shaped by the Eurasian reality of its domestic and international environment. Kazakhstan’s population is composed of Turkic people, mainly Kazakh, and Slavic people, mainly Russians who constitute Eurasian identity of the country in domestic level. In international level, Kazakhstan is neighboring with Slavic world in the north and with Turkic world in the south. This geo-cultural location makes Kazakhstan a Eurasian country which means it is a country with Slavic and Turkic identities.

The Slavic component of Kazakhstan’s national identity since beginning i.e. independence has been stronger than Turkic component due to the dominant position of Russian population in the country in demographic and economic terms and as

²⁴⁴ Alexandra George, *Journey into Kazakhstan: the True Face of the Nazarbayev Regime*, University Press of America, New York, 2001, p. 3.

result of Russian imperial and Soviet assimilation policies. After independence though Russian population decreased by falling from %37 in 1989 to %23 in 2009, Russian language and culture, and Russian Federation continued to play determinant role in Kazakhstan's national identity formation.

Comparing to the Slavic (Russian) component of Kazakhstan's national identity Turkic component was weaker in all sense. Even it will be not wrong if one claims that the Turkic identity of Kazakhstan was discovered after the independence. Except few scholars, many Kazakh scholars and Kazakh general population were far from understanding that their nation was a part of the great Turkic family. Since independence, and year by year the rise of interest of Kazakh community in Turkic world is observed. In recent years Turkology Departments were opened in many universities in Kazakhstan. The Turkic Academy establishment in Astana in 2010 by the initiative of President Nazarbayev²⁴⁵ became the driving force in this respect. Previous scholars who used to name themselves as philologist of Kazakh language and historians of Kazakhstan now became Turkologists. The vice rector of the L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University professor Dikhan Kamzabek says that he is frequently asked why Turkology studies became so popular. He answers that "whoever deepens in studying Kazakh language and history finds out that all Turkic people have the same root. These consciousnesses sooner or later pull Turkic people to each other."²⁴⁶ All these interest in and awareness of Turkic origins in their turn strengthen Turkic component of the Kazakhstan's national identity. In political understanding this tendency is dealt within framework of Eurasianism where Turkic identity of the country is co-existed with Slavic one.

In the final analysis, Kazakhstan's national identity is composed of Turkic and Slavic components. At one glance, it looks that Kazakhstan has divided identity. But the main achievement of Kazakh leadership is that it succeeded to turn this ambiguity into an advantage. Nazarbayev to solve this ambiguity or identity crisis in other

²⁴⁵ <http://turkacadem.kz/kaz/about.php?set=2> Also see,
<http://www.turkistangundemi.tv/06062011/turk-akademisi-ve-calismalari.html> Accessed on
19.03.2014

²⁴⁶ Dikhan Kamzabek's interview with author 28 January 2012.

words, and prevent any clash between different ethnic and religious groups identified Kazakhstan as a Eurasian country where 130 ethnic and religious groups live in peace. In international level, “At this strategic crossroad where Chinese, Russian, Central Asian and Western civilizations converge; Kazakhstan has arrived as a stable and significant nation state.”²⁴⁷ Under this Eurasian peace, Kazakh government tries to balance Russian influence by Turkic culture. For this purpose Kazakhstan builds close relations with Turkic countries. In this regard Kazakhstan’s relations with Turkey which was establish as a country with strong references to Turkic civilization is significant, as these relations strengthens Kazakhstan’s Turkic identity and balance against Slavic one. In this way, Kazakhstan becomes real heart of Eurasia, which is in fact Turkic-Slavic common world. In the following part of the study I examine how this Eurasian identity of the country shapes Kazakhstan’s perception of Turkey in the four levels of analysis which are decision maker, elite, general public and international environment.

²⁴⁷ Jonathan Aitken, *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes after 20 Years of Independence*, Continuum, London, 2012, p. 2.

PART 2 KAZAKHSTAN'S PERCEPTION OF TURKEY

Kazakhstan's view on Turkish foreign policy is determined by its Eurasian identity. Turkey as the strongest state of the Turkic world has significant influence on Kazakhstan. When we analyze Kazakhstan's perception of Turkish foreign policy, we should keep in mind the Eurasian that is Turkic-Slavic identity of Kazakhstan. Although Turkey's power cannot be compared by that of Russia, in cultural terms Turkey's influence is deeply penetrated into the country. It is because Kazakhs as Turkic people find more and more themselves close to Turkey.

When we say Kazakhstan's view we mean not only the view of decision makers or elite, we mean all variables which constitute this view. Kazakhstan's view on Turkish foreign policy is analyzed in four levels. The first level is international system level. Here we analyze how international structure shapes Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. The second level is decision maker level. The views of Nursultan Nazarbayev who is the first president of the country and the main architect of the Kazakh foreign policy are analyzed. The third level is elite level. The fourth level is public level.

CHAPTER 4

NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV'S PERCEPTION OF TURKEY

4.1 Introduction

There is no doubt that in decision maker's level in determination of Kazakhstan's view on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy president Nazarbayev has enormous impact. Nursultan Nazarbayev as the first president of nation is constructor of Kazakhstan's national identity and at the same time the main architect of Kazakh foreign policy. Therefore, it is natural that his views are one of the important determinants of Kazakhstan's image of Turkey. Legally speaking, according to the Constitution of Kazakhstan, "The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be the head of state, its highest official who determines the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the state."²⁴⁸ So Nazarbayev's view on Turkey and his personal friendships with heads of states are very important in building bilateral relations. It will not be wrong to claim that in countries where the heads of states say the last word in decision making, the level of relations between states is in ratio with relations between heads of states. In such states, in foreign policy formation the fact that how decision makers see the world is significant. Convergence in worldviews of decision makers determines the overlapping of the state interests.

²⁴⁸Point 40 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan
http://www.kazakhstan.orexca.com/kazakhstan_constitution.shtml#3 Accessed on 7.08.2012

Interestingly, when I asked a bureaucrat working in the Administration of the President the question ‘Who advises the president on Kazakhstani policy toward Turkey?’, he said ‘If the president had followed the advices on Turkey of people around him, today there would have been nothing as Kazakh-Turkish relations.’²⁴⁹ His answer shows that Nazarbayev plays crucial role in development of Kazakh-Turkish relations. The idea is that Kazakh-Turkish relations are developing despite the will of ruling elite who is leaning toward Russia and against cooperation with Turkey. It is because the majority of Kazakh elite is alien to Kazakh culture thus alien to Turkic culture. Based on this, Turkey is perceived as ‘the other’ while Russia is home country whose culture and language represent their own culture and language.

Nazarbayev comparing with this Russified elite stands close to native Kazakh culture and language. As we have discussed in Chapter 3 Kazakhstan’s population and elite as well, is divided as those who support Kazakhness and those who supported Kazakhstaniness. The most of bureaucrats and intellectuals who support the idea of Kazakhstani nation are far from the cultural values of Kazakh people and generally could not speak Kazakh language. And those who supported the idea of Kazakh nation are the representatives of Kazakh culture, literature, history and language and as it was discussed previously possessed weak position in decision making process.

Nazarbayev who is the main architect of the idea of Kazakhstani nation, contrary to the expectation, is fluent in Kazakh language, writes poems in Kazakh, plays dombira, and sings Kazakh songs. Nazarbayev is aware of sensitiveness of both Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs. As defined by Olcott, proving himself to be a skilled politician, Nazarbayev was able to bridge the gaps between the republic’s two major nationalities.²⁵⁰ That is why Dugin described Nazarbayev as a Kazakh who revived the culture of his people and restored Kazakh statehood and independence, and at the same time as a Russian who internalized Russian culture, Russian science, and

²⁴⁹ Interview with a bureaucrat from the Administration of the President Nazarbayev, 2.02.2012

²⁵⁰ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Second Edition, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 259.

Russian and Soviet labor ethics.²⁵¹ The similar view was expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev “Never forget that Nazarbayev is a man of two cultures. He is both Russian and Asian in his roots and outlook.”²⁵²

Nazarbayev was born and grew up in the village,²⁵³ while “the majority of Kazak intellectuals today are either the first or second generation of their family to have been born and brought up in the city.”²⁵⁴ In addition he was born in south-eastern Kazakhstan, which was the last part colonized by the Russian Empire. Comparing with northern part of the country south and south-eastern part preserved Kazakh culture and language.

Nazarbayev studied in school where the education language was Kazakh. Even in 1956 when his school was closed due to the small number of pupils, he moved to a larger school. What motivated him was not fears of linguistic inadequacy but was “his deep-seated feeling of identity with his Kazakh roots and heritage.”²⁵⁵

When we compare city with village, city represent Russian culture; and villages, or *awıl* as Kazakhs say, represents Kazakh culture. As it is also noticed by some authors “In contrast to the Russian-influences towns, the rural areas became regarded as places where Kazak traditions had lain dormant in their original form.”²⁵⁶ Nazarbayev himself notes that “Kazakh *awıl* always remained the source of potential of national revival and marker of national identity.”²⁵⁷ Beginning from 1990 the

²⁵¹ Akeksand Dugin, *Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Avrasya Misyonu*, Çeviren Lazzat Urakova ve Mehriban Gençkal, Yeni Avrasya Yayınlar, Ankara, 2006, p. XI.

²⁵² Jonathan Aitken, *Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan*, Continuum, New York, 2009, p. 247.

²⁵³ A.P.Zhitnukhin, *Nursultan Nazarbayev: Bez Pravykh i Levykh, Stranitsy avtobiografii, razмышleniya, pozitsii...*, Molodaya Gvardiya, Moskva, 1991, p. 11.

²⁵⁴ Karen Odgaard and Jens Simonsen, ‘The New Kazak Elite’, in Ingvar Svanberg (ed.) *Contemporary Kazaks: Cultural and Social Perspectives*, Curzon, Surrey, 1999, p. 19.

²⁵⁵ Jonathan Aitken, *Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan*, Continuum, New York, 2009, p. 14.

²⁵⁶ Karen Odgaard and Jens Simonsen, ‘The New Kazak Elite’, p.23.

²⁵⁷ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V Potoke Istorii*, p. 237.

number of bureaucrats recruited from urban places is increasing while the number of bureaucrats recruited from rural areas is constantly decreasing.²⁵⁸ In 1994 bureaucrats from towns composed 36,3% of elite, in 2002 it reached 57,8%.²⁵⁹

The other issue which makes Nazarbayev distinct than other elite is his age. He was born in 1940. Generally, people who were born in 40s, comparing with those who were born in 50s and 60s, are aware of Kazakh traditions, culture and worldview. It is because in 1940s people who witnessed pre-Soviet Kazakh culture were alive. After the World War II the Soviet Union became superpower and further to consolidate its population, the policy of Sovietization was accelerated. The people who were born in 1950s and 60s, lived in the brightest period of the Soviet Union, which led to internalization of the Soviet identity.

Sally Cummings by analyzing age of Kazakh elite concludes that the average age of the elite is lower than that of heads of government worldwide. He underlines that the youngest tended to be concentrated in the presidential administration and economic agencies, the eldest in parliament.²⁶⁰ Saadanbekov by referring to the president of the Agency of State Service of Kazakhstan says that while the capital city moved from Almaty to Astana only 50% of bureaucrats followed Nazarbayev. It is obvious that the eldest people who did not want to leave their comfort stayed in Almaty.²⁶¹

In this way, the birth place and time that is his childhood during which the character of Nazarbayev formed have important implications for decision making.

Concerning Nazarbayev's image of Turkey, although as many other Kazakhs he was aware that Turks share common culture and language, nevertheless, his image of Turkey was not different than that which was indoctrinated according to the official ideology. Turkey, as a country which was in the western bloc during the Cold War

²⁵⁸ Sally N.Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2005, p. 68.

²⁵⁹ Zhumagul Saadanbekov, *Nursultan Nazarbayev: Zakony Liderstva*, Kültegin, Astana, 2005, p. 337.

²⁶⁰ Sally N.Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2005, p. 59.

²⁶¹ Zhumagul Saadanbekov, *Nursultan Nazarbayev: Zakony Liderstva*, Kültegin, Astana, 2005, p. 334.

and as a NATO member, had enemy image in the Soviet Union. Besides, it was generally described as backward country.

4.2 Presidential Term of Turgut Özal

The change of this negative image of Turkey to positive one was realized when Nazarbayev visited Turkey on the invitation of Turkish president Turgut Özal in October 1990. It is important to note that this was the first visit of Nazarbayev to a foreign country as the head of sovereign state.²⁶² The matter is that the visit took place just after Kazakhstan released the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on 25 October 1990. As it would be in the case of independence a year later, the invitation of Turgut Özal was perceived as strong signal to recognize Kazakhstan's statehood. Nazarbayev indicates that although the Soviet Union still existed, he was welcomed according to the protocol of the head of state.²⁶³ These kinds of signals are generally given to show that the guest is highly respected by the host. If we take into account that this was a first visit of Nazarbayev to Turkey the value of the respect is well understood. Here we should underline the personal role of Turgut Özal. His initiatives, charisma, decisiveness contributed a lot to the formation of image of Turkey in the mind of Nazarbayev. It means that personal relations between leaders of states can play significant role in bilateral relations.

Nursultan Nazarbayev confesses “of course I was impressed with the real life in Turkey, with progressive development of its economy and community. It was contrary to the official perception about this country in the USSR.”²⁶⁴ This statement means that the previous image of Nazarbayev on Turkey is replaced by the new image. Nazarbayev was not only impressed by the warm welcome of President Özal, but also with the real conditions in Turkey. This positive image of Turkey led to

²⁶² Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 193.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 194.

close cooperation between two countries. As Nazarbayev would recall later, “Exactly during that visit we cast the basis of further interaction with Turkey.”²⁶⁵

In 1991 when the dissolution of the Soviet Union was still out of discussion, Nazarbayev while answering Russian journalist’s question “Don’t you think that foreign political and state leaders are too much interested in you and your position as the President of Kazakhstan? If it is so, how do you explain such phenomena? ” having noted that the leaders of several foreign states are interested in Kazakhstan because they want to see Kazakhstan as stable, democratic state with strong economy which develops according the way which is followed by the whole civilized world, stated that in his foreign visits and international conferences he has no ambitious aspirations. What is important for me, he says, is to find mutually beneficial ways of cooperation in order to improve the lives of people by the effective transition of our economy to market relations. Nazarbayev gives examples of his visit to USA and Korea. Then by underlining Turkish president Turgut Özal’s visit to Kazakhstan he states:

It is important to note that the people of Turkey and Kazakhstan have common historical and cultural roots, and traditions. By the way, there are large minority of Kazakhs living in Turkey. They are also definitely interested in the revival of the cultural and economic relations with Kazakhstan. But of course, foreign businessmen are interested in our country due to the stable condition, the rich natural resources, and the firmness in transition to market economy.²⁶⁶

‘Ambitious aspirations’ can be understood as political projects as pan-Turanism and pan-Islamism. In this way Nazarbayev is saying that it is normal to develop cooperation with foreign countries and it is especially necessary when there is Kazakh community in that country.

The first official visit of Nazarbayev to Turkey was realized on 25 September 1991.²⁶⁷ This visit took place after the unsuccessful attempt of coup d’état in

²⁶⁵ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 194.

²⁶⁶ A.P.Zhitnukhin, *Nursultan Nazarbayev: Bez Pravykh i Levykh, Stranitsy avtobiografii, razmyshleniya, pozitsii...*, Molodaya Gvardiya, Moskva, 1991, p. 229.

²⁶⁷ Abudlvahap Kara, *Turgut Özal ve Türk Dünyası: Türkiye – Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri 1983-1993*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2012, p. 144.

Moscow in August which accelerated the dissolution of the USSR. So this visit, as compared with the first visit in October 1990, passed in more free and confident atmosphere. In addition, Turgut Özal until this time had already visited Almaty in March 1991, therefore some friendship and certain common language had already emerged between two leaders.

During this visit Özal himself went to Esenboga Airport to welcome Nazarbayev. Moreover, Özal provided an audio cassette with Kazakh songs through Kazakhs in Turkey, and made a surprise to Nazarbayev when they got into the car. Nazarbayev exclaimed: 'I thought I arrived at Ankara. But I am as if in Almaty.' Özal as an answer said: "of course, this is your country, you are not in foreign country, you are in your home country."²⁶⁸ This kind of gesture contributed to the friendship between Nazarbayev and Özal and then to deepening of Kazakh-Turkish relations.

Interestingly, during this period from Kazakhstan's perspective there were Russia and its emerging leader Yeltsin who considered Central Asia as burden to its economy and tried to distance itself from this region. On the other side, there were Turkey and its leader Özal who considered Central Asia as an opportunity and tried to utilize every possibility to develop its relations with the region. Under these circumstances, even for Nazarbayev who was against the collapse of the Soviet Union and struggled until the last moment, and in fact still is struggling to hold the Soviet republics together, Turkey's support to his young nation in these anarchic international relations, which was not familiar for him, was indispensable. Nazarbayev well understood and valued this warm support of a brother nation.

When we examine Nazarbayev's personal view on Turkey, it is easy to notice a special place of Turkey in his mind. It is because Turkey as semi-periphery country, in Wallerstein terms, has passed successfully economic reforms which Kazakhstan was about to start. To learn from Turkey, which is culturally, geographically and economically close to Kazakstan, is easier and more fruitful than to learn from western developed countries. In comparison of Western model of development with Eastern one, Nazarbayev noted on 16 December 1991:

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 146.

I have to say that our orientation toward East is not only due to the geographical location of the country, ethnic closeness and common culture, though they possess underestimated importance, but due to the condition that the market experiences of these countries are applicable for us. Our problems for them are much clearer than let's say for high developed countries of West. Contacts with China, Turkey, Korea and Singapore even today are giving results.²⁶⁹

That is why in his very first book published in 1992 *In the Way of Freedom and Democracy* he emphasizes on important place of Turkey and President Turgut Özal in the economic and political reforms of Kazakhstan.²⁷⁰ It seems that Turkish statesman really understood conditions of new post-Soviet republics. For example Turgut Özal in his address to Kazakh parliament having noted that Turkish people view the reforms being realized in sovereign Kazakhstan with understanding made emphasis on stability by stating “We are especially pleased that there is stability in your country. This condition gives opportunity to build real democratic society and clearly defined market economy.”²⁷¹

Nevertheless, concerning Turkish model it must be noted that for Kazakhstan it was considered as one of the models among others. As it was discussed in Chapter 3, Kazakhstan defined itself as a Eurasian country with its own way of development which combines Western, Eastern Asian, Russian, and Turkish models of development.²⁷²

There is no doubt that Nazarbayev was impressed by Turgut Özal's economic reforms, but before that as the ‘*Elbası (il başı)* – Father of Nation’ who played the crucial role in the establishment of the Republic of Kazakhstan, he was impressed by the dare reforms of the founder of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He doesn't hide his admiration: “I respect Mustafa Kemal Atatürk very much and appreciate him. When my country gained its independence, one of the first books I

²⁶⁹ Quoted in R.M. Kaliev, *Respublika Kazakistan i Sovremennyyi Mir* (the Republic of Kazakhstan and Modern World), Elorda, Astana 2000, p.120.

²⁷⁰ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Yolunda: Otobiyografi, Demeçler, Görüşler, Amaçlar*, Hotama Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul 1992, p.234.

²⁷¹ ‘Qazaqstan – Türkiya: Dostuğımız bekiy tüsedı’, *Halıq Kenesi N69, 10 Sawir, 1993 j.*

²⁷² *Kazakhstan Strategy 2030.*

read was about Atatürk's life and his reforms. We made a statue for this great person in one of the most beautiful places in Astana."²⁷³

In the ceremony of the opening of this statue Nazarbayev emphasized that nobody must be annoyed that in Astana there is the statue of Atatürk who was the founder of strong Turkey in the region after Ottoman Empire.²⁷⁴ In his book *Kazakhstan's Way* Nazarbayev writes 'When we started building our country, I have read carefully biographies of many persons who founded their country. They are the first president of Turkish Republic Kemal Atatürk, 31th president of the USA Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "father of Chinese reforms" Deng Xiaoping, Malaysian ex-prime-minister Mohathir Mohammad.'²⁷⁵ In his another book dedicated to the new capital of Kazakhstan Astana *In the Heart of Eurasia*, he made reference to the experience of Turkey when 'General of Turkish Army Mustafa Kemal Atatürk moved Capital city in 1923 from Istanbul which was the Capital of Ottoman Empire to Ankara which was the center of national liberation movement against Antanta forces. Then it became the capital of dynamically developing Turkey'.²⁷⁶ No doubt that Turkish modernization was considered by Nazarbayev as one of the options. Nazarbayev underlined that the experience of Turkey in democratization and economic and social development is example for Kazakhstan.²⁷⁷

To come back to Nazarbayev's relations with Turgut Özal, Nazarbayev writes that he knew a lot about Turgut Özal's reforms which raised Turkish economy from the collapse. Nazarbayev shares the view that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk created Turkey as modern state, and Turgut Özal made it modern in economic sense.²⁷⁸ As the first

²⁷³ Erdal Şafak 'Astana'da Atatürk Anıtı', *Sabah Gazetesi*, 19 Ekim 2009

²⁷⁴ *Atayurt Dergisi* Kış 2010, Sayı 3.

²⁷⁵ N. Nazarbayev, *Qazaqstan joli*, Qarağandı, 2006, p. 11.

²⁷⁶ Н.Назарбаев *Еуразия жүрегінде* 38

²⁷⁷ 'Speech of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev during the visit of the President of Turkish Republic Turgut Özal', 1993, quoted from Prof.Dr. Mehmet Saray, *Türk Devletlerinde Parlamento, Demokrasi ve Atatürk*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara 2008.114.

²⁷⁸ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 194.

president of Kazakhstan, and the reformer Nazarbayev learnt both from former and latter.

Nazarbayev reminds that Turkey under Özal leadership launched reforms to build economy of free market through privatization, openness, and state regulation of economic processes. He notes that after Özal privatized small and middle enterprises all these enterprises became rentable, effectiveness of production increased, conditions of workers improved. Nazarbayev also mentions his policy of drawing foreign investment, policy of making Turkish lira convertible, his struggle with black market, first free economic zones.²⁷⁹ In fact all these reforms and policies were applied by Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. Both as admiration and wish for Kazakhstan he underlines “Turkish businessmen and entrepreneurs became self-confident and began to believe in their ability to compete with the West.”²⁸⁰

Nazarbayev’s misperception of Turkey occurred in the first summit of Turkic states organized in Ankara in 1992. He refused to sign the declaration prepared by Turkish side which stated “we move on the direction of integration with Turkey due to our common historical roots, commonality of culture and language, and mentality.”²⁸¹ I think the term ‘integration’ was misunderstood as ‘union, as if uniting with Turkey’. It is because Nazarbayev misperceived Özal as Turanist. He notes that Özal’s visits to Central Asian states were not only related with necessity of building good relations with new states, but for certain extent was related with the wish to realize the idea of Kemal Atatürk, to form strong union of Turkic states. “He was the follower of Pan-Turkism, the idea of great Turkey, which will unite whole Turkic world from Baikal to Mediterranean Sea and Dunai.”²⁸² After the summit Nazarbayev stated “Kazakhstan is and I am personally as the president elected by the Kazakhstani people absolutely sure that if we establish different association on the

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 195.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 196.

ethnic, cultural or political level, then not only make peoples of our states converge but make them more diverge from each other.”²⁸³

As Turgut Özal was perceived by Nazarbayev as Turanist, the word ‘integration’ meant for him “the abandonment of just gained independence, cutting the traditional ties with neighbors (i.e. Russia – D.A.), taking in our shoulders another ‘big brother’ in place of just got rid of ‘big brother’.”²⁸⁴ Nazarbayev instead of “integration” proposed “economic, humanitarian, and political cooperation” and “to reconstruct torn relations in civilized way, by respecting just gained independence, sovereignty of each state.”²⁸⁵

Another statement in the declaration to which Nazarbayev was against was the sentence that ‘in the summit the situations in Karabag, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Cyprus were discussed.’²⁸⁶ Obviously, Nazarbayev tried to avoid any statements which have possibility to contradict with Russian interests. Another explanation can be that to sign such declaration can be understood as taking sides in the mentioned conflicts. After the summit in the press conference Nazarbayev stated concerning Karabag problem in which Kazakhstan tried to be mediator “We listen to both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The scientific approach is necessary. It should not turn into war of militants. The conflict doesn’t necessitate the solidarity of Turks. The third part should not interfere into the conflict. It must be resolved by the dialogue of two sides.”²⁸⁷

²⁸³ ‘Ankarskaya deklaratsiya – za mir i sotrudnichestvo v regione’, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.253*, 3 Noyabrya 1992 goda.

²⁸⁴ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Yüzyıllar Kavşagında*, Ankara, 2012, p. 217.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

²⁸⁶ Abudlvahap Kara, *Turgut Özal ve Türk Dünyası: Türkiye – Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri 1983-1993*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2012, p. 212.

²⁸⁷ ‘Ege’den Çin’e Türk Birliği’ Tercüman, 2.11.1992. quoted in Abudlvahap Kara, *Turgut Özal ve Türk Dünyası: Türkiye – Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri 1983-1993*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2012, p. 214.

Nazarbayev concludes his thoughts about Özal that he understood that we needed exactly this kind of relations: equality, friendship, mutually beneficial relations.²⁸⁸ Maybe because of this emphasis on rationality Kazakh-Turkish relations did not experience ups and downs and developed steadily. There is proverb in Kazakhs which says: ‘to say thin and to find fat (about sheep)’. It means a low expectation leads to a high discovery, or on the country, high expectation leads to disappointment. Nazarbayev was against sentimental revolutionary development of relations, he was for rational evolutionary development of relations. The fact that the term ‘integration of Turkic states’ ironically was coined by Nazarbayev in mid 2000s shows that he chose the right tone of approach. Shirin Akiner indicates that Nazarbayev understood the potential of the Turkic World.²⁸⁹ But more correct would be that Nazarbayev understood that potential in early 1990s, but it needed time to pronounce and realize that potential. When we analyze the acceleration of institutionalization of integration within Turkic states after Nakhchivan summit of 2009, where Nazarbayev acted as main supporter of these projects, then it is apparent that Nazarbayev’s views on Turkic world coincide with that of late Turgut Özal.

Nazarbayev bases his policy towards Turkey and Central Asian states on the place of Turkic world in Eurasian continent. Turkic world always was linking bridge between peoples and cultures. Nazarbayev writes “when I call to realize our common cultural-historical destiny, I don’t mean breaking away and isolation from other cultural poles... Exactly this Turkic-Islamic world will become the bridge which will enrich cultures of the peoples of the following civilization systems: a) West; b) Arabic-Iranian world; c) Russia; d) China.²⁹⁰ According to Nazarbayev, Turkic people acting as a single entity can affect the geopolitics of the region as an equal subject not as a passive element.²⁹¹

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Shirin Akiner, ‘Evolution of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: 1991-2011’, in *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies* No:6, USAK, 2011 p.10.

²⁹⁰ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V potoke istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 112.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 114.

This strategy was formed and pronounced in the first Turkic summit. In his speech in the summit Nazarbayev stated that “The historical cooperation of people does not necessitate the isolation and partition on the basis of brotherhood bonds.” Further he elaborates this statement: “Turkic people since ancient times tried to create their history together with other ethnos and people united with the destiny. We have been living for centuries together with all human kind who were born and developed in Asia, our Great Mother.”²⁹² In short, there is implicit reference to Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan who has close relations with Russia. Nazarbayev warns that in his cooperation with Turkic world, he should take into account the reality of Russia. Indeed, none of the Turkic states represented in the summit has so much dependence on Russia as Kazakhstan.

On the other side, in the mind of Nazarbayev Turkic world was component part of Asia. As it is known just before the Turkic summit in 1992 Nazarbayev in his speech in 47 Session of General Assembly of the United Nations pronounced to establish Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). He reiterated this proposition in the Turkic Summit. Nazarbayev made emphasis on the phrase “Turkic portion of Asian garden”. In his interview to a journalist after the second Turkic summit in 1994 in Istanbul, Nazarbayev clarifies his interests in Turkic summits as follows:

First of all, I consider the Istanbul meeting in the context of my idea of gathering Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. This is the only reason. All meetings, regional contacts which contribute to the realization of this idea, and as you know all participants of Istanbul summit are members of the Conference, for me have prior meaning. That is why I attend this kind of regional activities.²⁹³

To come back to the first summit, in his speech Nazarbayev mentions about four models of actions for Turkic states. The first model is to develop convergence of people without hesitation. In the first model the priority is given to culture and

²⁹² ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları Zirvesinde yaptığı konuşma 30 Ekim 1992, Ankara’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012, p. 55.

²⁹³ Irina Bektiyarova, ‘Interview with Nursultan Nazarbayev’, *Ponorama*, No.41, 22 Oktyabrya 1994 goda.

economy. In the words of Kazakh president “We will not try to put our interaction into political frame, this process will continue on its natural way.” The outcome will be emergence of general Turkic market. The second model discussed by Nazarbayev is to search for more coordinated methods of economic and political cooperation for the interests of Turkic people. This model means institutionalization of relations. The outcome will be emergence of international organization. The third model aims to create the regional institution which is larger than Turkic realm. In other words it means to extend the Turkic realm in Asian garden. The fourth model is to build peace, stability and security in whole Asian continent. The first step in this direction is Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. Nazarbayev says that “The fourth model comparing with others has its advantages. Maybe this path will not give results immediately. However, it covers our interests, interest of people living with us together, and interests of all our neighbors in Asian continent.”²⁹⁴ It is apparent that Nazarbayev is trying to make stress on Asianness rather than on Turkicness.

In conclusion having noted that the decisions of Turkic leaders can be misinterpreted by others, Nazarbayev proposes to conclude another document, besides common declaration, as an address to Eurasian states and peoples inviting them to peace. He states that “The document will be an evidence of our wish to peace.”²⁹⁵ Nazarbayev in his interview to a Turkish journalist during the Turkic summit stated:

If Timur and Bayazid had not fought against each other, the history would have been different today. So now we have to institutionalize the feelings brotherhood and cooperation in such way that it would hug all Asian nations. For that purpose I propose Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.²⁹⁶

Despite the all handicaps of the first summit, the meeting can be considered as successful. The most important point of the Ankara declaration was that the leaders

²⁹⁴ ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları Zirvesinde yaptığı konuşma 30 Ekim 1992, Ankara’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012, pp. 56-58.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

²⁹⁶ Taha Akyol, ‘Tarihi Dönemeç’, *Milliyet*, 1.11.1992. Quoted in Abudlvahap Kara, *Turgut Özal ve Türk Dünyası: Türkiye – Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri 1983-1993*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2012, p.215.

expressed their firmness to meet in constant way, so this first summit was beginning of the series of Turkic summits.²⁹⁷ These summits strengthened the notion of the Turkic world.

To conclude Nazarbayev's thoughts about Özal, he says that "As a person who knew Özal very closely, I can say that he was charismatic, he could create the atmosphere of trust. He was a politician with deep knowledge, wise and humane."²⁹⁸ Regarding Özal's death Nazarbayev notes that his death indicated the end of one of the important phases of the Turkish history. "Turgut Özal as the architect of 'Turkish miracle', the follower of free development of economy, real brave reformer was worldwide recognized leader."²⁹⁹ Nazarbayev highly evaluates Özal's foreign policy understanding. According to him:

Turgut Özal was well-known as a great politician in foreign affairs. After Turkish political relations with the countries of Near and Middle East, and countries of the former East bloc, and then with new independent states warmed, the measures to establish the basis of economic cooperation were taken.³⁰⁰

In fact there is similarity in foreign policy understandings of Nazarbayev and Özal. Both leaders give priority to economy. Özal's foreign policy is generally described as merchant's foreign policy, while Nazarbayev's foreign policy based on drawing investment into Kazakhstan. In addition Nazarbayev's slogan in reforms 'economy first, then politics' is also fit to Turgut Özal's understanding. Both leaders believe that economic integration leads to political cooperation thus guaranteeing regional security. In domestic reforms both believe that economic one should lead and political one should follow it. Turgut Özal in his interview to a Kazakh journalist answering question on multi-party system stated the following:

45 years passed since we adopted the multi-party democratic system. You also will certainly transit to democracy. But multi-party system is a very delicate issue. There

²⁹⁷ http://www.turkkon.org/docs/10_AnkaraBildirisi1992_1.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi.pdf
Accessed on 7.10.2013

²⁹⁸ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 198.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

should be no place for anarchy. Before transition to democracy, order should be established. I think you will face difficulties if you decide to transit to democracy immediately. Therefore, these problems should be solved respectively one by one. Economy also should be improved. If economy is left behind, it will be difficult to transit to democracy. Economy never should be left behind. Firstly, economic condition should be improved.³⁰¹

Turgut Özal was a charismatic leader and was loved by Kazakh people. During one of his visits to Kazakhstan, a journalist asked him “How many Kazakh are there in Turkey?”³⁰² Turgut Özal’s answer touched Kazakhs very much. Özal said “Including me, there are 70 million Kazakhs in Turkey.”³⁰³

Nazarbayev concludes his memoirs about Özal with the sentence “I highly value the support of Turkey and of Özal given to Kazakhstan. We will never forget that this country was first to recognize our independence.”³⁰⁴ As the expression of this appreciation and of his friendship, Nazarbayev attended Özal’s funeral. Unfortunately, he was the only Central Asian leader to do so. During the funeral Nazarbayev described Özal’s death “as the great loss of the Turkic world.”³⁰⁵ Later in the same year as the sign of thanks of Kazakh nation and debt to him, one of the main streets of Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan at that time, was named after Turgut Özal.

To sum up, during the presidential term of Özal, Nazarbayev’s perception of Turkey was formed. In this respect, his friendship with Özal positively contributed to

³⁰¹ Erjan Wayis, ‘Türük Respublikasının Prezidenti Turgut Özal: ‘Qazaq halqına bar jaqsılıq tileymin’’, *Halıq Kenesi* N52, 17 Nawrız 1993 jıl.

³⁰² There is a small Kazakh diasporoa in Turkey with population of 5000 to 15000 who migrated in 1950s from today’s Western China (Xinjiang). They were welcomed by Adnan Menderes government and were settled to Kayseri, (Develi ilçesi Sin-delhöyük and Musa hacılı köy), Konya (İsmil and Zengin köy), Niğde (Ulukışla ilçesi Altayköy), Aksaray (Sultanhanı), Manisa (Salihli) and Istanbul (Zeytinburnu).

³⁰³ Seniha Üner, Hüseyin Güngör ‘Türkiye’de ben dahil 70 milyon Kazak yaşıyor’ *Atayurt Eğitim, Kültür ve Ekonomi Dergisi* Kış 2009 sayı 1, sayfa 14.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Taha Akyol, ‘Özal’a Saygı’, *Milliyet*, 22.04.1993. Quoted in Abudlvahap Kara, *Turgut Özal ve Türk Dünyası: Türkiye – Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri 1983-1993*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2012, p. 243.

Nazarbayev's perception. In fact, on this perception Nazarbayev built his policy towards Turkey. This perception is the basis of Nazarbayev attitude towards Turkey.

4.3 Presidential Term of Süleyman Demirel

Close relations on the presidential level was continued by President Süleyman Demirel. Nazarbayev met with Demirel on October of 1990, in his first visit to Turkey. At that time Demirel was the leader of strong opposition party. On May of 1993 Süleyman Demirel was elected as the 9th president of Turkish Republic. Nazarbayev describes it as a zenith of long carrier of 69-aged outstanding politician.³⁰⁶ Touching upon the relation between Özal and Demirel, Nazarbayev notes that "Once Demirel was Özal's teacher, but then their paths diverged." Then he adds that "despite the disagreement between these prominent politicians the common work wasn't damaged. Each of them made an invaluable contribution to the development of Turkish state."³⁰⁷

Demirel continued his active foreign policy toward Turkic world as the head of the state. He made his first visit on this position to Turkic states, first to Cyprus then to post-Soviet Turkic republics. Demirel frequently visited Kazakhstan. Although the euphoria of the first meetings was lost, Demirel's visit to Kazakhstan continued to contribute to positive image of Turkey in Nazarbayev's view. Demirel, as Özal, tried to utilize every opportunity to show that Turkic world is important for Turkey. One of the diplomatic gestures to express the importance of the guest was displayed during Nazarbayev's official visit to Turkey in 1994. As it is noted by Muhtar Qul-Muhammed, when the plane of Kazakh president entered Turkey's air space four jets of Turkish air forces accompanied the guests' plane as a gesture of respect until Esenboğa airport. In the airport, president Demirel himself met the guests.³⁰⁸

Süleyman Demirel continued Özal's initiatives on gathering the leaders of Turkic speaking countries. The second summit which was planned in Azerbaijan in 1993 did

³⁰⁶ N. Nazarbayev, *Gasyrlar togysynda*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 192.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 193.

³⁰⁸ Muhtar Qul-Muhammed, 'Teñizder terbetken Türkiya', *Jas Alaş No.145*, 22 Qaraşa 1994 jil.

not take place due to the instability there. In 1994 Turkic summit was hold in Istanbul with the invitation of Demirel. Having learnt the lessons from the first summit, this time Istanbul declaration emerged in the result of the consultations of all parts. In addition until the summit in 1994 the reality of Turkic world was recognized by international politics and internalized by the domestic politics. On 12 July 1993 TÜRKSÖY, the organization which will deal with cultural affairs in Turkic world, was established. So leaders of Turkic states came together with more readiness and real expectations than it was in the first summit. As it was put by Nazarbayev in his speech in the second summit “Suspicion in inter-state relations is slowly replaced by trust and mutual understanding. Confrontations in the old frontlines of the Cold War are replaced by partnerships.”³⁰⁹

During his official visit to Turkey which was first after inauguration of President Demirel, Nazarbayev used more confident statements. After signing Friendship and Cooperation Agreement between Kazakhstan and Turkey Nazarbayev described bilateral relations as ‘brother relations’ and stated that Turkey is supporter of Kazakhstan. He underlined “We rely on you.”³¹⁰

When we analyze the speech of Nazarbayev in the summit we clearly see how Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan shapes Kazakh president’s policy. Nazarbayev indicates that he perceives with satisfaction the dialogue between Russia and USA.³¹¹ It is obvious that positive trend in Russian-US relations and cooperation between Russia and Turkey positively affects Kazakh foreign policy generally and Kazakh-Turkish relations particularly. Under this circumstance, even cooperation with NATO for Kazakhstan is promising. Nazarbayev touched upon this subject in his speech in the summit.

³⁰⁹ ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları Zirvesinde yaptığı konuşma 18-19 Ekim 1994, İstanbul’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012, p. 61.

³¹⁰ ‘Qazaqstan men Türkiya Dostıq jane Intımaqtastıq turalı şartqa qol qoydı’, *Halıq Kenesi No.158, 19 Qazan 1994 jıl.*

³¹¹ ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları Zirvesinde yaptığı konuşma 18-19 Ekim 1994, p. 61.

Let's analyze the 'Partnership for Peace' program which aims to facilitate interaction for peace and security between us and NATO countries including Turkey which plays an important role. We understand and support the main principles of the doctrine. It is first of all wide-range cooperation and attempt to diminish the accumulated distrust in the issues of planning security and defense.³¹²

One of the main issues discussed in Nazarbayev's speech is integration. Having noted that one way of global development is to search for and implement models of integration, Kazakh president states that institutionalized models of integration prove the fact that framed ideological and other forms of imposed inter-state unions which were dominant once upon a time are replaced with integrations based on more firm commonalities of interests of developments.³¹³ In more precise way, integration should be open and free from ideological confrontations. Further, Nazarbayev expresses his views on Turkic integrations, Eurasian Union and Economic Cooperation Organization. Concerning the project of Eurasian Union which was in fact pronounced by Nazarbayev himself in the spring of that year, he clearly states that "it is not revival of the old Soviet Union." According to Nazarbayev, "The project is designated to the wellbeing and humane values of millions of people who share hundred-year common history, the traditions of co-existence, cultural heritage and common destiny."³¹⁴ In fact Nazarbayev's confidence in the second Turkic summit is stemming from the fact that by pronouncing Eurasian Union he gave strong message to Russia that Kazakhstan will remain close partner of Moscow. That is why he was more assertive in the issue of integration within Turkic world.

Concerning the Turkic integration Nazarbayev stated that the time to establish a union which unites Turkic countries has come. He expressed his belief that this union is not directed against anyone and it will not be a military one. Nazarbayev underlined "The aim of the union is to establish peace and to increase well-being of people."³¹⁵ This statement is aimed to assure Russia and Russian population of

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid., 62.

³¹⁴ Ibid., p. 63.

³¹⁵ 'Qazaqstan men Türkiya Dostıq jane Intımaqtastıq turalı şartqa qol qoydı', *Halıq Kenesi* No.158, 19 Qazan 1994 jil.

Kazakhstan who are concerned that Kazakhstan is distancing from Russia. In the press conference after the summit Nazarbayev reiterated that the aim of the union is to revive spiritual values, to develop economy and to help each other in building modern statehood.³¹⁶

In his speech in the summit Nazarbayev having indicated that the common history among Turkic people creates available conditions to develop cooperation in different spheres, states “Besides, this kind of cooperation does not limit our attempt to develop wide-range relations with other states and with our traditional partners.”³¹⁷ Nazarbayev underlines special place of Kazakhstan which cannot be oriented solely on Turkic world. Further Nazarbayev calls to explore not only cultural commonalities while establishing relations but also learn more about peculiarities of the countries. As an example he says that Kazakhstan can explain how different people living in the country are enriching the cultural palette of Kazakhstan.³¹⁸ By this Nazarbayev reminds that Kazakhstan’s culture is not only composed of Turkic culture but also includes other cultures namely Slavic one. Based on this reality Nazarbayev states that while reviving cultures and languages of people the main responsibility is cast upon society itself rather than state. “It is because during this process misperception of the role of state can lead to harm in the balance among different nationalities in the country.”³¹⁹ In this way Nazarbayev is saying that Kazakhstan in its relations with Turkic world should take into account external and internal balances.

While discussing the Economic Cooperation Organization in his speech, Nazarbayev states “To reach maximum efficiency from the work we should think to include partners from Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States, first of all Russia, into the actions of the

³¹⁶ ‘N. Nazarbayev: Türkiyağa sapar jemisti boldı’, *Halıq Kenesi No.160, 21 Qazan 1994 jıl.*

³¹⁷ ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları Zirvesinde yaptığı konuşma 18-19 Ekim 1994, p. 63.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

ECO.”³²⁰ There is perception that leader of Kazakhstan expresses Russian interest in the absence of Russia. However, it should not be forgotten that Kazakh leaders expresses Turkish interests in the absence of Turkey as it was in Eurasian Summit in 2012 when Nazarbayev proposed to include Turkey as the member of Eurasian Customs Union. This situation displays Kazakhstan’s Eurasian that is Slavic-Turkic identity. To come back to Turkic summit, no doubt that the second summit further strengthened Turkic component of Kazakhstan’s Eurasian identity.

During Demirel’s presidency five Turkic summits in Istanbul (1994), Bishkek (1995), Tashkent (1996), Astana (1998), and Baku (2000) took place. Although the euphoria of the first years passed, we should confess that these summits were effective tools to remind that the people of these states are united by common Turkic world. Especially from Kazakhstan’s view these summits were perceived as the recognition of the Turkic roots of Kazakhstan. When we analyze the declarations of the summits, we find out that there is internalization of Turkic identity. Although in the first declaration heads of states express that they share common history and culture, there is no word ‘Turkish’ or ‘Turkic’. Instead, leaders refrained with term ‘Eurasia’ which is geographical term, and politically neutral one. In Istanbul declaration of 1994 the phrase ‘Turkish dialects’ was added. In Bishkek declaration of 1995 the term ‘Turkic people’ was coined; in Tashkent declaration of 1996 the term ‘Turkish-speaking countries’ entered into circulation.

In these summits leaders emphasized common values and exchanged views on regional and international problems. At the same time it became the forum where parties declared their support to each other’s internal and foreign policies. In Istanbul Declaration of 1994 which was signed after the second summit of Turkic speaking countries, Nazarbayev besides other leaders “noted with satisfaction the efforts made by related countries on the issue of transferring of oil and gas pipelines via Turkey to Europe and Mediterranean Sea.”³²¹ In Bishkek Declaration of 1995 and Tashkent Declaration of 1996 leaders of Turkic states “underlined the necessity of

³²⁰ Ibid., p. 65.

³²¹ http://www.turkkon.org/docs/10_IstanbulBildirisi1994_2.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi.pdf
Accessed on 20.10.2013.

international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism and separatism that recognize no boundaries.”³²² In Astana Declaration of 1998 to the list of threat, besides terrorism and separatism, fundamentalism was added.³²³ In Baku Summit of Turkic speaking countries held in 2000 leaders denoted the importance of Istanbul Declaration and Agreement on Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan Great Oil Pipeline signed on 18 November of 1999, and the importance of Intergovernmental Declaration on the principles of realization of Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey-Europe Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline. In addition Turkic leaders ‘renewed their propositions on the building of peace, stability and security in South Caucasia and Central Asia which were pronounced in the OSCE Istanbul Summit and other meetings, and confirmed their belief that these propositions will contribute to regional and global peace.’³²⁴

In all these summits Demirel as the head of Turkey, and as the eldest among presidents, was respected. In Baku Summit of Turkic speaking countries held in 2000 Turkic leaders “emphasized the important role of Turkey’s President Süleyman Demirel in establishing and strengthening of understanding and trust among leaders of Turkic speaking countries, and in the development of friendship and brotherhood among those countries, and in convergence and solidarity of Turkic peoples; and expressed their gratitude.”³²⁵

Speaking on the fifth anniversary of the Kazakhstan independence Nazarbayev thanked Süleyman Demirel who was attending that ceremonial meeting. Declaring

³²² http://www.turkkon.org/docs/09_BiskekBildirisi1995_3.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi.pdf Accessed on 20.10.2013.

http://www.turkkon.org/docs/08_TaskentBildirisi1996_4.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi.pdf Accessed on 20.10.2013.

³²³ http://www.turkkon.org/docs/07_AstanaBildirisi1998_5.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi.pdf Accessed on 20.10.2013.

³²⁴ http://www.turkkon.org/docs/06_BakuBildirisi2000_6.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi.pdf Accessed on 20.10.2013.

³²⁵ http://www.turkkon.org/docs/06_BakuBildirisi2000_6.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi.pdf Accessed on 20.10.2013.

Kazakhstan's strategy in foreign policy Nazarbayev noted that "In recent years the active economic and political dialogue of Turkic states, interrupted by totalitarian isolation, was restored. Here there is a big contribution of our honorable guest President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel. This is the rising element in world politics and Kazakhstan actively supports the strengthening of integration in this direction."³²⁶ The presence of Turkish president on fifth anniversary of Kazakhstan's independence was good gesture from Turkish side. As Nazarbayev stated, "Between two nations there formed big friendship, and Kazakhstanis know the value of that friendship and are proud of it."³²⁷

Nazarbayev says that there are friendly relations between him and Demirel. He underlines that there are only very few examples of constant and fruitful relations among head of states.³²⁸ Nazarbayev and Demirel are still in contact and exchange views on regional and global affairs. Nazarbayev generally meets with ex-President Demirel when he visits Turkey. It is worthy to mention that there is a university in Kazakhstan named after Süleyman Demirel.

In the final analysis, Demirel confirmed Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey formed in early 1990s. Although during 1990s Turkey experienced political and economic instabilities, this did not change the perception of Turkey as he was well aware of limits and handicaps of Turkey.

4.4 Presidential Term of Ahmet Necdet Sezer

Although President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was considered to be passive in foreign affairs, Kazakh-Turkish relations continued steadily developing during his presidential term too. Sezer continued the tradition of Demirel and firstly visited Turkic countries. Before this visit Nazarbayev and Sezer met in New York during

³²⁶ N. Nazarbayev, *Lessons of History and the Modernity: Speech in ceremonial Meeting devoted to 5th anniversary of Kazakhstan Independence*, Almaty, "Kazakhstan" 1997, p. 101.

³²⁷ N. Nazarbayev, *Çasrlar toğısında*, Atamura, Almatı, 2003, p. 193.

³²⁸ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 199.

UN General Assembly session and in Antalya where Nazarbayev was in holiday.³²⁹ On 19 October 2000 Sezer visited Kazakhstan where he gave lecture in Eurasian National University and attended the 1500 year anniversary of city Turkistan, where there is tomb of Ahmet Yassawi and Kazakh-Turkish University after his name.³³⁰ Interestingly, in the press conference both Nazarbayev and Sezer stated similar opinions concerning the importance of development of relations with Russia. Nazarbayev underlined that Kazakhstan considers cooperation with Russia as priority and attempts to build constructive interaction with the northern neighbor.³³¹ While these statements once more underline Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity, it seems that Turkish leaders comprehend this peculiarity of Kazakhstan.

Nazarbayev and Sezer met again in the Turkic summit which was held on 27 April 2001 in Istanbul. The 7th Summit of Turkic states was held in the year of tenth anniversary of independence of post-Soviet Turkic republics. Within ten years the cooperation among Turkic states reached considerable success. However, it was far below of the expectations of early 1990s. On 16 October 2000 Nazarbayev in his interview to Turkish journalists analyzed the first decade of Kazakh-Turkish cooperation. Having noted that the relations between two brother countries which began with late Özal and then continued with Demirel caught a certain degree and many agreements which should be concluded between two countries were signed, Nazarbayev underlined that now the important thing is to position these agreements on concrete basis.³³² In other words Nazarbayev says that until today, there were rhetoric on brotherhood and fraternity but now it is time of action.

Today approximately 1300 Turkish firms are active in Kazakhstan. The volume of Turkish investment reached 1, 5 milliard US dollars. Since 1993 within seven years Kazakhstan drew 10 milliard US dollar foreign investments. It is the highest rate

³²⁹ Kadir Dikbaş, Enes Cansever, 'Nazarbayev'den Zaman'a özel' <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2000/10/16/roportaj1/roportaj1.htm> Accessed on 21.10.2013.

³³⁰ <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/ahmet-necdet-sezer-basin-aciklamalari/494/57781/kazakistan-basbasa-ve-heyetlerarasi-gorusmeler-sonrasi-basin-aciklamasi.html> Accessed on 21.10.2013.

³³¹ 'Otnosheniya Kazakhstana i Turtsii budut ukrepyat', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* No.247, 28 Sentyabrya 2000 goda.

³³² Kadir Dikbaş, Enes Cansever, 'Nazarbayev'den Zaman'a özel'

among some European and post-Soviet states. According to the data of the World Bank Kazakhstan is among the 20 countries which draw the most investment. When we analyze these investments in ratio, Turkish investments in Kazakhstan occupies third place after those of the USA and England.³³³

As it is seen, Nazarbayev knows the value of Turkish contribution to the development of Kazakhstan. However, he also expresses his dissatisfaction and displays his expectation:

Since the first day of the independence I have pursued special policy to draw Turkish businessmen to Kazakhstan and to provide conditions for them to invest the country. It is imperative of being close and of being brother. However, the majority of Turkish businessmen who came to Kazakhstan until today are constructor companies. It means that they do not invest focused on production but work with contracts. For example, almost Astana was built totally by Turkish companies. But the majority of Turkish firms are middle size entrepreneurs. The big companies of Turkey have not come to Kazakhstan yet.³³⁴

When it came to 2000s, there was an atmosphere that Turkey lost Central Asia, and Russia is coming back to the region under the leadership of Putin who was more ambitious and aggressive than his predecessor Yeltsin. The perception of the recreation of the Soviet Union was strengthened with the formation of the Eurasian Economic Community. As we have already mentioned Nazarbayev was the main figure under the idea of Eurasian Union.

“Eurasia means the integration of Europe with Asia. However, it is impossible to make Eurasian countries to integrate with each other and increase the level of relations to desirable one” explains Nazarbayev. Regarding Kazakhstan’s place in Eurasia he says that Kazakhstan since 1890 have been under the sovereignty of Russia. Therefore, the economy became dependent on Russia. Kazakhstan had no relation in economic sense except Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and other neighboring countries. Transportation ways became dependent on Russia. Kazakhstan’s trade was focused on solely Russia.³³⁵ Under such conditions, Kazakhstan besides developing new cooperation with outside world had to strengthen infrastructure formed during

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Ibid.

the Soviet time. Although many experts evaluate Eurasian Economic Union as a political one, Nazarbayev's opinion about the future of the entity is interesting. Nazarbayev claims "Eurasian Customs Union now consists of Kazakhstan, Russia, Kirgizstan, Belarus and Tajikistan. However, our doors are open. Any country who wishes to be member of the Union can do so. The important point is that we have to show that the union is useful. For example, Turkey, China, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Baltic states can become the members of the union."³³⁶ Nazarbayev would repeat this propose in early 2010s.

Although Turkey's membership in Eurasian integration is a remote possibility, Nazarbayev utilizes this discourse to balance against Russia. This means that Kazakhstan's interest in Turkic integration and in Turkey will preserve its vitality. Because of this, Nazarbayev have paid attention to Turkic summits including 7th Summit despite the fact that the general interest of Turkic leaders in Turkic summit was in decline. In addition cooperation with Turkey, and Kazakhstan's activism in forums and conferences like Turkic summits were important for Nazarbayev to reach the purposes in foreign policy.

In this regard, the new turning point of history, 9/11, forced Turkey and Kazakhstan play more active role in the region. Turkey as a state with Muslim majority and NATO member, and Kazakhstan as a Central Asian state were concerned with the situation in Afghanistan. Even before 9/11 terrorist attacks they expressed this concern in Istanbul summit of Turkic speaking countries.³³⁷ Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Nazarbayev continued forming common vision on regional and international affairs. For example, on 3 October 2001 Nazarbayev visited Ahmet Necdet Sezer to exchange views on post 9/11 situation in the region.³³⁸

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ http://www.turkkon.org/docs/05_Istanbul2001_7.Devle%20BaskanlariZirvesiBildirisi.pdf Accessed on 22.10.2013

³³⁸ <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/ahmet-necdet-sezer-basin-aciklamalari/494/58281/kazakistan-cumhurbaskani-nursultan-nazarbayev-ile-gorusme.html> Accessed on 22.10.2013

Ahmet Necdet Sezer on 4 April 2002 attended the first Summit meeting of Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) held in Almaty by the initiative of Nazarbayev. Organization of such conference first was pronounced by Nazarbayev on 5 October 1992, at the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly. CICA was supported both by Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel.³³⁹ The presence of Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who very rarely traveled during his presidential term, in the first Summit meeting of CICA, no doubt, was the evidence of that Turkey appreciates its relations with Kazakhstan and gives all possible support to initiatives of this young state. As the country which shares with Kazakhstan similar foreign policy vision, it was meaningful that Turkey took chairmanship of CICA from Kazakhstan in 2010.

Another factor which influenced the bilateral relations was changes in Turkish domestic politics. In 2002 new generation of young politicians like Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power and their Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AK Parti) won majority seats of parliament in that way forming stable government. This development gave Turkey opportunity to pursue predictable foreign policy. Starting from 2003 improvement of Turkish economy strengthened ruling party's hand in foreign policy.

Taking into account domestic change and improvement of Turkish economy, Kazakh president Nazarbayev paid an official visit to Turkey in May 2003. This visit gave new impetus to Kazakh-Turkish relations. In addition, at this moment Kazakhstan succeeded to improve its economy. Since 1998 Kazakh economy was rising annually 10%. Kazakhstan repaid IMF debts within seven years. So in many aspects Kazakh economy was more confident and firmer than Turkish economy at that period.

Nazarbayev in his speech at the meeting organized by Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Agency (DEİK), having expressed his happiness that one-party government established in Turkey, stated that Kazakhstan is ready to support

³³⁹ K.K. Tokaev, *Pod stygom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 510.

Turkey.³⁴⁰ He claimed that “If Turkey realizes privatization our banks and businessmen can buy or invest plants in Turkey. We are ready to invest in Turkey.”³⁴¹ It is certain that the improvements of economies of two countries accelerated the bilateral relations. In this regard Nazarbayev, having noted that he is frequently asked question ‘what can be done to improve relations among Turkic countries’, makes emphasis on economic relations.

I think first of all we should develop economic relations. If our economic relations develop and strengthen, then political, cultural and other relations, including security issues, will develop automatically. Now Turkey’s trade volume with Europe and the West is 41 billion US dollars, while its trade volume with Turkic states is only 1 milliard US dollars, and half of that 1 milliard is related to Kazakhstan. Firstly we should think of this.³⁴²

Nazarbayev is aware that the cultural relations and people to people relations between two countries are important. In this sense, having indicated that almost twenty thousand students from two countries are studying in Ahmet Yesevi University, there are 28 Kazakh-Turkish lyceums, and recently ten thousand Kazakh students studied in Turkish universities and military schools, asks ‘why should I do this?’ He answers “It is because I want our children and grand children to know who their ancestors are, and want them further strengthen bilateral relations.”³⁴³ I think the phrase ‘to know the ancestors’ is crux of the statement. Kazakh foreign policy toward Turkey and Turkic world is not only result of state interests. Rather it is a long-ran strategy which has deep implication in Kazakhstan’s identity in the future. When we compare Uzbekistan’s attitude toward Uzbek students in Turkey whom Uzbek government see as viruses transporting instability to the country and Nazarbayev’s view on the issue, it is apparent that Kazakh president understands the role of Turkey in transformation of Kazakhstan. It will not be exaggeration to say that Nazarbayev’s aim in providing interaction between Kazakhstan and Turkey is to

³⁴⁰ ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türkiye Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu’nce düzenlenen toplantıda yaptığı konuşma 21 Mayıs 2003, İstanbul’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012, p. 108.

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 106.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 108.

Turkify i.e. Kazakhify Kazakhstan without disturbing internal balance between Turkic-Slavic population of the country and without deteriorating relations with Russia. For that purpose, first of all Kazakhs as people should discover their Turkic identity and ‘know their ancestors’; and Kazakhstan as the state should establish close relations with Turkey. In conclusion Nazarbayev stated:

It is a fact that Turkey is a great state. If the Republic of Turkey is strong and economically powerful, we, as your brothers, by taking support from you, by trusting you, and learning your success, will be happy. ... This time I came here to promise that I will struggle with all my effort to further develop bilateral relations.³⁴⁴

In the same visit Nazarbayev addressed to the military academy of Turkey. As the visit took place in post-9/11 period, the topic was related to security issues. As Nazarbayev put in the beginning of his lecture, it was a view on security from Central Asia.³⁴⁵ Having noted that Caspian basin in Eurasian space became important in global politics, Nazarbayev proposed to gather ‘Caspian stability pact’ as Caucasian stability pact. Kazakh leader believes that Turkey which links the Caspian region with Middle East and Balkans will enter the pact.³⁴⁶ It is apparent that Turkey’s participation in such pact will balance Russia and Iran.

Concerning Central Asian security Nazarbayev indicates that the CSTO and the SCO play important role in the regional security system. Further he states “Generally the regional security of Central Asia primarily is related to the relations within USA-Russia-China triangle. In addition, the impact of European Union, Turkey, and Islamic states on geopolitical situation of the region cannot be neglected.”³⁴⁷ In this way, Nazarbayev evaluates Turkey as important regional actor which can affect the regional balance.

³⁴⁴ ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türkiye Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu’na düzenlenen toplantıda yaptığı konuşma 21 Mayıs 2003, İstanbul’, p. 109.

³⁴⁵ ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türkiye Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı’nda yaptığı konuşma 21 Mayıs 2003, İstanbul’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012, p. 94.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 96.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 97.

Turkey's EU membership process which accelerated with AK Party government is estimated by Nazarbayev positively. Kazakh leader stated "We support Turkey's attempt to become a member of the European Union and firmly believe that powerful and secular Turkey with strong interactions with Europe suits interests of Kazakhstan and whole Turkic world."³⁴⁸ Nazarbayev does not neglect to suggest Turkey not to ignore relations with brother states in Eurasian space while intensifying EU accession process.³⁴⁹ Turkey's drive into inside of Eurasian and Turkic integration in early 1990s was evaluated as Turkey's one-sided strategy towards the region rather than interaction and cooperation with regional Turkic states. Now after a decade Nazarbayev's call to Turkey reveals Turkic integration is internalized by regional countries. Moreover, Kazakh leadership realized strategic significance of Turkey to diversify its foreign policy. In this regard, from Kazakhstan's perspective as it is expressed by Nazarbayev Turkey's relations with Russia are important.

We are pleased to see that Turkey is developing close political and economic relations with Russia and other CIS countries in the Eurasian space. Realization of this convergence not only facilitates mutually beneficial trade-economic, investment, transport and energy cooperation among parts but also positively affects to preserve security and stability in the vast Eurasian space under the conditions of in the globalization process.³⁵⁰

Indeed, Russia and Turkey have more contradiction in Eurasian region than Russia and USA. In many regions two countries see each other as the main rivals. The convergence or at least cooperation positively affect to resolution of the conflicts. From Kazakhstan's view the best type of relations between Russia and Turkey is strategic partnership if not alliance. Ultimately any kind of cooperation between two contributes to ease Kazakhstan's identity crisis which is tensed between Turkic and Slavic worlds, between Ankara and Moscow.

On 11 January 2006 Nazarbayev was reelected as the President of Kazakhstan. In the ceremony of inauguration Turkey was represented not by the President Sezer, even

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 98.

³⁵⁰ 'Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Türkiye Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı'nda yaptığı konuşma 21 Mayıs 2003, İstanbul', p. 99

not by Prime-Minister Erdoğan, but by the vice-prime-minister and minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gül.³⁵¹ The level of representation reveals the fact that AK Party government was preoccupied with the EU accession process and the Middle Eastern affairs. It was Abdullah Gül then as the president of Turkey who accelerated Turkey's relations with Turkic world and especially with Kazakhstan.

While Abdullah Gül met with the Kazakh minister of foreign affairs Tokayev, they discussed the importance of the holding the Turkic summit which is planned to be organized in Turkey.³⁵² After the last summit in 2001 Turkey entered the economic crisis which restricted its hand in foreign policy. On the other hand Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were not so eager to attend these summits and in last two summits were represented only by the presidents of the parliaments. The most interested Turkic states were Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan who were both politically stable and economically in rise due to their natural resources.

On 18 May 2006 Nazarbayev met with the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Antalya. Two leaders discussed the issues of bilateral cooperation.³⁵³ Their meeting took place in Antalya because Nazarbayev was in holiday there. He frequently comes to Antalya. The matter is that in early 1990s Turkey allocated certain lands in Antalya to the leaders of Turkic states. It should be noted that it was clever decision of Turkey. It gives opportunity to meet the leaders in unofficial atmosphere away from the views of journalists. Once, Nazarbayev said that “Kazakhstan actually has everything except Mediterranean Sea.”³⁵⁴

Although AK Party foreign policy seemed to be focused on the EU and the Middle East, there was steady rise in Central Asian direction of Turkish foreign policy. As professor Yagya from Sankt Petersburg State University put it “the government of

³⁵¹ *Diplomatic Herald*, 1(7) 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

³⁵² *Diplomatic Herald*, 1(7) 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

³⁵³ *Diplomatic Herald*, 2 (8) 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

³⁵⁴ ‘Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Kazak-Türk İş Forumu’ndaki Konuşması’ in Bağdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, 200.

the Justice and Development Party actively struggled with fundamentalists and officially refused the idea of 'Great Turan'. However, exactly this Party started pursuing a policy for the creating the union of the Turkic countries."³⁵⁵ Although this statement is exaggeration, the fact is that the recovery of Turkish economy made its foreign policy more active not only EU and Middle East but also in Eurasian region.

The 8th Summit of Turkic speaking countries held in Antalya on 17 November of 2006 is as if confirming this point. After five years of break the leaders of Turkic states at last could come together. However, the leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have neither participated in nor sent their representatives to the summit. Ilham Aliyev replaced Haydar Aliev as the President of Azerbaijan, and Kurmanbek Bakiyev replaced Askar Akayev as the President of Kirgizstan. Therefore, Nazarbayev was the only leader who witnessed the Turkic summits of Özal and Demirel era and thus was the most experienced leader in the summit.

Nursultan Nazarbayev in his speech having underlined that there is no unresolved problem between Kazakhstan and Turkic states at the time being, indicated that the trade and economic, scientific and technical, and cultural humanitarian relations among Turkic states have elevated to the level of strategic partnership. Then he drew attention to the rising economic potential of Turkic states which make possible the realization of new projects in education and culture.³⁵⁶ In early 90s Nazarbayev tried to stay away from rhetoric which could be misinterpreted by Russia, and lead to the rise of pan-Turkist sentiments thus destabilizing domestic politics in Kazakhstan. But now Nazarbayev was proposing to hold days of cultures of Turkic people, make Turkic history, literature, and art more popular by utilizing modern IT technologies.³⁵⁷ It is because Nazarbayev having launched the project of Eurasian integration, he guaranteed Russia's friendly attitude toward Kazakhstan. However, in domestic politics not everyone was glad with the idea of integration with Russia.

³⁵⁵ V.S. Yagya, 'Puti pereputya sovremennoi Turtsii', *Aktualnye problemy mirovoi politiki v XXIveke: Vostok v mirovoy politike, Vypusk 4*, Nestor Istoriya, Sankt Peterburg 2009, p.125.

³⁵⁶ *Diplomatic Herald*, 4 (10) 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Especially nationalist wing of Kazakh intellectuals were concerned that the independence is being lost. So the discourse of Turkic integration was utilized to satisfy the expectations of Kazakh nationalists.

Besides the cooperation in the spheres of culture, science and education Nazarbayev proposed to strengthen economic cooperation among Turkic states. He suggested utilizing effectively the transit and transporting potential of Turkic states. Nazarbayev emphasized “Economic integration is the path to stability, progress and sustainable development of our region.”³⁵⁸ It means that the Russian cultural and economic influence in Kazakhstan should be balanced by Turkic one.

The confident atmosphere of the summit was reflected in the text of the Antalya Declaration. The Turkic leaders draw the attention of international community to post-9/11 Afghanistan as well as to Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. Moreover parties emphasized the necessity of preservation of the rights and liberties of Turkic people in Iraq. The heads of states also stressed upon the strategic importance of Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tiflis-Erzurum gas pipeline. While the leaders supported Kazakhstan’s candidacy to the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009, regarding Turkey the heads of states expressed their happiness on the achievements of Turkey in the EU Accession process. Having noted the important place of Turkey in Eurasia, the Turkic leaders declared that they believe that Turkey’s accession into the EU will accelerate the political, economic and social development of the region and will strengthen the region’s relations with the EU. In addition, the leaders supported Turkey’s candidacy for the UN Security Council in 2009-2010. If in previous summits the leaders just denoted that they exchanged views on Cyprus issue, this time they declared that they support the initiatives of the UN on ending the international isolation upon Cyprus’s Turkic people.³⁵⁹

On 14 February 2007 Nazarbayev met with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the ceremony of inauguration of Turkmenistan’s newly elected President Gurbanguli

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹

http://www.turkkon.org/docs/04_AntalyaBildirisi2006_%208.Devlet%20BaskanlariZirvesiortakbildirisi.pdf Accessed on 22.10.2013

Berdimuhamedov. Nazarbayev and Erdoğan discussed the issues of economic cooperation, especially the transportation of hydrocarbons of the Caspian region.³⁶⁰

To sum up the presidential term of Sezer, during these years Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey continued to develop in positive direction. The matter is that since 1998 Kazakhstan's economy began to rise. This achievement in domestic policy provided Nazarbayev with confidence in his multi-vector policy. In this context, Turkey whose economy also began to recover in 2000 became important partner. In addition Kazakhstan was established as a state. The fear of fragmentation was overcome. Ethnic Kazakhs share in Kazakhstani population was increasing. This meant that Kazakhstan could pursue more assertive policy in Turkic world. As the matter of fact, it is important to note that Nazarbayev continued to actively participate in Turkic summits while his counterparts in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan lost their interest in the forum.

4.5 Presidential Term of Abdullah Gül

In 2007 strengthening position of ruling party after general election and the election of Abdullah Gül, who was the minister of foreign affairs, as the 11th President of Turkish Republic created convenient environment to further continue foreign policy trends earlier started. As Professor Bağcı noted:

It is a privilege for Turkish foreign policy that we have a president who understands foreign policy. It is because it is beneficial in relations with states where head of states are active in foreign policy. Will Davutoğlu negotiate, let's say, with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev, foreign policy? Nazarbayev will say: 'What will I talk with Turkish minister of foreign affairs, you should talk with my minister of foreign affairs'. Nazarbayev's counterpart is Abdullah Gül. They talk foreign policy with each other. In my opinion this condition gives Turkey flexibility.³⁶¹

Nazarbayev was the first foreign leader to visit the newly elected Turkish President. As it was mentioned above, Gül have met with Nazarbayev several times as the vice-prime-minister and minister of foreign affairs. Gül as a professional diplomat knew

³⁶⁰ *Diplomatic Herald*, 1 (11) 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

³⁶¹ Prof.Dr. Huseyin Bağcı 'Türkiye'ye Soğuk Savaş sırasında biçilen elbise artık dar gelmektedir' in Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Mehmet Yegin (eds.), *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Usak Yayınları 2011, p.13

how it is important to be beside foreign counterpart in significant ceremonies and international meetings. Gül visited Kazakhstan on 15 December 2007, which was one of his first visits abroad. During the visit he participated in the ceremony of the anniversary of Independence Day of Kazakhstan. By this symbolic gesture Turkish President once more displayed that Turkey supports strong and independent Kazakhstan. Reciprocal visits continued during whole period of Abdullah Gül's presidency. In one of the press conferences Gül stated:

All you know that His Excellency President Nazarbayev comes to Turkey several times in a year. We also in the same way will visit Kazakhstan more frequently. Before, visits were made once in 2-3 years. If the visit was paid in a year, the next visit in that year was conceived as too much. It was conceived as if not adequate to the protocol. We leave such understanding, it is not right. If it is necessary I will go to Kazakhstan for 3-4 times in a year.³⁶²

On 5 July 2008 Gül visited Kazakhstan and participated in the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Capital Astana. Abdullah Gül, along with Jordan King Abdullah II, was the foreign leaders outside the CIS. Gül's participation in the celebration was important both to Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev. The matter is that 6 July, the day when Kazakh parliament voted for Nazarbayev's proposal to move the Capital from Almaty to Aqmola (then Astana), is at the same time birthday of President Nazarbayev. In this way the day of Astana 6 July coincides with the birthday of Nazarbayev. Therefore, the participation in the celebration of the day of Astana means to show respect not only to Kazakhstan, but at the same time personally to the President Nazarbayev.

Nazarbayev in his speech at the ceremony while thanking the leaders of foreign countries described Russia as friend and ally, and Turkey as brother country.³⁶³ This statement reveals that in the mind of Nazarbayev Russia is associated with 'friend and ally image', while Turkey suites 'brother image'. There are certain advantages and disadvantages of these images. Russia is Kazakhstan's neighbor. Kazakhstan cannot get rid of this neighborhood and move to other region. As in relations

³⁶² 'Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül'ün Kazak-Türk İş Forumundaki Konuşması', in Bağdad Amreyev, *Dönemimizdeki Kazakistan-Türkiye İlişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat, İstanbul, 2011, p. 184.

³⁶³ *Diplomatic Herald*, 2 (16) 2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

between neighbors, Kazakhstan learns to live with neighbors. Turkey is ethnically and culturally brother of Kazakhstan. As in relations between brothers Kazakhstan cannot cut its relations with brothers. Concerning brother and neighbor Kazakh proverb says ‘*Ağayinniñ atı ozğanşa, körşi awıldıñ tayı ozsın*’ which means ‘we prefer in horserace wining of the horse of our neighbor to that of the brother.’ In other words Kazakhs prefers neighbor to brother. It reminds Turkish proverb ‘*Komşu komşunun külüne muhtaçtır*’ which means ‘neighbor needs neighbor’s ashes’.

While in his speech Gül stated that his presence is the evidence of brotherhood between Kazakhstan and Turkey, Medvedev stated that Kazakhstan and Russia support each other only as the real brothers do so.³⁶⁴ These statements show that leaders prefer to be called brothers to being called friends and allies. Maybe it is because generally speaking friendship and alliance are generally built on interests of nations. In the absence or disappearance of interests, the friendship or alliance can be ended. In the case of brotherhood, the relations develop stemming from the fact of being brothers. The relations between brothers are based not on interests but on sentiments. Motivations behind actions are not interests but sentiments. Even in the absence of interests the relations between brothers can exist and develop. Although in international politics it is taught that there is no place for sentiments, Constructivism and image theory say that sentiments, kinships, religious and ethnic solidarity are important components of international relations.

The turning point both in relations among Turkic states and that between Kazakhstan and Turkey was realized in October 2009. On 3 October 2009 the 9th Summit of leaders of Turkic states was held in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan. In his speech in the summit the head of Kazakhstan proposed to establish the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States (Turkic council).³⁶⁵ After the summit the Turkic leaders, who were Nursultan Nazarbayev, Abdullah Gül, Ilham Aliyev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, signed the Nakhchivan Declaration which was the longest one in the history of the Turkic summits, and the Nakhchivan Agreement on the establishment of the

³⁶⁴ *Diplomatic Herald*, 2 (16) 2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

³⁶⁵ *Diplomatic Herald*, 4 (22) 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States. Later Abdullah Gül would describe it as the historical moment and realization of seventeen-year dream. He expresses his gratitude to Nazarbayev as the main supporter of this project.³⁶⁶ After the meeting between Nazarbayev and Gül, Turkish President awarded Kazakh leader ‘State medal’ and called as the ‘doyen’ and ‘*Aksakal*’ of the Turkic world.³⁶⁷

According to the Nakhchivan agreement the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States is composed of the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Senior Officials Committee, the Council of Elders of the Turkic-speaking States, and the Secretariat.³⁶⁸ Among these bodied the most important one is the Secretariat, which is a permanent executive body of the Turkic Council. The Turkic summits were not held between years of 2001 and 2006, and then between 2006 and 2009 because of the absence of such permanent institution which would coordinate, organize and implement the decisions of the summits. In the next Turkic summit held in Istanbul it was agreed to celebrate 3 October as the day of Turkic-speaking countries with the reference to the importance of Nakhchivan summit.³⁶⁹

On 22 October 2009 Nazarbayev paid the official visit to Turkey. During the visit the heads of states signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership between Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev. It was only the confirmation of the real condition of relations. Since mid-90s Turkey was defined by Kazakhstan as the strategic partner.³⁷⁰ Before the

³⁶⁶ ‘Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül’ün Kazak-Türk İş Forumundaki Konuşması’, in Bagdad Amreyev, *Dönemimizdeki Kazakistan-Türkiye İlişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat, İstanbul, 2011, p. 185.

³⁶⁷ ‘Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül’ün Basın Toplantısındaki Konuşması’, in Bagdad Amreyev, *Dönemimizdeki Kazakistan-Türkiye İlişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat, İstanbul, 2011, p. 2007.

³⁶⁸ Nakhchivan Agreement

³⁶⁹ ‘10.Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Zirvesi Türkiye’de Yapılıyor’, Anadolu Ajansı, 15 Ekim 2010, in Bagdad Amreyev, *Dönemimizdeki Kazakistan-Türkiye İlişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat, İstanbul, 2011, p. 238.

³⁷⁰ Kasymzhomart Tokayev, ‘Turtsiya – Strategicheskiy Partner Kazakhstana’, in *Kazakhstan-Turtsiya: 5 let druzhby i sotrudnichestva*, Bilig, Ankara, 1996, p. 8.

ceremony of signing the agreement Nazarbayev expressed this fact with words “In reality we were acting as the strategic partner until now.”³⁷¹

During the visit Nazarbayev addressed the Turkish parliament which was his second address since independence of Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev summarized the bilateral relations and gave significant messages to the representatives of Turkish community. “We know very well that Turkey, which was the only independent state of the Turkic world at that time, was the first country to recognize our independence. We will remember this forever.” Nazarbayev stated. Then he added “Today’s Kazakhs as your brothers are living in ancient and original lands of our great Turkic ancestors.”³⁷² This statement means that the discourse of Turkic world is internalized by Nazarbayev. Turkey is perceived as Turkic state which has not lost the Turkic statehood traditions. Kazakhs are represented as Turkic people who occupy indigenous Turkic lands. Kazakhs and Turks of Turkey came from the same root that is great Turkic ancestors. Although language and culture are important, Nazarbayev made emphasis on ancestors which strengthens the perception of being brothers. Nazarbayev having reminded that before his visit to Turkey he opened the statue of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk states that as the expression of fraternal feelings of Kazakh people towards Turkey.³⁷³ This means that when the legacy of Turkicness is utilized one of the main references is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. While speaking on Kazakh foreign policy and Kazakhstan’s place in the world Nazarbayev states:

We developed friendly relations with our great neighbors Russia and China within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We succeeded to establish political and economic partnerships with Europe, USA, and Islamic world. Kazakhstan was the first country among the states of Islamic world and Turkic world to be elected as the chairman of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. These are our achievements.³⁷⁴

³⁷¹ Bagdad Amreyev, *Dönemimizdeki Kazakistan-Türkiye İlişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat, İstanbul, 2011, p. 184.

³⁷² ‘Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in TBMM Kürsüsü’ndeki Konuşması’, in Bagdad Amreyev, *Dönemimizdeki Kazakistan-Türkiye İlişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat, İstanbul, 2011, p. 174.

³⁷³ ‘Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in TBMM Kürsüsü’ndeki Konuşması’, p. 175.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.176.

Nazarbayev reminds that Kazakhstan as a Eurasian country has good relations with North, i.e. Russia and the CIS countries, with East, i.e. China and Asian countries, with West, i.e. Europe and the USA, and with South, i.e. Islamic world. However, while defining Kazakhstan Nazarbayev says it is Islamic and Turkic country by putting it among counties of Islamic and Turkic worlds. Regarding Turkish economy and foreign policy Nazarbayev expresses his pleasure on rising influence of Turkey.

Of course, we are very proud of Turkish successes. In recent years Turkey became 17th economy in the world and 6th in Europe with its rapidly developing industry. Turkey turned to the state with a special place in global politics and became great power in its region. It is certain that Turkey's role in solving problems in Middle East, Iran, Iraq, and Caucasian conflicts will increase. We support Turkey's bid for membership in European Union.³⁷⁵

Indeed, before the Arab uprisings in 2011, Turkey's influence in the region in parallel with its economy was rising. Turkey was pursuing active foreign policy in Middle East and Caucasias. Turkey was negotiating with EU on its membership. Nazarbayev later in the press conference, having reminded that the situation in this region is very complicated, stated that the Turkey's status is rising and the evidence of that is the fact US President Barack Obama one of his first visits made to Ankara, Turkey is mediating between US and Iran, Turkey is improving its relations with Syria and Iraq, it has its own word concerning Palestinian problem. Then Nazarbayev added that Turkey on the one hand as Muslim country, and as secular and democratic state which stands close to Europe on the other, has great potential.³⁷⁶

Nazarbayev's support to Turkey's membership in EU was put in details in Nakhchivan declaration of Turkic states. Turkic leaders including Nazarbayev "noted with satisfaction the progress Turkey has achieved in the European Union accession process whereas Turkey is a significant State of the Eurasian area whose membership in the European Union will create political, economic and social momentum for the

³⁷⁵ 'Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev'in TBMM Kürsüsündeki Konuşması' in Bağdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, 176.

³⁷⁶ 'Qazaqstan Respublikasının Prezidenti N. Nazarbayevtın Türkiya Respublikasının Prezidenti A. Gülmen bolğan kezdesüwinen keying baspasöz maslihatında söylegen sözi' in *Vneshnepoliticheskaya deytsel'nost' Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayeva v 2009 godu*, Kazakhstanskiy Institut Strategicheskikh Isledovaniy, Almaty 2010, p.120.

development of the region as a whole.”³⁷⁷ Especially for Kazakhstan Turkey’s membership in EU is important. It will mean that Kazakhstan’s interests will be taken into account in EU via Turkey. On the other hand, Kazakhstan’s good relations with European countries will also positively affect Turkey’s accession in EU. It is useful to note that Kazakhstan is the only country of Central Asia which adopted state program on cooperation with EU. The State Program ‘Path to Europe’ was adopted to intensify interaction with the states of Europe in the spheres of technologic and energy cooperation, in the sphere of transportation, trade, economic cooperation, and further modernization of Kazakh community. The main aim of the program is to enhance Kazakhstan into the level of active strategic partnership with the leading European countries in the political, economic, and humanitarian fields.³⁷⁸

In the interview with Turkish journalists before his visit to Turkey, Nazarbayev, having stated that Kazakhstan’s good relations with Germany and France can contribute to Turkey’s accession process, analyzed the reason why European states are against Turkey’s membership. He underlined that the highest level of objection against Turkey’s membership in EU stems from France and Germany, but also mentioned that there are other states as well who are against Turkey’s membership. According to Nazarbayev the first reason of this objection is that Turkey has 80 million population. The second reason is that this population is young. So there is fear of unemployment in Europe because of this young population. Another reason is that Turkey is a Muslim country. The life style and culture are different in this country. So they think that there will be problem of adaptation. Nazarbayev suggests Turkey should explain itself very well, Turkey should enter into dialogue after detailed calculation of when what to say, where what to do.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁷ Nakhchivan Declaration, UN document database.

³⁷⁸ Marat Tazhin, ‘Gosudarstvennaya Programma Respubliki Kazakhstan ‘Put’ v Evropu’ na 2009-2011 gody v deystvii’ in *Diplomatic Herald 1(19) 2009*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 6.

³⁷⁹ Erdal Şafak, ‘Atalarınızın Yurduna Gelin’, *Sabah Gazetesi*, 19 Ekim 2009.

Turkish-Armenian relations and Karabag problem were asked to Nazarbayev in his meeting with Turkish journalists. At this moment the Protocol signed between Armenia and Turkey was under discussion in international and domestic publics. Nazarbayev stated that the neighboring states have to be in good relations with each other and the borders between neighbors should always serve for peace. Considering from this perspective Nazarbayev thinks that it is imperative for the relations between Turkey and Armenia to move toward friendship. Kazakh leader reminded that he is one of those people who work for the establishment of peace in Caucasus and the development of dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. Nazarbayev claimed that the establishment of peace and friendship in Caucasus will lead to the solution of the Karabag problem.³⁸⁰ From Kazakhstan's point of view, the solution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has vital importance for Central Asia. According to Nazarbayev the peaceful settlement of this problem will provide the transportation of oil from Baku to Ceyhan through more available and closer way comparing with the present route. Nazarbayev contends that it would be more profitable for Kazakhstan and other oil-exporting countries.³⁸¹

Nazarbayev having firstly praised Turkish foreign policy in his address to Turkish parliament suggested that it would be appropriate if Turkey turns its face toward the East. He states "Developing strategic partnership with Russia, pursuing balanced policy toward China will increase the prestige of Turkey." Then he added that he is pleased with Ankara's policy toward his Turkic speaking brothers.³⁸² This statement means that Turkey's relations with Russia, China, and Turkic world are perceived by Nazarbayev as eastern direction of Turkish foreign policy. Nazarbayev is well aware of the fact that Turkey's relations with China and especially with Russia will strengthen Kazakhstan's hand. More Turkish-Russian relations are intensified; more Kazakhstan is relieved and confident. As it was discussed in Chapter 3, Kazakhstan

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ekrem Dumanlı, 'Gerçek Türkiye Dostu', *Zaman*, 19 Ekim 2009.

³⁸² 'Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev'in TBMM Kürsüsündeki Konuşması' in Bağdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, 177.

is a country which is pulled toward Slavic world and Turkic world which are represented by Moscow and Ankara respectively. The convergence of these two opposing poles will affect Kazakhstan positively. To remind from Chapter 3, Nazarbayev's idea of Eurasianism was proposed to diminish this tension between Turkic and Slavic worlds.

Concerning China, the word 'balanced policy' was specially chosen. It is because in July 2009 there were bloody clashes between Han Chinese and Uygurs who are Turkic people of Xinjiang province of China. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan was only leader around the world who accused Beijing in genocide. This statement caused the deterioration of relations for some time. As response to Nazarbayev's call, in 2012 Turkey became 'Dialogue Partner' with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Astana, no doubt, made constructive contribution to this achievement of Turkish diplomacy. It was very symbolic that the protocol on dialogue partnership was signed in Almaty on 26 April 2013 by Ahmet Davutoğlu and Dmitri Mezentsev, the Secretary General of the SCO during Turkish minister's official visit to Kazakhstan.

In geographical considerations viewed from Asia, Turkey is situated in the west of Asia, and China is situated in the east of Asia. What is between them is Central Asia. Kazakhstan as the largest Central Asian country will mostly benefit from East-West trade. Vitalization of Central Asia in fact means the rise of the influence of Central Asia. From economic, political and cultural considerations, Kazakhstan supports Turkey's interests in Asia, and especially Turkey's relations with China.

Turkey's relations with Russia, China and EU from Nazarbayev's view were further deliberated the next day of the visit in the Kazakh-Turkish Business Forum. Nazarbayev stated that:

I think that Turkey should improve its relations with Russia. I always suggest the same thing to Russian leadership. Many things happened in history! We should forget negative things; we should look ahead to future. If we think of past history, for example, in the war between Germany and the Soviet Union 26 million people were perished. If we think about these all, we should not even say 'hi' to Germans. But today it is not like that. The past events are up to past generation. At the moment we have to look ahead to future. If Turkey besides looking to the West, European Union,

pays attention to the East, do not forget us, improve its relations with Russia and China; then Europe also will begin to respect Turkey.³⁸³

As response to Nazarbayev, after six months Ahmet Davutoğlu statements give perception that he came to similar conclusion. He stated

Turkey's position between Asia and Europe resembles an arrow and bow. More you pull and tense the bow toward the inner side of Asia; more the arrow will go speedily and strongly toward the other horizons. So we are pulling and tensing the bow toward Kazakhstan. We transfer the speed and force which we gained from inner Asia to EU, world, Latin America, and Africa. This is our mission. This is Turkey's mission. This is the basis of our foreign policy.³⁸⁴

Regarding Turkic world, Nazarbayev in his speech in the Turkish Parliament indicated that it is known that Kazakhstan is also trying his best for the Turkic world.³⁸⁵ This statement is expression of the fact that Kazakhstan has strong foreign policy towards Turkic world. It is obvious that this kind of statement would bother Russia who still has paranoia of Turkic solidarity. That is why Nazarbayev reiterated that it is apparent that the cooperation within Turkic world is not against anyone. He indicated that this process should be evaluated as the sincere interest of brother countries which were torn from each other.³⁸⁶ Evaluating internal dynamics within Turkic world in another speech Nazarbayev stated that:

Among Central Asian countries it is Turkmenistan which has the most advantageous location to provide gas and petroleum. But there are some problems between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan concerning the status of the Caspian Sea. When Berdimuhammedov came to power I mediated several meetings with Aliyev. I hope the problems will be solved.³⁸⁷

³⁸³ 'Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Kazak-Türk İş Forumu'ndaki Konuşması' in Bağdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, 192.

³⁸⁴ 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Kazakistan Konya Fahri Konsoloslugu'nun Açılış Törenindeki Konuşması', in Bağdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, 192.

³⁸⁵ 'Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev'in TBMM Kürsüsündeki Konuşması', p. 177.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Erdal Şafak, 'Atalarımızın Yurduna Gelin', *Sabah Gazetesi*, 19 Ekim 2009.

This means that in addition to the fact that Kazakhstan has no problem with Turkic countries, it tries to mediate between the parts which have problems. As concluding remarks about the future of Turkic world Nazarbayev in his speech in the Turkish Parliament stated “In my opinion we can introduce Turkic civilization to the world and reach somewhere as prestigious states equal with other nations only through uniting our powers.”³⁸⁸

We should note that Nazarbayev was one of the first leaders around the world who understand the potential of the ideational values such as culture, civilization, and religion. Kazakhstan’s relations with Turkey are based on Turkic civilization. Moreover, Kazakhstan as most of the countries of Turkic world is situated among different civilizations and religions. Maybe because of this characteristic feature of Turkic world the general worldview of Turkic people is tolerant comparing with other people. Teachings of Ahmet Yassawi, Yunus Emre, and Mevlana say to be tolerant toward other people with different religions, cultures. Whether due to the culture which nourished on the nomadic civilization which is famous with its hospitality and tolerance and on the teachings of above mentioned dervishes, whether due to the geography of Turkic world which was always intersection of different civilization and religions, Turkic people have been tolerant toward alien cultures, civilizations, and languages. In Kazakhstan’s case we should also count the impact of the internationalism and fraternity and friendship of nations propagated during communist era. As the consequence of this historical background, for both Nazarbayev and Turkish leaders it was natural to utilize the place of their country for foreign policy purposes. Nazarbayev in his address to the Turkish parliament having indicated that the concepts such as culture, humanity and virtue are important tools to develop friendly relations, and giving references to tolerant teachings of Yassawi and Mevlana stated “In this regard, we are pleased to see that the positions of our countries in this direction are similar. To express it more precisely, while Kazakhstan became a center where the congresses of the leaders of world and traditional religions are held, Turkey is co-chairing the Alliance of Civilizations.”³⁸⁹

³⁸⁸ ‘Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in TBMM Kürsüsündeki Konuşması’, p. 177.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 179.

Further, Nazarbayev drew attention to the fact that both countries pursue active foreign policy in the region. In 2010 Kazakhstan was preparing to chair the OSCE, while Turkey was preparing to chair the CICA. He concluded by assuring that Astana and Ankara would continue to contribute to the resolution of the conflicts and tensions in the region as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Middle East.³⁹⁰ As it was discussed earlier, Kazakhstan more correctly Nazarbayev was aware that by isolation and staying away from regional problems, it is impossible to get rid of them. On the contrary, Nazarbayev believed that with the interference of great powers and with thousands of soldiers from overseas it is impossible to solve regional problems, unless the regional countries themselves take initiatives and cooperate with each other. The similar points were underlined by Abdullah Gül in his address to Kazakhstan's Parliament during his visit to Kazakhstan on May 2010. He stated:

Existing political and economic stability in our countries, our visionary foreign policies, and our historical accumulation made Turkey and Kazakhstan desirable cooperation partners. Turkey's non-permanent membership in UN Security Council and Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship are the reliable indicators of the fact that our countries are capable to seriously contribute to regional stability and cooperation.³⁹¹

The culmination of Turkey's support to Nazarbayev's initiative of the CICA was realized when Abdullah Gül replaced Nazarbayev as the chairman of the CICA in the summit held in Istanbul on 8 June 2010. In the summit Nazarbayev in his speech mentioning security problems in Asia stated that the situation concerning Iranian nuclear program should be resolved only through diplomatic means and the agreement between Iran, Turkey and Brazil on cooperation in the field of uranium was important step in this direction.³⁹² In this way Nazarbayev expressed that Kazakhstan supports Turkey's independent initiatives in international politics.

Nazarbayev in his speech underlined also that Turkey has unique historical, political and cultural experience for further realization of extremely difficult process of

³⁹⁰ 'Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev'in TBMM Kürsüsündeki Konuşması', p. 180.

³⁹¹ <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/371/56105/kazakistan-parlamentosunun-ortak-oturumuna-hitaplari.html> Retrived in 22.10.2013

³⁹² 'Vystupleniye Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan Nursultana Nazarbayeva na otkrytij tret'ego Summita SVMDA (Stambul, 8 uyunya 2010 g.)' *Diplomatic Herald 2(24) 2010*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, p. 22.

building confidence and developing of Asian cooperation.³⁹³ It was meaningful that he quoted Mevlana's word that 'the candle does not lose its light by lighting the other candle'.

In the final analysis, during the Abdullah Gül's presidential term Kazakh-Turkish relations caught a momentum. This can be considered as the reflection of the relations between Gül and Nazarbayev. Reciprocal visits were made every year. The summits of Turkic states were held every year without break since 2009. All these meetings contributed to Kazakh-Turkish relations. It can be said that the real friendship was formed between two leaders. During the Nazarbayev's visit to Turkey on 27-28 August 2014 to attend the inauguration ceremony of the newly elected Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the expression of the feelings of friendship Nazarbayev invited Gül to dinner given for his honor in the embassy of Kazakhstan in Ankara. As it is known, the territory of the embassy is considered to be the territory of that country to whom the embassy belongs. Therefore, the dinner given for the honor of the 11th President of Turkey was held in the territory of Kazakhstan. In this way, Nazarbayev expressed his respect to his friend Abdullah Gül. It was the first time for Gül to visit a foreign embassy as a guest. Another interesting point is that on 16 December 2014 Abdullah Gül attended the celebration of Kazakhstan's independence in Ankara, this time as an ex-President.

The presidential term of Gül was the period of fruitful cooperation between Kazakhstan and Turkey. Gül as a diplomat well understood the strategic importance of Kazakhstan. He continued the foreign policy understanding of Özal and Demirel towards Kazakhstan. In this sense, we can say that Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey as a reliable partner was strengthened. The important detail is that during this period a statue of Nazarbayev was erected at the center of Ankara and several streets in other cities of Turkey were called after his name. Although I can predict that Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey will not change in the future, the fact is that the

³⁹³ Ibid.

end of the presidential term symbolized the end of the brightest period of the bilateral relations in the presidential level.

4.6 Conclusion

To sum up Nazarbayev's view on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, it is obvious that since the very beginning, Nazarbayev paid special attention to cooperation with Turkey. His attitude towards Turkey reflects Eurasian reality of Kazakhstan. He understands that Kazakhstan's relations with Turkey balances Russian influence in the country. On the other hand, he argues that Kazakhstan's relations with Turkey do not contradict with its relations with Russia.

In this context, two concepts are important to understand Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey: Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan and multi-vector foreign policy based on that identity. These two concepts are apparent in Nazarbayev's speeches concerning Russia and Turkey. For example, in 1996 while signing agreement on deepening integration among Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Russia, Nazarbayev stated that this agreement does not frame his country's relations with other states in near and far abroad.³⁹⁴ 'The relations with other states', first of all, were understood as Kazakhstan's relations with Turkey.³⁹⁵ On the other hand, in 1997 in the meeting of TÜRKSOY members, Nazarbayev, having noted that it was not secret that Kazakhs have Turkic roots, stated:

However, besides being proud of our roots we should not forget other realities which are necessary for the preservation of independence of the state. The world has changed. Now it is not only divided into two poles. Now it is more complicated. In Kazakhstan, we pursue multi-vector foreign policy and we are not oriented toward particular state.³⁹⁶

'Orientation toward particular state' means that while Kazakhstan develops relations with a certain state or a certain group of states, it does not cut its ties with other state

³⁹⁴ Mädi Qayıñbayev, 'Türki memleketteri men qawımdastıqtarınıñ 4-qurılıtaı', *Egemen Qazaqstan No.71, 12 Säwir 1996 jil.*

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Aygöl Omarova, 'Älem san-sanalı, sondıqtan onda İzgilik pen dostıq saltanat quruwğa tiyis', *Egemen Qazaqstan No.191, 30 Qırküyek 1997 jil.*

or group of states. In this context, multi-vector foreign policy means to develop relations with both Moscow and Ankara. This strategy of multi-vector foreign policy is not only worked out by Nazarbayev, but it is determined by the Eurasian identity of the country.

Keeping in mind Nazarbayev's Eurasianism and multi-vector foreign policy of Kazakhstan, I argue that at the decision maker level Nazarbayev understands the importance of Turkey. He has positive perception of Turkey. So Turkey's image in his mind is 'brother image.' Moreover, Nazarbayev is a constructor of Turkey's 'brother image' in Kazakhstan. It will not be exaggeration to define Nazarbayev as a cornerstone of Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. While building brotherly relations with Turkey, however, he understands that Kazakh-Turkish relations should not undermine Kazakh-Russian relations.

It is not an easy task to develop equal relations with both Moscow and Ankara. With the resurgence of Russian Federation both Russian leaders and society became confident and aggressive in their attitudes towards outside world. In 2012 after the Nazarbayev's official visit to Turkey, Russian media organized a campaign in attacking the Kazakh president by accusing him in insincerity. And in August 2014 Nazarbayev in his interview which was taken in Turkey stated that Kazakhstan has the right to secede from the Eurasian Economic Union. Putin's answer was harsh. After a couple of days in the meeting with Russian youth, answering a question on nationalism in Kazakhstan, Putin stated that Kazakhs had had never statehood before 1991.³⁹⁷ Taking into account the conflict in Ukraine, the statement multiplied resentment of Kazakh public. As an implicit answer to Putin, Nazarbayev in one meeting declared that in 2015 Kazakhstan would celebrate the 550 anniversary of the establishment of Kazakh khanate.³⁹⁸ This meant that Kazakhstan has at least 550

³⁹⁷ David Trilling, 'As Kazakhstan's Leader Asserts Independence, Did Putin Just Say, 'Not So Fast?'' August 30, 2014

<http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69771> Accessed on 14.05.2015

³⁹⁸ Joanna Lillis 'Kazakhstan Celebrates Statehood in Riposte to Russia' January 6, 2015 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71536> Accessed on 14.05.2015

years of statehood if we do not take into account the Golden Horde and the Great Turkic Kaganate.

Ultimately, in Nazarbayev's understanding, Turkey occupies high place in priority list of Kazakh foreign policy. This priority is reflected in the rank of bureaucrats served as the ambassadors of Kazakhstan to Turkey. Most of ambassadors were chosen from close circle of President Nazarbayev and then after return served in high positions in Kazakhstan. Turkey as a country which is situated in geopolitically important region served as a place for Kazakh diplomats to become professionals. First ambassador Kanat Saudabayev, having finished his service in Turkey, became ambassador of Kazakhstan to USA, and then long years served as the State Secretary in Kazakhstan. Most ambassadors as Kayrat Saribay served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as vice-minister. Present ambassador Janseyit Tuymbayev before his appointment to Turkey served as the minister of education in Kazakhstan. From this point it is reasonable to switch to the next level of analysis which is elite of Kazakhstan.

CHAPTER 5

KAZAKH ELITE'S PERCEPTION OF TURKEY

5.1 Introduction

Nazarbayev was not alone in constructing Kazakhstan's national identity and building its foreign policy. Kazakh elite played an important role too in the nation and state building process. An examination of the new elite of independent Kazakhstan is thus important. To understand the modern Kazakh elite, it is important to know the historical development of it. Present-day Kazakh elites see themselves either as heirs of pre-Soviet Kazakh elite who struggled for Kazakh identity or as the continuity of the Soviet elite. This dichotomy reflects Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity. The Eurasian feature of modern Kazakh elite will be elaborated later. Before, the traditional structure of Kazakh elite before colonization needs to be understood.

Generally, the elite of any nation can be divided into political or bureaucratic elite, business or economic elite, and intellectual and cultural elite. Kazakh traditional elite until the Russian colonization due to the structure of Kazakh khanate was composed of '*Töre*', the descendants of Ghengis khan which can be considered as political elite, '*hoja*', the descendants of Arab missionaries, who can be considered as spiritual or cultural elite, and '*bay*', the wealthy people, who can be considered as economic elite. The institution of '*biy*' can also be considered as the intellectual elite. Nobility in Kazakh community was not related to aristocracy or wealthy people. The term

noble was referred to those who knew their pedigree or tree of genealogy. All Kazakhs traditionally knew and still know their ancestors' name especially last seven generation by heart. It is because according to tradition people who share common ancestors in seven generation are considered to be brothers and sisters, and it is forbidden to marry with one of these relatives.

With the colonization of Kazakh lands and dissolution of the institute of khans and sultans, 'Töre' lost their legitimacy to rule people while the institution of 'biy' lost its significance. Thereby the bureaucratic or political elite were abolished. The wealthy Kazakhs, 'bay', did not play a crucial role in the Kazakh history. Moreover, 'bay' as distinct class was abolished by the communists because they represented upper class in the class struggle. Therefore, I concentrate on intellectual elite which is sometimes called as intelligentsia who played crucial role in the formation of Kazakh consciousness and still have an impact in shaping views of modern elite of Kazakhstan. The institution of 'hoja' besides Mullah, though, were abolished by the communist as regressive forces, before that they also contributed to the formation of intellectual elite. Before and during the colonization, Kazakh intellectual or spiritual elite were first trained in local school from Mullah of *awl*, and went on to study in *madrasa* of Central Asia for further studies.

5.1.1 Emergence of Kazakh Intelligentsia

While the Tsarist Russia tried to rule the Kazakh people directly, the Russian schools for Kazakhs were established to recruit Kazakh youth for the service of the Russian Empire. The graduates of these schools formed the new generation of Kazakh intellectual elite. As it is put by Steven Sabol "In the nineteenth century as Russia's presence in the steppe increased so did its desire for a better educated indigenous population to serve the needs and interests of the state. The Kazakh intelligentsia emerged as the social and economic relationship intensified between the Russian state and its non-Russian population."³⁹⁹ The difference between traditional intellectual elite and new one was that the latter was aware of real power and

³⁹⁹ Steven Sabol, *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p. 53.

superiority of Russian Empire and backwardness and inferiority of Kazakh community.

They did occupy a distinct position in both Kazak and tsarist society, yet they neither represented nor conformed to any of the social and economic categories often reserved for intellectual groups. Although in the nineteenth century, the Kazak intelligentsia operated between the two societies and cultures, by the twentieth century, representing only a small segment of the Kazak society, they sought to mediate between the state and its subjects and to preserve and advance the cultural and economic development of a people who were steadily becoming subjugated and impoverished.⁴⁰⁰

The number of Kazakh intellectuals was increasing with graduates of the schools of *Jaditši*, Muslim modernists under the guidance of Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinski as well. The difference between Russian schools and those of *Jaditši* was that *Jaditši* schools taught Islam besides Russian language and modern science. In this respect *Jaditši* schools were positioned between Russian schools and traditional *madrassa*. Martha Brill Olcott says that “During the quarter century that preceded the Russian Revolution, several forces vied for control of the Kazakh masses, among them secular reformers, Kazakh bureaucrats, the Muslim clergy, and Pan-Turkic reformers.”⁴⁰¹ She especially underlines two groups, one is the graduates of Russian state schools who further studied in Petersburg, and the other the graduates of Muslim schools who “turned to Kazan and Istanbul for their intellectual directions.”⁴⁰² This means that the Eurasian identity, Turkic and Slavic identity, of Kazakhstan developed during this time.

During these decades straddling the turn of the century, the Kazakhs increasingly thought and acted as a homogenous community. This was partly because of the Russian policy of secular education, which led to the development of self-aware Kazakh elite, and partly a product of the spread of Islam, which introduced another definition of community and provided a literate clergy who could maintain a communication network throughout the steppe.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 54.

⁴⁰¹ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs, Second Edition*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1995, p.100.

⁴⁰² Ibid., p. 101.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., p. 113.

Steven Sobol also quotes Bökeyhanov, the head of Kazakh government of Alash in 1917-1920, who defined the divisions among the Kazakh intelligentsia, particular the split between the secular Westernizers and the Panturkists-Panislamists.⁴⁰⁴ These conclusions mean that Kazakh elite with the colonization and Europeanization/Russification gained Eurasian identity.

5.1.1.2 The Role of Kazak Intelligentsia in the Formation of Kazakh Nation

Despite the differences in their educational background and ideological orientations, this intelligentsia played crucial role in the formation of Kazakh identity and Kazakh nation further.

Their central goal was to bring Western and Russian advances – cultural, technological, and educational – to the Kazakh people, often through the dissemination of their own history, literature and religion. They were Russian-educated element of society fixed on the one hand between images and traditions of the Islamic and nomadic heritage they possessed and, on the other hand, an expanding, colonial power that introduced new and alien methods and concepts of education, values, and identity.⁴⁰⁵

At the beginning of the twentieth century Kazakh intellectual elite tried all possibilities to find solutions for the plight of Kazakh people. The first task was to make the Kazakhs aware of their problems, literally meaning ‘to awaken the nation’. It is not a coincidence that Mirjaqip Dulatov’s first collection of poems is called *Oyan Qazaq!* (Awake Kazakh). As is known from history, Kazakh intelligentsia used printed media to make their voices hear by the masses. The journal *Ayqap!* which began to be published in 1911 by Muhamedjan Seralin became a vital forum in which Kazakh intellectuals collectively articulated their growing social concerns. The journal *Ayqap!* was followed by newspaper *Qazaq* established by a group of Kazakh led by Alihan Bökeyhanov and Ahmet Baytursinov.⁴⁰⁶

After the revolutionary upheaval in 1905, Kazakh intelligentsia began to come together politically. Kazakhs were represented in Duma, the parliament of Russian

⁴⁰⁴ Steven Sabol, *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness*, p. 80.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 55.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 67.

Empire. Most of Kazakh intellectuals gravitated politically toward Constitutional Democrats. After the February Revolution 1917 the prominent Kazakh intellectuals formed *Alash Orda* political party which worked for the autonomy of Kazakh lands. As it is noted by Sobel correctly although some Kazakhs favored complete independence, most of Kazakh intellectuals including the chairman of *Alash Orda* Alihan Bökeyhanov believed territorial and cultural autonomy within a democratic federated Russia was the best course to pursue. Alihan Bökeyhanov who was de facto the first elected President of autonomous Kazakh argued that Kazakhs' future was with Russia.⁴⁰⁷

Alash Orda party and *Alash Orda* government which represented nationalist, secularist, and pro-western wing of Kazakh intelligentsia was for Western values such as democracy but with the preservation of distinct Kazakh culture. Although Kazakh intellectuals tried to form common stance with Tatars and Transcaucasians against Central government, "many Kazakhs did not share the same Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic visions."⁴⁰⁸ Haleb Dosmuhamedov in 1917 in newspaper *Qazaq* criticized those who were for the creation of a single Muslim republic.⁴⁰⁹

Like it would be repeated 74 years later, the declaration of autonomy took place after harsh debates among Kazakh intellectuals in press. It is because when *Alash Orda* was preparing to declare its autonomy the Provisional Government established after February Revolution 1917 was dissolved by the Bolsheviks who usurped power in October 1917.

In general, most writers favored the declaration of autonomy, but many urged Alash to negotiate with Kolchak (White forces), the Bashkirs (Northern Turks), and leaders in Turkistan (Southern Turks). If one part of the Kazakhs pulls toward Siberia and the other toward Turkistan, one author argued, it is clear that the people of Alash will be torn apart.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 89.

⁴⁰⁸ Steven Sabol, *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazakh National Consciousness*, p. 134.

⁴⁰⁹ Quoted in Steven Sabol, *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazakh National Consciousness*, p. 140.

⁴¹⁰ Steven Sabol, *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazakh National Consciousness*, p. 142.

Despite the difficult situation in the region *Alash Orda* government succeeded to exist as political entity in 1918 and 1919. In the autumn of 1919 when the Red Army defeated White forces and guaranteed its control over the region, Kazakh leaders negotiated with Bolsheviks. “In November 1919, amnesty was granted to members of *Alash Orda* and its leaders joined the Communist Party.”⁴¹¹

Kazakh intellectuals continued their struggle for the formation of Kazakh nation under the rule of the Soviets. With the consolidation of the Soviet power in the Republic, Bolsheviks launched purges against Kazakh elite. These purges culminated in 1937 and 1938 which is described by Martha Brill Olcott as “the Great Terror.”⁴¹² The Soviet regime wiped out most of the elite from the Tsarist era.⁴¹³ Even those intellectuals who had not supported nationalist *Alash Orda* government, but since beginning sided with the communists such as Turar Rısqulov, Säken Seyfullin, İliyas Jansüğürov, and Beyimbet Maylin were arrested and killed. During the Soviet era, not only literature legacy of the Kazakh elite of first quarter of the century was forbidden, but also their names were erased from the historical memory of Kazakh nation.

5.2 Kazakh Elite after the Independence

The purging of Kazakh elite in 1930s disrupted the evolution of Kazakh elite. Since then Kazakh elite became part of the Soviet elite. Thus it is apparent that Kazakh elite after the independence were in fact the Soviet elite. It can be said that the representatives of the Kazakh elite who were for the independence and cooperation with the Turkic world were exterminated as nationalists and pan-Turkists. Thereby weakening the Turkic component of the Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan the Slavic and Russian component strengthened. Nazarbayev in his book *In the Stream of History* on national identity of Kazakhstan devotes one chapter to *Alash* legacy and notes that:

⁴¹¹ Ibid., p. 149.

⁴¹² Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs, Second Edition*, p. 219.

⁴¹³ Karen Odgaard and Jens Simonsen, ‘The New Kazak Elite’, p.19.

The realization of the program of *Alash* made possible the resolution of certain contradictions in Kazakh community by reconciling tradition and modernity. ...Kazakh people gained real opportunity to reach its main purpose, to reconstruct its nation-state. However, the peaceful development was interrupted by the new crisis in Russian community which led to the establishment of dictatorship of Bolshevik party.⁴¹⁴

Despite Nazarbayev's statements, political elite of the country distanced itself from *Alash Orda*. Dihan Qamzabekulı a scholar who writes on *Alash Orda* complained that Kazakh elite were not interested in Alash leaders:

Nowadays, unfortunately, our statesmen while fulfilling their responsibilities do not mention Alash intelligentsia. For example, in the parliament sessions it was not heard that a deputy pronounced that 'Alihan Bökeyhan argued that, Mustafa Shoqay claimed this, Ahmet Baytursinulı had such concepts, Hael Dosmuhamedulı contended in this way'. Only one conclusion stems from this: they do not know the history of the nation. Where is the continuity between elites?⁴¹⁵

This means that Kazakh elite see themselves as the inheritors of the Soviet elite rather than nationalist Kazakh elite who struggled for Kazakh identity and founded the Kazakh nation. The other possibility is that they positioned themselves between nationalist *Alash* elite and the internationalist Soviet elite.

Odgaard and Simonsen count two characteristic features of Kazakh elite. One is that the most of them were born in cities; the other is that the majority of them had been educated in Russian. The scholars note that the majority of Kazakh intellectuals today are either the first or the second generation of their family to have been born and brought up in the city.⁴¹⁶ As we have discussed earlier, Russian culture was dominant in the towns which led to Russification of Kazakhs there. "In contrast to Russian-influenced towns, the rural areas became regarded as places where Kazak traditions had lain dormant in their original form."⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁴ N.A. Nazarbayev, *V potoke istorii*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 167.

⁴¹⁵ Dihan Qamzabekulı, *Türkistan Alqabı*, Shanıraq-Mediya, Astana, 2011, p. 7.

⁴¹⁶ Karen Odgaard and Jens Simonsen, 'The New Kazak Elite', p.20.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

Sally Cummings also underlines the birthplace and education of Kazakh elite. According to her study, for the post-independence elite, the most striking fact in terms of birthplace was perhaps that around 17 per cent of the 1995 political elite were born outside Kazakhstan, 13 per cent of them in Russia.⁴¹⁸ Concerning educational background of Kazakh elite the scholar remarked: “Most Kazakhs in higher education had also attended Russian schools. Of the central elite, over a quarter had attended either a university or a higher education institute in Russia. Of these, a fifth had studied in either Moscow or St Petersburg.”⁴¹⁹

As Cummings noticed correctly, to have been born or recently worked abroad does not appear to have been either a political advantage or disadvantage in becoming a member of the Kazakhstani elite.⁴²⁰ Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that social and educational backgrounds of a person affect perception. It is natural for Kazakh elite to consider Russia as part of their identity.

5.3 The Eurasian Identity of the New Kazakh Elite

Mekemtas Mirzahmetov divided Kazakh intellectuals into two groups. “One is equipped with Russian culture. The second is those who have national spirit. It should be put precisely that they are disgusted by each other and fundamentally contradict each other.”⁴²¹ Odgaard and Simonsen note that Kazak elite were fragmented in the line of those who spoke Kazakh, and those who did not.⁴²² Marat Qabanbay concludes “Those, whose main language is Russian, though are well-equipped are unaware of their own nation. And those, whose main language is Kazakh, though know their nation are unaware of the world.”⁴²³ Nurbolat Masanov

⁴¹⁸ Sally N. Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, p. 69.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁴²¹ Mekemtas Mirzahmetov, *Kazaklar Nasıl Ruslaştırılmaya Çalışıldı*, Aktaranlar Bağlan Özer ve Tümen Somuncuoğlu, ÇAVSAM, Çankırı, 2012, p. 157.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴²³ Marat Qabanbay, ‘Bul ziyalı – qay ziyalı? Qazaq intelligentsiyası bar ma özi?’ in *Qazaq Almanaqı* No.02 (06) 2010, p. 91.

also came to the same conclusion, when he analyzed that the majority of Kazakh elite come from Soviet time party-namenklatura which reflected Soviet thinking, and some come from periphery having an ethnocentric worldview.⁴²⁴

The composition of the elite reflects the Eurasian identity of the country. It should be noted that with the demographic shift from non-Kazakhs towards Kazakhs, the new generation of Kazakh elite are being recruited from Kazakhs and especially from younger generation who are being brought up free from the Soviet era education. It does not consequently mean that Kazakhization of elite will take pace. As it is noted by Cummings, “The group that joined the ranks of the elite during this period – young ethnic Kazakhs – also did not appear attitudinally uniform, falling instead into two main groups which could loosely be termed cosmopolitans and bourgeois nationalists.”⁴²⁵

In addition to the demographic shift, there is no doubt that the educational background of the Kazakh elite is diversifying as the youth pursue studies in European and Asian countries. Marat Qabanbay argues that the Kazakh elite would be complete when the youth who studied abroad and free from pro-Kazakh and pro-Russian leanings return to the country. “In this way, the triple union composed of the pioneers of the two groups and ‘the foreigners’ will form qualified Kazakh elite.”⁴²⁶ The process of diversification of Kazakh elite, especially of political elite will take time. There is even a saying among Kazakh graduates of foreign universities that those who graduated from Russian universities become bureaucrats, and those who graduated from Turkish and Chinese universities become businessmen.

During the nation-building years, bureaucratic elite became prominent. Political institutions first of all were to be established. Therefore, political elite were the driving force in nation building. In addition, post-Communist countries where the economies were organized by the state lacked economic elite. The political elite were

⁴²⁴ Nurbolat Masanov, ‘Politicheskaya i ekonomicheskaya elita Kazakhstana’, in *Tsentral’naya Aziya i Kavkaz* No.1, 1998, p. 81.

⁴²⁵ Sally N. Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, p. 72.

⁴²⁶ Marat Qabanbay, ‘Bul ziyalı – qay ziyalı? Qazaq intelligentsiyası bar ma özi?’ p. 92.

also responsible for the formation of a business or economic elite. This led to the economic elite becoming part of the political elite. In the words of Cummings, there is the fusion of economic and political power.⁴²⁷

In most of post-colonial states generally there is shortage of cadres in conducting reforms. In the case of Kazakhstan the majority of bureaucratic elite came from the Soviet bureaucracy. According to Cummings' study, "Of the 244 elite members identified in 1995-1996, nearly two thirds had served in either executive or party post in the Soviet era, and the majority of those in an executive position. Just over a third had come from outside the *nomenklatura*, primarily from research."⁴²⁸ It is, therefore, no surprise that Kazakh elite see themselves as the continuity of the Soviet elite rather than nationalist Kazakh elite.

Another fact is that one third of bureaucratic elite were former intellectual elite. "The overwhelming majority of Kazakh political elite had undergraduate degrees. Fifty per cent of the elite have some form of post-graduate education. Of this about one third were candidates of science and nearly one fifth held doctors of science."⁴²⁹ Although the statistics was good for bureaucratic elite revealing the high academic level of its members, it was not at the detriment of intellectual elite. It is a brain drain to politics from academia.

Generally the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the breakdown of the system including science and education system. During the first few years post independence, the new governments were busy establishing the main institutions of the state. Under the circumstance, science lost its previous eminent position. Odgaard and Simonsen described those years as follows:

Many of the institutes of the Academy of Science are more or less deserted. The situation at the universities is not much better as scholars are busy elsewhere, since they cannot survive on the salaries that they might, or not receive. Many have an

⁴²⁷ Sally N. Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, 42.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

additional, part- or full-time, job as interpreters, secretaries or in business, and others have given up their academic careers completely.⁴³⁰

With the growth of Kazakh economy, the value of science improved. Nonetheless, science could not reach the prestige it possessed during the Soviet era. As scholars observed correctly, “Most of those who take academic degrees these days do it principally in order to be better-placed when seeking a job in the private sector (and especially in the bureaucratic sector) and not, as previously, in the hope of pursuing academic career.”⁴³¹

Although most of the intellectuals did not support the mass Kazakhisation, in fact it were intellectual elite, especially those who had studied Kazakh language and history, who were the driving force making more emphasis on Kazakhness rather than Kazakhstaniness. These nationalist intellectuals perceived themselves as the inheritors of Alash intelligentsia. These intellectual elite can be considered as opposition to the bureaucratic elite for the official ideology tried to find a mid-way between nationalists and cosmopolitans. Cummings accordingly defined Kazakh elite’s legitimating process as dual legitimation which is “a strategy that proposed simultaneously promoting internationalism and an ethnic Kazakh national-cultural revival.”⁴³²

5.4 The Kazakh Elite’s Perception of Turkey

Kazakh elite’s view on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy is related to the Soviet legacy. This legacy creates special relations with Russia, the center of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Due to the composition, Kazakh elite can be classified as those who favor Russian world and those who favor Turkic world. Therefore, to understand Kazakh elite’s view on Turkey, their view on Russia should be elaborated. In one word, Kazakh elite’s perception of Turkey is determined by their perception of Russia.

⁴³⁰ Karen Odgaard and Jens Simonsen, ‘The New Kazak Elite’, p.34.

⁴³¹ Ibid., p. 35.

⁴³² Sally N. Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, p. 78.

According to the study of Sally Cummings, many of the Kazakh elite regretted the demise of the Soviet Union.⁴³³ The Kazakh elite internalized the Soviet identity and considered the Soviet Union as their state. When the scholar asked the representatives of Kazakh elite to define their fatherland those in Pavlodar (north of Kazakhstan) tended to stress either the region or the Soviet Union, those in Uralsk and Shymkent referred to the region and the state of Kazakhstan.⁴³⁴ The interpretation can be that for those closer to Kazakh language and culture it was easier to internalize Kazakh state than for those who internalized the Soviet identity and after the end of the Union found themselves hanging in the air. “A significant number, however, already acknowledged that the main problem is getting used to working with Russia on the basis of a different relationship – as two independent states who should engage in mutually beneficial cooperation.”⁴³⁵

Kazakh elite’s view on Russia is determined by both, the shared Soviet legacy and the reality of being independent state. In the words of Cummings, “The elite’s attitude to Russia revealed a fundamental ambiguity that is germane to a self-other relationship, in which the ethnic both embraces and fears the ‘other’. Kazakh continue to depend on Russia, but also sought differentiation from their northern neighbor.”⁴³⁶ From this perspective, what makes Kazakhstan different from Russia is its Turkic identity.

Turkey due to the identity question and pragmatic reasoning occupied a high place in the priority list of Kazakh foreign policy. It is reflected in the rank of bureaucrats served as ambassadors of Kazakhstan to Turkey. Most of ambassadors were chosen from the close circle of President Nazarbayev, who on their return served in high positions in Kazakhstan. Turkey as a country situated in a geopolitically important region served as a place for Kazakh diplomats to become professionals. First

⁴³³ Ibid., p. 120.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 76.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., p. 120.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., p. 83.

ambassador Kanat Saudabayev after his tenure in Turkey became Ambassador of Kazakhstan to USA, and thereafter many years served as State Secretary in Kazakhstan. Most ambassadors like Kayrat Saribay served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Vice-Minister. Present ambassador Janseyit Tuymebayev before coming to Turkey was the Minister of Education in Kazakhstan.

The establishment of 'Department of Central Asia, South Caucasia and Turkey' in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2011 is evidence of the special place reserved by Kazakhstan for Turkey. Generally, while putting names to departments, foreign ministry of any country refrains from naming the country and instead prefer to name the departments by region. When the ministry of country A put name of country B into the label of the department it means that the country B was significant for the country A. It is apparent that the reorganization in the Kazakh ministry ran parallel to the rising power of Turkey. Turkey's weight under AK Party government both economically and politically mounted while its foreign policy was defined by activism both in regional and global affairs.

5.4.1 Bureaucratic Elite

Kazakh elite are the Soviet elite who internalized the official Soviet ideology. Since the establishment of the Soviet Union Kazakhs served as diplomats and contributed to the foreign policy of the country. One of the first ambassadors of the Soviet Union was Nazir Törekulov who in 1927 was sent to Saudi Arabia as plenipotentiary representative of the USSR.⁴³⁷ In 1930 he presented his letter of credentials as the ambassador to Prince Faisal.⁴³⁸

⁴³⁷ T.A.Mansurova, 'Nazir Tyuryakulov – vydayushchiysya gosudarstvennyy deyatel', diplomat i zhurnalist' Doklad General'nogo sekretarya YevrAzES na nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, posvyashchennoy deyatel'nosti polpreda SSSR Nazira Tyuryakulova (7 iyunya 2013 g.). ('Nazir Turiakulov - an outstanding statesman, diplomat and journalist' Speech of Report Tayir Mansurov, Secretary General of Eurasian Economic Community at the conference dedicated to the activities of the Soviet ambassador Turiakulov Nazir (7 June 2013). <http://www.nomad.su/?a=15-201306170031> Accessed on 2.04.2014.

⁴³⁸ *Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii i Sovetskogo Soyuz 1898 – 1991* <http://www.knowbysight.info/TTT/03702.asp> Accessed on 3.04.2014.

Another diplomat, Salim Kurmangozhin worked as a Soviet Consul in Istanbul between years 1973 and 1978. In his memoirs he wrote that it was astonishing for Turkish officials, writers, businessmen, and journalists to find that a representative of Kazakhstan became the Consul of the USSR. It removed the prejudice that only Russians worked in the Soviet diplomacy.⁴³⁹ In one of the receptions Turkish admiral on seeing seen his and his wife's faces and learning their names exclaimed "Turk" by pointing with fingers at them. In reply Kurmanguzhin pointed back his finger at the Turkish admiral and exclaimed "Kazakh!" Turkish admiral being surprised by Kurmanguzhin's answer asked why he called him Kazakh. Kurmanguzhin referred to the historical argument that Turks migrated to Turkey from Altay Mountain where Kazakhs now live and consequently Turks are Kazakhs.⁴⁴⁰ As one of the most active and productive diplomats Salim Kurmanguzhin had close and friendly relations not only with people who had sympathy toward the USSR like Aziz Nesin who called him "my brother" (kardeşim), but also with representatives of different political parties from right to left, and famous businessmen as Necat Eczacıbaşı and Vehbi Koç. However Salim Kurmanguzhin represented the interests of the Soviet Union and acted accordingly as a Soviet diplomat. Maybe that is why after the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of independent Kazakhstan, he was sent as representative of the new state not to Turkey where he had reliable relations but to Hungary.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan and Turkish official and non-official organizations rushed to the country. Turkey offered a window to the world by-passing Russia. As Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan in 1990s Sailau Batirsha-uli said in his interview to the author:

Kazakh elite had to understand that the world does not just consist of the Soviet Union. For that purpose, they had to see abroad. But the problem was that the foreign language most of them could speak was only Russian. It was not so

⁴³⁹ S.A. Kurmanguzhin, *45 let na diplomaticheskoy sluzhbe*, Zhibek Zholy, Almaty, 2003, p. 73.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 77.

reasonable to send them to Europe or America. Here, Turkey was good option as the Turkish language was similar to the Kazakh language.⁴⁴¹

During the first years of the independence although Turkey was perceived as an opportunity, generally Kazakh political elite tried to distance itself from rhetoric of ethnic and religious solidarity. It is because on the one hand Kazakh elite tried to present itself unique nation in the world, on the other hand Kazakh elite tried to avoid rhetoric reminding pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism policies which could be misunderstood by Russia. No wonder that Kazakhstan was the last Central Asian republic to become member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

In 1996, Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs Tokayev underlined the important aspects of Kazakhstan's policy towards Islamic and Turkic world. Firstly he underlined that Kazakhstan paid great attention to the Asian element of its foreign policy as it was justified given the geopolitical location of the country necessitating a balance in foreign policy priorities.⁴⁴² Indeed for Kazakhstan its relations with Asian countries were important due to trade and economy, oil export and transportation, and security issues. Furthermore, Kazakh Minister made some clarifications on the one-sided considerations on drawing Kazakhstan into the orbit of Islamic world and Kazakhstan's so called moral responsibilities for co-believers from other countries. According to Tokayev, from cultural and historical perspective Kazakhstan has been part of the Islamic world for several centuries and it is not necessary to draw it there. Concerning inter-state relations, he states that Kazakhstan, like a democratic and secular state work according to the constitution, without attention to ethnic and religious affiliations. The minister also drew parallels between domestic and foreign politics. He explained that as all citizens were equal within the country despite their religion and ethnic identity, in the same way in foreign relations religion and ethnic identity were not determinant criteria in choosing partners.⁴⁴³ In other words religion,

⁴⁴¹ Sailau Batirsha-uli's interview to the author. According to the diplomat he played the main role in introduction of visa-free regime between two countries. February 2012.

⁴⁴² Kasymzhomart Tokayev, 'Turtsiya – Strategicheskiy Partner Kazakhstana', in *Kazakhstan-Turtsiya: 5 let Druzhby i Sotrudnichestva*, Bilig, Ankara, 1996, p. 7.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., p. 8.

ethnicity, and civilization were not important factors in shaping the foreign policy. On the other hand this statement can also be interpreted as Kazakhstan, being a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country should develop multi-vector foreign policy.

Tokayev claims that foreign policy actions of Kazakhstan are based on national interests. The priority of Kazakh diplomacy, he states, is to contribute to resolving economic problems of the country. From this perspective Kazakhstan intended to deepen its contacts with Turkey, Iran, and Arab countries which can result in positive economic outcomes, investments and beneficial economic interactions.⁴⁴⁴ Tokayev also states that the main task of Kazakhstan's policy in the region of Near and Middle East, that is Turkey, Iran, and Arab countries plus Israel, was to establish economic cooperation and to integrate into the region.⁴⁴⁵ Kazakh foreign minister who made fundamental contribution to the establishment of Kazakh foreign policy called for that Kazakhstan's relations with foreign countries, including Turkey, should be grounded on sound basis which is not kinship, religious, ethnic or civilization solidarities but economic interests. Thus from Kazakhstan's perspective, Kazakh-Turkish relations since the beginning were based on rationality but not on sentimentality. In another book published a year later in 1997 Tokayev affirmed:

After the first interactions between Kazakh and Turkish leaders, pragmatic approach to the potential of Kazakh-Turkish relations prevailed. Turkey started to take into account that Kazakhstan would not sacrifice its relations with Russia or with other state, and even if it made statements about "brotherhood" of countries. These political statements were because parties wished to develop cultural-humanitarian relations. Common culture, language and spiritual values were not considered by Kazakhstan and as well as by other Turkic countries as basis enough for politico-economic integration. Turkey also demonstrated that its relations with USA and Europe were more important than strengthening friendship with brother Turkic states.⁴⁴⁶

Nevertheless, Kasymzhomart Tokayev, who can be considered as one of the architects of Kazakh foreign policy, was aware of Turkey's weight in international relations. Thirteen years before the conclusion of the agreement on strategic

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ K.K. Tokaev, *Pod stygom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 500.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 512.

partnership between Kazakhstan and Turkey, Tokayev admitted “We consider Turkey as our strategic partner.”⁴⁴⁷

In Tokayev’s understanding a common area which unites Kazakhstan and Turkey is Asia. That is why he included Turkey into Asian direction of Kazakh foreign policy. With regards to Turkey’s support to Nazarbayev’s initiative on CICA he stated, “It is pleasure to see that Turkey with full understanding supports Kazakhstan’s attempt to construct a workable structure in Eurasian space which can provide security. The realization of this initiative in practice is one of the main ambitions of our foreign policy.”⁴⁴⁸ Shortly, according to Tokayev, the aim of the Kazakh-Turkish interaction in international arena was to strengthen regional security.⁴⁴⁹

As the diplomat who represents Kazakh foreign policy at the highest level, Tokayev tried to be careful in his statements. He underscored that international cooperation with Turkey was not directed against a third party.⁴⁵⁰ It is explicit that by ‘third party’ Tokayev meant Russia, as he continues with Turkey’s and Russia’s stands. “Turkey is very concerned about Moscow economic expansion in the Caspian region, especially vis-à-vis oil transportation. Russia, on the hand, is not rid of the fear of Pan-Turkism and the habit of viewing development of relations of Kazakhstan with Muslim states as an evidence of the tendency of Islamic solidarity.”⁴⁵¹ Tokayev understood that he should refrain from statements which could be misunderstood and misperceived by Russia. In another book named *Belasuw (Overcoming)* Tokayev recalled:

In Moscow among foreign policy makers there are some who really thought that if Turkic people developed cultural relations with each other then this cooperation must necessarily be directed against other parties, first of all against Russia where

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Kasymzhomart Tokayev, ‘Turtsiya – Strategicheskiy Partner Kazakhstana’, p. 7.

⁴⁴⁹ K.K. Tokaev, *Pod stygom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 500.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

more than 20 million Turkic people live... I must confess that usually it was not easy to explain why Kazakhstan did not pursue such policy.⁴⁵²

In Tokayev's books and speeches Turkey is mentioned together with Iran as Middle Eastern countries.⁴⁵³ This was because as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan by giving a special status to Turkey would frustrate "third parties". As he emphasized in one place "developing relations with Middle Eastern states is characterized with stability and dynamism, while realizing the necessity to take into account and preserve a complex balance of political and economic interests of not only these countries but also third states."⁴⁵⁴ The words of professor Yagya from Saint Petersburg State University, former member of Duma, Russian Parliament, are good example to illustrate Russian concerns:

Moscow has been struggling for twenty years for a special place in the post-Soviet era, and for its recognition by the world. But unfortunately, Russia couldn't achieve it. Moreover, this position causes in many post-Soviet countries open or to a great extent secret, disguised rejection. They are in search of softer ways where unnoticeable drift towards West takes place while preserving visible orientation exclusively towards Russia. The apparent example is Kazakhstan.⁴⁵⁵

The transportation of Kazakh oil to the European market via Turkey was significant both for Kazakhstan and Turkey. The Caspian Sea was the main obstacle in realization of such projects. To add to it, the undetermined status of the Sea was another hindrance in the exportation of Kazakh oil through it. Regarding Turkish position on the matter, Tokayev noticed, "We are thankful to Turkey for its position which is to support the Caspian countries' attempt to justly determine the legal status of the Caspian Sea."⁴⁵⁶ Most probably he meant Turkey's role as mediator between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan whose position concerning the status of the Caspian Sea are opposite to each other and have disputed islands in the Sea.

⁴⁵² K.K. Tokaev, *Belasuw*, Dawir, Almaty, 2003, p. 117.

⁴⁵³ According to Soviet terminology, Turkey and Iran are defined as Middle East (Sredniy vostok), while Arab countries plus Israel are defined as Near East (Blizhniy Vostok).

⁴⁵⁴ K.K. Tokaev, *Pod stygom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 500.

⁴⁵⁵ V.S. Yagya, 'Puti pereputya sovremennoi Turtsii', *Aktualnye problemy mirovoi politiki v XXIveke: Vostok v mirovoy politike*, Vypusk 4, Nestor Istoriya, Saint Petersburg, 2009, p.125.

⁴⁵⁶ Kasymzhomart Tokayev, 'Turtsiya – Strategicheskiy Partner Kazakhstana', p. 9.

Summing it up, Tokayev compared to Nazarbayev preferred to use neutral language concerning Turkey. Tokayev intentionally refrained from using the word ‘brother’. In describing bilateral relations he preferred to use the terms ‘friendship’ and ‘partnership’ to term ‘brotherhood’.

The analysis of the speeches of other Kazakh Ministers of Foreign Affairs reveals that they continued making emphasis on friendship and partnership rather than brotherhood. Marat Tazhin, who became Foreign Minister in 2007 after Tokayev, during his official visit to Turkey, stated “Turkey is one of the important partners of Kazakhstan in the Middle East and Asia.”⁴⁵⁷ In 2009 in one article he wrote, “It is not disputable that nowadays Ankara is the most reliable and the most strategic partner of Astana.”⁴⁵⁸ The elevation of the status of Turkey in the perception of Kazakh Minister from ‘one of the important partners’ to ‘the most reliable and the most strategic partner’ was realized as the result of the intensification of relations at that period. Another explanation can be the fact that Marat Tazhin comprehended the strategic significance of Turkey in the two years he served as the chief of Kazakh foreign policy. In the same article Tazhin stated, “We highly regard brotherly relations which are based on common historical roots and cultural and spiritual heritage.”⁴⁵⁹ However, we should take into account that the article was directed to domestic public of Turkey. Still the main stress of the article was on the image of ‘partner Turkey’ rather than ‘brother Turkey’. A similar approach was adopted by Erzhan Kazykhanov, Kazakh Foreign Minister 2011-2012. In his meeting with Turkish counterpart Davutoğlu during his official visit to Turkey he stated “Turkey is our strategic ally in Eurasia and the most important economic partner.”⁴⁶⁰ At the

⁴⁵⁷ *Diplomatic Herald* 2 (12) 2007, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, p. 135.

⁴⁵⁸ Marat Tajin, ‘Ankara, Astana’nın En Güvenilir ve En Stratejik Ortağıdır’, *Atayurt Dergisi*, (Türkiye), Kış 2009, Sayı 1, p. 3.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁰ ‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Dış İşleri Bakanı Yercan Kazıhanov’un Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu ile görüşmesinden sonra basın toplantısında yaptığı konuşma 3 Ağustos 2011, Ankara’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye: Yüksek Düzeyli Stratejik İşbirliği 2010-2013*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, Ankara, 2013, p. 181.

level of foreign ministers concerning the perception of Turkey, the only exception was Kanat Saudabayev, who served as an Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Turkey and USA and then as Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan.

Kanat Saudabayev was the first Kazakh ambassador appointed to Turkey and served till 1996.⁴⁶¹ He analyzed Kazakh-Turkish relations under title ‘Kazakhstan – Turkey: Revived Relations.’⁴⁶² The title itself gave the message that Kazakhstan did not emerge as a subject of international relations in 1991, but it was only reemergence of the Kazakh statehood. In this way the title refers to the deep roots of bilateral relations. It is apparent that Saudabayev as Kazakh ambassador internalized the discourse of Turkic civilization. Having indicated that “One of the important foreign policy priorities is Turkey”, he touched upon that common history, culture, language, and religion unite two countries. Saudabayev states “We will remember forever that Turkey was first to recognize state independence of Kazakhstan.” He took note of the rising cooperation in the international arena and similarities of positions on important regional and international issues.

Turkey which supports the process of democratic reforms in Kazakhstan since very first day and its international initiatives, always underlines the prioritized place of our country. Convincing evidence of prioritized feature of Kazakh-Turkish relations is the regular meeting of the heads of states. Within past time 12 meetings took place on the high level. It is difficult to name another state except the CIS with whom Kazakhstan developed such deep relations.⁴⁶³

Indeed, the first five years of Kazakh-Turkish relations were very active. 12 meetings at the high level, as Saudabayev recalled, took place between Nazarbayev and Özal and then between Nazarbayev and Demirel. To develop relations among the CIS countries is natural, while developing relations with Turkey necessitated a certain political will. It can be said that in the first years of independence Ankara was a window to a world which by-passed Moscow. In economic terms therefore Turkey

⁴⁶¹ ‘Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Görev Yapmış Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Büyükelçileri’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012, p. 34.

⁴⁶² Kanat Saudabayev, ‘Kazakhstan – Turtsiya: Vozrazhdennye Otnosheniya’, in *Kazakhstan-Turtsiya: 5 Let Druzhy i Sotrudnichestva*, Bilig, Ankara, 1996, p. 12.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., p. 15.

became third trade-partner after Russia and Ukraine during that period.⁴⁶⁴ In other words, diversification of economic relations of Kazakhstan began with Turkey.

Another project which explicitly was meant to by-passing Moscow was transportation of Kazakh oil through Baku-Ceyhan pipeline which was under discussion at that time. Saudabayev having noted that a preliminary agreement was reached between the ministries of two countries inferred “These agreements do not contradict with other responsibilities of Kazakhstan. Moreover, this project is open to companies to all interested parties.”⁴⁶⁵ It meant that Kazakhstan’s joining the project does not contradict with the fact that Kazakhstan exported its oil through Russian territory. On the contrary, if Russian companies in Caspian Sea wished, they could join the project.

Saudabayev laid special stress on cultural relations between two countries. He noted that there was rising interest in Turkey on the history and culture of Kazakhstan because they remembered that the ancestors of modern Turks came to Anatolia from the territory of Kazakhstan. According to Saudabayev that is why the cultural exchanges intensified.⁴⁶⁶ In fact these cultural relations met the expectation of the people of two states who wanted to see their country as a country with Turkic identity and a part of Turkic civilization.

Interestingly, while Tokayev as Foreign Minister tried to reflect the Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan, Saudabayev as an ambassador and generally all Kazakh ambassadors laid emphasises on Turkicness. While Tokayev described Turkey as ‘friend’ and ‘partner’, Saudabayev preferred the words ‘friend’ and ‘brother’. When Saudabayev became state-secretary of Kazakhstan he continued describing Kazakh-Turkish relations as the relations which “took root in the depth of history.” He said, “The golden basis of our states is Turkic world. We should never forget that we have deep

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

roots established fourteen centuries ago during Turkic Kaganate and that we are united with the great Turkic civilization.”⁴⁶⁷

With regards to Kazakh students studying in Turkish universities, Saudabayev indicated that at that time more than 1.5 thousands Kazakhs were studying in Turkey. He remarked:

While they stay in Turkey for a long time, they not only learn their majors, but at the same time they deeply learn the history and culture of the country, its economy, mentality of its people, and then when they return to their home country they become active supporters of friendship and cooperation between the two peoples.⁴⁶⁸

Indeed for the durability of the bilateral relations the relations between peoples are important. It seems that Kazakh leaders realized this fact since the very beginning. Saudabayev underlined that the relations were not restricted by the contacts in the level of state structures. He indicated that large portions of the public of two states contributed to the strengthening of bilateral relations.⁴⁶⁹

Significant events in Kazakh-Turkish relations took place when Bagdad Amreyev a prominent Kazakh diplomat was ambassador of Kazakhstan to Turkey between 2008-2010. Concerning his appointment there is an interesting story. As Amreyev says in one of his interviews, before he came to Turkey, he has been serving as ambassador of Kazakhstan in many Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt for 12 years. After productive 12 years President Nazarbayev called him to Kazakhstan saying that it was time to return home. But when he met the President, he learnt that the president appointed him as ambassador to Turkey. Amreyev surprised with this news and exclaimed ‘Your Excellency, but you told me that I would return to home country!’ Nazarbayev answered ‘Turkey is also your home country.’⁴⁷⁰ Although

⁴⁶⁷ Kanat Sadabayev, ‘Kökü Derin Akrabalık’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012, p. 17.

⁴⁶⁸ Kanat Saudabayev, ‘Kazakhstan – Turtsiya: Vozrazhdennye Otnosheniya’, p. 18.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 19.

⁴⁷⁰ Tahire Kara, ‘Kazakistan Büyükelçisi Bagdad Amreyev: Cumhurbaşkanım Beni Türkiye’ye ‘Evine Gidiyorsun’ Diyerek Gönderdi’, *Atayurt Dergisi* 2009, Sayı 1, Republished in Bagdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, p. 68.

Nazarbayev sent Amreyev to Turkey being sure that he would feel himself as if he is in his home country, Amreyev, as any Kazakh elder diplomats who served both the Soviet Union and Kazakhstan, did not expect to see so much warmth and hospitality in Turkey. He could not disguise his surprise: “Before I came to Turkey, I knew that Turks have warm interest in Kazakhs. But I did not expect it would be to such a degree. I even could not guess. Therefore, it was an unexpected nice surprise for me.”⁴⁷¹

Amreyev counts several factors behind the intensification of Kazakh-Turkish relations in this period. First of all in terms of domestic politics Turkey experienced big changes and passed to a new level in democratic transformation. Secondly, Turkey realized new economic steps as the result of successful economic politics. Turkey’s economy became 16th largest in the world, and 6th largest in Europe. Thirdly, Turkey’s place in international arena changed.

Despite the difficulties in the European Union accession process, Turkey is pursuing permanent and very successful policy of diplomatic ‘attack’ towards the West. Ankara is conducting balanced relations with neighbors one by one resolving the problems. In recent years Turkey has succeeded to become regional leader by playing active role in the Middle and Near East, South Asia, Caucasus and Balkans, and Africa as well. In this way, Turkey regained its respect in the Arab world and today Ankara is evaluated as a sponsor who promises future in the peace building in the Middle East. Turkey especially after successful mediation between Israel and Syria succeeded to remain only ally of Israel in Islamic world. Turkey succeeded to build real partner relations with Russia with whom bilateral trade volume reached 38 billion US dollars in 2008.⁴⁷²

On the other hand, in 2000s, Kazakhstan established as a state with all institutions. As it is put by Amreyev, “Kazakhstan strengthened its position in post-Soviet space, turned into important political factor in Asia and became well-known in Europe. In addition Kazakhstan with its rising economy and harmony among its multi-ethnic and multi-religious population became a model for other states.”⁴⁷³ Indeed

⁴⁷¹ Tahire Kara, ‘Kazakistan Büyükelçisi Bagdad Amreyev: Cumhurbaşkanım Beni Türkiye’ye ‘Evine Gidiyorsun’ Diyerek Gönderdi’, p. 74.

⁴⁷² Bagdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, p. 11.

⁴⁷³ Ibid.

Kazakhstan succeeded to turn its “demographic trap”⁴⁷⁴ into an advantage. Unlike early 1990s, now both Turkey and Kazakhstan were ready to cooperation. “In this way, political, economic, and social developments which took place in Turkey and Kazakhstan made it compulsory to re-estimate bilateral relations with a new vision and to begin searching for new and effective methods of cooperation in order to protect the interests of the two countries in the world.”⁴⁷⁵

Despite the fact that Kazakh-Turkish convergence and strategic partnership agreement was motivated and determined by the national interests of two countries, Amreyev says that when he was appointed as an ambassador to Turkey, he reviewed the history of Kazakh-Turkish relations and came to conclusion that “it is not correct to search for political reasons behind agreements between two countries.” He highlighted that Turkish people had a favorable attitude towards Kazakhs and reminded the difficulties of 1990s when Turkey supported Kazakhstan. “In those years, constructors, investors, companies, goods and even food products and other consumption products came firstly from Turkey to Kazakhstan. The first hotels and schools were built by Turks.”⁴⁷⁶ In another place Amreyev quoted Kazakh proverb saying that the taste of dried bread eaten in the time of famine is never forgotten, “Turkey helped us in difficult times. Kazakh people will never forget it.”⁴⁷⁷

Concerning Turkey’s image in Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan’s image in Turkey Amreyev commented, “When one says ‘Turkey’ in Kazakhstan, the first thing which comes to mind is the unity of Turkic people and Turkic world. When one says ‘Kazakhstan’ in Turkey unintentionally brotherhood and unity of Turkic people, common history, culture and values come to mind.”⁴⁷⁸ So when Kazakh-Turkish relations are

⁴⁷⁴ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs, Second Edition*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 294.

⁴⁷⁵ Bagdat Amreyev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, p. 12.

⁴⁷⁶ Gülbarşın Aytjanbay, ‘Nursultan Nazarbayev: Türk Dünyasının Lideri’, *Aykın Gazetesi*, 5 Haziran 2009, republished in Bagdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, p. 39-40.

⁴⁷⁷ Tahire Kara, ‘Kazakistan Büyükelçisi Bagdat Amreyev: Cumhurbaşkanım Beni Türkiye’ye ‘Evine Gidiyorsun’ Diyerek Gönderdi’, p. 68.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

discussed, the conversation automatically veers to the topic of the integration within Turkic world.

When the integration process in the Turkic world is analyzed, we observe intensification of the process since 2006 Antalya Summit of Turkic states. According to Amreyev, attempt of unification of Turkic world was a “historical and evolutionary phenomenon.” He believed that the trend was promising and would strengthen year by year.⁴⁷⁹ This statement supports the idea that Kazakhstan’s view on Turkey and Turkic world is developing in positive tendency. As it is noted by the diplomat, the positive attitude of Turkic people to the issue of unification is one of the important domestic reserves as public opinion.⁴⁸⁰

Amreyev argued that in recent years power balance changed in the Turkic world and the fact that the Central Asian leg of the integration increased its weight accelerated the process.⁴⁸¹ Kazakhstan and Turkey stood out in this integration. Kazakh diplomat taking into account economic and political power of two states came to conclusion that Turkey and Kazakhstan would become the main supporters of Turkic world. “To put it in different way, without Turkey or Kazakhstan Turkic world will not be complete. Therefore, Kazakhstan and Turkey should be in unity and solidarity. It is because it is necessary for the unity and solidarity of Turkic world.”⁴⁸² Further, Bagdat Amreyev drew attention to Turkey’s identity in international arena, discussed in the first section ‘structural level’. Indeed Turkey’s identity is very similar with that of Kazakhstan. As Amreyev deduced, “Turkey is situated in the same cultural, geostrategic, political, and economic area with Kazakhstan.”⁴⁸³

⁴⁷⁹ Gülbarşın Aytjanbay, ‘Nursultan Nazarbayev: Türk Dünyasının Lideri’, p. 45.

⁴⁸⁰ ‘Birlikler ve Teşkilatlar Başkalarından ayrılmak için değil, Birleşmek için Kurulmalıdır’ in *Aykın gazetesi* (Kazakistan), 26 Ocak 2010, republished in Bagdat Amreyev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, p. 53.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴⁸² Tahire Kara, ‘Kazakistan Büyükelçisi Bagdat Amreyev: Cumhurbaşkanı Beni Türkiye’ye ‘Evine Gidiyorsun’ Diyerek Gönderdi’, p. 69.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

Regarding the place of the Turkic world in the security angle of Turkic states Amreyev has an interesting point. “To speak realistically, Turkic world is strategic depth and secure area in the back front for Turkic states. In the case of Kazakhstan, for instance, if Russia is the closest friend, China is the closest neighbor then Turkic states are the closest brothers and natural supporters.”⁴⁸⁴ Indeed Kazakhstan has institutionalized relations with Moscow within framework of CIS and Eurasian Economic Union framework, and institutionalized relations with Beijing within SCO framework. Amreyev contended that from the perspective of closeness, common values, and natural uniting factors Turkic people are not behind others.⁴⁸⁵ Amreyev states, “We built very close and high-degree relations with Russia and China, and to build the same relations with Turkey is important for us.”⁴⁸⁶ It is because Turkic integration is a “balancing factor” against Russia and China who are in the fore front of Kazakhstan.

From political point of view, the establishment of Cooperation Council of Turkic States as an inter-state organization of Turkic countries in Nakhchivan is the sign of completion and putting a name to the process of natural convergence of Turkic people which began a long time ago. This should be evaluated not only as in terms of strengthening of statehoods, independence of Turkic countries and diversification of foreign policies, but at the same time it should be analyzed as an important balancing factor in developing national securities of these countries.⁴⁸⁷

The question generally asked by Kazakh journalists and Kazakh community is whether Turkic integration does not contradict with the Eurasian integration in the post-Soviet era. In addition in terms of security, Kazakhstan is member of the Organization of Treaty of Collective Security led by Russia, while Turkey is member of NATO. Amreyev clearly stated that Turkic integration is not an alternative to

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 54.

⁴⁸⁵ ‘Türk Dünyasının Yeni Konfigürasyonu’, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda Gazetesi (Kazakistan) 19 Aralık 2008*, re-published in Bagdad Amreyev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, p. 34.

⁴⁸⁶ Tahire Kara, ‘Kazakistan Büyükelçisi Bagdad Amreyev: Cumhurbaşkanım Beni Türkiye’ye ‘Evine Gidiyorsun’ Diyerek Gönderdi’, p. 70.

⁴⁸⁷ ‘Birlikler ve Teşkilatlar Başkalarından ayrılmak için değil, Birleşmek için Kurulmalıdır’, p. 55.

other organization like CIS, SCO, CSTO, and Eurasian Economic Union.⁴⁸⁸ In terms of security he gave the following answer.

Turkic countries due to several historical reasons are members of the organizations which have different military-political orientations such as NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization and so on. I do not think that a new institution will emerge in the similar format. Turkic states should develop their integration on the basis of political, economic, cultural and social relations.⁴⁸⁹

When we look from Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan prism, Russian-Turkish relations gain special importance. Amreyev pointed out that Russians and Turks do not perceive each other as enemy. Russia and Turkey became important trade partners. He underlines that “Russian-Turkish relations are experiencing the brightest period in their history. And this situation is advantageous for Kazakhstan who established strategic partnership with both Russia and Turkey at the same time.”⁴⁹⁰ Interestingly, Amreyev considered Russia as part of the Turkic world.

We should indicate that Russia is one of the important members of the organization of TÜRKSÖY which unites cultures of Turkic people. Russia is a home country of Turkic people as Tatar, Bashkir, Noghay, Tuva, and Hakas. Russian government greatly supports these people within the framework of general measures of TÜRKSÖY.⁴⁹¹

Concerning the membership of Turkey in Eurasian Economic Union, Amreyev thinks that in the future it is possible that a new organization uniting Russia, Turkey and Kazakhstan will emerge.⁴⁹² A Turkish scholar propounds that Kazakhstan wants to see Turkey as a member of Eurasian Economic Union to balance Russia. Though for Turkey it is a disputable issue whether the membership is necessary or not.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 54.

⁴⁸⁹ ‘Türk Dünyasının Yeni Konfigürasyonu’, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda Gazetesi (Kazakistan) 19 Aralık 2008*, re-published in Bagdad Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, p. 37.

⁴⁹⁰ Gülbarşın Ayıtjanbay, ‘Nursultan Nazarbayev: Türk Dünyasının Lideri’, p. 46.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., p. 46.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ SDE 1.11.2014

5.4.2 Intellectual Elite

Kazakh intellectual elite in accordance with the Eurasian identity of the country are divided to those who lean to the Turkic world and those who stay close to the Slavic world. The third group is between these two. They really understand that Kazakhstan has Eurasian identity and consequently has to develop close relations with both Slavic and Turkic world. Naturally these intellectuals are closer to the government. The prominent representatives of these intellectuals are Äbdimälik Nısanbayev, one of the editors of the book *Eurasian Doctrine of Nursultan Nazarbayev*,⁴⁹⁴ and Sergei Selivyorstov, the author of book *Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey: Through the Pages of Eurasian Ideas of Nineteenth and Twenty First Centuries*.⁴⁹⁵ In 1997 Nısanbayev became an honorable member of Atatürk National Cultural Center of Turkey. In his speech at the center Nısanbayev mentioned the problem of interaction and mutual understanding between Turkic and Slavic world, between Islam and Christianity. He claimed that there is integrity in Turkic and Slavic cultures and exchanges of views between the two would be fruitful. Nısanbayev concluded that peace and freedom can be built not at the expense of other nations and people, but by working all together in cooperation.⁴⁹⁶

Those closer to the Turkic identity generally have positive or in other words ‘brotherly’ perception of Turkey. However, it should be indicated that these groups consider Kazakhstan as the center of the Turkic world. For example Mırzatay Joldasbekov, scholar on Turkic studies, was one of the first Kazakh bureaucrats to visit Turkey in early 1990s, said that “The historical homeland of all Turkic-speaking peoples and of all Turkic world is Central Asia and especially Kazakhstan.”⁴⁹⁷ Ädil

⁴⁹⁴ A.N.Nısanbayev, V.Yu.Dunayev (eds.), *Evrasiyskaya Doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva*, Institut filisofii i politiligiı KN MON RK, 2010.

⁴⁹⁵ S.V. Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya: po Stranitsam Evraziyskikh Idey XIX-XXI vekov*, Baspalar üyi, Almaty, 2009.

⁴⁹⁶ K. Äljanov, ‘Qazaqstan ǵılımina körsetilgen qurmet’, *Egemen Qazaqstan* No.120, 21 Mawsım 1997 jıl.

⁴⁹⁷ Mırzatay Joldasbekov, ‘Mıñ jıldıq saǵınıs’, in ed. Malık Otarbayev, *Sana säwletşisi*, Anarıs, Almatı, 2010, p. 61.

Ahmetov said that Turks looked at Kazakhstan as their fatherland and had sincere respect because Kazakhstan is a land where the purest Turkish language is preserved.⁴⁹⁸ No doubt Turgut Özal made a deep impression on Kazakh elite. Joldasbekov met Özal three times and describes him as warm, patient, clever and wise man. “He as Atatürk was a man who really loved Turkic world and really worried for the future of Turkic people.”⁴⁹⁹ Asılı Osmanova indicated that the land of Kazakhstan is valuable for Turks due to the fact that it is the center of Turan from where all Turkic sons came from. “Therefore Turkish intellectuals cannot be ignorant about the future of new state of Kazakhstan.”⁵⁰⁰

Kazakh intellectuals understand that relations with Turkey contribute to Turkic i.e. Kazakh identity of Kazakhstan. For Kazakh nationalists Turkey became natural ally against their struggle for cultural independence and against Russian domination in the country. Batırhan Därimbet expresses Kazakh nationalists’ feelings on the Turkic solidarity in the best ways.

Turkic states as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan can rapidly develop in unity and by strengthening brother relations with Turkey and within the Turkic world. In this respect, the place of the Republic of Turkey with its model of development is important for Turkic world. The day when the newly transformed Turkic world unites around progressive idea will become the most progressive community of the world is not so far. In that day the spirits of Jüsip Aqşora, Ziya Gökalp, Ali Turan Hüseyinzada, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa Şoqay, Mağjan Jumabay and others who struggled for the ideas of Turkism will be in peace and pleased with their descendants. May live forever the Great Turkic world and its soldier in forefront the Republic of Turkey! May Täñri save Turks!⁵⁰¹

Kazakh nationalists feel more at home in Turkey where Kazakh language is valued and listened⁵⁰² than in the most cities of Kazakhstan where Kazakh language is considered inferior. It was not a coincidence that International Association of Kazakh

⁴⁹⁸ Ädil Ahmetov, ‘Amerikanı aşqan Türikter edi’, *Juldız*, No.8, 1993 jil.

⁴⁹⁹ Mırzatay Joldasbekov, ‘Mıñ jıldız sağımış’, p. 62.

⁵⁰⁰ Asılı Äliqızı Osmanova, ‘Atatürik elindegi alqalı jıyın’, *Jas Alaş*, No. 43, 19 Nawrız 1993 jil.

⁵⁰¹ Batırhan Därimbet, ‘Türik dünyasınıñ alğı şebinde’, *Jas Türkistan*, 2-3, 1999.

⁵⁰² Professor D. Kişibekov, ‘Atatürik eline barğanda...’, *Jas Alaş* No. 102, 10 Şilde 1993 jil. Jumabek Kenjalın, ‘Istanbuldıñ istiq lebi’, *Halıq keñesi* No.201, 25 Qaraşa 1993 jil.

Language formed by Kazakh nationalist intelligentsia awarded Turkish President with the medal of ‘the Pride of Mother Language’ for his contribution to the revival of language, spirit and culture of Turkic world.⁵⁰³

The revival of Turkic civilization is important for Kazakh intellectuals. In exploring this new area Kazakh intellectuals learnt from the experience of Turkey. The explicit example is the journal *Jas Türkistan* and scholar Fadli Äli who translated Hüseyin Nihal Atsız’s pieces.⁵⁰⁴ The interaction of Kazakh nationalist elite with Turkish elite was provided by different forums and conferences organized by Turkey. One of these meetings was Congresses of Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation of Turkic States and Communities annually organized from 1993 to 2001 and then in 2006 and 2007 by the foundation with the same name.⁵⁰⁵

The topics discussed by Turkic intellectuals and scholars were common alphabet and common history. The majority of Kazakh scholars, as it was expressed by Professor Äbduäli Qaydarov, agreed that Kazakh language should adopt Latin alphabet.⁵⁰⁶ Kazakh scholars also contributed to the construction of common Turkic history.⁵⁰⁷ In the facilitating the cooperation between Turkic scholars, a series of ‘Turkic Congress (Turkic Kurultay) of Turkic states and communities on friendship, brotherhood and cooperation’ played important role.⁵⁰⁸ Mihail Esenaliyev who attended one of these congresses indicated that “The commonalities of history and culture, language and religion, literature and art, and politico-economic problems necessitated solidarity and integration. In that case the idea of integration among states is not taken from

⁵⁰³ Ömirзақ Aytbayulı, ‘Süleyman Demirelmen birgeötkizgen bir sağıat bes minut’, *Qazaq eli* 23-29 Qazan 1998 jil.

⁵⁰⁴ Hüseyin Nihal Atsız, ‘Türk morali’, translated by Fadli Äli, *Jas Alaş*, No. 67, 1 Mamır 1993 jil.

⁵⁰⁵ Bilgehan Atsız Gökdağ, ‘Türk Devletleri ve Topulukları Dostluk, Kardeşlik ve İşbirliği Vakfı (TÜDEV)’, *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013, p. 827.

⁵⁰⁶ Mädi Qayınbayev, ‘Türkiler alfavitinde – qazaqtın ‘ä’ äripi’, *Jas Alaş*, No.43, 19 Nawrız 1993 jil.

⁵⁰⁷ Professor Januzaq Qasımbayev, ‘Stambulğa sapar’, *Jas Alaş*, No. 58, 16 Sawır 1993 jil.

⁵⁰⁸ Ömir Qoñırbay’s interview with Fadli Äli ‘Türkiler tağı bas qospaq: Türki tektes halıqtardıñ II quriltayı qarşaında’, *Türkistan*, No. 12, 26 Kökek 1994 jil.

air.”⁵⁰⁹ Uliqbek Esdāwletov, a high ranked diplomat of Kazakh Foreign Ministry who attended the fourth congress, noted that the fact that this kind of big gatherings organized in Turkey displayed that Turkey was a leader of the Turkic world.⁵¹⁰ As observed by Shirin Akiner “Since independence, general awareness of a shared Turkic culture has been strengthened by the wide variety of links that have been developed with Turkey.”⁵¹¹ However, Kazakhs as a post-colonial nation were suspicious about real intentions of Turks.

Nevertheless, the Kazakhs, like the other Central Asians, are jealous of their newly acquired independence and are highly sensitive to any external attempts to impose new political and ideological constraints on their national policies. Cooperation with Turkey is welcomed, but in some circles the initial enthusiasm for rapprochement has been replaced by a degree of resentment at what is perceived to be the condescending ‘neo-big brother’ attitude of Turks.⁵¹²

Generally, Kazakh scholars say that their duty in international conferences was to defend and explain Kazakhstan’s position on several issues. As Nazarbayev wrote, in the first summit of the heads of Turkic countries, he refused to sign the declaration prepared by the Turkish side because it would mean “the abandonment of just gained independence, cutting the traditional ties with neighbors (i.e. Russia – D.A.), taking on our shoulders another ‘big brother’ in place of just riddin ‘big brother’.”⁵¹³ Though in late 2000s, Nazarbayev understood the potential of the Turkic World,⁵¹⁴ the sensitiveness about the independence of the country continued to be present especially among those Kazakh elite who stood close to Russia. For example, Toktar Aubakirov in his speech in the World Turkic Forum, organized by TASAM in 2010

⁵⁰⁹ Mihail Esenaliev, ‘Birliqimen küşti, tutastıqimen quwattı’, *Türkistan*, No.16, 17 Kökek 1996 jıl.

⁵¹⁰ Mädi Qayınbayev, ‘Türki memleketleri men qawımdarınıñ 4-inşi qurılıtaı’, *Egemen Qazaqstan*, No.71, 12 Säwir 1996 jıl.

⁵¹¹ Shirin Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p. 65.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, 66.

⁵¹³ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Yüzyıllar Kavşağında*, Ankara, 2012, p.217.

⁵¹⁴ Shirin Akiner, ‘Evolution of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: 1991-2011’, in *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies No:6, USAK, 2011* p.10.

laid emphasis on equality among Turkic groups.⁵¹⁵ In this way first astronaut of Turkic world openly denounced that he was against the ‘big brother attitude of Turkey’.

The speech of Kazakh representative in the conference devoted to the 20th anniversary of Turkic Republics organized in Ankara by Ahmet Yassawi University was more explicit example of sensitiveness about the Independence. Kazakh scholar, head of Institute of Strategic Studies of Kazakhstan Bolat Sultanov proffered:

Turkey can aid Africa. But Kazakhstan is independent, sovereign country. It does not need the aid of other countries. ... Countries of Turkic world are independent. Every country acts independently. Independent countries must develop relations with world’s countries while developing relations among themselves. Countries must protect their independence. Global developments, changes must be taken into consideration. The influences of outside countries on Turkic Republics must be evaluated. My subjective view is that every country must first be independent.⁵¹⁶

It was significant that after the speech he was asked to clarify why Kazakhstan was stressing on its independence in relation with Turkey while was speedily integrating with Russia. It is obvious that as a result of the Soviet legacy, in minds of most of Kazakh elite Turkey was perceived as ‘the other’, while Russia was ‘svoi’ or ‘ourselves’. In 2008 I witnessed a celebration organized by the Military School for Land Forces of Turkey (*Kara Harp Okulu*) where Kazakh students study on Turkish scholarships. A Kazakh officer told me, “We would have smashed them (Turks) if they entered World War II in the side of Germany.” The stress ‘We would’ shows that even after twenty years after the breakdown of the USSR, Kazakh officer can identify himself with the Red Army.

It seemed that Turkish leaders were aware of the ‘big brother phobia’ of the post-Soviet Turks. For example, President Demirel in his meeting with scholars from Turkic countries, working on common alphabet, stated that the transition to Latin

⁵¹⁵ Toktar Aubakirov, ‘Türk Dünyasının Eşitliği Üzerine...’, in Dr. Almagül İsina (ed.), *World Turkic Forum: Turkic Council, Turkic Diaspora and Socioeconomic Cooperation*, TASAM Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, p. 118.

⁵¹⁶ *Bağımsızlıklarının 20.Yılında Türk Cumhuriyetler, Uluslar arası Toplantı 05-06 Ekim 2011-Ankara: Konuşmalar, Ankara 2011*, p.199.

alphabet was the domestic policy of every single country, underlining that Turkey does not want to be hegemony on the issue.⁵¹⁷

With the respect to ‘big brother’ and ‘little brother’ discussion, the point which Kazakh intellectuals underscored was that in the minds of Kazakh people there was a distinction between Turkish and Turkic, while in Turkey there was no emphasis on the distinction. Kazakh writer Koysygara Salgarin explained as follows:

In old times, there was only one term - Türk. In 1926 at the meeting of the Soviet Turkologists in Baku it was decided to name Turkic people living in the Soviet Union as Türki (which is Turkic in English—D.A.), and those of Turkey as Türk (Turkish—D.A.). In Russian language Türki’s singular is Tyurk and plural is Tyurki; while Türk’s singular is Turok and plural is Turki. The Soviets solved the problem with one letter.⁵¹⁸

The separation in terminology got firmly entrenched in minds of people. Therefore, to call Kazakh as Turk is perceived by him or her as to be Turkey’s Turk. For post-Soviet people who experienced the horrors of sovietization, assimilation policies and survived with its national identity, it was equal to abandoning their hard-won identity and accepting a new identity, which was not Soviet this time, but Turk, Turkey’s Turk.

Despite the different perception of the term Turk in Turkey and Kazakhstan, Kazakh intellectuals debated Kazakhs’ Turkicness. For example, Professor Namazali Omashev argues that “the word ‘Tyurki’ (Turkic—D.A.) was introduced for temporary usage. However, millions of people are still using this term. But we must not be afraid of term ‘Turk’. If we start to use this term, others also can start to use it.”⁵¹⁹ Academic Aydos Sarim says:

It is logical to use term ‘Turk’. Because our famous poet Mağjan Jumabay wrote:

Türkistan eki duniye esigi ğoy,

⁵¹⁷ Mädi Qayınbayev, ‘Türkiler alfavitinde – qazaqtın ‘ä’ äripi’, *Jas Alaş No.43*, 19 Nawrız 1993 jil.

⁵¹⁸ Doç. Dr. Canat Momınkulov, ‘Türki Aleminin Ğasıru Türklerdi Biriktire Ala Ma?’(Can the Century of Turkic World Unite Turks?) *Aykın Respublikalıq qoğamdıq sayasi gazet* No 39, 2194, 2 Mart 2013, www.aikyn.kz Accessed on 15.04.2014.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

Türkistan er türktiñ besigi ğoy

(Turkistan is gate of two worlds,

Turkistan is cradle of brave Turks)

So, why should we be ashamed of our Turkicness? We are also Turks. Calling ourselves Turks does not mean to forget that we are Kazakhs.⁵²⁰

One scholar once put it ‘if only Mustafa Kemal called Turkey not as Turkey but as Oguzia, or Ottomania, or Anatolia, whatever but not Turkey, today it would be easier for other Turkic people to accept the term ‘Turk’ as upper identity.’ In fact, by declaring itself as the continuation of Turkic Statehood, “Turkey, unfortunately, monopolized all Turkic heritages.”⁵²¹

According to the Soviet Turkologists there are no ethnic ties among Turkic people. In other words Turkic people are not relatives as explained in Turkey. What unites Turkic people is their language and thus enjoys only linguistic ties among them. According to the Soviet Turkology and official ideology, Turkic people have different ethnic origins, but once upon a time a group who called themselves Turks conquered all these people and assimilated or Turkified them. Therefore, the Soviet Turkology preferred to call Turkic people as ‘Turkic-speaking people’ or ‘Turkish-speaking people’. It is the same as today’s Russian speaking people of former Soviet Union or Francophone people. Today the term ‘Turkic speaking countries’ is in official usage. All official meetings are organized under the term. However, it is expected that in the future the term will be replaced with ‘Turkic’. As Halil Akıncı, the secretary general of Turkic Speaking Country’s Cooperation Council put it “The Turkic Speaking Countries is too long a name. The phrases ‘Turkic Summit’, ‘Turkic Council’ are accepted by every party.”⁵²²

No matter it is Turkic world or Turkish world, Kazakh intellectual elite as compared with political elite stand closer to Turkey. It is because political elite were the

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ S.V. Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya*, p.199

⁵²² *Bağımsızlıklarının 20.Yılında Türk Cumhuriyetler, Uluslar arası Toplantı 05-06 Ekim 2011-Ankara: Konuşmalar, Ankara 2011*, p.194.

continuation of the Soviet bureaucracy understanding Soviet and Russian culture, while intellectual elite were the strata of community who perceived things differently than official ideology, representing views closer to the common people.

Based on this, Kazakh intellectuals were those who welcomed the independence. Further, intellectual elite as it was in *Alash* intelligentsia defined themselves responsible for the future of the Kazakh nation. It can be argued that ethnic Kazakh nationalism prevailed among intellectual elite. Kazakh nationalists found common language with nationalist groups in Turkey who paid special attention to Turks outside of Turkey. The first dialogue between Kazakh nationalists and Turkish nationalists was established after 1986 December Revolt in Almaty. Muhtar Shahanov, who was the head of the commission which investigated the victims of the revolt, was invited by Professor Turan Yazgan to Turkey. Muhtar Shahanov in his book about 1986 Revolt wrote that he found support for his struggle to disclose the truth about the 1986 December events to the world community and he felt as if he leaned on the brother country.⁵²³

Besides general perception of Turkey, Kazakh elite were interested in Turkish foreign policy as suggested by the available literature on Turkey. Kazakh intellectual elite, more correctly Kazakh experts and scholars of International Relations, tried to understand the place of Turkey in the context of Kazakhstan's interests.

5.5 Kazakh Elite's Perception of Turkish Foreign Policy

In Chapter 3 while discussing Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity and in Chapter 4 while examining Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey I have drawn the general frame where Kazakhstan is situated and what Turkey means for Kazakhstan's decision makers. Here within that framework, I elaborate Kazakh elite's perception of Turkish foreign policy. First of all, foreign policy of Turkey toward Eurasia has vital importance for Kazakhstan. Therefore, firstly I analyze how Kazakh elite perceive Turkey's activism in the Eurasian region. In addition, Kazakh elite are also interested in Turkish foreign policy in the West and the Middle East. Kazakh elite's perception of Turkish foreign policy in those regions is examined as well.

⁵²³ Muhtar Şahanov, *Jeltoqsan epopeyası*, Jalın, Almatı, 2011, p. 857.

5.5.1 Turkey's Relations with Eurasia

“After turbulent 90s, Turkish elite faced an intellectual dilemma of overestimated hopes of Turanism and overcome the complex of Turanism.”⁵²⁴ More precisely, Turkey would either continue its foreign policy in post-Soviet region either based on Pan-Turkic aspirations or pursue realist policy based on real situation, possibilities and calculations of interests of regional powers and especially of Russia.

In content, overcoming and over viewing of ‘complex of Turanism’ which was the very characteristic of radical groups in Turkey in 20th century, carried out through the idea of ‘Eurasia’. However, in Turanism, it must be noted, there was an innovative side. Turanism, despite its extremeness, provided the shifting of Turkish political thinking towards Eurasianism. Therefore, intellectual way of Turkey to modern Eurasia naturally passed through the ideal Turan. It can be said that the idea ‘Turan’ in the Turkish political thinking transformed into more realistic idea of ‘Eurasia’ at the end of 20th century.⁵²⁵

Indeed, the term ‘Eurasia’ was first used in Turkey by Namık Kemal Zeybek, Turkish Minister of Culture in 90s, who had a pan-Turkic stand. In 1992 when national broadcasting company TRT was planning to open new channel for Turkic speaking countries, he proposed to name it ‘Eurasia’. He explained that it could be named as ‘Turkic world’ but the area of broadcasting covers non-Turkic countries as well, so it was proper to call it as such.⁵²⁶ Further in 2004 he noted that under the term of Eurasia they thought the unity of all Turks. Thus, according to him, term Eurasia is the Eurasia of Turks.⁵²⁷ The non-governmental organization ‘the Union of the Eurasian Writers’ (Avrasya Yazarlar Birliği) which presents pan-Turkic stand also preferred the term Eurasia to unite writers and poets of Turkic world.⁵²⁸ However, it must be noted that there are nationalists who are against the word Eurasia. As Kavuncu expressed, “It should be remembered that it is necessary to use

⁵²⁴ S.V.Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsia*, p. 203.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁵²⁶ Sh. I. Ibrayev (ed.), *Evrasiyskaya Ideya N.A. Nazarbayeva i Tyurkskoye Prostranstvo* (Eurasian idea of N.A.Nazarbayev and Turkic space), Collective Monography, Saryarka, Astana, 2011, p. 307.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

⁵²⁸ Avrasya Yazarlar Birliği – The Writers Union of Eurasia <http://www.ayb.org.tr/> Accessed on 21.05.2015

the concepts in their proper places. As such, I say it as a slogan: Turkistan and not Central Asia; Turkic world and not Eurasia!”⁵²⁹

So overall conclusion concerning Eurasianism is that it made Turkey and Russia reconcile with each other. Marlene Laruelle defines this reconciliation as follows:

Classical pan-Turkism implied Russia’s all-out retreat from, or at least loss of standing in, Turkic lands. The reemergence of Eurasianism in Russia and the increasing use of the term ‘Avrasya’ in Turkey, however, establish a new ideological balance. The implication is that Russia and Turkey are no longer competing for the mythical territory of Inner Asia—which both Eurasianists and pan-Turkists claim as their people’s ancestral homeland—but are Eurasian allies. Only Eurasia can bring the two countries together and transform their status as Europe’s ‘periphery’ into an identity-building and political framework that would allow them to triumph over the West and control the Turkic-speaking world.⁵³⁰

In 1994 President Süleyman Demirel speaking in a conference ‘Eurasia in our days’ said that “Eurasia first of all is Turkic-speaking countries and neighbors of Turkey” then he continued:

Turkey supports neither pan-Turkism nor pan-Turanism. In none of the periods of history of the great Turkic community which is stretching from Adriatic Sea to Chinese Sea, there was one uniting state. However, in this region there are people who share the same history, culture, language, religion, traditions. If we call them our brother, who can question it?⁵³¹

The question arose ‘what is the aim of Eurasian policy of Ankara?’ Demirel answered, “We want Kazakhstan, for example, to be able to stand on its own feet, to manage affairs by itself, preserve its independence.”⁵³²

President Demirel, an experienced politician, was aware of Turkey’s limitations and represents Turkish traditional thinking. Interestingly, while his rejection of pan-Turanism and pan-Islamism was in line with founding leadership’s understanding,

⁵²⁹ Quoted in Pınar Akçalı, ‘Eurasianism in Turkey: Different Perspectives and Challenges’ in Hisao Komatsu (ed.) *Central Eurasian Studies: Past, Present and Future*, Maltepe University, 2011, p. 22.

⁵³⁰ Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008, p. 171.

⁵³¹ Quoted in S.V.Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya*, p. 205.

⁵³² Ibid.

his accent on independence of Turkic countries recalled Fevzi Çakmak's thoughts expressed during the World War II. "In May 1942 he was willing to allow Turkish civilians to go to Germany to prepare for the establishment of separate states in the Turkic areas captured from the Soviet Union."⁵³³ Similar views were shared by Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Prime Minister of Turkey between 1942 and 1946 and his foreign minister Numan Menemenciöğlu. "Saraçoğlu explicitly maintained in a conversation with von Papen that 'Turkey could not remain disinterested in the fate of 40 million people of Turkish origin in Russia', in case of Russia's total defeat that would permit 'a reorganization of the Russian realm'. To him, 'the union of these areas with Turkey ... was hardly possible; perhaps, however, the areas could receive administrative autonomy with a strong cultural affiliation with Turkey'."⁵³⁴

Seliverstov noted that Demirel chose absolutely the right tone. By not rejecting significance of new, post-Soviet Eurasia, underlining brotherhood of Turkic people and at the same time rejecting political pan-Turkism, he drew attention to the necessity of strengthening the real sovereignties of the countries of Eurasian region. And he is absolutely right, because without it none of the firm configurations are possible. Without this 'standing on its own feet' the situation will always risk falling to perspectiveless of either Russian 'imperialism' or Turkish 'pan-Turanism'.⁵³⁵

5.5.1.1 Turkey-Russia

Sergei Seliverstov quoted Halil Akıncı's words "Turkey and Russia are the strongest partners in the Eurasian region. Turkey is ready to cooperate with Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey considers Russia as partner and does not compete with it" and then he notes:

The era of the closed official Turkish nationalism and radical political pan-Turkism are left in the past. Considering Russia as partner not as antagonist competitor in the Eurasian region corrects previous understanding of Turkish thinkers of the ideal Turan. Irreconcilable pan-Turkic opposition 'Turan-Russia' in the concept of Eurasia

⁵³³ William Hale, *Turkish foreign policy 1774-2000*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2000. p. 91

⁵³⁴ Şaban Çalış, 'Pan-Turkism and Europeanism: a note on Turkey's 'pro-German neutrality' during the Second World War' *Central Asian Survey* (1997), 16(1), p. 106.

⁵³⁵ S.V.Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya*, p. 205.

positively resolved. In Eurasian space of 21st century there is place for both Turkey and Russia, and both for Slavic and Turkic worlds.⁵³⁶

After decade of interaction it seemed that both Turkey and Russia started to understand each other. Beginning from early 2000s, internal politics of both countries stabilized. While in Russia the pragmatic and charismatic leader Vladimir Putin ordered the end of the Chechen War, nationalizing state companies which were privatized in 90s and resurgence of Russia as great power, in Turkey AK Party ended decade of coalitions thus starting an era of stable domestic politics and predictable foreign policy. Although it needed more cooperation for both elites to get rid of historical prejudices and stereotypes, it seemed that both Ankara and Moscow understood the indispensable role of each other in regional affairs. To resume Russian-Turkish relations pragmatism of constantly increasing economic trade relations overwhelmed the ideological political traditions.

Even before AK Party came to power, both Ankara and Moscow comprehended the strategic significance of each other. Within context of Turkish Eurasian policy it was meaningful that in 16 November 2001 in New York Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Ismail Cem and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation Igor Ivanov signed protocol ‘plan of measures of Eurasian cooperation of Turkey and Russian Federation (from bilateral cooperation to multi-dimensional partnership)’.

Seliverstov points out that “new understanding about Turkey gradually is spreading among Russian intellectuals”. Particularly, philosopher A.V. Ivanov concludes that ‘in the new century Turkey could play important a constructive role in the establishment of new form of unions within the continental space of Old World, in other words, fulfill the mission of one of the mediator-conjuncture in whole geopolitical space of Eurasian continent. In this case, new Russia and new Turkey could together step into the 21st century as pivotal integrating forces of the Old World and demonstrate model of Eurasian cooperation based on new principles and priorities.’⁵³⁷

⁵³⁶ Ibid., p. 204.

⁵³⁷ S. V. Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya*, p. 205.

5.5.1.2 Post-Soviet space

“The republics of Caucasus and Central Asia are at the center of special attention of Eurasian policy of Turkey.”⁵³⁸ “The countries of Southern Caucasus and Central Asia play the role of bridge between East (South Eastern Asia) and West (Europe). The most operative and advantageous opportunities in the sphere of transportation (land, water, air, train) and communication (telephone, linkage, optic cables, lines and pipelines of energy) in relations between East and West belong to countries of this region.”⁵³⁹ As it is known, “Turkey has distinctive interests and ambitions in Eurasia to preserve and promote its international status as influential regional power.”⁵⁴⁰ Turkey, as it was seen in the example of Kazakhstan, was first country who recognized the independence of regional countries. Turkey with its official institutions and non-governmental organizations rushed the region. As A. Zubkov writes, “indistinct policy of Moscow and active support of West contributed to strengthening of Turkish influence in the region.”⁵⁴¹

In early 90s, the tactical task of Ankara was to convince West and the USA in priorities of utilizing of its contacts with Central Asia. In February 1992 Süleyman Demirel who was prime-minister at that time, in his visit to Washington stated that the change in regional status of Turkey and possibilities of actively participating in determination of political future of Muslim republics of the CIS. In addition, Turkey supported interests of the USA in Caucasus and Central Asia which aimed to strengthen positions of NATO there and to establish control over energy recourses lines. In particular, it was related with the petroleum pipeline Baku-Ceyhan.⁵⁴²

Dulat Sagnayev analyzed that “Ankara viewed the perspective of expanding of geopolitical areas through uniting Turkic republics as realizable. Besides, it was necessitated by the difficult economic situation that could be resolved by the

⁵³⁸ Dulat Sagnayev, *Evrasiiskaya Politika Turetskoy Respubliki v Kontekste Natsyonal'nykh Interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, p. 35.

⁵³⁹ Sh. I. Ibrayev (ed.), *Evrasiyskaya ideya N.A. Nazarbayeva i tyurkskoye prostranstvo* (Eurasian idea of N.A.Nazarbayev and Turkic space), Collective Monography, Saryarka, Astana, 2011, p. 270.

⁵⁴⁰ Dulat Sagnayev, *Evrasiiskaya Politika Turetskoy Respubliki v Kontekste Natsyonal'nykh Interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, p. 3.

⁵⁴¹ Quoted in Dulat Sagnayev, *Evrasiiskaya Politika Turetskoy Respubliki v Kontekste Natsyonal'nykh Interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, p. 36.

⁵⁴² Dulat Sagnayev, *Evrasiiskaya Politika Turetskoy Respubliki v Kontekste Natsyonal'nykh Interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, p. 36.

resources of the Caspian region.”⁵⁴³ As a response to Turkish pan-Turkist ambitions, Russia, Iran, China, Armenia formed a coalition against Turkey.⁵⁴⁴ Russia was not only suspicious of Ankara’s initiatives but those of regional countries as well. Seliverstov notes:

Russia is not used to one Turkic world. But it is necessary to realize this intellectual effort because the rejection of pan-Turkism does not mean the denial of the existence of historic-cultural relations among Turkic people and countries. If Russia feels it is not an imperial outsider, but instead an organic component, then it is necessary to agree and support Turkic peoples’ attempt of solidarity. Without taking into account Turkic factor in a tolerant way, any kind of Eurasia in 21st century is impossible.⁵⁴⁵

After such considerations Kazakh scholar S.V. Seliverstov commented on Russian thinkers that “it is impossible to agree with researchers who consider that interest of Turkey to Turkic people as ‘expansionist aspirations’, and as ‘dangerous factor’.”⁵⁴⁶

Indeed, among Russian experts there was paranoia about Turkey’s close relations with Turkic countries as revelation of pan-Turkic aspirations. As Russian analysts argue, in their Eurasian policy Turkish political elite consider Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Turkmenistan and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as basis of one future Turkic State. Besides, Ankara seriously considers Turkic (autonomous) republics within Russian Federation such as Altai, Bashkortostan, Tataristan, Hakasia, Sakha, Taimyr, Tuva, Chuvash, as significant geopolitical instrument by including them into Eurasian space.⁵⁴⁷ As Graham Fuller expressed, yet the reality is that Turkey’s historical and ethnic relations with the Muslim (largely Turkic) peoples of the former Russian and Soveiet empires can never totally disappear as a potential concern to Moscow. It is almost as if Moscow and Ankara represent alternate poles of influence upon these peoples.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., p.32.

⁵⁴⁵ S. V. Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsya*, p. 206

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁷ Dulat Sagnayev, p.56.

⁵⁴⁸ Graham E.Fuller, *The New Turksih Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 2008, p.129.

Turkish foreign policy in Eurasia though rejects Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism; it is built on the awareness of common ethnic and cultural origins. In other word, Turkic civilization is as rationale of Turkish Eurasian policy. The disappointment or failure of Turkish foreign policy early in 90s can be analyzed as unpreparedness of both Turkey and other Turkic countries to cooperate with each other. The absence of interaction of two peoples for long decades resulted in alienation. It is significant that the only initiative, proposed by Turkey in 90s and successfully institutionalized was TÜRKSOY, which was founded to protect, keep alive and transfer cultural values of Turkic civilization. Both Turkey and especially post-Soviet Turkic countries needed time to realize that their people are descendants of great Turkic civilization. “Thus, the success of Turkey’s overture in the region was heavily dependent on how the process of self-identification and the nation building in the region would evolve and in what extent the Turkic peoples of the region would view Turkey and their Turkicness.”⁵⁴⁹ Turkish foreign policy’s activism in the region became driving force in identity formation of Turkic countries. Turkish elite’s stress on common ethnic and cultural origins made elites of regional countries and especially Kazakh elite realize that their country was part of Turkic world. The summits of Turkic speaking countries launched by Turkey were the main tools of promoting the integration among Turkic countries. However, due to economic and political instability in Turkey and passive position of other Turkic countries the summits lost their relevance. As Shirin Akiner writes,

Nevertheless, President Nazarbayev understood the potential of this framework... In 2006 he took steps to revive it and was instrumental in setting in motion a process of institutionalization. In 2009 this resulted in the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States. The inaugural summit of this new intergovernmental organization was held in October 20-21 in Almaty 2011, with the participation of the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kirgizstan, and the Prime-minister of Turkey.⁵⁵⁰

Indeed one can observe the acceleration of Kazakh foreign policy within Turkic world began from mid 2000s. Kazakhstan which was expected due to its close relations with and dependency on Russia, to stay passive in relations with Turkic

⁵⁴⁹ Aigerim Shilibekova, p.92.

⁵⁵⁰ Shirin Akiner, ‘Evolution of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: 1991-2011’ *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies*, USAK, 2011, s.10.

countries and especially vis-à-vis Turkey, started to play an active role in this direction. It was a result of its multi-vector foreign policy initiative. Since 2008 TÜRKSÖY under Kazakh Secretary-General Duysen Kasseinov accelerated its activities. In 2010 Kazakhstan established Turkic academy in Astana.

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan who were expected to pursue more active policy in Turkic world could not satisfy expectations. They do not send representative not only to high level official gathering, but even to conferences and congresses in academic and cultural levels. Under these circumstances, Kazakhstan became Turkey's most reliable partner in Central Asia. General integration within Turkic world is evolving around a Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan-Turkey axis. Turkish foreign policy in this region can be divided as Caucasian and Central Asian. Turkish foreign policy in this region can be divided as Caucasian and Central Asian.

5.5.1.3 Caucasus

Viewed from Kazakhstan the region of Caucasus is significant both as a part of Turkic world and as a part of post-Soviet space. Therefore Turkey's policy in the region is important for Astana. As it is noted by Sagnayev:

Caucasus is historic-geographical neighbor of Turkey. Caucasian region once included to the Ottoman Empire always was a subject of closest observation of Turkish political circles. Historically established spiritual closeness of Caucasian people besides existing ethno-cultural and geopolitical aspects sometimes facilitated the overlapping of their interests with those of Turkey. Many emigrants and refugees found shelter in Turkey. Moreover, Caucasus has been always a kind bridgehead for further contacts of Turkey with Turkic peoples of Eurasian region at all. In other words, Caucasus is outpost of Turkey which would provide it with geopolitical superiority in Eurasia.⁵⁵¹

The main ally of Turkey in the Caucasus is Azerbaijan. If all Turkic countries are compared, then from ethnic point of view, Azerbaijanis are the closest people to Turkey's Turks.⁵⁵² Azerbaijani language is understood both by Turkey's Turks and Central Asian Turks. "In 20s and 30s the center of cultural life of all Turkic peoples was the city Baku. Outstanding representatives of intelligentsia of Tataristan,

⁵⁵¹ Dulat Sagnayev, p. 38.

⁵⁵² Ibid.

Turkistan, Crimea, Turkey and other regions lived and worked there.”⁵⁵³ It is not a coincidence that journal ‘Soviet Turkology’ was published from Baku. Accordingly, Azerbaijan had deep favourable sentiments toward Turkey even before the collapse of the USSR. After the end of Cold War the sentiments were so high that in 1992 Azerbaijani people elected pro-Turkic president Abulfaz Elçibey.

In the final analysis, besides geography, from ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical, political point of view, Azerbaijan shared greater proximity with Turkey in comparison to Central Asian Turkic countries. The Turkish-Azerbaijani relations were defined in Haydar Aliyev’s well-known phrase ‘One Nation, Two States’. It must be noted here, that while Turkish elite emphasized the first part of phrase ‘One Nation’, Azerbaijani elite underlined the second part ‘Two states’.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabag had deep implication on Turkish foreign policy. Turkey supported Azerbaijan, while Russia supported Armenia. “Russia-Armenia and Turkey-Azerbaijan convergence forced Iran and Georgia to pursue different balance policies. The developments observed in Turkey-Georgia and Iran-Armenia relations form interesting regional equilibriums.”⁵⁵⁴ To put differently, “Russian-Armenian-Iranian triangle is balanced by Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian line, backed by the West in 1990s.”⁵⁵⁵ Interestingly, according to collective monograph *Eurasian Idea of N.Nazarbayev and Turkic Space*, published by Turkic Academy in Astana 2011, Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian line was harmed after the war between Georgia and Russia, in recent times got weaker under Western pressure to open Turkish-Armenian border.⁵⁵⁶

From Kazakhstan’s point of view, Caucasus has special concern. Kazakhstan both as Turkic country and, maybe more important, as post-Soviet country, was interested in

⁵⁵³ Ibid., p. 22.

⁵⁵⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu*, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, p.126.

⁵⁵⁵ Sh. I. Ibrayev (ed.), *Evrasiyskaya Ideya N.A. Nazarbayeva i Tyurkskoye Prostranstvo* (Eurasian idea of N.A.Nazarbayev and Turkic space), Collective Monography, Saryarka, Astana, 2011, p. 261.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 261.

peaceful resolution of Karabag problem. Kazakhstan in the very first year of its independence demonstrated active foreign policy within post-Soviet space, and even made contributions in the settlement of the Karabag conflict by mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “With the initiative of President of Kazakhstan in Almaty in August 1992, the trilateral negotiations on settlement of crisis in Karabag with the participation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan took place.”⁵⁵⁷ As Salim Kurmanghozhin, the first Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan in that period, wrote in his memoirs,

The negotiations were difficult and lasted for three days. Minister was constantly informing N.Nazarbayev about the developments in negotiations. We were discussing till late nights in order to find ways of peaceful settlement of the prolonged conflict. As a result the Memorandum was accepted where Azerbaijan and Armenia expressed their readiness to cease military operations on 1 September 1992.⁵⁵⁸

Kazakhstan as partner of Armenia in the CIS and the Organization of Treaty of Collective Security on the one hand, and partner of Azerbaijan in Caspian Sea and Turkic Council still has potential to play the role of a mediator between conflicting parties in Karabag.

In fact, within this framework Kazakhstan from Azerbaijani perspective has significance as one of the important players within the CIS, which balances and mitigates the imperial approach of Russia. Besides, Azerbaijan consider Kazakhstan, which adhere just and objective stand in Karabag problem, as one of the players which can prevent Armenia from drawing the Organization of Treaty of Collective Security into the conflict in case of failure of the diplomatic attempts and beginning of military operations.⁵⁵⁹

From geopolitical and geo-cultural point of view, in the Caucasus Georgia’s situation was similar to that of Kazakhstan. Georgia in fact as Kazakhstan should learn to live together with Russia while preserving its independence. Moldova and especially Ukraine needs to learn to live together with Russia. All these countries cannot escape the reality of geography. As developments after 2008 show that all these countries

⁵⁵⁷ S.A. Kurmanguzhin *45 Let na Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhbe*, Jibek Joly, Almaty, 2003, p.226.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 227.

⁵⁵⁹ Sh.I. Ibrayev (ed.), *Evraziyskaya Ideya N.A. Nazarbayeva i Tyurkskoye Prostranstvo* (Eurasian idea of N.A.Nazarbayev and Turkic space), Collective Monograph, Saryarka, Astana, 2011, p. 274.

are stranded between the West and Russia. When we take into account economic dimension and ethnic minority issues, the circumstances are even more complicated. The independence of Abkhazia and South Osetia, the annexation of Crimea display that if Russia's neighbors do not learn to co-exist with Russian reality, then Russia is ready to do anything to protect its 'imperial dignity'.

Taking into account the practice of Kazakhstan in Eurasianism and multi-vector foreign policy, the first thing for Ukraine and Georgia to do is to define themselves not as European but as Eurasian countries. Azerbaijan is managing to balance the West and Eurasia. However, Azerbaijan's position in Astana Summit of the OSCE when Baku refrained from signing Astana declaration showed that Azerbaijan preferred to stay out of both West and Eurasia. In the final analysis, it seems that Eurasianism is a formula to co-exist with Russia.

5.5.1.4 Central Asia

In March 2011 there was 'the Conference of Turkic World's Social Science' organized by Gazi University in Ankara within the framework of Nevruz celebrations. In that conference I observed an interesting issue concerning understanding of Turkic world in Turkey. The first panel was devoted to Central Asia. Representatives of Central Asian countries, including me, presented their papers. After speeches ended when it came to debate, though the audience was expected to be interested in and informed about Turkic world, there were no questions, reactions, or comments. The second panel of the conference was devoted to Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Crimea. The same audience which was passive in Central Asian panel immediately turned into an interested one. Questions, retorts, contributions, comments were made. The conclusion is that 'the Turkic world' understanding of Turkish community is much more related with Ottoman world. Based on the observation, Turkish community's relation with Central Asian countries is sentimental and not backed with information and knowledge. This condition as noted by Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, recalls Ahmet Kutsi Tecer's almost classical poem 'There is a village, far away' (*Orda bir köy var, uzakta*) which says 'There is a village, far away; that is our village. Even if we haven't seen it; even if

we haven't been to it, that is our village...' (*Orda bir köy var, uzakta O köy bizim köyümüzdür. Gezmesek de, tozmasak da O köy bizim köyümüzdür...*)⁵⁶⁰

The observations expressed almost a century ago, by Kazakh intellectual and politician Mustafa Şoqay, the head of Autonomous Republic of Turkistan who after Soviets came to power migrated to Europe and for some period stayed in Istanbul, are still relevant in present-day Turkey's.

I frequently met with Turks. Almost all with whom I had conversations were ignorant about life of Turkistan. I was not surprised. Influential newspapers of Istanbul asked me indeed extraordinary questions: Are Kirgiz Muslims? In what language Sarts speak? History of this Turkic country, traditions of its people were in most cases terra incognita for them. Only after Bolshevik revolution they started to penetrate into the territory of Turkistan. Only few representatives of intelligentsia were really interested in the history of Central Asian people. But as they were motivated by feeling of national pride, they were restricted by researches of the period when Turkic people composed one nation. They were not interested in present life of Turkistan which has its own differences. That is the reason why Turkistan was for most Ottoman Turks was an undiscovered country.⁵⁶¹

As Aigerim Shilibekova notices that most of the studies by scholars in Turkey remain limited in scope of research relating to the Central Asian region. Main obstacles are the lack of knowledge of regional languages, limited access to local scholarly works and research due to the distant location. Interestingly, majority of Turkish scholars specializing on Central Asia have never been to the region and have been extracting information mainly from western sources.⁵⁶²

Turkish foreign policy ran parallel to the general perception of the world in Turkish community and scholarship. Turkey as heir of the Ottoman Empire and regional power played an active and confident role in Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East. Whereas vis-a-vis Central Asia, either due to geography with the natural barrier, Caspian Sea, to penetrating the region or due to the history of Central Asia never

⁵⁶⁰ Doç. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin EROL "Orda bir Türkistan Var Uzakta..." 2012-05-15
<http://www.usgam.com/tr/index.php?l=807&cid=678&konu=26&bolge=0> Accessed on 20.07.2013

⁵⁶¹ Quoted in Dulat Sagnayev, p. 39.

⁵⁶² Aigerim Shilibekova, p.11.

being part of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey could stay indifferent in its foreign policy towards the region.

From Central Asian perspective, Turkey is an important partner.

The region has attracted world attention primarily because of their strategic location on the center of Eurasia and the abundance of natural resources like oil, natural gas, and hydro-carbons. So for their main access route to the outside world has been through the Russian Federation. It is essential that in order to strengthen their independence these countries should also have other options. One such option is through Turkey.⁵⁶³

Thus, Eurasian policy of Turkey is aimed to strengthen its relations with Russia, and to support the independences of Caucasian and Central Asian countries. In Eurasian direction Russia as an important power in political, military, cultural terms play a crucial role. Regarding Russian-Turkish relations many scholars in Kazakhstan believe that Kazakhstan as close and reliable partner of both Russia and Turkey, and as a country which shares Turkic values and post-Soviet values, as it was discussed in Chapter 3, could help to overcome stereotypes and prejudices between Russia and Turkey.

Moreover, as “third pillar of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asia along with Russia and China,”⁵⁶⁴ Kazakhstan promotes Turkish interests in Asia. If we consider Central Asia as foothold of Eurasian policy of Turkey for further development of its relations to the East, then Kazakhstan as the most reliable and since 2009 a strategic partner played a role of supporter of Turkish interests. Dulat Sagnayev pointed out:

It was not accidentally that in January 2005 during his visit to Astana, Vladimir Putin expressed his satisfaction about the interest of Ankara in participating in cooperation within the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Russian President said that it was expressed by Prime Minister Erdogan during his visit to Moscow. Putin added ‘it is pleasant’.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶³ N. Joshi, ‘Central Asia’s Geopolitical Perspectives on Turkey’, in *Interrelations of Turkey and Central Asia in the context of Enlarging Europe*, Materials of the International Research Conference, Daik-Press, Almaty 2006.p.117.

⁵⁶⁴ Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects’ in in Rumer, Eugene, Trenin Dmitri, and Zhao, Huasheng (Eds.) *Central Asia, View from Washington, Moscow and Beijing*, M.E.Sharp, New York,2007, p. 80.

⁵⁶⁵ Dulat Sagnayev, p.53.

In October 2013 in the Summit of Eurasian Customs Union, President Nazarbayev stated that Prime Minister of Turkey Erdoğan asked him the potential of Turkey's membership in the Union. Nazarbayev added that "I am frequently asked by European leaders whether we are rebuilding the Soviet Union. If we take Turkey as a member of the Customs Union we will get rid of such criticisms." Nazarbayev's statement, in fact, was a reaction to the news that Russia was trying to bring Syria into the Customs Union. No doubt that Turkey's membership in the Union will be useful, while Syria's existence even as a normal state is debatable. Thus the project of Eurasian Union was differently perceived in Moscow and Astana. While Russians consider it as a political union, Kazakhs think it as an economic one. Nazarbayev's statement also implied that Kazakhstan had an alternative to lean on. A month later in November 2013 during Erdoğan's visit to Moscow, he was asked by a journalist about his intention to apply for membership in the Eurasian Customs Union. Erdoğan answered that he is for integration with regional countries and added "we insist on membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization."

AK Party government's involvement in Asian organizations especially its reiteration of SCO perceived in different ways in Turkey. Many experts and scholars consider the Asian opening of Ak Party as not serious. Despite this stand of elite toward Eurasia, the public is quite interested in relation with the region. Central Asia constitutes a part of Eurasian and even Asian policy of Turkey. As diplomat of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ali Kemal Aydın put it "When we say Eurasia, the Asian dimension stands out. Central Asia is heart of Eurasia. Asia is one of the dimensions of Turkish foreign policy."⁵⁶⁶ As Ahmet Davutoğlu underlined in August 2011 during the press conference with newly appointed Kazakh Foreign Minister Erzhan Kazikhanov, whose visit to Turkey was his first official visit abroad as Minister, "Turkey and Kazakhstan are committed to working together on a common strategy in Asia."⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁶ Ali Kemal Aydın's speech in the conference organized by Center for Eurasian Studies. Ankara palas. 25.02.2014.

⁵⁶⁷ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-kazakistan-disisleri-bakani-yercan-kazikhanov-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisinin-metni.tr.mfa> Accessed on 4.10.2013

Central Asia as heart of Eurasia is becoming important area of international affairs. Regional energy resources are drawing interests of great powers. China is taking advantage of the geographical proximity. The oil pipeline between Kazakhstan and China deliver 20 million tons of oil per year, almost 10% of Chinese oil import.⁵⁶⁸ The Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline carries Turkmenistan's gas to China via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan opened in 2009. It provides 21.3 billion square meter gas which constitutes 51.4% of total import gas of China.⁵⁶⁹ The energy monopoly of Russia in Central Asia was broken by China.

Analyzing Turkish foreign policy under this circumstances of rise of Asia, one can observe thin parallel to that the rise of Eurasian and Asian dimension of Turkish foreign policy. Öniş and Yilmaz having claimed that “There is significant continuity in terms of a proactive and a multilateral approach to policymaking” argue that “The discontinuity is marked by a shift from commitment to deep Europeanization to loose Europeanization and a simultaneous shift to soft Euro-Asianism.”⁵⁷⁰

“The retreat to soft Euro-Asianism certainly does not signify the abandonment of the Europeanization project altogether. What it means, however, is that the EU will no longer be at the center-stage of Turkey's external relations or foreign policy efforts.”⁵⁷¹ In fact this means the diversification of Turkish foreign policy. “Turkey will continue to be an important regional power even if its foreign policy stance is characterized by soft Euro-Asianism. However, the best choice for Turkish foreign policy would be a commitment to deep Europeanization—in the words, making EU

⁵⁶⁸ Huasheng Zhao, ‘Central Asia in China's Diplomacy’, in Rumer, Eugene, Trenin Dmitri, and Zhao, Huasheng (Eds.) *Central Asia, View from Washington, Moscow and Beijing*, M.E. Sharp, New York, 2007, p.154.

⁵⁶⁹ Temuri Yakobashvili, ‘A Chinese Marshall Plan for Central Asia?’ <http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12838-a-chinese-marshall-plan-for-central-asia> Accessed on 19.11.2013.

⁵⁷⁰ Ziya Öniş & Şuhnaz Yilmaz, ‘Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era’, *Turkish Studies Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009*, p.20.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

membership the pivotal element or the central axis of its multidimensional foreign policy.”⁵⁷²

Turkey has a critical role to play for the enhancement of peace and stability in its volatile region as a pivotal power with substantial influence and capabilities. However, it can play a more constructive and effective role as a benign rather than a coercive power if it successfully fulfills four challenging tasks by: first, consolidating its democracy; second, maintaining good neighborly relations; third, achieving a balance in its troublesome EU—Turkey—United States triangle; and fourth, operating within a predominantly European framework while pursuing a multilateral foreign policy with extensive Euroasian ties.⁵⁷³

Viewed from Astana, Turkish involvement in Eurasia is perceived as constructive because its presence in the region somehow balances against Russia and China. As Nazarbayev put it for Turkic countries, “only through uniting our powers we can develop as honored and equal countries with others.”⁵⁷⁴ In case of SCO, in Nazarbayev’s understanding, uniqueness of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is that it unites the countries that possess different cultures and civilizations. All countries of the SCO despite the size of their territories, their history and culture, are equal and have equal votes.⁵⁷⁵ In other words, members of the SCO are representing Confucian China, Orthodox Christian Russia and Muslim Central Asia. Turkey’s active involvement in the SCO will strengthen Islamic component the organization. This opinion is shared by Secretary General Mezentsov, who remarked that ‘Turkey will strengthen the Shanghai spirit.’

To sum up, contrary to general analysis of Turkish experts about failure of Eurasian policy of Turkey, Kazakh experts evaluate Turkish policy in the region as successful. It is because from Kazakhstan’s perspective the presence of Turkey in the country in economic, cultural and educational terms, despite their governmental or nongovernmental origins, are evaluated as the result of Turkish strategy in the

⁵⁷² Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁴ *Kazakistan-Türkiye: Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012, p.143.

⁵⁷⁵ ‘Speech of President Nazarbayev in Summit of the SCO in Astana’. 15 June, 2011 in *Diplomatic Herald of the MFA of Kazakhstan*. 3 (30) 2011, p.12

region. On the other hand, as Chinese proverb says ‘More expectation, more disappointment’. In Turkish community thanks to mass media there was rise and fall of volume of information about Turkic World. It created an impression as if Turkish policy in the region ended with disappointments. From Kazakhstan’s side there was no exaggeration of expectations. Especially in Kazakhstan’s case, Turkey was one of the many players. Under these circumstances, Turkey’s assistance in opening up of Kazakhstan to world market, contribution to preparation of competitive cadres, Turkish presence in the country in terms of economic and especially cultural terms which could balance against Russian cultural existence was concluded as success of Turkish foreign policy. So from Astana’s perception there was no ups and downs. On the contrary, perceptions of Turkey and Turkish foreign policy in the country are steadily increasing.

5.5.2 Turkey’s Relations with the West

Within academic circle in Kazakhstan Turkey’s membership in EU is also a subject of heated debates. The significance of Turkey’s relations with EU is due to the perception of Europe as one of the power centers. Zarema Aznabakiyeva in her PhD dissertation *The Question of Turkey’s Accession into the European Union* taking into consideration the fact that integration process in Europe is strengthening economic as well as political and military issues suggests that it is obvious that the EU possess one of the main leading positions in the world. According to her analysis countries of Central Asia while forming their foreign policies, should take into account the changes taking place between Turkey and the EU as both of them are partners of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries in the spheres of politics, economics, trade, culture and education.⁵⁷⁶

The European integration and Turkey’s accession process is taken as a model for the CIS countries in general and for Central Asian countries in particular. Dulat Sagnayev hailed the experience of Turkey in the introduction of political reforms in the process of integration into the European Union as relevant for countries of the

⁵⁷⁶ Z.M. Aznabakiyeva, *Vopros Vstupleniya Turtsii v Evropeyskii Soyuz*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Kazakhski Natsyonalnyi Universitet im.al-Farabi, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006, p.5.

CIS who share the same interest in further modernization their state systems and cooperating with European countries as foreign policy priority.⁵⁷⁷ Zarema Aznabakiyeva also underlined the fact by stating that the process of negotiation on membership of the non-European country, which is Turkey in the EU, is subject of interest for regional states who are trying to create integration institutions in regional and trans-regional character. It must be added that experience of cooperation between Ankara and Brussels can be useful for Central Asian integration, namely in construction of economic space, and strengthening of cooperation in military and cultural spheres.⁵⁷⁸

As it is seen Turkey's democratization and modernization policies within the context of accession process into the EU are another aspect of those debates.

From the perspective of Kazakhstan, its cooperation both with EU and Turkey is important condition of Kazakhstan's integration into world community. It is one of the important aspects of success of democratic transformation and transition to complete market relations, especially now, when EU became major center of economic and political development of Europe, model of totally new relations among modern states.⁵⁷⁹

Generally Turkey's membership in the EU is perceived positively among academics in Kazakhstan. For example, Aznabakiyeva notes:

Enlargement of the European Union toward East will contribute to further development of relations of Kazakhstan with the EU as well as with Turkey. The EU and Kazakhstan accumulated enough experience of cooperation, built on the basis of partnership, thrust and mutual respect. This experience will multiply when Turkey became full member of the EU.⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁷ Dulat Sagnayev, *Evrasiiskaya politika Turetskoy Respubliki v kontekste natsyonal'nykh interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata politicheskikh nauk, Kazakhskii Natsyonalnyi Pedagogicheskii Universitet imeni Abaya, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2008, p.4.

⁵⁷⁸ Z. M. Aznabakiyeva, *Vopros Vstupleniya Turtsii v Evropeyskii Soyuz*, p.5.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid.

Analyzing from broader geographical extent, as Abuseitova does, “Turkey and Central Asian countries have common economic interests, historic-cultural relations, and traditions. For years, having developed their relations successfully, they are contributing into convergence of two parts of the world, Europe and Asia, in economic, cultural and humanitarian terms.”⁵⁸¹ In other words, Turkey, viewed from Kazakhstan, is not only a European country but it is also Eurasian country. “Turkey is important for western Europe not only within the framework of the EU, but also as Eurasian country who has close historical, cultural, and economic ties with Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan and can politically influence the process there.”⁵⁸²

Concerning Astana’s attitude toward the EU, Kazakhstan is the only country in Central Asia which adopted ‘State Program Path to Europe’ which aims to bring Kazakhstan to a new level of strategic partnership with leading European countries.⁵⁸³ The European Union and Kazakhstan have been partners since the country’s independence, sharing a dialogue which has continually expanded. In the early years of cooperation this dialogue initially focused on trade and investment, but since 2002 many important issues have been included, such as energy, transport, as well as justice, home affairs and political dialogue in issues of common concern. The main document, underpinning the EU partnership with Kazakhstan, is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was signed in 1995 and came into force in 1999. At the regional level, Kazakhstan is a priority country within the European Union and Central Asia - Strategy for New Partnership. In June 2012, the European Council and the European Commission published their Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy. The launch of the negotiations for the enhanced agreement between the EU and Kazakhstan took place on 27 June 2011

⁵⁸¹ Speech of M. H. Abuseitova, *Interrelations of Turkey and Central Asia in the context of Enlarging Europe*, Materials of the International Research Conference, Daik-Press, Almaty 2006.p.8.

⁵⁸² Z.M. Aznabakiyeva, *Vopros Vstupleniya Turtsii v Evopeyskii Soyuz*, p.52.

⁵⁸³ *State programme Path to Europe-2009-2011*

http://mfa.gov.kz/en/#!/information_about_kazakhstan/state_programme_path_to_europe-2009-2011/
Accessed on 8.04.2014

in Brussels. The start of the negotiations for an enhanced agreement is an important milestone to further advance relations and strengthens the EU and its Member States' cooperation with Kazakhstan.⁵⁸⁴

The parties achieved rapid development of trade and economic relations. The EU is the main trade and investment partner of Kazakhstan, surpassing Russia and China. The EU amounts to almost half (49%) of Kazakhstan's foreign trade turnover and 47% of foreign capital in Kazakhstan's economy. Kazakhstan's foreign trade turnover with the EU member states reached 53 billion US dollars in 2012 and 38.7 billion US dollars in the first 9 months of 2013.⁵⁸⁵

In the words of Bagdad Amreyev, Europe needs complementary and alternative strategic resource to provide and balance national interests in relations with Russia, China, USA, and the Islamic world. From Kazakhstan's perspective, Europe in global understanding is an important arena in terms of diplomatic maneuvering. Unlike other power poles, the EU has no ideological interests regarding Kazakhstan. Bagdad Amreyev underlines that Europe will continue to be one of the attractive centres in the structure of International Relations, and Kazakhstan will continue to move toward Europe with concrete and systematized agenda.⁵⁸⁶

Kasym Jomart Tokayev having stated that establishing durable relations and developing cooperation with different international structures of security is in consistence with the principles of multi-vector foreign policy of Kazakhstan and provide the strengthening of its national security in European direction through the

⁵⁸⁴ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/eu_kazakhstan/political_relations/index_en.htm
Accessed on 8.04.2014

⁵⁸⁵ 'Kazakhstan - EU Cooperation'

http://mfa.gov.kz/en/#!/foreign_policy/bilateral_relations/the_cooperation_of_kazakhstan_with_the_european_countries_and_countries_of_america/ Accessed on 8.04.2014

⁵⁸⁶ Bagdad Amreyev, *Doğu ve Batı Küreselleşme Çağrısı: Medeniyetler Diyalogu ve Kazakistan'ın Orta Doğu Politikası*, Hayat Yayın Evi, İstanbul, 2011, p. 131.

OSCE and the NATO.⁵⁸⁷ In respect to Kazakh-Turkish relations, these are two organizations where two countries cooperate with each other.

Kazakhstan and Turkey as countries situated at the edge of Europe try to vitalize the OSCE. Both countries believe for their security regional cooperation is necessary. The fact that last two summits took place in Istanbul (1999) and Astana (2010) display the activism of two countries in the OSCE. Although after the end of the Cold War the organization became an important organ in assisting the transition to democracy in post-Soviet countries, “the Return of History and the end of Dreams” vis-à-vis “the End of History and the triumph of Liberal democracy” decreased the role of the OSCE. Taking into account the polarization in the line of democracy exporters and democracy importers made the gatherings such as the OSCE summit almost impossible. Both the Istanbul and Astana summit were considered to be diplomatic success of Kazakhstan and Turkey. The success not only contributed to the dialogue between conflicting parties in Eurasia but also increased the image and credibility of Kazakhstan and Turkey.

Kazakhstan as the member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and participant of the Partnership for Peace program has close cooperation with NATO.

Kazakhstan has no intention to become the full member of NATO due to its geostrategic location. Kazakhstan by participating in common projects with NATO aims first of all to increase the level of preparedness of its own military forces taking into account military-technical potential of the Alliance. Based on this Kazakhstan is active in establishing relations with NATO.⁵⁸⁸

Turkey as NATO member supports Kazakhstan. It is not a coincidence that NATO Head of Liaison Office for Central Asia was Turkish diplomat Tugay Tuncer. In conclusion it can be said that Dosym Satbayev’s evaluations made in 2008 are still relevant:

Turkey is still unable to define its priorities, in which direction to move it: in the direction of the EU, the Middle East or Central Asia. Assuming that the door to the EU for Turkey has long been closed, and which has already led to the growth of

⁵⁸⁷ Kasymzhomart Tokayev, *Vneshnyaya Politika Kazakhstana v Usloviyakh Globalizatsii* (Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan in the Context of Globalization), SAK, Almaty, 2000, p. 179.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., p.197.

Islam in society, and for the Middle East, Turkey is still an outsider because of close ties with the United States and Israel, the return to Central Asia seems quite logical⁵⁸⁹.

5.5.3 Turkey's Relations with the Middle East

For Kazakhstan the Middle East is important. In Kazakh foreign policy priorities the Middle East preserves fourth place after Russia, China and the West.⁵⁹⁰ Since the establishment of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakh foreign policy has been defined as multi-vector policy. According to geopolitical location of the country, there are main four directions: Eurasian (to the North), Eastern Asian (to the East), Western, and Turko-Islamic or Middle and Near Eastern (to the South).⁵⁹¹ Abiyeva underlines that the countries of Middle and the Near East are organically included into spheres of important interests of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states due to geographical closeness, economic potential as well as close historical and cultural links with peoples of these countries.⁵⁹²

Kazakh elite as the continuation of Russian mindset label Turkey and Iran as Near Eastern countries, and Arab countries and Israel as Middle Eastern countries. Kazakh elite and academics are aware of the prominent role of Turkey in this region. As it is put by Abiyeva "One of the most influential states in this part of the world is Turkey."⁵⁹³ As Near Eastern countries, both Iran and Turkey are important for Kazakhstan. According to Kazakh foreign minister Tokayev:

The main task of Kazakhstan's policy in the Near East is to establish economic cooperation and to integrate in the region. The aim of the Kazakh-Turkish and

⁵⁸⁹ Dosym Satbayev, 'Turtsiya pytayetsya vernut'sya v Tsentral'nuyu Aziyu' 14.02.2008 <http://www.zakon.kz/104394-tjurkskijj-jel.-turcija-pytaetsja.html> Accessed on 5.04.2013

⁵⁹⁰ Addresses to Nation by President Nazarbayev.

⁵⁹¹ Kasymzhomart Tokayev, *Pod Styagom Nezavisemosti: Ocherki o Vneshney Politike Kazakhstana* (Under the Flag of Independence: Essay on Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan), Bilim, Almaty, 1997.

⁵⁹² Abiyeva N.S. *Tsentral'naya Aziya vo Vneshney Politike Turtsii, (s 1992 g.-po nyneshnii den')*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Kazakhski Natsyonalnyi Pedagogicheskii Universitet imeni Abaya, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2005, p. 7.

⁵⁹³ Ibid., p. 7.

Kazakh-Iranian interactions in international arena is to contribute to the strengthening of regional security under the basis of equality of all countries.⁵⁹⁴

From geographical considerations, Kazakhstan and Central Asia are linked with Turkey via Russia and Eurasia through North of Caspian Sea or via Iran and Middle East through South of Caspian Sea. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy's activism in Middle East direction, sooner or later will affect its relations with Central Asian countries in a positive way.

Although Turkey as Middle Eastern and European as well as Turkic country is indispensable for Kazakhstan; Iran due to its geographical proximity also deserves significant attention in Kazakh foreign policy. Nursultan Nazarbayev having stated that when Kazakhstan builds its international relations it learns to approach from the national interests, to find the most optimal methods of interactions with all countries of the world and international organizations, and having confessed that there are a lot of methods of persuading Kazakhstan to pursue certain policies, and there are even attempts of direct pressures, argues that Kazakhstan in its foreign policy cannot focus on and be locked by only one group of countries.⁵⁹⁵ Then he describes Kazakhstan's relations with Iran in the following terms:

For us Iran will be forever a strategic partner. Firstly, it is a Caspian state without whom it is impossible to solve the problem of exploitation of the Sea and its minerals. Secondly, Iranian direction is one of the prospective options to export our products to world market. It is another window to the world. Thirdly, it was and continues to be a respectable, key participant of economic and politic processes in the region and Islamic world.⁵⁹⁶

Tokayev analyzes that Turkey and USA on the one side and Iran and Russia on the other are competing with each other to dominate the Central Asian region. "Definitely, Iran as a regional power has its long-term interests in Central Asia and the Caspian region."⁵⁹⁷ It is interesting to note that Iran by developing close relation

⁵⁹⁴ K. K. Tokaev, *Pod styagom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 500.

⁵⁹⁵ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Yüzyillar Kavşağında*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, Ankara, 2012, p. 254.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁷ K. K. Tokaev, *Pod styagom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 518.

of strategic character with Central Asian countries is claiming to become a serious rival to Russia in transporting raw materials (oil and gas) and products of the region to world market.⁵⁹⁸

Tokayev as Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to emphasize the importance of Iran for Kazakhstan observed that if the meetings with colleagues of the CIS countries are excluded, he most frequently met with Iranian foreign minister.⁵⁹⁹ Nevertheless, after two decade of independence, if we compare Iran with Turkey, it was certain that in terms of economic, political, cultural, social relations Turkey occupied a higher place than Iran. While trade volume between Kazakhstan and Turkey is approaching 5 billion U.S. dollars, between Kazakhstan and Iran doesnot constitute even one billion U.S. dollars. If we take concluded agreements between countries as indicator of the level of bilateral relations, according to the data provided by the Kazakh foreign ministry until now 59 agreements were signed between Kazakhstan and Turkey, while the number of agreements between Kazakhstan and Iran is only 25.⁶⁰⁰ Furthermore, while there is only one flight per week between Iran and Kazakhstan, there are 27 flights weekly between different cities of Turkey and Kazakhstan.

Although I compare Iran and Turkey as rivals to each other, in Kazakh foreign policy thinking it is not accepted to think of one country as an alternative to another. It is important for Kazakh interests to build close relations with both of them. As affirmed by Shirin Akiner:

Kazakhstan's participation in larger regional organizations has been more effective. Moreover, as in its bilateral relationships, it has been able to use these bodies to maintain political, economic and geographic equilibrium by creating a network of counterpoises. This first became evident in the deft manner in which it balanced its

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 543.

⁶⁰⁰ 'Bilateral International Treaties of the Republic of Kazakhstan'

http://mfa.gov.kz/en/#!/foreign_policy/treaties_and_agreements/bilateral_international_treaties_of_the_republic_of_kazakhstan__/ Accessed on 3.04.2014.

membership of the Tehran-based Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) with the Ankara-led Turkic summits.⁶⁰¹

From the perspective of East-West transport corridor, Kazakhstan as well as all Central Asian countries, Iran, and Turkey constitute the southern route of emerging new Silk Road between East Asia and Western Europe. Tokayev propounded that the opening of Tedjen-Serahs-Meshhed rail road between Iran and Turkmenistan in 1996 was an event of historical importance for Central Asia. Now products of Central Asian countries could reach Iranian sea ports in Gulf and Turkish ports in Mediterranean and Black Sea. Moreover, he stressed that the passage between Iran and Turkmenistan, taking into account the fact that railroad between Kazakhstan and China was opened in 1990, meant opening of the corridor in Trans-Asian Railways from the coasts of Pacific Ocean to Mediterranean ports with a length of almost 11 thousand kilometers.⁶⁰² No doubt it is first of all the success of ECO, “a non-political intergovernmental organization, which focuses chiefly on economic, technical and cultural cooperation within the region. Kazakhstan plays a leading role in ECO and two Kazakhs have acted as Secretary General of the Organization.”⁶⁰³

Concerning Arab world in the memory of Kazakh people three personalities stand out. They are Abu Nasr al-Farabi (872-950), Sultan Baybars (1223-1277), and Nāzir Töreқulov (1892- 1937). These three persons were born in Kazakh lands and served in Arab lands. Abu Nasr al-Farabi who was a scientist and philosopher during the golden age of Islamic civilization was in Farab, modern day Otrar or Şäwildir. Sultan Baybars was the ruler of Egypt during Mamluk era who defeated Crusaders and Mongols in the 13th century. The tombs of Abu Nasr al-Farabi and Sultan Baybars, situated in Damascus, Syria, were restored in 2007 by the Kazakh side, according to the agreement between the governments of two countries.

Syrian president Bashar al-Asad while meeting with Kazakh delegates stated ‘I admire the respect of Kazakh nation to their great ancestors. We completely support

⁶⁰¹ Shirin Akiner, ‘Evolution of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: 1991-2011’, *Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies*, Volume 6, No. 12, 2011, USAK, Ankara, p. 10.

⁶⁰² K. K. Tokaev, *Pod styagom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 535.

⁶⁰³ Shirin Akiner, ‘Evolution of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: 1991-2011’, p. 10.

it. We are ready to propagate that al-Farabi and Sultan Baybars came from Kazakh lands.’ Then looking at his ministers he ordered with joke ‘Research very carefully, maybe there are other Kazakhs as well in the territory of Syria’.⁶⁰⁴

Nāzir Töreқulov was the first ambassador appointed to Arab countries. As it is known, in 1924 the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Hejaz, which was independent state in the west of Arabia. Soviet diplomatic mission in Jeddah was the first mission of the USSR in Arab countries. In 1926 when Saudi Arabia emerged, the Soviet Union was first to recognize it.⁶⁰⁵ In 1927 Nāzir Töreқulov was sent to the country as plenipotentiary representative of the USSR.⁶⁰⁶ In 1930 he presented his letter of credentials as ambassador to Prince Faisal.⁶⁰⁷ Soviet-Saudi relations were developing successfully. In 1932 Saudi government under the head of Prince Faisal paid official visit to Moscow.⁶⁰⁸ It was one of the main political successes of Nāzir Töreқulov as ambassador.⁶⁰⁹ He was so respected among diplomats and Saudi government that he became the doyen of the diplomatic corps. In 1936 Töreқulov returned to Moscow. In 1937 he was arrested and executed. This tragic news shocked the Saudi King Abdul Aziz Al Saud, who respected and loved Nāzir. Through diplomatic channels, the King made the Soviet government

⁶⁰⁴ Bagdad Amreyev, *Doғu ve Batı Küreselleşme Çağrısı: Medeniyetler Diyalogu ve Kazakistan'ın Orta Doғu Politikası*, Hayat Yayın Evi, İstanbul, 2011, p. 131.

⁶⁰⁵ Alexadr Baryshev, ‘Sovetski Soyuz i Arabskie Strany’ <http://www.barichev.ru/arhiv/bv3.htm> Accessed on 2.04.2014.

⁶⁰⁶ T. A. Mansurov, ‘Nazir Tyuryakulov – vydayushchiysya gosudarstvennyy deyatel’, diplomat i zhurnalist’ Doklad General'nogo sekretarya YevrAzES na nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, posvyashchennoy deyatel'nosti polpreda SSSR Nazira Tyuryakulova (7 iyunya 2013 g.). (‘Nazir Turiakulov - an outstanding statesman, diplomat and journalist’ Speech of Report Tayir Mansurov, Secretary General of Eurasian Economic Community at the conference dedicated to the activities of the Soviet ambassador Turiakulov Nazir (7 June 2013). <http://www.nomad.su/?a=15-201306170031> Accessed on 2.04.2014.

⁶⁰⁷ ‘Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii i Sovetskogo Soyuza 1898 – 1991’ <http://www.knowbysight.info/TTT/03702.asp> Accessed on 3.04.2014.

⁶⁰⁸ Alexadr Baryshev, ‘Sovetski Soyuz i Arabskie Strany’ <http://www.barichev.ru/arhiv/bv3.htm> Accessed on 2.04.2014

⁶⁰⁹ T.A.Mansurov, ‘Nazir Tyuryakulov – vydayushchiysya gosudarstvennyy deyatel’

understand that he did not want to see other envoys in his country. Thereafter, the relations between the two countries broke down and were restored only in 1990.⁶¹⁰

Concerning the political situation in the Middle East, that is Arab world plus Israel, Tokayev underlines oil, Islam, ethnicity as determining factor of politics in the Middle East. Foreign relations of regional countries developed mainly with oil importers, Arab countries, and Islamic world.⁶¹¹ Kazakhstan built relations with Arab countries on the basis of Islamic solidarity. Kazakhstan like Turkey tried to develop relations with Israel without harming its relations with Arab countries. Kazakhstan has diplomatic relations with all Arab states and Israel. Kazakhstan has an embassy in Egypt (Morocco) 1993, Saudi Arabia (and Kuwait) since 1996, Israel since 1996, United Arab Emirates since 2006, Jordan (and Palestin, Syria) since 2007, Qatar since 2007, Oman since 2009, and Diplomatic mission in Libya (2003).

Kazakhstan is interested in the resolution of Middle Eastern problem. Nazarbayev had an interesting proposition reharding the Middle East. In 2006 when Nazarbayev met with George H.W. Bush, 41st President of U.S., he suggested to include so called moderate Muslim states as Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and off course Kazakhstan, into the process of settlement of Middle Eastern problem. According to Nazarbayev through these countries it would be possible to modernize Middle Eastern region and protect its people from Islamic radicalism.⁶¹² Dulat Sagnayev underlined that Nazarbayev counted Turkey firstly and correctly as a model for regional countries.⁶¹³

Bagdad Amreyev, the first ambassador of Kazakhstan to Arab countries, realised that Arabs continued to play an important role in world politics in 21st century. Arabs are

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ K. K. Tokaev, *Pod styagom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 535.

⁶¹² Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, *Svet i Ten'*, Astana, 2007, p. 225.

⁶¹³ Dulat Sagnayev, *Evraziiskaya politika Turetskoy Respubliki v kontekste natsyonal'nykh interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata politicheskikh nauk, Kazakhskii Natsyonalnyi Pedagogicheskii Universitet imeni Abaya, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2008, p. 151.

represented in international community with 21 countries. Arabs are organized and have a strong voice in international organizations such as UN, Islamic Cooperation Organization, and OPEC. Arabs have a strong impact on other Muslim people, reminds that one of the aims of Kazakhstan's foreign policy is to build friendly relations with the Muslim world in general and with Arab countries in particular. He added that Kazakhstan's active relations with Arab countries will provide diversification of ways and methods of political and economic integration of the country into the international community; balanced foreign policy of the country; strengthening the country's position in international arena, and achieving important purposes of Kazakhstan's diplomacy in the Middle East, Islam, and Asian directions.

Kazakhstan's support to the Turkish candidate for the position of Secretary of General of OIC during the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in this organization in June 2004 and the support of Turkey to the candidacy of Kazakh representative to the position of Secretary General ECO demonstrate the reliable and allied character of bilateral relations.⁶¹⁴

In the final analysis the Middle East is part of the world where interests of Turkey and Kazakhstan overlap Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) are the regional organizations where two countries support each other.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I analyzed Kazakh elite's perception of Turkey. As I have noted, Kazakh elite, in line with the Eurasian identity of the country, are divided as those who prefer Russia and those who prefer Turkey. Taking into account this dichotomy of the elite structure, it is quite pragmatic that Nazarbayev developed the concept of Eurasianism which unites both pro-Russian and pro-Turkey inclinations and prevents discord.

Due to the Eurasian feature of the elite, there is no homogeneous perception of Turkey at this level. Kazakh nationalistic elite who are in minority consider Turkey

⁶¹⁴ Cooperation between Republic of Kazakhstan and Republic of Turkey http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/europe_america/11 Accessed on 9.11.2013

as natural ally. According to these pro-Turkic elite, the cooperation between Kazakhstan and Turkey strengthens Kazakh identity. They have strong ‘brother image’ of Turkey. However, the majority of the elite who possess key position in the government and parliament stay close to Russia or at least try to be selective in their consideration on Turkey. In their mind Russia is a country with whom Kazakhstan shares common language and Soviet history, whereas Turkey is a linguistically, culturally and historically alien country

The president of International Turkic Academy in the recent meeting with Kazakh students in Ankara underlined that the Kazakh bureaucrats in Kazakh government who have never pronounced word ‘Turk’, after the Ukrainian crisis began to talk about Turkic world.⁶¹⁵ This means that besides the demographic change and Nazarbayev’s activism in Turkic world, Russia’s aggressive policy towards its neighbors positively impacts Kazakh’s elite’s perception of Turkey. Therefore, it is expected that Kazakh elite will more and more pay attention to the discourse in the Turkic world. According to Almagül Isina, who works in think-tank center TASAM (*Türkiye Asya Stratejik Araştırmaları Merkezi*), the number of Kazakh participants of World Turkic Forum, annually organized by the same institute, who come from Kazakhstan with their own money is increasing year by year. In 2015 the number of Kazakhs who participate from outside and inside of Turkey is surpassed that of Turks.⁶¹⁶

Nevertheless, the rise of Kazakh elite’s interest in Turkey does not mean that Kazakhstan will change its attitude towards Russia. On the contrary, the rise of popularity of the discourse of Turkic world is accompanied with institutionally integration of Kazakhstan with Russia. Deliberately or not, Kazakhstan’s integration with Russia leads to the rise of the feelings of Turkic solidarity among Kazakh elite and Kazakh general public. As I will discuss in the next chapter Kazakhs elite’s interest in Turkey and Turkic world is shaping the general Kazakh public’s opinion about Turkey as well as Russia. The most important problem for Kazakh leadership

⁶¹⁵ Darhan Hıdıralı’s meeting with Kazakh students in Ahmet Yesevi University building on 6 March 2015.

⁶¹⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/almagul.isina> Accessed on 20.05.2015

in the long run is whether Nazarbayev's Eurasianism can overcome the incompatibility between the expectation of general public and state's foreign policy.

CHAPTER 6

KAZAKH PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF TURKEY

6.1 Introduction

Kazakhstan's people are the basis of Kazakhstan's national identity which was discussed in previous chapters. Both Nazarbayev and elite while identifying Kazakhstan take into account the general cultural, linguistic, and religious and civilization orientation of the people of Kazakhstan. Based on this, Nazarbayev's and elite's perceptions of Turkey are shaped by the general expectation of the public. Therefore, it is important to understand the public's perception of Turkey.

Jonathan Aitken indicates that Kazakhstan's most important resource is its people. "They are a combination of the talented and the traditional, full of futuristic ambition yet with deep roots in their ancestry and culture. Defining these roots is difficult because they are a fusion of ancient Steppe values; Turkic-Islamic heritage; and the testing experiences of Soviet colonization."⁶¹⁷ In fact, here Aitken is describing Kazakhstan's people's identity as Eurasian, that is Turkic-Islamic on the one hand, and Russian-Soviet on the other. However, due to the strong ideological impact of the Soviet period one can say that Turkic-Islamic side of identity was almost forgotten. They began to revive only after 1990s. Therefore, I argue that the

⁶¹⁷ Jonathan Aitken, *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes after 20 Years of Independence*, Continuum, London, 2012, p. 3.

historical evolution of the Kazakh public's perception of Turkey is closely related with the Soviet legacy. And the Soviet Union, as the heir of the Russian Empire, was built on Russian culture and Russian worldview. "For the Soviet Union, as for Europe, Turkey is 'the other', in cultural terms 'alien', in historical terms 'enemy'."⁶¹⁸

Therefore, when we analyze Kazakh public's perception of Turkey, we should keep in mind that Turkey until recent had strong 'enemy image' and was associated as 'the other'. However, these ideological frames constructed by the Soviet regime were broken when the people to people relations began between two countries. In this sense, in the formation of Kazakh public's perception of Turkey, three phenomena played important role. One is Kazakh Diaspora in Turkey, the second is cooperation in the field of education, and the third is tourism of Turkey. All these intensified interaction of peoples of two countries and positively affected the Turkey's image in Kazakhstan. So in this chapter firstly I analyze the impact of the legacy of the Soviet period, more properly, the impact of Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity on the image of Turkey. Then I focus on three phenomena, namely, Kazakh Diaspora in Turkey, cooperation in education, and tourism of Turkey. I conclude the chapter by analyzing the results of public polls.

6.2 Eurasian Identity of Kazakhstan or Kazakh-language Media vs. Russian-language Media

As I have discussed in Chapter 3, the Soviet legacy has enormous impact on Kazakhstan's national identity. In the same way, it affects the Kazakh public's perception of Turkey. From the point of view of the Communist ideology which was against imperialism, the Ottoman Empire as other empires was built on the blood and exploited labor of people. The Ottoman Empire in books of history the Soviet era was described as an empire of horror which exploited free people of Balkans. From my personal experience I still remember the picture from a book of history lesson where Ottoman Sultan Murat I was killed by brave Serbian peasant. According to the

⁶¹⁸ Anar Somuncuoğlu, 'Bağımsızlık Sonrası Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti'nde "Türkiye ve "Türk" Algısının Geçirdiği Değişim' in *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies*, Cilt: 2, Sayı: 3, 2007, USAK, p. 43.

research of Guldariga Nogayeva, Kazakh youth define the Ottoman Empire with words ‘warrior’, ‘brave’ and ‘adherent to traditions’.⁶¹⁹ After indicating that it is because of books of history lesson, she adds that in newly published books, especially in those which are in Kazakh language, the Ottoman Empire is defined in much more positive way.⁶²⁰

The republic of Turkey, though till the beginning of the Cold War had close relations with the Soviet Union, was described as a country where bourgeoisie against the will of Turkish people supports imperialistic policies of the USA. Turkey as NATO member was perceived as an enemy. This information created general perception in Soviet Union. And Kazakhstan as the most sovieticized and Russified republic of the Union shared the same perception in higher extent than other republics in Central Asia, Caucasus, and Baltic. Though Kazakhstan became independent, it needs time for prejudice and stereotypes to be abandoned. According to Nogayeva’s study, the general public in Kazakhstan learn about Turkey firstly from history lesson books and then from television.⁶²¹ As we have discussed in Chapter 3 Kazakhstan’s mass media is under influence of Russian mass media. Even most of Kazakhstan’s TV channels broadcasting in Kazakh language take news from Russian news services and then translate them into Kazakh. In other words, Kazakh community sees Turkey mostly from Russian point of view. In this sense, Turkey’s national TV channel TRT AVAZ and radio TRT Kazakh which are partly broadcasting in Kazakh language are very important to the improvement of Turkey’s image in Kazakhstan.

Any ethnic Kazakh whose identity as a nation was recognized with the independence of Kazakhstan is concerned with not being assimilated by big nations and with loss of Kazakh identity in interaction with Turks. The very simple question ‘Are you a Turk?’ or ‘Are Turkish?’ put by Turkish citizen to Kazakh one can frightened him. As reaction he will immediately answer ‘No! I am Kazakh!’ Although every Kazakh generally knows that there is a Turk in his or her genealogy, he or she considers that

⁶¹⁹ Guldariga Nogayeva, *Kazakistan’da Türkiye ve Türk İmajı*, Yüksek Lisans tezi AÜ, 2007, p. 109.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Ibid., p. 110.

Türk is different from today's Turkey's Türk. To say it in English, in Turkey term 'Türk' means both Turkish and Turkic; while in minds of Kazakhs they are totally different things. Kazakhs know that they are Turkic people, but they are afraid of being or becoming Turkish people assuming it as assimilation. Consequently in terms of language, as it is correctly put by Bruce Privratsky, Kazakhs resist any suggestion – now frequently made by Turkish propagandists – that Kazakh, Uzbek, and other Turkic languages are simply dialects.⁶²² It is the success of the Soviet terminology and ideology.

Above given examples show that the legacy of the Soviet Union had deep imprints in mindsets of people. "Turkey as a country which has both Muslim and Turkic identities had too many similarities with Turkistan and Azerbaijan. At the same time it was not one of third world countries which the Soviet Union tried to influence. Turkey stayed in the Western Bloc and could negatively affect Muslims and Turks of the Soviet Union. If the traditional enmity of Russia and the fear of Pan-Turkism are added into this list, it becomes clear why Turkey was a 'forbidden' country in the Soviet Union."⁶²³ Turkey's image in the pre-independent Kazakhstan can be summarized by the words of a poem which was popular in the Soviet Union. "I do not need Turkish coast; I do not need foreign lands." When Turkey's image began to improve in Kazakhstan journalists especially Russian speaking ones frequently used the words of this poem as their title. For example 'We need Turkish coast'⁶²⁴, 'Turkish coast will become ours'⁶²⁵ or 'Turkish coast became close us'.⁶²⁶

⁶²² Bruce G. Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory*, Curzon, Great Britain, 2001, p. 36.

⁶²³ Anar Somuncuoğlu, 'Bağımsızlık Sonrası Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti'nde "Türkiye ve "Türk" Algısının Geçirdiği Değişim' in *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies*, Cilt: 2, Sayı: 3, 2007, USAK, p. 44.

⁶²⁴ Edil Asylbekov, 'Nuzhen nam bereg turetskiy', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.133*, 18 İyulya 1995 goda.

⁶²⁵ Lyubov' Dobrota, 'Bereg turetskiy stanet rodnym', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.32*, 16 Fevralya 1995 goda.

⁶²⁶ Natal'ya Todorova, 'Stal blizok nam bereg turetskiy', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.161*, 29 İyunya 1999 goda.

Based on general negative stereotypes about Turkey in the Soviet Union, we can argue that Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey began to improve. However, it should be noted here that reconstruction of Turkey's image in Kazakhstan's public has its peculiarities due to the Eurasian identity of the country. If we consider media as the expression of the public's perception then we find out that Kazakh-language media and Russian-language media speak in different tones. Kazakh-language media underlines that Turkey is brother country, while Russian-language media stresses on 'friendly Turkey.' While in Kazakh media euphoria, romanticism and ideology are popular, in Russian language media prevails rationalism.

Kazakhs and Kazakh-language media respectively perceive Turkey as a brother nation and wish all the best. The 'brother' relations among Turkic states are summarized in the article 'We wish the situation in Turkish brothers will stabilize'.

There was a perception that Turkic world revived after the collapse of the USSR. The people with Turkic roots found their relatives. They were welcomed by the state of Turkey which gained its independence earlier. Ankara was first to recognize their independence and supported them politically. Then economic relations deepened. Brothers met each other and shared each other's happiness. And now we worry about the instable political situation in Turkey.⁶²⁷

In other words, in Kazakh-language media there is sentimentality, while in the Russian-language media there is more rationality. This difference is well revealed in the debate of so called Turkish model.

So called Turkish model of development was a widely discussed topic in Kazakh media. While Kazakh-language media take for granted Russian-language media debate the matter. For ethnic Kazakhs taking into account similarities of language and culture, to follow Turkish model was logical. But for Russians Turkey was alien. For example, Baybolova in her article 'Kazakhstan and Turkey: limits of cooperation' published in 14 March 1992 in the Russian language newspaper *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* argues that there is a "great battle" between Turkey and Iran on influence over Central Asia.

Turkey according to unilateral evaluation of journalists has all chances to win this battle. It is not only because of its religious, ethnic and linguistic closeness to

⁶²⁷ 'Türük tuwıstardağı jaǵday turlawlı bolsın', *Egemen Qazaqstan No.44*, 5 Nawrız 1997 jil.

Muslim republics of CIS, but also because of its economic situation and its experience in social, economic and political developments.⁶²⁸

Concerning Kazakhstan's attitude towards the Turkish model the author having noted that Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have already declared that they would follow the Turkish path, contends that Kazakhstan will not follow the model of a concrete state.⁶²⁹ This opinion is adequate with the idea of Nazarbayev who defined Kazakhstan as Eurasian state with its own model of development.⁶³⁰ Baybolova observes that Kazak-Turkish relations are dominated by ideological factor. Interestingly, she argues that "Turkey, taking into account the fact that it does not have enough capability to realize its policy through economic activities, tries to compensate this by widening contacts in the spheres of culture, education, and religion."⁶³¹ The author concludes that Kazakhstan will learn from the Turkish model which proves that "a country which is experiencing transition to democracy and market economy to prevent chaos in all spheres of the community should lean to the regime of enlightened and secular authoritarianism."⁶³²

The difference of positions of two groups was revealed in very acute form in the debate of Kurdish issue of Turkey. Concerning the problem Kazakh-language media and Russian-language media have totally different positions. As it is known there are a large number of Kurds in Kazakhstan. They have their association. They participate in the works of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. Even more, Kurdish professor of National Academy of Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nadir Nadirov is member of Kurdish Parliament in exile in Netherlands.

⁶²⁸ Sh. Baybolov, 'Kazakhstan i Turtsiya: grani sotrudnichestva', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.62-63, 14 Mart 1992 goda*.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Strategiya Nezavisemosti*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 41.

⁶³¹ Sh. Baybolov, 'Kazakhstan i Turtsiya: grani sotrudnichestva', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.62-63, 14 Mart 1992 goda*.

⁶³² Ibid.

The position of the Russian-language media is close to that of media of Russian Federation. In the article of Adil' Umarov 'Turkey again demonstrates muscles' in newspaper *Delovaya nedelya* about Syrian-Turkish confrontation in 1998 defines PKK terrorists as 'partisans' and 'fighters' but not as 'separatists' and 'terrorists'. He writes that it is apparent that it is impossible to defeat Kurds as Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Greece support them.⁶³³ In similar way, Israpil Khabaev in his article 'The War without Odzhalan' defines PKK terrorists as 'rebels'.⁶³⁴

In 1999 in Almaty a group of Kurds organized a demonstration and tried to express their protest on the arrest of Ocalan in front of the Turkish embassy. On this event and generally on Kurdish separatism in Turkey, Rahmanqul Berdibay wrote an article 'Turkey's people and land are not separable' where he counts Turkey's contribution to the development of Kazakhstan. He reminds that Turkey supported Kazakhstan's independence not only with words but with actions, Turks opened almost 30 modern schools where Kazakh children are educated for free, they constructed so many industrial and cultural centers, they contributed to the development of Ahmet Yassawi University, they restored the tomb of Ahmet Yassawi, they allocated scholarships for Kazakh students in Turkish universities, they put statues in their main cities for our poets Abay and Mağjan, it was Turkey who welcomed Kazakh refugees from China. "In brief, we, Kazakhs, will not forget even for a moment that we have been witnessing the sincere brother assistance first of all from Turkey. Therefore, Turkey is our brother. We can declare without hesitation that Turkey's friend is our friend and Turkey's enemy is our enemy. Concerning disputes there are civilized ways of solving them. Kurds and others have to recognize democratic form and order. Turkey's people and land are not separable."⁶³⁵

⁶³³ Adil' Urmanov, 'Turtsiya vnov' demonstriruet muskuly', *Delovaya nedelya No.39*, 9 Oktyabrya 1998 goda.

⁶³⁴ Israpil Khabaev, 'Voyna bez Odzhalana', *Delovaya nedelya No.39*, 8 Oktyabrya 1999 goda.

⁶³⁵ Rahmanqul Berdibay, 'Türkiyanın eli de, jeri de tutas', *Egemen Qazaqstan No.40*, 26 Aqpan 1999 jil.

To sum up, Russian-language media reflect the perception of the part of the Kazakh public which stands close to Russia. The source of information of this group is the Russian Federation. In other words, Kazakhstan's Russian-language media see Turkey through the prism of Russia. Although the Kazakh-language media also receive news on Turkey through Russian media services, with the development of Internet and network between Kazakh and Turkish journalists, Kazakh-language media began to question the information serviced by Russia. In this respect, it is important to remind the establishment of the Public Foundation of Turkish-speaking journalists of Kazakhstan which aims to form unified stand of Kazakh journalists.⁶³⁶ The chief of the foundation is a prominent journalist Naziya Joyamergenqızı.

6.3 Kazakh Diaspora in Turkey

In 1990s the considerable size of Kazakh Diaspora whose number was from 20 thousand to thirty thousand existed in Turkey.⁶³⁷ Most of these people migrated to Turkey in 1953 from the modern west China that is Eastern Turkistan, through India and Pakistan. In 1980 their number increased with migrants from Iran and Afghanistan.

As it is known from history in the eighteenth century when Russia began its colonization of Kazakh lands from the southern west, China occupied eastern part of Kazakh lands. In this way Kazakhs were torn into two empires. Those who rebelled against the Russian Empire and lost generally migrated to China or to the Afghanistan and Iran. Those who rebelled against the Chinese government migrated to India through Tibet. Eventually Turkey became last destination of Kazakhs abroad. As it is put by Halife Altay, "...taking into account the unstable situation in Pakistan, we thought the most secure place for us can be Turkey, which was the sole and the last castle of Turkic world."⁶³⁸ According to the article of Esengül Köpçızı,

⁶³⁶<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Public-Foundation-of-Turkish-speaking-journalists-of-Kazakhstan/592446320861209?pnref=lhc> Accessed on 14.05.2014

⁶³⁷ Qıdır Rahat, 'Xalqı – 62,5 miylliyon, Qazaqtarı – 25 mñ', *Atacurt, Qazaq eli gazetiniñ qosımşası, No.13*, Nawrız 1998 jil.

⁶³⁸ Halife Altay, *Anayurttan Anadolu'ya*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1981, p. 372.

Turkish president Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes were interested to welcome Kazakh migrants to Turkey in order to increase the proportion of Turks in the country.⁶³⁹ On the other hand, under the conditions of the Cold War, migrants or refugees from China and the USSR were considered as the fighters against Communism. Hasen Oraltay indicates that almost every Kazakh who tried to escape imperial prosecutions in their countries dreamed to reach Turkey. Besides Kazakhs from China and Afghanistan, he counts Kazakh prisoners in Nazi jails from the Soviet Union who migrated to Turkey after the end of the World War II. He concludes that Kazakhs in Turkey did not face discrimination and became active member of society by participating in political parties and issuing newspapers and journals under names ‘Kazakh’ and ‘Alash’.⁶⁴⁰

In early 1990s Kazakh government launched a program of repatriation of Kazakhs abroad to Kazakhstan. According to Muhtar Qul-Muhammed, half of migrants from Afghanistan repatriated to Kazakhstan in 1993-1994, while those who came to Turkey in 1950s are not so eager to return their homelands.⁶⁴¹ Those who returned to Kazakhstan brought Turkish culture. By becoming the members of Kazakhstani society they became bridges between Turkey and Kazakhstan. These Kazakhs of Turkey contributed to the positive image of Turkey in Kazakhstan. They became representatives of Turkey in Kazakhstan and vice versa.

As the majority of Kazakhs returned from Turkey were religious and women were with head scarves, they were associated with Islam. The first translation of Quran from Arabic to Kazakh was made by Halife Altay who was one of the first Kazakhs who returned from Turkey. They contributed to the training of Mullahs by sending them to study in Turkey.⁶⁴²

⁶³⁹ Esengül Köpqi, “‘Tuqımımız tuzday qurımasa eken’ deydi qandastarımız’, *Qazaq Eli* No.8, 26 Aqpan 1999 jil.

⁶⁴⁰ Hasen Oraltay, ‘... Şekara tısındağı qazaqtar’, *Qazaq eli* No.21, 1 Jeltoqsan 1995 jil.

⁶⁴¹ Muhtar Qul-Muhammed, ‘Teñizder terbetken Türkiya’, *Jas Alaş*, No.145, 22 Qaraşa 1994 jil.

⁶⁴² Gülzeynep Sädirqızı, ‘Qızdar Türkiyağa jürip ketti’, *Egemen Qazaqstan*, No.146, 26 Mawsım 1992 jil.

Not only because of the activities of Kazakh Diaspora in Turkey, but generally in Kazakh community Turkey is associated with Islam. It can be because of plenty number of mosques in every city of Turkey. No doubt that the call for worship ‘azan’ gives deep impression on anybody who visits Turkey. It is certain that majority of Turkish people identify themselves with religion.

Kazakh writer Säken Seri in his visit to Turkey witnesses voice of the call to worship and asks what it is. Having learnt that there are seventy mosques in the city he asks again “If there are seventy mosques, then how many theatres are there?” The administrators of the city disappoint him. They were not only unaware of the number of the theatres, but they do not know whether there is or not any theatre in the city. Further he finds awkward that the majority of Turkish notables were looking down or somewhere else when the best Kazakh ballet artists were performing their dances as if it was not the zenith of arts as we considered but pornographic dance. When he learns that there is retirement house he does not hide his disappointment. “We thought that in Muslim country there could not be such place”⁶⁴³ Shortly, in Kazakh community Turkey has ‘religious’ image. Generally students who study in Turkey are frequently asked a question ‘Will you become Mullah?’ Besides Kazakh Diaspora Turkish entrepreneurs realized the construction of several mosques in Kazakhstan. Tulegen Izdibayev in his article notes that Turkey is helping in revival of Islam.⁶⁴⁴ Ultimately, Kazakhs of Turkey, their stories of migration contributed to the image that Turkey was not alien country to Kazakhs and will continue to be a ‘brother’ nation for Kazakhstan.

6.4 Cooperation in the Field of Education

Kazakhstan, which gained its independence after the demise of the Soviet Union, faced the problem of modernization of its education system. In this context, Turkey proposed its assistance and experience in many spheres. It is certain that cooperation in the field of education contributes to the development of Kazakh education system

⁶⁴³ Säken seri, ‘Ankarada – Abay parkı (Jazuwşı joljazbası)’, *Egemen Qazaqstan*, No.154, 7 Tamız 1998 jil.

⁶⁴⁴ Tulegen Izdibayev, ‘Eshshyo odin shag po puti dukhovnogo sbližheniya kazakhskogo i turetskogo narodov’, *Kazakhstankaya Pravda No.97*, 12 iyunya 1994 goda.

and constitutes an important part of the bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Turkey. Most importantly, it positively affected the image of Turkey in Kazakhstan. The cooperation in the field of education became one of the important tools which provided formation of Kazakh public's perception of Turkey.

The cooperation in the field of education had a high priority in the bilateral relations. Kazakhstan as a new country had to modernize its education system, prepare qualified specialists and train competitive employees. From Turkey's perspective, the aim of the Turkish foreign policy was to support the independence of newly emerged Turkic republics, build close relations with them, and help them to integrate into the international system. To reach these aims a proper strategy was worked out. As Köksal Toptan, the minister of education of Turkey in 1990s expressed it "We decided that the strongest, the most durable and promising project would be investment in the field of education."⁶⁴⁵ In other words, cooperation in education became the important instrument of Turkish foreign policy toward the region.⁶⁴⁶

The word 'cooperation' is important in this context. Although we are analyzing educational policy of Turkey towards Kazakhstan and how it is perceived by Kazakh community, which means that the subject here is projects, initiatives, and aid made by Turkey, this policy cannot be successful without consent of Kazakhstan. For that purpose, Turkish governments should be cautious not to harm bilateral relations as any change in political relations has potential to disrupt Turkish initiatives in the field of education. As the twenty years' experience showed, without cooperation of its partner-country, Turkey's official institutions even non-official groups can do nothing. In this regard, Uzbekistan's case is good example to illustrate how the deterioration of political relations could end all investments in that country including education. Accordingly, rather than speaking of one-sided Turkish education policy towards the region, it is reasonable to define the subject as bilateral cooperation in the field of education. On the other hand, a political relation by only itself does not

⁶⁴⁵ Büyük Öğrenci Projesi'nin 20. Yıl Dönümü 23 Aralık 2012 <http://www.haberler.com/buyuk-ogrenci-projesi-nin-20-yil-donumu-4194774-haberi/> Accessed on 6.01.2014

⁶⁴⁶ Y. Kavak & G.A. Baskan, 'Educational Policies and Applications of Turkey towards Turkic Republics and Communities', in *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 20, 2001, p. 93.

mean anything. Political relations must be underpinned by economic, cultural and educational relations. For the bilateral relations to be more durable, the relations between peoples of two countries should be constructed. The more people involved in bilateral relations, the more the political relations are stable. Common values, common sense of identity are becoming more and more determinant in foreign policy.

In this context, Turkey's investment in education was a correct strategy. Especially when we take into account the fact that though the post-Soviet Turkic countries defined themselves as Turkic, brother nations to Turkey, they and particularly Kazakhstan were torn from their Turkic roots. Indeed, Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity was formed as the result of this cutting the roots. As we discussed earlier, the Tsarist Russian and Soviet assimilation policies forced Kazakh people to leave the orbit of Islamic-Turkic civilization and enter into the orbit of the Slavic-Russian culture. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan found itself in a identity crisis. To overcome this identity crisis, Kazakhstan's leadership welcomed foreign support which could help to reconstruct Kazakh nation's Turkic and Islamic identity.

Kazakhstan supported all official and non-official initiatives of Turkey in the field of education. Even more, Kazakh leadership did not close down Turkish private schools in the country, established by non-governmental organizations, whose aim was allegedly to be to train a new generation, with pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic sentiments, which can then disrupt the constitutional system of the country.

Turkey on an official level built its relations with the new Turkic countries on the legacy of the Turkic civilization. Turkey acted as a big brother who could lead and protect the Turkic world. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was established to support first of all Turkic Republics and communities.⁶⁴⁷ The revelations of this understanding in education were 'Great Students Project' and 'the establishment common universities' (in Kazakhstan's case 'Hoca Ahmet Yesevi International Kazakh-Turkish University').

⁶⁴⁷ Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). <http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/about-us/1> Accessed on 10.01.2014

Turkey, since 1992-93 academic year, on the basis of bilateral agreements launched ‘the Great Student Project’ which aimed to provide scholarship to 10,000 students from Turkic countries and to give them opportunity to study in Turkish universities.⁶⁴⁸ The aims of the project were to promote the level of education in Turkic Republics and Communities, to help to meet the need of qualified specialists, to bring up a generation friendly to Turkey, and build durable bridge of brotherhood and friendship in Turkic world.⁶⁴⁹ Although the amount of scholarship decreased from 8,195 in 1993 to 1,548 in 1998,⁶⁵⁰ Turkey despite all economic difficulties in the country did not end this project. The total number of students studied in Turkey till 2010 composed 27,383.⁶⁵¹

Besides this project, there are dozens of students who come to Turkey by their own means. Until 2010 anyone who proves that he or she has Turkic origin was considered to be in equal terms with a citizen of the Republic of Turkey in payment of tuition fees. The Consulate of Turkic Republics and associations of Turkic communities provided this ‘certificate of Turkicness’ (*Türklük Belgesi*). It seems that Turkey’s increasing emphasis on Ottomannes rather than Turkicness affected the flow of students from Turkic world. As it was indicated by Kudret Bülbül, Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (*T.C Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı*) focuses not only on Turkic world but on whole world.⁶⁵² Accordingly, it is apparent that the number of scholarships allocated to Turkic people is decreasing while that for Middle East and Africa is increasing. This can be evaluated as the diversification of the Great Student Project which since 2012 changed its name as Turkish scholarships.

⁶⁴⁸ Y. Kavak & G.A. Baskan, ‘Educational Policies and Applications of Turkey towards Turkic Republics and Communities’, p. 95.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 96.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 97.

⁶⁵¹ The statement of Turkish minister of National Education in ‘Büyük öğrenci projesi’. <http://www.memurlar.net/haber/157356/> Accessed on 21.12.2013

⁶⁵² Opening speech of Kudret Bülbül, head of Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities of Prime Ministry of Republic of Turkey, (*T.C Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı*), in I Sosyal bilimler sempoziomu 13.04.2015.

From Kazakhstan's perspective, Turkish scholarships were considered as an important opportunity to increase the level of education. Until 2011 Turkey was the country which provided the most amount of scholarships for Kazakh citizens.⁶⁵³ According to the statistics of the Ministry of Education of Kazakhstan, until 2013 within the Great Student Project, 954 Kazakh citizens graduated from Turkish universities and 504 citizens are still studying.⁶⁵⁴ These numbers only reflect those who graduated. However, there are many who came to Turkey to study and could not graduate the universities. Since 1992, 3,150 Kazakh citizens studied in Turkey.⁶⁵⁵ The statistics show that only 30% of students finish their education successfully.⁶⁵⁶

The condition of students and the level of education were the most debated issued in Kazakhstan. Although the first permanent representative of the Kazakh Ministry of Education in Turkey Nurjan Azimbayev assures Kazakh community that the condition of the students is better than in 1992,⁶⁵⁷ Muhtar Qul-Muhammed suggests to decrease the number of students and increase the amount of their scholarship. He argues that the quality is important than the quantity of students.⁶⁵⁸

Although Kazakhstan in 1993 launched its own program 'Bolashak' (Future) to train youth abroad, Turkey remained one of the main destinations of Kazakh youth. Kazakh leadership did not restrict its citizens from studying abroad. In this regard,

⁶⁵³ Bilim jane Ğılım Salasındaǵı Halıqaralıq Intımaqtastıq. Qazaqstan Respublikası Bilim jane Ğılım Ministrliǵı 2011. http://www.edu.gov.kz/yzmeti/khalyaraly_yntymatasty/ Accessed on 25.11.2013

⁶⁵⁴ The Ministry of Education and Science. Bilateral Cooperation in the Field of Education and Science. http://www.edu.gov.kz/yzmeti/khalyaraly_yntymatasty/bilim_zhne_ylym_salasynday_khalyaraly_yntymatasty_turaly_aparat/ Accessed on 26.11.2013

⁶⁵⁵ The Ministry of Education and Science. 'Bilateral Cooperation in the Field of Education and Science.' http://www.edu.gov.kz/yzmeti/khalyaraly_yntymatasty/bilim_zhne_ylym_salasynday_khalyaraly_yntymatasty_turaly_aparat/ Accessed on 26.11.2013

⁶⁵⁶ Y. Kavak & G.A. Baskan, 'Educational Policies and Applications of Turkey towards Turkic Republics and Communities', p. 98.

⁶⁵⁷ Muhtar Anarbekov, 'Türkiyadaǵı turaqtı wäkil ondaǵı qazaq studentteriniñ jay-küyi tuwralı äñgimeleydi', *Halq keñesi No.402*, Säwir 1994 jil.

⁶⁵⁸ Muhtar Qul-Muhammed, 'Teñizder terbetken Türkiya', *Jas Alaş No.145*, 22 Qaraşa 1994 jil.

Turkey was preferred by Kazakh families with middle income. If we take into account that the idealist people in the history generally came from middle income families, most probably graduates from Turkish universities contribute a lot into the development of their country.

The general observation is that the Turkish graduates are patriots and nationalists. Many Kazakhs, who could not speak Kazakh language before they came to Turkey, learn it here because of the public pressure. In Kazakhstan not to speak in Kazakh is normal, but in Turkey where people perceive you as a brother with whom they share common origin and language, not to speak your mother tongue is a shame. Moreover, in Turkish public there is constant flow of information that Kazakh people were exploited and assimilated by the Russians and the Soviets. All these circumstances make Kazakh youth rediscover their roots which are Turkic in fact. Generally speaking, 'Great Student Project' is contributing into strengthening of Kazakh identity. The prominent example is Darhan Hidirali who is now serving as the head of the International Turkic Academy in Astana.

Another cooperation area in the field of education which became an instrument of formation of Kazakh public's perception of Turkey is Hoca Ahmet Yesevi International Kazakh-Turkish University. This university was established in Kazakhstan in accordance with the agreement between the Government of Kazakhstan and the Government of Turkey in 1992.⁶⁵⁹ Today the university has 11 faculties and one high school where 16,000 students study, 4,000 of whom are from Turkey, 750 are from other Turkic countries and communities, and the rest are Kazakhs.⁶⁶⁰ Approximately, 70,000 students graduated from the university until 2013.⁶⁶¹ The university is situated in town Turkistan (*Yassı*) in the south Kazakhstan

⁶⁵⁹

http://mfa.gov.kz/en/#!/foreign_policy/treaties_and_agreements/bilateral_international_treaties_of_the_public_of_kazakhstan_/turkey/ Accessed on 17.12.2013

⁶⁶⁰ 'Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Kazak-Türk Üniversitesi'.

http://www.yesevi.edu.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=118 Accessed on 26.11.2013

⁶⁶¹ Osman Horata, 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Sınır Ötesi Yüksek Öğretim Tecrübesi: Türk Cumhuriyetler Örneği', in *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013, p. 832.

where the tomb of Ahmet Yassawi, the great spiritual leader of Turkic world, is located. Turkistan was a small, backward town during the Soviet period. Due to its name Turkistan, the land of Turks and ideological importance, intentionally very limited investment was made during that time.

From a strategic point of view, common Kazakh-Turkish University would have been much more fruitful, if it had been established in intellectual centers like Almaty or Astana rather than in a rural area. Nevertheless, although Turkish side had to build everything from zero, the names ‘Turkistan’ and ‘Ahmet Yassawi’ were very symbolic. Indeed Ahmet Yassawi is the spiritual leader who compromised Islam and Old Turkic traditions. In this sense, city Turkistan is considered to be Mecca of the Turkic world. So the name Turkistan and Ahmet Yassawi are the common heritages of Turks.⁶⁶² As it is put by Fuat Köprülü, Yassawi is the origin of Anatolian Islam.

According to tradition, the spiritual influence of Ahmad Yassawi continued for a long time in all of the Balkans, Asia Minor, Azerbaijan – in short, among the Western Turks generally – as a great many dervishes who claimed to be attached to him gradually began to enter those regions. In the various countries to which he travelled, Evliya Çelebi visited the türbes of a number of saints who were considered to be connected with Ahmad Yassawi and he lists them one by one: Avshar Baba, whose türbe in Niyaz-abad was place of pilgrimage; Pir Dede, who was buried in, and had a tekke in, Merzifon; Akyazılı, whose great tekke was in Bat-ova plain on the Black Sea coast; Kademli Baba Sultan, who was buried in Adatepe on the Filibe road; Geyikli Baba, who was buried in Bursa; Abdal Musa; and Horos Dede, who was buried in Unkapanı. All of them were khalifas of Ahmad Yassawi.⁶⁶³

Turkish presidents during their visits to Kazakhstan try to visit this city.⁶⁶⁴ This tradition was continued from Özal to Gül and Erdoğan. In his last visit to Kazakhstan Özal stated “Once upon a time Muslims from Central Asia who were disciples of Ahmet Yassawi taught us Islam. And today descendants of those people who learnt Islam, grandsons of grandsons, disciples of disciples consider duty to pay the debt by teaching you Islam.”⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶² Erkin Qıdır, ‘Türkistan barşa türük besigi göy’, *Egemen Qazaqstan*, No.84, 13 Säwir 1993 jil.

⁶⁶³ Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, *Early Mystics in Turkish Literature*, Translated, edited and with an introduction by Gary Leiser and Robert Dankoff, Routledge, USA, 2006, p.31.

⁶⁶⁴ Ertay Bekqulov, ‘Türki jurtın tabıntqan Türkistanım’, *Halıq kenesi*, No.115, 13 Mamır 1992 jil.

⁶⁶⁵ Qaynar Oljay, ‘Türkiya tügel köşip kelgen sındı’, *Egemen Qazaqstan*, No.82-83, 10 Sawir 1993 jil.

So the name Ahmet Yassawi is symbolic name in bilateral relations. Today there are tree foundations after the name Ahmet Yassawi in Turkey. One is International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Foundation situated in Ankara and led by Namık Kemal Zeybek, the second is situated in Istanbul and led by Erdoğan Aslıyüce, the third is established by Kazakhs migrated to Turkey in 1950s.⁶⁶⁶ So Ahmet Yassawi is still admired by Turkish community.

From Kazakhstan's perspective, it was in its interests to establish the university in Turkistan, because the flowing investment to the university would develop the town and the region. On the other hand, the major cities of Kazakhstan were preoccupied by Russian culture, while in the periphery, Kazakh culture was predominant. So it would be easier for Turkish side to find common language and introduce their education. In addition, the South Kazakhstan is populated much more densely than other regions. In the final analysis, the establishment of the university in Turkistan helped not only to increase the level of the education but also to develop the most densely populated region of the country.

Concerning Kazakh public perception of the university we can refer to Bruce G. Privratsky who having noted that the Turks' cultural and religious impact has been significant, indicates that the local Kazakh-Uzbek symbiosis began to assume a more active Pan-Turkic dimension when the Turkish Turks arrived.⁶⁶⁷ But it is wrong to suggest that the university only contributed to the positive image of Turkey. Privratsky as scholar who lived and studied in Turkistan has correct observations about the place of the university in the Kazakh public perception of Turkey.

The Turkish presence has produced both gratitude and reaction. I have heard Kazaks wonder whether they have been realized from the Russian yoke only to submit to a Turkish one. This is an uncomfortable development for Kazak professional people who were educated in the Russian tradition, proud of the achievements of the USSR, and thought of Turkey as a client of the United States, not a benefactor or source of foreign aid.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁶ Asilbek Rahat, 'Asil baba atındağı qor adamdarı', *Qazaq eli*, No. 16, 25 Sawir 1997 jil.

⁶⁶⁷ Bruce G. Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory*, Curzon, Great Britain, 2001, p. 44.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

Besides the official institutions, Turkish non-governmental organizations also rushed the region to reconstruct Turkic and Islamic identities through education. We can generalize and divide them into two groups: Turkists and Islamists. While Turkists underlined Turkic solidarity, Islamists tried to revive religious values. Turkists were represented by the ‘Foundation of Turkic World Studies’ (*Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı*) and Islamists were represented by so called ‘Gülen Movement’. Both groups aimed to transform the society by educating youth.⁶⁶⁹ From this standpoint both have enlightening mission in what they sincerely believed.

The difference between two is that Turkists explicitly pronounced that they work for the Turkic ideals as it was in parallel with the official rhetoric of Turkey. Islamists never explicitly stated that they have religious agenda. On the contrary, the net of schools of Gülen Movement use English as education language, teach natural sciences, and computer technologies. What they are doing is to bring up a generation who are aware of their religious and as well as national values, and at the same time who can understand the modern world. So the aim is to modernize the Kazakh community with the preservation of traditional values. In this sense, Gülen Movement resembles the Jadidist movement of nineteenth century led by Ismail Gasprinski who aimed to modernize Turkic communities of Tsarist Russia. Another similarity between Jadidist movement and Gülen Movement is their activism in media. Since 1 January of 1992 two week after declaration of independence the newspaper ‘Zaman-Kazakhstan’ began its life in Kazakhstan.⁶⁷⁰ Unlike Islamists, Turkists “insisted on using Turkish as education language, despite the fact that the demand of the community was English.”⁶⁷¹ In addition, while Turkists tried to

⁶⁶⁹ Saadet Pınar Yıldırım, ‘Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı ve Çalışmalarının Kısa Özeti’, *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013, p. 832. Şerif Ali Tekalan, ‘Dünyadaki Türk Okulları’, *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013, p. 1110.

⁶⁷⁰ S. Yagmurova, ‘Gazetnyi most: Turtsiya—Alma-Ata’, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.271*, 26 Noyabrya 1991 goda.

⁶⁷¹ Saadet Pınar Yıldırım, ‘Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı ve Çalışmalarının Kısa Özeti’, *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013, p. 833.

replace Russian language with Turkish as lingua franca,⁶⁷² Islamists did not hesitate to teach Russian in their schools.⁶⁷³

The Foundation of Turkic World Studies established two Turkology departments one in the Abay Kazakh State University, in Almaty, the other in the Qorqıt Ata State University, in Kızılorda. The foundation also has three schools, one in Kentaw, the second in Turkistan, and the third in Kızılorda.⁶⁷⁴ The Gülen Movement which established ‘Kazakh-Turkish Education Foundation’ (*Kazak-Türk Eğitim Vakfı - KATEV*) in 1997 has one university named after Süleyman Demirel, in Almaty, one Economic College, in Taraz, and 30 schools all over the country.⁶⁷⁵ Thus non-governmental organizations constitute important place in cooperation in the field of education between Kazakhstan and Turkey. As is noted by Pınar Akçalı, Turkish schools are said to be respectable institutions which positively contribute to the image of Turkey.⁶⁷⁶

To sum up, viewed from Turkey, Turkish foreign policy toward Turkic world is seen as if Turkey entered the region with great expectations and returned with deep disappointments.⁶⁷⁷ However, viewed from Kazakhstan Turkey’s position in the region of Central Asia is strengthening. Especially when Kazakh-Turkish relations are analyzed, as we discussed above, Kazakhstan became the most reliable strategic

⁶⁷² Ibid.

⁶⁷³ Kazakh-Turkish Education Foundation (KATEV).

<http://www.katev.kz/?p=content&cl=hakkimizda&i=8> Accessed on 14.01.2014

⁶⁷⁴ Mehmet Yüce, ‘Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı’nın Türk Dünyasına Yönelik Eğitim Faaliyetleri’, *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013, p. 1153.

⁶⁷⁵ Kazakh-Turkish Education Foundation (KATEV).

<http://www.katev.kz/?p=content&cl=hakkimizda&i=8> Accessed on 14.01.2014

⁶⁷⁶ Pınar Akçalı, ‘Orta Asya’da Ulus Devlet İnşası ve Türkiye: Genel Bir Değerlendirme’, in Ayşegül Aydıngün – Çiğdem Balım (eds.) *Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Türk Dilli Halklar – Türkiye ile İlişkiler*, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, Ankara, 2012, p. 596.

⁶⁷⁷ Doç. Dr. Pınar Akçalı, ‘Türk Dış Politikası ve Türk Dünyası’, in Dr. Almagül İsina (ed.), *World Turkic Forum: Turkic Council, Turkic Diaspora and Socioeconomic Cooperation*, TASAM, İstanbul, 2012, p. 79.

partner of Turkey in the region. In this context, the cooperation in the field of education constitutes the considerable part in the bilateral relations. Both governmental and non-governmental organizations of Turkey are contributing to the improvement of education level of Kazakhstan. The Kazakh leadership did not question the origins of the Turkish initiatives. Rather Kazakhstan pragmatically evaluates the Turkish initiatives according to the results of the established institutions. In spite of their ideological motives, Kazakhstan did not stop cooperation with Turkey, as in the final analysis they helped to modernize its education system. From Turkish perspective, no matter what their origins are, any Turkish project of education in Kazakhstan strengthens Turkish presence in the country. The outcome is that Kazakh-Turkish relations got more stable and stronger. It can be predicted that this trend will continue in the foreseeable future as the new and new generation friendly to Turkey graduates from the Turkish schools and universities. In the final analysis Kazakh-Turkish cooperation in the field of education is the main factor which contributes to the positive image of the Turkey.

6.5 Tourism of Turkey

The third factor which facilitates people to people relations is Turkish tourism. It makes possible to replace old stereotypes and prejudices among the peoples of two countries. With the recovery and then rise of Kazakh economy Kazakhs began to travel abroad for holidays. Although Kazakh new rich class could travel where ever they want, the majority of Kazakh tourists prefer Turkey due to the available prices. According to the statistics of Turkey, in 2012 380,046 people, in 2013 425,773 people, and in 2014 437,971 people as tourists came from Kazakhstan.⁶⁷⁸ For a country with the population of 17 million, it is very high data. It means that Tourism of Turkey constitutes significant part of the bilateral relation and affects the image of Turkey among Kazakhs.

According to Yuliya Semykina's article besides prices Turkey is close to Kazakhstan in mentality. The fact that there is no-visa regime between two countries also

⁶⁷⁸ Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu 'İstatiksel Tablolar ve Dinamikler Sorgulama' http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1072 Accessed on 14.01.2014 13.05.2015

contributes to the development of tourism.⁶⁷⁹ Another journalist Natal'ya Todorova also notes that Turks' mentality is close to our and adds that those who can speak Kazakh can easily communicate with local people.⁶⁸⁰ It is apparent that tourism of Turkey positively affected the Turkey's image in Kazakhstan. If we take into account that in 1990s in foreign media Turkey was known by fight with PKK terrorists, we observe that tourism repaired this damage. Tourists spread their positive impressions about Turkey thus contribute to positive image of Turkey. In her article Todorova indicates that she has seen neither terrorists, neither tanks, nor security forces. Moreover she notes that the owner of the hotel where she stayed was Kurdish.⁶⁸¹

When we mention tourism from Kazakh perspective, it is adequate to mention Kazakhstan's relation with North Cyprus Turkish Republic. There is not any statement of Nazarbayev or any other high rank decision makers on the issue of recognition of North Cyprus Turkish Republic. However, in people to people relations Kazakhs used to meet northern Cypriots in different meetings of Turkic people. Even more, Kazakh nationalists suggest recognizing the independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. Tursin Jurtbay stated that it would be a support to Turkey if other five Turkic republics recognized North Cyprus.⁶⁸² Regarding tourism of Northern Cyprus, Kazakhs began to travel there for holidays since mid-1990s. According to article of Togzhan Kasenova one of the popular places in recent years for Kazakh tourists became Cyprus and other islands near it. Kasenova warns that Kazakh tourists do not question the status of island and political problems about it.⁶⁸³

⁶⁷⁹ Yuliya Semykina, 'Ya gotov tselovat' pesok...', *Journal Kontinent No.1*, 21 iyunya-3 avgusta 1999 goda.

⁶⁸⁰ Natal'ya Todorova, 'Stal blizok nam bereg turetskiy', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.161*, 29 Iyunya 1999 goda.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Interview of the author with Tursin Jurtbay. February 2012 Astana.

⁶⁸³ Togzhan Kasenova, 'Egeyskie ostrova – yabloko razdora', *Delvaya nedelya No.11*, 20 Marta 1998 goda.

Besides holiday tourism, North Cyprus became popular for Kazakhs in terms of educational tourism. When I visited the republic in 2014, I learned that more than 200 Kazakh students were studying there. In addition, North Cyprus became popular with the academic conferences among Kazakh academicians. The organizers of the conferences publish the presentations as articles in the indexed journals. It is the condition which is required to defend PhD dissertation in Kazakhstan.

To conclude, tourism, which means interaction of people, positively affects Turkey's image in Kazakhstan. Pınar Akçalı points out that tourism can be an advantage for Turkey in improving its image.⁶⁸⁴ The other study displays that it is fact that tourism of Turkey positively affects the Turkey's image in Kazakhstan. The authors of the study underline that Turkish tourism occupies considerable share in constitution of the positive perception of Turkey.⁶⁸⁵ The general understanding is that those people who visited Turkey have positive perception of Turkey as compared to those who have not. Taking into account the rising tendency of this dynamics, we can argue that Turkey's image in Kazakhstan will further improve.

6.6 Public Polls

When we analyze data of public poll *The Perception of Turk and Turkey in Kazakhstan* conducted by BilgeSAM, we see that the general feeling of sympathy of applicants, who are academics, students and working personnel of the Kazakh Economic University, Süleyman Demirel University, and Kazakh-American University, towards Turks is similar with that towards Russians.⁶⁸⁶ This fact one more time shows that Kazakhs culturally are pulled toward Russia and at the same time toward Turkic World. New public polls show that Kazakh community's sympathy toward Turkey has been increasing during 20 years after independence in

⁶⁸⁴ Pınar Akçalı, 'Orta Asya'da Ulus Devlet İnşası ve Türkiye: Genel Bir Değerlendirme', in Ayşegül Aydıngün – Çiğdem Balım (eds.) *Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Türk Dilli Halklar – Türkiye ile İlişkiler*, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, Ankara, 2012, p. 597.

⁶⁸⁵ Ayşegül Aydıngün - Hayati Tüfekçi, 'Avrasya'nın Merkezinden Dünya'ya Açılan Ülke: Kazakistan', in Ayşegül Aydıngün – Çiğdem Balım (eds.) *Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Türk Dilli Halklar – Türkiye ile İlişkiler*, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, Ankara, 2012, p. 119.

⁶⁸⁶ Dr. Salih Akyürek, *Kazakistan'da Türkiye ve Türk algısı*, BilgeSAM Rapor No: 44, Ankara, p. 12.

expense of Russia. According to research realized in 1995 “Kazakhs’ sympathy towards Russia was %46.5 and toward Turkey only %8.9.”⁶⁸⁷ In 2012 Kazakhs’ sympathy towards Russia was %57.8, whereas Kazakh’s sympathy towards Turkey was %57.6.⁶⁸⁸ This data reflects Kazakhstan’s Eurasian identity. In other words, Turkic-Slavic feature determines the country’s identity.

More interesting thing is that, the feeling of sympathy towards Turks among new generation between ages 17-25 is higher than old generation who are above 40 years old.⁶⁸⁹ It is explained by the fact that they were brought up in the post-Soviet era so had no negative stereotypes.⁶⁹⁰ This condition supports the argument of the study that Kazakhstan’s perception of Turkey is now more positive.

Nogayeva’s study shows the similar result about sympathy of Kazakh community toward Turkey. To the question ‘what do you feel toward Turks?’ %37.8 of respondents said ‘sympathy, while %24.4 answered that ‘they feel nothing’.⁶⁹¹ This ‘feeling nothing’ shows that Turkey is still undiscovered country for many Kazakhs.

Another public poll under the same title *The Perception of Turk and Turkey in Kazakhstan*, carried out by Kazakh academician Zhanat Mominkulov and applied to the students of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and Turar Ryskulov Kazakh Economic University, shows that %44,5 of applicants consider Turkey as brother country.⁶⁹² %43,2 of applicants answered ‘maybe Turkey is brother country’.⁶⁹³ To

⁶⁸⁷ Emre Kongar, *21.Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000’li Yıllarda Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı*, Remzi Kitabevi, 1998, p. 479.

⁶⁸⁸ Dr. Salih Akyürek, *The Perception of Turk and Turkey in Kazakhstan*, BilgeSAM Rapor No:44, 2012, Ankara, 2012, p. 12.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.14.

⁶⁹¹ Guldariga Nogayeva, *Kazakistan’da Türkiye ve Türk İmajı*, Yüksek Lisans tezi AÜ, 2007, p. 92.

⁶⁹² Zhanat Mominkulov, *Kazakistan’da Türkiye ve Türk algısı*, p. 9.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

another question which is put to evaluate closeness of Turkish people, %64,8 answered that ‘Turkish people are brother to us’, while %6 answered that ‘they are totally alien people’ and %18,9 preferred to say ‘Russians are closer to us’.⁶⁹⁴ The pollster underlines that despite the majority of students are Russian speaking students, the perception of Turkey among students is still positive.⁶⁹⁵

The applicants’ general sympathy towards Turkey is certain. However, when one closely observes data of polls, it is seen that the highest level of sympathy %59 constitutes Süleyman Demirel University. The university was established in Almaty by Turkish businessmen. On the other hand, the sympathy Kazakh-American University towards Turkey is %45 which is the lowest level in the poll.⁶⁹⁶ As Akyurek underlines the investment in education is very important.⁶⁹⁷ In this sense, despite all handicaps, ‘the Great Student Project’ (*Büyük Öğrenci Projesi*) launched by Turkey in 1992 to give opportunities for youth of Turkic Republics to study in Turkey made considerable contribution to improvement of Turkey’s image in the post-Soviet Turkic world. In Kazakhstan’s case, Ahmet Yassawi University plays important role in construction of positive perception of Turkey. “The Kazakh-Turkish schools, functioning all over the country, play the similar roles by spreading positive image among Kazakh people.”⁶⁹⁸

To sum up, any Kazakh who confronts with Turks or visit Turkey comes to conclusion that Turks and Kazakhs are relatives. The public poll of Mominkulov, whose respondents are students who specialize on Turkey and International Relations, shows that %72.8 of youth attended to the questionnaire consider Turkish

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

⁶⁹⁶ Dr. Salih Akyürek, *Kazakistan’da Türkiye ve Türk algısı*, BilgeSAM Rapor No:44, Ankara, p.12.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

⁶⁹⁸ Anar Somuncuoğlu, ‘Bağımsızlık Sonrası Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti’nde “Türkiye ve “Türk” Algısının Geçirdiği Değişim’ in *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies*, Cilt:2, Sayı: 3,2007, USAK, p. 52.

language as similar to Kazakh language while %18.5 consider it as totally different language, and %2.8 said Russian language is better.⁶⁹⁹

To the question ‘Is Turkey a country with imperial ambitions?’ %13.6 of respondents answered ‘Yes’, %2.9 ‘No’, %28.7 ‘Maybe yes’, and %35.6 said ‘Maybe no’. The pollster, by indicating that most of respondents are aware of Turkey’s condition, notes that in total %42.3 (%13.6 ‘Yes’ plus %28.7 ‘Maybe yes’) consider that Turkey is a rising power. To the question ‘What power is Turkey?’ %47 of the respondents answered ‘it is medium power country’; %40 said ‘it is regional power’, %6.7 said ‘it is not super power’, and %1.3 answered ‘it is super power in the world’. To the question ‘how do you evaluate present foreign policy pursued by Turkey?’ %60.5 of respondents answered ‘correct’, %18.3 said ‘soft’, %12.6 defined it ‘clever’, %5.6 indicate it as ‘wrong’, and %2.8 responded ‘aggressive’.⁷⁰⁰

According to the results of these polls it is apparent that Turkey has a positive image in Kazakh community. Analyzing the answers of the applicants one can come to conclusion that Turkey’s image in the country will evolve in positive direction. In these public polls it seems that sympathy towards Turkey is surpassing that towards Russia. But we should take into account the fact that all these polls were realized in the south and west of Kazakhstan. If the same poll was realized in the north, for example in the city of Petropavl or in the east, in the city Öskemen, definitely, the results would on the contrary due to the demographic composition. These polls are important to see the image of Turkey in the most densely populated city of Almaty which is at the same time is the intellectual of the country. Unfortunately, I could not reach any public poll organized in the capital Astana. But most probably, if such poll organized in Astana, it would reflect the Eurasian identity of the country which means sympathy towards Russia and Turkey would be the same. Nevertheless, the sympathy towards Turkey among youth would be still high as the main flow of youth to the capital is coming from the south.

⁶⁹⁹ Zhanat Mominkulov, *Kazakistan’da Türkiye ve Türk algısı*, p.15.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.11.

In addition to the results of these public polls, as the measurement of the Kazakh public perception of Turkey we can consider the interest to learn Turkish language in Kazakhstan. Aydıngün and Tüfekçioğlu detect in their study that in Kazakh society there is a rising interest to learn Turkish language.⁷⁰¹ Besides the Turkish schools in Kazakhstan and the Turkish Universities in Turkey and Kazakhstan which teach Turkish language there are many other institutions which do this job. According to the information provided by Turkish embassy, the Turkish Ministry of Education send Turkish language teachers to Almaty Turkish Language Teaching Center (Almaty TÖMER), Kentaw Education Center, Abilayhan World Languages University, Turan University, Abay Kazakh National Pedagogic University, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, International Foreign Languages and Professional Carrier University, State Girls Pedagogic University, Kazakh Social Relations and Labour Academy, Kazakh Military Academy, Kazakhstan Ziraat Bankasi, No 139 school. Besides them Yunus Emre Institute, established in Astana in 2010, plays significant role in teaching and providing support to spread Turkish language.⁷⁰² This rising interest to learn Turkish supports the argument of the dissertation that the image of Turkey is evolving in a positive direction.

6.7 Conclusion

As it was mention in Chapter 3, while discussing domestic factors which shape Kazakhstan's national identity, Kazakhstan's population is composed of Turkic people who identify themselves with Turkic civilizations and of Slavic people who identify themselves with Russian and Soviet civilization. These two groups constitute Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan. Due to the fact that Russian and Soviet culture was dominant in the country, Turkey was perceived as 'the other'. But with the shift of the balance in favor of Turkic group, that is Kazakhs, and partly due to the fact that Kazakhstan identified itself with Turkic civilization, Turkey's image in the country began to improve. According to a study besides ethnic Kazakhs other Turkic groups

⁷⁰¹ Ayşegül Aydıngün - Hayati Tüfekçi, 'Avrasya'nın Merkezinden Dünya'ya Açılan Ülke: Kazakistan', in Ayşegül Aydıngün – Çiğdem Balım (eds.), *Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Türk Dilli Halklar – Türkiye ile İlişkiler*, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, Ankara, 2012, p. 120.

⁷⁰² Ibid., p. 121.

such as MeskhetianTurks (*Ahıska Türkleri*), Uygur, Uzbeks, Kazan Tatars, Crimean Tatars have positive image of Turkey.⁷⁰³ In addition to this general trend, three factors affected Kazakh public's perception of Turkey. These are Kazakh Diaspora in Turkey, cooperation in the education, and tourism of Turkey.

In early 1990s, Kazakh government launched a program of repatriation of Kazakhs abroad to Kazakhstan. Those who returned to Kazakhstan brought Turkish culture with themselves. By becoming the members of Kazakhstani society they became bridges between Turkey and Kazakhstan. These Kazakhs of Turkey contributed to the positive image of Turkey in Kazakhstan. They became representatives of Turkey in Kazakhstan. Ultimately, Kazakhs of Turkey, their stories of migration contributed to the image that Turkey was not an alien country to Kazakhs and will continue to be a 'brother' nation for Kazakhstan.

Cooperation in the field of education constitutes the considerable part in the bilateral relations. Both governmental and non-governmental organizations of Turkey are contributing to the improvement of education level of Kazakhstan. The Kazakh leadership did not question the origins of the Turkish initiatives. Rather Kazakhstan pragmatically evaluates the Turkish initiatives according to the results of the established institutions. In spite of their ideological motives, Kazakhstan did not stop cooperation with Turkey, as in the final analysis they helped to modernize its education system. All Turkish project of education in Kazakhstan strengthens Turkish presence in the country. The outcome is that Kazakh-Turkish relations get more stable and stronger. It can be predicted that this trend will continue in the foreseeable future as the new generation friendly to Turkey graduates from the Turkish schools and universities. In the final analysis Kazakh-Turkish cooperation in the field of education is the main factor which contributes to the positive image of the Turkey.

Concerning tourism, we can say that this factor which means interaction of people, positively affects Turkey's image in Kazakhstan. The general perception is that those people who visited Turkey have a positive perception of Turkey as compared to

⁷⁰³ Ibid., p. 123.

those who have not been yet. Moreover, people who visited Turkey discover that Turkish language is similar to Kazakh language. This discovery is important as people began to view Turkey not as 'the other' country but as 'our' country.

Except these three factors which shape Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey, there are other factors as well which were not analyzed in the dissertation. Those are Turkish business in Kazakhstan, intermarriages between Kazakhs and Turks, and Turkish soup operas. Although these factors were not examined in the study, I can say that these factors have disputable impact on the image of Turkey in Kazakhstan. It is a fact that Turkish businessmen are contributing to the Kazakh economy. Especially Turkish construction companies are active in the building of new capital. However, due to the low education and cultural level of workers in those companies there is general negative perception about them. In 2006 in the western part of the country there was a bloody clash between Kazakh workers and Turkish workers. This event displays that Turkish business has no positive impact on Turkey's image in the eyes of the Kazakh general public. Concerning intermarriages I can say that generally Kazakh women marry with Turkish men and then move to Turkey. And even if Kazakh men marry Turkish women they stay not in Kazakhstan but in Turkey. A proper study should be conducted on the issue. Before that, it is difficult to evaluate how these intermarriages affect Turkey's image in Kazakhstan. But what is certain is that the phenomenon is at the detriment of Kazakhstan in demographic and intellectual sense. I remember how Meryem Hakim, an ethnic Kazakh academician of Turkey, in her speech in World Kazakh Congress in 2005, called not to send Kazakh girls to study in Turkey, as generally they marry and stay there. Concerning Turkish soup operas also it is difficult to evaluate, as it has both positive and negative influence.

To conclude the chapter, it can be said that Kazakh public is discovering Turkey. This discovery breaks the previous negative images of Turkey constructed during the Soviet time. In this sense, Turkey's image in Kazakh public is evolving from the negative one to the positive. The more two people learn about Turkey, the more Turkey's image in Kazakhstan will improve. Taking into account the general tendency to globalization, and rate of interaction of two peoples, it can be predicted

that Kazakh public perception of Turkey will evolve in positive direction. In one word I can say that 'brother image' of Turkey in Kazakh public is strengthening.

CHAPTER 7

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND KAZAKHSTAN'S PERCEPTION OF TURKEY

7.1 Introduction

When the international environment is considered as the level of analysis in Image Theory of International Relations, it is conceived that Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is determined by the interaction of states in the system. The idea is that it is the international environment where Kazakhstan is situated shapes Kazakhstan's attitude towards Turkey. In Constructivist understanding, especially Wendt's systemic Constructivism, Kazakhstan's view on Turkish foreign policy is shaped by the cultural environment of Kazakhstan and cultural identity of Turkey. In this chapter, I firstly examine Kazakhstan's international environment, which is Eurasian as it was discussed in Chapter 3, and how that environment is affecting Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. Secondly, I analyze interaction between Kazakhstan and Turkey by taking into account the identities of two countries. So the main argument here is that it is international environment (East-West, Europe-Asia, Christian-Islamic, Turkic-Slavic,) and then the (Eurasian) identities of two countries which shapes Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey in international level.

7.2 Eurasian Environment of Kazakhstan

As we have mentioned in Chapter 3, while discussing international factors which shape Kazakhstan's national identity, Kazakhstan is situated between four civilizations. These are Western-European, Eastern-Chinese, Russian-Slavic, and Turkic-Islamic civilizations. Taking into account these groupings towards which Kazakhstan is pulled, Nazarbayev defined the country's identity as Eurasian.⁷⁰⁴ It is important to note that the concept of Eurasia is not only a bridge which links these civilizations, rather, "it is a unique civilization with its own past and future."⁷⁰⁵ It is because the concept of bridge does not have its identity, but civilization has. Moreover, in the collective memory of Kazakhs, which is also pronounced at the political level, ethnic Kazakhs see themselves as the heirs of nomads and the nomadic empires such as Huns, Great Turks, the Mongols and the Golden Horde. In this sense, Nomadic-Turkic civilization was 'the other' of settled civilizations such as Chinese in the east, Persian-Iranian in the south, and Roman-European in the west. Eventually, Turkic-nomadic civilization was encircled and colonized by the settled civilizations. In this regard, Kazakhstan emerged in the remnants of this Turkic-nomadic civilization culturally and mentally. If one digs the collective memory of modern Kazakhs, there are three 'others' in their self-identification. The first 'other' is '*qıtay*' Chinese, the second 'other' is '*sart*' Persian, and the third is '*aqqulaq*' Russian. Among this three, 'the otherness' of Persia-Iran was resolved within the frame of Islamic solidarity.⁷⁰⁶ The perception of 'the other' related to Russia was mitigated by mutual co-existence, and especially during the Soviet Union by the concept of Soviet man and the common Soviet history where Kazakhs shoulder in shoulder fought against Nazi Germany and fascist Japan. But the perception of 'the other' China is still strong.

⁷⁰⁴ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na poroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 95.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ The term '*sart*' in Modern Kazakh language has a meaning of merchant (<http://sozdik.kz/ru/dictionary/translate/kk/ru/>). As we have discussed in chapter 3, it refers to Persian settled people of Central Asia. It is culturally 'the other' of Turko-nomads. But in religious term, as Shi'a, Iran is identified with term '*qızılbas*' which is indeed 'enemy image' (<http://sozdik.kz/ru/dictionary/translate/kk/ru/>).

Ultimately, modern Kazakhstan in cultural-civilization sense is situated among Western-European, Eastern-Chinese, Russian-Slavic, and Turkic-Islamic poles. Kydyrbekughli defines these four centers as geopolitical rectangle.

Geographically, Kazakhstan is situated on the geopolitical triangle Russia-China-Islamic world. However, the domination of the Western world under the leadership of the USA turned this triangle into a rectangle. Practically, none of these four geopolitical poles or subjects wants to grant Kazakhstan a neutral status. The main reason of this unwillingness is physical geography and geologic map of Kazakhstan.⁷⁰⁷

For Kazakhstan due to the ‘image of the other’ and ‘enemy image’ of China, the immediate threat was stemming from China, whose main rival in Eurasia the USSR was disintegrated into small states and by this China gained an opportunity to invade the Central Asian fragile weak states. In addition, the Central Asian countries as Kazakhstan, Kirgiz Republic and Tajikistan inherited from the Soviet Union disputable borders with China. This border was drawn in nineteenth century by a treaty between Qing dynasty in China and Romanov dynasty in Russia. As it is indicted by Zhao Huasheng, from a Chinese historical view the boundary was based on the unequal treaties imposed by Russia.⁷⁰⁸ In Chinese history books the territories of Tang dynasty of China including south-eastern regions of Kazakhstan are considered as Chinese territories. “China in its educational and ideological policy teaches its people that the territories of Kazakhstan and other states of Central Asia are either as temporarily free from settlement territories or as indigenous Chinese lands.”⁷⁰⁹ Moreover, the clashes between the Soviet and the Chinese forces in the border in 1969 were fresh in the memory of Kazakhs. Therefore, according to a study held in 1995 almost 40 percent of Kazakhs viewed China as principal threat to the

⁷⁰⁷ Doulatbek Khidirbekughli, ‘Kazakhstan kak geopoliticeskiy subekt v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh’, in *Tawelsiz Qazaqstanniñ halıqaralıq bedeliniñ ösüwi jáne jahandanuwdıñ qawip-qaterleri, Halıqaralıq ğilmiy-praktikalıq konferentsiyaniñ materiyaldarı*, Filosofiya jáne politologiya Institutı QR BGM ĞK, Almatı, 2011, p. 112.

⁷⁰⁸ Huasheng Zhao, ‘Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy’, in Rumer Eugene (ed.), *Central Asia Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing*, ME. Sharp, Armonk, New York, 2007, p. 173.

⁷⁰⁹ Doulatbek Khidirbekughli, ‘Kazakhstan kak geopoliticeskiy subekt v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh’, p. 113.

country.⁷¹⁰ In comparison, ‘China threat theory’ in Kazakhstan is more prominent than in other states of Central Asia.⁷¹¹

As it was mentioned above, not only because of the physical or military threat, but because of the unfamiliar, alien language and civilization, China is considered from the perspective of culture and identity as ‘the other’. It can be argued that China has the strong ‘enemy image’ in Kazakhstan. Interestingly, this perception was not only constructed during the Soviet-Chinese rivalry, but has its roots in deep history. From the perspective of Turkic-nomadic worldview, China was always ‘the other’. Even, Chinese built the great wall to differ themselves from nomads. Today Kazakhs call China as ‘*qıtay*’. And this word in proverbs and phrases does not have good association. When there is crowd and noisy Kazakhs curse ‘*Oy, qıtay bolǵır*’ (May become *qıtay*) or ‘*qıtay qıp jiberdinder goy*’ (You turned me to *qıtay*, you made me mad). In these phrases ‘*qıtay*’ is used in the meaning of crowd and noise. There is another proverb, where ‘*qıtay*’ is used in the meaning of ‘China’. ‘*Qara qıtay qaptasa, sarı orıs aǵayınıñday köriner*’, which means if black Chinese rush into your homeland, yellow Russian will look like your brother. Here, besides the meaning of the proverb itself, the word ‘black Chinese’ displays that China is ‘the other.’ Among Kazakhs today China has ‘the image of a dragon swallowing its neighbors’.

Both Chinese government and Kazakh government tried to dissolve this ‘enemy image’ of China. In February 1995 China provided a security guarantee for Kazakhstan as the prize of Kazakhstan’s refusal of the nuclear bombs inherited from the Soviet Union. In 1998 Kazakhstan was the first among the post-Soviet states to resolve its border issues with China. Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state to form a strategic partnership with China in 2005.⁷¹² Despite all positive developments in Kazakh-Sino relations China remains as a concern in security thinking of

⁷¹⁰ *Etnopoliticheskii monitoring v Kazakhstane*, Akkor, Almaty, 1995. Quoted in Sally N.Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2005, p.83.

⁷¹¹ Huasheng Zhao, ‘Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy’, p. 172.

⁷¹² *Ibid.*

Kazakhstan.⁷¹³ In addition, as Jonathan Aitken notices, the mood of general public remains stubbornly to the manifest expansion of all things Chinese in Kazakhstan, from the illegal immigrants who surface in Almaty's flea markets to the growing number of Chinese-owned businesses. He quotes new joke among Kazakhs 'If you are planning to leave this country – learn English; if you want to stay here – learn Chinese.'⁷¹⁴

From Astana's perspective, the Chinese rising power is balanced by close allied relations with Russia. Although in the collective memory of ethnic Kazakhs Russia is 'the other' in identity building, in relations to China, Russia, as it was indicated in the above mentioned Kazakh proverb, is 'our selves'. Indeed, Kazakhs are living together with Russians for almost three hundred years. Kazakhs know their mindset, understand their language. In addition, in demographic sense, ethnic Russians' population is decreasing, if even is not decreasing, is not frightening as that of Chinese. There is another Kazakh proverb '*Eski jaw añdısqanğa jaqsı*' which means that it is better to fight the old enemy whose tactics of fight are familiar than an unfamiliar new enemy. In this sense, Russia is familiar old enemy as compared to China. Ultimately, as it is put by Nazarbayev:

After the independence Russia did not become simply just one of our neighbors. It is already time to understand and recognize the simple fact that our partner relations with Russia will be one of the indispensable conditions in providing the strategic security of our country in upcoming century.⁷¹⁵

It is explicit that the 'providing security' is against threat from the East.

In this line the first strategy of Kazakhstan was to save existing security system of the Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States which was established in Almaty aimed to serve this strategy. As the result, the cooperation among the post-

⁷¹³ Doulatbek Khidirbekughli, 'Kazakhstan kak geopoliticeskiy subekt v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh', p. 115.

⁷¹⁴ Jonathan Aitken, *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes after 20 Years of Independence*, Continuum, London, 2012, p. 145.

⁷¹⁵ 'QR Prezidentiniñ Qazaqstan halqına joldawı, Stabil'nost' i bezopasnost' strany v novom stoletiyе 16.09.1999' http://www.akorda.kz/kz/page/kazakhstan-respublikasynyn-prezidenti-n-a-nazarbaevtyn-kazakhstan-khalkyna-zholdauy-20199-zhylyhy-kyrkuiek_1342857844 Retrieved 10.12.2012

Soviet states was solidified in 1995 by the Treaty of Collective Security which later became the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Since very beginning Kazakhstan stayed close to Russia.

Kazakhstan's convergence to Russia, even during the early 90s when Russia itself was unwilling to such convergence, can be evaluated as balancing with Russia against China. Further, after this purpose is accomplished Kazakhstan did not want to be too much dependent on Russia. This time Russia had to be balanced by other powers. But this balance should not damage Kazakhstan-Russian alignment. In the words of Cumming, the main challenge for Kazakhstan has been to create new foreign policy which is at once respectful of but less dependent on Russia.⁷¹⁶ Kazakhstan's purpose was to guarantee its independence. In this regard Turkey provided an opportunity, especially when we take into consideration the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO. Kydyrbekughli having counted Russia, China, and Islamic world as threats to Kazakhstan's security and suggesting that Euro-American globalism is not a threat, concludes that strong relations with the Western countries would balance the geopolitical claims of the neighbors as Russia and China.⁷¹⁷ It is certain that Kazakhstan cannot enter the security system of the West. So in this circumstance, Turkey is the best option.

Although Kazakhstan's identity was defined as Eurasian which means both Turkic and Slavic; as we have discussed in the previous chapters, the internal balance between the two is shifting towards Turkic one. In addition, in the final analysis, from the perspective of the collective memory of the ethnic Kazakhs, Russia is in terms of identity 'the other'. Therefore, Turkey which is the leader of the Turkic world to whom Kazakhs belong, could balance Russia in cultural sense. In other words, 'image of the other' of Russia constitutes 'ourselves image' of Turkey.

The second priority of Kazakhstan in its foreign policy in early 1990s was to be integrated into international system. In the first years of independence, the aim was

⁷¹⁶ Sally N. Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2005, p. 2.

⁷¹⁷ Doulatbek Khidirbekughli, 'Kazakhstan kak geopoliticeskiy subekt v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh', p. 115.

to become members of international organizations. The matter is that when Kazakhstan becomes a member of an international organization, it means that the independence, that is, the existence of the state as a subject of international system was recognized. Beside the fact that Turkey was the first state to recognize Kazakhstan's independence, Ankara supported Kazakhstan's membership in all international organizations.

Indeed, international organizations are good places to understand how in systemic level 'threat image', 'enemy image', 'friend image' 'kin image', 'brother image' to sum up, 'image of the other' and 'ourselves image' affect the actors. For example, in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization there are three degrees of states. In the first degree there are full members, in the second degree there are observer states who have potential to become full members, and in the third degree there are dialogue partners. China, Russia and Central Asian states are the full members of the organization. In the second degree Russia supports India to grant the status observer in the organization. Moscow wants to balance Chinese rising influence by India. From the perspective of China, India as its rival in Asia is balanced with Pakistan's observer status. Iran's observer status in geopolitical sense is supported both by Russia and China. In economic considerations, Iran is important for the Central Asian states to reach the world market bypassing Russia and China. Afghanistan is important as a security concern for all members but first of all for the Central Asian states. In dialogue partner level, Russia supports Belarus, China supports Sri Lanka, and Central Asian states support Turkey. The table below displays the relations within the SCO. In the first line there are full member-states. In the second line there are observer states. And in the third line there are dialogue partner states. If one looks from top to down, there are certain feelings of solidarity among Russia-India-Belarus against China-Pakistan-Sri Lanka. And the Central Asian states and first of all Kazakhstan which is "the third pillar of the organization along with Russia and China"⁷¹⁸ try to strengthen their positions with cooperation with Iran, Afghanistan and most importantly with Turkey which is a Muslim-Turkic state and a member of NATO.

⁷¹⁸ Trenin, Dmitri 'Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects' in in Rumer, Eugene, Trenin Dmitri, and Zhao, Huasheng (Eds.) *Central Asia, View from Washington, Moscow and Beijing*, M.E.Sharp, New York,2007, p. 80.

From Constructivist approach, the internal dynamics of the SCO read in similar way. Nazarbayev noted in his speech in the SCO Summit in 2011 that the uniqueness of the SCO is that it united the states which represent different cultures and civilizations.⁷¹⁹ Russia represents Orthodox Christian world, China represents Confucian world, Kazakhstan represents Muslim Turkic world. Therefore, for Kazakhstan it is natural to support the Turkey's status as the dialogue partner.

Table 1. Dynamics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Members	Russia	China	Central Asian states
Observers	India	Pakistan	Iran Afghanistan
Dialogue partners	Belarus	Sri Lanka	Turkey

In Constructivist understanding, Kazakhstan's view on Turkish foreign policy was determined by cultural and civilization environment of the country. Nazarbayev indicates the importance of cultural issues in the following way.

Cultural revolutions in contrast with political ones take places without shooting a bullet and without bloody nights; in terms of influence they are more significant than the change of a political elite with another one. Cultural transformations whose consequences are more long-lasting and fundamental display their power in different ways than political ones.⁷²⁰

Cultural rationale is important to form an independent subject of international relations. For Kazakhstan which has identity crisis this issue is twice important. As it was discussed in Chapter 3, Kazakhstan is situated, even hanged, between Orthodox Christian Slavic world and Muslim Turkic world. These two worlds can be defined as two poles toward which Kazakhstan is pulled. As the post-Soviet, and more importantly as the post-Russian state in cultural terms, the Russian culture and language was more predominant than Turkic one in Kazakhstan. However, Kazakhstan sees itself as the continuation of nomadic Turkic statehood. This

⁷¹⁹ 'The Speech of Nursultan Nazarbayev at the Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Astana, Astana 15 June, 2011', *Diplomatic Herald*, 3 (30) 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, p. 10.

⁷²⁰ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 65.

identification of Kazakhstan with Turkic legacy necessitates cooperation with Turkic states, and first of all Turkey.

Nevertheless, there is no discussion on the shift of Kazakhstan's place from Slavic orbit to Turkic orbit. Rather Kazakhstan is trying to survive without leaving any of the orbits. Kazakhstan's concept of Eurasianism which is conceived as the space of co-existence and interaction of Slavic-Turkic poles should be interpreted as Kazakhstan's attempt to resolve this dilemma. By introducing Eurasian concept, Kazakhstan tries to develop close relations with Turkey without harming its cooperation with Russia.

To sum up, international environment pushes Kazakhstan towards Turkey. The basis of the convergence is reference to the Turkic civilization. In addition, Islam is factor in international environment which make possible the convergence of two states as they are both are situated at the edge of the Islamic world. Moreover, Turkey's place in the Western world, its experiences in building a democratic, modern, Western community also affects Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey positively.

To open this last point on democracy, the leaders of Central Asian states after independence faced the security-freedom dilemma. The leaders had to ensure security of their countries and provide freedom to their people. As the states who gained their independence from totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union, all Central Asian states promised freedom to their people in their national constitutions. However, by the time it was understood by the most of leaders that more freedom can lead to less security or even to instability and chaos in the country. The tensions in 2005 and 2010 in Kirgiz Republic which was earlier described as an island of democracy proved this understanding. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan preferred security to freedom. Nazarbayev pursues balanced policy which provides both security and freedom. Thus, from the perspective of the security-freedom dilemma Kazakhstan's case is the most successful in the region. Taking into account this consideration, Turkey as a democratic country can be perceived as an inspiring model for the Central Asian people. As it is indicated by Galymzhan Jusipov, the more democratic Central Asian states are, the closer their relations with Turkey

are.⁷²¹ In this respect Nazarbayev's success is that he provided his people with freedom by developing close relations with democratic countries and first of all with Turkey whose democratic experience and cultural values are closer to us than the Western countries, in this way giving opportunity for people to interact with foreigners.

7.3 Kazakhstan-Turkey Interaction

Another explanation of Kazakhstan's positive perception of Turkey from Constructivist approach is that Kazakh-Turkish relations began with a clean start. As it is examined in Wendt's Constructivism, both sides were absent of established prejudices about each other. According to Constructivism, the level of bilateral relations is determined by the state identities of both Kazakhstan and Turkey. Similarities of state identities of two states create condition for cooperation. The reciprocal perceptions are determined by the identities of two states.

Having analyzed Kazakhstan's and Turkey's identities, one can find many similarities in the state identities of two countries. Both Kazakhstan and Turkey are Eurasian states which mean that they share both European and Asian values and play the role of bridge between East and West. Although Kazakhstan is considered as a Central Asian state, regarding the worldview of its people, and especially of its ruling elite, it is more European and less Central Asian comparing to its southern neighbors, just like Turkey which is more European and less Middle Eastern than its southern neighbors. Ottoman later Turkish elite who studied in Western countries was under the influence of Western achievements. Later this generation was driving force in modernization of Turkey. And Kazakh elite who studied in Russian schools and universities during imperial⁷²² and Soviet time were much more populous than students from other Central Asian Republics. As a result both Kazakhstan and Turkey became Westernized.

⁷²¹ Galym Jusipov's presentation in the Conference held in METU IR June 2013.

⁷²² Emin Özdemir, *20.yüzyılın başlarında Kazakistan'da fikir hareketleri*, Doktora Tezi, Gazi Üniversitesi, Ankara 2007, p. 72.

In terms of civilization in addition to the fact that Kazakhstan and Turkey share Turkic civilization, both form the border of Islamic civilization, in other words both are situated in the region where Islam meets other civilizations. Both states are situated in geopolitical important regions. Both link the West to the East and the North to the South. Both states play significant role in transporting oil and gas. As Ahmet Davutoğlu noted “Our countries are situated on the important transportation lines one of which passes on the North and the other on the South of the Caspian Sea and link East of Eurasia to West of it.”⁷²³ Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Turkey Zhanseyit Tuymebayev emphasizes that “Two brother countries are perceived as big regional states with similar foreign policy and strategic purposes, and international positions.”⁷²⁴ Moreover, both states are neighbors to volatile regions of Central Asia and Middle East. This condition makes both countries be more sensitive in regional affairs.

In addition to these similarities there are many differences between state identities of two countries. Turkey is traditionally member of Western alignment. During the Cold War it aligned with Western bloc and at the present time it is an indispensable member of NATO. And Kazakhstan during the Cold War was one of the Soviet Socialist Republics and naturally was the member of Warsaw Pact. At the present time it is member of Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. More broadly, Kazakhstan is founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which is perceived as an anti-American organization. While Turkey is a member of EU Customs Union, Kazakhstan along with Russia and Belarus form Eurasian Economic Community. However these differences in state identities of Kazakhstan and Turkey do not cause to depart from each other. On the contrary, both states understand strategic importance of their location. As ex-ambassador of Kazakhstan

⁷²³http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-egemen-kazakistan-gazetesinde-_kazakistan_-16_02_2010-tarihinde-yayimlanan-makalesi.tr.mfa Retrieved 22.07.2012

⁷²⁴ Canseyit Tüymebayev, ‘Kazakistan ve Türkiye: Etkin İşbirliği Örneği’, *Atayurt Eğitim, Kültür ve Ekonomi Dergisi* Kış 2011 sayı 5, p. 5.

to Turkey Bagdat Amreyev emphasized “Bilateral relations don’t only cover Kazakh-Turkish relations, they also affect all regional and global politics.”⁷²⁵

However, here it must be noted that foreign policy priority of Turkey is West in general and European Union in particular, while foreign policy priority of Kazakhstan is Eurasia in general and Russia in particular. There is an organic link between Turkey and EU on the one hand, and between Kazakhstan and Russia on the other. The link between the West and Turkey, and that of between Russia and Kazakhstan can be described as the stability axes. The other directions out of these priorities are complementary to these axes. On the one side, development of complementary directions increase the value of stability axes, on the other, they make Kazakhstan and Turkey more confident actors in their regions.

All these geopolitical and geo-cultural realities shape Kazakhstan’s and Turkey’s identities. In fact, their location between East and West in terms of values and geopolitics make Kazakhstan and Turkey states with multi-identity. The fact that both states are situated on the intersection of civilizations forces them or gives them an opportunity to promote inter-civilization dialogue. President Nazarbayev also pointed to this fact in his address to Turkish Parliament. Giving reference to the globally respected great thinkers as al-Farabi, Yassawi, Mevlana who invited people to peace and tolerance, he noted “In this respect we are pleased to see that our positions in this direction are similar. To say more precisely, if Kazakhstan became the center where the Congresses of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions take place, Turkey is co-sponsoring United Nations Alliance of Civilizations.”⁷²⁶ Thus the geo-cultural and geopolitical location of both Kazakhstan and Turkey is utilized in foreign policy and for the sake of creating of positive image of the country where people with different religious and ethnic identities live in tolerance and peace.

⁷²⁵ Bagdat Amreyev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, p. 348.

⁷²⁶ ‘Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in TBMM Kürsüsündeki Konuşması’ in Bagdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011, p. 179.

Their plurality of identities forces them to pursue multi-vector foreign policy. This multi-vector foreign policy is defined with having good relations with all neighbors and using diplomacy to solve regional problems. According to Nazarbayev:

General directions of foreign policy are determined with the awareness of the country's place and role in the modern world. These are export specialization in international share of resources and labor, forming belt of peace around the Republic of Kazakhstan, contributing into strengthening of international stability and security, creating convenient external conditions for the economic development and democratization of Kazakhstan, drawing investment, constructive cooperation with other states in the spirit of friendship, equality and common interest, active integration of Kazakhstan into global and regional economic processes.⁷²⁷

Kazakhstan's foreign policy is directed to provide peace and stability in whole Eurasian space.⁷²⁸ In his annual message to Nation in 2010 Nazarbayev stated "Kazakhstan will pursue an active, pragmatic and balanced foreign policy aimed at ensuring national interests, increasing the international prestige of Kazakhstan country and strengthening national, regional and global security."⁷²⁹ It is not difficult to see the coincidence between these understandings of Kazakh foreign policy and the main principle of Turkish foreign policy "Peace at home, peace abroad". Both countries' decision makers understand that they cannot isolate their countries from the regions and pursue passive foreign policy.

In terms of taking initiatives in international affairs, no doubt both Kazakhstan and Turkey pursue proactive foreign policy. Nazarbayev renewed Kazakhstan's position towards regional and global affairs in his speech on 2nd March 2012 given for the honor of 20th anniversary of Kazakhstan's accession to the United Nations by stating

⁷²⁷ Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev's interview to journal of «Caspian energy» October 2005.
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/speeches/interviews/interview_of_president_n_a_nazarbaev_of_the_republic_2 Accessed on 16.07.2012

⁷²⁸ Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev's interview to French journal L'Essentiel des Relations Internationales 21.09.2011
http://www.akorda.kz/kz/speeches/interviews/azastan_respublikasyny_prezident_nrsultan_nazarbaevty Accessed on 16.07.2012

⁷²⁹ Address of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev to the People of Kazakhstan 2010
<http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/content/reference/messages/message2010> Accessed on 16.07.2012

that “Global participation will be the backbone of our foreign policy strategy for decades to come. Kazakhstan has always been and remains a worthy enterprising player in regional and world politics.”⁷³⁰

Both states play active role in international and regional organizations. Istanbul and Ankara, and Almaty and Astana became cities which host many important international meetings. Kazakhstan and Turkey play active roles in international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council). The fact that the last two summits of the OSCE took place in Istanbul (1999) and in Astana (2010) is good evidence of Kazakhstan’s and Turkey’s activism in international organizations. In all these organizations Kazakhstan and Turkey support each other reciprocally.

Kazakhstan’s support to the Turkish candidate for the position of Secretary of General of OIC during the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of this organization in June 2004 and the support of Turkey to the candidacy of Kazakh representative to the position of Secretary General ECO demonstrate the reliable and allied character of bilateral relations.⁷³¹

As Ahmet Davutoğlu underlined during the press conference with newly appointed Kazakh foreign minister Erzhan Kazikhanov, whose visit to Turkey was his first official visit abroad on this position, “Turkey and Kazakhstan are committed to working together on a common strategy in Asia.”⁷³² Davutoğlu’s statement is relevant to the other spheres of cooperation as well. Turkey supported Kazakhstan’s candidacy for the chairmanship in OSCE and OIC, while Kazakhstan supported

⁷³⁰ Remarks by President Nursultan Nazarbayev at a meeting with heads of the diplomatic missions accredited in Kazakhstan. 2.03.2012
http://www.akorda.kz/en/speeches/summit_conference_sittings_meetings/vystuplenie_prezidenta_respubliki_kazahstan_na_nazarba Accessed on 16.07.2012

⁷³¹ Cooperation between Republic of Kazakhstan and Republic of Turkey
http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/europe_america/11 Accessed on 15.12.2013

⁷³² <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimiz-kazakistan-disisleri-bakani-yercan-kazikhanov-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisinin-metni.tr.mfa> Accessed on 15.12.2012

Turkey's candidacy for the non-permanent membership in UN Security Council in 2009-2010. "In the final analysis, Turkey and Kazakhstan are in strategic cooperation both in international and regional arenas. Two countries support each other's policies."⁷³³

When the Kazakh-Turkish relations analyzed, it must be noted that since the very beginning bilateral relations were promising. As we have mentioned above, in the first years of the independence, Kazakhstan's prior aim was to be recognized by and to integrate with world community. In this regard, Turkey played an indispensable role. "For the young states of Central Asia and Caucasus close cooperation with Turkey first of all provided independency from Russia, the possibility of convergence with European institutions and the USA, and economic aid of Turkey and that of its Western allies as well."⁷³⁴ Beside the fact that Turkey supported Kazakhstan in all possible international organizations, it became a window of Kazakhstan to the world.

From Turkish perspective, Turkey pays significant attention to the post-Soviet space including Kazakhstan. The emergence of new Turkic states seemed to end loneliness of Turkey in international arena. As Süleyman Demirel put it "Until recent times in international meetings of states Turkey used to sit lonely. But now we are strong together with independent Muslim republics of the CIS, and we will support each other."⁷³⁵ On the other hand, after the end of Cold War Turkey understood that its success in this direction will strengthen its hand in its relations with the West. When the Soviet Union dissolved Turkey found itself in a new geopolitics as if its border of influence reached the borders of China. President Demirel's well known phrase "Turkic world from Adriatic Sea to the Great Chinese Wall" is important to express the spirit of that period. Turkey's Turkicness and secular democracy gave it an opportunity to establish warm relations with the post-Soviet Turkic republics. Due to

⁷³³ Erdal Şafak 'Atalarımızın Yurduna Gelin' *Sabah Gazetesi* 19.10.2009

⁷³⁴ G.K. Abdrahmanova, 'Turgut Ozal i yego politika v otnoshenii stran postsovetskogo prostranstva', in *Bezopasnost: mejdunarodnaya, regionalnaya, natsyonalnaya*, Almaty, Daik Press, 2007, p. 346.

⁷³⁵ Sayasat Beyisbay, 'Türkiyanın ıstıq ıqılası', *Egemen Qazaqstan No.73-74*, 28 Nawrız 1992 jıl.

its democracy and liberal economy Turkish model was proposed as an example in 1990s for post-Soviet Muslim republics. It can be speculated that if Turkey was not a secular republic it would be difficult to find a common language with new republics as the elite of these countries were secularists in their worldview. It must be added here that Turkey's identity which is Turkic and secular, created a convenient environment for Turkish ambitions. Although Turkish foreign policy of 1990s towards Turkic world was criticized as romantic and unrealistic, in my opinion thanks to the euphoria of that time Turkey succeeded to establish durable relations if not with all Turkic republics but with most of them and certainly with Kazakhstan. Therefore it is correct to say that closeness of identities of Kazakhstan and Turkey created an atmosphere for the launching of friendly relations.

Turkey was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan on 16 December of 1991 after half an hour it declared its independence. By this action Turkey occupied very special place in the new history of independent Republic of Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev as a head of sovereign country made his first visit to Turkey.⁷³⁶ On the other hand, it is certain that the recognition of Kazakhstan was prepared and calculated action of Turkish diplomacy as Kazakhstan was the last Soviet republic to declare its independence. In fact Kazakh-Turkish direct relations started in 1990 after Kazakhstan accepted 'The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic' which established "the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the Kazakh SSR within its territory over the laws of the Union"⁷³⁷ thus de facto obtained "the right to freely secede from the Union."⁷³⁸ On 15 May 1991 between Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KazSSR) and Turkish Republic 'the Agreement on Cooperation' was signed, where parties expressed their wish for further widening and deepening of bilateral cooperation in political, trade-economic, scientific-technological, environmental, cultural, humanitarian, informational and other spheres

⁷³⁶ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003, p. 194.

⁷³⁷ 7 point of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic <http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/chronicle/02> Accessed on 5.05.2014

⁷³⁸ 1 point of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic <http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/chronicle/02> Accessed on 5.05.2014

on the long-term basis.⁷³⁹ On 16 May of 1992 Kazakhstan opened its embassy in Turkey which was its first embassy abroad. Moreover Turkish embassy to Kazakhstan was the first embassy opened in Kazakhstan. “The first ambassador who conveyed the letter of credentials to the President Nazarbayev was Turkish diplomat Argun Özpay.”⁷⁴⁰

In the following years Kazakhstan’s strengthening position in international community and increase of independency from Russia made it possible for Kazakhstan to pursue more confident policy in other directions. The establishment of a new department under the name of ‘Central Asia, South Caucasia and Turkey’ in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2011 is a good evidence of this fact. It is apparent that within 20 years the balance of directions in Kazakh foreign policy has been achieved. In the word of Nazarbayev, “We have developed a carefully balanced foreign policy – open to working with many countries – and have created new organizations to foster cooperation.”⁷⁴¹

The establishment of ‘Department of Central Asia, South Caucasia and Turkey’ in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2011 is a good evidence of the fact that for Kazakhstan Turkey occupies special place. Generally foreign ministry of any country in the names of departments refrains from naming the country, and instead, prefers to call departments by name of the region. When the ministry of country A put name of country B into name of department it means that the country B is significant for the country A. It is apparent that this reorganization in the Kazakh ministry is parallel to the rising power of Turkey. Turkey’s weight under AK Party government both economically and politically is increasing. And Turkish foreign policy is defined by activism both in regional and global affairs.

⁷³⁹ K.K. Tokaev, *Pod stygom nezavisemosti*, Almaty, Bilim 1997, p. 509.

⁷⁴⁰ Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, *Svet i Ten’*, Astana, 2007, p. 199.

⁷⁴¹ Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan ‘Kazakhstan as the Great Connector’ in the inaugural publication of the *BRICS summit, March 29, 2012 New Delhi, India*. the BRICS Research Group Higher School of Economics and University of Toronto, Toronto ON M5S 3K7 Canada, p. 21.

7.4 Conclusion

To sum up, as it is seen, Kazakhstan and Turkey develop close cooperation. Based on this cooperation it can be summarized that Turkey is perceived as ‘friend’ in international relations. Generally ‘friend image’ of Turkey is interchangeably used by ‘the brother image’. It is apparent that bilateral relations are based on common culture and history. In other words identities of two states determine their view on each other. While Turkey is perceived as friend and brother, Russia is perceived as friend and ally, and China as friend and partner. If we assume that friend image is put just to show good intentions, then we find out that the terms ‘brother’, ‘ally’, and ‘partner’ define the real condition of the relations.

Indeed Kazakhstan with its geographical and cultural proximity to Russia could be expected to stay close to Russia and away from Turkey; and Uzbekistan who is far from Russia and has homogeneous Turkic culture could be expected to stay away from Russia and stay close to Turkey. But it turned out to be that Kazakhstan stays close to both Russia and Turkey, while Uzbekistan stays away from both of them. This circumstance can be explained with self-identification of the country and leader factor.

Concerning self-identification of Kazakhstan, as we discussed in previous chapters the country defines itself as Eurasian one. Kazakh version of Eurasian idea is that it means Slavic and Turkic cultures can co-exist in the country. Leaned to this Eurasian idea, Kazakhstan develops close cooperation both with Russia and Turkey. There is no contradiction in doing so. Moreover, Astana tries to play a role of mediator between Moscow and Ankara.⁷⁴²

In the final analysis, two factors shape Kazakhstan’s perception of Turkey in international level. One is international environment where Kazakhstan is situated. The other is interaction between Kazakhstan and Turkey. In fact, the environment where Turkey and Kazakhstan are situated can be defined as Eurasian in the sense

⁷⁴² S. V. Seliverstov, *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya: Po stranitsam Evraziistikh idei XIX-XXI vekov*, Baspalar uji, 2009; D.E. Sagnayev, *Evraziiskaya politika Turetskoi Respubliki v kontekste natsionalnykh interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, Disertatsiya na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata politicheskikh nauk, Almaty 2009.

that different geopolitical and geo-cultural spheres of influence intersect with each other. From this perspective, both Turkey and Kazakhstan are situated in Eurasia that between, geographically, Europe and Asia, culturally, the East and the West, economically, the North and the South, and religiously, the Christian World and Islam. This Eurasian environment makes compulsory the convergence between Kazakhstan and Turkey. In this sense, international environment positively affects Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey.

While international environment creates suitable condition for Kazakh-Turkish cooperation, the interaction itself between two countries positively affects Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. Firstly the bilaterally relation began from clean beginning which means Kazakhstan and Turkey did not inherit problematic relations from the past. On the contrary, the fact that Turkey was the first country who recognized Kazakhstan's independence, gave a positive impetus to the bilateral relations. In fact this action of Turkey constructed the 'brother image' in Kazakhstan. To put it differently, the discourse of Turkic brotherhood was not just empty words, but concretely realized in action.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I analyzed Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey in the post-independence period. In my examination, I applied the Constructivism. In Constructivist understanding, it is the identity of the state which determines its perception. Based on this conception, the main argument of the study is that the basic determinant of Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is Kazakhstan's national identity.

In Constructivist approach of International Relations Theory, as the name Constructivism hints, since very beginning it was argued that the world is socially constructed. In Constructivist understanding there is real world and world in our mind. As Alexander Wendt emphasizes "A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward object, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them."⁷⁴³

Due to the differences in cultural and social environment the same reality can be perceived in different ways by different people. In International Relations the understanding of one common world and different worlds were expressed by Francis Fukuyama's work *End of History* and Samuel Huntington's work *Clash of*

⁷⁴³ Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 397.

Civilizations. While Fukuyama made emphasis on one world heading for liberal democracy,⁷⁴⁴ Huntington underlined different worlds with different values based on their historical civilizations.⁷⁴⁵ According to Constructivists it is culture, history, civilization which shapes the views of the actors in international relations. In the words of Wendt, identity is the basis of interests. From this perspective, positivist approaches as Realism and Liberalism conceive identities of actors in international relations as homogeneous, because they tend to act in similar way. In other words, their perception of outside world is framed by power and economic interest. While Constructivists argue that identities of actors are heterogeneous because the cultures and international environment which constitute their identities are different.

In Constructivist school there are several approaches to the problem of construction of identity. Systemic Constructivists like Wendt argue that interaction between subjects shape the identity of self, while unit-level Constructivists argue that domestic politics are more important than the system. In this dissertation I apply the third Constructivist approach that is holistic which gives equal importance to both international system and domestic politics. Nevertheless, there is consensus among Constructivists that the view about other and perception of other is closely related to the identity of the self. Therefore, in order to understand other's view on the self, the identity of the other should be analyzed.

The self can feel sympathy toward other and present itself as friend of the other. But this feeling of sympathy and friendship does not mean much if the same feelings are not shared by the other. The famous saying of Mevlana Jelaleddin Rumi 'No matter how much knowledgeable you are, you are only as much knowledgeable as your partner understands you' indicates that your knowledge is measured by the level of perception of the partner. In the same way, status of a state in international relations

⁷⁴⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1992.

⁷⁴⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

is determined not in the way it presents itself to other, but by the view of other states about it.

The change in the identity of the self leads to the change in view about other. Therefore it is important to analyze the identity of perceiving part. As it is expressed by Wendt, the Cold War was over because the United States and the Soviet Union decided that they are no longer enemies.⁷⁴⁶ In terminology of image theory which is discussed below it means that reciprocal image of enemy was changed into image of friend. In the final analysis we can conclude that identity is basis of perception. This is the main argument on which the study is built.

In analyzing Kazakhstan's national identity, which is in fact still forming, I argue that Kazakhstan is situated at the intersection of Slavic and Turkic worlds. In addition, its population is composed of Slavic people like Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarus on one hand, and Turkic people like Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Uygur, on the other hand. While the Slavic people consider Kazakhstan as a part of the Slavic-Russian world, the Turkic people consider it as a part of the Turkic world. Under these circumstances, Slavic people view Russia as a protector and a center of attraction, whereas Turkic people view Turkey as the same. This fragile situation could lead to the partition of Kazakhstan into two poles if not handled with care. Taking this condition into account Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev defined country's identity as Eurasian. In this way Nazarbayev introduced his own version of Eurasianism. He utilized Classical Eurasianists' notion of Slavic-Turkic synthesis. Nazarbayev's Eurasianism became a national ideology of the country, which prevents conflicts among different ethnic and religious groups, and especially between Slavs and Turks (between Russians and Kazakhs). In international arena, Nazarbayev's Eurasianism positions Kazakhstan at the center of the Eurasian continent. According to Kazakh foreign policy thinking, Eurasianism is the philosophical basis of its multi-vector policy.

To make it precise, Eurasianism is another name of Kazakhstan's pluralism and multilateralism with Kazakh-Russian tandem at the center. I define this tandem as a

⁷⁴⁶ Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 397.

Eurasian nucleus of Kazakhstan. This nucleus at the domestic level pulls and consolidates all ethnic and religious groups in the country. In international relations this nucleus does not gravitate towards Russia or Turkey but became a center itself which pulls both Moscow and Ankara. In this way, Kazakhstan became a center which stands in equal distance to all power centers including the East and the West. In this sense, the place of Astana, the heart of Eurasia or the epicenter of the world, is very symbolic. It manifests the new Eurasian identity of the new independent Kazakhstan.

Within this consideration, Turkic world in general and Turkey in particular as a leader of Turkic world, represent one side of Eurasian nucleus of Kazakhstan. To open this, Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is directly related with the Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan. Therefore, it is impossible to separate Kazakh-Turkish relations from domestic politics and even from nation and state building process in Kazakhstan. That is why the main argument of the dissertation is that Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity is the basic determinant of its perception of Turkey.

Nonetheless, it should be noted here that although Constructivism discusses identity, perception and image conceptually, it lacks the methodology to measure the self's perception of other. To fill this gap, I applied the Image Theory of International Relations Theory whose main subject is image and perception.

Shortly, Image Theory is a theory of strategic decision making that identifies the primary judgments guiding international images, or stereotypes, and the selection of international policies. Image theorists suggest that ideas about other actors in world affairs are organized into group schemas, or images, with well-defined cognitive elements. These images are organized in a systematic way, comprised of cognitions and beliefs regarding the target nation's motives, leadership, and primary characteristics.⁷⁴⁷ Images, perceptions or stereotypes are significant in international

⁷⁴⁷ Michele G. Alexander, Shana Levin, P. J. Henry, 'Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Feb., 2005), p. 22.

relations as they “serve to justify a nation’s desired reaction or treatment toward another nation.”⁷⁴⁸

It is useful to note here that the terms image and perception can be used interchangeably as I have been doing in this study. But to be concrete, perception is wider than image. Image can be defined as the product of perception. In this sense, while concept of perception covers both the perceiving process and its result, image solely means the outcome of this process. Therefore, Image Theory is focused on outcome of perception.

Fisher underlines the importance of images in the following way:

It is fundamental that people, including those on one’s own side of an issue, do not ordinarily react to an event or issue on the basis of the facts as might be empirically determined but on the basis of their images of the fact, on what they think or believe to have happened or to have been at stake. Thus, international relations evolve around interplay of images.⁷⁴⁹

This ‘interplay of images’ can explain relations among states. As Boulding put it in similar way, “It is always the image, not the truth that immediately determines behavior. We act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it ‘is’.”⁷⁵⁰ Robert Jervis argues that the image of a state can be a major factor in determining whether and how easily the state can reach its goal. He argues that a desired image can often be of greater use than a significant increment of military and economic power.⁷⁵¹ In this sense, the purpose of diplomacy of any state is to construct desired image. And public diplomacy is image making within the target community.

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

⁷⁴⁹ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Second Edition, Intercultural Press, USA, 1997, p. 4.

⁷⁵⁰ K. E. Boulding, ‘National Images and International Systems’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 1959), p. 120.

⁷⁵¹ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1970, p. 6.

By analyzing the image of state A in state B, it is possible to predict the behavior of state B towards state A. The main proposition of the Image theory is that “behavior depends on the image.”⁷⁵² According to Image theory images can be enemy image, ally image, dependent image, imperialist image, barbarian image and so on, and responds can be accordingly. For example, if a conquering state succeeds to change its ‘imperialist image’ in the conquered realm to ‘spreader of civilization image’, then it does not need military force to exploit the colony any more. It means that conquering minds and hearts is more profitable than conquering lands and people. That is why every nation who is aspired to have respectable place in the world works for their image in foreign countries. In words of Jervis, the image of a state is a major factor in determining other state’s policies toward it and states therefore have good reason to try to project desired images.⁷⁵³ British Council, Goethe Institute, Confucius Institute, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, CNN, BBC, student exchange programs, scholarships serve to improve the images of the respective countries.

During the Cold War the work of these kinds of institutions were called propaganda or psychological warfare. Today their works are called as image making or perception management. With the development of technologies, Internet and Social Media, nations who control these means are more successful in creation of their positive images than those who are not able to develop their own technologies.

The central question of Image Theory is ‘what determines the image?’ Boulding argues that there is message and image. When message hits the image it can remain unaffected, it can change in some regular and well-defined way that might be described as simple addition, or it can change revolutionarily.⁷⁵⁴ Message first of all means statements of decision makers, relations between leaders and elites of two countries, people to people relations. In some cases, a state’s relations with the third

⁷⁵² Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969, p. 6.

⁷⁵³ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1970, p. 8.

⁷⁵⁴ Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969, p. 10.

part can give different messages to perceiving part. In sum, message covers all activities of a state which can affect its image in perceiving country. Diplomacy, public diplomacy, people to people relations are important tools in making positive and desired image. Especially with the development of Internet networks, which can by-pass official sources of information, people to people relations gain greater importance. While until recently the stands of decision makers were important, now in the age of globalization the opinions of masses are becoming more and more important. Robert Jervis count decision-makers, bureaucracy, domestic politics, and international environment as levels of analysis of perception.⁷⁵⁵

In order to examine Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey while I applied the Image Theory of International Relations, I utilized these four levels of analysis. Shortly, decision maker, elite, general public, and international environment constitute Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. Based on the analysis at these levels, I argue that Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey is evolving from a negative 'alien image' and 'image of the other' to a positive 'friend image' and 'brother image'.

At the decision maker's level, the first president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev plays a crucial role. He is the main architect of Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity and its multi-vector foreign policy. Consequently, his perception of Turkey is significant. When we analyze Nazarbayev's views on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, it is obvious that since the initial years of Kazakhstan's independence, Nazarbayev paid special attention to the cooperation with Turkey. His attitude towards Turkey reflects the Eurasian reality of Kazakhstan. He understands that Kazakhstan's relations with Turkey balance the Russian influence in the country. It is important to note here that Nazarbayev's policy towards Turkey and Turkic world is realization of the grand strategy, which aims to strengthen the Turkic component of Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity. Today Turkey is perceived positively in Kazakhstan due to this grand strategy which intensifies people to people interaction.

Nazarbayev comprehended the potential and the limits of Turkey and worked out an adequate strategy. In fact, his perception of Turkey constituted the basis of this

⁷⁵⁵ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p.13.

strategy. Taking into account the assumption of the Image Theory which claims that decision makers do not ordinarily react to an event or issue on the basis of the facts as might be empirically determined but on the basis of their images of the fact, on what they think or believe to have happened or to have been at stake,⁷⁵⁶ I argue that the image of Turkey in the mind of Nazarbayev is a positive ‘brother image.’

The positive image was formed during the presidential term of Özal. In this respect, Nazarbayev’s friendship with Özal positively contributed to Nazarbayev’s perception. It is not coincidence that Nazarbayev in his book *On the Threshold of XXI Century* under subtitle ‘Between East and West’ where he writes his first experiences in foreign policy he firstly discusses Kazakh-Turkish relations. Only then he analyzes Kazakhstan’s relations with China, Europe, Arab states, Iran, Japan, and the USA.⁷⁵⁷ It is apparent that the image of Turkey in Nazarbayev’s mind is positive as Turkey played significant role in integration of Kazakhstan into world community.

The friendly and even brotherly relations were continued during the presidential term of Demirel. So during Demirel’s presidential term, the close relations between Nazarbayev and Demirel strengthened Nazarbayev’s positive perception of Turkey. Both Özal and Demirel sincerely supported Kazakhstan’s independence.

From the position of identity construction and nation-building in Kazakhstan in relation to Turkey it is worthy to mention the summits of Turkic states initiated by Turkey in early 1990s. Nazarbayev’s attendance in the summits displays that he recognized the Turkic identity of Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev as a pragmatic politician understands that Kazakhstan should develop friendly neighborhood relations with Russia. But at the same time he is well aware of the fact that Kazakhstan as an independent state should construct its own unique identity. In this regard Turkey plays significant role. For a country whose majority of the population see themselves as part of Turkic world, it is natural to develop close relations with Turkey. However,

⁷⁵⁶ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Second Edition, Intercultural Press, USA, 1997, p. 4.

⁷⁵⁷ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003.

these brotherly relations with kin country should not undermine neighborhood relations. Under these circumstances where Kazakhstan is pulled towards Moscow and Ankara at the same time, in order to prevent partition of the country in the Turkic and Slavic line, Nazarbayev worked out his concept of Eurasianism. The concept aims to harmonize Turkic and Slavic identities of the country. Accordingly, Kazakhstan's relations with Russia should be balanced and harmonized by cooperation with Turkey.

Based on this assumption, although Turkey experienced political and economic instabilities throughout the 90s, this did not change Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey, as he was well aware of the limitations of Turkey. Although Sezer was passive in foreign policy, Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey continued to develop in a positive direction. The matter is that since 1998 Kazakhstan's economy began to rise. This achievement in domestic policy provided Nazarbayev with confidence in his multi-vector policy. In this context, Turkey whose economy also began to recover in 2000 became an important partner. In addition, Kazakhstan confirmed and strengthened its statehood. The fear of fragmentation was overcome. Ethnic Kazakhs' share in Kazakhstan's population was increasing. According to 1998 population census, ethnic Kazakhs constituted 53% of the population of Kazakhstan.⁷⁵⁸ This meant that Kazakhstan could pursue a more assertive policy in the Turkic world. As a matter of fact, it is important to note that Nazarbayev continued to actively participate in Turkic summits while his counterparts in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan lost their interest in the forum.

The presidential term of Gül was the period of a fruitful cooperation between Kazakhstan and Turkey. Gül as a diplomat well understood the strategical importance of Kazakhstan. He continued the foreign policy understanding of Özal and Demirel towards Kazakhstan. In a sense, we can say that Nazarbayev's perception of Turkey as reliable partner was strengthened.

⁷⁵⁸ Qazaqstan Respublikasının Statistika jöindegi Agenttigi (Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan), (2000) *Qazaqstan Respublikası Halqının Ulttıq Quramı: Qazaqstan Respublikasındağı 1999 jilğı Halıq Sanağının Qoritındısı*. (National Composition of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Conclusion of the Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1999) Almaty.

At the decision maker's level, the interesting question is that whether the bilateral relations will be the same in the post-Nazarbayev period. Taking into account the present condition of the bilateral relations, I predict that there will not be much change in the future, as the relations between the two countries are based on a firm foundation and deep roots in the sense that people of two countries are interlinked with each other. Only the fact that more than four hundred thousand Kazakhs visit Turkey annually⁷⁵⁹ displays the high rate of interaction between peoples. Moreover, taking into consideration the rise of Turkicness in Kazakhstan I predict that no matter who leads the country Kazakh-Turkish relations will further develop. In other words, 'the Nazarbayev factor' will continue to shape Kazakh foreign policy.

The second level of analysis of perception is elite level. The elite level is the level where perception is transferred to politics. Therefore, the perception of the dominant elite is important in foreign policy. Kazakh elite, in line with the Eurasian identity of the country, are divided as those who prefer Russia and those who prefer Turkey. Taking into account this dichotomy of the elite structure, it is quite pragmatic that Nazarbayev developed the concept of Eurasianism, which holds both pro-Russian and pro-Turkish inclinations in harmony and prevents conflict. Due to this Eurasian feature of the elite, there is no homogeneous perception of Turkey.

Kazakh nationalistic elite who is in minority considers Turkey as a natural ally. However, the majority of elite who possess key positions in the government and parliament stay close to Russia or at least try to be selective in their leanings towards Turkey. The bureaucratic elite, which in fact is the continuation of the Soviet bureaucracy, mostly considers Turkey as 'the other'. It is because they are themselves alien to Turkic identity that the Kazakh language and culture is part of. Among the intellectual elite there are diverse perceptions of Turkey. But the mainstream intellectual elite support Nazarbayev's Eurasianism that aims to reconcile pro-Turkish and pro-Russian tendencies.

Nevertheless, besides the demographic change in favor of Kazakhs, Nazarbayev's activism in the Turkic world, and Russia's aggressive policy towards its neighbors

⁷⁵⁹ Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu 'İstatiksel Tablolar ve Dinamikler Sorgulama' http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1072 Accessed on 13.05.2015

positively affect Kazakh elite's perception of Turkey. Therefore, it is expected that Kazakh elite more and more will pay attention to the discourse of Turkic world. But the increase in Kazakh elite's interest in Turkey does not mean that Kazakhstan will change its attitude towards Russia. On the contrary, the rise of popularity of the discourse of Turkic world is accompanied with an institutional integration of Kazakhstan with Russia. Deliberately or not, Kazakhstan's integration with Russia leads to the rise of the feelings of Turkic solidarity among Kazakh elite and Kazakh general public. The most important problem for Kazakh leadership in the long run is whether Nazarbayev's Eurasianism can overcome the incompatibility between the expectation of the general public and state's foreign policy.

The third level, which is general public, is an important determinant of perception in the long run. It is expected that with democratization of the country the decision makers and the dominant elite have to take into account cultural inclinations of the general public. In that case, it will be difficult to pursue a foreign policy which is against the will of most people. So in the long run with the rise of Turkic people's share in Kazakhstan's population, Turkey's image will evolve in positive direction. But at the time being, there is no unified perception.

As it was stated above, Kazakhstan's population is composed of Turkic people who identify themselves with Turkic civilization and of Slavic people who identify themselves with the Slavic civilization. These two groups constitute the Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan. Initially, due to the fact that Russian and Soviet culture was dominant in the country, Turkey was perceived as 'the other'. But with the shift of the balance in favor of the Turkic group, and partly due to the fact that Kazakhstan identified itself with Turkic civilization, Turkey's image in the country began to improve. Along with this general trend, three factors affected the Kazakh public's perception of Turkey. These are Kazakh Diaspora in Turkey, cooperation in the field of education, and tourism in Turkey.

In the early 1990s, Kazakh government launched a program of repatriation of Kazakhs abroad to Kazakhstan, including the Kazakh Diaspora in Turkey. Those who returned to Kazakhstan from Turkey brought the Turkish culture with themselves. By becoming the members of Kazakhstani society, they became bridges

between Turkey and Kazakhstan. These Kazakhs of Turkey contributed to the positive image of Turkey in Kazakhstan. They became the representatives of Turkey in Kazakhstan. Ultimately, Kazakhs of Turkey and their history of migration contributed to the image that Turkey was not an alien country to Kazakhs and will continue to be a 'brother' nation for Kazakhstan.

The cooperation in the field of education constitutes a major part in the bilateral relations. Both governmental and non-governmental organizations of Turkey are contributing to the improvement of education level in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh leadership did not question the origins of the Turkish initiatives. Rather Kazakhstan pragmatically evaluates the Turkish initiatives according to the results of the established institutions. In spite of their ideological motives, Kazakhstan did not stop cooperation with Turkey, as in the final analysis they helped to modernize its education system. All Turkish projects of education in Kazakhstan strengthen Turkish presence in the country. The outcome is that Kazakh-Turkish relations get more stable and stronger. It can be predicted that this trend will continue in the foreseeable future as a new generation who was educated through the Turkish system emerges. In the final analysis, Kazakh-Turkish cooperation in the field of education is the main factor which contributes to the positive image of the Turkey.

Tourism also contributes positively to Turkey's image in Kazakhstan through the interaction of people. The general perception is that those people who visited Turkey have a positive perception of Turkey as opposed to those who have not visited yet. Moreover, people who visit Turkey discover that Turkish language is similar to Kazakh language. This discovery is important as the people began to view Turkey not as 'the other' country but as 'our' country.

At the general public level it can be said that Kazakh public is in the process of discovering Turkey. This discovery breaks the previously negative images of Turkey constructed during the Soviet time. In this sense, Turkey's image in Kazakh public is evolving from a negative one to a positive. The more the Kazakh people learn about Turkey, the more Turkey's image in Kazakhstan will improve. Taking into account the general tendency to globalization, and degree of interaction of Kazakh and

Turkish people, it can be predicted that Kazakh public perception of Turkey will evolve in positive direction.

At the international level, Kazakhstan and Turkey develop close cooperation. Turkey is perceived as a 'friend' in international relations. Generally the 'friend image' of Turkey is interchangeably used by 'brother image'. It is apparent that bilateral relations are based on the common culture and history. In other words, identities of two states determine their view of each other. From the perspective of the common culture and history, which is in fact Turkic civilization, in the collective memory of ethnic Kazakhs, there are three 'others' in their self-identification. The first 'other' is '*qıtay*' (Chinese), the second 'other' is '*sart*' (Persian), and the third is '*aqqulaq*' (Russian). Among this three, 'the otherness' of Persian was resolved within the framework of Islamic solidarity. The perception of 'the other' related to Russia was mitigated by mutual co-existence, and especially during the Soviet Union by the concept of the Soviet man and the common Soviet history where Kazakhs shoulder in shoulder fought against the Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. In fact we can consider Kazakhstan's Eurasianism as the continuation of this mitigation of the feeling of 'the otherness'. But the perception of China as 'the other' is still strong. This pushes Kazakhstan towards Russia, as Russia is 'us' as opposed to China. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, from the perspective of the collective memory of the ethnic Kazakhs, Russia is 'the other'. To express it differently, Turkey is 'us' in relation to Russia. Therefore, Turkey, which is the leader of the Turkic world to whom Kazakhs belong, could balance Russia in the cultural sense. In other words, "the other' image' of Russia constitutes 'us image' of Turkey. However, in the Kazakh official discourse, there is no place for such images. In the political rhetoric, Turkey is perceived as a 'friend and brother,' Russia is perceived as a 'friend and ally,' and China as a 'friend and partner'. If we assume that 'friend image' is put just to show good intentions, then we find out that the terms 'brother', 'ally', and 'partner' define the real condition of the relations.

In the final analysis, two factors shape Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey at the international level. One is international environment where Kazakhstan is situated. The other is interaction between Kazakhstan and Turkey. In fact, the environment where Turkey and Kazakhstan are situated can be defined as Eurasian in the sense

that different geopolitical and geo-cultural spheres of influence intersect with each other. From this perspective, both Turkey and Kazakhstan are situated in Eurasia between, Europe and Asia, between the East and the West culturally, between the North and the South economically, and between Christianity and Islam religiously. This Eurasian environment forces a convergence between Kazakhstan and Turkey. In this sense, the international environment positively affects Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey.

While the international environment creates suitable conditions for Kazakh-Turkish cooperation, the interaction itself between the two countries positively affects Kazakhstan's perception of Turkey. First of all Kazakhstan and Turkey did not inherit problematic relations from the past thus the relations have started on a clean slate. Besides the fact that Turkey was the first country that recognized Kazakhstan's independence, gave a positive impetus to the bilateral relations. In fact this act of Turkey constructed the 'brother image' in Kazakhstan. To put it differently, the discourse of the Turkic brotherhood is not just empty words, but concretely realized in action.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A

Abiesova, Nazgul' Shakimashripovna *Tsentral'naya Aziya vo vneshney politike Turtsii (s 1992 g. – po nyneshnii den')*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Kazakhski Natsyonalnyi Pedagogocheskii Universitet im. Abaya, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006.

Abdrahmanova, G.K. 'Turgut Ozal i yego politika v otnoshenii stran postsovetskogo prostranstva', in *Bezopasnost: mejdunarodnaya, regiyonalnaya, natsyonalnaya*, Almaty, Daik Press.

Abuseitova, M.H. (ed.) *Interrelations of Turkey and Central Asia in the context of Enlarging Europe*, Materials of the International Research Conference, Daik-Press, Almaty 2006.

Abzhaparova, Aida '(Re)imagining Eurasianism: (Geo)political and (geo)cultural practices of Kazakhstan in the preservation of its security', Paper prepared for British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, 27-29 April, 2011, Manchester, UK.

Ahmetov, Ädil 'Amerikanı aşqan Türikter edi', *Juldız No.8, 1993 jil.*

Aitken, Jonathan *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes after 20 Years of Independence*, Continuum, London, 2012.

Aitken, Jonathan *Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan*, Continuum, New York, 2009.

Aitmatov, Chinghiz *The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years*, Indiana University Press (February 22, 1988)

Akçalı, Pınar 'Orta Asya'da Ulus Devlet İnşası ve Türkiye: Genel Bir Değerlendirme', in Ayşegül Aydingün – Çiğdem Balım (eds.) *Bağımsızlıklarının*

Yirminci Yılında Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Türk Dilli Halklar – Türkiye ile İlişkiler, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, Ankara, 2012.

Akçalı, Pınar ‘Türk Dış Politikası ve Türk Dünyası’, *World Turkic Forum: Turkic Council, Turkic Diaspora and Socioeconomic Cooperation*, ed. Dr. Almagül İsina, TASAM, İstanbul, 2013.

Akçalı, Pınar ‘Eurasianism in Turkey: Different Perspectives and Challenges’ in Hisao Komatsu (ed.) *Central Eurasian Studies: Past, Present and Future*, Maltepe University, 2011.

Akiner, Shirin *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995.

Akiner, Shirin ‘Evolution of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: 1991-2011’, in *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies No:6, USAK, 2011*.

Akyürek, Salih Kazakistan’da Türkiye ve Türk algısı (*The Perception of Turk and Turkey in Kazakhstan*), BilgeSAM Rapor No:44, Ankara <http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-91-2014040836rapor44.pdf>
Retrieved on 15.04.2013

Alexander, Michele; Levin, G. Shana; Henry, P. J. ‘Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images’, *Political Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Feb., 2005)*.

Altay, Halife *Anayurttan Anadolu’ya*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1981.

Amreev, Bagdat *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, ‘Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in TBMM Kürsüsündeki Konuşması’ Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011.

Amreyev, Bagdad *Doğu ve Batı Küreselleşme Çağrısı: Medeniyetler Diyalogu ve Kazakistan’ın Orta Doğu Politikası*, Hayat Yayın Evi, İstanbul, 2011.

Anarbekov, Muhtar ‘Türkiyedağy turaqtı wäkil ondağı qazaq studentteriniñ jay-küyi tuwralı añgimeleydi’, *Halıq keñesi No.402, Säwir 1994 jil*.

Ancschi, Luca ‘Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy: neo-Eurasianist rhetoric in post-Soviet Kazakhstan’, *Nationalities Paper: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 19 Aug 2014.

Aubakirov, Toktar ‘Türk Dünyasının Eşitliği Üzerine...’, in Dr. Almagül İsina (ed.), *World Turkic Forum: Turkic Council, Turkic Diaspora and Socioeconomic Cooperation*, TASAM Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012.

Asylbekov, Edil ‘Nuzhen nam bereg turetskiy’, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.133, 18 Iyulya 1995 goda.*

Aydingün, Ayşegül & Tüfekçi, Hayati, ‘Avrasya’nın Merkezinden Dünya’ya Açılan Ülke: Kazakistan’, in Ayşegül Aydingün – Çiğdem Balım (eds.) *Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Türk Dilli Halklar – Türkiye ile İlişkiler*, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, Ankara, 2012.

Aytbayulı, Ömirзақ ‘Süleyman Demirelmen birge ötkizgen bir sağat bes minut’, *Qazaq eli 23-29 Qazan 1998 jil.*

Aytjanbay, Gülbarşın ‘Nursultan Nazarbayev: Türk Dünyasının Lideri’, *Aykın Gazetesi, 5 Haziran 2009*, republished in Bagdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011.

Aznabakiyeva, Zarema Myrgyyasovna *Vopros Vstupleniya Turtsii v Evopeyskii Soyuz*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Kazakhski Natsyonalnyi Universitet im.al-Farabi, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006.

Ä

Äljanov, K. ‘Qazaqstan ğılımına körsetilgen qurmet’, *Egemen Qazaqstan No.120, 21 Mawsım 1997 jil.*

B

Bağcı, Hüseyin ‘Türkiye’ye Soğuk Savaş sırasında biçilen elbise artık dar gelmektedir’ in *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası* ed. Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Mehmet Yegin, Usak Yayınları 2011.

Baryshev, Alexadr ‘Sovetski Soyuz i Arabskie Strany’
<http://www.barichev.ru/arhiv/bv3.htm>

Baybolov, Sh. ‘Kazakhstan i Turtsiya: grani sotrudnichestva’, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda No.62-63, 14 Mart 1992 goda.*

Begalin, Kayrat *Khany Zolotoy Ordy*, Aruna, Almaty, 2011.

Bekqulov, Ertay ‘Türki jurtın tabıntqan Türkistanım’, *Halıq kenesi No.115, 13 Mamır 1992 jil.*

Bektiyarova, Irina 'Intervyu s Nursultanom Nazarbayevym', *Ponorama*, No.41, 22 Oktyabrya 1994 goda.

Berdibay, Rahmanqul 'Türkiyanıñ eli de, jeri de tutas', *Egemen Qazaqstan* No.40, 26 Aqpan 1999 jil.

Beyisbay, Sayasat 'Türkiyanıñ ıstıq ıqılası', *Egemen Qazaqstan* No.73-74, 28 Nawrız 1992 jil.

Bezertinov, Rafael 'Perspektivy tyurkskoy ideologii' in *II International Congress of Turkologists Modern Turkology: Theory, Practice, and Perspectives, II Volume*, Ahmet Yassawi Universiteti, Türkistan, 2007.

Biryukov, Sergey V. 'Eurasian Doctrine of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev: 'Thinking space'', 24.01.2013, <http://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/eurasian-doctrine-kazakh-president-nursultan-nazarbayev-thinking-space#.VUoWLY7dHW> retrieved in 6.05.2015

Boulding, K. E. 'National Images and International Systems', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 1959).

Boulding, Kenneth E. *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969.

Braudel, Fernand *A History of Civilizations*, translated by Richard Mayne, Penguin Books, London, 1995.

Burchill, Scott 'Introduction', in *The Theories of International Relations*, Second Edition, Palgrave, 2001, p. 5.

C

Cem, İsmail *Engeller ve Çözümler: Türkiye'de Sosyal Demokrasi*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011, p.343

Cem, İsmail *Turkey in the New Century: Speeches and Texts Presented at International For a (1995-2001)*, Rustem, Nicosia 2001.p.67

Choi, Han-Woo 'Geo-Cultural Identity of the Western Turkestan' *International Journal of Central Asian Studies* Volume 8 (2003) p.2.

Corrigan, Jim *Kazakhstan*, Mason Crest Publisher, Philadelphia, 2005.

Cummings, Sally N. *Kazakhstan: Power and Elite*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2005.

Ç

D

Davutoğlu, Ahmet *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslar arası Konumu*, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul 2009.

Därimbet, Batırhan 'Türük dünyasınıñ alğı şebinde', *Jas Türkistan* 2-3, 1999.

Demko, George J. *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896-1916*, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1969.

Dikbaş, Kadir & Cansever, Enes 'Nazarbayev'den Zaman'a özel'
<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2000/10/16/roportaj1/roportaj1.htm>

Dobrota, Lyubov' 'Bereg turetskiy stanet rodnym', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* No.32, 16 Fevralya 1995 goda.

Dugin, Akeksand *Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Avrasya Misyonu*, Çeviren Lazzat Urakova ve Mehriban Gençkal, Yeni Avrasya Yayınlar, Anlara, 2006.

Dumanlı, Ekrem 'Gerçek Türkiye Dostu', *Zaman*, 19 Ekim 2009.

E

Erol, Doç. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin "Orda bir Türkistan Var Uzakta..." 2012-05-15
<http://www.usgam.com/tr/index.php?l=807&cid=678&konu=26&bolge=0> Accessed on 20.08.2012

Esenaliyev, Mihail 'Birliğimen küşti, tutastığım quwattı', *Türkistan* No.16, 17 Kökek 1996 jıl.

F

Fukuyama, Francis *The end of history and the last man*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1992.

Fuller, Graham E. *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*, Rand, Santa Monica, 1992, p.4.

Fuller, Graham E. *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. 2008, p.4.

Fuller, Graham E. *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and Its Implications for Western Interests*, RAND, Santa Monica, 1993, p.1.

Fisher, Glen *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Second Edition, Intercultural Press, USA, 1997.

G

George, Alexandra *Journey into Kazakhstan: the True Face of the Nazarbayev Regime*, University Press of America, New York, 2001.

Gökdağ, Bilgehan Atsız ‘Türk Devletleri ve Toplulukları Dostluk, Kardeşlik ve İşbirliği Vakfı (TÜDEV)’, *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013, p. 827.

Gökalp, Ziya *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi*, Kültür Bakanlığı, Ziya Gökalp Yayınları, İstanbul, 1976.

Gumilyov, Lev *Ritmy Evrzii: Epopkhi i Tsivilizatsii* (Rhythms of Eurasia: Ages and Civilizations), AST, Moskva, p. 23.

H

Hale, William *Turkish foreign policy, 1774-2000*, Frank Cass Publishers, London 2000. p.91

Horata, Osman ‘Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Sınır Ötesi Yüksek Öğretim Tecrübesi: Türk Cumhuriyetler Örneği’, in *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013, p. 832.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

I

Ibrayev, Sh. I. (ed.), *Evraziyskaya ideya N.A. Nazarbayeva i tyurkskoye prostransvo* (Eurasian idea of N.A.Nazarbayev and Turkic space), Collective Monography, Saryarka, Astana, 2011.

Ichheiser, Gustav 'Misunderstandings in international relations', *American Sociological Review*, June 1, 1951, p. 311.

Ismagulov, O. 'Ethnogenesis of Kazak people', in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998.

İzgöer, Ahmet Zeki *Osmanlı arşiv belgelerinde Avrasya = Ottoman archival documents Eurasia*, Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği, İstanbul, 2008.

J

Jandarbek, Zikiriya *Yassawi Joli jane Qazaq Qoğamı*, El-şejire, Almatı, 2006.

Jervis, Robert *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1970.

Jervis, Robert *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p.13.

Joldasbekov, Mırzatay 'Mıñ jıldıq sağımsı', in ed. Malık Otarbayev, *Sana säwletşisi*, Anarıs, Almatı, 2010.

Joshi, N. 'Central Asia's Geopolitical Perspectives on Turkey', in *Interrelations of Turkey and Central Asia in the context of Enlarging Europe*, Materials of the International Research Conference, Daik-Press, Almaty 2006.p.117.

K

Kagan, Robert *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2008.

Kadyrzhanov Rustem, “Vybor alfavita–vybor identichnosti”, *Kazakh almanaghy*, № 4, 2009, p.66.

Kadyrzhanov, Rustem ‘Kazaks and Kazakstanis’ ORSAM Rapor No: 75 ORSAM Avrasya Stratejileri Rapor No: 13, Ekim 2011. http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/201258_13raportum.pdf
Retrieved in 25.08.2012

Kaliev, R.M. *Respublika Kazakhstan i Sovremennyyi Mir (the Republic of Kazakhstan and Modern World)*, Elorda, Astana 2000.

Kara, Abudlvahap *Turgut Özal ve Türk Dünyası: Türkiye – Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri 1983-1993*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2012.

Kara, Tahire ‘Kazakistan Büyükelçisi Bagdad Amreyev: Cumhurbaşkanım Beni Türkiye’ye ‘Evine Gidiyorsun’ Diyerek Gönderdi’, *Atayurt Dergisi* 2009, Sayı 1, Republished in Bagdat Amreev, *Dönemimizde Kazakistan-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk Dünyası*, Hayat Yayınları, İstanbul 2011.

Kasenova, Togzhan ‘Egeyskie ostrova – yabloko razdora’, *Delovaya nedelya No.11, 20 Marta 1998 goda*.

Kaşkari, Mahmut *Divanü Lugat-it-Türk, (çev.Besim Atalay)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1992.

Katzenstein, Peter J. ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’ in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. Columbia University Press, New York. 1996.

Kavak, Y. & Baskan, G.A. ‘Educational Policies and Applications of Turkey towards Turkic Republics and Communities’, in *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi, 20, 2001*.

Kenjalın, Jumabek ‘İstanbuldın ıstıq lebi’, *Halıq keñesi No.201, 25 Qaraşa 1993 jil*.

Khabaev, Israpıl ‘Voyna bez Odzhalana’, *Delovaya nedelya No.39, 8 Oktyabrya 1999 goda*.

Khidirbekughli, Doulatbek ‘Kazakhstan kak geopoliticeskiy subekt v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh’, in *Tawelsiz Qazaqstannın halıqaralıq bedelinin ösiwi jane jahandanuwdın qawip-qaterleri, Halıqaralıq ğılımi-praktikalıq konferentsiyanın materiyaldarı*, Filosofiya jane politologiya İnstitutı QR BĞM ĞK, Almatı.

Kişibekov, D. ‘Atatürük eline barganda...’, *Jas Alaş No. 102, 10 Şilde 1993 jil*.

Kongar, Emre *21.Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı*, Remzi Kitabevi, 1998, p.479.

Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat *Early Mystics in Turkish Literature*, Translated, edited and with an introduction by Gary Leiser and Robert Dankoff, Routledge, USA, 2006.

Köpqızı, Esengül “‘Tuqımımız tuzday qurımasa eken” deydi qandastarımız’, *Qazaq Eli No.8*, 26 Aqpan 1999 jıl.

Kumekov, B. ‘About the term ‘Kazak’’, in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998.

Kumekov, B. ‘Problem of the Kazak statehood’, in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998.

Kurmanguzhin, S.A. *45 let na diplomaticheskoi sluzhbe*, Jibek Joly, Almaty, 2003.

Kuşçu, Işık ‘Ulus İnşası Sürecinde Kazakistan’da Etnik Geri Dönüş Göçü Siyaseti ve Etkileri’ in *Orta Asya’da Siyaset ve Toplum: Demokrasi, Etnisite ve Kimlik*, ed.T.Demirtepe USAK, Ankara 2012, p.176.

L

Laruelle, Marlene *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008, p. 183.

Lukaşev V.– Epifantsev S., “Mozhet li Russkiy Kazahstanets Stat’ Kazakhom?”, 1 Haziran 2009, <http://www.zonakz.net>

Lillis, Joanna ‘Kazakhstan Celebrates Statehood in Riposte to Russia’ January 6, 2015 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71536> Accessed on 14.05.2015

M

Mansurova, T.A. ‘Nazir Tyuryakulov – vydayushchiysya gosudarstvennyy deyatel', diplomat i zhurnalist’ Doklad General'nogo sekretarya YevrAzES na nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, posvyashchennoy deyatel'nosti polpreda SSSR Nazira Tyuryakulova (7 iyunya 2013 g.). <http://www.nomad.su/?a=15-201306170031> Accessed on 2.04.2014.

Masanov, Nurbolat 'Politicheskaya i ekonomicheskaya elita Kazakhstana', in *Tsentral'naya Aziya i Kavkaz No.1*, 1998.

McChesney, Robert D. 'Central Asia's Place in the Middle East: Some Historical Considerations', in Menashri, David (eds.), *Central Asia Meet the Middle East*, Frank Cass &Co. Ltd, New York, 2002, p. 30.

Mirzahmetov, Mekemtas *Kazaklar Nasıl Ruslaştırılmaya Çalışıldı*, Aktaranlar: Prof. Dr. Z. Bağlan Özer, Yrd. Doç. Dr. Tümen Somuncuoğlu, Avrasya Stratejik Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi, Çankırı, 2012.

Mominkulov, Zhanat 'Kazakistan'da Türkiye ve Türk algısı' (*The Perception of Turk and Turkey in Kazakhstan*). Avrasya Ekonomik İlişkiler Derneği adına Gümüşhane Uluslararası Toplantısı için özel Mayıs 2012 tarihinde Al-Farabi Kazak Ulusal Üniversitesinde yapılan sosyolojik araştırma.

Mominkulov, Doç. Dr. Canat 'Türki Aleminin Ğası Türklere Biriktire Ala Ma?' (Can the Century of Turkic World Unite Turks?) *Ayqın Respublikalıq Qoğamdıq Jane Sayasi gazet. No 39, 2194*, 2 Mart 2013. www.aikyn.kz

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, USA, 1973.

Mustafa, Golam 'The Concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian Policy and Its Implications', *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4 (2013).

Mustafina, R. 'Role of Islam in Kazakhstan', in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998.

N

Nazarbayev, Nursultan *Ewraziya jüreginde*, Atamura, Almaty, 2005.

Nazarbayev, N. *Ğasırlar togısında*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003.

Nazarbayev, Nursultan *Strategiya Nezavisemosti* (Strategy of Independence), Atamura, Almaty, 2003.

Nazarbayev, Nursultan *Yüzyıllar Kavşagında*, Ankara, 2012.

Nazarbayev, N.A. *V Potoke Istorii*, Almaty: Atamura, 2003.

Nazarbayev, Nursultan *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003.

Nazarbayev, Nursultan *Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Yolunda: Otobiyografi, Demeçler, Görüşler, Amaçlar*, Hotama Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul 1992.

Nazarbayev Nursultan *Qazaqstan jolı*, Qarağandı, 2006.

Nysanbayev, A.N. & Dunayev, V. Y. (eds.), *Evrziiskaya Doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva* (Eurasian Doctrine of Nursultan Nazarbayev), Almaty, 2010.

Nysanbayev, A. and Kadyrzhanov, R. ‘Natsyonal’naya idey: grazhdanskaya ili etnicheskaya?’ *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 24 December 2006.

Nogayeva, Guldariga *Kazakistan’da Türkiye ve Türk İmajı*, Yüksek Lisans tezi AÜ, 2007.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004.

O

Odgaard, Karen and Simonsen, Jens ‘The New Kazak Elite’, in Ingvar Svanberg (ed.) *Contemporary Kazaks: Cultural and Social Perspectives*, Curzon, Surrey, 1999.

Oljay, Qaynar ‘Türkiya tügel köşip kelgen sındı’, *Egemen Qazaqstan No.82-83*, 10 Sawir 1993 jil.

Olcott, Martha Brill *The Kazakhs, Second Edition*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1995.

Olcott, Martha Brill *Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C. , 2002.

Omarova, Aygöl ‘Älem san-sanalı, sondıqtan onda İzgilik pen dostıq saltanat quruwğa tiyis’, *Egemen Qazaqstan No.191*, 30 Qırküyek 1997 jil.

Oraltay, Hasen ‘... Şekara tısındağı qazaqtar’, *Qazaq eli No.21*, 1 Jeltoqsan 1995 jil.

Osmanova, Asılı Äliqızı ‘Atatürük elindegi alqalı jıyn’, *Jas Alaş No. 43*, 19 Nawrız 1993 jil.

Ö

Öniş, Ziya & Yılmaz, Şuhnaz 'Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era', *Turkish Studies Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009*, p.20.

Özdemir, Emin *20.yüzyılın başlarında Kazakistan'da fikir hareketleri*, Doktora Tezi, Gazi Üniversitesi, Ankara, 2007.

Özkök, Ertuğrul 'Olimpiyatlarda en çok Kazakistan Milli marşını sevdim.' 9.08.2012 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/21186713.asp>

P

Privratsky, Bruce G. *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory*, Curzon, Great Britain, 2001.

Q

Qabanbay, Marat 'Bul ziyalı – qay ziyalı? Qazaq intelligentsiyası bar ma özi?' in *Qazaq Almanaqı No.02 (06)*, 2010.

Qamzabekulı, Dihan *Türkistan Alqabı*, Shanıraq-Mediya, Astana, 2011.

Qasımbayev, Januzaq 'Stambulğa sapar', *Jas Alaş No. 58, 16 Sawir 1993 jil*.

Qayıñbayev, Mädi 'Türkiler alfavitinde – qazaqtın 'ä' äripi', *Jas Alaş No.43, 19 Nawrız 1993 jil*.

Qayıñbayev, Mädi 'Türki memleketteri men qawımdastıqtarınıñ 4-qurıltayı', *Egemen Qazaqstan No.71, 12 Säwir 1996 jil*.

Qıdır, Erkin 'Türkistan barşa türük besigi ğoy', *Egemen Qazaqstan No.84, 13 Säwir 1993 jil*.

Qul-Muhammed, Muhtar 'Teñizder terbetken Türkiya', *Jas Alaş No.145, 22 Qaraşa 1994 jil*.

R

Rahat, Asılбек ‘Asıl baba atındağı qor adamdarı’, *Qazaq eli No. 16, 25 Sawir 1997 jil.*

Rahat, Qıdır ‘Xalqı – 62,5 miylliyon, Qazaqtarı – 25 mıñ’, *Atacurt, Qazaq eli gazetiniñ qosımşası, No.13, Nawrız 1998 jil.*

Reus-Smit, Christian ‘Constructivism’, in *The Theories of International Relations*, Second Edition, Palgrave, 2001, p.209.

S

Saadanbekov, Zhumagul *Nursultan Nazarbayev: Zakony Liderstva*, Kültegin, Astana, 2005.

Sabol, Steven *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p. 151.

Sadıq, Seydulla *Qazaq publitsistikası: Ulttıq biregeylik maseleleri*, Nurlı Alem, Almaty, 2013.

Sädirqızı, Gülzeynep ‘Qızdar Türkiyağa jürip ketti’, *Egemen Qazaqstan No.146, 26 Mawsım 1992 jil.*

Sag, Armand ‘Kazakhstan in the World: the Turkic Heritage and the World around It’, in *Turkic World Almanac*, Turkic Academy, Almaty, 2013.

Sagnayev, Dulat Elemesovich *Evraziiskaya politika Turetskoy Respubliki v kontekste natsyonal’nykh interesov Respubliki Kazakhstan*, Dissertatsia na soiskainie uchenoy stepeni kandidata politicheskikh nauk, Kazakhskii Natsyonalnyi Pedagogicheskii Universitet imeni Abaya, Respublika Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2008.

Şahanov, Muhtar *Jeltoqsan epopeyası*, Jalin, Almaty, 2011.

Sartayeva, Raushan ‘Problemy sotsiokulturnoy konsolidatsii I formirovanie novoy identichnosti v Kazakhstane’ in *Tawelsiz Qazaqstannın halıqaralıq bedelinin ösüwi jane jahandanıwdın qawıp-qaterleri, Halıqaralıq ğılımi-praktikalıq konferentsiyanın materiyaldarı*, Filosofiya jane politologiya İnstitutı QR BĞM ĞK, Almaty, 2011.

Saudabayev, Kanat ‘Kazakhstan – Turtsiya: Vozrazhdennye Otnosheniya’, in *Kazakhstan-Turtsiya: 5 let druzhby i sotrudnichestva*, Bilig, Ankara, 1996.

Seliverstov, S.V. *Kazakhstan, Rossiya, Turtsiya: po strnitsam evraziiskikh idei XIX-XXI vekov*, Baspalar uyi, Almaty 2009, p.8.

Semykina, Yuliya ‘Ya gotov tselovat’ pesok...’, *Journal Kontinent No.1, 21 iyunya-3 avgusta 1999 goda.*

Seri, Säken ‘Ankarada – Abay parkı (Jazuwşı joljazbası)’, *Egemen Qazaqstan No.154, 7 Tamız 1998 jil.*

Shilibekova, Aigerim *Kazakhstan and Turkey in the Context of Emerging Security System of Central Asia*, unpublished PhD dissertation, the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, 2009.

Somuncuoğlu, Anar ‘Bağımsızlık Sonrası Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti’nde “Türkiye ve “Türk” Algısının Geçirdiği Değişim’ in *Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, Cilt:2, Sayı: 3,2007, USAK.*

Svoik, Pyotr ‘Natsional’nyi vopros v Kazakhstane: vzglyad “russkoyazychnogo,” *Tsentral’naya Aziya i Kaskaz 1998.*

Ş

Şafak, Erdal ‘Astana’da Atatürk Anıtı’, *Sabah Gazetesi, 19 Ekim 2009.*

Şafak, Erdal ‘Atalarımızın Yurduna Gelin’, *Sabah Gazetesi, 19 Ekim 2009.*

T

Tamir, Ferhat ‘Gaspıralı İsmail Bey ve Kazak Aydınlarına Tesiri’, *Yeni Türkiye 46, 2002.*

Tajin, Marat ‘Ankara, Astana’nın En Güvenilir ve En Stratejik Ortağıdır’, *Atayurt Dergisi, (Türkiye), Kış 2009, Sayı 1.*

Tazhin, M. ‘Sovereign Kazakhstan’, in *History of Kazakhstan, Essays*, Gylym, Almaty, 1998.

Tazhin, Marat ‘Gosudarstvennaya Programma Respubliki Kazakhstan ‘Put’ v Evropu’ na 2009-2011 gody v deystvii’ in *Diplomatic Herald 1(19) 2009*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Tekalan, Şerif Ali ‘Dünyadaki Türk Okulları’, *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı, 53*, Yeni Türkiye Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, Ankara, 2013, pp. 1107-1113.

Todorova, Natal'ya 'Stal blizok nam bereg turetskiy', *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* No.161, 29 Iyunya 1999 goda.

Tokaev, K.K. *Pod styagom nezavisemosti* (Under the Flag of Independence), Almaty, Bilim 1997.

Tokayev, Kasym-Jomart *Vneshnyaya Politika Kazahstana v Usloviyah Globalizatsiyi* (Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy under the conditions of Globalisation), Almaty: AO Sak, 2000.

Tokayev, Kasym-Zhomart *Svet i Ten'* (Light and Shade), Astana, 2007.

Tokayev, Kasymzhomart 'Turtsiya – Strategicheskiy Partner Kazahstana', in *Kazakhstan-Turtsiya: 5 let druzhby i sotrudnichestva*, Bilig, Ankara, 1996.

Toynbee, Arnold J. *A Study of History*, Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D.C. Semervell, Oxford University Press, New York and London, Thirteenth Edition 1956.

Trenin, Dmitri 'Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects' in in Rumer, Eugene, Trenin Dmitri, and Zhao, Huasheng (Eds.) *Central Asia, View from Washington, Moscow and Beijing*, M.E.Sharp, New York, 2007.

Trilling, David 'As Kazakhstan's Leader Asserts Independence, Did Putin Just Say, 'Not So Fast'?' August 30, 2014 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69771> Retrieved in 14.05.2015

Tüymebayev, Canseyit 'Kazakistan ve Türkiye: Etkin İşbirliği Örneği', *Atayurt Eğitim, Kültür ve Ekonomi Dergisi* Kış 2011 sayı.

U

Uslu, Nasuh 'The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period', *Alternatives, Volume 2, 2003*, p.164.

Urmanov, Adil 'Turtsiya vnov' demonstriruet muskuly', *Delovaya nedelya* No.39, 9 Oktyabrya 1998 goda.

Ü

Üner, Seniha & Güngör, Hüseyin ‘Türkiye’de ben dahil 70 milyon Kazak yaşıyor’ *Atayurt Eğitim, Kültür ve Ekonomi Dergisi* Kış 2009 sayı 1.

V

Valikhanov, Chokan ‘Sledy shamnstva u kirgizov’, in *Sobranie sochineniy, 4 tom*, Qazaq Sovet Ğılım Ensiklopediyası, Almatı, 1985.

Valikhanov, Chokan ‘O musul’manstve ve stepi’, in *Sobranie sochineniy, 4 tom*, Qazaq Sovet Ğılım Ensiklopediyası, Almatı, 1985.

W

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the state, and war; a theoretical analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of international politics*, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1979.

Wayis, Erjan ‘Türük Respublikasının Prezidenti Turgut Özal: ‘Qazaq halqına bar jaqsılıq tileymın’’, *Halıq Kenesi* N52, 17 Nawrız 1993 jil.

Wendt, Alexander ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, *International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992)*.

Y

Yagmurova, S. ‘Gazetnyi most: Turtsiya—Alma-Ata’, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* No.271, 26 Noyabrya 1991 goda.

Yagya, V.S. ‘Puti pereputya sovremennoi Turtsii’, *Aktualnye problemy mirovoi politiki v XXIveke: Vostok v mirovoy politike, Vypusk 4*, Nestor Istoriya, Sankt Peterburg 2009, p.125.

Yakobashvili, Temuri ‘A Chinese Marshall Plan for Central Asia?’ <http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12838-a-chinese-marshall-plan-for-central-asia> (19.11.2013).

Yıldırım, Saadet Pınar ‘Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı ve Çalışmalarının Kısa Özeti’, *Yeni Türkiye: Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, Yeni Türkiye Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, Ankara, 2013, pp. 830-837.

Yüce, Mehmet ‘Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı’nın Türk Dünyasına Yönelik Eğitim Faaliyetleri’, *Yeni Türkiye:Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı*, 53, 2013.

Z

Zhao, Huasheng ‘Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy’, in Rumer, Eugene, Trenin Dmitri, and Zhao, Huasheng (Eds.) *Central Asia, View from Washington, Moscow and Beijing*, M.E.Sharp, New York,2007, p.154.

Zhitnukhin, A.P.*Nursultan Nazarbayev: Bez Pravykh i Levykh, Stranitsy avtobiografii, razmyshleniya, pozitsii...*, Molodaya Gvardiya, Moskva, 1991.

Journals and Newspapers of Kazakhstan

Atayurt Dergisi

Ayqın

Delovaya nedelya

Diplomatic Herald

Egemen Qazaqstan

Halıq Kenesi

Jas Alaş

Juldız

Jas Türkistan

Kazakhstanskaya Pravda

Kazakh almanaghy

Kontinent

Ponorama

Qazaq eli

Türkistan

Nursultan Nazarbayev's speeches and interviews

‘Vystupleniye Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan Nursultana Nazarbayeva na otkrytij tret’ego Summita SVMDA (Stambul, 8 uyunya 2010 g.)’ *Diplomatic Herald* 2(24) 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türkiye Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu’na düzenlenen toplantıda yaptığı konuşma 21 Mayıs 2003, İstanbul’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012.

‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türkiye Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı’nda yaptığı konuşma 21 Mayıs 2003, İstanbul’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012.

‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları Zirvesinde yaptığı konuşma 18-19 Ekim 1994, İstanbul’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012.

‘Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları Zirvesinde yaptığı konuşma 30 Ekim 1992, Ankara’, in *Kazakistan-Türkiye Dostluk ve İşbirliğinin 20 Yılı*, Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, 2012.

‘Qazaqstan Respublikasının Prezidenti N. Nazarbayevtin Türkiya Respublikasının Prezidenti A. Gülmen bolğan kezdesüwinen keying baspasöz maslihatında söylegen sözi’ in *Vneshnepoliticheskaya deyztel’nost’ Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayeva v 2009 godu*, Kazakhstanskiy Institut Strategicheskikh Isledovaniy, Almaty 2010.

N. Nazarbayev, *Lessons of History and the Modernity: Speech in ceremonial Meeting devoted to 5th anniversary of Kazakhstan Independence*, Almaty, “Kazakhstan” 1997.

‘Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbayev to the nation. January 17, 2014’ http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_215751_kazakhstan-respublikasynyn-prezidenti-n-a-nazarbaevty-n-kazakhstan-khalkyna-zholdauly-2014-zhylhy-17-kantar

‘QR Prezidentiniñ Qazaqstan halqına joldawı, Stabil’nost’ i bezopasnost’ strany v novom stoletiyе 16.09.1999’ http://www.akorda.kz/kz/page/kazakhstan-respublikasynyn-prezidenti-n-a-nazarbaevty-n-kazakhstan-khalkyna-zholdauly-20199-zhylhy-kyrkuiek_1342857844

‘The Speech of Nursultan Nazarbayev at the Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Astana, Astana 15 June, 2011’, *Diplomatic Herald*, 3 (30) 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, p. 10.

Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s interview to French journal L’Essentiel des Relations Internationales 21.09.2011 <http://www.akorda.kz/kz/speeches/interviews/azastan-respublikasyny-prezident-nursultan-nazarbaevty>

Official Documents

‘Deklaratsiya o Gosudarstvennom suverenitete KazSSR’ (Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR) 25.10.1990 <http://www.mfa.kz/index.php/ru/vneshnyaya-politika/khronika-nezavisimogo-kazakhstana/12-material-orys/650-deklaratsiya-o-gosudarstvennom-suverenitete-kazssr> Accessed on 4.03.2012

Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RK ‘O gosudarstvennoi nezavisimosti Respubliki Kazakhstan’ (The Constitutional Law of Kazakhstan on ‘State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan’) 16.12.1991 <http://www.mfa.kz/index.php/ru/vneshnyaya-politika/khronika-nezavisimogo-kazakhstana/12-material-orys/651-konstitutsionnyj-zakon-rk-o-gosudarstvennoj-nezavisimosti-respubliki-kazakhstan> Accessed on 8.07.2012

The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2007) <http://en.government.kz/docs/konstitutziya.htm> Accessed on 30.08.2012.

Doktrina Natsional’nogo edinstva Kazakhstana (Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan) <http://www.inform.kz/rus/article/2263364> Accessed on 23.05.2012

Qazaqstan Respublikasının Statistika jöindegі Agenttigi (Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan), (2000) *Qazaqstan Respublikası Halqının Ulttıq Quramı: Qazaqstan Respublikasındaǵı 1999 jılǵı Halıq Sanaǵının Qoritındısı.*

(National Composition of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Conclusion of the Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1999) Almaty.

«Kazakhstan Respublikasinin 2009 jilgi Ulttiq haliq sanaginin qoritindilari» Taldamali Esep, Kazakhstan Respublikasi Statistika Agenttigi, p.20.

Electronic sources

Official website of the UN <http://www.un.org>

Official website of the Turkish Grand National Assembly <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/>

Official website of the Turkic Council (Cooperation Council of Turkish Speaking Countries) <http://www.turkkon.org/docs/>

Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan <http://www.akorda.kz/>

Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan <http://www.mfa.kz/>

Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/>

Official website of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan <http://www.edu.gov.kz/>

Official website of the International Turkic Academy <http://turkacadem.kz/>

Official website of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) <http://www.tika.gov.tr/>

Official website of the Turkey's Statistics Institute <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/>

APPENDICES

A: LIST OF INTERVIEWED KAZAKH EXPERTS

Darhan Hidirali, the head of International Turkic Academy (Interviewed in February 2012).

Bürkitbay Ayağan, the head Institute of State History (Interviewed in February 2012).

Dihan Kamzabek, vice-rector of the L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University. (Interviewed in January 2012).

Interview with bureaucrat from the Administration of the President Nazarbayev, 2.02.2012

Sailau Batirsha-uli, diplomat, vice-minister of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan (Interviewed in February 2012)

Tursın Jurtbay, historian, the head of Otrar Kitaphanası (Library of Otrar) of the L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Interviewed in January 2012).

B: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Ametbek, Dinmukhammed
Nationality: Kazakhstan (KZ)
Date and Place of Birth: 2 June 1980, Kazakhstan
Marital Status: Married
Phone: +90 507 927 46 18
email: dimash192@gmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, International Relations	2004

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2015- Present	TRT TSR	Producer
2011	TRT AVAZ	Translator
2006 January	The L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University	Head of International Office
2005 September	The L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University	Inspector of International Office

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English, Turkish, Russian, Chinese

PUBLICATIONS

1. 'Kazakh-Turkish Cooperation in the Field of Education' *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences* 143 (2014) 190 – 194.
2. 'Kazak Dış Politikasının Analizi' *Yeni Türkiye* dergisi Türk Dünyası Özel Sayısı 2013 Sayı:54.
3. 'Қазақстан мен Ресейдің ынтымақтастығына Түркияның көзқарасы' *Л.Н. Гумилев ат. Еуразия Ұлттық Университетінің хабаршысы* N1-2 (5-6) 2012.

HOBBIES

Dombra, Kazakh traditional music instrument. Тоғызқұмалақ, Turkic intellectual game

C: TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezde ben bağımsızlık sonrası dönemde Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısını analiz ettim. Çalışmada ben İnşaacılığı uyguladım. İnşaacı anlayışına göre, algıyı devletin kimliği belirler. Bu anlayışa dayanarak, çalışmanın temel argümanı, Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısının temel belirleyicisi Kazakistan'ın ulusal kimliğidir.

Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi'nin İnşaacılık yaklaşımı isminin de ipucu verdiği gibi ta baştan dünyanın toplumsal yani sosyal olarak inşa olduğunu iddia ediyordu. İnşaacı anlayışında iki dünya var: biri, gerçek dünya; diğeri aklımızdaki dünyadır. Alexander Wendt'in de vurguladığı gibi, "İnşaacı sosyal teorinin temel bir ilkesi, diğerk aktörlere de dâhil olmak üzere, insanlar kendileri için sahip olduğu anlam temelinde, nesnelere tepki verirler."⁷⁶⁰

Kültürel ve sosyal çevredeki farklılıklar nedeniyle aynı gerçeklik farklı kişiler tarafından farklı şekillerde algılanabilir. Uluslararası İlişkilerde 'ortak bir dünya' ve 'farklı dünyalar' anlayışlarını Francis Fukuyama'nın *Tarihin Sonu* ile Samuel Huntington'un *Medeniyetler Çatışması* eserlerinde ifade edildi. Fukuyama, liberal demokrasiye doğru yol almakta olan 'tek dünya' anlayışına vurgu yaparken,⁷⁶¹ Huntington tarihsel uygarlıkların oluşturduğu farklı değerlere dayanan 'farklı dünyalara' dikkat çekti.⁷⁶² İnşaacılara göre, uluslararası ilişkilerde aktörlerin

⁷⁶⁰ Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 397.

⁷⁶¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1992.

⁷⁶² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

görüşlerini şekillendiren kültür, tarih ve medeniyettir. Wendt sözleriyle, kimlik çıkarların temelidir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, pozitivist yaklaşımlar olan Realizm ve Liberalizm uluslararası ilişkilerde aktörlerin kimliklerini homojen olarak tanımlarlar. Çünkü onlara göre, bu aktörler benzer bir şekilde hareket etme eğilimindedirler. Diğer bir deyişle, onların dış dünya algısı güç ve ekonomik çıkar çerçevesi ile sınırlandırılmıştır. İnşaacılara göre ise aktörlerin kimlikleri heterojendir çünkü onların kimliklerini oluşturan kültür ve uluslararası çevre farklıdır.

İnşaacı okulda kimlik inşası sorununa çeşitli yaklaşımlar vardır. Wendt gibi sistemik inşaacılar özneler arasındaki etkileşimin kimlikleri şekillendirdiğini savunurlarken, en birim-düzeyi inşaacılar iç siyasetin sistemden daha önemli olduğunu iddia ederler. Bu tezde ben hem uluslararası sisteme hem iç siyasette eşit önem veren bütünsel yaklaşım olan üçüncü yaklaşımı uyguladım. Bununla birlikte, 'öteki' ile ilgili algı ve diğerleri hakkındaki görüş konusunda bunları algılayanın kimliği belirleyeceğine dair İnşaacılar arasında fikir birliği vardır. Bu nedenle, öz'ün 'öteki' algısını anlamak için, öz'ün kimliğini analiz etmek gerekir.

Öz 'öteki'ye karşı sempati hissedebilir ve 'öteki'ye kendini dost olarak gösterebilir. Ama eğer aynı duygular, karşı taraftan paylaşılmazsa sempati ve dostluk duyguları pek anlam ifade etmez. Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi'nin ünlü sözünde belirtildiği gibi, 'Ne kadar bilgili olursan ol, ancak karşıdakinin anladığı kadarsın.' Yani insanın bilgisi muhatabının algı düzeyine göre ölçülür. Aynı şekilde, uluslararası ilişkilerde bir devletin statüsü kendini tanıtmaya ve tanımlama şekliyle değil, diğer devletlerin sözkonusu devlet hakkındaki bakış ve görüşleri ile belirlenir. Başka bir deyişle, başkalarının algısı devletlerin statüsünü belirler.

Öz'ün kimliğinde yaşanan değişiklik onun başkaları algılamasındaki değişikliklere yol açar. Bu nedenle algılayan tarafın kimliğini analiz etmek önemlidir. Wendt'in de ifade ettiği gibi, Soğuk Savaş sona ermişti, çünkü Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Sovyetler Birliği birbirini artık düşman olarak görmüyorlardı.⁷⁶³ Aşağıda değineceğim İmaj teorisinin terminolojisinde karşılıklı 'düşman algısı' ya da 'düşman imgesi' karşılıklı 'dost algısına' ya da 'dost imgesine' dönüşmüş oldu. Son tahlilde

⁷⁶³ Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 397.

biz kimlik algının temelini oluşturur sonucuna varabiliriz. Bu çalışma, işte bu temel argümanın üzerine inşa edilmiştir.

Aslında hala şekillenmekte olan Kazakistan'ın ulusal kimliğini analiz ederken, ben Kazakistan'ın Slav dünyası ve Türk dünyasının kesiştiği bir noktada yer aldığını iddia ediyorum. Buna ek olarak, ülke nüfusu bir taraftan Ruslar, Ukraynalılar ve Belaruslar gibi Slav halkından, diğer bir yandan Kazak, Özbek, Uygur gibi Türk halkından oluşmaktadır. Slav unsuru Kazakistan'ı Slav ve Rus dünyasının bir parçası olarak düşünürken, Türk unsuru Kazakistan'ı Türk dünyasının bir parçası olarak görmektedir. Bu koşullar altında, Türk kökenli insanlar bir koruyucu ve cazibe merkezi olarak Türkiye'yi görmekteyken, Slav kökenli insanlar ise bir koruyucu ve cazibe merkezi olarak Rusya'yı görmekteledir. Dikkatle ele alınmadığı takdirde bu kırılgan durum Kazakistan'ın iki kutup halinde bölünmesine yol açabileceği aşikardır. Bu durumu dikkate alan bağımsız Kazakistan'ın ilk Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev ülke kimliğini 'Avrasyalı' olarak tanımladı. Bu şekilde Nursultan Nazarbayev Avrasyacılığın kendi versiyonunu öne sürmüştü. O Klasik Avrasyacıların Slav-Türk sentezi kavramından yararlandı. Böylece, Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığı farklı etnik ve dini gruplar arasındaki ve özellikle Slavlar ve Türkler (hususen de Ruslar ve Kazaklar) arasındaki çatışmaları önlemeyi amaç edinen, ülkenin ulusal ideolojisi haline geldi. Uluslararası arenada ise Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığı Kazakistan'ı Avrasya kıtasının merkezinde konumlandırır. Kazak dış politikası açısından, Avrasyacılık Kazakistan'ın çok vektörlü dış politikasının felsefi temeline dönüştü.

Bunu daha da açarsak, Avrasyacılık, merkezinde Kazak-Rus tandemi bulunan Kazakistan'ın çoğulculuğu ve çok taraflılığının başka bir adıdır. Ben bu tandemi Kazakistan'ın Avrasyacı çekirdeği olarak tanımlıyorum. Ulusal düzeyde, bu çekirdek ülkedeki tüm etnik ve dini grupları kendine çeker ve birleştirir. Uluslararası ilişkilerde ise, bu çekirdek Rusya veya Türkiye'ye doğru çekilmez, tam tersine Moskova ve Ankara'yı kendine çeken bir merkez haline gelir. Bunun sayesinde, Kazakistan, Doğu ve Batı olmak üzere tüm güç merkezlerine eşit mesafede duran bir merkez ülkeye dönüşür. Bu anlamda Avrasya'nın kalbi ya da dünyanın merkezi olan Astana'nın yeri çok semboliktir. Astana yeni bağımsız Kazakistan'ın yeni Avrasya kimliğini gösterir.

Bu düşünceler çerçevesinde, genel olarak Türk dünyası ve özellikle Türk dünyasının lideri olan Türkiye, Kazakistan'ın Avrasya çekirdeğinin bir tarafını temsil etmektedir. Bunu açıklarsak, Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısı, Kazakistan'ın Avrasya kimliği ile doğrudan ilgilidir. Bu nedenle, Kazak-Türk ilişkilerini iç siyasetten ayırmak imkânsız ve hatta Kazakistan'da ulus ve devlet inşa sürecini Kazak-Türk ilişkilerinden ayrı değerlendirmek zordur. Bu nedenle, tez'in temel argümanı Kazakistan'ın Avrasya kimliği onun Türkiye algısının temel belirleyicisidir.

Bununla birlikte, İnşacılık kavramsal olarak kimlik, algı ve imaj değerlendirmesine rağmen, öz'ün 'öteki' algısını ölçmek için metodolojiden yoksun olduğunu burada belirtmek gerekir. Bu boşluğu doldurmak için, ana konusu imaj ve algı olan Uluslararası İlişkilerin İmaj Teorisini uyguladım.

Kısaca, İmaj Teorisi dediğimiz uluslararası imajlara rehberlik eden birincil yargıları, ya da kalıplaşmış önyargıları ve uluslararası politikadaki kararları tanımlayan stratejik karar verme teorisidir. İmaj teorisyenleri dünya işlerinde diğer aktörler hakkındaki fikirler iyi tanımlanmış bilişsel unsurları ile, grup şemaları veya imgeler halinde düzenlenmiştir diye önerir. Bu imge ve algılar hedef ülkenin motifleri, yönetimi ve birincil özelliklerine ilişkin bilişlerden ve inançlardan oluşur ve sistemli bir şekilde organize edilir.⁷⁶⁴ Uluslararası ilişkilerde imge, imaj, önyargı ve algı önemlidir, çünkü onlar "bir milletin başka millete karşı arzuladığı tepkiyi ya da tutumunu haklı göstermeye hizmet ederler."⁷⁶⁵

Ben bu çalışmada yaptığım gibi algı ve imge birbirinin yerine kullanılabilir olduğunu not etmekte yarar vardır. Ama somut olmak gerekirse, algı imgeden daha geniştir. İmgeyi algılamanın ürünü olarak tanımlayabiliriz. Algı dediğimiz algılamayı, algılayış sürecini ve algılama sonucunu kapsar, imge ise sadece bu sürecin çıktısıdır. Bu nedenle, İmaj Teorisi algı sonucuna odaklanmıştır.

⁷⁶⁴ Michele G. Alexander, Shana Levin, P. J. Henry, 'Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Feb., 2005), p. 22.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 25.

Boulding imge ve imajın önemini şu şekilde vurgular: “Davranışları her zaman gerçek değil, imge belirler. Biz dünyaya olduğu gibi değil, bize görüldüğü şekline göre tepki veririz.”⁷⁶⁶ Robert Jervis bir devletin imajı onun hedefine kolayca ulaşması için önemli bir faktör olabilir diye savunuyor. Ona göre, istenilen bir görüntü, imge, algı genellikle askeri ve ekonomik gücün kullanımdan daha da önemli olabilir.⁷⁶⁷ Bu anlamda, herhangi bir devletin diplomasisinin amacı istenilen algı ve imge oluşturmaktır. Kamu diplomasisi ise hedef toplum içinde algı yönetimidir.

A devletinin B devletindeki imajını analiz ederek, B devletinin A devletine karşı tutumunu öngörebiliriz. İmaj Teorisinin ana fikri “davranış imgeye bağlıdır.”⁷⁶⁸ İmgeler ‘düşman imgesi’, ‘müttefik imgesi’, ‘bağımlı imgesi’, ‘emperyalist imgesi’, ‘barbar imgesi’ olabilir ve tepkiler de buna göre olur. Örneğin, eğer bir işgalci devlet kendisi hakkındaki ‘emperyalist imge’sini ‘medeniyet götüren imge’yle değiştirmeyi başarabilirse, o zaman bir daha koloniyi sömürmek için askeri kuvvet gerekmez. Demek ki zihinleri ve kalpleri fethetmek toprakları ve insanları fethetmekten daha karlı olduğu anlamına gelir. Dünyada saygın bir konuma talip olan her ulus, yabancı ülkelerde kendi imajı için çalışır. British Council, Goethe Enstitüsü, Konfüçyüs Enstitüsü, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, CNN, BBC, öğrenci değişim programları, burslar ilgili ülkelerin imaj ve algılarını iyileştirmek için hizmet ederler. Soğuk Savaş sırasında bu gibi kurumların bu tür çalışmaları propaganda ya da psikolojik savaş olarak adlandırılırdı. Bugün ise onların işleri imaj yapımı veya algı yönetimi olarak bilinir. Teknolojilerin, İnternet ve Sosyal Medyanın gelişmesiyle, bu araçları kontrol eden uluslar kendi olumlu imajlarını geliştirmede bu teknolojilere sahip olmayan uluslara göre daha başarılı olurlar.

İmaj Teorisinin merkez sorusu ‘imajı belirleyen nedir?’ Boulding algılama sürecinde mesajı ve imge olduğunu savunur. Mesaj imgeyi çarptığında o etkilenmez, hafifçe

⁷⁶⁶ K. E. Boulding, ‘National Images and International Systems’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 1959), p. 120.

⁷⁶⁷ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1970, p. 6.

⁷⁶⁸ Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969, p. 6.

etkilenebilir ya da devrim niteliğinde deęişebilir.⁷⁶⁹ Mesaj her Őeyden önce karar vericilerin ifadeleri, liderlerin, iki ũlke elitlerinin ve halklar arası iliŐkiler demektir. Bazı durumlarda, ũçüncü taraf bir devletle iliŐkiler kısmen algılamaya farklı mesajlar verebilir. Özetle, mesaj bir devletin algılayan ũlkenin algısını etkileyecek bütün faaliyetlerini kapsar. Diplomasi, kamu diplomasisi, insanların iliŐkiler olumlu ve istenilen imaj yapımında önemli araçlardır. Özellikle bilgi resmi kaynakları by-pass yapabilen Internet ağlarının geliştirilmesi, daha fazla önem kazanmaktadır. Yakın zamana kadar Karar vericilerin tutumları önemli idi, ancak küreselleŐme çağında artık onunla birlikte kitlelerin görüşleri daha önemli hale gelmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Robert Jervis karar vericiler, bürokrasi, iç siyaset ve uluslararası ortamı algı analiz düzeyleri olarak sayar.⁷⁷⁰

Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısını incelemek amacıyla bu Uluslararası İliŐkilerin İmaj Teorisini uyguladımızda, algının bu dört analiz düzeyinden yararlanılmaktadır. Yani karar verici, elit, genel halk ve uluslararası çevre Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısını oluşturur. Bu analiz düzeylerine dayanarak, ben Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısı olumsuz 'öteki imgesi' ve 'yabancı imgesi'nden olumlu 'dost imgesi' ve 'kardeş imgesi'ne doğru gelişmekte olduğunu savunuyorum.

Karar verici düzeyinde, Kazakistan'ın ilk Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev'in önemli bir rol oynadığı bellidir. O, Kazakistan'ın Avrasya kimliğinin ve çok vektörlü Kazak dış politikasının ana mimarıdır. Bundan dolayı onun Türkiye algısı önemlidir. Türkiye ve Türk dış politikası hakkındaki Nursultan Nazarbayev'in görüşlerini analiz ettiğimizde, Kazakistan'ın bağımsızlığının ilk yıllarından itibaren, Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Türkiye ile işbirliğine özel önem verdiği karşımıza çıkar. Nazarbayev'in Türkiye'ye karşı tavrı Kazakistan'ın Avrasya gerçeğini yansıtır. O, Türkiye ile Kazakistan'ın ilişkilerinin ũlkedeki Rus nüfuzunu dengelemek için önemli olduğunun farkındadır. Burada Őunun altını çizmekte fayda var: Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Türkiye ve Türk dünyasına yönelik politikası Kazakistan'ın Avrasya

⁷⁶⁹ Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: The Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor Paperbacks The University of Michigan Press, USA, 1969, p. 10.

⁷⁷⁰ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p.13.

kimliğinin Türk bileşenini güçlendirmeyi amaç edinen büyük bir stratejinin hayata geçirilmesidir. Bugün Türkiye'nin Kazakistan'da olumlu algılanması işte bu insanlar arasındaki etkileşimi yoğunlaştıran büyük stratejisinin sayesinde.

Nursultan Nazarbayev Türkiye'nin potansiyeli ve sınırlarını kavramıştı ve ona göre bu stratejiyi ortaya attı. Aslında, Nazarbayev'in Türkiye algısı, bu stratejinin temelini oluşturmaktadır. İmaj Teorisinin iddiasına göre karar vericiler genellikle deneye dayalı bir şekilde tespit edilen gerçekler temelinde bir olay veya konuya tepki vermez, ancak kendi algılarının temelinde ve tehlikeli olduğunu düşündüğü ve inandığı şeyler temelinde karar verirler.⁷⁷¹ Bu varsayımı dikkate alarak, ben Nazarbayev'in zihnindeki Türkiye imajının olumlu 'kardeş imgesi' olduğunu ileri sürüyorum.

Bu olumlu algı Turgut Özal'ın cumhurbaşkanlığı döneminde oluştu. Bu bağlamda, Turgut Özal ile Nursultan Nazarbayev arasındaki dostluk Nazarbayev'in Türkiye algısına olumlu katkıda bulundu. Nursultan Nazarbayev'in dış politikadaki ilk deneyimlerini paylaştığı *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde* kitabında 'Doğu ile Batı Arasında' alt başlığı altında öncelikle Kazak-Türk ilişkileri hakkındaki görüşlerini belirtmesi tesadüf değildir. Ancak ondan sonra Kazakistan'ın Çin, Avrupa, Arap ülkeleri, İran, Japonya ve ABD ile ilişkilerini analiz eder.⁷⁷² Kazakistan'ın dünya ile bütünleşmesinde Türkiye önemli rol oynadığından dolayı Nursultan Nazarbayev'in zihnindeki Türkiye imajının olumlu olduğu açıktır.

Dost ve hatta kardeşlik ilişkileri Süleyman Demirel cumhurbaşkanlığı döneminde de devam etti. Yani Süleyman Demirel'in cumhurbaşkanlığı döneminde, Nursultan Nazarbayev ile Süleyman Demirel arasındaki yakın ilişkiler, Nazarbayev'in Türkiye hakkındaki olumlu algısını güçlendirdi. İşin gerçeği şu ki Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanları Turgut Özal ve Süleyman Demirel içtenlikle Kazakistan'ın bağımsızlığını desteklediler.

⁷⁷¹ Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, Second Edition, Intercultural Press, USA, 1997, p. 4.

⁷⁷² Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Na Paroge XXI veka*, Atamura, Almaty, 2003.

Kazakistan'daki kimlik inşası ve ulus inşası bakımından Türkiye ile ilgili olarak 1990'ların başlarında Türkiye'nin başlattığı Türk devletleri zirvelerinden söz etmeye değerdir. Çünkü bu zirveler Kazakistan'ın kimliği açısından önemli sayılır. Zirvelere Nursultan Nazarbayev'in katılımı, onun Kazakistan'ın Türk kimliğini tanıdığını gösterir. Nursultan Nazarbayev pragmatik bir politikacı olarak Kazakistan'ın Rusya ile dostça komşuluk ilişkilerini geliştirmesi gerektiğinin farkındadır. Ama aynı zamanda o Kazakistan'ın bir bağımsız devlet olarak kendi benzersiz kimliğini inşa etmesi gerektiği gerçeğinin de farkındadır. Bu bağlamda Türkiye önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Nüfusunun çoğunluğu kendilerini Türk dünyasının bir parçası olarak gören bir ülke için Türkiye ile yakın ilişkiler geliştirmek doğaldır. Ancak, kardeş ülke ile bu kardeşlik ilişkileri komşuluk ilişkilerine zarar vermemelidir. Kazakistan Moskova ve Ankara'ya doğru aynı zamanda çekilmektedir. Bu koşullar altında, ülkenin Türk ve Slav çizgisinden bölünmesini önlemek amacıyla, Nazarbayev kendisinin Avrasyacılık kavramını ortaya atması çok isabetli olmuştur.

Nazarbayev Rusya'daki Panславizm veya etnik Rus milliyetçiliğinin Rusya'nın dağılmasına yol açabileceği gibi Kazakistan'da etnik Kazak milliyetçiliğinin Kazakistan devletinin parçalanmasına yol açabileceğinin farkındaydı. Buna ek olarak, Kazak yönetimi ülkenin Çarlık Rus ve Sovyet dönemi tarihini göz ardı edemezdi. Bu nedenle, Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığı Slav-Türk halklarının ya da Kazak-Rus halklarının bir arada barışça yaşamasını vurguluyordu. Dahası, Kazakistan yüzden fazla etnik ve dini grupların barış ve uyum içinde yaşadığı bir yer olarak tanıtılıyordu. Böylece, Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığı ülkenin çoğulculuk ve çok kültürlülüğünün ideolojik ve akademik temeli oldu. Bu anlamda, Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığı Kazakistan'ın kucaklayıcı ve kapsayıcı milliyetçiliğinin başka bir adıdır. İç politikada Avrasyacılık çok etnikli Kazakistan kimliğini inşa etmek için temeli oluştururken, dış politikada Avrasyacılık, Kazakistan'ın çoklu vektör politikasının temel oldu. Bu politika Kazakistan'ın belirli bir ülke veya bölgeye yakınlaşmasının diğer ülke ve bölgeden uzaklaşmayacağını bildiriyordu.⁷⁷³

⁷⁷³ A.N. Nysanbayev, V. Y. Dunayev (eds.), *Evrziiskaya Doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva* (Eurasian Doctrine of Nursultan Nazarbayev), Almaty, 2010.

Kazakistan'ın Avrasya politikası Nazarbayev tarafından Rusya'ya yaptığı ziyaret sırasında 1994 yılının baharında açıklandı. O zaman birçok Sovyet sonrası Cumhuriyetlerinde bağımsızlık coşkusu vardı ve Rus liderleri de Batı'ya dâhil olmakla ve Batı tarafından tanınmakla meşgul idiler. Atlantik dünya görüşü hâkim olan Rus yönetimi Orta Asya'yı Rusya ekonomisine bir yük olarak değerlendiriyorlardı. Moskova Devlet Üniversitesi'nde yaptığı konuşmasında Nursultan Nazarbayev Avrasya Devletler Birliği'nı oluşturmak fikrini önerdi. Nazarbayev yüksek düzeyde entegre olmuş ekonomiler, benzer sosyal ve politik yapılar ve halkların zihniyeti, birçok cumhuriyetlerinin çok uluslu kompozisyonu ve BDT ülkelerindeki ortak tarihi gelenekler gibi ortaklıkların daha fazla entegrasyona yol açabileceğini vurguladı.⁷⁷⁴

Nazarbayev'in bu cesur adımı Rus akademisyenleri tarafından büyük bir coşku ile algılandı ve canla başla desteklendi. Daha sonra, Kazak cumhurbaşkanı bu yeni Avrasyacılık versiyonunu birkaç kitapta ve Avrasya Ulusal Üniversitesi'nde yaptığı yıllık konuşmalarında geliştirdiler. Nazarbayev, akademik anlamda Avrasyacılık üzerine tartışmayı başlatıcı olarak ve siyasi anlamda bir uygulayıcı olarak Avrasyacı idi. Golam Mostafa tarafından belirtildiği gibi, Rusların Avrasyacılık hakkındaki görüşler ve kavramları, çok aktif baskın olsun ve akademik ve entelektüel organize olabilen radikal milliyetçiler tarafından yayılmaktaydı ancak bir devlet politikası veya ideolojisi olarak gelişemiyordu.⁷⁷⁵ Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev Avrasyacılığın kendi versiyonunun sunumu ile Klasik Avrasyacılık mirası üzerindeki Rus aydınlarının tekeli sona erdirdi.

Bu bağlamda, Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığı ile Rus aydınlarının, özellikle Aleksandr Dugin'in Avrasyacılığının arasındaki farkı karşılaştırmakta fayda vardır. Luca Anceschi'nin altını çizdiği gibi, A.G. Dugin'in sert saldırgan yeni Avrasyacılığı ile ona tamamen zıt olan ve uyum ve uzlaşmayı önemseyen Nursultan Nazarbayev'in iddialı yeni Avrasyacılığı'nın uyumsuzluğunu göz önünde bulundurursak, Kazak

⁷⁷⁴ N. Nazarbayev, 'O formirovani Evraziiskogo soyuza gosudarstv' in A.N. Nysanbayev, V.Y. Dunayev (eds.), *Evraziiskaya Doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva*, Almaty 2010, p. 40.

⁷⁷⁵ Golam Mustafa, 'The Concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian Policy and Its Implications', *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4 (2013), p.169.

cumhurbaşkanının Dugin ile aynı kavramı kullanması çok fazla soru işaretleri uyandırmaktadır.⁷⁷⁶ Öncelikle bu uyumsuzluk düzgün olarak muayene edilmelidir. Çünkü öyle yapılmazsa, sanki Kazak cumhurbaşkanı Rus emperyal Avrasyacılığını destekliyor gibi anlaşmazlığa yol açabilir. Anceschi Dugin'in Avrasyacılığı ile Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığı arasında kesişen üç konuyu tanımlar. İlk olarak, Dugin'in neo-emperyal eğilimi başlangıcından beri anti-emperyalist bir eğilim olan Kazak Avrasyacılığı ile belirgin bir şekilde uyumsuz oldu. Dahası, Dugin'in yeni Avrasyacılığı Batı karşıtı bir görünüme sahiti. Bu tutum Sovyet sonrası Kazakistan'da geliştirilen yeni Avrasyacılık tarafından asla paylaşılmazdı, asla kabul edilmezdi. Son olarak, yeni Avrasyacılığın iki şekli post-Sovyet devletin bir Avrasyacı topluluğuna katkısını ve bu devletlerin topluluğu kurma yetenek ve iradesini çelişkili bir şekilde değerlendirdi. Sovyet sonrası oluşan egemenliklerin korunması, bir yandan, yeni Kazak Avrasyacılığın teorik evrimi için sabit bir etki olarak tesir ediyordu. Kazakistan da dahil olmak üzere devletlerin yapay ve geçici formları konsolidasyonu, diğer yandan, Dugin tarafından eski Sovyet bölgesindeki devlet oluşumunun temel sonucu olarak kabul ediliyordu.⁷⁷⁷

Benzer bir şekilde, Sergey Biryukov Nazarbayev'in Avrasya kavramının yedi temel özelliğinin altını çiziyor: ilk olarak, gerçekçi, realist karakter, yani 'ideolojik önceliğin' olmaması; İkincisi, Sovyet sonrası alanda 'Avrasya entegrasyonu' fikrini modernizasyon amaç ve hedefleri ile bağlama eğilimi; üçüncüsü, egemen bağımsız bir devlet olarak Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti çıkarlarının önceliğine odaklanmak; dördüncüsü, 'Sovyet sonrası sahanın' mevcut durumu ve onun gelişiminin ana eğilimlerini gerçekçi bir şekilde yansıması; beşincisi, Avrasya entegrasyonu gelişme yollarının Kazak hükümeti tarafından benimsenen çok yönlü bir strateji bağlamında gözden geçirilmesi; altıncısı, ekonomik ve siyasi entegrasyonlarının işbirliğine eğilim ve son olarak, 'entegrasyon projesi' kapsamında sadece Kazak ve Rus

⁷⁷⁶ Luca Anceschi, 'Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy: neo-Eurasianist rhetoric in post-Soviet Kazakhstan', *Nationalities Paper: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 19 Aug 2014, p. 742.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

çıkarlarını hesaba katmak değil, bunun yanı sıra Orta Asya devletlerinin çıkarlarını da göz önünde bulundurmak.⁷⁷⁸

Anceschi fikrine göre, yeni Kazak Avrasyacılığı özgün olarak ortaya çıkışından bu yana değişmez anti-emperyalist duruşunu muhafaza etmesine karşılık Dugin'in Nazarbayev Avrasyacılığına bakışında bir parabolik evrim geçirdi.⁷⁷⁹Dugin *Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Avrasya Misyonu* adlı bir kitap yazdı. Orada Avrasya entegrasyonunu genel olarak Slav-Türk ve özellikle de Kazak-Rus birliği olarak tekrar gözden geçirdi. Yukarıda tartışıldığı gibi, Kazakların büyük çoğunluğu iki dilli ve hem Rusya ve Türk dünyasına eşit mesafede duruyorlar. Kazak cumhurbaşkanı bu özelliği temsil eder. Dugin, Nursultan Nazarbayev'i halkının kültürünü yeniden canlandıran ve Kazak devletini ve bağımsızlığını yeniden inşa eden bir Kazak olarak ve aynı zamanda Rus kültürü, Rus bilimi ve Rus ve Sovyet emek etiğini içselleştirmiş bir Rus olarak tanımlar.⁷⁸⁰

Ancak, Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığını sadece Rusya ile yeniden bütünleşme ile indirgemek yanlıştır. Kazak lider Avrasyacılık fikrinin ana lokomotifleri olarak Asya'da İşbirliği ve Güven Artırıcı Önlemler Konferansı'nı (CICA), Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği'ni ve Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü'nü sayar. Her üç oluşumun da Kazak cumhurbaşkanı girişimiyle oluşmuş olduğunu akılda tutmak önemlidir.⁷⁸¹ Pratik açıdan, Mostafa'nın da ifade ettiği gibi, Kazakistan'ın Avrasya politikası birden fazla amaç ve hedefe hizmet etmek için tasarlanmıştır: dış politikada Avrasya dayanışması ve kimliği temelinde Rusya ve diğer bölge ülkeleri ile ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi, 'Asya ve Avrupa arasında bir köprü' rolü oynayarak ve

⁷⁷⁸ Sergey V. Biryukov, 'Eurasian Doctrine of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev: 'Thinking space'', 24.01.2013, <http://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/eurasian-doctrine-kazakh-president-nursultan-nazarbayev-thinking-space#.VUoWLY7tHw> Accessed on 6.05.2015

⁷⁷⁹ Luca Anceschi, 'Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy: neo-Eurasianist rhetoric in post-Soviet Kazakhstan', p.743.

⁷⁸⁰ Aleksand Dugin, *Nursultan Nazarbayev'in Avrasya Misyonu*, Çeviren Lazzat Urakova ve Mehriban Gençkal, Yeni Avrasya Yayınlar, Anlara, 2006, p. XI.

⁷⁸¹ Nursultan Nazarbayev, 'Proekt Evraziiskogo Soyuzu: problem i perspektivy integratsii', in A.N. Nysanbayev, V.Y. Dunayev (eds.), *Evraziiskaya doktrina Nursultana Nazarbayeva*, Institut filosofii i politologii KN MON RK, Almaty, 2010, p.26.

barış, istikrar ve tarafsızlığın kalesi olarak Asya ve Avrupa ile ilişkileri dengeleme; iç politikada ise huzurlu ve ahenkli, istikrarlı, uyumlu ve başarılı bir çok etnikli ve çok uluslu bir ulus oluşturulmasıdır.⁷⁸² Bu son nokta önemlidir, çünkü o ülkenin kimlik krizini çözmek için katkıda bulunur.

Yukarıda gördüğümüz gibi, Kazakistan ulusal düzeyde ve uluslararası düzeyde Türk dünyası ve Slav dünyasının ortasında duruyor ve bu iki dünyaya doğru çekiliyor. Hazar İmparatorluğu, Qipchaqs, Moğol İmparatorluğu, Altın Orda, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu gibi Türk devletleri genelde Slav insanlar tarafından düşman olarak algılanmakta ise, Çarlık Rusyası ve Sovyetler Birliği gibi Slav devletler Türk halkları tarafından düşman olarak algılanmaktadır. Bu anlayış içinde Slavlar ve Türkler karşı kutuplar olarak kabul edilmektedir. Örneğin, Graham Fuller Rus-Türk etkileşimi hakkında şunları ifade eder: “Burada gerçeklik şu ki, Türkiye’nin eski Rus ve Sovyet imparatorluklarının Müslüman (büyük ölçüde Türki) halklarla tarihsel ve etnik ilişkileri Moskova’ya potansiyel bir sorun olarak asla tamamen ortadan ortadan kalkmaz. Moskova ve Ankara bu halkların üzerine neredeyse alternatif kutuplar etkisi yapıyor gibidir.”⁷⁸³

Kazakistan açısından bakıldığında, üç ülke Doğu ile Batı’nın buluştuğu, Avrupa’nın Asya ile kavuştuğu ve İslam dininin Hıristiyan dini ile karşılaştığı ‘Avrasya’nın stratejik merkezi’ olarak öne çıkar. Onlar ortaklaşa “yeni bir trans-Avrasya eksenini teşkil etmesi gereken Kazakistan, Rusya ve Türkiye’dir. Ancak, bu mantığa göre, diğer iki devletin bir buluşma yerinde olduğundan dolayı Kazakistan merkezin merkezi gururunu yaşıyor.”⁷⁸⁴ Dolayısıyla Kazakistan’ın Avrasyacılığı Slav dünyası ile Türk dünyasını ve Rusya ile Türkiye’yi karşı kutuplar olarak değil, tam aksine birbirlerini tamamlayan iki kutup olarak tanımlayan bir kavramdır.

⁷⁸² Golam Mustafa, ‘The Concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Policy and Its Implications’, p. 165.

⁷⁸³ Graham E.Fuller, *The New Turksih Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 2008, p.129.

⁷⁸⁴ Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008, p. 183.

Öyleyse, eğer biz ‘Avrasya’yı Türk ve Slav halklarının etkileşim alanı olarak tanımlarsak, ‘Avrasyacılığı’ bu iki kutpun barışçıl birarada yaşama sanatı olarak tanımlayabiliriz. Burada Rusya güç merkezi olarak Slav kutpunu temsil ederken, bağımsızlığını kaybetmemiş ve Türk devlet geleneğini devam ettirmeyi başaramış tek Türk ülkesi olarak Türkiye Türk kutpunu temsil eder. Bu yapılandırmada, Slav ve Türki dnyaların kesiştiği yer olan ve nüfusu Slav ve Türk halklarından oluşan bir ülke olarak Kazakistan için Rus-Türk ilişkileri özel önem kazanmaktadır. Avrasyacılığı kavramının bu açısından bakıldığında, Türkiye, Kazakistan ile Rusya tarafından oluşturulan Avrasya entegrasyonuna girdiği takdirde, Kazakistan açısından, ‘Avrasya denklemi’ tamamlanmış olacaktır. Kısacası Nursultan Nazarbayev’in Avrasyacılığı’nın asıl amacı ülkenin Türk ve Slav kimliklerini uyumlaştırılmaktır. Buna göre, Kazakistan’ın Rusya ile ilişkileri onun Türkiye ile işbirliği ile dengelenmesi ve uyumlu hale getirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Bu varsayıma dayanarak, Türkiye 90’lı yıllar boyunca siyasi ve ekonomik istikrarsızlıklar yaşamasına rağmen, bu durum Nazarbayev’in Türkiye algısını değiştirmedir. Çünkü o Türkiye’nin sınırlarının farkında idi. Cumhurbaşkanı Sezer dış politikada pasif olmasına rağmen, Nazarbayev’in Türkiye algısı olumlu yönde gelişmeye devam etti. Zira 1998 yılından itibaren Kazakistan’ın ekonomisi yükselmeye başlamıştı. İç politikadaki Nazarbayev’in bu başarısı ona çok vektörlü politikayı güvenle yürütmesini sağladı. Bu bağlamda, ekonomisi 2000 yılında toparlanmaya başlayan Türkiye önemli bir ortak oldu. Buna ek olarak, Kazakistan devlet olarak pekişti ve güçlendi. Parçalanma korkusu aşıldı. Kazakistan’ın nüfusu içindeki etnik Kazakların payı artıyordu. 1998 nüfus sayımına göre, etnik Kazaklar Kazakistan nüfusunun %53’ünü oluşturdu.⁷⁸⁵ Bu Kazakistan’ın Türk dünyasında daha iddialı politika izleyeceği anlamına geliyordu. Nitekim Özbekistan ve Türkmenistan’daki meslektaşları bu foruma olan ilgilerini kaybetmiş ise de Nazarbayev Türk devlet başkanları zirvelerine aktif olarak katılmaya devam etti.

⁷⁸⁵ Qazaqstan Respublikasının Statistika jöindegi Agenttigi (Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan), (2000) *Qazaqstan Respublikası Halqının Ulttıq Quramı: Qazaqstan Respublikasındağı 1999 jilğı Halıq Sanağının Qoritındısı*. (National Composition of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Conclusion of the Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1999) Almaty.

Gül'ün cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemi Kazakistan ile Türkiye arasında verimli bir işbirliği dönemi oldu. Bir diplomat olarak Gül Kazakistan'ın stratejik önemini anlamıştı. O, Özal ve Demirel'in dış politika anlayışını devam ettirdi. Bu anlamda, biz Nazarbayev'in Türkiye hakkındaki 'güvenilir bir ortak algısı' daha da güçlendi diye söyleyebiliriz.

Karar verici düzeyindeki ilginç bir soru, Nazarbayev sonrası dönemde ikili ilişkilerin aynı olup olmayacağıdır. İkili ilişkilerin mevcut durumunu dikkate alarak, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin sağlam bir temel ve derin köklere dayalı olduğunu yani iki ülke halkının birbirine bağlı olduğunu dolayısıyla gelecekte çok değişiklik olmayacağını tahmin ediyorum. Sadece her yıl dört yüz binden fazla Kazakların Türkiye'yi ziyaret ettiği gerçeği halklar arasındaki etkileşimin yüksek oranda olduğunu bir göstergesidir.⁷⁸⁶ Ayrıca, Kazakistan'daki Türklüğün yükselişini dikkate alarak ben ülkenin başında kim bulunursa da, Kazak-Türk ilişkilerinin daha da gelişeceğini tahmin ediyorum. Bir başka deyişle, 'Nazarbayev faktörü' Kazak dış politikasını şekillendirmeye devam edecektir.

Algı analizinin ikinci seviyesi, elit düzeyidir. Elit düzeyi algının siyasete aktarıldığı düzeydir. Bu nedenle, egemen elitin algısı dış politikada önemlidir. Kazak eliti, ülkenin Avrasya kimliği doğrultusunda, Rusya'yı tercih edenler ve Türkiye'yi tercih edenler olarak ayrılır. Elit yapısının bu ikilemini dikkate alarak, Nazarbayev'in Rus yanlısı ve Türk yanlısı eğilimleri uyum içinde tutarak, çatışmayı önleyen Avrasyacılık kavramını geliştirmiş olması oldukça pragmatiktir. Elitin bu Avrasya özelliğinden dolayı Kazakistan'da Türkiye ile ilgili homojen algı yoktur.

Azınlıkta olan Kazak milliyetçi elit Türkiye'yi doğal müttefik olarak görmektedir. Ancak, hükümet ve parlamentoda kilit pozisyonları sahip çoğunluk elit Rusya'ya yakın durur ya da en azından Türkiye'ye yönelik eğiliminde seçici olmaya çalışır. Aslında Sovyet bürokrasisinin devamı olan Kazak bürokratik eliti, çoğunlukla Türkiye'yi 'öteki' olarak algılar. Çünkü kendileri de Kazak dili ve kültürüne başka bir deyişle Türk kimliğine yabancıdır. Entelektüel seçkinler arasında ise Türkiye

⁷⁸⁶ Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu 'İstatiksel Tablolar ve Dinamikler Sorgulama' http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1072 Accessed on 13.05.2015

çeşitli şekilde algılanmaktadır. Ama ana elit Türk ve Rus yanlısı eğilimleri uzlaştırmayı amaçlayan Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığını destekliyorlar.

Bununla birlikte, Kazakların lehine olan demografik değişim, Türk dünyasında Nazarbayev aktif tutumu ve Rusya'nın komşularına karşı saldırgan politikası Kazak seçkinlerinin Türkiye algısını olumlu şekilde etkilemektedir. Bu nedenle, Kazak elitin Türk dünyası söylemine daha da önem vermesi beklenmektedir. Ancak Kazak elitin Türkiye'ye olan ilgisinin artışı Kazakistan'ın Rusya'ya karşı tavrını değiştireceği anlamına gelmez. Aksine, Türk dünyası söyleminin yükselişi Rusya ile Kazakistan ilişkilerinin kurumsal entegrasyonu ile yan yana gelişmektedir. Kasten ya da değil, Rusya ile Kazakistan'ın entegrasyonu Kazak elit ve Kazak kamuoyunda Türk dayanışma duygularının yükselmesine yol açmaktadır. Uzun vadede Kazak yönetimi için en önemli sorun, Nazarbayev'in Avrasyacılığının kamuoyunun beklentisi ile devletin dış politikası arasındaki uyumsuzluğun üstesinden gelip gelemeyeceği sorunudur.

Üçüncü düzey olan genel kamuoyu, uzun vadede algının önemli bir belirleyicisidir. Ülkenin demokratikleşmesi ile karar vericiler ve egemen elit halkın kültürel eğilimlerini dikkate almak zorunda kalacağı beklenmektedir. O durumda, çoğunluk insanın iradesine karşı bir dış politika izlemek zor olacaktır. Kazakistan'ın nüfusunda Türk unsuru payının artışı ile uzun vadede Türkiye'nin imajı olumlu yönde gelişecektir. Ama şimdiki zamanda Türkiye'yle ilgili bütünsel algı yoktur.

Yukarıda belirtildiği gibi, Kazakistan'ın nüfusu kendilerini Türk medeniyeti ile tanımlayan Türk halkından ve kendilerini Slav medeniyeti ile tanımlayan Slav halkından oluşmaktadır. Bu iki grup Kazakistan'ın Avrasya kimliğini oluşturur. Başlangıçta Rus ve Sovyet kültürünün ülkede egemen olması nedeniyle, Türkiye 'öteki' olarak algılanmıştı. Ama dengenin Türk tarafı lehine kayması ve kısmen de Kazakistan'ın kendisini Türk medeniyeti ile tanımlaması ülkedeki Türkiye imajının düzelmesine yol açtı. Bu genel eğilim ile birlikte, üç faktör Kazak halkının Türkiye algısını etkiledi. Bunlar Türkiye'deki Kazak diasporası, iki ülke arasındaki eğitim alanında işbirliği ve Türkiye'nin turizmidir.

1990'ların başında Kazak hükümeti Türkiye'dekiler dâhil olmak üzere yurtdışındaki Kazakların Kazakistan'a geri dönüşünü amaçlayan bir program başlattı. Türkiye'den

Kazakistan'a dönerler kendileri ile birlikte Türk költürünü de getirdiler. Onlar Kazak toplumunun üyeleri olarak, Türkiye ile Kazakistan arasındaki köprüleri haline geldiler. Türkiye'den gelen bu Kazaklar Kazakistan'ın Türkiye ile ilgili olumlu imajına katkıda bulundular. Onlar Kazakistan'daki Türkiye'nin temsilcileri oldular. Sonuçta, Türkiye'deki Kazaklar ve onların göç hikâyeleri Türkiye'nin Kazaklar için bir 'yabancı ülke' olmadığını ve Kazakistan için bir 'kardeş ulus' olmaya devam edeceğini göstermeye katkıda bulundular.

Eğitim alanındaki işbirliği ikili ilişkilerin önemli bir bölümünü oluşturmaktadır. Hem Türkiye'nin hükümet kurumları, hem sivil toplum örgütleri Kazakistan'daki eğitim düzeyinin gelişmesine katkıda bulunmaktadır. Kazak yönetimi Türk girişimlerinin kökenlerini sorgulamamaktadır. Aksine, Kazakistan Türk girişimlerini yerleşik kurumların sonuçlarına göre pragmatik olarak değerlendirmektedir. Onların ideolojik saiklerine rağmen Kazakistan, Türkiye ile işbirliğini devam ettirdi. Çünkü onlar son tahlilde Kazak eğitim sistemini modernize etmeye yardım ettiler. Eğitim alanındaki tüm Türk projeleri Kazakistan'daki Türk varlığını güçlendirmektedir. Sonuç olarak Kazak-Türk ilişkileri daha istikrarlı ve daha güçlü hale gelmektedir. Türk sistemiyle eğitim gören yeni neslin ortaya çıkmasıyla bu eğilimin devam edeceği tahmin edilebilir. Son tahlilde, eğitim alanındaki Kazak-Türk işbirliği, Türkiye'nin olumlu imajına katkıda bulunan ana faktördür.

Turizm de insanların etkileşimini sağlayarak Kazakistan'da Türkiye imajına olumlu katkıda bulunmaktadır. Genel algı şu: Türkiye'yi ziyaret eden insanlar henüz ziyaret etmemiş olanların aksine Türkiye hakkında olumlu düşüncelere sahiptirler. Dahası, Türkiye'yi ziyaret eden insanlar Türk dilinin Kazak diline benzer olduğunu keşfederler. Bu keşif önemlidir, çünkü insanlar Türkiye'yi 'öteki ülke' olarak değil, 'bizim ülke' olarak görmeye başlarlar.

Genel halk düzeyinde Kazak halkı Türkiye'yi keşfetme sürecinde olduğu söylenebilir. Bu keşif, daha önce Sovyet döneminde inşa edilen Türkiye ile ilgili olumsuz algıları kırmaktadır. Bu anlamda, Kazak kamuoyundaki Türkiye imajı olumsuzluktan olumluluğa doğru gelişmektedir. Kazak halkı Türkiye hakkında daha fazla bilgi edindikçe, Kazakistan'daki Türkiye'nin imajı daha da iyileşecektir. Küreselleşmeyi ve Kazak halkının Türk halkı ile etkileşim derecesini dikkate alarak,

genel eğilimi Kazakistan'daki Türkiye algısının olumlu yönde gelişmeye devam edeceği tahmin edilebilir.

Uluslararası düzeyde, Kazakistan ile Türkiye yakın işbirliğini geliştirmektedir. Türkiye, uluslararası ilişkilerde bir 'dost' olarak algılanıyor. Genellikle Türkiye'nin 'dost imgesi' 'kardeş imgesi' ile beraber, bazen de birbirlerinin yerine kullanılır. İkili ilişkilerin ortak kültür ve tarihe dayalı olduğu açıktır. Diğer bir deyişle, iki devletin kimlikleri birbirlerinin algılarını belirler. Aslında Türk medeniyeti olan ortak kültür ve tarih perspektifinden bakıldığında, etnik Kazakların kolektif hafızasında kimlik tanımlanmasında üç 'öteki' vardır. İlk 'öteki' 'qıtay' (Çin), ikinci 'öteki' 'sart' (Fars) ve üçüncü 'öteki' de 'aqqulaq' (Rus). Bu üçünün arasında, Farsların 'ötekiliği' İslami dayanışma çerçevesinde çözüldü. Rusya'ya ilişkin olan 'öteki' anlayışı Sovyet döneminde Sovyet adamı kavramı çerçevesinde ve Kazakların diğer Sovyet halklarıyla beraber omuzomuzca Nazi Almanyası ve militarist Japonya'ya karşı savaştığı ortak tarih çerçevesinde azalmıştır. Aslında biz Kazakistan'ın Avrasyacılığını bu 'ötekilik' duygusunun azaltılmasının devamı olarak düşünebilirsiniz. Ama 'öteki' olarak Çin'in algısı hala güçlüdür. Bu durum Kazakistan'ı Rusya'ya doğru iter. Çünkü Çin'le kıyasladığımızda Rusya Kazakistan için 'bizizdir'. Ama yinede son tahlilde etnik Kazakların kolektif hafızasının perspektifinden, Rusya 'ötekidir'. Farklı bir şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse, Türkiye ile Rusya'yı kıyasladığımızda Türkiye Kazakistan için 'bizdir'. Bundan dolayı Kazakların da ait olduğu Türk dünyasının lideri olan Türkiye, kültürel anlamda Rusya'yı dengeleyebilir. Bir başka deyişle, Rusya'nın 'öteki' imgesi Türkiye'nin 'biz' imajını oluşturur. Ancak, Kazak yöneticilerin resmi söyleminde, bu tür ifadeler için yer yoktur. Siyaset söyleminde, Türkiye 'dost ve kardeş' olarak tanımlanır, Rusya 'dost ve müttefik' olarak tanımlanır, Çin ise 'dost ve ortak' olarak tanımlanır ve algılanır. Biz buradaki 'dost' imgesini sadece iyi niyeti göstermek amacıyla kullandığımızı varsayarsak, o zaman 'kardeş', 'müttefik' ve 'ortak' terimlerinin ilişkilerin gerçek durumunu tanımladığı sonucuna varırız.

Son tahlilde, uluslararası düzeyde iki faktör Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısını şekillendirmektedir. Biri, Kazakistan'ın bulunduğu uluslararası ortamdır. Diğeri ise, Kazakistan ve Türkiye arasındaki etkileşimdir. Nitekim Türkiye ve Kazakistan'ın buldukları ortamı Avrasya olarak tanımlayabiliriz. Bu bölgede farklı jeopolitik ve

jeo-kültürel çıkarlar birbiriyle kesişiyorlar. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye ve Kazakistan, coğrafi olarak Avrupa ve Asya'nın arasındaki, ekonomik olarak Kuzey ve Güney arasındaki, kültürel olarak Doğu ve Batı arasındaki, din olarak Hıristiyanlık ve İslam arasındaki Avrasya'da yer almaktadır. Bu Avrasya ortamı Kazakistan ile Türkiye arasında bir yakınlaşmayı zorunlu hale getirir. Bu anlamda, uluslararası çevre Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısını olumlu bir şekilde etkilemektedir.

Uluslararası çevre Kazak-Türk işbirliği için uygun koşulları oluşturur iken, iki ülke arasındaki etkileşimin kendisi de Kazakistan'ın Türkiye algısını olumlu etkilemektedir. İlk olarak, Kazakistan ile Türkiye'nin ilişkileri geçmişten hiçbir sorunu miras almamıştı. Böylece ilişkiler temiz sayfadan başladı. Türkiye'nin Kazakistan bağımsızlığını tanıyan ilk ülke olması ikili ilişkilere olumlu bir ivme kazandırdı. Aslında Türkiye'nin bu eylemi onun Kazakistan'da 'kardeş imajını'nın inşa sürecinin başlangıcı idi. Bir başka deyişle, Türk kardeşlik söylemi sadece boş sözler değil, somut eylem olarak gerçekleşmiş oldu.

D: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Ametbek
Adı : Dinmukhammed
Bölümü : Uluslar arası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Locating Turkey in Kazakhstan's Eurasian Identity

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: