MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY OF MIGRATION: THE CASE OF POST-1974 IMMIGRANTS IN THE BAHÇELİ VILLAGE IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY OF MIGRATION: THE CASE OF POST-1974 IMMIGRANTS IN THE BAHÇELİ VILLAGE IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

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This thesis endeavours to construct a theoretical and conceptual framework to systematically explain the multi-dimensionality of migration as well as to apply these insights to analyse an empirical case. The construct, informed by the main principles of critical realism, provides necessary conceptual tools to enable a holistic study of migration through integrating various levels of aggregation; structure and agency; multiple factors that partake in generative mechanisms; and causes as well as consequences of migration and settlement into the analysis. This study focuses on immigration and settlement within the first migration wave taking place between 1975-1980 from Turkey to northern Cyprus and on the Bahçeli village (Kalograia) as its empirical case. Critical realism informs the methodology and the methods of the study, so that deeper lying generative mechanisms are searched for by employing qualitative methods such as participant observation, oral history interviews and in-depth interviews. The endeavour to construct a multi-dimensional and multi-factorial approach to migration enables a distancing from mainstream migration theories which have a focus on economic factors and an incorporation of ‘cultural’ factors such as the ideas of ethnicity and nation into the causal analysis. Ethnic community building processes are analysed as a part of the holistic explanation of migration that also considers the ‘unintended’ consequences of long-term settlement of immigrants. The community building aspect also brings to the fore that ideas on ethnicity and nation are socially constructed and are constantly reproduced in context specific contingencies.

Keywords: Migration, Migrant Communities, Ethnicity, Northern Cyprus, Critical Realism
ÖZ

GÖÇÜN ÇOK BOYUTLULUĞU: 1974 SONRASI KUZEY KIBRIS BAHÇELİ KÖYÜNE YERLEŞEN GÖÇMENLER ÖRNEĞİ

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Mart 2015, 412 sayfa


Anahtar kelimeler: Göç, Göçmen Cemaatleri, Etnisite, Kuzey Kıbrıs, Eleştirel Realizm
To my dearest family

and

to all who want to belong...
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A Ph.D. thesis, so lengthy in duration and complex in substance cannot be successfully brought to an end without help and support of various kinds. Happily I am at a point, where I can express my gratitude to the many people; among which are friends, family, tutors and mentors, who have inspired, helped and supported me throughout this journey.

A study of this nature cannot be accomplished without the many kind people who gladly opened their homes and hearts to me and shared their stories and immensely valuable opinions without any expectations in return. They are the contributors truly situated at the heart of this study and I am much indebted to each and every one of them. Furthermore my friend whose name I cannot disclose, has gone far and beyond in her efforts as a reliable guide and a great friend, facilitating my access to her extended family, relatives, friends and neighbours. I want to extend a special thank you to her wholeheartedly for all of her efforts and friendly trust. I also wish to thank the politicians, bureaucrats and experts who very kindly accepted to be interviewed by me despite their very busy schedules. Their input has been priceless.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFSC</td>
<td>Turkish Federated State of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td><em>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston</em> (National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td><em>Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı</em> (Turkish Defence Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTP</td>
<td>Republican Turkish Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Communal Liberation Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUP</td>
<td>National Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCY</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>From Turkey</td>
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<td>ME</td>
<td>Mersin</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Migration has been identified, in the academia and in politics as a “major demographic force” in all modern societies especially since early 1990s (Massey 1990; Castles 2002). Ever since, it has been argued that the present can even be referred to as the “age of migration” (Castles & Miller 1998). Quantitatively speaking, according to the UN International Migration Report of 2013, there were 232 million international migrants around the world and this figure is definitely a lot larger when undocumented migrants are included. Qualitatively speaking, on the other hand, it has been argued that “mobility” has become a defining characteristic of many societies, replacing their former “sedentarist” structures (Urry 2000). Similarly, some scholars talk about a “culture of migration”, referring to a phenomenon in some societies where international migration becomes an ordinary future prospect for many young people (Kandel & Massey 2002). Migration is not only important because of its high prevalence. Rather it has been argued that migration is linked to economic development (Taylor et al. 1996a; 1996b; de Haas 2010a). Contrary to this argument, it is argued from a critical political economy perspective that migration is related to the reproduction of the world capitalist system of spatial inequalities and thus to the reproduction

1 According to Castles (2002) “[…] the public interest in migration in the early 1990s represent[s] a shift in perception, rather than in the real significance of the phenomenon” since migration has always been a significant factor in “colonialism, industrialization and nation-building” and in the restructuring of the western economies in the post-1945 era (ibid: 1144).

2 The UN defines international migrants primarily as foreign-born citizens and foreign non-citizens of a state, using either ‘place of birth’ data or data on ‘foreign citizens’ when the former is unavailable. Using of different criteria to define who is a migrant has consequences for the estimated figures (King 2012). Undocumented migrants are, for instance, not included in this figure, so that it is a lot smaller than it actually is. Moreover, internal migrants (urban -rural) are also not included in this figure, despite the fact that internal migrations too play an important role in many societies and have social, political and economic repercussions comparable to that of international migrations.

3 The authors describe the “culture of migration” as a significant normative value in a community, where especially young males view migration as a normal means to economic mobility and a normal part of life-course so that they expect to migrate at some point in their lives.
of the dependency of the sending states (see Arango 2000; King 2012). Migration also increases the demographic and cultural diversity of especially the receiving states by means of generating the so-called “migrant communities” (Castles & Miller 1998; Castles 2002; Vasta 2004; Kaya 2012). It has thus become one of the most controversial contemporary political issues, in which political and social attitudes towards immigrants range from their acceptance as integral parts of multicultural societies to their ‘othering’, rejection and exclusion (see Koopmans et al. 2005; Bauböck 2006; Koopmans 2013).

Against this background, migration studies that have become increasingly widespread in a variety of academic disciplines comprise theoretical works on migration and related phenomena on the one hand, and a great number of case studies on the other hand. Yet, despite ever increasing academic attention to the issue of migration, there is little agreement among scholars, let alone different disciplines, regarding the definition and explanation of migration; and no single, universally accepted framework to analyse the great variety of real cases of migrations (see ibid; Massey et al. 1993; Arango 2000; King 2012). Moreover, the latter, with their ever-growing volume and diversity, point out to many shortcomings of the mainstream theories of migration and compel theoreticians to devise their tools for explanations which would offer a more genuine acknowledgement of the complexity, multi-layeredness and multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon. It is in this sense that the variety and diversity of case studies are of immense value, especially when these are more strongly related to theory development.

Taking the above situation into consideration, the present thesis is planned as a case study research, which at the same time, communicates closely with theories and concepts in an attempt to causally explain the highly complex phenomenon of migration. It poses the research question “how can the multi-dimensionality of migration be conceptualised?” and endeavours to provide answers by scrutinizing the case of the first wave of post 1974-migrations (taking place between 1975-1980) from Turkey’s Trabzon (Araklı district, Ayvadere village) and Mersin (Gülnar district), to Bahçeli village (Kalograia). This case is, as will be explored and explained in detail throughout this thesis, a rather unique case of
migration, in the causation of which cultural factors\footnote{Culture is used in a critical realist sense to denote, non-structural factors, such as ideas and discourses.} stand out as opposed to economic factors that characterised the majority of “labour migrations” in Europe since 1945. In so being, it provides an example to a rather neglected theme in migration research. Hence, as will be argued in more detail, this case suits one of the major aspirations of this thesis, which is to make a modest contribution to the theoretical explanation of migration through the construction of a conceptual framework which can be used to account for less ordinary empirical cases such as the one at hand. Such a framework needs to allow the incorporation of many factors into the analysis. The construction of such a multi-dimensional and multi-fакtorial framework to utilise in the explanation of migration will be done by employing the conceptual propositions of a critical realist meta-theoretical paradigm.

The multi-dimensional and multi-factorial explanation of migration in general and the case of this study in particular will be advanced in two analytical steps. In the first step, the focus of analysis will be on the causation of migration that is, on the motivations, intentions, of multiple social actors (i.e. the states and the immigrants) and other causal factors relating to the initiation of this movement. In the second step the focus will be on the effects of migration, that is, on the consequences of the long-term settlement of immigrants in Bahçeli village in the island’s north. This will be done by concentrating on the phenomenon of ethnic community formation and preservation by immigrants, which is an often-encountered phenomenon. The migrant communities will be conceptualised as an alternative means of migrant incorporation into the receiving society. As such, they will be argued to be solidarity networks among the immigrants which equip the latter with necessary tools to cope with structural and cultural discrimination in the place of destination (see Kaya 2012), as well as being reinforced by immigrants’ transnational ways of being and belonging (Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004). By considering both of the dimensions of the causes and the consequences, this thesis argues, against mainstream migration theories, which focus on the causes of migrations only, that a migration movement can never be analysed in its full extent by looking at the reasons of its occurrence alone. A more complete explanation has to take into consideration the consequences, that is the effects of the continued presence of immigrants in the receiving society. This is because migration is not a “one off event” (King 2012) which
ends when the movement had occurred. Therefore, the analytically separable two dimensions of the inquiry cannot be separated when thinking about the phenomenon of migration if there exists a desire towards an in-depth understanding and explanation.

As will be explained in detail, a critical realist methodology does not only seek to understand social phenomena but claims to be able to explain it by placing emphasis on causal analysis. Thus, as was already mentioned, this thesis endeavours to utilise a critical realist meta-theoretical approach to achieve a thorough explanation of migration in general and the case under scrutiny in particular. Yet, in that explanation, the employed critical realist paradigm does not seek to identify law-like regularities in relation to empirically observable social phenomena. Rather it endeavours to reveal those beneath the surface phenomena, which have causal powers (Iosifides 2011: 61). In the search of the latter critical realism looks for multiple factors, since it argues that social change is caused by the interplay between structural, cultural and agential factors (Archer 1995; Porpora 2013). In this sense the critical realist approach adopted in this study enables a diversion from mainstream migration theories, which have remained insufficient in their single level and single (group of) factor(s) explanations (see Morawska 2007).

At the same time the critical realist explanatory paradigm adopted in this thesis allows the alternative framing of this migratory movement as a case of ‘ethnic migration’ (see Brubaker 1998; Tränhardt 2001; Hedberg 2004; Bauböck 2006), rather than an economic labour migration, although it does not deny the importance of economic factors in its causation especially at the micro-level, i.e. regarding the motivations of the groups of immigrants. Thus this thesis also makes a case for a critical realist reframing of the phenomenon of migration in general, by emphasising the suitability of the former to explain less common and more complicated cases of migrations, such as the present one, in which more than a single causal factor (and a non-economic one) takes part in below the surface causal mechanisms. It will be argued in this sense, that critical realism, with its emphasis on the complex, multi-dimensional and multi-factorial character of social reality, offers the tools much needed to overcome the weaknesses associated with conventional theories of migration.
At this point, the case of immigration from Turkey to North Cyprus in general need to be briefly introduced before turning attention to the particular case of immigration from Trabzon and Mersin to Bahçeli village. The inflow of immigrants from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus started soon after the 1974 de facto division of the island into a Greek Cypriot administered south and a Turkish Cypriot administered north. The initial immigration and settlement of Turkish nationals in the northern part of Cyprus was facilitated through some immigration policies and programmes, in the making of which, both Turkish Cypriot and Turkish states collaborated. In this regard, the largest proportion of immigrants arrived after the signing of an official agreement between Turkey and the newly founded Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) with the title “agricultural workforce agreement” [tarım işgücü protokolü], to bring in some 30.000 agricultural workers (Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009; 2014). This agreement facilitated the immigration of many peasant families as well as some urban working-class families to the island. As part of their broader immigration policy, the Turkish Cypriot government of the period also encouraged professionals and technicians, as well as soldiers and military personnel who took part in the Turkish military interventions (including their families and the families of the soldiers killed in the interventions) to settle in the islands’ Turkish Cypriot ruled areas (see Hatay 2005; 2007). All of these immigrants were encouraged to settle in the designated areas through the allocation of capital, in form of lands, fields, empty houses and various other properties, which were left behind by Greek Cypriot refugees. This facilitation of migration can be causally related, in interaction with other structural, cultural and agential factors, not only to the initiation of the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus, between 1975-1979, but also to the laying of the foundations of informational and social network ties between the two countries (Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009: 22-23). In this sense it had led to the emergence of structures, like migrant networks and a migration system, which later, along with other sets of structural and cultural factors, caused and eased the continuation of further migrations between the two countries. In general, this migration wave (along with the later waves) can be argued to have given rise to a socially, economically and politically disadvantaged population group, i.e. an ethnically defined migrant community (and subgroups of it) which usually faces discrimination and “othering” from the Turkish Cypriot society (Hatay 2005; 2008; Erhürman 2006; Kurtuluş & Purkis, 2009; 2014).
Against this background, the particular case studied in this thesis, namely Bahçeli village, represents a typical site of immigration and settlement within the broader category of the first migration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus in three important respects: Firstly, the first migration wave after the 1974 division of the island is characterised by rural settlement, in which immigrant Turkish nationals were typically resettled in empty villages, like Bahçeli, that were evacuated by Greek Cypriot refugees. The second characteristic of the first migration wave is the spatially segregated settlement of immigrants. Bahçeli village is a typical example in this sense too, since it is exclusively inhabited by immigrants from Turkey. And thirdly, Bahçeli village represents a typical case within the first migration wave, in being a site for communal settlement for immigrants. In other words, immigrants from the same place origin (same village and urban district) were resettled in Bahçeli village as a community, which was also a usual practice during the first migration wave in general. In the case of Bahçeli village, the first and the biggest group of immigrants came from the Ayvadere (Aho) village of Trabzon's Araklı district. This type of settlement left the incoming community ethnically and culturally intact upon relocation, so that migration had little heterogenising effect for the people involved. The settlement of some families from Mersin (Gülnar) two years later in 1977 in the village heterogenised the village in terms of place of origin, but not in terms of country of origin and national belonging, since, to date, with the exception of very few spouses, there are no native Turkish Cypriot families (or other nationalities) in Bahçeli.

With the study of the case briefly described above, this thesis aims to make a double contribution to migration research in general: firstly by adding to the diversity of case study researches and secondly, by contributing to the conceptual explanation of migration and

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5 The only exception here is one urban region, namely the Varosha region in Famagusta (Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009).

6 Mixed-settlement of immigrants from Turkey and native Turkish Cypriots who were displaced from the islands southern part also occurred, though this was much less common.

7 Initially two different villages from the Araklı district of Trabzon were settled in Bahçeli. However, due to disputes between the two groups, one was eventually resettled to another village so that only Ayvadere immigrants remained in Bahçeli.
migrant communities. Regarding the first aim, i.e. that of empirical contribution, it can be argued, that the case of this thesis is most suitable, since it represents not only an unconventional but also an under-studied empirical case of migration. The first migration wave to the northern part of Cyprus in general, has indeed not attracted much academic interest despite the political attention it received. Hence rigorous academic research of Turkish immigration to northern Cyprus is rather scarce. One important reason for this is the highly politically controversial character of the first migration wave and, related to that, the long-lasting non-disclosure of reliable data about it by the states involved (Hatay 2005; 2007). Secondly, this thesis also aims to make some, though modest, contributions to the theoretical explanation of the general concepts of migration and immigrant community formation. This will be done, as was already argued, by a critical realist reframing of these concepts, i.e. through “applying the [critical] realist precepts to [the] substantive research debate” (Cruickshank 2003: 144 in Iosifides 2011: 88). This will entail most importantly an “immanent critique of other approaches and explanatory attempts” (ibid: 87), so that existing theories of migration will be regarded as insufficient in providing satisfactory explanations of the complexity and diversity of contemporary international migration processes. Critical realism, it will be argued, is more suitable for the study of complex social phenomena, like less usual cases of migration and migrant community formation since it acknowledges the multi-layered, multi-factorial, multi-dimensional character of these, and attempts to explain them in their complexity without falling into the traps of determinism and reductionism. Using the critical realist perspective, this thesis endeavours a multi-dimensional theoretical analysis of the case of Bahçeli, incorporating into the analysis, both causes and consequences and the multiple levels of aggregation, i.e. the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels, pertaining to both the sending- and the receiving-contexts. It will moreover, take structural, cultural and agential factors at these multiple levels of aggregation into consideration and analyse the complex set of interactions among all these factors.

As C. Wright Mills informs us “[n]either the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both” (Mills 1959: 3). In this line of thought, it has been paid attention to construct such a conceptualisation that would enable the analysis of immigrants’ experiences, dispositions and meanings in close reference to broader societal
contexts, and the structural and cultural factors, as well as macro-agential factors which operate within these contexts. In this way a thorough understanding and an alternative explanation of the subject, concentrating on “generative mechanisms underneath or beyond surface phenomena, experiences and interpretations” (Iosifides 2011: 74), will be achieved, even though this explanation will remain fallible, and necessarily refutable through further critical research.

This thesis triangulates the methods of ethnographic participant observation, oral history interviews and critical in-depth interviews. These methods, qualitative in character, as will be argued in some detail in Chapter 3, are necessary for an in-depth understanding of the case under scrutiny; and when used in combination with various secondary sources, they do provide the necessary reliable data for this purpose.

The following chapter develops a theoretical-conceptual framework for an alternative explanation of migration and migrant community formation in general which will be used for the analysis of the case of this study in particular. It departs from the complexity of the notion of migration and presents mainstream theories that try to explain it. After critically evaluating these, it develops a critical realist framework for an alternative explanation, which is multi-dimensional, multi-factorial as well as non-reductionist and non-determinist. This alternative framework focuses firstly on the integration of various levels of analysis in the explanation of migration, secondly on the identification of multiple causal factors, and thirdly on an integrative approach to causes and consequences of migration. Chapter 3 then explains the methodological approach of this study in detail, which was inspired by critical realism. It describes the conceptualisation of the case, the underlying assumptions and research plan. It gives information on the research methods used and data gathered. It also discusses some important ethical issues. Chapter 4 gives a detailed account of the case of the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus in general, and from Trabzon and Mersin to Bahçeli village in particular. The description of the case is based on oral history interviews conducted with politicians, bureaucrats and mid- to high-ranking government officials of the period as well as in-depth interviews with the pioneer migrants in Bahçeli village. Chapters 5 and 6 then move on to the analysis of the causes of the case of migration under scrutiny.
concentrating on the macro-, the meso- and the micro-levels respectively. In all of these levels of aggregation structural, cultural and agential elements which partook in the complex causal mechanisms giving rise to the first migration wave in general and migration to Bahçeli village in particular will be identified and their interplay within the so-called generative mechanisms will be explained through the use of retroduction. Chapter 7 is then directed at the analysis of the consequential migrant community formation processes. Once again macro, meso and micro-levels of aggregation will be scrutinised, within which structural, cultural and agential factors that reinforce community building and preservation by the immigrants will be identified. These multi-dimensional analyses will not only display a multitude of interacting factors but also the discrepancies and the contradictions immanent in pertinent processes, and so, once again, demonstrate the complexity of the phenomenon of migration in general and the empirical case of this study in particular. The concluding Chapter 8 then summarises the findings of this thesis and highlights main issues arising in the analysis. Furthermore it evaluates the appropriateness of the term of ‘ethnic migration’ for the case under scrutiny and the potential of the critical realist approach to explain such a migratory case in its causes and consequences.
CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The present thesis aims at exploring, describing and theoretically explaining the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus as well as the consequential ethnic community formation and preservation processes, concentrating on the narrower case of Bahçeli village. In so doing, it does not aim at producing a novel general theory on migration and ethnic community formation in a strict sense. However, neither does it aim at an analysis of these issues using one or more of mainstream theories of migration without further questioning and criticizing their explanatory capacities. It rather aims at working out a coherent theoretical-conceptual paradigm, which would enable a multi-dimensional (regarding macro, meso, micro-levels) and a multi-factorial (regarding structural, cultural and agential) explanation of migration in its causes and in its consequences focusing on migrant community formation, so as to facilitate the explanation of the case of this study.

It must be underlined, that in developing this conceptual/theoretical framework, it will be refrained from, what Iosifides (2011) calls “opportunistic eclecticism”: This refers to an un-careful mix and match approach to various theories, that is, to explaining different dimensions of the issue of migration with different theories without carefully thinking about the theoretical compatibility and combinability of the individual theories used (see also Morawska 2007; Bakewell 2010). An important aspiration of the present chapter is to avoid this, by forming an integrative and coherent theoretical and conceptual framework informed by critical realism.

Meta-theoretically inspired by critical realism, two main concepts will be studied: These are “migration” and “community formation”. Regarding both of the notions, the aim of this chapter is to look for conceptual abstractions and theoretical explanations, in accordance with the basic precepts of a critical realist perspective. This comprises “a critical appropriation of

2.1 The Notion of Migration: Significance, Themes and Typologies

Although geographical movement of people has been a characteristic of all human societies throughout the history (King 2012: 4)\(^8\), especially since the end of the Second World War, migration can be regarded as “a major demographic force” (Massey 1990: 61) and “an integral part of contemporary world developments” (Castles & Miller 1998: 46), increasingly affecting almost every society socially, economically and politically (Portes 2008)\(^9\). However the significance of migration is not only due to its high level of prevalence throughout the world, but also “because of the way it shapes and re-shapes societies, making them more diverse and complex” (King 2012: 6) and similarly, because of the way it relates to “social change” (Portes 2008), especially in regards to the ideologies of ethnicity and culture, but also in regards to social stratification and class formation in the countries of destination (Castles and Kosack 1973; Castles and Miller 1998; Portes 2008; Jasso 2011). Moreover, migratory movements are generative of wider societal phenomena relating to acceptance and non-acceptance of immigrants in the host societies, producing attitudes ranging from the celebration of diversity and multiculturalism to many versions of nationalism and racism (King 2012; Koopmans et al. 2005; Joppke 1999; Koopmans 2013).

As migrations became more prevalent throughout the globe and their transformative potential was acknowledged, migration studies also flourished in a variety of academic disciplines. Whereas sociologists are among those who have the longest engagement with migration studies along with geographers and economists, others such as social psychologists, political scientists, anthropologists, historians, demographers and researchers in fields like law,

\(^8\) King (2012) talks here about a “roving instinct” which belongs to human nature defined as “the need to search for food, pasture and resources; the desire to travel and explore; but also to conquer and possess” (ibid: 4; also King 2004).

\(^9\) In this sense, migration scholars point out to the mainly since the mid-1970s emerging numerous new immigration countries in the developing areas of the globe alongside traditional immigration countries like western Europe, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Castles and Miller 1998; Castles and Davidson 2000).
humanities as well as literary, media and cultural studies have also been doing research and theorisation on the subject of migration (King 2012: 9-10). Academic studies of migration, in these various academic fields, in turn, have yielded a significant diversity in the themes of focus\textsuperscript{10}. Moreover, it has been recognised by the scholarship that contemporary migrations are highly varied in their types. Distinctions are made between internal and international migrations; temporary and permanent migrations; regular and irregular migrations; and voluntary and involuntary migrations (i.e. refugee movements). The category of voluntary labour migrations, on which most of the major migration theories focus (Karpestam & Andersson 2013), can be divided into further categories: Most important differentiation can be made between high-skilled migration (also called brain drain) and low skilled migration, “work contract migration”, “retirement migration”, “family reunion-migration”, “marriage migration”, “residential tourism” (King 2012: 9). All of these typologies must be understood as ideal types, which can easily “break down in practice” (King 2012: 8; McDowell & Haan, 1997:10). McDowell and Haan emphasise this point as follows:

We should not be surprised to find that, as in Sri Lanka, ‘refugee migration’ (i.e. the flight from conflict) is linked to ‘labour migration’ and seems to have a great deal of organisation and rationality in it. Conversely, we should not be surprised to find that migration movements that have a predominantly ‘economic’ character may be related to ‘refugee’ migration: migration from the Punjab, for example, has long historical traditions, but the high degree of mobility has also been influenced by the up-rooting of millions during Partition in 1947 (1997: 10-11).

As can be guessed from the discussions above, to which more themes can easily be added, the issue in question is highly complex, multifaceted and multi-dimensional (Iosifides

\textsuperscript{10}Most common of these include the theories of causation of migration (see Massey et al. 1993; 1998; Goss and Lindquist 1995; Arango 2000; 2004; Morawska 2007; Castles 2010; Portes 2010; de Haas 2010b), migration policies (see Castles & Miller 1998; Brochmann & Hammar 1999; Brochmann 2004; Hollifield 2008), effects of migration on receiving societies’ class structure (Castles and Kosack 1973); its cultural effects on receiving societies like cultural diversity and formation migrant minorities (Castles and Miller 1998; Bauböck & Rundell, 1998; Vetrovec 2006; Vetrovec and Wessendorf 2005) and immigrants’ social incorporation, integration and/or non-integration, social discrimination and marginalisation (i.e. Soysal 1994; Bauböck 1994; Vetrovec 1996; Joppke 1999; Favell 2001; Bauböck et al. 2006). Migration has also been studied from the perspective of the sending countries, which has been done from a developmentalist framework. Last but not the least, a relatively more recent analytical theme in migration studies is transnationalism, studied especially by Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Basch et al. 1994; Bauböck 1994; Portes 1999; Vetrovec 1999; 2001; Levitt and Jaworski 2007; Faist 2010).
This complexity has consequences for the theoretical explanation of migration and related phenomena: It has proved to be extremely difficult to produce a single universal theory to account for all migrations in general (see Massey et.al 1993; 1998; Arango 2000; King 2012; Morawska 2007). Instead, most of the existing theories focus on single types of migration, especially voluntary labour migrations (Karpestam & Andersson 2013: 12), and even within this category on different aspects of migrations, like either on their initiation or continuation (Massey et al. 1993; 1998), on their causes rather than consequences (Arango 2000; Karpestam & Andersson 2013), and a single level of explanation, like micro, meso or macro (Faist 2000, Morawska, 2007; Iosifides 2011). Furthermore, it seems to be difficult to overcome these problems, so that King (2012) suggests: “[i]t should be clear from the foregoing that migration is too diverse and multifaceted to be explained in a single theory” (ibid: 11; see also Arango 2000). Yet, as will be argued later, most of the difficulties of theorising arising from the complex character of the notion of migration can be overcome, through the development of a meta-theoretical analytic paradigm which can accommodate this complexity, multifacetedness and multi-dimensionality. Yet, before moving on to the discussion of such a paradigm, the major established theories of migration need to be briefly reviewed. This will be done in the following section.

2.2 A Review and Evaluation of Main Theories of International Migration

A systematic review of (international) migration theories can be done using several types of categorisations. One major categorisation takes the level of aggregation into account, differentiating between theories that explain migratory movements at a macro-level and at a micro-level and /or at the meso-level (Faist 2000; Morawska 2007). Still another instrumental categorisation of migration theories, can be found in the influential work of Massey et.al (1993; 1998), in which the authors categorise theories of migration regarding their explanatory focus, which is either on the initiation of migratory movements or on their perpetuation. A further categorisation of migration theories can be made in regards to their association with general sociological approaches. Pryor (1981) for instance distinguishes between classical theories, conflict theories and systems theories of migration, linking them with functionalism, Marxism and general systems theory respectively, whereas Goss and
Lindquist (1995) differentiate between functionalist approaches, structuralist approaches and integrative approaches (in Bakewell 2010: 1692). In the following, whereas the former two categorical differentiations will also be utilised, the theories will also be grouped under general rubrics of “theories of neo-classical economics”, “historical-structural models”, and “systems approaches” (see King 2012).

Geographer Ernst Georg Ravenstein’s works called “The Laws of Migration” (1885, 1889) can be identified as the earliest systematic conceptualisations of migration (Castles and Miller 1998).11 His so-called “laws” were in fact general statements without any links to actual empirical data (ibid: 20) but they had indeed formed the foundations upon which later theories were built (King 2012: 12).12 Contemporary approaches based on Ravenstein’s statistical laws are referred to as “push-pull theories” (Morawska 2007; King 2012). These theoretical models identify the causes of peoples’ migratory movements in the interaction of the push and pull factors, in which whereas the former drive people out of their places of origin, the latter encourage people to settle in the place of destination (ibid.). Push-pull theories can operate at macro as well as micro-levels, and are usually used to explain the initiation of international migration. Whereas the push factors, that is, reasons why people leave their country of origin, can be underdevelopment, rapid population growth, political repression present in the country of origin as well as poverty, low social status, unemployment, underemployment of the individual etc., pull factors can include better job and income opportunities, political freedom, better education and welfare systems as well as demand for (migrant) labour in the place of destination (Castles & Kosack 1973: 27, King 2012: 13).

The theories of neo-classical economics utilise the “push and pull logic” in explaining how migratory movements are initiated both at macro and at micro-levels (Massey et al. 1993:

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11 According to King (2012), Ravenstein’s statistical generalizations were calculated referring to national (especially British) datasets, so that they in fact are about internal migrations (ibid: 11).

12 Ravenstein stated for instance that migrations usually occur from agricultural to industrial areas, increase with developments in industry, transport and commerce, have economic causes, and produce counter-migrations. He also states that women and men have different migratory behaviour, women predominantly present in short distance migratory movements and men in international movements (King 2012:12).
433-436). At the macro-level this model considers the international movement of labour to be driven by labour markets and explains labour migration with respect to international wage differentials, which result from international supply and demand differentials regarding labour. It follows, labourers move from low-wage to high-wage countries until, supply and demand come to an equilibrium and the wage differentials are so eliminated. At this equilibrium, the movement of labour will also come to a halt (ibid.). At the micro-level, theories of neo-classical economics regards that it is individual rational actors who make migration decisions with an expectation of monetary and otherwise advantage from this movement. The decisions to move or to stay are made through the so-called rational cost/benefit calculations, where the potential rational migrant chooses to migrate when expected net returns are greater than the net costs. Moreover “[a] potential migrant goes to where the expected net returns to migration are greatest” (ibid: 435). One of the versions of this micro neo-classical model is human capital theory. This theory argues that migration is a selective process, in which the likelihood of migration varies according to some individual human capital characteristics such as age, gender, level of education, language skills, and other personal psychological characteristics such as the degree of willingness to take various risks (Morawska 2007: 5). According to this theory “brain-drain” becomes an important consequence of migration, since the selection occurs positively with respect to human capital, thus negatively affecting the human capital in the areas of emigration (ibid).\(^\text{13}\)

Developed within the neo-classical tradition the “new economics of labour migration” (NELM) approach operates at a different level of aggregation, i.e. at the meso-level (Arango 2000: 87). This approach can be seen as “an inside criticism of the micro version of the neo-classical theory” and so makes amendments to it especially by suggesting that migration decisions are met by families or households (and sometimes other culturally relevant units) and not by individual migrants as suggested by neo-classical economics approaches (ibid). In these decisions “[…] people act collectively not only to maximise expected income, but also to minimise risks and to loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures, apart from those in the labor market” (Massey et al. 1993: 436). In this sense, through migration,

\(^{13}\) Note here the conflicting conclusions reached by two versions of neo-classical economics of migration model regarding the consequences of emigration for the sending regions.
households engage in income diversification, through varying their resources of household income through allocating some of their members to local labour markets and others to foreign labour markets with better structural conditions. The rational consideration in this process is that “[i]n the event that local economic conditions deteriorate and activities there fail to bring in sufficient income, the household can rely on migrant remittances for support” (ibid.). Such risk minimisation through migration is especially valuable in developing countries where there are insufficient or poorly accessible public and /or private insurance schemes (ibid). Through migration of some/all members of households the household increases its relative affluence, or decrease its relative deprivation (ibid.). An important insight follows from this approach that households may find migration advantageous even in the absence of wage differentials, in order to reduce its income risks, so that the elimination of wage differentials would not put an end to migration, instead an improvement of social insurance schemes may be more effective in this regard.

The neo-classical economics approaches – regarding micro, meso and macro versions- are criticized in being overly simplistic, deterministic, functionalist and ahistorical (King 2012). They do not take extra-economic factors into consideration, thus commit to economic determinism (Morawska 2007: 7), which will be argued to also cause the over-rationalisation of migration decisions. Moreover, explaining the movement of migrants solely as a result of their rational calculations, these theories cannot account for, on the micro-level, why so many people, in similar socio-economic positions, do not migrate, or, at the macro-level, why there are different rates of emigration from (or immigration to) countries with similar structural conditions (Massey et. al 1993; Arango 2000; De Haas 2008; King 2012). King (2012) states in this sense that the neo-classical approach fails “to consider personal, family or socio-cultural factors; to acknowledge a political reality of multiple barriers to international movement; to pay attention to the varied histories of colonialism that linked certain countries together and not others; and to take on board the systemic structuring of the world economy in terms of dependency and underdevelopment […]” (ibid: 14). Moreover, as Arango (2000) points out “it equates migrants with workers, and disregards all migration that is not labour migration” (ibid: 287). Last but not the least, one of the main assumption of neo-classical approaches - that international migration would lead to a balancing of economic development
and wage-rates in the sending and receiving states has been empirically disproven (Morawska 2007).

Generally speaking, gender is a missing factor in much of mainstream migration theorisation, which leads to an incomplete or a flawed explanation of the phenomena. In this sense, whereas the advantage of the NELM approach to migration has been argued to be its ability to move beyond the individual migrant and take into account the family factor in the decision making process, its ignorance of patriarchal power relations present in the household (or any other socio-cultural collectivity) has been heavily criticised (Bakewell 2010; King 2012). As King (2012) puts it NELM “assumes […] that intra-household relationships are harmonious, leading to unanimous collective decision-making. In other words, the family or household is treated as a black box without acknowledging the tensions or conflicts that are contained therein […] which might lead to ‘distorted’ decision making” (ibid: 23). Moreover, NELM, seeing migration as a risk diversification strategy, has little explanatory power in a context, where a household as a whole is involved in migration (ibid.; Arango 2000). All in all, this model has especially been criticised with the argument that it has not really brought a revolutionary insight to neo-classical migration theory. As Bakewell (2010) puts it “NELM tends to use the utility maximising household in the place of the utility maximising individual “ (ibid: 1693). As Arango (2000) summarises: “[…] it is doubtful whether the disparate ingredients that make up the new economics of migration are sufficiently woven and logically integrated as to constitute a coherent theory, or whether it is no more than a critical, sophisticated variant of neo-classical theory” (ibid: 288).

Another set of migration theories, the historical-structural models, operates at the macro-level and concentrate on the structural factors in explaining international migration. In this group, are the dual labour market theory, the segmented labour market theory, dependency theory and the world systems theory (King 2012: 16). According to Piore (1979), an influential proponent of the dual labour market theory, international migration is generated through the demand of developed nations for cheap migrant labour (Massey et al. 1993: 440). It is therefore the pull factors operating in the receiving countries, rather than the push factors in the sending states, which need to be focused on (ibid.). The determining pull
factors are associated especially with a bifurcation of the labour market in the highly industrialised receiving states with a capital-intensive primary labour market and a labour intensive secondary labour market (Morawska 2007: 2). The former of these is characterised by stable, well-paid, secure and skilled jobs and require human capital. Needless to say, the jobs in the primary sector are primarily reserved for non-migrants, whereas the migrants from under-developed states usually have access to the secondary labour market, characterised by unskilled, labour-intensive, unstable, flexible, insecure jobs and low wages (ibid; Massey et al. 1993: 440; King 2012: 16). This whole mechanism is then reproduced by “[…] the very presence of migrant workers” whose concentration in the secondary sector “reinforce […] the undesirability of these secondary-sector jobs for the local labour force, which in turn enables employers to drive down wages and working conditions even more” (King 2012: 16). With low bargaining powers, migrant workers, and especially the most vulnerable of them like undocumented migrants from poor countries who have no alternatives to accepting these jobs and the bad conditions of work (ibid.)

The segmented labour market theory, adds to this picture that the secondary labour market is further divided into “segments” along lines of gender, nationality and ethnicity. Once these labour market segments are established (the first recruitment is via governments, employers etc.), the recruitment of migrants to these is facilitated especially through immigrant communities and networks (King 2012: 17). According to Massey et al. (1993) the arguments of dual labour-market theory do not contradict with those of neo-classical approaches, in that it does not deny that individual migrants or households make “rational, self-interested decisions”. Yet the former implies contrary to the latter that migration is caused by a structural need for immigrant labour in developed capitalist economies rather than by wage differentials between regions. Similarly, the neo-Marxist dependency school focuses on the demand side of migration, and argues that

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14 Sassen’s “global cities can be seen as applying similar arguments to the post-fordist era of capitalism. For Sassen (1988,1991) the clustering of corporate headquarters, financial centres, professional services and the like in major cities like New-york and London led to the rise of the so-called global cities, the socio-economic structure of which “take […] on an hour-glass shape, with ‘bulges’ of high-income and very low-income inhabitants, the latter geared to serve the needs of the former. Working in restaurants and hotels, cleaning offices and houses, taking care of children and elderly: these are the low-end jobs mainly undertaken by immigrants from poor countries” (King 2012: 17). The primary mechanism creating the demand for migrant workers is the native population, which, even if poorly educated and lacking necessary skills for the primary sector, resist taking the stigmatized migrant jobs, creating a structural need for migrant labour (Massey et al 1993: 447).
migration waves are created by *structural* needs of industrial and post-industrial capitalist societies (King 2012:17). In contrast to the neo-classical approaches, which perceive migration as a “self-correcting” process, through which wage-differentials between sending and receiving areas are gradually eliminated, dependency theory sees migration as “self-perpetuating” (King 2012: 17). For the dependency school the global division of labour, create global inequalities and dependencies of the underdeveloped nations on the developed nations, while at the same time “disloca[ting] millions of people in poor countries from their traditional way of life: they either migrate to urban areas within their own countries or are involved in international migration in search of the means of survival” (ibid.). The *World Systems Approach* to international labour migration, on the other hand, builds on the work of Wallerstein (1974) and seeks the causes of international migration to the global capitalist market structure: “In this scheme, the penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral, non-capitalist societies creates a mobile population that is prone to migrate abroad” (Massey et al. 1993: 444). According to this approach international migration is closely tied to capitalist development. Whereas global capital penetrates peripheral regions disrupting traditional livelihoods, labour (or rather the reserve army of labourers) moves in the opposite direction, from the periphery towards the core areas (King 2012: 18; Arango 2000: 291). Therefore international migration has to be viewed as linked to “the dynamics of market creation and the structure of the global economy” rather than to “wage-rates” (Massey et al. 1993: 448). This approach also postulates the hypothesis that international migration is more likely to occur between nations, which have historical ties stemming from i.e. colonialism (ibid; Arango 2000).

The *political economy approach* differs from the economic theories discussed so far, by focusing on political factors, instead of the economic ones alone and the role of the states in the initiation (or deterring) of peoples’ movements across borders (Morawska 2007) and with its macro-level focus, this theory too can be added to the “historical-structural models” (King 2012:19). For this approach it is demand for migrant labour in combination with states’ or supra-national organisations’ (i.e. EU), immigration policies – immigrant admission policies, entry/ stay regulations, citizenship policies, allocation of work permits etc.- that generate waves of migration (ibid; Morawska 2007: 3). According to Morawska (2007) even though
the political economy approach argues for the importance of states’ (supra-national bodies’) political decisions in the causation of migration alongside economic circumstances, they do not claim, with the exception of the hegemonic stability model, the former to be more/less or equally important in comparison to the latter. The latter model, on the other hand, “views the global economic system as resting on the political and military power of a group of the dominant states” (ibid: 4). Morawska (2007) summarises:

The hegemonic receiver-states, according to this theory, employ the neoliberal economic order to regulate global trade and finance as well as international migration, especially through temporary low-skill labour importation programmes and residence laws inducing encouraging settlement of well-to-do foreign investors (ibid: 4).

Historical structural models in general are criticised on their one sided concentration on the demand side in the causation of migration, the exclusion of the push factors in the sending contexts; and the lack of a notion of migrants’ agency (Arango 2000; King 2012; Morawska 2007). Regarding the latter Arango (2000) points out that these theories perceive migrants as “little more than passive pawns in the play of big powers and world processes presided over by the logic of capital accumulation (ibid: 291). It is further argued that while the neo-classical economics approaches lean towards economic determinism, most historical structural models lean towards “historical determinism” (King 2012: 19). Furthermore, some of the historical structural model have little explanatory power for specific migratory ties, as Arango (2000) argues, the world systems approach for instance is applicable at the global level only, cannot account for the diversification of migration “flows and paths” especially considering migrations which do not follow the channels of capital penetration (ibid). This is especially because:

Rather than a theory of migration, world systems theory is a grand historical generalisation, a by-product of a univocal, reductionist and sense-loaded interpretation of history in which all countries pass through similar processes, as if following a grand script or some rigid laws of historical development (ibid: 291).

Even the political economy approach, which claims, “bringing the politics back” cannot escape being a “single-factor explanation” like other macro-level migration theories which
cannot capture the complexity of the phenomenon (Morawska 2007: 8). This approach is also blamed for the “excessive causal weight accorded the macro –level political forces in shaping international migration flows at the cost of human actors and their local environment” (Morawska 2007: 8).

Having reviewed theories explaining the initiation of migration acts and flows, attention must be turned towards a second major group of theories, which, according to Massey et al. (1993) attempt at explaining why and how migratory movements continue to take place even when the initial push and pull factors cease to be as effective. Indeed these theories postulate a different set of factors for the perpetuation of international migrations (ibid: 448). The theories and approaches in this category can be put under the collective heading of “Migration System Theories” since they “all suggest that migration flows acquire a measure of stability and structure over space and time, allowing for the identification of stable international migration systems” (ibid: 454). Among them are the network theory, institutional theory and the theory of cumulative causation (ibid.).

Migration systems theories in general hold that “[i]nternational migration systems consist of countries—or rather places within different countries – that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants, and are also characterised by feedback mechanisms that connect the movement of people between particular countries, areas, and even cities to the concomitant flows of goods, capital (remittances), ideas, and information“ (Bakewell 2012: 7). This results in identifiable patterns of migration flows, which persists over space and time (Massey et al. 1998: 61). Systems approaches can be viewed as beneficial since they necessitate a multi-sited focus “on structure, linkage and process” (King 2012: 20 ), on the contexts pertaining to origin and destination (Bakewell 2012:9) as well as on different levels of aggregation like meso-level networks and macro-level systems (ibid.).

At the macro-level is the institutional-theory, which recognises the role of private profit-seeking organisations that are established like an “underground-market” to promote the movement of people against official restrictions and regulations of nation-state governments (or supra-national organisations) and the voluntary organisations of humanitarian help -which
counteract to improve the conditions and rights for the treatment of migrants- (Massey et al. 1993: 450). These emergent institutions have the capacity to facilitate migration even against governments’ wills, so that migration becomes further difficult to control and contain even with harsher anti-immigration policies.

The network theory, on the other hand, operates at the meso-level and it identifies migrant networks as the primary focus of analysis, arguing than they are causally related to the generation of further migration. Migrant networks, can be defined as “[…] sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin” (Massey et al 1993: 448). According to King (2012) migrant networks can be considered “a form of social capital stretched across migrant space”15 (ibid: 21), and facilitate further migratory movement by acting in cost and risk reducing and returns increasing way (Massey et al. 1998: 42-43). According to Arango (2000) “[t]hey convey information, provide financial assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation, and give support in various forms” (ibid: 291). These functions of the networks have to the effect that they become capable of inducing further migration, and so enable the self-perpetuation of the flow:

Once the number of migrants reaches a critical threshold, the expansion of networks reduces the costs and risks of movement, which causes the probability of migration to rise, which causes additional movement, which further expands the networks, and so on (Massey et al. 1993: 449).

Migrant networks can also facilitate migration through the so-called “demonstration effects” (Arango 2000: 291) which are effective in the place of origin regarding potential immigrants. Boyd and Nowak (2012) suggest that migrant networks comprise three main types: “family and personal networks, labour networks, and illegal migrant networks” (ibid: 79-83 in King 2012: 22). Yet, leaning on Tilly (2007) a fourth type can be identified comprising the so-called “[w]eak ties, based on (perceptions of) common cultures or ethnicities, or even fleeting friendships between migrants in vulnerable positions, can generate a sense of mutual

15 According to Arango (2000) this view of migrant networks as social capital was initially suggested by Massey et al. (1987), so that migrant network theory can be associated with the broader social capital theory influentially suggested by i.e. James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu.
trust or empathy and thereby result in bonds being formed and help being given” (King 2012: 22).

Theories of migrant networks are usually regarded as having a considerable amount of explanatory power for international migration. Arango (2000) is for instance among those who are highly enthusiastic:

The importance of social networks for migration can hardly be overstated. It can be safely said that networks rank among the most important explanatory factors of migration. Many migrants move because others with whom they are connected migrated before. Migration networks have a multiplier effect, which is implicit in the formerly fashionable expression ‘chain migration’ (ibid: 291-292).

King (2012) argues moreover that the network theory offers insight about the “‘crucial meso-level’ between micro and macro formulations, helping us to move beyond the impersonal mechanics of gravity and push-pull theories of migration and to connect individual and socio-structural reasons for migrating” (ibid: 21). Moreover, research on migrant networks can also be beneficial in understanding “the dynamics of differential migration; they help to predict future migration, since networks ‘reproduce’ migrants through time; and contribute to resolving a major theoretical distinction between the initial causes of migration and its perpetuation and its diffusion in time and space (ibid; also Arango 2000).

Last to consider here is the theory of cumulative causation. According to this theory, developed especially by Massey et al. (1993; 1998), the self-sustainment of international migration is possible since “[…] each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely” (ibid. 1993: 451). This process is termed following Myrdal (1957) “cumulative causation” (ibid). The authors argue that there are especially six socio-economic factors which stand out in the process of cumulative causation. These are, regarding the sending context, the disruption of traditional income distribution, the withdrawal of land from agricultural production, the re-organisation of agriculture (i.e. capitalisation of agrarian production through investments of migrants), a rise in the culture of migration, the depletion of human capital and regarding the receiving context, the social labelling of some jobs as
migrant jobs (ibid: 451-554). These factors and more, according to this theory have effects to increase the possibility of further migration, and these effects are, in themselves, likely to be augmented with increasing volumes of migration.

Migration systems approach is regarded, by its proponents, to be suitable to explain the phenomenon’s multi-dimensionality. Bakewell (2012) notes in this sense that “simply by describing a system, the approach immediately draws attention to its constituent parts. […] The system approach demands the analysis of both origin and destination areas” (ibid: 9). Moreover it does not only regard the push and pull factors in these contexts but also intervening factors such as policies, institutions and considers various levels of analysis like the meso-level networks, macro-level systems (ibid). Yet, there are also some important criticisms. As Arango (2000) argues:

[T]he migration systems approach to migration, which aspired to draw on the analytic power of general system analysis, is as yet no more than a desideratum which has never been fulfilled, at least as far as international migration is concerned. It has hardly gone beyond the identification of international migration systems, at a purely descriptive level. Moreover, such identification has confined itself so far to the most stable part of the system, the countries that stand at the receiving end (ibid: 292, emphasis in original).

Moreover, the systems theory in general (especially in its traditional form i.e. that of Luhmann), and systems approaches in migration research in particular, can be criticized for reifying the system itself and for lacking the notion and a real possibility of agency. As Bakewell (2012) puts it “[t]his tendency to depersonalise, and thereby depoliticise social systems renders them devoid of agency” (ibid: 9-11). Furthermore, all of the various systems approaches can be argued to be unable to explain how a migration system starts in the first place. At the same time, they are unable to predict and account for the decline of the so-called migration systems. As King (2012) notes “[c]umulative causation contains an obvious internal logical flaw – it cannot proceed ad infinitum – and even when the established work on migration systems says remarkably little about how networks dissolve” (ibid: 30). With the recognition of these deficiencies, increasingly more scholars (especially those who adopt a critical realist outlook into migration research) are arguing, for a reframing of the systems approach to migration with a more concentrated focus on agency of the migrants (Bakewell
In this respect Bakewell et al. (2011) introduces the notion of “pioneer migrants” who exercise agencies and generate, in interaction with other factors, the migration systems in the first place. Yet, it can be argued that even with the very important notion of “pioneer migrants” the agency factor remains subordinated to the structures of the migration system, especially in that the agency of the later migrants remain invisible.

The above review of main migration theories has pointed out to the fact that there is no single theory under the rubric of “migration theories”, which could pass without substantial criticism. Arango (2000) argues in this sense that the existing migration theories are all partial and limited. In this words:

Existing theories generally promise more than they deliver. They tend to be partial and limited, in the sense that they are useful to explain a facet, or a dimension, or shed light on a particular feature, or are applicable to certain types of migration in certain contexts and not to others. […] The ambition to provide the explanation for migration, or for international migration for that matter, often betrays them. The aspiration at general applicability that can be presumed of a theory is generally neither met nor disclaimed (Arango 2000: 294).

2.3 A Critical Realist Paradigm for the Explanation of Migration

Before proceeding to develop a general framework for the explanation of migration regarding its causes and consequences three main shortcomings of the major theories evaluated in the previous section will be identified:

i. The first of these is the focus of most of the reviewed theories on a single level of aggregation (micro, macro or meso) and connected to that, though distinct from it, the focus either on structural factors or on agential factors in explaining migration (Morawska 2007; Bakewell 2011).16 As Morawska, 2007 argues:

16Iosifides rightly notes the following on this issue: “[…] social interaction does not always belong to the micro-level of analysis and investigation of structural properties to the macro-level (Mouzelis 2000). The distinction between micro- and macro-levels of analysis lies in the differences in the range of the impacts and consequences of social processes, relations and phenomena, and it does not correspond with the distinction between agency and structure. Thus face to face interaction of state leaders in order to formulate new migration policies in the European Union is not a micro-level event
The recent recognition of immigration scholars of the complexity of interrelated multi-level factors that shape international population flows has led to the critical evaluations of the existing theories of migration. The main criticism shared by these assessments of different theories, […] concerns their exclusive focus on single (or single family of) causal factors which, in view of the diversity of simultaneously operating factors renders the proposed explanations insufficient (ibid: 7).

For Bakewell (2010) it is especially the, as he terms it, “structure-agency impasse” which can be identified as a major obstacle in the development of a coherent migration theory. He argues leaning on Faist (2000:23-24):

Understanding the relationship between structure and agency remains one of the most common deep-seated problems in social sciences, which has persisted over decades. […] It is particularly important for the study of migration because the agency of migrants (and non-migrants) continues to play a central role both in the development of social scientific theory on migration and in shaping the policy responses to peoples movements (ibid 2000: 1689-1690).

ii. The second common weakness of migration theories is, with the exception the political economy approach, their fundamental economic determinism (Arango 2000; King 2012). As Arango (2000) argues “[a]ny theory built primarily with economic materials is bound to be in trouble in an international migration scene in which political considerations and the states intervene so prominently” (ibid: 293). Furthermore, even the political economy theory of migration, with its focus being on receiving state policies, does not represent a satisfactory alternative to the explanation of the complex issue of migration. What is needed for successful theorizing of contemporary migration and related processes, instead, is a more balanced concentration on broader political and cultural factors as well as economic factors in both sending and receiving contexts so as to form a multi-factorial analysis.

iii. Last but not the least, a third shortcoming of migration theories in general can be seen in their exclusive focus on the causes of migratory movements (Greenwood, 1985; Arango […]]. and the examination of the structural properties of a local immigrant network […] does not entail macro analysis” (Iosifides 2011: 158).
As Arango (2000) argues on this issue, “[s]ome doubts can be raised as well about the usefulness of the over-arching emphasis put so far on the causes of migration” (ibid: 293):

[…] it can be surmised that the focus of existing theories may be somewhat misplaced. The first and foremost, often the only dimension of migration that theories have aimed at explaining is why people move, or variants of the same question, such as what determines the volume of migration […] This is clearly the case with neo-classical theory, the new economics of migration, world system theory, dual labour markets, and even the venerable ‘push-pull’ framework […]. Yet, it is not clear that investigating the causes constitutes the most useful and interesting line of enquiry nowadays (ibid: 293).

Indeed the consequences of people’s over-the-borders movements are at least equally worthy of scientific inquiry. Moreover, a sole theoretical focus on the causes and the exclusion of the consequences of migrations from theorising implies a conception of migration as a one-time act, which comes to a halt after the movement has taken place. This is however, misplaced since migration has to be equally understood as a process and a lived experience (King 2012). In this sense the inadequacy of migration theories to consider the consequences may also be argued to hinder the utility of migration theories for migration research to a great extent. Researchers interested in themes concerning both the causes and the consequences of migration for instance, need to employ both theories of migration to explain the causes and additional theories and concepts to explain the consequences. This may however lead to eclecticism, if the two sides of the migration coin –causes and consequences- are not united under a single explanatory framework.

International migratory movements are initiated and perpetuated due to a variety of reasons. Global and local economic developments, technological advancements (which affect production techniques as well as consumption), changes in consumption patterns, environmental and climate change, inter-community/group (political/religious) conflicts (Gold and Nawyn 2013) as well as various individual reasons (i.e. life betterment, risk aversion, escape from poverty, escape from oppressive social relations etc.), may all play part in migrations. On the other hand, migratory movements have a variety of political, economic and social consequences both for the sending and receiving societies and for
individuals/families in both sending and receiving societies, among them migrants as well as non-migrants. Moreover, these reasons in themselves are not constant but dynamic, changing through space and time. These pose a real challenge to the theoretical study of migration. As Arango (2000: 295) put it:

[...] [L]imitations are part and parcel of the general difficulties that the social sciences experience when trying to explain human behaviour, affected by a large number of inter related variables. But, in addition to that, in the case of migration they have to do with difficulties that are inherent to the phenomenon under scrutiny. Indeed, migration is hard to define, difficult to measure, multifaceted and multiform, and resistant to theory-building (Arango 1985), ‘opaque to theoretical reasoning in general, and to formal models in particular’ (Davis 1988, 245) (ibid: 295).

As the inadequacy of single theories in explaining the phenomenon of migration has been recognised, a variety of solutions were suggested for migration theory building (Massey et al, 1993; 1998; Arango, 2000; Castles 2010; Portes 2010; King 2012). On the one hand, there are various attempts to optimise some of these theoretical frameworks. On the other hand, is the suggestion to stop the search for a single ‘grand theory’ of migration (see Arango 2000; Castles 2007; 2010; Portes 2010; King 2012). The group holding the latter opinion suggest that the scholarship should instead aim at producing middle-range theories related to specific contexts. Furthermore, a third and particularly strong tendency, which was influenced especially by Massey et al. (1993; 1998), comprises the view that the existing theories should be treated as complementary, so that single theories can be combined so as to be able to incorporate various explanatory factors pertaining both to structure and agency and different levels of aggregation into theory building. As Massey et al. put it:

Because theories proposed to explain the origins and persistence of international migration posit causal mechanisms at many levels of aggregation, the various explanations are not necessarily contradictory unless one adopts the rigid position that causes must operate at one level and one level only. We find no a priori grounds for such an assertion. […] it is entirely possible that individuals engage in cost-benefit calculations; that households act to diversify labour allocations; and that the socioeconomic context within which these decisions are made is determined by structural forces operating at the national and international levels (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991). […] Rather than adopting the narrow argument of theoretical exclusivity, we adopt the broader position that causal processes relevant to
international migration might operate on multiple levels simultaneously, and that sorting out which of the explanations are useful is an empirical and not only a logical task (ibid. 1993: 454-455).

Massey et al. (1998) propose so, that the major theories of migration can be put together to perform a thorough and multi-factorial analysis of international migration since the former all “[…] play some role in accounting for international migration in the contemporary world although different models predominate at different phases of the migration process” (ibid. 201). Yet as promising as it sounds, the above stated argument is not without problems. Most importantly, such an approach to migration theories neglects the usually incommensurable assumptions inherent in these theories. As Iosifides puts it:

[…] every theoretical framework either generic or more specialised, not only in migration studies but in social sciences in general, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) adopts a certain view on the nature of social reality (ontology), the means of knowledge production (epistemology) and on the appropriate research practices (methodology) (Iosifides 2011: 18).

Therefore, it cannot be readily assumed that the different theories can be so easily combined. For example, considering neo-classical theory, the NELM theory and the dual labour market theory, it can be demonstrated that these hold different assumptions for the initiation as well as for possible results of migration. As Bakewell (2010) rightly argues “[…] for neoclassical approaches, the wage differential between origin and destination areas is a necessary and sufficient condition for migration to occur; for NELM, it is not a necessary condition; and for dual labour market theory, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition“ (ibid: 1692). According to King (2012), whereas neo-classical approaches do not predict return-migration and would regard such, as an unsuccessful cost-benefit calculation by the emigrant, the NELM sees returnee migrants as successful migrants who have accumulated savings for their return (ibid: 23). Bakewell (2010) argues further:

The incompatibility seems even starker when one considers very different ontological and epistemological foundations of migration theories. For example, the rational choice theory and methodological individualism that underpin neo-classical and NELM approaches have little place in world systems theory (ibid: 1692).
The attempt to combine different theories regardless of ontological and epistemological compatibility can be termed following Iosifides (2011) “opportunistic eclecticism” (ibid: 34). In any case such a mix and match approach can be argued to be rather “unsatisfactory” (Bakewell 2010: 1692):

It pushes us to choose the theory that fits the context, but we can only know what first once we have done the empirical research. What such theory does not offer is any basis for developing robust concepts and hypotheses concerning the interaction of these concepts. Should we put forward any propositions and they break down, it can be blamed on the wider context. The theory remains untarnished by failure and we develop another theory to cope with the next dataset (ibid: 1692).

In strengthening this point Bakewell (2010) further argues, citing from Arango (2000):

Rather than fulfilling the function of guiding empirical research and providing testable hypotheses that can be contrasted with the facts, existing migration theories are mainly useful for providing explanations ex-post. The starting point is usually one or more common-sense, empirical observations, which are then dressed in more or less formal and abstract terms with the fitting explanations, drawn at times from the general reservoir of the social sciences. In so doing, theories of conceptual frameworks play the function of upgrading the formal status of empirical observations (Arango 2000: 294 in Bakewell 2010: 1693).

Contrary to the attempts, which combine different theories so as to explain different facets of migration, there are attempts so explain migration via a single coherent theory, i.e. within the framework of a meta-theory. Scholars in favour of this position do not think that the search for a coherent migration theory is futile. As Bakewell (2010) argues:

[…] [R]ecognising that migration is a universal human experience, and that it appears to occur according to observable (but shifting) patterns across space, time and societies, it seems reasonable to look for a level of general theory which can make sense of these patterns and explain the processes by which they take shape. This is already making the assumption that the concept of migration does have a universal application – that the act of moving residence is one which has significance at some level (economic, social, cultural, political, environmental, and so forth) in all societies. Hence, it does not seem over-ambitious to demand a fundamental agreement at the level of
basic theory (ibid: 1691).

Against this background, a critical realist meta-theoretical framework can be proposed, which delivers the necessary analytical tools for the development of a coherent paradigm capable of a multi-factorial and multi-dimensional explanation of migration and related phenomena. In the next subsections I argue that a critical realist paradigm is indeed capable of overcoming the three major weaknesses identified in regards to existing theories of migration reviewed in the previous section. It is able to incorporate both structure and agency in the explanation, facilitate a non-reductionist multi-factorial explanation, and integrate both the causes and the consequences of migration in a theoretical model.

A critical realist paradigm is capable of capturing and explaining the complexity, multi-dimensionality and the multi-factorial character of the phenomenon of migration. Moreover it is capable of offering an in-depth explanation since critical realism’s epistemological strength lies in its concern with the domain of the real, which is “the domain of ontological depth”, comprising “generative mechanisms” that produce phenomena in the social world (Iosifides 2011; Sayer 2000). As will be explained in more detail in the next chapter, critical realism suggests that the domain of the real, alongside the domains of the empirical and the actual make up the three domains of social reality. It argues in this respect that a sole concentration on the latter two domains that is on the domain of empirical (subjective experiences of phenomena), and or on the actual (on events that occur in the social world) like it is done by interpretivist and positivist approaches, is not enough to comprehend and explain the complete picture of social reality. Therefore, by focusing on generative mechanisms, i.e. factors, pertaining to the domain of the real, a critical realist framework endeavours to approach as close as it gets to social reality behind surface appearances (Iosifides 2011).

Critical realism stands out with its non-reductionist, and non-determinist outlook. Through what Porpora (2013) refers to as a set of “analytical dualisms” - between structure and agency; structure and culture; and culture and agency - it is capable of identifying an array of factors pertaining to different entities, i.e. to structural contexts, to cultural contexts, and to the agential dimensions in a variety of analytical levels (ibid: 27, see Archer 1995). Thus,
critical realism is capable of explaining migrations where economic rationality is not necessarily predominant, like cases of cultural or ethnic migration. Moreover, critical realists hold that although actors’ behaviours are conditioned by social structures and cultural factors, the agency of these actors always remain causally effective, always entailing a degree of creativity under the harshest conditions (Bakewell 2010, Porpora 2013). In this respect critical realism is never determinist. It only argues for tendencies and recognises context specific contingencies (Iosifides 2011).

Furthermore, the critical realist “morphogenetic approach” (Archer 1995; 1996; 2000; 2003), with its emphasis on social change, enables a study of migration in both its causes and consequences. It is, in other words, capable of conceptualising the issue of migration as a process and an emergent phenomenon, which gives rise to further phenomena in the societies and for the agents concerned, in the form of intended and unintended consequences. In so doing the intention to regard migration in its causes and consequences in one coherent theoretical framework is achieved.

In the following sections I will argue in more detail that a critical realist perspective is able to provide the necessary tools to conceptualise migration as a multi-dimensional, multi-factorial and complex phenomenon, so as be able to firstly integrate multiple levels of aggregation and consider both structural and agential factors; secondly to refrain from economic reductionism by considering cultural factors as significantly relevant; and thirdly integrate the causes as well as consequences within its paradigmatic umbrella.

2.3.1 The Integration of Structure and Agency in a Multi-Level Analysis

The relationship between structure and agency has been a traditional subject of debate in sociology in general. This is reflected in the field of migration research as well, then:

[...] theories of migration have tended to skirt around the problem of structure and agency, despite its importance. Some approaches lean towards a more determinist position and play scant regard to the decisions and behaviour of individual actors. Many go in the other direction and focus on the agency of individuals; they tend to struggle to take account of the role of broader social
structures in shaping migration patterns, except in as far as they are mediated through an individual’s decision-making (Bakewell 2010:1690).

These fragmented theories of migration, remain incomplete and flawed. What needs to be acknowledged for a complete theory of migration is the so-called “double embeddedness of migration”, which involves according to King (2012), “on the one hand the internal dynamics of migration based on migrants’ social networks and the way that migration is imbricated in migrants’ lives […] and on the other hand the way that, at a macro scale, migration is part and parcel of the contemporary world’s social transformation” (ibid: 25; see Castles and Miller 2009: 47). Massey et al (1998) too, have argued in this sense, that successful theorising of international migration must take four factors into account: Firstly, the structural factors, which lead to emigration from the origin; secondly, the structural factors, which facilitate immigration to the destination, thirdly, the aspirations and motivations of individual migrants; and fourthly, the various structures which connect the two areas of out- and in-migration. Apparently from these discussions is that the problem of accounting for both structure and agency at various levels of analysis in a single theory has been a challenge to pertinent theory. As Bakewell (2010) puts it, “the problem of structure and agency is a major stumbling block for the development of an integrated and coherent theory of migration” (ibid: 1692).

The recognition thereof, has led to two main trends in migration theorising, namely the structuration model and the critical realist model. As was stated earlier, the latter inspires the present study, so that it will be scrutinised in more detail. Concerning the former, namely Giddens’ structuration model, suffice it to say here that it has few disadvantages in contrast to the critical realist model: Most important of these is related to its argument for the “duality of structure”, conceptualising structures both as rules and as resources which are instantiated through agential action (Porpora 1998: 345; Elder-Vass 2008b: 289). Such an approach, in effect, conflates structure and agency, denying their analytical dualism and so prevents the separate analysis of the two (Porpora 2013; Archer 1995).17

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17 The structuration theory talks about the ‘duality’ of structure meaning that structures function both as “the medium and the outcome of the social practices they recursively organize” (Giddens 1984:25). In so doing, the structures are ‘instantiated’ as social action takes place and apart from that they only have the potential to condition social action, thus a ‘virtual presence’. Human agency on the other hand
Within critical realism, the relationship between structure (as well as culture) and agency has been most influentially postulated in Archer’s morphogenetic approach (1995; 1996; 2000; 2003). Contrary to the structuration model, this approach is capable of incorporating both structure and agency into the explanation of the social world without conflating the two, as well as accommodating various and multiple factors (including cultural ones) operating at different levels of aggregation within its framework. This is possible because the morphogenetic approach argues for the analytic dualism of structure and agency so as to be able to “examine their distinctive properties” (Archer 1995: 63). As Archer (1995) puts it, this is essential “[n]ot simply because ontologically they are indeed different entities with different properties and powers, but because methodologically it is necessary to make the distinction between them in order to examine their interplay and thus be able to explain why things are 'so and not otherwise' in society” (ibid: 63-64).

More specifically, the morphogenetic approach postulates not only the one dualism between structure and agency but a series of analytical dualisms (Porpora 2013: 26; see Archer 1995): Firstly, an analytical dualism between structure and agency; secondly that between structure and culture; and thirdly, that between culture and agency (Porpora 2013: 26). Here, agency is the related to individuals’ (or corporate agents’) capacity to exercise some degree of control over the social relations of which they are part as well as their ability to transform these (Sewell 1992:20; see also Iosifides 2011). Structure can be defined, on the other hand, as “relations among social positions” (Porpora 2013: 27) or more broadly as substantial, material and causally effective entities and emergent wholes (Elder-Vass 2008b). Furthermore structural entities can be separated from cultural ones in being material (or extra-discursive), rather than ideational (or discursive), which is integral to the definition of the latter (Porpora 2013: 27). Furthermore, although structures cannot be said to have an existence independent of human activity in general (rather they are produced by the later), inclines towards voluntarism (Bakewell 2010). As Iosifides (2011) argues “Furthermore, structuration theory implies a certain form of voluntarism, falls into a version of interpretivism and irrealism about structures, neglects the role of materiality in structuring the social world, denies social emergence and fails to effectively link micro- and macro-levels due to their conceptualisation as face-to-face interaction and non face-to-face (extended in space and time) social interaction respectively (Archer, 1995, Mouzelis, 1997, Cruickshank 2003a)” (ibid: 80).
there is the so-called temporal-disjuncture between agency and structure, within which “structure pre-exists the individual” (Bakewell 2010: 1696)\(^\text{18}\). Moreover structures are the “outcomes of agency, which “emerge” or pass a developmental threshold, beyond which they exercise their own causal powers, independently of agency which produce them” (Parker 2000: 73 in ibid.). This is the so-called “emergenist aspect” which has essential importance for critical realism: Both structures and human agency have emergent properties, meaning they have “causal powers in their own right” (Elder-Vass 2008a: 463).\(^\text{19}\) Leaning on the arguments of Archer, Elder-Vass (2008a) explains:

social structures, like organisations and social institutions, are causally effective in their own right because their causal influence only arises when their parts (predominantly human individuals) are organised into this sort of structure. The individuals concerned would not have these causal powers if they were not organised into such structures, hence these are powers of the structure and not of the individuals who are its parts (ibid: 463).

On the one hand, critical realism recognises human agency as the decisive causal factor of social reality and acknowledges that structure does not exist independently of social actors (Manicas, 1998). However it argues that agential activity never exists in an unconditioned form (ibid). It is the structures, which provide, along with cultural forms, the material conditions for human agential activity (Priestley 2011). At the same time, though conditioned, human action cannot be said to be fully determined by culture or structure, rather there is always room for agential “ineluctable creativity” (Porpora 2013: 29). Critical realism recognizes moreover that agency has intentional dimensions (human reasons, intentions, meanings, interpretations, discourses), as well as unintended dimensions: “even if the acts of individuals are more or less ‘rational’, related to definite interests, and so on, their (structured) practices and the changes in them are not generally, if ever, intended, still

\(^{18}\) While accepting the truism ’No people: no society’, Archer dismisses “this society; because of these people here present” (1995: 141).

\(^{19}\) As Elder-Vass explains “[w]holes are emergent when they possess emergent properties, and properties of wholes are emergent if they would not be possessed by their parts, were those parts are not organised into such a whole. [And] emergent properties are essentially causal powers of the whole concerned [...]” (2008b: 284-285). Also important to note is that the critical realist notion of emergence “accepts that entities at many levels can simultaneously have causal powers, and that these powers may interact to produce actual events” (ibid: 291).
less are these changes ‘rational’” (Manicas 1998: 321).

This is the point of departure for the suggestion of analytic dualism of structure and agency, and culture and agency (and also culture and structure) (see also Archer 1995; Porpora 2013). Elder-Vass (2008a) argues in this respect:

if structures do have emergent properties, then for analytical purposes we can treat individuals and structures as distinct (while recognising that structures are ‘activity dependent’ – i.e. the product of the interacting individuals that form their parts). We can therefore analyse the interactions between them over time (ibid: 463).

As a basic proposition, the critical realist morphogenetic approach holds that “people always act out of structural and cultural circumstances, which their very actions then proceed to modify or sustain” (Porpora 2013: 28). It must be underlined that social change or its reproduction (morphogenesis/ morphostatis) is central to this approach and “social change involves a dialectical relation between human agency and the contexts in which those agents find themselves, contexts that include culture, structure, and physical things” (Porpora 2013: 29). The interplay between these factors in the production of social change (or the reproduction social order) is depicted in figure 1 below:

![Figure 1: The Morphogenetic Cycle (Archer 1995: 323)](image-url)
As can be read from the figure above, the three stage cycle of morphogenesis consists of, with the addition of factor time (T), structural conditions and cultural conditions which have a causal influence on the social interaction in the first stage (T1); the subsequent social interaction in the second stage (T2-T3); which in turn leads to structural elaboration in the third stage (T4) (Bakewell 2010; Archer 1995). In the case of morphogenesis, structural elaboration may include the modification of existing social structure(s) and the introduction of new ones; and in the case of morphostatis the reproduction of existing structural and cultural conditions (Archer 1995: 168-169). The last stage is then the start of a new cycle, which sets the structural/cultural conditions for subsequent social interaction (Archer 1995: 91). In explaining social change the theory of morphogenesis stresses conflict and unintended consequences:

The modification of previous structural properties and the introduction of new ones is the combined product of the different outcomes pursued simultaneously by various social groups. The unintended element largely results from group conflict and concession which together mean that the consequential elaboration is often what no-one sought or wanted (ibid.).

Critical realism distinguishes between three types of social agents: primary agents, corporate agents and actors (Iosifides 2011: 87). Whereas the first two “are defined as *collectivities sharing the same life-chances*” social actors “acquire their social identities from the way in which they personify the roles they choose to occupy” (Archer 2000: 261 in ibid.). On the other hand, while primary agents (i.e. individual immigrants, non-immigrants) are those who do not have a “collective action plan” to sustain or modify societal structures and cultural contexts and do so mostly unintentionally, corporate agents (i.e. nation-states, migrant organisations, political parties, other interest groups etc.), have a degree of collective organisation and try to actively impact on structural and cultural contexts (Iosifides 2011: 87). This distinction among agents makes it possible to locate agency at both macro, meso and micro-levels of analysis. This allows the incorporation of various types of agencies (states’ agencies, immigrants’ agencies) in a multi-level analysis, which will so lead to a more complete explanation of migration processes.

Furthermore, to better account for the complex notion of agency Emirbayer and Mische’s
(1998) conceptualisation thereof can be adopted. These argue that agency can be conceptualised as the:

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[...] \text{engagement of individuals of different structural environment which, through the interplay of habit, imagination and judgement, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing situations} \text{ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 970; emphasis in original).}
\]

They distinguish between three analytical components (constitutive elements) of agency, namely between the iterational (habitual), projective and practical-evaluative elements (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 963; 670-673). They define the first of these components, i.e. the iterational component, as “"the selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thoughts and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions and institutions over time”” (ibid: 671, emphasis in original). The second element, namely the projective component, is defined as “"the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors’ hopes, fears, and desires for the future”” (ibid, emphasis in original). Lastly, the third element, the practical-evaluative component is defined as “"the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations”” (ibid, emphasis in original). They argue furthermore, that “"it is possible to speak of a chordal triad of agency within which all there dimensions resonate as separate but not always harmonious tones””; and that these elements may not have the same weight in every case of action, but rather depending on the context, “"one or another of these three aspects might predominate”” (ibid: 972, emphasis in original). It must also be noted that according to the scholars each of these elements has its own “internal chordal structure” that is a “"simultaneous orientation towards the past, future and the present, for all forms of agency are temporally embedded in the flow of time (ibid.).

An important point that Emirbayer and Mische suggest regarding human actors is that these “"do not merely repeat past routine; they are also inventors of new possibilities for thought and action”” (1998: 983-984). This aspect is probably most suitable for the conceptualisation
of migrants in general and the so-called “pioneer migrants” in particular. The latter is discussed by Bakewell et al. (2011) in detail in an attempt to find a balanced account of structure and agency in explaining migration. They argue:

While we focus on the agency of pioneer migrants (as the most underdeveloped and under-theorized), we distance ourselves from the voluntaristic connotations, bearing in mind that the agency is exercised within the conditions created by structures. The structures derived from past historical actions in turn create the context for current agency. To be an agent means to be capable of exerting some degree of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which, in turn, implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree (Sewell 1992: 20). Broader structural factors such as warfare, colonialism, immigration policies, labour recruitment, or economic development play a significant role in setting the conditions determining the likelihood of pioneer migration and migration system formation (Castles and Miller 2009; Massey et al. 1994). [...]. While structural factors do obviously determine the necessary conditions for large-scale migration to occur between particular places and regions, whether this actually occurs heavily depends on the migration-facilitating and migration-impeding role of the agency of migrants, and pioneer migrants in particular (ibid: 11-12).

According to Bakewell et al. (2011) pioneer migrants are defined, in the case of international migration, as the initial migrants leaving their places of origin and settling for the first time in a different country, where previously there were no co-members of their original community. By joining a new community for the first time, these pioneers lead the way for others from their original communities, opening for the latter the opportunity to “follow in their footsteps” (Bakewell et al. 2011: 12). These pioneers are “innovators” who are entrepreneurial individuals willing to take risks (ibid). Thus they migrate. Yet, alongside their strong projective agency, according to the scholars, pioneer migrants may also often have a strong iterational agency, which explains how they can contribute not only to the initiation but also to the perpetuation of migration:

The dominance of the iterational agency element among pioneer migrants – an orientation towards preserving identities, interactions and institutions over time – would be conductive towards sustaining strong links and ties with their origin communities. The prevalence of habitual agency, past patterns of thought and action among pioneer migrants might therefore result in pioneer migrants actively seeking for their family members to
follow that path and join them. Those pioneers, who on their journeys long for the familiarity of ‘home’, social ties and known arrangements, might also be more prone to orient their actions towards encouraging other members of the community to join them, and – as a result – stimulate further migration (ibid: 15).

2.3.2 Migration as a Multi-Factorial Process

A second major problem with mainstream theories of migration, as was argued, is the over-rationalisation of voluntary migrations in terms of economic rationality and the regarding of migrants as economically rational ‘homo-economicus’. Accordingly, mainstream migration theories suggest at the macro-level that the volumes of migration waves are determined mainly by socio-economic factors such as labour demand and supply, wage differentials, labour market structures and at the micro-level that individual migrants (or households) move homes in order to maximise gain and minimise costs. In so doing, they commit to economic determinism denying the role of other structural and cultural factors in the causation of migratory movements. With the exception of the political economy model, they pay little attention to political and cultural factors in the causation of migrations; and even this approach takes only such political factors into account, which are, like immigration policies, meant to directly influence the volume of migrations. Thus the political economy model included, there is little room in classical migration theories for such cultural and ideational factors, which play overt as well as subtle roles in causing migratory movements, and no room for agency, which is not directed mainly at gain maximisation and cost reduction.

Accordingly, “culturally imbued migration” (Hedberg 2004: 26) or “ethnic immigration preferences” giving rise to “co-ethnic immigration” (Bauböck et al 2006) have not been extensively theorized in the literature. This is especially because as Bauböck et al. (2006) argue, the predominance of economic rationality models in the explanation of migration, makes it hard to grant a significant role to ethnic and cultural factors:

[C]o-ethnic immigration does not fit well into dominant migration theories that focus on economic push and pull factors and on the sociology of migration networks. From these perspectives, it is not easy to understand why states would encourage the immigration of co-ethnics who crowd out other migrants with better skills and – in the German, Israeli and Japanese
cases – are sometimes not even familiar with the destination state’s language (ibid: 68).

The few literature which the rubric ‘ethnic migration’ comprises, usually focus on ethnic “return” migrations in which ethnic minority groups return to countries to which they feel ethnic affinity (Brubaker 1998, Tsuda 2009; Thränhardt 2001; Levy and Weiss 2002; Münz & Ohliger 2003; Hedberg 2004; Joppke 2005). Other than these types of “return migrations” cultural factors like ethnicity and nationalism are usually not taken into account when explaining migratory movements causally (with some exceptions i.e. Joppke 2005). In other cases ethnic migrations are documented especially for certain nation-states of the New World referred to as ‘settler nations’ (like the USA, Canada, Australia), which had been actively facilitating the immigration from certain regions in the world (especially from Western Europe) to rebuild their populations while restricting the immigrants’ entry from other regions (Joppke 2005; Castles & Miller 1998). And although the ethnically informed restrictive immigration policies were abandoned and are considered illegitimate in the these countries and in Europe (and many democratic nations) since the 1960s and the 1970s, it can be argued that “preferential admission on similar grounds […] is still widespread and potentially growing” (Bauböck et al 2006: 68-69; Joppke 2005). Against this background, according to Thränhardt (2001), although there exist the recognition of the presence ethnic migrations, each of these has been treated as special cases by the literature and the similarities, which exist, have gone unnoticed by migration theory (ibid: 275). This calls for, as Bauböck et al. (2006) argue, the need for increased incorporation of cultural factors in the explanation of migration: “Migration research must be combined with studies of nation-building and nationalism for explaining the persistence of such preferential treatment as well as for evaluating it” (ibid: 69).

This can surely be done with the tools of a multi-factorial approach like critical realism. Then, a from a critical realist perspective, structural and cultural/ideational factors both have

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20 Brubaker (1998) writes about the return of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from Eastern Europe and Soviet Union to Germany; ethnic Hungarians from Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine to Hungary; ethnic Russian from the Soviet Union to Russia and Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel. Tsuda (2003; 2009) on the other hand treats the return of Japanese-Brazilians to from Brazil to Japan; and Hedberg (2004) writes on the return migration of Finland Swedes from Finland to Sweden.
emergent properties in their own right, and through taking part in social interaction along with agency, these lead to causation of events and phenomena. Moreover, the studies mentioned above, which deal with ethnic migrations can be useful in conceptualising how ethnicity, or rather, perceived ‘ethnic affinity’, and nationalism can partake in the causation of migratory movements. In this regard, according to Brubaker (1998) ethnicity may play two types of roles in the causation of migrations: “1) as a push factor in at the point of origin, and 2) as a pull factor at the point of destination” (ibid: 1047). While in the first case, the culprit is usually “ethnic conflict [functioning] as a push factor”, in the second case it is “ethnic affinity [functioning] as a pull factor” (ibid.) 21. Apart from ethnic return migration, nationalism as a socially constructed ideology, plays a significant role in ethnic migrations, on the one hand, in the causation (and legitimization) of migratory movements of ethnically defined groups -especially but not only in contexts of nation building- (Brubaker 1998; Wimmer & Glick-Schiller 2002; Hirschon 2003; Joppke 2005)22; and on the other hand, in impeding the movement of potential migrants, who are not considered to be culturally compatible, through specific migration policies.23

On the other hand cultural factors play a more directly discernible role in the consequences of migration processes, including ethnic migrations. As Fielding (1992: 201) puts it:

> We know, often from personal experience, but also from family talk, that moving from one place to another is nearly always a major event. It is one of those events around which an individual’s biography is built. […] Migration tends to expose one’s personality, it expresses one’s loyalties and reveals one’s values and attachments (often previously hidden). It is a statement of an

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21 In this respect, Brubaker (1998) argues that, ethnic migration becomes a tool for ethnic unmixing rather than heterogenization.

22 In their wider ranging critique of “methodological nationalism” Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) argue that there exists a “symbiotic relationship” between the political project of nationalism and the modern state, so that the history of nation and state building is marked by forceful expulsion of some unwanted peoples and “people’s exchange” (ibid: 306).

23 According to Brochmann (2004) immigration control policies may be formed and legitimized with regards to four dimensions, firstly regarding concerns about national security, secondly regarding national economy (i.e. absorption capacity), thirdly regarding demography and fourthly regarding social and cultural cohesion (which relates to preservation of national identity and traditions) (ibid: 4-5).
individual’s worldview, and is, therefore, and extremely cultural event” (cited from Hedberg, 2004:29).

In cases where ‘ethnic affinity’ is a pull factor, problems occur in the host societies after immigration takes place, since perceived ethnic affinity, usually constructed by official authorities in their narratives of national history, come into conflict with perceived ethnic differentials at the micro-level during various (daily) social interactions between migrants and non-migrants in the host society. As Brubaker (1998) argues:

[T]he identity officially recognized by the receiving state is not necessarily recognized in everyday life in the receiving country. […] Admitted to the state because of their official ethnic or ethno-religious sameness, they [the migrants] experience instead ethnic or quasi-ethnic difference, sustained by a host of factors linked to lived “ethnicity” such as language, dress, demeanour, habits, customs and so on. […] Thus, migrations of ethnic unmixing may in practice generate new forms of ethnic or quasi-ethnic heterogeneity in the receiving countries (ibid: 1053).

Similar observations can be made regarding Israel, Japan, South Korea, Germany and America and their immigration policies, which favoured certain groups with perceived ethnic affinity. In each of these cases (concerning the ethnic immigrations of Ethiopian Jews, Middle Eastern Jews, Russian Jews to Israel; ethnic Japanese to Japan, Ethnic Koreans to south Korea; ethnic Germans or the Aussiedler to Germany and ‘white’ Europeans to the USA) Thränhardt (2001) demonstrates that the immigration of the concerned groups were facilitated or accepted with regards to officially perceived ethnic affinity, yet the immigrant groups turned out have difficulties in the country of destination, including educational, labour market and other social discrimination and othering.

Against this background, it can be argued that to fully understand the phenomenon of migration, a reconceptualization of migration is needed. The solution may lie in the so-called “cultural approach” to migration, which is according to Hedberg (2004), one in which ethnicity (and also nationalism) is conceptualised as important parts of the migration phenomenon. Such an approach, as Hedberg argues, “must look for ‘plural stories’, which contain more than the instrumental, economic motive” (ibid: 30). In this sense “it may be necessary to emphasise the cultural aspects of migration in order to get “beyond” the
dominating discourse of economic analysis. By giving particular weight to the cultural dimension, new meanings would be released, which would otherwise have remained concealed” (ibid: 31 emphasis added).

A ‘cultural approach to migration’ can be understood as the utilisation of a specific ‘analytical lens’ which is a critical realist analytical strategy. In this sense it is “a way of ‘re-describing’ an event through the use of a separate theory, in order to extract new meanings” (Hedberg 2004: 75). Moreover a multi-dimensional approach is needed, which can differentiate between the significance of ethnicity at the macro-level (i.e. as part of a nation-state ideology) and at the micro-level (as part of everyday interaction). Both of these, i.e. a cultural approach to migration and a multi-dimensional analysis, can be granted by critical realism, for it is a non-reductionist and a non-determinist scheme.

2.3.3 An Integrative Approach to the Causes and Consequences of Migration

As was argued above, mainstream migration models are interested in explaining the causes of migrations rather than their consequences (Arango 2000; King 2012). Whereas the issues related to the experience of migration or migrant being have become topics of research accompanying the so-called “epistemological shift” in migration studies (King 2012), mainstream migration theories, as outlined above, are still one-sidedly focused on the reasons. Yet this one-sided focus is unjustified, since it implies the conceptualisation of international migration as a one-time thing, which happens and then ceases to happen once the movement from one country to another had taken place. More importantly, it ignores that migration has emergent properties in the sense that it is causative of further phenomena under favourable structural and cultural conditions. Conceptualised, in a critical realist framework, migration can be seen as an emergent phenomenon, causing further migration through the formation of migrant networks on the one hand; and on the other hand, as having effects for the countries involved in terms of structural elaboration (for instance it plays part in the formation of ethnically defined bifurcated labour markets) and lastly, for the migrants and non-migrants, as being an life transforming experience that goes well beyond the act of moving itself. As Castles and Miller(1998) put it:
Migration and settlement is a long-drawn-out process, which will be played out for the rest of the migrant’s life, and affect subsequent generations too. It is a collective action, arising out of social change and affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas (ibid: 19).

It must be mentioned that it is neither possible nor desirable to make a list of all possible consequences of migratory movements here. Furthermore, such a list will definitely not be an exhaustive one. Then, the consequences of migration are definitely multiple, changing with the type of migration and are contingent on many other factors, all of which continuously interact to produce effects. On the other hand, one consequence of migration stands out as rather significant: it is that of the formation of migrant communities (Castles and Miller 1998). This is even true regarding temporary immigration of individual migrants: these too construct a “permanent social group with rotating membership”, in other words, a permanent social category whose individual members may be temporary but since they are replaced by other immigrants who have similar characteristics, they affect the society in ways similar to permanent settlers (Castles & Kosack 1973: 56). In this respect, it can be argued that especially since the facilitation of labour migration to western Europe in the post World War II era, ethnic/migrant communities have become major integral parts of immigration countries, so that “[b]y 1970, there were over 12 million immigrants in Western Europe, and processes of ethnic minority formation have become irreversible” (Castles & Davidson 2000: 54). Castles and Miller (1998) illustrate the formation of migrant communities in the immigrant receiving countries in a four-stage model. These stages are:

1. Temporary labour migration of young workers, remittance of earnings and continued orientation to the homeland.
2. Prolonging of stay and the development of social networks based on kinship or common area of origin and then need for mutual help in the new environment.
3. Family reunion, growing consciousness of long-term settlement, increasing orientation towards the receiving country, and emergence of ethnic communities with their own institutions (associations, shops, cafés, agencies, professions).

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24 This would involve taking many perspectives into consideration: that of migrants and non-migrants in the sending and in the receiving states; as well as that of the international and global arenas and various actors therein.
4. Permanent settlement which, depending on the actions of the government and population of the receiving country, leads either to secure legal status and eventual citizenship, or to political exclusion, socioeconomic marginalisation and the formation of permanent ethnic minorities (Castles and Miller 1998: 28).

According to Castles and Miller (1998) migrant or ethnic communities can usually be regarded as unforeseen, or unintended consequences of migration (ibid: 46). As they put it “the emergence of societies which are more ethnically and culturally diverse must be seen as an inevitable result of initial decisions to recruit foreign workers, or to permit immigration” (ibid). This conceptualisation is, as was argued, in line with a critical realist understanding of migration in general.

Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, migrant community formation, conceived to be among the most important consequences of migration, needs to be explained when the phenomenon of migration itself is to be understood in its complexity. However the conceptualisation of the consequences of migration necessitates the use of further concepts, like ethnicity, identity (or identification), transnationalism. Yet, a random adoption of these concepts can, as was argued, lead to an eclectic framework and associated problems. In this sense, it is important to utilise a critical realist appropriation of these new concepts so as to achieve a comprehensive analysis of migration regarding both its causes and its consequences within an integrated meta-theoretical framework.

2.4 Immigrant Communities

Immigrant communities are regarded in this thesis as an important, though unintended consequence of immigration and settlement in the receiving context (Castles & Miller 1998). Kaya (2012) argues in this respect that immigrant communities, are produced and reproduced due to various needs of immigrants in the host country especially resulting from their socioeconomic deprivation and exclusion (particularly due to the decline of the welfare state in many European countries) and also due to their the affiliation with the country of origin (ibid:3). Vasta (2004) defines communities in general in three ways:

Firstly, community can be defined as a ‘geographical expression’ with a
‘fixed and bounded’ locality where human settlement is located in a particular local territory […]. Secondly, community can be understood as a local social system which refers to a set of social relationships which take place within a given locality. Here a ‘network of interrelationships is established between people living in the same locality’. These might be called neighbourhoods where there are informal social networks based on family and neighbours who share a sense of history. Thirdly, community also exists as a type of relationship or as a sense of identity. […] This type of communal identification need not arise from any personal contact but simply provides characteristics of communality such as language, the migration experience, ethnicity, class experience etc. (Vasta 2004: 2-3, emphasis in original).

Whereas immigrant communities can take all three forms identified by Vasta, they also provide the members with vital social capital, which the latter may be lacking in the receiving society.25 This social capital is functional for the immigrants in their everyday lives, especially at the presence of unfavourable conditions, which engender immigrants’ exclusion from economic, political and social-cultural resources. In this respect Kaya (2012) argues the following:

Making communities becomes one of the ways for them to cope with uncertainty, insecurity, unemployment, exclusion and poverty in the age of deindustrialization, or post-industrialism. Ethno-cultural communities refer to symbolic walls of protection, cohesion and solidarity for migrant origin groups. On the one hand, it is comforting for them to band together away

25 Social capital was defined by Bourdieu as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1985: 248 in Portes 2000). Furthermore as Lesser (2000) points out, the formation of social capital does not depend on the presence of personal contacts but rather on “positive interactions” taking place between the members of a social network (Lesser 2000: 6). In this context the central element of social capital, is “trust and reciprocity” (ibid.). Fukuyama writes in this regard: “social capital is the capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it. It can be embodied in the smallest and most basic social group, the family, as well as the largest of all groups, the nation, and in all the other groups in between” (Fukuyama 1995 in ibid: 7). Social capital and mutual trust are positively correlated, and an increase in these positively influences cooperation among the members of the community (Vasta 2004:3). Another important point to mention regarding the concept of social capital is related to Bourdieu’s argument about the interchangeability of different types of capital and the reducibility of these to economic capital: “Hence, through social capital, actors can gain direct access to economic resources (subsidised loans, investment tips, protected markets); they can increase their cultural capital through contacts with experts or individuals of refinement (i.e. embodied cultural capital); or, alternatively, they can affiliate with institutions that confer valued credentials (i.e. institutionalized cultural capital)” (Portes 2000: 45).
from the homeland, communicating through the same languages, norms and values. On the other hand, their growing affiliation with culture, authenticity, ethnicity, nationalism, religiosity and traditions provides them with an opportunity to establish solidarity networks against structural problems” (ibid: 10-11).

Portes (2000) argues that social capital may function in three main ways: Firstly “as a source of benefits through extrafamilial networks”; secondly “as a sort of family support”; and thirdly “as a source of social control” (ibid: 51). Therefore tight community networks of immigrants can be instrumental various ways, offering help, assistance and support to the immigrants in difficult life situations (i.e. search for work, unemployment etc.) as well as in maintaining discipline and compliance of the members with the rest of the community, where structural and cultural entities outside of the community may be alien, and frightening to the incoming group. In the latter sense social capital also functions to “restrict individual freedoms” (Portes 2000: 62), which has been especially recognised by the younger generations, who “[…] always feel the tension between the community and the wider society in the process of individuation” (Kaya 2012: 27).

At this point it must also be stressed that ethnic community experience is not genderless. Patriarchy sees women “not only as biological reproducers of an ethnic group, but also [as] the ‘cultural carriers’ who have the key role in passing on the language and cultural symbols to the young” (Castles and Miller 1998: 26). Therefore the preservation of traditional values within the community may mean increased social control over women in the community, and the continuation or intensification of their subordination (Fenton 2003). Kaya (2012) talks in this sense about the revival of a discourse of “honour” which becomes a discourse, along with other discourses of “culture, ethnicity, religion and tradition” to resort to, so as to get “attached to the political-public sphere” (ibid: 18-19).

In an age of insecurity and uncertainty, those wretched of the earth become more engaged in the protection of their honour, which, they believe, is the only thing left. […]Remaking the past, or celebrating honour, serves at least a dual purpose for the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coming to terms with the present without being seen to criticise the existing status quo. The ‘glorious’ past and the preservation of honour is, here, handled by the diasporic subject as a strategic tool absorbing the destructiveness of the present which is defined with structural outsiderism. Secondly, it also helps
to recuperate a sense of the self not dependent on criteria handed down by others - the past is what the diasporic subjects can claim as their own (Ganguly, 1992: 40) (ibid: 19-20).

The attachment of the immigrants to the public sphere in the host society through the communities they build or preserve can be explained with reference to the “pathways of migrant incorporation” approach, put forward by Glick-Schiller et al. (2004) regarding the case of Germany, who recognise that immigrants are incorporated into the host society in a multitude of ways rather than only through assimilation. They suggest that immigrants’ simultaneous connections to more than one society can be viewed as an aspect of their incorporation rather than separation. Their approach highlights three points, which depart from mainstream ideas on migrant integration or incorporation. Considering the case of Germany they argue the following:

First of all, the connection between cultural competencies and incorporation into social systems is empirically more complex than popular conceptualizations of integration may suggest. Dominant discourses about migration stress that it is only through a form of cultural change that foreigners can become a part of Germany. They focus on the cultural practices of foreigners within Germany, disregarding transnational connections or viewing them as an impediment to integration. From our point of view, incorporation into German society is not necessarily accompanied by cultural assimilation. Secondly, incorporation in one society is neither empirically nor theoretically exclusive. Data from studies of migration indicate that incorporation into more than one nation-state at a time is a frequent phenomenon that must be addressed by theorists of migration. Thirdly, there is little evidence that simultaneous incorporation in more than one nation-state is a liminal condition that will be overcome after successful integration. Rather there may be a direct connection between incorporation in a new state and maintaining cross-border incorporation (ibid: 1).

Therefore, immigrant communities, which are more often than not transnational communities, need to be conceptualised as an alternative way of incorporation rather than separation. This type of incorporation into the receiving society without breaking the ties with the society of origin may be tied to immigrants’ iterational agency. Leaning on Bakewell et al. (2011) it can be argued that it is mainly the iterational element of agency that leads to the formation of migrant communities in the country of arrival. According to the scholars, this element of agency, that is, the “orientation towards preserving identities, interactions and
institutions over time” (ibid: 15), seeks to promote and facilitate the migration of fellow country members (family members and others) to the same country of destination so as to preserve social capital:

Their dependence on various forms of social capital, but also their conscious efforts to foster social relations for their own future benefit and therefore interest in the active maintenance of social capital (Pathirage and Collyer 2011) motivates the pioneers to assist the migration of non-family community members and friends (ibid: 16).

Ethnic community ties are expected to become weaker with an increase in generation. There is expected to be a “gulf” between the experience of the first generation of immigrants (pioneers) and that of subsequent generations, socialising mainly in the receiving country (Castles and Miller 1998: 26). According to Cornell and Hartmann (1998) “as the distance from immigrant experience grows, the salience of ethnicity declines” (ibid: 208). It is therefore expected that with each subsequent generation the distance from the country of origin will increase, which includes a decrease in language use and cultural practices and an increase in intermarriage-rates (ibid.). On the other hand there may be some intervening factors, among which are continuing streams of migration from the place of origin which help to sustain ethnic identities (ibid). More importantly, it can be argued that the awareness among the second generation about the “contradiction between the prevailing ideologies of equal opportunity and the reality of discrimination and racism in their daily lives” may lead to ethnic survival or revival as well as “the emergence of counter cultures and political radicalisation” (Castles and Miller 1998: 36). Though this necessitates the presence of other contributing factors.

It is not only immigrants’ agencies which are causally related to the emergence of migrant communities, but also a set of structural and cultural factors in the receiving context such as ethnic discrimination, exclusion or deficient or uneven incorporation into the labour market and other societal institutions, self and other identification etc. Discrimination in general increases the use value of the community, which offers an alternative source of support and cooperation; and identification creates necessary cultural conditions so as to sustain the “community spirit” (Lee & Newby 1983 in Vasta 2004). These will be discussed below.
2.4.1 Ethnicity, Discrimination and Communities

The factor of ethnicity, pertaining to the cultural realm, can also be causally related to the formation of ethnic communities. It is important to highlight that ethnic community boundaries are erected and maintained in processes of ethnic encounters (Barth 1969). Eriksen (2002) argues in this sense that ethnicity is “an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group”, highlighting that it is constructed not in isolation but only then, when groups have a minimum mutual contact with each other (ibid: 12). In this sense migration can be understood as a significant facilitating medium; one in which immigrants come into contact with the population of the host country and enter into ethnic relationships with the latter and vice-versa. In these contacts immigrants are often deemed to be ‘different’ from the dominant non-migrant groups. Whereas this perception may be created from the inside, i.e. through the so-called “self-definition” or self-identification as will be described in the next section, it is also created from the outside, that is, through the so called “other definition”; usually meaning “the ascription of undesirable characteristics and assignment to inferior social positions by dominant groups” (Castles and Miller 1998: 30). The latter is associated with ideas of nationalism and racism, through which differential treatment of the group in question comprising their exclusion and othering in many societal domains, is justified via primordialist and essentialist discourses on ethnic and national identity. In these, ethnicity is taken to mean something one acquires naturally at birth; and something natural and enduring, denoting common origins, roots and blood-ties as well as a static and unchangeable culture; and is thought to determine the characteristics of the group in question (Cornell & Hartmann 1998: 48-56). The former, i.e. the self-definition of the group by means of ethnicity and culture on the other hand may “be interpreted as a symptom of the existing structural social and political problems such as unemployment, racism, xenophobia, exclusion, and assimilation” (Kaya 2012: 18).

Castles and Miller (1998) argue that the concept of culture has become central in the debates on ethnic minorities. Through processes related to the politicization of culture in immigrant receiving countries, belief in “cultural difference” replaces the idea of “racial superiority” and
becomes the ideological basis for various practices aiming at exclusion and discrimination of minorities (Castles and Miller: 38-39, see also Fenton 2003). They suggest that there are four ways in which “culture” or perceived cultural difference is thematised in discussions on ethnic minority groups:

First, [...] cultural difference serves as a marker for ethnic boundaries. Second, ethnic cultures play a central role in community formation: when ethnic groups cluster together they establish their own neighbourhoods, marked by distinctive use of private and public spaces. Third, ethnic neighbourhoods are perceived by some members of the majority group as confirmation of their fears of a ‘foreign take-over’. Ethnic communities are seen as a threat to the dominant culture and national identity. Fourth, dominant groups may see migrant cultures as primordial, static and regressive. Linguistic and cultural maintenance is seen as a proof of inability to come to terms with an advanced industrial society (ibid: 37).

Furthermore, as Fenton (2003) argues, “[i]n so many instances throughout the world, cultural difference is associated with unequal social relations. It [ethnicity and culture] is not simply, in Barth’s language, a matter of sustaining boundaries between groups, but also of sustaining inequalities of power and access to social resources” (ibid: 134). There are a “multitude of racisms”, or nationalisms, which elicit different forms of social exclusion for minorities, like “gatekeeper discriminations, maintaining of social distance, the valuation of culture difference, ethnic patterns of social inequality and outright hatred and violence” (ibid: 130). Racisms, or nationalisms, can be diverse, yet in all forms it includes “some sense of profound rejection of or antagonism towards visible minorities, coupled with a resistance to hearing their voice, and occasionally accompanied by the most appalling acts of violence not only by particular private individuals but also by agents of the state, the police and the penal system” (ibid.). To be illustrative of this diversity, it can be noted that Wieviorka (1995) distinguishes between two ideal types of racisms, i.e. between the ‘differentialist racism’ on the one hand, which comprises the othering, exclusion and oppression of an ethnic minority, constructed as “beyond acceptance or acceptability”; and the ‘inequalitarian racism’ on the other hand, which is about sustaining the inferior position of the ethnic minority and the prevention of its equal incorporation in the society (Fenton 2003: 130-131). This second ideal type can be better understood when coupled with the instrumentalist conception of ethnicity. Glazer and Moynihan (1963) and Cohen (1969; 1974) are among the representatives of this conception,
within which ethnicity is understood as a means to utility maximisation (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 56-59; Malesevic 2004: 94-110). This explains situations when ‘ethnic ties’ are used to legitimize the groups’ claims to economic resources or political rights (ibid). Related to the instrumentalist view is the circumstantialist view, which emphasises the opportunist character of ethnically informed action (Fenton 2003: 98) and draws attention to the its changing character. It claims “that ethnic identity is important in some contexts and not others, the identity is constant but circumstances determine whether it matters” (ibid: 84). The circumstantialist conception of ethnicity is summarised by Cornell and Hartmann (1998) as below:

In short, by the circumstantialist account, individuals and groups emphasise their own ethnic or racial identities when such identities are in some way advantageous to them. They emphasise the ethnic or racial identities of others when it is advantageous to set those apart or to establish a between those viewed as eligible for certain goods and those viewed as ineligible. Thus, they might deny persons of a particular race or ethnicity access to jobs or housing or schools. Similarly, they ignore ethnic and racial bonds when circumstances change and other interests, poorly served by an ethnic or racial boundary, come to the fore (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 58).

The view of ethnicity mainly as *ties of interest* coupled with a “competition and conflict oriented approach to intergroup relations” which also incorporates power relations into ethnic processes (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 63) may be explanatory of immigrants’ community formation in two senses: Firstly, it explains the material discrimination and exclusion of the immigrant groups by dominant group(s). The immigrant groups, which are interacting under unfavourable conditions, may thus have limited options but to form their own networks of support and solidarity and their own spaces of social relations. At the same time, they may react to various acts of discrimination and exclusion by different agents, -i.e. political parties, the state, host population- ideally and materially, by actively sustaining their communities’ ethnic boundaries (i.e. ethnic revival). In this sense, as Fenton (2003) argues, though it is important not to reduce ethnicity of immigrants to “reactive” behaviour, it is equally important to recognize that ethnic discrimination of minority groups “is a significant part of

26 ‘Situationalists put an even stronger emphasis on the ambivalence of ethnicity claiming “that the actual identity deployed or made relevant changes according to the social situations of the individual: the situation changes, the relevant identity changes” (Fenton 2003: 84).
the replication of ethnic boundaries in everyday life” (Fenton 2003: 133-134). Secondly, ethnic communities themselves may be conceptualised as sites of utility maximisation for the immigrants, who for instance may benefit from a sort of ‘enclave’ building within the receiving society. According to Cornell and Hartmann (1998):

entrepreneurs in such groups often develop dense, concentrated networks of small businesses. They employ members of their own group and either serve their own or other minority populations as “middlemen” traders (Bonacich 1973; Dahya 1974) or compete in the larger economy, sometimes in business niches to which dominant-group entrepreneurs are paying little attention (Light and Bonacich 1988; Portes and Back 1985) [...] Ethnic or racial boundaries are reinforced by the particular and often limited economic opportunities that these groups face and by the availability within such groups not only of workers but of pre-existing networks of trust that can be turned into entrepreneurial resources (ibid: 63).

A further point to highlight is the importance of wider societal conditions, which according to Fenton (2003) are necessary for the causation of ethnically informed relationships between groups of population. As Fenton (2003) argues, ambivalences of late modern capitalism (especially economic insecurities and growing inequalities); the degree of precariousness of the state (i.e. where the state demonstrates political and economic instability and has limited power to secure a feature for its citizens); and inter-state politics and its repercussions on state politics (i.e. geo-politics) all play important parts in causing ethnically charged relationships between population groups (ibid: 135-159). The second point is especially important regarding immigrant communities: Fenton compares in this sense, leaning on Simons (1997), the so-called “individuated societies where individuals are able to detach themselves from kin because they can rely on the state” and the so-called “trust-societies” where “people depend on kin because they cannot depend on the state” for economic stability and security (ibid: 146). This is in line with the social capital theory, which sees ethnic communities as sources of social capital, i.e. resources that the members can resort to in pursuing their interests and goals. Put the other way round, according to Cornell and Hartmann (1998),

[...] those who can solve life problems by recourse to existing relationships within their own ethnic or racial group have less reason to cross the boundary between groups in search of solutions. Those who cannot solve such
problems within the boundaries of the group, on the other hand, must turn elsewhere to deal with those problems (ibid. 213).

Yet in any case, it can be argued that “[w]orking within group boundaries tends to reinforce group identity” (ibid.). And in this sense it reinforces separate community building. The socio-spatial discrimination of immigrants on the other hand, is also an important contributing factor to immigrants’ community building. They sustain daily face-to-face interaction of people who share similar experiences, similar senses of identity and belonging through which the immigrant community is reproduced on a daily basis. Immigrants’ spatial segregation, has been traditionally conceptualised in sociology in two main ways; as structural exclusion of the immigrants from more attractive spaces of the city (Park 1928) and as migrants own choosing (Simmel 2001/1900) (Cattacin 2006). In both cases segregation is understood in negative terms. Yet Cattacin (2006) suggests a third way, in which the internal dynamics of segregated spaces, and their functionality are brought into attention and viewed in a positive way. According to the author “ghettos”, [and also other segregated spaces], can be understood as spaces of solidarity against the background of developments such as individualisation and flexibilisation of economy which undermine “societal and identity cohesion” and thus “the integration of the whole society” (ibid: 3). Cattacin develops three main arguments about segregated immigrant spaces: Firstly that these can be conceptualised as “aggregated neighbourhoods” which generate opportunity, in which, incoming migrants find “people they know and communities that can help and sustain the first steps of economic and social integration into the city” (ibid.). Secondly, that these segregated spaces may act in ‘identity stabilising’ ways: “Aggregated neighbourhoods become places in which fragile identities, threatened by daily experiences of discrimination or stigmatisation, can be stabilised through meeting people like themselves” (ibid: 5). Thirdly, Cattacin argues, these spaces “have a strong capacity to act and to solve concrete problems through their self-organisation” (ibid: 3). In this regard, segregated spaces comprising dense self-help networks, provide the so-called “parallel services” which are officially undelivered by i.e. the welfare state. These parallel services are thus tolerated and accepted by authorities (ibid: 8).
2.4.2 Transnationalism and Communities

The transnational approach to migration, “accents the attachments migrants maintain to families, communities, traditions and causes outside the boundaries of the nation-state to which they have moved” (Vetrovec 2001: 574; see also Basch et al. 1994; Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004; Levitt & Jaworski 2007). Transnationalism, although not an entirely novel phenomenon (Foner 2007) is a relatively new analytical theme, which has acquired considerable attention from migration scholars who have been framing international migration “as taking place within fluid social spaces that are constantly reworked through migrants’ simultaneous embeddedness in more than one society” (Levitt & Jaworski 2007: 131 italics added). Transnationalism as a ‘new analytic optic […] makes visible the increasing intensity and scope of circular flows of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by international labour migration” (Caglar, 2001 in Vetrovec 2001: 574); which was made possible especially by developments in communication and transport (ibid: 574-575; Foner 2007). The ‘simultaneity’ of immigrants’ lives was defined by Glick-Schiller et al. (2005) as follows:

[M]igrants often live their lives in more than one nation-state at the same time. They are simultaneously here and there, a part of a new land and another land or lands. We call this way of living, a living with and across borders and making daily life decisions with a network of people that includes both local and transnational actors, ‘simultaneity’ (ibid: 1; see also Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004).

Working on this central concept of “simultaneity” Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) distinguish between “ways of being” and “ways of belonging. They define the former as the individuals’ “actual social relations and practices” and the latter as “practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group” (ibid: 11; see also Glick-Schiller 2003).

Keeping this distinction in mind, it can be argued that transnational migrant being and/or belonging may take different forms in different societal domains (c.f. Levitt & Jaworski 2007). Regarding the economic domain transnationalism may help migrants overcome structural disadvantages, which impede their economic-integration and socio-economic
mobility in the receiving state (ibid.) According to Levitt and Javorski (2007) “[c]ross-border ties imbue ethnic communities with valuable social capital that can foster their horizontal and vertical integration. These effects extend far beyond the economic – the right type of social capital can help ethnic communities cut across class and spatial boundaries and barriers and help facilitate mobility for the second generation (Ruble 2005, Zhou 2004)” (ibid: 135). In the political realm, transnationalism takes place when there is membership to two or more governments. The so called “trans-border citizens” are those, who take part in the political debates and practices of more than one nation-state “claiming rights from and responsibilities to” these governments (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001 in ibid: 137). In this sense transnational processes, in which “sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks” (Beck 2000: 100 in Vetrovec 2001: 575) are deemed to contradict the assumption that the nation-state is the main container of social processes of various kinds (ibid.). In the cultural domain transnational activity comprises identification with both place of origin and place of destination and practice of culture and traditions of both places. Through the “[t]he power of art and culture […] migrants [are able] to express, create, remember, and recreate identity, whether individually or collectively, whether national or hybrid” (Levitt & Javorski 2007: 140).

Against this background transnational activity of migrants in the economic, political and cultural domains can be argued to reproduce and reinforce the so called ”transnational communities” which may be described leaning on Portes (1997) as follows:

[…] dense networks across political borders created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition. Through these networks, an increasing number of people are able to live dual lives. Participants are often bilingual, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require their presence in both (ibid. 1997:812 in Vetrovec 2001: 574).

In this sense, migrant communities are more often than not transnational communities, in which “intense linkages and exchanges between sending and receiving contexts including marriage alliances, religious activity, media and commodity consumption” are maintained
These connections “affect migrants as never before with regard to practices of constructing, maintaining and negotiating collective identities” (ibid.) As mentioned, migration often creates “[a] transnational identity […] whereby the migrant is tied to both the new and the old place of living” (Hedberg 2004: 33). These transnational identities can be conceptualised in line with, “in-betweenness” of migrant identities, which will be explained in the sub-section below.

Transnational communities can be formed via the activation of all agency components. Whereas iterational dimension of agency directed at preserving cultural and structural ties with the place of origin by means of resorting to transnational activity, the projective element of agency may play a role, specifically via the so called ‘myth of return’. In the latter sense, immigrants are interested in keeping links and ties with the origin both culturally and materially, i.e. by investing in the place of origin, building a family house etc., with the desire of future return. The practical evaluative dimension of agency, on the other hand, dominates in transnational economic activities of migrants, who face obstacles in economic integration into the host society.

Last but not the least few words need to be said about the factor of generation. Many scholars differentiate between migrant-generations regarding transnational attachments and activities, arguing that transnationalism is more prevalent for the first generation (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007). These decline with subsequent generation, as do links to the country of origin and intention of return (ibid: 133). However, even though transnationalism is not central to the lives of the second and later generations of immigrants, these generations can “choose” to be transnationally active at some point in their lives, since necessary skills and networks are available: “the same children who never go back to their ancestral homes are frequently raised in households where people, values, goods, and claims from somewhere else are present on a daily basis (Pries 2004)” (ibid: 134). They are therefore potential dwellers of fluid transnational spaces.

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27 Whereas these transnational communities may be viewed negatively, with the assumption that they may undermine integration in the receiving context, they are also viewed positively as elements of a democratic society (Vetrovec 2001).
2.4.3 Identification, Belonging and Migrant Communities

Castles and Miller (1998) argue that “[m]ost minorities are formed by a combination of other-definition and self-definition” (ibid: 46). This is in line with a critical realist perspective, which recognises the emergent properties of cultural entities. Since ‘identity’ or the process of ‘identification’ belongs to the cultural domain that possesses emergent properties (causal powers) in its own right, it may partake, under favourable conditions, in causative mechanisms related to migrant community building. In this sense ethnic identity, which can be defined “as an identity distinguished from other social identities by a belief in a common origin, descent, history and culture” (Vermeulen & Govers 1997:6) can be linked causally to processes of ethnic community formation at the place of immigration (Castles & Miller 1998; Vasta 2004; Fenton 2003).

Identity in general, may be conceptualised, following Lange and Westin (1981) as an act of conscious “reflection over the self, over his/her position in society and over relations to other human beings “ (ibid. 1981:432 in Hedberg 2004: 31). While it “provides a sense of belonging between people and is the basis for commonalities, [it] can also be formed through the process of differentiation” (Vasta 2004: 5). In this sense identity in general and ethnic identity in particular is not a property of a thing, rather it is an “aspect of a relationship” (Eriksen 2002; Hall 1989; Comaroff 1996). As Hall (2000) argues, “it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term - and thus its ‘identity’ - can be constructed [...]” (ibid: 17). And in this sense “[every] identity has at its ‘margin’, an excess, something more” (ibid: 18). The construction of identity for oneself, therefore, also involves the construction of identity for the ‘Other’. In this sense the process of identity construction takes place within specific power relations between the self and the ‘Other’ (ibid). This process unfolds furthermore within specific historical and structural conditions, in which the ‘Other’ too is not constant but changing. It is important to highlight that the term ‘identity’ does not denote a naturally given, unchanging essence. In Hall’s words:

[…]directly contrary to what appears to be its settled semantic career, […] identity does not signal that stable core of the self, unfolding from the beginning to end through all vicissitudes of history without change; the bit of
the self which remains always-already ‘the same’, identical to itself across time. Nor -if we translate this essentializing conception to the stage of cultural identity- is it that ‘collective or true self hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed “selves” which a people with as shared history and ancestry hold in common’ (Hall 1990) and which can stabilize, fix or guarantee an unchanging ‘oneness’ or cultural belongingness underlying all the other superficial differences (Hall 2000:17).

Hall stresses so the unstable, changing and fragmented nature of identity: “Identities are […] points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us” (Hall 2000: 19). It can thus be argued that “[w]e have now to reconceptualise identity as a process of identification, […]. It is something that happens over time, that is never absolutely stable, that is subject to the play of history and play of difference” (Hall 1989: 15). The notion of “identification”, therefore, may help so as to overcome the “reifying connotations” the former. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue in this sense:

As a processual, active term, derived from a verb, ‘identification’ lacks the reifying connotations of ‘identity’. It invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying. And it does not presuppose that such identifying (even by powerful agents, such as the state28) will necessarily result in the internal sameness, the distinctiveness, the bounded groupness that political entrepreneurs may seek to achieve. Identification – of oneself and of others – is intrinsic to social life; ‘identity’ in the strong sense is not (ibid: 14).

Moreover the term identification may be better suited to emphasise the situational and contextual character of the process:

In modern settings, which multiply interactions with others not personally known, such occasions for identification are particularly abundant. They include innumerable situations of everyday life as well as more formal and official contexts. How one identifies oneself – and how one is identified by others – may vary greatly form context to context; self- and other-identification are fundamentally situational and contextual (ibid).

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28 According to the authors, the state is a powerful identifier “because it has the material and symbolic resources to impose the categories” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:16). Yet, regardless of its power it “does not monopolize the production and diffusion of identifications and categories; and those that it does not produce may be contested” (ibid). This according to the authors is best demonstrated when the new social movements are regarded.
Ethnic communities, Anderson (1991) argues, are imagined communities in the sense that the members imagine a union with co-members without actually knowing them. This imagination produces ethnic identities, or identification with particular ethnic groups or ethnically defined nations. At the same time “invention” of histories, myths and symbols are central to this imagination (Hobsbawm 1992) and, as such, these may play a part in culturally imbued/ethnic migration processes. “[A]pects of identification [can be] seen as an underlying reason for the migration decision” (Hedberg 2004:32). Ethnic affinity may in this sense be a migration “naturalising” factor (see Morawska 2007). Yet, it is argued that even “ethnic return migrants” (see Brubaker 1998; Münz & Ohlinger 1998; Thränhardt 2001) have experienced a sense of betrayal by the imagined ethnic affinity, when these arrived at the destination “and instead felt a sense of belonging to the country of out-migration [...]” (Hedberg 2004: 33). The case of this study too, can be regarded as such an example, since, as will be argued, the officially constructed ethnic affinity between Turkish nationals and Turkish Cypriots and the, on the one hand by oppositional political agents (Erhürman 2006) and on the other hand within daily encounters, socially constructed ethnic difference between the two have come into conflict (Navaro-Yashin 2006). This is an unambiguous indication of the non-essential character of ethnic identity, which in turn explains the formation of separate ethnic communities by immigrants in the receiving context.

Turning attention to migrant communities, it can be argued that these involve such identification processes, through which emerges “some degree of collective consciousness (or feeling of being a community) based on a belief in shared language, traditions, religion, history and experiences” (Castles and Miller, 1998:30). In other words it is the ethnic community rather than the receiving society as a whole, which functions as “a source of social identity, shared meanings and mutual cooperation” (Vasta 2004: 2). Identification with the immigrant ethnic community may provide people with a sense of being and belonging, which counteracts some of the alienating effects of the act of migration, and the sense of loss of home. Yet, migrant identities are, according to Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2007) even more complicated and ‘special’, and cannot be explained just with the notions used for explaining non-migrant identities; then, migration implies, mobility, instability and a constant search for belonging and recognition (ibid: 97-98). Therefore, according to the authors,
migrant identities may be conceptualised differently:

One possible solution to the problem of approaching migrant identities might [...] consist of rethinking the concept of identity in general. Here, we propose, taking up Anne-Marie Fortier’s approach, to treat ‘identity as threshold … a location that by definition frames the passage from one space to another’ and to look at migrant identities ‘as transition, always producing itself through the combined process of being and becoming’ (2000: 2) within ‘identity spaces in between’ (Krzyzanowski, 2007) or as ‘passages’ (Probyn, 1996) (ibid: 98).

Moreover, they underline, the interaction between “objective (legal, socio-political) thresholds and attributed membership categories, and subjective experiences and self-assessments […]” often produce conflicting and contradicting identities for migrants, and so “determine a self-fulfilling prophecy of staying ‘in between’ (ibid: 98). These “identity spaces in between” (ibid.) had been identified in the previous subsection as pertaining to migrant transnationalism.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH, CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODS

It must be recognised that research findings produced through the employment of particular research methods, are to a great extent affected by the latter. The methods in turn are dependent on initial epistemological and methodological standpoints. Then, along with theories, methodologies prescribe the researcher what to look for. Yet this aspect can sometimes be overlooked, especially when researchers are concerned about combining research methods so as to achieve greater in-depth knowledge, as well as greater “objectivity”, validity and generalizability of their research findings. Doing so, their efforts may be at the danger of leading to what can be termed an “opportunistic eclecticism”, where “the problem of consistency between ontology and epistemology [of methodological approaches] and combining qualitative and quantitative methods remains largely unresolved” (Iosifides, 2011: 35). In order to resolve these fallacies and to achieve awareness, self-critique and reflexivity, which is defined according to Calás and Smircich (1992) as an assessment of “the relationship between ‘knowledge’ and the ways of ‘doing knowledge’” (ibid: 240), considerations relating to methodology and methods need to be made explicit, discussed and optimised. Therefore, the general epistemological and methodological orientation as well as the specific research methods employed in this thesis will be critically evaluated in the following.

3.1 Methodological Considerations

The following subsections will present a brief critical overview of positivism on the one hand, interpretivism and social constructivism on the other hand, which are generally assumed to be two main methodological frameworks in social research. I will then argue for a critical realist methodology in order to move beyond the dualism of the former.
3.1.1 Positivism, Interpretivism and Social Constructionism

*Positivism* is, according to Neuman (1994), “the approach of the natural sciences” (ibid: 57-58) and it is adopted by social researchers, with the assumption that “there is only one logic of science, to which any intellectual activity aspiring to the title of ‘science’ must conform” (Keat & Urry 1975: 25 in ibid.). Regarding the discipline of sociology, positivist methodology was introduced by August Comte and elaborated especially by Emile Durkheim in his canonical work “The Rules of the Sociological Method”. There are many versions of positivism like naturalism, behaviourism and logical empiricism (ibid: 58; Hammersley & Atkinson: 5). Generally speaking, positivist social science can be associated with the idea of the existence of „social facts“, which need to be gathered and systematised by the researcher (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009:17). Metaphorically speaking, “[t]he researcher, as it were, collects the crops of the earth which are already there, and then prepares them into a tasty dish” (ibid). The hallmark of positivism is then the supposition that data are observable, or even measurable (ibid). These are, then, like in empiricism, “sense data” or “publicly observable” data, on which all observers agree (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 6). The underlying assumption here is that “the social reality is patterned and has order”; and that rational human beings are likely (probabilistically speaking) to act in certain ways when they are under the influence of certain social forces (Neuman 1994: 59). Moreover, positivism argues for a “value-free” sociology, in which the researcher must be “objective”:

Science is a special, distinctive part of society that should be free of values. It operates independently of the social and cultural forces affecting other human activity. It involves the rigorous application of rationality and systematic observation in a manner that transcends personal prejudices, biases, and values. A researcher must accept and internalize the[se] norms in order to be accepted as a legitimate member of the scientific community (Neuman 1994: 61).

Positivism, especially logical empiricism has a “successionist/regularity view of causation”, which means that social causation is a “constant conjunction of discrete events” (Iosifides 2011: 92). Here, empirically observed regularities are taken to be causally related, so that if B always follows A, it is regarded as latter’s cause (ibid.). Looking for empirically observable ‘patterns’, positivist researchers usually prefer quantitative rather than qualitative techniques.
to collect sense data. In this respect, survey research, with a relatively large sample is often favoured (Neuman 1994: 225). Special attention is paid to “eliminate the effects of the observer” through the standardisation of procedures so that “replication by others” to test the reliability of the findings is possible (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007: 6; Neuman 1994: 60). The findings are then analysed using statistical methods.

The interpretative social science in sociology, on the other hand, can be traced to the ideas of Max Weber (Neuman 1994: 61), whose major methodological argument is that sociology must be directed towards “interpretative understanding” (Verstehen) of society and social action. In this line of thought interpretative researchers endeavour an analysis of ‘meaning’ and its ‘social construction’. Moreover, interpretivism -especially symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and hermeneutics- holds that “the social world cannot be understood in terms of simple causal relationships or by the subsumption of social events under universal laws. This is because human actions are based upon, or infused by, social or cultural meanings: that is, by intentions, motives, beliefs, rules, discourses, and values” (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007: 7). As interpretation is central to human action, one cannot, unlike positivists, expect to discover laws of behaviour.

Whereas positivists assume that there is a shared meaning system, interpretative researchers hold that there is no ‘one universal way’ to experience social reality (Neuman 1994: 63). This is because social life is not “independent of human consciousness” it is rather “what people perceive it to be” (ibid: 62). Moreover, “an interpretative orientation assumes that multiple interpretations of human experience, or realities, are possible” (ibid: 63). In contrast to the positivist prescription of value-free research, interpretivism is not concerned about being value-free; then, given that everything is imbued with meaning and values, this is, for interpretivists, not possible (ibid: 66). Therefore “[t]he interpretive researcher urges making all values explicit and does not assume that any values are superior to others” (ibid.). Accordingly, interpretive researchers opt for qualitative methods so as to provide an in-depth understanding of a social setting; and meanings, values and ideas people have about it.

One particular type of interpretivism is social constructivism, which holds that the so-called
―facts‖ are not naturally given, but socially constructed (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 23). For constructionists, research focus should be on how ‘social construction’ takes place; and care should be given so as not to fall prey to essentialism and reification, which they argue is performed especially by positivists (ibid.). In practice social constructionism is quite varied (ibid: 23-35), however main premises of this approach can be found in Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s (1966) ―The social Construction of Reality‖. According to them,

common-sense ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘ideas’ must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge. It is precisely this ‘knowledge’ that constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could exist. The sociology of knowledge, therefore, must concern itself with the social construction of reality (ibid: 27 cited in Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 25).

As critics of positivism rightly argue, „all facts are theory-laden“, so that theory is causally related to what is observed or measured as well as how it is observed and measured (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 17). Other critics, in particular historical relativists, have argued that all knowledge is conditioned by social and historical contexts (ibid.). Moreover in ignoring everything other than sense data, positivism commits the so-called epistemic fallacy of confusing ontology with epistemology, in which “what exists is defined as what can be known, and what can be known is defined as how the mind knows via sense experience” (Cruickshank 2003a:10 in Iosifides 2011: 92; emphasis in original). Related to that, it also commits the “fallacy of actualism” where social reality is “reduced to the levels of the empirical and he actual” i.e. to the levels of observable phenomena and events (Iosifides 2011: 92). Critics have thus argued for the need of “transcendence”, in other words, the need for scientific research to reveal more fundamental layers, “underlying patterns or deep structures” behind what is immediately empirically observable (ibid: 18; Iosifides 2011). According to the critics, especially post-positivists, structuralists, dialecticians and critical realists:

The positivists’ reduction to that which is observable (or even stronger, measurable) in reality is […] not very justified. If there are hidden patterns, underlying rule formations, which govern the observed parts of reality, and whose exploration can contribute to explaining these observed parts, then this seems to be a legitimate area for research (Alvesson ad Sköldberg 2009: 19).
Interpretivists in general and social constructionists in particular have had their share of important critiques. One of the most important criticisms is directed towards their conception that “since social reality is a social construction, the only thing worth investigating is how this construction is carried out” (ibid: 37; emphasis added). In so doing, interpretivists tend to, as Bourdieu suggested, “[…] stop where the real fun begins, instead of posing questions such as: ‘Why do people construct society in the way they do?’ and ‘How do these constructions function, as patterns of social reality, once they have been constructed?’” (ibid: 37).

Furthermore, many versions of the interpretive approach are marked by an individualist ontology, whose “basic feature lies in ascribing explanatory primacy to individuals and their actions in relation to social phenomena and forms” (Iosifides 2011: 77). Structure is reduced thereby to “patterns of aggregate behaviour that are stable over time” (Porpora, 1998: 340). It is therefore, critics argue, a “reductionist project” confining social reality to individual’s actions and behaviours (Iosifides 2011: 78). This results in “voluntarism, meaning and interpretative reductionism, a depthless ontology and explanatory limitations as regards structural contexts and factors” (ibid: 79). The interpretative approach thus has “anti-theoretical tendencies” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 37). Another discernible weakness is its ‘antirealism’ and ‘nominalism’, “according to which reality is amorphous, without qualities, and is only provided with arbitrary patterns by the researcher” (ibid.). Moreover, this line of thinking entails “the undermining of rational judgement of different truth claims” and so committing “the genetic fallacy” (Iosifides 2011: 55), which can be explained as below:

The genetic fallacy occurs with truth-relativism, because as truth-relativism reduces truth into a framework, the origin of a belief (in such a framework), rather than its relationship to an external referent, is held to determine its truth. A logical fallacy therefore occurs because it is impossible for the origin of a belief to determine its truth or falsity (Cruickshank 2003a: 18 in Iosifides: 2011: 56).

This logical fallacy, according to Iosifides, prevents interpretivist approaches to achieve anything more than mere description, and prevents any type of causal analysis as well as “limiting the critical potential of social sciences” (ibid: 56). Furthermore as critics point out,
most interpretivist approaches run the danger of being “self-destructive” (Alvesson & Sköldberg: 37-38), then if the reality is socially constructed, so are the arguments of the researchers who say so. As Cruickshank (2011) argues:

> The problem with social constructionism’s negative approach is that a consistent application of it would entail silence. To be sure, social constructionists fight shy of ‘privileging’ their view as the truth when it comes to the application of knowledge – thus they do not put forward policy solutions or argue for socialism. Nonetheless, any attempt to develop knowledge in the first place is pointless if one assumes that all knowledge is a symptom of an underlying discourse or metaphysic. Even if one does not seek to ‘privilege’ one’s knowledge by saying it is true and other views are false, the very act of undertaking research to develop knowledge will, ex hypothesi, entail the reproduction of some underlying nefarious discourse or metaphysic, unless, that is, one can step outside such discursive and metaphysical systems. Indeed, the very recognition that discursive or metaphysical systems are actually nefarious requires one to step outside their purview and see them from the ‘outside’ (ibid: 14, emphasis in original).

A similar type of self-destructive tendency can be found in social constructionists’ criticism of essentialism, then by trying to “intuit hidden constructions” constructionists themselves “adhere to such an essence, one that is marred by real existence and is not just constructed but is ‘out there’” and this is the “construction” itself, which is argued to be in the core of what happens (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 38). Last but not in the least, one can object to constructionists and interpretive social scientists, with the argument that social phenomena, even if they are socially constructed can be real and objectively existing, or at least they have consequences for real social life. In this sense, Searle (1998) has argued that one can speak of “an objective reality that is what it is only because we think it is what it is” (ibid: 113 cited in Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 39).

### 3.1.2 Beyond Positivism and Interpretivism – A Critical Realist Approach

As was already mentioned this study will be organised according to some of the main principles of critical realism. Here, critical realism is appreciated, as Sayer (2000) puts it, an alternative to “law-finding science of society modelled on natural science methodology and the anti-naturalist or interpretivist reductions of social science to the interpretation of
meaning” (ibid: 2-3). This orientation is further understood, put in the most basic sense, as a theoretical and a methodological framework, which attempts to arrive, as close as is possible to, *always fallible*, social reality, which is assumed to be existent irrespective of consciousness or knowledge of it on the one hand; and on the other hand, is multi-layered and more complex than the immediately discernible empirical phenomena (see Sayer 2000; Danermark et al. 2002; Elder-Vass 2008a; Iosifides 2011). Critical realism acknowledges that “knowledge of real objects is always conceptually mediated but nevertheless this does not prevent the acquisition of, more or less, valid, although fallible, knowledge about the intransitive realm”29 (Bhaskar 1998b in Iosifides 2011: 49)30. With this claim, critical realism declares that it offers “a third way” between empiricism and positivism on the one had and relativism and interpretivism (and various versions of these) discussed above on the other, though at the same time it is “wary of naïve supporters of realism who assume that it will indeed guarantee the production of true knowledge, when the independence of the world from our knowledge and entrapment of knowledge within discourse imply the impossibility if any such guarantees” (Sayer 2000: 2).

Critical realism has much in common with critical theory. The latter, in the widest sense, attempts to uncover what lies behind everyday common sense, through criticizing dominant societal norms and values instead of merely understanding them.

In general, CSS [Critical Social Science including Critical Realism] defines social science as a *critical process of inquiry that goes beyond surface illusions to uncover the real structures in the material world in order to help*

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29 The distinction between transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge is fundamental to Bhaskar’s philosophy of critical realism (Sayer 2000:). Whereas “[t]he theories and discourse as media and resources of science are part of its transitive dimension [...]” the “objects of study (or other kinds of propositional knowledge) in the sense of things we study - physical processes and social phenomena – form the intransitive dimension of science” (Sayer 2000: 10). This intransitive realm, according to critical realists, consists of social processes and phenomena, which are existent without the social researchers’ knowledge of them, and is so central to the approach (Iosifides 2011: 48-51).

30 According to Sayer (2000) it is important to highlight an important distinction between literary realism and critical realism, in this respect: especially the fact that the latter acknowledges rather than ignores unlike the former the “conceptually-mediated or theory –laden character of experience” (Sayer 2000: 11).
people change conditions and build a better world for themselves (Neuman 1994: 67 emphasis in original).

Therefore the critical realist approach does not depart from a positivist position, seeking for universal laws or truths, but criticises it, like the interpretivists, because it does not take people’s meanings, social contexts and history into consideration (see Sayer 2000). Moreover, a critical-realist perspective is critical of positivism, for its emphasis on an “unchanging” order, for being an “antihumanist” and status-quo-preserving type of science (ibid: 66). The critical approach instead,

[…] sees social reality as constantly evolving over time, misleading on its surface, and generated by unobservable and enduring structures. CSS [Critical Social Science] assumes that change is always happening and is rooted in the tensions, conflicts, or contradictions within the historically evolving organization of social relations or institutions. CSS focuses on change and conflict, especially paradoxes or conflicts that are inherent in the very organization of social relations. Such paradoxes or inner conflicts reveal much about the true nature of social reality (ibid: 67).

Critical realism is also critical of interpretivist approaches, which, in some extreme forms, deny the existence of a social reality outside of discourse (ibid.; Iosifides 2011; Cruickshank 2011). In this sense critical theory holds that social research should not be directed at empirical observation of the surface phenomena, nor should it be directed at understanding and explaining social phenomena. Disapproving the relativism inherent in interpretivism, critical theory expresses not only that research is value laden, but also, in direct contrast to interpretivists’ subjective and relativist understanding, that these values can be good or bad. This latter point is also related to critical theory’s emphasis on the desire to cause social change (Neuman 1994; Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009).31

Critical realism as a version of critical theory, is ‘critical’ with the aim of practicing “social criticism” and showing the “fallibility of social knowledge […] mainly by engaging in ‘explanatory critiques’ […] proving certain ideas or beliefs to be false […] proving certain

31 This is also in line with Marx’s argument: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1845: in http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm018).
social relations to be exploitative and asymmetric, and, in many instances, proving the necessity of holding false ideas for the reproduction of exploitative or oppressive social relations” (Iosifides 2011: 45-46). Its realism, on the other hand, relates to the assumption of the existence of an ‘objective reality’ independent of the mind (ibid: 45).

Critical realism originates from and is especially influential in Britain and has roots in the philosophical ideas developed by Roy Bhaskar and the sociological theory of morphogenesis of Margaret Archer (esp. 1995; 1996; 2000; 2003). Like critical theory, it has been greatly influenced by Marxism, especially agreeing on the value-laden character of theory and research, and arguing that these should be oriented towards changing the word (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 39). Likewise one of the main arguments of critical realism is that “analysis of underlying mechanisms and structures behind phenomena is what it takes to create theories that are not just concentrates of data” (ibid.). Thus, critical realists offer this system of thinking and research as an alternative to positivism and interpretivism, including social constructionism, in its extreme forms. In this sense Iosifides (2011) leaning on Hartwig 2007, argues that “critical realism is a philosophical movement aiming to guide substantive social science theorising and research practice and to offer a viable alternative to both positivism-empiricism and to various versions of idealism/neo-idealism, relativism and linguistic and/or discursive reductionism, such as certain forms if social constructionism, post-structuralism and interpretivism, in social theory and research” (ibid: 45).

One of the basic assumptions of critical realism, and a “defining feature” is the “mind independence of the world” (Sayer 2000: 2) that is, “[s]ocial reality entities may exist independently of our knowledge and identification of them” (Iosifides 2011: 47). Thus social reality does not consist of empirical reality only. Indeed “in everyday social interaction it is very usual to become aware of the discrepancies, or even contradictions, existing between

32 It must be noted that the critical realist approach adopted in this thesis does not conform to all ideas of Bhaskar’s philosophy. Then as Elder-Vass (2008a) argues, the tradition of critical realism following Bhaskar’s philosophy is not uniform but can be crudely divided into three categories – those following Bhaskar’s early work termed scientific realism, his later work of dialectical critical realism and his recent work of more spiritual kind (ibid: 456). The arguments developed in this thesis can be regarded as representing the first category, which, according to Elder-Vass is in the majority. Moreover, this thesis is interested in the sociological applications of this philosophy, so that the Bhaskar’s philosophy itself does not need to be further discussed.
surface appearances and depth realities related to relationships, processes and phenomena” (Iosifides 2011: 53). Yet, at this point it must be noted, as does Iosifides that “[t]his is not to suggest that appearances are less real than depth realities, since, for critical realism, the former are also a part of reality” (ibid: 53). In this regard, critical realism argues that the social world is multi-layered and makes an analytic distinction between the **three domains of reality**, the **empirical** (observable experiences of phenomena), the **actual** (events and occurrences which may or may not be observed) and the **real** (mechanisms that are causative of events and other surface phenomena which pre-exist the scientist) (Elder-Vass 2008a: 458; Iosifides 2011: 53-54). According to Elder-Vass (2008a) the empirical, the actual and the real are interrelated in that the empirical constitutes a subset of the actual, and the actual in turn constitutes a subset of the real (ibid: 458).

The mechanisms, which belong to the dimension of the real have **emergent properties**, that is they are able to exert causal powers and when a variety of mechanisms interact, these cause events (ibid.). Given critical realism’s claim to **explain** rather than merely describe and interpret phenomena, critical realists especially seek to uncover the last of these domains –the real- (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 40), as well as to discover the linkages of these three domains of social reality. Then as Iosifides puts it social explanation is not possible “without effectively linking the three domains of reality with each other” (Iosifides, 2011: 54). As Danermark et al. (2002) argue, instead of concentrating solely on the empirical domain, as does positivism, critical realism endeavours “to investigate and identify relationships and non-relationships, respectively, between what we experience, what actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world” (Danermark et al. 2002:21).

The three domains of reality is one of the two dimensions of the **depth ontology** that critical realism postulates (Elder-Vass 2008a, Priestley 2011). The second dimension to this depth ontology is the conceptualisation of reality as multi-layered, or in other words “stratified into an ontological hierarchy of entities, in which higher level entities have emergent properties—properties not possessed by the lower level entities that are their parts” (Eldervass 2008a: 462)33. This idea can be better understood in the example put forward by Priestley (2011):

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33 According to Elder-Vass (2004) stratification refers to “the division of the world into emergent
[...] for example, a school is stratified, comprising individuals, social groupings (such as departments) and the school as a whole. In turn, the school may be seen as a sub-stratum of the wider educational system, and in turn the whole of society. [...] Each successive stratum possesses properties not possessed by the individual entities that come together to form the emergent whole. Thus, for example, a social group such as a school department will possess certain emergent properties (for example certain forms of power/social influence) not possessed by the individuals within the group, by dint of the relationships that bind it together (ibid: 10-11).

Arguing that reality is complex and emergent, the “depth ontology” of critical realism differentiates between “materially real, ideally real, artefactually real and socially real entities” (Iosifides 2011: 54). Moreover, leaning on Lincoln and Guba (2000), it can be argued that the realism referred to here is “historical realism,” which can be defined as a “virtual reality shaped by social, political […] and gender values; crystallized over time” (ibid: 165: cited in Cupchik 2001: 2).

It must be stressed that a critical realist approach does not deny the significance of meaning, on the contrary, it appreciates the “double hermeneutics” of social sciences, that is, that social science must interpret other’s interpretations since these are inseparable from the objects under study (Danermark et al. 2002). “The ‘double hermeneutics’ feature of social science inquiry is inevitable because a basic characteristic of social reality differentiates it significantly from the natural one – that is, the concept-dependence of social practices, phenomena and processes” (Iosifides 2011: 57). However, unlike interpretivist, and constructivist approaches, critical realism treats “meaning” cautiously, by placing it “within embedded, relational systems and social structures” (ibid.). As Danermark et al. (2002) put it:

explanatory levels” (ibid: 2).

34 Applying these notions to migrant networks, these can be conceptualized as having emergent properties, which the individual migrants comprising it do not possess. Therefore the migrant network is capable of producing further migration even if individual migrants interacting within it do not intend to promote, or even resist to the immigration of other co-nationals (see Bukewell 2010).
The fact that social phenomena are concept-dependent should under no circumstances be seen as if the social world only exists as mental constructions in people's minds [...] The social structures, that are reproduced or transformed when members of society act in accordance with their concepts of reality, are real. They contain powers and mechanisms which operate independently of the intentions of the actions here and now (Danermark et al. 2002: 34).35

Therefore, a researcher adopting a critical realist approach is interested in understanding the meanings attached to the social world by the actors, but apart from that s/he is also interested in societal structures and cultural contexts, which make possible a particular way of understanding of the social world. Yet, s/he prioritises practical action over discourse and language or, in other words “doings over meanings” so as to be able to causally explain social phenomena, since as Iosifides (2011) puts it:

[…] social practices, characterised by tacit and implicit rules and understandings, are dialectically linked with social meanings and discourses. The latter have always to become embedded in concrete material social practices in order to exert a causal influence and the former always supersedes initial meanings, discourses, expectations and beliefs due to their emergent character; in other words, due to the unintended consequences of coordinated social action […] (ibid: 59-60).36

Moreover, a critical realist approach highlights causal explanation as the central role of social science (Hedberg 2004; Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009). Yet doing so it handles the notion of causality with caution. In contrast to a positivist empirical approach it does not treat causation as “regularities between discrete, observable, empirical events” by for instance interpreting correlations between variables as causality (Iosifides 2011: 62). Rather critical

35 To further elucidate this point, Pharo (2007) can be cited: “Consider for example, the case of racist stigmatization. Of course, the association of migrants and foreigners with wicked and dreadful characteristics is clearly a type of social construction that we find in many societies. But, [...] the reciprocal acts of rejection or aggression, the political instrumentalization of foreigners, the numerous ordinary decisions associated with in-group/out-group perceptions and relations, the secessionist consequences of exclusive forms of self-esteem, are not at all social constructions” (Pharo 2007: 487 in Iosifides 2011: 61).

36 Iosifides (2011) notes further that through this methodology the major weakness of social constructionism can be avoided and it becomes possible to conceptualise a social world which has “real causal properties outside or beyond discursive constructions of it” (ibid: 60).
realist approach seeks causality in the “interaction between underlying causal mechanism”\(^{37}\), which may or may not produce empirical events or regularities of empirical events” (ibid: 63). Furthermore, critical realism does not seek universal, law-like causal relationships between phenomena in a deterministic sense (Sayer 2000). It holds rather that “[c]ausal powers, when exercised, are tendencies, and their empirical actualisation and manifestation depend upon other contingent factors” (Iosifides 2011: 64; Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 42; Sayer 2000). In this sense the critical realist approach is anti-determinist and anti-essentialist\(^{38}\) and it recognises semi-regularities which can be defined as “the occasional, but less than universal, actualisation of a mechanism or tendency over [a] definite region of time-space” (Bhaskar and Lawson 1998: 13 in Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 42). Furthermore, an important claim of critical realism is that it endeavours to avoid both methodological individualism and sociological holism by paying due attention to both structure and agency in the explanation of social phenomena. As Porpora puts it:

> In contrast with methodological individualism, people do not act apart from or outside of cultural and social structural contexts, and in contrast with sociological holism, the causal focus is on individual people enmeshed in a nexus of human relations, not on parts of a social system connected by functional relationships (Porpora 2013: 29).

Lastly, a devotion to reflexivity requires the sparing of a few paragraphs to the criticisms and ‘weaknesses’ of critical realist though, which the author of this thesis too has to acknowledge from the onset. The first and the most important criticism directed towards critical realism is that it holds a “strong claim” of comprehending and explaining “social reality”. Alvesson and Sköldberg argue in this sense that the so-called objective structures and categories, that critical realists claim to exist objectively, may to some degree represent the subjective

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\(^{37}\) A mechanism is defined in critical realism as something, which can be causally related to the happening of something else (Elder-Vass 2008a; 2008b).

\(^{38}\) Sayer (2000) argues in this respect., that in critical realism “[t]here are four barriers to determinism. Firstly, whether causal powers –such as the ability to bear children- exist depends on the contingent presence of certain structures or objects. Secondly, whether these powers are ever exercised is contingent, not pre-determined. Thirdly, if and when they are ever exercised, their consequences will depend on mediation –or naturalisation- by other contingent phenomena. A fourth possibility is that natural and social causal powers themselves (and note merely whether and in what circumstances they are exercised) can be changed” (2000: 95).
ideologies and views of the researcher, rather than being objective categories (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 44). Critical realists would argue, I reckon, that this is rather an unrealistic, interpretivist point of view, and that structures and categories do indeed exert real effects on real lives. Although it can be argued that different researchers may define poverty differently, if one argues that it does only exist in the minds of the researcher s/he will be denying the real sufferings of real people. Moreover, that research can be, and is value-laden, is not, as was argued, contradictory to critical realism. Furthermore, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009), accuse critical realists of making “exaggerated claims”: “In reading critical realism one is struck by the confidence with which its proponents use the concept of objective reality, as a point of departure and reference for the knowledge that is produced” (ibid: 44-45). Yet, although I value this criticism highly, I believe that it must be highlighted that critical realists speak of the “fallibility of knowledge”, meaning the truth-claims made can always, through further research, wholly or in part, be refuted. Cruickshank (2011) argues in this sense, comparing positivism, constructionism and critical realism that, “[o]f the three positions, critical realism is the stronger – or perhaps it is better to say it is the less weak – because it recognizes that knowledge is fallible and thus open to revision and replacement through empirical research” (ibid: 4 emphasis added). He argues moreover that the recognition of this fallibility of knowledge, and therefore the method of criticism, rather than ontological presumptions, should be emphasised, to overcome the weaknesses that critical realism too entails.

Such an approach could put the recognition of fallibilism to work by holding that all theories and methods were akin to tools to solve explanatory problems, and better tools would be found by criticism. As there can be no justification of knowledge by turning to a source of knowledge and as knowledge is fallible, it follows that knowledge will grow through the revision and replacement of fallible knowledge claims driven by criticism. When a theory or empirical explanation offers a solution to a preceding explanatory problem we should seek to find problems with that putative solution until a new theoretical or empirical tool is required. Thus it is problems that are the drivers of knowledge rather than ontological definitions. Instead of looking back to a source of knowledge to justify or de-justify knowledge we should look forward (in every sense) to problems (ibid: 18).

This last point, I believe, cannot be emphasised enough. Through the placing of criticism at a
central position, critical realism, unlike constructivism, allows the prioritization of own research findings, though recognising that this is so until through justified and powerful critique, it is modified/replaced. Criticism, in form of self-criticism and reflexivity, must be viewed as a powerful tool throughout the research process itself; and can be utilised to adjust and modify own concepts and ideas when need be.

3.2 Conceptualisation of the Study

In the following the conceptualisation of this case study – the purposes and assumptions, research questions and research plan– will be outlined and described. Though, before proceeding to it, a brief overview of the stand of existing research on the subject of immigrants from Turkey in North Cyprus is given below.

3.2.1 Stand of Existing Research

There exist only few studies, which focus explicitly on the subject of migration and immigrants from Turkey in North Cyprus. Yet it is possible to divide the existing small body of literature, which has some relevance to the subject, into two categories. The first category comprises studies on the subject of “Turkish Cypriot Identity”, which has become a popular research topic since the last decade. Studies on the images of Turkish immigrants in the Turkish Cypriot community can also be put into this category since these discuss the subject in relation to Turkish Cypriots’ identity building processes and therefore, take the Turkish Cypriots’ views as the point of reference. The second category, on the other hand, contains studies that directly focus on immigration and immigrants from Turkey and are fewer in number.

The literature on Turkish Cypriot identity ranges from seeing Turkish Cypriot identity, in a primordialist vein, as directly linked to Turkish history and culture where “Cypriotness” is a mere geographical belonging (Nesim 1990) and where Greek Cypriot identity is its direct opposite/ the “other” (Volkan 1979; 1998); to literature which argues that Turkish Cypriots have increasingly been constructing their identities as mirror images of immigrants from
Turkey since the arrival of this group after the 1974 division of Cyprus (Erhürman 2006, Ramm 2006, Navaro-Yashin 2006; Şahin 2008; Hamit 2008). The studies belonging to the latter cluster, which are explicitly or implicitly constructivist, focus on the changing character of Turkish Cypriots self-identifications and identification of Turkish nationals (Erhürman 2006; Ramm 2006; Vural & Rüstemli 2006; Şahin 2008; Hamit 2008).

Navaro-Yashin’s (2006) article on the images of Turkish migrants in northern Cyprus shows the discrepancy between official and unofficial (everyday) discourses on ethnicity. Focusing on the way Turkish Cypriots perceive difference between themselves and the immigrants, despite nationalist elites’ discourses, she shows that the immigrants are “othered” by using “symbols of lifestyle, class and culture” (Ibid: 92). Navaro-Yashin suggests that the negative images of the immigrants are especially related to the unequal relations at the macro-level, i.e. relations of domination between Turkey and North Cyprus. On the other hand, Hatay (2008) discusses the issue of immigrants’ negative images as “xenophobia” on the part of Turkish Cypriots. He argues that Turkish Cypriots’ representations of the “others” which do not conform with their imagination of the modern, are rather orientalising. Şahin (2008) argues that the images of Turkish nationals are discursively formed and points out to the central role, played therein, by the mass media. Vural and Rüstemli (2006) on the other hand discuss the othering of the Turkish nationals with the concept of ‘identity fluctuations,’ highlighting the flexible and contextual character of the notion of identity. Ramm (2006), Erhürman (2006) and Hamit (2008) similarly discuss Turkish Cypriots’ identity discourses, in relation to the ‘othering’ of Turkish immigrants. What all these different studies and articles have in common is that they analyse the changes in Turkish Cypriot’s identity perceptions in a historical context, especially stressing the changes that took place after the immigrants from Turkey became a demographic factor in the northern part of Cyprus. In so doing they touch upon the identity dimension of the theme of immigration, and do so almost exclusively from the Turkish Cypriots’ side excluding immigrants’ experiences and perspectives.

Scholarly research with an explicit focus on immigrants from Turkey in North Cyprus is rather scant. It was Mete Hatay (2005), who conducted the first study on the immigrants
from Turkey and presented a research report for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). In this study, Hatay concentrates on “political integration” of Turkish immigrants in North Cyprus. Contrary to mainstream assumptions (especially held by the political left in Cyprus), Hatay argues, immigrants from Turkey do not support the dominant right-wing party (National Unity Party (UBP)) but also opposition parties (although mostly right-wing) and especially those parties that were founded by the immigrants themselves (Turkish Unity Party (TBP) and New Birth Party (YDP)). He argues further, that the immigrants’ voting patterns were especially determined by the political parties’ promises concerning alleviation of social and economic problems of the group, instead of by broader political ideology or opinions on the Cyprus Problem, which are important for the native population. Hatay (2007) on the other hand, focuses on demographic issues, among others, the numbers of indigenous Turkish Cypriot population and that of immigrants from Turkey, which is one of the most contested political issues in Cyprus. He endeavours to deconstruct the claims that TRNC citizens of Turkish immigrant origin have become the majority. Hatay and Bryant (2008a) on the other hand present in-depth interviews with immigrants, most of whom were from Turkey, living in the old-city of Nicosia. They focusing on immigrants’ experiences of discrimination regarding their relations with authorities and their social and cultural life; as well as their sense of belonging and identity.

So far, the most extensive study on immigration from Turkey to North Cyprus was carried out by two scholars from Turkey - Hatice Kurtuluş and Semra Purkis. Their project report, other articles and recently published book on the subject provide valuable insights and data (ibid: 2009; 2008; 2009; 2010 and 2014). An important contribution of their work to the analysis of migrations from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus can be are the typologies they construct. The scholars put the immigrations from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus taking place since 1975 in three chronological categories – i.e. “waves of migration”. They describe and analyse the characteristics of each wave of migration especially focusing on the factors leading to their initiation. Moreover, the authors analyse each of these waves especially in regards to the lived experiences of the immigrants involved, focusing on the discrimination and othering the latter.
As important and valuable as these insights are, the present thesis will argue against the scholars’ conceptualization of the first migration wave from Turkey as a case of labour migration. It will be argued that the authors fail to conceptualise migration as a multi-dimensional and multi-factorial social phenomenon; and consequently, unjustly disregard the importance of cultural factors and the central role of the then hegemonic Turkish nationalism in the facilitation of this migration.

3.2.2 Purposes and Assumptions of This Study

This thesis aims at being exploratory, as well as descriptive and explanatory. As was stressed in the introductory chapter, research on migration and immigrants from Turkey to North Cyprus is rather scant, thus many issues are still out there to be explored before being described and explained. Therefore, this thesis aims at exploring issues and matters that have not yet been studied regarding migrations from Turkey to North Cyprus in the first wave. This will also mean that, through this research study, some novel questions, rather than answers, will also be produced, which in turn, will call for further research. As such, this thesis also aspires to be constructive in providing a “sense of direction for future research” (Neuman 1994: 19). The second aim of this study is description, in which it aims at answering the “how” questions (ibid). In this respect contexts and events in the macro-level, meso-level and micro-level will be described and analysed. The goal here, in other words, is the description of processes, mechanisms and relationships so as to lay the necessary information for further analysis.

Alongside the explorative and the descriptive tasks, this thesis takes on a third task of explanation, via focusing on the “why” questions (ibid). This necessitates, most importantly that links between the information and theory are established. This must comprise not only an interpretive analysis of the data collected in the ethnographic field study, but at the same time, a construction of linkages between empirical events (data from the field) and wider societal structures (theoretical knowledge) through abstract thinking (Iosifides 2011; Sayer 1992). This process may lead to immediate theoretical modifications, when possible (adoption of an alternative theory), or at least to bringing weaknesses to light so that these
can be further discussed in future endeavours of theory building.

Despite being the necessary starting points to arrive at theories and concepts, “assumptions” often remain unexpressed and even unthought-of. Neuman (1994) rightly points out in this sense that “one way for a researcher to deepen her understanding of a concept is to identify the assumptions on which it is based” (ibid: 37). Having argued for a critical realist framework for the conceptualisation of the subject of migration in general and of the case study that will follow in particular, I reckon it valuable to make the basic assumptions adopted for the rest of this study:

- It is assumed that there are deeper lying causative mechanisms than immediately observable empirical phenomena as well as individuals’ interpretations and meanings in relation to phenomena. Although the latter are not less valuable, the identification of all of these dimensions is necessary for satisfactory causal analysis.

- It is assumed that “people always act out of structural and cultural circumstances, which their very actions then proceed to modify and sustain” (Porpora 2013: 28). Moreover, “[s]tructural and cultural properties objectively shape the situations that agents confront involuntarily and possess generative powers of constraint and enablement in relation to them” (Archer 2007: 28 in Iosifides 2011: 211). These assumptions necessitate the identification of agential, structural as well as cultural factors related to events and phenomena, so as to be able to identify and explain generative mechanisms related to them.

- The identification of the above mentioned dimensions of agency, culture and structure necessitates intensive research, through which in-depth knowledge about these are collected.

- The knowledge produced through every research is fallible and can be revised or even replaced through criticism. Yet this does not necessitate refrainment from knowledge production then “what is distinctive about fallibilism is that although it recognises that we can never be absolutely certain about the validity of any knowledge claim, unlike scepticism and relativism, it does not deny that we can be justifiably certain about many things, even at
the risk of subsequently discovering that we were wrong (Hammersley 2009: 7-8 in Iosifides 2011: 220).

3.2.3 Research Question and Plan of the Study

As was already mentioned, this thesis endeavours to find answers to the question “how can the multi-dimensionality of migration be conceptualised?” using the empirical example of first migration wave from Trabzon and Mersin to Bahçeli village. This general research question lays focus on two aspects: firstly, on the motivations and other causal factors in the initiation of this migration movement and secondly, on the effects of the persistence of migration, or in other words on the continued presence of immigrants in the receiving society. In regards to the case of Bahçeli village, the first part of analysis aims at the exploration and analysis of causal mechanisms leading to the initiation and occurrence of immigration from Trabzon and Mersin to Bahçeli village. It also focuses on the multiplicity of the factors involved in these mechanisms at various levels of aggregation like structural, cultural and agential factors at micro-, meso- and macro-levels. The second part of the analysis will be directed at generative mechanisms leading to ethnic community formation and preservation by the immigrants in Bahçeli village. This part of analysis is also organised with a multi-dimensional focus, with the incorporation of multiple levels – macro, meso and micro-levels – and multiple factors - structural, cultural and agential. The distinction between the levels of analysis is especially important due to the, according to critical realism, stratified nature of social reality and due to the notion of emergence: it is expected that entities in higher levels of aggregation entail emergent properties not possessed by their parts in lower levels of aggregation. This also implies that the causal powers to be identified in each of the levels of aggregation may indeed be different. Figure 2 below depicts the design for analysis.
Figure 2: Plan of the Study

This plan for analysis is a heuristic tool that helps conduct a thorough, non-reductionist and non-determinist analysis. It must not be derived from this study plan, that the causal influence of each level of aggregation has exact same influence in the causation of this particular case of migration. Similarly it is not expected that structural, cultural, and agential factors have exact same weight in the causation of immigration and in the formation of immigrant communities. The method of retroduction is here of crucial value, since it involves the differentiation between internal and necessary conditions from external and contingent ones. Thus retroductive logic allows arriving at an explanation, which does not comprise a list of all possible factors involved, but makes nuanced claims about each.
3.3 Research Strategy and Methods

As has been stated, in the endeavour to answer the research question presented above, that is, to explain migration from a multi-dimensional perspective, in regards to its causes and consequences at various levels of aggregation, a critical realist approach was adopted. It must be underlined in this regard that the methods, which were utilised for data collection, were not arbitrarily chosen. Rather the choice of methods were made with due care, in order to ensure that these were compatible with the main epistemological and methodological assumptions made explicit above. This process of choosing entailed, on the one hand, the identification of particular research methods and on the other hand their utilization in appropriate (thus sometimes slightly adjusted) ways. These issues will be described briefly in the following.

Given the basic assumption of critical realism about the nature of social reality, more precisely, that social reality is complex, multi-layered and multi-dimensional, scholars who undertake critical realist research, advocate the use of mixed methods (Bakewell 2010). “Mixed methods” or “triangulation” in social sciences enable “look[ing] at something from different angles or viewpoints” by “[…] using different types of measures, or data collection techniques, in order to examine the same variable” (Neumann 1994: 141). This underlies a further assumption that “[a]s the diversity of indicators gets greater, our confidence in measurement grows, because getting identical measurements from highly diverse methods implies greater validity than if a single or similar methods had been used” (ibid). It is argued moreover that triangulation optimally involves the mixing of qualitative and quantitative methods. Yet, availability of time and other resources to do research are not without their limits, so that, the triangulation within this thesis comprises participant observation, oral history interviews and in-depth interviews, alongside analysis of secondary (non-statistical) sources. This seems like a one sided inclination towards qualitative methods, so that weaknesses associated with these, especially regarding their limited representability and generalizability, can also be argued to be present here. Yet these must not be viewed as fatal weaknesses, then as Iosifides (2011) convincingly argues, qualitative methods are most suitable to carry out critical realist research that claims to be able to produce knowledge...
about beyond surface phenomena:

[There is an] unfortunate connection, on the one hand, between quantitative methods with positivism and, on the other hand, between qualitative methods with various versions of interpretivism, constructivism and relativism. Regarding the latter, this connection is so strong that it became almost definitional for qualitative research in general (see Porter 2007: 80). I strongly challenge this connection […] and demonstrate that the inherent strengths of qualitative methods can be fully implemented and appreciated when these methods are designed and applied within a critical realist meta-theoretical framework. Within realist frameworks, qualitative methods can become powerful means to investigate social reality in all its complexity and ontological depth and to enhance the causal-explanatory as well as emancipatory potential of social science research methods and social inquiry in general (Iosifides 2011: 1).

Therefore it must be stated that the choice of qualitative methods were in a sense preconditioned, on the one hand, by the nature of the research question which demanded a thorough and in-depth research; and on the other hand, by the practical and especially political difficulties associated with a larger-scale survey research, if it was to be representative of the whole of the immigrant population arriving within the first wave in the northern part of Cyprus. Moreover, and linked to the latter, the unavailability of any reliable statistical data pertaining to first wave immigrants from Turkey has rendered the option of a secondary research impossible. On the positive side, the time intensive methods used here have enabled an in-depth observation and study of the complex themes and questions as well as the constantly raising new ones. As Iosifides (2003) notes reflecting on the research methods he had employed in his labour migration study in Athens:

[…] I wanted to explore the different meanings of the immigration experience to different immigrant groups and to answer questions about the “why” and “how” of functioning of specific phenomena occurring in the labour and housing markets related to their socio-economic and spatial features and organization. The data I wanted to collect had mainly to do with information about processes, meanings, mechanisms and structures of inclusion and exclusion and the best possible way for achieving this was the application of a set of different, interrelated and complementary qualitative methods (ibid: 437).

The present thesis too is concerned about the “why” and “how” questions in relation to
migration and migrant community formation, which are also related to processes of and structures of discrimination, exclusion as well as to processes of identification involving meanings and feelings. Qualitative methods serve these purposes well, then as Iosifides (2011) states comparing qualitative and quantitative research methods in migration research:

Contrary to variable-oriented quantitative research, qualitative methods are case- and process-oriented, focusing on holistic and depth understanding of actor’s meanings, representations, practices, actions, experiences and relations (Miles and Huberman 1994, Maxwell 2004). The potential role of qualitative inquiry to critically investigating and understanding aspects of social phenomena related to migratory movements and analysing in detail their complexity is great given the uncritical, empiricist inclinations of much quantitative work in the field (ibid: 35).

I must state once again, that I endeavoured, in the design and the carrying out of the research, to apply the main principles of a critical realist methodology. A variety of qualitative methods, mainly participant observation, oral history interviews, informal interviews and critical in-depth interviews were employed so as to gather necessary detail-rich information. Secondary sources, on the other hand, in form of data collected and analyses on related subjects by other researchers have been utilized as another epistemological method so as to achieve access to other kinds of data especially on the macro-level historical context. It also served for comparing and contrasting of the concepts of this thesis and the findings from the fieldwork with others’ conceptualisations and findings.

This thesis is designed as a case study of migration and migrants’ community formation, focusing on the case of Bahçeli village. As such it aims at exploring, describing and explaining, in so far this case is representative of, the first wave of migration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus, as well as the consequences thereof relating to immigrants’ community formations. Neuman (1994) states that a researcher using a case study approach “gathers a large amount of information on one or a few cases, goes into greater depth, and gets more detail in the cases that she examines” (ibid: 321). According to Robson (2002) “case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life contest using multiple sources of evidence” (ibid: 178). Therefore case studies, with their “in-depth, multi-aspect and holistic”
orientation towards research (Iosifides 2011: 202) capture and produce a richer array of data, which are “contextual” and “authentic” (Bhattacherjee 2012: 93). Moreover, case studies are suitable for theory testing as well as theory building, where constructs emerge from data along research process (ibid.) This approach allows at the same time a significant degree of modification regarding research question(s), along the process of research, when data and information point to a need. Last but not the least, case study allows analysis at multiple levels of aggregation (ibid.). These strengths seem very much in line with the objectives, (and strengths) of critical realist approach, so that case study approach is sufficiently justified as a research strategy. Iosifides (2011) argues in this sense that “[w]hen case study research is conducted assuming realist principles it can be a powerful strategy that seriously challenges the positivist, variable –oriented quantitative methods […]” (ibid: 203). According to Iosifides, the identification of complex causal mechanisms within a case study can be argued to have “wider implications” which go beyond the specific case being studied. He argues leaning on Yin 1989 that,

> case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to the theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a “sample”, and the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalises theories (analytical generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation) (Yin 1989: 21 in Iosifides 2011: 203).

In the light of the above-presented arguments it does not seem unjustified to claim that, this case study will have some theoretical implications. Studying immigration from Turkey in the case of Bahçeli village in detail and in the light of the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, will shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical conceptualisation employed and may so reveal important points of consideration for general migration theory.

Yet, I am also aware of the implications of studying only one geographical case of immigration, i.e. the Bahçeli village, for the generalizability of the findings to the immigrant population as a whole. In this regard it must be stressed that this study does not aim at accounting for all immigrations from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus after the division of the island in 1974. Most importantly, as was mentioned, immigrations from Turkey to
North Cyprus can be put into a typology of three phases – i.e. “three waves of migration” (Kurtuluş and Purkis 2000). Temporally, the case of Bahçeli village fits into the initial wave, taking place between 1975-1980. Therefore it is assumed that it has different qualities when compared to the second and the third waves (see Kurtuluş and Purkis 2008; 2009; 2010; 2014). On the other hand, however, the case of Bahçeli village can be considered to be, more or less, typical of the immigration within the first wave. This is so since immigration to Bahçeli comprises *rural settlement, spatially segregated settlement* and *communal settlement* of the immigrants, as was usual within the framework of the first migration wave, though there were some exceptions to these regularities (in the sense that there was some urban settlement and some mixed settlement of immigrants) (see Kurtuluş and Purkis 2009). In this sense, it can be argued that, even if there can be some divergence in details, considering general trends, the case under study can be regarded as fairly representative for the first wave of immigration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus.

The main methods of research employed in this study were participant observation, informal conversations and in-depth interviews and oral history interviews. The fieldwork of this study consisted of gathering oral history data from some of the important politicians, bureaucrats and government officials of the period on the one hand and from the first generation immigrants from Trabzon (Araklı- Ayvadere) and Mersin (Gülnar) who were settled in Bahçeli within the first wave of immigrations from Turkey and from their descendants on the other hand. Expert interviews were carried out in Kyrenia, Nicosia, Famagusta and Ankara. Data collection from the immigrants was to a great extent carried out in Bahçeli, especially during the phase of participant observation. Most, but not all, of informal interviews were also conducted in the village. Yet in-depth interviews were also carried out in other places especially in Kyrenia, since persons who were initially settled in the village but now live elsewhere were also included in the sample. Field research was conducted in two parts: The first part comprised of participant observation and informal interviews and was conducted most intensively between December 2010 to April 2011. Some single visits were made to the village in summer 2012 and in 2013. The second part of the field research comprised critical in-depth interviews, which were conducted between April 2014 to August 2014 with Bahçeli villagers as well as with those who have moved out of the village. The oral history
interviews with the experts on the other hand have been conducted in the third phase of research during September 2014 and December 2014. I will describe these in more detail below.

3.3.1 Participant Observation and Informal Conversations

According to Dewalt and Dewalt (2002) “participant observation is a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture” (ibid: 1). As such it is one of the main ethnographic research strategies. According to the authors, participant observation gives the researcher opportunity to a “holistic understanding” of the phenomena under study (ibid: 92). It allows the “intense engagement and immersion of the researcher(s) within social situations, groups, processes and relations, the active interaction between the researcher and research participants in various ways and the researcher’s participation in ’naturally situated’ social activities and practices, in various degrees” (Iosifides 2011: 185). Most importantly, as Iosifides argues, participant observation is not limited to “investigating ‘culture’ alone” (ibid.). Critical realist research may profit from participant observation research, since these have the potential to produce “rich, detailed and nuanced data about a vast array of phenomena – social meanings and perspectives, social relations, practises, experiences, contextual influences and so on[…]” (ibid.).

I carried out participant observation during relatively early stages of my research where I was not yet decided, or convinced, about the theoretical and methodological framework I was going to employ. I knew however, from relatively early on, that the kind of data I needed to extract was in-depth data, since I was interested in investigating issues which could not be immediately discernible through formal interviews, since these issues had to do with self-, and other-representations, feelings of belonging, interaction among the members of the immigrant community and daily routines of community construction which might have gone unnoticed in formal interviews. Moreover, after I had decided on my research topic and that I was going to conduct a study mostly at a rural site (since this had been obvious regarding the
fact that the first wave of immigrants were predominantly settled in villages), participant observation seemed like an appropriate method of data collection. I wanted to get acquainted with the field in the best possible way, and as intensely as possible. Thus participant observation, or my version of it, seemed to be the most suitable method of inquiry. It was also in line with my aspiration of exploration.

As Iosifides 2011 argues “ethnography-participant observation may be viewed as an ‘umbrella method’ in which various techniques of collecting data and gathering information are employed” (ibid: 185). My version of participant observation, involved daylong visits to the village and participation in daily activities of the villagers, comprising most importantly visits to neighbours and having informal conversations with them. In these daily visits I also participated in numerous less ordinary activities attended by my host family, like weddings and other ceremonies. Members of this family and especially D. had been the primary gatekeepers granting me access to the field, introducing me to various persons, arranging for me meetings with less approachable persons and attending some of these with me. In this manner I visited Bahçeli between December 2010 and April 2011. Within this time period of 5 months, I was in the village 3-4 days each week. In 2012 and 2013 I continued my contacts with the villagers through occasional visits.

In retrospect, I think that the participant observation part of my research can be best defined as explorative. It has helped me understand much about the community relations within the village setting I was interested in discovering, including patriarchal relations within (extended) families, other sorts of power relations among the villagers (i.e. between immigrants from Trabzon and from Mersin, and within each community), and relations with the native population. I could observe both harmony and conflict in daily routines.

Doing participant observation was also associated with various problems, among which, those related to gender relations and gendered organisation of social spaces predominated. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) argue in this respect that gender is often an element, which affects the way men and women have access to fieldwork; that is, being a woman or a man would allow differential access to settings, activities and situations, enabling some as well as
being a restrictive force in others (ibid: 74). I did have a similar experience during the field research in the village. Being a woman I found it rather difficult, especially in the beginning, to approach men and even when I did, I noticed that they would rather not have prolonged conversations with me, and they would prefer other people to be around when they would. On the other hand, I probably had easier access (than a male researcher) to settings and situations where mostly women were present. This was definitely an overall advantage for rural research, since it was more usual to find more all-women spaces and activities in the daily life of the village.

Yet gender, being the main factor that organised social spaces was a factor that restricted my ability to construct a representative research sample that I intended to do. This was for the most part, related to fact that men, especially those of working age, were usually not in the village, but at their work places elsewhere, usually in Kyrenia. Even retirees were more often than not outside the village during day-time, mostly in the larger neighbouring village of Esentepe, where they frequented the coffee-houses. Bahçeli, during this period, did not have a functioning coffee-house itself. The same was true for the second generation, who increasingly moved out of the village. Thus participant observation in the village as a data collection strategy had a significant weakness related to limiting my sample to women who did not work outside the village and largely to first generation.

The data collection method that I have mostly used in the framework of the participant observation was “informal conversations” and “informal interviewing” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 108). In so doing, I introduced myself to the villagers and told them that I wanted to have chats with them about their stories of immigration to the village, their daily lives in the village and so on. I always revealed that my intention was to do a study, a thesis research on migration from Turkey. I as have already mentioned my gatekeepers allowed me increased access to people, since they had good relations with other villagers and were generally trusted. The villagers I talked to for the first time usually expected me to ask them questions because they expected to be interviewed. However, at this stage of my research I wanted to refrain from such a strategy, since I wanted discover my respondents’ own priorities and themes. Thus I wanted to let them take the lead. I limited my questions to their
memories of immigration, i.e. those of leaving their place of origin and settling in Bahçeli village. After such an initial topic people generally were interested in opening further conversation subjects on their own. Yet, in general, I found it rather hard to talk about such themes like ethnic relations with the host population, relations with political parties etc. This was because, during participant observation, I was treated mostly like a guest to whom people were most interested in revealing their cultural stuff like their food, some customs and traditions from their place of origin. They were also mostly careful, refraining from situations and opinions of conflict, since they viewed me as belonging to the dominant ethnic group.

Only later after few encounters I was able to ask some targeted questions. Yet even then there were significant difficulties. These were firstly, related to the method of inquiry itself and to the value it attached to ‘natural settings’. In this respect, I had to put less value on the ‘natural setting’, since it was otherwise rather hard to bring up topics – i.e. those topics which had to do with political matters in general – which were not necessarily the part of daily life. However, at this point, having been convinced of a critical realist methodology and thus the theory-dominant character of research, I was more willing to risk these distortions. Most importantly I was convinced that I could not reach men and the second generation through the strategy of participant observation only. It was at this stage that I decided to opt for more in-depth interviews with a targeted sample, than I initially planned.

3.3.2 Critical In-depth Interviews

The second part of the field research comprised semi-structured in-depth interviews, which were conducted between February to August 2014 with the villagers or ex-villagers either in Bahçeli or elsewhere. In so doing some assumptions and adaptations were made regarding critical realist precepts. From the viewpoint of critical realist research, in-depth interviews do not only provide data on individual interviewees’ subjective meanings, understandings and dispositions. As Iosifides (2011) puts it,

along with the aim of understanding participants’ perspectives from the ‘inside’, realist social researchers view interview data as evidence pointing to ‘extra-interview realities’ (Wengraf 2001: 6). In other word depth interviews can also be viewed as means for gathering critical information about the social world
In this sense critical realism does not only seek to discover surface patterns deduced from subjective interpretations of the informants; then although these are deemed important they are not the sole determinants of social reality. Instead it argues that since the agential perspectives, meanings and actions are embedded in wider extra-subjective social processes, in other words, since these are conditioned by structural and cultural contexts, the data generated here can be used, through the methods of retroduction and theoretical abstraction, to make deeper-lying causative mechanisms discernible (Iosifides 2011: 179). According to Wengraf (2001: 6-15) knowledge acquired from in-depth interviewing can be classified as pertaining to “discourses, objective referents and subjectivity” (ibid: 6-15 in Iosifides 2011: 179). Thus by taking into account the referent as well as the discourses and subjectivity (ibid.), the researcher can aim at gathering information on the extra-subjective domain, which can then be compared and contrasted with data from other sources.

The in-depth interview method that critical realists endorse, holds that assumptions and theories about processes and phenomena under examination need to be in constant dialectical interaction with the interview data (Iosifides 2011: 180). This necessitates the adoption of a ‘theory-driven approach” put forward by Pawson and Tilley (1997). They argue “[…] on the realistic model, the researchers’ theory is the subject matter of the interview, and the subject (stakeholder) is there to confirm, to falsify and, above all, to refine that theory (ibid: 155 in Iosifides 2011: 180). Iosifides (2011) further argues in this regard that what needs to be acknowledged is the “centrality of theoretical abstractions about causal mechanisms” as well as the fact that there is an inherent difference between social agents’ accounts and theoretical explanations of phenomena. Then,

[although agential reasons participate in the causal complexity of the social world, they do not fully explain social action, processes and phenomena. For social reality is characterised by stratification, ontological depth and emergence, and social action occurs within contexts and circumstances that are only partially acknowledged and is strongly influenced by past and present unintended consequences (ibid: 180).]

At the same time, another important advantage of the method of in-depth interviewing is its
flexibility, which enables the modification of the line of inquiry so as to investigate novel issues and explanations which emerge in the process of research (ibid).

Qualitative methods can be adapted more easily to pursue alternative lines of inquiry in the search for reproductive explanations. It is obviously far easier to change the line of inquiry as potential explanations emerge during the course of a series of conversational interviews, as the interviewer is not committed to the measurement of predetermined variables (McEvoy and Richards 2006: 75 in Iosifides 2011: 179-180).

Regarding my own fieldwork for instance, I chose to pay more attention to material processes of boundary maintenance (i.e. the processes of ethic business niche building, transnationalism etc.) so as to account for immigrants’ community formation, rather than focusing most strongly on discursive issues i.e. of self-identification. This has been made possible through the flexibility of qualitative methods I endorsed including in-depth interviewing.

Moreover, qualitative in-depth interviews (semi-structured/open) can be advantageous in asking “tough” questions. In this regard, I can note that, in my fieldwork experienced the issue that when I asked my informants about why they chose to migrate to Cyprus, they could not/did not directly answer. In the course of the interviews I asked my respondents to tell me about their migration experience and I often returned to this question in different ways, asking how their lives were prior to migration, what they expected from coming to live in Cyprus, if they knew Cyprus before, if they knew people who had migrated before, who’s decision it was to emigrate and if they tried to resist that decision etc. In my opinion, these questions —helped in “building up a picture of the migration decision from a variety of angles”, by acquiring not only the subjective explanation of the action but also the so-called “practical-consciousness” of the interviewees on this action (Halfacree and Boyle 1993: 336-338 in Iosifides, 2011: 36). Besides, the critical interview method also enabled me to differentiate between “reasons” and “rationalisations” (Iosifides 2011). For instance, my

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39 It must be noted that this is also in line with abductive logic endorsed by critical realist thinking.
40 In fact I believe that they sometimes found such a question insulting due to their past experience and encounters with native Cypriots who had judged their migration decision. This was particularly apparent when they told me about how their place of origin was in fact better, more beautiful, and so on. I was also told, more than few times, that they reckoned the people who did not migrate and stayed in the place of origin were better off than themselves.
questions relating to ‘self-identification’ of migrants revealed that these saw themselves as ‘Cypriots’ mostly on “practical” rather than “ideational” grounds. And more often than not, the reasons they provided were rationalisations (Chapter 7).

The process of interviewing is not only flexible and dynamic in itself but also in its interaction with theory building. Iosifides (2011) notes on this issue that “theoretical abstraction about possible generative mechanisms emerged during the research process can be explored further by in-depth interviewing either participants that have already been interviewed previously and new ones” (ibid: 180). Accordingly, I sometimes referred to my interviewees more than once to clear some topics and to talk about others, which were omitted before. Sometimes these revealed contradictory results, which for me further indicated the very complex character of social reality.

It must also be noted that though this method of research, compared to participant observation, mitigated the effects of gender to a certain extent, I still had difficulties with the interviews with men in the village. Therefore many of the interviews I conducted with men in the village were in the form of group interviews, and most of the time women (especially wives) were around, occasionally taking part in conversations. Where I could converse with men alone, was their work places.

As was mentioned the interviews were semi structured to open in style. A guiding-questionnaire was worked out which endeavoured to cover the themes outlined in theory. The actual questions were asked in a flexible manner, not abiding by the particular wording in the questionnaire (Appendix A). Main themes covered were the following:

i. Decision of migration, reasons, motivations etc.
ii. Migrants’ experience of migration, i.e. the event of migration, circumstances, feelings and emotions, disappointments etc.
iii. Migrants’ experiences of life and work in early years of settlement
iv. Migrants’ experiences of interaction with indigenous population
v. Migrants’ experiences of discrimination if there was any
vi. Migrants’ transnational activities

vii. Migrants’ identity perceptions for themselves and their community and their perceptions about the native population

Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 33 persons with immigration backgrounds (pioneer migrants and their offspring). Some of the interviews, six to be precise, involved two or more persons. The opportunity to such interviews arose spontaneously. Three of these interviews presented the possibility of insightful discussions focusing on a few themes. One such interview was with two men and a woman TM5 (44), TM6 (37) and TW7 (44), who are regarded as second generation Trabzon immigrants. The discussion especially focused on issues of identification and cultural/social divergence and convergence between the immigrants and the host population. The other one included two women, who are married to two brothers also from Trabzon TW10 (48, 1. Generation, Trabzon), TW11 (42, 2. Generation Trabzon). These interviewees reflected on their migration experiences as well as discussing issues such as discrimination and identification.

The third focus group interview was with three men MM1 (67, 1. Generation, Mersin), MM3 (51, 1. Generation, Mersin), TM4 (34, 2. Generation Trabzon) and a one man joining later TM1 (58, 1. Generation Trabzon), who discussed matters related to immigrants’ incorporation in the Turkish Cypriot society, their discrimination and self-identification. TM1 was later interviewed separately as well. Apart from these interviews, one interview was conducted with three elderly women, who were among the pioneer migrants from Trabzon TW2 (>85), TW3 (>85) and TW5 (65), who were gathered together at the time of the interview. In this TW2 was the leading respondent. A separate interview was conducted with TW5 later and an informal interview was conducted with TW3 during the participant observation phase of field research. A fifth interview, was with the first generation Trabzon immigrants TW1 (62) before her sister in law TW9 (52) who immigrated to Cyprus also from the Ayvadere village in year 1983 as a bride, joined in at a later point in the interview, and provided her opinions and experiences of immigration. This woman lived in a nearby village. Finally, the sixth one was originally designed as an interview with MW3 (48) who is an immigrant from Mersin (migrated in 1997 as a bride) yet as her daughter MW4 (19) joined the interview and shared her own experiences and interpretations. As MW4 was 17 at
the time, her own and her mothers consent was taken to include her views in my study.

Sampling was done regarding age, sex, place of origin and time of arrival. Regarding the place of origin more Trabzon immigrants were included in the sample than Mersin immigrants, 23:9 to be exact, though this ratio is not proportional to actual population ratios in the village, which was estimated, based on information from my respondents, to be 5:1/6:1. 1 person included in the sample was neither from Trabzon nor from Mersin, but was married to a Mersin immigrant. Different age groups were included in the sample with the primary concern to be able to differentiate between generations, that is the first generation, which had experienced the act of migration first hand, and the second generation which was born and/or brought up in Cyprus. Regarding the fact that many migrants arrived in Cyprus at a young age as they had just started a family or were just starting their families, most of the second generation are born in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The former also includes interviewees who had arrived to Cyprus as infants or small children, and are included in the second group since they had been socialised in Cyprus for the most part of their childhood and adolescence. Most of the people belonging to the third generation has not yet, to a great extent reached adulthood, thus these are not included in the sample. Concerning Trabzon immigrants, 13 persons (3 male, 10 female) belong to the first generation and 10 to the second generation (4 male and 6 female). Females are over represented in the first generation because in 4 cases these were later-comers, who joined the immigrant community as brides. Considering the Mersin immigrants on the other hand there were 6 persons from the first generation (3 male and 3 female, one female being a later-coming bride) and 3 from the second generation (1 male, 2 female). The ages of all interviewees range between 19 and >85. The interviewees of the second generation also had some variety regarding their educational backgrounds ranging from primary school education to university education, whereas the first generation, on the contrary, is poorly educated. For of the interviewee profiles see appendix B.

The interviews, except for 4, were, with the permission of the respondents, audio recorded. Of those 4 interviews, two could not be recorded due to technical difficulties and two could not be recorded because my informants MM1 and TW3 with both of whom I had already made two separate group interviews before did not wish to be recorded for a second time. In
these four cases interview notes were taken immediately after the interviews.

The duration of the interviews were highly varied, and depended on the will of my interviewees. Longest interviews were close to 2 hours. Only few interviews, four to be exact, lasted less than thirty minutes, the shortest of which was 12 minutes, in which case my respondent had difficulty hearing and soon complained about being tired.

The recorded interviews were transcribed to text and were analysed by labelling of data into categories deduced from theory on the one hand and into those themes emerging in the interview on the other hand. The migration decision and motivations, migration experiences, various experiences of discrimination, exclusion (political, economic, social and spatial types) as well as self-identification, identification/representation of the receiving population, transnationalism and future expectations including the myth of return were the basic categories arising from the interviews. The analytical tools of critical realism, i.e. abduction and “retroduction” (Danermark et al 1997) were employed in the analysis, so as to be able to arrive at an explanation rather than just “proving or disproving” of existing theory (Meyer & Lunnay 2013). According to Meyer and Lunnay (2013) the main difference of abduction from the most extensively used tool of deduction is that the former is directed at arriving at a possible explanation:

abduction shows how something might be, whereas deduction proves that something must be a certain way (Habermas 1978). For example, when doing theory-driven research, the findings might or might not fit the mould of the theoretical frame. When using deductive inference, the theory is proved or disproved. However, findings that are outside of the initial theoretical premise may remain unanalysed. Fundamentally, abduction is a means of forming associations that enable the researcher to discern relations and connections that are not otherwise evident or obvious. This allows the researcher to formulate new ideas, think of something in a different context, and to 'see something else' (Danermark et al. 1997). The aim is to identify data that are beyond the initial theoretical premise (ibid: para. 2.5).

Retroduction, on the other hand, is a method of differentiation between the internal and necessary relations from external and contingent ones (see Sayer 1992; Meyer & Lunnay 2013). In other words it “is a method of conceptualizing which requires the researcher to
identify the circumstances without which something (the concept) cannot exist” (Meyer & Lunnay 2013). It involves the "formulation of abstractions of various plausible explanatory mechanisms, placing these abstractions within certain theoretical and conceptual schemes and examining the truthfulness of alternative explanations in practice” (Iosifides 2011: 204). The usage of these analysis methods will allow a viable explanation of the first wave of immigration from Trabzon and Mersin to Bahçeli, which represents, as was argued below a typical case within the broader frame of first wave of migration from Turkey to North Cyprus.

3.3.3 Oral History Interviews

The third important part of data collection comprised expert interviews conducted with, on the one hand, some key persons who were involved in policy making and/or implementation in the initial phase of Turkish Cypriot state-building and during the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus; and on the other hand some members of opposition parties. For this purpose oral history technique was used, and few open-ended questions were directed to the interviewees regarding the time period of the first immigration wave from Turkey only when there was need to cover more subjects than what the interviewee offered.

A total of 12 interviews were conducted between September and December 2014. 10 of the 12 interviews were conducted with Turkish Cypriot government officials and politicians of the period. Among these were former ministers, deputy ministers and departmental directors of the Ministry of Resettlement and Rehabilitation; and members of opposition parties. 2 of these persons can be classified as policy makers and were directly involved in the policy making as well as the management of the immigrant settlement. 4 interviewees can be classified as policy implementers, who had various mid- to high-ranking positions in the Ministry of Resettlement and Rehabilitation. Another 4 people were members of opposition parties. One person was an opposition Member of Parliament around this time period, and three others were members of opposition parties but were not in the parliament. Two of these had high-ranking posts in the government later and especially during the Annan Plan period.
The last two interviewees can be regarded as representatives of the State of Turkey, one being a high-ranking bureaucrat at the time period under study and the other was an expert appointed to work in the northern part of Cyprus during the period of the first migration wave. Due to the nature of their positions in the period, both can be regarded as policy makers. So as to grant my informants the ethically due anonymity I will not state other details of their positions and will not expose other details directly related to their identities throughout this thesis.

In 11 of the twelve interviews, the interviewees were asked to narrate their memories and experiences on the first migration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus starting from the 1974 division of the island. Although there was no strict questionnaire the interviewer paid attention to cover at least 6 issues within each interview:

1. the purpose(s) of this migration policy
2. The political and otherwise preparations for the initiation of the immigrant flows (preparations regarding the plan, settlement areas, migrant recruitment etc.)
3. implementation of the migration plan and its management
4. The hardship if any during the bringing and settlement of the immigrants
5. Other details relating to the bringing and settlement of the immigrants
6. Personal memories

One of the interviews covered the Annan Plan period – especially 2002-2004 when the mentioned UN plan for a settlement of the Cyprus problem was negotiated inter-communally, debated, and was finally voted in a referendum in 2004- and focused on the paradigm change it brought to the perceptions of immigrants from Turkey in general political discourse. The following table indicates whether an informant is from Turkey or from northern Cyprus, and whether the person was involved in policy making, policy implementation or in the opposition politics.
3.4 Reflexivity and Terminological Considerations

Researching and writing about a politically charged subject and at the same time, being a member of the “native” ethnic group and hence the “dominant” group are probably the two most important issues to be noted regarding ethical issues. In this sense a brief look at the concept of reflexivity may thus be instrumental. Reflexivity, according to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) is an
important aspect of social research (ibid: 15). Its main idea is the continuous assessment of how knowledge is produced (Calas & Smircich, 1992:240); and continuous self-critique of the researcher during this process. Self-critique is necessitated because of the recognition that the researcher herself is an essential part of the research (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). Thus according to Hammersley and Atkinson, “[t]he concept of reflexivity acknowledges that the orientations of the researchers will be shaped by their social-historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon them” (2007:15). The authors argue moreover that social research has consequences: “At the very least, the publication of research findings can shape the climate in which political and practical decisions are made, and it may even directly stimulate particular sorts of action” (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007:15). Yet, this is not to imply that research should be directed towards certain political goals at all costs, through for example distortion of research findings. 41

Therefore regarding the first issue mentioned above, that is the highly political character of the questions posed by the present research, it must be recognised that there may be political consequences of asking them. Research results can be used for political purposes, which would not necessarily be in line with the ambitions of the researcher. Even though this can be quite intimidating, that the research results may yield some results can also be exciting. This is especially valid in the northern part of Cyprus, where current discourses on these subjects are still surrounded by myths. In this sense the researcher finds herself at ease with the idea that research on these topics can have a demystifying function. Indeed a demystified atmosphere is much needed in both political and social arenas so as to facilitate healthy discussions in these subjects. Last but not least, this research can raise further interest on the issues at hand, so that further research can be carried out which is much needed.

The second issue raised above relates to the fact that the researcher is doing research on a subject, which defines the researcher as a member of the dominant group. In other words, being a non-migrant Turkish Cypriot, places me in a structurally and culturally defined

41 On this point Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) state that research directed towards political or practical goals runs such a risk: “When we are engaged in political or practical action, the truth of what we say is not always our principal concern […].”
dominant position, which may in turn have an effect on the research process and even the research results to some extent. Firstly it might symbolically distance me from the immigrant subjects of research, and motivate them to present me a distorted image of themselves. This, I believe, was to some extent minimised through the ethnographic methods employed in the research. Participant observation allowed me a close and prolonged contact with the immigrant community in Bahçeli, which has also provided a lot of interaction to build mutual trust. At the same time I was also conscious that the above-mentioned background would also affect my own orientations. It has been, for example, difficult for me to understand let alone empathise with some of the everyday discourses of the immigrants on native Cypriots. Moreover, there may be some prejudices and stereotypes that I may have internalized without being aware of. These issues were constantly present in a type of inner-dialogue, which was kept on-going throughout the research, so that a greater awareness of everyday issues and possible biases could be achieved.

Related to the considerations outlined above, are considerations about some of the terminological problems encountered throughout this study. Terms had to be used in order to refer to events and groups of people in this study, then it is well acknowledged that “signifiers” are needed to make sense of phenomena and to explain them. Given this significance of discourse one of the problems within this thesis related to the choosing of terms to use, to refer to and to categorise people and events. Most of the available terms had political connotations and belonged to conflicting discourses. Categorising people as migrants and non-migrants or as Türkiyeli and as “native [Cypriots]” for instance were extremely difficult decisions. Most of the time, during my field research, I tried to omit using any word for categorisation. My strategy was to let the participants take the lead. I would then use the terms they had used to refer to their community. This proved to be a successful strategy and allowed me to be flexible. I could and did contextually alter the words I was using. I used a variety of signifiers like ‘people from Turkey’, ‘people from Karadeniz or Trabzon or Ayvdere and/or Aho or Mersin’, ‘immigrant’, ‘northern immigrant’ (Türkiyeli, Karadenizli, Ayvadereli Aholu, Mersinli, Göçmen, Kuzey göçmeni) to refer to the immigrants; ‘Cypriot’, ‘Turkish Cypriot’, ‘native/indigenous’, ‘southern immigrant’ (Kıbrıslı, Kıbrıslı Türk, Yerli, Güney göçmeni) to refer to non-immigrant Turkish Cypriots. The decision was
spontaneous and contextual, and allowed me to refrain from essentialising. Yet this was also not without difficulties. The excerpt below is from an in-depth interview with two Bahçeli villagers. It illustrates the difficulties referred to above:

**TM6**: “Well I cannot say that I am a native Cypriot, however, I am a Cypriot [originating] from Turkey.
**TM5**: “Cypriot with roots from Turkey”
**TM6**: “Well I’d say you don’t have to go into explaining the roots”.
**TM5**: “You may say ‘I’m a new Cypriot’”.
**TM6**: “I am not a new Cypriot brother, I am a Cypriot. No need to complicate the matters, I am a Cypriot. There is Cypriot versus people from Turkey. That differentiation is over and done with. There is no one here who doesn’t embrace Cyprus anymore. The biggest supporter of Kemalism as well as the most religious person in the world would tell you that. I went to Karpasia and there I found out, that for instance, to a large extent, RTP ([leftist political party] consists there of people from Turkey […]” […]).
**TM5**: “This kind of, contradicts what you just said. We are now Cypriots not ‘people from Turkey’ any more.
**TM6**: “But with roots from Turkey”
**TM5**: “See you just agreed!”
**TM6**: “Well brother, you originate from Turkey [your roots are from Turkey]. You cannot object to that”.

**Researcher**: “We are having difficulty with these terms, aren’t we?”
**TM5**: “Yes that’s right.
**TM6**: “It depends on how you understand what I am saying. Not only what I say but also what you understand is different. Now the issue is this: there are Cypriots who came from Britain, there are people who were British but stayed in Cyprus. […] There are those who came with us and there are immigrants who arrived in 1992. They too are Cypriots like I am. There is no difference. But they came for other reasons I didn’t come because of that”.
**TM5**: “I don’t accept them [as Cypriots]”.
**TM6**: “Well I was born here anyway, but I were talking about you. Why don’t you accept them?.
**TM5**: I don’t accept those Cypriots who arrived in 92. They are not [Cypriots]. They came for political reasons.
**TM6**: “What’s the difference? They will also start talking about these things in 20 years just like we do. Even if you don’t accept them now, you have to accept them then.”

(Interview with: TM5, 44, male, 2. G. Trabzon & TM6, 38; male, 2. G. Trabzon.)

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**TM5**: “Türkiye kökenli Kıbrıslı.”
**TM6**: “Ya o kadar kökenine kadar anlatmaya gerek yok.”
**TM5**: “Yeni Kıbrıslıyım diyeceksin.”
These issues were present both throughout the process of field research as well as during writing. In writing this thesis, I was many times compelled to choose from some sets of words to describe the people and events I was referring to, most of which had intense political connotations. The choosing of these terms therefore could not be done arbitrarily and involved much thinking. My main strategy was to discard terms with greatest political burden, and to use those which appeared to be more ‘natural’. The term “settler” for instance, is an important example. “Settler” is used in much international literature to refer to immigrants from Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus. This term defines the immigrants as agents from Turkey, which is seen as the “coloniser” of the northern third of the island of Cyprus (Bryant & Yakinthou 2012). Immigrants defined as “settlers” within the political discourse of Cyprus problem, are constructed as obstacles to a peaceful solution and their similarities with immigrants throughout the globe are ignored (see Hatay 2005; 2007; Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009; 2014). For these reasons this term was discarded from the beginning. I chose to refer to this group as ‘immigrants’, for the obvious reason that they immigrated to the island from their original homes in Turkey.

A migrant according to the UN-definition refers to people with a different country of origin, who come to live in a host country for more than one year (King 2012). Yet, in this study
with “immigrants” I do not only refer to people who moved to the island from Turkey but also to their children. Thus whereas the first group satisfies the criteria of the UN definition the second group does not. Still it was necessary for analytical purposes to include the second group in the study and define them over the immigration experience of their parents, to point out to the processes of discrimination and exclusion, which exceeded the boundaries of generation. Yet due to similar reasons, the two groups also needed to be told apart in some contexts, so that, I differentiated between first and second-generation immigrants when need be. Although I am aware of the political and ethical problems in using the phrase “second generation” to refer to the children of immigrants who themselves do not necessarily have migration in their biographies (see Thomassen 2010) I did use it for analytical reasons. It must also be noted that the second generation I refer to included some persons who were born in Turkey, whereas others were born in the island. The main criterion for categorisation was the amount of socialisation time spent in the country of origin. Those immigrants who came to the island in young ages such as 13-14 and did not attend school but were married at this age to construct their own families in Cyprus were regarded as first generation immigrants.

Some of the other terminological decisions are presented in the following: I chose throughout this thesis to use the term “immigrants from Turkey” instead of “Turkish immigrants” to signify that there are persons in this group who are ethnically not Turkish, like Alawites, Kurds, Gypsies and others. In this sense it does not reify ethnicity but denotes the country of origin. When there was need to further specify I used immigrants from Trabzon/ Mersin (and/or elsewhere). I also use the word “Türkiyeli” to refer to the immigrant communities, as this too signifies country of origin rather than ethnicity/nationality; and also because it is used in the vernacular (both by the indigenous population and by the immigrants). This was a purely analytical decision, as I am wholly aware that the word “Türkiyeli” is also politically and ethically charged: Using the term “Türkiyeli” has the unfortunate consequence of tying the immigrants too rigidly to their places of origin and denying them of becoming Cypriots even though the people I studied were all citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, among which are many who were born and raised in Cyprus and were legally as well as emotionally attached to the island more than (if at all) they were attached to Turkey. Yet a better term to suit the aims of the analysis which focuses on “immigrant communities” was
not found, then as was revealed, immigrant communities are constructed on the basis of the place of origin, and usually that of parents, rather than on the basis of citizenship (see Kaya 2012; Castles & Miller 1998).

To refer to the other group, I used the phrase “indigenous or native Turkish Cypriots”. This was especially because the term “non-migrant population” could not be used since many Turkish Cypriots (around 40% of the population) were also displaced between the years 1963-1974, so that such a term would not have included these refugees. Yet, at the same time care was taken to discard extremely primordialist terms such as “people with roots from Turkey” (Türkiye kökenli), and “genuine Cypriot” (gerçek Kıbrıslı). As primordialist and essentialist as these terms sound, due to which I refrained from using them, they proved sometimes to be the better accepted terms among the immigrants themselves.

All in all, it must be underlined that terminological categorisations and definitions were extremely complicated. In the fieldwork, it usually required a great deal understanding and tolerance to deal with these terms, especially on the part of the participants, for which I am truly grateful. And in the presentation of the findings the usage of terms involves risks for the author, in that through the use of the selected vocabulary she may be attributing, to the people she describes, such qualities that may not be present in reality. This is surely not intended.
CHAPTER 4

THE CASE

This thesis chose Bahçeli village as its empirical case. Yet so as to focus on this micro case, the broader context of the first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus needs to be examined. This is endeavoured by the present chapter, which will briefly describe, in the following subsections, the broader case of the first migration wave and the case of immigration to Bahçeli village respectively. In so doing a macro-micro link will be sketched out between the two events on the basis of oral history interviews with policy makers, state officials and opposition politicians of the period as well as with pioneer migrants who were resettled in Bahçeli.

4.1 The First Migration Wave from Turkey to North Cyprus

Recent literature suggests that the immigration movements from Turkey to North Cyprus can be best analysed in three different waves occurring at different time intervals and under different causal conditions and contingencies (Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009; 2014). The first wave, which is also the subject of the present thesis, stands out in being planned and facilitated by the states of Turkey and North Cyprus. It took place between the years 1975 and 1979/early 1980 and involved to a great extent immigrant families stemming from economically disadvantaged rural regions in Turkey as well as an urban working-class population who were attracted to the island due to the material benefits offered (interviews with P1, P2, P4, I1, I2, I3, I4).

Given that the first migration wave to northern Cyprus

43 The second and the third waves of immigrations from Turkey to northern Cyprus, can be argued to be caused by different sets of causal mechanisms. Regarding the structural contexts of these later waves, socio-economic factors stand out. For instance Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009; 2014) point out to the adoption of rural restructuring policies and other neo-liberal politics in Turkey, which had led to a significant increase of surplus labour accumulating especially in the agricultural sector. In the receiving context on the other hand, one can identify a significant demand for cheap migrant labour as the most important immigration generating mechanism such as neoliberal privatisations in the 1990s, the bifurcation of the labour market and the creation of a migrant economy and increased capital accumulation in the construction sector especially due to changes in property laws in the late 1990’s
comprised around 40,000 to 50,000 persons according to the oral history interviews conducted (with P1, P2, I3, P4) the Cyprus ranks the second (after Germany which received 689,602 immigrant labourers), among immigrant receiving countries within Europe considering years 1961-1974. Indeed the northern part of Cyprus had accommodated more immigrants than i.e. Australia (4,928), Belgium (15,448), Holland (24,041), Switzerland (6,562), England (2,090); Austria (35,102) and others (11,579); and close to when not even greater than France (50,931) until that date (Yasa & Bozkurt 1974:50).

It is important to highlight that the first migratory wave from Turkey to North Cyprus took place in an immediately post-war context: The inter-ethnic clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were brought to an end with two military interventions by the Turkish military in July and August 1974. These interventions, celebrated as “peace operations” by the Turkish Cypriot state and condemned as acts of “military invasion” by Greek Cypriots, had left the island divided in two parts along the so called Green Line, putting the northern part politically under the control of the then founded Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC). The division of the island was not only geographical but also “ethic” after the two communities became refugees in southern and northern parts according to their ethnic identities. As Greek Cypriots, who had been the majority ethnic group in the island left to the South, some of their houses and other properties in the northern part of the island were

(which had lead to a boom in this sector especially at the eve of the ‘Annan Plan’ referendum in 2003) (see also ibid.). In this sense especially the third wave of labour immigration to northern Cyprus must be explained as a part of a global trend. As Iosifides (2011) puts it “[d]uring the last two decades, migratory movements have been taking place within a specific contextual and structural environment: that of globalisation and, more specifically, that of neoliberal globalisation (Overbeek 2002). […] neoliberal globalisation entails the emergence of structural and systemic properties, the most significant of which is the expansion and deepening of market relations (Overbeek, 2002, Hatziprokopiou, 2006)” (ibid: 40). Additionally, other important contributing mechanisms can be found at the meso-level comprising migrant networks formed due to the previous migratory wave and the creation of institutions and organisations for labour recruitment, as well as at the macro-level, within the migration system that emerged due to past social interaction. In this sense, contrary to the first wave, systems theories, with their strong emphasis on the perpetuation of migration i.e. the migrant network theory; the institutional theory and migration systems theory can be of primary explanatory value for the latter waves. It is also important to note that the immigrants of the second and the third waves generally (with some exceptions) did not receive many of the privileges of the first wave immigrants from the Turkish Cypriot State. Accordingly, as Hatay (2007) argues, immigration from Turkey since the 1980’s cannot be understood as an official policy of the Turkish Cypriot state (ibid: 3).
settled by Turkish Cypriots moving from the south as refugees; and the rest remained unoccupied. Against this background, starting from May 1975, first wave immigrants were either brought to the island within the framework of the workforce agreement “the protocol-immigrants” or immigrated on their own accounts after becoming aware of the benefits offered; and were mostly settled by the authorities in villages evacuated by the Greek Cypriots in the northern part, one exception being the Varosha (Maras) region of Famagusta (Magusa) (interviews with P1, P2, P4, I1, I2).

The newly formed Turkish Cypriot state had resorted to Turkey for financial aid and expertise in the resettlement of the Turkish Cypriot refugees in the northern part of the island as well as for the bringing of immigrants from Turkey. I1 recalls:

Meanwhile we had asked Turkey for help, I mean, during the three month-period between August and December […] 74. Teams from the General Directorate for Land and Resettlement started coming over to Cyprus. They looked into the work that we were doing. The Turkish Embassy was helping us. Anyway, it was those people who came [from Turkey as experts], who had later constituted the Aid Committee [of the Turkish Embassy]. […] They assigned some people to work with us, […]. These people were those who had done field work, who had performed resettlement project applications in the General Directorate of Land and Resettlement [in Turkey]. […] They came as a team and I took them around for about 4-5 days. We found a minibus and I was the driver. We would prepare sandwiches, water and so on, and went out to show them the empty villages. There were professors among them, […] doctors and so on.44

The Governments of Turkey and TFSC cooperated in planning and executing the recruitment of the immigrants from Turkey to repopulate the villages that were not “preferred by Turkish Cypriots for settlement” (interview with I1). An Agricultural Workforce Agreement (Tarım

İşgücü Protokolü) was signed in February 1975 so as to officially initiate the bringing of the immigrants (Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009; 2014; interviews with P1, P4). P4, a Turkish official (settlement expert) involved in the planning, bringing and settlement of immigrants from Turkey to North Cyprus, narrated this as follows:

Turkey constructed a team, which consisted of experts. This team went to Cyprus and saw the prospective sites for resettlement and their conditions. There, it had long meetings with [Turkish] Cypriot authorities. I was in that team too and in the end, the first tentative plan was created. I mean that project was jointly prepared by the [Turkish] Cypriot authorities and experts from [Turkey], and the basic criteria were determined. Thereafter, a group of [Turkish] Cypriot authorities, that is, a delegation [from Cyprus] came over and had meetings with the political cadres in Turkey. This was the political dimension and if my memory doesn’t fail me, a protocol was made with the name “Agricultural Workforce Agreement”; “Agreement about the Agricultural Workforce which will be Sent to Cyprus”. The first draft of a program was prepared, and it was decided to send a 30 thousand-person agricultural workforce from Turkey to Cyprus. The execution of the program started in the first couple of months in 1975. First groups of immigrants were being sent to Cyprus in ferries from the Mersin harbour, accompanied by executives assigned to this task. Once again, as far as I can remember, the first group of immigrants were lodged in the Eastern Mediterranean University […] and the first resettlement was done in the village of Bahçeköy [Bahçeli].45

Although an official document relating to this agreement remained hidden for many years, Cenk Mutluyakalı, a renowned Turkish Cypriot journalist, managed to obtain and publish the official ‘Regulations and Guidelines’ (yönetmelik) of the protocol titled “The Guidelines for the Filling of the Labour Shortage in the Turkish Part of Cyprus with the Labourforce

Coming from Turkey on Demand of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus\textsuperscript{46} in year 2011 (Mutluyakalı 2011). According to this document, the regulations for the immigration of the workforce from Turkey dates to 2.5.1975 and so roughly coincides with the arrival of the first immigrant groups.\textsuperscript{47} This suggests that these regulations may have been finalized ex-post or at least almost simultaneously as the actual bringing of first groups of immigrants to the island pointing out to the immense speed with which the programme was planned and implemented.\textsuperscript{48}

These regulations and guidelines for the choosing, bringing and settlement of the first wave immigrants was prepared conjointly by a team of housing and settlement experts commissioned for this purpose by the Embassy of Turkey in North Cyprus within the framework of the newly constructed Aid Committee of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia (\textit{TC Yardim Heyeti})\textsuperscript{49}, the key actor in the economic restructuring in the northern part of Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{46} “Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devletinin İstemi Üzerine, Kıbrıs’ın Türk Bölgesindeki İşgücü Açığının Türkiye’den Gelecek İşgücü İle Kapatılmasına İlişkin Yönetmelik”.

\textsuperscript{47} The first group of Trabzon immigrants in Bahçeli have reported to have arrived in May 1975.

\textsuperscript{48} This may also suggest that the related labour migration agreement was a retrospective attempt to make the immigrations official, like was the Resettlement, Land Distribution and Equal Property Law 4177 (1977) (\textit{İskan Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası}) which attempted to, among other things, form a legal basis for property and land allocations to the immigrants (both from Turkey and from the southern part of Cyprus), most of which was already implemented by the year of 1977 in which the law was passed.

\textsuperscript{49} The Aid Committee of the Turkish Embassy is in fact the key agent of economic restructuring taking place in North Cyprus after the division. P4 narrates the construction of the Turkish Aid Committee after the division of the island as follows: “[...] after the military operation there was a need for assistance and financial aid from Turkey. These [aids] were supposed to be channelled into a variety of fields. This financial and professional aid was to go into infrastructure development, agricultural sector; housing and resettlement; and social issues. The exact fields where there was need for assistance and financial aid had to be determined, aid demanded; and the supplied resources needed to be channelled into appropriate projects. At first, it was planned for the Turkish Embassy to take on these tasks, but the structure of the Embassy was not very suitable to undertake these tasks which mostly involved technical matters. Therefore it was decided to construct such a committee under the chairmanship of the Ambassador, and to assign experts from Turkey to manage each sector. This was how the Turkish Aid Committee came into being. It consisted of 4 sections, one of those was the [section of Social Afairs, Resettlement and Rehabilitation” ("[...] şimdi harekattan sonra Türkiye’nin yardımları söz konusuydu. Bu yardımlar çeşitli sahalarda olacağını, kanalize edilecekti. Alt yapı olacağını, tarım sektörü olacağını, iskan olacağını, sosyal konularda olacağını. Bunların sağlanması, bunların talep edilmesi Türkiye’den, ve bu [...] sağılan kaynakların, projelerine uygun olarak uygulanmaya sevk edilmesi, kanalize edilmesi söz konusuydu. Bunun Büyükelçilik içinde yürütülmessi
(interview with P1), together with a team of Turkish Cypriot officials. These policy makers specified the criteria for choosing potential immigrants, the geographical areas from which these immigrants were to be chosen, and other details regarding the movement. Details about these plans and preparations may be found in the document published by Mutluyakalı (2001) mentioned above. Whereas the document states that potential migrant families have to have Turkish citizenship and speak Turkish as mother tongue to be eligible for the movement (ibid.), it further specifies that the following population groups were to be given priority when choosing immigrants:

Turkish Cypriots who had previously migrated to Turkey, who have Cypriot origins, who have Turkish citizenship or who still work and live in Turkey; farmers and agricultural labourers; qualified workers who can be employed in the industry, business and other service branches; artisans, craftpersons, businesspersons and capital owners; experts and technicians in a variety of occupational fields; unskilled workers (ibid., translated by AT).

Moreover, the document states that families from places of origin, which had social, geographical and climate conditions similar to that in North Cyprus, families from places with population and housing problems, and those families with poor economic conditions were to be given priority as potential immigrants:

Areas where the population has a higher social integration potential; areas with population that have the skills and know-how suitable for employment in Cyprus; areas with a high population density and housing problems; coastal regions; mountainous and forest regions; regions with climate conditions that are similar to Cyprus [are to be given priority]. […] Regarding the agricultural labour force, non-sedentary nomads, villages which will be affected by dam projects; villages which are located within areas that are defined as forests according to 6831 Article 13/B of Forest Law; villages with a high rate of

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50 Daha evvel Türkiye’ye göç etmiş bulunan Kıbrıs kökenli, T.C. uyruklu veya halen Türkiye’de ikamet eden ve çalışan Kıbrıslı Türkler; çiftçiler ve tarım işçileri; sanayi, turizm ve diğer hizmet dallarında çalışacak kalifiye işçiler; esnaf, zanaatkarlar, sermaye ve işletme sahipleri; çeşitli meslek dallarındaki uzman ve teknisyenler; vafısız işçiler (ibid.)
landless population; villages that are located at historical and touristic sites. […] Regarding families: those families which do not have enough land of value or occupations and properties that bring sufficient income will be given priority (ibid, translated by AT).51

The above quoted official from Turkey who was involved in the planning and execution of first migration wave, also recalls that some criteria were taken into consideration in the choosing of the immigrants’ origins. Most important of these, he recalls was the criterion of similarity: It was planned to bring immigrants to the island from such regions that had relatively similar climate conditions and hence similar agricultural conditions and practices. He explains:

We can roughly place the villages in the northern part of Cyprus, which were emptied by Greek Cypriots, in three main groups. [In other words] even though each and every village had specific characteristics, we can speak of three main categories I think. One of these is the region of Morphou. As you know this is a region in which there is citrus production. The second region is the region of Famagusta including Rizokarpaso. This region is rather different, with more irrigated farming and fruit farming. The third region is Mesoria and Nicosia region. This region is rather characterised by dry farming. Taking these into consideration, people who could easily adapt to the conditions in Cyprus, that is, people who had know-how in these types of agriculture were preferred [as migrants]. Because, within this planned migration, there was no demand for other occupational groups, the immigrants were planned to be employed in the agricultural sector. Therefore for the Morphou region workers were brought from Mersin and Antalya regions, who had the necessary agricultural know-how. For the Famagusta region and for Rizokarpaso workers were brought from the Black Sea region. For the Mesoria region, on the other hand, Central Anatolians were considered more suitable (P4).52

51 Sosyal uyum yeteneği yüksek olan nüfusun yaşadığı bölgeler; Kıbrıs’taki istihdam dallarına yatkın bilgi ve beceriye sahip nüfusun yaşadığı bölgeler; nüfus yoğunluğu fazla ve iskan sorunu büyük olan bölgeler; deniz yakını, dağlık ve ormanlık bölgeler, iklimi Kıbrıs’a benzer bölgeler”[önceliklidir]. […] Tarım kesiminden gidecek işgücü için köylere açısından yerleştik durumda olmayan göçebeler, yapılan veya yapılması planlanan barajlardan göl sahası içinde kalan veya kalacak köylere, 6831 sayılı Orman Yasasının 13/B maddesi kapsamına giren orman içi köylere, topraksız nüfusun yoğun olduğu köylere, tarihi ve turistik değere sahip yerler üzerinde kurulmuş köylere öncelik verilir. […] Aileler açısından: Topraksız yahut yeterli toprağı olmayan ailelere, yeterli gelir getiren bir işe veya mülke sahip bulunmayanlara, öncelik verilir (ibid). 52 Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Rumların boşalttığı köyleri kaba taslak üç bölgeye düşünülebiliriz. Her bir köyün kendine göre apayrı özelliklerini olmakla birlikte, yani genel olarak topladığımızda üç bölgeye aylarabiliriz tahminim. Bunun birincisi Omorfo bölgesi. Burası biliyorsunuz, narenciye ağırlıklı bir bölge. İkinci bölge Dipkarpaz’ı da içine alan Magosa bölgesi. Burada da değişik, daha ziyade sulu tarım ve meyveçiliğe dayanan, mevsiz de olsa bir bölge. Üçüncü bölge olarak da Meseresa ve Lefkoşa
Yet as another interviewee involved in the policy making and planning of the immigrant settlement in the island commented, it was not possible to limit the potential immigrants to those regions, which had populations with appropriate know-how for the agricultural types present in Cyprus. Therefore people were mostly chosen on the basis of another criterion, i.e. on the basis of their ‘precariousness’ and their need for relocation and resettlement. In other words such a strategy to choose the immigrants from economically less developed regions in Turkey that were at the risk of environmental hazards was selected so as to increase the success of persuading potential immigrants for the movement (interview with P4). This was especially so when the first criterion could not be fulfilled (interview with P3): “Like I’ve already said, it is difficult to make it 100%, there is no ready workforce there which had been trained exactly in that particular sector, which at the same time is landless and unemployed. You cannot find such persons so easily.”

The same interviewee (P3) also explained:

The issue that needs to be taken into consideration in my opinion was this: You need to bring people from those places in Turkey which are similar to Cyprus in terms of climate conditions. Mersin for instance. But, people in Mersin have jobs, have fields of their own, have houses of their own. You see, Mersin is not one of the poorest parts of Turkey. Why should people from Mersin leave [their lives behind] and come here? I mean, this was a very hard job, people from Turkey who had desired to come here are from places the geographical conditions and climate of which may not be very similar. Do you understand what I mean?


53 “Dedim ya, tam %100 de sağlamak zor, orada hazır bir [...] iş gücü yok, tam bu sahada eğitilmiş olan ki şu sıradakentdi neredenle topraksız ve işsiz kalmış. Yani böyle insanlar smarlama bulunmuyor.”

Therefore the second criterion was more often than not the determining factor regarding the choosing of the protocol immigrants. According to P4 those groups of people in Turkey, especially from the Karadeniz region, who had little alternatives to migration to make a living, were given priority for this migratory movement:

First of all, the people from the selected places had settlement/housing problems. These people had to wait their turns so as to be resettled, so to speak. Some of them lived in forest areas. Some lived in places affected by natural disasters and some of them were landless or had very little [agricultural] land and it was extremely hard to provide them with land and to rehabilitate them in those places in Turkey. Projects were prepared to solve these issues in Turkey, and these people were being relocated but they comprised such a large group that a certain amount of time was needed to completely relocate them. Most of the people in this situation were from the Karadeniz region.  

Yet many of the potential immigrants from the poorest regions in Turkey could not be persuaded to move to North Cyprus either, so that none of the villages in Turkey could be brought to the island as a whole (interview with P4). At the same time as the choosing of potential immigrants, many preparations were being made in the places of destination. Whereas the choosing of immigrants was mainly Turkish officials’ responsibility, the preparations in the villages of destination were being made especially by Turkish Cypriot officials. A Turkish Cypriot government official who was involved in the settlement of the immigrants during the first migratory wave narrated the following:

The protocol was prepared by the authorities in Turkey and here [in Cyprus]. There were surely some political figures with which Mr. Denktaş had meetings. Turkey made the decisions regarding which people to send but we
made the decisions regarding the villages [to be repopulated] here. I mean, not me, those above us, it was a process at the level of ministers. The decisions were made by highest-ranking administrators [...]. We would first determine which villages were empty, the houses of which were emptied when the Greek Cypriots left. I was a member of one of those teams, which were in the field doing that kind of work before I joined the resettlement commission. We would go to the villages and make an inventory of the houses. [...] We would note the conditions of the furniture in the houses, the number of rooms, the general state of the houses, whether they were good for settlement, the availability of electric power [...] and running water. When there was no connection [to the electricity network and water supply] these would be connected. Those were the first steps of work. There were inventory lists in the end. Those would be sent to the persons in charge. It was pre-determined how large the population of a village would be. Then there was the task of numbering the houses that were to be distributed. You can still see the numbers on the houses in some villages [...] (I4).

The resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees had already started but was not finalised before the arrival of immigrants from Turkey. At the same time, most of the initial Turkish Cypriot refugees did not comply with the resettlement plans prepared by the Turkish Cypriot government officials but tried to secure for themselves and for their relatives “better” sites of settlement (I1). Many of the Turkish Cypriot refugees, even those who lived in the villages in the south, preferred to be settled in or close to the cities in the north (I4). The emerging political system of patronage (Lacher & Kaymak 2005; Bryant & Yakinthou 2012) allowed many to do so. The post-1974 period was, in part, a time where many southern refugees sought a betterment of their living conditions and sometimes of their village communities


57 This is also a very much criticized point in the domestic politics in the northern part of Cyprus. The opposition regards that the resettlement and property distribution matters involved much corruption and were done rather arbitrarily, instead of within a clearly defined set of rules giving the same rights to all involved persons (interviews with O2; O3; O4).
through migration and resettlement. I1 recalls in this regard that “[…] of course, in the meanwhile, the influential people in the villages, the teachers, the mukhtar were complaining to Denktaş all the time, saying ‘we don’t like this village, we like that village’. Some would be resettled here and others would be resettled there”. I1’s lengthy narration of the difficulties during the resettlement of the Turkish Cypriot refugees are further illustrative:

Cypriot refugees [Turkish Cypriot refugees] chose places close to the centres and those places which were more fertile. […] The farmers, shepherds, searched for suitable places, large fields. You cannot create those exact conditions [they had in the southern part of Cyprus] over here. […] There were teachers, members of the police force, doctors, football players, artisans, tradespeople; all of these people had their own interests and desires to think about. Therefore we had a lot of difficulties. When we brought people to a village, some liked it, some didn’t, it wasn’t very successful. […] Moreover the resettlement project we prepared, for which we worked day and night including the weekend, and as I said it was a 5-6 hundred page project proposal, could not be really put into application. In the meanwhile, the Cypriots preferred villages and areas which were close to towns. We had a lot of difficulties in Nicosia, […] as you can guess [many people] preferred to be resettled in Nicosia.

In the meanwhile, in May 1975, immigrants from Turkey started to arrive in the island (interviews with 1. generation immigrants). With the exception of the Varosha region of Famagusta, these immigrants were settled in evacuated Greek Cypriot villages in the north. The incoming migrants from Turkey were usually resettled in villages with relatively less favourable conditions, which were relatively more distant and less developed, than those reserved for the indigenous population, although some of the former arrived earlier than the Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south. As I2 stated:

58 “[…] Tabi bu arada köyün ileri gelenleri, öğretmenleri, muhtarlar devamlı Denktaş Bey’in kapsında, İşte ‘Biz köyü beğenmedik, o köydür’. Bir kısmı oraya yerleşir, bir kısmı buraya.”

Some of the immigrants from Turkey came before the refugees from the south had arrived. But where the latter was going to be resettled was already determined in advance, their places were reserved. We did not bring the immigrants [from Turkey] to those places. Mostly, we relocated them in those remote places and in villages no one preferred.\textsuperscript{60}

Moreover, the main pattern of settlement was that persons coming from the same village/region (sometimes few neighbouring villages) from Turkey would be resettled together in an empty Greek Cypriot village in the northern part of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{61} Another important pattern regarding the resettlement of the immigrants, relates to the fact that the immigrants were generally resettled separately from the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population (majority of which were refugees from the southern part of Cyprus and were also being resettled, in the northern part almost simultaneously as the immigrants from Turkey) (interviews with P1, P2, P3, P4, I1, I2). Only in a minority of cases were the immigrants from Turkey resettled together with Turkish Cypriot refugees.\textsuperscript{62}

The above mentioned reservation of less favourable places for the communal resettlement of the immigrants from Turkey was not done by Turkish Cypriot officials in secrecy from Turkey. It was rather a policy, which was at least known and accepted by the latter party, who also played a central role in this policy making. As the interview with I1 revealed (also the interview with P2), Turkish Cypriots had asked for help from Turkey on financial as well as technical matters relating to resettlement from the very beginning and Turkish Cypriot officials had shown the empty villages available for resettlement to the officials sent from Turkey prior to the start of the actual bringing of the immigrants. “We brought them to these villages and showed them, and this was what I said to them then: “These villages are empty

\textsuperscript{60} Türkiye’den gelen göçmenlerin bir kısmı güneyden gelenlerden önce geldi. Güneyden gelenlerin hepsi şeylerli belli, nereye yerleseceleri, onlara rezerv yapilmsı. Oralara yerlestirme olmadı, Türkiye’den gelenler[i]. Daha fazla kuyu yerlerde, kimsenin yerlesmek istemediği köyler boş kalmıştı ve özellikle bazı yerlerin, köyün belli bölgeleri.

\textsuperscript{61} Kurtuluş and Purkis (2014) report in this regard that first wave immigrants were settled in this manner in 26 villages and one urban neighbourhood in Famagusta (ibid: 50).

\textsuperscript{62} Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009) report the numbers of to be 25 and 5 for segregated and mixed settlements respectively.
because [Turkish] Cypriots didn’t like them. Moreover these are villages which were losing population before [the partition] anyway” (I1).

The original plans notwithstanding, as was revealed through the oral history interview with P4 who was one of the experts from Turkey involved in the settlement of immigrants, the official plan for immigration and settlement was not wholly respected during the execution phase (also interviews with P1, P2, I2, I4). Therefore especially after the initial groups were resettled in the island, there have been considerable deviations from the foreseen plan. This is reckoned by P4 to be a rather negative aspect relating to the immense speed of the whole migration and settlement operation.

[…] it was not possible to execute this plan in such a short time. As I said, it is not furniture that you are moving around. These are human beings. It was not possible to persuade them, make them accept and ensure that they [had a high chance of ] integration into the society of destination within a few days only. [The consideration of these issues] would take a while and required patience. But, to begin with, the political leadership in Turkey didn’t attach much importance to these issues and didn’t really pay much attention to the opinions of the experts and the technical committee and allowed everyone who wanted to go to Cyprus participate in the migration movement. They were only concerned with the formation of a population as fast as possible, however that formation might be [didn’t interest them]. [They did not consider] for instance, whether these people could adapt and whether the local population would embrace them. Although they had discussed these issues at length, in my opinion they did not make the right decision and as I said before, this, until the end of 1975 smoothly-running, planned migration was transformed into an unplanned and uncoordinated movement, where everyone, who wished to, could take his/her suitcase and migrate. 

63 “Bu köyleri bunlara götürdük, gösterdik ve benim zaman söyledigim de şuydu ‘Bu köyler Kıbrıslıların beğenmediği için boş olan köylerdir. Bir de bunlar Rum zamanında da nüfusları azaliyordu.’”

What P4 refers to above is indeed a striking aspect of the first migration wave from Turkey to the newly established TFSC. Indeed this operation of immigrant recruitment and resettlement stands out in being planned in compliance with a militarist and masculine rationality, so that its swift disintegration when put to practice seems to be due to a contradiction inherent to that type of rationality. Whereas this ‘rational’ thinking foresaw the systematic repopulation of acquired lands, it surely did not take the ‘less rational’ factors of social reality, such as human intentions and emotions, into consideration.

Hence, as P4 mentions, the first wave of migration comprises not only the immigration of within the protocol foreseen agricultural workforce, that was to be recruited directly by state officials. On the contrary, a large number of immigrants arrived on their own initiatives, though these were too settled in the islands’ northern empty villages under the same conditions as the state-brought agricultural workforce. It can thus be argued that the first wave of migration from Turkey to North Cyprus comprises two main groups (alongside two smaller groups of soldiers and technical personnel): those brought within the framework of the Agricultural Workforce Agreement (protocol immigrants) and those immigrants who arrived on their own initiatives (extra-protocol immigrants). 66 According to the above respondent P4, whereas the protocol immigrants amount to 30-35 thousand, another 15-20

66 Not everyone involved in the initial discussions about who to bring from Turkey as immigrants have the same opinion. According to P3 the whole immigration program was a rather successful settlement operation (iskan faaliyeti), P1, P2, I4 made similar statements, and even P4 considered the whole immigration operation, despite pointing out to its shortcomings a successful event.

66 In addition to these two groups of immigrants, two additional though smaller immigrant groups within the first wave may be identified following Hatay (2005; 2007) and Canefe (2007). One of these, that is, the third group of immigrants, comprises Turkish soldiers who participated in the military interventions in July and August 1974 and their families (including wives, children, parents and siblings) (ibid; also expert interviews with P1, P2, I1, I3). Additionally, the families of the 498 soldiers who lost their lives during these interventions were offered the opportunity to settle and acquire property, citizenship and martyrs’ allowances (see Hatay 2007: 32). Although the exact number of persons who settled as part of this policy is unknown, according to Hatay (2005), the Turkish Army Veterans Association with 1200 active members may be indicative (ibid: 11; 2007: 3; 32). According to Şahin et al. (2013) a significant number of these immigrants are married to Turkish Cypriots. (ibid: 625). The fourth group of immigrants on the other hand, comprise white-collar workers, technical staff and semi-skilled to skilled labourers who were too offered houses and other property to stay in the island and to “[...] assist the infrastructure of the Turkish Cypriot/Turkish-controlled areas of the island” (Hatay, 2005: 11-12; see also Canefe 2007: 282).
thousand people are extra-protocol immigrants, i.e. those coming to the island on their own initiatives.

The protocol immigrants were recruited mainly via radio announcements and through contacts by officials from governorates and housing directorates – valilikler ve iskan müdürlükleri- in the provincial areas in which these villages were located (Hatay 2007; interview with P4). As these villagers did not have information on Cyprus, let alone the desire to be resettled there, some strategies were used so as to encourage the communities’ immigration. P4 describes in this regard that some community leaders were chosen among the immigrants and brought to the island to be persuaded, before these were asked to convince their whole community, their families, friends and relatives, to take up the migration journey:

Some people with leader qualities were chosen from those villages, which were going to be transferred to Cyprus. They were taken to Cyprus, towards the end of 1974, before the implementation of the resettlement plan started in 1975. They were taken to the places where they were planned to be resettled. Of course, there were some who liked it, and others who didn’t, and they also saw some shortcomings and had some wishes and demands. They were also brought together with the authorities in Cyprus, and were given the chance to discuss and […] decide together with the authorities how those problems could be solved. When these people returned to Turkey and went to their villages in Turkey they were convinced to a large extent to participate in the migration, and so played an important role in the persuasion of the people in their villages. There were village headmen [mukhtar] and other influential persons like village masters [ağa] and from some villages even primary school teachers among these committees.67

67 Bu Türkiye’den götürülecek insanların yaşadığı köylerdeki bir takım lider vasıflı insanlar seçildi ve bunlar önceden, uygulama başlamadan önce, 1974 yılının sonlarına doğru Kıbrıs’a götürüldüler. Kıbrıs’ta o iskân edilmeleri düşünülen yerleri bunlar gezdi, gezdirildiler. Tabi beğenmeyenler de oldu, ama, çeşitli de problemler ileri sürdüler, çeşitli istekler ileri sürdüler. O zaman Kıbrıs’taki yetkililerle de bunlar temas ettirildi. O eksiklerin, o problemlerin nasıl giderileceği hususunda karşılıklı görüş alışverişinde bulunuldu ve […], bu problemlerin nasıl çözüleceği hususunda karşılıklı mutabakata varıldı. Bunlar tekrar Türkiye’ye döndüklерinde, köylerine geldiklerinde, büyük ölçüde ikna olmuş olarak geldiler; ve bu köylerindeki insanların ikna edilmesinde de tabi bunların rolü büyük oldu. Çünkü bunların içinde köyün muhtarlarını vardı, köyde işte ağ a tabir edilen, sözü geçen insanlar vardı, hatta bazı köylerden köy ilkokul öğretmenleri dahil olduğu bu şeyler, komitelere.
So as to encourage potential immigrants for the movement, they were promised relatively generous material benefits like luxurious houses, lands, orchards, salaries and subsistence assistance (interviews with 1. generation immigrants, see Chapter 5). Moreover potential immigrants were also given the security to be returned to Turkey if they did not wish to settle after initial migration (interview with P4).

A rather high return rate, ranging from 25-35%, was reported by my respondents (interviews with P3, P4, I1, I2). It can be argued that it was partly this return migration which has created the opportunity for the settlement of further groups of immigrants in the island. Thus the second group of immigrants, -the extra-protocol immigrants, i.e. the persons who had heard about the immigration opportunity to Cyprus and decided to participate in it on their own initiative especially in order to benefit from the incentives involved, filled the places that were made vacant by the returnees. Some of these immigrants were from villages, which were close to those, where announcements for the immigration program were being made whereas others came from cities like Mersin which were close to Cyprus (see Kurtuluş and Purkis 2014: 69-76). According to Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009) there was also significant amount of Alawite population among this second group of immigrants the majority of which chose emigration from Turkey due to political difficulties they were facing especially after a nationalist right-wing government came into power (Demirel’s national front Government in March 1975).

As was mentioned, in addition to various material incentives like empty Greek Cypriot houses and other properties, the first wave immigrants, who were settled in the TFSC were granted citizenship “almost upon arrival” (Hatay 2005: 10-13; 2007: 3; interviews with the immigrants). In these years of nation-state formation, Turkish Cypriot officials did not consider immediate naturalisation of immigrants problematic, but rather to the benefit of Turkish Cypriots in general, since another one of the motivations for the political elite of the period in planning and facilitating this immigration was, as will be argued in detail, of political nature. In this sense these immigrants were not only brought to the island to build an

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68 Kurtuluş and Purkis too report a high return rate of 20-25% (ibid: 69).
agricultural workforce but also to help achieve a nationalist ideal of a from Greek- Cypriots separate nation-state for Turkish Cypriots.

Partly because of the high rate of return migrations, the exact number of the first wave immigrants from Turkey successfully settled in North Cyprus is unknown. Yet the most important reason for the unavailability of complete information is the politics of secrecy of the Turkish as well as the Turkish Cypriot authorities concerning the subject (Hatay 2005; 2007; Şahin et al. 2013). Accordingly, estimations on the number of first wave immigrants are highly varied: Kurtuluş and Purkis talk about 82,500 persons (and a 20-25% returnee rate); Hatay (2007) suggests, referring to a statement of the former Minister of Interior in 2003 and his own calculations using 2006 census data, that the number of successfully settled first wave immigrants is around 15,000. Other researchers’ estimations are within the 25,000-35,000 (see Morvaridi 1993: 220; Bryant and Yakinthou 2012: 27). Greek Cypriots on the other hand declare the number of immigrants a lot larger, ranging from 130,000-160,000 (Hatay 2007: 4). The unofficial numbers given by my respondents (political actors and officials) also varied from 40 to 50 thousand (interviews with P1, P2, P4, I1, I4). It must also be stated that almost all of my respondents reckoned this settlement program to be rather successful, despite the rather high return rate in the initial years (P1, P3, P4, I1). I4’s following statement may be illustrative:

It is to 100% successful. I have never heard that an the whole of an incoming village [group of immigrants] had returned. In such a case it would have been unsuccessful. I mean, imagine I brought the Akçay village from the north (from Turkey) or from Ağırsu village, and they all went back after six months. There had been no such thing. Because, for them [the immigrants] too, this was a valuable place. Those people came from mountain villages and so on. Moreover, the one that came on their own initiative were unemployed people.69

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69 %100 başarılıdır. Hiç ben duyдум gelen bir köyün olduğu gibi geriye döndüğünü. Ancak o zaman olur. Yani getirdim ben (...) kuzeydeki Akçay köyünü. Veya Ağırsu köyünden geldiler yerleştiler ve altı ay sonra gittiler yok öyle bir şey. Çünkü Onlar için de kiymetli bir yerdi burası. O gelen insanlar dağ köyündendi vs. vs.. Sonra gönüllü gelenler işsiz güçsüz insanlardı.
This policy of systematic settlement of immigrants through allocation of property and citizenship was officially abandoned by late 1979/early 1980’s (Interviews with P1, P2, P4). Therefore it can be argued, as does Hatay (2007) that “[i]mmigration after 1979 was no longer an official policy, but rather reflects persons who came to Cyprus on their own initiative” (ibid.), without receiving the privileges of the immigrants of the first wave. This was also in line with the findings of the research. P1’s narrative is explanatory:

The process of bringing the immigrants continued until 1980, and we have given the immigrants the right to settlement. What does the right of settlement mean? Like I just said, it refers to getting a house, land and credit. This procedure was stopped after the 80s. Immigrants coming to Cyprus after the 80s are exempt from these rights. Those came on their own initiatives. It may be the case that they could rent properties left in the national treasury and it may be the case that the changes in the settlement law granted them the right to own their lands later on, but the real policy of resettlement had granted the right to properties until 1980 to the beneficiaries defined by law.

According to Hatay (2007) this policy was brought to an end due to “international pressure and internal opposition” in North Cyprus (Hatay 2007: 3; also Bryant and Yakinthou 2012).

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70 The allocation of property to immigrant Turkish nationals ceased after this date with an amendment to the ITEM Law number 4177 – Law for Housing, allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value (İskân, Topraklandırma, ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası) in 1982 (Hatay 2007:3). Yet as some of the expert interviews revealed there have been cases of property allocation to Turkish nationals who wished to settle in the northern part of Cyprus for some more years by the Turkish Cypriot government (interviews with P4, I4). The granting of citizenship too has become selective and based upon the fullflelead of citizenship law (in the TSFC Citizenship Lac Act No: 21975 those persons residing in TSFC territories over the period of one year were eligible to apply). Yet, there exists –to date- a clause in the law which makes it possible for the Council of Ministers to grant citizenship to persons deemed to be to the benefit of the state (Hatay 2007: 3). It is especially this clause has been attracting a lot of criticism since it renders the allocation of citizenship a highly political issue and open to misuse by political actors.

71 Although the official policy was abandoned, Hatay argues that naturalisations continued, especially during election years (2007:32), so that the critique towards right-wing governments’ misuse of naturalizations as a means to gain votes for themselves continued.

Yet it can also be argued that it was stopped because the resources - i.e. empty houses and land - were to a large extent depleted by the end of 1979.

4.2 The Village

Bahçeli, as has already been stated, constituted the main site of the ethnographic field research. The choosing of this village as the field research site was due to two important reasons. Firstly, I wanted to work in an all-migrant village, which represents the typical settlement pattern for the first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus. As was argued, Bahçeli can be considered a typical site of settlement since it displays three important qualities: it is obviously a rural site of settlement, it represents the dominant spatially segregated type of settlement comprising immigrants only and it represents the dominant mode of communal settlement for the incoming migrants. Moreover like all villages settled within the framework of this first wave of immigration, it includes a large number of “pioneer migrants” (see Bakewell et al. 2011). As it was deemed important to gather information from the pioneer migrants so as to be able to causally explain the movement, a village study in general was thought to be a good starting point of research. Moreover, it was deemed important to gather information on the village seen not only as a geographical space but also as a community comprising particular social relations (see Vasta 2004) the account of which was reckoned to be significant in explaining migrant community formation.

Secondly, having decided to work in an all-migrant village, my acquaintance with few persons from Bahçeli in particular was valued as an important opportunity, since it would, I considered, provide easier access to more people and provide a greater amount of mutual trust between the researcher and the community. My experience has been very much in line with these initial expectations, in that my gatekeepers proved to be of very much help in providing me easy access to people, groups and also to those kinds of knowledge, which can be regarded as “insider-information” that a researcher might not so easily obtain.

Bahçeli is currently an all-migrant village with only few exceptions of indigenous Turkish Cypriot spouses and the vast majority of these migrants have arrived and settled in the village between 1975 and 1977. It is a small village about 28 km away east from the nearest city of Kyrenia, situated at the northern skirts of the five finger mountains. It is reached by a 30-35
minute drive on a highway along the coastline. This highway divides the mountain and the coastal sides of the village. The old settlement area of the village is situated on the skirts of the Five Finger Mountains. The coastal side of the village mostly comprises newly built houses. These so-called “villas” are being built there since the 2000’s and some are still under construction.

Prior to the 1974 division of the island, Bahçeli had been a Greek Cypriot village known by the name “Kalograia”, which means “nun” in Greek. In year 1975 it was populated by 590 peoples of Greek Cypriot descent (prio-cyprus). Its economy depended on fruit farming and agriculture and its produce comprised mainly fruits especially apricots, carobs, olives, olive oil and crops and other fruits and vegetables (see link www.kalograiavillage.org). According to the accounts of some of the villagers there used to be a jam factory and an oil mill in the village when they had arrived, which they also used for a little after their settlement in the village. The Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the village evacuated the village after the 1974 military operation of Turkey and became internal refugees in the southern side of the island. This village was the first village where immigrants from Turkey were settled by the state (interviews with P1, P4, I1, I2, I4).

Current population of Bahçeli originates from Turkey, from the Ayvadere village (Aho) of Trabzon’s Araklı district and from the Gülner district of Mersin. According to the 2011 census, the village had a de jure population (based on the usual place of residence) of 388 persons, 193 females and 195 males. The immigrants from Ayvadere all have close kinship ties with one another, thus it can be argued that the community character of their village in Turkey had been preserved upon immigration. The Mersin immigrants constitute another sub-community, yet as this group of originally less than 10 families, most of which came together to form a group only prior to their departure from Turkey, they, unlike the Trabzon

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73 See link: http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net

74 See link: http://www.devplan.org/Frame-tr.html
immigrants, were not a community in a strict sense (and in the sense of Ayvadere immigrants) prior to their settlement in Cyprus.75

Although both Trabzon and Mersin immigrants initially arrived in the framework of the special protocol, i.e. the agricultural workforce agreement (tarım işgücü protokolü), between TFSC and Turkey, and were assigned agricultural lands, gardens and some animals upon arrival, currently only few do stockbreeding, gardening or agriculture for income. Most families do grow fruits and vegetables for their own domestic consumption, and some families have a few animals the products of which are mostly for the use of the family or in some cases bring a little income. Most of the male inhabitants of the village work in freight and transport businesses, or did so at some points in their careers. Currently some of those employed in the transport sector are business owners, whereas others are bus drivers, taxi drivers or lorry drivers (tir-şoförü) (interviews with immigrants). Only few are employed in the public sector – though this is one of the largest employment sectors in North Cyprus especially for the indigenous population – and those who are, work(ed) for the ministry of health and ministry of agriculture as blue-collar workers. Women from the first generation usually work at home and attend their gardens and animals (if they have any) whereas their daughters do participate in the workforce especially in the private sector.

The main highway to the village was built in 2004-2006, which has, the villagers often expressed, shortened the distance between the city and the village quite a lot. Formerly, the road to Bahçeli was narrow and dangerous, making the distances longer (temporally), and the village more distant and isolated. This spatial isolation was expressed by many of the villagers I spoke to especially in their narrations of the past. Currently not only the highway but also the private cars owned by many of the villagers have lessened this spatial isolation.

Bahçeli like many old Greek Cypriot villages still bears many marks of war. Some of the old houses are still empty and partly demolished (see Appendix C). Moreover the village has received little infrastructural investments. The villagers often expressed their feelings of

75 There are also some kinship and place-of-origin (hemşerilik) ties among these families since some of them originate from the same village –Ishaklar- in the Gülner district of Mersin from a generation back.
being ignored by the state and by the municipal authority in such matters, and regarded the services to the village as of low quality.

The village had a primary school until 1994 (see Appendix C), when within the framework of the state’s centralisation policy it was closed. This was regarded by many of the villagers as a further example of discrimination by the state. Although the village also has a small village clinic, it is not regularly visited by a doctor. It has a mosque which was converted from the former orthodox church named Agios Mamas Church (see Appendix C).

In the recent years the village’s demography has been changing. Though the boom in the construction sector in the first half of 2000’s had declined towards the end of the same decade, it had led to the temporary settlement of some labour immigrants especially from Mersin and Hatay in the village. These immigrants had rented houses and rooms from the villagers during their stay, yet most of them have left the village since the decline of the sector. On the other hand, the aforementioned new settlement area on the coastal side of the village is now home to some new immigrants from Europe (especially England), Israel and Russia. Yet most of the villagers, especially women, expressed that they had little to no face-to-face contact with these people as the latter do not reside in the old village area.

4.3 The Event of Immigration and Settlement to Bahçeli

As mentioned above, Bahçeli was the first village to which immigrants were settled by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments within the framework of the agricultural labour recruitment agreement that initiated the first wave of immigration from Turkey. One of my informants, a high-ranking Turkish Cypriot government official/politician (P1), recalls this incidence as follows:

The first village that we repopulated is Bahçeli village. And I have this memory: [...] that day as the immigrants came to the new place, a new environment which was something they strange and unexpected for them, they were quite bewildered. [...] And people started crying, “we don’t want to move into these houses” they said. There was a great hesitance, and I cracked a joke to them all: “For gods sake!” I said “I am sure that the emigrants [refugees] who left this place are weeping in the south and so do the people we
want to settle here! Human psychology is really interesting [strange].

The above quoted memory is in fact from the first settlement ceremony that was organised in Kalograia, the name of which was also changed to Bahçeli, to welcome the immigrants. These ceremonies of settlement of the first groups of immigrants, as was narrated during the oral history interviews, were organised so as to be encouraging for the immigrants. As one of the Turkish Cypriot government officials recalls:

When we went to Bahçeli, everyone including the Turkish Embassy representatives as well as Denktaş and his whole cabinet, were there. Everywhere was decorated with flags and all. Speeches were given, the lots were drawn among them and people were allocated houses. [...] It was festive. There were flags, decorations, drums and zurna. They tried to make it like a feast. Through the ceremony they tried to enhance the motivation of the new comers. The military personnel, the Turkish Embassy including the Ambassador, all political leaders, Denktaş and so on (I4).

The political elite and state officials improvised and created these “festivities” since, as they all asserted, the settlement of the immigrants proved to be much more complicated and a lot harder than was originally planned (as irrational elements that contradicted the masculine rationality). General difficulties in the settlement of the immigrants in the places of destination were narrated by all who were involved in these processes. Below are the narratives of P4 and I1 who recalled the difficulties of settling the immigrants in Bahçeli:

Yes there were zurna and drums, but before those instruments were played there we went through a lot of difficult moments. I had arrived to Cyprus just a day after the group of immigrants. This immigrant group was first
accommodated in the Eastern Mediterranean University, the buildings of which were converted into a guest house back then. I went to Cyprus a few days later, and we went to Famagusta with Mr. [X] and we were staying in Salamis Bay hotel if I recall correctly. At the same time we were regularly visiting the village to inspect the preparations on the one hand and on the other hand we were having meetings with the [immigrant] villagers in the guest house. Everything was going smoothly. But one day, not long but only a few days later, a village headman [mukhtar] together with some people came searching for us and found us. “The deal is off” they said, the whole group I mean. I mean, they were 40 or 60 families, something like that. “What happened, why is the deal off?” Some of these men had gone and seen the village on their own, through their own means. Moreover a gossip was spread around, that Greek Cypriots, EOKA groups rather, were in the mountains and were planning a raid. Therefore, it was a life-threatening situation. [...] they also had many other reasons. They said “we back out!” All hell broke loose. We came to the guesthouse. Can you believe it? Maybe it took 12 hours. We started at 5 in the afternoon and discussed the matters with them until 5 in the morning. We shouted, we talked nicely to one another. In the end we assured them once again, and said: “we will make the draw, see your houses, think again, if you, in the end, want to quit, we will put you into the ships and send you back”. As I said, it took us hours. Later, the preparations took a couple of days, and there was a draw, and they were taken to the village with zurna and drums, like you said. I remember that 8-10 families actually returned, but the majority agreed to stay (P4)

The first village we resettled is the Bahçeli [Bahçecik] village, which we transferred to Kalograia. […] Think about it, this was the first immigrant group. We took these people to the village, we founded the village
cooperative. We assigned them a guide, we gave them everything including their bottled gas, because they were the first village. Furniture like beds, mattresses, all the necessary things like fridges and all that; there were zurna and drums, the corps commander, the ambassador, the president, Denktaş were all there. We took them there with such a ceremony. […] Since it was the first village there was a big ceremony. Moreover, we changed the name of Kalograiya as a courtesy; yet the name of the village in the lists taken to Turkey was written as Kalograia [...]. The group of immigrants came, on the day of resettlement we took down the sign saying “Kalograiya”, and put up a sign saying “Bahçeli”. Well the people started saying […] “you deceived us, you brought us from one mountain to another mountain”. We had a problem there. We named the village “Bahçeli”, because their village of origin was named “Bahçeli”. They said to us “we want Kalograia”. We said “this is Kalograia”. “This is a bone-dry place, it is in the mountains” [they said]. It was a problem. Well at the same time, meals were being prepared to be distributed; the head man [village leader] made a gesture with his eyebrows and they refused to get out. Half of them returned (I1). 79 80


80 The main difficulty in the settlement of both Turkish Cypriot refugees and Turkish immigrants was regarded by those interviewees who were involved in these operations as being related to the conditions of the available resources. One of the main difficulties was identified as the fact that the houses and properties available for resettlement were not uniform but instead all had various qualities. P4’s narration is illuminating: “As I said, these people were persuaded but problems started as soon as they arrived in the island. It was not possible anyway not to have any problems, because resettlement projects elsewhere in the world have advantages. For instance, say you want to relocate like 100 households from region A to another region. You first prepare a construction plan of the relocation site. Houses are built there, those are standard houses, they are identical to one another. If you are going to distribute land, the parcelling is balanced, because you are doing it from the scratch. But here [in Cyprus] it wasn’t like that. When you go to village A [in Cyprus], and if there are 40 houses there, all of those 40 houses have different qualities. There are good ones, bad ones, ok ones, ruined ones. If you’re distributing fields, the fields are not identical. You want to give them orchards and fruit trees, those are all different from one another. First of all it is difficult to make the families accept this situation. There is only one thing that can be done, drawing lots. However, even though we persuaded them to accept the drawing of lots, because, they too had seen that there was no other way of doing it, afterwards 10 out of those 40 families broke the deal. I mean, they didn’t accept what they got. The person may be right from her/his own perspective but the implementer is also right. There is nothing else he can do. What can he do? He cannot create something else. He has no way of making things [equal], this is all, all that there is. Well there were many such problems”. (Tabi yani dediğim gibi,
It is probably not an exaggeration to argue that many of the immigrants experienced migration as a painful incidence. Fieldwork revealed that the immigration to Bahçeli, though it was voluntary in a strict sense, did not necessarily involve ready consent of all parties. It was especially women who found the immigration decision rather hard to make [see 5.3.1].

The following excerpt is from an interview in the village, with some of the eldest women who were among the pioneer migrants:

**TW2:** “[They told us:] ‘We will take you to a place, which is so much like paradise’. So we packed up. We packed our beds, pots and pans, some food. I alone, filled a lorry with my stuff. There was a flat land in front of the market place.”

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I was told by P4 that this problem had been anticipated. As P4 recalled, he had pointed out to the non-presence of women in the initial groups of potential immigrants: “[...] one of the biggest shortcoming was that there were no women in these groups. As you know, this is one of our social weaknesses. This was even more prominent back then, like 30-40 years ago. This was, in my opinion, a great disadvantage. But I have to say one thing. I was the person making the suggestion back then, saying ‘No, these groups are incomplete. It is imperative that some women from the villages join these groups’, but no women could be found to participate in the groups. There wasn’t any women who were willing to join. This was an important shortcoming, and I believe, would these groups be [mixed gender], they would be more efficient; they would produce more realistic approaches. However, unfortunately, it wasn’t like that”. ([...]) büyük bir eksiklik de o zaman meşela bu gidenheyetler içinde hiç kadın yoktu. Bu da genel bir sosyal hastalığımız biliyorsunuz. O yıllarda da, işte 30-40 yıl önce bunlar tabi daha da belirgin bir şekildeydi. Bu bence çok çok büyük eksiklikti.AMA şuuna da hemen belirtmek isterin. Ben de çünkü bu öneride bulunan insan olarak o zaman “Hayır, bu heyetler eksik, bu heyetlerin içine mutlaka o köyden bazı hanımlar da, kadınlar da katılmalıdır” dediğim zaman o heyetlere dahil olabilecek hiç kadın aday bulunmamıştı. Yani kadınların da hiç biri istemedi bunu. [...] Bu büyük noksantıktı. Yani ben öyle inandığım ki, o heyetler böyle oluşabilseydi çok daha yararlı olurdu, çok daha gerçekçi yaklaşımlar ortaya çıkabilirdi. Ama işte bu gerçekleşmedi maalesef).
TW5: “A plain, a big plain.”
TW2: “Well the vehicles, were in a row, busses, trucks.”
TW5: “Like 5 service busses, 5 lorries, […] we said to ourselves the state came and collected us to go and fight in the war.”
TW2: “We were crying and shouting. Well we were separated from our daughters from our nation, from our grand children.”
TW5: “We left our homes behind […]”
TW2: “[…] we got into the vehicles and drove to the sea.”
TW5: “We arrived at this sea, do you understand, at Mersin […]”
TW2: “We were afraid”
Interviewer: “What were you afraid of?”
TW2: “This was an alien place. It was a place of war.”
TW5: “There was a war, we were aliens.”
TW2: “We came and a ferry approached to welcome us. We thought that they were coming to kill us, but they wanted to welcome us. We crossed the sea, and there were thousands of them. They gave us food, meals of many different sorts”.
TW5: “There were girls who did the cooking”
TW2: “Our beds were ok.”
TW5: “Ok.”
TW2: “But we were crying. Crying. We were very upset. We stayed there for a week.”
TW5: “Didn’t we stay longer?”
TW2: “No it was one week. After one week the vehicles arrived. There was also a vehicle with food, cooked food. We didn’t have to cook. And so we came to this place. We came and we got scattered in the village. The houses had different numbers, the keys were numbered[…] Many of the women said ‘I don’t want to stay in this place’. They brought us back to the school, served us a meal. We had the meal and were back on the way to Famagusta, to the guesthouse”.
TW5: “They were begging us to stay.”
TW2: “They made bears dance, they were begging us so badly”
(Interview with TW2, >85, female, 1. generation Trabzon & TW5, 65, female, 1. generation Trabzon).

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TW5: ova, büyük bir ova
TW2: Evet, arabalardız dizildi, diyeлим otobüsler, kamyonlar
TW5: servis otobüsleri 5 tane, 5 tane de kamyon dizildi, […] dedik ki savaşın diye bizi gelip devlet topladı, oradan anladım mı...
TW2: ağlamak kıyamet kopuyor. Tabi kızlarımızdan ayrıldık, milletimizden ayrıldık torunlarımızdan ayrıldık.
TW5: Evlerimizden, yuvamızdan ayrıldık […]
TW2: “[…] Bindik arabalara. Ora benim bura senin. Dayadık denize”.
TW5: “Geldik yani bu denize, anlar mısun? Mersine. […]”
TW2: “Korkardık.”
Araştırmacı: “niye korkuyorsunuz?”
On the other hand, first problems of spatial displacement were regarded by many of the officials and politicians I interviewed, as problems of initial adaptation resulting from first encounters with more modern living conditions. The narrative from a mid-ranking government official (I4) quoted below is illustrative of the satirical description of the initial settlement of ‘unknowing’ Turkish villagers to ‘technologically more advanced’ living spaces:

She was saying “Uşi” which meant Mr. [...] I went there and asked “what’s going on there?” She says “The stove here is making us cold”. She meant that the oven was blowing cold air. “How could the stove make you cold?” “It is” she said. I went in her house, opened the fridge and it was working. Well before they arrived we plugged in the appliances. We would make sure that everything functioned. After making the inventory [...] we would check the electric power and whether there was running water. “This is a fridge. The stove and the oven are over there” I said. She didn’t know what an oven was either. [...] “what is this good for?” she said. “You put your meat and your water in here” I said. “What do you normally do to have cold water back in your place?” I said. That was what came to my mind. “We place the bottle, the container under running water. It would be ice cold before we drink it” she said. But it is 40 degrees hot here and it is not possible to do that here. So this is a refrigerator” I said and showed her. I opened the door of the fridge and showed her the ice. Found a bottle and filled it with water, and put it in there. There were such issues.

TW2: “gelirdik burada yabancı. Savaş yemiş.”
TW5: “savaş yemiş, yabancı muyuz [...]”
TW5: “[...] Aşçı kızlar”
TW2: “Yataklarımız yerlerimiz tamam.”
TW5: “Tamam.”
TW5: “Daha çok kalmadık mı?”
TW5: “Yaşvaryorlar... Karın diye”
TW2: “Ayi oynatıyorlar. Kıyamet alameyt”

Moreover the resettlement in Bahçeli revealed to be problematic in another respect not anticipated before. Initially two main groups of immigrants were settled in the village. These came from two separate villages in the Araklı district of Trabzon, namely from Bahçecik (referred to as the Çebi group) and from Ayvadere (Aho). Yet these two communities came into conflict with each other soon after their settlement in the village. Few months later, the former group was relocated to another village in the Karpassia Peninsula whereas the latter group still inhabits the village today. P1, a high-ranking Turkish Cypriot government official, and policy maker, recalls this incident as follows:

The first village that we resettled was Bahçeli, and I remember this: [...] There were two groups from Anatolia which were resettled there [...]. After a while these did not get along well with one another. They almost killed each other, and we relocated one of the groups to Rizokarpaso.  

This incidence was another example of the contradiction which was inherent to the masculine rationality that was the basis for this migration program. Moreover it can also be interpreted as the re-emergence of the Ayvadere (Aho) community in Cyprus as a village community that remained intact, to a certain level, in spite of migration. This was due to the principles of communal settlement and segregated settlement from Turkish Cypriots which characterised the first migration wave. TM3’s narration below makes this re-emergence discernible:

[...] There used to be some disputes between us and the Çebi group from time to time.[...] Fights among the children. There was a kid of ours, 16-17 years old. One of theirs beat him up, did something to him. Things escalated, there were fighting in the village. So Denktas relocated this Çebi group to Rizokarpaso. [...] As these things happened they said to that group “we will move you from there”. I don’t know if my father had an influence. [...] Like

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84 İlk taşdırığımız köy Bahçeli köyüdür ve orada ben anımlarında şunu anlatıyorum: [...] Anadolu’nun iki yerinden oraya insan geldi [...]. Bir süre sonra kendi aralarında anlaşılmadılar. X grubu[...] -nerdeyse kanlı biçaklı oluyordular- ve [X] grubu[...] Dipkarpaz’a gönderdik.

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I said, my father was very close to Denktaş, they would wine and dine together at least once a week for sure. Later two families went to Yamaçköy. There were few more people in the village not from Aho [Ayvadere], one of those, two of those went there, few went to Ziyamet. And the Çebi group went to Rizokarpasos as a whole. […] We from Aho, remained in the village (TM3, male, 54, 1. generation, Trabzon).85

A few years later, namely in 1977, a smaller group of immigrant families from Mersin Gülnar were allocated places in the village and were resettled in the houses that remained vacant after the departure of the Çebi group from the village. Although the settlement of the Mersin group had also attracted some resistance from the first group - the Ayvadere villagers- the two groups stayed on peaceful terms with each other so that they still cohabited the village.

Although settlement to Bahçeli village was typical of the first wave, in the senses that immigrants were settled collectively as a community and segregated from Turkish Cypriots, none of the two groups settled in Bahçeli came from such villages which were being relocated to elsewhere within Turkey due to environmental and other reasons (which was a criterion for the selection of immigrants from Turkey in the original plan). In this sense Bahçeli does not comprise “relocation migrants” which is argued to be one of the typical immigrant groups within the first wave of migrations from Turkey to northern Cyprus (see Kurtuluş and Purkis 2009; 2014). The case of Bahçeli, as will be explained below, proves to be more complicated.

Considering the first group currently inhabiting the village, i.e. the Ayvadere immigrants, emigration from their villages can be considered a rather active decision that involved immigrants’ strategic thinking and behaviour: According to the 1. Generation Trabzon immigrants I interviewed, it was not their village Ayvadere but the neighbouring village

Bahçecik which was considered for migration to Cyprus since this village was planned by Turkish authorities to be relocated within Turkey due to being forestland. As the villagers from Ayvadere had heard about the migration programme and wanted to participate in it, they had to be recruited by the state. Therefore, these got their names registered on the list which was provided for the Bahçecik village, using their personal networks. The following excerpts from interviews with TM1 and TM3 illustrate this event:

I was in Istanbul before the migration to Cyprus started. I had job in the textile industry. I mean I worked in a textile workshop. My uncle was there, I was there with him. My father was in Trabzon […] in the Araklı district. […] There was the military operation, and the issue of migration to Cyprus came up. This was what I had first heard. Anyway, my father called me “son, we are going to Cyprus as a family, come with us!” I went to Trabzon […]. When I was there, they told me the story like that: Well it was a village called Bahçecik, which was planned to be resettled in Cyprus, and not our village. This was a village which was located in forestland […]. These villagers had made an application to the Resettlement Ministry of Turkey saying: “Our village is on forestland. We cannot make a living here. Transfer and resettle our village to somewhere else within Turkey”. This was their demand for many years. So when the [Turkish] state was planning, or thinking –whatever you want to call it- to bring migrants to Cyprus, they first considered this village, thinking “lets send these to Cyprus”. They formed a delegation from the villagers. They were from the other village but my family, my uncles, and my father has close relations with that village, so my uncle was also included in that delegation. […] 7 families from my village joined that village. They got registered as if they lived in that village, so that their participation in the migration programme was legitimate (TM1, 58, male, 1. generation Trabzon).

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There was a village called Bahçec[i]k in the 60’s in Turkey. This was a landslide site, and the villagers had appealed to the state. They demanded “relocate the village from its current location, let us migrate elsewhere [...]”. This application was filed. Later, when there was the Cyprus operation, they, the government, come and say: „You have such an application, and there was a [military] operation, I mean the 74 operation. Let u stake you there“. At that time my father was a beloved person in our district, in the Arakli district [...]. He was in the transportation business, did stock breeding and also was a well known/influential person in the local market-place. They had told him: „[…] there is an issue like that, lets go there together“. Like as a leader. So they came here.[...] My father is from the Aho [Ayvadere] village. [...] he is not from Baçec[i]k, Baçec[i]k is another village we are from Aho. But in the district it was those people [Bahçecik villagers] who were asked to take participate in the migration, and those people tell my father “come with us, let’s go together”. Like, to be a leader for them. (TM3, 54, male 1. generation Trabzon immigrant).

The second group, i.e. the Mersin Gülnar immigrants on the other hand, may be differentiated from the Trabzon (Araklı) Ayvadere immigrants in being an urban population. The members of this group were urban proletariat, who (mostly a generation ago) had already left their villages and settled in the city prior to immigration to North Cyprus. They had heard about the migration programme and wanted to participate especially due their hard working and living conditions in Turkey and wanted to benefit from the material incentives like houses, agricultural lands and other properties involved. They were also relatively less affluent than the Trabzon immigrants at the time of their immigration. MM1 (67, male, 1. generation Mersin), one of the leaders of the group of Mersin immigrants, explains that it he was the one who decided to undertake the journey to North Cyprus and it was him that brought the others along. His narration of the group’s arrival is given below:

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Well, [...] the state didn’t bring us. I came on my own initiative. My governor in Mersin [...] was best friends with my master [boss]. As I worked for my master [as an apprentice] I went to him [the governor] and said, “it is so and so, there are some poor families. If I wanted to take them along would you give us passports, or not?” He said, “go, and have a look, then come to me I will grant you [passports]. So we came here and went all around. We decided to stay. When we returned, the families that came with me wanted to immigrate as well. We applied together. They took our pictures and so on. [...] I came and saw this place and told [the families back in Mersin]. [...] 13 families. [...] there were 10 families. I allowed the other three families join the group at the Famagusta harbour. Those families had come to Cyprus after me, they had acquaintances. They were told, [so and so] will come here. They will come as a group of 10-15 families. We will put your names on their list, so you will be given citizenship and you can settle. So when we arrived, they gave us the names of those three families. I wasn’t willing to have them [at first] [...] but as some older person I respect insisted that I put them in the group, I agreed. So I put those three families in my list and brought them here. They too received the citizenship and settled.

MM1 also explains that, upon their arrival in the island, they had to negotiate not only with the state officials but with the new mukhtar of Bahçeli (a Trabzon immigrant) as well, so that the group could settle in this village. According to MM1 their group had chosen to settle in the Bahçeli village after being given a choice among few villages which had available space. They chose to settle in the village through some cost-benefit calculations, based on the information that was given to them by the authorities in Cyprus.

We came on our own. I came with Y. We were in front of the mosque and we said “who is the village headman?”. Because [Mr X] had said the best village is Esentepe and Bahçeli. And also Karaağaç. But Karaağaç is small.

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and it has less land. Esentepe was almost full. But in Bahçeli there were still 20-25 empty houses. There were also plots of lands which could be allocated. “It is the last [furthest] village but will also be the most valuable village in the future” [he said]. [...] We had made a deal with [the authorities in Cyprus]. I told a deputy, “if there is a problem upon entrance to the country I can give your name and telephone number, so that you can tell them that you have the names of these families, so that they d not send them back. Upon entrance, the police officer saw 94 people. I told to the police officer, “X knows the names of all these families. He gave us permission and so we came. They reserved us houses in the Bahçeli village. They know about this”. So they called Mr X. He said “I know all of these names. We assigned them houses in Bahçeli. We demanded their arrival as an agricultural workforce”. After [...] that person made these statements, they took us out of the room, told us to wait for half an hour, an hour, a vehicle will come and pick you up. [...] our stuff was loaded [in the bus]. Back then the schools on the eastern side of the Selimiye mosque was used as a guesthouse. We stayed there for 15-20 days. We stayed there to see if children get sick because of climate change and all that. They served us food. The women would tidy up afterwards. They took us here afterwards, everyone settled in houses, so we lived to this day. 89

CHAPTER 5

THE MACRO-LEVEL – LOOKING AT STRUCTURAL and CULTURAL CAUSES
AND STATES’ AGENCIES

The first wave of migration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus constitutes the initial stage in the swift emergence of a migration system between the two states. As was mentioned, a migration system denotes a space, which is marked by relatively stable linkages, of various types, between sending and receiving areas (Arango 2000; Massey et al. 1993; Bakewell et al. 2011; Bakewell 2012). Systems thinking is valuable for the study of the case of immigration from Turkey to North Cyprus in general; and for the case of Bahçeli in particular, since it allows a multi-dimensional and a multi-factorial analysis and so is compatible with a critical realist thinking. As Arango puts it:

Such association [of sending and receiving areas in migration systems] does not only result from migration flows, but is buttressed by connections and links of a varied nature. These linkages, and their multiple interactions, constitute the most appropriate context for the analysis of migration. Such a framework should ultimately be able to integrate the contributions of the remaining theoretical explanations, together with all the actors relevant in the process of migration, including networks and intermediary institutions, and some usually neglected dimensions, particularly the state (Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik 1992) (ibid. 2000: 292).

In such line of thought, the emergence of the migratory system between Turkey and northern Cyprus will be analysed not only looking at the actual flows of immigrants from the former into the latter but also through an examination of relevant contexts, those of structural and cultural nature, in both the sending and the receiving countries and areas. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, causal analysis is a central goal of critical realism when explaining a concrete event (Hedberg 2004; Iosifides 2011) and this chapter as well as the next will endeavour a causal analysis of the emergence of the migration system between Turkey and the northern part of Cyprus.
Since critical realist thinking argues that the social world is stratified, meaning that the causal powers of entities in the higher level strata (i.e. the macro-level) are not possessed by the entities in the lower level strata (meso and/or micro-levels) (Sayer 1992; Priestley 2011; Iosifides 2011) it follows that the generative mechanisms arising from the social interaction at the macro-level are irreducible to those found at the meso and micro-levels (see ibid.). In this line of thinking and to attain a systematic analysis, a macro-level analysis, a meso-level analysis and a micro-level analysis will be performed separately, so as to identify the different generative mechanisms giving rise to immigration from Turkey to northern Cyprus in general and from Trabzon (Araklı) and Mersin (Gülnar) to Bahçeli in particular.

This chapter undertakes the first of these tasks. It seeks to identify macro-level structural and cultural factors, as well as the (macro-level) agency by the two states involved (acting as corporate agents), highlighting inter-linkages between different contexts as well as those between these contexts and empirical events. In so doing it endeavours to identify the underlying mechanisms at the macro-level, which have, in a complex web of interaction with migrants’ agencies at the micro-level, initiated the first migratory wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus in general.

This multi-factorial analysis will moreover bring to the fore that causation of social phenomena like migration is rather complex, and cannot be explained, especially in such less ordinary cases as the one studied here, with the focus on a single set of factors. To be more precise, this chapter will argue against the main thesis put forward by Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009; 2010; 2014) that this first immigration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus can be regarded as a case of labour migration caused especially by structural pull mechanisms at the place of destination. It will be argued here instead, that without taking cultural and ideational (i.e. political) factors into consideration it is almost impossible to explain the causation of the first migratory wave studied here. This chapter will thus highlight the cultural and political character of the first migratory wave from Turkey to North Cyprus.
5.1 Examining the Economic Approach to the First Migration Wave from Turkey to the Northern Part of Cyprus

Before attempting at an explanation of the first migration wave from Turkey on the macro-level, existing approaches towards the subject need to be reflected upon. There are in fact very few studies on the migration wave in question, and except for the research carried out by Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009) there has been no research-based attempt at explaining it theoretically (for research on aspects of this migration wave see the literature review in 3.2.1). On the other hand, one dominant view about this migratory wave in question has focused exclusively on its political character. Within this perspective, Turkey is regarded as the coloniser of the northern part of the island and the first migration wave from Turkey with which a large number of Turkish population was settled in the villages left behind by Greek Cypriots is understood as an attempt to further solidify and guarantee the existence of Turkey on the island. This perspective has serious shortcomings: it either ignores the experiences of the immigrants altogether, or in its extreme versions, argues that these immigrants (the so-called “settlers”) are just passive pawns in the hands of Turkey and the collaborating Turkish Cypriot ruling elite, who actively strive towards the continuation of the partition of the island.

Somewhat on the opposite pole, the “labour migration” thesis regarding the initial migratory wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus was put forward by scholars Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009; 2010; 2014). These scholars have conducted a rather extensive TÜBİTAK funded research on the subject during 2007-2009. In their study they focused on all migration waves from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus from 1975 to 2009 and revealed many detailed accounts relating especially to immigrants’ experiences of migration and settlement, their problems of adaptation and experiences of social exclusion (ibid.).

Although revealing most of its peculiarities, the authors prefer to conceptualise not only the later waves but also the very first wave of migration from Turkey to northern Cyprus as a case of “labour migration”. In other words, they explain the first migratory wave, which is also the subject of the present thesis, by employing an economic approach, in line with a push-pull theory of migration. They argue that the first migratory wave was caused
especially by a “severe shortage of labour” in the northern part of Cyprus after the division, since it had lost a great deal of its human capital after the removal of Greek Cypriots from the northern part of the island (2009: 55-59). Although the authors also mention the context of state-building by saying “having acquired the military and political control of 36-38 of the island which was disproportional to their population, Turkish Cypriot state also needed to control their state economically” (ibid: 56, translated by A.T.) they do not further employ any cultural/political factors such as ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism’ in their analysis of the migration wave under question. They therefore reach the following conclusion regarding the causation of the first wave:

Considering its role in filling the labour shortage that North Cyprus experienced after the division, the migrations between 1975-1979 are precisely labour migrations. However the extreme emphasis put on the political side of this migration, had concealed its labour migration character and the human factor it involved (Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009: 218 translated by A.T.).

In their 2010 article the authors once again make economic factors the central focus of their analysis, they also mention that the ethnic minority situation of Turkish Cypriots may be a co-factor in the receiving context, although they do not discuss it any further. They argue:

Considering its role in filling the labour shortage that North Cyprus experienced after the division, the migrations between 1975-1979 are, in part, precisely labour migrations. Yet they are caused by the severe labour shortage in North Cyprus and the incentives offered to the immigrants in order to escape being a minority, rather than unemployment in Turkey (Kurtuluş & Purkis 2010: 480 translated by A.T.).

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The authors’ main thesis is that the first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus is to a large extent determined by economic factors. They argue that this is especially so when one focuses, as they call it on the human aspect of this migration:

Regarding the immigrants, this migration, like other labour migrations too, has economic reasons at its roots. Irrespective of the political ideas of those who had ‘resettled’ them, the immigrants had migrated so that they had land to cultivate and make a living (2009: 218; see also 2010: 501; translated by A.T.).

Even if this migration wave can be explained solely by economic factors at the micro-level as the authors argue, this does not justify their labour-migration thesis considering the totality of this case. Moreover it will be simplistic to assume that the micro-level too is determined solely by economic factors. The main issue that has to be criticised considering Kurtuluş and Purkis’s approach is that they employ an incomplete analysis of the empirical case they study. While economic factors may have played a dominant role (yet not the only role) within the migration generating mechanisms on the micro-level, the mechanisms simultaneously operating at the macro-level cannot be side-lined, and the generative mechanisms found at this level were not dominated by economic factors. In other words, it is impossible to consider this migratory movement without the structural and cultural factors as well as states’ motivations at the macro-level, since these had indeed constructed the political, economic and legal framework within which individual immigrants have exercised their agencies.

In their 2014 book, the authors partly repeat their labour migration thesis considering the case of the first wave. They depart from the macro-level and offer an analysis with regards to mainly economic-structural factors, underlining that the bringing of immigrants from Turkey, i.e. the ethnic selectivity immanent in this case of migration is a mere contingent factor. They argue:

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92 […] göçmenler açısından bakıldığında bu göçün temelinde de diğer işgúcü göçleri gibi ekonomik nedenler vardır. Göçmenler kendilerini ‘yerleştirenlerin’ politik düşüncelerinden bağımsız olarak, işleyebilecekleri ve geçimlerini sağlayabilecekleri bir toprak için göç etmişlerdir (2009: 218; see also 2010: 5001).
The geographical redistribution of population on a homogeneous ethnoreligious basis after the final division of the island, had on the one hand, given rise to a severe labour shortage in the North, as well as to a clear collapse of societal division of labour. [...] An agreement to reunify the island, on the other hand, could not be reached in the short run. [...] The problems that North Cyprus had, which had emerged as a novel political-geographical space after 1974, due to the population it had lost through the involuntary emigration, had become visible during the very first year. That the crops could not be harvested during the harvest season for citrus fruits, just a few months after the division, was the first indicator. This problem was tried to be overcome with use of a seasonal workforce supplied by Turkey. However, it was noticed shortly afterwards that the shortage of labour was something structural caused by the involuntary geographical redistribution of labour in the island rather than being confined to the citrus production sector only. Because of the non-recognition of the Turkish Administration of North Cyprus by the international community, it was not possible to recruit labour force from the regional or the international labour markets. Therefore, the only country where labour could have been recruited was the Republic of Turkey, which had recognised the in 1975 founded Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) (ibid: 6-7, translated by A.T., italics added).93

Once again after mentioning that the Turkish Cypriot political leadership has had the “political desire” (Kurtuluş & Purkis 2014: 7 italics in original) to increase the Turkish (Cypriot) population of the island through bringing of immigrants from Turkey, they imply that this is merely an outcome, not a real causal factor per se. As can be seen the authors prioritize economic-structural factors over the political factors in their explanation. In a rather brief paragraph they argue that the main factor in the causation of the wave was a “radical shortage of labour”:

On the other hand, this severe shortage of labour was seen as a great political opportunity [by Turkish Cypriots] to reinforce and strengthen the existence of Turkish Cypriots in the island and to escape the situation of being the minority in the island, which had happened due to the rapid loss of population of Turkish Cypriots starting in the period of transition of the control of the island form the Ottomans over to the British and due to clashes controlled by paramilitary powers, which were intensifying since the 1950s. In other words, the problem of labour shortage, which surfaced as a real problem after the division, had offered a legitimate basis for the realisation of the political desire of increasing the Turkish population in the island through [the recruitment of] migrants coming from Turkey (ibid; translated by A.T.).

However, in their 2014 book, unlike in their 2009 project report, Kurtuluş and Purkis, do more openly acknowledge that the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite of the period had facilitated this migration partly in order to boost the population of the Turkish Cypriots. Yet their general conceptualisation does not take this agential motivation (which according to critical realism is a causal factor) and accompanying cultural factors like ideas and discourses on nation and ethnicity into consideration as constitutive elements of this migratory wave.

Kurtuluş and Purkis (2014) do not see it necessary to employ a different conceptualisation, which goes beyond an economic-structural explanation, to explain the peculiarities of the case of first wave immigrations to northern Cyprus. Political-cultural factors are not incorporated into the explanatory analysis, and although these are deemed to be part of the motivations of the Turkish Cypriot state, they are not directly linked to the causation of the case. Once again the justification for this argument is given by directing the focus of attention to the immigrants (i.e. the micro-level).

The collapse of the division of labour in North Cyprus and the problem of labour shortage, which arose due to the involuntary migration of the Greek Cypriots to the southern part, was not tried to be solved by demanding a male labour force like in classical labour migrations, but by demanding peasant

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94 Diğer yandan, bu radikal işgücü açığı, Ada’nın Osmanlı yönetiminden İngiliz yönetimine geçişyle başlayan ve 1950’lerin ortalarından itibaren para-militer güçlerin kontrol ettiği çatışmalar nedeniyle hızlanan nüfus kaybının neden olduğu azınlık pozisyonundan kurtulmak ve Kıbrıs’ta Türk varlığını yeniden güçlendirmek için büyük bir politik fırsat olarak görülmuştur. Diğer bir deyişle, bölünmeden sonra gerçek bir problem olarak ortaya çıkan işgücü açığı, Ada’da Türk nüfusunun Türkiye’den gelecek göçmenlerle çoğaltılması yönündeki politik arzunun gerçekleşmesine mesruiyet zemini oluşturulmuştur (ibid.).
communities comprising families. This was at the same time related to the aim of increasing the Turkish population, which had become the minority [in the island] by 1974. It is this aim that creates a political counter-discourse, which is so powerful that it conceals the immigrants’ reasons for migration and the difficulties they go through (ibid: 118 Translated by A.T.)\(^95\).

Kurtuluş and Purkis developed their labour migration thesis especially as a critique of what they see as a ‘highly political’ understanding of migrations from Turkey to northern Cyprus both in the international arena especially influenced by Greek Cypriots and among some Turkish Cypriot academicians. They argue that an emphasis of the micro-level can serve as a means to overcome this political determinism:

To see the immigrants, which make up the first immigration wave to North Cyprus just as a population “transferred” to Cyprus for Turkey to realise its colonial ambitions and to create in North Cyprus a reservoir of votes in favour of the Turkish Cypriot political elite loyal to Turkey, is widespread among the Greek Cypriots and the international community […]. The perspective that views immigrants as a transferred population reduces population movements to numbers and hence disregards the societal and class positions of the immigrants. Therefore this perspective is politically deterministic and makes it hard to conduct sociological, economic and spatial studies on the economic-geographical labour movements between North Cyprus and Turkey and their periodically changing qualities. It is so hard to overcome this political determinism, that the researchers have had to ask themselves during this research: “Could we be also perceived as researchers serving the colonial ambitions of the country [Turkey]?”. It was due to this political determinism that we had to repeat, many times, that we were looking at the subject, not from the point of view of the states’ or international political interests’ or strategically experts’, but from a modern migration theories perspective and from the viewpoint of immigrants. It is surely possible to perceive this first migration wave as a population engineering carried out by the collaboration of Turkey and Turkish Cypriot Political Leadership, regarding its form, the planning of the immigration, the selection of the places where the immigrants were to be resettled, the organised relocation of the immigrants […]. However, the situation is different regarding the contents. Oral history interviews with pioneer migrants have clearly revealed that, for the villagers

\(^{95}\) Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta Rumların Güney'e zorunlu göçleriyle çökken işbölümü ve işgücü açığı sorununu, Türkiye'den klasik anlamda işgücü göçü sayılabilerek erkek işgücü talep edilerek değil de, ailelerden oluşan köylü toplulukları talep edilerek çözme çabası, aynı zamanda Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta 1974'te aznîk seviyesine düşmüş Türk nüfusu artırma amacını da içinde barındırmaktadır. İşte bu amaç, göçmenlerin göçme nedenlerinin ve yaşadıkları zorlu göçme süreçlerinin üstünü örtmek güçte bir politik karşı söyleme neden olmaktadır (ibid: 118).
who had no chance of making a living in their own places of origin, this migration is nothing more than a typical migration movement, though with the encouragement of some incentives, that they undertook to another country to try and make a living, like anywhere else in the world (2009: 219-220, Translated by AT).  

Kurtuluş and Purkis must be given credit regarding their strong advocacy for the immigrants and their deconstruction of the immigrants’ highly political representation. In this sense the authors rightly emphasise the human aspect of this migration and show via immigrants’ oral history accounts that the motivations of individual migrants are surely different from that of political actors. Indeed my own research too has revealed, that the intentions of the political actors in facilitating this immigrant settlement in the northern part of the island are often not even understood let alone shared by the immigrants themselves. However, although any migration research must be careful in the way it intentionally or unintentionally constructs migrant representations, Carling’s (2005) warning must be borne in mind that “good advocacy is not always the same as good research” (ibid: 18).  

Rather, a complete analysis of migration, considering any empirical case, must add multiple levels of aggregation into the
analysis and within each of these, consider a multitude of factors, be they of economic, political or ideological nature, rather than overemphasising single dimensions, factors or levels of analysis. The challenge is, furthermore, not to construct an adversary discourse towards the immigrants in so doing.

It must also be noted that Kurtuluş and Purkis (2014) seem to have partly backed away from their original argument about the first migration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus in that they are more open to the recognition of the political motivations of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments in facilitating this migration (which they note in the conclusion part of their study see 285-295).98 Yet they seem to suggest once again, although this is not always so clear, that political actors’ reasons are not necessarily relevant in the causal explanation of the case.99

This thesis argues, contrary to Kurtuluş and Purkis’s arguments, that cultural factors along with economic ones, especially ideas about ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism’, were central in the causal mechanisms relating to the case of the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus. To be more precise, it is the interplay of cultural factors with structural and agential factors on the macro-level, that had engendered the necessary context, within which the immigrants made their migration decisions. That being said, this thesis argues that migration can only be explained through a multi-dimensional analysis, and suggests that some analytical steps need to be taken into consideration in so doing. These are:

98 That the authors only in the conclusion of their book that they devote some space to the discussion of the wider political-historical context of the first migration wave is a further weakness regarding the coherence of their thesis.

99 Moreover their book title “Immigrants from Turkey in North Cyprus” [Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Türkiyeli Göçmenler] is also more in line with their focus of attention, which is on the immigrants rather than the migration itself and so less problematic than the title of their original research which claimed to conceptually explain “Turkish migration to North Cyprus”. Their research project report was titled: „The Characteristics of Turkish Migration to North Cyprus and the Economic, Socio-Spatial Integration Problems of Turkish Migrants“ [Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Türk Göçünün Niteliği ve Göçmenlerin Ekonomik Sosyo-Mekansal Bütünleşme Sorunları] and so implied to explain the migration case and not only the case of immigrants.
1. Firstly, an analytical differentiation between macro, meso and micro-levels of aggregation.

2. Secondly, a genuine recognition that causation is complex and multi-factorial. Therefore not only economic and structural but also cultural as well as agential factors (operating at different levels) need to be taken into account as real causal factors rather than mere contingencies.

3. Thirdly, it needs also to be recognised that only when the *interplay* of all of these levels and factors are taken into consideration and are carefully studied, can a complete analysis be made which is non-reductionist, non-determinist, multi-factorial and multi-dimensional.

5.2 An Alternative Conceptualisation: Underlining Multi-Dimensionality and Multi-Factorial Causation of the First Immigration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus

The previous subsection has criticised the conceptualisation of the first migratory wave by Kurtuluş and Purkis as a more or less typical case of labour migration, which they argued to be a theoretically based alternative to political discourses considering this migratory movement a type of politically motivated population engineering and the immigrants as the agents of this political motivation. As was explained in detail, however, their conceptualisation remains far from constituting a sufficiently acceptable alternative explanation since it ignores a vital characteristic of migratory movements in general as well as of the case of first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus in particular; and this is their multi-dimensionality.

In a similar sense, Elder-Vass argues leaning on Bhaskar that “[a]ctual events […] are not produced by single causes as the covering law model suggests, but by a complex interaction of the causal powers of the entities involved. Outside the closed systems of the laboratory, multiple causal powers constantly interact with each other” (2010: 47). In this line of thought migration has to be conceptualised foremost as a complex event; caused by an interplay of a multitude of causally relevant factors. This is also true for the initiation of the first wave of migration between Turkey and the northern part of Cyprus on the one hand and for the
emergence of a migration system between these two geographical places on the other. Against this background, the following sections focus on the macro-level to identify and analyse various factors, which partook within the migration generating mechanisms concerned. These will try to systematically reveal, in the light of a critical realist framework, structural, cultural and agential factors respectively, which can be causally related to the first migratory wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus.

5.2.1 Structural Factors

According to critical realism structure (as well as culture) has emergent properties in its own right, that is, it has causative powers independent of individual actors (Porpora 1998; 2013). Structural factors most commonly associated with the causation of migratory movements in general are demographic structures (i.e. population densities) and economic structures related to the relations of production and the socio-economic division of labour (national as well as international). These socio-economic structures are, in turn, causally related to two important macro-economic indicators directly linked to causation of migratory movements, i.e. supply and demand for labour. These macro-economic factors have especially been emphasised within the so-called push-pull theories of migration. The push-pull framework, including the neo-classical approach to migration, expects people to migrate from geographical areas with high labour supply (and high population density) to areas of high labour demand (and low population density), due to the effects of wage differentials between these regions, until the latter and therefore the incentives for migration are eliminated (de Haas 2007: 11-12). Although this thesis argues that a push–pull explanation is not satisfactory (for instance that of Kurtuluş and Purkis’s), it regards, in line with a critical realist theoretical framework, that socio-economic factors, among which are labour supply and demand on the macro-level, do play their roles within migration generating mechanisms; and so they deserve to be part of the analysis. Therefore it can be postulated for the case at

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100 This was especially discernible in Western Europe when the countries stopped their official recruitment of migrant labour around the year 1973. After this year immigration still continued in other forms (see Castles & Miller 1998) especially in form of family reunion, since structural (i.e. migrant networks, segmented labour markets etc.) and cultural factors (like stigmatization of certain migrant jobs in the receiving states and the establishment of a culture of migration in the sending states) were involved, independently of the states’ agential powers, in mechanisms generating further migrations.
hand that socio-economic factors among broader structural factors that can be related to the causation of the first migratory wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus are a high labour surplus in Turkey and a high labour demand in the northern part of Cyprus in the period concerned.\textsuperscript{101}

In the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s, Turkey had experienced a significant movement of people within its borders, in the form of internal rural to urban migrations (Yasa & Bozkurt 1974; Yıldırım 2010). It has been argued that it was the changes in the traditional division of labour brought about by rural transformation processes, which had played a significant part in the causation of these movements. According to Yıldırım (2010), rural transformation processes are the outcome of a complex interplay between “capitalist development, modernisation and urbanisation” taking place in Turkey in that period (ibid: 400 translated by A.T.). These, he argues, had led to the rise of the so-called “small peasantry” (küçük köylülük) making it difficult for traditional farmers to survive in their villages (ibid.).\textsuperscript{102}

Turkey also started experiencing large-scale overseas emigration starting from the 1960’s (Abadan-Unat; 1995; 2011; Sirkeci 2002)\textsuperscript{103}. According to Abadan-Unat (2011) whereas Turkish citizens emigrated on individual accounts in the first phase of Turkish emigration to

\textsuperscript{101} Even though basing their argument on such a push-pull explanation of migration, the formerly mentioned scholars Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009; 2014) regard the factors pertaining to Turkey that may generate potential emigrants, i.e. the so-called push-factors at the macro-level, not to be of great significance. Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009; 2010) argue that socio-economic factors pertaining to Turkey cannot be considered among the main causes of migration to North Cyprus. In a similar way Şahin et al. (2013) too argue “[...] it appears that, factors like surplus labour, low-wage policies and unemployment and unfavourable basic economic conditions in Turkey are not among the main causes of migration [to North Cyprus]” (Şahin et al 2013: 617; translated by AT) (Sonuç olarak, göç etme nedenleri arasında Türkiye’de yaşanan işgücü fazlası, düşük ücret politikaları, işsizlik gibi temel ekonomik koşulların yetersizliği gibi faktörlerin temel etken olmadığı anlaşılmaktadır).

\textsuperscript{102} This is, according to the author, a phenomenon caused by a number of factors like mechanisation in agricultural production (through use of tractors); changes in the legal context (especially through Land Laws known as the ÇTK act -Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu- of 1945 which allowed the allocation of agricultural land to landless peasant families) as well as demographic developments like population growth leading to less agrarian land per capita. The developments in the infrastructure, i.e. motorways, in the framework of the Marshall plan, can also be causally related to these issues (Yıldırım 2010).

\textsuperscript{103} This is also partly due to the Turkish state policy regarding emigration until that time, then as Abadan-Unat (2011) notes, Turkish Citizens were granted the constitutional right to emigrate in 1961 for the first time (ibid: 10).
Europe in 1950’s, the second phase of Turkish emigration to Europe in the 1960’s was characterised by mass migrations on the basis of bilateral labour recruitment agreements with European Governments. Whereas Germany received the greatest number of immigrant labourers (648,602 between 1961-1974 according to Yasa & Bozkurt, 1975: 50) other states like Austria, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland France, Sweden and Denmark also received labourers from Turkey on the basis of these bilateral labour agreement. This second phase lasted until 1973/1974 when the receiving countries stopped labour recruitment from abroad altogether due to the global oil crisis (ibid; Castles & Miller 1998).

According to Abadan-Unat (2011) the 1960’s were “years of high unemployment, and many Turks looked to going abroad as a means of economic improvement” (ibid: 11). In these years emigration was also encouraged by the Turkish state via the so-called “5 Year Development Plan”, which aimed, among other things, at “population control and the export of surplus labour” (ibid: 12). This policy brought emigration under state control rather than leaving it to be an individual business (ibid). Among related economic factors, İçduygu (2011) counts “economic decline and increasing income inequalities” (ibid: 11). Considering the periods of 1960’s and 1970’s, Sirkeci (2002; 2003) also underlines among others, the effects of ethnic conflict in Turkey, via the notion of “environment of insecurity”, which have been effective in the emigration of Kurdish population, though they made up until the 1980s, a rather small percentage of all emigrants from Turkey (7-8% until 1980). Furthermore, almost half of Turkish emigrants during this phase comprised rural population (Yasa and Bozkurt 1974: 57) so that it can be argued that generative mechanisms leading to internal rural-urban flows within Turkey can also be related to overseas emigration of Turkish nationals. Bostanoğlu (1987) argues the following in this sense: “International migration, we should remark, is an extension of internal migration beyond the borders of the country; and has somewhat diminished the magnitude of the ‘crisis’. Therefore, international migrations

\[^{104}\text{After this year Turkish migration to Europe continued especially on the basis of family reunions (Castles & Miller 1998: 14-17).}\]
can be regarded as a ‘long distance’ type of Turkish urbanisation process” (ibid: 91; translated by A.T.).

The first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus was, as described in the previous chapter, also regulated by a bilateral labour recruitment agreement, thus making it an issue of the states rather than individuals. Because it comprised to a large extent peasant families, the first wave of immigration to northern Cyprus can also be causally related to the emigration generating mechanisms like rural transformation processes in Turkey, which made emigration abroad a necessity for the peasants who were gradually becoming uprooted from traditional rural relations of production. Indeed most of the pioneer migrants of rural origin I interviewed, stated that they had indeed had the intention of emigration from their villages to elsewhere, mostly to overseas, prior to their decision to immigrate to northern Cyprus (see Chapter 5). The immigrants coming from the cities too were relatively poor and were in seek of an economic improvement of their living conditions. Ethnic conflict in Turkey was also a reason for the participation of a Kurdish population in the first immigration wave to northern Cyprus, like to other European countries during this period (see Sirkeci 2002; 2003; Sirkeci, Cohen & Yazgan 2012, Kurtuluş and Purkis 2009).

Lastly, another factor that can be causally related to the first wave originating in the place of origin is the various infrastructure constructions (especially dam projects), and various environmental problems in Turkey (i.e. floods, landslide, earthquakes etc.) which led to projects of village relocations and resettlements within the country. According to Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009; 2014) the largest part of the immigrants within the first wave, were landless villagers who had demanded from the Turkish government to be resettled elsewhere in Turkey. This is in fact not necessarily specific to this case, but a phenomenon also found in emigration to Europe from Turkey. For instance, According to Sirkeci (2002) due to the Keban Dam project and a major earthquake in Varto in 1967, “people from these areas were given priority if they prefer[ed] to go abroad for work instead of settling down in anywhere else in Turkey” (ibid: 13).

Yet emigration-generating mechanisms, like rural transformation processes, urbanisation etc. are not sufficient to explain the emergence of the case of migration under scrutiny. On the contrary, an analysis of the latter remains incomplete without the consideration of the mechanisms, which attract emigrants to the place of destination, among which are structural factors pertaining to the northern part of Cyprus. In this respect, the main structural factor (though it must be underlining that it is neither the sole nor the most important causal factor) to be identified, as was done by Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009; 2014), is the shortage of labour arising in the northern part of the island after its 1974 division.

A labour shortage in the agricultural sector is the officially stated reason behind the facilitation of the first wave of immigration to northern Cyprus by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot states who signed a bilateral labour recruitment agreement in 1975. Particularly one of the interviewees, P3 who was a high ranking bureaucrat from Turkey during the initiation of the first migration wave, had explicitly underlined that Turkish Cypriot demand for labour was the main reason behind the initiation of the first migratory wave and so the main cause:

The essential factor here, I remember, was to fill the huge economic gap, labour shortage here [in northern Cyprus]. For instance there were fields, orange orchards. Oranges were rotting on the trees because there was no one to collect them. At the end of the day, you have to plant carrots, you have to plant potatoes. There was no one to do the planting. Some were martyred, [...] the number of the martyrs is not small considering the population of Cyprus. The male workforce had diminished in size, men were needed for some jobs, women could not do the same jobs. Such social factors were effective, but the main factor I remember, is the need here. It was the need, the demand uttered by the Turkish Cypriots. Why would Turkey send [the migrants] on its own, when there was no such demand?106

106 [...] esas faktör, ben hatırlıyorum, yani esas faktör şeydi, buradaki büyük bir ekonomik boşluğu doldurmak, insan gücü boşluğuunu doldurmak. Mesela tarlalar var, portakal bahçeleri var, portakallar ağaçların üstünde çürüyor çünkü toplayacak adam yok. Sonuçta havuç ekeceksiniz, patates ekeceksiniz, ekecek adam yok. İşte bir kısmı şehit olmuş, [...] Kıbrıs'ın ölçüsünde az değil tabii şehit olanların sayısı. Erkek iş gücünde azalma var, işte bazı işleri daha çok erkekler yapıyor, kadınların aynı iş yapmaları zor. Bu gibi sosyal nedenler etkili oldu ama benim hatırladığım ilk faktör, en önemli faktör buradaki şeydir, ihtiyaçtır. Kıbrıslı Türklerin dile getirdikleri ihtiyaç, taleptir, yani burada talep olmasa Türkiye kendi kendine niye yolların?
He continues:

[...] I [...] came into office here in December 1974. There was then such an appalling view. We went to Morphou for instance, there were stray pigs running in empty fields, without supervision, there was no one to collect them. There were many animals running around, fruits were rotting on the trees, people were unable to work. There were only few people who could immediately be transformed into a ready workforce [...] As I see it is very wide-spread in our society to link everything to a political motivation, this is so in Turkey an it is so here [in Cyprus]. What big political reasons, ideas were behind this [policy]? It must be seen that things happen sometimes, many times, due to social needs. I mean there was such a social and economic situation that it forces you to provide labour power, at least temporarily.107

According to a critical realist outlook actors’ reasons play an important role in causal mechanisms. Yet this recognition renders it crucial for the researcher to be cautious. Regarding the issue of whether to take agential reasons at face value Iosifides (2011) warns “[u]nderstanding the role of human reasons in causal explanation of social action presupposes the differentiation between real reasons and rationalisations [...]” (ibid: 65). Thus, what political actors present as reasons may well be rationalisations of their political actions. Moreover, as was argued in the previous section which criticised Kurtuluş and Purkis’s labour demand thesis, it seems to be too simplistic to take socio-economic factors, deprived of wider contexts to be sufficient causal factors. To underline once again the labour demand thesis is oversimplifying the causation of the first wave immigration from Turkey to North Cyprus in three respects: firstly by taking Turkish and Turkish Cypriot official justifications to be the cause; secondly by considering economic factors like labour-demand isolated from their wider contexts of class relations of production; and thirdly by overemphasising structural economic factors over non-economic ones.

Regarding the first issue, i.e. the differentiation between real reasons and rationalisations, it must be underlined that few peculiarities of this migration case look rather suspicious. Most important among these is the rather striking fact that this particular migration policy lacked economic rationality in many respects. For instance this movement did not contain the in Western Europe found economic rationality regarding the minimisation of the socio-economic costs of migration (Castles & Miller 1998). In contrast to immigration to Western Europe, the intention in the import of immigrants was to assure their permanent settlement. Therefore whole extended families or kin-groups, even whole village communities rather than individual labourers were recruited. This was a rather cost intensive utilization of labour migration for the restructuring a post-war economy. There were small children as well as elderly within the immigrant groups who needed cost intensive state care like education and health services, as well as old-age pensions. In this regard a then middle-ranked state official (I4) I interviewed who was involved in the settlement of the immigrants in the villages comments:

They brought old men with cancer; we brought and settled a 90 year-old man from the harbour on a stretcher. Whether it is labelled “Agricultural Labour Program” or not, the real reason behind this migration was population transfer. When transferring this population we brought a village as a whole. There are young people and children but also old people in the village. We brought this man on a stretcher and he died after a few days. We visited the villages all the time. We asked, during a visit what had happened to the man, they said “he had cancer and he died”. I mean we brought a man with cancer, he died in Cyprus and we buried him in Cyprus.108

Moreover, the lack of further policies to promote the development of agricultural production and to use this imported labour productively is also strikingly absent. In this respect many of the interviews and informal conversations with pioneer migrants revealed that they were rather disappointed with the lack of orientation and assistance in Cyprus to enable their adaptation to the kind of agricultural production in the island, as well as with the negative

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attitude of the state, which did not support their production. Many of the pioneer migrants I interviewed and spoke to during the participant observation emphasised this point, stating that they had hard time being economically active in the agricultural sector. The statement quoted below was made by one of my interviewees who is now self-employed in the transportation business. It is illustrative of the perception of many of the immigrants in the village, that after their resettlement in Cyprus they were left on their own to figure out how to make a living:

They brought people for agriculture, as agricultural workers. You will find that in official documents if you look into those. The brought the people here as agricultural workers, but no one could do agriculture/farming, they did not let them. [...] People needed guidance, but they didn’t do that. On the contrary they ruined those who did farming (TM3, 54, male, 1. generation, Trabzon).109

Regarding the second issue, that is, the class aspects of the labour-demand of the Turkish Cypriot state, one must also take the interests of the Turkish Cypriot capitalist class into consideration, who also had the political upper hand. In this respect it can be argued that the dominant Turkish Cypriot capitalist class had genuine interests in utilising migration as a means to enlarge its share of market on the one hand, and on the other hand to have access to an army of cheap labour. The Turkish Cypriot bourgeois was engaged in capitalist accumulation, especially since the 1950’s, through nationalist means. With serious concerns about their unequal economic development in relation to the Greek Cypriot capitalist class, the Turkish Cypriot bourgeois saw the creation of a “Turkish economy” as a way forward (Erhürman 2006; Kızılyürek 2002). This involved the taking of due measures, the most striking of which was the “from Turk to Turk campaign” (Türkten-Türke kampanyası)110


110 Denktaş reflects on this policy as follows „In that period (1958-1960) we had established a campaign called from Turk to Turk, for the purpose of the Turkish community to support each other. The Greek Cypriots were really upset. It was not in their advantage to lose a 120,000-person market. This was also posing a threat to the interests of a small group of Turks which had earned an income by selling from the Greeks to Turks. We claimed to be forming a novel Turkish market with importers and exporters“ (Denktaş, 2005: 73 in Erhürman 2006: 96, translated by A.T.). (“O zaman (1958-1960) biz Türkün Türkü koruması gerekçesiyle Türkten Türke kampanyasını diye bir kampanya başlatmıştık. Rumlara çok dokunmuştu bu. 120,000 kişilik bir çerçeve kaybetmek kendi için iyi bir şey değildi.
which was being promoted in the 1950s (ibid.). In this respect, according to Erhürman (2006), the division of the island in 1974 could be interpreted as an achievement of the Turkish Cypriot bourgeois in creating a national market independent of Greek Cypriots. This has opened up new possibilities to this dominant class, further extended by the recruitment of immigrants from Turkey which broadened this national Turkish market –through also creating connections to the Turkish mainland economy- on the one hand; and by supplying the bourgeois with cheap labour, on the other hand.\footnote{This has had, as will later be discussed, repercussions on the relationship between the immigrants and the Turkish Cypriot subordinate classes and the Turkish Cypriot left representing the latter.}

Finally the third issue mentioned above was the overemphasis of structural economic factors in the explanation of the first migration wave. In this regard the repeatedly underlined argument within this thesis is that, it is impossible to explain migration through economic structural factors alone. The explanation of migration with reference to supply and demand for labour in the framework of push –pull theories of migration, would at the best be reductionist and incomplete. Such an explanation disregards the historical-political context of the migratory wave at hand, ignores the roles played by further social and cultural factors in its causation and renders agencies of the migrants’ invisible. De Haas argues when commenting on migration theories in the neo-classical line in general that “(m)igration does not take place in a social, cultural, political, and institutional void” (2007: 14). When considering migrations especially by Kurdish citizens of Turkey for instance, Sirkeci highlights the significance of ethnic conflict alongside other socio-economic factors (Sirkeci 2003; 2002; Sirkeci, Cohen & Yazgan 2012). In a similar sense, it must be underlined for northern Cyprus that the 1974 division of the island had created a new political opportunity for the Turkish Cypriot community, which had been in the minority and in a disadvantaged position both politically and economically on the one hand, and on the other hand, in which Turkish nationalism had become the hegemonic ideal seeking to construct a nation state, a national economy as well as an \textit{ethnically Turkish} population. In this respect, even if the labour shortage/demand thesis is to be accepted as partially explanatory of the first migration
wave, a valid explanation must not ignore that the restructuring of economy that was taking place in the northern part of the island after the division was taking place in a context of Turkish Cypriot nation-state building. Hatay (2007) implies thus as he writes “[t]his policy was designed to bolster the Turkish population and create a viable economy independent of Greek Cypriots” (ibid: 2, italics added). This necessitated the due use of ideas of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’. Therefore it is not possible to ignore ideas on ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ in the causation of this migratory wave. These belong to the cultural factors which will be explained below.

5.2.2 Cultural Factors

In the critical realist perspective, culture denotes “beliefs, norms, ideas and other kinds of information” (Priestley 2011: 13; Archer 1995), or in other words, an ideational system as opposed to the material system encompassing structures (Porpora 2013). Moreover these are deemed to interact with structural and agential factors in the production of actual events. This is also true for the first wave of migration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus, so that without the analysis of cultural factors its explanation is not possible. More specifically, without understanding the historical, political, cultural and ideational relationships between Turkey and Cyprus as well as those between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities in the island, it is not possible to fully explain the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus after the division.

In the following, a macro-level analysis of cultural factors will be endeavoured, especially highlighting the emergence of ethnic nationalism, which, as will be suggested, acts as an essential cultural context in which the migration movements from Turkey started in 1975. The next subsection (5.2.2.1) will scrutinise the rise of conflicting ethnic nationalisms in Cyprus that had led to inter-communal clashes and the division of the island, and the following one (5.2.2.2) will concentrate on the development of ‘Turkish nationalism’, which is the ideational context during Turkish Cypriots’ nation-state building, of which, the first wave of immigrations from Turkey were an essential part.

5.2.2.1 Rise of Ethnic Turkish Nationalism Among Turkish Cypriots

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According to Kizilyurek-Gauter Kizilyurek (2004) pre-modern Cyprus was a non-nationalist territory where the idea of “a nation” with a single overriding cultural identity made little sense (ibid: 40; see also Gellner 1983). In this atmosphere, cultures and cultural/religious identities could exist side by side in relative harmony as they were neither politicized nor burdened with the idea of a homogenized ethno-national identity (ibid.). Therefore, after the 1571 Ottoman occupation of Cyprus and the following population transfer to the island, the mixed society in Cyprus comprising a majority of Christian Orthodox Cypriots, a relative minority of Muslim Cypriots; and some smaller groups like Maronites, Armenians, Latins and Jews cohabited in the island in relative harmony (Keefe and Solsten, 1993; Nevzat 2005, Kizilyurek & Gauter- Kizilyurek 2004; Şahin 2008; Bozkurt and Trimikliniotis 2012) even though there had not been much convergence among them (Nevzat 2005).

Yet things changed as modernity took its course in this territory, starting towards the end of the Ottoman rule and accelerating with the advent of the British administration in 1878 (Kizilyurek & Gauter-Kizilyurek 2004; Nevzat 2005; Şahin 2008). This process entailed the creation of politicized ethno-national identities out of traditional religious ones and the subsequent rise of competing and conflicting ethno-nationalisms (ibid; see Gellner 1983; 1997). This is not a process exclusive to Cyprus. On the contrary as Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) argue, the period of 1870 to 1918 corresponds to one of intense nation-building periods in the world, in which nationalism is born:

“A concept of “ethnic” and/or “racial” peoplehood began to replace “civic”

112 The degree of harmony and peacefulness of the relationships between the Christian and Muslim populations of Cyprus subject to dispute. Whereas some scholars suggest total integration of the communities, others have shown proof of occasional dispute (i.e. Çevikel 2002). Even those who are critical of the ‘nostalgic’ overemphasis of the tranquility of the relations between the communities in this period, suggest that the relations were usually peaceful It can therefore be argued that, “Cyprus under the Ottomans was neither an island of persistent interethnic hostility, nor one of political, social and cultural uniformity or integration” but “[n]otwithstanding occasional reports of quarrels and squabbles, there is little of substance that could lead us to intimate that there was any persistent, widespread conflict between the two main communities on the island during Ottoman rule, even towards its more insecure end” (Nevzat 2005: 65).

113 One exception may be ambivalent identity of Linobambakoi who were a small group of Greek speaking Muslims.
conception initially shaped by Enlightenment philosophers and concretized in the course of the US, French and Haitian revolutions. The people now primarily meant a nation united through common ancestry and a shared homeland, no matter where its members might have wandered” (ibid: 312-314).

In this sense the endeavours of nation-state building in both Greek and Turkish mainlands, had transformative effects on both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. As the latter got acquainted with the ideas of nation and nationalism, these communities underwent the process of cultural elaboration: i.e., they were gradually transformed into modern ‘ethnic communities’ with distinct national/ethno-cultural identities (Kizilyurek & Gauter-Kizilyurek 2004). This process also entailed structural elaboration, in which traditional relations between communities were reorganised into hierarchical power-relations, organised along ethnic lines that entailed competition, dispute and resentment instead of – a significant level of - mutual accommodation and solidarity (see Pollis 1998; Kizilyürek 2002; Kizilyurek &Gauter-Kizilyurek 2004; Nevzat 2005).114

Obviously modernity did not bring about one unified ‘Cypriot identity’ to the island (Şahin 2008). On the contrary, Cyprus as a territory did not mean one and same thing to the communities that inhabited it. It rather assumed its meaning “[...] only as a part of the “suprafamily” of Greek and/or Turkish nation” (Kizilyurek& Gauter-Kizilyurek, (2004: 38). In this respect both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have been affected by what Loizides (2007) calls “motherland nationalisms” - “a sense of primary loyalty to the national centres of Ankara and Athens, respectively” (ibid: 173). This is in fact in line with the argument Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) make about nationalism: “The concepts of the modern state and of a national population have historically developed within trans-border rather than territorially limited national spaces” (ibid: 308, emphasis added). In this sense,

114 From a materialist point of view it can be argued that the mostly peaceful traditional life in the island was due to similar living conditions its people experienced under the Ottoman administration, irrespective of their religious identity (Kizilyurek-Gauter-Kizilyurek:2004: 39). Then apart from the affluent ruling class and clergy, people of both communities, who were mostly peasants, lived under similar conditions of “exploitation and poverty” (ibid.). This similar economic and social experience then put people into situations of solidarity instead of dispute. A number of events are reported that show the existence of solidarity and cooperation between Christian and Muslim communities like collective rebellions organised by the leaders of both religious groups (ibid: 40).
trans-border relations were causally related to the formation of ethno-national identities in Cyprus too, and “[p]erceptions of common origin and history with Turkey and Greece have been instrumental in mobilizing each community in favour of competing nationalist projects” (Loizides, 2007: 174).

Regarding the Greek Cypriot community, it can be argued that causal mechanisms leading to the emergence of Greek Cypriot nationalism originate from the nation-state building processes taking place in mainland Greece (Kizilyurek and Gauter-Kizilyurek 2004). This “helenocentric” nationalism regards Greek Cypriots as part of the greater Greek ‘ethnos’ (Peristianis 2006) and it seeks the revival of the perceived Hellenic past of the island by means of unification with Greece (enosis)115 (Loizides 2007: 174). In this form Greek Cypriot nationalism started taking a more concrete shape as early as the late nineteenth century and culminated during the twentieth century. In politicized form, it was the leading cultural factor, especially in the 1950s, in the generation of armed struggle against the British colonial rule (ibid). It materialised, especially in the mid-1950s, in the actions of the underground organisation National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters - EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston) (ibid; Keefe & Solsten 1993). The latter claimed to be fighting against British colonialism, but was soon regarded by the Turkish Cypriot community too as life-threatening (Loisides 2007: 175).

On the other hand, Turkish nationalism, glorifying the Ottoman past of the island and highlighting, among other things, its geographical proximity to Turkey (ibid.), was developed at a somewhat later date among Muslim Cypriots. According to some scholars Turkish nationalism started as a reaction to Greek nationalism (Kizilyürek 2002, Kizilyurek & Gauter-Kizilyurek 2004). Loizides points out in this sense, that Turkish Cypriot masses were mobilized during the 1940s and 1950s by the political elite, which made use of the fears and insecurities of the former at the face of Greek Cypriots’ demands for enosis (union with

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115 “The Enosis movement was part of Greek irredentism, known as the “Megali Idea” which was the prevailing ideology once the Greek state was formed. It entailed the vision of liberating those regarded as “Greeks still under foreign yoke” and bringing them under one political roof” (Peristianis 2006:102).
Greece) (2007:174). Yet Greek nationalism is not the only causal factor in the development of Turkish nationalism among Muslim Cypriots. As Nevzat (2005) argues, Turkish nationalism in the island had developed to a large extent by importing ideas and symbols initially from the Ottoman Empire during its final years where nationalist movements (especially the Young Turk Movement) were flourishing; and later from the newly founded Turkish nation-state. Especially with the success of the Kemalists, the idea of a Turkish nation and Turkish nationalism was well discernible among the Muslim Cypriot community so that by the beginning of the 1930s the latter had started to make demands to the British colonial government for greater political autonomy for their community especially in matters concerning religion and education, basing those demands on the perceived shared Turkish ethnicity of their community (Nevzat 2005: 432). Among the many factors playing roles in the generation of this Turkish nationalism are increased literacy and education among Turkish Cypriots coupled with a prompt adoption of the Kemalist curriculum of Turkey in the 1920s; an increased availability of Turkish (tanzimat) literature and Turkish Press in the island, advancements in Turkish Cypriot’s own press; a rising Turkish nationalist intelligenzia with a university education from Turkey, political links between Turkish Cypriot’s political parties in Cyprus and parties in Turkey and a flourishing of clubs and organisations in the island that defined themselves in Turkish nationalist vein (Nevzat 2005; Şahin 2008).

116 Turkish Cypriot political elites elicited these fears by referring to the history of Crete and pointing out to a possibility of similar fate for Turkish Cypriots (Loizides, 2007:174, also Bryant 2004; Kızılyürek 2002).

117 According to the author the initial reactions to Greek nationalism in the early nineteenth century, by Turkish Cypriots (whose key identity was Muslim instead of Turkish) was not based on nationalist sentiments. They rather objected to Greek Cypriots’ disloyalty to their ottoman sultan and caliph (Nevzat 2005: 432). Only later did Turkish Cypriots abandon the idea of a multi-ethnic empire, and turn to Turkish nationalism (ibid: 85).

118 The rise of national press and other national media, developing within the era of “print-capitalism” is directly linked to the spread of nationalism among masses creating new ways in which people relate to others in a political community and the imagination of a nation (Andersen 1991).

119 A major indicator of the rise of Turkish nationalism among Turkish Cypriots could be seen in the emigration of a significant number of Turkish Cypriots to the newly founded Republic of Turkey when these were confronted with the choice between British and Turkish citizenship during the initial years of the annexation of the island to Britain (Samani 1999; Nevzat 2005; Hatay 2007).
While the Greek nationalist discourse of *Enosis* (Union) was widely supported within the Greek Cypriot community in the beginning of the 1950s, Turkish Cypriots openly pronounced their own nationalist demand of *Taksim* in 1956, which meant the partition of the island and the unification of the northern part with Turkey (Loizides 2007: 175). With the announcement of the latter, Turkish nationalism got a political program with the military slogan: “*ya taksim ya ölüm*” meaning separation/division or death (Evre 2004). It had, by that time at the latest, clearly developed into a “separatist ideology” rather than being “a merely romantic attachment to mother Turkey” (Kizilyurek & Gauter-Kizilyurek 2004: 45).

In the meantime a series of events starting in the 1950’s had led Turkey to construct “Cyprus” as its national cause (*milli dava*) (Samani 1999). This marks the advent of a new facet in the relations of Turkish Cypriots with Turkey, in which Turkey started to express strategic interests in the island (Kızılyürek 2002). Moreover, from then onwards a public discourse in Turkey became discernible in which “Turkish-Cypriots have been referred to as ‘our kinsmen (*soydaslarımız*)’ a term that signifies blood and lineage” (Navaro-Yashin 2012:51). Within this discourse Turkey could later rationalise the military intervention to the island as an act to save its kinsmen in Cyprus the Cypriot Turks (*Kıbrıs Türkü*) from the danger of genocide attempted by Greek Cypriots under the aim of enosis. (see ibid).

The Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organisation named Turkish Defence Organisation - TMT (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati*) was founded in 1957/1958 by Turkish Cypriot community leaders at the time, in close cooperation with Turkey’s Special War Unit (Navaro-Yashin 2005; see Samani 1999), claiming to counter EOKA attacks to Turkish Cypriots.  

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120 According to Loizides (2007) a church-run referendum held in January 1950 revealed that 95.73% of the Greek-Cypriot community favoured union with Greece. (ibid: 175).

121 According to the authors the conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots is also causally related to the generation of a Turkish Cypriot ethnic identity from a prior “linguistic/religious concept” (Kizilyurek & Gauter-Kizilyurek 2004:45)

122 TMT had followed a predated underground organization Volkan which was founded some years earlier (Keefe and Solsten 1993: 28-29).
itself was inspired by the Greek Cypriot EOKA so that “the mimicry and mirroring” between them was rather significant (Navaro-Yashin 2005: 105). It can be argued that the two underground organisations operated in the further dissemination and culmination of nationalist ideologies among their respective communities, cultivating hatred in respective community towards the “other” depicted as the “enemy” as well as establishing a “spirit of terror” over own community so as to prevent any opposition to their policies (see ibid: 104-106). It is apparent that both of these underground paramilitary organizations were the main actors in the creation of violent armed conflict between the now ethnically defined Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

In this context the postcolonial period for Cyprus had started with the signing of the treaties of Zurich, London and Nicosia in years 1959 and 1960 (Samani 1999; Joseph 1997). The newly founded Republic of Cyprus had so gained its freedom from the British and was declared sovereign, the guarantee of which (in sense of territorial integrity) was provided by an agreement between the new Republic on the one hand and Britain, Turkey and Greece on the other (ibid). However, since the idea that “the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983: 1) still had different meanings for each of the two communities, the ultimate nationalist goal of each community had not come to an end. The latter were still hoping for either the unification with “mother Greece” or “mother Turkey” (see Kızılyürek 2002). Under these circumstances a unitary nation, a single national identity and a single national culture, which would embrace both Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not be achieved (Şahin 2008; Tzermias 1994 in Nevzat 2005; Canefe 2007). This can be understood leaning on Danforth 2008 statement below:


124 According to Canefe (2007) the Republic of Cyprus also suffered issues of legitimacy since its declaration did not involve a process of consultation and negotiation with a wide group of representatives of these communities (ibid: 278).

125 Constantinou (2007) argues in this respect that “[t]he most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or Turkish Cypriot. Postcolonial Cypriot identity is quintessentially and inescapably hyphenated; and hyphenated across a fixed Greek-Turkish axis. Being simply and singly Cypriot is a constitutional impossibility' (ibid: 248).
To a great extent the states have the power and the resources to determine what [identity] choices are available to people and what rewards of sanctions will be when they exercise ad adopt specific identities [...] Despite the best efforts of a nation-state to ensure that all its citizens develop one and the same national identity, however, the hegemonic power of the state is never absolute (Danforth, 2000: 88, cited in Kiziyurek & Gauter-Kizilyurek 2004: 38).

Apart from these cultural factors, there were also structural factors (i.e. the constitutional power sharing arrangements) pertaining to the newly founded Republic, which led to the emergence of mechanisms curtailing its homogenising power and furthering the ethnically defined relations between the two communities (Keefe and Solsten 1993; Canefe 2007; Şahin 2008). As argued by Keefe and Solsten (1993) “[t]he entire structure of government was strongly bicomunal in composition and function, and thus perpetuated the distinctiveness and separation of the two communities” (1993: 33)

As a result, rival Greek and Turkish nationalisms continued to haunt the two communities, which continued to construct the other community as its adversary. The Turkish Cypriot community who were in the minority, perceived an increasing threat of assimilation and

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126 On the cultural and symbolic level Şahin (2008) highlights several other deficiencies: Greek and Turkish Cypriots were unable to agree, so that even a flag for the Republic was created with difficulty (Şahin 2008: 46.). The Republic did not have a national anthem so that the communities continued to play those of their respective motherlands’ and also continued to celebrate the national holidays of Greece and Turkey (ibid, see also An 1998)

127 It can be argued that the constitutional organisation of public life along ethnic lines had to the effect that the separate ethnic identities were further institutionalised. An example is that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could partake in various institutions of the Republic, including the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives in a special power-sharing ratio of 7:3 respectively. Moreover, separate Communal Chambers for Greek and Turkish Cypriots where in charge of communal matters such as religion culture and education (Keefe & Solsten 1993: 33).

128 According to Kızılyürek (2002) Cyprus had remained even during the years of Republic of Cyprus, both for Turkey and for Greece, a “national cause”, so that the ethno-national rivalry of the two communities was periodically supported “The attention was turned to the ethnic kin living under the roof of a nation-state, rather than to the Cypriot state and its independence, to ‘national union’ rather than to the union of the Cypriot state. Accordingly, despite cyclical attitudes of the Greek and Turkish governments, they usually supported the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders who had ‘national dreams’”(ibid: 272, translated by A.T.). (“Dolayısıyla dikkatler, Kıbrıs devletine ve onun bağimsızlığa değil, o devlet çatısı altında yaşayan ‘soydağlara’ çevrilmiş, Kıbrıs’ın devlet birliğinden çok, ‘ulusal birliğe’ önem verilmişti. Bu da, Kıbrıs’ta ‘ulusal hayaller’ peşinde koşan Kıbrıs Türk ve Rum liderlerini, zaman zaman Türk ve Yunan hükümetlerinin konjonktürel tutumlarına rağmen, destekleyen, hatta teşvik eden bir ortam yaratıyordu”).
extinction. Therefore, as the Greek Cypriot president of Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, proposed the ‘thirteen points amendment to the constitution’ (Joseph 1997; Şahin 2008)\footnote{With these amendments the Greek Cypriots sought to bring justice to the constitution which they saw as granting too many rights to Turkish Cypriots which were in the minority (Şahin 2008: 48; Joseph 1997: 28).}, these were perceived by the Turkish Cypriot members of the government as a lessening of their rights and a weakening of their community’s position in the administration of the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore the latter withdrew from their seats (Şahin 2008).\footnote{The infamous thirteen-point amendment proposal was advanced by Makarios involved according to Keefe and Solsten, (1993) “constitutional revisions, including abandonment of the veto power by both the president and the vice president, an idea that certainly would have been rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, who thought of the veto as a form of life insurance for the minority community”(ibid: 35).}

Little later, in December 1963 inter-communal violence erupted and the two communities fought a devastating war against each other under the guidance and manipulation of their respective paramilitary organisations (EOKA and TMT) which lasted, with periodical calming and escalations, until 1974.

5.2.2.2 Turkish Nationalism During Turkish Cypriot’s Nation-State Building

The first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus took place, not only in a historical-cultural context of conflict, but also, as was already mentioned, in a context of nation-state building. This included, foremost, the employment of cultural factors of “ethnicity” and “nation”, or more precisely, the ideas thereof. Before these processes are explained in some detail for the Cypriot case, it may be useful to be reminded that this is a global phenomenon. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) argue in this respect that the rise of nations as well as nationalisms have a “symbiotic relationship”:

“It was in the context […] of the salience of ideas about nation and race that nation-state builders, including elites, political leaders, state officials and intellectuals, initiated systematic efforts to erase, deny or homogenize the internal cultural and national diversity that existed within all the industrializing states of Europe and the Americas” (ibid: 314).

In this respect, it can be argued that a similar process took place in the island of Cyprus and that the rival Greek and Turkish nationalisms had to the effect that the two communities
could not co-exist on peaceful terms. An inter-communal war was fought, had left great
destrictions and had resulted in the division of the island into two “ethnically homogeneous”
parts. The latter was achieved with the military interference of Turkey to a military coup
d’êtat in Cyprus by the Greek military junta of Greece and Cypriot National Guard in July
1974. From that date, Turkish Cypriots’ nationalist motivations further guided their
ambitions towards separate state building, which they had in fact started, as will be described
below, even before the division (see Arslan 2012).

The first step for Turkish Cypriot state-building was the material separation of the two
communities from each other. The physical separation first started with the fleeing of a
significant number of Turkish Cypriots into TMT-guarded enclaves following the escalation
of inter-communal clashes in 1964 (Keefe and Solsten 1993; Hatay and Bryant 2008). According to Hatay and Bryant (2008) the enclaves were constructed in the non-mixed villages inhabited by Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot neighbourhoods in cities, the largest being in the capital city of Nicosia (ibid: 427). The period of enclavement is important in the further establishment of Turkish nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot community, then as Canefe (2007) argues:

A feeling of a total isolation, the not satisfied need for societal trust and a long
term living through socio-economic difficulties had, day-by-day, formed the reference points of reinforcing the living in the so-called enclaves and the discourse that living together with Greek Cypriots would bring destruction (ibid: 280; translated by AT).

Although the Turkish Cypriot enclavement period is known as a period of immense hardship,

131 Turkey launched two military operations to the island in 20 July and 14 August 1974.
132 According to Keefe and Solsten (1993) not all Turkish Cypriots fled of their own volition, some were forced into the enclaves by TMT (ibid: 36)
133 “[t]opyekûn bir tecrit hissi, toplumsal güvene duyulan ançak giderilemeyen ihtiyaç ve uzun vadeli sosyo-ekonomik zorluklara katlanma, söz konusu kurtarılmış bölgelerdeki yaşamı ve özellikle 1974 sonrası kuşağlı milliyetçi otoriteye mutlak itaat etmeye yönelik biçimde, Kıbrısh Rumlularla bir arada yaşamının felakete götureceği dair söyleni gündemne pekiştiren dayanak noktaları teşkil etmiştir” (ibid: 280).
it also marks the first state-like experiences of Turkish Cypriots and so has been an initial step in the later state-building processes (Hatay & Bryant 2008b). As Hatay and Bryant (2008b) argue “[t]he decade of their enclavement gave Turkish-Cypriots their first professional theatre, their first radio station, and their first pop music groups. […] It was the Turkish-Cypriots’ first experience of having their own space and it was a space that most believed would eventually become their country with Turkey's intervention and support” (ibid: 427-428). This period of almost hegemonic Turkish nationalism was also a period of enhanced Turkish Cypriot solidarity, not only due to the existence of armed conflict with Greek Cypriots (perceived as the ‘enemy’) but also due to the equality of the people in the face of hard living conditions (Hatay & Bryant 2008b). This is obvious since even though there had been some resistance to TMT rule in the period “the growing power of political leader Rauf Denktaş remained relatively unchallenged” (ibid: 428). Thus the first attempt at separate nation-state building can be found in this period of enclavement, which is the 28 December 1967 declaration of Turkish Cypriot Autonomous Administration (Kıbrıs Türk Otonom Yönetimi).

Yet, more profound effort was put into state-building after the final division of the island in 1974. Through the prompt displacement of large proportions of each community’s populations (Keefe and Solsten 1993: 43), the division led to the formation of two ethnically homogeneous parts. Fierce geographical boundaries - along the so-called Green

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134 According to Canefe (2007) there was only limited reference to a unified Cypriot nation during this time, comprising only some labour union protests and bi-communal communist party membership; and these groups only had a subordinate position in the society (ibid: 279).
135 This administration was in fact declared after the situation on the island had normalised for a short period and some Greek troops were withdrawing from the island (see Keefe and Solsten, 1993). Still Turkish Cypriots declared their separate administration "until such time as the provisions of the Constitution of 1960 have been fully implement" (ibid 38). This temporary administration starkly resembled a government in its structure with a president (Fazil Küçük) and a vice president Rauf Denktaş and a legislative assembly, although it did not seek recognition since it would otherwise violate the constitution of Republic of Cyprus and international agreements (ibid).
136 The division of the island took place as a result of the two military interventions by Turkey in 20 July and 14 August 1974, which were organised as a reaction to a coup d’état to the Cypriot government by the Greek military junta in collaboration with the Cypriot national Guard.
137 Although the numbers are once again, open to debate, according to Morvaridi (1993) 180.000 Greek Cypriots and 60000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced.
line - were erected between the two communities, which run from the east coast (Famagusta) to west coast Morphou and across the capital city of Nicosia. This, it can be argued, to a great extent, has been the realisation of Turkish nationalist ideal of partition -Taksim-\(^{138}\) and marks the beginning of Turkish Cypriots’ more comprehensive experiences of statehood with even closer relations with their ‘motherland’ Turkey. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was founded in 1975 and lasted some 8 years, until being replaced in 1983, due to a series of political reasons, with the internationally non-recognized yet to date surviving ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC). The TRNC was the final realisation of “Turkish Cypriot’s nationalist-drive” (Arslan 2012; Samani 1999).\(^{139}\) These processes were described in an oral history interview, by O1, who was an opposition member of the parliament in the 70’s as follows:

Well this need was first felt in 1963, the first seriously felt need was in 1963. All of a sudden we were stateless. What was needed was a state-like organisation, but we didn’t have the power to form one. What happened was that we had the TMT, which was secret but was organised all over Cyprus. The politicians of the period had founded something called “General Committee” on that basis, so that it could fulfil the need for a state. Of course that was a military arrangement. Later, especially after the events of Geçitkale-Boğaziçi\(^{140}\) the Temporary Turkish Administration of Cyprus was established, at the end of 67, 68, end of 67 in 28 December 1967. That was an act of creating a more civilian state. After the peace operation and after these territories were claimed, they called it Autonomous [Turkish Cypriot Administration], it was still an administration and later after the Peace Operation there was a Federation, a geographical federation. There was the discourse of a geographical federation before that but it was finalised after the operation. As you know there was a

\(^{138}\) The Turkish nationalist thought sees the division of the island as a victorious end in itself, as an approach to the ideal of Taksim. They praise the incident of Turkish armed intervention as an act of saviour of the Turkish Cypriots from the monstrous enemy. Turkish Cypriot left on the other hand, being naturally not homogeneous, views the division of the island in a negative way. At a moderate level it argues that the only solution to the so-called Cyprus Problem is the reunification of the island under a bi-communal federation and seeks political cooperation with Turkey on these matters. At a more radical level it views Turkey’s military and political presence, as purely interest oriented, as an act of colonising and as the very reason of the continuation of the division of the island.

\(^{139}\) One of the most controversial reasons is claimed to be the urge to secure Denktaş’s position as the head of the State. It was seen necessary since the constitution of the TFSC did not allow Denktaş to get re-elected after he had won the presidential elections two consecutive times.

\(^{140}\) O1 is referring to the 15 October 1967 attacks of the Greek Cypriot military groups to the Turkish Cypriot villages of Geçitkale and Boğaziçi.
thing that Turkey, Greece, the Greek Cypriot part had signed in Geneva and in Wien, through which they had accepted a geographical federation. This happened in 1975, all of a sudden, we didn’t have knowledge of it; despite may be, there were some preparations before hand. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was officially announced. The justification for that, what they had said was something like “The Greek side doesn’t want an agreement, let us announce our federated state, and when they do the same we can form a Federation together.” Well that didn’t work out, it was a long process but actually in 1983 all of a sudden, I mean although there was a state, a new state was founded. There were political reasons for that. It was, in a sense, also a cover for Denktaş’s political reasons. This is a fact, he had power, he had political domination, he was very powerful. […] he couldn’t do anything that Turkey would not accept, but apparently he made Turkey accept his ideas.141

Samani (1999) highlights the ‘cultural’ processes like the acquisition of a ‘national consciousness’ and a ‘national identity formation’ of Turkish Cypriots in the state building process:

The announcement of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) stands for the “formation of a nation-state” as the final stage of becoming a “national people”, that was arrived at in the end of a process of, since 1878 continuing, ethnic differentiation and the acquisition of national consciousness. In other words, TRNC can be regarded as the result of acquiring a national identity and developing the consciousness of becoming “a people”. Consequently, Turkish Cypriots have joined the groups, who have built nation-states through the acquisition of the consciousness of being ‘a people’ in the twentieth century

Hirschon (2003) too stresses the importance of cultural factors, especially identity building, in the process of nation building. As she argues:

[...] Nation-state building involves a process of constructing a distinct identity - in opposition to the 'other' - defining social, cultural, and psychological boundaries besides the more obvious political and geographical ones. In order to foster a national identity after military conflict in states created out of mixed populations, particular mechanisms are often employed which intensify this alienation. These negative sentiments can be mobilised for political ends by the state, by particular interest groups, and/or by power-seeking individuals. The shared common past can be recast, with an emphasis on narratives of conflict, friction and violence, exacerbating hostility between peoples who, at the interpersonal level, might formerly have accommodated one another's differences in an atmosphere of mutual respect and symbiosis (Hirschon 2003: 10-11).

Turkish Cypriots’ identity building during their nation-state building era, had entailed, like Hirschon argues, not only the drawing of a geographical border between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot inhabited territories or the construction of political boundaries through separate state building, but also the establishment of social, cultural, and psychological boundaries between the two communities (see also Navaro-Yashin 2005). In this context national identity for Turkish Cypriots was constructed in opposition to a monstrous and brutal Greek Cypriot “other” (Hamit 2008; Şahin 2008). National history and other symbols were put into operation. Through strategically selective remembering, which following Canefe (2007) also entails forgetting in the construction of a collective memory, the peaceful times of coexistence of Greek and Turkish Cypriots was forgotten and inter-communal conflict was highlighted instead (Canefe 2007: 321-322; 280-281). The history of Cyprus was rewritten as one of hostility and “eternal” enmity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, emphasizing the greater agony the latter suffered at the hands of the former and so creating the so called

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“victim complex” (Hirschon, 2003: 11). Nationalist history schoolbooks were produced to tell children (who had not witnessed the war, and until 2003 opening of some borders for crossings, had not met Greek Cypriots) from a young age onwards, about the horrific activities of Greek Cypriots and to depict Turkish Cypriot’s as victims and the Turkish army as their heroic saviours.

As well as the ‘eternal enmity’ between Greek and Turkish nations, the continuing perception of Turkey as motherland is at the core of official nationalist narratives in this period. In this sense, the period of nation-state building is marked by the further development of Turkish nationalism. This also entails the creation of the “motherland-infant land” rhetoric, which describes the close and familial (and essentially hierarchical) relationship between North Cyprus and Turkey (Bryant & Yakinthou 2012). Whereas this claims unbridgeable difference between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it promotes the perception that there is no ethnic and/or cultural difference between the latter and people from Turkey. It rather emphasises that there exists ethnic kinship between the two. This line of thought is marked by a primordialist approach to ethnicity and nationality, and the rhetoric of this discourse makes abundant reference to primordial identity markers such as blood-ties, brotherhood and kinship; along with the more obvious traits like shared language and religion (see Kızılyürek 2002: 293-294).

Another important claim of the Turkish nationalist discourse is that Turkish Cypriots and Turks from Turkey share common origins, which go way beyond Ottoman times and extend to Central Asia and these shared “roots” are valued higher than the history of coexistence with Greek Cypriots and other communities in Cyprus. Cyprus itself is not recognised as a factor in identity construction (Kızılyürek 2002). Late Rauf Denktas’s, (one of the most significant the community leaders of Turkish Cypriots, and the essential political actor in the

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143 Yet this time, Turkish nationalist discourses and politics are more strongly challenged. In fact, the critique of Turkish nationalist discourse has become one of the central tenets of Turkish Cypriot left, which can also be seen, in its second generation (starting from mid-1960s), as an identity movement (Kızılyürek 2013).

144 For an example of a primordialist argumentation on Turkish Cypriot identity see Nesim (1990) *Kibrisli Türklerin Kimliği* (The Identity of Turkish Cypriots) published by the ministry of education of TRNC.
foundation of TRNC, of which he was the president for 22 years until 2005), infamous statement on this issue can be considered the best example to illustrate this point. Denktaş stated publicly in 1995 the following:

I am a child of Anatolia. I am Turkish in every way and my roots go back to Central Asia. I am Turkish with my culture, my language, my history, and my whole being. I have a state as well as a motherland. The notions of “Cypriot culture,” “Turkish Cypriot,” “Greek Cypriot,” “a shared Republic” are all nonsense. If they have their Greece and we have our Turkey, why should we live under the roof of the same Republic? […] Some individuals are producing fiction about the existence of “Cypriots,” “Turkish Cypriots,” “Greek Cypriots.” There is no such thing as a “Turkish Cypriot.” Don’t dare to ask us whether we are “Cypriots.” We could take this as an insult. Why? Because there is only one thing that is “Cypriot” in Cyprus, and that is the Cypriot donkey (Denktaş, quoted in Navaro-Yashin 2006: 86).145

“Blood” is, as mentioned, another often encountered metaphor, which does not only denote the perceived biogenetic sameness of Turks and Turkish Cypriots (shared “blood-ties”), but also a tough and honourable military achievement. In this rhetoric the Turkish Cypriot territories are argued to have been taken with blood (kan ile alınmak), where “blood” refers to the blood of the veterans and martyrs. Moreover the reference to blood makes the country

145 Similar statements are still continually being made by the proponents of ethnic Turkish nationalism, even though they are increasingly met with criticism A member of the parliament whose party had played the leading role with Denktaş in nation-building but was at the time in opposition, was critical of the identity politics of the leftist government in power. She held a speech on this issue on 20 April 2006 stating: “[…] I feel that there are struggles to separate us from our Turkishness, from our national culture and construct a spirit of Cypriotness. For instance a year ago they removed the pictures of Dr. Fazıl Küçük from the stamps. They put, pardon my language, some animal pictures there instead. They are [changing] the history books my friends, the history books, to alienate us from our national culture and to lead us towards an artificial Cypriot culture. You all know these things, that they are removing the history of national struggle and replacing it with made up Cypriot culture stuff like macaroni and chicken and so on” (quoted in Hasgüler 2008: 10-11, translated by AT). (…][Türkülüümüzden, ulusal kültürümüzden bizi koparp ‹Kibrışlılık ruhu›nu açıklama çabaları gibi geliyor bana. “[…) Mesela, bundan bir yıl önce damga pullarlarındaki liderimiz Dr. Fazıl Küçük’ün resimleri çıkarıldı. Bunun yerine, affedersiniz birkaç hayvan resimleri kondu. […] Türkülüümüzden, ulusal kültürümüzden koparp suni Kibrışlılık kimliğini yönendirmek için tarih kitaplarımızı, arkadaşlar, tarih kitaplarımızı. Bunları hepiniz biliyorsunuz, tarih kitaplarımızı gibi Kibrısı Türk mücadelesi tarihininsocklupt atılması ve onun yerine efendim, makarna bullu, bilmem ne gibi uyduruk Kibrışlılık edebiyatılar […]” (quoted in Hasgüler 2008: 10-11). More recently another right-wing member of parliament Zorlu Töre, has claimed: “[c]urrently 99% of Turkish Cypriots are part of the Turkish nation. They are Turks of Cyprus. Some people are allergic to national values. They define themselves as Cypriots” (Star Kıbrıs, translated by A.T.). (“[ş]u anda Kıbrıs Türk halkın %99'u Türk milletinin parçasıdır. Kibrıslı Türk'tür. Bazı kişilerin milli değerlere alerjisi var. Kendilerini Kibrıslı olarak nitelendiriyorlar”).
into something extremely precious because it was a hard ‘gain’, and at the same time its inhabitants are put in a position of indebtedness towards the soldiers who had shed that blood. Since a lot of the blood in the acquisition of northern territories belongs to Turkish soldiers who ‘victoriously’ fought in the military operation in 1974, Turkish Cypriots are also indebted to the latter. Therefore, from this perspective soldiers and people from Turkey are not only viewed as Turkish Cypriots’ ethnic brothers but also, and more importantly, as Turkish Cypriot’s heroic savours, to whom Turkish Cypriots are eternally indebted. On the macro-level, Turkey is the liberator of Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriot enemy. This is continually uttered in the so-called ‘motherland-infant land’ rhetoric: Turkey is the mother who had saved its infant, and Turkish Cypriots owe their mother a “debt of gratitude” (Anavatan'a Şükran Borcu). Turkish nationalist discourse, with its militaristic connotations does therefore not only attribute an ethnic Turkish identity to Turkish Cypriots equal to that of Turks from Turkey, but by places the latter in an owing position towards their motherland.

National identity building for the Turkish Cypriot society entailed, last but not least, a series of important symbolic adaptations, which would materially construct the Turkish Cypriot nation-state as a reflection of the ‘motherland’ Turkey. Among these are the “swift” changing of all of the Greek names of towns and streets into Turkish names; giving people, via the surname law, Turkish family names (Kızılyürek 2002: 290). Other symbols include taking over of Turkish national anthem, basing the TRNC flag (in 1983) on the Turkish flag\textsuperscript{146} painting a gigantic version of it on the Pentadaktylos range of Kyrenia mountains (Beşparmak Dağları) situated in such a position to face the Greek Cypriot part.\textsuperscript{147} The Kemalist nationalist slogan “Happy is who calls himself/herself a Turk” (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene) is inscribed next to it (see Navaro-Yashin). As would be easily assumed the Turkey’s national holidays are also adopted as Turkish Cypriot’s national holidays (Hamit 2008).

The first wave of immigration from Turkey to North Cyprus took place within the above described cultural context, in which Turkish nationalism was the hegemonic discourse. This,

\textsuperscript{146} The TRNC flag is the copy of the Turkish flag, only with reversed colours (white background and red crescent and star) and two horizontally running red stripes near the top and the bottom of the flag.

\textsuperscript{147} For a photograph of this flag see following link: http://www.cyprus44.com/culture/flag.asp
in turn, entailed the perception of Greek Cypriots as the “enemy” and conversely, Turkey as Turkish Cypriots’ motherland. Furthermore, Turkish nationals are perceived, through a primordialist understanding of ethnicity as kinsmen with same-blood, same-culture and same-roots. It is clear that, under these circumstances, whereas the Greek Cypriots are constructed as elements to be expelled, the immigrant groups were elements to be included in an independent Turkish (Cypriot) nation. They were perceived, by the Turkish Cypriot state as ‘naturally’ belonging to this nation and were therefore received with feelings of glory.

In the light of the above, it becomes clear that the cultural context related to the Turkish Cypriot nation-state building cannot be omitted in a thorough explanation of the first migration wave from Turkey. Then as all migrations in the world, this case too did not take place in a cultural void and, since that cultural context entailed conflict, it cannot be sufficiently explained with economic-structural factors alone. On the contrary it is the cultural context, which needs to be highlighted and therein the ideas of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, which became dispersed among the Turkish Cypriot community. It needs to be acknowledged that the emergent properties of these cultural factors were involved in the generative mechanisms of the first migration wave from Turkey immediately after the 1974 division of the island.

5.2.3 Agency of the States in the Initiation of Migration

The agency of the states in the generation of migration movements may be partly explained by the political economy approach. For a reminder, this approach “sees the immigration policies of receiving states […] – quota and admission systems, regulations of entry, duration of stay, work permits, citizenship rights etc. – as directly shaping the volume, dynamics and geographical patterns of international migration flows” (King 2012: 19). Thus especially following Zollberg et al. (1989) and Zolberg (1999) state policies and regulations can be considered to be central in the explanation of the initiation and continuation of actual migration waves (Freeman & Kessler 2008: 657). Yet as Freeman and Kessler argue “[…] the motives that might underlie state actions remain poorly specified” (ibid).
From this point of view it must be underlined that the first wave of immigration from Turkey to North Cyprus and the emergence of the migration system between the two countries could not have been possible without the policies constructed and applied by the states of Turkey and North Cyprus. Moreover the construction of these state policies of migration – like all state policies in general - materialised within the framework of wider structural and cultural motivations of the states, which in turn were shaped within the historical structural and cultural circumstances, explained above.

Critical realism as was mentioned, considers agency as directly related to the causation of social phenomena. Considering the case of this thesis, agency at the macro-level relates to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot states’ agencies, i.e. their goals, motivations and desires in planning and facilitating the first immigration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus. Therefore, the following endeavours to examine the agency of the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot state in some detail. The analysis will be based on oral history interviews conducted with 12 state officials from North Cyprus and Turkey, who were either involved in policy making or policy implementation or were opposition politicians during the period of the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus. Among these are politicians, who were in the power at the time, as well as opposition politicians, bureaucrats and government officials of various ranks.

5.2.3.1 Mutuality of Action

Before moving on to the discussion of states’ motivations, goals and desires, which are, following a critical realist framework, causally related to the initiation of the first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus, the mutuality of agential action by states needs to be underlined. This is indeed not a readily accepted political discourse. An important and internationally reputable political discourse describes Turkey as the ‘occupier’ and ‘coloniser’ of the northern part of the island. Within this discourse the agency of the Turkish Cypriot state is ignored, either because its existence is disregarded altogether\(^{148}\) or because it

\(^{148}\) This is a highly controversial political topic, as will be easily understood when it is regarded that the current Turkish Cypriot state TRNC is internationally non-recognized. Yet such political discussions are beyond the goals of this thesis and it must suffice to say that, Turkish Cypriot state’s
is constructed as a victim and a passive pawn at the hands of Turkey. On the other hand, needless to say, within this discursive framework, Turkey is constructed as the sole facilitator of this migration and settlement policy. This is especially true when regarding Greek Cypriot discourses on the issue. Bryant and Yakinthou (2012) argue in this sense that “[t]o the vast majority of Greek Cypriots, Turkey continues to be foremost characterized as occupier of the northern third of the country, and expeller of Greek Cypriots from their ancestral homes and villages […]” (ibid:67). What is ignored is the mutuality of the agential action by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments. Yet as Şahin et al. (2013) argue, this is a rather biased view. Instead,

It appears that [Turkish] Cypriot and Turkish authorities have cooperated in the planning of the project of labour force [transfer] from Turkey. In other words, the two parties took joint action in sending a labour force from Turkey to Cyprus during this period, and that there is no unilateral will. That is to say, Turkey had not decided on population transfer to Cyprus unilaterally. All the planning was carried out together with TFSC authorities (ibid: 609).

The state officials and politicians interviewed in this study made similar statements. In this respect a high-ranking Turkish state official (P3) who was working in Cyprus immediately after the military intervention in 1974 repeatedly emphasised the point that the demand for an immigrant labour force was made by the Turkish Cypriot government. He underlined this point by stating: “I’ll also tell you this, these people came with the demand of the Turkish Cypriot government”.

P4, too mentioned during the interview that the decision about the bringing of immigrants from Turkey was mutually made by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot political leaders:

de-facto existence (though unrecognized), above all, had to be an a priori recognition so as to facilitate analytic explanations.


150 “Şunu da söyleyeyim Kuzey Kıbrıs yönetiminin talebiyle bunlar geldi [...]”.

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[...] there was a joint decision by officials from the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and Turkish politicians who were dealing with Cypriot matters, about the transfer of an agricultural workforce from Turkey to northern Cyprus. That was towards the end of 1974. The implementation of the plan started in the beginning of 1975.151

Similarly, P2 a high-ranking Turkish Cypriot state official and later politician who defines himself in the nationalist vein, argued that it was especially the Turkish Cypriot side, which demanded the bringing of immigrants from Turkey. He stated:

[...] we did have a big enough population. Turkey was the first county to turn to. We applied to Turkey so that a population could be transferred from there to here. At the period I was among the technical staff, it was late Kotak who leded this policy. I mean, we wanted people to come in so that we could fill the empty areas, otherwise we could not stake out a claim on these areas.153

Generally it must acknowledged that, although the interviewees differed in their perceptions about the first wave of migration from Turkey to North Cyprus in general, and its causes in particular, non of them argued that the initiation of the movement had been one-sidedly decided upon. In other words, the mutuality of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot states’ decisions, planning and actions in the facilitation of the first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus was either implicitly or explicitly stated in the oral history interviews with policy makers and implementers who were active during the period of the first migration wave (interviews with P1, P2, P3, P4, I1, I2, I3, I4).

151 [...] o zaman Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti yetkilileri ve Türkiye’deki Kıbrıs’la ilgili siyasilerin müsterek bir kararla Türkiye’den kuzey Kıbrıs’a tarım işgücü götürülmesine sevk edilmesine kararı verildi. 1974 sonlarına doğru. 1975 yıl başlarına da bu uygulamaya geçildi.

152 İsmet Kotak was the first minister of the Ministry of Settlement and Rehabilitation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

5.2.3.2 States’ Goals and Motivations

The identification of the goals and motivations of the states -i.e. that of Turkey and northern Cyprus, related to the causation of the first migration wave necessitates, once again, the consideration of relevant historical-structural and historical-cultural circumstances, which partook in the construction of the former. Regarding the Turkish Cypriot state it must be considered most importantly that prior to the 1974 partition of the island the Turkish Cypriot community was in a relative subordinate position both in economic and in political spheres. Numerically speaking Turkish Cypriots were in the minority. Accordingly, these were represented in the public service and in many other consociational power sharing arrangements of the post-colonial Republic of Cyprus (1960-1963) with a ratio of 30 to 70 per cent. This system was based on population ratios of the two communities and it can be argued, that it was even generous towards the Turkish Cypriot community since it did not correspond to 30% of the population of the island (Samani 1999: 94-95) and was even further declining in size due to net emigration rates. According to a census in the year of the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 the actual population ratio was 77.1%-18.2% for Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively (Hatay 2007: 4)\textsuperscript{154}. Furthermore, Turkish-Cypriots also had a relatively low position in the social division of labour compared to their Greek Cypriot counterparts. According to Arslan (2012), “Greek-Cypriots had specialised in modern, urban professions and skilled arts, whereas Turkish-Cypriots were largely confined to traditional, unskilled occupations (ibid: 121). This traditional division of labour along ethnic lines was perceived especially by the Turkish Cypriot elite as the generator of an asymmetrical dependence: “In terms of such vital needs as law and health, Turkish-Cypriots were fully dependent on Greek-Cypriots. Turkish –Cypriot town dwellers were dependent on Greek-Cypriot traders for provision of consumption goods, while Turkish Cypriot peasants were dependent on Greek-Cypriot merchant-usurer capital for both the realisation of their produce and the provision of subsistence goods” (ibid). Moreover the enclavement of the Turkish Cypriot community between 1963-1974 had worsened their disadvantaged socio-economic position. On the other hand, it must be considered that this period was (especially

\textsuperscript{154} Hatay (2007) argues that it was the British colonial period, in which demography has acquired a new and politically significant meaning “when ethnic proportions began to determine the balance of political power” (ibid: 1).
since the 1950’s), as was explained in section 5.2.2 a period in which Turkish nationalism was the dominant among Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus was increasingly becoming a national cause for Turkey.

Against this background, the 1974 division of the island provided the Turkish Cypriot community with the physical and political separation from the Greek community, which was a long sought goal by the Turkish nationalist elite (see Samani 1999; An 1996). Moreover the division of the island in 1974 had initially left Turkish Cypriots in a relatively more advantageous position: As a result of this division a large proportion of people from both communities were displaced, creating ethnically homogeneous and segregated territories for both communities. According to Gürel and Özersay (2006) 142,000 Greek Cypriots (around 30% of their population) left from the northern part of the island, to which eventually 45,000 Turkish Cypriots (around 40% of their population) moved from the southern part (ibid: 3). The former had therefore left plenty of resources (agricultural land and also factories) in the northern part of the island. The latter amounted to 36 per cent of the whole island and has been, since 1974, under the political control of the Turkish Cypriot community.

It can be argued that this disproportionately large amount of territory and the economic resources contained within it - among which were many agricultural lands and gardens - left at the disposal of Turkish Cypriots after Turkish military operations, established the physical means for the facilitation of this migratory movement. Moreover, not only was it the means, but also the justification for the nationalist Turkish and Turkish Cypriot political elite, to sign a bilateral agreement in order to bring in an immigrant workforce, which at the same time allowed the increasing of the Turkish Cypriot population for political reasons. Thus, in the

155 The numbers relating to refugees from both communities are largely disputed, and these range from 140-200,000 for Greek Cypriots, and 45-65000 for Turkish Cypriots respectively (interviews with HA, IK, CB, ES). Morvaridi reports the numbers as 180000 to 60000 (Morvaridi 1993:209). It must be noted moreover that the refugee movement was not finalized before labour agreement between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments were made and the initial group of immigrants within the first wave of immigration were brought to the island in May 1975.

156 Although Güler and Özersay report the percentage of Turkish Cypriot part to be 36 of the island, the numbers vary according to the source. The Turkish Cypriot percentage of territory is usually reported between the range of 34-38% (Guler & Ozersay 2006).
oral history interviews conducted with former government officials and politicians, two types of reasons/motivations were pointed out to. Where as P3, I2 and I3 have emphasised economic reasons, namely the labour shortage in the northern part’s agricultural sector after the division as the main cause; P1, P2, P4, I1, I4, O1, O2, O3, O4) explicitly named other extra-economic, political motivations of the governments for the initiation of this immigration wave.

P3, who was a high-ranking government official from Turkey involved in the migration policy-making after the division, had explicitly asserted that economic reasons alone motivated the states in initiating this immigrant flow, emphasising that the demand had come from the Turkish Cypriot government. Denying that there were motivations of other kinds for the Turkish state in facilitating this migration, i.e. increasing the population of Turkish Cypriots to change the demographic balance in favour of Turkish Cypriots, he asserted in the following statement, that the bringing of immigrants to the island was solely economically motivated and aimed at filling the labour shortage that arose in the aftermath of the 1974 division:

When it comes to Turkey, one needs to take a look at the picture after the intervention. This picture has a military, a political, a humanitarian and an economic dimension. The picture was this: after the Turkish intervention -even though it is difficult to give a precise number, it is estimated that about 200,000 Greek Cypriots living in the North emigrated to the South. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots living in the South were not allowed to emigrate. Thousands [...] [of Turkish Cypriots] were kept in Limassol for months. Therefore there was a lack of human capital in northern Cyprus. There weren’t enough people to do the production, to work in the fields [and] to harvest the citrus fruits. It was impossible to continue with the production. [...] It may be possible to maintain control over an area by means of armed force but it is not possible to ensure the continuation of production through the use of armed force. For that reason, a need had arisen and the Turkish Cypriots had communicated this need. Various methods had been elaborated in order to meet this demand. For one, the soldiers [who served here] were offered to stay if they wanted to. Some of them settled here, some married Cypriot girls. The Turks who stayed in the South couldn’t come; therefore workforce from Turkey was required to meet the needs of the agricultural sector, especially in the villages. This need arose partially due to the reason [just mentioned]. Turkey made some preparations for this purpose. Our relevant ministries and the Aid Committee of the Turkish Embassy were dealing with these issues. As a matter of fact, all of the Turkish Cypriot population [of Cyprus] had once
been transferred from Turkey, from the Konya region, etc. After Cyprus had been conquered by the Turks, certain criteria were applied to choose the Turks to be transferred and resettled here, for example one barber or one blacksmith per 30 people and so on. Back then there was a similar resettlement plan and Turks living in Cyprus today are the descendants of the people who were once transferred from Turkey. There was a similar project. As far as I could observe it was managed very cautiously. If there had been an excessive population transfer this could have destroyed the economic balance and create serious problems of unemployment. In order to prevent this, the experts from the Ministry of Resettlement prepared a project to identify the population to be resettled according to the number of people needed, where these people were needed and the specifics of the regions these people were to be resettled in, so that people from regions with similar conditions could be chosen. If the aim had been to change the demographic structure, as alleged by the Greeks, another strategy would have been utilised. Turkey didn't follow such a strategy. Turkey has the advantage of having a high population. Besides, that would also have helped reducing the unemployment in Turkey. As far as I know, no such strategy was employed. If there had been such a strategy a balance in the populations [...] [between Greeks and Turks] would have been established by now and Turkey would have invested to create employment opportunities and would have settled more people here. Such a strategy was not employed. It was about filling the [labour] gap and the continuation of the [agricultural] production.157

Regarding the above statement, it must also be noted, that even though P3 insisted that economic motivations were underlying Turkish government’s policy, he also states that this policy was justified in regards to some historical-demographic ‘facts’. P3 draws attention to common origins and common history of the post-1974 immigrants and the native Turkish Cypriot population, and so hints at a justification, commonly held among the political elite of the period: that Turkish Cypriots were the descendants of a population transferred to the island by the Ottomans, this immigration program in 1975 could not be understood as an intervention to the demography of the Turkish Cypriot population, of which it is sometimes accused.

I3, a government official involved in the rehabilitation of immigrants, can also be counted among the first group of interviewees who considered the initial immigration wave from Turkey as being caused by mainly economic reasons. He argued that a minimum size of economically active population was necessary for the Turkish Cypriot community to survive after the division. In other words, an immigrant labour force was necessary for the economic improvement and thriving of the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus, according to this interviewee, the governments facilitated this movement at the time as an act to correct the severe labour shortage. Yet, at the same time I3 also mentioned that the Turkish Cypriot leadership at the time had not perceived a re-unification of the island on the basis of the 1960 arrangements as desirable and considered that a possible solution to Cyprus problem would involve the preservation of the achieved un-mixing of the two communities, a principle that was later developed as the idea of bi-zonality. This, he argues, contributed to the bringing of immigrants from Turkey rather than seeking a solution that would involve the return of Greek Cypriots to their territories.158

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158 I have to note here once again that, the recording of the interview with I3 was deleted due to technical problems. The comments above are therefore based on the notes that were taken during and immediately after the interview.
Lastly, the quotation below stems from an oral history interview conducted with a middle ranking Turkish Cypriot official of the period I2, who was involved in the settlement of the immigrants from Turkey in northern Cyprus during the first immigration wave. He too explains that the Turkish Cypriot state’s motivation in facilitating this migratory movement was primarily of economic nature. He points out to the after the division emerging imbalance between supply and demand of productive forces, i.e. a supply of means of production and a shortage of labour. He argues:

Let me put it this way, the settlement areas left by the Greek Cypriots who emigrated to the south, were agricultural areas. Another aspect that was taken into consideration was the number of Turkish Cypriots who immigrated [to the north] from the south. As the immigration from the south to the north started, some fled illegally, [whereas] others were in military bases and couldn't flee. The committees that were established here, village representatives and the decision-makers in the north [...] had determined where people from certain villages in the south were to be resettled in the north [before the people actually arrived]. [...] After reserving new settlement areas for all village communities that were in the south, some villages in the north remained empty. Some villages, especially the villages on the northern slopes of the mountains, which were difficult to reach, remained empty. For example Sadrazamköy, Kayalar and Bahçeli, Kaplıca, Davlos, Mersinlik [...] as well as the villages in the Karpassia region had remained unoccupied. Other villages were only partially resettled and there were still empty houses. [...] the fact that some houses and especially some agricultural fields were still empty had created an opportunity [for the recruitment of immigrants]. There were many fields, which had no owners after the Turkish population from the south were allocated houses and land. This was perceived to be the economic cause of the immigration from Turkey to Cyprus. These people would come and prevent agricultural fields and gardens from drying out, and work in the fields. They tried to bring this population from such regions in Turkey which didn’t have enough agricultural land, such as mountain villages like in Trabzon and from certain regions like Adana, Konya and Mersin. The peasants from the mountain villages were brought here as an agricultural workforce. These immigrants were called agricultural labourers. [...] As far as I know economic reasons lied at the basis of this decision. If there had been any other political reasons, these were either beyond my knowledge or happened beyond my command.159

159 Şimdi şöyle söyleyeyim, bizim kuzeyden güneye göç etmiş Rumların terk etmiş olduklarını yerleşim yerleri. Bunların, tabii yerleşim yerleri tarımsal araziler; ve bir de güneyden kuzeye gelen Kıbrıslı Türk göçmenlerin miktarı dikkate alındı önce. Ve hatta güneyden kuzeye göç başladığı zaman- belli bir kesim kaçak olarak geldi, belli bir kesim işlerde mahsur kaldı, gelemediler- buradaki komiteler, köy temsilcileri, kuzeydeki yetkililer, [...] her güney köyünün yerleşeceği kuzeydeki köyleri tespit ettiler. [...] Tüm güneydeki köylere [...] kuzeyde yerleşim yerleri rezae edildiği halde bazı köyler boş kaldı.
Whereas the last sentence of this interviewee can be interpreted as a half-hearted indication that other factors may have been present in the motivations of the political actors at the time, other interviewees were more precise. The political reasons and motivations indicated by the second group of interviewees -by P1, P2, P4, I1, I4, O1, O2, O3, O4 among which are opposition politicians as well as those who define themselves in the nationalist vein- can be grouped under two headings – ‘population boosting’ and ‘re-population of territory’.

The goal of boosting the population of the Turkish Cypriot community was regarded by many of the interviewees as the main political goal in addition to economic motivations. II a middle-ranking government official of the period, had explained that increasing the population had been the clandestine aspect of this migration policy. He identified the motivations of the two states in bringing the immigrants to North Cyprus as follows:

Firstly, a population politics, this is the secret side of the issue; and secondly to people to do the production.. However, Turkey transferred its problems, like I said, brought [people from] sites of landslide, dam projects, and mountain areas. But the secret political side of this policy, in my opinion, was this: we had to increase our population, if we wanted to continue living in this island.160

A similar explanation was offered by P4, a Turkish state official involved in the planning of the bringing of the immigrant labour-force from Turkey. According to P4 political


160 Bir nüfus politikası, bu işin gizli tarafı, ikincisi de burayı işleyecek.. Ama Türkiye de kendi sorununu aktardı, yeni dediğim gibi heyelan bölgesi, baraj altı ve orman içi köyler, o da onu buraya kamufle etti. Ama bunun gizli politik yönü nüfustu, ki benim görüşüm göre, burada bizim nüfus bakımdan bu adada yaşayabilmemiz için, nüfusumuzu arttırmak gerek.
motivations played a central role in the agency of the states along with economic ones. He explains that, the states were firstly concerned with the correction of the labour shortage, which was generated after the expulsion of the Greek Cypriot population from the northern part. He explains:

There was a large area which remained empty in the north. It is not possible to describe this as just a demographic gap. A large labour-force moved from the north to the south, creating great economic problems. At first, it was thought that the gap would be filled by Turkish Cypriots living in the south. But when their number was taken into account, it became evident that they would not suffice.\footnote{Kuzeyde çok geniş bir alan büyük bir alan boşluğu ortaya çıktı. Ve sadece demografik boşluğu olanatmak mümkün değil. Büyük bir işgüçü kuzeyden güneye geçti, ekonomik açından büyük zorluklar doğdu. Bunları doldurabilmek için ilk düşünülen güneyde yaşayan Kıbrıslı Türklerdi. Ama sayisal olarak bakıldığında bunların yeterli olmadığı ortaya çıktı.}

Thus according to the interviewee the states had therefore firstly acted with economic motivations to meet the newly created labour demand. On the other hand, however, he argues, other political factors too motivated the states in the collaboration of the bringing of an immigrant population to the island. Among these political motivations were most importantly the desire to defend the military operation and justify the acquisition of the over one third of the island in the international arena. In his own words:

[...] This migration was not planned only with economic and social motivations. There was also this concern behind it: There could be an international political platform shortly afterwards to make a decision regarding the future of peace operation under the auspices of the United Nations. It was obvious that when the demographic situation of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and the corresponding geographical areas would be taken into consideration, the decision would not be in favour of the Turkish side. Because, again as far as I can remember, the northern part, that is, the Turkish part of the island, corresponded to 36% of the whole island. [However] the population of the Turks in the island, in turn, was only around 18%. This was surely a negative situation regarding the demographic balance. It would have been very hard to defend this situation in the political arena. I mean there was a political aspect to this issue along with economic and social reasons. Both the political leaders in Cyprys and Turkish authorities, had envisaged to swiftly increase the population to achieve a balance, or at least to come close to it. And as I just said, they knew that this could not be achieved through the Turkish
Cypriot population from the southern part of Cyprus, so that they decided to transfer a certain amount of population from Turkey to Cyprus.  

P4 suggests, moreover that the political aspirations of the leaders at the time to defend national interests of their states in the international political arena did not only lead to the decision to bring immigrants to the island, it had also been effective in the actual materialisation of this migration policy. In other words the political motivations of the states are not only causally related to the emergence of the first migration wave, these also affected the speed with which the immigration policy was implemented as well as the actual methods with which it was carried out. According to P4, the speed with which this migration program was commenced pointed out to the panic that the political elite got into:

Both the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Turkish political elite were concerned that the talks under the auspices of the UN and negotiations would start in a short while and that the negotiation table would be set in the near future. The situation could have brought both the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish elite into a difficult situation, therefore they wanted that [the population transfer] was done quickly. One could say that they were in panic. In fact it was not possible to put such a plan into practice in such short notice.
O1, an opposition politician who was in the parliament at the time had also identified Turkish Cypriot state’s motivation in the initiation of this migration movement as a type of population politics. Yet he stated that, though he agreed with this position at large, he (and his colleagues) would have preferred the return of Turkish Cypriot diaspora members from abroad.

As I previously mentioned, the population transfer to Cyprus had not only been desired but it was a necessity after 1974. But we never thought that it would have happened in this way. Thousands of [Turkish] Cypriots live in Britain. The number of [Turkish] Cypriots living in Turkey amounts to a million. We thought that they would gradually be brought back to Cyprus and we didn’t think about a policy of mass resettlement. There was even a letter that I wrote to Ecevit shortly after the Peace Intervention. "Please encourage them [Turkish Cypriots to return]. Let us do something”. I mean, that was the plan actually.\(^{164}\)

On the other hand, according to Şahin et al. (2013) population transfer to the island from mainland Turkey had not been a new idea, but rather it had been an issue under consideration in the political circles of the Turkish Cypriot community since at least the 1960’s. The Turkish Cypriot diaspora living in Turkey had been the first target. Yet it was the events of 1974 that had prepared the contingent conditions for the realisation of this long held ambition:

The diminishing Turkish population in Cyprus had always been a concern for the Turkish Cypriot leadership and there had been various attempts to solve this problem. One of these attempts was to bring back and resettle the Turkish Cypriot population living in Turkey. This idea is clearly present in Rauf R. Denktaş's memories of 1967. Denktaş’s proposal included the resettlement of the Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey to the Turkish areas of the island in secrecy in order to preserve the population balance on the island. In this regard it is obvious that the idea of a population transfer from Turkey to Cyprus was not an issue which came up all of a sudden after 1974. In other words beginning in mid-60s the idea of transferring a population from Turkey in order to increase the Turkish population in Cyprus was being discussed both

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\(^{164}\) E şimdi tabii yani bu 74 sonrası ki şeyde, az önce de söyledim, yani Kıbrıs’a nüfus aktarılması gerekli şeydi, istekti. Ama yani böyle bir şey olabileceği bizim aklımıza gelmezdi yani […]. İngiltere’de bir kaç bin Kıbrıslı var, Türkiye’de yaşayan Kıbrıslıların sayısı belki de bir milyonu bulur yani. Yani onların yavaş yavaş getirilmesiydı bizim, öyle kitle halinde getirilmesi diye bir şeyimiz yoktu hatta ben kendiinde şeyden hemen sonra, Barış Harekâtından kısa bir sure sonra benim Ecevit’e yazdığım bir mektup vardı. Yani teşvik edin artık, bir şey yapalım bu konuda. Yani öyle bir şey vardı.

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Indeed it was revealed through the interviews (especially with P1, P2, I1, I4) that the TFSC leaders had also called people with Turkish Cypriot origins to return to the island, promising them various material incentives like houses and other financial benefits. However, they did not manage to reach out to a big enough population. Moreover, the incentives offered by the TFSC were not attractive for the Turkish Cypriot expatriates to mobilise them for return migration. As I1 explains, only few Turkish Cypriot diaspora members could be persuaded to return:

In fact the persons living in Britain, Australia and Canada were also invited with the promise that they would be allocated houses. However, even though we first said that we would "provide houses" for the ones who return, later we said "the semi-finshed constructions will be allocated the reparations of which will be at their own expense". There was a Council of Ministers’ decision, I think it was the decision numbered 7619. Well, I don't remember the exact decision now. These people would come up to us [and say]: "Mr. Denktaş invited us, so here we come". They also wanted houses in Nicosia, Kyrenia or Güzelyurt. When we offered them houses in villages, they were annoyed. "We were invited with the promise of house allocation". But according to the decision, the houses had to be empty houses or semi-finshed houses, which had to be repaired at the expense of the immigrants. […] As far as I know some did settle here and established businesses. Some established businesses but couldn't sell their products, made a loss. But there were also some others who acquired a semi-finshed construction or building, damaged during the
war, repaired and rebuilt them, because they had brought money from England.\textsuperscript{166}

At this point it must be underlined that the historically constructed ideas on ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ of Turkish Cypriots within the framework of the Turkish nationalist discourse had at the same time offered a justification for the bringing of an immigrant population from Turkey to the island, which did not necessarily have a Turkish Cypriot background. As was explained in the previous section (5.2.2) Turkish nationals were perceived within this primordialist discourse to be ethnically identical to Turkish Cypriots, to share the “same blood”, “origins” and “roots”. Therefore immigrants from Turkey were constructed as perfectly qualified to replace the Turkish Cypriot population who had previously emigrated from the island under the harsh circumstances created by the adversary policies of Greek Cypriots. This idea was also present in the previously quoted statement made by interviewee P3 (see 5.2.3.2). A quotation from an interview conducted by Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009) with Denktaş, who was the central political actor at the time, is further illustrative: “We view the immigrants as people who have come in the place of our population which was forced to emigrate because of the Greek Cypriots. It is not possible to have a different view point” (Rauf Denktaş, quoted in Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009: 58, translated by A.T.)\textsuperscript{167}. Denktaş is also renowned for having said “Giden Türk Gelen Türk” in response to criticisms of population transfer from Turkey (see Kızılyürek 2002).

O2 and O3 who were opposition politicians during the first immigration wave from Turkey, pointed out to another issue, which had indeed become the main leftist discourse about the immigrants from Turkey since their arrival in the island. According to O2 the policy of


\textsuperscript{167} “Bunlar [göçmenler] Rumlar nedeniyle hicrete zorlanan ve adayı terk etmiş olan nüfusumuz yerine gelmiş bulunuyorlar diye bakiyorum. Eee başka türlü bakmak da mümkün değil”.
“population transfer from Turkey” was closely linked to the desire to secure the presence of Turkey on the island. In this respect he explains:

It had all started with an innocent cause. Orchards were the first among those causes. The citrus and vegetable fields were drying out due to the summer weather and they needed to be taken care of. The people [Turkish Cypriots] living in the south hadn't arrived yet. Therefore immigrants were brought in due to the reason that there was a labour shortage. They were brought to fill the labour shortage. In fact the way people were resettled resembled the population transfers to the conquered areas during the Ottoman period. They started by transferring and resettling a complete village in Cyprus. They settled people who had problems [in Turkey], who did not have enough land and employment opportunities in their villages of origin. They brought them not only from a particular region but from all regions, yet mostly from the Karadeniz region. There is no land in the Karadeniz region and people cannot do agriculture. In this way people were being brought in as immigrants. [...] They were being resettled here. People had some suspicions and concerns from the beginning that the main cause was something else. Despite the [claimed] reason, which seemed innocent, people who arrived did not know anything about type of agriculture. How would the people from the Karadeniz region know about citrus farming? The citrus fruits were the main problem. But they [immigrants] didn't know crops agriculture either. [...] Eventually, [the aim] was integration with Turkey. Increasing the influence of Turkey in Cyprus could have only been achieved through population transfer. The Turkish bureaucracy and the shadow [parallel] government never trusted us Cypriots [...]. If we were to say one day "No, we have had enough" Turkey could respond "but you are not alone; it is not only you who are Cypriots." That was the reason [for Turkey] to have a population here.
According to O2 Turkish and Turkish Cypriot political leaders at the time needed a population they could „trust“ and manipulate for their own political purposes, so that these immigrants were brought with the primary aim to secure the predominance of pro-Taksim, Turkish-nationalist parties in North Cyprus, which were loyal to Turkey. O3 offers a similar explanation to the migration wave under scrutiny. This facilitated migration, he argues was an act of population engineering with the ambition to annex Cyprus to Turkey (i.e. Taksim).

In his own words:

They wanted integration, to create a separate identity and to create here a protectorate or a dependant province; hence this was all the result of political, cultural and other actions of their invasionist rationality. But since life has a dialectical logic and contains contradictions; and since human beings are infinitely variable, a set of relations and possibilities were created which were different to what they were planning. Life does not end up being what engineers try to make it. I mean this was an act of engineering.169

Moreover O2 and O3 also argued that the bringing of immigrants primarily as a political manoeuvre to increase the population of the northern part of the island, was not primarily tied to the aim of protecting national interests of the states in the international political community (which was argued by P4), but on the contrary the main motivation of the nationalist ruling class of the period as well as that of Turkey was to secure the continuation of their power and domination in the island.170

169 Entegrasyon, ayrı bir identite yaratmak ve buraya kendine bağlı bir protektora ya da kendine bağlı bir eyalet haline dönürmek istiyor, o fetihi anlayışın yaratmak istediği hem siyasi, hem kültürel, hem diğer bütün alanlarda bir politikasının sonucuydu bunlar. Ama hayatın diyalektiği ve hayatın kendi içindeki çelişkileri, insan karakterinin sonsuz bir açılıma sahip olması hadisesi sonucu onların düşünüldüğünden farklı ilişkilerin ve potansiyellerin doğmasına da [imkan verdi]. İlla bu mühendislerin çizdiği şekilde şekillenmiştir hayat. Yani o mühendisler bunu dizayn ettiler.

170 It is indeed this perception of the first immigration wave, by the Turkish Cypriot left which had evolved to a discriminating discourse against the immigrants. It had constructed the latter as the „others‘ of a Cypriot identity in opposition to a “Turkish” identity which was embraced as an ideal to be achieved along the road to a peaceful solution to Cyprus problem and the reunification of the island. MT, another politician active in the same political party described the views of the pro-solution forces towards the incoming population as negative and pointed out to the Annan plan period which had to the effect that the relations between the former and Turkish immigrants started to normalise.
Additionally a second though not unrelated political motivation was also identified by the interviewees, which relates to the repopulation of the territories acquired by the military operations by Turkey in 1974. This was especially suggested by P1, P2, I4. The excerpt below is from the interview with P1 who was a high-ranking policy maker in the concerned period. He argues that, in addition to economic reasons, the immigrants were brought to the island with the aim to repopulate vacant settlement areas so that the return of Greek Cypriots was prevented.

[This migration program] had two dimensions. One was political and the other one was technical. The political dimension was this: There was the worry, in Denktaş’s mind, that may be when the villages remained empty the Greek Cypriots would be eager to come back to the northern part, and they would put pressure on international organisations for this purpose. But in fact we did [also] need an agricultural workforce in those villages. The gardens were running dry, they were not being irrigated, the fruits were spilled on the ground, were being dumped into the riverbeds. Therefore these immigrants were brought under the rubric of labour migration. Turkey had such a potential, because it had plans relating to relocation of the villages which were in located in forestland and which were threatened by dam projects; and was searching for sites to relocate these villagers. In a sense the two things coincided, they found resettlement sites for these people and at the same time the Cyprus politics of Turkey was being executed. I mean population transfer to the island was a project similar to the one in the period of Selim II, but they came under the rubric of agricultural labour, and at the same time, we actually needed an agricultural workforce. In this way we filled the villages, and had the chance to take control of the land for both dry and irrigated agriculture and at the same time we increased our population.\footnote{Bu göçü iki boyutu vardı. Birisi siyasiydi, diğeri ise teknikti. Siyasi boyutu yarın köyler boş görünür, Rumların istahı kalkar, tekrar Rumlar kuzeye gelmek için uluslararası örgütlerle bazıı yapar endişesi de vardı Denktaş’ın kafasında. Ama esas gerçek olan bu köylerde bizim tarım iş gücüne ihtiyaççimiz vardı. Bahçeler susuz, bahçeler kuru, meyveler yerlere dökülmüş, dere yataklarına atılıyor. [...] Dolayısıyla bu göçmenlerin tarım iş gücü altında getirildi. Türkiye’nin böyle bir potansiyeli vardı çünkü orman köylərinden nüfus boşaltma ve baraj suları altında kalabileceği köyleri boşaltmaya dair projesi vardı ve bu insanları yerleştirecek yer anyordu. Yani ikisi üst üste geldi, hem onlar bir yerleşecek yer bulmuş olyorlardı hem de Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs’a ilgisi, politikası uygulanmış olayor. Yani buraya nüfus aktarma II. Selim dönemindeki gibi bir proje idi ama tarım iş gücü altında geldiler ve gerçekten ihtiyaççimiz vardı. Böylece bütün köyleri doldurduk ve gerek kuru, gerek sulu arazilere sahip çıkma olanlığı bulduk ve nüfusumuzu da takviye etmiş oldu.}

P2 another high-ranking policy maker of the period similarly asserted that it was important for the state to repopulate the areas, which were under Turkish control. The bringing of
immigrants from Turkey, was in his explanation the only solution, especially given that Turkish Cypriot expats did not return to the island, although they were invited back.

The main reason, I’ll tell you, was that we didn’t have enough people to fill the houses and settlement areas in the northern part of Cyprus that we acquired after the Greek Cypriots were expelled after the peace operation. Because if you leave an area/ a place empty, it will not be yours. A current example to this is Varosha, or the village of Ahna, they are empty. But with whom should we have filled these places? Now, [...] some of our friends talk nonsense sometimes, excuse my language, when they say things like “Why did people come from Turkey?” and all that. At that period we immediately invited the Cypriots abroad: “Come back and we will give you land and even houses. You left due to the pressures of the Greek Cypriots and negative events of the past. Come back to your homeland, we will give you all that”. [...] However we did not get the result that we were looking for, there came only few people.172

I4, who was a civil servant involved in the settlement of the first wave immigrants, i.e. a policy implementer, regarded the primary motivation of the state as the filling of vacant properties. This, he argued, gave rise to the arbitrariness in the post 1974 distribution of property in the northern part of the island and created a general social injustice not only in regards to property distributions to immigrants from Turkey but also to the Turkish Cypriot refugees.

[...] the administration faced a difficult situation because there were houses that remained empty. Therefore, even the 1963 or 1958 refugees, and even if these were already allocated houses [were distributed houses and property]. Even if they were refugees or children of martyrs, at the age of 40 or 60, they acquired houses. Even if the person was 10 years old at the time of being a refugee, and was by then 20, s/he too received a house. We also settled the northern part in a sense. We resettled, in the northern part of Cyprus, those

coming from the North [that is Turkey] and the local population, as well as the refugees from the southern part.\textsuperscript{173}

\textbf{5.2.3.3 State-Building, Ethnicity and Nationalism}

Taking the issues explained in the previous sections into account, it can be argued that abundant economic resources, coupled with the opportunity of self-governance and the prospect of non-dependence on Greek-Cypriots regarding social division of labour and other political prospects are definitely among the motivations of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces in their quest of increasing the population and repopulation of the territories in the northern part of the island. These motivations need to be understood and explained within the framework “Turkish-Cypriot nationalist drive toward state-building” (Arslan 2012: 120). Although this was evident in a number of oral history interviews P1 described this policy most clearly:

\begin{quote}
I mean, in the north we had already made our decision and started the implementation. What was that decision? We had already said in the very beginning that ‘we are in the north[ern part] and we will build a common federal republic with Greek Cypriots , the land and properties in the north are under our control and sovereignty’.\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}

Therefore, according to this interviewee, who would become a high ranking government representative after the 1974-partition, the Turkish Cypriot side sought a solution to Cyprus problem on the basis of two sovereign states. He argued further: “Of course, we say that a new phase had started after the military operation. We have a state of our own now and we will seek a solution on the basis of this nation state. Here, we have founded our federal state,


\textsuperscript{174} Yani artık biz kuzeyde kararımızı vermiş ve uygulamaya başlamıştık. Nerede bu karar? ‘Biz artık kuzeydeyiz ve Rumlarla bir ortak federal devlet kuracağız, kuzeydeki mal artık bizim kontrolümüzde ve egemenliğimizdedir’ diye biz bunu ta baştan, yani gemileri yaktık biz ta baştan.
so we expect the same from the other party too”. It would therefore be incorrect to accuse the Turkish Cypriot side for not wanting a solution, as did the international community. Then the former did seek a solution, but had in the meanwhile tried to have a strong nation-state of their own. In P1’s words:

But what type of solution should that solution be? A federal structure, a structure with two federated states. Therefore, Ecevit had never said “No I will not strengthen [my state/my part], I cannot not do what I want here”. I mean […] the political messages coming from him, from law experts, from experts on land and resettlement were like “we are going to make our area prosperous, build a nation-state, strengthen it, increase the population” and so on. I mean this was the presupposition from the very beginning. […] Of course! And Denktas was someone who overemphasised these desires, no one can deny that, so that he worked in accord with Ecevit. […] He had filled the Atatürk square and gave speeches from the balcony of Saray Hotel and so on. He had such good relations with the military […]

Against this background it can be argued that the corporate agency of the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot states entailed a strong “projective element” in that it was influenced to a great extent by the states’ goals and desires for their futures. In this respect the 1974 division of the island was perceived by the Turkish Cypriot leadership as an opportunity to alter the minority situation of Turkish Cypriots, and by the Turkish state as a means to secure perceived future advantage regarding the island and its international strategic interests through it. At the same time, on the other hand, the practical-evaluative element was a strong

175 Tabii, biz artık harekattan sonra yepyeni bir dönem başladığını kabul ediyoruz. Artık kendi devletimiz var, bu devlet esas olarak bir çözüme gidilecektir. Aha, federal devletimizi de kurduk, karşı taraftan aynı hareketi bekliyoruz.

176 It must be noted here that although this interviewee talks about a federal solution to the Cyprus problem, it is obvious from his descriptions that he is embracing the system of confederation, which was proposed by Denktaş.

component of their agential actions. This is especially discernible in their utilisation of immigration (form Turkey) as a part of state building after a new situation, i.e. the partition of the island and the homogenisation of the territories, had emerged. Regarding the agency of the Turkish Cypriot state, however an iterational element also comes to the fore. This is especially discernible in the construction of the national history of Turkish Cypriot community during the early years of state building and entailed a process of selective remembering and forgetting (Canefe 2007) within which the memory of sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots due to their minority status in the island was emphasised, at the expense of memories of peaceful co-existence.

Throughout these processes, ideas of ethnicity and nationalism were employed. This is discernible in the utilisation of migration as a strategy to boost the population and repopulate territory, and in the choosing of immigrants’ national origins. Houses and other properties left behind by Greek Cypriot refugees offered an opportunity to establish a Turkish population on the island and to prevent the return of Greek Cypriots to these territories. At the same time, empty villages made landless peasants the sought-for profile, majority of which accepted their states’ proposal to move to Cyprus, since they did not own enough land in Turkey to make a good living.

Indeed ideas of ethnicity and nation serve to justify states’ actions of regulation and control of their borders, often directed at keeping unwanted peoples out (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller 2002; Bauböck et al, 2006). Yet at other times, as has happened in the case of North Cyprus, these ideologies can be utilised to attract immigrants from certain geographies (Brubaker 1998). In this sense “culturally imbued migration” (Hedberg 2004: 26) or “ethnic immigration preferences” (Bauböck et al 2006) are not rare phenomena. As Bauböck et al (2006) argue:

Several states (among others Israel, Italy, Japan, Germany, Greece, Spain and Portugal) have also adopted preferences for foreign nationals whom they consider as part of a larger ethnic nation or as cultural and linguistic relatives who will more easily integrate in the destination country. With some notable exceptions […], ethnic immigration preferences are a rather neglected topic in comparative migration research. This may partly be due to the fact that co-ethnic immigration does not fit well into dominant migration theories that focus on economic push and pull factors and on the sociology of migration.
networks (ibid: 68).

The consideration of the above arguments brings us close to that what could be termed a multi-dimensional approach to migration. This will be described next.

5.3 From an Economic to a Multi-Factorial Approach

This chapter departed from a critique of the economic-structural approach to migration in general and to the first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus in particular. Adopting a multi-dimensional viewpoint within the framework of critical realist thinking a multi-factorial approach to the explanation of migration was put forward. It was argued that not only economic structural but also cultural-ideational factors played a role in the causation of this migration movement. In the cultural sphere ideas of ethnicity and nation were identified as dominant ideologies of the period, which also conditioned agential action by the states. In other words, it was endeavoured, in accordance with a critical realist methodology, to search for causal mechanisms, rather than being content with just the surface appearances. In this sense an economic perspective was regarded as unsatisfactory. Then the labour shortage that appeared in the island’s north after its partition and the accompanying population displacements had at the same time provided the states with a justification for the initiation of the influx of a population, the planning and the execution of which would not have been possible without the cultural factors and agential motivations of political nature.

Turkish Cypriot power holders had been constructing their community’s identity in ethnic and national terms as belonging to the Turkish nation, which they saw as being represented by Turkey, especially since the initial years of Kemalist state-building in Turkey (see section 4.3). These processes intensified in the post-colonial period of Cyprus, in which adversary relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots deepened, and these were further alienated from each other, due to the paramilitary activities of both communities. At the end of this period, when the island was divided after Turkey’s military interference, immigrants from Turkey -and not from elsewhere- were perceived as integral elements of state building in the island’s north as was the expulsion of Greek Cypriots. The former were perceived as necessary elements for the nation-state state building as they would fulfil the political agenda.
of the states as well as the labour shortage that was created after the collapse of the former division of labour between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Accordingly, these immigrants repopulated the ex-Greek Cypriot villages and properties so as to preserve the ethnic unmixing of Turkish Cypriots by preventing the return of the latter (see Hirschon 2003).

Obviously the two states cooperating in the immigrant recruitment for North Cyprus did so within the context of historically developed consciousness about nation and nationality attributed to Turkish Cypriots, the rival political relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and the relations between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey based on the belief of ethnic-affinity. In the light of the above, it can be argued that the motivations of the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot governments, in initiating this movement form Turkey to North Cyprus cannot be assumed to be of purely economic nature, contrary to many post World War II migrations in Western Europe (see Castles and Miller 1998). As was elucidated in detail, this is reflected in the oral history interviews conducted.

On the other hand, the causal analysis of the first migration wave from Turkey to North Cyprus is yet not complete. Given the complexity of social reality, it can be expected that, at different levels of aggregation, diverse -even contradictory- generative mechanisms may be identified. For this reason, the following chapter endeavours a micro-level analysis regarding the causation of the first wave of migration from Trabzon and Mersin in Turkey to Bahçeli in the northern part of Cyprus.
CHAPTER 6

THE MESO- and MICRO-LEVELS - LOOKING AT BAHÇELI IMMIGRANTS

6.1 The Meso-Level Causal Factors

As Porpora (2013) states, in critical realist thinking, causation of social phenomena “[…] involves a dialectical relation between human agency and the contexts in which those agents find themselves, contexts that include culture, structure, and physical things” (ibid: 29). At the same time, as has been argued, interaction between these factors take place at different levels of aggregation. It is therefore, necessary to incorporate these different levels of aggregation into the analysis, so as to capture the complexity and the multi-dimensionality of the phenomena under study. In this sense, the previous chapter endeavoured to explain the 1975-1980 migratory movement from Turkey to northern Cyprus at the macro-level, revealing macro-structural, macro-cultural and macro-agential causal powers, which became efficacious in the materialisation of this movement. Yet apparently the identification of generative mechanisms at the macro-level is not sufficient to explain the whole event of migration, then without the agential impact of the immigrants themselves, there would be no movement. In this sense, the present chapter endeavours to explain the agency of the migrants, by drawing mainly on the narratives of the “pioneer migrants”, in the causation of the first migration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus. At the same time, this chapter concentrates on the meso-level, by focusing on the case of immigration from Trabzon and Mersin to Bahçeli, that is, it tries to uncover extra-individual structural and cultural factors specific to the particular areas these pioneer migrants stem from. These factors are expected to have a more immediate effect in shaping the contexts in which groups perform their agencies.

Furthermore, this chapter will point out to the process of ‘emergence’ through which, it is expected that the emergent properties found at the macro-level are not found at the meso-
level, which in turn possess emergent properties not found at the level of individual interactions (micro-level). Yet, as mentioned, the causation of an actual event i.e. the first wave of immigration from Turkey to northern Cyprus, can only be explained when a multi-dimensional perspective is taken into account, since an emergenist perspective “accepts that entities at many levels can simultaneously have causal powers and these powers may interact to produce actual events” (Elder-Vass 2008b: 291). It is thus expected that the explanation of migration at meso and micro-levels will bring to the fore different causal mechanisms compared to those discovered at the macro-level in the previous chapter.

According to Iosifides (2011) “[...] because causal powers exerted by those systemic properties are in constant interaction with other causal factors of different nature or with those at different levels and with various contingent factors, migratory movements are not strictly determined by the logic of capital accumulation, despite the existence of certain tendencies” (Iosifides 2011: 40). This means that the macro-level mechanisms are mere tendencies when these are not matched with similarly efficacious mechanisms at lower-level strata; i.e. at both meso and micro-levels. Therefore as important as the broader structural and cultural environment is in influencing migratory trends in various geographies, there are also some local-level factors, which too have causal effects within generative mechanisms.

The meso/local-level can be conceptualised as one mediating between the macro-level and the micro-level (Sayer 1992). In this sense the local-level emergent properties (causal powers) may be even more important in the decision-making for immigrant groups, since some of these factors are more likely to be directly shaping the conditions of social action, by influencing the motivations as well as the resources available to potential migrants. In this respect, the following subsections will regard structural and cultural factors at the meso-level, which had been effective in the causation of the initial wave of migration and from Trabzon and Mersin to Bahçeli.

6.1.1 Meso-Level Structural Factors

The receiving context, seen form the meso-level, obviously entails an empty village with
abundant housing capacity as well as agricultural fields and gardens, made available by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities, for an incoming population from mainland Turkey. These resources were, moreover presented as adequate to secure the immigrant population an agricultural livelihood. On the other hand, there were locality-specific factors also in the sending context, which partook in the immigration generating mechanisms from Trabzon (Araklı, Ayvadere) and Mersin (Gülnar) to Bahçeli in the northern part of Cyprus. These will be explored below.

Abadan-Unat (2011) explains emigration from Turkey to western countries especially from a macro historical-structural perspective employing a world systems perspective and focusing on centre-periphery relations. Other macro-level perspectives on migration suggest that migration takes place from economically less advanced to more advanced countries especially with higher wages. Such perspectives cannot be employed when explaining immigration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus, since the latter had become a quasi-sovereign state since the partition in 1974, which is economically and politically dependent on its relations with Turkey for survival. In this respect, the northern part of Cyprus can most definitely neither be counted as belonging to the core nations nor considered to be economically more advanced than Turkey.

Yet, moving on to the meso-level, it can be argued that Cypriot towns and villages were indeed relatively more developed in relation to the remote Anatolian villages in Turkey from which many of the immigrants originated. Therefore although neither neo-classical labour migration theories nor world systems theories can explain migration from Turkey to northern Cyprus from a macro perspective, seen from the meso-level, the general trend of migratory movements taking place from less advanced to more advanced regions is not necessarily refuted (see also Kurtuluş & Purks 2009).

A meso-level explanation of the case must also take into account the emigration-generating mechanisms at the regional levels. Morawska (2007) argues in this sense that meso-economic factors refer to the macro-economic context “reflected at the local levels” (ibid: 17). Therefore, one must focus on the meso-level reflections of the at the macro-level
identified demographic and socio-economic factors, like transformation of rural relations of production and the emergence of small peasantry. In this sense, it must be investigated whether these processes have been effective in the regions of emigration concerned.

According to Yıldırımaz (2010), some regions in Turkey were more prone to emigration (ibid: 426-430). The Karadeniz region is among these, which according to the author constitutes a traditional emigration region in Turkey (ibid: 428). Therefore it can be argued, regarding Karadeniz, at least at the meso-level, that similar mechanisms generating internal rural-urban migration within Turkey and labour migration from Turkey to Europe are among the causes of immigration to North Cyprus. Among causal factors are, according to Yıldırımaz, an increase in rural population, a rise of small peasantry and increasing land prices: “Karadeniz region […], reveals the most substantial data on the relationship between rural to urban migration, population growth, small landownership and increase in land prices” (Yıldırımaz 2010: 428; translated by AT). He argues moreover,

The key reason of emigration from the Karadeniz region is that the production that was carried out on the basis of existing landownership was not sufficient to fulfil even the most basic needs of a growing population. Regarding the estimations that agricultural income in the Karadeniz region is below Turkey’s average of 58% (Kazgan 1957-1958: 388), this insufficiency is even more obvious. The geographically limited [due to terrain factors] possibility of agricultural land expansion, unlike in other regions of Turkey, had given rise the most important component of migration in that period (ibid: 429).

This point was raised in the in-depth interviews with the immigrants as well. TM1 noted in this respect the following.

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178 “Karadeniz göçü, […], kırdan kente yaşanan göçün, nüfus artış, küçük toprak sahipliği ve artan toprak fiyatları ile olan ilişkisini de en somut olarak gözmeyebileceğimiz verilerini sağlamaktadır” (Yıldırımaz 2010: 428).

They [have] hazelnut fields, houses and all that […] , they still do. But the thing is, if you divide the whole property to the children of the families who came here, they all get only one piece. This is a general situation there. Back there, someone who has a 20-donum hazelnut field is said to be wealthy landowners, but there is no such situation. Therefore this is the reason why Karadeniz has been a place of emigration and there are many emigrants [from Karadeniz] in many places all over Turkey. […] Most of my family is in Istanbul (TM1, 58, male, 1. generation Trabzon).  

A meso-level analysis focusing closely on the sending localities the immigrants stem from, may offer an further explanation: This initial wave of migration took place predominantly from rural regions in Turkey, which were relatively deprived and technologically less developed. In this respect, the field research has revealed that (perceived) difference in technological development between the rural regions of origin and destination was also effective in the initiation of this wave of immigration, in addition to the material incentives in the form of houses and properties that were offered to the immigrants. I was told, especially by women throughout the field research, they were persuaded into migrating to Cyprus with the promise of a better everyday-life, especially comprising modern houses with electricity, running tap water, and other technological advantages. Although some of the promises were exaggerated so as to persuade women who were either sceptical or not willing to partake in the movement -like automatic house-doors which would open upon approach- most of the time, even the promise of electric lighting was effectual (interview with TW6). The higher degree of technological development in Cyprus in comparison to rural regions in Turkey and the promise of a more ‘modern’ daily life in modern houses, had constituted an efficacious motivation for groups from rural regions, like for Trabzon immigrants from the Ayvadere village to undertake the immigration journey.

On the other hand, it cannot be argued that perceived technological advancement had a similar causal relationship to the immigration of the second group of immigrants form Mersin. These immigrants, unlike the rural Trabzon immigrants, belonged to urban  

proletariat as most of them had already emigrated from their original villages (mostly from İskaklar village in Gülnar) and were already working in a district (Erdemli) close to Mersin. As MM5 explains:

We were not in the village as before we immigrated here. Many of these people were not in the village, they had already gotten out of the village. They had moved to a district close to central Mersin. They were working there as greengrocers. They constructed a group there (MM5 40, male, 2. generation Mersin).

Therefore regarding the case of the Mersin immigrants, it can be argued that it was the working conditions and low wages along with the perceived opportunities –including houses, fields and orchards- that were effective in initiating the immigration wave under consideration.

Among other structural factors, which usually play a role in migration generating mechanisms, are transnational migrant networks connecting migrants in the place of destination with non-migrants (including potential migrants) in the place of origin, and providing the latter with necessary means to encourage and ease their migration. Yet, initially, for neither of the groups were there pre-established transnational migrant networks present in the northern part of Cyprus of any kind, which would ease the immigration of the groups. In this sense, as Kurtuluş and Purkis (2009) argue, the migratory ties between Turkey and North Cyprus were yet to be formed with the initiation of this first wave of migration. However, it is important to note that, these links and networks are rather swiftly formed, so that the 1975-1980 time period also contains immigration facilitated through mechanisms created in the first place by migrant networks. Field research has revealed in this sense that especially for the Trabzon immigrants, such networks have facilitated the bringing of brides and extended family members to the place of immigration by the pioneers. TM2’s story about how he was involved in the first wave of migration illustrates how swiftly migrant networks were formed:

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Our arrival was a little interesting. We gave a girl in marriage, sent her here. We came here in that way. They had arrived three months before us. [...] It was the first or the second month of 76. We applied [for immigration] afterwards, and immigrated here as a family. [...] I was single when I arrived. [...] I got married here. [...] I got married in 79. I married someone from Turkey, [...] she is also from Araklı (TM2, 58, male, 1. generation Trabzon).

These ties were further effective in the perpetuation of immigrations after the decline of the first wave in 1980 and so in the generation of the later waves of migrations from Turkey to northern Cyprus.

6.1.2 Meso-Level Cultural factors

According to Morawska (2006), a national (macro-level) ethnic affinity may function as a pull factor at the meso-level. She explains this in the following:

[...]the groups collective recognition of its national or ethnic world Diaspora referred to in school textbooks, in national literature and at national celebrations, “naturalises” international migration in the eyes of group members by making it a component of national/ethnic collective identity. This collective recognition of one’s group’s world Diaspora as part of national or ethnic history and symbolic [...] potentially matter for decision making as early as the initiation phase of migration - [...]” (Morawska 2007: 16).

Perceived common origins and the symbol of blood-ties within the ‘our kinsmen’ (soydaşlarımız) discourse, which was popularised in Turkey especially since mid-1950s (see Navaro-Yashin 2012; Samani 1999) and more importantly, the perception of Cyprus as ‘infant-land’ (yavru vatan), corresponding to the construction of Turkey as the ‘motherland’ by Turkish Cypriots, thus the construction of Turkish Cypriots as a type of Diaspora, may thus have tied the two societies together on the discursive and symbolic levels. These symbolic ties may have thus functioned as mechanisms “naturalising” the act of international migration from Turkey to northern Cyprus in general.

Looking at the meso-level cultural context however, one must identify whether and to what extent the macro-level cultural context is reflected at the meso-level. In this respect, it is important is to find out, whether the mechanism relating to symbolic ties across borders can be identified at the group level for each of the two communities. In this sense, research reveals that even though Turkey had reproduced a nationalist discourse on Cyprus by viewing it as its national cause as early as in the 1950s, this political discourse may not have acquired a significant space in the collective memory at the local level. This fact applies especially to rural populations and can be explained by taking into account that this group had rather scant national education, limited contact to a national political life and a limited use of national media (i.e. no televisions). For this reason, people from certain origins may not have been acquainted with the primordialist “our kinsmen“ discourse prevalent on the macro-level. In this respect Ioannides (1991) argues:

Cyprus has certain relevance for settlers whose relatives were killed during the invasion and for retired officers and demobilized soldiers who served in Cyprus and later settled here. For the farmers, however, Cyprus has no particular meaning. It is quite plausible that a substantial number of them had little or no clear idea of where Cyprus was located before their departure from Turkey. This could be particularly true with regard to farmers coming from central, eastern or northern Turkey (ibid: 28-48, in Hatay 2005: 12).

Hatay (2005) reaches the same conclusion. He notes “[s]ome of the older people of the village [Kayalar village] who were interviewed insisted that they did not know where Cyprus was before they actually arrived on the island. Many such stories can be cited” (ibid: 12). My research could also, to a great extent, verify these claims. Many of the pioneer migrants in the village have stated in this respect that they had little knowledge about Cyprus prior to their arrival to the island. Some of these migrants narrated that they had heard about Cyprus only a few months before their departure to the island, after having watched a documentary film in the cinema. TW2 and TW4, who apparently have watched the same documentary film on Cyprus in the aftermath of the 1974 military operation to the island by Turkey described this incidence as follows:
**Researcher:** “Did you know about Cyprus before?”

**TW2:** “No. How could I? There is a district of Trabzon called Sürmene. My uncle had a son. ‘I will take my cousin to the cinema’, he said. They had filmed Cyprus. We were taken to a place. There were no TVs back then. My god, there was such bloodshed [shown in the film]! We were to come here [to Cyprus] soon. So, [we thought] they will kill us too. In the end it was God’s will. (TW2 > 85, female, 1. generation Trabzon)\(^{183}\)

**TW4:** “They took us to Sürmene to [show a film about] the war in Cyprus. They screened a film in the cinema. We saw how all those people were jumping with parachutes, how people cried, how they prayed. We cried a lot.”

**Researcher:** “When was that?”

**TW4:** “During the last months of 74. The war had just ended here. They showed us the recordings. We were watching those scenes in the film.”

**Researcher:** “Who was screening the film?”

**TW4:** “[...] I don't know. I was a child. Back then there were no TVs. There were only cinemas. We have first seen a TV after we arrived here. It was black and white but at least there were TVs here. [...] Anyway, we went there. All the people were crying. We saw how they shot all those people. They killed the children of a man in the bathtub. They showed us everything there. We were very frightened and we cried a lot. That was the first time we went to the cinema. Imagine that. We were frightened as if all those aeroplanes were flying above us.. We had never seen such a thing before. Due to the film I watched I was really afraid coming to Cyprus.”

(Interview with TW4, 55, female, 1. generation Trabzon).\(^{184}\)

\(^{183}\) *Araştırmacı:* „Kıbrıs’ı biliyormus muydunuz?“


**TW4:** “[...]Bir de bizi Kıbrıs savaşı için Sürmene’ye götürdüler. Sinemada bunun şeyini verdiler. O paraşütlere insanların atlayışı, insanların ağlaması, oralarda dua etmesi.. Biz çok ağladık.”

*Araştırmacı:* “O ne zamandı!”

**TW4:** “İste 74’ün son ayları [...] İşte burada savaşı yeni bitmiş. Onların kayıtlarını gösteriyorlar. Neyse biz sinemayı izliyorduk orada”.

*Araştırmacı:* “Kim gösterdi onu?”

The immigrants who lived or worked in the cities prior to their movement to Cyprus were more exposed to national and military discourses at least by 1974. TM1, a Trabzon immigrant explains that although the people in the village had no idea about Cyprus prior to 1974, during the military intervention in 1974 people were euphoric about Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots.

The villagers did not know [about Cyprus] [...]. The events of 1967; the village had a mukhtar, uncle Ali, he passed away though. He went up and down the village and warned people: “close your windows there is a war in Cyprus”. I understood much later that the planes were sent [to Cyprus in 1967 [...] and that there was an intervention in 1974. It was a Saturday, around 6:30, I was in Istanbul. I woke up early in the morning to go to work and was washing my face in the bathroom. I was staying in that hotel. There were no TV’s in the hotel, so I was listening to the radio, to the statements of Ecevit. He was saying something like “the intervention has begun”. There were TV’s in large stores. People used to stop in front of the stores and watch TV. All the people felt the same way about Cyprus. They felt bad. “Our people are really suffering there. How could we help?” People were lining in front of military recruitment offices. That was how the people felt (TM1, 58, male, 1. generation Trabzon).  

Still, it must be taken into account that locality-specific differences may exist. In this sense a Mersin immigrant stated that there was a local radio based in Anamur, which was broadcasting news about the inter-communal strife in Turkey, and it was a rather popular channel among the people in and close to Anamur. This radio channel was effective in the diffusion of a nationalist imagination regarding Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots. MM1 states:\footnote{Not all Mersin immigrants that I interviewed had the same memory about this radio station, and its broadcasts on Cyprus issue.}

In 1959 I was in the 4th grade of primary school. They were about to establish a new radio station called The Voice of Cyprus in Anamur. In August 1960 it started broadcasting under the motto “this is the voice of Cyprus radio”. [...] It was broadcasting about the events here. The broadcast was similar to today’s radio station “The Voice of the North” with songs following one another. The broadcasting continued until 1974 and 1975. Older people were always listening to it. We were following the events of 1963 and so on. [...] people were taking it quite seriously. People used to come with their steers, an hour before the daybreak to listen to the news.[...]. The radios were like sweets’ boxes. There were only 3 radios in the whole village with 1500 households. We were all gathering around these 3 radios. When they were reporting about the children murdered in the bathtub, people got really agitated. [...] If one took the usual route it used to take 15 hours to get to Anamur from the village 9 hours to the district and 6 hours by car to Anamur. But taking advantage of the moonlight, people took the route through the forest and made it in 4 and a half hours. [...] 278 people from our village [...]. Then the elders had decided that everyone should take out whatever weapons they had, whatever was passed on to them from their grandfathers. [...] 4 people had some guns. We were going to the war. 278 people from our village volunteered. In Anamur they distributed cigarettes and food for the villagers and contacted Ankara. [...] The commander came to Anamur with a helicopter. Military vehicles followed. They took the villagers and on the 4. day they brought them back to the village. They made a list of their names. They told them if there is war we will call you. I was a kid back then. Our uncles came “Who are these Greek Cypriots, that they are killing our brothers?” the adults used to say that. They got in a line in the village, and said we will march to the Turkish National Anthem. They also fired guns. All the people took the shortcut to Anamur shouting and yelling (MM1, 65, male, 1. generation Mersin). 187

There can also be other kinds of cultural factors effective at the local-level. Following Morawska (2007), it is expected for instance, that an established “culture of migration” can contribute positively to outmigration. The culture of migration relates to past actions of migration that have a place in the collective consciousness of the community concerned. Culture of migration as such, Morawska suggests, can be internalised by the potential migrants and act as part of the iterational component of their decision-making (ibid). This factor can be found in both Trabzon and Mersin immigrants. Research data suggests that migration was regarded by the immigrants from Mersin as a natural “destiny” within the life course of each family. The quotation below is illustrative for the Trabzon group:

Istanbul, Ankara, Germany. Many people from the Karadeniz region were emigrants abroad. The ones who stayed in the village were old people like us now. Young people like you wouldn’t stay in the village. I has always been this way. […] If you ever go to our villages today you will find bushes around the houses. No one is left there. People left their villages back then, settled somewhere else and stayed there. Back home you could earn money only with tea or hazelnuts, but with nothing else. Only if you took good care of the field you could harvest once a year. We did not have roads until Özal came to power. There were no roads before. [We travelled] with horses and donkeys (TW4, 56, female, 1. generation Trabzon).188

The Mersin group on the other hand comprise people and/or their offspring who had already emigrated from their villages. Therefore immigration to North Cyprus was not the first act of movement taken up by their families in search for a better life. For the Mersin immigrants, this speaks for a culture of migration at the local level.

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6.2 The Micro-level: Migrants’ Agencies

In critical realist thinking and research, migrant’s stories are viewed as sources of data, which reveal “human reasons, interpretations and meanings [that] are agential causal powers that interplay with structural and cultural powers” (Iosifides 2011: 182). Moreover it is considered that their experiences “are not merely unique individual experiences but, rather, are systematically shaped by social relations of gender, class, ethnicity and migrant status” (Lawson 2000:174 in ibid.183). Therefore the theoretical and analytical potential of migrants’ stories need to be taken into account when explaining migration (ibid). Furthermore migrants’ narratives are surely first-hand proofs of the complexities, indicating the multi-layered and multi-factorial nature of social reality. In this sense as was already mentioned, it is expected that the micro-level makes such generative mechanism discernible, which are, due to the process of emergence, not identical to those identified at the meso and/or macro-levels.

As was argued in detail in the theoretical chapter, it is immigrants’ agencies in general and pioneer migrants’ agencies in particular, which along with structures and cultural conditions, determine the initiation and formation of a migration system. As Bakewell, de Haas and Kubal (2011) argue “[w]hile structural factors do obviously determine the necessary conditions for large-scale migration to occur between particular places and regions, whether this actually occurs heavily depends on the migration-facilitating and migration-impeding role of the agency of migrants, and pioneer migrants in particular“ (ibid: 12).

6.2.1 Whose Agency?

Literature on labour migration concentrates on the voluntariness of the act of migration (in comparison to being a refugee), so that the decision of human actors to make the journey becomes an important causal factor. Yet before moving on to the analysis of these decisions, i.e. to investigate what motivations, desires and goals underlie migratory decisions, the first question that shall be regarded is “who makes the decision to migrate?” There are various answers to this question in the theoretical literature. Whereas the neo-classical economics approach suggests in this respect, that migration decisions are made by rational, profit
maximising and costs reducing individuals, the NELM theory, claims that migration decisions are made by households rather than individuals. According to NELM these household decisions are made moreover via such rational considerations, which do not focus on opportunities but also take costs and risks into consideration. Therefore it is expected that households and families try to diversify their risks by for example not participating in the migratory movement as a whole unit.

The case studied here has revealed that individual migration decisions are almost non-existent. In many of the cases the decision to migrate was made by extended families, which decided who went and who stayed. In this sense the NELM must be considered valuable in diverting the attention away from the individual and towards the family or household, and pointing out to the family strategy to diversify risks. Yet NELM’s implication of democratic-decision making within the household or the extended family cannot be verified against empirical evidence. The “household decision” or the “family decision”, the field research has shown, is not a democratically made collective decision of the family concerned. Rather these decisions reflect the community specific patriarchal power relations within the household and/or family.

It can be argued in this sense that, for the Trabzon community of Bahçeli, it is the elder male head of the extended family, who has the greatest decision-making power. TW2’s husband was the head of the family and as he made the decision to participate in the migration program offered by the state he brought not only his wife but also his children with him some of which were already married with offspring. He was also one of the very first people (along with few other men) who came for a short visit to Cyprus as part of the committees, to see and to encourage others from his village to go along. His wife TW2 (>85 years old) explains:

In fact, it was my husband who made the decision. His name is [X]. [X] is my husband. There was also [Y] was among the first ones who came here. […] there was also [Y]. The two of them came, they were the first ones to see this place. “I went there and looked at everything. It is very nice there” he said. I asked him “what did you see? Fields […], orchards?”; that’s what we had back home; he said “I saw it all, I even saw butter churns”. But there are no churns
here, churns made of wood. He was lying. [...] In fact there is no such thing here. He told that to me to deliberately [deceive me].

In the following quotation she explains the persuasion process, underlining that there was no coercion:

“That place is very nice. If you like, I will take you there, if not I do not force you” he said. “Why don’t I force you? Well [if you like the place] you will say ‘May God bless you’ but if not, […] then you would curse me]. You would say ‘why did you take us there’. So I’ll take those who like it” he said. But there were some people, and he said about them “I will take these people to that village, even if I have to pay for them from my own pocket”. They were very poor. “I’ll take them along” he said. Anyhow, we came here and settled. [...] We agreed and came along.

TW1, who was also present during the same interview, says that although they initially resisted this decision, they eventually accepted it: “We took a swipe at him but we later agreed. We made a hue and cry for a little while, but then we got tired” (TW1; 64; female, 1. generation Trabzon).

The following excerpt from another interview with Trabzon immigrant TM3 (54, male, 1. generation Trabzon) illustrates the role of the male head of household in the decision making process:

**Researcher:** “Did your mother want to come over?”

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191 Biraz çattık ama kabul ettik sonrasında şite. Bağırık biraz, yorulduk ama”. 

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In those days, we are talking about the 70s, what women wanted didn’t really count. What did it matter, whether she wanted or not. Her husband was leaving, so she followed.

Researcher: “Did one of your brothers oppose?”

TM3: “No they didn’t. How could they object to my father? How could you object to your father in those days? How could you ever say a word to your father?”

In some of the individual cases the decision-making family leaders did not themselves participate in the act of migration. Rather they encouraged/persuaded some members of their families to participate. Younger men, even if these were already married, obeyed these decisions, though they may have had some negotiating power. Women on the other hand were generally not asked about their opinion. Many of my respondents’ narratives are illustrative of this. TW1 explains that it was her father-in-law’s decision that she and her husband participated in the immigration. In her own words:

My father-in-law sent us here. We came with the people who opted to come after there was a demand for a labour force. They resettled us here. They said there are furniture and goods in the houses. […] My father-in-law sent my husband and he came, but first he came and had a look, and took us later. I mean he had first come with other people, with the neighbours, to go around and take a look. He talked me into it afterwards (TW1, 61; female, 1. generation Trabzon immigrant).

Another common practice throughout the first wave was the arrangement of marriages by fathers and father-in-laws, so as to bring partners for their children to the place of destination. In the case below the marriage was completed in Turkey so as to register the couple as a separate household, so as to benefit from property allocations. TW4’s explains in the

192 Araştırmacı: „Anneniz istedi mi gelmeyi?”
TM3: “O zamanlar- 70’li yıllardan bahsediyoruz- o zamanlar kadınların isteyip istememesi ne kadar geçerli olurdu ki. Sen istesen ne olur, istemesen ne olur. Kocan kalktı gidiyor, sende gidiyorsun”.
Araştırmacı: “Ağabeylerinizden karşı çıkan oldu mu?”


following that it was not possible for girls to object to their father’s decisions. She narrates her coming to the island, involuntarily, as an immigrant bride as follows:

**TW4:** My father-in-law came and settled here. He went back to Turkey to marry off his grand child. His grandchild was X. He [...] was in love with my sister. [...] He went to Turkey to take her to Cyprus. He saw me there and wanted to marry me to his son. His son was really young, so was I. But he insisted. That was how they took me. I came here with my sister as a bride. [...] 

**Researcher:** “Well, [...] did you know your husband [before]?”
**TW4:** “No”.

**Researcher:** “Did you want to come here?”
**TW4:** “No, I never wanted. I cried a lot. [...] in those days the circumstances were not suitable to think of marriage. And do you know, what we thought of Cyprus? We were children, and we had the feeling that we were going to a place of darkness. They were talking about the war. We had never seen a war. We had only heard of it. [...]”

**Researcher:** “Who made the decision then, when you didn’t want to come and cried?”
**TW4:** “Back then when the older people spoke the young had no say. We could not express our views when the father was present. Married or not. There was no such thing. If your father had made a decision, you had to obey”.

**Researcher:** “So it was your father who made the decision.”
**TW4:** “Of course. My father-in-law and my father decided together. Nowadays things like that only exist in the Eastern Anatolian regions. They make a 15 year old girl marry a 60 year old man. Now, such things do not exist anymore but the wishes of the parents are still important”.

(Interview with TW4; 55; female, 1. generation Trabzon).194

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**Araştırmacı:** “Peki eşiçi [...] tamyor muydun?”
**TW4:** “Hayır”.

**Araştırmacı:** “Gelmeyi istedin mi?”
**TW4:** “Hayır hiç istemedim. Çok ağlayarak da geldim. [...] O zamanki şartlarda da böyle evlilik düşünmek çok zordu. Bir de Kıbrıs bize nasıl bir yer gibi gelirdi bilir misiniz? Çocuktuk, sanki böyle karanhık bir yere gidiyoruz. Bir de savaş diyorlar ya biz hayatta savaş görmemişiz. Ismini duymuşuz o kadar. [...]”

**Araştırmacı:** „Peki kim karar verdi, sen istemedin ağladın?”
**TW4:** “Eskiden büyükler konuştugu zaman biz küçükler konuşamazdık. [...] Biz babalarımızın yanında kesinlikle böyle konuşamazdık. Evleniriz, evlenmeyiz... Öyle bir şey yok. Yani baba neye karar verdiğise odur.”

**Araştırmacı:** „Yani baban karar verdi.”

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Many women I talked to, who were married at the time of their immigration have told me that they were unwilling to migrate to Cyprus at first. They were all talked, when not forced, into it by their husbands. Another woman TW3 in her late 80s (1. generation Trabzon) told me that when she refused to migrate to Cyprus her husband suggested that she could stay in Turkey, but that he would go without her, and take the younger kids along. For TW3 this was unacceptable, because she did not want to be separated from her children. Another woman told me during an informal conversation that she was threatened by her husband with divorce and separation form her children, so had to accepted to partake in the migration. In other, less coercive cases, women were persuaded by their husbands to accept the proposal of emigration with exaggerated promises of a luxurious life. When asked about who decided for her family to migrate to northern Cyprus TW6 explains that it was her father’s decision, who persuaded her mother through the promise of a modern life:

My father. […] I don’t know. My father and some other older people. […] They were influential people. I mean, they knew about things that were happening on the other side of the earth. They gathered together and decided. “Let’s go and take a look. If we like it there, we take our families along, if not we don’t”. So they came here and went around. They stayed for a couple of weeks. My late father, god have mercy on him, liked this place a lot. I mean he really loved Cyprus. Back then the electricity poles were just being installed. In 1975, think about it, but there was electric power here. He came up to my mother and said, “you press the button and the lights go on. It is that good!” “You press the button and go upstairs with the lift”, He must have been to the city. Because there is no such thing in the village. No lifts I mean. I don’t know if he had been to hospitals in the city, of some high buildings, I don’t know where there are lifts. […] He wanted to talk my mother into it. When you look to the walls you see your face, when you look to the floor you see your face. I think the place my father was describing was the paradise that was how the elderly described the paradise to us. So my mother made her decision too and said: “Ok let’s go!” But it was hard (TW6, 53, female, 1. generation Trabzon).

TW1’s story is similar. She explains:

[...] What they had told us. They told us that when you’d approach a house, the doors would automatically open; [that there are] luxurious houses, everything is clean; but as we arrived we did not find anything like that. I mean we were really deceived. [...] We were young; when they told us that the houses are so and so good, so and so furnished, very good, we were misled, [thinking] there would be good jobs, high salaries. But as we came we didn’t find anything. (TW1, female, 61, 1. generation Trabzon).

Similar patriarchal mechanisms operated within the immigrant families coming from Mersin. Contrary to Trabzon immigrants these families were nuclear families, which had already experienced migration, as they had already migrated from their villages to the city (see Chapter 4). In these families, it was the men who made the migration decisions and persuaded/made their wives follow. This is apparent in MW1’s (76) narration: “My husband said ‘let’s go’. [He] went [to Cyprus], came back and said ‘it is nice there’. I had to be convinced. Could a mother of four be separated/divorced? She has to [follow], so I came.”

Later during the interview she explains a more detailed story of the conflict in the household due to the migration decision of her husband and how she was finally ‘coerced’ into migration:

I said “you are not going”, I said “I won’t go”. “Why won’t you go” they asked me. “They will give you cars, fields, houses”. “I don’t care what they give […]!” I said. My husband said “I’ll go whether you come or not”. I came here with my
daughter in my arms, weeping and yelling. We got out of the ferry in Famagusta [...]. I didn’t know who they were, whether they were ghiaour or not, we came from there. They put us in the cars, sent us to Nicosia. We spent one or two months there. They [the men] went and looked around.\(^{198}\)

The interview with MW2 (>80) below reveals a similar story, in which the woman takes part in the movement rather involuntarily. MW2, though did not speak extensively about it, due to her hearing and health problems, had explicitly stated that the migration decision for her nuclear family was not her own.

**Researcher:** „Who made the migration decision?“
**MW2:** „They decided there, and we came. How would I know! I don’t know. “
**Researcher:** „Did you want to come?“
**MW2:** „I came whether I wanted to or not. “
**Researcher:** „Tell me a little bit about it. “
**MW2:** „I don’t know, I don’t know. How did we come? When we first came the children were so young, they grew up here, we married them off, we have, we have daughter-in-laws. “
**Researcher:** „Did you like it here when you first came?“
**MW2:** „Whether I liked it or not I came, we didn’t go back either, we stayed here. “
**Researcher:** „Did you wish to go back/return?“
**MW2:** „Say I didn’t. What’s it going to change? My husband wanted to come here, so I came along [...] It was my husbands decision. He came as a migrant. “
**Researcher:** „Did you want to come along back then“
**MW2:** „No I didn’t but what could I have done? [...] They had come here for a visit, to look around, and they made the decision. So we migrated. Should I get separated /divorced and stay behind? You can’t stay behind. It is not possible to stay alone [...] with all the kids. “\(^{199}\)


\(^{199}\) **Araştırmacı:** „Kim karar verdi?“
**MW2:** „Oradan karar vermişler, öyle gelmişizdir. Ne bileyim ben. Bilmiyorum. “
**Araştırmacı:** „Siz istediniz mi gelmiyor?”
**MW2:** „İster istemez geldik iste“
**Araştırmacı:** „Anlattın biraz. “
**MW2:** „Bilmiyorum, bilmem. [...] Nasıl geldik? Hep geldiğimizde ufak ufaktı çocuklar. Hepsini büyüdü, gelin aldılar.“[...]
**Araştırmacı:** „Beğendiniz mi ilk geldiğinde buraları?“
**MW2:** „Yahu, beğenir beğenmez işte geldik. Ne yapacağız? Geri de gitmedik, oturduk bakalım. “
In the light of these findings, it can be argued that calling the migration decision a ‘household decision’ as does NELM theory, without further analysing the decision making processes within the family is misleading. The family should not be considered as a peaceful and harmonious unit in which all individuals share same motivations, rather it must be emphasised that migration decisions cannot be explained without taking area of origin specific patriarchal power relations into consideration.

6.2.2 Rational Calculations

Field research revealed that the immigrants’ main motivation in partaking in this migratory movement was their desire for a better life. Both Trabzon and Mersin immigrants have narrated the hardships they had in Turkey. Although not unemployed, most of the Mersin immigrants were rather poor and/or propertiless. In this sense MW2 (>80, female, 1. generation Mersin) regards that their main motivation for migration was their state of poverty in Mersin. She states in this respect: „Hardship, it was all hardship. All because of poverty. Would we have immigrated if we had [wealth]? We came because of poverty“.200. MM3 narrates their deprivation in Mersin as follows:

We were children; I had just finished primary school back then […]. If we had something perfect we would not have come here. We had a small place. We did our thing there [farming]. My father would also take other jobs whenever he found one. Like that you see. So […] he brought us all here (MM3, 51, male, 1. generation Mersin).201

Araştırmacı: “Siz istediniz mi geri gitmeyi?”
MW2: „İstemedin mi diyelim, ne fayda? Biz istedikten sonra insan […] gelecek. […] Beyim karar verdi. Göç geldi buraya“.
Araştırmacı: „Siz istediniz mı o zaman?“

200 „Zorluklu hep zorluktu. Yoksulluktan hep ya. Var olsa buraya göçer gelir miydik? Yoksulluktan geldik“.

MM5 (41) a second generation male immigrant from Mersin makes a similar comment regarding the whole group of Mersin immigrants:

My guess is that they gave them houses for free. They told them they would give them land for free. That is why, what else could it be? Or may be their businesses there [in the place of origin] were not so good. Why would a person come here anyway? It s/he had a good business/job, s/he would surely not come here for an adventure.\footnote{202}

In this sense not only better earning possibilities but especially houses and fields, which were promised to the immigrants were effective in the facilitation of the movement. As MM1 (67, 1. generation Mersin) asserts it was the prospect of property ownership which motivated him the most, rather than employment related reasons, since in his opinion he could also find work elsewhere.

When I came from there I found some welding jobs. [I thought] I would work in any case, and when it comes to worse I would have acquired a house and some land. Back in Mersin we used to live in a rented house. I had a welding shop which I also rented. […] I used to pay 350 liras for that shop back then. I used to pay 650 liras for rent. I came here and I saved that money. I carried out with my job. I never got into debts.\footnote{203}

Land allocation prospects were especially motivating for the farmers who were attached to the land for their livelihoods. In this regard both Mersin immigrants, most of who were engaged in vegetables and fruits production in Mersin; and Trabzon immigrants, most of who were farmers, were attracted to Cyprus due to the promise of agricultural land. In this respect the at the meso-level identified factor, i.e. small peasantry and landlessness seems to reflect at the micro-level. TM2’s narrative illustrates this:


We were not poor thank god. But we did not have land. We had 12 donums [1 donum is about 1000 square meters]. We were 14 brothers and sisters. You see we had 11 donums of land in Turkey. My father thought about that you see. Well in any case it was because of poverty and due to the decision of the [Turkish] Cypriot government that my father thought about it favourably and came. And we did not object (TM2, 59; male, 1. generation Trabzon).  

TM3 (54; male, 1. generation Trabzon) too refers to the problems related to landlessness, demographic developments and hardships of making a living based on agriculture alone.

It was probably a lot of property back then, but it is like in Cyprus: Imagine there is a village of 750 households in the present, but in 10 years there will be 2000 households there. What happens to the land? It will be divided. My grandfather for instance divided his land among his 7 children; those 7 children had 50 children of their own in total. They will divide their land too. [...] Back home, in Karadeniz, the living conditions are not like you can imagine. There it is highlands. You would collect hazelnuts once in one year, one in twelve months. Sometimes you may have to divide that too; or what would you do if you had two tons of hazelnuts? Two tons of hazelnuts would make 7,000-8,000 liras in a year (approximately 2,500 –2,850 Euros). There is nothing else, you have to go abroad. But here [in Cyprus] it is not like that.

Moreover the skills of both groups were demanded by the Turkish Cypriot government, which was recruiting an agricultural workforce. In this sense the immigrants also perceived their human capital to be suitable for immigration to northern Cyprus and settlement in rural places. This was referred to by a second generation immigrant with parents from Trabzon (TM6, 37, male) who explained, regarding the decision of migration and settlement of his...

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grandfather, that it was their rural background, which made him want to settle in Bahçeli village:

My grandfather came here first and had a look at whether this place was suitable for us, whether we could live here. He came to this village [and saw] the olive trees were full of olives. He saw the apricots. He never saw anything like that. He saw all the agricultural land. We are agricultural labourers, because they did not know anything other than agriculture they left Kyrenia and settled in the village. [...] [Anyway] when they saw this place they thought it was more suitable for them. Not Kyrenia. My family had not seen the city before. But I am not referring to my father, they had buses back there [in the city], they were in the transportation sector.206

The above explanations comply with the explanations offered by neoclassical economic models, which postulate that at the micro-level migration decisions are made rationally on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. Furthermore, the research revealed that rational considerations were not always confined to economic calculations i.e. the prospect of higher incomes. Another important motivating factor especially for Trabzon immigrants was the prospect of a modern life. This is especially true regarding immigrants who came from the Ayvadere village of Trabzon. In this regard TM3 (54, male, 1. generation Trabzon) emphasizes that the rural life of this community in Turkey’s Trabzon was rather deprived of technological advancements, so that the immigrant committee who had visited Cyprus prior to the community’s immigration, in which was also his father, were rather impressed with the relatively advanced technological situation in Cyprus:

My father was a wise and beloved person in the district, in Aho district. [...] They told him, ‘Uncle [...] there is such a thing, lets go there’. Like a leader. So they went there [...]. They came here, they traveled around, looked around. My father saw everything. When he came [back to Turkey he explained] everything, pardon my language, that the toilets were so modern, that there was hot water in the houses. Back then, there was no running water in the houses in Turkey, water was only outside. There was no electricity, except for in the cities; in the villages

there was no electricity. He came back and said: “We’ll go there”. Well, of course, they hesitated a little. People, the relatives stood up, “you cannot go, you cannot do that”. “I will go, this place is so and so” he said.

As was explained in the previous section leaning on TW1’s and TW6’s narratives women were especially persuaded to migrate through exaggerated promises. The promise of a more ‘modern’ daily life, in modern houses, had therefore constituted an efficacious motivation for groups from rural regions, like for Trabzon immigrants to undertake the immigration movement. Considering the perception of the degree of advancement in Cyprus relative to Turkey TM1’s (58 male, 1. generation Trabzon) narration is illuminating:

The conditions back then were not what they are today. How possible is it now that I go to Hawai? I can’t go. In 1975 Cyprus was like Hawaii for Turkey. Do you understand what I mean? […] According to the point of view of the people from Turkey back then, there was no Internet, no television, it was as simple as that. Cyprus was such a popular place. It was a miracle even to come to Cyprus as a tourist let alone settling here and that is a fact.

Against this background it can be argued that it was especially the practical evaluative dimension of migrants’ agencies that dominated their rational calculations. These calculations were based on an acknowledgement of own human capital, situation of relative deprivation—especially in terms of landlessness and lack of technological advancement in the area of origin – and opportunities involved in migration, like house and land allocations promised by the Turkish Cypriot state.

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208 It must be noted that this immigrant had an opinion on Cyprus, since he was in Istanbul prior to his immigration. Many other immigrants, as was explained, did not have any knowledge at all on Cyprus.

6.2.3 (Lack of) Migrant Networks

According to Arango (2000) migrant networks play a strong causative role in the causation of migration. As he puts it:

The importance of social networks for migration can hardly be overstated. It can be safely said that networks rank among the most important explanatory factors of migration. Many migrants move because others with whom they are connected migrated before. Migration networks have a multiplier effect, which is implicit in the formerly fashionable expression “chain migration” (ibid: 291-292)

Yet the first wave of migration from Turkey to northern Cyprus in general and to Bahçeli in particular, took place in the absence of formerly established migrant networks. These initial immigrations involved pioneer migrants, who, as was argued, did not have much knowledge about Cyprus. In this sense it can be argued that the lack of networks could have acted in an migration-impeding way. Lack of “risk diminishing” networks (Morawska 2007), or social capital could have increased the feelings of fear and insecurity during the movement of the pioneer migrants. These fears and insecurities were often mentioned by the immigrants especially by women. On the other hand though, lack of networks can also be considered a contributing factor to the immigrants’ motivations to bring more people from their social circles along, and thus it can be contributing to the continuation of immigration (see Bakewell, De Haas & Kubal 2011). This may be explained by the habitual/iterational dimension of agency directed towards the preservation of traditional social relations and customs acquired in the place of origin. In this respect the iterational agency of pioneer migrants dominated in their actions which were directed towards formation of social capital and plays an essential part in the formation of the migration system, which in turn has emergent properties i.e. the power to further perpetuate migration (ibid.). The pioneer migrants in the northern part of Cyprus were not only pioneers in settlement but also the pioneers in network formation. Yet after a developmental threshold these networks have become self sufficient in perpetuating migratory links (ibid).

In this regard it can be argued, that the swift emergence of migrant networks were discernible within the first wave of immigration itself i.e. in years between 1975-1980; which in turn
generated, along with other factors (like the continuation of incentives), the perpetuation of migration and changed its scope to include further immigrant profiles. This is why the first wave does not solely consist of immigrants brought by the state within the framework of the bilateral labour agreement of 1975, but also those immigrants who participated in the movement through networks constructed both in the place of origin and in the place of destination. One of the middle-ranking government officials of the period, had noted in this regard that migrant networks had indeed become discernible to the authorities in Cyprus:

We noticed at one stage, that some people would come on their own initiative. One person would come to Famagusta, by ferry, on his own, find a vehicle in Famagusta and go to Kumyali. We followed such a person, [and saw that] a friend of his would communicate with him, would find for him a place, and he would come and occupy a house (I1, policy implementer).210

Many immigrants in Bahçeli also narrated how migrant networks functioned. MM4 (57, male, 1. generation Mersin) for instance explained that he came to North Cyprus via family links. Note that MM4 was not a protocol immigrant either. His migration story is given in the quotation below:

I was a student then. I was a student. I had just finished high school. My late brother came here as an immigrant and I was curious, so I came too. When I came I wanted to return. I wanted to join the military. When I did not pass the university exams I stayed. I did my military service in Erenköy here [in Cyprus].211

Similar transnational networks still perpetuate immigration to the village today, primarily via transnational marriage arrangements. The narratives of some of the immigrants included in the sample are indicative of these networks. Below are some examples:

210 Baktık ki bir yerde adam kendi çıkıyor. Feribotla geliyor Mağusa’dan; Mağusa’dan vasıta bulup Kumyali’ya gidiyor. Boyle takip ettik birini, onun o köydeki adamı veya arkadaşı onuna haberlesiyor, ona yer ayarlıyor, geliyor evi işgal ediyor.

Our first arrival was a little interesting. We gave away a girl in marriage here. We came here afterwards. They had come three months before us. [...] It was the first or the second month of 76. I don’t want to lie. They gave in the application later. Only then we immigrated here as a family. [...] Then there was Denktaş. They brought us here in collaboration with the housing and settlement agency of Turkey. There was a dormitory in Famagusta. They brought us to that dormitory. They said to us, ‘wherever you like’. We liked Bahçeli. So we moved there. They gave us land. They gave us houses. Or more precisely they gave these to those who were married. [...] I was single when I came. [...] I got married here. I married in 79. I married someone from Turkey [Trabzon] (TM2, 59; male, 1.generation Trabzon immigrant).  

MW3: „My husband was engaged with someone else before and he was officially married. He came to Turkey to get a divorce. Then they came to see me, upon someone’s recommendation, because he was thinking of getting married [again]. It was an arranged marriage. They came and the next day we were bound together in a promise of marriage. In one day, it was very sudden.“

Researcher: „Did you know you were coming to Cyprus when you got married?“

MW3: „Yes“.

Researcher: “Does it mean that you desired to come to Cyprus?”

MW3: „With my husband. My husband came to me 15 days before the wedding. I actually wanted to stay [in Turkey] but his family did not want him to."

Researcher: „Where did you want [to live]?“

MW3: „I wanted to live in Turkey, I wanted my husband to live in Turkey. [But] then I came here with our mutual decision“

(interview with MW3; 48, 1.generation Mersin, arrival in 1997).  


Araştırmacı: „Kıbrıs’a geleceğiniğini biliyor muydunuz evlenince?“

MW3: „Evet.“

Araştırmacı: „Yani Kıbrıs’a gelmesi istediniz mi?“

MW3: „Eşimle beraber. Eşiim düğünden 15 gün önce nişanma geldi. Ben de azıcık orayı istedim ama ailesi istemedi.“

Araştırmacı: “Nereyi istediniz?”

MW3: „Türkiye’de yaşaymayı, eşimin Türkiye’de yaşamasını. O zaman yine ortak kararla ben buraya geldim.“
Researcher: “How did you come to Cyprus?”
TW8: “I came here as a bride. It was arranged. They came and asked for my hand. I mean I came as a bride.”
Researcher: “Are you from Trabzon Araklı?”
TW8: “Yes. We are from the same village.”
Researcher: “Did you know your husband?”
TW8: “No, I didn’t know him before. He is a relative, but I did not know him. They came here [to Cyprus] many years ago, during the migration time. He was born and raised here. I came from there 11 years ago”
(interview with TW8, 34, 1. generation Trabzon, arrival in 2003).

Transnational marriage networks were less predominant among Mersin immigrants, who sought to increase their social capital, especially in the initial years of migration, through incorporation into the larger immigrant community in the village and into the Turkish Cypriot society in general. This can be regarded as one important reason behind the more liberal marriage practices observed in this group in contrast to the Trabzon group, especially in the initial years of settlement. The Mersin immigrants themselves stated during the interviews and during informal conversations that their group had a more open perception of marriage with native Turkish Cypriots and with Trabzon immigrants as did the Trabzon group (especially interviews with MM1, MM3, MM5).

6.2.4 Culture of Migration, Geographical Proximity and Promise of Return

The contingent factors of culture of migration, geographical proximity and the promise of return made by the state all acted in ways so as to reinforcing the migration decisions of the immigrants in the case of Bahçeli village. As was argued before, both communities who immigrated to the village from Trabzon and Mersin were familiar with the concept of migration. Thus a “habituated culture of migration” (Morawska 2007: 21) can be argued to have played an important role in the migration decision making for both groups. As TM3 (54,

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214 Araştırma: „Kıbrıs’a gelişin nasıl oldu?”
TW8: „Gelin olarak geldim. Görücü usulü geldiler istediler. Öyle yani gelin olarak geldim.
Araştırmacı: „Trabzon Araklı’dan mısin?”
TW8: „He. Aynı, aynı köydeniz“. 
Araştırmacı: „Eşi ni tanıyor muydu?“
TW8: „Yok önceden tanımadım. Akrabamız ama tanımdık. Çok önceden onlar göçmen zamanı buraya gelmişler. Burada doğup büyüümüşler. Ben oradan geleli 11 sene oldu İşte.“

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male, 1. generation Trabzon) emphasised, the Karadeniz region had a long-standing emigration tradition:

There, where we come from, is full of migrations. [...] In other words the Karadeniz people have always emigrated because there are no factories, there is nothing. What will you do? Not everyone can do animal husbandry. There is no agriculture, no factories.\(^{215}\)

Whereas the “culture of migration” pertained to the iterational dimension of immigrants’ agencies, the “geographical proximity” of the island of Cyprus and mainland Turkey as well as “the promise of return” made by the state allowed easier decision-making. According to a Turkish policy maker P4:

[The immigrants] were given the promise [to be brought back to Turkey] [...] There was a guarantee that you would be brought back if you didn’t like it and all of the material costs of that return would be compensated by the state. There was such a decision.\(^{216}\)

Last but not the least, it can be argued leaning on Morawska (2007) that geographical proximity not only acts as a factor which enables quick access to a nearby destination country but also acts as a “security net” since it allows, “quick and easy” return when need be (ibid: 22-24). Thus it can be argued that it was this factors which contributed to the initial migration decision of the groups as well as to the rather quick returning decisions among the first immigrants, so that a rather large proportion of initial immigrants returned shorty after their arrival in the island.

6.3 The Causation of the First Wave of Migration

Regarding the complexity of social reality, that is the multi-dimensional and multi-factorial character of causal mechanisms, it is not possible to identify and isolate one single cause of

\(^{215}\) [...] bizim orası hep gurbet [...] Yani Karadeniz insanın gurbette oluşu odur, fabrika yok, hiç bir şey yok. Onun için ne yapacak? Herkes hayvancılık yapamaz ya. Tarım yok, fabrikada çalışacaksın, yok.

migration, which can be applied to explain the first wave of migrations from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus. Rather, there are various *causes*, which may be different as well as contradictory at different levels of aggregation. This means, that considering the interplay of the agency of immigrants, the local-level structural and cultural conditions as well as those found at the meso-level along with macro-level agency of corporate actors, a very complex web of social interactions can be identified. It is in this sense impossible to consider immigration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus in its first wave without referring to rural transformation processes taking place in Turkey; nor is it possible to account for this migratory movement without understanding the historical ties between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots prior to the division in 1974. More importantly one must not forget to consider the cultural context within the latter, which was especially hallmarked by a discourse of Turkish nationalism that was further developed and strengthened during the hostile ethnic relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Taking these into account, one must move from an economic approach to a multi-dimensional approach to migration to explain the first migration wave from Turkey to the islands’ north, as well as to the Bahçeli village.

The case of the first wave of immigration from Turkey to northern Cyprus in general and the case of Bahçeli village in particular is further illustrative of the challenge of not losing the sight of different levels of aggregation when attempting a causal explanation. The multi-dimensional character of causes of migration becomes much obvious when one takes into account the findings of this chapter regarding the micro-level agents of the movement, i.e. the migrants themselves. As has been argued, although not uniform and locally specific, most of these families (especially Trabzon farmers) did not even have much of an idea on Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots prior to their immigration. The knowledge of the war which most of them acquired sparsely shortly before immigration, did not act in an immigration inducing way, and when at all, it induced fear and feelings of insecurity for the people who were to be resettled in the island. Thus looking at the micro-level one cannot find the effects of cultural factors identified at the macro-level, i.e. Turkish nationalism and perceived ethnic ties between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, to have a dominant role in the facilitation of the movement. Among the most important motivations of migration at the micro-level were the perceived opportunities for a better life especially defined as a more modern life and property
ownership.

At the micro-level, it can be seen that the migration decision for the groups was the outcome of an interplay of all three dimensions of agency. The practical-evaluative dimension involved decision-making on the basis of rational calculations taking into account own human capital, relative deprivation including landlessness (for Trabzon immigrants also lack of technological development), and opportunities offered by the states. The iterational/habitual dimension involved for both groups of immigrants an internalised culture of migration, as well as the urge to swiftly construct networks. The projective dimension of decision making on the other hand involved the geographical proximity of the island to Turkey and the promise of return made by the states.

The micro-level reasons and motivations of immigrants notwithstanding, it can be argued, using retroductive logic that the ideas on ethnicity and nation have been indispensible in the causation of the first wave migration from Turkey to North Cyprus. On the one hand, partly owing to the ethno-nationalist ideologies at work, it was the physical division of Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent ethnic homogenisation of the island, which made it possible for the governments (Turkish and Turkish Cypriot) to implement such a policy of migration and settlement. On the other hand, the dominant Turkish nationalist discourse among Turkish Cypriots allowed them to utilise migration for nationalist political goals. In this sense immigrants from Turkey in North Cyprus have become crucial elements of Turkish Cypriot nation-state building. This prioritisation of the macro-level in the explanation, partly supports a cultural approach rather than the economic approach in the explanation of the first immigration wave to the northern part of Cyprus in general and immigration to Bahçeli village in particular. Yet, taking into account the economic factors dominant in the generative mechanisms especially at the meso and micro-levels, it is more suitable to speak of a multi-dimensionality of the causation of migration.

Before moving on to the analysis of consequent community formation in the case of the Bahçeli village, another point to highlight is the initiation of a ‘migration system’ as an emergent. It can be argued that the first wave of migration from Turkey to northern Cyprus,
of which the case of Bahçeli is a more or less typical example, was the first step in the creation of a migration system between the two states. In other words, a migration system can be argued to have come into existence between these two countries, which, being an emergent and having causative powers of its own, ensures the perpetuation of migration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus to this date.

Figure 3: Multi-dimensional Causation of Migration
CHAPTER 7

IMMIGRANTS’ ETHNIC COMMUNITY FORMATION AND PRESERVATION

The recognition of the multi-dimensionality of migration, as was argued in this thesis, requires not only an explanation of its causes but also the incorporation of the explanation of its consequences into the analysis. Thus following the previous two chapters, which endeavoured an exploration and explanation of the causes, this chapter scrutinizes the effects of the first migration wave in the Turkish Cypriot society, which will be analysed with the thematic focus on immigrants’ ethnic communities. As was argued, the critical realist morphogenetic approach’s emphasis on social change enables a study of migration in both its causes and consequences in a theoretically coherent whole. Within this framework migration is conceptualised as a process and an emergent phenomenon having intended as well as unintended consequences. Migrant communities can be regarded as an example to the latter, especially in regards to the agential motivations of the corporate actors at the macro-level, which were argued to be especially influenced by ideas of ethnic and national unity of

217 The first wave of immigration of Turkish citizens to the northern part of Cyprus can be argued to have had a variety of significant social consequences, that is, it is related to the emergence of novel structural and cultural entities in the Turkish Cypriot society. One of the most significant consequences of this initial wave of migration can be regarded as the formation of a migration system between Turkey and the northern part of Cyprus encompassing relatively stable exchanges of people, ideas and goods between the two states, which have persisted ever since (Fawcett 1989). The migratory ties between Turkey and North Cyprus which were created as a result of this first wave were something novel and unprecedented: although political and social relations were present between Turkish Cypriots and the Ottomans, such migratory ties between the two geographies were not found previously (see Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009). This migration system has emergent properties, which, when activated through necessary mechanisms, have been causative of further migrations even though the initial conditions of migration had changed. This is clearly seen when the second and the third waves of migrations from Turkey to northern Cyprus are analysed: the latter took place without the active agential facilitation by the states of Turkey and northern Cyprus, and they were not encouraged, unlike the first wave, through property distributions to the individual immigrants by the state. Thus, it can be argued, that the migration system fulfilled the important criterion of self-perpetuation, which was described by Bakewell, de Haas and Kubal (2011) as “once a critical number of migrants have settled at the destination, migration becomes self-perpetuating because it [the system] creates the social and economic structures- in particular the migrant networks- to sustain the process” (ibid: 6). Thus the following two waves of migrations have conditions, reasons and motivations that are different from those which had been dominant for the first wave (see Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009; 2014).
Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationals. The nationalist aspirations of state building notwithstanding, migrant communities were formed, and/or preserved by the incoming migrants especially through the influence of such mechanisms that also included further structural and cultural factors as well as conflicting agential motivations by, for instance, some native Turkish Cypriot groups with counter-ideologies.

7.1 Social Consequences of Migration and Settlement – Immigrants’ Ethnic Communities

Ethnic communities of immigrants can be conceptualised, firstly, as formations resulting from a reaction to exclusionary social and cultural conditions found in the receiving context (Castles & Miller 1998; Kaya 2012). It can be argued in this sense that the first wave of migration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus is causally related to the emergence of a novel set of social relations especially marked by changing ideas on nation and ethnicity in the receiving context. Whereas the pre-1974 era was marked by a dominant Turkish nationalism within which Turkish Cypriots were perceived as belonging to the Turkish nation represented by motherland Turkey (see Chapter 5), the post-1974 era witnessed the development of a new “reactive” national identity by Turkish Cypriots which emphasised the distinction of the former from Turkish nationals and their similarity with Greek Cypriots (see Kızılyürek 2002; Erhürman 2006; Şahin 2008; Hamit 2008). This also entailed, on a practical rather than symbolic level, the development of ethnically charged relations between the incoming groups of immigrants from Turkey and the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population. This, in turn, gave rise to, in interaction with other social factors, various structural and cultural processes of discrimination, exclusion and othering of immigrants (see Erhürman 2006; Hamit 2008).

On the other hand, immigrants’ ethnic communities also necessitate the taking into account of the processes of boundary formation by the immigrants. It takes into account that immigrants strategically preserve, rather than readily give up some of the social, cultural, economic and political characteristics they bring along, like their ethnic identities, traditional and religious practices, ways of living, customs, beliefs etc. as well as forming and/or preserving solidarity networks among themselves. In this sense a focus on immigrants’ ethnic
communities exemplifies migrants' agencies, rather than representing them as passive victims being excluded from the receiving society and at the same time not representing them as ‘inferior’ groups incapable of adaptation. Thus, the consideration of immigrant ethnic communities requires a focus on boundary building processes from within and without.

Referring to ethnic communities does not suggest separation or marginalisation, but a form of incorporation into the host society. Immigrants have several options of incorporation into the host societies, which may be argued to range between the ideal types of assimilation, separation, integration and marginalisation (Berry 1997: 9). Yet, as was explained above, these options are rarely freely chosen. Rather the actual forms of incorporation are determined by a complex web of interactions between relevant structural and cultural factors as well as the immigrants’ and the (especially receiving) states’ agencies. In real cases, various mechanisms involving these factors usually give rise to hybrid forms of incorporation. In this sense, ethnic communities can be regarded as one such form of immigrants’ incorporation into the receiving society. Therefore as well as describing boundary building processes from within and without, ethnic communities are conceptualised in this study as structural and cultural entities that enable immigrants’ incorporation by providing them with various material and non-material means to cope with the disorienting and alienating experience of migration. Through ethnic communities, the immigrants are able to have simultaneous reference to the society and culture of origin and destination in their everyday lives. Immigrant communities also involve affective elements, like identification

218 According to Berry (1997) these are the four acculturation strategies that immigrants employ in the receiving states taking into account the issues of „cultural maintenance” and „contact and participation” (ibid: 9). Acculturation is defined here in a “neutral” way as “those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups” (Redfield, Linton & Herskovits 1936: 149 in ibid: 7). Within this framework, taking into account the immigrants’ point of view, Berry defines firstly the assimilation strategy as when “individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures”; secondly, separation strategy as “when individuals place a value on holding on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others” (ibid: 9). Berry thirdly speaks of integration strategy “[w]hen there is an interest in both maintaining one’s original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups […], while at the same time seeking to participate as an integral part of the larger social network”. Finally, fourthly, marginalisation is defined as an immigrant strategy “when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination)” (ibid.).
and belonging to (though with varying degrees) both the country/area of origin and the country of destination. This is in line with the arguments of Glick-Schiller et al. (2004) who have demonstrated that migrant incorporation does not have to follow an assimilationist logic in practice. The scholars argue:

 [...] migrants manage to become incorporated in different local, national, transnational, regional, and global contexts at the same time. Being included in one national or transnational context is neither the precondition for nor precludes inclusion in another context. […] migrants engaged in […] various pathways of incorporation become part of […] states and localities and make claims as members of these societies but not in the ways in which integration has previously been understood […] (Glick-Schiller et al. 2004: 15).

Indeed migrant communities must be viewed in the light of the above, as functioning primarily as solidarity networks, as forms of social capital, which facilitate and ease adaptation rather than inhibit it (see Cattacin 2006). Therefore migrant communities are, although they definitely are not indicative of assimilation, modes of incorporation rather than separation, segregation or marginalisation. They are, to a great extent, but not exclusively, directed against exclusion and othering by the host society, and towards overcoming various obstacles in this respect.

Last but not least, the formation of immigrant communities in the receiving context need to be understood as pertaining to morphogenesis, that is, to social change brought about by the interplay of structure and culture as well as the various agencies -i.e. of the states, of the immigrants and of the non-immigrants (see Archer 1995; Porpora 2013). Immigrant communities modify the existing structural and cultural contexts of the receiving societies and add to these new ones; and in so doing, they are rather significant elements of social change (morphogenesis) in modern societies (see ibid.).

Immigrants from Turkey have been forming ethnically and culturally defined communities throughout Europe since the 1960’s when labour migrations was initiated from Turkey to several European countries on the basis of various bilateral agreements. Immigrant groups from Turkey in Europe, termed by several scholars as Euro-Turks (see Kaya 2009; 2012; Kaya & Kentel 2005; 2007), had initially formed their local neighbourhood-based migrant
strategies, which entailed to a great extent, some separation from the receiving society and a primary socialisation which was “carried out with other Turks, preferably hemsehris (fellow-villagers, Landsmannschaften), in private homes, mosques, public restaurants, and coffee houses (the exclusive domain of men), and on structured occasions such as the large parties frequently held in rented halls to celebrate engagements, weddings and circumcision ceremonies […]” (Kaya 2012: 12). In this way Euro-Turks have developed, similar to other migrant groups, kinship and area-of-origin based solidarity networks in the receiving societies (ibid.).

Immigrant Turkish nationals in northern Cyprus too have been forming ethnically defined communities since their arrival in 1975. Various scholars and researchers writing about the subject of immigrants from Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus have remarked that these immigrants constitute identifiable groups in the Turkish Cypriot community. Kurtuluş and Purkis, for instance, talk about problems of adaptation and integration of immigrants. They describe the social exclusion, segregation and ghettoization experiences of immigrants (ibid 2008; 2009, 2014). Erhürman (2006) reckons, that the othering of the immigrants from Turkey as a homogeneous group of Türkiyeliler (people from Turkey) was done especially by the Turkish Cypriot left within its project of constructing a common Cypriot identity for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Navaro-Yashin (2006) on the other hand describes the othering of the immigrants by the native population as a whole through the use of “symbols of lifestyle, class and culture” (ibid: 92). She argues:

Under Turkey’s military and political control in northern Cyprus since 1974, Turkish Cypriots and people from Turkey have been put in contingent, complex, and specific relations of power. Turkish Cypriots and settlers from Turkey perceive cultural difference in one another, though they are classified as “kinsmen” or as members of the same “ethnic” or “national group” in dominant political discourses (Navaro-Yashin 2006: 95).219

From the immigrants’ side these ethnic communities are especially discernible in regards to the transnational ways of being and belonging of their members. As this chapter will further

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219 Similarly, Lacher and Kaymak (2005) too argue that it was close contact with one another that caused Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey to start to perceive cultural difference in each other, despite the fact that “cultural identity continues to be officially proclaimed to this day” (ibid: 155).
argue these communities are primarily based on ties of common-area of origin (*hemşehrilik*) rather than a wider sense of national belonging, so that it can be argued, as does Hatay (2005) that “[t]he Turkish immigrants constitute a *heterogeneous population*, with varying degrees of attachment to the island and integration into the Turkish-Cypriot community” (Hatay 2005: 1, italics added).

Immigration of Turkish nationals to the northern part of Cyprus was facilitated as was argued in the previous chapter not only due to economic reasons but also with political motivations of the states (Chapter 5). The latter have justified their acts by utilising primordialist ideas of *ethnicity* and *nationalism* within the framework of the in Chapter 5.2.2 described Turkish nationalist ideology, which assumed ethnic and cultural sameness between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationals. Based on such official views of ethnicity stressing common roots, origins and blood-ties, as well as common religion and language between the immigrants and the indigenous population, it was reckoned that the immigrants would readily and swiftly assimilate into the Turkish Cypriot society. Therefore immigrants’ incorporation into the receiving society was not regarded as an issue to be taken into consideration. Oral history interviews have revealed that many of the politicians then involved in policy making (and who identified with the Turkish nationalist discourse) often had an assimilationist approach to the immigrants’ incorporation into the Turkish Cypriot society. Therefore immigrants’ incorporation into the Turkish Cypriot society was not regarded as an issue to be taken into consideration. Oral history interviews have revealed that many of the politicians then involved in policy making (and who identified with the Turkish nationalist discourse) often had an assimilationist approach to the immigrants’ incorporation into the Turkish Cypriot society. As I2, a Turkish Cypriot government official involved in the resettlement of immigrants (policy implementer of the period), put it: “[The immigrants] were given credits to make them adapt economically but I do not remember anything intense regarding their social adaptation, like education/training etc. That [type of adaptation] was regarded as the job of the children who were going to grow up here”. In this line of thought the Turkish nationalist officials at the time had reckoned that social integration or rather assimilation of immigrants would occur naturally, at least in the second generation.

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220 The opposition politicians, and some policy implementers who also defined themselves in the opposition (on the left) on the other hand stressed the cultural discrepancies between the immigrants and native Turkish Cypriots.

221 Kredi verildi ekonomik olarak adapte olabilmeleri için, ama sosyal adaptasyon konusunda yoğun herhangi bir şey hatırılamam, böyle eğitimler yapılsın vs. O burada yerleşmiş ve burada büyüyecek olan çocuklara bırakıldı o iş“.
At the same time though, cultural differences were observed even by Turkish nationalists upon first contact. Il for instance, who identifies with the Turkish nationalist ideology, which underlines cultural sameness between Turkish Cypriots and Turks from mainland, did mention that there existed some cultural difference between the immigrant groups and the native population. He stated: “You may have heard about those who settled in Varosha, that they have cut the feet of the tables, that they could not use toilets, bath tubs etc. Of course they had a different culture, things like that would happen you see”. Another interviewee (P2) who was a high-ranking policy maker and later politician during the first migration wave narrated the following incident, while later on during the interview underlining that he perceived the adaptation of the immigrants to have been accomplished:

Now I drive around to see what is happening, how things are going, because we gave these people houses, places, goods, everything that we could within the limits of those conditions back then. We gave them fridges, washing machines, we gave and we gave. [...] Once I came across a man, during the time of olive harvest, who was walking, in front of three women, his hands behind his back. The women were carrying the baskets with olives. [...] I said ‘stop’ [to the driver] and I got out. [...] I said to the man: ‘is that not disgraceful, who are these?’ He said ‘they are my wives, and the one at the back is my daughter’. ‘And, what are they carrying on their backs in those baskets?’ “We collected the olives that the state gave us’ [...]. I said ‘hey Mr. your hands are behind your back, why don’t you carry a basket too? You make the women carry. How can you do that, how can you make women suffer like that?’ I scolded him. [...] The man didn’t tell me anything, but the women dropped their baskets and attacked me. They said ‘We are his wives, who are you? What’s it to you?’ This is a thing, because they were used to that way. Even today it is the women who collect the tea leaves in Karadeniz. I tried to defend women’s rights, but they almost beat me up, would my driver not interfere. I mean, these are real, these things that I just told you are the recent history of Cyprus; we had experienced these things.

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222 “Maraş’a yerleĢenler, belki duydunuz iSTE, yani masanın ayaklarını kesip şey yaptılar, tuvaleti kullanamama, banyoyu kullanamama vesaire. Tabii farklı bir kültür, bunlar da olacaktı yani”

Another cultural characteristic, which was alien even to the most Turkish-nationalist policy maker or implementer at the time was polygamy which was not that uncommon among the immigrants. The following excerpt is from the oral history interview with İ2 (a policy implementer of the period) and can be illustrative in this respect:

I have an interesting memory there too, let me tell you that. I don’t know whether it was the Konya group or the Adana group, but in one of those groups there was a man with two wives. He was officially married to one of those women [civil marriage] and the other one was his second wife with whom he had a religious marriage [imam nikahı]. Well of course, there was no such thing in our society. One house was assigned to the man for his family with his official wife, and another house was assigned to his second wife for the man’s family with that woman. The man objected: “This woman is my wife so you have to allocate that house to me too” he said. However one person could not be allocated two houses. He said “I am the head of the family, the head of both families, so you have to allocate both houses to me”. Yet our laws and regulations did not allow that, therefore we assigned one of the houses, in which he lived with his officially married wife and their children to the man and the other house to his second wife as if she was [the head of] family. Because we could not have done otherwise at that time. The social structure of their village [of origin] could have been like that, but the conditions here are different and despite all the clamour and insistence from the man, we assigned the house to the woman [the second wife]. It was an interesting incident.


I2 asserted once again in the interview that the Turkish Cypriot state’s administration of the period thought that such discrepancies would be easily overcome. The following memory of his dialogue with one of the main actors of this migration policy is noteworthy in presenting this assimilationist presumption of the politicians despite their initial realisation of ‘cultural difference’:

Well, [in one occasion we] […] were watching the incoming groups at the harbour. They would come and our teams would pick them up and transfer them to the busses and so on. Anyhow, it was the end of a tiring day; an evening or night-time arrival. There was a group, a family, a man and with him three or four children, a woman holding a child, and the woman was also pregnant, in any case [there were] six/seven children in total. X turned to me […] and said: ‘[…] it is not this man and this woman that we are bringing to Cyprus, it is the children […] that we are bringing to settle in Cyprus’ he said. “We cannot change them [the man and the woman], their way of clothing and appearance. But these children […] will grow up here and will look like us”. Now this was an interesting point, an interesting opinion, it really was. Because when these families arrived, they were really very different, especially in regards to social aspects. Culturally, regarding their way of living, they were very different. There were many examples in Famagusta. For instance they would remove the European-style toilets, and try to make things suitable for performing ablution […]. They would take apart the bathtubs because they could not bathe in those, they would convert those to shower baths.225

It was also revealed that especially those policy makers, politicians and policy implementers who identified with the Turkish-nationalist ideology tended to perceive this assimilationist project to have been successful. The following excerpt from an interview with P2, who was quoted above narrating his encounter with a male immigrant who would make his wives and daughters to do the carrying olive baskets, is illustrative:


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[...] I told them that day in the Council of Ministers meeting: “My [...] aim is to make the people who have settled in Cyprus say I am a Cypriot, my motherland is Turkey; just like when you ask someone from Turkey where are you from and [they say] I am from Turkey but [...] originally I am from Adana“. I said “the day we make them say that, this thing will be over”. And today we are at that point. [...] We are at that point. Even when some politicians speak [otherwise] I I do not care. You should consider the reality. This is the reality today.

Based on the oral history interviews with the policy makers and implementers of the period of the first migration wave, it can be stated that for both right-wing and left-wing officials and politicians, the migration policy’s success can be measured against the extent of assimilation of the immigrants. As the previous comment illustrated, right wing supporters tend to think the project to be successful in that the majority of the incoming group in the first wave have assimilated (interviews with P1, P2, P3, P4, I1). The following comments can be illustrative:

Today this population has completely adapted. I am talking about this population, not about those who were floating and wandering or the ones that commit murders, those are rubbish, the ones we don’t want. I was in the hospital for a month. Do you know who I saw? The daughters and the grandchildren of this population, they are serving me as nurses. They are nice and cheerful, in the Near East University Hospital, in Famagusta General Hospital. In fact this project was very successful. I can definitely say that (P1, high-ranking policy maker).

What is the situation now? When an immigrant that we brought in 74, 75 was 5 years old or 10 years old, s/he is now over 40 years old. He is a lieutenant, a
commander/major in the military, a police officer. In the hospitals, since our girls do not want to become nurses, it is to 80% their children who have become nurses. I mean they are [...] in governmental offices, they take part in the police department, everywhere, in the health sector in the educational sector. It was obvious in the beginning that not all would successfully adapt but there is a restructuring now.

Similar statements were made by P3 and P4. Yet, on the other hand, not all perceived the project to have reached the ideal outcome of assimilation. Opposition politicians of the time tend to view the assimilationist project less successful. For instance O3, an opposition politician of the period, believes that the settlement policy of the administration back then, purposefully created an atmosphere of conflict between various migrant groups coming from the southern part of Cyprus and from Turkey; and it is only since some years that these groups have been having a peaceful relation with one another:

Think of Limassol, think of Larnaca, think of Paphos. The people of these places, people from neighbouring villages, have had social and economic relationships with one another. You took these people and threw one over here and one over there. All of those ties among the people broke. And they also placed a lot of different people among them [...] including a group from

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228 Şimdi nedir durum? Bizim 74’te, 75’te getirdiğimiz göçmen, 5 yaşındaki, 10 yaşındaki bugün 40 yaşının üstündedir, askerde yüzbaşdır, binbaşdır, poliste subaydır. Hastanelimizde, bizim kızlarımız nurse olmak istemez, hastanelerde %80 onların çocuklarıdır. Yani onlar artık şey etti ve devlet dairelerinde, poliste, her yerde, sağlıkta, eğitimde artık bulunuyorlar. Tabi başlangıçta bunun hepsinin tutmayıcağı belliydi ama bir yaşanma oldu.

229 [...] as far as I know, among the global resettlement projects, this is one of the most successful ones. I mean regarding the rate of return. [...] I mean there were advantages here: there is a common language, a common religion, a common culture. These elements have simplified the job. This is why, to my knowledge, even in the first year, many people had married Turkish Cypriots. ( [...] benim bildiğim kadarıyla dünya ölçeğinde yapılan iskân faaliyetleri içerisindeki en başarılı örneklerden biri budur. Yani bu geri dönüş oranı itibariyle, [...]. Yani bunun avantajları şunlar: dil birliği var, din birliği var, kültür birliği var. Bu gibi unsurlar işi kolaylaştırdı. Bu yüzden benim bildiğim daha ilk yılda çok sayıda insan Kıbrıslı Türklerle evlendi).

230 Indeed I saw in my short visit to Cyprus last year that, the new generation which was born in Cyprus is not different at all, I mean in terms of dialect, in terms of behaviour, dressing, way of life. They have completely adapted. This is a very pleasing and nice thing. All of those problems I referred to will disappear. (Nitekim geç啜 sene bir kısa süreli Kıbrıs ziyaretinde şunu gördüm, Kıbrıs'ta doğan yeni neslin hiç farkı yok, yani dil olarak, davranış olarak, giyim kuşam olarak yaşam tarzı olarak. Tamamen adapte olmuş. Bu çok sevindirci tabi çok güzel bir olay. Zamanla bütün o dediğim eskilerinden kaynaklanan problemler ortadan kalkacaktır).
Turkey; and all the ties among the people broke. These people are only recently starting to develop a new way of interaction with each other, to have a different way of cultural relationship and to develop a different identity.\textsuperscript{231}

I4, an official of the period who dealt with the settling of the immigrants reckons contrary to the argument of especially P1 and P2 that the immigrants still do not identify with Cyprus.

They run away after selling [the properties]. I know a lot of people who came and settled, acquired a house and land; sold the house, sold the land, then run away and bought a house in Adana. Those that we employed as civil servants did the same thing. There is a saying that everything gets back to its roots. Everything returns to its original state. I mean, I came from Turkey I have a longing for that place. Our dead, our graves, my mother, my father, my grandmother, my aunt are still there. The longing for home is very important. If a man has a successful business, drives a Mercedes, feels that he has a much better standard [of living] here than he would over there [in Turkey] and feels that he has acquired a high value in this society then he wouldn’t run away. But everyone less than that will run away. They will go. What are they waiting for? There will be a solution, they will acquire the EU passport and go from here to Italy, Spain. We don’t have money here [in Cyprus]! Even we can’t handle the life here in this country. Even we can’t handle the expensiveness of life. If we cannot do it, it is a lot harder for them.\textsuperscript{232}

The different opinions of the officials and politicians of the period notwithstanding, as the rest of this chapter will demonstrate in more detail, communities of the incoming migrants

\textsuperscript{231} Düştün sen Leymosun’u, düştün sen Larnaka’yı, düştün sen Baf’ı 500 sene bu insanlar hep bir merkezle, civar köyler birbiri ile muhabbetli ya da ekonomik ilişki içinde oldu. Sen onları aldın birini aramana attın, birini karamana attın. Bütün o bağlar köptü insanlarda. Bunların arasına bir hayle de başka insan yerleşirildin [...], ve sonucu bir de Türkiyeli kesim de yerleştirdin; ve bütün insanların birbirleriyle bağlı köptü. Şimdi yeni yeni insanlar başlıyor bir yeni ilişki biçimini, sosyal, kültürel bir başka ilişki biçimini geliştirirler ve bir başka kimlik oluşsun.

have largely been preserved and were reproduced, so that differences between the immigrants and the indigenous population can be observed regarding their socio-economic and political positions, inclusion and exclusion, transnational ways of life and self identification. The following will regard the causes of the formation/ preservation of immigrants’ ethnic communities in the case of the first wave of migration from Turkey in general and in the case of the Bahçeli village in particular, concentrating on macro, meso and micro-levels respectively.

7.2 Looking at the Macro-Level

The following sections endeavour a causal analysis of the Türkiyeli communities at the macro-level. Whereas the first subsection considers the structural context, the subsection that follows considers the cultural context and the roles of various corporate actors (states and political parties) that are located within each, which can be causally related to the formation and preservation of ethnic communities among the immigrants from Turkey.

7.2.1 The Structural Context:

According to Castles and Miller (1998) the effects of immigration on the receiving society can be diverse and “depending on the actions of the state and the population of the receiving society” a type of immigrant community, ranging between “ethnic communities” based on mutual accommodation to “ethnic minorities” based on exclusion and segregation is formed (ibid: 29). As was already mentioned, the first wave of immigrants had acquired full nominal citizenship rights almost at their arrival (Hatay 2005). Yet citizenship rights do not guarantee membership, in the sense of being recognised “[…] by others as sharing with them some essential features of biography and culture” (Bauböck 1991: 8). This is because, as Bauböck further argues “citizenship is a specific feature of the political sphere and not of society in general” (ibid: 10). Accordingly, neither does citizenship predestine the total integration of the incoming group into a society, nor does it prevent the formation of ethnic communities. Thus even in the presence of citizenship rights, like in the case of the first migration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus, ethnic communities can be constructed in the receiving
context primarily as informal solidarity networks. Many times, ethnic communities can be regarded as spaces for protection from structural political, economic and social exclusion and as a survival strategy for the immigrants. In this respect Kaya (2012) argues the following on the issue of immigrant community formation:

When the migrants arrive in the receiving country they are given shelter, advice and support by their kin and former neighbours. Their previous social group status and class, lack of language, exclusionist incorporation regimes as well as the segregationist housing policies of the receiving countries make them stick together and develop a web of solidarity by means of informal local networks. What defines the boundaries of community here is not necessarily ethnicity, but the material conditions […] (ibid: 11-12).

Considering the case of first wave immigrations to northern Cyprus the first structural factor, which can be related to the creation of ethnic immigrant communities can be regarded to be the **communal and segregationist settlement policy** it involved. In other words, it was the policy of the Turkish Cypriot state, in cooperation with Turkey, which provided a first means for the immigrant communities to be established and to a greater extent, to be preserved since many of the immigrants had arrived as communities in the first place. As was already described, the immigrants, which mostly comprised groups coming from the same place of origin, like village communities, were settled in rural areas in the northern part of the island which were evacuated by Greek Cypriots after the division. Thus already existing communities were resettled together and to a great extent separately from the native population and other communities, creating in the place of destination, communities that have been preserved upon migration. According to a state official from Turkey (P4) this policy, which was preferred by the Turkish Cypriot side, had been discussed in policy making circles. As a result of the discussions, a policy was developed which favoured communal and segregated settlement, as it was thought to be advantageous regarding the adaptation of the incoming population to the new environment.

The issue of separate settlement of immigrants and [native Turkish] Cypriots can be much discussed. It has positive and negative sides. The positive side was considered to be this: for instance there is a village A in the northern part of Cyprus, which was evacuated by Greek Cypriots, with 50-60-80 households. It was thought that if you could bring and settle 50-60 households from Turkey consisting of people from the same village, these could adapt faster and more
This village has an imam [Muslim religious leader] [...] as you know he is very important; [and] a teacher. If these persons could be persuaded to come along with the villagers, including the mukhtar [village headman], if these people could be settled in the same village in a way that they are used to living, it was assumed that they could adapt to the place more easily. This was not a very wrong approach in the beginning, but, of course, this had a negative side: Turkish Cypriots and these Turks coming from Turkey were to be constructing a new society, [and] would have to live together [...] in Cyprus. This was not a provisional application, and in this sense it may be theoretically correct that these two communities had to live together and close to one another, this was also not a wrong way of thinking. But as I said these two conflicting ideas were discussed and evaluated for a long while. However, this was not a decision made by Turkey, I must emphasise and enunciate that. This was the how late Mr. Denktaş approached the matter. He said 'we want a village from Turkey as a whole, with its hodja [imam] and its teacher, with all of its elements without destroying those structures'. This approach was also embraced here [in Turkey] and was largely employed. But like I said it also had a downside.

The communal and segregated settlement of the immigrants in the northern part of the island can also be argued to have been advantageous to the Turkish Cypriot state allowing the latter to benefit from the communities’ functioning as solidarity networks for the immigrants so that it could minimise its own responsibilities towards the immigrants regarding their economic and social integration into the Turkish Cypriot community. Through the encouragement of communities, states can reduce the burden of immigrants’ economic and

social welfare and so, as Kaya (2012) argues, immigrant communities as spaces of solidarity against the “structural ills of everyday life such as unemployment, poverty and deindustrialisation” are being encouraged by neo-liberal states throughout western Europe, which are increasingly reducing their spending for social services (ibid: 10). Fenton (2003) argues similarly that ethnicity (and thus groups defining themselves in ethnic terms) becomes activated in contexts of insecurity and structural discrimination, where states are reluctant to provide security to their members. In this sense it can be argued that incoming communities in the Turkish Cypriot context were preserved with similar motivations. The newly formed Turkish Cypriot state had neither the ideological –since it was assumed within Turkish nationalist thinking that Turkish Cypriots and Turks from Turkey belonged to the same ethnic group and to the same nation - nor the political and economic means to invest in immigrants’ integration into the society through non-segregationist methods. It must be underlined once again that regarding the communal and segregationist settlement policy of the states it is more accurate to talk about the preservation of incoming communities rather than their genesis from the scratch. In many cases the incoming immigrant communities were preserved whereas in other cases, in which the immigrants started arriving on their own initiative these were incorporated into the already present communities according to their place of origin and the place of settlement in the destination.

The second factor pertaining to the structural context, which partakes in the mechanisms favouring the construction and preservation of ethnic communities by the immigrants, is the ethnically informed encounters between the immigrants and the indigenous population in the processes of post-partition political and economic restructuring in northern Cyprus. This has to do with erecting and reinforcing community boundaries by groups to exclude the ‘others’ when the latter have a minimum of direct contact with each other (Eriksen 2001; 2002). Thus as Eriksen (2001) argues, ethnicity does not have much to do with “objective cultural differences”; so that it is not more important when groups have developed different cultural aspects in isolation from one another. On the contrary, “[…] ethnicity is frequently most important when groups are culturally close and enter into contact with each other regularly” (ibid: 262). Yet boundary construction by ethnic groups comprise discourses of cultural difference. In this regard O2, an opposition politician of the period explains that the
reservation of Turkish Cypriots regarding the sharing of living space with immigrants from Turkey was due to the cultural differences which became discernible from the very beginning.

When they arrived and moved into a house they did not even manage to live in that house. You see, the baths, the bath tubs, hot water, cold water, washing basins [in houses], that animals [should be] outside.. For a long time, they […] insisted on living like they did in the places they came from. After a while the natives did not want them. And as I recall, there were some villages [in which native people did not want the immigrants] in that period. There was X [village] for instance. Turkish Cypriots had demolished old houses in that village so that nobody else could come and settle.234

Some of the state representatives and officials (policy makers and implementers) as well as opposition politicians who were interviewed, did explicitly and/or implicitly point out to perceived cultural differences between the immigrants and the indigenous population, regarding it to be the main cause of conflict between the two groups (i.e. interviews with P1, I4; O2; O3). Whereas the discursive aspects of ethnicity will be further analysed in the next section, it can be argued at this point that the cultural difference discourse may be hiding another important source of “ethnic” conflict. This relates to the utilisation of ethnicity, using the symbols related to culture, customs and lifestyle in everyday life as a tool for competition over scarce resources; and entails a conceptualisation of ethnicity, in line with a rational choice thinking, as “no more than a social resource that can be mobilized and manipulated for individual gain” (Malesevic 2004: 99). This perspective moves away from the symbolic aspects of ethnicity and stresses its utilitarian value; so that it argues as mentioned in chapter 2, that people adhere to their ethnic groups in order to maximise their gain. Moreover, ethnicity often “[…] takes on […] a hierarchical character, where groups are ranked according to their differential access to resources and here correlation between class and ethnicity is high” (Eriksen 2002: 46). In this context it can be argued that “ethnicity is not only about difference”; in other words “[i]t is not simply, […] a matter of sustaining

boundaries between groups, but also of sustaining inequalities of power and access to social resources” (Fenton 2003: 134).

Immigration from Turkey to northern Cyprus between 1975-1980 entailed, as was described, large scale property distributions. Groups of immigrants coming in as agricultural labourers were allocated houses as well as large plots of land. This had planted the first seeds of conflict between the indigenous population and the immigrants. Thus, leaning on Lacher and Kaymak (2005), it can be argued that the cultural difference discourse in the northern part of Cyprus, was related to “[...] the larger process of construction of political community in the [...] North, in particular the emergence of the state as a major source of patronage and the subsequent rise of political conflict over the state’s distributive capacities” (ibid: 155).

Accordingly, although P1 argued otherwise235, field research revealed that at least some native Turkish Cypriots may have felt that the immigrants who were receiving a significant share within the redistribution process were doing so at the expense of native Turkish Cypriots. It was in this context that ethnicity was activated, and immigrants from Turkey were defined as the ‘others’ of the native Turkish Cypriots, against which the latter had to try and sustain not only cultural but also structural boundaries of economic power relations in circumstances in which the government was incorporating a large number of ‘foreigners’ into the on going redistribution. I4, a middle-ranking Turkish Cypriot official who was involved in the settlement of immigrants as a policy implementer explained the latter with the metaphor of a cake:

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235 Regarding the issue of property distributions to immigrant Turkish nationals, P1 as well as P2 - both of who were high ranking policy makers, during the first migration wave from Turkey – argued explicitly that the indigenous population in the island in general was rather welcoming towards the immigrants and did not oppose property distributions to the latter. Those who were sceptical, according to P1 were opposition politicians. As P1 put it: „Generally there are those who say ,you could have more resources to distribute today, if you didn’t give them out to landless immigrants who came from Turkey’. This is especially uttered by the politicians, but our people have in fact accepted that as a thing, they did not object to the distributions of property [to the immigrants] as in return to what they have received/ gained. („Genel olarak işte ‘Türkiye’den topraksız gelene vermeseydiniz bugün daha çok verebilecek kaynağınız olurdu’ diyen var. Onu da siyasiler söylüyor daha çok ama kendi insanımız bunu bir şey olarak kabul etmiştir, kazandığına karşılık bunun verilmesine hiç itiraz etmemiştir“).
Imagine a whole cake. That [cake] belonged to Turkish Cypriots. Everybody would have a large enough piece. [...]. When there are 10, 50 people everyone would have a piece, but when there are 100 people […]. They would even say to you [a native Turkish Cypriot], you do not need to eat at all, and give your piece to him/her [the immigrant]. You see.236

I2 too, who was also a middle-ranking policy implementer during the period, argued that although there was not much opposition to the settlement of immigrants in the North, native Turkish Cypriots may have opposed it on the grounds that they would have to share the available resources with the latter. He argued: “If there had been a negative reaction, this was because, in some places, people believed there would be less resources to be distributed. But there was no significant opposition”.237

This is in fact also related to the issue of perceptions of injustice, widespread in the Turkish Cypriot society, regarding the post war allocations of various economic resources. The issue of property distributions after the division in 1974 is a complicated as well as important issue which cannot be discussed here in its entirety (see ibid; Morvaridi 1993). Yet it must be borne in mind that the policy of the Turkish Cypriot state on this issue has been rather controversial and in so being, it created many conflicts in the society of social, political and economic nature. Lacher and Kaymak (2005) argue in this respect that “[i]n practice the regime degenerated, as demands for property in exchange for political allegiance led to wholesale redistribution, irrespective of equity” (ibid: 154). This policy has further reinforced conflict and competition among the groups and so was effective in the activation of ethnicity as a means of competition. The following quotation is from an oral history interview with opposition politician O3. O3 describes the controversial character of the issue of property distributions, by underlining their arbitrariness and the utilisation of this policy as a means of political favourism to gain political advantage. According to the interviewee, whereas property distributions was used as a means to preserve political power by the ruling party

236 Bir pasta düşün, bu Kıbrıs Türk toplumunun durdur. Herkes gayet rahat yerdi […] 10 kişi, 50 kişi olunca herkese bir parça düşer ama 100 kişi olunca […]. Hatta derler sen yemesen de olur ve parçayı ona verir. Yani.

237 “Tepki […] olmuş olsa bile dağıtılan kaynakların azalacağından dolayı belki tepki olabilirdi, bazı yerlerde. Ama öyle büyük bir şey yoktu.”
then in power, it created many disputes and “conflicts of sharing” among various groups in the population:

[With the resettlement system they created, they assigned a lot of properties to those who did not deserve. They also determined the value of the Turkish Cypriot properties left in the southern part the way they wanted by diminishing the value of some and valorising others at a higher rate. They created such a mechanism. And those many people who wanted to obey the rules and regulations were not given any property at all. Thus there was a huge indignation in the society, and some civil society organisations were founded like the one called Southern Refugees’ Solidarity Organisation. Those conflicts of sharing; and conflicts regarding issues like ‘someone was given too many and someone else was not given anything’ culminated. [...] This was the main source of conflict continuing from 1977, when the property law […] was passed, until the 1990s. That was the whole issue. At the same time, they announced various political packages and so on and properties were distributed arbitrarily through the faulty mechanism they created, and they obtained political advantages from that.]

It can be argued that this policy, which was effective in the creation of ethnic encounters and competition between the two groups also gave rise to the discourse of ‘undeserving winners’ about the immigrants, especially since some native population groups felt that they belonged to the deserving group, who however did not receive a fair compensation for the properties they left behind in the southern part. Throughout the years, as the property issue was continuously misused for political purposes (see Lacher & Kaymak 2005), this discourse was even further established, so that towards the mid-2000’s when the Annan Plan period had to the effect that property prices rose, the immigrants saw themselves confronted by critical comments about their rights to property ownership. The following excerpts from in-depth

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This highway was built after the Annan Plan. There were people from Nicosia, who didn’t know where Bahçeli village was before. After the building of the highway the land prices in this area rose a little bit and when somebody sold a piece [of land] for some money, they said „he cannot sell Greek Cypriots’ property“. They used to come here during the Annan Plan period. [...] Not the Greek Cypriots, people from RTP [Republican Turkish Party] [...] CLP [Communal Liberation Party] [...] When we discussed back then, [they would say] „don’t sell, don’t do it“. Well „don’t sell“, right? [...] You are telling me not to sell, because this place belongs to Greek Cypriots. “You don’t have the right. It is their land. They own the title deeds”. Don’t they still say that? They are. [...] You are telling an old man who has waited 30 years not to sell, that it is not his, that he has no right (MM3, 51, male, 1. generation Mersin).

Let me put it this way. It is not a political party thing [...] , but rather my friends have always said to me the following: “What are you doing there, you live so far away. Even god has forgotten you“. It was even the case that many people were allocated land/property from this area in the past [...] and they would accept. It was insulting to them to allocate them properties from this region. It was like giving them land in the mountains. But when this road was built and investments were made, especially after this road, the places which had cost 500 TL a donum, became 10 thousand sterling, 20 thousand sterling, some places were worth 30-40 thousand sterling. Then people sold and received such amounts of money that they had not earned in their lives through working. [...] But the worst thing was, I still see this, since some native Cypriots see me as a close friend, we discuss these matters, they say „you came from Trabzon, and got rich through selling the property of the giaours [Greek Cypriots]. This is being said very often. I mean, this statement is often made by Turkish Cypriots. You see, they still have not come to terms with this (TM4, 34, male, 2. generation Trabzon).
According to both MM3 and TM4 the discourse of ‘undeserving winners’ included the argument that immigrants’ property ownership was unlawful and that they had an ‘unfairly easy access to economic prosperity’ through the selling of those properties. Moreover, they argued that this discourse was rather widespread among the native Turkish Cypriot population. In their opinion these discourses were unfair mainly because they ignored the past difficult times the immigrants had in northern Cyprus trying to make a living under harsher conditions than many native Turkish Cypriots. The discourse of “undeserving winners” can be argued to further include the discourse, in which migrants are constructed as a population group, who are ‘stealing’ the jobs of the indigenous population. I4, who was especially critical of the facilitated migration within which the first wave immigrants were settled in the island’s north, was further convinced that immigrants from Turkey in general (and not only first wave immigrants) were unfairly occupying some employment positions that had to be reserved for the indigenous population. He argues:

Well, we didn’t talk about […] the issue of employment of people from Turkey. They [the administrators] employed them in the public sector when Turkish Cypriots were idle on the streets [unemployed]. 3/4 of the police force are immigrants from Turkey, 3/4 of hospital employees are immigrants from Turkey. I mean there is such a big disaster in the public sector. Most of the employees are from Turkey. What happens then? They came and took away your food and your jobs. […] These are the negative sides of migration. […] 10 thousand people used to use your hospital, now 100 thousand people use it. They say there isn’t enough medicines, not enough doctors, not enough schools. The reason for these is the uneven change. You should have determined a margin, and said that [the number of immigrants] cannot be more than Turkish Cypriots. If you drew that line we could be 50/50. But no they are three times, 5 times, 7 times, 10 times the population of Turkish Cypriots. Nobody is controlling this. For example, we are just about to change the law to make naturalisations easier. There is a man here, a butcher. “I have 5 stamps in my passport brother” he says to me. “Ok, brother?” [I say]. “Brother, I am getting the white identity card now, and in 5 years I will become a citizen”. He
has 7 children. You have 1 child, do you think of having a second? […] But he doesn’t think like that. They have families of sizes 5, 7, 9, 10.

What I refer to above can also be related to the issue identified as the discourse of ‘demographic danger’ by Hatay (2007; 2008; see Bryant & Yakinthou 2012), in which the number of immigrants from Turkey is perceived to be so large that it poses a serious threat to Turkish Cypriots’ societal positions and way of life. This is a discourse that can also be identified in many other immigrant receiving countries, and is used as a main rationalisation for anti-immigrant sentiments (see section 7.2.2).

The third structural factor relating to the formation and preservation of immigrant communities found on the macro-level is the development of an ethnic division of labour. After the division in 1974, immigrants who were essential parts of state building have not only become elements of political restructuring but also of economic restructuring. The Turkish Cypriot state on the other hand, instead of becoming an independent nation-state with an independent (national) economy, has become dependent on Turkey not only politically but also economically. From the year 1974 onwards, close political and economic ties between the two countries were beginning to give shape to economic structures in the northern part of Cyprus especially owing to the to-date prevailing non-recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state by the international community except for Turkey. Instead of an economy based on production, an economic system was created which had a swollen non-productive civil service sector, the survival which, in turn, largely depended on financial


242 According to Lacher and Kaymak (2005), the enhancement of state’s distributive capacities through the creation of many public sector jobs can be regarded as a means through which the newly created
aid from Turkey (Lacher & Kaymak 2005; Hatay & Bryant 2008; Trimikliniotis & Bozkurt 2012).

This type of post-division economic restructuring affected the immigrants’ position in the economy, who were officially brought to the islands’ north to build an agricultural workforce: Firstly, the immigrants had often found themselves unable to make a living in a declining sector such as agriculture. Secondly and more importantly according to the findings of the in-depth interviews with immigrants, contrary to the statement made by I4 quoted above, many immigrants from Turkey soon found out that they were largely left outside of the boosting public sector, which was becoming the dominant sector of employment in northern Cyprus. Whereas native Turkish Cypriots had become overrepresented in the civil service sector, the immigrants were left out largely because of their human capital, i.e. low levels of education, but also because of their lack of social capital (see Kurtuluş & Purkis 2009; 2014). In this sense it can be argued that, what had been created was an ethnic division of labour, that confined immigrants from Turkey to less secure and lower paid jobs in the private sector.

Building of an ethnic niche as an alternative way of incorporation into the economic system (see Cornell and Hartmann 1998), can be a solution to economic and structural discrimination of the immigrants in the host societies. This is an often-encountered phenomenon at the presence of significant barriers of involvement in mainstream economy. According to Kaya (2012):

> [b]oth qualitative and quantitative data gathered in the Euro-Turks research (Kaya and Kentel, 2005 and 2007; Kaya, 2009) reveal that immigrants with lower educational capital and less economic resources are likely to end up in ethnically defined niches in the labour market, while better skilled immigrants are much less dependent on such niches”. (Kaya 2012 :27)

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Turkish Cypriot state could “[…] derive its considerable internal legitimacy both from the increased security it provided to its citizens, and the material benefits it created” (ibid: 156).
Ethnic niche building experiences of the immigrants in the case of Bahçeli will be analysed at the meso-level in section 7.3. The following section concentrates on the cultural (i.e. discursive) context at the macro-level.

7.2.2 The Cultural Context: The Development of a Cypriotist Culture and the Discrimination of Immigrants

Brubaker (1998) explains that migration used as an instrument of ethnic unmixing, rather than a heterogenizing force, does not usually bring results of social harmony. He argues that migratory movements can be facilitated and regulated by using ethnicity as a “legal myth”. In the specific cases he analyses - German resettlers in Germany, ethnic Hungarians’ return migration to Hungary, ethnic Russians’ return migration to Russia, the settlement of Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel - the migrants were encouraged to move to the destination country, due to “ethnic affinity” being constructed there as a pull factor. Therefore as Brubaker suggests:

these ethnomigrants cannot simply be considered labour migrants or “economic refugees”. Labour market and other economic considerations have indeed often been important in their migration decisions. But unlike cases of conceptually “pure” labour migration, ethnicity plays a crucial role in engendering, patterning and regulating these flows (ibid: 1049).

Nevertheless, the ‘officially defined ethnicities’ of these groups do not provide them with means to integration/assimilation into the receiving society without further problems. This is so since, as was already stated, ethnic identities are neither primordially given nor fixed but rather socially constructed when two or more groups have a minimum of contact with each other (Eriksen 2002). This means, in turn, that “official ethnicity” which refers to “ethnicity as [a] legally codified and bureaucratically administered” category and “informal ethnicity”, which refers to “ethnicity as a meaningful category organizing perception, experience and social relations in everyday life” may and do come into conflict during processes of social interaction (Brubaker 1998: 1051). The case of migration from Turkey to northern Cyprus can, as was argued, be added to the cases analysed by Brubaker, not only because, as was described in chapter 5, ideas on ethnicity and nation (as a cultural factor) were involved in
migration generating mechanisms, but also because in this case too one can find a conflict between officially codified ethnic identity, informed by Turkish nationalism, which emphasises ethnic sameness between Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey and informally constructed identity perceptions of Turkish Cypriots who see significant cultural difference between themselves and the immigrants. So in the northern part of Cyprus too, despite dominant Turkish nationalism in its state building epoch that constructed immigrant Turkish nationals and native Turkish Cypriots as having same ethnicity, scepticism and negative attitudes towards Turkish immigrants developed very soon. According to Lacher and Kaymak (2005) it was the close contact between native Turkish Cypriots and the immigrants that gave rise to perceptions of cultural difference. They argue:

Indeed both veterans of the 1974 intervention […] and additional settlers from Anatolia were initially embraced as liberators and brothers. But it was the closer contact itself that also gave rise to a perception of cultural differences between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Settlers. Though their ethnic and cultural identity continues to be officially proclaimed to this day, this notion is no longer universally shared among Turkish Cypriots. Among younger generations, an increasing alienation from the official construction of identity has set in (ibid: 155)

The reflections of Turkish nationalism, which had dominated the period of Turkish Cypriots’ state building, can be found in the symbolic aspects of the migration policy of the first wave. The political elite, which was convinced that Turkish Cypriots belonged to the Turkish nation represented by ‘motherland Turkey’ presupposed that the through the partition achieved ethnic homogeneity would not be violated with the immigration of Turkish nationals to the island to form a new nation state. Thus, the Turkish nationalist immigration policy of the state was hallmarked with the controversial motto “a Turk comes a Turk goes” (giden Türk gelen Türk) (Kızılyürek 2002), which referred to the interchangeability of emigrating Turkish Cypriots and immigrating Turkish nationals (Lacher & Kaymak 2005). This was because as was already argued, Turkish nationalist politicians in power were assuming that the two groups shared the same ethnicity and nationality, so that economic, political and social

243 Lacher and Kaymak (2005) explain this growing alienation among younger generations especially through economic-structural factors, like the diminishing distributive capacities of the Turkish Cypriot state, which at the same time engender a diminishing capacity for the state to contain discontent.
conflicts that were soon noticeable in the Turkish Cypriot society did not exist in reality but were constructed by a group of traitors. This can be read from Denktaş’s disapproval of these conflicts:

They are constantly fighting with Turkey, and differentiating between “we” and “you”. Is there a difference? Are we not people who originate from Turkey too? Is blood and culture not the same thing? I have problems understanding the state of mind of people who do not see that (Denktaş quoted in Kızılyürek 2002: 294, translated by A.T.)

Turkish Cypriots’ separate nation-state building endeavours have, it seems, come to an end with the foundation of TRNC in 1983 (Samani 1999). Event though the Turkish Cypriot power elite have claimed to have constructed an independent and sovereign state with this TRNC, in practice the independence of the new state was from the Greek Cypriot neighbours and the sovereignty was only recognized by the “motherland” Turkey, from which the former was far from being independent. The already mentioned political and economic dependency of the Turkish Cypriot state on Turkey was not uniformly viewed as a problem. In the Turkish nationalist circles, many continued to view annexation to Turkey (Taksim) as the most desirable option, yet others hoped for an eventual international recognition of the state (Lacher & Kaymak 2005). On the other hand, those on the political left, saw the policies of the right wing power holders as undesirable and unrealistic and argued that the existence of TRNC could only be an intermediary state of affairs, until a comprehensive solution would be found to the prevailing Cyprus problem, and a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic would be erected on the island. It is in this context that the political left in the northern part of Cyprus emerged as an identity movement after the division (Kızılyürek 2012). According to Erhürman (2006), it was the political left, highly discontent with the regime, which proposed the development of a Cypriot identity as the core cultural element of


245 The critics of the nationalist regime and like-minded academics often argue that the nationalist project of the Turkish Cypriot state has severely failed (Lacher & Kaymak 2005; Kızılyürek 2002) It must be noted, though that despite the fact that many people became increasingly discontent with the regime in TRNC (ibid.), it has not been abandoned by its proponents, who strongly support the preservation of the status quo through an anti-settlement attitudes towards the Cyprus problem.
its politics. This entailed the creation of a common Cypriot identity, which had to embrace the recognition of cultural resemblance of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to one another, rather than their cultural sameness with respective “motherlands”. Such common cultural and ethnic identity would serve as an important force to enable the political reunification of Cyprus, under the roof of a federal state. This identity project also entailed the endeavour to break away from the Turkish nationalism which prevailed in the processes leading to partition.

Yet, this identity project with the main purpose of recreation of unity and peace among Greek and Turkish Cypriots, according to Erhürman (2006), also aimed at the preservation of the political will of Turkish Cypriots, which was perceived to be diminishing in the face of increased incorporation of alien elements into the Turkish Cypriot society. Those alien elements were identified as immigrants from mainland Turkey, who acquired citizenship in ever growing numbers, and were voting for right-wing parties (that had brought them) which represented the status quo and the continuation of Turkish nationalism (ibid: 93-94).

Immigrants from Turkey as a homogeneous group of Türkiyeliler were thus identified by the political left as a hindrance to Turkish Cypriots’ true political will. According to I2, a middle-ranking policy implementer of the period, left wing parties believed that the Türkiyeli votes were being manipulated by the ruling right wing, for political advantage:

> These people had not yet joined politics, in that period. Later, when they gradually joined politics, they began to act and to vote in groups. There was a Türkiyeli vote so to speak. Some political parties have reacted by saying that the votes of these people who were brought and settled from Turkey were being manipulated.\(^{247}\)

According to I4, Turkish Cypriots were deceived by the ruling class into accepting the immigration of Turkish nationals, on the grounds that these were being brought fill the empty villages, as a workforce. Yet, he argues, the real reason for the government of that period to bring immigrants was political. What I4 explains can be read as an example to the activation

\(^{246}\) According to Bryant and Yakinthou (2012) 25% of citizens with voting rights are of Turkish immigrant origin (ibid: 28).

\(^{247}\) Daha siyasete katılmadıysı bu kesim, o dönemde daha siyasete katılmadıysı. Daha sonra, işte yavaş yavaş siyasete katılmaya başlayınca bu defa işte onlar blok halinde hareket etmeye başladılar, önce Türkiyeli oy şeklinde. Bazı siyasi partilerde işte bu Türkiye’den gelen ve yerleştirilen göçmenlerin oyları manipüle edildi, edilecek, ediliyor gibi tepkiler oluştu.
of ethnicity under circumstances of competition over scarce resources, which may develop when groups come into close contact with each other in uncertain political, economic and social contexts, rather than ‘an ethnic conflict’ which was naturally given:

People were deceived into accepting this labour force. […] Why? They thought, the villages are empty anyway. They could see easily, they are empty. When travelling from one place to another, say someone wants to get to Famagusta, everywhere is empty. They were not disturbed when someone was settled there. What if Greek Cypriots came back […] There was fanaticism [nationalism] in that period. It was right after the Greek and Turkish armed clashes. Even the most communist was ok with it [bringing immigrants]. There was war, there was death. Someone from his relatives or a relative of his relatives was killed. Therefore the left wing was weak. They had found their weak side. These villages were empty. They knew that the people who were being settled in the villages came from Turkey too. There is always a brain wash in things like this. They told people the reasons underlying these migrations over and over. Moreover, all people made some money out of it. Some were employed as civil servants. Some grocery shop owners started selling more. Some merchants started making more money. All of these had made people agree. Nobody would sit down and talk about immigrants from Turkey coming and settling here. These things all came to light a lot later, when properties, the value of which got higher, were being sold and they left after selling. Moreover, the politicians. As far as RTP is considered, they knew that it was because of these people that NUP came to power with more votes each time. Everybody knew. People supporting RTP were there. We knew who we were, we could count each other, 15, 20, 50, 100 […]. We were the only ones from the younger generation, there was no one else. It was us and our families. We would get 20% they would get 80%. It was when people realised that the demography was changing, and that the immigrants had joined the circles of NUP which distributed, properties and benefits, that they started worrying. Think about it, how many years it took us to come to power, after 1974.248

Similarly O3, an opposition politician active in politics during the period, explains in the following excerpt how immigrants votes were being manipulated for political advantage. According to him the main right wing political party NUP\textsuperscript{249} had distributed property and kept the issue of title deeds unsolved as a means to ensure its political domination. Initially, although immigrants were allocated houses and plots of land, they were not issued title deeds, so that for a longer period of time the promise of title deeds was used by the ruling right-wing party so as to gain votes from the immigrants:

People were not issued title deeds. Why? […] The issue of title deeds had always been neglected. The [property] law was adopted in 1977 after the 1976 elections. For the elections in 1981 NUP’s main slogan was: "We will issue title deeds". In 1985 elections they used the slogan again: "We will issue title deeds" and in 1990 once again: "We will issue title deeds". Therefore, they established this mechanism by suspending the issuing of title deeds […] after the adoption of the property law […] in 1977 this whole battle continued until 1990. This [title deeds issue] had been the main issue. […] In 81, 85 and 90 general elections NUP’s campaigns were based on the slogan "we will issue title deeds"\textsuperscript{250}

Under these circumstances, for the Turkish Cypriot left, the opposition to the methods of the political right entailed, the almost categorical opposition to the presence of immigrants. This was present in the oral history interview conducted by O2, a left-wing opposition politician who was active in the period. According to this interviewee the opposition was not directed to the immigrants as individuals but to the politics of Turkey (and its collaborators in

\textsuperscript{249}National Unity Party (NUP) was the largest political party originally affiliated with Denktaş especially during state building; and was the longest ruling political party in the Turkish Cypriot state history.

northern Cyprus) since he believes that the migration policy is part of a wider policy of annexation to Turkey. As he puts it:

These people are here in the end, it is not right to treat them differently. But I am against this policy of bringing and settling people, a population, here because it was the policy of Turkey. I am against that politics. I am sure many of our friends think of it this way. [But] there are also friends of ours who say “well this is racism”. But there is also this side to it: we are losing this country, Turkish Cypriots are becoming subordinate, they are becoming second-class citizens. In any case, this side of the issue is still continuing today and being supported by other types of politics. There are many things. We have lost our hands, now we will lose our arms and much more. Our prime minister was in Turkey. Why? Because he wants to ask for money. Why does he ask for money? To give it to people who do not have a right to it [deserve]! To give it to people who are not entitled! It has always been like that in Cyprus. Unfortunately, we have always given an opportunity to the realisation of some plans which were made by some circles in Turkey.  

Yet to blame the political left in the creation of the “other” image for the immigrants is way too simplistic. It can be argued leaning on Erhürman (2006) once again, that the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie, which represented Turkish nationalism, too was involved in this process. Then although it had embraced Turkish immigrants as part of its Turkish nationalist political ideology, these had in reality approached the immigrants with a “distant sympathy”. For them the latter fulfilled some essential roles: they provided cheap labour to the bourgeoisie, helped to create links to the economy of Turkish mainland and ensured the political domination of this class (ibid: 96). Their relationship was therefore grounded upon utilitarian reasons rather than emotional motivations. As a result, immigrants from Turkey were constructed mainly as a political category. Whereas the right wing ruling classes

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regarded them as a means for the continuance of their power, the Turkish Cypriot left was less sympathetic arguing they constituted a voting reservoir for the representatives of status-quo and a hindrance to the realisation of true political will of Turkish Cypriots; and the international community as well as the Greek Cypriot side defined them as “settlers” which had been sent by Turkey in order to ensure the prevalence of its authority and domination in the island in the long run. 252

Under these circumstances the discourse of Cypriotism 253, which was being constructed as a reaction to Turkish nationalism and the dubious politics of the political right, as well as a means to achieve a solution to Cyprus problem which would be the most effective way to eliminate the status quo, swiftly acquired a new nationalist face: Whereas the Turkish-nationalist policies of the state building era were constructing an ethnic Turkish identity for Turkish Cypriots which had excluded Greek Cypriots as its “others”, the new others of Turkish Cypriots were, within the Cypriotist discourse, Turkish nationals in general and immigrants from Turkey in particular (Hamit 2008).

252 Nick Kounoupis, the coordinator of an England based Greek Cypriot Lobby argues that Turkish immigrants “have been deliberately sent to Cyprus by Turkey in an attempt to change permanently the demographic composition of the island in a classic attempt at ethnic engineering” (Borowiec, 2000: 157-158). Due to the position of the Greek Cypriot government in the international political arena and the unrecognised status of the Turkish Cypriot state, this view finds considerable support in the international community.

253 According to Bryant and Yakinthou (2012) there are two interrelated discourses which can be argued to be wide-spread in the Turkish Cypriot community in relation to the construction immigrants from Turkey as Turkish Cypriots’ ‘others’. These two discourses are the “discourse of demographic danger” and the “discourse of cultural erosion” (Bryant & Yakinthou 2012: 27-32). The first one is related to an anxiety, widespread in the Turkish Cypriot society, in which immigrants from Turkey are deemed to be too numerous, even outnumbering the indigenous population, so that they pose a “population problem”. (ibid; Hatay 2007) 253 The second one is, on the other hand, related to the perception that immigrants pose “threat to Turkish Cypriots’ way of life” (ibid). As Bryant and Yakinthou (2012) put it, “for most Turkish Cypriots today, […] ‘population’ is a top of their list of both social and economy problems, as well as one of the main sources of tension with the Turkish government and Turkish Republic” (ibid: 28). Moreover, within these discourses Turkish Cypriots perceive a threat to their local culture by the growing number of immigrants, which are identified as the actors of Turkey’s Turkification policy (and more recently in relation to AKP government, a policy of Islamisation) towards the island’s north (ibid). This also gives rise to what the authors call “[…] an explosion of local culture, with television shows that emphasize the Cypriot traditional village culture; a new market in Cypriot traditional food, music and folk dance; and new ‘traditional’ festivals celebrating everything from local tulips to wild artichokes” (ibid: 29-30).
In the Cypriotist rhetoric, while Turkish Cypriots were attributed a distinctive “national character” through the process of “positive stereotyping” (Pickering 2001:95) the “others”, that is the immigrants from Turkey were deprived of those positive characteristics and attributed, through negative stereotyping, undesirable negative features. Thus according to Erhürman (2006) this discourse constructed “the ones coming from the outside [the immigrants from Turkey in general] [ … as] people who lived in houses and under conditions that we would never live, dressed the way we did not dress, talk in a way we would not talk, live in a way we did not live, would insult women, harass them, rape them, steal and rob” (ibid: 98, translated by A.T.)

In popular discourses the exclusion of Turkish nationals is expressed linguistically by referring to the immigrants with degrading names such as garasakal, gaco and fica (black beards, gaco and seaweeds). Moreover, negative stereotyping was not only carried out on inter-personal level, but also through the press (Şahin 2008) and collective organisations like trade unions, civil society organisations as well as political parties.

7.3 Meso and Micro-Level Mechanisms in Ethnic Community Formation

Immigrant communities are agentially constructed within structural and cultural contexts, which as was explained in the previous sections, limit immigrants’ incorporation into the mainstream society. Communities are, at the same time, sources of social capital, which allow immigrants alternative ways of social action and an alternative “pathway of incorporation” into the host society (see Glick-Schiller et al. 2004). In this line of thought this section will regard the reflections of the, at the macro-level identified issues on the meso and micro-levels in regards to immigrants’ community building and preservation.

As was argued migrant community formation, may be regarded as a reaction to structural exclusion and discrimination by dominant groups (see Kaya 2012). Dense social and economic networks of support and cooperation may be formed among immigrants, usually of same origin, so as to counteract various kinds of social exclusion, discrimination and discrimination.

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254 “Dışarıdan gelenler, bizim yaşamayı uygun görmemişiz evlerde, hiç yaşamayacağımız koşullarda yaşayan, bizim gibi giyinmeyen, bizim gibi konuşmayan, bizim gibi yaşamayan, kadınlara laf atan, onları taciz eden, onlara tecavüz eden, çalan çırpan, soyun soğana çevirenlerdi”.

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othering. Migrant communities may be formed, due to various reasons linked to immigrants’ spatial segregation; their political discrimination; by processes of ethnic “enclavement”, in which sectorial and otherwise economic niches are formed as ways of incorporation in the larger economy due to economic discrimination and exclusion; and due to social discrimination by dominant native groups, and states. Immigrant communities are also built and reinforced in so far as immigrants are simultaneously incorporated into more than one society. In other words, the presence of immigrants’ transnational ties, their transnational “ways of being” as well as “ways of belonging” (Levitt & Glick-Schiller) are also factors that affect their community makings. The latter is, as was argued, linked to immigrants’ conscious identification with the place of origin (ibid). Against this background, immigrant communities may be linked to all three dimensions of agency; practical-evaluative; iterational/habitual and projective. The following discusses immigrant community formation within this framework. Immigrants’ community formation and reinforcement regarding the case of Bahçeli will be analysed with regards to all three agency dimensions as well as regarding three main themes of focus: immigrants experiences of exclusion and othering (Section 7.3.1); transnationalism (Section 7.3.2) and identification (Section 7.3.3).

7.3.1 Immigrants’ Experiences of Exclusion and Othering

Literature suggests that ethnic community formation by immigrants may be motivated by their experiences of discrimination, exclusion and othering in the receiving society. In this respect, the structures of exclusion, identified at the macro-level, can be argued to be reflected at the meso and the micro-levels. Based on the data collected in field research, the experiences of Bahçeli villagers of exclusion and othering can be put into four categories: experiences of spatial segregation and discrimination by the state, their experiences of economic exclusion (i.e. exclusion from the Cypriot way of employment), their political discrimination within the discourse of Cyprus conflict, and their experiences of exclusion and othering in everyday relations with the native population.
7.3.1.1 Spatial Segregation

Regarding spatial segregation, informal conversations as well as semi-structured in-depth interviews have revealed that many of the immigrants living in Bahçeli village, were rather discontent about what they saw as living in a segregated locality. MM5 (41, male) a second-generation villager with parents who immigrated from Mersin regards the community’s segregation as rather involuntary. His narration is also important as it implies that women were disproportionately affected through this segregation:

Our village for instance [Bahçeli], and also villages like Kaplıca, Sadrazamköy, Kayalar remained introverted. Because people from the same place of origin came to the same place [in Cyprus], and so they couldn’t have relationships with the outside. Our village was like that too. Before this road, people in the village were truly disadvantaged, they had no connections to the outside. There was neither a bus to Kyrenia or anything else, nor did people have cars. They were like trapped in the village, you see. They would go to Esentepe at the most. People from Kaplıca village, from Mersinlik village are in a similar situation, they also came from the same origin. They had come together from same place and were placed in a rural place […]. They didn’t mix with others. They couldn’t mix with others. Was it not for Esentepe, we wouldn’t mix at all, I reckon. At least Esentepe was a mixed village and was close to us. We went to school there, and got to know few other people. Otherwise where could you have gone from Bahçeli? You had no car, there was no road. Where could the people go? They only saw one another in the village. There was nothing else for them. Through truck driving it was only the men of the village that could go outside, the women were never out of the village.\(^\text{255}\)

The narration of TM6 (37, male) who’s grandparents and parents had immigrated from Trabzon is also illustrative. This interviewee too links spatial segregation to isolation from other (ethnic) groups/communities and argues that spatial segregation had prevented inter-group socialisation and promoted the prevalence of (cultural) difference:

We live here in a place of deprivation. We are far away from everything. There are no social activities. We live at such a distance. We are only among ourselves, there are no other groups among us. A child living in a farm, in a village is different; you are different from him/her. For instance, the child of my sister goes to Kyrenia American Collage. She is the same age as my daughter. When I bring them together, I notice the difference straight away.256

TW1 (62, female, 1. generation Trabzon) explains the hardship the community had encountered due to spatial characteristics of the village like its distance from the centre. As she explains it was the spatial isolation and remoteness of the village, which furthered the community’s predicament.

[…] you had no car, you had nothing. There was only one car in the whole village. Then you had to go to Nicosia from here. We got up at 4 in the morning and travelled to Tatlısu. There was a bus from there. To get that bus we had to walk to the main road on the coast. Had we found a car [ through hitch hiking], we would drive in that car [to Tatlısu].257

On the other hand it is also possible to find elements of voluntariness, and even active agential role of the immigrants themselves in spatial separation during the initial stage of immigration. In this respect it was revealed during field research that whether or not the Trabzon community chose willingly to settle in Bahçeli village, they chose to settle as a community and in so doing they sought to prevent the mixing of their community with others. They had seen it as an advantage to be settled in the village of Bahçeli, after viewing some other options, since they could remain in this village on their own, rather than in close


contact with native Turkish Cypriots, or other migrant groups. TM3 (54, male 1. generation Trabzon) describes in the following the process of settlement decision in the village. He argues, that the prospect of being in a village without any other group (immigrant or native) was an important criterion, which was effective in the settlement decision made by community leaders.

We came to the village, but of course it was a place which had just came out of war. As we were on the way, at Akatu, the children and the women started shouting. They were shouting and all that. Well it was a place that had just got out of war, you see. [...] There was fear and nervousness. Anyway, we arrived in the village, we got out, it was the 8th month, it was apricot harvest time, [...] no the fifth month, yes it was the fifth month. Anyway, they went here and there, “No we don’t want this village!” [...] We returned to the guest house in Famagusta. Then they gave 2-3 limousine taxis, Mercedeses to those 30-35 year olds. They told the drivers “drive them around Cyprus”. [...] Then when that group saw the plain they said, “no we definitely don’t want the plain”, so they didn’t go there. They came to this area, saw Çatalköy, Esentepe, Bahçeli, and the places around here. One of these people was my brother, another one was the son of my uncle, few from the Çebi group, the older ones. Then my father said, “we will stay here, in this village, we can do livestock breeding here”. Most of the people who came from Turkey, knew livestock breeding. “You can do stockbreeding, there are trees, there is agriculture and most importantly there is water here” he said. [...] “There is the sea, we are on the coast”. He said, “we stay here, we stay; when we don’t stay here, the deal is off”. They said ok, so we came back to the village. There was also this: In Esentepe and Çatalköy, there were people from the southern side [Turkish Cypriot refugees], we didn’t want live together with them. Here, the whole village belonged to us, there were no strangers, we would be among ourselves. This was what they preferred.258

The above statement shows that the Bahçeli immigrants did consciously try to keep the integrity of the community and avoid heterogenization. The Bahçeli village can be argued in this sense to have provided the immigrants with a sense of security against the unknown. The incoming groups of immigrants were interested in keeping their community character intact that, as was already described (Chapter 4), they not only refrained from mixing with the indigenous population, but also played their part in the expulsion of the Çebi group, which too was from the same district in Trabzon. Interviews with pioneer migrants have revealed that these had even demolished some of the houses, which remained vacant so as to prevent the settlement of other groups in the village (interviews with TM1, TM2, TM3).

In the following dialogue, TM3 further explains about the settlement of the Ayvadere (Aho) community in Bahçeli village in detail. In his opinion, the arrival and the settlement of the Mersin group after the relocation of the Çebi group from the village was tolerated by their community leader due to perceived advantage of having them. Otherwise, the interviewee underlined, the community (the community leader) did not wish to have anybody else in the village and so, demolished vacant houses so as to prevent the settlement of other people in the village.

**TM3:** “My father accepted seven families from Mersin. My father wanted to have them.”
**Researcher:** “Were there people in the village who didn’t want the Mersin group among themselves?”
**TM3:** “Nobody could not to want someone that my father wanted.”
**Researcher:** “Why did your father want them [in the village]?”
**TM3:** “They had come from a similar place. […] Our trees are different. We didn’t know what olive trees were, what carobs were, barley and wheat agriculture was done a long time ago. We didn’t know this type of agriculture at all. My father said: “These people know these things, they are only seven families anyway, let us have them among us.” And they really had the know-how. “They at least knew the climate of this place, and the thing, so let them stay in the village” [he said]. They moved to the village like that, otherwise, had my father said no, no one could come. Think about it, this village used have 150 houses. My father had all of those old houses demolished.”
**Researcher:** “Why?”
TM3: “So that nobody could come and settle. He had them all demolished, those old houses.”259

All-migrant spaces, like the Bahçeli village, are causally related to immigrants’ separate community building. Yet, although spatial segregation is often seen as undermining immigrants’ integration into the society, as the arguments above demonstrate, these may alternatively be understood, by the immigrants, as mediating the alienating experience of migration and the related feeling of “loss of home”. Thus all migrant spaces, may provide a sense of integrity and wholeness to the immigrants.

On the other hand immigrants’ community building cannot be only tied to spatial segregation and isolation of the village (which is argued to be partly due to immigrants own endeavours), but also to further social, political and economic exclusion which can only be indirectly tied to living in a remote village. First generation immigrants with whom informal conversations and theory-laden in-depth interviews were conducted have narrated their experiences of settlement in the village with an emphasis on the hardships they encountered and underlined their feelings of exclusion and deprivation through living in a village. MM4 (57, male) a first generation immigrant from Mersin states this disappointment as follows:

I didn’t know what Cyprus was […]. I was disappointed when I came, I mean when I saw Cyprus. Why? Because, for instance I had not experienced village life before. Because of my father’s occupation who was an imam, I had lived in the city. To tell you the truth I didn’t know how to grow tomatoes. I came from a busy city. I came to a place like a Mexican town, where at 10 o’clock

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259 TM3: “Mersin[den], sonra babam aldı yedi aile. Babam istedi onları.”
Araştırmacı: “Köyde ilk istemeyen oldu mu Mersinlileri?”
TM3: “Babamın istediğini kimsenin istememe şansı yoktu.”
Araştırmacı: “Niçin istedi babanız?”
Araştırmacı: “Neden?”
MM4 was a town dweller before migrating to Cyprus. Yet within the framework of the immigration policy of the first wave, he was settled in a rural place. However, this disappointment was also uttered by those who came from the rural places in Turkey, especially by women, who were encouraged to take up the movement with exaggerated promises about the modern everyday life in the northern part of Cyprus (see Chapter 6). Many women narrated that their feelings of deprivation upon migration. TW1’s (62, female) narrative is illustrative:

They said there is furniture and goods in the houses. They said “you will not need anything else”. But we came and saw that there was nothing. [...] What a scene. There was not even a chair. There was a house down there in a bad condition, I had moved in there, for a month [...], I had brought a bed. I only had one daughter then. I only had one child. We were three people, my husband, me and the child. The government gave support in accordance with the number of people in the household, say with regards to the number of children in the household. One bed, three plates, three forks, spoons. One rug, one double bed, one single bed. Three wooden things. [We were] like migrants, really like migrants. But what had they promised us.

As it turned out, immigration and settlement in Bahçeli entailed, a continuation of socio-spatial discrimination and exclusion from socio-economic resources. Socio-spatial discrimination was a general theme encountered throughout the fieldwork carried out in the village, expressed both by Trabzon and Mersin immigrants as well as first and second generations. TM4 (56, female) a first generation Trabzon immigrant complained in this
regard not only about the village’s socio-spatial isolation but also about the governments’ lack of services to the village, saying: “Look, we are in this village since 75. Have you seen anything that the state had done in this village? For god’s sake please tell me. Was it supposed to be this way?.”

Similarly TM6, quoted above also narrated his discontent with the social conditions in the village, referring to his dialogue with a Turkish Cypriot politician as follows: “[I said] ‘I am a Cypriot brother. This is my village. There is such a village in Cyprus’” […] I said ‘I live in a place of deprivation. You are making me live under primitive conditions. Is it ok that no one comes here?’”

The villagers discussed many issues regarding discrimination by the state, like not having up-to-date infrastructure and other services in the village. Among the many issues, not having a landline system in the village was a commonly perceived problem. The quotation below is from in-depth interview with MM3, (51, male, 1. generation Mersin), who came to the village as a teenager with his family.

There is no landline in this village until this date. If you consider Turkey, wherever you go there is electricity, telephone lines, everything. But not here. All of the politicians [all parties] said something different. In the last presidential elections, Erdoğan was the Prime Minister. He made us a promise. Hasan Taçoy was the Minister of Transport. So many years have gone by, there is still nothing. In the end we put some pressure and we managed to make them do the cabling work. But there is still no landline.
Similarly, the following statements made by TM7 (33, male, second generation Trabzon) MM4 (57, male, 1. generation Mersin) and TW4 (56, female, 1. Generation Trabzon) respectively are on the matter of spatial discrimination inflicted upon the village by the state. MM4’s and TW4’s arguments, that many of the services are brought to them via the hands of Turkey is important. It is indeed a widely held belief that the village gets the few public services it does from the Aid Committee of the Turkish Embassy. It was mentioned to me many times that many types of public-works, like stone walls and barriers were being built with the financial aid of Turkey. This kind of discourse can be argued to sustain the emotional links that the immigrants have to the state of Turkey, rather than encouraging the community to develop a sense of belonging to the Turkish Cypriot state.

RTP was in the government then. We were having a chat, talking about the problems of the village. I said “I want to ask you something”. He said “Go ahead”. I asked: “I did my military service in Pyla. Do you know Pyla?” He said “Yes I do”; I said “look let me tell you something. Pyla is a village in the buffer zone. Half of the people there is Greek and the other half is Turkish. They have a telephone system there. A link system. […] There are no cables anywhere. Is that right? ” “That’s right”. “That place is in the buffer zone, where is this place located?” I said. “In Africa? Why is there no telephone system here?” We are in year 2014 and this village still has no telephone system. If you ask them they have installed the lines and all they have to do is to connect it to the central system. What are you waiting for then? (TM7, 33, male, second generation Trabzon).265

Speaking specifically about the village, [I think that] the politicians have always regarded this place as a source for votes [for the elections]. The services that we get, there is the highway, the [Turkish Cypriot] state did not contribute to that. It is only the roads in the village that were asphalted by the state. There is no telephone [landline] system in this century. The highway was built by the state of Turkey. Our state did not contribute to that. I cannot really imagine a state, which, for instance, does not even install telephone lines of a

Let me tell you a basic thing. For example they are building a wall here. I believe it is financed by the Turkish Embassy. I went out and saw the jeep. There were engineers I think, I don’t know any of them. There is a pole there [...]. It is in the middle of the road since last 5 years. Down the street of my house there is another pole, like that one. Another one in front of the house of [X]. They are electric poles. The kid had hit that pole twice in the night. The wires broke and fell down. [...]. Is it ok not to remove the three poles for 10 years my dear? This is a simple thing. A car fell down behind this house. According to the project there should have been a wall there. [...] I thought to myself I go out and tell them. My son had hit the pole 3-4 days ago. I mean, the kid had almost died. I thought, I’d tell them so that they could remove the pole, it was the elections period, so they would probably do it, I thought. I went out, the man was speaking with the workers, I said “brother, there are three poles in this village that need to be removed, can you get those three poles removed”. “That’s not our job” he said. A young worker said “according to the project the wall has to be down here”. He said to the worker “you build a one meter high wall up here”. I think he was the engineer, I don’t know. “Never mind, put it up here” he said. The other one said “but brother, in the project, the wall is down there, the mukhtar said so”. “Then leave it like that, don’t do it” he said. “That’s enough, finish this part, and we’re done” he said. Why are you so ignorant? If you are not going to do it, say “I will not do it”. If you want to do it, do it correctly. We are human beings too (TW4, 56, female, 1. generation Trabzon).267


The decline of the agricultural sector makes it hard for many to continue living in the village. In this sense the distance of the village from the city i.e. the main resource of paid-labour, becomes an issue of another type in the socio-economic discrimination of the villagers. The excerpts below from interviews with TM7 and MW3 are illustrative in this sense, that the spatial distance that the village poses is a further reason of immigrants economic exclusion:

I want to live in Kyrenia, because of work. I now have a side job. [...] I have to drive that road everyday. If I was in Kyrenia it wouldn't have been so difficult. I mean, the only disadvantage of being in this village is [distance to] work. [...] Well, because I am not in the village the social life doesn't interest me much. Men socialise only in the coffee house, and women pay each other visits (TM7, 33 male, 2. generation Trabzon).

MW3: “[…] I have no car, I have no way of transportation. That I have no car is my biggest problem.”
Researcher: “How about your husband?”
MW3: “He doesn’t have one either.”
Researcher: “Where does he work?”
MW3: “He works for the Esentepe municipality.”
Researcher: “How does he go there?”
MW3: “He hitch hikes. Unfortunately. It is hard. When you don’t have your own car here it is as if you’re hands are tied up. It is as if you are not living a life” (Interview with MW3, 48, female, 1. generation Mersin).

268 İşten dolayı ben Girne’ye gitmek istiyorum. Şimdi bir de ek işe girdim. [...] Her gün o yolu çekiyorum. Girne’de olsam o kadar sıkıntı yok. Yani bu köyde olmanın tek sıkıntısı iş. [...] Valla köyde pek durmadığım için sosyalleşme beni bağlamıyor. Sosyalleşme zaten bir tek kahve, erkekler için, kadınlar da artık, o ona gidiyor bu buna gidiyor

269 MW3: “[...] Arabam yok, ulaşım yok. İşte arabam olmadığı için en büyük sıkıntı o.”
Araştırmacı: “Eşinizin?”
MW3: “Eşimin de yok.”
Araştırmacı: “Ne is yapıyor eşiniz?”
Araştırmacı: “Nasıl gidiyor oraya?”
Women’s experiences of the spatial isolation of the village are reinforced by patriarchal gender relations. Whereas most of the first generation immigrant women, unlike their husbands do not socialise outside the village, the second generation also find it hard to overcome the spatial and social barriers of the village in their everyday lives. Moreover the deprivation of the village of numerous social services like health care and childcare puts an extra burden on women. Whereas it increases their dependency on their husbands and other (wo)men, it also contributes to the perpetuation of this dependency, since many women are denied of educational rights and/or from inclusion in the labour force. TW8 (34, female, 1. generation Trabzon) a house wife whose husband is a long distance truck driver (between Turkey and Cyprus) narrates in the following her hardship of living in the village without a driving’s licence especially when her husband is on the road:

> When that happens, I neither have a car nor a driving licence. If I had the latter, there is an old car, but I can’t drive. You then have to ask someone to give you a ride. But when the child gets sick s/he doesn’t wait for you. Therefore it is hard. That’s why I don’t like this place.\(^\text{270}\)

I also encountered many life stories in which community barriers as well as living in the village became an additional obstacle for many female children to attend higher education. TW12 (33, female, 2. generation Trabzon) was one of the few young women who graduated from the university in the second generation who are now in their 30s, and told me how her family moved to Kyrenia where her high school was, so that she could attend. Later as she was successful and wanted to go to university her choices was limited to Kyrenia as well.

> “When there is a university here why should you go?” they said. When I graduated from the university, I had a degree in literature. The professors had told us “there is a programme in the Gazi University, do you want to go there?” Well I had graduated, and they said “go into employment, what do you do with further education? You did this, you are done, what do you want more?” So I didn’t go. After high school, as I was entering the university exams, for example, they did their research and told me, “there is a teaching degree here an the university, so why should you go far away and be out of sight?” They didn’t send me so I studied here. […] I wanted to go to Lefka, I

wanted to study to become a history teacher. They told me “teaching is teaching, study literature, what difference does it make?” So I was forced to study literature. […] My grandmother had no intention of sending me to the university anyway, my uncle had helped/supported me. My grandmother didn’t let my sister study. “A girl shouldn’t study”. We used to live together and my grandmother was very powerful in the household. She was very dominant like her own father. When I graduated from the primary school she didn’t want to let me continue. My uncle from Germany had come to visit back then and told his mother off: “This kid will go to school and you will not intervene!” he said.

There are many similar stories about the daughters of the first generation immigrants. Many children, especially females were forced out of the school at a young age (after elementary or secondary school). Similar obstacles are present in womens’ participation in the workforce.

These stories of women’s discrimination must be understood as an outcome of a complex interplay patriarchal gender relations, class relations as well as (gendered) community barriers and spatial obstacles, the latter of which is reinforced by a lack of services such as transportation and child care. The excerpts below illustrate these issues further. In the first quotation MW3 explains that living in the village, living under circumstances of economic hardship and being a young woman was limiting the future prospects for her daughters:

MW3: “I definitely want to offer them a good education but I don’t have the financial power. […] I have to start [saving] now, so as to send the child to private preparatory classes, for the [preparation for] university I mean. I cannot consider sending her to a private university anyway, because of my financial difficulties. Anyway I wish that she passes the university entrance exams. Even that depends on money. If you cannot give the child some basis, you cannot expect from her something more. Only 10% of the children are

successful on their own without going to a private afternoon school. […] All parents want their children to have a good education and achieve something.

**Researcher:** “What if your daughter wants to go to [a private] university? What if she [tells you] for instance, that she could work and pay for it?

**MW3:** “She doesn’t have such an option. There is no car for her to drive to work. What will she go to work with? Going to work is a problem. […] There is no public bus (Interview with MW3, 48, female, 1. generation Mersin).”

It can be revealed from the below quoted conversation with TW15, that spatial circumstances related to living in the village, social class and gender relations are, in a complex interaction with one another, restrictive not only for the woman in question but also for her children. This may in a sense contribute to the preservation of community boundaries, as far as these are defined by social and economic exclusion.

**Researcher:** “Do you have any plans [regarding the future of your children?”

**TW15:** “Sure I do, but how? I am at home, my husband is the only person who works outside, and his salary is barely enough for the household, for the children.”

**Researcher:** “What are those plans?”

**TW15:** “Do you mean regarding their education? Could we save some money, put some money in the bank, that could help”.

**Researcher:** “Do you consider looking for paid work?”

**TW15:** “Sure. If there were someone to take care of the children. There is a nursery in Esentepe. You need to have a car, to take the children there, go to work, and pick them up again, it is hard I mean. […] As I got pregnant this year I left it at that, otherwise of course everyone wants their children to get a good education. I would have loved to send [the child] to an English school, so he learns English. I couldn’t. […] They do it nowadays, they send kids to English schools at young ages. You send them to nursery, so the kid socialises. Otherwise the child is always in the village, with other children,

**MW3:** “[Okutmayı] Muhakkak ki istiyorum ama maddi gücüm el vermiyor. […] Şimdi ben başlamam lazım ki o çocuğumu dershaneeye göndermek için, üniversite için yani. Para dışı üniversiteyi zaten düşündüğüm, istersem de düşünmemem maddi sıkıntımdan. Gönlüm ister zaten kendi kazansın okusun. O da mine paraya dayanıyor. Çocuğa şimdi temelden bir şey veremedikten sonra ilerisini bekleyemezsin çocuktan. 10% çocuk çok başarılı olur, dershaneeye gitmeden kendi çabalarıyla kendi başarılarını bir yerlerde gelmeyi. […] Hangi anne baba isteme çocukları okusun, bir yerle gelsin”.

**Araştırmacı:** „İsterse kızın? Mesela çalışırım ben yaparım [derse]“


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**Araştırmacı:** „İsterse kızın? Mesela çalışırım ben yaparım [derse]“


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what is s/he going to learn?” (Interview with TW15, 33, female 2. generation Trabzon).

7.3.1.2 Economic Exclusion and Ethnic Niche Building

Immigrants who arrived within the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus were recruited as agricultural labourers. These were resettled in rural places, and were allocated land, and to some extent few other resources (i.e. credits) so as to initiate their economic activity. They were, officially, expected to be active in agricultural production. Yet, as was revealed during the field research this expectation of the government, in the case of the village, could not be lived up to by the immigrants. This was partly because of economic developments related to a decline in the agricultural sector, and partly due to unfavourable policies of the Turkish Cypriot government. Conversations with the Bahçeli villagers revealed that they had much difficulty in finding a way to become economically active upon immigration. Below are some excerpts from in-depth interviews which are illustrative of the hardships:

TW1: „Of course we worked. We harvested olives from the mountains. We bred livestock. What is there that we didn’t do?“
Researcher: „Livestock?“
TW1: „Animals, cows. I mean we did stockbreeding.“
Researcher: „What about olives?“
TW1: „There were olives as well“
Researcher: „How was that? Did it bring money? Can you please explain?“
TW1: „No it didn’t bring much money. We as women suffered a lot. We used to get on the donkeys and travel for two hours to milk the sheep. The state had

273 Araştırmacı: „[Çocuklarının geleceği] için planların var mı?“
TW15: „İlka ki ama nasıl olacak iste, ben evdeyim sadece esim çalıĢıyor, onun maaĢı da anca eve yetiyor, çocuklara yetiyor“. Araştırmacı: „Nedir planların?“
TW15: „Okumalar açılsından mı? Birikim yapak, atsak bankaya, kenara koysak, yardım falan“
Araştırmacı: “ÇalıĢmayı düşünüyor musun?“

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given us the sheep. 10 sheep per household. We used to milk them. We saved a little bit [of money] and bought a cow. But we didn't have enough [money] to put aside. We had just only enough to sustain our living. But the men.. We woke up at 4’o clock to go to Erenköy. I was pregnant with my daughter. I was in the ninth month of my pregnancy. We used to set off around 4 o’clock at night, with boots on our feet. We were harvesting oranges for other people. I mean, that was how we made our living. We used to harvest apricots. But we were not able to sell them."

**Researcher:** „You received monetary aid for one year I suppose."
**TW1:** „One year“
**Researcher:** „How about later?“
**TW1:** „They didn't give us anything later."
**Researcher:** „Was it as if they told you ,do whatever you want!’?”
**TW1:** „That's exactly what happened. They deceived us to come. They said ‘You will have food, monthly wages, annual wages.’ [But] we didn't get anything.“

TW1 explains further that the economic hardships continued, until some 10-15 years ago. She remembers having immense financial problems, not being able to afford things like shoes and clothes for her children. In her opinion things got a lot better in the recent years:

My children went to the school. I have pictures of them going to school when I didn't have enough money to buy them shoes. I wasn't able to buy them clothes.

We were poor. Where could I find the money? If you didn't have something I would give you, if I didn't have it, you would give me. That’s how we survived.

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274 TW1: „Çalıştık tabii kızım... Dağlardan zeytin topladık, mal ettik. Neler etmedik“.
**Araştırmacı:** „Mal dediğiniz?“
**TW1:** „Hayvan hayvan, inek. Hayvancılık yani“.
**Araştırmacı:** „Zeytin?“
**TW1:** „Zeytin de vardı“
**Araştırmacı:** „O işler nasıldi? Yani para getirir miyi? Biraz anlatır misin onları?“
**Araştırmacı:** „Bir yıl yardım verdiler galiba.“
**TW1:** „Bir yıl“.
**Araştırmacı:** „Ondan sonra hiç vermediler mi?“
**TW1:** „Ondan sonra vermediler.“
**Araştırmacı:** „Yani ne ister seniz yapın gibi mi oldu?“
**TW1:** „Ayı yiyemiz, kandırıb götürdüler bizi. Yok yiyeceğiniz, yok aylığınız, yok yıllığınız ama hiçbir şey görmedik“.
Now we have [money] but I always warn my children not to waste it. Their wardrobes are full with shoes. There were times we didn't have all these. Everyone wore new clothes for Eid/Bairam. My children had never had cloths for Bairam or anything. I had such hard times. [One of my children] told me that she had once seen a pair of shoes someone was wearing and wanted to have the same ones. But I couldn't buy her those shoes. How could I? [...] Until today I live from hand to mouth. There is no money. My husband has worked and he has retired, all we have is his pension. He wasn’t careful with money. Then we got the children. He didn't put any money aside until he retired.  

TM1 and MM3 also narrate similar stories of financial hardship. According to both interviewees the villagers worked hard doing agriculture and stockbreeding but those occupations didn’t bring much money. MM3 especially underlines the lack of job opportunities for the immigrants outside the village in explaining the economic exclusion of migrants:

Yes we kept sheep in Bahçeli. We bred lambs but we were not able to sell them. We grew vegetables we couldn't sell them. We grew crops we couldn't sell them either. We were only able to sell the carobs to a factory in Boğaz. He used to give us some money when he got the product and the rest after a year. The family was big. The state provided us with food only for 5-6 months. Afterwards they didn’t give us anything (TM2, 59, male, 1. generation Trabzon).  

For example, people living in Nicosia could find work. They worked and fed their children. We didn't have any employment opportunities. We were always here in the village. One year we harvested olives, we kept it in the depot, and used the oil ourselves because it was not sold. We lived through such difficult

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times. If we had job opportunities, it would have been easier. But there were no opportunities (MM3, 51; male 1. generation Mersin).

Many immigrants, including the ones quoted above either implied or clearly stated that it was the Turkish Cypriot state’s fault that the agricultural sector declined. Bad policies, they argued, curtailed agricultural production and narrowed markets. TM6 (37, male, 2. generation, Trabzon), for instance was clear in his opinions about how state policies were responsible for a decline in the sector:

The policy followed here was wrong. All dirty and dubious businesses were transferred from Turkey to Cyprus. They shut down the industry, they killed the agricultural sector. They killed stockbreeding. I am 36 years old, I have witnessed that process. I know very well what happened back then. When I was a child the number of animals (sheep and cows) was 10 times the number of people. Currently, the proportion is barely 1 animal to 10 people. What do they say? They say “There is no agriculture, no stockbreeding here”. [Of course not], you didn’t let it [thrive]. None of the governments did.

TW4’s (56, female, 1. generation Trabzon) husband is now a rather successful freight business owner, but when she thinks about the past she narrates a similar story of intense hardships during the initial years of migration and settlement:

There was a dairy farm over there, where I said was a church. We had grounded wheat. There was an oven left from the Greeks. I used to bake bread in there and he brought milk. We had only bread and milk for six months. It was 1986, the year we lost my father-in-law. [My older daughter] was 6 years old, and the younger one was four. We used to lock them in the house and go to collect olives. We used to come at night. My husband would say: “Let me check if the kids were alive”. I used to cook the milk and cut cubes of bread in it. I wanted them to wake up and eat that, that was their food. There was nothing else to eat.

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We picked the olives and piled up them in front of the door. They brought a vehicle [to pick it up] but they said “this is moulded. It is not good for producing oil. It won’t sell“. I left the kids on their own for 3 months. I can never forget the pain I felt in my heart. We couldn't sell the oil either. The past should stay in the past. God give us good health. Thank god, we made it so far.

She explains further how men were motivated into seeking alternative employment options, at the sight of immense hardships and not being able to make a living with agricultural production alone. Her descriptions are in line with the thesis that ethnic business niche formation involves a dominant practical evaluative agency, which seeks, out of perceived alternatives, the best available solution to issues at hand.

DenktaĢ brought us here so that we do agriculture. He could have preferred the people from the city. He brought us because we have experience with stockbreeding and agriculture. There is nothing we don’t know. That’s why he brought us. We collected carobs. 1-2 years it was fine. They came and bought it. But then, they started not giving us money. We collected the olives but they went bad. We couldn't sell the oil. How can I explain? We saw the crops and worked in the fields but we were not compensated. People started doing smuggling. What exactly did they do? They were driving to Turkey with trucks and transferring goods. They started with [smuggling] differential gear. They used to hide it under the vehicle. Then they stopped doing that. They started working in Kyrenia. Some were working as cab drivers others were working in the hotels, or got employed somewhere as garbage collectors.

In the light of the field-research findings including many informal interviews it can be argued that economic niche building was partly due to the decline of the agricultural sector but also due to the non-integration of the immigrants into the Cypriot way of employment. As was explained above, the aftermath of 1974 division, northern Cyprus had become politically and economically dependent on Turkey, with limited productive power. Instead of socio-

economic success and stability, this state depended for its legitimisation and survival, as was explained by Lacher and Kaymak (2005) on the “mechanisms […] [of] the distribution of the spoils deriving from the control of more than a third of the island […], and the construction of an alliance of old and new elite groups that was underpinned by the distributive capacities of the new state, and the ability of this alliance to secure mass support through the instruments of patronage and clientelism” (ibid: 150). This entailed most importantly, as was described, the creation of a bulging public service sector for employment of large proportions of the population. Yet, it was Turkish Cypriots, who were overrepresented in this sector. This was partly due to the lack of human capital related to education, among the first wave immigrants and the continuation of relatively lower levels of education among the second generation; but also due to the emergence of the system of patronage and clientelism and the lack of social capital of the immigrant groups to enable competition within this system with Turkish Cypriots. The former, immigrants’ lack of education, as the main impeding factor in public sector employment was mentioned in the conversation quoted below:

Researcher: „Are there people in this village who work in the public sector?“
TM5: „You need to be well educated in order to be employed by the state“
Researcher: „But you work in the public sector don’t you?“
TM5: „It started after the 90s in general“
TW7: “He started in 94”
TM6: “There are only few people working for the state”
TM5: “15-20 people at most. There are 20 people I suppose but they are workers”
TM6: “20? There are no civil servants”
Researcher: “So they are employed by the state as workers. Are there no civil servants”
TM5: “No, there has never been. Our children just finished their education.”
(Interview with TM5, 44, male 2. generation Trabzon, TM6 37, male 2. generation Trabzon and TW7, 44 female, 1. generation Trabzon)²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ Araştırmacı: „Burada mesela devlet[te] çalışan [var mı?]“
TM5: „Devlet[te] çalışmak için (eğitim lazım)...“
Araştırmacı: „Mesela sen devlet[tesin], değil mi?“
TM5: “Genel olarak 90’dan sonra başladı.”
TW7: “94’de girmiş.”
TM6: “Devlet dairesinde parmaklarınla sayacak kadar insan vardı.”
TM5: “15-20 kişi ancak[…] 20 kişi var ama işçi olarak.”
TM6: “20 kişi mi? Memur olarak hiç yok.”
Araştırmacı: “Devlette çalışan işçi.. Memur hiç yok mı?“
TM5: „Yok. Olamadi. Daha çocuklarımız yeni okudu bitirdi.“
The second reason for immigrants’ exclusion from the dominant mode of employment was, to mention once again, the insufficient means to compete with the host population in the system patronage and clientelism of the Turkish Cypriot state. The exclusion from public service employment was an often encountered topic during the field research, in many informal conversations as well as in in-depth interviews. In this regard, MM3 and TM4 interpreted the concentration of the male population of the village in the transportation and freight businesses as an outcome of barriers and obstacles to their integration into Turkish Cypriot dominant economic sector of civil service employment. They assert that lorry-driving, ‘as one of the hardest occupations’, was taken up by the majority of the villagers because farming was not a sufficient occupation and also because the state did not employ the villagers and other options were not available.

**MM3**: “When we first came here […] everyone had 5-10 animals, sheep, cattle […]. What else could you do? […] I mean, you could at least eat yogurt and drink milk you get from the animals […] if you had nothing else. I mean there was no [help] from the government. The whole problem is this: go around the island, this village is the one which is the least employed by the government. But, you can say, this is one of the most successful villages standing on its own feet. People worked as truck drivers, as shepherds, as taxi drivers, they always did some type of work. People have just started to work for other people [in the private sector] […]. That was not possible before anyway. You had to go from here to Esentepe, on foot or with the tractor, take the bus from there and go to work. How could you do that? There was not even a bus with a regular schedule. The road […]. Our village is the last village, at the border […]. After our village the villages belong to the is the district of Famagusta.[…] People from Tatlısu [neighbouring village] went to Geçitkale, to Nicosia, the bus routes were different. […] Well, we made it to this date.”

**Researcher**: “How did this business idea regarding truck driving/ transport businesses develop?”

**TM4**: “Out of desperation.”

**MM3**: “You have no other option, you have to do something for living.”

**TM4**: “That is one of the last [worst] jobs.”

(Interview with TM3, male 1. generation Mersin and TM4, 34, 2. generation Trabzon)²⁸¹

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²⁸¹ **MM3**: “Biz buraya geldiğimizde […] herkesin 5-10, gücünün yettiği şeyi [hayvani] vardı, koyun olabilir, küçük baş olabilir, büyük baş olabilir […] Yani başka şansın ne? Yani bunlarla […] hiçbir şey yapamazsan sütünü yoğurdunu yiyip geçinecektin. Yani, Devletten şeyin yoktu ya burada. Yani bütün sorun buradan insanların, bütün adayı gez, devletle en az çalıshan köy bu köydür. […] Ama diyebileceksin ki kendi ayağının üstünde durabilen en iyi köylerden de biridir. Ama tırçılık yapmıştır,
TW4, on the other hand, who also stated that her university-graduate daughter was cheated by the politicians through the promise of a government job, was even clearer on this issue. According to her politicians, she refers mainly to right wing, which allegedly her family also supported, do not value immigrants, when it comes to employment.

**TW4:** “Employment in the municipality is only since the last 10 years. 15 years ago no body from us [our village] was employed by the state.”

**Researcher:** “Why?”

**TW4:** “Because of disregard. Because our people give their votes but do not demand anything in return. [...] There were only a few people who did that only later. For example my husband was offered benefits [due to some political relations]: [...] They told him ‘we will give you what ever you want, if you like we can give you two T permits [taxi/bus licences] from all over Kyrenia, we’ll give you this, give you that’. Like I told you, my husband is from the old school [...] “Don’t give me these, go offer employment to those kids” he said. “These kids are driving trucks to Turkey with 15, 16 years of age, they don’t know the job, they don’t know the world”. It was time of terror, two of our people were killed back then in Turkey. [...] “Aren’t you sorry for these people?” he said “give them jobs, I don’t want anything, don’t give me anything. What should they do, wait another five years for you to give them employment” (Interview with TW4, 56, female, 1. generation Trabzon).

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282 **TW4:** “Bu belediye şeyleri de 10 senedir falan var. 15 seneden önce bizim devlet işinde insanımız yoktu.”

**Araştırmacı:** “Bu nakliyatçılık nasıl gelişti?”

**TM4:** “Çaresizliğiden.”

**MM3:** “Çaresizsin yanı bir şey yapacaksin.”

**TM4:** “Yapılacak en son işlerden birdir o.”


**Araştırmacı:** “Bu nakliyatçılık nasıl gelişti?”

**TM4:** “Çaresizliğiden.”

**MM3:** “Çaresizsin yanı bir şey yapacaksin.”

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282 **TW4:** “Bu belediye şeyleri de 10 senedir falan var. 15 seneden önce bizim devlet işinde insanımız yoktu.”

**Araştırmacı:** “Neden yoktu?”

TM7 (33, male) a second generation villager with parents from Trabzon, too feels that Turkish immigrants have an inferior chance of economic mobility, due to their lack of social capital. He states this as below:

Researcher: “Do you currently feel that you are being discriminated against?”
TM7: “Yes I do”
Researcher: “Can you give 1 or 2 examples?”
TM7: “The most basic example is this. I work in [X]. [There is a civil servant there who is originally from Trabzon.] We were having a chat. I asked him ‘Can you not get promoted?’ ‘Let me tell you something’ he said. ‘[…] there are 100 personnel. The ones with higher ranks from those 100 civil servants have to get retired, so that the ones below them get promoted’. I said ‘that’s right’. ‘They don’t get retired that easily’ he said. ‘Secondly, […] do you know how many civil servants are there which have Turkish mainland origins?’ I said ‘you are the only one. All others are native Cypriots.’ He asked me ‘what do you think, would they promote me, or would they promote them?’ ‘Who is greater in number? I am [people with Turkish mainland origins] more numerous in the population but they are the majority in the civil service sector.””

MM5 too talks about the relatively more advantageous position of the native Turkish Cypriot population. He argues that, although both immigrant and native population got accustomed to the system of clientelism, it is the native population who, through their connections, i.e. higher social capital, benefit from the system to a greater extent.

MM5: There are some people among the Cypriots, who do not have anybody in their families that works in the civil service sector. But then there are those where the whole family is employed in the civil service sector. Because they have more contacts. This system of favour through personal contacts is very widespread in this country, so people are used to that. We have to do

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283 Araştırmacı: “Sen şu an o ayrımcılığı yaşiyor musun?”
TM7: „Yaşıyorum“.
Araştırmacı: „Mesela 1-2 örnek verir misin?“
everything through personal contacts. You go to the police station and think ‘is there someone I know there?’ You go to the local administration office thinking ‘is there someone I know there?’ Everyone does that, there are only few people who don’t.”

**Researcher:** “Do you think the Cypriots have an advantage in that sense?”  
**MM5:** “Of course they do. At the end of the day, they have more contacts in the government offices, that is normal.”

**Researcher:** “How about when it comes to finding employment?”  
**MM5:** “It has a big effect on finding employment] not a small one. I find such things normal for this island, the whole system of this island is built on favour through social contacts, on good connections”  
(Interview with MM5, 41, male, 2. generation Mersin).284

According to TM6 it is not only the state but also the private sector, which does not invest in the region and so contribute to the economic exclusion of the immigrants. The latter also contributes, as he asserts, to the continuation of the demands of the villagers from the political parties and the governments: “I bring this up before every election. Why are there no investments in this region to provide more employment opportunities? So that people get jobs and leave you alone. So we don’t come to your door before every election” (TM6, 37, male, 2.generation Trabzon).285

According to TW4, who was quoted above, it was only after the villagers took initiative to overcome this unjust situation, that they prospered. She argues, as people stopped expecting favours from the politicians and governments they resorted to their own means –social and human capital-, to make a living, and in that they have been relatively economically successful.


**Araştırmacı:** “O anlamda daha avantajlı mı peki Kıbrıslılar?”
**MM5:** “Tabii ki daha avantajlıdır sonuçta onların devlet dairesinde daha fazla tanıdıkları olması da normaldir zaten.”

**Araştırmacı:** “İşe alınma anlamında?”
**MM5:** “İşe alınma anlamında da etkisi bayağı vardır, yani az değildir. Öyle şeyler ben bu ada için normal karşılyorum adanın bütün şeyi torpil üzerine kurulmuş, tanık üzerine kuruluş.”

285 „Ben bunu her seçimlerde gündemine getiriyorum. Neden bizim buraya yatırım yapılmıyor istihdam sağlansın diye? İnsanlar işe girsinler, artık düşünsünler yakanızdan. Her seçimde gelip kapınızı çalmayalım.”
People have given up on the political parties. They stopped following their footsteps. They understood that they should not have expectations from them. Some bought cars, lorries through their own means, others worked as drivers. Some others worked somewhere else. I mean they have stopped expecting and started working on their own. In 88s my husband [who did transportation] had just arrived from Turkey and brought a sack of potatoes. I never forget that day. It was as if there was nothing missing in the house anymore. It was only a sack of potatoes, [but] you’d say there’s nothing missing.

All in all these statements indicate that ethnic niche building, and through it the reinforcement of the ethnic community boundaries, can be explained through discriminative political and economic conditions. The structural obstacles of economic mobility and a precarious state, were especially important in the production and reproduction of ethnic communities. This is in line with the arguments put forward in chapter 2.4.1 especially leaning on Fenton (2003).

Last but not least, it must also be mentioned that it was not only the practical-evaluative agency of the immigrants that brought about the ethnic niche formation for Bahçeli immigrants, but also the iterational-habitual dimension of their agencies. In this regard it can be argued that, not only the limiting economic and political conditions, but also the human capital of the group is causally related to niche building. Then the immigrants from Trabzon, Ayvadere, brought along the necessary skills and know-how for the economic participation in this niche. The excerpt below, from an interview with TM3 is illustrative of the human capital factor in the ethnic niche building, which demonstrates relation of ethnic niche building to habitual agency factor.

**Researcher:** “How was this business idea born?”

**TM3:** “This was our job anyway. It was what we did in Turkey before we came. We were in the transportation sector.”

**Researcher:** “Where did you do transport to?”

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TM3: “In Trabzon? We mostly had busses [human transportation]. We also had lorries but they worked within the district. We did the job in our own town. When we came here that was the job that we knew, we also knew animal husbandry, so we continue to do both of these” (Interview with TM3, 54, male, 1. generation Trabzon).

It is also important to note that these skills, along with the business aspirations were passed on to next generations. In this regard the field-research revealed that the reproduction of the community also took place over the continuation of the ethnic niche in the next generation. As was explained by my informants, the male population of the village identified with truck-driving starting at a very young age. Most of the boys aspired to be truck-drivers themselves once they grew up. MM3 and TW14 remember this with amusement. MM3 explains: “When small children were asked what they wanted to become when they grew up, they used to say that they would like to become truck drivers” (MM3, male, 1. generation Mersin). TW14 confirms this with a memory from her childhood: “They used to tell us to draw pictures at school, all the boys used to draw trucks” (TW14, 31, female 2. generation Trabzon).

TW6 (53, female, 1. generation Trabzon) reflects on the past, and explains the occupational decision of her own sons as a childish aspiration to truck-driving. She regards this as a major barrier on their socio-economic mobility.

TW6: “He didn’t go to school [after a certain age]. He wanted to become a driver. ‘I will become a truck driver’, he insisted. He worked as a truck driver for a while. The same is true with my younger son, the too is a secondary school graduate. He is a truck driver. He also works as a merchant. He comes and goes. And this one got employment in the Esentepe municipality. It is a state [public sector] job. I mean he doesn’t only do stock breeding. Had he not done these things, he could have become something better. He is in Esentepe

287 Araştırmacı: “Bu iş fikri nasıl geldi aklınıza?”
Araştırmacı: „Nereden nereye taşıyordunuz?“

288 „Küçük çocuklara büyüyince ne olacaksın diye sorunca tır şoförü olacağım derlerdi.“
289 „[Okulda] resim çizin derlerdi. Erkek çocuklarının hepsi kamyon çizerdi“

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all day, from morning till night. I don’t know. They didn’t want a higher education. I mean, none of the children back then went on to higher education, they wanted to become truck drivers.”

Researcher: “Why?”
TW6: “I don’t know. They were kids who were eager to drive cars”

Researcher: “Did they see it as play?”
TW6: “Exactly, it was like play. And most of them became truck drivers anyway.”

The niche building did not only include the children of Trabzon Ayvadere immigrants but also the second generation of Mersin immigrants, and some first generation Mersin immigrants who were rather young at their arrival. It can be argued in a sense that, under similar economic conditions of exclusion, the Mersin and Trabzon immigrants converged in the economic niche.

Researcher: “Did you do truck driving too?”
MM5: “Well without doing that you cannot get out of Bahçeli. You need to do that. Not the new generation, but all of our generation did that. […] I later worked as a taxi driver, and then I started doing this.”

Researcher: “Can you tell me a little bit about truck driving? Why do so many people in Bahçeli work as truck drivers, bus drivers etc.?”
MM5: “Well, in villages, generally, after one person would start earning money from a business everyone else wants to do that too. After that [truck driving] everyone started working as taxi drivers. I mean, in Bahçeli, the second most common occupation is taxi-driving. Probably because they didn’t find anything else to do. Moreover, regarding the trucking business, it was the case in the past that, almost all of the islands’ [northern part] goods transportation was done by Bahçeli villagers. There were only few companies in the past. One was in Famagusta and one was in our village. The two were partners anyway. There was no other company in this business. (Interview with MM5, 41, 2. generation, Mersin) 291

Araştırmacı: „Neden[…]?“
TW6: „Ne bileyim ben? Çocuk araba sürmeye heveslenir ya.“
Araştırmacı: „Oyun gibi mi geldi?“
TW6: „Aynı oyun gibi. Zaten onların çoğunu da tır şoförü oldu."

291 Araştırmacı: „Tırçılık yaptınız [mi] siz de?“
7.3.1.3. Experiences of Political-Cultural Exclusion

In-depth interviews conducted with immigrants have revealed several issues that can be subsumed under the topic of political exclusion, which can also be related to reproduction and reinforcement of community boundaries. One of the often-mentioned topics was the exclusion of immigrants from Turkey by political parties, which was partly described in the previous section. Yet, in addition to being excluded in the economic sphere, through non-recruitment by political parties and governments to the public sector, the interviewees have also expressed discontent with being excluded both by dominant right-wing parties as well as left–wing parties, from the political sphere. As MM4 expressed “the politicians have always perceived this place [solely] as one which brought them votes in the elections”292 Many immigrants believed that the political elite only regarded immigrants as voters, but did not really embrace them. TM3’s argument below, that the immigrant population is not represented in the parliament and that political parties do not have candidates with immigrant origins is illustrative:

Look at the parliament today, consider the 50 members of the parliament, currently there is only one person among them, I think from İskele again, who has Turkish origins. Well I think, that person is the only one from NUP. RTP did not have such a candidate this year, if they do, they make their candidate win. There wasn’t any this year in their lists. [...] There are some mayors. There is one person in İskele from DP, he is a minister; and one member of parliament representing Famagusta who has roots from Turkey, I think there are no more. Only two.

292 “siyasiler burayı hep bir kendilerine göre oy getirci bir yer olarak görmüşlerdir.”

293 Bugün meclisi görüyoruzsın iste 50 tane milletvekili, şu an T.C. kökenli bir tane yine İskeliden var galiba, bir tane bir şey var, sanırım bir, bir tane UBP’de var, CTP bu sene listesine koymadı, koydu mu
This was according to the interviewee, due to the election system, which allowed preferential voting (ranked-voting) and voting on the basis of candidates rather than parties. Although the interviewee stated that he considers this system to be a good one, he implies that voters also make ethnic preferences, and candidates of Turkish origin are usually disadvantaged. Subsequently he asserts that the politicians view the immigrant communities in the villages primarily as a bearer of votes, rather than as fellows.

They constantly held the people in the villages back through such methods. They meant, “you will not interfere into anything, you only need to vote as a community in a certain way, and act in a certain way. I will solve your problem, I will provide your child with employment, I will do this, I will do that”; but they didn’t do anything in the end. I mean nothing changed in the last 39 years. Nothing will change.\(^\text{294}\)

Furthermore, many of the interviewees, who defined themselves as interested in party politics, described their perceived distance from Turkish Cypriot left-wing politics (especially from RTP). This was especially a topic of conversation with the first generation and some second-generation male migrants during informal conversations an in-depth interviews. TM1, TM2, TM3, TM5, TM6, all described their, or their fellows, experiences of being alienated from Turkish Cypriot left-wing parties through the discourse of being the unwanted. TM6, who defines himself in the left criticized the left in not approaching the immigrants. According to him, RTP had a strong image that it disliked immigrants, and it was partly its own fault that this image could not be changed. For TM6, RTP had very limited contact to Bahçeli villagers:

If you’d ask now, the village is still theirs. It is still the right-wing which has power in this village. Do you know why? There is a thesis that remains

unchanged for 40 years. They proposed a thesis and this is still being promoted. [...] They still haven’t done anything to disprove that thesis. RTP did not do anything. [...] [The thesis is] that RTP doesn’t like people from Turkey. There is no plan to disprove it. [...] Why do you remain silent? Why don’t you ask? Did you ever come and take a look at me? Did you come and say hello to me and asked how I am? [...] There is no such thesis. We were together everywhere, but when it came to politics I became the unwanted. Tell me I am not unwanted, come and tell me that I am wanted. Come here and make me feel that. How many times did these people come to see my father. [...] They didn’t come and explain this to people. How many people know the administration of the party [RTP] except the party members, except people in politics? No body does. How many times did [...] come to the village. Only during election periods.295

Furthermore, many of the immigrants I talked to during the participant observation and in-depth interviews pointed out to their perceived exclusion and othering within the discourse of Cyprus problem. Especially the discourse that the immigrants from Turkey should be sent back to Turkey in the case of a solution to the Cyprus problem was found unacceptable. Many villagers mentioned this discourse of expulsion as adversary. According to TM3 (54, male, 1-generation Trabzon) this was a political discourse aimed at the intimidation of the immigrants, so that they would not vote for the pro-solution political left: “[This discourse] aimed at a provocation of people against RTP. ‘RTP is communist. RTP cooperates with the South. RTP will send the people from Turkey back, will do this, will do that.’” According to this interviewee this rumour also had to the effect that many people sold their properties to foreigners during the Annan Plan period:

They said they [Greek Cypriots] will come and get their places back. They will come after the solution, and we will get mixed. When we get mixed, everyone will get his/her own place back, and that people from Turkey will go back to


296 “[...] CTP’ ye karşı insanları böyle kıskırtmak, ‘CTP komünisttir, CTP Güneye beraber işbirliği yapıyor, CTP oradan gelenleri geri gönderecek, şunu edecek, bunu edecek‘“.
Turkey, or they will give some money to people from Turkey and send them back. There were such cheap politics. [Thus] most of these [properties] were sold to foreigners, would they be sold to our own people that would be fine. Most of these were sold to the Jews.297

Many interviewees made a distinction between natives who promoted such adversary discourses and who did not. TM1 (58, male, 1. generation Trabzon) for instance, explains that, as he encountered this discourse, a Turkish Cypriots friend of his wanted to comfort him. He found that rather polite and friendly:

Once, I think it was just before Annan Plan, there were rumours here, that they would send people from Turkey back and all that. There were some political rumours. Late [X] was such a special person. He said to me “my son […] you are one of ours, we will not send you back” […] so that I am not irritated, [or] worried. So that I don’t feel down […]. He meant it will be hard for you to go back. He wanted to keep my spirits high. We will stand by you, we will not send you back. He was a very kind-hearted person.298

 Whereas many of the immigrants especially highlighted their discontent about this discourse that meant to them that they did not belong to the future of a united Cyprus and were elements to be expelled, it was especially the second generation that highlighted their practical experiences of being politically excluded from a prospect of a unified Cyprus. These especially referred to not being able to cross the border to the southern part of Cyprus and being politically discriminated against in this regard. MM5 expressed on this issue his belief that the opening of the borders have reinforced the discrimination against people with immigrant origins, leaving them largely confined to an unrecognised polity when native

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Turkish Cypriots could enjoy political integration into the European Union and the rest of the world:

Well my son asks me, he says, “daddy, aren’t we Cypriots?” “We are Cypriots my son” I say. “Ok” he says, “Why can’t I go to the Greek Cypriot side then”. How should I explain it to the child? What shall I say? Can you explain. […] I […] think that things were better before 2000. There were not many differences between people back then. But thereafter, after the borders were opened, I saw that there are very big differences. There are really great differences. Because this time it is only us that are held captive [in the northern part of Cyprus] and cannot go anywhere. In the past [Turkish] Cypriots used to say “we are here in thing [a prison]”. Before the borders were open they were like imprisoned. But after the border gates were opened, they got passports from the Greek Cypriot side and all that, and so became the citizens of the whole world. But we remained where we were. And so it is.. Even the people like Bulgarians who had migrated to the country after we did can go to the Greek Cypriot side, we can’t.299

As is indicated in the above quotation some immigrants also perceived that their future prospects were blocked due to this political discrimination and othering. TM4, a young second generation immigrant explained his negative experiences of being the political ‘other’ as follows:

I am one of those who’s been discriminated the most. I will tell you a story. [...] there were [football] tournaments […]. It was in Antalya. They included Cyprus also. Once it was in France. That one was across Europe. I joined it. I had somehow managed to get a visa. After that, one year later, the world cup was in Spain. Again I was in the team [hoping] to take part in that one too. […] I called the Embassy in Turkey. My situation is so and so, what shall I do, where shall I apply to [for the visa]? They said, prepare such and such documents and come to us. I also called the Embassy in the Greek part of Cyprus, just in case. They said you have to go to Ankara. I put everything that

I had together and went to Ankara. I, of course, took all my passports with me, TRNC and Republic of Turkey ones. I gave them to the visa office. A man took them and started stamping. Then, after seeing the TRNC documents, he stopped. He went to the back, talked to whomever he did and came back. He said; I am sorry but you cannot apply here. Where shall I apply? To Nicosia.. When you say Nicosia, there is a northern and a southern part. They don’t have [offices] in the North, should I go to the South then? They don’t perceive it as North and South, they see it as Nicosia. I called here and there, no solution. A friend helped me out and we made it to the Spanish Embassy [in the southern part of Nicosia]. The former one was stamped, so I filled in a new one [application form] and submitted it. The lady took it, went to somewhere, asked and came back. She said, sorry but you cannot apply. And where shall I apply to? To Ankara. But I am coming from Ankara anyway. […] If you are a Cypriot you have a Greek Passport anyway. You have no problems. If you live in Turkey, again you have no problems. […] in the end, they didn’t accept it. […] The problem is this: I couldn’t get a visa, neither from Spain nor from Ankara, or the Greek side, just because I am a Turk living in Cyprus, hence I couldn’t go anywhere. Those living in Turkey don’t go through this. Neither do the native [Turkish Cypriots] here, only those like us (TM4, 34, Male, 2. generation Trabzon)³⁰⁰

Below is a similar story told by TM6 during another in-depth interview, about an attempt of a group of second-generation descendants of immigrants from Turkey, who wanted to cross the border to watch a football game in the southern part of Cyprus. According to the friend of this interviewee TM5 who was also present in the interview, the group was trying to trick the

Greek Cypriot police. Yet, they failed, since they were identified as descendants of “settlers”. This was perceived by TM6 as an act of unfair discrimination.

The policeman told us. That policeman was a Greek Cypriot policeman, he said, get them out, also those people from Sadrazamköy. [...] When you look at his looks, he sticks out as a Laz, it was the size of his nose. It is so obvious, you would say that this man is definitely Laz. Anyway, they made them get out, and we are laughing at them through the window. We were joking, telling them “look, you cannot go”. At that moment, they told the driver, “you cannot go”. He said “I am a British citizen”. He [the policeman] said “you don’t have a passport”. He came with the Republic of Turkey passport. I said to him, “how could you make such a mistake?” A policeman entered the vehicle. In the meantime, I thought I could take the driver’s seat. I said I have a driving licence. I have an international driving licence. They said “OK”. The policeman came. He asked whether I had insurance, “what insurance?” “Bus insurance”, I said, “let me go and get one immediately. The insurance office is open right there”. They said “no”. They threw us out too. Our names were also noted down. I thought “I know what I will do to you”. I have a friend working as a border police at the Greek side. When I got back I called him. I asked him to come with me to Nicosia. I told him “I need to ask a few questions at the Civil Registry office”. I took everything with me, my kids’ identification documents, etc. It was the time when Annan Plan was being negotiated. Our Registry Office is officially in [southern] Nicosia, the one in the TRNC is not recognised as official. Anyway, we went, crossed the border. He [the border police] said “you cannot cross to the other side”. I asked “why?”. He said “you cannot go”. I said, “am I registered over there?” “Yes”. “Then why can’t I go”. He said “the document you are holding are fake”. The police is saying that to me. We tried crossing that border you know, they noted all our names down. [...] My place of birth is here [Cyprus]. He said “you cannot cross the border, your parents are from Turkey” I said, “did your parents pop up here”? I said they are also from somewhere” (TM5, 37, male, 2. generation Trabzon).
Many similar stories were told to me during the informal conversations. Young people explained their similar experiences and that of their friends and acquaintances, and parents narrated the experiences of their children. All in all it can be argued that this issue is perceived as unjust among the community.

The discrimination of the immigrants from Turkey takes place through denying them Cypriot passports. Native Turkish Cypriots are allowed to have a passport of the Republic of Cyprus which is a EU member state. As a result they can not only travel throughout Europe and in many parts of the World without entrance and visa restrictions, these passports also offer them the benefit of low educational fees for studying in the UK, which is a popular destination of university education among Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, the children of immigrants are also discriminated against by denying them the chance for a European education, which without the passports are usually not affordable for the families. TM4’s story below about the collapse of his plans to take a masters degree in the UK, and TW10’s narrative of her daughter’s lack of opportunity, unlike her class mates and friends, to study in the UK are illustrative:

Let me tell you something else. When I graduated from the university, I applied to Wales University to study [...]. At the same time, [X a native Turkish Cypriot] too had applied. We both got our acceptances. [...] In the end I couldn’t go, but he went. There is only one reason for that, because they are citizens of the Republic of Cyprus they are accepted as citizens of the European Union. At that time it had cost for European citizens 3 thousand 100, 200 sterling. For us it was 9 thousand 10 thousand sterling. As an international student we had no financial power for the visas and so on. I never forget, I applied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Ministry of Education and to the President. [...] only the executive assistant of the [president] got back to me. But I couldn’t explain him my point, [that] we were both the citizens of this country. In the end we need to be given the same rights. Well their reason was that they had no such budget. They referred me to the Ministry of Education, to at least give me the monthly minimum wage. There was such a plan but I had to


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make an advance payment, and since I couldn’t do that I couldn’t go (TM4, 34, male, 2. generation Trabzon).302

My daughter wants to go there [to Britain]. What was the name of the university? But it is very expensive for Turkish nationals. For those with Greek Cypriot passports it costs 3 thousand sterling, for me it costs 20 thousand, at least 17 thousand, 19 thousand sterling. It is so, I don’t want to send her, I cannot pay that much money. Could she get a loan from the government, the government would pay for her studies and she would pay back after finishing, after getting her. […] My daughter wants to go to England, because all of her friends are [Turkish] Cypriots, and she loves them all. That’s why she wants to go there, she says “either there or here, I will not be separated from my friends” (TW10, 48, female, 1. generation Trabzon).303

As can be understood from the above quotation, political discrimination of immigrants, through denying them citizenship and passports of the Cyprus Republic when Turkish Cypriots have the right to, has become a relatively more recent point of divergence and separation between the two population groups. Immigrants perceive themselves as being unfairly discriminated against, and as having to endure the political, social and economic consequences thereof. This is also a factor, which can be argued to reduce the attachment and identification with Cyprus, at least in regards to the prospect of a reunified Cyprus, within which the immigrant community is constructed as the outsiders.


7.3.1.4 Experiences of Discrimination and Othering by Host Population

Last but not the least, the fourth point relates to the social and cultural discrimination and othering of the immigrants performed by dominant groups, i.e. the native Turkish Cypriots. Ethnically informed social relations between immigrants and the indigenous population materialize as discrimination of the immigrants in public space, i.e. differential treatment at the hospital, in the school, or in other public spaces and as ethnic encounters between immigrants and the native population in everyday life. Experiences of exclusion and othering in everyday contacts such as these can also be causally related to the reproduction and reinforcement of community boundaries, through the activation of the practical-evaluative element of migrants’ agencies. This is explained by Kaya (2012) as follows:

The migrant strategy is formed in their own local neighbourhood in which they stick together, isolated from the rest of the society. Most socialising has been carried out with other Turks, preferably hemsehris (fellow-villagers, Landsmannschaften), in private homes, mosques, public restaurants, and coffee houses (the exclusive domain of men), and on structured occasions such as the large parties frequently held in rented halls to celebrate engagements, weddings and circumcision ceremonies (Mandel, 1990: 155). It is the development of social networks, based on kinship or common area of origin and the need for mutual help in the new environment that made the construction of migrant strategy possible (Castles and Miller, 1993: 25)". (Kaya 2012: 12)

Field research in Bahçeli revealed that ethnically charged encounters did take place between the immigrants and the host population. Discrimination and othering of the immigrants took place at school, in the neighbourhood, in the workplace. TW11 narrates in the following quotation, the way she was treated in school by her teachers as a ‘dirty’ person.

Especially when there were incidents of lice infestation; and my mother is a very meticulous women. We used to go to school, and the teacher, even the teacher, used to check the Turkish Cypriots’ hair with her hands and Turkish students’ hair with the ruler. I had such an experience, and I had on my hair, on my hair follicles dandruff and I was always sent home to my mother: “Go, you have lice in your hair, you have nits”. I would go home and my mother used to say “you don’t”. I would go back to school and say to the teacher that I
didn't have any. “No you do have”. But it was always the native kids that had lice on their heads. [The teacher] would never say anything to them and I would see them in the hair of the friend sitting next to me, the lice would move up and down but [the teacher] would never tell her that she had lice. [The teacher] would treat us differently back then. Nowadays there are no such things. (TW11, 42, female, 2. generation Trabzon).

For TM2 discrimination and othering came unexpectedly from a neighbour, which made him feel betrayed, since as he indicates they were trying to show solidarity with Turkish Cypriots by sharing provisions with them.

…”X”, “…Y”, “…Z”; these are 4 brothers. They said to Denktaş, get these ‘black beards’ out of the village, to Denktaş. (...) Denktaş said “bring the guns with you so that I get them out of here with guns”. He said “have you no shame? if it wasn’t for these people, would you have ever seen this place in your life?” I said to [X], he passed away recently, […]. They used to distribute food to us back then, canned food, luncheon beef. We weren’t used to eating the luncheon beef, we thought it was pork. I would collect them all. My late mother used to say, “my son these Cypriots are poorer than us since they just came out of war”. […] I would go around and distribute the provisions that were given to us to them. I swear, I used go from one house to another and distribute, the provisions given to us by the state to the Cypriots. I said [to X] “let us aside, but don’t the provisions I gave away to you have any meaning at all that you are speaking this way. What difference would it make whether I get out of here or not?” (TM2 59, male, 1. generation Trabzon).


TW15 explains in the following how she felt as an outsider, despite her friends being generally nice to her. It was the knowledge of being the “Black Beard” or the “other”, that made her conscious, and to doubt the kindness of her colleagues.

There used to be some discussions at school regarding being a Cypriot or from Turkey. There was the word “Black Beard”. In the smallest dispute the word “Black Beard” would be used, but it was not something exaggerated, there were no conflicts. […] But there was the words. They were nice, I mean I don’t know. My [Turkish] Cypriot friends were nice. We were also nice to them, but still I felt like a stranger (TW15, 33, female 2. generation Trabzon).306

TW15 explains further in the following that she and her sister tried to fit in through changing their clothing styles, which however created conflict within the family, and the larger village community. Still fitting and blending in was, as she describes, their primary goal.

We used to wear trousers. One time, my mother took all our trousers and burnt them. She burnt the new trousers we bought right before my eyes. We used to work in the factory. […] We used to work at the textile. When we went there, we used to wear long skirts. There were Cypriot older sisters there. “Why are you dressed up like this, like old women?” [they said]. We couldn’t reply: “Our families are this way. They want it this way”. There at work, first day you were covered and then you started wearing more revealing clothes. We started to dress less modestly. […] We wanted to blend in. We didn’t want to have anyone talk behind our backs. We felt like outsiders anyway, because there were mainly Cypriots. 3-4 Turkish people only. You go and work with them [Cypriots]. We started wearing more revealing clothes, gradually (TW15, 33, female 2. G. Trabzon).307

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According to TM7, whose childhood was spent in a mixed neighbourhood in the city of Famagusta the estrangement between the native population and the immigrants was heightened in the 90s especially after the later waves of immigrants arrived. According to him the state’s lack of control of immigration allowed people with criminal tendencies to come to the island from Turkey, who in turn damaged the reputation of immigrants from Turkey in general, including the first wave immigrants.

The first generation, meaning our fathers, and Cypriots had no problems with one another. They had arrived to a country which just came out of war, so the people perceived them as liberators. They showed great respect. It was only later, when the environment became dirty, there was a rift between us and the second generation. Only then there started a differentiation between Cypriots and people from Turkey. […] In our neighbourhood in Famagusta there were Kurds, Alawites, Cypriots and Arabs. It was a really mixed neighbourhood. And we were well-integrated. […] In southern Derinya. There was a house adjacent to our house, our house was a semidetached house. We would go in and out of that house [next door]. That family would also come to our house. But problems, bad things, started later in the 90s. It was then when they allowed entrance with identity cards [instead of passports], any Tom, Dick or Harry came [to Cyprus]. In the 80's [if somebody did something they would sat] [X]'s son, but later they said people from Hatay [did it], and later people from Turkey [did it]. Like the saying “a fly is small but enough to turn your stomach”. […] It all started like that (TM7, 33, male 2. generation Trabzon).

In the light of the above, it can be argued, that ethnic encounters with native Turkish Cypriots, are efficacious in overt and subtle ways making the immigrants feel different and as the unwanted. And one strategy to cope with such everyday discriminative discourses is the reproduction of the community and the reinforcement of its boundaries.
7.3.2 Transnationalism

As Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) rightly argue “migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social fields,”

309 encompassing those who move and those who stay behind” (ibid: 2). Moreover, although “engagements across national borders” among immigrant communities are not novel phenomena, these have undergone some qualitative changes with the advancement of communication and transportation technologies (Foner 2007). In this respect, as Foner (2007) puts it, “it is now possible for immigrants to maintain more frequent, immediate, and intimate contact with their countries of origin” (ibid: 2487). Migrant incorporation into the host society, as Glick-Schiller et al. (2004) rightly point out, does not necessitate cultural assimilation or exclusive integration into one state only (ibid: 1).310 Rather it can also be linked to immigrant community formation. In this regard it can be argued that transnational agency of the immigrants constantly reproduce and reinforce communities’ ties and relations with their places of origin. Therefore researchers have increasingly recognized that migrants’ continuing ties with their countries of origin need to be incorporated into migration theory and analysis (Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004; ibid).

These transnational ties comprise “strong and enduring economic, political, and social ties to their homelands” (Foner 2007: 2484).

Against this background qualitative research within this thesis has revealed that transnationalism is prevalent in Bahçeli. Most of the immigrants, especially Trabzon immigrants, preserve strong ties, especially of economic, social and cultural type, with their villages/towns of origin.311 Moreover immigrants’ transnationalism can be argued to involve

309 These scholars use the Bourdieuan notion of social field so as to move beyond the so-called “nation-state container theory of society” (ibid: 7)

310 According to the authors there is no one single model for migrant integration into the host society, but instead, “five pathways of incorporation” (Glick-Schiller et al. 2004: 1-3).

311 It must be underlined here that it is not only immigrants from Turkey but also native Turkish Cypriots who operate in “transnational social fields” (Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004). On the macro-level the intense political, economic and cultural links between Turkey and Cyprus make it impossible to have purely national economic, political and social transactions in everyday life. Moreover daily incorporation of Turkish Cypriots into the Turkish mainstream culture is secured by the wide array of Turkish TV channels, which broadcast TV series and political debate programs that are highly popular in Turkish Cypriot households, both of migrant and non-migrant origins. Turkish press is also closely

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all three dimensions of the concept of agency, projective, practical-evaluative as well as iterational components.

Firstly, transnationalism has indeed a very strong and material presence in the village especially in the economic sphere. As was already described many of the Bahçeli immigrants, especially those from Trabzon, but also some of the Mersin, have been active in the transport business since their arrival. Many of the villagers have earned their living at some point in their lives as truck drivers in freight business, carrying commodities between Turkey and Cyprus. Currently some of the biggest fright companies in Kyrenia are owned by Bahçeli villagers. In this respect it can be argued that a “transnational way of being” affected the everyday lives of many working age male immigrants in the village, through their occupations (see Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004). Being a cross-border truck driver has meant being constantly on the road between home country and the country of destination. Owning or being employed in a fright company has meant constant reference to two states in the economic spheres. Bahçeli villagers’ regular economic transnational practices via the freight business, involves utilization of “bicultural skills” and “social networks beyond national borders” Levitt & Jaworski 2007: 135; Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004). This type of “simultaneous economic incorporation” in two countries has (ibid: 135), as was described above, resulted from the domination of practical-evaluative component of migrants agencies exercised within the framework of structural difficulties of economic incorporation in the Turkish Cypriot state (see Section 7.4.1).

Secondly, it was technological as well as economic developments leading to, among other things, affordable communication and transportation and a betterment of immigrants’ financial situations, that have made it possible for immigrants from Turkey in northern Cyprus, to practice “transnational ways of being”, i.e. practices of everyday life that span over national borders, in more frequent and intense ways since mid- 2000s. It was revealed, in this respect, through participant observation and in-depth interviews that many of the Trabzon immigrants in Bahçeli had purchased or built homes in Trabzon especially during followed in the island. Through these and other social channels, Turkish political, social and cultural discourses are part of the Turkish Cypriot ones.
the period of construction boom in northern Cyprus. In this period the property and land prices in Cyprus rose sharply, encouraging many property owners to sell their lands to construction firms. Bahçeli immigrants too participated. As TM6 (37), a second-generation male Bahçeli villager put it many first generation Trabzon immigrants “When the borders were opened in 2005, and when they sold the fields here, they built houses for themselves there [in Turkey]”\textsuperscript{312} The same is true for a only few of first generation Mersin immigrants.

In fact many of the first generation Trabzon immigrants who were interviewed for this thesis, stated that they often visited their home towns/villages and other places in Turkey. Whereas many of the retirees regularly visited and even stayed for a few months every year, most of the younger generation stated that they visited their relatives in Turkey less often (not every year). The latter group is actually quite heterogeneous in this respect, and although many of them do not entertain a myth of return, they view Turkey as the primary holiday destination. Many of the former group, i.e. first generation Trabzon immigrants, have properties in Trabzon, which they had either owned prior to their immigration or which they bought recently especially after selling some of their lands and properties in Cyprus. These regularly travel to their villages, some do so, in order to attend their hazelnut fields during the harvest time. Moreover as I was told by many, they escaped the hot summers of Cyprus by moving to their second homes. They enjoyed being in Trabzon and moving to their \textit{yayla}\textsuperscript{313} settlements in the summer season. First generation Trabzon immigrants, as it seems, are continuing their traditional cultural practices seasonal migration: By spending winters in Cyprus and moving to Ayvadere village’s highland, yayla, in summers, and they practice this tradition over national borders. TW4’s and TM3’s statements are illustrative, and similar statements were often made. TW4 states: “I go to Turkey since 97. I went almost every year […] for two months, three months. I built a house in the yayla. We don’t go down [to the village]. We stay in the yayla”. (TW4, 55, female, 1. generation Trabzon immigrant)\textsuperscript{314} TM3 too states:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{312} “2005’te kapılar açılıncaya, burada tarlalar satılınca kazanıla parayla orada kendilerine ev yaptılar.”
\item \textsuperscript{313} Temporary settlement places in highlands.
\item \textsuperscript{314} Ben Türkiye’ye 97’den beri giderim. Aşağı yukarı her sene gittim […] iki ay, üç ay. Yaylada ev yaptım ben. Aşağı inmeyiz de yaylada dururuz.
\end{itemize}
“We go there during the yayla period, for 2-3 months a year. [...] It is usually holiday time here, so we go”. (TW3, 53, male 1. generation Trabzon)\textsuperscript{315}.

The quotation below, is taken from an in-depth interview which was conducted with three of the eldest female Trabzon immigrants. TW2’s (>85, female 1. generation Trabzon) statement in this interview is illustrative of the transnational character of life for the first generation:

How can I put it? We love our yayla. When the summer comes we move to our yayla. We travel back and forth [to and from Cyprus]. We come back because otherwise they cut our monthly allowances. That is a problem for us. We are old. They cut our money, our old age pensions (TW2> 80; female, 1. generation Trabzon)\textsuperscript{316}.

This type of simultaneous home making in two different geographical places is especially common after the immigrants or their spouses have retired. Retirement provides on the one hand the monetary means and on the other hand necessary leisure time for the immigrants to engage in such activities. The individual cases below are illustrative. In the first case the interviewee explains that his father has built a house in the place of origin (Tabzon) after his retirement, in which he dwells for six months of every year. In the second case it is also the father of the interviewee who now lives in Mersin, Turkey. Yet this case is exceptional since it is to my knowledge the only Mersin immigrant of first generation who return-migrated to Turkey, which he did because of remarrying a woman from Mersin, and as was stated by his son, due to the material and health related benefits of living in Turkey at an older age.

In the past few years, after getting retired, my father went back and built a house there. Now he is there for 6 months and here for the other 6 months of the year. But, otherwise he does not do any business investments, or buy land there. He didn’t do any investment like that (TW11, 42, female, 2. generation Trabzon).\textsuperscript{317}

\textsuperscript{315}Yılda 2-3 ay bir yayla dönemimiz var, zaten gidiyoruz, onu alıyoruz. [...] Tatil zamanına geliyor zaten, gidiyoruz.


\textsuperscript{317} [Babam] son zamanlarda emekli olunca iştə gitti ev yaptı orda. Şimdi senenin 6 ayı orda 6 ayı burada. Yoksa yani böyle iş yatırım yok, toprak alma yok. Öyle bir yatırım yapmadı.
After my mother had died, my father married another woman. He lives there [in Mersin] with her. [...] Why does he live there? Because of his pension. My father gets a pension from here. He lives there comfortably with the pension he receives from here. And also the health system is very good there. That’s why he lives there. We go [and visit], but most of the time he is the one who comes here for a visit. He comes once or twice a year (MM5, 41, male 2. generation Mersin).  

Migrant transnationalism may also be conceptualised as a future oriented strategy, in which the *projective component of agency* dominates and is linked to the “myth of return”. According to Kaya (2012) a similar “migrant strategy” was prevalent among the first generation Euro-Turks, who were motivated by the idea that they would return to their homeland after saving enough money to enable themselves an upward mobility in Turkey. According to the scholar, during this initial phase, immigrant communities were constructed in the countries of destination based on the “quest of return” (ibid: 10-11). It is in this juncture that the “transnational way of being” meets the so-called “transnational ways of belonging” (Levitt-Glick-Schiller 2004). A combination of the two give rise to transnational activity of having two homes here and there, so that the immigrant gets as close as possible to being in homeland, even if a permanent return is not achieved.

First generation immigrants in Bahçeli entertain a community specific myth of return, the frequency of individual cases of which is higher among Trabzon immigrants than among Mersin immigrants. Although there were some exceptions, immigrants from Trabzon in Bahçeli, like other migrants throughout the world are found to entertain a myth of return. This is especially remarkable because it is not compatible with the “settler” concept used in international political discourses to refer to first wave immigrants from Turkey in north Cyprus. The excerpts from in-depth interviews below, in which the interviewees explain their/their parents quest for return are illustrative. Regarding the second excerpt, it must be noted that TM7 (33, male), a second-generation immigrant, clearly states here and elsewhere.

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in the interview that his primary attachment is to Cyprus rather than to Turkey, and that he would never consider living in Trabzon:

**TW1:** “But you see, my children were born and raised here, […] they visit [Trabzon] but they don’t want to stay. Otherwise we wouldn’t stay here. But they want to go there for a visit and then return”.

**Researcher:** “Do you travel back and forth because of your children being here?”

**TW1:** “My children are here. We [me and my husband] are there in the summers and here for the winters.”

**Researcher:** “Do you mean that you would not have stayed here any longer, were your children not here [in Cyprus]?”

**TW1:** “I wouldn’t. I stay here just for the children” (interview with TW1, 62, female, 1. generation Trabzon).\(^{319}\)

I don’t have such a plan [to live in Trabzon/ Turkey] but my father has. For instance I told my father “give me one or two years. I will get a loan for you. Then you go to Trabzon and build your house”. He still says that if he had a house there he would not stay here. This is what I work for. […] There is also this: they cannot handle the heat anymore. They were not born here. They desire to be there (TM7, 33 male, 2. generation Trabzon).\(^{320}\)

On the other hand a quest for return or a myth of return does not explain all transnational dwelling practices. In the case of North Cyprus, easy travel possibilities also play a crucial role in the ‘transnational ways of being’ (Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004) of the immigrants particularly due to geographical closeness of Cyprus and Turkey. Although highlighting that he considers Cyprus as his main country MM4, a first generation immigrant from Mersin, , describes how easily he travels to his newly purchased second home in Turkey, due to geographical proximity. In this narrative the geographical proximity between Mersin and

\(^{319}\) TW1: “Ama şimdi çocuklarını burada doğdu, büyüdü ya […] gezmeye oraya [Trabzon’a] gelyyorlar ama kalkıp gelmiyorlar. Yoksa biz burada kalkıp durmazdık. Ama onlar gezip tozup dönmek istiyorlar”.

**Araştırmacı:** “Siz çocukları burada olduğu için mi gidyip geliyorsunuz?”

**TW1:** “Çocukların burada. Biz şimdi yazın orada, kışın burada.”

**Araştırmacı:** “Yani siz, çocukları burada olmasa, burada durmaz mydınız?”

**TW1:** “Durmam burada. Çocuklar için.”

Cyprus is brought to the fore as well as the point that a “transnational way of being” does not necessarily translate to a “transnational way of belonging” (Levitt-Glick-Schiller 2004: 11).

I am not thinking of leaving [going back to Turkey for good]. The businesses (jobs) of my children are here, they make a living here. This is my country. I have accepted that. Whether some people like it or not. I did my military service, I pay my taxes. But it is like when someone from Gönen dere, or from Cihangir [Cypriot villages] have relatives in Australia and they miss them, they want to go to [Australia or] England [to visit relatives], I want to go to Turkey for sure. I have friends and relatives. I bought a flat there, furnished it. I go there, like this, without taking anything with me, I open the door [of the flat] […] I put the kettle on the cooker, I sit in the balcony. […] I stay there for a month, for 15 days, for 2 months. It is not distant. [I go] whenever I like. For instance, I have just bought flight tickets, to and back. I’ll fly on the 19th of May, and will return on the 21th of June. I will be here in the month Ramadan, but at least I will be there for 10 days, without the flies (TM4, 57, male, 1. generation).

Whereas transnationalism was explained above as something based on practical-evaluative and projective dimensions of migrant agency, the iterational dimension of migrant agency, that is, the interest in preserving former social relations through ties with the community of origin (see Bakewell, Haas & Kubal 2011) is especially discernible in the across-borders marriage patterns of the immigrants. Transnational ties with the place of origin are kept alive as a community strategy through the import of brides and bridegrooms. Then the continuation of ties with the community of origin have provided the immigrants with a sense of security and protection against the alienating experience of migration.

321 Transnational ways of being’ according to Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) refer to practices of everyday life within transnational social fields and must be distinguished from conscious identification with a particular nation or ethnicity which may be termed “transnational way of belonging”.

Marriage choices, more precisely the issue of imported brides and bridegrooms according to Kaya (2012) can be conceptualised as a type of migrant strategy so as to “reinforce community boundaries […]” (ibid: 23). An important instrument for “cultural continuity” for the Trabzon immigrants has probably also been the continued contact with the over-the-borders networks through overseas marriages. It was noticeable that the Trabzon community in particular continued with their traditional marriage patterns so that the majority of the marriages even for the second generation remained inter-familial. Thus many of the Trabzon immigrants are either married to a relative from Bahçeli or somebody (mostly a relative) from Ayvadere in Trabzon. When this ideal type of marriage does not happen, the first generation still prefer brides and grooms with Turkish and more suitably with Karadeniz origins over Cypriots. As a result marriages between the immigrants and Turkish Cypriots are still rather infrequent in Bahçeli, though, it seems this is about starting to change: throughout the interviews, none of the immigrants stated that they were against the marriage of their children with native Turkish Cypriots. Only in some instances, it was narrated by some second-generation female Trabzon immigrants that their parents were restrictive in marriage options. In an in-depth interview, TW15 (33) narrated that her grandfather made marriage decisions for the older sisters, both of who were then taken out of school and married off to Ayvadere villagers in Trabzon.

My grandfather had made them get married. […] My grandfather wasn’t here [but] he used to intervene from there. […] He would say for example, “You will not send them to school, marry them off!” to my father, and my father couldn’t say anything, he couldn’t protect his own daughters. He couldn’t say “I will send them to school if I want to and I will marry them off if I want to”. 323

Regarding Mersin immigrants, transnational marriage patterns were less predominant. It can be argued that Mersin immigrants primarily sought to increase their social capital especially through incorporation into the larger immigrant community of Bahçeli and into the society Cyprus. This is an important reason behind the marriage practices observed in this group.

especially in the initial years of settlement, which included marriages with native Turkish Cypriots as well as with Trabzon immigrants. Yet all in all there were indicators that things were changing. For instance, there were some mixed marriages while the field research was being carried out. All in all there are few marriages between the immigrants and native population and few more between the immigrants of Trabzon origin and of Mersin origin. Moreover, all interviewees with not-yet-married children stated that they did not believe in arranged marriages as did the generation before them. They argued that marriage decisions had to be made by the persons concerned and not by their parents. Although opinions do not always readily translate to actions, there are indications that marriage choices of younger generations will be more liberated.

Last but not least it must be noted that transnationalism does not only matter during the life-span of the immigrants. Indeed, as the field research showed, it was possible for immigrants to have preferences of locality for when they die. Whereas there were some cases where the deceased person had allegedly demanded that his grave would be in Trabzon, there are many graves in Bahçeli belonging to the deceased relatives of the immigrants. The two following examples are indicative. TM2 (59, male, 1.generation Trabzon) states about his father’s grave is in the village cemetery: “My father’s grave is here, and so is my mother’s. On the left hand side, just when you leave Bahçeli. […] My father had said, ‘If I die here, bury me here’ and he died here”. On the other hand, the following excerpt shows that although the villagers often do bury the dead to the cemetery of the village, some elderly first-generation immigrants explicitly wished for an arrangement of burial in the place of origin and that the last wills in this respect seem to be rather heterogeneous:

**Researcher:** “Where do they bury the dead?”
**TM6:** “Here [in Cyprus]”
**Researcher:** “Was your grandfather the only one [whose grave is in Trabzon]?”
**TM6:** “But why did they take my grandfather there? That was his last will. All of his brothers and sisters, including his grandfather are buried in the same place [same cemetery]. I can show you the picture. […] [However] there are some who are older than my grandfather here in the cemetery of Bahçeli.

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TM5: “He was born in 1927.”
Researcher: “Didn’t they want to be buried in their country of origin?”
TM5: “No, no. But my father said, ‘wherever I die, you need to take me to Trabzon.’ He doesn’t want to be here”.
Researcher: “Why?”
TW7: “He likes it more over there”
TM6: “[…]. Do you know what my mother says? I don’t know if you can see it from there. There is a hill on the top of that cemetery [in Bahçeli]. […] That is the only will of my mother. ‘When I die bury me up there’”
(interview with TM5 37, male, 2. generation Trabzon, TM6 44, male 2. generation Trabzon and TW7 44, female, 1. generation Trabzon)325.

Considering Mersin immigrants (out of 8 families in total) all of the graves of the deceased were in Bahçeli, so that it can be argued that Mersin immigrants were either more attached to the island in comparison to the Trabzon group, or more disconnected from Turkey. An elderly Mersin immigrant commented on this issue as follows:

MW1: “[…] It is over for us.. Our place is this, our land is here. When we die we stay here, when we live we stay here. God wiling”.
Researcher: “Are the people who die here [in Cyprus] buried here?”
MW1: “[Of course, sure, they are buried here. This is our land. Our food, our labour is here. It was our destiny. Whether we die or live we are here.”
(interview with MW1, 76, 1. generation Mersin immigrant).326

325 Araştırmacı: “[Ölüleri] Yani nereye gömerler?
TM6: “Hepsini buraya gömuer.”
Araştırmacı: “Bir tek dedenizi [mi Trabzon’a gömdüler?]”
TM5: “1927 doğumlu”.
Araştırmacı: “Memlekete gömülmeyi hiç istemediler mi?”
Araştırmacı: “Neden?”
TW7: “Oraya daha çok seviyor”.
TM6: “[…]. Benim annem ne der biliyor musun? Bak buradan görünür mü biliyorum. Şu mezarlığın üstünde büyük bir tepe vardır. […] Annemin tek vasiyeti odur bana. Ölürsem beni oraya gömün”.

326 MW1: „[…] Bizimki geçti… Yerimiz burası, toprağınız burada. Ölürsek de burada kalacağız, kalırsak da burada kalacağız, Allah izin verirse“.
Araştırmacı: „burada ölenler zaten Kıbrıs’a gömüldü değil mi?”
MW1: „tabi tabi buraya gömülüyorlar. Toprağınız burada. Yiyiceğimiz, ekmeğimiz buradayız. Çekçeğimiz çilemiz varmış. Ölürelse de burada kalırsak da buradayız“. 
All in all, it can be argued that transnationalism in varied forms, occurring due to diverse mechanisms and agential action is a prevalent phenomenon for the immigrants in the village. This simultaneity of being and belonging in two states at the same time is also a symptom of immigrants’ community based lives in Cyprus as well as being causally related to it, i.e. reproducing and reinforcing (ethnic) community boundaries between the immigrants and the indigenous population. On the other hand there are indications that the second generation is relatively less involved in transnational ways of being, although this cannot be readily concluded. It can be argued rather that the patterns are more diverse in the second generation. The following dialogue is indicative:

**Researcher:** “Regarding your nuclear family, how often do they travel to Turkey? Do they regularly visit their relatives in Turkey?”

**MM5:** “Only two brothers of mine go regularly. I have two older brothers [who go regularly]. Because they had lived there, they have friends. I don’t. It is as if I have no ties.”

**Researcher:** “Your friends and your social network are here then”

**MM5:** “Of course. I have no friends and network there. There is no one I know anyway. I have no childhood friends there” (interview with MM5, 41, male, 2. generation Mersin)327

### 7.3.3 Identification

Regarding the notion of identification and how it relates to migrant communities, Levitt and Glick-Schiller’s (2004) argument can be a starting point. The authors argue:

If individuals engage in social relations and practices that cross borders as a regular feature of everyday life, then they exhibit a transnational way of being. When people explicitly recognize this and highlight the transnational elements of who they are, then they are also expressing a transnational way of belonging. Clearly, these two experiences do not always go hand in hand” (Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004: 12).

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327 Araştırmacı: “Sizin çekirdek ailenizin Türkiye’ye gidiş gelişleri nasıldır? Her yıl akrabalarına mutlaka gidilir mi?”

**MM5:** “Her yıl sadece iki abim gidiyor. İki tane büyük abim var. Çünkü onların orda yaşamışıkları var, arkadaşları var. Bizim olmadığımız için. Bizim hiç bağlımz yok gibi bir şey”.

**Araştırmacı:** “Sizin çevreniz buradadır [öyleyse]”

**MM5:** “Tabi. Orada benim hiçbir çevrem yok. Tanıdığım biri yok ki. Çocukluğumu yaşadığım, arkadaşlık ettiğim birisi yok yani.”
Identification is related to the so-called sense of “‘belonging’ with its embedded affective dimension” (Mee & Wright 2009). Accordingly a transnational way of being does not necessarily imply a transnational way of belonging, i.e. simultaneous identification with the place of origin and destination. This was in line with the findings of this study. Identification exclusively with Turkey was almost not present, and although there were some affective elements in the feelings towards the country of origin, it was found that these were rather in the form of feelings of affection towards the area/ village/ town of origin. On the other hand, many of the immigrants defined their attachment to Cyprus over material and instrumentalist reasons, by for instance regarding their living in Cyprus and making a living in the island as the very proof of belonging to Cyprus rather than to Turkey.

### 7.3.3.1 Identification With Turkey/ Place of Origin

In-depth interviews with immigrants have revealed that the duration of socialisation in the place of origin had a positive effect on identification with the place of origin. In other words the longer the time spent in the place of origin, and not in the place of destination seems to be influential in this respect. This identification with the place of origin has a positive relationship with a transnational way of being, in that immigrants who did identify with their homelands, villages, cities etc. were found to be more likely to own a house and other properties there, or have the wish to do so; and to visit the places more regularly. Many also had a wish to return (see section 7.3.2). The quotations below are further illustrative. The first quotation is from an interview with TM1, who although stating that he feels at home when in Cyprus, also acknowledges that he misses his place of birth. In his opinion this “homesickness” is part and parcel of getting old:

There is surely homesickness. It does not change. I even remember the stones of my village. Even the roads, I remember. The older I get, the more I remember. I remember the places where I drank water, which roads I walked down. I remember going to school, the days I skipped school. But this is something that comes with life. It is not necessarily a problem imposed by
immigration. But one misses, it is part of life (TM1, 58, male, 1. generation Trabzon). MM3, also states that he has a certain attachment to his birth place, even though he is also among those who stated that they did not ever want to return to Mersin. According to him it is the first generation who has a certain amount of attachment to their places of origin. The second generation on the other hand do not have such feelings, and would not even enjoy a longer vacation there.

I, for example, came here when I was 13. We had a thing with there [place of origin] from childhood you see. We would visit 3-5 times a year. When I go with my children, you can’t keep them there for more than 10 days there. They live in a place like the Bahçeli village, but they go to Kyrenia in the evenings and so on. They are used to being here. That is to say, even though most of the families [in the village] purchased houses in Trabzon [and] Mersin, they only fulfil so their own longings, but you can’t make the kids live over there. It is not possible. Culture is different, lifestyle is different. Everything is different they can’t stay (MM3, 51, male 1. generation Mersin).

Field research revealed further that the second-generation Bahçeli villagers did not generally identify with the place of origin of their parents. They usually stated that they considered the living conditions there as hard and limiting, and admitted that they did not enjoy the everyday life there. Not having any close friends there was also a common respond. TW14 was among the few second-generation interviewees, along with MW4 who identified the strongest with the place of origin of her parents. Both of these interviewees had the desire to even migrate to their parents’ hometowns. According to TW14, her admiration of her parent’s place of origin grew due to her own experiences there as a university student, and before that she too would never consider being able to live over there in Trabzon.

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TW14: “I used to say that I couldn’t stay in Trabzon, but now I think I can.”  
MM3: “Then you find a husband in Trabzon and stay. You can’t live there any other way.”  
TW14: “No, it has nothing to do with that. May be it’s because I studied there, I don’t know. I studied in Turkey. That’s why. Had I studied here, I sure wouldn’t think as such, but I used to think [when I was in Turkey] for instance, that I would never [come back] to Cyprus when I finish my studies. I came here involuntarily.  
Researcher: “Did your family force you?”  
TW14: “Of course, they made me come.”  
Researcher: “Did you look for any jobs while there?”  
TW14: “I didn’t but they didn’t give me the chance. They brought me over as soon as I graduated” (interview with TW14, 31, female, 2. generation Trabzon; MM3, 51, male, 1. generation Mersin)330

7.3.3.2 Identification with Cyprus:

Whereas identification with Turkey entailed affective elements of emotion, a reference to past memories and so on, identification with Cyprus was rather based on instrumentalist reasons and so belonged to the practical-evaluative component of agency. In other words, the interview questions regarding ‘self-identification’ of migrants revealed that the migrants saw themselves as ‘Cypriots’ mostly on ‘practical’ rather than ‘ideational’ grounds. Informal conversations and interviews revealed that, rather than due to affective reasons, a feeling of belonging to Cyprus was especially determined by the fact that northern Cyprus was the current place of residence and that the person did not wish to ‘go-back’ to Turkey.

Researcher: “When you describe yourself, what would you say for instance if they ask you about where you’re from, whilst you’re abroad?”  
TM2: “I am Cypriot.”

330 TW14: “Eskiden Trabzon’dan duramam diyordum ama şimdi orda da dururum”.  
MM3: “O zaman Trabzon’dan bir koca bulur orada durursun. Başka türlü de duramazsınız”.  
Araştırmacı: Ailen mi zorladı?”  
TW14: “Tabii canım, onlar zorladı da geldim.”  
Araştırmacı: “İş aradın mı orada?”  
TW14: “İş aradım ama fırsat verdiler. Okulu bitirir bitirmez getirdiler.”
**Researcher:** “Is this how you answer?”

**TM2:** “Yes.”

**Researcher:** “How about when you go to Turkey for vacation for instance?”

**TM2:** “I say I am a Trabzon born Cypriot. There is no going back. Besides, one cannot stay [live] there anymore. But if the state sends us back, that is something we cannot do anything about.”

(Interview with TM2, 58, 1. generation, Trabzon)

It was mostly occupational reasons that the interviewees put forward, for their primary identification with northern Cyprus. Moreover, the second-generation stressed that their personal social networks were mostly in Cyprus rather than in the place of origin of their parents, and this too was influential in shaping their identification patterns. Moreover, the elderly in the village, like TW2 (>85, female, Trabzon), TW3 (>85, female, Trabzon), MM2 (84, male, Mersin), MW1 (76, female, Mersin) referred to their old-age allowances. They were only allowed to be abroad for a limited amount of time in year. To a smaller extent, social and cultural adaptation to Cyprus was mentioned as well. The quotation below is from the interview with TW1, and illustrates a mixture of feelings about Cyprus as the place of destination. TW1 had stated in the interview that she would wish to return migrate to Trabzon, but could not do so because of her children being in Cyprus. Yet even in her case, where primary identification is with the place of origin, elements of identification with Cyprus is also present.

in a way, I think that it is good that I came here. You know why? There was too much hard work and suffering there [in Turkey]. It is easier/more comfortable here. [...] We used to carry everything on our backs there. That is to say, women suffered more there. Its not that we are comfortable, but lets say we are more comfortable here than we were there. Thus, still, we stayed because we liked it here. We were very young when we came here. Our children grew up here. We became natives. [...] That's why we stayed. I mean, life has gone by, its over. There is a saying; “you stay where your

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**Araştırmacı:** “Peki kendiniz tanımlarken mesela yurt dışında size nerelisiniz diye sorduklarında [ne dersiniz]?”

**TM2:** “Kıbrıslıyım.”

**Araştırmacı:** “Öyle mi cevap verirsiniz?”

**TM2:** “Evet.”

**Araştırmacı:** “Türkiye’ye tatile filan gittiğinizde?”

stomach is full”. […] There was water to drink, bread to eat here. For better or worse, we stayed, you see (TW1, 62, female, 1. generation Trabzon).

On the other hand, there were others who did identify with Cyprus more strongly:

Ask [them]: “why are you Cypriot?”, [they] would reply: “I was born here. My place of birth is Kyrenia”. Ask me [and] I say “I was born in Turkey but I grew up here. 14 years of my life was spent there, 34 years here. I am from here” I say. I too say this. I mean, my place of birth is there [in Turkey], but I […], lived here and I am from here. When I go back to my hometown today, I go just for a vacation. I mean, just to see the green scenes, the beauty. Otherwise, I cannot stay there while my children are here, I cannot live there. May be, just may be, if my children were also there, I might be able to live there. But I like it here. I mean, this is our homeland (TW10, female, 48, 1. generation Trabzon).

Whereas, identification with Turkey, as was argued, is mostly local rather than national, it can be argued that identification with Cyprus is sometimes also based on locality rather than nationality. Field research has supplied some clues in this direction; especially that identification with Cyprus in some instances was based on the community. A good example can be the excerpt below. The interviewee below explains how she identifies with Cyprus more than with Trabzon even though she has only few contacts to “native” Turkish Cypriots.

In this case it is the community that provides the immigrant with a sense of identity rather than the country of origin or destination:

TW16: “You see, we like it here because we were born here, if we were born elsewhere, we would have liked it there. I like it here. We couldn’t have made it anywhere else. For example, when we go to Trabzon, we cannot stay. 15 days, 20 days, then I miss home.”

Researcher: “How is life outside the village? Have you ever lived outside the village?”

TW16: “No.”

Researcher: “Do you spend time?”

TW16: “I do. I visit, go around. Friends, relatives, I mean I go around.

Researcher: Do you have Cypriot friends?”

TW16: “No.”

Researcher: “And your husband?”

TW16: “He has.”

Researcher: “In which region do your friends outside the village live?”

TW16: “In Kyrenia, also in Esentepe. I mean, there are Cypriots that we mingle with, it’s not like there aren’t any. But I would be lying if I said I have many Cypriot friends. I don’t”.

(interview with TW16, 35, Female, 2. generation Trabzon)

TM7 (33, male, second generation Trabzon) on the other hand, argues that identification with Cyprus is so developed among persons with immigrant origins, that these would not accept an annexation to Turkey. Though, as can be read from the excerpt below the rationalisation of this opinion is based more on economic rather than emotional reasons.

That is a false tale. Right now Cyprus is a hump on Turkey’s back. Downright hump. They cannot do anything without sorting it out here. They have to get rid of this hump. This place has nothing political with Turkey. Turkey is keeping this place strategically. Think of capes of Karpas and Koruçam. A distance of 100 kilometres. When you take this distance and go crosswise, thousands of kilometre squares absolutely belong to Turkey. No


Araştırmacı: “Köyün dışındaki hayat nasıl? Köyün dışında yaşadın mı hiç?“

TW16: „Yok“. 

Araştırmacı: „Vakit geçiriyor musun?“


Araştırmacı: „Kıbrıslı arkadaşlar var mı?“

TW16: „Yok“.

Araştırmacı: „Eşinin de öyle mi?“

TW16: „Eşimin var. “

Araştırmacı: “Burunun dışında bölge olarak nerede arkadaşların var?“

TW16: „Girne’de, Esentepe’de de var. Öyle görüştüğümüz Kıbrıslılar var yani, yok değil. Öyle çok Kıbrıslı arkadaşım var desem yalan olur. Yok“. 

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one can enter this sea without Turkey’s permission. When you look up, it is Russia, behind that Armenia. […] It is military strategy. The only breathing point. That’s why they don’t want to let it go. In the past, this place was a part of Turkey’s land, anyway. They lost it because of İsmet İnönü, and didn’t claim it back. They wouldn’t have faced these problems if they had taken it back. This is my opinion. Turkey needs to solve this problem. Um, is it possible to be annexed? No. [I] wouldn’t want this either. Once annexed, everything would be permitted, then who ever wishes to come, could come over. It would be far worse than it is now. Opportunities are limited anyway. They will be even more limited. In any case, you need to have a referendum for annexation. My opinion is that the result would be negative. I mean 90% of my generation doesn’t want it (TM7, 33, male, 2. generation Trabzon).339

7.3.3.3 Inbetweenness

Moving to more emotional issues, immigrants’ self identification patterns were interestingly similar among Trabzon and Mersin immigrants and across generations. Many stated that they actually felt in-between. This feeling was mostly due to taking notice of others’ definitions. They felt that they were perceived as aliens both in Turkey and in their places of origin, as well as in Cyprus by native Turkish Cypriots. The following excerpts are illustrative of this common pattern of self-identification. In the quotation below MM3 states that he feels at the “margin” of the Turkish Cypriot society rather than fully belonging to its “centre”.

We forgot about Turkey. But as Cypriots we are at the margin. We are not in the centre, we are at the margin. You, the new generations have mixed together. They met at the universities and became friends. They still socialise together.

But we, as migrants, are at the margin. We could not move to the centre. (MM3, 51, male, 1. generation, Mersin).  

TM6 utters similar feelings of not belonging to either Turkey or to (northern) Cyprus. According to him neither of the societies accept persons with immigrant origins as their own.

There is something else that people do not realise. Cyprus doesn’t accept me as belonging to it. When I go to Turkey, Turkey doesn’t accept me as belonging to it. When I go to Turkey, I am a Cypriot, when I go to Cyprus I am from Turkey (TM6, 37, male 2. generation Trabzon).  

While TM5 (male, 44, 2. generation Trabzon) argues that “[In Turkey] they notice that you are a stranger straight away”, he also takes notice that “native” Turkish Cypriots also do not always embrace him. Answering a question on whether he identifies himself as a Cypriot or as a person from Turkey, a Cyprus born, second generation villager answers, “Somewhere in between” (Interview with TM4, 34, male 2. generation Trabzon). The excerpts below are also illustrative of these issues. The first excerpt is from an interview with TW11 and the second one is from an interview with MM4 and MW5. The feelings of being in-between are present in both of these excerpts.

**TW11:** “I mean it is not important for me because [Cyprus] is like my homeland. I mean when I go to Turkey, they see me there as a stranger. But, also here they see me as a stranger. In a way, it is like we don’t have a homeland. When you look at it, when we go to Turkey they say “you’re Cypriot”. When we come here, they say “[you’re from] Turkey. We don’t know what we are either. We don’t know what to do either. It is like when Turkish immigrants in Germany; or Turkish Cypriots in England are told ‘you

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338 [Türkiye’de] Zaten yabancı olduğun hemen hissediliyor.

339 Araştırmacı: “[...] Kendinizi Kıbrıslı mı hissediyorsunuz yoksa Türkiyeli mi? Yoksa başka türlü mı?”

**TM4:** “Arada bir yerde [...]”
are Cypriots’ when they are over there, but when they come here they are told ‘you are from England’. It is the same thing. It is like that I mean. I don’t know what else you want to ask.”

Researcher: “But [what is] Cyprus for you?”

TW11: “Homeland. […] It is my homeland. I mean I would not go to Turkey to live there, because all my friends and acquaintances are here. I mean, I neither have friends nor a history or a past there. I don’t have anything. I can’t say ‘well I have memories there’. I don’t have any memories there.”

(Researcher with TW11, 42, female, 2. Generation Trabzon)340

MM4: “I mean when we go to Turkey they call us Cypriots, and here they call us Türkiyeli [people from Turkey]. We are stuck in the middle. Actually we are stuck in the middle. This is a destiny of migrants. I heard that this is so all over the world. For example the Irish in America are still referred to as the Irish, the Italians as Italians. We are like that. When we go to Turkey they say the ‘Cypriots have come’, when we come here they say ‘people from Turkey have come, people from Turkey have gone’. I mean this is a label that is stuck with us.”

Researcher: “What are your feelings [in relation to identification]”

MM4: “I have no feelings at all. I am a retiree” [he laughs].

Researcher: [to his wife]: “How about you?”

X: “Well I am not well. I have pain here, I have pain there. I shout at the grandchildren” [she laughs].

Researcher: [to the daughter]: “What are your feelings?”

MW5: “I feel like I belong to no where”

Researcher: “To no where?”

MW5: “I don’t belong anywhere. Like my father. When I go there I am a Cypriot, here I am from Turkey. There is such a discourse […] Do I like it in this place? Yes I do. I miss this place even when I go to Turkey for three days. I was born here, what can I do?”

(interview with MM4 57, male 1. generation Mersin; MM4’s wife, 1. generation Mersin; MW5 33, 2. generation Mersin)341

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 Araştırmaçı: “Ama sizin için Kıbrıs?”


It was also further mentioned, by TM7 who was quoted above as an example to identification with Cyprus (section 7.3.3.2), that there was some hope out of this situation of vagueness. The interviewee hoped that things would change for the better for the third generation, so that it will be easier for them to identify with Cyprus. According to him the third generation would have fathers who were born in Cyprus too, so that they will be in a better position to claim belonging to Cyprus. With each generation, he argues, the descendants of the immigrants and the native Turkish Cypriot population will become less and less divergent.

When someone asks me where I am from, I say I am from Cyprus (I am Cypriot). Then he looks at me and thinks that I don’t look it. Well my roots are from Trabzon. [...] But these things will change. “Where are you from?”. “I am from Cyprus”. “Where is your father from?” “He was born in Cyprus.” This is like when a native Turkish Cypriot is asked: “Where are you from?” “Cyprus”. “Where is your father from?” “Cyprus”. “Where is your grandfather from?” “Cyprus”. “Where was his grandfather from?” “Turkey”. It is all a matter of generation. These things are changing with each generation. This is why I think this will be over for them [the children]. In the past, it was not easy for people from Cyprus and Turkey to marry one another. That is over now. My brother is currently married with a girl from Adana. The world has gotten smaller. It will change. These will also change hopefully (TM7, 33, male 2. generation Trabzon).342

yani. Türkiye’ye gittiğimiz zaman bize Kıbrıslı geldi diyolar, buraya geldiğimiz zaman da işte Türkü yetişti, Türkü yetişti. Yani bu bizim anladiumuz yapmış bir şeydir.”

Araştırmacı: “Siz nasıl hissetmeyorsunuz?”


Araştırmacı: [Eşiyle] “siz?”

X: “Ben işte hastayım, oram ağrır buram ağrır. Torunlara bağırıyorum oturuyorum (gülüyor).”

Araştırmacı: [Kızına]: “siz nasılsı hissediyorsunuz?”

MW5: “Ben de hiç bir yerli hissediyorum.”

Araştırmacı: “Hiçbir yerli?”


CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This thesis endeavoured to study the subject of migration with the aim not only to underline its complexity and multi-dimensionality, but also to theoretically integrate these into its conceptualization. For this purpose a conceptual and methodological framework informed by the main principles of critical realism was constructed, which aimed at the explanation of migration and consequential community formation by immigrants. This conceptual framework was utilised to scrutinise a rather unordinary case of migration, namely that of the case of immigration from Trabzon and Mersin to Bahçeli village (Kalograia) in the northern part of Cyprus. This particular case is one, which is located within the larger case of the first wave of post-1974 immigrations from Turkey to northern Cyprus.

The first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus took place between the years 1975-1980 and was facilitated through the collaboration of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot states. The immigrants were encouraged to participate in this migration wave by means of material incentives, such as allocation of houses, fields, land and other properties, which were left behind by the Greek Cypriot population in the evacuated villages and areas when the former became refugees in the southern part of Cyprus after the division of the island in 1974. The largest proportion of immigrants arrived in the island’s north after the signing of a bilateral labour agreement between Turkey and the newly founded Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) in 1975. This bilateral protocol was titled ‘Agricultural Workforce Agreement’. It aimed at bringing in 30,000 agricultural workers, comprising families from rural regions of Turkey, which were especially vulnerable to unemployment and poverty due to various reasons, among which were terrain conditions, and the areas’ being under threat of environmental disasters or infrastructure investments, like dam projects. This agreement facilitated the immigration and settlement of many peasant families as well as some urban working-class families. The then governing Turkish Cypriot state also
encouraged some technicians, professionals as well as the soldiers, including their families (as well as the families of deceased soldiers), who took part in the Turkish military interventions in July and August 1974, to move to the islands’ northern part, which was by then under Turkish Cypriot and Turkish military control. The total number of immigrants was estimated by the former government officials and politicians who were interviewed to have exceeded the 30,000 threshold and to be around 40,000 to 50,000 (interviews with P1, P2, P4, I1, I3). Towards the end of the first year the official migration program, in which immigrants from preselected regions and villages were being brought to the island, was aborted and the state allowed it for everyone to take part in the migration, regardless of whether they fulfilled the criteria for being chosen as protocol immigrants or not. Subsequently, many other population groups from Turkey participated in the migration wave, and were settled in the island under the same conditions as the protocol immigrants: they were allocated houses and other properties and were issued the citizenship of the TFSC.

Within the framework of the first migration wave, immigrants from the Ayvadere (Aho) village of Trabzon’s Araklı district and later, immigrants from Mersin’s Gülnar district were resettled in the Bahçeli village in the northern part of Cyprus. The majority of the Ayvadere villagers arrived between 1975-1976, along with another neighbouring village in Trabzon named Bahçecik. Upon resettlement in Bahçeli the two communities came into conflict with each other, and although Bahçecik villagers had the official right to resettlement in northern Cyprus (within the framework of the protocol because of the fact that their village in Turkey was situated in forestland), they lost the upper hand and were relocated an resettled, leaving Ayvadere villagers as sole inhabitants of the village. A smaller group of immigrants arrived from Mersin Gülnar in 1977 and were settled into the houses left vacant after the Bahçecik group had left. The general case of the first migration wave and the particular case of migration and settlement in Bahçeli village was described in Chapter 4 in detail. The chapter brought to the fore, referring to the oral history interviews with the bureaucrats, government representatives, officials and politicians of the period an important contradiction: whereas migration from Turkey to northern Cyprus within the first migration wave had started out as a rationally planned operation, especially committed to a masculine and military rationality, it quickly shattered into pieces during the actual execution. As one of the interviewees, who
was involved in policy making stated: “Although they [the politicians] had discussed these issues at length, in my opinion they did not make the right decision and as I said before, this, until the end of 1975 smoothly-running, planed migration was transformed into an unplanned and uncoordinated movement, where everyone, who wished to, could take his/her suitcase and migrate” (see p. 120). This important contradiction within the first migration wave in general is, as was described, also reflected in the particular case of resettlement in the Bahçeli village. This migration policy was brought to an end by the end of 1979 - beginning of year 1980, due to “international pressure and internal opposition” in northern Cyprus (Hatay 2007). Yet it can also be argued that it was stopped because the resources, such as empty houses and lands were, to a large extent, depleted by the end of 1979.

The particularities of the case of Bahçeli village notwithstanding, as was argued, it represents a typical case of immigration and settlement within the broader category of first wave of immigrations. This is especially true in regards to three important respects: Firstly, immigrants of the first wave were typically settled to empty villages evacuated by Greek Cypriots. Bahçeli village was such a place, the Greek Cypriot population of which had become refugees in the southern part of Cyprus in 1974. Secondly, Bahçeli village is exclusively populated by immigrants, as was usual for the first migration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus. In so being, it is representative of the in the first wave dominant pattern of spatially segregated settlement. In the case of Bahçeli village, the first and the biggest group of immigrants came from the Ayvadere (Aho) village of Trabzon’s Araklı district. Until the settlement of a smaller group of immigrants from Mersin’s Gümüş district two years later (in 1977), this type of communal settlement left the incoming community ethnically and culturally intact, in that migration had little heterogenising effect for the people involved. The later settlement of some families from Mersin then heterogenised the village in terms of area of origin, but not in terms of nationality and country of origin, since there were no native Turkish Cypriot families in the village. This was identified in Chapter 7 as an important factor causally related to the building and preservation of “ethnic” migrant communities.

This study posed the main research question “how can the multi-dimensionality of migration
be conceptualised?” and set out to provide answers to it in reference to the case of Bahçeli village by adopting a two step approach to analysis: In the first step, the analysis focused on the causation of migration, i.e. the motivations, intentions, and other causal factors related to the initiation of this movement. In the second step, by contrast, the focus was on the effects of this migration wave, that is on the consequences of long-term settlement of immigrants in Bahçeli village and especially on the immigrants’ ethnic community formation and preservation processes.

A critical realist meta-theoretical approach was argued to offer valuable tools to achieve a thorough explanation of migration in general and the case under scrutiny in particular. Such an approach was developed in Chapter 2 and included a due reframing of the concept of migration as well as a due appropriation of related concepts such as migrant communities, migrant incorporation and discrimination, transnationalism, ethnicity and identification. This general paradigm informed by critical realism was argued to be advantageous in capturing and explaining the complexity of the phenomenon of migration by placing a genuine and adequate emphasis on its multi-dimensionality and multi-factorial character. Furthermore, as was argued, a critical realist methodology, does not endeavour to understand social reality but aspires to explain it, hence placing causal analysis at a central position. In other words critical realism was suitable in developing an in-depth explanation, since it offered the epistemological advantage that was derived from having a primary concern in the domain of the real. This was defined as “the domain of ontological depth” encompassing “generative mechanisms” (Sayer 2000). According to critical realism the domain of the real, alongside the domains of the empirical (encompassing subjective experiences of phenomena) and the actual (the events that occur in the social world) make up the three domains of social reality and argue that a sole concentration on the latter two domains, like it is done by interpretivist and positivist approaches, does not result in a sufficient explanation of social reality. Hence, a critical realist framework endeavours to approach as close as it gets to social reality which lie below surface appearances, by focusing on generative mechanisms within the domain of the real (Iosifides 2011).

Furthermore, Chapter 2 endeavoured to critically evaluate migration theories that are
dominant in pertinent literature, especially focusing on their weaknesses, so as to make a case for the need for a critical realist reframing of the issue of migration in general. Theories of *Neo-Classical Economics* including the push-pull approaches and the *New Economics of Labour Theory*; historical-structural models including *Dual Labour Market Theory*, the *Segmented Labour Market Theory*, the models of *Dependency School*, the *World Systems Approach*, *Political Economy Approach*; and finally Migration Systems Theories encompassing the *Institutional Theory*, *Network Theory* and the *Theory of Cumulative Causation* were analysed. Consequently the conceptual model constructed in this chapter aimed especially at overcoming three major shortcomings that were identified within these approaches. The first of these was identified as their focus on a single level of aggregation (micro, macro or meso) and in a similar way, their one-sided focus either on the structures or on agential factors in explaining migration. It was argued, leaning on Bakewell (2010), that a “structure-agency impasse” was a rather important blockage in the development of a coherent migration theory. Secondly, it was argued that mainstream migration theories did not generally incorporate a variety of causal factors into the explanation of migration. Instead they are generally inclined, with the only exception of the political economy approach, towards *economic determinism*: whereas macro-level theories suggest that migration waves are determined mainly by socio-economic factors such as labour demand and supply, wage differentials and labour market structures; theories at the micro-level, emphasise that individual migrants (or migrant households) make migration decisions as rational actors via the so-called cost-benefit calculations. The political economy approach to migration on the other hand, though focusing on receiving state’s migration policies, does not necessarily present a satisfactory alternative, which would have to take into concentration broader political factors. Thus the political economy model included, there is little room in classical migration theories for cultural and ideational factors, such as the ideas on ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism’, which play overt as well as subtle roles in causing migratory movements in contemporary societies. The predominance of economic rationality models in the explanation of migration makes it hard to grant a significant role to ethnic and cultural factors, so that such migration forms which can be labelled “culturally imbued migration” (Hedberg 2004: 26) or “ethnic immigration preferences” (Bauböck et al. 2006) have not been adequately theorised. Thirdly, mainstream migration theories were argued to direct their focus on the
causes of migratory movements exclusively and so, to disregard the consequences of these events. Yet a one-sided theoretical focus on the causes of migration, it was argued, implies a conception of migration as a one-time occurrence coming to an end right after the movement had taken place. Such a conception was argued to be misplaced since it did not consider migration as a process, which exceeds the act of movement itself, to have wide-reaching long-term effects (King 2012). Consequently, the inadequacy of mainstream migration theories to consider the consequences of migration was argued to hinder their utility to a great extent, in achieving a holistic explanation.

Against this background, it was argued that a critical realist meta-theoretical framework could serve to overcome these weaknesses. Firstly, through the utilisation of what Porpora (2013) refers to as “a set of analytical dualisms”, between structure and agency; structure and culture and culture and agency, borrowed from the critical realist morphogenetic approach (ibid: 27), such a framework is suitable for identifying a variety of factors (structural, cultural and agential) in different contexts (i.e. in sending as well as receiving contexts), in different analytical levels (micro, meso and macro). This enables the integration of structure and agency as well as various levels of analysis, which is an important step towards a multi-dimensional and holistic explanation of migration. Regarding the factor of agency, it is further acknowledged following Emirbayer and Mische (1998) that there exist three agency components. These iterational (habitual), practical-evaluative and projective components of agency may interact in structured and culturally set situations, so as to reproduce and transform these. Social change is at the centre of morphogenetic approach (see Archer 1995; 1996; 2000; 2003), which postulates “people always act out of structural and cultural circumstances, which their very actions then proceed to modify or sustain” (Porpora 2013: 28). Moreover, doing so, it stresses unintended consequences and social conflict. Archer (1995) argues in this sense “[t]he unintended element largely results from group conflict and concession which together mean that the consequential elaboration is often what no-one sought or wanted” (ibid: 91). Secondly, through the dualism between structure and culture, one is able to incorporate into the analysis the cultural-ideational factors, alongside economic-structural ones, so as to explain the multi-factorial character of migration. This makes it possible to develop a so called “cultural approach” to migration, which is according
to Hedberg (2004), one in which ethnicity (and also nationalism) is conceptualised as an important part of the migration phenomenon. Such an approach, as Hedberg argues, looks at the so-called “‘plural stories’, which contain more than the instrumental, economic motive” (ibid: 30). Yet this does not mean the part played by structural factors and economic motivations are to be refuted; it only means that the dominant economic approach to the explanation of migration need not be taken as given. Thirdly, the critical realist “morphogenetic approach”, with its emphasis on social change, enables a study of migration in both its causes and consequences. It is, in other words, capable of conceptualising the issue of migration as a process and an emergent phenomenon, which gives rise to further phenomena in the societies and for the agents concerned, in the form of intended and unintended consequences. In so doing, the aim to regard migration in its causes and consequences in one coherent theoretical framework is achieved.

Leaning on Castles and Miller (1998) ethnic migrant communities were conceptualised as unforeseen, or unintended consequences of migration, then as they argue, though not necessarily intended by the governments, the emergence of ethnic and cultural diversity in immigrant receiving societies is almost inevitable (ibid: 46). Regarding the consequences of migration, namely the building of ethnic communities, five further notions were brought to the fore. The first of these was that although migrant communities were forms of incorporation rather than separation from the receiving society, they were largely produced and reproduced due to various structural barriers that the immigrants experienced in the country of destination (Kaya 2012). The second one was related to the communities’ function as a form of social capital. Migrant communities were conceptualised as alternative sources of social capital, or support networks, as well as sources of social control (Portes 2000). Moreover, they may be formed through the activation of the iterational element of immigrant’s agency, with the intention to preserve ties with the place of origin through the preservation of identities (Bakewell 2011). Thirdly, alongside structural factors, cultural factors such as ideas on ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ were also identified as causally related to the formation and reinforcement of ethnic communities. In this sense, ethnicity takes on the function of “boundary maintenance” between groups (Barth 1969), in which this boundary maintenance is more often than not tied to the maintenance of inequality (Fenton 2003). The
activation of ethnicity in the interaction of groups could be related to the need to maintain unequal access to social resources, when the groups perceive themselves as being in a competition over scarce resources. Fourthly, immigrants’ transnational ways of being (Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004) and their “simultaneous embeddedness” in more than one society at a time (Levitt & Jaworski 2007: 131) was also argued to be related to community formation and preservation. In this respect immigrants’ transnational activities in the economic, political and cultural domains were expected to reproduce and reinforce the so-called ”transnational communities”. Lastly, immigrants’ processes of identification from within and without, in which identity is constantly being constructed in situational and contextual contingencies, was also related to immigrant community formation and preservation.

Critical realism, unlike positivism, does not seek law-like regularities in the explanation of social reality. Instead recognising the intrinsic complexity of social phenomena, it acknowledges that it is phenomena lying beneath surface appearances that have “unobservable causal powers and mechanisms that bring about change and have an impact on things” (Iosifides 2011:61). Nor does it take social reality to be something consisting of discourses and meanings only. In this respect, it can be argued that even though critical realism does pay attention to people’s meanings of the social world, unlike interpretivism and especially social constructionism, critical realism pays particular attention to the structures within which those meanings are constructed. These methodological considerations, which were discussed in detail in Chapter 3, were taken as reference points in choosing and appropriating the research methods for this study. The latter comprise qualitative methods such as participant observation and informal interviews, theory-laden critical in-depth interviews and oral history interviews. Details about data collection through the use of each research method were explained in Chapter 3. In general it can be argued that this triangulation enabled the collection of in-depth data, from pioneer migrants in Bahçeli village as well as from their offspring most of which were born in Cyprus on the one hand; and from policy makers, policy implementers (among which were various government officials with mid- to high-ranking positions who were in office in the period concerned), as well as opposition politicians of the period on the other hand, to enable investigation of the issues from a variety of angles and perspectives.
In compliance with the conceptualisation of this study, which set out to systematically explore the causes and the effects of this case of migration at macro, meso and micro-levels of aggregation, Chapters 5 and 6 were committed to the study of the causation of the first migration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus. Chapter 5 aimed at a macro-level analysis of the causation of the first wave of migration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus. It identified, described and analysed a number of structural, cultural and agential factors, which partook in emigration and immigration generating mechanisms. Among the structural factors in the sending context, which played a part in generating mechanisms were, as was argued, the human capital surplus in Turkey, especially due to demographic developments and transformation processes taking place in the agricultural sector, which brought about the proliferation of the phenomenon of small peasantry and small landownership since the 1950’s. The cultural context entailed, on the other hand, perceived common origins and the symbol of blood-ties within the “our kinsmen” discourse, which was popularised in Turkey especially since mid-1950s (see Navaro-Yashin 2012; Samani 1999). In the receiving context on the other hand, there were structures relating to an ethnic division of labour, which had collapsed after the division of the island and the so arising labour shortage. Cultural factors in the receiving context which were identified as playing the most significant part in the causation of this migration wave were ideas of “ethnicity” and “nation” which were constructed historically in interaction with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of the so called “motherland nationalisms” (Loizides 2007: 173).

It was argued that the states involved had two types of motivations in facilitating the first wave of migration movement: whereas one of these were economic motivations directed towards the filling of the labour shortage that arose after the partition, the other one was political motivations directed at separate nation state building. On the basis of oral history interviews with various governmental and political actors of the period, among which were policy makers, implementers and opposition politicians, it was demonstrated that ideas of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, and not economic reasons, were the internal and necessary condition for the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus to occur. In this sense, it was argued, a viable explanation of this migration wave required a certain distancing
from an economic approach to migration in general, and the adoption of a multi-factorial approach. In this particular migration case the former was argued to be partial and erroneous, especially in taking the official justification for this migration wave—a severe labour shortage after the division of the island—to be the cause.

Furthermore, it was argued, based on oral history interviews, that this migration wave was facilitated through a cooperation between Turkey and the newly established Turkish Cypriot state TFSC as is indicated by the bilateral labour agreement between the two states. Thus conceptions, which are widespread in the international political arena, that Turkey had sent a population to the island on the basis of a primarily one-sided decision and for political motivations of its own, were not supported by interviewees’ statements, though some of the opposition politicians in the sample did regard the role of Turkey to be of decisive weight. Based on the oral history interviews conducted within the framework of this study two agential motivations of the Turkish Cypriot side were especially highlighted within the general political motivation of nation-state building: The first of these was a desire to increase the Turkish Cypriot population, which was regarded as an important issue by the political elite. Whereas population ratios were originally related to political power-sharing arrangements in Cyprus, which were at its high-point in the consociational system of the Republic of Cyprus, ‘population’ became an even more important problem when more than one third of the island (around 36%) was brought under control of the less than one fifth of the total population (18%). Increasing the population as swiftly as possible was hence regarded, by the political elite, as the only way, through which the acquisition of this amount of territory could be justified in the international arena. The second political ambition, was closely related to the first aim: The political elite of the period had considered increasing the population in the northern part of the island, since the small Turkish Cypriot population posed problems when it came to actually repopulate the areas which were acquired by the military operations. It was revealed through oral history interviews with some influential government representatives of the period that population transfer was seen as a strategy, that would enable the Turkish Cypriot party to lay claim to the ‘acquired’ territories, and to physically own these. This strategy would, moreover, effectively prevent the return of the Greek Cypriots to the places that they had left. On the other hand, the motivation of state-
building as the main aim behind the facilitation of the movement of an agricultural workforce to the island encompasses the former two. It refers to the aspiration of a (from the Greek Cypriots) separate nation-state building, which was dominant in the period under study. It was perceived that with the increase of population, and through the repopulation of empty villages, lands and houses by people who were members of Turkish nation to which Turkish Cypriots naturally belonged, an ethnically and nationally ‘pure’ Turkish population could thrive in the islands north in separation from their Greek Cypriot neighbours. Thus as was argued, the immigrants were not assigned a primary role in the economic restructuring of the post-division era - then this restructuring surely did not involve the creation of an economy based on (agricultural or industrial) production- but were predominantly perceived as elements of a nation-state building project. A primordialist approach to ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, emphasising common roots and blood-ties underlies this goal. Moreover, as was argued, it was precisely because of the fallacy of this assumption, that ‘ethnicity’ did not prove to be such a naturally given, unproblematic ‘thing’ that would unite this newly built polity. In this sense, the resulting ethnic encounters between the immigrants and the native population can be regarded as a chief unintended consequence of social change that this migration wave brought about.

It was argued that the factors present at the macro–level in the sending context were reflected at the meso-level. Then, especially in Trabzon, one could identify the presence of rural transformation processes and demographic developments, which led to the creation of small peasantry with small landownership. These, as well as a culture of migration partook in emigration generating mechanisms, which was prevalent among both Trabzon and Mersin immigrants. Yet on the other hand, field research showed that even though Turkey had constructed a nationalist discourse on Cyprus by viewing it as its ‘national cause’ as early as in the 1950s, this political discourse did not necessarily acquire a significant space in the collective memory at the local level. This fact applies especially to rural populations, like the Trabzon group of this case and can be explained by taking into account that this group had a rather scant national education, limited contact to a national political life and a limited use of national media (i.e. no televisions). For this reason, although people from certain regions may have been familiar with the “our kinsmen“ discourse prevalent on the macro-level, this
was not the case for many of the rural populations which were brought to the island as protocol immigrants.

On the other hand, looking at the micro-level (Chapter 6) in the case of the Bahçeli village, one cannot find the same causal mechanisms involved in the initiation of this migratory wave. Instead, at the micro-level, migration decisions of individuals were found to be made with regards to a different set of motivations, in which economic motivations predominated. Based on critical in-depth interviews with pioneer migrants in the village, it was argued that, a desire for a better life, especially in terms of modern living conditions, was especially motivating. Furthermore, especially in the case of Trabzon immigrants, who did not necessarily define themselves as poor prior to the movement, the offer of house and property ownership as the pack and parcel of this migration program had crucial immigration-encouraging effects. Land allocation prospects were motivating for the persons who were attached to the land for their livelihoods, so that the Mersin immigrants too, most of who were engaged in vegetables and fruits production, were attracted to this migration program.

Field research also revealed that, even though the migration movement was taken up by whole households and extended families (the latter of which was the case especially for Trabzon immigrants), it is not possible, contrary to the postulate of NELM theory, to speak of harmony within the family regarding decision-making processes. It was shown that when contemplating agency, it is necessary to take into consideration, gendered relations of power within the households and within the larger community. In the case of this study through the specific patriarchal power relations, women were not involved in decision making in the same way, if at all, as men. What was striking for Trabzon immigrants was that, their migration decisions were made by the most powerful male heads of extended families, among which were fathers and father-in-laws of the actual immigrants. For the Mersin immigrants it was mostly the male head of nuclear families who made the decision to migrate. Furthermore, it was argued that while rational calculations, which took into account perceived relative economic and technological deprivation as well as material opportunities offered in northern Cyprus, pertained to practical-evaluative agency of the immigrants, so did human capital. It was also revealed that the other two agency components were also present
in the migration decision making: Both a habituated culture of migration (pertaining to habitual-iterational agency) and projective easy return opportunity due to geographical proximity of Cyprus to Turkey as well as the promise of return given by the state (projective agency) acted to ease the migration decisions. Furthermore, iterational agency, that is immigrants’ orientations towards their societies of origin with the ambition to preserve traditional standards and ways of life, had crucially participated in the swift formation of migration perpetuating networks. Pioneer migrants in northern Cyprus were thus not only pioneers in migration and settlement, but also the pioneers in migrant network formation. This aspect was less predominant among Mersin immigrants who sought to increase their social capital especially through incorporation into the larger immigrant community of Bahçeli and into the society in northern Cyprus. This was regarded as one important reason behind the more liberal marriage practices observed in this group especially in the initial years of settlement.

As was argued, the complex, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted character of migration can be thoroughly explained when not only its causes but also its consequences are taken into consideration. In this sense, the first migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus has to be linked with at least two important consequences: The first of these was, as was argued, the creation of a system of migration between Turkey and northern Cyprus, which, coupled with other generating mechanisms, has been perpetuating flows of immigrants from Turkey to the island. In other words, the first migration wave comprising state facilitated migration from Turkey has initiated links and networks among the two countries so that further migrations have continued even thought these are no longer facilitated as a part of state policy through various material benefits.

The second consequence on the other hand refers to a phenomenon which was unanticipated and unintended by the political actors of the period, that is, the formation of migrant communities. Migrant communities in the northern part of Cyprus was made the subject of Chapter 7, which in accordance with the general framework of this study, looked into immigrant communities from a variety of dimensions and angles. Considering the macro-level, the first structural factor, which was associated with the creation of ethnic immigrant
communities was regarded to be the communal and segregationist settlement policy involved in this migration wave. In other words, it was the policy of the Turkish Cypriot state, in collaboration with Turkey, which provided a first means for the immigrant communities to be established and, to a greater extent, to be preserved, since many of the immigrants had arrived to the island as village communities in the first place. As was already described, immigrants, which mostly arrived in groups from the same place of origin, were settled in the villages in the northern part of the island which were evacuated by Greek Cypriots after the division. Thus already existing communities were resettled together, and to a great extent separately from the native population. Rather than being heterogenised upon migration these communities were largely preserved. The communal and segregated settlement of the immigrants in the northern part of the island was argued to have been advantageous to the Turkish Cypriot state allowing the latter to benefit from the communities’ functioning as solidarity networks for the immigrants so that it could minimise its own responsibilities regarding the economic and social integration of the latter.

Indeed migrant communities were conceptualised, as forms of social capital, which facilitate and ease adaptation of the immigrants in the receiving context rather than inhibit it (see Cattacin 2006). They are therefore, modes of incorporation rather than separation, segregation or marginalisation. As solidarity networks they are directed against exclusion and othering by the host society and towards overcoming various obstacles. Moreover the formation of migrant communities in the receiving context need to be understood as pertaining to morphogenesis, that is, to social change brought about by the interplay of structure and culture as well as the various agencies, i.e. of the states, of the immigrants and of the non-migrants (see Archer 1995; Porpora 2013). Immigrant communities modify the existing structural and cultural contexts of the receiving societies and add to these new ones; and in so doing, they are rather significant elements of social change (morphogenesis) in modern societies (see ibid.).

Apart from the segregationist settlement policies of the state, ethnically informed encounters between the immigrants and the indigenous population in the context of post-partition political and economic restructuring in northern Cyprus can be identified as a factor which
participates in the mechanisms favouring the preservation of migrants’ ethnic communities. In this regard, the second structural factor was most importantly related to erecting and reinforcing community boundaries to exclude the ‘others’ by the dominant groups due to competition over scarce resources. Even though this competition was justified through using symbols related to culture, customs and lifestyle, the factor of ‘ethnicity’ that underlies these relationships need to be explained in utilitarian terms rather than in cultural terms. It was argued that under circumstances where competition over scarce resources is especially promoted by the states, ethnicity becomes a social resource and is activated for gain (Malesevic 2004, Fenton 2003). The period after the division of the island in 1975 was such a period in which the newly formed Turkish Cypriot state was engaged in major redistribution of property, in which first wave immigrants as major beneficiaries from property distributions and Turkish Cypriots among which were groups who did not benefit as much, were put in a relation of conflict. The undermining of the principle of equity and justice by the state when performing this large scale redistribution (Lacher & Kaymak 2005) can be argued to have furthered the activation of ethnicity in this relationship.

The third structural factor relating to the formation and preservation of immigrant communities found on the macro-level is the development of an ethnic division of labour. Post-division economic restructuring in the northern part of Cyprus had affected the immigrants’ position in the economy, who were officially brought to the islands’ north to build an agricultural workforce. Yet as they found themselves unable to make a living in a declining sector such as agriculture and more importantly they soon experienced being largely left outside of the boosting public sector, which was becoming the dominant sector of employment in northern Cyprus. Whereas native Turkish Cypriots had become overrepresented in the public sector, the immigrants were left out largely because of their human capital, i.e. low levels of education, but also because of their lack of social capital. In this sense it can be argued that, what had been created was an ethnic division of labour, that confined immigrants from Turkey to relatively less secure and lower paid jobs in the private sector.

In the cultural context on the other hand, the construction of a Cypriotist culture was
identified as primarily efficacious in the formation and reinforcement of immigrants’ communities. ‘Cypriotism’ entailed the exclusion and othering of Turkish immigrants in general and immigrants of the first wave in particular. In so doing immigrant groups were defined from the outside collectively and homogeneously as different; and through the process of so called negative stereotyping as culturally inferior, uneducated, dirty, and even criminal (see Erhürman 2006).

These issues were reflected at the meso and the micro-levels as well, so that immigrant groups’ community formation was affected by their experiences of discrimination and othering after their settlement in the place of destination in the northern part of Cyprus. It was argued, based on the in-depth interviews with immigrants in Bahçeli that the immigrants were exposed to 4 types of discrimination: These are related to their experiences of spatial segregation and discrimination by the state; their experiences of economic exclusion (i.e. exclusion from the Cypriot way of employment) and ethnic niche building; their political discrimination within the discourse of Cyprus conflict; and their experiences of exclusion and othering in everyday relations with the native population. It was argued based on interviews with the first generation immigrants from Trabzon, that whereas spatial segregation was the first discriminatory act towards the immigrants, it was to a significant extent also voluntary, then although spatial segregation is often seen as undermining immigrants’ integration into the society, as the arguments above demonstrate, these may alternatively be understood by the immigrants themselves, as mediating the alienating experience of migration and the related feeling of ‘loss of home’. Thus all-migrant-spaces like the Bahçeli village, while contributing to the reproduction of migrant communities, provide a sense of integrity and wholeness to the immigrants. On the other hand, structural obstacles to economic mobility and a precarious state, were found to be especially important in the production and reproduction of ethnic communities, which gave rise to immigrants’ ethnic niche building. In the case of Bahçeli village it was revealed that the immigrants were largely excluded from the better paid and more secure civil service employment. This gave rise to, as was argued by the villagers themselves, the concentration of the villagers in the transportation and freight sector, in which many of the Bahçeli villagers worked as bus, taxi and long distance truck drivers, and/ or owned related private businesses. This ethnic niche was the result of a
combination of practical-evaluative as well as iterational components of agency, which took into account present conditions as well as patterns of past behaviour and human capital. Employment in the freight sector, since it largely involved being on the road to and from Turkey, further strengthened ties with place of origin through continuous first-hand contact. Furthermore, immigrants’ exclusion from the prospects of a unified Cyprus through the discourse of “settlers” and through not being able to cross the borders to the southern side and not being issued Cyprus republic passports was found to be further reinforcing community boundaries, since these provided the immigrants with impaired means and sense of belonging to the island. Similar was found to be true regarding ethnic encounters between the immigrants and the indigenous population. Immigrants of the first generation as well as their children who were interviewed had declared having the perception of being different and even the disliked ‘other’.

Immigrants’ transnationalism, it was argued, can also be linked to immigrant community building and preservation. In this regard it can be argued that transnational agency of the immigrants constantly reproduce and reinforce communities’ ties and relations with their places of origin. In the case of Bahçeli many of the immigrants were found to be engaged in transnational activities, especially through participating in the above-mentioned ethnic niche, but also through regularly visiting their places of origin for vacations (place of origin of parents) and through owning houses and other properties in their towns/villages of origin. Migrant communities as well as transnational ways of being were, in the Bahçeli case especially concerning Trabzon immigrants, also constructed based on a “quest for return” (see Kaya 2012), i.e. through a projective agency, directed towards the future. It was argued in this sense that with homes in both lands immigrants could get, as close as possible, to return migration without the actual permanent return. This prevalence of myth of return, a concept not compatible with the ‘settler’ discourse used in the international arena to refer to immigrants from Turkey in northern Cyprus, was found to be higher among Trabzon immigrants. Whereas transnationalism was explained above as something based on practical-evaluative and projective dimensions of migrant agency, the iterational dimension of migrant agency, that is, the interest in preserving former social relations through ties with the community of origin (see Bakewell, Haas & Kubal 2011) is especially discernible in the
across-borders marriage patterns of the immigrants. Especially among the Trabzon community transnational ties with the place of origin were kept alive as a community strategy through the bringing of brides and bridegrooms from the place of origin. It was also revealed that transnationalism does not only matter during the life-span of the immigrants. Indeed, as the field research showed, it was possible for immigrants to have locality specific preferences for burial practices. Whereas there were some cases, in which the deceased person had allegedly demanded that his/her grave would be in Trabzon, there were also many graves in Bahçeli belonging to the deceased relatives of the immigrants. Transnational burial practices were not observed among Mersin immigrants.

Last but not the least it was revealed that identification exclusively with Turkey was almost not present among the immigrants in Bahçeli village, and although there were some affective elements in the feelings towards the country of origin, it was found that these were rather in the form of feelings of affection towards the area/town/village of origin. On the other hand, many of the immigrants defined their attachment to Cyprus over material and instrumentalist reasons, by for instance regarding their living in Cyprus and making a living in the island as the very proof of belonging to Cyprus rather than to Turkey. Whereas identification with Turkey entailed affective elements of emotion, a reference to past memories and so on, identification with Cyprus was rather based on instrumentalist reasons and so belonged to the practical-evaluative component of agency. In other words, the interview questions regarding ‘self-identification’ of migrants revealed that the migrants saw themselves as ‘Cypriots’ mostly on ‘practical’ rather than ‘ideational’ grounds.

At this point, it can be argued that although this thesis endeavoured to provide a holistic picture of migration and long term settlement of immigrants in the receiving context regarding the case of Bahçeli village, as the remarks above show, it also provided important clues regarding the existence of differential patterns. Field research had firstly revealed in this regard, that there existed important clues on gender related differences at many stages of migration and settlement. Firstly, it was found that women were likely to be less involved in decision-making processes regarding migration. This was identified as contrary to the suggestions of the New Economics of Labour Migration Theory, which assumes that
migration decisions are made in relatively harmonious households. Taking the findings of this study into consideration, it must be emphasised that households and families consist of gendered hierarchical social relations of power. Similarly, gender and generation related differences in the community experience of the immigrants were also revealed in the case of Bahçeli. Women’s experiences of the spatial isolation of the village was found to be reinforced by patriarchal gender relations. Whereas most of the first generation women, unlike their husbands did not work or socialise outside the village, second generation women also found it hard to overcome the spatial and social barriers of the village in their everyday lives. Furthermore, the deprivation of the village of numerous social services like health and child care put an extra burden on women. It was revealed in this respect that this increased their dependency on their husbands and other men (and sometimes women) as well as contributing to the perpetuation of this dependency, since many women were denied of educational rights and/or from inclusion in the labour force due to the factor of ‘distance’. There was also evidence regarding differential community experiences of generations. It was revealed in this sense, that whereas the first-generation was simultaneously tied to Cyprus and their places of origin in Turkey, especially through owning second houses and other properties which they regularly visited, the second-generation was less involved in these practices. Although they did also visit the place of origin of their parents they did so less often and for shorter periods at a time. The latter group was actually found to be quite heterogeneous in this respect, and although many of them did not have an intention of return to the place of origin of parents, they viewed Turkey as the primary holiday destination. This difference was also reflected in the transnational ways of belonging: the second generation villagers tended not to identify with Turkey to the extent that their parents did. In explaining their primary identification with Cyprus they pointed out to their lack of memories in Turkey, which was perceived to be an essential part of identification and belonging. There were some exceptions to this, which indicates, as was identified in pertinent literature, the potential of second generation to lead transnational lives as well as to develop transnational ways of belonging, that is, conscious identification with the place of origin of parents. These exceptions comprised such cases, in which the second generation villagers had spent prolonged time living in Turkey, due to education, work etc. Yet, disregarding the exceptions, the lack of primary identification with the place of origin of parents cannot be
argued to secure for the second generation a more certain feeing identity. Since identities too are constructed in complex interaction between structure, culture and agency (of not only immigrants but also the native population), the second generation villagers too, when not more intensely compared to their parents, had indicated that they perceived themselves to be trapped in-between.

To conclude, few arguments of this thesis could be underlined. Most importantly, this thesis had argued that a genuine acknowledgement of complexity, multi-dimensionality and multifactoriality of migration was long due and this could only be done when this multi-faceted character of the issue could be incorporated into its theorisation. The critical realist framework adopted had served this purpose and allowed an integrative approach by incorporating multiple levels of aggregation into the analysis as well as a variety of factors into the explanation. It also looked into the consequences as well as the causes under the same coherent meta-theoretical framework.

By investigating structures, culture and agency, in accordance with the critical realist framework it took into account not only economic-structural but also cultural as well as agential factors (operating at different levels of aggregation) as real causal factors rather than mere contingencies. Then as, Elder-Vass (2010) argues leaning on Bhaskar “[a]ctual events […] are not produced by single causes as the covering law model suggests, but by a complex interaction of the causal powers of the entities involved. Outside the closed systems of the laboratory, multiple causal powers constantly interact with each other” (ibid: 47). In this regard the repeatedly underlined argument within this thesis was that, it is impossible to explain migration through economic structural factors alone. Thus, it was argued, an explanation of migration, for instance, with reference to supply and demand for labour within the framework of push–pull theories of migration, would at the best be reductionist and incomplete. Such an explanation disregards the historical-political context of the migratory wave at hand, ignores the roles played by further social and cultural factors in its causation and renders agencies of the migrants’ invisible.

This thesis also showed that an analytical differentiation between macro, meso and micro-
levels of aggregation was beneficial, since it provided a systematic direction for the analysis. In this process it was recognised that only when the *interplay* of all of these levels and factors partaking in the generative mechanisms at each level are taken into consideration and are carefully studied, can a complete analysis be made which is non-reductionist, non-determinist, multi-factorial and multi-dimensional. The critical realist framework constructed in this thesis was capable of explaining a case of migration in which economic reasons and economic rationality was not necessarily predominant at all levels of aggregation. It was argued that, a viable explanation must take into account the main context of nation-state building at the macro-level in the period concerned. The macro-level of the case under scrutiny was therefore, as was shown, predominated by within the Turkish nationalism proliferating ideas on nation and ethnicity. The predominance of economic motivations among the immigrants (micro-level) on the other hand, does not disprove this thesis, since immigrants’ motivations alone could not have generated this migration wave from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus. Agential factors are but only one of the causal factors, along with structural and cultural ones, which had entered into a complex interaction so as to generate the first migration wave to northern Cyprus in general and the movement to Bahçeli in particular.

Thus this particular case of migration studied here, was illustrative of the phenomenon that causal mechanisms operating at different levels of aggregation may be different and even contradictory. The multiplicity of causal mechanisms – the predominance of cultural factors in the macro-level causal mechanisms and the predominance of economic factors in the micro-level causal mechanisms – is explainable in terms of the critical realist notion of “stratification” which denotes the division of social reality into different emergent levels. It is so anticipated that emergent properties of the macro-level are not present at the meso and/or micro-levels. On the other hand, it can be argued that the macro-level must have primary position in the explanation, then without the immigration policy constructed mutually by the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot states, it would not have been possible for the immigrants themselves to take up the migration movement to the island. Hence a multi-dimensional and multifactorial outlook is necessary in the explanation of the case under scrutiny, and involves the taking into consideration of the cultural factors in addition to economic-structural factors.
in emigration and immigration generating mechanisms.

Arising from the highly political nature of agriculture, that is, its immanent relation to land ownership and control, and the military connotations thereof, it is not all that startling, that an official demand for an “agricultural workforce” is accompanied by important political ambitions which were identified in this thesis. It can be argued moreover that this disproportionately large amount of territory and the economic resources contained within it - among which were many agricultural lands and gardens- left at the disposal of Turkish Cypriots after Turkish military operations, established the physical means for the facilitation of this migratory movement. The appropriation of these economic resources, coupled with the seizure of the opportunity of self-governance and the prospect of non-dependence on Greek-Cypriots regarding social division of labour and political power were identified as being among the motivations of the Turkish Cypriot side in its quest for increasing the population and repopulation of the territories in the northern part of the island. Thus the dubious call for an agricultural workforce, through which the already declining village economies could apparently not be revived, need to be treated cautiously when one is making statements about the causation of the migration wave under scrutiny. Rather, the first wave of migration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus need to be understood within the framework of what Arslan (2012) refers to as the “Turkish-Cypriot nationalist drive toward state-building” (ibid: 120), which was present even before the 1974 partition.

Moreover, the investigation of the consequences of this migration case, as part of a holistic explanation of migration, brought to the fore that social change, as is underlined by critical realist theoreticians, always entails unforeseen and unintended consequences (see Archer 1995). In this respect, ethnicity, this thesis argued, is not only related to the causation of the first migration wave to northern Cyprus, but is also linked to the consequences thereof. Whereas the state’s intention was to create an ethnically homogeneous Turkish nation-state in the island’s north, separate from Greek Cypriots, through boosting the Turkish Cypriot population and through populating the territories gained by military operation; unintended consequences of agential action unfolding within contextual structural and cultural circumstances were effective in the emergence of persisting migrant communities, through which the immigrants were incorporated into the Turkish Cypriot society. In other words due
to the complex nature of social reality, ethnic boundaries were erected between the
immigrants and the indigenous population despite the ideas and preconceptions of the
corporate actors about the ethnic and national unity between the two. It can be argued
therefore that ethnicity, especially functioning as a means of competition over scarce
resources, did not result in a harmonious Turkish nation in the islands’ north as was supposed
by politicians, but rather, in a still continuing competition, conflict and socio-economic
inequality.

Thus through this multi-dimensional framework, the impact of ethnicity in the case of
northern Cyprus, could be differentiated in relation to its repercussions in different levels of
aggregation: between the significance of ethnicity at the macro-level, as part of a nation-state
ideology and at the micro-level, as part of everyday interaction (see Brubaker 1998). Ideas on
nation and nationalism and how they played a role in both causation and the consequences of
migration, sheds light to the social construction of the former and their ever fluid character.
In the light of the above nationalism too can be identified as a dynamic concept which is still
in constant motion, shaping the relationships of the island’s inhabitants with each other in
particular ways throughout history. In this sense it can be underlined once again that the
complexity and multi-dimensionality of social reality which is reflected in this case can be
understood as one in which its underlying ‘masculine rationality’ proved to be not so straight
forward. Owing to the failure of this militarist/ masculine rationality this migration case is
one in which nationalist assumptions of nation and ethnicity quickly broke into pieces in
practice.

This conclusion cannot be left at this point, without pointing at some limitations of this study.
These could also be regarded as issues which require urgent further research. Firstly, this
study was planned and executed as a case study research, which focused on an all-migrant
village. In so doing, it revealed important data especially regarding the issue of immigrants’
community building and preservation, in which the spatially segregated settlement of the
former was identified as an important factor partaking in related generative mechanisms. Yet,
further research may enable a better understanding of this issue by comparing and contrasting
the findings of this study with data collected on migrants’ community building (or its non-
existence) in a mixed village or a mixed settlement area. Such an analysis could make a valuable contribution by highlighting the importance of governments’ settlement policies, and so can also guide future policy making in this regard.

Secondly, this study focused on the first migration wave only, which was characterised by immigrants’ property acquisition upon settlement. In the second and the third waves of migration from Turkey to northern Cyprus, the immigrants were not allocated properties. In this respect it may be interesting to compare immigrants’ community building experiences and patterns of self-identification in the different immigration waves to the island’s north, concentrating on the effects of the factor of property allocation. This will enable to find out, whether the particularities of the first wave, especially the house and land allocations it entailed, would make a difference in the patterns of incorporation, feelings of belonging and patterns of transnationalism of the immigrants.

Last but not the least, the author reckons that research on migration and immigrants from Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus is still in its infancy. Further research on various topics in this field is required for a better understanding. For instance more extensive research on immigrants’ incorporation and community building in the Turkish Cypriot society (ie. through a representative sample for all first wave immigrants) is necessary so as to be able to arrive at more generalizable knowledge. Moreover, although the present study could arrive at some clues regarding gender and generation specific patterns of community building, it was beyond its scope to make generalizable statements on these issues. In this sense further research can make these patterns more discernible and facilitate the integration of these into theory building. And most importantly, further research is needed not only to better understand and explain issues about immigrants from Turkey in northern Cyprus which were discussed in this thesis but also many others that were not.
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**WEBSITES**

Cyprus 44 website: http://www.cyprus44.com/culture/flag.asp

Marxist Internet Archive:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm018

PRIO Cyprus Website for Internal Displacement In Cyprus: http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net/

Private Website devoted to Kalograia Village: www.kalograiavillage.org

TRNC Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation Statistics and Research Department website: http://www.devplan.org


TRNC Presidency website: http://www.kktcb.org
APPENDICES

A - INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

1. DEMOGRAPHICS

Age
Gender
Occupation
Education
Place of origin (own/of parents)

2. ARRIVAL IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

Can you describe your arrival in northern Cyprus (the background conditions, circumstances, the act of migration, the arrival in the Famagusta harbour)?
How old were you when you arrived in Cyprus
With who did you arrive (which family members, relatives took part in the migration)?
Who made the migration decision? (if the age is appropriate and if the person himself/herself didn’t make the migration decision, ask whether s/he had objected).
Did you come to Cyprus by registering your names in the migrant lists or via other means?
(When applicable) can you describe your first impressions of Cyprus, your feelings when you arrived in the Famagusta harbour?
Can you describe your arrival in the Bahçeli village?
What were your initial feelings, your first impressions, etc.?
Describe settling into your house?
What did you think, feel? What did you like dislike?

3. EXPERIENCES OF EXCLUSION I: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCES

What did you do for living in Turkey?
What did/do you do for living in Cyprus? (Occupations, side jobs)
How satisfied are you with your living conditions
Do you have business plans, for yourself, your children? (Try to find out if the participant wants to/wants his or her children to get employed in the public sector).
What kinds of problems do immigrants from Turkey have in northern Cyprus?
What do you think of Turkish Cypriot governments’ policies in relation to the immigrants?
What do you expect from the politicians, governments, political parties in regards to your situation (political / economic situation) as an immigrant?
Are you a political party member here in Cyprus or in Turkey?

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4. EXPERIENCES OF EXCLUSION II: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL EXPERIENCES

Do you have native Turkish Cypriot friends? Do you have Turkish Cypriot family friends that you regularly visit?
How well do you get along with native Turkish Cypriots?
(When applicable) How are/were your relationships in the school, at work, in social life?
(When applicable) What are your preferences when choosing your marriage partner/partner for your children? (Do you prefer a partner from Cyprus; Turkey in General, specifically your place of origin, or otherwise)?
(When applicable) would you marry a Turkish Cypriot? How would your family react if you did (would they accept your decision/be unhappy, not accept)?
What do you think about the later immigrants from Turkey?

5. TRANSNATIONALISM & MYTH OF RETURN

How often do you travel to Trabzon/Mersin/Turkey?
What do you do there when you visit (business, visiting family, harvesting)?
Did you make an investment in the place of origin (bought a house, property etc.)?
Are there close family members of yours in the place of origin (Trabzon/Mersin)
Do you have plans of return?
Did some of your family/acquaintances return migrate? Why?
(When applicable) Do your children wish to return to Trabzon/Mersin? Do you want them to?
In retrospect are you happy that you immigrated to northern Cyprus?

6. IDENTIFICATION

How do you define yourself? (Turkish Cypriot, Turkish, from Turkey, from Trabzon/Mersin?)
Do you feel that you belong to Cyprus/to the Cypriot society? (Ask for an explanation).
Do you identify with Cyprus? Do you feel that Cyprus is your homeland?
(When there is an indication in this direction) In what ways are you similar/not similar to ‘native’ Turkish Cypriots? Did you your children become similar to ‘native’ Turkish Cypriots? In what ways have they become similar?
# B - INTERVIEWEE DEMOGRAPHICS

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SECOND GENERATION (with parent(s) from Trabzon)
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**SECOND GENERATION (with parent(s) from Mersin)**

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Map 1: Map of Cyprus and location of Bahçeli village.

Map 2: Location of Bahçeli.
**Image 1:** Kalograia 1973.
Source: http://www.kalograivillage.org/page/photo-gallery-notes

**Image 2:** Kalograia Primary School 1965.
Source: http://www.kalograivillage.org/page/photo-gallery-notes
Image 3: Bahçeli Mosque converted from orthodox Agios Mamas Church, picture taken March 2015.

**Image 5:** The view from the road to the village, picture taken March 2015.

**Image 6:** View of the old school building, picture taken March 2015.
Image 7: Old factory building 1, picture taken March 2015.

Image 8: Old factory building, picture taken March 2015
Image 9: View from the village, bus stop, picture taken March 2015

Image 10: View from the village, picture taken March 2015.
Image 11: View of the village, picture taken March 2015.

Image 12: View from the village, picture taken March 2015.
**Image 13:** View from the village, picture taken March 2015.

**Image 14:** View from the village, an old demolished house, picture taken March 2015.
**Image 15:** View from the village, the co-operative building currently used as grocery store, picture taken March 2015.

**Image 16:** View from the village, picture taken March 2015.

Devlet desteği ile gerçekleşen bu göç dalgasının başlatıldığı 1975 yılının sonlarına doğru göçmenlerin planlı bir şekilde Türkiye’de önceden belirlenmiş bölge ve yörelerden adaya seçilerek getirildiği göç programı durdurulmuş ve Kuzey Kıbrıs’a göç hakkı protokolde ön görülü şartlara uyup uymadığına bakılmaksızın isteyen herkes için geçerli kılınmıştır. Dolayısıyla Türkiye’nin birçok bölgesinde gelen değişik gruplar bu göç dalgasına dâhil olmuş ve adaya protokol göçmenleri ile aynı haklara sahip olanlara göre yerleştirilmiştir.

Bu anlamda ev, iş yeri ve (çiftçilere) toprak iskanı hakkı protokol dışında KTFD vatandaşlığı verilmiştir.


"[Politikacilar]


Bu çalışmanın ana sorusalı, üçüncü bölümde, ‘göçün çok boyutluluğu nasıl kavramsallaştırılabilir?’ sorusu ile ifade edilmiştir. Bu soruyu cevaplamak için ise iki adımdan oluşan bir yaklaşım geliştirilmiştir. Buna göre ilk adımda, göçün sebepleri
(motivasyonlar, niyetler ve göçün başlaması ile ilgili diğer nedensellik faktörleri) üzerine yoğunlaşılırlarırken; ikinci adımda ise bu göç dalgasının etkileri sorgulanır ve özellikle göçmenlerin Bahçeli’de uzun vadeli yerleşimlerinin esas neticesi olan etnik cemaat (ethnic community) oluşturma veya bunları yeniden ürete sürecleri üzerinde durulur.

Bu tez, kullandığı eleştirel realist meta-teori yaklaşımın, göç olsunun hem genelde, hem de söz konusu özel vaka çerçevesinde ele alınıp incelenmesinde önemli araçlar sunduğunu öne sürer. Bu teorik çerçeve çalışmaların ikinci bölümünde geliştirilmiştir; ve göç kavramını ve bununla ilgili olan göçmen cemaatleri, ayrımılık ve katılma/eklemenme (incorporation), ulus aşırılık (transnationalism), etnisite ve kimlik kavramlarını yeniden ele alır ve uyarlar. Eleştirel realizm kuramının ana prensiplerini barındıran bu genel çerçeve göç fenomenini açıklamada ve incelemekte, göç konusunun çok boyutluğuna ve çok-faktöriyel oluşuna vurgu yaptığından büyük avantaj sağlar.


İkinci bölümde, ayrıca, konuyla ilgili literatürde geçen göç teorileri de eleştirel bir çekilde değerlendirilmeye çalıșılmıştır. Burada özellikle ‘Neo-klasik Ekonomi Teorileri’, ‘Yeni Göç

Dolayısıyla ana akım göç teorilerinin göç olgusunun etkilerini araştırmadaki bahsi geçen yetersizlikleri bu teorilerin göçü bütünülüklü bir şekilde ele almalarına engel olur.


İkinci olarak yapı ve kültür arasındaki ikilik saysesinde, hem ekonomik-yapsal faktörler, hem de kültürel-fikirsel faktörlerin analizi yapılarak göçün çok faktörlü karakteri açıklanabilir. Böylece göç olgusuna kültürel bir yaklaşım geliştirilmesi mümkün olur. Hedberg (2004)’e göre bu yaklaşım ile ‘etnisite’ (ve milliyetçilik) olgusu göçün kavrumsallanmıştırmsında kendişine yer bulur. Ama bu, yapsal ve ekonomik faktörlerin önemsiz olduğu anlamına gelmez; göç olgusunu açıklarken sadece hegemonik iktisadi yaklaşımın tek doğru olarak kabul edilmemesi gerektiğini gösterir. Üçüncü olarak da iddia edilmiş ki, eleştirel realist...

olarak, göçmenlerin kimlik oluşturma sürecinde kimliklerin sürekli olarak durumsal ve kavramsal ihlallere göre şekillenmekte olduğu da göçmen cemaatleri ile ilintili bir husustur.


Bu göç dalgasına mezo düzeyden bakıldığında zaman, makro düzeydeki yapısal faktörlerin burada da rol oynadığı görülmür. Dolayısı ile Türkiye’de 1950’lerden itibaren tarımda gerçekleşen dönüşümler ve demografik gelişmeler sonucunda küçük köylülük ve küçük toprak sahipliğinin ortaya çıkmasıyla açığa çıkan bir işgücünün, özellikle bölgesel düzeyde
diş göçün gerçekleşmesine etken olduğu iddia edilebilir. Özellikle Karadeniz’den dışarıya gerçekleşen göçlere bu çerçeveden bakmak gerekir. Bu örnekte yer alan Karadeniz ve Mersin göçmenleri için geçerli olan bir de “göç kültürü” olgusu vardır. Buna göre bu bölgelerdeki insanların göç etme fikri ile önceden karşı扰乱 olmuşları veya hatta bunu benimsemeleri göçu kolaylaştırıcı etkenler arasındadır. Önemli olan hususlardan bir diğeri de bölgesel düzeyde, makro düzeyde etkin rol oynamış olan “soydaşlarımız” söylemine rastlanmanın ve özellikle Kıbrıs’ın kuzeyine Türkiye’nin kursal alanlardan yölenen göçleri buna (veya benzer milliyetçi etnik ve milli birlik söylemlerine) bağlamının (ender istisnalar dışında) pek mümkün olmadığını savunanlar olabilir.


Bu etnik işbölümünde göçmenler daha kötü maaşlı, daha az korunaklı, ve daha ağır çalışma şartlarına sahip olan özel sektörde iş sahibi olabilmislerdir. Bu koşullarda Bahçeli örneğinde olduğu gibi etnik nişler de oluşturulmuştur. Bahçeli örneğinde göçmenler, Trabzon grubu öncülüğünde geçmiş beşeri sermayelerini göz önünde tutarak taşımacılık sektöründe niş oluşturmuşlardır. Kültür alanda ise bir Kıbrışlılık kültürünün inşa süreci çerçevesinde uretilen göçmenleri dışlayıcı söylemler, göçmen cemaatlerinin oluşturulmasına ve güçlendirilmesine katkıda bulunmuştur. ‘Kıbrışlılık’ kimliği Türkiyeli göçmenleri homojen bir grup olarak kabul eden, dışlayıcı ve ötekleştiren bir söylemi de berberinde getirmişlerdir. Bu söylemlerde Türkiyeli göçmenler farklı, kültürel olarak daha aşağı, eğitimsiz, kirli ve hatta suç yaştırmaktan insanlar olarak inşa edilmişlerdir.

Meso ve mikro düzlemler incelendiğinde dışlanmaya maruz kalan göçmenlerin aynı zamanda ulus aşırı yaşam tarzları ve adiyet şekilleri ile de göçmen cemaatlerini yeniden uretikleri görülmektedir. Bahçeli’deki göçmenler sadece yukarıda bahsedilen etnik niş daha dâhil olarak değil aynı zamanda, son yıllarda artan bir şekilde hem Türkiye’de hem de Kıbrıs’ta ev (ve başka taşınmaz mal) sahibi olarak da ulus aşırı yaşam şekilleri geliştirmişlerdir. Özellikle Trabzon göçmenleri için geçerli olan başka bir husus da bu ulus aşırı yaşam şekillerinde bir

Bu tez Bahçeli örneğini ele alarak göç olgusunu bütünlüklü bir şekilde anlatmaya çalışılmış olmasına rağmen, göç ve göçmenlik deneyimlerinde farklı örüntüler bulunduğu dair de önemli ipuçları yakalamıştır. Bu örnek ötesinde özellikle, göç ve yerleşimin birçok aşamasında patriarkal sistem ve toplumsal cinsiyet faktöründen kaynaklanan önemli farklılıklar olduğu görülmektedir. Bu anlamda öncelikle kadınların göç kararı alınırken erkekler gibi ve onlar kadar etkin oldukları gözlemlenmiştir. Dolayısı ile, Yeni Göç Ekonomisi teorilerinin aksine göç kararlarının harmoni içerisinde var olan hane halkları tarafından verilen kararlar olduğu gösterilmiştir. Bu anlayışın sonuçlarına dayanarak altı çizilmelidir ki, hane halkları ve aileler hâli hâli gerçekçi güç ilişkileri barındırır ve bu çalışma sonucunda şu noktaları ele alalım:  

- Kadınların köyün mekânsal izolasyonunu deneyimleme biçimlerinin ataerkil ilişkilerle belirlendiği görülmektedir. Bu bağlamda ilk nesil kadınların köyün dışına pek çıkmazken, ikinci nesil köylü kadınların da köyde yaşamaktan kaynaklanan sosyal ve mekânsal cemaat barierlerini aşmaları kolay olmamaktadır. Köydeki pek çok eksiklik (sağlık ve çocuk bakım gibi hizmetler olmayışı) kadınların üzerinde ek bir yük olmaktadır. ‘Nesil’ faktörünün de bazı konularda farklılık yaratan bir durum olduğu belirlenmiştir. Özellikle ilk nesil göçmenlerin ulus aşırı varoluş biçimleri ile aynı anda hem Türkiye’de hem de kuzey Kıbrıs’a bağlı oldukları...


Burada kurgulanış çok boyutlu çerçeve dâhilinde göçün sonuçlarının da incelenmesi ile ortaya çıkan bir diğer husus ise sosyal değişim ve amaçlanmayan/istenmeyen sonuçları olduğunu. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma etnisite olgusunun
E - CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION

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WORK EXPERIENCE

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Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAŻARIN

Soyadı : Talat
Adı : Ayşenur
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): Multi-Dimensionality of Migration: The Case of Post-1974 Immigrants in the Bahçeli Village in the Northern Part of Cyprus

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐

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